The Christian Right Thesis: Explaining LongitudinalChange in Participation among EvangelicalChristians

Ryan L. Claassen Kent State University

Andrew Povtak Kent State University

Many attribute George W. Bush’s strong campaign performance to Republican efforts to increase turnout amongevangelical Protestants by stressing issues that focus on ‘‘moral values.’’ However, most scholarly studies eitherfocus on demonstrating that moral issues affected vote choice in recent elections or they focus on documentinglongitudinal changes in party loyalty or political attitudes among Evangelicals. Our task is to add to this literatureby examining long-term trends in participation among Evangelicals and comparing those trends to trends amongother major religious denominations. We find that, contrary to conventional wisdom, the increase in Evangelicalturnout appears to have been driven by social and demographic changes among Evangelicals rather than by apolitical strategy. In fact, controlling for social and demographic changes, we find more impressive turnout gainsamong other groups, such as black Protestants and the nonreligious.

‘‘In dozens of interviews since the election, grass-rootsactivists in Ohio, Michigan and Florida credited Pres-ident Bush’s chief political adviser, Karl Rove, withsetting a clear goal that became a mantra amongconservatives: To win, Bush had to draw 4 millionmore Evangelicals to the polls than he did in 2000.’’

—Alan Cooperman and Thomas B. Edsall,Washington Post, 11/8/04

‘‘Mr. Rove’s relentless focus on turning out more Repub-lican voters, many of them evangelical Christians, was thecritical factor in Mr. Bush’s victory, Republicans said.’’

—Elisabeth Bumiller, David M. Halbfinger andDavid E. Rosenbaum, New York Times, 11/4/04

Following the 2004 presidential election, numer-ous media sources were quick to conclude thatPresident Bush’s narrow victory was, in part,

attributable to a dramatic increase in turnout amongvoters that identified with the Christian Right. How-ever, systematic attempts to assess longitudinal changein participation rates among religious groups have notbeen forthcoming. Hence a major part of the conven-tional wisdom about why the Bush campaign was sosuccessful remains largely unexplored. Instead, thescholarly postmortem of the 2004 presidential elec-

tion has focused primarily on whether the electionturned on moral issues, such as gay marriage (see, forexample, Abramowitz 2004; Burden 2004; Campbelland Monson 2007; Hillygus 2007; Hillygus andShields 2005; Langer and Cohen 2005; Lewis 2005;Smith, DeSantis, and Kassel 2005). These studies arepart of a larger literature that addresses longitudinalchanges among religious groups in vote choice, partyidentification, and issue divisions (Brooks 2002;Brooks and Manza 1997, 2004; Bolce and de Maio1999a, 1999b; Davis and Robinson 1996; Hunter1991; Knuckey 2005; Layman 1997; Layman 2001;Layman and Hussey 2007; Manza and Brooks 1997;Sims 1996; Wuthnow 1989). Clearly, value voting andgreater Republican loyalty among Evangelicals con-tributed to Bush’s success in what appeared to be apattern of increasing Republican electoral strength.The current literature, however, leaves basic ques-tions unanswered about whether these value voterswere at the polls because of the campaign or if theywould have cast ballots in any case. Thus our studyaddresses an understudied aspect of the ChristianRight Thesis—whether a part of increasing Repub-lican electoral success is due to having mobilized

The Journal of Politics, Vol. 72, No. 1, January 2010, Pp. 2–15 doi:10.1017/S0022381609990430

� Southern Political Science Association, 2010 ISSN 0022-3816

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Evangelicals that would not have participated other-wise.1

Our task is to add to scholarly understanding ofthe ways in which religious groups affect the dynam-ics of national elections by examining their long-termtrends in participation. To date, a conventional wis-dom that credits changes in turnout among Evangel-icals with some portion of Bush’s electoral success hassurvived on little more than journalists’ commentsabout ‘‘high’’ Evangelical turnout. And even somejournalists have expressed concern over whetherclaims of a major Evangelical mobilization are rootedin sound evidence. In the wake of the 2004 election, andmuch ado about greater Evangelical turnout, ThomasEdsall noted in the Washington Post, ‘‘Exit polls do notpermit a direct comparison of how many evangelicaland born-again Americans voted in 2000 and 2004because the way pollsters identified these voterschanged’’ (November 8, 2004).

In short, a more systematic effort to understandlongitudinal change in participation among membersof different religious groups is needed. For example,‘‘high’’ turnout implies a comparison to past turnout,but Evangelical turnout in 2000 and 2004 has yet to becompared to Evangelical turnout in previous electionsin a systematic way. ‘‘High’’ turnout also implies acomparison to turnout among members of otherreligious groups, and again these comparisons haveyet to be made. After all, high turnout among Evan-gelicals could simply reflect the greater political en-gagement of religious persons and not a uniqueresponse to Bush’s campaign. In order to provide amore systematic study of the conventional wisdom wetest the thesis that longitudinal changes in turnoutamong Evangelicals were unique relative to otherreligious groups and attributable to Bush’s religiousidentity and specialized Republican party appeals.To do so, we analyze participation changes in majorAmerican religious groups from 1960 to 2004 using theNational Election Study (NES) surveys. We find thatturnout among Evangelicals did increase over time, butwe also find that their greater participation is explainedalmost entirely by socioeconomic status (SES) factors.As a group, Evangelicals have posted impressive SESgains and, of course, SES is strongly correlated withturnout. To be sure, Evangelicals were targeted likenever before in 2000 and 2004 (Monson and Oliphant2007), but we find little evidence of a participation-

based response to those efforts. The more parsimo-nious explanation for increased turnout amongEvangelicals is based on longitudinal changes in theirsocioeconomic characteristics. Moreover, severalother groups, such as black Protestants and thenonreligious, managed more impressive increases inturnout over the same period of time. This suggeststhat a conventional wisdom that focuses on Repub-lican gains due to stimulating Evangelical turnoutoverlooks other, more potent, mobilizations of othergroups.

Previous Literature

As we describe above, recent scholarly investigationsinto the Evangelical response to political campaignshave, for the most part, left long-term participationtrends unexplored. This is not to say, however, that therecent literature has neglected questions about theEvangelical response to political campaigns altogether.On the contrary, there have been numerous efforts toexplore the structure of Evangelical voting in cross-sectional analyses (which cannot answer questionsabout longitudinal change in turnout by design), andthere have been numerous efforts to explore longitu-dinal changes in partisan loyalties among Evangelicals(which might have included investigations into longi-tudinal changes in turnout, but generally did not). Wereview this literature because it has much to offerregarding the changing structure of the parties’ religious-based coalitions. But we also take pains to highlightanother interesting dimension in the changing struc-ture of the parties’ religious-based coalitions—changewrought by differential mobilization. To be sure, a partof change in the size and strength of the parties’ electoralcoalitions occurs when groups once loyal to one partyshift and become loyal to the other. But anotherimportant part of that story, and one that has not beeninvestigated fully, is the role of differential mobilization.All else equal, if groups loyal to the Democrats partic-ipate less (or even maintain steady rates of participation)while groups loyal to the Republicans participate more,then differential mobilization also contributes to changein the size and strength of the parties’ electoral coalitions.The conventional wisdom would have us believe that thisis precisely what has occurred with respect to Evangelicalparticipation, but the conventional wisdom rests on littleor no systematic evidence.

We begin with cross-sectional efforts to docu-ment the role of moral issues structuring vote choice.These studies are an important part of the evidence

1See Manza and Brooks (1997, 42–43) for additional discussionof the ‘‘Christian Right Thesis.’’

longitudinal participation among evangelicals 3

that Evangelicals were crucial to Republican cam-paign success because these are the issues that theRepublican campaign highlighted and used in micro-targeting directed at Evangelicals (Monson andOliphant 2007). Several scholars have found thatspecific issues, such as gay marriage, played a significantrole cultivating support for President Bush in 2004.Gregory Lewis (2005) conducted two analyses, one atthe individual level (using data from a March 2004L.A. Times poll), and the other at the state level (usingBush’s share of votes per state from 2004). At theindividual level, Lewis finds that views on gay marriagewere significant predictors of vote intent, even control-ling for a host of other factors. At the state level, hefinds that states with more conservative views aboutsame-sex marriage issues supported Bush at signifi-cantly higher rates in 2004.

Campbell and Monson (2007) also found that so-called gay marriage bans (GMBs) were crucial toBush’s 2004 reelection. Part of their evidence comesfrom regression models investigating the county levelchange in votes for Bush from 2000 to 2004 in stateswith GMBs on the ballot. They found that the percentof support for GMBs was a significant factor predict-ing increased support for Bush and that the effect ofGMBs is explained almost entirely by the percent ofEvangelicals in each county. In other words, GMBsmattered, but they really only manifest any effect onchanged vote share through Evangelical value voters.They also conducted an individual level analysis ofwhether GMBs stimulated turnout in 2004 andwhether the effect of GMBs on turnout was especiallypronounced among Evangelicals. They find thatGMBs did stimulate turnout and that they matteredmost among Evangelicals.

While such efforts indicate that Evangelicals weremotivated to turnout by moral issues and primed tothink about moral issues once they arrived at pollingplaces in 2004 (but see Abramowitz 2004; Burden2004; Hillygus 2007; Hillygus and Shields 2005; andLanger and Cohen 2005), they are limited by researchdesign from testing whether either pattern reflects amore long-term trend. For example, Campbell andMonson show that GMBs stimulated turnout amongEvangelicals in 2004, but their study cannot answerquestions about whether Evangelical turnout in 2004was unusually high relative to past elections. Otherstudies explore long-term trends, but they havefocused primarily on changes in partisan loyalty.The general thrust of these efforts has been a system-atic analysis of changes in the religious compositionof party coalitions in the United States in the contextof the ‘‘Culture Wars’’ thesis.

For example, Layman (2001) frames his contri-bution as establishing a middle ground in the culturewars debate. If the debate is between those whomaintain that a new religious cleavage has emerged inAmerican politics along traditionalist-modernist linesto replace past denominational cleavages (Hunter1991; Wuthnow 1989) and those who claim thatdenomination continues to define religious cleavagesin American politics (Brooks and Manza 1997; Sims1996), then Layman finds a middle ground iden-tifying in the long-term trends an emerging tradi-tionalist-modernist cleavage and shifting—but stillimportant—denominational cleavages. Layman ex-amines religious political cleavages from a variety ofperspectives comparing the religious identities andbeliefs of Democratic and Republican activists, Dem-ocratic and Republican party identifiers in the masselectorate, and Democratic and Republican voters.However, the role of turnout structuring long termchanges among different religious groups is not a partof Layman’s narrative. To be sure, Layman’s analysisof long term trends in party identification and votingreveals a widening partisan gap within the Protestantdenomination along the traditionalist-modernist di-mension and increasing political differences acrossthe other denominations (and compared to seculargroups), but our concern is that a portion of theselong term trends may relate to unexamined patternsof participation and nonparticipation.

Although Layman identifies longitudinal changesin American religious-political cleavages, he does notdistinguish the role of changing participation patternsfrom other factors that contribute to those changes.Indeed, most contributions to the culture wars debatedo not assess whether changing turnout patterns existor contribute to observed changes in party loyalty(Bolce and de Maio 1999a, 1999b; Brooks 2002;Carmines and Layman 1997; Evans 2002; Knuckey2005; Layman 1997; Layman and Carmines 1997;Layman and Hussey 2007). Manza and Brooks (1997)are a notable exception, in that they include ananalysis of turnout in their assessment of religiouschange in the party coalitions. Like Layman, theirstudy also shows increasing political division amongwhite Protestants—with liberal Protestants shiftingsupport away from the Republican Party and con-servative Protestants moving in the opposite direc-tion. But Manza and Brooks also test for linear trendsin the participation of different religious groups from1960 to 1992. They find none and conclude, ‘‘Mostimportant for the Christian Right Thesis, there is noevidence of increasing participation by conservativeProtestants at the ballot box since 1980’’ (61).

4 ryan l. claassen and andrew povtak

Brooks and Manza take up the Christian RightThesis again noting,

Since 1980 most social scientists have found little evidencein support of popular and recurring commentaries thatidentify religion (and evangelical Protestants, in partic-ular) as a major source of conservative political trends inthe United States. But in the past several years a new lineof research has reported results suggesting that earlierstudies underestimated evidence that partisan changeamong specific religious groups has contributed to anemerging Republican electoral advantage. (2004, 421)

They again find less evidence of a religious basis forpolitical change than other scholars, but the turnoutdimension of the Christian Right Thesis receives con-siderably less attention than it did in their previousanalysis. While they do estimate a model of turnout andconsider turnout as a factor in each religious group’srelative contribution to each party’s coalition, the modelassumes no turnout trending among religious groups(see Brooks and Manza 2004, Appendix B).

In short, the longitudinal turnout patterns ofdifferent religious groups have received only limitedscholarly attention and have yet to be investigatedrigorously in data that includes the most recentpresidential elections—at least two of which havebeen described as evidence of a successful GOPstrategy to inspire increased turnout among Evangel-icals (e.g., the turnout dimension of the ChristianRight Thesis).2 We undertake a new test of theturnout dimension of the Christian Right Thesis byestimating models of turnout among different reli-gious groups that add to previous studies in severalways. First, we estimate separate models for midtermelections and presidential elections. Republican gainsin Congressional elections are an important part ofthe Christian Right Thesis and so the omission ofmidterm elections in Manza and Brooks (1997) andthe failure to separate the two types of elections inBrooks and Manza (2004) leaves important questionsunexplored. Second, by dividing the time periodcovered (1960–2004) into several periods and byusing a set of dummy variables, rather than specifyinglinear trends, our models will be sensitive to nonlinearturnout changes. Third, we assess turnout trends over alonger time period than has been done previously.Manza and Brooks (1997) only cover 1960–92 andBrooks and Manza (2004) only cover 1972–2000. Inpart, Brooks and Manza (2004) eliminate the pre-1972elections because of difficulty identifying divisions

among Baptist identifiers, but we are able to includepre-1972 elections because we divide the data into timeperiods. Hence, turnout trends can be compared overthe entire period or by simply comparing post-1970time periods (if one is concerned about an unmeasuredpre-1972 split among Baptists).

Data and Methods

We rely upon the NES data collection in order to examinelongitudinal changes in participation among differentreligious groups from 1960 to 2004. One of the challengesassociated with systematic comparisons of differentreligious groups lies in defining the relevant groups.Although the NES has collapsed subjects’ religiousaffiliations into the major denominational categories—Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish—distinguishing evan-gelical Protestants from mainline Protestants requiresthat one return to the full list of religious affiliations. Todo so, we follow the coding scheme developed in Steens-land et al. (2000) and further refined in Brooks andManza (2004). Steensland et al. conduct an empiricalanalysis comparing a variety of denominational catego-rizations using the General Social Survey (GSS). Theirfinal scheme produces seven categories, and they demo-nstrate the empirical merits of their system compared toother categorizations. Brooks and Manza adapt theSteensland et al. system to the NES, and we follow theirlead creating seven categories: mainline Protestant,evangelical Protestant, black Protestant, Catholic, Jew-ish, other religion, and nonreligious (see the supple-mentary online appendix at http://www.personal.kent.edu/~rclasse/jop2010appendix.pdf).

We begin by dividing the years covered in ourdata (1960–2004) into four periods, 1960–70, 1972–80,1982–90, and 1992–2004.3 We do so for several rea-sons. First, doing so will enable us to examine par-ticipation in each period rather than assuming linearpatterns in participation change over time. Second,several of the religious categories are relatively small,and pooling is necessary in order to ensure that theestimates for each group involve a sufficient numberof observations. Third, and most importantly, theseperiods mark important historical transitions for thereligious groups in question. For example, Layman(2001) notes that the rise of secularism in the 1960sinspired increasing political involvement of organiza-tions, such as the Moral Majority, the ReligiousRoundtable, and the Christian Voice, in the 1970sand 1980s. He notes, ‘‘The cultural progressivism of2Green et al. (2007) do describe the percent turnout by religious

groups, but their data only span 1992–2004 and they do notestimate statistical comparisons of changed turnout across thegroups nor do they estimate multivariate models.

3Because crucial variables are missing, we omit the years 1962 and2002.

longitudinal participation among evangelicals 5

the 1960s and 1970s and the orthodox response of the1970s and 1980s drew the lines for a new form ofAmerican cultural conflict’’ (2001, 11). The finalperiod captures the early years of the ChristianCoalition. The organization devotes enormous resour-ces to mobilizing its membership. During the 2000presidential election it distributed over 70 millionvoter guides and its former president, Ralph Reed,served as the Southeast regional chairman for the Bush-Cheney campaign in 2004.4 Finally, we also examineparticipation in presidential and midterm electionsseparately in order to eliminate the possibility thatdifferent numbers of presidential or midterm electionsin each period confound the over-time patterns.

Our first test involves stratifying the data into theseven denominational categories outlined above andsimply regressing turnout (e.g., whether the subjectreported voting in the general election) on a set ofdummy variables capturing our time periods (the firsttime period is specified as the baseline). These modelstest whether the rate of participation for each religiousgroup changed significantly over the time period.In order to assess whether changes in participationamong the seven groups were significantly differentwhen compared across groups, we also estimate pooledmodels of turnout in which we include our set ofperiod dummy variables, a set of dummy variables forthe seven groups, and interactions between the groupvariables and the period variables. The model weestimate is described by the equation,

TO 5 aþ bgGDþ bpPDþ bgpGD*PD ð1Þ

where TO is whether the individual reported voting,GD represents the set of group dummy variables, andPD represents the set of period dummy variables. Thebgp coefficients test whether the over-time change inturnout, in each period, for each group, was signifi-cantly different compared to the omitted group(mainline Protestants).

These initial models provide a basic, descriptive-level examination of the over-time turnout trends foreach group and a comparison of these trends.However, it is well established that a variety of socialand demographic characteristics shape political par-ticipation (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980). Whilethese effects would be orthogonal to period effects ifthe social and demographic characteristics of eachgroup were uncorrelated with time; omitting these

important determinants of turnout would bias esti-mates of over-time participation change if groups’social and demographic make-up also change overtime (e.g., if the distribution of income amongevangelical Protestants changes over time). In orderto assess the possibility of bias, we reestimate each ofthe models described above with a set of social anddemographic control variables. These controls in-clude frequency of attendance at religious services(recoded 0–1), party identification (0 5 Democrat,.5 5 Independent, 1 5 Republican), strength of partyidentification (the 7-point scale folded and recodedto range from 0 5 independent to 1 5 strongidentifier), income (0–1), education (0–1), marriage(0/1), residence in the South (0/1), union member-ship (0/1), age (0–1), and age squared. In the first setof models, turnout is simply regressed on the perioddummy variables and the social and demographic con-trol variables for each group. Changes in the coefficientsassociated with the period dummy variables will indi-cate whether group membership or other changes weredriving over-time change in turnout. In the interactivemodels, we again pool all seven groups and regressturnout on the group dummy variables, the perioddummy variables, the control variables, the interactionsbetween the group and period variables, and the inter-actions between the group and control variables, asshown in equation (2) below,

TO 5 aþ bgGDþ bpPDþ bcCV

þ bgpGD*PDþ bgcGD*CVð2Þ

where CV represents the set of control variables. The bgc

coefficients test whether the effect of each control vari-able for a group was significantly different than amongthe omitted group (mainline Protestants). The bgp co-efficients test whether the over-time change in turn-out, in each period, for each group, was significantlydifferent than that of the omitted group (mainlineProtestants), controlling for social and demographicfactors.

Results

Table 1 contains the over-time patterns of turnoutchanges for each group in presidential elections, andTable 2 contains the analogous analyses for midtermelections. The first column of Table 1 reveals signifi-cant declines in the turnout of mainline Protestantsin the 1970s and 1980s compared to the 1960s. In themost recent elections, however, the decline in turnoutwas not significant. Because the regressions include

4Although we have included 2004 in the last period, we note thatdivisions of the data into alternative periods return identicalpatterns of results. For example, if the last period is designated‘‘2000–04,’’ the pattern of results is the same as the one we report.

6 ryan l. claassen and andrew povtak

only the period dummy variables, the changes in pre-dicted probabilities would be identical to the ob-served changes in rates of turnout for each group, ineach period. In order to provide this substantive in-formation, we have also provided the observed ratesof turnout, in each period, for each group. It is evi-dent that mainline Protestant participation was off ofthe 1960s rate in all three subsequent periods, but thedecline was greatest in the 1970s and 1980s. Turningto the second column of Table 1, the conventionalwisdom that Evangelicals did something to inspirevoter participation in recent decades appears to beconfirmed. Unlike mainline Protestants, the declinein participation among Evangelicals in the 1970s and1980s fails to achieve statistical significance, while thegain in participation in the most recent elections

more than twice exceeds its standard error. However,despite the enormous attention given Evangelical par-ticipation in the popular press, several other groupsposted equally (or more) impressive gains. Black Pro-testants evidence steady gains in participation in eachsubsequent period with the gains reaching statisticalsignificance in the most recent period and the samecan be said of participation among the nonreligious.Indeed, each group boasts higher turnout in the mostrecent period compared to the 1960s, except mainlineProtestants and Catholics. The overall pattern inTable 2 for midterm election participation is quitesimilar, with a few minor exceptions. In terms of ro-bustness of effects, the turnout decline among main-line Protestants in midterm elections is robust in themost recent period—though it was not robust in the

TABLE 1 Stratified Models of Over-Time Change in Participation (Presidential Election Years Only)

PeriodDummies

MainlineProtestant

EvangelicalProtestant

BlackProtestant Catholic Jewish

OtherReligion Non-Religious

Constant(1960–1970)

1.63***(.08)

.77***(.08)

.52***(.13)

1.64***(.10)

2.32***(.51)

.59*(.27)

.16(.20)

Observed Turnout 84% 68% 63% 84% 91% 64% 54%1972–1980 Coefficient 2.42***

(.10)2.17(.11)

.10(.18)

2.47***(.13)

2.50(.61)

.39(.34)

.30(.24)

Observed Turnout 77% 65% 65% 76% 86% 73% 61%1982–1990 Coefficient 2.41***

(.10)2.196(.104)

.11(.17)

2.48***(.12)

2.52(.58)

.04(.33)

.39(.22)

Observed Turnout 77% 64% 65% 76% 86% 65% 63%1992–2004 Coefficient 2.17

(.10).25*(.10)

.40*(.17)

2.228(.121)

.31(.62)

.21(.31)

.55**(.21)

Observed Turnout 81% 73% 72% 80% 93% 69% 67%N 6137 4544 1489 4735 442 533 1757

*p , .05; **p , .01; ***p , .001. Logit estimates, all tests two-tailed, standard errors in parentheses.

TABLE 2 Stratified Models of Over-Time Change in Participation (Midterm Election Years Only)

Period DummiesMainline

ProtestantEvangelicalProtestant

BlackProtestant Catholic Jewish

OtherReligion Non-Religious

Constant (1960–1970) .64***(.07)

.07(.08)

2.02(.14)

.68***(.09)

1.25***(.26)

.47(.25)

2.00(.18)

Observed Turnout 65% 52% 49% 66% 78% 61% 50%1972–1980 Coefficient 2.25**

(.09)2.27*(.11)

2.35(.20)

2.30*(.12)

2.39(.36)

2.43(.32)

2.20(.22)

Observed Turnout 59% 45% 41% 59% 70% 51% 45%1982–1990 Coefficient 2.06

(.09)2.10(.10)

.31(.18)

2.45***(.11)

2.24(.40)

2.20(.31)

2.46*(.21)

Observed Turnout 64% 49% 57% 56% 73% 56% 39%1992–2004 Coefficient 2.30***

(.09).16

(.10).13

(.18)2.50***

(.10)2.93**

(.33)2.42(.29)

.15(.19)

Observed Turnout 58% 56% 53% 54% 58% 51% 54%N 4516 3566 1173 3633 340 469 1475

*p , .05; **p , .01; ***p , .001. Logit estimates, all tests two-tailed, standard errors in parentheses.

longitudinal participation among evangelicals 7

most recent presidential elections. Also, turnout gainsnoted among Evangelicals, black Protestants, and thenonreligious in recent presidential elections are notrobust in recent midterm elections. Finally, in con-trast to the pattern in presidential elections there is arecent decline in midterm participation among thosewho identify as Jewish and those associated withother religions.

While the results in Table 1 and Table 2 provideinformation on over-time changes in participationwithin each group, Table 3 and Table 4 comparethose changes across the groups. Because mainlineProtestants are the omitted category in the set ofgroup dummy variables, the pattern of participationamong mainline Protestants is the baseline patternagainst which the others will be compared. Hence,the first column of Table 3 is identical to the firstcolumn of Table 1. The estimates in the secondcolumn of Table 3 compare change in participationamong Evangelicals to change in participation amongmainline Protestants. These are the coefficients for

the interactive terms formed by multiplying theevangelical Protestant dummy variable and the pe-riod dummy variables. The last cell in the column isthe direct effect of the evangelical Protestant dummyvariable, and it indicates that participation amongevangelical Protestants lagged compared to partici-pation among mainline Protestants in the 1960s (e.g.,when the included period dummies all equal zero).The significant coefficient for the most recent periodindicates that Evangelicals did indeed zig where themainline Protestants zagged—and the difference inparticipation patterns is statistically significant. Compar-ing the coefficient for the direct effect of the Evangelicaldummy variable and the 1992–2004 interaction coeffi-cient, it is evident that Evangelicals have yet to best therate of participation among mainline Protestants (e.g.,the participation deficit in the 1960s represented by -.86 isa larger coefficient than the combined gain amongEvangelicals represented by .42 and the decline amongmainliners represented by 2.17). The significant inter-action term, however, signals they are gaining ground.

TABLE 3 Interactive Model of Over-Time Change in Participation (Presidential Election Years Only)

PeriodDummies

(Baseline)Mainline

Protestant

Period*EvangelicalProtestant

Period*Black

ProtestantPeriod*Catholic

Period*Jewish

Period*Other

ReligionPeriod*

Non-Religious

1972–1980 2.42***(.10)

.25(.15)

.52*(.21)

2.05(.16)

2.08(.62)

.81**(.36)

.73**(.26)

1982–1990 2.41***(.10)

.21(.14)

.51**(.20)

2.07(.16)

2.11(.59)

.45(.34)

.79***(.24)

1992–2004 2.17(.10)

.42**(.15)

.56**(.20)

2.06(.16)

.48(.63)

.38(.32)

.72**(.24)

Relig. Dummy(1960–1970)

1.63***(.08)

2.86***(.12)

21.11***(.16)

.01(.13)

.69(.52)

21.04***(.28)

21.47***(.22)

*p , .05; **p , .01; ***p , .001. Logit estimates, all tests two-tailed, standard errors in parentheses. N 5 19,637.

TABLE 4 Interactive Model of Over-Time Change in Participation (Midterm Election Years Only)

Period Dummies

(Baseline)Mainline

Protestant

Period*EvangelicalProtestant

Period*Black

ProtestantPeriod*Catholic

Period*Jewish

Period* OtherReligion

Period*Non-Religious

1972–1980 2.25**(.09)

2.01(.14)

2.10(.22)

2.04(.15)

2.14(.37)

2.18(.33)

.06(.24)

1982–1990 2.06(.09)

2.04(.14)

.37(.20)

2.39**(.14)

2.18(.41)

2.15(.33)

2.40(.23)

1992–2004 2.30***(.09)

.46***(.13)

.43*(.20)

2.20(.14)

2.63(.34)

2.11(.31)

.45*(.21)

Relig. Dummy(1960–1970)

.64***(.07)

2.57***(.10)

2.66***(.16)

.04(.11)

.61*(.27)

2.17(.25)

2.64***(.19)

*p , .05; **p , .01; ***p , .001. Logit estimates, all tests two-tailed, standard errors in parentheses. N 5 15,172.

8 ryan l. claassen and andrew povtak

While this may indicate that there is still room foradditional gains among Evangelical voters, the possibil-ity of their adding additional conservatism to theelectorate is balanced by the even more robust patternsof participation gains in the third column and in the lastcolumn. Again it is evident that Evangelicals did not havethe monopoly on electorate expansion. Both blackProtestants and the nonreligious also zigged wheremainline Protestants zagged and both groups havegained ground on, but not yet surpassed, participationamong mainline Protestants. And again, the pattern isvery similar in midterm elections.

While Evangelicals, and several other groups—especially black Protestants and the nonreligious—have indeed gained ground on the rate of participationamong mainline Protestants, we fear that attributingthese gains to group membership may be premature.As described in the data and methods section, ifthe distribution of social and demographic character-istics among members of each group changed overtime, these changes—not group membership—may account for the changes in turnout documentedthus far.5 We have reestimated the basic modelshaving added our social and demographic controlsin Table 5 and Table 6. Several of the patterns ofover-time change revealed in the first three rows ofthese tables are starkly different than the patternsfrom Table 1 and Table 2. Of primary interest, theestimates in the second column reveal over-timedeclines in turnout among Evangelicals, controllingfor social and demographic factors. The reversalindicates that recent turnout gains among Evangel-icals are better attributed to gains on social anddemographic indicators rather than their affiliationwith Evangelical denominations. For example, re-gressing income on the period dummy variables for

Evangelicals reveals positive gains in each period andsignificant ones in the most recent period.6 Theireducation gains have been even more impressive.Furthermore, as others have documented (and weconfirmed in our data), Evangelicals have becomemore Republican over time and the positive PIDcoefficient in the second column indicates thatRepublican Evangelicals are more likely to vote thanDemocratic Evangelicals. Granted, denominationalaffiliation and Republican targeting efforts deservesome credit for the positive independent effect ofpartisanship, but the over-time declines amongEvangelicals are robust even if the partisanshipcontrols are omitted.7 In short, the turnout gainsamong Evangelicals appear to have more to do withsocial and demographic trends than with the Chris-tian Coalition.

The balance of Table 5 reveals that the trendsamong mainline Protestants and Catholics remainnegative after controlling for social and demographicfactors and the trend among Jews, similar to what isobserved among Evangelicals, also becomes negative.In contrast, the gains in turnout among black Pro-testants, those from other religions, and among thenonreligious suffer less with the addition of the con-trol variables. Although the gains in turnout are nolonger robust at conventional levels, the coefficientsare at least positive. Nevertheless, the lack of robust-ness indicates that a portion—and perhaps even thelion’s share—of credit for turnout gains among thesegroups also lies in social and demographic changesamong members over time. Interestingly—in contrastto what we found among Evangelicals—these groupshave not trended toward the Republican Party. BlackProtestants have become significantly more Demo-cratic over the time period studied, while we cannotreject the null hypothesis that the distribution ofparty identification among the nonreligious has not

5Too often scholars note longitudinal, distributional changes in pooledcross-sections and assume they are due to individual-level change (e.g.,Evangelicals becoming more wealthy or more Republican). But thereare other sources of distributional changes and one cannot isolate thesesources without panel data. For example, newcomers and/or attritioncan also change distributions to the extent newcomers differ fromcurrent members or differ from outgoing ones. Furthermore, new-comers to our designated groups come in two flavors: those who comeof age within their denomination and those who switch denomina-tions. Thus it is important to recognize that increased wealth amongEvangelicals, for example, may be the result of upward mobilityamong individual Evangelicals, generational increases in wealthamong Evangelicals, or due to wealthy mainline Protestant movementinto Evangelical churches. We cannot disentangle these differentsources of change due to data limitations, but we note that the group-level changes we document are crucial to understanding trends inreligious politics in any case. To the extent one is worried about therole of denominational switching, however, Hout, Greeley, and Wilde(2001) indicate that different fertility rates—not switching—explainnearly all of the shift in the relative sizes of evangelical compared tomainline Protestant groups (2001, 470).

6We describe several longitudinal changes in social and demo-graphic variables among different groups in the text, but toconserve on space, we do not report full analyses in tables. Theseresults are available from the authors upon request.

7In order to test whether the change in the trend that occurs withthe addition of control variables is due to party identification(e.g., the positive trend among Evangelicals in Table 1 comparedto the negative trend in Table 5), we reestimated the SES modelswithout the partisan controls. This tactic effectively tests whetherthe SES variables alter the trends even if partisanship-related-turnout is credited (vis-a-vis the correlation between time andpartisanship) to the period dummy variables. The results arerobust to the modification (specifically, the Evangelical turnouttrend remains negative). Changes in party identification clearlycontribute to the increased turnout among Evangelicals observedin Table 1 and Table 2, but partisanship is not driving the resultsin Table 5 and Table 6.

longitudinal participation among evangelicals 9

changed. It may at first seem that the trend towardDemocratic partisanship among black Protestantswould suppress turnout (given what we note aboutevangelical Protestants), but the PID coefficientamong black Protestants (and among the nonreli-gious) is opposite signed—meaning that Democraticblack Protestants are more likely to vote than Re-publican black Protestants. This is interesting becausethe trends in changed party identification amongblack Protestants and the nonreligious increase turn-out—just as changing partisanship among Evangel-icals did—even though the groups are moving intodifferent parties. Finally, we also want to highlight theimportance of religiosity explaining turnout. Fre-quency of attendance at religious services is a potentpredictor of participation for each of the first fourreligious groups listed in Table 5. But interestingly,the effect of attendance in these first four columns issmallest among Evangelicals. Granted, the acrossgroup differences are not large, but they indicate that

the religious services of Evangelicals are no more po-tent mobilizing membership than the religious serv-ices of mainline Protestants, black Protestants, andCatholics.8

TABLE 5 Stratified Models of Over-Time Change in Participation with SES Controls(Presidential Election Years Only)

ParametersMainline

ProtestantEvangelicalProtestant

BlackProtestant Catholic Jewish

OtherReligion Non-Religious

1972–1980 2.32**(.11)

2.14(.12)

.24(.21)

2.18(.15)

2.87(.58)

.59(.48)

.24(.27)

1982–1990 2.50***(.11)

2.36**(.12)

.04(.20)

2.28(.15)

21.24*(.55)

.23(.45)

.23(.25)

1992–2004 2.33**(.12)

2.20(.12)

.18(.21)

2.20(.16)

2.56(.62)

.27(.42)

.44(.23)

Attendance 1.07***(.11)

.83***(.11)

1.36***(.22)

1.18***(.12)

.72(.64)

2.17(.46)

—

PID .32***(.08)

.28***(.09)

2.43(.23)

.25*(.11)

2.20(.44)

2.001(.302)

2.27*(.14)

Strengthof PID

1.13***(.11)

1.42***(.12)

1.35***(.20)

1.37***(.13)

1.25(.70)

2.81***(.40)

1.21***(.17)

Income 1.14***(.17)

1.02***(.17)

.82**(.30)

.80***(.19)

2.17**(.70)

.67(.55)

.97***(.24)

South 2.59***(.09)

2.40***(.08)

2.41**(.15)

2.47***(.11)

.14(.58)

2.23(.37)

2.50***(.14)

Education 2.43***(.17)

2.50***(.18)

1.77***(.33)

2.20***(.20)

1.84*(.80)

2.96***(.58)

3.07***(.25)

Union .17(.10)

.08(.10)

.34*(.17)

.13(.10)

2.22(.43)

.19(.28)

.12(.14)

Age 4.95***(.66)

5.66***(.70)

3.73**(1.17)

7.24***(.76)

22.47(3.57)

5.35*(2.38)

2.99**(1.03)

Age Squared 23.62***(.81)

24.43***(.87)

22.64(1.40)

26.28***(.97)

6.16(4.34)

24.06(3.19)

21.58(1.37)

Married .40**(.08)

.22**(.09)

.12(.14)

.29*(.09)

2.43(.42)

.45(.29)

.42**(.13)

Constant 22.55***(.19)

22.94***(.20)

22.54***(.33)

22.84***(.21)

2.20(.86)

23.82***(.67)

22.85***(.30)

*p , .05; **p , .01; ***p , .001. Logit estimates, all tests two-tailed, standard errors in parentheses.

8We were also interested in testing whether our results holdamong the very religious. If religiosity is eclipsing denomina-tional identity—as some culture wars studies suggest—thentesting our model among very religious people is an importanthurdle. Toward that end, we reestimated the models reported inTables 5 and 6 for those in the most frequent category of theattendance variable. The patterns of results among the veryreligious are nearly identical to the patterns reported in Tables5 and 6 (specifically, the turnout trend among very religiousEvangelicals is still negative). In a similar vein, we reestimated themodels having stratified by whether subjects perceived importantparty differences. We argue that lack of positive turnout trendsamong Evangelicals in Tables 5 and 6 raise questions aboutwhether a strategy of focusing on moral issues succeeded. But theskeptic might wonder whether we would observe the samepattern among Evangelicals who perceive important party differ-ences (because they are more likely to have been motivated by anincreased focus on moral issues). Again, the pattern of resultsremains robust.

10 ryan l. claassen and andrew povtak

Turning briefly to Table 6, the overall midtermpatterns are even more similar to the overall presi-dential election patterns than was the case withoutthe social and demographic controls. Indeed thepattern of over-time change in participation formainline Protestants, evangelical Protestants, Catho-lics, and Jews are all the same. But the pattern of weakincreases in participation among black Protestantsand those associated with other religions turn weaklynegative. Only the nonreligious post positive, thoughinsignificant, gains in midterm election participationand only in the most recent period.

Finally, in order to compare over-time trendsfrom the more fully specified models across thegroups, we again estimated pooled, interactive mod-els. These results are reported in Table 7 and Table 8.Of primary interest is the observation that we cannotreject the null hypothesis that the over-time trend of

participation in presidential elections among evan-gelical Protestants was the same as the over-timetrend among mainline Protestants. In contrast, theover-time participation trends in presidential elec-tions among black Protestants and the nonreligiousare significantly different—the trends themselveshaving been described by the results in Table 5. Thebasic story in Table 7 is that, once one controls forsocial and demographic factors, only black Protes-tants and the nonreligious differ significantly fromthe over-time participation pattern evident amongmainline Protestants. We do not dispute the fact thatEvangelicals increased participation in presidentialelections—witness Table 1. Nor do we dispute thattheir over-time participation pattern is unique whencompared to that of mainline Protestants—witnessTable 3—though we would dispute that the patternamong Evangelicals is unique given the similar

TABLE 6 Stratified Models of Over-Time Change in Participation with SES Controls (Midterm ElectionYears Only)

ParametersMainline

ProtestantEvangelicalProtestant

BlackProtestant Catholic Jewish

OtherReligion Non-Religious

1972–1980 2.20*(.10)

2.27*(.11)

2.30(.20)

2.16(.12)

2.44(.38)

2.19(.38)

2.10(.22)

1982–1990 2.13(.10)

2.23*(.11)

.24(.19)

2.39**(.12)

2.27(.44)

.01(.38)

2.50*(.21)

1992–2004 2.46***(.10)

2.08(.11)

2.04(.21)

2.48***(.12)

21.02**(.38)

2.28(.40)

.15(.19)

Attendance .69***(.10)

.44***(.11)

.54*(.21)

.54***(.11)

.88(.53)

2.20(.42)

—

PID .15*(.08)

.12(.08)

2.49(.25)

.17(.09)

2.14(.35)

.37(.26)

.15(.14)

Strengthof PID

.87***(.11)

.58***(.11)

.97***(.22)

.70***(.12)

.96*(.43)

1.69***(.33)

.82***(.18)

Income .71***(.16)

.17(.17)

.54(.29)

.34*(.17)

.43(.56)

.73(.50)

.03(.25)

South 2.39***(.08)

2.04(.08)

2.22**(.14)

2.43***(.11)

2.92*(.35)

2.84*(.33)

2.27(.15)

Education 1.31***(.14)

1.51***(.16)

1.03**(.31)

1.03***(.16)

.97(.58)

1.80***(.47)

1.33***(.22)

Union 2.07(.09)

.18(.10)

2.06(.18)

.06(.09)

2.68*(.32)

.11(.31)

.14(.16)

Age 4.79***(.66)

4.76***(.70)

2.46*(1.20)

5.60***(.72)

1.77(2.54)

3.23(2.34)

3.78***(1.08)

Age Squared 23.80***(.79)

23.44***(.87)

21.11(1.51)

24.72***(.91)

2.42(3.05)

21.24(2.94)

23.37*(1.41)

Married .17*(.08)

.13(.09)

.19(.14)

.23**(.09)

.36(.31)

.21(.27)

.27*(.13)

Constant 22.31***(.17)

22.29***(.19)

22.03***(.33)

22.04***(.19)

2.95(.68)

22.74***(.66)

21.88***(.27)

*p , .05; **p , .01; ***p , .001. Logit estimates, all tests two-tailed, standard errors in parentheses.

longitudinal participation among evangelicals 11

patterns among several other groups in Table 3.However, we do raise serious questions aboutwhether efforts sponsored by the Christian Coalitionor other aspects of Evangelical affiliation are accu-rately characterized as the driving forces of votermobilization. Clearly neither can be credited for thepositive shift in the distributions of income andeducation among Evangelicals—and it appears thatthere is very little mobilization left to explain amongEvangelicals once one controls for social and demo-graphic factors—indeed no significant differenceswhen compared to mainline Protestants.

Although the midterm election patterns in Table 8are similar to those in Table 7, it must be noted that,controlling for social and demographic factors, Evan-gelical participation declined significantly less in themost recent midterm elections than did participationamong mainline Protestants. Also, it bears mentioningthat the pattern of over-time participation in midterm

elections among black Protestants is no longer signifi-cantly different than the pattern among mainlineProtestants. Although this may indicate that Evangel-icals did something different in midterm elections, evencontrolling for social and demographic factors, it mustalso be noted that the over-time trend in midtermelections, controlling for social and demographic fac-tors, was a negative one (see Table 6). Hence, it wouldappear that the much heralded rise of the ChristianRight—in presidential elections and midterm elections,alike—is primarily a result of demographic changesamong those who consider themselves Evangelicals.

Conclusion

Our results indicate that the Christian Right Thesis, asan explanation for Republican gains in electoral strength,

TABLE 7 Interactive Model of Over-Time Change in Participation with SES Controls (PresidentialElection Years Only)

Parameters(Baseline)Mainline

Parameters*Evangelical

Parameters*Black

Parameters*Catholic

Parameters*Jewish

Parameters*Other

Parameters*Non-Religious

1972–1980 2.32**(.11)

.18(.17)

.56*(.24)

.14(.18)

2.54(.59)

.91(.49)

.56(.29)

1982–1990 2.50***(.11)

.14(.16)

.55*(.23)

.22(.19)

2.73(.56)

.73(.46)

.73**(.27)

1992–2004 2.33**(.12)

.13(.17)

.51*(.24)

.14(.20)

2.23(.63)

.60(.44)

.77**(.26)

Attendance 1.07***(.11)

2.24(.16)

.28(.24)

.11(.16)

2.36(.64)

21.25**(.47)

—

PID .32***(.08)

2.04(.12)

2.75**(.24)

2.07(.14)

2.52(.45)

2.32(.31)

2.59***(.16)

Strength of PID 1.13***(.11)

.29(.16)

.22(.23)

.24(.17)

.12(.71)

1.68***(.41)

.08(.21)

Income 1.14***(.17)

2.13(.24)

2.33(.34)

2.35(.26)

1.03(.72)

2.48(.58)

2.17(.29)

South 2.59***(.09)

.18(.12)

.18(.17)

.12(.14)

.73(.59)

.35(.37)

.08(.16)

Education 2.43***(.17)

.07(.25)

2.66(.37)

2.23(.26)

2.59(.82)

.53(.61)

.64*(.30)

Union .17(.10)

2.08(.14)

.18(.20)

2.03(.14)

2.39(.44)

.02(.30)

2.04(.17)

Age 4.95***(.66)

.70(.96)

21.22(1.34)

2.28*(1.01)

27.43*(3.63)

.40(2.47)

21.97(1.22)

Age Squared 23.62***(.81)

2.81(1.19)

.99(1.62)

22.66*(1.27)

9.79*(4.41)

2.44(3.29)

2.04(1.60)

Married .40***(.08)

2.18(.12)

2.28(.17)

2.11(.12)

2.83(.43)

.05(.30)

.02(.15)

Relig. Dummy(1960–1970)

22.55***(.19)

2.39(.27)

.01(.38)

2.30(.28)

2.35**(.88)

21.27(.70)

2.30(.36)

*p , .05; ** p , .01; *** p , .001. Logit estimates, all tests two-tailed, standard errors in parentheses.

12 ryan l. claassen and andrew povtak

may overstate the religious dimensions of Evangelicalvoter mobilization. Several accounts of the rising tide ofRepublican support attribute credit to efforts and eventsthat have transformed evangelical Protestants fromdeliberately apolitical roots into an increasingly activeand partisan religious voting bloc (Layman 2001, 10–12). According to the Christian Right Thesis, historicalincreases in electoral participation by evangelical Prot-estants occurred in response to (1) the rise of moralissues on the national agenda, (2) the openly religiouscandidacy of George W. Bush, and (3) organizedefforts to mobilize Evangelicals by Christian Rightorganizations (Campbell 2007; Campbell and Monson2007; Monson and Oliphant 2007). That turnout hasincreased among Evangelicals is undeniable. It is alsoclear that the historical turnout trend among evangel-ical Protestants is different than that of mainline Prot-estants. But evidence that the trend is best described as

a function of sociodemographic changes in the com-position of the denomination poses a problem for theChristian Right Thesis. Indeed, controlling for socialand demographic factors, the historical trend is not oneof increased participation, nor is the over-time patternsignificantly different than the one observed amongmainline Protestants. In light of changes amongEvangelicals that have made them more prosperousand better educated as a group, one would expectincreased participation even in the absence of moralissues on the national agenda, born again candidates,and voter guides. The explanation for historic increasesin Evangelical participation lies not in the ChristianRight Thesis, but in the basic precepts of the SES modelof political participation.

Also of interest are the turnout patterns we un-cover among other religious groups. Although there isno ‘‘Christian and Secular Left Thesis,’’ and although

TABLE 8 Interactive Model of Over-Time Change in Participation with SES Controls(Midterm Election Years Only)

Parameters(Baseline)Mainline

Parameters*Evangelical

Parameters*Black

Parameters*Catholic

Parameters*Jewish

Parameters*Other

Parameters*Non-Religious

1972–1980 2.20*(.10)

2.07(.15)

2.11(.22)

.03(.15)

2.25(.39)

.01(.39)

.10(.24)

1982–1990 2.13(.10)

2.10(.14)

.36(.22)

2.26(.15)

2.14(.45)

.14(.39)

2.37(.23)

1992–2004 2.46***(.10)

.38*(.15)

.42(.23)

2.02(.15)

2.56(.39)

.18(.41)

.61**(.22)

Attendance .69***(.10)

2.25(.15)

2.15(.24)

2.15(.15)

.19(.54)

2.89*(.43)

—

PID .15*(.08)

2.03(.11)

2.64**(.26)

.02(.12)

2.29(.36)

.22(.27)

2.001(.158)

Strength of PID .87***(.11)

2.29*(.15)

.10(.24)

2.17(.16)

.09(.44)

.82*(.35)

2.05(.21)

Income .71***(.16)

2.55*(.23)

2.17(.33)

2.37(.23)

2.29(.58)

.02(.52)

2.69*(.29)

South 2.39***(.08)

.35**(.11)

.17(.17)

2.04(.14)

2.53(.36)

2.45(.34)

.12(.17)

Education 1.31***(.14)

.19(.21)

2.29(.34)

2.28(.21)

2.34(.60)

.49(.49)

.02(.26)

Union 2.07(.09)

.25(.13)

.01(.20)

.13(.13)

2.60(.33)

.18(.32)

.21(.18)

Age 4.79***(.66)

2.03(.96)

22.33(1.37)

.81(.98)

23.02(2.62)

21.56(2.42)

21.01(1.26)

Age Squared 23.80***(.79)

.36(1.18)

2.69(1.71)

2.92(1.21)

3.38(3.15)

2.56(3.04)

.43(1.63)

Married .17*(.08)

2.04(.12)

.02(.17)

.07(.12)

.20(.32)

.04(.28)

.10(.15)

Relig. Dummy(1960–1970)

22.31***(.17)

.01(.26)

.27(.37)

.27(.26)

1.36(.70)

2.43(.69)

.42(.32)

*p , .05; **p , .01; ***p , .001. Logit estimates, all tests two-tailed, standard errors in parentheses.

longitudinal participation among evangelicals 13

increased turnout among secular voters and blackProtestants has received far less attention recently(no doubt because the Democratic party did notemerge the victor in the 2000 and 2004 presidentialelections), the raw increases in turnout over time areeven more impressive than those of Evangelicals andthey appear to be less a function of sociodemographicchanges in the groups. Although the positive trends arenot robust once one controls for sociodemographicfactors, the differences between what happened amongmainline Protestants and what happened among blackProtestants, and the differences between what hap-pened among mainline Protestants and the nonreli-gious, are robust. To be sure, early historical turnoutgains among black Protestants have much to do withdismantling legal barriers to participation—but sus-tained increases in turnout are suggestive of uniqueefforts in black churches (Calhoun-Brown 1996).Likewise the results are suggestive of unique politicalinfluences at work among secular Americans. Perhapsthese unique political influences are efforts by secularorganizations, such as Rock the Vote campaigns, but italso seems plausible that increased turnout amongthe nonreligious represents a backlash against highlyvisible Christian Right campaigns (Bolce and de Maio1999a, 1999b).

Finally, it bears mentioning that our findings donot refute the Christian Right Thesis as it relates tononturnout sources for the rising political might ofEvangelicals. For example, increasing political unityamong Evangelicals due to changes in the partisanloyalties of leaders and members strengthen the votingbloc independent of turnout (Layman 2001). Also,growth in the size of the denomination adds electoralstrength independent of turnout—and in 2004 evan-gelical Protestants, ‘‘were the largest religious tradi-tion, including one-quarter of the adult population’’(Green et al. 2007, 19). Thus, although sociodemo-graphic changes best explain the turnout dimension ofthe Christian Right Thesis, we make no claims abouthow best to explain membership expansion and chang-ing partisan loyalty. In any case, our results suggestadditional scrutiny is required interpreting the religiousdimensions of political participation—whether one isdescribing a burgeoning Republican coalition or aDemocratic coalition that has retaken the presidency.

Acknowledgments

A previous version of this paper was presented at the2009 annual meeting of the Midwest Political ScienceAssociation.

Manuscript submitted 30 September 2008Manuscript accepted for publication 20 February 2009

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Ryan L. Claassen is Assistant Professor at KentState University, Kent, OH 44242.

Andrew Povtak is Graduate Student at Kent StateUniversity, Kent, OH 44242.

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