The Armenian Revolutionary Federation: Richmond Senior Thesis: Nationalism & Socialism Mix

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Terpandjian 1 I. Introduction Although the Hay Heghapokhakan Dashnaktsutiun or the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF) was successful in establishing itself as the leading revolutionary party in Armenia, it was unable to maintain steady relations with Armenia’s neighbors. The ARF was established to ensure the creation of a united, free, Armenia but exhibited drastic differences in ideological areas when compared to other revolutionary parties like the Bolsheviks. Both organizations were driven by notions of socialism but the ARF was gradually driven by a desire to create a unified homeland for all Armenians and essentially incorporated a democratic world view empowered by a socialist perspective. In this paper, I will explicate the history of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation and its political relations with Ottoman Turkey, Russia and how it’s unique ideological background served to exacerbate the relations the ARF had with Armenia’s neighbors. Together, all these relationships will assist in my explication as to why the ARF’s

Transcript of The Armenian Revolutionary Federation: Richmond Senior Thesis: Nationalism & Socialism Mix

Terpandjian 1

I. Introduction

Although the Hay Heghapokhakan Dashnaktsutiun or the

Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF) was successful in

establishing itself as the leading revolutionary party in

Armenia, it was unable to maintain steady relations with

Armenia’s neighbors. The ARF was established to ensure the

creation of a united, free, Armenia but exhibited drastic

differences in ideological areas when compared to other

revolutionary parties like the Bolsheviks. Both organizations

were driven by notions of socialism but the ARF was gradually

driven by a desire to create a unified homeland for all Armenians

and essentially incorporated a democratic world view empowered by

a socialist perspective. In this paper, I will explicate the

history of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation and its

political relations with Ottoman Turkey, Russia and how it’s

unique ideological background served to exacerbate the relations

the ARF had with Armenia’s neighbors. Together, all these

relationships will assist in my explication as to why the ARF’s

Terpandjian 2

ideology made it susceptible to oppression and persecution by the

aforementioned governments including the Bolsheviks. Rather the

distinct ideology of the ARF served to harm its foreign relations

that culminated in its exile from Armenia by the Bolsheviks in

1921. The ARF delayed its oppressors long enough to survive and

established a framework for a united and independent Armenia via

the short-lived Democratic Republic of Armenia (1918-1920).

II. The Dashnaktsutiun (1890-1922)

The Armenian Revolutionary Federation has been the

most powerful and influential party that played a decisive role

in establishing the Republic of Armenia1 by establishing a

framework for a state that placed emphasis on a united Armenia.

Although it was established in 1890 by three members of the

Russian-Armenian intelligentsia: Kristapor Mikayelian, Simon

Zavarian, and Stepan (Rosdom) Zorian, its exclusive goal for more

than a decade was initially to create a federation “for the

purpose of mounting a unitarian struggle for the political and

1 Ara Caprelian, “The Armenian Revolutionary Federation and Soviet Armenia,” Armenian Review 28, no. 3 (1975): 283.

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economic freedom of Turkish Armenia”2 either by all means. Unlike

the Bolsheviks, who were also a “vanguard party of the

revolutionary proletariat that operated under the organized

principle of democratic centralism with a personal pledge of

loyalty to Lenin and quasi-military discipline3, the ARF was not

characterized as having a “lack of compromise and conciliation

with the bourgeoisie”4 because it was founded by Russian Armenian

intelligentsia, thus considered bourgeoisie. This would play an

important role in Bolshevik-ARF relations because the Bolsheviks

refused to compromise with bourgeoisie, their class enemy.

Although the ARF had socialist origins, it was founded by the

class enemy of the Bolsheviks, the bourgeoisie. The party was a

vanguard party because its members consisted of professional

revolutionaries who published papers, organized cells,

manufactured weapons, led guerilla operations and subsequently

ran a government. At its inception in Tiflis, Georgia 1890, the

party adopted a decentralized modus operandi according to which

chapters of the ARF in different countries could plan and 2 Avedis Sevian, “The Founding of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation,” Armenian Review 34, no. 2 (1993): 1283 Orlando Figes, A People’s Tragedy: The Russian Revolution 1891-1924 (USA: Penguin Books,1996), 151.4 Ibid.,154.

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implement policies relative to their respective political

atmospheres. This became more apparent between the different

bureaus that dealt with different issues either in Russian or

Turkish Armenia. The party set its goal of a society based on the

democratic principles of freedom of assembly, freedom of speech,

freedom of religion and agrarian reform.5 These qualities would

eventually contribute to straining relations with both the Turks

and the Russians. In addition, the organization placed a serious

emphasis on cultural values because the founders espoused that to

be a member of the Dashnaktsutiun is to be truly Armenian by

imbibing the Armenian cultural values while striving to achieve

the party’s goals. It had political relations with the Russian

Empire, the Ottoman Empire, Turkish Republic and the Bolshevik

regime by adapting to the situations that were occurring during

each time. Despite their being times where cooperation seemed

visible, the ARF often found itself being politically duped in

all its relations.

5 Hratch Dasnabedian, History of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation Dashnaktsutiun (1890-1924) (OEMME Edizioni, 1989) 79

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The ARF gradually acquired significant strength and sympathy

among Russian Armenians. This is primarily because the ARF’s

stance towards the Ottoman Empire was synonymous with tsarist

foreign policy: anti-Ottoman. Therefore the party enjoyed the

support of the central Russian administration until 1903.6 On

June 12, 1903, Tsar Nicholas II issued an edict to place all

Armenian Church property under imperial control as part of his

policy for gradual Russification of minorities.7 The Armenian

Church embodies the core of being Armenian. The identity of an

Armenian originates from the Armenian Church because it was

considered to be the first church to accept Christianity as a

nation in 301. A.D and prided itself along with the language and

traditions it espoused. The destruction of the Armenian Church

could have nullified the Armenian national existence because of

their interconnective nature. This was faced with strong ARF

opposition, because the ARF perceived the tsarist edict as a

threat to the Armenian national existence. Therefore, the ARF

leadership dispatched militiamen who acted as guards and held

6 Anna Geifman, Thou Shalt Kill: Revolutionary Terrorism in Russia, 1894–1917.(USA: Princeton University Press, 1993) , 21–22. 7 Ibid., 23

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mass demonstrations. The first outbreak of violence occurred in

Baku in February 1905. This signaled to the ARF that the tsarist

authorities operated under an anti-Armenian policy and were

responsible for orchestrating anti-Armenian pogroms8 and

massacres in cities like Baku, Yerevan, and Zangezur, (Figure 1)

that were carried out by Tatars (Azeris), who were chasing their

own Pan Turanian9 dreams, who all too readily massacred, pillaged

and destroyed Armenians in the subsequent Armeno Tatar War from

1904-1906 which culminated with the Tatars suing for peace.10

Therefore, Dashnaks deemed armed activity, including terror, as

necessary for the achievement of their political goals. Unable to

rely on tsarist forces for protection, the Armenian bourgeoisie

turned to the ARF. When accused by tsarist officials for being

overly aggressive, the ARF argued that it needed to organize the

defense of the Armenian population against Muslim attacks. The

Armenian bourgeoisie turning to the Dashnaks for help serves to

8 A pogrom is an organized massacre. Sultan Abdul Hamid II was notorious for his anti-Armenian pogroms.9 Pan Turanism is a political movement that is geared to the union of all Turanian (Turkish speaking) people. It supersedes the unity of all Turkish people (Pan- Turkism) but called for a unity of all Turanian language speakerswhich included the Ottoman Turks, Tartars, and Azeris. This philosophy was embraced by the Ittihadists as well.10 Hratch Dasnabedian, History of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation Dashnaktsutiun (1890-1924) (OEMME Edizioni, 1989) 80-81

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highlight how much of a major political force the ARF was in

Armenian life. In addition, the ARF’s areas in the Russian sphere

were in not only in Moscow and St Petersburg, but also in

Yerevan, Tiflis and Baku. The activity of the Dashnaktsutiun in

Transcaucasia was curtailed during the Stolypin reaction (1908-

12). The Tsar’s policy of Russification ruined Tsarist-ARF

relations, which was apparent from the ARF’s exuberance at the

collapse of the Romanov autocracy in the March Revolution in

1917.

Although Russification policies by Tsarist Russia ruined

relations with the AR, its relationship with the Ottoman Empire

was characterized by pogroms, deception, violence and ideological

conflict. The ARF dealt with two different parties in the Ottoman

Empire throughout several phases: the reign of Sultan Abdul Hamid

II (1894-1908)11 and the Young Turks (1909-1916). The ARF was

especially active in the Ottoman Empire, where it organized or

participated in many revolutionary activities. In 1894, the ARF

took part in the First Sassoon Resistance; supplying arms to the

11 Historians called Abdul Hamid II ‘the Red Sultan’ for establishing bloody pogroms targeted against the Armenians.

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local population to help the people of Sassoon defend themselves

against the Hamidian purges in the Bitlis vilayets (Figure 2). In

June 1896, the ARF organized the defense of Van in the Turkish-

Armenian province of Van (Figure 2), where Ottoman Hamidian

soldiers attacked the city. Although they assisted the civilians

in temporarily repelling the attack, they were unable to prevent

the Hamidian troops from subsequently massacring the Armenian

residents there. On March 30, 1904, the ARF played a major role

in the Second Sassoon Resistance. In this circumstance, the ARF

sent arms and fedayees12 to defend the region for the second time.

Among the 500 fedayees participating in the resistance were top

figures like Andranik Ozanyan13 and Kevork Chavoush.14 They

managed to hold off the Ottoman army for several months, despite

their meager forces and supplies. Realizing that compromise with

the sultan was impossible, the ARF attempted to assassinate Abdul

Hamid II in the failed Yildiz Attempt in 1905, but Kristapor

Mikayelian accidentally died while testing bombs for the mission 12 Armenian irregular units consisting of volunteers who left their families to form armed units. The term literally means, “one who is ready to sacrifice his life”.13 (1865-1927)Armenian general, political and public activist and freedom fighter, greatly admired as a national hero. 14 (1870-1907) Armenian fedayee who led operations against the Turks and Kurds. He died in combat fighting the Ottoman army at Sulukh.

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and the ARF’s involvement was discovered by the Sultan. The

assassination of Abdul Hamid II, the chief executioner of the

Armenians was not a new thought, but financial difficulties of

the ARF had thus far postponed implementation15. The failed

Yildiz attempt planned by the ARF in Constantinople mirrored the

Bank Ottoman debacle in 1896, where the leaders, the very souls

of the operations, died in the early stages and the operations

did not achieve the desired results16. In a general assembly

meeting in 1907, the ARF acknowledged that Armenian and the Young

Turks17, a group of mostly European educated Turks shared similar

goals: constitutional reform and the deposition of Abdul Hamid

II. So promising was the Ittihadist movement that the ARF even

joined them in plotting the overthrow of Abdul Hamid.18With this

alliance, the ARF hoped to gain autonomy to govern Armenian

populated areas of the Ottoman Empire as a “state within a

state”.19 The ARF decided to cooperate with the Ittihadists,

hoping that if they came to power, autonomy would be granted to

15 Dasnabedian, History 77.16 Ibid., 7717 Also called Ittihadists or the Committee of Union and Progress18 Edward Alexander, A Crime of Vengeance: An Armenian Struggle for Justice. (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2008), 9719 Ibid., 97

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the Armenians. In 1908, the Red Sultan was deposed in the Young

Turk Revolution, which launched the Second Constitutional Era of

the Ottoman Empire (1908-1918), where the Ittihadists assumed

control.

Although Armenians gained more seats in the 1908 parliament,

the reforms fell short of the greater autonomy that the ARF had

hoped for. However, the increasing Pan-Turanist attitude taken by

the Young Turks, along with random massacres of Armenians in Adana

(Figure 3) in 1909 “raised serious doubts about the intentions of

the new regime.20 But in spite of these doubts and pressure from

skeptical members, “the ARF initially continued its cooperation

with the Young Turks. Nonetheless, the ARF gradually became

suspicious of the Young Turks and their increasingly Turkist

political and economic policies. The ARF elected a committee to

prepare for self-defense, should that become necessary. In May

1912, the ARF severed its ties with the Ittihadists.”21

During the First World War, under Russian pressure, the Ottoman

government agreed to the appointment of two Europeans as high

20 Dasnabedian, History 7821 Vincent Lima, “The Evolving Goals and Strategies of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation, 1890-1925,” Armenian Review 44, no. 2 (1991): x.

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commissioners for the Armenian provinces.22 Tsarist Russia was able

to pressure the Ottoman because of the Treaty of San Stefano

(1878) (Figure 4) signed at the end of the Russo-Turkish war

(1877-1878) allowed for Russia to acquire Armenian and Georgian

territories in the Caucasus which included Ardahan, Artvin, Batum,

Kars, Olti and Bayazid (Figure 4). This highlights that the

Ottoman Empire wanted to avoid another conflict with the Russians,

where the outcome would mirror San Stefano’s. While the Russian

Empire was preoccupied with the dawn of the Great War, the Young

Turks23 attempted to “solve” the Armenian Question24 with a pogrom,

setting out to wipe out the entire Armenian population. During

this time, the ARF, maintaining its ideological commitment to a

“free, independent and United Armenia,” led the defense of the

Armenian people during the Armenian Genocide, becoming leaders of

the successful Van Resistance, aiding the villagers in the defense

of Musa Dagh25 and other areas, until the end of World War I. The

22 Ibid., xii23 Leading the Young Turks was a group known as the Ittahid Triumvirate. It consisted of Minister of Interior: Talaat Pasha, Minister of War: Enver Pasha,and the Minister of Navy and Defense: Djemal Pasha 24 The Armenian Question is the creation of an independent Armenia that consists of both Turkish Armenia and Russian Armenia. 25 A well known book by German author Franz Werfel called: “The Forty Days of Musa Dagh” chronicles this episode of Armenian resistance.

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Armenian Genocide had depopulated Western Armenia by scattering

the Armenian population all over the world in countries like

Lebanon, Syria, France, and the United States which served as

havens to the Armenian refugees.

While the Ottoman Empire depopulated Western Armenia with its

pogroms, “the Bolshevik victory in the October Revolution put

Armenians in an uncomfortable position for two reasons: it was not

very well received by most Armenians--- not so much for

ideological reasons, but because the Bolsheviks were committed to

peace at all costs and recalled Russian units from Turkish

Armenia”, where they had been positioned for a Caucasian front

during World War I. This was a severe concern because it permitted

Turkish forces to enter Western Armenia. Unknown to the ARF, the

Treaty of Brest-Litovsk took Russia out of World War I and

effectively handed Kars, Ardahan and Batum to Turkey. Second, it

put Armenians in an uncomfortable position of having to choose

between Russia and the other European powers (namely Great Britain

and France). The European powers showed interest in dividing the

vanquished Ottoman Empire and establishing a large Armenian buffer

state between Russia and Turkey: This was to be done via the

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Treaty of Sevres in 1920 with American President Woodrow Wilson

promising a large Armenian state with access to the Black Sea,

thus eliminating the landlocked problem for Armenia but the Allies

did not show active interest in assisting and the Treaty was

signed at a time when Bolsheviks and the Ottomans were

simultaneously pressuring Armenia.”26 (Figure 5)

Amidst the disintegration of the Russian Empire, Armenian,

Georgian, and Muslim leaders of the Caucasus united to create the

Transcaucasian Federation in the winter of 1918. The Federation

lasted only three months and eventually led to the proclamation of

the republics of Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan. With the

collapse of the Transcaucasian Federation, the Armenians were left

to fend for themselves as the Ottoman army approached the capital

of Yerevan. The resulting Battle of Sardarabad (May 21-29 1918)

culminated with an Ottoman defeat and the inception of the

Democratic Republic of Armenia (DRA) was announced the same day

with the ARF in government. However, the newly, established state

was devastated. With a dislocated economy, and starving refugees,

the DRA had plenty of challenges to face. The Armenian

26 Lima, The Evolving, xii-xiii

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Revolutionary Federation had a strong presence in the DRA

government. Most of the important government posts, such as prime

minister, defense minister, and interior ministers were controlled

by its members. Despite their stable governance, the ARF was

unable to stop the impending Communist invasion from the north and

the Turkish invasion from the west. In December 1920, squeezed

between the Turkish Army under General Kiazim Karabekir and the

Eleventh Red Army, the Dashnak government of Armenia reluctantly

capitulated to the Communists, who now promised to push back the

Turkish Army.27 The Party did make an attempt once to establish a

working relationship with the Soviets, but failed in 1921 at Riga28

due to the successful anti-Dashnak campaign staged by the Armenian

Bolsheviks. The ARF was banned, its leaders exiled, and many of

its members dispersed to other parts of the world. “Due to tight

communist control, the Armenian Revolutionary Federation could not

operate in the Armenian SSR and the political party remained

banned until 1991.”29

III. ARF Politics27 Ibid., xiii28 Ara Caprelian , "The Armenian Revolutionary Federation and Soviet Armenia," Armenian Review 28, no. 3 (1975): 28529 Caprelian, “ARF-Soviet Armenia” 285

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The ARF Doctrine had been influenced by two currents of

world thought: nationalism and socialism.30 Democratic liberal

ideology and the concept of the rights of man were brought

from Western Europe by Armenian intellectuals who studied

there. This was a legacy of the French Revolution of 1789 as

well as of philosopher John Locke and English

political/judicial thought. This influence was significant

because of two reasons: “(1) it would aid in the creation in

the democratically-crafted National Constitution of the

Western Armenians in 1860 prior to the inception of the ARF;

and (2) it was prevalent especially in Turkey and the

intellectuals in the provinces which would provoke Ottoman

acts of aggression.”31 Socialism, specifically Marxism, was the

other influence on the ARF, transmitted via Russian

revolutionary thought.32 Before 1907, this was the most

important influence on the ARF despite theories of historical

materialism and class struggle not being relevant to the

realities of Western Armenia, given the nature of the Turkish

30 Dasnabedian, History 37.31 Ibid., 3732 Ibid., 37

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persecution that was driven by religious and racial

hatred.33However, under the influence of the “social democrats

and the Narodnaya Volya (the progenitors of the Russian Social

Revolution) socialism was adopted as an important segment to

the ideology of the Caucasian-Armenian intelligentsia.”34 After

World War I, the ARF replaced its previous Russian orientation

with a Western European one and made nationalism its focus,

thus making the ARF a scapegoat for Bolshevik attacks.

Combined persecution from Turkish and Russian authorities re-

awakened awareness and pride the concept of nationality and

national consciousness35; it gave the ARF the aspect of

national-liberation, in addition to its initial character as a

movement essentially for human liberation. A reaction to the

growing persecution under Turkish and Russian despotism was

the awareness and pride, in general the concept of nationality

and national consciousness. A growing “national self-awareness

and nationalistic tendencies gave the Armenian liberation

movement the aspect of national-liberation, in addition to its

33 Ibid., 3734 Ibid., 3735 Ibid., 38

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initial character as a movement essentially for human

liberation”.36 Any approach that would place the Armenian

revolutionary movement solely in one of the above ideological

thoughts would be flawed because the ARF movement was

conceived as a hybrid of nationalist and socialist elements.

All those tendencies, attitudes and feelings were present in

varying proportions among Armenians of the last quarter of the

nineteenth century, on both sides of the Russo-Turkish

border.37

The principal founders of the ARF were socialists, and

Marxist elements are clearly present in the introductory

section of the Party's first program written by Rosdom Zorian.

Entitled "General Theory", the program was made up of three

parts: Objectives, Means and Organization.  Moreover, the

formulated objectives and corresponding claims were realistic

and objectively based on the actual needs and the potential of

Western Armenians, rather than a dogma that espoused utopian

ideas like “World Revolution”. The first program of the ARF

36 Ibid., 3837 Ibid., 38

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did not include ambitions of building a socialist order or

creating an independent Armenian state. The ARF was to

formulate such goals in the course of time, coordinating its

claims with the consecutive evolutionary stages of the Armenian

Question, which its activities transformed into a national

cause. The statement made by Zorian that “No model of social

organization, however ideal it may be, can be realized at

once”38, and “the only way to achieve this ideal society is

through the transformation of existing conditions”39 serves to

highlight the realization that the path to independence would

demand much from all of them. With its proposed objectives and

demands, the ARF program formed the sum of the practical

concerns plus the aspirations and goals of that party. This

congregation of goals and ideas “is dependent both on current

conditions—the international and national, in general—and on

the social and political thought of the given party”.40

Therefore, the program itself was subjected to change in

accordance with the evolution of ideas. In this fashion, the

38 Ibid., 3839 Ibid., 3840 Ibid., 38

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demands of the ARF program in the national and the political

realms were realistically coordinated with the evolutionary

stages of the Armenian case.

The initial “Objective” of the ARF Dashnaktsutiun was

to “achieve political and economic liberty in Turkish Armenia

by means of insurrection”.41 This section of the “General

Theory” set the party’s political, social, and economic

demands—“(in order) a democratic regime, democratic freedoms,

equality before the law, etc, security of life and labor, the

elimination of forced and unpaid labor, compulsory education,

an equitable division of land, reorganization of the tax

system (progressive tax), etc.”42 The “Objective” changed

prominently in 1907, to include the rights of the Armenians in

the Transcaucasia via “the Plan of Action for the Caucasus”.

This plan advocated the principle of an autonomous Armenia in

the framework of a Federated Democratic Republic of

Transcaucasia; at the same time, it made the demand for a

federated autonomous Turkish Armenia within the Ottoman state.

41 Avetis Sevian, “The Founding of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation,” Armenian Review 34, no.2 (1981): 127-2842 Dasnabedian, History 43

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This marked a pivotal moment in ARF politics because the ARF

ceased to consider the concept of “Armenia” restricted to

Turkish Armenia alone and considered it the right and

responsibility of the Armenian people to struggle for the

liberation of Russian Armenia too.”43 In 1907, the proposition

of two separate Armenias within the borders of two different

states was perhaps the only logical and possible way of

creating an “Armenia” in the historically Armenian territories

and provided the necessary solution for the combined issues of

Turkish and Russian Armenia (Figure 6). As a result of the

evolution of the Armenian Question and the liberation struggle

waged by the ARF, a conclusion was reached, for the final

stage of objectives: “the need to establish the independence

of a unified, integral Armenia.44 That demand, the culmination

of the Dashnaktsutiun political thought and aspirations,

remains in effect always, made permanent by the sacrifices

made during the liberation struggle in 1918.”45 Since 1919, all

the World Congresses of the ARF have adopted that programmatic

43 Dasnabedian, History 4344 Hratch Dasnabedian , Documents For the History of the ARF, (Beirut: II 2nd edition, 1985) 14-1645 Dasnabedian, History 44

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objective of an integral Armenia repopulated by all Armenians

as the most just and final solution of the Armenian

Question---in short a free, independent, and united Armenia.46

The “Means” of the “General Theory” were the ways the ARF

would follow in order to achieve their objectives. These included

propaganda, revolutionary education of the people, the

organization and arming of the people for self-defense, sabotage,

the execution of corrupt government officials and all exploiters

as well as Armenian informers and traitors, and direct conflict.

The “Means” of the ARF shifted depending on circumstances. This

aspect of the “General Theory” was best demonstrated by the

establishment of the fedayee militias. Also, throughout 1899-1906,

within the context of the ARF’s activities in political relations

and propaganda, “the following types of activities were

organized: attempts in the parliaments of Europe (especially in

France, but also Italy, Belgium, Britain, the Netherlands, and

elsewhere) to ensure intervention on behalf of the Armenians;

public meetings and demonstrations in Paris and other capitals

with the active participation of many eminent personalities like

46 Dasnabedian, History 45

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Georges Clemenceau; international conferences of friends of the

Armenian Cause; and pro— Armenian Resolutions in successive peace

conferences and socialist congresses.”47 These aspects

demonstrate that the ARF never relied solely on militant means in

pursuit of its goals.

The last aspect of “General Theory” was called

“Organization”. In this sphere, the fundamental turning point

achieved by the first Congress was the adoption of the principle

of decentralization, which Simon Zavarian had ceaselessly

advocated from the very beginning.”48 A decentralized system was

better suited to the wide area of operations that the ARF

undertook; it established a “dynamic network of organizational

bodies that freely conducted organizational and revolutionary

work based on each region, while at the same time was guided by

the same objectives laid down in the program, and motivated by

the same ideological inspiration.”49 In an ennobling atmosphere

of unconditional devotion to the cause of Armenian liberation

decentralization guaranteed the unprecedented vitality and

47Dasnabedian, History 6148 Dasnabedian, History 6149 Ibid., 62

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unrestrained expansion of the ARF.50 Throughout its evolving

agenda, the ARF had realized organization was the key to success.

Therefore, the areas of operations were divided into two spheres:

the Eastern and Western Bureau. The Bureau was the coordinating

and information processing body for the revolutionary activities,

the liaison center between the regional units, and the depository

and distributor of the Party’s assets (money, weapons, and

labor).51 The Western Bureau or Droshak52 conducted the external

propaganda for the Armenian liberation struggle and was given

responsibility for political relations and answering the Armenian

Question; it successfully started an unprecedented movement in

France in favor of the Armenians. The Eastern Bureau was

responsible for the organization not only in the Yergir53 but in

the Transcaucasus as well as in Russia. The most important

organizational bodies outside the Yergir were the central

committees of the frontier regions (Kars, Yerevan, and Ardabagan)

(Figure 2), because they were the ones immediately responsible

50 Dasnabedian , Documents 11-1651 Dasnabedian, History 6252 It means “flag” in Armenian and it was the official organ of the ARF. Priorto Geneva it had been organized in Tiflis, Georgia (1890) and was based in Geneva (1892-1914).53 It translates to “the Homeland” or “country”

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for the transportation of men and arms to the Yergir. It is

important to note that concerns of the ARF shifted at times

between the Eastern and Western bureaus. For example, the

immediate concern from 1904-06 for the eastern regions were the

Armeno-Tatar confrontations in Baku and Nakhitchevan (Figure 1)

engineered by Tsarist Russia and executed by the Azeri Tatars,

but the most fundamental part dealt with the “Plan of Action for

the Caucasus”. The plan energized the new front opened by the

preceding Third World Congress in Sofia Bulgaria 1904. The ARF

had difficulty dealing with the concept of “socialism”, and other

associated terms in ARF assemblies and press because this was a

betrayal of the principles as well as the fundamental “Objective”

of the ARF; how could socialists seek an independent Armenia?

Socialism clashes with nationalism because nationalism impedes

the progression of socialism to communism. To the ARF,

nationalism was more important because the needs of both Turkish

and Russian Armenia needed to be addressed. The Congress reunited

minds and confirmed the resolve of the ARF to wage, collectively

and equally the liberation struggle of the entire Armenian

Terpandjian 25

nation.54 The World Congresses of the ARF would clarify the

organizational structure of the ARF.

The World Congresses of the ARF were its most important

assemblies, for they modified the party’s program, worked out

bylaws, defined the political lines and strategy for the

immediate future, and elected members to the Bureau. These

congresses did not have an established time frame which meant

that it sometimes could be several years till the next congress

convened. All subordinate meetings were bound to observe the

principles established by the World Congresses and to execute

their decisions.55 For example, “Rayonagan”56 Congresses involved

representatives of several regions from the same geographical

area such as Transcaucasia and Russia or the whole of Turkish

Armenia (Figure 6) who took strategic decisions in periods

between World Congresses based on their respective areas. World

Congresses clarified the organizational structure of the ARF

defining through the bylaws, the reciprocal responsibilities,

interdependence, and rights of the various organizational units

54 Dasnabedian, History 79.55 Ibid.,7956 Means Regional

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and assemblies. The World Congresses also instituted a new and

supreme party unit called “the Body Representing the Will of the

Dashnaktsutiun” “which was empowered to conduct the external

relations of the Party; if necessary, to redistribute forces; to

strengthen the bureaus and responsible central committees with

new man-power; and in exceptional and unforeseen circumstances,

to postpone or alter the decisions of the World Congress, as well

as initiate new undertakings, under its own responsibility.”57

“The Will” was composed of the representatives of the two bureaus

and the four responsible central committees.58 Some of the World

Congresses that are of extreme importance shall be mentioned.

In 1892, the First World Congress of the Dashnaktsutiun was

held at Tiflis, Georgia. The congress represented a combination

of Russian-Armenian and Turkish Armenian revolutionaries

maintaining a range of views. The goals were vaguely articulated

in order to accommodate the various views represented but the

Dashnaktsutiun rejected views that tied the improvement of the

people’s condition (socialism) definitely and exclusively to

57 Dasnabedian History 8058 Ibid., 80

Terpandjian 27

their independence (nationalism). In 1898, the Second World

Congress, held in Tiflis, decided to greatly expand on propaganda

and foreign relations in Europe. The publication in France of the

French periodical Pro Armenia was entirely financed by the Western

Bureau.59 The journal served as the international foreign

language source of information about, and voice for, the cause of

the Armenian people.60 Its editors and contributors were from the

political and literary-cultural elite of France, including Pierre

Quillard, Jean Jaures, Anatole France, and Georges Clemenceau.61

The Fourth World Congress held in Vienna in 1907, marked pivotal

ratification of a two front struggle: Ottoman and Caucasian, with

parallel strategic objectives—national autonomy.62 In addition,

the 1907 Congress rejected the proposal on separating Turkish and

Russian-Armenian issues under the banner of the Dashnaktsutiun63;

the congress ratified both the legitimacy and the content of the

“Plan of Action for the Caucasus; adopted the fundamental

principles of the socialist program, declared the ARF to be the

party of the Armenian workers, whom it aims to organize 59 Ibid.,17160 Ibid.,17261 Ibid., 17262 Ibid., 17363 Ibid., 177

Terpandjian 28

politically and economically and whose economic/class and

political rights it intends to defend.”64 The Fourth World

Congress specified goals for Turkish Armenia: “Political and

social freedom, based on broad local autonomy and federative

ties, within the boundaries of a democratic Ottoman state, in

which all elections take place on the basis of general, equal,

direct, secret, and proportional suffrage, without discrimination

by race, religion, or gender.”65 The success of the Fourth World

Congress was based on its ability to reconcile the polar

viewpoints of the Western and Eastern Armenians and affirmed the

“willingness of the ARF to collectively wage liberation struggle

for all Armenians on both borders and officially endowed that

liberation struggle with the humanist vision of socialism.”66In

1911, the Sixth ARF World Congress held in Constantinople in

focused on problems that the ARF faced with their Ittihadist

allies and functioned as a prelude to the end of relations with

the Ittihadists after they had insisted that the Armenians put

aside their demands for internationally guaranteed protection of

64 Ibid. 85.65 Ibid., 8566 Documents for the history of the ARF III 2nd edition Beirut 1985, 315-328

Terpandjian 29

the Armenians and “revolutionary tactics,” and the Dashnaks had

refused. In 1913, the Seventh World Congress in Garin/ Erzurum

(Figure 2) marked the Eastern and Western Bureaus being replaced

by the Bureau of Armenia which centralized the operations center

for both Eastern and Western Bureaus. This effectively

centralized the theater of operations for the ARF.67 In 1914, the

Eighth World Congress in Garin, focused on establishing self-

defense units and forces in the Turkish-Armenian provinces and

marked a foolish attempt to dissuade the Ittihadists from

participating in World War I.68 In September 1919, the Ninth

World Congress of the ARF held in Yerevan, decided to void all

the past minimum political demands of the ARF’s program regarding

Russian and Turkish Armenia and “replaced it with a declaration

of an independent and united Armenia and make every effort to

implement it on the basis of a democratic republic.”69 These

Congresses played quintessential roles in developing the final

identity of the ARF: a nationalist movement.

IV. ARF – Tsarist Russia

67 Dasnabedian, History 179.68 Ibid., 179.69 Ibid., 180

Terpandjian 30

The last decade of the nineteenth century marked a rise

in Russian chauvinism with non-Russians focused on politics and

culture. “The Caucasian Armenians experienced ill-treatment

under the harsh rule of Tsars Alexander III and his son Nicholas

II, who both carried out a policy of Russification against

minorities. The national institutions of the Russian Armenians,

as well as their cultural and political figures----the

intelligentsia—were persecuted. In the eyes of the Russian

government, the Armenians were undesirable elements.”70 The

Tsarist authorities were suspicious of the Armenians “who were

among the most of Russophile of his (Tsar) subjects”71 but they

considered them as untrustworthy and prone to revolutionary

tendencies. This belief prompted both tsars to introduce

policies like the confiscation of the Armenian Church property,

which produced the main result the policies were geared at

preventing, by steering Armenians towards the ARF.

The “Plan of Action for the Caucasus” was a cordial expression

of the Eastern Armenians’ revolutionary outburst against tsarist

oppression. The anti-tsar front had been established on June 12,70 Ibid., 1971 Yves Termon, Les Arméniens, (Paris: Seuil, 1996), 94

Terpandjian 31

1903 when Tsar Nicholas II issued a decree that authorized the

confiscation of all the properties of the Armenian Church, by

the state. This unexpected decision, made within the context of

the policy of gradual Russification of minorities, triggered a

wave of anger and revolt among the Russian Armenians, and the

Dashnaks took charge of this movement. The ARF convinced

Khrimian Hayrig, the spiritual leader of the Armenian Church and

Catholicos of All Armenians72, to reject the decree and refuse to

voluntarily surrender the wealth of the Armenian Church. Also,

demonstrations and public meetings were organized in all cities

of the Transcaucasus, and for a time the external propaganda of

the Dashnaktsutiun was concentrated against Tsarism.

Demonstrations, especially in Yerevan, were often violent and

bloody. ARF assassins executed numerous Russian functionaries

and Armenian collaborators. The popular movement against the

Tsar reawakened the national identity of the Transcaucasian

Armenian bourgeoisie and revitalized the organizational regions

of the ARF in the Transcaucasus.73

72 The equivalent of the Pope in Rome.73 Dasnabedian, History 70

Terpandjian 32

In 1905-06, the Armenian-Tatar massacres broke out during

which the ARF became involved in armed activities. These

massacres were anti Armenian pogroms devised by Tsar Nicholas

II’s administrators and carried out by the Azeris in Baku who

wanted to expand their Pan Turanism movement. The ARF held the

Russian authorities responsible for inciting the massacres as

part of a larger anti-Armenian policy. During that period, the

ARF regarded armed activity, including terror, as necessary for

the achievement of political goals.74 An example of this was May

11, 1905, when Dashnak revolutionary Dro Kanayan assassinated

Russian governor general of Baku, Prince Nakashidze, who was

considered by the Armenian population as the main instigator of

hate and confrontations between Armenians and the Tatars.75

During 1906-1911, the ARF became victimized under the

persecution of Peter Stolypin, the de facto dictator of the

Tsarist regime in that period.76 The Russian government began to

view the ARF as even more dangerous after 1908, when the party’s

74 Ronald Suny, Transcaucasia, Nationalism, and Social Change: Essays in the History of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996) pp. 166–167. 75 Simon Vratsian, Tempest-Born DRO, trans. Tamar Der Ohanesian (New York: Armenian Prelacy, 2000), 13–22.76 Anahide Der Minassian, La Question Armeniene, (Paris: 1983), 107.

Terpandjian 33

role in the political formation of the constitutional monarchy

in the Ottoman Empire, which was formed following the deposing

of Abdul Hamid II, and headed by the Ittihadists, gained the ARF

international recognition for its involvement in the successful

nationalist front. Top functionaries of the regime, the “Black

Hundreds” and even the State Duma accused the ARF of separatist

intentions.77 For Stolypin, “the Caucasian Movement and the

Dashnaktsutiun were nearly synonymous”78. In addition, Okhrana,

the Tsarist secret police, prepared files on the organization

and its known members.79 Teachers, journalists, writers, doctors,

clergymen, craftsmen, and merchants were jailed and all were

accused of being Dashnaks, whether they were or not. Stolypin

considered “the Caucasian Movement and Dashnaktsutiun nearly

synonymous and accused the ARF of being an illegal organization

whose aim was to topple Tsar Nicholas II’s regime by means of

political and economic terrorism. In early 1912, he brought 52

senior Dashnaks to trial and sentenced them to prison and exile

but evidence such as tampered evidence and false testimony 77 Orlando Figes, A People’s Tragedy: The Russian Revolution 1891-1924 (Penguin Books, 1996) 224.78 Der Minassian, La Question 9479 Hratch Dasnabedian, Documents For the History of the ARF (Beirut: II ,2nd Edition, 1985) 330

Terpandjian 34

prompted the acquittal of the senior Dashnaks.80 The tsarist

authorities were disturbed by the revolutionary Armenian

nationalist movement within the Ottoman Empire and feared the

relationship between Eastern and Western Armenia would promote

similar tendencies within Transcaucasia too. Therefore, the

tsarist regime cracked down on the ARF.

As the ARF adopted more of the socialist ideology into

its directive, it distanced itself further from Tsarist Russia.

Still, the ARF did not share any links to the Russian socialists

such as the Bolsheviks, Mensheviks or Social Revolutionaries (SR)

but members had friends or colleagues that were primarily members

of the Bolshevik party. Despite these seemingly turbulent

relations, Tsarist Russia developed an active interest in

intervening in the Ottoman Empire. They were instrumental in the

appointment of European governors for the Armenian provinces in

the Ottoman Empire and encouraged formations of volunteer units

in World War I on the Caucasian Front. Still, the Dashnaks were

reluctant to be a pawn of Tsarist Imperialism yet the ARF still

kept its goal of overthrowing the Russian autocracy. This is

80 Dasnabedian History 94

Terpandjian 35

evidenced, by the ARF's embracement of the February 1917

Revolution in the Russian Empire81 However, Rosdom Zorian, a

veteran enemy of the autocracy, was reported to have exclaimed:

“You don’t understand what is happening; revolution during the

time of war! That is death for the Armenian people.”82 It is

interesting to note how prophetic Rosdom’s words would become.

However, Tsarist-ARF relations were characterized by persecution

and discrimination for their nationalism as well as for

Russification. The role of the ARF in the Turkish nationalist

movement gave the image of the ARF as a threat to the stability

of the Russian autocracy.

V. ARF- Ottoman Relations

While Tsarist Russia tried to impose its policy of

Russification on the ARF and Armenians along with persecute

the organization for its nationalist temperament, the Ottoman

Empire’s relations with the ARF was also characterized by

prejudice, conflict, and oppression. Their relations are 81 Vincent Lima, “The Evolving Goals and Strategies of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation, 1890-1925." Armenian Review 44, no. 2 (1991): xi-xii.82 Simon Vratsian, Along Life’s Ways; Episodes, People, Experiences, Vol 3 (Beirut: Droshak, 1963), 150

Terpandjian 36

marked by countless skirmishes In 1894, the ARF took part in

the First Sassoon Resistance; supplying arms to the local

population to help the people of Sassoon defend themselves

against the Hamidian purges. To raise awareness of the

massacres of 1894-96, members of the Dashnaktsutiun led by

Papken Siuni, occupied the Ottoman Bank in August 26, 1896.

The purpose of the raid was to dictate the ARF’s demands for

reform in the Armenian populated areas of the Ottoman Empire

and to attract European attention to their cause since the

Europeans had many assets in the bank. “The revolutionaries

were to occupy the Imperial Ottoman Bank, with its European

officials and capital. At the same time, noon exactly, the

revolutionaries would bombard the barracks in Samatia, a

suburb of Constantinople and demolish the prime minister’s

carriage as it crossed the Galata Bridge. They would bombard,

from a nearby street, the Ottoman soldiers marching on the

bank and deliver their demands to the European embassies. It

would be hoped that the European powers would intervene by

force, if a disturbance that undermined Ottoman security was

Terpandjian 37

established.”83 Armen Garo, one of the leaders of the

occupation of the bank asked “After all, had not the great

European powers warned the Sultan only last May that they next

time there were any disturbances in Constantinople they would

land the armed forces of their twelve battleships to restore

order?”84 In action, only part of the plan was implemented. The

bank was occupied and fighting occurred in Samatia. The

occupiers of the bank were given some vague promises and safe

passage to Europe, while the sultan organized a pogrom. “Yet,

Armen Garo was outraged at being treated like a common

criminal by French authorities; he felt he was doing them a

service by providing them with the excuse they needed to do

what was to him obviously in their interests: to intervene in

the governance of the Ottoman Empire and appoint European

governors for the Armenian provinces.”85 The operation caught

European attention, but at the cost of more massacres in

Erzurum, Bitlis, Diyarbakir, Harput, Sivas, Trabzon and Van

(Figure 8) by Sultan Abdul Hamid II.

83 Lima, Evolving viii84 Armen Garo [Garegin Pastermajian], Bank Ottoman: Memoirs of Armen Garo, trans. Haig T. Partizian (Detroit: Armen Topouzian, 1990), 103-10585 Lima, Evolving ix

Terpandjian 38

The Khanasor Expedition was performed by the Armenian militia

against the Kurdish Mazrik tribe, who collaborated with the Red

Sultan, on July 25, 1897. During the defense of Van in 1896, the

Mazrik tribe had ambushed a squad of Armenian defenders and

massacred them. The Khanasor Expedition was the ARF’s

retaliation.86 Some Armenians considered this their first victory

over the Ottoman Empire and continue to celebrate annually in its

remembrance. In 1905, members of the ARF organized the Yildiz

Attempt, an assassination attempt on Abdul Hamid II in the

capital city of the Ottoman Empire, Constantinople. The Yildiz

attempt failed to assassinate the sultan because the timed bomb

missed its target by a few minutes. The ARF also lost one of its

founders, Kristapor Mikayelian, in an accidental explosion during

the planning of the operation.87 With their assistance in the

deposition of the sultan by the Young Turks, the ARF hoped to

have their nationalistic goals recognized by the new Turkish

authorities.

86 Dasnabedian History 4587 Ibid., 48

Terpandjian 39

Although the ARF hoped for an improvement in their

relations with the Ittihadists, their hopes for improvement were

dashed when the Ittihadists failed to make Armenia more

autonomous and instead, voiced Pan-Turanist ideals that

eventually culminated into a program for the extermination of the

Armenian population in Turkey. The plan for the total

extermination of the Armenian nation had been worked well before

the war. The Ittihadists knew the ARF and the Armenians were very

strong and their demands clashed with Pan-Turanism. The two

groups could not live in harmonious, peaceful coexistence with

each other because their ideologies were different. The Ittahid

Triumvirate: Mehmed Talaat, Ismail Enver, and Ahmed Djemal

proceeded to systematically murder 1.5 million Armenians in a

‘final solution’ to exterminate the entire Armenian race. The

systematic implementation of this plan began on the night of

April 24, 1915 with the arrest and massacre of the Armenian elite

of Constantinople: writers, poets, artists, scientists,

politicians, party leaders, and clergy. The massacre of already

disarmed Armenian officers and men in the Ottoman army

immediately followed; many of those Armenian soldiers had

Terpandjian 40

performed their duty in the Ottoman army on the Caucasian front,

and many of their Armenian comrades had fallen on the battlefield

while in the Turkish army. The third stage was the extermination

of the Armenian populations in towns and villages, both through

on-site massacres or through mass deportation and exile to the

deserts of Syria and Mesopotamia. Already decimated by starvation

and disease while on the road, deportees were often subject to

massacre. Amidst this, the ARF organization, with its executive

bodies, leadership, and ranks, completely disappeared from the

whole of Turkey, as did the entire Armenian community there.

Since diplomacy had obviously failed, the remnants of the ARF

resolved to military means and participated in battles against

Turkish forces. The ARF forces were led by General Andranik

Ozanyan in areas like Van-Vasbouragan, Daron-Sasoun, Shabin,

Karahisar, Urfa, and Musa Dagh (Figure 8). On May 29, 1918, ARF

forces had successfully defeated the Ottoman Army at the Battle

of Sardarabad and proclaimed their independence in the aftermath.

The Battle of Sardarabad was considered very important because

according to Hovhannes Bagramyan, Marshal of the Soviet Union:

“The significance is great because if the Armenians did not

Terpandjian 41

defeat the Ottomans there, they would have proceeded to

Echmiadzin and Yerevan and then nothing would have remained of

Armenia.”88However, this would not be the last time that the

Ottomans and the ARF would clash.

With the Treaty of Brest Litovsk, the Ottoman Empire recovered

the territories that it had been forced to cede at the conclusion

of the Russo-Turkish War (1877-1878), primarily Ardahan, Kars,

and Batum, and the Armenian provinces. This forced all Russian

troops that were stationed in Turkish Armenia on the Caucasian

Front to fall back to the borders of the Democratic Republic of

Armenia. The Ottoman Empire recognized Armenia as a republic on

June 4, 1918 and signed the Armistice of Moudros with Great

Britain on October 30, 1918 which officially removed the Ottoman

Empire from World War I.

Although the Ottoman Empire concluded its involvement in

World War I, this did not prevent it from having further

relations with the ARF. Despite the establishment of the DRA

acting as a temporary two year pause for the ARF, the Armenians

88 (Armenian), Aramayis N. Mnatsakanian ,ՄՄՄՄՄՄ ՄՄՄՄՄՄՄՄՄ, ՄՄՄՄՄՄ Մ ՄՄՄՄՄՄՄՄՄՄՄՄՄՄ ՄՄՄՄՄՄՄՄ (Marshal Baghramyan: An Outline of His Life and Work) (Yerevan: Hayastan Publishing, 1978) 32.

Terpandjian 42

became involved in a series of skirmishes with Turkish militants

in the district of Oltu (Figure 4), a territory which was under

the jurisdiction of local Muslim warlords. When the Armenians

invaded the district in June 16, 1920, General Kiazim Karabekir

interpreted these skirmishes as an act of aggression and drove

the Armenians out, thus commencing the Armeno Turkish War. The

war lasted until December 1920 with the DRA signing the Treaty of

Alexandropol which forced the DRA to demilitarize most of its

forces and give up most of its pre-war territory and give up all

of the territories it received from the Treaty of Sevres, which

was not ratified by the Armenian government since the Soviet

invasion of Armenia took place. Conflict was the predominant

theme of ARF--Ottoman relations since the goals of both were

conflict inducing because the ARF’s Armenian nationalism sharply

conflicted with Turkist nationalist ideology yet the ARF’s

socialism never bothered the Ottomans.

In response to the Armenian Genocide, the ARF initiated

“Operation Nemesis” in 1921, the mission in which Droshak

operatives would be assigned specific targets who were

responsible for the planning as well as the carrying out of the

Terpandjian 43

Genocide. 89 The operation was entirely successful. This was a key

moment for the Droshak because “Operation Nemesis” demonstrated

“the excellent network that the ARF established through the

transfer of information regarding the targets”90

In short, ARF-Ottoman relations were characterized by

bloodshed, oppression, and attempted genocide not only because of

the ARF’s nationalist ideology but because the Ottomans viewed

the ARF and Armenians as a foreign threat that had to be

suppressed. The Armenian Genocide remains the prime reaction that

the Ottomans Pan-Turanism and the Armenian Question were

incompatible together. Therefore, conflicting nationalist ideals

ruined ARF-Ottoman relations. The massacres of the Armenian

populations under both the Sultan and the Ittihadist’ attempted

genocide highlights that the Ottoman Empire viewed the Armenians,

especially the ARF as a menace. Sultan Abdul Hamid II was a

devout anti-Armenian and perceived the Ottoman Armenians “to be

an extension of foreign hostility, a means by which Europe could

get at our most vital places and tear out our very guts”91

89 Alexander, A Crime 2590 Alexander, A Crime 4591 Altuğ Taner Akçam, A Shameful Act: The Armenian Genocide and the Question of Turkish Responsibility (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2006) 44

Terpandjian 44

VI. The Republic of Armenia

After the fall of both the Tsarist Regime in March 1917 and the

Provisional Government in November 1917, the absence of a strong

central government in Russia prompted Transcaucasia to become

independent.92 The Dashnaktsutiun, for reasons of national

security, was interested in maintaining the integrity of the

loosely-formed Transcaucasian state. But Georgia and Azerbaijan

declared independence, the Transcaucasian state disintegrated,

and the National Bureau, Dashnak dominated, was left with no

choice but to declare Armenia’s independence in late May 1918 and

to mobilize all Armenian resources to defend its borders against

Turkey. The aftermath of the October Revolution, when the Russian

abandoned the Caucasian Front the Armenians faced the Turkish

armies alone and waged a dramatic fight for survival that had

taken on the aspect of popular war. National independence was the

just recompense for that heroic effort, itself the culmination of

long years of revolutionary struggle.93

The government of the established Democratic Republic of

92 Lima, Evolving xii93 Hrant Bastermajian, Histoire De L’Armenie (Paris, 1964), 416-423

Terpandjian 45

Armenia following its declaration of independence after the

Battle of Sardarabad over the Turks, from premier to cabinet

members to the legislature, was dominated by the ARF. It hoped

for international recognition to ensure its security, but that

recognition came too slow.94 The Allies, including the United

States, granted de facto recognition-d jure to follow on the

signing of the Treaty of Sevres. "Counting on Western support,

the Armenians had expected that the area of the six vilayets would

eventually become their new home and this stipulation was

included in the Treaty of Sevres and accepted by Turkey at the

end of the war. According to the treaty, Turkey would recognize

an independent Armenian state, and President Wilson would draw up

its boundaries, but the terms were never implemented (Figure 5).

The reasons were grounded in the person and plans of Mustafa

Kemal, a former Ittihadist, who engaged in a campaign for his own

ascent to power. His plans, stemmed from a deep-seated

nationalism that included the eradication of the Armenian

Republic. In 1920, Kemal invaded Armenia with a Turkish Army as,

with Lenin's approval, a Red Army invaded from the north. Caught

94 Alexander, A Crime 36.

Terpandjian 46

in a pincers between the two, and rather than succumb to Turkish

rule, which recent events had shown to be synonymous with

extinction, the Armenian Republic surrendered to the Eleventh Red

Army, eventually to become one of the fifteen Soviet

Republics.”95

The organization left an indelible mark on the life of the

Armenian Republic both on the legislative and executive levels

of government. The four consecutive heads of government were all

Dashnaks; moreover, all of them formed either entirely

Dashanktsakan cabinets or coalitions. The last Prime Minister

was Simon Vratsian, who occupied his position from November 23,

1920 until the sovietization of Armenia on December 2, 1920.96 At

various levels of government ARF leaders and fieldworkers worked

to bring the newly created Armenian state out of the “shapeless

chaos”, to endow it with democratic structures, a socialist

economic and social order, and above all an Armenian character,

with national unity, and integrity as a state.97 Moreover, in

the field of foreign relations, the ARF worked to obtain

95 Ibid., 3796 Dasnabedian, History 12997 Ibid., 129

Terpandjian 47

international recognition of and the necessary assistance for,

the Armenian Republic.98 The fundamental legacy of the Armenian

Republic was the creation of a national outlook and agenda: the

establishment of a united (free and independent) Armenia. With

its historic declaration on May 28, 1919, the government of

Armenia adopted the principle of a democratic united and

independent Armenia as a political platform to be pursued by the

state itself.

As the government of Armenia, the ARF found it necessary to

supply military assistance to the army, with its own units. Men

such as Murad of Sepastia99 would train the new army based on the

experiences they underwent. The army even helped the Bolsheviks

in Baku following independence when the city was besieged by

Azeris and Tatars. However, this lone episode of cooperation was

unique because of the Azeris and Tatars assaulting the

Bolsheviks and Armenian forces in the city. Elsewhere, the ARF

did not find any appeal in Bolshevism.

VII. ARF-Bolshevik(Soviet) Relations

98 Ibid., 12999 Murad of Sepastia (1874 — August 4, 1918) was one of the well known fedayees of the Armenian national liberation movement. He would later fight alongside the Bolsheviks during the defense of Baku and died in combat.

Terpandjian 48

Contrary to the positions of the tsarist autocracy and

the Ottoman Empire, the Bolshevik Party was prepared (at least in

theory) to accommodate the aspiration of the oppressed minorities

of the Empire by revising its program that subscribed to the view

that the right of self-determination could be granted only to the

proletariat of any oppressed nation. This also included

Armenians as well.100 Scholar Ronald Kowalski notes that “for many

Bolshevik, self-determination was increasingly little more than

'a diplomatic game which has to be played in certain cases'. But

played it was for the Russian Civil War, no doubt as a weapon

against the Whites who remained wedded to a One and Indivisible

Russia.”101The Russian Revolution in 1917 and the lifting of

tsarist repression gave the ARF the opportunity to pursue its

goals in the Russian empire with more freedom, optimism and

enthusiasm. The ARF adopted a policy of collaboration with

Russia-with the Petrograd Provisional government and then after

the revolution of November 1917 with the Bolsheviks. 102 It also

100Ronald Kowalski, The Russian Revolution (New York: Routledge, 1997) 167101 Ibid., 167102 Rubina Peroomian, “Dashnaktsutiun -Bolshevik Relations, 1918-20: Dashnaktsutiun’s Quest for Peaceful Coexistence” Armenian Review 46, no. 1/4 (1993): 157

Terpandjian 49

should be noted that there was a good amount of Armenian

Bolsheviks in Transcaucasia. However, Bolsheviks in Armenia

declared: “a nationalistic unity and a collaboration between the

bourgeoisie, the proletariat, the peasantry, and the imperialist,

petty bourgeois Dashnaktsutiun in the lead is a betrayal of the

tactics and the revolution of the international proletariat”103

This stance of the Armenian Bolsheviks never changed with regard

to the ARF and the Republic of Armenia, thus stifling the

possibilities of long term ARF-Bolshevik cooperation.104 The

declaration made by Armenian Bolsheviks paralleled Bolshevik

teachings on the nationalities. The Bolshevik government wished

to reinforce communism and implement its principles but for a

time, however, Bolsheviks in Moscow were cautious not to alienate

ethnic elements in the former Russian empire lest they would lose

their support. Although they had just ousted the Provisional

Government, the Bolsheviks had rival factions to deal with like

the royalist White Army.

103 (A.N. Mnatsakanian, ed., The Great October Socialist Revolution and the victory of Soviet Rule over Armenia: A collection of documents and materials) (Yerevan: Academy of Sciences of Armenian SSR, 1960) no. 45 pp 73-74)104 Peroomian , “Dashnaktsutiun” 158

Terpandjian 50

The Brest-Litovsk treaty, struck a deadly blow to the

Russian-occupied lands of Western Armenia. Lenin agreed to hand

over to Turkey the districts of Kars, Ardahan, Batum and the six

Armenian vilayets 105(Figure 2). The declaration “about Turkish

Armenia”, signed by Lenin and issued on 31 December 1917 “granted

autonomy to Turkish Armenia, but it also called for the

evacuation of the Russian army from the Caucasian front. With

Russian military operations halted there and the borders left

open to Turkish aggression, the Armenians were not capable of

holding on to the Western Armenian lands.”106 Rather, the treaty

of Brest-Litovsk foiled the creation of an independent Western

Armenia as well as called for revolution to spread soviet rule

all over Transcaucasia.107 Scholar Bagat Borian, who later became

a victim of the Soviet Purges said: “By withdrawing the Soviet

troops from the Turkish front,” he reasoned, “Lenin intended to

prove to Turkey that he did not follow the tsarist imperialistic

policies. In that context the Armenian Question was only a means

not a goal”108

105 Provinces; Richard G Hovannisian, Armenia on the Road to Independence, 1918 (Berkeley: Univ of California Press, 1967), 101-105106 Peroomian , “Dashnaktsutiun” 158107 Ibid., 159108 Hovannisian, Armenia on the Road 100

Terpandjian 51

Following the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, the ARF was struggling

for a favorable settlement of the Armenian Question. According to

Rouben Ter Minassian, the ARF had three options: “(1) ;lean

towards the Turks, (2) go against their Transcaucasian neighbors

and Turks and rely on the Allied Powers (3) sever ties with

neighbors and allies and trust Bolshevik government in Moscow and

the activists for support and arbitration in the region.”109

Instead of adopting a specific course of action, it explored

possibilities on all three because the ARF was divided. During

the period before Armenian independence-from the Bolshevik

Revolution to 28 May 1918—in the absence of direct relations, ARF

leaders relied on the goodwill of Armenian Bolsheviks to mediate

with the Moscow government. Despite mutual criticism and

animosity, the ARF leaders attempted cooperation with the

Armenian Bolsheviks, some of whom were former classmates or

friends.110 The Brest- Litovsk treaty and the declaration of

Armenian independence on May 28, 1918 made the breach between ARF

and Bolsheviks wider. The ARF being the key player in the

109 Rouben Ter Minassian, The Memoirs of an Armenian Revolutionary Volume 7. Los Angeles: Horizon Press, 1952. 138-139110 Ibid., 160

Terpandjian 52

formation of free Armenia and the republic’s administration

apparatus came under heavy criticism by Armenian Bolsheviks to

whom the concept of Armenian independence was preposterous.

Nationalism antagonized the Armenian Bolsheviks. Nonetheless, the

independence of Armenia changed ARF-Bolshevik relations because

the Dashnaks attempted in vain to persuade the Bolshevik

government to extend recognition to the republic of Armenia. The

Bolsheviks were not ready to make such a commitment while still

preoccupied with factions like the Whites in their civil war and

consolidating their power and spreading it all over the Russian

Empire.

The Ninth World Congress of the ARF advocated reaching out to all

Russian factions with power to help their cause. It had adverse

effects on ARF Bolshevik relations; Soviets were suspicious of

Armenian relations with anti Bolshevik forces. From the Ninth

World Congress of the ARF which placed important framework for

Armenia’s foreign relations, a resolution passed read: “Despite

an absolute goodwill toward the Russian people and the political

revival of Russia, our diplomacy should resist the Russian

government’s attempts to spread Russian domination over former

Terpandjian 53

Russian Armenia and to hinder the realization of United

Armenia”111 The ARF attempted to establish relations with the

White Army commander General Anton Denekin as well as Admiral

Kolchak in Siberia, hoping that in case of a White victory over

the Bolsheviks, the already established relationship would

benefit the Armenian people.(Figure 9) However, Denekin firmly

stated that although he recognized the existence of governments

fighting against Bolsheviks in the outlying regions of the

Russian empire, the interests of all Russia would supersede in

future relationships with them.112

An exceptional case of ARF Bolshevik cooperation developed in

Baku in 1918. Baku was the only region under Soviet rule in the

Caucasus. Ironically, while the Mensheviks, the Muslims, and the

Dashnaks were struggling against the Bolsheviks, in all of the

Caucasus, in Baku alone, an ARF-Bolshevik joint military campaign

was initiated against the invading Turkish army. The ARF’s

incentive for this cooperation was the protection of the city’s

Armenian population , whereas the Bolsheviks took into account

111 Excerpts from the decisions of the ARF Ninth General Congress, Yerevan: Urardia Press, 1920, p.g.6 112 Simon Vratsian, Republic of Armenia, (Tehran: Alik Press, 1958), 34.

Terpandjian 54

the ARF’s tremendous influence among Armenians in Baku, they now

had a considerable military force ready to fight against Turkish

force with fedayees like Hamazasp in charge and Murad of Sepastia.

Despite the unsuccessful outcome, amazing was the extent of

cooperation, and the ARF hoped the goodwill shown towards

Bolshevik rule in Baku would allow the Bolsheviks to be more

lenient of the ARF113 The turn of events in Baku further

deteriorated Bolshevik ARF relations. The joint military campaign

had not been able to stop the Turkish army, which continued to

tighten the siege and threatened to capture the city. Despite the

protests of the Bolsheviks, a British regiment was invited to

assist in the Baku defense.114 The Bolsheviks secretly left but

were arrested and seemingly executed by a British force stationed

in Baku, but the Bolsheviks blamed the ARF for the murders.115

Despite increasing Bolshevik anti government agitation, Armenian

government welcomed Bolsheviks expelled from other parts of

Transcaucasia for two main motive reasons: many of the Armenian

Bolsheviks were personal friends of the ARF leaders and fellow

113 Peroomian , “Dashnaktsutiun” 163114 Ibid., 164115Ibid., 165

Terpandjian 55

socialists, sharing persecution and prison during the tsarist

regime. There was also the hope of using Bolsheviks as mediators

to procure the Moscow government’s goodwill toward independent

Armenia. 116This was foolish because the Armenian Bolsheviks were

still committed to undermining the ARF regardless of personal

relations between both parties and this made the ARF Bureau

become criticized: for having developed close ties with the

Bolsheviks, thus, inviting the suspicion of the Allies; and for

not recognizing the importance of the Bolsheviks in the Caucasian

arena.117

During the Armeno- Turkish war, unexpectedly, the Bolsheviks

forged a treaty with the Kemalists which was finalized by the

Russo- Turkish Treaty on August 24th. This treaty stipulated

mutual assistance to facilitate the transportation of men and

equipment through each other’s territories. According to the

treaty, the Moscow government denied recognition to any treaty

signed by a Turkish representative without the consent of

Nationalist Turkey (The Treaty of Sevres was therefore

116Ibid., 166117 Ibid., 166

Terpandjian 56

discredited by the main representatives). Upon receiving news,

Kemal authorized his general Kiazim Karabekir to begin his

military campaign against Armenia and commence the Armeno Turkish

war. This was too much for the Armenian government who then made

appeals to the European Allies and to the Bolsheviks to help. It

should be noted that they were not aware of Russo Turkish secret

agreement and Moscow in turn accused Armenians of antagonizing

assaults on Turkey.118 The Bolshevik-Kemalist plot against Armenia

became all the more apparent especially after Azerbaijan fell in

April 1920. The Azeri Communist Body began to harass Armenia by

raising the issues of Karabakh, Zangezur and Nakhitchevan and by

provoking internal instability

At this point, Armenia was caught between two fires, Turks from

the West and the Red Army from Idjevan. The intervention of

Moscow seemed to be indispensable. A large group of Armenian and

Azeri Bolsheviks came to deliver an ultimatum demanding, the ARF

to renounce the Treaty of Sevres and accept Moscow’s arbitration

in defining and finalizing borders of the republic as well as

118 Ibid., 173

Terpandjian 57

being granted passageway for the red Army to be allowed to cross

Armenia in order to reach Kemalist troops.119

The signing of the Act of Sovietization of Armenia put an end to

ARF-Bolshevik relations for 1920. Why was Armenia sovietized when

the Bolsheviks were indifferent? According to Moscow officials,

the Russian relationship with the Allied Powers was another

factor that promoted the sovietization of Armenia. It was not

feasible for Russia to reach India and confront the British

there. Kemalist Turkey, which had received substantial aid from

Bolshevik Russia for use against the Allies, was doing nothing of

the kind. ON the contrary, the Turkish Army was using the

military aid to expand eastward. Thus, the threat to Bolshevik

Russia in Transcaucasia and especially in Armenia did not come

from the Allies, whose promises to guard Armenia against Turkey

and Russia remained unfulfilled. The Bolsheviks knew very well

that the Allies had lost interest in the Caucasus, especially

Armenia, and were trying to normalize relations with Nationalist

Turkey. The real danger came from Turkey and Pan-Turanist

aspirations. An Armenia completely dependent on Turkey would have

119 Ibid., 173

Terpandjian 58

been a constant menace to them, and that menace had to be

eliminated.120

In the spring and summer of 1921, the resistance in Mountainous

Armenia, which Soviet Russia had declared “disputed territory”

was doing all it could to prevent Zangezur from being forcibly

annexed to Soviet Azerbaijan. In this grave situation, the

responsible entity of the ARF in exile made a last attempt to

avert bloodshed. It expressed its willingness to stop resistance

upon receiving firm guarantee that Zangezur will become part of

Soviet Armenia.121 During this time, the makeshift body

administering the ARF’s affairs abroad decided to hold talks with

the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Russia. The talks

took place in Riga in the summer of 1921.122 The purpose was to

receive firm guarantees that Zangezur would become part of Soviet

Armenia and not Azerbaijan. The Riga delegates had a mandate to

make certain concessions in return for the active pursuit of the

integration of Turkish Armenia by the Bolsheviks.123 Although the

120 Ibid., 180121Hrachik Simonian."The Last Try: The Dashnak-Bolshevik Talks in Riga, 1921." Armenian Review 44, no.2 (1991): 53122 Lima, Evolving xiii-xiv123 Ibid., xiv

Terpandjian 59

Armenian Bolsheviks proclaimed that Zangezur would definitely be

annexed to Armenia after being liberated from the Dashnaks, there

was no guarantee that this would be done. The ARF gave no merit

to this proclamation and continued to defend the last remnant of

the fallen Republic of Armenia.

The ARF appointed a delegation for this in May 1921. The

delegation consisted of Vahan Papazian (chair), Vahan

Navasardian, and Arshak Jamalian, to initiate contact with Soviet

authorities. The delegation made it clear that the purpose of

these talks would be to initiate cooperation in examining and

resolving conflicts like the one Zangezur. Suggestions were sent

to Lenin, who suggested that the RCP delegation consist of Ter

Gabrielian, Adolf Abramovich Ioffe, and V.A. Ter Vahanaian. The

signatures of Lenin and Zinoviev and the approval of the

Politburo serve to highlight that the RCP would agree to

negotiate but any further cooperation would be politically

intangible.124

The Bolshevik delegates responded by saying that there was no

reason to believe that Turkey would cede territory to a 124Ibid., 57

Terpandjian 60

desovietized Armenia, to the protection of which Soviet Russia

would have no commitment; on the other hand, they insisted, the

Communist party of Russia was committed to respecting the right

of nations to self-determination within ethnically defined

borders, without which the spread of the proletarian revolution

would be hindered by the fear of Russian imperialism. They argued

that they respected Armenia’s sovereignty, ironically supporting

this contention with reference to the fact that they had just

refused to infringe on it by negotiating with the Dashnaks on the

matter of Zangezur. 125

The persecution that began and was directed above all against the

Dashnaktsutiun, the political hatred exhibited toward it-a

consequence of the fact that for decades the Dashnaktsutiun was

the predominant force in Armenian life-forced the Dashnaktsutiun

to leave the homeland for which it made so many sacrifices.”126

During this time, Zangezur and Karabakh were under assaults by

the Red Azerbaijanis who had the full fledged assistance of the

Red Army. With the involvement of the Red Army in the fight, ARF-

125 Ibid., xiv126 Simonian, The Last Try 64

Terpandjian 61

Bolshevik relations entered a new phase consisting of diplomatic

negotiation, coupled with armed confrontations. The situation was

a reflection of the Bolshevik policy of military aggression and

territorial occupation.127

The Armenian Communist representative in Moscow, Sahak Ter

Gabrielian called for a meeting whose outcome was to negotiate

with the ARF with several conclusions hoping that

"...negotiations will probably have an appropriate influence on

the working peasantry of Zangezur, even if [the negotiations] do

not lead anywhere.(1). A peaceful end to the problems in Zangezur

and Karabakh (2) falsely claim of the Dashnaks having

negotiations with Kemal Pasha and harboring schemes against

Russia and Transcaucasia. (3). A huge part of the Armenian

intelligentsia, which is sympathetic to the Dashnaks, is probably

uncomfortable with exile, and if given certain "guarantees" by

the central committee of the Russian Communist Party (RCP), is

willing to return to work. This was important because the RCP

correctly perceived the Armenian intelligentsia as being

necessary to Armenia, and if the negotiations went well, it would

127 Ibid., 169

Terpandjian 62

not be a loss. (4) They also claimed the Dashnaks were planning

an attack on a Soviet representative to attract the attention of

the European democrats to the "Armenian Question". According to

Ter Gabrielian, the talks would "help draw the intelligentsia

into the work of Soviet Armenia"128

The claim with Kemal was false because even if the Dashnaks

wanted to negotiate with Kemal, Kemal would have had no reason to

negotiate with them. Kemal, after all, had close relations with

the Bolsheviks. In addition, the claim that Dashnaks were

planning a terrorist act is not credible either. It was clearly

intended on the part of the Armenian Communists to mislead the

RCP and provoke it to be extremely intolerant of the Dashnaks.

Plus, Ter Gabrielian rules out any cooperation between the

Armenian Communists and Dashnaks as well as Dashnak involvement

in the affairs of Soviet Armenia because: "it makes no political

sense"129

The Dashnak delegates challenged that the actual practice of the

Communists does not correspond to their theories. He said that he

128 Simonian, The Last Try 57129 Ibid., 56

Terpandjian 63

could sign his name to anything the Communists proclaimed in

meetings, but what they do in real life is something totally

different. He went on to say that he is convinced that the

Armenian people are opposed to Soviet rule in Armenia and if the

Russian troops were not there, the Soviet government would fall

immediately. The existence of the Soviet government in Armenia is

wholly dependent on foreign support.130 Ioffe objected and said

that the sovietization of Armenia took place not because Russia

wanted it, but because local conditions required it and Russia

naturally assisted. The Dashnak delegates pointed out that when

it became clear that Armenia would not voluntarily relinquish its

independence, Russia decided to use brute force and did so hand-

in-hand with Turkey. Ter Vahanaian said that the democratic

government of Armenia fell because of the pro-Entente policies it

pursued in spite of the fact that the Armenian people are pro-

Russian no matter what government exists in Russia. Furthermore,

he said, Armenia has an economic interest in Russia. The

catastrophic idea of creating a Greater Armenia with the help of

the Entente and the fear of tying the destiny of Armenia to

130 Ibid., 113

Terpandjian 64

Soviet Russia-the Russia to which the Armenian masses are so

well-disposed led to the downfall of the Dashnak government of

Armenia.131

Meanwhile, in Tiflis, the Caucasian Bureau of the central

committee of the RCP was examining the question of whether to

make Mountainous Karabakh part of Armenia or Azerbaijan, and the

leader of Soviet Azerbaijani government, Nariman Narimanov,

claimed that if Karabakh is not made part of Azerbaijan, the

Azeris, who supposedly have a great deal of influence among all

the segments of the people, will rise in rebellion and overturn

the newly formed government. The discord of Armenian Communists

weakened the party. Thus, in one case Armenian Bolsheviks

belittled the Dashnaks, and thereby weakened the position of

Armenia in Moscow, while in the other case Narimanov played up

the role and significance of the Azeris, and in that way

increased the leverage of Azerbaijan in Moscow.132This serves to

highlight how Soviet Azerbaijan received Zangezur, Karabakh and

131 Ibid., 63132 Ibid., 59

Terpandjian 65

Nakhitchevan from Russia, both of which should have been given to

Armenia since they were historically part of Armenia.

On July 15, 1921, Lenin received word from Lukashin,

secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of

Armenia that the Dashnaks had fled Zangezur and the city was

under Red Army control. He wrote that since Soviet power has

been firmly established in Armenia, the Armenian Communist Party

considered further negotiations with the Dashnaks inappropriate.

On the seventeenth, the RCP central committee received a

communiqué from Lenin who stated, "I agree with comrade Lukashin

and propose the agreement be decisively and immediately

rejected. I propose the following decision be adopted immediately

by telephone: "The draft agreement about the Dashnaks, signed by

Ioffe and the other comrades in Riga, be decisively and

immediately rejected. In my opinion, such an agreement is not

only wrong but also dangerous is definitely correct. On the

twenty-sixth the members of the Politburo were consulted by

telephone. They agreed with Lenin's proposal. Thus, the agreement

initialed by Ioffe was rejected. Thus the negotiations with the

Terpandjian 66

Dashnaktsutiun ended and the Bolshevik leaders of Armenia

achieved their goal133

Throughout their relationship, the Soviets did not hide the

fact that national aspirations for a united country, which the

ARF espoused, were diametrically opposed to the policies of the

Soviet government. A united homeland for Armenians was considered

reactionary and nationalistic. The nationalism of the party, its

cardinal interest in the welfare of the Armenians as a nation,

and the methodical manner in which it championed the Armenian

Question did not hold the interests of Soviet Communism. While the

Communists were insisting on class war, the ARF was advocating

the concept of a supra class nationalism.134 Therefore, the

Bolsheviks believed that it must suppress the ARF’s nationalist

movement. Thus, ARF- Soviet relations were characterized by

oppression135

The Armenian Bolsheviks were successful in campaigning to abort

any attempt of ARF-Bolshevik rapport. For reasons of personal 133 CPSU, Central Committee, Marxism-Leninism Institute, Central Party Archive,fund 4047, index 1, item 194, pp. 1-2, addendum no. 1134 Ara Caprelian, “The Armenian Revolutionary Federation and Soviet Armenia” Armenian Review 28, no. 3 (1975) 284 135 Ibid., 291

Terpandjian 67

gain—an opportunity to rule a country—and following faithfully

the Communist ideology of internationalism, they could not bear

to see the burgeoning of a state within the boundaries of an

empire inherited by the Bolsheviks.136

The statement made by Krassin, a high ranking Soviet official, said:

“We do not have a special interest, neither economic, nor political in Armenia. Armenia is not valued as a mediator in international relations either. You do not have a network of railways. You do not have Baku or Batum. We will never let go ofBaku, and for that matter of Azerbaijan, but Armenia is different. We do not wish to spread our territorial dominion; we are not only interested in lands; we have enough… As to the regime, Armenian Bolsheviks have convinced us that that the Armenian nation aspires to Communism. If that were not true, we would have gone against imposing our regime over you… We need an independent Armenia to separate Azerbaijan from Turkey, the vaster the better. Don’t let our friendly relations with Turkey fool you. That relation is temporary. And if Turkey manages to expand to reach common borders with Azerbaijan, it will constantly incite the Azerbaijanis against us”137

This statement highlights the reason why Bolsheviks undermined

the political relations with the ARF. It could be safe to say

that the ARF’s nationalist ideology led to their eventual

expulsion from Soviet Armenia. Armenia remained loyal to Russia

for years, while Russia did not remain loyal to Armenia.

136 Peroomian , “Dashnaktsutiun” 179137 Avetis Aharonian, From Sardarabad to Sevres and Lausanne (Boston: Hairenik Press,1943), 22-23

Terpandjian 68

VIII. Conclusion

The ARF’s ideological mix of socialism and nationalism

inevitably soured all of its political relations, especially with

the Soviets. This close association had its drawbacks for the

Armenian state because “Western powers were unsympathetic towards

a government run by a party whose platform advocated socialism at

a time when the Russian Revolution had resulted in the formation

of the first socialist sate in history. Conversely, its

nationalist program made it a foe of Bolshevism and hence earned

it the enmity of the Soviet regime.”138 The long history of the

Armenian People was permeated by oppression and cruelty inflicted

by one foreign tyrant after another. The ARF’s “principal

ideological achievement was bringing together a literate elite,

local activists and peasant guerillas into a single party.”139The

main aim of the organization initially a reform movement with

obtaining economic and political reforms for the Armenians in

Anatolia gradually transformed into a revolutionary party aiming

for independence from the Ottoman and Russian empires. With the

138 Rouben Paul Adalian, Historical Dictionary of Armenia. (Maryland: Scarecrow Press, 2002), 74139 Adalian, Historical 73

Terpandjian 69

establishment of a series of networks throughout the Russian and

Ottoman Empires ,plus Europe and the United States, the ARF was

able to establish different organs that would take or direct

specific actions. To achieve its goals, the ARF supported

guerilla activities, political actions, and in particular held a

series of congresses that would help establish their political

and military motives. These congresses also helped reconcile

opposing viewpoints and establish internal unity. This was the

key behind the ARF’s ideological achievement: “bringing together

a literate elite, local activists and peasant guerillas.”140 The

ARF was and is still considered “a tightly knit disciplinarian

organization with grass roots mechanisms in many centers.”

Although it is not as revolutionary and popular today, it is

nonetheless financed “mainly by membership dues and

sympathizers.”141

The ARF was the most nationally conscious element active in

Armenians affairs since the last century. Second, the ARF needed

to be reassured that the past attempts of the party to liberate

Armenia, and its activities especially during 1918-20 were not

140 Ibid., 73141 Ibid., 77

Terpandjian 70

expended in vain. Together with their allies in the Moscow

leadership, Armenian Bolsheviks were doing everything to abort

the ARF’s quest for peaceful coexistence with Soviet Russia. They

shaped opinions in the leadership and influenced policies and

decisions.142 Within the environment of an independent state, the

Dashnaktsutiun not only operated as a truly political and

parliamentary party--one, moreover, that held governmental power-

but also kept intact its military and revolutionary traditions,

deploying party resources to consolidate the state and secure its

Armenian character. The ARF remained the only real force capable

of inspiring the remnants of the Armenian people and the newly

liberated homeland with a social ideology, a national agenda, and

the will to survive. According to Ara Caprelian, the most

nationalist among the Armenians in the Diaspora were “the

Dashnaks and their followers. These people as a group, more so

than others, were concerned with maintain an Armenian resource to

defend its borders against Turkey."143 The statement made by Dr.

David Brandenberger that “..even films and literature were

142 Peroomian , “Dashnaktsutiun” 180143 Caprelian, “ARF-Soviet Armenia” 292

Terpandjian 71

assailed for promoting "nationalist and reactionary opinions”144

highlights that nationalist and reactionary opinions of groups

such as the ARF were not looked upon favorably in Soviet Russia.

Thus, the polar ideologies that the ARF espoused ruined its

political relations with others.

IX. Literature Review

Throughout my research, I have realized that four

sources have been essential to my research in answering my

question of why the ARF’s ideology often placed the organization

in conflict with Tsarist Russia, the Ottoman Empire and Soviet

Russia. Each one of these sources not only provided a plethora of

information, but also analyzed issues both broad and specific,

that pertained to the question I was aiming to answer in my

thesis. These sources along with the others helped to demystify

the topic I was writing about.

144 David Brandenberger, National Bolshevism: Stalinist Mass Culture and the Formation of ModernRussian National Identity 1931-1956 ( MA: President and Fellows of Harvard College, 2002) 188

Terpandjian 72

The first source I considered essential was The History of the

Armenian Revolutionary Federation Dashnaktsutiun (1890-1924) by Hratch

Dasnabedian not only because it chronologically listed all

Dashnak activities but that it offered visual aids and analyzed

why actions were taken. Dasnabedian’s sources included the

memoirs of senior ARF members and it felt like his book provided

me with insight into the head of men like Simon Vratsian, Rosdom

Zorian, and fedayees like Armen Garo. In addition, Dasnabedian

provides information on the ARF doctrine and objectively

rationalizes how the Dashnaktsutiun achieved their goals. Without

this source, my research would have been severely limited because

none of my other sources successfully capture the timeline, the

doctrine, and the visual representation of the Armenian

Revolutionary Federation.

Although Dasnabedian’s History of the Armenian Federation

Dashnaktsutiun was instrumental in my research, Roubina Peroomian’s

“Dashnaktsutiun -Bolshevik Relations, 1918-20: Dashnaktsutiun's

Quest for Peaceful Coexistence” and Ara Caprelian’s: “The

Armenian Revolutionary Federation and Soviet Armenia" were

important sources that factored into my research because

Terpandjian 73

Peroomian’s article offered analytical insight into the ARF-

Bolshevik relations and marked the reasons why the ARF failed in

its negotiations with the Bolsheviks. Caprelian offers insight

why the ARF did not like the Bolsheviks by illustrating the

policies that the Bolsheviks and later the communists placed on

the ARF as well as the Armenian people following the exile of the

ARF from Soviet Armenia. Caprelian and Peroomian both are

consistent in their rationalizing that nationalism and socialism

combined posed problems for the ARF in their political relations.

Both Peroomian and Caprelian explain and analyze the

relations of the ARF with the Bolsheviks and Communists, but

another gem I discovered in my sources came from Vincent Lima’s

article entitled: "The Evolving Goals and Strategies of the

Armenian Revolutionary Federation, 1890-1925." This source was

very helpful because Lima highlights the evolving means and

objectives that the ARF pursued from its inception till its exile

from Armenia by the Communists and some of the underground

activities it participated in afterwards. Lima points out the

circumstances that led to ARF oppression as well as conflict in

the different political relations of the ARF. Lima makes

Terpandjian 74

excellent points such as explaining the failure of the Treaty of

Sevres for the ARF came because it was signed when both Kemalist

Turkey and Soviet Russia were pressuring the Democratic Republic

of Armenia to make a decision. Therefore, I considered Lima’s

article to be valuable in the development of my paper. Although

some sources were relatively redundant and overlapping, similar

conclusions can be drawn from these sources and point towards

three positive conclusions. First, the ARF merged two different

schools of thought: socialism and nationalism but the drawback to

this achievement took the form of isolationism from both the

Western Powers and Russia for both parties recognized the

Dashnaktsutiun’s inclusion of the other’s ideology. Second, the

organization kept true to its original mission which was the

eventual creation of a free and independent Armenia but this

fidelity to their creed fostered trouble in the early 20s between

the Armenian Bolsheviks and the Dashnaks to the extent that the

feud compelled the Central Communist Party in Moscow to give

Artsakh to the Red Musavatists and the absorb Armenia into the

Soviet Union. Lastly, the Armenian Revolutionary Federation was

able to successfully mandate Armenians worldwide to retain their

Terpandjian 75

cultural heritage and their success therein is still visible to

this day.

Bibliography

1. Adalian, Rouben Paul. Historical Dictionary of Armenia. Maryland: Scarecrow Press, 2002- Adalian’s entry is an objective view on the Armenian

Revolutionary Federation and offers a broad and reliable socio-historical background to the politically still quite unsettled and economically devastated present day Armenia.

2. Aharonian, Avetis. From Sardarabad to Sevres and Lausanne. Boston: Hairenik Press, 1943- Aharonian’s book explores the perspectives of both Dashnaks

and their rivals on the treaties of Sevres and the subsequent Lausanne treaty. He explores the Treaty of Sevres and the beneficial outcomes it held for Armenia. In addition, Aharonian takes a look at the

3. Akçam, Altuğ Taner. A Shameful Act: The Armenian Genocide and the Question of Turkish Responsibility. New York: Metropolitan Books, 2006- Akçam’s book tells the story of the Ottoman Empire’s

slaughter of 1.5 million Armenians in 1915 as well as theearlier massacres perpetrated by the Red Sultan. Akçam tries to reconcile two Turkish historic narratives: one that depicts an empire that was consistently in conflict and made the victim by Western powers and internal nationalist movements and the other that details the attempted eradication of an entire people, among persecution of other minorities. He uses Ottoman, European and American sources to explore both narratives

4. Alexander, Edward. A Crime of Vengeance: An Armenian Struggle for Justice.Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2008

- From this source, I draw on the ARF’s strength post 1915 as well as its ‘network’ built abroad following the ousting of the ARF from Armenia.

Terpandjian 76

- Edward Alexander relies on historical archives of several countries which include Germany and the United States. Being a retired foreign service officer, he knows the value of facts and documents facts well.

5. Bastermajian, Hrant. Histoire De L’Armenie. Paris, 1964 - This source documents a history of Armenia and offers

critical perspective from an Armenian living in France,who is a member of the Dashnaktsutiun. He was a member of the Pro Armenia editorial staff.

6. Brandenberger, David. National Bolshevism: Stalinist Mass Culture and theFormation of Modern Russian National Identity, 1931-1956. MA: President and Fellows of Harvard College, 2002.

- Although not directly pertaining to the time period of active ARF involvement in Soviet Russia, Dr. Brandenberger makes a reference that Communists suppressed all forms of nationalist ideology and representation.

7. Caprelian, Ara. "Some Aspects of the Armenian Question and the Armenian Revolutionary Federation." Armenian Review 29, vol. 4 (1976): 373-401

- History of the post-World War I diplomacy indicates howand why Armenia lost its independence. The Armenian Revolutionary Federation still actively works for a just solution to the Armenian question and has a clear and publicized strategy with this as its goal. This is promoted by publications, demonstrations, memorials of Turkey's attempted genocide of Armenians. It also publicizes and protests present injustices perpetrated by Turkey against its Armenian citizens. Based on a doctoral dissertation presented by the author to New York University, entitled 'The Armenian Revolutionary Federation: The Politics of a Party in Exile

8. Caprelian, Ara. "The Armenian Revolutionary Federation and Soviet Armenia." Armenian Review 28, vol. 3 (1975): 283-311

- Discusses the history of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation in Armenia and in exile and its role in establishing the Republic of Armenia in the USSR 1890s-1975

Terpandjian 77

9. Caprielian, Ara, “The Armenian Revolutionary Federation: ThePolitics of a Party in Exile.” PhD dissertation in PoliticalScience, New York University, 1975.

- Caprelian’s dissertation helps explain the activities of the ARF following its exile from Soviet Armenia.

10. Dasnabedian, Hratch. The History of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation Dashnaktsutiun (1890-1924). Italy: Oemme Edizioni, 1989.

- Dasnabedian’s book is a compendium of the ARF’s historyand focuses on a broad spectrum of issues that deal with all its aspects.

11. Dasnabedian, Hratch. Documents for the History of the ARF. Lebanon: Beirut, 1985.

- This source documents all the notes from the World Congresses, the “General Theory” various dispatches sent out by the Eastern and Western Bureau, notes from regional meetings, and the declaration of Armenian Independence. It helped me understand more about the political organization of the ARF.

12. Dasnabedian, Hratch. "The A.R.F. Record: The Balance Sheet of Ninety Years." Armenian Review 34, vol. 2 (1981): 115-126

- Examines the political, social, and economic factors inArmenia from 1830 to 1889 and the Armenian cultural renaissance of the 1840’s, which led to the formation in 1890 of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation. Discusses the federation’s military activity from 1890 to 1921 and mounting terrorism from 1890 to 1895.

13. Figes, Orlando. A People’s Tragedy: The Russian Revolution 1891-1924. USA: Penguin Books, 1996.

- Figes’ has areas in his book that discuss Armenia’s relationships with Russia both during the time of the Russian Empire and the Bolshevik/Soviet regime so I will draw on examples from this source.

14. Geifman, Anna. Thou Shalt Kill: Revolutionary Terrorism in Russia, 1894-1917. USA: Princeton University Press, 1993.

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- Geifman’s book explores the revolutionary unrest in Russia from the autocracy until the November Revolution in 1917. She gives excellent attention to the Russification policies that the Tsars Alexander III and Nicholas II enacted on minorities, including Armenians and the political responses that followed as a result.

15. Hovannisian, Richard G. Armenia on the Road to Independence, 1918. Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967.

- This source gives detailed information on the route theARF took on the road to establishing the Democratic Republic of Armenia. In addition, this source explains why the Treaty of Brest Litovsk signed by Russia was sodetrimental to the work of the ARF.

16. Hovannisian, Richard G. "Mountainous Karabagh in 1920: An Unresolved Contest." Armenian Review 46, vol.1/4 (1993): 1-36.

- Recounts the disappearing hopes of the Armenian majority of Nagorno-Karabakh of being politically united to the geographically separated Republic of Armenia, from the treaty of 22 August 1919, by which they temporarily accepted autonomy within Azerbaijan through violations of that agreement, the mission of Arsen Mikayelian from the (Armenian Revolutionary Federation) to Karabagh, the 8th Assembly of Karabagh Armenians, and armed conflict to the ultimate loss of the region as both Armenia and Azerbaijan became Soviet republics.

17. Kaligian, Dikran Mesrob. "The Armenian Revolutionary Federation under Ottoman Constitutional Rule, 1908-1914." Dissertation Abstracts International  65 (2004)

- This work utilizes the internal documents of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation [ARF] to examine Armenian-Turkish relations for the brief period of constitutional rule in the Ottoman Empire. It integrates this resource with the existing research on the last years of the empire, as well as the archives of the British, American, and German diplomatic corps. By reducing the overemphasis on central government

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policies and by describing unofficial contacts, political relations, and provincial administration and conditions, it provides a fuller picture of this key period in Ottoman history. This work sets out to resolve many of the conflicting conclusions in the current historiography including the question of whether or not the ARF and Armenian community largely remained loyal to the constitutional regime and only resumed their appeals to Europe after the government's repeated failure to implement promised reforms.

18. Kowalski, Ronald. The Russian Revolution. New York: Routledge, 1997

- Collection of documents and sources reviewing the ever-changing debate on the nature of the Russian Revolution. The collection provides excerpts from newspapers, memoirs and literature, complete with commentary and background information on sources and has some sections dealing with the ARF.

19. Lenin, Vladimir Ilyich. Yerkeri Liakatar Zhoghovatzu (Complete Collected Works). Moscow: Progress Publishers, vol. 53. 75-76

- This work from Lenin examines his attendance at the conference in Moscow that would determine whether or not to have negotiations with the Dashnaktsutiun.

20. Lima, Vincent “The Evolving Goals and Strategies of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation, 1890-1925,” Armenian Review 44, no. 2 (1991): vii-xix

- Introduces an issue containing four articles about the ARF, chronicling the history of the nationalistorganization from its founding in Tbilisi, Georgia, by Russian Armenians, through its struggles for Armenian independence from the Ottoman Empire and the political changes due to the genocide during World War I, the Turkish nationalist movement, and the Russian Revolution. It was a very helpful source to utilize not only because it covers the

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different goals and strategies of the ARF but it comes from an unbiased source: a person who does not have anyArmenian connection and is looking at the organization from an objective viewpoint.

21. Mnatsakanian, Aramayis N. The Great October Socialist Revolution and the victory of Soviet rule over Armenia: A collection of documents and materials.)Yerevan: Aypetrat, 1960.

- Mnatsakanian explains in her article how the Dashnaks were perceived by the Russian Bolsheviks and the Armenian Bolsheviks and the steps Armenian Bolsheviks took to undermine rapport between the ARF and the Bolsheviks.

22. (Armenian) Mnatsakanian, Aramayis N.ՄՄՄՄՄՄ ՄՄՄՄՄՄՄՄՄ, ՄՄՄՄՄՄ Մ ՄՄՄՄՄՄՄՄՄՄՄՄՄՄ ՄՄՄՄՄՄՄՄ (Marshal Baghramyan: An Outline of His Life and Work). Yerevan: Hayastan Publishing, 1978

- Mnatsakanian writes about Marshal Baghramyan who was anArmenian military officer that took part in the Battle of Sardarabad and later joined the Red Army when the ARF was ousted from Soviet Armenia. He explains the importance of the battle that guaranteed Armenian’s independence. Mnatsakanian has excellent documentation throughout her book.

23. Pastermajian, Garegin (Armen Garo). Bank Ottoman: Memoirs of Armen Garo. Translated by Haig T. Partizian. Detroit, MI: Armen Topouzian, 1990.

- Armen Garo was an Armenian fedayee and among the leadingDashnaks in Constantinople (present-day Istanbul). He was one of the leaders of the debacle at Bank Ottoman and chronicled his experiences and beliefs in his memoirs.

24. Peroomian, Rubina. “Dashnaktsutiun -Bolshevik Relations, 1918-20: Dashnaktsutiun's Quest for Peaceful Coexistence.” Armenian Review 46, vol. 1/4 (1993): 157-182. 

- Peroomian takes a look at the period in which the Dashnaks were keeping the Bolsheviks at bay for as longas they could while possessing ideology that was essentially anti-Bolshevik.

- Reviews relations between the ARF and Bolsheviks both in Russia and Armenia following the Russian Revolution.

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Despite the ARF not being a full independence movement,seeking two autonomous Armenian provinces within the Ottoman Empire and the Russian Empire, Armenian Bolsheviks regarded them as too bourgeois, which, along with the geopolitical threat posed by Turkey, led to the incorporation of eastern Armenia within the USSR.

25. Sevian, Avetis. "The Founding of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation” Armenian Review 34, no. 2 (1981): 127-139.

- An English translation of the original Armenian text, which appeared in the Boston 'Hairenik Monthly' 1936 15(2-17): 57-65 and describes the founding and historical background of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation in 1890. Quotes memoirs and letters of participants and sections of the first 'Manifesto of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation' in order to establish with certainty the founding date.

26. Simonian, Hrachik. "The Last Try: The Dashnak-BolshevikTalks in Riga, 1921." Armenian Review 44, no.2 (1991): 53-70

- The archives of the Communist Party of the Soviet Unioncontain minutes of negotiations in Riga, Latvia, 8-14 July 1921, between the Bolsheviks and the (ARF), both of which were struggling to control Eastern Armenia, the ARF offering to renounce armed conflict if the Soviets would guarantee that Zangezur would be in Soviet Armenia and not in Soviet Azerbaijan.

27. Suny, Ronald G. Transcaucasia, Nationalism and Social Change: Essays in the History of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996.

- This source focuses on the nationalist movement that emerged in Armenia as well as in Azerbaijan and Georgia.

28. Ter Minassian, Rouben, The Memoirs of an Armenian RevolutionaryVolume 7. Los Angeles: Horizon Press, 1952.

- Ter Minassian recounts his life with the ARF throughoutthe years. Very insightful information is present here for an additional read.

29. (French) Ternon, Yves. Les Arméniens. Paris: Seuil, 1996.

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- Yves Ternon is a French historian who devotes his research on crimes against humanity and especially on genocides like the Holocaust, Armenian, and Rwandan.

30. Varandian, Michael. "History of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation." Armenian Review 24, no.1 (1971): 63-72. 

31. Varandian, Michael. "History of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation." Armenian Review 25, no.2 (1972): 76-80. 

32. Varandian, Michael. "History of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation." Armenian Review 25, no.4 (1972): 70-78.

- This trilogy traces the struggle of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation for independence from Russia, Persia, and the Ottoman Empire

33. Vratsian, Simon. Republic of Armenia. Tehran: Alik Press, 1958.

- Simon Vratsian chronicles his time as Prime Minister ofthe Democratic Republic of Armenia.

34. Vratsian, Simon. Along life’s ways; Episodes, People, Experiences Volume 3. Beirut: III, 1963.

- Simon Vratsian chronicles his time with the ARF and recounts his meetings with the founders, fedayees, and foreign dignitaries.

35. Vratsian, Simon. Tempest-Born DRO. Translated by Tamar DerOhanesian. New York: Armenian Prelacy, 2000.

- Simon Vratsian chronicles the life of one of the most important members of the ARF, Drastamat Kanayan, a politician, and fedayee, who sacrificed most of his life committed to the cause of a united, independent Armenia.

36. Excerpts from the decisions of the ARF Ninth World General Congress, Yerevan: Urardia Press, 1920

- Some of the important decisions that the World Congressmade for ARF foreign policy towards the Bolsheviks and the European powers.

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37. CPSU, Central Committee, Marxism-Leninism Institute, Central Party Archive, fund 4047, index 1, item 194, pp. 1-2, addendum no. 1

- This document examines the final decision made by Leninto terminate negotiations at Riga with the Dashnaktsutiun.

Appendix: Maps

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Figure 1: http://conflicts.rem33.com/images/Armenia/armenia_1918_19.JPG

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Figure 2: The Armenian provinces in Turkish Armenia.

(http://www.armenian-history.com/images/maps/Eastern_provinces_Ottoman

-Empire-Western%20Armenia.jpg)

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Figure 3: Adana

(http://www.kaloustian.eu/ARMENIAN%20HISTORY/Maps/Clicia%20Maps/184Kil

ikian-Adana1909.gif)

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Annex to the Treaty of San Stefano, showing the change of the border between the Russian and the Ottoman Empire in the Caucasus.

Figure 4 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:SanStefano4.jpg)

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Figure 5: Partitioning of Anatolia and Thrace according to the Treaty of Sèvres (http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a/a0/TreatyOfSevres_%28corrected%29.PNG)

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Figure 6: Western and Eastern Armenia (http://www.armenica.org/cgi-bin/armenica.cgi?323539021424950=1=3==Armenia==1=3=AAA)

Figure 7: Pogroms and massacres of Armenians in Turkish Armenia (http://www.epektasis.net/picts/image001.gif)

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Figure 8: Genocide map and resistance map (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Armenian_Genocide_Map-en.svg)

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Figure 9: White Army movement during Civil War (http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/5/54/Russian_civil_war_West_1918-20.png)

Red- Frontiers, 1921

Orange- Bolshevik Control, November 1918

Blue- Maximum White Army Advances