THE MODALITY OF ∑ARÎK IN TANNAITIC HEBREW

149

THE MODALITY OF ∑ARÎK INTANNAITIC HEBREW

TZVI NOVICK

NOTRE DAME

Abstract

The Paper argues that the word Òarîk in tannaitic Hebrew does not,despite claims to the contrary, indicate permissibility. Analysis ofapparent counter-examples illustrates the relationship between tele-ological necessity and weak deontic obligation.

In tannaitic Hebrew, modal Òarîk ordinarily indicates ‘necessary’.However, commentators have identified instances in which Òarîkseems to mean something like ‘permissible’. In this essay I reviewthese and other relevant instances from the perspective of modernlinguistics. My analysis establishes that the notion of permissibilitydoes not belong to the semantics of Òarîk; its apparently anomaloususages yield to pragmatic explanations. The pragmatic range of Òarîkin fact bears witness to a modal phenomenon that has received insuf-ficient attention, namely, the close relationship between the catego-ries of necessity in teleological modality and weak obligation (as ex-pressed, e.g., by English ought) in deontic modality.

Usages of Òarîk Typical and Atypical

The etymological meaning of the root Ò-r-k lies in the notion of lackor need.1 From here it is a short step to the core modal usage of Òarîk

Journal of Semitic Studies LIV/1 Spring 2009 doi:10.1093/jss/fgn044© The author. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the University of Manchester.All rights reserved.

* I thank Elitzur Bar-Asher, Dr Eliezer Diamond and Professor Christine Hayesfor their comments on earlier drafts of this article. This essay was made possible inpart by a grant from the Memorial Foundation for Jewish Culture.

1 See Ben Yehuda’s dictionary (A Complete Dictionary of Ancient and ModernHebrew, [New York 1959]), 5631–6). For discussion of Ugaritic and Aramaic cog-nates see E.Y. Kutscher, A History of the Hebrew Language (Jerusalem 1982), §123;Isaac Gluska, Hebrew and Aramaic in Contact During the Tannaitic Period: A Socio-linguistic Approach (Tel Aviv 1999), 57 n. 338. For a full account of the verbalforms of the root in tannaitic Hebrew see Menahem Moreshet, A Lexicon of theNew Verbs in Tannaitic Hebrew (Ramat-Gan 1980), 312–13.

1731-08_Joss09-1_Art07_fgn044 03-09-2009, 15:15149

at University of N

otre Dam

e on Septem

ber 27, 2011jss.oxfordjournals.org

Dow

nloaded from

THE MODALITY OF ∑ARÎK IN TANNAITIC HEBREW

150

in rabbinic literature, teleological necessity: to accomplish the goalat hand, one thing ‘needs’ (Òarîk) another.2 Thus, for example,m. Îag. 2:3: ‘Vessels produced in purity need (Òerîkîn) immersionbefore being used for holy things but not before being used for theheave offering’.3 In most cases, the telos that defines the necessity isleft unstated, to be inferred from context. Òarîk also extends to ex-press deontic obligation, as in m. Maksh. 2:8: ‘One who finds anobject in a place with a majority of gentiles need not (’ênû Òarîk) an-nounce it; if in a place with a majority of Jews, he needs (Òarîk) toannounce’.4

In some cases in tannaitic literature, deontic Òarîk appears to indi-cate not obligation but permissibility. I know of seven such casesidentified by other commentators: t. Ma¨as. Sh. 5:16; t. ¨Eruv. 5:10;t. ¨Eruv. 5:18 (bis); t. Shab. 13:7; Sifre Num. 68; Sifre Deut. 16. Ofthe seven, three (t. Ma¨as. Sh. 5:16; t. ¨Eruv. 5:10; t. ¨Eruv. 5:18) arepositive, and four (t. ¨Eruv. 5:18; t. Shab. 13:7; Sifre Num. 68; SifreDeut. 16) involve negation.

Leaving aside the positive instances for later, and the one negativeinstance (in t. ¨Eruv. 5:18) that occurs together with a positive Òarîk,we may take up first the three independent negative instances. T.Shab. 13:7 addresses what food may be rescued from a house in caseof fire on the Sabbath. The principle underlying the pericope is thatone may only rescue such food as one intends to use on that day.According to ms. Vienna, the pericope reads: ‘if he saved fine bread,he is not permitted (’ên rasa’y) to save coarse bread’ (on the assump-tion that there is enough fine bread to suffice for the Sabbath). Butms. Erfurt reads ’ên Òarîk instead of ’ên rasa’y. If ’ên Òarîk is not a mis-take — the fact that it is the lectio difficilior argues in its favour —the phrase indicates, like ’ên rasa’y, impermissibility. The more com-

2 Such conditional sentences have been called ‘anankastic’, from Greek ânágkj.See George Henrik von Wright, Norm and Action (London 1963), 10; Kai vonFintel and Sabine Iatridou, ‘What to Do If You Want to Go to Harlem: Notes onAnankastic Conditionals and Related Matters’ (Cambridge, Mass. 2004), 1–15(ms. available at http://web.mit.edu/fintel/www/harlem.pdf ).

3 Unless otherwise qualified, citations to the Mishnah use ms. Kaufman; to theTosefta, ms. Vienna; to Mek. R. Ish., ms. Oxford 151; to the Sifra, ms. Assemani;to Sifre Num. and Sifre Deut., ms. Vatican 32. For another case of teleological Òarîksee m. Kel. 5:7, where Òarîk occurs in response to the question: ‘how does one pu-rify an impure oven?’ See also MenaÌem Zevi Kaddari, ‘On Deontic Modality inMishnaic Hebrew’, in Moshe Bar-Asher (ed.), Studies in Mishnaic Hebrew (ScriptaHierosolymitana 37, Jerusalem 1998), 207–8, 213.

4 Outside of this case, lehakrîz ‘to announce’ is always preceded in tannaitic lit-erature by Ìayyab.

1731-08_Joss09-1_Art07_fgn044 03-09-2009, 15:15150

at University of N

otre Dam

e on Septem

ber 27, 2011jss.oxfordjournals.org

Dow

nloaded from

THE MODALITY OF ∑ARÎK IN TANNAITIC HEBREW

151

mon meaning of ’ên Òarîk, ‘he need not’, would be nonsensical here,as it is in no case obligatory to save one’s food from a fire.5

The next instance, Sifre Num. 68 (Horovitz ed., p. 63), involves adebate about the identity of the characters in Num. 9:6 who had in-curred corpse impurity and therefore did not participate in thePassover sacrifice. R. Ishmael opines that these were the bearers ofJoseph’s coffin, while, in R. Akiva’s view, they were Mishael andElÒafan, who had removed the bodies of Nadav and Avihu from theTemple (cf. Lev. 10:4). R. Isaac counters: ’ên Òarîk ‘that is not per-missible (to say)’, because any of these figures would have contractedcorpse impurity long enough before the Passover that ‘they couldhave purified themselves’. Rather, these were individuals who, imme-diately before Passover, had encountered and buried an abandonedcorpse. As R. Isaac attempts to refute the views of R. Ishmael andR. Akiva, and not simply to offer his own alternative, it is clear that,with ’ên Òarîk, he means to claim that their views are not simply notnecessary, but in fact not supportable.6

In Sifre Deut. 16 (Finkelstein ed., pp. 26–7), the last pericopealleged to attest negative Òarîk ‘not permissible’, it is reported thatR. Ishmael, when acting as judge in a case between an Israelite and anon-Israelite, would always decide in favour of the Israelite, whetherby applying Torah law or the law of the nations. R. Shimon b.Gamaliel comments: ’ênû Òarîk ‘it should not be done so’, but ratherthe judgment should be fair, under whatever law the litigants agreeupon. Given that R. Shimon champions a different practice, we mayrightly conclude that he means to characterize R. Ishmael’s approachnot simply as unnecessary, but as incorrect.7

I have found many other clear instances of negative Òarîk with theapproximate sense ‘not permissible’ in tannaitic literature. Two exam-ples will suffice. In t. Hor. 1:7, an interpretation of a biblical verse is

5 On this passage see Saul Lieberman, Tosefta Ki-Fshu†ah (3rd ed.; New York2001), 2.211.

6 On this passage see Menahem I. Kahana, ‘The Halakhic Midrashim,’ in S.Safrai (ed.), The Literature of the Sages, Second Part (Philadelphia 2006), 37–8 andn. 157. In the Bavli parallel (b. Suk. 25b), the printed editions and ms. Munich 95omit ’ên Òarîk, but mss Harley 5508 and Ebr 134 include it.

7 On this passage see Saul Lieberman, Tosefet Rishonim (Jerusalem 1937–9),1.155; Kahana, ‘Halakhic Midrashim’, 37 n. 157. The medieval commentary ofPseudo-Rabad (Herbert W. Basser [ed.], Pseudo-Rabad: Commentary to Sifre Deuter-onomy [Atlanta 1994], 19) glosses ’ênû Òarîk with ’ênû yakôl in his explication of thepassage: ‘R. Shimon disagrees and says that if they came before an Israelite andsaid, judge us according to Israelite law, he is not permitted (’ênû yakôl) to judgeaccording to gentile law to make the Israelite victorious’.

1731-08_Joss09-1_Art07_fgn044 03-09-2009, 15:15151

at University of N

otre Dam

e on Septem

ber 27, 2011jss.oxfordjournals.org

Dow

nloaded from

THE MODALITY OF ∑ARÎK IN TANNAITIC HEBREW

152

offered, then challenged, then defended by citation of a second verse.The conclusion follows: ‘thus one should not (’ên Òarîk) say accord-ing to the latter view (the challenge to the interpretation) but accord-ing to the former view (the original interpretation)’.8 The point issurely not that the challenge need not be accepted — it has, after all,been refuted — but that it should not be accepted. The other in-stance occurs in Midr. Tannaim Deut. 6:6 (Hoffmann ed., p. 26).According to R. Eliezer, the word ’eleh in Deut. 6:6 indicates that, inthe liturgical recitation of the surrounding pericope, one need haveconscious intent only until one reaches Deut. 6:6. R. Akiva re-sponds: ’ênû Òarîk, for the continuation of the verse indicates that thesection as a whole, even beyond Deut. 6:6, requires conscious intent.The phrase ’ênû Òarîk evidently indicates not that R. Eliezer’s view isunnecessary, but that it is incorrect.9

8 Thus ms. Erfurt; ms. Vienna has ’ên Òorek. See infra note 13.9 Other clear examples include Sifre Num. 78 s.v. nôs¨îm ’anaÌnû (Horovitz ed.,

p. 75); Midr. Tannaim Deut. 6:4; 33:7; 33:26; 34:5 (Hoffmann ed., pp. 24, 214,221–2, 224). I also think it likely (pace the translation in Jacob Neusner, TheTosefta: Translated from the Hebrew with a New Introduction [2 vols; Peabody 2002(1977–86)], 537) that t. Sheq. 3:22 provides another instance. R. Shimon is assert-ing not that the proselyte need not set aside a bird offering in the absence of theTemple, but that he should not. Evidence for this interpretation comes not onlyfrom the fact that the reason supplied by R. Shimon argues positively against set-ting aside the offering (and not merely against a requirement to set aside the offer-ing), but also from the Bavli and Yerushalmi parallels (collected in Lieberman,Tosefta Ki-Fshu†ah, 4.712), which have R. Shimon ‘nullify’ the practice of havingproselytes set aside bird offerings. Another probable example of negative Òarîk in thesense of ‘not permissible’ occurs in Mek. R. Ish. Ba-Ìôdes 2 (Horovitz ed., p. 210):‘Rabbi says: we ought not (’ên … Òerîkîn) to make Moses great if it requires that theHoly One, Blessed be He, retracted his word’. See the identical statement in Mek.R. Ish. Ba-Ìôdes 4 (Horovitz ed., pp. 217–18). For another possible example, seem. Yoma 4:1, which concerns the Temple ritual on Yom Kippur. According to thefirst, anonymous view, the high priest is supposed to declare, over the he-goat se-lected by lot as a sin offering, לי"י חטאת ‘for God as a sin offering’. R. Ishmael re-sponds: ‘he should not have (lô’ hayâ Òarîk) said “as a sin offering” but only “forGod”’. From the Mishnah text alone, one could probably, with equal plausibility,render lô’ hayâ Òarîk in R. Ishmael’s response as: ‘he need not have said’. But fromthe Sifra parallel (’AÌarê Môt 2:2) (Weiss ed., 81a) it is clear that R. Ishmael notonly licenses the omission of ‘a sin offering’ but precludes it outright: ‘He shouldnot have said “as a sin offering”; he says only “for God”’. (The Mishnah pericope isalso paralleled in t. Yoma 2:10.) It is therefore more plausible to interpret lô’ hayâÒarîk as signalling preclusion, at least in the Sifra version. The same constructionoccurs in very similar contexts in two other pericopes in the Mishnah, at m. Ta¨an.2:3 and m. So†. 9:6. Finally, a discussion in Midr. Tannaim Deut. 24:16(Hoffmann ed., p. 160) reaches the conclusion that children under the age of thir-teen are penalized neither by the earthly court nor by the heavenly. The questionthen arises: ‘If this is the case, then infants should not (lô’ Òerîkîn) die, and why

1731-08_Joss09-1_Art07_fgn044 03-09-2009, 15:15152

at University of N

otre Dam

e on Septem

ber 27, 2011jss.oxfordjournals.org

Dow

nloaded from

THE MODALITY OF ∑ARÎK IN TANNAITIC HEBREW

153

Accounting for the Atypical Negative Usages

Is there a philological basis for Òarîk with the meaning ‘permissible’?A semantic shift from the notion of need or necessity to permissibil-ity is, to my knowledge, cross-linguistically unattested. The closestapproach to the latter notion in the context of tannaitic Hebrewcomes with the word Òôrek. The Aramaic cognate, Òerôk, is amply at-tested with the meaning ‘power, capability’ in Targum Jonathan (TJ).Thus, for example, Jer. 14:22 ‘are there, among the vanities of thepeoples, rain-bringers’, is rendered in TJ as: ‘behold there is nopower (Òerôk) in the errors of the peoples to rain down rain’. Like-wise, the king of Israel’s lament in 2 Kgs 5:7, ‘am I God, that I maykill and enliven?’, occurs in TJ as: ‘is there in me the power (Òerôk)from God to kill and enliven?’.10 In tannaitic Hebrew, the clearest in-stance of Òôrek ‘power, capability’ occurs in Sifre Zuta Num. 5:31(Horovitz ed., p. 239). In this pericope it is supposed that an adul-terous woman who, because of her other virtues, merited to pass thetest of the So†ah waters, will tell her friends: ‘Do not hesitate to sin.I drank and the waters did not harm me. It seems that they have nopower (Òôrek)’. The Hebrew construction here, ’ên bahen Òôrek ‘theyhave no power’, precisely matches the Aramaic lêt/’ît behôn Òerôk ‘theyhave (no) power’ in the above instances from TJ. I have also foundthree other pericopes in which, as in TJ, foreign gods are deniedÒôrek .11

then do they die?’ This case is quite certain, but its status as tannaitic is question-able.

I have collected five instances in post-tannaitic literature where Liebermanmakes a claim for Òarîk ‘possible, permissible’. Three (y. ¨Eruv. 2:3 [20a]; b. Shab.121a; b. Yoma 88a) involve negation and two (y. Pes. 1:1 [27a]; y. Gi†. 6:2 [48a])are positive. See Saul Lieberman, Yerushalmi Ki-Fshuto (Jerusalem 1934), 252, 369–71; idem, Tosefet Rishonim, 1.155; idem, Tosefta Ki-Fshutah, 2.822; 3.855). Thethree negative cases are plausible. On the two positive instances see n. 22 below.

10 The use of Òerôk in connection with divine power, as in the above examples, isvery prevalent in TJ: when a prophet rejects the divine status of foreign gods orkings (e.g., Isa. 37:19; Ezek. 28:2; Hos. 8:6), TJ denies of them Òerôk. See also TJto Judg. 6:31; 1 Kgs 18:21; 18:24; 2 Kgs 19:18; Isa. 41:23; Jer. 2:11; 10:11;16:20; Jon. 1:5; Hab. 2:18. In all of these cases, where Òerôk is not followed by aninfinitival complement, it is possible to interpret the word as ‘benefit’ rather than‘power’, but in light of the examples cited in the body of the text, where aninfinitival complement follows, and the meaning ‘power’ seems clearly called for, itseems reasonable to assign the meaning ‘power’ in these cases also.

11 Mek. R. Ish. Ba-Ìôdes 6 s.v. lô’ yihyeh (ed.Horovitz, p. 223) = Midr. TannaimDeut. 5:7 (Hoffmann ed., p. 20); Mek. R. Ish. Ba-Ìôdes 6 s.v. kî ’anôkî (Horovitzed., p. 226); Sifre Deut. 318 (Finkelstein ed., p. 364) = Midr. Tannaim Deut.

1731-08_Joss09-1_Art07_fgn044 03-09-2009, 15:15153

at University of N

otre Dam

e on Septem

ber 27, 2011jss.oxfordjournals.org

Dow

nloaded from

THE MODALITY OF ∑ARÎK IN TANNAITIC HEBREW

154

Semantic development from capability to permissibility is attestedin such roots as y-k-l. Can the semantics of Òôrek / Òerôk, then, sup-port the assignment of the meaning ‘permissible’ to Òarîk? There arereasons to doubt. First, Òôrek is never attested with the meaning ‘per-missibility’ in tannaitic Hebrew (or, to my knowledge, in any otherstratum of Hebrew). Second, even Òôrek ‘power, capability’ is, to myknowledge, attested only in the above instances, so that it may bebracketed as an Aramaic calque that achieved limited circulation, atleast in the register of literary tannaitic Hebrew.12 Finally, what istrue of Òôrek is not necessarily true of Òarîk.13

32:17 (Hoffmann ed., p. 195). In the second of the three cases, Òorek alternateswith koaÌ ‘strength, power’. Another possible example occurs in Sifre Deut. 43(Finkelstein ed., p. 98), where a king instructs his son, who is about to visit a ban-quet: ‘do not eat more than your Òorek, do not drink more than your Òorek’. The sonignores his father, and eats and drinks ‘more than his Òorek’, and ends up vomiting.It seems more reasonable to assume that Òorek here indicates one’s capability ratherthan one’s need, as one can ordinarily eat and drink far in excess of one’s need with-out vomiting. Presumably, the semantic development of Òôrek and its Aramaic cog-nate proceeded in two stages: ‘a want, a need’ > ‘that which supplies a need, some-thing that confers benefit’ > ‘power, capability’. The first stage is widely attested inHebrew and Aramaic, for example, in Sifre Deut. 324 (Finkelstein ed., p. 375) ‘fatthings in which there is Òôrek’, which Reuven Hammer (Sifre: A Tannaitic Commen-tary on the Book of Deuteronomy [New Haven 1986], 336) renders as ‘fat thingswhich are nourishing’; in TJ, e.g., at Jer. 13:7; and in Samaritan Aramaic, as per Z.Ben-Hayyim, The Literary and Oral Traditions of Hebrew and Aramaic Amongst theSamaritans (Jerusalem 1957–79), 3.2.179, 197. I have not found evidence of thesecond stage outside TJ and the noted rabbinic sources, and it appears to have goneunnoticed by lexicographers. The entries under Òôrek in Ben-Yehuda’s dictionary(Dictionary, 5640–6) and under Òôrek and Òerôk in that of Marcus Jastrow (A Dic-tionary of the Targumim, the Talmud Babli and Yerushalmi, and the Midrashic Litera-ture [New York 1992], 1271, 1300) do not include the meaning ‘power, capability’.Nor is this meaning recognized in translations of Targum Jonathan. Thus Daniel J.Harrington and Anthony J. Saldarini (Targum Jonathan of the Former Prophets: In-troduction, Translation and Notes [Aramaic Bible 10; Wilmington 1987], 273), forexample, render the above phrase from 2 Kgs 5:7 thus: ‘Is there need from beforethe Lord for me to kill and to let live?’

12 Note that in the clearest case, Sifre Zuta Num. 5:31, it occurs in the mouthof a woman conversing with her friends, i.e., in a colloquial context.

13 There is some confusion, in the transmission of Ben Sira and tannaitic litera-ture, between Òôrek and Òarîk. See Z. Ben-Hayyim, מסורת השומרונים וזיקתה למסורת,Hanoch Yalon ;אLesonenu 22 (1958), 229 n. 15 ,הלשון של מגילות ים המלח וללשון חז"לIntroduction to the Vocalization of the Mishna (Jerusalem 1964), 102–4. It is note-worthy, however, that, while mss Kaufman and Parma of the Mishnah usually fa-vour ’ên Òôrek lômar over ’ên Òarîk lômar (Yalon, Introduction, 103), in the threeMishnah pericopes cited above, supra at note 9, as attesting negative Òarîk with themeaning ‘not permissible’, namely, m. Ta¨an. 2:3; m. Yoma 4:1; and m. So†. 9:6,mss Kaufman and Parma consistently record Òarîk.

1731-08_Joss09-1_Art07_fgn044 03-09-2009, 15:15154

at University of N

otre Dam

e on Septem

ber 27, 2011jss.oxfordjournals.org

Dow

nloaded from

THE MODALITY OF ∑ARÎK IN TANNAITIC HEBREW

155

Given the absence of a solid philological basis for Òarîk ‘permissi-ble’, we should explain negative Òarîk ‘not permissible’ on pragmaticgrounds. What is occurring in the above cases is that negative Òarîk‘not necessary’ is pragmatically strengthened, by an accepted conven-tion of usage, so that hearers understand it to convey not only thatthe predicate is not required (which is what it literally says), but thatthe predicate is, moreover, impermissible, excluded.14 The strength-ening convention is presumably rooted in considerations of polite-ness: it is more civil to make the weaker assertion that one need notrather than the stronger assertion that one should not.

Further support for this conclusion comes from a closer look atone of the examples examined above, from t. Hor. 1:7: ‘thus oneshould not (’ên Òarîk) say (judge) according to the latter view butaccording to former view’. This statement, in a slightly different ver-sion, constitutes a standard terminus in the exegesis of the school ofR. Ishmael: ‘thus you should not (’ên ‘aleyka) say (or judge) accord-ing to the latter view but according to former view’.15 The Tosefta’s’ên Òarîk corresponds to ’ên ‘aleyka in the latter terminus. If we ex-plain ’ên Òarîk ‘not permissible’ by supposing that Òarîk is semanti-cally ambiguous between ‘necessary, required’ and ‘permissible’, thenwe must likewise suppose that the construction ¨al x is semanticallyambiguous between ‘it is incumbent upon so-and-so’ and ‘it is per-missible for so-and-so’, but the latter meaning is never attested.Rather, in both cases, the ambiguity is a product of the pragmaticstrengthening convention that operates upon the negative colloca-tion.

The resulting pragmatic ambiguity is attested in parallel construc-tions in other languages. Thus, for example, the Italian sentence,Gianni non deve andare a Roma, can mean either that Gianni neednot go to Rome (with no pragmatic strengthening) or that Giannishould not go to Rome (with pragmatic strengthening).16 In modernHebrew, too, hû’ lô’ Òarîk la-leket can indicate that the subject need

14 For extensive discussion of the pragmatics at work see Laurence R. Horn, ANatural History of Negation (Chicago 1989), 337–61. Syntactic explanations of thephenomenon (which in syntactic terms is called ‘NEG-raising’) are also available —for discussion see Ferdinand de Haan, The Interaction of Modality and Negation: ATypological Study (New York 1997), 13–14 — but the pragmatic explanation is tobe preferred because negative Òarîk can and often does indicate the absence of a re-quirement. The availability of the strengthened interpretation (‘impermissible’) de-pends on the discourse context.

15 See, e.g., Mek. R. Ish. Nezîqîn 2 (Horovitz ed., p. 252); Sifre Num. 24(Horovitz ed., p. 30).

16 See De Haan, Interaction, 93, and see generally 86–109.

1731-08_Joss09-1_Art07_fgn044 03-09-2009, 15:15155

at University of N

otre Dam

e on Septem

ber 27, 2011jss.oxfordjournals.org

Dow

nloaded from

THE MODALITY OF ∑ARÎK IN TANNAITIC HEBREW

156

not go or that he ought not go.17 We may likewise think, in English,of not necessary in such contexts as the irked parent who responds tohis toddler’s overturning a dinner plate with: ‘That really wasn’t nec-essary’, i.e., the toddler should not have done that.

The ease with which negative Òarîk allows for pragmatic strength-ening suggests that Òarîk, in its deontic usage, often conveys weakobligation, like English ought, rather than strong obligation, likeEnglish must, for this sort of pragmatic strengthening is cross-lin-guistically much more common with weak universal modals ratherthan with strong ones.18 Many of the examples of ’ên Òarîk ‘not per-missible’ collected above are more naturally rendered ‘ought not’than ‘may not’. Likewise, the exegetical formula ‘it ought not say’(i.e., the verse in question should be written differently) can be ex-pressed either with Òarîk (as in Sifra BeÌûqôtay 1:1 [Weiss ed.,p. 111a]) or with ra’ûy ‘should’ (as in t. So†. 6:11; Sifra Mîlu’îm 1:2[Weiss ed., p. 45b]; Sifre Num. 86 [Horovitz ed., p. 85]). The usageof a term with roots in teleological necessity to express weak obliga-tion is readily comprehensible. Teleological necessity appears ‘weaker’than deontic obligation in that it is less peremptory: it does not issuedirectives, but instead purports to make objective claims about rela-tionships between means and ends.

Positive Òarîk ‘Ought’

If the above analysis is correct, then we should expect to find cases ofpositive Òarîk with the meaning ‘ought’. Let us turn first to the three

17 Laurence R. Horn, ‘Remarks on Neg-Raising’, in Peter Cole (ed.), Syntax andSemantics, Vol. 9: Pragmatics (New York 1978), 199. The example of Greek xrß‘need, necessity’ is also instructive. (For the translational equivalence of xrß and Ò-r-k, compare Tob. 3:1 in Aramaic [4Q197 3, 1 Ò]ryk lk] and Greek xreían ∂xeiv].) InOd. 3.14, Athena informs Telemachus that he need feel no shame (‘there is no needof shame for you’) on account of his father’s absence, because, having travelled toNestor’s home, Telemachos is now in a position to find out about his father. Nega-tive xrß here clearly indicates the absence of a need; Athena’s point is that, untilnow, Telemachus had reason to feel shame, but this reason no longer obtains. Thusthe Murray-Dimock translation [The Odyssey: Books 13–24 (LCL 105; Cambridge,MA 1995), 81] clarifies by adding a temporal marker: ‘Telemachus, no longer needyou feel shame’. (Cf. ∫piqen in 2.270, 278.) But compare Il. 9.496, where Phoenixhere tells Achilles: ‘So, Achilles, master your great spirit, nor is there need for youto have a pitiless heart’. The first clause indicates that negated xrß in the secondclause has the force of ‘should not': Achilles is being asked to control his passionsand show pity.

18 See Horn, Natural History, 324–8. As Horn notes (328), this generalization isweaker in the case of deontological as opposed to other kinds of modality.

1731-08_Joss09-1_Art07_fgn044 03-09-2009, 15:15156

at University of N

otre Dam

e on Septem

ber 27, 2011jss.oxfordjournals.org

Dow

nloaded from

THE MODALITY OF ∑ARÎK IN TANNAITIC HEBREW

157

cases of alleged Òarîk ‘permissible’ listed above. T. ¨Eruv. 5:10 beginsby indicating that if a father and his dependents live in differenthomes in a single courtyard, ‘they do not need (’ên Òerîkîn) to makean eruv’ in order to carry. The reason is that, given the others’ de-pendence on the father, their homes do not constitute legally distinctdomains, so that the entire courtyard counts as a single, private do-main owned by the father. However, ‘their alleyway [into which theircourtyard leads] Òarîk a post and crossbar’. The parallel in the Bavli(b. ¨Eruv. 73a) reads: ‘their alleyway is rendered permissible (nîtar)[for carrying] by means of a post and crossbar’. Thus Saul Liebermanconcludes that the force of Òarîk in t. ¨Eruv. 5:10 is ‘becomes permis-sible’.19 However, Òarîk here can more easily be assigned its basicsense of teleological necessity: the Tosefta is indicating that the alley-way requires a post and crossbar if one wishes to carry.

The second alleged instance of positive Òarîk ‘permissible’ occursin t. ¨Eruv. 5:18. This pericope treats of a situation in which one ormore households in the courtyard has not participated in the eruv.For carrying to be permitted in this circumstance, such householdsmust let their homes to one of the households that has participated,either through a legitimate rental arrangement or by a nominal dec-laration ceding control over the home (a legal fiction). The Toseftastates a basic distinction between Jews and gentiles in this regard: ‘AJew cedes control, but in the case of a gentile, [the eruv will notwork] until he rents’. Only Jews, not gentiles, can take advantage ofthe legal fiction. Immediately prior to this line, the Tosefta declares,according Lieberman’s rendering: ‘a Jew who publicly desecrates theSabbath may not (’ên Òarîk) cede control, and a Jew who does notpublicly desecrate the Sabbath may (Òarîk) cede control’.20 But it isequally or more plausible to render these modals instead as, respec-tively, ‘should not’ and ‘should’. The Jew who publicly desecrates theSabbath may, technically, make use of the legal fiction, but the ob-servant Jews who use the eruv should not rely on this technicality,but should instead treat him like a gentile, and enter into a rental ar-rangement with him. Likewise, the observant Jew ‘should’ cede con-trol, that is, not only can he do so, but he should do so, and not ei-ther refuse to cede control or insist on rent. The Tosefta conveys thesame quasi-obligation in two earlier pericopes: ‘it is incumbent(miÒwâ) upon one to cede control’ (t. ¨Eruv. 5:11); ‘it is incumbent(¨alayw) on a member of the courtyard who forgot to participate in

19 Lieberman, Tosefta Ki-Fshu†ah, 2.396.20 Lieberman, Tosefta Ki-Fshu†ah, 2.402.

1731-08_Joss09-1_Art07_fgn044 03-09-2009, 15:15157

at University of N

otre Dam

e on Septem

ber 27, 2011jss.oxfordjournals.org

Dow

nloaded from

THE MODALITY OF ∑ARÎK IN TANNAITIC HEBREW

158

the eruv, to cede control’ (t. ¨Eruv. 5:12).21 Thus, while the distinc-tion between Jew and Gentile occurs in teleological universals — theJew can make the eruv work by ceding control, the Gentile cannot— the distinction between observant Jew and apostate occurs inweak deontics: the former should cede control, and the latter shouldnot.

The last pericope, t. Ma¨as. Sh. 5:16, tells a story involving R.Eliezer, who owned a vineyard near Lod. Produce of a vineyard’sfourth year must be consumed in Jerusalem. Grapes grown at somedistance from Jerusalem may be redeemed on money, which mustthen be taken to Jerusalem and spent there on food. Rabbinic decreeat first permitted redemption only for vineyards beyond a day-trip’sdistance from Jerusalem, but later extended this license to all vine-yards beyond the city’s walls (t. Ma¨as. Sh. 5:14–15). The Toseftatells that R. Eliezer ‘did not want’ to redeem his vineyard. His stu-dents told him: ‘now that, by decree, all vineyards up to the wall ofJerusalem are subject to redemption, you are Òarîk to redeem it’. R.Eliezer then arose, and harvested and redeemed his crop. OnLieberman’s account, R. Eliezer, a traditionalist, was reluctant to relyon the license to redeem. But his students informed him that the li-cense to redeem entailed a stricture — it prohibited the sale of one’sfruit within Jerusalem — and therefore R. Eliezer could (Òarîk) re-deem, and need have no qualms about relying on a lenient ruling.22

Lieberman’s reading requires extensive inference beyond the plaintext. It seems far easier to suppose that Òarîk here indicates propriety.R. Eliezer’s students tell him that because the rabbis have now de-creed redemption permissible even to the wall of Jerusalem, it ismeet that he do so.23

21 On t. ¨Eruv. 5:11 see Lieberman, Tosefta Ki-fshuta, 2.397–8.22 Lieberman, Tosefta Ki-Fshu†ah, 1.785. For R. Eliezer’s tendency toward strin-

gency in legal practice, see Yitzhak D. Gilat, R. Eliezer ben Hyrcanus: A ScholarOutcast (Ramat-Gan 1984), 60–7. Lieberman’s exegesis seems in part motivated bythe aim of aligning the Tosefta story with its parallel in the Babylonian Talmud (R.ha-Sh. 31b; BeiÒ. 5a). According to the Bavli, R. Eliezer wished to convey his vine-yard to the poor. His students informed him that his colleagues had already ‘per-mitted’ (hatîrûhû) his vineyard. For further explanation see Rashi, ad loc., adoptedby Lieberman. Lieberman sees an equivalence between ‘permitted’ in the Bavli ver-sion and the Tosefta’s ‘you are Òarîk to redeem it’.

23 The two cases of positive Òarîk ‘permissible’ in the Yerushalmi alleged byLieberman (see above n. 8) are likewise dubious. On y. Pes. 1:1 (27a), two alterna-tive interpretations of the question in this passage, ‘as for dark alleyways, need/may(Òarîk) one inspect them ab initio by candlelight?’ are described ad loc. in the com-mentary Qorban Ha-¨edâ, and there seems no reason to favour one over the other.The solution to the other positive Òarîk, y. Gi†. 6:2 (48a) (‘a minor girl who is Òerîkâ

1731-08_Joss09-1_Art07_fgn044 03-09-2009, 15:15158

at University of N

otre Dam

e on Septem

ber 27, 2011jss.oxfordjournals.org

Dow

nloaded from

THE MODALITY OF ∑ARÎK IN TANNAITIC HEBREW

159

In this last case, Òarîk shades almost into the notion of permissibil-ity. David Daube’s analysis of Latin oportere offers an enlighteningparallel:

Oportere signifies ‘it is correct, proper’. Hence it may refer not only towhat is necessary, to duties, but also to what is permitted, to rights. Imay say ‘The correct thing is to wear evening dress’, i.e. it is necessary;but I may also say, ‘It is perfectly correct to wear a lounge suit’, i.e. it ispermitted.24

Thus, for example, the jurist Ulpian determines that if a party wall isdefective, ‘it was assuredly proper (oportuit) to pull it down’. ButDaube acknowledges that ‘even when oportet refers to rights, it doesnot express complete freedom of choice. “The proper” always retainsa trace of “the requisite”’.25 In t. Ma¨as. Sh. 5:16 too, R. Eliezer’s stu-dents do not simply state that R. Eliezer may redeem his fruits, butthat he may properly do so. They are not offering legal advice, but at-tempting to persuade him by characterizing redemption of the fruitas the ‘correct thing’ to do.

Positive Òarîk ‘ought’ occurs in a number of other cases. For exam-ple, R. Judah b. Baba is quoted (t. Ter. 5:10) as insisting that ‘courtsshould (Òerîkîn) conclude that all become nullified in one hundredand one’, i.e., that heave-offerings of all species lose their status whenthey fall into a mixture one hundred times larger than it.26 Likewise,t. B.Q. 9:29 dictates that one who is injured by another should(Òarîk) seek God’s mercy on behalf of the injurer even if the injurerhas not sought it.

to be divorced’), is probably to be found in y. Yev. 13:2 (13c), where the samepericope is introduced in connection with a structurally parallel line from theMishnah (‘a minor girl who is Òerîkâ to refuse’) that uses Òarîk in the ordinary senseof ‘necessary’.

24 David Daube, Forms of Roman Legislation (Oxford 1956), 12.25 Daube, Forms, 14.26 Roger Wertheimer (The Significance of Sense: Meaning, Modality, and Moral-

ity [Ithaca 1972], 120 note *) observes that ought is rare in contemporary legislativeEnglish. The one exceptional case that he cites seems quite analogous to t. Ter.5:10: ‘The grand jury ought to find an indictment when all the evidence before it,taken together, is such as in its judgment would, if unexplained or uncontradicted,warrant a conviction by trial jury’. Wertheimer explains the significance of oughthere: ‘Given the special role of the grand jury … the intent and rationale of thissection seem clear enough. While the grand jury is not bound (‘must’ or ‘shall’) tofind an indictment in such cases, it is not simply empowered or permitted to do so.Nor should one say that it is left to the grand jury’s discretion. Rather the grandjury is provisionally or presumptively bound: i.e., they will find an indictment insuch cases, but if, in their judgment, there is some good reason for not doing so,they are permitted to refrain’.

1731-08_Joss09-1_Art07_fgn044 03-09-2009, 15:15159

at University of N

otre Dam

e on Septem

ber 27, 2011jss.oxfordjournals.org

Dow

nloaded from

THE MODALITY OF ∑ARÎK IN TANNAITIC HEBREW

160

Conclusion

I have argued that Òarîk, as a modal word, stretches from teleologicalnecessity (‘necessary’) to strong obligation (‘must’) to weak obligation(‘ought’). This range of usages, all readily explainable on pragmaticgrounds, makes Òarîk ambiguous. Does negative Òarîk, in any givencase, indicate the absence of teleological necessity (or of a strongobligation) with respect to the act in question, or a weak obligationnot to perform that act? Does positive Òarîk indicate teleologicalnecessity, strong obligation, or weak obligation? I have not attemptedto identify how, if at all, tannaitic Hebrew distinguishes contextuallyamong these usages.27 In most cases the possibility of confusion isminimal. But it is worth noting that almost all the cases of Òarîk‘ought’ collected here, positive and negative, occur in the Tosefta andthe tannaitic midrashim, and very often in conversation. This distri-bution suggests that Òarîk ‘ought’ has a colloquial flavour, as alreadyimplied by its origin in the pragmatics of politeness.28

27 See Kaddari, ‘Deontic Modality’, 211, on Òarîk: ‘Sometimes society is thesource of the obligation and its essence is good advice, as in … “Three things aman must [Òarîk] say in his house on Sabbath eve, towards dusk” [m. Shab. 2:7]; …“for a man must [Òarîk] satisfy people just as he has to satisfy the Almighty’ [m.Sheq. 3:2]”.’ While many examples of Òarîk ‘ought’ do have an interpersonal ele-ment, it is questionable whether society should be described as ‘the source of obli-gation’; we may note that m. Sheq. 3:2 cites two scriptural prooftexts. In any case,both of the pericopes cited by Kaddari begin with Òarîk ’adam ‘one should’. It isprobable that the occurrence of ’adam as subject plays at least some role in signal-ling the weak deontic force of these declarations. Statements beginning Ìayyab’adam ‘one must’ likewise, though to a lesser extent, tend to convey obligations thatare in one or another sense weak; see, e.g., m. Ber. 9:5: ‘One must bless over thebad as one blesses over the good’.

28 It seems that Òarîk expressing strong obligation also tends to occur withslightly greater frequency in the Tosefta than in the Mishnah. Thus, for example, inthe Mishnah, le¨asser is preceded in three pericopes by Ìayyab (m. Dem. 6:11–12;m. Gi†. 5:4) and never by Òarîk. In the Tosefta, Òarîk le¨asser occurs in nine pericopes(t. Dem. 8:1 [paralleling m. Dem. 6:12]; t. Ma¨as. 2:5; 2:10-12; t. Ma¨as. Sh. 3:7–8; t. Shab. 15:14) and Ìayyab le¨asser in only two pericopes, one paralleling Ìayyable¨asser in the Mishnah (t. Dem. 1:4 [paralleling m. Dem. 6:11]; t. Ma¨as. 2:1).Likewise, t. Pes. 5:7 corresponds to m. Pes. 8:2, but the former twice has ‘one need(Òarîk) not perform the Second Passover’ while the latter twice has ‘one is exempt(pa†ûr) from performing the Second Passover’. More generally, in the parallel dis-cussion of the Second Passover in t. Pes. 7–8 and m. Pes. 8–9, the Tosefta withoutexception uses ’ên Òarîk while the Mishnah equally consistently uses pa†ûr or animperfect verb. This distribution may suggest that Òarîk ‘must’ was also perceived ascolloquial, though not to the same degree as Òarîk ‘ought’.

1731-08_Joss09-1_Art07_fgn044 03-09-2009, 15:15160

at University of N

otre Dam

e on Septem

ber 27, 2011jss.oxfordjournals.org

Dow

nloaded from