Scaling Up Obama’s Promise Zone Initiative

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Elena Hodges 1 Elena Hodges PLSC 203 Jacob Hacker Final Paper 30 April 2014 Scaling Up Obama’s Promise Zone Initiative: An Innovative Community Solution to Inequality, or More of the Same Empty Promises? Introduction Confronted by ballooning income inequality, the disintegration of middle class economic security, and the growing political clout of private, monied interests, for many the American Dream longer rings true. 1 While those at the very tip of the income distribution are surging ahead, the middle class is barely hanging on and those born into neighborhoods of concentrated poverty have increasingly slim odds of ever getting ahead. 2 In the face of systemic inequality in the United States, neither cautiously redistributive economic measures nor isolated social programs can succeed in restoring true equality of opportunity. While fundamental reforms to the American political system would be both beneficial and effective, the current political climate itself precludes any such sweeping changes. In this paper I argue that implementing bundled social programs on the community level constitute the best way to target inequality, both in terms of outcomes and overall political feasibility. Using the Promise Zone Initiative as a case study, I 1 Cohen, Michael. “The American Dream is Now Just That for its Middle Classes – A Dream.” The 2 “A child born in the bottom fifth of the income distribution has a 7.8% chance of reaching the top fifth in the U.S. as a whole. But in some places, such as Salt Lake City and San Jose, the chance of moving from the bottom fifth to the top fifth is as high as 12.9%. In others, such as Charlotte and Indianapolis, it is as low as 4.4%. The spatial variation in intergenerational mobility is strongly correlated with five factors: (1) residential segregation, (2) income inequality, (3) school quality, (4) social capital, and (5) family structure.” Chetty, Raj; Hendron, Nathaniel; Kline, Patrick; Saez, Emmanuel. “Where is the Land of Opportunity? The Geography of Intergenerational Mobility in the United States.” NBER Working Paper. Jan 2014.

Transcript of Scaling Up Obama’s Promise Zone Initiative

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Elena Hodges PLSC 203 Jacob Hacker Final Paper 30 April 2014

Scaling Up Obama’s Promise Zone Initiative: An Innovative Community Solution to Inequality, or More of the Same Empty Promises?

Introduction

Confronted by ballooning income inequality, the disintegration of middle class

economic security, and the growing political clout of private, monied interests, for many

the American Dream longer rings true.1 While those at the very tip of the income

distribution are surging ahead, the middle class is barely hanging on and those born into

neighborhoods of concentrated poverty have increasingly slim odds of ever getting

ahead.2 In the face of systemic inequality in the United States, neither cautiously

redistributive economic measures nor isolated social programs can succeed in restoring

true equality of opportunity.

While fundamental reforms to the American political system would be both

beneficial and effective, the current political climate itself precludes any such sweeping

changes. In this paper I argue that implementing bundled social programs on the

community level constitute the best way to target inequality, both in terms of outcomes

and overall political feasibility. Using the Promise Zone Initiative as a case study, I

                                                                                                               1    Cohen, Michael. “The American Dream is Now Just That for its Middle Classes – A Dream.” The 2  “A child born in the bottom fifth of the income distribution has a 7.8% chance of reaching the top fifth in

the U.S. as a whole. But in some places, such as Salt Lake City and San Jose, the chance of moving from the bottom fifth to the top fifth is as high as 12.9%. In others, such as Charlotte and Indianapolis, it is as low as 4.4%. The spatial variation in intergenerational mobility is strongly correlated with five factors: (1) residential segregation, (2) income inequality, (3) school quality, (4) social capital, and (5) family structure.”

Chetty, Raj; Hendron, Nathaniel; Kline, Patrick; Saez, Emmanuel. “Where is the Land of Opportunity? The Geography of Intergenerational Mobility in the United States.” NBER Working Paper. Jan 2014.

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examine the gap between its intended goals and its current prospects, looking forward to

what initiative needs to be a transformative force in American society.

Counterarguments Against Inequality as a Problem

In any debate about the best way to tackle inequality, one must first address those

who argue that United States is a meritocracy and that inequality as such is not

necessarily a bad thing. After all, in a society in which hard work and talent is rewarded

by economic prosperity, inequality would reflect nothing more than a fair, functional free

market in which the most dedicated workers won out. Indeed, Tocqueville once lauded

this very characteristic of American society, writing that Americans have “greater

equality in point of fortune and intellect…than in any other country in the world, or in

any age of which history has preserved the remembrance.”3

Politicians like Herman Cain – “if you don’t have a job and you’re not rich, blame

yourself” 4 – and Paul Ryan – “if you work hard and play by the rules, you can get

ahead...we promise equal opportunity, not equal outcomes” 5 – espouse this view. But

their arguments rest upon the premise of fundamental equality of opportunity which,

upon examination, does not exist in contemporary American society.6 Even a cursory

look at the breakdown of income distribution, minimum wage stagnation, and social

mobility and educational outcomes across income levels outlines a very different reality

from Tocqueville’s rosy view of America (see Figures 1-5 in the Appendix).7 Some other

                                                                                                               3  de Toqueville, Alexis. Democracy in America, Ch. 3.1835. 4  Stewart, Rebecca. “Cain: Not Rich? No Job? Blame Yourself.” CNN Policy Ticker. 5 Oct 20 11.  5  Johnson, Glen. “Text of Romney-Ryan Speeches.” The Boston Globe. 11 Aug 2012. 6  Leonhart, David & Quealy, Kevin. “The American Middle Class is No Longer the World’s Richest.” New York Times. 22 April 2014. 7  Saez, Emmanuel. “Striking it Richer: The Evolution of Top Incomes in the United States.” 3 Sept 2012. Kochhar, Rakesh, Fry, Richard, & Taylor, Paul. “Wealth Gaps Rise to Record Highs Between Whites,

Blacks, Hispanics.” Pew Research, Social & Demographic Trends. 26 July 2011.

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conservatives, like Gregory Mankiw and Marco Rubio, acknowledge the surge of income

to the top but argue against redistributive measures or the need for political reform.8 In a

debate in January 2014, Senator Marco Rubio (R, FL) said, “I think it would be wrong

not to recognize that there is a significant number of Americans that do not have equality

of opportunity,” but then asserted “it is not a political issue” and criticized federal

spending on social programs.9 Neither of these arguments holds water, however. As

Emmanuel Saez, Thomas Picketty, and Timothy Noah all contend, explosive growth at

the top has been anything but innocuous, coming at the expense of lower- and middle-

class social mobility, economic security, educational attainment, and health outcomes.10

And as Martin Gilens, Robert Dahl, and Bachrach & Baratz all argue, inequality is a

manifestly political issue, impacting political engagement, policymakers’ responsiveness,

and private political clout through donations and lobbying.11

Alternative Approaches: Redistributive and Political

Even after determining the scale and wide-ranging social problems that stem from

income inequality, the government’s role in addressing these issues remains contested. In

this paper I attempt to identify the strategy with the best chance of dealing with

inequality’s interrelated facets. I briefly examine two broad strategic approaches –

redistributive, in the form of taxes and transfers, and political, such as large-scale                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          Wilson, William Julius. "Why Both Social Structure and Culture Matter in a Holistic Analysis of Inner City

Poverty." SAGE. 2010. 8  Mankiw, Gregory N. “Defending the One Percent.” Journal of Economic Perspectives. 2013. 9  CBS. “Face the Nation Transcripts January 12, 2014: Rubio, Cummings, Wisniewski.” cbsnews.com. 10  Saez, Emmanuel. “Striking it Richer: The Evolution of Top Incomes in the United States. 3 Sept 2012. Noah, Timothy. “The Great Divergence.” Slate. 2010. Web. Piketty, Thomas; Facundo, Alvaredo; Atkinson, Anthony; Saez, Emmanuel. "The Top 1 Percent in

International and Historical Perspective," Journal of Economic Perspectives 27:3 (Summer 2013): 3-20. 11 Gilens, Martin. Affluence & Influence: Economic Inequality and Political Power in America. Princeton UP. 2013. Dahl, Robert. Who Governs: Democracy and Power in an American City. New Haven: Yale UP, 1961. Bachrach, Peter & Baratz, Morton. "Two Faces of Power." American Political Science Review. Dec 1962.  

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lobbying and campaign finance reform, ultimately rejecting them both due to their lack of

root-cause efficacy or political viability. Ultimately, I argue that a place-based patchwork

approach to social programs should be the American government’s highest priority.

The federal government already employs the first avenue, redistribution, in the

form of taxes and transfers. It is certainly true that low- and middle-income Americans

would benefit from a more progressive tax system, especially since top marginal tax rates

have been falling steadily since the 1960s even as the top cadre’s income share has

exploded (see Figure 6 in the Appendix).12 So too would increasing government transfers

such as EITC, SNAP, and disability benefits bolster the lower class in the short term. As

Kentworthy notes, the United States does far less to reduce income inequality through

transfers than do its OECD peers (see Figure 7 in the Appendix).13 However, neither

taxes nor transfers address the social and political circumstances that trap people in

poverty in the first place. Redistributive measures, encompassing both the broad

categories of taxes and transfers, only treat after-the-fact inequality. Though they can and

should constitute part of any solution, they are not enough in isolation.

A second approach, recognizing the interplay between wealth and political

influence, would involve intensive structural reform to America’s political system. For

those that argue that Washington has become beholden to private, monied interests at the

expense of middle- and lower-class Americans, it makes no sense to try to address

inequality without doing anything about the intimate link between elected officials,

lobbyists, and corporate interests. With no limits to private campaign donations and a

                                                                                                               12  Piketty, Thomas; Facundo, Alvaredo; Atkinson, Anthony; Saez, Emmanuel. "The Top 1 Percent in International and Historical Perspective," Journal of Economic Perspectives. Summer 2013. 13  Kentworthy, Lane. “Taxes and Inequality: Lessons From Abroad.” Consider the Evidence. 10 Feb 2008.  

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thriving lobbying industry with voluntary expenses disclosure, the interests of wealthy

donors and the corporate lobby are increasingly prioritized over those of middle- and

lower-class Americans.14 As Robert Dahl writes, “in a political system where nearly

every adult may vote but where knowledge, wealth, social position, access to officials,

and other resources are unequally distributed, who actually governs?”15 Indeed,

Congressional voting records reveal unprecedented polarization, and campaign

contributions from the top 1 percent have risen exponentially (Appendix, Fig. 8 and 9).16

While Gilens and Dahl paint a concerning portrait of the link between wealth and

political power, the pattern itself makes the prospect of structural reforms unlikely. This

catch-22 is magnified by additional political factors. Political polarization and the

increased use of the filibuster make passing legislative reform challenging even under the

best of circumstances; all too often, though, the influence of mega-rich campaign donors,

corporate lobbyists, and policy makers’ own preferences discourages any action at all.

The phenomena of unequal political representation and policy drift have troubling

implications for the health of the American democracy, but their thorniness belies the

chance of an overhaul to the American political system.

The Case for an Integrated Programmatic Approach

In lieu of either strictly redistributive economic policies or major reforms to the

American political system, a third approach, centered on place-based social programs,

emerges as the best strategy. Unlike taxes and transfers, these programs can effectively

                                                                                                               14  Gilens, Martin. Affluence & Influence: Economic Inequality and Political Power in America. Princeton UP. 2013. 15   Dahl, Robert. Who Governs: Democracy and Power in an American City. Yale UP: 1961. Print. 16  Saez, Emmanuel. “Striking it Richer: The Evolution of Top Incomes in the United States. 3 Sept 2012.        Gilens, Martin. Affluence & Influence: Economic Inequality and Political Power in America. Princeton UP. 2013.  

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address the spectrum of income inequality’s causes and effects, and unlike campaign

finance reform or broad political restructuring, they stand a chance of garnering enough

bipartisan support to be politically feasible. This is not to say that no work can or should

be done on tax and transfer policy, campaign finance reform, or political restructuring.

Prioritizing integrated social programs in no way precludes other policy reform efforts;

rather, it presents the most feasible way to focus resources where they will have the

greatest impact on communities that need the most help. Rather than focusing narrowly

on individuals, policymakers now recognize that holistic, broad-based social programs

are better-equipped to both mitigate poverty’s consequences and to deal with its root

causes. Investment in communities, especially in their children, has been proven to pay

off across the board, especially with regard to earnings and later incarceration rates (see

Figure 10 in the Appendix).17

This idea in and of itself is nothing new; from FDR’s New Deal programs to

Johnson’s Great Society to Clinton’s Enterprise Zones, many Presidents have resolved to

use social programs to shore up those in need. However, most of these plans involved

individual programs that functioned in isolation from one another – programs like Head

Start, Job Corps, D.A.R.E. (Drug & Alcohol Resistance Education), Upward Bound, 21st

Century Learning Centers – coordinated by many disparate agencies.18 But most of these

programs have had modest or even negligible success.19

                                                                                                               17  Besharov, Douglas & Call, Douglas. “Income Transfers Alone Won’t End Poverty.” The Policy Studies Journal. 2009. 18  Sawhill, I.V., and Baron, J. “Federal Programs for Youth: More of the Same Won’t Work.” Youth

Today. May 2010, pg. 21.  19  Sawhill & Baron found that since 1990 there have been ten instances in which a large-scale federal

social program was evaluated by a scientific research design. In nine of these ten cases popular programs were shown to have modest or no impacts on their participants.

Ibid.  

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The fundamental weakness of so many failed or marginally successful

antipoverty programs lies in their narrow scope. Job training for single mothers,

without providing access to affordable childcare, makes little sense. Neither does

implementing high-quality early education program without simultaneously

improving the quality of elementary, middle, and high schools. In order to really

level the playing field, social programs must address all the issues that

disadvantaged communities face. No matter how good any single program is,

without support from complementary programs it will not be able to compete with

the aggregate effects of the problems that disadvantaged communities face:

When the fabric of community is destroyed, things like working schools, useable playgrounds, decent housing, support from religious institutions, functioning civic organizations, and safe streets are nonexistent or so marginal that they are ineffective. When this occurs in poor communities, the gravitational pull of disorganization and dysfunction is so strong on already fragile families that only a small fraction of the children in these neighborhoods can escape.20

According to the Center for the Study of Social Policy (CSSP), “the complex challenges

these neighborhoods face require a unique set of interconnected solutions that are

effective, sustainable and make a lasting impact on the lives of children and families.”21

Additionally, “the need for collaboration between state policymakers and

community members has never been clearer in the midst of a heated Congressional

environment and the drastic cuts taking place through sequestration.”22 The best way for

policymakers and community members to promote equitable outcomes for children,

                                                                                                               20  Harlem Children’s Zone, Inc. “Growth Plan FY 2001-FY 2009.” www.hcz.org. 21  Center for the Study of Social Policy. “Aligning Resources and Results: How Policymakers and Communities Can Collaborate to Improve Neighborhood Outcomes.” cssp.org. 2013. 22  Ibid.

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families and communities is to “ensure that all children and families are supported by

federal policy and funding that is aligned with a common set of results.”23

The Promise Zone Initiative: A Case Study

I have chosen Obama’s Promise Zone Initiative (PZI) as a case study, since it

offers the best example of contemporary policy with a holistic patchwork approach to

social programs. The White House’s Promise Zone Fact Sheet professes just such an

approach: “it takes a collaborative effort – between private business and federal, state,

tribal and local officials; faith-based and non-profit organizations; children and parents –

to ensure that hard work leads to a decent living for every American, in every

community.”24 The PZI is “a place-based idea that will foster partnerships between the

federal government and communities, leverage local investments and increase access to

tools and resource that will help leaders revitalize their communities.”25 The lofty goals

continue, with US Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)’s website

asserting,

The Promise Zone Initiative will revitalize high-poverty communities across the country by creating jobs, increasing economic activity, improving educational opportunities, reducing serious and violent crime, leveraging private capital, and assisting local leaders in navigating federal programs and cutting through red tape.26 Five of twenty Promise Zones have already been designated, and the second

round of selections is ongoing (see Figure 11 in the Appendix for a map of Zone

                                                                                                               23  Center for the Study of Social Policy. “Aligning Resources and Results: How Policymakers and Communities Can Collaborate to Improve Neighborhood Outcomes.” cssp.org. 2013. 24  The White House, Office of the Press Secretary. “Fact Sheet: President Obama’s Promise Zones Initiative.” www.whitehouse.gov. 8 Jan 2014. 25  Center for the Study of Social Policy. “Public Policy & Community Change Brief.” cssp.org. July 2013. 26 OneCPD Planning and Resource Exchange. “Promise Zones.” HUD. 2013.

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locations).27 In practical terms, the Promise Zone designation offers no new funding, but

is intended to “help communities make the most of funding that is already available to

them.”28 Promise Zones will receive preference for certain Federal Programs and tax

breaks (see Figure 12 in the Appendix for full list of planned components to the

initiative).29

The PZI is intended to replicate the “wild success” of the Harlem Children’s Zone

(HCZ), which covers a 90-block stretch of Central Harlem. The HCZ aims to support the

neighborhood’s children from the moment they’re born until they leave for college with

an integrated ‘Promise Pipeline’ of 20 programs (see Figure 13 in the Appendix).30

HCZ’s “emphasis is not just on education, social service, and job re-creation, but also on

rebuilding the very fabric of community life.”31 The HCZ’s mission statement outlines its

guiding philosophy:

The Harlem Children’s Zone is developing a new paradigm intended to overcome the limitations of traditional approaches by systematically coordinating programs focused on the critical needs of children and families and targeted efforts to rebuild community infrastructure.32

The HCZ has had remarkable success across a variety of metrics ranging from

Math and English test scores to college-preparedness to high school graduation

                                                                                                               27  The first five Zones, located in San Antonio, Philadelphia, Los Angeles, Southeastern Kentucky, and the Choctaw Nation of Oklahoma, have each put forward a plan on how they will partner with local business and community leaders to make investments that reward hard work and expand opportunity. The White House, Office of the Press Secretary. “Fact Sheet: President Obama’s Promise Zones. 2014. 28  Ibid.  29  OneCPD Planning and Resource Exchange. “Promise Zones.” HUD. 2013. 30  These programs range from adult classes for expectant parents to after-school programs, asthma care,

and precollege counseling to broader community initiatives like block organizations, park and playground refurbishment, and help for tenants in buying buildings from the city. Harlem Children’s Zone, Inc. “The HCZ Project.” www.hcz.org.

31  The Bridgespan Group. “Harlem Children’s Zone: Transforming the Organization while Scaling Up in a Tightly-Defined Local Service Area.” bridgespan.org. Oct 2005.  32  Harlem Children’s Zone, Inc. “Growth Plan FY 2001-FY 2009.” www.hcz.org.

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and incarceration rates (see Appendix, Fig. 14-15).33 These results are wonderful,

but it would be a serious mistake to assume that replicating these outcomes across

the nation with the Promise Zone Initiative will be easy or straightforward.

Obstacles to the Promise Zone Initiative’s Prospects for Success

Though initially lauded as “nothing short of revolutionary,”34 the PZI faces

significant barriers. While the initiative has the potential to do more for hard-hit

communities than any preceding policy efforts, the Promise Zone Initiative’s glaring lack

of funding needs to be addressed if is to have any chance of effectively combatting

chronic inequality. Paul Trough of The New York Times Magazine originally commended

its “blueprint for a more coordinated, more effective, more responsive way to direct the

often haphazard flow of government money into urban neighborhoods devastated by the

multiple effects of concentrated poverty," this blueprint has yet to come to fruition.35

Obama initially pledged to devote a “few billion dollars a year” to the PZI, but

this funding has not materialized.36 Instead, in large part because of the economic

recession, the Obama administration’s approach has ended up conforming pretty closely

to the traditional Great Society approach of funneling money directly to the poor through

benefits and transfers.37 Federal government funding for nonmilitary discretionary

                                                                                                               33  Harlem Children’s Zone, Inc. “The HCZ Project.” www.hcz.org. 34  Erickson, Amanda. “Why Hasn’t the Harlem Children’s Zone Been Replicated Even Without Obama’s

Help?” The Atlantic Cities. 16 Aug 2012. 35  Tough, Paul. “What Does Obama Really Believe In?” New York Times Magazine. 15 Aug 2012.  36  Erickson, Amanda. “Why Hasn’t the Harlem Children’s Zone Been Replicated Even Without Obama’s

Help?” The Atlantic Cities. 16 Aug 2012. 37  Cohen, Rick. “President Obama Unfurls a New Place-Based Program: Promise Zones.” Non-Profit Quarterly. 10 Jan 2014.

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programs is on track to be “lower in real terms than before the Great Recession and to fall

to a historic low as a share of GDP.”38

Although its model, the Harlem Children’s Zone, boasts ample private funding,

most, if not all, of the 20 Promise Zones will struggle to find comparable support. Susan

Greenbaum of Al Jazeera argues that HCZ’s extremely high funding levels are “not

replicable in most other places.”39 Under Geoffery Canada’s leadership, the HCZ has

“always had exceptional opportunities to leverage money.”40 In 2009, the HCZ had assets

of nearly $200 million, two-thirds of it from private donations. 41 Stan Druckenmiller, a

board members and one of Canada’s college friends, happens to be a billionaire hedge-

fund manager; the rest of the HCZ board boasts similarly wealthy philanthropists like

billionaire Kenneth Langone and Goldman Sachs president Gary Cohn. Brookings

analyst Grover Washington expresses concern with the PZI’s current funding situation:

“My quarrel is not with an effort in Harlem funded largely with philanthropy, it’s with

the federal approach to scaling this up.”42 Marquitta Speller, principal of one of the HCZ

schools, sums up the problem succinctly: “I don’t think you can experience the same

level of success without the same level of resources.”43

The Promise Zone Initiative does not have to be doomed by its current lack of

funding, though. In addition to seeking out private philanthropists, the PZI should take

                                                                                                               38  D’Andrea Tyson, Laura & Greenblatt, Jonathan. “Opportunity for All and Social Innovation: Obama’s Policy Agenda.” New York Times, Economix. 14 April 2014. 39  Greenbaum, Susan. “Obama’s Promise Zones a Weak Brew of Recycled Ingredients.” Al-Jazeera. 16 Jan 2014. 40  Erickson, Amanda. “Why Hasn’t the Harlem Children’s Zone Been Replicated Even Without Obama’s

Help?” The Atlantic Cities. 16 Aug 2012. 41  The Bridgespan Group. “Harlem Children’s Zone: Transforming the Organization while Scaling Up in a Tightly-Defined Local Service Area.” bridgespan.org. Oct 2005. 42  Otterman, Sharon. “Lauded Harlem Schools Have Their Own Problems.” New York Times. 12 Oct 2010.  43  Ibid.  

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advantage of innovative investment solutions like impact investment in the vein of the

Social Innovation Fund and the Pay for Success initiative.44 The Fund makes competitive

grants to social sector intermediaries like foundations and nonprofits as well as social

enterprises, requiring “up to a three-to-one match of private money with government

dollars.”45 The fund enjoys bipartisan support in the Senate, reflected in the 2014

omnibus budget, which increased resources for the fund to $70 million, the highest level

in its five-year history, from $47 million.46  Similarly, the Pay for Success Initiative uses

‘social impact bonds’ wherein the government sets a specific, measurable target for a

social program and attracts an investor to fund the program. This ‘outcome financing’

approach is especially promising, since the investor can earn a return but bears the risk of

the program’s failure; since the government pays only for success, investors are

motivated to fund effective social programs and to do all they can to ensure their

investments pay off.47 Correctly applied to the PZI, these strategies could pump enough

capital into Promise Zones to give these communities a real chance at success.  

However, aside from fiscal concerns, the PZI also runs the risk of alienating the

very people it seeks to serve. Unlike the HCZ, which is tightly integrated into the fabric

of Central Harlem, a close-knit, culturally vibrant community, most Promise Zones have

no comparable default network to build from. Currently, the community members of the

Zones themselves are not included as ‘stakeholders,’ a list that includes public officials,

                                                                                                               44  D’Andrea Tyson, Laura & Greenblatt, Jonathan. “Opportunity for All and Social Innovation: Obama’s Policy Agenda.” New York Times, Economix. 14 April 2014. 45  The Social Innovation Fund was one of the first projects of the new White House Office of Social Innovation and Civic Participation, established by Obama in early 2009. The Fund has already awarded

$175 million in grants and has catalyzed over $420 million in philanthropic capital. Ibid.  

46  Jolin, Michele. “Social Innovation in Washington, D.C.” Stanford Social Innovation Review. Summer 2011. 47  Ibid.  

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schools, housing authorities, police, private developers, and participating nonprofit

organizations.48 This is deeply problematic, since it sends the patronizing message that

the Zones will be imposed upon communities by outside forces rather than designed

through dialogue and cooperation with community members. Besides increasing distrust

among residents, this approach fails to respect and utilize these members’ vital

understanding of their communities’ sociopolitical and cultural context.49

Replicating the HCZ on a national level requires a tricky balancing act: each

program must be tailored to the needs of its particular community while simultaneously

preserving the coherence of the initiative as a whole. “Barriers [will be] created if

decisions are made void of a clear understanding of what a community needs and feels,”

something that is difficult to achieve in even one place, much less 20 disparate

communities.50 At the same time, though, the entire initiative rests upon the premise of

coordinating the efforts of different agencies and departments. Navigating the push-pull

between efficient overall coordination and sensitive engagement with communities’

unique situations will be a challenge, requiring community leaders who can emulate

Canada’s guiding role within the HCZ. Amanda Erickson argues that for the HCZ model

to “work in other cities, it would need a similarly passionate, visionary leader.”51 Without

these three features – adequate funding, member engagement and participation, and

strong community leadership – the Promise Zones face an uncertain future.

                                                                                                               48  Greenbaum, Susan. “Obama’s Promise Zones a Weak Brew of Recycled Ingredients.” Al- Jazeera. 16 Jan 2014. Watson, Bernardine. “Are the Obama Administration’s ‘Promise Zones’ a Promising Anti-Poverty Strategy?” The Washington Post. 13 Oct 2013. 49  Schlanger, Danielle. “Obama’s Urban Affairs Office Brings Hope But Not Much Change.” Huffington Post. 26 July 2013. 50  Erickson, Amanda. “Why Hasn’t the Harlem Children’s Zone Been Replicated Even Without Obama’s Help?” The Atlantic Cities. 16 Aug 2012. 51 Ibid.

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Conclusion

Inequality in the United States looms larger than ever, threatening to eclipse the

American Dream entirely. As a presidential candidate, Obama asserted that if we want to

end poverty, we need to “heal the entire community.”52 But in the current climate of

political gridlock and monied interests, turning things around for those trapped in cycles

of poverty seems almost like wishful thinking. In lieu of redistributive taxes and transfers

or a total political overhaul, community-based social programs are the best candidates for

reducing inequality and supporting communities stuck in concentrated poverty.

The Obama administration has prioritized its commitment to this approach,

modeling its Promise Zone Initiative after the Harlem Children’s Zone’s program

pipeline. The PZI aims to tackle inequality through a patchwork of community programs

and coordinated governmental assistance. However, Obama’s PZI lacks crucial features

that have enabled the HCZ to function so well: ample funding sources, understanding of

the community context through engagement of residents, and clear community leadership

figures. The PZI risks repeating the old mistakes of it predecessors.53 The Promise Zone

Initiative constitutes an important, yet flawed, plan to tackle the underlying social drivers

of inequality; rather than giving up on it entirely, coordinated efforts should be made

address its weaknesses and allow it to fulfill its promise to Americans.

                                                                                                               52 Erickson, Amanda. “Why Hasn’t the Harlem Children’s Zone Been Replicated Even Without Obama’s Help?” The Atlantic Cities. 16 Aug 2012. 53  Clinton’s Enterprise Zones and Renewal Communities Sawhill, I.V., and Baron, J. “Federal Programs f or Youth: More of the Same Won’t Work.” Youth Today. May 2010.

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Appendix

Figure 1: US Mean Family Income Distribution 2000-2006

(Piketty & Saez, 2008)

Figure 2:

Income Share of the Top 1 Percent: 1913-2011

(Piketty & Saez, World Top Incomes Database)

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Figure 3: American Incomes are Losing Their Edge, Except at Top

Inflation-adjusted, after-tax income over time – in 2014 dollars

(Luxembourg Income Study Analysis, Leonhart, David & Quealy, Kevin. “The American Middle Class is No Longer the World’s Richest.” New York Times. 2014.)

Figure 4:

Minimum Wage in the US: Outpaced by Inflation

(Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2013)

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Figure 5: Median Wealth Ratios between Whites and Minorities, 1984-2009

(Pew Research Center, 2012)

Figure 6:

United States Tom Marginal Income Tax Rate, 1913-2003

(Internal Revenue Service, 2004)

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Figure 7: Taxes and Inequality: Lessons From Abroad

(Lane Kentworthy, data from Luxembourg Income Study database, 2008)

Figure 8: US Party Polarization 1879-2013 across House and Senate

(Polarized America, voteview.com, 2013)

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Figure 9: Strong Upswing in Campaign Contributions in the Top 0.01 Percent of Households

(Piketty & Saez, 2013)

Figure 10: Investing in Early Childhood Education: Benefits and Costs

(Barnett, 2004)

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Figure 11: Locations of first 5 Promise Zones

(http://www.freedomworks.org/content/central-planners-latest-buzzphrase-promise-zones-0, 2014)

Figure 12: Promise Zone Initiative Components, from HUD website

Accountability for Clear Goals: Each Promise Zone has identified clear outcomes they will pursue to revitalize their community, with a focus on creating jobs, increasing economic security, expanding access to educational opportunities and quality, affordable housing, and improving public safety. All Promise Zones will continuously track those outcomes, and have committed to sharing data across their community partners (private-sector, non-profits, federal, state, and local agencies, etc.)

Intensive Federal Partnership: Each Promise Zone will receive federal staff that will work on the ground, side-by-side local staff, to help communities break down regulatory barriers, use existing funds more effectively, and implement their economic visions…These first 5 Promise Zones will benefit from intensive federal support at the local level to help them implement their economic and community development goals.

Help Accessing Resources: Promise Zones will be able to access federal investments that further the goals of job creation, additional private investment, increased economic activity, improved access to educational opportunities and affordable housing, and reduction in violent crime. Promise Zones will receive priorities in accessing resources from up to 10 agencies: the Corporation for National and Community Service; the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Education, Health and Human Services, Housing and Urban Development, Justice, Labor, and the Treasury; and the Small Business Administration.

National Service: Each Promise Zone will be provided five full-time AmeriCorps VISTA members to support their strategic plan. These VISTAs will recruit and manage volunteers, and strengthen the capacity of Promise Zones to expand economic opportunity.

Cutting Taxes for Businesses: Proposed tax cuts on hiring and investment in Promise Zones – based upon Empowerment Zones tax credits – to attract businesses and create jobs.

(OneCPD Planning and Resource Exchange. “Promise Zones.” HUD. 2013.)

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Figure 13: Visual mapping of PZI programmatic structure, after the style of the Harlem Children’s

Zone

(LISC Institute for Comprehensive Community Development, http://www.instituteccd.org/news/3265)

Figure 14:

Outcomes for Harlem Children’s Zone program participants, from age 5 to age 40

(HighScope, http://www.highscope.org/)

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Figure 15: Mean Test Scores for 2008 winners and losers of lottery for the HCZ Promise Academy,

controlling for gender and income, compared to average results of White and Black students in New York City

(from Fryer and Dobbie’s 2011 paper “Are High Quality Schools Enough to Increase Achievement Among the Poor?

Evidence from the Harlem Children’s Zone,” 2011)

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