The art of making classes in Serbia: Another particular case of the possible

The art of making classes in Serbia:

Another particular case of the possible

Predrag Cveticanin a,*, Mihaela Popescu b

a Centre for Empirical Cultural Studies of South-East Europe, Serbiab California State University, San Bernandino, USA

Available online 5 November 2011

Abstract

The paper presents a construction of social space in Serbia using multiple correspondence analysis

(MCA) on data from a 2005 national survey based on a probability sample of 1364 interviewees. We discuss

the theoretical and methodological consequences of a different understanding of the principle of capital

composition in comparison with Bourdieu’s research practice. We argue that social capital should be

included not only in the theory of capitals, but also in the construction of social space, and that social capital

and cultural capital should be treated both in terms of their volume (quantity) and in terms of different types

(qualities). In Serbian society, we distinguish between ‘‘local cultural capital’’ and ‘‘global cultural capital’’

and between ‘‘social capital of solidarity’’ and ‘‘political social capital.’’ The results indicate (1) the strong

gravitational pull of the social space – i.e., that social space can be used as a predictive map for cultural

participation, taste, styles of material consumption, identities, attitudes, and political preferences of citizens

of Serbia; and (2) that four theoretical classes can be discerned in social space in Serbia (farmers, workers,

middle classes and higher classes).

# 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction

In Distinction (Bourdieu, 1984) and other works in which he considers the roles played by

different forms of capital in the construction of social space, Bourdieu discusses the shared

features, subtypes and mutual conversion of economic, cultural and social capital (Bourdieu,

1980, 1998; Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992). However, in his empirical research (Bourdieu and de

Saint-Martin, 1976; Bourdieu, 1984, 1996), the concepts of economic and cultural capital

perform the entire analytical work, while social capital disappears from the stage.

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Poetics 39 (2011) 444–468

* Corresponding author.

E-mail addresses: [email protected] (P. Cveticanin), [email protected] (M. Popescu).

0304-422X/$ – see front matter # 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

doi:10.1016/j.poetic.2011.09.006

http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/0304422X

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.poetic.2011.09.006

mailto:[email protected]

mailto:[email protected]

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.poetic.2011.09.006

Two reasons account for the exclusion of social capital from Bourdieu’s construction of social

space. The less important one pertains to his understanding of social capital as a resource that

contributes to the reproduction of social inequalities, a corollary of which is that respondents are

likely to be more reluctant to provide reliable data. The second, more important reason, is that in

contemporary, advanced (capitalist) societies, social capital is a less efficient principle of

differentiation than either economic or cultural capital, and consequently social capital plays a

smaller role in the reproduction and transformation of the social order.

However, in the appendix to the article ‘‘Social Space and Symbolic Space,’’ entitled ‘‘The

‘Soviet’ Variant and Political Capital,’’ Bourdieu (1998) identifies a divergence in the principles

of differentiation active in socialist societies and capitalist societies respectively. In socialist

societies, the blocking of the agency of economic capital expressed as ownership over the means

of production led, on the one hand, to the increased importance of cultural capital and, on the

other, to the appearance of political capital (or, as Bourdieu notes, a ‘‘political type of social

capital’’) as the key principle of differentiation.

Here, we argue that in post-socialist societies social capital has not lost its importance for

understanding the structures of social inequality and it should, therefore, be incorporated into the

construction of social space. Moreover, we maintain that neither social capital nor cultural capital

should be treated as a single resource and exclusively in terms of quantity – that is, volume of a

particular capital, as Bourdieu does. We use two distinct types of social capital (political social

capital and social capital of solidarity) and two distinct types of cultural capital (local and global)

to construct the social space in Serbia.

We hypothesize that in societies that were at some point in history ‘‘Westernized’’ – either

through colonization (e.g., India, China, Indonesia, Mexico, or Algeria) or through the activities of

their own elites (e.g., Serbia, Romania, Russia, or Turkey) – there is a constant tension and struggle

between global and local culture for the status of legitimate culture. In these societies, this tension is

more important than the one between high culture and popular culture. In general, we argue that one

cannot take for granted an equation between high culture and legitimate culture; rather, one has to

identify legitimate culture after studying the field dynamics that are specific to particular national

contexts. We performed this analysis for Serbia in a previous work (Cveticanin and Popescu, 2009),

and we build the present analysis on the basis of our previous conclusions.

The analysis proceeds as follows. First, we discuss the nature of social and cultural capital in

Serbia. Second, after re-conceptualizing the notion of capital, we construct the social space in

Serbia using economic capital and subtypes of social and cultural capital. We demonstrate that the

main opposition previously identified in the field of cultural practices (Cveticanin and Popescu,

2009) – namely, that between global and local culture – also plays an important role in the

constitution of social classes in Serbia. We advance the analysis by showing how patterns of

identities, attitudes and political preferences align in the Serbian social space. Finally, we show that

by considering both differences in the volume and in the composition of capitals, we can reliably

construct four social classes in this social space: farmers, workers, middle classes and upper classes.

2. Social and cultural capital in Serbia

Despite the specificities of the Yugoslav path to socialism1 – the workings of market

mechanisms, the unimpeded operation of small entrepreneurs (petit bourgeoisie), as well as the

P. Cveticanin, M. Popescu / Poetics 39 (2011) 444–468 445

1 See Allcock (2000), Barton et al. (1973), Denitch (1990), and Lazic (1995).

existence of obvious economic differences in society – in Yugoslavia, and likewise in

Serbia,2 political capital was as significant a principle of differentiation as in other socialist

countries.

The key competitors in a struggle to establish the dominant principle of domination in

Yugoslavia were, on the one hand, the party cadres of peasant or working class origins, who were

poorly endowed with cultural capital, but who had carried out the socialist revolution; and, on the

other hand, second-generation members of the nomenklatura3 who had secured their political

positions mainly due to their professional knowledge (technocrats). The struggle between these

groups – the holders of political (social) capital and cultural capital – took place between 1960

and 1990, with variable success on either side.4

The domination of social capital in socialist societies, including Serbia, was also enacted by

the use of personal networks and informal contacts for a variety of purposes – such as to ensure

goods and services in short supply, to find work and secure promotions, to influence official

decisions, or to bypass formal procedures. This use of informal networks in Serbia did not have a

special name, although in other socialist countries terms such as blat in the USSR (Ledeneva,

1998, 2006), guanxi in China (Smart, 1993; Yang, 1994) or załatwyc sprawy in Poland (Wedel,

1986) were invented. These informal practices represent a specific form of non-monetary

exchange, intermediate between commodity exchange and gift giving. Such informal exchanges

of favors and uses of ‘‘connections and acquaintances’’ are based both on personal relationships

and on positions of control over access to public resources.

The series of civil wars along with international isolation and sanctions in the 1990s further

increased the importance of social capital in Serbia. With the dissolution of the monetary system

and the shortage of basic goods, the networks of connections and acquaintances providing a

medium of exchange for goods and services became the only capital worth owning. Similarly, in

proportion to the collapse of official public institutions that enable the order and stability of

everyday life, the importance of political social capital and the relative power of its holders

increased.

Following the change of regime in October of 2000, the formal institutions in Serbia were

slowly restored to their normal functions. The availability of everyday consumption goods made

the role of informal exchange networks unnecessary in this domain, although ‘‘connections and

acquaintances’’ continued to function for securing services that were difficult to obtain through

public institutions (e.g., in the areas of health, education, etc.) or prohibitively expensive in

private ones (e.g., private clinics or private educational establishments). At the same time, under

conditions of mass unemployment and ineffective state service, social capital remained a key

resource in finding work and securing promotion, sidestepping bureaucratic processes or altering

official decisions.5

P. Cveticanin, M. Popescu / Poetics 39 (2011) 444–468446

2 Serbia was the largest of the six republics that comprised the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia until 1991.3 Nomenklatura were elite groups in communist countries, usually appointed by the Community Party leaders

from a list of ‘‘approved names,’’ that held key management positions at all levels (see, e.g., Dogan and Higley,

1998).4 See Gagnon (2004).5 It should be noted that social capital played an important role in the transformation of the political elite into the new

dominant class in post-socialist societies. Even when they were divested of all other means of power, members of the

nomenklatura still had the acquaintance of other important members of society, some of whom owed them favors. During this

period, their former political social capital was transformed and functioned, following our proposed terminology, as social

capital of solidarity.

2.1. Types of social capital in Serbia

We argue that in Serbia there are two types of social networks that may be used as social

capital. We thus differentiate between political social capital (mainly impersonal and

instrumental) and social capital of solidarity (which, in addition to being instrumental, has

important expressive and emotional functions). Social networks represent political social

capital when they link people whose control over access to public resources (goods and services)

enables them to use these resources to satisfy the private needs of other members of these

networks and in this way accumulate power (and acquire access to the resources they do not

control). The sum of these networks represents the parallel, informal structure of power in

Serbian society.6 These positions of control over access to public resources are located in the

political sphere proper (politicians, representatives of the local, regional, and national

governments), but they can also be positions of authority in firms and public institutions (e.g.,

CEOs, deans, and military generals), or positions of expertise in public institutions (e.g.,

doctors, judges, and university professors). In principle, anyone who has control over access to

public resources, no matter how small the advantage conferred, possesses some political social

capital. But just occupying these positions is not enough. Rather, to put political social capital in

motion, the individual has to be willing to participate in the system of exchange of ‘‘favors’’ and

to accept the commitment of returning counter-favors. Unlike the social capital of solidarity, the

favors dispensed as part of the political social capital can go to complete strangers in exchange

for a corresponding counter-favor.7

In contrast, the social capital of solidarity is based on the existence of ‘‘primary ties’’ – social

networks of solidarity among neighbors, friends, relatives, or ‘‘countrymen’’ who can pitch in to

help with money, goods, services or emotional support. The emotional and expressive function of

these social networks is as crucial as the instrumental one. Importantly, however, these social

networks can also be used as capital. Unlike political social capital, which requires a trade-off in the

form of access to previously unavailable resources, the basis for requesting favors by virtue of social

capital of solidarity rests precisely in claiming ‘‘primary ties’’ – that is, being a relative, friend, or a

neighbor.

Note that we distinguish between capital and resources in general. Capital is a special type of

resource. Like any other social resource, capital provides access to valuable goods and other

resources. Capital can be accumulated, transmitted and, under certain circumstances, converted

into another type of capital. Another important characteristic of capitals is that they are field

specific. However, in our view the key feature that distinguishes capitals from other types of

resources is that capitals not only provide specific benefits to individuals and groups, but can also

be used to partially or fully deny those benefits to others. Therefore, we argue that social capital in

the sense proposed by, for example, Putnam (2000), and Putnam and Leonardi (1993) is a social

‘‘glue’’ or citizenship issue, not a form of capital, but simply an important resource.

2.2. Cultural capital in Serbia

A second group of resources that shape social space in Serbia is cultural capital. In a previous

paper (Cveticanin and Popescu, 2009), we demonstrated that two main oppositions structure the


6 See Cveticanin (1997, 2001).7 The fact that political favors can go to total strangers distinguishes political favors from blat relationships and brings

them closer to bribery, although they do not involve monetary exchange.

field of cultural practices in Serbia: the opposition between local and global culture, and the

opposition between traditional culture and contemporary, popular culture.

These forces active in the field of cultural practices in Serbia produce seven types of distinct

cultural practices (see Fig. 1). There are four types of ‘‘pure’’ cultural practices: (1) traditional

folklore cultural practices (instances of traditional local culture); (2) neo-folk cultural practices

(examples of contemporary popular local culture); (3) contemporary global cultural practices or

urban cultural practices (cases of contemporary popular global culture); and (4) traditional elite

cultural practices (occurrences of traditional global culture). Additionally, there are three types

of omnivorous cultural practices, where by ‘‘omnivores’’ we understand those who cross

important cultural boundaries in one (in this case, Serbian) society8: (5) rurban omnivores (who

in their cultural practices cross the boundary between contemporary popular global and

contemporary popular local culture); (6) elite omnivores (who cross the boundary that separates

traditional global elite culture and contemporary popular global culture); and finally (7)

conformist omnivores (who cross both of the important symbolic boundaries in the field of


Fig. 1. Field of cultural practices in Serbia.

8 In the paper ‘‘Understanding Cultural Omnivorousness: Or, the Myth of the Cultural Omnivore,’’ Warde et al. (2007)

point out that there are two definitions of omnivorousness: the definition based on volume and the definition based on

composition. Here, we use the term omnivore closer to the latter definition. However, instead of adopting the a priori

distinction among highbrow, middlebrow and lowbrow genres, the identification of omnivores requires as an initial step –

namely, the identification of cultural boundaries that are considered ‘‘unbreachable’’ in a particular society. Only then can

omnivores be identified as those who cross these symbolic boundaries. This understanding highlights the cultural relativity of

omnivorousness, that is, that it can have different manifestations and different operationalizations in different societies.

cultural styles in Serbia: that between local and global culture and that between traditional and

contemporary popular culture).

In contrast to the French society described by Bourdieu, in Serbia, the basic opposition is not

between highbrow culture and popular culture, and highbrow culture does not automatically entail a

claim to legitimate culture. In Serbia, the main opposition between global and local culture9 enables

the formation of two types of cultural capital – local cultural capital and global cultural capital –

whose proponents struggle to promote their cultural resources as legitimate (see Fig. 1).

Generally speaking,10 cultural activities designated as local culture in Fig. 1 are either related

to rituals connected to important life events or rites of passage – such as births, christenings,

starting school or finishing one’s education, going into the army, marriages, the birth of a child,

divorce and death – or represent a part of everyday entertainment. Therefore, cultural activities at

the local culture pole in Serbia belong to the following types of social contexts: secular or sacral

celebrations (such as slava [a celebration of the family patron saint], christenings, weddings);

concerts, fairs and in kafanas (restaurants), where people sing and dance folk dances (kolo) to the

accompaniment of live music; as well as playing of musical instruments close to the local

tradition, such as the accordion, violin, trumpet, and in rural areas, bagpipes, frula and kaval

(both a sort of pipe that people in the villages make themselves). Among the institutions that

support and celebrate this local culture in contemporary Serbian society are the Serbian Orthodox

Church and, in particular, privately owned media.

Aesthetically, local culture in Serbia is based on traditional folk culture, but currently it also

includes contemporary elite and popular cultural forms based on folk culture. A particularly

important indicator of belonging to local culture is a preference for folk music in its different

forms (traditional folk music, newly composed folk music, turbo-folk). Additional indicators are

preferences for Serbian family television series – in particular, those that deal with life in the

villages, as well as a preference for a particular genre of popular Serbian television sitcoms

portraying the lives and troubles of the ‘‘little guy.’’ It is important to note, as a matter of course in

Serbia, that this type of aesthetic membership in local culture is often equated with membership

in lower social classes or with the status of the parvenu.

On the other hand, at the pole of the global culture we encounter participation in global

highbrow art forms such as theater, ballet, and opera – as well as the consumption of products of

global popular culture, such as jazz, blues, rock, hip-hop, and techno. After initial resistance in

the 1950s, modernization tendencies and the pro-Western orientation of Yugoslav socialism

resulted in the acceptance of genres such as jazz and rock n roll as legitimate forms of cultural

production, while the terms ‘‘mass culture’’ and ‘‘kitsch’’ continued to be associated with newly

composed folk music and local soap operas. Other stereotypical associations with global culture

in Serbia include: the use of the standard linguistic variety; knowledge of and use of foreign

languages; university education; knowledge of history and of the norms of the global elite and

popular culture; an ability to play ‘‘bourgeois’’ musical instruments, such as the piano, or

contemporary instruments such as the electric guitar; a high level of literacy in information

technology. In general, global culture is acquired and promoted mainly through the educational

system. To reiterate, association with the pole of global culture is a constitutive part of the social

identity of upper social classes.


9 The multiple correspondence analysis (MCA) used to construct the field of cultural styles in Cveticanin and Popescu

(2009) showed that the first axis (explaining 77.28% variance) distinguished between global and local culture, while the

second axis (explaining 8.96% variance) distinguished between traditional culture and contemporary popular culture.10 See Cveticanin (2003, 2007).

3. Data and variables

The present study is part of a larger project to reconstruct the Serbian social space and field of

lifestyles based on data from the survey ‘‘Cultural Needs, Habits and Taste of Citizens of Serbia

and Macedonia’’ conducted on a national proportional probability sample of 1364 interviewees.

The fieldwork was conducted from October to December 2005. Of the planned 1485 respondents

in Serbia, 91.9% participated in the survey.

We relied on both approaches to Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA) as outlined in

Lebart et al. (1984). Because in our previous paper (Cveticanin and Popescu, 2009) we presented

results of the application of the ‘‘reciprocal approach,’’ in this paper we will present only results

that directly pertain to the construction and analysis of social space in Serbia. We used indicators

of economic capital and two types of cultural and social capital as active variables.

We operationalized economic capital (Table 1) with five indicators: (1) average monthly

income of the respondent’s household per household member; (2) size of respondent’s dwelling

(if owner); (3) size of respondent’s summer house/cottage (if any); (4) amount of land owned by

respondent (if any); (5) the value of the respondent’s car (if any).

Cultural capital (Table 2) was operationalized using four indicators: (1) respondent’s

education; (2) respondent’s mother’s education; (3) respondent’s father’s education; (4)

respondent’s musical taste.11

We relied on four indicators of social capital (Table 3). The first two represent political-social

capital in a narrow sense: (1) respondent’s membership in a political party; (2) respondent’s

involvement in party leadership at the local, regional or national level.12 The third indicator

showed (3) whether the respondent had access to informal networks for favor exchange in state

institutions. In the absence of a better indicator of social capital of solidarity, we relied on (4)

responses to questions regarding whether respondents enjoyed attending family celebrations and

whether they maintained primary network ties, which is a prerequisite for using these ties as a

form of social capital.

We projected onto the social space constructed in the above manner, indicators of cultural

practices,13 styles of material consumption and worldviews, identities and political preferences

as supplementary variables.


11 In 2005, we did not have a clear understanding of the existence of subtypes of cultural and social capital, identified in

subsequent data analyses. In order to make it possible for these differences to reveal themselves in the construction of

social space, we used indicators that, in the original research, were not designed to were not designed to operationalize

subtypes of cultural and social capital. For cultural capital, we used as an indicator the response to the question relating to

favorite musical genre. For social capital of solidarity, we used the response to the question relating to whether

respondents enjoyed attending family celebrations – i.e., whether they maintained primary network ties, a prerequisite for

using these ties as a form of social capital.12 Members of party leadership make up 4% of our sample, so we gave a lot of thought to the issue of including them in

the analysis. What tipped the scales in the end was that these people represent a part of the field of power in Serbia that is

certainly ‘‘populated’’ by a small number of people. In order to assess the stability of the social space constructed, we

included in the analysis a further 21 members of party leadership from a study we had conducted in 2006 using the same

questionnaire, thus raising their participation in the sample to 5%. A repeated analysis resulted in a map nearly identical to

the map of social space presented in Fig. 2.13 Under the term ‘‘cultural practices,’’ we conceived of a ‘‘block’’ of inter-connected elements comprising cultural

needs (motivation for participating in cultural activities); cultural habits (actual participation in cultural activities); taste

(preferences); knowledge of cultural issues and cultural possessions (cultural equipment, books, paintings, musical

instruments, etc.). See Reckwitz (2002).


Table 2

Distribution of indicators of cultural capital.

Variable, categories and map codes % Variable, categories and

map codes

%

(1) Respondent’s education (3) Father’s education

Elementary school or less (Self: �elem. sch.) 13.64 Elementary school or less

(Pa: �elem. sch.)

38.34

High school (Self: high sch.) 56.52 High school (Pa: high sch.) 42.52

College (Self: college) 12.17 College (Pa: college) 7.62

Graduate education (Self: BA+) 15.47 Graduate education (Pa: BA+) 9.38

Missing 2.20 Missing 2.13

100% 100%

(2) Mother’s education (4) Taste

Elementary school or less (Ma: �elem. sch.) 50.51 Folklore taste (FOLKLORE) 22.87

High school (Ma: high sch.) 36.95 Rurban omnivores

(RURBAN OMNIVORES)

36.58

College (Ma: college) 4.77 Urban taste (URBAN) 9.38

Graduate education (Ma: BA+) 5.79 Conventional taste

(CONVENTIONAL)

28.74

Missing 1.98 Elite taste (ELITE) 1.98

Missing 0.44

100% 100%

Table 1

Distribution of indicators of economic capital.

Variable, categories and map codes % Variable, categories and map codes %

(1) Family income per capita (4) Land size

Less than 50 EUR (I: �50 EUR) 19.65 No land (Land 0) 69.79

50–100 EUR (I: 50–100 EUR) 28.30 Up to 2 ha (Land �2) 12.24

101–250 EUR (I: 100–250 EUR) 37.10 2–10 ha (Land 2–10) 15.84

More than 250 EUR (I: 250+ EUR) 11.44 10+ ha (Land 10+) 1.98


100% 100%

(2) Size of house/flat (5) Cost of car

No house/flat (Flat 0) 10.85 No car (Car 0) 53.96

Up to 50 m2 (Flat �50) 14.30 Up to 1000 EUR (Car �1000) 18.18

51–75 m2 (Flat 51–75) 25.22 1001–5000 EUR (Car 1000–5000) 21.33

76–100 m2 (Flat 76–100) 23.83 5000+ EUR (Car 5000+) 6.45

100+ m2 (Flat 100+) 23.75 Missing 0.07

Missing 2.05

100% 100%

(3) Size of summer cottage

No cottage (Cottage 0) 81.31

Up to 50 m2 (Cottage �50) 7.04

51–100 m2 (Cottage 51–100) 5.65

100+ m2 (Cottage 100+) 6.01

Missing 0.00

100%

We used 26 variables as indicators of cultural practices: five indicators of cultural needs, six

indicators of cultural habits, eleven indicators of taste, two indicators of ownership of cultural

goods and two indicators of cultural knowledge. For indicators of style of material consumption,

we relied on 6 variables: indicators of the quality of respondents’ home equipment and indicators

pertaining to shopping for clothes and going away for a vacation (Table 4). To show how our

constructed social space organizes worldviews, identities and political preferences, we used eight

indicators (Table 5).

Finally, to demonstrate that our constructed social space, which uses both volume and

types of capitals, can be used to identify theoretical social classes, we constructed two

variables for respondents’ occupation and social class. First, we used respondents’

occupation – measured in the survey with a scale of 27 occupations – to construct nine basic

groups of occupations on the basis of the type and volume of resources used by respondents

in work and life strategies. Care was also taken to ensure that respondents who belong to each

of the nine have comparable levels of education and income and that their work conditions

are also comparable. These nine occupational groups include: (1) farmers; (2) unskilled and

semiskilled workers; (3) highly skilled workers; (4) lower-level experts; (5) clerks and lower

management; (6) small entrepreneurs; (7) experts; (8) big entrepreneurs, CEOs and upper

management; and (9) politicians and high ranking military and police officers. Second, after

showing how these occupations map onto our social space, we constructed four theoretical

social classes. (The frequency of each occupation and class in the sample will be displayed in

the respective maps.)

4. Results and analysis

In order to construct the Serbian social space, we employed multiple correspondence

analysis, or MCA (Greenacre, 2007; Le Roux and Rouanet, 2010; Le Roux et al., 2008; Lebart

et al., 1984). We used specific MCA (Le Roux and Rouanet, 2010), with the ‘‘missing’’

categories as passive categories of the active variables. We use indicators of economic (21

modalities), cultural (17 modalities) and social capital (10 modalities) as active variables. Table

6 shows the eigenvalues and variances explained by the first 5 axes. Data were analyzed using

SPAD 7.3.


Table 3

Distribution of indicators of social capital.

Variable, categories and map codes % Variable, categories and map codes %

(1) Party membership (3) Access to informal networks for favors

Party members (Party+) 11.58 No connections (Connect 0) 39.88

Not party members (Party�) 86.95 Connections score between 1 and 4 (Connect+) 36.00

Missing 1.47 Connections score between 5 and 10 (Connect++) 23.83

Missing 0.29

100% 100%

(2) Party leadership (4) Access to ‘‘primary ties’’ networks

Party leaders (Party Leader+) 3.52 Enjoys family gatherings (Family+) 60.85

Not party leaders (Party Leader�) 96.26 Neither enjoy, nor dislike (Family+/�) 24.78

Missing 0.22 Dislike family gatherings (Family�) 10.04

Missing 4.33

100% 100%

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Table 4

Distribution of cultural styles and material consumption indicators.

Modalities and map codes % Modalities and map codes % Modalities and map codes %

(1) Like going to theater (12) Like traditional folk (23) # books in home library

Yes (LikeTheater+) 34.09 Yes (Folk+) 56.01 Over 200 (Lib 200+) 15.91

Neutral (LikeTheater+�) 23.90 Neutral (Folk+�) 21.19 26–199 (Lib 26–199) 43.55

No (LikeTheater��) 37.46 No (Folk��) 17.52 Less than 25 (Lib <25) 38.05

Missing 4.55 Missing 5.28 Missing 2.49

(2) Like going to art galleries (13) Like newly composed folk (24) Types of cultural equipment

Yes (LikeArtGal+) 19.50 Yes (NewFolk+) 36.66 Lux (CultE++) 21.48

Neutral (LikeArtGal+�) 25.37 Neutral (NewFolk+�) 20.53 Standard (CultE+) 37.83

No (LikeArtGal��) 49.78 No (NewFolk��) 37.76 Basic (CultE) 40.69


(3) Like doing art (14) Like turbo folk (25) # correct answers to local culture

questions

Yes (LikeArt+) 14.15 Yes (TurboFolk+) 23.83 0 (local: 0ans) 8.65

Neutral (LikeArt+�) 14.66 Neutral (TurboFolk+�) 18.84 1–4 (Local: 1–4ans) 54.55

No (LikeArtGal��) 65.10 No (TurboFolk��) 51.83 5–8 (Local: 5+ans) 27.79


(4) Like going to sport events (15) Like easy listening music (26) # correct answers to global culture

questions

Yes (LikeSportEvent+) 29.99 Yes (EasyLis+) 58.50 0 (Global: 0 ans) 43.48

Neutral (LikeSportEvent+�) 18.99 Neutral (EasyLis+�) 20.16 1–4 (Global: 1–4 ans) 38.71

No (LikeSportEvent��) 46.26 No (EasyLis��) 15.98 5–8 (Global: 5+ ans) 8.80


(5) Like going to family events (16) Like classical music (27) Types of home equipment

Yes (LikeFam+) 60.85 Yes (Classics+) 27.42 Lux (HomeEquip: Lux) 10.56

Neutral (LikeFam+/�) 24.78 Neutral (Classics+�) 25.59 Standard (HomeEquip: Std) 39.08

No (LikeFam�) 10.04 No (Classics��) 42.01 Basic (HomeEquip: Basic) 50.37


(6) Went to theater past yr (17) Like jazz and blues (28) Freq. buying cloths abroad

Often (GoTheater++) 9.53 Yes (JazzBlues+) 25.59 Often (DressAbroad++) 2.27

Some (GoTheater+) 19.79 Neutral (JazzBlues+�) 20.60 Some (DressAbroad+) 15.62

No (GoTheater��) 68.70 No (JazzBlues��) 48.90 None (DressAbroad 0) 74.93


P.

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Po

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9 (2

01

1)

44

4–4

68

45

4

Table 4 (Continued )

Modalities and map codes % Modalities and map codes % Modalities and map codes %

(7) Went to art galleries past yr (18) Like rock (29) Freq. buying cloths at flea market

Often (GoArtGal++) 8.21 Yes (RockPop+) 44.28 Often (DressFlea++) 33.43

Some (GoArtGal+) 17.01 Neutral (RockPop+�) 15.84 Some (DressFlea+) 40.18

No (GoArtGal��) 73.09 No (RockPop��) 35.70 None (DressFlea 0) 22.29


(8) Went to sport events past yr (19) Like ‘‘dance and house’’ music (30) Freq. went on holidays (last 5 yrs)

Often (GoSportEvent++) 19.57 Yes (DanceHouse+) 24.34 Often (Holidays++) 18.18

Some (GoSportEvent+) 20.16 Neutral (DanceHouse+�) 15.91 Some (Holidays+) 33.87

No (GoSportEvent��) 58.36 No (DanceHouse��) 54.99 None (Holidays 0) 46.70


(9) Hours of TV in weekends (20) Like techno (31) Lodging while on holiday

More than 5 h (TV++) 9.90 Yes (Techno+) 12.32 Hotel (Hotels) 12.76

1–5 h (TV+) 71.55 Neutral (Techno+�) 13.27 Bed & Breakfast (B&B) 37.90

Less than 1 hr (TV��) 14.66 No (Techno��) 69.57 Didn’t go on holiday 48.24


(10) Freq. of internet use (21) Like hip-hop (32) Holiday destinations

Heavy (Internet++) 16.06 Yes (HipHop+) 8.21 Abroad (Abroad) 19.43

Low (Internet+) 24.56 Neutral (HipHop+�) 13.20 Local (Country) 31.52

None (Internet��) 53.45 No (HipHop��) 72.87 Didn’t go on holiday 46.33


(11) # of books read past yr (22) Like heavy metal

Over 8 (Books 8+) 13.93 Yes (HeavyMetal+) 9.90

1–7 (Books 1–7) 38.56 Neutral (HeavyMetal+�) 11.73

None (Books 0) 43.91 No (HeavyMetal��) 73.61


4.1. Social space of Serbia

Because of space limitations, we discuss only the plane defined by the first two axes (see

Fig. 2).14 Table 7 presents the contribution of the active modalities on the two axes.

Axis 1 – which explains the greatest part of the total variance, just as in Bourdieu’s model –

expresses the total volume of capital. As illustrated in Fig. 2, axis 1 distinguishes between high


Table 5

Distribution of worldview variables.

Modalities and map codes % Modalities and map codes %

(1) Self-identification (same codes in maps) (5) Attitudes toward privatization

ID: man/woman 23.09 In favor (PrivateEc+) 28.96

ID: family 59.38 Neutral (PrivateEc+/�) 21.70

ID: occupation 1.91 Opposed (PrivateEc�) 47.21

ID: party 0.73 Missing 2.13

ID: inhabitant/local 1.03 100%

ID: inhabitant/region 0.44 (6) President vote

ID: nation 3.23 Tadic (Vote: Tadic) 39.15

ID: religion 1.98 Nikolic (Vote: Nikolic) 13.78

ID: race 0.15 Didn’t vote for president (Pres: No vote) 35.26

ID: citizen 0.44 Missing 11.80

ID: Balkan 0.59 100%

ID: European 1.32 (7) Party vote

ID: Cosmopolitan 1.83 DS (Vote DS) 22.14

ID: Other 0.07 G17+ (Vote G17+) 2.13

Missing 3.81 LDP (Vote LDP) 1.32

100% DSS (Vote DSS) 3.74

(2) Attitudes toward abortion SRS (Vote SRS) 10.78

In favor (Abortion+) 50.59 SPS (Vote SPS) 2.05

Neutral (Abortion+/�) 15.10 Didn’t vote for a party (Party: No vote) 41.72

Opposed (Abortion�) 32.62 Missing 16.13

Missing 1.69 100%

100%

(3) Attitudes toward homosexual marriage (8) Score on nationalism scale

In favor (Homosex+) 12.39 Score below 15 (Nationalism 1) 16.72

Neutral (Homosex+/�) 11.36 Score 16–20 (Nationalism 2) 18.70

Opposed (Homosex�) 74.49 Score 21–25 (Nationalism 3) 19.50

Missing 1.76 Score 26–30 (Nationalism 4) 13.64

100% Score above 31 (Nationalism 5) 11.66

Missing 19.79

(4) Well-being of the nation more important

than individual well-being

100%

Yes (Nation+) 28.67

Neither, nor (Nation+/�) 28.01

No (Nation�) 40.76

Missing 2.57

100%

14 As shown in Table 6, social space in Serbia is organized along three axes. The first one accounts for 62.11%, the

second for 10.34%, and the third one for 8.20% of the variance. The total cumulative modified weight of the first three

axes is 81%. The third axis systematically separated the extreme values of capital (minimum and maximum values) at one

pole and averages of all types and subtypes of capital values at the other pole.

total volume of capital (on the left – marked TVC++) and low total volume of capital (on the right

– marked TVC��). High volume of capital is indicated by monthly family income per

household member of over 250 EUR (I: 250 EUR+); apartment/house of over 100 m2 (Flat

100+); summer/weekend house/cottage of over 100 m2 (cottage 100+); university education of


57.057.0-

-2.25

-1.50

-0.75

0.75

Axis 1: 62.11%

Axis 2: 10. 3%

Self:<=elem. sch.

Ma: hig h sch .

FOLKLORE

I: 250+ EUR

Flat 0

Flat 100 +

Cottage 100 +

Land 0

Land 2-1 0

Car1000-500 0

Car 500 0+

Party+

Party Leader+

Connect0

Connect++

Self: BA+

Ma: <=elem. sch.

Ma: college

'Ma: BA+

Pa: <=elem. sch.

Pa: high sch.

Pa: collegePa: BA+

RURBAN OMNIV.

URBAN

CONVENTIONAL

ELITE

I: <=5 0 EUR

I: 50-100 EUR

I: 100 -250 EUR Cottage 0

Cottage 51-10 0 Land <= 2

Family +

Family+/-

Family -

Party-

Flat<=50

TVC--TVC++

LCC

GCC EC--

EC++PSC

SCS1

43

2

bisector II

bisector I

Fig. 2. Map of social space of Serbia.

Table 6

Eigenvalues, raw and modified inertia for the first five axes.

Axes 1 2 3 4 5

Eigenvalues (l) 0.2329 0.1484 0.1401 0.1030 0.0968

Raw inertia 9.11% 5.81% 5.48% 4.03% 3.95%

Modified inertia 62.11% 10.34% 8.20% 2.39% 2.21%

both parents (MA: BA+, PA: BA+) and of the respondent him/herself (Self: BA+); a large number

of active ties in public institutions (Connect++); membership in a political party (Party+); and

membership in the leadership of a political party (Party Leader+). Low volume of capital is

indicated by a concentration of modalities representing minimal values for all indicators:

monthly family income of under 50 EUR per capita (I: �50 EUR); apartment/house smaller than

50 m2 (Flat �50 m2); no ownership of a car, summer/weekend house/cottage or land (Car 0,

Cottage 0 and Land 0); primary and lower level of education of both respondent and respondent’s


Table 7

Active categories in the construction of social space: Contributions (in %) to the first 2 axes (in bold, contributions of

categories selected for the interpretation of each axis).

Contributions (in %) Contributions (in %)

Axis 1 Axis 2 Axis 1 Axis 2

(1) Family income per capita (7) Mother’s education

I: �50 EUR 4.00 0.20 Ma: �elem. sch. 7.74 1.47

I: 50–100 EUR 0.99 0.02 Ma: high sch. 4.18 1.86

I: 100–250 EUR 1.54 0.93 Ma: college 1.61 0.06

I: 250+ EUR 3.82 2.26 Ma: BA+ 4.00 0.00

10.35 3.40 17.53 3.39

(2) Size of house/flat (8) Father’s education

Flat 0 0.32 3.47 Pa: �elem. sch. 10.38 1.56

Flat �50 0.92 1.39 Pa: high sch. 1.85 1.06

Flat 51–75 0.00 0.43 Pa: college 1.82 0.06

Flat 76–100 0.00 0.27 Pa: BA+ 5.88 0.00

Flat 100+ 0.27 5.70 19.93 2.68

1.51 11.26 (9) Taste

(3) Size of summer cottage FOLKLORE 10.22 2.34

Cottage 0 0.14 0.94 RURBAN OMNIVORES 0.01 0.06

Cottage �50 0.02 0.00 URBAN 2.48 0.96

Cottage 51–100 0.03 1.29 CONVENTIONAL 2.85 1.09

Cottage 100+ 1.12 6.45 ELITEa – –

1.31 8.69 15.56 4.45

(4) Land size (10) Party membership

Land 0 0.26 5.26 Party+ 1.44 12.21

Land 2–10 0.58 1.46 Party� 0.19 1.59

Land 10+ 0.20 11.71 1.64 13.81

1.05 18.43 (11) Party leadership

(5) Cost of car Party Leader+ 1.26 14.13

Car 0 1.39 3.27 Party Leader� 0.05 0.50

Car �1000 0.06 0.06 1.31 14.63

Car 1000–5000 1.18 3.40 (12) Access to informal networks

Car 5000+ 3.45 2.17 Connect 0 3.17 1.60

6.08 8.90 Connect+ 0.01 0.21

(6) Respondent’s education Connect++ 4.68 4.94

Self: �elem. sch. 8.81 1.69 7.86 6.75

Self: high sch. 0.01 0.52 (13) Access to ‘‘primary ties’’

Self: college 0.46 0.06 Family+ 0.32 0.51

Self: BA+ 5.34 0.00 Family+/� 0.16 0.78

14.62 2.27 Family� 0.78 0.03

1.25 1.32

a Passive category. Used for illustrative purposes only.

parents (MA: �elem. sch; PA: �elem. sch, Self: �elem. sch); lack of ties in state institutions

(Connect 0) and no membership in a political party (Party�) and, therefore, in party leadership

(Party Leader�).

When we draw the angle bisector through origin at 458 in relation to both Axes 1 and 2, we see

that plotted along bisector I are mainly indicators of social capital. Indicators of economic

capital are located in their vicinity. In the first quadrant of the map of social space in Serbia (top

right corner), we find a concentration of both low values of indicators of economic capital and

lack of indicators of political social capital (such as party membership and party leadership

membership or ties in state bodies), but also positive indicators of the social capital of solidarity

(Family+).

Conversely, in the third quadrant of the map (the lower left corner), plotted along bisector I

are indicators of political social capital (membership of political parties, membership of party

leadership, and a large number of ‘‘connections and acquaintances’’ in public institutions).

Also located in the vicinity of this axis are high values of economic capital indicators (such as

a large apartment or summer/weekend house/cottage, an expensive car and high family

income).

Similarly, when we draw the angle bisector through origin at 458 that passes through the

second quadrant (top left corner) and fourth quadrant (the lower right corner), we find indicators

of global cultural capital concentrated in the second quadrant (graduate education of respondents

and their parents and elite and urban taste), and indicators of low education of respondents and

their parents and folklore and rurban taste (in quadrant four).

This result strongly supports the idea that both volume and type of capital should be used when

constructing social space. In his research papers, Bourdieu treats capital composition as a relative

preponderance of economic or cultural capital. However, the results of the above analyses

suggest that we should also consider different types (qualities) of capitals, such as ‘‘local cultural

capital’’ and ‘‘global cultural capital’’ for cultural capital, and ‘‘social capital of solidarity’’ and

‘‘political social capital’’ for social capital. Our map of social space thus constructed indicates the

existence of different bases (resources) for social grouping in Serbia and therefore different

strategies available to these different groups.

This can be clearly seen when indicators of cultural practices and material style of

consumption (Fig. 3) and respondent worldviews and political preferences (Fig. 4) are

superimposed onto this map as supplementary variables.

4.2. Types of cultural practices and styles of material consumption

The second step is to test whether the social space constructed above can be used as a

‘‘predictive map’’ (Lebart et al., 1984) when it comes to types of cultural practices and styles of

material consumption in Serbia. To do so, we project onto it indicators of cultural practices and

material consumption as supplementary variables. These variables have 60 modalities (see

Fig. 3).

As Fig. 3 confirms, the angle bisector axis stretching from quadrant 4 (lower right corner) to

quadrant 2 (top left corner) is the axis that discriminates between local cultural capital (bottom

right corner, marked LCC) and global cultural capital (top left corner, marked GCC).15 In

quadrant 2, below this angle bisector axis and next to Axis 1, we find indicators characteristic of


15 This axis corresponds to Axis 1 in Fig. 1.

traditional elite cultural practices: frequent visits to the theater and art galleries (GoTheater++,

GoArtGallery++); large home libraries (Library 200+); and intensive use of the computer and

Internet (Internet++). Above this group of modalities, also in the second quadrant of the map,

plotted along the bisector axis we find indicators of the cultural practices of elite omnivores and

global urban cultural practices. Once again, in their cultural practices elite omnivores cross the

boundary that separates traditional global elite culture and global contemporary popular culture.

Their cultural practices are identified by indicators such as highest level of knowledge related to

global culture (Global: Ans 5+); a large number of books read in the twelve months before the

survey (Books 8+); and an affinity for classical music, but also jazz and blues, rock and pop


0.15.05.0-0.1-

-0.50

-0.25

0.25

Axis 1

Axis 2

LikeTheater+

LikeTheater--

LikeArtGal +

LikeArtGal +/-

LikeArtGal --

LikeClass ical+

LikeClass ical +/-

LikeClass ical- -

LikeRockJazz +

LikeRockJazz +/-

LikeRockJazz --

LikeFolk+

LikeFolk +/-

LikeFolk--

LikeBooks+

LikeBoo ks--

LikeArt +/-

LikeArt--LikeSportE vent+

LikeSportEvent +/-

LikeSportEvent--

LikePlaySport+

LikePlaySport--

LikeFamEvent+

LikeFamEvent +/-

LikeFamEvent--

GoTheater++

GoTheater--

GoConcert++

GoConcert+

GoConcert--

GoArtGal++

GoArtGal+

GoArtGal--

GoLibrary++

GoLibrary+

GoLibrary--

GoS portEvent++

GoSportE vent+

GoSportEvent--

TV>5

TV1-5

PC++

PC+

PC--

Internet++

Internet+

Internet--

Books8+

Books1-7

Books0

Folk+

Folk--

NewFolk+

NewFolk +/-

NewFolk--

TurboFolk+

TurboFol k +/-

TurboFolk--

EasyLis +/-

Class ics+

Class ics--

JazzBlues+

JazzBlues--

RockPop+

RockPop +/-

RockPop--

DanceHouse--

Techno+HipHop+

HeavyMetal +

Lib200+Lib26-19 9

Lib<25

CultE++

CultE

HomeE++

HomeE+

HomeE

DressA++

Dress A+

Dress A0

Dress F++

Dress F+

Dress F0

Holi day++

Holi day+

Holi day0

Hotel

B&B Holi day0

Abroad

Holi day0

LCC

GCC EC--

EC++PSC

SCS

1

43

2

TVC--TVC++

Fig. 3. Cultural practices and material consumption projected on the social space (zoomed around the map center).

music, dance/house and techno music. The global urban cultural practices, on the other hand,

remain within the confines of contemporary popular culture and are expressed in terms of

preferences for contemporary forms of global pop culture, such as techno, dance/house, heavy

metal, and a dislike of contemporary forms of local popular culture, such as newly composed folk

music (NewFolk��) or turbo-folk music (TurboFolk��).


-0.75

0.75

-2.25

-1.50

-0.75

0.75

Axis 1

Axis 2

ID: occup ation

ID: party

ID: inhabitant/localID: inhabitant/regio

ID: nation

ID: religion

ID: race

ID: citizen

ID: BalkanID: Europe an

ID: Cosmopoli tan

Abortion+

Abortion-

Homosex+

Homosex-Nation+

Nation-

PrivateEc+PrivateEc-

Vote: Tadic

Vote: Nik olic

Pres: No vote

Vote DS

Vote G17+

Vote LDP

Vote DSSVote SRS

Vote SPS

Party: No voteNationalism 1

Nationalism 4

Nationalism 5

LCC

GCC EC--

EC++PSC

SCS

1

43

2

TVC--TVC++

Fig. 4. Identities, attitudes and political preferences.

In the central part of the map, we find indicators of two other groups of omnivores:

rurban16 omnivores (who cross the boundary between popular global and popular local

culture), and conformist omnivores (who cross both of the important symbolic boundaries in

the field of cultural practices in Serbia: that between local and global culture, and that

between traditional and contemporary popular culture). The latter group of modalities is

characterized by knowledge pertaining to both local (Local: Ans 5–8) and global culture

(Global: Ans 1–4); possession of slightly smaller home libraries (Library 26–199) and a

smaller number of books read in the year preceding the survey (Books 1–7). In the taste

domain, the conformist omnivores are characterized by a parallel affinity for classical music

(although not a marked one, Classic+�); an affinity for folk music singers of the older

generation; and a marked affinity for easy listening music, which is a distinctive preference of

this group (EasyListening++).

Rurban omnivores share many of the above-mentioned features in the field of cultural

consumption; however, in the taste domain, they display a mixture of products of global and

local culture, genres (techno and dance/house on the one hand and turbo-folk on the other)

and singers, DJs and bands that are typically treated as discordant. Further down this axis

(quadrant 4), we find the two remaining types that we have identified in the field of cultural

practices (Fig. 1). Indicators characteristic of these styles display an affinity for original folk

music (Folk+), as well as an affinity for the already-mentioned singers of the older generation

(for carriers of the traditional folk style), for neo-folk music (NewFolk+) and turbo-folk

music (TurboFolk+) and turbo-folk performers (such as Ceca Raznatovic and Jelena

Karleusa). Indicators also include a preference for family television drama produced in

Serbia, in particular drama depicting rural life, as well as a preference for a specific type of

popular Serbian television sitcoms. These styles are also characterized by a low level of

knowledge pertaining to both elite and popular global culture (Global: Ans 0); small home

libraries or no books in the home (Lib <25); absence of reading as a leisure activity (Book 0);

and a dislike of elite and popular global genres (Classics��; Jazz/Blues��; Rock/Pop��;

Dance/House��).

Along the second inserted axis, we find mainly indicators of material consumption.

The segment of social space characterized by a high level of economic capital and

possession of political social capital (quadrant 3) also displays conspicuous material

consumption: summer/winter holidays abroad (HolidaysAbroad); vacation accommodation

exclusively in hotels (Hotels); shopping for clothes abroad (DressAbroad); luxurious home

equipment (HomeEquip: Lux) and cultural equipment (CultE++). Along bisector II, the

leisure activities most often mentioned are sports-related activities (LikeSportEvent++,

GoSportEvent++).

At the opposite pole of bisector II, we find indicators that point to no summer/winter vacation

travel (Holidays 0); shopping for clothing at the flea market (DressFlea++); ownership of basic

home equipment (HomeEquip: Basic) and basic cultural equipment (CultE). In between the two

poles, close to the map center, we find the mean values of indicators of material consumption,

such as ownership of a standard set of home equipment and cultural equipment (HomeEqup: Std


16 Rurban cultural practices represent a mixture of global popular cultural practices and local popular cultural practices.

The social carriers of these ‘‘neither-urban-nor-rural’’ cultural practices are mainly members of the second and third

generation migrants to cities in the course of rapid urbanization. Regarding this phenomenon of the peasant urbanities, see

also Simic and Hammel (1973).

and Cult. E+); summer/winter holiday travel within Serbia (Country) in B&Bs and camps

(B&B).

4.3. Social space and identities, attitudes and political preferences

The third step was to find out how particular patterns of identities, political

preferences and stands on social issues corresponded to our constructed social space. For

this purpose, we projected the eight indicators of worldviews, identities and political

preferences onto the social space (as supplementary variables). These indicators have 38

modalities.

As indicated in Fig. 4, high volume of total capital correlates with self-identification

as ‘‘European’’ (ID: European) or ‘‘citizen of the world’’ (ID: Cosmopolitan). The

respondents richest in cultural capital identified themselves as ‘‘Other’’ rather than with any

of the pre-defined answers we offered them (ID: Other), while respondents with political

social capital listed their political party as the most important basis for identification (ID:

Party). In this area of social space close to the pole of high total volume of capital, we

encounter indicators of positive attitudes toward the privatization of state property

(PrivateEc+); women’s right to abortion (Abortion+); and the right to marriage of adult

homosexuals (Homosex+); as well as the lowest scores on the nationalism scale (Nationalism

1). Therefore, the inhabitants of this area of the Serbian social space should be identified as

liberal. Those closer to the pole of global cultural capital (quadrant 2) support the Liberal-

Democratic Party (Vote LDP), a party whose members are mostly young people rich in

cultural capital, with a pro-Western orientation – a party that might be considered an example

of the ‘‘cultural left’’ in Serbia. On the other hand, the respondents from this same area of the

social space with high total volume of capital, but closer to the pole where indicators of high

economic capital and political social capital are located (quadrant 3), support G17+ (Vote

G17+), a party that developed from a think-tank expert organization (G17) and that promoted

a libertarian ideology and the interests of entrepreneurs and technocrats in its subsequent

political program.

On the right of the social spacewe find an exact opposite in ideological orientation: identification

with family (ID: family), traditional gender roles (ID: man/woman) and the nation (ID: nation).

This area of the social space is also characterized by a negative attitude toward the privatization of

state property (PrivateEc�) and the right of adult homosexuals to marriage (Homosex�), as well as

a negative (Abortion�) or ambivalent (Abortion+�) attitude toward women’s right to abortion. To

the right of Axis 1, which indicates a decrease in the total range of capital, we observe high scores on

the nationalism scale (Nationalism 3 and Nationalism 4), while the highest score on this scale in

social space (Nationalism 5) is located slightly lower, closer to the local cultural capital pole.

The dominant worldview in this area of social space (lower right hand corner) could be described as

conservative. Here, we find the voters of the Socialist Party of Serbia (Vote SPS) and the Serbian

Radical Party (Vote SRS), the main proponents of nationalistic politics and civil wars in the former

Yugoslavia in the 1990s. People who voted for Tomislav Nikolic (SRS candidate for president in

2005) are also to the right of the social space.

Closer to the central part of social space, an area characterized by average values of total

capital and a preponderance of conformist omnivores and rurban omnivores, we find self-

identification with the place of residence (inhabitant/region and inhabitant/local); religion (ID:

religion); and the Balkans as a geographical and cultural area (ID: Balkan). The central area of

the social space clusters ambivalent attitudes toward the privatization of state property


(PrivateEC+�) and toward the right of adult homosexuals to marriage (Homosex+�).

Interestingly, here we also find the electoral base of the Democratic Party (Vote: DS) and the

Democratic Party of Serbia (Vote: DSS), which formed the government when we conducted the

survey. This was precisely the electoral base that assured the 2005 victory of Boris Tadic, the

presidential candidate of the Democratic Party.

Next to Axis 2, in the upper area of social space, above Axis 1, characterized by low economic

capital, we find those who abstained from voting (Party: No vote and Pres: No vote). It seems

likely that their abstinence is equally the result of the lack of economic capital and the lack of

political social capital.

Overall, it appears that in Serbia, cultural practices and styles of material consumption,

identity sources, elements of worldviews and political preferences unequivocally respond to

the ‘‘gravitational pull’’ of social space. Our analysis shows that the endless variety of

social and cultural practices is far from random or idiosyncratic, even though it cannot be

reduced to social conditioning. Our results reveal that particular cultural practices, types of

material consumption, particular identities and political preferences are more probable in

certain areas of social space than in others. The types of resources available to the inhabitants

of particular areas of the social space clearly influence the social practices of citizens of

Serbia and represent the basis for particular social collectivities and their associated life

strategies.

4.4. The construction of theoretical social classes

Our final task was to reconstruct how these resources contribute to the constitution of social

classes in Serbia. To do so, we projected the nine occupational groups identified in Section 3 on

the cloud of individuals in the social space that we constructed, and then drew the concentration

ellipses (Le Roux and Rouanet, 2010; Le Roux et al., 2008). The numbering of the quadrants

follows the convention in Figs. 2–4.

As Fig. 5 indicates, the nine occupation groups described in Section 3 above occupy

different areas of social space, and are therefore characterized by different combinations of

capitals, different cultural practices and material consumption styles, identities, worldviews

and political preferences. Farmers are on the whole located on the right-hand side of

social space and are subsequently characterized by a low total volume of capital, local

cultural capital, a low level of economic capital and reliance on the social resources

of solidarity. Given the area of social space they occupy, farmers are mainly characterized

by traditional folklore cultural practices and neo-folk cultural practices. They identify on the

basis of primordial relationships (identities related to gender roles, family and nation),

and exhibit a conservative worldview (negative attitudes toward the right of women to

abortion, homosexual marriages and the privatization of state property). And farmers have

high scores on the nationalism scale. They represent the social base of the Socialist Party of

Serbia and the Serbian Radical Party. Farmers are the group whose characteristics exhibit the

lowest level of variance, making them the most coherent group of all nine occupational

groups.

Unskilled, semiskilled and highly skilled workers cover the same areas of social space – with a

low and average total volume of capital, a relatively low volume of economic capital, reliance on

the social resources of solidarity and, unlike farmers, lack of unity in terms of belonging to local

or global capital. It is also worth mentioning that variance within the group of highly skilled

workers is lower than within the group of unskilled workers. We distinguish two clusters of


individuals: one located more in the field of local cultural capital and another located more in the

field of global cultural capital. Presumably, this distinction is due to other social determinants

(such as gender, age, place of residence).

In contrast, lower-level experts, clerks and lower managers, as well as small entrepreneurs,

occupy an area of social space characterized by an average total volume of capital, average

volume of economic resources, a more pronounced reliance on political social capital than on

the social resources of solidarity, and membership in both local and global culture. Based on

their position in social space, these groups seem to be characterized by the cultural practices of


Fig. 5. Occupational groups in Serbia.

conformist omnivores and rurban omnivores. Their position in the social space also

indicates self-identification based on place of residence (local identity, regional identity,

Balkan identity) and on religion. These occupational groups are characterized by ambivalent

attitudes toward issues like abortion, homosexual marriages and the privatization of state

property and average scores on the scale of nationalism. Their political preferences in 2005

leaned toward the Democratic Party and the Democratic Party of Serbia (at that moment the

ruling parties).

Lastly, the occupational groups of CEOs and upper management, politicians and higher-

level experts are located to the left of Axis 2, which corresponds to high total volume of

capital. Experts are almost entirely located in the upper left area of the social space, which

corresponds to global cultural capital. Experts are characterized by elite cultural practices,

the practices of elite omnivores and global urban cultural practices. They self-identify either

as individualistic or European/cosmopolitan, hold liberal worldviews and vote mainly for the

Liberal-Democratic Party. Although predominantly located on the left of the social space, the

occupational group consisting of professional politicians, managers of state companies and

high-ranking police and army officers also occupies the central part of the map, as well as a

sizeable part of the area below Axis 1, characterized by local cultural capital. This

distribution partially matches the dispersion of middle classes in social space and cultural

practices, forms of identification, worldviews and political preferences of clerks, small

entrepreneurs and lower-level experts.

Finally, the group of large entrepreneurs is the group with the highest variance. They are

mainly located on the left area of the social space, along the axis that organizes indicators of

economic and social capital. However, the distribution of this occupational group also

encompasses a large area in the center of the social space and the area of local cultural capital.

They represent a highly incoherent group recently recruited from all possible social strata; hence,

their cultural practices range from traditional elite cultural practices to the practices of rurban

omnivores and neo-folk cultural practices. Similarly, in terms of self-identification, worldviews

and political preferences, this occupational group has high variance. The only constant for the

majority in this occupational group is the high volume of economic capital and the predominant

use of political social capital.

The analysis of Fig. 5 indicates that we can construct four theoretical classes based on a

composite of similarities/differences in the total volume of capital, cultural practices, material

consumption styles, identities, worldviews and political preferences: (1) farmers (lower right

area of social space, fourth quadrant); (2) unskilled and skilled workers (top right area, first

quadrant); (3) the middle classes comprising lower-level experts, clerks and representatives of

lower management and small entrepreneurs (central area); and, (4) the upper classes comprising

professional politicians, managers of state companies and high-ranking police and army officers,

large entrepreneurs and experts in state and private companies (left area of social space, high total

volume of capital) (see Fig. 6).17


17 In the transformation of these ‘‘theoretical’’ classes into real and mobilized classes in Serbia, an important role is

played by ‘‘struggles on symbolic boundaries’’ between holders of global and local cultural capital in Serbia. These

struggles rage in Serbia on four symbolic battlefields: between the educated and the uneducated; between the urban and

the recently urbanized (and rural) groups; between residents of the (‘‘European’’) (Cveticanin and Popescu, 2009). North

of the country and residents of the (‘‘Oriental’’) South; and between ‘‘cosmopolitans’’ and ‘‘patriots’’ It is worth

mentioning that in the case of the opposition between the ‘‘European’’ North and ‘‘Oriental’’ South, we are dealing with

the poles of symbolic geography of Serbia, not its geographical coordinates. See also Bakic-Hayden (1995).

5. Discussion and conclusions

In sum, in this paper we have demonstrated the importance of including subtypes of social and

cultural capital in the construction of social space in post-socialist societies such as Serbia. We

have showed that the main opposition previously identified in the field of cultural practices

(Cveticanin and Popescu, 2009) plays an important role in constitution of social collectivities in

Serbian society. We have also showed that patterns of identities, attitudes and political

preferences in Serbia are homologous with social space. Finally, we have demonstrated that, by

considering both differences in the volume and in the composition of forms of capital, we can

reliably construct four theoretical classes in Serbia: farmers, workers, middle classes and upper

classes. In conclusion, we attempt to identify the theoretical and methodological consequences of

a different understanding of the principle of capital composition.

According to Bourdieu social space includes both material (economic) and symbolic

(cultural) factors whereas, in a Weberian conception, these are separated as ‘‘class’’ and ‘‘status.’’


Fig. 6. Theoretical classes in Serbia: subclouds in plane 1–2 with mean points and concentration ellipses.

This understanding of the composition of capital as ‘‘a relative preponderance of economic or

cultural capital among available resources and powers’’ enabled Bourdieu (1984) to identify

only a few basic types of class habitus and habitus of class fractions, and also allowed him to

characterize and even label some of them (e.g., ‘‘distance from necessity,’’ ‘‘aristocratic

asceticism and bourgeois hedonism,’’ ‘‘pretension and cultural goodwill’’ or ‘‘the choice of the

necessary’’). Habitus thus identified has been used to explain social practices according to the

formula ‘‘[(habitus) (capital)] + field = practice.’’

Our conception of social space encompasses the influence of the many important ‘‘powers and

resources’’ in the social formation: the influence of economic factors (indicators of volume of

economic capital), cultural factors (indicators of local and global cultural capital), the influence

of formal authority (indicators of political positioning) and informal powers (indicators of social

capital of solidarity and political social capital). Thus conceived, social space represents a

complex social jigsaw puzzle, which is no longer based on uniform units of measure –

‘‘amounts’’ of economic capital and of legitimate cultural capital. Instead, it consists of regions

defined (in addition to overall volume of capital and volume of economic capital) also by

different types of cultural capital and social capital. Constructed in this manner, it is somewhat in-

between Bourdieuian geometrical space and more topological models of a field (as in the cases

ofthe hodological space of Kurt Lewin or the organizational field of the ‘‘new institutionalists’’).

Within it, in the attempt to explain social practices, different combinations of capital and

subtypes of capital characteristic for particular areas of social space are used. Clearly, this

represents an explicative principle of high complexity, but as we have shown in this paper, some

types of social groupings and some types of social practices are more probable in certain areas of

social space than in others.

It is well known that Bourdieu’s conception of class incorporates a network of interactive

factors which is made up of so-called primary properties (volume of capital, composition of

capital and social trajectory) and secondary properties (gender, place of residence, age). It is also

well known that Bourdieu aimed to replace linear thinking with the ‘‘structural causality of a

network of factors’’ (empirically reformulated) (Weininger, 2002, 2005). We believe that in

relation to this theoretical complexity, Bourdieu’s model of social space (‘‘the field of social

classes’’) is rather reductive. At least as far as the analysis of post-socialist society in Serbia is

concerned, a more complex model of social space, which incorporates sub-types of social and

cultural capital has proven exceptionally useful.

Acknowledgments

The study was supported by the European Cultural Foundation. The authors would like to thank,

first and foremost, the editors of this special issue, Elizabeth B. Silva and Tony Bennett, and all

members of the SCUD network. Our thanks also go to Jovana Dimitrijevic Savic for the translation

and encouragement; Ivana Spasic for the patient reading of our papers and the ‘‘creative

grumbling;’’ Vanda Krefft for input during the editing process; and to Eric Gordy for many years of

support. Finally, grateful thanks to two anonymous reviewers who amazed us with the depth of their

knowledge and helped us improve our article. Any remaining errors are our own.

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Predrag Cveticanin is the head of the independent research institute Center for Empirical Cultural Studies of South-East

Europe. He was a coordinator of the three major research projects on cultural consumption in Serbia (2002, 2005, 2010).

His research interests focus on links between social and cultural stratification in South-East Europe.

Mihaela Popescu is assistant professor in the Department of Communication Studies at California State University, San

Bernardino, USA. Her research focuses on communication law and policy, the first amendment, political economy of

media industries, and cultural consumption patterns in South-East Europe.


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