Kadin Williams

Soren Kierkegaard’s Repetition:

Ambiguity and the Whirlwind

Introductory Note: This paper seeks to interpret Soren Kierkegaard’s book Repetition in light

of his use of the biblical Job story, the book’s relationship to Kierkegaard’s larger body of

literature, and T. Wilson Dickenson’s attempt to examine Repetition on its own terms. To that

end, this interpretation utilizes a hermeneutical middle-ground between the methodologies of T.

Wilson Dickenson and John Douglas Mullen. This interpretative middle ground relies heavily

upon Repetition’s relationship to the biblical story of Job, which is a key part of the story and

most interpretative models. The story of Job takes the reader through the death of Job’s children,

the loss of his possessions, and his health affliction. In response to all of these tragedies the story

concludes with a revelatory speech from a Whirlwind and an epilogue that restores his material

possessions. Repetition primarily revolves around two characters – Constantine Constantius and

the anonymous Young Man. Over the course of the book, these characters engage the subject of

Job both implicitly and directly.

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Soren Kierkegaard’s dramatic intertwining of performance, narrative, and philosophy in

Repetition moves in a way that not only engages the reader intellectually, but also involves the

reader through the movement and ambiguity personified by the characters and magnified by the

ending. Kierkegaard’s use of the Job story as a platform for dialog and parallelism in his

characters creates the hermeneutical question of whether or not he extrapolates the Job story in a

way that both respects and stays relatively authentic to the original. In other words, “Is Soren

Kierkegaard asking Job to do some philosophical work for him, or is he freeing Job of that

burden?” Perhaps fittingly, the answer can be seen as a reframing of Kierkegaard’s “Either/Or”

into a “Both/And.”1 More specifically, he uses Job as an example of his ideal, through at least

1 On a literal level I mean to say that the question’s answer should not be viewed as an inherent

dichotomy. On another level, I mean to say that Kierkegaard’s writings were categorized to

indicate the primary focus of particular works (the aesthetic, ethical, religious), but that such

categories fail to capture the ambiguity in the duplicity of the whole authorship. To quote

Strawser’s analysis: “Based on a comprehensive reading of the Kierkegaardian corpus, which is

to say nothing with respect to the man, ‘Kierkegaard’ the author is both religious and aesthetic.

Neither solely one nor solely the other, he is one in the other. Only from this point of view can

the dialectical duplicity and ambiguity be maintained. Kierkegaard’s original ‘either/or’ must

give way to an ultimate ‘both/and,’ as indicated above.” See: Michael Strawser, Both/And:

Reading Kierkegaard From Irony to Edification (New York: Fordham University Press, 1997),

N12, pg. 246.

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two levels of engagement2, while retaining the lack of resolution of the original Job text. The

failure of the characters as illustrated through the letters in Repetition parallels the ambiguity of

Job, including an emphasis upon the revelation brought by the whirlwind.

Kierkegaard’s use of the Job narrative in Repetition is intriguing for its consistency both

to Kierkegaard’s philosophy and its attachment to the Job-text itself. There is a definite tension

in Kierkegaard scholarship towards the question of hermeneutical framework – specifically in

regards to Repetition which seems to stand as a particularly tricky text.3 This essay will critique

interpretive conclusions from two hermeneutical camps in its consideration of the Job dialog in

Repetition.

Before moving on to discuss how Kierkegaard uses Job in his philosophy it will be

necessary to highlight the elements of his thought that are most pertinent to the Job discourse. He

is what many might call a proto-existentialist.4 Largely drawing his initial thoughts from

Schelling, Kierkegaard radically critiqued the negative Socratic philosophy of Hegel.5 From

Kierkegaard’s perspective, the Hegelian system sought to capture all of reality within its

2 This can be seen at the literal level of the dialog and the inferential level of embodied

philosophy in the characters themselves. More specifically, through the use of the young man as

a parallel figure to Job, albeit a less righteous and perhaps inferior version of the original, as well

as through the content of the dialog itself. 3 To explore this methodological tension further see T. Wilson Dickenson, “Repeating, Not

Simply Recollecting, Repetition: On Kierkegaard’s Ethical Exercises” Sophia 50, no. 4 (2011):

657-675 for a perspective that focuses less upon Kierkegaard’s larger corpus and treats

Repetition largely on its own terms through careful investigation of the literary features. For

another perspective see John Douglas Mullen, Kierkegaard’s Philosophy: Self-Deception and

Cowardice in The Present Age (New York: New American Library, 1981), 119-120. This

perspective interprets Repetition as something within the larger corpus of Kierkegaard’s writings,

and specifically within a particular period of his writings. 4 Eric Ziolkowski, The Literary Kierkegaard (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press,

2011), 20. 5 Frederick Copleston, S.J., A History of Philosophy: Modern Philosophy From Post-Kantian

Idealists to Mark, Kierkegaard, and Nietzsche, vol. 7 (New York: Doubleday, 1994), 335.

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dialectical net. The unfortunate consequence of this was that existence, or in other terms

‘Positive Philosophy,’ was left without a realm of its own.6

As a philosopher and theologian Kierkegaard was very practical. He was concerned with

existence and its various ambiguities. For him, existence was a category relating to the individual

rather than as a member of a group.7 In his view, Hegelianism had no room for the individual, it

could only universalize. ‘Existence’ meant “realizing oneself through free choice between

alternatives, through self-commitment. […] To merge or sink oneself in the universal, whether

this is conceived as the State or as universal Thought, is to reject personal responsibility and

authentic existence.”8 Particularity was everything for Kierkegaard and this is why he had a

tendency to highlight the antitheses and distinctions one comes across in some of his more

difficult writings.

To a large extent Kierkegaard’s philosophical explorations centered around two very

prominent themes. One was the problem of evil and the other was whether or not he was justified

in some way for ending his relationship with his fiancé.9 Regarding the problem of evil, he was

particularly interested in exploring whether or not, “the commands of God can so far vary from

human commands and expectations as to be not only incomprehensible but humanly and morally

repugnant.”10 It was through this question that he explored the concept of what a person’s

attitude and behavior should be in relation to the Divine. In Repetition specifically, one can see a

great deal of Kierkegaard’s ethical struggle with his past actions. When creating the character of

6 Ibid. 7 Ibid. 8 Ibid, 335-336. 9 Murray Rae, Kierkegaard and Theology (New York: T & T Clark, 2010), 24-27. 10 Brian Stiltner, “Who can Understand Abraham? The Relation of God and Morality in

Kierkegaard and Aquinas” The Journal of Religious Ethics, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Fall, 1993), pp. 222.

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the Young Man he was clearly informed by the memory of his behavior towards Regina Olsen,

his then fiancé. From his perspective, his actions towards her would have only been justified “if

he had a personal mission from God whose absolute demands are addressed to the individual.”11

To a great degree, it was through these two lenses that Kierkegaard examined the relationship

between God and humanity.

While Karl Barth may often get the credit and references for drawing a radical distinction

between God and humanity he acquired many of these views through his readings of

Kierkegaard and Dostoevsky.12 It was Kierkegaard who, in challenge to Hegel and the idealist

school, cried out, “God is not man, and man is not God. And the gulf between them cannot be

bridged by dialectical thinking. It can be bridged only by the leap of faith, by a voluntary act by

which man relates himself to God and freely appropriates, as it were, his relation as creature to

the Creator, as finite individual to the transcendent Absolute.”13 He was concerned with getting

humanity to see the plight of its situation and to recognize where it stands in relation to divinity.

He believed that choice and freedom were key elements of ‘self’ and ‘existence’ and that the

really important problems of life are not solved by thought, but by the act of choice, “on the level

of existence rather than on that of detached, objective reflection.”14 Like many of his characters

who experience crises (the young man, Job, Abraham) Kierkegaard too seems to live in crisis.

His philosophy flows from his personal situation and context.

11 Copleston, A History of Philosophy, 344 12 Karl Barth, The Epistle to the Romans, trans. Edwyn C. Hoskyns, 6th. ed (New York: Oxford

University Press, 1968), 4. 13 Copleston, A History of Philosophy, 336. 14 Ibid, 336.

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It is quite likely that Kierkegaard’s conception of repetition15 was informed from his

thoughts of suicide and moral/religious conversions.16 The three-fold structure of his system,

organized around categories of ethical decision-making, placed his characters into the

“aesthetic,” the “ethical,” and the “religious” ways of living.17 Kierkegaard illustrates these three

states through the use of characters. The “aesthetic” state can be seen to some extent in the

Young Man of Repetition or even Don Juan, the ethical state is very much personified by

Socrates, and the religious state is illustrated by Abraham.18 In Repetition specifically, he focuses

more upon the transition from the aesthetic to the ethico-religious.19

This transition between spheres, generally speaking, is what Kierkegaard means by

repetition. This practice of repetition requires an insight into human integrity and the desire to

better oneself.20 This will, or desire to better oneself, is a form of courage that presses forward.

In Repetition, specifically, he tells the story of Constantine Constantius,21 who tries to formulate

a Platonic recollection, but fails.22 In this state of failure Constantine recognizes the necessity of

his own failure and yet is unable to will the necessary move – a condition which he also

recognizes in his young friend.23 He states, “Repetition is too transcendent for me. I can

15 This is my first usage of the term “repetition” as opposed to “Repetition.” This new usage

designates the abstract philosophical concept explored in Kierkegaard’s book Repetition. 16 Copleston, A History of Philosophy, 338. 17 Ibid, 347. 18 Ibid, 343-344. 19 Timothy Polk, “Kierkegaard and the Book of Job: Theodicy or Doxology?” Word & World 31,

no. 4 (September 1, 2011): 409. This is largely because Repetition was written at an earlier stage

in Kierkegaard’s development. In this time period specifically, he was primarily focused upon

distinguishing the aesthetic from that which was other. See: Strawser, Both/And, N12, pg. 246. 20 Mullen, Kierkegaard’s Philosophy, 119-120. 21 The name “Constantius” is obviously reflective of this person’s philosophical embodiment. He

stays stagnant and is quite incapable of change. 22 Kierkegaard, Repetition and Philosophical Crumbs, 160. 23 Mullen, Kierkegaard’s Philosophy, 119-120.

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circumnavigate myself, but I cannot get beyond myself.”24 So in other words, Constantine is

constant in his inability to move beyond his own sphere. And in that state he is able to see the

anxiety/dread facing the young man who is also having a hard time moving spheres, albeit

different ones.

In this categorical structure of ambiguity25 Kierkegaard emphasizes the importance of

hermeneutics in the political realm. In a striking similarity to Levinas’ concept of lapse,

Kierkegaard conceives of repetition as a critique of the established church and humanity.26 For

both of these thinkers, no historical manifestation can ever be adequate to the call of personal

responsibility, whether the institution or mass be of a political or religious nature.27 For

Kierkegaard, repetition requires an open-ended relationship with God, who can never be

encapsulated in a particular socio-historical community.28 That is not to say, however, that he

negates the importance of community. Rather, he was providing a corrective to an overemphasis

or misinterpretation of it.

Repetition as manifest in the transition (its questionable if one can ‘entirely transition’

from one sphere to another) from the ethical to the religious is often conceived of as teleological

24 Soren Kierkegaard, Repetition and Philosophical Crumbs, trans. M.G. Piety (New York:

Oxford University Press), 50. 25 I say ambiguity because the placement of characters is not always as clear-cut as it is with the

arch-type of Abraham in Fear and Trembling. 26 J. Aaron Simmons and David Wood, ed.’s, Kierkegaard and Levinas: Ethics, Politics, and

Religion (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008), 3. 27 Ibid. I do, however, suspect that Kierkegaard is only applying this critique at the institutional

level. I suspect that he would see the “Body of Christ” as a collection of authentic individuals,

rather than a mass of people who lose their identity into the whole. If there were to be a loss of

identity that relationship would probably manifest itself in a interchangeable relationship with

God, rather than the more abstract body universal/ realm of divine consciousness. 28 Ibid.

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suspension of the ethical in his writings.29 For the young man in Repetition there is an acute

sense of loss and anxiety about his fiancé. The concept of repetition addresses this by exploring

how a sense of meaning and direction in life can be recovered after its loss.30 When the young

man “awaits his thunderstorm” there is an obvious parody of Job’s whirlwind narrative. In taking

this act, or leap so to speak, the young man demonstrates what Kierkegaard wants to characterize

as “faithful trust” in a fulfilling restoration. That faithful trust, however, is only part of repetition.

Constantine refers to the young man frequently in terms of the poetic – or more specifically, “a

poet on the verge of the religious.”31 So in many ways, the young man parallels Job – at least in

Kierkegaard’s interpretation. The difficulty with that interpretation is determining whether or not

Job was seeking restoration or an explanation. In light on Job chapter twenty-three, the latter

seems more likely.

Since Kierkegaard’s conception of repetition is so religious in nature, it is almost

justifiable to refer to it as a form of communication between an individual and God. In his

opposition to the Hegelian negative-philosophy, he pushed towards a view of the self that did not

focus as heavily on a past that needed to be recollected.32 Instead he focused on a repetition

forward into the religious sphere of being.33 As Dickenson states, “Repetition does not refute

abstract problems, but it carries out a performance that is meant to bring its reader into the

29 This is particularly true of Fear and Trembling, but it is also true in other places as well

including the role of Constantine in Repetition. See: Simmons and Wood, Kierkegaard and

Levinas, 77. 30 Kierkegaard, “Introduction” in Repetition and Philosophical Crumbs, ix. 31 Ibid, xiii-xvi. 32 Simmons and Wood, Kierkegaard and Levinas, 224. 33 Ibid, 224.

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difficult space of movement and practice.”34 For him, the truth of communication was in

transcendence and repetition.35

Repetition as a movement or event that allows an individual to gain a better awareness of

oneself and the world through a different lens comes not through a recollection that one can find

in the self, but rather through an external source.36 As Constantine stated when referring to the

absence of repetition, “all of life is dissolved into an empty, meaningless noise.”37 The grief,

anxiety, and despair that can overcome an individual require this alleviation, but the source of

this is perhaps the most interesting emphasis in Kierkegaard’s treatment of Job. For Socrates and

Hegel, one could find meaning in loss in human intelligence and will.38 Kierkegaard comes at

this question of self-sufficiency in both Repetition and Crumbs. His conclusion is that humanity

is radically insufficient to the task.39

His alternative suggests that humanity gets its cognitive and moral bearings not through

prompted remembering, “but quite unexpectedly as a gift from the unknown, as a revelation from

the future. Repetition is epiphany that sometimes grants the old again, as new, and sometimes

grants something radically new.”40 The point is that there is a return to a prior state of comfort,

but at the same time a change in the very essence of who the person is. To what extent that

change manifests itself is difficult to say. It is hard to determine how Kierkegaard views the

constitution of himself and his subjects, but it is possible he sees a combination or singularity of

34 T. Wilson Dickenson’s article, “Repeating, Not Simply Recollecting, Repetition: On

Kierkegaard’s Ethical Exercises” Sophia 50, no. 4 (2011): 659. 35 Ibid, 219. 36 Kierkegaard, “Introduction” in Repetition, viii. 37 Ibid, 19. 38 Ibid, ix. 39 Ibid. 40 Ibid, xv.

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categories or possibly even some other alternative like a vessel structure. It is, of course, highly

likely that Kierkegaard would resist describing self-identity in the ways listed above because

they too readily reduce the importance of individuality. However it seems necessary to find some

way to frame his conception of self as it relates to repetition at a higher degree of clarity.

This being obfuscation could, however, be one of his primary goals. It was because of his

familiarity with Kierkegaard that Jean-Paul Sartre famously came to the idea that ethical values

are a matter of radical choice.41 So the freedom of the individual before God is always of

paramount priority for him.

In Repetition, self-reception is one of the key operative terms. Kierkegaard characterizes

Job as waiting through his suffering with nothing to choose, “he is only dust and ashes.”42 This is

interesting because it almost seems to parallel the Testament of Job’s emphasis on Job being

patient.43 This is, however, the wrong conclusion. There is one reference in particular that seems

to highlight the positive element of Job’s cries out to God and justice. This call resounds, “Does

one no longer dare to complain to God? Has the fear of God… become greater? […] Speak,

therefore, memorable Job!”44 This underscores his emphasis upon having a relationship with

God whether that happens to be pleasant or hostile on an experiential level. The positive element

is always the existence of that relationship.

41 Ibid, x. 42 Ibid, xi. 43 C.L. Seow, Job 1-21: Interpretation and Commentary (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Publishing

Company, 2013), 118. The Testament of Job is an extra-biblical source that retells the Job story.

It has been very influential on most Western interpretations of Job. For example, James 5:11

cites Job and declares that he was patient. There is no explicit mention of patience in the original

Job text, however, the Testament of Job makes uses this as an explicit theological emphasis. 44 Kierkegaard, Repetition, 58-59.

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The Young Man’s story highlights Kierkegaard’s understanding that when one finds

oneself caught in despair, at the very edge of the abyss, there is no autonomous choice by which

one can pick oneself up out of the waste of depression. Instead, one is found, remade and saved

by the intervention of the other.45 In this view, truth is not created. Instead, it is given and once

this happens it steal’s one’s heart.46 Kierkegaard’s “Biblical” insufficiency-model implies that

selves or identities are something given or bequeathed.

His emphasis upon this dependence is interesting, however it can make one wonder if

there is a contradiction between his emphasis upon choice and the movement of God to take a

person from one sphere to another. Kierkegaard answers this concern by implying that an

individual must be receptive to encounters with the other. The following description of his view

attests that,

“In letting go of the drive for explanation of hurt, we forgo a striving-to-achieve, forgo the

impulse of an autonomous, executive self. This allows receptivity and willingness to

supervene. A craving for self-sufficiency subsides. Such is the heart of Repetition, and the

heart of the Christian option mapped out in Philosophical Crumbs.” Soren Kierkegaard,

“Introduction” in Repetition and Philosophical Crumbs, trans. M.G. Piety (New York:

Oxford University Press), xvi.

Repetition, as expanded through the Job discourse, involves a restoration at the point at which

one yields (which in the case of Job was not until the appearance of God in the Whirlwind) and

accepts dependency upon God.47 Rather than trying to create repetition, Job is encountered by it.

“It happens on its own, in a fresh burst of glory that overtakes and humbles our sense of studied

control.”48

45 Kierkegaard, “Introduction” in Repetition, xi. 46 Ibid. 47 Ibid, 19. 48 Ibid, xii.

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Returning to the question of whether or not Kierkegaard asks Job to do some

philosophical work for him, it seems as though there may be an element in which he is using Job

in a way that may go too far. His emphasis upon the restoration of Job as an alleviation seems to

rely too heavily upon the epilogue, but at the same time one cannot simply ignore the epilogue

even if it carries a fairy-tale quality to it.49 So while Kierkegaard’s definition of repetition may

rely heavily upon this concept of restoration or relief, there are grounds for it in the importance

he gives to the Whirlwind and the epilogue in Job. So in a sense it is certainly reasonable to say

that Kierkegaard used Job to make his philosophical position stronger by capitalizing on the

perfect example of individual suffering. On the other hand, it is also equally valid to suggest that

Kierkegaard is true to the text by retaining the ambiguity surrounding the question of “why” God

does something. Rather than focusing on theodicy, he follows Job’s lead and moves to doxology

by avoiding easy answers and demonstrating a repetition of Job’s faith through the characters of

the dialog.50 Kierkegaard does not seem to be wrapped up with the issue of theodicy as much as

he is concerned with exploring the difficulties of life outside the role of God. It is important to

note, however, that Timothy Polk’s suggestion that Satan’s statement, “Strike all that he owns,

and if he doesn't curse you to your face, then I'll be damned!”51 provides evidence of Satan’s

agency in Job’s affliction is questionable.52 He argues that the form of speech used in this text is

that of an oath and, more specifically a curse. He then goes on to suggest that this was something

49 Seow, Job 1-21, 72-73. 50 Polk, “Kierkegaard and the Book of Job,” 409. 51 Job 1:11. 52 Seow, Job 1-21, 104 and 155-156. This position needs to be considered for two reasons. The

first is the Job-text’s treatment of Behemoth (Job 40:15-24) and Leviathan (Job 41:1-34). In

these two doxologies the distinction between God and chaos becomes vacant. The second comes

from Margarete Susman’s view of Job from a Post-Holocaust perspective. In this view, the

Jewish people need an explanation for their suffering, for they know, like Job, that the lethal

arrows fired at them come from God (Job 6:4).

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understood to be self-actualizing; once spoken, this speech went into effect magically.53 The

forces of destruction in Job chapter one seem to present difficult questions to this line of

reasoning. In many ways, placing the blame on Satan seems to be a relatively poor scapegoat

approach to the problem of evil.

Kierkegaard seems to avoid this sort of interpretation. Rather than put the blame on God

he does one of two things (which of these is perhaps not entirely clear). The first option is that he

says God uses this event as a test of Job, just like he tested Abraham. The second option, which

would stem on greater attention to the drama of the characters and less attention to the dialog,

avoids this sort of answer and retains a level of mystery around the problem of evil and

theodicy.54 While this paper has tended to draw more heavily upon the hermeneutic that uses

outside texts to interpret Repetition, Dickenson introduces an argument that seems appealing on

this particular subject. He posits:

“Exceeding straightforward argumentation, Kierkegaard does not simply call into question

the content of particular philosophical positions, but also questions the role, expectations

and practices of his reader. […] Making this move will entail a shift from the ordering of

conceptual formulations to an attention to practices that are formative of subjects and

actors. Of central importance will be the manner in which the medium and form of

Repetition parallels and transforms ancient Stoic exercises of ‘self writing.’ Written in the

form of a notebook and letters, Repetition echoes a number of Stoic exercises that were

directed toward ethical formation. Coming forward, much like Diogenes, Repetition does

not refute abstract problems, but it carries out a performance that is meant to bring its reader

into the difficult space of movement and practice.” T. Wilson Dickenson, “Repeating, Not

Simply Recollecting, Repetition: On Kierkegaard’s Ethical Exercises” Sophia 50, no. 4

(2011): 657-675

53 Polk, “Kierkegaard and the Book of Job,” 414. 54 This model relies more upon T. Wilson Dickenson’s article, “Repeating, Not Simply

Recollecting, Repetition: On Kierkegaard’s Ethical Exercises” Sophia 50, no. 4 (2011): 657-675.

This methodology suggests this interpretation because, Repetition has little to say by the way of

conceptual content about repetition. And efforts to elucidate and systematize repetition have

typically drawn the concept of ‘repetition’ from the Kierkegaard corpus. This methodology

argues that these efforts only minimally attend to the performance which is Repetition. Instead of

viewing the book as a dramatic production in and of itself competing views have to avoid the

logic/genre of the text itself.

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From this hermeneutical perspective, Repetition is actually something to be inspired through the

reading of the text in a concrete and physical manner. And, if one were to believe that this sort of

activity could actually inspire the valued outcomes then it could be possible that Kierkegaard

wrote Repetition in this way.

While certainly consistent with Kierkegaard’s aims, this theory doesn’t seem to be

represented in the majority of literature that speaks to Repetition. It does, however, introduce an

element that shows more respect to the complexity of Job. When Dickenson suggests that:

“David J. Gouwens frames Kierkegaard’s work in a manner that parallels Foucault’s shift

in thinking about ethics from a focus upon codes to practices of the self. He writes that

Kierkegaard’s practices of thinking are not oriented toward ‘arcane realms of knowledge,

or matters of technical expertise alone, but [they are] exercises in a discipline aimed at

coming to wisdom’ (1996, 28). By situating Kierkegaard’s work in a formative trajectory

of thinking, in contrast with one centered upon systematic articulation, the ethical

relevance of his texts can become clearer as they are positioned within a different

understanding of the task of ethics.” T. Wilson Dickenson, “Repeating, Not Simply

Recollecting, Repetition: On Kierkegaard’s Ethical Exercises” Sophia 50, no. 4 (2011):

662.

he strikes a remarkable consistency with Kierkegaard’s thought, even as expressed from other

hermeneutical models. The question of whether or not Kierkegaard actually employed this model

in Repetition will likely remain a debate; however, the existence of this theory provides a

superior answer to Kierkegaard’s treatment of theodicy as it relates to Job. If this is indeed his

model of choice, then his work preserves ambiguity and successfully keeps an element of

consistency with Job as a whole text and not simply the prologue and epilogue.

The evidence in favor of this view will probably not win over every hermeneutical camp,

but suggests that this view’s conclusion on Kierkegaard’s ambiguity is certainly not

unreasonable. Kierkegaard expressed his interest in teaching in this manner in a set of

unpublished lecture drafts that he wrote when considering a seminary teaching post. In the

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course of these lectures he argued against “the modern treatment of ethics as a science, insisting

instead that its instruction should more closely resemble that of an art or craft. […] Ethics, on

this account, is not a matter of communicating knowledge but it is about ‘the communication of

capability.’”55 Accordingly, he believed that there was danger in moving too quickly from words

to concepts, because it misses the point of experiencing the ethical lesson that the student is

supposed to learn.56 His goal seems to have been a continuous challenge that engaged the reader

in a way that transcended the literal level. Considering Kierkegaard’s propensity to communicate

indirectly and sometimes confusingly, this interpretive hermeneutic seems to at least be on to

something.

It is hard to say whether or not Kierkegaard’s writing of Repetition is so insular that it

excludes the possibility of reading other Kierkegaardian texts into it, but that position does seem

extreme. An alternative could be an interpretive methodology that recognizes this particular

text’s uniqueness, but also ties in strong correlations from texts of the same period and later texts

that further expanded his theories. An example of this sort of engagement can be found in the

character Constantine Constantius who, while already mentioned, provides quite an interesting

case-study. Not only does he stay stagnant, but he also seems to represent the ‘ethical sphere’

and is unable to move to the religious. Furthermore,

“The young man remarks that when he talks to Constantius he feels as if he is talking not

to a human being but to an intellect or an idea. The young man notes that Constantius’s

truth is true, ‘but it is a truth so very cold and logical, [it is] as if the world were dead’ (R,

191). This cold logic pervades Constantius’ advice to the young man about his aesthetic

love.” T. Wilson Dickenson, “Repeating, Not Simply Recollecting, Repetition: On

Kierkegaard’s Ethical Exercises” Sophia 50, no. 4 (2011): 669.

55 Dickenson, “Repeating,” 662. 56 Ibid.

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One interesting dilemma here is the fact that the Young Man is obviously in the aesthetic sphere,

but he seems to be pushing towards the ethico-religious. Consequently, the lines and boundaries

between the spheres then seem to be quite complicated.

The ending of the story complicates this picture even more because the reader finds out

that the Young Man was a literary invention of Constantine, which of course reminds the reader

again that it’s all a literary invention. The focus, then, could arguably be drawn away from the

love affair of the Young Man and towards the very act of writing and reading itself/oneself in a

text like this one. If Dickenson is right, in that the point of this text is to move and challenge the

reader through an internal method of change, then this literary formulation makes sense.

Kierkegaard’s Repetition can be seen as a “Both/And” because it deals with Job through

at least two levels of engagement. A methodology like this helps keep a level of complexity that

informs and engages the imagination in a way that respects the difficulty of the problem of evil,

but also provides hope in the movement of the whirlwind which is the culmination of

Kierkegaard’s ideal, which is repetition. A repetition is a movement across and through an abyss

of separation so that humanity might be moved by divinity. The characters of the story, like Job,

have to rely upon God for their repetition. So in this sense, Repetition adequately treats the Job

narrative with the respect it requires on an existentially anxious level. At the same time,

however, it also tries to (perhaps on one level – that is subject to hermeneutical context) comfort

those who need it and lead one to a state where they can find relief.

Kierkegaard is certainly capable of writing a polyphonic text and that seems to be what

he has done. Ambiguity and hope exist in parallel to each other in this text because of

Kierkegaard’s hope in the ‘other’ which crosses the abyss. As such, he brilliantly balances the

weight of the material in the Biblical story of Job with his own contemporary concerns. In his

Kadin Williams

use of the Job story, Kierkegaard successfully utilizes Job for his own philosophical work, but he

also maintains a level of anxious opaqueness that is authentic to the story of Job.