Size Matters

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Size Matters: The Effects of Political Orientation, Majority Status,

and Majority Size on Misperceptions of Public Opinion

Shira Dvir Gvirsman

Department of Communication

Tel Aviv University

Ramat Aviv

Israel

Tel: 972-3- 6405863

shiradvir@me.com

Running Header: Size Matters

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Shira Dvir-Gvirsman is a senior lecturer in the Department of Communication

at Tel Aviv University, Israel. The author would like to thank Jacob Shamir

for his permission to use the joint Israeli-Palestinian polling project data and

Jacob Shamir, Yariv Tsfati, and Lilach Nir as well as the anonymous

reviewers for their constructive comments on earlier versions of the article.

This material is based upon work supported by the Israeli Ministry of Science

and Technology (MOST), Grant # 3-878 to the author (study 2 and 3) and by

grants from the Jerusalem office of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation and by

the Ford Foundation Cairo Office to Prof. Jacob Shamir (study 1). Any

opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this

material are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the

funding agencies. Address correspondence to Shira Dvir Gvirsman, Tel Aviv

University, Ramat Aviv, Tel Aviv, Israel; e-mail: shiradvir@me.com.

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Abstract

According to cognitive research, members of a social majority are better than minority

members at estimating the consensus, since the latter tend to overestimate the popularity of

their opinion. These differences have been explained using the motivational reasoning model.

The purpose of the current study is twofold: to verify that majority members indeed provide

more accurate public consensus estimations and to test the effect of political orientation on

this relation. Following the motivational reasoning model, it is suggested that proponents of

right-wing ideology will overestimate support for their group, especially when in the

minority, since they have a stronger reaction to political threat. The research involved three

case studies. In the first, data from 33 surveys conducted over 10 years (N=15,129) were

analyzed using multi-level analysis. The results showed that a) majority members are more

accurate in gauging consensual opinions than minority members; b) the gap in accuracy

between majority and minority members increases with the size of the majority; and c) those

holding right-wing attitudes tend to overestimate their group size, more so when in the

minority or when support for their opinion declines. The second case study analyzed data on

four different issues, using a within-subject approach (N=450). The findings were similar,

with the exception of a non-significant effect for majority size. Lastly, in the third case study,

the causal mechanism suggested was supported by an experimental setting (N=388). The

results are discussed in light of the motivational reasoning model regarding information

processing and ideology.

Keywords: Motivational reasoning, Accurate perception of public opinion, Majority,

Minority, Ideology

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Perceptions of public opinion are important, perhaps even more so than what this

opinion is in reality (Noelle-Neumann 1974). It appears, however, that such perceptions are

not very accurate (Fields and Schuman 1976; Scheufele and Moy 2000; Eveland and Glynn

2011). In fact, most people tend to overestimate the popularity of their own opinion among

the general public, and – interestingly – this tendency borders on the extreme in people who

hold the minority opinion on a certain issue (henceforth, minority members). This last finding

has been thoroughly explored in cognitive psychology (Gross and Miller 1997; Krueger and

Clement 1997), but hardly at all in the political context (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1987;

Wojcieszak 2008). If minority members are indeed prone to misjudge their relative weight

among the public, this might have a significant bearing on achieving consensus on different

political issues and other processes, such as political persuasion (e.g., Martin, Gardikiotis,

and Hewstone 2002).

This study investigates misperceptions of public opinion among majority and minority

members, focusing on the role of political beliefs and ideology. According to the cognitive

literature, minority members overestimate the popularity of their opinion among the public,

and the extent of misestimation differs between members holding left- and right-wing

attitudes. This claim is grounded in motivational explanations for political ideology and in

processes involved in estimating consensus (Marks and Miller 1987; Krueger and Clement

1997; Kenworthy and Miller 2001). Minority members’ tendency to overestimate their group

size is a compensatory response to the threat entailed by their minority status (Kenworthy and

Miller 2001). Since right-wing ideology is rooted in the need to manage anxiety and is

characterized by conformity (Tarr and Lorr 1991), minority status can be experienced as a

greater political threat by the right-wing than the left-wing. As a result, proponents of right-

wing ideology will also misperceive public opinion to a greater degree.

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This research is based on three case studies: two were investigated using multi-level

analysis and one was based on experimental design. In the first case study, perceptions

regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict were gauged based on data from 33 surveys

collected over more than 10 years. The second used a within-subject approach and explored

changes in individuals’ perceptions of four different issues. Thus, the two subset analyses are

mutually complementary: the first analyzes perceptions over time, while the second, different

issues. The third establishes the causal relation advanced here.

The findings demonstrate that minority members do indeed overestimate their group

size – but this tendency reflects, for the most part, the impact of a political attitude. In all

cases, proponents of right-wing beliefs consistently overestimated public support for their

side, especially if in the minority and support was waning – conditions categorized here as a

political threat.

Minority/Majority Differences in Accurate Estimations of Majority Size

A meta-analysis carried out by Sunders and Mullen (1983) revealed that the majority

assesses consensus more accurately than the minority. This finding has since been confirmed

by many studies (Mullen and Hu 1988; Mullen and Smith 1990; Gross and Miller 1997). A

closer look at the estimations made by majority members reveals that they tend to

underestimate the prevalence of their standpoint – a factor that rendered their estimations

more accurate (Mullen and Smith 1990). Minority members, on the other hand, consistently

overestimate support for their views.

Such misperceptions of their respective group size by both minority and majority members

can affect political processes in a variety of ways. To begin with, the size of the minority is

overestimated by all members of the public (recall that the minority overestimates while the

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majority underestimates their respective group size). This, in turn, might mean that the

majority opinion will carry less weight in the political process, thereby compromising the

preferences of the majority in order to satisfy the wishes of an “inflated” minority. This effect

could be brought on by several processes. For instance, minority members might be less

willing to compromise, since they overestimate public support for their opinion (Kenworthy

and Miller 2001). Alternatively, when the minority is perceived as large (e.g., 45% vs. 20%)

people are more open to accept its opinion (Martin, Gardikiotis, and Hewstone 2002).

This difference between majority and minority estimations relates to a key question

studied by both political and cognitive scientists: whether one processes information in a

Bayesian-rational or a motivational way (Gerber and Green 1999; Krueger and Funder 2004;

Taber, Cann, and Kucsova 2009). In the case in point, a motivational explanation would

suggest that minority members feel socially threatened by their minority status and therefore

compensate by overestimating the popularity of their opinion (Kenworthy and Miller 2001).

Motivational processing of political information has attracted a great deal of scholarly

attention, but little effort has been devoted to differences between consensus estimations by

majorities and minorities. The handful of examples investigated so far in political research

yielded conclusions inconsistent with the cognitive literature. For instance, Wojcieszak

(2008) demonstrated that minority members overestimate the popularity of their opinion, but

to a much lesser extent than is documented in cognitive research. Huckfeldt and Sprague

(1987) showed that minority members were more accurate in their perception of majority

opinion and more aware of their minority status. These authors made the case for a rational

model (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1988), arguing that minority members are more frequently

confronted with information about their minority status and tend to update their social

perceptions accordingly. They do not disregard this information, as a motivational reasoning

model would have predicted (Taber, Cann, and Kucsova 2009).

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Given these inconsistences, the first research question is:

R1. Do majority members tend to underestimate their group size and, conversely, do minority

members tend to overestimate their group size?

Political Orientation and Motivational Processing

If the motivational model holds true for consensus assessments by minority members,

people with different political orientations perceive their minority status as a threat. That is,

individuals holding right-wing ideology, as opposed to left-wing, are more conformist and

place higher value on the group and on group loyalty (Tarr and Lorr 1991; Cohrs et al. 2005;

Graham, Haidt, and Nosek 2009). Individuals holding left-wing ideology, in contrast,

demonstrate a stronger need for uniqueness (Stern, West, and Schmitt 2014). Since

proponents of right-wing and left-wing beliefs assign different levels of importance to the

alignment between one’s views and those of the group, minority status will encapsulate

different levels of threat to them. One way to reduce this tension is to attribute one’s position

to other members of the group (Burke, Kosloff, and Landau 2013; Zhang and Reid 2013).

This kind of response should be more prevalent among the right-wing than among the left-

wing.

Support for this idea comes from several sources. First, conservatives, in comparison to

liberals, generally tend to overestimate the prevalence of their opinions (Stern, West, and

Schmitt 2014). Likewise, conservative values and other indictors of right-wing ideology have

been linked with higher levels of projection and false consensus (Strube and Rahimi 2006;

Amit, Roccas, and Meidan 2010). As to my claim that they will react strongly to threat,

Zhang and Reid (2013) showed that individuals whose social identity was more strongly tied

to the group were more influenced by social threat, and consequently overestimated the

consensus with their opinion. Furthermore, people with a tendency towards authoritarianism,

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which is closely associated with right-wing ideology (Jost, Nosek, and Gosling 2008), have a

stronger reaction to threat in general (Lavine, Lodge, and Freitas 2005; Stenner 2005;

McCann 2009). For instance, Feldman and Stenner (1997) found that political threat, defined

as perceived ideological distance between self and political actors, affected only

authoritarians. By the same token, being in the minority can be expected to pose a greater

threat to proponents of right-wing ideology and cause them to overestimate their group size –

a mechanism which, as framed by the motivational model, restores a sense of belonging and

reduces threat.

Hence the first hypothesis:

H1: When in the minority, individuals with right-wing attitudes will overestimate the

prevalence of their opinion to a greater extent than those with left-wing attitudes.

The Effect of Majority Size

According to cognitive research, the propensity of minority members to overestimate their

group size grows with the increase in majority size (Mullen and Smith 1990). This reaction

evokes yet again the fundamental question of whether the processing of information is

governed motivationally or rationally (Krueger and Clement 1997; Gerber and Green 1999).

The motivational-processing model assumes that members of different groups will find the

same information threatening to different degrees, and accordingly, react differently (Gross

and Miller 1997; Kenworthy and Miller 2001). In fact, what conservatives are likely to

construe as a threat may be perceived as good news by the liberals. Kenworthy and Miller

(2001) demonstrated that when minority members believe the popularity of their opinion is

declining, they perceive this as a greater threat, and consequently overestimate the size of

their group even more. Majority members, on the other hand, are hardly at all susceptible to

changes in their group size.

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Thus, in accordance with the cognitive literature, I set forth the following hypothesis:

H2. With the increase of majority size, the tendency of minority members to

underestimate it will increase as well.

Hypothesis 1 entails different expectations regarding proponents of left- and right-wing

ideology. Thus, the latter are expected to feel more threatened by their minority status and

therefore to display a more acute response than the former. H2 provides an elaboration in that

it focuses not on minority or majority status as such, but on the direction in which the public

opinion is changing. Based on H1 and H2, a third hypothesis is suggested: Conservatives will

perceive a decline in support for their views as a greater threat than liberals, much like their

response to minority status. Thus, a change towards the left should exacerbate the threat

perceived by the right-wing, increasing the extent of their overestimation and consequently

increasing the difference between misestimations by conservatives and liberals. The opposite

is expected to occur when public opinion moves further right.

Thus, changes in public opinion should affect those with right-wing attitudes more:

H3. The relation between political attitude and misestimation of support for one’s

opinion is moderated by the direction of change in the majority size. Individuals with right-

wing attitudes will overestimate the prevalence of their opinion to a greater extent than those

with left-wing attitudes, when public opinion is changing against them.

Case Study 1: Perceptions of Public Opinion Regarding the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

over Time

Israelis’ perceptions of public opinion regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict were

chosen as a case study for three reasons. First, opinions on this issue is considered a

determinant of an Israeli’s political ideology in general. Second, perceptions of public

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opinion concerning this issue have been studied before, and results have shown that the

majority opinion is in favor of negotiating with the Palestinians (Shamir and Shamir 1997).

Third, misperceptions of public opinion on this issue might have severe political implications.

If the hypotheses of this research are confirmed, it might be that the difficulties in achieving a

compromise stem, in part, from misperceptions regarding the majority opinion among the

general public.

Method

In July 2000, in the wake of the Camp David summit, a joint Israeli-Palestinian polling1

project was initiated; since then, periodic surveys have been conducted every year by the

Dahaf Research Institute (see the Appendix for data collection dates). The present study used

data from 33 of these surveys conducted between July 2002 and March 2012 (total

N=21,953). Each is based on a different representative sample of randomly selected Israeli

citizens aged 18 and older. Dual-frame sampling of landlines and cellphones was used.

Sample sizes ranged from 500 to 1,000 respondents interviewed in Hebrew, Arabic, or

Russian. The sample was stratified according to region; sections were selected with

probability proportional to size. The response rate ranged between 34% and 42% and the

margin of error was 4.0%-4.5% (calculated using the AAPOR’S RR2).

Measures

Independent Variables

Political attitude was measured by asking each respondent, “To what extent do you

support or oppose dismantling most of the settlements in the territories as part of a peace

agreement with the Palestinians?” The answer was given on a scale ranging from 1 (“strongly

1 See: http://truman.huji.ac.il/AboutPolls.asp.

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support”) to 4 (“strongly oppose”). Higher scores indicate a right-wing attitude (M=2.3,

SD=1.1).

Majority size was based on the aggregation of responses to the above question from each

survey. During the years investigated, majority size ranged between 45% and 68% (M=55%,

SD=6.4).2 These data were transformed to indicate majority size in absolute values (M=56%,

SD=5.4).

Majority status. Participants’ political attitude was also recoded to a dichotomous

variable indicating if their opinion was in the majority or the minority, according to the

majority size at the specific time-point (M=.59, SD=.49).

Dependent Variables

In all surveys, respondents’ own opinion on the issue was obtained first, followed by

questions about their perceptions of the majority opinion. Each respondent was asked: “In

your opinion, what percentage of the Israeli public supports dismantling most of the

settlements in the territories as part of a peace agreement with the Palestinians?” Respondents

who provided a numeric estimate were not probed further. Respondents who provided a

general estimate (such as “the majority”) were asked a follow-up question: “What percentage

is that?” Using this technique increased the response rate by 4% (M=48.4%, SD=18.9).

Based on this series of questions, the dependent variable was calculated:

2 To validate this measurement further, it was correlated with a similar measurement of support for peace

agreements. The data come from another series of surveys conducted by the Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace

Research, survey conducted by Prof. Tamar Herman and Prof. Efi Yaar (these data are available for 15 of the 33

surveys, r = .63, p < .01).

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Overestimation/underestimation of group size. I first calculated the difference between

respondents’ estimates of the percentage supporting dismantling settlements and the actual

percentage supporting dismantling in the same survey. This variable ranged from -67

(underestimating support for dismantling by 67 percentage points) to +54 (overestimating

support by 54 percentage points, M=-6.4, SD= 8.0). I then recoded this variable according to

the participants’ political views, so that supporters of dismantlement received a higher score

if they overestimated support for dismantlement, while opponents to dismantlement received

a higher score if they underestimated support for dismantlement. This variable ranged from -6

(underestimating support for one’s side by 66 percentage points) to +67 (overestimating

support for one’s side by 67 percentage points, M=3.7, SD=19.5).

Control Variables

Political ideology was measured using a scale ranging from 1 (extreme left) to 9

(extreme right) (M=5.5, SD=2.4).

Demographic variables included education (years of schooling, M=14.7, SD=3.4); age

(in years, M=44.8, SD=16.9); gender (1=female, 51% female); family income (a five-point

scale, M=2.8 SD=1.3), ethnicity (1=Arab, 14%), and religiosity (a four-point scale, 1– very

religious, 4 – secular, M=2.7, SD=0.9).

Statistical Analysis

A multi-level analysis was conducted (using R, nlme package). The first model tested

RQ1, H1 and H2. The dependent variable was the level of overestimation/underestimation of

one’s group size. The predictors included political attitude, majority status (RQ1), and control

variables at the first (individual) level; majority size as a predictor at the second (aggregated)

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level; and two interactions: between majority status and personal attitude (H1) and a cross-

level interaction between majority size and majority status (H2).

It is important to note that the hypothesis regarding the effect of ideology (H1)

allowed two options for analysis: using a self-placed political-orientation scale or a specific

attitude. The former strategy aligns with the literature on political ideology and conservatism,

and the latter with cognitive literature on bias in assessments of majority size. Thus, all

analyses reported next were conducted twice, once for each measurement. Since no major

differences in the results emerged, and given the primarily attitudinally based literature

addressing consensus estimation, only the analyses based on attitude measurements are

presented.3

To test H3, which predicts that the direction of change in public opinion will impact

the estimations of conservatives more than of liberals, the sample was divided according to

the periods in which public opinion shifted to the right (18 surveys) and to the left (15

surveys).4 This was carried out under the assumption that a change toward one’s own views is

not perceived as a threat, while a shift away is (Gerber and Green 1999; Kenworthy and

Miller 2001). Next, the above-described multi-level analysis was conducted again: once on

the subset of data from periods in which public opinion shifted to the right and once with the

subset of data from periods it shifted to the left. To test empirically if the right-wing are

influenced by a directional change to a greater extent than the left-wing, an additional

interaction, between political attitude and majority size, was included. Therefore, the

complete model for periods in which public opinion shifted to the right included two cross-

3 All other analyses are available as online supplementary material.

4 To measure change of support, lag of support was calculated and the direction of change – left or right – was

determined according to the signal (negative or positive) of the lag score. These results were triangulated with

data collected by the Tami Steinmentz Center for Peace Research, Tel Aviv University.

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level interactions (majority size * political attitude, and majority size *minority status). The

model for periods in which public opinion changed towards the left showed no variance in

majority status: majority opinion was always in favor of dismantling settlements.

Consequently, the interaction between majority status and majority size was excluded.

Results

Figure 1 presents actual public opinion and perceptions of public opinion by majority

vs. minority members. By and large, majority members tend to underestimate and minority

members to overestimate their respective group size (estimation of group size: mmajority=53,

mminority=59; over-under estimation: mmajority=-2.8, mminority=13.3, t(1,12,624)=35, p<.01). These

numeric estimations are very close to those previously documented in the literature (Sanders

and Mullen 1983; Mullen and Hu 1988).

Figure 1 about here

To test the effect of majority size on this relation, multi-level analysis modeling was

carried out in stages, of which the last two are presented in Table 1.5

[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]

The first stage tested a model that included the main effects and control variables. The

results show that both the majority members and the proponents of left-wing attitudes

underestimate their respective group size. The presence of this tendency in majority members

constitutes an affirmative answer to RQ1. Moreover, as is evident in Figure 1, minority

members are less accurate in their perceptions of public opinion than majority members.

5 When testing for slope variability, the model with a random slope is significantly better than the one with a

fixed slope (ICC1=.014; Majority opinion: L. ratio=1131, p<.01; Opinion direction: L. ratio=406, p<.01).

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The second stage introduced interactions into the model. Both majority size (H2) and

political attitude (H1) affect the relation between majority/minority status and estimation

error. The interaction between majority status and majority size was negative: when majority

size increases, the difference between majority and minority members’ estimation errors

increases as well (see Figure 1). This preliminary finding, which lends support to the

motivational rather than the Bayesian-rational approach, was further investigated in the

analysis testing H3, which is presented next.6

Lastly, the level of overestimation displayed by minority members was found to be a

function of their political views. As predicted by H1, those holding right-wing attitudes

invariably overestimated their group size (minority: 23.3 percentage points; majority: 5.6

percentage points), always to a greater extent than the left-wing, especially when in the

minority (minority: 9.5 percentage points; majority: -0.7 percentage points).

To examine H3, the data were divided into periods, according to the shift of public

opinion –right or left – and another analysis was conducted. The model displayed in Table 1

includes an interaction between political attitude and majority size. If the right-wing are more

sensitive to the threat entailed by being in the minority, they should overestimate more as

majority size increases, but only in periods when public opinion is changing against them.

Conversely, when public opinion shifts closer to their attitudes, they should feel less

threatened, even if in the minority. The results support this hypothesis: the interactions

obtained were significant. As Figure 2 shows, among the left-wing, the level of

overestimation was rather stable, but not so among the right-wing. During periods when

6 Following Kruger and Clement (1997), a more detailed analysis of the effect of majority size on minority and

majority members' perceptions was conducted, yielding no support for the rational model. For full details see

online appendix.

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public opinion shifted closer to their views, and therefore the perceived threat decreased, the

right-wing overestimated their group size less, and vice versa.7

Figure 2 about here

In summary, majority members underestimate while minority members overestimate

their respective group size, and this pattern is sensitive to the size of the majority. Yet, there

are major differences in the estimations of those holding left-wing and right-wing attitudes.

The right-wing have a general tendency to overestimate support for their side, which

increases even further when they are in the minority and when they are losing public support.

These results confirmed the motivational explanation for misestimating public opinion.

Conservatives and minority members alike supplied tainted estimations, theoretically, in

response to the perceived political threat posed by their minority status. Additional support

for these results are presented in the online appendix.

Case Study 2: The 2013 Israeli Election

This case study is based on an Internet survey conducted seven weeks prior to Election

Day among a sample of Israeli Jewish voters.8 It uses a within-subject approach to assess the

effect of majority size on perceptions of public opinion regarding four different issues that

stood at the center of the election campaign: social welfare, Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, a

possible attack on Iran’s nuclear installations, and relations between the secular and the ultra-

Orthodox sectors. 7 One reviewer suggested that changes in public support might be attributed to the level of terror attacks. See

Online Appendix for further analysis.

8 Israeli Arabs (who comprise approximately 18 percent of the Israeli population) were not included in this

study.

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Method

Data were gathered by Panels, a survey company specializing in Internet-based

research, between December 23 and 25, 2012. Panels recruits its large panel of respondents

via Internet: sponsored links on Google, Facebook, and other popular sites. Respondents are

asked to take part in periodic surveys in exchange for incentives (gift certificates). The entire

panel comprises more than 40,000 participants, and an average panelist answers 1.2 surveys

per month (no minimum required). It is important to note that in 2012, Internet access among

the Jewish population in Israel was 82% (Dror and Saar 2012) and some estimations put it

even higher, at 98%. Among those who do not use the Internet, two populations are

especially prominent: low-income sectors and ultra-Orthodox Jews, with the latter

underrepresented in other sampling methods as well (Dror and Saar 2012).9

Panels tailors a sample to a study’s aims. For the present study, a random sample of

900 panelists was created, representative of the Israeli population for age, gender, and

geographic stratification. All participants received an email notice with a link to the survey.

Out of 900, 453 completed the survey; 39 did not complete the entire questionnaire and were

not included; and the rest did not enter the survey (AAPOR’S RR2=55%). Participants’

demographics roughly match census figures for age (in years, M=44.4, SD=16.9), income (on

a five-point scale, M=2.6 SD=1.3) and education (on a six-point scale, where 1 stands for

“elementary school” and 6 for “MA or PhD”; 46% hold an academic degree, the same rate as

found in OECD data reports regarding Israel). Women were overrepresented in the sample

(56%, compared to 52% in the general population), and ultra-Orthodox were

9 Ultra-Orthodox Jews refrain from using the Internet for religious reasons, most notably that the content may

entice individuals away from a righteous path. For a more detailed description of biases stemming from the use

of a paid Internet sample, see Chang and Krosnik (2009).

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underrepresented (on a 4-point scale, where 4 stands for “very religious,” M=1.7, SD=0.9;

5.5% compared to 8.2% in the general population and 7% in RDD samples).

Measures:

Independent Variables

Political attitude was measured by asking one question regarding each of the issues

investigated (social welfare, Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, a possible attack on Iran’s

nuclear installations, and relations between the secular and ultra-Orthodox sectors. See

Appendix for exact wording.). The order of items was randomized between respondents and

responses were given on a 7-point Likert-type scale, with 1 standing for “strongly support”

and 7 for “strongly oppose.” These questions were then recoded, so that, in all cases, 1 refers

to a right-wing attitude and 7 to a left-wing attitude. (To align with the direction of attitude

scale in the first case study, the final score was reverse-coded so that 1 refers to left-wing

attitude and 7 to right-wing attitude.)

Majority size was based on the aggregation of responses regarding personal political

attitudes (support negotiations with the Palestinians: 45%; social welfare: 48%; attack Iran:

43%; religious relations: 71%).10 As in the first case study, these data were transformed to

indicate majority size in absolute values (M=58%, SD=7.5).

For majority status, participants’ answers on each issue were recoded to a dichotomous

variable indicating if their opinion was in the majority or minority, according to majority size

(M=.61, SD=.48).

10 These data were compared with responses to similar questions in another Israeli election study. The difference

in means was the margin of error.

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Dependent Variables

Each respondent was asked to assess the percentage of the Israeli public that supports the

attitude of one of the sides on each of the issues (i.e., a two-state solution for the Palestinian-

Israeli conflict; attack Iran, and so on). In three cases, the questions assessed public support

for left-wing parties and in one case for right-wing parties (support for negotiations with the

Palestinians: M=48.2%, SD=18.9; social welfare: M=48.2%, SD=18.9; attack Iran:

M=48.2%, SD=18.9; religious: M=48.2%, SD=18.9).

Directional error in the estimation of public opinion (overestimation/underestimation)

was calculated as specified in the first case study. This variable ranged from -62 to +69

(M=7.0, SD=24.1).

Control Variables

As in the first case study, covariates included political ideology (ranging from 1 for

extreme left to 7 for extreme right, M=3.5, SD=1.3) and demographic variables.

Statistical Analysis

A multi-level analysis was conducted, identical to the one employed in the first case

study. This case study could not test H3 as the data employed were not longitudinal.

Results

Figure 3 presents estimations of group size made by majority and minority members

according to issues. On average, both minority and majority members overestimated their

respective group size (across all issues: group size mmajority=54, mminority=54; over-under

estimation: mmajority=6.0, mminority=8.2). Yet, here too, majority members’ tendency to

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overestimate was lower than among minority members (t(1,1,482)=1.9, p=.06), although not

statistically significant. To test the effect of majority size on this relation, multi-level analysis

modeling was carried out in stages, of which the last two are presented in Table 1.11

Figure 3 about here

The results displayed in Table 1 are similar to those obtained in the first case study.

Specifically: (a) minority members overestimated their group size to a greater extent than

majority members (R1), (b) the right-wing overestimated their group size, and (c) a

significant interaction was found between political attitude and majority status (H1). In

contrast to the first case study, no effect of majority size was found (H2). This could be

attributed to the low variance in majority size.

In sum, although in general, members of the majority – as opposed to the minority –

tend to underestimate their group size, the analyses presented above point to political attitude

as a factor that should be taken into account. In all cases, the right-wing overestimated their

group size to a greater degree than the left-wing, and not once did they underestimate it.

Thus, it seems that the dividing line should be drawn not between majority and minority but

between left- and right-wing ideologies. Majority size did have some effect on the estimation

errors, but it was limited.

Case Study 3: Experimental Design

A third case study was conducted to test the underlying mechanism, that is, to establish

that people holding right-wing ideology, in comparison to left-wing, feel more threatened

when in the minority (H1), and that feelings of threat mediate the relation between ideology

and overestimation (H2).

11 ICC1=04; no significant variance between participants.

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21

Kenworthy and Miller’s (2001) experiment – which was designed to test the effect of

change in majority size on overestimation – was replicated, with the interdiction of political

ideology as a factor. A 2 (left/right opinions are gaining support in the public) by 2 (left/right

political orientation of participant) between-subject design was implemented.

Method

Participants

Using the same online platform (Panels) and the same method of sampling, 400

participants were recruited. Eighteen did not complete the entire questionnaire and were not

included (AAPOR’S RR2=51%). The average age was 43 (SD=14.7), 47% held academic

degrees, and 51% were females (income: M=2.6 SD=1.3). Political ideology ranged from 1

for extreme right to 9 for extreme left (M=4.6, SD=1.9). Data were collected January 7-9,

2014.

Materials and Procedure

Participants were first asked to specify their opinions regarding 13 issues concerning

vast areas, such as social welfare, religious-secular relations, education, civil rights, and

Palestinian-Israeli negotiations (see Appendix for full wording; majority size on these issues

ranged from 48% to 79%, M=60, SD=9.5). The order of questions was randomized. Then, the

following manipulation was randomly presented (alternative levels of variables are in

brackets):

Opinion polls conducted once a month since the last election on a representative

sample reveal a clear pattern of dissatisfaction with the current government. More and

more voters support [are concerned about] the idea of a compromise with the

Palestinians that will lead to the establishment of two states. The dissatisfaction of

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22

Israeli citizens due to the lack of progress [compromise] in the negotiations with the

Palestinians is so severe that polls show support for the government find low.

Participants were then asked to rate their feelings of threat, anxiety, security, and

calmness given this survey data on a scale of 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much). Security and

calmness scores were reversed so high scores indicate low levels of these feelings. The

Cronbach’s alpha for the four-item scale was .86 (M=4.0, SD=1.7).

Lastly, participants were asked to assess public opinion regarding each of the 13

issues in a manner described in previous case studies (overestimation/underestimation was

calculated as specified above. This variable ranges from -15 to +35, M=5.2, SD=8.7).12

Results

The effect of political orientation (H1). Table 2 presents the means and standard errors

of overestimation and of feeling thermometer according to experimental condition and

political orientation, and the results of the ANOVA test. As evident from the table, supporters

of right-wing ideology showed stronger emotional response to the experimental condition:

when in the majority, they felt less threatened in comparison to their counterparts from the

left, while when in the minority, they felt more threatened. This finding lends support to the

first hypothesis presented, that majority/minority status entails different levels of threat to the

endorsers of left-wing and right-wing ideology. As for overestimation, among those holding

left-wing ideology, there was no significant difference in overestimation, no matter if they

were in the majority or the minority. Those holding right-wing ideology, in contrast, showed 12 Manipulation check: The mean estimate of consensus by those told that the right-wing opinion is gaining

power was 2 points to the right in comparison to those told that left-wing opinions are gaining power, t(380)=1.5,

p<.10.

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23

greater overestimation under the minority condition. These results concur with the findings

obtained in the two case studies described above.

[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]

Mediation analysis (H2). To test whether feelings of threat mediated the relation

between political orientation and overestimation, a mediation test was conducted (Hayes

2013).13 As can be seen in Figure 4, being in the majority decreases negative feelings, more

so among those from the right. Negative feelings, in turn, cause overestimation of support for

one’s side and mediated the effect of majority statues on overestimation (left-wing: effect

size=-.46, CI=-1.1 to -0.5; right-wing: effect size=-1.2, CI -2.5 to -1.0).

Insert Figure 4 about here.

In sum, additional support for the hypotheses presented here was found in an

experimental design that established that proponents of right-wing ideology show more

negative feelings when in the minority. As a result, they overestimate the popularity of their

opinion to a greater degree than their counterparts on the left.

Discussion

Previous research suggests that estimations by majority members are more accurate than

those of minority members and as the majority becomes more numerous, minority members

tend to underestimate majority size (Sanders and Mullen 1983; Gross and Miller 1997). This

study explored whether this pattern would hold in a political context and partly confirmed the

assumption. On all occasions examined, minority members overestimated their group size to

a greater degree. In one case, misestimations were impacted by majority size.

13 PROCESS is a SPSS macro supplied by Andrew Hayes (http://www.afhayes.com/). See Apendix for details.

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24

Regarding political issues, the major difference in the extent to which groups

underestimated majority size stemmed not from majority/minority status, but from political

position. Although there is a difference between majority and minority members, the

dissimilarity between the left-wing and the right-wing is striking. The right-wing tended to

overestimate support for their side, regardless of their majority/minority status (Stern, West,

and Schmitt 2014) and were somewhat more sensitive to changes in majority size. The

different responses to change in majority size was further supported by the results of the

experimental design. However, an accurate demonstration of the impact of majority size

could be obtained only in the first case study, where the data showed a bigger change in

public opinion over time. Thus, further investigation is called for.

The above findings lend support to the motivational reasoning model in several ways.

The behavior of minority members and the right-wing aligned with motivational explanations

in the literature far better than with predications based on the Bayesian-rational model

(Krueger and Clement 1997; Kenworthy and Miller 2001). Indeed, minorities were generally

more prone to error and less accurate. Furthermore, another analysis ruled out the rational

Bayesian conclusion as an explanation for the differences (see Online Appendix).

Misperceptions among the minority could also have more general implications. The

issues analyzed are part of an intractable conflict. Misperceptions among the minority group

– whose members object to the peace process – may stand in the way of a peace agreement.

Under the illusion that their opinion is aligned with the public consensus, minority members

have no incentive to back down from their position (Kenworthy and Miller 2001).

My findings regarding the differences between Left and Right fit well with

investigations into the psychological foundations of right-wing ideology in two ways.14 First,

14 Right-wing attitudes observed here were correlated with the general scale for the right-left ideology.

Size Matters

25

Jost, Nosek, and Gosling (2008) suggested that right-wing ideology is motivated by a need

for cognitive closure, which may help explain conservatives’ tendency to consistently

overestimate public support for their side since it is tied to in-group biases in judgment and

conformity (e.g., Shah, Kruglanski, and Thompson 1998).

Second, aligned with the motivational account of right-wing ideology is the finding that

the right-wing showed a stronger reaction to a perceived threat when in the minority and

when public support for their cause was waning. It has been contended that authoritarianism

and conservative beliefs develop initially as a way to deal with chronic anxiety and perceived

threat, and are subsequently primed when the person senses immediate threat (Feldman and

Stenner 1997; Jost, Nosek, and Gosling 2008). Accordingly, an alert that one’s opinion

deviates from the majority could serve as a cue priming conservative motivations – which, in

turn, introduce bias to the assessment process.

It is also noteworthy that the left-wing overestimated their group size when in the

minority. This result fits well with findings from the cognitive literature reviewed above, as

well as with some conclusions derived from terror-management theory (Burke, Kosloff, and

Landau 2013). In light of the motivational model, this bias can be construed as a motivational

response to minority status. An explanation for the results that follows this rationale suggests

that, when threatened, liberals will become more like conservatives in that they will

overestimate majority size, although to a lesser extent. A “conservative shift” (Bonanno and

Jost 2006), will take place – lending further support to the idea that conservatism is

psychologically motivated.

This study is not without caveats. The main drawback is the limited data available for

the time periods in which the majority opinion was hawkish – thus impacting statistical

power and the representativeness of the results. A more thorough investigation of the effect

Size Matters

26

of majority size would require data that include more variance in size and direction. For

instance, no effect of majority size was found in the second case study; yet, given the low

variance in majority size, the meaning of this finding is unclear.

In the future, a more scrupulous investigation of a wider variety of issues should be

undertaken using a longitudinal analysis similar to the one employed in the first case study.

Although the second and third case studies expanded the range of analysis to some degree,

they lacked the depth of analysis offered by the first one. A more extensive longitudinal

perspective could also determine the role of contextual factors other than majority size

(Shamir and Shamir 1997). Likewise, it is important to expand future research across political

context and political systems. This study was limited to the Israeli political arena, and

although its findings concurred with recent US findings (Stern, West, and Schmitt 2014), the

scholarly community is still short of empirical evidence enabling generalization.

Lastly, to measure the estimation error, aggregated support as captured in the present

data was used, and no external data was adduced. This option was chosen since no external

data that could serve as an alternative set had been gathered simultaneously with that in the

corpus. When possible, the data used here were compared to distributions of Israeli public

opinion obtained by other surveys, with satisfactory results. Nonetheless, relying on a single

corpus of data may have skewed the dependent measurement – a possible limitation that must

be taken into account.

The results of this study have more general implications that need to be investigated

further. First, they may be relevant to the “spiral of silence” model (Noelle-Neumann 1974),

which suggests that when we perceive the prevailing opinion is different than ours, our

willingness to openly express our views diminishes. If individuals with right-wing ideology

project more than the left-wing, then the spiral of silence should be asymmetrical. The main

Size Matters

27

force driving it is awareness that one holds the minority opinion (Scheufele and Moy 2000).

It seems, however, that when in the minority, the right-wing is less aware of its minority

status than the left-wing. Consequently, the spiral of silence may occur less frequently in

situations where minority opinion is on the right of the political spectrum.

Second, the results have a bearing on the ongoing debate regarding individuals’ ability

to react in a purely rational manner to social information (Gerber and Green 1999; Taber and

Lodge 2006). It has recently been suggested that the problem is not whether or not people are

rational, but rather the way rationality is defined by scholars. Thus, Kruger and Funder

(2004) note that in research today, any divergence from the exact outcomes anticipated from

purely rational processes is viewed as evidence for human irrationality. For instance,

overestimation of one’s own group size is considered projection, while underestimation is

described as false uniqueness (Brown 1986). Both behaviors are seen as deviations from pure

rationalism. Yet, such a normative criterion might be problematic and we might want to

consider changing the benchmark for rational behavior (Taber and Lodge 2006; Kruglanski

and Boyatzi 2012). Indeed, it has been suggested (Funder 1995) that to achieve perfect

accuracy, an individual needs to go through numerous stages – and this should be

acknowledged by researchers. Moreover, political psychologists have long argued that even if

our information processing is biased, the result could still be adequate (Sniderman, Brody,

and Tetlock 1993). Adopting this realistic approach to rationalism could further the

discussion of our ability to navigate our way rationally in the political world.

Supplementary Data

Supplementary data are freely available online at http://poq.oxfordjournals.org/.

Size Matters

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Size Matters

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Appendix

Dates of surveys for first case study

Poll No. Start date End date 1 7/5/01 7/111201 2 11/14/02 11/26/02 3 4/4/03 4/11/03 4 6/2/03 6/2/03 5 12/7/03 12/9/03 6 3/17/04 3/22/04 7 6/23/04 6/27/04 8 11/29/04 12/6/04 9 3/8/05 3/13/05 10 6/6/05 6/9/05 11 9/11/05 9/19/05 12 12/8/05 12/15/05 13 3/16/06 3/20/06 14 6/11/06 6/15/06 15 12/11/06 12/14/06 16 3/22/07 3/26/07 17 9/6/07 9/11/07 18 12/12/07 12/19/07 19 3/12/08 3/17/08 20 5/25/08 6/5/08 21 10/1/06 10/21/06 22 11/26/08 12/6/08 23 3/1/09 3/7/09 24 5/21/09 6/3/09 25 12/9/09 12/15/09 26 6/6/10 6/16/10 27 9/30/10 10/7/10 28 11/21/10 11/29/10 29 3/21/11 3/28/11 30 6/12/11 6/21/11 31 12/11/11 12/14/11 32 6/17/12 6/21/12 33 11/3/12 3/15/12

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Questions for Case Study 2

Attitudes

To what degree do you agree with the following statements?

1. People should take care of themselves; it is not up to the government to ensure everybody

has a reasonable standard of living.

2. I’m willing to pay a bit more taxes if it will help those in need.

3. To reach a compromise agreement with the Palestinians that includes recognition of the

Israeli state, security arrangements, and a solution to the refugee problem, Israel should

agree to evacuate settlements.

4. The Palestinians are not interested in negotiating for any agreement, thus Israel should

defend its citizens through military force.

5. Israel should take military action against Iranian nuclear facilities since Iran is an

immediate danger to Israel's security.

6. When it comes to Iran’s nuclear capabilities, Israel should consider international public

opinion and try to find a diplomatic solution.

7. It is important to maintain Israel’s Jewish characteristics; it is therefore essential to take

into consideration the needs of the ultra-Orthodox community.

Questions for Case Study 3

To what extent do you agree with the following statements?

1. People need to be responsible for their own standard of living. It is not the role of

government to be responsible for a reasonable standard of living for everyone.

2. I am willing to pay a little more in taxes if it will help the weak in society.

3. Israel must defend itself and its citizens from infiltrators from countries like Eritrea and

Sudan.

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31

4. Deportation and incarceration of refugee seekers from countries such as Eritrea and

Sudan is improper.

5. In exchange for an agreement with the Palestinians that includes recognition of Israel,

security arrangements, and a solution to the refugee problem, Israel much agree to

evacuate settlements.

6. Palestinians are not interested in negotiations for an agreement and therefore Israel must

defend its citizens through military force.

7. Within the framework of school classes, stressing Jewish values and strengthen

attachment to the State should be allowed.

8. It is important that the school system curriculum permit critical debate regarding topics

relating to the Jewish-Palestinian conflict and the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF).

9. Israel should take military action to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons since

Iran is an immediate danger to Israeli security.

10. Regarding a nuclear Iran, Israel must take into account international public opinion and

try to find a diplomatic solution.

11. In a Jewish state it is important to ensure that Jews marry according to Jewish tradition

under the auspices of the Rabbinate.

12. People must be allowed to marry without the involvement of the religious establishment.

13. There must be equality regarding the military draft between the secular and the ultra-

Orthodox and therefore there is a responsibility to draft all male ultra-Orthodox youths

into the IDF.

14. There is a need to preserve the Jewish characteristics of the State of Israel, and it is

therefore important to be considerate of the religious and ultra-Orthodox publics.

15. International public opinion is against Israel because of anti-Semitism.

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32

16. Some international groups and foreign countries are critical of Israel because of its

actions in the Occupied Territories.

17. If people can pay for private medical services there is no reason for the state to prevent it.

18. It is the obligation of the state to provide adequate medical treatment to all of its citizens

without regard to their financial capabilities.

19. The speech of people who denigrate the name of the State of Israel and harm national

morale must be limited.

20. Freedom of speech is essential to the democratic functioning of the State.

21. Israeli Arabs enjoy all the rights of citizenship in Israel and there is no discriminatory

policy against them.

22. Israeli Arabs receive discriminatory treatment in Israel and suffer from racist attitudes.

23. The right of workers to unionize harms economic growth in the Israeli economy.

24. The right of workers to unionize must be protected because it prevents detrimental

employment practices.

25. The IDF is the most moral army.

26. Representatives of the military should not be allowed entrance into high schools to

encourage joining combat units.

In the following questions, you will be asked to estimate in percentages the extent of Israeli

public support for various issues and record them in the empty boxes. The answers range

between 0, indicating total lack of support, to 100, indicating full support:

1. What percentage of the Israeli public supports, in your opinion, the establishment of a

Palestinian state on the ‘67 borders with corrections such as annexation of settlement

blocs? _____ 999. Don't know

2. What percentage of the Israeli public supports, in your opinion, drafting most male ultra-

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Orthodox youths into the IDF? _____999. Don't know

3. What percentage of the Israeli public believes, in your opinion, that citizens, rather than

the state, should be responsible for their own standard of living? _____ 999. Don't know

4. What percentage of the Israeli public believes, in your opinion, that infiltrators should be

incarcerated and deported? _____ 999. Don't know

5. What percentage of the Israeli public supports, in your opinion, military action against

Iran? _____999. Don't know

6. What percentage of the Israeli public believes, in your opinion, that attachment to the

State and Judaism needs to be strengthened in the framework of the school curriculum?

_____999. Don't know

7. What percentage of the Israeli public believes, in your opinion, that Jewish citizens much

marry under the auspices of the Rabbinate? _____999. Don't know

8. What percentage of the Israeli public believes, in your opinion, that international public

opinion is hostile to Israel because of anti-Semitism? _____999. Don't know

9. What percentage of the Israeli public believes, in your opinion, that people should be

allowed to have private medical care that is paid out of their own pocket? _____999.

Don't know

10. What percentage of the Israeli public believes, in your opinion, that the statements of

people who denigrate the name of the State of Israel and harm national morale must be

limited? ____999. Don't know

11. What percentage of the Israeli public believes, in your opinion, that Israeli Arabs receive

discriminatory treatment in Israel and suffer from racist attitudes? _____999. Don't know

12. What percentage of the Israeli public believes, in your opinion, that the right of workers

to unionize harms economic growth in the Israeli economy? _____999. Don't know

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13. What percentage of the Israeli public believes, in your opinion, that representatives of the

military should not be allowed into the high schools? _____999. Don't know

Description of the script used to test the model in case study 3.

To test the model, a formal assessment of moderated mediation was conducted using Hayes’

(2013) bootstrapping technique (5,000 iterations). The latter produces confidence intervals

for both the moderated direct effect and the moderated indirect effect, based on the

distributions obtained from the given data set. This technique is more powerful than the

traditional Sobel test and is rapidly becoming the preferred test for mediation (Hayes 2013).

Since multicollinearity is a typical result of interaction, we used centralized variables and

tested those interactions using regression analyses.

Size Matters

35

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List of Figures:

Figure 1. Actual support for dismantling of settlements and majority and minority

estimations of majority size. Polls are averaged so that those falling within a two-percent

margin are aggregated. To facilitate presentation of data, Figure 1 shows averaged results,

such that all polls with support levels showing a 2% difference (e.g., 50%-52%) were pulled

together. The pattern obtained when using the full set of data was no different and is available

upon request.

Figure 2. Over-estimation /under-estimation of group size according to political

attitude, majority status, and direction of change in majority size. Polls averaged so those

within a two-percent margin are aggregated. The pattern obtained when using the full set of

data was no different and is available upon request.

Figure 3. Over/under estimation of group size according to majority status, for each of

the issues.

Figure 4. Mediation analysis for relation between majority status and overestimation of

popularity of one’s personal opinion among the public. **p < .01; *p < .05. Dashed line =

n.s. relation