The History and Evolution of Martyrdom in the Service of Defensive Jihad

Farhana Ali and Jerrold PostThe History and Evolution of Martyrdom in the Service of Defensive Jihad: An Analysis of Suicide Bombers in Current Conflicts

social researchVol 75 : No 2 : Summer 2008 615

much has been written about the iraq war, emphasizing not

only the failure of US policies but also the internecine fighting among

the varied groups, including Al Qaeda and Shia and Sunni militias, all of

which have contributed to the carnage in a country with deep histori-

cal Islamic roots. Iraq’s important place in Islamic history as the birth-

place of fitna (anarchy) has important implications and consequences

to the conflict today.1 According to Islamic doctrine, the word “fitna”

has been translated as chaos, “time of temptation,” war, as well as anar-

chy. A scholar of religious history, Karen Armstrong, further notes that

the concept of fitna is “symbolic”; thus, battles between Muslims today

have compelled some Muslims to seek a return to early Islam during

the time of Prophet Muhammad (570 to 680 AD) (Armstrong, 2000: 37).

Furthermore, fitna originated from the early struggles Muslims

faced after the Prophet Muhammad died in 680 AD, leaving a politi-

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cal vacuum for the newly established Muslim community. After his

death, four caliphs were selected to lead the Islamic community, which

then soon spread across different countries to include Iraq, Egypt, and

Syria. In Iraq, the fourth imam and caliph, Ali ibn Talib, established his

kingdom. There, he was poisoned by a dissenting party known as the

Kharijites.

Iraq is famously known by both Sunni and Shia Muslims as the

location where Ali’s son, Imam Hussein, was brutally killed by a Sunni

caliph, Muawiyyah, in a place called Karbala, known as “a battlefield

among battlefields.” The murder of Imam Hussein is viewed as one of

the most important martyrdoms in Islamic history.

Unlike his brother Hassan, Hussein refused to accept the rule of

the new Muslim leader based in Syria. His refusal to give him allegiance

resulted in Hussein’s murder. Enraged over the martyrdom of Imam

Hussein, Muslims in Kufa, Iraq formed their own party, which became the

“Partisans of Ali” or Shia. Today, Shias reenact the martyrdom of Imam

Hussein on the day when he was killed, known as the Day of Ashura (the

tenth day of the first month of the Islamic calendar, Muharram). Thus, for

Shias, the meaning of shahadat (martyrdom) is understood in the context

of the school of thought that embodies the struggle and death (that is,

martyrdom) of Imam Hussein (Shari’ati, 1986: 154).

It was only after the fall of the secular Baathist Iraqi leader,

Saddam Hussein, that Shias were permitted to openly display their

grief over the loss of Ali’s family on the streets of Baghdad; it is an

event in which men, women, and children actively take part in rituals

of mourning, remembrance, and curses hurled at key Islamic figures

who either opposed Ali at the time of his rule or did not seek vengeance

for the death of his predecessor, the third caliph, Imam Uthman.2 The

disagreements that arose from the Muslim communities over their

deaths spawned the first revolt and wars among Muslims for political

power and determining the “rightful” ruler to lead the umma (global

Muslim community).

Imam Ali’s martyrdom has important religious consequences for

the Islamic religion. The religious establishment in the Muslim world

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Martyrdom, Defensive Jihad, and Suicide Bombing 617

today continues to debate the core issues within Islam: What kind of

man should lead the ummah? How could Muslims who had justified

the killing of other Muslims surrender to God’s will? These historically

based questions give rise to another question that is a major focus of

this paper: Can the history of the martyrs of early Islam be uncritically

extrapolated to become the basis of emerging definitions of “martyr-

dom” and narratives of identity?

As it relates to the Iraq war, the issue of coexistence and tolerance

of different sects, ethnicities, and belief systems has been increasingly

absent from Iraqi society. Taking advantage of the diverse religious

and ethnic landscape, militant leaders and clerics have defined Iraq as

the new battlefield. These individuals are classified as Salafi-Jihadis, an

extreme offshoot of the Salafi doctrine, which practices Islam accord-

ing to the “pious predecessors” or early Muslims. The Salafi-Jihadis

espouse the use of violence to achieve their political ends and justify

this under the umbrella of Islamic doctrine. Hence, the writings and

recorded sayings of the Salafi-Jihadi leaders and clerics, if broadly

accepted, would transform the political map of the Middle East by

encouraging perpetual conflict with the West and other perceived

enemies (including Sunnis and Shias, rival states, and Muslim leaders).

The Salafi-Jihadis are in conflict with the traditional leaders and clerics

in the Muslim world, opposing them as legitimate rulers and interpret-

ers of Islamic law.

While several challenges remain for Islamic mobilization, moder-

ate or “mainstream” Muslims search for an Islamic system that defines

their pluralism, protects their Islamic identity, and provides an avenue

for Islamic mobilization and religious activism. Unlike militants, the

majority of Muslims are able to organize and participate in their local

politics and shape societies through nonviolent methods. Militant

Islamists, however, opt to preserve their Muslim identity through

violent means to achieve their goals, of which a political end is almost

always an integral part.

Groups fighting in Iraq today seeking an established political

system to protect their specific communities and interests have the

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support of an influential, powerful religious establishment, mostly

from the Muslim Arab world. Their provocations and published works

provide an impetus to continue the violent jihad, capitalizing on a

long tradition of martyrdom, to justify suicide attacks in Iraq and

elsewhere. An understanding of the clerical debate as it relates to

Iraq requires an overview of martyrdom in Islam, its original intent,

purpose, and meaning, in order to project how, over time, the concept

of martyrdom has been employed to justify modern suicide bombing

campaigns.

Through the use of suicide as a tactic, it is clear that Al Qaeda

and affiliated terror groups have changed the landscape and the culture

of war in the Muslim world. This paper is a two-part study that focuses

on the feelings of discontent exhibited in the extremists’ understand-

ing of “jihad”—a sacred word in Islam, misinterpreted, in the view of

the extremists, by liberals and nonviolent individuals and groups—and

its relationship to martyrdom. The extremists’ focus on a particular

vision of Islam has given rise to a battle of belief against unbelief and

sparked a war of words in which various groups and individuals are

now reasserting their right to claim the true meaning of “jihad.” To

promote a particular form of jihad, extremists claim to be fighting for

the unrelieved agony of the Muslim umma—a point with some cred-

ibility even to moderate Muslims—but choose to satisfy their anger

with narratives driven by revolutionary change in the society in which

they reside. Related to the sacred narrative of jihad is martyrdom as

described by the early ideologues and adapted by contemporary Islamic

clerics, terrorist leaders, and operators. While jihad can exist without

martyrdom, the inverse is not true. Therefore, this paper stresses the

all-powerful narrative of war through the ideals of justice, glory, and

redemption for the long-suffering of the Muslim people at the hands of

perceived Western enemies.

The viability of a jihad-style war by which martyrs are made

(that is, successful suicide bombings) increases their chances of victory

and forces an equally relevant question that guides this paper. The

second part of this study offers a comprehensive plan to delegitimize

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the radical representatives of Islam by first understanding the terror-

ists and insurgents’ use and abuse of martyrdom narratives to recruit

new members and bless their operations through the use of religious

overtones and symbolic ideals based on secular, national goals (that

is, the defense of a territory or homeland). While Islam is not the

only religion where martyrdom is represented, this paper provides an

analytical framework from which to explain suicide bombing, using

an historical, ideological approach that can be found in classical and

contemporary literature that rationalizes self-sacrifice and describes

the role of the “martyr” in current conflicts, both in, Iraq and in the

Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

THE MAKING OF A SHAHID

Reviving the Muslim umma (the global Muslim community) requires

participation in jihad, which is considered ibadat or acts of adoration.3

As an act of worship, the basic root of jihad is derived from the Arabic

verb jahada, which means “effort and striving” (Abualrub, 2002: 78-79).

While there are many forms of jihad, all of which are defined by a set

of rules, jihad is best described as self-defense: defense against tempta-

tion, defense against Satan, defense against the unjust, and, as is most

commonly known in the West, defense against religious persecution.

It should be noted that jihad is “well defined and explained by a set

of rules and regulations” (Abualrub, 2002: 78). The senior adviser of

the Muslim Public Affairs Council (MPAC) in Washington, D.C., Maher

Hathout says, “Historically, fighting back against aggressors [the pagan

Arabian Quraysh tribe] was prohibited during the thirteen years of the

Meccan period. . . . After the migration to Medina and the establish-

ment of the Islamic state, Muslims were concerned with how to defend

themselves against aggression from their enemies.”

Contrary to popular Western understanding, jihad has a broad

semantic content, and is different from qittal (fighting). Both terms,

jihad and qittal, have “significantly different meanings and uses in the

Qur’an” (Fatoohi, 2002: 67). “The latter word involves killing and blood-

shed, and is “only one aspect of armed jihad” (67). Therefore, the trans-

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lation of jihad as holy war is inaccurate. For the larger Muslim world,

jihad is simply an everyday living, breathing concept. The so-called

greater jihad refers to struggle or persistence in leading a life free of

evil. The jihad of the heart specifically embodies having a heart free

of evil thoughts and desires, whereas the jihad of the tongue refers

to giving voice to and leading a pious life according to the words of

the Prophet, and the jihad of the deed refers to carrying out deeds to

assist the umma, to assist Muslims who are suffering. These embody

the greater jihad. The lesser jihad, the jihad of the sword, refers to the

obligation to take up the sword in defense of the umma in defense of

believing Muslims who have had the sword taken up against them. It is

accordingly a defensive jihad.

It was only after 13 years of persecution and living in exile that

the permission to fight was incorporated in the form of religious verses.

According to Muslim theologians, the revelation for defensive jihad

was delivered by God in response to a specific set of circumstances,

and was “motivated by the fact that the Muslims suffered injustice

and were forced to emigrate . . . without justification.” Among the first

Qur’ani verses for fighting is no. 22: “Leave is given to those who fought

because they were wronged—surely God is able to help them—who

were expelled from their habitations without right, except that they

say ‘Our Lord is God.’” The more popularly cited verse, “And fight in

the way of Allah those who fight you, but transgress not the limits.

Truly Allah likes not the transgressors”3 permitted jihad within certain

perimeters for self-defense. The first verses of fighting “are very clear . . .

and do not contain even the slightest evidence of religious compul-

sion.” The aim of fighting was threefold: “to stop aggression, to protect

the mission of Islam, and to defend religious freedom.” It is through

participation in jihad that the early Muslims on the battlefield hoped

to achieve martyrdom or shahadat. Through jihad, a believer also hoped

to enter paradise, “which God has opened for His chosen friends [and] a

garment of piety” (Mutahhari, 1986: 125).

The climate in the Muslim world in the nineteenth and twenti-

eth centuries sparked the emergence of a new Islamic revivalist move-

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ment or jihad as an individual duty.4 Leading US-based Muslim jurist and

scholar Khaled Abou El Fadl maintains that “not all social and political

frustrations lead to the use of violence,” but the rhetoric of belligerence

that developed in countries like Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan was

able to “exploit an already radicalized discourse with the expectation

of resonating with the social and political frustrations of a people” (El

Fadl, n.d.).

Long before 9/11, Muslims perceived injustices against them by

Western powers, attributed primarily to colonial domination, forcing

the advent of “political Islam,” a modern phenomenon and by-product

of the “Muslim’s peoples’ interaction . . . with the West during the past

two hundred years, a period when Western power has been in the ascen-

dancy and Muslims have become the objects, rather than the subjects,

of history” (Ayoob, 2004).

The attacks on 9/11 placed the Muslim feelings of alienation,

betrayal, and distrust toward the West in the media spotlight, broad-

casting the “long conflict between the Islamic world and the West,

a conflict largely dominated by the former until a little over 300

years ago, when the Ottomans failed in their second attempt to take

Vienna” (Lewis quoted in Tolson, 2005). In the current lexicon of

violent jihadis/insurgents, the words “Western” and “United States”

spur negative reactions to foreign interventionism, enabling some

mainstream/moderate Muslims to understand, if not sympathize, with

Al Qaeda leaders’ broader goals of fighting for justice and security in

the Muslim world. This language then feeds into a powerful narra-

tive that can appeal even to mainstream/moderate Muslims, some

of whom quietly sympathize with the extremists’ appeal for justice

while rejecting the monopoly of power maintained by Western coun-

tries over the Muslim world.

A Return to the Khalifah (Caliphate)

In their attempt to reappropriate Islam as a total way of life, several

pioneers emerged to cultivate a new Islamic polity that romanticized

the vision of the Khalifah, a period when a Muslim ruler governed the

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Islamic world.5 Bin Laden borrowed the caliphate ideal as the solution

for Muslims living under Western governments and legal codes; he used

this term to appeal to a disenfranchised Muslim population, searching

to reestablish their historic identity within the modern sociopolitical

context in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

The Islamic world is inherently diverse, divided by cultural,

ethnic, linguistic, as well as separate sociopolitical histories and trajec-

tories of intellectual development. Ignoring the reality on the ground

that no two Muslim countries are alike, bin Laden has oversimplified the

struggle of Islam with the West by assuming that Muslims worldwide

will rally to his cause.6 Manipulating the theme of Muslim “unity,” bin

Laden calls on Muslims to accept violence as the only course of action

for a quixotic return to the Khalifah. Indeed, when he referred to return-

ing 80 years to restore the caliphate, he was referring to the abolition

of the caliphate by Mustafa Ataturk , the founder of the modern state of

Turkey, who ended Muslim rule in the Ottoman empire in 1924.

Although Islamic history had identified extremists, contempo-

rary Muslim scholars have failed to provide a clear and precise defini-

tion of extremism. They simply know it when they see it. Therefore,

the Muslim world today relies on different scholars to determine who is

and is not an extremist, leaving the door open for debate and a perpet-

ual clash of words and perceptions. Other Muslim scholars offer an

alternative view. Contemporary experts in Islam claim that extremists

mirror the traditional and distorted practices of the Muslims during the

period before Islam was revealed, known as Ayyam al-Jahiliyah (The Days

of Ignorance).7 This term is synonymous with the concepts of disbelief,

polytheism, backwardness, and ignorance. By being “ignorant” about

the “true” Islam, the Muslim community was partitioned, leading to

war and intracommunal conflict in the name of jihad.

Indeed, a singular event in the evolution of radical Islam was

the creative revision of the concept of the term al-Jahiliya by Sayyid

Qutb, who in the 1960s radically critiqued Nasser’s Egypt in his two

important books, In the Shadow of the Quran and Signposts. As Gilles Kepel

observes in Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam, it was Qutb who applied the

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term al-Jahiliya not just to the period preceding the birth of Islam but

also to the present. This revolutionary concept in turn was drawn from

Mawlana Mawdudi, a Pakistani Muslim who “laid the cultural founda-

tion for a future Islamic republic, defined in opposition to the Muslim

nationalism that led to the birth of Pakistan in 1947 (Kepel, 2002:

32-33). Criticizing the Egyptian regime, Qutb in effect declared that

self-styled Islamic societies that did not conduct their affairs strictly

according to the Quran were not authentically Islamic, and were guilty

of jahiliya. The true Muslim should break with the surrounding jahiliya,

for contemporary so-called Muslim societies were, in effect, afflicted

by barbarism and ignorance (Kepel, 1994: 19-20). Before he was

executed by the Nasser regime in `1965, Muslim Brotherhood leader

Qutb declared “there was a war to be waged in the name of Islam”

(Taheri, 1987: 34).

Following in this tradition, Egyptian writer Abd al-Salam Faraj

played a major role in developing the ideological arguments underly-

ing Islamic extremism. In his important book, Al-Faridah al-Gha’ibah

(The Neglected Duty), he argues that jihad had become a “neglected

duty” among contemporary Muslims. It was influential in the 1980s

among the youthful generation in particular, which it stimulated to

enter extremist groups. The struggle, according to Faraj, is not just for

personal devotion but is also against the enemies of Islam; he elevated

the importance of warfare in defense of Islam. Those who participated

in this righteous struggle would be rewarded by being elevated to the

highest levels of paradise. This struggle must continue until Islam

prevailed over the entire world.

Faraj both denounced Egyptian President Anwar Sadat’s regime

and called for violence in overthrowing it. Implicated in the assassina-

tion of Sadat, he was executed in 1982. Ayman al-Zawahiri, a founder of

the Egyptian Jihad, and subsequently cofounder with Osama bin Laden

of Al Qaeda, was deeply influenced by the preaching of Faraj, although

he warned against the assassination of Sadat.

Also strongly influenced by Sayyid Qutb was Abdallah Azzam,

the radical Wahabi Islamist whose most famous writing, In Defense of

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Muslim Lands, became the basis for the defense of Afghanistan against

the godless Soviet invasion. Azzam was Osama bin Laden’s mentor

during his university years and inspired him to recruit the so-called

Afghan Arabs in defense of Afghanistan, the event which played

a seminal role in producing bin Laden’s destructive charismatic

leadership.

Qutb, Faraj, and Azzam, all radical Sunni Muslims, were impor-

tant forbears of bin Laden, Zawahiri, and Al Qaeda. At the same time,

radical Shia theologians were sketching the basis for defensive jihad as

well. Notable was Ayatollah Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah, the

spiritual mentor of Hezbollah, whose ingenious reinterpretation of the

Quran provided the basis for suicide in the service of jihad, despite the

prohibition against suicide, which is quite explicit in the Quran. Indeed,

Muslim scholars have emphasized that anyone who commits suicide in

the name of Islam is a kafir (disbeliever). Moreover, mainstream schol-

ars have emphasized that Muslims are encouraged to establish peace on

earth rather than resolve disputes through war/violence. But Fadlallah

creatively revised this bedrock foundation. “Borne aloft on a wind of

words, he (Fadlallahj) made himself the voice of Hezbollah’s conscience

and its spokesman to the world” (Kramer, 1997: 84).

In order to counter the strict prohibition against suicide,

Fadlallah ingeniously equated death as a suicide bomber

with soldiers entering battle in which they knew that they

would die, arguing there was no moral distinction, and

that the only difference was the time of death. He used this

moral logic to justify suicide bombings by Shi’a forces as

actions justified by oppression and the military asymmet-

ric nature of the war against Israel: “If an oppressed people

does not have the means to confront the United States and

Israel with the weapons in which they are superior, then

they possess unfamiliar weapons. . . . Oppression makes

the oppressed discover new weapons and new strengths

every day” (Kramer, 1998: 131-157).

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Fadlallah’s moral logic aimed to legitimize suicide attacks.

Fadlallah went on to observe that the practices of suicide, assassina-

tion, and hostage taking were extremes that, in ordinary times were

prohibited by the Quran, and should only be carried out in excep-

tional times. But these were exceptional times. This also became

the justification for the practice of kidnapping, even though the

Quran specifically calls for hospitality toward strangers. Fadlallah

confronted this at the time of the wave of kidnapping in 1982 of

37 American and Western hostages. Fadlallah’s followers used the

exceptional circumstances of the times to justify overriding the strict

proscription of the Quran: “Just as freedom is demanded for a hand-

ful of Europeans, it is also demanded for the millions of Muslims”

(Kramer, 1998) . This “exceptional times” justification for violating

what is ordinarily proscribed in the Quran is extremely important in

considering how the reframing of suicide terrorism into martyrdom

operations occurred, and became the justification for violating the

strict proscription against suicide.

At different times in Islamic history, jihad as defensive warfare

was pursued vigorously, resulting in a gross proliferation of fitna.

Muslims initiated war with one another based on their separate ethnic-

ities, cultural traditions, belief systems, sects, and distinct political

movements. How jihad transforms society and constitutes a symbolic

expression of political interests can be a useful way of studying the

Islamic renewal in its attempt to reproduce the ideal of the umma, but

these wars also demonstrate the historical fallacies of Muslim leaders

who distort their interpretation of the Quran and Islamic history in

order to sustain conflict based on their human emotions and religious

fervor.

Justifying Suicide

Today, the debate among the ulama (Islamic scholars) on the permissibil-

ity of suicide continues to divide the Muslim world; some view suicide

as a legitimate tactic while others contend that is illegitimate on the

basis that it was never employed by the Prophet of Islam, and therefore,

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suicide is haram (forbidden). Many scholars argue that suicide is one of

the major sins in Islam that annuls one’s faith (Abularub, 2002: 209-11)

and those well versed in religious text often cite the Quranic verse, Al Maeda, that clearly rebukes those who kill: “He who kills anyone not in

retaliation for murder or to spread mischief in the land, it would be as

if he killed all of mankind, and if anyone saved a life, it would be as if

he saved the life of the whole people” (Kramer, 1998: 144). The prohibi-

tions against suicide are unambiguous.

And do not kill yourself, for God is merciful to you.

Whoever kills himself with an iron weapon, then the iron

weapon will remain in his hand and he will continually

stab himself in the belly with it in the fire of hell eternally,

forever and ever; whoever kills himself by drinking poison

will eternally drink poison in the hellfire, and whoever

kills himself by falling off a mountain will fall forever in

the fire of hell.

There is a famous hadith (oral traditions) prohibiting suicide. The

Prophet said to a man who wanted to sever his hand because he was

badly wounded in a battle: “the gates of Paradise will be closed to you

forever if you take your own life.” Or put another way, “I forbid Paradise

for him” (the man who cut his hand). These come from Imam Bukhari

(5333) and Imam Muslim (158), two well-known and highly regarded

and respected hadith collectors in Islam. Thus Fadlallah transformed

and reframed the forbidden act of suicide into the honorable, indeed

sacred act of martyrdom.

The Hezbollah suicide bombings of the American and French

embassies in Lebanon in late 1982 and of the US Marine barracks in

Beirut in 1983 transformed the Middle East and the United States role

as honest broker. These actions led to the withdrawal of the US peace-

keeping force in Lebanon. It was Fadlallah who provided the theologi-

cal justification for these extreme actions in the exceptional times.

Fadlallah’s religious justification and the consequent actions are said

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to have served as inspiration and to have been a model for Ayatollah

Ruhollah Khomeini in Iran.

That the issue remains open to interpretation by various Muslim

clerics and terrorist organizations leaves the question unanswered.

Most mainstream Islamic theologians reject the use of suicide as an

appropriate response to state-sponsored or group-initiated violence.

Other clerics are less clear about their position regarding suicide.

The debate over the moral, religious, and practical justifica-

tion for suicide in Iraq can be seen in the framework of four influ-

ential ideologues, “each representing four successive stages.” They

include Abdallah Azzam, Ayman al-Zawahiri, Sheikh Abu Muhammad

al-Maqdesi, and Sheikh Yousef al-Ayiri (Paz, 2005: 40-41). Before discuss-

ing in detail the core ideas of the “second” or “third generation” of

Al Qaeda’s key thinkers, several observations are in order. First, as

indicated earlier, clerics legitimizing the use of suicide operations do

not call it “suicide.” According to Doha-based Shaykh Yusuf Qaradawi,

suicide is a Western term and does not apply to the Muslim context.

He says suicide is “incorrect and misleading,” and prefers the term

“heroic operations of martyrdom.” In an interview with an Egyptian

newspaper, Qaradawi provided his ruling on suicide by identifying it

as a “weapon of the weak”—an argument often used by other militant

groups. His fatwa subscribes to jihad as an individual duty (jihad fard), “as when the enemy seizes the Muslim territory” (Qaradawi, n.d.).

Before Qaradawi’s fatwa, the Afghan veteran mujahideen coordina-

tor, Abdallah Azzam, empowered Muslims by declaring jihad as a duty

for all members of society, including women, in his book, Defense of Muslim Lands.8

Second, the term “suicide” minimizes the heroic acts of the

martyr. After the 9/11 attacks, several Muslim scholars revisited the

concepts of martrydom and jihad in an effort to explain to Western

audiences (and indirectly, the Muslim world) the roots of suicide as

martyrdom. Most scholars reaffirm the rationality of self-sacrifice,

discounting terrorist attacks as legitimate or rational. While it should

be noted that the cult of martyrdom is a Shiite phenomenon (that is, the

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guilt over the loss of martrys including Imam Hussein and his father,

Ali), this concept had religious justification. For example, Shiites reject

that at no time in their history has the use of martyrdom operations

been employed against civilians, not even during the Iranian revolution

(Kermani, 2002). Thus, the use of suicide to justify martrydom attacks is

largely a trend among Sunni-based extremist organizations, including

Al Qaeda and the Taliban.

Third, “suicide” is neither self-sacrifice nor self-immolation,

which are defining characteristics of martyrdom. Shias and Sunnis

agree on this point, and share common sentiments about the mean-

ing and purpose of shahadat. As described by one Shia scholar, martyr-

dom has two essential elements: “life is sacrificed for a cause [and] the

sacrifice is made consciously”; this sacrifice can be achieved through

a law in Islam that is called jihad (Mutahhari, 1986: 128-129). The

longing for martyrdom is reflected in both Sunni and Shia literature,

although Shias desire martyrdom because of their loyalty to Shia-

specific martyrs, such as Imam Ali and his son, Hussein. For exam-

ple, according to one hadith, “We always have Imam Ali’s name on

our lips, and claim to be devoted to him. . . . True Shi’aism requires

us to follow in his footsteps, too.” To be killed in “God’s way” is a

strong desire in Shia tradition. During the month of Ramadan, it is

noted that Shias pray for martyrdom, not only for God’s pleasure but

to be among the early Muslims who achieved shahadat (Mutahhari,

1986: 132).

For Shias, the longing for shahadat does not equal death. Rather,

martyrdom is seen through the prism of life and to remain in the pres-

ent. According to Ali Shari’ati, a shahid

signifies one who is present, an overlooker, an observer, a

witness and one who bears witness. It also means the truth-

ful and honest informant, and it also means conscience. It

is what is sensed and seen, the one toward whom all eyes

are directed, and last but not least, it means pattern, exem-

plar, model (Shari’ati, 1986: 193).

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He further states that the act of martyrdom is not a bloody or destruc-

tive event, but a positive outcome of those who have sacrificed.

Because it is not seen as a tragic event, the shahadat choose death will-

ingly; it is a decision made “with all their awareness, logic, reasoning,

intelligence, understanding, consciousness and alertness” (Shari’ati,

1986: 194).

Shia doctrine on martyrdom derives from the martyrdom of Imam

Hussein or Ali, and is shaped through that prism. The Sunni school of

thought on martyrdom is not so constrained and differs. For Sunnis,

the expression of jihad and martyrdom emerges with a straightforward

emotional force, supported by religious verses and glorious oral tradi-

tions of early martyrs (known as the Companions of the Prophet). Thus,

Sunnis express blanket adulation of Islam’s prophet and his company of

martyrs, regarded as the first champions of their faith, which includes

Imams Ali and Hussein but is not limited to these two trailblazers of the

Islamic movement.

NARRATING THE MARTYRS’ PATH TO GLORY

Terrorists and insurgents’ use of narratives to reach local and global

audiences is often set in romantic-revolutionary terms. Viewed as neces-

sary for survival, these narratives enable those waiting to be martyred

to fulfill their vision. For example, in the ninth issue of the Al Qaeda

in Iraq publication entitled “From the Biographies of the Prominent

Martyrs,” the author, Abu Ismail al-Muhagir, recounts the story of a

Saudi Arabian who heeds the call of Muslim scholars to join the jihad in

Iraq (SITE, 2006). According to the story, Muhagir describes a wounded

jihadi as “the coming of the martyr to the field of jihad and his demise.

He is one of those who did little but was greatly rewarded.”

There are countless other stories like this that feature the

martyr’s will to seize power through the old-fashioned way of self-

immolation or guerrilla warfare. Not every martyr dies through the

use of suicide attacks, even though it is the preferred tactic of choice

for Al Qaeda and its affiliates. How martyrdom is expressed is increas-

ingly visible through terrorists’ media outlets, including videos, state-

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ments, and online chatter. According to Sherifa Zuhur, a video by Al

Qaeda obtained in Falluja “is a superb recruiting tool that critiques the

West, documents and ritualizes martyrdom, [and] demonstrates the

pan-Muslim membership of the organization” by featuring religious

quotations while depicting “nontraditional ‘religious’ music, borrow-

ing from the Eastern/Arab church and Western traditions” (Zuhur,

2005). Videos and the conscious use of communication networks offer

insurgents a rich platform to broadcast tactical successes, operational

targets, and current (and future) intentions for winning the war against

the West. That these narratives are central to the insurgents’ persua-

sion and propaganda campaign is evident in their statements, in which

arguments based on rigid interpretations of Islamic doctrine are used

to justify violent operations to force a quick withdrawal of coalition

forces.

Second, narratives often reflect people’s experiences (both lived

and imagined), observations, cultural traits, established norms, and

layers of identities that can include religious affiliation, beliefs, and

can be enforced by short- and long-term interactions with like-minded

individuals. For insurgents and terrorists, one of the more consistent

narratives has been their rage against the West and apostate Muslim

governments. Apathy expressed at the secular and Western world

offers a spiritual platform from which insurgents draw their values,

vision, and volume of fellowship. Drawing on their cliques and a dedi-

cation to self-sacrifice, the insurgents have effectively propagated the

idea that Muslims have been excluded and unjustly treated by exter-

nal actors; the insurgents’ ability to refer to past crimes committed

against them aggravates the tensions they have with foreigners and

their own local government. By responding to both local and global

grievances, insurgencies today are evolving networks (Hammes,

2006).

Third, all politics is not local. Today, local insurgents increas-

ingly appeal to global audience(s) to further spread their propaganda,

mobilize support for their cause, strengthen recruitment, and work

to aggressively weaken the adversaries’ counterinsurgency campaign.

.


The insurgents’ message resonates with segments of the Muslim popu-

lation—both local and global communities—because it echoes the

message revealed earlier by well-known Islamic scholars and revolu-

tionaries in the Muslim world. For decades, scholars and learned imams

have called Muslims to return to Islam to achieve salvation at the indi-

vidual, societal, and global level.9

Fourth, information is power. The spread of narratives is in part

“how people get their news” and ways in which people understand the

information they receive. Information from political elites likely differs

from that provided by the insurgents intent on eliminating any form

of state-society synergy or engagement. It is equally important to know

who transmits information (an Islamic cleric online issuing a fatwa, a

jihadi on a password-protected al Qaeda-affiliated website, a US-backed

media outlet such as Al Hurra television, and mainstream Arab news

centers, such as Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiyya.10 In a battle for public

support, both the state and insurgency compete for power with the

premise that they are capable and willing to fundamentally improve

people’s lives.

Finally, a growing concentration of communication power in

a handful of insurgents enables them to develop central “myths” or

messages tailored to the needs and concerns of local populations. With

global computer communication systems, insurgents exploit the abil-

ity to convey, convince, and draw others into their political programs,

organizations, or social groupings. The insurgents’ seductive power to

link mythology with perceived reality deepens the meaning of their

messages and serves as an instrument for Islamic social and political

change. How the state, local government, or community leaders can

counter the insurgents’ adventurism in technology—mixed media,

computer-generated images, and print media—will depend on the

government’s ability to develop variations on the themes and myths to

which the insurgents give meaning.11 The importance of these narra-

tives helps to shape the insurgents discourse as well as emphasize

“operational and ideological cohesion” (Hammes, 2005). The use of

common messages and symbols, often taken from an earlier Islamic

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period but transformed to suit the present situation, are intended to

enhance the political legitimacy of local terror groups, while poten-

tially increasing their credibility with external Muslim audiences for

broader sympathy, support, and recognition. With a case study of insur-

gents in Iraq, the different powerfully emotive themes that shape the

narrative, with theological backing from former and current Islamic

ideologues, amplifies the terrorists’ decision for self-sacrifice (that is,

martyrdom).

PERCEPTIONS OF THE IRAQ WAR

The interest in waging jihad in Iraq has by far generated the greatest

amount of interest among jihadis, insurgents, and Islamic thinkers.

No Salafi-Jihadi ideologue, polemicist, or strategic thinker has denied

the importance of the Iraqi jihad, but the disagreement among them

has been centered on the legitimacy of the war, who should partici-

pate (local Iraqis versus foreigners), the possible negative impact

of internal strife or fitna, and the legitimacy of Salafi cooperation

with other groups, such as the Shia, Baathist, and Sufi resistance

elements.

The debate concerning the Iraq war has its roots in the first Gulf

War, when the United States and its partners were unwilling or unable

to oust Saddam Hussein from power. While the conditions for war were

different then, Iraq today is the most important battle for Al Qaeda and

its followers. Winning in Iraq is thus non-negotiable for the Salafi-Jihadi

community.

Even before the start of the Iraq war in March 2003, Al Qaeda and

other strategic thinkers had highlighted the significance of the Iraq

conflict for the Islamic world (Hegghammer, 2006: 18). Referencing Bin

Laden, the now deceased Al Qaeda leader in Iraq, Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi

said the war in Iraq “is a new Crusader campaign against the Islamic

world and it is a decisive war.” The statement implied that the destruc-

tion of American forces in Iraq is the first step to spreading Islam to

the rest of the Arabian Peninsula until “the path of Muhammad [is

extended] from Mecca to the Aqsa Mosque,” a religious center of historic

.


and symbolic importance to both Shi’a and Sunni Muslims (Zarqawi,

2006).

As early as fall 2002, leading ideologues published articles online

and in jihadi magazines and on the Internet in which they articulated

the need to liberate Iraq. Salafi-Jihadi scholars such as Hamed al-Ali

offered the first long strategic analyses emphasizing the US campaign

in Iraq. As the war continued, more texts proliferated online and in

Saudi-based jihadi journals, such as Majallat al-Ansar. The abundance of

texts, statements, and overall support for the Iraq war seemed unparal-

leled in the twenty-first century.

Moreover, several events, such as the electoral victory in the

Palestinian Authority of the militant Palestinian group Hamas in early

2006, and other debates regarding political participation in the Middle East,

have drawn attention to Iraq. Western scholars recognize the importance

of Iraq in Al Qaeda’s global war to defeat perceived Western intervention

in a country that should be ruled by Islamic law. Victory in Iraq is central

to the extremists’ overall agenda to win the ideological battle against the

West and to resolve the debate between Islam and Westminister-style

democracy. Couched in these terms, jihadis view Iraq as part of a larger

global conflict with democracy, nationalism, Westernization—all the

forces that constitute apostasy and disbelief. Therefore, winning the Iraq

war is equally important to Al Qaeda as it is for Washington.

WHY IRAQ?

From March 2003 to February 2006, one terror scholar noted that there

were 443 suicide attacks in Iraq (Hafez, 2006). With rising numbers of

suicide bombers, Iraq is projected as the new jihad from which martyrs

are readily available, willing, and able to damage civil society and

disrupt government’s efforts to quell the violence.

While scholars and strategists agree on the importance of jihad,

they differ on who should participate in the various conflicts in the

Muslim world today. The debate over which jihad takes precedence is

largely in reaction to the Iraq conflict and the participation of foreign

fighters subordinate to local Sunni militias or Al Qaeda’s leadership in

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Iraq. Ideologues and terrorist leaders backing the Iraq war offer several

arguments as to why Iraq is the new battlefront in the global jihad.

According to a Syrian Salafi-Jihadi known as Abu Mus’ab al-Suri, “a

historical new period began” for the Islamic revival when the United

States occupied Iraq in 2003 (al-Suri, 2004).

In an interview with Al Qaeda’s As-Sahab production, Al Qaeda’s

second in command, Ayman al-Zawahiri, reinforces jihad in two

regions: the gulf, from which he believes the West will be defeated in

Iraq, and Israel. Zawahari and others continue to highlight the prospect

for victory in jihad, indicating that success in Iraq will enable jihadis

to focus on jihad elsewhere, such as Europe. Iraq therefore represents

Al Qaeda’s pursuit of restoring Islam on earth through support for a

caliphate.

In their work, pro-Iraqi ideologues highlight three themes:

Iraq is the “best example today of Muslim suffering at the hands of

Americans”; the war is a “strategic crossroads in the overall struggle

between Muslims and the Crusaders”; and the price and prospect for

victory is higher than it has been in any other conflict, except perhaps

during the Afghan jihad in the 1980s (Hegghammer, 2006: 22-23).

Despite his death a year before the second Gulf War, Saudi ideo-

logue Yusuf al-Ayiri became a leading architect of the Iraq jihad, author-

ing about 40 books and many articles in Arabic on the doctrine of

jihad.12 Al-Ayiri’s influential work concerning Iraq include The Crusader War on Iraq and a book published in August 2003 entitled The Future of Iraq and the Peninsula after the Fall of Baghdad, in which he focuses on

both the past and the future of the region in light of “US Occupation

of Iraq” (al-Ayiri, 2003).13 Al-Ayiri claims Iraq will be transformed into a

secular, democratic state, which he and others have rejected as systems

of jahiliyyah. According to al-Ayiri, as noted in The Crusader War Against Iraq, fighting and victory in Iraq are critical to winning against future

aggressors.

Similarly, the Jordanian-Palestinian cleric and Zarqawi’s spiritual

mentor, Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, published the Tawhid wal-Jihad, a

doctrine that has inspired the Islamist movement in and outside Iraq.14

.


According to al-Maqdisi, the Islamic awakening today is the “blazing

fire in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Palestine” (al-Maqdisi, n.d.).15 Influenced

by Juhaiman bin Muhammed al-‘Uteibi, who took control of the

Grand Mosque in Mecca in November 1979, Maqdisi cites Bin Laden’s

and Zawahiri’s support for what he claims is a patent victory in Iraq

(Teitelbaum, 2000). However, al-Zarqawi strongly rebukes Maqdisi for

calling the Iraq jihad a “furnace” and tells him, “You should have waited

until you got a more accurate sense of the reality we live with here,

then you could choose whichever theological avenues you would like

to advise [us] on.” His statement to Maqdisi is an attack on the scholar’s

ignorance of Zarqawi’s reality (Kazimi, 2005: 68).

In contrast, clerics opposed to the Iraq war have raised concerns

with the tactics used by both the Shia and Sunni groups, such as behead-

ings, kidnappings, and the killing of innocent Muslims (Shia, Sunni,

Baathist, or Sufi). The ongoing battles between the Shias and Sunnis

have caused intense fitna that could further deepen the current schism

between them, making reconciliation a hopeless wish. The hostil-

ity between the Shia and Sunni, in particular, is intended to diminish

Washington’s hopes of stability in Iraq. More important, the murder of

both Shias and Sunnis has unleashed a drama of ancient rage, awakened

years of internal biases and suffering, and produced a cult of believers

ready to brand the other as rafidis, or rejecters of truth.16 For example,

Saudi Sheikh Abd al-Muhsin Al-‘Abikan, an adviser to the Saudi Justice

Ministry and member of the Saudi Shura Council, has rejected the Iraq

war and opposed religious scholars who claim that the Iraq war is a

legitimate jihad. In a May 2005 interview in a Saudi daily, he said there

was “no jihad” in Iraq and dismissed the claim by jihadis that the Iraq

war was legitimate according to Islamic religious law (MEMRI, 2005).

He also called scholars supporting the Iraq war “dissenters and sinners”

who should stand trial for the fatwas they have produced to back Iraqi

militias.17 In Iraq, top religious leaders also strongly condemned the

use of bombings against civilians, calling it un-Islamic, including Grand

Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, who called the attacks against Iraqi religious

sites as “hideous crimes.”

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Defining Iraq as Legitimate Resistance

Supporting the idea of Iraq as muqawama or resistance is a Kuwaiti-based

cleric, Hamid al-Ali, “the most visible and prolific theologian on the

Iraq question” (Hegghammer, 2006: 19).18 Ali has written over 20 fatwas and other texts endorsing the Sunni insurgency in Iraq and its tactics

against the Shia. He states that there are two campaigns in Iraq: the

first under the banner of the Crusaders and the rafida (Shiites) and the

second is under the banner of muqawama; he believes the mujahideen

are at the forefronts of this campaign and includes anyone who wants

to repel the Crusader forces in the maslaha (interest) of the umma.19 Ali’s

work includes “Takfiris and the Creation of Fitna in Iraq,” “Responses to

Those Who Forbid Jihad in Iraq,” and “A Statement from Sheikh Hamed

al-Ali Warning of the Implementation of Iran’s Designs in Iraq and

Upon the Sunni Muslim People.”20 Ali’s work is vehemently anti-Shia

and warns Sunnis of Iranian interference in local Iraqi politics.21

Like Ali, Qaradawi uses the term “resistance” to refer to the Iraq

war. In a statement from November 2004, he says Muslims must support

the “valiant Iraqi Resistance” and calls for spiritual and financial backing

(Qaradawi, “Shaykh,” 2006). Before the war, Qaradawi in late 2002 declared

that no Muslim country was to assist the Security Council in attacking Iraq

because “Muslim scholars [considered support for] the American campaign

on Iraq [as] haram,” or forbidden (Qaradawi, “Attacking Iraq,” n.d.).

Conversely, Bin Laden’s former Saudi mufti, Musa al-Qarni, in a

March 2006 interview on Dubai TV, announced his support for the Iraq

jihad. He said, “I think fighting the Americans on the land of Iraq is

jihad, and that Americans are aggressors. . . . Iraq constitutes a legiti-

mate and obligatory defense” (al-Qarni, 2006). Other Saudi-based clerics

such as Salman al-‘Awda also supported driving the Americans from

Iraq but do not advocate the participation of Saudi youth.22

MARTYRDOM OPERATIONS IN THE PALESTINIAN

CONTEXT

An Israeli professor of Islamic and Middle Eastern history at Hebrew

University, Raphael Israeli, believes that “suicide bomber” is a misno-

.


mer and a Western label that implies a “disposition toward madness.”

Instead, an Islamic frame of reference needs to be adopted in order

to understand the “unparalleled mode of self-sacrifice” (Israeli,

2005: 36).

A Hamas suicide bomb commander interviewed in an Israeli

prison became quite exercised when asked how he could justify suicide

bombing as being in the service of Allah when the Quran specifically

prohibits suicide. He replied, angrily, “This is not suicide. Suicide is

weak, it is selfish, it is mentally disturbed. This is istishhad (martyrdom or

self sacrifice in the service of Allah.)” Hassan Salame, assuredly the most

notorious suicide bomb commander in the history of the Palestinian-

Israeli conflict who is now serving 46 consecutive life sentences in an

Israeli prison, asked the same question, replied: “A martyrdom opera-

tion bombing is the highest level of jihad, and highlights the depth

of our faith. The bombers are holy fighters who carry out one of the

more important articles of faith.” According to another suicide bomb

commander, “It is martyrdom attacks which earn the most respect and

elevate the bombers to the highest possible level of martyrdom” (Post,

Sprinzak, and Denny, 2003: 171-184).

Mohammad Hafez, in his important book, Manufacuring Human Bombs, emphasizes the theme of redemption and concern for the

Palestinian people, which regularly appear in bombers’ last wills and

testaments as well as in interviews with potential suicide bombers.

“Suicide bombing is not only an opportunity to punish an enemy

and fulfill God’s command to fight injustice but also a privilege and

a reward to those most committed to their faith and their values. To

be selected for ‘martyrdom operations’ is akin to receiving a stamp of

approval or a certificate of accomplishment from one’s peers. It is a

form of endorsement of one’s moral character and dedication” (Hafez,

2006: 44).

Another theme that Hafez stresses is helping the Palestinian

people. That is reflected in quotes from interviews with failed female

suicide bombers conducted by Nicole Argo, whose interviews have also

enriched terrorism scholarship. According to one would-be bomber, “I

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638 social research

did this because of the suffering of the Palestinian people. The falling of

shuhada [those martyred by Israeli forces] . . . and the destruction every-

where in Palestine. . . . I did this for God and the Palestinian people.”

Another said, “I believe the operation the operation would hurt the

enemy. . . . Also [a] successful mission greatly influences society. It raises

the morale of the people; they are happy, they feel strong” (Quoted in

Hafez, 2006: 50).

The extremity of their situation required acts of martyrdom,

which is a value deep within the society. Hafez stresses there are three

factors that seem to be necessary for a campaign of suicide terror-

ism: a culture of martyrdom, an organizational decision to employ

this tactic, and a willing supply of volunteers. He also points out that

there are actually three proscriptions in the Quran that these acts

violate—not only the prohibition against suicide, but also the prohibi-

tion against killing innocents as well as the prohibition against killing

Muslims.

In the Palestinian territories, they have been set on this course

early in life. On radical Islamist websites, there are pictures of infants

with toy suicide bomb belts, of a girl no more than two and a half years

old with a diamond earring, holding a hand grenade. In the mosques,

sermons celebrate the glory of the shahids. Friday sermons aired on

Palestinian Authority television (PATV) in the summer of 2001 by

Muhammad Ibrahim Madi are instructive. One stated: “Shame upon he

who does not educate his children of Jihad. . . . Blessings upon he who

dons a vest of explosives on himself or his children and goes into the

midst of the Jews and says: Allah Akbar [God is Great].”

A few months later, Madi recounted a conversation he had with

a 14-year-old boy who wanted to blow himself up and kill Jews. His

sermon was broadcast, on PATV, August 3, 2001:

I was uplifted when a youth said: “Oh, Sheikh, I am 14 years

old. I have more than 4 years and then I will blow myself

up among Allah’s enemies, I will blow myself up among

the Jews.” I said to him, “Oh young child, may Allah let you

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merit Shahada and let me merit Shahada.” All the weapons must be aimed at the Jews, Allah’s

enemies, the cursed nation in the Quran, whom Allah

describes as monkeys and pigs, worshippers of the calf

and idol worshippers. . . . Nothing will deter them except

the color of blood in their filthy nation . . . unless we blow

ourselves up, willing and as our duty, in their midst (Madi,

2001).

In interviews with incarcerated Palestinian terrorists, almost

all indicated they first heard of the manner in which their parents’

property had been taken in the mosque, and were set early on the

path of terrorism and martyrdom. The signs on the walls of the

Hamas-run kindergartens read: “The children of the kindergarten are

the shahids of tomorrow.” This theme is incorporated into all levels of

school. At an Islamic school in Gaza City run by Hamas, an 11-year-old

student states: “I will make my body a bomb that will blast the flesh

of Zionists, the sons of pigs and monkeys. . . . I will tear their bodies

into little pieces and cause them more pain than they will ever know”

(Kelley, 2001).

According to the June 26, 2001, USA Today article that reported

the episode, the boy’s classmates responded Allah akbar. The teacher,

demonstrating that the entire system is deeply involved, yelled, “May

the virgins give you pleasure,” referring to one of the rewards awaiting

martyrs in paradise, while the principal smiled and nodded his approval.

The value of martyrdom continues to be emphasized throughout

students’ education, continuing into university. Signs in the classroom

at Al-Najah University in the West Bank and at Gaza’s Islamic University

state that “Israel had nuclear bombs. We have human bombs” (Kelley,

2001). The theme of the high status of martyrs is found throughout

Palestinian society.

Mia Bloom has played an important role in interviewing suicide

bombers and their trainers. In her book, Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terror, she quotes one trainer, Munir al-Makdah, as saying, “Jihad and

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640 social research

the resistance begin with the word, then with the sword, then with the

stone, then with the gun, then with planting bombs, and then trans-

forming bodies into human bombs” (Bloom, 2006: 47).

Writing in the Palestinian-Israeli Journal, Iyad Sarraj has tried to explain

the desperation that has driven the Palestinian people to such extremes:

The Palestinians have been driven to a state of hopelessness

and despair, the kind of despair that comes from a situation

that keeps getting worse, a despair where living becomes no

different from dying. Desperation is a very powerful force—

it is not only negative, but it can propel people to actions or

solutions that would have previously been unthinkable. . . .

The rapid Israeli military deployment and its immediate

shoot-to-kill policy have deepened the sense of victimiza-

tion, helplessness and exposure of the Palestinian masses. . . .

Suicide bombing is an act of ultimate despair, a horrific

reaction to extremely inhuman conditions in a seriously

damaged environment of hopelessness. Suicide bombing is

the ultimate cry for help (Sarraj, 2003).

An art history student explained why she was preparing for a

suicide bombing: “At the moment of executing my mission, it will not

be purely to kill Israelis, the killing is not my ultimate goal. . . . My act

will carry a message beyond to those responsible and the world at large

that the ugliest thing for a human being is to be forced to live without

freedom” (Sarraj, 2003: 36).

As to how they justify killing civilians, Hisham Ahmed quotes

two Palestinian interview subjects:

If it is considered moral and justifiable for the Israeli army

to kill over 19 Palestinian civilians, including many chil-

dren, and destroy houses on top of their heads just to kill a

wanted Palestinian activist, why is it not OK for Palestinians

to go after settlers and soldiers while other Israelis stay

AliPost.indd 640AliPost.indd 640 6/24/08 10:11:25 AM6/24/08 10:11:25 AM


indifferent as we are getting slaughtered on a daily basis?

We do not have highly advanced weaponry with which to

face a regular army. All we are in control of are our bodies.

We do not like or want to die. But if this is what it takes to

terrorize them as they brutalize us all the time, why not do

it (Ahmed, 2005).

MARTYRS IN SECULAR / NATIONALIST GROUPS23

Similar to insurgents in the Iraq war, secular/nationalist terrorist groups

have employed martyrdom to achieve their objectives. The tactic of

suicide terrorism, which began in Lebanon with the 1983 Hezbollah

attacks on the US and French embassies and the US Marine barracks,

has spread to other countries (Speckhard, 2005). Active implementers of

this technique are three nationalist-separatist groups—the Tamil Tigers

of Tamil Eelam in Sri Lanka (LTTE), who perfected the suicide belt; the

Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in Turkey; and the Chechen separatists

in Russia. For these groups the tactic is not justified by appealing to a

reframing of the Quran.

How can youth who willingly give their lives for the cause be

explained when it is not justified on religious grounds? A feature in

common among these three quite diverse movements is the presence

of a charismatic leader–follower relationship, so that the leader of the

cause is ascribed godlike status and the cause itself is treated as a matter

of faith (Post, 2007: 235). In the desperate situations of the Kurdish

people and for the Tamils, devoting oneself entirely to the cause and

being a follower of Abdullah Ocalan of the PKK or Prabhakaran of the

LTTE or Shamil Basayev of the Chechen separatists becomes the domi-

nant identification for the members, transcending their individuality,

so that if the leader decrees that this act will advance the cause, the

young member willingly follows this directive.

Even after the apparent compromise of his career-long goals

following his capture, PKK leader Ocalan, who had been seen as the

very embodiment of the Kurdish cause, retained for some his godlike

heroic stature. A 14-year-old Kurdish girl, Nejla Coskun, set herself on

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642 social research

fire in central London protesting Ocalan’s arrest in February 1999. The

image in the story by Nik Fleming of the Guardian is vivid: “With flames

leaping from her back and shoulders, she dashed through a crowd of

startled demonstrators in central London. As the fire melted the skin

on her neck and her hair began to burn, she clenched her teeth and ran

faster, stretching out her arms, her hands curled into defiant victory

symbols” (Fleming, 2002).

Interviewed three years later, Coskun spoke without regret. “I

felt so strongly that I was willing to die,” she said. “I thought, ‘What can

I do to help change something?’” Despite her permanent deformity and

the multiple painful reconstructive surgeries she had to endure, her

resolve was undiminished. I’m glad I did it. It was worth it because Kurdish people

are dying, burning daily. Before, when I told people I was

Kurdish they did not understand. But the TV, magazines and

newspapers have done interviews and talked about the situ-

ation, and now people know who the Kurds are and what

they are fighting for. . . . I would do it again (Fleming, 2002).

Shorn of the religious justification, Coskun’s motivations and

rationalizations sound very similar to those of the Muslim suicide bomb-

ers. Bloom cites an interview with Vasantha, a young Tamil Tiger whom

she asked why he was prepared to contemplate such a drastic action.

The boy had a simple answer: “This is the most supreme sacrifice I can

make. The only way we can get our Eelam [homeland] is through arms.

That is the only way anybody will listen to us. Even if we die” (Bloom,

2005: 63) Another respondent replied, “The harassment that I and my

parents have suffered at the hands of the army makes me want to take

revenge. . . . It is a question of Tamil pride, especially after so much

sacrifice. There is no escape” (Bloom, 2005: 63).

Reminiscent of the manner in which children in the Palestinian

refugee camps idolize their heroes, the shahids, so do the Tamils. Bloom

.


observes that “young Tamils know the names of the martyrs . . . what

they have done” (Bloom, 2005: 63) Prabhakaran’s forcible personality has

already been described. Bloom cites his 1993 Black Tiger Day speech as

demonstrating the charismatic force of his leadership. Demonstrating

the powerful impact of Prabhakaran’s leadership on his followers, one

member related, “We are given moral support by our leader and we have

reached this position only because of him” (Bloom, 2005: 159). Women are disproportionately represented among LTTE suicide

bombers. For some of them, this is because they are trying to redeem

their honor. “According to Hindu faith, once a woman is raped she

cannot get married or have children. Fighting for Tamil freedom may

be the only way for such a woman to redeem herself. This idea of sacri-

fice is ingrained in Tamil culture.

Tamil mothers make great sacrifices for their sons on a

daily basis; feeding them before themselves or the girl chil-

dren, serving on them and so on. Acting as a human bomb

is an understood and accepted offering for a woman who

will never be a mother. Family members often encourage

rape victims to join the LTTE (Bloom, 2005: 160).

This is also true for the so-called Chechen black widows. There

is a deep cultural tradition within Chechen society concerning the role

of widows, whose future is bleak. By carrying out an act of violence

against the Russians responsible for their husbands’ death, they can

exact a measure of revenge as well as redemption. Anne Speckhard has

addressed the issue of societal trauma leading to a value on suicidal

terrorism not previously present:

Suicide terrorism had no place in Chechen history

but during the last two wars Chechen individuals and

Chechen society as a whole increasingly found them-

selves devastated by meaningless traumas. In response

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644 social research

to this many sought out, embraced and constructed indi-

vidually and as group ideologies that empowered, made

meanings from and expressed their pain while fighting

back against enemies much more powerful than them-

selves. Indeed the entire phenomena of suicide terror-

ism in Chechnya as in all the places it has migrated to

since its modern-day appearance in Beirut has begun as a

psycho-social phenomena in reaction to traumatic stress,

a besieged mentality, social marginalization, alienation or

other perceived or real sufferings—and in this response

some segment of society has embraced and promoted the

ideologies that breathed life into it as tactic for fighting

back (Speckhard, 2005: 3).

Speckhard observed the manner in which the act of martyrdom

released the traumatized Chechen from her psychological pain:

A Chechen respondent recalls how her cousin became

withdrawn and depressed following the killing of her

brother by Russians, but just before going on her suicide

mission this girl became euphoric, falsely announcing her

need to travel to Moscow in order to prepare for marriage.

The cousin recalls, “I believed her because she really was

very much excited in those days, and a shine appeared in

her eyes.” Indeed just as with normal suicides who have

committed to die, her depression likely lifted as she began

contemplating release from psychic pain and she uncon-

sciously activated the dissociative defense necessary to

carry it out (Speckhard, 2005: 10).

The issue of revenge for the death of a sibling or friend is regu-

larly encountered as motivation for entering the path of suicide terror-

ism in all the groups discussed.

.


SHOWING THE OTHER FACE OF ISLAM

This paper reviews the evolution and transformation of two key

concepts—jihad and martyrdom—by Muslim theoreticians, especially

Sayiid Qutb, Abd al-Salam Faraj, and Abdullah Azzam, the mentor

of Osama bin Laden. The concept of the lesser jihad, the jihad of the

sword, came to be seen as the most important form of jihad, deem-

phasizing the greater jihad—jihad of the self, known as jihad bil nafs, which specifies the duty to conduct one’s life in a moral fashion and

forbids what is wrong. Over time, the terms jihad and martyrdom were

misappropriated by terrorist leaders and their members to justify acts

of violence in the name of Islam. In doing so, the essential meaning of

jihad became distorted, and disturbed the original intent of “jihad of

the sword” or defensive jihad, which was an obligation for Muslim men

to protect Islam from invasion and its enemies. The emphasis on the

exceptional nature of the threat to Islam, propagated by Hezbollah’s

spiritual leader, Muhammad Husyan Fadlallah, paved the way for

other radical theologians to justify suicide terrorism, reframed as acts

of martyrdom, to counter perceived threats against Islam and Muslim

communities worldwide.

These reframings of jihad and of suicide as martyrdom are by no

means uncontested. Indeed the “silent majority” of moderate Muslims

continue to counter extremist ideology and supporters both publicly

and privately. That there is a continuing dispute between moderate and

extremist Islamic theologians is clear, though not always recognized.

These narratives are in active contest. But in this dispute, the extrem-

ist interpretation is given a disproportionately louder voice. Indeed,

the moderate voices seem stilled and muted by comparison. While the

contrary voice is published in Islamic scholarly journals and articulated

at national conferences, their moderating message is slow to reach

important target audiences, which include the alienated Islamic youth,

who are being exposed to an uncontested extremist narrative through

a multiplicity of channels, and the non-Muslim communities living

in the West, which in turn contributes to the rise of Islamophobia in

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646 social research

the United States and elsewhere. Without a single message to coun-

ter terrorism, the extremist voice is able to guide alienated youth,

through the Internet and social-kinship ties, to the path of terrorism

and “martyrdom operations.” What is imperative is to strengthen the

moderate voices in a manner that reaches not only impressionable

youth before they are inspired to volunteer to join the jihad but also

non-Muslim audiences in order to restore the principles of Islam based

on peace, tolerance, and mercy.

The media, a powerful tool that communicates and influences

ideas and beliefs, can serve to balance the struggle among competing

narratives. Moderate and mainstream Muslim communities can reach

a global audience through varied media outlets to counter the extrem-

ist message. Across Muslim communities, an effort to clarify Islam’s

message is already under way. Consider the multitude of emerging

voices within the Arab and Muslim media aimed to demoralize the reli-

gious terrorist. These programs have included the Egyptian play Attiya, the Terrorist Woman; the Syrian drama series, Al-Hur al-Ayn; the Jihad series

on Saudi television that features reformed jihadis; and the Terrorism in the Grip of Justice television programs launched by Iraq’s Ministry of

Interior. Through creative use of the media, these programs can play

a valuable role in de-romanticizing and discrediting insurgents in Iraq

and their use of suicide tactics, which in turn helps to inhibit terrorists’

recruitment efforts in other countries. While there is insufficient data

to confirm whether these programs are effective, they reflect a grow-

ing awareness on the part of the Muslim media of the need to show the

“other” and more human face of Islam that is anti-terror, anti-violent,

and anti-suicide.

NOTES

1. Fitna has been translated as chaos, “time of temptation,” war, and

anarchy. The word originated from the early struggles Muslims

faced after the Prophet Muhammad died in 680 AD, leaving a politi-

cal vacuum for the newly established Muslim community. After his

.


death, four caliphs were selected to lead the Islamic community,

which then soon spread across different countries to include Iraq,

Egypt, and Syria.

2. Murder by a band of soldiers is an event of great magnitude, for the

death leaves the fourth and last caliph in Islam, Ali ibn Talib, with the

burden of rooting out dissenters among the Islamic caliphate. Not

knowing the identities of the killers and their supporters, Ali opted

to maintain order by not seeking vengeance. But his efforts failed,

and his five years in power were defined by internal strife within the

Muslim community. Ali’s supporters in Kufa, however, continued to

seek retribution for his murder and remain opposed to the newly

declared Caliph Muawwiya, who moved his kingdom to Damascus,

Syria, which further removed the Muslim community from Mecca,

the birthplace of the Prophet and home to Islam’s early adherents.

3. Former theorists of Muslim law authorized the rights and duties

of the Muslim scholar to declare war against a kuffar (infidel) ruler/

people. Former Indian scholar Maulavi Chiragh Ali asserts that it is

the absolute right of the Muslims to fight in defense of Islam when it

is attacked; similar arguments have been circulated and repackaged

in the works of Abdallah Azzam, the former veteran mujahideen

coordinator of the Afghan jihad, and the writings of Yousef al-Ayiri,

a key ideologue of the Al Qaeda network in Saudi Arabia who was

killed by Saudi security forces in June 2004. For background texts on

jihad, see Jalal (2002) and Peters (1996).

4. This concept is known as jihad fard ‘ayn. In the contemporary period,

Abdullah Azzam, who was the mentor of Osama bin Laden, high-

lighted this concept in his major work, “In Defense of Muslim Lands.”

A myriad of other Islamic scholars and terrorists alike support the

concept, including Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi’s work, From the Fruits of Jihad, and former Saudi Al Qaeda ideologue, Yusuf al-Ayyiri. See Abu

Muhammad al-Maqdisi, “Between the Permissible and What is Better,

and Between the Legislated and What is More Beneficial”; al-Ayyiri’s

work “The way to Jihad, How the Nation can Reach it, and What is

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648 social research

the Understanding of the Way.” Doha-based cleric Yusuf al-Qaradawi’s

work can be found at the Middle East Research Institute (MEMRI) or

www.islamonline.net.

5. The golden era of the caliphate refers to the rule of a democratically

chosen caliph until the fall of the Ottomans in 1924.

6. As in Christianity, Muslims in general have nothing more in common

with each other than the fact that they share a “Muslim” identity,

albeit one that this enormously diverse and complex.

7. A reference to civilizations that had forgotten the teachings of the

previous messengers, including Christ, until the advent of Islam.

8. Also stated in a separate fatwa published in 1984.

9. A large number of authors, both classical and contemporary, have

written on this subject. For background, see Ahmad (2001 and 2000).

Also see A’la Mawdudi (2000 and 1991); Qutb (1993); ‘Abduh (2004);

and Ahmed (1990).

10. A fatwa is a published opinion or decision regarding religious doctrine

or law made by a recognized authority, often called a mufti. From

Glasse (1989: 125).

11. Literature on the meaning of myths can be useful. According to

philosopher Alisdair MacIntyre (1970), myths are neither true nor

false, but living or dead. So long as myths give meaning to life, it

becomes significant. See MacIntyre (1970), Anderson (1991), and Levi-

Strauss (1987).

12. See Paz (2006), who states that between 2000 and 2003, al-Ayiri

authored about 40 books and long articles in Arabic on the doctrine

of jihad. Published on the Internet, al-Ayiri became known to most of

the world after his death in June 2003 by the Saudi police.

13. Published as a series of 11 articles on the website of the Center for

Islamic Studies and Research. Also taken from the article by Paz,

2006). Paz states that between 2000 and 2003, al-Ayiri authored

about 40 books and long articles in Arabic on the doctrine of jihad.

Published on the Internet, al-Ayiri’s recognition by most of the world

came after he was killed by Saudi police in June 2003.

14. In the early 1990s, pieces on Palestine likely served to remind the

.


Muslim community that Jerusalem was not to be forgotten. For

instance, issues 79 and 96 of Al Jihad included statements made by

jihadi figures that stressed the significance of the Palestinian cause.

In one interview, Enayat Allah Khalil said fighting in Palestine was a

religious duty, citing Jerusalem as the site of Prophet Muhammad’s

great night journey. Another interview by the former spiritual leader

of the Palestinian group Hamas conveyed the message “armed jihad

is the way to independence.”

15. Iraq is the new theater of jihad, but Afghanistan and Palestine also

figure prominently in jihadi literature. For example, Ayman al-Zawa-

hiri indicated that the “wound of Palestine is bleeding in the heart

of every Muslim . . . and [the mujahideen] will not allow American

to dream of security [there].” From Zawahiri (2003). For other refer-

ences to Palestine, see Al Jihad magazine, vol. 1, issues 1-12 (1984). Bin

Laden’s Betrayal of Palestine makes clear that Palestine was a central

issue from the start. Bin Laden emphasizes jihad in Palestine “so

that it may be liberated and returned to Islamic sovereignty.” Bruce

(2005). For Azzam’s objective in establishing a Muslim government in

Afghanistan, see Martyrs: The Building Blocks of Nations. 16. For an understanding of historic Shia and Sunni strife (and periods of

limited cooperation), see Nasr (2006).

17. From Al-Watan (Saudi Arabia), May 18, 2005 and July 6, 2005. For other

interviews with al-‘Abikan, see MEMRI Dispatch, August 12, 2005.

18. Al-Ali is a former secretary general of the Kuwait-based Salafi Movement.

He received a two-year suspended sentence for publicly opposing

Kuwait’s support for the US-led war on Iraq in 2003. In December 2005,

al-Ali was acquitted by a Kuwaiti judge on charges of forming a funda-

mentalist group suspected of plotting terrorist attacks in the country,

and for his involvement in supporting shoot-outs between Islamic

militants and Kuwaiti security forces in January 2005.

19. Online at <www.tawhed.ws>.

20. Online at <www.alsakifah.org>.

21. Ali’s work can be found online at <http://www.tawhed.ws> and

<http://www.alsakifah.org>.

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650 social research

22. Earlier texts that reflect strong support for the Iraqi jihad include

Kharif al-Ghadab al-‘Iraqi (The Iraqi Autumn of Wrath) by Abu ‘Ubayd

al-Qirshi; Bayan hawla Gazuw al-Salibiyyin ‘ala al-‘Iraq (Statement

Regarding the Crusaders’ Invasion of Iraq) by Abu Basir al-Tartusi;

al-Harb al-Salibiyya ala al-‘Iraq (The Crusader War on Iraq) by a key

Saudi Al Qaeda ideologue, the late Yusuf al-‘Ayiri; and Risalat Munasara wa Munasaha li-Ikhwanina Ahl al-Sunna wa’l-Jama’a fi’l-‘Iraq (Letter to our

Sunni Brothers in Iraq) by Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi.

23. This section is drawn from Post (2007: 234-237).

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The History and Evolution of Martyrdom in the Service of Defensive Jihad

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