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Department o f Politicai and Social Sciences

T he Plurality of T ru th

A critique o f research on the state and European integration

by

H anna O janen

Thesis submitted for assessment with

a view to obtaining the Degree o f Doctor of the

European University Institute

Florence, May 1997

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EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE

Department of Political and Social Sciences

The Plurality of Truth

A critique of research on the state and European integration

by

Hanna Ojanen

Thesis submitted for assessment with

a view to obtaining the Degree of Doctor of the

European University Institute

Examining jury:

Prof. Martti Koskenniemi (University of Helsinki)

Prof. John Krige (CRHST, Paris)

Prof. Susan Strange (University of Warwick - supervisor)

Prof. Jan Zielonka (EUI)

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Contents

A c k n o w l e d g e m e n t s • i

C h a p t e r 1

In t r o d u c t io n i

1.1 T h e a im s a n d n a t u r e o f t h e s t u d y 1

1.2 Co n c e p t u a l p r o b l e m s 3

The "chaotic" variety o f meanings of'the state' 3

1Integration ' - scarcely less "chaos" 6

General features o f the use o f the concepts 8

The *essential contestability' and the role o f choice 11

13 Delineating a research practice in the study o f the relattcnsep between the state

AND INTEGRATION 16

1.4 Th e m e t h o d o f t h is s t u d y 23

C h a p t e r 2

A p p r o a c h e s t o t h e r e l a t io n s h ip

BETWEEN THE STATE AND INTEGRATION 31

2.1 INTEGRATION AS A SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEMS OF THE STATE AND THE STATES SYSTEM

32

2.2 INTEGRATION AS A PROCESS IN WHICH THE STATE IS WEAKENED OR REPLACED 39

Developments within the view 43

2.3 THE STATE WHICH STRENGTHENS ITSELF THROUGH INTEGRATION 56

Development across the views 65

Towards a synthesis 72

2.4 INTEGRATION WHICH TRANSFORMS THE STATE 86

Chapter 3

Causes and consequences 100

3.1 THE STATE OF THE ART IN INTEGRATION STUDIES:

A SELF-PORTRAIT WITH SOME CORRECTIVE REMARKS 100

3.1.1 A self-portrait 100

3.1.2 Some problematic effects o f research practice 102

3.2 Th e c r u c ia l a s s u m p t io n s a n d q u e s t io n s 1 10

3.3 T h e o r ig in s o f t h e a s s u m p t io n s 113

3.3.1 Methodological considerations 113

Observing integration 114

The dilemma o f comparison 116

The assumption o f rationality 119

3.3.2 Views on science and theory 123

Continuing debate 123

Middle-of-the-road theorising and its consequences 131

3.3.3 The effects o f disciplinary divisions and idiosyncrasies 135

Discipline construction 136

Discipline tenacity 139

3.3.4 Values 158

Intrinsic value, or the nature o f the state 160

Instrumental value, or the declining position o f the state 164

3.4 In c o n c l u s io n : t h e in h e r it e d a m b ig u it y a n d it s im p l ic a t io n s f o r e m p ir ic a l

r e s e a r c h 177

Chapter 4

European integration and nordic cooperation i82

4.1 O p t in g f o r in t e g r a t io n - t h e s l o w r e t r e a t o f N o r d ic c o o p e r a t io n 182

4.1.1 EU enlargement: a push towards a necessary reappraisal o f Nordic

cooperation 182

4.1.2 The symptomatic failures o f the grand designs in security and economy 183

4.1.3 The low profile o f Nordic achievements and institutions 193

Achievements 193

Institutions 2 0 0

Implications 208

4.1.4 The challenge o f the EU: increasing incompatibility 209

4.2 N o r d ic in t e g r a t io n : e l e m e n t s o f a m o d e l 226

4.2.1 The 1990s: new dynamism fo r Nordic cooperation 226

4.2.2 The extent and methods o f Nordic cooperation 228

Actors and fora 229

Aims and method 238

4.2.3 The acquis nordique 245

4.2.4 Meeting o f two methods o f integration 258

Chapter 5

FINNISH INTEGRATION POLICY 267

5.1 EU MEMBERSHIP: AN END TO THE TRADITIONAL FINNISH INTEGRATION POLICY 267

3.1.1 The customary principles o f neutrality and sovereignty in Finnish integration

policy 267

5.1.2 The EEA: a step into a whirlpool 276

5.1.3 The rhetoric o f application and the implications o f membership 286

5.2 M e m b e r s h ip in t h e E u r o p e a n U n io n : a f u r t h e r d im e n s io n

f o r F in n is h in t e g r a t io n p o l ic y 300

5.2.1 The logic o f membership 300

5.2.2 Neutrality: the cold war means in Finnish integration policy 304

Bilateralism (1945-1955) 305

The period o f trade liberalisation (1955-1959) 307

Delineation o f a Finnish free trade policy (1960-1972) 309

Maintaining a broad integration system (1973-late 1980s) 312

The end o f the cold war and the EEA 314

5.2.3 The implications o f membership 319

6.1 Th e p l u r a l it y o f a c c o u n t s 327

6.1.1 Recapitulating the study 327

6.L2 The contribution o f the four accounts 330

6.2 POSSIBILITIES AND LIMITS OF SCIENTIFIC ANALYSIS 339

6.3 Th e p l u r a l it y o f tru th a n d t h e c r e d ib il it y o f r e s e a r c h 341

Ch a pter 6

Co nclusio ns 327

Bibliography 346

A ck no w ledg em en ts

It would be impossible to enumerate all the people who have contributed to this study. It has

evolved over a long period of time, in different places, and I have been aided in the work in

many different ways. Many have contributed to it decisively without their noticing it, and

others without my recognising their contribution. In addition to a general acknowledgement

for all involved, I would like to single out several persons who have had a particularly

important role in the process. Many of them I have learned to know at the European

University Institute, a uniquely inspiring and bewildering research milieu which offered me

precious opportunities for discussion with a number of visitors, professors and colleagues.

Above all, I wish to thank my brilliant supervisor Susan Strange, outstanding both in her

criticism and in her confidence in the thesis. A number of times she has deservedly questioned

the enterprise with a pungent critique; still, time and time again, she has also shown an

understanding o f the study far clearer than the author's, making the effort seem worthwhile

once more.

I have further drawn great benefit from the seminars of several professors at the EUI and the

discussions with them in different phases of the work. In particular, I would like to thank

Roger Morgan for his interest and valuable comments, as well as for taking the time to

discuss thoroughly several important parts of the thesis, John Krige for his stimulating

seminars and comments, Alan W. Cafruny for his commitment and the useful bibliographical

suggestions, and Giandomenico Majone for the seminars and comments which broadened my

theoretical and methodological perspectives. I have also had the opportunity to discuss with

or receive comments from several others, among whom I am glad to mention Iver B.

Neumann, Stefano Guzzini, Helge Hveem, Martin Hollis and Teija Tiilikainen. In addition,

I would like to recognize here the inspiration and encouragement given by Martti

Koskenniemi. At a later stage, the comments by Jan Zielonka helped in clarifying the main

arguments.

In Florence, I have been able to share both the most intricate theoretical problems and the less

academic divertimenti with my dear friends and colleagues, to whom I give hearty thanks. I

owe a debt of gratitude no less to my colleagues in the Department of Political Science at the

University of Helsinki, as well as the students of international politics with whom I have been

able to develop my thoughts.

II

For the case study on Nordic cooperation, I am particularly indebted to the personnel of the

Nordic Council and the Nordic Council o f Ministers in Stockholm and Copenhagen for their

generous help with both interviews and documentary material.

The thesis as it now stands would certainly have been both less accessible and less thoroughly

thought out if it had not been for the teaching and advice o f Nicki Hargreaves and Nicky

Owtram at the EUI language centre. For a non-native writer, the complex interplay between

thoughts and their linguistic expression becomes particularly tangible. Clearly, the contribution

of the language teachers has not been limited just to 'superficial* grammatical or stylistic

corrections, but has on many occasions been crucial to the clarification of the ideas presented,

contributing to whatever this work has achieved in its aim o f understanding and helping to

understand research. I am also grateful to Daniel Oakey for correcting the manuscript; all

remaining errors and imprécisions are mine.

At home, my mother has been an enviable research assistant in following the newspapers, so

keeping me informed about developments in Nordic politics. Particular thanks go also to Aira

for unfailing accommodation and intellectual cheering-up, and o f course to Mikael, by no

means just for taming some of my wildest misinterpretations of contemporary history.

Finally, recognition is due to the Academy of Finland for financing my studies in Florence.

Florence, January 1997

Hanna Ojanen

Ch a pter 1

In tro d u ctio n

1.1 T h e a im s a n d n a t u r e o f t h e s t u d y

The relationship between the state and European integration is with good reason a central

concern in current political sciences. Scholars approach it in different ways; some study how

integration influences the state, others how the state influences integration. In answering the

question of how the state and integration relate to each other, all of them deal with a problem

which is particularly important because of its concrete implications, but which is also

particularly difficult to resolve.

The concrete empirical questions o f what happens to the state in the process o f integration,

or what is the role of the state in that process, are essential for the understanding o f the nature

and functioning o f the present European political systems. I f the states' functions change, one

can also expect changes in the political, administrative and judiciary systems and structures

of the states. Changes in functions and practices can also be seen as amounting to gradual

changes in political culture. Through changes in the role and nature of the state, the contents

of citizenship as well as the forms o f political participation may be expected to change.

Finally, the understanding o f democracy and identity will be modified. On the other hand, if

the states guide the process o f integration, they can be seen to do so on the basis o f their own

characteristics, being able to halt the process when they wish. The empirical relevance of the

understanding of the relationship between the state and integration is, however, not based only

on these long-term effects. In some situations, it has an immediate and decisive importance

in political decision-making. Not least, a country's decision to join the European Union is

based on an evaluation of the consequences of membership; the understanding of these

consequences, then, depends on how the relationship between the state and integration is seen.

The relationship is also important as a part of the larger, in some sense classic theme of the

future of the state. Integration can be seen as one o f the factors which influence the position

of the state, together with such phenomena as technological development or economic

internationalisation. Moreover, as 'state' and 'integration' are both central concepts constantly

involved in research, the question o f how the two relate to each other arises in a variety of

different contexts.

At th^same time, the question is „from the outset difficult. The answer depends on how the

two terms are understood, and it is well-known that both terms have many meanings. Both

'state' and 'integration' are abstract entities which lack a single concrete referent in the real

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world; they are often used in research as basic assumptions without any explicit definitions,

and, moreover, both also figure among value-laden concepts. These problems have repeatedly

led scholars to the conclusion that the terms are not suitable for scientific analysis, since they

cannot be appropriately defined, and should be avoided. Some tend to see 'the state' as a term

which probably at some point in time had a referent, but which now, in changed political

realities, is increasingly outdated and hampers or distorts analyses. As a consequence,

examining how two equally complex concepts relate to each other may appear a task close

to impossible. One can, in fact, see a tendency to leave the question o f the relationship

between the state and integration altogether unanswered, making it disappear from the central

research concerns.

Yet, the question has been answered in research, and in numerous quite different ways - quite

understandably so, if one looks at the variety of the meanings o f both terms. This plurality

of answers renders the vast field of integration studies confiictual in outlook, and also

particularly interesting to explore. This study, then, intends to be a critical examination of this

plurality o f answers to the question o f what is the relationship between the state and

integration. Instead of aiming at a specific answer to the question, as is the case in the

existing literature, the study aims at analyzing the answers, showing through examples how

certain concrete views and answers emerge in certain contexts. On the one hand, it aims at

identifying factors which lead to adapting a certain understanding, that is, explaining how and

why a certain result is achieved. On the other hand, it aims to evaluate the consequences o f

that understanding for further research, i.e., what follows from its application.

In essence, thus, the thesis is a study on research. It intends to shed light on the research

process with a view to attaining an improved understanding of the variety o f different results.

This introductory chapter grounds this analysis through some general considerations on the

conceptual and methodological problems related to research concerning ’the state' and

'integration', considerations which in part explain why the relationship between the state and

integration is so complicated and so central as a research problem.

Through this in-depth analysis of research on the question of the relationship between the

state and integration, the thesis can also be seen to open a view to research practices also

more in general. It is, after all, not rare in social sciences to be confronted with a plurality

of different, even contradictory research results. What should be deduced from this plurality,

however, is a question less often dwelled upon: the normal 'consumer' or ’producer' of

academic knowledge in a similar field might not be particularly well-equipped to deal with

it. Assessing the different results requires knowledge on how they actually have been attained.

3

Seeking to analyze some central features of research processes in this particular field, the

thesis therefore aims at increasing the general understanding o f and capacities to evaluate the

plurality of different research results and, in this sense, at yielding generalisable insights on

the evaluation o f research.

1.2 C o n c e p t u a l p r o b l e m s

The "chaotic" variety o f meanings o f 'the state'

When the two concepts 'state* and 'integration' are analyzed separately, the quarrels about their

respective meanings immediately draw attention. In particular, 'the state' is well-known in this

respect: few would contradict the claim that the concept o f 'state* belongs to the most

controversial concepts in political sciences. Characteristically, it is often used without

definition: any explicit definition seems to provoke a disagreement on its appropriateness.

Among the definitions of the concept, some appear more often than others, to the point of

being somehow 'standardized'. This is true in particular for Weber's definition o f the state as

having the monopoly of legitimate physical violence in society1 2 but also for the definition of

the state through specific characteristics agreed upon in international law3, according to which

the state has a permanent territory, a permanent population living in that territory, a

government capable of governing the territory and the population, and the capacity o f entering

into relations with other states.

The state can be seen from different perspectives as a territorial entity, a political,

administrative and judicial unit, level or machinery. It can be seen as normative or

institutional legal order; it can also be seen as a functional unit, a provider of common goods

such as security or welfare. Further, one can see it, as Dahl and other pluralists, as an arena

of contention for different interest or social groups; it can be identified with bureaucracy, the

executive, or a single leader. It is also possible to see the state as a network or source of

authority and power which competes with other similar ones for resources and loyalty. One

can also emphasise the state as an ethnic-cultural unit, a (political) community o f people, or

1 In Economy and Society, edited by Gunther Roth and Claus W. High, 1968 (vol. 2, chapter 9; vol. 3, chapters 10-13).

2 . _iThe treaty concerning the rights and duties of states, made in a conference preceeding the establishment of

the Organization of American States (OAS) in Montevideo 1933, first formulated these classical criteria of statehood, a definition of the state as a subject o f international law, (See, e.g., Crawford, James, The Creation o f States in International Law, Oxford University Press, New York 1979: 36, and Brownlie, Ian, Principles o f Public International Law, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 4th ed. 1990: 72.)

4

an object of identification; one can see it in a Hegelian way as a fulfilment of human nature,

as well as, in a Marxist way, an apparatus which furthers the aims of some groups or classes,

inherently shaped by classes or class struggles and functioning to preserve and expand modes

of production. Further, the state can be seen either as the main actor in international relations,

a sovereign among sovereigns or as a part o f a system, interdependent with others, or still a

dependent subsystem of a larger system. (Cf. Ferguson and Mansbach 1989: 41-79.)

For some particular purposes, more detailed - and clearly not less contestable - definitions o f

the state have also been proposed. As examples, one might mention Grieco’s (1990: 24)

definition of the state as the institutions and roles within a nation which are responsible for

foreign policies, or Poggi’s (1990: 19) stipulation according to which an organisation which

controls the population occupying a definite territory is a state insofar as it is differentiated

from other organisations operating in the same territory, as it is autonomous and centralised,

and its divisions are formally coordinated with one another.

The question o f how to define or understand the state can, without doubt, be somewhat

confusing. However, it can be made to seem even more confusing than it actually is. A good

example is the inventory of meanings o f the term 'state' compiled by Ferguson and Mansbach.

The authors seem to aim at showing that the question of the definition o f the state can be

characterised as "conceptual chaos", and indeed, they succeed in it, adding to the chaos by

a convincingly chaotic presentation, and magnifying it by reference to some anecdotal records

in counting the different meanings of the state where impressive numbers have been

achieved3.

It is also customary in the literature to arrive at a certain conclusion about this state o f affairs.

It is recalled that the concept has many meanings, and that this makes the analysis o f the state

particularly complicated, but it is also often pointed out that finding the proper meaning o f

the term is a formidably difficult, even impossible task. Quite often, the conclusion is that it

would be best to avoid using the term at all, perhaps replacing it with something more

suitable. Thus, Ferguson and Mansbach note that the concept of state has so many meanings

that it is practically useless as a tool for analysis and a part o f theory. Instead o f 'the state',

one could, in their view, use terms like 'power centre'. They propose to direct attention to

shifting patterns o f authority and recommend historically - even prehistorically - grounded

3 For example, C. H. Titus found in what he called "a cursory examination o f the term 'state'" no less than 145 different meanings (an article intitulated 'A nomenklature of political science', American Political Science Review, 25 (1) 1931: 45, 615; quoted by Ferguson and Mansbach 1989: 41 and by Cassese 1986: 120).

5

analyses of what these have been and how and why they have changed. (Ferguson and

Mansbach 1989: 1-3, 84-88.)

In a similar vein, Easton concludes from the amount of different definitions o f the state that

a satisfactory definition is impossible to find. For him, however, the concept is important in

practical politics as a means for achieving national cohesion, if not as a tool o f analysis.

(Easton 1971: 107, 112*113.) Palan, in turn, sees the problem of the 'state' in its not being a

discrete entity, as implied in the theory, where its definition invariably falls back on either

society or government. He proposes as a unit o f analysis the political process, meaning the

process, formal and informal interactions by which governing institutions and the society at

large are related to each other. (Palan 1990: esp. 15, 89, 96, 146.)

Others argue that the state is rendered obsolete as a concept by the various changes in

contemporary world which had deprived of its former characteristics. In Czempiel's view, one

has to give up the notion and the concept of the state as there are no "states" acting in the

transnational world, nor are there states as actors in domestic politics; thus, there is no use

in preserving the terminology.4 In its place, Czempiel proposes a "demand-conversion

relationship between a society and its political system”. (Czempiel 1989: esp. 124, 132.) For

Schmitter, 'state* should not be used in political analysis or in the analysis o f integration

"except in those rare cases where state capacity and action are wielded distinct from the

powers o f government, bureaucracy, parties, associations, firms, individuals, etc.". This is

because the state no longer resembles "its historical self1; among other features, it has lost its

differentiation from civil society, sovereignty, and capacity for unitary action. Moreover,

Schmitter argues, the relevance o f territoriality has changed; the contemporary context

systematically favours the transformation of states into other political forms, such as

confederatii, condominii or federatii. As the state has changed so much, it is, indeed, a waste

of time speaking o f it or redefining it. (Schmitter 1991: 3, 12, 15, footnote 15.)

As such, these observations cannot be said to be particularly new. One could point out, for

example, Zimmem who argued in 1939 that the very notion of'state' was perhaps obsolete

4 However, Czempiel argues that the state is still the most important distributor o f (political) values in a society. In his view, even though also societal actors - such as multinational enterprises - do distribute values, the state is the only one which distributes them authoritatively; its role is especially uncontested in security.

or obsolescent (Zimmem 1939: 284).5 The discussion on the problematic definition o f the

state does not seem to offer convincing solutions: the proposed substitutes are hardly less

ambiguous and their appropriateness can also be questioned, while abandoning the concept

of 'state* would seem a rather hasty way o f resolving the problem. As will be seen below, the

same problems characterise also the discussion on the concept o f integration, where the lack

of agreement on its definition is similarly seen as a major problem. Together, the two

discussions would seem to point to some general features in research, in particular difficulties

in dealing with the role and functions o f definitions in an adequate way.

’Integration' - scarcely less "chaos”

One might expect the concept of integration to differ somewhat from the concept o f the state.

There seems to be two main differences: on the one hand, 'integration' is obviously a term o f

recent origin in comparison with the concept of state; one might suppose that it would be

more precise and that it would be less probable that it is taken for granted as an uncontested

concept. On the other hand, integration could also been seen somehow as a 'second order’

concept, not equally central and basic as the state. Integration has also been predominantly

a phenomenon to be explained, and therefore, the very definition of the term has been the

aim, or part of the aim, of research much more than it has been for the concept o f the state.

Moreover, the fact that integration is often seen as an ongoing process has meant uncertainty

about whether integration already 'is there' or whether it will 'come later', even as to whether

it is there to a certain extent, with the ensuing problems of measurement, indicators and

quantification.

However, the same discourse is valid for both concepts: defining 'integration' is by no means

less complicated and the ensuing disagreement not less vehement. For both terms, different

meanings abound. The frustration over the difficulties in reaching a consensus about the

meaning or shared definitions and the uneasiness about the actual nature of the phenomena

to be studied are very similar, and so are the attempts to find more suitable alternative

6

5 Arguments on the decline of the state seem to have followed the state all the time. One might also point out that Carr argues in 1945 that the state has become an anachronism: due to the development in military technology, it can no longer guarantee the security and welfare of its citizens (E.H. Carr, Nationalism and after, MacMillan, New York 1945, esp. chapter 2; quoted by J. Ann Tickner, 'Re-visioning Security', in Booth and Smith 1995: 175); see also Heiz 1957.

7

concepts and advice to renounce the use o f the term6. Both concepts are value-laden and both

are in practice often used as assumptions rather than being opened up for discussion -

something which will be considered closer below.7

Among the often-quoted 'standard' understandings of integration, one could point out Haas'

definition according to which integration is a process whereby political actors in several

distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political

activities toward a new centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre­

existing national states, the end result of integration being a new political community

superimposed over the existing ones (Haas 1958: 5, 16). For Deutsch, in turn, integration is

the attainment, within a territory, o f a ’sense of community' and of institutions and practices

which are strong and widespread enough to assure (for a 'long' time) dependable expectations

of 'peaceful change'. A central factor thus is an agreement on peaceful change and peaceful

settlement of disputes instead of resorting to large-scale physical force. (Deutsch et a l 1957:

5-7.) For Etzioni, integration is the ability of a unit or system to maintain itself in the face

of internal or external challenges (Etzioni 1965: 12, 329-332), while for Galtung (1967: 368),

integration is a process whereby two or more actors form a new actor.

The definitions o f integration range, in fact, from the most lexical ones - combining

something, becoming part o f something else, previously separate units forming a new,

composed unit - to more specific ones where the term is divided into subconcepts. Thus, for

instance, one can speak about political, economic, social or juridical integration as well as

about integration limited to the process in the European Communities/Union, or in a wider

sense, encompassing different other forms and geographical areas of integration. Furthermore,

one can understand integration as a process, a structure or as a final result or end state.

6 Bartelson (1993: 11) observes similar "death blows" given to the scientific use of the concept o f sovereignty because of its blurred meaning by, among others, E. H. Carr. In Krasner's (1989: 88) terms, 'sovereignty' is a term which has lost meaning and analytical relevance.

7 There is also an interesting possible point o f comparison in the fact that every now and again, both 'state' and 'integration' seem to become object of an intensive debate, while being in other times rather left out from the discussion: both appear and disappear, as it were, in waves as focal objects o f research interest. As to integration, one could see a wave from late 1950s, culminating in the early to mid-1970s, and another in from mid-1980s. For the state, Ferguson and Mansbach (1989: 13-14) observe how the state was 'out* from the late 1950s to mid- 1970s, when a successful resurrection occurred. (They quote Krasner as one of those who counterattacked the trend in order to defend the state from the students of international relations who have "multinationalized, transnationalized, bureaucratized, and transgovemmentalized the state until it has virtually ceased to exist as an analytic construct" (Comparative Politics, vol. 28, 3/1976, p. 317.) - Yet, the 'waves' carrying these concepts out and then bringing them "back in" again should perhaps not be seen as more than interesting surface 'trends in research; in practice, it is difficult to do without these concepts and totally leave them aside.

A cursory look at integration literature suffices to show the extent to which the meaning o f

’integration' is contested. It is typical to find demands for work towards a common

understanding of the term in order to allow for both progress and more accurate results.

Integration studies are commonly depicted as a field o f widespread controversy as to concepts

and definitions, perhaps particularly as regards the very notion o f 'integration'. The problem

of not having reached a clear consensus on the delimitation o f the field or the dependent

variable, that is, what integration exactly is, is noted by several scholars. Puchala even

compares integration scholars to blind men examining each a different part o f an elephant and

failing to agree on what it actually is. In his view, the situation is made even worse by the

fact that the elephant has been growing in size and complexity and that normative concerns

have influenced intellectual efforts. (Puchala 1972: 267-268; cf. Haas 1970: 607, Caporaso

1971: 228, Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff 1981: 453, 459; chapter two.)

As in the case o f the state, if integration often appears 'underdefined', it can also become

'overdefined' so that the variety of different meanings discourages the use of the concept.

Remarks that a commonly agreed definition of integration can hardly be found8 have led, in

fact, to suggestions for a new conceptual framework replacing the original term. For instance,

Puchala (1972) calls for new empirical research within a new descriptive framework, that o f

a "concordance system"; Schmitter (1991) proposes speaking o f a new form o f political

domination; still others have turned to more classical conceptual frameworks, such as the

distinction between Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft (e.g., Kaiser 1972), while Haas (1975)

turns to what he sees as new and more interesting themes to be explored, to 'interdependence'

and 'systems change'.

General features o f the use o f the concepts

Generally, it seems, the plurality of meanings o f 'the state' and 'integration' leads to conflicts

between the different definitions, if not to a dismissal o f the concepts. In this study, what is

seen as problematic is not the complex character of the two terms but precisely the common

attitude towards and the conclusions drawn from this complexity. It does not seem to be

* One cannot avoid the temptation of setting this ardent discussion about the meaning of 'integration* in the context of how the term was originally invented in the European context. In fact, those drafting written documents and treaties about the European arrangements were well aware of conceptual problems and the value- ladenness o f political terms; it has been said that the term 'integration* was explicitly chosen because it was less precise and therefore far more suitable than, e.g., the proposed 'union', which had too deep connotations (see Milward, Alan S., The Reconstruction o f Western Europe 1945-51, Methuen & Co, London 1984; af Malmborg 1994: 19-20).

9

particularly rewarding to resign and give up the use of the terms, as the state and integration

quite clearly exist in reality, in some form or another. Replacing the terms would not

guarantee that the same problems would not appear with the new term as well. Even more

importantly, however, the very idea that there should be only one commonly agreed meaning

for the term in order for it to be usable is problematic.

The different meanings, in fact, are not comparable in that they stem from different contexts

and needs. The state, for instance, is examined from different viewpoints and with different

focuses in different academic disciplines: Weber's definition has a particular purpose in

sociology, the Montevideo criteria in international law. One could divide the different views

as to whether the state is seen from the outside or from the inside, in relation to its own

society or to the external environment. Another division could be seeing the state as an entity

different from other entities or as a variation of a more general form or theme9. Still one could

be analyzing the state synchronously or focusing on the development of the state in time.

An important factor contributing to the difficulties in finding a consensus about a 'proper'

meaning of the concept of 'state* is that the concept actually consists of two different

elements, one ethical and the other formal, as Grant puts it. The formal element o f the concept

of state includes features which states may share (without, thus, differentiating between the

states, or rather, defining them as similar to each other) and which, on the other hand,

distinguish the state from other organisations.10 What Grant calls the ethical component, then,

concerns views about the nature o f the state, closely related to values. These, in turn,

determine the view on the state’s functions, scope and limits. Thus, simplistically put, a

communist would see the state as an instrument o f class rule, a socialist as a distributive

agency, a liberal as a guarantor of individual rights and a conservative as the voice o f society.

On the other hand, the state can also be seen as the realisation o f man's social nature, a power

for its own sake, a practical necessity, or an aid to salvation. (Grant 1988: 691-692, 709.) A

discussion on how the state should be defined, thus, is not merely a question of the empirical

9 Cf. Ferguson's and Mansbach's three broad groups: those concentrating on the relationship between the state and its society, those concentrating on the relation between the state and the international system, and those in which the state is seen as Janus-faced or merely as one of several power networks, views in which both sides of the state are taken into account, rendering the notion more complex, and in which the state is analyzed less as constituting a category of its own. Note, however, that the authors argue that it is not possible to focus either on the external or the internal face of the state without implicitly or explicitly alluding to the other (p. 41). (Cf. the broad question of the mutually constitutive relation of the outside and the inside; Walker 1993.)

10 These formal features are, for Grant, politics (the state is the background and implicit object of politics), government, citizenship, roles, offices and institutions, sovereignty, territory and arbitration (the state as the final court of appeal).

10

characteristics o f states or what they actually are; it is also intertwined with considerations

about what the state should or should not be.11 Again, the concept of integration does n o t

differ from that o f the stale: the ethical or normative aspect is present in both.

It is seen here that the complexity, or ambiguity, of 'the state' - as well as o f 'integration* - is

an inherent feature o f the term; thus, the reduction o f meanings for the sake of analysis m ay

not necessarily be a way to increase their understanding. It might, on the contrary, increase

fragmentation and "conceptual chaos".12 This ambiguity could also be rendered understandable

by remarking, as Bartelson does, that a central concept is actually bound to be ambiguous by

the very fact of its centrality Bartelson notes that a concept becomes central to the extent tha t

other concepts are defined in terms of it or depend on it for their coherent meaning and use

within discourse. These linkages, influential or rhetorical, saturate the concept in question w ith

multiple meanings and make it ambiguous; this ambiguity, then, is open to further logical and

rhetorical exploitation. (Bartelson 1993: 11.)

The explicit definition of the concept is, in fact, less important than the use in which the

concept is put. In practice, explicit definitions are not always given and even if they are, the

definitions and what actually is meant by the concept in a particular piece o f research might

not coincide. Attention has to be paid to the function of the concept in the analysis. An

important difference appears as to whether the concept is used as a tool for analysis or as an

object o f analysis, or, in other words, whether the state is seen as something to be explained

11 Ferguson and Mansbach, for whom the concepts in social sciences are inherently value-laden and reflect the normative biases of the theorists, maintain that all the views on state they present are totally instrumental, originating from nonnative and ideological preferences and suitable for normative and ideological aims rather than for theory construction or achievement of conceptual consensus. They also argue that social scientists are as a rule less 'objective' in their search for definitions than they admit or realize; definitions are shaped to conform to value preferences (norms, ideologies, political aspirations) which are rarely articulated and serve as weapons in battles among scientists. Further, they point to the link between the power to define and the power to control, arguing that for policy makers, the control of concepts is a source of unique authority and legitimacy. (Ferguson and Mansbach 1989: 41, 83-85.) A discussion on the role of values and the value-laden character of 'the state* is undertaken later in this study when views about the intrinsic and the instrumental value of the state are examined, with examples such as the understanding that the role and importance o f the state have been diminishing (arguments such as Schm ¡tier's, which was already presented above).

12 It could be argued with Ferguson and Mansbach (1989: 84) that "were the social scientists somehow able to develop a consensual body of concepts, that very triumph would serve to render their work even more irrelevant to practitioners 1...)".

11

or an explaining factor.13 The very question of whether the definition becomes a problem is

a question of the function o f the concept. When used as an explaining (independent and

isolable) variable, the state is often a taken-for-granted element in the theory - more a constant

than a variable. It often forms the basis for the definition of other concepts or for a whole

conceptual hierarchy: a series of concepts and understandings are built on it, such as 'state

functions', 'state interest', 'intergovernmental', 'international', 'supranational', even 'citizenship'.

As the terms 'international' and 'supranational* show, what is seen to be outside or above the

state is a function of the understanding of the state itself.14 1

It also seems that the role and functions of the two concepts, state and integration, as research

objects is becoming more similar. Despite the difficulties in explaining integration, or perhaps

because o f these difficulties, 'integration' seems to be acquiring some o f the features of 'the

state' as to its functions in theory construction. Although there still is an ongoing debate

between different ways of explaining integration - cf. chapter two - there seems to be a shift

from integration as a dependent variable to integration as an independent variable: while it

first was explained by different factors (background variables, indicators, etc.), it now explains

different phenomena, such as regionalism or the strengthening of the executive in relation to

the legislative.75

The 'essential contestability' and the role o f choice

The notion of 'essential contestability' helps to articulate the problems with the prevailing

view on concept definition in other terms. Several terms central in political and social

sciences have been described as 'essentially contested'. For Gallie (1956), essentially contested

concepts involve endless disputes about their proper uses on the part o f their users; the

characterisation as essentially contested applies when the concept involved is appraisive in

that the state of affairs it describes is a valued achievement, when the practice described is

internally complex in that its characterisation involves reference to several dimensions and

13 Cf. Bartelson (1993: 15) on sovereignty: the more sovereignty is thought to explain, the more it is itself withdrawn from explanation. Thus, for instance, turning sovereingty into a constitutive rule in the way Dessler and Wendt do means that sovereignty itself is withdrawn from study.

H The state could thus well be regarded as an example of what Niiniluoto calls primitive concepts, concepts such as 'point' in geometry, which cannot be defined explicitly but which serve as a basis, within the discipline, for the definition of other concepts (see Niiniluoto, Ilkka, Johdaius tieteenfilosofiaan, Otava 1980, pp. 164-166).

1S It seems that through the process of theoretical accumulation, integration becomes something isolable or independent, an explanatory variable, while, at the same time, the EU integration is increasingly analyzed as unique or incomparable; cf. chapter three.

12

when the agreed and contested rules of application are relatively open. An example o f these

concepts could be 'democracy'.16 Connolly (1974) shares with Gallie the idea of essentially

contested nature, illustrating it with the concept of politics. 'Politics' is an internally complex

and contestable term: it is impossible to specify an invariant set o f necessary and sufficient

conditions for its proper application. Certainly, 'the state' could be included in this category,

too, although it does not, for some reason, figure among the contested concepts in Connolly's

book.17

Connolly argues, however, that according to the prevailing view, the concepts used in

contemporary social sciences are not such contested concepts. This view is based on a

distinction made between descriptive and normative concepts; the former, noncontroversial,

are those pertinent to scientific work. They are neutral and technically defined, designed to

meet the conditions of objective inquiry; they allow for common definitions and impersonal

tests, in short, for objectivity. For those representing this view, the notion of essentially

contested concepts is difficult to assimilate and easy to ignore. (Connolly 1974: 11-12.)18

Connolly points to three important elements which contradict this view on concepts and

definition - elements which are also helpful in understanding the problems related to 'the state'

and 'integration'. Firstly, Connolly touches upon the problems in drawing a clear line between

16 W. B. Gallie, 'Essentially Contested Concepts', in Proceedings o f the Aristotelian Society, vol. 56, London, 1955-1956 (reprinted in Max Black (ed.), The Importance o f Language, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall 1962); quoted in Connolly 1974: 10.

17 One could also argue that the state in particular is perhaps not essentially contested but, on the contrary, a fundamentally uncontested concept. This is what Walker has argued on state sovereignty: far from its largely accepted status as an "essentially contested" concept, state sovereignty is instead an essentially uncontested concept; it is treated as an already settled question. (Walker 1990, quoted in Weber 1995: 2.) In a way, there is a consensus o f not problematising its meaning. This consensus could be linked to the factual acceptance of the essential contestability or the idea that certain terms are such that an agreement on their definition is impossible to reach; this, however, does not mean that they could, or should, not be used.

18 For example, Oppenheim maintains that ordinaiy language is too blunt a tool to be of use for scientific investigation and the language used in political life is especially ill-suited for the purposes of political inquiry. It is therefore necessary, in his view, to construct a language as free as possible o f the imperfections of ordinary usage, or rather to reconstruct its basic concepts. He sees that essential contestability commits the claimant to a radical conceptual relativism, which is an obstacle to scientific explanation. Oppenheim argues that the 'contestabilists' - among others Connolly, Feyerabend and Winch - for whom political concepts must be interpreted in terms of the actors' own perceptions o f political phenomena, accuse the 'reconstructers', among whom Oppenheim includes himself, for being static and unable to capture historical and ideological aspects. However, Oppenheim claims that also this 'reconstructivism' means that concepts are defined in terms of perceptions; the difference is that they are not defined in terms of the perceptions o f particular actors but of any actor. This makes them, in his view, applicable to any situation, and suitable for scientific explanation. (Oppenheim 1981: 177-178, 185-186.)

13

concepts acceptable in social inquiry and those to be excluded, challenging the distinction

between descriptive and normative concepts. Description, for Connolly, is not pure 'naming':

to describe is to characterise a situation from the vantage point of certain interests, purposes

or standards (Connolly 1974: 23).19 Connolly notes that concepts such as 'democracy', 'politics'

and 'freedom' are bounded by normative considerations. Their normative side, or "moral

component", is essential for the use o f the concepts: if it is not taken into account, their

rationale and the possibility of applying them to new situations is lost. In fact, Connolly

argues that contests about concepts are not just about the concepts of politics but are part of

politics itself. {Idem: 27-30.) On the other hand, the concepts of ordinary discourse or

language play a central role in the technical inquiries; one cannot devise a technical language

which would minimise disagreement and troublesome features {idem: 36).

Secondly, he stresses that an understanding of a concept requires that the concept be seen in

a context. In other words, it requires an understanding o f relations between concepts and

conceptual systems. Connolly notes how the different dimensions of the term 'politics' refer

to other concepts such as 'institution', 'decision', 'motive*, 'interest', or 'consensus'; in order to

clarify the concept o f politics or to make it intelligible, he argues, its connections with a host

of other concepts have to be displayed, and an elaboration o f the broader conceptual system

within which it is implicated is needed (Connolly 1974: 12-14).

Thirdly, Connolly points to the limits for operationalism not only in specifying more closely

the criteria of concepts, and in arriving, for example, at commonly agreed, precise definitions,

but also in the comparison of different definitions. It is often thought that interpretations could

be judged against some standard operationalised definitions. However, in that case, all invoked

concepts should be operationalised, which would already be close to impossible. Furthermore,

even if it were established that one proposed definition of politics were more operational than

another, this in itself would not be sufficient to establish it as the preferred definition. Indeed,

Connolly argues that the more operational definition might leave out elements central to our

idea of politics. To assess the relative merits of different definitions, one should, in Connolly’s

view, look at the point or purpose of the definition. (Connolly 1974: 15-16.)20

19 The very distinction or dichotomy is encouraged, Connolly argues, by the common way of choosing as examples some atypical notions such as 'good* v. 'yellow*; these concepts do conform to this distinction, but many others do not fit into one of its two cells without some strain or distortion {idem: 25). - The distinction between 'theoretical' and 'descriptive' will be closer examined below.

20 Thus, he seems to align himself with those who see that all definitions are purposive and can only be evaluated with regard to their purpose. For instance, Bayles (1991: 253) underlines the importance of purpose arguing that sufficient definitions can only be achieved if the purpose of the definition is known. The question of

14

The prevailing attitude towards definitions, as Connolly depicts it, seems thus to involve a

contradiction in that concepts are expected to be and treated as an objective, technical m atter,

while at the same time, they reflect important theoretical and normative commitments. A n

extensive quote from Connolly might illustrate this point:

"But why doesn't each investigator simply stipulate definitions suitable to his particular purposes and leave matters at that? Why do differences in interpretation o f a key concept so often become disputes over its proper meaning? Why, when these disputes occur, are they essential in the twofold sense that the prevailing use is continually vulnerable to challenge and reassessment and that the disputants find themselves treating the issue as important rather than merely irksome? It is widely known that even social scientists who formally state that the definitions they advance are merely "arbitrary" stipulations preceding the important questions of inquire become quite disturbed when their own favored definitions o f key concepts are challenged; but the model of inquiry accepted by these social scientists makes it difficult to locate the source of that irritation." (Connolly 1974: 20-21).

In all, Connolly sees that conceptual disputes are neither a mere prelude to inquiry nor

peripheral to it, but when they involve the central concepts o f a field of inquiry, they are

surface manifestations o f fundamental theoretical differences. The conceptual debates are often

intense because o f the tacit understanding of the relation o f these debates to deep

commitments and the import that the outcome of such contests has for the politics o f the

society. (Connolly 1974: 20-21, 40.)

That differences concerning concept definition easily lead to stagnating disputes might well

depend on factors linked to the "model o f inquiry" alluded to by Connolly - in particular, it

could be argued, to an inadequate consideration o f the role o f choice. The very idea that

research involves choice seems, in fact, often to meet with an ambivalent reception. Choice

seems to be too subjective and arbitrary an element to fit in the common picture o f research

as something objective and definite. At the same time, however, many admit that research

results do not stem automatically from reality or from the material at hand, and that the very

material does not automatically constitute itself: at all stages, the scholar makes choices, both

conscious and unconscious. Reality is necessarily 'mediated' through the active role o f the

researcher. The concepts can be seen as introducing an element o f choice which intervenes

purpose in political analysis is obviously complicated: a definition formed according to the purposes of the researcher can be seen as a negation of objective research, at least if one thinks that the purpose in finding a proper definition in order to be able to answer a certain question is directly linked to the purpose o f arriving at a certain answer.

15

between reality and the result o f the research. In a situation in which there is no single 'real*

meaning for these concepts, but instead a variety o f meanings, and in which the framing o f

research questions implies a decision on the meaning, the understanding adapted is not

obvious and cannot be taken for granted. Therefore, it is illuminating to try to assess both the

array of choice and the different constraints that might reduce the number of possible choices.

Being aware of the manifold meanings or definitions that both 'the state' and 'integration* may

have, one can assume that the different views concerning how the two affect each other

depend on how both terms are defined, or, in other words, which definitions are chosen for

the terms. The point is simple, but it deserves attention in that the link between definitions

and results is not always recognized. It is not completely clear whether research results should

be judged against some objective, external point of reference, such as a particular definition,

or against the choices made in the research itself, respecting the integrity of the piece of

research. Research results are sometimes criticised because they do not reflect the views of

the reader, although they might well be consonant with those o f the writer. Secondly, and

more importantly, the link between definitions and results deserves attention in that the choice

available seems to be, after all, rather limited: not all definitions will do, and a choice made

will subsequently function as a constraint for other choices.

The choice, in fact, might not be 'free' at all. Moreover, it might not be intentional. One can

see that there is a certain array of possible choices, which in the case of the state and

integration is certainly not modest; in practice, though, the choice is restricted by various

factors, in particular the position o f the scholar and of the research as to methodology and

academic disciplines.21 Finally, the choice is crucial in the sense that there is not only the

possibility of choice, but also a necessity of choice. It is apparent and somehow

commonsensical that the scholar should always determine what he means by the concepts he

uses; thus, he has to choose a meaning, and precisely one meaning, to which he is then

expected to adhere. These general rules o f what could be called 'research practice* are seldom

seen as a constraint, in that they seem to be the essence o f the research itself.

21 These types of restrictions are examined in detail in chapter three.

16

13 Delineating a research practice in t h e study of t h e relationship between the state a n d

INTEGRATION

The features of concept use outlined above can also be seen as a part of a 'research practice',

o f certain rules and understandings of what research is and how it is to be conducted which

can be assumed to influence the existing research on the relation between the state and

integration. ‘Research practice' is here used to mean a relatively limited and taken-for-granted

set o f rules concerning the procedure o f a study, norms and practices o f research as a

regulated activity involving expectations concerning the coherence, logic and proofs o f a piece

of research, i.e., a view on how research should be conducted and what counts as scientific

knowledge in each field. It involves very practical matters linked to the definition o f terms,

internal coherence and the question of evidence.22 It can also be seen to involve a general

understanding o f the process, also of what 'scientific* is23.

As taken-for-granted and conventional, research practice can also be expected to resist change.

It sets certain constraints of theorising and definitions and may influence one's way o f

thinking to the extent that one might be unable to imagine different models or solutions,

alternative conceptualisations and assumptions. One could think that some of its rules are

particularly ’costly' to alter, in particular those concerning the definition and choice o f objects

of the discipline in question, as well as the rules of the 'scientific game' more generally.

Among the most important rules, one could see the respect for the facts and obedience to the

rules o f coherence, as Morin (1982: 38) proposes. * 89

22 Thus, it is narrower than the well-known ideas of 'paradigm' by Kuhn, 'research programme' by Lakatos or 'research tradition' by Laudan. For Laudan, to exemplify the matter, a research tradition means a set o f guidelines for the development o f theories, which itself is not explanatory nor predictive or testable and does not give precise answers to specific questions, It involves an ontology delineating the types of fundamental entities that exist in the domain and to which theories reduce the empirical problems when explaining them. It also outlines the different modes by which these entities can interact and often also the legitimate methods to analyze them; it may also define partially the problems and their importance. (Laudan 1977: 79-86.) Laudan's 'research tradition’ acts negatively as a constraint on the types of theories which can be developed and justifies the theories (idem:89, 93). Laudan argues that theories are never self-authenticating: they invariably make assumptions for which they provide no rationale (idem: 94). - Laudan also remarks that in a historical analysis (of science or of ideas), the basic units should be the research traditions rather than individual concepts: change in the former explains changes in the latter. For him, concepts fthe state', 'space') do not have a historical autonomy which allows one to explain their historical transformation independently o f the broader patterns o f belief. (Idem: 183-184.)

33 Cf. Morin's (1982: 78) understanding of what science is: 'scientific' has perhaps to be defined as what the majority o f scholars understands as scientific; cf. Can's (1961: 78) quote of a physicist defining a scientific truth as a statement which has been publicly accepted by the experts.

17

The prevailing or conventional research practice could, then, be seen as characterised by the

quest for objective, cumulative knowledge, and by the presentation of science as rational and

progressive. One could further see a link between the goal o f objectivity and a tendency to

isolate phenomena for analysis. Morin (1982) criticises what he calls the traditional Western

scientific paradigm and particularly its experimental methodology for having led, by creating

manipulation, not only to discoveries but also to regression: the 'desecologisation', or isolation

o f the object for study, his decreased the possibilities of understanding them through reducing

or eliminating knowledge about how they relate to their environment.24 The objects of

research are, thus, moulded in some way or another to allow for the kind of results which are

deemed scientific. As Lowi (1992; 3) points out, if one supposes that science must be rational,

it must follow a prescribed method and must concern itself with rational, that is, orderly,

repeatable, and predictable phenomena. This explains, for Lowi, why it analyzes small, even

microscopic units: the smaller the unit, the more units we have, and large numbers of units

behave according to the regularities o f mathematical probability.

The conventional research practice involves also a certain view on progress. In this view, the

scholar has a tool kit consisting of definitions, theories (in the role of hypotheses to be tested)

and methods, such as a way o f formulating questions of a specific type, analyzing the material

and eventually concluding on the basis o f that empirical evidence • which is taken to be more

or less given and exist independently of the researcher.25 Progress can be equated with

accumulation of knowledge or development of cumulative theory; this is seen to require

consensus on the meanings o f the central terms used, such as 'the state'.26

Experimental methodology implies that the object of study is isolated in an environment created and controlled by the researcher; its natural environment is not interesting, since it does not allow for the isolation of variables. However, by isolating the object, one also destroys its reality, the possibility to understand its life. Therefore, Morin argues, insularity should be abandoned. The distinction between autonomy and dependency is, for him, something artificially created. In ecology, the two are not distinguishable at all: in order to maintain itself, an organism needs energy from its environment. In a similar vein, Morin argues, also cultural autonomy develops in interaction with other cultures. The more complex a system is, the greater are its chances of becoming autonomous, but at the same time, its relations of dependency become more various. In all, Morin suggests the aim of accepting the natural uncertainty and complexity, contradictions and incoherence - without, however, committing the error of repeating that everything is complex. (Morin 1982: 64-66, 97, 112, 194; also 310 and 316; cf. Morin, 'Pour une nouvelle conscience planétaire', Le Monde Diplomatique 427, O ct 1989.)

21 However, it should be noted that this does not mean that scholars think in this way. Rather, conventional research practice is constructed as if that was really true, although the scholars know that the interpretation of reality is not objective and uniform.

26 Cf. Ferguson and Mansbach 1989 (esp. pages 2-3, 68, 82). For them, the conceptual chaos implies that international relations is barely a "field" and certainly not a discipline; they remind that 'the state* is not the only fuzzy concept in the field, but is accompanied by other similar ones, such as ’autonomy', 'aggression',

18

A central feature in conventional research practice is thus reflected by the twist o v e r

definitions considered above. At the surface, discussions on both 'state* and ’integration' seem

to be concerned with progress, and therefore with shared definitions; on a deeper level,

however, there are considerable differences in theoretical commitments which make it d ifficult

to renounce a particular view in favour of this objective. Central concepts must be defined;

they cannot have several meanings, although an explicit definition is not always required, and

the scholar has to adhere to the definition throughout the research for the sake of coherence.

This seems quite clear: one cannot understand the study, its results have no relevance if one

does not know what has been meant by the terms used. Moreover, in social sciences

characterised by conceptual twists, is it not the task of the scholar to contribute with clear and

precise, well-justified understandings? A large part of the research process consists o f im plicit

or explicit concept definition: this is how the scholar renders the complex reality explicable

or understandable.* 27

Thus, it is only natural that the scholar agrees without any particular need for reflection with

the categorical warning Umberto Eco gives in his vade-mecum o f how to do research. He is

against even trying to write on something one does not succeed in defining. Terms one cannot

define should be avoided; and should a difficult term like that happen to be central in one's

study, adds Eco, it would be better to abandon the research activities altogether.28

The normal practice of starting from a definition is not as such somehow wrong; rather, it

directs research in a rather uniform or narrow way. Much effort is put into finding the proper

meaning and a sufficiently precise definition of the terms, one which, in addition, the

scientific community could agree on. These aims reflect the need for explanation,

generalisation and accumulation. However, it is not clear whether a definition should be a

priori or based on the case in question. The fights between different views also tend to be

inconclusive as there is no agreement as to the criteria for comparing different views.

'imperialism', 'interdependence', 'dependency' and 'regime'. - 'Integration' and 'sovereignty', obvious candidates for the title of 'fuzzy', are not considered closer in their book.

27 Through the definitions, research could be said to create its object of study. In the evaluation of the truth value of results (theories), the importance o f the definitions used can therefore, even be seen to outweigh that o f 'direct* empirical evidence. Conversely, it is questionable whether transferring the final answers into the realm of empirical research actually helps to circumvent the importance of conceptual choices.

28 "Definite sempre un termine quando lo introducete per la prima volta. Se non sapete definirlo evitatelo. Se è uno dei termini principali della vostra tesi e non riuscite a definirlo piantate li tutto. Avete sbagliato tesi (o mestiere)." Eco, Come si fa una tesi di laurea, Bompiani, Milano; 23th ed., 1995, pp. 167-168; emphasis original.)

19

Furthermore, despite the aim o f defining, the same terms often appear in research without any

explicit definition, as taken-for-granted basic building blocks of a conceptual apparatus used

in the analysis.

While it is easy to justify an unambiguous use o f concepts as being the very aim and basis

of scientific analysis, it could also be asked whether this in the long run could also be

counterproductive. In the context o f integration studies, defining both 'state' and 'integration'

from the outset may be a precondition for a meaningful analysis, and a fixed understanding

of the state may help understand the process of integration. However, it could also be thought

that the lacking problematisation o f the state may, in this case, actually turn out to be a

stumbling block rather than a useful simplification. The variety of meanings can be seen as

an important and integral characteristic of the two terms, and their reduction could be

dysfunctional for explanation or a constraint for research.

On the other hand, the significance of universal, placeless and timeless definitions could also

be questioned. They can be seen as a necessary basis for generalisations. However, one might

argue that 'contextualised' definitions are more valid. Contextuality, in turn, can be seen as

involving two aspects. First, a specific definition always serves a certain purpose in the

theoretical context in which it has been put, and the adequateness of a definition depends on

the purpose. Second, one could emphasise in Morin's way that the objects of research cannot

be fully comprehended if abstracted from their environment, the links to the environment

being an integral part of the object itself. In this case, for example, one could argue that the

state cannot be understood as a separate unit, but only in relation to its environment,

composed of phenomena such as integration.

Applied to the context of the study o f the state and integration, the conventional research

practice would, thus, mean that research would seek one (right) answer to the questions it

poses, for example, one explanation or theory, through adapting one definition for each term,

and with the view o f eliminating rival views. This logic of research practice seems above all

to make both the theoretical past and the alternative answers disappear; with them, it could

be argued, the possibilities for dealing with the plural interpretations disappear, too. The study

o f European integration seems, in fact, to illustrate this feature. Integration studies as a field,

like many other fields, seems more concerned with its present shortcomings and future

development than with its past, although it obviously would not be what it is without this

past. The usual proceeding in the study of integration starts from a review o f existing theories;

their comparison often leads to the conclusion that they are not enough and that new theories

20

should be sought The emphasis is on progress; existing theories are seldom seen as adequate,

which has to do with the manner they are looked at - theories are usually criticised.29

Criticism for the sake of criticism is not a very demanding activity. Compared with the task

of constructing something solid and new, it might even be fairly easy. After all, it is simple

to criticise theories in that they themselves offer plenty of material for criticism, both by

omitting factors and by being built on a specific view as to what is a good explanation.

Therefore, a pertinent criticism can always be constructed on either the question o f which

factors can be linked to the question or the question o f what is a good theory. In short, one

asks for more factors to be taken into account when the explanation is simple and for

simplicity when the explanation becomes too multifaceted.30 Further, the new contribution, or

the solution offered after the critical review of existing literature, may often be just a new

concept, new name or typology which in reality changes little if anything (cf. Strange 1988).

It also happens that one simply reinvents the wheel31 through details that actually already were

present. The search for newness requires a considerable knowledge o f the past and may still

not succeed. A final pitfall, then, seems to be that the links between theories are not perceived

to be important: a theory is criticised for an undue emphasis of certain factors, which is as

such a valid procedure, but which loses meaning when one takes into consideration that the

theory is an answer to another theory which, in turn, did not take that factor into

consideration. Research, thus, seems to have the best intentions to go on and improve the

understanding of, for example, European integration, but it might not have the best means for

doing so. Rather, it produces unduly incoherent arid conflictual knowledge, without giving

tools for understanding it.

The hypotheses which conduct this analysis could be summarised as follows. First, a special

research practice is an important factor in determining how a specific question is studied and

29 This critical approach has obvious pitfalls. First, it can happen that the object o f criticism, e.g., a theory, is depicted in a simplified way. This happens especially when speaking at an aggregate level about 'isms' and referring to secondary sources instead of the origins o f a theory: a certain image o f a theory is gradually created, and with it also a common way o f criticising it. Certain criticisms become archetypical, repeated; still, there might not be a single author or work which would clearly represent that kind of a theory.

30 Theory links factors and puts them into some order of importance; by definition, then, different theories have different orders and no one can have all factors included. This can result in an eternal debate between different emphases even though the discourse is constructed so that it seems to have an end, or all aim at an end which would be the theory, or a better one. These are aims which cannot be achieved, but which at the same time sustain research as activity, making it even some sort o f perpetuum mobile.

31 However, at times, less useful inventions are also made.

21

what kinds of results are achieved. Secondly, an important part of this research practice is

choice. As regards the definitions used, there are always several possibilities among which

one can choose; this leads to the question of interests, power and purpose. On the other hand,

however, the scholar also has to choose one of these. In a way, the scholar has the ability and

power to define, but also the unfortunate necessity to define. In the analysis of what has been

chosen among what by whom, it might well be intuited that mechanisms internal to research,

that is, the research practice, affect the choice to a considerable extent. In brief, the basic

consequence of choice, the exclusion o f some views, together with what seems to be a general

attitude towards choice in research practice32, result in decreased consideration o f alternative

views and thereby also make the relations between different views more nebulous.33

Further, it is supposed here that the normal analysis o f the relationship between the state and

integration34 avoids letting both terms 'float' but proceeds, instead, by holding one o f the two

constant and explaining the other in terms of the first. Conceptual problems can be avoided

through making a certain concept an assumption. Indeed, if the state is studied, integration

is 'stable', and vice versa - perhaps for the simple reason, pointed out by Bartelson (1993: 19-

20), that every scientific practice has to start somewhere, taking something for granted. In the

study of the relationship between integration and the state, this implies a contradiction

between the existence of clear answers and the vague character of both terms considered

separately: the uncertainty about the meaning of both terms turns into firm views o f their

essence when research on their relationship is concerned as the problem is made into a

remarkably neat research problem. In the explanations o f integration, most solid

understandings o f the state can be found, and likewise, integration appears unquestioned in

contexts where the state is focused on. Further, one o f the two terms may actually be the key

to understanding the discussion. For example, the difference between different views on

integration (e.g., neofunctionalism and intergovemmentalism) can be seen in the understanding

of the state, and vice versa.

Finally, there seems to be inadequate consideration o f the way in which both definitions and

theories are linked to each other and among themselves, something that can be seen as a result

11 The role of choice is seen to be rather minimal if it exists at all.

11 Indeed, one might think that the various points in research where a choice is made are also points in which different views are related to each other. Concentrating on choices could therefore increase the transparency of research and thereby increase the capacities to evaluate it, perhaps even to improve its quality.

34 Which looks like an open equation (e.g., 2x + 3 * y) in that both terms are open to discussion.

22

of undermining the role of choice in research. As regards the links between concepts, one can

interpret the wish to find a generally valid definition for each term as a factor contributing

to seeing the concepts in isolation. Theories link concepts, both intentionally and

unintentionally; on the other hand, theories are linked to each other through conceptual

choices.

23

1.4 Th e m e t h o d o f t h is s t u d y

This study does not try to determine the relationship between the state and integration but to

analyze and understand how and why the various existing answers have been achieved.35 In

fact, it could be argued that still another study on the relation between the state and

integration based on normal research practice would not necessarily add much. Instead o f the

normal rush through the well-established stepping stones - a presentation and criticism of

'isms' - towards something 'new' that might not be very different from the previous

knowledge, the study proposes some steps back, looking at the origins and backgrounds of

the views. It is a critical study of research, of some internal mechanisms through which

knowledge is created, transformed, criticised and transferred. The study aims at a better

understanding of how theories work and how scholars work with theories in the particular

field in question. Instead of reaching for a single best view or theory, the thesis is directed

towards pointing out the relations between theories.

In a way, the method of this study could be characterised as being horizontal in contrast to

more vertical or chronological studies. It analyzes the choice o f meanings, and in particular

three aspects of these choices: the restrictions and consequences of choice and the function

of choice as a link between apparently very different views. It also tries to see the meanings

in their specific contexts rather than starting with blank definitions, taking into account the

mutual influence between the state and its environment, which includes integration.

The historical evolution o f the meanings or the conceptual history of the two terms is here

paid relatively less attention to. Conceptual history would obviously increase awareness of

past development and existing, or previously existed, alternative views. Particularly in the case

o f the 'state', the importance o f the historical variation as to its meaning is easy to perceive.

M Understandably, then, it does not start by defining what is meant by the terms 'state' and 'integration'; nor does it adhere to those claiming that it could be possible to do without these terms. Following one particular definition would obviously hinder the analysis of what different definitions imply for research; as Bartelson notes in his research on sovereignty, starting a history of sovereignty with the definition of the term sovereignty would be to subject its historicity to the sovereignty of the present, and hence to narrow the scope of investigation. In writing a genealogy of sovereignty, Bartelson analyzes the relations between sovereignty and truth or sovereignty and knowledge, instead of attempting at answering what sovereignty is. He turns the question of meaning into a question of function, and considers particularly problems that arise when a scientific understanding of sovereignty is attempted; rather than dismissing the concept because of its ambiguity, he casts a suspicious glance into the practice of definition, the practice o f clarifying the meaning o f a concept through ever more fine-grained qualitative differences: essential features, elimination of borderline cases, etc. This attitude is, in his view, heavily indebted to the codes o f semantic conduct drawn up by post-Kantian empiricists which gradually became scientific common sense: the rational settling of disputes over truth necessitates clear-cut definitions. (Bartelson 1993: 10-13.)

24

However, these aspects have been amply studied.36 On the other hand, writing a conceptual

history would bring with it the same problems related to normal research practice. Ferguson

and Mansbach (1989: 17-18) comment on the conceptual history o f the state by noting that

the historical origins o f the state cannot be identified without an identification and definition

of the object; the problem, therefore, is that in history, there is no good basic model to serve

as a general definition and, instead, there is a risk o f being too abstract. The problem,

however, could rather be the opposite: there are many possibilities to start the analysis and

therefore many different versions of its conceptual history. In the analysis o f the different

views on the state and integration, the thesis takes a course somewhat similar to a

genealogical analysis in explaining the formation of the present views in terms of their past.

As Bartelson puts it, a genealogical analysis does not tell what actually happened in the past

but how the present became logically possible. (Bartelson 1993: 6, 51; for a more thorough

discussion, pp. 64-.) At the same time, however, the thesis stresses the existence o f plural

present views and the importance o f their interrelations for their development.

The study involves a view o f scientific progress which is not necessarily shared by what has

been called here the normal research practice. For normal research practice, progress in

science implies a consolidation of a certain view and increasing consensus about the object.

Here, progress is viewed in a different way. It is assumed that the ability to relate different

results to each other is lost without knowledge of why different results emerge in the first

place; therefore, undermining the non-objective characteristics o f research actually constitutes

a hindrance towards its development. In a sense, the study comes close to that o f Feyerabend

who emphasises the harmful effects of claiming that there is only one possible method, or,

in general, certain given rules for scientific activity. For Feyerabend, progress lies not in the

gradual consolidation o f existing views but in different views, in the very falsification o f

theories by finding facts which contradict them. The requirement of consistency is not

reasonable as it tends to conserve the old, he argues, pointing out the common tendency to

see a theory as better not because o f its superior quality but because o f its age and familiarity

(Feyerabend 1975: 35-36).37

3i For an introduction on the origins of the notion of state and classical literature (Bodin, Hobbes, Suarez, Grotius, Machiavelli), see Skinner (1989); also Poggi (1990). For conceptual change more in general (e.g., constitution, state, democracy, public interest, revolution), see Ball, Terence - FaiT, James - Hanson, Russell L. (eds.), Political innovation and conceptual change (Cambridge University Press, 1989).

37 This leads to the obvious difficulties of something new to be understood and accepted without reducing it to the already familiar {idem: 256).

25

A final methodological point which the thesis makes in relation to normal research practice

is also linked to the views on progress and concerns the relationship between theory and

reality. Theories are often seen to be the aim of research; they are understood as solutions or

explanations o f problems, usually o f causal type, to be tested by empirical evidence.

Explanation is usually juxtaposed to description; the logic o f explanation requires the singling

out of the relevant, important determinants (cf. Allison 1971: 4). Progress, thus, would consist

in increasing correspondence between facts and theory. It is, however, not necessarily possible

to make a clear difference between facts and theory - indeed, they are not separate realms (cf.

Feyerabend 1975: 66). Like a theory, also a description involves choosing relevant elements,

facts and phenomena, as well as ways o f linking them together, or drafting causes and reasons

- thus, essentially theoretical elements (cf. Hanson 1965, esp. 54, 70). On the other hand, if

theory is seen as an explanation, it is still a relative explanation as its adequacy can be

contested.38 A theoiy, in fact, could be seen as essentially an understanding of how different

elements are linked to each other, both at the level of events and at that of concepts. In a

theory, concepts are not defined in isolation, one at a time, but they are always interrelated

so that the stand taken on one concept has bearing on the understanding o f the other concepts.

Therefore, relations between concepts influence in an important way the single definitions.

This makes the analysis of choice even more pertinent The way concepts are used is a result

of a choice, or a series o f choices; their use is grounded in different interests or aims, be they

theoretical or practical. The necessity o f choosing and the expected coherence in following

the choice has wide repercussions: it is easy to see that this kind of a conceptual pre-

understanding of the questions shapes the answers given, just as it shapes the framing o f the

concrete research problems.

Drawing on these considerations, the thesis starts with a presentation in chapter two o f the

different views on the relationship between the state and integration to be analyzed. The study

does not pretend to offer a complete overview on the state and integration in the literature,

which is vast, but an adequate reflection o f the variety of views in order to propose reasons

for the adoption o f a particular view and to reflect upon the consequences of the view for

further research.

38 One could see, like Morin does, that theory is not knowledge, but something which makes knowledge possible: it is not an arrival or solution, but the possibility to address a problem. Pointing to Popper's view on the difference between theory and doctrine as the fact that theory accepts its own fallibility or the possibility that it is falsified, Morin argues that the very scientificity o f theories lies in their 'mortality' - even though theories have, in his view, a tendency to degenerate into doctrines. (Morin 1982: 35-36, 314.) - Feyerabend (1975: 307) seems to be quite close to Morin in arguing that claims to the only right method or the only acceptable theory belong rather to ideology than to science.

26

Three important branches or perspectives can be discerned in the study o f this relationship.

For the first, there is, evidently, the branch of integration studies, or the study of the process

of integration and the theories of integration. There, the relationship between the state and

integration constitutes an important fork in the debate - and also a perpetual bone o f

contention. Thus, major differences appear in the answers to the questions o f what happens

to the state in the process of integration and what the role o f the state in that process is.

Somewhat plainly expressed, a certain 'cartellisation' o f views into two groups can often be

discerned, represented by the claims that integration either weakens or strengthens the state

(statements usually connected to neofunctional and intergovernmental theories, respectively).

Secondly, the relationship between the state and integration also appears elsewhere in the

discipline o f international relations. Questions such as how integration changes the role o f the

state, the meaning of sovereignty and the nature o f inter-state relations are seen as

increasingly important to study and to take a stand on. On the other hand, the future o f the

state is in some sense even a classical theme o f research in the field of international politics.

A variety o f factors influencing its role and position have been examined, including the

process o f integration together with phenomena such as technological development,

nationalism or economic internationalisation.

Third, within comparative politics or political science proper, the study of national political

and administrative systems is increasingly taking into account the effects of integration which

seem to strengthen the importance of widening the frame of analysis from a purely national

one and to call into question the understanding of basic concepts such as democracy, political

participation, rights and duties, and citizenship.

The analysis o f the views is also aimed at elucidating the kind o f research practice adopted

in the field. Whether or not it actually appears conform to that outlined above, it certainly

affects the emergence o f the views in an important way. In chapter three, reasons found for

adopting a certain view are grouped together, emphasising particularly the domains of

disciplinary factors, view on methodology and theory, and values.

Similarities and differences between the views emerge in a concrete way when they are

applied to concrete cases. This application is made in chapters four and five. While the views

are similar in their applicability to the cases, the consequences of their application are widely

different, and consequential in practice. This brings the study back to why, in concrete terms,

the answer to the question on the relationship between the state and integration is so

important. In practical politics, the problem can be translated into a question o f the

27

consequences o f membership in the European Union for a country or for other integrative

processes and institutions. Clearly, these consequences can only be assumed on the basis o f

existing knowledge; yet, their role in decision-making about the membership is decisive.

For this study, two cases are chosen which are particularly illustrative from this point of view,

Nordic cooperation and Finnish integration policy. Finnish integration policy serves as a

timely example of the importance the evaluation o f the consequences o f EU membership has

for a state's decision whether to join or not. This evaluation depends on how both integration

and the state are understood; therefore, rather different interpretations may appear. The chapter

on Nordic cooperation evaluates somewhat similarly the possibilities and future prospects of

Nordic cooperation when several Nordic countries are EU members. Again, the evaluation

depends on how integration is understood, that is, whether it is seen as impeding or making

practically ineffectual the continuation of a parallel Nordic cooperation. At the same time, the

contents of integration and cooperation are compared. The view on the prospects o f Nordic

cooperation does not only depend on the understanding o f integration: equally central is the

way Nordic cooperation itself is understood. Often, in fact, Nordic cooperation seems to fall

somewhere between cooperation and integration, while it has also been argued that it is more

an extension o f state than integration. A typical question in the literature is whether or not

Nordic cooperation is integration, as well as whether it is important or not for the single

Nordic countries, and if so, in which ways.

In order to exemplify the array of possible interpretations and, thus, of choices, two versions

are presented o f both cases. The versions are examples o f how different ways of

understanding the relations between concepts and facts result in different pictures. The method

of presenting different versions underlines not only that different but still correct versions are

possible, but also that these versions are, in fact, quite far from each other as to their results

and implications. In addition to showing the rather customary fact that 'reality' can be given

very different theoretical interpretations and that evidence can be found for opposite claims

about Nordic cooperation and Finnish integration policy, the thesis aims at illustrating that the

very activity of research means that a version, normally one version, of reality is constructed.

The result is a construction, which in turn implies the existence of other constructions.

This procedure might recall the study of Allison about the Cuban missile crisis. Aliison tries

to explore the influence of unrecognised assumptions upon thinking about an event and what

alternative perspectives are available. Applying three different "conceptual lenses" or frames

28

of reference to the same material, he aims at uncovering additional facts but also underlining

how the different lenses highlight different aspects of the same event. (Allison 1971: v-vi.)39

Allison's study gives some important insights to the present study, while it also leaves open

some important questions which this thesis aims to tackle. Notably, Allison is in the end

rather unclear as to whether the different versions are compatible, while the concrete

consequences o f the use of the models are not fully reflected upon.40 This study differs from

Allison's in that the 'results' are not the same. Where Allison seems to present three ways o f

arriving at the same point, at what happened in reality, this study presents three ways o f

arriving at three different interpretations o f what actually happened.

There are, however, three essential points in Allison's study which have direct bearance on

this thesis. First, regarding what is here seen as the causes for the adoption o f a certain view,

Allison shows how the simple question o f technical feasibility - indeed, certainly one among

the internal constraints in research - may to a surprising extent affect the choice o f

framework.41 Secondly, as to the consequences o f different views, Allison notes a consequence

that might easily be disregarded: the existence of other models reveals the character o f each

39 Allison uses three such lenses, noting that these are not the only possible ones (Allison 1971: 255): the rational actor model, in which a particular event is seen as a result o f governmental choice, based on national goals, the model of organisational process, in which what happens is seen as outputs explained by certain features of the organisations in question, such as routines or patterns of behaviour, and the complex model o f governmental or bureaucratic politics, in which what happens is neither a choice, nor an output, but 'resultant* o f various bargaining games among different players in the national government with different conceptions, goals and personal abilities to influence the situation. (Idem: esp. 4-6,67, 79.)

40 Allison is not quite clear on whether his models are compatible and complementary or whether they are alternative so that one model would suit some cases better than others (esp. pages 274-277). The facts chosen are without doubt compatible; actually, the versions can be seen as a mere accumulation of details, revealing more and more information about the same facts. Allison also refers to the second and third model as improvements of the first and to an "apparent" incompatibility between the model I on the one hand and the two other models, on the other (idem: 246-247), and alludes to the possibility of having a grand model or working synthesis incorporating the features of all models. At the same time, he notes that more attention should be paid to the points in which the explanations are compatible or incompatible. He also notes that a number of scholars blend insights of all three. (Idem: 5, 257-259; see also pages 274-275 on how the different models could take into account factors underlined in the other models.) - Further, the links between frameworks and the propositions (or assumptions about international relations) are not very clear (see, e.g., pp. 34-35 and 180).

41 The question of feasibility is more important than it might seem. The models are not in practice equally easy to put into practice. Allison points out that models II and m require much more information than model I, while finding the kind of information required in model III on perceptions and priorities is obviously difficult to find, "close to an art" (Allison 1971: 181). It might happen, thus, as Allison notes, that since it is costly and difficult to acquire information, the actions of the "own" government are explained by model HI while those of the "other" are explained by model I (idem: 251).

29

one as an alternative or a version. In the presence o f models II and III, it is no longer possible

to treat model I as a simple description: it is a model While model I could alone be seen as

a considerable contribution to the understanding and explanation o f foreign affairs, the

existence of models II and III shed another light on it and on the difficulties in applying it.

Thirdly, Allison also points to the question of incompatibility of the standards for adequate

explanation.42 The compatibility o f facts notwithstanding, it might be impossible for someone

committed to one o f these models to accept the premises o f the other models. Allison

exemplifies this by noting that even if the information needed by model IQ were easy to

acquire, those adhered to model I would consider the information needed by model III as an

undue concern with subtlety, gossips and anecdotes, not as evidence. There is, in other words,

an important difference as to what evidence is seen as relevant and what is taken to be an

adequate explanation. Similarly, models Q and QI held model I inadequate, since it neglects

important factors; it is rather a shorthand, not itself a full analysis or explanation (idem: 254-

255).

A version, or a result o f research, however good, is always only one version as it is a result

o f a series o f choices and a selection of facts made in preparing it. The comparison of

different versions, theories and definitions is problematic. This seems to suggest renouncing

the aim o f arriving at one version, and developing, instead, a thinking based on the existence

of a variety o f different versions. These, however, could be seen as linked to each other in

that they result from the same situations of choice (crossroads, as it were). Together, they

would seem to form the most adequate basis for evaluating each one of them singularly and

the matter in its totality.

All in all, the study aims at bringing together the conceptual constraints and possibilities of

research on state and integration with wider implications about the limits of research practice,

42 It is interesting to confront the different explanations and the different 'lessons' drawn on the basis of the different versions. In model I, the explanation of international events is done through recounting the aims and calculations of nations or governments (Allison 1971: 10); in this view, nothing is inexplicable, and all is ultimately explained as rational. Explanation is achieved when the aims which would lead to such action are discovered; suitable aims can also be projected or postulated. As Allison puts it, if a nation performed a particular action, that nation must have had ends toward which the action constituted a maximising means (idem: 33). In the second model, it is natural to find out seemingly dissonant goals since different parts of the organisation have different goals (idem: 97), while in the third, the analyst also has to take into account factors such as misperceptions and miscommunication (idem: 178-179, 181). As to the 'lessons', then, model I is confident that nations will not commit suicide, tending to affirm that nuclear war is not a real possibility and that nuclear crises are manageable. Models II and III, also recalling historical precedents, note that irrationality is possible and that hazards and luck play a role, and emphasise the risky and problematic features of the process of crisis management (idem: 183, 259).

30

the way in which an academic account emerges and how reality is presented through

conceptual tools, ending with considerations about the significance of plural and contradictory

interpretation o f reality. In emphasising the context-dependency or context relativity o f

definitions and theories, a certain relativism seems to characterise the thesis: there is no single

right story about the cases chosen. The existence of several true versions is certainly not new,

but, in fact, the starting point and the raison d'etre of the normal scientific enterprise: one has

to find out which one is correct, to evaluate, to compare. Therefore, the thesis does not in the

first place aim to show that different versions are possible. It rather tries to tackle the problem

of relativity in the sense of explaining theory construction or scientific analysis through its

vertical and horizontal relations, origins and consequences. The validity of results depends on

internal, vertical relations between assumptions and definitions which not only guarantee the

coherence o f the piece of research, but also imply that the final result can be neither the

whole truth, nor 'more correct' than another version. In fact, horizontal relations between

versions could be equally important in understanding why the final results actually emerge.

Finally, then, the thesis is drawn into the question of interpreting what is the domain o f the

objective in comparison with that of the relative, what theory is, and how matters tend to

become objective with the development o f the discipline, or, how knowledge on facts is

constructed.

Chapter 2

Approaches to the relationship between the state and integration

This chapter identifies the different answers presented in the literature43 to the question of the

relationship between the state and integration. However, it does not merely list the various

views; it also aims at showing how these views have emerged. One can argue that this latter

question of how different views or theories are reached is mostly absent in the usual accounts

of approaches to integration. Often, in fact, different theories are presented as separate and

autonomous, perhaps with a comparison of their relative strengths and shortcomings. Such a

division into traditional 'isms' * neofunctionalism and the like - is not appropriate for several

reasons. First, this division is not necessarily relevant when seeking answers to the precise

question of the relationship between the state and integration. Secondly, labels such as

'neofunctionalism’ tend to obfuscate the analysis in that there is seldom agreement on what

ideas and which authors belong to which category (several examples of these difficulties will

emerge later in this chapter). Thirdly, and most importantly, these categorisations miss an

essential element needed to make the views understandable, that is, their succession or

chronological order, how they are related to each other.

This traditional mode of presentation may suit well the purpose of criticism in that the

shortcomings o f the theories become particularly visible when the theories are presented out

of context. However, it is argued here that a proper evaluation and criticism of theories and

research results must be based on first making them understandable. The variety o f views

concerning the state and integration cannot be fully understood if the views are analyzed in

abstract, one by one. It is important to note how central a role other views play in the

development of a particular view on the question. Therefore, this chapter draws a path through

the various views, showing how the ideas and theories have developed in relation to each

other. This done, it will also be easier to explain the bends along the path, or why the views

have emerged - something permitting an evaluation of the results and an overview of some

general features o f research practice, undertaken in chapter three.

Before embarking upon the analysis, however, two exceptions have to be presented which

confirm the rule that chronology is seldom taken into account in the evaluation o f different

theories. On the one hand, theories can be seen as time-bound in the sense that they reflect

the events of a particular period in time, therefore applying in such conditions but not in

43 The literature examined consists of research on integration in the field of political science and international relations, with only very limited references to integration studies in other disciplines such as law, and leaving aside material such as memoirs of persons closely involved with the development of the European Communities.

32

others. An example of this type o f presentation is given in Harrison (1974)44. On the other,

there is also an example in the previous literature in which chronological order is taken into

account in the sense understood here, that is, aiming to show not only the influence between

events in reality and theorising but also, and mainly, how the different theories influence each

other. This example is Pentland's article (1981), a review o f the sequence of integration

theories where not only succession, but also a dialectical mode o f development is identified.

In his view, the prevalent theory at a given time comes to be challenged by a new one and

from this confrontation, a synthesis emerges as a new prevailing theory, to be, in turn,

eventually challenged by a still newer one.45

c

2.1 In t e g r a t io n a s a so l u t io n t o t h e pr o b l e m s o f t h e s t a t e a n d t h e s t a t e s s y s t e m

The presentation o f different views on the relationship between the state and integration can

suitably begin by a view predating the establishment of the European Communities and which

could be depicted as an inherently problem-solving approach. In simple terms, this view is

that integration is a solution to some of the problems o f the state and the system o f states.

The background and context of this view is the immediacy o f the problem o f war and the

problem o f post-war organisation of international relations. The likelihood o f war is the main

problem in the system of states: the state is a problematic entity, the main organisational unit,

a rather closed one but not really self-sufficient or undisputed, and the relations between states

tend to be conflictual, even war-prone. Thus, the relations between states should be made

more peaceful. In this search for suitable ways for doing this, integration appears as one

possibility, a way o f transforming the relations between states.

44 Harrison argues that functionalism, the least politically ambitious theory, was in vogue between the wars, at a high point o f European nationalism. Federalism, the most ambitious one, came next in the post-war disruption and disillusion. Finally, neofunctionalism, a compromise, emerged in conditions of recovery and improving political atmosphere (Hanison 1974: 66).

45 Pentland saw two of these rounds already completed: the confrontation between federalism and functionalism (until 1950) was replaced by a neofunctionalist synthesis, which was then challenged by pluralist or confederalist theory; these were again synthesised into a policy-making approach, which came to be challenged by structuralist views. Importantly, however, the old theories have continued to exist, increasingly "populating the intellectual landscape” in the field. - Pentland's approach comes close to the present one also in some features which will be considered further in chapter three. Notably, he suggests that in addition to the "checkered fortunes” of the EEC, methodological and ideological factors have also had their influence on the theoretical evolution. The theories, greatly influenced by "the changing norms, interests and methods" of political science, especially as practised in North America, are, in his view, an uneasy blend o f the empirical (science) and the normative (ideology) (Pentland 1981: 545).

33

Different variations are presented as to what 'integration' is seen to mean here. However, they

all share the general belief in the positive consequences o f pulling the states somehow closer

to each other and increasing the linkages between them. Three o f them have become

particularly relevant for the development of integration studies: Mitrany's functional

cooperation, Deutsch's transnational links, and federalists' proposal to bring the states together

as parts of a large federal state. They all share some elements with the larger theoretical

frameworks o f solutions to the problem of war through, e.g., a Kantian world government or

through the League of Nations' approach to world organisation, as well as with literature on

the formation o f new political communities or regional unions, and with that on the

inadequacy of the state as a form of political organisation. Characteristic for them all is that

they are essentially prescriptions and proposals concerning possible ways of shaping interstate

relations, not analyses of something already taking place.

In the context o f early integration literature, federalism can be seen as an institutional or

constitutional solution to the problem of war: in order to secure peace, something more is

needed than mere international organisation between sovereign states, namely, strong common

institutions which gather the states in one legal and political system. Federalist theory

therefore examines the functioning o f federal states and the advantages of this organisational

form in comparison to a unitary state as well as the possibilities for previously sovereign

states intentionally to choose a common central authority and constitution. The example of

how a federal state - the United States, Germany, Switzerland - is organised, the division of

competencies between the central federal authority and the states (Lânder, cantons), is to serve

as a basis for the organisation of relations between the European states; a federal structure

with a common central authority is seen to be a model which renders the otherwise bellicose

interstate relations equally peaceful and organised as the relations between the parts of a

federal state.

While federalism was a significant political movement o f the post-war years in Europe -

although perhaps not a particularly coherent one46 - and inspired writings with titles such as

Will There Be a United States o f Scandinavia? (Franzén 1944) and The United States o f

46 Note, in particular, the European Union of Federalists (later European Federalist Movement) which was established in 1946, gathering in the Hague in 1948 and 1953, and the Congress of European People, established in 1956 and aiming at a common constitution, universal suffrage, etc. (see, e.g., Harrison 1974: 44-52). - In analyzing the Hague conference of 1948, Haas notes the wide range of views represented and the disagreement on anything beyond the common denominator of the will to create a united Europe, e.g., on whether a European state structure was needed, on its functions, degree of centralisation and form of government to be adopted (Haas 1948: esp. 550).

34

Europe (Haas 1948), its internal variety has caused notable problems of classification. Even

though federalism is usually seen as one o f the cornerstones in the theory construction on

integration, there is some hesitation as to what federalism actually means and whether som e

particular authors could be classified as federalists. For instance, Pentland (1973) seems to

have difficulty identifying exponents o f this tradition, pointing out, hesitatingly, Etzioni as

being closest to federalism among the theorists.47

It is important to note, however, how the contribution o f David Mitrany is grounded on using

the idea o f functional cooperation48 as criticism of the federalist ideas. Mitrany published in

1943 a short, pamphlet-like reflection entitled^ Working Peace System. An Argument fo r the

Functional Development o f International Organization. The essay was presented by the

publisher as ’’one possible approach to the problem of post-war organisation”. It attained an

influential role in integration studies, its author being commonly identified as the founder o f

functionalist integration theory. For Mitrany, the central question was how to avoid a new

war, or how to alter the relations between the states and abolish reasons for waging war. In

essence, he proposes the method o f functional organisation, that is, conferring the management

of an increasing amount of practical tasks, previously functions o f the states, to common

institutions, expressly created functional organisations. In practice, governments would transfer

the executive authority and resources needed for the fulfilment o f these tasks to the

organisations.

Mitrany's approach is wary: the territorial and ideological divides of the system o f states

should be surmounted, albeit gradually and unnoticed. In the presence of war and hostile

47 Reference is often made to Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi. notably to his Pan Europe (Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., New York 1923), Carl J. Friedrich, Trends o f Federalism in Theory and Practice (Frederick A. Praeger, New York 1968), Arthur W. Macmahon (ed.), Federalism: Mature and Emergent (Doubleday, Garden City, New York 1955) and William H. Riker, Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance (Little, Brown, Boston 1964) but also to Proudhon, Du Principe Fédératif (1863).

48 One might want to note the wide literature on international functional organisations which developed as a result of the period of unprecedented efforts in planning and creating new organisations both at a universal (UN) and regional level after the second world war. Particularly in Western Europe, the organisational activities of the early post-war years were such as to prompt an observer to claim that "during the years 1947 and 1948, the ideal of a united Europe has been pushed closer to realisation than ever since the breakdown of the universal church and the universal empire" (Haas 1948: 528; Haas had in mind Bulgaria's call for a formal federation of the communist-controlled parts o f the Balkan peninsula, the customs union between Benelux countries, the Franco- Italian customs union, the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) and the Western Union or the Treaty o f Brussels). (See Taylor and Groom 1978; also Abi-Saab 1981.)

35

ideologies, one should not endeavour to unite states by what divides them49, but through what

already unites them, that is, the specific, common functions. (Mitrany 1943: esp. 7, 10, also

23.) Instead o f an abrupt surrender o f sovereignty, there would be inconspicuous and partial

transfers of authority. National agencies would not be displaced; on the contrary, they might,

indeed, derive fresh life and scope from wide functional co-ordination with the outside world

(idem: 37, 53). It is important that unity should grow freely, and the functional method is

conducive to that goal: bring endowed with "the virtue of technical self-determination" (idem:

35), logical and natural in character, it is naturally expansive, leading to further coordination

within similar functions.

The state is a problematic construction for Mitrany. In particular, he sees the division o f the

international system in states as an "artificial amputation" o f social relations and links. He

deplores the way social actions are arbitrarily cut at the border of the state with only uncertain

ways of linking them across the borders. Harmful for people, this division can be seen as

unsatisfactory also for the states themselves, to judge from the inclination of states to be

involved in conflicts over territory - the location o f these borders - and to be concerned about

their authority. Integrating the states' means and authority to perform concrete, common

functions diminishes both the authority of a state and its integrity in a more concrete sense:

the development of functional cooperation leads to a gradual fading off of frontiers. The

continuous development of common interests and activities across the frontiers makes these

meaningless and brings an end to the "artificial amputations"; hence, also changes o f frontiers

- a common cause o f conflict - become unnecessary. In this sense, Mitrany sees in functional

cooperation a way to peaceful change and international society. (Mitrany 1943: 26, 42.) It is

important, however, that this development be realised in a manner such that it does not

overtly go against the wishes of states, but, instead, through steps which the states can see as

beneficial.

When associating Mitrany with integration studies, it is not sufficient to take into

consideration only his view on the possibilities of increasing technico-functional cooperation

in shaping interstate relations - as he seems to be linked to subsequent integration theories by

for example Haas. One has also to take into account his view that integration has certain

limits. This becomes clear when analyzing Mitrany's criticism o f federalism. In his view, the

For example, over geographical or ideological divisions: while a geographical union would cut across political or ideological divisions, an ideological one would be equally unstable because o f the inherent instability of the ideological basis, easily shaken and abused by propaganda (Mitrany 1943: 11, 14).

36

aspirations o f the federalists are both unrealistic and potentially injurious.50 One should not

endeavour to unite states according to a pre-established general framework or theoretical

pattern, as federalists envisaged. The unsuccessful example o f the League o f Nations as the

first international organisation with (in principle) universal membership and the task to

promote international cooperation and achieve international peace and security shows for

Mitrany that it is better not to begin with constitutional forms. As such, though, functional

organisation is not incompatible with a general constitutional framework nor precludes its

coming into being (Mitrany 1943: 20-21).

On the one hand, plans of this kind would require considerable political will on behalf o f the

state, which Mitrany deems improbable.51 On the other hand, a framework of that kind would

not be needed, either: for Mitrany, the greatest common needs, peace and social advance, do

not require overall political authority but are best advanced through functional cooperation in

different fields. Furthermore, a union or federation of states, i f formed, would not solve the

problem o f war. On the contrary, being "a mere change from the rivalry o f powers and

alliances to the rivalry of whole continents”, it would only exacerbate the problem by

reproducing the logic of political exclusion and the system of national states and, in reality,

would only threaten security. Mitrany's ideal o f unification differs fundamentally from that

of the federalists in that he emphasises the importance o f universal peace and cooperation

over narrow regional arrangements. In his view, a close continental union could rather

differentiate than integrate, implying even dangerous antagonism with outside world, either

as a result o f the close internal cooperation or since the stimulation of internal unity could

imply the need to invent extraneous dangers.52 (Idem; 12, 34, 38, 53-54.)

M In a sense, then, Mitrany is not an integration theorist at all; cf. Harrison (1974: 27-28) who notes that the functionalist thesis was not originally related to the question of integration, unless in opposition to it. For Mitrany, it was important to break away from the link between authority and territory.

51 This pessimism about the prospects o f resolving political differences through constitutional arrangements which involve limitation o f sovereignty suggests that Mitrany's political observations have much in common with the realist school of international politics (cf. Harrison 1974: 31, 34; note also Morgenthau's "brilliant and enthusiastic" introduction to a collection o f Mitrany's essays, published in 1966 with the title of 'A Working Peace System’; cf. Taylor 1975).

52For Mitrany, it is useless to hope or to prescribe that relations between these kinds of unions or a union

and other states should be liberal and co-operative: finance, production, defence and the like cannot be organised tightly in a sectional unit, and at the same time be open on equal terms to other units. The closer the organisation of the sectional unions is, the sharper will be their division from other similar unions, and the more tenuous their links with any universal body. (Mitrany 1943: 17-19; cf. Mitrany 1975: 154 and Mitrany 1963; cf. Haas 1961 who also holds that regional integration may slow down universal integration altogether, the universal arena thus remaining what it is, confined to minimising conflict and seeking minimum common denominators.)

37

A fruitful comparison can be here made between the writings of Mitrany and Karl W.

Deutsch, in particular Political Community and the North Atlantic Area by Deutsch et al.

(1957). Both see in the increasing transborder or transnational activities a way towards more

peaceful relations between states. Both are universalistic or general in outlook, and for both,

the process of integration helps to overcome the intrinsically conflictual relations between the

states, without, for that matter, replacing the system of states as such. Their views are also

problem-solving in intention. What differentiates the two, however, is that Deutsch's study

presents results o f concrete research on different historical cases and is based on a different

methodology. In fact, it can be seen to open a new type o f research on unification or

integration, a type which in the 1960s got a rather strong footing. Its central characteristics

- rigorous definition, objective and precise hypotheses, testing - will be returned to in chapter

three.

The point of departure in Deutsch et a l (1957) is the elimination of war and the building to

that effect of a wider political community, the purpose being to find out general conditions

for security communities to emerge or to exist.53 'Political community' is defined as a social

group with a process of political communication, some enforcement machinery and some

popular habits o f compliance. 'Security community', in turn, is an integrated group o f people,

either pluralistic, if their governments remain separate, or amalgamated, if they merger

formally. 'Integration', within a territory, is the attainment o f a 'sense of community' and of

institutions and practices which are strong and widespread enough to assure, for a long time,

dependable expectations of peaceful change and settlement o f disputes in lieu o f resorting to

large-scale physical violence. (Deutsch et a l 1957: 5-7.)

The authors first identify the conditions for the existence o f security communities in the

realms of social communication, interaction, values and expectations54. Subsequently, they

examine the stage of integration, or the degree to which these conditions exist, in different

53 The book deepens the analysis of Deutsch's Political Community a t the International Level (Doubleday, New York 1954) and leans on case studies by historians who, in separate volumes, have studied four cases, the relations between Norway and Sweden at the time o f writing, the United States, the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, and the Habsburg Empire in 1914.

u A very important condition for an amalgamated security-community to exist or emerge is found to be the mutual compatibility o f main values. Other essential conditions include distinctive way of life, expectations of stronger economic ties or gains, marked increase in political and administrative capabilities of at least some particular units, superior economic growth for at least some of the participating units, unbroken links of social communication between territorial and social strata, broadening of the political elite, mobilisation of persons (at least the politically relevant strata) and multiplicity of ranges of communication and transaction. (Deutsch et al. 1957: 58, 123-159.)

38

subareas o f what they call 'North Atlantic Community'.55 Deutsch thus aims at generalisable

knowledge about the formation and existence of these communities, generating also

prescriptions as to what could be done in the form o f policy implications.

Deutsch's subsequent writings add a consequential element to his understanding of integration,

namely, a rather negative view on the state. It appears in particular through Deutsch's

characterisation o f foreign policy. In his view, the foreign policy o f every country deals, first,

with the preservation of independence and security, and, second, with the pursuit and

protection o f its economic interests, particularly those o f its most influential interest groups.

Foreign policy consists of resisting penetration and manipulation by foreign countries and

ideologies while aiming at accomplishing active penetration and manipulation of its own and

spreading its own national and ideological propaganda. (Deutsch 1968: 87-88.) This being the

case, integration is needed: mankind is unlikely to survive for long without a new political

climate, greater international openness, understanding and compassion, which help to achieve

integrated political communities in the long term. However, this is not necessarily easy to

achieve: most governments and people prefer, in Deutsch's view, sovereignty or pluralism to

supranationalism or integration, which would involve a loss of capacity and prestige. {Idem:

202 .)

In sum, the three variants of the first view on the relationship between the state and

integration present three different interpretations of integration as a solution to problems o f

the system of states: federalists see it as the establishment of common political institutions;

Mitrany as the development of international organisations; and Deutsch as the development

of relations between societies or people.56 Together, these theories - labelled subsequently as

federalist, functionalist and transactionalist or pluralist integration theory - serve an important

function in the development of integration theories. Indeed, it is difficult to find studies o f

integration where at least one of these would not feature as a foundation for subsequent

theoretical constructions. In general terms, one could argue that these views have contributed

” The area comprises 19 countries in Europe and North America. The result o f the analysis is that the highest degree of community is found to exist between the United States and Canada; this core is followed by a triad with Ireland. The third highest degree of community exists between these three together with the Scandinavian countries and the Benelux, after which there is a considerably larger leap in the degree of integration. (Deutsch et al. 1957: 10, 156-157.)

36 The differences can be striking; in comparison to federalists (or an institutionalist like Etzioni, see below), Deutsch's way o f examining people rather than institutions is particular. No new common institutions are envisaged in his political communities, and the existing institutions disappear in the background as institutional affiliations and various integrative efforts do not seem to influence much the results (for instance, as the United States, Canada, Ireland and the Scandinavian countries together show signs of remarkable integration).

39

to the development of subsequent theorising particularly through fostering an approach in

which the state is taken as the 'known', not in need o f analysis but rather a background factor

which justifies integration, and integration as the 'unknown' to be investigated. As will be seen

below, these elements appeared linked in particular to a methodological stand close to that

of Deutsch’s.

2.2 In t e g r a t io n a s a p r o c e s s in w h ic h th e s ta t e is w e a k e n e d o r r e p l a c e d

In part, the second view on the relationship between the state and integration can be seen as

a direct continuation and further specification of the first. It assumes what was prescribed

before; in other words, if integration previously was seen as a process which could have

certain effects on the states system, it is now analyzed as a process which does indeed have

these effects, and the thrust o f the analysis is shifted to more specific questions on how this

takes place. The crucial difference between the two views is that the proponents o f the second

one interpret the events they are observing as instances o f the phenomenon envisaged by the

first.

Thus, according to this view, integration and formation of a new political community is taking

place, and it can be directly observed, first in the case o f the European Coal and Steel

Community (ECSC), then in the European Economic Communities (EEC). This is the starting

point of Ernst B. Haas' studies on integration, paramount in directing the development in the

field. In particular, Haas' definition of integration in The Uniting o f Europe (1958) forms the

basis of this second view on the state-integration relationship: for Haas, integration equals the

formation of a new political community57. In the process o f integration, national political

actors are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities towards a new

centre whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the national states. A new

political community is subsequently formed, superimposed over the existing ones (Haas 1958:

4-5, 16). Integration is seen as a two-way process in which the central institutions affect and

are affected by the subject groups {idem: xxxii-xxxiii) and in which the actors' values and

interests are redefined. While in the beginning, the national values held by the groups direct

the decisions to join in or to abstain from the proposed steps of integration, these values

57 'Political community', for Haas, is a condition in which specific groups and individuals show more loyalty (obedience and expectation) to their central political institutions than to any other political authority, in a specific period of time and in a definable geographical space. In Western Europe, the existing national states are such political communities.

40

gradually change towards a geographically larger, regional orientation and towards new

'nationalism'.58 {Idem: 13-14, 19.)

Haas builds partly on a criticism of the works of both Deutsch and Mitrany. In addition,

federalism plays a role as a theoretical stand against which Haas examines his findings. Like

Deutsch, he analyzes the formation of political communities. However, he seems to criticise

Deutsch's methodology and particularly his definitions. Direct reference to Mitrany does not

appear before Haas' Beyond the Nation-State of 1964. In Haas' view, although dynamism and

comprehensiveness make the functional approach better than other approaches (Haas 1964:

x), he criticises, in particular, the proposition that the political can in an unproblematic way

be separated from the technical. He also aims at refining functionalism with the help o f

qualifications and specifications concerning learning and unintended consequences.59

Haas' aim is to present a theory or generalisations about the processes by which political

communities are formed among sovereign states, and also an account of the adaptive ability

of actors (Haas 1958, preface of 1968: xi). There is, for Haas, one concrete example o f this

kind of integration in the contemporary Europe, namely the ECSC, of which Haas analyzes

the first five years o f activities.60 In concrete, he asks whether the ECSC is intergovernmental,

federal or sui generis in nature {idem: 34) and answers the question through studying the

change in behaviour (comparing the years 1952 and 1957) by national political parties, trade

associations and trade unions, national governments, supranational trade associations,

supranational trade unions, supranational political parties, and the High Authority, the

independent decision-making body of the ECSC. Haas concludes that the ECSC is not quite

federal but rather 'supranational': it is a hybrid with plainly federating consequences. In his

view, the ECSC has been a motor in a sectorially and geographically expanding process o f

58 Shifts in the focus o f loyalty need not necessarily imply the immediate repudiation of the national state or government: multiple loyalties exist, although not necessarily in harmony with each other (Haas 1958: 13-14).

39 For Haas' criticism o f functionalism, see Haas 1964: 6, 13, 21-22; for more specific criticism of Mitrany based on, e.g., organisation theory, especially the role of experts v. politicians in the process of integration, pp. 95-96, 101-102, 115.

60 The Treaty of Paris establishing the ECSC was signed in 1951 by France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg and came into operation in 1952. - Haas remarks that the ECSC, the vital centre of integration until 1958, was planned by the founders as one side of a triangle together with the European Defence Community (EDC) and European Political Cooperation (EPC) (Haas 1958: 29-30).

41

integration in which interests are defined anew and new forms of behaviour emerge. (Idem:

526-527.)61

The results of this analysis concern the conditions for and the motors or mechanisms of

integration. They are presented as what Haas calls a functional62 theory of integration - further

developed in Beyond the Nation-State o f 1964 and the new preface to 'The Uniting o f Europe’,

written in 1968. In short, the theory claims that the initiation of political unification does not

require majority support or identical aims by all key groups, that the acceptance of unification

will be facilitated if the state units are already ideologically or socially fragmented and if

there is a tradition o f mutual consultation and rudimentary value sharing, and that also an

external threat is helpful. Once established, central institutions affect integration if they cause

strong positive or negative expectations. What Haas calls his "perhaps most salient

conclusion" is that major interest groups and politicians determine their support or opposition

to central institutions and policies on the basis of a calculation of advantage. In Haas' view,

the process is dominated by nationally constituted groups with specific interests and aims,

willing and able to adjust their aspirations by turning to supranational means when this course

appears profitable. (Idem: xxxii-xxxv.)

Haas' approach is characterised above all by the aim at generalisable knowledge and theory

formation and by the centrality of the idea of something new replacing the old, the new

political community replacing the states - a development, moreover, which he seems to

welcome, judging from the criticism against the state presented in Haas 1964. Haas sees the

object he is observing and explaining - integration in the ECSC, the only existing

w In particular, Haas refers here to the "strikingly federal" powers of the ECSC regarding the routine regulation o f the common market of coal and steel (part pages 29-30, 38-48, but see also pages 51-58 for the limits of its power in questions not directly related to these domains), but also to its expansive nature, both regarding a spill-over o f its powers into sectors other than coal and steel (e.g., to labour policy) and geographical spill-over or attractiveness. (Idem: 49-50, 301, 313-315.) - However, one cannot fail to notice a certain circularity in the study: the ECSC is found to be what it was defined in the first place. Integration is defined as a process whereby values and behaviour change, and the ECSC is defined as an instance of integration; thus, it is logical that values change - even though the brevity o f the period studied make value changes appear more surprising. Much is taken as given: both the nature o f the ECSC as a special, supranational organisation and the identification of unifying agents are rather a given (by definition, as it were) than a result of a study. This becomes clear in the introductory statement according to which Haas studies the "selected groups, institutions and ideologies which have already been demonstrated to act as unifying agents in political systems clearly 'integrated’ by any applicable standards and the one organisation a priori capable of redirecting the loyalties and expectations of political actors, namely the ECSC." (Idem: xxxii.)

62 Although Haas is often presented as the neofunctionalist par excellence, he in fact calls his theory 'functional'; nor does Haas later place himself to the category of neofunctionalism (see, e.g., Haas 1970).

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supranational organisation - as something new and unique. He notes that what is interesting

for him as a political scientist is to see voluntary 'integration' taking place before his eyes. H e

describes the object of study as one o f the very few current situations in which the

decomposition of old nations can be systematically analyzed within the framework o f the

evolution o f a larger polity, perhaps destined to develop into a nation of its own (Haas 1958:

xxxi). This aspect of observability is most consequential for Haas' understanding o f

integration. Basing research explicitly on observation is, in his terms, preferable both to the

prescriptive traditional theories where reality is analyzed through a model o f how it should

be and to the ultra-scientific theories where reality is analyzed through pre-established,

abstract theoretical models.63

The aim o f theory formation, the view on the state and other factors which clarify Haas'

understanding o f integration appear particularly in Haas 1964. In this study, Haas combines

his considerations on integration with a wider view on the international context seen as an

international system, identifying the process of integration with a process which transforms

this system or leads to an altogether different international system, from Gesellschaft to

Gemeinschaft. Integration, thus, refers to a process which "links a given concrete international

system with a dimly discernible future concrete system", a process o f increasing the

interaction and mingling of national environments so as to obscure the boundaries between

the system of international organisations and the environment provided by their nation-state

members, a process beyond the nation-state (Haas 1964: 29). Concretely, he examines the role

of international organisations in this change (idem: 16-11, 81), seeking an effectiveness model

in which the criterion o f success o f the organisation is its contribution to the transformation

of the international system to a higher level of integration (idem: 92). The organisation

analyzed is the International Labour Organisation (ILO) and the author asks whether it is an

organisation capable of maximising the process of integration (idem: vii).64

Haas underlines the importance of developing an explanatory and projective theory, aiming

at predictions on, among other things, the capacity of collective decisions to transform the

beliefs o f the actors and on the capacity o f an organisation to be a transformatory actor. To

81 The aspects of Haas' approach which best explain why he adopts this position - scientific outlook, negative view on the state, novelty and observation - are analyzed more closely in chapter three.

64 The analysis of the ILO might appear largely a digression from the analysis of European integration (especially since the results o f the analysis show that in the end, the ILO was not particularly successful in the task of transforming the international system), were it not for the fact that it has an important role in further developing Haas' view on integration.

43

do that, Haas examines both theories o f organisational efficiency, particularly the prerequisites

for an organisation to be effective and grow, and systems theory (Haas 1964; 95-96, 10i-102,

115). In particular, Haas maintains that systems theory - one of the novelties o f the time

characterised by "immoderate theorising" - provides the opportunity o f both explanation and

prediction. Haas aims at elaborating functional theory "in the light of social science theory

and contemporary empirical studies", mainly in a system theoretical framework, using the

method o f contextual analysis (idem: 23-24, 47-50) and underlines the role o f scientific

accumulation.65

Developments within the view

In Haas' footsteps, there developed in the 1960s and early 1970s a vast literature on

integration which, remaining within the second view outlined above, added to it further

specifications and, at times, also a rather technical outlook. Seemingly, the various authors

concerned share merely a deep disagreement about what should be studied and how. In fact,

the literature is characterised by constant quarrel about what integration is, followed by

anxiety about the consequences of this disagreement for integration theory and the lacking

signs of progress or growth o f knowledge.66 Nevertheless, the disagreements are rather

superficial. Below the surface, there is, in fact, a solid common ground, a consensus as to the

main questions to be asked and the type of research to be conducted.

Central in this common ground is the understanding of integration. It is seen as a new and

unforeseen process which has its driving forces in influential social groups and which implies

a gradual transferral of the state's functions and authority to the common, supranational

institutions. Together with functions and authority, these institutions also gamer the loyalty

o f the people, becoming a new centre not only of political activities but also of identification.

Integration transcends the state; it offers a more effective way o f political and economic

65 See the example above of studying groups, institutions and ideologies which have already been demonstrated to act as unifying agents in political systems. Note also the conclusions of Haas 1958 (his study substantiates the pluralist thesis that a larger political community can be developed if the crucial expectations, ideologies and behavioral patterns of key groups can be successfully refocused on a new set of central symbols and institutions; Haas 1958: xxxii-xxxv).

66 See, e.g., Haas 1970: 607, Puchala 1972: 267, Caporaso 1971: 228, Nye 1968. Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff (1981: 453, 459) also point out that integration theory has not been sufficiently advanced to arrive at either a commonly accepted definition or a general agreement on the relevant indicators of integration; Harrison (1974: 115) criticises the inadequate consensus particularly as to background conditions and notes the variation in the accounts of regional background conditions, arguing that they have neither been established as absolute impediments, nor as sufficient or indispensable for integration.

44

organisation than the states and makes governments gradually accept and comply with the fac t

of their diminishing authority.

This understanding of the relation between the state and integration functions as the common

premise o f this group of analyses, to the extent that the question is not explicitly taken up at

all. Indeed, the very entity 'state' does not necessarily appear in these studies, nor is the

concept much used. Thus, the studies follow the example set in Haas 1958 where no such

entity is involved in the process of integration. The only occasions in which the state appears

in the analysis are rather fleeting in nature: on the one hand, the ECSC admittedly consists

of states; on the other, states and political communities are held to be, for the time being,

practically the same. However, there is no such collective actor as the state which would have

its interests in the process of integration. The actors considered are not states, but political

parties, interest groups and governments. In fact, in rejecting collective actors, Haas sees a

need to justify even his choice to see governments as actors: they have to be observed since

their attitudes cannot be simply reduced to those of the leading party in a multi-party

government (Haas 1958: 240).

The governments, then, have to adjust their behaviour to the new situation in which their own

authority is increasingly limited. Haas actually observes clear changes: novel procedures and

codes o f conduct emerge in the relations between governments, even a supranational attitude

comprising consensus and an atmosphere of cooperation, compromise formulas and

concessions by all (Haas 1958: 489-491, 498, 512, 515-520).67 France, for instance, behaves,

according to Haas, in a different way in the ECSC and the OEEC, being more cooperative

in the former because of the greater engagement and identification with the purpose o f the

organisation {idem: 520-523). Interests change, and national interests are always compromised.

Governments seek to secure a maximal position but without obstructing the process, thus

making possible the evolution of more integrated decision-making over time. In the long run,

they defer to federal decisions as they recognise a point beyond which attempts to sidestep,

ignore or sabotage them are unprofitable (idem: xxxiv, 240-, 279-280).

67 Haas' supranational method of decision-making corresponds to the 'community method' identified by Lindberg and Scheingold (1970: 96-97) as emerging in the Council, characterised by the governments' frequently showing commitment and accepting the Community as an active and valid partner, by a spirit of problem solving, responsiveness, will to compromise, long-term thinking, common interests, issue-linkages, and the achievement of unanimous agreements in the end. (Later, different interpretations of 'community method' have been given. For instance, Baker and Kolinsky (1991: 108) interpret it as meaning that the Commission, the ’European element1, can identify sectors for inclusion in integration, which implies its widening.)

45

Later, Puchala (1972: 277-282) describes integration as involving procedures which facilitate

cooperation and allow for efficient problem-solving and regulation of conflict In this system,

the states find it possible consistently to harmonise their interests and compromise their

differences. Conflicts between the actors follow from divergent views about ways to cooperate

rather than from incompatible interests. In the relations between the states, bargaining prevails

over coercion and confrontation, which are considered illegitimate and occur infrequently. The

system is also characterised by open communication, high mutual sensitivity and

responsiveness.

Building on this understanding, there has evolved a growing body of literature which reflects

the increasing popularity o f the phenomenon as a central research object68. It shares a research

programme in describing, explaining and predicting the process of integration through the

construction and refinement o f theories and models. The main research questions concern the

necessary or helpful background conditions for the process of integration to start, the

indicators of the level of integration at a given time, the possibilities of measuring the speed

of the process, and the explanatory value of single variables which affect the process.

While the contribution of this branch of research might not be impressive in terms of new

findings or conceptual innovations, it does have an important role in directing subsequent

research on integration. By its cohesion and accumulative research agenda, it succeeded in

making some theoretical lacunae increasingly apparent, something that is later successfully

used by those representing an opposite view on integration and the state.

Three such influential developments within this second view can be discerned, For the first,

the literature comes to reject the possibility of comparison in integration studies, concentrating

increasingly on the study of the European Community and depicting it in terms which cannot

be applied to other organisations. Secondly, the theories used in the analysis o f integration

tend also to become more specialised and the early uses o f theories of systems and

organisations are replaced by the evolving theories on integration. Thirdly, the central objects

of debate become what concepts and definitions should be used, what variables and indicators

would be most suitable, and how the explanatory power o f the theories could be improved.

68 An indicator of the prominence of integration studies could be the publication in 1970 of a special issue of International Organization dedicated to regional integration. It contains articles by Haas, Lindberg, Puchala, Inglehart, Nye, Schmitter, Alker, Hayward, Korbonski and Scheingold; all, it is explained, have been inspired by Haas 1958. It also contains an extensive selective bibliography on integration compiled by Haas (p. 1003 onwards). - The issue is published also as Regional Integration. Theory and Research, edited by Leon N. Lindberg and Stuart A. Scheingold (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts 1971).

46

Initially, a comparative approach seemed to gain popularity. It had an evident justification in

that the aim o f theory building and the nature of the claims presented about integration w ere

such as to require applicability in several cases, for example in other geographical regions.

At least, the aim of testing the theories required material which was not the same on which

they were based In fact, Hansen (1969: 242) sees the comparative approach as a tendency

in the late 1960s. On the one hand, the European Communities were compared with other

European organisations; on the other, there were comparisons between the European

integration process and similar efforts in other regions, in particular in Latin America and

Africa.69 Amitai Etzioni's Political Unification (1965) remains perhaps the most extensive

comparative study of integntion or the process of unification. He constructs a research setting

which enables a comparison between four unions, the EEC ("growing union"), the Nordic

union ("stable union") and two other contemporary but failed unions, the United Arab

Republic (1958-61) and the federation of the West Indies (1958-62).

However, the approach soon faced strong criticism. The comparisons were found problematic

in that, for instance, the differences between less developed and industrialised countries were

not adequately taken into consideration (e.g., Hansen 1969). At the same time, the authors

themselves tended to conclude that the European experience was not really comparable: the

comparisons mainly highlighted the special features o f the European Communities. Haas

(1961) pointed out the particularity o f European Communities in respect to European

institutions in that when different modes o f conflict resolution in the organisations were used

as indicators for integration, the European Communities emerged as the most successful

institution availing itself of all the modes presented, and having, in addition, contributed by

the mode o f "upgrading common interests" which emerged in no other organisation (Haas

1961: 367-370). In addition, Haas concluded that the European processes could not be

reproduced in other contexts because the necessary preconditions existed to a much lesser

69 For example, Haas (1958: xxxvi) saw that his findings on the ECSC could be generalised to apply also to NATO, Scandinavian cooperation, OEEC and the relations between Canada and the United States, although not so much to other regions, such as Latin America. In Haas 1961, the question is whether the successful technique of integration in Europe can be imitated elsewhere, as it presumably would contribute to peace (Haas 1961: 366); Haas examines the various European efforts - more or less as parts of the same integrative process - and applies the findings to the Soviet bloc, Latin America, Arab states and United Nations. For examples o f further comparisons with Latin America, Africa and Asia, see Haas and Schmitter, 'Economics and Differential Patterns of Political Integration: Projections about Unity in Latin America' in International Organization, vol. XVIII (4) 1964, pp. 105-T il (revised in International Political Communities: An Anthology, New York 1966); Haas, 'The 'Uniting of Europe* and the Uniting of Latin America* in Journal o f Common Market Studies 1967; Nye, 'Comparing Common Markets: A Revised Neo-Functional Model' in International Organization, vol. 24 (4), 1970, and Haas 1975 in which 30 regional organisations are compared. For literature on socialist integration, see Muoser 1986.

47

degree, even though he acknowledged the possibility o f different functional pursuits also

yielding integration (idem: 389-392). Similarly, Etzioni's comparison rather ended than started

comparative analyses on European Communities and other unificatory processes: the study

presents the European Communities as different from the others, mainly because o f the role

of strong central institutions.

As a result, it was increasingly perceived that the terminology and theories developed actually

applied only to the EC, which set it as a sui generis phenomenon apart from other

endeavours. The very term ’integration* was increasingly limited to the EC so that, for

instance, EFT A and Nordic cooperation gradually no longer qualified as instances. It was also

argued that concentration on the EC instead of comparisons was conducive to more effective

theory building and more powerful explanations (Lindberg and Scheingold 1970: 107).70

The second main development concerned the limitation o f theories applicable in the study of

integration.71 72 Earlier on, theoretical inspiration had been searched for in different fields of

research, and particularly the different variations o f systems theory were applied to the study

of integration7*. As was seen above, even organisational theory was applied in Haas 1964.

Soon, however, these ways o f making integration part o f some more general phenomenon

come to be replaced by expressly created integration theories. In fact, in this mainstream of

theorising, an article such as Galtung's (1967) emphasising the need for a more general

conception of integration based on a structural approach appears rather atypical.

70 However, the basic problem o f reconciling the unique nature o f the object and the aim o f generalisation remained; Haas himself encouraged comparisons again in 1970. The uneasy attitude integration studies have displayed to comparison is further examined in chapter three.

71 Together with the limitation of research objects, this specialisation can be seen as a part o f a certain discipline formation, o f a tendency to build up integration studies as a field of its own, especially in the late 1960s and early 1970s, through specifying its own research interests, theories and methods. These disciplinary dynamics (changes in whether or not integration studies is seen as an autonomous discipline) are an important long-term factor in influencing the understanding of integration and will be considered closer in chapter three.

72 E.g., Haas 1964, Lindberg and Scheingold 1970, Lindberg's article in International Organization 1970, based on systems analysis and decision-making theory, and Karl Kaiser, The U.S. and the EEC in the Atlantic System: the Problem of Theory' in Journal o f Common Market Studies, vol. V (3) 1967. However, Lindberg and Scheingold adopt quite different aspects o f systems theory than does Haas: they do not, like Haas, consider integration as a transformation of the international system but analyze the EC as a political system of its own. In addition, they consider the EC in terms of system equilibrium, something abandoned by Haas for a more dynamic view of system transformation. (Seen as a further development of (neo)functionalism, this is a modification almost by reversal: integration does not necessarily lead 'forward' or mean continuous, automatic progress, but can evolve towards equilibrium and persist as such.)

In the ensuing contest between the different integration theories, these scholars - those closest

to (neo)functionalism - found evidence for discrediting their opponents. Federalism, in

particular, was seen as falsified by the events both in Europe and in Africa which effectively

contradicted its descriptions and explanations; in Haas' view, none o f its assertions-predictions

had proven to be true (Haas 1970: 624-625, 629; cf. Puchala 1972).71 * 73 At the same time, they

also had to improve theirs to encounter the same type of criticism from others. Notably, the

mid-1960s crisis in the process of integration made them adjust their view on integration.

Haas' second preface to The Uniting o f Europe, written in 1968, is a good example of

theoretical adjustment in which an unforeseen event threatening the theory is made conform

to it, almost transformed into evidence for it, in this case for the preferability o f functional

approach. The events between 1958 and 1968 seemed for the most part to confirm Haas'

theory: it applied equally well to the EEC, which had inherited the role, spill-over potential

and unique supranational style of the ECSC. Moreover, great developments had taken place;

in Haas' view, integration had proceeded with a considerable speed after 1958. In its first five

years, the EEC had attained astonishing results, coming close to voiding the power o f the

national state in all realms other than defence, education and foreign policy. Particularly

striking for Haas were supranational decision-making and definition of rights o f individuals,

enforceable by the Community. This development had not been planned or approved by the

governments when establishing the EEC; it was more or less automatic.

Against this background, the abrupt deceleration o f the process in mid-1960s was surprising.

The crisis was caused by a new attitude adopted by France, less enthusiastic of

supranationalism and more based on furthering its own interests74. That a "single charismatic

Frenchman" [de Gaulle] could stop the process, as Haas put it, did not, however, undermine

71 Remarkably, although federalism first was not identified with a specific author or as a specific theory, itcomes to be pointed out as the only clear case of falsified theory. The critics point out that federalism, based on rather disparate historical examples and not having specified any integration dynamism, is not conducive toscientific study about how the conversion might take place. (For further interpretations of federalism, see, e.g., Nye 1968: 875-876; Lindberg and Scheingold 1970: 11-12; Harrison 1974: 42-43, 55-58,235-236.)

74 Between 1964 and 1966, France stayed outside the Community decision-making and created a crisis in the financing of the agricultural policy, objecting the proposals for 'own1 revenues for the Commission and the use of qualified majority voting. The problem was resolved in January 1966 with the Luxembourg compromise which recommends unanimity and gives the possibility of vetoing the decisions on the basis of vital national interest of the member states. (See, e.g., Baker and Kolinsky 1991: 115; Miriam Camps, European Unification in the Sixties: From Veto to the Crisis, McGraw-Hill, New York 1966.)

49

the validity o f the functional explanation71 * * * 75. On the contraiy, it demonstrated that

functionalism, being gradual, was the only usable strategy. However, the theory had to be

reformulated: it had exaggerated the automaticity o f the process and did not sufficiently

distinguish between the causative role of temporarily differentiated sets of conditions

(background conditions, conditions prevailing at set up, and those prevailing after). Further,

it assumed too strongly the end of ideology, particularly nationalism76, and gave too little

weight to the different stimuli coming from the external environment. (Haas 1958, preface

1968: xiii, xx-xxv.)

This general aim o f improving the theory is also the common denominator of the third general

development within the view. Essentially, it was seen that resolving the problems concerning

the concepts used, as well as the choice o f variables and indicators, would bring forward both

the theory and integration studies in general. As to the concepts and definitions used, there

was a general agreement on the need for arriving at shared definitions in order to ascertain

that all shared the same object o f research, and, thus, to allow for accumulation, progress and

more accurate results.77 Although a specific terminology started to emerge based on

considerable similarities in the choice o f concepts to be used, there were also considerable

differences in how the terms were actually defined. For instance, a comparison of Haas 1958

and Etzioni 1965 shows that both use the term 'political community' instead of the term 'state',

71 The importance of already achieved integration in influencing the perception of interests was confirmed.Haas mentions the integration threshold, a condition in which the beneficiaries of earlier integration steps haveachieved such vested position in the new system as not to permit a return to an earlier mode of action: e.g.,expectations which the politicians do not dare to disappoint, or regional enmeshment of administrative ties andpractices with the consequence that national and supranational agencies cannot perceive themselves as functioning except in terms of ongoing cooperative patterns. (Haas 1958, preface 1968, xxix-xxx.)

16 Haas proceeds to explain that in certain conditions, supranationalism is likely to be substituted for nationalism, while in others, nationalism prevails. Supranationalism prevails over nationalism in conditions such as those of the 1950s: pessimism and frustration prevailed, national self-identity was not highly valued, and the nation-state seemed unable to guarantee welfare, security, democracy and human rights. These conditions, the trauma of war, need for reconstruction and the perceived threat of communism favoured the search for regional unification as the remedy, the acceptable shared goal being economic advantage (not federalism or cultural unity). (Haas 1958, preface 1968: xviii-xx.) At that time, the situation was very different in Britain and the Scandinavian countries; it was also very different in 1967 {idem: xvi-xvii).

77 It is striking how many researchers seem to arrive at a personal conclusion that a particular term does not have a single, commonly agreed definition. In a way, the researcher seems to expect there to be a single definition in the literature, being surprised when, instead, a whole variety can be found. Similarly, those worrying over inadequate definitions of 'integration* seem to believe that some other notions (such as the state) would present a considerably higher degree o f development in this aspect

50

which, like 'sovereignty', does not appear, whereas their definitions o f 'integration' are quite

different.7*

Several authors reproached the unproductiveness o f the studies thus far conducted. Caporaso

(1971: 228) noted a widespread controversy "even on the simplest of issues" in integration

studies, on the entities to be studied, definitions, concepts and indicators, and the lack of

common standards for the evaluation of knowledge, interpreting evidence and measuring

progress. Haas and Puchala were surprised at the fact that fifteen years of studies had not

sufficed to achieve a clear consensus on the delimitation o f the field, and that the dependent

variable still caused problems (Haas 1970: 607; Puchala 1972: 267).78 79 Some advocated

remaining within the core meaning the words commonly have, preferring simplicity to

absolute precision (Harrison 1974), while others aimed at more precise and technical

terminology. Nye, for example, aimed at sharper analytical tools and a clarification and

strengthening of the foundations o f causal theory through conceptual clarifications. In his

view, as the common usage o f 'integration' was often confusing, scholars should agree on a

common or easily translatable vocabulary. To this effect, he sought to relate some o f the

major definitions and formulate falsifiable hypotheses by disaggregating the concept of

integration into different types - political, social, economic - and subtypes, and developing

specific indices for the subtypes. (Nye 1968: 856, 858-859.)

It became quite common to see that the old terms of traditional political science were not

applicable and that new ones should be invented. Several authors maintained that old concepts

and models o f the social sciences were not enough to describe the peculiar character of

integration and the European Communities (e.g., Lindberg and Scheingold 1970: 306-307).

For Puchala, the main problem was that although contemporary international integration was

an essentially new, unfamiliar and rather unconventional phenomenon, the scholars insisted

upon analyzing it as instances of more familiar patterns, as federalism, nationalism,

78 Etzioni defines 'political community' as efficient control o f means of violence, decision-making centre capable of altering significantly the resource allocation and the dominant focus of political identification. 'Integration' for him is the ability of a unit or system to maintain itself in the face of internal or external challenges, while 'unification' is a process by which the bonds among the units of a system are strengthened (see the glossary in Etzioni 1965: 329-332).

19 Despite the claims that the very understanding of what integration was and how it was to be studied had not yet been achieved, there were also quite sophisticated analyses based on apparently unquestioned assumptions. Above all, those arguing that the earlier efforts of theorising were not relevant were quite positive that what had been studied as integration was not integration, or at least should be called with some other terms. For instance, when Haas brings integration studies to a rather abrupt end in 1975, the meaning of integration is definitively taken for granted, coinciding with its dismissal as an interesting and important object of research.

51

functionalism or power politics. In his view, conventional models did not satisfactorily

describe or explain this phenomenon, nor did they raise very productive questions about it.

(Puchala 1972: 267-269.) Here, he followed Haas, who came to see that the main problem in

the integration theories developed thus far was that they analyzed integration as a process

towards a 'federal union', 'security community' or 'political community', all "lamentably

unspecific and inconsistent" as dependent variables since they could not yet be observed or

measured in nature (Haas 1970: 630-631). In all, the theories - federalism, communications

or transactionalist approach and neofunctionalism - were no more than pretheories or empirical

generalisations which did not meet any of the criteria o f description, explanation and

prediction. {Idem: 609-610, 613, 619.)

In Haas' view, the solution to the problem of scarce theoretical quality was to replace these

dependent variables with new ones, namely, 'regional state', 'regional community' and

'asymmetrical regional overlap'. Admittedly, these were also heuristic, without any real-life

counterparts, but they provided "orienting provisional points in the future", being illustrations

of possible temporary results o f the integration processes.80 (Haas 1970: 607, 634-635). Apart

from the labels chosen, a very similar proposal is made by Kaiser (1972: 227-231) who

proposes 'super state', 'functional region' and 'regional conglomerate'. Similarly, Puchala (1972)

argues that the problem of the conventional frameworks has been that they test the present

in terms o f progress or regression in relation to a hypothetical future instead of basing the

analysis on what integration is at present in different regions. He proposes instead that

integration be best thought of as a set of processes which produce and sustain a "concordance

system" at the international level. This model describes, in Puchala's view, Western European

integration better than any of the models "currently in vogue". Essentially, it is a complex and

highly institutionalised international system in which there are different types of

interdependent and quasi-autonomous actors, the states being the main units. The relations

between the actors are characterised by cooperation, mutual sensitivity and effective problem­

solving. (Puchala 1972: 269-276, 283.)

As later examples o f the perceived need for new concepts, one could mention Alger (1981:

136-137) who criticises Haas' new variables for not succeeding in really liberating the analysis

from the hold of the nation-state model - which, in fact, was used as a point of comparison

in that it was said to be "the opposite o f a regional state". Similarly Schmitter sees that the

essential problem of theorising about integration has been that all the theories have seen the

end-state o f integration as being either an international organisation, a nation, or a state. In

80 Five years later, Haas (1975: 84-85) saw the 'asymmetrical overlap' (or 'semilattice') as the most likely outcome in the short to medium run.

52

his view, recourse to these traditional terms has impeded the understanding o f the specific

nature of European integration. Therefore he suggests seeing the European Community as a

"new form of political domination" in order to capture its long-term dynamic and different

evolutionary possibilities. (Schmitter 1991: 2-3.) Other new concepts to describe the

qualitatively different multi-layered European governance could be such ideal types as

condominio, consortio, confederano and stato/federatio (Schmitter 1996; 132-134).

In addition to concepts and definitions, the debate on the development of theory dwelled on

the choice o f variables and indicators and their measurement. Different authors tended to use

different indicators, both quantitative and qualitative, but it was noted that even when the

same indicators were used, the results could be different.81 Indicators pose the problem not

only of a certain arbitrariness, but also o f possible confusion with the consequences o f

integration, as Scheingold (1970: 978-980) points out: what researchers study as indicators

of integration - that is, different changes which are used to determine whether or not

integration is taking place - can actually be seen as the consequences o f integration.

The variables used to explain integration tended to grow more numerous. From the early

Haasian conditions for integration such as value sharing, external threat or social

fragmentation and Etzioni's (1965) emphasis on common institutions as explanatory variable

o f the level and scope o f integration, research continued discovering major relevant variables

(cf. Hansen 1969). It was seen that what could be seen as the intervening variables between

economic and political union in Western Europe, or the conditions in which an economic

union will be transformed into a political union, namely, the internal logic of industrialism,

pluralism and democracy, could in other regions be replaced by other cultural or stylistic

attributes serving as 'functional equivalents'.82 83 Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff (1981: 453, 459)

deduced from the difficulties in arriving at agreements on definitions and indicators that the

theories could lack emphasis on factors in the international environment and the role o f

81Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff find that Deutsch and Haas use transaction flows as an indicator, while Lindberg

uses the delegation of decision-making power and Inglehart the survey of opinions towards integration. In addition, sentiments and contacts, loyalty and legitimacy have also been employed (cf. Caporaso 1971: 228-229). Even diametrically opposite results have been achieved with the same indicators so that while for Deutsch, integration has stopped or reached a plateau since 1957-58, Lindberg sees substantial progress in the five years after 1958 (cf. Haas 1958, preface 1968), and for Inglehart, integration never halted after 1958. (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff 1981: 454-455.)

83 While this term was used in Haas and Schmitter 1964 (see footnote 68, 69, page 46), Nye proposed instead the concept of 'catalyst' (an accidental historical factor which decisively influences integration) which for him was better than the 'functional equivalence' (see Nye, 'Patterns and Catalysts in Regional Integration', International Organization 19, 1965; see also Harrison 1974: 108).

53

coercion, while Pentland acknowledged the need for analyzing an impressive amount of

independent variables. Being a complex, multi-dimensional phenomenon, integration

necessitates taking into account many background variables as well, such as threat from the

external political environment, structure o f the international system, support o f powerful

outside states, convergence of interests, common institutions, patterns and habits of

cooperation and consultations or conflict resolution, and geographical factors. (Pentland 1973:

211-212, 216-217.)83

At the same time, the snowball-like tendency of integration theories to include all kinds of

elements provoked indignat .on. Instead o f theories, the outcomes were seen as accounts of all

that integration involves, as Puchala referred to Nye's article o f 1970. The results did not

much resemble scientific theories in a strict sense, that is, being deductive-nomological and

structured in a special way, as De Vree noted in his criticism o f integration theories by Haas,

Deutsch, Etzioni and Lindberg. In his view, the attempts at theory formation have been loose

and informal. The theories present a mixture of historical narrative and description o f minute

details, being characterised by undisciplined concept formation, impressionistic judgement on

the basis o f empirical propositions rather than precise observation, and are close to everyday

language. (De Vree 1972: 3-5, 316-319.) Haas, too, criticised the amount of indeterminate

variables and the tendency to add "fudge variables" whenever the standard ones were not

enough, including such "mythical animals" as "functional equivalents", "catalysts",

"federalizers", "compellingness" or "high politics". (Haas 1970: 630-631, footnote 28.) Hansen

noted that the more comprehensive the scope of theories became, the more apparent it was

that all aspects of international and regional change were a part of a "seamless web" o f social

reality that defies exhaustive treatment (Hansen 1969; 253, 271). An intricate confrontation

between different standards for adequate explanation was, thus, unavoidable. The more

parsimonious versions which explained the process o f integration with a few variables were

criticised for disregarding important factors, while the more extensive versions were criticised

for putting together too many disparate elements and thereby losing the explanatory power

altogether.

Still, integration studies acquired in the early 1970s a rather technical outlook. Already in

Deutsch et ah (1957) and Etzioni (1965), a rather scientific language was used. Particularly

Etzioni's study was explicitly constructed as theory-led, consisting o f the examining o f precise

propositions or hypotheses. The aim o f testing models and hypotheses against reality was

Cf. also the telling title by Lindberg in International Organization 1970, 'Political Integration as a Multidimensional Phenomenon Requiring Multivariate Measurement'.

u

54

present in many studies. For instance, Puchala's 'concordance system' was such a model to be

tested through "stepping out into the empirical world" (Puchala 1972: 283-284). Traces of

simulating experimental methodology were not difficult to find.84 Questions o f quantification

and measurement obviously surged85 and Haas welcomed approaches which allowed for

mathematical manipulation. In fact, his new dependent variables (see above, page 51)

suggested by organisation theory, had specific value in this sense: allowing for mathematical

manipulation, they contributed to a promising way o f improving the theories, that is,

systematic comparison with the help of computer simulation.86 Haas is, however, optimistic

about the development of theory. Referring to the work o f Nye, Schmitter and Puchala, he

maintains that the specification of independent variables, their operationalisation and the

establishment of clear links between them, is advancing rapidly (Haas 1970: 637).87

Explicit use of terminology relating to experimental methodology is visible in Haas and Schmitter (1964) where it is stated that other regions may have functional equivalents for the important traits "isolated" in Western Europe; Lindberg and Scheingold (1970) wish to take advantage of the "unique social laboratory that the Community offers for the study of integration processes"; for Haas (1970: 608-609), the units and actions studied provide a "living laboratory" for observing the peaceful creation of possible new types of human communities at a very high level of organisation and of the processes which may lead to such conditions. (Quotation marks added.)

85 See, e.g., the use of the index of relative acceptance (RA index) in showing that integration has slowed down; the index [RAjj = (A^ - E^) + E^, in which -1 < RA^ < oo , A^ = actual trade between two countries, and - expected trade between two countries] is developed by Deutsch and I. Richard Savage to assess the preferences of the members of the Community for internal transactions as opposed to transactions with third countries (see Deutsch et a t, France, Germany and the Western Alliance: A Study o f Elite Attitudes on European Integration and World Politics, Charles Scribener’s Sons, New York 1967; Lindberg and Scheingold 1970, page 38 et passim; see also the test made in Fisher, William E., 'An Analysis o f the Deutsch Sociocausal Paradigm of Political Integration', International Organization, vol. 23 (2), 1969, pp. 259-290, and Caporaso 1971). - Caporaso writes about the problems o f measurement and scoring, the relation between theory and measurement and proposes criteria by which to assess the state o f integration examining convergence between scoring procedures, differential predictive and explanatory capacity of a variety o f different scoring procedures, average intermdicator correlation and factor analysis. (Idem: 233-253.) For integration as an object of formal reasoning, multiequation causal models, flow charts and computer simulations, see, e.g., Alker, Hayward R., Jr.: 'Integration Logics: A Review, Extension, and Critique', in International Organization, vol. 24 (4) 1970, pp. 869-914.

86 For Haas, computer simulation is one o f the most exciting possibilities open to students of regional integration, having both a "sobering and an intellectually explosive impact": it demands standardisation of variables, links and measures, and requires subordination to concepts which seem to summarize observed processes and which can thus "become branching points on the flow chart”. The most exciting possibility is the chance to go beyond the very limited number o f actual historical cases. Progress in theorising depends on the acceptance of the discipline which computer simulation implies, although computer simulation, in turn, depends on further progress in theorising. (Haas 1970: 644-645; also footnote 33, p. 634.)

87 Although Haas encourages comparison, a problem remains: he emphasises the need to differentiate between integration studies and the studies of other regional cooperative phenomena, although he does not succeed in making the difference clear, but his way of defining the latter as non-integration and differentiating them through pointing out that their basic concern is not integration implies that they cannot be used for the purpose of

Although the development o f more strictly defined research agendas can in some sense be

seen as a requirement for progress in the studies, it also implies a certain one-sidedness and

opens lacunae in the form of questions which are not posed. Such was certainly the question

of the consequences o f integration, which Scheingold pointed out as neglected by the scholars

who had mainly analyzed the process o f integration itself, describing, measuring, explaining

and forecasting its course. Moreover, he pointed out that integration was seen as good by

definition, which contributed to limited research interest in the consequences of integration

or its costs and benefits. Posing the question of consequences involves, therefore, a change

of perspective and sensitivity to value questions. It leads to ask what difference it makes

whether Europe integrates, without taking for granted either the merit o f integration or the

desirability of the Communities' initial goals. (Scheingold 1970: 979-981, 1002.)“

Even more visibly, the concentration on certain questions, terms and methods, encouraged by

this branch of integration research, opened a door for the critics in leaving aside the state, or

depicting it as taken-for-granted while integration was the 'unknown' to be analyzed.88 89 Quite

obviously, critics could point out the inadequate consideration of the state as a basic

shortcoming of this view.

55

comparison. He also limits what should be studied in the realm of integration studies to the EC by noting that as it has been found out that the commitment to create a common market is the most conducive to rapid regional integration (while, in contrast, free trade organisations have great difficulty in influencing the policies of their members), new hypotheses concerning future regional integration should be formulated in the context o f common markets (Haas 1970: 616).

88 In Scheingold's view, there is little understanding about the extent to which integration actually has the impact it was expected to have, such as altering dramatically the relationships between the nation-states in Europe, or of how integration affects the distribution of influence and material welfare. For him, it seems just as reasonable to expect the changes that the Community was supposed to generate to breed dislocation, discontent and instability, at least in the short run (he points to, e g., nonparticipatory tendencies as possible costs of regional integration, suspect materialistic orientations of the communities and the probability that certain groups will be disadvantaged, as well as the disruptive international consequences o f integration). (Scheingold 1970: 991- 997.)

89 See, for instance, Lindberg and Scheingold who, in difference to many others, expand on what the state is; nevertheless, they note that the constantly shifting scope and the amorphous character of the EC make it only partially comparable to a nation-state as a decision-making system (Lindberg and Scheingold 1970: 66) - as if the state did not have these characteristics.

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2.3 Th e sta t e w h ic h str en g th en s it s e l f t h r o u g h in t e g r a t io n

The third view on the relationship between the state and integration has in its background two

important factors. On the one hand, it develops on the basis of a realist view on international

relations: integration does not constitute any exception to the rules o f international relations,

but is viewed as an instance of normal90 international relations; thus, it is also explainable as

such. On the other hand, it develops as a criticism of the view considered above, at a time

when this has a rather prominent position.

An early illustration o f the differences between the second and third view can be found in

Graubard (ed., 1963), represented by Haas and Raymond Aron. The main difference concerns

the perception of change: quite clearly, Aron's framework is such as to make the possibility

of integration constituting a notable change in international relations rather improbable.

Aron, eminent representative o f the realist school o f international relations, is sceptical about

the possibility of the emergence of a 'new Europe' and the desirability of a European state,

doubting the kind of objectives it might have. Central in Aron's understanding o f integration

is that it is not automatic; there is no inevitable, smooth progression from economic unity to

political unity, and neither are there necessary linkages between different domains.91 The

governments, each with different views, have a central role in the process, and unification

does not proceed if the governments do not wish to reach agreement. Nor does Aron see

traces of a process towards community-building: the relations between the member states -

outside the economic field - are not basically different from those in the past Aron also

stresses the importance o f security and defence: without the capacity to defend itself (or at

least a relative autonomy in the Atlantic Alliance), there will not be a federation. In all, Aron

sees neither wish, nor ability nor capability in the states to form something o f the kind

including, for example, common diplomacy. (Aron 1963: 40-41 , 4 6 , 50-51, 6 0 -6 1 .) Thus,

90 What is seen to be 'normal' in international relations can obviously have different interpretations. However, one might argue that those representing the second view see integration as 'abnormal' international relations, while in the first view, changing the nature of international relations was more a wish or a goal.

91 Aron maintains that those arguing for the smooth advancement from economy to politics are more Marxist than they realize; for him, it is "pure fantasy" to imagine that identical foreign policy emerges on the day there is free circulation. - Similarly, Harrison (1974; 185-186, 197) sees the vulnerability of the neofunctionalist theory in the relation between politics and economy which is neo-Marxian in character in assuming that economic imperatives will impose themselves on the political arrangements of society and that economic integration is less demanding than political union.

57

Aron emphasises the role of governments and sees that considerations of politics, history and

security are fundamental for their policies, even more so than economy.

Haas, on the contrary, sees the question in terms o f rational progress, even feeling. He

observes important changes taking place and applauds them, in particular the new

supranational method. In fact, while for Aron, things continue being as they have been, for

Haas, almost everything has changed and the 'new Europe' is, in fact, a reality92. The new

Europe is a pluralist and industrial society where politics is less ideological, where there is

more value agreement, and where the national state no longer "feels capable" of realising

welfare within its borders and which has made its peace with interdependence.

Supranational ism is the appropriate method to secure maximal welfare, including military

security, for a post-capitalist state in the new Europe. It represents the victory o f economy

over politics and over nationalism. (Haas 1963: 67-73.)

Haas stresses that the new method does not necessarily mean that the governments would only

experience a loss o f power; in fact, they are quite content with the process. The state itself

sees its interests in a different way, understanding that isolation is possible only at the

expense o f welfare. It is true that governments can brake the process: spill-over is far from

automatic. However, the integrative logic operates, and the process indeed advances. There

is a cumulative pattern of accommodation in which the countries refrain from veto and seek

compromises, upgrading their common interests. I f difficulties in some area emerge,

concessions are made in related fields. The European executive’s ability to gain power does

not alarm the governments, since there is no 'community point of view' or general interests

which would subordinate the national criteria and the governments feel that concessions are

rewarded by gains. The final compromise includes a feeling o f commitment, creativity and

gain. (Idem: 65-66, 77-78; cf. Haas 1958, preface of 1968.)

The second important background feature o f the third view is that it receives a confirmation

and a spark from the difficulties encountered by the second in explaining the halting o f the

process of integration in the mid-1960s. In fact, events leading to the Luxembourg 93

93 Interestingly, Haas argues that EFTA corresponds to the profile of the new European society even better than the EC. In fact, he notes that with the French veto, it is not surprising that the supranational-integrative logic began to assert itself rapidly within EFTA (1963-), taking the form of discussions on common commercial policy towards third countries, agricultural agreements, acceleration o f trade barrier removal, development aid concertation, increasing involvement of experts and interest groups, establishment of a parliamentary gathering in the form of EFTA delegates meeting in the Council o f Europe. These features, argues Haas, facilitate the assimilation o f EFTA countries to EC. (Haas 1963: 78-79.)

compromise are seen to falsify the second view, while from the point of view o f the third,

they appear only logical. In essence, they confirm the fact that the state has not succumbed

to integration, constituting evidence for the realist view o f the state as the main actor and the

common institutions as subordinated to them.

Thus, Stanley Hoffmann, a central figure in the third view, argued in 1966 that integration in

Western Europe was hampered or made impossible by the resistance of the nation-state. The

failure of unification was caused by several features o f the international system: differences

in national situations, or the diversity among the units o f the system (domestic context, geo-

historical situation, outside aims), the globality of the system which means that regional

subsystems have only a reduced autonomy, and the stability o f the bipolar world which

supports and expands the operations of national diversity. Integration would require both

internal integration within the units, absence of domestic cleavages93, and subjective similarity,

that is, policy-makers' conviction. (Hoffmann 1966: 904-905.)

For Hoffmann, the system is profoundly conservative with respect to the diversity o f nation­

states, and their very existence is a formidable obstacle to their replacement. Even though they

are "often inchoate, economically absurd, administratively ramshackle, and impotent yet

dangerous in international politics", they remain the basic units because there is no agreement

on what could replace them. The nation-state is the highest possessor o f power, the main

focus of expectations, initiator, pace-setter, supervisor and often destroyer o f the larger entity.

{Idem: 863, 866, 908-909. )94 In Hoffmann's view, there is a race between the logic or

necessity of integration and the logic o f diversity or autonomy o f governmental action. The

former, functional integration, could win if it could promise a permanent excess o f gains over

losses, but it cannot: while, theoretically, this could be true o f economic integration, it is not

true of political integration and 'high politics', where there is no common agreement on goals

and methods. {Idem: 881-883.)

Thus, the state, or its resilience and the recovery o f national distinctiveness (cf. Wallace 1982:

64) served in explaining why the process of integration did not advance as projected by the

neofunctionalists: after all, the governments retained the power to block the process if it went

93 On the contrary, Haas argued that the acceptance o f unification will be facilitated if the state units are in fact already ideologically or socially fragmented (see Haas 1958: xxxii-xxxv).

w It is important to note, however, that the nations survive transformed', national sovereignty (both legal and de facto capacity) have been transformed, and the states now resemble each other more (Hoffmann 1966: 889- 890,910-911).

59

against their interests.95 In other words, the claim that there is an automatic process towards

increasing unification, something that was seen as a central feature in previous theories,

proved to be wrong. Typically, the picture given on the second view by the representatives

of the third reorders the polemics described above into an approach perhaps more coherent

than was actually the case. As the states are the central actors in international relations, they

are such also in integration, and lead the process according to their interests, having also the

possibility o f suspending it, as shown by France. Where the neofunctionalists saw the process

of integration as a continuum, here appeared the idea o f a pendulum between two logics, one

functional, having to do with economic and technological transformation, the other political,

linked to statehood, sovereignty, national identity and political accountability (Wallace 1996:

440-441).

In essence, the third view on the relationship between the state and integration can thus be

depicted as a state-driven view on integration. Integration is seen as a way of improving

states' capacities to solve their common problems through joint decision-making, common

policies and a sharing of resources.96 It is also an efficient means or tool for a single state in

pursuing its particular interests or increasing its power. As such, it may also imply elements

of competition between the participating states. The states are the motors o f the process of

integration: having decided to start it, they subsequently control its development, which

95 Grieco notes that this was not the only explanation of the crisis: while Hoffmann and Puchala saw that nation-states were too different to integrate, Haas attributed the failures to increasing interdependence with the United States, Japan and other industrial countries which had overwhelmed the integrative forces (Grieco 1991:

5).

96 The way of depicting integration as a method of problem solution was, in the end, advanced by both the second and the third view. Challenges from the environment, interdependence, turbulence, or, simply, modernity were seen to require more than action by single states. For instance, Haas (1975) saw that integration was essentially an answer to these challenges; even previously, he had pointed out the possible gains from integration for the states (Haas 1958, 1963). Representatives of the third view first argued that integration was not necessary as there were other, less ambitious but equally efficient methods of solving the problems. For instance, Hoffmann (1966: 892-894) argues that what the state can no longer provide by itself, it can provide through cooperation, or the citizens can go and find it across borders, without any need to transfer their allegiance (cf. Harrison 1974: 11- 12). Similarly, Hansen (1969: 256) sees that a mere common market coordinated by sovereign states would give sizeable benefits without any need for management by ceaselessly expanding supranational authorities (italics original; Hansen refers, among others, to Bela Balassa, The Theory o f Economic Integration; Homewood, London 1961). Taylor, in turn, proposes that the conviction of statesmen about the virtual impossibility to act in Europe without further transfer o f authority, or to increase the scope o f integration without increasing its level was probably wrong, the statesmen being victims of their own rhetoric in euphoric moments and of a mistaken strategy by the Commission (Taylor 1983: 113). Later, however, the understanding that integration could essentially be a way to increase the states’ possibilities to regain their otherwise diminishing power, o r to extend their ability to manage international issues. For instance, W. Wallace (1977: 322) notes that the EC is an institutional framework which serves the interests o f governments better than alternatives, partly as a defence against interdependence (cf. Milward, below).

follows the logic of the states' interests. Integration is, thus, explained by the concrete

preferences, needs and interests of the states, for example concrete economic gains. The states

calculate the costs and benefits of different policies and outcomes, having also to weigh

economic gain against loss of authority (cf. Morgan 1994b: 131). In Lindberg's terms, the

states do not need to share the same reasons for supporting integration. What is necessary for

integration, however, is that their interests converge and that their concrete goals are

interdependent. (Lindberg 1963: 289, 293.)

The state becomes, thus, a unit inseparable from the study and explanation o f integration.

Being introduced in explaining why integration had not progressed as foreseen by the previous

theories, it was soon seen as a factor which also explained why integration took place and

why it progressed in a certain way. The logic o f the state is, in fact, not limited in its

application only to difficulties in the process. It also allows for seeing integration as a real

and significant process which effectively has an impact on the states. This impact, however,

is beneficial for and aimed at by the states. They might have to compromise on some

questions, but, after all, these compromises are a normal part o f interstate practices, having

to do with differences between the states' goals and capabilities.

In this view, the research agenda for the analysis and explanation o f integration consists o f

analyzing state interests and policies. Characteristically, the conceptual apparatus also involves

elements which were absent in the previous views. Particularly central are the concepts o f

'high politics' and 'national interest'. This is clearly visible in Hoffmann's criticism of Haas'

theories. Hoffmann criticises the 1950s and 1960s "explosion" of theories about depoliticised

progress in integration for overlooking the difference between low politics, issues linked to

the aim of maximising common good, and high politics, issues of vital importance and zero-

sum nature.97 Further, Hoffmann criticises the theories for underestimating the power o f the

main actors to stop or to slow down the process o f integration and the ability of national

bureaucracies to resist the transfer of power. Moreover, the theories did not consider the

differential impact of external countries on different members. For Hoffmann, a state-centred,

pluralistic and structured approach is needed which takes into account the autonomy of both

politics and the state, the diversities within and among states and societies, and the fact that

each has its own dynamics, due to its own interests, social forces and institutions. In his view,

integration theory should consider the domestic priorities and goals o f the states, the

97 The realm o f high politics is not open to any incremental spill-over of integration from economy and welfare. Integration in high politics is more difficult to achieve, and this may also explain difficulties in integration in the realm of low politics, as some degree o f high political coordination seems to be a prerequisite for progress in economic integration (see Harrison 1974).

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compatibility of the goals and the possibility of achieving them by cooperation, the impact

of environment on separate actors and the institutional interplay between community organs

and states. (Hoffmann 1982: 26, 29-30.)

Parallel to the distinction between low and high politics, also international and domestic

politics are seen to differ in crucial respects. In contrast, a major premise for Haas was their

similarity. For Haas, as Harrison points out, the ends o f foreign policy are qualitatively similar

to ends implicit in any other field o f politics; therefore, the "laws" of political behaviour

identifiable in the domestic field are applicable to the international field as well.98

In addition to the different concepts used, also the methodological stand adopted in the third

view puts it apart from the second. In part, the third view is based on a methodological

criticism of the previous one. It builds on a long tradition o f explaining international relations

through the state actor, leaning on traditional methods o f foreign policy analysis: attention to

single events prevails over the aim of rigorous theory-building. Still, constructing a theory is

by no means excluded. As will be seen below, the view involves several possibilities for

developing state-based theories, such as assessing the relative importance o f particular states,

interest calculations, and, most importantly, the possibility o f using comparison. While the

second view faced a problem in that it had defined integration as a unique phenomenon and

thus limited the possibilities o f comparison, the third view makes comparison an obvious

method: as a tool o f the state or a form of international relations, integration is comparable

to the other tools and forms available, such as international cooperation and organisations.

An example of such analysis of integration is provided by Twitchett and Twitchett (1981) for

whom the EC is a framework for diplomacy. In their view, the states use the EC as a vehicle

for promoting national goals. If there are sufficient shared interests and if benefits and a

general strengthening effect on all participants are expected, even a common foreign policy

may emerge. Understandably, then, attention turns into the different aims and aspirations of

the member states in their relations to the EC: the questions asked by the authors include the

reasons for each state to opt for membership, the attitudes o f successive governments on

issues such as common foreign policy, the extent to which the EC is perceived to further

58 Harrison <1974 : 237-238) confronts Haas' neofunctionalist integration model based on pluralism and mutual adjusting behaviour with Hoffmann who distinguishes domestic and international politics by the relative centralisation o f decision-making in the former and the relative decentralisation (lack of supranational authority) in the latter, basing the analysis on Dynamics in International Relations by Haas and A.S. Whiting (McGraw Hill, New York 1956) and Hoffmann’s Contemporary Theory in International Politics (Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1960).

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specific national interests, and the differences o f opinion within the state on membership and

the future direction o f integration. (Twitchett and Twitchett 1981: xv, 1, 15.)

As was seen above, the third view sees the state both as the founder of the process o f

integration and as its controller. The first aspect, how the states chose to create the integrative

forms of cooperation and subsequently shape them according to their interests, is well

exemplified by Milward's writings." Milward argues that historical research suggests a theory

of integration totally different from those presented by political scientists and economists,

essentially one not based on the assumption of the decline of the state (Milward 1990: 262,

269). The EC is an international framework constructed by the state for the completion o f its

own domestic policy objectives, which, in turn, are shaped almost entirely by domestic

political pressures and economic resources.99 100 (Milward and Snrensen 1993: 20-21). In other

words, integration is a strategy for the state in the pursuit o f its interests, chosen among the

possible strategies as the most advantageous. Basically, there are two alternative strategies or

international frameworks for advancing national policy choices, intergovernmental cooperation

and integration, which differ in that integration is more durable and binding, and therefore

also more efficient.101

Against this background, the decision to launch the integration process was understandable:

after the years 1929-1945, the European states were weakened, and there was a need to

reassert, or rescue, the nation-state as the fundamental organisational unit of political life.

Economic growth was aimed at, and some policies - those with direct implications on

international relations, such as industrialisation and agriculture - were seen as better advanced

through integration than through individual action or cooperation. (Milward and Sorensen

1993: 5-6.) Thus, the Communities were not established because o f commitment to the idea

o f European unity, but because o f the need to solve certain domestic economic problems and

99 On the other hand, Milward argues that it is wrong to claim (as does the elitist historiographical tradition) that it is states and institutions which mould events; the true origins of the EC are economic and social (Milward 1992: xi).

100 Milward and Sorensen depict their theoretical position as realist, but they also differentiate themselves from both realists (Hoffmann and Aron) and neofunctionalists in claiming that there is no antagonism between state and integration.

101 Actually, Milward uses the word 'interdependence' for the first strategy, and defines it as international cooperation. This is quite confusing, since 'interdependence' is commonly used in many other ways; for instance for Keohane and Nye (1977: 8-11), it denotes mutual, often asymmetric dependence or a situation characterised by reciprocal effects among countries or among actors in different countries. (For the definition o f interdependence, see also Milward et al. 1993.)

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to reassert the nation-state as the basic organisational unit (Milward 1992: 437; similarly in

Baker and Kolinsky 1991; cf. Morgan 1994b: 132).102

Thus, a clear rationale or motivation was pointed out for the process - something that in

Puchala's (1981: 157) view was actually missing in earlier theories: he criticises Deutsch for

the missing motivational dynamics, for giving no answer to the questions of who opts for

amalgamation, when and why. Moreover, the same logic o f state strengthening also explains

the subsequent developments. As Milward (1992: 447) puts it, the future o f integration

process depends on national policy choices. The argument that the Community actually helps

preserve the nation-states - far more than it forces them to wither away - was notoriously

advanced by Hoffmann who saw that although traditional sovereignty had become "clearly

obsolete", it was not likely that the state would be superseded in the process o f integration.

In fact, the EC even regenerated the state, adapting it to the present world. (Hoffmann 1982:

21, 23, 33-35.) Similarly, Taylor (1978: 229) had argued that supranational elements help

states to survive rather than tend to replace them. From this view, only a small step was

needed to argue that integration might even be necessary for the survival o f the states,

something alluded to already by Puchala (1972). Puchala encouraged analyzing to what extent

participation in integration actually enhances rather than undermines national sovereignty, and

to what extent it preserves rather than supersedes an international state system. In fact, for

him integration - or the "concordance system" - is characterised by cooperation instead of

coercion and confrontation and by a less egoistic definition of self-interest because o f the

perception of interdependence or national inadequacy as the affirmation that nation-states can

be preserved as distinct entities only through the international pooling of resources to confront

problems which challenge their separate existence. (Puchala 1972: 269-271, 277-282; see also

his footnote 22.)

The necessity o f integration notwithstanding, the states still remain in the control of the

process. This aspect is best illustrated in Taylor's analysis of the process of integration.

Taylor's central idea is that the states control the process by setting limits beyond which

integration cannot be allowed to proceed, and he examines where these limits are, or where

the states choose to defend their sovereignty, locating the mechanisms and contexts o f the

imposing of limits. He observes that in the 1970s and early 1980s, the state remained on the

102 Cf. Lindberg and Scheingold (1970: 3-6, 24) who argue that the Community was a result o f balancing different interests and reconciliating different forces: after the war, the viability of the state was questioned, but it was difficult to say whether the weakening of the state was a cause or a result of war and whether, consequently, the state should be strengthened or not. Those favouring the decline or demise of the nation-state had, in Lindberg's and Scheingold's view, more weight in this process.

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whole intact: coordination prevailed over supranationalism and contradictions among

preferences over spillover. In fact, intergovemmentalism was strengthened in the 1970s at the

expense o f supranational tendencies, and the states were becoming clearer about the limits o f

integration. (Taylor 1983: 29-56, 115.)103 For Taylor, too, the acquis communautaire has

become a vital precondition of national autonomy in that the success of negative integration104

has become essential for the effective use o f the governments' policy instruments. At the same

time, negative integration has helped prevent positive integration: measures taken by the

Communities tend to alert the governments who then take countermeasures, and economic

costs are also a powerful disincentive for further integrative measures. {Idem: 187-188.)105

For both the aspects of shaping the common institutions and o f controlling the process, the

third view draws attention, again, to differences between states. Put simply, the relative

strength and importance of the states varies, and major states may have more say than the

minor ones. Thus, the positions of the large member states have acquired special importance

in the explanation o f integration. For instance, while Morgan (1972) saw the political structure

o f Western Europe as shaped by the interaction between national systems and supranational

institutions, he singled out France and Germany as the most important single actors. More

straightforwardly, Keohane and Hoffmann (1991: 295) conclude that what matters most are

the bargains among the major players. Typically, the analyses have concerned questions such

as preference-convergence between the major states, the role o f Germany and whether the

states' influence is directly proportional to their relative strength. * 10

As indicators of supranationalism, Taylor weighs the extent o f majority voting, financial autonomy and right of initiative o f the Commission and the challenges posed to the exclusive competence of the member states. In his view, although integration was wide in scope, its level was low due to the low level of independence of central institutions. (Taylor 1983: 80, 106, 110.) Factors such as the fragmentation of the idea of national interest and the undermining of a hierarchy of interests admittedly undermined the status of governments in the political system of the Community (idem: 107-108), but several factors such as the establishment of COREPER and the summits or the membership o f Denmark and the United Kingdom served the intergovernmental side, helping to impose limits upon the incursions of the Communities into the actions and structures of the states (idem: 96-97, 101-102,214).

1W Negative integration means measures aimed at abolishing different barriers, e.g., to trade or free movement, while positive integration, seen as more difficult to achieve, denotes merging of authority and the creation of new, common regulations (see also Harrison 1974: 242-244, 247).

10i Referring to Lindberg (in International Political Communities, 1966, and in 'Integration as a source of stress on the EC system'. International Organisation, voi. 20, 1966) Harrison also refers to the evidence that the governments can avoid the logical consequences of integration for an "unexpectedly long time", and that the success of an integrative step cause stress and raise barriers to further integration (Harrison 1974: 87).

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A final important feature linked to viewing integration as controlled by the states is that it

adds a further difference between the second and third views. In the second, the own

dynamism of the process is stressed, and a certain automatic development appears (through

the interests o f the common institutions or through being necessary for carrying out the

previous steps). In emphasising the states' control over the process, the third view thus implies

that the process is reversible, at least more clearly so than the second. The basic condition of

integration is that the member states must see their interests as consistent with the enterprise

(cf. Lindberg 1963: 293).

Development across the views

To understand the subsequent development of the third view, and, at the same time, that of

the second, it is important to take into consideration the emerging dialogue or contest between

these two views which shapes both, and which increasingly takes the place of overviews of

several theories as the central axis in the literature. From the 1970s on, a typical feature of

integration literature was the aim to give an overview and evaluation of the whole field of

integration theories. As a typical example, Pentland divides integration theories into two

groups as to what they see as the result o f integration: a new, large state, a model advocated

by federalists and neofunctionalists, or a community, a model promoted by pluralists and

functionalists. In Pentland's view, the last two differ in that pluralists see the community as

compatible with the nation-state system - it merely alters the way in which states deal with

each other - whereas functionalists argue that the community replaces the state. Furthermore,

the theories also differ as to the view on how integration is achieved or of what its causes are.

Pluralists and federalists stress political variables, while functionalists and neofunctionalists

emphasise economic, social and technological factors. In addition to the differences

concerning the understanding o f the purposes and scope o f integration or the result of the

process and the way integration is achieved, the views also differ in their assumptions about

international politics and social change, the 'state' and 'politics'. (Pentland 1973: 21-23, 189.)106

106 Pentland sees that for pluralists and functionalists, the state is an undifferentiated whole, whereas neofunctionalists perceive it as a complex of interests and issue-areas, identifying it with government or political elite (Pentland 1973: 122). Both pluralism and federalism, then, take the state as the basic political 'given', which is to be accommodated rather than abolished or circumvented, by reconciling its value and shortcomings (idem: 149, 170). The state has different roles in different theories (idem: 190), and, correspondingly, also the view on the central institutions differs: functionalists and neofunctionalists attribute to them important resources for affecting the behaviour of their member-states, while "the more traditional and widely-accepted assumption", in Pentland’s-view, is that the behaviour o f international organisations can reaHy only reflect the outcome of the power-contest between its member-states (idem: 229-230). - Cf. Lindberg and Scheingold's (1970: 11-12) division of theories according to goal - rebuilding or transcending the nation-state • and strategy (economic or political determinism) of resolving the postwar problems. For still another thorough overview, see De Vree 1972.

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Above all, these overviews revealed a considerable confusion as to the understanding o f the

theories. Apart from the generally shared conclusion that none of them was particularly good,

the overviews were surprisingly different. It was not clear exactly how many different

approaches had been presented and what the main contents of each of these were. While Haas

(1970) analyzes federalism, communications approach and neofunctionalism, Puchala (1972)

evaluates federalism, nationalism, functionalism and power politics, Pentland (1973)

federalism, pluralism, neofunctionalism and functionalism, and Harrison (1974) functionalism,

federalism and neofunctionalism.107 The state-oriented view is variably called traditionalist,

pluralist, realist or intergovernmentalist, the label 'pluralist' being particularly ambiguous, as

it is also used of the pluralists who see the state and society as consisting of different groups

(thus, for example Haas).

The question of where to place a particular author was also difficult. For instance, while

Pentland points out Deutsch as representing the pluralist integration theory, close to realist

views, Lijphart (1981: 247) argues that he represents the opposite camp; Etzioni, in turn, is

a federalist for Pentland and neofunctionalist for Harrison (1974), There were also different

understandings of the differences between functionalism and neofunctionalism (see, e.g.,

Lindberg and Scheingold 1970: 7; Taylor 1983: 4). In fact, for some, the different approaches

were, in the end, not so different: De Vree notes that, contrary to his expectations, the theories

o f Haas, Deutsch, Etzioni and Lindberg were not alternative, but variations o f a common

theme (De Vree 1972: 326; on the common theoretical core, pp. 328-344). Pentland, on the

contrary, gives a picture of integration theories which unwillingly - it seems - minimises the

points in common.

However, an essential dividing line was emerging, corresponding largely to the distinction

between the second and third views analyzed here. Their mutual criticism became increasingly

the central theoretical debate. Writings such as Hansen 1969 and Harrison 1974 are among

the clear, early examples of how the two views are evaluated in comparison with each other.

Both attack, in essence, the second view, basing their criticism on insights of the third. They

criticise neofunctionalists for overestimating the expansiveness of functional integration in

underlining automatic spillover. For Harrison, there is much greater likelihood that integration

As later examples, one might mention Webb (1983) comparing neofunctionalism, intergovemmentalism and interdependence, or Schmitter (1991) comparing functionalism, neofunctionalism, transactionalism, realism and intergovemmentalism.

will set in motion conservative, equilibrium-restoring reactions. Spill-over or 'engrenage'108 is

likely to be limited in scope and does not assume a continuing progress. Harrison sees that

the political factor, involvement of national governments, is crucial in the process of

integration: political integration depends upon acts of political will rather than upon any

known dynamic process (Harrison 1974: 242-243, 247). Moreover, even though there was

political will to integrate, the capacity for integration o f the states cannot be taken for granted.

This capacity is related to conditions o f consensus formation and control in member units

which are rarely found in practice (idem: 14-15, 95, also 100-101).109 Indeed, Hansen argues

that the pace of the European integration has actually diminished. For both, neofunctionalism

failed to relate the process of integration closely enough to international system and take into

account the interaction between endogenous and exogenous variables, or the factors in the

environment which affect the process. In addition, they denied the distinction between high

and low politics and overestimated the role of institutions (Hansen 1969: 247-249; Harrison

1974: 132, 137-138, 149, 202, 205.)

In all, both authors point to the lacking explanatory and predictive power of neofunctionalism.

In Hansen's view, it is illustrative that an event such as de Gaulle's effective deceleration of

the process remains a mystery for Haas, while for Hoffmann, such "deviance” is inevitable

as perceptions change (Hansen 1969: 252, quotation marks original). The claim o f the

extending involvement and importance o f institutions has also been subject to reappraisal in

the light of the history of the EEC, its validity being limited to cases where certain necessary

background conditions obtain and especially to pluralistic, complex societies (Harrison 1974:

75, 77-79, 81, 86). Harrison goes on to argue that neofunctionalism dominates by criteria of

scholarly reputation, numbers, resources and volume, but not by quality (idem: 232-234),

suggesting that its attraction resulted from the "mesmeric effect of behavioural ism taken to

the point of neglect o f the authoritative element in decision-making", that is, the crucial role

o f government leaders (idem: 89-90). Harrison also sees a bias in integration studies deriving

from a historicist view that there is something inevitable about the demise o f the nation-state

in a world shrunken and exposed to new terror of war by the technological revolution and that

functional cooperation is the only rational transformation response (idem: 22).

108 The enmeshment of units and 'locking-in' of the achieved steps, making the costs of opting out o f the joint policies higher than those of continued involvement.

109 He underlines, thus, the importance of differentiating between states (idem: 31-33, 39, 239-240).

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Indeed, Harrison sees neofunctionalism as a systematic misapplication o f a fruitful but

imperfect model o f domestic politics to relations between sovereign states. Appropriate for

the study o f the United States, neofunctionalism is less useful as a theory of integration. This

is because integration is governed by the same rules as international behaviour in general,

being to a considerable extent system dominated, or determined by factors such as relative

power, numbers, economic dependency and geographical position. In regional integration, as

in international relations, all actors attempt to maximise, in the long run, security, prosperity

and influence. Integration is a function of threat, leadership and crisis, and in its analysis, also

the coercive power of the state has to be taken into account. (Harrison 1974: 238.) In all,

Harrison sees that power-oriented conflict models of international society, where consideration

is given to the perception of relative power in influencing decision-making structures and

coalition formation, has considerable explanatory value and appear most relevant to the study

of integration110 {idem: 239-240).

Obviously, the criticism of neofunctionalism was responded to with countercriticism, as when

Haas pointed out that Hansen downgrades too much the importance o f "expansive" bargaining

styles and the institutions in which the styles take shape (Haas 1970: 619, footnote 18). Often,

however, the critics seem to bark up the wrong tree; on both sides, the criticisms are often

based on rather simplified understandings o f the opponent and may also contain evident

misunderstandings. A typical case is the criticism of neofunctionalism for its assumption o f

automaticity in the integration process. For Haas, for instance, spillover was far from

automatic, although, admittedly, he presented rather dissimilar views about it. Similarly,

seeing the inadequacy o f Haas' theory in its disregard for the interaction between exogenous

and endogenous variables (Hansen 1969: 250) is misleading (see Haas 1958, preface of 1968).

Rather curious is also the view which Keohane and Hoffmann (1991: 12) express on the older

theories when maintaining that the emerging European entity does not much resemble the

entity foreseen by the most enthusiastic functionalists and federalists, who envisaged a transfer

o f powers to institutions whose authority would not derive from the governments (italics

added). It is, in fact, easy to see that it was precisely the functionalists (Mitrany) and

federalists who saw that the governments would decide either case by case or all at once the

transfer of their powers.

110 With the help o f Kaplan's models (used also by Haas 1964) of behavioral regularities based on the number and powers o f actors and to balance of power, Harrison analyzes integration as a factor of Western strength confronting the Soviet Union, while the Europeans are also keen on more power towards the United States; a bipolar system provides impetus towards integration among bloc actors, while its effect on the uncommitted is divisive (Harrison 1974: 132, 137-138, also 149).

69

A closer look at the original texts also shows that the 'new' ideas proposed by the critics are

not always thoroughly new. This applies even to the centrality o f the state in integration:

Mitrany (1943) saw that states could derive fresh life and scope from coordination, and,

indeed, Haas claimed that integration was dominated by nationally constituted groups, which

turned to supranational means when this appeared profitable (Haas 1958: xxxii-xxxv; cf. later

Milward, see above). Thus, the distinction between the opponents, which they themselves

highlight, seems at times to disappear, as in the case o f Harrison's and Haas' view on the role

of the state or government. While the latter would argue that governments can be persuaded

not to obstruct integration, the former holds that there will be no integration if not through

the political will o f the states.

Importantly, both views progressed by absorbing the criticism. The proponents of the second

view increasingly accommodated the state actor in their frameworks; Haas came to redefine

integration as a process in which states voluntarily "mingle, merge and mix" with their

neighbours, loosing thereby the factual attributes of sovereignty but acquiring new techniques

for resolving conflict between themselves (Haas 1970: 610-611). It was promptly noticed that

this was a significant transformation in that the new definition embraces one of the central

concepts o f the political or federalist approach, sovereignty, which Haas had previously

denounced as alien to neofunctionalist theory.111 Haas (1975: 72) also agreed with the validity

of the distinction between high and low politics, although he points out that it refers to

attitudes, and not to fixed objects o f politics and that the same issue may shift on the

spectrum between 'low' and 'high* according to the specific circumstances, in time and

between different countries112 (cf. Harrison 1974: 199; Hansen 1969: 252.)

In a way, the two came to share a common research question in finding a rationale for the

state to integrate. This became the main problem for the third view, which could be criticised

by pointing out that integration had not completely halted in the late 1960s, but continued,

and that it indeed acquired new emphasis and efficiency. Particularly in the mid-1980s, the

third view was challenged by the project of 1985 for a common market by 1992 and the

Single European Act of 1987. Finding an explanation for the states' voluntary integration

,n Kaiser (1972: 210, also footnote 11) points out that Haas had previously (Journal o f Common Market Studies, vol. 8, p. 70) argued that it is misleading to say that neofunctionalists share with federalists a strong reliance on the concept o f sovereignty and that he himself does not see any need for using the concept.

112 Thus, in opposition to Hoffmann for whom certain values (particularly the control o f diplomatic influence and military security) always have primacy, Haas sees that there is no permanency or dichotomy given by nature between the low and the high, but that it is an empirical question.

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became more difficult when this integration implied increasing transfer of power away from

the states. However, the logic of the third view could be extended: the answer was to show

that the states preferred integration to non-integration because o f its (still, overwhelmingly)

beneficial consequences. After all, had integration weakened them, it would not have been

rational at all to join in the process.

What is seen as beneficial for the states is somewhat altered. It is acknowledged that

integration does comport some loss of power, but that, summing up, the final outcome is still

positive. An example of this type of calculation, influenced by a neoinstitutionalist analysis

o f state behaviour, is prov'ded by Milward. He sees that transactions, integration included,

naturally imply that the weaker party has to sacrifice something to maximise its national

advantage. At the same time, extending the range and complexity o f transactions with others

and formalising them may be beneficial in reducing the vulnerability of the actor to

interdependence (Milward 1992: esp. 18-20). Integration in particular does imply some

sacrifices in terms of concessions of the state powers or a partial loss of sovereignty; these

sacrifices are, however, compensated by other elements o f integration which make it, in all,

preferable to states.113 Moreover, being able to structure the central institutions, the states are

able to preserve the balance of power within the integrationist framework in their favour.

(Milward and Sorensen 1993: 12-20.)

Similarly, Grieco depicts integration as a possible and advantageous strategy for the state as

an explanation of why states not only cooperate through institutions but may also wish to

strengthen them. He proposes that relatively weaker states may wish to institutionalise the

coalition's activities in order to avoid being dominated by the group's strongest member. This

is called collective binding strategy. The strongest member, in turn, has its reason to integrate

in that it may prefer the institutionalisation as a vehicle for exercising limited leadership o f

its coalition partners. (Grieco 1991: 9-21.) Further, in the common institutions and cooperative

arrangements, the weaker states will seek rules which will provide sufficient opportunities for

them to voice their interests and possibly prevent their domination by stronger parties (Grieco

1995: 34).

113 Milward presents three such elements: the irreversibility of integration, which means certitude of bargaining results, the possibility o f reducing the number of members, which simplifies the agenda, increases efficiency and reduces potential conflicts, and the central system of law, which implies compliance. Thus, the very features pointed out as evidence for the effective undermining of state authority in the process are converted into benefits.

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Emphasising the compensation of losses by the diverse benefits from institutionalised

integration was not the only way of explaining why the undeniable loss of decision-making

power by the states was not totally negative. Another consisted in arguing that the states were

actually not transferring or renouncing sovereignty, but sharing or 'pooling' it. Therefore,

nothing was really lost. This idea is visible in Keohane’s and Hoffmann’s (1991: 7-8)

formulation: for them, the puzzle to be solved is how to account for the pooling of

sovereignty and the unexpected set of institutional changes accompanying this process. They

remark that the governments have sacrificed their legal freedom of action, "sovereignty in the

operational sense", to a remarkable extent. In issues where the decision-making authority is

removed from the states, it is shared among governments, through a process of qualified

majority rule. Thus, sovereignty is pooled114. Moreover, they stress that an interstate body -

the Council of Ministers - has the crucial decision-making role, and that the decisions are

implemented by governments or through national courts enforcing Community law. Baker and

Kolinsky (1991: 119), in turn, argue that sovereignty has not been lost to the Community or

some supranational institution, but to the executive branch o f each state and to the Council

o f Ministers.

The 'threats' of integration are, thus, minimised; gradually, integration comes to be seen even

as necessary for the state. The idea o f a necessary surrender o f a degree o f national

sovereignty (cf. Morgan 1994b: 133) appears.115 As Wessels puts it, the only way the state

can secure not only welfare but also sovereignty is participation in the decision-making in

interstate level and efficient (read: sovereignty-cutting) forms o f cooperation (Wessels 1992:

43; cf. Pinder 1986). The growing demands on the state and the fact that the state is

increasingly evaluated by its performance make it rational for the state to resort to interstate

mechanisms. These, in turn, induce a development towards a more open state or a self-

induced erosion o f the closed state organisation, towards a fusion between the participating

states (Wessels 1992: 40-43). It can even be seen that it is in the interests o f the states to

abandon their own interests: as Wessels puts it, while the states are still able to place

boundaries to the incremental development, increased efficiency takes precedence over the

protection o f self-interests which, finally, are counterproductive {idem: 48, 51). * 113

On page 30, however, they see sovereignty as both pooled and shrunk, (Italics added.) Cf. Held's "divided" and "limited" sovereignty; Held 1989, esp. 237-239.

113 A comparable phenomenon could be the willingness to accept limitations of national sovereignty for the goal of international peace and justice in the constitutions of France, Italy and Germany of the late 1940s (Baker and Kolinsky 1991: 102).

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Towards a synthesis

From the late 1980s, the question of state-integration relationship emerges as an increasingly

central division in the analysis of integration. The theoretical debate concentrates around this

question, and around the two, by now familiar, positions. They present themselves as quite

different, even mutually exclusive. On the one hand, integration is seen as a result o f political

will, as process started and led by the states which also control the common institutions. On

the other, states are seen pushed into the process through forces in the international and

domestic environment, being then profoundly influenced by the common institutions and

decreasingly able to influence the process. It is typical, however, that the 'pure' positions

which correspond to the second and third views become less common. Both sides make

concessions to each other, coming - perhaps unwillingly - also closer to each other's positions.

While giving different answers, they tend to become sweeping, aware of the pitfalls pointed

out by critiques.

A look at Matlary's and Moravcsik’s writings illustrates this reformulation o f the views,

second and third respectively, based on the mutual criticism. Moravcsik (1991) compares, on

the basis of empirical evidence, the intergovernmental and supranational116 explanations for

the success of the Single European Act. Comparing the relative role of the Community

institutions with that o f the member states, he concludes that the states are more important.

Thus, the intergovernmental approach, based on the relative power o f member states and the

convergence o f their national policy preferences, has more explanatory value. In his view,

"historical record" does not confirm the importance o f international and transnational factors

in integration. (Moravcsik 1991: 44, 49-50.) However, as a concession to the supranational

view, Moravcsik argues that his "intergovernmental institutionalism" also accords an important

role to supranational institutions in cementing existing interstate bargains as the foundation

for renewed integration {idem: 56).

Subsequently, Moravcsik examines closer the question of why states aim at integration. As

the state-based explanation of integration is, however, criticised for a too generic

understanding o f the state which can see anything the state does as being in its interests,

116 Actually, however, he labels the two explanations "supranational institutionalism" and "intergovernmental institutionalism". The labels seem to underline that the author has taken into account criticism against the views and does not aim at comparing already discredited versions. While the former is "close to" neofunctionalism, the latter is said to differ from Keohane's "modified structural realist" explanation in that more consideration is given to the state: states are not 'black boxes' - a typical criticism of the realist view - but entities entrusted to governments, which themselves are responsible to domestic constituencies (Moravcsik 1991: 21-27).

73

further specification seems needed in order to make the claim convincing. Thus» he does not

simply argue that integration and even supranationalsm can benefit the state, but specifies the

argument through defining 'the state' more precisely. In his view, supranational ism strengthens

the governments’ control over domestic affairs, permitting them to attain goals which are

otherwise unattainable. Thus, supranational ism is acceptable insofar as it strengthens the state

through strengthening the position of the national executive. (Moravcsik 1993b: 507.)'17 This

argument about the EC increasing the power of the executive - both national and the Council

o f Ministers - has been forwarded by Baker and Kolinsky (1991: 119); also Lindberg and

Scheingold (1970: 86) noted the strong position of the executive. For them, the executive

power is virtually autonomous of the legislatures when it comes to determining national

positions on Community problems. In fact, the parliaments were pointed out as the main

losers already by Lindberg (1963: 295) and Cox (1965: 114).

On the other side o f the division, Matlary gives a different answer to the question o f why

states choose to maintain a supranational institution which de facto and de jure implies a

transfer of sovereignty and which can and does act against the interests of the member states

on particular occasions. She criticises the intergovemmentalist explanation, based on state

interests, for inability to assess whether the state really has succeeded in pursuing its interests.

This inability is due to the intergovemmentalist conception o f the state. The state is a ’black

box', assumed rather than examined; it is seen to be a rational, unitary and egotistic actor; its

behaviour and interests are static and given. Both the interests and identities are seen as

exogenous to interaction. Therefore, in this framework, there can be no change of interests

or strategy. (Matlary 1994: 21, 23).lIS 117 118

117 In specifying this influence, Moravcsik uses neoinstitutionalist terms, as Milward above. The EC institutions strengthen the power of governments in two ways, through reducing transaction costs and the costs of identifying, making and keeping agreements, and through strengthening the autonomy of national political leaders vis-à-vis particularistic social groups within their domestic polity. In general, international cooperation redistributes control over important domestic political resources (initiative, institutions, information and ideology), and such shifts tend to benefit those who control access to international negotiations and institutions, generally the national executives (Moravcsik 1994). Moreover, turning domestic issues into international ones means less transparency and more possibilities of government manipulation. The government is also able to scapegoat the EC for unpleasant domestic policies. (Seminar at the EUI, October 19, 1993.) Similarly, Marks (1995: 5-6) claims that as states tend to be more autonomous in matters of foreign policy and as a variety of ex-domestic issues is lifted to the EU level, state dominance is consolidated. - Cf. the idea the government leaders playing a "two-level game" simultaneously in international and domestic 'game boards'; Putnam 1988, Evans et a i 1993.

118 This seems, again, a somewhat simplistic characterisation o f the adversary. One could also see that the peculiar self-validating nature of the realist view is based exactly on the mutability of these interests (precisely because the interests of the participants change during negotiations, the result, whatever it might be, can be seen as being in their interests). - Note also for Matlary, intergovemmentalism is less a theoretical approach to integration than a set of assumptions about the role of the state in multilateral cooperation, attractive perhaps

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At the same time, Matlary remarks, intergovemmentalism denies the uniqueness o f the EC,

reducing it to multilateral cooperation which leaves the state unchanged as the pivotal actor.

As the EC is not seen as an independent actor - if not in the sense of being a 'neutral',

technical actor which facilitates agreement - it cannot have own strategies; therefore, it does

not make sense either to assume that the EC could impose rules on a recalcitrant government.

Thus, integration can only strengthen the state. For Matlary, on the contrary, integration

should be seen as more than cooperation, a change and possibly the creation o f new units or

political entities. It may strengthen the state, but the effect can also be the opposite. (Matlary

1994: 9-11, 17-18.)

Matlary agrees that states do further their interests, and that they can benefit from integration,

as their interests can coincide with those o f the Commission. The state can benefit from the

ability of EC to deal with issues of international scope which need multilateral solutions. It

may also favour integration where there appears to be a transferral o f power to the EC when

it can make use of EC rules to deal with a domestic problem which it cannot resolve alone.

In that sense, states do not 'pool' their powers in the EC arena but rather create power.

(Matlary 1993a: 188-192.) However, what makes the EC unique compared to other

international organisations is the specific interplay of formal and informal aspects; one

particular feature is the commitment to the EC on the part o f an inner core o f members which

is not explicable in terms of instrumental interest but which must be accounted for on

historical grounds (Matlary 1994: 7).

For Matlary, to understand integration, one must take into account both formal variables -

states, institutions, interests groups and the internal market programme119 - and informal ones,

comprising the informal regime of deregulatory politics and transnational policy networks

which identify and modify the interests of the formal actors. Informal integration, or the

intended but indirect effect of agenda-building by the EC or the expansion of an issue-area

through linking to other areas, is important in explaining formal integration: it is less visible

and thus more easily accepted, and it causes pressures for more formal integration. Therefore,

the framework for analyzing the role o f the state has to include an emphasis on domestic

politics and a processual view of interests as modified by institutions in interaction with the

because of its simplicity.

1,9 Matlary notes that the internal market programme, as a formal regime which sets limits to specific areas and serves as justification of policies, is a powerful basis for arguing against individual state interests; it has made a policy which goes against the 'four freedoms' virtually impossible. (Cf. Haas' upgrading the common interest.)

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EC, taking into account also the less egoistic needs to arrive at a common interest and posit

a sense of common identity and objectives, also transcending own interests. (Matlary 1993a:

182, 185, 193-196, 198-201; see also Matlary 1993b.)

In all, both views make concessions to the other; at least, direct references to the other view

are made. For instance, Keohane and Hoffmann (1991: 10) start their examination of

European institutions by explicitly stating their intention to take neofunctional theory

seriously, and, in fact, quote Haas extensively.120 They also deny that a state-centric

perspective would provide a satisfactory explanation o f the SEA. However, they still remain

within that view, noting that such an explanation must begin with governmental actions, as

these are what they observe as leading directly to the Act. When explaining institutional

change in the EC, therefore, they stress the 'preference-convergence hypothesis' holding that

convergence of governments' preferences is necessary for widening or deepening integration.

Yet, the spillover model, explaining change through the role of the institutions o f the

Community, and explaining them by the political economy hypothesis as adaptation to

pressures from the world political economy, also contain some elements of truth. {Idem: 17-

25.) Later, Hoffmann (1995: 5-6) admits not only that institutions often have "more than a

superficial effect" on interest definition and calculations of gains and losses, but also that the

European unity has made progress, and that the EU has, in fact, become a necessary and

permanent part of the European political landscape and thus a subtle, if often shaky,

international actor.121

Neofunctionalists' concessions are not less visible. In addition to the shifts, noticed above,

towards less determinism or automatism in spillover and an allowance for the inclusion of

political will as an important element (see also Mutimer 1989: 80), one might see that these

proponents o f the second view could accept the basic claims o f the third with the help of

120 For the authors, the EC is best characterised as a network involving the pooling of sovereignty, and by the term 'supranational'. They note that this characterisation might be surprising, taking into account their position on the intergovernmental side of the debate. As a matter of fact, the authors aptly welcome Haas' view on supranationality from 1958, a view which, for them, depicts it as a mere style of political behaviour, a cooperative strategy in interstate relations (seeking to attain agreement by means of compromises upgrading common interests). Although the process of policy-making in the EC is supranational, it takes place in the context o f agreements between governments; also successful spillover requires prior agreement among governments. (Keohane and Hoffmann 1991: 10, 15, 17.)

121 His formulations are, however, cautious, and underline continuity. For Hoffmann, the relation between the state and the EC is not a zero-sum game; the European entity has helped the restoration and consolidation o f the former. Further steps envisaged (losing sovereignty, the enhancing position o f the executive) have, on the other hand, alerted citizens and parliamentarians. (Idem: 3-4.)

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some alleviating conditions. For the first, state interests can be deemed important, if

understood not as given but affected by, for example, the common institutions. Relatedly, it

is also acceptable to explain the process on the basis of state actions, when these are also seen

as having unintended consequences: the process itself and the functioning o f common

institutions may be such as to make seemingly inconspicuous decisions lead to an unintended

factual decline in the position of the states. The states may have an important role in

controlling integration, but it is not necessarily under a total control by the states or any one

of them, nor is it based on the conscious following of clearly defined objectives (cf. Wallace

1977: 322). As Morgan (1994b: 129) points out, there is also a difference between arguing

that the Community was developed in order to enhance the sovereignty of its member states

(as Milward does) and that the member states can (still) act from a position o f strength in

determining the future o f the Community (as Hoffmann 1982 does).

Taking into account the criticisms and formulating answers also to questions originating from

the other approach, trying thus to explain all that is explained by the rival and even some

more, the two views show a certain tendency to 'inflate' and become complete, mirror-image

explanations o f integration. The mutual tendency to come closer to the opponent is facilitated

by the various possible interpretations of the central concepts, such as 'supranational'. As a

result, the theoretical discussion is close to an impasse: criticism becomes predictable, as it

without exception leans on either one or the other122, and the differences between the views

become increasingly theoretical, with no clear evidence for the preferability o f one answer.

There is the choice between two very general modes of explanation which both can be

criticised but which do not seem to have alternatives.

i:: When, for instance, Harrison (1974) maintains that the neofunctional view has neglected the role of political actors and political will, a certain deadlock is approaching: while it is not very productive to criticise a theory for not having taken into account everything, Harrison's criticism is particularly unproductive in that neofunctionalism developed as a criticism of approaches in which political will was particularly stressed (especially federalism). - A search of the faithful understanding of the neofunctional approach - or any other approach - in integration studies is as unavailing as the search for the real definition of the state. However, for a large part, literature evolves in terms of theories, assuming a consensus on their contents and representatives which stems perhaps more from the evaluative discussion itself than from the original contributions. These 'basic* works can, in fact, be read in different ways, depending on whose view on the approaches is adopted. For instance, before espousing Haas' argument that the federalist approach has been effectively discredited by events in Europe and in Africa (Haas 1970: 624-625), one has to take into account what Haas intends by federalism (for him, the federal approach assumes the identity of political postulates concerning common purpose and common need and the transferability of institutions from the national to the regional level; it seeks simultaneously to meet the need for more effective governmental action through centralisation and the democratic postulate of local control and local autonomy through decentralisation).

77

The intergovernmental view, as noted, can be criticised for its notion of the state, too generic

and self-validating to serve as a basis for explanation. It is claimed that the state matters, but

the state seems, at the same time, to be altogether lost; it disappears or becomes a convention.

On the other hand, however, the neofunctionalist line of argumentation stresses that the state

is no longer central or sovereign; in doing this, it creates a rather formidable state which

plausibly never has existed.

The generalisations on the state seem to have equally problematic consequences for the two

views on integration. For intergovemmentalism, the exaggerated generality of the state makes

it nearly eternal and universal, a highly flexible arrangement which adapts to all changes. At

this very general level where the particular characteristics o f the state do not matter and

therefore may change, changes are interpreted as adaptation to the environment and policies

as rational for survival. In this view, the ultimate character of the state is also manifest in that

it is the state that ultimately defines its own characteristics, such as population, and measures

the efficiency of its government.123 Similarly, 'sovereignty' can have many meanings, to the

point of not mean anything. For research, this implies the irritating fact that as the state adapts

to the circumstances, the meaning of the state has to be constantly updated or recomposed;

in addition, the tautological validity of the arguments diminishes their credibility. Accordingly,

the state becomes, in a way, immune to integration: its essential features cannot be threatened,

since they are constantly redefined. Adopting the logic of the state also implies that

integration can only strengthen the state, as it otherwise would not be undertaken.

In the second view, then, the state is analyzed against a fixed picture of what the states have

previously been. With a clear view of what the state is or has been, it is possible to formulate

quite precise appraisals: for instance, having proceeded to a certain level or point, European

integration has deprived the member states of the attributes of statehood, such as decision­

making competence in economic or commercial policy, the supremacy of national legislation,

or, more generally, sovereignty. The insinuating assumption that the states actually have

sometimes been really sovereign and supreme authorities may well be needed for the

formulation o f precise hypotheses or statements. Different indicators and criteria seem,

however, to succumb to the particular resilience and tenacity of the states: the states are more

resilient and tolerant towards integration than a theoretical point o f view might indicate. An

absolute autonomy is, in fact, not vital for the state. Abstractions or 'ultimate' features such

1:3 This kind of view is naturally familiar from the realist school of international relations, being, in turn, partly motivated by considerations of methodology and disciplinary boundaries (see, e.g., Jackson and James 1993, Rosenau 1989.)

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as 'being in control of the people and territory' or 'being sovereign' can in practice be

understood as nominal rather than as real features. Moreover, the states seem to be rather ill-

suited to generalisations, since being a state does not seem to require being similar to other

states. It seems, in fact, that an important feature of the states is some kind of right o f being

different. In all, statehood seems to be a convention, but it is also a convention which entails

the idea that statehood is not objective, not to be decided by others. One could argue that the

essence of statehood is that states have the right to be different, to refuse intrusion in their

internal affairs, even to decide for themselves what constitutes an 'internal affair'.

The consequences of these generalised concepts for the study of integration are quite puzzling.

In fact, the views do not seem to lead very far if not to two dead-ends, diametrically opposed.

It could be said that while in the first view, integration is held constant while the meaning of

the state is variable, in the second, state is the constant which explains integration. Both

views, however, practically remove the state from the central concerns in integration studies.

In fact, the result may be a certain marginalisation of an important research question, that of

the relation between the state and integration. Firstly, the 'dismantled' character of the state

impedes the analysis o f concrete questions or taking into account empirical variations. The

view on the state affects the way the impact of, for instance, different consequences of

integration is evaluated: what is an important change depends on what is important for the

state, that is, what is seen to be the core of the state, and therefore many empirical facts are

seen not to affect the state. Secondly, the questions about the basic character o f the state, in

turn, are impossible to answer as empirical problems, as what is said to be common to all

states and important for statehood either changes limitlessly, which in the final account means

that it becomes immune to change, or becomes meaningless in that the states do not, in

practice, very much care about fixed meanings or general characteristics.

Against this background, it is easy to see why conclusive evidence for any of the views is

hard to find. The example of ascertaining the truly supranational character of the EU and the

indisputable weakening of the position o f states illustrates this problem. The legal

argumentation on the development o f European law or the process o f constitutionalisation

with federative elements - supremacy o f Community law over national law, irrevocability,

development o f enforcement - does not succeed in conclusively ruling out the

intergovernmental interpretation.

Weiler, Burley and Mattli could here exemplify the argumentation in favour o f

supranationalism and constitutionalisation. Weiler sees that a constitutionalisation of the

Community has indeed taken place, transforming the relationship between the Community and

79

its member states; the nature o f the Community has changed from an international

organisation into a truly self-contained legal regime. Central components o f this

constitutionalisation are the doctrine o f direct effect and the doctrine of supremacy of

Community law in relation to national law. Even more important, however, is the doctrine of

implied powers. While in international law, treaties must be interpreted in a manner which

minimises their encroachment on state sovereignty, in the EC, the Court o f Justice has

adopted a teleological, purposive rule according to which powers are implied in favour o f the

Community where they are necessary to serve the legitimate ends it pursues,124 125 (Weiler 1991:

2406-2407, 2413-2417.)

In practice, this has meant a significant diminution of the states' possibilities of 'exit', or of

avoiding their obligations under the treaty.123 The particular system of judicial remedies and

enforcement o f the Communities places them apart from traditional international organisations.

National courts and the European Court are integrated into a unitary system of judicial review

as regards the treaty, and therefore, even though a member state could disregard the European

Court, it cannot disregard the decision o f its own court. For Weiler, the combination of

constitutionalisation and the system of judicial remedies have to a large extent nationalised

the Community obligations and introduced on the Community level a habit of obedience and

respect for the rule o f law which is traditionally more associated with national obligations

than international ones. {Idem: 2418-2422.)

Somewhat similarly, Burley and Mattli (1993) argue that legal integration - the gradual

penetration of EC law into the domestic law of its member states - makes it difficult to

maintain that the member states really are able to further their interests through integration.126

124 Further means of constitutionalisation have been exclusivity (the total prohibition of own action by the states, e.g., the common commercial policy) and preemption (in some areas, only positive Community legislation preempts the action by the member states).

125 Weiler adopts Hirschman's concepts of exit and voice (in Hirschman, Albert, Exit, Voice and Loyalty - Responses to Decline in Firms. Organizations, and States. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1970), that is, the mechanism of organisational abandonment in the face of unsatisfactory performance and the mechanism of intraorganisational correction and recuperation (put simply, less exit means more voice and less voice more exit, the possibility of exit leading to the question o f loyalty for the organisation). Thus, the constitutionalisation of the Community and the system of legal/judicial guarantees mean that the possibility of "selective exit" has been at least partially closed. (Idem: 2411-2412.)

126 The authors argue that neofunctionalism (in Haas' formulation) provides a convincing and parsimonious explanation of legal integration in the Community, driven by supranational and subnational actors pursuing their own interests; law, mostly perceived as 'technical', takes here the role of mask for politics, originally forecast for economics (Burley and Mattli 1993: 43-44).

80

In their view, those claiming that integration serves the interests o f the states through asserting

that a particular decision was in the interests o f a particular state, do so with the luxury of

hindsight and manipulating the analysis at a very high level of generality. If one assumes that

states will comply with the judicial decisions only if they are in their interests, there is an

obvious incentive to deduce interest-compatibility from compliance. The authors note that the

rulings of the Court are not consistent with the preferences of (some) member states which

the Court would attempt to track. In reality, many cases show that the governments have

strongly disagreed as to the outcome of a particular case and have also strongly argued against

the ultimate position o f the Court, which, however, has followed the lead of the Commission.

Over time, the member states tend to accept the Court's position and regard the path chosen

as inevitable. Explained in neofunctionalist terms, the primary players in the process o f

integration are above and below the state (government), which, circumvented, may either

choose to or feel constrained to yield to the pressures of converging supra- and subnational

interests127. (Burley and Mattli 1993: 51, 54-56.)128

Yet, what constitutes evidence in one context is not necessarily evidence in another.129 In fact,

127In concrete terms, the Court has created a pro-community constituency of private individuals by conferring

rights upon individuals and giving them a direct stake in promulgation and implementation of Community law, but permitting, on the other hand, their participation only in a way which would advance Community goals. Integration has been advanced also through courting the national courts, convincing them of the desirability of using the European Court and, above all, conferring to the lower courts the possibility of de facto judicial review of legislation. The strategy is one of reciprocal empowerment: the European Court simultaneously strengthens its own legal legitimacy by making it appear that its own authority flows from the national courts who have sought its guidance and who ultimately decide the case - although the Court frequently offers a virtual template for the subsequent lower court decision. (Burley and Mattli 1993: 60-65.)

12SThe authors also adopt the characterisation of the process o f legal integration by incremental expansion

through, e.g., the method o f upgrading common interests: the modus operartdi o f "teleological method of interpretation" means that the Court justifies its decisions in light of the common interests of the members as enshrined in the objectives of the Treaty of Rome. Referring to concepts such as customs union, freedom of movement, non-discrimination or mutual solidarity shifts the analysis to a more general level on which it is possible to assert common interests and long-term interest over short-term interest. {Idem: 68-69.) As evidence for the stated awareness of the fact that the political constraints of the Court are not sufficient but that the Court has the power to pursue its own agenda, and that the personal incentives in the judicial and legal community as well as the structural logic of law favour integration rather than the protection of state interests, the authors refer to the ways of limiting the position o f the Court in the Maastricht Treaty. (Idem: 73-74.)

129 A concrete example of how evidence for state power can also seem evidence for the power o f institutions is the problem of whether the relative strength of states v. institutions can be resolved by looking at the power relations between the Commission and the Council. Usually, it is seen that the Commission represents the supranational forces while the Council represents the states; their relations have, however, been seen as difficult to estimate. E.g., Lindberg and Scheingold (1970: 92) hold that if power is defined traditionally as formal authority, ability to impose sanctions and possession of monopoly of legitimate force, the Council is all-powerful; if, however, power is defined in a 'positive' way, as participation in decision-making and objective success in

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representatives o f a more intergovernmental approach interpret the situation described above

in a different way. For instance, Taylor, for whom "the continuous assertion by a

distinguished group o f lawyers that Community law is superior may also be seen as part of

a political process o f realising that possibility" (Taylor 1983: 280), concludes that the

Communities are not a federation and that the position of the member states therefore is

clearly stronger; the states' system prevails, and they are also those who are ultimately

responsible (idem: 292, 301). Taylor underlines the voluntary aspects of integration, seeing

that measures agreed to by the member states cannot be against them.130

For Taylor, a sovereign state is by virtue of its sovereignty entitled to decide upon those laws

which shall apply within its territory - though members of the EC may be sometimes

disinclined or lack the capacity to do this. Governments remain "masters of the treaty" since

they are not bound by any amendments they do not consent to; a withdrawal is also a feasible

alternative to accepting amendments. The fact that Community law is effective in the member

states does not automatically imply its superiority. The effectiveness can also be grounded on

the fact that it was introduced as an international treaty, a decision taken according to national

constitutional norms, which therefore remain superior to the Communities' constitutional

norms. In all, then, the Communities' system is an extension o f the judicial arm o f the state.

(Idem: 276-281.)

Moreover, Taylor sees a tendency in the Community to use sparingly the supranational

measures available as the use of these could have disintegrative effects. Although the

interpretation of Community law and its application is the exclusive right of the Court, the

Court has tended to avoid policy issues where there is a chance o f sharp dissent. Similarly,

the possibility of sanctions and counter-measures by other countries against a state, for

example in the case of unfair competition, cannot be used too often; otherwise, the

Community would be enforcing at the cost of its own disintegration. (Idem: 287-291.)

getting one's preferences accepted by others, the Commission wields substantial power (power of initiative, European perspective, technical knowledge). (Cf. Marks 1995.)

1)0 Cf. the general idea that an international commitment by the state which restrains its behaviour is not evidence for a loss of sovereignty, but for the effective use of that sovereignty. Taylor himself refers to Scelle's idea of a dédoublement fonctionel: national institutions exercise both national sovereignty and, as a collective body, powers on behalf o f the Community, the one function being the counterpart of the other; therefore, a treaty establishing a supranational community or an act issued thereunder cannot be unconstitutional under national law (Taylor 1983: 281). - Taylor (1991a: 78) also notes that although it has been argued that British sovereignty has been compromised by a series of EC directives going against the wishes of the government, the government itself made the political choice to agree to the directives (because of the long-term benefits), and, therefore, the acceptance was an exercise of national sovereignty rather than its abdication.

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Interestingly, Taylor's argumentation is, in the end, not totally discredited by Weiler. In all,

the effects of the supranational characteristics o f the Community on the position of the

member states are difficult to estimate, and Weiler remarks that they are not necessarily

negative at all. On the one hand, the differences between the Community legal system and

traditional international law might not be that important in practice: the intergovernmental

character o f the procedure of judicial review and the consequent limitations on its efficacy are

clear and, most importantly, no real enforcement exists (Weiler 1991: 2419-2420). On the

other hand, the states have also defended their position. As the possibility for the states to

evade their obligations has diminished, the Community law has become binding also inside

the member states, and effective legal remedies to enforce the law have been adopted, the

states have strengthened their hold on decision-making.131 * 133 Thus, an equilibrium emerged in

that the member states could accept the constitutionalisation because they took the real control

of the decision-making process, minimising the threats to their position. Actually, Weiler

argues, the closure o f exit was in the interests o f the states. The closure contributed to the

strengthening of the Community, which was not a zero-sum game, but strengthened, in fact,

also the member states. All could attain decisive power o f influence unattainable in more

traditional fora of international relations: the small states increased their weight and power in

inherently interdependent policy areas, while the larger states had particular interests they

could effectively vindicate through the Community (e.g., agriculture for France and

relegitimation for Germany). (Idem: 2429-243 0.)’32

The development towards some kind o f synthesis of the two views seems, in fact, to be a

common way o f avoiding the risk for finding oneself in a theoretical impasse between the

two. Its only alternative would seem to be the 'exit', leaving the study o f integration altogether

131 In other words, if 'exit* if foreclosed, the need for 'voice' increases. In Weiler*s view, this took place in theformative period o f the Communities. While the Rome Treaty's original decision-making process had strong supranational elements by virtue of the central role o f the Commission and the intended development towards decision by majority voting, the Luxembourg Accord meant that each member state could veto the legislation proposed by the Community; this signalled the rapid collapse of all other supranational features of Community decision-making. The European Council of Ministers, an organ not established by the treaties, assumed the role of giving impetus to the policy agenda of the Community. (Weiler 1991: 2411-2412; 2423-2427.)

133 Similarly, MacCorraick argues that the relation between the states and the Community cannot be seen as a simple 'zero-sum game'. In his view, the idea that delegation o f power does not mean infringement on sovereignty can be applied from the point of view of one member country, but it is not applicable from the viewpoint o f the Community organs or of other member states: it is implausible to represent the Community organs as mere delegates of one sovereign state. However, to say that the member governments are now substantially but the delegates of the Community is, for MacCoimick, only a shift from one monocular view to another. No state in Western Europe is any longer sovereign; none is in a position such that all the power exercised internally in it, whether politically or legally, derives from purely internal sources; nor has the Community such a plenitude of powers as such. (MacCormick 1993: 3-5, 8, 14-16.)

83

and searching for new problem formulations. At times, scholars have proposed to leave the

field and move on to questions which are seen to be more timely and relevant, such as

globalisation (e.g., Rosamond 1995, Anderson 1995). Notably, Haas quitted integration studies

in 1975 referring to this argument.133 He declared that integration studies were no longer

interesting or important and that a further development of integration theories was "probably

not worth our while". Instead, one should study the more important and recent phenomena,

systems change, interdependence and turbulence. Integration, then, could partly be seen as a

case within these frameworks.133 134 (Haas 1975: 1, 86-88.)135

At the same time, Haas' 'exit' also presents some elements o f synthesis. It is a criticism of all

integration theories - once again put into one bundle - using arguments presented by

intergovemmentalists against neofunctionalism and transnationalist criticism of state-centred

analyses of international relations. Thus, in particular, he remarks that the theories did not take

into consideration the obstinate character of the state and that the national capability to resolve

problems might recover136. The synthesis becomes visible in his new understanding of

133 Cf. Haas, 'Turbulent Fields and the Theory of Regional Integration', International Organization, vol. 30 (2) 1976, pp. 172-212; The Web o f Interdependence, 1970.

1M Haas now defines interdependence as a condition in which governments are so vulnerable that unilateral action is (seen as) unwise to survival. Integration, in turn, means the institutional procedures devised by governments for coping with the conditions of interdependence in the form of increasing, decreasing or maintaining interdependence. Policy interdependence does not always lead to policy integration. Turbulence, then, denotes a setting of great social complexity in which actors have confused perceptions, incompatible objectives and in which they are interdependent; uncertainty increases, and, thus, it is difficult to develop stable expectations. Therefore, turbulence may also challenge the process of integration: as the actors are uncertain about their options, they aim at keeping most options open and avoid foreclosing them by exclusive reliance on regional forces. Instead, arrangements and coordination beyond the region may become attractive. This questions the authority o f regional institutions and may undermine the legitimacy of their policies. For the "half-way house" of EC, turbulence implies that federation, disintegration and confederation may occur simultaneously, and the 'house' cannot last as such. (Haas 1975: 22-25, 32, 60-63, 78-79, 86-89.)

135 The development of the conceptual apparatus of social sciences is concretely visible in the series of ’new* concepts which appear in Haas' text, ranging from 'interdependence' and 'turbulence' to other typical teims of the 1970s, such as 'spaceship earth' or 'global village' (see footnote 18). Haas states that he borrowed the term 'turbulence' from the literature on social planning and management. Similarly, decision-making theory and game theory have influenced Haas' analysis (see esp. Haas 1975: 83).

136 In addition, they assumed regional self-containment without seeing that the problems tackled - such as currency or employment - were in reality not regional in scope and depicted integration as too orderly and rational a phenomenon, based on incremental decision-making, utilitarian calculus and shared basic objective in the gradual attainment of a security community. Haas sees that this objective is now questioned and new ways of calculating costs and benefits emerge. This sense of orderly process and the assumption that states manage to cope collectively according to the rationality of disjointed incrementalism imply that integration theories fail to capture such phenomena as global polities and search for new world order. (Haas 1975: 12, 14-17.) Actually,

84

integration as an effort towards the management of turbulence or "control of turbulent fields"

rather than towards achieving regional political integration. {Idem: 18-20; cf. above, footnote

95, 96, page 59.)

In a situation in which there are two conflicting approaches to the question o f integration and

the state and in which, moreover, both views are well-developed and events seem to confirm

that what both foresee can take place simultaneously, a theoretical synthesis of the two

appears a natural solution. In fact, one could see that in the 1990s, integration theory has

increasingly adopted a common research agenda in the form o f explaining why and how it

is possible that both views can be true at the same time. Or, as Hoffmann put it, the question

to be answered is what he saw as the "paradox" of integration which simultaneously curtailed

states' capacities for unilateral action and served to preserve the state as the basic unit. In his

view, the explanation could be found by analyzing the whole as a 'regime*. (Hoffmann 1982:

33-35.) Different versions of this synthesis can be found, many o f them not even o f recent

origin.

In the 1970s, there was a search for some kind of synthesis of the various approaches and

definitions used in the literature; Puchala (1972) compared integration scholars to blind men

examining each a different part of an elephant and failing to agree on what it actually was,

and Lindberg and Scheingold (1970, preface) expressed the need for an overall perspective

in the "vast outpouring" of theories and analyses of integration. Advocating some kind of

synthesis, they maintained that the seemingly contradictory theories actually focus on different

aspects of a larger whole.137

Notably, the idea o f synthesis appeared in the literature which claimed that integration

simultaneously strengthens both the states and the central institutions, and that there is, thus,

no necessary opposition between the state and integration. The idea o f symbiosis between the

state and integration was presented by Lindberg and Scheingold in 1970. They saw that it was

no longer appropriate to think of the integration process in terms of the Community's capacity

to accumulate the power to impose decisions on the nation-states, since both the states and

Haas extends his criticism so far as to indirectly accuse himself of something he did not do: in Haas' view, a shortcoming was that the theories did not allow for the possibility that actors' motives, interests and values change (idem: 8-9) - something very basic in his own early writings (e.g., Haas 1958).

137 Pentland (1973: 21) made an effort at synthesising the various views by constructing the "lowest common denominator" of the different definitions for integration (integration as a process whereby a group of people, organised initially in two or more independent nation-states, come to constitute a political whole which can, in some sense, be described as a community).

85

the Community thrived: instead, integration should be seen as a kind of symbiosis between

the systems, a merging of systems which results in the actors' increasing tendency to define

their roles in terms o f joint problem-solving rather than as agents of one or another system.138

The authors also ask whether the Community has, in fact, contributed to the reconsolidation

of the nation-state and whether its existence can be seen a precondition to the long-term

viability of the nation-state. In their view, the most convincing case for the relevance o f the

Community for the nation-state can be made with respect to economic matters. As regards the

political reconsolidation of the members, the authors see that increase in political capacity at

the national and supranational levels are likely to be mutually reinforcing rather than mutually

exclusive. (Lindberg and Scheingold 1970: 32, 35-37.)

Later, also Taylor suggests that in the EC, the organisation and the state are mutually

reinforcing, and that the relationship between the state and the Community is symbiotic. Both

are strengthened in integration; it is even possible that the subnational entities are strengthened

as well. States are pushed to accept some constraints in their struggle to promote their own

interests. However, they have also reason to promote the common system because o f its

benefits, such as increase in economic and military or strategic security. At the same time,

the strengthening o f the common system can reinforce the distinctiveness of the participating

units.139 Instead of a linear and progressive view on integration involving increasing accord

among the participants and gradual strengthening of the community level, Taylor proposes a

consociationalist view which does not expect a reconciliation o f regional differences but

identifies the built-in pressures in the EC which tend to consolidate the sub-units (the states).

(Taylor 1991b: 109, 119, 121-122, 125.)

Matlary proposes similar ideas o f both the states and the Community being simultaneously

strengthened. She sees that the emergence of an issue of international scope requiring

multilateral solution is a precipitant for a period of integration; the EC receives legitimacy,

which is needed for the Commission to increase its own institutional role. In periods o f much

138 In the book, however, the idea o f symbiosis seems to be abandoned quite soon, the Community and the states being analyzed as separate realms; it reappears in the end when the authors conclude that the EC and the states are becoming more and more subtly intertwined and that some symbiosis between the state and the EC might be the most flexible and adequate form [of system] (idem: 308-310).

159 In fact, Taylor argues, states can even join the Community in order to develop their distinctive identity, as in the case of Spain, Portugal, Western Germany, and arguably even Britain. The potential of common action has to be convincing in order to preserve the capacity for individual action; the system allows the state to appear as a distinctive power.

8 6

integration, therefore, both the states140 and EC institutions gain in influence, the reverse being

true for periods of less integration. The Commission may pursue a strategy o f its own

provided that the states are able to satisfy theirs. (Matlary 1993a: 193-194.) In addition,

Matlary points to the need for conceptualise the state as semi-integrated, not a unit totally

distinct from the EC. Interaction between the state and integration varies from area to area,

and their divide is not clear-cut. (Matlary 1994: 12-13, 23; see Kelstrup 1992.)

One could even see that the theories of multilevel governance are, in a sense, syntheses

between the two approaches. They also seem to share the method of appealing to the

ambiguous and complex nature of reality for justifying the need for applying elements from

different theories, visible in Haas' account of 'turbulence'. This is particularly visible in Marks

1995. He presents multilevel governance as a model between the state-centric one and a

purely supranational system where common institutions have autonomous coercive power. In

this model, the states remain "immensely strong institutions". However, the increase in the

scope and depth of institutionalised, collective decision-making dilutes sovereignty, and

transforms the relation between the state and its domestic constituency. In addition to their

monopoly position in decision-making, the states' control o f individuals in their territories is

diminishing. They are losing their grip on interest aggregation and the mediation o f domestic

interest representation in international relations. Political interests and pressures are not nested

within each state, nor are states separate arenas providing the sole channel for domestic

political interests to the European level. Instead, the political arenas are interconnected, and

subnational actors act directly in both national and supranational arenas. (Marks 1995: 1, 3-

5.)141

2 .4 I n t e g r a t io n w h ic h t r a n sf o r m s t h e s t a t e

The fourth view on the relationship between the state and integration is one in which

integration is seen as a process which transforms the state. The state, thus, is not seen to

140 When the EC represents a forum to which the rest o f the world looks, the profiles of the states and the pursuits of their national interests receive much more attention; also the possibilities o f utilising the 'gate-keeping' function are activated (Matlary 1993a: 193).

141 Marks notes that the model of multilevel governance presents (only) an indirect challenge to state sovereignty and is as such "infinitely more attractive to state executives than a purely supranational system where European institutions would have autonomous coercive power”. Ambiguous and complex in nature, it is unlikely to be a stable equilibrium; especially the larger states press hard to reinforce intergovernmental safeguards (in the form of voting weights, etc.). (Idem: 23-25.)

87

disappear, nor necessarily to be weakened or strengthened in the process. It remains, although

it is changed in different ways. The changes may concern its functions, policy-making

processes, administrative apparatus and power relations between the different state organs, but

also such features as political culture or identity. The extent and nature of the changes

depends on the particular features of the state in question; the focus is, therefore, on a single

state rather than states in general.

The appearance of this view can be explained through two main phenomena having to do with

the previous development of integration theory. The first is the tendency towards a synthesis

of the views, considered above; the second is the new centrality o f domestic politics in the

study of integration. In a way, the tendency towards synthesis creates a special ‘niche1 in

which this approach can be based. It is seen that integration effectively influences the state,

even though the state is not replaced, and it is also seen that the previous views, when

remaining concentrated on the puzzle of whether or not states control the process and benefit

from it, risk overlooking the central question of how the state is influenced in concrete terms.

Thus, the view also takes into account the criticism directed against the third view for

analyzing some general conception of state, or the state, without taking into consideration the

differences between states. After a considerable expedition in other questions, thus, the fourth

view brings the discussion back to Hoffmann's (1966) state which 'survives, although

transformed' (see above, footnote 94, page 58), building its research agenda on analyzing these

transformations closer.

The second background factor, the centrality of domestic politics, is also underlined in the

fourth view as an important criticism of the former views, and, thus, as a step forward in

comparison to them. Bulmer (1983) proposes the domestic politics approach as an alternative

to approaches used thus far in integration studies. His central idea is that domestic politics

may have a vital impact on the policy-making output of the EC. He therefore aims at an

approach in which domestic politics, the domestic policy-making structures and attitudes

within a member state regarding the EC are synthesised to explain the behaviour and positions

o f a member state in the Community. Consideration of domestic politics had, in Bulmer's

view, been pushed into the background by two factors: on the one hand, the turn in interest

from developing integration theories to examining how policies are made in the EC - which

resulted from the deceleration of integration in the 1970s and 1980s - and, on the other hand,

the evolving debate between supranationalism and intergovemmentalism which has

overshadowed some important findings concerning policy-making in the member states.

(Bulmer 1983: 349.)

88

In this debate, Bulmer takes the side of intergovemmentalism, which, in his view, is based

on actual developments in contrast to neofunctionalism which is based on theoretical

predictions and assumptions which have not stood up to developments in the real world. He

adopts the intergovemmentalist postulates o f retention o f power by governments and o f

comparability of the EC to other international organisations.142 Thus, the policy-making

analysts - particularly Wallace, Wallace and Webb - are right, in Bulmer's view, in identifying

the national govemmen’s as central in the EC. However, they did not fully explore the

linkages between domestic and EC tiers. Neither is intergovemmentalism sufficient for the

study o f the member states' attitudes towards the EC, because it sees the governments as

omnipotent, monolithic structures. The disaggregation o f the governments' positions is

essential in Bulmer's approach. Another essential difference is that while intergovemmentalism

focuses on the EC as an international organisation, Bulmer sees that since the same actors -

political organisations, parties, interest groups, parliaments - are involved both in the EC and

national politics, EC policy-making should be examined in the same way as domestic politics.

(Bulmer 1983: 349-351, 355-356.)

Integration, or perhaps better EC policy-making, is thus seen as govemment-led, nationally

anchored: the national polity is the basic unit in the EC. As Bulmer puts it, the domestic

policy-making process does not follow the logic o f integration, as assumed in integration

theories; instead, integration follows the logic o f decision-making processes. However,

although governments formally are in a key position between national politics and Community

politics, it is important to note that the power o f the governments varies from case to case.

The government can be captured by domestic interests or transnational forces, but it may also

have power to impose policies on domestic interests. (Bulmer 1983: 353-354.)

Thus, Bulmer's approach deviates further from the intergovemmentalist position in that the

member states are seen as essentially different with respect to policy structures and

instruments, internal conditions, interests, degree of centralisation and relationship to the

outside world. Their policy-making styles and political cultures differ, which is seen, for

instance, in the relations between government and other political actors; whether the * 38

143 Bulmer argues that the state has the ability to decide at which level it defends its interests, to choose between the national level, the EC or that of other international regimes. The domestic political tier has an important function in determining whether the EC is seen as the most appropriate level of action for responding to the international challenges. (Bulmer 1983: 353, 356; cf. later Milward, above; note also Webb (1983: 2, 37-38) remarking that the EC can be seen as a forum for the pursuit of important interests, and that the question of relevance is central. For her, it is important to analyze when and whether the Community is seen as a relevant and effective body, this having to do with its legitimacy; she notes that states increasingly weigh the EC in these terms, efficiency creating support.)

89

government develops policy through consensus building or imposition depends on its strength

and political culture. Thus, the EC policy, as any other domestic policy, is formulated

differently within the different member states. In addition to differences in the domestic policy

environments, there are also important differences between different policy areas. For Bulmer,

the domestic policy-making structures together with the attitudes held within the member

states regarding the EC explain why a particular state adopts a certain policy or negotiation

position in the EC. The national positions together, then, explain the final outcome o f EC

policies. (Bulmer 1983: 350, 353, 357, 361.)

Against the background of the development of integration theories, it is perhaps only

commonplace of Bulmer to remark that the domestic politics approach is "arguably more

embracing and/or more realistic as a device explaining Community negotiations than the

alternatives on offer" (Bulmer 1983: 363). What is interesting, however, is that the approach

is presented as a novelty by accusing the former contributions o f having been dominated by

international relations approaches. This is pointed out by Bulmer also in 1993 as he notes that

the study of integration has been mainly conducted within international relations theory, using

their 'toolkit1. Hix (1994) goes on to specify that the EC has been mainly studied as an

example of supranational integration or o f intergovernmental cooperation between nation­

states, using, consequently, approaches of international relations, such as neofunctionalism and

intergovemmentalism. In other words, the previous views now appear reorganised in a

somewhat peculiar way, stressing their shared origins in international relations. For

neofunctionalism in particular, this categorisation is surprising143, and seems to affirm the

factual rapprochement between the originally very dissimilar second and third views.

The novelty o f the approach is, in fact, relative, especially as regards both the emphasis on

the differences between states and on the importance of disaggregating the position o f the

government instead o f treating it as unproblematic and coherent. Both seem rather to have

only temporarily disappeared from the analysis. For Haas (1958), in fact, this disaggregation

was the very starting point; only subsequently does there seem to have been an aggregation.

A similar circularity appears also in the way of introducing domestic approaches to balance

the international approaches, as these were introduced as an alternative to the previous

dominance of the domestic ones (see, e.g., Harrison 1974).

As Webb (1983: 17-18) points out, the contribution of neofunctionalism has actually been to point out the political nature o f policy-making in the EC, the specific bargaining and consensus-producing mechanisms and strategies, and the comparability to domestic politics.

In fact, domestic politics has often played an important role in explaining state behaviour in

the EC context. In parallel to Bulmer's work, state policies and preferences have been studied

in the framework o f analyzing decision-making in the Community in terms o f the member

states' capacity and resources, domestic constraints, extra-national constraints, goals and

strategies (e.g., Helen Wallace) and in the framework of foreign policy analysis.144

However, Bulmer introduces the domestic politics approach also for a another purpose, that

o f analyzing the EC as a political system. What makes it important, in Bulmer's view, to use

a comparative public policy perspective instead of international relations approaches is that

the EU is becoming a state145, and it can be seen as a multi-tiered system of government.

Leaning on new institutionalism, basically emphasising the role o f institutions as constraints

on behaviour but also as shaping goals, Bulmer undertakes the task of examining the nature

o f policy processes in the EU through its governance structures, institutions, instruments,

procedures and rules. Further, he remarks, as empirical studies have shown that the EU

represents governance without government, a certain regulatory governance regime, it is

appropriate to study it divided in policy subsystems, taking into account the differences in

national patterns of governance in different policy areas (Bulmer 1993: 351-356, 371).

Similarly for Hix, theories of international politics are o f limited use in the analysis o f the

Community which has developed as an internal political arena, becoming something more

than an international organisation. In fact, Hix claims that politics in the EC is not inherently

different from politics in any democratic system: it is dominated by questions o f

representation, participation, distribution, allocation, and political and administrative

efficiency. As the EC begins to address 'positive' integration issues such as the Social Chapter

which bring questions o f allocation and distribution of resources to its realm, the international

approaches become insufficient. In contrast, comparative analysis - for Hix, the study o f the

internal politics of political systems or politics within rather than among nations - suggests

that there are two fundamental dimensions o f politics in the Community : in addition to the

dimension o f national v. supranational, identified also by the international approaches, there

1M Bulmer's analysis of governments as in a key position between national politics and Community politics, sometimes captured by domestic interests or transnational forces and sometimes in the position to impose policies on domestic interests, deriving power both from their domestic and EC position, is also close to Moravcsik’s position (see above).

141 Cf. the strong opposition (above) to the idea of likening the EU and the state, either because it was not really like a state or because 'suite' was an old and inadequate concept for analyzing integration.

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emerges also a socio-economic conflict along the party-political left-right dimension. (Hix

1994: 1-2, 6, 24, footnote 2.)m

Thus, Hix argues that the more fruitful comparative approach to the analysis o f the EC should

challenge the still dominant international approaches which simply describe it as unique (Hix

1994: 20-22).146 147 Again, the previous discussions for and against comparability seem to be

forgotten. In fact, the analysis o f the EC as a political system, based on a comparison between

the EC and the state, is one of the basic approaches to the EC. For instance, for Wallace

(1977: 303, 322), conventional models o f domestic policy-making are one source for

understanding the Community process, or 'the partial political system' as he calls the EC.

Thus, questions such as how policies are made in the EC or who participates in the decision­

making are amply reflected at by, e.g., Lindberg and Scheingold (1970) - closely resembling

Bulmer 1993 - and in detailed comparisons of different policy-making areas.148

This lengthy discussion on domestic politics approaches serves to make understandable the

appearance of the fourth view which is evolving from these elements. The fourth view, in

fact, can be seen as based on still a new, third, application of domestic politics approach to

examine the influence o f integration on the domestic scene, on the state. With a slight change

o f perspective, the domestic politics approach thus gives ground to a mirror image o f the

Bulmerian (1983: 353, above) perception of integration following the logic of domestic

decision-making processes, namely, to the analysis of how domestic policy-making changes

146 Hix distinguishes between the analysis of European integration, for which the international relations approaches may still be valid, and the analysis of European Community politics, for which comparative politics approaches are more appropriate. For him, in particular neofunctionalism and intergovemmentalism give only a unidimensional view on the political conflict in the EC, seeing the situation as one in which the actors (states or interest groups) either support or oppose further supranational integration. Functionalism and federalism, in turn, both sought to deliberately prescribe systems which would minimise political conflict, which makes them perhaps the least useful o f all international relations theories for the study of EC politics. - Hix also observes that Haas (1958) placed great importance on the role of political parties, but that he analyzed the alignments of national and supranational parties in terms of whether they were pro- or anti-integration, and not on the basis o f a socioeconomic conflict. (Hix 1994: 6-8, 10-11.)

147 Hix refers here to Sbragia, A. M. (ed.), Euro-Politics: Institutions and Policymaking in the "New* European Community, Brookings Institute, Washington 1992.

148 The analysts o f the Community policy-making have found, for instance, reasons for the attraction and achievements of the EC in its robust and innovative model of negotiating. H. Wallace (1990: 217-218, 223-224) points out as typical features the inducements to cooperate and to improve the performance of negotiations, as well as a high commitment to cooperation. In her view, the fact that negotiated decisions turn into enforceable Community law means seriousness and leads to hesitation to agree, but also to ability to predict the legal consequences and the behaviour of others; it is seen that results matter and that coalitions are necessary, and there are embedded expectations of reciprocity.

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as a result of integration, based on the assumption that national decision-making processes,

structures and policies are influenced or transformed by integration, if not altogether follow

it. While the idea that the process of integration changes the state is by no means a new

contribution of this view, it differs from the previous views by the conceptualisation o f that

change. On the one hand, the changes are seen to be the empirical question to be examined

on the basis of the study of concrete, single states; on the other, even a deep transformation

is expected to occur instead of a generic 'strengthening' or 'weakening' effect. In addition,

'integration' is partly seen as covering both formal and informal processes. In comparison to

the previous, the fourth view seems, however, to be more a view in formation, albeit an

increasingly popular one.

An important part o f the studies on how the national political processes have changed under

the influence of integration appears under the notion of 'Europeanisation', As an example of

the use o f the label, it is useful to examine closer the contribution o f Andersen and Eliassen

(1993) - a study which seems to be situated in between the study of the EC policy-making

and its effects on the national system. The authors deplore the fact that most studies o f policy­

making - also comparative studies - have retained a national bias: the unit o f analysis has

been the national system, which has been looked at as relatively closed. The EC has mainly

been regarded as external to it, almost as a disturbance. Further, the EC policy-making has

often been studied from the perspective of international politics, as extension of foreign policy

or an arena o f international cooperation149, or as a formal legal politico-administrative system,

as a legal entity, an orderly system with a common body o f law at its core. Andersen and

Eliassen stress the need for studying policy-making in a new way because of the important

changes that have occurred (or will occur, or even will have to occur) in its nature, that is,

because of the Europeanisation, or 'Europeification', as they call it, o f policy-making. The

European political system has to be made the unit o f analysis; the authors see that their

approach differs from the above in "emphasising the totality of the EC institutions and the

national political system". (Andersen and Eliassen 1993: v, 10-12, 255.)

In their view, there is "a complex game around the policy-making process". The increased

importance o f central EC institutions has mobilised a variety o f interests which seek to

influence the process, and this has further strengthened the role o f the central institutions in

relation to member countries (Andersen and Eliassen 1993: v, 17). Therefore, one has to take

into account the enlarged scope of national policy-making, the increased number and types

u9 Here, the authors rather sloppily mention the 'integrationist' perspective o f neofunctionalism, represented by Keohane and Moravcsik (and not by, e.g., Haas).

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of actors to be considered (idem: 11-12). A fundamental aspect o f the conceptual model

describing the EC as a new type o f political system, which the authors claim to introduce, is

the tension between the member states and the emerging transnational authority at the EC

level. The key question is how policy-making is affected; the authors examine conditions in

which national traditions prevail and in which attempts to structure policy from above

succeed. (Idem: 13, 17, 256.) In concrete, the authors study EC decision-making and various

areas of EC policy-making (but also implementation), looking at the degree of

institutionalisation o f policies at EC and national levels, the distribution of interests (whether

there are segmented conflicts between member countries, whether their interests are

complementary, what alliances appear) and aim at locating the driving forces in the decision­

making levels and showing the relative importance and role of different actors in the process,

taking into account actor strategies, coalitions and dependencies. (Idem: 11-12, 14-15, 19-,

257, 261.)

Nevertheless, the authors have problems in locating what it actually is they propose as a

novelty. A mere centrality of the EC and its political processes, instead of a focus on the

state, is obviously quite common in research, as is the study of how EC policy-making can

be influenced. Attempting perhaps to see the EC and the state as intertwined, they still

remain, as to their results, in the realm o f some well-known features o f the EC policy-making

process150.

A possible reason may lie in the very concept of'Europeification* which is, indeed, somewhat

confusing, and appears more as a substitute for 'integration' used by others in similar contexts.

On the one hand, the authors seem to examine the Europeification o f the national policy­

making - which, indeed, is the title of the book - arguing, for instance, that almost all policy

areas will in the future have an EC dimension. On the other hand, they also speak about "the

Europeification of the EC system of policy-making". While the need for this new approach

is first motivated by referring to Europeification as a fact, the authors subsequently argue that

Europeification is needed as a reaction to the increasing complexity o f the European policy­

making context or that it can be necessary in certain sectors to deal with the effects of a

Europe without frontiers, they later turn the argument again by noting that the Europeification

o f EC policy-making leads to increased complexity. (Andersen and Eliassen 1993: v, 10, 12-

13, 255.)

lJ0 Pointing to, e.g., the importance o f lobbying, they examine different phases in the EC decision-making to identify the possibilities for influencing this process (p. 26; see p. 29 and the title "how and when to influence legislation").

94

Actually, Andersen’s and Eliassen's contribution is more about EC policy-making in different

fields than about national policy-making. It points out differences between different policy

areas as to both the policy -making in the EC and to whether there is European policy-making

at all. It also points out how different new and partly unconventional actors, such as large

enterprises, get involved in the regulatory activities, a fact which certainly has implications

for the functions of the state in interest representation and aggregation. However, it does not

consider the concrete changes in the national sphere as a result o f Europeanisation, or the

situation in which policies implemented in the member states are no longer made in the states,

but at the EU level, and in which the national policy-making adapts to its new position as a

part o f a larger process.

A further step towards the analysis o f the changes in the states is made by Héritier et a l

(1994), based on the view that the extending rule- and policy-making at the European level

induces changes in the member states or in their very statehood. The change in statehood is

examined with the help of a particular case, a comparison between France, Germany and the

United Kingdom151 as to their policies in the EC environmental policy-making, especially

clean air regulation, and how the rule-making in this field has influenced their statehood. The

theoretical framework is that of policy network analysis, linked among other things to rational

choice, symbolic interaction theory, new institutionalism and policy analysis; a series o f in-

depth interviews constitute the research material. (Héritier et a l 1994: 4, 7-8, 25-26.)

The dimensions of statehood which integration is seen to influence are the central

organisational features o f the state (degree of centralisation or decentralisation, administrative

competencies and practices, distribution of financial resources between different administrative

realms), the instruments of governance and juridical rules, the dominant problem-solving

philosophy or ideology (e.g., justification of state intervention), the borderline between the

state and society, and, finally, the societal interest aggregation by political parties and their

position in the system. (Héritier et a l 1994: 1, 3-5). Two features o f these changes deserve

particular attention. First, while some o f the changes are not only easy to notice but, indeed,

striking, there are also important incremental changes which are close to being indiscernible.

Secondly, integration does not influence all member states in the same way: while some need

1)1 The three are chosen as ’high-regulating' countries (countries with specified domestic regulation on the issue and a suitable implementation machinery) which, accordingly, are assumed to strive for similarity between own and EC rules and to have interest in extending the common rule-making (Héritier et a l 1994: 12-13).

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no particular adaptation, others need only formal changes, the substance o f regulations

remaining the same; some, however, have to make even major substantial changes.152

In concrete, the changes in statehood could be divided in general and particular. On the one

hand, the authors conclude that in general, the national governments and executives have lost

influence in policy formulation as the Communitarian law-making replaces the national. The

borderline between the state and society has moved; patterns o f interest mediation and

representation have changed; the state is 'opened up' and the quality and form of direct

contacts between the state and private actors has changed. Local actors are strengthened, and

national actors increasingly have direct contacts with the Commission; political parties lose

power as policy formulation is increasingly carried out in the Community, and as the

European parties are weak. On the other hand, the countries examined experience different

changes, such as the requirement for Britain to open its administration to public scrutiny as

a result of converging domestic and European goals of increased transparency, and its changed

problem-solving philosophy. (Héritier et ai. 1994: 391-394.)

In the end, the authors see that the overall change in statehood is significant, but not

subversive. Some old patterns of statehood are changed or substituted; more often, however,

what takes place is an addition: new elements - institutions, measures - are added to the old

patterns. In all three states, only very partial substitution has taken place. This is made

understandable by pointing out that the states seek to resist changes. First, the influence

between integration and the state is not one-sided: the starting point of the analysis is that

there is an ongoing process o f mutual transformation between the European institutions and

the member states. While the European regulations influence statehood, also the states

influence the European policy-making. In addition, there is also a mutual influence

horizontally between the member states. (Héritier et a l 1994: 1 ,3 .)

1SÎ Quite similarly, H. Wallace (1973: 5, 8-9) examines the patterns of national administrative inputs into the Community process and the effects of this involvement on the national institutions of the member states. She draws attention to the differences between the states as to, e g., their administrative style and organisation and ways of formulating national policies, and points out how this interaction results in a blurring of the distinction between domestic and foreign policy; the governments get new commitments and obligations, and the established patterns of national policy formulation are challenged. Note also similarities with Webb (1983: 27, 29) who notes the national officials* tendency to protect national competencies, and sees that there are transformational effects on the states (c.g., governments are pressed to keep the channels to other governments and other actors open and to continue discussion in order to secure their policy). The governments can also use the EC as a resource in domestic politics (also W. Wallace 1977; cf. Moravcsik), and the EC has often to rely on governments for. the provision of the basic administrative infrastructure.

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Second, European policy-making is seen as a regulatory competition153 between the member

states, a contest for putting one's own imprint on Community policies and legislation, or

transferring the own regulatory culture, practices and regulations on to the European level. All

states share the aim o f influencing the common policies and regulations in order to minimise

the pressure for change emanating from the process, and, consequently, the scope of concrete

changes they have to realise. They attempt this for both institutional and economic reasons:

on the one hand, they aim at preserving their own traditions and institutions, changing which

is costly; on the other, they also aim at preserving or increasing the competitiveness o f

national industry by avoiding increases in production costs not shared by others or by selling

own products or innovations to other member countries. {Idem: 2, 13-14.) This being the goal

of the states, the authors proceed to answer how the states attempt this and in what conditions

they are likely to succeed.

The outcome o f the contest does not depend solely on the states: subnational and sectoral

actors inside member state and supranational ones also participate. Especially the strategies,

structures and traditions of the Commission have to be taken into account. To answer why

the Commission strives for certain regulatory solutions, what strategies it adopts and what

conditions are helpful comprise, in fact, the authors' research agenda.154 (Héritier et a l 1994:

4, 12, 15-18.) In the end, however, the Commission tends to conform to what the states find

acceptable.

All in all, the authors' approach is perhaps less state-changing than state-conserving. They

balance changes against influence, and underline that the transfer o f competencies is not a

zero-sum game. Even when sovereignty is lost, national identity and the representation of

national interests are not, and the state still has the tasks of implementation - particularly so

3 See the subtitle of the book, "Ein re gu Iati ver Wettbewerb".

154 The Commission is explained to have specific interest in expanding the Community rule-making. The reasons for this stem partly from its statutory responsibilities, the task of striving for harmonisation and integration of policies, furthering market integration and eliminating trade barriers, and being responsible for the observance of the international treaties in the field to which the Community is a part In addition, however, it also has own, vested interest to expand its rule-making activities. On the other hand, the authors note that the strategy of the Commission has been to fmd solutions acceptable for the member states, emphasising subsidiarity in the last years (Héritier et al. 1994: 17-18).

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because of subsidiarity - and of being the caretaker of democracy in that it is the only existing

infrastructure for democracy.155 (Héritier et a l 1994: 388-390, 393.J156

In sum, the analyses based on the fourth view on the relationship between the state and

integration seem to point to the continuing, if not increasing, relevance of the basic questions

on state and integration, rather than yielding any essentially new answers. The studies o f the

transformation o f a particular state open the question of what the cause of this transformation

actually is, that is, what integration or Europeanisation represents. Integration is now made

to explain, while it was previously explained; on the other hand, the transformations observed

may come to be seen as an explanation o f integration. Two aspects seem to make it more

difficult to define: on the one hand, the 'European' influence can be part of some larger

phenomena; on the other, the process influences the state both through its formal and its

informal parts.

Among the scholars examining the transformation of the state, these aspects are brought

forward especially by Olsen and Matlary. For Olsen, the question is about the way political

processes transform political actors and structures. Europeanisation not only influences

institutions, but also identity and perceptions of reality.157 He points out the difficulty in

isolating the effects o f Europeanisation on national state from other influences and sees

Europeanisation as a result of global processes, economic, technological, demographic and

cultural development which make the nation-state in many respects too small to be functional.

(Olsen 1994: 11-12, 14-15.) For Matlary, Europeanisation means increasing importance of

political processes at the European level; for this, the EU itself is, however, only one reason,

economic changes being among other possible reasons. For her, the central question of how

the states change as a result has to be analyzed with tools which make the division between

liS Neither do actors in national networks necessarily lose decision-making power and possibilities; regional and municipal actors found, indeed, new partners, and for instance in Britain, local decision-making competence increased. (Hcritier et al. 1994: 394-395).

156 For their analyses on specific states, see Knill on France and the European Union in French Politics and Society, vol. 11 (1) 1993, and on the United Kingdom in Politische Vierteljahresschrijl, vol. 36 (4) 1995.

157 Olsen pays attention to differences between countries and between policy-areas; he also notes the close links to basic questions in political analysis, such as how political identity is changed or created, how institutions and rules are changed and how the allocation of values is changed.

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the state and the EU disappear. Such tools are, for example, comparative policy, network

analysis and policy diffusion.158

The transformation o f the state can without doubt be seen as a development in the direction

of a fusion between the state and the EU. Complete Europeanisation, as was seen above,

would imply the disappearance of the 'national* from the political processes and decision*

making. Wessels's 'fusion thesis' comes perhaps closest to describing this development. Instead

of a transfer o f loyalty, Wessels observes a new system o f shared government, a significant

trend towards engrenage or interlocking o f the national and the Communitarian. While

national civil servants participate in EC decision-making, they gain access to and influence

on this decision-making and implementation, but gain also more weight in their own national

systems. The same applies for Community officials, ministers and interests groups. (Wessels

1990: 230.) As noted above, Wessels also argues that in resorting to interstate mechanisms

in order to cope with the growing demands, the state induces a development towards a more

open state or a self-induced erosion of the closed state organisation, towards a fusion between

the participating states (Wessels 1992: 40-43).

All in all, the fourth view on the relationship between the state and integration seems both

complex and attractive as a base for further research. It might well develop into a prominent

branch o f integration studies, in a way similar to the development o f the second view in the

early 1970s. After all, the empirical material which can be analyzed from this perspective is

nearly limitless. The question of how integration transforms the state can be translated into

a variety o f different research problems regarding different countries, time spans, policy areas,

procedures or state functions. At the same time, the premises remain ambiguous. The process

of transformation is clearly double-sided: while the state is changed, it also changes or

influences the process o f integration and the common institutions. What can be seen as a

Europeanisation o f national policy-making can also be seen as nationalisation o f European

policy-making. As a result of the transformation, the state might virtually 'disappear' in a

fusion with the larger community, disappearing, thus, also as a research object. Still, the state

as a unit is also seen as recomposed and strengthened by the same process. Not surprisingly,

the view that the EU maintains the state appears anew in the context o f Europeanisation, for

instance as the ’lobbyification* at the central EU level is seen to require a higher degree of

coordination at the national level (cf. Andersen and Eliassen 1993: 14-15, 257, 261). Further,

Matlary in the CORE research course (Humlebaek, May 30, 1996), describing the Norwegian project Advanced Research on the Europeanisation of the Nation-State (ARENA), in which both Matlary and Olsen work.

perceiving transformation requires some stable point of comparison, a view on what the object

of transformation actually is. This implies dissension on definitions as well as on methods.

Changes in the state cannot be observed without focusing on it, with the ensuing problem that

the more one focuses on the state, the more permanent it becomes. This may again further the

perceived need to make it disappear from the analysis. The fourth view, thus, does not give

a definitive answer to the initial question. Rather, it keeps the basic debate on the state and

integration alive.

C h a p t e r 3

C a u s e s a n d c o n s e q u e n c e s

3.1 T h e s t a t e o f t h e a r t in in t e g r a t io n s t u d ie s :

A sel f-p o r t r a it w it h so m e c o r r e c t iv e r e m a r k s

3.1.1 A self-portrait

In the preceding examination of literature, four quite different views on die relationship

between the state and integration were identified and analyzed. According to the first,

integration is a remedy for some inherent weaknesses of the state and the state system: pulling

the states closer together in some form or another makes interstate relations more

accommodating and peaceful, in addition to improving the states' capacities to fulfil their

functions. In the second view, states are eventually altogether replaced in the process of

integration: the superiority of integrative solutions compared to what separate states can

achieve is compelling; a dynamic process o f integration is put in motion, and the states have

to adapt themselves to its consequences, that is, their diminishing role and power. The third

view, on the contrary, sees states as the real motors of the process o f integration, which in

essence is a series of measures aimed at strengthening them. The states set the direction and

limits of the process, halting or accelerating it as needed. Finally, in the fourth view,

integration is a process which causes consequential changes inside the participating state,

transforming its policies and policy-making procedures, and influencing gradually also its

administrative, judicial and political systems.

A proper evaluation o f each view and o f the plausibly confusing plurality which they together

constitute requires an explanation o f both why these views - rather than some others - have

emerged and how they actually influence research. This is the task o f the present chapter.

Some important elements towards the explanation of the origins o f these views already

appeared in the preceding analysis. In particular, the role of succession was found to be

paramount: theories and conceptual frameworks were seen to lean heavily on previous

research. Chapter two delineates, in fact, a path through the various views, showing how the

four have succeeded one another. As such, it is not the only possible path or the history of

integration studies; yet, it reveals an essential interdependence between the views. Some

general conclusions can thus be drawn. On the one hand, the views are not single or isolated,

but relate to each other either through criticising previous views or through building on

previous findings and conceptualisations, that is, through accumulation. This means that none

of the views is alone definitive or exhaustive, nor is any of them better than the other views

in absolute terms. On the other hand, the different views also make each other understandable:

none of them is irrelevant for the whole picture.

101

This, however, is not how the study o f integration depicts itself. In the self-portrait which

emerges from the ways in which the scholars themselves explain what they do, the succession

of views and theories does appear and constitutes, indeed, a central part of the portrait.

However, succession is understood in somewhat more straightforward terms. Evaluation of

previous theories plays a crucial role in research. This evaluation is done in the light o f real

world developments: the succession of theories is seen as progress towards better

understanding of reality. Research is, thus, seen to produce better results through comparison

and criticism of previous research, rejection of the disproved elements and accumulation or

synthesis o f the elements that have been verified.

Accordingly, in fact, all new theories developed in the literature are invariably presented as

better than the previous ones. Also the grounds on which the theories are seen to be better

are the same for all: the superior explanatory capacity or better correspondence with reality.

This correspondence, then, is understood to be self-evident rather than questionable, and is

indicated en passant. Thus, for instance, Puchala (1972: 283) argues that his 'concordance

system' describes Western European integration better than any o f the current models, being

based on the actual reality or current situation instead of projections of future; Moravcsik

(1991) sees historical record to confirm a theoretical view and disprove another; Bulmer

(1983: 363) maintains that the domestic politics approach is "arguably more embracing and/or

more realistic as a device explaining Community negotiations than the alternatives on offer".

In leaning on this type of reasoning, integration theorists hardly differ from other social

scientists who rather sporadically reflect on the problems in the evaluation of theories and

their development.139 Indeed, it is not uncommon to find overviews of existing theories in

which all o f them are shown to be defective - at times magnifying their defects through a

simplification of their contents. The scholars may also present their own contribution as the

right solution by depicting the field of research as consisting o f two extreme views which

have both to be rejected.159 160

159 When the question of evaluation of theories is addressed, it is usually done by referring to some general criteria which are themselves seen to be beyond criticism. For example, see Vasquez's criteria of good theories which he deems "standard in philosophy of science" and which include, e.g., accuracy and greater explanatory power, but also falsifiability and consistency with what is known in other areas (John A. Vasquez: 'The Post- Positivist Debate: Reconstructing Scientific Enquiry and International Relations Theory After Enlightenment's Fall', in Booth and Smith 1995; p. 230 et passim)-, similarly Sorensen (1991: 92). However, although these criteria may serve in criticising others, they seem of scarce help in constructing something not exposed to the same criticism.

160 Arendt remarks that in academic debates, the authors often present the discipline in terms o f three positions, two existing views which are both faulted, and the superior alternative, which is the author's own (Hannah Arendt, 'Lying in Politics: Reflections on the Pentagon Papers', in Crisis o f the Republic, Harvest/HBJ,

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Importantly, however, this self-portrait seems not to reach beyond some kind o f pseudo-

metatheoretical discussion. The role of empirical reality as the arbitrator in theoretical debates

appears exaggerated; the concrete empirical events are roughly the same for all. On the

contrary, the differences between views stem much more from assumptions which cannot be

empirically grounded and which, moreover, often seem to be taken for granted rather than

deliberately chosen. The picture which emerges from the previous analysis o f the literature

suggests, indeed, that the scholars do not necessarily work in the way they themselves

describe. The actual development o f research seems often circular, based on standard

criticisms o f previous views. In this chapter, the aim is to elaborate on the significance of

these findings or of the internal logic of research and its assumptions, questioning, first, the

assumed progression as to the explanatory power and, second, proceeding to an analysis o f

the essential assumptions and their backgrounds in the study of integration.

3.1.2 Some problematic effects o f research practice

The examination of literature in chapter two shows clearly the crucial role of existing

academic research in any analysis. However, it does not show that this necessarily implies any

progress or, indeed, replacement of old views by the new ones. In general, scholars seem to

be unaware o f or underestimate the factual influence of previous research. Obviously, all agree

that research builds - in some way or another - on existing research. Indeed, the very aim of

research is to improve the previous results through correction and accumulation o f established

knowledge. Existing research, however, has also less perceptible effects. First, through

'vertical' accumulation, it acts as a powerful constraint by leaving a legacy of

conceptualisations and research problems to subsequent research. Second, more 'horizontally',

the opposing theories also have their influence. Mutual criticism or competition between

different theories is a central motive for their development. In taking into account the

criticisms from and achievements o f rival views, they develop by reflecting each other.

Several instances of this reflection were seen in the preceding overview where particular

views were usually justified by juxtaposing them to the existing ones and showing their

relative merits.

As a whole, it could be argued that the study o f integration manifests more signs o f circularity

than o f actual progress - circularity which results from the research practice. It was repeatedly

observed that arguments introduced as new had, in reality, already been presented in previous

San Diego, New York, London; quoted in Wæver 1994; 22).

research; instead o f a replacement of views, one could observe notable durability. This

durability has been noticed before - notably Pentland (1981) observes that old approaches

continue to exist alongside newer ones, although he does not expand on the possible reasons.

The present analysis, then, points to some o f these in the research practice itself: it seems that

the inherent necessity of taking into account previous theories takes the lead, forging the

discussion into rather complicated theoretical answers to the question of compatibility of

different theories.

Three tendencies in reconciling different views appear in the literature; all of them are

actually conservative as to the existing theoretical frameworks. The first is one which rather

openly functions to defend all the different views by claiming some sort of consensual

'division of labour' between them. The second is the development of two main rivalling views

into two mirror images, perfect opposites, through the need o f (better) answering all the

questions the rival succeeds in answering. The result is a predictable, ever-ongoing debate

with the same, re-emerging arguments. A third tendency is to develop the views towards a

synthesis by explaining away their differences.

The first of-these could be seen as the least theoretically ambitious in that it circumvents the

problem of making different views compatible. It is argued that each theory has its role in that

different theories are understood to describe and explain different aspects o f reality: the

existence of each is justified by mutual complementarity. Puchala (1972) introduced the image

o f integration theorists as blind men each examining a different part of an elephant and

incapable of arriving at a consensus on its description; subsequently, many integration

theorists have adopted the understanding that each scholar, or theory, may well have a part

or a question which they explain better than the others. For instance, it has been argued that

neofunctionalism explains everyday integration while intergovemmentalism is better in

explaining the 'big decisions' (Moravcsik), or that a similar division applies to different

historical phases or to the distinction between high and low politics (Hoffmann, Harrison).

Further, Hix (1994) sees that neofunctionalism and intergovemmentalism may still be valid

for the explanation o f integration, while comparative politics approaches are more suitable for

explaining Community politics.161

1(1 Conventional in nature, this understanding leaves aside the problem that the assignment of proper fields and questions is somewhat arbitrary. It is impossible to see from an empirical case which view applies to it and which does not. Moreover, the basic argument that there are essential differences between areas, periods or domains (such as domestic and international politics) which justify the application of different theories is itself a rather problematic assumption to take as given and even more problematic to prove.

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A parallel can be drawn to the development o f international relations theory: Waever argues

that the different schools of thought of the 1990s relate to each other through this kind o f

compatibility or division o f labour. They do not explain the same but, instead, "do different

jobs". They have different explanatory sources in different areas, and, instead of modifying

each other, may be mutually serviceable. (Waever 1994: 21-22.)162

The second tendency, the development of different views in contact with each other towards

increasing opposition, leads to a situation in which there are two equally established and

equally problematic views to be chosen among. In particular, the debate between

neofunctionalism and intergovemmentalism has acquired these characteristics as both have

developed, as it were, complete and quite established understandings o f integration. They can

be seen to exclude each other as integration is seen to work against the state in the one and

to favour the state in the other. However, neither is groundless; they simply build on different

conceptualisations in that in the first, the state is seen through, directed and formed by

integration, while for the other, the state is the motor of integration, integration being defined

through the state.

This development can lead to a paralysis or impasse as to the theoretical discussion: the two

views cannot be combined - having become exact mirror images - but, at the same time,

neither o f them is alone a convincing basis for the understanding o f integration. However,

rather than being typical of integration studies, this problem is encountered in several contexts

which address the conceptualisation of the state. The respective conceptualisations in these

two views and their problems were examined above in chapter 2.3. Here, two analogous

examples from other fields of research might illustrate the question on a more general level.

In his analysis o f legal argumentation, Koskenniemi (1989) has identified two exhaustive and

mutually exclusive ways of arguing about order and norms in international law. On the one

161 Waever proposes a temporal succession: the period of incommensurability (inter-paradigm debate) was followed by a period in which different views approached each other (the so-called ’neo-neo synthesis', see below), in turn followed by division of labour. It seems, however, that the different modes rather coexist. Examples o f the idea of a division of labour are not difficult to find in any period. For instance, Grieco refers to this kind o f division in explaining different forms of interstate relations in maintaining that realism is typically the form o f analysis for relations between adversaries; except for military alliances, realism is not usually applied to relations among states which are on friendly terms (Grieco 1990: 14). He even avails himself o f this specialisation in testing the views against each other: for him, the superiority of realism is better demonstrated by applying it to a Field where it has not usually been applied. (For Grieco, realism is "analytically superior" to liberalism: "from a logical viewpoint", it offers a more complete understanding of the effects of anarchy on states and the problem o f international cooperation than liberalism does as it identifies one consequence of anarchy which liberalism does not, the fear for survival and problem of relative gains). (Idem: 29, 49.)

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hand, it is argued that norms are based on factors such as common interests or the nature of

the system which makes them prior or superior to the state or above it: there is a set o f norms

which not only effectively regulates the behaviour o f states, but also dictates what their

legitimate interests can be. On the other hand, it is argued that norms are based on the

(factual) behaviour, will or interests o f the states; in this case, the states are taken as given,

and they are prior to the international system. What is essential is that neither of these views

can be definitively or systematically chosen as the basis for argumentation. The proponents

o f either of them cannot accept the other view as it appears too 'political' and subjective: the

first, 'descending' or normative model seems subjective as it assumes that there exists some

kind of natural moral; it cannot demonstrate the content o f its aprioristic norms in a reliable

manner. The second, 'ascending' or concrete model is subjective because it privileges state will

and interest over objectively binding norms; it cannot bind the state behaviour at all. Thus,

the one leads to utopia, the other to apology. Koskenniemi sees that as the international legal

discourse cannot fully accept either of these justificatory patterns, it works so as to make them

seem compatible: the result is an incoherent argument which shifts between the two and

remains open to challenge from the opposite - providing also the dynamics for international

legal argument (Koskenniemi 1989: 40-46, passim.)

Similarly, Bartelson juxtaposes two views on the relation between the state and the

international system represented by international politics and macrosociology o f state

formation. The two fields understand this relation in opposite ways, taking for granted what

the other seeks to explain. Being state-centric, international politics'63 takes, in Bartelson's

view, sovereignty, the defining property of the state, as given: it is ontologically and

historically prior to the system of states and therefore explains the presence o f the

international system. The second view, in turn, problematises both state and sovereignty and

explains state formation and consolidation with reference to external anarchy and conflict. The

presence of the state is accounted for in terms of generative structural features of a sphere of

social action that is thought to exist prior to the state. (Bartelson 1993: 16, 19-20, 31-33.)

It is understandable, then, that the debate between integration scholars from opposing camps

can be exhausting. In attempting to defend a view on the basis o f empirical evidence or

analytical superiority, the scholars are constantly exposed to criticism from the opposite,

equally developed camp. The same arguments for and against tend to return, and new

1(53 Seeing thus international relations theory as state-centric can be taken either as a misunderstanding or a tactical choice of representation; cf. the discussion on how a somewhat simplified image of international relations theory was used in justifying the preferability of domestic politics theories in the analysis of integration (chapter 2.4).

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openings or alternative viewpoints are rather déjà-vus than real novelties. In the examination

of literature, it was seen, for example, how those criticising previous theories for neglecting

the role o f the state were subsequently criticised for overemphasising the same factor and

being exaggeratedly state-centred. Similarly, the suggested originality of the proposal to

disaggregate the position of a government was lost when noticing that the opposite (and

preceding) idea of aggregation had, in its turn, been offered as an alternative to an anterior

view based on disaggregation. The factual impossibility to reject either one out o f hand is

obviously problematic and if the choice comes to be limited to two completely opposite and

equally impossible views, it is more appealing to avoid the whole question.

The imminent risk o f circularity and scarce hope of conclusion notwithstanding, a vigorous

debate between the two views continues. It could be argued that the reason for this vitality

lies in the benefit both views get from the debate: it could be the debate itself, and thus the

existence o f the opponent, which sustains the views. Again, a markedly similar case can be

seen in international relations theory. Indeed, the usual self-image of the discipline in

textbooks is a succession of important debates between different views.164 It has been pointed

out that these debates might not necessarily be 'real' in the sense o f aiming at verifying and

falsifying views, but that they can also have a conservative function.165 In Guzzini's view

(quoted in Wæver 1994: 9), the 'inter-paradigm debate', or the debate between the different

schools o f thought, can constitute a barrier against critique and legitimise scientific routines,

when the other theories or paradigms are taken to speak different language and therefore be

both outside criticism from the others and unable themselves to criticise the others.

On the other hand, the vitality of the debate between two different views may also be seen

as evidence for the fact that the views are perhaps not so different but, instead, share some

important elements. Attempts at synthesising the different views can be seen as an important

contribution, a possibility o f progress through collecting the elements o f truth which the views

have been amply shown to contain. A synthesis saves, as it were, the trouble o f accepting

either view in its totality and brings the debate between the two to an elegant conclusion.

Indeed, to judge from the literature, synthesising neofunctionalism and intergovemmentalism

is not an exercise in the class of squaring the circle: merging the two seems rather simple. To

extend Pentland's (1981) reasoning about the dialectical development of the field, this

164 For examples as well as for a further elaboration on the theme, see Waever 1994 and Guzzini 1992; for a different view on the self-images of the discipline, see Smith 1995.

165 For Waever (1994: 11), the inter-paradigm debate was perhaps partly a real debate, partly a constructed one, invented for specific presentational purposes, teaching and self-reflection of the discipline.

particular synthesis would only be the next in a series consisting of syntheses of the main

rivalling approaches which then come to be challenged by new ones, a series which started

from neofunctionalism as a synthesis o f functionalism and federalism

This kind of merger has been emerging both within the two views themselves - partly through

deliberate accommodation of mutual criticism, partly unconsciously through preparing for

criticism from the other side - and on a more abstract metatheoretical level. It was seen in the

previous chapter how those advocating the view that states lead the process of integration

have felt compelled to give credit also to the influence of common institutions and to specify

what they mean by the state. The proponents of the other view, in turn, have acknowledged

that national interests and political will may indeed play a role in the process, although one

has to take into account that these very interests are shaped by the process itself or by the

common institutions, and that even though the state may indeed have a powerful role in the

process, its actions can have unintended consequences which actually work against them.

Again, these efforts could be compared with the "neo-neo-synthesis" identified by Wæver, i.e.,

the tendency of the mainstream of international relations theory to converge around a

synthesis of neorealism and neoliberalism, a synthesis which became the dominant research

programme of the 1980s.166 (Wæver 1994: 13, also Wæver 1992.)

On a more metatheoretical level, a synthesis has emerged in the context of structurationism,

an answer to the problem of how to balance or combine structuralist and agency-oriented

explanations, taking into account the influence of structures on the behaviour of an actor

together with the influence of the actor on these structures. Structurationism would depict the

state in relational terms as constituted by relations to others and conceivable as a state only

m Waver maintains, thus, that what is often seen as a debate, even a central one, turns out to be a synthesis disguised as debate. (For the explanation of the debate and its main themes, such as whether the states strive for absolute or relative gains, see, e.g., editor's introduction in Baldwin, David (ed.), Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate, New York: Columbia University Press, 1993). Weaver argues that the synthesis was made possible by the development of realism into neorealism and o f liberalism into neo-liberal institutionalism. The two became increasingly compatible; the participants were striving to set up a joint framework, a 'rationalist’ research programme (anti-metaphysical, theoretical minimalism), and they came to share a conception of science, a shared willingness to operate on the premise o f anarchy, shared interest in the evolution o f cooperation, and shared research questions (whether institutions matter and why cooperation is possible despite the anarchy). In Wacvefs view, those working inside the synthesis (for instance, Keohane), have succeeded in creating an attempt at cumulative research from a few theoretical questions which is surprisingly consistent and systematic for the discipline, resulting in often sophisticated methods for testing, and being in general useful and successful, although, as Waever adds, hardly interesting enough to keep its hold on attention. (Weever 1994: 16-17.) Similarly, Smith sees that views on whether states pursue absolute or relative gains have to be seen as part of a specific view o f international politics rather than as two alternatives. Although the neorealism-neoliberalism debate is an important one in his view, it gives an extraordinarily narrow a picture of the field and its crucial topics. (Smith 1995 : 23-24.)

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in the structure (Wendt 1987; 357); in the analysis of the relationship between the state and

integration, it would emphasise the mutual influence between the common institutions and the

state.

An example o f structurationism as a solution to the opposing interpretations o f integration -

and also an example o f abstract synthesis - is provided by Wind (1996) who aims at

explaining the simultaneous existence of two opposite tendencies, intergovemmentalisation

and constitutionalisation, in the development o f the European Community, and solving the

puzzle of why states, if they genuinely want to preserve their autonomy, nevertheless accept

measures which considerably limit this autonomy. The proposed answer lies in understanding

that the outcome, or what actually takes place in the process of integration, does not depend

solely on the actors, their preferences and goals, nor on the pressure by the structures or the

constraining influence of common institutions. While the outcome has usually been explained

in terms o f either the one or the other, neither one will do alone. In short, Wind links the

explanatory factors across the two into a circle-like pattern. The goals and interests o f the

actors do matter, but they are shaped by institutional dynamics. These institutional dynamics,

or the structures in general, have their own autonomy in the sense that the actors are not

capable fully to control them. The actors attempt at modifying the structures according to their

preferences, but their actions have also consequences which were not originally intended or

anticipated; therefore, they can indeed cause institutional dynamics which go against their

self-interests - albeit, to close the circle, these institutional dynamics simultaneously shape the

interests. (Cf. also Matlary 1994.)

This type o f synthesis is, however, perhaps still rather a deus ex machina than an authentic

solution to the problem. The elements it brings to the discussion, such as unintended

consequences, are not new, but have been present from the beginning. More importantly, it

does not lead very far, as it does not eliminate the problem. As an effort, it much resembles

the attempt to resolve the problem o f the contemporary discourse o f sovereignty and its two

contrasting views (see Bartelson above), an attempt which merely restates the original

problem. In fact, having identified the two contrasting views on sovereignty, Bartelson

examines a third, dual view, which combines the two, as both are needed. In other words, this

third model, structuration theory167, blends structures and agents which the two others both

187 Bartelson refers to Wendt, Giddens and Dessler. Structure is thus reconceptualised as a set of rules which serves as both medium and outcome of state agency; the international system is conceptualised in terms of constitutive and regulative rules which condition the possibilities o f state action and are reproduced and transformed as a combined result of the intended and unintended consequences of state action. Thus, the international system is dependent on the actual practice of states, which is made possible by the system itself.

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tiy to keep ontologically and epistemologically distinct - international relations adopting

ontological individualism and macrosociology adopting structuralism. Sovereignty now

becomes a link between the two; it constitutes both.168 (Bartelson 1993: 39-41.) The irony, as

Bartelson puts it, in this answer is that the original problem is restored. The attempted

synthesis tries to overcome the same ontological difference that nourishes it: sovereignty is

made either into an agency that structures or a structure that acts; in both, the problem is

restored, now beyond the reach o f critical concepts. {Idem: 42.)

Finally, synthesis does not escape a more general problem of scientific accumulation, namely,

that it may actually work too much for the conservation o f particular understandings.

Accumulation is inherently problematical in that although it is necessary and rational to build

on existing bases, the ensuing sedimentation of certain assumptions makes it increasingly

difficult to question them. Accumulation tends to confine the assumptions and the research

questions to those that can be answered within the assumptions. In a way, one could see the

debates such as those between integration strengthening or weakening the state or the states

striving for absolute or relative gains as pseudodebates: the important background assumptions

on the state remain unquestioned.

What is most problematic in this development is that the very question of the relationship

between the state and integration may fall outside the central research concerns, becoming,

instead, a background assumption. This is a possibility if it comes to be judged totally

uninteresting or impossible to analyze, either because the efforts at answering it end up in

repetition or an all-encompassing synthesis, or because both terms have so many meanings

that they cannot be meaningfully used in research, or because there are seen to be no grounds

for comparing the different views. The only possibility o f posing the original problem again

is through analyzing why particular assumptions on the state and integration have been made.

In the development o f the studies o f integration, the 'whys' seem, indeed, to have gradually

disappeared; it also seems that new reasons are invented subsequently to justify the original

choices, as when empirical reality or some objective scientific standards are presented as the

reasons for the different claims. This chapter concentrates on these 'whys*. After having shown

the assumptions behind the different views on the relationship between the state and

integration, the chapter continues with an analysis of the crucial and complicated questions

to which these assumptions are answers, identifying the alternative assumptions among which

168 A system of sovereign states cannot exist without being intersubjectively acknowledged as such by its constitutive parts - Bartelson refers to Giddens (Nation-State and Violence, pp. 281-282).

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the scholar in principle can choose. Finally, several constraints on this choice are identified.

These are, then, the 'whys' of the assumptions. These factors - the methodological stand o f

the scholar, the view on the aims o f theory and science, disciplinary divisions, and values,

linked to time and place - are argued to be not only more stable than the rather shaky points

o f reference in empirical reality, but also more important, and even more productive in

increasing the usefulness of scientific analysis.

3.2 T h e c r u c ia l a s s u m p t io n s a n d q u e s t io n s

Assumptions make research coherent in forming the basis which is accepted as true; in

contrast to hypotheses, their validity is not at stake in the investigation. At times, assumptions

which are widely approved may lose their 'assumed' character: they come to be seen as shared

background knowledge instead o f being explicitly stated in literature. Thus, identifying the

underlying assumptions in a given piece o f research is not necessarily simple.

In the overview o f integration studies, the variety o f assumptions is, however, easily

observable. For instance, when Burley and Mattli (1993) propose to study the role o f the

Court in the Community, they assume that it does or can have a role; when Moravcsik (1994)

asks why the European Community strengthens the state, he assumes that it does strengthen

it; when Weiler (1991) asks how to conceptualise the transformation in the relationship

between the member states and the Community, he supposes that it has been transformed;

when Bulmer (1983) asks how domestic politics may have a vital impact on the policy­

making output of the EC, he assumes it can have; when Taylor (1983) asks where the states

choose to defend their sovereignty, he assumes they can and do choose; when Grieco (1991)

poses the question o f why states integrate, he sees this behaviour as somehow anomalous, due

to certain assumptions about how states normally conduct their relations.

That these assumptions indeed are assumptions can be shown by linking them to wider

questions and theoretical debates which, particularly in the case o f state and integration,

appear intricate. Systematically speaking, one could discern the following chain of influence

as the explanation o f a given understanding:

state-integration view <- assumption « - theoretical question <— constraint'

Thus, each view is based on specific assumptions, which are related to wider theoretical

questions. Why these questions come to be answered in the way they do depends on particular

I l l

constraining factors. The assumptions and their theoretical contexts are first presented here

case by case.

The first view on the state and integration - seeing integration as a remedy for some inherent

weaknesses o f the state and the state system - involves the assumption that these weaknesses

exist, in other words, that the state is not (or is no longer) capable of fulfilling its functions

and that interstate relations are inherently conflictual, due to the adverse nature of the state.

These assumptions obviously prompt the wider questions about whether or not the state is an

adequate or appropriate form of political organisation, what it functions should be, how its

effectiveness should be assessed and whether its position has changed as a result o f certain

challenges. A further basic question is what the nature of the state and interstate relations

actually is and whether something like the inherent nature of the state actually exists.

The second view stresses the role of the interests of certain societal groups or the common

institutions in the process o f integration which is also seen to have its own driving force in

some functional logic of expansion. The state is seen to be replaced by a more appropriate

framework. It is thus assumed that integration is not in the interests of the state but, indeed,

works against it, diminishing the actual decision-making power o f the member states. On the

other hand, the state is seen to have only a minor role in the process, if it is at all conceived

as an actor o f its own. On the contrary, institutions are seen to have an important role both

as structures and as actors. Finally, the nature of the integration process is seen as relatively

difficult to foresee or control.

The third view assumes that the state is a rational actor and that integration can essentially

be explained as international politics in general. States are the motors of the process and they

also control it, being capable of countermeasures in case of adverse effects. Integration is in

the states' interests: it consists of measures which increase the states' capacity to solve

different problems. The common institutions, then, are created by and subordinated to the

states; therefore, they are not independent actors.

The assumptions o f the second and third view can be seen as instances of the same

background problems. Is the state an actor, and if it is, is it a unitary and rational one? Are

institutions independent actors? Whose interests are the state interests, and how are they

formed? Is the state autonomous from its society and/or international system? Are states

central in international relations? Is the process of integration controllable? Is it reversible?

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The fourth view, finally, assumes that integration causes some particular, definable changes

in the state which can be given such labels as Europeanisation. These changes are, on the one

hand, not necessarily beneficial nor necessarily foreseeable, and, on the other hand, affect not

only the capacities or capabilities o f the state but also its inner structures and identity. In the

background of these assumptions, the main questions are how to conceptualise the kind o f

influence integration can have, and, above all, whether states are similar or not - whether they

have the same interests and whether integration thus influences them in a similar way.

The different background questions can be grouped into six major problems to which each

view implies some stand. The first is the question of the nature o f the state, including its

behaviour and interstate relations. It is a question which might seem to be not worth

consideration because too metaphysical; still, important statements in the literature are based

on assumptions concerning the nature o f the state, having a direct influence on how the nature

o f integration is seen. The second problem concerns the efficiency of the state in fulfilling its

functions. It involves the questions o f how to measure efficiency, who should measure it, what

the state functions are or should be, whether they change in time and if so, why.

The third problem is the actor capacity o f the state and/or institutions. It comprises the

questions o f the possibility to constitute a unitary and/or rational actor, with the ensuing

question of what is understood by rationality (a rationality based on the analysis of costs and

benefits or one based on a pursuit o f relative gains), the way its interests are defined and

formed and the groups or parties comprised in this formation. The last question is further

linked to the question o f the autonomy of the state, which, together with the question o f state

functions, is tied to the question o f legitimacy. Autonomy is also an aspect o f the question

o f what are the relations between the state and (other) institutions. In addition, actor capacity

has to do with the question of whether and how institutions, including the state, change, and

whether they can adapt themselves to changes in the environment.

The fourth one, the problem of whether states are to be seen as essentially similar, can

actually be added to all the other questions. It appears not only in the form of whether the

states are similar in their nature and interests or their conception o f what is political or not

political, 'high' or 'low', but also in the question of whether the state is the same in the

international and domestic contexts. This leads to the fifth question of the nature of

international relations, whether states are central and whether integration is a part of

international relations, with implications for the understanding o f the role of the state in the

process of integration. Finally, the sixth problem concerns the conceptualisation of integration

as a process, the possibility of seeing it as an instance o f some more general phenomenon,

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its controllability and reversibility, the motors and motivations, and, indeed, whether some

actors matter, as well as the question of what integration actually causes in the participating

units.

In all, most complex questions concerning the state and integration are thus implicitly

answered in the assumptions behind the four different views. All share a basic duality in that

they can be answered in both ways, 'yes' and 'no', as it were: as a coin, they seem inherently

to have two indispensable sides. The whole question of the relationship between the state and

integration changes shape according to the answer. Yet, it does not seem that there is, in fact,

a perfectly free choice among the alternative answers; neither does the academic community

seem to be particularly aware o f why these questions come to be answered as they do,

unnoticed.

Next, four crucial factors which lead to the adoption of a particular answer, or constrain the

choice, are analyzed with the aim of showing how they have influenced the study o f the

relationship between the state and integration. They are, first, methodological considerations,

second, explanatory standards and aims o f research, which influence the definition and

formulation of concepts, research objects and questions; third, disciplinary divisions and

peculiarities, which influence the conceptualisation of different phenomena, and fourth, values,

which enter when evaluating the nature and appropriateness o f the state.

3.3 T h e o r ig in s o f t h e a ss u m pt io n s

3.3.1 Methodological considerations

It is impossible to point out any single research method which would be the suitable one for

studying integration. Since there are many ways of understanding the nature of integration,

there are also plenty of different methods which can be employed in its investigation -

methods which, in turn, influence the results obtained. It seems that the general

methodological stand o f the scholar, together with a strong hold on a specific understanding

o f the aims o f research, explains a lot of the emergence o f different views on the relationship

between the state and integration. Similarly, the debates about the suitability of particular

methods reflect the understandings of integration. While the general debate between what

could be called a traditional and a modem, scientific stand on research will be the subject o f

the next section, the present part concentrates on the influence o f certain methodological

views on the research on integration and on the discussion about the suitability o f these

methods.

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One can discern three crucial methods or methodological choices which have formed

integration studies in a particularly profound way: recourse to observation, use o f comparison

and the application o f different assumptions o f rationality. It could be argued that in general,

the discussion about these methods has been insufficient, if not altogether absent, even

evaded, with the possible exception o f comparative methodology. In some cases, certain

methodological statements have been made explicitly; others give the impression o f

unawareness of the importance o f methodology. Still in some cases, some methodological

ideals are espoused rather superficially, and there may also be a discrepancy between the

statements on methodology and the actual methods used.

Observing integration

One could with good reason ask whether integration is something that can be observed or

whether it is, quite the contrary, something intangible or invisible. One might also want to

remind of the problems of subjectivity and credibility involved in observation. In the early

phases of integration theories, however, these questions were not posed: Haas adopted

observation as his prime method, and this choice of his left a clear mark on integration

studies.

For Haas (1958), observation represents the most appropriate and reliable method for the

study of integration. Indeed, to convey more credibility to his conclusions, he underlines that

they have been attained by using exclusively observation as method. Observation, in his

words, is preferable both to the prescriptive traditional theories where reality is analyzed

through a model o f how it should be and to the "ultra-scientific" theories where reality is

analyzed through pre-established, abstract theoretical models.

Haas followed quite closely the change in methodological and scientific thinking introduced

by the new behaviourism in social sciences o f the 1950s and 1960s. The goal was to explain

behaviour, and behaviour was to be explained through concrete empirical demonstration rather

than, for instance, by referring to general rules which in principle could be said to govern i t

It was also important to strengthen the argument quantitatively through collecting data on

many cases and many variables for which reason statistical methods and computing were

introduced. What was observed, in turn, was prescribed by the pluralist view o f politics as a

contestation between different interest groups or political forces in the society. As Krasner

puts it, observation was peculiarly compatible with a pluralistic view o f the political universe

as heterogeneous and atomistic (Krasner 1984: 229-230). (See also 3.3.2 and 3.3.3.)

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Haas' study, thus, is based on the observation of behaviour by different groups. Importantly,

also his widely quoted definitions are based on observation. At least, Haas underlines that he

has defined the central terms o f 'political community' and 'political integration' on the basis

o f observation and description o f behaviour. The preferability o f this method, for Haas, lies

in the ensuing political relevance o f the definitions. Haas is taking distance from what he sees

as unsuitable objective definitions, definitions which rely on some objective criteria

superimposed by the observer upon the social scene - such as the volume of economic

transactions and similar criteria used by Deutsch. Instead, Haas relies on the assessment o f

the actual conduct or habitual behaviour patterns and the perception of interests and values

by the major groups involved, for example, ECSC officials or trade associations, as the only

politically relevant method. (Haas 1958: 11-13, 32-33, footnote 5.) As an example, Haas’

definition of the term 'supranational' - the vague and novel term sadly in need of precise

definition, as he puts it - is based on observation of the ECSC and o f the behaviour of other

actors towards it. It is defined as the existence of governmental authorities closer to the

archetype of federation than any past international organisation but not identical with it,

verifiable through a certain behaviour of men and groups. (Idem: 9, 32, 59; observations on

pages 29-58.)

For Haas, thus, observation connects the scholar in an unproblematic way to reality. That his

observations actually are similarly 'imposed' on reality than those he criticises is, however,

quite clear; the theoretical preconceptions involved are simply not mentioned What he

actually chooses to observe - political parties, trade associations and trade unions at the

national and the supranational levels, governments and the High Authority - is given by

previous research. For Haas, it suffices to note, without more specification, that what he

studies has already been demonstrated "to act as unifying agents in political systems clearly

’integrated' by any applicable standards and the one organisation a priori capable o f

redirecting the loyalties and expectations o f political actors, namely the ECSC" (idem: xxxii).

This last expression alludes also to the circularity involved in the method: that these actors

behave in a certain way in the context of integration becomes more a matter of definition than

o f any candid observation.

Therefore, a rather basic but fundamental consequence o f observational methodology is that

Haas studies what is already there instead of, for instance, envisioning future arrangements.

Haas 1958 is about what already exists and aims to explain and generalize about the processes

observed. The theoretical framework and the observations become fused: Haas is observing

integration, and thus what he is able to see becomes integration. Observability, the possibility

o f pointing out concrete behaviour, is an evidence of the actuality o f integration; at the same

time, integration is defined as what could be observed in a certain situation.

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Secondly, the method contributes to the notorious absence of the state. Seen from a pluralist

point of view, the state is incompatible with observation: as the state is not a unitary actor and

does not as such behave, it is unobservable. In Haas 1958, the only occasions in which the

state appears are rather fleeting in character: on the one hand, the ECSC admittedly consists

o f states; on the other hand, states and political communities are noticed to be, for the time

being, practically the same. However, there is no such collective actor as the state which

could have interests in the process of integration. The actors considered are not states, but

political parties, interest groups and governments. In fact, the rejection of collective actors

goes even further: Haas sees a need to justify even his choice to see governments as

collective, unified actors instead o f going directly to the different interests influencing the

governments' position. The reason for observing governments, for Haas, is that their attitudes

cannot be reduced to those of the leading party in a multi-party government (Haas 1958: 240).

Accordingly, there seems to be no single 'national interest' involved.

The dilemma o f comparison

Discussion on the suitability of comparative methods, or whether integration can be studied

by comparison, has followed the study of integration throughout. The question is fundamental

in that the choice is between seeing integration or the EC/EU as unique, and therefore not

comparable to other phenomena, or as in some sense similar to other phenomenon and thereby

comparable. How the term 'integration* is understood has implications not only on whether

the process o f European integration can be compared, but also to what exactly it can be

compared, if comparison is possible, and on whether integration studies can be seen as a

discipline o f its own (cf. 3.3.3).

The uneasiness on the issue of comparability was already present in Haas' work. On the one

hand, he underlined the novelty and unique nature of the process of integration he was

observing: his designation in 1958 o f the ECSC as the only existing supranational organisation

restricted the domain to be studied under the heading o f integration. On the other hand,

however, Haas also aimed at generalisations about the phenomenon in order to construct a

theory of integration. For this aim, Haas urged comparison, which he saw as a promising path

towards the improvement of theories (Haas 1970).

Explicitly or implicitly, several possible points o f comparison have been proposed and used

in the literature, usually with the effect o f excluding each other. International relations

scholars tended to see integration as normal interstate relations or foreign policy, or compare

the EC to other international organisations or regimes. As seen in chapter two, there was a

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general tendency in the 1960s to study integration as a general phenomenon, comparing

different regional integrative endeavours. Gradually, the EEC/EC came to be seen as the sole

object of analysis sufficiently dissimilar to any other regional groupings. As a reconciliation

o f this unique or sui generis nature o f the object with comparative methodology, it was

proposed that if the EEC in all its features was not comparable to others, it could be

compared with itself, across different areas or different points in time, seeing the EEC as a

variety of decisions, actions and series of processes (Harrison 1974: 22-23). Similarly,

Anderson (1995: 453-454) urges comparison, most appropriately comparing the EU to itself.

It was also proposed that integration was to be seen as an instance of more general

phenomena such as interdependence (Haas 1975) or domestic politics (Bulmer 1983).

Without doubt the most problematic comparative setting has been to compare the evolving

Community and its institutions to the state: the possibility and appropriateness of comparing

the EC to the state was among the first main research debates in integration studies, and has

remained one ever since. From the beginning, integration theorists (Haas, Deutsch) were

studying the formation of a new political community, alluding with 'political community' to

something thus far represented by the state. The state was a suitable point o f comparison: in

order to perceive both the novelty and the proceeding nature o f integration, some stable point

was needed to compare it with. At the same time, the traditional importance o f the state gave

integration additional relevance as it was seen to create a new centre for political activity and

loyalty.

A thorough analysis of this kind is provided by Lindberg and Scheingold 1970.169 They see

the EC as a political entity or system, a "would-be polity", and aim at analytic models which

would help understand how and why changes in this political system occur, or what accounts

for the growth, stabilisation or decline o f an enterprise like the EC, and, in essence, whether

the EEC will continue to exist as it now is (Lindberg and Scheingold 1970: v). In their study,

the state both composes the environment o f the EC170 and functions as the political system

suitable for comparing the EC with; even though the authors maintain that integration is a

"substantially unprecedented phenomenon", and that "the constantly shifting scope and

amorphous character" of the EC make it only partially comparable to a nation-state as a

decision-making system, they evaluate the Community system on the basis o f standards for

1M See also Lindberg, Leon N.: 'The European Community as a Political System: Notes toward the Construction of a Model', Journal o f Common Market Studies, vol. 5 (4) 1967, pp. 344-387.

170 In fact, the environment of the political system is here limited to (mostly) nation-states and their population, other factors being reduced to these (or manifesting themselves through the states).

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evaluation of political systems or states in general, their support and efficiency {idem: iv, 2 5 ,

66). Taking as a starting point a list o f the functions commonly attributed to a government,

they compare the scope and intensity o f Community decision-making process to national

processes in the different areas to find out the relative importance of the former.171

At the same time, the very idea of using the state as a point o f comparison and as a tool o f

analysis in integration studies was strongly criticised. For many, it was precisely the way o f

adhering to the state which impeded the integration scholars from perceiving the real, different

nature o f integration and the EC. The comparison to the state, thus, was seen as a burden fo r

the studies (see all the literarure pointing out the detrimental influence on the studies o f using

similar old terms and entities as a point o f comparison or analytical tools; cf. chapter 1 and

p. 138).

These criticisms notwithstanding, approaches rather similar to that o f Lindberg and Scheingold

have subsequently been reintroduced either referring to the character of the EC/ÈU which

increasingly resembles the state (Bulmer 1993) or stressing the fruitfulness of comparison as

a method in relation to simply describing the EU as unique (Hix 1994: 20-22). Thus, the

Community has been seen as a political system and decision-making in this system has been

compared to decision-making in domestic politics.

In the end, however, the uneasiness with comparison cannot be erased. The similarities and

differences which form the basis of a comparative setting are definitely relative, as is the

novelty and uniqueness of the phenomena - taking into account examples such as Zimmem

(1939) seeing the League of Nations as something unique and new in international relations,

one could argue that, in some sense, everything new is unique for some time. The uniqueness

can be a construction which impedes the real understanding o f the phenomenon, but equally,

the claim that integration does not have any unique features can be a misunderstanding, a

position which impedes the scholars from seeing its peculiar features. Obviously, the

understanding o f the consequences of integration for the state depend on how the question is

seen: a unique integration is dramatically different from integration as normal politics or

171Basing the study on Easton’s 'A Systems Analysis o f Political Life' (and using also the RA index, cf.

chapter 2.2), they use data on attitudes and behaviour (e.g., feelings towards other community countries, attitudes concerning the approval of a specific function of supranational institutions, and transactions, such as mail, trade and tourism). The results are rather mixed; they find that the system has general legitimacy and that, in all, a permissive consensus has emerged in that the Community enterprise was seemingly taken for granted as an accepted part of the political landscape (idem: 60-62). The scope of the system, having thus far showed steady overall increase, was now stagnating, perhaps even declining; its decision-making capacity had already known its ups and downs (idem: 99-100).

J

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international relations as it can have consequences for the state which go beyond the 'normal',

constraining and moulding the states in a more profound way, or even dissolving them. The

dilemma with comparison, thus, is that both incomparability and comparability are untenable

alone; even the unique and new has to be made understandable through something already

known, and the unique, in fact, only becomes visible by comparison.

The assumption o f rationality

Referring to actors o f some type in the process of integration and aiming at explaining their

behaviour necessarily leads to the assumption of some kind o f rationality governing that

behaviour, since locating the causes o f certain actions also makes them rational. If the motives

cannot be found, the behaviour is irrational and thereby also inexplicable. Where the

explanations differ is therefore not the assumption of rationality as such but the nature or type

o f the rationality in question, especially whether one refers to an objective rationality shared

by all actors or to individual rationalities, and to which extent the rational action is seen as

predictable on the base of calculations. Thus, one can differentiate between moderate

rationalists, those who refer to rationality in the explanation o f behaviour in the general sense

o f pondering the costs and benefits of alternative actions, and more pronounced rationalists

who make rational choice an explicit basis of explanation, analyzing negotiations with the

help of models and game theories, nuancing the calculation to different degrees with different

constraints o f the situation and o f the actor itself (bounded rationality).172

The first, general use o f rationality is well recognisable in the view that integration is in the

interests of the state which, accordingly, furthers integration as long as it can benefit from it.

However, it is not limited to realist or state-centred views. Rational calculation was actually

the basis of Haas' functional theory of integration. As he himself put it, his "perhaps most

salient conclusion" was that major interest groups and politicians determine their support or

opposition to central institutions and policies on the basis of a calculation o f advantage. As

a matter of fact, Haas came even closer to the realist explanation in arguing that the process

is dominated by nationally constituted groups with specific interests and aims, willing and

able to adjust their aspirations by turning to supranational means when this course appears

profitable. (Haas 1958: xxxii-xxxv.)

172 See, e.g., Garrett, G., 'International Cooperation and Institutional Choice: The European Community's Internal Market' in International Organization. vol. 46, pp. 533-560, or Garrett and Weingast, Ideas. Interests and Institutions: Constructing the EC's Internal Market (paper presented at APSA annual meeting, Washington D.C., September 1991); for the analyses of voting power in the common institutions, Widgrén 1995; on rational choice approaches in general, Hix 1994: 12-20.

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Stressing the importance of not assuming certain attitudes, for instance, that governments

would necessarily try to hinder the process of integration or that federal institutions would

necessarily further it, Haas investigated whether governments habitually sought to hinder or

to advance integration, and whether the decision-making habits were changing, and why. He

concluded that no government habitually sought to hinder or to advance integration, and no

one consistently 'won' or ’lost' (idem: 524-525). Governments sought to secure a maximal

position but without obstructing the evolution of more integrated decision-making over time

(idem: 240-, 279-280). Haas sees that they may occasionally attempt to sidestep, ignore or

sabotage the federal authority's decisions, but they also recognise a point beyond which such

evasions are unprofitable: the study shows that in the long run they defer to federal decisions

in order not to set a precedent for other governments (idem: xxxiv). In fact, the formation o f

a political community requires that the governments do make themselves "constantly and

invariably the spokesmen of national interest groups" or to insist on formal veto, thereby

obstructing the process, but to give way in negotiations when in minority (idem: 9-10). Haas'

assumption of a utilitarian rationality was clearly expressed also later, as when he remarked

that "as long as political actors are sufficiently rational to calculate their interests and seek

accommodations on that basis, our ingenuity ought to be great enough to devise observational

techniques, concepts, and indicators to catch the interregional variation in their modes of

calculation" (Haas 1970: 642).

The assumption o f rationality seems to be most convincing when it is understood that

different actors assess rationality in different ways, that their values and aims differ. The

problem of the assumption is, however, that it is almost too convincing. Once adopted, every

action appears in the interests of the actor: since the actor chose a certain action, it must have

perceived it to be in its interests. In integration theories, the problem is always close by that

integration is always interpreted as in the interests of states.

Brought to its logical end, this view assumes there to be some general interest behind all

actions which make even the decisions which might have disadvantageous consequences

somehow beneficial in the long term. When the benefits o f integration in the end outweigh

its costs (cf. e.g., Grieco), the logic of state action may also include moves which limit its

powers (cf. Navari 1991b) or its sovereignty; in other words, participation and limitation of

sovereignty and renouncing one's own interests can actually be in the interest o f a state. As

Wessels (1992) remarks, 'own interest' remains as long as there is an actor. Not even

sovereignty, thus, is a steadfast principle with which to assess rationality. States may indeed

stress the importance of preserving sovereignty, but the actual contents of the term vary. In

Milward's words, "national sovereignty and the state itself have been a legal and

1 2 1

administrative convenience, not an absolute irreducible entity” (Milward 1992: 446). He

argues that to define an inviolable core of the state, which must be preserved against any

future trend of integration, or to define the surrenders o f sovereignty in advance, would have

been to negate the process of integration as a solution to the national problem, for it was

inherent in the process that surrenders would be accepted whenever necessary, as the need for

them emerged (idem: 344). Finally, then, the state is made eternal and immune to anything

that might challenge its position.

Some critics maintain that one cannot treat the state as an actor with clear, unambiguous aims,

since it is not a unitary actor, but that its acts - if it 'acts' at all • are based on different,

competing interests. Others observe that the state, while acting as rationally as possibly, is

evidently also weakened in the process o f integration. As a compromise accepting both state

rationality and the possibility that the state cannot always maximise its interests, the idea of

unintended consequences has been referred to. This, however, does not solve the main

problem connected to the question of rationality, namely, the difficulty of finding out whether

an action was intentional and what the intentions actually were.

As Burley and Mattli point out, the conclusion that a specific outcome has been in the

interests of the state and that it has succeeded in the pursuit o f its objectives may well be

accomplished deductively: if it is assumed that states will only comply with the judicial

decisions if in fact those decisions are in their interests, they have an obvious incentive to

deduce interest-compatibility from compliance. It is, they remind, easy to assert that a

particular decision was "in the interests” o f a particular state with the luxury of hindsight and

the ability to manipulate the analysis at a very high level o f generality. (Burley and Mattli

1993: 51.) The same result is achieved, one could argue, by referring to the general goals of

integration - such as economic well-being - as justifying decisions taken in domains not

directly connected to the aim, that is, by the method of upgrading common interest, or

referring to the general goals o f the state, as has been done, among others, by Milward.

The task o f evaluating whether a state has been able to influence integration according to its

interests is, in fact, a matter o f interpretation to which the way preferences are formed is

obviously a central key. There is an apparent division between theorists who argue that

preferences are formed prior to a negotiation, and those arguing that interests are constantly

revised in the course of the negotiations or any other types o f interaction (cf. Matlary 1994).

Actually, however, no one argues that states would not revise their interests - after all, it is

only rational to adapt them to the situation. In reality, it is precisely the changing nature of

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the national interests which makes the realist position so impermeable: since the state m odifies

its interests according to its possibilities, it can always be said to have secured them.

It could even be argued that it is, once again, the critics o f a realist view on interstate

relations who commit the error of assuming fixed interests, not the realists themselves. As w as

seen in chapter two, Haas emphasised that the tendency of interests to change in the process

and the use o f compromises and mediation were the characteristic novelties in the relations

between states in the ECSC, later carried over to the negotiations for Euratom and EEC

treaties. He observed that new codes o f conduct were emerging, implying an atmosphere o f

cooperation and concessions by all: simple intergovernmental bargaining from fixed positions

was abandoned in favour of delegation o f power to experts and mediation (Haas 1958: 515-

520). Seeing these as a novelty implies, however, that in Haas' view, states did not behave

like that before.

Clearly, no state is able to choose, without any constraints, any action whatever, nor to control

all of its consequences. Rational state action quite understandably involves not only an

adjustment of interests according to the situation, but also a more general alignment o f

policies according to the environment. It is therefore equally difficult to say whether a state

should be deemed vulnerable to external changes or rather prudently adapting its policies to

them, as it is to assess whether a state has attained its objectives in the context o f integration

or whether it has experienced a serious decline. As Wendt (1994) notes, there is also the

possibility of counteractions which compensate for the possible losses.

The essential question, therefore, is whose aims and whose rationality are taken as the starting

point in the analysis. Those criticising an overtly state-centred interpretation o f integration and

the ensuing way o f seeing integration as rational for the state seem easily to overlook this

question, referring instead to some kind o f inherent rationality in the process itself. This kind

of teleological interpretation of the process was typical of early integration theories which

emphasised rationality and intentional action motivated by the need to improve the functioning

of the system, but it has been present also later. Rationality, however, necessarily resides in

some actor. Therefore, the first choice which has to be made is that between the actors - the

state, the common institutions, firms, individuals, or the executive - for which the process o f

integration might or might not be rational, also explaining why.173 Secondly, one also has to

J Cf. Deutsch, who argues that if it is asked why anybody wants integration, two reasons are usually given: either to eliminate a threat or to gain greater capabilities. In his view, however, integration cannot be thought o f solely in ternis of mutual bargaining or advantage; if common social practice (e.g., understanding, sense o f community, concertation, interest-mediation) is missing, frustration and ungovernability follow (Deutsch 1974:

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choose between two alternative ways to analyze the question o f rationality from the point of

view of a given actor: either following the way the actor, e.g,, the state, itself depicts its

interests and successfulness - which easily becomes a story o f endless successes - or

constructing external, objective standards of measurement, with the risk o f having to use very

general arguments. I f these choices are disregarded, a rather superficial use o f the rationality

assumption follows with logical problems, e.g., if the common institutions (the Court, the

Commission) are described as capable of having their own interests and strategies and

successfully pursuing these interests while maintaining that the state is not capable o f similar

behaviour in that it is not a unitary and rational actor.

3.3.2 Views on science and theory

Continuing debate

As the previous section already suggested, the basic debate between two methodological

stands, one 'traditional', the other 'modem', o f the 1950s and 1960s played an important role

in integration studies, as it did in international relations or social sciences more generally. It

would be misleading, however, to think about that debate as associated with a specific period

of time or limited to strictly methodological questions. Instead, one could speak about a

continuing debate between two different understandings of science and theory which has

appeared in different forms in the discussion on research.

In international relations literature, the debate is known as the second 'grand debate' o f the

field, the one between traditionalists and behaviouralists; it could be seen as a debate between

the descriptive and the explanatory, or between idiosyncratic and nomothetic. It partly

reappears in the juxtaposition of understanding and explaining (cf. Hollis and Smith 1990) and

in the debate between reflectivists and rationalists, as labelled by Keohane (1988), or

constructivists and positivists. The first emphasise the particular, intuition and reasoning, and

the traditional methodology of history and philosophy. The second position, in turn, holds to

objective reality, the general, and, to differing degrees, the aims of theory construction,

explanation and prediction.174 Together with new methods, the behaviouralist "theoretical

181-183).

,u Constructivists can also be seen, as Hix does, as the other main structural approach to integration and the EC, together with the Marxist approach (seeing integration as a response to a new phase in the development of capitalism, or as a product of capitalist hegemony), and thus in contrast with agency-oriented approaches, such as pluralism or rational choice theories. The constructivist approach, represented by, e.g., Ashley, Ruggie and

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revolution" (cf. Lijphart 1974) introduced new links across disciplinary boundaries,

emphasising the possibility of sharing the same methodology in different fields (cf. Sm ith

1987: 195).

Reading the contributions to this debate by Bull and Kaplan (1966) gives a vivid picture n o t

only o f the character of the debate as a contest between two irreconcilable views trying to

defeat the other, with a serious commitment from both sides, but also o f the difficulty in

arriving at any results due to the different standards employed on both sides, and, thus, o f its

endless and always timely nature.

In integration studies, the debate could be personified by Mitrany and Haas, or, in Taylor’s

way, between functionalism and neofunctionalism. For Taylor, in fact, neofunctionalism w as

a scientific restatement o f functionalism, developed by such American scholars as Haas and

Lindberg for whom behaviouralism became by the 1950s a backdrop to the discovery o f

functionalism (Taylor 1975: xii-xiii).

As was seen in chapter two, a voluminous branch o f integration research based on the new,

scientific methods evolved in the 1960s, aiming at explaining why and in which conditions

integration took place, how exactly it proceeded and what types o f consequences it had. A n

early manifestation of this direction was the way in which Deutsch et a l (1957) used an

apparatus of explicitly defined concepts, induction and comparison in order to achieve

generalisable knowledge on security communities. It was characterised by the wish to

formulate objective and precise hypotheses which could be operationalised and measured,

allowing for subsequent testing and verification, with the overall aim o f theory building.

Models were constructed and tested through "stepping out into the empirical world" (Puchala

1972: 283); several authors explicitly referred to 'laboratory conditions' in their studies. The

aims of formulating falsifiable hypotheses and arriving at clarification and strengthening o f

the foundations o f causal theory were advanced by, for example, disaggregating the concept

of integration into different types and developing specific indices for the subtypes (Nye 1968:

856). The wave o f 'scientism' oriented the study on integration towards more specificity,

locating, as it were, the laws which govern the process o f integration in its background

conditions, phases and pace. This required shared definitions, measurability,

operationalisability, and verifiability. The call for shared or 'translatable' vocabulary led partly

Walker, and to which Hix includes cognitivists, post-structuralists, postmodernists, critical theorists and structurationists, could, for instance, analyze integration as a transformation o f national identities and expectations (Hix 1994: 9-10, literature in footnotes).

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to an increasingly technical language, partly to desperate attempts to abolish the old terms

unsuitable for that aim, including, in the end, the term 'integration' itself. The ideal of

measurability, in turn, was followed sometimes despite the resistance of the material to the

attempts of quantification.175

Haas, with some hesitancy, led the scientists. His own view on integration could not be

understood without taking into account the intentionally 'scientific' character of his studies,

but also the meaning attributed to 'scientific', which, indeed, changed somewhat from study

to study. Characteristic of his study of 1958 were the aspiration to accumulative knowledge

and an at least metaphoric use o f 'laboratory conditions'; his theory was based on existing,

demonstrated facts and concluded as substantiating the thesis of the pluralists176. In 1964, Haas

dissociated himself from what in his view were 'unscientific' studies, that is, mere descriptions

and prescriptions. Haas argued that theories had previously often been given normative or

descriptive, even propagandists tasks177: a major tradition in international relations consisted

in applying some doctrine, such as Hobbes's, to description and prescription, and theories were

merely judged as correct or incorrect, true or false. In Haas' view, theories had to be judged

according to their usefulness and capacity to "rise above advocacy, order phenomena, explain

relationships, isolate trends, and thereby project the future rather than prescribe for it"; thus,

he underlined the importance of developing an explanatory and projective theory. (Haas 1964:

51-52.)

175 E.g., when Lindberg and Scheingold present an equation for explaining and predicting system change (Ds=fI(S+Su)(Dd+Dl)]+eft), they actually do not accomplish more than a replacement of words with symbols, the meaning of the assumption thus clothed being that change in a system (Ds) is a function o f the system (S), systemic support (Su), change in demand (Dd) and change in leadership (Dl), with the addition o f the panacea of a general error term (e„). The problem obviously is how to get further, how to operationalise the variables to give them countable values. Even though the authors are careful to specify the limits o f their models and equations - in fact, the equation is not used in the book - and specify that M[T]he model cannot posit quantitative relationships among the variables they nevertheless see this shortcoming as temporary: ”[...] since we do not y e t have quantitative scales for their measurement. Hence, its use at this stage is essentially heuristic. More concrete applications implying efforts to operationalize and quantify are possible, however." (Lindberg and Scheingold 1970: 114-115, footnote 18; emphasis added.)

176 Namely, that a larger political community can be developed if the crucial expectations, ideologies and behavioral patterns of key groups can be successfully refocused on a new set o f central symbols and institutions (Haas 1958; xxxii-xxxv).

177 As an example o f this earlier theorising, Haas gives the image of the balance-of-power which served as an organising concept in explaining all international relations. In reality, he argues, this mode o f conduct never prevailed, and if its norms had been applied, the result would have been unceasing war. (Haas refers, i.a., to his own unpublished dissertation Belgium and the Balance o f Power, Columbia University 1952; see also Journal o fPolitics, XV (3) 1953.)

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In particular, Haas saw that systems theory178 - one of the novelties of the time characterised

by "immoderate theorising" but still in its infancy in its application to international relations

- provided the opportunity for both explanation and prediction; it forced a re-examination o f

traditional tenets and involves a new way o f seeing the role o f theory. The system theoretical

framework, together with the method o f contextual analysis, were the suitable tools for

elaborating functional theory. (Haas 1964: 23-24, 47-50.) As the virtues of systems theory

Haas saw its close relationship to functional analysis: it involves considerations on the proper

operationing of the system and the assessment o f the functionality or disfunctionality o f the

parts of a system for the whole. The systemic approach also helps in avoiding the erratic

separability doctrines of the functionalists; it does not imply automaticity or inevitability,

projecting, instead, probable evolutionary patterns. {Idem: 82.) In addition, the actor-oriented

variety of systems theory seeks to combine international and domestic political relationships

{idem: 59-60).

At the same time, however, Haas also underlines that he is taking distance from the boldest

aims of scientific analysis and quantitative behaviourism in general systems theory. On the

one hand, he sees systems as analytical devices rather than real entities; he him self

concentrates on a level of concrete activities o f observable social units. Systems theory is

useful, in his view, only when it "facilitates projective thinking based on important

abstractions that group and categorize important recurrent events". On the other hand,

although he aims at projection, he confines the goal to a relatively short-term prediction -

"perhaps for the next decade, but not more". (Haas 1964: 52-53.)

Similarly, his own method, "contextual analysis”, is for him more ambitious than historical

narration but more modest than deductive science: it aims at generalisation within a confined

context o f a given historical, regional or functional setting, seeing the context, or the 'whole*

of which the phenomenon under investigation is part in "relatively modest and easily

observable terms" (Haas 1964; viii). Haas underlines the need for historical sociology in

which systems are always concrete and defined by the concerns o f the epoch's actors {idem:

29), characterising himself as "historical-clinical" rather than quantitative {idem: 82-83). As

he explains, he does not present a theory, model or case study, assuring prominence to "pre-

behavioral political theory" {idem: vii). In the end, he sees his own functional approach as

,7* Notably Morton A. Kaplan, System and Process in International Politics (New York, Wiley 1957); cf. also volume XIV of World Politics (1/1961) which contains a whole spectrum of system theoretical approaches, including optometry, and articles about the applications to integration, e.g. Lindberg, Leon N.: 'The European Community as a Political System: Notes toward the Construction of a Model', Journal o f Common Market Studies, vol. 5 (4) 1967, pp, 344-387.

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hardly exhaustive and certainly not a self-sufficient explanation: its utility is largely heuristic

(idem: 458).

As a conclusion and prediction, in the end179, Haas expects integration to continue in its

present form in the emerging future system, labelled "hetero-symmetrical multipolarity", a

system which is looser than the present one and which the actors will be more numerous and

regional blocs less cohesive. Integration "must be expected to proceed in line with the forces

here outlined, without significant acceleration over the present rate"; it will come about in the

same unplanned and almost accidental fashion that has dominated in the past. (Haas 1964:

484, 492, 496.)

What makes these predictions interesting is their origin in Haas’ personal use and

interpretation of systems theory. In fact, there is a solid group o f systems theories with a

rather different view on integration, a group from which Haas dissociates himself. This

'functional sociology', or the stability-oriented mechanistic and organismic analogies, as Haas

characterises the group, is based on the association of mutually supporting inputs into a social

system with growth of structure, expansion o f functions and development of equilibrium; such

systems which merely reinforce themselves are not useful for his purposes (Haas 1964: 26,

76-77). For the representatives o f this group, in fact, predictions concerning integration point

more to equilibrium than to continuous progress, as they do for Haas.180 As an example,

Lindberg and Scheingold emphasise the tendencies towards equilibrium in the unprecedented,

179Undertaken in the last chapter 'Historical sociology and the future of nationalism* in which he argues that

an appreciation of types of nationalism is essential in order to know whether the nation of the future will be more or less 'permeable', susceptible to external influence, and whether pluralism at the national level will increase or decrease. He also aims to predict where national movements will occur and which types of ideology they will espouse. (Idem: 464-465, 467-.)

180 Haas refers in particular to Talcott Parsons, The Social System (The Free Press, Glencoe, 111., 1951, pp. 27 and 36) and Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure (The Free Press, Glencoe, 111., revised edition 1957, pp. 30-36). Parsons sees integration either as a static condition of complementarity between systemic components, which thus maintain equilibrium, or a 'moving equilibrium', which modifies the system but maintains its uniqueness. Process and result are one, subordinated to the notion of self-maintenance. Similarly for Kaplan (in System and Process, pp. 89, 116-117), integration is close to regulation, stability and flexibility. Integration occurs when units join together or cooperate under conditions which do not appear to permit satisfaction o f their system needs in any other way. Integration - merging to form a larger unit - may seem the only way to maintain some aspects o f the old identity or to satisfy some o f the old needs or values. A system may also absorb another system in order to satisfy its system needs; Kaplan gives the example of integration achieved in the balance-of- power system by the balancing nation's playing its proper role, that o f balancing the system through mediation and conciliation among the major blocs so as to prevent the hegemony of any one alliance or state. (Haas 1964: 28, 58-60; Haas also refers to Alger's application of Easton, Almond and Riggs to integration studies in American Political Science Review, vol. LVII, 1963.)

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curiously ambiguous "pluralistic” or mixed EC system (Lindberg and Scheingold 1970: 306-

307). Integration, thus, is not dynamic. Individual sectors tend to move towards equilibrium;

the actors' concern with protecting their initial gains also counteracts progress, and, in fact,

the very success o f integration tends to retard growth: the conservative proportion o f the

system grows due to routinisation, socialisation and increased legitimacy; even functional

spill-over will tend to stabilise the system and inhibit growth. {Idem: 282-283, 291-293.)

In 1970, Haas' view on theories turns stricter and he deems what integration studies had thus

far achieved as 'empirical generalisations’ with a doubtful theoretical status; they explain

successfully some outcome but are not justified in terms o f some more comprehensive

intellectual structure. For Haas, the three achievements - federalism, communications approach

and neofunctionalism - are three pretheories or "theoretical conventions", which all have their

own methodology; they do not "provide an explanation o f a recurring series o f events made

up of dimensions of activity causally linked to one another". (Haas 1970: 619, 622-623.)

Although only the federal approach has been falsified in the sense that none of its assertions-

predictions have proven to be true, Haas argues, the two others have neither been falsified nor

have they demonstrated positive predictive power outside Western Europe; they have been

better in predicting failures. They cannot be easily compared since they address different

levels of abstraction, and the axioms are loose. {Idem: 629.) Moreover, the ideal types and

terminal conditions they have developed - federal union, security community, political

community or union - are, for Haas, not true dependent variables, since they cannot yet be

observed or measured in nature {idem: 630-631, emphasis added),1*1

Mitrany disapproved o f the 'scientific* study o f integration claiming that his own functionalism

not only was more useful in practice, but that it also was more scientific in that it was more

realistic: bom of realities and dealing with realities, Mitrany argued, it could be said to be

m Despite the allusions to a "change in perspective on his part as to what constitutes a variable and a method on linking variables" (Haas 1970: 638, footnote 34), Haas' view on theory does not necessarily become clearer by reading the article; in fact, it is almost as if the author was trying to evade the concept of 'theory*. Aiming at "something more than empirical generalisations”, he calls for concepts or ideas at a higher level o f abstraction than the variables themselves, which he calls for "evaluative concepts". Appropriately scored concepts associated with the explanation o f a postulated outcome constitute an "action path". A given action path is characterised by a certain kind of learning, a certain pattern of responsiveness and a certain degree o f spillover. The act of judging whether a concrete regional set of trends and decisions approaches some of the three terminal conditions involves a series of evaluative steps on the part o f the observer, he asks what is the mix of recurrent behaviours which accounts for a given trend in a given sector (using evaluative concepts such as spillover, elite responsiveness, bargaining style), what is the mix of all integrative and disintegrative trends in all sectors for the region (fulfilment, extension, retraction) and what is the sum of all the processes described under these labels (authority- legitimacy transfer). (Idem: 637-638.)

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more scientific than the would-be ones. In fact, Mitrany argued that "[I]n the flood o f

international methodology, with most practitioners tending to use a contrived idiom o f their

own, there is a fair presumption that the more 'scientific' the less relevant it all becomes."

According to Mitrany, the international political theory - unlike natural sciences - has seen

almost as many approaches as performers, and, thus, no solid basis has developed; neither is

there evidence of any of these would-be scientific notions having had any effect on

practitioners and their pclicies. The scientific theorists dismiss the old national limits without,

however, being able to break way from the old territorial conception. (Mitrany 1975: 248,

259-260, 262-266; see also Journal o f Common Market Studies 1965; cf. Bull 1966.)

One of the main sources of criticism towards the 'scientific' scholars has been their inability

to maintain their promises to be able to use the theories for prediction. The problem with the

predictions, however, is not so much that they would altogether fail; it is rather that they are

rather vague and could well be achieved with no more advanced scientific method than logical

reasoning. In fact, what emerges as the typical predictions are either that integration proceeds

as it does now, following from the point where it seems to be now (Haas 1964)1*2, or that

integration either proceeds forwards, goes backwards or remains still. As an example,

Lindberg and Scheingold (1970: 279) "perceive" three possible future outcomes for the BC,

the first being that it continues to grow, but at decreasing rate, eventually approaching overall

equilibrium state, the second that growth pressures mount, leading to a series of forward

linkages which could eventually transform its system^and capacities into federal or quasi-

federal pattern, and the third that a cumulation of crises leads to a genera] spill-back and

reconfirmation of national decision-making patterns.

Perhaps as a result of this criticism, a certain 'science of the short run' appears, characterised

by projections cautiously limited to 'the foreseeable future'. Thus, Lindberg and Scheingold

(1970: 277) conclude that "[I]n the short run, there is no reason to expect dramatic variations

in the level o f support available to the EC." At the same time, however, the authors qualify

their conclusions as being reached "on the basis of the evidence presently available" (idem:

279). They also stress that "prognostication" or predictions are possible only on the basis of

orderly assumptions, in conditions of'all other things being equal'; if events prove us wrong,

they say, it should be possible to pinpoint the errors in facts, assumptions or theory (idem:

183 Cf. Haas' early view on military cooperation as the first j^tep in integration; considering the general will or interest towards a (con)federation and the measures thus far*taken, Haas concluded in 1948 that "the way toward European unity, in which sovereignty will inhere predominantly in the central authority, will apparently proceed through military alliance and economic integration to confederation, and then on to final full federation.” (Haas 1948: 550.)

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281 ).181 * 183 That the style and problems of prognostication have not considerably changed in time

is not difficult to see; as a later example, one could quote Wessels* (1992: 55) three scenarios

for the development o f the state in Western Europe - towards fused federal state, back to

decentralisation, or, by a qualitative leap, to common constitution - which, moreover, can also

happen all simultaneously, or Wallace's (1994: 68) remark that despite the loss o f national

economic autonomy, the national abilities to shape the balance o f advantage within European

and global markets remains and "is likely to remain for some years to come".

Together with the aim o f prediction, the scientific approach to concepts has been a constant

bone of contention. Opentionalism, associated with positivism, stresses that each concept

must be associated with a precise and definite testing operation which specifies the conditions

of its application. Remarking that this doctrine is often advanced both as a vehicle for

specifying more closely the criteria of concepts and as a standard against which competing

interpretations of concepts can be appraised, Connolly sees that the limits for operationalism

are clear. It would require that all invoked concepts be operationalised, which would be an

immense task; even more importantly, even if it were established that one proposed definition

of politics were more operational than another, this in itself would not be sufficient to

establish it as the preferred definition. In fact, by way o f specification, the more operational

definition might drop out some elements which are central to, for instance, our idea o f

politics.184 As an example, Connolly criticises Deutsch’s endorsement o f this doctrine185.

Deutsch claims that each concept in his study is defined in terms of some operation that can

be repeated and tested by different people regardless of their preferences, but he does not and

cannot deliver on his promises: Connolly remarks that none o f his definitions is translatable

either into a single operation or a small set of invariantly associated, simple operations. He

also notes that in recent studies, the doctrine is most often invoked by political scientists when

they criticise the work of others, less so that the author explicitly claims to conform to the

doctrine himself. (Connolly 1974: 15-16, footnote 5.)

181 The problem obviously is that one cannot know in which of these three the error lies. Cf. Keohane andHoffmann 1991: 20, footnote 40: "The predictions o f a theory can fail to be borne out by events for one of two distinct reasons: (1) because the propositions of the theory were false, so that even if the preconditions specifiedin the theory apply, anticipated results do not occur; or (2) because the conditions for the operation o f the theory are simply not met. In the latter case, the theory is not falsified but just appears irrelevant to the situation."

m Therefore, Connolly argues, taking into account the purpose of the definition is the only possible basis for deciding that one proposed definition is superior to another (cf. chapter 1).

t8S In Politics and Government: How People Decide Their Fate, Houghton Mifflin, Boston 1970, p. ix.

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In part, however, the scientific approach has been misperceived, and it has been accused of

a rigidity and aims actually remote to many of the practitioners in question (cf. the arguments

in Kaplan 1966), constructing what could be called a strawman o f positivism to which no one

actually subscribes in the real world (cf. Oppenheim 1981: 190).186 Both the scientific and the

traditional approaches evidently have their own standards o f evaluation. They provide the

common frameworks which make it possible to perceive the results of research as results and

which also make a certain type o f progress possible and visible; however, that it is 'progress'

might not be clear for these in the other approach.

In particular, the logic of falsification o f the scientific approach is ambiguous as it factually

produces falsification of the views presented. This has sometimes been interpreted as a failure,

for example by Taylor (1975: xix) who suggests that the 1960s attempt to subject

functionalism to the discipline o f modem social science was in fact felt as a relative failure

also by the main architects. Taylor argues that as neofunctionalists were seeking scientific

rigour in the sense o f modem social sciences, they were vulnerable to the short-term challenge

o f events; their propositions were deliberately constructed so that they could be falsified, and

that is what also happened. The falsification, however, can also be interpreted as a sign of

progress unattainable for those whose arguments cannot be falsified (cf. Kaplan 1966). The

scientific approach is, in fact, characterised by remarkable optimism, either about the potential

o f the tools already constructed - as when Haas (1970: 638) asserts that H[T]he multiple

dependent variable we have devised enables us to specify to whom the authority and

legitimacy have been transferred” - or about the possibilities o f continuous improvement,

visible in Haas' statement that 'political community' cannot yet be observed or measured in

nature and, similarly, in Lindberg and Scheingold 1970 (cf. above; similarly Kaplan 1966).

Middle-of-the-road theorising and its consequences

The contemporary integration studies are, in some form, still characterised by the basic debate

between scientists and traditionalists, with perhaps the additional step that moderately

positivist 'rationalists' would now be seen as the traditionalists, while the challenge would

come from the reflectivist or constructivist side, those seeing reality as socially constructed

and subjectivity as constructed through values, norms and practices. Even this debate shows,

An interesting example of misperceived theorist could be Waltz (1979, 1990) who asserts that his theories are not meant to be applicable to reality; they are mere theoretical constructions.

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however, signs o f compromise. One cannot fail to remark a certain convergence o f the two

towards a moderate, middle-of-the-way view on science and theory.1*7

This moderate understanding could be summarised as the current generally accepted research

practice, the general view on the aims and nature of the study. It consists o f those features

usually associated with 'scientific' which are shared by all. In part, it consists o f a mere

adoption o f certain terms without necessarily espousing all their implications.187 188 In part,

however, this shared conception is rather influential for the results, perhaps even more so

because o f its taken-for-granted nature. In particular, these influential components of the

middle-way view are the aims of accumulation, generalisation, explanation and the

improvement of theories and the state o f knowledge.

The influence o f the ideal of accumulation, for the first, is ambiguous. It is easy to see that

research does not necessarily get very far if nothing can be taken as already established

knowledge, as it also is understandable that common definitions and concepts, if attained,

facilitate communication. At the same time, accumulation both helps and hinders: shared

definitions as well as shared assumptions might, despite the good purpose, also restrict and

mislead research, becoming an insuperable sedimentation o f facts rather than assumptions, as

was seen in the cases of the decline of the state, the spill-over o f integration or the high

transaction costs. Generalisation, in turn, may similarly be an implicit ideal, when knowledge

187 Again, a comparison could be made with the development in international relations theory towards a "neo- neo synthesis". After a shared development towards a more scientific restatement ("neo-") of the various theories, neoliberalism and neorcalism formed a synthesis, occupying the rationalist camp. They came to be opposed by the reflectivists, who increased their 'domain* by seizing the issues which no longer fitted the scientific agenda of the rationalists, that is, the historical or hermeneutic study of statesmen (from the realists) and normative or ethical considerations (from the liberals). (W aver 1992: 178 and 1994: 15.) The reflectivists (such as Kratochwil and Ruggie), emphasise, in essence, non-positivist methods: institutions are not something actors rationally construct according to their interests, since they act in meta-institutions (such as the principle of sovereignty) which create the actors (shape their identities) rather than the other way round; institutions and actors constitute each other mutually. Waever argues that the clear polarisation between rationalists and reflectivists in the 1980s was turned in the 1990s into increasing rapprochement as regards, e.g., sovereignty: rationalists have admitted the existence of 'deep conventions' and thereby moved towards acknowledging the role o f constitutive principles like sovereignty, very close to writings of some reflectivists; both the extreme rationalists (rational choice) and the extreme anti-IR approaches (deconstructivists) have been increasingly marginalised. (Waiver 1994: 14, 17.)

188 This is the case for, e g., 'independent' and 'dependent* variables or hypotheses and their testing. Without necessarily implying that the hypotheses should or could somehow be tested, many scholars use the 'technique* of presenting their research first in the form o f hypotheses and then in that o f results. Hypotheses o f this type can be found in both explicit and implicit forms; an example of a normal hypothesis could be Mutimer*s (1989: 100) statement that if the removal of internal borders with the consequent need for a common immigration policy is effected but does not result in substantial centralisation of decision-making, it is reasonable to conclude that there are problems with the spillover hypothesis.

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overtly based on one case only is valued less than one apparently applicable to all cases. A

main problem of generalisation in integration studies can be seen to be the difficulty of

choosing whether to stress the similarity or the differences between states. Both choices,

again, may lead to exaggerations, as when the progress o f integration is implicitly based on

the assumption that the states are similar as to their interests (and, thus, also functions and

nature) or their conception of the distinction between low and high politics or the political and

the technical.

The aim of explaining phenomena causally, for instance, o f identifying causes and dynamisms

of integration, requires an evaluation of the relative importance o f different possible causes.

This has interesting consequences for the question of whether integration is automatic or

irreversible. If the incentives to or forces behind integration are seen to be on the level o f

general phenomena such as technological development or security, the reversibility o f

integration might appear less probable than if they are identified as more time- and place-

specific conditions189. Lindberg and Scheingold (1970: 22-23), for instance, see that many

original incentives to integrate have disappeared; the historical point of time in which the

Communities were established was a time when co-operation was universally recognised as

necessary in every problem-solving programme. Seen from the present, however, it was

perhaps a period of transitory weakening o f a fundamentally healthy system.

The most intricate problem related to explanation is, however, the question of how to evaluate

the adequacy of explanations, reflected in the aim of improvement through criticism and

comparison of different views. Mostly, it is understood that theories can be compared and that

this is also an appropriate way of presenting one's own contribution as superior to others'.

However, there are also more cautious approaches to comparison. It is noted that theories

develop or transform and may correct themselves, thereby becoming less vulnerable to

criticism (Webb on neofunctionalism, 1983: 20-21). Wallace (1977: 321) argues that it is

mistaken to look for one model or theory only. Webb (1983: 37), who maintains that each

image of EC policy-making is imperfect and distorting, discusses whether it is, in the end,

possible to choose satisfactorily between various theories.190

189 When Waever (1995: 14) proposes security as the basic motive for integration, he also points out that integration works as a security mechanism only when it proceeds, that is, as an ongoing process.

190 She sees the available choice as already reduced by "market forces" (Webb 1983: 9) and analyzes the remaining intergovemmentalisin and interdependence together with neo functionalism. (Interdependence is here characterised by the emphasis on the diminishing importance of boundaries and the demise of the self-sufficient state; it is represented by Keohane and Nye, but also by Miriam Camps, The Management o f Interdependence (Council on Foreign Relations. New York, 1974).

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The discussion on the adequacy of explanations can, in broad terms, be characterised as a

discussion which proceeds as if there really were some objective criteria for their

evaluation.191 By far, the most popular criteria for the superiority of some explanation or

theory to other seem to be the ability to reflect reality and the ability to explain change.

Mitrany (1975; see above), for instance, presents functionalism as more realistic than

neofunctionalism. In addition, functionalism has a serviceable character and has actually been

used. It is a pragmatic way to a peaceful change, breaking up national-political issues into

specific technical, economic or social problems which can be resolved, preferably at an

administrative level {idem: 252-253) and to viable non-coercive authority, away from the

dogma of territorial sovereignty {idem: 264-265). Sensible to the 'size' of the problems, it is

preferable to problem solving within the hard state boundaries {idem: 256).192

The virtue o f being able to explain change is equally popular, not only in integration studies

but in political science and international relations moire generally193. At the same time, the

evolving nature o f integration or the EU and the increasing complexity of the modem world

are referred to as an excuse for not being able wholly to explain the phenomenon under

consideration, or for not yet being able fully to comprehend it.194

191 If the question of the criteria is posed at all, reference seems typically to be made to Lakatos, whose 'auxiliary hypotheses' seem appealing for the purpose of keeping the theory "whole" while "recognising various roads to salvation within it" (Haas 1970: 642; see references to Lakatos' views also in Moravcsik 1993a, Matlary 1994 and Grieco 1995). As suitable auxiliary hypotheses, one might see the specifications concerning the applicability of the various theories through distinctions between formal and informal integration, 'big' and 'small' decisions ('big' decisions, such as those concerning the extension o f integration to new areas, can be explained by intergovemmentalism, 'small' decisions, e.g., on the intensification o f cooperation in a previously integrated sector, by neofunctionalism; Moravcsik 1991: 48), informal and formal integration, or between different types of policies (it has been suggested that while intergovemmentalism applies to redistributive policies, supranationalism characterises regulatory policies; see Pollack, Marie A. (1994): 'Creeping Competence: The Expanding Agenda of the European Community* in Journal o f Public Policy, vol. 14 (2), pp. 95-145).

m The tasks of functionalism, however, are opposite in national and international spheres: in the former, it is against the dangerous centralisation, while in the latter, it is for establishing unity. Together, these tasks are aimed against nationality in its negative meaning, through a diversification o f practical loyalties. (Mitrany 1975: 262, 265-266.)

191 In integration studies, e.g., Alger 1981. Cf. the discussion on whether or not regime theory explains change, Hoffmann arguing that it does, Strange that it does not (see International Organization, vol. 36).

194 While impressive pictures of this complexity are given in the literature (see, e.g., Wessels' (1992: 55] above mentioned three different scenarios for the development of the state in Western Europe which all take place simultaneously), one can hardly find a point in the past or in the future when reality was or would be less complex. Again, the problem is not limited to integration studies. Current circumstances seem invariably more complex than the past. See, e.g., Herz (1957) suggesting that in the past, power was something measurable and calculable and served as a standard of comparison between units which were impermeable, and that it made sense to consider power units as politically independent and legally sovereign. Now, he argues, this can no longer be

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In fact, 'reality' and 'change' are only apparently reassuring points of orientation for

scientificity or research practice. They are taken to be such when correspondence with reality

and capability to explain change are referred to as the goals and yardsticks o f research.

Nevertheless, they are rather intricate for such a function. Both 'reality' and 'change' involve

endless problems o f perception, explanation and interpretation. The observation of change

requires a stable a priori view or definition, compared to which change becomes visible; the

example of 'the state' reveals, however, the risks involved in defining the state a priori. On

the other hand, if integration is seen as constantly changing, one could expect also the state

to be perceived like that. In the end, what 'scientific' implies can simply be seen in different

terms, as shown in the examples of the debates between Haas and Mitrany, or Kaplan and

Bull, debates between the representatives o f two different views not really speaking the same

language.

3.3.3 The effects o f disciplinary divisions and idiosyncrasies

It is not difficult to see the importance of disciplinary divisions for the emergence of different

views on the state and integration: almost by definition, different academic disciplines could

be said to contribute to the study each with its particular perspective. Each discipline has its

own research problems or objects and particular ways or methods in approaching the problem;

equally, it has its own theories, concepts and underlying assumptions. Both the state and

integration belong to the objects of research in several different fields; put together, the

different perspectives can be both contradictory and complimentary.

At the same time, drawing the boundaries of a particular discipline is not a straightforward

task. Indeed, defining an academic discipline is always controversial, as is the very question

o f what is required o f a field of study or a branch of knowledge in order to be considered a

discipline. There are, however, some clear marks the disciplines such as international relations

have left on the study of integration; these disciplinary inheritances will be closer examined

below.

Before the examination of these idiosyncrasies, it is important to consider some more general

aspects of disciplines which the review of integration studies brings into light. They are linked

to the very idea and structure of disciplinary divisions, to how the disciplines actually function

made due to changes in territoriality caused by economic, psychological and nuclear warfare - something that leads to the conclusion that ’the state* no longer is a useful concept (Heiz 1957: 486-487,473-475.)

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and how they lean on each other. A discipline bestows on the scholar a certain array o f

theories and approaches; thus, it also - efficiently though often unnoticed - limits this array.

Typically, a discipline alsc has its blind spots and tactical strategies for avoiding or explaining

away certain questions and for justifying their solution in a certain way rather than another.

In fact, an academic discipline is essentially defined by the difference, by what distinguishes

it from other disciplines, and therefore the different disciplines actually justify each other.

Two aspects of this structure of disciplines emerge as having particular importance for

understanding why and how the different views on the state and integration have been

attained. The first is the construction of disciplines, the other is their tenacity. The study o f

integration, in fact, is a fitting example o f the efforts o f creating a new discipline and o f the

consequences of such discipline construction, while it also suggests how the established

disciplines might react when faced with a new object o f study.

Discipline constntction

It is important to understand disciplines as intentional constructions and a continuous

construction of new disciplines as an integral part o f research practice. The need for a new

discipline stems from the inadequacy of the existing ones in answering certain new questions,

from new approaches and methods. At the same time, however, discipline creation may also

involve certain opportunism because of the attraction o f the advantages and status o f an

established discipline, and it certainly involves a complex interplay between the importance

o f the research object and that of the academic status. Obviously, becoming an object o f study

o f a particular discipline also greatly affects the way the object is understood.

In the case o f integration studies, one might legitimately question whether integration studies

could or should be seen as a separate discipline and whether they at any time have been such.

The answer, however, has only limited importance. On the contrary, the question itself is

crucial: whether or not the study o f integration constitutes a special discipline is a question

o f the nature of integration, whether integration is something particular, perhaps unique, or

rather something 'normal', an instance of a more general phenomenon, something that can be

explained through the already existing frameworks of the established disciplines - for instance,

interest groups politics or international relations.

In order to justify the need for a special discipline of integration studies, one has to prove that

integration is in some way ’new' and 'different', a procedure which involves a degree of

artificiality. The novelty of integration is obviously relative and has to do with how both

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integration and the existing frameworks are understood rather than with, for example, the

period in question. Indeed, the review o f integration studies points to a continuous alteration

o f claims for its novelty and for its adaptability to existing frameworks, exemplified below

by the ’accommodation* of integration by realist international relations study.

It is easy to see how the early deliberate efforts at discipline creation considerably affected

the way integration was subsequently understood. For Haas in particular, it seems to have

been essential to underline the novelty o f what he was studying, the process of integration;

it was actually this newness that made the phenomenon so important as a research object.195

Yet, this newness was not purely a conclusion from Haas' observations on integration; it was

also a basic assumption in his early studies. Thus, on the one hand, Haas observed factual

changes in the behaviour of political actors which justified the particularity o f integration; on

the other, he took these changes as given: integration in the ECSC was new since the ECSC

was the first and only existing supranational organisation which provided • in Haas' words -

one of the very few current possibilities systematically to analyze the decomposition o f old

nations within the framework of the evolution of a larger polity, perhaps a nation o f its own

(Haas 1958: xxxi).

In a way, integration studies was built on and justified by the shortcomings o f existing

frameworks in dealing with and explaining the peculiar and unexpected elements which

integration involved. Haas himself used his findings both to discredit traditional approaches

to international relations and to search for a distinct identity for integration studies if not as

a specific discipline, then at least as a "significant field o f study", elaborating on its

particularity compared to both international relations and other studies of political unification

and regional cooperation. Haas pointed out that the study of regional integration and the

traditional study o f international relations had, first, quite different concerns: the former was

concerned with tasks, transactions, perceptions and learning, the latter with sovereignty,

military capability and balances of power. Second, integration studies had a particular

justification in that they were not constrained by the dichotomies between "high" political and

"low" functional concerns or between the domestic and the international. In all, Haas argued

193 Haas seems to have a special quest for the new and the (therefore) important; in 1948, Haas is fascinated by the unprecedented activities in establishing new international organisations (1947-48); later, he shifts the analysis from integration to other, more important phenomena such as interdependence (Haas 1975).

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that they advanced the empirical theory o f international relations by clearly delineating and

establishing recurrent practices and allowed for comparative studies (Haas 1970: 608-609).196

The important consequences o f the assumption of novelty and particularity were twofold. O n

the one hand, a logical corollary to this assumption was that integration cannot be studied as

an instance of something already seen or by using old conceptual devices: a new corpus o f

concepts and methods was needed. Partly because o f Haas' influentiality, partly because o f

the inherent appeal of novelty, this idea came to be widely accepted. Claims about the

inadequacy of old concepts and theories in the study o f integration were subsequently m ade

by a considerable number of authors (e.g., Lindberg and Scheingold 1970, Haas 1970, Puchala

1972, Alger 1981, Schmitter 1991), becoming close to a permanent feature o f integration

studies. In particular, the use o f the concept 'state' was discouraged as it was seen to hinder

the understanding of integration (notably Alger 1981 and Schmitter 1991); this obviously

contributed to the difficulty of analyzing the state in the context of integration. On the o ther

hand, the assumed novelty of integration had also methodological consequences. Notably, as

was seen above, the possibility of studying it through comparison was put into question as

there was, by definition, nothing comparable to it.

Interestingly, Haas later referred to normative reasons in motivating the search for a theory

of integration. While the study o f integration had, in his view, previously been motivated by

(or, "we were stimulated by") "two otherwise unrelated trends, the flowering in the United

States of systematic social science and the blooming in Europe o f political efforts to build a

united continent, to 'integrate' Western Europe at least" (Haas 1970: 607), it was now

impossible to abandon the study because ''the stakes are too high".197 {Idem: 645.)

196 Moreover, Haas argued that while the study of regional cooperation or regional organisations simply furnishes material on the beliefs and important activities of the actors, the study of regional integration is concerned with the outcomes or consequences o f such activities and with their impact on members. Actually, the way in which Haas defined 'integration' served the purpose of differentiating between the fields of study. At the same time, when Haas claims that cooperative state behaviour is new and results from integration, he rather confirms than discredits the realist confidence on the fact that states never cooperate otherwise, or that they never learn, make concessions or sacrifice their purposes. (Haas 1970: 608, 611-612.) For a comparable justification o f the realist view as addressing a subject o f its own, see James 1989.

197 Approaching a Mitranian viewpoint, Haas warns of the dangers of concentration: regional integration may lead to a future world made up of fewer and fewer units, each with the power and will to self-assertion associated with classical nationalism. He claims that future may force us to equate peace with nonintegration and associate the likelihood of major war with successful regional integration, although this is perhaps not likely. However, he argues that one major normative utility of the study of regional integration is its contribution as a conceptual, empirical and methodological link between work on the future o f the international system and the future o f the nation-states whose interrelationships make up the system.

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In all, no decisive steps into the direction o f an accepted disciplinary status nor into that of

its denial seem to have been taken in the case of integration studies. Rather, there is a

continuous process o f discipline construction with temporary halts and new openings. The

measure o f artificiality involved in this construction is manifest in the fact that it was Haas

himself who in 1975 quite successfully argued that integration was no longer a field

distinctive or important enough to be studied separately. On the other hand, others have

maintained that while the phenomenon really is particular and worth a field of its own, the

concept o f 'integration' is no longer a suitable term for analyzing it - having thus come to

share the reputation o f the state. Finally, periods in which integration studies seem to have

had a relatively firm own identity • perhaps linked to the overall changes in the popularity of

integration studies19* - have given rise to doubts about the reverse of this identity, a relative

isolation, being possibly disadvantageous (Scheingold 1970: 1001-1002).

Discipline tenacity

While the formation of new disciplines helps to explain some features of the emerging

theories, it also contributes to the tenacity o f existing disciplines: new theories challenge the

older ones, making them develop and strengthen themselves. In fact, old frameworks do not

seem to succumb very easily to new, unexpected events. Quite on the contrary, the existing

frameworks and perspectives form the new event as an object o f study through their ways of

posing problems and their assumptions; indeed, they make the object of study an illustration

of what they are studying, denying its suggested novelty. This tenacity is the second aspect

of disciplines which has considerably formed the study of the state and integration: several

established disciplines have effectively 'appropriated' integration into their frameworks.

A particularly impressive example of how this has been done is the case of the realist

international relations paradigm converting integration from an anomaly into an additional

evidence confirming the validity of the approach. At first, integration and the studies of

integration were seen to be quite antithetical to and, in fact, greeted as a useful criticism of

the realist paradigm. Integration studies were seen as providing an alternative to the traditional

realist view on international, or interstate, relations, closer to an idealist background of

collective security or world government (Alger 1981: 126), even to the extent that integration

The rises and falls of the popularity of integration have often been associated with the bursts and halts of the process o f European integration itself; having been relatively popular in the 1960s and early 1970s, integration studies became somewhat disregarded after mid-1970s, and regained energy from the mid-1980s.

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theory was seen as having a prominent position among the contemporary approaches to the

study of international relations (Hansen 1969: 242).

Theories of integration were above all seen to challenge the realist 'power politics' paradigm

by bringing to light patterns of behaviour and events which were either not supposed to

happen or which were not supposed to be very consequential if they happened. Such

contradictory findings were the important role of cooperation in interstate relations - fo r

Puchala, integration theorists were in the 1950s and early 1960s virtually alone in holding that

international collaboration for welfare ends was an important aspect of contemporary

international relations - the role o f actors other than the state such as international

organisations, including the nongovernmental ones, the different linkages between states in

such forms as transgovemmental links between bureaucracies or interdependence, and the

connections between foreign and domestic politics.

Integration studies were seen to free the analysis o f international relations from the state-

centred paradigm of international anarchy in that they allowed for new ways o f treating the

state, not as a unique entity or something impermeable and autonomous, but as an entity

influenced by its environment and also amenable to analysis by new methods and analogies

from other social sciences. Thus, integration studies also contributed with new methodological

and conceptual alternatives; they enriched the study with, among others, international political

economy, bargaining theory and attention to social context or processes of organisational

growth. This, in turn, increased the possibilities o f integration studies to, in Alger’s words,

"inquire into the dynamics of change". (Lijphart 1981: 233, 240; Pentland 1973: 240; Puchala

1981: 147-148, Alger 1981: 123, 125.)

Taking into account these evaluations o f the influence o f integration studies, one could expect

that the traditional realist approach to international relations would have been seriously

threatened. As integration was observed to change state behaviour and the nature o f interstate

relations, and particularly because it was seen to blur the distinction between foreign and

domestic politics, it could have made the previous approach - if not the very discipline -

redundant in its traditional form. What happened, however, was that international relations

scholars turned integration into something fitting well their own views, showing the

appropriateness o f the traditional paradigm and, respectively, questioning the validity of

alternative views.

In broad terms, this turn can be described as proceeding through four different phases. A first

reaction o f realist scholars to the early integration theories was to deny the possibility that any

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real integration, as defined by these theories, could actually take place, as it was completely

contrary to the real behaviour and nature of the states. Realist explanations of international

relations are based on the assumption o f international anarchy, a situation in which

cooperation is too risky, or costly, to be rational. Cooperation, thus, needs explanation, and

its explanation is particularly difficult, except for allusions to some form of alliance formation

(cf. Grieco 1991). While integration was seen and studied as nation-building, realists like

Aron doubted the very existence o f such a process (Aron 1963). Aron tended to minimize the

relevance o f the integrative measures taken, stressing not only that the transfer of sovereignty

was very limited, concerning mostly technical and economic functions, but also that these

measures and the common market in general did not necessarily lead to more advanced forms

o f unity, such as a federation. On the contrary, he saw that the significance o f national

independence was rather increased by the widening of the functions of the state, the rules of

international law impeding open intervention in the internal affairs of another state, and the

nationalisation of culture. (Aron 1962: 7I3-734.)199

The first phase o f the realist 'appropriation' o f integration could perhaps be described as a

phase in which it is seen that integration does not in any fundamental way change the logic

o f power politics or the international order. For Aron, the necessity of the logic o f having

enemies and friends is constitutive o f politics and, in a way, also of integration. In the

background of the efforts towards unification, there was the common threat from the Soviet

Union and the wish to obtain some measure of independence o f the great powers. Thus, if the

conflict between the two blocs were to disappear, not much would remain of European

integration, either. (Aron 1962: 740-741.)200

In a second phase, it was admitted that integration could, indeed, take place, albeit as a mere

geographically limited exception which does not challenge the principles of international

relations. As late as 1979, Waltz - in difficulties with integration, which is practically

impossible in the light o f his assumptions about the nature of the international system - argues

199 In the index to Paix et guerre entre les nations (first but also the subsequent editions), words such as 'European Economic Community' or 'integration' cannot be found; the nearest would perhaps be "Europe and the concept of state". The phenomenon of integration can be found, finally, in the chapter 'Au-delà de la politique de puissance' the first part o f which is on international law (paix par la loi) and the second (paix par l'empire) on sovereignty and federations.

200 In fact, integration would not necessarily contribute to peace; it might worsen the situation by magnifying the conflicts: "Croire que l'unité européenne serait pacifique alors que les nations étaient belliqueuses serait reproduire l'erreur de ceux qui croyaient que les nations seraient pacifiques alors que les rois avaient été belliqueux" (Aron 1962: 300).

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that "although the integration o f nations is often talked about, it seldom takes place", even i f

it could be mutually enriching. This is because the structure o f international politics sets limits

to cooperation in the form o f inequality in the expected distribution of the increased

production, the uncertainty about the others' intentions, and the fear of dependency through

cooperation and exchange. (Waltz 1979: 104-106.) In Waltz's view, the system would change

if all chose not to have interest in preserving themselves, preferring amalgamation; however,

if only some do, the system as such remains unaltered {idem: 118).201

Subsequently, realist scholars developed the view according to which integration in its

contemporary form served the interests o f the states. As a concession to the supranationalist

theorists who argued that integration gradually weakened the state, they admitted that there

were certain limits beyond which integration could not go without having, indeed, a

considerable impact on the state and cutting its powers. These thresholds, however, w ere

chosen so as to make it unlikely, even impossible, to attain them.

Taylor's early writings show how particularly demanding criteria can be used to refute the

opposing approach. He argues that for the supranationalist view to be correct, the EC should

be an actor in international relations or a federation - both conditions it cannot fulfil. Why it

cannot fulfil them, in turn, stems from Taylor's view on what an actor or a federation is: he

equates actorship with exclusive role o f representation or foreign competence and deems the

EC's competence occasional rather than typical or incremental (Taylor 1983: 120-, esp. 131-

132, 156.)202 Federation, in turn, involves the superiority o f federal law in relation to national

law and the existence of an independent sphere of central authority. Further, a federation has

constitutional immunity against dissolution by secession of its constituent regions, the central

government controls exclusively foreign relations and defence, and the federal constitution can

be amended without the consent of all constituent regions {idem: 270). In the light o f these

features, the Community is not a federation.

Further examples o f setting conditions for integration to be 'real' or effective include

Hoffmann's defence issues: contrary to economic and monetary regimes, defence issues were

201 Waltz also reserves the word 'integration' for national realm and 'interdependence' - in the sense of a looser connection - for the international realm. As states are like units, interdependence among them is low as compared to the close integration o f the parts in a domestic order. Further, the growing interdependence between states, caused by increased international activity, is for Waltz a unit level characteristic; thus, it has no profound importance for the system as such. (Waltz 1979: 144-145, 204.)

202 Cf. notably SjOstedt 1981 for an earlier, more thorough analysis o f the actor capability of the EC and, more generally, the problem of how to define an actor and assess its autonomy as actor.

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of a zero-sum game nature, and therefore the formation of a defence community would be the

decisive change which would solely weaken the state203 (Hoffmann 1982: 36-37). For James,

then, the threshold is the existence of a common constitution and a factual irrevocability o f

the process o f integration. As the European Community does not have the ultimate legislative

power but only limited competencies, the member states are not part o f a common

constitutional arrangement and remain, thus, sovereign.204 (James 1986: 246-253.) Similarly,

Taylor claims that the Treaty of Rome is a treaty and not a constitution: as long as the basis

o f the Community rests upon a treaty, there is, in his view, no decisive legal loss of

sovereignty; he also rejects the claims that a monetary union would be a decisive threat to

sovereignty (Taylor 1991a: 73-74 and 1991b: 123).

A final step in the 'appropriation' of integration by the realist scholars was completed when

it was noted that integration in any case was in the interests of the states, even when

seemingly going far against it. Otherwise, in fact, it would not have been embarked on. It was

a strategy deliberately chosen by the states, defensible in terms of efficiency and benefits; the

process of integration increased both the possibilities of the states to resolve their problems

and their general capabilities (for different variations, see, e.g., Hoffmann 1982, Milward

1992). Among the most coherent realist explanations o f integration, one could cite Grieco's

systematic examination of the challenges posed by supranational integration to (neo)realist

thinking - an examination which also shows the elasticity, or tenacity, of realism.205 Grieco

points out that the simple introduction of calculation of costs and benefits, which well fits the

premises o f a rational (and egotistic) actor-state, suffices to explain the establishment of

institutions and cooperative frameworks, and thereby also integration, which is seen essentially

as a framework for cooperation: cooperation may be profitable, but it is costly, and

institutions are seen to lower these costs. (Cf. Grieco 1988.)206 For Grieco, European

305 However, Hoffmann also notes a paradox in that the absence of a defence community is, at the same time, a weakness of the state and of the integrated entity as a whole.

204 James also notes that reaching the point o f 'no return' is neither likely, nor particularly important: even if this point was reached for the members, it would not challenge sovereignty as such, as other states would hardly follow the model.

205 For Grieco, adjustability is an asset to the theory: referring to Lakatos, he argues that a good theory has to be both adjustable and not less useful than its rivals (Grieco 1995: 26-27).

206 This way of thinking unites several different strains of theories: it makes new institutionalism and realism match quite well (see Keohane), makes possible the application of the twist over relative v. absolute gains also in integration, and, indeed, connects Haas with realists; also for Haas, calculation on the basis o f interests was the foremost motive for governmental action (see Haas 1958). - Cf. Hix's categorisation of'old' and 'new1 institutional approaches to integration, the former comprising most analyses of the EC within comparative constitutional law

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integration shows how states may cooperate through institutions and actually seek to

strengthen them. Institutionalisation o f the coalition's activities may help the weaker states to

avoid being dominated by the group's strongest member; they will also strive for su ch

common rules which will best guarantee the possibility o f voicing their interests. T h e

strongest member, in turn, may prefer institutionalisation as a vehicle for exercising so m e

leadership on its coalition partners. (Grieco 1991: 9-21 and 1995: 34.)

Thus, the realist international relations theorists have made integration not only perfectly

explainable as normal international relations or normal state behaviour - analyzing it a s

cooperation or a way to facilitate cooperation, but also as adaptation, a security m echanism

(cf. Waever 1995) or foreign policy - but also evidence for their own framework. In fact, th e

assumption of the difficulty of cooperation in its absence makes integration rational. This tu rn

of interpretation, facilitated by the notable flexibility o f central concepts such as 'cooperation'

or 'sovereignty'207, could be compared to translation: the EC comes to be seen through a

certain conventional terminology. Thus, integration can be analyzed through the concept o f

'hegemony' (e.g., in Keohane and Hoffmann 1991: 32); it can be seen as an international

organisation, as when Taylor (1983: 24) defines integration as a process whereby th e

international organisation acquires responsibility for taking decisions in areas previously

reserved for the state, or as an international regime, as by Hoffmann 1982. As a regime - a

set of norms, rules, policies and the like - the EC both restrains states' actions by im posing

costs and limiting the freedom o f unilateral action, and provides them with new opportunities

through burden sharing, external support, etc. Thus, Hoffmann proposes that integration theory

should be built on the domestic goals and priorities o f the states, thereby resembling foreign

policy analysis. Essentially, both regime theory and the framework of international

organisation withdraw the specificity or unique nature of the EC.

and comparative public law, e.g., comparisons o f conventional international law and new elements in EC la w (Weiler, Mancini) or assessment of the contribution of the European Court of Justice. The latter includes decision-making theories (Sbragia, Wessels, Scharpf); also the concepts of federalism and consociationalism are used. (Hix 1994: 12-20).

207 Indeed, that cooperation is seen difficult in international relations is basically a mere assumption, even though it seems to have become indispensable to certain theories (for an example of the explanation o f cooperation, see notably Keohane 1984). Similarly, the high cost o f transactions is also an assumption. Moravcsik argues that there is no evidence that they really are high; this, in his view, questions both supranational integration theories and regime theory which are based on this assumption (lecture in the CORE research course in Humlebeek, May 29, 1996). As to 'sovereignty', the question o f how much transfer of sovereignty 'matters', what actually is lost when sovereignty diminishes, and, naturally, whether sovereignty is a countable which can exist in different degrees are all matters o f viewpoint. The background problem is whether the 'common' (authority, institutions) increases or decreases the 'own' and whether the state can perish through its own actions, which is also a problem of rationality (cf. 3.3.1).

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It is also interesting to see how Hoffmann introduces his approach as a new and better one.

Instead of taking the road explained above o f claiming that integration cannot become a threat

for the state, he argues that this outcome was originally possible, but has since become less

likely. Therefore, when he starts by remarking - by now in a rather familiar way - that

integration should no longer be seen in traditional terms, he means that one should not assume

an engagement in the formation o f a new entity which supersedes nations and a zero-sum

game between the state and the EC. Actually, integration simultaneously curtails the state’s

capacities for unilateral action and serves to preserve it as the basic unit. The regime

approach, then, not only helps explain this state of affairs which otherwise would remain a

paradox, but allows also for an explanation o f change: simply, the process of integration halts

if the restraints outweigh the opportunities. (Hoffmann 1982: 33-35.)

The 'appropriation' o f integration by the field of domestic or comparative politics, then, rests

in a similar way on the novelty and superiority of the approach in the study of integration.

In essence, it was a conquest of integration from the international politics approach, based on

the understanding that integration thus far had been studied mainly as international relations,

and that 'politics' had been virtually absent from the study. The 'appropriation', thus, was a

question of showing that integration was not something special, nor an instance o f normal

international relations, but normal domestic politics.

The domestic politics approach could be seen to involve three different perspectives. First,

there are the explanations of state behaviour in the context of integration by domestic factors

and the variation in the internal situations of each state - for example, policy-making

structures and attitudes held within a state on the EC (Bulmer 1983). Next, the EU is analyzed

as a political system which comprises primarily the same actors as the national political

systems, such as political parties and interest groups, even as a new or evolving state, the aim

being an understanding of policy-making and power relations in this system (e.g., Bulmer

1993). Thirdly, there are analyses of national political systems and political decision making

procedures in terms o f the changes and challenges caused by integration, the EU membership

or more generally 'Europeanisation'. (See, e.g., Héritier et a l 1994).

The novelty and superiority of these perspectives is quite obviously relative. As was seen in

chapter two, domestic politics approach was introduced by Bulmer (1983) as a new,

alternative approach for analyzing the behaviour and position o f the member states in the EC.

Thus far, it was claimed, the analysis had been unduly dominated by international relations

approaches which were deemed inadequate for the understanding o f the process, particularly

in its more recent phases, and had to be completed or replaced (Bulmer 1993; similarly Hix

" ‘" “iunri

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1994). Bulmer characterised the domestic politics approach as ’’arguably more embracing

and/or more realistic as a device explaining Community negotiations than the alternatives on

offer" (Bulmer 1983: 363), while the use o f a comparative public policy perspective was

(more) appropriate, in his view, because the EU had increasingly come to resemble a multi­

tiered state (Bulmer 1993). Hix, in turn, emphasised the inability of the international politics

approaches to deal with the actual substance of politics, or the 'normal' issues o f political

conflict on a left-right axis (Hix 1994: 10-11; chapter 2.4),

It is somewhat surprising to see the claim that the field of comparative politics has "only

recently woken up to the possibility o f applying its theories and principles to political

behaviour and action in the Community" (Hix 1994: 12) in that if the approach literally was

something new, one would have to conclude that political scientists thus far had somehow

naively ignored integration. Not taking into account that integration could have effects on the

states' administrative systems and policies, or concepts isuch as democracy, implies a negation

of integration comparable to that by the early international relations realists. One could, in

fact, sketch an itinerary similar to the realists' in appropriating integration gradually into the

study of political systems through links such as a new resemblance between the state and the

Union or the increasingly important changes in the state caused by integration.

Rather, the appeal o f novel approaches might have led to a somewhat cursory consideration

of the preceding ones. Above all, to place Haas among the neofunctionalists on the side o f

international relations approaches is to overlook the fundamental way in which pluralistic

political science formed his study o f integration and, consequently, integration study in

general, through providing a certain understanding of its causes, participants and mechanisms.

As a matter of fact, Haas (1970) argues that integration studies must rely on the study o f

comparative politics and economics. Considered more closely, in fact, several 'novelties' are

already familiar from previous research. Several examples emerged in chapter two: when

Bulmer (1983) claims that it is important to disaggregate the government's position instead

of treating it, like international relations approaches do, as monolithic and non-contradictory,

he actually adopts Haas' original pluralist position. Further, when Bulmer (1993) sets himself

the task o f examining the governance structures, institutions, instruments, rules and procedures

of the EU in order to get to know the nature o f its policy processes, he comes close to what

Lindberg and Scheingold did in 1970. Finally, introducing the analysis o f domestic

environment as an important and thus far neglected part o f the explanation o f integration and

state policies in that context (e.g., Moravcsik) quite interestingly illustrates the 'tactics' o f

paving the way to important openings through a selective view o f the achievements thus far.

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Novel or not, the domestic politics approach is certainly different from that o f international

relations approach, and its specific inheritances to the study o f integration are of particular

interest here. Most importantly, seeing the EU as domestic politics rather than international

(interstate) relations allows for a different conceptualisation o f the mutual influence between

the state and integration. While the position and behaviour of states influence integration and

the common institutions, these, in turn, influence the states, their institutions and practices.

Changes have been identified in policies and policy-making as well as in the political system

as a whole, for example through changes in power relations between its different components

(e.g., Moravcsik and the growing importance of the executive.) Finally, also the

conceptualisation o f citizenship, political participation, democracy or identity can change. One

could argue, in fact, that analyzing these changes is an important step forward, perhaps unduly

delayed by the tenacity o f the traditional research frameworks which do not allow for

recognising the possibility of such changes.

Analogously, changes in the national juridical systems - and not only in laws and law-making

- as well as changes in the administrative systems and procedures can be seen as an extension

o f integration to law and administrative sciences, giving rise to a similar 'appropriation* o f

integration by these branches. Notably, administrative science literature on integration,

studying internationalisation of national administration and the features o f international

(communitarian) administration, is rapidly growing.

It is important, however, to avoid simplifying domestic politics or international relations by

disregarding their internal variation. Both include a variety of different approaches. Therefore,

delineating the inheritance of the different disciplines in terms o f generalised differences

between the two would only repeat the mistake of those who ground the superiority o f some

particular approach on a simplified view of the others. Some o f the approaches have been

particularly consequential in influencing the way the questions are posed, pointing out what

does and what does not need to be explained. A primary example is without doubt the need

to explain why states cooperate, stemming from the realist international relations assumption

that states do not normally cooperate. Nonetheless, not all international relations theory see

cooperation as a problem, nor is the state always seen as the central actor, a 'black box' or

inherently egoistic; similarly, domestic politics also includes a variety of different views on

the state.

Therefore, it is more accurate to describe what integration theories have inherited from these

disciplines in terms o f certain debates rather than assumptions. Thus, integration studies have

not inherited from international relations the problem of cooperation but rather the debate on

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whether cooperation is a problem, not the assumption of state centrality but the debate on

whether or not the state is to be considered central. Accordingly, a closer look at these

debates helps to understand the development o f integration studies.

In the study of international relations, the debate on whether the state is or should be central

is almost classical, ever-ongoing. In its most familiar form, the debate is between the

archetypal realist view, consciously centred on the state, and its different critiques. In the

realist view, international relations are, in essence, interstate relations; other actors have only

a subordinate position vis-à-vis the state. Consequently, explanations are based on state

behaviour and state interests. Institutions are seen as secondary entities which are created and

controlled by the states and derive their power from them. They are essentially tools o f the

states, aimed mainly at facilitating cooperation, as was seen in the case of realist view on

integration. (See, e.g., Abi-Saab 1981: 12.)

This realist position is often pointed out as the dominant approach to international relations.

However, in terms of popularity and perhaps also of quantity, the position which criticises

realism seems to be prevalent. Notably the theorists o f interdependence or transnationalism

of the 1970s - particularly Keohane and Nye (1973 and 1977), Haas 1975 - criticised the

traditional analyses o f international relations for the exaggerated importance given to the state

and the consequent neglect of new actors. However, the state had been pointed out as an

anachronism well before that (cf. chapter one), and the argument appeared subsequently in

still other forms. The many sides and meanings and the wide scope of the state seem to make

it susceptible for as many challenges from various directions, challenges which are seen to

undermine the relative importance of the state in theory and practice. In fact, virtually all

major changes in the contemporary world, technological as well as cultural, have been seen

as potential challenges to the state as autonomous and primary actor in international relations,

including, obviously, integration (cf. the discussion on values below).

One of the main targets of criticism has been the realist - or in the context of integration,

intergovemmentalist - view on institutions which follows from the emphasis on the state and

its ability to appear as a unitary actor above or beyond any profound influence by other

institutions. For instance, Hix (1994: 6-8) criticises intergovemmentalism for not taking into

account the institutional dynamics and the influence o f institutions in shaping not only the

behaviour o f national actors, but also their preferences, for seeing the integration process as

a strict zero-sum game and for defining the notion o f national interest in too monolithic terms,

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while it should be seen as incorporating competing views on what is vital for a particular

state.208

Judging from those who brought institutions 'in' with new vigour under 'new institutionalism'

(see notably Bulmer 1993 for integration), the prevalence of realism and the ensuing neglect

of institutions has been quite comprehensive. The critical discussion, in fact, seems often to

stay at a level of general problems, presented in rather 'black and white' terms. As such, the

question o f whether institutions matter or not much resembles the argumentation between

those who claim that governmental preferences are formed prior to interaction, e.g.,

international negotiations, and those claiming that preferences are formed in that very

interaction. These problems are apparent in that they conceal the central assumptions used;

at the same time, research practice seems to give the tools for answering these, while the

more profound questions remain outside its reach.

The question of institutions is, however, slightly more complicated in that the divisions are

not necessarily clear: distinction has to be made also as to the ways in which they are seen

to matter and what, indeed, the institutions are. In addition, the views hardly exist in pure

forms.209 In international relations, a large literature exists on the autonomy or "individual

will" of international organisations210 and on the ways of measuring their relative strength.

While the influence of European institutions on the member states has been underestimated

by realists, others have certainly taken it into account. The view that institutions shape the

behaviour and preferences of actors, in the precise sense of European institutions shaping the

preferences of governments, featured in Haas' early contributions. It is also difficult to find

any total rejection o f the possibility that institutions could influence actors' behaviour in the

literature. Although some game theorists and advocates o f rational actor model are sometimes * 109

m For Hix, there are, however, two refinements of intergovemmentalism which attempt to address these drawbacks. The preference-convergence approach (Bulmer 1983) sees that integration proceeds as a result of converging policy preferences among the major member states, and that these preferences are results o f domestic political factors. In the elite-bargaining approach, then, the state is not monolithic, but there is a rational zero-sum bargaining; also the two-level game between domestic and international elites is referred to (e.g., W. Sandholtz and 3. Zysman, '1992: Recasting the European Bargain', World Politics 41 (1) 1989).

109 Similarly, to expect from Aron as a typical realist the position that states are somehow eternal or that they are all similar is to oversimplify. In reality, Aron (1962) sees the state more as one fonn of political community in the context o f historical development; the international system ("système planétaire") is, for him, characterised by heterogeneity or diversity.

2,0 For Virally (1981: 53), their "individual will" is the capacity to take decisions which are not identical with the sum of the individual decisions o f its members (through majority decisions, relatively independent decision­taking bodies or bodies based on restricted membership).

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accused o f committing this error, these approaches too mostly take into account the

institutional context o f the actor (cf. also the 'neo-neo synthesis').

Actually, the question of how institutions should be understood is a part of the discussion o f

state centrality, which, in turn, is a permanent feature both o f international relations and o f

domestic politics. Both international relations and domestic politics involve the same debates

on state actorship or autonomy v. the importance of structures; indeed, there is an agent-

structure division inside both disciplines, not between the two (for a useful categorisation, see

Hix 1994: 9-10).

In the study of domestic politics, the question of state centrality takes the form of whether the

state as such is an appropriate unit o f analysis, or whether it should be reduced to some other,

more important forces or actors. One might accordingly differentiate between formal legalism,

dominant approach in political science in the United States till the 1950s, which identified

political life with the state and emphasised formal rules in the explanation of behaviour, and

pluralism, a reaction against this understanding, which developed as one orientation associated

with the methodological views o f the 'behavioral revolution' o f the late 1950s and 1960s.

According to the pluralist view, public actors and institutions such as the state can be virtually

ignored: actually, they are not seen to have an identity or existence separate from the society.

Instead, they are seen as constrained by societal forces and pressures, which, consequently,

become the focus of the analysis. Society is seen to consist o f diverse groupings, each

attempting to maximise their own self-interests, struggling for them in arena such as the

government, or the state: for a seminal pluralist author such as Dahl211, the state is equated

with the government, that is, a collection o f individuals occupying particular roles; it is not

an administrative apparatus or a legal order. (Krasner 1984: 226-230.)

It can reasonably be argued that the development of integration studies cannot fully be

understood without taking into account the pronounced influence this pluralist research setting

had in the most influential early work o f Haas'. In the beginning, 'the state' was notoriously

absent from the studies. Subsequently, it was disaggregated into a variety o f different actors,

disappearing from the analysis as an entity, while integration was rather seen as politics in

general, a competition between different interests. Even the government's position was

disaggregated into the different competing background interests.

211 See, e.g., Robert Dahl, Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1961).

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Pulling these disciplinary inheritances together, one can easily see a convergence o f the

pluralist approach to domestic politics and the well-developed criticism of state-centrism in

international relations theory towards something close to a fully-fledged apprehension for any

overemphasis of the state. In fact, to counterweigh the realism-oriented view, there developed

a 'non-state-centred' understanding o f integration, equally problematic because it was

avaricious of possibilities of analyzing the state - something reflected also in the debate of

whether it was appropriate to depict the end result of integration as a state, or whether this

altogether hampered the analysis.

Clearly, one cannot overlook the problems of straightforward state-centrism. It was seen in

chapter two how the lacking problématisation of the state turns out to be a stumbling block

rather than a useful simplification; the state comes to define itself212, placing itself outside the

reach of any 'objective' measures of its relative power. In particular, 'sovereignty' - a central

feature for all, and a clear indicator o f the influence of integration on the state for the

supranationalists - comes to be seen as defined by the state itself. This implies that

sovereignty cannot diminish, since it is constantly redefined: when constraints emerge, the

limits are simply changed. Taylor provides a good example of this way of thinking. He argues

that sovereignty has never been untrammelled; it has always been subject to the 'givens' of

international economic and political circumstances. In order to be accepted as members of

international society, states have always recognised that they must acknowledge the prevailing

rules and codes o f behaviour. There is a general sense of what sovereignty entails at a

particular time. The outer limits o f freedom of action are conventionally (emphasis original)

defined and sovereignty is the right to act within those limits. Sovereignty, thus, is

conventionally defined, and therefore its perceived aspects change overtime.213 (Taylor 1991a:

76.) The ultimate result of this reasoning is actually that the state is immune to integration; * 211

211 When looking at Koskenniemi (above) on legal argumentation, one sees the dilemma in international law which results from the difficulty in deciding whether a state is a state because o f some subjective criteria, that is, whether the state really defines itself, or because o f some objective criteria, being defmed collectively - i.e., what comes first, the system or the state. The criteria for statehood is seen as a question of 'sufficient' isolation, independence or sovereignty from other states and entities. On the other hand, the internal matters of a state are excluded from the intervention from the part o f other states which makes the definition of the state an internal matter at the discretion of the states themselves.

211 As practical examples, Taylor points out that as constraints emerged on the independent ability o f Britain to control its own economy, the British simply changed their view about the outer edges of sovereign action. He also refers to the example o f military contingency planning, which used to be seen by the states as a matter of their exclusive sovereignty. In NATO, however, joint planning became the norm without creating the sense that sovereignty had been endangered. Precisely the opposite was the case: giving up an outmoded condition of sovereignty came to be seen as necessary in order to preserve sovereignty.

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the argumentation about sovereignty which simply changes meaning in time and place is close

to self-validation, implying that nothing really can be said.214

Similarly, the previous analysis pointed out problems also in the non-state-centred view.

Statements about the factual decline or non-centrality o f the position of the state require firm

definitions o f integration - or Europeanisation, or internationalisation - in terms o f the nature

of the 'European', o f the changes this development causes or requires from the participants,

as well as clear views of the situation o f departure in the state studied. Easily, the demands

on the state become unrealistic, or else the state cannot be dealt with at all due to the

apprehension for excessive state-centrism. 'Integration' comes to be loaded with explanatory

tasks, something that leads away from the question and explanation of what integration

actually is (cf. Bartel son and chapter 1). In a way, one could even see the framework as a

mental disposition for observing certain changes and indicating integration, not something

else, as their cause215.

A firm opposition to state-centrism faces a particular dilemma especially because o f its

assumptions about the autonomy of the state - that the state is not autonomous (enough) to

be the main actor - and the similarity o f states, or that all states can be considered similar in

this respect. Both the questions of state autonomy and state similarity might be, in fact,

exceedingly complicated to function as a solid basis for a framework.

The critics of pluralism emphasise that the state is much more autonomous and that the state

preferences are at least as important as those o f the civil society in accounting for what a state

does; state autonomy is the translation o f state preferences into public policy and the existence

o f autonomously adopted policies.216 (Nordlinger 1981: 26). In other words, the pluralists -

ÎH Similar argumentation for opposite views on the state appears in many different contexts, e.g., in discussing international treaties, which seem to set limits to state action while, on the other hand, their stipulation is considered as evidence of sovereign status, or the status of international organisations as subjects of international law: this status can be interpreted as meaning relative autonomy vis-à-vis the state, or as a feature needed for functioning in a subordinated position, as a "tool" for the states.

m This might be particularly visible in concrete empirical cases such as how to anticipate or evaluate the possible consequences of EU membership for a country in economic terms, cases in which it .is clear that something will change, although the causes of the changes are very unclear and it is difficult to assess how significant they will be or when they will take place; cf. chapters four and five.

w Whether or not these policies correspond to societal preferences is related to representativeness or, in Nordlinger’s terms, how the public officials carry out, ignore and circumvent their representative responsibilities. In general terms, it is assumed that the goals of public officials comprise the realisation of both autonomy and societal support.(Nordlinger 1981: 206.)

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but also corporatists and Marxists, as Nordlinger remarks - simplify in explaining public

policy by societal constraints, as a response to the expectations and demands particularly of

those who control the most important resources, and in making the state little more than an

arena for social conflicts or interest mediation, dependent even to its existence from societal

forces. (Idem: 1-3, 5.) Accordingly, politics should be seen more as a question of rule and

control than one o f allocation, as in pluralism, and the state as an actor in its own right which

cannot be understood as a reflection of societal characteristics or preferences (Krasner 1984:

224-229).

Two assumptions strengthen this view. On the one hand, an important factor which

contributes to Nordlinger's conclusions is his way of seeing the state as a defined group of

individuals.217 Nordlinger argues that public officials can act on their preferences not only in

absence of opposition but also despite opposition. They have different ways to free themselves

from the control o f private actors. The state can affect the societal preferences and direct

them, freeing itself from opposition or constrain. It can also bring about a shift in the

alignments of societal resources or reinforce societal convergence. In fact, Krasner specifies

a wide array of resources which public officials can use to strengthen their own position and

secure their preferences or in arguing for their autonomy - for instance, limiting resources or

masking decision-making procedures, (Nordlinger 1981: 209-210; Krasner 1984: 230-231.)2,i * 218

117 For Nordlinger, it is important that the state refers to individuals, since only individuals have preferences; the definition must also be neutral and generalisable to all states in all times, and therefore he excludes sovereignty, coercion and legitimacy from the definition, being variables both inside and among states. Thus, the state refers to all those individuals who occupy offices that authorise them, and them alone, to make and apply decisions that are binding upon any and all segments of society; made up of and limited to those individuals who are endowed with society-wide decision-making authority upon any and all private actors (Nordlinger 1981: 9-

11).

218 This discussion can be directly linked to the views on integration as strengthening the state. Navari argues that the international element is used to resolve the problem presented by the state seen as free from society and capable of autonomous action, though still in some relation to society. She refers to Skocpol and Giddens, for whom the state's participation in an international system of competition both frees the state elite and yet keeps it chained to some social 'reality'. (Navari 1991a: 10.) Skocpol notes that the state's involvement in an international network of states is a basis for potential autonomy of action over and against inside groups, also the dominant class (quoted in Nordlinger 1981; 23). Accordingly, integration is pointed out as one aspect of international relations which increases the autonomy of the state, either through the increased problem-solving capacity (Kahler 1987: 299-302) or through increasing independence from society (Halliday 1991: 196, 199-200). In fact, Halliday (1994: 78-80) argues that seeing how and why international participation strengthens the state requires distinguishing between the state and society and understanding the relation between the two as variable. Cemy (1990: 96-102), in turn, sees that the international system can help maintain the state as a structure.

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The second assumption concerns institutions, their nature and what the category of institutions

actually comprises. When Krasner claims that a greater emphasis should be put on

institutional constraints on individual behaviour in that structures limit, even determine, both

the actors' conceptions of their own interests and their political resources, he seems to com e

close to the non-state-centred view. In reality, however, he is underlining the importance o f

the state as an institution, including certain administrative apparatus, legal order and political

beliefs or ideology, which coordinates expectations, delineates legitimate modes o f interaction

between state and society and serves as a basic source o f identity. Krasner avails him self also

o f some (assumed) characteristics of institutions, in particular the idea that institutional change

is difficult, episodic and dramatic rather than continuous and incremental. The influence o f

institutions is, thus, magnified by their unresponsiveness to the environment. Krasner claims

that institutions respond more to their own needs than to those o f their domestic society o r

the international environment. The state as administrative apparatus and legal order does not

adjust smoothly to changes in its domestic environment. Once in place, institutions will rather

perpetuate themselves, also since the cost o f maintaining existing institutions may be less than

the cost of creating and maintaining new ones, implying a possibly growing incongruence

between the state and its environment. (Krasner 1984: 234-235 and 1989: 84-86.)

In the end, the autonomy of the state is not an empirical variable in that it could somehow

be measured. As Nordlinger (1981: 21) argues, state autonomy is not the same as state

capacities, powers or strength. Actually, their relationship can even be inverse: a state with

wide-ranging capacities is also confronted with great demands and pressures. Rather, the

question is linked to the choice o f assumptions, especially the already familiar twist over

whether the state should be seen as an actor, a structure, or both - the last alternative being

the most presumable and also the most complicated in practice. For Skocpol, for instance, the

state's position is actually based on its being both an actor and an institutional structure with

effects in politics. It is an autonomous organisation which can formulate and pursue goals

which are not simply reflective of the demands or interests o f social groups or society. This

is because extranational orientations, challenges in maintaining domestic order, organisational

resources which collectivities of state officials may be able to draw on and deploy; essentially,

the autonomy is not a fixed structural feature, and the power and capabilities o f the state

depend and are uneven across policy areas. (Skocpol 1985: 9,14-17.) On the other hand, then,

the state matters not simply because of the goal-oriented activities of state officials, but also

in that their organisational configurations affect political culture, encourage some types o f

group formation and collective political action but not other types, and make possible the

raising of certain political issues, but not others (idem: 21).

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Analogously, then, the question of whether the states are essentially similar to each other is

a question of theoretical assumptions, in this case perhaps more clearly also one which

depends on the discipline in question. In much of the realist international relations literature,

particularly following from Waltz 1979, states are essentially seen as similar to each other;

their differences do not count, except for some strategic differences in capabilities. It has been

commonplace to use the stand on whether or not states are similar as a crucial divide between

the disciplines o f political science and international politics, the former focusing on the

differences, the latter assuming that there are no differences.219 Thus, for instance Nettl (1968),

for whom states are so different that in some of them, there actually is no 'state' at all, argues

that this does not apply for international relations; Ferguson and Mansbach (1989: 2, 83)

observe that a certain concept of state defines in practice the boundaries of the discipline of

international relations. However, it is not only the realists who retain that states are similar;

the same assumption is clear in the critics' argumentation that states * without distinctions -

are not central.

The essential problem is that in order somehow to verify the assumptions of state centrality

and state similarity, if that is needed, one has to take the variety of states into consideration,

and thus analyze the state, instead of making it something unanalysable as the extreme

positions tend to do. The dilemma behind this kind of verification is illustrated in Nordlinger's

problem of how to show that the state is not autonomous. He sees that the imminent problem

of theories of the pluralist type is that as they fail to differentiate state and society, they do

not have any possibility of validating their own assumptions either: only if state and society

are distinguished does it become possible to make a case for the autonomy [but also non*

autonomy] of the state (Nordlinger 1981: 4-5). In other words, although any distinction

between the state and society is a simplification, it has to be drawn in order to validate the

thesis of non-autonomy or to show the existence of a trend in which the state has become less

and less distinctive (idem: 12-13). The same is true for state similarity: the possibility of

arguing like Halliday (1994: 95) that international pressure makes the states increasingly

compelled to conform to each other in their internal arrangements, requires an analytical

starting point in seeing the states as dissimilar. 119

119 A study of integration based on the assumption of state similarity obviously yields quite different results from those based on the assumption that states are different and that, accordingly, the relationship between the state and integration is also variable. In practice, assuming state similarity simplifies the analysis. Differentiating between states is not unproblematic: a mere distinction between large and small states (e.g., Aron [1963: 52] who notes that an integrated Europe gives better safeguards to the small states than a Europe composed o f sovereign states) leads to endless discussions on what constitutes a small state.

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The argumentation about the non-centrality of the state, far from decreasing the need fo r

studying the state, even increases it. The position o f the state in the analysis is, in fact,

ambivalent: on the one hand, it is needed for comparison and verification, on the other, it is

seen to hamper the analysis. Moreover, if used, it is easily attributed unrealistic characteristics.

One might recall Alger remarking that the way in which neofunctionalists [!] use the state as

a yardstick in the analysis of integration inhibits them from seeing anything new or different.

Furthermore, Alger notes, the characteristics of states thus used are exaggerated: they are

assumed to have single centres o f authority, co-ordination and planning, and a clear

hierarchical organisation. (Alger 1981:136-137, 140.)220 Similarly demanding criteria appeared

above in Taylor's features of federation (read: statehood) - superiority of federal law, an

independent sphere of central authority, constitutional immunity against dissolution by

secession of the constituent regions, exclusive control of foreign relations and defence by the

central government, possibility to amend the federal constitution without the consent o f all

constituent regions (Taylor 1983: 270). They appear also in Wallace (1996: 451) when he sees

the EU as a quasi-state "without the coherent articulation of interests and political preferences

characteristic o f a well-developed polity”. In other words, not only is the EC expected to have

state-like characteristics, these characteristics are somehow imaginary, and it is not clear that

they would fit the states, either. In fact, also Keohane and Hoffmann (1991: 12) remark that

”[P]ortrayals o f the state are often bedeviled by the image o f an ideal-typical 'state' whose

authority is unquestioned and whose institutions work smoothly. No such state has ever

existed(;...).w These high demands obviously increase the 'immunity' considered above.

It is not strange, therefore, that the concept of state now disappears, now appears again in the

studies o f political science and international relations. The concept has in successive waves

been thrown out and "brought back in" both as an analytical concept and as a research focus.

Its virtual absence from the professional academic lexicon in the 1950s and 1960s - as

Krasner puts it - shaped the beginnings o f integration studies. Pluralist and structural-

functionalist approaches dominated both political science and sociology, replacing the 'old-

fashioned' state by society-centred explanations of politics and governmental activities and the

study of, i.a., government, interest groups and voting (cf. Skocpol 1985: 4). A contributing

factor to its dismissal was perhaps the relatively 'stateless' environment in which the research

220 In Alger's view, integration scholars have not differed from other scholars in international relations: "they have rarely freed themselves form the outlooks o f those whose actions they study. Rather, the hallmark of their craft has been legitimization of the operating theories of these officials by translating them into scholarly language. In the process they have also legitimized these practitioners in the eyes of the public at large by accepting their self-proclaimed roles in world affairs - an important part o f their operating theories" (Alger 1981: 137).

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took place, the United States. Nettl (1968: 561-562), for whom conceptual changes are both

"ideologically and geographically" conditioned, notes that the erosion of the concept o f state

coincided with the shift of the centre o f gravity of social science to the United States;

similarly, Nordlinger (1981: 5) remarks that a concept of state has been barely thinkable in

the United States. A geographical concentration of research facilitated, at least, a development

of a methodologically and conceptually uniform research agenda.

Yet, the state did not disappear for a long time. Perhaps its "skeletal, ghostly existence" has

remained there all the time, as Nettl (1968: 559) expressed it, as "for all the changes in

emphasis and interest of research, the thing exists and no amount o f conceptual restructuring

can dissolve it." In fact, the concept returned in the 1960s with the renewed success of

Marxist state theories, which actually predict the crisis and dissolution of the state (Cassese

1986: 120) and in the mid-1970s with the questions o f the extent of state autonomy and the

relations between the state and its environment (Krasner 1984: 223-224). In integration

studies, the 'introduction' of domestic politics approach managed, in fact, to put the state

newly in the focus of attention. The state was vigorously reintroduced via three routes. First,

through explaining EU policy outcomes on the basis o f national positions, domestic

environment and policy-making; secondly, it came through analyzing the EU policy-making

with the help of the toolkit o f domestic politics but, and here is an essential difference,

making the national level disappear from between (either by concentrating on the EU

institutions, like in studying a particular state, or by linking relevant parts o f the domestic

political settings, political parties and the like, directly to these institutions). Thirdly, it was

reintroduced when analyzing the influence o f the EU on a particular state, reversing the first

research setting.

To sum up, the tenacity of disciplinary frameworks faced with the domain of integration

cannot go unnoticed. Instead of blurring their divisions, integration studies might do a favour

by locating and underlining the divide. Disciplines are, in a way, necessarily artificial; the

basic reasons for maintaining disciplinary divisions, the interplay between different disciplines,

the internal order o f a particular discipline and debates on whether some field does or does

not constitute a discipline do not necessarily have anything to do with any real qualities of

the objects o f study. Rather, the existence of disciplines requires an affirmation and protection

o f their dissimilarity; they need a consensus on that they actually are different and also all

needed. One could assume, thus, that there is a 'conservative' debate on the disciplines similar

to that on different schools of thought (see above).

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In the case of integration studies, one can clearly see that the disciplines have a stake in

maintaining that they are different: the difference between domestic politics and international

relations can be presented in accentuated rather than 'blurred1 terms, as when both

supranationalism and intergovemmentalism are seen as theories which focus on the

characteristics o f the EC as an international organisation instead of studying it as domestic

politics (Bulmer 1993), or when Hix (1994) maintains that neofunctionalism too is an

international relations approach. The practice o f presenting the own view as superior to the

others also persists, as do, in fact, the reasons for why it is seen to be better. One can thus

add Krasner (1984: 243) to the list of those who see as the assets of the own approach ("new

statism") the inclination to see disjunctures and stress within any given political system and

to take into account historical evolution; moreover, it is seen to allow for the study o f the

influence and change of political institutions and their adequate descriptions. (Krasner 1984:

226-230).

Indeed, whether or not one agrees that this particularly disciplinary division between

international relations and domestic politics is appropriate, it is certainly necessary to adm it

the existence o f basic theoretical problems which cannot be overcome by simply adhering to

either the one or the other discipline, as is often done. That is, it is not possible to simply to

claim that one o f them 'suits better’ as both not only suit, but are also needed, as exemplified

by the neglect o f the state which, albeit avoiding the shortcomings of state-centrism, leads to

problems which recall the necessity o f looking at the state.

3.3.4 Values

Among the main factors influencing the views on the relationship between the state and

integration, values play a fundamental role. Yet, their role is seldom recognised. The general

idea that science could be completely value-free may no longer convince large audiences, but

in the case of particular theories, the assumption of objectivity still seems to live on, and the

theories are seldom, if at all, analyzed as to the values they represent. Similarly, while 'the

state' is easily recognised as a value-laden concept, the theoretical statements where it is used

are not necessarily seen to involve values. At the same time, in the case o f integration

theories, some o f the most clearly value-laden statements on the state can be found in the

writings which otherwise adhere to the ideal of objectivity and value-free science.

Not only does the understanding o f the state often involve attitudes - inclination or aversion

- in discord with the empirical character o f the study; this understanding also tends to colour

(i

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the understanding o f integration and the whole question of the relationship between the two.

The analysis of integration, in fact, seems at least partly based on views on the state which

are value statements and therefore cannot be 'verified' or 'falsified' through empirical evidence.

Further, statements o f value and statements of empirical facts seem to get confused in that the

former are accumulated and transmitted further in the guise o f statements o f empirical origin.

It is imperative, thus, to distinguish between facts and values in order to locate the

consequences the latter has for research. This section is concerned with identifying the values

involved in three particularly influential statements concerning the state and integration -

without, for that reason, claiming that values would not play a role in other examples as well.

The statements or assumptions are, first, that the state is not an adequate or appropriate form

of political organisation, second, that it is no longer capable o f fulfilling its functions, and

third, that international relations are inherently conflictual due to the contentious character of

the state. All three are actually implied in the first view on the state and integration, i.e.,

seeing integration as a remedy for the inherent weaknesses o f the state and the state system.

Concretely, statements on the value of the state or the estimate in which the state is held, are

identified as positive or negative judgements, explicit or implicit, on its usefulness or

importance.

The state is a value-laden concept par excellence, a concept which has strong normative

connotations and which, at least below the surface, often carries a multitude of positive and

negative beliefs and attitudes. Its value-ladenness can actually be seen as an essential reason

for the difficulties in finding a consensus about the proper meaning of the concept. As Grant

points out, the concept of state is actually composed of two inherent and equally important

parts, the one formal, the other ethical. Thus, even in case o f a shared understanding o f the

formal component or definition of the concept, one would still have a variety of different

views on the second part of the concept, that is, on values concerning the nature and functions

o f the state. (Grant 1988: 691-692, 709; cf. chapter 1.)

Further, it is useful to divide the ethical or normative component by distinguishing between

instrumental and intrinsic values: the state can be seen to be valuable as a means for

something else, in which case it has instrumental value, or it can be seen as a value or an end

in itself, which is the case o f intrinsic value. The question of whether the state has

instrumental or intrinsic value is actually among the most far-reaching divisions in political

theories. On the one side, as proponents of instrumental value, one could mention Hobbes,

for whom the state guarantees a minimum political subsistence and the only defence against

anarchy, J.S. Mill, or Locke, for whom the purpose o f the state is to protect private property

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and represent property interests. Especially for Locke and Mill, the state is, as it were, a

matter of choice, one instrument among others. On the other side, Hegel - together with, i.a.,

Aristotle, Burke and Rousseau - represents those for whom the state has intrinsic value. F or

Hegel, individuals are constituted by the institutions and practice of which they are part; there

are rights of the collective which are different from and more important than those o f the

individual. (Grant 1988: 693-, esp. 704-708.)

This theoretical distinction is an integral part also of the discussion of the state in integration

studies: statements on the diminishing or altogether nonexistent value of the state as such o r

as a means for somethirg else form a central, although rarely explicit part o f the

understanding o f integration. Thus, the distinction serves in the following as a device fo r

classifying the value statements identified in the studies.

Intrinsic value, or the nature o f the state

In view of all the disagreement on the proper understanding of the state, it is somewhat

surprising to find a fair consensus about its intrinsic value, not only in integration studies but

also in international relations literature in general. Or rather, one might speak about a

consensus on the lack o f intrinsic value: mostly, in fact, the state is pointed out as the cause

of different problems and injustices. In particular, it is remarked that states are by nature war-

prone, the relations between states being intrinsically conflictual, and that the state is an

inadequate or ineffective form of political organisation. In Bull's words, we are constantly

reminded that the state is an obstacle to the achievement of a viable world order, peace and

security, that it stands in the way of the promotion o f economic and social justice in world

society and hampers efficient solutions to the problem o f living in harmony with environment

in that the division o f mankind into states prevents tackling problems on a global scale (Bull

1979: 111). Statehood is seen as morally indefensible egotism either because it creates

artificial distinctions among members o f the human community or because state apparatuses

are used for the oppression of individuals (Koskenniemi 1994: 23).

This view seems even to unite the critics and the criticised, to judge from Hoffmann, who

despite the role of a state-centred realist portrays the nation states as "often inchoate,

economically absurd, administratively ramshackle, and impotent yet dangerous in international

politics". The problem for him is that the states still remain the basic units as there is no

agreement o f what could replace them. As such, they are also central for the understanding

of integration. As the highest possessor o f power, the nation-state functions as initiator, pace­

setter, supervisor, even destroyer in relation to the larger entity. The very existence o f the

-< L

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states is a formidable obstacle to their replacement; the system is, in fact, profoundly

conservative of the diversity of nation-states. (Hoffmann 1966; 863, 866, 908-909; cf.

Hoffmann 1982: 26, 30.)

In the early writings on integration, one can perceive a clear mistrust towards the state. In

fact, they were focused on resolving the problem of war which stemmed from the system of

separate, sovereign states. Thus, the federalists were advocating a federal structure with a

common central authority as a model which would render the otherwise bellicose interstate

relations equally peaceful and organised as relations between the parts of a federal state.

Mitrany, also concerned for peace and security and the aim of finding new ways of organising

the relations between states, argued, on the contrary, that federations would not solve the

problem of war, only magnify it, reproducing the logic of political exclusion and the system

o f national state on a larger scale, and actually constituting a threat to security.

Similarly, Deutsch et a l (1957) write about the building of a wider political community in

order to eliminate war. The rather negative view on the state which is in the background of

that effort becomes clear especially in Deutsch's book on international relations through his

characterisation of foreign policy. It was noted in chapter two how Deutsch, in the best realist

style, claimed that the foreign policy o f every country deals, first, with the preservation of

independence and security, and, second, with the pursuit and protection o f its economic

interests, particularly those of its most influential interest groups. This, in his view, implies

that the countries aim at resisting penetration and manipulation by foreign countries and

ideologies, while simultaneously accomplishing active penetration and manipulation o f their

own, spreading their national and ideological propaganda, e.g., through economic aid or

support of cultural and scientific exchange missions. (Deutsch 1968: 87-88.)

This state o f affairs makes it understandable that integration is needed, although it is also

difficult to achieve. In Deutsch’s view, most governments and people prefer sovereignty to

integration, which would diminish their capacities and prestige. Yet, Deutsch argues that

mankind is unlikely to survive for long without a new political climate, greater international

openness, understanding and compassion, which help to achieve integrated political

communities in the long term. (Deutsch 1968: 202). Later, he hopes that scientific and

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technological breakthroughs will shorten the time needed for dismantling the coercive s ta te

machineries221. (Deutsch 1986: 220-221.)

Similarly for Haas (1964), who also avails himself o f rather strong expressions, the adverse

character of the state plays a role in the reasoning for functional organisation. Functional

organisation, for him, is a way to overcome "the distorting role of the modem state w ith

respect to the possibilities of human fulfilment". Haas goes on to notice that pre-industrial an d

pre-national primary occupational groups were the "true focuses for human happiness" because

they afforded a sense of participation in the solution o f practical problems. The rise o f th e

territorially bounded, omnicompetent national state led to the loss of group spontaneity an d

an end to the tendency to identify with occupational colleagues elsewhere, while the search

for national security became the focus o f life in the state. Even the administration o f general

welfare measures, such as social security legislation, took place within the depersonalised

context of the state structure. "The unnatural state" took the place o f natural society.222

Both Haas 1958 and Haas 1964 can be seen as presenting reasons for the preferability o f

integration to the previous state of affairs. Integration needs to be explained, since it involves

new or unusual elements - characteristics which integration obviously assumes in juxtaposition

to the classical view on the egoistic and competitive behaviour of sovereign states in

international relations. In the case of the ECSC, Haas observes that a special code o f conduct

or supranational attitude emerges among the participants; the rule of simple intergovernmental

bargaining from fixed positions is abandoned in favour of delegation of power to experts and

mediation; collective action and review replace specific national demands (Haas 1958: xxxiv,

515-520). More generally, as functions create loyalties and the transfer of functions thus

reorients them towards welfare agencies, the field o f the non-controversial widens, and

cooperation becomes possible, in the long run, in all interstate relations (Haas 1964: 6).

121 Deutsch even estimates that these machineries will be needed - for national defence and for immigration control - until about 2200 A.D. Afterwards, only the provision o f services and the production o f goods will be left under the administration of the state.

222 In claiming that a true solution to peace would be "the réintroduction of man, united in natural occupational groupings that ignore territorial boundaries" (Haas 1964: 9-10), Haas actually comes close to Mitrany, who proposes that cross-border activities would pave the way towards international society by bringing an end to the 'artificial amputations', the situation in which social actions are arbitrarily cut at the limit o f the state with only uncertain ways of linking them across the border (Mitrany 1943: 42). Mitrany also criticises the old, static and strategic view of peace as keeping nations quietly apart; his view of peace is social, bringing the states actively together. For him, the meaning of security as the security of a physical territory is outdated; instead, security is seen as an undisturbed social life, to be preserved by common government (idem: 27, 51).

163

On the other hand, however, Haas also leaves space for the state to change. For him,

supranationalism seems the appropriate regional counterpart to the national state which no

longer "feels capable" of realising welfare within its borders and which has "made its peace

with interdependence". In the process o f integration, the interests of the actors, including

governments, change: the state itself comes to see its interests in a different way (Haas 1963).

On the basis of a calculation of advantage, governments recognise a point beyond which

attempts to sidestep the decisions of the common authority are unprofitable (Haas 1958: xxxii-

xxxv).223 Haas sees that the governments are able to learn the art of revising their demands

and seeking new ways of satisfying them without destroying themselves in the process (Haas

1964: 81) - although seeing this ability as a consequence of integration is odd as it

presupposes that the states did not previously have the capacity to revise their demands

according to the environment.

What is seen as the essential core of the state is perhaps more often than not seen in negative

terms also in that the functions of coercion and defence are emphasised at the expense of

other functions. In all, the state is easily made a scapegoat for all kinds o f failures, and its

persistence a reason for pessimism and passivity as to the possibilities of improvement.224 At

the same time, as Bull (1979: 114-115) remarks, there is no reason to assume that any

alternative order would not be associated with the same problems; in his view, abolishing the

state system would not as such bring any alleviation, since the problems associated with the

state, such as war or economic injustice, actually have deeper causes than those embodied in

any particular form of political organisation.

The consequences o f the view that the state has scarce intrinsic value are tangible both in the

understanding of international relations and of integration. The egoistic character of the state

is seen to make it war-prone, something which makes international relations inherently

unstable and conflictual, and interstate cooperation so difficult. Perhaps as the utmost

representative of this logic of state action, Tilly (1985: 181, 184-185) describes the activities

which states carry on "under the general heading o f organised violence" as war making

333 Haas argues that permanent isolation from the commitment to unity is possible only at the expense of welfare; for him, supranationalism is the method to secure maximal welfare, including military security, for a post-capitalist state, victory of economy over politics and over nationalism (Haas 1963: 67-73).

224 On the other hand, realism itself seems often a strawman, the villain of the story. Bull reminds that the term 'statist' is applied in a pejorative sense to describe those unable to free themselves from the bad old ways, while "it is difficult to believe that anyone ever asserted the 'states-centric' view of international politics that is today so knowingly rejected by those who seek to emphasise the role 'the new international actors'" (Bull 1979: 111- 112).

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(elimination or neutralisation o f outside rivals), state making (elimination or neutralisation o f

inside rivals), protection (elimination or neutralisation o f the enemies of the states' clients) and

extraction (acquiring the means of carrying out the first three activities). The consequence fo r

international relations is that war becomes the normal condition; external competition creates

internal state making.

In reality, the view involves an unavoidable circularity. The state is seen to behave necessarily

in a specific way because of the nature o f the system o f states where it simply has to behave

like that; the nature of the system, however, is not a real cause but only a logical

consequences o f the assumed nature o f its composing units, the sovereign states.

Secondly, the view also contributes in rendering the concept of integration equally value ­

laden. Integration comes to be seen as something positive in that it is depicted as a solution

to the problems o f the states system otherwise unattainable, not only because of an adherence

to its broad goals as expressed in the Treaty of Rome. Thus, a negative view on the state can

be a ground for arguments in favour o f integration; conversely, a positive view on the state

may induce a negative view on integration, if the state and integration are seen as

incompatible. This could even be presented in the form o f a simple table concerning the

values (positive and negative attitudes) towards integration, as explained by the view on the

state and the understanding of the relation between the state and integration:

relation state-integration relation state-integration

symbiotic antagonistic

view on the state positive + -

view on the state negative - +

Instrumental value, or the declining position o f the state

As regards the instrumental value of the state, an argument comparable in popularity to that

o f the problematic nature of the state, is the argument about the decreasing importance,

diminishing centrality or withering away o f the state. Indeed, in speaking about the profession

o f international lawyers, Koskenniemi (1994: 23) notes that there is probably no general

statement about the condition o f the object o f study that arouses more enthusiasm than the

Á

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thesis of the 'withering away of the state'. In a similar vein, Navari (1991b) remarks that the

thesis is advocated from a whole theoretical spectrum from systems theorists, realists and

political economists to pluralist, socialists and marxists. The different reasons for seeing the

state as no longer what it used to be, or no longer capable o f fulfilling its functions, for

seeing that the state gradually loses its ability to control or to govern what was called

'national economy' and the ability to influence its environment are often gathered in general

statements about the crisis of the nation state or that of the welfare state225. As a general

consequence, it is seen that the state no longer is the central actor in international relations

it once was.

Classifying these statements as reflecting values rather than facts may seem curious. Mostly,

indeed, when an author claims that the state no longer is what it used to be, he is explicitly

referring to empirical facts as the basis for that claim. Koskenniemi, too, discerns these

arguments from the criticisms based on ethical or moral considerations; the state is seen to

wither away because of factual developments in the international world, such as

interdependence and globalisation of politics. As a result, states are no longer able to handle

even their own external security, not to mention problems such as air pollution, without

entering into forms of cooperation which entail dissolution of their sovereignty. (Koskenniemi

1994: 23.) Nevertheless, these statements evidently concern the instrumental value of the state,

not always clearly discernible from arguments on intrinsic value. Moreover, they also tend to

assume the role o f assumptions.

Various coinciding examples of reasons for the decline of the state can be found in the

literature, usually similar also as to the consequences of this decline in terms of the disability

o f the state to fulfil its functions. States are seen to be simultaneously threatened from

different directions: the development of military technology renders traditional security policy

and military alliances meaningless, transnational markets and multinational enterprises threaten

national trade and social policies, and global environmental problems question the control of

the state. Furthermore, also cultural challenges, the diminishing cultural differences, and

growing sub-, supra- and transnationalism, challenge the state. Together, these factors make 111

111 Cf. the recent special issues of Dcedatus (vol. 124 (2) 1995, 'What Future for the State'), Political Studies (vol. XLÜ, 1994, 'Contemporary Crisis of the Nation State?’) and West European Politics (vol. 17 (3) 1994, 'The State in Western Europe - Retreat or Redefinition?*). - One can further distinguish between external 'state retreat', the erosion o f state autonomy in international arenas, manifest in, e.g., the transfer of certain functions, and internal retreat, the diminution of state authority and activity (expenditure) at the domestic level; for an introduction, see Müller, C. Wolfgang - Wright, Vincent (1994): 'Reshaping the State in Western Europe: The Limits to Retreat'. West European Politics, vol. 17 (3), pp. 1-11. See also Haass 1979.

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the state less able to fulfil its functions in security, welfare, and social justice. (Brown 1988:

41-43, 160, 193-.)

Strange argues that although states collectively are not obsolete (indeed, they are still the most

influential and therefore critical sources o f authority in the world system), they are becoming

defective: like old trees, they are hollow in the middle, even though they still grow new

shoots. For Strange, authority over society and economy is becoming increasingly diffused

after two or three centuries in which it became increasingly centralised in the institution o f

the state. She proposes that state authority - and, consequently, state legitimacy - has

diminished partly because it has leaked away, both horizontally and vertically, partly because

it seems to have just evaporated. The state authority is undermined, first, as a result o f the

growing asymmetries of state authority, which make the notion of state sovereignty

increasingly a fiction. Second, some authority over less politically sensitive issues has shifted

from national states to international authorities of various kinds - interstate, private and

commercial, such as IMF, the European Commission, Greenpeace or transnational

corporations and banks. The authority o f the state is increasingly either shared with, sustained

or constrained by these authorities. Within many states, the authority o f the state is also

increasingly shared with local and regional authorities. (Strange 1995: esp. 55-57, 63, 66-67).

In the background of this development, there is a profound structural change, determined by

the increased pace and costs of technological development and changes in international

financial structure, in particular the increased capital mobility, a change which has severed

the connection between the power of the state and its control over the territory. Power over

production, security, credit, and ideas is now also exercised from outside the territory.

Accelerating technological change proposes that the nature o f the competition between states

in the international system has changed, and so have the nature of the states and their

behaviour towards one another.226 In this new situation, the state has growing difficulties in

fulfilling its functions, such as progress in industrialisation and raising o f living standards.

(Strange 1989: 169-170; Strange 1995: 58-60; Stopford and Strange 1991:43-44,49-50,205.)

336 Accelerating technological change implies increasing capital costs and internationalisation o f production; the key factors of production are no longer land, labour and capital, but capital, information and energy; thus, instead of competing over territory and wealth-creating resources, the states are now competing for market shares in the world economy. The governments become aware that they are competing for the favours of foreign firms, inducing them to enter, on the other hand, the authority of the state over the enterprises inside their territorial borders diminishes. Industrial policy and trade policy become more important than defence and foreign policy; states are obliged to seek commercial rather than military allies, and these might well be, e g., foreign-owned firms. (Strange 1995: 58-60; see also Stopford and Strange 1991, esp. 43-44, 205; Strange 1989: 169-170.

167

In the studies of integration, the arguments on the decline o f the state appear at least in three

versions. Firstly, integration is seen as one of the challenges to the state, as one reason for

its withering away. Integration, thus, weakens the state, which makes irrelevant the

frameworks where integration is explained as state policies, perhaps even the use of the term

'state1 in the analysis. The fact that decision-making and rule-making is increasingly shifted

to the European level and made collective, multilateral or supranational, or perhaps tied to a

system of multilevel government, implies not only a dilution o f sovereignty but also

fundamental changes in the locus o f political control: Marks points out that states are, in

particular, losing their gnp on the mediation of domestic interest representation in

international relations. Although states remain "immensely strong institutions", they have not

sustained their former control o f individuals in their territories. (Marks 1995: 1; cf. Matlary

1995.)

Among the factors diminishing the role o f the state, the priority o f European community law

over domestic law in the areas o f Community competence is obviously central. States are

losing autonomy in the sphere of economy, but also over national defence and defence

procurement. Wallace remarks that they are also beginning to lose autonomy over the central

state functions of public order and maintenance of territorial boundaries. In his view, even

though little has changed for the state as a focus for popular identity and a basis for

legitimacy, the nation as a political and social community is disconnecting from the state as

provider of security and welfare; both the state and the nation have lost coherence, and the

European nation state is in retreat (Wallace 1994: 55, 74-76).

Others go on to claim that the position of the state is questioned also as to identity and

legitimacy. Matlary (1995: 100-102) sees that the state is in decline as a political ordering

principle and weakened as the source of democratic legitimacy, as tasks formerly undertaken

by the state are now increasingly on the international and EU agenda. Therefore, she argues,

a new type o f democratic theory is needed, looking back to federalist ideas, where subsidiarity

becomes a principle o f determining the appropriate locus and participants in decision-making.

Functional or corporate representation will become more important than territorial belonging

and the scope for non-state actors will increase; factors such as ethnicity become more

representative of identity than the state.227

227 Without entering any discussion on identity, one could simply note the differences in views on whether 'national identity' is as natural or as constructed as any other identity; one may see the nation state as a focus for social and political identity which is actively constructed and propagated by the state through national education, national history and national media (cf. Wallace 1994: 63, 69), but one might also see that the reason for a government to come about is essentially to maintain differences in culture, social institutions, religion and

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In the end, not much remains o f the traditional state. As Schmitter puts it, the state now least

resembles its historic self: it has lost its capacity for unitary action, its unchallenged centrality

in human existence, differentiation from civil society, boundedness and security stemming

from territorial exclusivity, sovereignty which separated and protected it from other political

units, and the monopoly of collective means o f violence (Schmitter 1991: 2-3).

As such, this argumentation fits well the criticism of realism's focus on the state. Accordingly,

Wallace sees academic analysts as placed in two camps, some defending the state as the only

political reality, others emphasising the relative novelty of the developed nation state, and the

radical implications of the adjustments the West European states are making in the face o f

changes. While the former stress the stable character o f the state, the latter see it as a product

of modernisation or the creation of an earlier process o f political, economic and social

integration over the past 100-200 years. In Wallace’s words, the latter, incarnated by Poul

Schluter, are less fundamentalist (emphasis added) as the former, as they see that

technological and economic innovation may indeed be rendering the concept o f the

autonomous nation state obsolete. The former - Margaret Thatcher and Charles de Gaulle -

see the nation state as a natural and permanent framework for political life, thereby

considering informal and formal integration as a fundamental threat and [?] an impossible

dream. (Wallace 1994: 55-56.)

A second way of linking integration and the position o f the state is to use the argument o f the

decreasing centrality o f the state as a rationale for integration. The decline o f the state can be

seen not only as a widely accepted fact, but also as an irreversible, natural process: as B eloff

(1963: 52, 55, 61) puts it, the middle-sized nation state is obsolete for many functions o f

modem government, and the need for larger political institutions "is widely felt". Examples

of this thinking were seen above, for instance in Haas 1963. Finally, as a third interpretation

o f the situation, one might see the realist position that in order to recuperate and regain the

lost capabilities or to face the new challenges, states choose to integrate. Integration, thus, is

seen as a method o f management o f the states' problems (e.g., Mil ward). One can also see an

incentive for integration in the widening o f the functions o f the state: governments are

increasingly measured or evaluated through their performance, through the goods and services

they now can provide only in cooperation with others (Wessels 1992: 42-43).

Nevertheless, the 'withering away' argument has some obvious problems linked, first, to its

ubiquity, and, second, to its nature as a statement of values. The ubiquity, or the sheer volume

traditions - differences seen as values to be defended (cf. Strange 1995).

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of the argument may increase its plausibility, but it may also undermine it: the overt

generality o f the statements about the decreasing value of the state is actually among their

main problems. They are not particularly time and space specific; they might have become

more common in recent years, but this does not necessarily reflect a corresponding change

in reality. Rather, it could evidence accumulation, an emerging consensus in seeing reality in

these terms. It is, in fact, difficult to locate a starting point in time for these arguments; the

1990's 'Europeanisation' is not such, nor is the 1970s's discussion on transnationalism,

interdependence and new actors.

Parallel to this discussion, counterarguments have also thrived. On the one hand, it has been

argued that if the state is not always directly able to control changes, it can adapt, and often

also benefit from them, increasing its power (e.g., Rosenau 1989, Thomson and Krasner 1989,

Puchala 1993). For some, the role of the state has also dramatically grown through its

geographical and functional spreading, even to the point of bringing an end to the autonomy

o f transnational relations (Bull 1979: 112-113). On the other hand, it has been emphasised that

no unambiguous or definitive changes have actually taken place; it is noted that the state has

never been the only central actor in international relations (Bull 1979: 112-113) or that the

state has always been part of a system o f competing and mutually involved states (Skocpol

1985: 8; see also the discussion on the state-centred view above.)

It is therefore not surprising that somewhat more cautious, balancing views appear which

leave space for both interpretations. Some see that a more general transformation of the state

takes place (e.g., Rosecrance 1996). It is also remarked that the changes notwithstanding,

states still remain very powerful (Strange 1995, Marks 1995), or that the same types of

changes may in different times have different effects. For example, Wallace notes that

economic integration, industrial modernisation and technological innovation have previously

operated in an opposite way, to reinforce national political systems, something which explains

that the 1960s were the high point of national consolidation and state management of

economy and society. The question is now whether these forces still function like this.

Moreover, not all national autonomy is lost, as the national abilities in education, research and

development or partnerships with companies show. The governments may also move on to

the European plane in pursuit o f objectives they no longer can achieve on a national basis.

(Wallace 1994: 61, 68.)

The 'withering away’ arguments are rather problematic as regards the possibilities of

answering whether they actually are true. For the first, they are said to apply to all states, that

is, to an abstract idea o f the state rather than to a particular case. Arguments about states in

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general, however, are inconsistent with the obvious differences in the existing states. It is

certainly true that "different states manage differently", and that the divergences between

countries is growing (Stopford and Strange 1991: 29). The question of the degree o f similarity

needed in order to claim that states in general, even a particular group of states, is 'withering

away' is intricate. Secondly, an empirical verification o f state power or position is obviously

complicated not only because these might not be countable - indeed, how to weigh the losses

in some sectors and the gains in others, or weigh the regionally differentiated influences? -

but also because the assessment of the state's effectiveness depends on whose view is taken

into account in the assessment.228 Analogously, it is difficult to ascertain whether the role o f

other actors has increased at the expense o f the state, as it is impossible to reduce the question

to quantitative terms (Bull 1979: 112-113); the mere existence of nonstate actors in

international relations does not prove that they are autonomous (Haass 1979: 131).

In the background o f these difficulties, there is the general problem that the assessment of the

state's value is complicated by the tendency of empirical elements to get intertwined with

value judgements: it is difficult not to find, at some stage, references to what the state should

be. This is particularly visible in the question of the functions o f the state. While there seems

to be a broad agreement on the fact that the state cannot fulfil its functions, the views on what

these functions are, or should be, seem to differ. Are the states' functions for instance security,

welfare and social justice, or, as Wallace (1994: 64) puts it, the preservation o f internal order,

maintenance of national boundaries, defence of national territory, provision of legitimate

government, services and welfare, and the promotion o f national prosperity? Are the functions

put in a specific order of importance? How is welfare interpreted - does it mean progress in

industrialisation and raising of living standards?

The discussion on state functions seems to involve, again, the problems of deciding whether

states are essentially similar, the tendency to depict the state in a relatively negative manner,

and the risk for creating a exaggerated image o f what the state has been or should be. One

228 Effectiveness is also linked to authority or loyalty. Strange (1995: 70-71), for instance, notes that it is not surprising that state authority declines if its role as the guardian of national security, on which obedience and authority used to rested, is insufficiently replaced by the welfare role of the state as guardian against economic insecurity. Dunn, in turn, argues that states which effectively promote the security of their subjects win, and deserve, a higher degree of loyalty than those that do not. In fact, he sees that if there is a contemporary crisis of the nation state, it must stem from a growing gap between the causal capabilities of even the more advanced nation states and the effective demands placed upon those powers. (Dunn 1994: 5, 11.) Indeed, the assessment is also influenced by the growing expectations on the state - Bull (1979: 119) notes how states are presumed to facilitate, e.g., the management of world economy, the eradication of world poverty, the promotion of racial equality and women's rights, the raising o f literacy and labour standards.

LI

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might argue with Navari that for those advocating the 'withering away' argument, the state has

some integral functions which it no longer can fulfil or which are no longer needed, while one

could also assume that there are no really indispensable functions.329 That these indispensable

features are portrayed in negative terms is questionable and returns the discussion to views

on the intrinsic value of the state - especially because o f the apparently neutral terminology

in which they are presented. The custom o f referring to the Weberian conception of the state

as some kind of basic, shared understanding illustrates this problem well: when Wallace, as

an example, avails himself of this view in arguing that the "irreducible minimum o f the

concept of a state" is a body which exercises an accepted monopoly of violence within its

boundaries and a willingness to use violence against outsiders to defend those boundaries,

frontier controls and rights of entry and residence being among the most basic tenets o f the

nation state (Wallace 1994: 61-62, 70), the state seems directed against someone more than

it is meant to be fo r someone. (Cf. Tilly, p. 163.)

Finally, statements about the loss of attributes and capabilities by the state seem to create an

understanding of the state as much more powerful than has actually ever been the case. It

often happens that the concrete state under observation is compared to rather demanding

definitions o f what the state should be, or has been, in order really to be a state. For instance,

Schmitter uses a rather sharp picture about the state, referring to Tilly and Weber: the state

is a "political organisation which uniquely controls the concentrated means of coercion within

a given contiguous territory, which exclusively claims the right to control the movement of

peoples and goods across its boundaries and which is formally centralised and differentiated

from society" (Schmitter 1991: 2-3, emphasis added). One can ask whether such exclusive

control ever has existed and if it has at some point in time and in some particular state,

whether this situation should be made a norm for what the state should be.

The subjective and the objective assessments, the values and the facts, thus, tend to get mixed

when evaluating the state, and, typically, those advocating a view opposite to the own are 229

229 Navari also reproaches them for assuming that the state is solely an outcome of social forces which has no logic, purpose or interest o f its own. For her, not only does a logic o f the state exist: indeed, each state has a particular governing logic which may also include apparently illogical choices, such as diminution of powers - having less power may sometimes provide with more resources. (Navari 1991b: 143-144, 146-150.) Further, Navari notices the role of unintended consequences and the ambiguity of, e.g., regimes, which maintain the capacity to be a state (by financing of the state apparatus), enhance predictability, enlarge political scope and enhance the legal capacity of states (e.g., by making enforcement a matter o f international obligation) while they also involve unintended consequences such as the creation of international secretariat and their transformation into new political actors with their own logic. In the EC, she argues, states are always pushed into handing prerogatives either to the bureaucracy or to the market, because the alternative would involve handing them to another state; the states always retain the notional choice to withdraw. (Idem: 157-160.)

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accused o f employing subjective criteria. The 'withering away* school draws on what its

members see as factual changes in reality. Their opponents, in turn, reproach them for

replacing. objective assessments by subjective analyses o f the adequacy of the state -

something that Haass (1979:136), for example, sees as quite inconsistent with the 'modernism'

implied in their emphasis on interdependence and nonstate actors. Still, this tendency o f

mixing facts and values and the difficulty of constructing an objective view of the

instrumental value of the state seem to be inherent in the concept itself.

As Koskenniemi (1994) points out, a valid criticism o f the state cannot lean solely on facts

or values: it has to appeal to both empirical and ethical arguments. Therefore, criticisms

combine sociological rhetoric and ethical principles in order simultaneously to appear

objective and to appeal to conscience. At the same time, the ethical component of the critique

comprises contradictory evaluations: it is the Achilles’ heel which makes the criticism in the

end so feeble.

Koskenniemi illustrates this problem by going through no less than eight common criticisms

against the state. It is well worthwhile to reproduce the list here as it reveals not only that the

state has been criticised from all possible directions o f political thought, but also that the

criticisms can be played against each other. The by now familiar instrumental type o f

criticism, or what Koskenniemi calls "managerial critique", sees states as either too large or

too small to respond effectively to the recent challenges o f economy, technology and

legitimacy. Therefore, they should be replaced by functionally rational entities. On the other

hand, according to the neo-right critique o f the social welfare state, states hamper the creation

o f efficient financial and commodity markets: stressing the role of the market in creating

acceptable conditions for social life, it maintains that a workable system of production and

distribution can only be attained by eliminating state bureaucracies.

In addition to these, there is a legacy of criticisms stemming from the idea that the state in

some way serves some groups or individuals more than others. The neo-left critique of the

liberal Rechtstaat (in the 1950s to 1970s) criticises the state for being a tool for the

oppression of workers by the bourgeois class, and maintains that the false formality o f the

state should give way to the authentic, internationalist interests of the proletariat. The

conservative critique of real socialism, in turn, criticises the functioning of ideological state

apparatuses for furthering the interests o f the communist elite, being prisons o f nations;

instead, one should aim at realisation o f self-determination and authentic communities. The

critique o f elitism in third world, then, criticises the elites for betraying the ideals o f

decolonisation; states are instruments o f oppression, and there is need for "self-defence

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communities" instead of artificial structures. Ideologies o f human rights stress that the state

is an obstacle to the realisation o f human rights and individual freedoms and used as

justification for overruling these rights: the task, therefore, is to create regimes for the

protection of individuals against the assimilating structures o f the state. A cultural critique of

the state emphasises the primacy of spontaneous, indigenous cultural formations and criticises

the rigid administrative structures, artificial 'official' cultures and the assumed homogeneity

of the nation, demanding greater protection and support for spontaneous cultural productions.

Finally, the feminist critique concentrates on the public-private distinction or the artificial

boundary between the state and the household: the state upholds a formalistic, patriarchal

power structure against civil society, while the silenced real-life voices should be reflected

in the conduct of civil affairs. (Koskenniemi 1994: 24-26.)

The problem with these criticisms is revealed, in fact, when they are brought together. All

appeal to the authentic in comparison to the artificiality o f the state, and this makes them

contradict each other, since all refer to something different as being 'authentic'. In other

words, each posits a foundational principle outside statehood on which the ordering o f human

affairs should be based. Koskenniemi argues that the ideal o f authenticity implies a

naturalistic view o f human society which further refers to a conception of unconditional, self-

evident knowledge, used against the state. The problem is that none o f these authenticities can

sustain itself merely by appeal to its self-evidence. The critiques are contradictory; the various

authentic states o f affairs cannot be realised simultaneously. For example, economic efficiency

might well be inconsistent with individual rights. On the other hand, the critiques are also

indeterminate. Even if the 'real' principle were known, it would be impossible to reach it, to

know how public life in practice should be organised to reflect it, without, for instance,

creating conflicts between individual rights. In the end, Koskenniemi argues that the criticisms

function as political ideologies in that they suggest the necessity of realising something that

is already there and, consequently, they de-emphasise the decision processes needed to realise

them. As an example, to call for the replacement of the state structures by bundles o f human

rights takes these latter as given and fails to see their historical, context-dependent character

and the need to decide what is required to attain them. (Koskenniemi 1994: 26-27.)

This discussion also shows how the question of state autonomy, addressed above, cannot be

separated from values attached to the state. As Nordlinger remarks, the questions o f whether

the state is autonomous and whether the autonomy should be "applauded, accepted or

condemned" are two different, essential problems. His answer to the latter question, however,

reveals the common inability to deal with values: he claims that the answer is, "in a way",

empirical (Nordlinger 1981: 211-212). Evidently, the autonomy of the state can be seen as

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inconsistent with democracy, for instance when the incongruence between state and internal

environment becomes too large as a result o f excessive demands upon society, threatening

legitimacy (Krasner 1984: 238). Alternatively, one might also see autonomy as a precondition

for effectiveness.

In conclusion, the discussion on values shows that the inadequate consideration of the ethical

component , o f the concept of state risks taking statements based on values for factual

statements, as developing consensual knowledge on the state.230 This has several problematic

consequences. First, accepting the view that the state no longer is as important as it used to

be as an assumption for further studies - something not at all uncommon - cannot be seen as

an improvement in comparison to seeing the world as state-centred. Rather, it is a replacement

o f one type of consensual knowledge by another. An 'anti-realist* starting point as a new

cornerstone could only become a new 'black box' on which research is built. It could hardly

avoid the same type o f criticism one can direct to the realist assumptions: simply overriding

the state by the argument of its invalidity can do it as much injustice as the realist habit o f

explaining everything through the state does to the rest.

The second problem is the combined influence o f statements about the intrinsic and

instrumental value o f the state on the use o f the concept itself as an analytical tool. The

diminishing value o f the state in contemporary world is translated into a diminishing value

of the state as a concept or an explanatory factor in research: 'the state', accordingly, should

be abandoned or replaced by something else, e.g., 'form of political domination' (Schmitter

1991) or 'political process' (Palan 1990). (Cf. chapter I.) It is concluded that much o f Western

social science is obsolescent, if not yet quite out-of-date, as it is based on tacit premises about

the state as the most important unit of analysis, concentrating on issues within a state or

comparison of two or more national systems or societies, but also because of the

overemphasis of the violent conflict between states as the core problematique of the system

(Strange 1995: 70). This certainly shows to what extent theoretical assumptions - in which

230 There is obvious discomfort as to the role of subjective assessments, stemming from Hume's law and the naturalistic fallacy (that one cannot deduce what should be from what is, or vice versa) and the maxim of value- free science. Lessnoffs portrayal of Weber's thoughts reflect the problem: on the one hand, Weber argues that there can be no definitive concepts or theories in social sciences, because judgements of value and cultural significance are not definitive and vary from one investigator to another, on the other hand, he also claims that the truth of propositions is not to be seen as relative to or dependent on value. The propositions are factual, ,subject to critical assessment through relevant evidence and logical reasoning. Although the concepts of social |science reflect evaluative judgements, they should not themselves be evaluative; in this sense, social science must Ibe value-free. (Lessnoff 1988: 796.) What is left open, however, is the question of how to assess what is *"relevant evidence" and "logical reasoning". |

I

I

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also the withering away thesis has to be included - really direct research. As Haas puts it, the

status o f integration theories "is of tremendous importance because it is they rather than the

nature of things which lead students to postulate the relationships between variables; it is they,

not the nature o f things, which lead us to the specification o f what is an independent and a

dependent variable." (Haas 1970: 623.)

In fact, not only are the possible positive functions of the state not given much consideration,

even though statements about the decreasing value of the state do not as such necessarily

imply their absence. States can also be seen as providing order in the international system.

For Bull, the system of states is the form of universal political organisation most able to

provide minimum order in a political society where there is not a consensus broad enough to

sustain the acceptance o f a common government, but in which there is a consensus that can

sustain the coexistence of a plurality o f separate governments. The state has provided order

both internally and at an international level, limiting the rivalry through cooperation, guides

o f conduct and common institutions. In some cases, there has been additional need for the

state, as in the third world countries, where peoples have been able to take charge o f their

own destiny only by gaining control of states. (Bull 1979: 115-119, 121, 123.)

Similarly, Koskenniemi maintains that as long as there are no shared basic values or wide

agreement on what constitutes good life, the formal-bureaucratic rationality of the state

provides the best possible safeguard against the totalitarianism inherent in a commitment to

substantive values, which forces those values on people not sharing them. In his view, there

is also little reason to be confident that some subject-matters (peace, economy, environment)

are authentically global and must be dealt with by globally uniform solutions. Therefore,

statehood should continue to survive, if only in the absence o f any better real alternative.

(Koskenniemi 1991: 397, 401-402, 405, 407.)

In other words, Koskenniemi sees that the raison d'etre o f the state is its 'artificiality’ or

formality.231 The state provides a space for the ascertainment o f the truth or the acceptability

o f the proposed forms of life o f the various views on the state. In a way, it is the language

2J1 Koskenniemi refers to Kelsen, who distinguishes between the sociological and the juridical conception of the state: as social reality, states are constantly changing, on the way in and out; they are the consequences and instruments of the use o f power. However, states are not mere power, we also see the power of the government as somehow acceptable. At the same time, statehood cannot be based on some principle of justice either because o f the impossibility to reach the justice and the authenticity. (Kelsen, Hans, D er Soziologische und der Juristische Staatsbegriff. Kritische Untersuchung des Verhältnisses von Staat und Recht. 1928. - Cf. Jellinek, Das Recht des modernen Staates I. Allgemeine Staatslehre. 2. Auflage, Verlag von O. Häring, Berlin 1905, p. 167-176.)

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through which to examine and compare the various jargons o f authenticity, or to reconcile the

various conceptions o f justice, rights and effectiveness. This reconciliation is always subject

to criticism and change, but the state is never simply the values it seems to espouse at any

moment, nor only the interests it most closely reflects. As Koskenniemi expresses it, the polis

has not existed for the fulfilment of passions ulterior to itself, it has not existed to provide us

with well-being: it has instead defined to us - differently in different times and places - what

well-being means. It has not existed to realize just principles: it has encapsulated justice in

itself. Thus, he sees that the thesis of the withering away o f the state is a thesis about the

uselessness or unrealistic character of the concept of the polis, and of law: ”[I]t is a tragical

thesis that has found us unable to rule our public lives through conscious choice and debate,

just as we are unable to control forces that dictate our private wishes. It holds that we must

surrender the polis to an exterior purpose, to some self-evident certainty in no need of public

reflection." (Koskenniemi 1994: 27-29.)

Finally, the exclusion of both the state and of values from the analysis effectively hinders

research from dealing with some of the most central questions concerning the changes in the

locus and nature o f authority, such as those pointed out by Strange (1995) as the new,

important questions facing social scientists - who, in her view, shirk their responsibilities if

they fail to think about them. After problems of war and peace - removed with the state-

centrism - the question becomes how to deal with the asymmetry o f structural power. Another

important question is the void o f authority and the assessment o f how much authority actually

is needed232, or how much rules, supervision and intervention by political authority is

necessary for the system's continued stability, equity and prosperity, and where the authority

is to come from. (Strange 1995: 56, 71-72.)

The questions cannot be answered if the state is excluded from the analysis: on the contrary,

they suggest more consideration to the state, for instance in the form of the classical debate

132 Strange observes that as a result of the integration of the world economy, in which the conventional mode] of coterminous territory, state authority and economy no longer applies, there are some important responsibilities of political authority - in finance, transport, communication and production - that no one in a system based on territorially defined states is in a position fully to discharge. In some matters, authority seems just to have evaporated: the realm of anarchy in society and economy has become more extensive as that o f all kinds of authority has diminished, and some necessary authority once exercised by states is now exercised by no one. Simultaneously, there is also an increase in the political, not purely economic, activities and responsibilities of transnational enterprises, especially as to the responsibility over the location of production and the assumption of judicial and welfare responsibilities within the community (Strange 199S: 69).

177

on the limits of state action233, on how and to which extent to limit state action vis-à-vis the

individual, or the questions of how to justify coercive institutions, what the state should do

and how, that is, what is the nature of the best type of political regime. These, again, are

questions about values, the importance of which could, in the end, also be justified by

reference to their function as a motor of change234. Why, after all, should one see the state as

something stable through nailing it down by some definitive statements on its nature, if it

actually constantly changes in reflection of its internal and external environment?

3.4 In c o n c l u s io n : t h e in h e r it e d a m b ig u it y a n d it s im p l ic a t io n s f o r e m pir ic a l r e s e a r c h

With this third chapter, the thesis has come half-way towards its aim to help evaluate the

scholarly answers to the question of the relationship between the state and integration. In

chapter one, the question was noted to be both difficult and important to answer: it is about

two basic concepts which form a nexus o f a variety o f theoretical debates, while having, at

the same time, very concrete implications in practical politics. The analysis started from the

idea that the 'consumers' and the 'producers' of academic knowledge on the question might

not be well- equipped to deal with the plurality of answers to the question.

Evaluation requires an understanding o f how the answers are achieved and why they emerge.

These aspects, however, tend to remain invisible in most research, as if they were self-evident.

Indeed, when delineating the development o f integration studies in chapter two, it was found

out that the prevailing research practice was not particularly conducive to an analysis o f the

background of the views. Rather, the emphasis was on progress through views which replace

one another on the basis of improved explanatory capacity or correspondence with reality.

Plural answers were seen as a problem. With an adequate consideration of the background,

however, the importance of that plurality becomes clear. In chapter three, four 'whys' o f the

answers, or internal reasons which fundamentally shape the answers forming the 'lenses'

through which empirical cases are looked at were found. They were methodological stand or

the ways of understanding and analyzing the state and integration, the views on the aims of

research, on disciplinary boundaries, and, finally, on values. At the same time, these factors

231 For an overview and introduction to the literature on state intervention (Mill, Hart, Rawls), see C. L. Ten, 'The Limits of the State', in Parkinson, G. H. R. (ed.), An Encyclopedia o f Philosophy, Routledge 1988,

154 Cf. Habermas (Knowledge and human interests, 1968), who objects to the exclusion of value judgements as this undermines critical opposition to existing structures of domination and drives the discussion on the 'good life* out of politics (cf. Lessnoff 1988: 800).

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connected integration studies to broader debates in international relations and social sciences

in general.

These factors can be seen to shape the understanding of the state and integration through

presenting choices between two alternatives. These choices are indispensable elements in the

evaluation of research on the question. Often invisible to the reader, they imply a continuous

oscillation between two possible views on the nature o f the state and integration, in particular

between seeing the state as good or bad, efficient or not, unitary or not, rational or not and

autonomous or not, but also between seeing states as similar or different and institutions as

'mattering' or not. Consequently, research on the state and integration is bound to have

various, even opposite interpretations. Still, the different views appear to compete with each

other despite their shared origins and despite the fact that they need each other, both for the

support they can gain because of the shortcomings o f the others and for the possibility o f

development through criticisms - perhaps also to maintain a debate which constitutes the field

of research.

At this stage, the reader might agree in principle that there are various views on the state and

integration, and that, accordingly, an empirical case can also be interpreted in different ways.

However, the thesis has here achieved only the first part of its task. Its final conclusions could

not be drawn without combining the practice of research to the question of what research

appears to be like in principle. The questions of evaluation and development of research have

to be taken to the level of concrete events and phenomena in order to see how, in reality, a

case study is written, and to give the reader the possibility of evaluating 'normal' research with

the help o f the factors previously identified. Empirical cases are thus needed for understanding

what these theoretical stands actually imply, how they influence concrete research and

possibly also politics. In fact, without concrete cases, one would not be able to see how the

analysis o f the state-integration relationship may have concrete relevance also for political

decision-making.

However, the role and form of case studies in this thesis differs from the way cases are

commonly used in research. Most often, case studies serve the purpose of testing (read:

validating) a proposed theory: they tend to be reassuring, even with no decisive role of their

own. Counterfactuals which would contradict the study are seldom taken up; in fact, the

theoretical framework might shape the presentation of the cases to appear in any case in

harmony with the theory.

* 179

Here, the cases do not 'test' a view: the aim is not to show that a case supports one or several

views. Nor is the aim to show that the views are equally applicable; the four views do not

need such support. In the end, writing case studies which show that the state is weakened or

strengthened by the process of integration would obviously not be uninteresting, but it would

not produce any additional knowledge in comparison to the already known. In this study, the

aim of the cases is to show the plurality of truth ’in reality' and reflect on how plural

interpretations contribute to the understanding of concrete cases. Conventional cases tend not

to be helpful in such evaluation of the research itself: they are opaque in that they do not

reflect on the choices made. The choices become visible only if alternative views are

presented, too: the existence o f several versions makes each o f them appear as a version (cf.

Allison in chapter one).

Two versions are therefore presented on the two cases, Nordic cooperation and Finnish

integration policy. In both, the context is the time period roughly from 1992 to 1995, a period

o f debates on possible Finnish and Swedish membership in the HU. The debates concentrate

on the consequences o f membership, both for Finland and for Nordic cooperation which risks

facing a competition with the EU. In simple terms, the question for Finland is whether to join

or not, and, for Nordic cooperation, whether something could or should be done in

preparation, and if so, what. The answers depend on what the consequences o f EU

membership are. Now, what are they? What do we know about them? After the previous

analysis, it is easy to see that the question of consequences is a question of how the two

parties influence each other. Thus, it is our basic question of the relationship between the state

and integration put in concrete terms: will Finland become a mightier member of the

European system, will Nordic cooperation cease to exist? This study has amply shown that

various views exist, and that they are, moreover, to a considerable degree formed by

theoretical oscillations which cannot be resolved in favour of any o f them. Our knowledge on

the consequences is thus constructed on the basis of assumptions.

This becomes clear in the concrete studies. In chapter 4.1, Nordic cooperation is seen to

succumb to the EU; in the version 4.2, it is seen to manage, even thrive, if not altogether be

an example for European integration. In chapter 5.1, Finnish EU membership is seen to imply

the beginning of a profound and partly involuntary change in the Finnish state, while in 5.2

it is but a logical continuation o f Finnish integration policy, its aims and nature. These results

are based on different assumptions, or views on Nordic cooperation, integration, Finnish

integration policy and the Finnish state.

1 8 0

The cases are amply documented and present a large amount of details with opposite

interpretations. Each of them is aimed to be acceptable as a thorough analysis o f the subject

which takes into account virtually all existing literature. The versions are written on purpose

for this study, instead of analyzing existing studies, in order to have as complete, thorough

and comparable versions as possible, versions which, moreover, follow the same research

practice and take into account the same facts.

Individually, the case studies are examples of normal research based mainly on secondary

sources. They are to be seen as independent pieces o f research, out of the immediate context

o f the precedent theoretical analyses. As normal case studies without any particular theoretical

ambitions, they are not directly connected to the four views analyzed previously: in th e ir

genre, questions such as "what is the relationship between the state and integration" are

seldom posed overtly. There are no apparent theoretical differences between the versions: th e ir

assumptions are only partly visible and tend to be built-in rather than explicit. Similarly, the

versions take for granted many problematic conceptualisations. Neither do the cases

themselves much refer to supporting theoretical literature. They are mere descriptive analyses

- something that, in the end, tells a lot about our conventional views on what ’description’ is.

Finally, normal case studies do not contain references to the fact that they are but versions;

neither, thus, do these cases.

Put together, however, the cases build a rather confusing whole: they are incompatible and

contradictory. This is a concrete manifestation of the "whole”, or the plurality o f truth, the

analysis of which has been the aim of the thesis. In a way, this confusion is assumed to lead

to reflection on why the versions are like they are. They are not incompatible because o f

different facts or scientific standards: they are exactly the same as to their facts and model

of inquiry. They involve the same basic choice situations, only that different choices have

been made concerning the basic assumptions.

What we are able to observe through these cases is, first, the concrete link to real politics,

something that reveals why the capacity to evaluate research is so fundamental in practice.

Secondly, we acquire a more concrete understanding o f the bases of our knowledge and o f

how it is constructed: the cases function as examples o f how knowledge is constructed on the

level o f 'mere' description. This becomes evident when asking how to give, in concrete terms,

different interpretations on Nordic cooperation. Assuming that the reader might not be familiar

with Nordic cooperation, it seems necessary to start with a description of what Nordic

cooperation. Subsequently, different versions could be created through different interpretations

o f the description. That the cases chosen might not be well known helps to locate an essential

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problem in this view on case studies: it is not possible first to describe and then to interpret

the description in different ways. The difference between the different versions lies in the very

description itself. Description is not neutral: from the moment the description o f Nordic

cooperation starts, the first choices are made regarding its nature. In fact, they appear in the

very titles o f the chapters. These choices, then, as will be seen, are directly linked to the basic

oscillations on the state and integration with which the reader has been able to familiarize

himself. They, together with the assumptions, are gathered and closer analyzed in the

concluding chapter.

Thirdly, by way o f being transparent, the cases provide information on the possibilities and

limits of analysis; these will be taken up in the final chapter. The cases show that much more

may be achieved in research than what could be thought. Still, not everything might be

possible in practical terms. The scholarly reasoning tends to - or is forced to - take sides and

find evidence for one of them as the 'right' way of seeing the question. Finally, the cases give

additional material for conclusions on the choices made, compatibility and links between

different views.

C h a p t e r 4

E u r o p e a n in t e g r a t io n a n d n o r d ic c o o p e r a t io n

4.1 O p t in g f o r in t e g r a t io n - t h e s l o w r e t r e a t o f N o r d ic c o o p e r a t io n

4.1.1 EU enlargement: a push towards a necessary reappraisal o f Nordic cooperation

Nordic cooperation * cooperation between the five Nordic countries, Denmark, Finland,

Iceland, Norway and Sweden - has for decades enjoyed a unanimous popularity among both

the Nordic politicians and the people. Codified in the Helsinki Agreement o f 1962 and

institutionalised in the Nordic Council and the Nordic Council of Ministers, established,

respectively, in 1952 and 1971, Nordic cooperation encompasses a great variety of activities,

some dating back to the 19th century. In the Nordic countries, Nordic cooperation has come

to assume an imprint not only o f something self-evident, even prosaic, but also o f being above

any criticism or objection. Outside Norden, in turn, the Nordic235 countries are commonly

perceived as a whole and treated as a unit in many contexts.

However, with the signing of the Treaty on the European Economic Area, the decisions by

Finland, Norway and Sweden to apply for EU membership and, above all, the membership

achieved by Finland and Sweden, the self-evidence o f Nordic cooperation has increasingly

been called into question. Not only are three of the five countries now EU members, the EU

has itself become something different from the EC Denmark joined in 1973. In this new

situation, the political activities, time and resources o f the member countries are increasingly

concentrated on the EU. The same is true also for the two countries outside the EU, Iceland

and Norway, involved in the process o f integration directly through the EEA and indirectly

through the practical necessity of taking into account the developments in the EU: the

decisions and policies of the Union have nowadays a fundamental importance for the policies

of the Nordic countries, whether members or not.

This new centrality of the EU for the Nordic countries implies a multiplication o f the fields

and forms of their participation in international collaboration, notably a new binding and

supranational character of that participation. At the same time, it implies an unintentional

duplication o f work, as matters traditionally considered in the Nordic institutions now appear

also in the European ones. This calls into question the appropriateness o f a separate Nordic

level o f cooperation. Not only might Nordic cooperation now be less central and interesting

for the Nordic politicians; it might also be less needed. Moreover, it might become altogether

235 Sometimes also the term 'Scandinavian' is used. While *Nordic' includes all the five countries, 'Scandinavian1 actually denotes Denmark, Norway and Sweden, at times also Iceland.

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impossible, either for the simple reason of feasibility, in view o f the limited resources, or

because of its incompatibility with the binding nature of EU membership. Therefore, a re-

evaluation of the achievements and nature of Nordic cooperation is imperative in order to

judge whether or not it still possesses features which make its preservation important or

extends to fields appropriate for a purely Nordic cooperation, and, in that case, how Nordic

cooperation might be safeguarded within the larger context o f European integration.

4.1.2 The symptomatic failures o f the grand designs in security and economy

The usual emphasis on the long history o f Nordic cooperation and its consensual character

sometimes conceals the fact that there actually have been quite far-reaching plans for

cooperation between the Nordic countries. In particular, those in the fields of security policy

and economy have even come close to the establishment o f what could be called a Nordic

union, or, to borrow Franzen's (1944) term, the United States o f Scandinavia. Wider, European

schemes of cooperation have, however, always outweighed the purely Nordic plans in the vital

fields of security and economy. The decisions of the Nordic countries to opt for the EEA and

the EU can, therefore, be seen as a continuation of this familiar pattern rather than something

new and different.

In security policy, the most far-reaching cooperation plans were presented by Sweden in the

late 1940s. Nordic cooperation in matters of security had in the past been mainly limited to

the joint declarations of neutrality by Denmark, Norway and Sweden during the two world

wars. Other plans had not been particularly successful; the Stockholm plan on cooperation

between Finland and Sweden for the defence of the Aland Islands, presented in 1939, was

never implemented due to the opposition by the Soviet Union (Wendt 1981: 25-26), and, well

before that, the Danish initiative for a Scandinavian defence alliance in 1864 against the

German threat collapsed as the other countries adopted a neutral position when Denmark was

attacked.

The intensification of the cold war in the late 1940s gave initial impetus towards increased

Scandinavian defence cooperation, and Sweden presented an initiative to coordinate the

defence policies of the Scandinavian countries as an alliance outside the two rivalling blocks.

Negotiations with Denmark and Norway began in 1948. Both Denmark and Norway were,

however, cautious of the capabilities o f such alliance. For them, access to Western strategic

material was vital, and this also destroyed the foundation for a Scandinavian defence union.

The United States, as a reply to the Danish request of arms for the Nordic Alliance, made

arms deliveries conditional upon a Nordic membership o f the NATO, and, in fact, Norway

and Denmark joined the NATO in 1949. (Etzioni 1965: 198-199; Turner 1982: 113-115;

Wendt 1981: 27-28.)236

Iceland, too, joined the NATO and in 1951, it further signed a defence agreement with the

United States which led to the establishment of a military base in Keflavik (Turner 1982: 116-

117; Jervell 1991a: 27). Fin.and had signed in 1948 a pact on mutual friendship, cooperation

and assistance with the Soviet Union recognising in principle Finland's wish to remain neutral

in conflicts between the biocs; At the same time, the pact forbade the signatories from

entering into alliances directed against each other, something which for some years hampered

Finland's participation even in Nordic cooperation, regarded by the Soviet Union as a

camouflage for links to the West. Finally, Sweden remained neutral, bolstering its neutrality

with a strong national defence.

Thus divided by their orientations in security policy in NATO allies237 and neutrals, with the

specific Finnish concern for not taking risks in its relations to the Soviet Union, it was clear

that Nordic cooperation in the fields o f foreign and defence policy was not appropriate. There

were instances in which foreign affairs were discussed, such as the informal ministerial

meetings related to the common concerns in the United Nations, but in the formal context o f

Nordic Council, it was understood to be natural that the Council refrain from considering

problems related to defence or foreign policy. Although no formal reservations on this point

were made, it was declared in the debates in the Swedish and Norwegian parliaments in 1952

that Nordic cooperation did not include defence or foreign policy matters. Also for Denmark

and Iceland, these matters were considered outside the competencies of the Nordic Council.

(Wendt 1981: 343-344.)

236 For more on these negotiations, see Thorsten Boning Olesen, 'Brodrefolk, men ikke vibenbrodre - diskussioneme om et skandinavisk forsvarsforbund 1948-49', in Den Jyske Historiker, vol. 69-70, 1994, pp. 151- 178.

237 Both Norway and Denmark made, however, some reservations when joining the NATO. Norway made a declaration prohibiting foreign bases on Norwegian soil as long as the country was not attacked or exposed to threats of attack, and also prohibited, a few years later, the storage of nuclear weapons on Norwegian territory. Similarly, Danish membership was made contingent on the exclusion of foreign bases and nuclear stockpiles in all territory, with the exception of foreign bases in Greenland. As Miljan notes, the Danish NATO membership was controversial in that it was a radical departure from Denmark's traditional policy of neutrality; the reservations aimed at preserving some kind of semi-neutrality. As to Norway, the membership was accepted as inevitable by all except a small left-wing minority and came later to be regarded, Miljan argues, as one o f the necessary bulwarks to Norway's sovereignty (Miljan 1977: 80-81). Turner points out that in addition to helping win support by preserving some links with the neutralist past and freedom for independent foreign policy, the reservations were also aimed to be conciliatory in the relations with the Soviet Union, especially so for Norway which attempted to nullify the Soviet complaints ensuing from the NATO decision (Turner 1982; 116-117).

185

This general agreement and the overall low profile of the Nordic Council notwithstanding,

Finland could not join the Council from the beginning: the Finnish representatives could not

accept the proposed statutes due to the highly critical attitude o f the Soviet Union towards

Nordic cooperation.238 Together with the general relaxation in international relations in 1955,

however, this view changed; objections to Finnish membership were removed and Finland

became member o f the Council before the end of that year.235 Nevertheless, it was considered

necessary again to emphasise the non-political nature of the Council: the Finnish government's

proposal for membership made the reservation that the representatives of Finland should not

participate in the discussion if the Council, against accepted practice, were to discuss military

questions or questions which would lead to adopting a position on conflicts of interest

between the great powers. (Wendt 1981: 35-37, 343-344.)

In fact, even though international questions were not totally absent from the agenda o f the

Nordic Council, they were until the 1990s rather marginal. To a large extent, the discussions

on foreign affairs revolved around the question of whether these kinds of issues could be

discussed at all. Some regarded discussion possible, without claiming, however, that the

Nordic Council could attempt to interfere with the member states' attitudes concerning foreign

affairs. For the majority, matters of foreign and security policy did not belong to the field of

the Council; therefore, no explicit exclusion of these issues from the Council's work was

considered necessary. (Wendt 1981: 249-250.)

The Finnish initiative on a Nordic nuclear weapon free zone has been one of the most

persistent issues linked to foreign policy and security. For Wiberg (1986: 5), it is also one of

the failed grand schemes for Nordic cooperation. Having been debated for the first time in

1964-1966, the issue returned on several occasions, most recently in 1987, when, for the first

time, some measures were taken in that a study group was established to investigate the issue.

Other proposals of similar nature, such as the proposal for a Nordic security and cooperation

agreement to refrain from the use o f force or the threat of it, were similarly rejected without

any support and, consequently, led to no action. Reference was also made to the need to avoid * 539

358 The Soviet Union saw the Council as merely a tool of forces behind the NATO. The United States, in turn, had no difficulties in accepting Nordic cooperation as far as it was practical, but did little to stimulate it. However, when Nordic cooperation obtained security policy characteristics, it met negative reactions from the United States (Jeivell 1991a: 27).

539 Finnish entry to the Council was in practice very simple, as it had participated in the preparatory works and been in close contact with the members also for the time of the first three Council sessions, receiving its documents; actually, the statutes (art. 3) stated that upon a request by Finland, Finnish representatives may take part in the deliberations and decisions of the Council.

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ill-considered changes in foreign policy issues and to the fact that the Nordic Council was not

the right forum for the treatment o f these issues. (For an extensive account, see Wendt 1981:

249, 347-348, 350-358; see also Joenniemi 1990: 212.)

Comments on international affairs outside the purely Nordic sphere were even more

occasional. The Council was forced to consider a lengthy dispute between Iceland and the

United Kingdom over Iceland's fishing limits which began in 1954 (see Wendt 1981: 356-367,

388-394). The cautious attitude of the Council was reflected particularly when, in 1964, a

proposal was presented for a recommendation to support the United Nations declaration o f

1963 on the elimination of racial discrimination particularly in South Africa. No action was

taken: it was emphasised that it was not expedient for the Council to deal with matters o f

such internationally controversial character in the light o f the pre-judicial effect for the future

which could result from an initiative from the Council. {Idem: 249.)

In the field of economy, the efforts towards a Nordic customs union or common market were

more prolonged and lasted, indeed, for over twenty years. While planning for a purely Nordic

arrangement, the Nordic countries, nevertheless, kept an eye on the developments in Europe

which, in the end, made these plans redundant. Close economic cooperation was not new for

the Scandinavian countries. In the 1930s, for example, they had been party to the Oslo

agreement together with the Benelux countries; the agreement aimed at common principles

in foreign trade policy and prevention o f increase in customs duties (Wallensteen et at. 1973:

50, 53). In the 19th century, there had even been a Scandinavian Monetary Union between

Denmark, Norway and Sweden (Wendt 1981: 92-100). The 19th century proposals o f customs

union had not, however, been realised.

The specific negotiations for a Nordic customs union started in 1947, originally as a response

to the pressure from the United States to form regional groupings for qualifying for Marshall

aid (e.g., Nielsson 1978: 288). Denmark, Iceland, Norway and Sweden formed in 1948 a Joint

Nordic Committee for Economic Cooperation to plan for common tariffs and a customs union.

The negotiations proceeded rather brokenly. There were two waves of negotiations between

1947 and 1954 which both collapsed due to, on the one hand, disaccord on the range o f

cooperation and, on the other, Norwegian reluctance. Nevertheless, it was Norway who took

the initiative for new discussions soon after the decision on NATO membership, opening a

second wave o f negotiations in 1950. For Pharo, this initiative was at least partly aimed to

be a remedy or compensation for the ensuing new division between the Nordic countries

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regarding their security arrangements240. Similarly, Jervell (1991a: 27) sees that the Norwegian

support for a Nordic customs union in the 1950s was motivated more by the need to make

the NATO politically acceptable than by the sake of customs union itself.

The final committee report of 1954 judged the customs union plan unacceptable both

economically and politically. The economies of the three countries differed considerably. Free

trade in agricultural products would have exposed Norwegian and Swedish agriculture to a

potentially destructive competition from Denmark, with the ensuing risks for a gradual

depopulation of large rural areas. Moreover, Norway was against the proposed dismantling

o f tariffs and restrictions as they would not have benefitted the Norwegian industry which was

not export-oriented like those in Denmark and Sweden. (Wendt 1981: 102-104.)

This negative view notwithstanding, the negotiations resumed and a third round was

undertaken from 1954 to 1959. It was motivated by, on the one hand, the recovery of

Norwegian industry, which gave greater confidence in the beneficial effects of a customs

union. On the other hand, it was also thought that a Nordic customs union and industrial

investments could be competitive with Germany; as the Marshalt-plan was ending, other

investments were needed in order to guarantee economic growth.241

Meanwhile, the Nordic Council had been established; it encouraged the negotiations by

recommending in 1954 that the governments prepare the conditions for a common Nordic

market242, with Finland as well taking part in the ensuing governmental investigations. In

1957, a new committee report was issued, together with a draft convention for Nordic

economic cooperation. (Wendt 1981: 104-105, 109.) In the Nordic Council session o f 1957,

however, the plans were discussed in a new light. While 'the Six' - Belgium, the Netherlands,

Luxembourg, France, Germany and Italy - meeting in Messina in 1955 and Venice in 1956,

prepared a plan for an economic union, United Kingdom, a major trading partner o f the

Nordic countries, had requested in 1956 the OHEC243 to examine prospects for the creation

140 Helge Pharo, seminar at the EUI, November 8, 1993.

241 Helge Pharo, seminar at the EUI, November 8, 1993.

242 Wendt remarks that the teim 'union* was replaced by the tenn 'common market1 because of Norwegiansensitivity.

243 Founded in 1948 at the behest of the United States to ensure the fair and effective distribution o f Marshall aid and to try to prevent a recurrence of protectionism, working towards the removal of import quotas (Turner 1982: 112).

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of a European free trade area including the six, United Kingdom and other interested

countries. Thus, the question became whether or not also a Nordic market should be

established; without doubt, the Nordic countries would follow the United Kingdom.244 An

additional Nordic arrangement was motivated by the fact that the Nordic countries would then

be a united front in free trade negotiations; moreover, a Nordic common market would be

useful for Finland which otherwise could be isolated, as it could not become member o f a

Western European trade area. Some perceived the Nordic arrangement as useless, even

harmful. Danish farmers began to think that the Nordic customs union would prevent Danish

EEC membership, which they believed necessary. (Wendt 1981: 105*107.)

Although there were some differences in the attitudes o f the Scandinavian countries about the

solution to be chosen245, the agreement on a Nordic common market was, indeed, very nearly

achieved in 1959. Even Finland seemed to be ready for such a move: when the Nordic prime

ministers met in Kung&lv that year, it was announced that the Finnish government was

prepared to propose to the parliament to join the Nordic common market. It soon became

clear, however, that there was no such thing to join. The meeting, instead of approving the

plan, conveyed a tacit understanding that the plan was to be abandoned. The Nordic option

had lost ground faced with the parallel investigations the three Scandinavian countries had

conducted together with the United Kingdom, Portugal, Switzerland and Austria about the

possibilities o f a free trade area among themselves. Already in July 1959, the seven signed

the Stockholm Convention establishing the European Free Trade Agreement, EFTA, which

came into effect in 1960.

244 There was perhaps also an affinity between the Scandinavian states and Britain in that both rejected the idea of supranational arrangements. These countries had cooperated already before in the context o f UNI SCAN and through permanent economic consultations. (Turner 1982: 128, 136.) (UNISCAN, a British-Scandinavian economic committee established in 1949, arranged for several years after 1950 regional consultations between senior civil servants, e.g., on currency issues; Miljan 1977: 85.)

usAt that time, Sweden supported the wider free trade arrangement, while Denmark was for closer links to

the EEC. On the other hand, the support for a Nordic common market was more widespread in Sweden than in the other countries.

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As a result o f EFTA, tariff barriers were removed in Scandinavia, and trade increased.246 In

short, as Sundelius and Wiklund note (1979: 64), what had been impossible to accomplish

during twelve years o f Nordic negotiations had suddenly been reached within a broader

perspective in less than a year, from 1959 to 1960. Purely Nordic cooperation in economic

matters continued in the form of meetings between the heads o f the trade departments o f the

Nordic foreign ministries and a permanent committee o f economic ministers (Wendt 1981:

111-115).

Plans for a Nordic common market had, however, not been completely forgotten. The failed

attempts of some EFTA members to join the EEC changed the situation and made the Nordic

option once again appealing. When Britain in 1961 announced its decision to apply for EEC

membership, it was followed by Denmark and Norway, while Sweden applied for association

allowing certain trade concessions without corresponding political involvement (Turner 1982:

136).247 The entry negotiations, however, were ended by the French veto in 1963. Roughly

the same sequence o f events was repeated in 1967; the Swedish renewed application for the

closest possible association agreement in line with neutrality never got beyond the stage of

formal submission (Turner 1982: 160; Wendt 1981: 123-124).

Denmark was now more receptive to the idea of a Nordic economic community than the

others because of the likely delay in EEC negotiations. At a Danish initiative at the 1968

session of the Nordic Council, an examination of common market interests and economic and

trade cooperation was again undertaken. The Nordic countries - excluding Iceland - had

achieved remarkable success in the previous Kennedy Round o f the GATT negotiations on

By the end of the year 1969, all duties and restrictions on industrial goods were removed. Agriculture was left to bilateral negotiations. A specific Finnefta agreement (1961) gave Finland for practical purposes the status o f a member state, and Finland could also benefit from the increase in trade. Turner remarks that those gaining most from the EFTA agreement were the Nordic countries; in the first decade, trade between all EFTA members increased by 186%, while by 284% between the Nordic countries. The most remarkable advance was the proportion of Finnish trade with EFTA, which rose to over 50% by the end of the 1960s. (Turner 1982: 132-133.)

147 The Nordic Council made an effort to minimise any division which might be caused by Denmark and Norway joining the EEC by urging the governments in 1961 to enter into a formal agreement on cooperation. As a result, the Helsinki Agreement was signed in 1962. The Nordic Council's policy also included close contact in EEC negotiations. The efforts were reflected in the motivation for the Danish application in which Denmark stressed its interest in preserving Nordic relations and the need to continue the Nordic labour market. Similar declarations were made by Norway and Sweden (Wendt 1981: 116-117); in Norway, the decision to apply for full membership was accompanied by a strong stand taken for Nordic unity, which for Norway was something new. The EEC negotiators, in turn, assured Denmark that a non-binding joint proclamation on Nordic cooperation would not prejudice the Danish application. (Anderson 1967: 290.)

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tariff reductions (1966-1967) by acting as a block.248 The EEC and other countries had sought

to exclude important Nordic exports from the offer to tariff reductions; as a response, a joint

negotiating delegation was formed by Denmark, Finland, Sweden and Norway249 - something

that Finland, Norway and Sweden had done also in the GATT conference of 1956. (Wendt

1981: 122; Turner 1982: 139.) This success perhaps facilitated the agreement to take new

steps in cooperation, the aim o f which was to ease the participation in an expanded European

market without, however, affecting the foreign and defence policies o f the Nordic countries.

This was the start for the negotiations on an organisation o f Nordic economic cooperation,

the NORDEK250, the draft treaty o f which being promptly finished in 1969. The formation o f

a customs union was a required condition for GATT acceptance of mutual concessions

exclusively between Nordic countries. It was also a prerequisite for effective common trade

policy; it would prevent the distortion o f imports in favour o f Denmark and Norway which

had lower tariffs for raw materials and semi-manufactures than Sweden. NORDEK was to

give a push towards full coordination o f the four economies - Iceland aimed at joining the

NORDEK later, after having joined the EFTA (Turner 1982: 109). In the view o f the Nordic

Council, a dynamic economic cooperation required including, e.g., also external tariffs,

agriculture, fishing, capital market, conditions for competition and trade policy (Wendt 1981:

119-121).

The NORDEK plan was, in fact, extremely wide. It contained provisions on economic policy,

capital movement, tariffs and trade policies, shipping, energy and industrial policy, agriculture

and fisheries, land transport, labour market and social welfare, state supportive measures,

public procurement, control of business methods hindering competition, right of establishment,

harmonisation o f legislation, education, research, development aid and financial assistance.

It also contained the establishment o f new organs for cooperation - notably the Nordic

Council o f Ministers and the NORDEK secretariat, which was to receive no instructions from

national authorities and was, for Solem (1977: 83) actually comparable to the EEC

248 This particular GATT round has also been reported to be a success fort the EEC common trade policy, as >the EEC now acted as one unit

249 At that moment, the Nordic countries formed the largest trading partner of the EEC. In 1965, 13.5% of the :EEC exports went to the Nordic countries, 12.6% to the United States and 8.7% to United Kingdom. 1

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iM 'Nordek' is an abbreviation o f 'Nordic economic', symptomatic in that the noun was omitted - Turner, .among others, notes that the word 'union* had unfavourable connotations for Finns and Norwegians (Turner 1982:145; cf. Solem 1977: 79). t

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commission - and regulations on the introduction of common tariffs towards countries outside

EFTA. (Wendt 1981: 125-129.)

Public opinion being broadly favourable to NORDEK, the Nordic countries' views on what

NORDEK actually would be differed considerably. For Finland, it was particularly important

to know whether NORDEK would be permanent or transitional: it emphasised NORDEK's

value in itself, not as a launching pad for EEC membership. Sweden could perhaps have

accepted NORDEK as an alternative to the EEC; Denmark and Norway, however, were in

favour of Nordic cooperation only if it was not a hindrance to membership in the EEC. There

were further differences as to the possible supranational features of NORDEK. Denmark,

while preferring the EEC, was not opposed to a union-like NORDEK with, for example,

common agricultural policy and capable of exercising supranational authority. Norway,

however, was hostile to supranationality, above all in defence policy. In fact, the preamble

of the NORDEK treaty was to state, confirming the practice in the Nordic Council, that the

cooperation should not impinge on the foreign or security policies of the members; it should

not be seen as an invitation to NATO forces to extend their area of influence. (Wendt 1981:

128, 133-135; see also 346-347, 351.)

The year 1969 was, however, also a turning point in the EEC enlargement: after the

resignation of de Gaulle, there were no hindrances to begin the negotiations with the

applicants. This obviously coloured the NORDEK negotiations. Finland announced that it

would be prepared to complete the negotiations only conditionally: it reserved itself the right

to refrain from continuing the negotiations and from implementing the treaty in the case any

country initiated official negotiations aiming at a connection with the EEC, either before or

after the NORDEK treaty came into force. It also required a general provision to be added

in the treaty stating that all participants had the right to refrain from implementing the treaty

if any country reached a decision on a connection with the EEC after the NORDEK treaty

was approved, since the foundation for cooperation would then have been altered. These

conditions being accepted, the Nordic Council approved the NORDEK proposal in February

1970, and the treaty was to come into force on January 1, 1971 with the establishment of

institutions. The customs union was to take effect one year later. (Wendt 1981: 131-132.)

In March 1970, however, Finland announced that it was not prepared to sign the treaty,

although it was satisfied with its contents and still supported the intensification o f Nordic

cooperation. The announcement was motivated by reference to the reservation concerning

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possible negotiations on EEC membership by other signatories.251 This move came as a

surprise for the other Nordic countries and henceforth, the NORDEK treaty had to be

considered inescapably dead. This implied also the end o f the twenty years of unsuccessful

efforts to create a Nordic customs union.

Very soon, the attention of the Nordic countries turned again to the wider European

framework, and they began initial meetings with the EEC already before the end o f the year.

Negotiations with Finland, Iceland, Sweden and the other EFTA countries concerning free

trade arrangements for industrial goods started in December 1971. (Wendt 1981: 136-138,

140-141.) Denmark and Norway, in turn, signed the treaties on EEC membership in January

1972 together with the United Kingdom and Ireland, the three becoming members from

January 1, 1973. Norway's accession treaty was defeated by a referendum in September 1972.

Instead, a free trade agreement was signed between Norway and the EEC in May 1973.

{Idem: 144-145, 158; Turner 1982: 159.) Despite the failure o f these grand designs, more

informal and practical Nordic cooperation in economic matters, trade policy, industrial policy

and production, has developed. The Nordic Investment Bank was founded in 1975; there has

also been cooperation between the Nordic central banks. (Wendt 1981: 148-153, 160-161,

165-166, 181-182.)

In conclusion, the attempts to build a Nordic union both in the field of foreign and security

policy and in economy have failed for two main reasons. Firstly, the interests and orientations

o f the countries have been too different to combine and their views on what Nordic

cooperation should be have differed too widely. Accordingly, the Nordic countries have come

to be divided economically, politically and militarily both between NATO and neutrality and

between the EFTA and the EEC. Further discrepancies have appeared on a North-South and

an East-West axis regarding the relative importance of, respectively, the Arctic and the

Atlantic interests for the different Nordic countries. (See Tunander 1991: 59; Hettne et al.

1991; Andren 1991: 281.)

Secondly, even if sufficient agreement could be achieved, a purely Nordic arrangement would

hardly be large enough to be independent from external forces or a viable alternative to wider

European arrangements. That the three plans for Nordic governmental cooperation, defence

union, customs union and common market, were all dependent on external incentives and

2S1 Turner (1982: 149) sees the reasons for the changed attitude in the victory of the right wing parties in the parliamentary elections in March. The populist rural party had won more support and attacked the Soviets; as a consequence, the Soviet Union perhaps made their feelings known about the Nordic cooperation issue.

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developments such as the Marshall plan has led several analysts to conclude that there does

not seem to be any independent impetus inside the Nordic countries towards Nordic

cooperation (StrSth 1980: 104-106; Miljan 1977: 87). The influence of external political and

economic long-term factors is mainly centrifugal. They have, as a rule, exceeded the internal

political factors which have occasionally worked for Nordic cooperation.252 In a long historical

perspective, there has been no independent Nordic alternative to Europe; for the economic

interests, the Nordic area was only o f secondaiy interest. (Str&th 1980: 107, 113; cf. Jervell

1991a: 37-38.) Consequently, a purely Nordic solution has either not been possible at all in

the important fields of foreign and security politics, trade and economic policies, or it has

been resorted to only when better alternatives have not been available.

4.1.3 The low profile o f Nordic achievements and institutions

Achievements

The failures of the grand Nordic union plans, together with the rather nonspectacular nature

of the Nordic institutions (see below), sometimes conceals the wide array of achievements of

Nordic cooperation on a more pragmatic level. In many ways, Nordic achievements have been

remarkable. Compared to the efforts of the European Communities, Nordic treaties and

cooperative practices were not only achieved earlier - e..g, free movement of people, treaty-

based cooperation in environmental protection and culture - but were also more encompassing.

Particularly the 1950s were a period o f intense Nordic cooperation in many fields. In fact,

Jervell labels it the 'golden years of Nordic cooperation': political energy, central politicians

and the attention o f mass media were concentrated, or at least more involved than nowadays,

on the Nordic context (Jervell 1991a: 33 and 1991b: 189). The main achievement of the

1950s, and, indeed, the basic foundation of Nordic cooperation, was the common labour

market, established by facilitating the movement of persons across frontiers and by

harmonising legislation concerning social policies and the like.

231 StrSth (1980: 110-111) also argues that the "much-publicized close cooperation" in the GATT negotiations of 1964 was hardly more than tactical cooperation in order to achieve non-Nordic goals; similarly, for Denmark, the NORDEK plan was only a bridge to the EEC.

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The work for a passport union began in the early 1950s. In 1954, the need for work and

residence permits was abolished for citizens o f other Nordic countries253 and an agreement on

Nordic labour market principles was signed. In addition to the free movement o f labour, it

included the objective o f full employment policy in each country. (Wendt 1981: 188-189; see

also Wallmén 1966: 51.) Later, the agreement was extended to some categories demanding

special authorisation or certificates, such as the medical profession (Wendt 1981: 223). These

measures were accompanied in 1955 by a Nordic Social Security Convention {idem: 213-218)

which has subsequently been revised in various occasions. The aim of the convention is to

guarantee equal welfare for the own citizens and for those o f other Nordic countries for such

things as sickness insurance, unemployment benefits and pensions.

Nordic citizens are also in a specially advantaged position in comparison to other foreigners

with regard to the right to vote and eligibility to stand for posts in local councils and the

access to citizenship. Together with a number of 'infrastructural' facilities254, the Nordic

conventions permit the Northeners to live and be active in all Nordic countries partly under

the conditions applying to the citizens, partly under conditions similar to those in the home

country.

In the background of these facilities, the prolonged legislative cooperation has been

particularly important. Stemming from the 19th century, it became more structured through

the establishment o f the Nordic civil law commission in 1901 and the Nordic committee for

legislative cooperation in 1946. The areas o f cooperation gradually widened from trade law

to different aspects of private and criminal law, covering aspects of family law, traffic

regulations and citizenship as well as commercial and business legislation. In 1932, a

convention on the recognition and enforcement of judgements in civil trials was signed.

Subsequently, a regular cooperation between the ministers o f justice began in the form of

long-range programmes of legislation. (Wendt 1981: 258-261.)

253 Iceland joined this agreement in 1955. The final step was taken in 1957 when passport control for foreigners was abolished at the inter-Nordic borders; Iceland joined this in 1966. - It should be noted, however, that the Nordic labour market does not concern citizens of third countries; each country requires work permits individually and they have different immigration policies.

254 E.g., the Nordic Postal Association, the principle of which has been that Nordic mail can be posted on domestic rates. This usage, later extended to the Baltic countries, seems, however, endangered both by the EU regulations and by the privatisation o f the post. One might also mention cooperation in telecommunications, railways and the Scandinavian Airlines System, SAS, which was formed in 1946 of the Danish, Norwegian and Swedish national airline companies. (Wendt 1981: 193-194, 197-199.)

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The Helsinki Agreement urges the greatest possible legal harmonisation between the Nordic

countries. Uniform provisions are, thus, the objective, to be attained by continuous

collaboration as well as harmonisation or, where possible, uniform formulation of legislation

or joint legislative measures. However, harmonisation has not been interpreted as an objective

in itself, but, instead, as a means to provide better conditions o f life. (Wendt 1981: 264-265.)

In fact, a large part of the aims of the Helsinki Agreement, especially the greatest possible

uniformity in private law and the highest possible degree o f juridical equality between the

own citizens and the nationals of any other Nordic country residing in the country, can be

seen as measures aiming at facilitating the functioning of the Nordic labour market.

Legislative cooperation and harmonisation has subsequently concentrated on consumer policy,

food control, environmental cooperation and working environment (see Working programme

1990: 71). From the early 1970s, the efforts in environmental protection have been prominent,

even to the point of being indicated in an opinion survey as the main area o f Nordic

cooperation. Environmental questions were added to the Helsinki Agreement in 1974, and in

1976, a convention on environmental protection was signed including both legislative

harmonisation and principle according to which the interests o f the other Nordic countries or

citizens - regarding, for instance, the effects of pollution - have to be placed on an equal

footing with the own interests. (NU 1988/4: 103-116; cf, Wendt 1981: 235-240.)

In addition to the common labour market and legislative cooperation, a third cornerstone of

Nordic cooperation has without doubt been culture. As early as in 1946, a Nordic cultural

commission was set up by the ministers o f education to assist the governments. An agreement

on cultural cooperation was signed in 1971; it included a secretariat for cultural cooperation

and, actually, the first joint Nordic budget. In 1966, a Nordic cultural fund was created to

support private persons and organisations, while the Council o f Ministers supports public

organs. Cultural cooperation covers, among others, education and research255, arts and sport.

(Wendt 1981: 289-299). A general aim and principle has been to preserve the Nordic cultures

and languages and to promote their mutual understanding. For this purpose, a Nordic language

secretariat was established in Oslo 1978. There are also councils for the protection of each

language. The Council of Ministers supports literature translation, and a Nordic literary prize

and music prize are awarded yearly. {Idem: 324-328.) Radio and television have been seen

:5i For the multitude of Nordic research institutes and programmes, see, e.g., Verksamhetsberdttelse 1993. Cooperation has also resulted in the private Nordic Summer University (from 1950) and the publication of textbooks and periodicals, such as Scandinavian Political Studies (from 1967), Cooperation and Conflict (from 1965) and Scandinavian Journal of History (from 1976) (Wendt 1981: 305-310).

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as a central means in cultural cooperation, and programme exchange and joint productions

have been encouraged {idem: 317-320).

In all, the Nordic countries form without doubt a fairly coherent region as regards both culture

and legislation. There might be a community of law in many respects o f greater range than

inside many federal states, as the Council itself has put it256, and, effectively, a quite unique

sense of community in the Nordic countries. In questions such as those concerning the free

movement of people, culture and environment, Nordic cooperation has not met major

obstacles; rather, it is considered self-evident Public opinion is very favourable towards

Nordic cooperation and tends even to attribute more fields and achievements to it than what

is actually the case. For example, in a Nordic opinion poll o f 1993, cooperation in foreign and

security policy was seen as the most important field o f Nordic cooperation next after

environmental questions, and when asked whether there should be more or less cooperation

or whether the actual extension was suitable, a large majority welcomed more. While the

contents of Nordic cooperation were not well known, practically no one had anything against

it.257 In fact, as Solem (1977) notes, Nordic cooperation is like democracy in that nobody

seems to be against it, or even to afford to question it (cf. Lange 1965: 164).258

To what extent the sense of community is due to deliberate efforts in that direction is difficult

to assess. Some see the efforts as superfluous. Lidstrdm and Wiklund, for instance, maintain

that the Nordic countries would probably adopt coinciding positions in different international

contexts even without consultations or other special efforts, simply because of the similarity

of their basic attitudes (Lidstrom and Wiklund 1968:121; Wiklund 1968: 148). The Nordic

countries have always resembled each other not only in being small and homogeneous, but

also as to culture and political and judicial systems. Cooperation would not be so smooth

without the suitable background of common traditions and history as parts of the same state

2M Nordic Cooperation. An introduction. The Nordic Council, Stockholm, 1972.

257 Nordens fo lk om Nordiskt samarbete. En attitydundersókning i Sverige, Norge, Danmark, Finland och Island váren 1993. TEMO AB l'Or Nordiska Rádet och Nordiska Ministerrádet.

258 In fact, Waever (1992a: 94) notes that in the debate on EU membership, furthering Nordic cooperation was an argument which both the opponents and the supporters used to strengthen their positions. Relying on the popular support for Nordic cooperation, the opponents of EU membership depicted Nordic cooperation as a (better) alternative to European integration, while European integration was, in the supporters1 view, a very good base for the development of Nordic cooperation.

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formations under the same basic laws259 or the parallel national structures which help to

identify the right counterpart (Sundelius 1982: 182, 190-193). On the other hand, the natural

bilateral relations between the Nordic countries have also brought them closer to each other.260

In any case, the sense of community encourages pragmatic and informal cooperation in all

fields - to the extent that informal cooperation taking place outside the Nordic institutions is

perhaps of greater extension than formal cooperation. There are some 40 minor Nordic

institutions which are financed by the budget of the Council of Ministers, for example

research institutes, cultural institutes and information offices. Some informal Nordic

cooperation actually takes place on all levels, from an indefinite list of private Nordic

organisations and associations (see Wendt 1981: 90 et passim) to cooperation between

political parties and interest organisations. In public administration, regular meetings and

contacts occur from municipal level to that of the central administration, comprising the

judicial, executive and legislative branches. Direct contacts and cooperation without special

formalities between Nordic public bodies, organisations and companies is, in fact, a taken-for-

granted basis of Nordic cooperation (Rules and procedures 1988: 7; see also Nielsson 1978:

295; Wendt 1981: 40)261. Informal links and some kind of public right to cooperation seem

to be a norm and ideal for Nordic cooperation.

An important field o f informal cooperation outside the institutions • although encouraged in

the treaties - is cooperation in international organisations and conferences. Particularly in the

:59 A strong legal unity developed within the two kingdoms of the region after 1523. On the one hand, Danish law was increasingly applied in Norway and influenced Norway's national law. On the other, Sweden- Finland had a joint legal foundation in a common statute-book from about 1350; the code from 1734 was particularly important for the Nordic community of law, as it retained its validity after Finland's separation from Sweden preserving the juridical affiliation with Scandinavia as a Russian grand-duchy. Furthermore, the union between Sweden and Norway in the 19th century undoubtedly had similar unifying consequences. (Wendt 1981: 257.)

m See, e.g., Karvonen's (1981) study on policy diffusion from Sweden to Finland in the form of conscious introduction of Swedish models into the Finnish system, sometimes through Nordic cooperative contacts. Cf. also Solem's (1977) efforts to discern the consequences of Nordic cooperation for national policies and decision­making, realised in a form of a survey of the opinions of civil servants, parliamentarians and ministers. No clear consequences emerge; Solem notes the difficulties in assessing the degree to which unity has come about specifically because of the Nordic Council • which itself is also a consequence o f this unity.

Î61 In particular, the Nordic Council encourages cross-border cooperation. By means of regional loans from the Nordic Investment Bank (established in 1975) and a convention of cross-border municipal cooperation (1977), cooperation between municipalities in border regions has been established in, e.g., traffic, schooling, environmental protection and public health services (Kivimàki 1992: 14; Wendt 1981: 243-246).

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UN organisation, cooperation in the form o f both preparatory Nordic meetings and contacts

during the sessions is well developed. It is often limited to exchange o f information, but in

wider UN issues, particularly in economic, social and humanitarian issues, also a broader and

more formalised cooperation exists.262 The Nordic ambassadors to the UN meet regularly

throughout the year, and the traditional autumn meeting between the ministers for foreign

affairs has mainly been concerned with the next meeting o f the UN General Assembly.

Through these meetings and the more informal daily contacts between the delegations and the

ministries, the Nordic countries agree on common positions, division o f work responsibilities

and common voting declarations. Coordination is most developed in UNESCO and GATT;

in other organisations, such as IMF, IBRD, OEEC/OECD, ECE or Council o f Europe -

particularly the Council for cultural cooperation - where the Nordic countries may have a

common, rotatory representative in the decision-making bodies or present joint initiatives.

EFTA, in turn, is one of the organisations with which the Nordic Council has continuous

contacts on secretarial and committee levels. (NU 1988/4: 38-39, 50, 64-65, 67-71; W endt

1981, esp. 367, 373; see also Landqvist (ed.), 1968.)

This kind of cooperation has often been pointed out as both consistent and effective. Nordic

countries are often perceived as a bloc or a regional unit in international organisations, one

of them may address the meeting on behalf of the others, and the coherence o f the 'Nordic

bloc' has factually been high in the analyses o f voting behaviour in the UN General

Assembly263. Without doubt, a similar coordination gives additional weight to the single

Nordic countries and their policies in international fora, in addition to the concrete advantages

of cost sharing and access to information. After having applied for EU membership, however,

Finland and Sweden started voting more in line with the other EU members, weakening the

'Nordic front1 (Væmo 1993: 174-179; Sverdrup 1996: 15).

The image of the Nordic countries as a regional unit has found a place also in the literature

on security policy, despite the fact that foreign and security policy have been absent from

Nordic cooperation. Quoting Deutsch, they are often referred to as a 'pluralistic security

community' characterised by peaceful settlement of disputes both among themselves and in

262The fields o f peace keeping and development aid have been central in the Nordic cooperation linked to the

UN organisation. In 1964, a Nordic Stand-by Force in the United Nations service (NORDBERFN) was established (Wendt 1981: 369-371); cooperation in development aid started already before the Nordic Council was set up {idem: 381-387), and a Nordic Development Fund was established in 1989 to give loans and finance projects o f Nordic interest {Verksamhetsberiittelse 1993: 196; VerksamhetsbertttteIse 1992).

243 See, e.g., Cooperation and Conflict, volume II, 1967.

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relations with outsiders.264 The overall security situation of the region has increasingly come

to be called the 'Nordic balance', something that is not a mere situation but actually some kind

of guarantee o f the security o f the Nordic countries.

According to the idea or theory of Nordic balance, the different security decisions o f the

Nordic countries - Swedish neutrality, Finnish neutrality with the particular weight o f Soviet

relations, the Norwegian and Danish NATO membership with reservations - actually balance

each other and guarantee together the security of all the countries. As Wiberg and W aver

(1992) put it, the Nordic security community is a subregional constellation in relation to

which the superpowers have come to see self-restraint as lying in their own interests. It is a

self-reproducing area or situation of low tension which, hypothetically, would function in the

following way: were the Soviet Union to put pressure on Finland, the Nordic NATO members

would ease their bans on foreign bases in their territories in peacetime, a measure which

would result in dissuasion (or vice versa).

The idea o f Nordic balance seems really to have functioned as a legitimate motivation for

national policies and decisions such as the high military expenditure in Sweden, seen to

guarantee not only Sweden's own security but also, as a part o f the balance constellation, the

overall security in the Nordic region. It also increased the legitimacy of NATO membership

in Denmark and Norway. (Wiberg and Waiver 1992; Joenniemi 1992b: 64-65.) Indeed,

Wiberg and Waever see that Nordic balance has not merely been a rhetorical formula, but also

something real: the Nordic countries have, in fact, had some leeway, and would really take

[or, "would have taken", cf. below] each other's interests into some account. In Mouritzen's

view, Nordic identity has been a significant tool in the statecraft of individual Nordic

countries in foreign and security policies. The tight cooperation between the Nordic countries

has not seldom been used as a tool to obtain some political concessions, as in the case of

Denmark which, referring to the harmful effects of certain decisions on Nordic cooperation,

264 Compared with the extension to which it has been quoted in the Nordic literature, Deutsch et al. 19S7 is actually quite brief about the Scandinavian security community. On the basis of a historical case study on the relations between Sweden and Norway, it notes that the Scandinavian security community is characterised by limited functional amalgamation. The most important functions, however, have not been amalgamated: the common laws must be adopted by national legislatures, the common parliamentary body can only make recommendations, and it has no common defence forces, police, or control over the political and economic systems of its members (Deutsch 1957: 22-23).

200

has probably obtained somewhat more autonomy in the EC (for more examples, s e e

Mouritzen 1993a: 9-10; also Jervell 1991a: 35 and 1991b: 194).265

Institutions

The Nordic institutions, the Nordic Council and the Nordic Council of Ministers, but also th e

Helsinki Agreement, generously reflect the amplitude and variety in Nordic cooperation.266

The agenda of the Nordic Council is, in this respect, particularly illustrative: in principle, n o

question is excluded, providing it can be said to contribute to maintain and further develop

Nordic cooperation under existing agreements or being in the interests o f at least two N ord ic

countries. In contrast to most international institutions, thus, the field of action o f the C ouncil

is practically limitless. Neither the statutes of 1952 nor the Helsinki Agreement set an y

restrictions on the matters the Council may consider. It is therefore hardly surprising that th e

activities of the Council range from transplantation o f bodily organs and restriction o f th e

harmful effects of boxing to household education in the Baltic countries. An overview such

as that o f Wendt's gives the impression that nothing escapes the influence of Nordic Council

- in fact, Wendt, a Nordist, sees that if something has not been considered by the Council, th e

reason can be that cooperation in that particular field already functions so well that n o

measures are needed (Wendt 1981: 366).

Although wide in scope, the institutions are not particularly powerful in imposing any depth

to the cooperation. The exclusion o f issues o f high political nature has evidently implied th a t

the Nordic institutions also concentrate their activities on less controversial questions, w ithout

having the formal powers to endanger the differing national choices. As a consequence, the

institutions have not been able alone to sustain cooperation when sufficient will and consensus

among the members have been lacking. They could be characterised, first, as being 36

36i Cf. also Mouritzen’s article in Journal o f Peace Research, vol. 31, 4/1994, on rise and fall o f Nordic model as a foreign policy instrument.

Iw As a thorough introduction to Nordic cooperation, Wendt’s book of 1981 is indispensable; after that, however, no similar concise accounts have been published. Therefore, the reports on activities and plans by the Council o f Ministers is perhaps the best way to get an overview on Nordic cooperation. Another possibility is to have a look at the 2000-page 'blue books’ about the Nordic Council sessions. In the past, the Nordic Council published overviews on its activities over some years at the time, but the latest of this kind only covers the period until 1986. Still another way of getting acquainted with the various fields of activities is the list o f publications by the Councils and other Nordic institutions, e.g., Trykt og Udgivet 1994, Nordisk MinisterrAd, Kobenhavn 1994. A recent analytical overview is presented in the special volume of Den Jyske Historiker, "De Nordiske Feellesskaber", vol. 69-70, 1994.

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compensations for unachieved plans rather than as independent engines of cooperation, and,

secondly, as intendedly weak in their position and capabilities.

Almost as a rule, the Nordic institutions have been established either as a substitute or

compensation for more far-reaching agreements, or as a codification and formal guarantee of

existing practices. It has often been pointed out how setbacks, caused by some external

constraints, of potential Nordic strategies and plans have led to increased motivation to

develop cooperation in other, more pragmatic forms, such as new institutions (see, e.g.,

Sundelius and Wiklund 1979: 63; Sæter 1993: 8-9; Jervell 1991b: 187; Strâth 1980: 111).

The establishment o f the Nordic Council in 1952 was motivated by the risk of cleavage

between the Nordic countries revealed by the problems of the plans for common defence and

customs union. As Andrén (1991: 291) notes, the Council was originally formed in order to

balance the negative effects for Nordic cooperation of the different security loyalties emerging

in 1948-1949. An institutionalisation o f cooperation between the Nordic countries was thus

needed to ensure that they would not be increasingly drifting apart. The Council was given

a rather unassertive character; it was to assure the commitment to cooperation and to protect

the already, achieved results o f that cooperation rather than to create or envisage new

initiatives or more binding forms of cooperation.

In its own portrayal, the Nordic Council is an organ for joint consultation between the Nordic

governments and parliaments in matters concerning cooperation between two or more Nordic

countries. In addition to being an initiating and advisory body and a forum for discussion, the

Council can give recommendations, proposals and statements o f opinion to one or more

governments or to the Nordic Council o f Ministers, the implementation of which occurs by

identical laws and regulations by the five states.

The Council is composed of representatives both of the parliaments and the governments of

the five countries, as well as o f the three self-governing regions.267 In all 87 parliamentary

representatives are elected by the national parliaments from among their members268 for a

period of one year; normally they are re-elected. The governments appoint an appropriate

number of ministers to each Council session; there are also representatives of the executive

2(7 Aland and the Faeroes became members of the Nordic Council in 1970, Greenland in 1984.

168 The seats are divided as follows: Denmark 16, Finland 18, Iceland 7, Norway 20, Sweden 20, Aland 2, the Faeroes and Greenland one each.

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organs of the self-governing regions. Some 80 government representatives attend the annual

sessions (Rules and procedures 1988). The elected and appointed participants o f one m em ber

country or a self-governing territory form the national delegation; all the eight delegations

have their secretaries connected to the national parliaments. The delegations take care o f th e

practical organisation of assemblies in their own countries and function as a link between th e

Council and the ministries and government agencies.

The Plenary Assembly of the Nordic Council is required to gather at least once a year w ith

the venue rotating each time. The Council's activities are directed by a Presidium, elected a t

the first meeting o f each ordinary session for the period up to the next ordinary session. It is

composed o f president and four vice-presidents with their deputies, in all normally two from

every country. The Presidium meets also between the sessions, eight to ten times yearly

(Rules and procedures 1988: 12). It follows the work of the governments and the Council o f

Ministers in implementing the recommendations o f the Council, organises sessions and

supervises the activities of the committees. It can also set up ad hoc committees during the

sessions, and it has the right to represent the Council. In some cases, it is also authorised to

approach the governments or the Council of Ministers by means of a representation without

waiting for consideration of the Plenary Assembly, The Presidium reports to the Plenary

Assembly on its activities at each ordinary session. (Wendt 1981: 38, 56-58.) The permanent

committees o f the Council also meet between sessions and have their own secretaries. The

committee structure of the Council was reorganised in 1996, and there are now three

permanent committees and a control committee.269 In addition, temporary committees may be

established.

In order to avoid functional duplication and a large bureaucracy, the Council originally

refrained from setting up any joint secretariat. Only in 1971, the Secretariat of the Presidium

and the Secretariat o f the Nordic Council o f Ministers were established.270 (Rosas 1988: 227;

Wendt 1981: 47, 62.) Finally, there is a Secretariat Co-ordinating Committee with

269Before, the permanent committees were six: legal, cultural, social, economic, environmental and budget

and control committee, consisting normally of 13 members. (See 'Arbetsordning fCr Nordiska R&det', rules of procedure for the Nordic Council, in Nordiska samarbetsavtal.)

170 Both are now placed in Copenhagen. Originally, the secretariat o f the Council of Ministers was placed in Oslo and that of the Presidium in Stockholm. In 1986, the former moved to Copenhagen as a result o f the merger with the secretariat for Nordic cultural cooperation, joined by the presidium secretariat in 1996. The secretariats, which consist of Nordic civil servants on fixed-term contracts, have never been massive. Before the latest relocation, there used to be some 30 persons at the secretariat of the Presidium, 80 in the secretariat of the Council of Ministers and 40 in all the national secretariats together (Wendt 1981: 63-65).

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responsibility for Nordic secretariat functions. It consists o f the general secretaries o f the

national delegations and the Secretary-General to the Presidium. (Rules and procedures 1988:

26-27.)

The basic treaty on cooperation between the Nordic countries, the so-called Helsinki

Agreement or the Nordic Cooperation Treaty was signed on March 23, 1962. Again, its

motivation can be found in external developments, mainly in the decision of the United

Kingdom in 1961 to apply for EEC membership.271 In the view of the Nordic Council, this

implied a need for a codification of Nordic cooperation in the form of a binding international

agreement stressing the main results and outlining the trend of future development o f Nordic

cooperation. Such an agreement would, first, make Nordic cooperation better known outside

the Nordic countries and help to gain recognition of the claim to maintain it in the

negotiations with the EEC; secondly, it would strengthen the Nordic countries during the

negotiations; differing positions could otherwise threaten Nordic cooperation. (Wendt 1981:

39-40; Nielsson 1978: 291.) Above all, the treaty served as a guarantee of continuing

cooperation; it was to define how far cooperation had progressed and to introduce certain

guarantees that cooperation, once established in a particular sphere, would not be abandoned

- as stated in the introduction to Nordic cooperation by the Nordic Council (cf. footnote 256,

page 196).

The Helsinki Agreement is rather general in nature, very much a statement o f intent or

expression of solidarity (Solem 1977: 63), or, as Anderson (1967: 288) puts it, a joint

proclamation. In addition to enumerating the main fields and forms of cooperation, it contains

basic rules for the Nordic Council and the Nordic Council of Ministers. According to the

agreement, the governments shall endeavour to maintain and further to develop cooperation

between the countries in juridical, cultural, social and economic fields, as well as in transport

and communications and, after the revision approved in 1974, protection of the environment.

The agreement urges the parties to strive separately and collectively to promote Nordic

interest and to consult with each other to this end in appropriate fields, including international

trade. It also urges consultations on matters of common interest under debate in international

organisations and conferences, the extension of diplomatic assistance abroad to citizens of

171 As another motivation, Wendt alludes to foreign policy unrest; the Soviet Union applied considerable pressure upon Finland and was critical of the other Nordic countries, manifesting displeasure with the growing Danish-Norwegian cooperation with Germany within NATO (Wendt 1981: 40).

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other Nordic countries272, coordination o f Nordic assistance to developing countries,

coordination o f statistics and joint efforts to spread knowledge abroad about the Nordic

countries.273 In all, the treaty can be seen as a mere confirmation of existing practices (cf.

Turner 1982: 141).

The establishment of the Nordic Council of Ministers in 1971, in turn, was - together with

the agreements on cooperation in culture (1971) and transport (1972) - a partial compensation

for the failed plans for an economic union. The Council o f Ministers, a committee of senior

officials and a secretariat were all envisaged in the NORDEK treaty as new permanent

institutions to administer NORDEK cooperation; in the background, there was also the Nordic

Council's aspiration to more effective cooperation between the governments (Wendt 1981: 77),

Wendt, in fact, sees that the efforts expended upon an economic union served in carrying

through reforms which implied an important expansion and strengthening of the institutions

for Nordic cooperation (Wendt 1981: 45-47); Jervell (1991a: 35), on the other hand, deems

the establishment of the Council of Ministers as bureaucratisation rather than a sign of new

projects.

The establishment o f the Nordic Council o f Ministers did not in practice imply any profound

novelties in Nordic cooperation; cooperation between governments simply acquired an official,

treaty-based form, having thus far been informal in character.274 At the same time, the Council * 371 * * 374

272 There has been a lot of informal cooperation between Nordic consular representatives abroad, encouraged also by Nordic Council recommendations by the Nordic Council (see NU 1988/4: 29), although it has been seen by the governments as unsuitable for general agreements (Wendt 1981: 363-365).

371 In addition, there are many separate Nordic cooperation treaties in different fields. Among the central onesare the Convention on Nordic labour market signed in 1982, which replaces a previous one from 1954, the Nordic Treaty on work environment (1989), on cultural cooperation (1971), on environmental protection (1974),on social security (for the first time in 1955), and on transport and communications (1973). (See Nordiska samarbetsavtal, Nordiska râdets presidiesekretariat/Nordiska ministeirâdets secretariat, Stockholm 1993.)

374 Cooperation between governments had began in virtually every area in the form of ministerial meetings by the end of the 1960s. In the 1960s, two ministerial committees were formed, one for economic cooperation and one for the coordination of aid to the developing countries. In other respects as well, the executive has been linked to Nordic cooperation long before the actual establishment o f the Council o f Ministers. Ministers participate in the work of the Nordic Council; in each ministry, a special liaison official works as a link between the ministry and the national delegation to the Nordic Council. Finally, one minister from every government is appointed as minister for Nordic cooperation with the tasks o f coordination, supervision and encouragement. These ministers have as their deputies specially appointed civil servants, who foim the Committee of Co­operation Ministers’ Deputies (stüllfôrtrûdarkommittee). (Wendt 1981: 75-76, 78, 81; Rules and procedures 1988: 32.)

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of Ministers was given the authority to make decisions which were binding for the individual

countries (see below).

The Council of Ministers is composed o f one member o f each member government, the

composition depending on the issue; it meets in 20 different constellations {Rapport 1992: 42).

Responsible for cooperation between the Nordic governments and for cooperation between

the governments and the Nordic Council in all areas o f Nordic cooperation, the Council is

assisted by a secretariat and by 18 different committees o f senior officials275 and special

advisory committees which prepare the decisions. (Rules and procedures 1988: 32-33.) The

Council of Ministers presents to the Nordic Council a yearly report on Nordic cooperation

(C l) and an account on plans for the continued cooperation (C2).

Both the Nordic Council and the Nordic Council o f Ministers can be characterised as

deliberately weak institutions. Their powers are mainly limited to recommendations on issues

o f Nordic interest. Where the possibility of binding decisions is provided, it is not usually

used. An obvious further limitation is the exclusion of matters of high politics from the

agenda of Nordic cooperation; even the Helsinki Agreement actually stipulates that a member

country can withdraw from the application of the treaty by six months' notice.

The establishment of the Nordic Council illustrated well the general aim not to endanger the

neutrality and sovereignty of the members - in particular for Finland, in fact, any steps

towards supranational cooperation with the Nordic countries belonging to NATO, and later

to the EEC, would have been completely impossible. During its first ten years of existence,

or until the Helsinki Agreement, the Nordic Council had a peculiar constitutional foundation:

instead of an international agreement, it was based on identical, parallel national legislation.276

Thus, any country could withdraw by unilaterally repealing the legislation in question. Set up

by parliaments, the Council was not an intergovernmental organisation in the strict sense, and

it was not clear whether it could be seen as subject of public international law (Rosas 1988:

229; Petren 1959). For Wendt, this peculiarity was practical and natural: it assured that there

was no fear for the Nordic Council infringing on the sovereignty of national parliaments

375 For a complete list, see the Working Programme of the Council of Ministers, 1990.

276 In Denmark, the statutes were passed as law and promulgated as a treaty. In the other three countries, they took the foim of parliamentaiy resolutions (Anderson 1967: 24). While the Danish and Swedish parliaments accepted the draft proposal unanimously, in Norway, a sizeable minority voted against the plan (Lange 1954: 288; Wallmin 1966: 16; Anderson 1963: 26; cf. also Wendt 1981: 34-36 and Solem 1977: 45-46).

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(Wendt 1981: 50); the absence of a treaty meant that no international obligations of a legal

character were assumed (Robertson 1973: 280).

In practice, the powers of the Nordic Council are limited to the possibility of issuing

recommendations to the member governments and the Council of Ministers. Proposals for

recommendations can come from the elected members (one or more), the Council o f Ministers

and from the governments. After a consideration in a committee, the recommendations are

accepted - which can happen either unanimously or when more than half of those present and

at least 30 representatives vote in favour (Rules and procedures 1988: 24) - rejected o r

deferred to further consideration in the general assembly. Only the parliamentary

representatives have the right to vote. The Council o f Ministers presents, then, an account on

the measures taken in view with the recommendations; on the recommendations addressed to

particular governments, the account is presented by the governments in question. There is also

a specific question time in which the elected members can question the members o f

governments on all matters pertaining to Nordic cooperation. (Rules and procedures 1988: 22;

Wendt 1981: 69-70.)

Thus, the Nordic Council has no supranational authority: it cannot make decisions which bind

the individual member states. The governments are not compelled to follow the Council’s

views, nor are they legally obliged to bring any specific issues before the Council. (Wendt

1981: 52.) In reality, the Council has had problems in establishing itself as a party o f its own

right in the consideration of Nordic matters. The wish of the Presidium that the Council be

consulted before making any crucial decisions on foreign political, economic or military

alignment was only very partially fulfilled in 1971 when the Council was given the right to

be heard in important questions of Nordic cooperation. However, the national governments

could escape this obligation by defining the matter urgent. (Art. 46, Wendt 1981: 52; Turner

1982: 138; Anderson 1967: 289.)

The importance o f the Nordic Council is further shadowed by the fact that in many fields,

results were already achieved before the creation o f the Council, as in the case of passport

union. The existence of a complete network for cooperation existing prior to the Council has,

for Anderson, implied that the Council has had difficulties in making a place for itself in

Nordic cooperation; in his view, the Council has rather served as a not very successful

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pressure group (Anderson 1967: 22-23, 117-118).277 It does not dispose o f large financial

resources, either.278 Nevertheless, the lack of formal powers notwithstanding, the Nordic

Council can have real influence on national policies in that its recommendations are to a large

extent implemented by the governments. For Wendt, the reason for the influentiality o f the

recommendations is that the political parties generally elect their leading and most influential

members to the Council (Wendt 1981: 52).

The Council of Ministers, on the contrary, can take binding decisions. This possibility is,

however, used rather sparingly and subject to a series of conditions. A binding decision by

the Council of Ministers only binds those who participate in the decision, and only those

concerned by it participate. In fact, the Council of Ministers can take decisions without even

all the countries being present, if the question concerns only some of them (cf. Etzioni 1965:

191-192).279 Abstention is not an obstacle for decision. Decisions, for which each minister

disposes o f one vote, are taken by unanimity, apart from procedural matters where decisions

can be reached by simple majority. In matters where a national constitution call for

parliamentary approval, neither the country concerned nor the others are bound by the

decision until it has been approved by the parliament. (Art. 62-63; Wendt 1981: 77-78.)

It seems that binding decisions by the Council of Ministers in practice never occur, at least

not in important matters. As for the Nordic Council, the area and the type of cooperation are

rather consensual, limited to the traditional fields of cooperation, such as coordination of

development aid. Controversial matters are not brought to the Council (cf. Turner 1982: 170;

Nielsson 1978: 285). Instead, decisions can be taken on a lower level of senior officials; more

importantly, a specific issue can be considered in an informal ministerial meeting and, thus,

277 Wendt and Anderson argue that the authority of the decisions by the Nordic Council has been also diminished by the fact that the government members have no right to vote in the Council. The original intention of the NIPU, expressed in a draft for the Council statutes, had been to give the right to vote to government members. However, in a meeting of the ministers for foreign affairs in 1952, the draft was changed, notably concerning the position of government members: it was decided that they would only have the right to speak. (Wendt 1981: 35.) The representatives of the governments actually deleted all the binding provisions and weakened other sections of the draft (Anderson 1967: 281).

278 For instance in 1988, the budget for the Nordic Council was 26 million Swedish crowns; in 1993, the budget for the Council of Ministers was 650 million Danish crowns. The latter was shared between institutions (46%), projects and subsidies (44%) and secretary (10%); Sweden is responsible for 37.2% of the budgets (1989). Additional resources for Nordic cooperation come from the national budgets of the member states. (Wendt 1981; 82-83, 88; Rules and procedures 1988: 28; Verksamhetsberdnehe 1993: 3.)

379 Decisions concerning self-governing territories become binding in the extent they participate in . the decision on the basis o f their self-governance.

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without the binding effect of the official Council decision. Moreover, it has been said that the

informal and the formal meetings do not in practice differ so much; the same principle o f

consensus is applied in both. (Wendt 1973: 20.) Finally, the prime ministers, the ministers o f

foreign affairs, defence, foreign trade and development aid never meet as a Council o f

Ministers although they otherwise meet regularly; thus, even the possibility of making binding

decisions has been excluded in their fields.

Implications

The examination of the character o f the achievements and institutions o f Nordic cooperation

reveals the remarkable width of the cooperation. It is a factor which shows that Nordic

cooperation is considered advantageous, becoming, over the years, a strong tradition. At the

same time, however, this width has its reverse in the risk of embarking on too many

unimportant, secondary matters. As Anderson (1967: 103-104) notes, common interest being

the sole limit for the matters to be considered, the Nordic agenda becomes burdened with a

variety of different issues so that less energy is left for important matters.

Many important matters, moreover, are excluded from Nordic cooperation which concentrates

on consensual, low-profile issues. As was seen above, the divergent external political and

economic relations have set limits to cooperation. The few international questions on the

agenda of the Nordic Council have been approached with the greatest o f delicacy or with no

action taken, discussing mostly whether discussion was possible (cf. Sundelius 1982: 193;

Wendt 1981: 52, 343, 345-346). Instead, unanimity and solidarity are emphasised; issues

where different points of view can be expected are left out o f the Council's discussions.

Functioning primarily as a vehicle for the manifestation o f an already existing consensus, the

Council gives little opportunity for resolution o f differences. (St&lvant 1988: 452; Etzioni

1965: 193.)

Thus, the overall character of Nordic cooperation is vague and indefinite. There are no strong

guarantees about the continuity of cooperation, notably no strong institutions nor binding

treaties. At the same time, there is no dynamism independent o f the member states. In fact,

the general appreciation of Nordic cooperation and the assurances about its importance for the

countries not seldom turn out to be rather rhetorical. Similarly, measures apparently in favour

of Nordic cooperation may actually merely further the national interests. For example, when

Denmark has played the 'Nordic card' in the EC, it has not necessarily acted to protect Nordic

cooperation, but to gain more autonomy in the EC by referring to Nordic cooperation and,

conversely, in the Nordic context through the 'EC card' (cf. above; Mouritzen 1993a: 9-10).

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Despite the existence of a Nordic community, a certain mistrust seems at times to have made

the cooperative efforts surprisingly difficult. In some occasions, the Nordic countries have

even seemed to perceive close cooperation with each other as a threat to their own culture and

identity. This was particularly clear in the case of the long debated plans for a Nordic TV

satellite, the NORDSAT. In a Council debate on the satellite issue in 1974, those seeing that

the satellite would be beneficial for mutual understanding and useful for those living in

another Nordic country were contested with the argument that it would undermine national

culture (Wendt 1981: 321-322). On the other hand, it has also been difficult to achieve a

mutual recognition o f exams, even though the Nordic education systems are quite similar to

each other; this, in turn, has hampered the functioning o f the different Nordic exchange

programmes (idem: 303).280

Finally, Nordic cooperation seems in many ways dependent on and vulnerable to external

events. Even the original reason for the community-building in the region has been seen as

exogenous, namely, the fear of great power intervention (Sundelius 1982: 179). Similarly, the

'Nordic balance* has been more a result o f external forces than of any deliberate Nordic

efforts. As Wiberg and Waever note (1992, esp. 24-26), it did not emerge as a design of

security experts, implemented in unison and secrecy by the Nordic countries, but gradually,

by trial and error. The particular Nordic sense of community did not necessarily have an

important role, either. The balance was only partly of Nordic making; as a security complex,

it depended on the cold war structure, and accordingly, it has lost ground with the end o f the

cold war. Faced with strong outside forces, the 'naturalness* o f Nordic cooperation seems

actually rather volatile. As Andren (1967: 22) puts it, the Nordic is "fair-weather integration"

with no political insurances for a rainy day; in particular, this becomes visible in relations

with the EU.

4.J.4 The challenge o f the EU: increasing incompatibility

The process of European integration has always been important for the Nordic countries.

However, their participation in the process was for a long time limited by the political climate

o f the cold war. The end of the cold war, thus, represented an obvious catalyst for a new

rapprochement. In addition, there was an further factor which considerably increased the

attraction, even decisive importance, of the EC for the Nordic countries: the late 1980s* steps

forward in integration, the Single European Act and even more so the negotiations for a treaty

280 A convention to this effect was, finally, signed in 1994.

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on the European Union, made it clear that they would be increasingly influenced by th e

direction the process was taking and that, consequently, it was increasingly important for th em

not to be left outside.

In 1989, the Nordic countries, together with other EFTA members, were offered th e

possibility to begin negotiations for a broader participation in the process through a special

agreement which would, in practice, extend the acquis communautaire to these countries; th e

offer was very welcome, and negotiations were initiated the same year. Already before they

were concluded (1991), however, it had become clear that what the treaty on the European

Economic Area would offer was not enough for the Nordic countries: it was increasingly

perceived as leading to a situation in which they would be bound by the regulations o f the

union without any possibility o f influencing them. In fact, negotiations on EU membership

began in February 1993, before the EEA was signed.

The Nordic membership applications revealed, once again, not only the attraction of the EU

but also the relative weakness o f the Nordic bond. The Swedish application in July 1991 cam e

as a surprise for the other Nordic countries, a particularly bitter one as it came soon after a

solemn renewed commitment made by the countries to inform the others in advance about

important political and economic decisions281. Still, the move was a mere reiteration o f a

similar situation in 1961 when Denmark applied for EEC membership without consulting the

other Nordic governments or the Nordic Council. Similarly in 1959, the governments o f

Sweden, Norway and Denmark had ignored the Council when they dropped the NORDEK

plan for EFTA. (Anderson 1967: 289.) These events only confirmed that the principle o f

consultations before important national decisions indeed has been a principle, not practice (cf.

Andrén 1984: 259).

Soon after Sweden, Finland and Norway applied for EU membership. While there had been

some informal cooperation during the membership negotiations, which were conducted in

parallel, once again the final decisions on membership pulled the countries apart. In fact, in

the Finnish debate on EU membership in autumn 1994, the politicians stressed even the

importance of making the final decision about the Finnish EU membership before the results

of the Swedish referendum were known, in order to avoid any signs of dependency in relation

to Sweden.

181 Interview at the Presidium secretariat, Stockholm, May 30, 1994.

211

The EU entry o f Finland and Sweden in 1995 * the Norwegian membership was again rejected

in a referendum - has implied an escalation in what was already a situation of tacit

competition between Nordic cooperation and European integration. For some time, the main

interests and activities of the Nordic countries had been directed to the European level; when

compared to the 1950s, the 1980s had been idle running for Nordic cooperation (Jervell

1991a: 33 and 1991b: 189). The countries aspiring for membership showed more eagerness

in adapting to the EU than in cooperating with other Nordic countries. Meanwhile, the Nordic

activities tended increasingly to follow the European, being justified as making the adaptation

to the EU easier. At the same time, the European arrangements functioned once again as the

necessary external stimulus for Nordic cooperation.282

EU membership does not necessarily leave much space for separate Nordic activities, in

particular since the field of activities o f the EU has constantly been widening so as to cover

practically all fields of Nordic cooperation. In many ways, the EU is a serious challenge to

Nordic cooperation: its size, supranationality and dynamism put to the proof both the practical

possibilities in terms of time and resources and the motivation or interest for Nordic

cooperation. Among the first basic elements of Nordic cooperation which were seen to be

concretely endangered by the EU membership was the Schengen agreement, the aim of

abolishing internal frontier controls, the consequent tightening of police cooperation and the

fortification of the outer frontiers. The Nordic passport union was immediately threatened by

the fact that this outer EU frontier would go in between the Nordic countries. While this

problem was solved in favour of Nordic cooperation283, other, more important problems have

remained. First, the specific rights o f the Nordic citizens are not necessarily reconcilable with

the principle o f equal treatment of EU nationals. Second, the informal but still important

practice of cooperation in legislation and policy making in different areas is similarly

jeopardised by the necessary commitment to EU policy making and the common policies -

for instance, the increasing demands for coordination in foreign policy makes parallel Nordic

commitments impossible.

For instance, Kivimaki (1992: 45) points out the EEA agreement as the most important economic cooperation treaty between the Nordic countries for yean and even as one of the most important treaties which regulate the relations between Nordic states which both deepens and widens cooperation (cf. also Verksamhetsberùttelse 1993: 198).

iH The result o f the Schengen negotiations was that the Nordic passport union could continue, despite the fact that Norway and Iceland are not EU members: they were given observer status, while Finland and Sweden signed the treaty together with Denmark in December 1996 (Helsingin Sa nomat, December 17, 1996).

212

In this situation, to guarantee the continuation o f Nordic cooperation, it is imperative both to

convince the EU about its value, and to bind the Nordic countries to it. This latter task m ig h t

be even more difficult than the first one. Certainly, there seems to be a consensus on and a

commitment to the importance o f continuing Nordic cooperation284. On the other hand, it h a s

also been argued that the EU membership of three o f the five countries gives additional

impetus for Nordic cooperation inside the EU and that, additionally, the fact that Iceland a n d

Norway are not EU members makes Nordic cooperation even more important for them th an

before as a channel to EU decision-making. Still, these might be only rhetorical moves; th e

indefinite character of Nordic cooperation would need specification, its contents and m ethods

reformulation. To do this is difficult; moreover, as will be seen below, it may even b e

counterproductive.

As previously in the history of Nordic cooperation, challenges to the Nordic unity have been

promptly answered by innovations and measures aimed at increasing the efficiency of N ordic

cooperation: in the early 1950s, diverging security policy led to the creation o f the N ordic

Council; in the early 1960s, the EEC applications necessitated the signing of the Helsinki

Agreement; in the early 1970s, the collapse of NORDEK advanced the establishment o f th e

Council of Ministers. The early 1990s' challenge has not remained unanswered, either. T his

time, however, the answer has not been a new institution, nor a treaty, but rather a general

pruning. The general aim has been to strengthen Nordic cooperation by making it m ore

effective and more binding.

The various plans and projects presented by the Nordic institutions - some o f them already

realised - can be gathered under three main approaches: sharpening the profile of Nordic

cooperation to assure a role for it, increasing its dynamism through by broadening the official

284 It is usual that the Nordic countries give special assertions of endorsement to Nordic cooperation; one might cite the Danish footnote declaration in the Single European Act stating that the Act does not affect Denmark's participation in Nordic foreign policy cooperation (Stilvant 1988: 449; Pedersen 1990: 104), the regional clause o f the EEA on the possibility of continuing regional cooperation arrangements, among which Nordic cooperation, or the joint declaration by Finland, Norway, Sweden and the EU in early 1994 confirming that Nordic cooperation will continue independently of a EU membership of these countries (Per Stenbfick in Nordisk Kontakt. 2/94). These statements find echo in the habitual declarations by the governments on the value of Nordic cooperation, e.g., that "(TJhe Nordic countries find it very important to continue and strengthen the existing Nordic cooperation which is of great value in itself1 (Working Programme of the Council of Ministers 1990: 7), that Nordic cooperation and its widening is both natural and self-evident (Swedish ministry for foreign affairs on Nordic cooperation in 1979), or that a further development of Nordic cooperation is for cultural, political and economic reasons a privileged goal in the Swedish government policy (similar report o f 1986).

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scope o f cooperation and widening it geographically to include, in some respects, also the

Baltic states, and, finally, making the institutions and practices more efficient.285

Regarding the first approach, Nordic cooperation has been delineated in new terms as part of

the wider European context. As expressed by the prime ministers at their Bornholm meeting

in 1992, Norden is not an alternative but a natural part o f European cooperation; it is both

compatible with and complementary to European integration. In the view of the executive,

while Nordic cooperation can in certain fields benefit the Nordic countries in their role in

European politics, participation in European integration may also be anew impulse for Nordic

cooperation.286 The Working Programme of 1990 (p. 8) notes that "from being essentially

directed towards Norden, Nordic cooperation has in very few years become considered an

element in European cooperation". This new characterisation had gained ground throughout

the 1980s. Stalvant (1991: 157) remarks that the 1980s economic programme of the Council

of Ministers on internal market diverged from the previous discussions in that no Nordic

alternative was presented; the main aim was to assure compatibility with the EEA efforts. The

report NU 1988/4, in turn, states explicitly that "one should see integration in the Nordic

countries as a part of the general integration development in Europe".

It is generally understood that this essential compatibility with the European efforts can best

be assured through concentrating Nordic cooperation on specific Nordic issues, or the

"genuine Nordic interests". Thus, the overlapping areas, those already treated in the broader

European context, should be cut as superfluous. In addition to avoiding problems of

competency, this precision of Nordic cooperation would have the advantages of guaranteeing

it a meaningful role and of avoiding unnecessary waste o f time and resources. Evidently, it

would also help preserving the motivation for cooperation in a situation in which the

competition for the interest o f both politicians and parliamentarians between Nordic and

European cooperation has obviously been turning to the favour of the EU.287 These "genuine * 386 387

285 Many of these ideas were presented in a statement by the prime ministers on the occasion o f their meeting at Bornholm on August 17, 1992 (quoted here as Rapport).

386 In the view of the personal advisors to the prime ministers, Nordic cooperation is needed to strengthen the genuinely Nordic interests and to help participation in the EEA and the EC. Its tasks are, therefore, to secure Norden as a home market, to strengthen the aspects of a value community (identity and mutual understanding), to increase the competitiveness of Nordic industry, and, finally, to have a role in securing national interests (Rapport 1992: 9).

387 The motivational problems are not new; Sundelius and Wiklund (1979: 74) and Solem (1977: 138) remark that the general approval of Nordic cooperation by, e.g., all political parties may be a facade for inertia instead of a proof of a will to continue while no one feels obliged to really push for the implementation of concrete Nordic

1

Nordic interests” are generally seen to be environment, culture, energy and infrastructure, a n d

the broad citizen policy, which involves the rights o f the Northeners, social welfare, la b o u r

market, working environment and consumer policy. Among these, culture has a been a ss ig n ed

a particularly prominent role: the aim is to allocate half o f the budget o f the Council o f

Ministers to culture, education and research. (Rapport 1992: 12; Verksamhetsberattelse 1 9 93 :

1-2, 8).

2 1 4

The second approach to the protection of Nordic cooperation has been to give it m o re

dynamism and impetus, perhaps also importance, through broadening and widening in tw o

different ways: by including foreign policy and extending cooperation also to the B a ltic

countries.

Foreign policy issues, or rather cooperation in international affairs, became a subject o f

committee work in the Nordic Council in the late 1980s, when a committee was established

to examine how Nordic cooperation could be further developed and strengthened in

international matters.* 288 Including international issues in the agenda of the Nordic Council w a s

seen as motivated by the fact that international issues were not totally detached from N ord ic

cooperation, but in a sense a traditional, although secondary part of it, and that the H elsinki

Agreement does not explicitly hinder their examination, as it does not limit the fields o f

cooperation (NU 1988/4: 9; NU 1990/7). The mandate o f the committee excluded, how ever,

questions pertaining to security politics; foreign policy was seen as touching on the border o f

the mandate.

The committee work resulted in ideas on how cooperation could be made more effective in

the traditional fields, e.g., through widening the far-reaching and formalised cooperation in

GATT and UNESCO to other organisations as well. Among the other committee proposals

was the appointment of an international secretary to the Presidium, which was realised. (N U

1988/4: 11-12, 20-21, 99, 144, 153-155). It was also argued that it would be beneficial to

remove all possible doubts on the status of international questions by an explicit statement

in the treaty. The committee therefore proposed to complement the Helsinki Agreement by

measures. The problems might be further exacerbated if the European Parliament was to acquire a more prominent role in the future (cf. Per Stenbâck in Nordisk Kontakt 2/94).

288 Recommendation 22/1986 to the Council o f Ministers. The committee, called the Nordic Council’s committee on international cooperation, gave two reports, the so-called SOder I (NU 1988/4) and Sôder II (NU 1989/7), quoted in the following by their serial numbers. A third important report in this respect is the report bythe organisation committee (NU 1990/7).

215

a statement on the wish of the signatories to "improve co-operation in international questions"

or "to maintain and further develop co-operation in the field o f international questions" (NU

1990/7: 89-90, 150).2*9

As shown by the guidelines for the committee work and the resulting formulation o f the

amendment, however, the actual significance of modifying the agreement was not to introduce

something new and different, and certainly not to form a common Nordic foreign policy.

Rather, the result was a simple codification of the existing practice o f coordination and

consultation in certain international issues. The final modification of the Helsinki Agreement

(March 18, 1993) followed a later proposal presented in 1992 by the advisors to the prime

ministers (the Tloniemi group') and consists essentially in adding to the preamble the wish to

"renovate and develop Nordic cooperation in the light o f the Nordic countries' enlarged

participation in European cooperation", without mentioning international cooperation as such.

In addition, article 1 states now that "the contracting parties shall consult (bdr r&dg&ra) each

other in questions o f common interest under examination in European and other international

organisations and conferences".289 290 Moreover, the treaty now mentions the governments'

responsibility to safeguard the common interests in international cooperation. (See Rapport

1992.)

In any case, international questions have become more dominant in the work of the Nordic

Council. One could argue with St&lvant that the decisive threshold has been transferred one

step ahead: discussion on international affairs is now considered possible, but not with the

view of reaching common conclusions or demanding common action (Stdlvant 1988: 446).

In the Nordic Council, discussion on international affairs began actually only in the late

289 What 'cooperation in international questions' actually means is not necessarily clear. Moreover, the proposal differs according to the language used both as to whether the question is about introducing or further developing cooperation in the field and to whether the proposed cooperation concerns foreign policy (as in the Finnish version) or international questions (Swedish and English). Similarly, the nature of cooperation varies, the Swedish 'samrdda' (consult, confer) being the least ambitious of the three, without doubt less than 'cooperation*. (Cf. the three versions: first, the introductory "and wishing to improve co-operation in international questions", in Finnish "joka haluaa vahvistaa yhteistyfita ulkopoliittisissa kysymyksissa”; in Swedish "och som Onskar fOrstarka samr&det kring intemationella frig or"; second, first article: "the Contracting Parties shall in addition endeavour to maintain and further develop co-operation in the field of international questions”, in Finnish "Sopimuspuolten tulee taman lisaksi pyrkia yhteistyOhbn kansainvalisissa kysymyksissa” and in Swedish ”De fordragsslutande partema skola har&ver samr&da i intemationella frigor" (NU 1990/7: 90, 160).

290 Moreover, article 33 reads that the countries participation in European and other international cooperation provides good possibilities for cooperation in benefit to Nordic citizens and firms, and that the governments have in this respect a special responsibility to safeguard the common interests and values. In addition, a minor change was made to article 40 by mentioning explicitly the role of the prime ministers and the ministers for foreign affairs in the context o f cooperation.

216

1980s, the 1988 session being a watershed as regards full discussion on the E uropean

dimension (NU 1989/7E: 7). A look at the discussions in the Council from 1986 o n w ard s

seems to show, however, that the debate on the suitability o f discussing questions o f fo re ig n

policy has continued. In addition to issues such as detente, conflict in the Middle East, n u c le a r

weapon free zone, development aid, refugee policy, human rights or South Africa, th e

recommendations with a clear foreign policy character and linked to the current po litica l

situation cannot be said to be particularly prominent.291

On the other hand, the Nordic Council itself has adopted a more active role in international

relations, defining itself as an international and regional organisation the field o f w h ich

naturally includes international questions. The Council has given consideration to developing

contacts to the parliamentary organisations of the CSCE, WEU and NACC, as well as to

widening its traditional contacts with the interparliamentary assemblies o f the CIS, EFTA a n d

EEA into the field of security policy.292

To some extent, indeed, also questions o f security and military policy start to appear in th e

context of Nordic cooperation. Although the report NU 1990/7 (p. 91) stated that th e

international dimension and the realm o f competencies exclude issues of military-political

nature, the personal representatives o f the prime ministers argued in 1992 that foreign an d

security policy are an important part o f Nordic collaboration (samverkan) at the governmental

level.293 What has without doubt taken place is a change in the agenda o f the meetings o f th e

Nordic ministers of defence (excluding Iceland): from the spring of 1993, the discussions

concern, in addition to the traditional UN issues, cooperation in the UN in the form of troops

291 In 1993, for instance, the only recommendation of this kind urged the governments to strengthen the ir demand about the withdrawal of the Russian troops from the Baltic countries (rec. n. 18/93/P; VerksamhetsbenStlelse 1993: 218, 227). - In the absence of recent overviews on the activities o f the Council, the sources used here are vaiious unpublished compilations by the presidium secretariat of citations and ideas expressed in the Plenary Assembly and summaries of recommendations and activities in international issues, prepared for various purposes of internal information.

292 See "Nordiska Rfidets intemationella verksamhetsplan for 1995-96" (Presidiesekretariatet, Stockholm, M ay 30, 1994) and "Nordiska Rfidets relationer till ridets intemationella samarbetsparter" (Presidiesekretariat, Stockholm, December 24, 1993, including pro memoria of the international cooperation of the permanent committees.)

291 They even go further by stating that this cooperation "appears chiefly as an active initiatory cooperation in order to influence current issues of substance and to a lesser degree as reactive cooperation which is often linked to daily events or development tendencies." This is important if active policy is seen as more important than passive statements, but less so if it does not mean more than very general Nordic initiatives, while leaving the reactions (which can be seen as the main part o f foreign policy) to the national governments only.

' 217

in Bosnia, cooperation between Sweden and Norway in weapon industry and research and

collaboration to the establishment of a Baltic peace keeping force for the UN.

The other aspect o f the above mentioned approach to broaden Nordic cooperation is that it

has in the 1990s widened geographically to include a Baltic dimension in many of its

activities. A dense network o f bilateral relations has developed after the independence of the

three Baltic states in spring 1990, complemented by joint Nordic initiatives. They form a part

of the Council o f Ministers' yearly programme of cooperation with the adjacent areas,

prepared since 1990, and later widened to cover also Northwest Russia and the Barents

region.294 The goals of the programme are to promote democracy, human rights and transition

to market economy, the main tools being grants and exchange programmes for students,

scholars and trainees, but also for parliamentarians and civil servants. In order to facilitate the

contacts, the Council of Ministers has established special information offices in the Baltic

capitals. There is also a special pool for financing different cooperation projects with Baltic

countries and Eastern Europe, e.g., environmental research, investment and finance, industrial

and commercial cooperation and social welfare, and different sectorial initiatives.295

The Nordic Council, in turn, has signed in 1992 a cooperation agreement with the Baltic

Assembly, an interparliamentary council established in 1991. It includes cooperation in the

development o f democratic institutions and different specialised areas ranging from

environmental protection to security policy; for instance, the withdrawal of foreign military

forces and nuclear safety in the Baltic Sea area are mentioned. There has also been

cooperation in several fields such as customs administration. The more far-reaching proposals

concerning the participation o f the Baltic countries in the Nordic Council have, however, not

led to any measures taken. Instead, the Baltic countries have increasingly taken part in

informal cooperation outside the Nordic institutions; for example, the Baltic ministers of

justice participated in the meeting o f their Nordic counterparts for the first time in 1993. Even

194 The Baltic dimension can be seen as a part of a larger process of régionalisation in the Nordic area, The Nordic countries are involved in several regional, to varying degree institutionalised cooperation forms, notably the Arctic region - comprising Greenland, Iceland, the northern areas of other Nordic countries, United States, Canada and Russia - the Barents Sea region and the Baltic Sea Council, established in 1992 and meeting once a year at the level o f ministers for foreign affairs of the Baltic Sea countries with the participation of the European Commission (Rapport 1992: 56).

195 See Rapport 1992: 56-59 and 'Nordisk ministerrâds arbejdsprogram fo r Baltikum og Osteuropa* (October 9, 1990; revised October 8, 1992); 'Nordic Working Programme for the Baltic Region and Other Adjacent Areas 1993’ and 'Nordic Working Programme 1994 for Areas Adjacent to the Nordic Region’.

218

the Nordic coordination in international organisations has started to include Baltic countries,

at least in the IMF and EBRD. (Verksamhetsberàtteîse 1993: 177, 180-181, 199.)

Finally, the third approach to protect Nordic cooperation has been to increase its efficiency.

Among the measures envisaged, the most important are, first, increasing the participation o f

the executive, particularly the prime ministers, second, making cooperation more binding, an d ,

third, cutting and reorganising the institutions (see, e g., NU 1990/7: 99-102).

Accordingly, the governmental side o f cooperation was reorganised in 1993. To increase th e

dynamism and flexibility of Nordic cooperation, the responsibility for the overall coordination

of Nordic cooperation was given to the prime ministers. Meeting three to four times yearly ,

they are assisted by the Nordic Cooperation Committee (NSK), established in 1992, w hich

is formed by the ministers o f cooperation and senior officials.296 The NSK takes care o f th e

daily activities and directs the secretariat for the Council o f Ministers. It has full competence

to make decisions in all questions where unanimity can be achieved and where the respective

ministers have not reserved themselves the right o f making decisions. The NSK can also

receive tasks directly from the prime ministers. {Rapport 1992: 14; Oppfolginsgruppen 1992:

6.)

On the other hand, suggestions concerning the decision-making methods have been forwarded.

It has been pointed out that the method of proceeding typical for Nordic cooperation is unduly

time-consuming; in fact, its slowness it has been seen as a reason for the failures o f the large

Nordic projects (e.g,, Solem 1977: 75). As such, it reflects the national political 'style* o f the

Nordic countries: the principles of consensus and openness, or the greatest possible level o f

public access, imply that before a decision is taken, its feasibility and acceptability have to

be ascertained, and therefore the opinions of a large number o f different groups are heard.

(Milas 1978: 52-53, Wendt 1981: 48-49.) In comparison with the EU, however, Nordic

cooperation would need new dynamism; the lengthy procedures may hinder the necessary

adaptation to the greater tempo of the European institutions.

In order to increase efficiency, more binding, even supranational methods have been proposed,

something that could seem to change the style of Nordic cooperation quite dramatically. The

report NU 1990/7 (pp. 83-84) envisages that the Council of Ministers could make a decision

even with one country disagreeing, a method which is called the ”4/5 consensus”. This

296 The representatives of the Faeroes, Greenland and Aland are invited to one meeting per year and to other meetings which especially deal with the self-governing territories.

219

method would mean that a country which is not ready to join the decision can be left out so

that it still has the possibility to join the decision later. Even if adopted, however, this would

not introduce supranationality to Nordic cooperation, at most add to its 'multi-speed1 nature:

since the decision does not bind the disagreeing country, it cannot be said to be a majority

decision; it is still unanimous as to those who are bound by i t Still, the term 'supranational*

is used, albeit ambiguously,297 On the one hand, the committee responded in the negative to

a member proposal concerning the establishment o f a Nordic commission as an initiatory,

preparatory and executive organ, following the example o f the EU, and warned against

establishing new organs which presumably would not get new and wider tasks in addition to

the existing ones. On the other hand, however, it also stated that "if, at a later stage, some

supranational elements are taken into the cooperation, consideration can be given to the

establishment o f a commission". The committee also stressed the differences between the

European Community and Nordic cooperation, outlining the latter as cooperation which does

not limit the national decision-making competence, as "co-existence and understanding to

benefit all Nordic citizens", not integration. (NU 1990/7: 82-83, 113-115.)

As for now, effectiveness has concretely been furthered through institutional simplification;

the Rapport 1992 (pp. 42-43) points out that there is less need for the machinery o f civil

officials and that the institutions and projects (some 800) which partly or wholly depend on

Nordic budget should be revised and their number perhaps reduced. After some discussions,

reductions have been made. The number of minor Nordic institutions has been cut, the

secretariats of the two Councils have been relocated. The reorganisation of the permanent

committees, mentioned above, can also be seen as a measure in this direction.

As a whole, however, the measures aimed at protecting Nordic cooperation raise two

questions: are they really sufficient, and do they really have the supposed consequences? They

do not seem to alter the character o f Nordic cooperation to the extent necessary to face the

challenge o f the EU. It still lacks the EU's central assets: the calculability provided by binding

decisions, directly applicable legislation and a court o f justice; the weight of size and the

agenda with crucial issues of economy and politics; and a logic and dynamism independent

o f its member states, assured by the strong institutions and the long-term political goals. There

is not even a hegemonic power in the Nordic context capable of being the motor for

cooperation (cf. Jervell 1991a: 37). In the past, these differences have explained the scarcity

297 For instance, according to the report, "in certain cases it may be necessary to resort to majority decision"; the versions of this statement in Swedish, Finnish and English coincide almost only in that they are all rather unclear (see NU 1990/7: 17, 84, 145 for the respective versions). The report also notes that Denmark cannot automatically comply with the supranational decisions of two organisations.

220

of concrete results in Nordic cooperation; now, they can hardly be supposed to contribute to* * JOtt

its resistance .

A basic problem is that the original motives for Nordic cooperation seem now to work against

it. In contrast to the EC/EU which proceeds by the force o f political commitment to ambitious

long-term goals o f economic and political union, Nordic cooperation has progressed in m ore

modest and uncontroversial steps. It has concentrated in fields where the concrete goals o f th e

different countries actually converge, where it is seen as concretely beneficial by all th e

participants. Very concretely indeed, NU 1989/7E (p. 61) states that the motive o f N ordic

cooperation is to save money for the individual Nordic countries, while the Rapport o f 1992

(p. 20) declares that basic idea of Nordic cooperation is to be led by demand (cf. S tilvant

1988: 452). Quite understandably, then, when measured against a more advantageous

alternative, the superior benefits of a wider and more effective integrative framework, Nordic

cooperation risks losing its motivation. In an interview at the Presidium secretariat

(Stockholm, May 30, 1994), this was expressed very straightforwardly: Nordic cooperation

can be dispensed with if it is not necessary • something one could hardly hear about the

EU.299

Moreover, all the supporting measures envisaged involve features which may actually turn

them against Nordic cooperation. For the first, widening into foreign policy is perhaps more

a reflection of external developments than a measure which increases the weight o f Nordic

cooperation or its practical importance for parliamentarians and members o f government

involved in the new EU issues. With the disappearance of the bloc division, also the reasons

for not discussing international issues disappeared - as was well shown by the commitment

of the aspirant EU members to the development of the common foreign and security policy

of the EU. Moreover, the widening did not bring anything new to Nordic cooperation: it only

codified the traditional, pragmatic Nordic consultations and background discussions. One

could even see that the fact o f explicitly stating the competence limits the possibilities o f

cooperation, if the agreement is understood as comprising only consultations in the context

of organisations and conferences. Since this has traditionally been the case, the explicit

statement rather excludes new forms o f cooperation in international matters, such as binding

298 Cf. Jervell 1991a: 36-37; StAlvant 1991: 174; Etzioni 1965: 223-226; Andrin 1967: 10; Milas 1978: 18.

199 An example o f the difficulties to motivate the efforts towards more efficiency could be that when the practice of one annual Council session was changed from 1992 to two annual sessions, it did not take long to see that the second meeting was not really needed, and the Council returned to the former practice.

J

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Nordic commitments or joint actions. After all, increasing Nordic foreign policy coordination

would only increase the possible collisions with a similar European coordination.300

Similarly, then, the new Baltic - and more generally regional - dimension o f Nordic

cooperation can also increase internal divisions instead o f being a source of dynamism,

evidence of its attraction as a model301 or a springboard to wider European relations (cf.

Jervell 1991b: 192). The interests o f the Nordic countries do not necessarily coincide in

relation to the Baltic states302, and the same is true for regional cooperation, for example, in

the Arctic region. These projects might, thus, also result in conflicts with the internal

régionalisation in Norden, when, for instance, the 'Vâstnorden' - the Faeroes, Greenland and

Iceland - feel that they get too little attention in comparison to the Baltic countries (Rapport

1992: 50).

Concentrating Nordic cooperation on the genuine Nordic interests, then, is also a problematic

strategy. It has always been reminded that the Nordic countries do not really have many truly

common interests. In vital economic issues such as agriculture, fisheries or industry, the

interests o f the Nordic countries are, in fact, very different (cf. Wæver 1992a: 94; Wiberg

1992: 246; Stâlvant 1991: 176-177). It has also been pointed out that increasing convergence

iW Similarly, the entrance of security policy to the Nordic agenda seems only apparent. Rather, one might speak about a redefinition of security: security politics have entered Nordic cooperation as a result of the changed security constellation which permits a division of security into different areas, some suitable for cooperation for, e.g., economic reasons. In fact, when the prime ministers mentioned in their Bornholm declaration security policy as a field of common Nordic interests in participating in the European cooperation and in which one should develop cooperation between the governments, the report to the prime ministers states that the concept o f security has a new dimension, including also non-military matters (Rapport 1992: 11). It could be argued that the new cooperation concentrates on these more technical issues, being economically advantageous; the political side still remains outside.

301 While the Baltic states have formed their common institutions following the model of the Nordic ones, other regional organisations have also shown interest towards Nordic cooperation, e.g., ASEAN, the Gulf states, Central America, Andian Pact, Balkan states and the Viscgrad countries (interview at the secretariat of the Council of Ministers, Copenhagen, June 2, 1994; NU 1988/4: 49).

302 Hettne et al. (1991: 39) note that attempts at finding a common Nordic line on the issue have been insufficient in relation to the temptations for individual politicians to engage in grandstanding. The Nordic countries have taken different stands - the closer to the Baltic states, the more eager the state has been in practical cooperation but the more cautious in political issues. Thus, for instance in a meeting of the Nordic foreign ministers in November 1990, the Danish and Norwegian ministers wished regular meetings with the Baltic ones, while their Swedish and Finnish counterparts were less enthusiastic, emphasising a more encompassing cooperation including the Soviet Union and Poland (Wasver 1992b: 164).

222

in the economie and political directions does not necessarily mean more reasons fo r

collaboration» either, but rather increasing competition (Hettne et al. 1991: 27-28).303

Moreover, several Nordic scholars see that even the basic sense of community and N ord ic

identity is now seriously threatened. Consisting essentially o f a 'difference' based on keeping

outside the military divisions and o f a moral and concrete 'superiority* in relation to th e

'European', it appears increasingly hollow as the division has disappeared and, perhaps m o re

importantly, as the 'European' model now has taken the lead.304 Previously, it was o ften

remarked that Nordic cooperation had in many fields proceeded further than European

integration (see, e.g., Goldschmidt 1990: 92, 97); now, however, as equally high or even

higher results o f cooperation had been achieved in the European context, the 'Nordic' has lo s t

its role as a model and even become peripheral. The progressive, integrated and market-based

European setting offers an attractive, alternative object of identification (cf. Wæver 1992a: 86-

87 and 1992b; Joenniemi 1992b). In concrete terms, the process of European econom ic

integration has not only been a model for or influenced the development o f N ordic

cooperation, as when the establishment o f the EEC influenced the plans for a Nordic customs

303 In fact, Nordic cooperation shows a remarkable Variable geometry* in that not seldom an agreement involves only some of the countries; there is also a tendency towards further bilateralisation (e.g., an agreement on industry and energy between Sweden and Norway in 1981; interview at the Presidium secretariat, Stockholm, May 30, 1994, and Wiklund 1984: 218). One might ask whether, formally speaking, bi- or trilateral cooperation can be seen as a part o f Nordic cooperation; if not, the contents of Nordic cooperation are considerably reduced (cf. Joenniemi 1992b: 37-40).

304 The Nordic countries are sometimes lavishly depicted as virtuous and profoundly well-meaning, even altruistic; e.g., Miljan (1977: 97) speaks about a Nordic 'filter', a kind of automatic taking-into-consideration o f the other Nordic countries' interests through which the concrete national decisions always pass; for Turner (1982: 2), the asset of Nordic cooperation is the encouragement of mutual understanding and sympathy between ordinary people; strong popular support has been pointed out (e.g., Nielsson 1978: 278-279, 281) as well as its nature as less dramatic and less based on elite level than the EC process or the Benelux cooperation (Sundelius 1978: 61- 62; Sundelius and Wiklund 1979: 71); for Joenniemi (1992b: 36, 40-41), the originality and fashion o f the 'Nordic* lies in some special, value-oriented and immaterial features, such as stability and peace. In all, there has been a tendency to see the Nordic countries as characterised by low military tension, anti-militarism, high social stability and standard of living, a small state philosophy of being morally better than the larger states, e.g., in the debates on colonialism in the 1950s (Jervell 1991a: 15-16) and Nordic cooperation as better than the EC because of the prevalence o f societal actors, voluntary, informal and consensual nature - the absence of formal agreements equalling moral superiority (Neumann 1992: 17). On the other hand, Wiberg (1992: 247-248) argues that there have always been competing identities and differing links to outside countries, and that these, in fact, have caused the failures of the grand Nordic cooperation schemes.

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union or the developments in the 1960s those for NORDEK. (cf. NU 1988/4: 56): increasingly,

the concrete Nordic measures are justified as adjustment to European cooperation.305

Consequently, i f this Nordic identity previously could be used instrumentally as a tool in

international relations, it has now lost its credibility, being actually abandoned. Mouritzen

notes that for the Swedish bourgeois government (from 1991), the Nordic model was no

longer consistent with the perceived Swedish national interests; instead, reference was made

to European identity (Mouritzen 1993a: 1, 12*13, 21*22). He interprets this as a paradigm

example o f adaptive acquiescence: the membership application made it necessary to appear

as good Europeans, while stressing the Nordic, or even Swedish, identity was seen as

counterproductive and might sustain fears among the southern EU members (idem: 15-18).

Similarly, Wasver (1992a: 78) sees that in 1989 to 1990, there was particularly in Sweden an

almost complete acquiescence to the perceived necessity of joining the European Community.

This showed the volatility of the 'Nordic' also by casting one o f the basic pillars o f Nordic

cooperation, reluctance to supranationalism, in a rather strange light.

A second problem in the concentration on 'genuine Nordic interests' is that the diminishing

share left for Nordic cooperation and the nature of this 'left-over* are not necessarily

conducive to uphold the interest in Nordic cooperation and the motivation of politicians to

support it.306 This applies perhaps especially well to culture; increasing centrality o f cultural

cooperation lowers the profile of Nordic cooperation, making it less important and less

interesting (cf. Jan P. Syse, Council president, in Helsirtgin Sanomat, January 30, 1994) and,

concretely, cutting the resources from other fields of cooperation. The necessary compatibility

M* A first mapping about the degree to which Nordic cooperation is influenced by the development o f the EC's home market is presented in the report of the Nordic Council of Ministers on Nordic cooperation 1987 (C1/1988), final report Norden i Europa 1988 and a complementary report. The economic integration seems, in fact, to proceed pari passu with the EU, or imitating it; e.g., a plan for economic development and full employment (1985, B 59/e) contains, e g., the establishment of a Nordic home market; in 1987, a programme for abolishment of barriers to trade was presented (B 70/e), including the principle that products from one land can be marketed in the other countries, and the mutual recognition of test results. The working programme o f the Council o f Ministers (1990: 10-11) mentions among the recent Nordic integrative measures the decision to remove the remaining barriers to capital movements across frontiers on July I, 1990 (excluding Iceland), agreement on gradual liberalisation of road traffic, a new agreement on recognition of higher education and new environmental action programme and standardisation.

306 Evidently, the EU sphere increasingly covers its traditional functions, something shown also in comparison to the late 1960s when the Nordic countries faced the same problem because of the unclear effect o f Denmark's and Norway's potential EEC membership for Nordic cooperation; then, it was argued that Nordic cooperation was not thwarted, since many of the areas it covered - cultural activities, transport, environment, social welfare, regional cooperation, major traffic projects - were outside the Treaty of Rome or not at all affected by EEC- cooperation (Wendt 1981: 141-144).

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of Nordic cooperation and European integration may marginalise the former, making i t a

function or echo o f the wider process.

Similarly, the increasing role of the executive and the prime ministers could be in terpreted

as a way of assuring the compatibility between the Nordic and the European rather than a s

a measure furthering Nordic unity. In practice, prime ministers now have a leading position

in both contexts. Their cooperation in the Nordic context is informal and unbinding; it ta k e s

place outside the institutions. Moreover, a generally more informal role has been envisaged

for Nordic cooperation after the Finnish and Swedish EU membership. It has been seen th a t

formal cooperation could tike place in the EU, while Nordic cooperation would appear in

different informal frameworks and forms (cf. Kivim&ki 1992: 24, 26-27; Rapport 1992: 10).

This reduces the position o f the Nordic institutions, especially the traditional role o f

parliamentary cooperation in the Nordic Council, but it can also jeopardise the other b asic

feature of Nordic cooperation, the central non-statal cooperation (Joenniemi 1994a: 12).307

Finally, efforts towards a more binding Nordic cooperation do not seem very prom ising,

either. On the one hand, they would seem possible only in the most uncontroversial issues.

On the other, they would go against the requirements of EU membership. The possibilities

of the Nordic countries cooperating tightly inside the EU as some sort o f a Nordic bloc a re

reduced both by the scarcity o f common interests and the practical impossibility of com bining

two binding commitments without either making them coincide or halting the progress in th e

European context.308 It has also been pointed out that the growing aspirations and independent

actorship o f the Nordic Council are problematic in that they seem to surpass the limits o f

political will and the outlines o f the governments, questioning the legitimacy o f the Council.

Thus, they might decrease, rather than increase, the influence of the Council. (Vsemo 1993:

240, 249, 270-275, 293.)

307 Both Waiver and Joenniemi see that concentration on levels other than the state would be good for future Nordic cooperation (W aver 1992a: 95-96 and 1992b: 160; Joenniemi 1994a: 36) - provided that motivations for cooperation still exist when the formal cooperation diminishes. As such, the effect of the executive limiting the extension o f Nordic cooperation is not new. For instance, Wallmdn (1966: 86-87) has remarked that the value o f the Nordic Council's recommendations may decrease because o f the fact that the addressee (government) takes part in the decision on its contents; the executive has also influenced the formulation of the Helsinki Agreement by making it less categorical.

"* Symptomatically, the report NU 1988/4 is against the idea of a common information office in Brussels because o f the different points of view between the countries (pp. 144, 153-155).

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On the one hand, there has been some optimism about the possibilities of forming a grouping

inside the EU, even emphasising the Nordic framework as one level of decision-making by

applying the principle of subsidiarity. However, the Nordic politicians have been wary of

provoking the EU with speculations about block-like behaviour within the EU. As the Rapport

(1992) cautiously observes, while it is common in the EC that the members cooperate with

like-minded countries in forwarding their national priorities, permanent groupings are not

common.309 Therefore, Nordic cooperation in the EC would consist in consultation

immediately before a matter is taken to the Community level. This kind o f informal

cooperation would let the Nordic countries know each others' points of view and coordinate

where possible. At the same time, the Council o f Ministers stresses the importance of

avoiding double work in the form o f separate Nordic and European levels, and thus, of

avoiding a parallel Nordic decision-making level. {Rapport 1992: 13, 37; KivimSki 1992: 25-

26, 31, 45; Planer 1993: 6.)

In all, it is accepted that the credibility o f the EU would not allow for a Nordic cooperation

based on systematic, binding commitments. Instead, it is seen that Nordic cooperation could

find its raison d'etre in informal consultations and in the special contribution the Nordic

members would give to the EU on the basis of their tradition o f collaboration. Several such

contributions have been envisaged: practice in subregional cooperation, being a model as a

source of identity or in resisting dominant cultures (StAlvant 1991: 163-168, 171-173),

compensation for the democratic deficit (Jervell 1991b: 206-207, 210) and concrete

achievements in environment, labour market, social policy, cultural and educational

cooperation (Working programme 1990: 81). Equally, areas such as transparency and openness

or development o f relations with countries and areas outside the EU could be among the

Nordic contributions.

The possibility o f making concrete contributions seems, however, to require a rather tight

Nordic cooperation for this purpose. In all, thus, the Nordic countries are caught up in a

dilemma. To preserve at least some o f the distinctive achievements of Nordic cooperation,

they would have to sharpen their profile and tighten the joint efforts. A sharpening o f this

kind, however, could, by increasing the credibility of Nordic cooperation, go against that of

the EU. In the end, thus, there does not seem to be much room for systematic Nordic

cooperation unless it is definitively redefined as something not distinctive, but conform to the

109 In fact, when the question of widened Nordic cooperation was taken up by Denmark in its membership negotiations, the EC answered with a counter-declaration about the priority of the Community integration (StAlvant 1991, referring to Agence Europe, November 10, 1971).

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goals and methods of European integration. In that case, it could perhaps be safeguarded in

the framework of art. 233 of the Treaty of Rome, which allows for the autonomy of Benelux

cooperation to the extent it brings forward the general process of integration (e.g., Jervell

1991b: 208). Another question is, then, whether the necessary political will could be found

in the Nordic countries.

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!

X X X

4.2 N o r d ic in t e g r a t io n : e l e m e n t s o f a m o d e l

4.2.1 The 1990s: new dynamism fo r Nordic cooperation

For many observers, politicians and scholars alike, the 1990s have profoundly changed the

conditions for Nordic cooperation. Several factors - decrease o f the particularity o f the 'Nordic

model’ in social policy, increasing participation in European integration by the Nordic

countries, the end of bipolarity in international relations - seem to converge in gradually

eroding the foundations of Nordic cooperation. It now faces serious competition from the EU

for resources, time and motivation. The binding nature o f EU integration makes parallel

Nordic efforts incompatible and illegitimate, while the EU membership o f Finland and

Sweden may induce new conflicts o f interests between the members and the non-members.

The 'Nordic option' has appeared to lose ground, if it ever really was seen as a possibility and

as an alternative to the EU. In fact, some have maintained that real Nordic integration would

require the total insufficiency of the national systems and the inacceptability or unavailability

of European solutions (Andren 1984: 261).

The various changes, or perhaps in sum the 'Europeanisation', as Sverdrup (1996) puts it,

affect the need and opportunity for Nordic cooperation. He points out signs o f increasing

informality, lessening of cooperation in international organisations, and decreasing resources

and interest. Nordic cooperation seems in retreat, judging from the cutting of institutions or

the concentration on fewer issues, selected by applying the criteria of utility and 'genuine

Nordic interests’.310 Nordic cooperation has lost credibility as a tool in the policies of the

Nordic countries (Mouritzen 1993a); even the Nordic identity is endangered by the loss o f

particularity and leading role due to the end of bipolarism and the superior dynamism o f

European integration (Wasver 1992a and 1992b; Joenniemi 1992b). Waever even argues that,

310 On 'genuine Nordic interests', see Rapport 1992: 12 and Verksamhetsberòttelse 1993: 1-2, 8.

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despite a temporary revival of'Nordism' in the current phase o f adaptation and transformation,

Nordic cooperation will be "dead by late 1990s", although it continues in culture and

education (Wasver 1992a; 95 and 1992b: 149).

This pessimistic view of the future o f Nordic cooperation is, however, based on a

misunderstanding o f its nature. Nordic cooperation is compared to EU integration, assuming

that the two are essentially similar as to tasks and goals: thus, they are either seen as

incompatible or merely overlapping. In both cases, Nordic cooperation is the weaker, the less

binding, less successful, dynamic or effective, and therefore it seems clear that the choice

between the two falls on the EU integration.311

It is certainly true that Nordic cooperation has experienced periods of declined interest; its

largely self-evident nature has not always inspired those involved to strengthening or

innovation. However, the major changes of the 1990s, the end o f the cold war and the EU

membership of Finland and Sweden, actually form major incentives for Nordic cooperation

capable o f providing it with the needed new dynamism. As three o f the five Nordic countries

now are also EU members, the two forms of integration, Nordic and European, are much

closer connected than before. In concrete terms, this implies increasing need and possibilities

for cooperation between the Nordic countries in the European context, while the achievements

in the latter may also inspire similar measures within Nordic cooperation. Moreover, the

ensuing need for comparison and adjustments creates a new consciousness about Nordic

cooperation, its nature and achievements: new plans in the EU integration often bring up the

fact that a similar plan already has been realised in the Nordic context - as, for instance, is

shown by the free movement o f people. This kind of comparison also furthers the 'Nordic

identity'. In fact, one can hardly seen that Nordic identity would be in danger because o f the

contacts with the 'European'; actually, it is through these contacts that a special Nordic

identity can develop, based on the perceived common attitudes and principles which are seen

to differ from the European ones.

Thus, this situation gives new impetus for understanding what Nordic cooperation actually is.

This, in turn, is conducive to an improved understanding o f the whole phenomenon of

integration. Through the differences and similarities between the Nordic and the European

111 In addition to politicians, also scholars tend to give more attention to EU integration than to Nordic cooperation. The 'academic image' of Nordic cooperation as a rather colourless research topic might well be partly grounded by Etzioni, who in his comparison of different unions claims, e.g., that "[...] the Nordic Union is just a noninspiring, indecisive, high consensus-commanding, egalitarian endeavour" and that "[T]he sessions of the Nordic Council aTe sporadic, short and dull" (Etzioni 1965: 195-196, 226).

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processes, an improved picture o f the EU emerges, pointing out fields in which N ordic

cooperation could well serve as a model for the larger process, as well as fields in which the

Nordic one could benefit from the latter.

4.2.2 The extent and methods o f Nordic cooperation

The apparent clarity of the term 'Nordic cooperation' easily misleads the scholars to

concentrate on the fields literally characterised as being 'Nordic' and 'cooperation'. This is a

small, although not insignificant, field o f agreements and arrangements common to all the

Nordic countries and involving measures which can be seen as cooperation - nothing m ore

and nothing less. In reality, there is not much 'Nordic' cooperation in the sense o f being

common to all the Nordic countries, even less exclusively to them. There are treaties and

practices which concern only some o f the countries, and few interests link them in questions

such as the relations to adjacent areas. Rather than being a separate field o f its own, the

'Nordic' is an aspect or the overlapping part of the different national realms. Moreover,

'cooperation' takes many different forms, some of which could as correctly be characterised

as harmonisation, unification or joint action. Thus, the literal interpretation o f 'Nordic

cooperation’ reduces both the extension and the depth o f the phenomenon, depicting it as

rather low-profile and modest in its aspirations.311 312

On the other hand, quick conclusions from the failed large-scale plans for union and from the

formal aspects o f Nordic institutions and agreements313, may have the consequence that two

3,1 It has become a commonplace to underline the differences between Nordic cooperation and European integration, even to the extent that their comparison is seen impossible; this, in turn, might be prohibitive as to further research interest in Nordic cooperation. In earlier literature, however, the use of terminology was less restrictive, and also the terms 'union* and 'integration' were applied in the Nordic context. Franzén CWill There Be a United States o f Scandinavia?', 1944) discusses the then actual debate on the creation of a Scandinavian confederation and notes the recent proliferation of publications on the subject. Etzioni (1965) compares different unions or plans for a union, among which the "stable union: the Nordic associational web" - having been subsequently quoted more for "associational web” than for "stable union”. Finally, Turner (1982) entitles his comparison with the EEC "the Other European Community. Integration and Co-operation in Nordic Europe".

311 The studies o f Nordic cooperation tend to be focused on these not only because of the theoreticalframeworks which give particular importance to institutions as a motor of integration (e.g., Etzioni 1965, Jervell1991a: 37), but also by the simple reason of feasibility. Institutions are accessible, tangible and easy to locate as an object of study (cf. Orvik 1974: 68). Thus, although for many authors the institutions o f Nordic cooperation matter relatively less, while the informal side is particularly relevant, they rarely consider the latter more thoroughly. For example, Jervell (1991b: 187) notes that informal cooperation is a unique feature in Nordic cooperation; however, he relieves himself from further consideration by stating that it is difficult to analyze, and analyzes instead the institutionalised cooperation.

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additional particularities of Nordic cooperation pass unnoticed. First, there exists a large

informal cooperation which might not be easy to approach but which in practice hardly differs

from the formal as to its concrete importance. Secondly, the low-profile nature o f Nordic

cooperation has often been emphasised by the involved actors themselves as a kind o f self­

definition, even camouflage, in order not to give reasons to oppose Nordic cooperation be it

for the domestic opinion, or for the external environment.

Actors and fora

The basic treaty on Nordic cooperation, the Helsinki Agreement of 1962, alludes to the

variety o f issues, actors and forms o f Nordic cooperation. It is an agreement to sustain and

further to develop Nordic cooperation in the fields of legislation, culture, social policy and

economy as well as in those of transport and communications and environmental protection,

the general aim being the widest possible similarity as regards different national norms and

an appropriate division of labour between them wherever suitable preconditions are to be

found (preamble; art.l). Thus, rather than creating or urging cooperation, it gives an overview

of the existing cooperation, stating the signatories’ commitment to it; on the other hand, it

does not limit cooperation to the fields explicitly mentioned. Nordic cooperation is above all

characterised by two features: the limitless field of issues and the variety and variability of

the actors concerned as well as of the fora where it takes place.

The matters pertaining to the competence of the Nordic Council are practically limitless.314

The only criteria by which the Helsinki Agreement (art. 44) delimits them is interest to more

than one Nordic country: the Council may take initiatives and give advice on all matters

concerning collaboration (samverkan) between all or some Nordic countries. Similarly, the

decision-making competence of the Council of Ministers comprises the entire field o f Nordic

cooperation (art. 60). There has been a general understanding among the Nordic countries that

the Nordic institutions do not consider issues of foreign and security policy; until the 1990s,

in fact, these fields have been practically excluded from formal Nordic cooperation.

Nevertheless, due to the wide field o f Nordic cooperation, issues of this kind emerged in the

discussions at times, leading to debates on whether or not the Council actually was authorised

to discuss them. In 1964, the Presidium therefore stated that the Council indeed had the

formal competence to discuss foreign policy and defence, warning against any decision of

principle or alteration of the statutes which would formally exclude such matters. This was

m For an idea of the broad scope of activities, see, e.g., the proposal for organisation of committee work in the Nordic Council by the organisation committee, NU 1990/7; 203.

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motivated by the possibility that in the future, situations could arise in which it w ould b e

natural for the Council to examine such matters. (Wendt 1981: 249-250.)

According to the Helsinki Agreement, cooperation takes place - in addition to the N o rd ic

Council and the Nordic Council o f Ministers - in the meetings between prime m in isters,

ministers for foreign affairs and other ministers, in special organs for cooperation and b e tw een

the public authorities of *he countries (art. 40). The variety o f issues implies also a variety o f

participants. In fact, it is taken for granted that not only Nordic public bodies but a lso

organisations and companies should be able to cooperate with a minimum o f form alities.

Thus, different interest organisations, including trade unions and political parties, traditionally

cooperate with their Nordic counterparts, e.g., in the form of four permanent Nordic p a r ty

groupings in the Nordic Council (Rules and procedures 1988: 7 , 16).315 Moreover, the sp h ere

of private Nordic cooperation comprises, for example, regular Nordic meetings o f d ifferen t

professionals, some from the 19th century, and thq Norden associations, established by c iv il

servants, politicians and business leaders, the general aim of which is to promote N ord ic

cooperation through inspiring different Nordic initiatives and spreading knowledge o f o th e r

Nordic languages and cultures.316 (Wendt 1981: 18-22; Kivimaki 1992: 14.)

As regards the fora and levels where Nordic public authorities cooperate, five different types

can be distinguished: subnational, national, Nordic, regional and international. The subnational

level consists o f cooperation between municipal and regional authorities. Thus, the practice

of direct transborder correspondence between municipalities was codified in the Helsinki

Agreement (art. 42); the Nordic Council has particularly encouraged cooperation in border

regions. Furthermore, a convention between Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden on

municipal cooperation across the Nordic state frontiers was signed in 1977 to facilitate

collaboration in the - traditionally wide - field of municipal competence, such as culture,

environment, health care, transport and tourism. Assisted by regional loans from the Nordic

Investment Bank, the municipalities share, for instance, schooling and health care services.

315 Ideas for a Nordic trade union had been presented already in the late 19th century (Wiklund 1968: 147), but they materialised first in 1972 in the form o f the NFS, Nordens fackliga samorganisation. In 1982, the industrial associations formed a joined secretariat. Cooperation between employers has been more informal. (Wiklund 1984: 216.) The inter-Nordic cooperation between political parties was not institutionalised until the mid-1970s, with the exception of the social democratic parties (Karvonen 1981: 101).

3,6 Every country has its own national association. In Denmark, Norway and Sweden the association was founded in 1919, in Iceland in 1922 and in 1924 in Finland. Subsequently, a Norden association has been established also in the Faeroe Islands (1952) and Aland (1970); the latest newcomers are the Norden associations in the Baltic countries.

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(KivimSki 1992: 14; Wendt 1981: 243-246.) In addition, transborder cooperation can also take

place between larger units than municipalities. There are, in fact, several large Nordic

subgroups317 which reflect regional or local identities and interests; together, they form an

informal cooperation council {Rapport 1992: 50-51).318

The national level comprises cooperation between various Nordic state authorities taking place

outside the Nordic institutions. A concise way o f describing it would be to remark that

practically all state authorities cooperate with their Nordic counterparts, something that has

given rise to the metaphor o f a "cobweb model” of integration; this is part of the informal or

unofficial Nordic cooperation which parallels and completes the cooperation taking place in

the institutions. On the one hand, there are Nordic meetings between the heads of

governmental bodies such as state archives, post and railways, the supreme courts and central

banks (Wendt 1973: 17-18). On the other hand, there is extensive cooperation on different

levels between the ministries.

Practically all ministers have regular Nordic meetings, irrespective of whether they also meet

as the Council o f Ministers. This practice began already in the period of 1929-39; for

instance, the ministers for foreign affairs have met regularly at least twice a year since 1932,

and those for development affairs and defence have also met twice yearly (Wendt 1981: 24;

NU 1988/4: 118-124). The prime ministers have had since 1993 a particular responsibility of

the overall coordination of Nordic cooperation; they meet three to four times yearly. One

minister from every government is appointed as the minister for Nordic cooperation with the

task of coordinating, supervising and encouraging Nordic cooperation; together with a special

cooperation committee composed o f senior officials, they assist the prime ministers. The

cooperation committee (NSK, Nordisk samarbetskommitte, established in 1992) heads the

secretary for the Council of Ministers and takes care of day-to-day activities. It also has full

317 Nordkalott (the northern parts of Finland, Norway and Sweden), Västnorden (Greenland, Iceland and the Faroes), Kvarken, Mittnorden, Ärvika-Kongsvinger, Skärgärd (Stockholm, Aland, Abo), Öresund and Gstfold- Bohuslän.

3,8 For the Sämi population living in the northern parts of Finland, Norway and Sweden, transborder cooperation is natural and the openness of national borders important because of the special characteristics of the reindeer culture. The Nordic Sämi Council was established in 1956; subsequently, it established contacts with the Sämi people in Russia and became Sämi Council (Verksamhetsberöttelse 1993: 25; see also Wendt 1981: 248- 254).

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competence to make decisions in all questions where unanimity can be achieved and w h e re

the respective ministers have not reserved themselves the right of making decisions.319

In addition to ministers, cooperation across ministries takes place also at lower leve ls.

Traditionally, the foreign relations o f particular ministries have passed through the m in istry

for foreign affairs, but this has not been the case for Nordic contacts. For example, Sundelius

argued in 1978 (pp, 57-60) that the foreign ministries had very limited opportunities to

coordinate the Nordic policies because of the well-established practice of d irec t

communications and informal contacts. In each ministry, a liaison official is appointed as a

link between the particular ministry and the national delegation to the Nordic Council. W end t

(1973: 17-18) also mentions that the chiefs for administration, trade and press o f the m inistries

for foreign affairs regularly meet their Nordic counterparts.

The formal Nordic level o f cooperation comprises the two main institutions, the N ordic

Council and the Nordic Council o f Ministers, established in 1952 and 1971. The idea o f

Nordic parliamentary council was expressed already in 1938. Since 1907, the Nordic m em bers

of parliament had met regularly in the semi-private Nordic Interparliamentary Union, N IPU ,

founded as a regional organisation within the worldwide Interparliamentary Union. Its scope

was exchange o f opinions and occasionally, it inspired legislative initiatives, although it had

no institutional authority.320 (Wendt 1981: 33).

The Nordic Council, on the contrary, is not only a parliamentary assembly: it is an organ fo r

joint consultation between the Nordic governments and parliaments. It is composed o f 87

parliamentary representatives and a variable number of representatives of the five governments

and the three self-governing regions. In practice, a large majority of the executive has usually

participated in the plenary sessions321. The Council can give recommendations, proposals and

statements o f opinion to one or more governments and to the Nordic Council o f Ministers.

The recommendations are accepted unanimously or by vote with more than half o f the present

and at least 30 representatives in favour (Rules and procedures 1988: 24). It also has the right

to be heard in the most important questions of Nordic cooperation, when this is not made

impossible through lack of time. The Council can also pose questions to the members o f

319 Wendt 1981: 75-76, 78, 81; Rules and procedures 1988: 32; Rapport 1992: 14; Oppfolgmsgruppen 1992:6 .

310 Finland and Iceland joined the NIPU in the 1920s (Anderson 1963: 30 and 1967: 16).

311 The Rules and procedures of 1988 give the number of some 80 government representatives.

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governments on all matters pertaining to Nordic cooperation. (Rules and procedures 1988: 22;

Wendt 1981: 52, 69-70.) Although the governments are not formally compelled to follow the

Council's recommendations or to bring any specific issues to it, it is often pointed out that the

recommendations approved by a broad majority o f the Nordic Council have considerable

weight in the national parliaments and governments; the recommendations are to a large

extent implemented. In Wendt's view, the reason for this is that the political parties generally

elect their leading and most influential members to the Council. (Wendt 1981: 52). Thus, in

a way, the Nordic parliamentarians may exercise power over the governments; although the

latter can present proposals, they do not have the right to vote. In addition, the members of

the organs of the Council, the permanent committees and the Presidium, are elected among

the parliamentarians; the government representatives have access to the committees, but

without the right to vote.

The Presidium of the Nordic Council, which in practice takes care of cooperation between the

yearly sessions, has considerable autonomy in that it can address a 'statement' directly to the

governments or the Council of Ministers when it is not considered suitable to await

consideration of the plenary assembly. In addition, the Presidium has the right of representing

the Council. (Wendt 1981: 38, 56-58.) The Presidium coordinates and is responsible for the

international activities of the Nordic Council. Both the Nordic Council and its four permanent

committees have contacts with similar international organisations or institutions; for example,

the Nordic Council signed in 1990 a cooperation protocol with the Council of Europe about

mutual observer status, it is observer in IPU since 1992, and has contacts with the

parliamentary organs of Benelux, CIS, EFTA and EEA. The Nordic Council is also member

of one o f the 24 interparliamentary delegations to the European Parliament, together with

Finland, Iceland and Sweden (NU 1988/4: 68). The international activities o f the Council have

expanded in recent years, and it defines itself increasingly in terms of an actor of its own with

contacts even to organisations of which the Nordic countries are not members. There have

been discussions on the possibility o f establishing contacts with security organisations such

as CSCE, NACC and WEU. In its relations to the EU, the Nordic Council will (1994)

establish contacts with the Committee of regions and take an active role as a regional policy

actor in Europe.321 322

321 See "Nordiska RSdets intemationella verksamhetsplan fSr 1995-96" (Presidiesekretariatet, Stockholm30.5.1994); "Nordiska Rfidets relationer till ridets intemationella samarbetsparter" (Presidiesekretariat, Stockholm 24.12.1993, including pro memoria of the international cooperation of the permanent committees); NU 1988/4; 69-70.

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The establishment of the Nordic Council of Ministers implied a strengthening of governmental

cooperation. It is composed of one or more members of each government, with th e

participation of the representatives o f the self-governing territories. Convening as a C ouncil

of Minister, the members of governments have the power o f making, by unanimity, decisions

which are binding for the individual countries. Usually, however, the Council of M inisters

proceeds on the basis of consensus. Thus, it does not much differ from the equally consensus-

based informal meetings between ministers which are held parallel to the meetings as a

Council o f Ministers. Some ministers never meet as a Council of Ministers; the difference

between the two types o f meetings is not very clear, however, and a meeting can even beg in

as the one and end in the other (Wendt 1973: 20).323 The Helsinki Agreement (art. 67, 40 )

also equates the two, stating that consultation between governments can take place, in addition

to the Council of Ministers, also in Nordic ministerial meetings. Responsible for cooperation

between governments and between the governments and the Nordic Council, the Council o f

Ministers submits yearly to the Nordic Council an account of Nordic cooperation and o f

future plans, as well as a budget proposal; in addition, it presents an account on the measures

taken in view with the recommendations of the Council. Furthermore, the prime ministers and

the ministers for foreign affairs give a yearly account of their activities. (Rules and procedures

1988: 32-33; Planer 1993: 5.)

In evaluating the Nordic institutions, it is important to note that they differ in two central

ways from many other international institutions. For the first, their main function is not that

of a locomotive o f cooperation; they should not be evaluated in terms of what they have

created or achieved, since they do not necessarily 'achieve'. Instead, they coordinate and

strengthen existing activities. While the establishment of the Nordic Council was more a way

of assuring the Nordic countries' commitment to cooperation than an effort at creating new

forms of cooperation, the objective of the Helsinki Agreement was to define how far

cooperation had progressed and introduce certain guarantees that cooperation, once

established, would not be abandoned. (Cf. Sundelius and Wiklund 1979: 69; Nielsson 1978:

282-283, 295.)

323Pragmatism seems to prevail over formalities, even to the extent that different sources give different views

on which ministers do not meet as the Council o f Ministers: NU 1990/7 and Wendt (1981: 366-367) list those of development affairs, foreign trade and foreign affairs, while the Rules and procedures (1988: 30) mention prime ministers and the ministers for foreign affairs and defence. A somewhat similar pragmatic curiosity was found by Anderson (1967: 40) in precedent Rules o f procedure for the Nordic Council according to which the Presidium could reach unanimous decisions without actually meeting, while in more routine activities, particularly those regarding their own national secretariats, the members of the Presidium could act individually, without mutual consultation.

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The second main difference is that the Nordic institutions are not intended to be above, not

even completely separate from the national administrations. Again, evaluating them on the

basis of formal authority vis-à-vis the member states, own resources and independent goals

would be mistaken: the Nordic institutions would appear unduly weak (e.g., 0rvik 1974 who

does not even consider the Council o f Ministers). Relatively few people work on a full-time

basis for Nordic cooperation; the secretariats of the Nordic Council and the Nordic Council

of Ministers are quite simll - some 150 persons in all, including the national secretariats - and

are rather getting smaller than growing through the recent relocation of the secretariats under

the same roof in Copenhagen. However, the number of personnel does not say much about

the productivity o f cooperation. In a particularly important phase of Nordic cooperation such

as the 1950s, when a large part of the acquis nordique (see below) was created, one could

hardly speak about personnel: Petrén (1959: 119) remarked that the only official working on

a somewhat more permanent basis in the Council was the person who took care of the

transcriptions o f the Council discussions (cf. also Anderson 1967: 55).

The basic idea, in fact, is not that only a separate secretariat would take care o f Nordic

interests and activities: instead, all civil servants in the Nordic countries have the possibility

of working for a fixed time period (four to six years) in the Nordic secretariats. Thus, there

is no independent Nordic administrative career. The Nordic is rather an aspect of the work

in the national administration, which contributes to a bureaucratic interpenetration o f Nordic

cooperation in the national administrations (cf. Sundelius 1978: 105-106).324 Similarly, the

'Nordic' is an aspect of the national as to its resources. The Nordic budgets are not large, but

they are not all the money spent for Nordic cooperation as some expenses of the Councils are

financed entirely via the national budgets of the member states. Each national delegation has

also a budget o f its own in the framework of its own parliament. It is, in fact, difficult to

assess the total amount of money spent on Nordic causes, as it is difficult to distinguish

between expenditure for national and for Nordic purposes. (Wendt 1981: 63-65, 82-83, 88;

Rules and procedures 1988: 28.)

Regional level cooperation between the Nordic countries and the adjacent areas is of

increasing importance for Nordic cooperation, reflected also in the reform of the permanent

314 Still, the secretariat of the Presidium is also an actor of its own. On the one hand, both secretariats have power in initiating, vetoing and broking decisions to the extent that they may even reduce the influence of the parliamentary members of the Council (Sundelius 1978: 68-69). On the other, with the establishment of an international secretary to the Presidium, the international contacts of the Council have considerably developed. For example, it signed in 1992 an agreement on parliamentary cooperation with the newly established Baltic Assembly.

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committees o f the Nordic Council325. At the government level, several initiatives have b e e n

taken especially in the relations with the Baltic countries; cultural cooperation is a lso

developing within the Arctic region which includes the United States, Canada and Russia. T h e

Council o f Ministers has since 1990 prepared a special yearly working programme f o r

cooperation with adjacent areas; since 1992, these have covered not only the Baltic countries

but also Northwest Russia and the Barents region. There is also a special pool of funding o f

different cooperation projects with Baltic countries and Eastern Europe and sectorial in itiatives

such as the Baltic Investment Programme (BIP), while the Nordic Investment Bank (NIB) h a s

for a long time been active in Eastern Europe, especially in the Soviet Union. Cooperation

with adjacent areas also involves collaboration with different newly established regional

bodies both in the level of governments and through the Nordic Council. Among these a re

the Baltic Assembly, the Baltic Sea Council (est. 1992), the Barents Council (est. 1993) a n d

the Arctic Council (est. 1996).326

In recent years, Nordic cooperation has been widening to include a Baltic dimension. In

addition to practical assistance in the framework o f the working programme for neighbouring

regions, cooperation takes place also at the governmental level. For instance, the B altic

ministers o f justice participated in their Nordic counterparts' meeting for the first time in 1993,

and similarly, the Baltic prime ministers have met the Nordic ones in connection with a

Nordic Council session. The Nordic countries have also aided in the establishment of a Baltic

peace keeping force for the UN. Recently, Nordic cooperation in international organisations

has also started including Baltic countries, at least in the IMF and EBRD.

(Verksamhetsberdttelse 1993: 177, 180.) In April 1996, the first meeting between Nordic

Council and the Baltic Council, together with a meeting between the Nordic ministers fo r

cooperation and the newly formed Baltic Council of Ministers took place in Vilnius.

(Helsingin Sanomat, April 15-17, 1996).

Cooperation in international organisations, the fifth level or fora of Nordic cooperation, is

actually one o f the first forms of Nordic cooperation. Already in the 1920s, Denmark, Norway

and Sweden were cooperating in the League o f Nations, holding, for instance, a rotating

In addition to the control committee, there are now three permanent committees, one for Nordic issues, one for the EU and one for issues of neighbouring areas.

326 See Rapport 1992: 56-59 and the following documents by the Council of Ministers: "Nordisk ministerr&ds arbejdsprogram for Baltikum og Osteuropa" (October 9, 1990; revised October 8, 1992); "Nordic Working Programme for the Baltic Region and Other Adjacent Areas 1993* and "Nordic Working Programme 1994 for Areas Adjacent to the Nordic Region"; Vasmo 1993: 165-166; Helsingin Sanomat, September 22. 1996.

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Nordic seat327. They also cooperated in other early international bodies like the ILO or the

UPU, where the Nordic Postal Union from 1935 and its successor, the Nordic Postal

Association has been the foundation for joint action (Wendt 1981: 23,193-194). Subsequently,

cooperation in the United Nations has been seen central in the foreign policies o f the Nordic

countries. Cooperation takes various forms, such as preparatory meetings before the sessions

between government members and continuous consultation and exchange of information

during the sessions. The Nordic ambassadors to the UN meet regularly throughout the year,

and the ministers for foreign affairs and defence have traditionally considered the upcoming

General Assembly issues in a meeting before the session; peace-keeping and development aid

have been among the central areas of cooperation.32' Through these meetings and the more

informal daily contacts between the delegations and the ministries, the Nordic countries agree

on common statements (anfSranden), division of work responsibilities and common voting

declarations. In fields other than economic, social and humanitarian, cooperation is generally

limited to exchange of information. Formally, however, the final taking of an attitude is

national, although the preparatory work is done jointly. Among the special agencies,

coordination is most developed in UNESCO and GATT, comprising far-reaching and

formalised division of labour. In GATT, well-organised cooperation has occurred between

Finland, Norway and Sweden with the participation of Iceland when possible. There has been

some coordination also between all the five Nordic countries despite the fact that Denmark

has participated in the EC delegation. (NU 1988/4: 38-39,48, 50.) In IBRD, IDA, AFDB and

IMF the Nordic countries have a joint rotating seat. (Wendt 1981: 381-387.)

Similarly, cooperation has been regular in the OECD, where the first common Nordic action

was taken in 1983. In the Council of Europe, cooperation is based on the similar directions

the countries delegations receive from their ministries for foreign affairs. The Nordic

ambassadors in Strasbourg meet regularly, usually after a similar meeting between the EU

countries to get information from Denmark. When Denmark was still the only Nordic EC

member, it acted as a bridge between the EC and the other Nordic countries: Nordic

ambassadors in Copenhagen were continuously informed about EC issues. Moreover, the

Danish parliament has contacts with other Nordic parliaments. (NU 1988/4: 64-65, 67, 69; see

also Turner 1982: 140; Wendt 1981: 146, 367, 373.)

327 Subsequently, the Scandinavian states were also in close contact with Finland (Landqvist 1968: 85).

Ji> See Nielsson 1978: 306; Wendt 1981: 369-371). • In 1989, a Nordic Development Fund was established ( VerksamhetsbenOttehe 1993: 196; more in the same of 1992).

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In practice, the Nordic countries have coordinated their policies in international organisations

to the extent that they are often seen as a fixed regional grouping with a virtual claim to b e

represented as such, usually through one rotating representative in the highest organs o f

decision (see Wendt 1981: 373). In fact, in the analyses o f voting behaviour in the G eneral

Assembly, the coherence o f the 'Nordic bloc' has been remarkably high in comparison w ith

other groupings329. The Nordic NATO members sometimes vote differently from the o th e r

Nordic countries; the introduction o f consultations on foreign policy matters among the E E C

members, in tum, did not prevented Denmark from voting with the other Nordic countries

rather than with the EEC group. (Wendt 1981: 368-369.)330 The practice o f cooperation in

international organisations in the form of consultations in questions o f common interests o r

joint appearance and measures has also been codified in the Helsinki Agreement (art. I), th e

Nordic treaty on cooperation in the fields of transport and communications (art. 3) and in th e

treaty on cultural cooperation (art. 2).

Aims and method

It is often underlined that the aims and motives o f Nordic cooperation are very practical in

nature: the purpose of cooperation is to decrease formalities, share costs and increase th e

single Nordic countries' possibilities to resolve different problems. In fact, the report N U

1989/7E (p. 61) states straightforwardly that the motive o f Nordic cooperation is to save

money, while the Rapport 1992 (p. 20) declares that the basic idea o f Nordic cooperation is

that it is led by demand. Sundelius enlarges the motives from overcoming the limited national

resources and resolving regional problems to concrete gains in defending the region from

outside forces, strengthening the international influence o f the Nordic countries, achieving

certain domestic objectives and securing collective prosperity (Sundelius 1982; 182, 190-193;

Sundelius and Wiklund 1979: 71).

The various Nordic cooperation treaties seldom go beyond stating the simple aim o f increased

cooperation in the field in question. The preamble of 1962 of the Helsinki Agreement,

however, also refers to the purposes o f further to encourage the dose community between the

9 See, e.g., Cooperation and Conflict, vol. II, 1967.

110 The importance attached to the uniform voting behaviour is shown by the consequences which an exception to this rule comported. In 1965, the usual cooperation suddenly failed as Denmark changed its opinion about sanctions against South Africa without informing the other Nordic countries. This created bewilderment, and the matter was brought to the Nordic Council session in 1966. Some members of the Council demanded a revision o f the Helsinki Agreement in order to change the expression 'should consult' to 'must consult'. Although no action was taken in the matter, the importance of consultations was emphasised. (Wendt 1981: 371-372.)

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countries, cooperation, uniform rules and, where possible, an appropriate division o f labour.

According to the Helsinki Agreement, cooperation takes the form of continuous consultation

and, when needed, coordinated measures. The practices of cooperation in the international fora

were presented above; coordination o f national policies and rule-making will be closer

examined below.

Both the aims and methods o f Nordic cooperation could be characterised above all as being

gradual, functional and cautious. It advances step by step, and each step is carefully planned,

involving broad consultations and a general openness to public to ascertain its feasibility and

acceptability. Following the principle of transparency common to the Nordic public

administrations, also Nordic cooperation aims at widest possible openness to the public

(Helsinki Agreement, art. 43 from 1974). Thus, its tempo is rather slow, and controversial

steps are avoided. These are often pointed out as basic problems in Nordic cooperation. In

Etzioni's view, the fact of being highly egalitarian and concerned with unanimity may be

helpful in maintaining commitment, but it is not conducive to action, and the lack o f action

may even be alienating (Etzioni 1965: 195-196). The Nordic institutions have also themselves

pondered the necessity to respond to the faster rhythm of work o f the EC by making Nordic

cooperation more effective, arguing that "it should also be possible in many cases to formulate

political goals without waiting for the results of studies of various kinds" (NU 1989/7E: 15,

19-22).

However, these features are also advantageous. The fairly decentralised, practical-functional

(cf. Lange 1954: 286) style has helped Nordic cooperation to expand, inconspicuously but

steadily (Anderson 1967: 147, 149). Almdal even sees it as a functional approach to

integration which focuses on the process rather than the end (Almdal 1986: 5-8, 16). The

treaties do not set any limits to cooperation331, and it actually has widened both functionally

and geographically. Often, this widening has followed the 'spill-over' model: the consequences

of cooperation in a field have made it necessary to cooperate in related fields as well. For

instance, in the Nordic Council meeting of 1964, the ministers for education called for a

common Nordic school system, needed because of the functioning of the common labour

market; the result was a recommendation towards continued unification o f school systems.

(Siikala in NU 1969/21: 59-60). Sundelius and Wiklund (1979: 64-65) have also observed

'spill-around' in the form of spill-over from failure in one field to success in another: notably

111 Wendt sees that the definition in the Helsinki Agreement according to which the Nordic Council, in addition to being an initiating and advisory body in questions of cooperation, "in general has those tasks which are apparent from this and other agreements" makes it easier for it to assume new duties (Wendt 1981: 51-52).

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the treaties and institutions have been seen as achievements which compensate for setbacks

in other areas. For instance, the plan for defence alliance led to the establishment o f th e

Nordic Council, the applications for EEC membership to the Helsinki Agreement, and th e

NORDEK plan to the Council of Ministers.

The cautious aims and methods o f Nordic cooperation may also serve an important purpose

in making it easier to agree to. The general acceptability both domestically and internationally

has been sought for by deliberately underlining its non-binding and pragmatic character. In

particular, this kind of 'sordino' was needed during the cold war to enable the F innish

participation in Nordic cooperation, which for Soviet Union seemed linked to the W estern

European organisations: in practice, Nordic cooperation had to be defined in terms which d id

not impinge on the neutrality and non-alignment o f its members. On the other hand, in

relations with the EC/EU, it has been important to stress that Nordic cooperation is

compatible with the broader integration process.

One might, in fact, discern a practice o f self-definition by the Nordic institutions, adopted also

by scholars writing about Nordic cooperation, a self-definition which by so convincingly

stressing the modest and thus 'harmless' nature of cooperation, actually succeeds in covering

much more advanced forms of coordination and harmonisation. In a way, the Nordic

institutions have had a certain monopoly over their own definition, being able to decide about

the nature of the information offered. It could be argued that this has permitted the single

Nordic countries to benefit from Nordic cooperation in different ways, and perhaps protected

the very existence of Nordic cooperation in relation to European integration.

In fact, knowledge about Nordic cooperation is rather poor both as regards the public and the

non-Nordic academic community. A concrete need for particular information activities arose

in the early EEC negotiations, as it was important to provide the EEC with an understanding

of the objectives and results o f Nordic cooperation. As Wendt put it, "[S]ince the governments

intended to insist upon the continuation o f Nordic cooperation both within the framework o f

the EEC and with the Nordic countries outside it, the EEC authorities naturally might desire

to know exactly what this Nordic cooperation involved. It would not be easy for the Nordic

representatives to explain. Nordic cooperation had always been free and informal in style; the

individual countries generally approved uniform legislation, or each one o f them introduced

measures upon which all could agree. The results o f cooperation were only to a limited extent

expressed in conventions." (Wendt 1981: 39-40, 376-379.) The principal means o f informing

about Nordic cooperation, then, was the drawing up of the Helsinki Agreement in 1962. The

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agreement is, however, rather general in nature; in fact, the formal documents hardly give a

clear or complete picture of Nordic cooperation.331 332

One of the first statements which had the effect of depicting Nordic cooperation as singularly

informal and 'low political' in nature was the declaration by the Finnish government when

Finland joined the Nordic Council in 1955. The government stated that the Nordic Council's

activities were restricted tc issues concerning the Nordic countries and mainly to

administrative, social and economic affairs. Moreover, it was emphasised that the

representatives o f Finland should not participate in the Council discussion if the Council,

against accepted practice, were to discuss military questions or conflicts of interest between

great powers. (Wendt 1981: 35-37, 343-344.) Through these statements, Finland was, in part,

defining the defined: there was already a general consensus that Nordic cooperation did not

include defence or foreign policy matters.333 This was also confirmed by the NORDEK draft

treaty of 1969 which stated that cooperation should not influence the foreign or security

policies o f the Nordic countries {idem: 346-347, 351).

The low profile is particularly emphasised in the publication 'Nordic Council: Rules and

Procedures', where the presentation o f Nordic cooperation begins by stating - quite

surprisingly - that the [Nordic] region "is not a federal state" (p. 7). Further, it is observed that

"decisions on foreign and security policies cannot be taken by joint Nordic bodies" (p. 8) and

that "as unanimity is required, the Council of Ministers is not vested with supranational

powers o f any kind" (p. 31). Nordic cooperation is presented as something informal, not

impinging on national decision-making capacity. It is also presented as a model for other

regions showing that sovereign states are able to cooperate in joint projects without having

to base their cooperation upon common defence and foreign policy (e.g., Council of Ministers'

working programme for adjacent areas; also Wendt 1981: 380-381). In fact, the practice that

the ministers for foreign affairs and defence do not meet as a Council of Ministers and cannot,

thus, make binding decisions, underlines the exclusion of their fields from the formal Nordic

331 A coordinated long-range information plan about the Nordic Council and Nordic cooperation came into effect in 1976; as an example of the various information activities, the report NU 1969/21 is a collection of papers presented in the third conference organised by the Nordic Council for international organisations inEurope.

333 By further emphasising the low profile, the Finnish 'definition’ actually shed a doubt on whether the profile in reality was that low. The definition was also permissive in that the issues considered were said to be "mainly" restricted to social and economic questions, and as the possibility of discussion on foreign policy in the Council was, even if exceptionally, recognised.

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cooperation. This does not mean, however, a total absence o f foreign policy and defence fro m

the field of cooperation: rather, they have been treated in other, more informal.

It is difficult to say whether this practice o f self-definition reflects an intended strategy.

Several authors seem to be inclined to think that it does, pointing to the benefits o f th e

strategy. Anderson argues that the Nordic type o f low-key international cooperation is o ften

less threatening to outside forces than a comprehensive, supranational strategy in w hich

defence and foreign policy dimensions can easily come to dominate the picture: it antagonises

neither domestic groups nor neighbouring countries (Anderson 1967: 147,149). Sundelius and

Wiklund (1979: 72-74) no :e that the practice of handling politically sensitive issues outside

the Council o f Ministers has been useful in maintaining flexibility and discretion, serving th e

Nordic countries well.334 Also Joenniemi (1992: 48-49) maintains that the choice of profile

is intended. For him, the Nordic countries seem to be well aware that they must not challenge

the conventional understandings of international relations too openly. In Joenniemi's words,

they must define themselves as a subtext of ordinary international relations, drawing the

attention away from the fact that their relations actually are not 'international' in character335

- something to which we will return below.

Whether or not the 'image* of Nordic cooperation has been a result of conscious strategy, it

seems to have directed research to emphasise the low profile, even though rather interesting

scholarly manoeuvres have sometimes been needed in order to confirm that Nordic

cooperation in fact is what it has been defined. An illustration can be found in Sundelius

(1978). His starting point is that there is a clear difference between the EEC, characterised

by formal commitment to supranationalism and eventual political union, and Nordic

cooperation, mere joint "management o f transnational ism” motivated by the countries' small

size and vulnerability. He underlines that the Nordic institutions are in no sense supranational

decision-making centres independent o f the governments, and that even though Nordic

relations are more like an extension o f domestic policy formulation than traditional foreign

w In addition to the low profile, also the generally unexplicit nature can be used for some purposes. Stâlvant (1991: 177-179) observes that the Nordic countries have been unwilling to define the economic, legal and political preconditions on which Nordic cooperation is based in their relations to the Baltic countries - seemingly in order not to define the conditions which would give the right o f participation.

m This is what Joenniemi seems to imply; he speaks about the need to avoid problems of Nord en being defined as a paradise. Moreover, he argues that there are many Wordens', a variety of interpretations and understandings, and that it is pointless to try to define the Nordic concretely: rather, there is a joint field o f understanding which prevails only if the participants in the discourse are allowed to adhere to their respective understandings, without being too harshly confronted with the question of what is "real” and what is not (Joenniemi 1992b: 62-64).

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policy making, this does not concern issues of vital national political importance. (Sundelius

1978: 5-10, 105-106.)

In analyzing Nordic cooperation, then, Sundelius applies Lindberg's list of policy areas

intended to analyze the scope of the EC. The application shows the extremely broad scope

of Nordic cooperation which, in fact, includes all the issue areas listed.336 What does not

appear, however, is the difference between the spheres of high and low politics assumed by

the theories Sundelius refers to. He quotes Lindberg and Scheingold who expect integration

to start in the sphere of low politics, proceeding in a particularly advanced stage eventually

to that o f high politics, and Hoffmann who doubts whether even successful regional

integration ever reaches beyond low politics. Interestingly, when Sundelius examines Nordic

cooperation in the light of Lindberg and Scheingold’s typology o f high and low politics, no

significant differences emerge in the scope or intensity of joint policy between the two types

of issues337. This result could lead to the conclusion that the Nordic case presents

characteristics o f particularly advanced integration. Sundelius, however, constructs a new order

o f salience of issues338 which permits a result coherent with both the assumption about the

progress o f integration from low to high politics and about the low-profile nature o f Nordic

cooperation, concluding that joint management in Nordic cooperation is most successful in

less salient issues, although the salience has been growing. (Sundelius 1978: 99-100.)

Recently, this cautious self-portrayal has appeared in particular in the relations to the EU.

While the Nordic countries have repeatedly stated their commitment to continuing Nordic

3M Lindberg's list contains 22 issue areas divided in functions in external relations, politico-constitutional functions, socio-cultural functions and economic functions. In Nordic cooperation, Sundelius observes that positive coordination (joint outputs) dominated in 13 areas, such as socio-cultural activities and politico- constitutional functions. Negative coordination (compatible policy outputs) dominated in 9 areas, while in external relations and economy, there was both positive and negative coordination. In fact, the extensive Nordic cooperation comprises, for example, negative political coordination in security policy ('Nordic balance'), coordination in foreign policy, joint measures in trade policy (common front in the GATT negotiations o f 1967), intensive policy coordination in public health and safety and in the maintenance of order, creation of uniform Nordic law through parallel national committee work in practically all areas of law making, substantial results in economic development and planning and, finally, free movement o f goods, services and labour. (Sundelius 1978: 80-96.)

337 For them, high politics includes military security, diplomatic influence, political participation, public safety and order, economic and military aid and legal-normative system. Low politics consists of community relations, economic development, business regulation, labour and agriculture, control o f economic system and o f monetary and fiscal policy, culture, social welfare, education and research.

33! The new rank-ordering is, thus, 1. security policy, 2. economic issues, 3. political participation, public order and health, 4. welfare and education, S. culture and recreation.

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cooperation despite the EU membership o f some Nordic countries, they have asserted, at the

same time, that this commitment does not imply anything incompatible with EU membership.

As early as in 1961-1962, when Denmark, Norway and Sweden applied for EEC membership

or association, Denmark stressed in the motivations for the application its interest in

preserving Nordic relations and the need to continue the Nordic labour market. Similarly,

Norway and Sweden took a strong stand for Nordic unity. (Wendt 1981: 116-117.) For the

EEC negotiators, in turn, the low profile o f Nordic cooperation was clearly a prerequisite for

its acceptability: they stressed that a joint proclamation on Nordic cooperation would not

prejudice the applications as long as it was non-binding (cf. Anderson 1967: 290).

In a similar vein, the compatibility o f Nordic cooperation with European integration was

stressed in the EE A agreement which states that

"The provisions of this Agreement shall not preclude cooperation: (a) within the framework of the Nordic cooperation to the extent that such cooperation does not impair the good functioning o f this Agreement; [...]"(art. 121, part IX).

Finally, when signing their membership treaties, Finland, Norway and Sweden gave a joint

declaration together with the EU stating that

"The Contracting Parties record that Sweden, Finland and Norway, as members of the European Union, intend to continue, in full compliance with Community law and the other provisions of the Treaty on European Union, Nordic Cooperation amongst themselves as well as with other countries and territories."(Corfu Protocol; August 17, 1994; Part E, joint declarations, n. 28.)

These statements actually assure the compatibility o f Nordic cooperation and European

integration in a manner largely favourable to the Nordic countries in that the declarations

remain silent about what Nordic cooperation means.339 In fact, at the level o f formal

agreements, Nordic cooperation and EU membership could hardly be found incompatible due

to the 'low profile' definition of the former. Therefore, these defining statements can be seen

as 'protecting moves' which, although weak in appearance, actually serve particularly well the

purpose o f consenting the further continuation of Nordic cooperation. On a closer look, some

339 There has certainly been a 'briefing' about Nordic cooperation similar to the efforts in the early 1960s, as the EU was obviously interested in knowing what it consented to when consenting to the continuation of Nordic cooperation. Probably, however, it had to content itself with a rather vague formulation. - Although the Nordic countries did not formally cooperate in their membership negotiations, there was a lot o f informal cooperation (interview at the secretariat of the Council of Ministers, Copenhagen, June 2, 1994).

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of them even leave the low profile behind. In the last example, the geographically extensive

definition o f Nordic cooperation is remarkable, permitting, for example, a further development

of cooperation with the Baltic countries. Even more remarkable in this sense is the Danish

statement accepted to the protocol in the SEA negotiations where

"...the Danish government takes note that the adoption o f section three (in the Act) on European political cooperation does in no way affect Danish participation in the Nordic foreign policy cooperation."(Dansk Udemigspolitisk Àrbog 1986, Copenhagen 1987, p. 310-, quoted in Pedersen 1990: 104.)

This is a rather puzzling statement in light of the fact that "Nordic foreign policy cooperation"

did not exist at all according to the usual definition of the contents of Nordic cooperation.340

Yet, it cannot be taken as a mere solemn declaration without concrete consequences. This is

demonstrated in particular by the effectiveness of the Nordic stand in the negotiations on the

Schengen agreement.341

4.2.3 The acquis nordique

The core of the wide array of treaties, common laws and practices of collaboration which

Nordic cooperation involves and which so easily evades a precise definition can best be

summarised by Hveem's (1992) telling term acquis nordique. It contains the common labour

market, passport union and harmonised public administrative systems and social welfare

,w Moreover, Denmark proposed a new article to the Treaty of Rome on third country participation in EC cooperation. In principle, the proposal, if adopted, would have made Nordic participation possible in all EC activities. Denmark also tried to obtain a privileged status for Norway within the European Political Cooperation; what it obtained was that a statement was added to the act spelling out the EC's openness towards other democratic countries in Europe. (For this and other proposals, see Dansk Udenrigspolitisk Arbog 1985, Copenhagen 1986, pp. 290-; quoted in Pedersen 1990: 104.) See also Vasmo (1993: 115-119) on the Danish reservations on the Maastricht treaty, possibly aimed at serving also the other Nordic countries.

341 Denmark's declaration that it will not accept any EU norm implying an encroachment of the Nordic passport freedom (NU 1988/4: 96-97) was, in fact, not rhetorical. Associating non-EU members to the Schengen agreement, the Nordic passport union came to form a singular exception to an agreement which is one of the most advanced and important steps towards political union between the EU members, permitting free movement o f people between the member countries while closing to a larger degree the outer borders. Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden became all observes in May 1996, and the EU members signed the treaty in December 1996. Iceland and Norway, in turn, will be associated with Schengen through a cooperation treaty which gives them the right to participate in working groups and ministerial meetings. (He bin gin Sanomat, February 22, April 19, December 17, 1996.)

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together with permanent cooperation and wide common representation in international

organisations. While pointing out the comparability with the acquis communautaire, the word

acquis is particularly fitting in that it gives the idea o f something acquired, helping to explain

the at the same time invisible and solid nature of Nordic cooperation.

The main achievement of Nordic cooperation is without doubt the existence o f a virtual

Nordic citizenship based on the free movement o f people, achieved already in the 1950s. In

1954, an agreement on Nordic labour market was signed, including free movement o f labour

without the need o f work permits342, and completed by the objective o f full employment

policy in each country. The work for a passport union had began before the establishment of

the Nordic Council, and the final step in establishing a passport union was taken in 1957

when passport control for foreigners was abolished at the inter-Nordic borders. (Wendt 1981:

188-189.) Initially, the labour market convention did not include professions demanding

authorization or specific certificates; subsequently, however, measures have been taken to

establish, for instance, a medical labour market (idem: 223).

The Nordic labour market measures were accompanied by a Nordic social security convention

which replaced different bilateral agreements in 1955 and which has subsequently been

revised and extended in various occasions. The aim of this convention is to guarantee in

principle equal welfare for the own citizens and for those who come from other Nordic

countries, e.g., in case of sickness or unemployment and for old age pensions. (Wendt 1981:

213-218.) In contrast to the EU, Nordic social security has not been linked to economy and

working dimensions: the freedom of movement and equality with the citizens o f the country

does not require employment (Eurooppa, October 27,1992: 11 ; cf. Working programme 1990:

52). Nordic citizenship implies the possibility of living and being active in another Nordic

country partly under the conditions applying to citizens o f that country, partly under

conditions which are similar to those o f the home country.

The different 'infrastructural' arrangements which facilitate Nordic citizenship in practical

terms would be impossible to enumerate. Among the many details which make the freedom

of movement easier to realize, one could mention the validity of medical prescriptions and

342 In Sweden, Nordic citizens have been able to work without work permits since 1943 (Etzioni 1965: 209, footnote 94).

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driving licences in all the Nordic countries and the fact that domestic rates also apply to

Nordic post343.

Further, the rights o f the 'Northeners' include the right to vote and be elected to local councils

as well as the acquisition of citizenship quicker and with lesser formalities than citizens of

other countries.344 The so-called 'citizen policy', aimed at safeguarding and developing these

rights, is one o f the primary areas o f Nordic cooperation. According to the Helsinki

Agreement, the parties shall continue to work to attain the highest possible degree of juridical

equality between resident nationals o f other Nordic country and the own citizens and

endeavour to facilitate the acquisition o f citizenship by nationals o f other Nordic countries.

Nordic citizenship and the acquis nordique more generally are based on a long history of

legal harmonisation and general encouragement of cooperation in different fields. They have

resulted in a degree o f community o f law in the Nordic countries which has been estimated

to be greater than in many federal states. The aim o f continuing legislative cooperation in

order to attain the greatest possible uniformity in private law, strive to create uniform

provisions regarding crime and consequences of crime and work for mutual execution of

sentences are also codified in the Helsinki Agreement. The work in the Nordic Council is

based on the principles of continuous collaboration as well as harmonisation or, where

possible, uniform formulation o f legislation or joint legislative measures, and the Council of

Ministers shall yearly give a report on long-range Nordic legislative cooperation. However,

harmonisation is not interpreted as an objective in itself, but a means to provide better and

less complicated conditions of life. (Wendt 1981: 264-265.)

Nordic legislative cooperation began, in fact, already in the 19th century; typically, it has

resulted in uniform laws approved by the five national parliaments. In 1901, the Nordic civil

law commission was established. In the first 30-40 years, legislative cooperation concerned

mainly legislation on trade, but it was subsequently widened to other areas. In 1946, a Nordic

committee for legislative cooperation was set up, joined in 1947 by Finland and Iceland. From

1948, cooperation was extended to criminal law in the form o f regular meetings of delegates

appointed by the ministers of justice, later by the ministers themselves. Subsequently, the

legal committee o f the Nordic Council urged synchronised cooperation already in the phase

w This was originally the principle of the Nordic Postal Union, established in 1935. The practice has later been extended to the Baltic countries, but is somewhat hampered by the EU regulations and privatisation.

3W In fact, after a period of residence, a Nordic citizen has the right unilaterally to declare the assumption of a new citizenship, without applying for it.

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of investigations and between departments. (Wendt 1981: 258-261; 266-286.) From the 1970s

onwards, the main fields of legislative cooperation have been environmental protection,

consumer policy, food control and work environment (Wendt 1981: 235-240; NU 1988/4: 91-

95).

Legislative cooperation is, however, not the only field of Nordic cooperation with origins in

the 19th century. The Nordic 19th century was a mixture o f increasing national awareness and

emphasis on elements of a common identity, in particular in the form o f 'Scandinavianism',

a movement among young academics especially in the 1840s and 1850s which inspired

research on common history and culture as well as collaboration more generally, including

the aim of legislative uniformity.345 From 1872, regular Nordic meetings o f jurists were

organised, designed to encourage where possible the widest expert agreement upon issues

concerning legislation and the administration of justice in questions which were important for

the Nordic countries. The first joint Nordic law was issued in 1880 on bills of exchange: the

same draft was approved by all parliaments, prepared by national commissions individually

and collectively. In the 1880s and 1890s, Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden prepared

common laws on such things as trade marks and maritime regulation. (Wendt 1981: 258.)

Cooperative efforts were certainly also inspired by developments abroad, for example the

German Zollverein or the Latin Monetary Union, constructed around France in 1865, and the

German unified monetary system. The 19th century plans for Nordic cooperation were

extremely wide, ranging from expanded instruction in other Nordic languages and mutual

recognition of university degrees to standard weights and measures, tariff union, common

currency and joint monarchy. A postal union was being prepared, and professional Nordic

meetings began; for example, the first Scandinavian meeting o f national scientists was held

in 1839. Also labour movements established Nordic contacts. (Wendt 1981: 18-21.) The

Scandinavian monetary union was established between Denmark, Norway and Sweden in

1875. Its last fragments lapsed only in 1924, the year of Iceland's entry to the convention.

345 These cooperative relations were quite new in the Nordic relations, and without doubt not self-evident for all. Until the 19th century, in fact, conflicts outweighed cooperation; the short period of the Kalmar Union (1397 to 1448), which gathered Denmark, Norway and Sweden under a common king with common foreign policy and defence, was rather exceptional and motivated by the common threat constituted by the North German Hanseatic states which sought to dominate the area. (Wendt 1981: 13). More usually, there were three competing states in the region, Denmark, Norway and Sweden; after the Kalmar period, the two main states, Denmark-Norway and Sweden-Finland, were in war with each other in several occasions, as the Seaman War (1675-1679) and the Great Nordic War (ending in 1721). The Nordic states also took different stands in the Napoleonic wars. In the 19th century, Norway and Sweden formed a personal union, while Finland was an autonomous grand-duchy under the Russian czar.

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Cooperation between central banks, initiated with the union, still continues (idem: 100). Not

all the plans materialised, however; notably, those for a dynastic union, military alliance and

customs union failed. The Danish proposal for a defence alliance against the German threat

was deluded by the other Nordic countries which adopted a neutral position when Denmark

was attacked in 1864, and the hopes for a customs union suffered a setback in the 1880s.

(Idem: 92-99.)

This long history of Nordic cooperation seems sometimes to lead to notable problems of

interpretation. A perspective of more than hundred years is difficult to take into account in

research, and the causes and consequences of Nordic cooperation tend to get inverted so that

a factor such as similarity o f administrative structures and legislation between the Nordic

countries comes to be seen as a mere fortunate prerequisite or cause for Nordic cooperation,

while, in reality, it can be a consequence of long-lasting, at times difficult cooperative efforts.

Thus, the acquis nordique is often taken to be a condition of departure rather than an

achievement. In addition to the long history, also the unfocused and undramatic manner in

which cooperation is achieved contributes to this misunderstanding. Often, in fact, the

achievements lack a direct link to Nordic institutions. Instead, they might originate in the

national or international346 contexts or be, for instance, initiatives of the Nordic interest and

parliamentary groups which, in contrast to the EEC, mainly precede the establishment of

common institutions. (Cf. Nielsson 1978: 287.)

Similarly, cooperation in different fields is often seen as self-evident. However, the acquis

nordique also comprises practices o f regular cooperation in three fields where cooperation is

actually far from self-evident, due to the differences between the Nordic countries, namely,

culture, economy and foreign and security policy (cf. Hveem 1992).

Nordic cultural cooperation is seen as a cornerstone in the joint efforts. It tends, however, to

evade exhaustive definition because of its remote origins and the variety o f actors and

initiatives involved347. At the ministerial level, a Nordic cultural commission was set up by

M6 For instance, EFTA offered the possibility of accomplishing the aims of economic cooperation which had been shown impossible to realise in a purely Nordic context (Sundelius and Wiklund 1979: 64).

J<7 As the former Danish minister of education K.B. Andersen eloquently expressed in his speech 'The Nordic countries as a cultural community' (NU 1969/21: 47), "Attempts to describe something requires first of all an isolation of the subject from its environment, and then a delimitation as well as a comprehensive view. It is, however, not so easy to apply these requirements to the theme of this paper: "Cultural Cooperation in the Nordic Countries, and its Popular Background". Nowadays the Nordic community of culture is both in practice and in principle a matter of course to such a degree that it defies any really exhaustive and satisfactory description. It is

2 5 0

the ministers o f education in 1946 to assist the governments in cultural affairs. In 1966, th e

Nordic cultural fund was created to promote cultural activities and cooperation in research a n d

education. In 1971, the Nordic countries signed a treaty on cultural cooperation w h ich

expressly mentions cooperation at different levels o f education, research, arts and media. I t

also aims at a coordination o f the Nordic countries' participation in international cultural

cooperation.

Among the various achievements, one might mention the various Nordic research institutes

and programmes, the private Nordic Summer University, which started in 1950, literary an d

music prizes and a film and television fund, established in 1990 (Wendt 1981: 305-310;

Verksamhetsberattelse 1993). The depth of the Nordic cultural cooperation is, however, b e st

shown by the two dimensions which concern the basic features of the national societies:

cooperation regarding the structure, goals and contents of the educational systems and th e

position of languages.* 348 349

The efforts concerning the mutual understanding o f languages and cultures more generally

were first concentrated on the different Scandinavian languages, while the position of Finnish

and the minor languages in the Nordic countries was relatively weaker. In fact, eight different

languages are spoken in the region, three o f which, Finnish, Greenlandic and Sami, are no t

even Scandinavian, Subsequently, all languages have been involved; the idea is both to

promote mutual understanding and to help preserve the cultures and languages. For this

purpose, a Nordic language secretariat and a council for the protection o f each language have

been established. (Wendt 1981: 324-328.) Particularly important from the point o f view of the

principles of the Nordic community is the Nordic language treaty, signed in 1981. Covering

the five principal languages o f the region, it gives the right to use one's own language in

like the incidental music to a film: it fonns an integral part of the whole, and is, therefore, not easily experienced as a separate element; indeed, we may not notice it at all - though we do know it is indispensable to the overall impression."

348 Cultural cooperation was first financed through a special common budget, actually the first joint Nordic budget; now, it is financed through the budget o f the Council o f Ministers. In the beginning, there was also a special secretariat for cultural cooperation, placed in Copenhagen, now connected to the secretariat o f the Council of Ministers (Wendt 1981: 289-299).

349 Particularly interesting early efforts in these fields were the Nordic orthography meeting in 1869 which succeeded in harmonising some features of the Scandinavian languages (see Wendt 1981: 326) and the revision of history and geography textbooks, which began in the 1930s and consisted of recommendations given to the publishers as to measures intended to increase mutual understanding on Nordic relations (Andersen in NU 1969/21: 55; Wendt 1981: 91).

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communication with different public authorities of other Nordic countries, for example the

police, public health service and school administration.

It is perhaps emblematic that the language treaty entered into force only in 1987, while Nordic

treaties as a rule enter into force soon after they have been signed. Cultural cooperation is,

in fact, not necessarily a matter of course between the Nordic countries. Instead of being

facilitated by their 'cultural similarity', it has often actually highlighted the cultural differences

and a certain antagonism. After all, the Nordic national identities have, to some degree, been

created against each other; the memories of the relatively recent "intra-Nordic colonisation”,

as Hveem (1992) puts it, of Iceland, Finland and Norway, and a strong nationality

identification persist (cf. Nielsson 1978: 308).350 This has been particularly clear in issues of

education and research, where the Nordic plans have not always succeeded: the differences

in national education systems, which from the perspective o f an outsider could appear rather

small, have not been easy to overcome. Wendt (1981: 303) points out the "disappointedly

slight practical results" in the mutual recognition of examinations351, while Solem notes that

a recommendation by the Nordic Council in 1961 aiming at a systematic division of labour

in Scandinavia within research and scientific education was unacceptable for the governments

(Solem 1977: 111, 118-119). Similarly, the discussions on a joint Nordic television satellite

highlight the closeness of questions o f cultural cooperation to those of national identity and

sovereignty. In fact, while for some, the satellite would favour the Nordic objectives of mutual

understanding and knowledge, alleviating also the living in another Nordic country, others saw

that it would undermine national culture (Wendt 1981: 321-322; see also

Verksamhetsberattelse 1993: 19).

In fact, it would be mistaken to see culture as a neutral field o f 'low politics'. This is also

shown by the slow progress in this field in the EU. Cultural cooperation - developing a

European cultural area, safeguarding the cultural heritage, developing cooperation in the

audiovisual field and in education - entered the EC only in 1987 by the Single European Act

3i0 "The memories of past domination and political disputes are still fresh enough to make political union an undesirable goal", argue Sundelius and Wiklund (1979: 61); others, too, explain the avoidance of the term 'union' in the Nordic context by its unfavourable connotations for Finns and Norwegians (Turner 1982: 145; Solem 1977: 79; Wendt 1981: 104-105). Haskel (1976: 227, footnote 10) gives also the example of the Swedish prime minister and minister for foreign affairs suggesting the expression ’facilitations in the inter-Nordic communications' ("lattnader i den intemordiska samftrdseln") in lieu of 'passport union' in order not to create difficulties for Finland.

531 In May 1994, however, the ministers for education signed an agreement on the free movement of students (He Is ingin Sanomat. May 31,1994).

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and a framework-giving programme for cultural cooperation (NU 1988/4: 87-88). Moreover,

in the Maastricht Treaty, harmonisation o f laws is explicitly excluded in education and culture

(cf. Burley and M attii 1993 : 73-74). That Nordic cultural cooperation nowadays appears as

self-evident as it does proves the importance o f the steps taken.

Many analysts have, nevertheless, understood the importance of cultural cooperation.

Andersen (NU 1969/21: 47) argues that cultural cooperation, necessary for the progress o f

economic collaboration, also continues irrespective of the success or failure o f other

collaboration projects. In a similar vein, Solem notes that close cultural cooperation is a

natural prerequisite for solidarity and successful cooperation in other fields. He further

remarks that the social and cultural fields might well become increasingly central in

integration, as the economic dimension becomes gradually depoliticised through becoming

subject to technological and scientific planning and management (Solem 1977: 14, 118). The

Working Programme 1990 (p. 43) maintains that the Nordic cultural community enables the

Nordic countries to be heard and respected to a higher degree than if they had acted

individually; in recent years, the centrality of cultural cooperation has been increasingly

underlined.352

The conditions for Nordic economic cooperation, then, could seem rather unfavourable.

Indeed, the efforts at Nordic cooperation have been hampered both by clearly diverging

economic interests and by the competition caused by similarity. In particular, the conditions

for agriculture vary considerably, the countries have different trading partners and even

compete with each other directly in certain sectors, such as pulp and paper. Yet, although the

plans for a Nordic economic union never materialised and despite the division o f the Nordic

countries in their economic affiliations between, first, the EFTA and the EEC, and, later, the

EU and the EE A, economic cooperation has been a constant factor of Nordic cooperation.353 * 333

532 Culture might also become increasingly salient both as a fundamental element of integration (cf. Turner 1982) and as a bone o f contention; in other words, it might acquire features of'h igh politics' (cf. the analysis of Sundelius 1978 above which shows the temporal and spatial variation in what actually is 'high'). Stâlvant comes to a similar conclusion in arguing that the 'low* questions which previously linked the Nordic countries together could possibly divide them in the future, while questions which previously limited Nordic cooperation, even security, could become more central and common. Similarly, questions o f national identity and culture in relation to dominant cultures could acquire a more central and uniting role. (Stâlvant 1991: 184.)

333 One could mention for instance, cooperation in the framework of the Oslo convention of 1932 which also comprised the Benelux countries, Finland joining in 1933 (Wallensteen et al. 1973: 50, 53) and UNISCAN, a British-Scandinavian economic committee, established in 1949. Meetings between the heads of the trade departments of the Nordic foreign ministries started in the early 1950s (Turner 1982: 140) and a Nordic permanent committee o f ministers for economy was formed in 1960 (Wendt 1981: 111-115; see also 100-101). - On the 100 years' history o f Nordic economic cooperation, see K. Moller, Nordisk ekonomisk samarbejde gennem

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It is also one o f the main areas of cooperation mentioned in the Helsinki Agreement (art. 18-

25) according to which the Nordic countries shall promote cooperation in the fields of

production and investment, including an appropriate division of labour, and work towards

facilitating direct cooperation between Nordic firms and economic cooperation in the border

regions. In addition, they shall aim at free capital movement and abolition o f barriers to trade.

In questions o f international trade policy, the countries shall, individually and collectively,

promote the Nordic interests.

The different attitudes towards the Economic Community did not, in fact, impede practical

Nordic economic cooperation in such forms as a joint negotiation front in the GATT. Already

in the GATT conference of 1956, Norway, Sweden and Finland had a joint negotiator (Turner

1982: 139) and in the Kennedy Round (1966-1967), Nordic cooperation was particularly

successful. It was based on a special agreement between Denmark, Finland, Norway and

Sweden giving the common negotiator the exclusive right o f making binding proposals and

decisions in the negotiations (Gustafsson 1968: 170). At that time, the Nordic countries

formed the largest trading partner o f the EEC, which also acted as one unit in the

negotiations. Through a joint negotiating delegation, the four Nordic countries achieved better

results than they had expected in a situation where the EEC and other countries had aimed

at excluding important Nordic exports from the offer to tariff reductions. (Wendt 1981: 122.)

In addition to cooperation in the Bretton Woods institutions and between central banks354,

Nordic economic cooperation has also developed in special Nordic institutions such as

Nordforsk, the Scandinavian council for applied research, founded in 1947, Nordtest. an

institution for standardisation and material testing (in 1972), the Nordic fund for technology

and industrial development (1973) and the Nordic Investment Bank (1975), which gives loans

and guarantees for the realisation o f Nordic projects and finances exports of Nordic interest.

The NOPEF (Projektexportfonden), functioning from 1982, became a permanent cooperation

organ in 1988 with the idea o f strengthening international competitiveness through exports to

developing and state-trading countries. (NU 1988/4: 62; NU 1989/7E: 40; Wendt 1981: 148-

153, 165-166, 167-181.)

100 aar, Nordens serie 11, Stockholm 1945.

ÎM Wallensteen et a i (1973: 76) remark also joint Nordic banks abroad, such as the Scandinavian Bank Ltd in London and the Banque Nordique de Commerce in Paris.

254

Both the EFTA and the EEA agreement have considerably increased Nordic economic

cooperation. In the 1960s, all the Nordic countries - with the exception of Iceland - were

members o f EFTA355 which in practice led to the removal o f tariff barriers in Scandinavia:

by the end o f 1969, all duties and restrictions on industrial goods were removed. Trade

between the Nordic countries increased considerably. (Wendt 1981: 111-115.) The EEA

agreement, which entered into force on January 1, 1994 comprising all the Nordic countries

together with the EU countries, Austria and Liechtenstein, has further widened and deepened

economic cooperation between the Nordic countries. In its field, it has been seen as one o f

the most important of the treaties which regulate the relations between Nordic states. It has

also led to increased legislative harmonisation in fields new to Nordic cooperation (Kivimaki

1992: 45; Verksamhetsberàttelse 1993: 198).

While the Nordic legislative cooperation has for a long time followed the developments in

similar efforts between the EC countries - Wallmén (1966: 38) points out a Council

recommendation of 1962 on the matter • also the EC plans for economic cooperation have

inspired similar Nordic initiatives. For example, in 1985, a plan for economic development

and full employment was given (B59/e), containing the establishment o f a Nordic home

market and measures to promote export, industrial policies, research and development. In

1987, a programme for abolishment o f barriers to trade was presented (B70/e). Certain

liberalisation concerning free capital movement and establishment rights has taken place (see

NU 1988/4: 61); a decision was made to remove the remaining barriers to capital movements

across frontiers on July 1, 1990, excluding Iceland. (Working programme of the Council o f

Ministers 1990: 10-11; NU 1988/4).

Finally, Nordic cooperation has also always involved elements o f foreign and security politics,

although these have become more prominent only in the recent years. In principle, the Nordic

countries’ foreign and security policies have been truly different because of their varying

affiliations: Denmark, Norway and Iceland are NATO members, while Sweden and Finland

are neutral, the latter having also been bound by a cooperation on friendship, cooperation and

mutual assistance with the Soviet Union.

In the cold war period, there was a general consensus that questions of foreign and security

policy did not belong to the field of formal Nordic cooperation (Wendt 1981: 343-344; Lange

1954: 289-291; cf. above, p. 241). These issues were in principle not discussed in the Nordic

3 ÎJFinland became an associate member in 1961 and a full member in 1986; Iceland joined EFTA in 1970.

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Council. As questions of this kind, however, at times came to the agenda356, there were

repeated debates on whether or not they actually could be discussed, leading to the statement

by the Presidium that the Council did have the formal competence to discuss them. The

Finnish communists were particularly active in introducing elements of foreign policy to the

Council.357 In addition to purely Nordic issues, also matters linked to UN resolutions and

international relations more generally, such as the Russian intervention in Afghanistan, were

discussed (Wendt 1981: 249,352,358-359). The Council also acted in an international dispute

- although not as an institution - when the relations between Iceland and the United Kingdom

were severed by a dispute over Iceland’s fishing limits, leading to the three so-called ’cod

wars' (1958-1961, 1972-1973 and 1975-1976). Cautiously, Iceland was assisted by the

Presidium of the Nordic Council and the Nordic foreign ministers, as well as by NATO. (See

extensively in Wendt 1981: 388-394.)

On the informal side, however, consultation on foreign policy and defence has been regular

at different levels, including the meetings of ministers for foreign affairs and defence (see

above). Moreover, the Helsinki Agreement furnishes the Nordic Council with a range of

practical issues having to do with foreign policy or international relations. The section "Other

cooperation" (art. 33-36) encourages cooperation in foreign service, development aid and

information activities on Nordic cooperation abroad. According to the treaty, Nordic foreign

service officials on assignment outside the Nordic countries, shall, to the extent compatible

with official duties and in accordance with the host country, assist nationals of another Nordic

country, if that country has no representation in the locality concerned. In practice, also joint

representations and some sharing o f functions have taken place in the consular field; there has

been a lot of informal cooperation between Nordic representatives abroad and exchange of

information between the Nordic countries on, e.g., new opening plans for embassies has been

encouraged. (Wendt 1981; 363-365; for the Nordic Council recommendations on these issues,

see NU 1988/4: 29.)

556 Attempting at exemplifying this restriction in practice, Wendt gives an account of discussions on international issues as something exceptional and provocative. However, rather than showing how rare exceptions confirmed the rule of non-discussion, he unintentionally shows that foreign policy issues have been constantly present in the Council. He also directly alludes to this when noting that "in recent years, there has been a growing tendency to vote on party lines, particularly concerning foreign policy matters, multinational companies and economic problems [...]" (Wendt 1981: 55, italics added).

357 They proposed, e.g., to add peace and disarmament to the aims of the Council; they were also interpreted in 1976 to wish to give the Soviet Union a place in Nordic cooperation (Wendt 1981: 351, 355; cf. 0rvik 1974: 87).

256

In the late 1980s, international questions became increasingly dominant in the Nordic Council.

In 1985, a member proposal was made on a committee to examine how Nordic cooperation

could be further developed and strengthened in international matters. The ensuing committee

work was based on the perceived need for further cooperation in this field; it was observed

that while the Council always had examined questions o f international character, they had not

had a central role. The mandate of the committee for international co-operation was limited

to "various international issues", explicitly excluding questions pertaining to security politics;

however, while, e.g., the report NU 1990/7 excludes issues o f military-political nature, it adds

that no explicit prohibition is needed (NU 1990/7: 91; see also the reports NU 1988/4 and NU

1989/7). From 1988, the discussion on European integration started fully in the Nordic

Council (cf. NU 1989/7E: 7), while recommendations were also given on detente, arms race

between the superpowers, conflict in the Middle East, refugee policy, South Africa and the

Baltic countries.

The proposals o f the reports about the strengthening o f the international dimension led to the

establishment o f an international secretary to the Council and to a revision o f the Helsinki

Agreement which was to remove the doubts concerning the competence o f the Council in the

field of international issues by stating them explicitly (NU 1988/4: 11-12; 20-21; NU 1990/7;

89-90, 150). On the basis of a proposal by the personal advisors to the prime ministers, the

Helsinki Agreement was modified in 1993 and contains now clearer indications on

cooperation in international questions.358

The ease with which these modifications were made shows that the question was not about

introducing something new to Nordic cooperation, but rather about consolidating the

traditional practices: the previous conditionality of art. 1 was removed - it had stated that ''the

parties shall, when possible and appropriate, consult each other in matters of common interest

[...]" (italics added).359 Again, the official interpretation of the significance of this cooperation

m The preamble now notes the countries' wish "to renovate and develop Nordic cooperation in the light o f the Nordic countries' enlarged participation in European cooperation". According to art. 1, the contracting parties shall consult (bôr râdgôra) each other in questions o f common interest under examination in European and other international organisations and conferences. Art. 33 adds that while participation in European and other international cooperation provides good grounds for cooperation to the benefit of Nordic citizens and firms, the governments have in this respect a special responsibility in safeguarding the common interests and values. Finally, the meetings of prime ministers and the ministers for foreign affairs are explicitly mentioned as fora of Nordic cooperation (art. 40). (Cf. Rapport 1992.)

W9 Interestingly, Nordic cooperation in foreign and security policy seems not only acceptable but even central for the general public; in a large Nordic opinion poll (Nordens fo lk om nordiskt samarbete, 1993), foreign and security policy were seen as a very important field of Nordic cooperation, after environmental protection, ftee

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was narrow: the motivations for the recommendation to the Council o f Ministers about

strengthening cooperation in international context (22/1986) stressed that the aim was not to

form a common Nordic foreign policy, only to coordinate the nationally decided policies. In

the Nordic context, however, where cooperation primarily takes place at the level o f policy

formulation and preparation, the difference between a Nordic policy and a coordination of

national policies is not necessarily evident.

Recently, questions of security and defence have become increasingly important. The personal

representatives o f the prime ministers stated in 1992 that foreign and security policy were an

important part o f Nordic collaboration at the level of governments, pointing to the wide

existing practice o f cooperation. They also defined it in ambitious terms, noting that

cooperation in these fields appears chiefly as an active initiatory cooperation in order to

influence current issues of substance {Rapport 1992: 29-30). In the light of the formal picture

of Nordic cooperation, this might appear surprising, as security policy has traditionally been

excluded; like foreign policy, however, security policy has also been part o f the informal side

o f Nordic cooperation. The novelty o f the 1990s is rather its gradual emergence in the formal

contexts, such as the plan for international activities of the Nordic Council360 for 1995-96,

which states that in accordance with the active role of Norden in the fields of foreign and

security politics, questions o f security policy should be treated when they have common

Nordic importance.

Traditionally, the Nordic ministers for defence have met regularly; the issues to be considered

in the different fora have, however, been delicately chosen. Thus, the ministers for defence

have not met as the Council o f Ministers; in the ministerial meetings, mainly UN issues have

been discussed, while other issues have been treated only in breakfast meetings. Besides, the

ministers usually consult each other by phone several times a week.361 Again, the practice of

informal consultation seems to have been more important than the official diverging security

policy affiliations o f the Nordic countries for the general perception of the region. Similarities

seem to outweigh differences: scholars refer to a Nordic security community, Nordic balance

(cf. Joenniemi 1992b, Wiberg and Wasver 1992) and negative policy coordination (Sundelius

1978: 80-81) implying that the Nordic security policies are not only mutually supportive -

possibility o f study in other Nordic countries, recognition of exams and the possibility of free trade across frontiers.

140 Nordtska R&dets intemationella verksamhetsplan for ¡995-96.

Wl Interview at the Swedish ministry for defence, Stockholm, May 31, 1994.

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e.g., Denmark's and Norway's NATO policies362 lessening the pressure on Finland and Sweden

- but also fairly similar. The different alliances have not prevented the Nordic UN votes from

being remarkably similar; the mere possibility of writing a book such as Foreign policies o f

Northern Europe (1982)363 where the foreign policies o f the Nordic countries are seen as

sufficiently similar and sufficiently different for a comparative study is illustrative o f the

transformation o f the difference between neutrals and NATO members into a ‘Nordic foreign

policy*.

In 1992, a working group was set up by the ministers for foreign affairs to examine issues

linked to security in Northern Europe364. Since 1993, the meetings of the ministers o f defence

have been characterised by an enlarged agenda, comprising the joint Nordic troops in Bosnia

and cooperation between Sweden and Norway in weapon industry and research. In November

1994, an agreement on joint procurement and cooperation in weapon industry was signed

between Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Denmark and Finland (see also Vaemo 1993: 120). The

military commanders-in-chief have also expressed favourable opinions on cooperation in

defence365 In fact, Neumann (1995) sees that cooperation in the field of security may become

an increasingly important part o f Nordic cooperation as the end o f the cold war has made the

Nordic security concerns increasingly similar. Security might also become relatively more

central as other fields of cooperation have partly been removed to the EU/EEA level.366

4.2.4 Meeting o f two methods o f integration

The Finnish and Swedish EU membership from 1995 has once again made a comparative

evaluation of European integration and Nordic cooperation expedient, showing both their

partly similar, even overlapping contents and the differences in what could be called the

method o f integration. The comparison highlights the particular characteristics o f Nordic

cooperation, its rather vague appearance, commitment based on a sense o f community rather

362 See, e.g., Turner 1982: 116-117 and Miljan 1977: 80-81.

363 See, in particular, Sundelius's article 'North European Foreign Policies in a Comparative Perspective'.

364 See Norden og nordisk samarbeid, Oslo 1992.

345 Interview at the Swedish ministry for defence, Stockholm, May 31, 1994.

366 Cf. StAlvant 1991: 184; Ilkka-Christian BjOrklund, former secretary general of the Nordic Council, points out the actual security political importance of Nordic cooperation for Finland during the cold war; Helsingin Sanomat, December 14, 1994).

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than obligations, and its nature as informal integration or domestic politics rather than inter­

state interaction.

The formal institutions and treaties o f Nordic cooperation give only an imperfect picture of

its extension, as it takes place in many different fora, often in unofficial forms, and as both

the type and number of participants varies considerably (cf. Joenniemi 1992b: 37-40). Nordic

cooperation is, in fact, a paramount example of'variable geometry'. The number of the Nordic

countries actually participating varies from case to case: often, some of the countries are not

included at all or have joined the arrangement later. Thus, to mention but a few examples,

Iceland joined the agreement on Nordic labour market and passport union some ten years after

its start (Wendt 1981: 188-189) and it has not participated in the meetings of the ministers

for defence. Finland, in turn, joined the Nordic Council only in 1955 and did not participate

in the meetings o f the ministers for foreign affairs from 1932 to 1934 and again from the end

o f the second world war till 1956, while being, however, usually represented in the meetings

o f other ministers, for example, justice, fisheries, social welfare and education (Wendt 1959:

24, 39). Subsequently, even Baltic countries have been included in many undertakings. It is

important to note that even cooperation between only two Nordic countries is comprised in

official Nordic cooperation, rather than being understood as bilateral cooperation. Bilateral

matters share the general methods o f Nordic cooperation - direct links between authorities,

etc. - and can also be brought to the Nordic Council. According to the Helsinki Agreement

(art. 44), the Council can take initiative and give recommendations in matters concerning

cooperation between all or some of the Nordic countries and self-governing territories.367

In addition to the variability of participants, the issues considered are in practice unlimited.

This flexibility is one of the main strengths of Nordic cooperation. The consensual and

functional base o f participation ensures high legitimacy: while there are different motivations

and reasons for different Nordic projects, there are, on the other hand, no reasons to oppose

Nordic cooperation. The broad participation implies also that the continuation o f Nordic

cooperation is not dependent upon the level of states; the 'motors' of Nordic cooperation can

be found also at a subnational or regional level. Proceeding in an open and gradual way on

the basis of concrete common interests, Nordic cooperation cannot be said to have any

negative side-effects (cf. Almdal 1986: 95, 101); the characteristic "piece-meal

microintegration" has also be seen as important for finding the ’point of diminishing returns'

367 Taking bilateral relations to the level o f common institutions has been made easier by allowing for a restriction of the right to vote to the countries concerned (art 49). Similarly, the quorum in the Council of Ministers depends on the number of countries concerned (art 62). However, to date the Council has not made use o f this possibility (Rules and procedures 1988: 11).

2 6 0

(Solem 1977: 113, 165-166). This pragmatism together with the consolidation and habitual

nature o f Nordic cooperation contribute to its general popularity.36®

While the vague character may help the Nordic countries in using Nordic cooperation as a

tool for different national purposes, the credibility o f Nordic cooperation as a tool in different

contexts (see Mouritzen 1993a: 9-10; Jervell 1991a: 24, 35) shows also the existence o f a

substantial commitment. In comparison to the HU, the commitment to Nordic cooperation has,

however, a rather different, informal character; it is not based on binding commitments or

supranational bypassing of national decision-making capacity. Instead, it could be seen as

based on a general sense of community, perhaps the "unique Nordic transnational community"

which Sundelius (1978) notices. It manifests itself in the usual acceptance o f seeing something

in terms of 'Nordic' or likening the Northeners to each other368 369, and is a result o f a lengthy

period of cooperative efforts and intentional creation of community and common identity

through the involvement in the cooperation of various parts o f the population.

The achievements of Nordic cooperation are often seen as rather self-evident in that the

countries are so similar. In reality, however, the self-evident character o f the cooperation is

itself an achievement and proves the existence o f a sense of community. The mere

similarity370 as such does not determine the success of cooperation; it may even be

counterproductive. It is more important to examine why the countries actually are similar -

368 Typically, the large Nordic opinion poll conducted in 1993 (see footnote 358, 359, page 256) revealed a very positive attitude towards and a rather scarce knowledge o f the actual contents of Nordic cooperation in the sense that the field in which it was seen legitimate and consolidated, even self-evident, was larger than the official contents. 74% of the almost 5000 respondents also welcomed increased cooperation.

3W E.g., the possibility of refening to "genuine Nordic interests" in the EU context or the principle of equating the interests of the other Nordic countries and their citizens with the own in the Nordic environmental cooperation (NU 1988/4: 103-116).

370 The Nordic countries are in many respects similar. As the important shared characteristics, Turner (1982: 243-246) points out social structures, level of development, high GNP, late industrialisation, small firms, social democracy, employees' participation in company decision-making; Kivimaki (1992: 9, 11-12) enumerates the welfare state, goal o f full employment, social justice, planned economy, strong state, small and homogeneous societies, large municipal autonomy, while Mouritzen (1993a: 5-7) lists a progressive character, placing substance before rhetoric, peacefulness, egalitarian society, solidarity with the third world, hospitality to refugees and environmentalism. However, there are hardly similarities without exceptions. It might be difficult really to say what Nordic* is in terms of characteristics shared by all the Nordic countries. In answering the intriguing question of whether Finland is a Nordic country, Engxnan arrives, in fact, to the conclusion that no Nordic country is 'more Nordic* than Finland, or that Finland appears, despite the obvious differences such as language, as Nordic as the others. He points out that jWorden comprises many different historical and geographical realities - the Atlantic region, the Baltic world, the Northern Kalott region, island and non-island societies, new and old states - and none of the countries belongs to all of them. (Engman 1994, esp. 76-77.)

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to a considerable degree, the similarities are results o f cooperation, e.g., the deliberate efforts

at legislative harmonisation - and how the similarities are used. As Etzioni points out,

similarities do not make a union in themselves: the effect depends on what is made o f them

(Etzioni 1965: 220; cf. Neumann 1992: 32). Similarity and geographical proximity together

with joint experiences or history may have dysfunctional effects to integration when creating

impediments and resentment (Solem 1977: 39-40). The hypersensitivity towards the notion

o f Nordic union or the Finnish politicians' obsession to decide on the EU membership before

Sweden are evidence of these problems.

In all, Nordic cooperation has been successful in region-building (cf. W cver 1992a: 99 and

1992b: 159). It has also transformed inter-state relations into something closer to domestic

politics. The Nordic relations are more like an extension o f domestic policy formulation

without central governmental control or coordination than traditional foreign policy (Sundelius

1978: 6-10; cf. Stàlvant 1991: 183). Joenniemi points out that the Nordic relations are

characterised by a communality which is usually located in the 'inside' o f a community; thus,

Norden falls in between international relations and domestic-societal properties. He refers also

to Deutsch who placed the Nordic region within the domain o f the domestic where the

societal is upgraded and the statist downgraded. (Joenniemi 1992b: 53-56.)371

While not supranational in the sense of transferring national competencies to a level above

the states or involving binding majority voting, Nordic cooperation has nonetheless been

effective in influencing the Nordic states and societies. As Solem notes, the frequently

advanced statements that recommendations dealing with noncontroversial issues have little

effect on political integration, that non-binding decisions and informal procedures mean that

the impact of Nordic cooperation to political integration is minimal, and that the Nordic

Council does not play an active or important role in the integrative process of Scandinavia

because it has no supranational powers, are at best misleading, at worst incorrect (Solem

1977: 13). Where others would see a need for strong common institutions, the Nordics do not,

because the national ones, anxious to cooperate, are acting as if such institutions did exist, as

Etzioni (1965: 226-227) points out. In fact, through the practice of collaboration in legislation

and the domesticisation of Nordic institutions, Nordic cooperation may actually have a more

profound impact on the states and societies than what it would have through the formal

371 In fact, Karvonen (1981: 103) suggests that Nordic relations should be studied more as domestic than international politics; on the other hand, he adds that it is also commendable to study the Nordic case from the point of view of international politics as "the Nordic experience has been one of the important empirical inspirations for students of international politics striving to break the boundaries of the high politics dominated traditions of their discipline."

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possibility of making binding decisions by majority vote. The Nordic method, called "the

parallel national action process" by Nielsson, may in practice mean political integration in a

behavioral sense as cooperation becomes a constant factor in national decision-making,

leading to identical decisions (Nielsson 1978: 270).

On the other hand, Nordic cooperation cannot be characterised as intergovernmental, either.

The governments are but one participant in the process; the executive, legislative and

jurisdictional branches are all involved and the role o f parliaments is particularly central (cf.

NU 1989/7E: 54). Accordingly, Nordic cooperation has been characterised as

transgovemmental or transnational, as a process which reaches across the national

administrations, parliaments and ministries instead o f functioning above the national level

(Sundelius 1978: 77). Equally, it could be seen as informal integration. The actual basis o f

the influence of the Nordic institutions might well reside, as Sundelius claims, in the merging

of the Nordic with the national rather than in their independence. He refers to Cox and

Jacobson (1974: 428, 433-435) who argue that international organisations should be assessed

according to their involvement in the effective governmental policy-making rather than by

how independent o f states they have become.372

Against this background of the nature o f Nordic cooperation, it is easier to evaluate the

possible consequences of the meeting between Nordic cooperation and the European

integration process. As was alluded to in the beginning, this meeting is above all conducive

to increasing consciousness of Nordic cooperation, its achievements and value, and an

improved understanding of both the Nordic and the European processes. The inevitable

comparison which follows from the need to adjust the two to each other highlights their

differences and, thus, shows what is distinctive in Nordic cooperation. At the same time, it

helps to identify ways to develop both processes.

Consciousness o f the contents of Nordic cooperation and the meaning of the 'Nordic' is

increased in a very concrete way through the discussions about EU membership and its

consequences which lead to comparisons between the European and the Nordic arrangements

in different fields. For example, the Nordic citizenship, and even the passport union, were

probably not well known for the large public until they were brought up by the discussions

of and plans for a European passport union. The emerging differences in the methods and

372Cox and Jacobson see that the organisations are often more effective if they involve influential national

policy-makers more fully. They also note that the autonomy o f an organisation might be illusory because the powerful states inevitably have the ultimate control, even though it is seldom asserted directly; on the other hand, the idea that autonomy would be universally good might in their view also be erroneous.

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achievements o f the two processes in concrete matters such as openness or consumer

protection not only increase awareness of the 'Nordic* but may also be turned into an

activation o f a Nordic identity. The new situation shows the importance of international

participation for collective identity formation. In the cold war period, traditional Nordic

cooperation in international organisations was almost the only way which induced other states

to perceive the Nordic countries as similar to each other or as a unit (cf. Vaemo 1993: 196),

thereby contributing somewhat to a 'Nordic identity'. Yet, it was perhaps more an interlude

which both limited the fields o f Nordic cooperation and isolated the Nordic countries from

the process of European integration, being hardly conducive to the formation of a Nordic

identity.373

At the same time, comparisons between the two processes lead to concrete measures taken

in order to safeguard the valuable elements in Nordic cooperation and to innovations as to its

further development. The Nordic governments and institutions have taken a series of measures

in order to secure a role for Nordic cooperation and to render it more effective (see, e.g.,

Rapport 1992: 26-29, 42). Notably, efforts have been put into defining the area o f the

"genuine Nordic interests". The future tasks of Nordic cooperation would be above all to

strengthen these interests and to help the Nordic countries participate in international

cooperation. In practice, Nordic cooperation should secure Norden as a home market,

strengthen identity and mutual understanding or the value community and increase the

competitiveness o f trade and industry, while having a role also in securing national interests.

(Idem: 9.) This 'profilation' also helps to avoid problems of overlapping competence with the

EU and a waste o f resources. It might even be seen as necessary concentration on fewer

issues to make Nordic cooperation compatible with EU integration (Jervell 1991b), thus

potentially diminishing its importance. In practice, however, the question does not seem to

be about any reduction of the agenda, rather a clearer upgrading of certain interests to the

common Nordic level.374

171 Many authors claim, on the contraiy, that Nordic cooperation faces serious problems with the end o f the cold war in that the need for cooperation and the Nordic identity itself were based on the conditions o f the cold war, that adaptation to the EU implies a need to abandon the Nordic identity as potentially counter-productive (Mouritzen 1993a) or vanishing attraction of the Nordic and disappearing identity (W aver 1992a and 1992b; Joenniemi 1992b). This argumentation, however, rather strangely implies that Nordic cooperation was bom, in practice, only with the cold war, it also seems to take identity as given, rather than constructed, something which is quite clear as to the European identity currently under construction.

374 In fact, the lists of the "genuine Nordic interests" which have been presented are rather wide and dissimilar. Put together, they quite resemble the traditional, unlimited view o f Nordic activities. The prime ministers' Bornholm declaration (1992) includes in these interests environment, citizen policy, energy and infrastructure; the report to the prime ministers lists culture, citizen policy, environmental protection and

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In addition to this profilation, a certain dynamisation o f Nordic cooperation seems now to take

place. The closer contact with the EU gives new impetus to Nordic cooperation, and thereby

increases its attractiveness. As the secretary general o f the Council of Ministers has noted, the

dynamism of continuation and deepening is important for the political support: cooperation

which is getting nowhere loses its dynamism and thereby the political will375. The EU

membership o f three of the Nordic countries gives a new fora for Nordic cooperation, but the

EU could also give the possibility of emphasising the Nordic regional framework as one level

of decision-making through the principle o f subsidiarity (cf. Rapport 1992: 13, 37; Kivimàki

1992: 31). While the European process has always inspired the contents o f Nordic

cooperation, influencing the issues considered and the measures taken, it seems now to inspire

also new methods. Interestingly, it could even contribute to making supranationalism

acceptable in Norden.

There have been several suggestions by the Nordic institutions into this direction. The need

for resorting more frequently to binding decisions has been mentioned. Report NU 1988/4 (pp.

28, 31) observes that Nordic cooperation has in recent years less than before been directed

towards binding conventions. While this is considered appropriate in the Nordic context, it

is also seen a potential hindrance in the wider European cooperation; particularly measures

such as those concerning the Nordic home market would need obligations in order to function

well. The need o f catching up with the EU integration in the fields where it has advanced

further has been visible. Report NU 1989/7E asserts that the Nordic Council needs higher and

more precisely defined goals, a greater sense of direction and more effectiveness: the Nordic

ambitions should not be lower than those of the EC, but at least equal.376

economic policy (Rapport 1992: 12), and the report on the activities of the Council o f Ministers (Verksamhetsber&ttelse 1993: 1-2) lists as politically preferential areas of cooperation culture, education, research, environment, fishery, social questions, health, labour market and work environment, consumer policy, energy, commerce and industry, regional policy, agriculture and forestry, legislation and equality. To these, Planer 1993 (p. 6) further adds a general economic-political cooperation.

375 Per Stenbflck in Nordisk Kontakt 2/1994.

3,6 As an immediate reform, the report proposes the establishment of a Nordic ombudsman with tasks ranging from questions linked to the removal of trade barriers to complaints from private persons who consider that their rights as Nordic citizens have been infringed and to making the implementation of resolutions more effective - in short, performing some functions of a common court o f justice. Thus far, similar complaints - the very existence of which actually shows that the Nordic citizenship* is not an empty term for the public - have been addressed to the Presidium. (NU 1989/7E: 15, 19-22, 34-37.) Instead of an ombudsman, the most recent plans envisage a special telephone service for Nordic citizens.

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In particular, report NU 1990/7 reflects on supranationalism. Observing that the Helsinki

Agreement does not set limits as to how deep cooperation can be, it considers the possibility

o f making decisions in the Council of Ministers with a "4/5 consensus" which would allow

the Council to decide even in the case o f one member country disagreeing, and thus as a way

to increase efficiency. However, the report is rather unclear as to what this decision-making

method would imply; it is concerned about the fact that Denmark cannot automatically

comply with the supranational decisions o f two organisations and states that "in certain cases

it may be necessary to resort to majority decision", while, on the other hand, it seems to

depict the method as a version o f the already common 'multi-speed cooperation'. A country

which is not ready to join the decision would not be bound by it, but could be left out and

have the possibility of joining the decision later. (NU 1990/7: 82-84.) Finally, the report

evaluates a member proposal on the establishment of a Nordic commission as an initiatory,

preparatory and executive organ, following the example of the EU, noting that "[I]f, at a later

stage, some supranational elements are taken into the cooperation, consideration can be given

to the establishment o f a commission" {idem: 113-115).

Highlighting their differences, the meeting between Nordic cooperation and European

integration points to factors which make Nordic cooperation valuable and thereby contributes

to its continuation. At the same time, the comparison increases the understanding o f the

respective problems of the two processes. In particular, it opens the discussion on whether

continuous progress, the rhetorics o f process and the abstract, ambitious goals really are

necessary for integration. The ambitious goals risk, in fact, compromising the smaller-scale

achievements in that they easily provoke general opposition. Similarly, assessing the relative

merits of independent institutions and coordinated national bureaucracies appears intricate, as

the institutions might not only advance integration but also develop their vested interests,

being difficult to control, in particular because of their relative closeness and lacking

transparency. Finally, the democratic deficit o f the European institutions, in clear contrast with

the parliamentary nature of the Nordic Council, points out the importance of broad

participation.

Compared to Nordic cooperation, the EU seems to remain in the discourse of traditional

international relations. It is characterised by the ’hard’ methods o f majority voting and directly

applicable common regulations, which are seen to be needed to make the member states

comply with the common plans, and by risk-taking in the form o f denying the possibility of

a "stable union" and warning against occasional steps backwards. The comparison with Nordic

cooperation may, in fact, lead to observing that there is both room for and need of a

Nordicisation of Europe (cf. Joenniemi 1994b: 37) through strengthening the informal and

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transnational methods of the Nordic type. As the Working programme (1990: 81) puts it,

Nordic cooperation is not only well suited by its organisation and nature for being developed

parallel to such organisations as EFTA and the EC and for learning from them, but also

capable of holding its own in relation to European integration process, even inspiring it. In

essence, the assets of Nordic cooperation are flexibility and adaptability which, combined with

concrete, pragmatic aims, make it developing and open-ended, but also so well 'tolerated'. As

Joenniemi (1994b: 33-34) notes, Nordic cooperation is often seen incompatible with the

apparently more establishea and coherent EU, and it is thus argued that the 'Nordic' can be

preserved only if made as similar as possible to the EU. It might well be, however, that the

EU with its somewhat mechanical and possibly counterproductive methods should rather take

into account the Nordic experiences.

Chapter 5

Finnish integration policy

5.1 E U MEMBERSHIP: AN END TO THE TRADITIONAL FINNISH INTEGRATION POLICY

5.1.1 The customary principles o f neutrality and sovereignty in Finnish integration policy

Surprisingly, the Finnish membership in the European Union - a decision compared in

significance to the declaration of independence in 1917 - has promptly been perceived as a

logical continuation of the traditional Finnish integration policy. As will be seen below, this

kind of continuity is purely rhetorical, constructed as an explanation and justification of the

decision through a redefinition of central concepts and a certain interpretation both of the

nature o f the policy and of the process of integration. In reality, membership in today's EU

does not allow for the continuation o f a policy such as the Finnish one has been. It therefore

implies a disruption of traditional Finnish policy towards Western European integration, but

it also implies major political changes in Finnish domestic and foreign policies, affecting

political culture and identity of the country.

Until the early 1990s, Finnish integration policy was quite consciously constructed on a

confluence o f two types o f goals, or two imperatives, as Tomudd has called them, the one

economic, the other political. On the one hand, the policy has aimed at furthering Finnish

economic interests; in particular, the economic imperative stated that Finland must not remain

outside any preferential trade arrangement which includes Norway or Sweden together with

any principal trading partner. On the other hand, the policy has aimed at safeguarding

neutrality and sovereignty or the autonomous decision-making capacity. In order not to

endanger its freedom of action and the credibility of the policy o f neutrality, Finland has, thus,

avoided supranational arrangements and political obligations which could be in conflict with

existing obligations to third countries, mainly the Soviet Union. (Cf. TOmudd 1969: 64-65.)

While the economic aims of Finnish integration policy - competitiveness, growth and stability

- hardly differentiate Finland from other countries, the importance o f the overall political aims

of securing a certain room for manoeuvre and autonomous decision-making capacity make

Finnish integration policy particular. In the Finnish case, integration policy has been a part

of foreign policy and closely linked to security political considerations (cf. M6tt6lS 1993: 64;

Himanen 1993: 26). The treaty on friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance (FCMA)

signed with the Soviet Union in 1948 has made it essential for Finland to avoid joining

arrangements directed against the Soviet Union and, thus, follow a policy of neutrality. This

political imperative has been manifest in typically Finnish caution in its proceedings, various

2 6 8

special arrangements and reservations, and in 'parallelism* by building symmetric relations,

through similar economic arrangements, with the two blocs.

In practice, neutrality or the 'metadoctrine' o f Finnish integration policy, based on Realpolitik

and respect for status quo377, as Antola describes it, has implied, first, a separation o f th e

political from the economic and allowing for participation in economic cooperation w h ile

inhibiting participation in political cooperation, especially involvement in matters w hich

involve a confrontation between the great powers and institutions based on the bloc division.

Secondly, it was pragmatic in the sense o f minimising politically sensitive elements a n d

ensuring parallelism. Thirdly, it emphasised autonomy: development or intensification o f

cooperation was considered possible on the condition of preserving the independent decision­

making capacity. Thus, the policy rested on a clear organisational differentiation, aiming a t

keeping EFTA, an organisation which allows for neutrality, separate from the supranational

EEC/EC. While membership o f the EEC/EC was categorically excluded, Finland was ra ther

cautious also as regards other organisations, perhaps even overpoliticising the Nordic Council,

the OECD and the Council of Europe. (Antola and Tuusvuori 1983: 246-250; Antola 1990b:

166, 1991a: 148 and 1991b: 17-18.)

These elements are clearly visible in the main settlements between Finland and the various

West European integrative institutions from the late 1940s onwards. As a first instance o f th e

Finnish policy, one might see the Finnish reaction to the Marshall Plan378 proposed by the

United States. The Soviet Union, with the Eastern European countries in its wake, rejected

the plan and, thus, it came to be seen in Finland as associated with the bloc division in

Europe and conflicts between the great powers. Moreover, the coordination o f national

policies proposed in the plan also involved some supranational features. Finland therefore

377 In Antola's view, the defence of status quo, notably bloc realities and the hierarchy of issues in which the political comes before the economic, has been a deliberate choice and an aim in itself, accepted also by the economic interest groups. Finland has been a bridge-building country for which neutrality, even absenteeism is a logical and confident option. (Antola 1991a: 146-147.)

378 Based on the idea of the foreign minister of the United States George Marshall, the plan, or the European Recovery Programme (ERP), was approved by the Congress in 1948. Consisting of economic aid and loans from the United States, it was aimed at facilitating the reconstruction of Europe after the war, but also at increasing political stability and cooperation in Europe. It was offered to all European countries, including the Soviet Union; as a condition, it required a European plan for trade liberalisation, customs union and a supranational organ for the coordination of the countries' economic policies, (af Malmborg 1994: 70, 79-80.)

269

rejected the invitation to participate.379 Instead, some particular, purely economic arrangements

were made to secure foreign capital for the relaunch o f production and export. For this

purpose, Finland received loans from the United States and Sweden. More credit was

subsequently received through membership of the Bretton Woods organisations IMF (1948)

and IBRD (1949), which had been created to further exchange stability and expansion o f trade

and to facilitate investment in production, reconstruction and development. (Antola and

Tuusvuori 1983: 122-124; Antola 1991a: 146; Hjerppe 1993: 67, 69; af Malmborg 1994: 82-

90.)

Finland was also able to join the GATT - which, as IMF and IBRD, was first not joined by

the socialist countries - as a measure necessary for Finnish export industries. The Finnish

accession treaty o f 1949 came into force in 1950. The GATT was established in 1947 to

further negotiations between the signatories towards nondiscriminatory tariff concessions and

trade liberalisation. For Finland, it secured, wide and multilateral markets, while it also gave

the possibility o f applying the most favoured nation (MFN) principle to countries outside the

agreement. This was an important prerequisite: as such, it did not contradict the bilateral trade

treaty between Finland and the Soviet Union, in force from 1947. (Antola and Tuusvuori

1983: 124^125; Hjerppe 1993: 69; on GATT, see Colliard 1985: 762, 768.) Preferring thus

bilateral agreements, on the one hand, and broad economic organisations on the other, Finland

stayed outside the Council o f Europe which might have led to supranational integration, the

OEEC which represented coordinating integration and, obviously, the EEC's common market

integration (Antola and Tuusvuori 1983: 125-126).

The cautious nature of Finnish policies was particularly manifest in matters o f Nordic

cooperation. Finland had not participated in the Nordic plans a for customs union in the

1940s, although it was involved in different cooperative arrangements with Nordic countries.

It also participated in the preparatory work for the creation o f the Nordic Council, established

in 1952. Nordic cooperation seemed advantageous for Finnish integration policy in that it

implied possibilities for both economic and political cooperation without formally limiting its

members' political room for manoeuvre.380 However, for the Soviet Union, Nordic cooperation

179 Other neutral countries were not equally cautious; Sweden received Marshall aid, while Switzerland did not. In the end, the resulted efforts towards economic coordination did not involve the supranational features or capacities of interfering in the national economic policies originally proposed; discussions on various customs unions went on, the Benelux being the only one to materialise, (af Malmborg 1994: 82-90.)

380 Safeguarding national sovereignty was an important principle from the beginning. The Nordic Council was not given any decision-making power, moreover, it was agreed upon that it would not discuss matters o f foreign and security politics. (Wendt 1981: 343-344.)

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was too closely connected with the Western bloc - after all, the majority o f the N ordic

countries were NATO members. Thus, Finland could join the Council only in 1955 when th e

critical Soviet attitude changed in the more general relaxation o f international relations and

the objections to Finnish membership were removed.

These favourable conditions and the low-profile nature o f the Council notwithstanding, th e

Finnish government considered it necessary to emphasise that membership would not lead

Finland to abandon its neutrality. Finland therefore joined with the important reservation tha t

the representatives of Finland should not participate in the discussions if the Council, against

accepted practice, were to discuss military questions or questions which would lead to

adopting a position on conflicts of interest between great powers. (Wendt 1981; 35-37, 343-

344; also, e.g., Forsberg and Vaahtoranta 1993: 238.)

The Finnish attitude towards Nordic cooperation soon became positive, and it gained an

important role for economy in the late 1950s. In 1956, Finland joined the Nordic economic

cooperation committee, which had been established in 1948 to plan tariff reductions; the sam e

year, a Finnish national committee for Nordic cooperation was established. Separate and

independent Nordic integration together with measures aimed at developing the economic

relations between Finland and the Soviet Union became, in fact, the Finnish response to

Western European integration. (Antola and Tuusvuori 1983: 126-127.) Although the Nordic

plans for deeper economic cooperation in the form of a Nordic common market were first m et

with caution in Finland, it would have been prepared to join the Nordic common market, had

the plan materialised. At the time this was announced in a meeting of Nordic prime ministers

in Kung&lv 1959, the other Nordic countries were, however, no longer aiming at a purely

Nordic arrangement. As a continuation o f negotiations between some OEEC members on the

possibilities for a wider free trade agreement, they had been negotiating for a European Free

Trade Association, and the Stockholm Convention establishing EFTA was signed later the

same year by Austria, United Kingdom, Portugal, Switzerland, Norway, Denmark and

Sweden.3®1

Finland had not participated in the negotiations between the Seven, nor, understandably, in

those between the Six for the establishment of the EEC. The question o f EFTA membership

was, from a political point o f view, more complicated for Finland than a Nordic solution

would have been. The Soviet suspicions concerning Finnish domestic politics and growing 381

381 The treaty, which came into effect in May 1960, applies through a special protocol also to Liechtenstein which has had a customs union with Switzerland since 1923.

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interest towards Western integration had culminated in the so-called "night frost crisis" in the

Finnish-Soviet relations in 1958 (see, e.g., Antola and Tuusvuori 1983: 129-130). However,

Finnish EFTA membership was not excluded in principle, provided it did not include

supranational organs or political obligations in contrast with Finnish foreign policy.382 This

did not seem to be the case: EFTA was a pragmatic, purely economic organisation. Leaning

on the article XXIV of the GATT treaty which allows for two exceptions to the MFN

principle, customs unicn and free trade agreements, it aimed at realising free trade,

establishing rules on competition, economic growth and better living standards, together with

harmonious development, expansion and liberalisation o f world trade. According to the

Convention, although the EFTA Council can make binding decisions, it does so mainly by

unanimity. The convention also includes security clauses and exceptions. Moreover,

agriculture - a central question for Finland - was almost totally outside the convention. {Idem:

93-96.)

The problems linked to EFTA membership383 were, thus, partly resolved by the non-political

nature o f the organisation and absence of supranationality, but also by the Nordic framework

and the inclusion of the other neutral countries Austria, Sweden and Switzerland (Antola and

Tuusvuori 1983: 131). Yet, two additional measures were seen necessary: a particular form

of association and parallel agreements with the Eastern countries. Thus, Finland did not

become a full member, but signed instead in March 1961 a special association treaty, called

FINEFTA. In practice, the status as associate member gave Finland the rights of a full

member but guaranteed its special interests, notably the avoidance o f supranational and

political commitments. The FINEFTA treaty included all the stipulations concerning trade and

economy of the Stockholm Convention with the exception o f a slower reduction of duties to * 583

,K In fact, in the Kungalv meeting, the Finnish prime minister Sukselainen had alluded to the possibility of Finland joining the EFTA together with the other Nordic countries: "...if the plan does not include political obligations nor provide for supra-national organs Finland is not less interested in this plan than the other Nordic countries" (cf. Tdmudd 1969: 64). The minister for foreign affairs Karjalainen, present at the Stockholm conference, noted that Finland could accept an agreement on tariffs and trade, but not political obligations in contrast with the Finnish foreign policy; the basis of Finnish integration policy was that while national interests should be secured in the Western markets, the undertakings should not conflict with the international position of the country or with the bilateral agreements with the Soviet Union. (Antola 1990b: 164, 165; Ulkopoliittisia lausuntoja ja asiakirjoja 1959: 52 and 1959: 57.)

583 Finnish membership was hampered not only by the negative Soviet attitude; the United Kingdom also opposed it as the Finnish membership would have induced further requests of membership from Iceland, Ireland, Greece and Turkey; in addition, it would have further complicated the negotiations in practical terms (af Malmborg 1994: 381-383; cf. Hakovirta 1976: 200-202).

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protect the barely competitive Finnish home market industry.384 Furthermore, bilateral trade

with the Soviet Union could continue undisturbed due to the exception that the removal o f

quantitative import restrictions did not apply to Finland for, e.g., liquid and solid fuels and

fertilisers, which were central to Finnish-Soviet trade. (.Idem: 134-135.)

Further, the association treaty differed from the Stockholm Convention as regards the allusions

to economic arrangements between the Western European countries. According to the

convention, EFTA aims at closer contacts with other states, associations o f states and

organisations; its introduction explicitly mentions closer economic cooperation between OEEC

members, including the members o f the EEC. These allusions were seen as potentially

involving political commitments not consistent with the Finnish policy. Therefore, they were

omitted from the FINEFTA treaty. Finally, before the FINEFTA treaty could come into force,

the question o f Eastern trade was settled by signing, concurrently, a Finnish-Soviet agreement

about tariff reductions to give the Soviet Union the same position as the EFTA countries in

the Finnish market. (Antola and Tuusvuori 1983: 131-136; Antola 1991a: 148; cf. EFTA

Convention, art. 32 and 36.)38S

Somewhat similarly, Finnish relations to the OEEC were originally organised through a

special agreement, the Helsinki Protocol, between Finland and the members of the OEEC.386

The political motivations for staying outside the organisation were, however, gradually

removed: the establishment of EEC and EFTA, OECD - the successor o f OEEC from 1961

with the entrance of Canada and the United States - lost its political significance and became

more clearly concentrated on purely economic matters (Muoser 1986: 155). Membership in

such an organisation was seen as enhancing Finnish possibilities to influence trade and

economic policies, as well as improving both its international status and access to information

(Antola and Tuusvuori 1983: 142-143), and Finland joined the OECD in 1968. However,

3M Finland had abolished war-based restrictions and quotas in its trade with Western Europe only three years earlier, and thus adaptation was longer (Antola 1991a: 148-149).

383 The Finnish-Soviet agreement was signed on November 24, 1960; both agreements came into force in the summer 1961 (T6mudd 1969: 65; Laine 1973: 20).

386 The protocol, signed in 1957, was of special importance for the liberalisation of trade with Western European countries; it covered 70% of the Finnish imports from Western Europe, and the Finnish exports were given an equivalent treatment with those of the other signatories. In 1956-59, there was a shift in export towards Western Europe at the expense of the Soviet Union and the socialist countries. In 1956, 26% of exports went to the (future) EFTA-countries; in 1959, their share was 30%. Corresponding shares for the (future) EEC were 23% and 28%, while the share of the socialist countries drop from 27% to 23%. (Antola and Tuusvuori 1983: 128, 130.)

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analogously to the case of the Nordic Council, Finland made it explicit that the membership

would not affect its sovereignty and neutrality: the Finnish representative gave a declaration

stating that

"[I]n acceding to the Convention of the OECD the government of Finland does not commit itself to anything that conflicts with the foreign policy pursued by Finland and with her recognised neutrality. [...] The government o f Finland notes furthermore that the rules and aims of the OECD do not limit Finland's possibilities to develop her trade relations with countries outside the Organisation."(Protocol o f the Paris meeting in which Finland joined the organisation, quoted in Muoser 1986: 155.)

Finland stayed outside the Council of Europe because of its (in the Finnish interpretation) cold

war history (Antola 1990b: 164) and because of neutrality; on the other hand, at the time of

its formation, the organisation showed clear supranational ambitions. In reality, the Finnish

rejection of the Marshall Plan was decisive for its relations with both the Council o f Europe

and the OEEC. While the OEEC was established as the European coordinating organisation

demanded for in the Marshall Plan, the Council of Europe, then, was established by the same

group of states. Finland was therefore not even invited to become a member.387

The question o f Finland's relations to the EEC was brought up by the fact that several EFTA

members applied for EEC membership soon after the EFTA had been established.388 The

applications were, however, not successful. This gave new impetus to plans for a Nordic

customs union and negotiations on a Nordic customs union (NORDEK) began in 1969. For

Finland, a Nordic common market would have been beneficial in that it would have

strengthened the position o f the country without jeopardising its vital interests. Again,

however, considerations of EEC membership intertwined with the Nordic plans: especially for

Denmark, NORDEK was to be a bridge to the EEC, something that made the Finnish attitude

towards the plan more critical. In the end, when the NORDEK treaty was in practice ready

to be signed, the Finnish government declared that Finland could not sign the treaty; in the

,87 AH OEEC members were invited to become members of the Council of Europe, and all accepted the invitation, with the exception of Switzerland. In fact, Finland became a member of the Council only in 1989. However, from the year 1963, Finland participated in and also hosted some meetings and projects of the Council in fields such as culture and environment on the initiative of the member states, and membership was discussed from time to time (Antola and Tuusvuori 1983: 229-231).

m Denmark and the United Kingdom applied in 1961, Norway in 1962; Austria, Portugal, Sweden and Switzerland applied for association. Especially consequential was the policy of the United Kingdom which had been the most important trade partner of Finland from 1946 onwards, followed by the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic of Germany (Antola and Tuusvuori 1983: 176).

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light of the commencing negotiations between Denmark, Norway and the EEC, it did no t

fulfil the Finnish demands o f stability and permanence. (Antola and Tuusvuori 1983: 144-

146.)

Finland aimed at finding a way to organise its relations with the EEC which would secure

neutrality and the already acquired privileges, while permitting, at the same time, an all-

European development without need for EEC enlargement (Antola and Tuusvuori 1983: 137-

142). To this effect, negotiations on a free trade agreement between Finland and the EEC

were launched on a Finnish initiative in spring 1970 - a measure which occasioned a unique

debate in Finland, giving birth to a large pamphlet literature.389 Finland had to reconcile its

traditional policy o f maintaining neutrality, trade with the Soviet Union, free trade with EFTA,

Nordic cooperation and previous international agreements, especially GATT, with the need

to avoid possible discrimination and isolation. An agreement was necessary to avoid the

réintroduction of tariffs in trade between Finland and the United Kingdom and Denmark

which left EFTA and joined the EEC in 1973 (cf. Laine 1973: 21).

In contrast to Sweden, which also was negotiating a free trade agreement, Finland was not

ready to discuss all possible areas of cooperation. It wanted to stay outside the EEC economic

policy, agreeing only on the removal o f duties for industrial products (Antola and Tuusvuori

1983: 148-150). The Finnish free trade agreement o f July 1972390 thus differed in some

389 See Antola and Tuusvuori 1983. In part, the themes greatly resembled those presented in the discussion on membership in the 1990s: the nature (supranationality, common policies, military character) and possible future development of the EEC were among the open questions. Considerations which were important for Finland in the bloc environment and détente of the early 1970s also emerged. For instance, Korpinen alluded to attempts to change the character of the rivalry between the blocs from military to economic. In his view, there were anti­détente forces in the EEC which feared that a policy of conciliation would weaken the internal unity and the defence willingness o f the blocs. These forces aimed to have the Scandinavian countries join the EEC as firmly as possible, and force the socialist countries to separate negotiations with the EEC under the shadow o f the Community's common trade policy, cutting the bilateral commercial-political relations between the EEC countries and the socialist ones. Korpinen therefore concluded that "it goes without saying that Finland will not let herself be used as a weapon o f mini-Europe's conjuncture politicians against the socialist countries”. (Korpinen 1973: 26- 27.)

190 The Finnish government decided to postpone the signing of the agreement, and it was signed only in October 1973; thus, it did not enter into force before January 1, 1974, one year after Sweden's agreement. The postponement evidently had to do with the domestic controversies around the treaty which was seen to jeopardise Finnish neutrality policy; cooperation with the EEC could lead to political dependency, as argued by president Kekkonen in 1970, and the Soviet Union might also see it as a threat (Antola and Tuusvuori 1983: 165-166). As reasons for the postponement, Korpinen (1973: 26) alludes to the need to find more information about the EEC, while Muoser (1986: 198-199) notes that the mandate of president Kekkonen, who was to guarantee that the agreement did not harm the Finnish-Soviet relations, was prolonged by a special law in January 1973. Moreover, the FCMA treaty was renewed in 1970, five years before it was due to expire, in order to “remove any possible

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respects from the free trade agreements signed by the other neutral EFTA members. As in the

case ofFINEFTA, the exceptions were both economic and political. The economic exceptions

agreed in the FINEFTA were maintained and the treaty also included the protection o f weak

industries for both parties - for the EEC, they were paper and wood. On the political side, it

was made easier for Finland to terminate the treaty: the term of notice for the termination of

the agreement was only three months instead of the twelve of the other treaties. More

importantly, the treaty committed Finland only as far as the actual text of the free trade treaty

was concerned, not as to possible future developments. The other free trade agreements

contained, in fact, an evolution or development clause stating that the parties to the agreement

could propose the extension o f their relations to areas not covered by the agreement when this

was seen to be beneficial for both parties. This was seen as a commitment which could

endanger Finland's freedom o f action, and it was omitted from the Finnish treaty. (Antola and

Tuusvuori 1983: 157-158, 165-166; cf. the introduction of the treaty and art. 32.)

Finally, as in the case of the FINEFTA treaty, a comprehensive arrangement was developed

according to the principle o f parallelism, granting the same customs privileges for trade with

both East and West. The free trade agreement with the EEC was accompanied by a

cooperation- agreement with the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON or

CMEA)391 and the so-called KEVSOS system of bilateral treaties on reciprocal removal of

trade barriers with the socialist countries other than the Soviet Union392. In addition, the Soviet

Union was provided with advantages in trade equal to those o f the Finnish trade in Western

Europe through a bilateral trade agreement. The Finnish policy was to support the

development o f economic cooperation in Europe between all the three organisations, EFTA,

the EEC and the CMEA. (Antola 1989: 56-57; Antola and Tuusvuori 1983: 156-157.)

doubt about the consistency of our policy" (Kekkonen in Washington, July 23, 1970, quoted in Miljan 1977: 261- 262).

391 The CMEA was established in 1949 as a reaction to the Marshall Plan. The CMEA charter, which made it a proper international organisation, was signed in December 1959. Finland initiated investigations on possible cooperation with the organisation in the summer of 1971; the official negotiations began in March 1973, leading to a cooperation agreement on May 16, 1973. The agreement, of rather general character, was essentially a foundation and framework for cooperation in questions of mutual interest in different sectors of economy, including industry, science and engineering. A joint commission was established for the investigation, development and execution of cooperation. (Kekkonen 1973: 29-31.)

392 Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and the German Democratic Republic (Laine 1973: 22); the treaties, still in vigour, comported the removal o f tariffs for industrial products by 1977 (in protected areas by 1985) (Lempiäinen 1994: 138).

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5.1.2 The EEA: a step into a whirlpool

Until the late 1980s, the Finnish integration policy had, thus, been characterised by

considerable caution. The freedom of action and autonomous decision-making capacity,

required to secure the Finnish neutrality and sovereignty, were not endangered by hasty steps

into new agreements or organisations. Rather, Finnish policy was based on weighing the

necessity, advantages and disadvantages of the different forms of cooperation, and on striving

for particular arrangements which would reconcile the economic needs for cooperation w ith

the maintenance of autonomy. In all, it has not been typical to accept international

arrangements as such, without accommodating Finnish wish for room of manoeuvre and

freedom from political commitments. This has sometimes been time-consuming; often, suitable

conditions have been awaited before action has been taken. Hakovirta (1976) has characterised

this policy as one o f 'wait-and-see': it has been customary to wait for a clarification o f the

situation in European integration before taking a decision, to wait for eventual changes in the

nature o f the organisations (especially OECD) before the decision, to wait for the

improvement in general conditions for participating, and to wait for the reactions o f the Soviet

Union before taking a decision.

At the same time, the Finnish attitude towards integration has been pragmatic. Instead o f

viewing integration idealistically as something overwhelmingly positive - or negative - it has

been approached as a phenomenon whose consequences are not self-evident. Motivated

originally by quite concrete political considerations about the possible threats and

disadvantages o f integration, notably the economic threat o f exclusion and the political

challenge to the prevailing order with ensuing insecurity (cf. Antola 1990b: 163), this attitude

has without doubt been fruitful. On the one hand, it has contributed to the development o f a

balanced view on the process; on the other hand, the relative 'outsidemess' has not only

permitted wide relations across the various organisational boundaries, but has also functioned

as a counterweight to excessively closed economic groupings.

In the late 1980s, however, this policy started to change. The agreement on the European

Economic Area, EEA (first called also 'European Economic Space', EES) was seen as a

further step and continuation o f this policy in that it first seemed to be an alternative to EC

membership which would guarantee the Finnish special interests. Moreover, it seemed to

evolve quite naturally from EFTA cooperation. However, the road from EFTA membership

to the EEA was not so straightforward and logical as it might be depicted. On the way, a

qualitative leap took place, implying an acceptance o f supranationalism and rejection of the

policy o f neutrality which reversed the traditional policy. To paraphrase Antola (1989: 55),

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Finland was pushed into taking these decisions by events in its closest and the most important

market area, Western Europe. This time, the decisions accumulated at an increasing speed and

led directly to full EU membership. A crucial limit which changed Finnish policy was, in fact,

already quite near. Maude (1976: 122-123), for instance, had represented the Finnish free

trade agreement with the EEC as the top achievement of Finnish neutrality policy: it could

organise the relations to the EEC from the mere basis o f free trade, notwithstanding the

common market character o f EEC integration. Much more could not have been achieved

without renouncing neutrality.

In essence, the EEA was aimed at coordinating the EC and EFTA into one common market.

The two organisations had been gradually approaching each other from the 1970s onwards393.

The Finnish stand to this development was originally cautious.394 The rapprochement acquired

more impetus in the Luxembourg meeting in 1984 between EFTA and the EC. In the meeting,

the aim o f creating a dynamic European economic area and the idea of widening the internal

market to EFTA were presented. As a consequence, the EC-EFTA relations were put on a

more systematic albeit still informal basis, and cooperation between the two was enlarged and

intensified. (Humi 1989; Rehn 1993: 194.)

This development made Finland anchor its policies more clearly to EFTA. In Antola's view,

a new Finnish "EFTA-card policy", or cooperative integration strategy, began: Finland now

was EFTA as the main tool in the integration policy of its members. More emphasis was put

on the importance o f cost-sharing with other EFTA countries. As all EFTA members were

faced with the threat of marginalisation in the integration process, increased unity between

them was seen to be in the interests o f all. For Finland in particular, a steady and unified

EFTA could provide insurance in that Finland would not be left alone to cope with the

relations to the EC. Thus, it was seen to be in the Finnish interests to strengthen EFTA, not

as an end in itself but rather because o f the common interests of its members. In other words,

Finnish integration policy was gradually shifting from separately tailored unilateral agreements

to an EFTA-based, multilateral approach. (Antola 1989: 61-62; 1991a: 150.) Accordingly,

191 Cf. the basis for this in the EFTA convention and the free trade agreements with the EC.

394 For instance, the EFTA countries issued in 1977 a declaration welcoming the development of the relations between EFTA and the EC in matters such as employment policy. Finland was ready to develop the free trade system, albeit on the basis of own agreements and maintenance of autonomous decision-making capacity: it favoured the enlargement and deepening of EFTA in the limits of neutrality. (Antola and Tuusvuori 1983: 158; Antola 1991a: 149.) Finland was also slower in developing its relations to the EEC than Norway and Sweden; its agreements with the EEC to supplement the free trade agreement were both fewer and narrower in scope (limited to trade issues) than the Swedish ones (Antola 1989: 60).

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Finland decided also to become a full member of EFTA. The agreement o f September 1985

entered into force in the beginning o f 1986.395

That the Finnish integration policy had begun to change became manifest when the Finnish

government addressed in November 1988 a report or white paper to the parliament on the

Finnish stand on economic integration in Western Europe. It could be argued that the veiy

need for such a paper ana its emphasis on the elements o f continuity in Finnish policies

revealed that the policy was changing. Indeed, the paper was but the first in a series o f not

less than four white papers on Finland and integration in little more than four years. These

reports show in a concrete way the rapid turn in Finnish integration policy, while reflecting,

at the same time, the government's concern for stressing continuity and justifying the change.

This first government report endorsed the traditional elements of Finnish neutrality-based

integration policy. As neutrality required national decision-making capacity, including its own

decisions on economic policies, it could not be combined with membership in a EC aiming

at a European Union, common foreign policy, supranationality and majority decision-making.

Membership being excluded, the Finnish aim was the closest possible cooperation with the

EC in order to safeguard Finnish interests in Western European integration. In general, the

report saw Finland as an active supporter of European economic cooperation: it was seen that

pooling economic capacities offered new possibilities for Finland. The importance o f

economic relations with the Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries was also

mentioned. (Government report 1988: 5-7.) According to the report, EFTA was the primary

way of securing the Finnish interests. The EFTA countries had similar interests in many

issues; together, they formed the most important trading partner of the EC. They could also

best avoid discrimination through joint negotiations and aiming at common views on as many

issues as possible. Therefore, it was felt that EFTA should be reinforced - without, however,

changing its nature to resemble that o f the Community. {Idem: 16-17 et passim; see also

Antola 1991a: 152.)

There, the report actually pointed to a central dilemma. The deepening o f EC integration via

the Single European Act in 1987, for example, had twofold consequences: it made the EFTA

countries increasingly dependent on good relations to the EC, while it also increased the

iM In practice, however, Finnish membership did not much change its previous status as associate member. Muoser (1986: 182-183) proposes that the decision to join could be explained by the fact that the character and membership of EFTA had changed into more 'neutral*, making it easier for Finland to become a full member. In fact, after the Finnish associate membership, EFTA had been joined by Iceland and Liechtenstein, while the NATO members Denmark and United Kingdom left EFTA in 1973 and Portugal in 1986.

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differences between the two organisations. The EFTA countries had to find a way to avoid

being left out o f the process of integration. At the same time, the increasingly supranational

character o f the Community made the membership even less compatible with the requirements

of neutrality. As Hakovirta (1987: 266-268) notes, the improving competitiveness o f the EC,

the prospective o f an arrangement which could ensure participation without immediate risks

for neutrality and the possibility that the EFTA would lose importance if further members

were to leave it pressed Finland and Sweden towards integration with the EC.

On the other side, however, the EC had set clear conditions to closer cooperation with the

EFTA countries; the neutral countries were not to be allowed to select some economic

benefits without bearing the same economic burdens and responsibilities as the ordinary

members, and without joining the Community's political purposes.396 These principles, laid

down in the Luxembourg meeting in 1984, were repeated in the EFTA-EC ministerial meeting

in Interlaken in May 1987: the EC gave priority to internal integration over any agreements

with third countries, emphasising balance of benefits and obligations in agreements between

the EC and third countries. Furthermore, it was stressed that the autonomy of EC decision­

making was not to be undermined nor made over-complicated through third country

participation. In all, the EC was limiting the possibilities of influence of third states. (Antola

1989: 61; cf. Pedersen 1991: 137-138, Cremona 1994: 510-511.)

In this situation, the proposal made by the president of the Commission, Jacques Delors, in

January 1989 about the EEA agreement to extend the common market to the EFTA countries

as a third road between membership and risk for marginalisation met the wishes of the EFTA

countries halfway. It gave them the possibility of increasingly participating in the integration

process without having to compromise their national policies. On the other hand, it let the EC

profit from the widening markets without risking interference with the deepening of

Community integration and without undermining the position o f Community institutions. For

Penttilà (1994: 21), it was like a proposal invented by the Finns themselves: participating in

the common market without getting politically involved was well suited to Finnish integration

396 The EC's firmness on not admitting neutral countries which would gain economic benefits without political commitments might, in Hakovirta's view, have been additionally strengthened by the negative attitude of the United States towards such special conditions in the 1970s (Hakovirta 1976 and 1987: 268-269, quoting-the EFTA Bulletin XII (9) 3).

policy.397 In fact, Finland soon became strongly devoted to the EE A plans as a suitable

alternative to EC membership (Antola 1991a: 150-151).

Finland also remained firmly in favour o f the EEA even though almost immediately, the EEA

came to be seen by other EFTA countries as a temporary phase towards the EC membership

rather than as an autonomous long-term solution. In fact, Austria applied for EC membership

already in July 1989, before the formal EEA negotiations started in 1990. (Cf. Rehn 1993:

194-195; Cremona 1994: 508.)

This new EEA policy was reflected in the second government communication on the Finnish

position towards Western European integration of November 1989.398 Recapitulating the stand

taken in the report of 1988 about the importance of cooperation with the EFTA countries, the

key role of national measures and competitiveness and the interest for a wider pan-European

collaboration including Eastern European countries, the government considered that active

participation in negotiations on a wider, general agreement between EFTA and the EC was

needed to safeguard the Finnish interests - participation which, however, was to be based on

the country's own premises.399

The government saw several positive features in the EEA agreement: it would guarantee equal

rights and mutuality with independent right o f initiative for the EFTA pillar, participation in

the preparatory work as well as homogeneous and efficient application and control o f the EEA

norms in the whole area. The agreement would essentially be a free trade agreement, not a

customs union. It would not include foreign and security policy, nor common policies in

economy or industry, even less so in agriculture: there would be no free trade in agricultural

products comparable to free trade in industrial goods. (Government communication 1989: 11-

14, 27). Although it was acknowledged that joint decisions would decrease the freedom o f

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397 In addition to offering a solution for the EFTA countries' participation in the economic area without full membership, and thus, without retarding the main aim of deepening integration, the EEA was also a part o f the strategy o f strengthening the competitiveness o f the Community in relation to the United States and Japan (Rehn 1993: 194). Cremona (1994: 508) notes that the formation o f the EEA was seen by the Community as an alternative to membership not only for the EFTA states but also for central and eastern European countries.

m One might note that the theme no longer was Western European economic integration, but integration in general.

m On the one hand, the EEA was seen to be needed in a situation characterised by changes in Eastern Europe, accelerated development of integration and the view held by some EFTA countries (Austria) that only EC membership was sufficient to safeguard economic interests. On the other hand, it was noted that the EEA would apply also to the relations between the EFTA countries and between the Nordic countries, guaranteeing thus that Finland could maintain its relations with these important reference groups (idem: 32).

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action o f the country, it was also underlined that decision-making in the EHA would be

consensual, i.e., not supranational {idem: 28). (See also Antola 1991a: 152-153.)400

There was, however, a growing discrepancy between the views held on the EE A by the EC

and the EFTA countries. In the EFTA view, the EEA was to be an organisation based on two

equal pillars, the EFTA and the EC. Real mutuality was also one of the conditions for

negotiations set by the EC, but rather in the sense o f ascertaining that the EFTA countries

could not circumvent the common norms. In fact, the emphasis by the EC on protecting its

decision-making autonomy implied that the two pillars were in a quite unequal position: the

factual capacity o f deciding on EEA norms qua norms of the Community would pertain to

the EC only.

The third government report on integration of March 1990 considered these problems while

giving a very positive picture about the economic consequences of integration.401 The EEA

was to guarantee equal competition position and safeguard the Finnish interests in the

integration process, particularly since the Finnish goals in economic policy were very similar

to those o f the EC. Competitiveness was needed to benefit from the new possibilities offered

by integration. As such, increased competition could cause problems of adaptation; however,

these problems would arise even outside the EEA. At the same time, remaining outside the

deepening integration would decrease competitiveness. (Government report 1990: 9.)402

The report noted that the EC had expressed concern about the application of EEA norms in

the EFTA countries arguing that there was a risk of selective application, and that it would

In response to the government, the parliament enumerated four issues on which the Finnish government should present national reservations in the negotiations. Firstly, national power to control and limit the extension of foreign ownership in Finnish companies and production facilities should be guaranteed. Secondly, the Finnish social security system was to be kept at least at the present level, maintaining the aim of its further development. Third, Finland had to secure the right to maintain and develop higher standards o f environmental protection than those in the EC area; finally, the national regional policy should be maintained. (Antola 1991a: 153.)

401 Integration would increase the efficiency of domestic economy; it was seen to imply simplification of administrative measures, increased opportunities for specialisation and thereby comparative advantages, economies of scale, increasing competition through the four freedoms, larger market and thus possibilities for innovation and growth, as well as decreasing price level. International competition was seen to benefit both consumers and the export sector. The report (p. 12) even advanced the idea that the growing supply of foreign labour force would alleviate the expected lack o f work force in Finland - a rather fantastic idea to be presented in the wake of a unprecedented unemployment in the country,

401 Note how competitiveness is seen simultaneously as a consequence of integration and a means, or a prerequisite, for benefitting from integration.

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be possible that the EFTA countries re-write these norms as national ones, being thus able to

change them. Furthermore, the EC was concerned over the unequal position of individuals and

firms o f the EC countries in that they would not have the same rights to appeal to courts and

administration in the EFTA countries as the individuals and firms from EFTA countries have

in the EC. (Government report 1990: 120.)

It was clear by now that the EFTA countries had to accept in some way or another the direct

applicability o f EEA norms. The Finnish government, however, did not intend to give the

agreement a supranational character. In fact, according to the report, the Finnish intention was

that the EEA would enter into force through a national measure, resembling an international

agreement {idem: 121). As to the question of a court charged with the supervision of the

agreement, the government alluded to the fact that by becoming member of the Council o f

Europe, Finland had accepted the competence of an international court as to whether Finnish

legislation is compatible with the international agreement. Therefore, the government saw no

hindrances in accepting an EEA court which could judge whether Finland had fulfilled its

obligations stemming from the EEA treaty. {Idem: 123.)

Thus, it was still seen in Finland that the EEA could be a way of combining political

neutrality and full participation in economic integration, that is, a solution which would secure

economic interests without political participation. In 1990, the prime minister Holkeri

compared the task of combining neutrality and EC membership to the task o f squaring a

circle. At the same time, the importance o f the EEA was in both political and economic terms

greater for Finland than for the other EFTA countries. (Cf. Rehn 1993: 195.)

As Antola argues, the government was pursuing rather disparate objectives as it aimed at

access to real influence with the possibility of some 'opting-out' and the retention o f a

meaningful role by the national institutions, notably parliament and president. Real influence

in the rule-making, however, was possible only through participation. Although EC

membership was still excluded in the second and third government reports, the rejection

became less categorical403 so that membership came finally to be seen as the second option

if the EEA did not materialise. (Antola 1991a: 153, 155). 401

401 The parliamentary discussions following the second report brought up the first signs of a gradual emergence of a pro-membership constituency. The opinion polls in May 1990 showed a shift towards favouring membership: 60% were for, 13% against On the other hand, 22% believed that Finland already was a member. (The EC Bulletin May 31, 1990, quoted in Antola 1991a: 156.)

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In all, the political imperative o f Finnish integration policy was gradually turned on its head.

Whereas political commitments had previously been avoided in order to safeguard the political

freedom o f action and sovereignty, they were now seen as the means for securing greater

political influence.404 The 'political' was no longer separable at will; involvement without

political commitment implied a factual loss of influence. In the course of the negotiations, in

fact, the expectations changed and the EEA came to be seen deprived o f decision-making

capacity for the EFTA countries. After considerable delay both before signing and before

ratification, the EEA treaty finally came into force on January 1, 1994.405

The agreement involves the EU countries and the EFTA countries excluding Switzerland; in

addition to the individual countries, the EU and the ECSC are also parties to the agreement.406

In short, the EEA implies that the five EFTA countries are an integrated part of and

participate on an equal basis with the EU countries in the internal market as far as the free

movement of persons, services, goods and capital are concerned, and cooperate with the EU

in other areas, such as research and development, environment and education. The intention

is to maintain a homogeneous and dynamic economic area which implies that new, related

EU norms have to be incorporated in the EEA. As regards legislation subsequent to the treaty,

once caught up with the existing EU legislation, the EEA Joint Committee shall address

proposals for new EU legislation to ascertain whether or not identical or similar rules need

to apply in the economic area. The EFTA countries are informed and consulted in the process

of shaping new EU legislation relevant to the EEA, and they can participate in preparatory

committees. In practice, the EEA Joint Committee must, within six months o f a new

404 Antola argues that neutrality was becoming a burden in that it prevented Finland from participating in the reconstruction of Europe and excluded it from decision-making in European integration (Antola 1991a: 157).

405 Although the EEA negotiations were completed already in October 1991, the treaty was not signed before May 1992. The European Court o f Justice first rejected the agreement because of the planned common EEA court, which was seen to be against the Rome Treaty; actually, as Cremona notes, it threatened the autonomy of the Community legal order. Instead, a separate EFTA court in the framework of EEA was proposed; this was acceptable to the European Court which then approved the treaty in April 1992. (See the opinions of the Court, 1/91 and 1/92; Cremona 1994 : 514-516.) The process of ratification was complicated since Switzerland left the agreement after the referendum in December 1992. This lead to financial problems which were resolved by adjustment protocols in March 1993. (EFTA Bulletin 1/94: 11; Rehn 1993: 194.)

406 The EU is, thus, as a contracting party on equal footing with the states, and therefore also the decision­making autonomy of the EU is safeguarded by the treaty: according to protocol 35, the contracting parties do not intend to transfer legislative powers to the institutions of the EEA. This does not only guarantee the legislative autonomy of the EFTA states, but also that of the European Community. (Cremona 1994: 520.) - The EEA institutions are Council, Joint Committee, Joint Parliamentary Committee and Joint Consultative Committee. In addition, new EFTA organs were created: Standing Committee, Surveillance Authority and EFTA Court were established to complement the EFTA secretariat (EFTA Bulletin 1/94: 6-8).

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Community decision, try to find an acceptable way of incorporating similar rules into the

EE A. New EE A rules must also be formally approved by EFTA parliaments within a six

month period o f the EEA decision. AH decisions in the Joint Committee must be taken by

unanimity between the two 'pillars’407, the EU and the EFTA states. Specific aspects o f the

agreement may be suspended by one country if their application would cause serious

problems, but only if all other means o f finding a practical solution have been exhausted. In

such a case the other covntries may apply equivalent countermeasures. (EFTA Bulletin 1/94,

esp. 6-7; EFTA News 1/1994.)

As regards the changing of EU norms, the EEA joint committee cannot make binding

decisions, and the EU Commission has the monopoly of initiative. The EFTA countries can

participate in the preparatory work, possibly consulted together with the EU member countries

and through experts and committee members. {Eurooppa 27.10.1992, p. 18.) This consultation

has not been made a formal part in the process of adaptation o f Community legislation; the

EEA has been drafted in such a way as not to require amendment of the EC treaty (Cremona

1994: 512).

In practice, Finland thus accepted with the EEA a large part o f the Community legislation,

in fact, excluding only the common policies in trade, agriculture and foreign policy, as well

as the contents o f the Maastricht Treaty regarding the aim o f economic and monetary union

and cooperation in internal affairs. The agreement met practically no political resistance in

Finland, while it was a matter of controversy in both Norway and Switzerland.408 In

Vayrynen's view, a probable explanation for the support was that the EEA did not include the

m The ’two-pillar' solution, thus, means that new institutions are created between the EFTA states and alongside the EC institutions and where EFTA involvement is limited to consultation. A one-pillar solution, in turn, would have implied giving a vote to EFTA members and creating an extended Council of Ministers for the EEA law-making. It is interesting to note that although the two-pillar solution signified less influence for the EFTA states, they themselves were against the second option, which would have implied an unacceptable degree of transfer of sovereignty. The first model was obviously also in the interests of the EC, as the second would have meant an infringement on the autonomy of the Community’s decision-making powers: the Community would have had to surrender power in EEA matters to the extended Council of Ministers. (See Cremona 1994: 510.)

m The Finnish parliament ratified the treaty in October with the overwhelming majority of 154 votes in favour and 12 against, with one abstention and 32 absent (Eurooppa 27.10.1992).

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two most sensitive areas, agriculture and foreign policy, while meeting the needs for equal

access on the EC's internal market o f Finnish business. (Vâyiynen 1993: 39.)409

Nevertheless, before even having entered into force, the EEA was overtaken by the goal of

EC membership. Interestingly, the EEA itself seems to have contributed to this change in

direction. The result of the negotiations was seen not to conform to the original aims. The

sense of necessity to join was increased, as the EEA produced a gap between rights and

obligations which previously did not exist, and which could be remedied only by choosing

between membership and the abrogation of the treaty.410

In the view of the Finnish government - which had aimed at a result which would not allow

for decisions binding Finland against its will and which would secure the position o f the

national organs o f government - the decision-making structure of the EEA did not fully

respond to the aim of equality: the EU did not accept the real joint decision-making proposed

by the EFTA countries. {Eurooppa 27.10.1992, pp. 4, 19, 29.) Yet, the government's

interpretation o f the EEA was perhaps exceedingly negative. It seemed to insist on the fact

that the EEA norms have to be made part of the internal legal order of the EFTA countries

and that, consequently, there is no real possibility of opting out. In fact, the government notes

that hindering EEA decision-making could lead not only to pressure from the other EC or

EFTA members, but perhaps also to a partial annulation o f the treaty (Appendix 1992: 103-

104).

A rather different interpretation has been given by Cremona who notes that automatic

application of the EEA norms is not envisaged, but that they have to be made part of the

internal legal order, stressing that the primacy of the national jurisdiction o f the EFTA states

4W However, foreign policy was not completely absent from the EEA; it was actually stated that security and defence were outside the treaty. The treaty was accompanied by two declarations: a rather weak one about continuing Nordic cooperation and a second one in which the EU member countries and the EFTA countries expressed their will to strengthen the political dialogue in foreign policy, aiming at closer relations in areas of mutual importance, or, in practice, unofficial consultation and discussion. This also implied the introduction of such a dialogue to the relations between the EFTA countries. (Eurooppa 27.10.1992, p. 5-6.)

410 In the negotiations, the EFTA countries were required to accept the acquis communautaire with at most temporary exceptions and emergency clauses, to establish an organ of control for competition policy and to contribute to the economic and social cohesion fund for Southern Europe. In addition, concessions were required in fisheries and agriculture (access to Norwegian and Icelandic fishing waters in exchange of access by their fishery products to the EC market). (Pedersen 1991: 137-138.)

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is not undermined.411 In her view, the EEA does not involve any doctrine of primacy or direct

effect of common law; it does not involve transfer o f sovereign rights to its intergovernmental

institutions. Furthermore, the EEA is concerned solely with the promotion o f trade and

economic relations between the parties; it does not contain common tariffs, trade policy o r

references to economic and monetary union, nor is it intended to be an area without internal

frontiers. In fact, the EFTA states did not envisage any automatic rule o f primacy for EEA

rules within their national legal orders, nor intend to transfer legislative powers to the

institutions o f the EEA (Protocol 35). The EEA norms have to be made part o f the internal

legal order; automatic application is not envisaged. Their primacy, therefore, will not derive

from their inherent character as EEA norms, but from national law, confirming the approach

of the Nordic EFTA states. (Cremona 1994: 519-521.)412

5.1.3 The rhetoric o f application and the implications o f membership

It is obviously difficult to say whether the EEA agreement would in reality have led to an

intolerable loss o f influence by the EFTA countries or whether it could have been a good

solution in line with their previous policies, as it was, in fact, immediately overruled by the

membership applications. In the short interval between the treaty and the EC membership,

hardly any serious efforts could be made towards applying the agreement, even less towards

further developing it. For Finland, the decision to join the EC was in practice implicit already

*u A similar difference in interpretation appears as to the Interlaken principles; while the Finnish government sees that they limit the- possibilities of influence by the EFTA states, Cremona notes that they are expressly included within the preamble to the EEA which states that the agreement does not restrict the decision-making autonomy or the treaty-making power o f the parties and that it is based on equality and reciprocity and an overall balance of benefits, rights and obligations fo r the contracting parties. Thus, they safeguard not only the autonomous decision-making capacity of the Community but also that of the countries party to the agreement; the agreement also reflects the respect for the wishes of the sovereign states which intend neither to transfer powers nor to confer legislative power on the institutions set up by the agreement. (Cremona 1994: 511; italics added.)

411 Cremona argues that although the EEA provisions may appear unconditional and sufficiently precise to create directly effective rights, such effects are precluded by the nature and characteristics of the agreement. She sees that the effective possibility of an EFTA state to 'opt ouf of a particular legislative act, with the consequence of affecting all EEA parties, is legally and politically perfectly defensible; in fact, "EC national parliaments, many of which are becoming restless at their lack of influence over Community legislation, may observe with interest their EFTA counterparts with a real option of rejecting proposed EEA legislation". (Cremona 1994: 522, 524.) On the other hand, however, she partly confirms the government's view by noting that the Court o f Justice was accorded in the EEA a de facto pre-eminence in the judicial structure without making it explicit through an "astute" compromise: since the EFTA states could not accept future rulings of the Court of Justice, the EEA (art.105) provides for the 'reception' of new rulings of the Court by means of measures taken by the Joint Committee. (Idem: 517.)

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in the fourth government report on integration o f January 1992. This time, the report

concerned the impact of EC membership for Finland. The government acknowledged the

importance of the EEA in safeguarding the central economic interests of the country, but

noted that it might only be temporary. Therefore, the best way fully to secure the Finnish

interests seemed to be the EC membership, that is, participating in the decision-making. The

report formed the basis for a government communication to the parliament on March 16 in

which membership application was proposed. The communication was approved413, and on

March 18, Finland applied for EC membership.

This turn in Finnish integration policy was expressed and explained in terms which made it

seem understandable, even a continuation of the traditional policy. On the one hand, the

government made the decision comprehensible through referring to the changes in the

environment, as well as in the internal situation, which required some measures taken. Thus,

the government report mentions the disappearance of the bloc division in Europe, the

Maastricht summit of December 1991 together with EU's statement that negotiations on

membership with the applicants could begin in 1992, the fact that the EU was becoming a

new type of actor in international relations, and, finally, that Sweden had applied for

membership in July 1991. The Swedish membership seemed the most concrete and immediate

reason for the Finnish application: it was seen that the Swedish membership would imply a

comparative advantage for the industry of Finland’s closest competitor. (Government report

1992: 5-7.) On the other hand, the turn in Finnish integration policy was underplayed through

the way in which the government presented the EEA and the consequences o f an eventual EC

membership. The evaluation of the consequences was further coloured by considerations of

the then domestic situation, notably the domestic economic crisis, and the uncertain situation

in Russia.

The EEA was essentially a springboard which facilitated a full membership in that it already

implied the adoption of a large part o f the acquis communautaire and, thus, lessened the

amount o f additional changes required while, at the same time, increasing pressure towards

membership. The government saw that the EEA would imply minor possibilities of

influencing EC norms in comparison with full membership414: in the EEA, Finland could

influence the contents of EC law only indirectly and with support from the other EFTA * *

413 With 108 votes for, 55 against and 32 abstentions.

*u Cf. President Koivisto in the College o f Europe in Bruges (October 28, 1992) noting that while the EEA would imply that Finland would need to adapt, EU membership would allow for participation.

2 8 8

countries. The government admitted that in the EE A, Finland could impede the adaption o f

new norms or hinder unacceptable decisions - which would be possible in the EC only when

the decision is taken by unanimity - but reminded that this could lead to pressure from the

other members. (Appendix 1992; 103-104.)

The assessment that national interests were best achieved or secured through EC membership

was motivated both politically and economically, subsequently also in terms o f security. The

political motivations centred around the possibility of participating in the decision-making

which in any case would have influence on Finland. Economically, membership was seen to

be the best solution, although it was noted that the economic consequences were difficult to

estimate more than hypothetically and that, indeed, rather dissimilar results had been achieved

in the various evaluations. The deep economic crisis in Finland with a sudden increase in

unemployment to almost 20% was one of the background factors which worsened the

expectations for economic consequences o f staying outside the EU.415 Some sectors of the

economy were seen to gain, others to lose; the possibilities o f benefitting from the potential

new markets in Russia, and the impact o f common trade policy for these, were also unclear.

Subsequently, also security considerations entered the calculations of the consequences o f

membership, becoming gradually central in justifying the membership. The new instability in

Eastern Europe and Russia increased the attraction of integration as a possible security

mechanism. (Salovaara 1994: 11, 13, 37; Penttila 1994: 24-25.)

Finally, important for justifying the reassuring view that membership would actually not imply

dramatic changes for Finland was obviously that the government depicted EU integration in

rather generic and loose terms as an all-European process in which Finland was seen to be

able grosso modo to continue its own policies. According to the government, membership

would not change the basis and essential aims of Finnish foreign and security policy; the core

of neutrality would remain unchanged, and continuity would characterise also Finland's

relations to the Nordic and Eastern countries. The responsibility for defence would remain 413

413 The collapse o f the Soviet trade was a major reason for the crisis. In the early 1980s, the Soviet Union was Finland's largest single trading partner, with a share of about one quarter. By the 1990s, the Soviet share had plunged to around 10%, due to low oil prices and the economic and political difficulties of the Soviet Union. Bilateral clearing ended in 1990 and trade became based on convertible currencies. (Hjeippe 1993: 72.) Rehn (1993: 202) sees as further factors contributing to the crisis the rapidly deteriorating terms of trade with Western Europe, rapid credit expansion after the liberalisation of capital markets and the resulting increase in demand and investment prices together with increase in income and consumption through tax reforms and a permissive credit policy. (Finnish capital movements were restricted longer than in other western economies; capital market liberalisation started in the 1980s by easing the imports of capital and, subsequently, the exports; Hjerppe 1993: 73.)

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national, and a decision on relations with the WEU would be made later. In the government's

interpretation, in fact, the common foreign and security policy of the EU is characterised by

its general aims o f peace, security and promotion o f human rights rather than, for example,

the aim o f formulating common positions and eventually common defence. Moreover, the

government emphasised the importance o f unanimity or/and essential common interests in the

joint foreign policy. Similarly, the envisaged common defence policy would be based on the

respect for the basic security and defence solutions o f the member states. In addition, the

government observes that the Maastricht Treaty allows for special bilateral or multilateral

treaties between the members, being compatible with the obligations stemming from NATO

membership as well as with neutrality416. (Government report 1992: 8-10,25; Appendix 1992:

35-37.)

While foreign policy thus could continue, Finnish trade policy would not be dramatically

altered, either, since the basic aims o f EC trade policy do not differ from Finnish ones:

national trade policy simply comes to be carried out in the framework of EC membership.

Indeed, the government points out that as a great power in trade policy, the EC can effectively

defend the interests of its members. (Government report 1992: 12.) Membership would

increase Finland's possibilities of influencing international issues; the EC would be a stronger

means of enforcement and would increase the importance o f Finland for other EC countries

(Appendix 1992: 35-37).

In reality, however, the membership decision indicated that a twofold change had taken place

in the orientation o f the government: firstly, membership was no longer a secondary option

- perhaps it was not even an option; secondly, the decision had to be made promptly: a "wait-

and-see" was no longer possible. The speed of the process was considerable: the decision was

quite suddenly made after only two years of public discussion on the possibility of

membership. The government saw several reasons for not dwelling on the question for too

long. The Swedish membership application was one accelerating factor; the government

wished the eventual Finnish membership application to be examined together with those of

Austria and Sweden, and this meant that the application had to be submitted already in the

early 1992. (Government report 1992: 5-7.) Reference was also made to the importance of

416 Here, allusion is made to the view expressed by Austria and Sweden that military non-alignment is compatible with the Maastricht Treaty.

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joining in time to participate in the intergovernmental conference of 1996 where the contents

o f the common foreign and security policy were to be specified (see Himanen 1993).417

Without doubt, the membership decision was linked to a broader change in Finnish foreign

policy, a change which essentially consisted of abandoning the policy of neutrality. In fact,

neutrality had been gradually eroding, or it had been come to be increasingly restricted as to

its application during the 1980s. First, the neutrality doctrine was renounced in wide

humanitarian issues to apply only in cases where the interests of the great powers were in

immediate conflict. Secondly, economic integration was detached from the field where

neutrality policy was applied, and in autumn 1987, it was clearly stated by the prime minister

and the minister for foreign affairs that participation in Western European integration was no

longer a component of the Finnish policy o f neutrality. The chief purpose o f this redefinition

was to avoid the comprehensive economic-political packages by which the Finnish political

commitments to the East and economic ties with the West were previously balanced. In fact,

the EEA treaty no longer involved the principle of parallelism. Thus, neutrality came to be

reduced to the fields of military and narrowly defined matters o f security policy. (VSyrynen

1993: 36; Mottolg 1993: 90-95.)418 In fact, in the Government report of 1992, what is left is

the "core of neutrality", that is, staying outside military alliances in order to enable neutrality

in war, supported by credible national defence.

As Mottola (1993: 90-95) notes, Finnish neutrality began to lose significance at the very time

when it was recognised officially by the Soviet Union; Arter (1995: 372) sees even an irony

in that Finland sought to abandon its neutrality when there finally was the possibility o f

giving it real substance and credibility.419 In fact, two important changes had taken place. On

417 The absence o f discussion on membership before 1990 can be explained by the traditional consensual character of foreign policy issues in Finland and the disciplined character of public discussion on them; the discussion on membership began, in fact, in early 1990 after a specific incitement by the president to reflect on the issue. As Rehn (1993: 206-207) notes, however, there were in the following year attempts to limit or control the discussion because of the ongoing EEA negotiations. That the possibility of joining really was quite new is shown by the fact that as late as 1990, two years before the application, Antola (1990b: 172) did not see membership as being among the foreseeable choices but argued that one had to expect rather dramatic changes in Europe before Finland would became an applying country.

418 The traditional statement on neutrality in the government programmes fell in the 1980s from the beginning of the section concerning foreign policy to the fourth chapter (Lipponen 1990: 9).

419 In a visit to Finland in 1989, the then Soviet president Gorbachev unconditionally recognised that Finland was a neutral Nordic country - thus far, the Finnish-Soviet communiqués had spoken about Finland's striving for neutrality - and that it was Finland's internal matter to decide on its attitude towards EC membership (e.g., Rehn 1993: 205). With a singular burst of activity, Finland unilaterally declared in September 1990 that the stipulations

I

the one hand, the traditional subordination of foreign policy to security policy was if not

reversed, at least abandoned; on the other, the importance o f participation outweighed the

need for retaining a certain freedom o f action. In Antola's (1991b: 21) words, the demands

o f integration policy posed a grave challenge to the foreign policy "metadoctrine" of

neutrality, and the status quo element became increasingly obscure in the early years o f the

1990s.

A new Finnish foreign policy doctrine started emerging in the early 1990s. The rapidly

revised interpretations of the Paris peace treaty and the FCMA in September 1990 were signs

of major change; as Majander put it, the FCMA treaty had been "brought down from the

inviolable realm o f holy liturgy to the sphere of mortal elements of foreign policy"420. The

new doctrine comprised essentially a decreasing centrality o f security and defence, and an

active integration strategy based on the possibility o f EC membership and harmony between

the interests of the EC and Finland (Patomáki 1991: 81-82).

This change has been interpreted as the beginning o f an altogether new epoch in Finnish

foreign and security policy. In general terms, Joenniemi sees that it implies that the general

is becoming more important than the particular, the multilateral more important than the

bilateral, and dynamism and openness more important than keeping a particular doctrine. At

the same time, even the traditional consensus (cf. Antola 1991a: 152) on foreign policy has

disappeared. The old realistic, 'managing on one’s own' view which emphasises the

particularity of the country is pushed into the background by a more common view, one in

which participation (e.g., in integration) is seen to be important, while distance (e.g., through

neutrality) may become a burden. In all, Joenniemi argues, in the Finnish self-conception, the

country and its policies are perhaps becoming increasingly comparable and similar to other

countries. (Joenniemi 1995: 106-108, 113; cf. Joenniemi 1992a.)

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of the Paris peace treaty concerning Germany as well as those concerning certain restrictions on the Finnish armed forces had lost significance and would no longer be applied. Analogously, the allusion to Germany in the FCMA treaty was seen to be obsolete. In the autumn of 1991, Finland negotiated simultaneously with the Soviet Union and Russia a new agreement, signed with Russia in January 1992 (the Soviet Union had ceased to exist in December 1991). At the same time, the FCMA treaty was abrogated. The new treaty differs from the FCMA in that it is based on the principles o f the United Nations and the CSCE; it does not involve positive security guarantees or mechanisms of consultation, but instead negative ones, the prohibition of the use of force and assistance in the case of an attack against the other party. (Mdttola 1993: 95-97.)

m Majander, Mikko: 'The Finnish-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance in Finland under President Koivisto. Two Rounds of Discussion.' Yearbook o f Finnish Foreign Policy, 1991 (Finnish Institute of International Affairs, Helsinki), pp. 37-38.

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One could even see that the aim of membership forced a radical change in the Finnish view

on foreign policy. As Tiilikainen explains, there could not be a doctrine further away from

the idea and aims o f the European Union than the traditional Finnish one. She argues that the

Finnish doctrine rather boldly subscribes to the idea that the state is authorised to act

egoistically to secure its existence and interests. The Union, on the contrary, is based on the

view o f the inadequacy of the traditional state and the harmfulness o f national identities

established by them. The state's task o f furthering its own interests is increasingly replaced

by tasks subordinated to the European goals o f harmonisation and mediation. In fact,

Tiilikainen argues, the Union questions not only the Finnish type of political realism, but also

neutrality, autonomy and the division between foreign and domestic politics. Furthermore, the

Finnish unitary political culture can hinder adaptation to the value-pluralistic structure o f the

Union. (Tiilikainen 1992: 15-16, 18-19.)

What makes the Finnish policy change particularly interesting, and also problematic, is its

actual magnitude. On the one hand, it seems that there has been authentic willingness to alter

the direction; on the other, the willingness to change has perhaps led to an unintentionally

dramatic reversal of the policy, the consequences o f which are deeper than expected. Above

all, the rhetoric o f continuity, the way o f depicting the Finnish membership decision as a

logical step in the customary direction, is bound to become increasingly hollow.

In fact, Finnish integration policy has been almost turned on its head: the traditional

avoidance of political commitments and supranationality has been replaced by what could

even be seen as an eagerness in welcoming both, and the search for specially tailored

arrangements has changed into promotion o f common policies. Yet, the elements of continuity

were emphasised in the discussion both by the government and by several researchers.

Integration was seen as a complement to national policies rather than an alternative to them

(e.g., Himanen 1993: 29-30) and as an additional means for furthering national interests; it

was argued that Finnish integration policy had not changed, but that the environment had

(Rehn 1993: 217).42'

WI Continuity does have a particular attraction; the logical is often more acceptable than the illogical. It may even be difficult to avoid the perception of continuity in explaining integration policy as somehow logical and rational action on the part of the policy-makers, as when Lempiâinen (1994: 128) claims that the acceptance of the EEA in Finland was made easier by the fact that the EEA has been a "logical step" in the economic integration in Western Europe. The mere fact that one has traditionally spoken about a 'Finnish integration policy' smooths the adjustment of membership, even though this policy was traditionally constructed on the explicit basis of non-membership.

\

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It is clear that these claims would only be true if the European Union were still a mere

intergovernmental community which could be used for such furthering of particular interests.

Understandably, this is how it was also depicted by the government* 422 before the membership.

It noted expressly423 that Finland, considering that membership was seen as the best way of

securing its national interests and international goals, would further its interests with the help

of the Union; it would also in the future independently define its own interests. In full

equality with other member states, Finland would be loyal to them, while expecting solidarity

from the others. As the common foreign and security policy has developed on the basis of

unanimity and as independent defence is conform to the Maastricht Treaty, the bases of

Finnish foreign and defence policy may remain.

Further, the government let it be understood that "the EU involves independent and sovereign

states having freely decided to exercise in common some o f their competencies", and that it

would be only normal to pursue the own interests in the negotiations, where "we will defend

our own views and pursue our interests just as others do". Finland would be an active

participant, but on "the basis of our own views", as, indeed, "it is in the interests o f the

Community as well to ensure that the interests of a new member are duly safeguarded".424 It

was, thus, only natural that the Finnish government refer to the decision by the German

constitutional court of October 1993 which states that the Maastricht Treaty is not in

contradiction with the German constitution, that the treaty does not imply the establishment

o f a federal state, that there is no automaticity in the treaty and that Germany will remain a

sovereign state, retaining also a necessary amount o f decision-making competence on its

currency. The same applied for Finland, the prime minister observed. (.Eurooppakirje 7/93.)

Similarly, the EU citizenship was seen as giving additional value to the national citizenship

rather than replacing it or making it irrelevant. The government explained that ”[W]e are also

keen to give Finnish nationals additional rights and improve the protection o f their interests

through the introduction of the citizenship of the Union, which does not in any way take the

place of national citizenship." (Eurooppa 1/93.)

412 It has also been rather straightforwardly expressed in the literature. E.g., Lempiainen (1994: 130) argues that the European Union, instead of being federalistic in nature, is characterised by closer cooperation between nation-states and serves the national interests.

422 Memorandum by the political department of the ministry for foreign affairs, October 26, 1992, publishedin Eurooppa 30.10.1992, pp. 1 -6; this document served as background information for the Commission's avis on Finland's application and the ensuing negotiations on foreign policy.

424 Finland's view as stated by Perth Salolainen, minister for foreign trade, in the ministerial meeting opening the conferences on the accession of Austria, Sweden and Finland to the EU, Brussels, February 1, 1993; quoted in Eurooppa 1/93.

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It is not that the government would have ignored the elements of supranationality in the

Union. Majority decision-making, direct applicability o f Community law, citizenship of the

Union, common foreign and security policy, eventual common defence and economic,

monetary and political union are all taken into consideration. The government report notes

some important constitutional and juridical consequences of membership, such as a significant

decrease o f the norm-giving powers o f the parliament and the president, the primacy and

direct applicability of EC law and the capacity of the Community to enter into international

agreements which partly deprives the state o f this capacity, as well as the obligation in the

Rome Treaty to resolve conflict situations arising between the commitments of membership

and previous international agreements (Appendix 1992; 101, 104, 106).

However, these features are interpreted in a particular way. It is seen that while the EU

membership does entail certain obligations, their amount and nature are controlled by the

member states. Similarly, while the Court of Justice obviously has an important role in

controlling the compliance of the members, its competencies are limited to these particular

obligations. On the other hand, the existence of common policies is moderated by stressing

the idea that in the framing of these policies, national peculiarities and interests are taken into

account, and that they, accordingly, strengthen and complement the national ones.423 * 425

This is obviously not what the EU maintained. The difference in interpretation could perhaps

be that the government's evaluation o f the consequences o f membership was based on

characteristics of the European Community while the EU emphasised that what was actually

at stake was the membership of the European Union. This was particularly emphasised in the

avis426 of the Commission on the Finnish application and in the declaration on foreign policy

made at the end o f the negotiations.427

423 For example, the Appendix 1992 (pp. 35-37) notes that unanimity or/and essential common interests areimportant and that the envisaged common defence policy will be based on the respect for the basic security anddefence solutions of the member states; further, the Maastricht Treaty allows for special bilateral or multilateral treaties between the members. One might ask, however, whether the possibility of treaty making between the members is as important as the possibility of bilateral relations with countries outside the Union.

426 November 4, 1992; published in the Bulletin of the European Communities, supplement 6/92. Unofficial Finnish translation in Eurooppa 4.11.1992.

417 It is interesting to confront the statement by Salolainen (above) with the response by the representative of the EU in which the main message was that the process and structures of the Union should not be weakened and that the whole EU acquis had to be accepted. This was repeatedly underlined with expressions such as "I should make it clear from the outset", "I would also recall", "may I remember you also". (Draft statement by Mr. Niels Helveg Petersen, president-in-office of the Council at the ministerial meeting opening the conferences on the accession o f Austria, Sweden and Finland to the European Union, Brussels, February 1, 1993; quoted in

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The clash o f interpretations is well illustrated by the case o f Finnish neutrality. In the

membership negotiations, questions o f foreign and security policy were expected to be

eventually problematic because of the Finnish neutrality. In difference to the Swedish

application, the Finnish one had not contained any conditions or reflections on neutrality (cf.

Arter 1995: 368). However, neutrality was supposed to become an important part o f the

negotiations (e.g,, Rometsch 1993: 44). The Finnish government had stated that the

interpretation of neutrality was not a question of negotiation: it would remain in the hands of

the government, as well as foreign and security policy more generally (Government

communication 1992; Rehn 1993: 206-207).

A common understanding on the issue seemed to be reached quite soon, while the main

problems turned out to be in the fields of agriculture and regional policy. Relieved, the

government concluded that the Finnish position had been accepted.428 The Commission,

however, questioned the Finnish neutrality policy already in the avis on the Finnish

application, asking whether it, even if reduced to its "core", would not constitute a hindrance

to the full acceptance of the foreign policy of the Union, including the defence o f the

independence and security of the Union and the development towards common defence. The

provisions of the Maastricht Treaty make it clear that new members have to accept the

common positions in foreign and security policy, including eventually a binding defence

policy and imposition of sanctions on third countries. To assume that Finland as a member

could still continue its neutrality policy would, thus, be mistaken and possibly also obstruct

the policies.429 Thus, the Commission urged full clarification on the Finnish position to

ascertain that it would not hamper the evolution of the common policies. It also recommended

specific and binding assurances on the political commitment and legal capacity to fulfil the

obligations in this field. Moreover, as a response to the rather vague Finnish interpretation of

Eurooppa 1.2.1993.)

4:8 The Finnish minister for foreign affairs Vayrynen noted in the parliament, responding to a question on the Finnish negotiation goals, that it seems that Finland can join the EC pursuing the policy which it has adapted in the post-cold war Europe and that no difficult or impossible commitments are expected (,Eurooppa 9.3.1993).

429 In fact, the Maastricht Treaty states that "[A] common foreign and security policy is hereby established" and that "[t]he Union and its Member States shall define and implement a common foreign and security policy, governed by the provisions of this Title and covering all areas o f foreign and security policy" (articles J and J.l, italics added).

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the WEU as a means of crisis management to which Finland would take stand later, the

Commission recalled that the WEU had also political aims (v4v/s, pp. 22-23).430

In reality, however, what was presented as the Finnish position - in foreign policy as well as

other issues - was no longer autonomously defined: it could hardly be a position which would

be in conflict with that of the others or incompatible with the EU stand. In fact, policy

redefinitions were demanded for; the A vis emphasises Finland’s ability to change the meaning

of neutrality and notes that it is also willing to do so: Finnish security and foreign policy are

noted to have developed considerably since the beginning o f the 1990s. Importantly, thus, the

own policies and interests can be furthered in the context o f the Union only with the strong

reservation that they have to be compatible with those o f the others, or the common

interests.431

Although the Finnish government seemed to use the compatibility argument to make the

required changes appear less important432, the effective limitations of the 'own' had to be

admitted. Although the furthering of own interests and continued neutrality were not explicitly

considered incompatible with membership, the Union posed quite clear restrictions on what

these could imply in practice. According to the conditions o f membership imposed by the

Commission433, new members have the duty to accept the acquis communautaire in its totality,

including the contents, principles and political objectives o f the treaties, also the Maastricht

Treaty, the legislation adopted in the implementation o f the treaties and the jurisprudence o f

the Court, the declarations and resolutions adopted in the Community framework, as well as

00 In fact, the Finnish relations to the WEU were settled very soon after membership: Finland acquired observer status in the organisation in February 1995.

431 Tonra (1994) sees that in the practical politics of the European Union, the 'national interest* can be referred to only exceptionally, in particular cases, according to what he outlines as special 'rules' for using the term.

431 In the government position (above; esp. p. 2-4), it is seen that Finland can without problems accept the results and goals o f the common policy, being ready to participate actively and constructively, as the EC countries and Finland in fact share the same values and socio-economic development and, therefore, they also have common goals in international relations. As an example, the position mentions the similarity of the Finnish and the EPC attitudes regarding the Baltic region. Further, it states that as all European countries are committed to the CSCE values of democracy, human rights and economic liberalism, there is no longer reason for a wide neutrality policy. - Salovaara (1994: 24) notes that since the early 1980s, Finland has indeed voted very much like the EC in the UN General Assembly, more so than Denmark, an EU member which has sometimes been more in line with Nordic countries.

433 The report o f the Commission on the challenge of enlargement presented to the European Council in Lisbon, June 26-27, 1992; Bulletin of the European Communities, supplement 3/92, pp. 11-12.

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the international agreements and the agreements between member states connected with the

activities o f the Community. Moreover, nothing more than technical adaptations, temporary

derogations and transitional arrangements could be agreed in the negotiations, while

safeguarding the achievements of the Community.

Quite unlike the older members of the Community, and unlike, for instance, Denmark - to

which Finland could in many respects be compared - Finland had, in practice, to accept all

the contents o f the Union unconditionally. This was made particularly clear before the

negotiations were over in a ministerial meeting434 where a rather pleonastic joint declaration

was issued stating that Sweden, Austria, Norway and Finland fully accepted the acquis

communautaire with its contents, principles and goals, and that there was agreement on the

fact that the juridical system of the new members will in the moment of accession be in

harmony with the acquis. (Eurooppakirje 1/94).435

The consequences o f the Finnish EU membership are difficult if not impossible to estimate

in terms o f gains and losses, the complex equations between the costs of commitment and the

gains of influence436 being further complicated in that they are also influenced by external

events. It is, for instance, quite intricate to calculate whether a country would be more secure

allied or not; in the Finnish case, much depends on the development of relations between the

EU and Russia (cf. Salovaara 1994). The very nature of the membership as perhaps the most

far-reaching change in Finnish constitution since 1919, and, moreover, of an sudden character *

*iA Brussels, December 21, 1993. The negotiations began on February I, 1993 and ended on March 1, 1994. The European Parliament accepted the results on May 4, 1994, and the accession agreements were signed on Corfu on June 24-25.

m This particular emphasis on the firmly binding commitment makes the position of the new member states different from that o f the existing members, which were never bound to accept such an amount of decisions without even the possibility of opting out (see, e.g., the exceptions Denmark was able to make on the Maastricht Treaty). One could also argue that the new member states were here used as a device for strengthening the credibility o f 'the common’: the declaration states further that the adhesion shall strengthen the internal cohesion o f the Union and its capacity to act efficiently in the field of foreign and security policy; the acceding countries shall from the moment of accession be ready and capable of participating fully and actively in the common foreign and security policy as defined in the Maastricht Treaty; the new members accept in its totality and without reservations all the goals of the Union treaty and they are ready and capable o f supporting from the moment of accession the policy in vigour of the Union.

m An illustration of the difficulties in assessing something as evasive as 'influence' is given by the game- theoretical study of Widgren 1995 about national influence in the EU. The conclusions attained (e.g., that EU decision-making process strongly favours small countries, p. 18) are based on a host of quite precise assumptions which are necessary to allow for a quantification o f the question, but which, at the same time, oversimplify the situation.

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contributes to making its dimensions impossible to calculate and foresee (Nousiainen 1992:

262). Similarly, the anticipated effects o f EU membership for the Finnish economy are highly

contingent on the assumptions about the general effects o f integration being true (cf. Eskelinen

1985 on the difficulty in anticipating and evaluating the economic impacts of integration).

Still, some profound changes are quite easily recognisable. Firstly, there are changes which

regard the power relations between the different state organs; the question o f the relationship

between the executive and the parliament and the evident transfer o f power from the latter to

the former observed in other member countries (cf. Jââskinen 1992: 278) also concerns

Finland. As a particularly Finnish problem, the relationship between the president and the

government, or the prime minister, is brought up through the increasing difficulty in

maintaining the distinction between foreign and domestic issues, distinction which has

traditionally constituted the boundary o f the powers o f the two (cf. Nousiainen 1992: 264).

Second, membership becomes increasingly visible in the contents of policies, especially

concerning economic and foreign affairs.

Third, the structure and functioning of the public administration changes through the interplay

of the national and the communitarian administrations. This ’européanisation*, mixing the

domestic and the international, as Hyyrylainen (1995: 12, 194-195) argues, brings with it

different consequences in different sectors. In general, however, it implies new coordination

of decision-making required for a successful integration policy, regulation and organisational

changes. These changes may help improve some features of national administration, but they

do not necessarily contribute to, e.g., increasing effectiveness. Moreover, the expanding

contacts between administrations challenge the national administrative culture; after all, in

areas such as customs administration, the Finnish central administration in fact comes to

function as a part o f the EU administration (cf. Temmes 1995: 215-216 et passim).

What is clear, therefore, is that a commitment has been made to a process o f European union-

and constitution-building which will imply increasing acceleration of change in the Finnish

state, most probably towards a growing similarity with other member states in their structures

and functions. Rather strikingly, many features which in Finland would probably be seen as

(valuable) particularities of the country were dissipated already in the avis on membership

application by the fact that in many crucial points, exactly the same wording was used in the

two avis of Finland and Sweden, especially for the chapter on foreign and security policy.437

07 Cf. Commission opinion on Sweden’s application for membership. SEC(92) 1582 final; Bulletin of the European Communities, Supplement 5/92.

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In fact, if reservations and 'exits' conform to national characteristics were formerly possible,

the possibility now seems increasingly rhetorical. The nature o f the process is demanding: it

is not possible to defend the particular if this implies obstructionism; the fact that different

issues are interlinked and that the process not only is irreversible but also needs to process

for its own credibility reduce possibilities for unanimity and exceptions.

All in all, the argumentation on continuity in Finnish integration policy has to be seen as

purely rhetorical. The appearance o f continuity can be seen as based on simplifying

reinterpretations or reversed meanings o f the central concepts. The arguments have been

turned on their heads: prospering economy, international status and influence are now linked

to membership, which even implies 'more sovereignty' in terms o f possibilities of participation

than non-membership. Neutrality has become suspect and the security of the country is now

better guaranteed in some kind of alliance/3* Even the continuity itself is reversed: although

the previous policy was based on non-membership, continuity is now seen to lie in

membership. In all, the Finnish road to the EU is straightened by explaining the policy

choices by very general axioms or principles, such as the 'national interest'. This, however,

implies the fallacy that anything can be explained as being 'in the interests'; whatever is done

reflects the Finnish interests - even supranationalism - through the simple redefinition o f the

own interests in conformity with a new identity acquired by the membership/39

The remaining question, then, is the 'why' o f this dramatic change. Different explanations have

been offered. Some refer to general factors such as rapid technological development, structural

change in world economy or the end o f the cold war (e.g., Rehn 1993: 168-169). However,

these are hardly events which take place at a given time and induce rapid reactions. Thus,

they cannot give an adequate explanation of the precise responses, nor do they give any

precise indications for policy. Rather, they serve in making the choices understandable

afterwards. However, in periods which are seen particularly transformatory, the question of

image, that is, how Finland is perceived in other countries, might be accentuated or revived.

There might well have been pressure for showing that Finland was able to follow the changes.

While a passive 'wait-and-see* policy could have been seen as reactionary or outdated, a rapid * 439

08 Indeed, EU membership quite soon led also to discussions on NATO membership; Finland become NACC observer in 1992 and signed the PFP agreement in 1994 (e.g., Rehn 1993: 212).

439 For instance, the government position according to which Finland considers that it can secure the national interests and international goals best as an EC member and that it will also in the future independently define its own interests (Eurooppa 30.10.1992) does not say anything about the goals; moreover, the second part verifies the first; interests can be defined so as to be best furthered in the EU. Integration can be said to be in the interests of the states; what is important, however, is that the interests are not given ex ante.

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decision to join the EC seemed to show that Finland, too, had entered the post-cold war era

(cf. Arter 1995). In fact, the decision was seen to enhance the Western character o f the

country, membership being even the most important factor influencing Finnish international

identity (Himanen 1993: 29-30; government position in Eurooppa 30.10.1992).440

Finally, an intricate choice remains between seeing the decision either as a necessity or as a

deliberate policy choice. In the first case, there actually was no choice, and the much-

emphasised national decision-making capacity was definitively only apparent.441 In the second

case, if the decision was a choice reflecting particular interests, perhaps a 'loose elite bargain'

between the political and economic elites (Vàyrynen 1993: 35,43-45), it seems that the rapid

transformation into an eager and willing supporter of integration (a Musterbiabe; see

Mouritzen 1993b) has taken place without profound consideration of the depth o f the ensuing

changes or the possible alternatives. Indeed, the membership was preceded by much less

argumentation concerning the possibility o f non-membership, which actually appeared a non­

possibility. Rather suddenly, not joining the EU came simply to be associated with the fate

of marginalisation and outstanding economic problems, even insecurity.442

X X X

5.2 Mem bersh ip in th e European u n io n : a further d im en sio n fo r Finn ish in teg ra tio n po lic y

5.2.1 The logic o f membership

Finnish membership in the EU has been interpreted by many as a fundamental change in the

traditional Finnish stance on European integration based on the principles of neutrality and

440 Similarly, Vayrynen (1993: 39) sees that the EEA conferred an enhanced European identity on the Finns, who were semi-isolated during the cold war. Actually, also the fact that Finland stayed outside the Council o f Europe started to become embarrassing in the late 1980s.

441 E.g., when the minister for foreign affairs Haavisto underlined that the potential changes in Finnish foreign and security policy in all circumstances will result from own decisions (July 1993; quoted in Eurooppakirje 5/93).

442 Cf. Arter (1995: 372) who argues that Finland would have had an alternative in remaining an EEA member, but that a covert recognition of a potentially considerable 'security bonus' to be gained through EU membership made this alternative disappear.

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protection o f a wide freedom o f action. This stance implied that Finland previously avoided

all political commitments or institutional obligations, in particular supranationality, in order

to not to risk these principles and its good relations with the Soviet Union. (Cf. Antola 1991a:

146-148.) Membership in the EEC/EC - directly based on confrontation between great powers

- was obviously not considered possible. Even Finnish relations to EFTA, OECD and Nordic

cooperation had to be defined in quite cautious terms, even refraining from full membership.

Accordingly, membership in the supranational EU would be even less compatible with this

policy. Therefore, it has been pointed out, Finland has had to change its policies rather

strikingly to make EU membership possible: it has completely renounced the former

governing principles of neutrality and avoidance of political commitments.

One should not overlook, however, the extent to which this impression o f discontinuity is

created by the very accounts o f Finnish integration policy which tend to trace clear 'lines’ and

'policies' to explain the past decisions. In other words, the general principles of the policy

might actually be post hoc constructions, perhaps supported by some political statements,

rather than steadfast guiding lines o f the concrete actions in practice. Finnish integration

policy can be made to appear logical, for example in always avoiding political commitments.

It might also be that, in absence of knowledge of the actual intentions, the fact that the

country has not been able to join some organisation has been interpreted as confirming that

the policy of the country actually excluded joining. Logically, then, the EU membership

comes to be seen as a proof o f a change of policy. The logic, however, may divert attention

from possible 'counterfactuals' and alternative interpretations. In the case of Finnish integration

policy, the problem with the usual description is the insufficient attention paid to the elements

o f continuity which characterise the policy also after the membership.

Furthering its interests with the best available means has naturally always been an aim in

Finnish integration policy. For a small state, an essential means is participating in the central

structures of European cooperation, while protecting, within these structures, a sufficient

freedom o f action and decision-making capacity which enables taking into account the

national particularities and specific interests in a given question. These are also the important

elements o f continuity which form the core of the Finnish attitude towards European

integration: avoiding economic and political exclusion and guaranteeing the possibility to

further the particular interests. Seen through these elements of continuity, it is no longer

curious that Finland has on some occasions actually participated in political cooperation or

considered EEC membership as possible quite early on. These elements also explain why the

EU membership - while obviously a novelty - is not a disrupting event. Rather, in fact, the

Finnish process o f accession proved to be too smooth to have represented a real change of

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policy. As President Koivisto stated in the European Parliament in November 1993, the

decision to apply for membership is, in a closer look, a logical continuation o f Finnish

integration policy.

At the same time, it is important not to misunderstand this continuity. Although the basic aims

remain, it would be curious to suppose that a country would for decades follow a coherent

policy in the sense o f always having the same interests or the same means for furthering them.

Its interests are not given and stable through time - even though there evidently are quite

permanent interests such as good relations with the neighbouring countries. Obviously, they

are defined according to the situation, not a priori. Similarly, one should see neutrality and

the avoidance of supranationality as means to an end o f policy rather than as elements of

continuity. As the interests, also the appropriate means for furthering them change as a result

of a natural adaptation to the environment. Useful in certain situations or certain periods of

time, they may also become irrelevant; their precise meaning may also change in time.

Thus, if some overarching "imperatives" have characterised Finnish integration policy, their

contents have changed in time. For a lengthy period in time, they were seen to be that Finland

must not remain outside any preferential trade arrangement which includes Norway or Sweden

together with any principal trading partner and that it must not disturb the credibility of the

policy o f neutrality (Tomudd 1969; 64-65). Subsequently, the economic and political

environment has changed. While Tomudd (1995: 101-102) still sees neutrality - even after EU

membership - as one of the elements o f continuity in Finnish policies, together with an

emphasis on the nation state, the Nordic relations and relations to Russia, neutrality has in the

meantime been redefined, and seems gradually to have lost its usefulness as a tool, perhaps

even becoming counterproductive (see below).

At the same time, continuity should not be exaggerated, either. Finnish policy has not been

an unfailing series o f successful combination of participation with perfect freedom of choice.

Rather, the constraints of environment, both internal and external, have also implied

compromises and setbacks, as in the case o f NORDEK (see below). Still, the constraints have

not necessarily been hindrances: they have formed the framework for the search o f rational

action. Thus, one need not see Finnish policy as a mere submission to external influences,

either, as has often been done in the literature. Not seldom, in fact, Finland has been depicted

as driftwood: being just a small country situated near a great power which does not have a

real choice o f policy, its policies being almost determined by external factors. The accounts

o f Finnish integration policy have also availed themselves of this picture. For Antola (1989:

55), adaptation - with some reservations - has been the key to Finnish integration policy and

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Finland has even been "pushed into her own decisions" by events in the environment.

Lempiainen (1994: 139), in turn, sees Finland as being at the mercy of international economy,

not being able to have much influence. In general, it has been argued that the limited

possibilities of action have made Finnish policies rather passive in nature. As Vayrynen (1993:

41) notes, the importance of foreign policy considerations has meant that the room for

political innovation has been fairly limited for Finland.443

These interpretations not only exaggerate continuity but can also become easily tautological:

everything is either rational adaptation or decided from outside. They seem to be ways of

explaining the policy post hoc rather than concrete descriptions o f the policy.444 In reality,

policy formulation has been more flexible. In fact, Antola and Tuusvuori (1983:160-163,246-

247) interpret the Finnish integration policy as an active strategy of mutual influence which

takes into account changes in the environment. Adaptation is, thus, not an aim in itself, but

a strategy to avoid the threat o f exclusion from major markets (Antola 1989: 55). Finnish

attitude has changed in time; as Antola (1991a: 148) notes, economic integration has come

to be seen as a factor which contributes to the stability in Europe, and integration policy has

become increasingly active and more autonomous from foreign policy. Similarly, even the

attitude towards political integration has been flexible: what has been seen as 'political' has

not necessarily followed any special logic, but it has depended on the situation. While the

Council o f Europe has been seen as too political, close political cooperation with the Nordic

NATO members has been more than acceptable. Dynamic and characterised by increasing

participation and commitments, the Finnish integration policy can be seen as following the

general development of Finnish foreign policy (cf. Mottola 1993: 88-89).

40 Finland, particularly Finnish foreign policy, often appears as an example in theories of political adaptation. For instance, Rosenau sees Finland as an example of acquiescent adaptation in that it has been adapting to one factor in the environment, acknowledging the dependency on the interests o f the Soviet Union. (See Rosenau 1981: 63, 119-120 and Mouritzen 1988; cf. MOttOla 1993: 83-88.) While the constraints by the Soviet Union on the Finnish participation in international organisations under the cold war imposed to Finland the need to ascertain that its arrangements could not be interpreted as implying political commitments, capable of jeopardising the Finnish-Soviet relations, the logic of adaptation has subsequently been extended to seeing Finland - still a small state with limited resources • as having now to adapt to the policies of the EU (e.g., Mouritzen 1993b).

444 The characterisation of Finnish integration policy as a "wait-and-see" strategy, a strategy consisting essentially in waiting for a clarification or a favourable change in the situation before taking important decisions (cf. Hakovirta), seems also an example of the wisdom of hindsight. On the other hand, there need be nothing especially Finnish about this attitude. In fact, in another context, Jervell (1991a: 40) notes that it can be appealing for a small country to wait until more is known about the 'new Europe' before deciding on the own attitude, but that this increases the risk that the others decide about the role of these countries in Europe.

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In fact, Finland's special interests have been defined according to the possibilities of the

situation - any rational action requires this kind of adaptation - and, when looked at more

closely, it has been able to further them rather efficiently. Even when full participation has

been hampered by political reasons, Finland has found several individual arrangements to be

able to participate in the process o f European integration without compromising its political

freedom o f action, such as individual loans from the United States instead of joining the

Marshall Plan or FINEFTA treaty instead o f EFTA membership (see below). Finally, these

organisations would not themselves be credible did not they allow for taking into account the

specific interests of the participants. This is true also for the EU; therefore, the Finnish

decision to join is a further step and logical continuation o f its policy in a changed

environment. At the same time, it is an important step which gives this policy not only

additional dimensions and possibilities, but also presents challenges through the mutual

relation o f influence between the organisation and its member states.

5.2.2 Neutrality: the cold war means in Finnish integration policy

Following Antola and Tuusvuori 1983 and Antola 1989, the Finnish integration policy of the

cold war era can be seen as having developed through four different phases which succeed

each other according to a clear logic of increasing participation. These phases are bilateralism,

trade liberalisation, delineation o f a Finnish free trade policy and maintenance o f a broad

integration system. The common denominator of this period from the late 1940s to the late

1980s was neutrality as a means needed for furthering the general aims of avoiding exclusion

from cooperation and securing the particular interests. As an interest above the others was not

to induce a deterioration in the relations with the Soviet union through commitments which

could compromise the bilateral treaties, neutrality came to be seen as the only possible foreign

policy position. Consequently, neutrality was also the basic means for Finnish integration

policy: participation in organisations o f a 'Western' character was acceptable as long as it

could be seen as conform to neutrality. What divided the periods, then, were the steps taken

towards increasing possibilities and widening scope o f participation and the diminishing

centrality o f neutrality. The domain of neutrality policy, first defined in very broad terms, was

gradually shrinking and towards the end o f the cold war, its usefulness as a means came under

increasing question.

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Bilateralism (1945-1955)

The period immediately following the second world war was characterised by a reconstruction

of both Finnish foreign policy and trade relations, with the subordination of the latter to the

former. The centrality of relations to the Soviet Union made the Finnish treaties with the

Soviet Union, especially the FCMA treaty, the cornerstones o f Finnish foreign policy. Trade

relations which could compromise the foreign policy were avoided; war reparations to the

Soviet Union and the conversion o f wartime economy were dominant. (Antola 1989: 55;

Antola and Tuusvuori 1983: 122-124.) In addition to signing bilateral treaties with the

traditional trade partners, such as Sweden and the United Kingdom, Finland signed in 1947

a bilateral trade treaty based on the principle of most favoured nation with the Soviet Union

(Hjerppe 1993: 69). The FCMA treaty with the Soviet Union of 1948, which concerned in

essence the defence of the Finnish territory in order to prevent its use for attack on the Soviet

Union, contained also a mutual commitment not to join alliances directed against the other

party. In addition, it mentioned the Finnish aspiration to keep itself outside the conflicts

between the great powers.

A first instance o f how the FCMA treaty was interpreted in practice was the Finnish rejection

o f the Marshall Plan. Originally, the plan of the United States aimed at facilitating the

reconstruction o f Europe was offered to all European countries, including the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union, however, rejected it, and the Eastern European countries followed this

decision. As the plan therefore came to regard only the Western bloc, it came to be seen in

Finland as associated with the bloc division in Europe and conflicts between the great powers

(see Antola 1991a: 146). Therefore, Finland too rejected the invitation to participate.

However, as a compensation for the lost contribution to the Finnish reconstruction, other

arrangements were made. As Antola notes, both the reparations and the re-establishment of

trade made it important to improve the export capabilities of the Finnish industry, for example

renewing the machinery of the wood processing industry. This necessitated foreign capital.

The United States gave a first loan for this purpose in 1948 and Sweden also granted large

loans. More credit was obtained when Finland joined the IMF and IBRD - even before

Sweden did445 - and despite the fact that the Soviet Union did not join the Bretton Woods

organisations. Moreover, Marshall aid helped Finnish industry indirectly by hastening

445 Finland became member of the IMF in 1948 and of the IBRD in 1949, whereas Sweden joined them only in 1951 (see af Malmborg 1994: 64).

ami

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economic growth and thereby increasing the demand for wood and paper,446 In all, Finland’s

position did in the end not essentially differ from that of other small countries in Western

Europe as far as their relations with Western economic cooperation were concerned. (Antola

and Tuusvuori 1983: 122-124; Hjeippe 1993: 67, 69; Hakovirta 1976: 153.)

In addition, Finland joined the GATT, also characterised by the absence of socialist countries.

The Finnish accession i:i 1950 was motivated by its effects in securing wide, multilateral

markets and letting the Finnish export industry profit in the best possible way from the

increase of economic activities. However, it was also important for Finland that the GATT

agreement gave the possibility o f applying the most favoured nation principle to countries

outside the agreement, that is, to the Soviet Union with which Finland already had a MFN

agreement. (Antola and Tuusvuori 1983: 124-126.)

Nevertheless, there were clear limits for Finnish participation in Western European

cooperation. On the one hand, Finland could not participate in the organisations which

developed more or less directly as a result o f the Marshall Plan, that is, the OEEC/OECD and

the Council of Europe. Neither could Finland take part in the Nordic negotiations of the late

1940s for a Nordic customs union. At the beginning, these negotiations were, in fact, a

response to the pressure from the United States to form regional groupings for qualifying for

Marshall aid (e.g., Nielsson 1978: 288). Finland’s neutrality as excluding projects for

supranational integration (the Council o f Europe as it was originally planned), coordinating

integration (OEEC), and common market integration (Antola and Tuusvuori 1983: 124-126).

Indeed, even the Finnish membership in the Nordic Council and the United Nations were first

hampered by the negative Soviet attitude. Finland had participated in the preparatory work

for the Nordic Council but could not join it from the beginning; the Soviet Union saw the

Council as a tool o f the forces behind NATO. Together with the more general relaxation of

international relations in 1955, however, this view changed and the objections to Finnish

membership were removed. In the same year, Finland also became member of the United

Nations as a result o f an agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union.447 In * 441

446 Muoser (1986: 152) argues that Finland was also given a boost, Zuschuß, from the Marshall funds ($ 500 000) for the export o f wood products to the Federal Republic of Germany.

441 Having been a member of the League of Nations, Finland had applied for UN membership in 1947; the application had, however, met with the veto of the Soviet Union in the Security Council. The Soviet Union linked the approval o f the Finnish membership to the acceptance o f those o f Bulgaria, Rumania and Hungary, which the United States did not wish (e g., Wendt 1981: 368).

307

1956, Finland was able to join the Nordic economic cooperation committee, and the Finnish

national committee for Nordic cooperation was established.

In joining the Nordic Council, the Finnish government made a declaration which aimed at

underlining the compatibility o f the Council membership with Finnish neutrality. According

to this reservation, representatives of Finland should not participate in the discussion if the

Council, against accepted practice, were to discuss military questions or questions which

would lead to adopting a position on conflicts of interest between great powers (Wendt 1981:

35-37, 343-344). Thus secured, active participation in Nordic cooperation assured, in fact,

benefits in both economic and political terms. Antola and Tuusvuori (1983: 126-127) observe

that Nordic cooperation gained an important role in the Finnish economy in the late 1950s,

being the only form of Western economic cooperation Finland could participate in. Close

cooperation with the other Nordic countries, also in the United Nations, strengthened Finland's

international position. As Forsberg and Vaahtoranta (1993: 238) note, Nordic cooperation

constituted a counterforce to the Soviet Union, with the effect o f raising the threshold for the

Soviet Union to exert influence on Finland.

As such, a Nordic orientation was not new for Finland. Already in the 1930s, Finland had

participated in the regular meetings between the Nordic ministers. Political cooperation with

the other Nordic countries was, however, temporarily interrupted: in the period from the

second world war to 1956, Finland could not participate in the meetings of the foreign

ministers (Wendt 1959: 24, 39). Before the war, Finland had also participated in the Oslo

Agreement on economic cooperation, signed in 1930 by Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Belgium,

Luxembourg and the Netherlands (Muoser 1986: 105). Thus, for Finland as well as for other

European countries, the years 1945-1955 entailed a gradual return to multilateral cooperation.

The period o f trade liberalisation (1955-1959)

The late 1950s saw the establishment o f both the EEC and the EFTA. While a membership

in the former was excluded by the Finnish neutrality policy, cooperation with the EFTA

countries was still seen possible. Although Finland had not joined the OEEC, Finnish trade

with Western European countries was liberalised in 1957 with a special Helsinki Protocol

between Finland and the 11 OEEC members. Some 70% of the Finnish imports from Western

Europe became free from import regulation, and the Finnish exports received an equivalent

treatment with those of the other signatories. Finland also participated as an observer in some

of the special committees of the OEEC. (Antola and Tuusvuori 1983: 128; see also Rehn

1993: 186-187.)

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In addition, Finland participated in the Nordic plans o f that period for a Nordic customs

union. Despite the critical moments in the Finnish-Soviet relations linked to the increasing

Finnish interest towards Western integration448, Finland was in 1959 ready for closer economic

cooperation between the Nordic countries. Rather quickly, however, the purely Nordic plans

had been changed into larger European ones, and the other Nordic countries abandoned them

in favour o f EFTA, which was established the same year.

In economic terms, EFTA membership was without doubt attractive for Finland. In fact,

Finnish EFTA membership was not excluded in principle. In a Nordic ministerial meeting in

1959, the Finnish prime minister Sukselainen had alluded to the possibility o f Finland joining

the EFTA together with the other Nordic countries, stating that "...if the plan does not include

political obligations nor provide for supra-national organs Finland is not less interested in this

plan than the other Nordic countries" (cf. Tômudd 1969: 64). Actually, the Finnish minister

for foreign affairs Kaijalainen attended the Stockholm conference where the EFTA agreement

was signed, even though Finland did not formally participate in the negotiations. He also

repeated the Finnish stand that while national interests should be secured in the Western

markets, the Finnish undertakings should not threaten the international position of the country

or the bilateral agreements with the Soviet Union. Thus, Finland could accept agreements on

tariffs and trade with the EFTA countries, but without political obligations and

supranationality. (Antola 1990b: 164, 165.)

Even though EFTA membership could not be seen as too demanding as to political

obligations and supranationality, based as it was on the clear will of the members of

establishing a non-supranational alternative to EEC integration, Finland could not join the

organisation. Finnish EFTA membership was hampered by the attitudes of both the Soviet

Union and the United Kingdom. The former expressed doubts about the possible negative

effects of such participation in closed economic groupings on the Finnish-Soviet trade (Pravda

July 19, 1959, quoted in Helsirtgin Sanomat the next day). The latter opposed Finnish

membership as it would have triggered several new membership requests and further

complications in the negotiations. (Hakovirta 1976: 200-202; afMalmborg 1994: 381-383.)449

448 ji iThe so-called 'night frost crisis' was perhaps a result not only of economic reorientation and increasing

links to the Nordic countries and the 'group of seven', but also of Soviet suspicions concerning Finnish domestic politics (Antola and Tuusvuori 1983: 129-130), the increasing NATO activities since 1957, the remilitarisation of Germany and the establishment of the EEC (Maude 1976: 18).

449 Quoting Helsingin Sanomat, Hakovirta claims that the United Kingdom never admitted being a hindrance to Finnish membership.

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Delineation o f a Finnish free trade policy (1960-1972)

In order to benefit from EFTA cooperation, it was important for Finland to organise its

relations with EFTA in a way which would not hamper trade with the Soviet Union. On the

other hand, the EFTA members were suspicious about the effects of the Finnish-Soviet free

trade in combination with a Finnish EFTA membership. Both parties therefore preferred a

special solution in the form of an association agreement between Finland and EFTA, the so-

called FINEFTA agreement, which was signed in 1960.

The fact that EFTA had other neutral members as well has been mentioned as a factor

rendering the FINEFTA agreement possible; the majority o f the then members, however,

belonged to NATO. In fact, it was considered important not to adopt the text o f the

Stockholm convention as such to the FINEFTA treaty. While the FINEFTA treaty includes

all the stipulations concerning trade and economy • with the exception of a slower reduction

o f duties and the right for import restrictions for certain products (appendices I and II) - an

exception o f a more political nature was constituted by the omission in FINEFTA o f the

allusions to economic arrangements between the Western European countries, that is, the aim

of developing relations to the EEC. In all, the association responded to needs o f Finnish wood

and paper exporters. The Finnish home market industry was given a period of protection

because of its weak competitive capacities, and the bilateral trade with East could be

continued without disturbances, while agriculture was adequately protected. (Antola and

Tuusvuori 1983: 131-135, Antola 1991a: 148-149.) Moreover, FINEFTA agreement gave

Finland in practice the rights o f an EFTA member. Although FINEFTA was conceived as an

autonomous organisation with an own joint council, Finland also had an observer in personal

capacity in the Council of EFTA (Hakovirta 1976: 219), and from 1968 onwards, the councils

o f EFTA and FINEFTA met at the same time so that in some cases, Finland could even be

outvoted ("majorisiert") (Muoser 1986: 181).

Finally, the FINEFTA treaty was balanced with a simultaneous Finnish-Soviet agreement

about customs reductions (Antola and Tuusvuori 1983: 136) which helped improve the

relations with the Soviet Union. In fact, the 'Finnish paradox', as stated by president Kekkonen

in October 1961, was that the better Finland succeeded in maintaining the confidence o f the

Soviet Union in Finland as a peaceful neighbour, the better were the Finnish opportunities for

close co-operation with the countries o f the Western world (Jansson 1973: 23).

Manifestly, these opportunities increased in the 1960s. The Finnish decision to join the OECD

in 1968, even though it actually only formalised the existing practice of participation in the

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work of the organisation, can be seen as an intentional further strengthening o f the Western

direction in Finnish integration policy. Again, the economic benefits o f the membership,

growing possibilities to influence trade and economic policies and improved access to

information - together with the additional motivation o f strengthening the country's

international status - were secured by a special declaration by the Finnish government in

joining the organisation about the intention not to commit itself to anything contrary to its

foreign and defence politics and neutrality. In addition, it was stated that the membership

would not limit Finland's possibilities to develop trade relations with countries outside the

organisation. (Antola and Tuusvuori 1983: 142-143; Muoser 1986: 155.)

Antola and Tuusvuori note that Finnish neutrality policy acquired a new interpretation in the

late 1960s. In the time of the FINEFTA agreement, neutrality had still been seen as setting

limits to Finnish possibilities o f action in Western European integration. However, from now

on, it was understood that neutrality gave the possibility even of having an active role in

promoting economic integration in Europe. While previously economic and political

integration had been closely connected, it was now realized that it was important to keep them

separate in order to allow for both participation and neutrality. Thereby, the Finnish

interpretation moved closer to that of the other neutral states. (Antola and Tuusvuori 1983:

139.)AS0 Finland still stayed outside what it saw as political integration and, thus, outside the

Council o f Europe. However, it participated increasingly in its activities and obtained in 1964

a special right for observer status in all the organs under the ministerial committee whenever

the Finnish government so wished, while the status o f observer was normally obtained only

through invitation (Serenius 1976: 39).

Political commitments seemed no longer completely excluded from Finnish integration policy.

In fact, Finland participated in drafting the treaty for a Nordic customs union, NORDEK,

which was intended to have also clear political implications. The NORDEK draft contained

provisions including harmonisation of legislation in a broad range of issues from economic

policy and regulations on the introduction o f common tariffs towards countries outside EFTA

to agriculture, labour market and competition rules. It also contained the establishment of a

Nordic Council o f Ministers which had the right o f making binding decisions and of the

4W President Kekkonen stated in 1967 that integration and neutrality were not to be regarded as mutually exclusive alternatives, while prime minister Koivisto stated in a Nordic prime ministers' meeting in Oslo 1968 that neutral countries had a constructive role to play in economic integration. Thus, a verbal policy similar to that of other neutral countries was used. (Hakovirta 1976: 230-231; Tômudd 1969: 68.) Hakovirta even claims that neutrality actually required participation in the West European cooperation to be credible (Hakovirta 1976: 302).

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NORDEK secretariat, which was to receive no instructions from national authorities, being

actually comparable to the EEC commission. (Wendt 1981: 125-129; Solem 1977: 83.)

NORDEK was seen to strengthen the Finnish position vis-à-vis the developments in the EEC.

Soon after the establishment of EFTA, in fact, the United Kingdom - the most important trade

partner - had applied for EEC membership, followed by Denmark and Norway. Thus, the

question o f the relations between EFTA and the EEC as well as the proper position for

Finland was far from being settled. As Antola and Tuusvuori put it, the blurring o f the

boundary between common market integration and free trade integration was a particularly

intricate problem for Finland. In the late 1960s, the Finnish policy was to support the

development of economic cooperation in Europe between all the three organisations, EFTA,

EEC and CMEA (Antola and Tuusvuori 1983: 137, 139-140, 247-250). While for Denmark

in particular, the NORDEK draft was a bridge to the EEC, Finland stressed the value of

Nordic cooperation in itself; it was important for Finland that NORDEK be kept separate from

the EEC.

Tomudd (1969: 70-71) notes that the question of the Finnish relations to the EEC appeared

quite complex. The possibility o f membership was not totally rejected; the national scene was

characterised by lack o f agreement on the meaning of the 'political* nature of the EEC and the

political implications of membership or association.451 Moreover, there was at first hardly any

public debate; Tômudd argues that the government deliberately avoided stimulating debate

by not divulging studies made by the authorities on Finnish relations with the EEC.

As a way o f assuring that this renewed interest towards Western integration would not harm

the relations with the Soviet Union - or, ”in order to remove any possible doubt about the

consistency of our policy*'452 - the FCMA treaty was renewed in 1970, five years before it was

due to expire. This notwithstanding, the Finnish integration policy suffered some setbacks.

First, as the possibilities of Danish and Norwegian EEC membership had considerably

improved, it no longer seemed evident that the NORDEK treaty could be kept sufficiently 4

4il Interestingly, Tomudd refers to some potentially self-fulfilling estimations, observing that the government can make predictions which are both plausible and favourable from the Finnish point of view - c.g., when it predicts that "continued integration will be compatible with a policy of neutrality", "neutral countries will have a constructive role in future European integration", "it is inconceivable that tariff barriers could be re-established between the Nordic countries" and that "an enlargement of EEC is improbably at the present time and will have to wait". If these statements can help to shape actual developments accordingly, TOmudd adds, they are obviously useful elements in Finnish integration policy.

452 President Kekkonen in Washington on July 23, 1970, quoted by Miljan 1977: 261-262.

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apart from the EEC to allow for a Finnish membership. In fact, Finland declared that if one

of the Nordic countries were to begin membership negotiations with the EEC, Finland would

leave the negotiations on NORDEK; similarly, if some of them would join the EEC after the

treaty was signed, Finland required the possibility not to apply the whole agreement. Finally,

in March 1970 when the NORDEK treaty was ready for approval, the Finnish government

announced that Finland could not sign the treaty453. (Antola and Tuusvuori 1983: 144-146.)

This, however, did not mean a halt in Finnish integration policy. On the one hand, Nordic

cooperation was given a firmer and politically more important character: even though

NORDEK did not materia'ise as such, much of its contents did, including the Council of

Ministers. On the other hand, negotiations on a free trade agreement between Finland and the

EEC were started on a Finnish initiative as early as in the spring 1970. Once again, the

Finnish aim was to avoid possible discrimination and isolation while maintaining neutrality,

Soviet trade, EFT A free trade, Nordic cooperation and its international agreements, especially

GATT. Thus, in comparison to Sweden which was ready to discuss all possible areas of

cooperation, Finland intended to stay outside the EEC economic policy, agreeing only on the

removal o f duties for industrial products. In all, the treaty should not limit economic or

political sovereignty or decision-making capacity, being compatible with neutrality and not

infringing upon the doctrine of foreign policy. (Hakovirta 1976: 290.) The free trade

agreement was initialled already on July 22, 1972, but a second setback occurred in that the

Finnish government decided temporarily to postpone signing the agreement. The treaty was

finally signed on October 5, 1973, and entered into force at the beginning o f 1974. Finland

also signed an agreement with the European Coal and Steel Community which entered in

force a year later.

Maintaining a broad integration system (1973-late 1980s)

The essential contents of the Finnish free trade treaty with the EEC were the gradual removal

of duties for industrial products and agreement of not creating new import duties. The

exceptions included the question of quantitative restrictions on fuel and fertilisers and the

protection of weak industries for both parties. Finland could also retain the restrictions

concerning payments and credits which it had in the OECD. Moreover, the Finnish free trade

agreement did not include the so-called evolution or development clause (art. 32) which meant

that Finland was committed only to the free trade treaty, not to possible future extension or

4H The reason was Soviet opposition; according to the formulation used by the government, the treaty corresponded to Finnish aspirations, but it did not fulfil the demands of stability and permanence.

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intensification o f relations with the EC. (Antola and Tuusvuori 1983: 147-156; Antola 1991a:

H 9 .r

In order to make it acceptable both internally and in terms o f foreign policy, the free trade

agreement was accompanied by protective legislative measures against possible harmful

effects of free trade and by parallel measures taken in trade with the socialist countries. These

measures consisted in a special system of bilateral treaties on the reciprocal removal of

barriers to trade with the socialist countries other than the Soviet Union - the so-called

KEVSOS treaties which had scarce practical significance (Antola 1991a: 149; Hjerppe 1993:

71) - and a cooperation agreement with the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance

(CMEA). In addition, a bilateral trade agreement was signed ensuring the Soviet Union an

equal treatment with the EEC countries on the Finnish market. (Hakovirta 1976: 290; Antola

and Tuusvuori 1983: 156-157; Antola 1989: 56-57.)

EFTA soon came to be seen as a suitable means in the Finnish integration policy. It had

shown to be less temporary than had perhaps been thought, and it became a useful forum for

consultations in international economic relations such as common preparations for the

Kennedy Round o f GATT. Since 1965, Finland had been participating in internal EFTA

discussions on European integration (Tomudd 1969: 67). In the 1970s, EFTA was

strengthened and it developed relations to countries outside the free trade area, becoming

increasingly an actor of its own (Antola and Tuusvuori 1983: 97-103).455 Finland was in

favour of both enlargement and deepening, being ready also for the development of free trade

and relations with the EEC in the limits of neutrality; the EEC relations were to be based on

own agreements and decision-making. (Antola and Tuusvuori 1983: 157-158; Antola 1991a:

149.)

In fact, the Finnish integration policy was shifting from special arrangements to an EFTA-

based approach. In this development, the Luxembourg meeting between EFTA and the EC

in 1984 constituted an important further step. In 1985, Finland became a full EFTA member

4M The authors note that Finland thereby succeeded in organising its relations to the Community on the basis of mere free trade, and not of common market integration; they attribute this success to partly to the favourable conditions created by the climate of détente and the fact that the other neutrals too opted for a free trade agreement instead of membership.

w By the 1990s, the results of this development were clearly visible. By 1993, EFTA had signed eight free trade agreements with third countries (e.g., Hungary) and a cooperation declaration with the 11 countries of Central and Eastern Europe, while the Baltic countries had asked for negotiations on association. (Press release from EFTA ministerial meeting in Geneva, June 15-16, 1993, quoted in Eurooppakirje 4/93.)

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• something that in practice did not entail any departures from its previous status as associate

member (Muoser 1986: 182-183). The Finnish reservations regarding the political nature of

the organisation and its relations to the EC were no longer particularly relevant. According

to the new Finnish "EFTA-card policy", EFTA should be the main tool in the integration

policy of its members; a strengthened EFTA was seen to be in the interests of all o f them as

a way of sharing costs and reducing the threat of marginalisation. (Antola 1991a: 149-150;

see also Government report 1988.) Finland was assuming an active role in the promotion of

economic cooperation (cf. Antola 1989: 61-62).

The end o f the cold war and the EEA

Towards the 1990s, full participation was visibly replacing neutrality as a means o f Finnish

integration policy. Throughout the latter part of the 1980s, there had been signs o f change in

the way neutrality was interpreted. Although no political aspects of integration had officially

been taken up, practical informal integration and cooperation with the EC had increased, and

this informal participation involved even elements of political cooperation.

The formal avoidance of political commitments notwithstanding, Finland had in reality been

participating in European cooperation on a broad front. Nordic cooperation kept Finland in

pace with the larger developments, facilitating, subsequently, also the EEA and the EU

membership (cf. Temmes 1995). The individual ministries participated through direct contacts

increasingly in the coordinative integration both in the OECD and in the Council o f Europe.

In fact, without even being observer, Finland had participated in and hosted from 1963

onwards meetings and projects o f the Council of Europe on the initiative of the member states

(Antola and Tuusvuori 1983: 229-240); Finland joined the Council in 1989.

As regards the EEC, Finland had been rather slow in developing its relations in comparison

to, e.g., Sweden, limiting the agreements with the EC to trade issues (Antola 1989: 60). Yet,

the EEC's importance for Finland was recognised, and Finland accredited an ambassador to

the EEC as early as in 1964 (Antola and Tuusvuori 1983: 138). Finland joined the EC’s

cooperation programme for high technology (EUREKA) in 1985, the year it was established,

despite the potential political implications o f such cooperation, and pursued additional bilateral

agreements with the EC to supplement the free trade agreement (Antola 1991a: 150 and

1991b: 17-18). Both economically and politically, the importance of participation was

recognised. National business leaders were increasingly aware o f the necessity of establishing

their companies in the European market. In the mid-1980s, the economic elite was tacitly

using the 'exit option', investing in Europe, and was becoming largely independent o f the

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political leadership (Vâyiynen 1993: 35,43-44). At the same time, also the ’political dialogue*

between Finland and the EC began. From 1988 onwards, meetings of a joint committee with

the Commission were held at the level o f heads of political departments of the ministers for

foreign affairs, then at ministerial level. In 1988, Finland invited the Community to open a

mission in Helsinki. (Antola 1989: 60; Eurooppa 27.10.1992, p. 5-6).

The margins o f interpreting the requirements of a policy o f neutrality had visibly grown

larger. On the one hand, the Soviet attitude towards Western European integration was

changing in the 1980s.456 Hakovirta observes how the Soviet posture developed from intense

hostility to occasional mild criticism, selective positive commentary and indications o f own

interest for cooperation, even participation457. Consequently, he argues, the control o f the

'acceptable limits of neutrality' remained increasingly in the hands of the neutrals themselves.

On the other hand, the EC was also changing its view on neutrality. Previously, the

unwillingness o f the EEC to let the neutral countries select some economic benefits of

membership without sharing the economic responsibilities and political goals of the ordinary

members had limited the relations of the neutral countries to the EEC. The United States was

also negative towards such special conditions.458 Hakovirta argues that the EC came to expect

a flexible, 'Irish-type' interpretation of neutrality: no-one claimed that neutrality would be an

obstacle to membership, provided a suitable interpretation was given. (Hakovirta 1976: 117;

1987: 268, 270-271.)

In fact, the Finnish prime minister and the minister for foreign affairs asserted in the autumn

of 1987 that participation in West European integration no longer was part o f the Finnish

policy of neutrality. In other words, neutrality was redefined as no longer affecting integration

4 6 Soviet criticism had not been directed solely towards Finnish participation in European integration, but towards the process in general; Muoser (1986: 177) alludes to the opinions the Soviet Union communicated to other Scandinavian countries and the notes it sent to the (future) EEC member states in 1957 criticising the EEC for being an economic basis for NATO and EURATOM for being an instrument for German rearmament; in the Soviet view, EEC was dominated by capitalist monopoly, it had neocolonialist intentions through the association treaties, and polarised trade for the disadvantage of third parties (idem: 194).

4)7 Although the Soviet Union had recognised the diplomatic capacity of the EC already in the CSCE conference of 1975 where Italy signed in the name of the organisation (Iloniemi 1990: 98), a real turning point in the EC-Soviet relations was a basic treaty signed in 1988 on the relations between the EC and the CMEA; on this occasion, the Soviet Union officially recognised the EC (Antola 1990a: 116). An economic frame treaty between the EC and the Soviet Union was signed in 1989 (Appendix 1992: 33).

4iS Hakovirta quotes the EFTA Bulletin (XII, No. 9, p. 3) according to which the United States sent in November 1971 a note warning the EEC not to conclude trade relations discriminating the US with countries unwilling to join the EEC as full members.

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policy; consequently, it did not hamper the deepening o f Finnish participation. In practice,

increasing integration with the West was no longer seen to necessitate parallel measures with

the East. However, it was still emphasised that integration should not undermine the

possibilities of autonomous decision-making - domestic autonomy was considered necessary

to maintain good relations with the Soviet Union (Vâyrynen 1993: 36). From the maintenance

of a broad integration system, thus, Finland openly concentrating its participation on the

Western European scene. This new stand got a confirmation from the Soviet Union in 1989,

when it stated that it was Finland's own matter to decide on its attitude towards EC

membership (cf. Rehn 1993: 205). In all, neutrality came to be reduced to a narrow field of

security and military policy, but also in a geographical sense through the notion of 'neutrality

in the neighbouring regions’. (Môttôlà 1993: 90-95, 101; cf. Tômudd 1995: 91, 93.)459 460

In this changed environment, the plan to establish a European Economic Area (EEA) between

the members of EFTA and the EC, presented in 1989; suited the Finnish policy particularly

well. First, it was designed so as to allow for neutral states' full participation in the common

market without having to accept the political aims of the Community. In fact, the Finnish

support for the EEA was seen as a logical outcome o f the Finnish EFTA-policy. It was also

a fitting compromise in that it excluded the sensitive areas of agriculture and foreign policy

while meeting the needs of business to gain access on an equal basis to the EC's internal

market. In fact, the EEA agreement met practically no political resistance in Finland, in

contrast to Norway and Switzerland. (Antola 1991a: 150-151; Vâyrynen 1993: 39.) Secondly,

it brought the eventual EC membership much closer as the agreement implied the acceptance

of a large part of the acquis communautaire. In fact, it seemed to be clear almost from the

outset that there were practically no hindrances to a full Finnish EC membership, either. From

an eager supporter o f the EEA agreement, Finland thus very soon passed, together with the

other EFTA members, to the preparation o f membership application.

The EEA negotiations began in the autumn o f 1989 and the treaty was signed in May 1992,

coming into force on January 1, 1994.m The EEA agreement involves equal participation of

459 Cf. the Finnish terra lahialuepuolueettomuus. 'Neighbouring regions' can be seen as denoting above all relations to Russia. These relations acquired a new basis when the FCMA treaty was replaced by a treaty with Russia in January 1992, based on the principles of the United Nations and CSCE (MflttOla 1993: 95-97).

460 The European Court of Justice first rejected the agreement because o f the planned common EEA court, which was seen to be against the Rome Treaty, or, as Cremona puts it, threatening the autonomy of the Community legal order: the interpretation of Community law would have been affected by decisions o f the EEA court, which was not bound to follow decisions of the Court of Justice handed down after the signature of the agreement. Therefore, a separate EFTA court was created with jurisdiction solely on EFTA states. (Cremona

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the EFTA countries in the 'four freedoms' and cooperation in other areas, such as

environment, education, research and development. It contains the EU legislation adopted

before August 1, 1991. Subsequent legislation having impact on the operation of the EEA,

that is, concerning the internal market, is successively added to the EEA norms in order to

maintain a homogeneous and dynamic economic area.

Considering that the EEA agreement entails a considerable part o f the acquis communautaire,

its unproblematic acceptance in Finland clearly shows both the compatibility o f the acquis

with the Finnish legislation, and, above all, the efficiency o f the preceding informal

adjustment o f Finnish norms to those o f the EC, which took place in part in the fora of

Nordic cooperation. Together with the economic contents, also the political part o f the

agreement was quite acceptable. Indeed, a declaration was given in which the members o f EU

and EFTA expressed their will to strengthen the political dialogue in foreign policy aiming

at closer relations in areas of mutual importance. However, security and defence were kept

outside the treaty. At the same time, the EEA implied that political dialogue between the

EFTA countries began (Eurooppa 27.10.1992, pp. 5*6). An EFTA court was established, and

the EEA also imposed a much stricter regime in competition policy than in the earlier free

trade agreements with the EC, enforced by the European Commission and the new EFTA

surveillance authority (Cremona 1994: 512-513).

However, the EEA came to be viewed as a temporary solution already in the course o f the

negotiations. In Finland, intensive discussions about EC membership started in the beginning

o f 1990. While Austria had applied for EC membership in 1989, before the initiation o f the

formal negotiations, Sweden applied in 1991 and Finland and Norway in 1992.

In essence, the problem of the envisaged EEA arrangement was that the members of EFTA

and EC were not based on an equal footing. In comparison to EC membership, the

membership of the EEA gave fewer possibilities to influence the EC norms. In the creation

and modification of community norms, EFTA members had only the right of being informed

and participating in the preparatory work, while the EU Commission had the monopoly o f

initiative. Thus, Finland could in the EEA influence the contents o f EC law only indirectly

and with the support of the other EFTA countries. In addition, although Finland had the

possibility to hinder unacceptable decisions and impede the adoption o f new norms, doing this

in practice could lead to pressure from the other EC/EFTA states, perhaps also to the partial

annulation o f the treaty. (Appendix 1992: 103-104; cf. Eurooppa 27.10.1992, p. 18; EFTA

Bulletin 1/94, esp. p. 6-7; EFTA News 1/1994.) In fact, the EEA was drafted in order not to

1994: 514-516; EFTA Bulletin 1/94: 11.)

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require amendments of the EC treaty nor to threaten the institutions o f the Community.

Therefore, consultation with the EFTA states had not been made a formal part in the process

o f adaptation of Community legislation (Cremona 1994: 512).

The government, having first favoured the strengthening of EFTA (Government report 1988),

emphasised increasingly participation in the EC integration process. In its report o f 1990, the

government stressed the economic benefits of the possible EEA agreement while noting the

negative consequences which remaining outside would have. (Cf. Antola 1991a: 151-153.) In

March 1992, however, the EEA phase had come to an end: in declaring to the parliament its

intention to apply for EC membership, the government stated that there was a risk for the

EEA being only temporary. Therefore, the Finnish interests seemed best secured by EC

membership. Politically, participation in the EC decision-making was considered essential. As

for the Finnish economy, equal opportunities with the competitors were vital. Integration was

also seen to contribute to sound economy. (Government report 1992; Eurooppa-tietoa

153/1994; Himanen 1993: 27.) The immediate reason for the application was the precedent

Swedish application which caused fears for worsened position for Finnish export industry (cf.

Salovaara 1993: 36-37). Net only economic arguments were used in favour of membership:

also the effect o f strengthening the image or international identity of Finland as a Western

country and strengthening the security o f the state through increased capability o f influence

and commitment to mutual solidarity were mentioned (Himanen 1993: 29-30; Eurooppa

30.10.1992; Môttôlâ 1993: 98-100).

Finally, increasing informal integration o f the Finnish economic and political system to the

Community had been paving the way to membership, realised in 1995. In practice, Finland

had been adjusting its policies to membership in several ways. Among the many examples,

the full liberalisation of capital movements, first step towards economic and monetary union,

had been undertaken in Finland simultaneously with the Community, in July 1990 (Eurooppa-

tietoa 153/1994: 13). In 1991-1992, the convergence criteria o f Maastricht became the

guidelines for the economic policy o f the Finnish government (Vâyrynen 1993: 44-45); in

June 1991, the Finnish markka was bound to the ecu (Lempiâinen 1994: 144). The legislative

harmonisation needed for EC membership had also been under way both as a result of the

EEA negotiations and as a part of adaptation by the single countries and the Nordic countries

together in matters such as foreign ownership (see Hjerppe 1993: 73). In foreign policy,

Finland voted since the early 1980s very much in line with the EC members in the UN

general assembly (Salovaara 1994: 24).

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5.2.3 The implications o f membership

During the cold war, neutrality had been a means which allowed Finland to further its central

aims in relation to integration: being able to participate and, thus, not risking the exclusion

from decision-making, while, at the same time, being able to defend its own important

interests. Towards the 1990s, neutrality was no longer needed to make the Finnish

participation possible. Indeed, neutrality was even becoming a burden in that it could be

interpreted in a way which questioned the Finnish willingness fully to share the duties and

rights of participation. During the membership negotiations, this view was forwarded quite

clearly. It was noted that neutrality was not a value in itself, but a means in realizing national

interests. Quoting Jacobson, Lempiainen (1994: 160) argues that after the cold war, neutrality

no longer widened the possibilities for action, but narrowed them, thereby losing its original

function. Similarly, the undersecretary of state Jaakko Blomberg asserted that the old principle

according to which one should not rely on receiving help from the others is suspicious in

today's world: it gives the idea that Finland acts alone without taking into consideration the

interests of the Community, thereby jeopardising the support and the stabilising effect the

Community membership can provide for Finland as a neighbour to Russia.46'

Once EU membership became politically possible for Finland, it was also understood that

while membership was an outstandingly efficient way to further Finnish interests, and that an

efficient EU would serve these interests particularly well. As an EU member, Finland can

directly influence decision-making and so can contribute to questions concerning the

development of the Union, even the policies of the other member states. This attitude has

become increasingly clear after the membership462, but it was visible already in the

negotiations where Finland did not make any exceptions or restrictions in adhering, but

accepted the acquis communautaire, the Treaty on European Union and the fmalité politique

as such. * 461

461 In Joensuu on February 11, 1993; quoted in Eurooppa 1/93. - Cf. Antola 1991a: 157.

461 Judging from the Finnish position in the IGC, Finland is ready for a reduction of unanimity in favour of majority decisions to increase effectiveness, as it is for an improved position of the Commission and the Court in matters of justice and home affairs, or internal security. However, Finland clearly docs not aim at a. federation, it underlines the possibility of opting out when vital national interests so require. (Antola in Ifetsingin Sanomat, March 8, 1996.) Even though Finland does not associate itself with some of the small member states, notably the Benelux, which emphasise the need to pursue federative, supranational arrangements as a way of having real influence on the more powerful partners, it is also in Finland's interests to be a part of an effective and strong union, which is, however, intergovernmental in nature with respect to foreign and security policy (cf. TOmudd 1995: 98). Thus, Finland did not confirm the expectations that other Nordic countries would, as EU members, follow Denmark's minimalism (cf. Laursen 1993).

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The Finnish government admitted that membership would reduce the freedom o f action and

the capacities o f the state due to, in particular, the primacy and direct applicability o f EC law

and EC's capacity to enter into international agreements which partly deprives the state of this

capacity, and that leaving the EC could in practice prove impossible. Nevertheless, it was seen

that Finland as a member could pursue its own policies more efficiently than before:

membership would be a stronger means o f enforcement and it would also increase the

importance o f Finland to other EC countries. In trade, Finland as member would carry out the

national trade policy in the framework o f EC membership, benefitting from the EC which, as

a great power in trade policy, can effectively defend the interests o f its members.

(Government report 1992, esp. 10, 12; Appendix 1992: 101, 104, 108.)

Further, as the government pointed out, membership would not change the essential aims of

Finnish foreign and security policy, either. Neutrality policy, now restricted to military and

security matters only, and defined as military non-alliance and credible independent defence,

was to be continued. Instead of being a hindrance to political cooperation, neutrality aims at

- as the government expressed it - furthering international cooperation, avoiding involvement

in a European conflict and furthering stability in Northern Europe. Further, the government

also emphasised continuity in the relations with the Eastern countries and the importance of

Nordic cooperation. Developing neighbour relations with Russia, strengthening the Nordic

community and the creation of Baltic Sea cooperation would contribute to the aim o f stability

and security in Northern Europe. 'Nordicity' was seen as one o f the cornerstones o f Finnish

national Eigenart and international position. Therefore, it was important for Finland to

continue and develop Nordic foreign and security policy cooperation between the governments

and in the Nordic Council, anchored to European security structures and aiming at

safeguarding Nordic values in Europe. (Government report 1992: 5, 10, 25; Appendix 1992:

34, 36.)463

It could be argued that this view on the consequences of membership is somewhat over-

optimistic in that the effectiveness of the Union, majority decisions and strong common

institutions actually contradict the claimed possibilities o f furthering own particular interests

and continuing traditional policies. Several instances could be found in the very process of

enlargement which depict the EU in rather demanding terms on this point. For example, the

principles laid down before the enlargement on relations with third countries aim at securing 461

461 Cf. TOmudd (1995: 101-102) who sees as the elements of continuity in Finnish integration policy - and as elements which give an own profile for its security policy - neutrality, an emphasis on the nation state, the Nordic relations and relations to Russia.

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the integrity of the Community by stating that no area o f cooperation should be excluded a

priori, that integration within the Community had absolute priority over any agreements with

third countries, that the decision-making autonomy of the Community must be safeguarded

and that cooperation with the EFTA countries should be based on 'real reciprocity' in all areas

(COM (85)206, COM (86)298, quoted in Pedersen 1991: 118). Similarly, in the EEA

agreement, the position of the Court of Justice and the autonomy of the legal system o f the

Community was defende d against the influence of EFTA states (see footnote 460, page 316).

The EC further required in the course o f the EEA negotiations the acceptance of the acquis

communautaire with at most temporary exceptions and emergency clauses (see Pedersen 1991 :

137-138).

In fact, the EC position seemed hardly less demanding in the membership negotiations.

Particularly in the case of foreign and security policy, the Commission464 questioned the

compatibility of Finnish neutrality policy with the full acceptance o f the foreign policy o f the

Union, including defence of the independence and security of the Union and development

towards common defence. It questioned the credibility o f the Finnish assurances

recommending specific and binding assurances on the political commitment and legal capacity

of the country to fulfil its obligations in this field. In fact, the provisions concerning common

foreign and security policy in the Maastricht Treaty seem to imply that the new member states

have to accept the common positions in foreign and security policy, eventually also in

defence, having to renounce the possibility of formulating separate foreign policies. In fact,

a joint declaration to this effect was given in the end of the membership negotiations by the

EU member states and the applying countries stating that the new members have to be ready

and capable of participating fully and actively in the CFSP from the very beginning, o f

accepting its contents without reservations, and of supporting the prevailing policies at the

time of entering the Union.465

Nevertheless, the understanding o f the compatibility between own interests, even neutrality,

and the CFSP prevailed. The discussions and the opinions expressed by the EU member

countries and by the Commission indeed enhanced the view that membership would not imply

464 Opinion on the Finnish membership application, November 4, 1992; Bulletin o f the European Communities, supplement 6/92.

465 Ministerial meeting on December 21, 1993; see Eurooppa 1/1994, Helsingin Sanomat 17.12.1993 and 22.12.1993.

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any particular difficulties o f adaptation.466 As stressed by the Finnish government, the common

foreign policy is formulated on the basis o f unanimity or essential common interests, and the

(thus far only envisaged) common defence policy will be based on the respect for the national

security and defence policies of the member countries. Moreover, the Maastricht Treaty allows

for special bilateral or multilateral treaties between the members and commitments such as

those stemming from NATO membership. It is also remarked that Austria and Sweden see

military non-alignment as compatible with the treaty. (Government report 1992; Appendix

1992: 3 5-3 7. )467

In fact, according to the Maastricht Treaty, the aim of the CFSP is to strengthen the security

of the Union and o f the member states and to safeguard the common values, fundamental

interests, independence and security of the Union (art. J .l). These are rather abstract notions

and reducible to the safeguarding of the interests o f the members. As it is the European

Council which defines the principles and general guidelines of the CFSP, deciding what issues

shall be included under joint action and defining a common position whenever the Council

deems it necessary (art. J.2), the member governments can be seen as the major agents of

systems transformation in this field (Petersen 1993: 20-23). Accession to the CFSP thus

implies above all the possibility of participating in decisions about its contents. In fact, the

Finnish government frequently alluded to the benefits of becoming member before the

intergovernmental conference of 1996 in allowing for participation in shaping the policies. In

addition to active participation in the development of the common foreign and security policy,

466 The minister for foreign affairs Vâyiynen in the parliament as a response to a question on negotiation goals, March 9, 1993, quoted in Eurooppa 9.3.1993. - The problems encountered in the negotiations did not reflect the apparent difference between the principles of Finnish integration policy and the character of the EU, but, instead, more concrete and practical matters, in particular agriculture and regional policy. This could be seen as a portrait o f the Union itself; hypothetically, one could deduce from the centrality of agriculture and regional politics in the negotiations that they also represent, for the time being, the most essential part both of national decision making or sovereignty and of the European Union.

467 The Maastricht provisions for the CFSP establish systematic cooperation between member states and joint action (art. J.l). Joint action, the goal or target o f the CFSP, is more ambitious and binding and includes the possibility of majority voting, but it is confined to areas in which the member states have important interests in common (art. J .l,3). Moreover, the Council's decision on majority voting must be unanimous. Issues with defence implications shall not be subject to the procedure o f joint action (art.2 J.4), and the policy of the Union shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain member states and shall respect the obligations of certain member states under the North Atlantic Treaty and be compatible with it (art. J.4).

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Finland also assured its readiness to contribute constructively to the development o f the

defence dimension of the Union.468

In addition, adaptation to the CFSP causes few problems not only because o f its thus far

limited range - it comprises a few questions o f general common interest such as democracy

in South Africa, on which the Finnish position is already similar (cf. T6mudd 1995: 103) -

but also because its particular interests in the field have in practice been acknowledged.

Nordic cooperation serves here as a useful example. In the EE A, a declaration was made

about the continuation o f Nordic cooperation after the entering into force of the treaty. While

this declaration might have seemed rather weak in that it posed on Nordic cooperation the

condition of not impairing the good functioning of the agreement (article 121, part IX), the

actual strength of the Nordic acquis is shown by the fact that the EU accepted the condition

o f the Nordic member states of acceding to the Schengen treaty only if the Nordic non-

members could also associate themselves to the treaty.

In all, the Finnish foreign policy might not have been the actual target of the Commission's

urge to compliance; rather, what was aimed at was neutrality in general, the most difficult

case among the neutral applicants being Austria. Actually, the fact the avis on the Swedish

and Finnish applications are almost identical as to foreign and security policy makes the

Commission's view appear more one of principle than one pointing to a concrete problem.

One could see the part of the negotiations concerning foreign policy as a tossing of the coin

o f the critical definitions which both sides actually want to avoid. While the Commission asks

for specification of Finnish foreign and security policy in order to ascertain its compatibility

with the CFSP, Finland, in declaring in turn its willingness to accept all the contents o f the

EU is, in a way, asking for a specification o f what this 'all' actually is - a question which

hardly could be answered without intense debates.

In this light, the negotiations between Finland and the EU can be seen as part of a special

rhetoric; the specific assurances about common foreign policy can be used to add credibility

to the Union by giving some authority and weight to the Maastricht provisions. This was

particularly visible in the declaration of December 1993 (see above) which was seemingly

strict but which, in the end, was made less demanding than the original EU position according

468 Minister for foreign trade, Pertti Salolainen, in the ministerial meeting opening the conferences of the accession of Austria, Sweden and Finland in Brussels, February 1, 1993; quoted in Eurooppa 1/93. - As to defence policy, the official stand has been that no alternatives are in principle excluded in its development (cf. MOttOla 1993: 101).

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to which the applying countries were to declare that they would accept not only all existing

but also all potential rights and duties deriving from the foreign and defence policy. This idea

was subsequently abandoned since it would have meant that the new member states would

have had to accept more obligations than the original members.

Thus, the contradiction which Antola (1991a: 155) points out between Finnish aims of

simultaneously guaranteeing access to real influence, possibility o f some opting-out and the

retention o f a meaningful role by the national institutions, notably the parliament and the

president, does not seem to be a real contradiction. The process o f integration actually builds

on a combination o f these elements: it cannot thrive without taking the participant's goals and

interests into account. In essence, the EU accommodates different views about the process and

the institutions and reflects the needs o f the participants.469 All of them - including the

common institutions - bring their views to the process, with sometimes even a competition

for influence. What the 'meaningful role o f national institutions’ is, then, changes little by

little; it can be seen as a part of the natural adaptation or adjustments which form the actual

implications of membership.

This adaptation as such is nothing new or particular for Finland. In the above, several

examples were given on how Finland has adapted to different forms o f international

cooperation and how it has, at the same time, influenced them through its policies, as when

it sought to limit the possible harmful effects of participation by special reservations and

conditions, such as the declarations in Nordic Council and OECD. Nordic cooperation, in

particular, has for a long time been an additional dimension in Finnish policy-making,

legislation and international activities. Now that also the EU constitutes such a dimension, the

similarities between the contents o f the two may facilitate the Finnish adaptation to EU

integration.470

469 The need to accommodate particularity in the Union may also lead to increasing Variable geometry'. As Cremona notes, while the internal market legislation probably requires an equal submission by all to the rules of the game, the extension o f the scope of Community activity "make it harder to argue that the entire Community system is really a seamless web of policies." In her view, it is difficult to see why, e.g., the CFSP should be a precondition for joining the internal market. (Cremona 1994: 525, passim.)

470 For instance, the contents of the CFSP do not much differ from those of the traditional Nordic cooperation in foreign policy (cf. Helsinki Agreement). As an example of practically identical provisions, one could cite the article J.6 of the Maastricht Treaty which states that the member states shall inform and consult each other on any matter of foreign and security policy of general interest and coordinate their action in international organisations and at international conferences, and that diplomatic and consular missions of the member states and the Commission delegations in third countries and international conferences and organisations shall cooperate in ensuring that the common positions are complied with.

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In broader terms, the influence of EU structures and agendas on Finland can be seen as an

instance o f the process of state formation through participation in various forms o f

cooperation. It concerns not only the interests of the country, but also the tasks, methods and

procedures in the administration, and, finally, also the state structures - such as the structure

o f central administration or the relative power of the parliament, prime minister and president.

In this sense, statehood is in constant evolution, and with it, also the meaning of sovereignty

or neutrality. What is regarded as the proper domain o f an individual state or as its interests

is not static or purely endogenous. Ultimately, it is participation - and not autonomous

isolation - which constitutes the state as a sovereign or a particular entity in international

relations.

This process can be seen very concretely through analyzing, for example, the role o f the

national administration. The Finnish public administration needs to adjust to the tasks which

its new role in integration implies, both as part of the EU administration in fields such as

customs, border control or statistics, and as a support for the national decision-makers in the

preparation of national goals and in the control and management of the implementation o f

common norms. The increasing links between national and EU administration are likely to

influence not only the practical methods and tasks of administration, but also the national

administrative culture and values. (Temmes 1995: 197-198, 215-216; cf. more generally Hill

1991: 90-92.) Concretely, adjustment implies strengthening features which help to cope with

these tasks while modifying others. In the Finnish case, Temmes points out in particular the

need for more 'management' and high-profile technocratic experts, and the need for more

flexibility as to boundaries between different administrative fields and between the 'domestic*

and the 'foreign'. Further, the centrality o f policy-coordination in the state apparatus and the

need to plan for national long-term strategies are new elements for the Finnish political and

administrative culture. (Temmes 1995: 210-216, 218-219.)

While EU membership is a logical continuation in the Finnish policies o f furthering its

interests through participation in international cooperation, the special characteristics o f the

EU, its effectiveness and political weight, give Finland additional possibilities of concrete

influence and, thus, also more importance for the other participants. As a member country,

Finland contributes to the process of integration with its own features and by bringing its

special concerns to the common agenda. At the same time, these very interests and features

are influenced by the process. Without doubt, Finland will exert influence on the EU policies

and the EU administration addressing the features which from a Finnish perspective are seen

as problematic, for instance, excessive bureaucracy, unclear implementation and weak follow­

up, the tendency for matters to get personified, or the immoderate importance of informal

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contacts, favours and counterfavours. The Finnish contribution in this sense could, then,

consist o f advancing the features of Finnish administrative system and administrative culture

which are considered particularly valuable. Among these, Temmes sees the general Nordic

features of legality, neutrality and openness o f the administration, open recruitment and wide

municipal autonomy, and the typically Finnish presidential powers, minority protection and

broad coalition governments. (Temmes 1995:175-176,192,213.) The extent to which Finland

actually succeeds in promoting these features, then, depends on the final sum o f the mutual

influence between the HU and its new member state.

C h a p t e r 6

C o n c l u s io n s

6.1 T h e p l u r a l it y o f a c c o u n t s

6.1.1 Recapitulating the study

This study started with the observation that increasingly numerous and central research

problems in political science require an understanding of the nature of the relationship

between the state and integration. Questions concerning the role and functions of the state in

today's Europe, the future of the state in general, or the development of the EU are but a few

examples o f the problems which either explicitly involve the need o f defining this relationship

or implicitly contain some understanding of the matter. To find answers to these questions,

one must take into consideration how the state is influenced by integration and how

integration, in turn, is influenced by the state.

In chapters four and five, two concrete research problems of this kind were presented. It was

asked, first, whether Nordic cooperation is likely to continue after the Finnish and Swedish

EU membership, or, in other words, whether Nordic cooperation is still profitable or possible

when conducted parallel to EU integration. Secondly, it was asked whether EU membership

has constituted a major change in Finnish integration policy or whether it is, instead, a logical

further step in that policy. These questions have in common the fact that they concern the

consequences of EU integration. The consequences, it was seen, could be assessed only with

knowledge about both the nature of the process of integration, o f Nordic cooperation, and o f

the state in question. In other words, to know the consequences, we need to know, for

example, to which extent the process of integration is under the control of the participating

states, or whether integration can proceed even against the will and aims of its participants.

Our knowledge on these questions, then, depends on our understanding of the relationship

between the state and integration, and thus, on how we understand and define the terms 'state'

and 'integration*.

Seeking answers to these questions, however, easily leads to definitional twists over the

proper way of understanding these contested terms. In these debates, some tend to argue that

the questions cannot be reasonably answered at all because defining the terms is a hopeless

task, or that they are not meaningful since the term 'state' is rather outdated and should not

be concentrated on. Others stress the need to arrive at a shared understanding, something that

was repeatedly found to be impossible. Both stands are, however, problematic. The question

of the state should not simply be overlooked, as might happen if it is put aside for definitional

reasons. On the other hand, searching for one definition and one answer is both difficult and

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counterproductive, as will be seen below. The same applies also to debates on theories.

Integration studies are characterised by theoretical debates which concern the understanding

of the state-integration relationship; there, too, theories are sometimes seen as outdated, and

the aim of arriving at a shared understanding appears unattainable. In fact, the debate between

the two extreme positions in this debate, that integration either strengthens or weakens the

state, is a typical example of potentially self-deceiving theoretical debates. They might go on

endlessly without arriving anywhere if the question about the assumptions, the meanings o f

the two basic terms is hidden in the background, as if it was somehow secondary to the

question.

Both debates actually turn the attention away from the abundance of answers, the fact that

several correct views actually have been presented. Due to the manifold meanings o f the two

terms, also several different answers to the questions appear. The actual problem, then, is

what attitude to take to this plurality. Pointing out one right view among the concepts and

theories would require clear criteria for evaluating them. Evaluation, then, requires knowledge

about how and why they emerge. Thus, in chapter one, the presence of contradictory views

led one to underline the need for examining closer the research on the subject, the ways in

which research approaches the question and its results. In practice, this means examining the

origins of particular views and the conditions for them to be correct, or how our knowledge

on the question is conditioned by the assumptions. That this examination of how and why

certain research results are achieved helps attain a better understanding of the variety of

different results does not regard only the relationship between the state and integration. Many

questions in social sciences involve the same problems of quite different interpretations and

outcomes. Therefore, this examination can be seen as relevant in illustrating some general

problems in research in the field.

Chapter one delineated the approach to the study of questions of this type as essentially

consisting of choice. In cases such as the 'state' and 'integration', the scholar has a wide array

of different meanings and definitions o f the terms to choose between. The choice is not

necessarily intended; on the other hand, however, it cannot be avoided. Thus, the reasons for

choosing a particular meaning and the array o f the choice become particularly interesting. A

proper evaluation of the results involves, then, considering not only the actual outcomes, but

also the possible ones, that is, what can be achieved. These features, shortly the possibilities

and limits of research practice, will be considered more closely below.

In chapter two, literature on the state and integration was analyzed emphasising the

importance of chronological analysis. Four different understandings were found; the

succession o f theories revealed, moreover, important features o f research practice, the way

results are attained and the nature of the links between the theories. When the different views

are analyzed chronologically, and not just individuating the different views as separate

theories, the links become visible. On the one hand, this succession was functional:

understandably, the views emerged through a consideration o f the preceding literature, its

criticism and comparison of its conclusions with the reality observed by the researcher.

Typical of the research was a search for the common, generally accepted and shared in

particular as to definitions; the ideal of accumulation of knowledge together with the need of

eliminating the disproved alternatives were seen as fundamental. In appearance, the different

views were all presented as new and improved in that they reflected reality better than the

preceding ones and better met the requirements of good scientific explanation. On the other

hand, however, this succession had also negative effects: knowledge often seemed sedimented

rather than properly evaluated, and leaning on previous research induced circularity and

predictability rather than new interpretations. At the same time, the concepts used and the

questions posed tended to converge and thereby become fewer due to the aim of shared

research premises.

In all, then, research on the state and integration appeared rather poor as to its self­

understanding or self-reflection. The search for one answer through the elimination o f rival

views seems to mislead research to suggest that the results should be evaluated by comparison

with reality and some explanatory standards. These two criteria, however, can least explain

the emergence of the views. In chapter three, it was argued that the two might be the least

applicable o f evaluative criteria in that they simply cannot be claimed to be sufficiently

unambiguous. Reality, on the one hand, can suit many theories - not the least as shown in

chapters four and five - while the scientific standards were also seen to differ from author to

author and from a time period to another. Four other reasons or factors were identified which

better explained the four different views: methodological considerations, view on science and

theory, disciplinary features and values. These factors directed the basic choices o f

assumptions which, then, led to the emergence of particular interpretations o f the state-

integration relationship.

That the reasons were of this type also showed that it was not possible to put the views into

some order o f correctness. This, however, does not mean that the views were not correct or

were somehow of less value. On the contrary, they were seen to make a profound difference

when applied to concrete research questions. This was done in chapters four and five where

two cases, Nordic cooperation and Finnish integration policy, were examined, both from two

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different points o f view. Even though they were based on same facts and same material, the

accounts yielded dissimilar, even opposite accounts.

6.1.2 The contribution o f the four accounts

The cases studies brought the question o f plurality from the abstract theoretical level to the

level of how we actually describe and write about real events. They can be summarised as

follows:

According to version 4.1, Nordic cooperation is seriously challenged by the increasing

involvement of the Nordic countries in the EU. A review o f the development o f Nordic

cooperation shows that all the most important attempts at closer coordination between the

Nordic countries in central policy areas and the great schemes such as defence union have

failed. This can be attributed to the different interests o f the countries and to the fact that a

purely Nordic solution in economic or security issues has never been a viable alternative. The

achievements have been of a rather low profile, and facilitated by the great similarity of the

Nordic countries. The Nordic institutions are weak and do not have an independent potential

for developing cooperation much further. In the new situation after the Finnish and Swedish

EU membership, the concrete usefulness and political will to continue Nordic cooperation are

likely definitively to evaporate. 'Nordic cooperation' seems increasingly a mere rhetorical

device in the politics of the Nordic countries. The measures and declarations apparently aimed

at guaranteeing a role for Nordic cooperation in the future lack credibility. Indeed, they may

even be counterproductive in practice.

The second version, then, claims that Nordic cooperation is not challenged: its structures are

actually strong, albeit different from the respective European ones; the achievements are of

a high profile, and, indeed, also the similarity o f the Nordic countries is to a great extent a

result of the past 100 years of experience in close cooperation in different fields. An analysis

o f the formal part and institutions of Nordic cooperation does not give an adequate picture

o f the Nordic integration process. Having started earlier, proceeding in a different way and

being both more extensive and deep than integration in the EC/EU, the nature o f Nordic

cooperation seems to evade the normal analyses of integration. However, there exists an

"acquis nordique" even including a Nordic citizenship; Nordic cooperation is a widely

recognised factor in foreign policy formulation and it has been successfully used as a tool by

the Nordic countries both collectively and individually. In the context of the EU, in fact,

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Nordic cooperation will play an increasingly important role both for the countries themselves

and for the development of the EU integration.

In version 5.1, Finnish EU membership constitutes an unexpected rupture in the traditional

Finnish policy towards European integration. It reverses the principles of that policy,

independent decision-making and autonomy, secured through avoidance of political

commitments. The rapidity and unconditionality of the decision seem to imply a change in

the national political 'style'. The causes and direction o f this change are difficult to explain;

above all, however, the claimed continuity of Finnish policies has to be seen as mere

rhetorics. The claim that Finland is actually able to continue furthering its interests

misinterpret the nature of the integration process which largely changes the view on what

these interests are, as well as it changes the practical functioning and tasks of many state

organs. In 5.2, finally, Finnish integration policy is seen as a series of logical steps stemming

from the aim to find the best possible ways to safeguard the national interests and to

participate in international cooperation to the widest extent possible. The decision to apply

for EU membership is therefore not a rupture, but continuation of this policy in an

environment which has changed making membership politically possible. The difference

between EU integration and the forms of cooperation in which Finland thus far has

participated is a matter of degree. The EU is uniquely effective and powerful and this gives

Finland as a member country an enhanced international status and more possibilities to

influence its environment.

Presented one after the other, these accounts seem confusing. Again, like in chapter two which

presented discordant views on the state-integration relationship, a plurality of opposite answers

appears. We may perceive a clear difference in the effect o f any one of these alone in

comparison to presenting all o f them together: while the facts are correct, the very presence

o f opposite interpretations makes all o f them appear incomplete or faulty. The conclusions

seem unsatisfactory, as the two versions seem to falsify each other. The effect of presenting

two alternative accounts might, in fact, be that although the first version might have been

accepted as such as a fair account of the case, the very presence o f a second version shows

that also the first is nothing more than a version, one possible account. This brings us back

to Allison, quoted in chapter one on the effect that different versions make each other appear

as versions, as a mere version among others.1471 The details on Nordic cooperation and Finnish

integration policy which have been duplicated presenting them in different contexts and with

<71 This effect is, however, more clearly visible in this study than in Allison's, where the versions do not actually contradict each other.

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different weights in the accounts serve as a reminder that they indeed have been interpreted

in the first place, that they do not automatically appear in a certain role in the account.

Furthermore, the procedure highlights the scarcely self-reflective character o f the accounts and

the ensuing benefits to be drawn from this kind of reflection in the sense of explaining the

premises of the interpretations. Clearly, even these empirical accounts rely on assumptions

which can be spelled out. At all the points where the accounts differ, one can find an allusion

to the reasons for which they differ, and thus a key to their proper evaluation. In this

evaluation, the central theoretical background questions individuated in chapter three are

immediately useful. Thus, we can find certain basic choices as to the stands taken on the

theoretical questions and crucial assumptions which become visible when two contrasting

interpretations are given. Among them, we find well-known debates in international relations

literature, notably whether (certain kinds of) institutions matter and the differentiation between

inside and outside, domestic and international, or between low and high politics. They are to

a large extent the same for both cases, and can all be seen as instances of the debate o f how

to define 'the state' and 'integration', with consequent differences as to the understanding of

a host of subconcepts such as 'supranational', 'cooperation', 'neutrality' or 'national interest'.

In essence, the cases illustrate the basic oscillations outlined in chapter three about the nature

of the state, its efficiency, actor capacity o f states and other institutions, state similarity, the

nature of international relations, the states' role in them and whether integration belongs to

international relations, and the nature of integration as a general v. unique phenomenon, its

consequences, controllability and reversibility.

In fact, when looked upon more analytically, the causes for the differences between the

versions appear. The versions 4.1 and 4.2 deem differently the need for and possibilities to

safeguard Nordic cooperation due to the different interpretations of the value and role

attributed to it. Version 4.1 is essentially institution-centred; it points out general patterns in

previous Nordic efforts and their tendency to fail, noting that the current situation is not new,

but that European integration has always been more attractive to the Nordic countries than

pure Nordic arrangements. In comparison to the picture given on the EU - characterised

through its long-term goals and ambitions, supranationality and effectiveness - the Nordic

institutions have a low profile. Were they strengthened, the situation would be different:

importance is given to the measures taken in this direction, but they are seen as ineffective.

It is seen that the more efficient the institutions are, the more useful they are for the states;

the basis o f the strength of the institutions is thus in their independence and possibility of

making binding decisions. It is also seen to be impossible to reverse the tradition of

concentrating on consensual matters such as culture or passport union, which are interpreted

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as belonging to low politics. Among the significant interpretations of details, one can see the

assessment of the Council's right to discuss foreign policy as a mere formality, or the scarce j

importance given to Nordic coordination in the Kennedy round: their joint appearance was f

nothing particular as, for instance, also the EEC appeared there as one actor. 'i

On the contrary, version 4.2 sees cooperation within the EU as a new possibility for the j

Nordic countries.472 Different levels of cooperation are presented in parallel; the institutions

are not highlighted, as they are only one part of the whole. Bureaucratic interpenetration is j

seen as more important than independent institutions: the strength of the common institutions

is seen in the fact that they do not constitute a separate level or actor: they are rather a part j

o f the domestic policy-making structures and processes.473 The time perspective changes from

that implicitly given by the institutions to that given by all the different forms of cooperation.

Evidence for the vitality and importance of Nordic cooperation is gathered through pointing

out its hundred years' traditions; frequently, early dates and details from the 19th century are

mentioned. This presentation inverts causes and consequences in relation to the previous

version: the starting point of the first version here appears as a result. Thus, Nordic ii

cooperation seems to involve much more successes than failures; at the same time, the i

commitment expressed by the Nordic countries and the institutions appear much more credible

and are taken seriously. Where the first version sees a weakness in that Nordic cooperation

concentrates on unimportant matters, this version sees that the limitless field of Nordic

cooperation is a proof of its unquestioned and domesticised role. It also avails itself o f a jdifferent classification of matters as 'high' or 'low* politics. Similarly, the variability o f the I

participants in Nordic cooperation is here a strength in that it removes an important hindrance

to reaching agreement, that is, the requirement of the participation of all. Finally, the distance !

to the EU is diminished through applying the same concepts, such as 'spill-over' and acquis

nordique.

Account 5.1 claims that seeing membership as a continuation of Finnish integration policy

cannot be but rhetorics; unavoidably, the EU membership makes the traditional policy

impossible in that the common policies and majority voting of the supranational and |

412 It starts with a dialogue-resembling manner, pointing out that the framework of the preceding version was wrong; in chapter two, this was seen to be the usual way of presenting one's contribution in the integration literature. At the same time, this second version also accentuates the first one's point of view.

473 In the absence of strong central institutions, Nordic cooperation has often been characterised as 'cobweb integration’. This metaphor is particularly interesting in that it 'explains1 the different impressions the scholars have had when looking at it. Indeed, if one happens to look through the cobweb, one might not see it at all.

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progressive EU replace autonomous policies and make it impossible for Finland to continue

safeguarding autonomous decision-making power. The traditional Finnish policies are seen as

having a value o f their own. Therefore, the profound changes in the Finnish policy seems

difficult to explain. It is argued that the reason for this change was perhaps a misinterpreted

necessity to join in order to avoid marginalisation. The consequences of membership are seen

to be profound and to a considerable extent also unintended; in brief, Finland is seen to lose

its particular features and become increasingly similar474 to the other member states, sharing

with them both policies and tasks in relation to the societies.

Version 5.2, then, sees the EU membership as a logical continuation of Finnish integration

policy, since Finland has always strived for that kind of participation as a means for furthering

its interests. Finland is seen as a normal small state, not as particularly keen on preserving its

own autonomy. Until the end o f the cold war, however, its policies were constrained by the

need to follow a policy of neutrality, an impediment to joining political and supranational

integrative arrangements. The EU is a particularly effective framework for furthering Finnish

interests. While it has an influence on the members, Finland as a member is also capable of

influencing the EU and contributing to changing it according to its specific aims. In this

account, the continuity in Finnish integration policy is built on an emphasis of the tradition

of pragmatic, informal participation in cooperation even when or before formal membership

or agreement was politically possible. The Finnish possibilities to influence the decision­

making and policies at the EU level, then, are grounded on interpretations of the EU which

differ from those o f the precedent version as to both the nature o f the EU institutions and of

the impact of supranationality. Here, the EU institutions are not an autonomous factor which

competes with the authority of the states; similarly, supranationality does not curtail the states'

powers but is seen as a feature which strengthens the positive effects of the EU. As an

example, the stipulations of the Maastricht Treaty concerning the common foreign and

security policy are here interpreted as an instance o f community rhetorics, whereas they are

taken literally in the first. *

*u Different aspects o f integration contribute to this development from 'state' to 'member state'. Similarity follows from the general effect that units in a system begin to resemble each other by way of being parts of the system, but it is also necessary for the functioning o f the system. In particular, similarity is increased through the need to have comparable bureaucracy, authorities with same competencies and same functions in the different countries, and by policies such as common standardisation and mutual recognition, which in time have consequences for further structures, such as education.

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In all, the cases help to show the concrete implications o f a series o f theoretical problems.

Above all, the assessment of similarity and comparability and the distinctions between change

and continuity, failure and success, and between rhetorics and facts are highlighted.

A first crucial choice for the development of the accounts concerns the assumptions about

similarity, in particular, whether the states are examined as essentially similar to or as

essentially different from each other. On the one hand, a difference appeared in the versions

on Nordic cooperation in that while similarity in the first version was seen as an explaining

factor of the success o f cooperation, it was seen as an achievement o f long-lasting cooperation

in the second version. On the other hand, the versions on Finnish integration policy differed

in that the first tended to underline the specific characteristics o f the state in question,

confronting it with the influence of the EU which makes the states increasingly similar,

whereas the second sees Finland as a 'normal small state*.

Essentially, thus, the cases show how 'similarity' depends on what is looked at. Therefore, the

understanding of questions such as whether small states differ from the large ones as to, e.g.,

Vulnerability’ to integration or possibilities to influence it, and whether integration has similar

consequences for all states are also questions which essentially depend on or are relative to

the theoretical assumptions made. In addition, the study also shows the relative nature o f

comparability: the definitions used form the basis for comparison, determining the degree o f

similarity. In the cases, this is illustrated by questions such as whether Nordic cooperation and

European integration can be compared and whether different member countries can be

compared as to their position in the process of integration and its consequences for them.

The distinctions between change and continuity, failure and success, and rhetorics and facts,

then, depend to a great extent on the time-span and logic employed in the study. The case of

Finnish integration policy shows clearly the way in which a 'policy' is constructed in the

account; the result depends on the time-span used, which, in turn, is relative to the definition

used. Obviously, the main thread of the account changes in function of what is known and

what has been chosen as the beginning and the end. New facts tend to change the

interpretation o f the older ones: the decision to join the EU easily makes the previous

developments seem logically to lead to this decision, whereas before knowing about the

decision this kind o f interpretation would have been improbable.475 Where the first version

475 The nature of knowledge about past facts is different from that about the present: the more ancient the facts are, the less numerous and the more firmly chosen (generally agreed) become the important facts. Conversely, the newer the facts are, the more numerous and disparate they are (which also gives the idea o f the speeding up of history).

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perceives change, the second sees continuation. When explaining the membership negotiations

from a ‘realist’ viewpoint as a national policy choice, the change in policy disappears; the

same terms (state, sovereignty) can be used both before and after membership, even though

with different (latent) contents. The time perspective in describing Nordic cooperation, in turn,

changes according to the definition: when the formal institutions are concentrated on (as a

consequence, e.g., o f comparison with the EU institutions), Nordic cooperation will tend to

be limited in time to the existence o f those institutions, and thus coincide with the cold war.

This can further lead to equating the favourable conditions for Nordic cooperation with the

conditions of that period, seeing, therefore, a consequential change in the end o f the cold war.

In the second version, however, Nordic cooperation is a rather different phenomenon for

which the institutions are not so central. In this case, the 19th century cooperation becomes

very relevant, and the cold war period can be seen more as an exception, a period which

limited the extension and depth of Nordic cooperation.

The evaluation of consequences is also a good example o f observing and interpreting change.

On the one hand, the cases point to the difficulty in assessing what actually changes as a

result of integration, or deciding whether some important changes take place. Understandably,

the manifest changes integration causes appear in rather concrete and limited questions - such

as changes in working practices or rhythm in public administration or in particular norms,

when the communitarian norm replaces the previous national one - and as such, they can be

seen as relatively unimportant. The large-scale changes that can be and often are expected of

integration - changes concerning such as redefinition of the areas o f exclusive competence

between member states and the Union, the amount of resources, decisions on policies, power

relations between different state organs or the widening o f the national political system to

include supranational elections and extended voting rights for non-citizens - are less visible.

The larger changes obviously consist o f a number of smaller ones, but the chain of causes and

effects, such as the reverberation of general economic decisions to education or culture - are

not necessarily clear, and they can be constructed in different ways.

On the other hand, the perception o f change - as the perception o f any movement - seems to

require a stable point o f comparison in order to become visible. In the cases, it is seen how

a rather stable 'Finnish integration policy' has to be constructed if a radical change in it is to

be shown; conversely, continuity is facilitated by letting in some incoherence instead of

drawing too clear a line. Interestingly, the first, 'rupture' view presents a more solid view on

Finnish integration policy than the second one does. In fact, a parallel can here be drawn to

the discussion on the withering away of the state where the critics of the state, or those

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arguing that it withers away, construct a particularly powerful state, a more robust image o f

it than those accused o f refusing to see that withering takes place.476

Conclusively, the cases highlight the plurality of truth in the form o f plurality of reality; they

ease the proper understanding o f plurality and its implications through linking the abstract,

theoretical plurality to concrete events, showing that the versions lead to quite different

concrete conclusions, political prescriptions, and further research questions. In other words,

the cases show the concrete importance o f the implicitly chosen assumptions in directing

further research, but also their political relevance.

First, it is important to notice how different concrete conclusions can be drawn on the basis

o f the versions when used as a ground for generalisations or prognostications. The chapter on

Nordic cooperation leads to two opposite conclusions as to what might be the right or most

effective method o f integration, a functional and pragmatic or a teleological and intangible

one. The first version on Finnish integration policy leads to conclude that states are gradually

becoming more similar to each other and also more clearly limited and defined as to their

functions and role. Instead of belonging to one and the same system, integration is a separate

process which defines the state and curtails its independence. The second version, on the

contrary, leads one to expect that integration and the state are approaching the same extension

since integration is defined by the states and used as a means in their policy. Integration will

thus not surpass the state, but will hardly remain more restricted in extension than the states

are as to their functions and fields of activities - in a way, the two are part o f the same

political system.

Further, the choices concerning conceptualisations obviously shape what is seen as important

questions to answer in further research. While a certain question is central in one version, it

may be a non-issue in the other, or answered latently by omission. For instance, if an account

o f a state's policy is written using the state's own perspective and definitions, the question of

the good or effective nature of the state might well not appear at all. Further, while version

5.1 leads one to study the mutual influence between the state and the EU institutions as a

476 The discourse of the decline of the state actually creates the state. In a sense, thus, a threat can be functional: while Weber (1995) remarks that 'intervention* is functional to the state or the states system in that it is needed to write the boundaries for the exercise of sovereignty, 'integration' can also function as a threat which constitutes the state. Wendt (1994: 389-390) seems to express this idea in concrete terms when he notes that increasing vulnerability and similarity, caused by, e.g., collective identity formation and transnationalisation, may generate perceived threats to self-control or fears that the state might lose its raison d'être if it is not different from the others. Therefore, states may respond to these tendencies by redoubling their efforts to defend egoistic identities.

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contest of who has greatest influence, version 5.2 starts looking for possible explanations for

why the change took place - a change which was not even observed in 5.2. Similarly, the

arguments on similarity may lead to the question o f whether similarity is functional, and what

kind of similarity is functional, necessary or important; from the perspective o f 5,1 and 4.2,

the capacity o f accommodating differences rather than eliminating them could be a central

question for the very success of the EU enterprise.

Finally, the cases, one by one, show the same inadequacy that the four theories did when they

were presented independently of the others. They suggest that an adequate account o f any

related case has to take into consideration diverging interpretations. Moreover, they suggest

that the familiar debate on whether integration strengthens or weakens the state might, as a

debate, be somewhat misleading, even rather futile. It could be seen as a pseudodiscussion

which certainly keeps the research going on in that it cannot be concluded in the favour of

any of the contenders; at the same time, it diverts attention from more basic questions. Indeed,

when the views are analyzed according to the assumptions, as above, one can also see how

the various background choices are linked to the irresolvable problem of whether to give

priority in conceptualisation to the state or to integration, that is, which of them comes first,

being a constant which defines the other. One can see the states as having always been

defined by their environment and the international organisation having been growing

simultaneously with the assertion of the state (in which case also integration obviously plays

a part in this definition); one can also see the states as defining their environment, in which

case the state is defined a priori. In any case, one of the two has to be made constant to

explain the other. Although the state has usually been in this role in the analysis of

integration, it is interesting to note that integration also appears, perhaps even increasingly,

as a constant which explains the state. Despite the difficulties in explaining integration, or

perhaps because of these difficulties, 'integration' seems to be acquiring some of the features

o f 'the state' as to its functions in theory construction. Perhaps through an accumulation of

knowledge, it comes to define the state or explain the different changes which take place in

the states. While the theories first aimed at explaining integration, they now use integration

in explaining different phenomena, such as regionalism, the strengthening of the executive

versus the legislative, or the states’ policies and structures. Moreover, integration becomes

something isolable or independent, while, at the same time, EU integration is increasingly

analyzed as unique or incomparable.

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6.2 P o ssib il it ie s a n d l im it s o f s c ie n t ific a n a ly sis

The plurality of truth which the theories and cases examined in this thesis reflect helps to

understand the process in which knowledge is constructed, leading to important observations

concerning the possibilities and limits of research. These, evidently, do not regard solely the

research on the state and integration. Quite concretely, the case studies exemplify this

construction o f knowledge by showing the internal dynamism implied in different theoretical

stands and, thus, the crucial importance o f the basic choices: they do lead the interpretation

in a particular way. We also see how, in practice, the accounts 'hide' some points, or minimise

their importance even though they do take them into consideration and, thus, do not really

'misrepresent' them.

In practice, the cases show how the analysis of Finnish integration policy actually constructs

that policy, and how a particular stand taken makes even the history o f that policy appear in

different forms in the search for evidence, or credibility, for the interpretation given. Thus,

the history o f Finnish integration policy is unavoidably drawn into the picture. The first

account depicts the period until membership as following the same, immutable principles; this

makes the membership appear as a rupture. The second, in turn, constructs the policy as a

logical sequel, almost path dependent: the general aim is to participate, and the policy

gradually changes in this direction. Similarly, Nordic cooperation is constructed twice through

its very definition as an institution-bound or as a more informal type o f cooperation. This

definition changes the time perspective, while it also determines in concrete terms what

aspects of Nordic cooperation are concentrated on in the account.

At this point, we can summarize the concrete sense in which this study is entitled as a

critique. The object of criticism has obviously not been any of the views on the state and

integration as such. Instead, the study points out three main features of the conventional

research practice - the understanding of accumulation, objectivity and empirical research -

which together contribute to the main and most consequential shortcoming of integration

studies in answering the question about the relationship between the state and integration: the

attitude towards the plurality of different views that result. First, plurality is seen as something

negative and inconclusive; second, relations between different views are seen as contradictory;

and third, progress is understood as accumulation of evidence in favour of one view, making

it the right answer, implying that one of the views is the best and that this can be found out.

In all, integration studies seem not to possess a particularly well-developed self-understanding.

Firstly, it is usually said that the problem in integration studies and the reason for their scarce

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results is the lacking accumulation of knowledge. This study would rather claim that the

problem is excessive accumulation: the same choices are repeated and different factors (e.g.,

indicators or variables) accumulate into long, rather useless lists, becoming a heavy package

o f persistent features in research. The cases encourage alertness about the often compelling

forces of quantity and logic or continuity in deciding which o f the theories available is the

best. Indeed, accumulation involves the problem that the original relation between assumptions

and results is not necessarily taken into account when results, conclusions or judgements are

taken over to subsequent research. Accumulation tends to turn assumptions into facts and

theories into evidence.

Secondly, being objective is seen as a self-evident aim o f research (as opposed to other forms

o f knowledge), and objectivity is most often seen to require that only one truth is possible.

However, one might also think that objectivism needs 'permissivism'. A view is not objective

if it eliminates equally good ones; a scientific view therefore should treat different views

objectively, or equally.

Finally, the cases do not solve the problem of the relationship between the state and

integration; they are not helpful in the traditional view o f deciding which view is better.

Indeed, no case would be, as empirical evidence cannot do that: it is impossible to say that

some view is not valid as long as the differences are in the realm o f assumptions and the

interpretation o f facts. In other words, recourse to empirical cases does not solve the kinds

o f problems it is thought to do. Most studies are characterised by strong empirical tendencies

or beliefs in the possibility of solving empirically problems o f a profoundly theoretical

character, such as whether integration has a similar influence on all states (which implies a

decision on whether all states are to be considered as essentially similar) or whether some

change in the state means that there no longer is a state (which implies a stand on whether

the state previously has been something different). Empirical studies, however, scarcely bring

anything new to the question; they only strengthen an idea - as deductive method could be

said to do: deducing something from certain assumptions does not increase knowledge.477

Instead, one could argue as Feyerabend (1975: 37) that the possibility for progress lies in

finding facts which contradict the theories, and that in order to find these facts, the research

methods may also have to be modified, as one method is conducive to one type of results. In

sum, the cherished ideals o f research do not necessarily yield the results expected.

Weber (1995: 17-28) points to the same problem arguing that the conventional methods o f studying intervention, behaviouristic classification of aspects o f interventionary behaviour, aim to uncover the nature of intervention but do not succeed in that they only uncover the prespeficied, theoretical meaning chosen in the first place; the empirical indicators are decided prior to the analysis.

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Thus depicted, research has its possibilities and limitations which have to be taken into

account in its evaluation, be it for the aim of applying the knowledge acquired or of

increasing it. On the one hand, that knowledge is constructed implies that it can be

constructed in different ways. It is, in other words, possible for the conventional research

practice to attain a number of different, but still correct, interpretations of the same facts;

these interpretations may have consequential practical implications. This is true for all the

views; thus, the theories of integration cannot be seen as mere 'bad old theories' which do not

work, nor as 'mere theories': they are examples of the actual possibilities of constructing

knowledge.

On the other hand, research also has its limitations. In particular, it is limited in its ability to

reflect the plurality o f truth. The rules of the conventional research practice is conducive to

one view at a time, producing chains of views - such as exemplified in chapters two, four and

five - in which all pieces are as such rather imperfect. At the same time, the different views

or versions seem credible only when presented alone; they try to falsify other views,

accumulating evidence in their support. This 'scientific' proof of their being 'evident' rests on

the fact that they do not reveal any conditionality; thus, they may also create 'necessary' links

between phenomena. Plurality therefore threatens the credibility of these views: they are

questioned by the presence of other interpretations which show how knowledge actually is

conditioned and relative to the assumptions. In the end, however, the understanding of what

creates credibility implied in the conventional research practice can be questioned. It can be

argued that research which is able to reflect the plurality of truth and which is aware of its

limits and possibilities is preferable to research which is not in that it actually is more

credible.

6.3 T h e p l u r a l it y o f tru th a n d the credibility of research

The usual research practice leads, thus, quite understandably to one answer at a time,

irrespective o f whether or not it is assumed that the questions ultimately have one (right)

answer. This is because of the rules concerning unequivocal definitions and logic; research

requires a stand taken on the definitions and indicators used, as well as on questions of order

o f importance. These elements are normally identified as parts of the theoretical part of

research. Theory enters the research process by providing with alternative frameworks:

different theories lead to different views, or answers, through different conceptualisations and

assumptions. The truth of each view is ascertained, in the final analysis, through these

assumptions. However, they seldom, if ever, support just one view: often, the basis consists

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o f choices between two equal alternatives, and therefore gives rise to at least two different,

equally well-based views.

This kind of'internal relativism' o f a piece o f research is generally well understood: the terms

can be defined in but one way at a time, and the rest of the study should conserve and follow

the choices made, thus making the results relative to the initial choices. The idea of theoretical

plurality is similarly quite accepted: while the empirical world is one, there are different

competing theoretical pictures of it. Actually, however, the logical consequence o f the 'internal

relativism’ and the plurality of theoretical views is that the produced results, the outcomes of

research, are visibly incomplete, partial, as pieces of one whole. Therefore, it is important to

stress the plurality o f truth as a way to increase the usefulness o f research as effectively

making reality more understandable through first making itself more understandable.

The term 'plurality', however, needs to be given a more precise meaning. It is important to

note that what is meant here by plurality is neither relativism, nor deconstructivism. The

decision to present alternative accounts might seem useless, anti-problem-solving and thereby

deconstructive: juxtaposing different versions, which alone could be convincing pieces of

research, has the effect of rendering both somehow 'optional' or speculative, as if what would

have been 'facts' no longer were such. However, it is not meant as support for the view that

anything goes, all results being equally good or bad, or that nothing (conclusive) can be done

- which in the end amount to the same. As Carr (1961: 30-31) has noted, that a mountain

appears to take different shapes when looked at from different angles of visions does not

mean that it has objectively either no shape at all or an infinity o f shapes.

There is, however, relativism in the sense that it is not difficult to see that the validity of

statements is relative to or depends on the definitions used, or on the angle of vision one has

chosen to look at the mountain. It is also quite clear that one cannot find any single objective

or absolute meaning for terms such as 'state* and 'integration'. That the concepts are 'relative'

in this sense, however, does not reduce their importance or the importance of the results

obtained. While one theory cannot encompass the variety o f meanings because of the rules

o f research practice which reduce the meanings o f the central concepts, it is understandable

that there might be several 'correct' theories on the same subject. In fact, the problem actually

is the tendency of theory to substitute a single meaning for the original variety of meanings.

Theories simplify, but this does not necessarily mean that they are incomplete; it could rather

be that they are too complete in that they succeed in 'universalising' some conceptualisations,

excluding all competing ones. Therefore, it seems that several theories together would render

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the reality better than a single theory despite the fact that accepting different theories and

meanings apparently relativises the very value and authority of the scientific explanation.47*

It is essential to note that this plurality is not a sign of weakness. In the end, the importance

o f plurality is not based on the idea of one empirical reality and a plural theoretical reality,

but on the thought that the plurality resides in the empirical, the description. This study, in

fact, questions the placement of the border between the theoretical and the empirical. Even

in absence o f discernible theories or the aim of theory-building, description (or empirical

research) involves what could be called theoretical elements. A 'mere* description is also a

way of rendering something understandable; it requires decisions, or choices, concerning

conceptualisation and the relative importance o f different facts. As here, different choices lead

to different versions, the number of which is certainly not limited to two. 'Theory' itself may

have to be given a wider meaning than is usually the case. It is difficult to say whether the

'cases’ of this study are more empirical than theoretical in character. The 'pure facts' do not

constitute a narrative or description: they do not 'mean' anything or have any 'importance' as

such. The meaning and importance stem from their placement into a context and their

relationing to each other. This, one could argue, is already 'theoretical' or optional in the sense

that it involves choosing between different possibilities. It is, in fact, difficult to locate the

border between general and particular: the distinction between theoretical and empirical

studies does not seem meaningful in that both actually imply the need of choosing and

ordering facts. In all, the domain of the objective or the absolute seems rather limited in

comparison to that o f the 'relative'.

In this thesis, the contradictory interpretations are shown to increase knowledge rather than

to diminish or question it. On the one hand, they increase knowledge very concretely in that

they tend to stress different facts and therefore tell more than any single account. As Peirce

has noted, it is better to trust the multitude and variety rather than any one view: a chain

* * Again, the empirical cases help to understand why a variety of views in needed to explain reality. In the practice of international relations, the actors represent different views which themselves are not stable, and their action certainly requires taking into consideration more than one perception of a given fact at the time. While the cases in this study raise the question of whether the views and definitions expressed by the object of research itself should be taken into account or not, and whether it is possible not to take them into account. It is also seen how political actors not only use definitions which suit their purposes, but also often avoid definition. In concrete politics, definitions of concepts, rules or goals- may, indeed, be rather counterproductive, as exemplified in the study of Finnish membership negotiations. On a more general level, Weber (1995: 60) points to the preferability o f leaving the aims and rules of common undertakings unsaid; similarly, Der Derian argues that definitions are sometimes counterproductive even in research (see his example of a UNESCO conference on cultural policy which decided not to define 'culture' or 'cultural politics'; Der Derian, James, On Diplomacy. A Genealogy o f Western Estrangement. Basil Blackwell, 1987, p. 31).

344

made of all views together is stronger than a cable which is as weak as its weakest part (cf.

Bernstein 1983: 224). On the other hand, the different accounts increase knowledge in that

they point out the choices made; thus, they increase the transparency of the views, helping

to understand their origins. They also help to individuate the limits and possibilities of

research, the 'options', such as the basic oscillations identified in chapter three concerning the

nature of state or the role of institutions, and, thus, may also draw attention to the need to

explain why some views appear in the literature less often than others.479 When increasing

their own credibility, however, they also increase the credibility o f the other views. Thus, the

versions make each other understandable and acceptable and have to lean on each other for

their credibility.

This might seem to be a rather 'shaky' ground for research to be credible. Yet, the

conventional research practice can in this respect hardly be seen as less shaky. In fact, it leads

to results which can easily be contested by the simple juxtaposition o f different views; it is

therefore not surprising that the results o f social sciences are often interpreted as artificial or

irrelevant for practical politics. The self-portrait o f the conventional research, maintaining that

the results are relevant in that they reflect reality and are conform to scientific standards,

cannot be very convincing since these can easily be seen to be contradictory. Thus, the

opaqueness or impenetrability of conventional research reduces its credibility.

In the end, acknowledging that the grounds of research practice - concepts, methods,

assumptions, values - are mere choices and, thus, relative and 'shaky', does not make the

results or the enterprise as such shaky or less worthwhile. The results actually become

criticizable and are bound to be found shaky when these grounds are hidden in some assumed

objectivism. An increased 'transparency' regarding the way research actually proceeds and the

choices it involves will only increase its credibility. It also increases the possibilities o f seeing

the biases o f research and allows for progress in research, not in the sense o f accumulating

evidence for one view and against some other, but as a development o f the understanding of

the foundations for the single views and their interrelations.

Objectivity, and thus credibility, can be seen to lay in understanding the 'unobjectivity' of

what one does, in mastering, as it were, one’s own perspective. In Carr's (1961: 163, 175)

view, a historian is objective if he has capacity to rise above the limited vision of his own

situation, being capable to recognise the extent o f his involvement, the impossibility o f total

m One could, for instance, point out the prevalence of views which give a negative view on the state in comparison to the positive ones.

i *** ie

l

objectivity and the interaction between facts and values. This is certainly true in social

sciences as well. One could think of research as a kaleidoscope which through a certain

mechanism produces several different pictures out of the same elements. Understanding the

working principles o f this 'scientific kaleidoscope' contributes to evaluating the results;

thereby, it also helps avoiding blind accumulation, the uncritical adaptation of methods,

definitions and theories which constrain the results of the analyses. Instead of trying not to

shake the kaleidoscope i:i order to keep the picture it shows immutable, as seems often be the

case in conventional research, one should see the meaning of the scientific enterprise in the

totality of the different constellations the kaleidoscope can produce when it is shaken. A more

transparent and self-reflective research practice would, thus, constitute a ground for increasing

the objectivity and credibility of research, in single cases as well as in the field o f social

sciences in general.

345

!

346

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i

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NU 1983/8. Organisation och arbetsformer for Nordiska ràdets presidiesekretariat. Stockholm 1983.

NU 1988/4. Intemationella samarbetsfràgor i Nordiska ràdei. Betànkande avgivet av Nordiska ràdets intemationella samarbetskommitté. Nordiska ràdet, Stockholm 1989. [The English version NU 1988:4E, The Nordic Council and International Co-operation. In Finnish, NU 1988:4F.]

NU 1989/7E. The Nordic Council and European Co-operation. Report o f the Nordic Council's Committee on International Co-operation. Nordic Council, Stockholm 1989.

NU 1990/7. Det nordiska samarbetet. Internationalisering och effectivisering. Förslag till reformer. Betànkandet avgivet av Nordiska ràdets organisationskommitté. Nordiska ràdet, Stockholm 1990. [Partly in English with the title 'Nordic co-operation. Internationalisation and improved efficiency. Proposed reforms. Report of the Organisation Committee of the Nordic Council.']

Oppfolginsgruppen for ny vurdering av det nordiske samarbeidet. Rapport til de nordiske lands statsministre. Arhus, 11. november 1990. (Quoted: Oppfolginsgruppen.)

P lanerfor det nordiska samarbetet. Redogörelse överlamnad av Ministerràdet. Nordiska ràdet 44:e session 1994 (C2), Kopenhamn 1993. (Quoted: Planer 1993.)

Rapport till statsministrama av statsministramas personliga representanter fo r nyvardering av det nordiska samarbetet 14.8.1992. ('Iloniemi-rapport'). [Report to the prime ministers by their personal representatives on re-evaluation o f Nordic cooperation.] Published in NKextra 'Det nordiska samarbetes framtid'. (Quoted: Rapport.)

UD informerar 1979: 2: Nordiskt samarbete. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Sweden, Stockholm 1979.

UD informerar 1986: 3: Nordiskt samarbete. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs o f Sweden, Stockholm 1986.

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c) Finnish integration policy

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Valtioneuvoston tiedonanto Eduskunnalle Euroopan yhteisön jäsenyydestä. Valtion painatuskeskus, Helsinki 1992 (March 16). (Quoted Government communication1992.)

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