Return Migration in Western Europe Current policy trends and their implications,

in particular for the second generation.*

BY HAN ENTZINGER**

1. INTRODUCTION

The present employment crisis in most countries of Western Europe has hit the immigrants in these countries even more severely than the original population. In particular, unemployment is high among the immigrants of the second generation, many of whom have been born in Western Europe, and for that reason cannot be considered ‘immigrants’ in the strict sense (Widgren, 1982, p. 2 I?).

In various countries these developments have led to a shift in attitudes towards immigrants, which has had implications that reach far beyond their role in the labour market. Sometimes, such shifts have found an expression in government policy for immigrants: a stronger emphasis has been put on promoting return migration as a policy aim.

The immigrants themselves, of course, as well as their children, have not remained unaffected by these changes. Their prospects for a fuller participation in the societies of Western Europe have not become brighter, and many of them have begun to reconsider return migration as a serious alternative. 1)

Yet, actual return migration is not increasing. One of the reasons for this is that sufficient opportunities for an adequate (re)insertion into the countries of origin are lacking. After all, those countries are also going through a crisis; a crisis which appears to be even more severe than the one in Western Europe.

Under these circumstances, thinking of the future of the immigrants does not always give rise to great optimism. One should not attempt to hide that in this respect, the interests of the industrialized countries of Europe are often opposed to those of the migrants’

*This article is based on a report prepared by the same author for the UNDPIILO European ReBonal Project for Second-generation Migrants. The report was presented and discussed at a Tripartite meeting on the Reintegration of Second-generation migrants in cases of voluntary return, held in Belgrade (Yugoslavia) from 17-19 October 1984. The ideas expressed in this report are those of the author and not necessarily those of the International Labour Organisation.

** Dr. H. Entzinger is a staff member of the Netherlands Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR) in The Hague. As a sociologist he has been involved in a large number of research projects on various aspects of international migration and the situation of immigrant minorities.

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countries of origin. This phenomenon tends to victimize the immigrants themselves in the first place. It will be clear that a solution to these problems can only be found through a concerted action ofthe countries ofdeparture and the countries ofdestination. Hence, the need for a close international co-operation seems stronger than ever before.

Fortunately, there do exist several examples of such forms ofco-operation. In this paper we shall be examining some of those examples. We shall also try to assess their effects on the migrants concerned, in particular their effect on young migrants; the so-called second generation.

Before we can do so, however, we shall briefly discuss current trends in government policy as regards return migration in various Western European countries. Our next step will be to analyze the implications of these policies for the present and future situation of the migrants. There is a tendency, especially among certain members of the second generation, to emphasize differences in ethnic belonging between themselves and the original population of the countries where they live. Should this be seen as an illustration of their wish to ‘return’, and, if so, what measures could be taken to facilitate those returns, and to improve their chances of success?

At the end of this paper, several suggestions for action will be made, both for the countries where the migrants actually reside and for the countries where they would like to settle (again).

2. CURRENT TRENDS IN RETURN-RELATED POLICIES IN WESTERN EUROPE

2.1. The changing situation of foreign immiwants

Just over a decade ago, labour migration from the European periphery and North Africa to the highly industrialized Central, Western and Northern parts of Europe virtually came to a halt. At that time migrant workers accounted for an average of about 10 per cent of the labour force in Europe’s major countries of immigration. During the following years the migrants’ contribution to the economies of those countries continued to be essential in many cases, but the need for new foreign workers had disappeared rather suddenly.

As the economic growth in the industrialized countries slowed down further and even began to stagnate, more people in those countries began to question the need for a continuing presence of such large groups of immigrants. Under these circumstances, most governments felt obliged to develop certain policy measures to encourage their return.

This is not to say that there was no return migration before the recruitment of foreign workers was stopped. During those years, which began in the late 1950’s, some countries had based their so-called guest worker policies on the principle of rotation. In particular, this was the case in the Federal Republic ofGermany, the Netherlands and in Switzerland. Yet, as long as the economic growth in these countries continued, there was often little need to enforce the return of those foreign workers who preferred to stay on. Other countries had opted less explicitly (France, Belgium and Luxembourg), or not at all (Sweden), for a guest worker policy. Of course, return migration did take place from those countries as well, but nearly always on a voluntary basis. *)

With the disappearance of the need for new foreign workers, admission regulations have become much stricter in all countries of Western Europe, except in the case of international migration within a common labour market such as, for instance, the European Community and the Nordic countries. In most countries, family reunification has also been made more difficult, although in this respect there are important differences from one country to another.

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The major issue which the former labour importing countries were faced with, however, was what should be done about those foreign workers and their family members who were already present at the time ofthe recruitment halt. It should be stressed again here, that the majority of these workers continued to be needed in the labour market.

In a French study by Le Pors, for instance, it was concluded in 1976 that if there had been 250,000 forced departures of migrant workers, only some 80,000 native workers could be found to fill the vacancies (Le Pors, 1977). In spite of the recent rise in unemployment all over Europe, similar conclusions may be drawn from a much more recent study by UNESCO (Thomas, 1982).

This very rise in unemployment has created serious problems for newcomers in the labour market in particular. Among those newcomers, immigrants of the second generation and also women who belong to the first generation, are strongly represented. For the few new jobs that become available, they have to compete with indigenous youngsters and women. There is strong empirical evidence that the chances for immigrants in this competition are' very limited (Widgren, 1982). This is a result of their insufficient educational qualifications, the language barrier, the second class legal status which they often possess, and also the discriminatory behaviour among potential employers; briefly, a lack of, or inadequate, opportunities for integration.

Another development which has occurred in the countries of Western Europe is that the average length of stay of all immigrants has risen considerably. Contrary to what had been expected in many cases, immigration - although initially thought of as a temporary phenomenon - turned out to be ofa permanent, or at least a semi-permanent, nature. With the exception of the Federal Republic of Germany, all governments of the immigration countries have now formally acknowledged this, albeit in some cases, such as the Netherlands, after a long and painful process (Entzinger, 1984; Hammar, 1985).

In 1975, for instance, only 12.0 per cent of all Turks living in the Federal Republic of Germany had a residence record of eight years or more; by 198 1 this percentage had increased to 48.5. For the Yugoslavs these percentages stood at 12.9 in 1975 and at 7 1.8 in 198 1. For the Spaniards, the third largest national group in the Federal Republic after the Turks and the Yugoslavs, it went up from 37.2 per cent in 1975 to 81.6 per cent in 1981.

The continuing presence of a substantial foreign population, and in some countries, its continuing growth, although at a much lower speed than before, have provoked serious integration problems for many immigrants and also for the original population3) (see Table I). An extensive analysis of these problems lies beyond the scope of this paper, but we may conclude here that all immigration countries have become aware now of the fact that such problems cannot be solved without some form of intervention by the public authorities.

Theoretically, such an intervention may be based on two different objectives: the promotion of integration or the encouragement of return migration. At first glance, these two appear to be strongly contradictory, but in practice both have been pursued simultaneously by most governments in Western Europe, often with different accents for different groups of immigrants, depending for instance on their length of residence or their nationality. In this paper, we will concentrate on return-related policies, both for the first and the second generation, but their close, although often ambiguous relationship with integration policies should be kept in mind by the reader.

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Table I . Trends i n the s ize of the foreign population in six immigrarion

count r ies , 1975 - 1982 (1975 = 100)

1978

!08

96

103

127

106

88

I 1979 1980 1981 1982

109 111 112 - 96 100 108 112

101 100 100 102

136 150 165 171

106 106 105 103

84 83 84 85

Belgium

FRG*)

France

Nether lands

Sweden

Switzer land 100

*) Federal Republ ic of Germany: d a t a for September 30th of preceding year.

Source: ca lcu la ted on the basis of national s ta t i s t ics , published by the OECD

(SOPEM1 1982).

2.2. A typology of return-related policies

A major distinction to be made in return-related policies is the one between forced and voluntary returns. ‘Forced’ return migration refers to those cases where the migrants’ return is a consequence of government administrative measures of which the individual migrant has no control. In cases of ‘voluntary’ return, the decision to go back is taken by the individual migrant himself, at least in principle. This does not imply that such a decision always reflects the migrant’s own free will. Family circumstances, for instance, may force him to return although he himself would have preferred to stay on.

Faced with the developments that we have described earlier, certain European governments have adopted an attitude designed to encourage the return of those foreigners whose temporary work or residence permits have expired.

In the Federal Republic of Germany, during the years 1973- 1976, the foreign labour forced declined by 600,000 workers, i.e. nearly one quarter of its original size of 2.6 million. The immigrants involved mainly had short residence records. Most of the immigrants who stayed behind had longer residence records, and it proved to be more difficult to incite them to return.

In Switzerland, the number of holders ofa temporary residence permit has decreased dramatically over the past ten years. Some of these people became permanent residents, but the majority returned - although many would have preferred to stay.

In 1974, the French Government also opted for a more active policy of return migration for certain immigrant groups. It could be observed that fora number of years this policy strongly undermined the migrants’ security of residence in France, including that of the second generation. There were

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numerous reports of foreign youngsters, many of them French-born and often unemployed, who were sent away to the country from which their parents had migrated, perhaps after having committed minor criminal offences (Cordeiro, 1983, p. 87 fQ. Since 1981, however, such practices have almost ceased.

In most European countries the side effect of these fairly rigorous administrative measures has been a significant increase in illegal immigration. Many migrants returned as illegals after having been denied the right to continued residence, and this created new and serious problems.

As fewer new immigrants were admitted to the countries of Western Europe, the share of foreign residents with a short-term permit decreased very rapidly, and the direct possibilities to promote forced returns were nearly exhausted. Consequently, most governments began to develop policy measures of a more indirect nature. In other words, they tried to make the continued presence of certain categories of migrants so unattractive that some of these migrants would see themselves as obliged to return.

This was the implicit reasoning, for instance, behind various measures taken by the Government ofthe Federal Republic of Germany in the second halfof the 1970’s. These measures mainly aimed at discouraging family reunification among foreign residents from outside the European Community (e.g. by lowering the maximum age for admission), and at preventing resident family members from entering the German labour market. It had been hoped that such measures would encourage return migration. Instead, family migration to the Federal Republic increased, since many migrants feared that, eventually, family reunification might be forbidden completely (Rist. 1980, p. 79 tt).

This latter step was actually taken by the French Government in 1974, but after severe political pressure, it was mitigated a year later.

In fact, virtually no major immigration country - with the possible exception of Sweden - has been able to avoid taking measures which it hoped would encourage return migration indirectly. Mention should be made here, for instance, of attempts to introduce quotas for resident foreigners in the labour market (France, Switzerland and the Netherlands) and the housing market (the Federal Republic of Germany and, more recently, Belgium), and also of the attempts to cut social security benefits for immigrants made by various governments (Entzinger, 1984).

As a general rule, nearly all such measures have not led to the increase of returns that had been hoped for. Their side effect, however, was that certain sectors of public opinion in Western Europe began to feel legitimized in their feelings that return is the ‘natural’ end of the migration process, and that immigrants who did not want to return should not be given the same rights as members of the original population (Hummur, 1984). It will be clear that these developments have harmed the integration process of all immigrants, and that they counteract other policy measures which aim at promoting the immigrants’ fuller participation in the receiving countries.

Various examples mentioned in the last paragraph illustrate that the distinction between forced and voluntary return is not always as clear-cut as it has previously been presented. Certain migrants, although legally entitled to stay on, have nevertheless decided to go home, and it is difficult, if not impossible, to figure out to what extent such returns have been the effect of the migrants’ own will. This issue will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 3.

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Yet, agood number ofmigrants have returned on a completely voluntary basis. In order to encourage this type of return, several European countries have set up special programmes. Some of these shall be discussed in the following sections, in which we shall concentrate on initiatives taken by the Federal Republic of Germany, France and the Netherlands, without, however, pretending to give a complete overview, not even for these three countries. Programmes of this type are meant to overcome constraints in the return process, and most of these constraints may be found either in the situation of the individual migrants themselves (2.3.) or in the situation found in their home countries (2.4.).

2.3. Policies directed at individual migrants

When the guest worker system was introduced in Europe it was thought that a few years work, with high wages, in an industrialized country, would enable these workers to save money, and to acquire better skills and qualifications. Not only would this guarantee a better future for them upon their return, but it would also contribute to the social and economic development of their home countries.

It is a well-known fact that many migrant workers have been able to save considerable sums of money, but if these savings were transferred to their home countries they were seldom invested in a productive manner. They were used mainly to finance the day-to-day cpsts of living of large numbers of relatives to the extent that, at times, the worker was doomed to stay forever in the country where he had found a - comparatively - well-paid job (Van den Berg-Eldering, 1979, p. 78). Thus, in many cases, the possibilities of saving money remained limited, and the same proved to be the case with the acquisition of relevant industrial experience that could be used after the migrants’ return.

Since both factors were thought to impede return migration, several countries in Western Europe decided to take measures of a financial nature (a) as well as measures in the field of vocational training (6).

(a) Financial incentives. The Netherlands was the first country in Western Europe to consider the promotion of voluntary return migration through a ‘departure bonus’.

In 1974, soon after the recruitment of new workers had almost been stopped, the Government of the Netherlands launched a plan to pay a Dfl. 5,000 bonus to every returning migrant. This plan, however, had to be withdrawn under parliamentary pressure because it was considered ‘inhumane’. The amount was said to be not more than ‘a tip’, and it was felt that this measure would not contribute to the home countries’ development. Instead, the Government was urged to intensify the search for an alternative return policy (Entzinger, 1978, p. 40).

France, on the contrary, did introduce in 1971 a ‘repatriation allowance’ of FF 10,000 for returning workers, whether employed or unemployed, plus FF 5,000 for each accompanying family member. Almost 100,000 returnees cashed this bonus, but the programme was stopped at the end of 1981 for three reasons (SOPEMI, 1982, p. 14 A):

(1) It was hardly used by the unemployed whose departure was desired most strongly by the French Government.

(2) It was hardly used by nationals of those countries to which the Government would have liked to see return migration increase.

(3) It was used primarily by migrants who had firm return plans anyway, and who saw the allowance mainly as an extra.

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During the years 1980- 1983 a special return programme - which included somewhat higher allowances as well as certain additional facilities - existed for Algerians wishing to return from France. It was based on a bilateral French-Algerian agreement, and about 25,000 Algerians had made use of it before it was discontinued in 1983 (Werner, 1983).

Yet another assistance programme was introduced by the French Government in the spring of 1984. By October of that same year some 1,400 applications had been submitted which would allow 4,500 workers and their family members to return under special conditions (Ministere des afaires sociales et de la solidaritk nationale, 1984).

Notwithstanding the somewhat discouraging experiences in the Netherlands and in France, the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany decided to introduce a return bonus for migrants of certain nationalities in November 1983. This measure was of a temporary nature: applications had to be made before July 1 st, 1984. The bonus, which amounted to DM 10,500 plus DM 1,500 for each accompanying child, could only be paid to migrants who had become unemployed (Heyden, 1984). Surprisingly, many foreigners showed their interest in this measure. During the first three months after it had become operative, 50,000 requests for information were made by potential returnees, but the actual number of applicants during that period remained limited to 5,000, of whom 3,000 had been accepted by the end of 1984 (Frankfurter Rundschau, 22-5- 1984). When the programme was stopped at the end of June 1984, 17,000 allowances had been awarded, most of these to Turkish migrants. This was slightly below the total number of 19,000 expected by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany when the programme was launched. The total amount involved was close to DM 2,000 million (NRC-Handelsblad, 3-8- 1984).

Also in other countries, discussions on the (re)introduction of financial incentives to encourage return migration have been intensified recently, in particular in Belgium and, again, in France, where new measures in this field are being considered by the respective governments. In the Netherlands, some large companies have been offering sums of up to Dfl. 25,000 to their foreign employees who wish to return. Since the recent outbursts of inter-ethnic tension in the French automobile industry, several firms in that country have been considering similar measures.

As a general rule, many foreign workers show an interest in such ‘departure bonuses’, but only a few ofthem actually submit an application. The major reason for the limited impact must be found in the level of the allowance. Migrants who leave and cash the return bonus always lose the right to return, and they often lose their entitlement to social security benefits. If the bonus equals, for example, not more than a few months of unemployment allowance to be paid in the country of residence, the incentive to apply for it is not really strong.

In order to overcome this problem, discussions have been initiated in several countries about the possibility of paying a much larger sum to returning migrants. That sum would be based then on a capitalization of the contributions that the individual migrant has been paying to the social security system during his years of employment. All countries in Western Europe that employ larger numbers of foreign workers have concluded social security agreements with certain countries oforigin. Under such agreements the retired or

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the disabled worker may continue to receive a pension after he has returned home, although the amount paid is usually much lower than what he would receive if he does not return.

In the year 1981 alone, for instance, close to Sfr. 3,000 million were made payable abroad under the Swiss pension scheme to more than 50,000 retired workers, most ofthem living in Italy (Muus a.o., 1983, p. 191). Since the end of 1983, the Federal Republic of Germany has also eased its pension regulations for returning migrants, and this has speeded up the return of 140,000 older migrants (NRC-Handelsblad, 3-8- 1984).

So far, such regulations have not been extended to other sectors of the social security system - the unemployment scheme for example. If this were the case, there can be little doubt that return migration would increase considerably, especially among the older unemployed migrants whose chances in the labour market in Western Europe have become very limited. Leaving aside legal constraints, however, the expenditures of any measure of this type would be so huge that it seems improbable that any government in Western Europe would be willing to opt for it. Yet, it should not be forgotten that the costs of an effective integration policy in these countries are also considerable. 4,

(b) Training facilities. As the lack of professional or vocational qualifications appeared to be one ofthe impediments for return migration, several countries opted for specific policy measures in this field. Most of these measures have been based on bilateral agreements with the migrants' countries oforigin, so as to ensure that the returnees could be reinserted into those countries in an adequate manner.

The Federal Republic of Germany was one of the first countries to launch such a programme. In the early 1970's, it signed an agreement with Turkey which provided for vocational and management training for Turkish workers who intended to return. The results of this programme were very disappointing. Not more than 56 Turks received training; most of them returned to Turkey, but eventually almost all went back again to the Federal Republic (Abadan-Unat a.o., 1976, p. 127-128; Adler, 1981, p. 70). The major reasons for this failure were dissatisfaction among the returnees about the labour conditions in Turkey, and financial difficulties between the two countries. In 1975 the programme was stopped, and since then vocational training for returning migrants has taken place only incidentally, mainly on a private basis.

In several other countries in Western Europe similar initiatives have been taken in the recent past. Most ofthese initiatives were launched by private companies, sometimes with a small state subsidy. Little research has been done into their results, but the general impression is that they have affected only very small numbers of returnees, and that many of them were faced with great difficulties upon their return. Some could not find a job of the type for which they had become qualified; others preferred to live off their savings or to start a small business, mostly in the tertiary sector. After some time many decided to go back to Western Europe, provided they were able to do so for legal reasons.

The only training programme that has been a relative success is the one set up in France.

It started in the late 1960's as the outcome of a bilateral agreement between France and Algeria, and for some time it also applied to nationals of other

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countries. It is being camed out by private training institutions in France such as the Central Fund for Economic Co-operation (Caisse centrale de cooperation economique). Most of these training activities in view of return are being financed by the French Government and the Social Action Fund (Fonds d’action sociafe). The latter draws its money partly from savings that stem from the reductions in family allowances payable to migrants’ family members who have remained in their own countries. In 1980 the costs of the programme were close to FF 28 million (Muus a.o., 1983, p. 181 a.

The relative success of this programme appears to stem from its basic philosophy, which is that a fruitful return and reinsertion can only be brought about by a joint effort of the two countries involved and also the migrant himself. This implies, among other things, that the countries of origin have a large say in the type of training courses offered, whilst, on the other hand, these countries provide certain job guarantees to the participants of the courses upon their return. A basic condition for this, of course, is that the countries of origin lack workers with certain qualifications that are needed for their economic development.

Until 1981, 2,000 migrant workers had returned under this programme, most of them Algerians. Of course, this is only a fraction of the estimated total of 60,000 to 70,000 returns which take place annually from France (Penninx, 1983, p. 25). Yet, the success of the programme is remarkable in comparison with that of similar training programmes in other countries.

The French return-training programme draws most of its participants from among adult immigrants with a certain residence record in France, who have well-defined plans to return, but who lack sufficient professional or vocational qualifications. Moreover, the programme also attracts growing numbers of second generation migrants, many of whom are confronted with high youth unemployment in France. The success of their participation in the programme appears to depend a great deal on their personal motivation to return, and on their employment prospects in the country of destination (Hommes et Migrations, No. 1043,1982). Therefore, a close co-operation between the two countries involved proves to be of vital importance for a successful continuation of such programmes.

2.4. Policies to improve structural conditions for return to the home countries

The disappointing experiences with the encouragement of individual returns have been caused partly by the lack of sufficient opportunities for returning migrants to become reinserted into the social and economic systems of their home countries. One should not forget that the discouraging economic prospects of many of those countries were the very reason why most migrants had left. Only a few traditional emigration countries, in particular Greece, Italy and Spain, have witnessed a certain economic upswing recently, and as a result have been able to accommodate substantial numbers of returnees in their labour markets.

In the majority of cases, however, there proved to be serious constraints for an effective reinsertion of returning migrant workers. Consequently, some Western European countries decided to intensify the search for instruments that could contribute to the economic development of the countries of origin of the migrants in a more structural manner. They have attempted to do so in two different ways:

(a) by using return migration as an instrument to improve the general economic situation in the home countries:

27 1

(6) by supporting certain initiatives in this field, taken by groups of (returning) migrants themselves.

(a) Return migration as an instrument for economic development. In 1974, after the foundering of its plans for a departure bonus, the Government of the Netherlands felt that it should assist the countries of origin in developing those regions from which many migrants originated, preferably by making use of the‘migrants’ savings. This would not only improve the living conditions ofthe people who had stayed behind, but it would also improve the opportunities for returning migrants, and hence increase their willingness to return.

In order to investigate the possibilities in this respect, the Government of the Netherlands financed a large-scale research project in Turkey, Morocco and Tunisia. This became known as the REMPLOD-project (Re-integration of Emigrant Manpower and the Promotion of Local Opportunities for Development), and it was camed out during the years 1974-1 977. The main results of this project have been described extensively by various authors, but on the whole they have been disappointing (Abadan-Unat a.o., 1976; Adler, 198 1 ; Penninx, 1982). As Penninx writes: ‘Direct positive effects for development from the flow of remittances and savings of migrants and returnees could be traced in quantitative terms, but seldom in qualitative ones. In both contexts a rather vulnerable growth has taken place, which is to a great deal dependent on the continuation of the flow of money from abroad. And it is questionable, at least, whether this flow from abroad will last for long’ (Penninx, 1982, p. 810).

Hence, infrastructural constraints, as well as diverging views between the (potential) returnees and the governments of their countries of origin, proved to be major drawbacks for the implementation of development programmes in which returnees could play a significant role. It should also be added here that, on the whole, most countries of origin are not really eager to grant special facilities to returning migrants because they feel that, in financial terms, these migrants are already better off than their fellow countrymen who have stayed behind. In some cases, social or political arguments have also been put forward for not granting special facilities to returning migrants.

While REMPLOD was on its way the Government of the Netherlands concluded several agreements with sending countries which would enable the latter to create jobs in areas of high emigration. These projects, however, proved to be not very successful, and the programme was stopped rather soon (Muus, u.o., 1983, p. 196 Q. Since that time the Netherlands continued to grant financial support to individual returning migrants who wanted to set up a small-scale business upon their return. This programme has cost Dfl. 14.5 million, ofwhich a large part have been loans at soft conditions. From 1977 onwards about 200 projects were approved under this programme, but as most of the project proved to fail fairly soon, the programme was discontinued in 1983 (Muus, a.o., 1983, p. 193 Q.

During the last few years both France and the Federal Republic of Germany have also concluded bilateral agreements with various countries of origin in view of promoting the economic development of these countries. Some of these programmes involve considerable sums of money: the Federal Republic, for instance, has agreed to pay DM

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400 million to Turkey. None of these agreements, however, are closely linked to return migration.

Mention should also be made here of the transfer of certain labour intensive industries to the migrants’ countries of origin. Such transfers have been facilitated by various governments in Western Europe - the Swiss Government for example - but they cannot really be considered to be part of a return programme (Maillut a.o., 1976, 1977).

(b) The support of initiatives by groups of migrants. After the disappointing results of the vocational training programme for individual returning migrants, the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany decided to approach the issue of voluntary return in a more structural manner. In this respect there is an interesting parallel between trends in the return policy of that country, and trends in the Netherlands which we have just analyzed.

Since the early 1970’s Turkish workers living abroad, in particular in the Federal Republic of Germany, have been investing part of their savings in Workers’ Companies which aim at setting up small- and medium-sized enterprises, mainly in the industrial sector, in Turkey. It was expected that such projects, in which some returning migrants might also be employed, would have a stimulating effect on the development of the Turkish economy. For that reason the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany decided to support those companies by, for example, subsidizing training management courses for shareholders and potential returnees. The companies’ activities in Turkey itself are being financed partly through a special fund, to which the Federal German and the Turkish Governments also contribute in equal parts (Penninx and Van Renselaar, 1977; Adler, 1981, p. 62 ll).

In an ILO study of 1978 it was found that 150,000 Turkish workers had bought shares in Workers’ Companies, which implies that one out of every four Turkish workers in Germany was a shareholder at that time ( Werth and Yalcintas, 1978, p. 23). The impact of the Workers’ Companies on Turkey is by no means negligible. Until 1982,128 enterprises had been set up under the programme, thus creating over 17,000 new jobs, of which about 2,400 were occupied by returned migrants. Another 100 enterprises were at a preparatory stage then, and these were meant to create another 14,000 jobs in Turkey (SOPEMI, 1982, p. 131).

The relative success of the Turkish Workers’ Companies has led the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany to conclude a similar agreement with Greece, while negotiations are under way with Yugoslavia. Of course, these companies are faced with constraints, partly because their views on the economic development of Turkey are not always in line with those of the Turkish Government. Moreover, the current economic crisis which also hits the members of the Turkish communities abroad, might have begun to affect their willingness to buy shares, and for that reason it could have a negative effect on the financial means of those companies in the future.

Yet, there is little doubt among various authors that the Turkish Workers’ Companies have been playing a useful role in the economic development of Turkey. Their return promoting effects, however, should not be overestimated. The 2,400 returns (excluding family members) to which they have led so far, should be seen against the average total annual return flow of about 75,000 Turks from the Federal Republic since the year 1978. Nevertheless, it is surprising to note that the initiative ofthe Federal Republic of Germany has not been adopted by any other country in Western Europe.

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2.5. Voluntary return programmes: reasons for their disappointing effects

From our preceding analysis of return-related policies in various Western European countries, we may conclude that there has been a gradual shift from the promotion of forced departures to the encouragement of return migration on a voluntary basis. This has largely been a consequence of the changing legal status of the majority of the immigrants. As their average length of stay increased, more migrants had become (semi-)permanent residents, and they could not longer be forced to leave.

We may also conclude that the potential interest in returning has remained strong among these migrants. Yet, the actual numbers of returns have been going down over the past years (see Table 2 as an illustration). The effects of the various schemes meant to encourage voluntary returns have remained below the expectations in nearly all cases. The major reasons for the limited impact of such programmes, no matter whether they are of an individual or of a structural nature, may be found in:

I ta l ians tM F

Swirzer land lir.5 11.2 5.7 5.9

Ne:her lands 4.7 4.6 4.4 3.8

Table 2: Swi tzer land , the Netherlands and the Federa l Repubhc of Germany: Returning migrants by c e r t a i n nat ional i t ies (and by sex) during 1976 and 1981, as a percentage of t h e t o t a l res ident population of t h a t nar ional i ty a t the beginning of those years

Moroccans Spaniards TurKs \I ugoslavs ILI F M F L\ F .L1 F

- - 15.9 16.0 11.7 14.3 11 .1 1a.1 - 5.8 5.8 6.4 5.6 8.1 7 .2

1.6 3.0 12.7 10.2 4.4 6.0 9.5 9.2 1.6 2.2 5.3 4.8 2.1 2.6 4.5 4.6

14.3 6.3 13.0 3.8

(a) The level of the return allowances. All departure bonuses that have been granted so far, equal not more than a few months salary (or unemployment allowance) in the country of residence as a maximum. Most of this money has to be spent by the migrants on the return trip itselfand on their reinstallation in the country of origin, and little will be left to ensure a decent living after that. It is not surprising, therefore, that most of these allowances have been cashed by migrants who already had firm return plans, and who would have returned anyway.

Under the present conditions, a return stimulating effect cannot be expected from such allowances. At the most, they may speed up a migrant’s planned return by a few months. Therefore, they should be considered mainly as an answer to an increasingly xenophobic public opinion in Western Europe.

13.6 12.1 11.1 5.0 k . S 6.3

(b) Lack of opportunities for the reinsertion of returning migrants into their home countries. The skills and qualifications of returning migrants are rarely tuned to the economic needs of their home countries. In those cases where they are, it is by no means

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certain that the returnees will be employed or want to be employed in the type ofjobs for which they would be qualified.

Most countries oforigin show a somewhat dualistic attitude in this respect. They are, of course, interested in the migrants’ financial remittances, which help lessen their trade deficits. Quite often, they are also interested in maintaining close cultural ties with their nationals living abroad. With only a few exceptions, however, they are not too keen on promoting their actual return, because, for various reasons, they find it difficult to accommodate these migrants (Kussirnuti, 1982). In this respect, as Muus points out, the interests of Western Europe and the migrants’ home countries are often opposed (Muus a.o., 1983, p. 4). This may be illustrated by the limited impact - in spite ofcertain small successes - of various training programmes and regional development schemes set up jointly by sending and receiving countries.

(c) Other constraints in the policies of the countries of Western Europe. As we shall discuss later, many migrants have a strong wish to return, but they constantly postpone their decision to do so for a variety of reasons. Some of these reasons are to be found in the policies of the countries where they reside. As a general rule, for instance, no country in Western Europe allows returned migrants to re-enter that country if the return is a failure. This makes migrants think twice before they give up the rights to which they are entitled at present.

Another factor that impedes return migration is that the entitlement to certain benefits of the social security system cannot be ‘exported‘ upon return. In most cases, old age pensions have been made exportable, but given the present age structure of the migrant population, this rule does not apply to many ofthem as yet. In all countries, however, there is a growing number of unemployed migrants who are already too old to have a realistic chance of ever being reinserted into the labour process. Many of them strongly wish to return, especially if their families have stayed behind, but they cannot do so because they would lose their only source of income.

In spite of the numerous constraints we have analyzed, return migration has been taking place and will continue to take place - also on a voluntary basis. The majority of these returns, however, are unattended and not really affected by any one of the programmes we have discussed. In order to get a better insight into these phenomena we shall now discuss the migrants’ own attitudes and behaviour in this respect. Here we shall concentrate on the second generation in particular.

3. THE MIGRANTS OWN VIEWS ON RETURN MIGRATION

3.1. From target worker to lifelong temporariness Our analysis of return related policies, both in the countries of Western Europe and in the countries of origin, has revealed that considerations at the national level do not always correlate very strongly with the attitudes of the individual migrant, nor with his actual behaviour.

For a better understanding of this discrepancy we shall have to recall briefly the migrants’ motives for leaving their home country. Most of them left for Western Europe as ‘target workers’ with a specific aim which they wanted to achieve with the money they could save there (e.g. a mamage, purchase of land, etc.). Their home country remained their point of reference, and return was seen as the natural end of the migration process.

These ambitions were very much in line with the basic philosophy of the guest worker policies, as adopted initially by many countries in Western Europe. In quite a few cases the

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guest worker system actually worked in this way, particularly during its first few years. As time went by, however, the migration process became much more complex. During that process, various changes occurred which made the target worker into an emigrant, without the migrant himself being fully aware of such changes and their consequences.

Some of these changes occur in the migrants’ country of origin, and they make it impossible for the individual migrant to achieve the target set before his departure. As a result of heavy emigration from certain regions, for instance, there is a heavy influx of foreign capital into those regions, stemming from individual remittances. Consequently, the price level of land, houses, dowries, etc. increases considerably. This not only disturbs the infrastructure of high emigration areas in many ways, but it also implies that the individual migrant requires more time to reach his target. As a result of his continuing interest in reaching a better standard of living upon returning to his home country, the migrant is doomed to stay abroad, perhaps even until his retirement age (Abadan- Unat a.o., 1976; Van den Berg-Eldering, 1979).

In many cases the target of the migrant may change as well while he is staying abroad. Some migrants gradually become aware of the impossibility of achieving what they intended to achieve. They may decide to give up their initial plans and return disillusioned. Quite often, they may be forced to do so for family reasons, or because they lose their job in the country of temporary residence and are no longer entitled to stay there.

The change of target is less clear among migrants who do not return. Those who do go back may be disillusioned, but in any case they have taken a firm decision, whether they were forced to do so or not - irrespective ofthe empirical fact that some may regret that decision after some time and try to go back to Western Europe.5)

Those who stay behind, on the contrary, rarely decide to do so deliberately, but in most cases this is merely the outcome of a continuing postponement of their return. Even when the original target has been reached, it may have been reformulated in the meantime, and the aspirations of the migrant may have been set at a higher level. More often, however, the ‘non-decision’ to stay is influenced by the continuing lack of opportunities in the home countries. As time goes by, the migrant becomes used to the income level and the consumption habits in his country of ‘temporary’ residence. In order to avoid a further alienation between himself and his family members, or in an attempt to increase the total family income, he makes his family join him. Consequently, he is forced to spend more money in the country of residence, and his remittances to his home country stagnate or decrease: the original target is further away than ever before.

Yet, the strong identification with his home country or region persists, and so does his willingness to return there eventually, although the plans may become less concrete as the years go by.

Uqar, for instance, reports about a survey he held among a sample ofTurkish workers living in West Berlin. He found that only 4 per cent of the Turks, with a residence record of more than seven years in West Berlin, intended to stay there for good. Almost 40 per cent planned to return within the next few years, whilst almost 60 per cent were undecided (Ucar, 1982, p. 221).

Slightly different data were found by Shadid in his survey among Moroccan workers in the Netherlands, but the tendency is almost as clear. Of all Moroccans who had been staying in the Netherlands for eight years or more, 22 per cent planned to return, 26 per cent planned to stay, whilst the remaining 52 per cent claimed to be undecided (Shadid, 1979, p. 166).

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3.2. The migrants’ reasons for returning

The manifest or latent wish to return sooner or later, as expressed by so many migrants, contrasts sharply with the actual numbers returning, and also with the limited effect ofthe various programmes to encourage voluntary return migration. Three hypotheses may be formulated that account for this discrepancy:

(a) The programmes are not sufficiently attractive (financially or for other reasons) to encourage migrants to return on a voluntary basis. After our earlier analysis of a number of programmes set up to encourage return migration, there can be little doubt about the validity of this hypothesis.

(b) The programmes do not really fit in either with the actual situation in which returning migrants find themselves, or with their needs.

(c) The expressed wish to return should be seen as a ‘substitute’ for other attitudes or feelings.

As we shall see, all three aspects may play a role in the individual migrant’s decision-making process as regards his return. In many cases they even tend to reinforce each other.

The inadequacy of voluntary return programmes to cope with the actual situation and the real needs of returning migrants, as we supposed under (b), may become apparent from an analysis of the argument that returning migrants actually put forward for their return. Of course, doing research on such matters is a very delicate affair. One can expect, for instance, that few migrants will openly admit that they have failed to reach their target. Hence, they may try to rationalize their return by putting forward other arguments.

Yet, the scarce studies that have been camed out among returning or returned migrants show that personal circumstances play a very important role in their decision to go back.

In his ILO study among Italians who had returned from Switzerland, Musillo found that out of his sample of 40 respondents, 23 had mainly returned for ‘family reasons’, and nine for ‘health reasons’. Only seven Italians had returned for ‘reasons of employment’ in the first place, but this did not always imply that they had become unemployed in Switzerland, and that they had been forced by the Swiss authorities to leave for that reason (Musillo, 198 1, p. 29 I?).

A French study camed out in 1977 and 1978 among returned Spanish migrants indicates that most of these migrants mentioned ‘integration problems’, experienced in particular by their children in the French school system, as the major reason for their departure. Unemployment in France was the second motive, even though the respondents may not have been affected by it personally (Muus a.o., 1983, p. 169).

In the REMPLOD project, initiated by the Government of the Netherlands, it was found in 1975 that among 546 Turks who had returned to the Bogazliyan district, 24.4 per cent claimed that family circumstances had compelled them to come back. Ill-health motivated another 27.6 per cent and 10 per cent were more or less turned out for working illegally. Among the 8.7 per cent claiming ‘other reasons’ many had been called home for military service (Abadan- Unat a.o., 1976, p. 190).

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In all cases mentioned, family circumstances or ill-health were among the major reasons for (voluntary) return. This is the type of return we have qualified as ‘returns of disillusion’. The bulk of those returns take place unplanned. Often the final decision to leave is taken rather suddenly, as for instance, upon the death of a family member, an accident at work, or as a result of serious school problems for the children. Any programme set up to encourage voluntary return migration, is not very likely to influence the decision of this important category of returnees. Under the circumstances mentioned, we may conclude that it is not very likely either that they will make use of the facilities provided by those programmes.

We may also conclude that, since so many returns take place suddenly and unexpectedly, there cannot be a strong relationship, at the individual level, between the migrant’s expressed wish to return and his actual departure.

3.3. The ‘return myth’ as an expression of integration problems

This latest conclusion supports our hypothesis mentioned under (c). According to this hypothesis the expressed wish to return should be seen as a substitute for other attitudes or feelings.

There is ample statistical evidence that, as time goes by, the incidence of return migration decreases. As we saw before, however, this does not imply that large numbers of individual migrants have given up their plans for an eventual return. Even though their original target may have been abandoned or modified, they continue to identify strongly with the country or the region from which they stem. This identification finds its expression in the persisting wish to return. Actual return plans, however, tend to become less concrete, and the return wish gradually turns into a ‘return myth’, with a strong ideological connotation.

In 1980, for instance, Mehrlander camed out a survey among migrants from the (former) recruitment countries living in the Federal Republic of Germany. 75 per cent of the respondents, selected on a random basis, said they intended to return - ranging from 60 per cent for the Turks to 93 per cent for the Portuguese. The others were undecided or they preferred to stay. Asked about concrete return plans, however, almost four out of every five migrants said they did not have any (Mehrliinder ao., 1981).

Similar results were found by Schoneberg in her recent survey among various immigrant groups in the Federal Republic of Germany and in Switzerland, and also in Shadid’s survey among Moroccans in the Netherlands (Schiineberg, 1982, p. 448 ; Shadid, 1979, p. 166).

It should be clear by now, that the way a migrant identifies himself with his home country changes as time goes by. During his holidays there, he understands that both he and his home society have changed, but in different ways. He also becomes aware of the extent to which he has grown accustomed to life in a Western European society, although he finds it painful to admit. Consequently, the home country gradually becomes a source of ‘romanticized memories’ (Muus u.o., 1983, p. 8). The psychological function of such memories, comparable to idealized youth memories among aging people in general, has been described in a convincing manner by the Belgian anthropologist Roosens. He notes that such memories and the image of the home country in general help overcome problems and frustrations of individual adaptation which the migrant encounters in his country of residence (Roosens, 1982).

Such feelings are experienced by many immigrants simultaneously, and therefore they may develop into a group ideology. The major function of that ideology is that it serves as

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a focus for feelings of belonging and togetherness, against the ‘outside world’ which is often becoming increasingly hostile. Although it may find its expression in the wish to return, it has little to do with actual return plans in reality. The problem with this ‘ideology of return’, which in fact is an ‘ideology ofethnicity’, is that it is often understood in its literal meaning by the population and, for political reasons, also, by the authorities of many countries in Western Europe.

Would like to r e t u r n

Would like to s tay

undecided

4. A RETURN POLICY FOR THE SECOND GENERATION AS WELL?

4.1. Immigrant youngsters wishing to ‘return’

The ideological character of the ‘return myth’, discussed in the previous chapter, is most evident among the second generation of immigrants. Many of them have been born in Western Europe, or arrived there at a very young age. For these youngsters, ‘return migration’ often should be understood as ‘emigration’ to the country from which their parents originate, and which they only know from their holidays and from the ‘romanticized memories’ of their parents. Yet, various social scientists report a strong return wish also among the second generation.

A recent survey, for instance, carried out by the University of Amsterdam among Turkish and Moroccan youngsters in the Netherlands, shows that 39 per cent of these youngsters would like to ‘return’, and that another 39 per cent prefer to stay. The remaining 22 per cent are undecided. It is particularly striking to note that the younger the age at which the respondents have come to the Netherlands, the stronger is their wish to return (Van Schelven and De Vries, 1983; see Table 3).

In her survey among foreign migrants in the Federal Republic of Germany, Mehrlander found the return wish to be stronger in the age group of 15 to 24 than in the age group between 25 and 40. Only very few young people, however, claimed to have concrete return plans (Mehrlander a. o., 198 1).

Arr ived prior

to 12th year

50 %

2s d 22 8

Arrived at

I I2 or older

+ 37 0

41 %

22 %

100 s I ;1

Source: Van Schelven h De Vries 1982, p . 43

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The statistics that are available for various countries in Western Europe do not allow for firm conclusions as regards the actual incidence of return migration among the second generation. Returns from the Netherlands, for example, are reported to be relatively high for children up to 14, but this is possibly an effect of frequent ‘commuter migration’ among some school children. Among the adolescents, return migration is below the average for all age groups for the Netherlands, but it is above that average for Switzerland (Muus u.o., 1983, pp. 90 and 136). In the latter case, however, a good number of returns may be labelled as forced returns of young workers with an expired temporary residence permit.

It has also been reported that those non-dependent youngsters who do return encounter serious reinsertion problems. For obvious reasons, their savings are very limited. They also show a strong preference to settle in the big cities of their home countries - many of which are overpopulated already and have great employment problems (Muus u.o., 1983, p. 179). In addition, they encounter serious social and cultural problems, having been brought up in a very different cultural setting (Kussimati, 1982, p. 11 Q.

In spite of these facts, the second generation’s wish to return continues to be strong, and the reason for that must be found primarily in their disappointing experiences in the countries where they actually live. Recent outcomes among Turks in the Netherlands, and also among Surinamese in that country, show that feelings of ethnic belonging and the wish to return are strongest among drop-outs from school and unemployed youngsters (Buiks, 1983; De GruuJ; 1983). Such feelings develop as an immediate consequence of their failing attempts to integrate, and of other problems they may encounter, as described by Widgren in his report for the UNDPIILO project for the second generation (Widgren, 1982).

We may conclude from this discussion that the ‘return ideology’ also becomes manifest among the second generation of immigrants, even though their migration experience may actually be lacking. The major motives behind the wish to return are clearly different for the two generations. For the youngsters it seems mainly inspired by the lack of opportunities in the country of residence, whereas for their parents it is a much more direct effect of the course of their migration history. In either case, however, actual return migration is low, and can be expected to remain low in the future.

4.2. Policy options for the second generation The integration problems of young migrants, combined with their expressed wish to return, make it all the more tempting for the countries in Western Europe to direct their return-promoting efforts to the second generation. So far, only very few specific programmes have been developed for them. As we saw, the French ‘return-training’ programme has attracted certain youngsters, and several private companies in Western Europe have set up vocational training courses for their young migrant employees who wish to return. The numbers of participants in these programmes, however, have been only very limited. Larger numbers of young migrants have been taking part in training activities set up in Western Europe under the auspices of their (parents’) countries of origin. Such activities have been described in Colicelli’s paper for the UNDP/ILO project for the second generation (Colicelli, 1984). Most of these, however, are not intended directly to improve the conditions for a successful return migration. They aim instead at maintaining and improving the cultural ties between the second generation and their (parents’) countries of origin.

This is also one of the aims of the programmes for mother-tongue teaching that have been initiated or supported by the educational authorities of various countries in Western Europe. Such programmes have been in existence since the beginning of family

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reunification. As Widgren has pointed out, mother-tongue teaching now serves several aims, some of which prove to be contradictory. It seems almost impossible, for instance, to reconcile the aim of preparing children for return migration with the aim of facilitating their integration into the receiving society, e.g. by creating a greater self-consciousness among these children. Moreover, the countries of Western Europe are faced with the strong desire of most countries of origin: to maintain close cultural ties with their nationals abroad, even though those nationals may never return (Widgren, 1982, pp. 17- 18).

Given the strong discrepancies between the expressed wishes of the second generation and their actual behaviour, the governments of the countries of Western Europe are faced with a serious dilemma. Should they develop new return schemes for that category in particular? Or should they emphasize the need for integration, which in many cases would be against the youngsters’ own ambitions? Or should they leave either option open - as many Western European countries have in fact been doing - and run the risk of perpetuating the minority position of their immigrants for a long time to come?

As we have seen, experiences with programmes for voluntary return migration generally have been rather disappointing. Most returns took place unattended, and many of them were unforeseen. There is little reason to believe that this will be different for the second generation. As we saw, their return wish is often a negative one, inspired by the problems they encounter in their countries of residence, rather than by a realistic assessment of their chances in the country where they would like to go. For that reason, the efforts of the countries of Western Europe for the second generation should be concentrated on improving their chances for a fuller and better participation as permanent residents in those countries. A major element of such policy should be the granting of a more secure legal status to those members of the second generation who prefer not to take up citizenship of their country of residence. Attempts should also be intensified to improve their knowledge of the language spoken in that country.

It will not be easy to overcome the numerous constraints that such a policy will be faced with. Apart from the considerable costs involved in an integration policy, the responsible authorities will have to cope with a growing opposition against the continuing presence of so many immigrants. An integration policy also seems to run counter to the expressed wish to return among large numbers of migrants : government money spent on integration cannot be spent on return programmes. Last but not least, as Widgren has pointed out, ‘any change of policy in order to better integrate “the second generation” on behalf of the receiving countries might, thus, be interpreted as a new evidence of the classical tendency towards unilateral action, which does not take the true interest of the countries of origin into consideration’ ( Widgren, 1982, p. 15). As far as this latest argument is concerned, it has been stressed on many occasions that the interests ofthe two countries involved in any international migration movement often clash. Yet, in this particular case one may wonder if the ‘true interests’ of the countries of origin lie in the return of substantial numbers of disillusioned young migrants, many of whom have become alienated from those countries, or do not even know those countries at all.

In this respect we may even go one step further. Although it may sound paradoxical, an intensified and unambiguous integration policy in the countries of Western Europe, especially for the second generation, will improve the chances for a successful ‘return’ of those youngsters who prefer to do so. There can be little doubt that the number ofpotential returnees among the second generation will go down as the integration process advances. Under those circumstances, however, the wish to return must be seen, more than at present, as the outcome of a decision-making process taken in all liberty by the individual,

28 1

and not any more as a reaction to the negative circumstances and the insecurity under which many of these youngsters live right now.

4.3. Suggestions for action

In this context we will not go into more detail as regards the various forms that an unambiguous and coherent integration policy may take, but we may refer to Widgren for a thorough description of the major areas of action and the major dilemmas that the countries ofimmigration are faced with in this respect ( Widgren, 1982; see also Entzinger, 1984 and Harnrnar, 1984). It should be stressed, however, that creating more and better opportunities for voluntary return migration, both for the first and second generation, could be just one element of an integration policy. As can be learned from the experiences during the past ten years, that element can only be effective if it is being developed in close co-operation between the countries of Western Europe and the countries of origin.

Another factor that should be taken into account here is that the situation of returning migrants of the first generation differs substantially from that of the second generation, although in individual cases it is not always easy to draw a dividing line between the two generations.

The ‘typical’ migrant of the first generation has spent a large part of his working life in Western Europe. In spite of his long absence, he has maintained close cultural and family ties with his home country, although the nature of those ties may have changed gradually. If a migrant of the first generation returns voluntarily, he does so very often for family or other personal reasons. As we have seen, that decision is often unpredictable, and for that reason it is extremely difficult for the public authorities to develop any policy instruments at all to facilitate this type of return.

Ifthe migrant’s motives for returning are mainly ofan economic nature, the possibilities for public intervention are somewhat better, at least in theory. In practice, however, returning migrants who wish to become reinserted into the economic system of their countries oforigin, often show a preference for those sectors in which there is little need for manpower. Many of them want to become self-employed or to start a small company in which they may invest their savings. Very often, the need for such activities is limited, and the conditions for the preferred type of investment are not so good for a variety of reasons. It has become clear from several experiments that the role which returning migrants may play in the social and economic development of their countries of origin should not be overestimated. An improvement of the conditions for investment in those countries might lead to an increase of remittances by nationals residing abroad, but this will not automatically facilitate the reinsertion process of those migrants who actually return. Many of them have become too ‘westernized’ - often to their own surprise - to function in the environment from which they originate.

This situation is somewhat different for those migrants of the first generation who do not take up a job after they return. As the migrant population in Western Europe grows older, it can be expected that the number of voluntary returns upon retirement will increase. In the majority of cases, bilateral agreements have been concluded between sending and receiving countries, under which old age pensions have been made payable abroad. Such facilities should be extended to the largest possible extent.

Large numbers of migrants, however, leave the labour process before they reach the pensionable age, either because they have become physically unable to work, or because they have become unemployed at such an age that it is highly unlikely that they will ever find another job. Many of these migrants strongly wish to return, especially if their families have not joined them. At present, however, these migrants cannot do so in most

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cases, because they would lose their entitlement to the benefits of the social security system of the country where they used to be employed. The best solution to this problem, which to some extent is also a humanitarian problem, would be to create facilities - at least for certain categories and age groups among the migrants - so that periodical disability and unemployment allowances would also be payable in the countries of origin. This could be achieved by extended bilateral agreements, of which a few examples already exist.

Making certain social security benefits payable in the countries of origin may be considered a financial incentive to encourage return migration, but such incentives are fundamentally different from the ‘return allowances’ that have been discussed and implemented by several countries in Western Europe. As we have seen, ‘return allowances’ have rarely come up to the expectations of the governments that have opted for them, and, what is more, they leave the impression that return is the ‘natural’ end of a migration process. History proves that this can often be a false assumption. Moreover, research outcomes have shown that such assumptions have a negative effect on the chances for integration of those migrants who prefer to stay on, and who are fully entitled to do so for legal reasons. Therefore, the idea of encouraging return migration by means of ‘return allowances’ should be rejected as a practice which would jeopardize the rights acquired by migrants and also the principle of co-operation between countries of origin and countries of employment.

The instruments of a return policy for the second generation will have to be quite different from those suggested for the first generation. Seen from the child’s perspective it will sometimes be difficult to label such returns as voluntary. The child‘s own views and feelings are not always taken into account when his parents decide to return, in spite ofthe fact that the parents may legitimize their decision as being to the child‘s benefit. In certain cases, however, return may be rather harmful in view of an equilibrated development of the child‘s personality. Of course, we should differentiate here between young migrants of school age, and adolescents who have finished their schooling.

The younger age groups either return with their parents, or they are sent back by their parents to other relatives who then look after their education. At first glance, an extension of the facilities for mother-tongue teaching in the countries of Western Europe would appear to be an attractive way of avoiding reinsertion problems among this particular group of children. Those who advocate mother-tongue teaching for that reason, however, sometimes tend to forget that, as we have seen, most returns take place unexpectedly, and that it is difficult, ifnot impossible, to predict which child will return eventually and which child will not.

In addition, experience shows that it is far from easy to integrate mother-tongue teaching programmes in view of a possible return into the ‘normal’ school curricula of the countries where the children actually live, and where the vast majority of them will continue to live. This is not to say that no special attention should be given to children of migrants in the schools of the countries of Western Europe, but such forms of attention should focus on improving their chances in those very countries. This does not mean, of course, that children of migrants - and their parents - should be denied the right to attend their own national classes outside the official school hours. There are many examples of such classes all over Western Europe, and the countries of origin play an important role in organizing these. Bilateral co-operation in this field should certainly be improved. In addition to this, better facilities should also be created in the countries of origin to (re)integrate children of returned migrants into their school systems. This should be done in co-operation with the countries from which those children have returned (or emigrated).

Measures for young migrants who are not of compulsory school age any more, should further be developed in the field of vocational training. For this age group too, it will often

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be difficult to predict whether or not an individual migrant will return eventually. In any case, it is more important that migrant youngsters attend and finish such courses, than that these courses are tuned specifically to the needs of the countries of origin. Once a young migrant has acquired a certain skill level, it will be relatively easy to let him or her attend a rather short preparatory course in which he may be admitted only after the decision to return has become firm and practically irreversible.

Of course, such preparatory courses will have to be tuned to the specific needs of the country where the youngsters enrolled would like to go. It would also be wise to make use ofspecific abilities or skills which the participants may have acquired in the country where they have spent part of their lives. One may think here, for instance, of language skills which could be of use in trade and commerce, or in the hotel sector which is expanding rapidly in certain countries of origin. Such programmes will be all the more successful if the participants can be guaranteed a job upon their return. For obvious reasons these programmes will have to be developed in close co-operation between the countries involved, and it is in this field in particular that trade unions and employers’ associations should also be encouraged to take initiatives. Given the high youth unemployment rate in most countries of origin, this will not always be easy to achieve. For understandable reasons, many countries are not inclined to grant a favoured position in their labour markets to nationals living abroad and willing to return. No wonder that little has been achieved in this respect so far, although certain interesting examples do exist. A first step along this difficult road would be to extend the mutual recognition of equivalent school diplomas between sending and receiving countries.

We may conclude that most suggestions for action mentioned in this section will affect only relatively small numbers of migrants. No matter how strongly the countries of Western Europe might wish to encourage or facilitate voluntary return migration, the vast majority of their immigrants will stay for ever, in particular the ‘immigrants’ of the second generation. For a number of reasons it would be unwise for all countries involved to embark on a policy to stimulate return migration. They rather should try to increase conditions under which truly voluntary return migration promises to be most successful, and they should realize that this can only be done in close co-operation between sending and receiving countries. Yet, an even more important conclusion of this paper is that the major concern of the countries of Western Europe should not be how to let their migrants go, but how to integrate them.

5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

During the past ten years, most countries in Western Europe have intensified their efforts to encourage the return of their foreign immigrants. These efforts have been inspired by the economic and employment situations in those countries, as well as by growing integration problems and by xenophobic feelings among their original inhabitants.

Shortly after the recruitment of foreign workers was stopped, many of them saw themselves as obliged to return because their residence permits had expired and were not renewed. As the immigrant population grew older, such ‘forced’ returns became less frequent. Return migration still occurred, but at a lower level. Migrants continued to return for personal reasons or because of deteriorating living conditions in Western Europe. The countries of origin found it increasingly difficult to accommodate these returnees, many of whom were strongly disillusioned.

In an attempt to encourage further returns on a voluntary basis, various measures have been taken in Western Europe, either unilaterally or in co-operation with the migrants’ home countries. Some of these measures were directed at the individual migrant (return

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allowances, vocational training, etc.); others were ofa more structural nature and aimed at improving economic conditions in the home countries. With only a few exceptions, such programmes did not have the effect that had been hoped for, and in many cases they were discontinued. The interests ofthe three major parties involved - the countries of residence, the countries of origin and the migrants themselves - often proved to be opposed too strongly to turn these programmes into a success.

Notwithstanding these disappointing experiences, the wish to return has remained very strong among most migrants. Most returns that do take place, however, are unplanned and spontaneous, and it is nearly impossible to incorporate these into any programme of the types just mentioned.

There is only a weak relationship between the migrants’ willingness to return on the one hand, and the low level of actual return migration on the other. This has given rise to the hypothesis that the wish to return should be seen as a substitute for other feelings. It should be considered in many cases as an expression of the migrants’ strong identification with their own ethnic group, and it is reinforced very often by a lack of opportunities to integrate into their new surroundings.

This phenomenon can be observed, in particular, among the second generation, many of whom only know their country of origin from their holidays and from their parents’ romanticized memories. Yet, the people and the authorities in Western Europe often take these young people’s wish to return in its literal sense, and this serves as an excuse for not developing a fully-fledged integration policy. The need for such a policy, however, may be even greater for the second generation than for their parents.

If the conditions for the integration of the second generation are improved, it is to be expected that the number of youngsters who wish to return will decrease. Those who persist in that wish, however, will do so on the basis of a free choice, and not as an effect of mounting disillusionment. Only under these circumstances can programmes to promote voluntary return migration be really effective, especially if they are being developed in a spirit of international co-operation between the countries concerned.

NOTES

1) For those members of the second generation who have been born in the country to which their parents have migrated, the term ‘return’ migration is actually inadequate. For that reason, ‘return migration’ should be understood in this paper as ‘migration of a person to the country of which he or she is a national’.

Mention should also be made here of the situation in the United Kingdom. The vast majority of that country’s immigrants were British passport holders upon their amval. Although immigration ofthese people to the United Kingdom has been made increasingly difficult, the return issue has never played a predominant role in that country, for the simple reason that a country cannot send away its own subjects. Similar conditions apply to certain categories of immigrants to France and the Netherlands, mainly originating from (former) overseas temtories. The situation of these groups of immigrants - a total of several million in the three countries mentioned - will not be discussed in this paper.

2)

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3) Statistics on the size ofthe foreign population in the major immigration countries of Western Europe, and ofchanges in their composition are published annually in the SOPEMI reports of the OECD (SOPEMI, 1974-1984). A more detailed description is given in Penninx’ recent report to the Council of Europe (Penninx, 1983). The impact of immigration on the demographic situation has been analyzed by Lebon in his paper for the UNDP/ILO European Regional Project for Second-Generation Migrants (Lebon, 1981).

In the Netherlands, however, a breakthrough in this field appears to be imminent. In December 1984 the Netherlands Government announced an experiment under which unemployed migrant workers aged 55 years or older would be allowed to return to their countries of origin without losing their entitlement to an unemployment allowance, although that allowance would be adjusted to the lower costs of living in those countries. As it appears, certain members of the Government would even like to extend the experiment to all unemployed foreigners who wish to return on a voluntary basis. In that case some 12,000 migrants, plus their family members, are expected to apply. The estimated cost that latter measure would amount to is 100 million guilders per annum, and it is highly doubtful whether that sum can be made available. Chances look better for the former experiment, which may involve some 4,000 migrants and which is expected to be endorsed by Parliament during 1985 (De TelegraaJ; I I - 12- 1984).

In 198 1, for instance, one out of every two Turkish nationals who left the Netherlands in 1977 had returned to that country. This percentage has been going up in recent years, although it should be added that Turkish children who ‘commute’ between the two countries are rather strongly represented among the re-returned migrants. Re-returns within four years are somewhat less frequent among migrants of other nationalities who have left the Netherlands: around 40 per cent for the Moroccans, and around 20 per cent for the Italians and the Yugoslavs. Only for the Spaniards has a considerable decrease taken place: from 16.4 per cent in 1971 to 8.6 per cent in 1981. There can be little doubt that the relatively good economic prospects in Spain account for this tendency (data from the Netherlands Central Bureau for Statistics, Statistics for Foreign Migration).

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Funkties eigen organisaties buitenlanders: een vooronderzoek vooral onder Turkse organisaties. Den Haag : Nederlands Instituut voor Maatschappelijk Werk Onderzoek, 1983.

Return migration from West European to Mediterranean countries. Geneva: ILO (Migration for Employment Project; Working Paper No. 23), 1978.

Het minderhedenbeleid: dilemma> voor de overheid in Nederland en zes andere immigratielanden in Europa. Meppel : Boom, 1984.

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The impact of migrants, especially second-generation migrants, on the demographic situation in selected countries of employment. Geneva: ILO (UNDP/ILO European regional project for second generation migrants; Working Paper), 198 I .

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Bilan de la Politique d'lmmigration. Paris, 1984 (10 October).

Retour et emploi des migrants dans le Mezzogiorno: enqugte sur un Pchantillon de migrations italiens. Gentve: BIT, (Projet sur les migrations a fin d'emploi; Document de travail no. 51), 1981.

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Immigrant populations and demographic development in countries of the Council of Europe. Strasbourg: Council o f Europe, 1983.

Penninx, R., and van Renselaar, H. A Fortune in small change. The Hague: NUFFIC/IMWOO/REMPLOD project, 1977.

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Moroccan workers in the Netherlands. Dissertatie Leiden, 1979.

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Moroccan families in the Netherlands. The ‘Netherlands’ Journal of Sociology, 15, (1979), pp. 73-82.

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LA MIGRATION DE RETOUR EN EUROPE OCCIDENTALE

L’article de H. Entzinger se refere a un rapport prepare par I’auteur dans le cadre du projet regional commun du PNUD et du BIT pour la seconde generation de migrants. I1 traite en particulier des tendances actuelles des politiques en la matiere et de leurs implications en ce qui concerne la migration de retour en Europe occidentale, et plus specialement celle de la seconde generation.

Au cours des dix dernieres anntes, la plupart des pays de 1’Europe occidentale ont intensifie leurs efforts pour encourager le retour des immigrants dans leurs pays d’origine. Cette attitude leur avait ete imposee par I’evolution de leur propre situation economique et de leur marche de l’emploi, ainsi que par la croissance de probltmes d‘integration.

Peu apres I’interruption du recrutement de travailleurs Ctrangers, beaucoup de ceux-ci se sont trouvts dans I’obligation de rentrer chez eux parce que leur permis de sejour etait venu a expiration et n’avait pas ete renouvelk. Neanmoins, ces retours ‘forces’ ont dimi- nue au fur et a mesure que I’ige de ces immigrants a augmente. La migration de retour continue encore aujourd’hui mais a un rythme moins eleve. Dautre part, les pays d’ori- gine des migrants ont eprouvt de plus en plus de difficultes pour accueillir ces rapatries dont beaucoup Ctaient tres d e q s du sort qui les attendait.

Diverses mesures ont ete prises en Europe occidentale, dans le but d’encourager d’autres retours volontaires, telles que le paiement de primes de retour et de formation profes- sionnelle ou d’autres dispositions visant a ameliorer les conditions economiques dans les pays d’origine. A part quelques exceptions, ce genre de programme n’a, en general, pas eu I’effet escompte et, dans beaucoup de cas, il n’a pas ktt poursuivi.

I1 n’existe qu’une relation minime entre la volonte de retour des migrants, d’une part, et la faible ampleur des mouvements de retour, d‘autre part. Ceci a donne lieu a la formu- lation d’une hypothese selon laquelle le desir de rentrer dans le pays d’origine doit Ctre interprete comme I’expression d‘autres sentiments. Dans de nombreux cas, il doit Ctre considere comme un puissant sentiment d’identification des migrants a leur propre groupe ethnique, souvent renforct par une absence de possibilitk d‘integration dans leur nouvel environnement.

Ce phenomene peut Ctre observe, en particulier, parmi les migrants de la seconde gtneration, lesquels n’ont d’autre connaissance de leur pays d’origine que celle qu’ils ont acquise lors de sejours de vacances. Toutefois, le desir de retour de ces jeunes gens est souvent pris au sens litteral et cela sert d‘excuse pour tviter de mettre au point des politiques d’integration bien elaborees.

Si les conditions d’integration dans les pays d’immigration ttaient ameliortes, on pourrait s’attendre a ce que le nombre de jeunes dtsireux de rentrer dans leur pays d’origine diminue. Ceux qui persisteraient dans cette decision exprimeraient alors reel- lement un libre choix. Des lors, des programmes destines a favoriser une migration de retour volontaire ne pourront Ctre reellement efficaces que si ces conditions sont reunies et ceci, sptcialement s’ils sont decides dans un esprit de cooperation internationale entre les pays concernes.

LA MIGRACION DE RETORNO EN EUROPA OCCIDENTAL

El presente articulo de H. Entzinger basado en un informe que el autor preparo origina- riamente para el Proyecto Regional Europe0 PNUD/OIT sobre la situacion de 10s migrantes de la segunda generacion, se refiere en particular a las actuales tendencias de las

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politicas en esta materia, y a sus efectos - particularmente para este grupo de la poblacion - por lo que respecta a la rnigracion de retorno en Europa occidental.

Durante estos ultimos diez aiios la mayoria de 10s paises de la region han venido incrementando sus esfuerzos para alentar la migracion de retorno de 10s inmigrantes que en ellos se encuentran. Estos esfuerzos son motivados por la situacion economica que dichos paises estan experimentando, especialmente a raiz del creciente desempleo, y por un empeoramiento de 10s problemas que afectan a ese sector de la poblacion.

Poco despues de haberse puesto termino a la contratacion de trabajadores extranjeros, muchos de ellos se vieron obligados a retornar a sus respectivos paises porque a1 vencer sus permisos de residencia estos no les fueron renovados. Per0 a medida que la poblacion inmigrante fue envejeciendo, tales retornos ‘forzados’ fueron volviendose menos frecuen- tes y asi ocumo que si bien la rnigracion de retorno siguio produciendose, ella tuvo lugar cada vez en menor cantidad. Asimismo, a 10s paises de procedencia les fue resultando mas y mas dificil dar colocacion a estos retornantes, muchos de 10s cuales, a su vez, llegaban sumamente desmoralizados.

En un intento de alentar un mayor numero de retornos voluntarios, 10s paises de Europa occidental han ensayado distintas medidas, como por ejemplo, la aplicacion de incentivos consistentes en subsidios de regreso y formacion profesional, o bien otros tendientes a mejorar la situacion economica de estas personas en sus paises de procedencia. Con solo algunas excepciones, tales programas no tuvieron 10s resultados esperados, y en muchos casos se ha desistido de ellos.

Lo cierto es que hay solo una tenue relacion entre el asentimiento de 10s migrantes a retornar, por una parte, y por otra el bajo nivel de la comente efectiva de migraciones de regreso. Esto ha dado origen a la hipotesis de que el deseo de retornar podria en realidad estar substituyendo a otra clase de sentimientos, y deberia considerarse en muchos casos como un exponente de la profunda identificacion del migrante con su propio grupo etnico, reforzada todavia mas, muy a menudo, por la falta de oportunidades para integrarse en el pais de acogida.

Este fenomeno puede observarse particularmente en la segunda generacion, cuyos integrantes no conocen en general su pais de origen mas que como lugar de vacaciones. Y sin embargo, sucede que el deseo de retornar de estos jovenes suele tomarse en sentido literal, utilizandolo como excusa para no desarrollar una politica amplia y positiva de integracion.

Es de creer que si se procediera a mejorar las condiciones para la integracion de estas personas, seria menor el numero de jovenes con deseo de retornar, y 10s que persistieran en el mismo, lo harian sobre la base de una libre opcidn. Solo con esos recaudos pueden ser realmente efectivos 10s programas destinados a promover la migracion de retorno volun- taria, especialmente si estos se llevan a cab0 con un espiritu de cooperacion internacional entre 10s paises concernidos.

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