T H E E X E G E T IC A L B A C K G R O U N D O E T H E “A M B IG U IT Y O F D F A T H ”

IN T H E W IS D O M O F S O E O M O N

by

K A RIN A M A RG IN H O G A N *The University of Chicago, Chicago, IE

O ne of the most often-diseussed issues in scholarship on the Wisdom o f Solomon is the au thor’s understanding of death and its ^ a tio n sh ip to hum an sinfulness.1 This problem has been addressed most recently and, in my view, most successfully, by M ichael Kolarcik, SJ.2 Kolarcik dem onstrates through a literary analysis o f the structure and judicial imagery of Wis 1:1-6:21 that the au thor’s central p u jó s e in these chap- ters is to refute a false notion of death, placed on the lips 01' “the un- godly” (άσεβεις; 1:9 etc. ) Fseudo-Solomon uses the underlying image ق.o f a trial to pit the nihilistic attitude of “the ungodly” tow ard mortality against the hope of “the righteous” for immortality; the reader is called upon to judge between the two.1 Kolarcik’s conclusion is that Fseudo-

* I would like to thank Dr. John j . Collins for his invaluable suggestions and encour- agement in the preparation of this essay.

1 Besides the eommentaries’ more or less extensive treatment of this topie, there have been a number of artieles on the subject. The follo^dng are the principal English- language contributions to the debate: F.R. Tennant, “ Ehe Teaching of Ecclesiasticus and Wisdom on the Introduction of Sin and Death,” J T S 2 (23 ل01ر 207- و ; John p. Wciscngoff, “Death and Immortality in the Book of Wisdom,” CBt،¿ 3 (1941) 104-33; R.J. 'Paylor, “The £s،:hatological Meaning of Eife and Death in the Book of Wisdom I-V,” ETL 42 (1966) 72-137; Jolm J. Collins, “The Root of Immortality: Death in the Context of Jewish Wisdom,” H TR Yehoshua Amir, “The Figure of ؛177-92 (1978) 71 Death in the ،Book of Wisdom,’” J J S 30 (1979) 154-78; John j . Collins, ،،Wisdom and Immortahty,” in Jewish Wisdom in the Hellenistic Age (OTL; Louisville, RY: Westminster John Knox Press, 1997) 178-95.

2 Michael Kolarcik, SJ, rThe Ambiguity of Death in the Book of Wisdom 1-6 (An Bib 127; Rome: Editrice Pontificio Istituto Bíblico, 1991).

.Ibid., 160 ئ13- ء.ء 112 ح م/م .

Koninldijke Brill NV, Leiden, 1999 Journal for the Study of Judaism, XX X, 1

KARINA MARTIN U()C,.^N

Solom on’s use of various terms for death (θάνατος, απώλεια, όλεθρός, τέλος, εκβασις, έξοδος, etc.) is dclfoemtely ambiguous beeause his pur- pose is to show that death means different things to the righteous and the ungodly،5 W hereas the wicked make no distinction between phys- ical mortality and the death of the soul, the righteous know that their souls are im m ortal and destined for union with God after (physical) death, ironically, they are both right from ?seudo-Solom on’s point o f view, since he believes that the immortality of the soul is contingent upon the way one chooses to live one’s life. The ungodly forfeit immor- t^ ity through their sinful lives, so for them, physical death does am ount to annihilation. Hence physical death can be presented as a pmtishment for wickedness, bu t for the righteous it represents a limit to suffering־ and a path to union with G od.6

By ^ a m in in g the statements about death in Wis 1-6 in the context of the complex argum ent in which they occur, Kolarcik has shown that Pseudo-Solom on’s perspective on death is more coherent than many scholars have supposed. Earlier scholars tended to isolate the most striking statements about death in W isdom (especially 1:13 and 2:23-4) and to interpret them in light of G en 1-3, to which these and several other verses in W isdom allude. The ^ o b le m witlt this approach, Kolarcik points out, is the tem ptation to read one’s preconceptions about the “C reation and Fall” into the ambiguous statements about death in W isdom . -Kolarcik does not completely avoid this pitfall him أself, however. H e offers his own interpretation of Gen 1-3 (informed by contem poraty biblical scholarship) in order to establish that ،،foe interpretation [of Gen 1-3] whereby hum an m ortality is taken as foe consequence of A dam ’s disob<^cnce is not self evident [ أ د־ء ] ill W is.”6 K olarcik’s brief exegesis of Gen 1-3 contributes little to his argum ent for the ambiguity of death in Wisdom. R ather than arguing 011 the basis of what G en 1-3 ،،actually says” about the origin of death, ft would have been more fruitful to explore the exegetical background of Pseudo-Solomon’s allusions to Gen 1-3.

Kolarcik does suggest that Pseudo-Solomon’s understanding of Gen

-Taylor (“Eschatological Meaning,” 102 ذ ا ة attempts to distinguish the exact nuane.es زof each of these terms and to determine which refer to physical death س which to spiritual death. In most eases, he is forced to conclude that the author’s usage of a given term is inconsistent or ambiguous.

6 Kolarcik, Ambiguity, 178-80.7 Ibid., 139.R Ibid., 146.

TI IK “AMBIGUITY OF DEATH” 1^ THE WISDOM OF SOLOMON

1-3 m ight profitably be com pared to that of Philo of Alexandria.^ Since the two authors are believed to have been n a -c o n ^ m p o ra r ie s in the A lexandrian Jewish community, they can be expected to have been familiar with some of the same exegetical traditions.10 This paper will pursue the com parison proposed by Kolarclk, extending it to include Gen 4. For both Philo and Pseudo-Solomon, the story of Cain and Abel, as m uch as that of Adam and Eve, appears to have been emblem- afic of' the relationship between sin and death. After ^m m ariz in g the m ain themes of the extensive exegesis o f G en 1-4 in Philo, we will be in a position to examine the allusions in W isdom to key passages in Gen 1-4, with an eye to the exegetieal traditions that they reflect. The object o f this com parison is not to argue for a direct relationship be- tween W isdom and Philo, but rather to offer a prelim inary sketch of the exegetical background against which Pseudo-Solom on’s enigmatic statements about death may better be understood.

For the purposes of this study, therefore, 1 will be concerned not so much with Philo’s o rignal contributions to the exegesis of' Gen 1-4 as with the older exegetical traditions preserved in his works. Recent schol- arship on Philo has drawn attention to the extent to whieh Philo’s trea- tises in c o ^ o ra te older sources and traditions, especially the exegetical traditions o f earlier generations of Alexandrian Jew s.11 In particular, the work of Thom as H. Tobin, SJ on the in te^ re ta tio n of the creation o f m an in Philo is the model and the starting point for this paper.^ According to 'Fobin, Philo preserves several earlfer stages of inteipre- tation o f'the two accounts of the creation o f m an (Gen 1:26-7 and 2:7) along with his own allegorical interpretations. Tobin uses several criteria

9 Ibid.1() James Kugel [Ihe Bible ه ,it Was [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press ل

ل و repeatedly illustrates that the Wisdom of Solomon alludes to exegetical motifs ([?وthat arc attested not only in Philo, but also in roughly-contemporaty' and earlier Palestinian sources.

11 This trend was set in the early 1970’s by two programmatic essays: Robert G. Hammerton-Kelly, “Sources and Traditions in Philo Judaeus: Prolegomena to an Ana- lysis of his Writings,” Studia Philonica 1 (26-3 ( ل و ? and Burlón L. Mack, “Kxegetical قTraditions in Alexandrian Judaism: A Program for the Analysis of the Philonic Corpus,” Studia Philonica 3 (1974-5) 71-112.

12 Thomas H. Tobin, SJ., The Creation ، س أ » . Philo and the History of Interpretation ־(CBQMS 14؛ Washington, D.C.: The Catholie Biblical Assoeiation of America, 1963). 1 will use Tobin’s phrase “the creation of man” i'or the sake of brerity and because most inte^retations in Philo assume that both Gen 1:26-7 and Gen 2:7 describe the creation of a single male human being (despite the explicit statement to tlie contrary in Gen 1:27).

KARINA MARTIN HOGAN4

to establish the relative chronology o f these stages of interpretation: indications by Philo that he is citing an interpretation which is not his own, logical dependence of one stage of interpretation npon another, and comparison with the contemporaneous developments of ^ex an d rian philosophy and the allegorical interç>retation of H om er. M ore recently, G regoi^ Sterling has dem onstrated that in 1 C or 2:6-3:4 and 15:42־ Paul is arguing against interpretations o وو4 f the creation o f m an that are otherwise known only from Philo. ا Sin،:e it is unlikely that Philo’s وworks could have reached C orinth prior to Paul’s first visit there (some- time before 53 c e ) , these inteipretations were probably well known am ong Hellenized Jews of the early first c e n tu ^ CE . 14

Traditions about the Creation o f Man in Philo

The earliest stage of exegesis preserved in Philo, which all the other interpretations of the creation accounts take for granted, Tobin calls the “anti-anthropom orphic” interpretations،15 £ach of these is motivated by an apparent anthropom orphism applied to G od in tire biblical text, which is then explained away by reference to philosophical concepts. The m ^ a־ n th ro ^ m o rp h ic interpretations 01' the creation of m an seem to derive from two different philosophic schools. Platonic concepts are typically used to ^ p la in G en 1:2b-?, as for example in op. 69:lb

. . . Moses tells us tha t m an was created after the Image of G od and after his likeness (κατ’ είκόνα θεοΰ και καθ’ ομοίωσιν). R ight well does he say this, for nothing earth-born is m ore like G od than m an. b e t no one rep- resent the likeness as one to a bodily form; for neither is G od in hum an form, nor is the hum an body God-like. No, it is in respect o f the mind.

n Gregory E. Sterling, “Wisdom among the Perfect: Creation 'traditions in Alexandrian Judaism and Corinthian Christianity,” NovT 37 (76 -364 ( ا و و .ذ

14 Ibid., 3 و2ه .15 This type of exegesis was first identified by Mac.k, “Exegetical Traditions,” 81.

* exegesis ean he traeed back as far as ^־istobulus, an AlexandrianJew of the mid-second century BCE. See Adela Yarbro Collins’ translation of Aristobulus, fragment 2, in James H. Charles^eorth, ed. Old Testament Pseudepigrapha (2 vols; New York: Doubleday, ذ 2. 8و7-و ل8ر و . According to Tobin (Creation, 37-40), examples oí'this type of interpretation in Philo can be found in op. 61. و 21 و71, م - , LA. 1.36-8, and Op. 72- ة8?-و .with parallels in Conj: 168-82, Mut. 27-32 and Fug) ئ .

16 All translations of Philo from the Greek are by E.H. Colson and G.H. Whitaker (LCL, 10 Volumes; London: ة ل آ ل؛ا ا1ن ا ذ Heinemann btd., ل2و و ). Quaestiones et Solutiones in Genesin et Exodum (و م . and Q.E.), of which only fragments survive in Greek, were trans- lated from the Armenian version by Ralph Marcus (LCL, 2 Supplement Volumes; Cambridge, MA: Haward University Press, 1 3 و .(ذ

THE “AMBIGUITY ٠ ? DEATH” IN THE WISDOM OF SOLOMON

the sovereign (ηγεμόνα) elem ent of the soul, that the w ord “im age” is used; for after the pattern ٠؛ ' a single M ind, even the M ind o f the uni- verse as an archetype, the m ind in each of those who sueeessively eam e into being was m oulded (άπεικον(σθη).^

In te rre la tio n s oí Gen 2:7, 011 the other hand, tend to resort to Stoic concepts, as in L A . 1,36-8:

“B reathed in to ,” wc note, is equivalent to “insp ired” o r “be-souled” (έψύχωσε) the soul-less (αψυχα); for G od forbid that we should be infcetcd with such m onstrous folly as to think that G od employs for inbreathing organs such as m outh or nostrils. . . .

Yet the expression clearly brings out something that accords with nature (^ ικ ώ τερ ον). For it implies o f necessity three things; that wlricli inbreathes, that which receives, that which is inbreathed: tha t which inbreathes is God, that which receives is the m ind, and tha t which is inbreathed is the spirit (το πνεύμα). . . . A union o f the three comes about, as G od pro- jects the pow er that proceeds from H im self through the m ediant breath (πνεύμα) till it reaches the subject. A nd for w hat purpose save that we m ay obtain a conception o f him? f o r how could the soul have conceived of God, had H e not b reathed into it and mightily laid hold o f it?’*

A similar division between Flatonic and Stoic i n t e g r a t i o n s exists at the next stage o f the exegesis o f Gen 1:26-7 and 2:7, which Tobin refers to as the first ،،single creation״ stage. Unlike the earlier anti- anthropom orphic intei^retations, which dealt with isolated “problem s” in the biblical narrative, this next stage of interpretation attem pted to provide coherent philosophical e ^ l a a t io n s of the Genesis accounts of the creation of m an ,^ The first account of the creation of m an is ex- pounded at this stage with the concepts o f Middle Flatonism, especially the notion o f the Togos as the in te rm ed ia^ between G od and the creation:^

17 ٢١٦(' main Flatonic text behind this and other interrelations of the creation accounts is, of course, the Timaeus. According to Tobin (١Creation, 46), this passage reflects a stage of Flatonism prior to Middle Flatonism, because of the absence of an ' between the Creator and the world. The intermedia!^ figure first appears ؛٨ tcxts of the late first century BCF,, such as the Tinmens Loams.

This interpretation is obviously not consistently Stoic, since it envisions a tran- scendent God. Yet the i^ntification of the πνοή ζωής of Gen 2:7 ( ا س witl! the رπνεύμα, ،٦ key concept of Stoicism, sliows tliat the main ^ilosophical background of the passage is Stoic.

19 Tobin, Creation, 56.20 Tobin, Creation, 57-65.

KARINA MARGIN HOGAN

Should a m an desire to use words in a m ore simple and direet w ay؛ he would say that the world discerned only by the intellect (τον νοητόν κόσμον) is nothing ehe than the W ord (λόγον) of G od w hen H e was already engaged in the act o f creation. ٠ . . It is Moses who lays this dow n؛ not I. W itness his express acknow ledgem ent in the sequel؛ when setting on record the creation o f m an, tha t he was m oulded (δ!£τυπώθη) after the image of G od (κα^£{κόναθ£0ΰ). Now if the part is the image o f an image, it is manifest tha t the whole world is so too؛ and if the whole creation . . . is a copy (μίμημα) of the divine image, it is manifest tha t the archetypal seal (ή άρχέτυπος σφραγ(ς) also, which we aver to be the world descried by the m ind, would be the veity W ord of G od.2؛

The expressi،)n κατ’ εικόνα θεού in Gen 1:27 is taken to m ean that the hum an person is “the image ٠؛ ' an im age,״ a eopy (μίμημα) of the original divine image or “archetypal seal״ that is the Logos.

Philo preserves only traces 01' a Stoic interpretation of the second creation account from this stage, but it seems to have been chiefly con- cerned with identifying the hum an soul as a “divine fragm ent” (άπόσπα- σμα θεΐον) of the e th e re a l πνεύμα (LA. 3.161) or as an “effulgence״ (απαύγασμα) of the divine nature (Spec. 4 This can be inferred ص.(123.in part from the second phase of the ،،single creation״ interpretation, in which the two accounts of the creation of m an were combined, lead- ing to a blending of' Stoic and Platonic concepts. This tendency can be seen most clearly in Det. 83, in which the ،‘Stoic״ πνεύμα (associated with G en 2:7) is equated with the “Platonic״ είκών (of Gen 1:26-7):

T o the faeulty which we have in com m on with the irrational creatures blood has been given as its essence, but o f the faculty which streams forth from the fountain o f R eason spirit (πνεύμα) has been assigned; not m oving air but, as it w ere, an im pression and stam p (τύπον τινά καί χαρακτήρα) o f the divine pow er, to which Moses gives the appropri- ate title o f “im age” (είκών), thus indieating that G od is the A rc h e t^ e o f rational existence, while m an is a copy (μίμημα) and a representation (άπεικό^σμα).^

The next stage of interpretation, called the “double ereation,״ treats the two creation accounts as referring to two different men, the first

2‘ op. 24-5; cf. L.A. 3.95-6, Her. 230-31, Spec. 1.80-81, 3.83 and 3.207, Q fi. 2.02.22 Tobin, Creation, 77-79. See also L.A. 1.39-40, Her. 281-3, Som. 1.33-4, Q.G. 2..59.23 Cf. Det. 86-7 and 90, Op. 139 and 146, Virt. 203-5, Her. 55-7 and 283, Spec. 1.171؛

Plant. 18-22, and Mut. 223، Tobin, Creation, 87-98.

7THE “AMBIGUITY GE DEATH” IN THE WISDOM OE SOLOMON

to “the heavenly m an” and the second to “the earthly m an.”24 The differ- enees between the two are sum m arized in op. 134:

After this he says tha t “G od form ed m an by taking elay from the earth, and breathed into his faee the b reath o f life” (Gen 2:7). By this also he shows very clearly that there is a vast difference between the m an thus form ed (ة πλασθεις άνθρωπος) and the m an that cam e into existence ear- lier after the image o f G od (ة κατά την εικόνα γεγονώς πρότερον); f'or the m an so form ed is an object o f sense-perception (αισθητός), partaking already of such or such quality, consisting of body and soul (έκ σώματος καί ψυχής), m an or w om an, by nature m ortal; while he that was after the [Divine] image was an idea (ιδέα) or type (γένος) or seal (σφραγίς), an object o f thought (νοητός) [only], in co ^ o rea l (άσώματος), neither male nor female, by nature incorruptible (άφθαρτος)*2‘؟

T he idea of a double creation of m an is eommonly assoeiated with Philo, but Tobin argues that it m ust have been part of the exegetieal tradition that Philo inherited, since Philo frequently “correets” it to refer not to two men but to two minds.1{) Usually, this correction is implicit, as in the following “refinem ent” o f the “Stoic” reading of Gen 2:7:

[Moses] uses the w ord “b rea th ” (πνοή) and not “spirit” (πνεύμα), imply- ing a difference between them ; for “spirit” is conceived o f as connoting strength and rigo r and pow er, while a “b rea th” is like an air or a peace- ful and gentle vapor. T he m ind tha t was m ade after the image and orig- inal m ight be said to partake 0 spirit, for its reasoning f '؛ a ^ t y possesses robustness; but the m ind that was m ade out o f m atter m ust be said to ^ r t a k e o f the light and less substantial air. . . p

T he shift from two men to two minds is motivated by Philo’s orig- inal way 01' reading Gen 1-3 as referring not to events which the first couple e ^ e rien ced , but to universal psychological ^ e n o m e n a .^ Tobin

24 These are the terms used to distinguish the two men in L.A. 1.31-2 and 0 ل.و . Cf. 1 Cor 15:47-9. Elsewhere (as ill the following passage) they are referred to as the “man after the image” and the “molded man;” see Q.G. 1.4, 1.8, and 2.56. In Conf. 41, 62-3 and 146, the “heavenly man” is identified explicitly with the Eogos.

25 Colson and Whitaker [Philo, LCE) obscure Philo’s terminólo^/ by translating πλασθείς as “formed,” while they render διετυπώθη [Op. 25) and άπεικονίσθη (( ج. 6و ) as “moulded.”

26 'Pobin, Creation, 135-9. The fact that the double creation of man is not Philo’s own idea becomes clear ill Q.G. 1.8, where it is implied in the position with whfeh Philo disagrees.

27 L.A. 1.42.28 Although in Quaestiones et Solutiones in Genesin Philo frequently expresses a prefer-

ence for the allegorical reading of Gen 2-3, he does not deny the validity of foe more

KARINA MARTIN HOGAN

calls Philo’s o rignal reading of Gen 1-^ “the allegory of the soul,” and points out that it is m ore concerned with subse<}uent “events” in the G arden of Eden than with the creation itself.^ Although Philo iirtei- preted some verses that relate to the m an alone allegorically (Gen 2:8, 15 and ةل7)و ־ the allegory of the soul focuses on the creation of wom an and the events of Gen 3.

Traditions about Adam and Eve in Philo

Most of Philo’s statements about the disobedience of Adam and Eve and its consequences are on the level of the allegory of the soul, and therefore are not directly relevant to our investigation, ^ e r th e l e s s , it is necessary to explain briefly Philo’s allegorical in te ^ e ta r io n of Gen 3, in order to be able to show that certain other interpretations of G en 3 are probably pre-Philonic. According to the allegory of the soul, the m an represents the mind; the woman, sense-^rception and the serpent, pleasure.30 In the most radically allegorical passages, Philo presents the “Eall” as merely the necessary union 01' intellect and sense perception, which is certainly not sinful in itself:

Tw o things, m ind and bodily sense (α'ισθησις), having already come into heing . ، ٠ it was necessaq^ tha t there should be a th ird subsistenee, namely pleasure, to bring both of them together to the apprehension of the objects 01' m ental and of bodily perception. Eor neither could the m ind apart from the bodily sense apprehend . . . any bodily shape w hatever, nor could the bodily sense apart from foe m ind m aintain the act of perceiving. Since then it was necessary tha t both of these should come together for the apprehension o f the objects about them , who was it that brought them together save a third, a bond of love and desirc, under the rule and dom inion o f pleasure, to which the prophet gave the figurative nam e of a serpent?^

literal interpretations that he transmits. Tobin,׳ Creation ة ق-ا ء 1ب , argues that Philo’s unique contribution to the history of exegesis was the idea that a text could have more' than one level of meaning; that is, that a literal and an allcgorieal inte^retation of a ؛fo/en text could both be valid.

29 Tobin, Creation, 135-49. The distinction between the earthly and heavenly mittd is made on the basis of Gen 2:8, 15 7-16 س،ا . See especially L.A. 1.53-5, 88-9, 90-91 and Q.G. 1.8.

30 Op. 165.31 L.A. 2.71-2; cf. L.A. 3.57-8, Cher. 56-60. It seems that in the background of this

allcgop/ lurhs a literal interpretation that maintains that Adam and Eve did not have sexual relations until after they ate from the tree of the knowledge of good and eril

THE “AMBIGUITY OF DEATH” IN THE WISDOM OF SOLOMON

M ore often, however, he uses the story to moralize about the bad consequences of allowing the m ind to be ruled by the senses, which are susceptible to the lure of pleasure. T he allcgoty of the soul isonly loosely based on Gen 3; not every verse can be fitted into theallegorical framework. O nly in one place does Philo claim textual justification for his allegorical reading, and the effect is to expose the lack of connection between the allegory and the narrative itself. In explaining why G od is said to make “tunics of skin” for Adam and Eve just before their expulsion from the garden (Gen 3:21)ء he writes:

. . . But according to the deeper m eaning, the tunic o f skin is symboli- cally the natural skin 01' the body. For when G od form ed the first m ind, H e called it Adam ; then he form ed the sense, which he called Life [i.e..Eve]; in the th ird place, 01' necessity he m ade his body also, calling ittymbolically a tunic of skin, for it was p roper that the m ind and sense should be clothed in the body as in a tunic of skin, in o rder that His handiw ork m ight first appear worthy o f the divine power. And could the apparel of the hum an body be better or m om fittingly m ade by any other pow er than G od?33

The implication of this inteityretation is that the events in the G arden of Eden are not part of hum an history, since Adam and Eve cannot properly be called hum an until they are given bodies, ^ c o rd in g to Philo, G en 2 and 3 are best read as timeless, symbolic descriptions of hum an psycho lo^ .

Following T ob in’s methodology, we can identify a few in te ^ re ta - tions of G en 3 that are incompatible with the allegory of the soul, and therefore are probably pre-Philonic traditions. These are mostly pre- served in Quaestiones et Solutiones in Genesin, a collection of isolated inter- pretations of verses, m any o f which Philo acknowledges are not his own. For example, the following interpretation of G en 3:1 و shows no awareness of the division of foe soul into m ind and sense perception which underlies the allegory of the soul, and is clearly in line with foe “Stoic” exegesis o f G en 2:7:

W hat is the m eaning of foe words, “U ntil thou returnest to the earth from which thou wast taken” (Gen 3:19)? I'o r m an was m oulded not only

and “knew that they were naked” (Gen 3:7). This literal interpretation does not appear in Philo’s works, however; in op. 151-2, the hrst sexual aet apparently follows directly upon the ereation of woman; cf. Cher. 61-4.

32 See, for example, L.A. 3.109-10, OJA. 1.45 and 1.40.33 Q.G. 1.53.

KARINA MARTIN HOGAN10

from the earth, but also from the divine spirit. First, it is evident that the earth-born ereature was eom pounded out of earth and heaven. And beeause he did not rem ain uneorrupted, but m ade light of the eom m ands o f God, turning away from the best and most excellent part, namely, heaven, he gave him self wholly over to the earth , the denser and heav- ier element, Seeond, if he had been desirous o f virtue, which makes the soul im m ortal, he would certainly have obtained heaven as his lot.34

H ere A dam ’s deeision to disobey G od’s ^ m m a n d m e n t means delib- erately forfeiting the heavenly aspect of his hum an nature, and hence his rew ard in heaven. A similar interpretation which draws on the “Platonic” exegesis of Gen 1:26-7 can be found in Viri. 204-5:

[T he first m an ’s] father was no m ortal but the eternal God, whose image he was in a sense, in virtue o f the ruling m ind within the soul. Yet though he should have kept that image undcfilcd and followed as far as he could in the steps of his P aren t’s virtues, when the opposites wem set before him to choose or avoid, good and e^ l, honorable and base, true and false, he was quick to choose the false, the base and the evil and spurn the good and honorable and true, with the n a t u ^ consequence that he exchanged im m ortality for m ortality, forfeited his blessedness and happi- ness, and found an easy passage to a hfo o f toil and m isery.3̂

Both of the above passages ignore Eve’s role in the story completely, for the sake of rap h asiz in g what Adam willingly gave up. A different stage of exegesis ^ aces the blame for the loss of immortality primarily on Eve:

W hy docs He, who knows all things, ask Adam, “W here art thou?” (Gen 3:9), and why does he not also ask the wom an? T he things said appear to be not a question bu t a kind of threat and reproach: w here art thou now, from w hat good hast thou rem oved thyself, o m an G ؛ iving up im m ortality and a blessed hfo, thou hast gone over to death and unhap- piness, in which thou hast been buried. But the w om an he did not con- sider it fitting to question, although [or: because?] she was the beginning 01' evil and led him (man) into a lifo o f vileness.30

34 Q.G. 1.51؛ for a similar anthropology connected to Gen 3:14, see L.A. 3.161.35 Cf. Sir 15:14*7, which implies that the choice of life or death (Deut 30:15) was

presented to the first human beings as it is to every human being.36 ζλΟ, 1.45. Cf. Sir 25:24, “From a woman sin had its beginning, and because of

her we all die.” This passage may represent the earliest stage of the exegesis of Gen 3 preserved in Fhilo, since its main motivation is anti-anthropomorphic (to clear God of the suspicion of ignorance).

THE “AMBIGUITY OF DEATH” IN THF, WISDOM OF SOLOMON ا ل

W hat exactly is m eant by “im m ortality” in these passages is not immediately obvions, however. In L.A. 1.105-7, Philo explains why it is that Adam and Eve go on living and even beget children after eat- ing the forbidden fruit, if G od said that ،،in the day that ye eat thereof, ye shall die the death” (θανάτω άποθανείσθε, Gen 2:17):

. . . D eath is o f two kinds, one tha t of the m an in general, the other that o f the soul in partieular. T he death o f the m an is the separation o f the soul from the body, but the death of the soul is the deeay of virtue and the bringing in o f wiekedness. It is for this reason tha t G od says not only “die” bu t “die the death ,” indicating not foe death com m on to us all, but that special death properly so called, which is tha t o f the soul becom- ing entom bed in passions and wickedness o f all kinds. A nd this death is practically the antithesis o f foe death tha t awaits us all. T he latter is a separation of com batants that had been pitted against one another, body and soul, to wit. T he form er, on the other hand, is a meeting o f the two in conflict, and in this conflict the worse, the body, overcomes, and the better, the soul, is overcome. But observe that w herever Moses speaks of “dying the death ,” he m eans foe penalty-death, not that which takes place in the course of nature.‘؟؟

In light o f this distinction, it seems clear that at least two of tbe passages cited above ;(λ (7. 1.51 and Virt. 204-5) refer to the loss of the itn m o r^ ity of foe sonl, not physical immortality, since both 01' them emphasize A dam ’s free choice of a ،،life 01' toil and m isety.” ^ ،،Death,” that is, foe death o f the soul, is foe object o l'A dam ’s choice, not merely fts punishm ent, ft does not appear that physical immortality was ever an option for Adam, according to this line of in te^ re ta tio n . M oreover, the fact that physical death “awaits us all” is nowhere in Philo’s works blamed on A dam ’s choice. Physical mortality' is simply a given of hum an existence, and eveiy person is assumed to have the same chance at spiritual imm ortality that was offered to Adam.

Traditions about Cain and Abel in Philo

T h a t Philo considered foe story of Cain and Abel in Gen 4 to be central to a philosophical reading of the Bible is apparent from the

37 That a life of vice leads to the death of the soul is a commonplace in Philo. See, for example, spec. 1.345, Fug. 113.

38 ft is le،؟.؟ clear that the third passage, QX'i. ١ .45, refers to the immortality of the soul, another indication that it may belong to an earlier stage of exegesis.

KARINA MARTIN HOGANI?

fact that he devotes three full treatises (De Sacrificiis Abelis et Caini, Quod Detenus Potiori insidian Soleat aud De Postentate Caini) and parts of others to its exegesis. If the bulk of each of these treatises may be considered digressions from the subject at hand, this is because the stety of Cain and Abel evokes so many themes dear to Philo’s heart. Only the theme o f the relation of sin to death will be treated here, naturally. Once again, non-allegorical in te g r a t io n s will be ^v en preference, since they are more likely to reflect pre-Philonic exegesis.

One of the problems with the stoty of Cain and Abel that troubles m any readers is that Cain seems to get off ^ ^ i c a l l y scot-free: although he is banished, he is protected by G od from being killed (in fact his death is never mentioned), and he goes on to found a city. M any o f the in te ^ e ta t io n s in Philo address this problem by arguing that, appear- anees to the contraty, the fate of Cain was actually worse than that o f his innocent brother Abel. According to one reading, the first homi- cide was actually a suicide:

God, however, in His loving-kindness will neither cause a being of an in^o lab le kind to be the victim 0 ن'ااa passion, nor 11 '؛ H e hand over the pursuit o f virtue to a m ad m urderer for ruin. So the words that follow, “C ain rose up against Abel his bro ther and slew h im ” (και άπέκτ£1ν£ν αύτόν; G en 4:8), suggest, so far as superficial appearance goes, tha t Abel has been done away with, but when exam ined m ore carefully, tha t Cain has been done away with by himself. It m ust be read in this way, “C ain rose up and slew him self” (m i άπέκτεινεν εαυτόν), not som eone else. And this is ju st w hat we should expect to befall him. For the soul tha t has extitpatcd from itself the principle of' the love of virtue and the love of G od, has died to the lifo o f virtue. Abel, therefore, strange as it seems, has both been put to death and lives: he is destroyed or abolished out o f the m ind o f the fool, but he is alive with the happy life in G od. ־آة

This in te^re ta tio n is based on the קרי אל תי technique that is familiar from rabbinic exegesis, whereby a small alteration in the text is pro- posed which alters the m eaning significantly.^ Philo (or his source) does not really substitute the ؛dternate reading for the standard one, how- ever, but rather combines them, since he acknowledges that Abel was

39 Det. 47-8.40 Although the technigue is mueh more suited to Hebrew than to Greek, in this

case a much more radical change would have to be made in the Hebrew text to yield the meaning “he Hlled himself.” Thus the exegetical motif is likely to have ori^nated in a Hellenish(: milieu.

THE “AMBIGUITY GE DEATH” IN THE WISDOM GE SOLOMON ! ٠؟

killed in foe physical sense. O ther details 01' the story are then used to reinforce the point that, for a righteous person like Abel, physical death is no great loss, whereas the death of foe soul means a lifo of misery:

W hat is the m eaning o f the words, “T he voice 01' thy b ro ther ealls to m e from the earth” (Gen 4:10)? This is most exem plaiw for foe Deityhears foe deserving, even though they are dead, knowing tha t they livean ineofporcal lif'e. But from the prayers o f evil men H e turns away His faee even though they enjoy the prim e o f life, considering tha t they are dead to true life and bear their body with them like a tom b, tliat they m ay bury their unhappy soul in it.4’

But if C ain’s punishm ent simply consisted of spiritual death, how was fois any worse than w hat befell his parents, whose sin surely had not been as great? Philo presences several traditions that address thisproblem. O ne is a contrast of the banishm ent o f Adam and that ofCain, which seems to belong to the stratum of tradition that holds £ve principally responsible for the ^p u ls io n from Eden:

A dam , then, is driven out by God; C ain goes out voluntarily. Moses is showing us each form o f m oral failure, one o f free choiec, the other not so. T he involuntai^ act, not owing its existence to our deliberate judg- m ent, is to obtain later on such healing as foe case admits of, “for G od shall raise up another seed in place of'A bel whom C ain slew” (Gen 4:25). Phis seed is a male offspring, Seth or “W atering,” raised up to foe soul whose fall did not originate in itself (ψυχή τη μή παρ’ εαυτης τραπείσρ). T he voluntaiy act [of C ain], inasm uch as it was com m itted with forethought and of set purpose, m ust incur woes forever beyond healing.**

Note that this comparison contradicts the insistence on A dam ’s free choice found in m any of foe interpretations o f Gen 3 cited above. A nother passage implies a ^ n t r a s t between the consequences 0؛ the Fall of Adam and Eve and the punishm ent that Cain deserved:

W hat is the m eaning ٠؛ ' foe words, “Everyone who finds m e will kill m e” (Gen 4:14), inasm uch as there were no other people but his parents? First o f all, he was likely to suffer harm from foe parts o f the world which were m ade for foe use and participation of good m en but none the less

و 1.70 41 م ; compare the second point in 1.76 م و :which begins ,(on Gen 4:15) م“Second, ^m ediately at the outset, [ScriptureJ wishes to describe the law 01' the incor- ruptibility of the soul and to refute foe false belief that this bodily life alone is blessed.”

43 Post. 10-11 (a more literal translation of the passage cited in Greek would be “the soul which did not turn aside of its own accord”).

KARINA M ^ T IN HOGAN١٠

exact ^ n ish m e r it front the wicked. Second, because he feared the attacks o f beasts and reptiles, for nature p roduced these for the punisfottcnt. o f unjust men. T hird , perhaps one m ay think 01' his parents, to w hom he first brought new grief and their first misfortune, as they had not known w hat death is.43

“D eath” is used in a purely physical sense here, and the author of the passage seems to consider no form of misfortune or ptm ishm cnt to be worse than physical suffering and death. Thus, it almost eertainly refleets a m ty early stage of exegesis, probably prior to the distineflon between physieal and spiritual death. S i^ ificanfly there is no passage ؛that takes into account A dam ’s spiritual death and eontrasts it with the punishm ent of C ain .14

It is not possible to provide an ade؟ uate sum m ai^ of the exegesis o f Gen 1-4 in Philo because so m any eonflicting traditions are repre- sented. Nevertheless, it is o r th w h ile to point out the most im portant issues to which the various exegetical traditions are responding. The first is the body-soul dualism which was com m on to both Stoicism and Platonism, although formulated in very different ways by the two philo- sophical schools. All of the interpretations of Gen 1:26-7 and 2:7 find biblical support for the idea that the hum an m ind or spirit partakes o f divinity (in cither a fragm entary or a mimetic sense), while the body is either insignificant or a liability. T he double-creation tradition goes so far as to imagine that there could be such a thing as a disembod- ied hum an person (in the realm of ideas, o f course). The idea that the spiritual part of the hum an person is potentially im m ortal com^s to the fore in the in to ^ e ta tio n s of the sin of Adam (and £ve). T he fact tha t Adam and Eve do not die on the day that they eat of the tree from which G od forbade them on penalty of death to eat generates the i n t e g r a t i o n that the o n seq u en ce of disobedience to G od is the ultimate death of the soul. It is with the story of Cain and Abel that the problems of the untimely death o f the righteous and the apparent trium ph of the wicked are confronted. Support is found in Gen 4 for the idea that the souls of the righteous dead are alive to God, and that certain sins bring about the immediate and irrem eable penalty of

ب Q.G. 1.74. Cf. Virt. 200, where ?hilo suggests tliat immediate death was too good أfor Cain; rather, God “held suspended over him a multitude of deaths-deaths which made themselves felt in a constant succession of griefs and fears, cariying with them full apprehension of the miseries of his most evil plight.” The same idea is developed at length in Praem. 69-73.

44 The significance of this omission is discussed in note 68.

THE ■،AMBIGUITY OF DEATH” IN THE WISDOM OF SOLOMON 15

Spiritual death. Some passages that seem to belong to an early stage of in te^ re ta tio n present C ain ’s sin as far more grave than A dam ’s, but it is unclear w hether later interpreters m ade any distinetion between the ^ n ish m e n ts of Adam and o f Cain, since each is said to have incurred spiritual death.

The Creation o f Man in Wisdom

T he author of Wisdom makes a num ber of allusions to both Genesis accounts of the creation 01' m an which reveal his familiarity with some o f the excgctical traditions found in ?hilo. T he clearest such allu- sion occurs in a passage (Wis 15:8-11) describing a m an who “molds” (πλάσσει) from clay a “vain god” (θεον μάτα ιον)^αη ironic inversion of Gen 2:7. T رآ he passage concludes, “. . . [the po tter’s] life is more worthless than clay, because he was unaware of the one who molded him (τ؛>ν πλάσαντα αύτον), and inspired him with an active soul (έμπνεύ- σαντα αύτω ψυχήν ενεργούσαν), and breathed into him a living spirit (έμφυσήσαντα πνεύμα ζωτικόν)” (15 :10b-ll, my translation).46 H ere the author takes for granted the “Stoic” in te^ re ta tio n according to which the πνοή of G en 2:7 is understood to be a part of the divine πνεύμα and is equated with the hum an ψυχή (cf. Τ Α . 1.36-8, above). A simi- lar identification of the soul with πνεύμα occurs in Wis 2:2-3, which also alludes ironically to G en 2:7. T he ungodly are lam enting their mortality: “. . . for the breath (πνοή) in our nostrils is smoke, and reason is a spark kindled by the beating o f our hearts; when it is extinguished, the body will turn to ashes, and the spirit (πνεύμα) will dissolve like empty air” (2:2c-3). Since the ungodly “reasoned unsoundly” (Wis 2:1), their ch arac teri^ tio n of the πνεύμα as subject to dissolution when the body dies is presum ably false from the au thor’s point of view, or rather not universally true.47

4 On Wisdom’s parodies of the creation accounts, see Mauriee Gilbert, “La relecture تde Gen 1-3 dans le livre de la Sagesse” in La création د ■ rOrient Ancien, ed. Fabien Blanquart (Paris: Editions du Cerf, 1. و7) 33ة־و ة

م ب Unless a more literal translation is required to make a point, all translations from اWisdom will follow the NRSV.

47 Although the presence of the ungodly at the judgment scene (4:20-5:13) suggests to some readers (e.g., Weisengolf, “Death and Immortality”, 10ق a continuation of their زexistence after death for the purpose of punishment, the author’s comment immediately following the speech of the ungodly (5:14) implies that the annihilation they expected will in fact befall their souls (see also 3:10). The author leaves no room for doubt about the fate of rigltteous souls, however: their reward is eternal lifo with God (5:15).

KARINA MARTIN HOGANlfi

The universality of physieal mortality, by contrast, is associated with the fact that the first m an was formed from the earth (Gen 2:7). Pseudo- Solomon acknowledges, “I also am mortal, like everyone else, a de- scendent of the first-formed child of earth” (Wis 7:1). In light o f the exegesis of Gen 2:7 found in Philo, it is likely that for Pseudo-Solomon being formed from the earth symbolizes the material or bodily aspect of hum an ^ s te n c e . Similarly, in the ^orem entioned passage about the potter, the brevity of hum an life is expressed in terms of its earthly nature: “W ith perverse industry, he molds from the same clay a vain god— he who was born from the earth a short time before, and returns after a little while to the place from which he was taken (έξης έλήμφθη; cf. Gen 3:19 LXX), when foe time comes to return his borrowed soul” (Wis 15:8, my translation). The potter’s folly consists not in the belief that objects made by hum an hands are divine (in 15:12-13, the author insists that an idol-m aker’s only motive is profit), but in the failure to recognize the implications o f his own material existence. Two conclu- sions about Pseudo-Solom on’s interpretation o f Gen 2-3 can be drawn from these two allusions. First, even though he apparently believes Adam was a historical person, foe “first-formed father of the world” (Wis 19:1), he reads foe creation stoty as a symbolic explanation of foe hum an condition. Second, while Pseudo-Solomon views physical mortality as an inheritance from Adam, he mentions it not in the con- text of A dam ’s sin, but in connection with his being formed from the earth (7:1). Thus, he apparently assumes that material existence entails mortality. This assumption may be com pared to Philo’s description of tire ؛،molded m an” o f G en 2:7 as “by nature m ortal.”*؛؛

T he significance of an allusion to Gen l:2 fi7 -in Wis 2:23 is some ־times missed because of a tendency to read 2:23-4 together as a neat sum m ary of the “C reation and Fall.” If read in the context o f what precedes it, however, 2:23 is clearly not about physical immortality, lost through the sin of Adam and Eve, but about spiritual immortal- ity, still attainable through a life of righteousness. ،،And [the ungodly] did not know the mysteries o f God, nor did they hope for the reward of holiness, nor did they choose (or: discern— έκριναν) the prize for blameless souls. For G od created m an for incorruption, and m ade him the image of His own eternity [or: own nature] (εικόνα της ιδίας άιδιότητος ^διότητος])” (2:22-3, my translation). From the context, it is clear that

.134 .٩۶ ٠٠

THE “AMBIGUITY OF DEATH” IN THE WISDOM OF SOLOMON ل ?

it is the soul, not the whole person, that was ereated for im m orality and is the image of G od’s eternity (or nature).^ 'hhis interpretation is in keeping with cvcty stage of the exegesis o f G en 1:26-7 found in Philo: it must he with respect to the m ind or soul that the hum an per- son was ereated in the image of God.

The author of W isdom does not make a distinction between ψυχή and νους; he distinguishes only between the potentially im m ortal spir- itual part of a person, and the m ortal body. At one point, Pseudo- Solomon represents the body as an obstaele to hum an reasoning: “For the reasoning of mortals is worthless, and our designs are likely to fail; for a perishable body weighs down the soul, and this earthly tent bur- dens the thoughtful (or: anxious) m ind” (Wis 9:14-15). Unlike Philo, however, he blames neither the body nor sense-perception for leading the m ind into sin.50 M oreover, he is not eonsistent in identifying the self exclusively with the spiritual part of the person. For example, in Wis 1:4, divine W isdom is said to avoid both “a deceitful soul” and “a body enslaved to sin” . In another passage, the au tho r’s first inch- nation seems to be to identify the self with the body, but he corrects himself: “As a child I was naturally gifted, and a good soul fell to my lot; or rather, being good, I entered an undefiled body” (Wis 8:19-20). Nevertheless, when Pseudo-Solomon speaks of immortality it is always in terms of the soul; there is no hint of a hope for bodily resurrec- tion.5i In his view of the afterlife, Pseudo-Solom on is every bit as “Hellenized” as Philo.

Pseudo-Solomon’s prayer in chapter 9 also begins with an allusion to the creation o f m an, this fime recalling tha t the first hum an being was created “in order that he might have dom inion” (iva δεσπόζω) over the rest of G od’s crcatores (Wis 9:2, my translation; cf. Gen 1:28). H e goes on to elaborate this role in terms more suited to a king than to hum ankind in general: “and rule the world in holiness and righteous- ness, and ^ o n ^ c e j u d ^ e n t in uprightness of soul” (9:3). Yet Pseudo- Solom on emphasizes tha t he prays for wisdom as “a m an who is weak and short-lived, with little understanding of judgm ent and laws” (9:5). The au thor’s royal persona heightens the tension between hum an

49 It makes no differenee to the argument which reading is preferred, since eternity is generally believed to be an attribute of the nature (or proper being) of God.

50 See Cl. Larcher, OF, Etudes sur le Livre de ¿a Sagesse (Ebib; Paris: j . Gabalda, 1%و ( أ266-8. He points out that in 4:11-12, where one might expect a mention of the right- eous being relieved of the temptations of the flesh, only external evils are mentioned.

1 .Pace Taylor, “Eschatological Meaning,” 131-7 ت

KARINA MARTIN HOGAN18

limitations and the responsibilities of power, but the allusion to Gen 1:28 suggests that this tension is built in to the hum an condition. W ithout the help of divine Wisdom, Pseudo-Solomon’s prayer acknowl- edges, no hum an being can accomplish the purpose for which hum an- ity was created (9:6, 13-15).

Wisdom on Adam's Sin

The same outlook on the hum an condition is encapsulated in the brief allusion to A dam ’s sin in Wis 19:1-2: “ [Wisdom] protected the first-formed (πρωτόπλαστον) father of the world, when he alone had been created; she delivered him from his own transgression (έκ παρα- πτώματος ίδιου), and gave him strength to rule all things.”52 The epithet πρωτόπλαστος recalls Wis 7:1, where mortality is assumed to be the natural result of hum anity’s being formed from the earth. T here is no suggestion in this verse that m o rta lity -o r indeed any bad consequence— came about as a result of A dam ’s transgression. Divine W isdom saw to it that Adam could continue to fulfill the role for which he was ere- ated, namely “to rule all things.” Even as he downplays the gravity of the expulsion from Eden, Pseudo-Solomon does not minimize Y a r n ’s sin by pinning the blame on Eve. Instead, he completely ignores her role in the story, insisting that Adam was all alone in the world and emphasizing that his transgression was his own. In this respect, his interpretation parallels those passages in Philo in which the Fall is char- acterized as the first m an’s autonom ous choice of evil over good (see above, Q fi. 1.51 and Virt 204-5). Yet the emphasis on the resultant loss o f spiritual im m ortality is lacking in Wis 10:1-2. This m ay be because Pseudo-Solomon intends to contrast the sin of Adam with that of Cain, a point to which we will return below.

Wisdom contains another probable allusion to Gen 3, however, which seems to establish a connection between the disobedience in Eden and the origin of death. I am, of course, referring to the highly-disputed verse, 2:24: “but through the devil’s envy death entered the world, and those who belong to his company experience it.” I argued above that in the preceding verse, the “im m ortality” for which hum anity was ere- ated is the immortality of the soul. Likewise, the “death” whose etiol- ogy is given in this verse cannot be simply physical mortality, sine(! only those who belong to D eath’s (or the devil’s) com pany or lot ex p o

52 NRSV omits the word “own,״ which may be quite significant, before “transgression/‘

THE “AMBIGUITY OF DKATI-Γ IN '■'HI- WISDOM OE SOLOMON ل و

rience it.53 It m ust m ean either spiritual death while a person is still alive, whieh Philo describes as “the soul becoming entom bed in pas- sions and wickedness o f all kinds,”ب or the “ultimate death” of body and soul together, which is the way the ungodly envision death and the way they will in fact e ^ e r ie n c e it (see Wi$ 3:10, 5:14). According to Kolarcik, the argum ent of the book requires that “death” in 1:1.3 and 2:24 signify what he calls “ultimate death,” since Pseudo-Solomon’s point is that the righteous and the ungodly c ^ c r ie n c e physical death in fundamentally different ways.53 Therefore, Wis 2:24 explains the ori- gin not of physical mortality, but of wickedness and its consequence, foe ultimate death of foe soul.

Wis 2:23-4 claims that G od’s original plan for hum anity was upset at some point by ،،the d e a l’s (or adversary’s) envy.” Although a case can be made for reading this as an allusion to C ain’s m urder of Abel (the arguments will be renew ed below), a comparison with roughly- contem porary cxcgetical traditions suggests that the prim ary reference is to the tem ptation of £ve by the se ^ e n t. The ؛act that Eve is not m o tio n e d is admittedly puzzling, but it is in line with the au thor’s essential denial of her existence in 10:1. In Rev و ل2:أ ،،foe Devil and Satan, the deceiver of the whole world” are m entioned as alternative names for “that ancfent s c le n t ,” which most com m entators take as an allusion to Gen 3.56 Second Enoch 31:6 says quite clearly that the de^l, taking on the form of a se ^ e n t, “entered paradise, and corrupted Eve.”5 T آ he foentification of the s e ^ e n t with Satan is also taken for granted in Life o f Adam and Eve 10-1?, where Satan explains that his motivation for pursuing Adam and Eve was envy, since he had been expelled from heaven for refusing to worship Adam as the image of God. Even though all of these works are probably somewhat later than

53 t he Greek is ambiguous as to whose company those W'ho experience death belong, but in ا : ل the ungodly are said to be worthy of Death’s company, with Death clearly ةpersonified.

54 L.A. 1.106 (sec above).53 Kolarcik, Ambiguity, 176-7.

See, for example, j . Massyngberde Ford, Revelation (AB 38; Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1975) 206. In the context of a more obvious allusion to Gen 2-3, the mother of seven sons says in 4 Macc 18:8 . ٠ nor did the Destroyer, tlie deceitful ser-pent, defile the purity of my ^rginity.” See Kugel, Bible, 72-4.

57 'Franslation of F.I. Andersen in Charlesworth, ed.. Old ‘Testament Pseudepigrapha 1. 154. Allusions to this tradition also occur iti Apoc. Ab 23, Apoc. Mas 16:4 and 3 Bar 9:7. rThese allusions are cited by David Winston, The Wisdom of Solomon (AB 43; New York: Doublcday, 1979) 121-3.

KARINA MARTIN HOGAN20

W isdom, they independently attest to what must be an older tradition. T he faet that Philo does not m ention the tradition that the serpent was the de^dl does not neeessarily m ean that he was ignorant o f it. His philosophical reading o f the Bible simply docs not adm it the existence of Satan ةق.

In general, Pseudo-Solomon is also loath to “give the devil his due.” T he other passage that is often cited as evidence for the au thor’s view of the origin of death is Wis 1:12-lb. 'Phere again, the death that “God did not m ake” (1:13) seems to be something other than com m on mor- tality. After asserting that “rigtaeousness is im m ortal” ( :ل5)ء ا the pas- sage concludes: “But the ungodly summon [Death] by their deeds and words; considering him a friend, they pine for him and make a pact with him, because they are worthy of his com pany” (1:16, my trans- lation).59 Pseudo-Solom on’s purpose in this passage is to clear God of blam e for hum an wickedness and its consequence, spiritual death. Although it would have been convenient to bring in the devil at this point, he prefers to hold the ungodly fully responsible for their fate. £ven if one would argue that death as personified here is the func- tional equivalent 01 the devil,^ the fact remains that the ungodly sum- mon him, not vice versa. Similarly, as Pseudo-Solomon is explaining in chapter 14 why id o la t^ is “the beginning and cause and end of every evil” (14:27), he insists that “through hum an vanity [idolatry] entered the world” (14:14). T he wording of 14:14 echoes 2:24a, but the responsibility for evil is shifted back to hum an beings. Yet in the context of the creation of m an for immortality (2:23), Pseudo-Solomon apparently felt compelled to offer a “biblical” explanation for the ori- gin o f spiritual death, and that entailed m em ioning the involvement of “the devil” in A dam ’s transgression.

Some com m entators have proposed that 0 διάβολος in 2:24 refers

ق ؛ Günter Mayer {Index Philoneus [Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1 ا و74]ر records no occur- rence of the term Σατανάς, and only one of δ^βολος— as a common adjective, “slan- derous,” one of a long list of attributes of the pleasure-lover in ،.32 . ه ؟ء

ت 1 have translated the aorist verbs in 1:16 in the present tense because they are دgnomic aorists: the verse describes the habitual actions of the ungodly, rather than a moment in the past when they collectively “summoned death.״ Winston, although he notes that the verbs are gnomic aorists ( Wisdom, 113), retains the misleading past-tense t rans la t ion .

Yehoshua Amir (“Figure of Death,” 158) maintains that Death and the devil are identical for the author of Wisdom, but this leads him to treat 2:24 as a nonsensical statement (161). Given that the devil is mentioned only in 2:24, Amir’s position is difficult to comprehend.

THE “AMBIGUITY GE DEATH” IN THE WISDOM OF SOLOMON 21

not to the se!^>ent 01' Gen 3, but to Cain, “the adversary” of the right- eous Abel.؛؛؛ This argum ent draws support from the context of 2:24, which follows the speeeh 01' the ungodly plotting the m urder of the righteous m an (2:12-20). O n this reading, Cain is a type for the wicked oppressors 01 the righteous who choose spiritual death for themselves by inflicting physical death .^ W hile this in te rre la tio n fits well with w hat the author has to say about Cain in 10:3-4 (see below), it docs not explain how a reader, coming across 2:24 first, would be able to figure out that ة διάβολος m eant Cain, ft is possible to infer from G en 4 that envy was the motive for C ain ’s m urder of Abel, bu t there is no evidence that first-century readers did infer it, m uch less that an allusion to “the e n ^ of the a d v e rs a r” would cause anyone to think immedi- ately of Cain. Envy— φθόνος— is one of Philo’s pet vices; he mentions it in more than 40 different passages, yet never in connection with Cain.63 N or does Josephus m ention envy in his expansion of the Cain and Abel story in Ant. 1.52-66. Therefore, it is unlikely that ة διάβολος in 2:24 refers to Cain. The prim ary allusion must be to the serpent o f Gen 3. Nevertheless, we cannot rule out foe possibility that foe author had C ain and Abel in m ind as well when he wrote 2:24. Pseudo- Solomon may have thought o f C ain’s m urder o f Abel as the occasion on which death actually “entered the world,” even though Adam and Eve had first “sum m oned death” (1:16) through their disobedience. In other words, he may have read foe stoiy of Cain and Abel as the cul- m ination 01' the “Eall” story·^

Wisdom on Cain’s sin

Even if Gen 4 is included in the allusion in 2:24, foe only passage in W isdom that clearly refers to C ain ’s sin is 10:3-4a: “But when an unrighteous m an rebelled against [Wisdom] in his wrath, he perished

61 Acc©rding to Winston ( Wisdom, ل ل ت ز , this was the suggestion 0 H. Bois, in Essai '؛sur les origines de la philosophie Judéo-Alexandrine (Toulouse, ل0ز ة و , taken up byJ.A.E. Gregg و ,n his commentary oil Wisd©m (Cambridge؛ ل0ز و . More recently, it has been ar1̂ ed؛by John R. Te vison, Portraits of Adam in Early Judaism from Sirach to 2 Baruch (JSPSup ل; Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1988) 51-2.

fi2 Lerison, Portraits, 51.63 Mayer, Index Philoneus.ة .This is the way the s^ond-centuiy Christian apologists Irenaeus of Lyons (Adv ب

Haer. 1.30.9) and Theophilus of Antioch (Ad Autolycum 2.29) apparently read Gen 3-4, probably influenced by Wis 2:24. Theophilus clarifies the connection between the devil’s envy and death: Satan’s e n ^ intensified when he saw that not only were Adam

KARINA MARTIN HOGAN22

together with (συναπώλετο) [his brother] in a fratricidal rage. W hen the earth was flooded because of him, W isdom again saved i t . . .” (my translation). Even from this brief allusion, it is obvious that Pseudo- Solom on’s reading of Gen 4 is heavily influenced by traditional inter- ^e ta tio n s . First, Cain is the only individual in Wis 10 who is singled out as an άδικος— even the collective enemies o f each “δίκαιος” are not called άδικοι. Thus, even though he does not m ention the right- eousness 0؛' Abel, Pseudo-Solomon apparently ^ew s C ain’s m urder of Abel as the archetype of all wrongdoing.65 In fact, it is “because of h im ” that G od decides to destroy the world with a flood (10:4). Since there is no exact parallel for this explanation o f the flood,66 we can only s^ cu la te about why Pseudo-Solomon believed G od waited ten generations before destroying sinful hum anity. It may have been to give them an opportunity to repent (cf. 12:10 etc.). In any case, far more significant for our purposes is the idea that Cain “perished together w ith” (or “destroyed himself along with”) Abel ( ل0:3مر If συναπώλετο referred to C ain’s physical demise, it would be a blatant contradiction o f Gen 4:16-17. It is m uch more likely that it reflects the tradition, preserved in Philo ',Del. 47-8)و that Cain destroyed his own soul at the m om ent when he took his b ro ther’s lifo. Although Pseudo-Solomon generally presents the death of the soul as the outcome of a lifetime o f ungodliness, he may have believed that there were certain sins grave enough to seal a person’s fate frrevocably.

The g e s t io n remains, docs Pseudo-Solomon believe that spiritual death “entered the w orld” at the same m om ent as physical death (i.e., with C ain’s m urder of Abel), or had Adam already experienced spirit- ual death as the consequence of liis transgression? The latter option, of course, would bring Pseudo-Solom on’s exegesis of Gen 3 into line

and Eve still alive, but the*y were bearing ehildren, and one of them, Abel, was pleasing to God. So lie indueed Cain to kill Abel, and “from these be^nnings death was intro- duced into this world, and it peivadcs the whole human raee to this day.” Irenaeus also blames the sei^ent for corrupting Cain, “in order that by killing his brother Abel, he might first show [the world] jealousy and death.” Winston {Wisdom, 121-22) cites both passages but docs not recognize them as attempts to reconcile Wis 2:24 with Gen 3-4.

ة For Cain arid Abel as types for the wieked and the righteous, respeetively, see آKugel, Bible, و-و2م } ل

ة و ,The closest parallel Kugel (Bible ة و can offer is Test. Adam 3:5, where it is implied رthat the “daughters of men” in Gen 6:1 wem specifically Cain’s daughters.

67 The verb συναπόλλυμι means “perish together” in the passive; the form συναπώλετο could also be understood in a middle sense, in which case it would mean “destroy one- self along with” someone else. Most translations have simply “perish,” omitting the sense of simultaneity that is crucial to the interpretation.

THE “AMBIGUITY OF DEATH” IN THE WISDOM OE SOLOMON

with the non-aiiegorieal in terprcteti© ^ preserved in Philo. 'Phe prob- lem is, there is no hint in W isdom that Adam incurred any irrepara- ble dam age by disobeying G od’s com m and. Instead, divine W isdom

. . delivered him from his ^n sg ress io n , and gave him strength to rule all t hings10:1-2 If .(״ ( Adam had forfeited the immortality of his soul, such an outcome would have been impossible. T he first thing Pseudo-Solomon says about di^fine W isdom is that she “will not enter a deceitful soul, or dwell in a body enslaved to sin1:4 It appears .(״ (that, faced with the alternative that Adam and Cain were subject to the same punishm ent, Pseudo-Solomon chose to regard A dam ’s disobe- dience as not sufficiently serious to m erit im m ediate spiritual death. Given that he read the story of Adam as that of hum anity in gen- eral, and that he believed that spiritual immortality was within hum an reach, he could hardly do otherwise.^ Thus, perhaps we must read Wis 2:24 as follows: although spiritual death “entered the world״ when the devil tricked Adam (alone or with £ve) into disobeying God, Gain was the first person to “experience” it by choosing to belong to the devil’s company.

Conclusions

Because Pseudo-Solomon’s allusions to Gen 1-4 are relatively few and mostly rather cryptic, a comparison o f his exegesis of these chap- ters with that found in Philo must be somewhat speculative. The task is complicated further by the various, often on trad ic to ry , levels of inter- pretation preserved by Philo. Nevertheless, it is possible to draw a fow tentative conclusions. First, the author of W isdom shows familiarity and essential agreem ent with the earlier stages of exegesis of the creation of m an found in Philo; namely, the anti-anthropom orphic and single- creation stages. H e makes no reference to the double-creation inter- pretation of Gen 1:26-7 and 2:7, but we have no way of knowing w hether he was unaware of' it, actively disagreed with it, or simply found it too sp ecn la tiv e for the purposes of' a protreptic discourse. Like

68 The same dilemma may have motivated Philo ldmself to prefer reading Geil 2-3 as an “allegory of the soul”, since the more literal interpretations could not reconcile the severity of Adam’s supposed punishment with the veniality of his sin, relative to that of Cain. A rabbinic solution to this problem was to infer that Cain had repented (and Adam had not), and to use the story to teach the power of repentance. See George Foot Moore, Judaism in the First Centuries o f the Common Fra: The Tannaim (2 Volumes; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1927) 1، 524-25, 530; cf. Kugel, Bible, 96.

KARINA MARTIN HOGAN24

Philo, Pseudo-Solomon lakes lor granted that physical mortality is an inevitable property of m aterial existenee, and that the only kind of immortality that was ever Mithin hum an reach is that of the soul, Since Pseudo-Solomon is well aware of the concept of spiritual death, it seems likely that he knew of the tradition that the consequence of A dam ’s disobedience was spiritual death, and rejected it. ft is even more prob- able that he renounced any i ^ e ^ e t a t i o n that blam ed Eve for A dam ’s sin, since he consistently avoids m entioning her. Pseudo-Solomon ap- parently afhrms the tradition that the death of C ain ’s soul was the immediate result of his m urder of Abel, ft is hard to tell exactly w hat connection he sees between “the devil’s envy” and the first m urder, but it is clear that he views Cain as the archetype of all evildoers.

A comparison o f the exegesis of Gen 1-4 in W isdom and Philo lends support to K olarcik’s thesis that death is an ambiguous concept in Wisdom. O n the face o f it, the suggestion that an author would use the same terms to refer to two quite different things— the death of the body which is com m on to all and the ultimate death of the soul which is the lot of the wicked is hard to swallow. Kolarcik d ^ o n s tra tc s the rhetorical effectiveness of such ambiguity, but one might still question w hether Pseudo-Solom on’s audience would have caught on to the double m eaning o f death. Assuming that current in te rre la tio n s of Gen 1-4 were preached in the synagogues of Afexandria, we can be fairly certain that they would have gotten his point more easily than present- day readers do. The concept of spiritual death was apparently adopted by A ^xandrian Jews to deal with two exegetical problems in Gen 1-4: why Adam and Eve did not die as threatened after eating from the tree of the knowledge o f good and evil, and why Cain was barely pun- ished for killing his brother. W hile the explanation that all three were punished with spiritual death (either immediately or at the end o f their lives) may have been ultimately unsatisfying, it would have popularized the notion that the death of the soul is more to be feared than the death of the body. We will never know w hether this “philosophical” view of death gained widespread acceptance am ong Hellenized Jews. ¥ e t it must have been familiar enough in A lexandria that Pseudo- Solomon could assume general comprehension of his adm onition, “Do not inrite death by the error of your life, or bring on destruction by the works o f your hands” (Wis ل)م ل: ة

آلمآورلم؛

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