John Skalko

Thomistic Ethics

Final Paper

December 13, 2011

Aquinas on Voluntary Acts in Brutes

Such philosophers [who deny that animals have thoughts, beliefs, act for reasons, and have no concepts] seldom entertain the thought that such resemblances and analogies between the perceptions, feelings, and intelligent activities of certain speciesof nonhuman animal might warrant, not only philosophical attention for their own sake, but also philosophical attention for the sake of a more adequateunderstanding of human perception, feeling, and practical intelligence.1

– Alaisdair MacIntyre

Any serious Thomist would do well to heed MacIntyre’s

advice, especially considering the fact that Thomas himself

disperses his analysis of animal behavior throughout his

treatment of human acts. Thus this purpose of this paper is

to focus primarily on Aquinas’ discussion of how brute

animals are said to be voluntary in ST I-II, Q6, A2 and to

defend it against some objections and misunderstandings.

The Context & Some Objections

1 Dependent Rational Animals (Chicago, La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1999), 13.

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In the ST I-II, Q6, A2 Aquinas asks, “Whether

voluntariness (voluntarium) is found in brute animals?” and

he answers in the affirmative. In order to put his reply in

context it must be noted that in the previous article

Aquinas concludes that voluntariness is found in human acts.

His reasoning for this is that the name of voluntary

(voluntarii) conveys that a thing is moved and in act by its

own inclination (which Thomas glosses in the next sentence

as having knowledge of the end).2 Now, a stone moves

downward from its own inclination, but since it has no

knowledge of its end, its principle of being moved towards

its end is not found within it. But man has both an

intrinsic inclination towards his end and knowledge of it.

So, voluntariness is found chiefly (maxime) in man.3

2 ST I-II, Q6, A1: hoc enim importat nomen voluntarii, quod motus et actus sit a propria inclinatione. Et inde est quod voluntarium dicitur esse, secundum definitionem Aristotelis et Gregorii Nysseni et Damasceni, non solum cuius principium est intra, sed cum additione scientiae.The Latin is taken from the The Summa Theologiae of Saint Thomas Aquinas, Latin-English Edition (Lexington, KY: NovAntiqua, 2011) which takes the Latin from the Busa. Unless otherwise indicated all English translations are takenfrom this edition.3 Ibid., Unde, cum homo maxime cognoscat finem sui operis et moveat seipsum, in eius actibus maxime voluntarium invenitur.

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This context makes it easy for one to assume that

Aquinas’ answer to article 2, “Whether voluntariness if

found in brute animals?” will be no. For in the “sed

contra” of article 1 Aquinas affirms, quoting Damascene,

that “the voluntary is an act consisting in a rational

operation” and thus man is voluntary as he performs such

acts.4 So, since brute animals cannot have acts consisting

in rational operation one may be tempted to conclude that

brutes cannot be said to be voluntary in their acts. Now,

Aquinas anticipates such an objection from the reader, as

the first objection against his position is precisely this:

brute animals do not have reason and will and so cannot be

called voluntary. But, Aquinas retorts that “voluntariness

(voluntarium) is derived from will (voluntas), and it can be

brought to those things in which is some participation of

the will (voluntas) according to some fittingness to the

will; and in this way voluntariness (voluntarium) is

attributed to brute animals, inasmuch as through some kind

4 ST I-II, Q6, A1: Sed contra est quod dicit Damascenus, in II libro, quod voluntarium est actus qui est operatio rationalis. Tales autem sunt actus humani.Ergo in actibus humanis invenitur voluntarium.

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of cognition they are moved to their end.”5 In other words,

brute animals are voluntary in a way analogous to the way in

which man is voluntary.

The third objection is also particularly relevant, as

it states that voluntary acts are said to be worthy of

praise of blame. But brutes are neither praised nor blamed

for their acts. Thus, they cannot have voluntary acts.

To which Aquinas replies praise or blame follows from

voluntary acts “secundum perfectam voluntarii rationem,”

“according to the perfect notion of voluntary,” and not

according to the imperfect notion of voluntary. So, it

appears here that Aquinas is noting that praise and blame

cannot be predicated of what is said to be voluntary only by

analogy. Thus, praise and blame can only be predicated of

what is fully-literally (as opposed to analogously) said to

be voluntary.

Aquinas’ Argument in ST I-II, Q6, A2

5 ST I-II, Q6, A2, ad 1: Voluntarium autem denominative dicitur a voluntate, et potest trahi ad ea in quibus est aliqua participatio voluntatis, secundum aliquam convenientiam ad voluntatem. Et hoc modo voluntarium attribuitur animalibus brutis, inquantum scilicet per cognitionem aliquam moventur in finem.This translation is my own.

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Now that we have dealt with the context of Q6, A2 and

some key objections, I shall now delve into the body of the

article where Aquinas argues that brutes have voluntary

acts. There Aquinas says that brutes have voluntariness

only imperfectly, whereas anything with a rational nature

has it perfectly. This is because “to the notion of the

voluntary is required that the principle of the act is

within the agent with some cognition of the end.”6 Now, man

has knowledge of the end perfectly, as he knows it “under

the aspect of end, and the relationship of the means to that

end.”7 Brute animals have imperfect knowledge as they

merely have apprehension of the end “without knowing it

under the aspect of end, or the relationship of an act to

6 Ad rationem voluntarii requiritur quod principium actus sit intra, cumaliqua cognitione finis.Translation is my own.7 Perfecta quidem finis cognitio est quando non solum apprehenditur res quae est finis sed etiam cognoscitur ratio finis, et proportio eius quodordinatur in finem ad ipsum. Et talis cognitio finis competit soli rationali naturae.

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the end.”8 This they have through their senses and the

estimative power.

Some Misunderstandings

At first glance it may appear that when Aquinas answers

that brutes have voluntary acts that he is attributing free

will to them. However, Aquinas makes it clear in the rest

of his reply that he is not attributing free will to them.

For he says that

Consequently, perfect knowledge of the end leads to theperfect voluntary; inasmuch as, having apprehended the end, a man can, from deliberating about the end and themeans thereto, be moved, or not, to gain that end. But imperfect knowledge of the end leads to the imperfect voluntary; inasmuch as the agent apprehends the end, but does not deliberate, and is moved to the end at once9 [emphasis added].

Notice Aquinas says that brutes do not deliberate, but are

moved to the end at once. In other words if a rabbit

8 ST I-II, Q6, A2: Imperfecta autem cognitio finis est quae in sola finis apprehensione consistit, sine hoc quod cognoscatur ratio finis, sine hoc quod cognoscatur ratio finis, et proportio actus ad finem. Et talis cognitio finis invenitur in brutis animalibus, per sensum et aestimationem naturalem.9 Ibid., Perfectam igitur cognitionem finis sequitur voluntarium secundum rationem perfectam, prout scilicet, apprehenso fine, aliquis potest, deliberans de fine et de his quae sunt ad finem, moveri in finemvel non moveri. Imperfectam autem cognitionem finis sequitur voluntarium secundum rationem imperfectam, prout scilicet apprehendens finem non deliberat, sed subito movetur in ipsum.

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perceives the fox as dangerous it does not deliberate about

whether or not it should run from it. It runs. There is no

delay for the rabbit in ‘deciding’ whether or not to run

from the fox or not. Once it has estimated10 that the fox

is dangerous it runs.

Thus, for Aquinas brutes do have voluntary acts but do

not have the power of free-will. Now, for contemporary

English speakers this sounds a bit odd. For the common way

in which the word “voluntary” is used today and the way in

which it is defined in the Oxford English Dictionary11 involves

free-will. “Voluntary” according to the OED is defined as

“of actions: Performed or done of one's own free will,

impulse, or choice; not constrained, prompted, or suggested

by another” (emphasis added). Thus, to the contemporary

speaker of English Aquinas sounds like a bit of moron when

he claims that brutes have voluntary acts but no free-will.

But Aquinas is not a moron and he is not using “voluntary”

(voluntarium) in that sense. For by “voluntary” he means

10 I use “estimated” as the act of the estimative power.11 The New Oxford American Dictionary defines “voluntary” in much the same wayas the OED.

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that a thing is moved and in act by its own inclination via

its knowledge of the end. So perhaps, a better word could

be used to translate the Latin “voluntarium” than

“voluntary.” For “voluntary” is not only misleading to the

contemporary English speaker but it also seems to have no

obvious etymological connection to the English word “will,”

whereas in Latin it is much more evident that “voluntarium”

is derived from “voluntas.” The only problem is I do not

have a better translation of “voluntarium” than “voluntary.”

Of course, one could use “that which comes from an intrinsic

principle under knowledge of purpose”12 instead of

“voluntary,” but that is just too clumsy a translation. So,

at best it seems we simply have to use the word “voluntary”

(unless a better translation avails itself), and explain

what we mean by it, lest we be accused of an oxymoron when

we say, “Brutes are voluntary but not free.”

12 This is Lagrange’s definition of what Aquinas means by “voluntary,” in his work Beatitude, A Commentary on St. Thomas’ Theological Summa, Ia IIae, qq.1-54 (St. Louis, London: B. Herder Book Co., 1956), 136. He also gives an excellent clarification of the voluntary as opposed to the involuntary when he comments that the voluntary has an intrinsic principle within itin terms of efficient and final causality (whereby it is efficiently moved to its final cause by something within it, namely cognition of theend).

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In other places it becomes particularly clear that

Aquinas denies that brutes have free-will. In ST I, Q83, A1

Aquinas says that free-will (liberum arbitrium) involves

reasoning in contingent matters, which may follow opposite

courses.13 And later on in the ST I-II, Q13, A2 he gives

more hints: The reason why man deliberates about the end

and the means thereto, while brutes do not deliberate is

that brutes do not have an intellect, but rather the

estimative power, and they do not have a rational appetite,

but rather a sensitive appetite, which is divided into the

concupiscible and irascible. Now, the sensitive appetite is

determined to only particular goods. Whereas in man the

rational appetite, namely his will which, although it is

determined to the good in general, is not determinate with

regard to particular goods.14

Now in order to further clarify how man’s appetite is

not determined to particular goods but an animal’s appetite

is I will now show how man and animal share some of the same

13 ST I, Q83, A114 ST I-II, Q13, A2

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cognitive and appetite powers, but also do not have certain

cognitive and appetitive powers in common.

Differentiating Brute Power from Man Power

Man and beast have some apprehensive powers in common.

They both have the five external senses and four internal

senses of common sense, imagination, memory, and

estimation/cogitation. Now I must clarify here that not

necessarily all animals have all four internal senses, as

some only have a few of them. Furthermore, not all animals

have all five external senses, as some have only a few of

them. Aquinas distinguishes between three levels of

apprehension in animals:

It is evident, then, that there are three levels of knowing in animals. The first level is that had by animals which have neither hearing nor memory, and which are therefore neither capable of being taught norof being prudent. The second level is that of animals which have memory but are unable to hear, and which aretherefore prudent but incapable of being taught. The third level is that of animals which have both of thesefaculties, and which are therefore prudent and capable of being taught. Moreover, there cannot be a fourth level, so that there would be an animal which had hearing but lacked memory. For those senses which perceive their sensible objects by means of an externalmedium—and hearing is one of these—are found only in

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animals which have locomotion and which cannot do without memory, as has been pointed out.15

So it is clear that Aquinas does not hold that all brutes

have all the same external or internal senses that we do,

only that they could. However, even among those who do have

all the same external and internal sense faculties that man

has, there remain some differences. For one, the estimative

power which the animal has is similar to the cogitative

power that is found in man, but it is not exactly the same.

As Aquinas says:

Note, however, that the cogitative faculty differs fromnatural instinct. The former apprehends the individual thing as existing in a common nature, and this because it is united to intellect in one and the same subject. Hence it is aware of a man as this man, and this tree as this tree; whereas instinct is not aware of an individual thing as in a common nature, but only in so

15 S. Thomae Aquinatis, In Duodecim Libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis Expositio, I, lect. 1, n. 13, p. 8, 3rd ed. (Marietti, 1977): Patet igitur tres esse gradus cognitionis in animalibus. Primus est eorum, quae nec auditum necmemoriam habent: unde nec disciplinabilia sunt, nec prudentia. Secundus est eorum quae habent memoriam, sed non auditum; unde sunt prudentia, etnon disciplinabilia. Tertius est eorum, quae utrumque habent, et sunt prudentia et disciplinabilia. Quartus autem modus esse non potest, ut scilicet sit aliquod animal, quod habeat auditum, et non habeat memoriam. Sensus enim, qui per exterius medium suum sensibile apprehendunt, inter quos est auditus, non sunt nisi in animalibus quae moventur motu progressivo, quibus memoria deesse non potest, ut dictum est.Translation is from: Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on the Metaphysics, trans. JohnP. Rowan (Chicago, 1961), the Dominican House of Studies, http://dhspriory.org/thomas/Metaphysics1.htm#1.

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far as this individual thing is the term or principle of some action or passion. Thus a sheep knows this particular lamb, not as this lamb, but simply as something to be suckled; and it knows this grass just in so far as this grass is its food. Hence, other individual things which have no relation to its own actions or passions it does not apprehend at all by natural instinct.16

In other words, the estimative power does not apprehend

individuals as existing under a common nature. Rather it

apprehends them as either beneficial or harmful.

Second, man has an intellect which is not found in any

brute animal and in this he respect greatly differs from

brutes. For through the intellect man is able to apprehend

universals. Since animals only have the estimative power 16 Sancti Thomae de Aquino, Opera Omnia Iussu Leonis XIII, P.M. Edita, Tomus XLV, Sentencia Libri de Anima, Bk. II, Capitulum 13, p. 122, n. 205-222 (Roma, Paris: Commissio Leonina, 1984):Differenter tamen circa hoc se habet eogitatiua et estimatiua : nam eogitatiua apprehen- dit indiuiduum ut existentem sub natura communi, quod eontingit ei in quantum unitur intellectiue in eodem subieeto, undeeognoscit hune hominem prout est hie homo et hoc lignum prout est hoc lignum; estimatiua autem non apprehendit aliquod indiuiduum secundum quod est sub natura communi, set solum secundum quod est terminus aut principium alienius actionis ue! passionis, sicut ouis eognoscit hune agnum non in quantum est hic agnus, set in quantum est ab ea lactabilis,et hanc herbam in quantum est eius cibus; unde ilia indiuidua ad que se non extendit eius actio ue! passio, nullo modo apprehendit sua estimatiua naturali : naturalis enim estimatiua datur animalibus ut per eam ordinentur in actiones proprias uel passiones prosequendas uel fugiendas.Translation from: Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s De Anima, trans. Kenelm Foster, O.P. and Sylvester Humphries, O.P. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1951), the Dominican House of Studies, http://dhspriory.org/thomas/DeAnima.htm#213L.

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they are not truly able to apprehend universals per se.

Thus, a lamb is not able to apprehend this wolf qua wolf but

rather as something to be feared. Now it is not in the

nature of the wolf that it must be feared, and thus it

follows that the lamb does not perceive the wolf under its

common nature. It does not perceive the universal ‘wolf.’17

Now, man and animal are also alike in that both have

sensitive appetites. However, man does not necessarily have

to act on his sensitive appetites as they can be curbed by

his rational appetites. Animals, on the other hand, are

stuck at the sensitive level. They have no higher appetites

than the sensitive appetites. They experience emotions like

we do, but differently insofar as they do not have a

rational appetite to moderate their lower appetites. Thus,

their passions cannot be moderated by reason and so they

experience emotions in an even more powerful way than we do.

Aquinas even says some are naturally disposed to some excess

17 Animals are nevertheless able to apprehend per accidens universals such as ‘all men caring a gun are to be feared.’ But that is not a per se universal, as a per se universal would be ‘man’ or ‘gun.’ See Deely’s article “Animal Intelligence and Concept-Formation,” The Thomist XXXV.1 (January 1971): 43-93.

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passion, as the lion to daring, the hound to anger, and the

rabbit to fear.18 Anyone who has handled rabbits for a

prolonged period of time can easily see how they are easily

frightened and are susceptible to what seems to be excessive

fear.

Now, since it has been said that animals have the

sensitive appetites, it must be mentioned what the proper

object of these appetites of the concupiscible and irascible

are. The proper object of the concupiscible is the sensible

good or evil, causing pleasure or pain respectively.

Insofar as something is presented to the concupiscible as

pleasurable it is desired and insofar as it is presented as

painful it is avoided. But some pleasurable goods are not

easy to attain as they involve suffering some evil in order

to attain them. Thus, there is a need for the irascible in

animals, whose proper object is the arduous good as

18 ST I-II, Q46, A5, ad1: Alia vero animalia, secundum quod recedunt ab hac qualitate complexionis ad dispositionem alicuius complexionis extremae, secundum hoc etiam naturaliter disponuntur ad excessum alicuius passionis, ut leo ad audaciam, canis ad iram, lepus ad timorem,et sic de aliis.

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difficult to attain and the arduous evil as difficult to

avoid.19

Now for animals the estimative appetite, as well as

imagination and sense,20 present the proper object to the

concupiscible and irascible faculties. And once its proper

object has been presented to the animal, the animal must act

on it. Man, on the other hand, has an intellect and will,

and since these are superior powers ruling over the lower

ones, he does not have to act on his lower desires. For by

his intellect he can know the good in general, not just the

good as pleasurable or as arduous. And he has a higher

faculty, namely the will, whose proper object is the good.

Aquinas clarifies the different objects of the will and the

sensitive appetites most clearly:

Now the sensitive appetite does not consider the commonnotion of good, because neither do the senses apprehendthe universal. And therefore the parts of the sensitiveappetite are differentiated by the different notions ofparticular good: for the concupiscible regards as proper to it the notion of good, as something pleasant

19 Aquinas discusses the proper object of the concupiscible and the irascible and how they differ from each other in ST I-II, Q23, A1 “Whether the passions of the concupiscible part are different from thoseof the irascible part?”20 ST I, Q81, A3, ad 2.

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to the senses and suitable to nature: whereas the irascible regards the notion of good as something that wards off and repels what is hurtful. But the will regards good according to the common notion of good.21

How this Supports Aquinas’ Argument

At this point it should be clearer how Aquinas is able

to say brutes have voluntary acts, but imperfectly. As

stated previous he says that something (viz. rational

agents) is said to be perfect voluntary when it has

cognition of the end by knowing it under the notion of end

(ratio finis) and the proportion of the means to that end.22

Whereas the imperfect voluntary (which is found in brutes)

merely has imperfect cognition of the end in only

apprehending the end but not under the notion of the end

21 ST I, Q82, A5: Appetitus autem sensitivus non respicit communem rationem boni: quia nec sensus apprehendit universale. Et ideo secundumdiversas rationes particularium bonorum, diversificantur partes appetitus bonorum, diversificantur partes appetitus sensitivi: nam concupiscibilis respicit propriam rationem boni, inquantum est delectabile secundum sensum, et conveniens naturae; irascibilis autem respicit rationem boni, secundum quod est repulsivum et impugnativum eius quod infert nocumentum. – Sed voluntas respicit bonum sub communi ratione boni.Latin is from the Editiones Paulinae.Translation is from The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas Aquinas, 2nd ed. rev., trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province, 1920,http://www.newadvent.org/summa/1082.htm#article122 ST I-II, Q6, A2: sed etiam cognoscitur ratio finis, et proportio eiusquod ordinatur in finem ad ipsum.

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(ratio finis) nor the proportion of the means to the end.23

Now, in light of what has been said earlier on how Aquinas

distinguishes the intellect and the cogitative from the

estimative power, an interpretation of what Aquinas means by

“ratio finis” will now be offered. For man knows the end

under the “ratio finis”, while brutes know the end but not

under the “ratio finis.” What this must mean for Aquinas is

that brutes do not know the end that they act for under the

notion of good, but only under the notion of some particular

good, i.e. the pleasurable, the arduous. This is because

brutes cannot really know universals and so cannot really

know this good qua good. For example, the cow cannot know

this grass qua good, but rather as qua desirable. Likewise,

the rooster knows the other rooster qua something to be

fought, but not qua evil. Thus the cow acts for the end of

eating this grass, but not under the “ratio finis.” It does

not eat it and think, “This is good for me and that’s why I

desired to eat it.” Likewise, the rooster acts for the end

23 Ibid., Imperfecta autem cognitio finis est quae in sola finis apprehensiione consistit, sine hoc quod cognoscatur ratio finis, et proportio actus ad finem.

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of clawing to pieces the other rooster but it does not think

“This rooster is evil as it is going to mate with all those

lovely hens out there by fertilizing their eggs, which are

eggs that only I should fertilize, so thus I’m going to claw

it to death.” Animals act for an end. They just cannot

give a reason as to why they act for the end for which they

act. It is not because of the mere absence of language or

the mere lack of the requisite vocal cords, etc. to express

their reasons for acting. Rather it is that they do have

the appropriate rational faculties to reflect and see why

they act as they do. As MacIntyre puts it, “Human practical

rationality certainly has among its distinctive features the

ability to stand back from one’s initial judgments about how

one should act and to evaluate them by a variety of

standards.”24 Animals, on the other hand, cannot stand back

and distance themselves from their judgments and give

reasons as to why they act as they do. But this does not

mean that they do not have reasons (where reason is used

analogically) for acting.25

24 MacIntyre, Dependent Rational Animals, 54.25 Ibid., 55.

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This brings us to an analysis of Aquinas next point,

when he says that brutes do not know the “proportio actus ad

finem,” whereas man knows “proportio eius quod ordinatur in

finem ad ipsum.” What this means is that brutes do not sit

back and reflect upon why they act they way that they do.

The wolf cannot really sit back and think, “I am pursuing

this deer so as to sink my fangs into her to kill her so as

to eat food so that I may live.” It simply desires self-

preservation and without any rational reflection it thereby

desires food when it is hungry, and thus goes hunting for

it. But it does not deliberate about how it should hunt for

its food. In other words, it does not sit back and think,

“Should I go down to the stream where I saw a deer before or

should I follow these old deer tracks or should I go

searching in garbage dumpsters where I found food before?”

It just searches for food by pursuing a course of action,

but without really thinking it through step by step. How

exactly this works inside the animal is hard for us to

conceptualize precisely because it is hard for us to

conceptualize doing anything or acting for an end which does

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not engage some aspect of our rational nature. It is hard

to imagine what it is like to act for an end but not under

the aspect of end. Perhaps the closest we can come to

knowing what it is like to act for end without doing so

under the aspect of the end is the following:26 you are

told to walk in a circle around the classroom and someone

engages you in deep intellectual conversation. In fact the

conversation is so engrossing that at some point you cease

to think about what you are doing, viz. walking around

several tables with chairs around them. You keep walking

around the room several times but since you are so focused

on the conversation you fail to notice that a chair has been

pushed in the way of your ordinary circuit. But instead of

tripping over it, you notice it, but since you are so

engrossed in intellectual conversation you push it out of

the way without even explicitly thinking about it or without

really even thinking about what you are doing. You do not

even think “I’m pushing this chair out of the way so as to

get around it.” Now, in the event of merely pushing the 26 This example is taken from personal experience and was illustrated tome by DeHaan.

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chair out of the way you are acting for the end of getting

it out of the way so as to walk around it. But there was no

rational judgment there, but merely pre-rational activity

going on there on the instinctual level insofar as you did not

think about and plan about how to move the chair out of the

way or whether to climb over it. It was merely the

cogitative power doing so as the intellectual faculties were

already engaged in deep intellectual conversation and so

were engaged in other matters. Now that is something like

what it is to act for an end (to continue making a circuit)

and to carry-forth a means to an end (moving the chair)

without knowing it under the notion of end qua end and

without knowing the relationship of the means to the end.27

Once again it must be emphasized that it is difficult for us

to imagine what it would be like to act for an end in the

way an animal does, because anytime we try to describe what

an animal is doing when it is acting we are engaging our 27 Technically in this example I was acting for a remote end, which I knew under the notion of the end, but that end was making a circuit because I was told to do so. But I had no intention, nor knowledge thatin making a circuit I would have to end up moving a chair out of the way. I also had another end that was going on, which was initiated after moving for the end of making a circuit, but which was carried out simultaneously with it, of engaging in simultaneous conversation.

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rational faculties and also utilizing language, an ability

that is proper to rational creatures alone. Thus, we are

trying to use a rational power, namely language, to describe

what is not really a fully rational activity. We are trying

to explain the irrational by using rational tools and

concepts and thus it is very difficult for us to understand

how brutes act for an end without knowing it under the

notion of end or the relationship of means to the end.

Nevertheless, some other passages in Aquinas may help

further clarify how brutes act for an end without knowing

the relationship of the means to the end. For Aquinas goes

through other passages following ST I-II, A6, A2 in which he

attributes certain acts of the will to man but says that

some such acts are not found in brutes.

In questions 13-16 of ST I-II Aquinas discusses the

various acts of the will with regard to the means, namely

choice (Q13), counsel (Q14), consent (Q15), and use (Q16).

In Q13, A2 Aquinas states that brutes do not have choice:

Since choice is the taking of one thing in preference to another it must of necessity be in respect of several things that can be chosen. Consequently in

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those things which are altogether determinate to one there is no place for choice. Now the difference between the sensitive appetite and the will is that, asstated above (I-II, q. 1, a. 2, ad 3), the sensitive appetite is determinate to one particular thing, according to the order of nature; whereas the will, although determinate to one thing in general, viz. the good, according to the order of nature, is neverthelessindeterminate in respect of particular goods...Wherefore irrational animals are not competent to choose.28

Now, some objections may be raised against this. As for

example, a dog awakes to a burning house and is presented

with multiple ways of escape it appears to ‘choose’ which

way it will escape. Likewise a wolf knowing there are

multiple locations in which deer may be appears to ‘choose’

which location to search first.

But Aquinas has already anticipated such an objection,

as he raises one precisely similar in the same article,

objection 3:

28 Respondeo dicendum quod, cum electio sit praeacceptio unius respectu alterius, necesse est quod electio sit respectu plurium quae eligi possunt. Et ideo in his quae sunt penitus determinata ad unum, electio locum non habet. Est autem differentia inter appetitum sensitivum et voluntatem, quia, ut ex praedictis patet, appetitus sensitivus est determinatus ad unum aliquid particulare secundum ordinem naturae; voluntas autem est quidem, secundum naturae ordinem, determinata ad unumcommune, quod est bonum, sed indeterminate se habet respectu particularium bonorum. Et ideo proprie voluntatis est eligere, non autem appetitus sensitivi, qui solus est in brutis animalibus. Et propter hoc brutis animalibus electio non convenit.

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We see this plainly in wonderful cases of sagacity manifested in the works of various animals, such as bees, spiders, and dogs. For a hound in following a stag, on coming to a crossroad, tries by scent whether the stag has passed by the first or the second road: and if he find that the stag has not passed there, being thus assured, takes to the third road without trying the scent; as though he were reasoning by way ofexclusion, arguing that the stag must have passed by this way, since he did not pass by the others, and there is no other road. Therefore it seems that irrational animals are able to choose.29

But such an objection does not bother Aquinas, as he

replies:

In all things moved by reason, the order of reason which moves them is evident, although the things themselves are without reason: for an arrow through themotion of the archer goes straight towards the target, as though it were endowed with reason to direct is course...Now as artificial things are in comparison to human art, so are all natural things in comparison to the Divine art...And thus it is in the works of irrational animals we notice certain marks of sagacity,in so far as they have a natural inclination to set about their actions in a most orderly manner through being ordained by the Supreme art. For which reason, too, certain animals are called prudent or sagacious; and not because they reason or exercise any choice

29 Et hoc etiam sensui manifestum videtur, apparent enim mirabiles sagacitates in operibus animalium, ut apum et aranearum et canum. Canisenim insequens cervum, si ad trivium venerit, odoratu quidem explorat ancervus per primam vel secundam viam transiverit, quod si inveniret non transisse, iam securus per tertiam viam incedit non explorando, quasi utens syllogismo divisivo, quo concludi posset cervum per illam viam incedere, ex quo non incedit per alias duas, cum non sint plures. Ergo videtur quod electio brutis animalibus conveniat.

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about things. This is clear from the fact that all share in one nature, invariably act in the same way.30

In other words, Aquinas is arguing that all animals which

share in the same nature would act in the same way if put in

a similar situation. Thus, all similar dogs that awake to a

burning house will ‘choose’ the same escape route even

though there are multiple options available. Likewise, all

hunting hounds that come upon a three-fold fork in the round

do exactly the same thing: sniff one path, sniff the other,

and then follow the third without even sniffing it. This is

not because they actually reason through what they are

doing, but rather due to their nature they act in a certain

way. If they really reasoned through what they were doing

then they would be able to sit back and reflect upon why

they act as they do. But animals do not do that. If they 30 ST I-II, Q13, A2, ad 3: Et propter hoc in omnibus quae moventur a ratione, apparet ordo rationis moventis, licet ipsa rationem non habeant, sic enim sagitta directe tendit ad signum ex motione sagittantis, ac si ipsa rationem haberet dirigentem...Sicut autem comparantur artificalia ad artem humanam, ita comparantur omnia naturalia ad artem divinam. Et ideo ordo apparet in his quae moventur secundum naturam, sicut et in his quae moventur per rationem, ut diciturin II Physic. Et hoc contingit quod in operibus brutorm animalium apparent quaedam sagacitates, inquantum habent inclinationem naturalem ad quosdam ordinatissimos processus, utpote a summa arte ordinatos. Et propter hoc etiam quaedam animalia dicuntur prudentia vel sagacia, non quod in eis sit aliqua ratio vel electio. Quod ex hoc apparet, quod omnia quae sunt unius naturae, similiter operantur.

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did, surely we would observe them doing so. But we do not,

so they do not do so. Thus, animals really do not have

choice.

In Q14 Aquinas writes on counsel, which is an act of

the reason giving direction as to the means.31 Now, it is

an inquiry about contingent singulars in regards to what

should be done.32 Thus it precedes choice.33 The intellect

does not pronounce judgment on things doubtful and uncertain

without previous inquiry, and this is called counsel.34

Now, though Aquinas does not explicitly say so here it is

quite clear that animals do not counsel, as they do not have

an intellect and so cannot reason. Thus, they do not

counsel about what should be done when there are multiple

paths of action open to them and thus they do not exercise

choice in such matters either.

In Q15, A2 Aquinas also says that brutes do not have

consent. He quotes Damascene on the matter in the sed contra

arguing thus, “‘After judging, man approves and embraces the31 ST I-II, Q14, A1, ad 1.32 ST I-II, Q14, A133 Ibid.34 Ibid.

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judgment of his counseling, and this is called the

sentence,’ i.e., consent. But counsel is not in irrational

animals. Therefore neither is consent.”35 In the responsio

Aquinas argues that:

Consent, properly speaking, is not in irrational animals. The reason of this is that consent implies anapplication of the appetitive movement to something as to be done...But irrational animals have not the command of the appetitive movement; for this is in themthrough natural instinct. Hence in the irrational animal, there is indeed the movement of the appetite, but it does not apply that movement to some particular thing. And hence it is that the irrational animal is not properly said to consent: this is proper to the rational nature, which has the command of the appetitive movement, and is able to apply or not to apply it to this or that thing.36

In other words, brutes do not have the power to apply their

appetite or not and so they cannot consent. Whereas man,

knowing that something is pleasurable, has the power to

35 ST I-II, Q15, A2: Damascenus dicit quod post iudicum, homo disponit et amat quod ex consilio iudicatum est, quod vocatur sententia, idest consensus. Sed consilium non est in brutis animalibus. Ergo nec consensus.36 ST I-II, Q15, A2: Respondeo dicendum quod consensus, proprie loquendo, non est in brutis animalibus. Cuius ratio est quia consensus importat applicationem appetivi motus ad aliquid agendum...Bruta autem animalia non habent in sui potestate appetivium motum, sed talis motus in eis est ex instinctu naturae. Unde brutum animal appetit quidem, sednon applicat appetitivum motum ad aliquid. Et propter hoc non proprie dicitur consentire, sed solum rationalis natura, quae habet in potestatesua appetitivum motum, et potest ipsum applicare vel non applicare ad hoc vel ad illud.Translation is from NovaAntiqua.

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consent or not to consent. He does not have to apply his

appetites to the pleasurable good that he perceives. But a

brute does not have such a power. If it is a pleasurable

good and there is no danger involved and it is not arduous

or difficult to attain the brute must pursue it. It cannot

but do otherwise. This is not the case with man.

Likewise, Aquinas also denies use to animals in ST I-

II, Q16, A2. Use is “to apply something to the purpose of

the will.”37 It is not found in brutes as they do not know

how to apply things to something else.38 Now, Aquinas does

acknowledge that brutes do apply their members to action, as

their feet to walk, their horns to pierce.39 But he says

that they do this through natural instinct, not by knowing

the order of their members to those operations.40

Thus, the fact that great apes use tools such as straw

to pick ants out of a hole in the ground is not a problem

37 ST I-II, Q16, A1: Augustinus dicit...uti est assumere aliquid in facultatem voluntatis.38 ST I-II, Q16, A239 ST I-II, Q16, A2, obj. 2.40 Ibid., ad 2: animalia per sua membra aliquid agunt instinctu naturae,non per hoc quod cognoscant ordinem membrorum ad illas operationes. Unde non dicuntur proprie applicare membra ad agendum, nec uti membris.

28

for Aquinas. He would merely say that they use straw from

instinct but do not know the order of such tools to their

operations. In other words, just as the bull cannot sit

back and reflect that “My horns are good for goring and so I

will use them for that purpose the next time a man walks

into the field.” Nor do apes sit back and reflect that a

stick is good for fishing ants out of a hole in the ground.

Rather they just naturally use it to fish ants out of the

ground.

Thus, Aquinas denies that brutes have choice, counsel,

consent and use. He also denies that they command

(imperium) their appetites to do something.41 Thus, it

should now be clearer what Aquinas means when he says in Q6,

A2 that brutes act for an end without knowing the proportion

of that which is ordained to the end. For brutes do not

counsel about the means to the end, nor do they really have

choice in what they do. Nor do they consent or use things.

Nor do they exercise command. Insofar as they lack such

41 ST I-II, Q 17, A2: imperare nihil aliud est quam ordinare aliquem ad aliquid agendum, cum quadam intimativa motione. Ordinare autem est proprius actus rationis. Unde impossible est quod in brutis animalibus,in quibus non est ratio, sit aliquo modo imperium.

29

abilities they do not know the proportion of the means to

the end. Rather they act from natural instinct. This is

not to deny that they actually do things which from our

perspective look like means to an end, rather it is merely

to say that they do not sit back and take counsel about the

various means to an end, then pronounce judgment upon a

particular means and choose it, and so command their

appetites to pursue such an end and thus use any things

necessary in attaining that end. On the contrary, brutes

merely estimate something as, for example, pleasurable or

beneficial and thus they pursue it. In some ways it is so

much less complicated that our actions that it is hard for

us to describe, let alone really understand what it would be

like to act in such a way. For to ask “Why do brutes act

the way that they do?” is in some ways to ask the wrong

question. They do not have reasons for acting like we do,

although they do act for an end. Explaining how they act in

some ways so much simple that it is difficult to explain.

To explain the irrational by rational concepts is no easy

task. Nevertheless, hopefully this analysis has shed some

30

light on what Aquinas means in ST I-II, Q6, A2 when he says

that brutes are voluntary but only in an imperfect sense.

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