The Palestinian Spring Examining the Limitations of Palestine's Political Opportunity Structures

& the Resilience of Authoritarianism in the Territories

Author: Amy Kishek Program: M.A., Political Economy of International Development, University of Toronto Research Focus: Political Economy of the West Bank Email: amy.kishek@utoronto.ca Abstract Inspired by the 2011 Arab Spring, and modelled after Egypt's “Jan. 25”, the March 15th youth-led movement in the Occupied Territories sought to reform the Palestinian National Authority and to end the rift between Hamas-led Gaza and Fatah's West Bank. The initiation of this humble movement, as well as the regional climate and the history of the Palestinian Authority, induced many to ask when the Arab Spring would truly come to Palestine. Boasting a long history of national struggle, and active civil society, Palestine seemed to be a perfect home for mass mobilization in the time of the Arab Spring. However no such movement came to pass. Rather, the structural, social and contextual situation subverted any desire for regime change and democratic legitimacy. This essay utilizes Social Movement Theory to examine the present situation in the Occupied Territories through public opinion surveys, and academic analysis of the “double occupation” of Palestinians. In sum, despite appearances, extensive political strains, and resources, Palestinians have limited political opportunities through the structures of the Palestinian Authority and the constraints of the Occupation.

The Arab Spring1 has drawn a global eye to the struggle for democracy by the Arab people,

who had largely been dismissed for their tacit acceptance of their authoritarian regimes. In the case of

Palestine, residents of the West Bank and Gaza are faced with a “double occupation”: by the Israeli

occupiers and the authoritarian Fatah regime in the Palestinian Authority. Boasting a long history of

national struggle, and active civil society, Palestine seems to be an ideal home for mass mobilization in

the time of the Arab Spring. However no such movement came to pass. Rather the structural, social and

contextual situation subverted any desire of regime change and democratic legitimacy. Utilizing Social

Movement Theory, this essay presents an examination of the present situation in the Occupied

Territories, and offers an outlook on the Palestinian people and their future state.

Introduction: The Palestinian Dilemma

“At a time when the Arab peoples affirm their quest for democracy - the Arab Spring - the time is now for the Palestinian Spring, the time for independence.”

Mahmoud Abbas, President of the Palestinian National Authority

When Mahmoud Abbas addressed the United Nations General Assembly on September 24th,

2011, the statement above was met with great applause. In making the case for Palestine's induction

into the United Nations, Abbas commenced the last phase of the Palestinian “statehood” project

initiated by Prime Minister Salam Fayyad in 2009. “Ending the Occupation, Establishing the State” is

the Palestinian response to decades of peace negotiations wherein Israeli and American officials

rhetorically contended that if the Palestinians proved themselves a viable partner with the capacity for

self-governance they could transform their interim Palestinian National Authority (PNA) (Palestinian

Authority (PA) referring to the executive branch) into a state; thus a two-state solution to the decades-

1 The author acknowledges the problematic nature of the term “Arab Spring” insofar as it is a term derived from Western spectators of the series of ongoing revolutions, beginning in 2011. In the context of this paper the Arab Spring will refer to these event, without assumption of overarching commonality, but as a political opportunity and specific moment in contemporary history.

old conflict. A strategy of “build it and they will come” informs the PA approach, despite continued

Israeli and American opposition to such a “unilateral” endeavour.

Abbas' aforementioned statement offers an interesting insight into the consciousness of the PA,

and into the dilemma of Palestinian self-governance. Foremost, it illustrates that the “notion of

'democracy' has generally been related to the goal of self-determination and associated ideas of

Palestinian national consciousness and national struggle” (Brynen, 1995, 187). However, as an interim

government, the PA is entrusted with the strenuous task of endeavouring towards independence while

offering accountable public responsiveness and representation to its peoples (Jamal, 2005, 122).

Created by way of the Oslo Agreements, the PNA was not primarily intended to deliver

democracy to Palestinians. Rather, it's main objective was “to negotiate the territorial and constitutional

limits of a Palestinian quasi-state in the context of an extreme asymmetry of power and resources vis-a-

vis Israel. To get anything at all, [the PA] had to demonstrate its ability to deliver security to Israel on

terms determined by the latter” (Khan, 2004, 43). Therefore, from the outset there was a tension

between the democratic rights of the Palestinian opponents of this particular 'peace process' and the

obligation to consolidate power and security.

In an address to the Carnegie Foundation on the topic of Palestine and the Arab Spring, Hanan

Ashrawi, a reform-minded member of the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC), as well as a member

of the PA negotiating team, articulated this tension quite well:

The thing is Palestine is unique because we are still under occupation. That’s the thing, people saying well, when are you going to rise? And we say rise where, against what, against – (chuckles) – whom? Now, the movement for reform in Palestine is a very, very active movement, and the movement for change is still a very active movement. And civil society has always been among the most intrusive and critical of all civil societies in Palestine, as you know. So there is that sense. And people were looking for the right objectives, the right slogans at this time. Some young people talked about – focused on the need to end the division, ending the rift. This became a slogan, a rallying cry, end the rift, and as a means of ending the occupation. So under occupation you have the internal domestic needs of putting one’s house in order and so on, of also democratizing and reforming. (Emphasis added).

Ashrawi is speaking specifically of the youth-led March 15th movement, which was initiated in

Gaza, and took place in the West Bank as well. It was inspired by the 2011 Arab Spring, and

specifically modelled itself after Egypt's “Jan. 25 Movement”. This effort sought to capitalize on the

commemoration of the Nakba (the marking of the expulsion of Palestinians from their homes in

present-day Israel in March of 1948), and featured rallies that were held in the West Bank and Gaza. It

saw modest turnout with thousands in Ramallah and other West Bank towns, and 15, 000 in Gaza

(Cook, 2011). The primary demand of the movement was an end to the rift between Hama-led Gaza

and Fatah's West Bank.

The initiation of this humble movement, as well as the regional climate and the history of the

Palestinian reform movement, induced many to ask when the Arab Spring would truly come to

Palestine.

According to polling conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research

between March 17th and 19th, 2011, 92 percent of Palestinians sympathized with demonstrators in the

Arab World; and two thirds expected this development to have a positive impact on Palestinian

conditions. However, despite this, only 36 percent of West Bankers supported West Bank

demonstrations to change the regime and 24 percent stated that they were ready to participate in such

demonstrations. In Gaza those numbers are 67 percent in support demonstrations in the Gaza Strip that

would seek to change the regime, with 50 percent ready to participate in demonstrations. (Fifty-one

percent preferred the slogan that calls for "people want to end the split" and 24 percent favoured

"people want to end the occupation") (PCPSR, 2011).

Political Strains: Potential Rallying Causes for Palestinian Reform

In addition to the direct issue of “the rift”, a number of political and contextual strains affecting

a cross-section of Palestinian society lend themselves to rallying cries for reform of the PA, if not a

political revolution.

Institutional Authoritarianism & Corruption

From its inception the Palestinian Authority was infused with authoritarianism through the

leadership and management style of former President and PLO Leader Yassir Arafat. He turned to

authoritarianism for numerous reasons ranging from personal style to strategic necessity, that was

originally manifest in the architecture of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) to the point at

which in 1999 “the Palestinian National Authority was governing Palestinian society in an authoritarian

way” (Jamal, 2007, 24). The Palestinian domestic situation has been described as one “with little

democratic accountability, weak state institutions, limited access to government officials, and few

channels—outside clientelistic networks—for citizen recourse” (Jamal, 2007, 24). Since Oslo, the

process of state building has been one in which the power of the dominant PLO elite was transplanted

onto the different institutions of the PNA and the governmental bureaucracy (Jamal, 2005, 132).

Further, the Accords enshrined a highly centralized system, entirely new to the OT, wherein the then

88-member parliament was subservient to the office of the president (RAND, 2005, 22).

Since Arafat's regime, current President Mahmoud Abbas has followed a similar trajectory.

Though Abbas’s term as president expired in 2009, and despite presidential and legislative elections

being tentatively scheduled for 2010, PA officials in the West Bank contended that he was entitled to

serve another year under the PA’s Basic Law. Since that time his term has been indefinitely extended

and the January 2010 election date was subsequently canceled (Freedom House, 2011). In addition to

this out-right refusal to facilitate elections, the PA, controlled in the West Bank by the Fatah party,

dissolved municipal councils in 2009, replacing all Hamas representatives with Fatah members

(Freedom House, 2011).

The unconstitutional nature of the PA as a representative body certainly did not quell growing

concern over corruption. A 2011 poll shows that 70 percent believe there is corruption in the PA

institutions in the West Bank and 59 percent believe there is corruption in the Hamas government in the

Gaza Strip; 33 percent believe that people in the West Bank can criticize the PA without fear, and only

19 percent believe that people in the Gaza Strip can criticize the authorities there without fear (PCPSR,

2011). According to the RAND Corporation, these concerns square with the reality on the ground, and

by 2002, the PA placed in the bottom 16 percent of countries globally in its ability to control

corruption, and among the bottom 12 percent in government effectiveness (RAND, 2005, 21).

Perceptions and knowledge of corruption though widespread for some time, were amplified in

January of 2011 when the Arab news network Al Jazeera released internal documents regarding

Palestinian-Israeli negotiations, in which there is clear evidence of the PA making widely unpopular

concessions to Israel, and ostensibly mishandling negotiations. Data shows that 79 percent believe all

or some of what Al Jazeera has reported regarding Palestinian-Israeli negotiations; with only 19 percent

believing none of it (PCPSR, 2011).

At its root the Palestinian national liberation movement is a part of a larger anti-colonial

struggle, however, once in power, as with most of the movements associated with these struggles “it

failed to deliver on [its] promises, instead allowing neocolonial relations of production and exchange to

bolster [its] own power and secure privileges for the national bourgeoisie and the 'international

investor'” (Khalidi, Samour, 2011, 7).

Restricted Opportunities for the Political Opposition

After the Oslo Accords, the PLO was transformed into the PNA, a politicized governmental

body, however interim. As such, factions manifested power through the apparatus of the PNA, with

Fatah dominating PNA ranks. Despite being represented in the PLO, opposition parties which

disagreed with the Oslo Accords lost influence: “The Palestinian opposition elite found themselves

marginalized by the Accords and unable to formulate a strategy of opposition in response to the new

and expeditious political developments of the peace process” (Jamal, 2007, 38). As a result, many

opposition elites were outside the newly formed political process, some going on to develop their own

local NGOs in an effort to create space for themselves in post-Oslo Palestine.

Other oppositional actors include those within Fatah, often referred to as the “new guard”, the

youth of the first intifada;. The lines are drawn between them and the “old guard”, which consists of

those member of Fatah who spent much of their lifetime in exile, as a part of Arafat's patronage

networks, and comprised the founders of the Palestinian national movement, together with the leaders

of various guerrilla organizations and the PLO bureaucracy (Shikaki, 2002, 94). Ongoing efforts to co-

opt and incorporate the new guard have continued since Arafat's regime to present.

Civil Society & the Palestinian Social Pact

In a well-documented study, Amaney Jamal demonstrates the PNA's bias nurturing and

facilitation of associations in Palestinian society deemed “pro-PNA”. Despite boasting a vibrant and

pluralistic civil society, “associations must carefully navigate the contours of existing political

realities” (Jamal, 2007, 24). According to Jamal “associations need to conform to basic, minimal state

expectations if they are to even exist [since in] state-centralized clientelistic settings, states extend their

monopoly on power to the associational terrain” (Jamal, 2007, 24). Moreover, the PA through Arafat

(and to a lesser extent through Abbas) has been able to “co-opt associational leaders, urging them to

adopt more sympathetic and government-supporting stances” so that ultimately this “asymmetry

influences the quality of civic engagement among associational members” and resentments toward the

governing regime, particularly as conditions continue to deteriorate in the Occupied Territories (OT)

(Jamal, 2007, 24-25).

These and other political strains make the case for regime change quite clear, if not urgent. In

this sense, Palestine is much like its neighbouring Arab Spring countries, however it allows for greater

opportunities for resource mobilization and thus greater likelihood for similar mass movements.

Capacity for Resource Mobilization

Taking into consideration Palestine's long history of civil disobedience, peaceful and armed uprisings,

and pluralistic civil society, it is understandable that a Palestine “Spring” was so seemingly plausible.

Electoral Mobilization & Opposition

The 2006 PLC elections saw widespread demand for reform through the election of Hamas. The Islamist party set

aside religion and ran on a platform of reform: “the Hamas victory is a direct result of Palestinian dashed expectations vis-

a-vis the peace front, growing corruption in the ranks of Fatah and hence the tarnishing of its once noble nationalistic

reputation, and the inability of the PNA to continue to finance its clientalistic network” (Jamal, 2007, 75), (Usher, 2006,

21).

Throughout the 2000s, both before and after the death of Arafat, Palestinians came to blame

Fatah for Oslo's failure. The “peace process” reinforced Palestinians' conviction that US foreign policy

was indeed biased against them, and Fatah began to be seen as part of the problem, if not a sellout “that

would negotiate away Palestinian national aspiration in return for adequate financial aid to sustain its

authoritarian grip on Palestinian society” (Jamal, 2007, 75-76). This view was confirmed by the

Palestine Papers.

In September 2000, when the Second, or the al-Aqsa, intifada broke out it triggered dramatic

changes in the Palestinian social and political environment. The PA steadily lost legitimacy both

domestically and abroad as a result of Israeli retaliation, as well as internal corruption and inefficacy.

Arguably this slide in popularity caused serious internal divisions within the nationalist camp and “the

resulting power vacuum opened the way for lawlessness and a rise in the authority of Hamas and other

Islamists” (Shikaki, 2004, 46).

The turnout in the PLC 2006 election was a staggering 77 percent, demonstrating again

Palestinians’ hunger for democracy. According to Graham Usher's analysis of the PLC elections:

“Wherever Arabs have been given a free vote, they have used the ballot box not simply to improve

“governance” but to strengthen opposition to authoritarian and corrupt regimes [...] and/or foreign

occupations that control their lives [...] Democracy here has not turned out to be a substitute for

national liberation, but an essential tool for it” (Usher, 2006, 27). As Palestinian discontent with the PA

infrastructure and its inability to either protect or provide for the population reached new heights and a

reform movement that included NGOs, opposition parties, and popular discontent, which “had been

many years in the making began to gather momentum” (Denoeux, Springborg, 2005, 26).

A noteworthy observation is that Palestinians saw within their own system an opportunity for

reform by expressing dissent and appetite for reform through the PLC: “Palestinians- though fully

aware of the PLC's shortcomings, and, indeed, frustrated by those failings- nevertheless persists in

seeing the PLC, explicitly or implicitly, as an expression of the Palestinian nation, and even as the

embodiment of Palestinian hopes for a better future” (Denoeux, Springborg, 2005, 23). Thus the PLC,

through which “reformer” prime minister Salam Fayyad was later incorporated, became both an arena

in which demands for reform were both articulated, and through which they were pursued (Denoeux,

Springborg, 2005, 26). Again demonstrating Palestinian's support and aspiration for legitimate,

democratic governance.

Civil Society

Palestine is well-known for its pluralistic and oft-described vibrant civil society. In 1999,

Palestine's 1, 500 associations encompassed a multitude of programs and agendas (Jamal, 2007, 51).

Most Palestinian non-governmental organizations had their roots in the PLO mass mobilization

strategy, during which time Left-wing organization, especially the Communist Party, played a crucial

role in the theoretical and organizational aspects of the strategy (Hammami, 2000, 16). From the outset,

NGOs and associations were inherently politicized: “Palestinian political factions disguised themselves

as social organization, [so that, for example, by the 1980s] it was common to find four organizations

based on factional ties in any given locale” (Jamal, 2007, 35).

Relations between the PA and the NGO community, much as with other sectors, is typified by

the PA's authoritarianism and with NGO's constant efforts at thwarting governmental controls

(Hammami, 2000, 17). As a result of external pressures, and the internal socio-economic and

humanitarian situations, the NGO sector grew substantially so that “by 1995, the “professionalized”

NGOs, dominated by figures with political histories in left factions, had become a vocal lobby whose

first showdown with the PA followed the issuance of a repressive draft law on charities and

associations by the ministries of social welfare and justice in February 1995” (Hammami, 2000, 17).

Oppositional failure to organize “third way” parties, lead NGO politicians to experiment with

new organizational forms which utilize NGOs as catalysts for social movement, an approached that is

derived from Latin American experiences with democratic transitions whereby NGOs seek to form

links with broad-based grassroots constituencies (Hammami, 2000, 27).

As compared to other parts of the developing world and the region, the West Bank has a large

and diverse set of civic associations; “it certainly possessed one of the richest associational landscapes

in the Arab world” [with an estimated] 20 percent of its population was involved in associational life

[in 1999]” (Jamal, 2007, 28). Conceivably, this active and politically engaged sector has the capacity to

mobilize Palestinians.

Political Opportunity Structures: What subverted the Palestinian Spring?

Despite cause and capacity for a Palestinian social movement geared forward internal reform,

the political opportunity structures present in 2011 created an insurmountable barrier. A variety of

institutional, social and circumstantial factors, as well as framing by the Palestinian Authority were

able to subvert any form of mass movement.

The Strength of Authoritarianism

The PA has sought to incorporate every aspect of the Palestinian population into the state

apparatus. As a result, the PA grew to behemoth levels, developing in a largely ad-hoc manner so that

“society is due more to special compromises made by the ra'ees [president/leader] with certain

individuals and groups than to the building of a durable framework of national representation”

(Bucaille, 2004, 55).

Arguably state formation in such circumstances as occupation require to some degree executive

centralization (Khan, 2004, 13). Accordingly much of the corruption flowed as a result of this state

architecture. Notably “this architecture was essential for the “security-first” route that Israel insisted on,

and nothing else was on offer to Palestinians in their attempt to construct a two-state solution” (Khan,

2004, 14)

The post of president is a four-year term determined through general election, while the position

of prime minister is nominated by the president and requires the support of the 132 member PLC, also

serving a four-year term. According to Freedom House, the elections for president in 2005 and of the

PLC in 2006 were largely free and fair in the view of international observers. Despite this there were

“credible reports of PA resources being used to benefit Fatah candidates in 2006”, as is the modus

operandi of authoritarian regimes (Freedom House, 2011).

Since 2006, and the split between Fatah in the West Bank and Hamas in Gaza, Abbas has moved

towards an “Arafatian” concentration of powers in an effort to “quarantine the Hamas-dominated

parliamentary one”: “It is of course supremely ironic—though wholly consistent with the U.S. vision of

democracy in the Middle East—that, having coerced Arafat into adopting a prime ministerial system to

diminish his powers, Washington now wants Abbas to recreate a presidential one to strengthen his”

(Usher, 2006, 28). This external pressure has allowed the Abbas regime to act more swiftly in

reinstating such a repressive system.

Media freedom continues to be a concern in the West Bank where “under a 1995 PA press law,

journalists may be fined and jailed, and newspapers closed, for publishing “secret information” on PA

security forces or news that might harm national unity or incite violence” (Freedom House, 2011). As a

result of this law, a number of small media outlets are continually pressured to provide positive

coverage of the PA and Fatah. Furthermore, since the 2006/2007 rift with Hamas, “both the PA and

Israeli forces have shut down Hamas-affiliated radio and television stations in the West Bank” and “in

July, the PA Ministry of Communications issued notices to 19 radio and 25 television stations to stop

broadcasting for one month and “correct their positions” or face permanent closure” (Freedom House,

2011).

Arafat was notorious for his tactics in silencing critics by strategically co-opting enemies and

ostracizing dissenters owning to either integrating them into the government or marginalizing them. By

incorporating dissenters he was able to reduce the numbers of opponents by making them partners, the

affects of which remain felt in the PA (Jamal, 2005, 136). This included those internal to Fatah, such as

the marginalization of Fatah's younger political leadership the new guard so as to diminish the

challenge they inevitably presented (Jamal, 2005, 133).

In sum, methods of co-optation are central to archetype of patronage politics. They are also a

stirring illustration of the way in which “a diaspora-based political movement has been able to mobilize

social and political units in the occupied territories and direct their struggle for political independence

and institution building”, which is significant in the larger context of state-civil society relations

(Muslih, 1993, 272).

The Benefits of Neopatrimonialism

The opportunity to establish new institutions through the creation of the PNA allowed “political

leaders to create their own circles of political supporters” and given the hasty nature with which they

were created “the patterns of recruitment familiar in Arab society were the most available”; that is

specifically neopatrimoniality, wherein benefits are distributed according to familial affiliation (Jamal,

2005, 133).

In the political sphere “political opportunism and social clientalism were far more dominant

than inclusive representation of sociopolitical fragments of society” (Jamal, 2005, 134). The appointed

ministers found themselves personally indebted to Arafat who had entrusted them with their respective

portfolios, a trust which was repaid with loyalty and access to personal networks. Fundamentally these

patterns of neopatrimonial power “proved to effective for bypassing formal political procedures and

emptying them of any substantial meaning” (Jamal, 2005, 136).

Clientalistic networks were constructed widely as the PA aimed to incorporate much of society

into the neopatrimonial web. This included the division of the PA areas into twelve districts where

governors were appointed; although they were appointed by law they turned out to be efficient agents

of control in the hands of the president (Jamal, 2005, 137). Their effectiveness stemmed from deriving

legitimate power by co-opting the dominant families in their regions. As such, patronage and the

exchange of allegiance for posts in the administrative apparatus surfaced as a successful mechanism for

all involved (Jamal, 2005, 137).

During the Oslo period the clientalistic network grew to the point whereby 25 percent of the

total Palestinian workforce was employed by the PNA (Jamal, 2007, 41). This large security force and

bureaucracy developed a neopatrimonial “social contract” as a result of putting so many individuals

(and by extension families) on the public pay roll (Jamal, 2007, 41). As a result of the dynamics of the

Occupation, in particular of the closures, demand of PNA social services and employment grew.

Moreover, in given the nature of the conflict “substantial redistribution were politically necessary to

stabilize the polity by accommodating critical constituencies” (Khan, 2004, 38). Through the

clientelistic PNA network, and the state (namely the President's office) had a monopoly on resources

and unchecked power; an outcome of the Occupation, the PA was able to reward and punish

Palestinians and exert influence on various aspects of Palestinian society. Ultimately, the PNA

consolidated to become “one of the largest bureaucratic regimes per capita in the world” (Jamal, 2007,

27).

Furthermore, it's noteworthy that the “excessive fiscal vulnerability of the PNA gave

considerable potential leverage to those responsible for clearing the transfers required for its day-to-day

survival” so that the “symbiotic interest of both the Israeli and the Palestinian side in being able to

allocate these rents in was that furthered their interests resulted in some unexpected 'institutional'

arrangements” (Khan, 2004, 39). An example of such arrangements is the fact that “the Israeli

government paid part of the official tax remittences owed to the PNA into accounts outside the

Palestinian Ministry of Finance that were directly controlled by Arafat and his financial advisor”

(Khan, 2004, 39). Thus, the clientelistic networks were aided and encouraged by Israel as a means by

which to control the Palestinian population.

Notwithstanding its vibrancy and multiplicity, Palestinian civil society had become an extension

of the government. Though many viewed or understood the PNA as corrupt, a far greater percentage of

PNA supporters attached prestige to officials and offices of the PNA: “to mingle, associate, and

converse with the PNA, as to serve it, bolster one's personal standing in society as a whole” (Jamal,

2007, 55).

Given the state of affairs in the OT, most civil society associations in the West Bank focus their

efforts on charitable causes, and endeavour to raise funds by creating products for sale or organizing

community events (Jamal, 2007, 135). However due to the PA monopoly on funding, specifically of

foreign aid, and the creation of a ministry to funnel funds to associations, these associations, including

welfare associations, were susceptible to clientelistic outreach and co-optation by the state, raising

“serious concerns about the usefulness of associations in producing democratic outcomes” (Jamal,

2007, 136).

Factionalism's Impediment on the Emergence of Agents of Change

Understanding of Palestinian politics calls for analysis of three axises of disunity: (1) splits

within the PLO elite who were in exile, or those who after the establishment of the PA became known

as returnees, and the growing number of “youth generation” national activists, who emerged under

occupation (Jamal, 2005, 168); (2) the widening gulf between the secular-national and the religious-

Islamic elite, including the attempts of “the former to promote a pragmatic political solution to the

Palestinian question, and the efforts of the latter to frustrate these attempts became a central

characteristic of the dynamics of Palestinian nationalism” (Jamal, 2005, 169); and (3) the political Left,

which has become inconsequential in the post-Oslo mainstream political field, but which historically

play a central role in mobilization and key aspects of associational life.

The political sphere in Palestine is highly fractured, both within and between political parties. In

the case of the political Left, parties and affiliates were marginalized by the Oslo Accords themselves,

since which time Fatah and its supporters have enjoyed significant latitude in Palestinian politics. From

the beginning, opposition parties formally boycotted the elections which resulted from the Palestinian-

Israeli negotiation. As consequence, the boycott contributed to disproportional representation of Fatah,

which won with 77 percent of the seats in the parliament (Jamal, 2005, 140). These initial elections

marked a regression in the role of political parties in Palestinian politics: “this political reality left

people with no serious option but to go to Fatah due to the weakness of the opposition and the

closeness of Fatah to the PA, as well as the role the latter plays in intimidating opposition parties”

(Jamal, 2005, 141).

Thereafter some in opposition felt an obligation to support the nation by supporting the PNA's

efforts, while others continued to argue that Arafat “had given up on the Palestinian cause to legitimize

his rule” (Jamal, 2007, 38). As outcome, Arafat silenced critics, co-opted enemies and ostracized

dissenters by either integrating them into the government or marginalizing them” (Jamal, 2007, 39).

Over time this Left, secular opposition also lost support for more objective reason having to do

with the changes in the Palestinian social structure, “mainly the decline of the working class and the

workers movement and the rise of poverty” (Jamal, 2005, 143). In addition, the secular opposition

diminished as a result of Islamism not only as a way of life but as a political strategy. Strategically

“Islamic organizations adopted a critical stand towards the pragmatism of Fatah, [so that] many

Palestinians who were close to popular belief viewed the Islamic movement as a serious and more

convenient alternative to the secular factions” (Jamal, 2005, 144).

Following armed clashes between Hamas and Fatah supporters in 2007, and Hamas militants

seizure of Fatah-controlled facilities in Gaza, the West Bank and Gaza were politically separated.

Thereafter, Fatah “cracked down on Hamas in the West Bank, arresting its officials and supporters,

shutting down its affiliated civic organizations and media outlets, and allegedly torturing some

detainees” (Freedom House, 2011).

The civil society in the OT provides an additional potential source for mobilizing agents for

social movements. However much like the political sphere, the civil society sphere is likewise fractured

along pro-PNA and anti-PNA lines. In the West Bank, “associations that were clients of the state

reproduced vertical ties between their members and the state” so that once they were “absorbed into the

whims of the governing power, those associations most benevolent in form and purpose became

hierarchically structured, clientalistic sites” (Jamal, 2007, 129). Pro-PNA association members viewed

their involvement as aiding the Palestinian national project. Thus “trust and civic engagement, in the

contexts that create the incentives for citizen cooperation, reinforce one another”, so that, as

consequence, as long as individuals can access clientelistic networks on their own merit they do not

require the collective efforts of their fellow citizens, are therefore unmotivated to organize counter-

structures vis-a-vis social movements (Jamal, 2007, 134).

As a result of the great degree of politicization of civil society and NGOs, “the uncomfortable

relationship between many NGOs and the “government” derives in large part from political

competition between Fatah-dominated PA and the leftist and Islamist opposition” so that this

“factionalism increases the incentive for the Palestinian Authority to consolidate its control over

resource flows” (Brynen, 1995, 195). Moreover, “resources can be directed either into PA programs

(thereby undercutting the appeal of opposition NGOs) or to support pro-Fateh institutions”, which wold

then continue to compete with the opposition within civil society (Brynen, 1995, 195). Ultimately, civil

society requires some form of political agency to provide the basic rules of associational activity, and

as such the state is an indispensable agent (Muslih, 1993, 272).

Given these issues of Palestinians factionalism, coupled with historically imposed constraints

by the PLO's “national front” structure, “the mainstream Fatah leadership has long used its control over

critical financial resources to manipulate rivals, sustain cliques, and reward key constituencies (Brynen,

1995, 197) and have largely been able to get away with it given the fact that Palestinians are “likely to

identify the economy and the peace negotiations as greater priorities than democratization” (Brynen,

1995, 194), an ongoing factor that's been exasperated in more recent years.

The Palestinian Security Dilemma

The uniqueness of the Palestinian occupation by Israel makes the politics of the OT equally

unique. The governing regime cannot be so forthcoming with its willing compliance and political

transfers with the occupier: “a constituency with such sympathetic understanding of the security

concerns of the occupying power is unlikely to have been broadly based in Palestine to have allowed a

democratic government to be constructed that could openly carry out the necessary regulations of these

political transfers” (Khan, 2004, 43).

An integral aspect of the “Ending the Occupation, Establishing the State” is security, wherein

the Palestinian Security Forces (PSF) are professionalized and depoliticized. Many critics of the post-

Oslo era and the Fayyad strategy argue that it has positioned the PA as an extension of the Israeli

Ministry of the Interior, emphasizing that “ the U.S.-trained National Security Force battalions have

reduced the cost of the occupation and made the outsourcing of security for Israel more effective than

under the previous PA” (Khalidi, Samour, 2011, 15). Similar criticism was wielded earlier this

century, pointing to a deeper institutional problem with regard to the PNA itself: “[Palestinian] police

have now shouldered the responsibility for repressing political groups hostile to the Israeli state [so that

now] Israel is obliging the Palestinian economic community and the international community (the

Americans provide equipment) to pay for its security” (Bucaille, 2004, 101).

This ostensible reform has been accompanied by growing incidents of human rights violations.

According to the International Crisis Group (ICG), the PSF in its struggle against Hamas, has routinely

violated human rights, frequently circumventing the Basic Law. Abuses include largely extra-judicial

arrest campaigns, with scores of supposed Hamas-affiliates detained without a court order; as well as

widespread torture and ill treatment at PA detention centres. In its 2011 report, the ICG states that

“from June 2007 to April 2010, the Independent Commission for Human Rights recorded some 580

such cases, carried out by various branches of the security forces, which have resulted in at least eight

deaths” (ICG, 2011, 31). These abuses generated a wave of criticism from Palestinian human rights

organizations and Western donors that the interior ministry spear-headed a drive for new regulations

banning torture, and the PSF amped up their “formal internal oversight mechanisms, and the civil

police established new internal oversight mechanisms, including a special unit for human rights issues”

(ICG, 2011, 31).

Despite these efforts, many in the human rights community point to the “heavy-handed policing

of political opposition [as creating a] gathering “culture of fear” [and an environment wherein] critics

today are reluctant to express dissident opinions in public” (ICG, 2011, 35). The ICG report concludes

that “in the West Bank, the continuing Israeli occupation —and the lack of a single, legitimate and

credible Palestinian leadership to decide and implement national strategy—complicates [matters in so

far as] security coordination with Israel has come to be widely disdained, even if its necessity is

recognized [...] The security forces themselves are simultaneously pitied and resented” (ICG, 2011,

35).

From its inception the PSF were another means by which the PLO could consolidate power,

relying on massive recruitment of young men from the Intifada in the West Bank and Gaza. This was a

successful strategy as “access to the police profession or the of a regular soldier was always a viable

alternative to unemployment or uncertain manual labour for a generation that had opted for political

engagement at the expense of university or professional training” (Bucaille, 2004, 37). Most of these

recruits were members of Fatah and therefore were able to identify with their leaders and to carry out

their roles or orders (Bucaille, 2004, 37). During this early period for the PNA, Arafat ordered his

various security services to investigate and round up hundres of Hamas operatives and militants who

were interrogated, creating a institutional culture of politicization within the PSF (Bucaille, 2004, 39).

The Homestretch to Freedom

The Palestinian statehood program, “Ending the Occupation, Establishing The State”, presents

an interesting case, yet again, of neoliberalism following neocolonialism. A closed economy with no

real industrial policy, as limited by the Paris Declaration and the Oslo Accords, the West Bank operates

at the behest of Israel, foreign donors, and IFIs informed by market economics. Since 2009, the PA has

initiated a number of economic liberalization reforms, such as the introduction of the Palestinian Stock

Exchange through this program in an effort to demonstrate the viability of an independent Palestinian

state to the aforementioned external forces, a proposal that is now before the United Nations. Coming

at a time of historic illegitimacy for the PA, “in the wake of unprecedented internecine political

divisions, the program represents a new, apparently “home-grown” strategy to achieve statehood

through neoliberal institution building” (Khalidi, Samour, 2011, 7). The strategy follows a regional

neoliberal trend, ironically the ill-effects of which was at the root of the 2011 Arab Spring. It is the

opus of Prime Minister Salam Fayyad, who took over the post in 2007 in the caretaker government

following the Fatah-Hamas struggle and the establishment of parallel governments in the West Bank

and Gaza Strip (Khalidi, Samour, 2011, 8).

A growth rate of 8 percent from 2008 to 2011 in the West Bank is “heralded as signalling the

first green shoots of the PA reform strategy”, however this growth is generated by what can be

described as an “economic peace bubble” originating in Ramallah where “an urban construction boom,

car shows, international hotels, fashionable restaurants, virtual stock trading systems, and e-

government are seen as evidence of a vibrant economy” (Khalidi, Samour, 2011, 8). The perception of

growth from this highly localized unsustainable speculative urban investment coupled with a dearth of

alternatives informs the widespread support for Fayyad's initiative. To the Palestinian middle class this

appeal of personal prosperity “might yet prove to be a potent basis on which to claim political

legitimacy” (Khalidi, Samour, 2011, 10).

Further support purportedly can otherwise be attributed to dependence on the PNA: “sections of

the Palestinian society that actively consent to and advance the neoliberal agenda are officials in the

upper echelon of the PA hierarchy, the NGO-sector, and the portion of the capitalist class that benefits

from the security reform-enabled, Israeli-sanctioned economic revival in the West Bank (Khalidi,

Samour, 2011, 19).

Lastly, Fayyad's strategy enjoys broad-based support in large part as a result of non-existing

competing models. In the case of Hamas, the blockade enforced by Israel prevents the implementation

of any Hamas economic policy (they are managing instead a “tunnel economy”), concurrently Leftist

intellectuals and political actors have been co-opted, serving as “ministers in successive Fayyad

cabinets since 2007, embracing the neoliberal program” (Khalidi, Samour, 2011, 11). Despite support

for “Ending the Occupation, Establishing the State”, Palestinians largely believe that the plan will not

successful in achieving its primary objective of formalizing the Palestinian state. However, this belief is

largely attributed to Israel (PCPSR, 2011).

Resilient Framing by the Fatah Regime

Framing, the construction of a narrative in order to bring social and cultural relevance to bare on

a given cause or movements, is used by social movements in order to generate support and common

conception of a given event(s). In the case of Palestine, Fatah through the PLO/PNA has perpetuated a

widely espoused framing of the conflict through the concept of “steadfastness”; that is “a Palestinian

political strategy for confronting Israeli policies in the Occupied Territories” (Jamal, 2005, 62). This

notion refers to the “protection of the Palestinian entity in all its aspects on the national soil”, a politics

of survival which harmonized Fatah's role in the OT with the provision of services and public goods

(Jamal, 2005, 62). This frame was established through (1) reference to Palestinian identity as

connecting the Palestinians of the West Bank to their national history and cultural heritage so as to

develop support for national, educational, and cultural activity; (2) attempts to prevent Israeli

authorities from dominating the “spiritual domain”; (3) efforts to provide its inhabitants with tools that

would enable them to stay on the land and to strengthen their connection to it; and (4) taking procedural

and legal measures to link the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza to the Arab world (Jamal, 2005,

63).

In addition to the concept of “steadfastness”, the Fatah regime sought to solidify its narrative

and hold by framing its tactics as necessary to ensuring Palestinian survival. Arafat warned routinely

that without a strong state “predators would chip away at what remained of a Palestinian political

community” (Jamal, 2007, 47). The threat extended beyond Israel, so that Palestinians “left to deal with

the harsh realities of the Israeli Occupation, should have rallied their support behind Arafat and the

PNA government, since the rest of the world—even the Arab world— had turned its back on the cause

of Palestinian liberation” (Jamal, 2007, 48). This framing of the Palestinian peoples' narrative as one of

isolation, against irreversible odds established a sense of fatalistic support of the PA.

Conclusions: The Future of the (Authoritarian) Palestinian State

The case for PNA reform has been ongoing since its inception through the Oslo Accords;

(“Democracy is a central issue of contemporary Palestinian debate. It is however a notion subject to

shifting and contested interpretations” (Brynen, 1995, 190)). It has reached new heights over the last

decade. Some analysts, such as the RAND Corporation, remain optimistic, arguing that “given the

transitional nature of much of PA authoritarianism, reform is possible” (RAND, 2005, 19). Some have

presented the case to Arafat's old guard as “reform or perish” (Shikaki, 2002, 105).

As with neighbouring Arab states which experienced the Arab Spring, Palestinian society too is

a “construction of decades-old authoritarian and state-centralized policies”, so that in order “to promote

civil society in ways effective for democracy, this underlying starting point needs to become the

governing paradigm of analysis” (Jamal, 2007, 138). In terms of the Arab Spring this governing

paradigm has been meet with mass mobilization and revolution, raising the question of whether reform

in itself is insufficient in so far as in “ruling governments and patrimonial linkages, where states are

deeply embedded within society, the bottom-up approach to democracy is seriously flawed” (Jamal,

2007, 137).

In light of the Fayyad statehood project and the Palestinian UN bid for statehood, it is

interesting to consider the trajectory of Palestinian politics. As detailed here, the authoritarian

structures, clientalistic networks, security apparatuses and national rhetoric are deeply entrenched,

having been developed over the course of decades beginning with the creation of the PLO in the 1960s,

and enshrined vis-a-vis the Oslo Accords and the PNA. Attitudes and leaders have not turned over, and

familial and factional cleavages abound: “traditional bourgeois families and those linking to the

Palestinian Authority continue to hold aloof from the movement, for fear of its political and social

consequences [so that] the political edifice built up by the Palestinian leaders of recent years looks

exceedingly fragile today” (Bucaille, 2004, 154).

The complexity of the conflict itself make it both difficult to actualize democratic reform as

people remain subject to the Occupation while concurrently the Occupation is used as an excuse to

subvert reform by the ruling regime. In the most benign sense the populism of the nationalist struggle

“may encourage [rather than] grassroots mobilization [...] followership and corrode tolerance for

political pluralism” (Brynen, 1995, 190). As outlined above, though Palestinians are largely aware of

the corruption and mismanagement at the hands of the Fatah regime, they are bounded to it through the

common cause of the Palestinian resistance, in addition to the PNA's monopolistic control of aid,

goods, and services, while those who dissent are subject to its security forces.

As experienced during the spring of 2011, no new tactic for mobilizing civil society has been

devised to change the current dynamic. At the same time, “Israeli repression has considerable enfeebled

the capacity of Palestinians to preserve the contours of their political community and to create a viable

state” (Bucaille, 2004, 154). And so Palestinians continue to manage their lives under a “double

occupation”, one internal and external.

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