the ashland oil spill, floreffe, pa — case history and response ...

THE ASHLAND OIL SPILL, FLOREFFE, PA — CASE HISTORY AND RESPONSE EVALUATION

Cdr. E. A. Miklaucic U.S. Coast Guard

Marine Safety Office Pittsburgh Suite 700, Kossman Building

Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15222

J. Saseen U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

Wheeling Field Office 303 Methodist Building

Wheeling, West Virginia 26003

ABSTRACT: On January 2, 1988, a storage tank at the Ashland Oil Terminal, Floreffe, Pennsylvania, near the Monongahela River 24 miles upstream of Pittsburgh, suffered an instantaneous and complete failure, releasing 90,000 barrels (about 3.9 million gallons) ofdiesel oil into the environment. The speed and volume of the release made ''first aid" almost impossible. Within hours, an estimated 18,000 barrels (750,000 gallons) ofdiesel had entered the river. Responders were faced with a power and communication lines shutdown, contaminated pota-ble water intakes, oil dispersion from river currents and turbulence resulting from numerous river dams, and life-threatening weather con-ditions, with temperatures often below 0°F. With the U.S. Coast Guard as first federal official on scene (FFOS) and the Environmental Protec-tion Agency acting as on-scene coordinator (OSC), a thoroughly inte-grated response organization of federal, state, local, and interstate agencies evolved.

Once the situation was stabilized, aggressive restoration of the Ash-land site by traditional removal techniques began. However, significant factors challenged the scientific community throughout river recovery areas. First, as contamination became suspended throughout the water column, water supply intakes at all depths were affected, resulting in water shortages for most of the population downstream as far as 200 miles. Supplying potable water and technical assistance to water au-thorities prompted questions about the use of 311 (k) for activities not clearly defined as cleanup. Additionally, cold weather caused extensive freezing, and ice cover limited full use of absorbent materials and equipment. Finally, river access points also hampered boom deploy-ment and surface oil recovery.

This case demonstrated the benefits of contingency planning and revealed areas where additional coordination might be accomplished. The associated Ashland site restoration continues to the present time.

Through the day of January 2,1988, three barges of diesel fuel were unloaded at Ashland Oil Company's Floreffe, Pennsylvania, water-front facility, at Mile 25 on the Monongahela River, and pumped into Tank No. 1338 at the terminal. This 4 million gallon tank had been reconstructed at the site in 1987; it had originally been constructed in 1940 and used at Whiskey Island (Cleveland), Ohio. Its current loca-tion at the Floreffe terminal is approximately 15 air miles from the Point in Pittsburgh.

At 4:58 p.m., the terminal operator completed a gauging visit to the tank top of No. 1338, just prior to filling it to maximum capacity for

the first time in that location. Fuel height in the tank was less than 2 inches from the maximum 46 foot depth, representing 3,857,384 gallons of product.

At approximately 5:02 p.m., while returning to the terminal office, the operator described hearing a sound like thunder and turned to observe the roof of No. 1338 collapse and a cloud of mist surround the tank area.5 The resulting wavelike surge of diesel fuel crossed facility containment berms, inundating the terminal and adjacent property, creating one of the nation's largest inland oil spills (Figure 1). Large quantities of fuel pooled in a low-elevation area of the adjacent Duquesne Power Plant. It then drained through a storm sewer where the oil was emulsified with cooling water from the river, which had been used by the power plant. Subsequently, the oil was discharged into the river via a spillway. Currently, it is estimated that 750,000 gallons entered the river, and that 204,600 gallons were recovered.

Ashland employees provided prompt and thorough notification of the tank rupture to local emergency response agencies and the National Response Center (NRC). The NRC notified local U.S. Coast Guard, Marine Safety Office (USCG MSO), Pittsburgh, who further notified the local Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) field office in Wheeling, West Virginia, and other agencies of the spill.

Immediately following the tank collapse, involved agencies at all levels dispatched personnel to collect information and confirm de-tails. Because all communication and power lines at the Ashland terminal had been shut off as a precautionary safety measure at the time of the spill, communications from the scene were hampered. Local and county agencies responded quickly in establishing a tempo-rary command post in the Floreffe Fire Hall, and took positive steps to ensure site safety and to evaluate and contain the spill.

Initial efforts were well thought out and executed without mishap; however, the instantaneous nature of the casualty made first aid con-tainment virtually impossible. Attempts to stem the flow of oil to the storm sewer inlet, 10 feet or more under the oil surface, were fruitless until the flow subsided and the sewer inlet was located. Truck loads of gravel and road material dumped at the 24 inch storm sewer inlet were swept away by the force of oil flow.

Action was further severely impeded by darkness, extremely cold temperatures, and later, by public safety considerations resulting from detection of gasoline vapors at the site. The fire and explosion threat from the discharge of gasoline require site operations to be suspended until the threat had been mitigated. Evacuation of the site and nearby residents was effected by the local fire chief.6

By 8:00 p.m., local and county responders were well established

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46 1989 OIL SPILL CONFERENCE

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Figure 1. The Ashland oil spill (land limits)

in a command post at the Floreffe Fire Hall. Allegheny County Emergency Management authorities ensured notification to down-stream facilities, provided response equipment, and supported local personnel using planned agreements. Despite difficult communica-tions with persons on scene, enough details had been confirmed that the Coast Guard and EPA established the appropriate federal pos-ture. Having roughly defined the location, amount, source and spread of the oil, USCG MSO Pittsburgh and EPA Wheeling agreed to jurisdiction determined by the existing USCG/EPA Memorandum of Understanding. EPA would assume on-scene coordinator (OSC) re-sponsibilities. USCG MSO Pittsburgh would assume first federal official on scene (FFOS) duties, then be relieved by the OSC upon the latter's arrival at first light on January 3,1988. By 10:00 p.m., USCG MSO Pittsburgh exercised control of river traffic by closing the Monongahela River, mobilized the National Strike Force, arranged air support, ensured cleanup contractor response, and began monitor-ing Ashland's response and assessing its effectiveness.

Ashland Oil Corporation accepted full responsibility for cleanup operations and contracted for all phases of containment and cleanup. Its cooperative response to guidance by federal officials monitoring the response contributed to the response's overall effectiveness.

Pending resolution of site safety issues by the fire scene commander and recognizing the excellent site control by local authorities, the USCG FFOS established a separate command post at the Ashland terminal. Communication constraints at the original command post and a need to separate long-term oil recovery planning and control from the immediate local response activity were prime factors in the decision.

Between 12:30 and 2:30 p.m. January 3, the FFOS coordinated river cleanup operations with Ashland, its cleanup contractors, and state and federal agency representatives. These operations focused on the following tasks: • Contractor acquisition of all available pollution recovery equip-

ment • Selecting effective and accessible containment and recovery areas • Extending the 12 mile closure of the Monongahela River to 26 miles • Mobilizing additional federal forces (the National Strike Force's

Atlantic Area Strike Team, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, and air support)

• Identifying and mobilizing local commercial, industrial river re-sources (e.g., tow boats, tank barges, and deflection barges)

• Notifying and mobilizing Pittsburgh Public Safety Department resources

• Requesting U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACOE) Pittsburgh District lock operations to contain oil in the locks (and then direct-ing contractors to those sites for recovery). Pennsylvania state agencies, the Department of Environmental

Resources (PADER) and Fish Commission (PFC), began assessing the impact on water quality of downstream water intakes (Figure 2).

The cleanup and recovery of the No. 2 diesel fuel from both the Monongahela and Ohio Rivers was the responsibility of the Ashland Oil cleanup contractor, O. H. Materials, Inc. (OHM), who hired many subcontractors to perform this task. USCG MSO Pittsburgh and the National Strike Force's Atlantic Area Strike Team (USCG/ LAST) closely monitored river cleanup activities and monitored Ash-land throughout the duration of the emergency.

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CASE HISTORIES 47

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Figure 2. Immediate response area for the Ashland oil spill on the Monongahela River, with intakes, facilities, and other features

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The EPA OSC arrived on site early Sunday morning, assumed the central role in response coordination, and provided advice to the Ashland Oil Company. Shortly thereafter, the first water treatment plant closed its intakes, creating a new emergency. The oil spill was

now threatening the public drinking water supplies of numerous com-munities that utilize both rivers. The water quality crisis became the third and most pressing focus of federal, state, and local response, significantly affecting public health and dramatically increasing per-

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sonnel and equipment resource requirements. Throughout the follow-ing week the OSC was assisted by all elements of the USCG/LAST, Environmental Response Team (ERT), Regional Response Team (RRT), and participating state and local agencies. This coordination led to a long-term response plan focused on water quality, river recov-ery, and site cleanup. The following response tasks were coordinated by the OSC and performed or monitored by the full spectrum of local, county, state, and federal agencies (Figure 3):3

• Site cleanup • Tracking leading edge • River traffic control • Congressional/political liaisons • Facility inspections • River cleanup • Environmental impact • Water quality sampling • Potable water delivery • RRT • Enforcement • Public affairs • Cost tracking. The incident-specific Regional Response Team (RRT) was formally

activated Monday, January 4, 1988. Many of the RRT member agencies were closely involved in the initial response. The following agencies participated in RRT activation:

• U.S. Coast Guard (Second and Fifth District, MSO Pittsburgh, National Strike Force LANTAREA Strike Team)

• U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (Regions III, IV, V) • U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Hunting-

ton, Louisville) • U.S. Department of Interior (Philadelphia, Chicago) • National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (Ann Arbor,

Rockville, Seattle) • Occupational Safety and Health Administration • Federal Emergency Management Agency • Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources • Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency • West Virginia Department of Natural Resources • West Virginia Department of Health • Ohio Environmental Protection Agency • Ohio River Valley Water Sanitation Commission • Kentucky Department for Environmental Protection. The RRT provided advice and guidance to the OSC, while RRT

members acted as conduits of information to and from their respective agencies. Conducted on a regular basis, RRT teleconferences focused on the political, programmatic, and statutory implications of agency actions. They also maintained continuity of information to all agen-cies involved. Recommendations for appropriate response actions were made. Emergency response actions continued through January 15, 1988 with EPA, USCG, and state and local agencies on scene.4

River cleanup

Nearly all the oil entered the river via a single 24 inch drainage pipe on the adjacent Duquesne Power Company property. This pipe joined Duquesne's cooling water discharge, which flowed into the river. Once the entry point was identified, the fire department in-stalled an underflow dam to prevent the oil from flowing into the river. However, due to delays caused by darkness, loss of power and communications, and evacuation of the area, the dam was not in-stalled until 9:00 p.m. on January 2, after most of the oil had already reached the river. This first containment was replaced by an inflatable plug, which failed early the next morning, releasing an additional 50,000 gallons into the river.4

During this spill, Monongahela River current was 1.1 mph, and the flow rate continued to decrease as temperatures fell in the days that followed. Predictions of plume movement were difficult to make due to the changing river flow rate. The spill occurred in the Lock and Dam (L/D) No. 3 pool at river mile 25. As the plume quickly reached L/D No. 3, the first in a series of locks and dams along the Monon-gahela and Ohio Rivers, it apparently became emulsified and dis-persed throughout the water column. As a result, containment booms retained only the oil that was not emulsified.

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Figure 3. Organization of the response to the Ashland spill

The original criteria used to select oil recovery sites was ease of access to river edge and capability for deployment, recovery, and storage of massive amounts of spill equipment. The sites initially selected were left descending bank (LDB) Mile 2.2, Southside Park (boat ramp and cemented area), and right descending bank (RDB) Mile 0.5 to 0.8, Monongahela River wharf, both on the Monongahela River near the Pittsburgh Point. Multiple deflection and collection booms, assisted by strategically placed barges used for oil deflection, were in place early on January 3. These sites recovered the largest amounts of fuel.

The first effective deployment of contractor resources was to L/D No. 2, Mile 11.2 RDB, at 1:00 a.m., January 3. This site also proved very efficient due to ease of equipment deployment and use of the lock as a collection basin. By maintaining upper lock gates open and the downstream gates closed, the lock formed a natural backwater enabling significant product recovery.

After USCG LAST visual inspection by air, more equipment was deployed to major natural collection points: Mile 15.8 Monongahela River; Mile 2.7 back channel Brunot's Island, Ohio River; and later, Miles 6.8 and 7.8 back channel Neville Island, Ohio River. Numerous smaller recovery efforts occurred at points throughout the 38 mile river recovery area as the oil gathered in eddies behind bridge piers, vessel mooring areas, and natural riverbank prominences.

To increase oil recovery further, two BUDA self-propelled suction barges were deployed. While underway, the BUDA deploys boom to collect oil product, and simultaneously vacuums the product and stores it in the vessel's 5,000 gallon tanks. This recovery method has been considered the best and most flexible alternative to boom sys-tems for river spills of this nature. However, the system did not reach full potential due to mechanical problems from extreme cold weather. Furthermore, ice clogged the suction intakes.

Other than the sites initially selected, few suitable locations for oil collection downstream from the spill site were found by the cleanup crews. River access was impossible at most points due to steep, heav-ily treed or rocky banks, sometimes at a distance from roads.

Extremely cold weather during the first weeks of 1988 not only compounded mechanical problems, but affected all aspects of person-nel response, monitoring, and cleanup activities. The frigid conditions increased the risk of hypothermia for river cleanup crews and led to demobilization of all river personnel on the fourth day after the spill. For several days ice cover on the rivers ranged between 50 and 90 percent. The ice, which contained some of the oil, interfered with the placement of booms and sorbent materials and complicated estima-tions of plume movement based on river velocity. Cold temperatures may have stabilized the oil emulsion, which in turn reduced oil recov-ery and increased the potential of water intake contamination.

Efforts to contain and recover oil at this enormous spill included more than 150 people, 11 vacuum trucks, 3 cranes, 10 barges and towboats, dozens of small work boats, and 20,000 feet of river boom. Three USCG and three private helicopters were used for air surveys and to transport personnel and equipment quickly over long dis-tances. During extreme weather conditions, extensive use of sorbent materials was prevented because ice cover prevented the sorbent ma-terials from contacting the oil. In addition, the ice cover and high risk of injury for work crews prevented the placing of booms in some otherwise strategic locations.

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CASE HISTORIES 49

Traffic in the Monongahela River was prohibited for 58 hours fol-lowing the Ashland spill and was restricted for seven days to enable cleanup crews to move about freely in the river. Daily evaluations of the restrictions on river traffic were made by the USCG MSO Pitts-burgh, acting as Captain of the Port.

On January 4, a local economic problem resulting from the Monongahela River closure was addressed in discussions on improv-ing oil recovery. When the river is open, 17 million tons of coal and coke transit this region, supplying energy requirements for numerous steel and related heavy industries.1 The closure left some with as little as 10 days operating supply. While largely administrative, the river closure was physically enforced by deflection boom crossing the river in four major recovery areas. By 10:00 p.m., a USCG buoy tender set buoys and moored the deflection boom so that a 200 foot mid-stream gap was opened for traffic. Vessel turbulence resulting from the re-opening was estimated to have little effect on the already emulsified oil. However, the boom's increased angle of incidence to shore recov-ery points greatly accelerated the rate of oil recovery by reducing oil entrainment.

Constant river cleanup monitoring by air, road vehicles, and small boats shifted oil collection resources and emphasis on a daily basis. Major recovery efforts continued up to January 18, when no further recoverable oil pools dictated a phasedown. Final river cleanup efforts were completed on February 5, 1988. Cleanup operations continued on site at the Ashland terminal, monitored by the EPA OSC until EPA's demobilization on February 26, 1988.

River monitoring

Three types of monitoring took place: defining the spill mass and tracking its movement, sampling and assessment at water intakes to protect water supplies and public health, and gauging the effects on fish and wildlife. Initially, flow and velocity forecasts by the National Weather Service (NWS) were used to predict oil plume location. Later, USACOE velocity data were supplied daily.

Spill mass and tracking. Oil plume tracking began on January 4, using data from overflight observations, taste and odor reports from treatment plant operators, and lock and dam workers. Flow and velocity data and weather forecasts were obtained from appropriate agencies. On January 5, PADER and the PFC commenced sampling on both rivers at three depths in the water column. River bank sedi-ment was also sampled. Analyses performed were for oil and grease (O&G) and total organic carbon (TOC). PADER, in cooperation with the Allegheny County Health Department, also initiated sam-pling of surface and groundwater intakes along the rivers in Pennsyl-vania, with analyses for volatile organics, TOC, and fuel oil per-formed by the PADER laboratory in Harrisburg.4

The plume tracking group at the Ashland command post consisted of representatives from EPA, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), PADER, and the Ohio River Valley Water Sanitation Commission (ORSANCO). They set up a sampling pro-gram at the first eight water supply intakes downstream of the spill site. Three samples per day were taken at each intake, but were cut back to two per day for logistic considerations. Analyses were first performed at a local contract laboratory (NUS), but suffered from backlog delays. A mobile laboratory was set up by the cleanup con-tractor, O. H. Materials, Inc., on January 6. Analyses tested for volatile organics, base neutrals, and No. 2 fuel oil.

On January 6 the OSC coordinated efforts with EPA, West Virginia Department of Natural Resources (WVDNR), and ORSANCO to track the spill using fluorometers on tow boats. One fluorometer-equipped towboat moved upstream from Wheeling, while a second towboat equipped with a TOC analyzer moved downstream. By the end of January 6 it was apparent that the fluorometer provided useful results for characterizing the plume, while the TOC analyzer did not. Thereafter, one fluorometer-equipped towboat was operated by per-sonnel from Ohio EPA, WVDNR, and ORSANCO. Samples were collected at the point where the fluorometer indicated the leading edge and the peak concentration of the spill. WVDNR's Guthrie Laboratory analyzed for volatile organics, base neutrals, and fuel oil. On January 6, 7, and 8, USACOE Pittsburgh collected samples at several locations including the New Cumberland, Montgomery, Emsworth, Elizabeth, and Braddock Dams. Ohio EPA set up a moni-

toring system at eight sites on the Ohio River and commenced sam-pling on January 7. Analyses tested for TOC, O&G, and organics.4

On January 13, USACOE Huntington District took over the down-stream tracking of the spill. They continued to perform the track-ing, using their own boat and a flowthrough fluorometer through January 23, when the spill left their jurisdiction at the river's Mile 436. USACOE's Louisville District continued the tracking until February 2, when the spill was no longer detectable by the boat-mounted fluo-rometer.

From January 19 through 23, a towboat was again employed to assist in the tracking and to provide samples requested by downstream water users. Five gallon samples were collected at the indicated peak for use by the utilities performing treatability studies. The spill reached Kentucky on January 22. The Kentucky Division of Water successfully used fluorometers at water intakes, combined with sam-ple analysis, at Maysville and Louisville, then moved the fluorometers downstream to provide intake monitoring at Evansville, Indiana, and Cairo, Illinois. By that time, spill dispersion led to inconclusive re-sults. Monitoring at Cairo, just above the mouth of the Ohio River, was concluded on February 12.4

In general, cold weather hampered the river monitoring. Poor navi-gation conditions forced the monitoring crews to use slow-moving tug boats for personnel safety, which often delayed the reporting of re-sults.

Sampling and assessment at water intakes. Water supply plants downstream from the Ashland terminal were promptly notified of the January 2, 1988, spill via county and state health and emergency management agencies. However, the presence of oil, top to bottom in the water column, and its corresponding impact on water supplies, was not recognized until early on January 3. The actions taken by individual water suppliers for water supply facilities in many cases reflected the degree of technical expertise and equipment used in processing river water. This situation played a significant role in water treatment. The information provided by emergency response agen-cies was also critical in enabling downstream water suppliers to imple-ment various treatment procedures and increase storage volume be-fore the spill affected their intakes. Public confidence in the water purveyors and in the responding agencies was maintained because water quality never deteriorated.

Coordination of raw and finished water quality testing and report-ing was critical. Accelerated testing and results through use of private laboratories verified the effectiveness of carbon treatment and con-firmed drinking water quality. Vital water plant operation decisions hinged on the speed and accuracy of sample results. In affected com-munities, specially modified emergency water tankers were set up quickly. Refill operations were well organized and staged indoors due to cold temperatures. Supplemental bottled water was provided by dairies and breweries who were given water quality guidelines by health agencies.

In a parallel effort underwritten by Ashland Oil Company, USCG LAST mobilized teams and pumping equipment flown from Mobile, Alabama, to barge water. By loading fresh water from uncontami-nated sources (the Allegheny River and Wheeling Creek) into clean 400,000 gallon tank barges, a temporary freshwater supply to river water plant intakes was made available. However, for several days, the extreme cold froze the pumps and water contained in the barges, delaying delivery.

The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania issued a Water Conservation Order for three counties during the incident. Public cooperation with this order allowed three of the four affected water suppliers in Penn-sylvania to avoid water loss to their customers. A summary of the experiences of the major water supply facilities and users affected by the Ashland oil spill follows in detail. Excerpts from the report con-cerning those plants most affected are reprinted here:4

West Penn Water Company (Becks Run), PA (Monongahela River Mile 4.5). West Penn Water (WPW) was notified by the Allegheny County Health Department (ACHD) about the spill at approximately 7:00 p.m., January 2. Little information was available on the spill location, size, volume (estimates ranged from 30,000 to 3 million gallons), or travel time to intake. The Hays Mine plant intake was closed early January 3, and testing began immediately using the ORSANCO-ODS gas chromatograph. Additional samples were sent to a local lab for GC/MS [gas chromatography/mass spectrometry] verification. Samples were also taken by EPA, PADER, and ACHD. Attempts were made to determine the chemical composition of the

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fuel oil. Consideration was given to blocking off the two upper water intakes and operating with the lower intakes. However, when oil was observed at depths greater than 15 feet the effort was abandoned.

On Monday, January 4, WPW pilot tested a carbon feed process that proved successful in removing the oil. Subsequently, four of the five Pennsylvania water companies affected by the spill used this process. The fifth water company, Sewickley Borough, utilized alter-native well water sources. On January 6, treatment and analysis schedules were established and the Hays Mine plant started operating at 25 percent capacity. Excellent public relations efforts helped to maintain public confidence throughout the water emergency.

City of Pittsburgh Water Authority, PA (Allegheny River Mile 7.4). The City of Pittsburgh draws its water from the Allegheny River, which was uncontaminated by the spill. The excess capacity of the Pittsburgh system provided 15 to 20 million gallons per day (mgd) to West Penn and West View Water Companies.

West View Water Authority, PA (Ohio River Mile 4.5). West View Water Authority was notified of the spill the evening of January 2, and immediately implemented their emergency contingency plan. This plan included increasing carbon feed capacity, topping off reservoirs and tanks, activating well fields, and establishing water line connec-tions with the City of Pittsburgh. Use of the developed wells was de-layed pending lab evaluation of raw water quality.

Regulatory agencies approved operation on January 10, at which time the plant started to blend 25 percent river water with well water. The primary factors that enabled West View to provide water to its customers were the use of well water, the connections with the City of Pittsburgh's system, and the Pennsylvania Emergency Manage-ment Council's conservation order.

Robinson Township Authority, PA (Ohio River Mile 8.6). Robinson Township was the only water company that had customers without water during the incident. Approximately 17,000 customers were without water for up to 48 hours. Two thousand (2,000) customers were without water for up to 5 days, and 200 customers were without water for an entire week. The Authority focused on development of interconnections with other water supply plants. It opened its river intakes eight days after the spill, on January 10, following conversion from a potassium permanganate feed system to a carbon feed system.

Midland Water Authority, PA (Ohio River Mile 36.2). Midland Water Authority received 24 hours notice of the spill. The inriver intake shut down at 6:00 p.m. on January 4, with 4 million gallons of water in re-serve. No interconnections were possible. Local industry was ordered to cut consumption to a minimum. On January 7, divers completed the installation of oil filter blanket material around the intakes, and plant startup procedures began. A 600-pound/million gallons pow-dered activated charcoal water treatment produced acceptable results and the plant went back on line at 2:00 p.m. on January 7.

East Liverpool Water Treatment Plant, OH (Ohio River Mile 41). East Liverpool water treatment plant shut its intakes at 3:00 a.m. on January 5, 1988, even though the plant had not yet been affected by the spill. Officials of the plant determined that they could not afford the risk of contaminating the facility. In the interim, reserves and water conservation were relied upon until river water treatment could commence. A creek outflow aided in minimizing the spill's effects by diverting oil from collecting near the facility's intake. By noon on January 7, East Liverpool was back on line treating water with acti-vated carbon. Ashland's mobile laboratory was utilized to test water samples on a 24-hour basis to ensure water quality.

Toronto Water Treatment Plant, OH (Ohio River Mile 60). At 11:00 p.m. on January 5, 1988, Toronto, Ohio, closed its intakes. A large reservoir, coupled with water conservation efforts, provided sufficient water supplies until the plant reopened its intakes and began treating river water at 10:30 p.m. on January 9, 1988.

Steubenville Water Treatment Plant, OH (Ohio River Mile 65). Steu-benville's storage capacity had been maximized and provided an ade-quate supply of water. The quality of water was monitored at 15 to 20 minute intervals. When odor became apparent on January 6, 1988, the water intake was closed for 10 to 11 hours. After the contamina-tion passed, the intake was reopened at 10:25 p.m.

Wheeling Water Treatment Plant, WV (Ohio River Mile 86.8). This plant monitored for oil in water using the Hanby Test, fluorometric analysis, threshhold odor, and gas chromatography, due to useful information from upstream utilities. The GC was used to confirm the presence or absence of low-level organics in raw and finished water. Treatment schemes were evaluated using jars of river water spiked

with oil. Reliable concentration and health effects data from upstream monitoring were not readily available during the spill's first week.

Alternative water sources were obtained from the communities of Martins Ferry and Bridgeport and water barges brought in by Ashland Oil coordinated by the USCG LAST. These barges were filled from Wheeling Creek, a tributary of the Ohio River. The plant went off Ohio River water the evening of January 8 and reopened by blending with barge water on January 10. Prior to reopening, a filter blanket was placed over the intakes by divers.

American Electric Power, WV (Ohio River Miles 76.5,111.1,111.51). Power plants utilizing the river for cooling water are vulnerable to high levels of oil. Since the period immediately after the spill saw near record demands for electricity due to heating needs, the threat of power plant disruption was a grave concern. The fact that there was no disruption is noteworthy; however, plans for water treatment were in place.

Sistersville Water Works, WV (Ohio River Mile 137). There was much concern regarding potential difficulties in providing adequate water supplies at Sistersville because there were no alternative supplies. During the crisis, Ashland provided barged water to Sistersville while the plant's intakes were closed from January 13 to January 21.

Huntington Water Treatment Plant, WV (Ohio River Mile 306). Hunt-ington was hampered by a water hysteria in fear of a water shortage prior to spill arrival. Diesel pumps were installed in a nearby, un-affected stream as an alternative water supply in anticipation of po-tential river contamination. Intakes were closed on January 22 and water from the Guyandotte and Ohio Rivers was blended for treat-ment until 100 percent Ohio River water treatment resumed on January 25, 1988.

Effects on wildlife. Determinations of this spill's long-term impact on mussel beds and fish are incomplete, partly due to lack of back-ground data against which to view new sample data. However, two oil impact studies designed by aquatic toxicologists from the WV DNR took mussel samples and a census before and after the spill. Sepa-rately caged mussels and catfish were suspended in the river ahead of the spill, then collected after it passed. Analysis of the organisms will be used to determine effects of the diesel fuel.

Pennsylvania and West Virginia authorities conducted shoreline counts to determine the number of fish killed. In the week following the spill, several censuses of dead and stressed fish were taken in dam pools along the river. More recently, annual fish collection surveys conducted by ORSANCO, in conjunction with state agencies, are expected to yield further information regarding ecological effects.

Significant efforts by the Pennsylvania Game Commission, Au-dubon Society, and dozens of volunteers to retrieve oil-endangered waterfowl met with limited success due to weather conditions. Ice and very low temperatures kept rescue workers on shore, hampering re-covery. Although many birds were saved, waterfowl mortality esti-mates ranged from 2,000 to 4,000 ducks, loons, cormorants, and Canada geese, among others.

Evaluation of response and recommended improvements

This evaluation considers three critical elements: coordination, communications, and resources.

Coordination. The initial 18 hours of response to the emergency could be characterized as a loosely organized, but relatively effective attempt to minimize the dangers and damage from the spill. As local, county, state, and federal agencies responded, each exercised its own responsibilities independently as liaison was established at the scene. At no time in the initial hours did any agency deem it necessary to "take charge" of the entire response effort. By 8:00 a.m. on January 3, all responding agencies were on scene and had established liaison with the others. A response organization then developed, which, while not without some temporary shortcomings, served as an effec-tive structure throughout the response period. This response organi-zation included the assignment by the OSC of specific areas of re-sponsibility, such as site cleanup, water monitoring, oil recovery, and assistance to water suppliers, to appropriate agencies.2

During the Ashland response, there appeared to be a constant tradeoff between the need to have all response personnel in a single command center, enhancing coordination, and the need to limit the

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CASE HISTORIES 51

number of people present to minimize confusion. A single, very large command post would have enhanced response effectiveness; how-ever, no site for such a center could be located in the first 12 hours, and the locations of the multiple response activities (spill site cleanup, river oil recovery, water supply protection) were widely separated. In retrospect, perhaps an effective future arrangement would be to es-tablish a central command post staffed by personnel responsible for each aspect of the response and separate operations centers for each aspect.

The Region III Regional Contingency Plan states: "The RRT shall be activated automatically in the event of a major or potential major discharge or release," but the RRT was not activated until Monday, January 4, 1988. The RRT could have provided assistance to the responding agencies sooner, had it become involved in the response during the first 24 hours following the spill. It is recommended that the RRT become active as soon as possible after future large spills occur. In addition, the RRT should consider designating an RRT Coordinator to facilitate communications among responding agen-cies. Such an individual could be the liaison between the OSC and developments at emergency operations centers (EOCs).4

Water monitoring coordination and communication suffered ini-tially because no lead agency was assigned. ORSANCO ultimately accepted the lead, but because there was no legal basis for OR-SANCO's role, this was made possible only by an informal agreement of the agencies involved. In the future, the early establishment of a single water monitoring data coordinating agency can serve to im-prove the focus on communications so that efficiency and data rele-vance are optimal. Furthermore, the lead agency can take steps to determine the availability of resources and to standardize analysis among the agencies.

While cooperation among the agencies was high, they operated independently, so that analyses were not standardized. For example, fluorometers were calibrated with different standard solutions, and sample results were quantified in different ways. Naturally, it would be optimal for agencies to use identical measures and procedures to compare analyses. The measurement techniques to be used for spe-cific situations should be standardized. Analytical methods for deter-mining contaminant concentrations should also be standardized. The Organics Detection System (ODS) gas chromatographs were invalu-able in providing on-site analysis with minimal sample turnaround time. GC/MS was used for verification of raw and finished water quality data, and was required by some regulatory agencies before approval was given to water plants to return to operation. Consid-eration should be given to standardizing portable GCs, with sub-sequent GC/MS verification, for incidents of this type.4

Communications. Communications during the initial stages of the incident were very difficult. The fact that all electrical power and communications were immediately shut off at the spill site due to safety considerations contributed to this problem. Even so, the sheer number of agencies involved in an incident of this magnitude would strain any communications system.

Some problems were encountered in reaching RRT members dur-ing off-duty hours. A list of 24-hour phone numbers for RRT mem-bers should be regularly updated and made available to all RRT members. In addition, numbers to newly installed or rented portable phones should be gathered and aggressively disseminated to response groups. Cellular phones are a necessity for rapid, efficient response. If not on hand, temporary rental of these phones is possible through some car rental companies. Backup installation of a large number of phone lines to the command post is essential during a response of this size. Cellular phone use can become a problem if system capacity is exceeded, which may happen in a major disaster. Conventional phone service should be installed as soon as possible. The use of hand-held radios should continue, especially those that allow multiple frequency selection. In addition, use of packaged communications trailers, avail-able through some phone companies and local agencies, should be encouraged.

EPA's and NOAA's electronic mail systems can be efficient mechanisms for communication among RRT members. Each RRT

member should be assigned an E-mail box under each system. For EPA-lead responses an RRT E-mail distribution system should be established at the Regional Response Center in Philadelphia. Such a system can promptly deliver hard copy reports and improve the qual-ity of RRT teleconferences.

River monitoring data, distributed using ORSANCO's electronic bulletin board and direct telephone, was widely used and worked well. Procedures for RRTs to use this system more effectively, or alternately, should be evaluated. Connected to river water utilities, essential data could be distributed via EPA or NO A A E-mail. Util-ities could then provide daily updates on their operations.

Resources. A lack of immediately available resources, such as con-tainment and monitoring equipment, hindered the response to the Ashland oil spill. Federal response equipment is housed in widely separated locations and so was not easily accessible for use. No cur-rent inventories of equipment and resources controlled by govern-mental or industrial entities existed. Delays were caused by the need to locate and transport needed equipment and by the necessity of diverting valuable personnel from actual cleanup efforts to do so.

For example, considerable difficulty was encountered in obtaining fluorometers for spill monitoring. Though quickly identified as a means of tracking, fluorometers were not commercially available. By chance one was found with the proper light wavelength filters for oil-in-water analysis. But when the decision was made to use the instruments in multiple locations (mobile and stationary), no informa-tion was available on appropriate instrument suppliers. More fluo-rometers were eventually located, but by then several days' of data were lost.4

A warehouse of available containment and monitoring equipment in the Pittsburgh area would have been ideal. However, the ware-housing of equipment for emergency responses is not mandated by any local, state, or federal agency; nor is it cost-effective. Inventories of locally available equipment would have assisted emergency re-sponded in quickly locating essential equipment. Such inventories could be developed through a cooperative arrangement among local industries and government.

During the initial days of response, the required turnaround time for water analyses to make critical decisions, could not be met. Later the mobile laboratory reduced this problem, but delays were frus-trating. The ability to provide this information, either through private contracts or mobile analytical laboratories, is important to response efficiency. State or local contingency plans should contain a list of local laboratories certified to perform necessary emergency testing, approved sampling and analysis protocols, and information on the location of contingency water and equipment supplies.

References

1. Baer, G. A., Jr., 1987. Ohio River Navigation System 1987 Statis-tical Supplement. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Cincinnati, Ohio

2. Miklaucic, E. A., 1988. Evaluation of Initial Response to the January 2, 1988, Ashland Oil Spill, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania

3. Saseen, J., 1988. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Federal On-Scene Coordinators report on the Ashland Major Oil Spill, Floreffe, Pennsylvania, January 2 through March 5, 1988

4. Voltaggio, T. C , et al., 1988. Incident Specific Regional Response Team—Ashland Major Oil Spill. Evaluation of the Response to the Major Oil Spill at the Ashland Terminal, Floreffe, Pennsyl-vania. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Region III, Phila-delphia, Pennsylvania

5. Welks, K., et al., 1988. Report of the Investigation into the Col-lapse of Tank 1338. Tank Collapse Task Force, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania

6. Withers, D., 1988. Report by the Floreffe Volunteer Fire Chief on the Ashland Floreffe Site Tank Collapse. January 2, 1988

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