Tripartism: Reality or Myth?

David Marsh and Wyn Grant

Tripartism: Reality or Myth?

IT IS INCREASINGLY COMMON TO FIND ANALYSES OF BRITAIN AS A corporate state, or more circumspectly as developing a tripartite system of economic and industrial policy-making.’ Unfortunately, such work is often marked by a lack of definitional rigour and an inadequate consideration of relevant empirical material. In view of these limitations in the literature our article has two aims. Initially it examines the relationship between corporatism and tripartism, showing that in many ways tripartism can be viewed as a variation on one strand of corporatist thought, and what is more that it is the strand which appears most relevant to discussions of Britain. Subsequently, against this background, we examine empirical evidence to establish how far Britain can be described as having a tripartite system of economic and industrial policy-making.

SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT

Of course, as there have been many corporatist theorists, so there have been many varieties of corporatist thought. Nevertheless,

I R. Pahl and J. Winkler are prodigious writers on the subject: for example, ‘The Coming Corporatism’, Challenge, March/April 1975, pp. 28-35; ‘Corporatism in Britain’, The Times, 26 March 1976. A conference held in London in 1976 on ‘The Corporate State - Reality or Myth?’ produced an interesting collection of papers on the sub’ect: A. Fox, ‘The Corporate State: Reality or Myth? An Industrial Perspective ; D. Johnson, ‘The Corporate State: Reality or Myth? A Historical Perspective’; R. Leaf, ‘The Corporatist Threat to British Industry’; R. E. Pahl and J. T. Winkler, ‘Corporatism in Britain’; T. Raison, ‘The Corporate State: Myth or Reality? A Conservative view.’ See also C. Crouch, ‘The Corporate State: Crisis or Compromise?’, paper delivered at the conference of the Contemporary British Politics Workshop of the Political Studics Association of the United Kingdom, Sheffield 1976; G. Lehmbruch, ‘Liberal Corporatism and Party Government’, paper delivered to the International Political Science Association Congress, Edinburgh 1976; L. Panitch, ‘The Develo ment of Corporatism in Liberal Democracies’, paper

Chicago 1976.

J

presented at the annua P meeting of the American Political Science Associaaon,

TRIPARTISM: REALITY OR MYTH? * 9s

Schmitter’s excellent review2 of the history of corporatist thought makes it clear that corporatist theorists share an emphasis on unity, or more particularly class harmony, but differ substantially as to the role that they assign to the state in the corporatist system. Indeed Schmitter shows how the stress on harmony between classes in corporatist thought develops from its origins as a 19th- century reaction against the individualism and competitiveness associated with capitalist development. The corporatist theorists believed that although labour and capital might have superficially conflicting interests they shared mutual rights and obligations. The organic unity of society is preserved if the organizations representing capital and labour are aware of these mutual rights and obligations. As Pahl and Winkler put it, ‘Society is seen as consisting of diverse elements unified into one body, forming one corpus, hence the word corporatism. These elements are united because they are reciprocally interdependent, each performs tasks which the other requires.”

There is no doubt that this notion of unity or class harmony is crucial in corporatist thought, but how is this class harmony to be obtained and preserved? O n this point a sharp distinction can be found between different models of corporatism in terms of their account of the role of the state. Indeed Schmitter establishes a crucial distinction within corporatist thought between what he terms ‘state corporatism’ and ‘societal corporatism’. He states, ‘That most original and stimulating of corporate theorists, Mihail Manoilesco, provided the key distinction between two different subtypes. The one he called cor oratisme pur, in which the

exclusivcly dependent on the activity of singular, non- competitive, hierarchically ordered representative “corporations”. The second in contrast he called corporatism esubordonnt, in which similarly structured “corporations” were created by and kept as auxiliary and dependent organs of the state which founded its legitimacy and effective functioning on other bases’.‘ In ‘state corporatism’ the state plays a directive role in the establishment of class harmony and the organizations representing the different economic interests within society are subordinate to and dependent

P. Schmitter, ‘Still the Century of Corporatism?’, Review ofPoliric5, Vol. 36,

legitimacy and functioning of t K e state were primarily or

1974, pp. 85-131. ’ Pahl and Winkler, ‘Corporatism in Britain’, op. cir . , p. 7. ‘ Schmitter, op. cir., p. 102.

GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION 1 9 6 on the state. In ‘societal corporatism’ the representative organizations are autonomous but cooperate with the state and each other because they recognize that they are mutually interdependent.

A similar distinction has been developed by Lehmbruch who distinguishes between ‘liberal cor oratism’ and ‘authoritarian

liberal corporatism are ‘the large measure of constitutional autonomy of the groups involved; hence the voluntary character of institutionalized integration of conflicting groups’ and ‘a hi h

shaping of public p ~ l i c y ’ . ~ This is the most important distinction within cor oratist

thought. In addition it is the notion of ‘societal’ or liberal’ corporatism which has dominated most discussions of corporatism in advanced capitalist societies. So Panitch argues, ‘The corporatist paradigm is understood to connote a political structure within advanced capitalism which integrates organised socio-economic producer groups through a system of representation and cooperative mutual interaction at the leadership level, and mobilization and social control at the mass level.’6

It is rather surprising in the light of the foregoin discussion that

corporate state is developing in Britain, are operating with a state corporatist notion. Indeed they define corporatism as ‘an economic system in which the state directs and controls predominantly privately owned business” and elsewhere claim that ‘corporatism is principally defined by one particularly important qualitative change, the shift from a supportive to a directive role for the state in the economy’.*

Pahl and Winkler, then, have a very different notion of corporatism from that which is to be found in most of the current literature. The idea of ‘liberal’ or ‘societal’ corporatism stresses cooperation between the state and the functional groups, not domination by the state of these groups. At the same time the ’G. Lehmbruch, ‘Consociational Democracy, Clw Conflict and the New

Corporatism’, paper presented to the IPSA Round Table on Political Integration, Jerusalem 1974. pp. 1-2.

Panitch, op. cit., p. 5 .

Ibid., p. 4. One of the difficulties in discussing Pahl and W i d e r ’ s work is

corporatism’. Lehmbruch argues t K at the essential features of

degree of cooperation among these groups themselves in t a e

P

Pahl and Winkler, the major proponents of t a e idea that a

’ Pahl and Winkler, ‘Corporatism in Britain’, p. 3 .

their use of a number of alternative definitions of corporatism.

TRIPARTISM: REALITY OR MYTH? I97

emphasis in corporate thought upon the need to promote class harmony inevitably directs attention towards the groups which represent capital and labour. Of course this in turn means that there is a close identity between ‘societal’ or ‘liberal’ corporatism and the idea of tripartism which has received a great deal of attention in Britain in the last decade. This seems evident as the doctrine of tripartism emphasizes the need for cooperation between government and the peak organizations representing both sides of industry, the T U C and the CBI, in the evolution of economic and industrial policy. Indeed, tripartism might best be viewed as a sub-type of ‘liberal corporatism’. In a ‘liberal corporatist’ state the emphasis would be on the relationships between government and a wide range of functional groups, or at least between government and all organizations that re resent

the relationshi between government and the peak organizations.

closely related and by examining how far Britain has developed a tripartite system of economic and industrial policy making we hope to throw considerable light upon arguments about the develo ment of ‘liberal corporatism’ in Britain.

and tripartism. However, as yet we have offered only a cursory explanation of the notion of tripartism. Before we can examine the empirical problems we have set ourselves it is essential that we give a more precise formulation of that term.

It seems to us that an ideal-typical tripartite system would have a number of distinct characteristics:

capital and labour. In contrast the notion of tripartism emp K asizes

Nevertheless ‘ P iberal corporatism’ and tripartism do appear to be

We K ope that we have established a link between corporatism

I . Obviously it would involve three parties, here the government, the CBI and the TUC, interacting to evolve a commonly agreed industrial and economic policy within both formal and informal settings. 2. The system would be underpinned by a basic consensus: whilst there would be disagreement between the parties, such disagreement would be limited in its character and therefore capable of resolution. In particular, the parties involved would be willing to set aside any fundamental disagreements about ultimate goals in order to arrive at agreed solutions to specific problems. Without such a consensus there would seem to be little chance of arriving at policies which would be acceptable to all parties.

GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION 198

3. An effective tripartite system would not only involve elite accommodation. Such a system would involve the acceptance of decisions as authoritative by both leaders and members of the groups involved. The leaderships would have to be willing and able to persuade their memberships to comply with the agreed policies. Without acce tance of the olicies evolved under such a

successfully implementing olicy would be slight. 4. The three parties woulcfeach have similar degrees of influence on the evolution of policy, otherwise the system would be tripartite in name but not in effect. If one or two parties became dominant, then not only would the term ‘tripartism’ be a misnomer, but also the disadvantaged arty or parties would feel under no obligation to accept the agree B policies.

If these can be agreed as the main characteristics of a tripartite system, how far do we have a tripartite system in Britain? Has the government involved the CBI and the TUC in policy-making on a regular and continuing basis? Is there a consensus which can provide the basis for the formulation of economic and industrial policy? Are the CBI and the TUC capable of becoming pillars of some kind of British liberal corporatist state? How equivalent is the influence of government, TUC and CBI on economic policy making? In the rest of the article we shall examine these questions.

system by the mem 1 erships of t K e groups, the chances of

A DEVELOPING TRIPARTISM?

Since the formation of the CBI in 1965 both it and the TUC have enjoyed good access to government. However, there is no doubt that at present the continuing worsening of the economic situation in Britain has led the Labour government to attempt to involve both sides of industry more closely in the process of economic policy formation. The government has inevitably turned to the ‘peak organizations’ as the representatives of both sides of industry. All this might lead one to see tripartism both as a description of the current means of evolving economic and as a develo ing

relationshi between the three parties since the formation of the CBI does P ittle to indicate that any permanent basis for consensus between the three parties exists.

During the life of the Labour government fiom 1964 until 1970

olic trend. However, a consideration of t K L e c anging nature oPthe

TRIPARTISM: REALITY OR MYTH? 1 9 9

relationships between the government and the CBI and the government and the TUC deteriorated. The Labour government's relations with the CBI had initially been reasonably good, indeed the government, and George Brown in particular, had pressed hard for the formation of the organi~ation.~ However, when the government introduced its statutory prices and wages freeze, relations quickly worsened. The CBI found the provisions of the I 968 Industrial Expansion Act so objectionable that they refused to talk about it to the Labour government. The CBI was even more disturbed by proposals announced by the government in I@ for the creation of a Commission for Industry and Manpower which would take over the functions of the Monopolies Commission and the National Board for Prices and Incomes. The Commission would have been given powers to investigate situations of market dominance as well as of monopoly and would have been able to enquire into mer ers retrospectively. The CBI felt that the

government intervention in industry. At the same time, relations between the Labour government and

the TUC reached one of their lowest ebbs with the introduction of the government's roposals for the reform of industrial relations in

subsequently withdrawn, but their intro uction seriously damaged relations between the TUC and the Labour government for the rest of its term of ofice and beyond.'O The notion of tripartism was hardly likely to be popular or practical while such conflicts existed.

There is little doubt that initially relations between government and the CBI improved considerably after the return of a Conservative administration in 1970. Indeed, although the Conservative government came to pursue interventionist policies, the CBI itself, as we have shown elsewhere," came increasingly to accept, while tryin to contain, government intervention in

the CBI were not without their troubles. So, although the CBI saw their former Director-General, John Davies, assume

W. P. Grant and D. Marsh, The Contederotion of British Industry, Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1977, p. 25.

proposals would H ay the basis for an intolerable increase in

January 1969. T K e government's pro osals were, of course, B

industry.'* Neverthe 'i ess, relations between the government and

lo See P. Jenkins, The Battle ofDowning Street. Charles Knight, London, x970. I ' Grant and Marsh, a . rit., pp. I 56168. l2 Although this poec y met increasing resistance from the organization's

membership.

200 GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION

responsibility in 1970 for what to them was the key Department of Trade and Industry, they were faced two years later with the 1972 Industry Bill in which he proposed a more swee ing extension of

is perha s more significant is that the CBI was unaware of the full range o P implications of these proposals untd the Industry Bill itself was ublished in May 1972. One of the most significant pieces of 1egisLtion for the CBI since its formation came as a very unpleasant surprise to the organization. This was hardly a situation likely to deepen trust and understanding between the CBI and the g~vernment . '~

However, there can be little doubt that the real body blow to hopes of meaningful tripartism during the life of the 1970-74 Heath government came with the passage of the 1971 Industrial Relations Act. As Lord Watkinson, President of the CBI in 1976, has commented, 'No Prime Minister has ever devoted as much care and patience as Edward Heath did to seeking to bring about tripartite agreement . . . on the cure for Britain s economic ills. Had the Industrial Relations Act not soured relationships, the initiative might well have ~ucceeded.''~ Indeed, the Industrial Relations Act came close to marking an all-time low in government-trade union relations. The overnment may not have

the unions, and the TUC, viewed the legislation in this way. This meant that those who had taken a conciliatory line in the TUC, in the style of George Woodcock, were com letely outflanked. It

contact between the TUC and the government at any level. The subsequent abortive talks on a voluntary prices and incomes policy which took place in 1972, and later discussions, were undermined by 'the atmosphere' which existed between the TUC and the government. It was very difficult to conduct meaningful tripartite talks on key political and economic issues against such a background.

The advent of a Labour government after the February 1974 election changed the picture substantially. After its defeat in the 1970 election the Labour Party reviewed its relationshi with the

intervention into industry than anything previous P y enacted. What

set out to confront the trade unions but t a ere is no doubt at all that

also ensured that for two years there was litt P e, if any, meaningful

trade union movement. The institutional aspect o P the new "Grant and Marsh, op. cit . , pp. 15b168.

Viscount Watkinson, Blueprint for Industrial Survival, Allen and Unwin, London, 1976, p. 8 5 .

TRIPARTISM: REALITY OR MYTH?

relationship which developed was the TUC-Labour Party Liaison Committee established in 1972 which was composed of six senior members from the Parliamentary Labour Party, the National Executive Committee of the Labour Party and the General Council of the TUC. The liaison committee played a central role in the development of the social contract and in the shaping of the Labour Party’s two 1974 election manifestos. Thus when the Labour government came into ofice relations were extremely close between the overnment and the TUC. This closeness was

Trade Union and Labour Relations Act and the 1975 Employment Protection Act.15

In contrast the CBI’s relations with the new Labour overnment

could talk of ‘reversing’16 the government’s initial policies in the

of Britain which facilitated the development of some measure of consensus on economic policy between the government, the CBI and the TUC in the short term, a consensus cemented by common fears about the fate of sterling. At the same time, the three parties worked together in the tripartite a encies, the Manpower Services Commission, the Health anf Safety Commission and the Conciliation and Arbitration Council. These agencies directly involved the CBI and the TUC in the executive o erations of government.”

Our discussion so far in B icates that, while there is evidence of im roving relations between the government and both the TUC an s CBI since 1974, there can be little confidence that a genuinely tripartite system exists. In the past relations have improved at various times but harmony has not persisted for long. One of the problems is that however good bilateral relations between the government and the CBI and the overnment and the TUC have been, there has rarely been a g o o j working relationship between the CBI and the TUC. What is more, on those occasions when the

20 I

reflected in a num Q er of pieces of legislation, notably the 1974

began badly, but then improved rapidly to the extent tB at the CBI

changes in government economic strategy ment of an economic orthodoxy P

”The role of the trade unions is discussed more fully in D. Marsh and A. Smith, The Trade Unions Rule, O.K.?, Research Paper No. 4 of the Polytechnic of Central London School of Social Science and Business Studies.

CBI Annual Report, 1975, p. 7. ”Their origins, structure and role are discussed more fully in Grant and

Marsh, op. cit., Chapter 7.


CBI and the TUC have found a basis for agreement, they have often been at odds with the government. As Lord Watkinson recalls, ‘Under the pressure of the miners’ strike of 1973 . . . the CBI and the TUC were very close to an agreement that could have got the government off the hook of its statutory Phase 3 wages policy as a plied to the miners. But once again . . . the chance was missedl.18 Of course, governments may not wish to encourage too close a relationship between the CBI and the TUC. According to the Crossman Diaries, one argument used in a discussion of prices and incomes policy in March 1968 was that ‘the TUC and CBI would be driven to make a common fiont against [the government] if [the government] made any suggestion that the prices and incomes policy was a permanen~y’.’~

Even in 1976, when there was evidence that both parties had better contacts with the government, much of that contact was bi- partite rather than tripartite in nature. The real problem, of course, is that while some degree of consensus on immediate measures may exist at any given time, as seemed to be the case in 1976, there is no evidence of consensus upon long-term goals. Indeed, even during 1975-6, there has often been considerable disagreement on the desirability of certain immediate economic measures, such as the possible use of import

There must be doubt, then, whether the first two conditions s cified earlier have been fulfilled for whole, or even for part, of

other two conditions at some length, because such a discussion may help us to judge whether Britain is likely to become a tripartite state at some time in the future. In particular, it is important to establish whether the groups involved are suficiently representative, well organized and in control of their memberships to operate as component parts of a genuine tripartite system.

t r e period considered. Despite this, it is worth considering the

PILLARS OF TRIPARTISM: THE POSITION OF THE CBI A N D THE TUC

Both the CBI and the T U C are large interest groups with good l o Watkinson, op. c i r . , p. 8 5 . l9 R. Crossman, The Diaries ofu Cabinet Minister, Vol. 2 , Hamish Hamilton and

Jonathan Cape, London, 1976, p. 709. ’O The joint CBI-TUC statement on import controls issued in 1976 amounted

to little more than agreement on the necessity for a somewhat wider range of ‘anti-dumping’ measures than were being undertaken at the time.

TRIPARTISM: REALITY OR MYTH? 203

access to the government. There are over 1 3 0 unions affiliated to the TUC and the latest available figures show that TUC membership is over I I millions.2’ The TUC estimate that about fifiy per cent of the working population is unionized.22 These figures are impressive when compared with those for other ma or

over 10 million people, one half of the total outside central and local g~vernment.~‘ As Lord Watkinson has emphasized, the CBI

TABLE I

Membership ofthe CBI

European countries.23 The CBI represents businesses who emp i oy

At 31/12/1973 At 31/12/1974 At 31/12/1975

Industrial companies I I ,242 10,234 10,112 Commercial companies 3 79 425 488 Public sector members I 8 16 I S Employers’ organizations

Industrial/commercid companies 9 Not stated

and trade associations 196 172 163

‘primarily revolves at present around the pivot of the one hundred top manufacturing Indeed, approximately fifty er

companies in the top five hundred of The Times list of one thousand companies. As we can see from Table I , the membership of the CBI has significantly declined since 1974. In Table 2, the membership pattern since 1970 is more clear.

However, the decline in membershi is not as significant as

have discontinued their membership are smaller firms which seem unlikely to rejoin because since 1973 the membership subscri tions

firms who left in 1974 because they believed that the CBI was accepting increased government intervention in industry too passively have almost all rejoined as we predicted in an earlier

cent of the total income from the CBI comes fiom mem E er

might at first appear to be the case. T R e majority of firms who

have been substantially increased. The small number of P arger

” The Guardian, 4 September 1976. ‘’ lbid. ‘’ G . Smith, Politics in Western Europe, Methuen, London, 1972, p. 326. 24 The Road to Recovery, CBI, London, 1976. p. 7. ‘’ Watkinson, op. cit., p. 146.


article.26 For example, GKN which suspended its membership in a blaze of publicity in 1974 paid its subscription to remain a member in the following year.

Overall both organizations have substantial memberships which is one of the reasons why each has good access to government. Government can view them as representing important interests within society. Each group is a member of a large number of advisory bodies and is regularly consulted by departments on all major issues which concern it. In addition these two groups are the only ones which enjoy continuing access at the Cabinet leveLZ7

TABLE 2

Percentage Change in total CBI Membership

Strong memberships and good access might be taken to indicate that these groups are both representative and capable of becoming pillars of a tripartite state. However, both organizations have significant weaknesses.

Obviously, neither the CBI nor the TUC is fully representative of the interests which they purport to represent to government. The T U C has only about fifty er cent of the employed population in membership and no Becision taken by the TUC General Council is binding on individual member unions. It is true that the TUC, through the operation of Rules 1 1 , 12 and 1 3 , can notionally exercise considerable influence over its membership in that it can demand to be informed in advance of any major impending wage claims and sto pages involvin

settlement have been tried, but it can in reality do nothing to prevent determined dissident unions from proceeding with their

26 W. P. Grant and D. Marsh, ‘The Politics of the CBI: 1974 and After’, Vol. 10,1975, pp. 90-104, p. 103. Consortium have enjoyed access at this level, but their

f large number Of workers, and can prevent furt K er action unti other means of

TRIPARTISM: REALITY OR M Y T H ? 20s

intended courses of action. Dissident unions can be expelled by a vote of the whole congress, but the TUC is reluctant to use this sanction. Even if a union is expelled, the TUC will be unable to prevent it from taking strike action or from receiving unofficial support from other workers.

The TUC, then, cannot ensure that the leadership of individual unions acts upon General Council decisions. At the same time, the nature of British trade unions has changed considerably in the last two decades so that the individual union leadership cannot be sure that its membership will act upon its instructions. Indeed, as Fox stresses, ‘Britain has the strongest semi-inde ndent shop-floor

formulate propositions about corporate control with some care, in so far as they apply to the trade unions’.28 Of course, at an given

the TUC may be more or less able to persuade its members that a particular policy line is advantage~us .~~ However, the TUC’s financial resources are limited compared with its smaller European counter arts and the staff of Congress House is only around a hundre B strong with thirty officials in the TUC’s regional offices. The staff of the TUC is not really large enough to perform the range of tasks with which they are involved.

We have discussed the CBI’s internal divisions in an earlier article and it would be repetitious to examine them in detail here.30 However, some new developments require emphasis. The organization’s position in relation to the nationalized industries has been changed by the formation of a se arate group fiom the

by the resignation from the CBI of the Post Office, the largest employer among the nationalized industries. Moreover, the CBI has encountered increased competition from three reinvigorated organizations, the Association of British Chambers of Commerce, the British Institute of Management and the Institute of director^.^' There can be little doubt that these developments have weakened the CBI’s position. It is also important to re-emphasize’?

For example, in 1976 the TUC was able to ocesta I the t reatened seamens’

union organisation in the world; a fact w F ich obliges us to

time, the trade union movement may be more or less uni Y led and

chairmen of the state industries (the so-ca P led ‘Group of 21’) and

“ A. Fox, ‘The Corporate State - Reahty or Mjth’, of. n’r.,

3o Grant and Marsh, in Government and Opposition, op, n’t. ” For a discussion of these developments see J. Bruce-Gardyne, ‘who Spe&s

’’ Grant and Marsh, in Governmenr and Opposirion, op. n’t., pp. 91-2.

13.

strike.

for British Business?’, T h e Director, September 1975. pp. 26p271.


that the CBI is an organization which re resents industrial capital;

purposes, and the CBI cannot claim to represent finance capital. Even the CBI’s leadership admits the weaknesses of the

organization’s internal decision-making structure. Lord Watkinson has admitted ‘it is surprising . . . that the CBI actually represents anything. Its structure of a Grand Council and a large network of internal and often overlapping policy committees is not well suited to the making of long-term policy or to instant reaction to events.’” Lord Watkinson’s predecessor as President of the CBI, Ralph Bateman, identified ‘the need to make the CBI an even stronger body’” as one of his priorities and asked Lord Plowden and Sir John Partridge to examine the CBI’s methods of policy-making and its internal structure. Their report, published early in 1976, made a number of detailed recommendations such as a strengthening of the two deputy-directors general which have been discussed within the CBI. Lord Watkinson has made it clear that the ‘old CBI tradition of “representing” the views of its members to government and reacting to events is no longer appropriate. In a world where militancy and industrial muscle counts, the CBI too has to become militant and activist when it suits the interests of its members.’35

It is evident, then, that both the CBI and the TUC have weaknesses which make it doubtful whether they could hnction effectively as pillars of a tripartite system. They are strong groups with large memberships but they cannot purport to represent all important sections of society. Perhaps more important as far as the government is concerned, it is by no means certain that either

once it has entered into an agreement, can ensure that its grout mem ers accept that agreement as authoritative. Neither group is more than a coalition of more or less diverging interests.

although City institutions are members, t K is is primarily for liaison

THE BALANCE OF INFLUENCE Of course, even if no genuine consensus exists as a basis for tripartism, and if neither the CBI nor the TUC is really in a position to assume a role as a pillar of a tripamte state, this does not mean that the two groups do not have a substantial influence on industrial and economic policy.

33 Watkinson, op. cit . , p. 146. 34 CB1 AnnuulReport, 1975. p. 6 . 35 Watkinson, op. c i t . , p. 147.


Questions about a particular interest group’s influence are difficult (and sometimes im ossible) to answer, but this does not

or was imminent in Britain one would expect both the TUC and the CBI to be very influential. Yet the academic literature tends to play down the influence of these groups. For exam le, after a

politics, May and Moran conclude, ‘the evidence suggests that for all their access to Whitehall [the trade unions have been a

effect piecemeal changes in policy has been increased by frequent contacts with Government departments. But on the really important issues the unions have lost consistently.’j6 However, if the unions have lost, one cannot really say that the CBI has won. After a review of the activity of the CBI between 1965 and 1974, we ourselves concluded, ‘although the CBI is aIways prominent and sometimes influential, it is in no sense politically d~rninant’.~’

It is clear that the situation has changed somewhat since 1974. We have already argued that the access of both trade unions and the CBI to overnment has increased. At the same time, the

the Labour overnment. The development of the social contract

policy. The TUC-Labour Party liaison committee formed in 1972 played a major role in the development of the first two stages of the Labour government’s incomes policy. In addition, the Trade Union and Labour Relations Act in 1974 which repealed the Conservatives’ Industrial Relations Act of 1971, the 1975 Employment Protection Act and the 1976 Trade Union and Labour Relations (Amendment) Act were all products of discussions with the TUC, particularly within the liaison committee.”

However, it may also be argued that the influence of the CBI has increased. Thus, the tax relief on stock appreciation negotiated by the CBI has added some 2,000 million a year to corporate

imply that they should not fJ e posed. If a tripartite system existed

survey in 1973 of the role of the trade unions in mo B ern British

relatively unsuccessful pressure group. No doubt t E, eir capacity to

influence oft a e TUC increased dramatically with the accession of

meant that t a e trade unions were influential in the evolution of

profitability and the series of 5 c anges in the Price Code made in

y, T. May and M. Moran, ‘Trade Unions as Pressure Groups’, N e w Society, 6

’’ Grant and Marsh, Confideration ofBritish Industry, op. cit., p. 217. September 1973, pp. 570-573. p. 573.

See L. Minkin, ‘The British Labour Party and the Trade Unions: Crisis and Compact’, Industrial and Labour Relations Review, October 1974, pp. 7-37.


1976 could improve company profitability by as much as L I , ~ O O millions. One might also contrast the 1972 Industry Act passed by the Conservatives with Labour’s 1975 Industry Act. The 1972 Industry Act contained a number of unpleasant surprises for the CBI, particularly the proposals on selective assistance contained in Part 2. Although the CBI received a number of ‘welcome assurance^"^ from the government, it cannot be said to have influenced the contents of the Act in any substantial way. In contrast, the CBI felt that its cam aign against the 1975 Industry

compulsory disclosure of information and the Government’s recognition of the need for guidelines for the National Enterprise Board’.40 Both the content of the guidelines and statements made by Eric Varley, Secretary of State for Industry, and Lord Ryder, chairman of the National Enterprise Board, seemed desi ned to

like the kind of state intervention represented by the National Enterprise Board, but it can console itself with the thought that, to some extent, the tiger has been tamed.

These substantial, specific concessions have to be set alongside the change in the Labour government’s overall economic strate y

extent to which this change of policy was due to CBI pressure and to what extent it was due to pressure from the City of London and the international financial community. One would have to take some account of the press campaign against Mr Benn and the result of the referendum. Moreover, to understand what has happened betwecn 1974 and the present, one needs to understand the nature of the British Labour Party; one needs to know how its leaders see the world and what their personal priorities are in relation to economic and social policy.42 In other words, one has to take account of sources of pressure other than the CBI and, above all, one has to consider the nature of the target of the pressure.

Perhaps the lesson the CBI has learned from its first ten years is that ‘the Confederation is now seeing the necessity of acting more

’’ CBI Annual Report, 1972, p. I I . 4” CBI Annual Reporr, 1975. p. 1 3 . 4’ See. for example, E. Varley, ‘The Enactment of the Industry Bill’, Trude and

Industry, 2 1 November 1975, p. 474. For an apposite comment on this point see R. H. S. Crossman, The Diaries .f

a Cabinut Minister, Vol. I , Hamish Hamilton and Jonathan Cape, London, 1975, p. 1 5 s .

Bill ‘contributed towards amen s ments to the provisions for

allay industrialists’ fears about the board’s role.“ The CBI f oes not

since it came into ofice. Of course, it is difficult to estimate t a e


to influence policy and events in advance and of taking a more political line where this is nece~sary’.~~ Certainly, the CBI has been outspoken in its criticisms of overnment olicy since 1974. O n its

the political arena than most of us would normally have Its leadership made a number of outspoken attacks on government policy, although it did not act on a suggestion from some of its members that it should publicly comment on the manifestos of the three political parties in the October 1974 election. As the government modified its policies, the CBI’s attacks moderated. However, it would seem that the organization is paying more attention to influencing public opinion than was previously the case. During 1975 the CBI held over fifty press conferences and 250 industrialists have now been through its ‘television familiarization’ courses.45 Lord Watkinson has emphasized, ‘the CBI must try successfully to influence the general public and the electorate as a way of supporting the longer-term policy objectives which it will be promoting in the NEDC and directly with g ~ v e r n m e n t ’ . ~ ~

One indication of the organization’s new concern with the development of long-term policy objectives and publicizing these objectives to a wide audience is the publication in October 1976 of the CBI’s ‘manifesto’, The Road to Re~overy .~’ This sets out the organization’s proposals for ‘making the mixed economy, broadly as we have it, When considering the likely relationship between a future Conservative overnment and the CBI, it is

Party’s policy statement, The Right Approach. The Conservative Party has commented that ‘in many respects The Road to Recover echoes the sentiments expressed in the Conservative Party s statement of aims’.49 Certainly, both documents are evasive on the subject of incomes policy. The Conservatives state that ‘our purpose must be to exclude the need for any further resort to a formal incomes policy’;5o the CBI states that ‘precise proposals [on

own admission ‘during 1974 t a e CBI was s rawn much further into

interesting to compare the CBI f ocument with the Conservative

Y

‘I Watkinson, op. cit., p. 88. “ CBl AnnualReport, 1974, p. 4. ‘5 CBI AnnualReport, 1975, p. 5 .

Watkinson, op. c i t . , p. 148. ” CBI, Road to Recovery, op. cit.

Ihid., p. 6. 49 Politia Today , H November 1976, p. 363. sa The Right Approach, Conservative Central Otfice, London, 1976, p. 38.


incomes policy] might not be helpful to our long-term aim of securing a radical reform of our pay determination The CBI are, however, rather more specific than the Conservatives about the expenditure cuts they would like to see (housing subsidies, public transport subsidies, commercial charging for certain education services). The CBI places rather more emphasis than the Conservatives on the role of the trade unions and compliments them on their ‘less inflexible’ attitude.52

Regardless of which party is in power, when it comes to influencing the broad sha e of economic policy, both the CBI and

narrows the range of possible policy options, by the government’s determination to pursue whatever happens to be its economic strategy at the time, and by the government’s need to secure the cooperation of other parties, including particularly foreign holders of sterling. So after its initially dramatic influence when the Labour government came to power, the influence of the TUC has substantially declined as the government has responded to other pressures. Thus, despite constant efforts, the TUC has been unable so far to persuade the government to introduce wide-ranging import controls, to take any reflationary measures designed to reduce unemployment, or to restrict cuts in public expenditure.

The crucial point is that it is the government which has the ultimate responsibility and is accountable to the electorate. Sectional groups may sometimes be able to frustrate government policy, but they cannot determine its course in the long run. Governments have to take much more than the views of the CBI and TUC into account when formulating economic policies, not least some estimate of likely electoral consequences (especially when the government has a slim Parliamentary majority). One also hardly needs to emphasize that a wide range of external forces and circumstances constrain the government in its choice of economic policy options. If the groups feel that they are getting little in return for their general sup ort of government economic policy, they may become increasing y sce tical about the value of

time of economic difficulty the CBI and TUC may be incorporated increasingly into the process of governmental decision-making on economic questions, without a consensus on

the TUC are limited by t K e way in which the state of the economy

entering into tripartite arrangements. 5 All t is means that while at a

” Road to Recovery, op. cit., p. 72. ’’ Ibid., p. 19.

TRIPARTISM: REALITY OR MYTH?

means and ends they are unlikely to become pillars of a tripartite or liberal corporatist state.

21 I

CONCLUSION

The belief that a tripartite solution to Britain’s economic problems is possible has been a recurrent feature of political debate since 1964.~’ However, it cannot be said that Britain has at any time in this period experienced a tripartite system which ap roximates to

might seem that in the period from 197s to the time of writing (December 1976) there has been increased contact between the government, TUC and CBI, but it seems doubtful whether this quasi-tripartite system will survive for long. This is not to say that tripartism is unimportant; at the very least, the attachment of so many decision-makers to the tripartite formula precludes the pursuit of other ossible policy options.

liberal cor oratism our evidence seems to throw considerable

liberal corporate state. In addition our material makes it difficult to consider Britain as a state corporatist system in the sense developed by Pahl and Winkler. Undoubtedly there has been an increase in government intervention into industry and the economy. However it is difficult to see the emer ence of the attern of

envisage will be introduced in Britain by 1980.” The government may have more influence on the direction of economic policy than either the CBI or the TUC. However, this does not mean that Britain approximates to a system of state corporatism. Indeed, we have shown that the government’s decisions are influenced by the CBI and the TUC. In addition, the government’s autonomy is constrained by other British interests, notably the City and by actors external to the system.

1964. Howcver, this article has been concerned with the period since 1964.

the characteristics described at the beginning of t R e article. It

If we accept t g at there is a close identity between tripartism and

doubt on t K e idea that Britain is, or in future will develop into, a

private ownership and state control w a ich Pahl an c f Winkler

53 This is not to say, of course, that the notion of ‘tripartism’ first emerged in

54 Pahl and Winkler, in Challenge, op. c i t . , p. 28.

Tripartism: Reality or Myth?

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