Shedding Light on Canada's Foreign Policy Alignment

Shedding Light on Canada’s ForeignPolicy Alignment

JONATHAN PAQUIN Université LavalPHILIPPE BEAUREGARD Université Laval

Introduction

The purpose of this article is to explore the issue of alignment in Cana-dian foreign policy. In recent years, this issue has come up repeatedly inpolicy analyses ~Bow, 2008–2009; Massie, 2014; Paquin, 2012!. The pro-American tone of the Harper government and its political rhetoric to theeffect that Canada is America’s “most reliable ally” have, for instance,revived the debate regarding Canada’s alignment with the United States~Hart 2008; Lennox 2009; Nossal, 2011!. Prime Minister Harper’s posi-tions on the Iranian regime or the United Nations, and the fact that hisgovernment conceded that it would align its policies with US securityregulations in the 2011 Perimeter Security and Economic Competitive-ness Action Plan, are often cited as examples in support of this argument~Byers, 2008!. Others have maintained that, despite the end of the ColdWar, Canada remains closely attached to its European allies because itshares with them common values and interests. As a result, Canada hasacted in conjunction with its European partners on a variety of issuesrelated to multilateral treaty initiatives such as the International Crimi-nal Court and the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Treaty ~DeBardeleben andLeblond, 2010–2011!. Meanwhile, other analysts have asserted that Can-ada is increasingly standing on its own by making unilateral decisions

Acknowledgments: The authors would like to thank the Social Science and Human-ities Research Council of Canada ~SSHRC! and the Fonds québébois de la recherchesur la société et la culture ~FQRSC! for their financial support. Thanks also to DorianeAngers for her excellent research assistance and to Justin Massie and the three anon-ymous reviewers for their helpful comments.

Jonathan Paquin and Philippe Beauregard, Department of Political Science, Univer-sité Laval, Pavillon Charles-De Koninck, 1030, av. des Sciences-Humaines, Québec~Québec! G1V 0A6

Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue canadienne de science politique of 27 doi:10.10170S0008423913000449

© 2013 Canadian Political Science Association ~l’Association canadienne de science politique!and0et la Société québécoise de science politique

on several international issues such as the Kyoto Protocol and the Israel–Palestine conflict ~Robertson, 2011!.

While these assertions are all related to the issue of Canada’s align-ment, they point in opposite directions and leave us with the followingquestions: 1! Are Canada’s responses to international events aligned withthose of its allies, and if so, which allies and why? 2! Is the Harper gov-ernment more in line with Washington than was the previous Liberal gov-ernment of Paul Martin? This article therefore attempts to shed light onthe issue of alignment by moving beyond the simple assertions and anec-dotal analysis that have sometimes exaggerated and distorted Canada’sbehaviour on the international scene.

To answer these questions, we will proceed in two steps. First, wewill test four major theoretical perspectives that may explain Canada’salignment or non-alignment: continental0US dependency, transatlantism,the Anglosphere argument and unilateralism. Using content analysis, wewill test these propositions by focusing on and comparing the responsesof Canada to those of the United States as well as those of France andBritain—arguably Canada’s main transatlantic partners—to six foreign cri-ses that occurred between 2004 and 2011 in the Caucasus, Eastern Europe,the Middle East and North Africa. This longitudinal analysis will allowus to empirically and systematically assess whether the existence of suchan alignment is supported by the facts and, if so, to identify the nature ofthis alignment. Second, our analysis will identify whether there has beena difference between the Harper and Martin governments’ responses toforeign crises and measures whether Prime Minister Harper has been morein line with the United States than was his predecessor. To assess the extentof this possible difference and measure whether a similar rate of align-ment means similar foreign policies between the Liberals and the Con-servatives, an in-depth comparison will be carried out of various importantthemes that were raised by both Canadian governments, such as thosereferring to democracy, stability and multilateralism.

Alignment and Concordance

Before proceeding further, some conceptual precision is in order. Align-ment can be said to occur when a government publicly adopts the posi-tion of another government after the fact, or, to state it differently, whena state modifies or updates its position in order to “bring it in line withthat of another” ~Mace, 2007: 5!. Canada can thus be said to be aligningitself with the United States, for instance, when it adopts a position alreadytaken by the American government. This outcome could result from theUS government calling its Canadian counterpart to express the hope thatCanada will adopt its position but could also originate from a rational

2 JONATHAN PAQUIN AND PHILIPPE BEAUREGARD

calculation made by Ottawa without any interference from Washington.Concordance is a different notion. It occurs when two or more govern-ments adopt the same position at the same time. This could be explainedby convergence between allies, that is, when two or more governmentsshare similar interests and reach the same position without consultingone another. It could also result from co-ordination, that is, when gov-ernments discuss and co-ordinate their positions prior to announcing them.

The next section delineates the logic of the four theoretical argu-ments mentioned above and generates hypotheses that will then be testedon empirical evidence.

Canada as a Continental and Dependent State

Often referred to as “continentalism,” one argument suggests that since theUnited States is Canada’s main economic partner and security providerthrough NORAD and NATO, Canada has no real choice but to align itspolicies and positions with those of the United States, regardless of thepreferences and behaviour of other states and allies ~Gotlieb 2005; Granat-stein, 2007; Hart, 2008!. In the words of Michael Hart, Canada’s strong

Abstract. The purpose of this article is to explore the issue of alignment in Canadian foreignpolicy. The main research question is whether Canada’s responses to foreign crises aligned withthose of its allies, and if so, which allies and why. The study proceeds in two steps. First, it testsfour major theoretical perspectives that could explain Canada’s behaviour: continentalism, trans-atlantism, the Anglosphere argument and unilateralism. By performing a computer-generatedcontent analysis, the article assesses these propositions by focusing on and comparing Canada’sofficial declarations to those of the United States, France and Britain to six foreign crises thatoccurred between 2004 and 2011. Second, the analysis identifies whether there is a differencebetween the Harper and Martin governments’ responses to foreign crises. The research providesquantitative and qualitative evidence suggesting that Canada’s foreign policy alignment primar-ily tends toward a transatlantic orientation. It also shows that the Harper government was lessin line with Washington than was the previous Liberal government of Paul Martin, which chal-lenges the conventional wisdom of Canadian foreign policy.

Résumé. Cet article explore l’enjeu de l’alignement en politique étrangère canadienne et posela question de recherche suivante : est-ce qu’à l’égard des crises étrangère le Canada s’alignesur les positions de ses alliés et, si oui, lesquels et pourquoi? Tout d’abord, l’article présentequatre perspectives théoriques susceptibles d’expliquer le comportement du Canada : le conti-nentalisme, le transatlantisme, la thèse de l’anglosphère et celle de l’unilatéralisme. En ayantrecours à une analyse de contenu assistée par ordinateur, cet article teste la validité de cespropositions en comparant les déclarations officielles du Canada à celles des États-Unis, de laFrance et de l’Angleterre à l’égard de six crises survenues entre 2004 et 2011. Ensuite, l’analysecherche à identifier s’il y a une différence entre les réponses des gouvernements Harper etMartin à l’égard de ces crises. L’étude fournit des données empiriques de type qualitatif etquantitatif qui suggèrent que le Canada a eu une orientation transatlantique lors de la gestionde ces crises internationales. Elle montre également que le gouvernement Harper est moinsaligné sur les positions de Washington que ne le fut le précédent gouvernement libéral, ce quiébranle certaines idées communément admises en politique étrangère canadienne.

ties with the United States are the “indispensable foundation of Canadianforeign policy in all its dimensions ~Hart, 2002–2003: 39!.” For these rea-sons, continentalists argue that Canada’s interests cannot be dissociatedfrom those of the United States. Any opposition by Ottawa to Washington’spolicy positions would not be in Canada’s national interest since such oppo-sition would harm the privileged relationship that Ottawa enjoys withWashington ~Granatstein, 2007: 78!. A recent study of Canada’s manage-ment of the Arab Spring identifies some recurring patterns in the way theCanadian government handled the popular uprisings in Egypt, Libya andTunisia ~Paquin, 2012!. The analysis found that Ottawa generally issuedstatements after Washington had done so and basically restated the samepositions. These findings suggest that Canada’s statements were eitheraligned with or fashioned in co-operation with those of the United States.

Structural arguments have been developed along these lines. Len-nox ~2009!, for instance, argues that Canada’s response to various inter-national events, from the Vietnam War to the terrorist attacks in 2001,has been primarily conditioned by its close and asymmetrical continentalrelationship with the United States. This argument is the logical twin ofthe dependency perspective espoused by critical theorists, who argue thatCanada’s statecraft is dominated by US power ~Martin, 1993!. In 1970,for instance, John W. Warnock, concluded that since Canada’s behaviourwas determined by its structural dependence on its southern neighbour“on all major issues over the past twenty-five years, Canada has stoodfirmly beside the United States.” Warnock added that “our political lead-ers have decided that Canada’s national interests are the same as those ofthe United States” ~1970: 303!.

To validate this argument, the analysis should demonstrate that, whenfacing international events such as foreign crises, Canadian governmentsalign their political positions with those of the United States, regardlessof the positioning of Canada’s other allies, while European states, forinstance, do not systematically follow Washington’s lead. Moreover, ifthe empirical analysis shows that alignment with the US has been con-sistent over time, then the structural aspect of Canada–US relations ratherthan the pro-American leaning of the Harper government would explainthis pattern. The following hypotheses will thus be tested:

H1: Canada’s responses are consistently aligned with those of the UnitedStates.

H2: Canada’s responses are more often aligned with those of the UnitedStates than with those of its European allies (that is, Britain and France).

H3: Canada’s responses are more often aligned with those of the UnitedStates than are the positions of the European allies (that is, Britain andFrance).


Transatlantic Ties

In the literature on international relations ~IR!, transatlanticism refers tothe close co-operation between North America and Europe over security,economic and political issues ~Anderson et al., 2008; Fehl, 2012; Risse-Kappen, 1995!. Several scholars have emphasized the fact that the UnitedStates and Canada continue to maintain strong ties with the Europeancontinent, ties that were forged by colonialism and have been sustainedby a transatlantic military alliance ~NATO! ~Haglund and Mérand, 2010–2011; Pouliot, 2006!. According to this perspective, despite the end ofthe Cold War and the subsequent regionalization of issues, Canada andthe US share close ties with this “community of values” and have retaineda sense of collective identity with Europe. This version of transatlanti-cism emphasizes the “transatlantic triangle” ~that is, Canada, the UnitedStates and Europe!.

In the context of Canadian foreign policy, however, transatlantic tiesusually refer to the relationship between Canada and Europe, known asthe “other” transatlantic relationship. As Joan DeBardeleben and PatrickLeblond argue, “Canada shares with European countries many key val-ues, including those relating to social welfare, international law, andhuman rights” ~2010–2011: 2!. Proponents of this second version of trans-atlantism, which is also known as Europeanism, point out that Canadahas supported most EU resolutions that were submitted to the UN Gen-eral Assembly ~Long, 2003; Mérand and Vandemoortele, 2011!. Someanalysts also emphasize the fact that the European Union is currentlyCanada’s second largest trading partner after the United States and thatCanada is currently embracing a strategy of increasing trade relationswith the EU in order to stimulate growth and reduce its economic depen-dency on the United States ~Deblock and Rioux, 2010–2011: 55!. Thisstrategy echoes Prime Minister Trudeau’s third option, which, in the 1970s,promoted the diversification of Canada’s foreign relations by strengthen-ing its ties to Europe, among other regions, in order to reduce Canada’svulnerability vis-à-vis the United States ~Sharp, 1972!.

In this article, we will test both versions of the transatlantic argu-ment ~that is, the transatlantic triangle and Canada–Europe ties!. If thetransatlantic triangle argument holds true, it should be found that Can-ada, in responding to foreign crises, does not merely align itself with theUnited States but rather tries to co-ordinate or align its responses withthe transatlantic ally that takes the lead in a given crisis, that is, with aEuropean state or the United States, depending on which country expressesits position first. Moreover, if evidence suggests that European states aligntheir positions with those of the United States as often as does Canada,then Ottawa’s alignment is unlikely to be explained by mere continentaldependency and might instead be the reflection of a transatlantic strat-

Shedding Light on Canada’s Foreign Policy Alignment 5

egy, whereby the United States plays the role of Western leader while itsallies act as followers. As for the “other” transatlantic relationship, thatis, Canada–Europe ties, in order for this argument to be validated, ouranalysis would have to show that Canada tends to align itself with eitherBritain or France rather than with the United States. This leads to thefollowing hypotheses:

H4: Canada’s responses are aligned with those of its main transatlanticallies.

H5: Canada and the European allies’ responses are aligned with thoseof the United States.

H6: Canada’s responses are more often aligned with those of its Euro-pean allies than with those of the United States.

Canada: Embedded in the Anglosphere?

In recent years, analysts have paid special attention to the links unitingthe “Anglo-Saxon” world. Authors such as Peter Katzentein ~2012!, KevinNarizny ~2012!, Srdjan Vucetic ~2011!, Christopher Browning and BenTonra ~2010! have dedicated books and articles to this subject, showingthat the evolution of international relations has produced and maintaineda distinct identity among English-speaking nations, usually defined asAustralia, Britain, Canada, New Zealand and the United States, andreferred to as the “Anglosphere.”

Vucetic, for instance, explains that the members of this club share aspecial relationship and a collective identity in international relations,which initially were racially defined by the British Empire and laterevolved around the US hegemonic power. He shows that these affinitieshave been consistent through time despite some disagreements, such asthe Anglo–American opposition during the Suez crisis in the 1950s and,more recently, the Canada–US clash over the invasion of Iraq.

While relatively new in the IR literature, the Anglosphere is quitean old concept. As Peter Katzenstein points out, it was a crucial elementof the tradition of Conservative British politicians such as Winston Chur-chill. The Anglo-Saxon world was perceived as a “community of statesthat @was# united by traits such as liberal values, Protestantism, individ-ualism @...# the use of the English language, common law, parliamentaryrules, and other ancient British traditions” ~Katzenstein, 2012: 1!. FrenchPresident Charles de Gaulle was suspicious of the “Anglo-Saxon peo-ples,” especially the Americans and the British, whom he saw as a polit-ical force that aimed to bring France in line behind American power duringand after the Second World War ~Thomson, 1965!.


The Anglosphere perspective predicts that, when faced with foreigncrises, any Canadian government will stand with its English-speaking part-ners and co-ordinate its responses with theirs. As a mainly English-speaking country, a former British colony and dominion, and a US juniorpartner, Canada will logically take positions that are more in tune withthose of Britain and the United States than with those of continental Euro-pean countries, such as France, for instance. The following hypotheseswill thus be tested.

H7: Canada’s responses are consistently aligned with those of Britainand the United States.

H8: Canada’s responses are more often aligned with those of the Anglo-sphere countries than with those of France.

Canada Acts Unilaterally?

Despite numerous debates concerning Canada’s alignment and Prime Min-ister Harper’s rhetoric about Canada being “the most reliable ally” of theUnited States, several statements issued by the current Canadian govern-ment have, in fact, suggested a tendency for Canada to act unilaterally~Robertson, 2011!. Although unilateralism seems far-fetched as a theoryfor a small nation such as Canada, it has been given some credence byscholars and analysts who have argued that it represents a growing trendin Canadian foreign policy. Some analyses have supported this idea byshowing that Ottawa does not always co-ordinate its diplomatic responseswith like-minded nations and often makes unilateral decisions to empha-size its values and protect its interests in the world. This approach wasreflected by a recent remark by Prime Minister Harper: “We take strong,principled positions in our dealings with other nations—whether popularor not—and that is what the world can count on from Canada” ~cited inRobertson, 2011: 76!. The Harper government, the argument goes, empha-sizes the fact that we live in a dangerous world where there is no naturalharmony of interests among states.

Several of the positions taken by the Harper government seem toecho this worldview. Soon after being elected, the Conservatives took aquick unilateral stand by cutting aid to Hamas after its 2006 democraticvictory in Palestine to protest against this party’s political platform andits position regarding the state of Israel ~Chapnick, 2011–2012: 151!. TheHarper government also boycotted a UN international conference on rac-ism to protest against the presence of Iranian president Ahmadinejad. And,more recently in 2011, Canada became the first state to unilaterally with-draw from the Kyoto Protocol, a move that was deplored by the inter-


national community. All these decisions were likely not fashioned inco-ordination with either the Americans or the Europeans.

If this tendency toward unilateralism is real and significant in Cana-dian foreign policy, we would expect Canada to speak first and alone,that is, before Washington, London or Paris, on the major key positionsstudied. The examples above suggest that the current Conservative gov-ernment is more inclined than the previous Liberal government to adoptthis type of behaviour. The following hypotheses will thus be tested.

H9: Canada speaks first and alone (that is, without concordance with itsallies) more often than it aligns itself with its allies.

H10: The Harper government has more often issued its statements firstand alone than did the previous Martin government.

H11: The Harper government’s responses have less often been alignedwith those of its allies than were the positions of the previous Martingovernment.

Comparative Foreign Policy and Content Analysis

To shed light on our initial research questions and evaluate the explan-atory power of these different theoretical perspectives, a longitudinal analy-sis of the responses by Canada, the United States, France and Britain tosix foreign crises occurring between 2004 and 2011 was conducted.France and Britain were selected because, along with the United States,they are arguably Canada’s main transatlantic allies for both historicaland cultural reasons. Moreover, the inclusion of Britain, when com-bined with the United States, allowed for the assessment of the Anglo-sphere argument.

As for the selected cases studied, our analysis focused on the 2004Ukrainian crisis, known as the “Orange Revolution,” which occurred afterthe second round of the presidential election was contested; the politicalcrisis provoked by the assassination of former Prime Minister Hariri inLebanon in 2005, which led to the “Cedar Revolution” and created tre-mendous tensions with Syria; the war between Israel and Hezbollah inLebanon triggered by the kidnapping of Israeli soldiers in 2006; the mil-itary conflict between Russia and Georgia over South Ossetia and Abk-hazia in 2008; and the crises arising from the popular uprisings in Egyptand Libya in 2011, which were part of the Arab Spring.

For the sake of our study, we will focus on the publicly stated involve-ment of the four Western countries in each crisis. The analysis beginswith the first official statement released by one of the four states inresponse to a crisis, while the end point coincides with the actual end ofeach crisis, with the exception of Libya. Indeed, the Libyan crisis ended


with the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1973, which autho-rized the use of military force to protect civilian populations. What hap-pened after that point was in the hands of NATO, thus rendering anyfurther study of diplomatic alignment futile. Table 1 shows the periodunder investigation in each case.

Why this time frame and these six cases? First, the 2004–2011 timeframe can be characterized as a “return to normalcy” following the ter-rorist attacks on the United States in 2001 and the 2003 transatlantic clashover the war in Iraq. Using this time frame, we can therefore assessCanada’s foreign policy alignment in the twenty-first century followingthe extraordinary and circumstantial events that marked the first man-date of President George W. Bush. The 2004–2011 time frame also makesit possible to include more than one government in power for each coun-try studied ~that is, Martin and Harper in Canada, Bush and Obama inthe United States, Chirac and Sarkozy in France, and Blair, Brown andCameron in Britain!. This improves the capacity to generalize from ourresults beyond one specific government. Second, since selection bias isalways a concern, we chose six significant international security crisesthat arose in four different regional contexts: Eastern Europe, the Cauca-sus, the Middle East and North Africa, which offer a good representationof the different dynamics of foreign crises. Our selection included casesof internal political turmoil which had international resonance, such asthe Egyptian revolution, as well as international conflicts which destabi-lized the regional order, such as the Israel–Hezbollah and Russia–Georgiawars.

Using QDA Miner, a mixed methods content analysis software,1 weconducted a structured and systematic analysis of the content of all theofficial statements released by the heads of government of the four trans-atlantic states ~that is, the Canadian Prime Minister’s Office, the WhiteHouse, the Elysée, and 10 Downing Street! and by their respective dip-lomatic agencies ~that is, Canada’s Department of Foreign Affairs andInternational Trade, the State Department, the French Department of For-

TABLE 1Time Frame of Crises

Crisis Beginning End

Ukraine’s Orange Revolution November 21, 2004 January 23, 2005Lebanese Cedar Revolution February 14, 2005 April 27, 2005Israel–Hezbollah War July 12, 2006 August 14, 2006Russia–Georgia War August 7, 2008 August 26, 2008Egypt’s Revolution January 25, 2011 February 11, 2011Libya’s Civil War February 15, 2011 March 18, 2011


eign Affairs, and the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office! duringthe identified time frame listed in Table 1. Statements included officialstatements, press briefings, public letters and interviews that officiallyappeared on the websites and in the archives of the selected agencies.2

In all, we gathered a dataset of 570 dated statements.3 While some ofthese statements were relayed through the media, no systematic foreignpolicy analysis of the whole body of statements has previously been con-ducted to extract the substance of the governments’ discourse and giveclear indications concerning the states’ behaviour. The analysis of theseofficial statements thus provided crucial information on the four states’values, principles and interests, as well as on how they handled foreigncrises more generally.

Structuring the Analysis

The first part of the analysis was structured around 47 key positions thatwere identified in our dataset. To identify these positions, we selected allthe developments for which at least three out of the four states releasedstatements signalling their positions, whether they agreed with one anotheror not. This allowed us to differentiate between general themes and moresignificant positioning on the part of the states.4 The support for a no-flyzone over Libya, the condemnation of the Russian invasion of Georgiaand the demand for the withdrawal of the Syrian army from Lebanon areexamples of significant positioning retained in our analysis. We then con-ducted a chronological analysis of these dated key positions to deter-mine the order in which they were adopted by the different states. Table 2presents an overview of all key positions retained in the chronologicalanalysis.

Alignment was found when one state adopted a given position afteranother state had already done so, taking exactly the same position,5 whileconcordance was found when two or more states adopted the same posi-tion on the same day.6 Alignment and concordance were mutually exclu-sive, but it was possible for a country to align itself with more than onecountry. For instance, if Canada issued a statement after the United States,France and Britain, and adopted the same position as theirs, Canada’sresponse was then counted as aligned with each of these states.7

The second part of the analysis was structured around the codifica-tion of 45 themes that were identified in the 570 statements ~see annexfor the list of coded themes!. These themes were coded on 13 130 occa-sions, corresponding to the total number of units of analysis and greatlyhelped in sorting out the information contained in the statements.8 Byconducting a detailed analysis of the frequency distribution of the codedthemes, we were able to quantify the relative importance of the variouspolicy positions expressed by Canada under Paul Martin and Stephen


TABLE 2Key Positions

Crisis Key Positions

Ukraine’s Orange Revolution 1 – Support the will of the Ukrainian people ~self-determination!.2 – Support a partnership with Ukraine.3 – Provide assistance for Ukrainian elections.4 – Demand transparency in Ukrainian elections.

Lebanese Cedar Revolution 5 – Respect for the self-determination of the Lebanese people.6 – Respect the framework of international laws and obligations.7 – Support UN Security Council Resolution 1559.8 – Support prosperity or economic development of Lebanon.9 – Condemn the assassination of Hariri.

10 – Call for justice for Hariri’s murderers.11 – Provide assistance to the government of Lebanon.12 – Support the Lebanese people.13 – Call for a Lebanon free of foreign interference.14 – Require that Syria withdraw from Lebanon.

Israel–Hezbollah War 15 – Respect obligations under international law16 – Enforce UN Security Council Resolution 1559.17 – Condemn Hezbollah’s actions.18 – Provide humanitarian assistance.19 – Ask for an effective and immediate ceasefire.20 – Support the deployment of an international force in Lebanon.21 – Condemn the involvement of Syria and Iran.22 – Demand the release of the Israeli hostages.

Russia–Georgia War 23 – Support the six-point peace plan.24 – Condemn the Russian invasion.25 – Provide humanitarian assistance.26 – Respect Georgia’s territorial integrity.

Egypt’s Revolution 27 – Support the aspirations of the people of Egypt ~self-determination!.28 – Call for free access to communications ~open media!.29 – Call for economic reforms.30 – Acknowledge the legitimate demands or needs of the Egyptian

people.31 – Support the protesters and the people of Egypt.32 – Commend the positive role of the Egyptian army.33 – Call for constitutional reforms.34 – Concerns about the repercussions for the situation with Israel.35 – Lifting the state of emergency.

Libya’s Civil War 36 – Support the self-determination of the Libyan people.37 – Referring Gaddafi to the International Criminal Court ~ICC!.38 – Condemn the regime’s repression.39 – Call for responsibility and accountability on part of Libyan

government.40 – Support sanctions against the Gaddafi Regime.41 – Implement sanctions against the Gaddafi Regime.42 – Provide humanitarian assistance.43 – Support the demands or rights of the Libyan people.44 – Raise the issue of the responsibility to protect the Libyan people.45 – Gaddafi must go.46 – Consider a no-fly zone.47 – Call for a ceasefire.


Harper and to compare them to those of the other states. What, then, waslearned from this two-phase analysis?

Canada Often Aligned Itself with the United States

Our study reveals that Canada aligned its responses with those of theUnited States 66 per cent of the time, or with respect to 31 of the 47 keypositions. That is, approximately two-thirds of the time, Canada issued astatement after the United States had already done so, and adopted thesame position, often expressed in the same words. Canada aligned itselfwith the United States at least twice during each crisis, and our analysisshows an alignment rate of at least 50 per cent for all of the crises, exceptthe Israel–Hezbollah war, for which the rate was 25 per cent.

One revealing example of Canada’s alignment occurred during the2011 Libyan crisis. All four states decided to impose sanctions on Libyain order to pressure the Gaddafi regime. On February 25, PresidentObama, through an executive order, announced a series of economic sanc-tions, including an asset freeze and travel ban on Gaddafi and his rela-tives, an asset freeze on the property and interests of the government ofLibya, and an embargo on arms sale to Libya. The United States wasthe first to announce its sanctions. On February 26, Secretary of StateClinton confirmed these sanctions, which were then partly supported byUnited Nations Security Council Resolution 1970. The next day, the Cana-dian prime minister announced the same sanctions as those announcedby the United States, specifying that Canada was going further than UNResolution 1970 by imposing “an asset freeze and a prohibition of finan-cial transactions with the government of Libya, its institutions and agen-cies, including the Libyan Central Bank” ~Harper, 2011b!. As Canadaclearly stated that it was going further than the provisions set out in theSecurity Council resolution, this foreign policy position showed a clearalignment with the United States rather than merely support for theresolution.

These findings suggest that the continental0US dependency argu-ment performs well. However, the next section goes beyond the Canada–USdyad and shows that Canada also aligned itself with Britain and France,which tends to undermine this argument.

Transatlantic Ties Better Explain Canada’s Behaviour

The analysis shows that Canada aligned itself with the leading transatlan-tic partner ~that is, either of the two European allies or the United States!76.6 per cent of the time. These results tend to validate the triangularversion of transatlanticism. As for the second version of transatlanticism


~the Canada–Europe relationship!, the results reveal that Canada aligneditself with either Britain or France as often as it did with the United States,that is, 66 per cent of the time. Together, these findings put the previousinference regarding the Canada–US dynamic into perspective and castsome doubt on the ability of the continental dependency argument toexplain Canada’s foreign policy alignment with regard to foreign crises.

It is unlikely that these results are purely coincidental. Indeed, if wetest for the reverse dynamic, we find that the United States aligned itsposition with that of Canada 12.5 per cent of the time, and that at leastone of the two European states aligned its position with that of Canada28 per cent of the time. These results show that transatlantic alignmentswith Canadian positions were relatively low.

The analysis clearly reveals that, in most cases, Canada lined upbehind the United States, France or Britain, depending on which countryreleased its statements first. Moreover, our results clearly suggest thatalignment rather than co-ordination was the central dynamic here. Can-ada adopted its positions in concordance with the United States—that is,on the same day—with respect to only 14.9 per cent of the tested posi-tions and with Europe with respect to only 6.4 per cent. These resultsshow that the ties that bind Canada to its transatlantic partners appearmore to be a matter of falling in line than of close co-ordination.

Lastly, with regard to our fifth hypothesis, the analysis shows thatalthough Canada’s alignment with the US was stronger than that of Franceor Britain, this difference was not great. Both France and Britain alignedthemselves with the United States 57.4 per cent of the time. While lowerthan Canada’s 66 per cent, this figure still shows an alignment with respectto the majority of the studied positions. This indicates that alignmentwith the United States did not only encompass Canada’s positions butthose of Britain and France as well.

It could be asked, however, what Canada’s response was when theUnited States and the European states disagreed on a common approachto managing a crisis. Did Ottawa follow its neighbour to the south, itsEuropean partners, or neither of these? This situation arose with respectto only one out of the 47 key positions. In key position no. 19, whichrefers to the 2006 Israel–Hezbollah war, the United States ultimatelyaligned itself with France by calling for an effective and immediate cease-fire between the two parties, but did so several days after Paris, possiblyto give Israel a free hand in conducting its military operations againstHezbollah for a few more days. France, on the contrary, wanted the cease-fire to be quick and effective. Facing this transatlantic disagreementbetween France and the United States, Canada remained silent on thematter and only addressed the issue of the ceasefire the day after it wasadopted by the UN Security Council, that is, once it was no longer apoint of discord between its allies.


The Anglo-Saxon Tie Does Not Seem to Matter

Do the transatlantic ties identified above hide a deeper and older connec-tion between Canada and its two Anglo-Saxon allies? To assess the Anglo-sphere argument, we first set out to identify the direction and importanceof the alignment dynamic between Canada, the United States and Brit-ain. As shown above, Canada closely aligned itself with the United Statesin the case of two-thirds of the tested key positions. Britain’s positionswere also closely aligned with those of the United States 57.4 per cent ofthe time, while the American government aligned itself with Britain only8.5 per cent of the time. The analysis shows that the links between Can-ada and Britain were much weaker. Only 34 per cent of Canada’s responseswere aligned with those of Britain. When Canada’s alignment with eitherthe United States or Britain was considered, the result rose from 66 percent ~the United States only! to 68 per cent. If the Anglosphere argumentholds true, it seems mostly a matter of Canada and Britain looking to theUnited States for leadership.

Second, we compared Canada’s alignment with Britain to Canada’salignment with a non-Anglo-Saxon state, in this case France. Interest-ingly enough, we discovered that the Canadian government aligned itselfmuch more often with France than with Britain ~59.6 and 34 per cent ofthe time, respectively!. Moreover, Britain aligned itself with France moreoften than with its Canadian “Anglo-Saxon” ally. London aligned itselfwith Paris in the case of 53.2 per cent of the tested positions and withOttawa in only 36.2 per cent of cases.

These results undermine the Anglosphere argument and indicate that,not only did Canada align itself with its transatlantic partners in mostcases, but that France, a non-Anglo-Saxon ally, was an important Cana-dian partner in this regard, even more so than Britain.

Canada as an Improbable Unilateral State

The results shown above clearly hint at the refutation of unilateralism. Inthe case of each of the 47 positions tested, Canada was the first to adopta position alone in only three instances ~6.4 per cent of the time!, andthese were the most symbolic and least consequential positions. Thismakes Canada the least unilateral state of the four. During the Israel–Hezbollah War, Ottawa was the first to raise concerns about the human-itarian situation caused by the conflict and the necessity of protectingcivilians on both sides of the Israeli–Lebanese border. It was also thefirst to ask for constitutional reforms in Egypt and for the end of thestate of emergency in that country. In all other instances, when Canadaissued a statement first, it did so on the same day as the United States,


France or Britain, which therefore counted as concordance ~that is, pos-sible co-ordination or convergence!.

Since our analysis included crises occurring under both the Liberalgovernment of Paul Martin and the Conservative government of StephenHarper, it was possible to compare the degree to which each Canadiangovernment was willing to act first on its own. The results show that theHarper government was more prone to unilateral responses than its pre-decessor. While there was no instance in which the Martin governmentacted first and alone, the Harper government did so 9.1 per cent of thetime. The analysis of the Harper years also reveals a lower rate of align-ment, although this rate was still over 55 per cent.

Therefore, while it remains true that Canada rarely takes a stand firstand alone ~less than 10 per cent of the time!, there has been a noticeableincrease in this behaviour under Prime Minister Harper. It should be notedthat the level of concordance between Canada and the United States alsoincreased slightly under Harper, and that the lower results for alignmentmay therefore be explained by closer co-ordination with Washington.Although it is correct to say that the number of unilateral decisions takenby Canada was higher under Harper than under Martin, such decisionshave remained a rare and marginal phenomenon, and the alignment rateof the Canadian government, with both the United States and Europe,remained as high as 57.6 per cent under Stephen Harper. Thus, it is pru-dent to conclude this section by indicating that this observed differencewill need to be confirmed in future research.

In sum, over the last decade, Canada’s alignment with its transatlan-tic partners, more than unilateral action, remained the overriding ten-dency in this country’s management of foreign internal crises and interstatewars. Table 3 summarizes Canada’s behavioural dynamic from 2004 to

TABLE 3Results, in Percent, for Canada’s Diplomatic Positioning by Crisis

Alignment with Concordance with

Cases US UK France Europe US UK France Europe

P. MartinUkraine 75 75 75 75 25 25 0 25Lebanon 90 50 80 90 10 10 10 10

S. HarperIsrael–Hezbollah 25 12.5 37.5 37.5 50 0 0 0Russia–Georgia 50 0 75 75 25 0 0 0Egypt 77.8 33.3 44.4 44.7 0 0 0 0Libya 66.7 33.3 58.3 75 0 0 7.1 7.1

Total 66 34 59.6 66 14.9 4.3 4.3 6.4


2011 while Table 4 presents the tested arguments by showing in detailhow Canada responded with respect to the key positions during each crisis.

Beyond Foreign Policy Alignment

As previously indicated, as part of our mixed qualitative and quantita-tive method analysis, we ran a frequency distribution analysis of the 45coded themes identified in the statements. This analysis brought out someinteresting findings concerning Canada’s behaviour.

Canada’s Democratic Persona

Not only did it emerge that Canada’s positions were aligned as often withBritain and France, taken together, as with the United States, but alsothat the defense and promotion of democracy were important values forOttawa. Among all the coded themes in the Canadian statements, 13 percent referred to democracy while this figure for the United States, Franceand Britain, taken together was, on average, 8.7 per cent. It was alsofound that the Martin government referred to democracy much more oftenthan the Harper government, with this coded theme accounting for 26.2per cent and 8.8 per cent of their statements, respectively.

Democratic values were also expressed differently by the two gov-ernments. Under Martin’s Liberals, the main discourse was centred ondemocracy-building efforts, election supervision and the respect for thepeoples’ right of self-determination. During the Ukrainian crisis, forinstance, Canada condemned the fraud and lack of transparency in theUkrainian presidential elections and offered to send observers to super-vise a rerun. Canada’s perspective was well expressed when Paul Martindeclared: “Canadians are proud to have played a meaningful role in thedemocratic elections in Ukraine” ~Martin, 2004!. In the case of Leba-non, Canada called for a democracy that was more open and transparent,that reflected the Lebanese people’s aspirations and was free from for-eign influence, meaning without the presence of Syrian troops on Leba-nese territory.

Stephen Harper clearly shifted the democratic rhetoric in anotherdirection, putting the emphasis instead on the defense of freedom andhuman rights and respect for international laws and obligations. PrimeMinister Harper seems to have shifted the focus of the democratic rhet-oric for instrumental reasons. For instance, his government condemnedthe “gross” violations of human rights by the Gaddafi regime in 2011and was the first, alongside France, to demand that the dictator’s crimesbe referred to the International Criminal Court. During the Russia–Georgia War, Prime Minister Harper put the emphasis on Georgia’s inter-nationally recognized boundaries and on the fact that it had a legitimate


democratically elected government. This rhetoric was clearly used to jus-tify Canada’s support for the Georgian government and to express its oppo-sition to South Ossetia and Abkhazia’s secessionism ambitions, as wellas Russia’s interference in Georgia’s internal affairs. During the Egyp-tian crisis, Foreign Minister Cannon revealed the reasons behind Canada’sdemocracy-centred approach: “Democratic development is a priority ofCanada’s foreign policy. Democratic development advances Canada’s inter-ests because it offers the best chance for long-term stability, prosperityand the protection of human rights” ~Cannon, 2011a!. Table 5 shows thatthese examples were quantitatively confirmed by content analysis.

The nature of the different crises may explain some of the differ-ences found in our study. However, the significant quantitative differ-ences and the qualitative changes in rhetoric observed suggest that beyonddifferent responses to various crises are different visions of foreign pol-icy. Aside from the use of democracy-related themes to condemn Gadd-afi and support Georgia, as previously mentioned, we found several otherinstances where the Harper government seemed to have instrumentalizedCanada’s promotion of democracy. In its statements, the Harper govern-ment repeated several times that Canada wanted to see a transition towarda new Egyptian government which would be respectful of the rights ofreligious minorities. As the Canadian minister of foreign affairs statedlater, this request targeted the protection of the rights of the ChristianCoptic minority ~Cannon, 2011b!. Approximately one month later, in themidst of the Libyan conflict, the Harper government presented itself as apromoter of human rights and freedoms, such as the freedom of expres-sion and assembly, to support the opposition of the rebels against theGaddafi regime and to legitimate their struggle.

Hence, the promotion of democracy was clearly at the core of Cana-dian foreign policy from 2004 to 2011. However, Martin and Harper tookdifferent angles and had different objectives in expressing this value.

The Importance of Stability under Harper

In relative terms, the Harper government did not refer to democratic val-ues as often as did the Martin government, but it paid much more atten-tion to stability. The frequency distribution indicates that 17.8 per centof the coded themes in Harper’s statements concerned stability, while thisproportion was only 11.7 per cent under the Martin government. Whileit could be argued that this difference may be explained by the fact thatprime ministers Martin and Harper were not facing the same type of cri-ses, the reverse tendency was observed in the United States. Indeed, Pres-ident Bush gave more importance to stability than did his successorPresident Obama ~15.6 and 13.5 per cent, respectively!. Although the gapbetween the two US administrations is smaller than that between the Cana-


TAB

LE

4Te

stin

gth

eM

ain

Alig

nmen

tD

ynam

ics

Con

tinen

tal

Dep

ende

ncy

Tra

nsat

lant

icT

rian

gle

Ang

losp

here

Uni

late

ralis

m

Key

Posi

tions

Can

ada

alig

ned

itsel

fw

ithth

eU

.S.

Can

ada

alig

ned

itsel

fw

ithth

eU

.S.,

U.K

.or

Fran

ce

Can

ada

alig

ned

itsel

fw

ithth

eU

.K.

and

the

U.S

.

Can

ada

issu

eda

stat

emen

tfi

rst

and

alon

e

1.Su

ppor

tth

ew

illof

the

Ukr

aini

anpe

ople

.Y

esY

esY

esN

o2.

Supp

ort

apa

rtne

rshi

pw

ithU

krai

ne.

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

3.Pr

ovid

eas

sist

ance

for

Ukr

aini

anel

ectio

ns.

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

4.D

eman

dtr

ansp

aren

cyin

Ukr

aini

anel

ectio

ns.

No

No

No

No

5.R

espe

ctfo

rse

lf-d

eter

min

atio

nof

Leb

anes

epe

ople

.Y

esY

esN

oN

o6.

Res

pect

the

fram

ewor

kof

int.

law

san

dob

ligat

ions

.Y

esY

esY

esN

o7.

Supp

ort

UN

SCR

esol

utio

n15

59.

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

8.Su

ppor

tec

onom

icde

velo

pmen

tof

Leb

anon

.Y

esY

esY

esN

o9.

Con

dem

nth

eas

sass

inat

ion

ofH

arir

i.N

oN

oN

oN

o10

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lfo

rju

stic

efo

rH

arir

i’sm

urde

rers

.Y

esY

esN

oN

o11

.Pro

vide

assi

stan

ceto

the

gove

rnm

ent

ofL

eban

on.

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

12.S

uppo

rtth

eL

eban

ese

peop

le.

Yes

Yes

No

No

13.C

all

for

aL

eban

onfr

eeof

fore

ign

inte

rfer

ence

.Y

esY

esN

oN

o14

.Req

uire

that

Syri

aw

ithdr

awfr

omL

eban

on.

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

15.R

espe

ctob

ligat

ions

unde

rin

tern

atio

nal

law

.Y

esY

esN

oN

o16

.Enf

orce

UN

SCR

esol

utio

n15

59.

No

No

No

No

17.C

onde

mn

Hez

bolla

h’s

actio

ns.

No

No

No

No

18.P

rovi

dehu

man

itari

anas

sist

ance

.N

oN

oN

oY

es19

.Ask

for

anef

fect

ive

and

imm

edia

tece

asef

ire.

No

Yes

No

No

20.S

uppo

rtth

ede

ploy

men

tof

int.

forc

ein

Leb

anon

.Y

esY

esY

esN

o21

.Con

dem

nth

ein

volv

emen

tof

Syri

aan

dIr

an.

No

No

No

No


22.D

eman

dth

ere

leas

eof

the

Isra

eli

host

ages

.N

oN

oN

oN

o23

.Sup

port

the

six-

poin

tpe

ace

plan

.Y

esY

esN

oN

o24

.Con

dem

nth

eR

ussi

anin

vasi

on.

No

No

No

No

25.P

rovi

dehu

man

itari

anas

sist

ance

.N

oY

esN

oN

o26

.Res

pect

Geo

rgia

’ste

rrito

rial

inte

grity

.Y

esY

esN

oN

o27

.Sup

port

the

aspi

ratio

nsof

the

peop

leof

Egy

pt.

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

28.C

all

for

free

acce

ssto

com

mun

icat

ions

.Y

esY

esN

oN

o29

.Cal

lfo

rec

onom

icre

form

s.Y

esY

esY

esN

o30

.Ack

now

ledg

eth

ede

man

dsof

the

Egy

ptia

npe

ople

.Y

esY

esY

esN

o31

.Sup

port

the

prot

este

rsan

dth

epe

ople

ofE

gypt

.Y

esY

esN

oN

o32

.Com

men

dth

epo

sitiv

ero

leof

the

Egy

ptia

nar

my.

Yes

Yes

No

No

33.C

all

for

cons

titut

iona

lre

form

s.N

oN

oN

oY

es34

.Con

cern

sab

out

repe

rcus

sion

sfo

rIs

rael

.Y

esY

esN

oN

o35

.Lif

ting

the

stat

eof

emer

genc

y.N

oN

oN

oY

es36

.Sup

port

the

self

-det

erm

inat

ion

ofth

eL

ibya

npe

ople

.Y

esY

esN

oN

o37

.Ref

erri

ngG

adda

fito

the

ICC

.N

oN

oN

oN

o38

.Con

dem

nth

ere

gim

e’s

repr

essi

on.

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

39.C

all

for

acco

unta

bilit

yof

the

Lib

yan

gove

rnm

ent.

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

40.S

uppo

rtsa

nctio

nsag

ains

tth

eG

adda

fiR

egim

e.N

oY

esN

oN

o41

.Im

plem

ent

sanc

tions

agai

nst

the

Gad

dafi

Reg

ime.

Yes

Yes

No

No

42.P

rovi

dehu

man

itari

anas

sist

ance

.Y

esY

esN

oN

o43

.Su

ppor

tth

ede

man

dsor

righ

tsof

the

Lib

yan

peop

le.

Yes

Yes

No

No

44.R

aise

the

R2P

the

Lib

yan

peop

le.

No

Yes

No

No

45.G

adda

fim

ust

go.

Yes

Yes

No

No

46.C

onsi

der

ano

-fly

zone

.Y

esY

esY

esN

o47

.Cal

lfo

ra

ceas

efir

e.N

oY

esN

oN

o

Tota

l3104

73604

71504

730

47


dian governments, these numbers suggest that it is not so much the kindof crisis that accounted for the occurrence of the stability theme, but ratherthe importance given to this theme by the different governments.

Multilateralism as a Core Canadian Value?

Canada is traditionally seen as a country that has been consistently com-mitted to multilateral diplomacy as a way to achieve its own self-interestedobjectives ~see Keating, 1993!. Although one could argue that, by align-ing itself with its main allies ~that is, Britain, France and the UnitedStates!, Canada followed a multilateral approach, there is a significantdifference between following others and promoting multilateralism. More-over, our frequency distribution analysis of the different themes coded inCanada’s official statements casts a shadow on the myth of Canada beinga champion of multilateralism.

Relatively speaking, our analysis shows that Canada referred to mul-tilateralism proportionally less often than did the United States, Franceor Britain. Moreover, Canada referred the least to UN resolutions andwas the only state that never mentioned NATO in its statements. Onepossible explanation for the absence of any reference to NATO is thatthe military alliance was closely associated with Canada’s military involve-ment in Afghanistan, which was expensive and somewhat unpopular inCanada. Hence, Ottawa may have wanted to avoid invoking NATO so asnot to arouse apprehension and controversy among the Canadian people.

Moreover, there was almost no difference between Martin and Harperwith regard to the issue of multilateralism, both governments havingreferred to this theme in similar proportions. Table 6 compares Canada’s

TABLE 5Percentage of Coded Segments for Selected Themes, by PrimeMinister1

P. Martin S. Harper

Democracy 26.2 8.8Self-Determination 4.7 2.4Freedom and Human Rights 1.9 8.4Minority Rights 0 1.1International Law 0.9 2.4

Notes: 1This table shows the percentage of coded segments for each code out of all the codedsegments for the declarations under a specific prime minister. For instance, 1.9 per cent of thecoded segments among the statements issued under Paul Martin were coded as “Freedom andHuman Rights.” The code “democracy” shown in this table is specific and was mainly codedfor segments related to elections or democratic institutions. The other codes can be seen asdemocracy-related values that cover different themes.


score to those of its transatlantic allies, and shows that 12.7 per cent ofthe segments of the Canadian statements were coded under multilateral-ism, while its three partners referred to this theme, on average, 17.4 percent of the time.

Several explanations could account for these findings. Canada is theonly country that does not have a permanent seat on the UN SecurityCouncil and, unlike Britain and France, is not a member of the Euro-pean Union. These two factors gave Canada less of a chance to addressthe issue of multilateralism. Paradoxically, since Canada is the least pow-erful state of the four, Canada’s prime ministers may have wanted to showthemselves to be strong and independent on the world stage.

Some analysts would argue that Canada has never really been thechampion of multilateralism that it claims to be. Making a judgment onthis matter, however, goes beyond the scope of this article. Nevertheless,caution must be used when presenting Canada as the multilateral statepar excellence since our study suggests that this value may no longerbe—if it ever was—the cornerstone of the Canadian way in the earlytwenty-first century.

Conclusion

This research provides quantitative and qualitative evidence suggestingthat Canada’s foreign policy alignment primarily tends toward a trans-atlantic orientation. In most cases, Canada aligned its position with thatof the United States or its main European partners. Within the transatlan-tic community, it was the United States that carried the greatest weight,since Paris, London and Ottawa all aligned themselves with Washingtonmuch more often than the reverse. Moreover, among the four states, Can-ada was the one that most often followed its transatlantic partners.

In assessing the continental dependency argument, we confirmed thatCanada aligned its positions with those of the United States in most cases,and did so more often than Britain or France. However, one of our hypoth-eses was rejected ~H2! since Canada aligned its positions with those ofEurope as often as with those of the United States. Our study shows that

TABLE 6Percentage of Coded Segments for Selected Themes, by Country

Canada The U.S. France Britain

Multilateralism 12.7 15.9 21.4 14.8UN Resolutions 3.2 5.8 5.8 3.8NATO 0 1.2 0.9 0.6


Canada often lined up behind Britain or France before the United Stateshad issued its statements. These findings tend to undermine the explan-atory power of the continental dependency argument.

The analysis also reveals that the Anglosphere argument performedpoorly. Canada indeed aligned its positions with those of both the UnitedStates and Britain ~H7!, but generally aligned itself more often with France~a non-Anglo-Saxon ally! than with Britain, which led us to reject hypoth-esis H8.

We also found that Canada was the instigator of very few strategicpositions. Rather than a country acting independently, Canada appearedto be dependent on the transatlantic community and reluctant to take thelead in managing foreign crises. Thus, overall, unilateralism as an argu-ment failed our empirical test, which leads to the rejection of H9. Nev-ertheless, the analysis demonstrates that the Harper government issuedits statements first and alone more often that did the Martin governmentand that its responses were less in line with those of its allies than theresponses of the previous Liberal government, which tends to validatethe related hypotheses ~H10 and H11!. This also challenges the conven-tional wisdom according to which, because of its pro-American rhetoric,the Harper government has aligned its positions with Washington moreoften than did the previous Liberal government. It should, however, bepointed out that alignment with the US nevertheless remained strong underHarper.

Finally, our study highlights three important aspects of the evolu-tion of Canada’s policy responses to foreign crises over the last decade.First, the difference in the way the Liberals and the Conservatives referredto democratic values and principles in order to advance their respectiveinterests. Second, the greater importance given to the notion of stabilityunder the Conservatives. Third, and surprisingly, the low priority givenby Canada to the multilateral process of crisis management, much lowerthan its transatlantic partners.

Annex

The second part of our study was structured around 45 codes ~themes!divided into nine categories. The last category contained themes that werespecifically coded for different crises. Contact the authors for furtherdetails on the rules of coding and definitions for each of these themes.

101: Democracy102: Self-determination103: Freedom and Human Rights104: Minority Rights


105: Open Media106: International Law

201: Multilateralism202: Unilateralism203: Partnership204: UN Resolutions205: NATO206: EU

301: Economy

401: Condemn402: Accountability403: Sanctions

501: Legitimacy502: Assistance503: Support

601: Stability602: Security603: Intervention604: Terrorism605: Military—positive

701: Self-interest702: Non-interference703: R2P704: Anti-Americanism705: Iran—negative

801: Change802: Speed

Egypt901: Israel902: Vice-President903: State of Emergency904: Islamist Groups

Libya905: Must go906: No-fly Zone


Russia-Georgia907: Territorial Integrity

Israel-Hezbollah908: Hezbollah—negative909: Release Hostages910: Israel’s Right to Defend Itself

Lebanon 2005911: Hariri Assassination912: Syrian Withdrawal

Ukraine913: Central Election Commission914: Electoral Transparency

Notes

1 Content analysis is increasingly used in foreign policy and public policy analyses. See,for instance, Jonathan Paquin ~2012! and Jean-Christophe Boucher ~2009!. See alsoMichael Laver and colleagues ~2003!. To consult the data set generated using QDAMiner, contact the authors. For more information on the software used, consult QDAMiner v4, Provalis Research http:00provalisresearch.com0QDAMiner0QDAMinerDesc.html

2 It would have been possible to analyse the statements issued by the Departments ofDefence and by development aid agencies in order to gain a more comprehensiveview of the responses of the four countries. However, given that this article focuseson diplomatic responses, the statements retained in our analysis constitute a repre-sentative sample.

3 The 570 statements were broken down as follows: Ukraine 63, Lebanon 120, Israel-Hezbollah 137, Russia–Georgia 58, Egypt 70 and Libya 122.

4 In order to test our theoretical arguments, three out of four states was the minimumnumber necessary to compare Canadian responses with those of the United Statesand at least one European state. Restricting the selection of key positions to instanceswhere all four countries had issued a statement would have reduced the number ofunits of analysis from 47 to 38. Three out of four states were therefore enough to testour hypotheses, while maximizing the number of tested key positions.

5 We concluded that alignment had taken place when there was a high level of similar-ity between the statement of a leading state and the statement of a following state.For instance, France declared that “Mr. Gaddafi must leave” Sarkozy ~2011!, whilethe US declared that “Moammar Qadhafi has lost the confidence of his people andhe should go without further bloodshed and violence” Clinton ~2011!. Both statescounted as having supported key position number 45. However, when Canada releaseda more general statement concerning Gaddafi in which it declared that “Canadaunequivocally supports the demands of the Libyan people for freedom, democracy,human rights and the rule of law,” Cannon ~2011c!, this statement was not countedas support for the key position “must go,” since it did not specifically ask for Gadd-afi to leave. Canada eventually aligned itself with France and the US on February 27when it asked Gaddafi “to immediately vacate his position and authority” Harper


~2011c!. Hence, while the specifics of the different key positions could vary, they allsupposed a certain degree of similarity and precision in the countries’ statements.For more information on the details in assessing the key positions, contact the authors.

6 The different time zones between Ottawa and Washington and London and Paris weretaken into consideration. However, this difference was found to have no impact onthe results. In order for the time zones to actually change the results, the statementswould have had to be issued very late at night in Ottawa or Washington and veryearly in the morning in London or Paris, so that the dates on which our analysis wasbased would not represent the order in which the statements were actually issued.Moreover, such a problem would have affected only a small portion of the resultssince in most cases where alignment occurred, the “follower” issued its statementmore than one day later, hence making the issue of time zones irrelevant. For exam-ple, Canada’s alignment with Europe occurred the next day in only 10 per cent ofcases.

7 We were unable to determine whether Canada’s alignment was, in fact, a belated align-ment with the United States or an alignment with the European countries or whetherboth dynamics played out. Also, our analysis focused on alignment and concordancebased on the time the public statements were made by the countries’ leaders, notwith-standing the impossibility of verifying whether consultation or co-ordination occurredor pressure was applied behind closed doors through undisclosed diplomacy.

8 The coding was carried out by two coders who followed a coding manual to mini-mize the risks of error. A code was entered when a segment of a statement referredto it and ended when the focus of the statement changed.

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Shedding Light on Canada's Foreign Policy Alignment

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