The environment and interdisciplinarity ecological and neoclassical economical approaches to the use...

EISEVIER Ecological Economics 10 (1994) l-13

The environment and interdisciplinarity Ecological and neoclassical economical approaches

to the use of natural resources

Paul 0. Vedeld

Department of Economics and Social Sciences, Box 5033, Agricultural University of Norway, 1430 Aas, Nomay

(Received 24 Februan 1992; accepted 12 March 1993)

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Abstract

This paper deals with the problem scientists from different disciplines have in communicating across disciplinary borders on matters pertaining to environmental problems. The paper gives a short presentation of the problem, a description of one possible theoretical framework to discuss this within, and an analysis of why and on what items one would expect economists and ecologists to agree or disagree. This is used to formulate some ideas on the distinction between inter- and multidisciplinarity. Interdisciplinarity is seen as the reflected and often meticulous eft’ort to interpret and translate research findings between different sciences or “paradigms”. Openness and complementarity are stressed.

Key words: Communication; Environmentalism; Interdisciplinarity; Paradigm

1. Introduction

Scientists from different disciplines think, understand and approach the “same phenomenon” in different ways. To establish a research programme or a common ground within ecological economics it is necessary to analyse in what sys- tematic ways there are differences between the two disciplines. In teaching development and resource economics for several years and having undertaken joint research with ecologists, I have experienced that a joint perception of problems related to the use of natural resources is not self-evident and should be explicitly analysed.

Deforestation in Africa can serve as an example of different perceptions among sciences. Many ecologists perceive deforestation as first of all destruction of nature, reduction of genetic diver- sity and long-term degradation of soils and the natural ecosystems, both in qualitative and quantitative terms. Many ecologists explain deforestation processes in terms of drought and overgraz- ing and other natural anomalies in addition to the pressure exerted through population growth. Their solution includes establishment of conservation areas, forest reserves, rescuing population growth, tree planting and effective guarding of the areas. Many economists focus on the loss in

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2 P. 0. Vedeld /Ecological Economics IO (19941 I-13

welfare for man following the deforestation. To explain deforestation they point to processes of land clearing, logging, fuelwood gathering, etc. These processes are in turn explained mainly by structural properties of the society, the economic driving forces through public policies, and market relations as well as increasing resource scarcity imposing increasing pressures on land and tree resources. The role of drought and population growth is often tuned down in relation to these factors as well as household internal factors. Economists’ solutions involve changing the economic structures and incentives, coupled with improved technology and redistribution of resources.

There are seemingly different worlds concerning what is the problem, what causes the problem and what may be viable solutions to the problem. A theoretical framework to analyse such differences within and an assessment of potential areas where ecologists and economists may be expected to encounter communication problems is pre- sented here. The conceptual difference between inter- and multidisciplinarity is discussed as well as perspectives on the nature and scope of interaction between economists and ecologists.

2. Paradigms

2.1. Introduction

Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962, 1969) provides a framework for analysing how two rival schools of thought fight for the hege- mony within a science. His conceptual framework is used in an anaIogue way to analyse disagree- ments one may see between economists and ecologists on matters pertaining to environmental issues and, in particular, on matters pertaining to the use of resources. Environmental studies is not an established science even if many researchers call themselves environmentalists. The study of the environment can be defined for our purpose as a meeting ground for tackling theoretical and practical problems related to the use of nature and natural resources (conservation is also use). Use of resources implies both physical aspects

related to resources and behavioral aspects related to the more and less reflective use by man. In such a context environmental studies is a meeting place and “battleground” for natural and social scientists.

2.2. Comparing paradigms

Relatikm may be defined as the position where one denies that there is one universal, ahistorical standard of rationality or demarcation criteria with respect to which one theory can be judged better than another. The rationalist as- serts that there is a single, timeless, universal criterion with reference to which the relative merits of rival theories are to be assessed (Chalmers, 1982, pp. 101-102).

How do we compare knowledge and choose the “best”? According to Kjorup’s (1985) interpretation of Kuhn, “ . . . we cannot choose rationally between paradigms, to report compelling reasons for our choice etc., as rationality belongs within the paradigm and in order to choose between paradigms we must stand outside these.” Bernstein (1983, pp. 79-108) claims that the only solution to this relativism dilemma, one he also claims that Kuhn shares, is to assume that there is a basic objective or universal body of established knowledge. Moreover, Bernstein claims that we have a language that lies beyond the scientific paradigms and that is in one sense without conditions. Communication is possible even if constrained. Through our language we establish a tool to analyse the rationality between paradigms as well as the qualitative differences between paradigms. We can avoid extreme relativism. It should be possible to hold - as Kuhn does - different paradigms up against each other in different ways (see Vedeld, 1991).

Kuhn provides three concepts for doing this. When two schools of thought or phenomena are in logical conflict, they are incomputible. If one school is selected, the other cannot be selected at the same time. When two schools of thought or phenomena cannot be found to have a common yardstick to perform measurements by, or they are not dealing with the same issue, they are incommensurable. When two schools of thought

P.O. Vedeld /Ecological Economics 10 (1994) I-IS 3

or phenomena are held up against each other and it is not necessary with a common fixed yardstick by which to conduct a comparison, they are still comparable in a looser sense.

I’. 3. No unified paradigm

This paper does not primarily aim at showing where economists are right and ecologists are wrong or vice versa. What is called methodological pluralism by Norgaard (1985, 1989) or paradigmatic pluralism by Soderbaum (1990) is a call for open and broadmindedness. Different sciences have different merits. They address objects in the real world from different angles, apply different assumptions and methodology, and use different general models of thought on the “same” phenomena. Instead of seeing this as a problem, it can be can viewed as an asset. It is possible to live with different approaches being applied to the same problems. When we get accustomed to it we will be able to translate and use such knowledge within our own perspectives and ways of thinking and doing research.

2.4. Paradigms and context

Science is often analysed strictly in relation to itself and not understood in a sociological context where we see scientists as human beings with their own particular preferences, prejudices, etc. Kuhn (1962) stressed the rigid training and conformity claims within a science or a paradigm, and that the trained scientists become propo- nents of a certain ideology stressed by the main- streamers within that science. Pressures and sanc- tions are exerted to maintain control. This strong bid for conformity causes the science as a puzzle solution activity to develop, whereas research from outside or between sciences is constrained. Such mechanisms, even if valuable in some re- spects, may constrain attempts at interdisciplinary approaches that many claim are needed to address certain environmental problems. Kuhn’s approach allows for seeing sciences as cultures with strong rules, symbols, patterns of thought, and being more like a way of life than a system ruled strictly by objective or even rational processes.

Inside the culture or paradigm, concepts, understanding and worldviews are more or less shared; people talk the same language and communicate rather freely. Between cultures, communication is more constrained. By learning more about other cultures, to stay within the metaphor. it may be possible to improve communication and our knowledge about larger and deeper parts of environmental problems. ’

3. A comparison of neoclassical economics and ecological approaches to the use of natural resources

Kuhn (1969) distinguishes four elements that constitute a science or the disciplinary matrix: exemplars (what he calls the true paradigm), symbolic generalizations, metaphysical models and values. I use these elements to structure the discussion on important similarities and differences between the two sciences and their approaches to analysis of the use of natural resources. Such epistemological clarification may improve our awareness and knowledge of where one may expect differences and communication problems to arise, and it may further improve our ability to meaningfully translate knowledge created in one science to other sciences.

Many researchers claim that there is a large principal difference between physical nature and man, and that these differences must lead to important differences in the study of nature and the study of man and society (Fsllesdal et al., 1986). The study of social phenomena requires other approaches and other methodologies than the study of natural phenomena (Blaug, 1980).

3.1. The exemplar

This is the true paradigm or the puzzle-solution set up as described in textbooks. It contains

’ Extending this further, thinking and also practice is guided

not only by theory or knowledge acquired through scientific

training. But in this paper the impact of professional training

is discussed, “holding other variables constant”.

4 P.O. Vedeld / Ecological Economics 10 (1994) l-13

both the ways problems are approached and solved and the socialization process within that science, “the time-tested and group-licensed way of seeing” (Kuhn, 1969, p. 189). Within the exemplar, there is a difference between the body of science or topics for research, basic rules/laws and the methodology including different forms of explanation. Kuhn’s conceptual framework, derived from physics, is not always easy to apply to other disciplines. For the main purpose of this paper, the questions under which category various components of a science belong is not very important (see Pheby, 1988, for elaboration). Much of what is denoted the exemplar here could be called the hard-core (Lakatos), a concept that Kuhn did not use.

The body of science Economics and ecology do not deal with the

same issues. Economics is a science about human choices and behaviour. This includes management and use of natural systems and resources. For the neoclassical economists, the market is, in general, considered as the best supplier of advice for action, both for individuals and for the society. Nature and natural system-related aspects are, to the extent included, found as constraints in the optimization models of economics.

Ecology is basically a science studying natural systems, natural processes and phenomena, and does not deal with human behaviour or adaptions. It gives normative “rules” for how man should behave in relation to natural systems and natural resources. For ecologists the nature through their own scientific interpretations constitute the main guidelines for choices over use of natural resources or natural systems.

Discussions about human action and choices pertaining to natural resources is one of the main fields for interaction between ecologists and economists. In my view most sciences are demar- cated and/ or established through what real world problems they see - through the body of the science - and by their focus on particular aspects of these problems. Methodology, values and general paradigms develop as more scientists become interested and participate in the study of certain real world problems. Other sciences may emerge

as offshoots from established sciences when the area of interest becomes so aparte in relation to the original science that a divorce becomes in- evitable or even desired.

As previously mentioned, an ecologist will take the ecological system as the point of departure, and will regard an environmental problem in relation to how people disrupt or destroy resources and ecological systems. The traditional economist has man as a point of departure, and will regard the environmental problems in terms of how natural resources and ecosystems may be utilized efficiently to improve welfare or how they may impose hazards on human welfare (see Hjorth, 1986). The economist and the ecologist will not, when faced with the “same” problem, accept each other’s orientation concerning what in the real world is the relevant focus of attention. Agreeing on a certain spatial restriction of a study area can become an insurmountable barrier between an economist and an ecologist studying environmental problems of watershed management (see Svedin, 198.5).

In practical research these problems are easier to discuss and come to terms with than some of the other problems I will address. A disagreement on settling the relevant body of interest will often become evident while undertaking a joint work. But it will still be a source of disagreement and possibly miscommunication. Often a relevance decision-making problem occurs. Who, in the sense of what discipline or researcher, de- cides what is the relevant science body of interest for a certain environmental problem?

The question of what is the relevant body of interest is learned by the scientist through training and by practitioners through experience. What people are able to see, understand and value varies with their backgrounds. In some ways, economics and ecology could be said to be incommensurable in that much of what is the scientific body does not address the same issues.

Basic rules-laws Differences pertaining to the basic laws should

not create the main area of differences between ecology and economics. Returning to Kuhn’s discussion on incommensurability, the basic laws in

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economics and ecology are not concerned with the same phenomena (see Vedeld, 1991, for an elaboration). Thus it makes little sense to hold them against each other. They are incommensurable.

Explanation To explain a phenomenon is one of the most

important tasks for science, maybe the most important. Different sciences have different rules or claims for how and when a phenomenon is considered or accepted as explained (Elster, 1983). NESS (1979) states in regard to explanation that “there is always a cellar”. Different sciences have different perceptions of the level and nature of this cellar. Ecology and economics differ when it comes to how frequently and in what connection intentional, causal and functional explanations are used. The difference in application of intentional and functional explanations is one of the key factors of constrained communication between the two sciences. It is both the type of explanation accepted and applied to a phenomenon, and the level at which one stops the chain of explanations for a phenomenon (Vedeld,

ly9iLy ecologists assume a “naturalistic” or even sociobiological approach for explaining human behaviour, easily missing social relations and their importance for man’s use of resources. For instance, in cybernetics and systems theory intentional explanation is not included, which, of course, is important to the extent systems theory is used in an attempt to explain human action. As Blaug (1976) puts it: “It is clear that natural scientists are denied this sort of participant, first-person knowledge because they cannot imag- ine what it would be like to be atoms or molecules.” Ecology as a science does not have a methodology for analysing human behaviour because it is not in their body of science. But important aspects related to human action and choice are still analysed by ecologists working with environmental policy and related issues. When doing this, methodology and concepts outside ecology are often used “ad hoc” or intu- Ilively, and the result is rather dependent on the Individual ecologist’s general orientation and less

on the formal ecological training. On the other hand, the intentional explanation, which according to Follesdal et al. (1986) prevails in neoclassical economic theory, through the theory of rational choice and methodological individualism can also be criticized for being less than realistic (see Vedeld, 1992).

The existence of intentional explanation in economics forms, in my opinion, one of the stronger reasons for partial incompatibility between economics and ecology because the sciences apply different forms of explanations to the same phenomena. I have used the Kuhn exemplar concept here as a way to structure elements that are included in the body of science. Kuhn’s own use of the exemplar is more ‘related to the exemplar as the particular science success-stories and to how one, in fact, should conduct research, which is not so important for the purpose of this paper.

3.2. Symbolic generalizations

The “readily formable components of the disciplinary matrix”, according to Kuhn (1969), steers science in a broad sense. It gives form and direction to the scientist’s way and ability to think. The entropy laws, population dynamics models and the natural selection through survival of the fittest are such generalizations in ecology. The law of diminishing return, the price mechanism derived from supply-demand relations and the concepts of rationality and utility maximization hypothesis are such generalizations in economics.

These broad generalizations provide both op- portunities and limits for understanding and explaining phenomena. Major conflicts between sciences occur when scientists with different science-specific generalizations apply these to analyse the same phenomena. Differences in training between scientists account for alternative and sometimes incompatible ways of describing and explaining “the problem”. Such incompatibility questions the relevance of different approaches. Debates over these issues are often revealed as science-status competitions.

A typical case - seen from an economist’s point of view - is when an ecologist tries to

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explain African deforestation in causal terms of population increase and natural calamities like fires, drought and tse-tse fly eradication. This may be due partly to the ecologist’s training in entropy laws, population dynamics and the particular ecology body of science. The economist would be more occupied with scarcity, supply-demand relations, land use policies, driving forces behind population pressures, as well as cash crop pressures. Both the latter two forces result in increased land clearing - the main process behind deforestation in most places in Africa. Similar examples of narrow-mindedness from economists compared to ecologists are not hard to find.

Symbolic generalizations steer our attention to different aspects of a problem. Through this training, economists and ecologists are steered in different directions often reaching incommensurable, but not necessarily incompatible, conclu- sions. Two (of many) cases to illustrate this are differing views on the reproduction of renewable resources and the scarcity of resources.

Resource reproduction From generalizations used in ecology, many

ecologists advocate that any analysis of the use of natural resources must be based on basic physical principles. As Francis Bacon put it: “To com- mand Nature, you have to obey Nature.” A traditional conflict between economists and ecologists concerns the qualitative and quantitative reproduction of the resource base.

Christensen (1989, p. 18) states: “Modern economic theories have neglected the implications of the basic physical principles governing material and energy use for an economic theory of production.” Ehrlich (1989, pp. 9-10) makes an even stronger statement: “From the viewpoint of an ecologist, the failure of the dismal science to contribute to solving human predicaments is un- derstandable from a cursory examination of what economists are taught. All one need do is to look at the circular flow diagram that ‘explains’ the generation of gross national product in any standard economics text. There are no inputs into the circular flow.. . The text does not, of course, give any coverage at all to what is now the central question of economics - what the scale of the

economic system can be before it irretrievably damages the ecological system that supports it.” Christensen (1989, p. 19) further stresses that: “ . . . no essential physical distinction was made between any input. The result was that physical and technical assumptions (marginal productivity) were made about economic activity which were in conflict with the basic physical principles governing material and energy transformations (Geo- rgescu-Roegen, 1971; Ayres, 19781.”

The sustainability of the resource base is an important area of research in environmental economics, where option values discussions and esti- mations, and applications of optimal control theory are fields of research addressing some of the elements raised around resource reproduction issues (see, for instance, Dasgupta and Heal, 1974; Henry, 1974). In traditional neoclassical production theory, however, it seems that the critique raised here may be appropriate.

Resource scarcity and substitution Resource scarcity and resource substitution can

also be said to be part of Kuhn’s symbolic generalizations. Barbier (1989) stresses a fruitful distinction between absolute and relative scarcity of resources.

Absolute scarcity, or Malthusian scarcity, is defined as the physical, natural-resource scarcity phenomenon. An economic system will often de- pend on an essential natural resource that has a finite limit on its physical availability. The resource may disappear completely. These may set physical limits on economic processes of production and consumption.

According to Barbier (1989), the relative scarcity or Ricardian scarcity refers to the economic assumption that human wants are infinite and that any resource will, therefore, be limited or scarce. This scarcity can be defined through stating that as long as the price is zero, and the demand is bigger than the supply at this price/ quantity level, one may talk of a relative scarcity. In an efficient market, increasing scarcity will give rise to increasing prices since increasing scarcity increases the cost of extraction because there is less of the resource and the resource often is of lower quality.

P.O. Vedeld /Ecological Economics IO (19941 I-13 7

In the neoclassical paradigm, resource scarcity is considered in relative terms. This is due to the assumed dynamics of the market mechanism over time - resource scarcity is not considered to be a constraint to economic growth: substitutes are found, technological innovations are induced by relative price changes, marginal stocks will be utilized more efficiently, and conservation will be induced also by curbing demand (Fisher, 1984). According to Barbier (1989), these are dynamic reasons why pessimistic predictions of the classi- cal economists (and ecologists) never came true. He still notes that the depletion of stocks is the real problem of natural resource scarcity within economics.

Many ecologists are oriented towards absolute scarcity. Ehrlich (1989, p. 10) states, for instance, that “The majority of economists have never been taught that ecosystems provide humanity with an absolute indispensable array of services _ . . While these services are free, they would, of course, be infinitely costly to replace.. . Today’s level of overpopulation can only be maintained by rapid depletion of Earth’s irreplaceable capital.. . Since they (economists) are unaware of the stress the natural systems now are under, most economists believe that the scale of economic activities can be increased indefinitely _ . While a few simple calculations show the idea to be ludicrous, its casual acceptance is rooted in two related axioms of mainstream neoclassical economics; that there is an infinite number of resources and that a satisfactory substitute can always be found for the role of any one of them.” Redclift (1988) points to the fact that the economists are interested in scarcity as the underlying reality behind human choice whereas the environmentalists are concerned that economic growth is the reality that makes human choice less and less possible under conditions of scarcity.

The symbolic generalizations lead economists’ and ecologists’ attention in different directions, and on a number of issues economic and ecological generalizations are in logical conflict.

3.3. Metaphysical models

Kuhn (1962) refers to these models as types of basic perceptions of the structure of material. For

pedagogic purposes, such models are used in any science and belong to what forms the researcher’s core working tools. Long after general theoretical knowledge and empirical knowledge is gone, these visual models remain and they are also important as they help to determine what is acceptable research within a paradigm. In economics the cob-web, a directional approach to cause-effect chains and supply-demand relations (“the cross”), and feed-back mechanisms in the market are examples of such models. In ecology the systems approaches with circular energy and matter flows, black-boxes and feed-back structures constitute examples of such models.

I shall briefly take up three aspects of such metaphysical models that I believe are important to understand why economists and ecologists may experience constrained communication.

Irreversibility The metaphysical model is in this context

linked to the view that resources are dead material or merely “things” to economists. Resources are not - they become! Ecologists conceive of resources differently. While natural resources are divisible in an economic context, they are in an ecological context integrated in complex, indivisi- ble, reproducing circular ecosystems or networks that everybody depends on. Moreover, ecosystems or nature are often considered to contain intrinsic values. For an ecologist, the destruction of genetic resources or unique feature in nature represents an irreversible loss, a loss that cannot be replaced. This further reduces future options for choice and poses increasing threats for future livelihood.

For many economists, the very essential marginality considerations constrain a deep understanding of irreversibility. A choice to destroy or deplete a resource is rational economic behaviour as long as the utility gained by doing so is higher than the costs involved. For an economist it may be okay to “kill the goose that lays the golden eggs”. The resource is valued or is likely to be developed by its alternative use value through willingness-to-pay principles, and an infinite value in such a context cannot be accepted by an economist - at least as long as substitutes exist.

8 P.O. Vedeld / Ecological Economics 10 (1994) l-13

Ehrlich (1989) states: “Biologists unfamiliar with economic ideas are often shocked when they discover that an industry appears to be deliber- ately destroying its resource base.. . The ratio- nale of the whalers’ behaviour came as a surprise to me, but, of course, would not have surprised an economist.. . Since an infinite array of resources is believed to exist, after one has been utterly destroyed, there will always be another that can also be exterminated for profit. It is assumed that we can live in a world of high discount rates forever - no need to worry about how today’s action will influence people a decade hence, since those people will be dealing with an entirely new set of resources.” These views on irreversibility are incompatible.

Resource divisibility Ecologists tend to view resources more as parts

of or as whole ecosystems and that the “resources” are not divisible in the economic sense. For economists the divisibility of a resource is of great importance as this is a prerequisite for the resource to be turned over in markets. Markets for private goods assume divisibility. I believe these views are incompatible.

Information Following Kuhn’s metaphysical models, ecol-

ogy and economics have rather different models for how information is disseminated in ecological and economic systems, respectively.

In ecological systems information is passed on through transfers of energy and matter, including genetic information. There is a locality to the transfer in that sender and receiver are physically attached or close in space. This seems, according to Svedin (1985), to be a reasonable assumption as long as one deals with purely biological links.

The information flow in economics is rather different. The old picture of markets with buyers and sellers (the producers) is no longer valid, and both the locality viewpoint and transmission through energy and matter are very different from that of ecology. “That a cause may have an effect that lies distant in either time or space without this being mediated by causes in between” is what Elster (1976) calls hysteresis. He

considered hysteresis to be an important distinction between natural and social sciences.

To what extent this makes economics and ecology incommensurable or incompatible is a difficult judgement even if the first seems more appropriate. My experience through practical work is that many ecologists may tend to seek “close” or local explanations for many anthropogenic phenomena. One example is the case for population pressures and resource scarcity where other, more complex and, in particular, geographically more remote causes could have been considered.

The time perspective The time perspective used by economists and

ecologists is also different. Through their training, economists learn to perceive time basically in “straight lines” with a rather limited time horizon of, say, 30-40 years as the extreme maximum. Ecologists will have a “circular time perspective” on certain aspects of resource use (the use of renewable resources, for instance), but also an infinite time horizon in other situations (no ex- tinction of species, for instance). This does not necessarily imply that economists are myopic id- iots and that ecologists are romantic fools. These time perspectives are there for different reasons or intentions, practical for the topics studied by the science, but not necessarily well-suited for any phenomenon under study.

In economics, choice of resource use over time is seen in relation to a discount rate. There is a trade-off between consumption today and increased consumption tomorrow. A positive discount rate implies that the further out in the future a cost or benefit occurs, the lower its present value. Many economists assume that most people prefer to have things now rather than in the future - present access and present use is better than future access and use. These are general applicable human values, according to economic theory. In an environmental context, this has impacts on the rate of depletion or off-take from a stock of resources. A certain discount rate implies a certain level of resource use.

There are at least for two reasons why ecolo-

P.O. Vedeld / Ecological Economics 10 (1994) I-13 9

gists do not accept the economists’ viewpoint on

this issue: (i) There is no scientific reason for trained

ecologists to believe that resources or ecosystems today are more or less valuable than in the future. There is no explicit theory of value in ecology, other than what may be derived from basic laws. The axiom that nature is always right, is for many ecologists unquestionably right and may not be seen as a “value”, but as something we as human beings should recognize and let guide our actions. For economists as well as for other social scientists, such a viewpoint is considered a value judgement and a principle that if maintained, implies a lot of restrictions on possible courses of action.

(ii> If man is considered as being one of many species, and if that both future generations and non-human livings have intrinsic rights, this will, according to the ecologists, influence to what extent “consumer impatience” should be allowed to destroy nature, enhanced through a certain discount rate level. The focus is less on maximum welfare defined in terms of level of consumption of private and public goods. Furthermore, in a biological or ecological context, 30 or 40 years is a very limited time horizon in relation to the establishment of a climax ecosystem, the establishment of a forest or the reconstruction of degraded nature.

In planning and management in relation to environmental issues, conflicts and miscommunication often arise between ecologists and economists concerning time perspectives. It seems that time perspective is an area of incompatibility between the two. ’

.i. 3. Values

Kuhn (1969) defines values in a narrow sense. Examples are internal values like accuracy, sim- plicity, consistency and plausibility, and external

--- ’ It may be argued that animals also have a positive discount

late - “the squirrel gathers nuts for the winter” - so it is not

the discount-rate principle in itself that is foreign to the

xologist but rather the type of application.

values like the social usefulness of research and the relation between research and society. As far as I can see, the political and ethical values

emanating from adhering to a paradigm are not included here.

Values have bearing on what is accepted as good and relevant research, over choice of approach and theory. It is difficult to see particular differences of these aspects between economics and ecology. Most likely there are also differences on what, topicwise, is good or relevant research for society at large.

Extending the discussion of values to the way in which ecologists and economists assign value to different objects or to alternative courses of action, we can see substantial differences. Some believe that there is a contradiction between man and nature per se. This view, supported by many ecologists, may assume that nature in itself has some kind of intrinsic interest or value completely outside man’s realm. Another approach, often assumed by economists, assumes that any concept of value is a social construct and that animals do not intrinsically value. Nature and animals can, of course, have value for man, but it does not make sense to claim that nature or animals themselves have some kind of intentional or intrinsic value. Values can only be meaningful within a framework of human perception. This discussion is seen in many contexts where uses of resources are discussed. One common context is the use of natural resources in terms of extraction and production and, on the other hand, conservation and retention for future generations. Regan (1981) distinguishes an ethic “of the environment” with an ethic “for the use of the environment”, where the issue of non-human nature being in- herently valuable is stressed. Turner (1988) cites O’Riordan (1985) who, along similar lines of thought as Regan, claims that the “environmental moralists” deny that the environment is a commodity at all, whereas the neoclassical economists tend to view the environment as a commodity that we can value.

Apart from the “Deep Ecology” approach of the philosopher Naess (1979) where nature is as- cribed value other than to human beings or as natural resources, there have been attempts by

10 P.O. Vedeld / Ecological Economics 10 (1994) I-13

ecologists to incorporate ecological principles in the form of values by which different alternatives for the use of nature or natural resources can be compared. The list of various Environmental Im- pact Assessment scaling techniques is substantial. The principles used for ranking different resources or natural systems are often in the form of “scientific values”, comparing, for instance, biodiversity in two ecosystems, comparing the resource’s gene values or representativity along a scale from common to rare, valuing the resource’s aesthetic value, etc. A joint feature very different from that of economists is that the valuation does not include “the willingness-to-pay principle”, but is in many ways a more top-down approach to ascribing values. I am not generally defending the willingness-to-pay principle in any context, but I merely state the ecological approach up to now has attempted to accrue values to nature through “scientific arguments”, but in a form that, in my opinion, is value-based in that they give strong recommendations for human action. This is partly defended by underlying arguments that nature is always right and that we have to obey the laws of nature, which to many economists is not self-evident. The economists defend the willingness-to- pay principle by claiming that it is the most decentralized and democratic decision-making process even if it takes an initial income distribu- tion as a point of departure.

An example of this difference may be related to pollution control where ecologists want to set physical standards according to the amount of pollution in a medium (Safe Minimum Standards f.i.1. An economist will claim that pollution should be understood in a context of people’s perception of whether a medium is polluted or not, and not merely the measurable physical pollution level. Willingness-to-pay to be compensated for various levels of (reduced) pollution is, accordingly. an acceptable way of formulating a value. By comparing the willingness-to-pay for various levels of reduced pollution with the marginal costs of at- taining these pollution levels, the economist de- rives the economically optimal pollution level.

It is quite common that the economists’ “optimal pollution levels” exceed the ecologists’ “optimal pollution levels”. The latter will often be

based on biological concepts such as the rate of pollution should not exceed the ecological system’s self-cleaning capacity, or that a fixed physical standard is recommended based on health hazards or other physical measures. Many scientists tend to regard this as less normative than an economically-based level of pollution. If we try to view this from “outside”, it seems rather obvious that both approaches are normative in the sense that they both contain recommendations for courses of human action. Economics and ecology, therefore, may viewed as partly incompatible in that they supply different advice for the same human choice options.

4. Towards improved communication and interdisciplinarity

“The whole is more than the sum of elements.” Aristotle

Interdisciplinarity is not the mere bringing to- gether of scientists from different sciences to apply their different perspectives to the same phenomena. Tiller (1985) calls this multidisciplinarity. It does not solve problems of cross-science communication to achieve a deeper environmental understanding. Multidisciplinarity is when people work in parallel on a certain topic.

Znterdisciplinariry takes place when efforts are consciously taken to develop a common language or set of concepts in order to undertake a joint study. This requires that the basic underlying assumptions as well the methodological aspects are clearly drawn up, and that a mutual or common reference background is created or at least that a formal clarification of different positions is made. This does not involve developing a new science, but creating a common ground for a special purpose. Kuhn (1969) claims that this approach can be used to translate research work from one language to another - of course, de- pending on the topics raised (see also Quine, 1960). He further claims that the translation process often induces clarification of one’s own views and values.

In some areas of study there may exist, or be rather easy to create, a joint understanding. On

P.O. Vedeld / Ecoiogzcal Economics IO (1991) l-13 11

other items the ways to understand in different paradigms are mutually excluding, as we have seen, for instance, regarding the time perspective in ecological and economic thinking. In such areas, according to Tiller (1985), interdisciplinarity

will have to be more than just adding up knowledge from different disciplines - more than the sum of elements. Tiller calls this “Gestalt-mod-

els” - when the parts of reality change character by being integrated into a larger context.

Some time has been spent on the discussions of the incompatibility and incommensurability

concepts introduced by Kuhn. Again, in Bern- stein’s interpretation (1983): “Kuhn and Feuer- abend show us that we can understand the ways in which there are incommensurable paradigms, forms of life and traditions that we can understand what is distinctive about them without imposing beliefs, categories and classifications that are so well entrenched in our own language games that we fail to appreciate their limited perspective.”

According to Bernstein, such openness may also improve our understanding of ourselves. The incommensurability thesis is an attack on objectivism, not on objectivity, and it “calls into question the modern version of objectivism which assumes that there is or must be, a common, neutral epistemological framework within which we can rationally evaluate competing theories and paradigms or that there is a set of rules that will tell us how rational agreement can be reached on what would settle the issue on every point where statements seem to conflict.” According to Bernstein, “Kuhn’s thesis does not talk about the problem of relativism in the sense that we are prisoners of our framework and cannot therefore be irrational. The thesis is a clarification of just what we do when we compare theories, paradigms and language games; we can compare them in multiple ways. We can recognize losses and gains. We can even see how some of our standards for comparing them conflict with each other. We can recognize - especially in cases of incommensurability in science - that our arguments and counter-arguments in support of rival paradigm theories may not be conclusive. We can appreciate how much skill, art, and imagination are

required to do justice to what is distinctive about

different ways of practising science and how in some areas scientists see different things” (Bernstein, 1983).

Furthermore, as communication across scientific borders is maintained over time, communication becomes more precise and less time is wasted on miscommunication. Communication changes character from multidisciplinarity to interdisciplinarity.

Both economists and ecologists adhere to rather positivistic and also rather deterministic models of explaining human behaviour. It could seem reasonable to assume that the rational ecological man would be the twin brother of the rational economic man. As we have seen, they are not.

Within a neoclassical economic paradigm, rules for rationality are set by factors like profit and utility maximizing behaviour, a general principle of preferring more to less is stated as universal, the view of nature as being resources, divisible and the more or less non-existence of irreversibility, and a time perspective giving priority to present consumption and profit. An economically rational use of resources may include depletion of both renewable and non-renewable resources, and little regard may be paid to the reproduction of the natural resource base. Furthermore, there is no intended direction for societal development in relation to environmental-related issues; the traditional neoclassical economics is not “adopted to consider total changes”, as Redclift (1988) puts it. He continues: “Resting as it does on the concept of the margin, it is epistemologically pre- disposed towards a reductionistic view of resources and their utility.”

For an ecologist, economic concepts of rationality do not appear very rational in their broader understanding of the rationality concept. In practical terms, the rational ecological man will have a longer time perspective and a different value orientation between present and future consumption, and maybe also of the general level of consumption. Nature is viewed as ecosystems more than just resources for man.

Ecologists suffer from having rather simplistic biological input-output views when explaining

I2 P. 0. Vedeld /Ecological Economics I0 11994) I-13

human action (Svedin, 198%. The abilities of ecologists to explain and predict action by people in relation to environmental problems are limited by force of their theoretical background. This is an important problem in the pohtical process where environmental policies are formulated and human choices are made. Ecologists put less emphasis or trust in the dynamics of human behaviour and the ability of individuals and soci- eties to adapt to altering conditions in their environment, and this is reflected, among others, in rather “pessimistic” views on the options offered by substitution and new technology options.

Economists have simplistic models for explaining and predicting human behaviour that often omit important aspects of the broad array of reasons why man acts as he does. This is with reference to natural systems and nature, as well as to cultural and more general social systems (see also Von Wright, 1971). I think that contributions from economists and ecologists are necessary but not sufficient when dealing with environmental-related issues, or as Redclift (1988) puts it: “An integrated theoretical approach to economics and the environment is not an exclusive concern of economists or environmentalists: it is a concern of those who wish to see the environment transformed in ways that enlarge human experiences without doing irreparable damages to nature.”

However, in a research programme for addressing environmental problems, ecologists and economists often meet in person or through use of each other’s knowledge in other ways. Science-specific knowledge is necessary and important, but it is not sufficient when addressing environmental issues. Different scientific angles give different pictures and contributions to the “infinite jigsaw puzzle” of “creating” knowledge. Openness to other disciplines, knowledge about basic assumptions and methods and their findings can improve any scientist’s own and joint research. It makes little sense to compare or try to find the “best science” for environmental studies as it most likely does not exist. Furthermore, efforts to create a new, Unified Science may not be the best way to go. But improving communication does make sense.

Ecological economics may be seen as one such effort. This paper has for pedagogic reasons pushed economic and ecological positions apart in order to clarify and pinpoint differences. There are, on the other hand, a number of important items pointing toward common grounds.

The developments within economics, in particular within institutional economics, both neoinsti- tutional and new institutional economics, pave the way for an improved set of economic approaches and tools that can meet some of the demands required by a closer linkage with ecology. For instance, the new trends found within transaction cost economics, game theory, the new approaches to information-related problems, the role of social institutions and modified be- haviourial assumptions open, in my opinion, a new and wider range of cooperation between ecologists and economists. Furthermore, there are already a number of cases of good scientific cooperation between fields such as ecologists and environmental/ resource economists working to- gether. Moreover, the emphasis in both sciences put on observation and empirical studies and quantitative approaches and mathematical mod- elling indicate areas where ecologists and economists can meet.

There are elements one can build on for joint research, but the need for contributions also from outside these two disciplines must also be stressed when dealing with environmental problems. I do not believe that ideas and knowledge alone will change the world dramatically since power structures, conflict over choice and access to resources, material conditions, etc. are important factors determining our course of development and change. Nevertheless, to develop knowledge can be seen as a necessary, if not sufficient, condition for improving our management of the environment.

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank T. Kvilhaug, 0. Berg- land, A. Vatn, E. Romstad, P. Sbderbaum, G. Hodgson, G. Fry, A. Randall, D. McNeal and R. Borgstrom for valuable comments on earlier drafts

P.O. Vedeld /Ecological Economics 10 (19941 l-13 13

of this paper. The final product is, of course, my own responsibility. I also thank the Norwegian Council for Agricultural Research for research funding.

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