The reality of “Revitalizing Health and Safety

The reality of ‘‘Revitalizing Health and Safety’’

Clive Smallman*

Judge Institute of Management Studies, University of Cambridge, Trumpington Street,

Cambridge CB2 1AG, UK

Received 13 November 2000; received in revised form 30 April 2001; accepted 15 June 2001

Abstract

Problem: Workplace health and safety remains an important international socio-

economic issue, but the progressive declines in reported incidents may be slowing. The

British Government has responded by launching a new policy initiative aimed at

‘‘Revitalizing Health and Safety’’ by establishing targets for improvement, strategies,

and a series of action points, mainly targeting employers and organizational issues.

This paper critically assesses the realities of implementing this policy with respect to

the scientific base for each of the strategies. Method: Literature meta-analysis; analysis

of policy. Results: Empirically proven determinants of workplace health and safety

provide baselines for compensation and conditions of work, workforce characteristics,

workplace characteristics, health and safety environment, political and economic

factors, and industry characteristics. Support for different policy elements is varied and

there are some significant gaps. Summary: An impressive body of research was found

that offers a firm foundation for future developments. However, the need for work that

is interdisciplinary, ordered, and collaborative is pressing. The need to move away from

elegant but simplistic pictures of occupational health and safety (OHS) management

practice, and to reflect true complexity is imperative. The reality of health and safety at

work is that it is an issue that is taken lightly by those who do not practice or research

safe and healthy working, and a serious issue for victims or relatives of victims of

shoddy management. It remains one of the bastions of inequality of work worldwide.

Impact on industry: The intent of governments in attempting to reinvigorate the

suppression of workplace injury and illness is motivated by both social and economic

imperatives. Motivation for organizations is not fully understood as there is no obvious

business imperative. If organizations can further understand and provide a scientific

justification for investment in OHS management, then governments’ task will be made

easier. By proving the value of OHS to management, we will demonstrate that

0022-4375/01/$ – see front matter D 2001 National Safety Council and Elsevier Science Ltd.

All rights reserved.

PII: S0022 -4375 (01 )00065 -2

* Tel.: +44-1223-766592; fax: +44-1223-339701.

E-mail address: [email protected] (C. Smallman).

www.elsevier.com/locate/jsr

Journal of Safety Research

32 (2001) 391–439

organizations continue to present considerable hazards to their employees. D 2001

National Safety Council and Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.

Keywords: Health and safety policy; Literature review; Research agenda

1. Introduction

Workplace injury and illness is an international economic issue. In the

United States and in Britain there is statistical and anecdotal evidence to

suggest that the long-term 20th century trend toward safer workplaces has

slowed and may have reached a plateau (Dorman, 1996; Fairris, 1998; Health

and Safety Commission, 2000). Notwithstanding the severe social implications

of this stagnation, the economic cost is considerable, and in 1998 work-related

injuries cost the United States US$125.1 billion (1.5% of GDP—National

Safety Council, 1999). By comparison, annual costs to the British economy

are between £14.5 and £18 billion (2.1% and 2.6% of GDP—Health & Safety

Executive, 1999).

The British Government’s solution to tackling this issue was to announce

the Revitalizing Health and Safety initiative in March 1999. The government’s

aims were to reinvigorate the health and safety agenda, to identify new

approaches to improving workplace health and safety performance (particu-

larly in smaller employers), to ensure that health and safety regulation

remains compatible with trends in the development of industry and com-

merce, and to ensure coherence between health and safety legislation and

other government programs.

At the heart of occupational health and safety (OHS) policy in Britain sits the

Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 (HSWA). This body of law:

. . .provides for goal setting law, taking account of levels of risk and what is

‘‘reasonably practicable,’’ with the overriding aim of delivering good

regulations that secures decent standards and protection for everyone.

Health and Safety Commission, 2000, p. 8

The Act effectively delegates responsibility for proposing new law and

standards to the Health and Safety Commission to the Health and Safety

Executive, the Act delegates responsibility for enforcing health and safety

legislation, investigating accidents and complaints, conducting research, and

providing information and advice. Local government also shares some

measure of responsibility for the enforcement of health and safety law in

retail, entertainment, and office premises.

In July 1999, the government and the Health and Safety Commission

initiated a consultation on the subject of health and safety, seeking contribu-

tions from stakeholders. From the 1,500 responses, the Health and Safety

Commission developed the Revitalizing Health and Safety Strategy Statement,

which is the first major policy statement on workplace health and safety in

C. Smallman / Journal of Safety Research 32 (2001) 391–439392

Britain since the HSWA over 25 years ago. The stated aim of this new

approach was to exploit innovations in pursuit of ‘‘adding value’’ to the

current system, while not threatening its overall balance. For example, the

strategy presents the first ever health and safety targets for Britain (Health and

Safety Commission, 2000, p. 8):

� to reduce the number of lost workdays due to work-related injury and

illness by 30% per 100,000 workers by 2010;� to reduce the incidence rate of fatal and major injury accidents by 10%

by 2010;� to reduce the incidence rate of cases of work-related illness by 20%

by 2010;� to achieve half of the improvement under each target by 2004.

These objectives are operationalized in a 10-point strategy statement. The

emphasis throughout is that improving workplace health and safety makes good

business sense. The government aims to lead by example through demonstrating

its own commitment to health and safety in the public sector. Furthermore, in

attributing health and safety failures largely to ‘‘poor management and ignorance

of good practices’’ (Health and Safety Commission, 2000, p. 19), the essential

role of education at all levels is stressed most strongly. The strategies are

supported by 44 action points focused around the themes of the business case,

leadership, partnership, and dealing with failures (Rose, 2000).

This paper critically assesses this policy with respect to empirical research on

health and safety management. The aim is to evaluate the extent of the theoretical

base that will support the implementation of the policy and to propose a research

agenda that will fill revealed gaps.

While this work is orientated around Britain, it is germane elsewhere, since

Britain has had considerable success in reducing OHS incidents in comparison

with other developed countries.1 The successful implementation of the British

Government’s policy should offer lessons for other nations, as will a science-

based critique of this policy and the literature.

The study begins by outlining the method used and then moves on to a

meta-analysis of past research on workplace health and safety, synthesizing a

composite model of the current orthodoxy. The policy implications of this

1 One study found that, over the period 1991–1995, fatality rates in Denmark, Finland, and the

Netherlands were greater than that in Britain, but less than that in the USA (Government Statistical

Service, 1997). Germany’s rate equaled America’s, but France, Belgium, Ireland, Spain, Italy, and

Portugal (in ascending order) killed more workers per 100,000 employees or self-employed than the

USA. Sweden and Ireland had lower nonfatal injury rates than Britain in 1993–1994. Denmark was

marginally worse than Britain and better than the USA. Each of the remaining major (and lesser)

European states has a worse rate than America. Portugal again had the worst rate. Whatever the

weaknesses of comparing this data, the picture of fatality, injury, and illness across Europe strongly

suggests the presence of a marked economic, not to say social, impact. The picture in the developing

world is worse and almost certainly understated (Jeyaratnam, 1992; Shrivastava, 1992, pp. 20–28).

C. Smallman / Journal of Safety Research 32 (2001) 391–439 393

model are then evaluated; leading to the conclusion with a critique of the

literature and the policy and by proposing a research agenda, which addresses

the shortfall between the current policy and the reality of revitalizing work-

place health and safety.

2. Method

In order to facilitate the policy analysis, a model was developed of the

theoretical determinants of OHS performance from the literature. An analysis of

the British Government’s Revitalizing Health and Safety Strategy Statement

against this framework is then presented. In both phases of the study, content

analysis was employed in order to draw out essential issues.

2.1. Meta-analysis of the literature

A significant issue for OHS researchers is the breadth and depth of the

literature on the subject, which is spread across several disciplines.2 A search of

the BIDS Social Science Citation Index, Proquest and Elsevier Direct databases

revealed some 280 substantive journal publications relating to the management of

OHS. For the purposes of this research, 55 articles from this literature were

identified using the following criteria:

(a) Articles had to present substantive, well-specified, and (above all else)

empirical content focused upon workplace determinants of OHS;

(b) They had to have been published in peer-reviewed journals or in a

monograph regularly cited by other authorities (e.g., Dawson, Willman,

Clinton, & Bamford, 1988a);

(c) Be published after 1990, except (again) where they are regularly cited by

other authorities.

Of the 55 selected, 20 were published in various journals focused upon

employee (industrial) relations or the economics of employee relations, 16 were

published in the Journal of Safety Research,3 8 were published in Safety Science,

and 5 were published in general management journals. Of the remainder, three

2 Studies of OHS fall broadly into ergonomics, law, sociology, occupational psychology,

employee relations, safety management, and occupational medicine. In this piece, I do not deal with

the occupational medicine (e.g., I deliberately excluded work-related stress from my searches, since

an early search revealed that I would have been overwhelmed by studies in this area) or ‘‘technical’’

aspects of safety management (sometimes termed safety science, e.g., ergonomics). These literatures

are highly technical and rarely report upon managerial or organizational behavior aspects of OHS.

Nor do I deal with directly with law, although its effects upon behavior are an input to the

development of models.3 I should point out that the selection of articles was made before I had targeted any particular

journal with a view to publishing my results!


articles were published in the same research monograph (Dawson et al., 1988a),

and the other three were published in journals focused upon risk. A summary of

these empirical studies is in Appendices A and B.

The content of each study was analyzed, identifying the nature of sample, the

country of origin, analytical techniques used, dependent variables, significant

independent variables, and main findings.

2.2. Analysis of policy

It is important to distinguish between policy analysis (the investigative and

consultative processes that leads to the development of policy) and the analysis of

policy (how effective is policy or how likely it is to be effective). This study falls

into the latter category, although it may feed into the former.

Each of the strategy points and their supporting actions were addressed,

aligning them with the elements of the model derived in the first phase. The intent

was to identify how much theoretical support for the strategies existed and to

identify gaps in knowledge.

3. Past research

3.1. Nature of samples

There is a bias toward the individual as the primary unit of analysis:

� Thirty-four studies evaluate the health and safety risk of individual

employees.� Three studies only mention interviewing managers.� The remaining studies focus on employee groups or are not specific.

More particularly, the bias is toward employees (workers) and the identifica-

tion of the factors that lead to their injury or illness.

Apparently, very little work explores the attitudes of management or senior

management to health and safety. Yet, Hayes, Perander, Smecko, and Trask

(1998) find that improving the safety record of a firm should include attention

to management’s role in safety (interestingly this researcher found no research

that evaluates safety managers’ attitudes either). Fuller (1999) finds that

managers’ responsibility for safety has to be fitted in with all of their other

responsibilities. This aligns with Dawson et al.’s (1988a) finding that the

problem associated with health and safety is that it must be traded off against

other management matters. Gill (1993) finds that the push for improvement in

safety is more likely to come from employee representatives than from

management. Hofmann and Sletzer (1998) find that supervisors’ openness to

upward communication about safety issues sends a strong signal to employees

about the degree to which their organization values safety. Notwithstanding


these findings, Smallman and John (in press) find broad (although not

statistically representative) support in British senior management in large firms

for linking health and safety with corporate performance.

From the point of view of organizational effects upon health and safety,

coverage has been effected at the work group, establishment (or workplace),

the firm, and industry levels. However, these studies again concentrate solely

upon the relationship between organizational structures and health and safety

risk. They do not look at the broader strategic picture of the organization.

Forty-four of the samples studied in the analyzed research do not specify

the size of the workplaces upon which their analyses are based.4 Fifteen

samples are taken from large organizations, and two each from medium-sized

and small organizations. This suggests that our knowledge of OHS manage-

ment in small and medium-sized enterprises is rather ‘‘thin.’’

The sectors from which samples are drawn are summarized in Table 1.5

Table 1 demonstrates a bias toward industry and manufacturing, particularly

high-risk industries. While OHS in these sectors remains important, as we move

to a different form of industrialization in the developed world, what are the OHS

implications of the so-called ‘‘new economy’’?

3.2. Country of origin

Of the examined studies, there are 27 US-based studies, 6 British, 6 Canadian,

4 Norwegian, 3 Australian, 3 Swedish, 1 German, 1 based in Hong Kong, 1

Indian, and 1 from Taiwan. Two comparative studies were evaluated, one covers

Australia and Britain, and the other covers 12 countries in the European Union.

The paucity of comparative work is probably attributable to differences in

health and safety legislation, and much of the American work focuses upon the

effects of the Occupational Safety and Health Act and its enforcement. None of

the comparative studies takes a view on organizational determinants or

‘‘national’’ cultural effects.

3.3. Analytical and methodological approach

In terms of dominant research design, there is a bias toward quantitative

techniques, based upon cross-sectional and occasionally longitudinal surveys,

and their evaluation through regression analysis and its variants.

Of qualitative techniques, only ethnographic content analysis is used, and

expressly in two studies only (Holmes, Gifford, & Triggs, 1998; Holmes,

Lingard, Yesilyurt, & De Munk, 1999). Dawson et al. (1988a) also apparently

make use of content analysis, but their formal approach is not specified.

4 The Commission of the European Communities identifies firms with less than 10 employees as

microenterprises, those with between 10 and 100 employees as small firms, those with between 100

and 250 employees as medium sized, and those with more than 250 employees as large.5 The number of samples exceeds 55 since several studies compared a number of sectors.


However, their development of case studies of health and safety, through a

mixture of interviewing, observation, and survey, is a comparative rarity.

Economic and psychological statistical modeling of individual behaviors,

based almost exclusively on primary or secondary data from self-completion

questionnaires, dominates the study of accident causation in the health and

safety literature. With the exception of Dawson et al. (1988a) and Nichols

(1997c), there is little in the way of a sociological study to fully explain

organizational behaviors that contribute to workplace injury or illness. Yet,

there is a lengthening strand of sociological and social psychological research

that uses qualitative analysis of systems failures to explain the causal

antecedents of disasters (e.g., Perrow, 1999; Sagan, 1993; Toft & Reynolds,

1997; Turner, 1976; Turner & Pidgeon, 1997). Nichols, albeit eloquently,

dismisses this body of work as ‘‘accounts of disasters’’ rather than ‘‘a

sociological theory of industrial injury,’’ on the grounds that it is too abstract

in its use of systems theory. However, surely disasters are industrial accidents

writ large? The organizational antecedents of both are similar; the outcomes

differ in scale only.

3.4. Dependent variables

Each of the empirical studies choose as their dependent variable full or

partial measures of the risk of injury in the workplace; they measure the

probability of injury, the severity of injury, some proxy for probability or

severity, or both. For example, injury rate is a direct measure of the

probability of injury; injury severity is a direct measure of severity; and

refusal to work is a proxy for risk of injury. The most frequently used

dependent variable is accident or injury rate (used in 26 studies), with safety

behaviors (including safety culture) employed in 12 studies. No study ties

safety with broader corporate performance. This study identified only one

organizational study that dealt explicitly with ill health (James, Lovato, &

Khoo, 1994).

Table 1

Nature of samples: sector

Sector Number of samples

Representative of industry in country of origin 20

Primary or utility 9

Nonspecific manufacturing industry 10

Construction 7

Chemicals 5

Health care 3

Civil aviation 1

Distribution 1

Retail 1

Students 1


3.5. Determinants of health and safety risk

The significant factors that influence injury risk, and to a much lesser extent

health risk, are many and diverse (see Table 2) and discussion of the more

significant issues follows.

3.5.1. Compensation and conditions of work

Some ‘‘flexible’’ employment practices, in particular subcontracting, have

been linked strongly to injury and illness (Blank, Andersson, Linden, & Nilsson,

1995; Nichols, Dennis, & Guy, 1995; Rebitzer, 1995). Contractors seem to suffer

higher rates of injury and illness due to a combination of:

� A lack of time and resources available for safety training.� The burden of liability lying with the contracting firm rather than the host.� Poor supervision by host firms, for fear of being found liable.

However, there is an apparent lack of understanding of the health and safety

implications of the growing number of alternative working arrangements.

Fernie and Metcalfe (1995) find that workplaces with ideal participation

practices are associated with relatively good financial performance, but

relatively poor performance on others measures (e.g., staff retention, absent-

eeism), and there may be a relationship here with injury and illness. Fuller

(1999) too develops a strong case for the role of employee participation in

developing effective safety management systems. Participation in returns

(rewards offered to promote commitment) is a matter of relatively heated

debate, particularly in its relationship to health and safety.

The relationship of pay to injury has been explained by the theory of

compensating wage differentials (Dorman, 1996; Viscusi, 1993), where

workers will accept more risk for more pay. This has been disputed on

the grounds that workers may have no choice in accepting high-risk work

because of an imperfect market for jobs (DeJoy, 1996; Dorman, 1996;

Nichols, 1997a). This links to political and economic factors.

3.5.2. Workforce characteristics

It is well established in the literature that different occupations carry

different levels of risk (Nichols et al., 1995; Williamson, Feyer, & Cairns,

1996). Much work has focused on high-risk groups, such those who work in

mining (Blank et al., 1995) and offshore (Rundmo, Hestad, & Ulleberg,

1998), although some revealing work has been done in exploring safety in

retail (Dawson, Willman, Clinton, & Bamford, 1988d).

Other research suggests that the age of employees is no guarantee of safety.

However, the age–injury rate relationship is complex, and is often contingent

upon the physical and technical environment in which workers operate

(Laflamme, 1996). Similarly, lengthy job tenure (or engagement rate) has

been found to equate to a lower propensity to injury (Dell & Berkhout, 1998).


There is less evidence to support the proposition that women are

generally less susceptible to workplace injury, although tentative support

Table 2

Major empirically proven determinants of occupational healthy and safety risk

Determinant groupa Determinantb Indeterminate

Association

with OHS

risk increases Decreases

Pay and conditions

of work

Wage replace rate or

sickness benefit

.

Degree of unionization .Walk around rights with

OHS inspectors

Pay .Proportion of manual workers .Physical working conditions .Working hours .Proportion of contract workers .Job stress and strain .Work intensity .

Workforce Safety values .characteristics Gender .

Occupation .Job tenure .Perceptions of hazard or risk .Age .Proportion of workforce

involved in production work

.

Workplace Firm size .characteristics Employee representation

and organization

.

Management organization

and control of OHS

.

Cooperation between workers

and supervisors

.

Capital intensity .Age of workplace .

Health and safety Management safety practices .environment Safety culture or climate .

Training .Lost day work rate .Supervisor safety .

Political and Number of inspections .economic factors Local unemployment rate .

Location .Industry Sector .

characteristics Rival firms adopting accident

prevention programs

.

a Determinant groups are listed in my subjective estimation of their importance within the

literature.b Determinants are listed in a crude rank order representing the number of times they occurred in

the research analyzed.


has been established both in workplace surveys (Nichols, 1997b) and in a

more general investigation of university students’ attitudes to safety (Crowe,

1995). Only indirect evidence exists in support of a link between ethnic

group and illness (James et al., 1994). The third acknowledged source of

workplace discrimination has apparently received no coverage; No work

was found that examines the relationship between disability and workplace

well-being.

3.5.3. Workplace characteristics

It is widely held that an inverse relationship exists between workplace size

(number of employees) and injury and illness (Nichols et al., 1995; Reilly,

Paci, & Holl, 1995). One explanation of this is that larger employers may

have better organization, have developed a greater awareness of OHS, have

higher rates of unionization, and better training (McVittie, Banikin, &

Brocklebank, 1997). Furthermore, there is a view that larger firms may have

more resources to deal both with the set-up and operational costs of

comprehensive health and safety arrangements (Nichols et al., 1995).

This latter issue links to workplace unionization and its significant impact

upon health and safety performance. The formal representation of employees

has been shown to have varying effects on health and safety-related issues

(Hebdon & Hyatt, 1998; Nichols et al., 1995; Reilly et al., 1995; Weil, 1991,

1992, 1999).

The level of technology in the workplace too has been shown to affect

propensity to injury and illness (Carriere, Dionne-Proulx, & Beauchamp,

1998; Lanoie & Trottier, 1998). However, the impact of broader manage-

ment-related issues that deal with the more commercial aspects of organiza-

tions (e.g., business strategy, competition, economic performance) on health

and safety has apparently received little attention in the literature.

3.5.4. Health and safety environment

Another established (if obvious) influence on well-being at work is the health

and safety environment within the organization itself. In particular, organiza-

tional ‘‘safety culture or climate,’’ originally a radical construct, is now a

significant element of the safety professionals’ armory (Clarke, 1999; Hofmann

& Sletzer, 1998).

The representation of the workforce with respect to health and safety is

another significant element of the organization health and safety environment

(Hebdon & Hyatt, 1998; Nichols et al., 1995; Rebitzer, 1995; Reilly et al., 1995;

Weil, 1999).

Training is another particularly strong interdisciplinary theme that runs through

extant theory on health and safety (Cox, Tomas, Cheyne, & Oliver, 1998;

DePasquale & Geller, 1999; Rebitzer, 1995). Yet management safety attitudes,

while intuitively critical in this area, remain woefully underresearched (Hayes

et al., 1998), except in the area of the supervision of contract workers in the

construction and chemical industries (Mayhew & Quinlan, 1997; Rebitzer, 1995).


3.5.5. The political economy of OHS

The nature, level, and enforcement of OHS legislation are recurrent themes in

the literature. Not surprisingly, it is a proven significant determinant of workplace

injury and illness (Bain, 1997; Gray & Jones, 1991; Hebdon & Hyatt, 1998;

Viscusi, 1986; Weil, 1991). Additionally, other wider economic factors have a

role to play, and unemployment rates, competition (leading to a production over

safety bias), and cost minimization all have proven effects on health and safety

(Adnett & Dawson, 1998).

In particular, the question of moral hazard (i.e., employees taking additional

‘‘sick’’ days because of the increased availability and level of sickness benefit

and insurance) receives heavy coverage in the literature (Fortin, Lanoie, &

Laporte, 1996; Lanoie, 1991; Ruser, 1991, 1998).

3.5.6. Industry effects

Some industries are inherently more risky than others (Maiti & Bhatta-

cherjee, 1999). Official statistics reveal the construction, extraction, and utility

supply and agricultural sectors had the highest levels of major injury in 1998/

1999 (Government Statistical Service, 1999). While the service sector remains

relatively low risk, the incidence of violence at work is a growing issue,

particularly in the health and transport sectors (Dalton, 1998).

3.5.7. Summary

Despite this impressive range of factors, none of the empirical studies under

consideration have taken a holistic view. No one has attempted to construct and test

a holistic model of how the essential characteristics of any organization (people,

strategies, technology, environment, structure, and culture) influence health and

safety risk. Furthermore, no one has firmly established a link between health and

safety performance and broader corporate performance. So, how can this body of

research support the British and other governments’ attempts to force health and

safety statistics through the structural ‘‘floor’’ they seem to have reached?

4. Revitalizing health and safety: scientific strategies?

This study now turns to the British Government’s 10-point strategy statement

that sets the framework for further action on workplace health and safety (Health

and Safety Commission, 2000, pp. 17–20). Looking at those points dealing with

workplaces (setting aside government leadership and education for the moment),

we assess the support that they each ‘‘enjoy’’ in the literature.

4.1. Work environment

The health and safety system needs to do more than just prevent work-related

harm. It must promote better working environments characterized by

motivated workers and competent managers. This will require a shift in focus


from minimum standards to best practice. In doing so we will make an active

contribution to the wider Government agendas of competitiveness, sustainability,

public health and social inclusion.6


The impact of work environment upon health and safety is well understood.

However, it is split into many parts under the guises of health and safety

environment, workplace characteristics (including management organization

and control), and compensation and conditions (worker motivation). None of

the empirical work found attempted to fully integrate these disparate elements,

although Hofmann, Jacobs, and Landy’s (1995) conceptual model hints at the

possibility of an effective synthesis at the macroorganizational, microorganiza-

tional, and individual levels.

At least part of the problem relates to a lack of analyses at the organizational

level and the interaction of work environment, health and safety performance,

and broader organizational performance.

Effective support of government policy on work environment will come

from continued research efforts into the effect of work environment upon health

and safety performance, and this is clearly important. However, as the state of

knowledge in this area approaches maturity (although it is clear that it may

have to be adapted to explain behaviors in new industries and organizational

forms), there is a clear need for interdisciplinary approaches that will deliver an

effective synthesis of work environment effects. Full support of this policy

requires the development of a comprehensive picture of work environment

effects, which the research community is well positioned to develop based upon

extant empirical work.

4.2. The workforce

The changing world of work means we must adjust our approach to health

and safety regulation. The health and safety system must complement the

government’s vision for a competitive, knowledge driven economy. We must

recognize and promote the contribution of a workforce that is ‘‘happy,

healthy and here’’ to productivity and competitiveness. This is a

workforce that understands its own responsibilities and benefits from a

strong health and safety culture.

Health and Safety Commission, 2000

Due to a variety of social and economic variables, the nature of work and

the workplace is changing. The need to adjust health and safety regulation

due to these changes is proven, at least in part (Appelbaum & Batt, 1994;

Levine, 1995).

One significant consequence of the changes is the emergence of ‘‘high

performance work systems,’’ which encourage employee empowerment and

6 The bold emphasis in each policy extract is the British Government’s.


shop floor participation (Appelbaum, Bailey, & Berg, 2000; Appelbaum & Batt,

1994; Levine, 1995). Such systems are proven to deliver competitive advantage

and benefit employees. Furthermore, the literature that describes them also

implies that health and safety has a role to play here, both as enabler and

performance indicator (stress is a particular issue in such systems of work).

However, if these work systems are encouraged, they require validation.

Outside of high performance work systems, which pertain mainly to

flexible mass production and analogous production or service forms (e.g.,

call centers), proof of the contribution that a ‘‘well workforce’’ makes to

organizational performance is limited. What exists is generally restricted to

quality of work life or affective well-being (Daniels, 2000). As it stands, of

the proven determinants of workplace health and safety risk in the empirical

work identified, the two largest groups do relate to employee characteristics,

and compensation and conditions of work. However, the literature again

suffers from a lack of integration. There are many different influences, but

the joint effects and interactions are seldom, if at all, explored. Furthermore,

none of the empirical work analyzed went on to evaluate the relationship

between competitive advantage, employee characteristics, compensation and

conditions of work, and workplace health and safety risk. No study mentioned

‘‘high performance work systems,’’ although one does indicate that the

successful implementation of internal controls of health, safety, and the

environment can be attributed to the perspective that well-being of employees

is crucial for the development in any facet of running a business (Nytro,

Saksvik, & Torvatn, 1998).

There is some scientific support available to help support the government in

implementing this element of their strategy. However, if the health and safety

system is to fully complement the government’s economic vision, then the

research community must itself complement work on high performance work

systems with projects that fully explore the role of and impact upon health and

safety within such systems. Notwithstanding this, their primary focus should

perhaps fall upon developing a better understanding of the relationship between

workplace well-being and competitive advantage.

4.3. Occupational health

Occupational health must remain a top priority if a real breakthrough is to be

made. The next significant step will be to take forward the Health and Safety

Commission’s new occupational health strategy. This will include better

compliance with health law, innovative arrangements to secure continuous

improvement, and having the right knowledge and skills available with

appropriate occupational health support.


Research into the management of occupational health issues in organizations

would be a cipher, were it not for the considerable ongoing effort into

understanding stress. Outside of this condition, our understanding of the


management of illness relies purely upon the outstanding work that is done in

occupational medicine. It is from here that supports for this strategy must come.

4.4. Small firms

There is a need for positive engagement of small firms, by promoting clear

models of how they too can reap the benefits of effective health and safety

management. We must commit to simplifying law that is over-complicated with

their needs in mind, without compromising standards and ensure . . . that small

firms are not deterred from seeking advice for fear of enforcement action.Wemust

redouble efforts to bring pressure to bear through the supply chain, particularly in

government procurement.


The economic case for (re)vitalizing OHS management in small- and medium-

sized enterprises (SMEs) is well established:

� Small firms have proportionately more accidents and injuries than

large firms.� Small firms employ more people in total than do large firms.

However, research into the management of OHS in SMEs is almost non-

existent (4 studies out of 55 in this work). If we do not understand management

attitudes to OHS in small firms, how can we engage them? This issue is

compounded by the difficulties of identifying7 and then ‘‘reaching’’ SMEs, and

further through the delegation for responsibility of regulation of health and safety

in SMEs to local authorities.

Even before SMEs are ‘‘reached’’ there is the question of developing a business

case that proves the benefit to them of effective health and safety management. As

the next subsection reveals, there is almost no science base for proving the case for

OHS investment in large firms; making the case for SMEs is doubly difficult,

given their generally lower level of financial and managerial resources.

4.5. Motivating employers

The compensation, benefits and insurance systems must motivate employers to

improve their health and safety performance, in particular by securing a better

balance in the distribution of the costs of health and safety failures. When

things go wrong, employers must also be motivated to rehabilitate injured

workers so as to maximize their future employability. The Government sees a

case for reforming the arrangements for employers’ liability insurance in pursuit

of these goals.


7 A senior HSE director Rose, Terrence (2000) admits to confusion over what constitutes a

small firm.


Almost no scientific base was found for supporting the assertion that there is a

business case for investment in health and safety, in other words, that such

investment produces returns to stakeholders. The little evidence that exists is

based largely around anecdote, which claims that excellence in health and safety

does produce returns, and mainly from reduced insurance premiums (e.g., Cooke,

2000). Notwithstanding this, while the economic and moral cases for investment

in health and safety are indisputable, the argument that ‘‘safety pays’’ frequently

used by government agencies is spurious, since:

. . .any attempt to argue that safety pays must specify for whom. Unless we can

identify a relevant decision maker for whom safety pays, the argument has no

capacity to motivate action to reduce injury and illness.

Hopkins, 1999, p 144

Furthermore, the logic of many regulatory bodies concerning employers’

assessments of the value of safety investment is demonstrably faulty. Regu-

lators worldwide make the assumption that employers judge investment in

OHS based on the proportion of the total cost of injury or illness that they are

likely to bear. Not so, for many employers will look at whether the cost of

prevention outweighs the potential cost borne by the employer, regardless of

what proportion of the total cost that may be (Hopkins, 1999). Furthermore,

mainstream management accounting techniques generally evaluate expenditure

on health and safety in the course of an accounting year. Hence, managers

have little opportunity to make rational investment decisions in health and

safety, which rely upon long-term investment to make a return on capital.

Consequently, investment in health and safety is generally undervalued

(Hopkins, 1999).

Top managers’ decisions are crucial to health and safety, and unless they are

held legally and financially accountable for such matters, those organizational

issues that directly affect top managers’ rewards8 and status will continue to

receive higher priority in the strategic agenda. In Revitalizing Health and Safety,

the British Government makes clear that it intends to

. . .develop a code of practice on Directors’ responsibilities for health and

safety. . .[in which it will]. . .stipulate that organizations should appoint an

individual Director for health and safety.. . .Health and Safety Commission, 2000, p. 26

Moreover, that it will take advice on:

. . .how the law would need to be changed to make these responsibilities

statutory so that Directors . . . are clear about what is expected of them in their

management of health and safety.


8 In the case of the Bhopal disaster it has been demonstrated that senior management actually

benefited financially from the incident (Hopkins, 1999, p. 150).


It seems that the British Government also believes that the Guidance on the

internal control requirements of the London Stock Exchange Combined Code on

Corporate Governance (ICAEW, 1999; Jones & Sutherland, 1999) may also

strengthen the position of health and safety matters with respect to corporate

priorities (Health and Safety Commission, 2000, p. 26).9 These proposals amount

to an assignment of responsibility and possibly, if the offence of ‘‘corporate

killing’’ reaches the statute books10, further accountability. However, these

proposals do not add up to a business case for health and safety. They are well

intentioned and may improve reporting and the bringing forth the worst

offenders;11 they do nothing to develop the argument that investing in OHS

can bring returns to stakeholders.

There are at least five main problems with respect to the ‘‘business case’’ for

health and safety that thus far have not been fully, if at all, addressed empirically:12

1. What do managers (particularly top managers) really think about health

and safety?

This research found a well-established picture of the attitudes of employees

and trade unions toward health and safety, but knowledge of the attitudes of (top)

managers is scant. The little that exists is confined to the effectiveness of

management systems and control and the importance of management support for

behavior-based approaches to health and safety (Cox & Cox, 1991; Cox et al.,

1998; Dawson et al., 1988a; Fuller, 1999; Hine, Lewko, & Blanco, 1999; Simard

& Marchand, 1995; Thompson, Hilton, & Witt, 1998), and much of this work is

based around employees’ perceptions of what is required of management. How

can we establish a business case for health and safety if we do not understand the

attitudes of people who make decisions with respect to any such case (Holmes et

al., 1998)? Furthermore, there is little work upon the attitudes of health and safety

managers to health and safety. After essential decision-makers, health and safety

managers are an important influence, and we do not even have a full picture of

their attitudes.

2. What is the nature and strength of the relationship between top managers’

rewards and health and safety?

11 Even if parliamentary time allows corporate killing to reach the statute books, the economic

advantages enjoyed by larger organizations in comparison to smaller organizations, means that the

larger organizations will be better able to defend themselves from prosecution.12 These problems apply equally to small- and medium-sized enterprises.

9 The Code requires that all companies listed on the London Stock Exchange include in their

annual reports statements concerning the status of the major risks that their company faces, and an

outline of the systems that they have in place to manage these risks. The Code does not specify which

risks should be reported upon. See McRae and Balthazor (2000) and Elliott, Letza, and McGuinness

(2000) for a full discussion of the Turnbull Committee’s recommendations.10 As with so much in health and safety the problem with such an offence lies in the development

of evidence. At least one senior health and safety official, Rose, Terrence (2000), has doubts about the

ability of the authorities to effectively gather evidence—not a question of ability, rather one of time

and resources.


Research into directors’ compensation abounds. Moreover, research into

directors’ compensation and organizational performance is also plentiful, but there

is no evidence to support the proposition that health and safety performance has

any impact upon top managers’ remuneration. If we cannot establish the existence

or nature of the relationship, then we cannot establish for whom safety pays, and

the business case (such as it is) is weakened considerably.

3. What is the nature and strength of the relationship between health and

safety and organizational performance?

While performance measurement is a thriving discipline, health and safety

performance remains relatively poorly served. However, it is beginning to receive

limited attention within the corporate social performance arena. That said, there

remains no significant empirically proven link between organizational perform-

ance and workplace injury and illness. This is critically important, since without

such metrics, it is impossible to appropriately adapt management accounting

techniques that in turn can prove the value of investment in health and safety.

4. What is the nature and strength of the relationship between workplace

injury and illness and other forms of organizational hazards (e.g.,

strategic, financial, market, legal, and other operational hazards)?

If the regulators expect organizations to report on the management of their

most pressing risks, where does health and safety sit in comparison with

other organizational risks? How do health and safety risks interact with

commercial matters? Does workplace injury and illness significantly damage

corporate reputation and, if so, what are the implications of this? If workplace

injury and illness risks can be demonstrated to influence other forms of

organizational risk, then the business case becomes considerably stronger.

4.6. Self-regulation

A more deeply engrained culture of self-regulation needs to be cultivated,

most crucially in the 3.7 million businesses with less than 250 employees.

We must demonstrate and promote the business case for effective health

and safety management. We must provide financial incentives that motivate

and change the law to secure penalties which deter. This culture must be

further supported through the full integration of health and safety within

general management systems.


It is abundantly clear that it is impossible for any government to fully fund

any regulatory body such that it can monitor all activity in their given sector or

discipline. Be it financial services, telecommunications, water, or in this context,

health and safety, total coverage is impossible from both funding and operational

viewpoints; the reality is that regulators can only be ‘‘watchdogs.’’

Hence, self-regulation (essentially an argument for best practice management)

is probably the only route to go with respect to workplace health and safety.

However, work on the effectiveness of local self-regulation is limited, and mainly

to that of Dawson et al. (1988a), who found that the British approach was weak in


its original formulation. In offering a prescriptive approach to health and safety

management they outlined (fully 12 years ago) many of the principles that the

government is now picking up. Several of their final recommendations bear

marked parallels with the strategies now at hand:

1. Senior management to develop a system of management accountability for

health and safety performance.

2. Senior management to screen health and safety performance of prospective

contractors and to monitor performance in any contracts.

3. Annual reports of quoted companies to include health and safety

performance data.

4. Provide fiscal, national insurance, and insurance incentives for improving

health and safety performance.

5. Increase the normal level of fines.

6. Develop partnerships particularly through workforce involvement. (Dawson

et al., 1988a)

The route to developing better self-regulation is to improve the level and

standard of health and safety management, and this rests squarely upon proving

the competitive advantages of improving health and safety performance or

providing significant disincentives for negative behavior. This requires financial

and intellectual investment that will only be increased upon the provision of either:

� Substantial proof that there is a business case for improving health and

safety, or� The imposition of punitive penalties that target senior management

remuneration either directly or by impacting shareholder value such that

shareholders will take active steps to ensure that OHS becomes a key

performance indicator.

The disadvantage of the latter is that it does nothing to tackle those ‘‘normal

accidents’’ that occur as a product of poormanagement (Perrow, 1999; Sagan, 1993;

Toft & Reynolds, 1997; Turner, 1976; Turner & Pidgeon, 1997). The advantage of

the former is that it is built upon the premise that accidents at whatever scale

represent a loss of investment. Hence, we return to the argument for the devel-

opment of a scientifically derived business case for health and safety investment.

In research terms, the development of best practice models for health and

safety is perhaps the way forward to establish the path to better self-regulation.

This requires the further development of noncompetitive benchmarking through-

out different sectors.

4.7. Partnership

The full potential of Roben’s vision for worker participation in health and safety

management at individual workplaces is yet to be realized. An innovative


response is needed to the challenges presented by the changing world of work.

Partnership on health and safety issues can lead the way for the government’s

wider agenda on partnership between employers and workers, indeed, effective

partnerships between all stakeholders in the health and safety system, including

central, regional and local government are crucial.

Health and Safety Commission, 2000

It has been repeatedly demonstrated that, as the proportion of workers

belonging to a union in a given workplace rises, so do measures of health and

safety risk (Lanoie, 1992; Nichols et al., 1995). Relating to this is another

established finding that OHS enforcement and compliance increases with respect

to unionization (Weil, 1991, 1992, 1996, 1999). On face value this appears to run

counter to the intent of increasing participation, that is reducing OHS risk.

However, the positive relationship between unionization and injuries is attrib-

utable to a higher propensity for unionized workforces to report injury and illness,

and where OHS is dealt with solely by management, incidents have been found to

rise (Nichols et al., 1995). The common finding that health and safety incidents are

grossly underreported supports this proposition (Ashford, 1976; Dalton, 1998;

Dawson et al., 1988a; Weddle, 1996). Further support is offered by at least one

authority, who found that the push for improvement in health and safety is bound

to come more from employee representatives than from management (Gill, 1993).

The importance of employee independent or union-based participation is

further emphasized by literature, which finds that committees with worker

representation are associated with a reduction in injury and illness rates (Nichols

et al., 1995; Reilly et al., 1995; Robinson & Smallman, 2000).

Additionally, Rooney (1992) found synergy between employee ownership and

worker participation with respect to increased action on OHS issues.

Consequently, there is considerable support from the literature for the

implementation of this particular element of strategy, at least from the point of

view of participation in OHS management. Unfortunately, the lack of participa-

tion is more likely attributable to:

� The dominance of a political ideology at odds with unionization and

worker participation in corporate governance between 1983 and 1996.� A combination of management who are insecure in their managerial ability

and not wishing to cede any measure of power to employees.

That OHS performance is tied to political ideology has been discussed in the

literature and it seems that governments with a penchant for deregulation may be

associated with a poor health and safety record (Bain, 1997). The paucity of

understanding management attitudes to health and safety has already been

discussed (seeMotivating Employers), as have the benefits of workforce empower-

ment and shop floor participation (in the form of high performance work

systems—see Work Environment). In this guise, the implementation of the

partnership element of the British government’s strategy has some support from


Table 3

The dialectic of designed-in safety

Indicators of highly

reliable organizations Evidence in support The neglect of politics

Prioritization � It has been established that managers influence safety

priorities by influencing the politics of communication,

whereas supervisors do so by influencing the fairness with

which they interact with employees (Thompson et al., 1998).� The positive contribution of workers’ observations

and comments on safety in establishing meaningful

safety targets has also been proven (Krause et al., 1999).

� The research I have analyzed reveals almost nothing of the opinions of

management, with respect to health and safety, although it does reveal the

importance of their role. So how are we to know what their priorities are?� Whilst the problems of conflicting interests have been well rehearsed, if

not clearly resolved, in the literature on agency, stakeholder and stewardship

theories of corporate governance, outside of normal accident theory

research, such issues have only received implicit attention in respect of OHS.

Redundancy Redundancy is a key issue in engineering design

(Smith, 1999, pp. 73–82).

Rundmo (1996) finds organizational and physical working conditions

affect worker behavior, but design redundancy is not explicitly mentioned.

Self-regulation

and culture� Employees’ commitment to safety culture has

also been identified with the establishment of� The criticality of communication in health and safety is poorly

served in the literature I analyzed and individual care for health

clear management procedures (Cox et al., 1998).� Several of the studies analyzed note the importance of

management support in the development of safety

cultures (Cox et al., 1998; DePasquale & Geller, 1999;

Lingard & Rowlinson, 1997) with others noting the crucial

role of organizational and social processes in their

development (Hofmann & Stetzler, 1996; Geller et al., 1996).

and safety (playing by the rules) is also relatively underresearched

(Geller et al., 1996).� The majority of the work is specifically focused upon safety

culture, rather than broader organizational culture, the impact

of which is not covered in the literature I analyzed.

Training and

organizational

learning

� Training in health and safety is a proven

important determinant (Cox et al., 1998;

Rebitzer, 1995).

� Outside of normal accident theoretic research, learning from health

and safety failures is not covered in the research that I analyzed.� Anecdotal evidence suggests that some industries exchange ‘‘war

stories,’’ and the Department of Health (2000) has taken an initiative

in this area with input from several leading normal accident theorists.

C.Smallm

an/JournalofSafety

Resea

rch32(2001)391–439

410

the literature. However, to reiterate an earlier finding, the research community

needs to take a look at the relationship between high performance work systems,

health and safety, and corporate performance if fuller support is to be developed.

4.8. Designed-in health and safety

The best way to protect workers’ health and safety, particularly where more

complex contractual structures are involved, is to ‘‘design it in’’ to processes

and products.. . .Health and Safety Commission, 2000, p. 19

There is no work in the empirical literature that was analyzed that offers direct

support to the implementation of this element of the strategy, although there is of

course evidence that engineers receive broad training in the development of safe

and reliable systems (Smith, 1999). However, both the effectiveness of such

training has been questioned (Blockley, 1994) and the conventional wisdom of

high reliability theory (Sagan, 1993) is complemented (Bain, 1999) by normal

accident theory (Perrow, 1999; Sagan, 1993; Toft & Reynolds, 1997; Turner,

1976; Turner & Pidgeon, 1997).

High reliability theory implicitly underpins the ‘‘design’’ element of the

government’s strategy. Essentially, the argument runs that safety can be created

and maintained by the presence of four specific conditions (Sagan, 1993):

1. That safety and high reliability are given a high priority by political and

organizational leaders.

2. Compensation for failures is effected through building redundancy

into systems.

3. Decentralized authority (self-regulation), strong organizational culture, and

continuous operations and training reduce error rates.

4. Organizational learning from trial and error supplemented by forecasting

and simulation.

Normal accident theory is a derivative of open systems theory where

organizations and their members are viewed as self-interested actors with

potentially conflicting interests (Sagan, 1993, pp. 28–45). Organizations are

also subject to broader political and social forces. The theory predicts that the

highly interactive complexity and tight coupling in cybernetic systems will tend

to produce accidents in a variety of settings, particularly ones where there is

high hazard. Adherents of this theory find partial fault with the conditions

typically required for high reliability:

1. Even where leaders give high priority to safety, this is liable to be

undermined by competing organizational and individual objectives.

2. Adding redundancy increases interactive complexity, encourages operators

to take risks, and reduces system transparency.


3. Tightly coupled operating systems require rapid communication and

adherence to rules. Decentralized decision-making does not encourage this.

Imposing a strong organizational culture is difficult in democratic society.

Constant training and practice cannot accommodate simulations that are

politically unacceptable, unanticipated, or overly dangerous.

4. The difficulties of organizational learning have been well rehearsed, but

essentially focus on uncertainty, politics, and culture.

This is not to say that most normal accident theorists are opposed to the

principles underlying HRT15. Instead they seem to be making an argument for a

‘‘reality check’’ within complex systems. However, the normal accident paradigm

seems largely to have been rejected by the scientific establishment, within which

the government’s advisors on health and safety sit (Hood & Jones, 1994, p. xi).

Consequently, it comes as no surprise that this element of the government’s new

strategy is built upon the principles of prioritization, redundancy, self-regulation,

culture, training, and organizational learning. However, the reality is rather more

obscure, and a dialectic exists (see Table 3).

Hence, in respect to the government’s strategy for ‘‘designing-in’’ safety, we

have a confused picture. The dominant paradigm enjoys support from a respected

and established orthodox tendency, which finds that reliability can and should be

designed-in. Contrast this with a vocal opposition operating from the premise that

all complex socio-technical systems tend to operate in degraded mode.

Weir, 1994

In other words, safety may be designed-in to systems, but it is the actions of

operators that dictate the degree of success of the design. Operators have their

own agendas and are subject, just as we all are, to broad political and social forces

that shape our attitudes to and actions in life, both at work and outside.

Consequently, there may well be support for this element of the strategy, but

there is contradictory evidence that suggests that a different approach may be

more effective. In particular, how does normal accident theory apply to truly

‘‘normal’’ accidents? Most of the events analyzed in the literature are major

incidents. Does the theory apply to ‘‘simple’’ OHS incidents? Are there such

things as normally reliable organizations?

Here, as with several other of the strategic elements of Revitalizing Health and

Safety, there are gaps and conflicts in the literature that pose serious threats to the

successful implementation of the vision. What are the central problems with the

theory and the policy, and what research is required to address these issues?

5. Conclusions

5.1. Problems with the literature

While there is a copious body of research on the management of health and

safety at work, it lacks coherence. Like so many risk-related themes, this is


attributable to the interdisciplinary nature of this field, with many disciplines

‘‘laying claim’’ to the primacy of their approach. What has resulted is a body of

work that is skewed toward understanding the mindset of the individual worker in

their approach to workplace health and safety. While understanding this is

important, we have few equivalent descriptions of managerial attitudes, with

almost none at all at the very top level. As with so many matters in organizations,

top management decisions are essential to health and safety performance, yet we

do not understand them. For instance, how does corporate governance affect

health and safety?

This lack of knowledge is exacerbated by the continued reinforcement of

a rational scientific paradigm, which insists that problems be simplified in

order to generate understanding. As a consequence, the research frameworks

that dominate research into the management of health and safety are

‘‘simplistic’’ cause and effect models, founded upon an assumption that

the adjustment of individual elements affecting health and safety will result

in positive and negative feedback such that performance will be improved.

However, this only partly reflects the true etiology of workplace injury and

illness, which as Table 2 suggests is far more complex than has thus far

been represented in the literature. How can we model such complexity?

While quantitative research has a role to play, the near absence of qualitative

grounded theories of how management shapes health and safety practices is

a must if we are to develop a fuller understanding of the forces at play in

this area.

We also do not have a full understanding of international variations in health

and safety management. How do different cultures view the issue of injury and

illness at work? For example, in Britain the sinking of the Herald of Free

Enterprise and similar transport failures brought public outcry and political

action. Are there any parallels or differences with recent events in Greece

(McGory, 2000), and if so, are there any cultural drivers that underlie the

development of such events?

Notwithstanding the development of more meaningful models, the issue of

getting the message through to employers and other users remains problem-

atic. Research in health and safety management goes largely unreported in the

general management literature and remains the province of specialist academic

journals and practitioner magazines.

5.2. A policy critique

The development of Revitalizing Health and Safety is an outstanding

achievement, pulling together as it does a wide span of opinion across govern-

ment, regulators, and industry. There is much to support the policy within the

science base, but there are also large gaps, which will need to be filled if the

vision is to be properly fulfilled.

Of the strategic elements that enjoy strong scientific support that will facilitate

their implementation, improving the work environment and the promotion of a


well workforce both have impressive bodies of work that support their value to

organizations. They do suffer from fragmentation and some work on developing

an effective synthesis of the work in both areas would help. Furthermore, neither

bodies of work properly explain the impact of high performance work systems on

OHS performance.

Perhaps the best-supported element of the strategy is the drive for

partnership. That the workforce can contribute to improving OHS management

is extremely well established, enjoying perhaps the strongest support among

all of the strategic elements. It is perhaps unfortunate that this issue remains

dogged by political and popular rhetoric that distort the true value that

consultation can bring to workplaces.

‘‘Designing-in’’ health and safety does enjoy considerable support, but from

only one ‘‘side’’ of science. The implementation of this element is certainly

feasible through employing orthodox high reliability theory. However, history

reveals a spectacular series of failures of systems designed around these

principles. Perhaps it is time for a rethink?

From the point of view of normal accident theory ‘‘designing-in’’ health and

safety is somewhat of an oxymoron, since the act of developing high reliability in

fact exacerbate a system’s propensity to fail. Hence, from this ‘‘side’’ of science

this strategic element enjoys little, if any, support.

Support for the small firms’ element of the strategy is weak and the

problems are allied to similar problems with the strategy element that deals

with motivating employers. First, specific to small firms, perhaps the only

support that science can offer is methodological, for there is much research

into general management aspects of entrepreneurship, and the approaches

taken to accessing small firms in such research may be insightful. However,

the issue that is common to firms of whatever size and their approach to OHS

is a lack of scientific evidence that supports the derivation of a business case,

and fundamental to this is our lack of understanding of managerial attitudes

toward health and safety. These issues in turn are inextricably linked to self-

regulation and its embodiment in best practice, of which we have little

scientific understanding.

Overall, if the policy is intended to mark a sea change in OHS practice in

Britain, and one that will offer lessons worldwide, then there is much work to

be done on its scientific base, as well as reorienting the philosophy in which it

is grounded. The consequent research agenda is broad indeed.

5.3. A research agenda

With respect to the work environment, we need to understand better the

effects of work environment on OHS performance at the organizational level.

Moreover, we need to improve our knowledge of interactions between work

environment, OHS performance, and broader organizational performance.

Similarly, we do not yet properly understand the relationship between the

workforce, high performance work systems, and workplace injury and illness.


Nor have we yet established a link between workplace well-being and

competitive advantage.

Occupational health it seems is divorced from safety. It needs to either be

properly integrated into research, or left as the province of occupational

medicine researchers.

While many of the commercial aspects of SMEs are understood, their

attitude toward health and safety is still not understood, and there remains a

problem of reaching them. Perhaps the solution lies in developing a business

case that is not based in scale economies? As indicated above, these

problems are shared with employers in general. Basically, we do not fully

understand managers’ motives with respect to OHS and this is probably a

significant barrier to our developing a true business (as opposed to

economic) case for investment in OHS. Managers’ motivations in this area

are probably a function of impact on remuneration, performance, and

prioritization with respect to other business risks, and these are issues that

also require further investigation. The provision of a strong business case

would markedly improve self-regulation, in other words pulling OHS

management practice up to the best or ‘‘world-class’’ levels—but what

constitutes world-class OHS management?

Knowing the themes relating to work environment and the workforce, we

recognize that, given the chance, partnership works to improve OHS perform-

ance. However, how is partnership affected by high performance work systems

and how does the interaction between them affect OHS performance and

broader organizational performance?

In terms of systems design, if the high reliability paradigm does not

work, does normal accident theory provide an alternative means for design-

ing-in safety? Does this theory apply to ‘‘simple’’ OHS incidents? Alter-

natively, is there the need to develop an integrating theory of reliability and

formal accidents?

Finally, at least in terms of setting a research agenda, this study found a

body of impressive research that offers a more than firm foundation for future

developments. However, the need for work that is interdisciplinary, ordered,

and collaborative is pressing. The research community now more than ever

needs to move away from elegant but simplistic pictures of OHS management

practice, and to reflect true complexity.

5.4. The reality of revitalizing health and safety

The reality of health and safety at work is that it is an issue that is taken lightly

by all but those who do not practice or research safe and healthy working, or who

are victims or relatives of victims of shoddy management. It remains one of the

bastions of inequality of work worldwide.

The intent of governments in attempting to reinvigorate the suppression of

workplace injury and illness is motivated by both social and economic imper-

atives. The motivations for organizations are not fully understood, for there is no


obvious business imperative. If we can further develop our understanding and

provide a scientific justification for investment in OHS management, then

governments’ task will be made easier. By proving the value of OHS to

management, we shall demonstrate that organizations continue to present

considerable hazards to their employees.

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Appendix A. Overview of empirical studies reviewed

Authors Sample Country Analysis

Adnett & Dawson, 1998 Reported industrial accidents and accident rates,

1981–1991

Britain Ordinary least

squares regression

Bain & Baldry, 1995;

Blank et al., 1995

2,397 accidents in mining industry, 1986–1990 Sweden Cross-tabulation

Blank, Diderichsen,

& Anderssin, 1996

Time series study of mining industry, 1911–1990 Sweden Ordinary least

squares regression

Chi & Wu, 1997 1,230 work-related injuries in 1989, 1990, and 1992 Taiwan ANOVA and cross-tabulation

Clarke, 1999;

Cox et al., 1998

3,329 manufacturing employees Britain ANOVA, multiple

linear regression,

structural equation modeling

Crowe, 1995 1,126 university health students USA Regression analysis

Curington, 1986 Combination of work injury records and

impairment scales, with data on work injuries

from compensated workers compensation

claims, 1964–1976

USA Generalized least

squares regression

Dawson, Willman, Clinton,

& Bamford, 1988b,

1988c, 1988d

Case studies in chemicals, construction, and retailing Britain Descriptive and qualitative

Dell & Berkhout, 1998 610 workers at a foundry, 1980–1995 USA Autoregressive integrated

moving averages

DePasquale & Geller, 1999 701 individuals in 20 organizations USA t tests

Fortin et al., 1996 30,000 construction industry workers,

1976–1986

Canada Mixed proportional

hazards model

Fuller, 1999 156 drivers at 56 distribution depots Britain Factor analysis; structural

equation modeling

Geller, Roberts,

& Gilmore, 1996

530 individuals at two industrial plants USA Regression analysis

Gill, 1993 7,500 managers and employee representatives European Union Descriptive

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Hayes et al., 1998 (1) 787 patients at a medical consulting firm USA Factor analysis

(2) 879 patients

(3) 181 telephone line workers

Hebdon & Hyatt, 1998 10,193 workplaces Canada Poisson based regression

Hine et al., 1999 24 employees from a nickel mine Canada ANOVA

Hofmann & Stetzler, 1996 21 team and 204 individuals in a chemical

processing plant

USA Hierarchical linear models

Hofmann & Sletzer, 1998 (1) 1,359 workers and 161 supervisors from

outdoor work crews of a large utility company

USA Hierarchical linear models

(2) 653 workers and 82 supervisors as above

Holmes et al., 1998 Matched sample of 168 painting industry

employers and employees

Australia Ethnographic content

analysis

Holmes et al., 1999 15 individuals from five small businesses in

the construction industry

Australia Ethnographic content

analysis

Hoyos & Ruppert, 1995 391 workplaces Germany Descriptives

James et al., 1994 89 members of minority groups employed by

four organizations

USA Multiple regression

Kochan, Wells, (1) National Survey of chemical plant managers USA Not specified

& Smith, 1992 (2) Nine in-depth plant-level case studies

(3) Survey of 600 direct hire workers and

600 contract workers

(4) Survey of 300 contracting firms

Krause, Seymour,

& Sloat, 1999

73 companies over 5 years USA Autoregressive integrated

moving averages

Laflamme, 1996 Longitudinal data set—male assembly

workers in the car industry—1980–1981,

1985–1986, 1990–1991

Sweden Factorial analysis of

correspondence; hierarchical

ascendant classification

Lanoie, 1992 140 observations covering most sectors of

economic activity in Ottawa,

1982–1987 inclusive

Canada Frequency estimated using

ordinary least

squares regression.

(continued on next page)

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Appendix A. (continued )

Lingard &

Rowlinson, 1997

Seven public housing construction sites Hong Kong Autoregressive integrated

moving averages

Maiti &

Bhattacherjee, 1999

6,281 workers from five underground coal

mines of one company, 1993–1996

India Binary and

multinomial logit

Mayhew & Based around four surveys: Australia (3) Not known, but

Quinlan, 1997 � 66 builders and 11 healthcare workers and Britain presumably variants of� 500 self-employed builders regression analysis� 31 building workers� 100 self-employed builders

McVittie et al., 1997 Data on nonfatal lost time injuries for

construction firms

Canada Descriptive

Nichols et al., 1995 592 workplaces Britain Logit models

Nytro et al., 1998 1,184 private and public enterprises Norway Bivariate analysis

Rebitzer, 1995 610 employees and 623 contract workers

in the petrochemical industry

USA Probit

Reilly et al., 1995 432 workplaces Britain Log odds

Ringenbach &

Jacobs, 1995

209 workers at a nuclear power plant USA Regression analysis

Rooney, 1992 Employee owned firms USA Logit

Rundmo, 1995 915 employees on eight oil platforms

from five different companies, 1990

Norway LISREL

Rundmo, 1996 1,138 respondents on 12 oil platforms

from nine companies, 1994

Norway LISREL

Rundmo et al., 1998 Comparison: Norway LISREL

(1) 915 employees on eight oil platforms

from five different companies, 1990

(2) 1,138 employees on 12 platforms (seven

common with 1990) from nine companies, 1994

Ruser, 1991 2,788 manufacturing establishments,

1979–1984

USA Ordinary and weighted

least square regressions

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Ruser, 1998 550,000 nonfatal injury and illness cases

involving at least 1 day away from work

USA Multinomial and

binomial logits

Ruser, 1999 National injury and illness data, 1992–1996 USA Descriptive only

Ruser & Smith, 1991 Bureau of Labor Statistics Annual Survey of

Injuries and Illnesses, 1979–1985

USA Regression

Scherer, Brodzinski,

Canty, & Crable, 1997

9,345 OSHA inspection reports USA Multivariate analysis of

covariance (MANCOVA)

Scherer, Owen, Comparison, 1988–1993: USA Multivariate analysis of

& Brodzinski, 1997 (1) 217 food processors covariance (MANCOVA)

(2) 338 fabricated metal products

Simard & Marchand, 1995 1,061 workgroups from

97 manufacturing plants

Canada Hierarchical linear regression

Thompson et al., 1998 Comparison at FAA Logistics Center: USA Structural equations

(1) 350 employees, 1992

(2) 329 employees, 1995

Viscusi, 1986 220 manufacturing establishments,

1973–1983

USA Log odds

Weddle, 1996 372 environmental services workers

in 12 hospitals

USA Descriptive

Weil, 1991 Inspection history of federally run

OSHA programs applied to

construction, 1985

USA Ordinary least

square regressions

Weil, 1992 Complete inspection history of

federally run OSHA programs, 1985

USA Ordinary least

squares regression

Weil, 1996 621 custom woodworking

establishments, 1972–1991

USA Logit

Weil, 1999 23,536 inspections conducted under the

Oregon OSHA program

USA Logit

Williamson et al., 1996 1,020 occupational fatalities Australia Cluster analysis

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Appendix B. Overview of dependent variables, significant independent variables, and main findings in empirical studies reviewed

Authors Dependent

variable

Significant independent

variables

Main findings

Adnett &

Dawson, 1998

Accident rate Output +

Work intensity +

Relative wages �

� Market failure, institutional and

macroeconomic forces not recognized in the orthodox economic

model of accidents.� Need to include social, psychological, and cyclical forces.� Reliance upon simple compensating wages framework is inappropriate, since

markets are not efficient in generating optimal risk premia.

Blank et al., 1995 Accident rates

for contract

workers

Contract workers +

Piece-rate or other type

of payment +

Mining and quarrying �

� Lack of information on risk exposure for contract workers.� Injured contract workers tend to work for SMEs or are self-employed.� Higher severity of injuries for contract workers.� Different wage systems and conditions of employment for contractors may

explain some of this.

Blank et al., 1996 Annual

accident rate,

annual

mortality rate

For annual accident

rate (likelihood):� Mechanization +� Reduction

in working hours +

Technological development affects occupational accidents, but the effect

is contingent upon other factors (economic and legal, inter alia).

� Unemployment +

For annual accident

rate (reporting):� Work Insurance Act,

1955 �� Work Insurance Act

1929 +

For annual mortality rates:� Mechanization �� Automation �

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Chi & Wu, 1997 Fatality rate of 12 Industry group, age (in � Workers with more than 15 years of experience were lower than average

accident types both cases sign varies

according to categories)

risk (no statistical test) except in industries or for injuries were age is an

impairment (slowness, lack of strength, loss of balance).� Also distinguish industries or accident types as age enhanced (experience is the key).� Some are neutral.

Clarke, 1999 �Cox et al., 1998 Commitment

to safety

Management actions +

Quality of safety

training +

� Commitment aspects of safety culture are more related to management

systems and procedures than the more personal and social aspects.

� Personal actions for safety seem not to affect employee’s appraisal of the

organization’s commitment.

Crowe, 1995 Safety values, Safety values: � Females more safety conscious than males

safe practices � Gender� Class standing � More junior subjects less safety conscious

(proxy for age) �Safe practices:

� Gender differences increase with years in college. Females progressively

safer; male static or less safe� Gender � Safety values are a good predictor of safe practices� Safety values

Curington, 1986 Injury type, Capital intensity + Importance of considering both frequency and severity.

injury frequency, Workers compensation +

injury severity Firm size

(no. of employees) �New hire rate +

Proportion employed in

production work +

Dawson et al., Effective Safety policy Essentially the problem is one of trade-off, using a feedback model of the firm

1988b, 1988c, self-regulation Management organization

1988d Employee organization

and representation

Dell &

Berkhout, 1998

Injury rate Job tenure � Long term employees enjoy lower accident rates


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Appendix B. (continued )

DePasquale &

Geller, 1999

Employee

involvement

in behavior-

Perception that BBS

training effective +

Success of BBS is based on a balance between trust, management support,

participation, and training

based safety Trust in management +

Education in BBS +

Job tenure +

Fortin et al., 1996 Duration of

workplace

accidents

Interaction of

unemployment insurance

with major injury with

easy diagnosis +

Getting social insurance right is difficult

December (Month) �Regional unemploy-

ment rate +

Hourly wage �Major injury with easy

diagnosis �Minor injury with hard

diagnosis �Fuller, 1999 Employees safety

concerns

Management control

Safety standards

Risk-taking behavior

Working conditions

Management’s responsibility for safety has to be fitted in with all others.

Workers have a good grasp of safety. Consensus approach can be a useful approach and

one that produces results

Geller et al., 1996 Individual care

for occupational

safety

Personal control +

Reactance �Group cohesion +

Extroversion +

Individual (active) care is highly complex construct that is the product

of a wider social process

Gill, 1993 Participation in Country Push for improvement is bound to come more from employee representatives

health and safety Introduction of

new technology

than from management.

Information, consultation, and participation not yet properly implemented

Industrial sector

Size +Technological

objectives

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Management style

Union bargaining power

Regulation

Employee relations system

Hayes et al., 1998 Accident rate

Job satisfaction

Management safety

practices� Employees who said they worked in a safer environment reported experiencing

fewer accidents and reported fewer health complaints than employees who said

Safety behaviors Supervisor safety they worked in a less safe environment.� Improving the safety record of a firm should include attention to management’s

role in safety.

Hebdon &

Hyatt, 1998

Refusal to

work rate

Refusal:� Strike +� Health and safety conflict is linked with other forms of industrial conflict.� General improvements in employee relations would result in reduced

Complaint rate � Arbitration linked

to strike �� Grievance arbitration

rate +

frequencies of work refusals and health and safety complaints.

� Mixed full- and part-

time bargaining unit �� Bargaining unit size �� Plus occupation and

industry effects

Complaint:� Grievance arbitration

rate +� Part-time bargaining

unit �� Mixed full- and

part-time bargaining unit �� Bargaining unit size �� Plus occupation and

industry effects


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Hine et al., 1999 Alignment to

work-place

safety principles

Occupation

Worker safety record� Relative to front-line workers, senior managers were significantly more

aligned with principles dealing with injury prevention, management

accountability, and rule following.� Workers with an above average safety record were more strongly aligned with

the principle

‘‘working safely is good business’’ than their below average counterparts.

Hofmann

& Stetzler, 1996

Unsafe

behaviors

Safety climate

Unsafe behaviors� Organizational factors are antecedents to the accident sequence� Role overload (insufficient training, time, skills) is particularly significant factor

Group processes

Hofmann &

Sletzer, 1998

Accident

attribution

Safety climate � Safety climate moderates the relationship between informational cues

and causal attribution

Safety communication � Where safety is openly discussed it is more likely that attribution will be

consistent with the information� Supervisors’ openness to upward communication about safety issues sends

a strong signal to employees about the degree to which their organization values safety

Holmes et al., 1998 Meanings of

risk control

Perception of risk

Risk control� OHS management programs based on perceived qualities or social

understandings of risk alone may be ignored or rejected by participants, may

exacerbate controversies, and lead to unsafe work� Need to understand both managerial and employee perceptions of

risk-important for planning

Holmes et al., 1999 Meanings of

risk control

Immediacy of effect � Immediate effects more important than delayed� Immediate effects more controllable than delayed� Focus on individual controls over risk rather than technological

Hoyos &

Ruppert, 1995

OHS risk

potential

Hazard type (human

body related, exposure to

dangerous liquids,

noise level)

Human behavior in hazardous situations is the most crucial factor

Perceiving and attending

hazard signals �Judging and foreseeing �

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Work design deficit +

Work organization

deficit +

Influencing behavior

deficit +

James et al., 1994 Blood pressure

Self-reports of

Blood pressure:� Self-esteem �� Substantial negative implications for both individuals and organizations

of circumstances that damage minority group members’ sense of esteem

health (illness

checklist)� Prejudice–

discrimination +� Importance of considering multiple indicators of health� Members of minorities have a fairly high sense of esteem leading to denial� Value differences of out-group bias and hostility. May help to keep BP down, but promote other ills

with supervisor �� Expressiveness +

Illness checklist:� Machinery

organization +� Self-esteem +� Value differences

with supervisor �Kochan et al., 1992 Safety

performance

Worker type

Management practices� Contract workers more likely to be engaged in high risk work; less experienced in

the workplace; received less safety training; receive less effective training� Close supervision results in lower injury rates� Comprehensive safety reporting lowers injury rates� Coemployment leaves employers liable, so plant managers are advised to avoid

supervising contract workers, and to separate them as far as possible

from employees� Choosing contractors with good OHS records keep injuries down� Safety data on contractors rarely collected

Krause et al., 1999 Injury (illness)

rate

Based–based safety � Self-sustaining mechanisms for continuous improvement in safety work. Based on

getting workers to observe and give feedback and then use safety data to select

safety improvement targets. Instead of observation by supervisors or outsiders.


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Laflamme, 1996 Accident rate Age �Accident type

Doubtful that age alone accounts for the result. Also combination of the physical and

technical environment that is genuinely more hazardous for younger workers, and a lack

of ‘‘relevant’’ experience when confronted by new and unfamiliar assignments.

Also need to look at accident type—older workers may be moved out of work

situations that are inherently hazardous to people whose speed, strength, and general

health are in decline

Lanoie, 1992 Accident rate Frequency: At best interventions by regulators lead to minor reductions in injury rates

Severity of

accidents

(workdays lost)

� No. of inspections

per 1000 workers �� Percentage of firms that have adopted a prevention program +� Wage replacement ratio +� Percentage of workers age � 24 +� Percentage of workers unionized +� Capital assets per 1000 workers +� Number of employees � Severity: No. of inspections per 1000 workers +� Percentage of firms that have adopted a prevention program +� Percentage of workers age � 24 +� Percentage of workers age � 45 +� Percentage of workers female +

Lingard &

Rowlinson, 1997

Safety

performance (site

housekeeping)

Based–based safety � BBS did not improve safety performance measured in terms of access to heights, the

use of bamboo scaffolding or the use of personal protective equipment. This is

probably due to:� a lack of management commitment in these three areas� the visibility of housekeeping� the inability of management to enforce the other three performance measures� unrealistic or unachievable safety goals� differential perceptions of hazards� differential recognition of hazards� inappropriate application of BBS

Maiti &

Bhattacherjee,

1999

Risk of injury

(Injury, Severe

injury, Reportable

injury)

Haulage worker �Other worker �Location

Occupation and location matter!

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Mayhew &

Quinlan, 1997

OHS risk Economic and

reward influences:

OHS standard compromised in tandem with increase in outsourced labor.

� Competition� Speed� Cost minimization� Pyramid

subcontracting� Corner cutting

Self-employment per se is not more dangerous than employed work, but OHS risks

are accentuated because of longer work hours, more intensive work, more hazardous

work, greater economic duress, more isolated settings, and poor access to

OHS information

� Lengthy hours� Overexertion

Disorganization:� Fragmentation� Isolation� Franchising

Inadequate regulation

Inability to organize

McVittie et al., 1997 Injury frequency Firm size � Size effect explained by better organization, greater awareness of OHS, higher rates

of unionization, and better training

Nichols et al., 1995 Injury rates Workplace size �250+ employees �Proportion of part-time

Explained by resources available to labor, management, and common to both of

them, but many organizational effects may take role

employees �Proportion of manual

workers +

Age of workplace �Workplace age

� 5 years �Percentage of employees

TU members +

OHS dealt with by

management +


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OHS dealt with by

safety representatives +

OHS dealt with by

some sort of

committee �OHS dealt with by

mixed arrangement +

Nytro et al., 1998 Implementation

of internal

control of health,

environment,

and safety

External stakeholders +

Competence for HES

work +

Time since

implementation

Underlying force can probably be attributed to the current HRM perspective that considers

the well-being of employees as crucial for development in any facet of running business

of regulation +

Rebitzer, 1995 Accident rates Contract workers

< 1 year at host +

Host plants offer more effective safety training and supervision than do contractors

Close supervision of

contract workers by

host �Safety training for

employees �Reilly et al., 1995 Probability of

injury

Size �Percentage female �Percentage manual

Joint consultative committees (both OHS and general) perform a significant social

role in reducing workplace injuries

workers �Joint consultative OHS

committee with all

employee members

chosen by unions �Joint consultative OHS

committee with no

employee members

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chosen by unions �Joint consultative general

committee with some

employee members

chosen by unions �(Industry and

regional effects)

Ringenbach

& Jacobs, 1995

Personal safety

orientation

Organizational

safety

orientation

Personal injury

risk Lost

work days

Safety orientations:� Fitness +� Age group +� Percentage of time

doing physical labor +

Personal injury risk:� Percentage of time

doing physical labor +

Age and fitness perceptions combine to form the basis for safety perceptions.

These perceptions have an impact on measures of injury

� Personal safety orientation +� Organizational safety

orientation +

Lost work days:� Age group

Rooney, 1992 Occurrence

of injury

Employee ownership

and worker

participation �Employee owners

receive cash dividends +

There is synergy between employee ownership and worker participation with respect

to increased action on OHS issues. Also stresses importance of allowing for

interaction effects.

ESOP introduced as a

result of crisis in exchange

for wage concessions +

No. of times workers

met on a quality circle

in the past year �(continued on next page)

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No. of years workers have

met on a quality circle +

Rundmo, 1995 Occurrence of

accidents

Occurrence of accidents:� Risk perception +

Individual injury experience affects subjective risk assessment

Risk perception and job stress combine to increase dissatisfaction with safety status

Risk perception

Safety status� Safety status �� Job stress +

Improvements of organizational and physical working conditions have a greater

effect on changes in risk perception, safety status and job stress than do measures

Job stress Risk perception:� Safety status �Safety status:� Injured personnel �Job stress:� Injured personnel +

directed at changing biased perceptions and individual judgments

Rundmo, 1996 Risk behavior

Occurrence of

accidents

Risk behavior:� Management and

employee commitment� Safety and contingency

� Risk perception does not predict risk behavior. Hence, safety cannot be improved

by changing individual risk perception. Factors that cause variations in risk

perception, as well as risk behavior and safety, should be the focus of

safety improvements.� Strain� Job stress� Stresses importance of subjective as well as

objective measures of risk� Perceived risk� Physical working

conditions� Safety attitudes

Occurrence of accidents:� Ignore safety regulations

� The direct effects of organizational and physical working conditions are stronger

than effects arising from job stress and risk perception� This is important since employee behavior is constrained by working conditions,

which accurately inform employees’ risk perceptions

� Carry out forbidden

activities� Cannot always perform

work correctly� Take chances to get job done

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� Do not use protective

equipment� Break procedures

Rundmo

et al., 1998

Risk behavior Manning

Safety versus

production bias

Commitment and

Organizational factors and workload influence safety status, via risk perception,

behaviors, and the probability of accidents and injuries

involvement Management

Ruser, 1991 Lost-workday

injury—case rate

(LWICR)

Weekly workers

competition benefit +

Weekly workers

Higher benefits are found to increase lost work day cases

Benefit effect is smaller in larger more highly experience-rated establishments

compensation benefit *

500+ employees �100–249 employees �250–499 employees �500+ employees �Weekly wage �Change in annual

employment +

Proportion of production

workers in workplace +

Proportion of female

workers in workplace �Weekly overtime hours

per worker +

Ruser, 1998 Claims reporting

moral hazard

(for injuries)

Wage replacement rate +

Worker chooses doctor +

These factors increase probability that injury is reported on a Monday (or the day

after a long weekend)

Moral hazard occurs for all types of injuries, not just for hard to diagnose


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Ruser, 1999 Injury and illness Increase job safety � Restricted-activity days are becoming a common aspect of occupational injury and

rates Composition

of lost-workday

Return to work � illness cases at the same time that days away from work

are becoming shorter and less frequent:

injuries increased job safety and faster return to work of

injured workers may account for this development

Ruser &

Smith, 1991

Lost-day worker

case rate

Previous period lost-day

worker case rate +

Change in employee

numbers +

Changes in inspection and record keeping practices have not affected rate.

Evidence suggests increase in underreporting.

Inspection in first

quarter �Industry risky relative to

private sector rate in

1982�Industry risk relative to

private sector rate all years +

Scherer,

Brodzinski,

et al., 1997

Lost workday

injury rate

Inspection scope

Lost workday injury rate:� Preparation hours +� On-site hours +

Enforcement alone may not be enough to reduce injury and illness rates. There may

be a relationship between compliance programs, which include consultation and

informal interactions with organizations, and improved injury and illness rates

Size � Litigation hours +� Total violations +� Total penalties

assessed +� Serious violations

percentage +� Penalty reduction

percentage +

Inspection scope:� Preparation hours +

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� On-site hours �� Litigation hours �� Total violations �� Total penalties assessed �� Serious violationspercentage �� Informal settlement

percentage �� Penalty reduction

percentage �Size:� Preparation hours +� On-site hours +� Litigation hours +� Total violations �

Scherer, Owen,

et al., 1997

Lost workday

injury rate

Inspection scope

Size

Lost workday injury rate:� Total penalties

assessed +

Inspection scope:

Regional differences in outcomes. The choice of enforcement scheme and how it is

implemented should affect the firm’s compliance decision

� Total violations �� Serious violations �� Informal settlements �� Penalty reduction �� Total penalties

assessed �Size:� Total penalties

assessed +


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Simard &

Marchand, 1995

Workgroup

safety

initiative

behavior

Nonroutine work process +

Cooperative relationships

between workers and

supervisors +

Workgroup

cohesiveness +

� Microorganizational factors are the primary determinants of the propensity of

workgroup to take safety initiatives, with supervisory participatory management

of safety the best predictor� Micro-level predictors can be substantially influenced by managerial action,

particularly the top-level management commitment to develop the safety program

and joint regulation mechanisms.

Supervisory participatory

management of safety +� Socioeconomic context of the secondary labor market for the firm may act as a

structural constraint for such commitment and other shop floor predictors of

workers’ safety initiatives behavior

Thompson et al.,

1998

Safety

conditions

Safety

compliance

Safety conditions:� Manager support for

safety (a function itself of

organization politics) +

Safety compliance:

Managers appear to influence safety by influencing the politics of communication,

whereas supervisors do so by influencing the fairness with which they interact

with employees

� Supervisor support for

safety (a function itself of

supervisor fairness) +

Viscusi, 1986 Injury rate Inspection � Effectiveness of regulation remains unproven

Weddle, 1996 Accurate injury

reporting

Age �Job tenure �

Systematic underreporting is a significant issue

Perceived injury

severity +

Weil, 1991, 1992 OSHA enforce-

ment activity

OSHA enforcement activity� Unionized workplace +

Critical role of unions in increasing enforcement activity and policy

OSHA enforce-

ment policy� Employee walk

around rights +� Size +

OSHA enforcement

policy:� Unionized workplace +

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Weil, 1996 Compliance with

OSHA

Second inspection

received by plant +

Penalties received by

plant +

Regulation has large impacts on business compliance. Government regulatory

agencies can substantially change private sector behavior, even given limited

regulatory resources

Unionized +

Follow up inspection +

Weil, 1999 OSHA

enforcement

Unionized +

Committee mandate +

Mandated OHS committees act as supplements to trade unions

Workplace size +

Firm size +

Multiplant firm �Full inspection +

Complaint inspection +

Accident inspection +

Health inspection +

Williamson et al.,

1996

Occupational

fatalities

Behavior factors +

Environment factors +

Unsafe work practices +

There are general casualties for fatalities at work, but there are exceptional

occupations (timber, electrical trade).

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The reality of “Revitalizing Health and Safety

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Transcript of The reality of “Revitalizing Health and Safety