THE MIMETIC THEORY AND EMPIRICAL

RESEARCH ON IMITATION

Shawn Witkowski (s0800565)

Master of Arts with Honours Music and

Philosophy

School of Philosophy, Psychology and

Language Sciences

Supervisor: Dave Ward

Word count: 7937

April 25th 2013

Abstract:

Mimetic Theory (MT) is the theory that (i) mimetism

and imitation are intrinsic constituents of certain

instances of human desires and (ii) mimesis, when it

takes the specific form of imitation of other

people's desires, potentially leads to rivalry and

violence between people. MT aims to account for the

rise of human desire, the origin of rivalry, its

development into conflict and ways of channelling

this violence.

In this essay, the author only investigates the

empirical status of the claim that some instances of

human desire are mimetic, and lead to rivalry. Such

an investigation should provide us with a better

understanding of the destructive side of mimesis

henceforth neglected

On the one side, the author researched the theory (MT)

both in edited volumes and in journal articles; on

the other side, he consulted empirical studies

published in various scientific journals. In thus

leading research on both fronts, the author aimed at

establishing parallels between MT and empirical

studies.

MT's argument for socially destructive mimesis claims

that mimetic desire is often responsible for the

rivalry that occurs between people. The author's main

argument is that Anspach's discussion of the doll

experiment makes a tenable argument for socially

destructive mimesis as conceived by MT. He mainly

argues on the grounds that Anspach's argument

displays MT's three necessary stages for socially

destructive mimesis. The author chiefly relies on

empirical evidence in developmental psychology to

support MT's argument that mimetic desire leads to

rivalry.

This essay provides a synthetic view of the relation

between MT and empirical research. It is shown MT

appears as a reliable tool for making sense of

empirical studies on gaze following, object grasping

and infant rivalry.

Table of Contents:

Introduction

1 Key stages of Mimetic Theory (MT)

1.1 How two desires target the same object : the

mimetic triangle of desire

1.11 Mimetic desire defined

1.12 Triangle of desire mechanism

[1.13 Two kinds of mimetic desire

1.2 The emergence of violent rivalries to possess the

object

[1.21 Why appropriative mimesis leads to greater

rivalries than acquisitive mimesis

1.22 How rivalries stem from mimetic desire

1.3 Each subject becomes model-obstacle for the other

1.31 From model to model-obstacle : what it is to be in a

state of rivalry

1.32 MT's contribution to 'the problem of social

cognition'

2 Empirical research on imitation

2.1 Gaze-following and object-grasping as the first

stage of mimetic desire

2.11 Gaze following as a means to catch and to

imitate desires

2.12 Object grasping as a means to catch and to

imitate desires

2.2 Evidence for mimetic desire leading to rivalry

2.21 The mother-doll-child mimetic triangle

2.22 Why MT comes onto the scene

3 MT's argument for socially destructive mimesis and

objections

3.1 MT's view of gaze-following as means for catching

desires

3.11 MT: gaze following enables mimetic desire

3.12 Gaze following enables mimetic desire:

objections and responses

3.2 MT's view of mimetic desire leading to rivalry

3.21 The doll as model-obstacle: objections and

responses

3.22 Imitation or inspiration: further objections and

responses

Conclusion

Introduction

Mimetic Theory (MT) is the theory that (i) mimetism

and imitation1 are intrinsic constituents2 of certain

instances of human desires and that (ii) mimesis3,

when it takes the specific form of imitation of other

people's desires, potentially leads to rivalry

between people.

MT distinguishes “desires” from “appetites” which

only refer to vital needs such as, for instance,

drinking and eating (Girard 1977, 92). Although it is1 "Mimetism" is commonly referred to as a deliberate, conscious form of "imitation". A mimetic behaviour is agentive whereas an imitated behaviour is automatic, passive (Girard 2009, 53).2 In MT's point of view, this means mimetism and imitation are

constitutive of what it is to have human desires, as opposed to being merely contingent intrinsic properties like, e.g. one's mass is a contingent intrinsic property of one's body.

3 "Mimesis" is a generic term that refers both to "mimetism" and "imitation".

common practice in everyday life, MT does not refer

to those basic appetites as “desires”. Hence MT

doesn't claim that all our desires – in the everyday

use of the term – are mimetic, but only that certain

instances of desire are mimetic. To this day, MT has not

given details about which instances of desire –

excluding appetites – should count as mimetic.

Although some theorists have claimed all desires are

mimetic (Kojève 1947, Girard 1977), I investigate

empirical support for the weaker claim presented

above in (i).

MT aims to account for the mechanisms through which

desires arise, the origin of rivalry, its development

into conflict and ways of channelling this violence.

MT does not account for the way in which we

experience our desires; MT is not about the

phenomenology of our desire. It aims at explaining

how desires are actually generated through social

interaction.

In philosophy, the claim for mimetic desire (see (i)

above) has notably received theoretical support from

Hegel-interpreter Kojève according to whom '[it] is

human to desire what others desire because they

desire it'4. As Gallese points out in his discussion

of Kojève (Gallese 2009, 89-90), the mimetic

component of desire is the mark of human desire: a

desire is human inasmuch as it is mimetic5. Even more

significant to our enquiry, Kojève establishes a link

between having a mimetic desire and obtaining social

recognition6.

On the other side, MT's claim that some instances of

human desire are mimetic is presented as an empirical

claim because (i) the experiments put forward in

section 2 belong to developmental psychology and

cognitive neuroscience and (ii) this claim originally

developed from social sciences such as literature and

anthropology. Girard exposed what he considered

numerous instances of mimetic desires in the work of

4 Kojève 1947, 13; translation in Gallese 2011, 105.5 In Gallese's words, a desire 'is human only to the extent

that it is mediated by the desire of others targeting the same object' (Gallese 2011, 90).

6 'To desire another's desire, to be the target of others' desire [...] is strictly intertwined with the issue of social identification and recognition' (Gallese 2011, 90).

major european novelists7.

In this essay, I only investigate the empirical status

of the claim that some instances of human desire are

mimetic, and lead to rivalry. Such an investigation

should provide us with a better understanding of the

destructive side of mimesis henceforth neglected (see

below); in doing so, it should help bridging the gap

between neuroscience and developmental psychology.

MT constitutes an explanatory model insofar as it

consists of five main stages, each closely knit

together chronologically:

a. the mimetic triangle of desire where the

subjects' desire converge on the same object8

(section 1.1)

b. rivalries arise to possess the object

(section 1.2)

c. each vertex of the triangle becomes a model-

7 Among these, see Girard R., Deceit, Desire and the Novel: Self andOther in Literary Structure (1965).

8 I will use the term 'object' in its broad, etymologicalsense – that (ob) which is thrown (jectus) before a person. Hencea person or subject (i.e. a parent) will be later referred to asan object of desire.

obstacle for the other (section 1.3)

d. the self-propagation of violence to new

parties leads to the unanimous victimage of a

common enemy (scapegoat mechanism) (Girard 1977,

1986, 1987)

e. the imitation of this violent social collapse

and of its resolution through the scapegoat

mechanism establishes religious sacrificial

rituals (Girard 1977, 1987)

I will focus on the first three as they appeal to

empirical evidence from cognitive science and

psychology. The last two demand evidence from

anthropology and archaeology which outpass my

competences and the purpose of this enquiry.

In MT's framework, socially destructive mimesis is

one side of human mimesis9. It refers to any imitation

of mental states (beliefs, desires, intentions) or

actions which leads to mutual antagonism, rivalry or

9 For an in-depth treatment of the duality of mimesis, refer to Gallese, 'The Two Sides of Mimesis: Mimetic Theory, Embodied Simulation, and Social Identification', pp. 21-44.

violence. Instances of it include but do not exhaust

brothers fighting for an object and war between

nations (Girard 2009, Konner 2011). It is opposed to

socially constructive mimesis which refers to any

imitation of mental states or actions which leads to

mutual cooperation and understanding. Instances of

the latter include but do not exhaust religious or

secular communion and cultural transmission (Donald

1991, Kruger 2011).

MT's argument for socially destructive mimesis claims

that mimetic desire, in a large number of cases, is

responsible for the rivalry that occurs between two

or more people. My main argument is that Anspach's

discussion of the doll experiment (section 3.2) makes

a tenable argument for socially destructive mimesis

as conceived by MT. I will mainly argue on the

grounds that Anspach's argument displays MT's three

necessary stages for socially destructive mimesis

(cf. a, b and c above).

In part 1 I present MT's narrative – from the

triangle of desire to the model-obstacle state of

rivalry – and I discuss the 'problem of social

cognition' (Gallese 2009, 22) as well as MT's attempt

to solve it. In part 2 I introduce three lines of

evidence in social psychology which seem to provide

support for MT's argument for socially destructive

mimesis and I discuss the claims in support of the

argument. In part 3 I raise objections to Anspach's

argument as well as possible responses, and I

conclude the doll case convincingly illustrates

socially destructive mimesis in that it exemplifies

(a) a mimetic triangle of desire leading to (b)

rivalry and to (c) the model-obstacle state.

1 Key stages of Mimetic Theory (MT)

1.1 How two desires target the same object : the

mimetic triangle of desire

1.11 Mimetic desire defined

To have a mimetic desire is to desire an object that

is, or has been desired by another subject10. The

object of my desire comes from someone else’s desire

of that same object. The desire does not arise

endogenously – from within and autonomously – but

exogenously, as a reaction to someone else’s desire.

Hence the object of a mimetic desire is copied from

someone else’s desire (Tarde 1903, Girard 1965, 1977,

1987, Kojève 1980).

1.12 Triangle of desire mechanism

MT pictures mimetic desire as describing a triangle

between two desiring subjects and the desired object;

hence mimetic desire is also referred to as a mimetic

triangle of desire. In such a context, B models his desire

upon a third party (say A)'s desire; thus A provides

B with the content of his desire – with his desire

proper11. To put it differently, B's desire arises

10 To have a mimetic desire is not to desire something that happens to be desired by someone else. It is because A desires that pair of shoes that B desires it as well.

11 Though it is unclear whether B's mimetic desire is an imitation of A's act of having a desire or merely of the contentof her desire, in both cases B eventually desires the content ofA's desire (Girard 1977, 86).

through the mediation or modellation12 of someone

else's desire. The latter claim merely is a

specification of the claim that certain instances of

our desires are mimetic. In MT's framework,

modellation consists of imitation – B's desire is

copied from the model (A)'s desire. My desire is not

merely influenced by the model's desire; it is, to a

certain extent, identical to his desire.

[1.13 Two kinds of mimetic desire

The concept of “identity” should be clarified here as

a mimetic desire need not necessarily be strictly

identical to the model's desire. When B desires a

pair of new shoes after having seen A wearing them, B

doesn't desire that very pair of shoes but another

replica or copy of them. Hence a desire of the

original and a desire of the copy are both instances

of qualitatively identical desires: they only differ

in the number of properties they share with the

12 I understand "mediation" and "modellation" as synonyms. Henceforth I only use the latter for the sake of terminological coherence (cf. model-obstacle state in section 1.31 below).

model's desire13.

In many cases, it is whether or not the object of

one's desire is replicable that determines whether

one desires to merely acquire or appropriate it. If

the object is replicable, there are several copies of

it (e.g. a pair of shoes) and the desirer is likely

to be satisfied with a copy. If it is not replicable,

there is no copy but only one reality of the object

(e.g. a lover or a Chairman position) and the desirer

is likely to yearn for appropriating it.

Hence this difference between desiring the original

and the copy leads to the distinction between (i)

acquisitive mimesis and (ii) appropriative mimesis

(Girard, 1987), between (i) imitation of the other's

desire to acquire the object without making it one's

exclusive possession and (ii) imitation of the

other's desire to acquire it solely for oneself – to

possess it. Both kinds of mimesis lead to rivalry,

though appropriative mimesis has a greater potential

13Qualitative identity holds between two things that share a certain number of properties. It contrasts with numerical identity which is total identity – that which only holds between 'a thing and itself' ("Identity", Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy).

to bring out conflict (as explained in section 1.21

below).

We now go on to analyse the mechanism that enables

these rivalries to emerge. This has first been

theoretically laid out in Girard (1977), further

discussed in Girard (1987) and empirically tested in

Anspach (2011).

1.2 The emergence of violent rivalries to possess the

object

Rivalry is a [shared] state that can arise as a

result of two subjects having a mimetic desire.

1.21 Why appropriative mimesis leads to greater

rivalries than acquisitive mimesis

Rivalry is a common – though not necessary –

consequence of mimetic desire. While A and B's

desires can be satisfied if they each acquire a copy

of the object, they cannot be satisfied when they

both attempt to exclusively acquire the original

object. Hence appropriative mimesis is prone to

trigger fiercer rivalries than acquisitive mimesis.14

1.22 How rivalries stem from mimetic desire

MT resorts to imitation alone to explain the

convergence of several desires on a single object. On

this account, what triggers rivalry not only is the

desired object's properties and, thereby, its

intrinsic value, but also the desirer's perception of

the object as someone else's goal (Gallese 2009, 22).

This claim may appear counterintuitive because it may

not seem to the desirer that one of the reasons for

14 Yet, if A and B's desires are both satisfied with theacquisition of a copy of the original, why would acquisitivemimesis trigger rivalries at all? There are two kinds ofacquisitive mimesis. With regard to the first kind, mimeticdesire leads to the acquisition of a mere copy of the originalobject. In the second kind, mimetic desire leads to theacquisition of part of the original, a share of the originalwith the model; this gives one partial possession of the object.Only the latter kind directly leads to rivalry: if B claims sharedownership over a pair of shoes that A also desires, A is likelyto perceive B as a rival. The former only indirectly leads torivalry, in cases where a growing indifferentiation between Aand B eventually leads one to resent the other: if A and Bdesire the same clothes, magazines and so on, it is likely theywill eventually desire the same lover or any other non-duplicable object.

her desire is her imitation of someone else's desire

for that same object. Despite making a sensible

point, this isn't an objection to MT because (i) MT

doesn't account for how one experiences one's desires

and (ii) it is part of MT to account for cases of

misknowledge15 of our own mental states, i.e. to

account for how one's representation of the genesis

of one's own mental states comes apart from the

actual genesis of one's mental states as shown in

empirical studies.

Hence MT rejects the 'object-centered' (Anspach 2011,

130) account of the genesis of rivalry to endorse a

'we-centric' (Ibid.) approach in which rivalry arises

from the 'intersubjective nexus' (Ibid.) – imitation.

As B imitates A's desire for an object, A and B are

soon to compete over the object. The mimetic nature of

desire accounts for B's shift of attention from the

desired object to the desiring subject – A. B's shift

of attention towards A doesn't mean B ceases to

desire the object; on the contrary, B attends to A

15 Girard defines misknowledge as the unconscious, mentalcovering up of the lack of autonomy in our desires (Girard 1987,223).

because A is an obstacle preventing B from acquiring

or appropriating the object. By focusing on A, B aims

at eliminating the other competitor (A) so that B can

then focus on the object again and fulfil his desire

by acquiring or appropriating it.

A sees B as a rival (and reciprocally) from the

moment A realizes B is an obstacle to the satisfaction

of A's desire.

1.3 Each subject becomes model-obstacle for the other

1.31 From model to model-obstacle: what it is to be in a

state of rivalry

I now account for why imitation is the root cause of

change in the way A and B perceive each other – from

model to model-obstacle. In section 1.12 I defined

mimetic desire in terms of a triangle of desire

mechanism. I thereby introduced the notion of the

model: my having a desire is copied from my model's

desire.

The model-obstacle state is one of rivalry that

emerges from mimetic desire. It refers to each

party's perception of the other as model-obstacle. In

practice, when in the first place B imitates A's

desire to acquire the Chairman position, A is a model

to B. When B realizes A is preventing B from

fulfulling his desire to get the position, B regards

A as model-obstacle16. The model-obstacle state is one

in which each party is perceived as, and in fact is

model-obstacle to the other. If B desires A's

Chairman position, then A is model-obstacle to B in

the first place. In return, A imitates B's desire for

the position which causes A to perceive B as her

model-obstacle. Rivalry need not be shared by two

subjects for the triangle of desire mechanism to

operate, as the doll case exemplifies (refer to

sections 2.2 and 2.3). If A is a model-obstacle to B,

A is both simultaneously model and obstacle to B; A

remains B's model although A has become B's obstacle.

We now have a theoretical picture of the 'two sides

of mimesis' (Gallese 2009, 21) consisting in prior

16 The notions of "obstacle" and "model-obstacle" have been introduced in Girard's original literary analysis (Girard 1965), further discussed in Girard (1977) and Girard (1987).

modellation on the one hand and subsequent rivalry on

the other, each closely knit together as the latter

stems from the former. We can now also gain a better

understanding of what was posited in section 1.22

above – to be in a state of rivalry is to undergo a

shift of attention from the object to the subject-

rival.

1.32 MT's contribution to 'the problem of social

cognition'

The 'problem of social cognition' (Gallese 2009, 22)

is the absence of a unique, most plausible theory

accounting for ways in which we make sense of others'

behaviour. The two most prominent theories in social

cognition – Theory Theory (TT) and Simulation Theory

(ST) – provide different explanations at different

levels and their conclusions seem to be incompatible.

For instance, ST's claim at the level of cognitive

neuroscience that we simulate others' mental states

in support of direct, non-theoretical inference of

others' mental states is incompatible with TT's claim

at the level of cognitive science that we use a

theory17 to infer others' mental states.

MT establishes a causal link between imitation and

rivalry as it chiefly pictures our desires as

imitations of others' desires, which leads to rivalry

when several subjects can't appropriate one object.

In asserting the central role of imitation in our

behaviour, MT challenges TT and ST which both rely on

folk psychology to account for our understanding of

other people's behaviour. Folk psychology refers to

our everyday understanding of how other people's

minds work, i.e. the way in which we attribute mental

states to make sense of people's actions. TT claims B

grasps mental states that caused A's behaviour by

using a theory of mind, then B infers that those

mental states are those that caused A's behaviour. On

the other hand, ST claims B grasps the mental states

that caused A's behaviour by using his own decision-

making processes to simulate A's mental states, then

17 See below in this section for what it means to make use of a theory when attributing mental states to a subject.

B infers that these mental states are those which

caused A's behaviour. ST chiefly differs from TT in

that it is non-theoretical: B makes no use of a

theory to attribute mental states to A. In other

words, B needs not have knowledge – even implicit –

of how the decision-making system works, i.e. of the

causality of mental states to each other and to

behaviour. ST claims instead that some of our neural

mechanisms – like, possibly, the mirror neuron system

(Gallese, Fadiga, Fogassi, Rizzolatti, 1996)18 –

enable simulation and provide us with a direct, non-

theoretical understanding of others' behaviour.

There are two, related points here that clash with

MT. First, TT and ST are both mind reading views as

they claim we attribute mental states by inferring them

from one's behaviour. Such inference is

representational on TT's account and

metarepresentational on ST's account19. MT denies mind18 Although many contemporary simulation theorists rely on

evidence from "mirror neurons" in support of a direct understanding of others' mental states, ST doesn't have to do so to count as ST.

19 TT involves representations because it requires that we draw on an external body of knowledge (a theory of mind) to give

reading is the most basic means for understanding

others' intentions but claims instead that

intercorporeity chiefly provides us with knowledge about

others. Gallese refers to intercorporeity as the

'mutual resonance' (Gallese 2009, 523) of intentional

behaviors, enabled by the mirror neuron system.

Intercorporeity seems to distinguish itself from ST

in that it ignores the need for any kind of mind

reading ability; it operates at a lower pre-

theoretical, i.e. pre-representational level20.

Second, mind reading implies that we make use of

propositional attitudes to linguistically represent

to ourselves the content – beliefs, desires – of

one's mental states. According to this belief-desire

model, actions are caused by prior mental states. Hence

meaning to mental states. ST involves metarepresentations because it claims we draw on our own decision-making processesto attribute mental states to others: we use our own mental states to think about others' mental states.

20 Gallese's most recent understanding of "embodied simulation" (as discussed in Gallese 2007, Gallese 2009 and Gallese 2011) seems to be closer to MT's model of the mind than to standard ST because it is essentially nonrepresentational: 'The folk-psychological model of mind reading proposed by standard accounts of simulation theory, which Gallese utilized to framethe functional relevance of mirror neurons, in my opinion does not apply to the nonrepresentational character of embodied simulation, as spelled out in [...] the present article' (Gallese 2009, 100).

the relevant account for an action consists in

showing that its reading in terms of a proposition

(e.g. “John enters the kitchen”) results from a

proposition that describes a prior desire (e.g. “John

wants to cook dinner”) and a proposition that

describes a prior belief (e.g. “John believes that

entering the kitchen will enable him to cook dinner”)

(Dupuy 2011, 195-196). MT denies that beliefs and

desires merely precede the action (Ibid., 197) and

uses double mediation to illustrate it. Double

mediation is the model's (B's) mimetic imitation of

his admirer's (A's) initial mimetic desire which

amplifies A's desire, and so on so forth. For

instance, A – in need of an object of desire – first

mimetically desires what he believes is B's object of

desire; B sees A as a rival and imitates A's desire

in return, which leads to rivalry. Because of some

chance sign (Ibid., 198), A thought this object was the

object of B's desire, when it wasn't in fact. The

point is that action – in our case, rivalry –

develops out of the illusion of an initial, authentic

desire, i.e. out of no desire at all. Hence the

illusion of a desire precedes action but action feeds back

onto desire21. If so, it would seem that actions aren't

merely caused by prior mental states, contrary to what

the belief-desire model claims.

Ever since Girard's investigation of the psychology

of imitation (Girard 1987), MT scholars have been

closely interested in empirical research on imitation

– either endeavouring to integrate findings into MT

or claiming to interpret and provide meaning to

empirical research in light of the theory.

In section 1.1 I explained the triangle of desire

mechanism, in 1.2 I accounted for how rivalries stem

from mimetic desire and in 1.3 I identified the shift

from model to model-obstacle with rivalry. In doing

so, I have laid out the theoretical tools necessary

for an understanding of the empirical research on

imitation which I am now to present in section 2.

21 One may object that A's mimetic desire of what she regards as being B's desire is still prior to rivalry. It may be replied that rivalry is simultaneous to A's mimetic desire because the latter immediately triggers B's perception of A as a rival.

2 Empirical research on imitation

2.1 Gaze-following and object-grasping as the first

stage of mimetic desire

2.11 Gaze following as a means to catch and to

imitate desires

In section 1.12, I described the mimetic component of

desire by referring to a triangle of desire where B

desires an object through imitation of his model's –

A's – desire. The next paragraph examines possible

empirical evidence for the way in which the

convergence of two desires on a single object – MT's

first stage – might come about. One should note gaze

following can support a variety of phenemena and the

study below should be regarded as one of many

contributions for making sense of MT, as opposed to

MT making sense of the study.

To copy another's desire, one needs the means to

recognize another's desire; B's desire for the

Chairman position requires B's conscious22 awareness

of A's prior desire for the position. This awareness

– desire recognition – itself relies on cognitive

mechanisms operating at the functional level23, such

as “mirror neurons”.

In a study on gaze following in children, Brooks and

Meltzoff (2002) tested two groups of 12-18 months

infants' reaction to an adult's head turn towards a

target. With one group, the adult opened his eyes

when turning to the object; with the other group, the

adult turned to the object eyes closed. The issue at

stake was the extent – if any – to which infants

relied on the adult's gaze to bring their attention

to the object. It turned out the first group of

infants (opened eyes group) followed the adult's gaze

'significantly more often' (Meltzoff 2011, 61) than

22 In a couple of experiments on gazing awareness in mimetic desire, Bry et al. (2011) have only reported on conscious mimetic desires: 'the present experiments found positive evidence that [...] mimetic desire effects are observed under conditions of gazing-awareness, and failed to obtain positive evidence that mimetic desire effects may be observed under conditions of gazing-unawareness' (Bry et al. 2011, 991).

23 The functional level refers to phenomena that usually (but notexclusively) occur at a scale smaller than a person. In our context, the functional – sub-personal – level is that of cognitive neuroscience, which deals with e.g some kind of neuron's activity in the brain.

infants in the closed eyes group24. These results

invalidate the interpretation of gaze following

according to which infants' attention to an object

arises through the other's head motion rather than

gaze direction (Ibid., 60-61) because if the latter

were correct, infants from both groups would have

reacted to head motion and cast their attention to

the object. Instead, the findings suggest that gaze

following is the means by which infants come into

visual contact with objects fixated by adults (Ibid.,

62). As visual contact with an object can translate

into desire for that object, gaze following seems to

be a possible means to catch – and, subsequently, to

imitate – adult desires.

In fact, the idea that gaze following may lead to

desire has been empirically tested in recent studies

(e.g. Bayliss, Frischen, Fenske and Tipper, 2007;

Bayliss, Paul, Cannon and Tipper, 2006, Exp.1). Those

studies have explicitly shown that one evaluates an

object more positively when it is perceived as being

24 On average, infants in the opened eyes group had higher gazingscores (M = 1.75) than infants in the closed eyes group (M = 0.46) (Brooks and Metlzoff 2002, 6).

looked at by another person, and less positively when

it is perceived as not being looked at (Bry et al.

2011, 987). Hence there seems to be a link between

following one's gaze toward an object and perceiving

it positively, i.e. as an object of desire.

2.12 Object grasping as a means to catch and to

imitate desires

If gaze following seems to be a way to catch a peer's

desire for an object, object grasping seems to be

another. In section 1.22, I presented MT's claim that

one's desire for an object isn't only caused by this

object's physical properties but also from one's

perception of these properties as being desired by

someone else. The next paragraph deals with empirical

evidence for this theoretical claim. Unlike the

Brooks and Meltzoff (2002) study, the study below

seems to support MT specifically.

In an experiment on “goal contagion”25, Lebreton et

25 "Goal contagion" is the terminology used in social psychology to describe the phenomenon that objects which appear as another person's goal are likely 'to become a goal for the observer' (Lebreton et al. 2012, 7146). It is also a way to

al. (2012) asked 116 adult volunteers to evaluate the

desirability of different object pairs shown in

videos (Lebreton et al. 2012, 7147). For each pair of

objects (e.g., blue and red shirt), four videos were

shown to the volunteer. In the first video, one

object (e.g., the blue shirt) was the goal of a

grasping action whereas in the second video, the

other (e.g., the red shirt) was not. The setting was

then reversed. In the third video, the red shirt was

the goal of a grasping action whereas in the fourth

video, the blue shirt was not (Ibid.). The time the

object was taken as goal of a grasping action was

labelled the goal condition (G condition) and the

time it wasn't was labelled the non-goal condition

(NG condition). The authors hypothesized that on the

whole, volunteers would evaluate objects in G

conditions as more desirable than objects in NG

conditions. Results confirmed the hypothesis as they

pointed out greater ratings for G than for NG objects

(Ibid.)26, thus suggesting a strong mimetic desiredefine the mimetic desire phenomenon (Ibid.).26 Data given in the results is: t(115)=5.13/2.37 in the G

condition and t(115)=4.69/2.44 in the NG condition (Lebreton et al. 2012, 7152).

effect (MDE). Results indicate that the observation

of object grasping is just as effective as gaze

following (see section 2.11) in catching a peer's

desire for an object (Ibid.). Looking into the

reasons for this MDE at the neuroscientific scale,

the authors unveiled a neural connection between the

mirror neuron system (MNS) and the brain valuation

system (BVS)27 (Ibid., ). They presented evidence that

MNS activity modulated BVS activity, which seems to

explain the authors' note that action observation –

such as in the G conditions of the experiment –

influences object valuation (Ibid., ). In this

experiment, the authors seem to present evidence –

from both social psychology and cognitive

neuroscience – for the claim that one perceives an

object as more desirable after one's perception of it

as someone else's goal and desire.

If mimetic triangles of desire are to be empirically

plausible, one needs to account for the way in which

27 The MNS is a part of the brain in which neurons fire bothwhen one watches a peer perform an action and when one performsthis action herself. The BVS is another part of the brain inwhich neurons fire when one evaluates the worth of an object(Lebreton et al. 2012, 7146).

rivalry can arise from A's imitation of B's desire

for an object.

2.2 Evidence for mimetic desire leading to rivalry

2.21 The mother-doll-child mimetic triangle

I now examine cases of mimetic desire – which seems

to rely, as section 2.11 and 2.12 demonstrates, on

sensitiveness to the others' gaze direction and

object grasping – leading to rivalry for objects of

desire – both (inanimate) things and (animate)

subjects.

Hart et al. (1998) led experiments which tested an

infant's reaction to the intrusion of a stranger in

an initial context of tête-à-tête between mother and

child (Anspach 2011, 137). They examined a 12-month-

old child's behavioral responses to (i) the

interruption of the tête-à-tête with his mother by

the presence of another adult woman and to (ii) their

discussion of (a) an infant-size doll and (b) an

illustrated dessert cookbook (Ibid.). In cases (a)

and (b), when discussing the object with the other

adult, the mother did not look at her child but kept

looking either at the doll or at the adult. Moreover,

the experiment reports that mother and adult

discussed positively about the doll and showed it

affection by carefully handling it when it was placed

in her lap, which suggests some attention or desire

for the doll which the infants' desire could be an

imitation of. From the interruption of the tête-à-

tête with his mother to the mothers' conversations

about the doll and cookbook, the child looked on,

which enabled her to follow her mother's gaze and

subsequently, to imitate her desire28 for the doll29.

The issue at stake was whether the infants would show

any rivalry towards the infant-size doll.

Experimenters reported that 'infants demonstrated

more signs of disturbance, including protest

28 It would be more correct to say that the mother cares for the doll or attends to the doll with interest rather than to say she desires it; why would she desire something she already possesses? Yet the mother must be animated with some kind of desire – to coo the doll or merely to attend to it – without which she wouldn't have attended to it in the first place.

29 As will become clearer in the rest of section 2.2 and in section 3.2, the outcome of the child's imitation of her mother's desire for the doll is not the child's own desire forthe doll but her desire to be the doll (Anspach 2011, 140), i.e. to replace the doll on his mother's lap and thereby, to be the object of his mother's attention and desire.

behavior, negative vocalizations and inhibited play,

particularly when the mother paid attention to the

doll' (Hart et al. 1998, 59). It seems that the most

intuitive interpretation of the doll case would

picture the doll as the child's object of desire and

the mother as the child's model. Seeing the mother as

model fits our common experience of a child modelling

her behavior and gestures upon that of her parents,

which modelling is considered a key tenet in the

child's developmental psychology (Gopnik and Wellman

1992, 160). Seeing the doll as object of desire fits

the canonical image of a child's eagerness to acquire

and to play with toys. Therefore, this reading of the

study seems to fully cohere with what our common

intuition would expect. Yet there is one respect in

which this interpretation seems to misfit the results

– it does not make sense of the observation that the

doll appealed more to the child when it lay on the

mother's lap than when it lay on the stranger's lap

(Anspach 2011, 139). Even though it seems one could

make sense of the latter observation by virtue of the

fact that the mother is 'more influential' (Ibid.)

model to the child than the stranger, yet it doesn't

fit the image of a child's will to play with toys

regardless of whom is holding them. Indeed, if the

child's behavior – protest and anguish – is to be

crucially explained through his desire to acquire and

to play with the doll, it remains unclear why the

child did not exhibit the same amount and intensity

of protest behavior towards the stranger when she

held the doll than she did towards her mother when

she held the doll (Ibid.,). Hence the interpretation

which pictures the doll as object of desire and the

mother as model and rival doesn't seem to make sense

of this important result given in the experiment.

It is because picturing the doll as desired object

and the mother as rival apparently fails to account for

the result described above that Anspach brings MT as

a potential solution to the problem, as we shall

later see in section 3.2.

2.22 Why MT comes onto the scene

I now consider a possible way of making sense of this

issue. The other adult in the doll case is unknown to

the child – she is a stranger. Toddlers are sometimes

scared or feel unsecure in the presence of a

stranger, and this by itself could explain that the

child did not protest as much against the stranger

than she did toward her mother. In that case, it

seems one wouldn't need to resort to an alternative

framework – MT – to make sense of the child's varying

behavior. Yet even if the child's greater interest

for the doll when her mother held it were to be

explained in a such a way, the child reacted in a

sufficiently stronger way toward her mother than toward

the stranger for one to wonder if the mother wasn't

more than just an influential model – the child's

object of desire.

In section 2.1 I reported two empirical studies on

the role of gaze-following and object-grasping in

[respectively] enabling desire recognition and object

valuation. In doing so, I have seemingly presented

empirical evidence for the mimetic triangle of desire

exposed in section 1.1. In section 2.2 I displayed an

experiment which seems to causally link mimetic

desire to rivalry, thus putting the material

presented in 2.1 in a framework enabling the rise of

rivalry. In doing so, I have presented empirical

research which I interpret and assess from the

mimetic perspective in section 3.

3 MT's argument for socially destructive mimesis and

objections

3.1 MT's view of gaze-following as means for catching

desires

3.11 MT: gaze following enables mimetic desire

In MT terms, the gaze-following study presented in

2.1 means the other's look contributes to giving

special value to the object. Because B gazes upon the

object, A credits it with special value although A

wasn't paying attention to it a moment before. Thus,

this study seems to provide an empirical basis for

the MT claim – made in section 1.22 – that our

desires for objects aren't only caused by their

physical properties but also from our perception of

them as being desired by someone else. As Meltzoff

puts it, '[...] we discovered that an inanimate

object takes on a special valence when it is looked

at by a social other' (Meltzoff 2011, 62). Meltzoff

claims following an adult's gaze towards an object

affects the child's evaluation of this object, i.e.

the worth one grants to this object. Furthermore,

Meltzoff specifies it does this in a positive way – it

gives worth to the object rather than taking worth

away from it. In Meltzoff's words, '[…] the infant

would come to desire one of two identical objects by

virtue of the fact that the adult looked at it.'

(Brooks and Meltzoff 2002, 10). On Meltzoff's view,

gaze-following potentially enables mimetic desire and

makes the convergence of several desires on a single

object possible.

3.12 Gaze following enables mimetic desire:

objections and responses

One may object it is unclear from the results if the

adult's look confers a positive value to the object as

opposed to a negative value, i.e. if the child really

desires the object or if he rejects it. Indeed, Meltzoff

relies on the child's pointing to the looked-at

object – and, to a lesser extent, on her vocalizing –

(Brooks and Meltzoff 2002, 10) to claim she

apparently desires it (Ibid.).

First, pointing isn't necessarily a sign of desire.

Toddlers point to objects for different reasons and

such an act can as much be interpreted as rejection

or just as one's surprise to see X object in X

location. Hence, even though pointing might more

often than not translate into desire, there is no

necessary link between the two.

Second, pointing doesn't seem to be sufficient for one to

attribute desire to the child. There are other

instances of the child's behavior that experimenters

should consider before granting the child desire.

Grasping and attempts at grasping are often reliable

signs of desire for an object (see Lebreton et al.,

2012). Yet experimenters reported 'infants made no

apparent attempt to grasp [the objects]' (Brooks and

Meltzoff 2002, 10). Hence the latter observation

casts doubt on whether the child really desires the

object and, thereby, it calls into question the

authors' own interpretation according to which it

indicates the child's desire for the object (Ibid.).

However, one may argue that the mere fact pointing to

an object may translate into desire for that object

more often than it doesn't is sufficiently reliable

evidence of the child's desire for that object. The

latter reponse could be held even though a child's

pointing to an object does not always translate into

desire for that object. Yet the latter response

doesn't invalidate the second objection above and one

could reply that pointing to the object is not

reliable evidence if no other item in the child's

behavior indicates desire for the object.

3.2 MT's view of mimetic desire leading to rivalry

3.21 The doll as model-obstacle: objections and

responses

I now critically assess Anspach's argument for

socially destructive mimesis in the doll case.

In MT's reversed point of view, the doll is not

pictured as the desired object but as model-obstacle

and rival. In MT terms, this means the doll is model

to the child's mimetic desire – the doll's desire is

that on which the child models her desire.

This claim assumes the doll has desires; however, as

an inanimate object, a doll doesn't have any desires

and is incapable of any mental activity whatsoever.

If the doll has no desire, it is impossible for the

child to have a desire imitated from the doll's. If

there is no desire to be imitated, there must be no

object of desire either which, on MT's picture, would

mean – no mother. The only way one could keep mimetic

desire in the picture would seem to be in going back

to the former reading according to which the doll is

the desired object and the mother stands as model,

for only then can the child imitate a person's – his

mother's – desire.

In fact, another way to keep mimetic desire in MT's

picture would be in picturing the stranger as the model

and rival who, by conversing with the mother, arouses

the child's desire for her mother (Anspach 2011,

141). However, this hypothesis doesn't fit the fact

the child seemingly exhibited no aggressive behaviour

towards the stranger (Ibid.), as one would do towards

one's rival.

In his discussion of the doll case, Anspach rejects

the objection that the doll has no desire on the

grounds that it misunderstands and misrepresents MT's

reading of the experiment. He claims MT doesn't

require that the model be a person or any other

desiring entity; 'the mediator may be literally anyone

at all' (Girard 1965, 92). Assuming this is the case,

one still needs an account of how one can imitate the

desire of an inanimate, non-desiring object. In doing

so, Anspach claims that in the doll case, as in all

cases in which the model isn't a desiring entity,

there is no mimetic desire per se but only inspired desire:

'Inspired by a model, but not imitated from a model's

desire' (Anspach 2011, 140). Anspach seems to claim

that mimetic desire should not be taken literally and

that we are dealing with something else than mimetic

desire.

I will raise two [further] objections to Anspach's

response.

3.22 Imitation or inspiration: further objections and

responses

First, Anspach doesn't clearly define what he means

by the child's inspired desire. We can only gather

from the negation he uses in the text – 'Inspired by

a model, but not imitated […]' (Ibid.) – that he contrasts

a desire inspired from a model with a desire imitated

from a model. However, this contrast is not enough to

clarify how an inspired desire precisely stands in

relation to a mimetic desire. Anspach's lack of

clarity leaves open for us whether he understands an

inspired desire as, for instance, a particular kind

of mimetic desire, a different kind of desire still

related somehow to mimetic desire or some kind of

desire unrelated to mimetic desire.

Before proceeding to the second objection to

Anspach's argument, I will make two assumptions which

ground my objection. The first is that his argument

explicitly aims at making a case for MT's

interpretation of the doll case and that, as such, it

must be making a case for mimetic desire30. Second, if

Anspach's argument is a defense of mimetic desire,

then I take he assumes a strong connection or near

identity between mimetic desire and what he refers to

as inspired desire, the lack of which would,

therefore, bring discredit to his argument.

The objection consists in that “inspiration”

essentially differs from “imitation” and “mimetism”

inasmuch as it doesn't involve a reproduction of the

model's means to achieve a goal; the concept of

“inspiration” is closer to that of “emulation”.

Because reproduction is necessary to “imitation” but

not to “inspiration”, there seems to be neither a

30 For an account of the essential link between MT and mimetic desire, refer to the introduction, sections 1.11 and 1.12.

strong connection nor near identity between the two.

Consequently, the same applies to the comparison of

mimetic desire and inspired desire. Hence Anspach's

argument seems to be untenable.

Yet the latter objection, despite sensibly pointing

to the lack of conceptual clarity in Anspach's

thought, seems to miss the point of his argument –

that everything in the experiment happens as if the doll

was a real, desiring subject. Anspach argues this is

the only requirement for the mimetic framework to

make a relevant interpretation of the doll case. The

mimetic triangle of desire does not require that two

real subjects attend to the doll, as long as the actual

subject (the child) misunderstands its rival (the doll)

as a subject and treats it as a desiring being, i.e.

so long as the child's desire is inspired from the

doll's. Thus, the same process occurs in the doll

case as would occur in a case in which the model was

a real person; hence the same mimetic framework can

apply to both processes. Such a response would then

allow one to reject the objection from lack of

conceptual clarity as being irrelevant to Anspach's

argument. Indeed, if the child believes the doll is

an other infant – « like me »31 – and if the child's

desire arises as a consequence of this belief, then

it is mere technicality to wonder whether her desire

arose from inspiration or imitation of the doll's

desire. The reason for this claim is that the point

of Anspach's argument is to picture the doll as model

and rival, and the mother as desired object (see

section 3.21). For this to be the case, the only

requirement is that the child gets her desire from

the doll and not from the mother. How she gets it –

through imitation, inspiration or other – is

irrelevant.

31 For an explanation of the link between perceiving an other as being "like me" and as my model, refer to Meltzoff, 'Out of the Mouths of Babes: Imitation, Gaze, and Intentions in InfantResearch – the “Like Me” Framework', pp. 55-74.

Conclusion

In this essay I have tried to examine MT's empirical

plausibility. In doing so, I both looked at whether

empirical research may help us to make sense of MT

and whether MT may shed light on empirical research.

I first introduced the problem of social cognition –

as defined by Gallese – to the reader as well as why

and how MT might bring up relevant solutions for

solving it. In a second section I presented two

empirical studies on the genesis of mimetic desire,

and a third study that causally relates mimetic

desire to rivalry. In a third section I exposed and

developed my argument – that when interpreted from

MT's perspective, the study on gaze following and the

doll study make a convincing case for socially

destructive mimesis. I chiefly relied on MT's concept

of misunderstanding in the doll case to argue for

MT's plausibility.

There is now a fast-growing body of research on gaze-

following, object-grasping and on how they lead to

mimetic desire. Yet there is to this day, remarkably

little evidence of whether or not and how mimetic

desire may lead to rivalry. It is now time this area

of research be explicitly and widely dealt with, so

that we can have an overall view of the MT's

empirical plausibility.

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