Jihad after Iraq: Lessons from the Arab Afghans

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Jihad after Iraq: Lessons from the Arab Afghans

MOHAMMED M. HAFEZ

Department of National Security AffairsNaval Postgraduate SchoolMonterey, CA, USA

The defeat of Al Qaeda in Iraq may generate new threats associated with the dispersalof its fighters in the region and around the world. Veterans of earlier insurgenciesand civil wars in Afghanistan, Bosnia, and Chechnya moved from one conflict zone toanother, lending combatants valuable skills and networks of support. The flight of Iraq’sirreconcilable insurgents is a greater threat to global security than the one posed bythe Arab Afghans because of the range of combat experiences and skills acquired inIraq since 2003. This manuscript revisits the history of Arab veterans of the anti-Sovietstruggle in Afghanistan (1979–1989) to draw out lessons for countering the currentbleed out from Iraq. It explores the diverse pathways taken by these “Arab Afghans” andthe factors that facilitated different patterns of dispersal around the globe. The articleconcludes with broad strategic recommendations for counterterrorism measures.

Since 2003, several hundred Muslims from around the world have been streaming intoIraq to wage jihad against the United States, the new Iraqi government, and their localallies. Many foreign fighters came from neighboring states such as Saudi Arabia, Syria, andJordan, and from as far away as North Africa and Europe.1 A substantial number of thesevolunteers have engaged in devastating suicide attacks against coalition forces and Iraq’ssecurity personnel, and they hold leadership positions in Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), one ofthe deadliest insurgent groups in that country.2

Iraq is not unique in attracting foreign militants. In the recent past, conflicts inAfghanistan, Bosnia, Somalia, and Chechnya have attracted foreign jihadists from aroundthe world. Many of these volunteers eventually moved on to other conflict zones, drawingon their earlier experiences and skills to aid fellow coreligionists in their civil wars orinsurgencies. Others returned to their home countries to battle their own regimes, hoping toestablish Islamic states in their stead. Some others joined Al Qaeda’s terror syndicate andits camps in Afghanistan, forming the backbone of a global network of terrorist trainers,financiers, and ideologues.

The contemporary history of global jihadism raises a number of questions. What isthe likelihood that veterans of the Iraqi jihad will one day leave the conflict zone to spreadtheir militancy to their home countries or internationally? What is the scope and extent ofthis threat, and who will bear the brunt of Iraq’s jihad veterans? What pathways might theforeign jihadists take if Iraq is stabilized and the government there succeeds in quelling the

Received 2 May 2008; accepted 19 June 2008.Address correspondence to Mohammed M. Hafez, Ph.D., Associate Professor, Department

of National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School, Glasgow 319, 1411 Cunningham Rd.,Monterey, CA 93943. E-mail: [email protected]

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74 M. M. Hafez

Sunni insurgency? What limitations are foreign jihadists in Iraq likely to face if they chooseto leave the conflict zone? What are the possible scenarios concerning the fate of Iraq’sjihad veterans? What measures could the United States and its regional and internationalallies take to mitigate their threat?

One way to answer these questions is to reflect on the phenomenon of “Arab Afghans.”The latter refers to Arabs who volunteered to aid the struggle of the Afghan Mujahidinagainst the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan (1979–1989) and the subsequent toppling ofthe communist regime of Muhammad Najibullah (1989–1992).3 This period constitutes theformative experience of Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda’s core leadership, and marksthe start of the global jihadist movement whose milestones include Bosnia, Somalia,Chechnya, and present-day Iraq. A substantial number of Arab Afghans became a menace inregional conflicts and on the international scene. Specifically, the most threatening elementsfunctioned as commanders of training camps in Pakistan and Afghanistan, giving safehaven to violent militants seeking skills in terrorism and guerrilla warfare. Some served asspiritual leaders or military commanders of national Islamist causes, including insurgenciesin Algeria, Egypt, Kashmir, Tajikistan, Bosnia, and Chechnya. Others served as leaders,financiers, or facilitators of international terrorist cells embracing Islamist causes.

It is important to revisit the experiences of Arab Afghans after dispersing fromAfghanistan during the late 1980s and 1990s in order to draw lessons for dealing withthe potential outflow of Iraq’s jihad veterans in the near future. Although several authori-tative books discuss the Arab Afghans in relation to the rise of Al Qaeda, none has drawnpotential lessons for Iraq’s current irreconcilable insurgents.4

The Phenomenon of Arab Afghans

In 1979, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan to aid the beleaguered communist regimethat was facing an insurgency from multiple Islamist factions. The Afghan insurgents, orMujahidin as they came to be known, called on Pakistan and other governments aroundthe world to aid their struggle and provide military, financial, and humanitarian assistanceto their fighters and refugees that sought a haven along the Afghanistan–Pakistan border.Hamid Ghul, Pakistan’s intelligence chief under President Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, was incharge of coordinating international support for the anti-Soviet efforts in Afghanistan. Heserved as a major conduit of aid that came mainly from Saudi Arabia, other Gulf countries,and the United States.

Muslim antipathy toward the atheistic ideology of communism and images of sufferingAfghanis inspired several thousand Arabs to volunteer as aid and humanitarian workersin the conflict zone. Some went a step further by volunteering to join Mujahidin factionsin rolling back the Soviet invasion through combat. In the context of a Cold War with theSoviet Union, the United States, Pakistan, and other Muslim governments allied with theUnited States did not hesitate to give their blessings and material support to these volunteers.

After a grueling war of attrition, the Soviet Union withdrew its forces from Afghanistanin 1989. However, the insurgency continued until the remnant communist regime of Muham-mad Najibullah, based in Kabul, fell in 1992. The victory of the Afghan Mujahidin wascomplete, but it was also mired by intense factional struggle and internecine bloodletting.The civil war among insurgent factions further burdened an already impoverished anddevastated country.

The role of the Arab Afghans in the anti-Soviet, anti-Communist struggle inAfghanistan can be divided into three phases:


Jihad after Iraq 75

• Phase 1: 1979–1984. A handful of Arab volunteers came to aid the Afghans. Theydid so mainly to help in humanitarian efforts and were mainly sponsored by Araband Muslim governments, as well as nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).

• Phase 2: 1984–1989. There was a gradual influx of Arab volunteers inspired bySheikh Abdullah Azzam, one of the fund-raisers and recruiters for the Afghan jihadand the founder of the Services Bureau (maktab al-Khidamat) that hosted Arabvolunteers in Peshawar, Pakistan.

• Phase 3: 1989–1992. The number of Arab volunteers increased substantially fromearlier periods. Many came to take advantage of the training camps that have beenset up by Afghan and Arab commanders as well as to fight the Najibullah regime.

By 1992, many of the Arab volunteers returned to their home countries or established ahaven in Peshawar, Pakistan. Others, inspired by their “successes” in Afghanistan, movedto new conflict zones, principally Bosnia, but also Algeria and Egypt.5 Bin Laden and theinchoate Al Qaeda organization moved to the Sudan. Their concern back then was thepresence of U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia following the liberation of Kuwait from the Iraqioccupation (1990–1991). It took sometime for the Al Qaeda threat toward the United Statesto manifest, but the Arab Afghans sprang into action in the early 1990s.

Characteristics of the Arab Afghans

It is fair to say that the jihad in Afghanistan was largely an Afghan affair, despite the inter-nationalization of the conflict by the mid-1980s. It was the Afghans who fought, sacrificedtheir lives, and ultimately triumphed over the Soviet invaders. International economic, mil-itary, and intelligence assistance were instrumental in the victory of the Afghan Mujahidin,but foreign supporters by and large did not create the insurgent movements nor did theyfight their battles.

The Arab Afghans were a tiny contingent in the anti-Soviet struggle, or “a drop in theocean” according to one former prominent Arab volunteer.6 Estimates of Arab volunteersin the Afghan conflict have ranged from 3,000–4,000 volunteers at any one time, especiallyafter 1986.7 Most of those served in Peshawar and other Pakistani cities bordering onAfghanistan. They were humanitarian aid workers, cooks, drivers, accountants, teachers,doctors, engineers, and religious preachers. They built camps, mosques, and make-shifthospitals and schools. They dug and treated water wells and attended to the sick andwounded.8 Only later did Arab volunteers come with jihad in mind.

The motivations of the volunteers can be divided into five categories, mainly thoseseeking religious fulfillment, employment opportunities, adventure, safe haven, and militarytraining. Initial volunteers were men in their twenties recruited from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait,and Yemen. Images of Afghani suffering publicized by government media and clericalnetworks encouraged young Muslims to volunteer. Governments subsidized the journeyof volunteers and paid some salaries.9 Abdullah Azzam, one of the early volunteers tothe conflict and a charismatic personality, was welcomed in the Gulf and given plenty ofopportunities to raise awareness of what was happening in Afghanistan, collect donations,and recruit volunteers. He was given funds to open up the Services Bureau in Peshawar,Pakistan. His magazine, Al-Jihad, was widely distributed in the region.

The Muslim world was undergoing an Islamic revival that began in the 1970s andthis atmosphere undoubtedly nudged young men to fulfill their religious duty toward fel-low Muslims.10 The story of Abdullah Ali Mekkawi, a Saudi volunteer to Afghanistan,is instructive. At the age of 18, he expressed a desire to aid the jihad in Afghanistan


76 M. M. Hafez

after learning about it through two magazines, Al-Jihad and Al-Bunyan. Both of thesewere widely available in the Gulf. He gained permission from his mother and SheikhAbdel Aziz bin Baz to go. His mother bought him the ticket. He wrote down the ad-dress of Abdullah Azzam’s Services Bureau in Peshawar, Pakistan, from the back of Al-Jihad magazine. Religious rulings (fatwas) by establishment scholars that declared jihadin Afghanistan as a compulsory obligation (fard ayn) for faithful Muslims also encour-aged volunteerism. Abdullah Anas, one of the earliest volunteers to Afghanistan, statesthat he decided to go after reading such a fatwa by Abdel Aziz bin Baz in a Kuwaitimagazine.11

Volunteers from the Gulf included guest workers who came from impoverished coun-tries such as Mauritania, Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen.12 They were seeking jobs and salarieswith Gulf-based NGOs in Pakistan, not martyrdom in Afghanistan. Even a substantial num-ber of members of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood went to serve as engineers and doctorsbecause they could not find employment in Egypt.13

By the mid- and late-1980s, volunteers also came from Egypt and North Africa. Anumber of Egyptian radicals were released from prison by the mid-1980s and knew thatthey would face harassment if they stayed at home. In addition to seeking a safe haven,they wanted to build up their clandestine military capabilities in order to topple theirregimes at home in the near future. By 1987, the core leaders of the Egyptian IslamicGroup (Gama’a Islamiyya)—Mohammed Shawqi al-Islambuli, Ali Abdul Fattah, and Ri-fai Taha—established themselves in Peshawar and began publishing al-Murabitun (TheSteadfast), a magazine focused on the situation in Egypt. They also created their own guesthouse—also called Al-Murabitun—parallel to Azzam’s relatively less-hawkish ServicesBureau and Bayt Al-Ansar.14

Along with the hard-core activists came adventurers, like “vacationing” students fromthe Gulf.15 According to Michael Knights, “The vast majority of Saudi ‘Afghan Arabs’ sawthe jihad as a colourful adventure and did little fighting. Some never even left Pakistan,others only spent their summer university vacations on jihad and very few experiencedmore than a single season of actual combat.”16 Afghani commanders were eager to obligethese adventure-seeking guests because they would tout them as “heroes” in front of theirGulf benefactors, who would then contribute handsomely to their factions.17

By 1989, after the complete withdrawal of Soviet forces, Pakistan and Afghanistanwere flooded with Arab volunteers seeking training in guerrilla warfare. (Their motivationsand significance will be discussed later.)

In addition to their relatively small size, Arab Afghans had little impact fighting onthe battlefield. Initially, Arabs that did engage in warfare were dispersed across the sevenmajor insurgent factions. Azzam encouraged this strategy because he saw the role of Arabsas propagandists who would report from the field and provide tales of heroism that couldbe disseminated to the Arab world to raise money and other assistance for the Afghanjihad.18 He recognized that the relatively small Arab force could hardly make a differencein the military arena. Thus, the vast majority of volunteers did not go inside Afghanistan,let alone fight there. This strategy prevailed until bin Laden decided in 1986 to create the“Lion’s Den,” a camp in Jaji solely for Arabs.19

The few Arabs that did fight in Afghanistan participated in the Battle of Jawr inApril 1986; Battle of Jaji in May 1987; Battle of Jalalabad in March 1989; and the Battleof Khost between 1989 and 1991. The core founders of Al Qaeda—Abu Hafs al-Masri(Mohammed Atef), Abu Ubayda al-Banshiri (Ali Amin al-Rashidi), and bin Laden—servedas commanders and fought in some of these battles.20


Jihad after Iraq 77

The Significance of the Afghan Experience for Global Jihadism

It is easy to discount the significance of the Afghan jihad in the rise of global jihadism ifone concentrates on the limited fighting role of the Arab Afghans. The actual import of thisperiod lies in the training, socialization, and networking conducted by the Arab Afghans.Away from their home governments and free to propagate their radical views, some ArabAfghans began to contemplate a larger role for themselves. They developed a culture ofjihad and martyrdom, and a template for mobilizing Muslims in defense of Islamic causes.Their experiences and skills became manifest in several insurgencies and civil wars duringthe 1990s. Above all else, they developed leaders like bin Laden, Emir Khattab, and AbuMusab al-Zarqawi, to name a few—that led terrorist movements and insurgencies acrossthe globe.21

Training

Despite their limited combat role in the Afghan jihad, a substantial number of volunteersparticipated in military training camps set up by the Pakistani intelligence services andrun by commanders of Mujahidin factions, especially Abdurrab Rasul Sayyaf of the Is-lamic Union (Ittihad al-Islami). According to Brigadier Mohammed Yousaf, who servedin the Afghan bureau of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) from 1983–1987, byearly 1986 ISI had constructed a huge and sophisticated infrastructure for guerrilla trainingalong the Afghan frontier. Approximately 16,000–18,000 Afghans passed through thesecamps each year. The Pakistanis also facilitated independent guerrilla and sabotage trainingby Mujahidin factions outside ISI control. About 6,000–7,000 trained this way each year.“Some of these were Arab volunteers.” He goes on to say that the camps instructed partici-pants on urban sabotage, car bombings, anti-aircraft weapons, sniper rifles and land mines.“Thousands of new graduates—the great majority Afghans, but also now some Algerians,Palestinians, Tunisians, Saudi Arabians, and Egyptians. . .”22

Arabs, too, set up their own training camps on the Pakistani border and in Jalalabadand Khost inside Afghanistan.23 These camps held names like al-Khalifa (The Caliph),al-Sada (The Echo), al-Jihad (The Striving), and al-Farouq (the arbiter between truth andfalsehood). The trainees were usually given a two- to three-week basic training course onhow to maneuver, use Kalashnikov and other fire arms, and fire rocket-propelled grenades(RPGs). Some were sent for advanced instruction in complex weapons and tactics.24 Someacquired skills in the use of explosives and detonators; placement of land mines; andfiring mortars.25 In addition to combat training, Arab Afghans acquired skills in logisticsand facilitation of guerrilla warfare. These skills included smuggling people and weaponsacross rugged terrains, and forging documents and passports.

Those who trained became the trainers of future jihadists in Afghanistan, Bosnia,Tajikistan, and Chechnya. Thus, despite their limited military role, the training acquired inPakistan was invaluable for the future global jihadist movement.

Ideological Socialization

Military training was not carried out in a political vacuum. Arab Afghans, especiallythose who came in the late-1980s, brought with them radical ideologies and a penchantfor proselytizing. Egyptians, in particular, were at the forefront of introducing the takfiriideology (one that labels as apostate any secular government in the Muslim world). TheEgyptian Islamic Jihad, led by Ayman al-Zawahiri, distributed leaflets that condemned


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the Muslim Brotherhood for its acceptance of democracy and willingness to abandonviolence.26

According to Abdullah Anas, “Some Egyptians in Afghanistan refused to pray behindDr. Abdalla Azzam, although he had higher educational degrees and better qualificationsthan all the Arab Afghans who lived in Peshawar, studied at Al-Azhar and memorized theHoly Koran by heart.”27 Azzam was seen as too close to the Muslim Brotherhood, whichwas not radical enough for some Egyptian militants. Anas further comments that Peshawarin 1989 was different from 1984, and became completely unrecognizable in 1992 becauseof the factionalism and takfirism.28

Another Arab Afghan, Hamid Mustafa (aka Abu al-Walid al-Masri), writes that “Pe-shawar witnessed many verbal duels, accusations and counteraccusations, divisions, wran-gling, and wars of leaflets among this hodgepodge of Arab Afghans who were torn up bydifferences.”29 Takfir was not only applied toward other political movements; volunteersfrom the Gulf and North Africa engaged in takfir against the Shiites and the Hanafi orien-tation of the Afghans. According to Milton Bearden, the CIA’s station chief in Islamabadfrom 1986 to 1989, the main Afghan complaint against the Arabs was that “They say weare dumb, and we do not know the Koran, and they are more trouble than they are evergoing to be worth.”30

Although ideological disputes did not bode well for unity, they did expose newcomersto the range of political beliefs along the Islamist spectrum. Invariably, some were attractedto the more radical factions. Vigilant security services were not around to prevent zealotsfrom distributing the works of Sayyid Qutb and other ideologues of militant Islamism.Nor were governments around to counter the radical ideology with their own breed ofestablishment Islam. Peshawar was truly an open market place of ideas without bounds orcensors, and young men had plenty of time on their hands to read, discuss, and argue thefiner points of jihadi politics.31

More ominous, however, was the tendency to merge military training with ideologicalsocialization. Individuals in camps did not just train on how to use a gun or hurl a grenade;they also were instructed on Islamic history, theology, and politics from an extremistpoint of view. Those in charge were keen to turn the theological notion of jihad intoan ideology—”jihadism” in defense of Islam and Muslim causes. According to Abu al-Walid al-Masri, the tendency toward preparation and training in military camps creates an“exaggerated militarization of the notion of jihad.” It also fosters an “unjustified confidencein the ability of the ‘organization’ to face and defeat the Crusaders.”32

Culture of Jihad and Martyrdom

The Arab Afghans developed their own distinctive culture that was carried to (and honedby) other conflicts, including Bosnia, Chechnya, and Iraq. This culture consists of at leastten elements.

Exaggerated triumphalism. Foreign fighters played a marginal role in the victory of theAfghan Mujahidin, but the Arab Afghans exaggerated their role in the conflict and claimedfor themselves a mythical victory. Bin Laden in particular framed the final dissolution ofthe Soviet Union in 1991 as the direct result of its failure in Afghanistan. All revolutionarymovements have a myth of genesis and global jihadists attribute their birth to the victoryin Afghanistan. Similar myths of victory were spawned in Bosnia in the mid-1990s andChechnya in the late 1990s. These narratives empower potential recruits and give them asense of inevitable triumph.


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Embracing new identities. Volunteers to Afghanistan often dropped their given namesand adopted aliases or noms de guerre that reflected heightened Islamic consciousnessand a commitment to radical action. They embraced the names of the companions of theProphet Muhammad, especially those who were involved in historic battles or ones eagerto achieve martyrdom. In addition to changing their names, they grew their beards andtrimmed their mustaches in accordance with Salafi teachings. They also donned Afghanclothing, giving them the appearance of authentic traditionalists. They began referring toeach other as “brothers” as if they were from a single family.

Abandoning nationalism for pan-Islamism. Although Arab Afghans were a fractiousbunch as evinced by their ideological schisms and excessive factionalism, their presence inAfghanistan among non-Arabs sowed the seeds of pan-Islamism in their minds. Ideologicaldisputes should not be confused with nationalist chauvinism, although the two sometimesoverlap. The diversity of nationalities in Afghanistan reminded Muslims of the universalityof their faith and, paradoxically, imbued them with a modern cosmopolitanism in parallelto their anachronistic fundamentalism. If Arabs can come to the aid of fellow Afghans, whycan they not fight for Tajikistan, Kashmir, Philippines, Bosnia, Chechnya, and, eventually,Iraq? In their minds, the Arab Afghans represented the vanguard of true Islamic unity thatabandons the “false idol” of nationalism, and aspires toward a caliphate that unifies theentire Islamic umma (nation). Years later, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi represented the spirit ofpan-Islamism in an eloquent statement in one of his montages as the leader of AQI: “Ourjihad in Iraq is the same as in Afghanistan, Kashmir, Chechnya, and Bosnia—an honorablejihad. . . . We shed the dust of divisive nationalism and hopeless patriotism that tears asunderthe ranks of Muslims and turns them into tasty bites for the infidels.”33

Allegiance to radical parties. Arab Afghans more often than not coalesced around themost radical factions in their home countries, ones that opposed democratic participationor nonviolent Islamic activism. In conflict zones, they formed their own units separate fromthe native Muslims they were coming to aid. This self-selection deepened their commitmentto radical politics and shielded them from countervailing influences.

Veneration of martyrdom. Arab Afghans may not have fought extensively inAfghanistan, but their mere presence their and socialization into radical Islamism fos-tered in some a desire for martyrdom. Jihadi magazines, especially Azzam’s Al-Jihad,lionized the “fallen martyrs” and fostered the image of heroic sacrifice in defense of Islam.Subsequent conflicts—Bosnia, Chechnya, and Iraq—saw similar propaganda, each timeimproving the quality and techniques of martyrdom veneration. Abdul Rahman al-Dosari(Abu Abdel Aziz Barbaros), a Saudi veteran of the Afghan jihad and one of the early leadersof foreign fighters in Bosina, reflects the spirit of martyrdom: “The Jihad in Afghanistanwas a great experience. Whoever was involved in this experience had the great desire thatAllah would keep them engaged in Jihad until their death and that Allah would give themtheir death in the battlefield of Jihad. And this is also our desire that we are killed in theway of Jihad.”34

Tendency toward cruel tactics. Arab Afghans, especially late comers, sometime en-gaged in exceedingly bloody tactics such as beheadings, mutilation, and hostility to non-Muslims. As one observer put it, “The obverse of this thirst for martyrdom—entirely aliento the Afghan—was a dehumanization of the ‘infidel’ enemy which sanctioned massacres ofprisoners and rape of captured womenfolk.”35 Cruel tactics such as beheadings manifestedquickly in Bosnia and have reached their apex in the Iraqi jihad.

Generational training. Camps set up by the Arab Afghans to train a new generation ofmilitants became a model to emulate in other conflicts. Thus, one finds training camps for


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Arabs in Tajikistan, Bosnia, Chechnya, and Iraq. These camps are intended to perpetuatethe ideology of jihadism and pass the baton to the next generation.36

Braving a rugged lifestyle. Arab Afghans reveled in their sense of bravery that camefrom enduring the inclement terrains and camps of Pakistan and Afghanistan. As an Afghanveteran put it, “we sat around the pot to eat tasteless food, which we ate with joy and zeal asif we were starting a new life.”37 This aspect of the jihadi culture appeals to adventurers andthrill-seekers. It harkens back to the formative period of Islam when men engaged in raids(ghazwat) while enduring the scorching heat of the desert. This lifestyle also celebratesthe ancient tribalism of the Arabs, one marked by gallantry and asceticism. Brotherhoodof arms and camaraderie in rugged training camps is another salient feature of the jihadiculture. Videotapes of Arab Afghans often reveal them eating together, wrestling with eachother, and laughing at each other in austere settings. In many ways jihadists have put thefun back in fundamentalism—turning jihad into an adventure.38

Puritanical preaching. Arab Afghans did not hesitate to impose their puritanicalSalafist beliefs on local populations, even conservative Muslims in Afghanistan. Theserules include banning the mixing of the sexes, preventing worshipping at gravesites, andconstantly correcting fellow Muslims on ritualistic matters. Their strong desire to establishan Islamic state in any territory on earth was hardly tempered by the need to maintain thegoodwill of the host population. According to Abu al-Walid al-Masri, Arab Afghans inthe 1980s were excessive in their call to the “correct creed” to an extent that “repelled thepeople form God’s faith.”39

Cementing ties through marriage. Some Arab Afghans married off their daughters orsisters to fellow jihadists. These marriages were not always calculated to produce enduringrelationships among jihadists, but their effect was the same. The brotherhood of arms wasfurther consolidated by marriage ties.40 Jihadists would marry local women to solidify theirlinks to villagers or tribes, a behavior bin Laden engaged in during the late 1990s. Sometimesmarriage to local women was intended to gain citizenship and avoid deportation.41

These cultural (or cultic) elements that first appeared in Afghanistan were passed onfrom conflict to conflict, and from one jihadi generation to another. Like any successfulbusiness or military organization, jihadists developed a distinctive culture that was intrin-sically valuable to those who participated in it. It attracted newcomers and kept them inthe movement despite their distance from home, lack of tangible rewards, and the austerelifestyle of jihad.

Network Ties

One of the greatest achievements of the Arab Afghans is their ability to forge network tiesthat endured beyond Afghanistan. One of the hardest tasks for radicals to accomplish is torecruit trustworthy individuals into their movement, especially under dictatorial regimes thatsuppress any form of opposition activism. Terrorists usually draw on kinship and friendshipties to build up their base, but this strategy limits their mobilization potential. In Pakistanand Afghanistan, the Arabs were not encumbered by vigilant security services and wereable to recruit openly into their organizations. Even those who did not join a particular groupbecame known to other jihadists, who would later draw on their connections for support.

Conflict zones attract criminals, forgers, and smugglers that traffic in weapons andpeople. They also attract humanitarian organizations and wealthy donors. Afghanistanattracted all these elements and Arab Afghans were able to network with them all. Thesepersonal ties became useful in future conflicts like Bosnia and Chechnya. In Bosnia, forinstance, humanitarian organizations were one of the principle means by which foreign


Jihad after Iraq 81

fighters were able to enter the conflict zone.42 Fake passports found in Bosnia are traced toforgers in Pakistan.43 Money intended from Muslims seeking to support their co-religionistsgoes to charities or relief organizations that are either infiltrated by jihadists or that divertfunds to militant activities out of sympathy.44 The ability of jihadists to raise funds locallyand internationally is a valuable one that can be transferred to other conflict zones or tofinance terrorism operations.

The case of the “Algerian Afghans” is illustrative of the power of networking. Algerianswho volunteered in Afghanistan used their network ties in the early 1990s to sustain theirinsurgency against the military regime at home. The Armed Islamic Group (GIA) wasinitially formed with the help of Algerian Afghans, although its key leaders were alsoa product of Algeria’s Islamist movement.45 The Algerian Afghans managed to acquirefinancing, communications equipment, and weapons through linkages with other ArabAfghans. They also used their Afghan ties to smuggle wanted Algerians outside the countryand to bring in Afghan-based Algerians into the country with the help of Al Qaeda throughtransit points in the Sudan, Morocco and Libya. Bin Laden set up offices in Yemen andthe Sudan to facilitate communication between Algerian militants at home and abroad,and to help forge documents and passports for fleeing militants. The GIA also drew on itsAfghan-network for political and ideological support, especially when it came to justifyingtheir bloody tactics against civilians. Their principle ideologue, Abu Qatada al-Falastini,was an Arab Afghan who established himself in London and published GIA communiquesin the Al-Ansar newsletter. He also issued fatwas condoning their violence.46

Safe Haven

The ability of Arab militants to find a haven in Pakistan and Afghanistan is one of themost important legacies of the Arab Afghan experience. Peshawar became the ultimatesafe haven for militant Arabs fleeing arrest at home and seeking to ferment revolution athome. In 1996, Afghanistan itself became a safe haven for Al Qaeda camps.

Chaos and civil war in Afghanistan, guest houses in Pakistan, and the refusal ofthe Pakistani government to crackdown on foreign radicals in the early 1990s turned theAfghan–Pakistan border region into a “field of dreams” for militant Islamists. Many Arabs,especially Egyptians, Algerians, Syrians, Iraqis, and Libyans, could not go home after serv-ing in Afghanistan because they knew what awaited them there. They stayed in Peshawar’sguest houses and became the recipients of fleeing dissidents from their home countries.

Egyptians and Algerians that were engaged in a violent struggle with their governmentsduring the 1990s exploited the Pakistani-Afghani training camps to the fullest. Talat FuadQasim, one of the leaders of the Egyptian Islamic Group, explained in 1994 why hismilitants were in Pakistan and Afghanistan:

The Egyptian Government has closed in on the brothers in Al-Minya and Asyut[in Upper Egypt] and forced them to leave for Cairo, Alexandria, and othergovernorates . . .They were also harassed in other governorates and were forcedto leave the country. They traveled to Afghanistan and Pakistan, where theyfound support from God on all levels.47

Hamid Mustafa (Abu al-Walid al-Masri), himself sheltered in Afghanistan until the fall ofthe Taliban in 2001, points out that Peshawar also became host to a number of non-Arab dis-sident organizations from Indonesia, Punjab, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and even China.48 Pak-istan, of course, hosted, funded, and trained Kashmiri groups to further its proxy war with


82 M. M. Hafez

India. The presence of diverse groups and nationalities expanded the network ties of ArabAfghans and enabled Al Qaeda to become a global organization in a relatively short time.

Beginning in 1993, Pakistan grudgingly agreed to crack down on foreign militants inits cities, but this was a half-hearted attempt at best. Ironically, both Nawaz Sherif and thelate Benazir Bhutto could not resist the political pressure to shelter radical Islamists whowere viewed as assets by the Pakistani security agencies, especially in their competitionwith India over Kashmir and factional competition in Afghanistan. Jihadists were eitherunder the protection of political parties, tribal groups, or smuggling mafias. Even whenPakistan officially signed a security agreement with Egypt in 1994, militant leaders of theEgyptian Islamic Group were allowed to flee, including Muhammad Shawqi al-Islambuli,Talat Fouad Qasim, and Muhammad Makkawi.49

Leadership

Above all else, the Arab Afghan experience produced capable ideological leaders, religiousideologues, and military commanders that would lead future struggles in places like Algeria,Egypt, Bosnia, Chechnya, and Iraq. As stated earlier, the genesis of Al Qaeda lies in keyfigures like bin Laden, Abu Hafs al-Masri, and Abu Ubayda al-Banshiri. All three acquiredcombat experience and leadership skills in battles like the ones in Jaji and Jalalabad.All three suffered injuries in combat. Their legitimacy among jihadists stemmed in somemeasure from their credentials earned in the battlefield.

As leaders moved from one conflict zone to the next, their prestige and leadershipbona fides were further consolidated, enabling them to assume the mantle of “Emirs”(commanders of the faithful). One such Emir is the Saudi Samir Saleh Abdullah Al-Suwailem, better known as Emir Khattab. He went to Afghanistan at the age of sixteenin 1988–1989 (some reports say he went in 1987 at the age of seventeen). He fought inthe Battle of Jalalabad in 1989 and lost several fingers in an accident with explosives. In1994–1995, he left Afghanistan for Tajikistan, where he served as a commander of one ofthree Arab units that fought in Tajikistan’s civil war (1992–1997). His role was to providelogistics for the Tajik insurgents as well as train Arabs and Tajiks on combat skills.

In 1995, Khattab visited Chechnya posing as a television reporter. His goal was toinvestigate the separatist conflict that began in late 1994. Khattab’s movement was facil-itated by Sheikh Ali Fathi al-Shishani, a Jordanian of Chechen origins and a veteran ofthe anti-Soviet struggle in Afghanistan. Sheikh Fathi had approximately 90 cadres at hiscommand, which were later turned over to Khattab (Sheikh Fathi died in 1997). In 1996,the first Chechen war ended, but Khattab was not content with the stalemate. He begancreating training bases in Chechnya’s southeastern region and training militants from theregion. Khattab also befriended Shamil Basayev, one of the Chechen commanders, andthey jointly formed an international “peacekeeping” militia. Khattab became the leader ofits international contingent made up of Arabs, Turks, and North Africans. Together theybegan to stir trouble in neighboring Dagestan, which precipitated the second Chechen warin 1999. He was assassinated by Russian agents in 2002.50

Dispersal of Arab Afghans

Arab Afghans as a collective did not arrive in, or depart from, Afghanistan in any particularyear. As indicated earlier, some left shortly after they arrived; others came in the late-1980sand early-1990s and settled in Peshawar for as long as they could. Therefore, when speakingof the dispersal of Arab Afghans, we are talking about the scattering of individuals andsmall groups over a period of time, not the departure of the foreign volunteers all at once.


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The years 1989–1992 were perhaps the most important for the Arab Afghan experience.This is the time when the greatest influx of Arabs took place, and it is the time when manyArabs began to think about a new direction beyond Afghanistan. Those who came didso mainly to seek a new safe haven and training along the Afghanistan–Pakistan borders.Those who left were influenced by five factors. First, the Mujahidin in Afghanistan drovethe Soviets out in 1989 and toppled the remaining communist regime in 1992, when Kabulfell into their hands. Arabs saw this as a victory for Islamism, but there was little else leftfor them to achieve in Afghanistan.

Second, Afghan’s Mujahidin factions fiercely competed with each other during thejihad years. The Islamic Party (Hizb-i-Islami) led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar competed withthe Islamic Association (Jamiat-i-Islami) led by Burhanuddin Rabbani and his militarycommander Ahmed Shah Masoud. Arab Afghans, bin Laden in particular, attempted tomediate these factional conflicts but to no avail. After their victory over the communists, thecompetition turned into internecine fighting and shelling. The rivalry between Hekmatyarand Masoud killed an estimated 40,000 people.51 The leaders of Afghan factions becamewarlords, not freedom fighters. Arabs that wanted to stay in Afghanistan were forced totake sides in a civil war that had no clear political horizon or objectives.

Third, by 1992, those interested in global jihad had plenty of arenas to pick from:Kashmir (insurgency, 1989–present), Tajikistan (civil war, 1992–1997), Bosnia (civil war,1992–1995), Algeria (insurgency, 1992–present), and Egypt (insurgency, 1992–1997), toname a few. Moreover, the first Gulf War (1990–1991) brought a substantial number of U.S.forces to the Persian Gulf, which offended bin Laden and like-minded fundamentalists. BinLaden initially thought of using Arab Afghans to liberate South Yemen from communistrule, but after 1991 he shifted his focus on removing U.S. presence from Saudi Arabia.52

Fourth, in 1989 a military coup in the Sudan brought radical Islamists to power. TheIslamists, led by Hassan al-Turabi, welcomed bin Laden and his Arab Afghans in order tobenefit from bin Laden’s largesse. The Sudan was a more attractive safe haven for manybecause it was an Arabic-speaking country that was close to Egypt and the heart of the Arabworld. It also lacked the chaos and internecine fighting that characterized Afghanistan’sfactional politics after 1992. Some of those who did not wish to stay in Afghanistan—andin all likelihood could not go back to their home countries—coalesced around bin Ladenin the Sudan. He employed them and paid them salaries, and even set up housing for themand brought their families to live with them.53

Finally, by1993, U.S., European, and Arab governments began pressing Pakistan toexpel foreign militants and repatriate wanted dissidents to their home governments. Pakistangenerally resisted this pressure because it viewed foreign militants as assets to be deployedin Afghanistan and against India, but eventually it had to close down some guest housesand make a show of deporting foreign militants. Arab Afghans saw the writing on the walland decided to leave before they were “sold out.”54

Those who left Afghanistan did not all participate in insurgencies, civil wars, orinternational terrorism. The stereotypical view of Arab Afghans leaving Afghanistan tostart revolutions in their home countries or to terrorize the world is incorrect. This imagedoes not do justice to the divergent paths taken by returning volunteers. At least sixarchetypes of dispersing Arab Afghans emerged.

Reintegrationists

Many Arab Afghans from the Gulf went back home and were treated as heroes (or, at theleast, not as villains). They ended up leading normal lives, even if they may have continued


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to don Afghani garb out of nostalgia. Although these individuals certainly have had deepsympathies for bin Laden and Al Qaeda, it is not evident that all or even most of themjoined the radical cause or even lent it a helping hand.

Government Assets

Many foreign fighters in Afghanistan, not just the Arab Afghans, became assets of regimesand their security services. This is especially the case of Yemen, where the returning ArabAfghans were given a haven and deployed against the socialist establishment of the formerSouth Yemen. In 1994 a civil war broke out between the North and South, and the ArabAfghans served as foot soldiers for the Northern establishment. They were rewarded fortheir efforts by including them in the security services and the Islah political party.55 Thesame can be said of Pakistan, which recruited many veterans of the Afghan jihad to supportthe Kashmiri insurgency as part of Pakistan’s proxy war with India.56

Facilitators

Many Arab Afghans saw their role as facilitators of jihadist movements in their homecountries or around the world. Facilitation included training, financing, and shelteringjihadists. It also encompassed smuggling weapons, forging travel documents, printing pro-paganda materials, and serving as communication liaisons between clandestine individualsor groups. Facilitators also produced ideological and theological justification for militantgroups. These facilitators were mainly in Peshawar, but they also emerged in Europe(London in particular), Yemen, the Sudan, and Afghanistan after the rise of the Taliban.57

Those who went to Western Europe did so because they could take advantage of liberalasylum laws and legal restrictions on the deportation of individuals to countries that carryout the death penalty.

One such facilitator is Sheikh Anwar Shaaban. He was an Islamist in Egypt untilhe fled to Afghanistan during the 1980s. In 1991, he obtained political asylum from theItalian government and settled in Milan. There he opened the Islamic Cultural Institute in aconverted garage. The Institute attracted Arab Afghans and sent Europeans to Afghanistanwith Pakistani visas. The Institute also attracted exiled dissidents from Egypt, Tunisia, andAlgeria. In 1992, Shaaban went with several other militants to Bosnia and served there forthree years as a spiritual and political leader to the Arab volunteers. He shuttled back andforth from Bosnia to Italy, bringing with him new recruits and veterans of the Afghan jihad.He also collected money from the Gulf to aid the jihad in Bosnia. He was killed in Bosniain late 1995.58

Social Revolutionaries

Some Arab Afghans, particularly those from Algeria and Egypt, saw an opportunity inthe early 1990s to overthrow their own regimes. In 1992, the military in Algeria abortedan electoral process that promised to bring Islamists to power. The coup unleashed anintense insurgency that peaked in 1997 but continues to this day. Algerian Afghans didnot start the insurgency, but their skills, networks, and experience facilitated the insurgentmovement.59 In Egypt, low level violence between the Gama‘a Islamiyya and the regimein the early 1990s gave way to a full-scale insurgency in Upper Egypt in 1992. Radicalleaders in Peshawar took in Egyptian militants to train them and sent them back for specificoperations inside and outside Egypt.60


Jihad after Iraq 85

Global Jihadists

A number of Arab Afghans took their training, experience, and networks to other conflictzones, especially Bosnia and, later, Chechnya. Their aim was to replicate the Afghanexperience, that is to say aid fellow co-religionists in their own struggles for secession orliberation. This is the quintessential story of Emir Khattab, who moved from Afghanistanto Tajikistan, to Chechnya in less than a decade.

Others shifted from a social revolutionary orientation to one of global jihadism. Thestory of Sabri al-Attar (Abu al-Miqdad) is instructive in this regard. In 1986, this Egyptianbecame involved in Islamic activism around the Ibad al-Rahman mosque in one of the Gizasuburbs on the west bank of the Nile River. He became an active member of the Gama’aIslamiyya. In 1991, he went to Afghanistan after acquiring a forged passport and a ticket toIslamabad through contacts in Saudi Arabia and Yemen. He was then taken to the Al-Ansarhouse in Peshawar. He was given the nom de guerre Abu al-Miqdad and sent to Al-Farouqcamp in Khost for basic training. He trained with Abu Ubaydah for two months. Nexthe went to the Khaldin Camp on the Afghan–Pakistan border where he trained in heavyweapons for a month and a half. The training was quite intense and, consequently, he wasseriously injured and required hospitalization. After recovering, he participated in somefighting north of Khost, mainly firing mortar shells for about a month and a half.

When he returned to Peshawar, al-Attar was convinced by other Egyptians to jointhe Islamic Group guest house in Peshawar, known as Al-Murabitun. There he receivedextensive indoctrination in their radical ideology. In mid-1994, he considered going toChechnya, but his mentors opposed the idea. Instead, he went to Sanaa, Yemen. From therehe traveled to Khartoum, Sudan. There he stayed in a farmhouse and learned about the useof circuits in explosives and to operate remote control detonators. In 1995, he stayed inSudan to train incoming jihadists. Later in 1995 he returned to Afghanistan and from therewent to Bosnia with a help of a Palestinian militant with connections to the Chechen jihad.His desire now was to fight, not just train in camps “like women.” He stayed in Bosnia forabout a year and fought under the command of an Arab with a U.S. citizenship. After theDayton peace accords that ended the Bosnian conflict, he sought to go to Kosovo perhaps toaid the secessionist Kosovo Liberation Army. On his way there he was arrested by Serbianintelligence and deported to Egypt.61

Some of the Arab Afghans were unwillingly absorbed into global jihadism because theycould not go back home and many governments were unwilling to take them in. Accordingto a Saudi speaking for the Arab Afghans in Jeddah during the early 1990s, “the Algerianscannot go to Algeria, the Syrians cannot go to Syria or the Iraqis to Iraq. Some opt to go toBosnia, the others have to go into Afghanistan permanently.”62 Some jihadists that went toBosnia ended up marrying Bosnian women to avoid deportation to their home countries.63

Roaming jihadists used a variety of means to enter a conflict zone such as Bosnia orChechnya. The most common was through illegal infiltration with the help of professionalsmugglers or by bribing local officials and border security. Others posed as humanitarianactivists, relief workers, or journalists seeking to cover a war zone. Some relied on fakepassports, even diplomatic passports, acquired through forgers in Pakistan or Europe. Mosttroubling are those who entered with the help of political parties or government officials,which was the case with the Sudan, Pakistan, and Bosnia in the early 1990s.64

Unaffiliated Terrorists

Less common were the volunteers who carried out successful and foiled terrorist attacksin the name of Islamic causes either in their home countries or in the West. Ramzi Yousef,


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the mastermind behind the 1993 World Trade Center (WTC) attack, is an example. Twoof his uncles were killed in Afghanistan in the anti-Soviet struggle. In 1990, he went toAfghanistan to train in the Khaldin camp, run by Arab volunteers. He trained for about sixmonths, learning weapons tactics, basic explosives, and military maneuvers. He graduatedto a more advanced course in remote-controlled bomb making. He experimented with someexplosives in Afghanistan’s civil war. He used his connections in Peshawar to acquire anIraqi passport, which he used to enter the United States. After the WTC bombing, Yousefattempted to bring down a Philippines airliner, PAL, with a small amount of explosives.His attempt failed, but the bombing killed a Japanese businessman. Although Yousef waslater linked to key individuals in Al Qaeda’s terror network, principally Khaled SheikhMohammed, the 1993 WTC operation is believed to be of his own planning.65

Comparing the Experiences of Arab Afghans and Foreign Fighters in Iraq

Arab Afghans were a relatively small group that had little influence on the course ofevents in Afghanistan, but yet they were able to carry out terrorist attacks around theworld, start new national and transnational terrorist cells, aid several insurgent movements,build camps to train future generations of radical Islamists, and threaten the only remainingsuperpower in the world. These considerations do not bode well for the dispersal of jihadistsfrom Iraq. Foreign fighters in Iraq may prove to be more threatening that their ArabAfghan predecessors in several respects, but they also lack some of the advantages of theirprecursors.

Size

The number of Arab Afghans who trained or fought in the conflict zone was no morethan 3,000–4,000 between 1984 and 1992 (and this estimate is on the generous side). Thenumber of foreign combatants in Iraq will almost certainly match that of the Arab Afghansor be higher. Estimate of the size of the Sunni insurgents in Iraq for each year between July2004 and March 2007 ranges from 20,000–70,000.66 If one takes the bottom end of thatrange—20,000—and estimate the number of foreign fighters to be about 5% of the totalinsurgent movement, one would get about 1,000 foreigners for each year, a total of 4,000 for-eign combatants as of 2007. If one adopts a more conservative estimate of 3%, the numbersof foreign fighters for each year would come to 600, a total of 2,400 in less than four years(it took the Arab Afghans roughly eight years to reach the estimated 3,000–4,000 number).

Two factors have substantially reduced the stream of foreign fighters into Iraq andmay mitigate their threat in the near future. First, Sunni tribes and nationalist insurgentsin Iraq have turned against AQI and are less willing to host foreign fighters than before.AQI’s expulsion from the Anbar province makes it more difficult for foreign fighters toenter Iraq from Syria, which has been a major transit point for foreign combatants. Second,foreign fighters are the main supply of suicide bombers in Iraq, which means they will notbe around to threaten other states.67

Yet despite these mitigating factors, a few hundred dedicated jihadists leaving Iraqcould still pose a threat to regional and international security.

Exposure to Combat

Foreign fighters in Iraq have been exposed to intense combat since the Iraqi insurgency tookoff. Unlike Arab Afghans who hardly fought in the battlefield, the foreign fighters aroundZarqawi were instrumental in some of the major terrorist operations in Iraq, including


Jihad after Iraq 87

the bombings of the United Nations, Jordanian embassy, and Turkish embassy. Foreignfighters also fought in the battles of Fallujah in 2004 and engaged coalition forces in severalcounterinsurgency operations. AQI and its foreign fighters have carried out car bombs andmass-casualty, mass-destruction suicide attacks; deployed a range of improvised explosivedevices (IEDs) and rockets; conducted kidnappings and beheadings; shot down aircraft;engaged in “wolf pack” attacks against hardened targets and assassinations of high-valuepersonnel; and intimidated the Iraqi government, the majority Shi’ite population, and, morerecently, Sunni insurgents and tribes that oppose them.68 Arab Afghans did not come closeto this level of military engagement in Afghanistan.

Nature of Learning Environment

In addition to combat exposure, foreign fighters in Iraq have acquired a number of logisticalskills and clandestine tactics. Many of the foreign fighters in Iraq have been smuggledthrough Syria and, to a lesser extent, Turkey, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Iran. Networkingwith smugglers is valuable because the latter could aid foreign fighters in leaving Iraq fornew destinations. Cooperation with deposed Ba’athist officers and intelligence personnelgives foreign fighters access to valuable counter-surveillance and counter-detection skills.Cooperation with kidnappers and criminals enables foreign fighters to establish financingsyndicates to fund their operations outside Iraq. Operating in relatively developed urbansettings that mirror neighboring states enables dispersing jihadists to transfer their skillswithout having to make substantial adjustments for terrain.

Strategic Depth

Iraq, unlike Afghanistan, is in the heart of the Arab world and centered in the oil-rich Gulfregion. It borders on six countries: Iran, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Turkey, and Kuwait.Four of these countries are close allies of the United States, which makes them potentialtargets of dispersing jihadists. More importantly, Iran and Syria are eager to prevent U.S.forces from succeeding in Iraq and may facilitate the movement of dispersing jihadists tocountries in which U.S. forces are present. Arab Afghans that sought to enter Arab countriesor Europe had to cross several borders, forge documents, and purchase airline tickets, allof which made their task harder and made them vulnerable to detection and arrests.

The proximity of foreign fighters in Iraq to some of their target states reduces thelogistical complexity of striking these states. There have already been several examples ofjihadists in Iraq deploying their cadres in bordering states:

• April 2004—Jordan: Foiled attack involving logistics and personnel from Iraq. Cellsought to smuggle three carloads of bomb-making supplies (explosives, detonators,and raw materials) into the country to develop car bombs.

• August 2005—Jordan: Attack on two U.S. warships in the Port of Aqaba in-volved three Syrian militants who smuggled seven Katyusha rockets over theIraqi–Jordanian border. Jordanian authorities claim the militants were in constanttouch with militants in Iraq.

• November 2005—Jordan: Attack on the Radisson SAS, Grand Hyatt, and DaysInn hotels in Amman, undertaken by Iraqi bombers who infiltrated across the Iraqiborder. They were sent by Zarqawi.


88 M. M. Hafez

• Late 2006–Early 2007—Saudi Arabia: Authorities break up seven cells that con-tained 172 members, some of whom trained in Iraq. They were planning majorattacks on oil facilities, Westerners, and government officials.

Communication Environment

The proliferation of Internet-based technologies facilitates the communication needs ofdispersing jihadists and enables them to share their skills and training much more easilythan the Arab Afghans were able to do. The Internet enables dispersing jihadists to distributetheir pamphlets and communiques with little expense; share their knowledge, skills, andtactics with like-minded jihadists by distributing online manuals; maintain network ties withjihadists in Iraq without risking detection; reach out to other jihadi groups for guidance onhow to enter other conflict zones; and access their training manuals without having to carrythem across borders.

Dispersing terrorists will likely mine the Internet for practical information and open-source intelligence in the same way counterterrorist analysts monitor jihadi websites forclues about jihadi behaviors and vulnerabilities.

Networking

Jihadists in Iraq are connected to experienced trainers, gun runners, people smugglers,guns-for-hire, criminals, forgers, and other radical Islamist groups. AQI has managed totransform its largely foreign membership into an Iraqi organization through cooptation andmoney. As noted earlier, similar network ties were instrumental for the rise of Al Qaeda’sterror network and for social revolutionaries in Algeria and Egypt. Deposed Ba’athiststhat cannot be integrated in the new Iraqi order may find a home in the global jihadistmovement as mercenaries, facilitators, or operatives. Although Afghan Mujahidin did notjoin Al Qaeda’s global movement in the 1990s, this may have been a practical problem oflanguage. Iraq’s Ba’athists speak Arabic and can, therefore, mix with the Arab-dominatedglobal jihadist movement. This was not the case with the Afghan Mujahidin.

Vulnerabilities of Dispersing Jihadists

Despite the clear advantages available to Iraq’s foreign fighters over their Arab Afghanpredecessors, the former will encounter two major difficulties if they choose to leave Iraqin the near future. The first is the absence of an inviting safe haven that borders on Iraq.The Arab Afghans were able to move between Pakistan and Afghanistan with relative ease.Those who wanted to leave Afghanistan’s battlefields or camps could settle in Peshawar’smany guest houses and training camps without fear of harassment or arrest. Iraq’s dispersingjihadists will not have such a haven to exploit. Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Turkeyare aligned with the United States and have been targets of radical Islamists. Therefore,they have no incentive to shelter fleeing jihadists.

Syria and Iran might choose to provide a safe haven for fleeing militants, but theywill do so discretely to avoid incurring further hostility or military action from the UnitedStates. Jihadists that go to Iran and Syria will not be able set up open camps like the onesthat developed in Pakistan during the 1980s or under the Taliban in the late 1990s.

Absence of an inviting safe haven next to Iraq means that dispersing jihadists will haveto cross multiple borders and acquire documentation to enter distant havens. These, in turn,increase their vulnerability to detection and arrest. Many foreign fighters in Iraq have to


Jihad after Iraq 89

turn over their cell phones, money, and passports to smugglers or the insurgent groups thathost them.69 If they choose to leave, they will have to acquire money and forged documentsto cross multiple borders to make it back to their homelands or new destinations.

The second major obstacle that dispersing jihadists will encounter is the fact that Arab,North African, and European governments are aware of their potential threat and are prepar-ing to deal with it. During the Afghan campaign, Arab and European governments tookin returning volunteers because they were aided by these governments to fight the SovietUnion. Volunteering for Iraq, in contrast, is considered a criminal act by these govern-ments. Returnees from Iraq will encounter arrests, interrogation, and possibly surveillanceto ensure they are not a threat. European governments are not likely to welcome jihadistsin their territory as they did Arab Afghans during the 1990s. Having been bitten once bythe Arab Afghans, these governments are on the lookout for jihadists seeking to destabilizetheir countries or take advantage of their territories.

Lessons for Countering the Future Dispersion of Iraq’s Jihadists

Michael McConnell, the director of national intelligence in the United States, recentlycautioned that “as we inflict significant damage on al-Qa’ida in Iraq, it may shift resourcesto mounting more attacks outside of Iraq.”70 The recent history of the Arab Afghanssuggests that such an assessment is not unduly alarmist. It is reasonable to assume thatthose who took extraordinary risks to travel to Iraq, especially the irreconcilable elementsof the insurgent movements, will seek to further their militant careers if staying in Iraq isno longer a viable option. Moreover, in the context of a multi-front “global jihad” wagedby Al Qaeda’s leaders against the United States and its allies, it is reasonable to assume thatIraq’s dispersing jihadists will seek linkages with radical groups that could benefit fromtheir skills and experiences. Learning the lessons of the Arab Afghans, therefore, is vitallyimportant for dealing with the bleed out from Iraq.

Arab Afghans were able to exploit four factors when they decided to leave Afghanistanand Pakistan in the early 1990s: emerging conflicts, safe havens, governmental support,and militant networks.

Emerging civil wars and insurgencies in Algeria, Bosnia, and Chechnya enabled someArab Afghans to move to inviting conflict zones where they could extend their militantcarriers. Therefore, foreign fighters that wish to leave Iraq in the near future are likely toseek other conflict zones, such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Somalia, where they are likelyto be welcomed by fellow militants in need of support. Foreign fighters might also seek tojoin insurgent Islamist groups in North Africa, especially in Algeria.

Dispersing Arab Afghans exploited safe havens and governmental support in Pakistan,the Sudan, and Yemen. All three countries had populations sympathetic to radical Islamists,were weak states with limited capacity to monitor borders, and harbored political calcula-tions that involved exploiting militants. Pakistan and Yemen used veterans of the Afghanjihad as assets in their national and regional conflicts, while the government in the Sudansought to benefit from the largess of bin Laden. Therefore, countries and communities withpopulations sympathetic to jihadism and governments unwilling or unable to monitor theirborders are at risk of attracting dispersing foreign fighters in the near future.

Iraq’s dispersing foreign fighters are likely to seek safe havens in places like Pakistan’stribal regions where radicals have been receiving shelter since the 1980s and where AlQaeda’s core leaders are currently based. Another possible destination is Palestinian refugeecamps in Lebanon because those camps are policed by Palestinian factions, not the Lebanesegovernment.


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Moreover, countries like Iran also might shelter radical Islamists if it perceives themas potential assets to be deployed against Western governments opposed to its nuclearprogram. Syria may shelter some dispersing jihadists to use them as assets against anti-Syrian forces inside Lebanon. Yemen might shelter radical Islamists in its war with theZaydi (Shi’ite) Huthi movement in the north.

Arab Afghans during the 1990s benefited from the network ties that developed duringthe anti-Soviet campaign. It took network links to enter into new conflict zones, financetraining camps, and acquire forged documents to move from country to county. Facil-itators of jihad in Pakistan, Europe, and the Sudan were the backbone of the emerg-ing Al Qaeda global network and the key to its high-profile operations. Even thosewho did not join Al Qaeda during the early 1990s sought haven in its Afghanistancamps during the second half of the 1990s, which later facilitated their merger withAl Qaeda.

Foreign fighters in Iraq have succeeded in forging new network ties with formerBa‘athists and Sunni insurgents. Therefore, dispersing jihadists are likely to exploit thesenetworks to exit from Iraq or build connections between facilitators inside Iraq and terroristcells outside the country.

Governments concerned about the threat of dispersing jihadists can broadly pursuea number of measures. First, they must make the dispersion of Iraq’s jihadists a topintelligence concern. Counterterrorism services must dedicate resources and personnelto assess the extent of dispersion from Iraq and track its development over time. At aminimum, they should develop databases on terrorism incidents with links to Iraq-basedgroups to look for patterns in network facilitation, methods, and tactics. Given that friend-ship and kinship ties are salient features of terrorist radicalization and recruitment, per-sons linked to insurgents in Iraq could be flagged for additional scrutiny when crossingborders.

Second, governments must treat emerging conflicts, weak states, and ungovernedregions as potential magnets for dispersing jihadists. Collaboration with allied intelligenceservices to anticipate the influx of militants into these areas in necessary, so is the need todevelop information on smuggling networks and routes that may facilitate the transfer ofdispersing jihadists. Routes to Afghanistan and Pakistan’s Federally Administered TribalAreas (FATA) should be a top priority because Al Qaeda is sheltered there and has strongsupport structures in both countries.

Third, Western states could aid vulnerable countries to improve the quality of theirpassports and update their border control technologies to make it difficult for individualsto enter their territories with falsified documents. Fourth, concerned governments mustengage in robust diplomacy to dissuade other states from offering unofficial safe havens tofleeing militants.

Finally, it may be beneficial to offer amnesty and reintegration programs to repen-tant foreign fighters seeking to exit the path of jihad. Those who return and provideinformation on their networks could be given immunity from prosecution or reduced sen-tences to be served in rehabilitation centers. Returnees should be monitored and have theirpassports confiscated to prevent them from traveling abroad until their rehabilitation iscomplete.

These measures comprise a comprehensive strategy to counter the threat of dispersingjihadists. They make the dispersion of Iraq’s foreign fighters more difficult, expose themto the risk of being apprehended at borders, deprive them of support networks and newsafe havens, and encourage them to exit the path of jihad through rehabilitation andreintegration.


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Notes

1. Richard A. Oppel, Jr., “Foreign Fighters in Iraq Are Tied to Allies of U.S.,” New York Times,22 November 2007.

2. Mohammed M. Hafez, Suicide Bombers in Iraq: The Strategy and Ideology of Martyrdom(Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2007).

3. The term “Arab Afghans” was initially used by some Arab governments—especially Egyptand Algeria—in the early 1990s as a derogatory reference to individuals that were seen as “trou-blemakers” or religious zealots that donned Afghan-style clothing. The term implied that Islamicactivists that went to Afghanistan brought with them alien ideologies and habits that were the sourceof political turmoil at home.

4. See the works of Steve Coll, Ghost Wars (New York: Penguin Books, 2005); Peter Bergen,The Osama bin Laden I Know: An Oral History of al Qaeda’s Leader (Washington, DC: Free Press,2006); and Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower: Al Qaeda and the Road to 9/11 (New York:Knoph, 2006).

5. Camille Tawil, Al-Qadea and Its Sisters (Arabic; London: Al-Saqi Books, 2007); John R.Schindler, Unholy Terror: Bosnia, Al-Qa’ida, and the Rise of Global Jihad (Osceola, WI: ZenithPress, 2007); Evan F. Kohlmann, Al-Qaida’s Jihad in Europe: The Afghan-Bosnia Network (Oxford,UK: Berg Publishers, 2004).

6. Abdullah Anas, The Birth of the Arab Afghans: The Autobiography of Abdullah Anasbetween Masoud and Abdullah Azzam (Arabic; London: Dar Al Saqi, 2002), p. 87. Anas was one ofthe early volunteers to Afghanistan and a close aid to, and the son-in-law of, Azzam. He also foughtwith Ahmed Shah Masoud, one of the legendary commanders of the Afghan Mujahidin.

7. According to Steve Coll, Ghost Wars, p. 201, “The CIA’s Islamabad station estimated in a1989 cable to Langley that there were probably about four thousand Arab volunteers in Afghanistan,mainly organized under [Abdurrab Rasul] Sayyaf’s leadership.” See similar estimates by ForeignReport, “Arab Volunteers in Afghanistan,” Jane’s Intelligence, 18 May 1989; and Anthony Davis,“Foreign Combatants in Afghanistan,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, 1 July 1993.

8. Anas, The Birth of the Arab Afghans; Muhammad Salah, “Events of the Jihad Years: TheJourney of Afghan Arabs from Everywhere to Washington and New York” (Arabic), Al-Hayat, 17–21October 2001, 5-part series.

9. Ibid.10. The story of Abdullah Ali Mekkawi, a Saudi volunteer to Afghanistan, is instructive. At

the age of 18, he expressed a desire to aid the jihad in Afghanistan after learning about it throughtwo magazines, Al-Jihad and Al-Bunyan. Both of these were widely available in the Gulf. He gainedpermission from his mother and Sheikh Abdel Aziz bin Baz to go. His mother bought him the ticket.He wrote down the address of Abdullah Azzam’s Services Bureau in Peshawar, Pakistan, from theback of Al-Jihad magazine. Nasser al-Buraq, “Volleyball Player that Turned to Jihad Tells Al-HayatHis Tales with the Arab Afghans” (Arabic) Al Hayat, 9 May 2007.

11. Anas, The Birth of the Arab Afghans, p. 14.12. Foreign Report, “Arab Volunteers in Afghanistan”; Mustafa Hamid (Abu Walid al-Masri),

“The Story of the Arab Afghans: From the Time of their Arrival in Afghanistan until their Departurewith the Taliban” (Arabic), Asharq al-Awsat, 12 December 2004, part 5.

13. Salah, “Events of the Jihad Years”; Davis, “Foreign Combatants in Afghanistan.”14. Ibid.15. Foreign Report, “Arab Volunteers in Afghanistan.”16. Michael Knights, “Saudi Terrorist Cells Await Return of Jihadists from Iraq,” Jane’s Intel-

ligence Review, 1 December 2005.17. Foreign Report, “Arab Volunteers in Afghanistan”; Salah, “Events of the Jihad Years”; Coll,

Ghost Wars.18. Anas, The Birth of the Arab Afghans.19. Anas, The Birth of the Arab Afghans; Wright, The Looming Tower.


92 M. M. Hafez

20. Hamid (Abu Walid al-Masri), “The Story of the Arab Afghans,” parts 5–6; CombatingTerrorism Center, “Cracks in the Foundation: Leadership Schisms in al-Qa‘ida from 1989–2006,”Harmony Project (West Point), October 2007. For more on the limited fighting role of the “ArabAfghans,” see Davis, “Foreign Combatants in Afghanistan.”

21. Zarqawi went to Peshawar, Pakistan, in 1989, and moved on to Khost, Afghanistan, to fightagainst the regime of Najibullah. In 1993, he returned to Jordan and shortly after created a militantcell with other “Arab Afghans” known as “Bayat al-Imam” (Allegiance to the Imam) group. The cellwas discovered and its members imprisoned until a royal pardon freed them in 1999. Zarqawi wentback to Afghanistan and set by a training camp in the Herat region bordering Iran. Following thecollapse of the Taliban regime, Zarqawi made his way to Northern Iraq to seek a new safe haven.Shortly after the United States invaded Iraq, he created and led the Tawhid wal-Jihad group, whichlater became Al Qaeda in Iraq. See Fuad Husayn, “Al-Zarqawi: The Second Generation of Al-Qaeda”(Arabic), Al-Quds al-Arabi (London), 13–30 May 2005, parts 1–15.

22. Coll, Ghost Wars, p. 144 (emphasis added).23. Salah, “Events of the Jihad Years”; Mustafa Hamid (Abu Walid al-Masri), “The Story of

the Arab Afghans,” part 7.24. Al-Buraq, “Volleyball Player that Turned to Jihad.”25. Salah, “Events of the Jihad Years.”26. Ibid.27. Open Source Center (OSC), “Egypt: Leading Arab Afghan on Mistakes of Arab Afghans,

Dispute with Bin Laden,” 27 July 2002.28. Anas, The Birth of the Arab Afghans, pp. 90 and 99.29. Hamid Mustafa (Abu Walid al-Masri), “Chatter on the World’s Rooftop” (Arabic), serialized

by Asharq al-Awsat, 28 October 2006, part 5. Abu Walid al-Masri is one of the earliest volunteersto Afghanistan and became the brother-in-law of Sayf al-Adl (Muhammad Ibrahim Makkawi), AlQaeda’s security chief currently in hiding. Mustafa became a member of Al Qaeda’s consultativecouncil in 1998. When Al Qaeda leaders moved to the Sudan, he remained in Afghanistan to run thetraining camps in Khost. He oversaw the “Furqan Project,” which involved training militants fromthe former Soviet Union, including members of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan’sNahda Party. When the Taliban came to power, he served as the editor of their Arabic version of theirmagazine, The Emirate.

30. Quoted in Coll, Ghost Wars, p. 153.31. Khalid Sharaf al-Din, “Fundamentalists’ Leaders Bogus Organizations to Confuse the Se-

curity Organs” (Arabic), 7 March 1999, part 2 of 3.32. Hamid (Abu Walid al-Masri), “The Story of the Arab Afghans.”33. Montage entitled “And Worship Shall Be Only for Allah,” issued by the Media Division of

AQI in June 2005, available at www.alaflam.ws/wdkl/index.htm (accessed 15 July 2005).34. Quoted in Evan Kohlmann, Al-Qaeda’s Jihad in Europe: The Afghan-Bosnian Network

(New York: Berg, 2005, p. 17).35. Davis, “Foreign Combatants in Afghanistan.” According to Foreign Report, “Arab Volun-

teers in Afghanistan,” there were reports that “Arab Afghans” massacred surrendering Afghan troopsloyal to the communist regime. There were even rumors that their wives and daughters were sent tothe Gulf as slave labor. The tendency toward beheadings, mass bombings of civilian targets, and ageneral hostility to non-Muslims became most manifest in Bosnia, Chechnya, and Iraq.

36. For more on training camps in Bosnia, see OSC, “B-H Croat Report Details Presence ofMujahidin in Bosnia During, After War,” 24 June 2006; Kohlmann, Al-Qaed’s Jihad in Europe,p. 24.

37. Hamid (Abu Walid al-Masri), “Chatter on the World’s Rooftop,” part 6.38. See, for example, the video of Khattab in Afghanistan, available at http://www.youtube.com/

watch?v=BfIXiaO4Qx4.39. Hamid (Abu Walid al-Masri), “The Story of the Arab Afghans,” part 4.


Jihad after Iraq 93

40. Abdullah Anas married the daughter of Abdulla Azzam; Abu Musab al-Zarqawi marriedhis sister off to Khaled Mustafa al-Aruri (Abu Qassam or Abu Ashraf), who was one of Zarqawi’sclosest associates from 1989 to 2001.

41. James Bruce, “US Fears Islamic Attacks in Bosnia,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, 1 March1996.

42. OSC, “Police Worried by Emergence of Transnational Islamic Groups,” 11 July 1996; OSC,“B-H Croat Report Details Presence of Mujahidin.”

43. Bruce, “US Fears Islamic Attacks in Bosnia.”44. Kohlmann, Al-Qaeda’s Jihad in Europe, chap. 3.45. Mohammed M. Hafez, Why Muslims Rebel: Repression and Resistance in the Islamic World

(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2003).46. Mohammed Muqadem, “The Journey of the Algerian Afghans from the [Armed Islamic]

Group to the Al Qaeda Organization” (Arabic), Al-Hayat, 25 November 2001, part 3 of 7.47. Quoted in Salah, “Events of the Jihad Years,” part 4 of 5.48. Hamid (Abu Walid al-Masri), “The Story of the Arab Afghans,” part 5.49. OSC, “Arab Afghans Said to Launch Worldwide Terrorist War,” 1 December 1995. For a

recent assessment of Pakistan’s historical legacy of shielding Islamists, see Carlotta Gall and DavidRohde, “Militants Escape Control of Pakistan, Officials Say,” New York Times, 15 January 2008.

50. Paul Tumelty, “The Rise and Fall of Foreign Fighters in Chechnya,” Terrorism Monitor(Jamestown Foundation), 4(2) (26 January 2006); also see the online video biography of Khattab asrelated by jihadists at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v = BfIXiaO4Qx4

51. Salah, “Events of the Jihad Years,” part 3.52. Wright, The Looming Tower; Bergen, The Osama bin Laden I Know.53. Ibid.54. Salah, “Events of the Jihad Years.”55. International Crisis Group, “Yemen: Coping with Terrorism and Violence in a Fragile State,”

ICG Middle East Report, No. 8, 8 January 2003; Jonathan Schanzer, Al-Qaeda’s Armies: Middle EastAffiliate Groups and the Next Generation of Terror (Washington, DC: Washington Institute for NearEast Policy, 2004).

56. Davis, “Foreign Combatants in Afghanistan.”57. OSC, “Arab Afghans Said to Launch Worldwide Terrorist War,” 1 December 1995; OSC,

“Police Worried by Emergence of Transnational Islamic Groups,” 11 July 1996; OSC, “Report onIslamic Movements in Britain,” 12 December 1997; Salah, “Events of the Jihad Years,” parts 3–5;Muqadem, “The Journey of the Algerian Afghans,” parts 1–7; Anthony Davis, “The Afghan Files:Al-Qaeda Documents from Kabul,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, 1 February 2002; Gordon Corera,“How Militant Islam Found a Home in London,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, 1 August 2002.

58. Kohlmann, Al-Qaeda’s Jihad in Europe, pp. 19–23.59. Muqadem, “The Journey of the Algerian Afghans,” parts 1–7.60. Salah, “Event of the Jihad Years,” part 3.61. Khalid Sharaf al-Din, “Fundamentalist Leaders Create Bogus Organizations to Confuse the

Security Organs” (Arabic), Asharq al-Awsat, 7 March 1999, part 2–3.62. Quoted in Kathy Evans, “Pakistan clamps down on Afghan Mojahedin and Orders Expulsion

of Arab Jihad Supporters,” The Guardian (London), 7 January 1993.63. Bruce, “US Fears Islamic Attacks in Bosnia.”64. OSC, “Arab Afghans Said to Launch Worldwide Terrorist War”; OSC, “Police Worried by

Emergence of Transnational Islamic Groups;” Bruce, “US Fears Islamic Attacks in Bosnia.”65. Coll, Ghost Wars, pp. 248–249 and 278.66. These estimates are derived from the Brookings Institution Iraq Index reports

of December 2004 (available at http://www.brookings.edu/fp/saban/iraq/index20041215.pdf)and June 2007 (available at http://www.brookings.edu/fp/saban/iraq/index20070628.pdf). In itsJanuary 2008 report (available at http://www.brookings.edu/saban/∼/media/Files/Centers/Saban/Iraq%20Index/index.pdf), foreign fighters are estimated to range from 300 to 2,000 for each monthof 2007. The variance in estimates of the size of Iraq’s insurgents is substantial. As early as 2005,


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General Mohammed Abdullah Shahwani, the Iraqi intelligence director, estimated that there were40,000 hard-core insurgents (see Tom Squitieri, “General Says New War Could Strain Military,” USAToday, 16 February 2005). In 2006, General John Abizaid estimated the insurgent force to be between10,000 and 20,000 (see Jim Michaels, “19,000 Insurgents Killed in Iraq Since ‘03,” USA Today, 26September 2007).

67. Hafez, Suicide Bombers in Iraq; Oppel, Jr., “Foreign Fighters in Iraq.”68. Michael Knights, “Saudi Terrorist Cells Await Return of Jihadists from Iraq,” Jane’s Intel-

ligence Review, 1 December 2005; Michael Knights and Brooke Neumann, “A New Afghanistan?Exploring the Iraqi Jihadist Training Ground,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, 1 July 2006; Jane’s WorldInsurgency and Terrorism, “Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI),” 26 October 2007.

69. Qasim Hamadi, “Detailed Information on 600 Al Qaeda Fighters in Documents Capturedby American Forces in Al-Anbar” (Arabic), Al-Hayat, 13 January 2008; Karen De Young, “PapersPaint New Portrait of Iraq’s Foreign Insurgents,” Washington Post, 21 January 2008.

70. Brian Knowlton, “Intelligence Chief Cites Qaeda Threat to U.S.,” New York Times, 5February 2008.


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