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Ethnicity, Authority, and Power in Central Asia

The people of Greater Central Asia-not only inner Asian states of the Soviet Union but also those who share similar heritages in adjacent countries such as Afghanistan and Pakistan, Iran, and the Chinese province of Xinjiang-have been drawn into more direct and immediate contact since the Soviet collapse. Infrastructural improvements, and the race by the great powers for access to the region's vital natural resources, have allowed these people to develop closer ties with each other and the wider world, cre<tting new interdependencies and fresh opportunities for interaction and the exercise of influence. They are being integrated into a new, wider economic and political region which is increasingly significant in world affairs, owing to its strategically central location, and its com­plex and uncertain politics. However, most of its inhabitants are pre-eminently concerned with familial and local affairs.

This work examines the viewpoints and concerns of a selection of groups in terms of four issues: government repression, ethnic group perspectives, devices of mutual support, and informal grounds of authority and influence. Responding to a need for in-depth studies concerning the social structures and practices in the region, this book examines trends and issues from the point of view of scholars who have lived and worked "on the ground" and have sought to understand the conditions and concerns of people in rural as well as urban settings. It provides a distinctive and timely perspective on this vital part of the world.

Robert L. Canfield is Professor of Anthropology at Washington University, St. Louis, USA. His many publications include (as co-editor) Revolutions and Rebellions in Afganistan, and (as editor) Turko- Persia in Historical Perspective.

Gabriele Rasuly-Paleczek is Associate Professor in the Department for Social and Cultural Anthropology, University of Vienna, Austria.

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Ethnicity, Authority, and Power in Central Asia New games great and small

Edited by Robert L. Canfield and Gabriele Rasuly-Paleczek

~~ ~~~:~;n~~;up LONDON AND NEW YORK

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1 Authoritarianism and its consequences in ex-Soviet Central Asia1

Anatoly Khazanov

Transitions from communism to liberal democracy consist not only of success stories, but also of obituaries. Although some scholars still claim that "after com­munism's collapse, there is no principled alternative to democracy left" (Fairbanks 2001: 55), during the past few years a growing number of politicians and observ­ers in the West have begun to express their disappointment with the political and economic performance of Central Asian countries. The only surprising ele­ment of their disappointment is that they were surprised at all. It was based on wishful thinking and exaggerated expectations. With regard to such countries as Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, it was also connected with the disjunction between appearance and reality that had existed in the beginning of the transitional period. Still, the failure of the democratic scenario in Central Asia could have easily been predicted and, in actuality, had been predicted by a number of scholars.

The transition from communism consists of two main processes that are far from completely intertwined: the transition from totalitarianism to another political order (whatever this order may be), and the transition from state socialism to the market economy. Many ex-communist states, including the Central Asian ones, face the additional problem of nation-state building. Thus, in order to succeed on the path of development, everything in the ex­communist countries should be rebuilt, and in Central Asia should even be built anew from the ground up: the economic system, the social organization, the political order, and ideology.

However, the main contemporary, Western patterns of ideological, political, and economic orientation, such as authoritarianism, conservatism, liberalism, and social democracy, are not applicable to Central Asian countries without serious reservations. To analyze their current order one should develop different criteria and notions. At the moment, all Central Asian countries might be characterized as authoritarian; however, in some important respects they are different from the authoritarian capitalist countries that one has been acquainted with. Under authoritarian capitalism, the government and administration do not abide by the rules of the democratic game. However, the economic sphere remains sufficiently autonomous. Although authoritarian rulers in capitalist countries may sometimes intervene in the economic sphere through populist, protectionist, and/or other measures, the market system and private property remain basically intact. To a

20 Anatoly Khazanov

significant extent, the economy is not monopolized by the state, and political elites have to coexist with economic ones.

In Central Asia, the state still reigns supreme not only in politics, but also in social and economic life, and the newly emerging economic elites do not have an independent existence. In fact, the Central Asian states are weak where they should be strong (the maintenance oflaw and order and management of coherent, orderly and fair market-oriented reforms), and strong where they should be weak (excessive control over the economy and society).

It seems that the best way to characterize the contemporary Central Asian soci­eties is to call them post-totalitarian. In the political sphere, their characteristic feature is a whimsical combination of totalitarian, authoritarian, and in rare cases even formal democratic institutions and characteristics, although the latter are always very weak and are nowadays in retreat. In the economic sphere, the social­ist institutions and forms of property frequently underwent insufficient change. At present, they coexist with the state monopolistic ones, the latter not very different from the former, as well as with the still much undeveloped institutions and forms based on private property and free enterprise.

To provide an explanation for this sad state of affairs, one should take into account many factors, including historical ones. With regard to Central Asia, one can recall the old saying that history is destiny, at any rate it has been so far. To start with, the independence of Central Asian states was not won in a struggle with the All-Union Moscow center. Because of the economic and political weakness of the region, the Central Asian leaderships to the very end were the most persist­ent champions of the preservation of the Soviet Union. They only wanted more power for themselves and more subsidies from Moscow. With the exception of Kyrgyzstan president Akaev, who faced an attempted mini-coup in his own repub­lic, all other Central Asian leaders either gave conditional approval to the August 1991 coup in Moscow or took a wait-and-see position. One could say that their countries' independence was, if not a sudden gift from heaven, then the almost imposed consequence of the Belovezhskaia Pushcha agreement (December 8, 1991, marking the disintegration of the Soviet Union) in which they had no part. Correspondingly, the institutional break with the Soviet past and the turnover of the ruling elites were insignificant in Central Asia (Khazanov 1995: 129 ff.).

Contrary to some European republics of the USSR, Central Asia lacked suf­ficiently strong counter-elites, which at the proper moment would be ready and capable of coming to power. In the Brezhnev period and later, the dissident move­ment, especially the secular and democratic one with specific political demands, was almost non-existent. Only in the late perestroika years (1988-91), which, incidentally, were the most liberal years in the long history of the region, did the first rudiments of civil society appear in Central Asia. However, they were too weak and unstable to challenge the ruling elites. It is true that in 1988-91 various groups and organizations began to emerge in Central Asia, in which the intelligentsia and the educated urban middle strata in general played the most active and organizing role. However, the formation of the opposition movements took place in significantly more difficult conditions than in many other republics

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Authoritarianism and its consequences 21

of the Soviet Union, because the political culture of the masses was extremely undeveloped.

National intelligentsias in Central Asia are a rather new phenomenon; they are a creation of the Soviet regime and are still not numerous. They lacked the tradi­tion of democratic political process and did nnt have a clear vision for the future of their countries, in the form of either Western-type liberal democracies or any other system. Instead, they are inclined towurds ethnic nationalism, because to them the dominance of their own nationality seemed to be the best safeguard and an improvement of their own position in society. Thus, human rights and iden­tity issues have become closely intertwined. A liberal democratic system, based on individual merit and competence and guar~ntceing equal rights to all citizens regardless of ethnic membership, began to b.:: considered as detrimental to the interests of politically strong and the most numerous but economically disadvan­taged titular nationalities.

In all, during the restructuring period the opposition in Central Asia proved to be not influential enough to lead broad and stable political movements with clearly formulated goals. It is notable that many of its leaders preferred to escape anti-communist slogans, were rather moden1te in their political demands, and were ready for collaboration with political cl ites. Often their criticisms of these elites were leveled more at personalities than at institutions. No wonder that the old communist political elites, the nomenklatura in the Soviet parlance, remained in power, and even managed to strengthen their positions with little difficulty in the new conditions of independence. For this they spare no efforts, and for now they are doing this quite successfully.

It is true that in some Central Asian count lies one could witness the struggle for power and spoils of state property between different factions of the nomen­klatura. However, this struggle did not endanger the dominant position of the whole stratum in their countries. In the beginning of the independence period, there were still more or less conspicuous dift~rences between the hard-line dic­tatorships, represented by the regimes of Presidents Karimov in Uzbekistan and Niiazov in Turkmenistan, that acquired grotl!sque forms in the latter; and the less repressive autocratic rule of Presidents Akaev in Kyrgyzstan (written before the fall of Akaev) and Nazarbaev in Kazakhstan. But even in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, which in the early 1990s were often praised in the West as virtual beacons of democracy in Central Asia, the prevailing political tendency is also authoritarian (Kurtov 2001 ).

All Central Asian countries share such common characteristics as hyper­presidentialism, the absence of a real separution of powers that at best exists only on paper, fragmented opposition, very weak and ephemeral political parties (where the multi-party system has any meaning at all), a lack of mecha­nisms of real public control and monitoring to hold officialdom and bureaucracy accountable, and constant violation of free sreech, free press rights, and other basic freedoms.

The most significant changes can be traced to ideology and the legitimation of power. Communist ideology was thrown overboard. It was replaced with the

22 Anatoly Khazanov

ideology of ethnic nationalism and ( ethno )national statehood building. Ethnic nationalism, with all its usual attributes-from a rhetoric of post-colonialism and a victimization complex; to a search for the 'glorious ancestors' and obsession with alleged autochthonism; and to an elevation of statuses of indigenous languages­is propagated by the ruling elites and many in the cultural elites (Koroteeva and Makarova 1998; Adams 1999; Kuru 2002: 73 ff.; Roy 2000: 165 ff.; Manz 2002; Olcott 2002: 58 ff.; Kosmarskii 2003; Ilkhamov 2004a). It is considered instru­mental to societal consolidation and, in fact, it helped the former to neutralize or convert to its cause some strata of the indigenous populations.

In spite of the proclaimed course aimed at the transition to the market econ­omy, so far the economic reforms in Central Asia have not been sufficiently deep and consistent to become potentially dangerous for the monopoly of power of the ruling elites. Private enterprise is still of limited importance to economic growth. All ex-communist states are facing the problem of redraw­ing the boundaries of their own activities, reducing their involvement in the economy and paving the way for private entrepreneurship and foreign inves­tors (Balcerowicz 1994; Linz and Stepan 1996: 390-1, 435; Khazanov 2004: 37-42). However, in Central Asia, the states still maintain control even over privatized sectors of economy through anti-competitive practices, licensing, arbitrary regulations, and other administrative measures. Their policy choices determine not only the general direction of economic development but also the fate of individual enterprises. In addition, squandering scarce resources for eco­nomically unsound projects has become a common practice detrimental to the overall well-being of ordinary people.

On the orders of President Niiazov, a luxurious international airport, many five-star hotels, and a soccer stadium have been built in Ashghabad, the capital of Turkmenistan, where the water supply and sewage systems remain hazardous to the health of its residents. This occurred at a time when the government had to introduce food rationing. Meanwhile, the airport is never used to its full capac­ity, and the hotels remain empty most of the time due to insufficient numbers of visitors to the country. Even rare international soccer games are attended by less than 1,000 people, since this game has never been popular in the country. Instead, the city-dwellers are invited to enjoy a huge, 14-meter-high gilt statue of Niiazov, rotating on a 70-meter-high pedestal, which was erected in the center of Ashghabad.2 Nowadays, a new grandiose project is on the agenda: the construc­tion of a large lake in the middle of the Kara-Kum Desert.

In Kazakhstan, President Nazarbaev's project to transfer the capital from Almaty in the south to the small northern city of Akmola, later renamed Astana, has already swallowed billions of dollars. The project was driven not only by Nazarbaev's personal ambitions but also by some political considerations, including the goal of strengthening the ethnic Kazakh presence in the Russian­dominated northern part of the country (Bremmer 1994; Huttenbach 1998; Wolfel2002). However, building the roads, power lines, gas pipelines, residen­tial complexes, numerous office buildings, and presidential palaces required, and still requires, huge sums of money. Even in 2003, the opposition criticized

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Authoritarianism and its consequences 23

the government for investing about 850 mill ion dollars in the development of the new capital, and only 85 million dollars in agriculture.

In all ex-communist countries, denationalization of state property was not a result of the further expansion of the private sector. To a greater or lesser degree, they all experienced a conversion of power into property. But in some Central Asian countries, privatization is still in its initia I stages, and even in those countries where it advanced further, it has not resulted in the emergence of independent eco­nomic elites. On the contrary, power and property have become inseparable. The ruling stratum seizes or controls the property without giving up their power. Just like in some other developing countries, state autonomy from societal pressures more often leads to disastrous rather than beneficial developmental outcomes.

The new economic order that has emerged in Central Asia as a result of the commercialization of governance can be characterized at best as political capi­talism-the fusion of the ruling elites with a new stratum of proprietors, whose very existence depends on their ties with those in power. The transfer of former socialist enterprises to holding companies has not changed much. Key enterprises, monopolies, and even whole sectors of the economy are controlled by members of bureaucratic elites and/or relatives and close associates of the presidents. Good connections with the governments and administrators are a much better guarantee of economic success than the risky entrepreneurship in an open sea of free com­petition. The lack of effective political representation, the absence of mechanisms for holding the governments and presidents accountable for their decisions, and the monopolistic structure of the industrial sector allow the ruling elites to use the national resources and revenues for their own enrichment and for further con­solidation of their power. The struggle within the ruling elites for shares in these revenues so far has not threatened the stability of the authoritarian rule.

The main danger of the nomenklatura privatization and control over the econ­omy consists not of the violation of social just ice. Historical justice is like a train that comes to the station late, if it comes at all. It would be very naive to expect that justice might immediately become rooted in the region after more than 70 years of ruthless communist experimentation and many centuries of previous des­potic rule. The problem is of a different order.

Often, economic policies in Central Asia are not connected either with eco­nomic rationality or with genuine national interest. Many nomenklatura members or people close to them acquired property, or control over it but have not learned how to run it in an efficient capitalist way. In fact, Central Asia has very limited, if any, history of private ownership in the modem Western sense. No wonder that at the moment there is a very limited understanding ofliberal capitalism there.

These circumstances aggravate the general inefficiency of the region's economies in the transitional period. All authoritarian countries share some common characteris­tics, although in politics more so than in economics. At present, the economic policies in Central Asia have little resemblance to those conducted by such East Asian coun­tries as South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore. They resemble more closely the policy that was pursued in the 1950s and 1960s in some Latin American countries. Their regimes were consumed with rent seeking-manipulating import licenses, foreign

24 Anatoly Khazanov

exchange controls, subsidies, government jobs, and so on--by high officials and their cronies and clients. I should hardly remind that such policies in Latin America, as well as in other countries, resulted in complete economic failure.

The first post-independence decade was a period of rapid economic decline in Central Asia (Kalyuzhnova 1998: 104-5, passim; Rumer 2000; Sievers 2003). The countries lost a significant part of their GNP: Tajikistan lost two-thirds of its GNP; Turkmenistan just under half; Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan two-fifths. Uzbekistan has managed with only a relatively small dip of around 10 percent, but this is according to official statistics, which can hardly be trusted. In practical terms, this means that the bulk of working people earned between 2.5 and 9 dollars per month, with 15 dollars considered a good salary and 25-30 dollars very good indeed. Taking into account the average number of dependents per family, not infrequently the per capita monthly income amounted to just under 3 dollars. This was a very significant drop in living standards in comparison to the late Soviet period. This situation and deteriorating health services also resulted in a decline in the life span. By 2001, the average life span in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan dropped to 54.3 years, in Kyrgyzstan to 52.6 years, in Turkmenistan to 52.0 years, and in Tajikistan to 50.8 years (Sovetskaia Rossiia October 6, 2001).

Although in some countries the economy has begun to climb back in the past few years, it is still premature to consider this animation as a sign of stable economic recovery in the region. During the past few years, there is a certain improvement in living standards only in Kazakhstan. Large sectors of populations, however, are still living below the poverty line. In some Central Asian countries, especially in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, drug trafficking has become a major part oflocal infor­mal economies, in which many unemployed people are involved. In addition, drug addiction has become common across the region (Lunev 2001: 61-2; Madi 2004).

One may come to the conclusion that the statist model of modernization, which has been chosen by Central Asian regimes, has so far turned out to be inadequate. The region desperately needs large-scale foreign investment and know-how. The decay of the modern sectors of economy with their obsolete technology and equipment can not be overcome by Central Asians themselves. However, with the exception of the oil and mining sectors (by 2002, the Chevron Texaco corpora­tion alone had invested four billion dollars in the oil sector of Kazakhstan---see Yermukhanov 2002b ), the prospects of attracting them seem dubious at the moment, given its geographic location, its shortage of infrastructure and skilled labor, its political instability, weak legal protection, and completely corrupt and inefficient administrations.

The positive impact of future oil and gas revenues should also not be overesti­mated. Although these are often seen in the region as the only hope for alleviating the current situation, there are many reasons to doubt that they will secure the sustained economic growth and sociopolitical modernization of Central Asia in general, or even of its individual states in particular. First, of the five countries which constitute former Soviet Central Asia, only Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan possess significant hydrocarbon resources. The reserves of Uzbekistan are suf­ficient only for satisfying domestic co~sumption. Second, for many reasons their

Authoritarianism and its consequences 25

windfalls-to-be are still rather problematic, considering the political and economic problems connected with oil transportation from this landlocked region. Third, capital-intensive projects generate a limited demand for labor, and a threat of "the Dutch disease" may become quite real. Successful development in the hydrocar­bon sector may be accompanied by growing backwardness and unemployment in other sectors. Just as in the present, in the futurl! the capitals and largest industrial centers, with their more or less Westernized populations, may remain islands in a sea of basically pre-modern society.

One of the most alarming post-Soviet developments in the region is the plum­meting quality of primary and secondary education, especially in rural areas, which even in the Soviet period was inferior to that in other parts of the Soviet Union. Still, one of the main Soviet achievements in the region was the almost universal literacy of the population. Nowadays, a growing number of children, especially girls, have no chance of attending secondary schools and have to work to supplement family income; some of theme\ en drop out from primary schools. In Tajikistan, school enrolment shrunk to 61 percent in 2001 (ICG 2003a). In Turkmenistan, the government reduced primary and secondary education from II to nine years (actually, to six years if one takes into account the time the school­children have to work in the cotton fields) and university education to two years (ICG 2004). If this trend continues, the region may well soon have a generation of illiterate and semi-literate people who will lag behind their parents in education.

I have mentioned but some of the many negative trends that are nowadays so conspicuous in the political and economic development of the Central Asian region. However, were I asked whether the development could take quite differ­ent and more successful forms, I would have to reply: "In my opinion, no."

At present, Central Asia is overburdened by its past. Not only many insti­tutions and traditions of the Soviet past, but also those which go back to the pre-revolutionary colonial one and even of the pre-colonial past of the region are still alive and often make a negative impact on the current situation there. Of all the numerous problems that Central Asian countries are facing now, the most acute one remains their underdevelopment. The Soviet leaders liked to refer to the Central Asian example as the model for successful development along socialist lines, which the developing countries were encouraged to emulate. The reality, however, was quite different from the Soviet propaganda.

In the Soviet period, modernization was pursued in Central Asia with a mini­mal participation by the indigenous population, and none of its processes-be they industrialization, urbanization, demographic revolution, revolution in edu­cation, or occupational mobility-were fully implemented there (Poliakov 1992; Fierman 1991; Kul 'chik 1995; Patnaik 1996; Panarin 2000: 90). The so-called interregional division of labor carried out by the Moscow center clearly con­tradicted the interests of the Central Asian republics, because it condemned the region to the role of supplier of raw materials, which left the region for other parts of the Soviet Union, mainly in unprocessed form. All Central Asian coun­tries were dependent on direct budgetary suprort and other forms of subsidies from Moscow.

26 Anatoly Khazanov

By the end of the 1980s, the per capita GNP in Central Asia lagged behind not only Russia, but some neighboring Muslim countries as well. Thus, in Russia the per capita GNP was 3, 780 dollars, in Iran 2,480 dollars, and in Turkey 1,640 dol­lars. In Kazakhstan it amounted to 2,160 dollars, in Turkmenistan 1,360 dollars, in Kyrgyzstan 1,220 dollars, and in Tajikistan 780 dollars. By 1990, the share of the urban population was 74 percent in Russia; 64 percent in Turkey; and 58 percent in Iran. In Kazakhstan it was 57 percent; in Turkmenistan, 45 percent; in Uzbekistan, 41 percent; in Kyrgyzstan, 38 percent; and in Tajikistan, 32 percent (Vishnevsky 1996: 139, 141). The picture would be even more grim if one were to take into account, first, that a significant number of the urban population consisted of members of non-indigenous ethnic groups, and, second, that in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan, the share of urban settlements with less than 50,000 residents is still very high.

No wonder that the social structure of Central Asian countries has many more similarities with that of the developing countries of the Third World than with that of developed Western countries, or even of Russia and Ukraine. It resembles a pyra­mid, in which people involved in the government and administration and, in the post-Soviet period, the political capitalists, are placed at its top, while the most numerous class, the peasantry, occupies the position at the bottom. By the end of the Soviet period, more than half of the indigenous population of the region still lived in the rural areas and was involved mainly in agriculture as sovkhozniks and kolkhozniks, i.e. laborers on the state-owned or collective farms, denied a voice in economic decision making and divorced from the property rights on arable land, pastures, and other key resources. They were treated as guinea pigs, raw material for several drastic political and socioeconomic reforms in the pursuit of a vain Utopia.

Moreover, many new tendencies that are becoming conspicuous in Central Asian agriculture in the post-Soviet period can be best characterized as anti­modem. It is true that agricultural policy is becoming increasingly different in individual countries, which display a continuum of change: from Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, where Soviet forms of ownership and organization still predomi­nate; to Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, which have changed the most. Nonetheless, in all these countries the immediate producers face extreme uncertainty not only about the prices they will get, but more basically about their rights to control land and animals, and they are unable to even estimate the probabilities of differ­ent outcomes. Land use rights are transferable, at least on paper, in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. But in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan any transactions in land are still prohibited.

Thus, the leadership of Uzbekistan is still unwilling to relinquish its monopo­listic control over agriculture. At best, some of the former kolkhozniks acquired leasing contracts, but by no means full titles to the land. Instead, former collective farms have been converted into new cooperatives, known in the Uzbek language as shirkats. This conversion, however, appears to be little more than a matter of smoke and mirrors. The state still holds a monopoly on cotton export and con­trols, and even dictates, the purchasing price on it well before the market price (Ilkhamov 1998; 2000). Corruption and abuse have already become the order of

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Authoritarianism and its consequences 27

things on these shirkats. Ordinary members do not have any greater freedom to determine their affairs than in the Soviet period, while the shirkat leaders have more independence from state control, and this is often exercised to the detri­ment of members. In 1999, the directors of several shirkats in the Navoi province boasted to me that, contrary to Soviet times, they could fire anybody they were not pleased with.

Likewise, in Tajikistan, dehqan associations, or joint stock companies, dif­fer little from the previous kolkhozes and sovkhozes, since the state retains large shares in many of them and controls cotton growing. At the same time, the heads of the Soviet era collective farms, officials in local administrations, and some civil war field commanders appropriated the best lands for themselves, thus creating a new stratum of landless peasants (ICG 2003a).

The transition away from Soviet-era agriculture and farm organization is most advanced in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. However, so far the results of their reforms are also unsatisfactory. From the very beginning, the reforms were accompanied by widespread embezzlement of state property and collective property by those in power. Directors and managers of the former kolkhozes and sovkhozes were taking control of disproportionate shares of the farms' wealth, and local officials were maintaining as much control and capturing as large a flow of benefits as they could. By 1999, thousands of small peasant farms and small cooperatives existed in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. But they are unable to maintain profitable and market-oriented produc­tion and operate as non-capitalist subsistence units (Rastiannikov and Deriugina 2000). No wonder that in the major cities of Kazakhstan foodstuffs from developed countries, including meat and milk products, have seized a significant share of the market; while local producers face many difficulties in selling their own produce. Although the government promised to invest 150 billion tenge (about one billion dol­hrrs) in agriculture in 2003-5, it seems that investments are intended only to stimulate marketable grain produce (Annual Address 2003).

During the post-Soviet period, the agricultural production in Central Asia was decreasing, and there is still no light at the end of the tunnel. Economic and social differentiation is growing. The negative effects of privatization are not balanced, and the number of dispossessed and displaced people is disproportionately high, while mechanisms that should lessen the pain of dispossession are nonexistent or too weak. This sad state of affairs is fraught not only with economic but danger­ous social consequences.

First, there is the danger of the re-peasantization and even swift pauperization of the majority offormer kolkhozniks and sovkhozni ks, including even those involved in pastoralism (Kerven 2003; Khazanov and Shapiro 2005). In the worst scenario some of them may even become laborers in new, large agricultural enterprises cap­tured by the former communist managers. In Kazakhstan, farmland has become progressively more concentrated in the hands of a few as a result of intimidation, blackmail, and fraud (World Bank 2000: 45-6). A similar development has taken place in Tajikistan. In principle, large agricultural enterprises that use wage labor are characteristic of the agricultural sector in some developed countries. In Central Asian conditions, however, such enterprises may well become latifundias.

28 Anatoly Khazanov

Second, a growing number of young people from rural areas who cannot find employment and do not see decent futures in agriculture are moving to the cit­ies. In Kazakhstan in recent years, hundreds of small villages were abandoned by their dwellers and several hundred thousand people have moved to the cit­ies (Yermukhanov 2002a; Alekseenko 2004). However, because of their low educational level and the depressed national economies, they cannot find employ­ment in the modem urban sectors. Just like in some African and Latin American countries, at present such Central Asian cities as Almaty, Bishkek, and Dushanbe are surrounded by a ring of poor squatter districts without roads, electricity, or running water. Many of their population do not have permanent jobs. Some are marginalized and constitute an underclass prone to violence and crime.

Last but not least, let us consider the working class and the middle strata. Numerically, they are still relatively small. The same can be said of the "new middle class" emerging as the result of the limited market-oriented reforms. In the Soviet period, many blue collars and members of the professional middle class came from non-indigenous ethnic groups-Russians, Ukrainians, Germans, Tatars, and several others. Their outmigration in the post-Soviet period (Vitkovskaia 1998; Panarin 1999: 149 ff.; Islamov 2000: 183 ff.; Savoskul2001: 393 ff.) is detrimental to the immediate economic development of the region, since these people were the backbone of the modernization process in Central Asia.

Another important characteristic of the Central Asian region which is detri­mental to its development is the importance of power groupings based on local, regional, and/or kin- and descent-based clanal and tribal identities and loyalties. The latter are still very much alive and conspicuous in the public consciousness, attitudes, and behavior: from personal relations and marriage arrangements, to social and political advancement and career promotion, and to infighting within the ruling elites. In the Soviet period, competition between regional factions some­times resulted in a very specific division oflucrative positions. Thus, in Tajikistan, where identities are very localized and even marriages between people of differ­ent regions are uncommon, the natives of the northern Sugd (former Leninabad) province, primarily from Khudjant and to a lesser degree from Kanibadam, had come to dominate the Communist Party apparatus and government; descendants of migrants from Samarkand and Bukhara made up a significant part of the intel­lectual elite; natives of Kuliab and Badakhshan regions presented a majority in the law enforcement bodies, while Garm natives were entrenched in trade and the shadow economy. Since the 1960s in Kazakhstan, members of the Elder Zhuz and their allies from the Junior Zhuz have been over-represented in the power struc­tures, while the intellectual and cultural elites to a large extent consist of members of the Middle Zhuz.

The Soviets failed to create a Homo sovieticus from ordinary Central Asians. In fact, many traditional institutions and social structures were by no means destroyed. They only underwent a certain transformation and adjusted quite well to the new social stratification. The undemocratic pyramidal structures of power that had been built with Moscow's consent and support, and the complete absence of even the rudimentary elements of civil society in the region, inevitably led to

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Authoritarianism and its consequences 29

a situation in which the actual dispensation of power and wealth was connected with a network of personal trust, patronage, and clientage. One ofthe important foci of any individual's loyalty remained the groupings in which one has grown up and lived. As in the pre-Soviet past, one's position in society was to a large extent connected with one's personal standing in these groupings (all these groupings not infrequently but erroneously are called by the umbrella term "clan," which obscures their real varieties and differences). These were the foundations of trust and, thus, the channels through which power was mediated and social advance­ment could be achieved. In these conditions, it was natural that leadership of any rank in Central Asia, even those at the top levels who were directly appointed by Moscow, relied on the support of their tribesmen or fellow countrymen.

The ordinary population, which was denied any participation in political life and was poorly protected by the state, also tend~d to rely on traditional institu­tions, such as kin groups, neighborhoods, or others, and on their old traditions of mutual aid and reciprocity. This situation left even less room for individual initia­tive and decision making than existed in the Eun )pean republics of the USSR.

In this respect, nothing has changed in Central Asia during the independence years. On the contrary, traditional institutions and attitudes that were somewhat hid­den in Soviet times, have nowadays become even more salient and important. The political elites are successfully manipulating them to secure their power further. No wonder that some of them, for example, shuro aksukal (the courts of elders based on customary law) in Kyrgyzstan, the avlod (lineage) based system in Tajikistan, or the mahal/a (residential neighborhood or local conmltmity) organization in Uzbekistan, are legalized under the pretext of the revival of national traditions.

Inasmuch as this policy is receiving a certain support from the ordinary people, it can be characterized as a kind of pseudo-populism. Moreover, they are play­ing a certain stabilizing function. However, the~c institutions, in the recent past informal, nowadays are put under state control. Thus, in Uzbekistan, the chairmen ofmahalla conm1ittees are elected by their members from candidates nominated by local authorities, and the state pays salaries of the chairmen and secretaries of mahalla committees (Bohr 1998: 21-2; Sievers 2002; Kamp 2004). In fact, this policy only strengthens the traditions of patriarclty, paternalism, obedience, and respect for elders and authorities which hinder the modernization process and development of civil society. Sievers (2002: 152) aptly characterized this policy as "pioneering grass-roots absolutism."

Instead of open competition with clear rules of the game, the recruiting into the political elites in Central Asia is based more than ever before on clientage, clan­nishness, and personal loyalty. These relations permeate Central Asian societies from top to bottom. The excessive concentration of power on the highest level is repeated on the local level. Every high-ranking orficial selects his own entourage from among his kin or fellows from his place of origin and grants them employ­ment, promotion, and protection. His subordinates, in tum, copy their patron's practices in selecting their own sycophants down to the lower levels of society. To become a good client of a big patron one should have one's own clients, in other words, to be a little patron one's self.

30 Anatoly Khazanov

In internal politics, local solidarities and allegiances are still more important than ethno-national ones. This situation is sometimes explained as a usual center­periphery competition (Ilkhamov 2004b; Luong 2004), however in Central Asian conditions it should better be perceived not only as a struggle of peripheral politi­cal elites for their share of scare resources and spoils, but also as a fighting for dominant positions in the center; hence, a salience of the regional groupings in the capitals. Besides, peripheral foci of power in Central Asia have originated not in arbitrary administrative-territorial arrangements; in many cases they reflect historical tribal and regional differences. Soviet policies reconfigured power relations in such a way that a new institutional regionalism and power relations superseded but at the same time coexisted with, and even reaffirmed old clan, tribal, and regional identities (Luong 2002: 63 ff. ). In the post-Soviet period, these identities have become even more salient.

Thus, in Uzbekistan, President Karimov rules with the support of the Samarkand faction and its allies from the Tashkent faction, while the members of the Fergana, Bukhara, Khwarazm, and Surkash (Surkhan-Daria and Kashkar-Daria regions) factions are pushed aside to less prominent positions (Carlisle 1995: 71 ff.; Petrov 1998: 97). In Kyrgyzstan, members of the northern tribes, especially from the Talas and Chu regions, constitute the main support base for President Akaev, while members of the southern tribes are dissatisfied with their shares of power and national wealth (Anderson 1999: 39-42). It is remarkable that, despite his declared negative attitude toward tribalism, Akaev himself belongs to the old and mighty Sary-Bagysh tribe, and many important positions in his entourage are occupied by his tribesmen.

In Kazakhstan, according to a 1995 opinion poll, 39 percent of the respondents believed that belonging to a particular zhuz (in the past, something like a tribal federation) was important in getting a job or a promotion (Olcott 2002: 185). Just like in the late-Soviet period, the dominant positions in the country's leadership are occupied by members of the Elder zhuz who have to share power with mem­bers of the Junior zhuz, since the main oil deposits are located on the territory of the latter. At the same time, most of the opposition consists of members of the Middle zhuz (Masanov 1996:46 ff.; Khliupin 1998: 7 ff.; Bukkvoll2004: 635-6; Schatz 2004: 95 ff.).

During the entire independence period, Tajikistan has experienced a power struggle between Khudjant, Kuliab, Badakhshan, Gissar, and some other factions. At times the struggle was so fierce that it resulted in civil war. This war was sometimes perceived as the struggle between ex-communists and secularists on the one hand, and Islamists on the other. However, it can be better explained as the struggle of regional factions that for various reasons had chosen different political orientations and ideological garments (Bushkov and Mikul'sky 1996; Djalili et al. 1997; Niiazi 1997; Zviagelskaya 1997). Thus, the Islamic Revival Party ofTajikistan was comprised mainly of inhabitants ofGharm and Karategin. Eventually, the Kuliab-Khujant-Gissar alliance, with assistance from Russia and Uzbekistan, defeated the Gharm-Karategin-Pamir alliance. At the moment, the leading positions in the country belong to the Kuliab faction, despite the fact that

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Authoritarianism and its consequences 31

Kuliab is one of the poorest and the most backward regions of the country. This situation is much resented by the other factions, especially the Khujant one, to the extent that one may wonder if the Kuliab faction would be able to remain in power without Moscow's military support.

In Turkmenistan, even the national flag contains five carpet designs which are characteristic of the main tribes in the country. The administrative boundaries of the provinces often correspond with tribal or subtribal territories. For the time being President Niiazov claimed that since he was an orphan, he did not have a close affiliation with any particular tribe. However, this is already a story of the past. Nowadays, it is acknowledged that Niiazov belongs to the most numerous Teke tribe, and from this tribe, especially from its Akhal subdivision, he recruits many of his subordinates (Dudarev 1998: 169; Akbarzadeh 1999: 282-3; Kadyrov 200 I: 6 ff.). Remarkably, even some members of opposition to Niiazov perceive democratization of their country only in terms of substitution of a federation of tribes for the current hegemony of one tribe (Kadyrov 200 I: 22).

All these factors are very unfavorable for the emergence of civil society. The majority of indigenous populations perceive themselves not only as, and often not so much as, individual citizens, but as members of various subnational col­lectivities, and take for granted a social hierarchy passed off as traditional. These groupings became an organizational principle of informal networks built in the state structures, and while the state remains undemocratic and controls key eco­nomic resources, there is nothing that may seriously undermine this principle. Individuals who are not included in kin, clanal, tribal, and regional networks, which perpetuate the norms of pseudo-traditional social hierarchy and the authori­tarian model of power, are doomed to a kind of social vacuum.

No wonder that the Central Asian rulers are very suspicious of all kinds of NGOs, which, not infrequently, were founded with Western encouragement and support in the vain hope of fostering the democratization process (Ruffin and Waugh 1999). Those which still exist can hardly be characterized as grass-root organizations. I am personally acquainted with leaders and activists of some of them. Many are courageous people who somewhat remind me of the Moscow dissidents of the 1970s. However, they are very isolated from the rest of society; moreover, influenced by their Western sponsors they sometimes become some­what detached from local realities and specifics.

Such is the state of things at present in Central Asia, and however regretful it may be, I do not see any serious stimuli for democratization and a rapid economic growth in the near future. On the contrary, thi~ future does not look particularly bright. Central Asia is a very unstable region, but public discontent there is more connected with the deteriorating economic situation than with the Jack of political freedom. Social apathy is widespread among ordinary people who do not believe that they can change anything through legitimate political process (Uyama 1993).

A lot has already been written about the endurance of Islam and the threat of radical Islam in the region (see, for example, Poliakov 1992; Malashenko 1993; Abduvakhitov 1993; Haghayeghi 1995; Sagdeev and Eisenhower 2000; Poujol 2001; Fletcher and Sergeyev 2002; Rashid 2002; Poujol 2004). Regional

32 Anatoly Khazanov

leaders like to present themselves as a bulwark against religious extremism, thus justifying their dictatorship-an argument that is also promoted by Russia and is often too easily bought into by the West. In the aftermath of September 11, Uzbekistan has become the key strategic partner of the USA in Central Asia and the American criticism of president Karimov's hard-line approach on combating all kinds of opposition appears to be more muted (Akbarzadeh 2004: 277 ff.). It is true that nowadays the Islamic opposition in some Central Asian countries seems to be much stronger than the secular one. Even in such a repressive country as Turkmenistan, since the mid-l990s mosques have become the centers of the people's concealed resentment.

Among other factors, the rise of Islamic extremism is connected with a crisis of societies and groups that are confronted by many challenges of modernity, including external ones, without having been sufficiently modernized them­selves and retaining many characteristics of pre-modem societies. It is often assumed, and not without good reason, that in conditions of large-scale social, economic, and cultural dislocation, it is precisely the Central Asian leaders who, through elimination or suppression of the secular opposition, are provok­ing dissatisfied and disoriented ordinary people to turn from traditional Islam to its radical and militant varieties (Khazanov 1995: 147-8; Schoeberlein 2001: 338-9). The violence that gripped Tashkent and Bukhara, in March 2004, may be quite indicative, even if one does not buy their official version provided by Karimov's government.

Still, socio-economic discontent in closed political systems alone is insuffi­cient to explain the rise of Islamic extremism. The political potential of Islam should never be underestimated. Let it suffice to mention the role oflslam in anti­colonial movements in Central Asia. In the Soviet Union, this was suppressed but remained dormant. As an anthropologist I would also suggest paying more atten­tion to agency-based factors, to various kinds of political actors who are playing an important role in mobilizing religious militancy throughout the Islamic world, including Central Asia. In this context, the foreign influence should not be under­estimated either.

Thus, Saudi Arabia and some other countries and movements have financed many institutions and activities that promote a rather rigid and militant version of Islam. In addition, many missionaries from Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Egypt, and some countries that had come to Central Asian countries, in the early 1990s, were propagating radical Islam. Later they were forced to leave, but the seeds were already planted. There is much evidence that some international Islamist groups and organizations channel aid to the militants in the region. In all, institutions matter, but so do human agents.

After a short period of flirtation with Islam in the early 1990s, the Central Asian governments are striving now to put it again under their strict control, and have increasingly cracked down on any signs of independence by the religious leaderships. Thus, in Uzbekistan, trials of Islamists are carried out regularly, and several thousands of people accused of Islamist activities are already in jail. People are allowed to pray only in state-approved and controlled mosques.

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Authoritarianism and its consequences 33

With the exception of Tajikistan, where the Islamic Renaissance Party is increasingly harassed by the government but ~till is legal, political Islam is for­bidden in all Central Asian states. However, this has not eliminated the religious opposition. At present, there are two main ot·ganizations operating in Central Asia with the proclaimed goal of turning the region into an Islamic state. The first is the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, \\·hich advocates the establishment of an Islamic state in Uzbekistan through violent means. Although influenced by Salafism, it deliberately avoided being assc)ciated with a particular group of Sunnism to make it acceptable to adherents or different schools. It had, or still has, training camps and bases in the mountain areas of Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Afghanistan, and enjoyed the support of the Taliban, and, apparently, of AI Qaeda. For several years, it was involved in armed struggle and terrorist activi­ties against the government of President Karimov. After September II and the following events, including the American military campaign in Afghanistan, the US government put it on the list of the major terrorist organizations in the world. These developments have weakened the Movement, but its capacity for regroup­ing and remobilization should not be underestimated. It seems that members of the IMU remain active in Tajikistan.

Another organization is Hizb-ut Tahrir (The Party of Liberation), which is of a distinctively transnational nature and has a clear-cut agenda (Babadjanov 200 I; ICG 2003b). Its main goal is to re-establish the Caliphate based on Sharia (Taji­Farouki 1996), and as the first step it wants to tum Central Asia into a single Muslim state, allegedly by peaceful means (s~e http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org). Hizb-ut Tahrir is a strictly clandestine organizCition which has many connections with radical Islamists in the Middle East. Most of its members are ethnic Uzbeks, especially from the Fergana Valley (lgushev 2005), but it is trying to expand its ethnic base and to extend its activity to other regions.

The Central Asian regimes are facing a difficult dilemma. Legitimating of political Islam may enhance its radical groups. Fighting it through repression may buy some time, but eventually turn out to be unsuccessful and lead to more violence. Both choices are shrewd with a risk and may result in a further destabi­lization ofthe region. One cannot exclude completely that in the future the current secular regimes may be replaced by Islamist ones, and despite some assurances to the contrary, there is no guarantee that the latter will be moderate and tolerant to political pluralism.

Still, history is on the move in Central Asia, just as in any other part of the world. It is quite possible that if not all then most of the current autocratic leaders of the Central Asian countries, in one way or another, will remain in power for life. But they are mortal, and ruling their countries from the afterworld is beyond their capabilities. It is also unlikely that all of them will be able to follow examples of North Korea or Azerbaijan, and retain powe1· within their immediate families. Thus, one cannot exclude that the future transition ofleadership in the region will be accompanied by in-fighting between different factions of political elites for a new distribution of power, wealth, and other privileges. The signs of this struggle are already quite evident in such countries as Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan.

34 Anatoly Khazanov

This in-fighting may sometimes look like a struggle between reformists and conservatives, and to some extent it may really be. However, one should be cau­tious in this regard, since the tribal and regional loyalties retain their importance for all factions involved. Be that as it may, the example of many former communist countries has proven that the transition from authoritarian rule has better chances for being successful when the political class is split. On the contrary, when it is consolidated, like in Putin's Russia, the imposition of or return to authoritarian­ism is much easier. Thus, in the future, the transition of power in Central Asian countries may provide a window of opportunity for a more liberal order, however small this window seems to be at the moment.

The collapse oftotalitarian communism was a step forward, just like the transition to the market-oriented economy, whatever deformed and distorted shapes this transi­tion has acquired. Just like elsewhere, the post-totalitarian state in Central Asia is not a monolithic entity but a complex constellation of structures, institutions, agencies, practices, and processes. Hopefully, the simple striving for survival in the contem­porary world and the necessity of attracting foreign investments will sooner or later force the ruling elites to undertake a certain liberalization of the economies. If suc­cessful, such a measure may result in a kind of political liberalization in the more distant future. It is impossible to predict if and when this may happen. Moreover, this proposed scenario for future development is far from the only possibility. However, at the moment, it is difficult to be more optimistic and to hope for more.

Notes

This chapter was submitted in 2005 and no revisions have been made since then. 2 http://www.svoboda.org/programs/rtV2000/RTL.092200.asp.

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