The Politics of Irregular Migratory Flows in the Mediterranean Basin: Economy, Mobility and...

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The Politics of Irregular Migratory Flows in theMediterranean Basin: Economy, Mobility and ‘Illegality’Ahmet İçduygu a

a Department of International Relations , Koç University , Istanbul, TurkeyPublished online: 26 Sep 2007.

To cite this article: Ahmet İçduygu (2007) The Politics of Irregular Migratory Flows in the Mediterranean Basin: Economy,Mobility and ‘Illegality’, Mediterranean Politics, 12:2, 141-161, DOI: 10.1080/13629390701373945

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The Politics of Irregular MigratoryFlows in the Mediterranean Basin:Economy, Mobility and ‘Illegality’

AHMET ICDUYGUDepartment of International Relations, Koc University, Istanbul, Turkey

ABSTRACT Because of the irregular migration flows and use of irregular labour in theireconomies, most Mediterranean countries of southern Europe face administrative battles overthe issue of so-called migration management. The main aim of this article is to elaborate howseveral countries of the northern Mediterranean Basin have experienced irregular migrationflows in the past decade. Particular attention is devoted to the process in which, wheneconomies are in need of labour, international labour flows might be inevitable even if therelated rhetoric and policies towards immigration are unsympathetic. This is debated hereover the triad of economy, mobility and ‘illegality’.

Introduction

It is often said that the history of the Mediterranean Basin is important in

understanding the origin and evolution of Western and Eastern civilizations. It is

within this context that one of the most striking issues that has marked international

affairs in the course of this past decade, and to a great extent the development of

international relations in the southern region of Europe, has been international

migration in the Mediterranean Basin. In other words, the nature of the migratory

movements around the Mediterranean is important in exploring the mechanisms and

dynamics of the international migratory regimes in other parts of the world, and of

their relationships. Surrounded by the Mediterranean Sea and covered by portions of

the three old continents, Africa, Asia and Europe, historically the Mediterranean

Basin has always been central to the global migratory movements (King, 1997,

1998, 2000; Ribas-Mateos, 2005).

Beyond this historical legacy, the Mediterranean Basin today stands as one of the

well-recognized geographical zones of the globe which has its own mark on

1362-9395 Print/1743-9418 Online/07/020141-21 q 2007 Taylor & Francis

DOI: 10.1080/13629390701373945

Correspondence Address: Ahmet Icduygu, Director, Migration Research Program (MiReKoc),

Deptartment of International Relations, Koc University, Rumeli Feneri Yolu, 34450, Sariyer-Istanbul,

Turkey. Email: [email protected]

Mediterranean Politics,Vol. 12, No. 2, 141–161, July 2007

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the global international migratory regimes operating between South and North, and

East and West. What distinguishes the current involvement of the Basin in the

related migratory regimes from its predecessors are the types and patterns of these

migratory flows. ‘Irregular migration’ is one of the main forms of mobility regimes

in the region today (Baldwin-Edwards and Arango, 1999; Baldwin-Edwards, 2002;

Icduygu and Unalan, 2002). While thousands of irregular migrants are ‘illegally’

crossing borders mostly from the southern and eastern parts of the Basin to the

northern and western parts, or as they are ‘informally’ working in the economies of

southern Europe, it appears that two related things, rather paradoxically but at the

same time in a complementary fashion, are happening. On the one hand, in a market-

driven environment of migratory regimes in the Basin, there are complementarities

between the economies which are in need of labour and the economies that have

surplus labour. As a result, then, labour flows occur from the latter to the former.

On the other hand, however, since many material conditions in the state control of

borders and labour markets make free international migration unviable in the region,

many of these migrant labourers find themselves in a situation where although they

violate the rules of border-crossings, or of residence and work permits, they are still

able to migrate to and work in these economies. In short, when national economies

need labour, it seems that it often becomes irrelevant to think of the status of labour

in these economies as if they are regular or irregular: indeed, the case of the

Mediterranean Basin amply illustrates this tendency.

Since the Second World War, southern Europe, or the northern shores of

Mediterranean Basin, has undergone a drastic transformation through which the

countries of the region have become more prosperous and developed. There is no

doubt that international migration has played a significant role in this transformation.

Initially, these countries were emigration countries that exported their labour to the

relatively more developed parts of the globe, and they have in return received

the positive impact of emigration over their economic development. However,

particularly after the European Union enlargement into the region, the migration-

related roles of many southern European countries have changed remarkably: today

almost all of these countries are immigration or transit countries rather than simply

emigration ones (Icduygu and Unalan, 2002; Baldwin-Edwards, 2005).

What seems ironic is that while most of the southern European countries on the

Mediterranean shores together with other EU countries tend to be advocating or

actually adopting a range of restrictive controls against the incoming migrant flows,

their economies are able to absorb thousands of irregular migrants without any

unbearable confrontation. Often relying on a restrictionist rhetoric of fewer benefits

but higher costs of immigration, which in itself precludes a so-called rational

assessment of immigration flows, these states emphasize that there is a need for

continuous and strong intervention to restrict and regulate migration flows. On the

other hand, however, mostly within a liberal frame of economic rationality, it

appears that as these economies start to experience labour shortages, concerns about

the availability of labour in domestic markets arise, and consequently calls for

immigrant labour increase. In addition to all these developments, thousands of

irregular migrants pour into these countries, and become highly functional to

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the needs of economies there. Even if initially they are irregular migrants, they

eventually become regularized ones. Both in public and academic debates, this

migratory picture is constantly justified by reference to the argument that relatively

free migration has not accelerated at a pace comparable to relatively free-trade flows

and free-capital movements. Indeed, this may imply that the conservative positions

of nation-states towards immigration still persist prominently in this age of large-

scale, accelerated globalization.

The primary aim of this article is to document how five countries of the northern

Mediterranean shores – Portugal, Spain, France, Italy and Greece – have

experienced irregular migration flows in the past decade, primarily focusing on the

regularization programmes that are designed to normalize the anomalies of irregular

migration. Particular attention is devoted to the fact that when economies are in need

of labour, international labour flows seem to be inevitable even if the related rhetoric

and policies adopt an unsympathetic stance towards immigration. This is debated

here over the triad of economy, mobility and ‘illegality’. It is argued that when some

economies demand labour and other economies are suffering from labour surplus,

we should expect to see labour mobility between these economies. However, by

having various political concerns as states tend to control borders and limit the

mobility of labour across borders, this may result in the emergence of ‘illegal’

migrants. ‘Illegality’ refers here to an assumption that international migration or

employment of migrants must be operating in defiance of the regulations of

territorial national governments. In reality, however, today this assumption is highly

questionable. As will be clear throughout this essay, the fine line between ‘legality’

and ‘illegality’ has become more blurred as contemporary forms of international

labour migration evolve in the global economy. This is exemplified by the presence

of millions of irregular migrants around the world who are floating between

‘legality’ and ‘illegality’ almost every day.

The Mediterranean Basin Today: Prone to Irregular International Migration

Particularly in the last decade, irregular arrivals from the south and east of the

Mediterranean Basin have become one of the most important immigration issues of

concern to countries in southern Europe. Various sources estimate the presence of

hundreds of thousands of irregular migrants in these countries, and even after the

application of several regularization programmes, several sources put the figures as

high as 700,000 in Italy, 500,000 in Greece, 500,000 in France, 400,000 in Spain,

and 200,000 in Portugal (IOM, 2000a; OECD, 2004). Some of these migrants

entered through ‘illegal’ means, but a large portion of them entered legally but failed

to depart when their visas expired. At the outset we need to clarify the term

irregular.1 Irregular is used here to connote people who are often defined as

‘illegals’ (Cohen, 1997: 1). The notion of irregular not only implies political

correctness but it also refers to a factual position: there is a diversity in the types of

migrants under this labelling. What we term irregular migration often takes two

different forms: (a) deliberate illegal entering, and (b) overstaying after the expiry of

a visa. Another group involves those who enter under a proper visa but violate its

Migratory Flows in the Mediterranean Basin 143

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terms, usually by working. In addition to these, there are also rejected asylum

seekers who continue to stay in the country of application (Tapinos, 2000).

Being peripheral to the core of Europe, the Mediterranean Basin has always been

an integral part of European migration regimes, but with varying roles. From the

1950s to the 1970s, as their post-war economies grew, Western European countries

responded to a shortage of labour by recruiting workers from the Mediterranean

countries – firstly, from Spain, Portugal, Italy and Greece, and then from

Yugoslavia, Turkey, Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria. In the 1980s and 1990s, as Italy,

Spain, Portugal and Greece integrated economically and politically into Europe,

migratory movements in the Mediterranean changed from a south-to-north direction

to a mostly east-to-west direction in the Basin. While almost all countries on the

northern shores of the Mediterranean became countries of immigration, those of the

southern and eastern shores were still countries of emigration. In these recent

migration flows in the region, irregular migration has become one of the dominant

modes of immigration. Given the fact that irregular entrants and overstayers do not

see the southern European countries as their final destination, and some appear to be

heading to the other countries in Europe, Mediterranean-based irregular migration

has begun provoking Europe’s long-standing immigration-induced anxiety in recent

decades (Duvell, 2005). It is obvious that as migration-related fears and security

issues have become dominant and have led to the notion of building a ‘Fortress

Europe’, the position of the Mediterranean region, which operates as a gate for

immigration flows to the core of Europe, has become an issue of concern.

A key question in this context is how to take a hard look at the various implications

of the increasing irregular migration in the Mediterranean Basin. As noted above, the

recent history of the Mediterranean region has been marked by significant migratory

movements at every stage. Features of contemporary regular and irregular migration

in many respects mirror those of the past. Therefore, the conventional starting point is

that irregular migrants are mobilized by a range of push factors at home and pull

factors at the destination, but one should of course pay attention to the complex

interplays of origin, transit and destination countries that form a regularity migratory

regime which operates within certain interests and distributes powers and advantages

or disadvantages in international, or transnational, settings. From a political economy

perspective, the incompatibility between the restrictive immigration policies of the

receiving countries and the high mobility potential of emigrants on the one side, and

the compatibility between labour demand from these immigration countries and

labour supply from emigrants, are main factors causing irregularmigration. There is a

discrepancy between the immigration policies adopted by the receiving countries and

the needs and expectations of their labour markets. The governments want to admit

more professionals and entrepreneurs, while the labour markets and employers wish

to have cheap labourers. As noted byMinghuan (2004: 2), ‘Such conflict between the

policy orientation and the demands of the market have created opportunities for

large numbers of unskilled labourers to stream into develop countries through

“irregular migration”’.

From an analytical perspective, there are two main arguments behind irregular

migration flows in the Mediterranean region and elsewhere.2 One claims that it

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occurs because the possibilities of regular migration have diminished, ‘as more

stringent entry controls force migrants into using illegal channels’ (Salt, 2000: 32).

The other says that loose control mechanisms of entries, visas, and work and

residence permits have made it easier for immigrants to enter and live in the

receiving countries without legal bases. Although the main argument in this essay

supports the former line of reasoning, as far as the related theorizing and empirical

research findings are concerned, the picture of irregular migration is still vague.

Partly by its nature and partly because of the lack of sound data, some aspects of

irregular migration are still relatively unknown. What we know is often merely a bit

more than speculation. The analysis and discussion here intend to go beyond

speculation and description.

How to See Irregular Migration: Some Theoretical and Analytical Concerns

There exist a range of new global contexts that affect how we think about irregular

migration and how we experience irregular movements of people around the world.

It is widely argued that the very elements of globalization that make migration easier

also make it more problematic (Weinner, 1996; Gungwu, 1997; Miller, 1997;

Hollifield, 1998; Sassen, 1998; Collinson, 1999; Icduygu and Keyman, 2000). There

are three main arguments on this linkage between contemporary globalization and

irregular migration. First, advanced communications and transportation technology

bring a level of transnationalism never before experienced. National borders and

territories together with citizens of many nation-states have been exposed to many

disorderly migrations as well as orderly ones more than ever. Second, a weakened

sense of community at local and national levels contributes to increasingly

uncontrollable and irregular mobility of individuals and their families. More and

more people have found themselves in an environment of insecurity where they can

easily get detached from their roots and violate legal restrictions. Third, economic

globalization and trends in postnational settings affect the dynamics of the labour

market around the world. International migration seems to be now more than ever a

‘function of changes in the international division of labour and reconstructing of the

global economy, which entails rapid and massive movements of productive factors,

including capital and labour’ (Hollifield, 1998: 34). Our ‘global settings’

increasingly require new types of flows of capital, goods, services, information

and people, which often fall short of the regulatory reach of the nation-state

particularly in relation to the immense flows of people among countries. It is often

argued that globalization ‘transcends the territorial borders of states’ and, as a

consequence, ‘profoundly affects the nature and functions of state of governance in

the world political economy, including of course, the governance of migration’

(Collinson, 1999: 6). It is obvious that the issue of irregular migration is deeply

related to the issue of ‘governance of migration’.

In addition to these three points mentioned above as they are embedded in the

linkage between globalization and irregular migration, what makes this linkage even

more complicated is the position of nation-states. As noted by Hollifield (1998: 34),

states are becoming less likely to take the possible risks of migration any more.


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Most of the nation states emphasize that there is a need for ‘migration management’.

Relying on restrictionist policies and practices, migrant-receiving countries have

often tended to develop a range of restrictive control systems for incoming migration

flows. Even more drastic measures are planned, and in fact realized, intending to

diminish the number of people attempting to enter or stay ‘illegally’. Despite these

efforts, however, it is a fact that ‘in absolute numbers immigration levels are at or

near historic highs’ in many developed countries (Papademetriou, 1998: 15).

Contrary to the restrictionists’ rhetoric and actions that have intensified in many

public, political and scholarly debates on immigration in the migrant-receiving

countries, both regular and irregular immigration continue to grow. From this point,

then, the question of how to explain the trends in the immigration flows gains

importance. In particular, the question of rising disorderly migration flows deserves

explanation. There are mainly two levels of discussion.

First, friction between the rising contemporary dynamics of globalization and the

persisting traditional structure of nation-state is part of the answer that we can offer

to this question. Increases in irregular migration, which might be considered as

anomie in the established international migratory regimes, emerges partly as a result

of the friction between local (national) and global (transnational/postnational)

interests. Fundamental to this anomie is the clash between the anti-migration

resistance of statist approaches and the pro-migration position of globalizing trends.

It appears that as far as contemporary international migration flows are concerned,

statist concerns are not sufficient to deal effectively with societal and economic

problems, such as irregular migration whose conditions of existence are increasingly

formed by the processes of globalization. Overall nation-state-based immigration

policies and practices are not easy-going in the sense that they fail to take into

account global/local social and economic changes in order to deal with newly

emerging migration patterns. On the other hand, it would be a mistake to think of

globalization as an easy-going process. On the contrary, it is beset by contradictions,

clashes and crises. As Shaw (1994) argues, embedded in the processes of

globalization are global crises (seen in a wide range of areas from economics to the

environment) and also a set of clashes between the global and the local – here which

occur in the distinct form of immigration, especially irregular migration.

Globalization amounts to the idea that it is no longer possible to think of

international migration only with reference to the national and border-based

territorial constitution of societal affairs. Instead, it is necessary to take into account

the unprecedented increase and changing global mobility of people across borders.

In short, while the cumulative effect of globalization forces is essential in generating

and facilitating legal and irregular migration, there are also countervailing pressures

tending to constrain migration drastically (UNRISD, 2001). It makes sense,

therefore, to look at the real economic implications of irregular migration for the two

main actors, namely migrants themselves and the receiving states.

This last point brings us to the second level of explanation about irregular

migration, which concerns the uneven acculturation of migration actors in the

globalized migration regimes. While one set of these actors, international migrants,

are becoming increasingly globalized in terms of their active position in the newly

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formed international migratory regimes, the other actor, migrant-receiving nation-

states, have slow and more reluctant paces in the globalized migration processes.

The former is far better incorporated into the process of increasing interconnected-

ness between societies, in which the intensification of social relations through the

global/local nexus dismantles the national and territorial constitution of social

action. While anxiety about irregular migration has risen, particularly among

the richer nation-states that are the destination of many migrants, the economic

(to a certain extent even social) settings of these states are somehow absorptive

enough of the irregular migrants. Large numbers of irregular migrants are able to

incorporate themselves into the social and economic environments of the receiving

countries. In short, many economies in the developed world are still absorptive of

migrant labour, often even preferring or tolerating the irregular migrants.3 While this

clear absorption is occurring, hardening immigration barriers against the increased

pressure to migrate are also developing. Thus, the consequences are anomalous, but

also apparently compatible with the international migration market conditions,

making millions of people irregular migrants around the world. At this point, taking

the key position of individual migrants into consideration, an elaboration of irregular

migration should not be confined to the migrants alone, but rather their articulation

into the irregular migration process. It is within this context that one has to deal with

the position of irregular migrants in the migratory process – focusing on the

question of how more and more potential (irregular) migrants are emerging, while

there is nowhere for them to migrate in a orderly manner (but many places to go to in

a disorderly manner). The intrinsic globalization of labour in the contemporary

world political economy, in other words, has not been matched by the real

globalization of the nation-state system on ideological and political levels. Nation-

states remain ideologically and politically very much tied to the territorial world

system, with practices restricting immigration as tightly as at any point in the past.

In this context of closely interacting globalizing and localizing migration

processes and forces, one has to deal with the position of individual irregular

migrants as a function of complex global and local migration processes, networks,

and labour markets and channels whose features are so central to the whole issue of

irregular migration. In the case of irregular migration, migration has become less of

a medium for holding a state-based controlled national business; instead, migration

flows tend to be an arena of collaboration and competition among individual

interests in the global political economy. Often irregular migrants associate in some

circumstances with non-territorial processes, identities and authorities, but in other

circumstances they remain firmly territorially-oriented.4 From that point on one can

argue that theoretical and analytical attention should be paid to exploring various

ways in which individual international migrants, first as non-territorial entities

and then as territorial ones, are articulated into the irregular migration processes.

This highlights the primary analytical importance of the labour market status of

individual irregular migrants in elaborating and understanding the totality

of irregular migration.

It seems that as far as the irregular migration flows are concerned states are

anything but impotent in the face of contemporary globalization. But the end of


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the statist type of sovereignty has not marked the end of state power. In other words,

the existence of irregular migration has not meant the end of the state. Just as

territoriality has remained important with the passing of territorialism, so states have

remained important with the passing of statism (Scholte, 2004: 9). Whatever new

world order might be emerging in the course of the linkage between contemporary

globalization and international migration, the state remains a major part of it. But

there is no doubt that the modern state is perpetually ‘in motion, evolving, adapting,

and incorporating always in some condition of transition’ (Scholte, 2004: 9).

Having approached theoretically and analytically the link between the processes

of globalization and the nature of irregular migration, we will now turn our attention

to the Mediterranean case to demonstrate historically and empirically the way in

which irregular migration has occurred in recent decades.

Irregular Migration in the Mediterranean Basin: An Overview

Since the early 1990s the Mediterranean Basin has been at the crossroads of irregular

migratory flows (Baldwin-Edwards and Arango, 1999; Baldwin-Edwards, 2002,

2005; Ribas-Mateos, 2005). These flows are not wholly new phenomena, but they

have gained unprecedented impetus in the last decade. Almost all countries on the

northern shores of the Basin, in other words southern Europe, have increasingly

become home for hundreds of thousands of irregular immigrants, while the southern

and eastern shores have continuously sent hundreds of thousands of irregularmigrants

to the northern shores. National and international press report cases of irregular

migration almost every day;5 and the public, policy makers and experts hotly debate

the issue with an intensifying interest.6 Of course, all these debates are not only

confined to the irregular migration flows, but also related to the regularmigrants in the

receiving countries.

As noted earlier, the extreme diversity of irregularmigration,which accommodates

various categories of people and movements such as ‘illegal entries’, ‘overstayers’

and ‘rejected asylum seekers’, makes it even more difficult than one can assume. In

general, no accurate figures exist on irregular migration and migrants anywhere

around the world. southern Europe, or the Mediterranean Basin, is no exception. But

some indirect and indicative figures are available. Some figures that reflect an

overview of irregular migration in the migrant-receiving countries of the south of

Europe have been compiled here. Estimates place the upper limit of irregularmigrants

in Europe at over 5 million in the early 2000s, as compared to around 2 million in the

early 1990s (IOM 2000a: 198, 2000b: 12; Koser, 2007: 59). More than half of these

migrants seem to be residing in five southern European countries: Portugal, Spain,

France, Italy and Greece. It is clear that the scale of irregular migration in these

countries, as a part of European-wide irregularmigration, is very significant. As noted

earlier, not all these irregularmigrants are the subjects of illegal entries, becausemany

are overstayers.

The characteristics of irregular migratory flows to each single country

are complex and varied but there is also a common frame to these flows in

the Mediterranean Basin. These flows have two main forms of movement.7

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The first one involves the flows that originate from the countries located in the

south and east of the Basin (such as Egypt, Morocco, Algeria and Turkey) and

arrive in the countries on its north shores (Portugal, Spain, France, Italy and

Greece). These migrants attempt either to establish their lives in the countries of

southern Europe or to re-migrate further north to central or northern Europe, or

even to other parts of the developed world. The second form of migration comes

either from the neighbouring countries to the south and east of the Mediterranean

Basin (such as Senegal and Iraq), or even from Asia (such as Pakistan, Bangladesh

and Afghanistan) and Africa (such as Nigeria, Congo and Somalia). There are in

addition irregular Portuguese- or Spanish-speaking migrants originating from

South America who arrive in their fatherland, the Iberian Peninsula. Several

migrants in this group also arrive with the intention of working in the countries of

southern Europe, but some also use these countries as a transit zone in an attempt

to go to the south, and then to other parts of Europe. It is already documented that

the main sea routes in the irregular migratory system in the Mediterranean Basin

are:8 (a) from the Maghreb directly to the southern coast of Spain, or via Melilla

and Ceuta; (b) from Turkey to Greece, Sicily, or mainland Italy; (c) from the

south-eastern Adriatic coast to Italy, and especially Puglia; and, (d) from Egypt

(or the Maghreb via Tunisia) to Sicily or mainland Italy, sometimes via Malta. As

far as trafficking and smuggling9 are concerned, besides these sea passages, there is

air travel and transport by land carrying thousands of people into the southern

European countries. Usage of these modes of transportation is varied, recently with

sea transport somewhat more frequent than transport by land, which is more often

used than air travel (Pugh, 2000: 13). However, smugglers periodically change

their routes and mode of transportation, adapting them to the preventive measures

taken by state authorities. For instance, as the Spanish security forces are cracking

down on the Strait of Gibraltar, there has been a striking drop in smuggling or

trafficking to Apulia and Calabria, but a huge increase to Sicily – and Libya seems

to be a point at which many boats are launching north.10

In the past decade almost all of the northern Mediterranean countries have

introduced regularization programmes in which hundreds of thousands of irregular

migrants are able to normalize their status in the host countries. These programmes

provide us with important information concerning the number of irregular migrants

and their characteristics.11 For instance, in 2001–02, the Portuguese government

launched a regularization programme for irregular migrants with employment

contracts: consequently 134,000 residence permits were issued. Most of these

irregular migrants were Eastern Europeans, Brazilians, and people from the

Portuguese-speaking African countries. In 2004 another programme provided

ground for further regularization of irregular migrants who could prove they were

present in the Portuguese labour market before March 2003 (see Table 1). There

were around 47,000 applicants but only 3,000 foreigners had received work permits

by 2006.

In 2005, the estimated number of irregular immigrants in Spain was over 1.2

million (Arango and Jachimowicz, 2005). Given the fact that there were 2.5 million

registered immigrants in this country in 2000 (OECD, 2005: 253), the ratio of


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irregular migrants to registered migrants was one to two. In the last two decades,

there were six regularization programmes for irregular migrants residing there, of

whom a total of more than 1 million have been regularized: over 40,000 in 1985–86,

110,000 in 1991, 21,000 in 1996, 164,000 in 2000, 235,000 in 2001, and 560,000 in

2005 (see Table 1). The last three regularization programmes were very

comprehensive and were made against a background of strong employment growth

and persisting unemployment. The Maghreb, South America and various African

countries were the main sources of these irregular migration flows. After 2000, new

legislation on immigration and immigrants in Spain promoted the integration of

immigrants already living in the country and strengthened controls and sanctions on

irregular migration and the irregular employment of foreigners.

Estimates of the total number of irregular migrants in France run as high as 500,000.

Unlike Spain, Italy, andGreece, the borders – not the shores – are themain gates for the

irregular migrants arriving in France. Mainly because of the distance of the trans-

Mediterranean sea passage,most boat people come to France in stages via the islands of

Lampedusa and then Sicily and mainland Italy, or via Spain. France has quite an

effective working system to guard its sea and shores (Pugh, 2000: 19). In the 1997–98

Table 1. Regularization of irregular migrants in the Northern Mediterranean countries

Year Regularizations

France1981–82 121,000 (immigrants)1997–98 78,000 (immigrants)

Greece1997–98 371,000 (immigrants)2001 351,000 (applications)

2001–04 228,000 (immigrants)Italy

1987–88 119,000 (immigrants)1990 218,000 (immigrants)1996 245,000 (immigrants)1998 217,000 (immigrants)2002 704,000 (applications)2004 650,000 (immigrants)

Portugal1992–93 39,200 (immigrants)1996 21,800 (immigrants)

2001–02 134,000 (immigrants)2004 47,000 (applications)

Spain1985–86 43,800 (applications)1991 110,000 (immigrants)1996 21,300 (immigrants)2000 164,000 (immigrants)2001 235,000 (immigrants)2005 560,000 (immigrants)

Sources: OECD, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005.

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regularization programme, there were 143,000 irregular migrants who applied for

regularization of their status, but only 78,000 of them received approval (OECD, 2001:

179) (see Table 1). The largest number of applicants were Moroccans, Algerians and

Malians, followed by Congolese, Chinese, Tunisians, Turks, Senegalese, Sri Lankans,

Filipinos, and Pakistanis. Most applications were not from overstayers, but from those

who had entered France as irregular migrants.

In Italy, the number of irregular migrants was estimated at nearly 400,000 in 1998

(OECD, 2001: 207). While the 1998 regularization allowed for more than 217,000

irregular migrants to obtain documents to stay in the country, irregular migration has

still been supported by an informal economy that attracts the migration of foreign

workers. Thousands of irregular migrants enter the country along the Adriatic coasts

or through Sicily. The coasts of Apulia are easily reached from Albania, the Sicilian

coasts are not very far from Tunisia, and landings often occur in Calabria with ships

sometimes coming from Turkey. It appears that irregular migration to Italy today

continues, although the presence of irregular migrants seems to be declining. The

regularization programme launched in 2002 was closed in early 2004, resulting in a

total of 650,000 permits (see Table 1). These migrants were mainly from the

Maghreb, the Balkans and Asia.

After Greece introduced its first regularization for irregular migrants in 1998,

more than 370,000 applied for legal status or a ‘white card’ (of temporary validity)

under a programme designed to regularize the residency status of irregular

immigrants (OECD, 2001: 193) (see Table 1). It seems that less than 60 per cent of

these migrants managed to proceed to the second stage of the regularization

programme by submitting an application for a renewable ‘green card’ (OECD, 2001:

193). In 1998, over 75 per cent of applicants for regularization were submitted by

nationals from just three countries in the Balkans: Albania, Bulgaria and Romania.

The second regularization programme in 2001 attracted over 350,000 irregular

migrants, approximately 228,000 of whom were regularized in the following years.

Analysis of regularizations in 2001 reveals a decline in the share of Balkan nationals

and the emergence of immigrants from other countries, in particular Peru and China.

How Irregular Migration in the Mediterranean Basin Operates: Some DirectEvidence

Having had a degree of comparability and giving the possibilities of some detailed

investigation of various aspects of irregular migration and migrants, the Eurostat-

NIDI data of the late 1990s12 are quite unique. But because of the partial availability

of data for a detailed primary level of analysis, the discussion here will be limited to

three main issues about irregular migration. The first issue is related to the level and

types of irregular migration – mainly focusing on the question of whether migrants

ever tried to enter the immigration country irregularly or overstayed a visa or permit.

The second issue has to do with the type of travel – whether a direct move from their

homeland to the destination country or a migration in stages. The last issue is the

question of whether irregular migrants had networks (relatives and/or friends already

living abroad) in the country of destination that facilitated their moves.


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It is obvious that all aspects of irregular migration are very sensitive, and

consequently many respondents in the surveys of the Eurostat-NIDI project may

have given socially desirable answers or refused to answer the related questions.

However, it is somewhat surprising that the figures on irregular migration still

appear to be quite high, reflecting the possibilities of actual numbers that could be

even higher. While these figures reflect the importance of the high levels of irregular

migration in the Mediterranean Basin, they also show that this type of migration

differs significantly between countries and migrant groups. For instance, 17 per cent

of Moroccans and 15 per cent of Senegalese migrants in Spain and 17 per cent of

Egyptians in Italy declared that they had entered the country without a visa or work

permit. This proportion was 7 per cent for Ghanaians in Italy. In addition to these,

15 per cent of Egyptians and Ghanaians in Italy and 20 per cent of Moroccans in

Spain were overstayers. The proportion of overstayers was highest among the

Senegalese in Spain, being more than a third.

As far as the sending countries are concerned, the Eurostat-NIDI surveys indicate

that Turks most often admit that they have tried at some time to enter a country

illegally (11 per cent) or that they have overstayed their visas (11 per cent). Figures

for Moroccans and Ghanaians are lower – both illegal entries and overstays make up

around 10 per cent of each country’s cases, but when ‘refusal’ and ‘don’t know’

answers are included they reach levels comparable to the Turkish case. Only a very

small proportion of Egyptian migrants indicated that they were involved in an

incident of irregular migration; but even in those cases, it was one-fifteenth of

migrants – a not insignificant figure.

Looking at the figures above, one could probably cautiously conclude the

following. Firstly, it appears that irregular migration has become an important and

integral part of international migration in the Mediterranean region. Not only the

‘illegal entries’, but also ‘overstays’ are important elements in irregular migration

cases. In fact, a significant proportion of the irregular migrants are overstayers, who

enter the immigration countries legally, but violate immigration terms by working or

staying after their visas have expired.

It seems that as distance from the destination country increases, so does the

likelihood of step-by-step migration. This is particularly obvious in the case of

entries without visa and/or permit. For instance, the majority of the irregular

Egyptian migrants (85 per cent) to Italy and irregular Senegalese migrants (97 per

cent) to Spain, and 36 per cent of Ghanaians to Italy travelled through a number of

countries. However, only 7 per cent of irregular Moroccan entries came to Spain

step-by-step. Corresponding figures for ‘legal entries’ were 14 per cent, 29 per cent,

10 per cent and 3 per cent, respectively.

It is obvious that irregular migrants have networks (presence of relatives and/or

friends already living in the destination countries) just as often as regular migrants

do. Seventy-six per cent of irregular Moroccans, 66 per cent of irregular Senegalese

in Spain, 58 per cent of irregular Egyptians, and 66 per cent of irregular Ghanaians

had networks in the destination countries. The figures for documented counterparts

are not very dissimilar: 60 per cent for both of the groups in Italy, 73 per cent for

Moroccans, and 78 per cent for Senegalese in Spain. Similarly, data from the sending

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countries indicate that among irregular migrants having a network at the destination

countries was as common as that among their regular counterparts. Only the

Moroccan case presented a minor deviation where having a network was much more

common among irregular migrants than regular migrants.

The fact that many irregular migrants have family and friends living at their

destination does not necessarily imply that this network also plays a role in their

migration. Almost two-thirds of the irregular Moroccan migrants and more than three-

quarters of the irregular Senegalese migrants in Spain declared that they succeeded in

their migration without the help of others. Only a very small proportion (1 per cent

among Senegalese and 3 per cent among Moroccans) received help from relatives. A

significant portion of both groups (15 per cent of Moroccans and 9 per cent of

Senegalese) indicated that they succeeded in migrating with the help of others – often

implying that they used the services of traffickers/smugglers. In the case of data

obtained from sending countries, only one-third of the irregular Ghanaians and half of

the irregular Egyptians indicated that they migrated without any help. Seven per cent

ofGhanaians and 20 per cent of Egyptians succeeded in their migrationwith the help of

their relatives,while one in every ten regularGhanaianmigrants andone in every fourof

their Egyptian counterparts did so with the help of others, again implying that the

services of traffickers/smugglers were used.

The Politics of Irregular Migration: Economic Realities versus Legal Concerns

As noted by Gallina (2006: 18), from a political-economy perspective, the roots of

the international migration regimes in the Mediterranean region can be mainly

attributed to the results of both the push (marginalization and destabilization in the

south and east) and pull (economic concentration and wealth in the north) factors.

There are various political-economy approaches that should be addressed in the

context of irregular migration in the region. For instance, referring to the dual

market theory, one can link the irregular migration and the use of irregular labour to

meeting the structural needs of economies in the region. Many of the economies

there still display a dichotomy favouring unstable employment through the

coexistence of a capital-intensive primary sector and a labour-intensive secondary

sector. These two sectors obviously lead to the emergence of a dual market: the lack

of upward mobility makes it difficult to motivate local workers to work in the

secondary sector, but immigrants, regular or irregular, from low-wage countries are

inclined to accept jobs in the secondary sector, because wages in that sector are still

higher than their home countries. In this process, many employers in the

Mediterranean Basin are consequently attracted by irregular migrants who supply

cheap and abundant labour. Many irregular migrants are also very much attracted by

jobs in more developed countries where they can easily earn a decent living. In this

context, irregular migration in this region can be seen as a consequence of market

penetration that is facilitated enormously by globalization, and it therefore acts as a

gigantic mechanism that regulates worldwide labour supply and demand and allows

for interaction based on migration flows.


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In the 1990s and early 2000s, immigration to southern Europe, particularly to

Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece, increased considerably (OECD, 2001, 2003, 2005).

Consequently, the number and share of the regular foreign-born population, in other

words, of immigrants, in all of these countries has grown. For instance, since the early

1990s, the largest increase occurred in Spain: the number of immigrants multiplied by

more than five times. Today there are 6.5 million immigrants in France, which is a

traditional immigrant-receiving country in the Mediterranean region, followed by 2.7

million immigrants in Spain, 2.5 million in Italy, nearly 1 million in Greece, and some

700,000 in Portugal. Among these countries, relative to population size, France has the

largest stock of immigrants (11 per cent), followed by Greece (9 per cent), Portugal (7

per cent), Spain (5 per cent) and Italy (4 per cent) (OECD, 2005).

It is well known that a majority of the new immigrants to the southern European

countries come from the south and east of the Mediterranean Basin. It is also well

known that today more than one-third of the over 13 million immigrants in the

northern Mediterranean countries were previously irregular migrants who later were

regularized through the regularization programmes in these countries (OECD,

2005). In short, irregularity has become an intrinsic and persistent character of the

international migratory regimes operating around the region in the past decade.

There is no doubt, however, that there have been many changes in the nature of the

irregular migration over the period.

Besides typical pull and push factors caused by a huge gap between the standard of

living and income opportunities between the countries of the south and north in the

Mediterranean region, the growing tendency ofmigration also reflects the demographic

structure and labour needs of the economies in the northern Mediterranean countries

(Fargues, 2006). It appears that demographic transformation in the northern

Mediterranean countries has begun to turn into an obstacle to sustainable economic

growth and social welfare. Declining birth rates together with aging of the population

have resulted in the shrinking of domestic labourmarkets. Naturally, then, immigration

emerges as a response to the needs of the economies in the region. In particular, certain

sectors of the economies of these countries of immigration are increasingly dependent

upon immigrant labour, though the distinctions between regular and irregular migrant

labour are not easily established. Therefore, the governments of these receiving

countries are under enormous pressure not only to meet the needs of the labour market

but also to prevent flows of irregular migrants.

In the last decade, a good economic climate and years of economic growth in the

northern Mediterranean countries have led to higher participation rates and

relatively lower unemployment rates (OECD, 2001, 2003, 2005). Various sectors of

the economies in the region have been considerably affected by this ongoing

economic transformation. Consequently, employers faced with difficulties in filling

vacancies raised their concerns about the availability of domestic labour in the

domestic market, and then called for the possibility of immigrant labour. It appears

that this growing demand for migrant labour was mostly voiced by employers in

Spain, Italy and Greece, and to a certain extent in Portugal, but it was hardly heard in

France. Meanwhile, it seemed that regular migration flows were not able to meet the

needs for labour in these economies; instead, irregular migration continuously filled

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the gap. Quantitatively and qualitatively, then, irregular migrants have remained

important, particularly in Spain, Italy and Greece, with their highly controversial

positions regarding the legal status and economic arrangements attached to them.

Naturally, from a statist perspective, irregularity in border-crossings is not

something desirable. Besides facilitating regular immigration, there are some policy

instruments to respond to labour shortages, such as increasing participation rates,

postponing the retirement age, stimulating the labour market participation of women

and immigrants. But none of these choices can offer an immediate, direct solution

(Muenz, 2006). Only immigration will be a functional response to the urgent need to

meet a growing demand for workers. Indeed, millions of irregular migrants have

been absorbed into the economies of the northern Mediterranean countries.

Confronted with the growing need for labour, some governments in the region

have made it easier for immigrants in employment to gain residence rights and have

allowed irregular migrants to regularize their situation. Some governments have

already started to facilitate immigration of workers with specific skills in certain

sectors. Other governments have introduced programmes to recruit migrants on the

basis of their human capital, such as implementing selective immigration to

compensate for an aging workforce. Some governments have considered temporary

or seasonal migration of unskilled labour for certain sectors like agriculture and

tourism (OECD, 2001, 2003, 2005).

As far as these policy developments are considered, for instance, in 2003, a new

law made the Portuguese government responsible for the preparation of a bi-annual

that forecasts labour opportunities that cannot be filled by internal and EU supply:

accordingly, the forecast is supposed to distinguish general labour market needs

from seasonal ones, and to open a labour recruitment programme. In Spain, a process

for consulting social partners, with large-scale employer involvement, was

introduced with effect in 2002 with the object of establishing quotas by sector,

province and type of job, on the basis of the real needs of the labour market and

taking account of local and national conditions. In Italy, the 1998 immigration law

had created a quota system for the admission of foreign workers, including seasonal

workers for tourism and agriculture. Similarly, a substantial revision of Greek law

concerning the entry and stay of third-country nationals became effective in 2006:

the law introduced a single stay and work permit of two years’ duration – and

renewable for another two years – depending on local labour market supply and

demand conditions.

What has also been witnessed in almost all of the northern Mediterranean

countries is that over time there has been a considerable change in the structure of

foreign employment by sector. While in previous years most migrant labour went

into industry, in the later period, there was a remarkable drop in this sector and a

shift towards agriculture, the service sector and domestic work, which rose slightly.

It appears that even if there is a certain level of unemployment in the countries of the

region, some unskilled jobs are being shunned by domestic workers, providing job

opportunities for immigrants. These are mainly jobs connected with tourism and

seasonal activities in agriculture and the domestic sector (childcare, household

services, care of elderly). In this regard, demand for low-paid labour has remained


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high, parallel to the process of the aging of population in the region, and as home

help is often used rather than public services.

While the economies of the southern European countries are attracting immigrant

workers, regardless of whether they are regular or irregular, governments tend to

introduce several policies and practices in order to regulate immigration flows and to

integrate foreign labour. There have been three main groups of policies. The first

consists of measures adopted at national and international levels to strengthen the

control of flows, including those of asylum seekers. The second concerns the fight

against irregular migration and the employment of irregular migrants. The third

covers all measures that aim to promote the employment of immigrants and to

ensure a better integration of immigrants into the receiving societies.

Several countries in the northern Mediterranean Basin have recently modified

their legislation and implemented new provisions governing entry, residence and

employment of immigrant workers. While some reforms have improved the position

of irregular migrants who had already settled in the receiving countries, most of

them aimed essentially at tightening border controls and amending conditions for

entry and employment. Related to the reinforcement of legislation concerning the

fight against irregular migration and employment of foreigners, first, new legislation

entered into force in order to boost the fight against people smugglers and to

strengthen the integrity of national and the EU borders and, second, some measures

were introduced to consolidate the awareness and obligation of the employers and

labour suppliers to combat the employment of irregular migrants. An increasing

number of northern Mediterranean countries have held regularization programmes

which aim to have more regular employment of irregular migrants and to ensure

their better integration into the societies they live in. The positive and negative

consequences of these regularization programmes are widely debated. They bring

irregular migrants out of the shadows of informal labour markets and provide

them with the status and rights necessary to become integral parts of society.

Regularization programmes can also be seen as a wise course of action from a public

security perspective. By opening up broader employment opportunities for these

migrants, they may discourage the pursuit of unlawful activities. There are,

however, some negative aspects of the regularization programmes: first, it is argued

that they encourage future irregular migration, sometimes even at greater rates than

those occurring before the programme; second, it is said these programmes reward

law-breaking, for instance, they essentially result in queue-jumping, with irregular

migrants entering before those who have been waiting their turn.

If economic rationality is reinforcing the phenomenon of irregular migration, how

and why is this type of migration often described as constituting a threat to state

sovereignty? In fact, the argument is that ‘states have a sovereign right to control who

crosses their borders, and by undermining that control irregular migrants threaten

sovereignty’ (Koser, 2007: 60). However, some scholars argue that sovereignty has not

ended in the age of globalization but rather taken new form to fit post-statist conditions.

They rightly emphasize that key ideas and practices like sovereignty are social

constructs that evolve as historical contexts change. In this regard, some commentators

have spoken of emergent ‘partial’ or ‘shrunken’ sovereignty, as states surrender their

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prerogatives in certain areas (Scholte, 2004: 7). Therefore, it is possible to think of

irregular migration within the context of this ‘partial’ or ‘shrunken’ sovereignty. At a

timewhen severe restrictions on immigrationflows are undermining the labour needs of

the economy, the emergence of irregular migration makes a case for re-thinking the

current immigration policies and practices to ensure our economic and social survival in

the globalizing world. Various regularization programmes mentioned above in which

hundreds of thousands of irregular migrants in the Mediterranean countries are

regularized are good examples of this re-thinking.

Concluding Remarks

Generally, capital, products and ideas have become more mobile, while

certain categories of labour, constrained by immigration law, continue under

the control and penalization of mobility. Considering the closing of borders,

these types of borderlands can be thought of as sites of resistance to

globalization. Can one call it an act of resistance? Can it be called forms of

circumvented states’ reactions to globalization, such as the stopping of human

border flows? (Ribas-Mateos, 2005: 177)

As implied earlier in this article, answers to these questions may vary widely from

conservative denials and liberal celebrations to critical perspectives that highlight

the very contradictory nature of irregular migration in the age of globalization.

Indeed, the absorption capacity of economies in the southern European countries for

the irregular migrants and the frequent regularization programmes for them

indicated that states in the region have adapted to economic rationality, although

they initially had, and probably even still have, some political concerns over the

‘irregularities’ in human flows across borders. However, regularization programmes

have faced political resistance. Various types of anti-immigration positions surfaced

including, for instance, those coming from the labour unions claming that immigrant

workers are stealing the jobs of native workers and are causing the low wages.

It appears that governments and public opinion in the southern European counties,

like their counterparts elsewhere in Europe, are confronted with, on the one hand, the

worry of population decline and its consequences for the economy, and on the other

hand rising concerns about security and external treats. Consequently, there are clashes

between the pro- andanti-immigrationpositions.The issues of irregularmigration stand

at the heart of this debate. Pro-immigration, or open-door, positions argue that

irregularity occurs because of restrictive immigration policies and practices which

leave no room for the possibilities of regular moves. Contrary to this argument, anti-

immigration, or closed-door, positions claim that even stricter policies and practices

should be introduced in order to prevent the irregular migration whichmay supposedly

risk the security of individuals and society.

Besides these conflicting views, it is important to question the notion of irregular

migration, by asking such questions as ‘what type of irregularity?’ and ‘irregularity for

whom?’ It is debatable whether the term irregularity, which is usually used in a very

negative and vague manner, is really useful in the context of migratory movements in


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which the fine line between ‘regularity’ and ‘irregularity’ is truly blurred. It is suggested

here in the case of the Mediterranean countries that an analysis in terms of economic

rationalities and political concerns might lead to more useful results. It is also

suggested that the ongoing dominance of nation-states in the affairs of international

migration should not be underestimated. In the context of migration, the state is not a

passive victim of globalizing trends but an active participant in the process. As noted

above, in the Mediterranean countries, governments intervene in, rather than control,

global migratory flows. Therefore, it is important to recognize the variety of statist

positions towards the emergence of irregularities in international migration.

This article argues that we need new mapping strategies to situate new forms of

migration such as irregular migration, and we also need to understand the nature of

irregular migration within the ‘unfamiliar terrain of globalized new times’ (Kofman

and Youngs, 1996: 21). We, the contemporary states and societies, cannot escape

responsibility for our own policy failures by blaming ‘illegality’. The cases of

irregular migration in the Mediterranean region make clear that in spite of the

complexity and ambiguity associated with this migratory setting, they are not

without pattern and meaning. Irregular migration flows, or irregular migrants, have

turned out to be very useful in balancing the labour shortages in certain sectors of the

economies of the northern Mediterranean countries which are dependent on cheap

and abundant labour to remain competitive.

Finally, although minimally addressed here, the question of what happens in the

southern European countries concerning irregular migration has to include an

integrated understanding of the international migratory regimes in the south of the

European Union, in particular referring to the wider context of the Barcelona Process.

Launched in 1995 by the 15 EU members and 12 Mediterranean countries, the new

initiative, the Barcelona Process, was aimed at enhancing economic, political, social

and cultural cooperation throughout theBasin.As far as the push and pull factors behind

irregular migration flows in the region are concerned, it is difficult to claim that the

Barcelona Process has been successful over time. As stated by Gallina (2006: 18), it is

possible to ague that ‘the failure of the Barcelona process, followed by the decreasing

influence on the part of the EU, has distorted the regional development process from a

process of Euro-Mediterranean partnership for a shared prosperity to the

implementation of a free trade area and neo-liberal policies, with negative social

impacts certain to follow’. Given its surrounding global economic and political

geography, the Mediterranean Basin remains an immense divide between the global

north and the global south, which reflects a persisting vulnerability to migrations of all

kinds, including irregular flows.

Notes

1 For an elaboration of the definition and historical background of the notion of irregular migration, see

Baldwin-Edwards (2006).2 For the related discussion see, for instance, the special issue of International Migration on

‘Perspectives of Trafficking of Migrants’, 38(3) (2000).3 For the related discussion see, for instance, Papademetriou (1998), Tapinos (2000), Entorf (2000), and

Baldwin-Edwards (2005).

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4 For a similar discussion on this issue see Collinson (1999: 10).5 For the various examples of press coverage of the issue see for instance the following three internet-

based newsletters: (1) CISNEWS of the Center for Immigration Studies, Washington, DC, USA (http://

www.cis.org); (2) Asian Migration News of the Scalabrini Migration Center, Quezon City, Philipinnes

(http://www.scalabrini.org); and (3) Immigration New Digest of the Technical Cooperation Centre for

Europe and Central Asia of the International Organization for Migration (IOM) (http://tcc/iom.int).6 See, for instance, various studies on irregular migration, and trafficking and smuggling produced by the

International Organization for Migration (IOM).7 Several studies by the IOM plus various reports of the ‘Push and Pull Factors of International

Migration’ (Eurostat-NIDI) project offer hard evidence about these two types.8 For related discussion see Pugh (2000: 14–15).9 It is argued that irregular migrants generally have relied upon a third party to assist them, whether they

employed a forger to make a false visa (facilitator), paid a person to help them across the border

(smuggler) or were exploited after transit by the person who transported them across the border

(trafficker) (for these definitions see IOM, 2000b: 7).10 See, for instance, Monzini’s essay in this volume of Mediterranean Politics.11 Data evaluated here on the regularization of irregular migrants were obtained from the SOPEMI

Report Series of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD, 2001, 2002,

2003, 2004, 2005).12 The Eurostat-NIDI project (1994–2000) was a comparative international migration survey on the push

and pull factors determining international migration flows. For the detailed elaboration of this study,

see EC (2000a). The main focus of the project was on migration from the southern and eastern

Mediterranean region and from sub-Saharan Africa to the European Union. Surveys were conducted in

five predominantly migrant-sending countries – Egypt, Ghana, Morocco, Senegal and Turkey (see for

instance, EC, 2000b, 2000c, 2000d, 2000e, 2000f) – and in two predominantly migrant-receiving

countries – Italy and Spain (see, for instance, EC, 2000g, 2000h) – between 1996 and 1998. The

Netherlands was also included in the migrant-receiving countries but only secondary data analysis was

conducted using existing survey data and statistics (see EC, 2000i).

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The Politics of Irregular Migratory Flows in the Mediterranean Basin: Economy, Mobility and...

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