The Failed State-Organized Crime-Terrorism Nexus: The cases of Boko Haram and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb

Lord Akporh Sowah

Department of Political Science, University of Alberta, 10-16 Henry Marshall Tory Building, T6G 2H4. Canada or 184-10333 121 St. Nw, Edmonton, AB T5N 1L1, Canada. E-mail:

lord.sowah@yahoo.com. Tel: 780-265-5493.

Abstract

The West African region has raised controversies on the international political platform. As organized crimes create security threats globally, the collaboration between terrorists and organized criminality make the situation worse. Several authors present theories explaining why terrorism takes place, as well as why terrorists collaborate with criminals in carrying out certain activities. These theories explain the crime-terror nexus between organized criminality and terrorism. This paper discusses the issue of failed state, and Transnational Organized Crime in the terrorism nexus. The theories discussed in the paper include the structural causes; diffusion of terrorism; terrorism can creep through the boundaries of neighboring countries, and crime-terror intersections; the collaboration between terrorists and criminals to carry out coordinated attacks. Further, the paper addresses the possible modalities of convergence between terrorism and organized criminality by drawing from confluence; when terrorist activities are similar to those of organized criminality (kidnapping, theft, forgery, drug trafficking, and extortion for protection), transformation or hybrid blending, and cooperation with criminal gangs. The paper cites Boko Haram and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) as notable cases that provide meaning for all the three modalities of convergence. Finally, the paper concludes by highlighting some key policy recommendations and overall concluding remarks.

Introduction

Brief Overview

Multiple security threats and dilemmas continue to draw challenges for several West

African countries (Abrahms, 2008). Globally, organized crime and terrorism are two forms of

crime that poses major threats to human security. In most cases, transnational organized crime

impedes economic, social, democratic, and cultural developments on a global level, with ! 1

disproportionate influence on developing ‘fragile’ states. With global threats and international

security, fragile states are struggling to fulfill the fundamental political, social, economic, and

security functions that account for a sovereign statehood. The state functions include: (a)

preservation of monopoly regarding the use of armed force, (b) maintaining legitimate and

effective accountable government institutions to protect the rights of its citizens, (c) creating a

regulatory and legal environment suitable for the private sector’s activities, and (d) meeting the

population’s social welfare needs. The basic assumptions concerning sovereignty and statehood

are absent in several West African countries, which creates an opportunistic partnership between

extremist groups, terrorists, and other aspects of state apparatuses (Angjeli, 2003). As a

consequent, the challenges and threats arising from transnational organized crime in Africa as a

whole, and particularly West Africa, are enormous due to the high presence of fragile countries

acting as potential breeding areas for criminal activities. Transnational organized crime in West

Africa takes the form of certain activities including diamond smuggling, human trafficking,

cigarette smuggling, forgery, trafficking in firearms, and illegal manufacture of firearms, armed

robbery, and oil smuggling.

Organized Crimes and Terrorism

The intersection of terrorism and organized crime takes different forms. First, the

alliances between terrorist and criminal groups, or secondly, through direct engagement by

terrorists in crime and criminals in terrorist activities. One of the strongest links in organized

crime-terrorism nexus is crime as the funding source for terrorism (Barnett, 2013). Decline or

failure for states to sponsor terrorist organizations after the Cold War, and additional measures to

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curb terrorism financing have pushed terrorist organizations to seek new sources of funding. At

the same time, the ever-increasing mobility, rapid innovations in communications and

globalization of world markets have created new opportunities for massive profits through illicit

deals. Currently, statistics places the total illicit trade’s volume at between 7% and 10% of the

world’s economy, with the production and trafficking of drugs remaining the market leader.

Crime-for-cash by extreme terrorist groups is not new (Barnett, 2014). However, experts raise

questions as to whether long-term strategic alliances, given the fundamental differences in

motives and aims, could be the long-lasting solutions to these unruly activities. In the real sense,

terrorists pursue a political agenda; while on the other hand, criminals do not intend to change

the political status quo (unless it threatens their working environment), but to push their profits to

the maximum. Arguably, decentralizing terrorist organizations leads to autonomous cells, which

facilitate cooperation and ideologies of terrorist leaders avoiding association with criminal

groups. Nevertheless, it is the belief of experts that criminal groups and terrorists create in-house

capacities for terror/crime than opting for alliances with organizations that are already operating

in those realms (Berrebi, 2012).

Failed States and Terrorism

Several phenomena lead to the subsumed ‘failed state’ label. Critics insist that rankings

and indexes based on aggregated scores regarding different areas of state performance (e.g.

governance, security, service delivery, and economics) pool states that have disparate features.

Additionally, experts have also noted the urgency to differentiate between the willingness, and

ability of the government in delivering these mandates (Cox, 2004). West Africa countries top

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the rankings of the failed-state category as they face substantially different challenges; from

illegitimate governments to the total lack of state authority or post-conflict recovery to current

civil strife. Other factors influencing the territory’s conduciveness to the presence of terrorism

include availability of income sources, adequacy of operational access and infrastructure,

favorable social and demographic characteristics, and invisibility (e.g. the ability to blend into

the entire population).

Organized Crime and Failed States

Some factors such as adequacy of infrastructure and invisibility are relevant for organized

crimes, but business opportunities (including the global market) play the overriding

considerations (Crenshaw, 1987). Linking organized crime to a specific location is somewhat

misleading since illicit streams flow through a series of countries (usually ends in rich countries

whose consumers are the main profit providers). Nevertheless, geographies of the illicit flows

prove that failed states can act as excellent environments for specific organized crimes, but not

all. The porous borders and weak state structures are relevant for trafficking of human beings and

drugs or smuggling of minerals. On the other hand, cyber-crime requires more reliable

infrastructure.

While there is a clear correlation between failed states and organized crime, the direction

of causality remains questionable. According to Crenshaw (1981), sharing of illicit streams in the

overall economy is larger than in the rich states; this means that profits from illicit activities are

larger than government budgets and salaries; government officials are more susceptible to

corruption. The state-structure infiltration by organized crime groups, as well as the corruption

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by political elites, the law enforcement, the judiciary, and other large governmental bodies

protect organized crime from persecution, and thus securing the future influence—definitely to

preserve the perfect working conditions for these groups (Crenshaw, 1987). With such intrusion

of unimaginable measures, there are chances of post-conflict or weak states that prevent the

establishment of a stable governance structure. These measures also undermine international

stabilization and efforts to build states through peace and crisis-response operations.

Crime-Terror Nexus

Crime-Terror nexus is a concept that refers to grouping two different actors that have

distinct identities, methods, and tools, which can also go overly rigid for practical purposes

(Eastman, 2002). Following the United Nations Convention on Transnational Organized Crime, a

group must have the following characteristics to perform organized crime. (a) must consist of at

least three people in collaboration, (b) the members must gather for a considerable or indefinite

period, (c) must be convicts or suspects in serious criminal offences, and (d) must have

objectives in pursuing profit and power. Terrorism is conducting premeditated violence and

threats of violence from the members of an organized group whose intention is attempting to

influence political behavior. The notion on terrorism differs from other political violence, that is,

different from ‘paramilitary’, which consists of groups that maintain violent capacities, and yet

not part of the state and private enterprises responsible for provision of various services.

The nature difference between both groups (political for terrorists, more entrepreneurial

for criminals) is the basis for skepticism, as stated in Gurr (1968), and Forest (2012), which has

raised serious scholarly debates. The immediate post-Cold War influence provides both players

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with more access to financial global markets and technological advancements, as well as with

increased civil wars and weak states. Although traditionally different, the rise in transnational

level of organized crimes of the 1990s, and the ever-changing nature of terrorist activities are the

major contributors to the blurred difference between criminal and politically motivated violence.

Such evanescence of the traditional limits is the current predominant character of the nexus

(Hassan, 1996). It includes one side of the flexible interactions between separate entities, and

another side of multilayered implications, which can cultivate on a regional and global level.

This paper seeks to address “The Failed State-Transnational Organized Crime-Terrorism

Nexus” by basing its arguments on the cases of the “Boko Haram” and “Al-Qaeda” in the

Islamic Maghreb. The theoretical review of the paper will include the concepts of failed states,

terrorism, and transnational organized crime. The theories in this paper include the structural

causes, diffusion of terrorism, and crime-terror intersections. The paper will also provide the

arguments for the possible modalities of convergence drawing on scholarly and documentary

evidence, as well as the contexts perpetuating them. The notable cases of convergence will

include Boko Haram and the Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). Finally, the paper will

address several counter measures or policy recommendations coupled with a precise conclusion.

Part 1: Theoretical Review/Conceptual Explanations

Structural Causes

In 1981, Martha Crenshaw pointed out a theoretical approach to comprehending the

causes of terrorism. Believing that terrorists are rational individuals, Crenshaw (1981) suggested

that terrorism activities rise in an environment with dissatisfied and discontented minority groups

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who lack opportunities for participating in political matters. West African states consisted of

many different religions and ethnicities. Additionally, democracy is a fragile issue in the region,

with countless instances of political power consolidated in the power of one entity. Through such

trends, it is easy to find dissatisfied political, religious, and ethnic minorities. Crenshaw

reinforces her arguments by offering terrorism as a rational strategy for people whose wish is to

challenge the authority of the state, especially since it appears as a relatively inexpensive choice

(Heyman & Mickolus, 1980). Nevertheless, she further explains that analysts could never have

anticipated the rise of Boko Haram of Nigeria as a violent threat to the nation’s wellbeing.

Although, changing the structure of the government with Jonathan Goodluck’s sudden

presidency has been cited as a potential account for reviving the Boko Haram sect; several other

West African countries have maintained consistent behavior on their political status for the past

twenty years.

The other common account for the rising trend of terrorism is economic deprivation. For

example, Ted Gurr (1968) in “A causal Model of Strife” links economic disparity with the

predisposition of the individuals to fall back on violent political actions. On the contrary, studies

such as the ones by Makarenko (2004) demonstrate that these links between terrorism and

economic development are weak. Considerably, the evidence is conflicting, and thus

inconclusive. In his book on “Africa and the War on Terrorism,” Ridley (2008) mentions the

general explanations regarding the emergence of terrorism. Several other contributors to that

academic volume cite external and internal indices as potential reasons for the rise of terror in the

West African region: highly corrupted states that are unable to govern effectively, a Wahhabi

focus on historical African successions, authoritative regimes, etc…

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To be specific, Ted Dagne believes there are internal indicators illustrating why the

continent will play a big role on the war-on-terror menace. Dagne emphasizes that official

corruption and abject poverty make many African states very attractive destinations for terrorist

groups (Heyman & Mickolus, 1980). This is a possible explanation that the list for causes of

terrorism in West Africa is very long. A blend of these causes could exist in the region, but with

disparate intensity in varying times and places. Forest (2012) alludes to some of the challenges

on Boko Haram, which creates a complex security territory in Nigeria. These challenges include

radical Islam and high unemployment, which have continuously challenged the state’s authority

on combating opposition. However, none of these factors would answer completely or directly

the causal effects of extreme terrorism in these regions.

Embarking on a more regional approach, Ridley (2008) indicates that West African

dynamics are in a way that internal threats override external ones. This means that West Africa’s

territory risks developing terrorist activities as a response to the internal pressure regarding

‘failed’ states, and increased extremism amongst the Muslim population compared to the

perforation of exogenous terrorist organizations from elsewhere. All these notable causes lie

under the structural category, which posits the causes of terrorist activities emanate from the

environment, and the cultural, economic, political, and social structures of the society (Heyman

& Mickolus, 1980).

Other scholars argue that terrorist groups can win over members for causes that are not

political. For instance, Abrahms (2008) refutes Crenshaw’s (1981) framework, which asserts that

terrorists are rational individuals who attack the innocent for political ends. Contrarily, Abrahms

(2008) finds out that terrorist actor s participate in these organizations not to accomplish their

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official goals, but to undergo social solidarity with other actors. To Ross’s (1993) model, it

happens that the most important fulfillment is ‘condition of communion’ and ‘sense of solidarity’

present in the social collectivity. With recognized despaired youth and high unemployment, it is

possible that the levels of terrorist activities in West Africa’s region experiences high

membership rates. Barnett’s (2013) model emphasizes on the fact that these organizations will

try to survive regardless of whether their actions compromise official goals. Crenshaw (1981)

further discusses that understanding the basic internal organizational processes followed by

terrorists is very crucial for policy because their activities do not necessarily reflect ideological

values. By learning the trends used by these authors, it is true that the bond on social networks

greatly affects the participation in terrorism, as well as their survival, success, and flexibility of

their organizations. For the West African community, these arguments carry a lot of weight since

tribal and family ties are of great value.

Diffusion of Terrorism

Other bodies of literature emphasize the chances of external penetration by terrorists into

a new region. For instance, Crenshaw and Midlarsky (1997) emphasize on the contagion

processes. In one country, terrorists’ activities lead to imitation of the same activities in another

country, and emergence of terrorists from experience of the existing groups in the neighboring

countries. Thus, a simple mechanism of diffusion explains terrorism in West African states,

especially after 2001 (9/11). Additionally, globalization assists diffusion of terrorism. Humphrey

(2004) argues that the three major processes have introduced dilemma in Africa. The three

processes include (a) decline in globalization benefits accruing in Africa, (b) globalization of

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Islam, and (c) dissemination of information across the entire continent. They insist on the

importance of globalization in Islam, as well access to increased technology, which they connect

to transporting such ideas (Ross, 1993). These arguments are not only plausible, but also

illustrate their claims by indicating that globalization facilitates spread of Al-Qaeda activities in

West Africa. They also insist there were known Al-Qaeda operatives in Nigeria and Niger

regions before 2001. They point out that Al-Qaeda’s historical financial ties link to terror

financing networks in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and the Democratic Republic of Congo.

In contrast, Heyman and Mickolous (1980) caution against over-relying on this argument

and emphasize that many no-contagious channels can factor the spread of terrorism. So far, this

section has described the socio-economic, political, and religious causes of terrorism.

Nevertheless, none of the possible arguments stands out above each other. Simply put, many of

the arguments apply to the West African case. Demonstrating indigenous causes is somewhat

difficult for the West African region. While it is probable that people in West Africa starting

fusing into terrorism because of an affiliation with the desire or the message for membership

within specific communities. A quick survey by Nigeria-US (2010) reveals that terrorism in West

African countries attracts vast sums of funding. This leads to the connection between terrorist

organizations masterminding political and criminal operations.

The relationship is not new within the scope of academic scholarship. Actually, Shelley

and Picarelli (2002) claims that there is an existence of a conceptual framework where one can

study terrorism as a crime since in many occurrences, terrorists participate in activities whose

motives of crime are political, but the act itself is viewed as criminal. A perfect example is the

kidnapping operations on the Western targets carried out by AQIM and other terrorists groups in

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West African countries and the Sahel. However, not every financial industry whereby Boko

Haram and AQIM become involved is necessarily political. For example, Boko Haram is

connected to bank robberies in major Nigerian cities, which makes these activities purely

criminal.

Crime-Terror Intersections

While debates are still on regarding the level of cooperation between terrorist

organizations and criminal groups, it is agreed upon that progressively terrorists and their

affiliates rely on criminal enterprises to fund their operations. Shelley and Picarelli (2005)

connect terrorists and criminal organizations through their many similarities. They note that both

the groups are rational actors, produce victims, use similar tactics (kidnapping and

assassinations), and both groups are criminalized through ruling and always stand in opposition

to the state. In addition, both groups operate secretly, although sometimes publicly in friendly

territories. Thus, the available literature regarding organized crime will assist in understanding

the operations of terrorist groups in the financial arena.

Berrebi (2012) agrees that terrorism and organized crime are connected. Terrorism

financing and money laundering could be seen as distinctive activities as they vary in the way

their actors wish to utilize their financial gizmo to disguise their money, but the author further

claims that the difference is useless since the issue is to point out the processing of illegal funds

to reach the organizations beneath the funds. Further, he refers to mutual benefits arising from

convergent interests (Cox, 2004). The author clearly points out that, criminal organizations

benefit from the terrorists’ ability and guerilla organizations to create damage, while the latter,

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however, benefit from the financing, which criminal activities obtain from them. The author also

mentions the fact that accumulating huge amounts of wealth is a challenge to the stability of the

state.

Schmid (1996) further provides a framework for analyzing those terrorist organizations

whose financial benefits are criminal: if terrorist organizations can undergo serious analysis like

the criminal organizations, we can assume that the two have similar behaviors. If it is generally

agreed upon that criminals focus on profit, then we can conclude that terrorists engage in profit-

making crime. Hassan (1996) references Boko Haram’s extensive finances, which are tied to

criminal activities in Nigerian Diaspora members. If there is a logical study on the Boko Haram

of Nigeria, then what would be the implications thereafter? Moreover, such questions are too big

a theoretical leap, as some terrorist funding experts disagree vehemently with the premise that

terrorist and criminal organizations qualify for the same classification.

The debate thus materializes between the two schools of thought: the traditional category

of scholars, and the upcoming literature on the new overlook of Transnational Organized Crime.

The former class argues that although criminal and terrorist organizations can lie on the same

spectrum, their respective grounds are at opposite extremities with each other (Heyman &

Mickolus, 1980). Contrarily, the latter class argues that underground organizations are

progressively merging criminal activities with terrorism, and thus the changing nature of the

threat the two poses to states.

Arguing on a different ground, Wilson (2009) distinguishes between criminal and

terrorist organizations using their motives. The author argues that at the heart of a criminal group

is the preoccupation with profit generation and maximization, while terrorist organizations are

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interested in bringing political changes. In his view, it would be biased to analyze the two groups

in the same manner. Ridley (2008) adds to the difference between the different views of the

groups on motivation by claiming criminals partaking organized crime focus on pure profits, and

seek optimal business environments. According to Ridley, organized crime is not interested in

destruction of the state. On the contrary, terrorists challenge the state directly—by either regime

destruction or attempting political inclusion or competing with the state through their own social

services. In addition, Ridley further states that terrorist organizations are much less

discriminating concerning those victimized by their activities as compared to organized crime.

Napoleoni (2004) on “The New Economy of Terror” agrees with the distinction between

these two groups. She furthers her argument by articulating that both organizations view money

on different perspectives. The author claims that criminal organizations operate their activities

similarly to private corporations, with profit accumulation as the ultimate goal (Abrahms, 2008).

Contrastingly, terrorist organizations’ interest is in money disbursement, other than laundering; to

them, money is not to be accumulated, rather spread within their network to support their

operations. As such, criminal activities, as well as legitimate businesses and illegal profits

represent just one of the ways used by terrorists to finance themselves.

John Picarelli and Louis Shelley of the “Transnational Crime and Corruption Center”

look into the concept of criminal for operating costs, separate funding sources, and non-criminal

sources for their operational activities. For terrorists, their operational funds for their missions

less likely come from criminal activities for the fear of jumbling operational nodes with criminal

activities, which may bring the unwanted attention of law enforcement, thereby jeopardizing

their missions. Other obstacles and challenges facing terrorist organizations engagements in

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criminal activities include skill levels required for participation; greater skills have high

probabilities of exposure to intelligence agencies and law enforcement authorities (Angjeli,

2003). In addition, collaboration with less committed financiers could endanger their

organizations. Picarelli further argues that this could bring double tragedy; raising the funds

through criminal actions could not only raise the attention of the law enforcement authorities, but

also bring increased risk to their cause. Following a more hierarchical structure, the probable

vulnerabilities may affect them both ways. From the terrorists’ perspective, a less ideological

committed contributor may not care about the source of the money, and thus be less bothered by

taking part in theft, drug trafficking, or even prostitution. Still, from the terrorists’ perspective,

the financiers can take part in the “dirty work” while the leadership continues with their

ideologically pure persona (Barnett, 2013).

The importance connected to religious beliefs leads to the crime-terror nexus. There is no

single organized crime formed around the adherence of ideological doctrines, while groups such

as Al-Qaeda and Boko Haram are essentially based on religious motivations. Actually, both these

groups have discredited the corruption of secular leaders (Barnett, 2014). Thus, there is difficulty

in the arrangement between benefiting from financial operations and maintaining ideological

credibility.

Part II: Possible Modalities of Convergence

Overview

Since the Cold War ended, the rising trend of transnational organized crime

organizations, as well as the changing nature of terrorist organizations is the source of new

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opportunities to withstand their common enemies by collaborating. Makarenko (2004) and

Dishman (2005) point out that the crime-terror continuum is convergence. The crime-terror

nexus convergence means that the two groups arrive at one status with terrorists and organized

crime groups becoming same or very similar with convergence of their beliefs and views

(Heyman & Mickolus, 1980). Makarenko (2004) presents that terrorist and criminal

organizations could converge into single entities that originally display characteristics of both

groups concurrently, but with the potential to transfigure into entities at opposite sides of the

continuum. Therefore, transformation occurs to such an extent that the ultimate motivations and

aims of the organizations change.

Nevertheless, there is no evidence proving that political and criminal groups have

converged into single entities with similar motives, ideologies, and views of failure and success.

Tactical association between the two groups has occurred frequently because of their

contemporary consistent interests, although strategic alliances have happened occasionally base

on their long-term goals. As different ideological beliefs and aims of these two entities are

obvious (no conflicts between the two), the realities make it very hard for the two groups to

preserve long-time cooperation or even combine into single entities (Hassan, 1996). However,

the terrorist or criminal group would alter itself into one entity that has features of both groups.

According to Ridley (2008), it is clear that state authorities cannot judge terrorist organizations

or criminal groups by their cover. Criminal groups can display political motivations or adopt

terror techniques to obtain a political advantage or use terrorism to control financial institutions,

natural resources, and subsequently gain political power of the state (Makarenko, 2004).

Consequently, terrorists may focus their attention increasingly on criminal activities that they

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solely maintain a public faced, although underneath, they have altered into a different kind of a

group with a different end game.

Modalities of Convergence

Various expositions are on the consideration of convergence between transnational

organized crime and terrorism, or between terrorism and organized crime. For some time, most

scholarly accounts make use of the two opposing hypotheses. For the first hypothesis, the

convergence of organized criminality and terrorism is a little less than a “contra natura” option.

Utilizing the second hypothesis, this one deals with spontaneity, and a quasi-natural tendency.

Works favoring the first position seek the justification of their theoretical approach, and the

other, the similarities between the two (Ross, 1993). Contrastingly, the critics of convergence

hypotheses only underline the prejudices represented by the trends involved, as well as the

differences distinguishing terrorist groups from organized crimes. However, the evidence from

several decades of research concerning the two phenomena goes beyond the specific type, which

shows two main conclusions.

First, the convergence between organized criminality and terrorism is neither natural nor

against nature. The first hypothesis considering this found empirical confirmation in several

cases. Thus, convergence is not questionable and comparable (Sanderson, 2004). However, the

opposing examples are significant and numerous, which makes it hard to maintain any idea

regarding a generalized trend towards convergence. On the contrary, and in the form if a

secondary conclusion, there are positive convergence cases that do not follow same patterns,

although they make it possible to pinpoint various alternative modalities.

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Confluence (Involvement in other Criminal Activities)

Using appropriation methods, this could be called convergence, and it deals with the

simplest form of the discipline. This type of convergence occurs when terrorist organizations

participate in activities that are similar to organized crimes (Shelley & Picarelli, 2002). Simply

put, this is criminal involvement of a different nature, whose aim is meeting financing or

logistical needs. The following categories indicate specific examples and crimes against

humanity that terrorist organizations commit as the larger part of the global terrorist sphere:

Drug Trafficking: This has been done in two ways: Large-scale by Taliban, Al-Qaeda,

and other jihadist groups; on small-scale by specific members of these larger groups. In all the

cases, their participation in the drug business needs a complete form of convergence (assistance

from professional drug traffickers).

Other illegal trade: following some information, the beginning of last decade saw Al-

Qaeda make use of the black market for gold and other precious stones in order to obtain funds,

launder profits from illegal sources, and convert the cash into objects that kept the value, and

thus easy to transport. Another significant product under trafficking by the jihadists is tobacco.

AQIM’s involvement includes smuggling cigarettes.

Theft: Once more, there is proof of theft in major Nigerian cities by Boko Haram, and

Al-Qaeda operatives throughout the world. These organizations commit robberies in major banks

as a means to obtain the funds required to carry out deadly terrorist attacks. These attacks lead to

hundreds, if not thousands of victims. The perpetrators use robberies as one means of financing.

Forging of Documents; Forgery covers the logistical requirements of terrorist

organizations; this means they work with criminals, who have vast experience as forgers. This

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was the situation with Ahmed Ressam of the Algerian SGPC. He tried to smuggle explosives into

the U.S. to carry out an attack at Los Angeles International Airport in 1999. The individual’s plan

was developed by the Al-Qaeda using falsified documents.

Kidnappings: leaving aside matters of illegal capture and holding people to force them on

political concessions, kidnapping for extortion constitutes a series of financing terrorism, both

global and local. The AQIM joined with the kidnapping business at the break of the last decade,

which is widely known, but by no means is it unique. It is also less interesting to note that Abu

Sayaff, a Philippine-based terrorist organization close to Al-Qaeda, became involved in the

recent kidnappings and ransom demands. The Boko Haram have also have also followed suit and

exploited huge amounts of funds from their kidnapped victims.

Extortion for Protection: the use of threats and intimidation, as the means to collect

regular amounts of money, dates back to the old criminal galleries. For instance, threats and

aggression with the intent to extort money from different businesspeople is now a general

practice amongst terrorist groups.

Transformation or Hybrid Blending (From Terrorism to Organized Crime)

When terrorists involve themselves in illegal businesses, operations, and numerous

revenue lines, there arises the possibility of the terrorists to raise the values attributed to their

illegal practices up to the point of an economic motivation, which is a characteristic of organized

crime (Sanderson, 2004). The change occurs on two levels: the groups evolves towards a hybrid

formation (halfway between organized criminality and terrorism), and transforming the terrorist

network into a criminal organization with the root cause of accumulating economic profits.

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According to Shelley and Picarelli (2005), the second level maintains the original ideological

facade, which makes it very hard to distinguish the cases from the previous ones.

Cooperation with criminal organizations and gangs

There are two classes and different levels in the ways used by organized crime groups

and terrorist to organize their work together (Eastman, 2002; Forest, 2012). One level takes place

when criminals decide to support terrorists because of religious or ideological reasons. This

option is less than abstract with a few empirical illustrations. The second form stems from purely

practical interests, which contains economic or material exchange (Gurr, 1968). Buying

explosives, weapons, and false documents from the criminals plays as a resource for terrorists to

utilize what they lack, as well as seize opportunities to obtain these products. Different reports

validate that various militants of the Al-Qaeda maintained contacts with Eastern European and

Russian criminal organizations. Their aim was to buy chemical, biological, and nuclear material,

although it seems that criminals end up cheating terrorists in their transactions. An example is the

role of the Al-Qaeda in the Balkan region in the 1990s. The Al-Qaeda logistical support came

from Albanian criminal organizations, which in turn collaborated with the Kosovo Liberation

Army (Heyman & Mickolus, 1980). Leaving aside the favorable scenarios between the terrorist-

criminals contracts, the collaboration for pragmatic reasons is not frequent. In most cases, there

are limited, sporadic, and particular exchanges, which are determined by the need to an urgent

resolution. Overall, there comes a time in which the initial correlation gives rise to creating

associations that last longer.

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Critical Scenarios for Convergence

Similar to any other criminal practice, organized crime and terrorism depend on each

other in their context. Not all the circumstances and settings foster them or make them possible

to the same extent. Furthermore, each setting and its time may modulate the development, and

thus generating specific, varied expressions and patterns. The same applies about the

convergence between the two threats (Nigeria-US, 2010). The probabilities in this context can

also change according to the circumstances. However, not all circumstances can favor organized

crime and terrorism with equal measures, while some just facilitate the two settings.

One common type of a facilitating scenario is the relation to the environments that are

crime producing. Such environments include jails, large towns and cities, deprived

neighborhoods, or the enclaves of borders. However, others span across a wider geographical

area: from a large portion to a multinational region. With the second type, there are affinities to

the highest levels between organized crimes and global terrorism. This connection is evident in

the activities of AQIM in the ungovernable Sahelian region and Boko Haram in Nigeria’s poorly

developed North.

Main Features of Convergence

Despite the fact that organized criminals and terrorist organizations spanning across

different borders with different geographical settings, it is clear that the two groups share some

problems and characteristics, which are not accidental but repeated (Makarenko, 2004). These

features include multi-frontier and porous border, state fragility, and weaknesses, ethical and

tribal heterogeneity, and lack of institutional legitimacy, a lot of corruption, armed conflicts, and

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critical or underdeveloped economic situations. A combination of these characteristics

contributes towards fostering the relationship between the two threats, organized crime, and

terrorism. In so doing, the combination extends the motivations that inspire them in both

opportunities and capacities, which make them possible. Legitimacy problems arise due to the

established political order, tribal and ethnic tensions, which sometimes act as catalysts for armed

conflicts (more so those that arise from foreign military interventions, or those that involve the

presence of foreign troops). This feature extends the reasons for practicing terrorism.

The problems of provisioning and food come from poor government, underdevelopment,

and from armed conflicts along with other limitations and economic crises (Sanderson, 2004).

All these problems engender the appearance of illegal markets, which risk exposure because of

the criminal gangs and terrorist organizations. Additionally, the options for the development of

these illegal markets are numerous thanks to corruption, porous borders, and the issues of trust

between tribal sentiments and solidarity commitments. On the last note, the extreme examples

are in the scenarios where institutions are unable to operate, which extends to the state losing its

performance capacity for the most basic functions. This way, it enables criminals and terrorists to

act and interact with complete impunity.

Forms of Collaboration

Incorporation in the Production Chains for Illegal Markets

The jihadist involvement in drug trafficking and other unlawful trades is possible because

of their dominance in these territories where the drugs pass through or come from (Makarenko,

2004). However, this type of control is only profitable if it converts to an ongoing economic

! 21

partnership, with other several groups in the business. For instance, in order to make the most

profitable business out of drugs, Al-Qaeda operatives in Pakistan and Afghanistan create a

commercial relationship between them and growers, corrupt government officials, men of war, as

well as professional traffickers (Ridley, 2008).

Tactical Alliances

This is another form of collaboration, whose course consists of collaboration agreements

and alliances with groups of professional criminals. A perfect example is the MOJWA

(Movement for the Oneness and Jihad in West Africa) jihadist organization formed in 2011

(Nigeria-US, 2010). This group was a result of combining militants from AQIM and local

criminal elements. These organizations struggle to survive, expand their reach, and develop

sophisticated tactics and skills by seeking external assistance for specific, one-time services. The

common motivations for the terrorist and criminal organizations collaborate with each other in

favor of financial viability, personal protection, logistical support, geographical growth, support

of exclusive criminal activities, and introducing third parties to facilitate their organizational

goals (Ross, 1993). However, such collaborations involve great risk to both partners; successful

alliances, or potential sources of competition, distrust, and opportunities for exploiting

vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities can lead to detection, as well as disruption of both

organizations. The tactical alliances could also introduce attention from the authorities,

compromised internal security, and ideological resistance towards illicit endeavors such as

kidnapping, drug trafficking, and fraud. Several observers of the crime-terror syndicates indicate

! 22

these disincentives are the major reasons why the core leadership of these groups, such as AQIM

and Boko Haram, face major challenges in their dealings (Sanderson, 2004).

Sub-contracting of Criminal Services

This collaboration involves hiring know criminal contractors to perform certain duties

and services to economize their efforts, or simply avoid risks. In some occasions, AQIM has paid

organized criminality assailants to kidnap some hostages for them (Shelley & Picarelli, 2005).

However, hiring these criminals keeps the terrorists under the radar of law-enforcement

authorities as they plan to carry out major attacks. On the other hand, criminal groups face

serious risks of unwanted attention from the authorities, heightened vulnerability of their

organizations, and risks of infiltrations (Shelley & Picarelli, 2002). During the contracts, the

criminal groups are in control of the lucrative revenue streams. However, criminal groups may

opt to avoid collaborating with terrorists if such contracts would disrupt the relationship between

the criminals and corrupt government officials. These officials are willing to facilitate crime, but

not risk carrying out terrorist-related ones.

Opportunistic Transactions

Finally, terrorists can take advantage of certain opportunities of collaboration offers from

criminal gangs or through unexpected events. To ensure that the groups remain undetected by the

authorities, they organize themselves in small groups (Eastman, 2002). Both groups reduce their

vulnerability by using front organizations in advancing their aims. The groups provide certain

services where the government has not provided the basic services such as health, education, and

! 23

social networks. These networks are parallel to the public institutions, but these are their

maneuvers to focus on a larger target. They prefer to cover their illegal activities with genuine

businesses. When performing their transactions, the authorities are diverted to thinking that the

deals are genuine when they are not. The technique allows the criminals and terrorists to launder

illicit profits by making it hard to stigmatize their criminal behavior.

Part III: Boko Haram and AQIM’s Convergence

Report from Consultancy Africa

Boko Haram’s growth in capability, coordination, and confidence has ties with other

extremist groups, which has led to analysts considering the influence of other extremist groups

on the escalation of attacks. A specifically concerning relationship is the one between AQIM and

Boko Haram. AQIM is a regional terrorist and criminal network that operates in North Africa,

particularly the Sahel region. In April 2014, there were bombings of a bus station, and the

abduction of at least 200 schoolgirls in the northeastern region of Nigeria, which seemed to

testify a convergence of the Boko Hara and the modus operandi of AQIM (Nigeria-US, 2014).

There is sufficient evidence showing that Boko Haram has had pertinent relations with

AQIM for the past three years, but the exact nature of the issue is subject to controversy. In

November 2011, Abu Qaqa, the official spokesperson of Boko Haram states that they were

together with Al-Qaeda. He added that Al-Qaeda was helping them promote the cause of Islam,

just as they were doing. Thus, Al-Qaeda helped them in their struggle. AQIM is believed to have

conducted training sessions for Boko Haram members, and that the two organizations may have

likely had joint operations in Mali. There is also the possibility that Boko Haram’s aptness to

! 24

conduct coordinated and sophisticated attacks could be the influence of AQIM, as well as Boko

Haram’s proficiency in deploying improvised explosive devices (Nigeria-US, 2014).

Additionally, there are speculations that Boko Haram may have obtained weapons from the

former Libyan suppliers through AQIM. At the same time, the increasing trend of kidnappings by

Boko Haram of foreign citizens, which began when a large number of Boko Haram members

returned to Borno after the Intervention of the French Military in January 2013; this may be an

indication of AQIM’s influence.

Comparative Analysis of AQIM and Boko Haram

Strategies and Techniques

When taking an in-depth comparative analysis of Boko Haram’s connection to the

mainstream of terrorist nexus on a global political arena, it is clear that the locally based terror

organization has more than just connections with the Al-Qaeda, which is an international terror

bracket on the global political landscape. Such a comparative analysis stems from their common

techniques in operations and strategies (Forest, 2012). Additionally, the analysis explores the

nature of operations by both groups, and comparing these operations with the modalities of

convergence. Despite the fact that Boko Haram is a locally based group compared to Al-Qaeda’s

international standards, the fundamental driving mechanism for the common features emanates

from the ideological vanguard, which characterizes the two groups; one group is purely based on

religious factors driven towards saving Islam by all measures. The following are fundamental

techniques and strategies of the two groups. The commonalities between the two groups include

! 25

bombings (suicide bombing, car bombing, airplane bombing), kidnapping (demand for ransom,

demand for political shift), and arson (setting schools and churches on fire).

Crenshaw (1981) suggested that democracy is a fragile issue within the region since it

experiences countless instances of political power. Boko Haram through the help of AQIM

makes the issue of failed state worse. In the modalities of convergence presented by Makarenko,

the kidnappings, arson, and bombings indicate confluence, which occurs when terrorist

organizations participate in activities that are similar to organized crime. With the ideological

component linking or binding Boko Hara to AQIM, this is no historical accident to discover a

common approach in techniques and strategies between the two organizations. Generally, the two

groups have used bombings, targeted assassinations, and coordinated arson attacks against

common enemies. Severally, the operations of the two groups are connected to car and suicide

bombings. In order to undermine the West African region, the Al-Qaeda has used a series of car

bombings between 2008 and 2012. The same case applies for Boko Haram. In 2011, Boko

Haram used car bombings to attack the United Nations’ compound based in Abuja (Forest,

2012). The other incident is the St. Andrew Military Protestant Church based in Jaji barracks of

Kaduna state. As AQIM continues to unleash a series of suicide bombings to hit known targets in

Mali, and the Maghreb region, the Boko Haram also unleash strings of bombings on Nigerian

checkpoints, as well as churches. Using the theory of confluence, it accounts for one terrorist

organization coordinating with a professional criminal group. In this instance, Boko Haram is not

entirely a terrorist group; their coordination with AQIM to carry out terrorist activities disguised

as criminal activities. While AQIM’s interests are purely political, it is also clear that Boko

Haram’s interests are profit related (Nigeria-US, 2014).

! 26

The use of kidnapping is the other fundamental strategy for Boko Haram and Al-Qaeda.

Over the years, both Boko Haram and Al-Qaeda carried out kidnappings demanding for ransoms,

either in the form of political policy shifts or money demands. The Associated Press (2012) notes

that the terrorists are under pressure of money sources, and this have turned to kidnapping for

ransom to compensate the dwindling cash reserves. The AQIM have long used kidnapping of

tourists and diplomats, collecting more than $80 million since the beginning of 2008. For the

first time, Boko Haram have applied the same kidnappings and demanding ransoms to release all

or execute the kidnapped French citizens. According to Nigerian government reports, the Islamist

extremist group was given more than $3m before releasing the French family of seven. The

French led military operations against Al-Qaeda and its affiliates, including AQIM in Northern

Mali following Boko Haram’s receipt of the ransom, which brought light to the contested strong

linkages between the two. In a press release by AQIM’s spokesperson, they said the kidnapping

was to stop the French military intervention in Northern Mali, where their troops were fight in

collaboration with Malian soldiers against Islamic extremist, as well as religious groups (Forest,

2012).

Using the modalities of convergence, this is a clear indication of hybrid blending or

transformation. Kidnapping is illegal, leave alone when kidnapping for ransom demands. AQIM

used Boko Haram to carry out the attacks, and requesting ransoms to replenish their diminishing

finances. The terrorist attributes are connected to their illegal practices, which appears as

organized crime. As noted by Makarenko (2004), the change occurs on two levels, between

criminality and terrorism. In this case, AQIM and Boko Haram carry out criminal activities, but

their goal is not purely economic, rather carrying out criminal activities to supplement their

! 27

terrorism goals and targets. According to the transformation theory, it is very hard to differentiate

the cases from the previous one, that is, it is very hard to distinguish between AQIM and Boko

Haram’s terrorism intentions from those of organized crime.

Additionally, both groups use arson attacks as another fundamental tool. Arguably, even

though AQIM has not used arson in the past, their main host Al-Qaeda has called on the Muslims

in the West to use fire attacks on the U.S. The issues published in a magazine suggest that Al-

Qaeda gave the instructions to ignite a firebomb, a strategy that teaches members how to ignite

an ember bomb in forests. The group recommended Montana because of its rapid population

growth, especially in the wooded areas. Following the same vein, Boko Haram has set churches,

homes, and schools on fire in Northern Nigeria. For instance, in December 2011, the militants of

Boko Haram launched a series of arson attacks on schools, and churches, including the First

Baptist Church in Maiduguri, Borno State, and the St. Theresa Catholic Church at Madala, Suleja

(Nigeria-US, 2010).

A Comparison of Operations

Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Boko Haram have carried out a series of

similar operations including Attacks, targeted assassinations, assaulting security installations, and

assaulting symbols of the Western Culture. While both groups are operating in different parts of

the globe, and sometimes the same place through the affiliations, there is reason to connect the

two in all aspects. Apart from having a common ideological component, the two have carried out

operations with similar economic, social, political implications on the global war on terror

(Makarenko, 2004). First, they have carried out large-scale operations that create global

! 28

attention. For example, AQIM has attacked Mali and other parts of West Africa. On the other

hand, Boko Haram attacked the UN compounds on August 2011, and the police headquarters in

Abuja. In the operations, the nature of their attacks has a lasting impact on economic, social, and

political landscape. The attacks shape the global comprehension of transnational organized crime

and terrorism as the most daunting challenges of security of neo-life (Forest, 2012).

The similarity of the targeted assassinations gives the framework of the connection

between the two groups. When the two groups emerged on the watch list of the international

counter-terrorism bodies, they had embarked on targeted assassinations of prominent political,

religious, and community leaders who were sympathetic and supportive of the international

effort in combating global terrorism. AQIM and Boko Haram assassinated outspoken leaders

who did not approve violence being in line with Islamic teachings. One of the assassinated

leaders includes Seikh Ja’afar Mahmoud in 2007. In other aspects, the groups have conducted

tactical operations against police stations, security checkpoints, and military outposts. With

intensified operations, the two groups have concomitantly unleashed a reign of terror on security

installations in several facets (Forest, 2012). The groups have conducted tactical insurgency

operations at local, national, and international levels.

Finally, both groups have conducted a series of attacks denouncing the western culture

and all the ideological bonding of its form. The groups share common views of the western

culture being a fundamental threat to Islam, churches, business centers, and schools emerged as

their targets over the years (Sanderson, 2004). The Al-Qaeda has ceased thousands of schools in

the Maghreb region, while Boko Haram has led widespread attacks on churches and schools in

! 29

their opposition to western education. The two continue to make affiliations in indisputable ways

standing for similar ideologies and ideological horizons.

Comparison of Linkages and Affiliations

After carefully examining the linkages and affiliations of the Boko Haram to the

mainstream AQIM, it is quite evident that the techniques and strategies of the local groups to the

extremist groups create links to external actors (Makarenko, 2004). These linkages and

affiliations are in the form of alliances, association, metamorphosis, and convergence. In Boko

Haram’s case, its association with AQIM falls in the framework of a coalition, brotherhood,

merger, or a partnership in the quest to propel their agenda of pursuing their objectives. Despite

AQIM operating in Somalia and Northern Mali, Boko Haram is no exception to Al-Qaeda’s

historical progress, which destabilizes the African continent (Ridley, 2008).

Furthermore, the vulnerability of Africa to porous border, weak institutions, and above all

poverty makes the threats of terrorism real across Africa’s political discourse. For instance,

Libya’s comparatively easy infiltration of distant and near neighbors in association with weak

authority in public finance and governance, irresistible internal conflicts, as well as porous

borders underlines the vulnerability of Africa’s states, and its political movements against the

destabilizing forces (Nigeria-US, 2010). The role of the Salafist Group of Algeria, which took the

name AQIM in simmering domestic unrests and violence in Northern Mali, and the Niger region,

provides evidence of the historical advancement of the Al-Qaeda and terrorism in the Sub-

Saharan political platform. The track record of Al-Qaeda and its collaboration with organized

groups goes back in history to its coalitions with FARC (Revolution Armed Forces of Colombia)

! 30

and AQIM. This was evident following the apprehension of the three Malian nationals linked to

FARC and AQIM. The cases confirm the much-anticipated connections between Al-Qaeda to the

local terrorist organizations such as Boko Haram (Forest, 2012).

Additionally, since mainstream terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda needs cooperative

organized groups and safe havens, they move from one place to another, launching attacks after

attacks in the search for ransom money to supplement their budgets. With the U.S. leading efforts

to decapitate Al-Qaeda leadership by destroying its safe havens in the Sub-Saharan region, the

increased number of terrorists in Africa is largely connected to Al-Qaeda’s attempts to open a

new global front (Makarenko, 2004). Arguably, the endeavors to impose Islamic Law in West

Africa falls along the extremists’ attempts to attack the region, which is not limited to vast oil

sources, but governance and cultural factors, as well as an array of education as outlined in the

fundamental ideology of Book Haram. Regardless of the efforts by the extremist groups, West

Africa is full of ideological extremist groups, which provide the raw materials for the likes of Al-

Qaeda. Most of the key players that ferment Al-Qaeda’s agenda in Sudan, Algeria, Nigeria, and

Libya are present in Northern Nigeria (Sanderson, 2004).

The linkages between AQIM and Boko Haram may take the form of assistance, mutual

support, or joint action geared towards fulfilling historically and traditionally defined missions

across the global political arena. The assistance is usually in the form of economic resources, and

further training to the militants (Eastman, 2002). According to studies by the United Nations

Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC, 2010), the survey involved 40 groups in 16 countries and

showed that 35 percent of terrorist cases involved levels of cooperation between TOC groups,

and major terrorist organizations outside the countries. The forms of collaboration, such as

! 31

tactical alliances are clear where the AQIM collaborates with Boko Haram to carry out major

professional crimes.

Part IV: Conclusion and Policy Recommendations

Conclusion

There is a lack of definite conclusion on how terrorism and crime converge. Between

1999 and 2009, distinguished academicians such as Levi Dishman, Fijnaut, Makarenko, Shelly,

and Sanderson came up with a model of crime terror nexus. Specific purpose and the particular

changing surroundings is seen as the determining factor in the mutuality between criminal and

political groups, both tactically and strategically. Stable-state contacts are the reason why

transactional organized crime groups such as the Hong Kong Triads and Silican Mafia do not

conspire with terror groups. Crippling the government is the only way that traditional groups and

terrorists can work together in aid of their survival; the recently formed crime actors with no

long-established financial strategies and long-time ideological beliefs and thereby would be open

to cooperating with terrorists to survive in the short-run. The new actors are mainly succeeding

in ungovernable areas. Due to the distinctness in ideological, practical, and political ways of

operation, the two groups are likely to transform themselves rather than cooperate with other

groups. In some instances, organized crime and terror groups cooperate in tactics and strategies

to achieve a common goal. The two groups however may find it challenging to maintain their

cooperation due to differing targets, goals, and motivations. They therefore only cooperate

tactically and strategically since there is no evidence showing the coming together of the two

groups to form one showing traits of the two entities. Makarenko sees common convergence of

! 32

causes as the reason why alliances between organized crime and terrorism have become rampant.

According to Shelly (2005), the reason for increased cooperation between the two groups is the

presence of regions within which crime groups and terrorist’s crisscross such as the presence of

chaos, conflict and in regions with the largest shadow economies. Ridley (2005) adds that the

cooperation between organized crime and terrorism depends on the state with those falling or

experiencing economic transition more susceptible since they are less risky to cooperation and

linkage between the two groups. Sanderson adds that crime and terror is made up of a

combination of criminal activities, terrorism, and a corrupt state, which is proving a challenge to

the West African governments and global interests. There is need to respond to crime and terror

since its increasingly becoming formidable. These states should therefore come up with effective

strategies through application of counter-terrorism and anti-crime policies since illegal

transformations are hard to judge by cover.

Policy Recommendations

Different agencies at national and international level should focus on information

exchange and copying successful practices to counter crime and terror. The solution to these

problems may lie with the government and international organizations being more responsive

and active than terrorists and organized crime groups.

The first step should see the opening of a government office with Hausa-speaking

diplomats in the North to reduce political corruption and correct social vacuums. These together

with social grievances allow social groups to move in and fill the gaps. Phasing out the indigene

system, which may involve alteration of the Nigerian constitution, may go a long way in building

! 33

transparency and trust with the population. Trust rebuilding may also be achieved through

protection of the rights of the minority without interfering with the rights of the majority. These

strategies will lead to cooperation between the government and the local administration, which is

vital in rebuilding fighting crime. The implementation of an open approach of eliminating

corruption and discrete approach of monitoring money laundering and criminal fund raising will

aid in strengthening financial monitoring systems. This combined with monitoring and

promotion of larger Sufi movements by the West African governments, which is by nature highly

low key, will prove beneficial. The latter should be considered being transformed into an actual

government affiliate denying them their security component henceforth limiting its gang

activities. All these are useful strategies in directing the state towards conflict mediation and

resolution.

Diversification of the economy to move away from its dependence on petroleum, which

provokes violence through jealousy and variance should be top of the agenda. These can be

achieved through strategies developed by Economic officers and development experts. A

manufacturing sector in the north should be created to seek development. This should prove an

attractive undertaking to the majority of the population who earn less than a dollar per day

through employment creation, it would also prove an upgrade from the current economy which

is based on crafts while also providing a natural transition, the industry would also attract

foreign cooperation due to the improved security in the region. The governments should use a

more comprehensive approach to eliminate violence and improve security in the region, which

would go a long way in restoring trust of the population to the authorities. The application of

violent approaches only leads to greater conflicts in the northern region. Fair arrests and the

! 34

subsequent trials through even application of the rule of law must be implemented. The problem

may be worsened by the inadequacy to train, fund and deploy law enforcement, security and

intelligence systems by the governments with a uniform command, control and liaison

connections. The US forces should train elite federal forces who should in turn train elite local

officers to curb the traveling of Boko Haram members in between states.

Law enforcement officers should be supplied with the appropriate intelligence both

human and technical in order to provide for aggressive but discrete tactical operations. The

military and Homeland Security should work together in controlling Nigeria’s, as well as the

entire West Africa’s porous borders to curb the security issues brought about by the Hausa ethno-

linguistic groups and Sahel-based migrants. The military should provide border patrol services,

which they are better equipped for while the internal security systems should provide document

identification and tracking services to the population. The indigene system should be replaced by

a national identification system, which would lead to provision for the security need and

reduction of sectarian tensions. All this requires oversight and guidance from the United States.

In situations where AQIM and Boko haram criss-cross sovereign borders, special joint operations

between nations in the region is required the nation should also share intelligence information.

According to Sage (2011), the success in defeating AQIM lies in the newly created Trans-

Saharan Counter-Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP), which is the coming together of 10 nations,

Nigeria and countries in the Sahel included. He argues that the partnership to target Boko haram

is required. The expansion of the US training partnership such as the Joint Combined Exchange

and Training in order to remain discrete and reduce visibility thereby avoiding a possible

negative reaction from the general population should be undertaken. Intelligence information

! 35

should provide a basis for targeting leadership nodes and decree of explosives without disturbing

the peace of the population, which is the overall target in the fight against terrorism. The

intelligence information should also establish the connection between Boko Haram and Al-

Qaeda affiliates. The collection of information should involve human networks in coordination

with technical and open source collection to target social media and text messaging which is the

medium through which violence is coordinated. The involvement of Muslims in government

operations, as well as providing a fair political stake should move the violence away from them.

Despite stability, violent eruptions are a common phenomenon. However, much of this acts as an

indicator of stability outbursts, which are historically normal in the region. Social education and

advanced measures should be taken to minimize violence at a lower cost. There is the possibility

of Boko haram becoming an international group linking geographically with AQIM. This creates

a host of problems involving U.S. and other major nations’ passport holders living in different

terrain from that of Sahel or the Horn of Africa. With the increasing threat posed by Boko

Haram, the world may experience economic retreat caused by consternation of world oil prices.

Al-Qaeda has succeeded in creating economic consternation in the western world; it has also

outlined its objectives in Africa with Nigeria’s petroleum infrastructure in the delta region being

the main target. It may be ill advised to dismiss Boko Haram as an Al-Qaeda affiliate now,

although prolusions have been made and conditions not granted. Boko Haram lugs all the AL

Qaeda traits making it potentially its entity. It has gained global hallmarks as evidenced in its

attacks on the UN headquarters and it is geographically located between Al-shabab and AQIM,

making it a good fit, it has the capability to strike Nigeria petroleum infrastructure and provide

U.S. passports, which is in line with Al-Qaeda objectives in Africa. The fact that Nigeria is a Sufi

! 36

nation is not enough to banish the group. With examples of Al-Qaeda in Iraq, Al-Qaeda in the

Islamic Maghreb and Al-Shabab, there is evidence of tactical collusion developed over a period.

This process maybe a method of security or business negotiation but the baseline is that Boko

haram is part of that process. Whatever the case the U.S. and Western governments should take

appropriate action to destroy Boko Haram, which will go a long way in the development of

Nigeria, the Sahelian region and the world at large.

! 37

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