Non-Voluntary Return? The Politics ofReturn to Afghanistan

Brad K. Blitz Rosemary SalesUniversity of Roehampton University of Middlesex

Lisa MarzanoUniversity of Middlesex

The forced removal of 35 Afghan nationals from the UK in April 2003 calls into question the viability of the government’s voluntary repatriation schemes and undermines the voluntary nature of return programmes. This article draws on the results of research conducted in 2002 toexplore the views of the Afghan community about return. We evaluate three motivations for pro-moting return programmes: justice-based arguments, where return is the ‘end of the refugee cycle’;human capital explanations, which focus on individual decisions to reverse the effects of brain-drain; and burden-relieving explanations, where return is an alternative to repatriation. Our find-ings suggest that domestic interest based arguments, rather than those founded on the protectionof human rights, are driving the policy-making agenda. Returns are portrayed as a means of reliev-ing the burden on welfare services, and placating an increasingly anti-immigrant public opinion.As well as individuals forcibly removed from Britain, other Afghans are being urged to return bymeans of financial inducements, and sometimes under the threat of repatriation. In this context,we can discern a new category of ‘non-voluntary’ returns where individual choice has little realmeaning.

The forcible deportation of 35 Afghan nationals in April 2003 came hard on theheels of an announcement that only 39 Afghan people living in Britain had takenup the opportunity to return through one of the voluntary repatriation schemesorganised by international agencies. These were the first deportations toAfghanistan since 1995 and they took place despite travel warnings from theForeign Office that the country remained unsafe.1 Human Rights organisationscriticised forced returns to Afghanistan on the grounds that their timing was notinformed by international human rights standards.2 These events called into ques-tion the viability of voluntary repatriation schemes as the threat of deportation forthose who did not choose to return cast doubt on their voluntary nature.

The promotion of refugee returns became a major plank of British governmentpolicy during the 1990s in cooperation with both European and international insti-tutions. This involved a range of initiatives aimed at encouraging voluntary return,with financial and other inducements, implemented through mediating agenciessuch as the International Organization for Migration (IOM). Voluntary refugeeagencies also play a key role in promoting these programmes through providinginformation and advice to target communities.

These programmes coincided with an increasingly harsh asylum regime (Sales,2002) and steps to increase the temporary nature of protection. The status of

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Exceptional Leave to Remain (ELR), for example, was abolished in 2002. This hadgiven longer-term protection to individuals not qualifying for full refugee statusagainst being returned to conflict situations.3 The practice of expelling ‘warrefugees’ from countries such as Kosovo once their leave expires has furtherincreased the pressure towards return. The White Paper on Immigration andAsylum, Safe Haven Secure Borders which led to the Nationality, Immigration andAsylum Act 2002 called for the deportation of 2,500 ‘failed asylums seekers’ permonth (Home Office, 2002a, p. 65). These developments have taken place in thecontext of growing public hostility towards asylum, with restrictive policies accom-panied by populist campaigns against asylum seekers in the mass media.

This article draws on the results of research conducted during 2002 that exploredthe views of the Afghan community in Britain about return. The research wascommissioned by Refugee Action, a voluntary organisation working with refugees,and the International Organization for Migration, and funded through the HomeOffice. These organisations were promoting a number of voluntary return pro-grammes and wished to gain a more detailed picture of the community and theirviews regarding return.4

The research took place at a particularly sensitive time both in relation to the publicdebate on asylum and to Afghanistan in particular. Following the establishment ofa western-backed regime there, the government was anxious to demonstrate thatthe country was safe, and asylum claims therefore unfounded. This imperativegrew with the build-up to war in Iraq. As the research began, Home SecretaryDavid Blunkett stated that the majority of asylum seekers from Afghanistan shouldreturn home.5 The community was thus understandably suspicious of talk ofreturn, and this had an impact on the response rate to our research.

We identified three discourses of return (Sales and Blitz, 2003): firstly justice-basedarguments, under which returns are seen as a means of resolving conflicts andrestoring social order. Secondly, the human capital argument is based on the notionthat returnees bring skills that can help in reconstruction. Thirdly, the burden-reliev-ing argument based on the notion that large numbers of refugees can cause socialand political problems in the country of exile. We argue that, while voluntaryreturn programmes were promoted using the first two of these discourses, in realitythe primary focus of British policy has been on burden-relieving.

Below we elaborate on these discourses of return. We then give a background toour study, with a brief description of the Afghan community in Britain and outlinethe main voluntary return programmes. We then present some of the main find-ings of our research, and discuss these findings in the light of these discourses. Weargue that the context in which voluntary return programmes take place seriouslycompromises their voluntary nature, and that it is more appropriate to talk of anew category of ‘non-voluntary’ return.

Discourses of ReturnReturn programmes are a result of complex negotiation between a number of gov-ernments and intergovernmental agencies often with conflicting agendas. Ourresearch suggests that three discourses of return are used in promoting return pro-

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grammes. These have different audiences, including the refugees themselves, thenew governments of the country of return, and the domestic politics. The first two involve some shared agenda with potential participants in voluntary pro-grammes, while the last suggests an opposition and cannot coexist with voluntaryprogrammes.

Justice

Justice-based arguments consider return as a means of post-conflict stabilisation.It is based on the belief that outstanding claims of injustice, that might otherwisespark new conflicts, can be put aside through returns. This policy is seen as fur-thering the goal of reconciliation and transition from war to peace (Toft, 2000).Thus refugee returns represent the end of the Refugee Cycle (Black and Koser, 1999).Castles et al. (2003, pp. 48–9) see ‘orderly return’ as the priority following the endof conflict, and while suggesting that this has been relatively successful in relationto Afghanistan, point to the increasingly compulsory nature of returns (Castles et al., p. 49). Ghosh (2000, p. 3) maintains that forced migration will persist until‘the conditions or circumstances which led to the flight are changed, and newopportunities are opened up for refugees to have a fresh start in life’. A recentpaper produced by the Refugee Council in partnership with a number of volun-tary agencies working with refugees (Refugee Council, 2004a) called for increasedprotection for refugees and for conditions conducive to return and a programmeof reconstruction and development based on best development practice (p. 19).

The antecedents of the justice-based approach may be found in the 1951 UnitedNations Convention on the Status of Refugees that recognises that once a migrantreturns, he (sic) is formally no longer a refugee and thus his claims and rights canbe addressed by the home state. Since 1951, the principle of allowing refugees toreturn home has been written into every major peace agreement and some describereturns as a counter-refugee crisis policy (Toft, 2000). The Convention, however,gives no guidance on the treatment of people whose asylum application has failed(Refugee Council, 2004b, p. 5). It is this group which has been the target of mostrecent return programmes.

Recent research evidence (Blitz, 2003; Turton and Marsden, 2002) suggests thatthe justice-based arguments may be overly optimistic. A major issue is that mostrefugees never actually return to their previous home, since post-conflict societiesremain divided. Returnees, many of whom have lost essential documents duringperiods of conflict, are often subject to the same constraints as new arrivals andmust re-establish themselves in their home country (Blitz, 2003). Those seeking to return are thus faced immediately with the challenge of asserting their rights.This is often in the face of social opposition since returnees may be associated with previous regimes and attached to former ethnic and political elite structures.This may be based less on ideology than on conflict over limited resources.Returnees are often resented for having left, for the opportunities they receivedwhile abroad, or for the incentive grants that they receive upon return. In mostpost-conflict situations where the IOM and its related agencies are working to facilitate returns, the experiences of war and exile have served to intensify divi-

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sions between ethnic groups. Such divisions may be deepened by the actions ofcurrent political groups and leaders (Turton and Marsden, 2002; Human RightsWatch, 2002).

Human Capital

Returns have also been promoted on the grounds that returnees have acquiredskills that can be invested in their home countries and address shortages due to a brain-drain. This view is prominent in the inter-governmental and non-governmental organisations promoting return. The International Organization forMigration, for example, advertises its assisted return programmes under thebanner, ‘your knowledge for your country.’ This theme clearly underlies the develop-ment of qualified returnees programmes, and is a view shared by the Afghan government. Return programmes targeted at elite groups are being replicated else-where, including Iraq.6

These programmes assume, however, that one can match skills with needs on theground, a claim that has been challenged by the results of the IOM’s Return ofQualified Nationals programmes in much of Africa and South-eastern Europe.7

More important is the assumption that refugees are in a position to make deliber-ate choices regarding their own future. Return policies which focus on individualdecisions pay insufficient attention to the nexus of domestic and international poli-tics in which return programmes take place. Repatriation and peace agreementsnegotiated at the international level often involve returnees being subject to pres-sure from host countries (Stein, 1997).

The desire of sending governments to promote returns may also come into con-flict with the needs of host governments for reconstruction (Ghosh, 2000, p. 2;Turton and Marsden, 2002). Resources planned for reconstruction can be divertedtowards meeting the needs of returnees.

Burden-Relieving

Implicit in the Refugee Convention was also the suggestion that an influx ofrefugees could undermine delicate domestic arrangements and that returns shouldbe encouraged as a means of protecting the internal order of vulnerable states.National policies of temporary protection, dispersal, and eventual repatriation weredeveloped to counter-balance this perceived threat. Bakewell (1999, p. 3) describeshow different stakeholders may interpret the practice of return according to theirown interests:

Voluntary repatriation can be seen as an ideal solution to the refugeeproblem as it brings the refugees back under the protection of the stateof origin, it restores them to their homes and it relieves the burden onthe host society. This assumes that the conditions which have causedthem to flee have substantially changed to enable refugees to come underthe protection of the state, that their idea of home remains related to aparticular place even a generation or more after leaving, and their pres-ence has continued to be a burden on the host society.

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The burden-relieving discourse appears to be to the fore in the present climate asrefugee-receiving countries tighten controls on entry. Recent asylum legislation inBritain is based on the premise that the numbers of asylum seekers entering andremaining in Britain needs to be controlled. The practice of repatriating refugeesunder the guise of return is becoming more commonplace, and increasingly tiedto the promise of foreign assistance to receiving states (Blitz, 2003). As more statesconsider returns as a means of ‘burden-sharing’ to appease domestic populations,the voluntary nature of return is endangered.8

Return Programmes To AfghanistanWaves of forced migration from Afghanistan have mirrored political developmentsin the region, and over twenty years of conflict have created substantial commu-nities of exiles such that by the 1980s, Afghans formed the largest number ofrefugees in the world (Magnus and Naby, 1998). It was estimated that in 1997there were 3.7 million Afghan nationals living in the Diaspora (King, 2000) manywith citizenship in the host countries. The Soviet invasion in 1979 precipitated amass exodus, with an estimated 3.3 million fleeing to Pakistan during the 1980s,and a further 2.9 million to Iran (Marsden, 1999, p. 56). Following the Soviet with-drawal in 1989, civil war prompted a further exodus that peaked in 1990. The fallof the Communist regime in 1992 provoked another outflow of migrants, as didthe rise to power of the Taliban in 1998. A prolonged drought between 1998 and2001 also caused both internal and external displacement.

There have been continuing flows of refugees since the overthrow of the Talibanregime in late 2001. According to UNHCR figures, there were 13,644 asylum appli-cations in Europe from Afghan nationals in the year up to March 2004, the sixthlargest group in relation to country of origin (UNHCR, 2004, p. 5). Afghanistanremains politically insecure and people are still fleeing abroad, in search of asylum.Reports that the Taliban and al-Qaida have remerged have featured in both thepress and on the Foreign Office website, giving rise to the belief that returnees may also be targeted and that internal and external migration will continue.9

Afghanistan remains an ethnically and linguistically mixed country but power hasshifted from the dominant Pashtuns who account for about 38 percent of the pop-ulation. Other groups including Tajik (25 percent), Hazara (19 percent), Uzbek (6percent), Aimaq, Turkmen, and Baluch have been able to establish greater controlin some former Taliban and Pashtun regions (US State Department, 2004). Thisshift in power between the various ethnic groups has been accompanied by con-siderable instability and human rights abuses in regions where refugees are return-ing (Human Rights Watch, 2003a). In certain parts of the country Pashtuns have been the victims of retaliation for their support of the former Taliban regime(International Rescue Committee, 2003).

Changes of regime in Afghanistan have also brought efforts to attract people backto Afghanistan, particularly from Iran and Pakistan. Repatriation efforts began in1989 with the Soviet pull-out, but large-scale returns did not take place until thefall of the Communist-supported government in 1992 (Magnus and Naby, 1998,p. 9; Koser, 2000, p. 61).

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With the establishment in 2001 of the Western-backed regime in Kabul led byHamid Karzai, there has been a series of programmes supported by foreign gov-ernments and international implementing agencies. Tripartite programmes havebeen implemented following the conclusion of formal agreements between theAfghan government, the UNHCR, and sending states including Iran, Pakistan,Britain, France, Denmark and the Netherlands. Four internationally sponsored pro-grammes involving Afghans are currently being implemented, and another is inprogress.

Current Return ProgrammesThe Voluntary Assisted Return and Repatriation Programme (VARRP) is a general pro-gramme operating since 1999 (Home Office, 2002b) and is implemented by theIOM and Refugee Action. The VARRP is open to any nationality and applies toanyone awaiting or appealing against an asylum decision or with ELR. Those withpermanent status (recognised, or Convention, refugee status and Indefinite Leaveto Remain) are ineligible for this programme.

In August 2002, a new Voluntary Return Programme for Afghanistan was announcedby the Home Office aimed at asylum seekers, including those appealing a refusaland those with ‘Exceptional Leave to Remain’. A grant of £600 is available for asingle person or up to £2,500 for a family and the scheme had an initial budget of£800,000. It was expected to attract 1,000 applicants but by 2002, only a handfulof Afghans had applied for the programme.10 In response, a new Voluntary AssistedReturn and Repatriation Programme for Afghans was initiated which provides return-ing migrants with a resettlement grant under certain conditions. Returnees are alsoeligible for job training, education, and where possible employment opportunities.The IOM has also assisted some returnees to set up small businesses.

The IOM’s Return of Qualified Afghans Programme (EU-RQA) is a specialised pro-gramme aimed at capacity building through encouraging short- and long-termplacements for qualified Afghans residing in the EU wishing to return to work incritical sectors. Assignments are for 6 or 12 months and include travel and reinte-gration assistance. Women receive an additional monthly allowance. The EU-RQAaimed to assist an estimated 200 highly qualified and skilled Afghan nationals resid-ing in EU member states to return and to assist 50 selected skilled Afghan nation-als to set up micro and small-scale enterprises in Afghanistan. Under theSelf-Employment Option grants of up to €5,000 per person are awarded to thosewishing to start their own small businesses.

A further programme, including ‘Explore and Prepare’ visits to Afghanistan, allowscertain categories of Afghan nationals the opportunity to make exploratory visitsto Afghanistan to assess the conditions for their long-term return.

The United Kingdom is also party to European agreements regarding returns. InDecember 2002, the European Union agreed a plan to encourage Afghan residentsto start returning home from Spring 2003. This involves a steering group led bythe European Commission responsible for developing pre-departure, travel relatedand post-arrival measures and which exchanges information on national return

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instruments. The plan includes fleeting references to current challenges inAfghanistan, not least the struggle to assist and reintegrate the large numbers whohave recently returned from refugee camps in Iran and Pakistan, including thoseforcibly deported.11 The return of such large numbers from the neighbouring coun-tries raises serious doubts about the region’s capacity to receive even more refugeesfrom Britain and the rest of Europe. In spite of warnings from human rights groupsand academic experts, the European plan sets out an ambitious programme ofreturns. Although the various governments of the EU have insisted that the Planwill focus initially on voluntary measures, it states explicitly that Afghans who donot return voluntarily may be forcibly removed and has set aside funding toencourage joint European repatriation efforts. The deportation of Afghans fromBritain and France in April 2003 suggests that this aspect will become increasinglyimportant.

The range of programmes on offer reflects the different motives for promotingrefugee returns. A number of sometimes conflicting agendas are reflected in theprocess of developing these programmes. The Voluntary Assisted Returns Programmeand the Voluntary Return Programme emphasise reintegration and support for findingemployment, while the Return of Qualified Afghans Programme is explicitly aimed atcapacity building. The target for the first two of these programmes, however, thosewith insecure status, compromises the voluntary nature of return, while compul-sion is explicitly introduced into the EU plan.

Afghan Residents and Return: Research FindingsOur research was aimed at assessing the views of Afghan residents about return,and the policy measures which could assist with return. The funders asked us togather data mainly through a postal survey. A questionnaire was devised, in con-sultation with Refugee Action and some Afghan community organisations inLondon, which also helped with the distribution. Questionnaires were also dis-tributed via the surgery of an Afghan doctor practising in London and throughAfghan community groups in Manchester, Bristol and Birmingham. The politicalcontext in which the research began, however, meant that there was considerablesuspicion of organisations involved in return and the response to the questionnairewas low (N = 117). The covering letter stated clearly our independence from thereturn programmes, and the confidentially of all responses. Several participants,however, including members of community organisations, told us that they wereunwilling to respond to a postal questionnaire, although they were happy to talkface to face once trust had been established. One recipient of a questionnaireinsisted on visiting the University to ‘check out’ the researchers before completingit, and subsequently consented to an interview.

Although the response to the postal survey was low, an overwhelming majority ofrespondents signalled a willingness to be interviewed. Interviews were organisedwith a sample of these respondents and with others contacted through RefugeeAction offices and community organisations. Participants included a range of occu-pational, social and educational backgrounds, and ethnic groups. Efforts were made

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in this part of the research to include groups who had been under-represented in the postal survey, particularly women, and to gain some regional variation. Intotal 33 individual interviews were carried out (10 in London, 8 in Bristol, 13 inManchester and 2 in Dover). Five focus groups were held, with numbers rangingfrom 5 to 12 people, of which two were in London, and one each in Manchester,Bristol and Dover. The majority of the interviews and focus groups were carriedout in English, but some were carried out using interpreters from the communityorganisations. The length of interviews and focus groups varied considerablydepending on individual experiences and the circumstances in which they tookplace. In addition, a number of interviews took place with academic and regionalexperts and political analysts.

The discussion below is based on both the responses to the questionnaire and thedata from the interviews and focus groups. Where numbers or percentages aregiven, these refer only to the questionnaire responses.

The Afghan Community in Britain

According to the Society of Afghan Residents (UK), there are approximately 52,000Afghans living in the UK. This is a conservative estimate and numbers could beconsiderably larger since asylum applications continues to increase. The commu-nity is divided on political and ethnic lines as distinct waves of migration followedchanges of regime. This diversity is reflected in motives for migration and currentconnection with Afghanistan, with for example Pashtuns perceived to be associ-ated with the Taliban regime.

Most Afghans in Britain are settled in north-west London, where the most well-established community organisations are concentrated. Compulsory dispersalunder the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 has led to small but rapidly growingcommunities in cities such as Birmingham, Bristol, Manchester, Glasgow andLeeds. According to the National Asylum Support Service (NASS) 3,720 Afghanpeople were being supported outside London under the dispersal scheme, the over-whelming majority of them male.12 The more established groups tend to have afairly even gender balance.

The long-established residents generally have secure status (Refugee Status orIndefinite Leave to Remain), often taking out British citizenship. As well as repre-senting a process of settlement and establishing a sense of belonging in Britain(Home Office, 2002) this enables refugees to return without jeopardising theirstatus in Britain. The more recent arrivals have insecure or temporary status(Exceptional Leave to Remain, asylum seeker, or refused).

Views about Return

The participants had complex views on return, reflecting the conflicting pressuresthat have given rise to return programmes. It was clear that the notion of ‘return’meant very different things to different respondents. In some cases it meant

190 BRAD K. BLITZ, ROSEMARY SALES AND LISA MARZANO

simply going to Afghanistan for a visit; for others a visit was seen as an experi-ment to see the situation for themselves and assess whether they would like tosettle; for a minority it meant full resettlement. For some respondents who wereborn in Britain, ‘return’ to Afghanistan meant going there physically for the first time: Afghanistan was ‘home’ even though they had never lived there themselves.

Nearly half the respondents to the questionnaire said they would like to return toAfghanistan in the future, a third were unsure and for a minority any form ofreturn was out of the question. It became apparent from the interviews, however,that the first two categories were overlapping, since participants felt that the con-ditions under which they would consider return were such a long way off. Apartfrom one who had visited for a few weeks, and two who were planning short visits,none were making plans to return and certainly none were planning to settle inAfghanistan in the immediate future. Thus most were, in the words of a survey ofAfghan refugees in Pakistan, ‘passive returners’, people who made ‘generalisedstatements about their return, and had no fixed timeframe for return in mind’(DACAAR, 2002, p. 9).

Positive Feelings about Return

Participants expressed two, often related, reasons for wanting to return. They hadan emotional attachment to Afghanistan that was often combined with a desire tohelp in rebuilding the country and give something back. The sense of attachment wasalso considered something to be passed on to future generations. One man wrote:‘I would like to go back to Afghanistan because I would like my children to expe-rience what I had in my childhood.’ A former army officer summed up his attach-ment to his country without clarifying how or when he would return. Hisstatement demonstrates the sense of loss following the wars that have ravaged hiscountry.

Afghanistan is a poor dusty country but for me it is heaven. It has a lotof sun, we have good food, good people, kind people. Every one lovestheir country and I like my own dusty country ... my mountains. Mydream is to return there. My country is gold.13

These feelings were shared even by young people born in Britain or who had comehere when very young. In a focus group, one young woman, who had never visitedAfghanistan, expressed her commitment to her parents’ country in terms of an ide-alised and distant return. Another woman claimed that return was a goal sharedby many in the community, ‘we know that we are going to be going back one day,everyone knows’. Others, however, suggested that a desire to go ‘back’ may notbe realistic. As one young professional man put it:

The sense of nostalgia is something that people hold on to [but] thethings that we take for granted here, it’s not there. We can sit here andlong for it, but as soon as you hit the ground, and have the realizationthat you will never be back in England to enjoy the electricity and thecleanliness and everything else – so when people say a lot about going

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back, it’s a sense of nostalgia, and something that they hold on to fromtheir past that they find it hard to let go ... they would not last for sixmonths to be honest.14

For some of this group, the desire to return was linked to the aim of using train-ing and education gained in the West. One doctor practising in London had visitedfor a few weeks in connection with a community organisation and was keen tobecome involved in organising training in Afghanistan.15 Several stated that theyhad, or were planning to acquire, skills and training to feed back to their homecountry. They felt that this would not only assist their own re-entry but also helpthe process of post-conflict stabilisation and economic development. One womanput it simply: ‘We want to go back with something.’ A young student said shewould not want to go to live, but to ‘establish things there’.

... I will go back to my country and say, you know, this is how you aresupposed to do things, and teach other people what I have been taught.And so I am not British in that sense, I’m Afghan, making use of Britainfor my benefit.

This study identified a highly educated and qualified Afghan community in Britain,but this group were not interested in permanent return. Some merely wanted tovisit but others were interested in working for short periods, particularly to assistwith training. The more recent arrivals, who are the target of most of the currentprogrammes are generally less educated, since they have faced years of disruptededucation, and therefore have less to offer in terms of human capital.

In spite of this strong attraction to the idea of return, for the majority this was nota realistic possibility within the foreseeable future. Several respondents spoke offeeling ‘pressure’ and fear that the British government would soon start deportingAfghans, as it did in April 2003. Many felt it was simply premature to talk aboutreturn. As one woman put it, people want to go back to a restored country.16

Opposition to Return

For some, the conflict was too recent and their level of mistrust of the currentAfghan government so high that they could not consider returning at all. Onerespondent living in London who lost his sister and saw his grandmother and auntburned alive, wrote: ‘I have no desire to return, I hate my own city and its peoplewho did this to us.’ Another middle-aged man, a former government employee,said simply: ‘If I go, I’m dead.’17

For others, arrival in Britain marked an important transition, and their lives inAfghanistan were relegated to recent history. For others, the opportunity of start-ing again in Britain meant a radical break with the past:

This is my home. I don’t even want to think about Afghanistan any more.This is my new life!

My future is here. To me it is like my life starts now. All I had before wasfighting and war.18

192 BRAD K. BLITZ, ROSEMARY SALES AND LISA MARZANO

Another respondent spoke of the psychological effects of relocation. For him,moving around was a waste of life and he claimed it was better to start afresh andremain in Britain where he and his family could establish new roots.19

While opposition to return was often the result of negative experiences inAfghanistan, for others it arose from a growing sense of being at home in the UK,or of being between two homes. One middle-aged professional man reported thathe had good friendships in the UK and was now a ‘two-home, two-countryperson’.20 In the knowledge that the political and moral landscape had changed in Afghanistan, he took comfort in the fact that, rather than living on nostalgicmemories of Afghanistan, he had a real life here.

Factors Influencing Views about Return

Our data showed no strong correlation between desire to return and age or gender,though those with children were less positive about return. Previous research hassuggested that owning property in the home country is a major determinant ofdesire for return (King, 2000). Most of our respondents had no property inAfghanistan, but there was a stronger desire to return among the few with mate-rial ties to Afghanistan. This was muted by fears concerning the current securitysituation and a belief that what they owned had been either destroyed or illegiti-mately repossessed. One man explained the challenges of returning to reclaimproperty:

There was a house ... but it was destroyed. Now I think there is just bareland ... but I don’t know if there is even that because under these dif-ferent governments people have made false documents and confiscatedland. So it would be very difficult to prove that it is ours. We have lostall the documents and it is so easy to ask in Afghanistan to make falsedocuments and confiscate land.21

The most important personal factor affecting the desire for return was immigra-tion status, with those with secure status most interested in return. Settled statusgives confidence and the ability to make choices, secure in the knowledge thatreturn to Britain is possible if things do not work out. The group that is targetedby the current return programmes, those awaiting decisions on asylum applica-tions or others with insecure status, were least likely to want to return. Their appli-cations were based on claims that Afghanistan is unsafe, and the difficulties in thesituation in Afghanistan were most fresh in their minds. We spoke to a number ofnew arrivals at Dover who had all paid several thousand pounds to escape, andhad undergone long and dangerous journeys. Understandably, they were not inter-ested in return in the near future.

We expected ethnicity to be an important factor. While under the Taliban, KabuliTadjiks were most at risk, now Pashtuns from the south east, who are seen as morelinked to the previous regime, are more likely to be disinclined to return. Whileour data showed that Pashtuns were more likely to be opposed to return than othergroups, the difference was not significant. The fears over security were expressedgenerally, with many people suggesting that no one was safe, while many doubted

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that things had really changed following the invasion. As one young man recentlyarrived in Dover put it:

Where have the Taliban gone? Where are the weapons? The people onlychange their turban and they shave their beard, and now they say thatthey are Mujahedin, but they are Taliban.22

We asked respondents to the questionnaire to rank a number of factors that mightinfluence their decision about return. The results show the overwhelming impor-tance of political stability in Afghanistan, followed by economic stability andimprovements in infrastructure. Individual factors such as marriage and kinshipobligations were considered much less important.

The predominance of security over other concerns reaffirms the findings of a recentsurvey of Afghan refugees in Pakistan (DACAAR, 2002) in which women in par-ticular viewed all other factors as insignificant. The centrality of security was reit-erated frequently during the interviews. A young professional woman summed upthe feelings of many Afghans: ‘If it is not safe for the President, how can anyonethink that it is safe for the people?’23

There was concern about continuing human rights violations. Some respondentsfelt personally threatened, while others spoke of more general problems. One said:‘Women have no human rights in Afghanistan, especially in the provinces.’24

Another said: ‘Women’s rights are lacking in Afghanistan. They use women asslaves. I would rather my daughters were brought up here, where women aretreated better.’25

These fears were substantiated by a number of human rights releases and researchstudies which appeared during the period of the research (Turton and Marsden,2002). In several parts of the country, a military-political structure consisting offormer mujahidin forces that fought with the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance beforethe fall of the Taliban have continued to carry out abuses against returnees. Abusesinclude political persecution, extortion of money, arbitrary arrests and detentions,and kidnapping and forced marriage of girls and young women. Women and girlsface significant intimidation and harassment on a daily basis (Human Rights Watch,2003b).

A key theme in relation to security was the issue of trust. As one respondent wrote:

We have lost everything, including our national ID, our pride. How canwe trust again? It needs time and proof ... We have lost everything.26

This mistrust had a number of dimensions. Respondents felt mistrustful of thegeneral situation in Afghanistan, and of specific groups within Afghanistan. Manyspoke of personal enemies, and of warlords who they claimed would make lifedangerous for particular groups. One respondent felt that anyone arriving fromoutside would be mistrusted:

... if you are going back, and you come from Britain, the people therehave changed, and time has passed, and they don’t recognise youanymore ... and when you go to the village, if they don’t recognise you,they kill you.27

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Mistrust of the British government and agencies associated with the return pro-grammes was reflected in the importance given to information about the situationin Afghanistan. One middle-aged woman commented:

We are not sure about the security in Afghanistan. Seeing it on the newsis different ... seeing is believing. If someone goes there and stays for twoor three months and comes back to tell us the facts, we could believethat.28

Mistrust was also evident in relation to our own research. One participant in afocus group, herself with secure status, referred to our own questionnaire whenshe commented:

Now there are so many leaflets and forms that they have sent to Afghanfamilies, just fill in, there was some sort of questionnaire, that is not pos-sible for any family to answer.29

This participant was willing to talk to us openly during this group which had been organised through an Afghan organisation. As the return programmesbecome more coercive, this suspicion has spread to all those involved in returnprogrammes.

Views about Return Programmes

The low number of people taking up the offers of voluntary return through exist-ing programmes was reflected in the responses of our participants, none of whomwere considering return through this means. We asked what support respondentswould need to assist them in return. The top priority was information aboutAfghanistan, followed by reassurance over their status in this country. Much lessimportant, particularly for women, was support aimed at re-integrating returnees,such as training and financial incentives:

The main thing is security. We are not sure about the security inAfghanistan. Seeing it on the news is different ... seeing images of crowdsin Afghanistan, of people buying and selling which is supposed to meanthat Afghanistan is now safe ... I don’t believe that. We have our ownpeople. We have our friends and relatives, different channels of news andthey say that there is nothing in Afghanistan. I don’t know why they aresaying that there is peace.30

Several interviewees commented on what they saw as the lack of relevance of resettlement packages, claiming that these did not take into consideration actual conditions in Kabul, the lack of available property, the insecurity in thepayment of wages, the sharp increase in rents, and the remarkable inflation thathas been prompted by the arrival of international troops. Respondents in Doverfelt that the package was an ‘insult’ after the difficulties they had faced in gettingto England:

It is as if our lives are being bought for £600. If the situation improves,they will not need £600 to go back.31

THE POLITICS OF RETURN TO AFGHANISTAN 195

Non-Voluntary Returns?Our research, and the evidence of participation in voluntary schemes so far, suggestthat large-scale voluntary returns from the United Kingdom are most unlikely inthe near future. Although participants in this study exhibited a strong commitmentto Afghanistan, for many this was not based on the reality of immediate returnand the majority could be described as ‘passive returners’. Only the most securewere enthusiastic about return, but wanted to retain the option of keeping onefoot in the United Kingdom. This supports evidence produced for the InternationalOrganisation for Migration in other contexts: security of status is key in deter-mining who opts for voluntary return (African Centre for Technology Studies,2000).

The political context in which current return programmes were taking place – bothin Afghanistan and the domestic political agenda in Britain – provoked suspicionrather than trust. The predominant political discourse around returns was one of‘burden relieving’, which compromised the voluntary nature of programmes. Thusthe main response of our participants was mistrust of what were seen as forciblereturns to an insecure and dangerous situation.

Many of our participants, predominantly the older group, had a nostalgic longing for an Afghanistan that was now utterly changed. For others however, par-ticularly the younger ones, this was linked to an aspiration to use their skills andexpertise for the benefit of Afghanistan and a strong sense of commitment torebuilding the country. Their views reflected the ‘justice-based’ and ‘human capital’discourses.

The security situation and continuing human rights violations which our respon-dents alluded to, and which were evident in the reports from Afghanistan (HumanRights Watch, 2002, 2003b) reflect some of the problems with the ‘justice based’discourse discussed above. Rather than immediate returns being linked to a processof reconciliation of previous divisions, participants feared that these divisions hadnot been eradicated by the current regime but were continuing under new guiseswith the new regime. The continuing concerns over individual and group rights(particularly the rights of women) suggests that returns would lead to new viola-tions of human rights. Our respondents also voiced the fears that, as new returnees,they would suffer hostility from those who had remained. The financial induce-ments to return, which appear trivial in relation to the cost of living in Britain, andin relation to the cost of arriving in Britain for new arrivals, would also be a sourceof resentment.

The human capital discourse underlies particularly the skilled return programmes.These programmes, however, have very small targets in relation to the potentialnumber of returnees, and the numbers actually taking up these programmes areeven smaller. The response from our research suggests that the inducements offeredare too limited relative to the risk involved, and that more flexible programmesallowing short-term placements are more appropriate than permanent return. Theability of the Afghan regime to make use of skills acquired in Britain, at least inthe short term, is also questionable (Turton and Marsden, 2002).

196 BRAD K. BLITZ, ROSEMARY SALES AND LISA MARZANO

The United Nations Development Assistance Programme for Afghanistan (UnitedNations, 2002) stated as a priority the need to ensure sustainable reintegration ofAfghans wishing to return. In June that year, however, the UNHCR warned thatthe ‘flood of refugees’ into Afghanistan was exceeding the ability of developmentagencies to cope (Harris, 2002). This fear was reiterated by the Afghan governmentas funds earmarked for reconstruction were shifted to immediate humanitarianrelief.

While these discourses reflect a potentially shared agenda between returnees andgovernments of host and receiving country, the predominant discourse of ‘burdenrelieving’ is based on a conflict. By portraying refugees as a problem to be removedas far as possible, the elements of trust and choice are compromised. The targetsfor deportations, and the determination to press ahead with these in spite of thewarnings of human rights organisations about safety in Afghanistan, suggests thatthis is the overriding motive for promoting return programmes. The awareness ofthis threat clearly affected the views of the community about return programmes,and undermined their trust in them and the organisations promoting and imple-menting them.

This raises issues for the voluntary organisations involved in the promotion of theseprogrammes. The Refugee Council, welcoming the programme for assisted returnannounced in August 2002, stressed the need for it to remain ‘absolutely volun-tary’ (Refugee Council, 2002) a view reiterated by Refugee Action (Refugee Action,2002; Refugee Council, 2004b) and by the European Council on Refugees andExiles which called for gradual voluntary returns to Afghanistan (ECRE, 2003). Inan evaluation of the Voluntary Returns to Afghanistan Programme, the Refugee Counciland Refugee Action highlighted the need to ‘decouple discussion of voluntaryreturn from talk of the removal process of measures of coercion’ (Refugee Council,2004b, p. 3). In spite of their warnings about the security situation in Afghanistanand the need to focus on issues of ‘safety and dignity’, the notion of return hasshifted from being a voluntary decision made by individuals to a policy optionwhich is exercised by governments, some of which have begun forced removals ofrefugees.

ConclusionsMore than two years after the displacement of the Taliban from Kabul, Afghansare still entering the United Kingdom as asylum seekers in large numbers. Whilepeople are still seeking refuge in the United Kingdom, large-scale return toAfghanistan is premature, and attempts to deport people may contravene theGeneva Convention regarding non-refoulement (that is, sending people back insituations where their lives may be endangered). Domestic interest based argu-ments, rather than those founded on the protection of human rights, appear to bedriving the policy-making agenda. Thus returns are portrayed as a means of reliev-ing the burden on Britain’s social services, and as a means of placating a publicopinion and media that has become increasingly hostile to immigrants and asylumseekers.

The pressure to demonstrate the success of return programmes is particularly strongfollowing military intervention. This imperative to show that western intervention

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in Afghanistan had created stability was evident in the build up to the war in Iraq.Iraqis too are now being targeted for return.

A new category of ‘non-voluntary’ returns seems to be emerging. As Stein (1997,p. 2) noted, political interests ‘particularly in the country of asylum, increasinglyare trying to influence refugee decision-making and limit its voluntary characterthrough pressure, harassment and direct violence’. As well as individuals forciblyremoved from Britain, others are being urged to return by means of financialinducements, sometimes under the threat of repatriation. This is combined with axenophobic media that effectively narrows the choices available to target commu-nities. This has implications for mediating agencies, including refugee communityorganisations, involved in providing information and advice about return andabout the options available to those with insecure status. The current context hasreinforced the importance of maintaining the voluntary nature of returns. As thereturns policy becomes more coercive, and voluntary return becomes the onlyalternative to deportation, the notion of choice has little meaning.

(Accepted: 14 September 2004)

About the Authors

Brad K. Blitz, School of Business and Social Science, Roehampton University, London SW15 5PU,UK; email: b.blitz@roehampton.ac.uk

Rosemary Sales, Social Policy Research Centre, Middlesex University, Queensway, Enfield, Middlesex EN3 4SA, UK; email: r.sales@mdx.ac.uk

Lisa Marzano, School of Health and Social Sciences, Middlesex University, Queensway, Enfield,Middlesex EN3 4SA, UK; email: l.marzano@mdx.ac.uk

Notes1 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Travel and Country Advice, 27 May 2003 (www.fco.gov).

2 Press releases from Amnesty International, ‘UK/Afghanistan: Forced Return of Afghan Asylum SeekersUnacceptable’ (28 April 2003) and Human Rights Watch ‘Australia: Don’t Send Afghans Home to Abuse,Recent Findings Refute Government’s Depiction of Conditions’ (23 May 2003).

3 Refugee Status (or Convention Status) is granted by the country of asylum to those deemed to meetthe definition in the Geneva Convention, that is to say, that ‘... owing to well founded fear of beingpersecuted for reason of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or polit-ical opinion is outside the country of his nationality is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling toavail himself of the protection of that country’. This definition has been used very restrictively inrecent years in European states (Levy, 1999). A broader definition of refugees which includes all thoseforced to migrate through fear of persecution regardless of legal status, is used here.

4 Sales, R., Blitz, B. and Marzano, L. (2003) The Afghan Community in the UK: Professional Capacity andviews on return. Report for Refugee Action and International Organization of Migration. London.(unpublished). This followed a similar report with the Somali community (Bloch, A. and Atfield, G.,2002).

5 Matthew Tempest ‘Blunkett: refugees should rebuild their own countries’, The Guardian, 18 September 2002.

6 According to the IOM, the return of qualified nationals programme aimed to boost rehabilitationefforts in post-conflict Afghanistan through the progressive transfer of know-how of Afghan expa-triate professionals to their home country. RQA was expected to facilitate the short and long termreturn and reintegration of an estimated 1,500 professionals by the year 2004.

7 See the evaluations documents by the International Organisation for Migration (2000a, 2000b, 2000c)and the report submitted to the IOM by the African Centre for Technology Studies.

198 BRAD K. BLITZ, ROSEMARY SALES AND LISA MARZANO

8 The Amnesty International Press Release of 28 April 2003, ‘UK/Afghanistan: Forced return of Afghanasylum seekers unacceptable’, which stated that ‘returns for “symbolic” purposes are dangerousbecause they are motivated by public perception rather than a cool-headed and objective assessmentof the reality on the ground.’

9 Peter Orbone ‘On the Road to Ruin’, Observer, 25 May 2003.

10 See Heaven Crawley’s ‘Tackling the causes of asylum’ in The Observer, Sunday 11 May 2003.

11 According to a report in 2001 by the US Committee for Refugees, ‘Afghan Refugees Shunned andScorned’, the Pakistani government embarked on a policy of mass refoulement. ‘On January 23, 2001,the governor of NWFP issued an order authorizing the police to detain and deport any Afghan notholding a valid Afghan passport and Pakistani visa, including both new arrivals and old refugees. Thegovernor reportedly instructed each police station in Peshawar to deport a minimum of five to tenAfghan men daily.’

12 NASS, unpublished figures.

13 Interview, Manchester, 22.09.02.

14 Focus group, London, 28.10.02.

15 Interview, London, July 2002.

16 Focus group, Manchester, 21.09.02.

17 Interview, Bristol, 15.09.02.

18 Interview with former child solider, Manchester, 21.09.02.

19 Interview with former doctor, Manchester, 20.09.02.

20 Interview, Bristol, 14.09.02.

21 Middle-aged former engineer, Manchester, 21.09.02.

22 Young former building worker, focus group, Dover, 18.10.02.

23 Interview, Bristol, 13.09.02.

24 Middle-aged former doctor, focus group, Dover, 18.10.02.

25 Middle-aged woman, former school teacher, interview, Manchester, 21.09.02.

26 Questionnaire response, young man living in London.

27 Former army officer, interview, Manchester, 22.09.02.

28 Focus group, London, 28.10.02.

29 Focus group, London, 28.10.02.

30 Middle-aged former engineer, Manchester, 21.09.02.

31 Young man, focus group, Dover, 18.10.02.

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