The aftermath of disaster in urban areas: An evaluation of the 1999 earthquake in Turkey

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doi:10.1016/j.cities.2004.08.010 Cities, Vol. 21, No. 6, p. 527–536, 2004 Q 2004 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. Printed in Great Britain 0264-2751/$ - see front matter www.elsevier.com/locate/cities Viewpoint The aftermath of disaster in urban areas: An evaluation of the 1999 earthquake in Turkey Ferah Akinci Department of Architecture, Yildiz Technical University, Istanbul, Turkey The earthquake on the 17th of August 1999 in the Marmara region of Turkey took more than 17,000 lives and destroyed more than 280,000 homes. The Turkish Government launched construction pro- jects, but the outcome has been disappointing. Priority has been given to cost-efficient earthquake resistant construction, and functionality was neglected. Important social, environmental, and historical dimensions of the housing were forgotten. This paper presents the results of a study investigating the earthquake housing projects, particularly the Hereke Earthquake Housing Project. This project started in March 2000 and was completed in June 2001. The objective of the study was to evaluate the success of the earthquake housing project; negative points were identified, and the origins of those problems analyzed. Most of the problems were due to the fact that the participation of the general public had not been possible, nor were academic experts consulted. The consequences of those mistakes are elaborated, and what can be done in order not to repeat the same mistakes is discussed. Q 2004 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. Keywords: Earthquake dwellings, Hereke Earthquake Housing Project, Cost-efficient earthquake resistant construction Background Turkey was devastated by a 7.4 intensity earthquake, which occurred at 3:01 am on August 17, 1999. Thousands died and thou- sands more became homeless as a result. The precautions against future disasters that the authorities should have taken by now have still not been systematized although more than three years has passed since then. More earth- quakes are likely, and the building stock of the country still needs to be evaluated for the likelihood of earthquake damage. A flexible feedback model of disaster prep- aration should be prepared. This paper presents the results of a study investigating the earthquake housing projects, particularly the Hereke Earthquake Housing Pro- ject. This project started in March 2000 and was completed in June 2001. This study has been under- taken to contribute to that pro- cess, to review some of what has been done until now, and to make a statement about what can be done from now on. The study is placed within the reality that Turkey is a country of frequent earthquakes. It exam- ines the reason for the loss of life and property, the change in pre- cautions before and after the earthquake (now that three years has passed), what has been done for the present building stock and which criteria have been implemented for the safety and stability of future buildings. It has also been an issue to explore in what ways the government has helped those people who lost their homes and also whether the replacement buildings are meet- ing the user’s needs. The study, examining the houses from pro- ject stage to application stage, has emphasized both positive E-mail: [email protected] 527

Transcript of The aftermath of disaster in urban areas: An evaluation of the 1999 earthquake in Turkey

E-mail: [email protected]

doi:10.1016/j.cities.2004.08.010

527

Cities, Vol. 21, No. 6, p. 527–536, 2004

Q 2004 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Printed in Great Britain

0264-2751/$ - see front matter

www.elsevier.com/locate/cities

Viewpoint

The aftermath of disasterin urban areas: Anevaluation of the 1999earthquake in Turkey

Ferah AkinciDepartment of Architecture, Yildiz Technical University, Istanbul,Turkey

The earthquake on the 17th of August 1999 in the Marmara region of Turkey took more than 17,000lives and destroyed more than 280,000 homes. The Turkish Government launched construction pro-jects, but the outcome has been disappointing. Priority has been given to cost-efficient earthquakeresistant construction, and functionality was neglected. Important social, environmental, and historicaldimensions of the housing were forgotten.

This paper presents the results of a study investigating the earthquake housing projects, particularlythe Hereke Earthquake Housing Project. This project started in March 2000 and was completed inJune 2001. The objective of the study was to evaluate the success of the earthquake housing project;negative points were identified, and the origins of those problems analyzed. Most of the problems weredue to the fact that the participation of the general public had not been possible, nor were academicexperts consulted. The consequences of those mistakes are elaborated, and what can be done in ordernot to repeat the same mistakes is discussed.Q 2004 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Keywords: Earthquake dwellings, Hereke Earthquake Housing Project, Cost-efficient earthquake resistant

construction

Background

Turkey was devastated by a 7.4intensity earthquake, whichoccurred at 3:01 am on August 17,1999. Thousands died and thou-sands more became homeless as aresult. The precautions againstfuture disasters that the authoritiesshould have taken by now havestill not been systematizedalthough more than three yearshas passed since then. More earth-quakes are likely, and the buildingstock of the country still needs tobe evaluated for the likelihood of

earthquake damage. A flexiblefeedback model of disaster prep-aration should be prepared. Thispaper presents the results of astudy investigating the earthquakehousing projects, particularly theHereke Earthquake Housing Pro-ject. This project started in March2000 and was completed in June2001. This study has been under-taken to contribute to that pro-cess, to review some of what hasbeen done until now, and to makea statement about what can bedone from now on.The study is placed within the

reality that Turkey is a countryof frequent earthquakes. It exam-

ines the reason for the loss of lifeand property, the change in pre-cautions before and after theearthquake (now that three yearshas passed), what has been donefor the present building stockand which criteria have beenimplemented for the safety andstability of future buildings. Ithas also been an issue to explorein what ways the government hashelped those people who losttheir homes and also whether thereplacement buildings are meet-ing the user’s needs. The study,examining the houses from pro-ject stage to application stage,has emphasized both positive

1The 17 August 1999 Kocaeli (Izmit)earthquake occurred as a result of themovement of the Arabian and Eurasianplates in a north–south direction, pressing

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and negative aspects—forexample, to what extent did thesenew houses reached their usertargets? For the prediction ofuser needs, a questionnaire wasapplied to the residents living inthe Hereke Earthquake housingsettlement in 2000.

the Anatolian plate to move to the west.As a result of this earthquake happeningon the North Anatolian Fault, the uppernorth part of the North Anatolian Faulthas been broken between Golcuk-SapancaLake, Golu-Akyazı and Akyazı-Golyaka.The fault observed on the landscape isabout 110 km in length. The west end ofthe fault extends from the west of Golcuk,to Yalova-Cınarcık and is approximately72 km. The North Anatolian Fault has theproperty of dominant lateral direction pul-sation and its sliding speed is about 10–20mm each year. The earthquakes occurringon this fault are large and their sizes varyup to M > 7. The lack of precautions isindicated by the loss of lives in 1998 inAdana being repeated in 1999 in Izmit.The region where the North AnatolianFault lies to the south of the Marmara Seais one of high seismic activity couple withpoor ground conditions. In these regions,the ground profile is generally made up ofthick, clay or loose sand layers that insome areas has the potential to liquefy.

The evaluation of the affectarea and the details of theearthquake

Turkish cities are in the midstof an intensive growth and con-struction phase because of in-migration linked to employmentor education. Rapid constructionhas a negative effect on theenvironmental quality of the cit-ies, as these new developmentsare not built to contemporarybuilding standards. This situationis the result of the unplanned andunregulated building process inTurkey, despite the fact that thisis a country that has frequentnatural disasters including floods,

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landslides and earthquakes. TheAugust 1999 Eastern Marmaraearthquake showed the results ofthis in a particularly violent way.Occurring at 00:01:39.1(GMT),the earthquake displayed a sur-face wave magnitude of 7.8(USGS-ABD), a body wave mag-nitude of 6.3 (USGS-ABD), anda moment magnitude of 7.4(ISK-Kandilli; USGS-ABD). Asa result, 17,480 people lost theirlives, and 43,953 people wereinjured. After the earthquake,73,342 buildings, including resi-dences and offices, collapsed orwere subsequently found to bebadly damaged. The total num-ber of structures sustaining somedamage was 244,383. The earth-quake, despite lasting only last-ing 45 s, affected 16 millionpeople in 10 cities—Istanbul,Bolu, Bursa, Yalova, Sakarya,Eskieshir, Kocaeli, Zonguldak,Tekirdag, Golcuk. The damageextended across a considerable

urban region, of some 64,000

km2 (Figures 1–5).1

lding due to unlicensed construction http://www.hurriyetim.com.tr/dosya/istanbuld

Figure 1 Collapsed bui epremi

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Examinations made by staff ofthe Istanbul Technical Univer-sity, Ground Mechanics andCivil Engineering Departmenthas shown that the main reasonthe damage occurred in Adapa-zarı, Golcuk and Yalova isrelated to the substrata. Theother conclusion that has beenreached is that buildings with acorrectly designed foundation didnot suffer damage. Damage toand collapse of concrete build-ings has occurred because build-ing codes designed to ameliorateearthquake shocks have not beenfollowed. The insufficiency of thesteel bars placed in the concrete,the latter’s quality (especiallywhen concrete is prepared inprimitive conditions on worksites, and the removal of columnsby the residents of buildings inorder to enlarge residentialspaces are the main issues thathave been ignored.The supervisory work done by

government is insufficient. Thequestion needs to be asked abouthow the present building stockcan be protected from a futureearthquake. However, most ofthe existing buildings are lackingin quality. The multi-story build-ings that will be damaged andwill never be inhabited again,and the probable loss of lives ina possible 7.5 magnitude earth-

quake, are given by theBosphorus University KandilliObservatory and EarthquakeResearch Institute (Figure 6).The deeper structural problem

that underlies these risk estimatesis the degree of overpopulationthat as resulted from the indus-trialization of the Marmararegion. This reflects incorrectregional development policiesfollowed at the national level.Government encouraged thehigher density in the region by itsvarious investments, despite allthe warnings of environmentalrisk. Government continues itsencouragement of free economiczones and supports populationand economic activity becomingdenser. On soft surfaces, the cre-ation of a denser population

The August 17 quake, measuring 7.4 on the Richter scale. Photos

Figure 2 courtesyof Hurriyet newspaper, Istanbul http://www.hurriyetim.com.tr/dosya/

istanbuldepremi

any mid-rise housing blocks in the region fared poorly durin

Figure 3 M g the quake

Murat Soygenis, AIA, http://www.e-architect.com/news/aiarchitect/oct99/quake.asp

Turkey has experienced 115 quakes in 75 years. http

Figure 4 ://www.e-architect.com/news/aiarchitect/oct99/quake.asp

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despite the high risk of an earth-quake is only possible with parti-cularly detailed and complicatedplanning activity. The area

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potentially affected by earth-quakes has a population that isalmost one quarter of the coun-try’s population. The percentage

of national income for the samearea is over one-third.The exact timing of the pre-

dicted Istanbul earthquake is ofcourse not known. However, theprobability of it happening in thenext 30 years is 65%. Two-thirdsof the building stock of Istanbulconsists of dwellings without aconstruction license or a permit.In light of this, the law [dated03.05.1985, numbered 3194], thatdenies infrastructure to suchbuildings, has to be enforced.According to another piece ofresearch in Avcılar, the mostdamaged area in Istanbul on 17August, of 52 buildings that weredamaged during and after theearthquake, the license and per-mit status of those buildings wereas follows:

. 23 of them were licensed andhad a use permit;

. 13 of them did not have thepermit;

. two of them were totallyillegal;

. and 14 of them were not con-formity with planning andother codes.

As it is seen, the fact that dam-age also occurred in buildingswith a permit makes us contem-plate the quality of buildingsapproved by the government.Another issue that attracts atten-tion in the same study was theinsufficiency of the number ofstaff working for the municipalitywho are available to inspect thesebuildings. As a result of theresearch and interviews in Avcı-lar, Bagcılar, Bakırkoy, and Mal-tepe district municipalities, it wasfound out that the staff wereoverworked and did not get theeducation and training they nee-ded for that kind of work. Forexample, in Bagcılar DistrictMunicipality, three engineers,one architect, and two techni-cians worked in the departmentof Project License in 1998; 1844projects were examined and givena construction license. There is aclear issue concerning the insuf-

eport results of Bosphorus University Kandilli observatory a

Figure 5 R nd Earth-

quake Observation Examination Institute

Figure 6 Collapsed apartments in Adapazari region. http://www.hurriyetim.com.tr/dosya/istanbuldepremi

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ficiency of the number of staffworking in building inspection.For example, the Maltepe Dis-trict Municipality has 11 techni-cians and two vehicles, BagcılarDistrict Municipality has 12 tech-nicians and five vehicles, AvcılarDistrict Municipality has sixtechnicians and two vehicles,Istanbul Municipality has 40technicians and five vehicles. Thistoo is a problem that needs to besolved immediately. As Table 1indicates, the shortage of staffimpedes the control of sub-standard buildings. In addition,interviews showed that the tech-nical staff also need to beinformed about ‘‘the rules andregulations for the buildings tobe built in disaster areas’’, andthey need to be trained pro-

fessionally, in particular, on theproject issues.

Examination of public sectoractivities before and after theearthquake

In Istanbul, the Governorship,Istanbul Municipality and Dis-trict Municipalities have pre-pared disaster plans. However,given the fact that these plans arenot integrated, one with another,it can be understood how muchchaos is likely to ensue in thecase of a disaster. JIKA (JapanInternational Cooperation Agency)and Istanbul Municipality haveprepared a map that is composedof ground examination results.On a district basis, a master planof scale 1/5000, with geological

conditions and the appropriate-ness of settlement maps, has beenprepared by the Ground andEarthquake Examination Direc-torate. With the help of thesemaps, residents can get infor-mation about the ground situa-tions of the settlements in whichthey live. However, this map hasnot been publicized to the resi-dents properly.

Istanbul Governorship hasformed a new organizationalstructure named the DisasterManagement Center (Figure 7).The emergency help groups thatare part of this center are; trans-portation, communication, rescueand lifting ruins, first aid andhealthcare service groups. TheDisaster Management Center ismanaged by a Governor Associ-ate. Its aim is to providecooperation and coordinationbetween institutions before, dur-ing, and after an earthquake, inorder to make sure that the dis-aster is avoided with minimumloss. Activities of the center canbe listed as follows:

. early warning and emergencyintervention project,

7 The organizational structure of the Disaster Management Center

Figure

Table 1 The minimal impacts of the planning process in the context of substandard buildingconstruction

The processes applied to buildings requiring a license

Municipality

Number ofmodificationreports

Sentence fordestructionand fines

Destructionsentencesapplied

Avcılar

856 856 8 Bagcılar 5411 5411 21 Maltepe 581 581 10 Bakırkoy 590 590 0

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. forming a Disaster InformationSystem,

. foundation of disaster associ-ation to provide equipment,

tool, and staff to Disaster Man-

agement Center,. providing caravans and con-

tainers from volunteer institu-

tions, providing and storing

tents to be used in case of a

disaster,. determining air, land, and sea

vehicles that can be used in

case of a disaster and determin-

ing helicopter airfields (there

are 57 helicopter runways in

Istanbul),. training volunteers about

searching and rescuing,. determining and demanding

funds from concerned minis-

tries needed to restore and

strengthen public foundations,. preparation of films, CDs, cas-

settes, and various publications

aimed to improve public con-

sciousness, and foundation of

Afet FM (Disaster FM) broad-

casting for training about

disasters,. allocating the 9th channel that

belongs to The Police Director-

ate as disaster coordination

channel and establishing a

mobile satellite ground ter-

minal that provides continuous

communication during the dis-

aster,. purchasing 210 portable desert

toilets to be used in case of a

disaster or an extraordinary

situation.

Additional research studiesthat the Istanbul Municipality isconducting about earthquakescan be gathered into three maincategories. These are:

. technical studies,

. emergency intervention pre-parations,

. supporting services and coordi-nation.

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In the technical studies cate-gory, there are the DisasterCoordination Center, Groundand Earthquake ExaminationDirectorate, Presidency DefenseSecretariat, Fire Brigade Depart-ment Chairmanship, EmergencyHelp and Life-guarding Director-ate, Connection Planning,Istanbul Water Management,and Istanbul Natural Gas Man-agement. Each department iseducated about how to plan andhow to be in coordination witheach other after the earthquakehappened. The foundation of theDisaster Coordination Center(AKM) is a result of adoptingthe Los Angeles model. After the17th August 1999 earthquake,similar earthquakes happened inGreece, Taiwan, and finally LosAngeles within short periods.Except in Los Angeles, theseearthquakes resulted in the lossof lives and significant propertydamage. So, the Los Angelesmodel has been evaluated for thewhole Istanbul City. Istanbul hasaimed to heal the wounds of aprobable earthquake with thehelp of the Los Angeles model.The Disaster Center will lead theaid, by the help of the data thatwill be collected from 130 moni-toring points, located in differentparts of the city. Ninety monitorslocated on the ground and 40more located on skyscrapers willreport the dimensions of disaster.The AKM personnel will leadthe aid and rescue work accord-ing to these data. Another stepthat the Istanbul Municipality iscarrying out is in emergencyintervention preparation. In this,there are investigations abouthow all the aid units will com-municate with each other in caseof an earthquake, especially atthe beginning.In the supportive services and

coordination category are Tech-nical Works Department Chair-manship, Road Care and RepairDirectorate, ISKI (IstanbulWater Department), IETT (BusConnection) and companies,Directorate of Social and Admin-istrative Studies, and BELTUR

(Cemetery Directorate). Thesesub-sections work to support theintervention units during andafter the earthquake. They pro-vide their equipment for the useof the rescue teams.Further, the Istanbul Munici-

pality has developed the earth-quake sensor project and variousprojects that observe groundmovements, and has started toarrange training seminars aimingto raise first-aid volunteers underthe name Istanbul MunicipalityFirst-Aid Volunteers. It has pre-pared an ‘‘Urgent Communi-cation and Action Plan’’ relevantto a probable earthquake. Finan-cial sources for preparation forsuch an earthquake have beenprovided by the Ministry of Pub-lic Works Disaster Fund, SocialSolidarity Foundation, City Priv-ate Department Budget, CityPrivate Administration Fund,Istanbul Disaster Association,and various donations. More-over, various institutions havebeen using their own budget forthe earthquake preparationactivities. For example, the for-mation of eight Earthquake Rec-ord Stations and the Project ofCity Geology, that are beinghandled by Istanbul Munici-pality, are being paid from themunicipality budget itself. Earlywarning and the emergency inter-vention project is being handledby Bogazici University with theassistance of foreign countries.Law numbered 3194 has been

formulated, aimed at makingsure that buildings are completedaccording to their permits andthe Building Control Law [dated29.06.2001, numbered 4708] andbuilding control institutions havebeen formed, aiming to buildbuildings of high quality and toarrange procedure and principlesof building control. However, theactivity field of building controlinstitutions is of course limited tothe buildings with a license. Dis-aster legislation, formulated afterthe earthquake, includes edictsabout some public improve-ments, as well as the arrange-ments about what to do in

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periods of emergency andrecuperation after an earthquake.Moreover, Obligatory Earth-quake Insurance, Competency inProfession and Building Controllaws have been formed.

The Hereke Project

In the context of these issuesexplained above, the Herekeearthquake houses were chosenas a pilot study area; the inten-tion is the examination of thegovernment’s housing project of1000 houses for the Marmararegion, developed for homelesspeople after the 1999 earthquake.It has been examined to whatextent these houses responded touser needs and necessary stan-dards of technical construction.In this context, the dimensions ofthe study began with the con-struction of the houses andended with the user demands.The project started in March2000, in an area taken over bygovernment near the existingHereke settlement, and it wascompleted in 2001.As a result of the earthquake,

Turkey residents recognized thatthe present building stock is lack-ing in quality and buildings areconstructed without recognitionof the dangers that nature cancreate. Above all, individualchoices and the views of indivi-duals about their residences aresubject to a very importantchange. Individuals are nowsearching for security in the firstinstance. Becoming aware of thereality that earthquakes have notbeen considered as a criterion inthe design of buildings up untilthis period, macro-planning doesnot exist in the country and plan-ning supervisions are insufficientall increase anxiety to an impor-tant degree. Today, stagnation inthe economy diminishes thesociety’s expectations from theconstruction sector and the build-ing process, with the result thatdifferent construction techniquesare put on the agenda and present

construction techniques are beingquestioned.After the natural disaster,

government institutions haveaimed to solve the accommo-dation problem of people withmany possibilities. After the dis-cussions of tent–prefabricatedbuilding systems, the choice wasmade for prefabricated buildings.Through this choice, governmentaims to gain some more time andto form well-planned new settle-ments on more secure ground.After long-term researches, somecriteria are determined, and theseare:

. to relocate the residents on anarea that is nearest to their for-mer settlements,

. to ensure the settlements areopen to development,

. to form the urban infrastruc-ture in totality,

. to form the new settlements tobe good examples to the newbuildings to be built in thefuture,

. to ensure the resistance of thebuilding technique to the earth-quake threat.

According to these criteria, arapid period of mass-housingprojects began and as a result,formation of settlements beganat high speed. Because of thevelocity of the work:

. regional housing needs deter-mination either was not done,or was insufficient,

. the expectations of the resi-dents regarding comfort con-ditions were not considered,

. this large-scale building processto form new cities, arose with-out complete examination fromthe point of view of architec-ture and urban planning.

Urban evaluation of newsettlements

The settlements that aredescribed as new urban fabric

carry two different under-standings. This differentiationchanges according to construc-tion responsibilities (the oneswho are responsible to the Pro-ject Application Department andthe ones who are responsible tothe Prosperity Ministry). Forma-tion of housing types and urbantexture depending on only thisvariable in the whole MarmaraRegion. Local data, land con-ditions, climate conditions, pan-oramic factors are not takeninto consideration and the nega-tive architectural and urbansituations are overcome via theconstruction techniques. Thissituation makes us aware that thefield data are not present in thedesign process. A contrary ideawill lead to the conclusion thatthe urban planning criteria werenot taken into consideration. Ina situation where settlement areadata are present, planning will bepossible in the light of right deci-sions, and this situation willincrease the quality of the ensu-ing urban pattern and also willshorten the process of develop-ment, resulting in minimizingthe cost of construction. But,the housing types that areconstructed by both of thetwo responsible units—ProjectApplication Department andProsperity Ministry—are stan-dardized and constructed underthe same settlement data all overthe Marmara region. Turkey isbeing filled with cities that aresimilar to each other. In a periodwhen urban patterns are gettingsimilar to each other, urban set-tlements are losing their attri-butes. It is obvious that with thesame construction technique andprocesses, qualified project pro-duction is possible. While thebuildings formed as civil archi-tecture, like hospitals, schools,and service units that carry simi-lar aspects, over time governmentincreases the similarity of pro-perty even more. When the kindof changes that urban patternswill undergo are taken into con-sideration, then the formation ofthe feeling of belonging will be

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Viewpoint: F Akinci

insufficient. For example, a num-ber of people living far from theMarmara region are residing inthe same F type housing blocksand having the same children’splaygrounds. So, there is littledifferentiation, taking into con-sideration both physical andsocial needs. As a result of thissituation, the projects areabstracted from the field of scien-tific planning and design. Andurban planning that is not takingthe social situation and expecta-tions into consideration, may dolittle to affect the quality of lifein return.Hereke earthquake residences,

both at the scale of the site planand the things described in thedwellings, are defective. Theleading problem is that instead offorming a settlement, carryingtraces from the historicalaccumulation of social being,meeting the regional needs, con-sidering the future, providing lowstory housing units, carryingmore simple construction techni-ques with private gardens, thereemerged a settlement type that isstandardized and not coveringthe expectations. It can be seenas a positive aspect that theurban pattern can meet all theneeds of infrastructure andsuperstructure planning. Rec-reational arrangements, edu-cational, and commercial areasare forming the best examples tothis. Another positive aspect of

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the project is the forming ofinfrastructural, superstructural,and social equipments, in theform of groups, containing 500families. But, it shows a negativeaspect of the project that most ofthe dwellings are closed off fromviews of the sea, because of theconstruction system.

When we consider thedwellings in the project

Dwellings have structural andfunctional solutions derived fromthe construction technique forthe most part. Multi-story (morethan five) buildings are not con-structed. Buildings are formed tothe height of ground floorþ twostories and ground floorþ onestory. In the dwellings, base-ments are thought as commonuse areas and shelter from dis-asters. All the dwelling units arecomposed of two rooms and aliving room that is open to gen-eral use. Net usage areas are;63–85–107 m2. The kitchen areais open to the outside via a bal-cony. Bath and toilet are in thesame space. Other units are com-posed of a living room for gen-eral use, parent’s bedroom andchildren’s bedroom. All the unitsare sized according to the mini-mum planning possibilities. Theresident’s needs are not takeninto consideration; flexible roomplans are in contradiction with

the understanding of planningpractice. So, the dwellings’ usewill affect the comfort conditions.The physical space needs of afamily with three children areevaluated on the same plane witha family with one child. Thissituation can cause the settlementto have its residents migrate andbe a temporary settlement, lessenthe quality of life, and make thesettlement loose its vitality. Butin addition to this, dwelling unitsall have the equipment like cen-tral heating, hot water, immobilekitchen solutions. This situationwill create demand in an areawhich has housing stock of lowquality and insufficient equip-ment. Dwellings are open to day-light as much as the constructiontechnique allows it to be, heatingprotection is high, physical com-fort conditions are sufficient.This situation reminds us thatthe decision-makers formed theproject solely with the need ofsecure sheltering and physicalcomfort conditions.Building facades take shape

determined from the constructionsystem. Architectural style effectsare compulsory although thebuilders tried to give an effect ofdynamism to the facades. Colorchoices are determined ran-domly. In a situation that similartypes come together on a plot ofland, visual pollution and pat-terns that make it hard to seeoccurs. However, the spaces

General view of the homes under construction

Figure 8

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formed between the buildingblocks are the positive solutionsfor increasing the feeling ofbelonging and neighborhoodrelations (Figure 8).

Conclusions

A series of conclusions can beoffered. First, despite there beingsufficient time for the process offormulating the project, the choi-ces of the residents who will beliving in that area was not takeninto consideration. Moreover,the project lost the option ofbeing a definitive example duringthat phase. Second, projects havebeen formulated without takingany regional data into consider-ation. The similarity of the dwell-ings in every settlement that willbe formed after the earthquake,in other words, the sameness ofthe solutions for the whole Mar-mara region, shows that noattention was paid to the dataobtained from the landscape andthe environment.Third, a model, which is in the

form of two types of general sol-ution and the repetition of sixdifferent types of dwellings, waschosen. It can be assumed thatthis decision was made becauseof the decision-makers’ idea oftypical projects, rather thanbecause of an explanation suchas construction technique or cost.The opportunity to meet resi-dents’ different demands and toobtain new living patterns waslost. The chance to develop newurban settlements, and to takingleadership by guiding other pro-jects in this field, was lost.Fourth, because the dwellings

were not formed according to theresidents’ needs, this will affect theliving quality and standards inthe long term. In the name of sus-tainability, and though there weremodern project solutions availablethat were guided by the historicalaccumulation of architecturalexperience, the designers refused toexplore such an attitude.Consequently, in the housing

blocks, a project solution that is

formed mainly by structurerather than function is present.Whether this situation expressesa new public understanding willbe obvious as time goes by.Fifth, we may ask why, when

such a wide-range project is indevelopment, should not thecommunity benefit from theexperiences of scientists? Whenreviewing the literature, it is seenthat most of the residents expresstheir dissatisfaction with theirdwellings. Volumes such as ‘‘thequality problem in mass hous-ing’’ and studies conducted byThe Presidency of Mass-HousingManagement Prime-Ministry in1996 are relevant here. The pro-jects that have been realized withthe leadership of the publicshould be consolidated with thecontemporary academic conceptsof our era, namely the partici-pation of the public and the par-ticipation of the user. Otherwise,all the projects that are designedare nothing but repetitions ofothers, and progress and flexi-bility are ignored. If user con-tributions had been taken intoaccount, it would have seen thatsingle-family houses are inrequest. Having small, and notmulti-story houses is somethingthat users show no sign of givingup wanting. Living in multi-storyhouses may harm to their mentalhealth, because of the social psy-chology that is developing withregard to the earthquake threat.The fact that most of the usershad relatives who were lostbeneath the earthquake ruins andthat they saw those scenes is con-tinually molding their collectivepsychology. It has reached thepoint that they considered theprefabricated shelters as theirhomes more so than the housesthey have now, except for thenegative issues of heat and noise.So, for the future, houses to bebuilt should be single-familyhouses with small base areas.This new understanding that canalso be applied to row housesalso lets the land be used mosteffectively and to solve the neces-sary issue of housing density.

Sixth, and in the context ofwhat is stated above, the factthat the country is an earthquakecountry has to be understood.The financing, production, andcontrol mechanisms of housingproduction processes must be re-handled in order to make itimpossible to produce housesthat are not resistant to earth-quakes, and regulations aboutthis must be developed.Reinforcement of importanturban infrastructure, urban ser-vice buildings, and buildings indanger of taking damage areimportant physical precautionsthat must be taken beforeanother earthquake occurs. Thework done and being done inLos Angeles must be taken as anexample. The Los Angeles CityCouncil had seen that the build-ings built of stone and brick werethe biggest threat for life orhealth loss and developed a law(number 154.807) that suggeststhese buildings must be strength-ened or completely destroyed.Seventh, the illegal construc-

tion process in Istanbul is con-tinuing with its former speedfrom 17 August 1999 until today.Local managements are eitherinsufficient or insensitive, and theBuilding Control Law is onlyaddressing a small group of resi-dents. The law must be madeeffective and the controls of localmanagements must be obtainedstrictly. Or, a probable earth-quake is going to cause painfulresults. The Local ManagementsReform Law, that has been onthe agenda for years but hasnever been realized, has to bemade valid as soon as possibleand this is important for deter-mining the duty limitations oflocal managements, for the issueslike authority sharing and con-trol. Although three years havepassed since the earthquake, it isa very significant deficiency thatthis law is still not valid. Also therange of the draft law is gettingsmaller and smaller. Moreover,in expectation of another earth-quake, there is occurring aninvasion of the green areas in the

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north of the city and theBosphorus. Instead of condoningthis kind of construction process,thus encouraging the unplanneddevelopment of the city, priorityhas to be given to the improve-ment of existing city patterns.Eighth, within the existing sys-

tem, there is no training given toworkers, craftsman, and con-tractors. This kind of deficiencymust be corrected immediately.

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Among the many activities ofthis type to be done beforeanother earthquake, the first is todetermine the existing buildingstock according to their impor-tance and size (historical build-ings, industrial buildings, publicbuildings, infrastructure facilities,military facilities, tourist facili-ties, mass housing, slums (build-ings without a license), eachgroup’s evaluation and strength-

ening processes, by whom theproject is to be designed, bywhom it is to be financed, bywhom it is to be put into practiceand controlled—all have to bedefined. And finally, the strengthof the existing buildings has to beexamined quickly, determinationshave to be made and precautionsneed to be taken Lives willdepend upon these actions. . .