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Founder’s LetterBeginning in 2010, the Oceans Beyond Piracy project has conducted annual estimates of the economic and human costs of maritime piracy. As the chairman of One Earth Future, I am proud to deliver this year’s study, which marks the first report to assess Southeast Asian piracy, in addition to piracy occurring in the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Guinea. Through our analyses, I have reached two conclusions about the state of maritime piracy.

As with any crime, motive, means, and opportunity must be present for piracy to occur. Alarmingly, we may be seeing a reemergence of these, as more foreign fishing vessels return to areas close to the coast of Somalia - frustrating coastal communities, and providing opportunity for the crime to occur. Alan Cole, head of UNODC’s Global Maritime Crime Programme notes “these provocations are similar to those that triggered piracy off the coast of Somalia in the first place. We are already seeing an upturn in regional piracy incidents since the beginning of the year [2015].”

As with previous years, our report finds that only 2.5% of costs associated with piracy are devoted to finding a long-term solution through investments ashore. Suppression efforts appear to have reduced the risk of piracy, but have done little to address root causes. Over 70% unemployment persists in Somalia, providing few economic alternatives to young men with ample access to guns. A comprehensive solution must include investments in economic development onshore as well as suppression at sea. It is unsustainable to fund primarily deterrence efforts while neglecting to address the problem at its source.

Marcel Arsenault

Founder and Chairman, One Earth Future Foundation

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Report Authors:Matthew R. Walje, Jens Vestergaard Madsen, Conor Seyle, Kellie Brandt, Peter Kerins,

Megan Matthews, Tyler Maybee

Contributors:Gregory Clough, Jon Huggins, Kaija Hurlburt, Andrea Jovanovic, Liza Kane-Hartnett,

Ben Lawellin, Maisie Pigeon

Lead Graphics:Timothy Schommer

For Comments & Questions on the Report:

Matthew R. WaljeProject Officer - Oceans Beyond Piracy Project

One Earth Future Foundation+1 720 274 8223

[email protected]

Jens Vestergaard MadsenSenior Project Associate - Oceans Beyond Piracy Project

One Earth Future Foundation+1 303 709 4776

[email protected]

Citation: Oceans Beyond Piracy, The State of Maritime Piracy Report 2014 (Denver, CO: One Earth Future Foundation, 2014)

F U T U R Eone earth

Cover Photo: Naham 3 close to the Somali coast by Niklas Ehlén Försvarsmakten - EU NAVFOR - Atalanta, Flickr

AUDITOR’S STATEMENTBIMCO was again invited to carry out a review of the methodologies and the calculations of this year’s State of Maritime Piracy report. We have found that the report continues to live up to its usual high standards and will retain its respect and credibility among all stakeholders in government and the shipping industry alike. The report constitutes an informed and constructive contribution to the counter-piracy debate.

It is clear to see that 2014 was a year of improvement in the Western Indian Ocean. Whilst attacks and hijackings have seemingly been deterred and defeated, there is, however, still clear evidence that the conditions ashore that create piracy have not changed substantially. The three legs of the deterrence milking stool, BMP, naval presence, and armed guards, have clearly reduced the threat in the High Risk Area to one of lower risk. The continued use of private armed guards onboard ships, though, should not be seen as an endorsement or institutionalization of the practice by the shipping industry, or as a waiver of the fundamental obligations of flag states under UNCLOS.

As pirate attacks continue to decline it is of paramount importance that the international community does not assume the fight is over, but continues to shift focus and resources to sustainable solutions that target the drivers of piracy at their root source. The myriad of capacity-building and regional coordination efforts are insufficiently developed to suggest that piracy has been eradicated to the extent that freedom of navigation can be assured without the need for additional self-protection measures, the payment of additional insurance premiums, and a naval presence.

Many of the lessons learned from Somali piracy continue to be taken forward, as and where they can, in dealing with piracy problems in the Gulf of Guinea region, where seafarers are regularly confronted with violent kidnapping and ransom. Here there seems to be a will to resolve the problems; the implementation of the essential solutions ashore, however, continues to take far too long whilst the industry continues to pay an unfair and unreasonable cost towards the protection it needs in order to trade. Without the continuing level of interest and commitment by both regional and international actors in the pursuit of solutions, such as the Yaoundé agreement, then the problem will remain unresolved.

This year for the first time, the report also includes a section on the human cost of piracy in Southeast Asia. The IMB has suggested that, “There’s a risk that the attacks and violence could increase if left unabated.” In the region, 93% of all attacks result in successful boarding of the victim vessel, significantly increasing the risk of direct, often violent, interaction between pirates and seafarers. This is particularly true in incidents where pirates attack a vessel with the goal of stealing its cargo and therefore need to stay on the vessel for a prolonged period of time. Worryingly, incidents, boardings, and piracy successes are highest there of any of the three regions Oceans Beyond Piracy has assessed in this year’s report.

The findings of the report once more highlight the importance of the continued focus of government and shipping industry stakeholders on combating piracy. It illustrates a reduction in the overall costs, but at the same time draws attention to the costs of capacity-building and their implementation. It is vital to change the conditions ashore that create piracy in areas where it occurs, and the report highlights how expensive this exercise is.

Angus Frew Secretary General, BIMCO

THE STATE OF MARITIME PIRACY 2014

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TAbLE OF CONTENTSINTRODUCTION

Acknowledgements ....................................................... iiForeword by Admiral Sir James burnell-Nugent ............. iiiPreface ......................................................................... iv Structure of Report ................................................ iv Definitions Used in this Report ............................... iv Regional Focus of this Report ................................. vi Data Sources and Methods .................................... vii

SECTIONSWestern Indian Ocean Region Overview .............................................................. 1 Economic Cost ....................................................... 4 Human Cost .......................................................... 27Gulf of Guinea Overview .............................................................. 37 Economic Cost ....................................................... 41 Human Cost .......................................................... 68Southeast Asia Overview .............................................................. 77 Human Cost .......................................................... 81Long-Term Impact of Piracy on Seafarers ............................ 87

Acronyms....................................................................... .... 91

Appendices............ Please Visit: www.oceansbeyondpiracy.org


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ACkNOWLEDGEMENTS

exactEarth is a data services company providing advanced information on global maritime traffic. Our exactAIS® service delivers an unrivalled view of the recognized maritime picture at a global scale, delivering operational efficiencies, enhancing security, safeguarding the environment, and assisting in saving lives.

For more information, visit our website at www.exactearth.com

The following data services provided data used in this report

Genscape and Vesseltracker™ deliver the world’s most comprehensive, up-to-date, and accurate shipping data feed. Today, the new Genscape Vesseltracker™ service routinely tracks over 100,000 vessels in near real-time every day—delivering the best open-ocean and close-to-port/coastal data on the market today.

For more information, please visit: www.genscape.com

The following data services were used in this report:

The following institutions and individuals provided research, data, or analysis, orotherwise contributed to the development of this report:

Michael G. Frodl, Esq., Founder & Head, C-LEVEL Global Risks, a Washington, DC-based consultancy

Dirk Siebels and the Greenwich Maritime Institute


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FOREWORD by ADMIRAL SIR JAMES bURNELL-NUGENT kCb, CbE When OBP released the first of its Cost of Maritime Piracy reports in 2011, Somali piracy was at its peak, yet the magnitude of the impact on seafarers, local populations and the global economy was only beginning to be understood. This 5th annual report by OBP on the cost of maritime piracy is the first ever assessment of the economic and human cost of piracy in the three primary hotspots in the world. It shows that maritime piracy continues to be a threat to seafarers, not only in the Western Indian Ocean, but also in the Gulf of Guinea and South East Asia.

This year’s analysis shows that in 2014 at least 5,000 seafarers were on board vessels attacked by criminals at sea, of which more than 1,000 were exposed to physical or psychological violence. 476 were held in captivity for some period of time, and 7 were killed. Some of these hostages have been held and tortured for over four years. This is an unacceptable level of violence that would not be tolerated if land or air routes were under similar threat - and it must not be tolerated at sea.

Although this report shows that the economic cost of Somali piracy may be down, the recent attacks on foreign fishing vessels and dhows in Somali waters show patterns similar to those that helped Somali piracy emerge ten years ago. However, because reporting is subject to restrictive criteria, these attacks on dhows are not normally included in official reporting and may hide a development that the reduced cost is masking – namely that Somali pirates still possess the means and capability – and are waiting for opportunities to strike. Stakeholders must act together and now to prevent a premature diminution of counter-piracy efforts.

The report also reveals disturbing piracy and armed robbery statistics from the Gulf of Guinea and South East Asia that show substantial dangers in shipping lanes and an unacceptable level of violence against seafarers. It is clear that the piracy business model in each of these regions must be addressed by a tailored response. As an example, the value of bringing together representatives from governments, industry and civil society to address the threat has been demonstrated by the success of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS).

An important project to capture the lessons learned from this Contact Group is currently under way, and, while other regions have different contexts than the Western Indian Ocean, lessons should be shared across. Early lessons identified include the need to maintain coordination across stakeholders, and increased regional leadership on capacity building, prosecutions, incarceration, and maritime law enforcement. Stakeholders have also come to realize the value of trusted reporting, timely warnings, and open communication channels (collectively known as Maritime Situational Awareness) backed by a credible constabulary response.

Therefore, a continued commitment from governments, the maritime industry and civil society is needed to address the persistent scourge of piracy and maritime crime across the globe. This, by now well developed, shared approach, is a model for what can be accomplished and could have a positive effect in addressing other crimes and threats at sea.


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PREFACEOur 2014 report is the fifth in a series by Oceans Beyond Piracy, which annually seeks to assess the cost of maritime piracy—both economic and human—to the international community. As in the past, we have restricted our analysis to specific regions. In keeping with previous reports, Somali piracy off the Horn of Africa is one area of focus; following its introduction in last year’s assessment, we again consider piracy in the Gulf of Guinea as well. New this year is an analysis of the human cost of piracy in Southeast Asia.1 Despite these recent expansions, this report should not be taken as a global assessment of maritime piracy, but rather as a serious effort to assess the impact of this violent crime in some of the most affected regions.

Structure of the Report

This year’s report is broken into four sections. The first is an assessment of piracy in the Western Indian Ocean, starting with an analysis of the economic costs, and followed by the human costs. The second section focuses on West African piracy, beginning with the economic costs analysis; the human costs follow. The third section is a brief overview of piracy in Southeast Asia, primarily assessing the human costs. With almost 17% of seafarers being directly attacked during a piracy incident and many more experiencing exponentially elevated levels of stress during transits in high-risk areas, the final section of this report showcases the first results of a long-term study attempting to measure the lasting impact of piracy on seafarers and understand their road to recovery. All appendices mentioned in the report are attached, or are available in the electronic version of our report, which is on our website at: http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/obp-reports.

Definitions Used in this Report

Following the reporting structures defined by major piracy reporting centers, the OBP dataset breaks pirate activity into: (1) type of incident (suspicious activity, failed boarding, successful boarding); (2) type of attack activity (robbery, oil siphoning, vessel hijacking, use of vessel as a mothership); (3) type of hostages (hostages kidnapped for ransom, detained hostages, long-term hostages); and (4) area where the attack occurred according to the delimitation of the waters. Each of these categories is further defined below.

(1) Types of Incidents• Suspicious activity – Where a vessel reported a close encounter with or direct approach from another vessel,

typically a dhow or skiff, that felt threatening in nature, as determined by the vessel master, due to the actions of the approaching vessel or from the observation of weapons, although the approaching vessel may not have actually made any overtly hostile action.

• Failed boarding – An attack by pirates where a boarding of a vessel was attempted, but failed.

• Successful boarding – Where pirates have successfully boarded a vessel, even if they were not successful in achieving their ultimate goal of robbery, oil siphoning, hijacking, or kidnapping.

(2) Types of Attack Activity• Robbery – Theft of any items from a vessel, except for oil, including ship stores, equipment, the crew’s personal

effects, cargo, etc., by armed or unarmed pirates. The crew may or may not have any direct contact with the criminals in these instances.

• Cargo theft – Theft of oil products from a vessel, whether crude or refined. Theft of palm oil is also included in this category.

• Vessel hijacking – Where pirates take control of a vessel, either directly or by using coercive measures to force the crew to direct the vessel to the pirates’ desired location, for any period of time.

• Use of vessel as a mothership – Where pirates take control of a vessel, either directly or by using coercive measures and force the crew to act, and use the vessel as the lead vessel in a pirate attack against another vessel.

1 For precise definitions of the various areas of interest discussed within this report, please see Appendix A.


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(3) Types of Hostages

• Hostages kidnapped for ransom – Seafarers who have been taken off of a vessel by pirates for the purpose of ransoming them. Abducted hostages may be taken to land or transferred to another vessel in order for pirates to demand a ransom.

• Detained hostages – Seafarers who are not captured for the purpose of ransom, but are held aboard a vessel under the control of pirates for a period of time while pirates rob the vessel, siphon oil, or use the vessel for personal ends such as use as a mothership from which to stage further attacks.

• Long-term hostages – Seafarers who have been or are being held hostage for a very long period of time, usually over a year.

(4) Terms of Delimitation

• Territorial sea – This is the area of the sea off a country’s coast over which the country claims absolute sovereignty, consistent with the rights and obligations of sovereignty applicable to that country’s territory. A country must officially claim its territorial sea to be entitled to its sovereignty rights and is permitted to claim up to 12 nautical miles off its shore (or internal and/or archipelagic waters), although some countries claim a larger area.2

• Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) – This is the area of the sea off a country’s coast over which a country has sovereign rights over natural resources, economic exploration and exploitation, and the establishment of artificial installations and structures. The EEZ is considered to be the “high seas” for purposes of piracy and the right of hot pursuit. A country must officially claim its EEZ to be entitled to its sovereignty rights and is permitted to claim up to 200 nautical miles off its shore (or internal and/or archipelagic waters), although some countries attempt to claim a larger area.3

• Archipelagic waters – These are the waters between land considered an archipelago - whether constituting an entire country or a portion thereof, which is a group of islands - which are so closely interrelated that they form an intrinsic geographical, economic, and political entity, or which historically have been regarded as such. These waters are usually considered internal or territorial waters of the country claiming the archipelago.4

• Open waters – These are waters which cannot be properly considered to be either territorial waters of a particular country, an EEZ, or the high seas due to the area’s status being disputed by two or more countries. As such, to avoid referring to these areas under a term which is disputed, OBP will simply refer to them as “open waters.”

Definition of Piracy as Used in this Report

The term “piracy” is used in this report in a colloquial manner, as opposed to a technically legal one, unless use of the proper legal term is necessary in order to discuss legal or reporting implications. This is due to the fact that the definition of piracy, as traditionally defined by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), is a very narrow one. Many of the attacks counted and discussed within this report are in fact “armed robbery” at sea, or a related form of maritime crime, because they occurred within the territorial waters of a coastal state. The technical definitions for both piracy and armed robbery are provided below, but this report will utilize the term “piracy” beyond the definition articulated in UNCLOS.

2 “United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,” 10 December 1982, United Nations Treaty Series 1833, p. 3 (1982), Article 3 (UNCLOS).

3 UNCLOS, Articles 55–57.

4 UNCLOS, Articles 46–54.


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Piracy: UNCLOS, Article 101, requires that an act of piracy meet all the following criteria:

That the attack:

1) Involved either:

a. Illegal acts of violence or detention,

b. Voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft, or

c. The act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an illegal act of violence or detention, or voluntary participation in the operation of a ship used for piracy;

2) Was committed for private ends;

3) Was committed by the crew or passengers of a private ship; and,

4) Occurred on the high seas or outside the jurisdiction of any State (meaning more than 12 nm from a coun-try’s shoreline).5

Armed robbery against ships: The International Maritime Organization’s (IMO) Resolution A.1025(26)6 defines armed robbery against ships as the following:

Any act which:

1) Includes any illegal act of violence or detention or any act of depredation, or threat thereof, as well as an act inciting or intentionally facilitating such illegal acts;

2) Was not an act of piracy as defined under UNCLOS;

3) Was committed for private ends; and,

4) Occurred within a State’s internal waters, archipelagic waters, or territorial sea (12 nm).

Ultimately, the only distinction between these two definitions is where the act occurred. While this distinction has important considerations for the legal structure governing the crime and the institutions implicated in responding, in considering the costs calculated in this report, this distinction is less relevant.

Regional Focus of this Report

This report is not a global assessment of the impact of maritime piracy. However, it does focus on the three regions most affected by this problem: the Western Indian Ocean Region, the Gulf of Guinea, and Southeast Asia. While the threat in the Western Indian Ocean remains primarily off the coast of Somalia, there are other piracy hotspots occur-ring around the Arabian Sea and Persian Peninsula. OBP defines a large Area of Interst in West Africa as bounded by Guinea-Bissau in the north and Angola in the south. However, the majority of incidents remain focused in the Gulf of Guinea. See Appendix A for detailed information on how our areas of interest are defined.

Southeast Asia is introduced as a new region for OBP in this year’s report. OBP’s Area of Interest is designed to ensure a comprehensive understanding of the issues facing seafarers and vessels in the region. Southeast Asia is a very large area; Indonesia alone is over 2,800 nm long. By comparison, the east coast of Africa from the Horn to the Cape is 3,300 nm long. A massive amount of vessel traffic flows through the region, as demonstrated by AIS data indicating that over 4,000 ships can be in the Malacca and Singapore Straits at a given time. Somali pirates operated within nearly the entire Western Indian Ocean region at their height, an area of nearly 4 million square nm. The area of interest in Southeast Asia is nearly as large, around 3.5 million square nm. Unlike Somali piracy, which occurred almost entirely in international waters, Southeast Asian piracy involves the territorial seas, archipelagic waters, and Exclusive Economic Zones of at least nine different Southeast Asian states. Part of the difficulty related to reporting 5 UNCLOS, Article 101(1)(a) (emphasis added).

6 “Code of Practice for the Investigation of Crimes of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships,” IMO, Res. A.1025(26), 18 January, 2010, available at http://www.imo.org/OurWork/Security/PiracyArmedRobbery/Guidance/Documents/A.1025.pdf.


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the scope of Southeast Asian piracy is simply the size of the area considered. While the majority of attacks occur near the Singapore Strait, it is by no means isolated to that locale. For the purposes of this report, OBP’s SE Asia Area of Interest is bounded by 21°30’N, 94°15’E; 10°S, 94°15’E; 21°30’N, 141°E; 10°S 141°E, excluding the EEZs of Myanmar and Taiwan.

Data Sources and Methods

One of the primary challenges in creating this report is gathering all the relevant data. At the core of this effort is our piracy incident database, where we compile all available information about hijackings, boardings, attempted attacks, suspicious approaches, and so on. This information—for example, the name of the targeted ship, the type of incident, or injuries to the crew—is drawn from a variety of sources: counter-piracy naval operations, monitoring organizations, local newspapers, other media reports, as well as internet and LexisNexis searches. Please see Appendix L for a detailed discussion of the incident database.

Another crucial component of the report is the number of transits in various regions of interest. These figures were calculated using the statistical software R to analyze AIS data purchased from exactEarth. In West Africa we also utilized port-visit data purchased from Vesseltracker, as well as AIS observations made using the exactEarth ShipView software tool. For more information about AIS and transits, please see Appendix H.

Last, we also reached out to a variety of experts, including insurers, trade bodies, journalists, flag states, etc., in order to solicit information, vet methodology, and verify early findings. The official auditor of the report was BIMCO. Please see the Acknowledgements section for a full list of our contributing partners.

In keeping with its predecessors, this report limits its economic analysis to first-order, direct costs - actual expenditures explicitly attributable to piracy. In other words, we consider only additional expenses to maritime stakeholders that they would not have incurred in the absence of piracy. Of course, one party’s cost is another’s revenue. However, income gen-erated through maritime piracy remains beyond the scope of the report.

Our research was extensive, but neither perfect nor conclusive: we were not able to acquire authoritative information about every relevant topic or business practice. As such, throughout the report our calculations employ conservative estimates and low-end figures in order to avoid overstating the cost of piracy. Additionally, we ascribe no cost to those items about which we could not find credible data. While only essential findings are reported within the main text, most sections are accompanied by an appendix detailing the methodology, figures, and calculations that appear in the report itself.

As always, this report represents a good-faith effort by Oceans Beyond Piracy to estimate the scope and impact of maritime piracy on the maritime community and its associated stakeholders, despite the acknowledged informational barriers and deficiencies. This latest iteration reflects the comments and criticisms elicited by its predecessors, and we anticipate that the feedback to this year’s report will again help us to revisit and refine our methodology. We welcome such engagement, and encourage interested parties to contact our organization via one of the means listed on the title page of this document.

THE STATE OF MARITIME PIRACY 2014 WESTERN INDIAN OCEAN REGION: OVERVIEW

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THE STATE OF MARITIME PIRACY IN THE WESTERN INDIAN OCEAN REGION OVERVIEW

ECONOMIC COST KEY FINDINGS:

HUMAN COST KEY FINDINGS:

PIRATE ACTIVITY KEY FINDINGS:

• Internationalnavycoalitionmandatesremainunchanged,butfewerassetshavebeencommittedtothemissions.

• TheInternationalBargainingForum’sHighRiskAreawasadjustedinmid-2014,reducingtheestimatednumberoftransits-andthereforeseafarers-eligibleforhazardpayby50%.

• IndustryBestManagementPractices(BMP),thedefinedHighRiskArea(HRA)andtheJointWarCommittee(JWC)ListedAreaforwarriskinsurancehavenotchangedsince2012,butre-routingandobservedspeedscontinuetodeclineandinsurancepremiumshavedroppedsteadilysincetheheightofthepiracycrisis.

• Percentageofvesselsemployingarmedguardsremainedstable,butteamsaregettingsmallerandmorediverseduetocostpressures.

• Accountsfromreleasedhostagesin2014(11hostagesfromMV Albedoheldfor1,288days&7hostagesfromMV Asphalt Ventureheldfor1,492days)revealedthefullextentoftortureandmistreatmentinflictedonseafarers.

• 26hostages(alltakenfromFV Naham 3-hijacked26March2012)remainatveryhighriskduetopoorconditionsofconfinementashoreandslownegotiations.

• Reportsof“SuspiciousActivity”arestillcommon,accountingfor87%ofallreportedpirateactivityintheWesternIndianOceanRegion(WIOR);theyareoftenclassifiedas“FalseAlarms”byreportingcenters.

• Restrictivereportingdefinitionsandframeworkscouldmaskimportantwarningindicatorsandprecursors.

• Incidentreportsforregionalvesselsareunreliableduetointimidationandlackoflocalreportingagencies.

THE STATE OF MARITIME PIRACY 2014WESTERN INDIAN OCEAN REGION: OVERVIEW

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ECONOMIC COST BREAKDOWN:

HUMAN COST BREAKDOWN:

PIRATE ACTIVITY BREAKDOWN:

THE STATE OF MARITIME PIRACY 2014 WESTERN INDIAN OCEAN REGION: OVERVIEW

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OBP’sdatasetindicatesatotalof142incidentsattributedtopirateactivityin2014(seePirateActivityBreakdownonpreviouspage).13%(18outof142)havebeenclassifiedasattacks,2ofwhichresultedinsuccessfulhijackingofdhows.Thefirstofthese2incidentswasanearlyJanuaryattackontheIndiandhowShane Hind,inwhich11IndianseafarerswerehijackedofftheeasternSomalicoastatthemouthoftheGulfofAdenandheldcaptivewhiletheirdhowwasusedasamothership.ThesecondwastheMay22ndattackonthedhowMesouth,inwhichonecrewmemberwaskilledandthevesselrobbed.Anothernotableincidentincludedinthe18attacksinvolvedtheMarshallIslands-flaggedtanker,Nave Atropos,whichcameunderattackbypiratesaboardShane Hind,whoengagedinafirefightwiththeembarkedPCASP.Shane HindwaslaterinterceptedbytheFrenchnavalvesselSirocoandtheIndianseafarerswerereleased.ThefiveSomalisinvolvedintheincidentwerearrested.

Theremaining124outof142(87%)incidentscompiledbyOBPwerecategorizedas“suspiciousactivity”afterverificationbyatleasttwosources.Itisimportanttonotethatreportingcentersoftenneglecttoclassifytheseincidentsaspiracy-relatedsincetheyfailtomeetindividuallyestablishedverificationstandardsorreportingcriteria.Whilethereareconflictinginterpretationsoftheveracityoftheseincidents,thefactthattheyoccurredatsea,andawayfrominvestigatingagencies,makesitdifficulttoconclusivelyruleoutpiracyorarmedrobbery.ThefactthattheseincidentsarebeingfrequentlyreportedindicatesthatseafarersoperatingintheGulfofAdencontinuetoconsiderpiracyarealandpresentconcernduringtransits.Theseincidentsarealsorepresentativeoftheanxietyfeltonthepartoftheships’crews,whichissignificantwhenconsideringthehumancostshistoricallyassociatedwithpiracyintheWesternIndianOcean.

OBPestimatesthatthecostofsuppressingpiracyhasdroppedbytwo-thirdssinceourinitialcalculationsfor2010,attheheightofthecrisis.Muchofthecostsavingshavebeenduetoeconomicefficienciesdevelopedovertime.However,ifinvestmentinsuppressioneffortsdipsbelowalevelatwhichpiracydeterrencecanbemaintained,thereisconcernthatasubstantialinvestmentwouldberequiredtore-establishthesamelevelofdeterrence.

ThehumancostofpiracyhasfallenprecipitouslysincetheheightofthecrisisaccordingtoOBPcalculations.Attheworstpoint,over600seafarerswerebeingheldofftheSomalicoastunderconditionsoftortureandextrememistreatment.Whilethecurrentthreatofphysicalandpsychologicalabuseisstilltoohigh,aresurgenceofpiracywouldlikelycauseamarkedincreaseindangertoseafarers.

Economic Cost of Piracy in the Western Indian Ocean Region (2010-2014)

Human Cost of Piracy in the Western Indian Ocean Region (2010-2014)

THE STATE OF MARITIME PIRACY 2014THE ECONOMIC COST OF PIRACY IN THE WESTERN INDIAN OCEAN REGION

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THE ECONOMIC COST OF MARITIME PIRACYIN THE WESTERN INDIAN OCEANTotal Cost Estimates Low HighIndustry-Employed Vessel Protection Measures $1,192,516,000 $1,284,558,000ArmedGuards $598,177,000 $683,631,000SecurityEquipment $3,170,000 $9,758,000IncreasedSpeed $575,906,000 $575,906,000Rerouting $15,263,000 $15,263,000Other Industry Costs $175,144,000 $175,144,000Insurance $103,494,000 $103,494,000Labor $71,650,000 $71,650,000Government and Civil Society Costs $804,825,000 $805,625,000MilitaryOperations $741,336,000 $741,336,000RansomsandAssociatedPayments $200,000 $1,000,000ProsecutionsandImprisonment $6,284,000 $6,284,000Counter-PiracyOrganizations $57,005,000 $57,005,000Total: $2,172,485,000 $2,265,327,000

COST OF INDUSTRY-EMPLOYED VESSEL PROTECTION MEASURES (Guards, Security Equipment, Increased Speeds, and Rerouting)$1,192,516,000 - $1,284,558,000Merchantshipspossessanumberofoptionstodefendagainstpirateattacks.Theseincludedefensemeasuressuchasbarbedwire,armedguards,andeffortstoavoidanapproachbypirates,suchasincreasedspeedsandreroutingtoavoidareaswherepirateactiongroupshavebeenactive.Thesemeasuresareexpensive,costingtheshippingindustryasmuchas$1.3billionin2014.Privatesecuritycostsdroppedby22%in2014,duetoashiftawayfromall-Britishteamsandtowardsmaller,multinationalPrivatelyContractedArmedSecurityPersonnel(PCASP)teams.Additionally,thenumberofvesselsusingincreasedspeedstodeterpirateshasdroppedby10%forcargovesselsand6%fortankers.WealsonotedthatwhilesomereroutingoccursalongtheroutebetweenthePersianGulfandSouthernIndia,nomeasurablereroutingoccursalongtheroutebetweentheGulfofAdenandSouthernIndia.Continueduseofincreasedspeedandrerouting,securitymeasuresoverwhichcrewshavesomemeasureofcontrol,indicatesthatthoseclosesttotheriskposedbypiracystillfeelthreatened.

THE STATE OF MARITIME PIRACY 2014 THE ECONOMIC COST OF PIRACY IN THE WESTERN INDIAN OCEAN REGION

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Key Findings:

• Armed guard costs are estimated to be between $598,177,000 and $683,631,000.

• Armed guard usage remained at 35% to 40% of vessels in the HRA.

• Declining cost is attributable to increased use of multinational teams and greater use of three-man teams over four-man teams.

AsdescribedinpreviousOBPreports,theuseofarmedguardsisawidelyemployedmethodforprotectingvesselsagainstpiratesintheWIOR.Thoughcomprehensivemarketdatadoesnotexist,OBPwasgrantedaccesstoadetaileddatasetontheuseofPCASPin2014thatwasprovidedbyamajorflagstateandanalyzedbyDirkSiebels.1Ourresearch,incombinationwithSiebels’dataandinterviewswithexpertsfromthemaritimesecurityindustry,demonstratesthatalthoughthenumberofvesselsusingarmedguardswhiletransitingtheWIORwasstableorevenslightlyhigherthanin2013,thetotalcostofemployingarmedguardsfell22%in2014tobetween$598millionand$684million.

Throughout2014,severalmediastoriesreferredtotheincreasedcompetitionandcostpressuresfacingPrivateMaritimeSecurityCompanies(PMSCs)intheWIOR.Publiclyavailableestimatesindicatethattheaveragecostpertransitdecreasedby28%in2014.2Siebels’analysisrevealstwotrendsthatmayhavecontributedtolowerratesfor

armedsecurityteams:ashiftawayfromtheuseofall-Western,predominantlyall-British,teams,towardmoremultinationalteams,andanincreaseintheuseofthree-manteamscomparedtofour-manteams,asshowninFigures1and2.

Figure2illustratesatrendtowardstheuseofthree-manteamsoverfour-manteamsfrom

1 DirkSiebelsisaPhDCandidateattheUniversityofGreenwichinLondon.ThedatadiscussedabovearebasedonrequestsmadebyshipoperatorsforpermissionfromtheflagstateforaPCASPteamtobeembarkedononeoftheirshipswhiletransitingthroughtheIndianOceanHighRiskArea(HRA).Uponreceiptofsucharequest,theflagstateissuesaLetterofNon-Objection(LONO)allowingtheownertoembarkaPCASPteamforthattransit.In2014,morethan2,000LONOswereissuedfortheBMP4HRA.Forthissection,datafromfourmonths(March,June,September,andDecember)and677individualtransitswasanalyzedindetail.ThestudybehindthedatasetwasfacilitatedbySAMI.Fordetailedinformationaboutthedata,[email protected].

2 “SomePrivateSecurityCompaniesareasRiskyasPirates,”Lloyd’s List,21August2014,http://www.lss-sapu.com/index.php/piracynews/view/1614;“BalancingSecurityCosts&Quality,”SAMI,12November2014,http://www.seasecurity.org/mediacentre/balancing-security-costs-quality/?dm_i=1AJX,2WRQX,6YUFL5,APUBI,1;KeithWallis,“MaritimeGunsforHireAdapttoChangesinSeaPiracy,”Reuters,3December2014,http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/12/03/us-piracy-shipping-guards-idUSKCN0JH2HC20141203.

Best Management Practices 4 (BMP4) BMP4 leaves the decision to hire armed guards to the individual ship owners or operators, but states that armed guards should be part of a set of layered security measures and that they are not a substitute for the fundamental BMP4 requirements.

Total Cost of Armed Guards$598 to $684 Million

Figure 1: PCASP Team Size


6 ©2015

2013to2014,withtheirusageratereachingparityinDecember2014.Theweightedaverageofthefourmonthsin2014analyzedhere(March,June,September,andDecember)indicatesthat46%oftransitsusedteamsofthreearmedguardsand53.5%usedfour-manteams.Transitsusingteamsoftwoorfiveguardsmadeuplessthan0.5%ofthetotalin2014.Anotherlikelydriverbehindthelowerper-transitcostofarmedguardteamsin2014wasthecontinuedshiftawayfromteamscomposedofBritishguardstowardtheuseofmixed-nationalityteams,orwhollynon-Britishteams,whicharegenerallycheaper.

Figure 2: PCASP Team Nationalities

DirkSiebels,whoprovidedOBPwiththeteamcompositiondata,explainstheseobservations:

Over the course of 2014, there has been a clear trend to teams with three rather than four armed guards. Moreover, where we have seen security personnel from the UK dominating the market in the past, that is no longer the case. There are still a lot of British guards but other nations are catching up fast, most notably Greece and India. This development can partly be linked to the general structure of the shipping industry, yet ship operators are also keen to employ more guards from various – perceived – low-cost countries. While the nationality alone does not say anything about the training levels of individual guards, smaller teams and more guards from outside the UK are important indicators for the financial pressures the private security industry has to work under.

OurmethodologyforcalculatingcostsassociatedwithPCASPteamshasnotchangedsignificantlyfromlastyear’sreport.Basedonconversationswithindustryexperts,weestimatethat35%to40%ofalltransitsthroughtheBMP4HighRiskArea(HRA)carriedPCASP.Publicestimatesofthedecreaseinthecostofarmedguardtransitsin2014rangedbetween28%and50%.Basedonthesefiguresweconservativelyestimatea30%dropintheper-transitcostcomparedtotheestimateinlastyear’sStateofMaritimePiracyreport.AscanbeseeninTable1,thisleadstoanestimatedcostofarmedguardsintheBMP4HRAofbetween$598millionand$684millionin2014.

Table 1: Cost of Armed Guards in the BMP4 HRALower Bound Upper Bound

Numberoftransits 72,600 72,600EstimatedUse 35% 40%NumberoftransitswithPCASPs 25,410 29,040Numberwith3-personteams(est.at46%) 11,689 13,358Numberwith4-personteams(est.at54%) 13,721 15,682Costfor3-personteamsataverageof$19,950/team $233,187,570 $266,500,080Costfor4-personteamsataverageof$26,000/team $364,989,240 $417,130,560Total Cost $598,177,000 $683,631,000


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Key Findings:

• 2014 saw an estimated $3,170,000 to $9,758,000 in sustainment costs related to replacing or refitting vessels with sandbags, razor wire, and warning signs.

• Existing merchant vessels operating in the WIOR are likely to have installed Ship Protection Measures (SPMs) within the past 8 years, resulting in negligible outfitting costs.

Table 2: Cost of Purchasing/Implementing SPMs3

Type of SPM Unit Cost Units Per Ship Estimated SPM Lifespan

Total Cost Per Vessel

RegisteringandreportingwithMSCHOA/UKMTO

$0 N/A N/A $0

RazorWire $4/meter 550-1,500meters(singletotriplelayers)

2years $2,200-$6,000

Sandbags $1/bag 550 6-12months $550WarningSigns $140/sign 3 1-2years $420

45

GiventhatSomalipirateshaveposedathreattomajorshippingroutessince2008,OBPestimatesthat,attheirdiscretion,shipownershaveoutfittedtheexistingvesselswithintheirfleetswithSPMspriorto2014.Asaresult,weestimatethecostofacquiringnewsecurityequipmenttooutfitvesselsin2014wasnegligible.However,giventhat

3 Inpastreports,wehavelistedlong-rangeacousticdevices(LRADs),electrifiedbarriers,andspecializedwater/foammonitors.However,asthesearelesscommonlyused(accordingtoamajorproducer,thecostofanLRADcounter-piracysystemrangesfrom$65,000–$75,000dependingontheacousticdevicemodels,andover65vesselshavebeenoutfittedbythiscompany),wehavedecidednottoincludetheminourlistofSPMsforthisyear’sreport,astheyarenotlikelytomakeupasignificantpercentageofestimatedSPMcostsfor2014.

4 Thisisbasedontheavailableonlinewholesalepriceof$3.55permeterofgalvanizedconcertinarazorwireandanaveragevessellengthof230metersandwidthof35meters,whichisequalto530metersofrazorwiretocovertheentireexteriorofthevessel.

5 TheestimatednumberofsandbagsisbasedonareasonableestimationofsandbagsrequiredtoconstructthreePCASPfiringpositions.

Total Cost of Security Equipment$3.1 to $9.8 Million

Best Management Practices 4—Ship Protection MeasuresBMP4laysoutasetofsuggestedplanningandoperationalpracticesforshipoperatorsandmasterstransitingtheBMP4HRA.ThedocumentoutlinesthreeFundamentalRequirements:

1)RegisterattheMaritimeSecurityCentre—HornofAfrica(MSCHOA),2)ReporttoUnitedKingdomMarineTradeOperations(UKMTO),and3)ImplementSelf-ProtectionMeasures(SPMs)suchaswatch-keepingandenhancedvigilance,enhancedbridgeprotection,physicalbarriers(forexamplerazororbarbedwire,electrifiedbarriers),watersprayandfoammonitors,andcitadels.

BMP4recommendsthatalltransitingvesselsregisterwithMSCHOAandreporttoUKMTO.However,thenumberandtypeofSPMsavesselshouldimplementwillvaryfromshiptoship,andshouldbebasedonanindividualriskassessment,takingintoaccounttheroute,heightoffreeboard,andanyotherfactorswhichmightaffectthevessel’sindividualriskprofile.


8 ©2015

thetypesofpassivedefensemeasuresthatsuffermostfromexposuretotheelements,suchassandbagsandrazorwire,willneedtobereplacedonoccasion,thesearetheonlySPMsforwhichwehavecalculatedareplacement.ThecostofrefittingvesselsandreplacingcorrodedordamagedpassiveSPMswasassessedtobebetween$3,170,000and$9,758,000for2014.6

Key Findings:

• The number of cargo vessels using increased speeds in the WIOR decreased by 10%, while the number of tankers using increased speeds decreased by 6%.

• Increased speed remains a significant way to avoid pirate attacks. The cost of increased speeds for 2014 was $575,906,000.

7Usingincreasedspeedstodeterpirateattackshasproventobeeffective.However,thistacticisnotwithouteconomicconsequence,asincreasedfuelconsumptionsignificantlyincreasescosts.Statisticalanalysisof2014vesseltrafficindicatesthatvesselstransitingtheWIORincreasedcostsbytravelingathigherthanaveragespeedswhiletransitingtheBMP4HRA.

Ourapproachforcalculatingincreasedfuelcostsusesequationsthatcalculatefuelconsumptionasafunctionofspeed,therebypermittingustocomparethefuelusageofshipssailingwithintheWIORtothatofvesselssteaminginareasnotsimilarlythreatened.WeattributeanincreaseinsteamingspeedbyvesselswithintheWIORtothecontinuedthreatofbeingattackedbypirates,andtheresultingincreaseinfuelconsumptioniscountedasacostofpiracy.Amorein-depthdiscussionofthemethodologycanbefoundinAppendixC.

Thefollowingtableliststhevariousvesselspeedsusedinourcalculations.Theobservedglobalaveragespeedforeachlength-categoryofvesselisusedasaproxyforthe“optimum”speedthatvesselswouldutilizeintheabsenceofapiracythreat.Toexcludeshipstravelingslightlyabovethisbaselinespeedforreasonsotherthanpiracy,weintroduced“threshold”values.Onlyshipstravelingabovetheobservedglobalspeedbyacertainminimumamount–thethresholds–wereconsideredtobedefinitivelyincreasingspeedduetopiracy.

6 ThisnumberwasderivedbyestimatingthetotalnumberofindividualvesselsoperatingwithintheWIOR,whichwasbetween7,000and5,000inayear.Theseestimatesarefoundbydividingthe71,000transitsfrom2014byanaverageannualtransitpervessel,whichwasbetween10and15.Weretainedthe2013estimatedrateofuseforrazorwireandsandbagsat80%andassumedthat25%ofthesewouldneedtorefitin2014.

7 WitherbySeamanshipIntl.,BMP4: Best Management Practices for Protection against Somalia Based Piracy, Version 4(Edinburgh:WitherbyPublishingGroupLtd.,2011),7,http://www.mschoa.org/docs/public-documents/bmp4-low-res_sept_5_2011.pdf.

Total Cost of Increased Speeds$575.9 Million

One of the most effective ways to defeat

a pirate attack is by using speed to try to outrun the attackers and/or make it difficult to board.7


©20159

Table 3: Vessel Speed by Vessel Type and Length120m-200m Vessel Length 200m-300m Vessel Length 300m+ Vessel Length

(all speeds in knots) Cargo Tanker Cargo Tanker Cargo TankerObservedGlobalAverageSpeed 12.94 12.77 13.21 13.09 14.88 12.41IncreasedSpeedBuffer 0.50 0.50 0.75 0.75 1.00 1.00IncreasedSpeedThreshold 13.44 13.27 13.96 13.84 15.88 13.41

Ourcalculationsshowadecreaseinthepercentageofvesselstravelinginexcessofobservedaveragespeedsforbothvesselarchetypes:from64%to54%forcargoandfrom66%to60%fortankers.8ThedataindicatethataslightmajorityofcommercialvesselscontinuetoincreasetheirspeedduringtransitsoftheWIORasoneofthecounter-piracyrecommendationsofBMP4.Thisanalysisyieldedanestimatedtotalcostof$575,906,000.9

Table 4: Fuel Cost Calculations120m-200m Vessel Length 200m-300m Vessel Length 300+m Vessel LengthCargo Tanker Cargo Tanker Cargo Tanker

AverageDailyNumberofVessels 82 29 51 44 25 7FractionofVesselsSteamingatIncreasedSpeed

49% 69% 64% 53% 37% 35%

EstimatedDailyNumberofVesselswithIncreasedSpeed

41 20 33 23 9 3

AverageDailyExcessFuelUse(Tons) 451 74 1312 448 517 89AverageDailyExcessFuelCost,Total $246,157 $40,154 $716,382 $244,386 $282,091 $48,655EstimatedAnnualExcessFuelCost $89,847,201 $14,656,041 $261,479,579 $89,200,771 $102,963,143 $17,758,953Estimated Total Annual Excess Fuel Costs, Cargo and Tankers $575,906,000

8 ThesepercentagesdifferfromthosepublishedintheStateofMaritimePiracy2013reportandaretheresultofapplyingthesamemethodology,includingvesseltypeandlength-optimalspeedvariations,toboththe2013and2014AISdatasets.

9 Thiscostestimate,whencomparedtoits2013equivalent,indicatesadropof$396,700,000inadditionalfuelcostsduetopiracy.Mostofthesecostsavingsappeartohavebeenrealizedduetoachangeinbehaviorbythelargestcategoryofbothtankersandcargovesselsexaminedinthisanalysis.

80

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80

70

60

50

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PERC

ENTA

GE

CARGO

2013 20132014

120-200m

200-300m

300+m

2014

TANKERS

PERC

ENTA

GE

Figure 3: Percentage of Vessels Speeding by Group


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Key Findings:

• No measurable costs from rerouting along the Gulf of Aden to Southern India route were incurred in 2014.

• Rerouting along the Persian Gulf to South India route cost roughly $15,263,000 in 2014.

Asdocumentedinpreviousreports,whenthethreatfrompiracywasatitspeak,manyvesselstransitingtheWIORattemptedtoreducetheirexposuretothethreatthroughtheimplementationofextensivereroutingpractices.ThesepracticesincludedroundingtheCapeofGoodHopetothesouthorhuggingthecoastsoftheIndiansubcontinentandArabianPeninsulatothenorth.Takingthesealternateroutesincreasesthechanceofavoidingknownareasofpirateactivity,butgenerallyresultsinhighercostsduetolongertraveltimes,greaterdistances,andtheaccompanyingincreaseinfuelexpenditure.

Route: Gulf of Aden–Southern India

Reroutingdrawstrafficawayfromthetraditional,directshippinglanebetweenthesoutherntipofIndiaandtheGulfofAden.BycomparingrecentshippingbehaviorwithbaselinetrafficpatternspredatingtheriseofSomalipiracy,wecanestimatethecurrentlevelofrerouting,andthecorrespondingcosts.DetailsofthisprocessaredescribedinAppendixD,butitisimportanttonotethatwecomparerelativetrafficflowsacrossvariousroutes,ratherthanabsolutevesselnumbers,inordertoaccountforyear-to-yearfluctuationsinoverallshippingtraffic.

Ouranalysisindicatesthatin2014,anysuchreroutingfromthedirectrouteacrosstheWIORwasminimalandeconomicallyinsignificant.Strongtrafficflowsalongthemoredirectroute,eveninexcessofthebaseline,suggestthat,broadlyspeaking,shipownersdidnotdecidethattravelinguptoanadditional600nminanattempttoavoidpirateswasworthwhile.Accordingly,weestimatethatreroutingalongtheGulfofAdentoSouthIndiaroutedidnotrepresentanyadditionalpiracy-relatedcostsfor2014.

Route: Persian Gulf–Southern India

Observationof2014AutomaticIdentificationSystem(AIS)dataindicatedthatvesselssteamingbetweenthePersianGulfandSouthIndiadosoatslowerspeedsandingreaternumbersalongaroutefollowingthecurveofthecoastlinethanthosetravelingalongthemostdirectroute.ThesetworoutesaredepictedinFigure5.Thedisparityinaveragespeedbetweenthesetworoutesindicatesthatvesselsaremodifyingtheirbehaviorduetothethreatofpiracy.

Thisreroutingbehaviorismostprominentamongtankers.Tankerships,andinparticularthosefullyladenwithpetroleumproduct,havealowerfreeboardandlessmaneuverabilityonaveragethancargovessels.Thesefactorsmakethem

Total Cost of Rerouting$17.9 Million

Figure 4: Rerouting along the Gulf of Aden to South India route

Figure 5: Persian Gulf to Southern India route


©201511

morevulnerableandattractivetargetstopiratesand,asaresult,theyaremorelikelytomodifytheirbehaviorinordertoavoidthethreatofpiracy.OuranalysisofAISdataindicatesthattankersappeartobereroutingslightlytostayclosertothecoastlinesofIndiaandPakistan,withthetwofoldobjectiveofstayingfartherfrompiracyhotspotsandclosertowherecoastguardscouldprovidehelponshortnotice.

Reroutingalongthecoast,asopposedtotakingthemoredirectroute,increasesthelengthofatransitbyonlyabout100nm.10However,vesselstravelingalongthedirectroutedosoathigheraveragespeeds,therebyincurringhigherfuelcostsdespitetheshorterdistancetraveled.

Weassessthatincreasedspeedsandreroutingbehaviorobservedamongvesselstransitingalongthisrouteareattributabletothethreatofpiracy.Asaresultwecanestimatethecostsvesselsincurusingthesebehaviorsasthedifferencebetweenthecostoftheircurrentpracticesandthecostoftravelingatoptimalspeedsalongtheshortestroute.Ourestimatesconcludethattheper-transitcostduetopiracyrangesfrom$3,700forcargoto$5,300fortankerscurrentlyengagedinrerouting.ThemethodologybehindthesecalculationsisfoundinAppendixH.

Table 5: Additional Fuel Costs Per Vessel Due to ReroutingCargo (120-200m Length) Tanker (120-200m Length)DirectRoute

CircuitousRoute

DirectRoute,OptimalSpeed

DirectRoute

CircuitousRoute

DirectRoute,OptimalSpeed

VesselSpeed(Knots) 15 13 13 14.5 13 13

FuelCost $76,595 $50,422 $46,700 $107,616 $90,499 $83,818Per-Vessel Cost $3,700 $5,300

Usingtheseper-transitcosts,wecalculateaconservativeestimateofreroutingcostsbasedonthepercentageofvesselstravelingthedirectrouteandthepercentageofvesselsreroutingatlowerspeeds.Ourestimationconcludesthatreroutingcostswerearound$15,263,000in2014.

Thoughtheseobservationsmaynotsignifycostsonthesameorderasreroutingandincreasedspeedhaveinpastyears,theydodemonstratethatseafarersandvesseloperatorscontinuetoconsiderSomalia-basedpiracyathreattosafetyandnavigation,andmodifytheirbehaviorsaccordingly.

OTHER INDUSTRY COSTS (Insurance and Labor)$175,144,000Inadditiontovesselprotectivemeasures,shippersbearothercostsasaresultofpiracy,includingWarRiskinsurancebreachpremiums,Kidnap&Ransominsurance,hazardpayforseafarers,andcaptivitypayowedtohostages.Altogether,theseareestimatedtohavecostasmuchas$175,144,000in2014.

10 JeppesenIntegratedMaritimeSuiteV1.2.0.146.

Figure 6: Traffic patterns for both NW- and SE-heading transits demonstrate that slower vessels hug the coastline, avoiding the more direct route.


12 ©2015

Key Findings:

• 2014 War Risk insurance cost $76,269,000.

• 2014 K&R insurance cost $27,225,000.

• Total piracy-related insurance in 2014 cost $103,494,000.

Alongwiththeexpenseofpurchasingstandardinsurancepolicies,vesselowners,charterers,andmanagersoperatingintheWIORincuradditionalcostsinsuringagainsttheriskofmaritimepiracy.Similartoitspredecessors,thisreportassessesthecostoftwosuchtypesofcoverage,WarRiskinsuranceandKidnapandRansominsurance(K&R).

• War Risk insurance: MostcommercialshipoperatorsacquireannualHullWarRiskinsurance,whichinsuresthephysicalvesselitselfagainstdamageorlossduetoactsofwar,invasion,insurrectionandotherinterventionsbyaforeignstatepower,orpiracy.11However,thistypeofpolicytypicallyexcludesfromcoverageseveralespeciallyhazardousregionsknownas“WarRiskAreas”(WRAs).12Theseareasareclearlydemarcatedwithineachpolicy,themajorityofwhichrefertothosedefinedbytheJointWarCommittee(JWC)as“listedareas,”13thoughthereisnosingleglobalauthority.InordertomaintaincoveragewhiletransitingaWRA,ashipoperatormustinformtheinsurerinadvanceofthevessel’spassage,andmustpayanadditional“breachpremium”(orpremiums)or“WarRiskAddedPremium”(WRAP).TheJWCWRArelevanthereremainedunchangedin2014andisshownatright.

• Kidnap & Ransom insurance: Thistypeofinsurancepolicyspecificallycoversthepaymentofransom14toensurethereleaseofcrewheldhostage.Additionally,K&Rpoliciesmaycoverotherrelatedcosts,suchasin-transitlossofransommoney,crisisconsultants,legalliabilities,andadditionalexpensesincluding,butnotlimitedto,deathandinjurytocrewmembers,aswellasrehabilitationcosts.15

11 “Warrisks”areusuallyexcludedfromnormalHullandHull&Machinerypolicies.Additionally,WarRiskpoliciesmayreimbursesomecostsassociatedwithrecoveryofavessel,cargo,andcrewfollowingasuccessfulpirateattack.Formoreinformation,seeJonathanS.Spencer,“Piracy,WarRisk&GeneralAverage”(presentation,NewYorkMarineInsuranceDay,30September2011),http://www.aimuedu.org/aimupapers/PiracyWarRiskandGeneralAverage.pptx.pdf.

12 Alsoknownas“additionalpremiumareas”or“breachareas.”

13 “JointWarCommittee,”Lloyd’sMarketAssociation,http://www.lmalloyds.com/Web/market_places/marine/JWC/Joint_War.aspx(accessedMay13,2015).

14 Tobeprecise,K&Rpoliciesareindemnitypolicies,meaningthattheywillreimburseaspecifictypeofloss.Inthiscase,thatmeansthattheshipoperatorfirstpaystheransomandthenmakesaninsuranceclaimontheloss.

15 “MarineKidnapforRansomandHijack(K&R)Insurance,”TheSwedishClub,http://www.swedishclub.com/upload/174/marien%20kidnap%20for%20ransom%20%28k&r%29%20&%20hijack%20insurance-2014-03.pdf.

Figure 7: JWC Listed Area/WRA

Total Cost of Insurance$103.5 Million


©201513

Cost of War Risk Insurance

Thetotalcosttoowners,charterers,andvesselmanagersofpiracy-relatedmaritimeinsuranceproductsremainsdifficulttoassessduetothemultiplerebatesanddiscountsonoffer,16thelackofpubliclyavailablemarketdata,andthefactthatwhatdataisavailabledoesnotsortWRAPsbyindividualWRA.Atthetimeofthiswriting,2014marketdatawasnotyetavailable.However,usingdatareleasedbytheHellenicWarRisksClub(HWR)for2013,17itispossibletoextrapolateandassessthetotalamountofbreachpremiumspaidfortheWIORWarRiskAreain2014.

GiventhetotalamountofbreachpremiumspaidbyHWRmembers,thepercentageofwarrisktransitsdeclaredthroughtheWIORWRA,andthetotalmarketsharecontrolledbyHWR,OBPcalculatedthetotalcostofWRAPsfortransitingtheWIORWRAin2013tobeapproximately$109million.AfulldescriptionoftheprocessofthiscalculationisfoundinAppendixI.

EarlyannouncementsfromboththeHWRandtheUKMutualWarRisksAssociationindicatedthatannualwarriskpremiumsdecreasedin2014.18WhileannualpremiumsaredifferentfromtheWRAPsdiscussedabove,thecontinueddecreaseinpirateattacksintheWIORandincreasedcompetitioninthemarineinsurancemarket19indicatetheWRAPsassociatedwithWarRiskinsurancedeclinedaswell.Basedonthesefactors,OBPestimatesa30%reductioninthecostofWarRiskinsuranceattributabletoSomalipiracy.This30%reductioninWRAPsbetween2013and2014resultsinanestimatedtotalcostof$76.3millionin2014.

Table 6: Cost of War Risk Insurance in 2014Estimated 2013 Total War Risk Premiums in WIOR

Estimated Decrease in 2014 WIOR War Risk Premiums

Estimated Total 2014 War Risk Premiums in WIOR (USD)

$109Million 30% $76.3 Million

Cost of K&R Insurance

InadditiontotheWarRiskinsurancepremiums,asignificantnumberofvesseloperatorstakeoutKidnap&Ransominsuranceasadditionalprotectionforthevessel’screw.AswithWarRiskinsurance,thereislittlepubliclyavailabledatatofacilitateestimationofK&RinsurancepolicycostsrelatedtopiracyintheWIOR.Toovercomethisinformationdeficit,OBPuseddatafrominterviewswithmaritimeinsuranceexpertstogaugerateofuseandcostpertransit.ThetotalcostwasthenmeasuredagainstanassessmentoftheglobalK&Rmarkettocheckforaccuracy.AfullexplanationofhowthesizeoftheglobalK&RmarketwasassessedisfoundinAppendixI.

Duetothecompetitivemarketforinsuranceproducts,andthefactthatSomalipirateshavebeenunsuccessfulincapturingamerchantvesselforransomsinceMayof2012,thepremiumsforWIORtransitshavedecreaseddramaticallyoverthelastseveralyears.Weestimatethatin2014,approximately25%ofallvesselstransitingtheWRAboughtK&Rinsuranceatanaveragecostof$1,500pertransit,totaling$27.2million.Basedonthisestimate,theSomaliK&Rmarketappearstototalabout10%ofthe$250millionto$290millionglobalmarket.

16 No-claimsbonusesareoffered,aswellasdiscountsforrepeatvoyages,adherencetoBMP4,embarkedsecurityteams(armedorunarmed),andwhetherornotcomplementaryinsurancepolicieshavebeenpurchased.Totaldiscountscanbeupto90%oftheinitiallyquotedprice,accordingtoLloyd’sMarketAssociation.

17 WarRiskClubsaremutualclubswhere,traditionally,membershipwasbasedonaffiliationwiththecountryinquestion.Forexample,HWRiscenteredontheGreekshippingcommunity,andtheNorwegianAssociationisopentocompanieswithintheNorwegianShippingCommunity.Otherclubs,suchastheUKClub,wereinitiallyopenonlyfornationally-flaggedvessels,butnowallowafullyinternationalmembership.

18 TheUKMutualWarRisksAssociationannounceda20%reductionin2014annualratesforitsmembers,whiletheHWRreducedannualpremiumsto45%.Inlate2014,bothclubsannouncedfurtherreductionsforthe2015year.See, e.g.,JimMulrenan,“UKMutualSlashesWarRatesfor2015Renewal,”Tradewinds,23January2015;JimMulrenan,“HellenicWarRisksClubSlashesAnnualPremiums,”Tradewinds,5December2014.

19 JudyGreenwald,“MarineInsuranceMarketRemainsCompetitiveDuetoAmpleCapacity,”Business Insurance,14September2014,http://www.businessinsurance.com/article/20140914/NEWS07/309149992.


14 ©2015

Table 7: Cost of K&R Insurance in the WIOR Number of Transits Estimated Percentage of Transits

Buying K&R InsuranceAverage Cost Per Transit Total Cost of K&R Insurance in

the WIOR72,600 25% $1,500 $27,225,000

Key Findings:

• OBP estimates that seafarers were eligible for $71,650,000 in hazard pay for exposure to piracy risks in 2014.

• Despite the fact that 48 seafarers were still being held hostage in 2014, and thus were entitled to captivity pay, OBP found no evidence to suggest that they or their families were compensated accordingly.

• As of July 2014, the Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor (IRTC) was removed from the International Bargaining Forum (IBF) High Risk Area, and several other seafarer labor agreements, reducing the number of transits eligible for hazard pay by half.

AdditionallaborcostsincurredbyshippingcompaniesasadirectresultofpiracyderivefromseveralcollectivebargainingagreementsagreedthroughtheIBF,theInternationalTransportWorkersFederation(ITF),ornationalseafarers’unions,whichareincludedinmanyseafarers’employmentagreements.Theseadditionalpaymentsaregenerallyclassifiedintotwotypes:hazardpayandcaptivitypay.

Hazard payistheadditionalsalarybonusseafarersmustbepaid—regardlessofwhetherornottheirvesselisattackedbypirates—whiletransitingdesignatedareassuchastheIBFHRAandtheIBFWarlikeOperationsArea(WOA),asdesignatedbytheITFandIBF.20WhiletransitingtheIBFHRA,seafarersareentitledtoabonusof100%oftheirbasewageforthedurationoftimetheyareinthearea,doubledcompensationfordeathanddisability,andtherighttorefusetosailandtoreturntotheircountryoforiginatnocost.IntheIBFWOA,seafarersareentitledtoalloftheabove;theirhazardpaywillbeaccruedforatleastfivedays(regardlessofwhetherthetransitislessthanfivedays)andforeachdayafterfive.Withinthatarea,theyarealsoentitledtocompensationfortwomonths’worthoftheirbasewageiftheyrefusetosailthroughthearea.Last,intheIBF“ExtendedRiskZone,”whichencompassesmostoftheWIOR,seafarersareentitledtohazardpayonlyintheeventofanattack,andpayableonlyfortheactualdayofattack.21

Captivity pay istheamountinadditiontobasepaythatseafarers(ortheirfamilies)areentitledtoforthedurationoftheircaptivityintheeventtheyaretakenhostage.

20 TheInternationalBargainingForum(IBF)istheforumthatbringstogethertheseafarersrepresentedbytheInternationalTransportWorkers’Federation(ITF)andtheinternationalmaritimeemployersthatmakeuptheJointNegotiatingGroup(JNG).Formoreinformation,see“AbouttheIBF,”ITFSeafarers,http://www.itfseafarers.org/about-IBF.cfm(accessedMay6,2015).

21 “IBFListofWarlikeandHighRiskDesignations,withMainApplicableBenefits(asof1stJuly2014),Addendum2,”IBF,http://www.itfseafarers.org/files/seealsodocs/33553/IBF%20LIST%20OF%20WARLIKE%20AND%20HIGH%20RISK%20DEFINITIONS%20JULY%202014.pdf.

Total Cost of Labor$71.7 Million

Figure 8: IBF High Risk Area


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Toidentifythecostofhazardpayin2014weuseanaveragedailycrewcostof$2,812.22ThisnumberisthenmultipliedbytheaveragetransittimethroughtheIBFHRA,232.6days,toarriveatthetotalof$7,311pervesselpertransitthroughtheIBFHRA.AssumingthepercentofvesselsoperatingofftheeastcoastofAfricathatemployabargainingagreementwhichincludeshazardpayhasnotchanged,weestimatethat70%ofvesselstransitingthroughtheIBFHRAandIBFWOAdisbursehazardpay,andthenmultiplybythetotalpayoutpertransitthroughthearea.

Ofnote,theIRTCwasremovedfromtheIBFHRAeffectiveJuly2014andwasdesignatedaspartoftheextendedriskarea,whereseafarersreceivehazardpayonlyintheeventofanattack.24AsnearlyhalfofthetrafficintheIBFHRAtransitstheareathroughtheIRTC,thisrepresentsasignificantminimizationoftheprotectionsforseafarerstransitingknownpirateareas,whiletheareadesignatedastheBMP4HRAcontinuestomaintainthesamecoordinatesasitdidduringtheheightofthepiracycrisis.InrecognitionoftheremovaloftheIRTCfrommanyhazardpayagreements,wehavesubtracted30%ofthetransitsforthesecondhalfoftheyearasaconservativeestimate.Usingthismethodology,atotalof$71,650,000shouldhavebeendisbursedashazardpayin2014.25

Table 8: Cost of Hazard Pay in the WIOR 26 27 HazardPayPerTransitThroughtheIBFHRA26 $7,311TransitsPerYearThroughtheIBFHRA27 20,000PercentageofVesselsDisbursingHazardPay 70%Subtotal $102,356,800LessIRTCTransitsPostJuly1,2014 30%Estimated Hazard Pay for 2014 $71,650,000

Cost of Captivity Pay

Inpreviousyears,OBPincludedthecostofcaptivitypayinourtotalcostofSomalipiracy.Captivitypayistheamountofadditionalcompensationpaidtoseafarers(ortheirfamilies)forthetimetheyareheldhostage.Thisincludesthebasewageplus35%ofthebasewage.In2014,however,ofthe48individualsheldcaptiveatanypointin2014,allwere(andthosewhoremaincaptivestillare)considered“high-riskhostages.”Wehavenoevidencethatanyofthesehostages

22 See “ComparisonofU.S.andForeign-FlagOperatingCosts,”U.S.DepartmentofTransportationMaritimeAdministration(2011),5-6,13-14,http://www.marad.dot.gov/documents/Comparison_of_US_and_Foreign_Flag_Operating_Costs.pdf.TheinflationcostswerecalculatedusingCPIInflationCalculatorfromtheU.S.BureauofLaborStatistics.“InflationCalculator,”InflationData.com(February28,2014),http://inflationdata.com/Inflation/Inflation_Calculators/Inflation_Calculator.asp.

23 ThisaveragewasidentifiedbyOBPanalystsusingship-trackingsoftware.

24 TheNorwegianShipowners’Association,inconjunctionwiththeNorwegianMaritimeOfficers’Association,NorwegianUnionofMarineEngineers,andtheNorwegianSeafarer’sUnion,removedtheIRTCfromtheirhazardpayagreementeffectiveAugust23,2014.“ProtocolRegardingAmendmentsoftheAgreementonRiskBonusintheGulfofAden,”20August2014,available athttps://sjooff.no/Artikler/PublishingImages/Protocol%20Gulf%20of%20Aden%20and%20Somalia%2020%20aug%202014%20-%20ENGLISH.pdf.Additionally,thePhilippineOverseasEmploymentAdministration,whichoverseesFilipinoseafarers’employmentagreements,alsoremovedtheIRTCfromitshazardpayagreement,effectiveOctober1,2014.“POEAGoverningBoardIssuesNewGuidelinesDefiningHighRiskAreasandBenefitsduetoSeafarers,”Official Gazette,GOVPH,30September2014,http://www.gov.ph/2014/09/30/poea-governing-board-issues-new-guidelines-defining-high-risk-areas-and-benefits-due-to-seafarers/.

25 ThediscrepancybetweenthetotalOBPidentifiedasbeingdisbursedin2013andthatamountOBPcalculatedin2014islikelyduetochangesinmethodologyofhowvesseltransitswerecountedforthisspecificcategory.Ourrefiningwasbasedonmoreextensiveinformationwereceivedin2014detailingwhereandhowhazardpayisdisbursed.

26 TheHRAisdefinedastheITF/IBFHighRiskAreawhichfollowsalineof400nmofftheSomalicoastalongEastAfrica.ThisnumberwascalculatedbasedoncrewingcostsandinternalOBPcalculationsoftheamountoftimeonaverageittakestotransittheIBFHRA.“ComparisonofU.S.andForeign-FlagOperatingCosts,”U.S.DepartmentofTransportationMaritimeAdministration(2011),5-6,13-14,http://www.marad.dot.gov/documents/Comparison_of_US_and_Foreign_Flag_Operating_Costs.pdf.SeeAppendixAformoreinformation.

27 IBFHighRiskAreaisdefinedastheGulfofAden(excludingtheIRTC)withtheadditionof400nmofftheSomaliEastCoast.See“IBFListofWarlikeandHighRiskDesignations,withMainApplicableBenefits(asof1stJuly2014),Addendum2,”IBF,http://www.itfseafarers.org/files/seealsodocs/33553/IBF%20LIST%20OF%20WARLIKE%20AND%20HIGH%20RISK%20DEFINITIONS%20JULY%202014.pdf.


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receivedbasepayorcaptivitypaywhileincaptivity.28However,ifthesehostagesareeligibleforsuchpay,thetotalamountduefor2014alonewouldtotal$1,835,000forbasepayand$2,477,000withadditionalcaptivitypay.29

GOVERNMENT AND CIVIL SOCIETY-BORNE COSTS (MILITARY, RANSOMS, PROSECUTIONS & IMPRISONMENTS, COUNTER-PIRACY)$804,825,000--$805,625,000

Theinternationalcommunityspentupwardsof$806milliononnavaloperations,ransoms,capacity-building,andprosecutionsandimprisonment.

Key Findings:

• 2014 naval costs were $741,336,000.

• Independent deployers made up 59% of the naval vessels committed to combat piracy in 2014, up from 51% in 2013.

Table 9: Counter-Piracy Naval Deployments in the WIOR 3031

EU NAVFOR Operation Atalanta

NATO Operation Ocean Shield

CMF CTF 151 Operation Copper Independent Deployers

Belgium,Croatia,France,Germany,Greece,Italy,Latvia,Luxembourg,Montenegro,Netherlands,NewZealand,Serbia,Spain,Ukraine

Denmark,Italy,Netherlands,NewZealand,Spain,Turkey

Australia,Denmark,Italy,Japan,Netherlands,NewZealand,Pakistan,SaudiArabia,Singapore,SouthKorea,Thailand,Turkey,UnitedArabEmirates,UnitedKingdom,UnitedStates

SouthAfrica,Mozambique,Tanzania30

China,India,Japan,Russia,SouthKorea,Iran,andtheUnitedKingdom31

Internationalnavalcoalitionsandindependentsingle-nationnavaldeploymentsremainedacrucialpillarinthearchitectureforsuppressingpiracyintheWIORin2014.Theseforcesaretaskedwithdeterringanddisruptingpirateactivities,aswellasescortinghumanitarianaidandcommercialtrafficthroughtheIRTCintheGulfofAden.Tothesouth,assetsassignedtoOperationCopperpatroltheMozambiqueChannelundertheauspicesoftheSouthernAfricanDevelopmentCommunity.WhilevariouscoastalnationswithintheWIORalsoperformrelevantcoastguardfunctionsandcarryoutcounter-piracyoperations,thereislittlepubliclyavailableinformationrelatedtotheiractivitiesand,assuch,wearenotabletoproperlyestimatethecoststheyhaveincurred.28 SeeChaiyotYongcharoenchai,“TheDevilandtheDeepBlueSea,”Bangkok Post,22March2015,http://www.bangkokpost.com/news/special-

reports/503918/the-devil-and-the-deep-blue-sea;GirijaShettar,“HostageProgrammeSaysPartnerswillnotDiluteAction,”IHS Maritime 360,30September2014,http://www.ihsmaritime360.com/article/14810/hostage-programme-says-partners-will-not-dilute-action.

29 SeeAppendixEforthetablewithcaptivitypaycalculations.

30 WhilethereisnorecordoftheinvolvementofTanzaniannavalassetsin2014,TanzaniapermittedcoalitionaircrafttobestationedatPemba.

31 Notethatseveralcountries,suchasSouthKorea,Japan,andtheUnitedKingdom,participateintheinternationalcoalitionsandalsoconductindependentnationaldeployments.

Total Cost of Military Operations$741.3 Million


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Betweentheinternationalcoalitionforcesandtheindependentdeployers,therewere,onaverage,15to20navyvesselstaskedwithcounter-piracyoperatingintheWIORthroughout2014.Theprecisenumberatanygiventimefluctuatedsignificantly,asshipsrotatedinandoutofthetheater,detachedfornationaltaskingormaintenance,andrespondedtoothercontingencies.32Althoughdeployingandoperatingthesevesselsincursthemajorityofthetotalcostofmilitaryactivities,otheritemsmustbeconsideredaswell:administrativebudgets,vesselprotectiondetachments,embarkedaircraft,aerialsupport,anddeconflictionefforts.

Table 10: Cost of Naval Operations in the WIORCategory 2014 CostAdministrativeBudgets $16,195,000SHADEConferences $541,000AssetOperatingCosts $717,495,000VesselProtectionDetachments $7,106,000Total $741,336,000

Administrative Budgets

Theexpenseofparticipatingintheinternationalmissionsisbornebytheparticipantsthemselves,aseachcountrypaystheoperatingcostsofitsownvesselsandassets.Onlythoseitemsrequiredtoconductthemissionitself—operationalheadquarters,theaterheadquartersaboardflagships,personneltransportation,andsoon—arepaidforfromacommonbudget,separatefromnationaloperationalexpenditures.

Table 11: Administrative Budgets for Counter-Piracy Naval Operations 33 34 35 36 37

Mission Common Administrative Budget

2014 Participants (Naval and Military Deployments)

EUNAVFOROperationAtalanta $9,885,619 Belgium,Croatia,France,Germany,Greece,Italy,Latvia,Luxembourg,Montenegro,Netherlands,NewZealand,Serbia,Spain,Ukraine

NATOOperationOceanShield $1,366,728 Denmark,Italy,Netherlands,NewZealand,Spain,TurkeyCMFCTF-15135 $4,942,809 Australia,Denmark,Italy,Japan,Netherlands,New

Zealand,Pakistan,SaudiArabia,Singapore,SouthKorea,Thailand,Turkey,UnitedArabEmirates,UnitedKingdom,UnitedStates

SADCOperationCopper36 N/A SouthAfrica,Mozambique,TanzaniaIndependentDeployers37 N/A Japan,China,Russia,India,Russia,SouthKorea,United

Kingdom,IranTotal $16,195,000

32 Forexample,warshipsfrombothcoalitionforcesandindependentdeployerstemporarilylefttheircounter-piracyoperationsinordertoescortvesselsremovingchemicalweaponsfromSyria.See, e.g.,“ChineseNavyWrapsupEscortMissionforSyria’sChemicalWeapons,”China Military Online,25June2014,http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/china-military-news/2014-06/25/content_6010867.htm;“HMSMontroseSalutesDanishChiefofDefence,”Royal Navy,18February2014,http://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/news-and-latest-activity/news/2014/february/18/140218-hms-montrose-danish.

33 Thisnumberrepresentsone-halfthebiennialbudgetfor2013to2014.“EuropeanUnionNavalForce(EUNAVFORSomalia)OperationATALANTA,”MaritimeSecurityCentre,http://www.mschoa.org/on-shore/about-us/eu-operation-atalanta(accessedMay7,2015).

34 ThisnumberisaccordingtotheUKgovernment’sresponsetoaparliamentaryinquiry.“Piracy,”SirNicholasSoamesforMidSussex,http://www.nicholassoames.org.uk/content/piracy-1(accessedMay7,2015).

35 Thisdatais,unfortunately,unavailable.Thiscostisestimatedasone-halfofOperationAtalanta’sadministrativecosts.

36 Thereisnoseparateadministrativebudgetforthiscost,asallthesecostsarebornedirectlybytheparticipants.

37 Thereisnocommonbudgetbetweenindependentdeployersbecauseeachoneoperatesautonomously.


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SHADE Conferences

GiventhenumberofcoalitionforcesandindependentnaviesoperatingintheWIOR,maintainingsomelevelofcoordinationisindispensable.TheSharedAwarenessandDeconfliction(SHADE)conferenceshostedregularlybyCombinedMaritimeForcesinBahrainaredesignedtofacilitatecoordinationamongallcountries,navalpartnerships,andindustryorganizationsinvolvedincounter-piracyoffEastAfrica.38

The31stthrough34thSHADEconferencesoccurredinMarch,June,September,andDecemberof2014.Ourassessmentlimitsitselftotheexpensesassociatedwithtravelandaccommodations.Withanaverageof110totaldelegatesfrom33countries,weestimatetravelandaccommodationacrossallfourconferencestohavecost$541,000.39

Asset Operating Costs

Asmentionedpreviously,alloperationalexpensesrelatedtocounter-piracyoperations,suchasfuel,wages,maintenanceandrepairs,etc.,arepaidbytheparticipatingnationsthemselves.Inestimatingthesecosts,wecompensatedforanumberofcomplicatingfactors40andincorporatedtheexpertinputofformernavalofficers.

Table 12: Naval Vessel Deployments 41

Surface Vessels Patrol Aircraft HelicoptersShip-based UAVs

Land-based UAVs

EUNAVFOROperationAtalanta 4 2 2 0 0.5NATOOperationOceanShield 2 1 2 1 0CMFCTF-15141 1.75 1 2 1 0SADCOperationCopper 1 1 1 0 0IndependentDeployers 11 2 6 1 02014 Total 19.75 7 13 3 0.52013 Total 23.25 6 5 1 2

Table 13: Operating Cost of Naval Assets2014 Cost Change From 2013

Ships $638,310,367 Down30.0%Aircraft $45,053,972 Up13.8%UAVs $34,130,400 Up158.2%Total $717,495,000 Down 25.7%

38 CombinedMaritimeForces,“31stSHADEConferenceHeldinBahrain,” Combined Maritime Forces,13March2014,http://combinedmaritimeforces.com/2014/03/13/31st-shade-conference-held-in-bahrain/.

39 PleaseseeAppendixBforthedetailsofthiscalculation.

40 Notonlyarenavalcostestimatesnotoriouslydifficult,butoperatingcostsvarysignificantlyfromcountrytocountryaswell.Forexample,attemptstoassessthecostofthesearchforMalaysianflightMH370indicatethatnumerouscostsarenotbeingproperlyrecordedbyonegovernmentaldepartment.SeeJaneWardell,“SearchforMH370tobeMostExpensiveinAviationHistory,”Reuters,8April2014,http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/08/us-malaysia-airlines-costs-idUSBREA3709520140408.Foracomparisonofmaritimeoperatingcostsinthecommercialcontext,see“ComparisonofU.S.andForeign-FlagOperatingCosts,”U.S.DepartmentofTransportationMaritimeAdministration(2011),http://www.marad.dot.gov/documents/Comparison_of_US_and_Foreign_Flag_Operating_Costs.pdf.Additionally,manyvesselsonlydedicateaportionoftheirdeployedtimetocounter-piracyoperations.Forexample,HMAS SuccessprovidedsupporttovesselsfromCTF-150,151,and152duringasingledeploymentin2014.

41 ThetotalnumberofCMFvesselsforwhichOBPhasdatais5.5.GiventhattherearethreeCMFTaskForces,wedividedtheCMFvesseltotalintothirds,givingusa1.75vesselon-stationaverage.


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Figure 9: Composition of Naval Vessels

Vessel Protection Detachments

“UnderEUCouncilJointAction851,whichisbasedonUNresolutions,OperationAtalanta…protectsvesselsoftheWorldFoodProgramme(WFP),theAfricanUnionMissioninSomalia(AMISOM)andothervulnerableshipping.”42ThisprotectionisprovidedviaVesselProtectionDetachments(VPDs):teamsofsoldiersthattravelaboardmerchantvesselswhiletheytransittheBMP4HRA.WhiletheseVPDsboasta“100%successrate,”43privateshipoperatorshavebeenreluctanttohirethemunlessrequiredtodoso,duetoareportedlackofdeploymentflexibility,acumbersomeapplicationprocess,andhighcostsofaround$6,635perday.44Most,ifnotall,VPDsarebelievedtoescortshipscontractedtodeliveraidtoAfricanportsintheBMP4HRA.

Table 14: Cost of Vessel Protection Detachments 45

Escorts VPD Cost Total CostWFP 51 $139,32845 $7,106,000AMISOM 0 $139,328 $0Total 51 ------------ $7,106,000

42 “EuropeanUnionNavalForceSomaliaOperationAtalanta,”EUNAVFORSomalia,1,http://eunavfor.eu/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/20150119_EUNAVFOR_Factsheet.pdf.See alsoActsAdoptedUnderTitleVoftheEUTreaty,CouncilJointAction2008/851/CFSPof10November2008,L301/33Official Journal of the European Union,http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:301:0033:0037:EN:PDF;“SecurityCouncilAsksNationswithMilitaryCapacityinAreato‘ActivelyFightPiracy’onHighSeasoffSomalia,”UNSecurityCouncil,PressReleaseSC/9467,7October2008,http://www.un.org/press/en/2008/sc9467.doc.htm;“Mission,”EUNAVFORSomalia,http://eunavfor.eu/mission(accessedMay7,2015).

43 “Mission”EUNAVFORSomalia.

44 MaximeZech,“PvdA:NoSecurityonMerchantVessels,”NL Times,10April2014,http://www.nltimes.nl/2014/04/10/pvda-security-merchant-vessels/.AsevidenceoftheissuesrelatingtodifficultiesaroundhiringVesselProtectionDetachments,aDutchgovernmentpolicybriefnotes,astranslated,that“[t]heregularcostforsalaries,materialsandequipmentoftheVPDarefundedfromthedefensebudgetandthereforefalloutsidethepolicyframework.TheadditionalfeesfortheuseofaVPDconsistlargelyoftransportofpersonnelandequipmenttoandfromthelocationoforiginanddestination,accommodationinports,accommodationonboardduringtheseatransportandadditionalsalarycosts(allowances).Theaccommodationsonboardarepaidbytheshipowners.”ThusthedailyfeeforVPDsrepresentsagenuinecostofpiracy,ratherthanmoneythatwouldhavebeenspentregardlessofpiracy.“BeleidskadermilitaireVessel Protection Detachment (VPD)terbeschermingvanindividueelzeetransport,”MinisterievanDefense,15June2011,http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/bestanden/documenten-en-publicaties/kamerstukken/2011/06/17/aanbiedingsbrief-beleidskader-militaire-vessel-protection-detachment-vpd-ter-bescherming-van-individueel-zeetransport/brief-mindef-beleidskader-vpd.pdf.

45 ThecostperVPDescortisbasedonanaveragethreeweekdeployment,whichrequiresashipownertocontribute€5,000perday.BibivanGinkeletal.,State or Private Protection against Maritime Piracy: A Dutch Perspective(TheHague:Clingendael,2013),http://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/20130200_state_or_private_protection_web.pdf.


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Key Findings:

• 18 hostages were released after estimated payments of between $200,000 and $1,000,000 were paid to secure their release.

Thetotalcostofsecuringthesafereleaseofthe18remaininghostagesfrom MV Asphalt VentureandMV Albedoin2014isestimatedtobebetween$200,000and$1,000,000.46InthecaseofAsphalt Venture,theundisclosedamountpaidtosecurethereleaseoftheseafarerswasdesignatedtocoverthelogisticalandtransportcostsofthegroupholdingthem.47Thereleaseofthe11crewmembersofAlbedoreportedlyoccurredaspartofadramaticescapemadepossiblebyapaymentof$200,000toafewmemberswithinthepirategroup.48

Ithasnotbeenpossibletoassessorverifyancillarycostsexpendedtonegotiatethereleaseoftheseseafarers,suchaspost-releasetransportcosts,orcostsformedicalcare,psychologicalcare,andhumanitariansupportforthecrewsandtheirfamilies.Accordingly,thesecostshavenotbeenincluded.Additionally,bothnegotiationsbenefitedfromdonationsofprobonoexpertisefromanumberofnegotiationexpertsandinternationallawyers.49Whileinthepastthevesselownersoroperatorshavetypicallypaidransomexpenses,thepaymentsmadetosecurethereleaseofseafarersin2014weremadebyprivatecharities,aswellasfamilymembersandfriendsofthehostages.

Table 15: Cost of Ransoms and Associated PaymentsNumberofseafarersreleasedafterpayment(ransomorother)

18

Numberofvesselsreleasedafterpayment(ransomorother)

0*

Numberofseafarersreleasedwithnopayment(ransomorother)

0

EstimatedcosttoreleasecrewoftheMV Asphalt Venture

Undisclosedamount,estimatedtobelessthan$1,000,000

EstimatedcosttoreleasecrewofMV Albedo

$200,000

Total Cost $200,000 to $1,000,000*BothAlbedo andAsphalt Venture sankwhileinthehandsofthepiratesand,thus,werelost.

46 Thealleged$1.6millionransompaidforthereleaseofjournalistMichaelScottMoore,whowasabductedonlandandtransferredtoSomalipiratesforcaptivity,wasnotincludedsincethisreportcoversonlymaritimepiracy.SeeAbdiGuled,“3KilledasSomaliPiratesFightOverRansom,”ABC News,26September2014,http://news.yahoo.com/3-killed-somali-pirates-fight-over-ransom-100409198.html.

47 GirijaShettar,“IndianAsphaltVentureSeafarersReleasedbySomaliaPirates,”IHS Maritime,30October2014,http://www.ihsmaritime360.com/article/15218/indian-asphalt-venture-seafarers-released-by-somalia-pirates.

48 JamesVerini,“EscapeorDie,”The New Yorker,20April2015,http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/04/20/escape-or-die.

49 “ReleaseofMVAsphaltVentureSeafarersWelcomedbyMPHRP,”MaritimePiracyHumanitarianResponseProgramme,30October2014,http://mphrp.org/news_details/index.php?NewsID=210;ColinFreeman,“WhyaRetiredBritishArmyColonelhasBecometheLastHopeforSomalia’sForgottenHostages,” The Telegraph,26March2015,http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/somalia/11495268/Why-a-retired-British-army-colonel-has-become-the-last-hope-for-Somalias-forgotten-hostages.html.

Total Cost of Ransoms & Associated Payments$200,000 to $1 Million


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Key Findings:

• The cost of prosecution and imprisonment in 2014 was $6,284,000 for four trials as well as the continued imprisonment of 842 pirates.

Thetotalcostofprosecutionsandimprisonmentsin2014decreasedover50%from2013tojustover$6million.Thistotalincludesboththecostoftrialsconductedin2014andthecostofimprisoningpirates,whetherawaitingtrial,undergoingprosecution,oralreadyconvictedandsentenced.OurmethodologyexcludescostsassociatedwithprosecutingorimprisoningpiratesincountriesparticipatingintheUNODC’sMaritimeCrimeProgramme(MCP),asthesecostsarepaidfromtheUNODC’sbudget,whichisincludedelsewhereinthisreportasapartofthecostofcounter-piracyorganizations.

Table 16: Cost of Prosecutions and Imprisonment 50

Region Pirate Trials

Average Cost per Trial

Total Trial Cost

Pirates Imprisoned

Cost per Year of Imprisonment

Total Imprisonment Cost

Total Regional Cost in 2014

Africa50 1 $228 $228 609 $730 $444,570 $444,798Asia 1 $7,314 $7,314 120 $376 $45,120 $52,434EuropeandJapan 1 $633,800 $633,800 86 $47,794 $4,110,284 $4,744,084NorthAmerica 1 $307,355 $307,355 26 $28,284 $735,384 $1,042,739Total 4 ------------ $949,000 841 ------------ $5,335,000 $6,284,000

FewertrialswereconductedinEurope,Japan,andNorthAmerica,wheretheytendtobequiteexpensive(seetrialcostsinTable16).In2014,onlytwotrialswereconductedintheseregionswhereasin2013,11wereconductedbecausecountriesinthepiracy-affectedregionnowhaveanincreasedcapacitytorunsuchtrials.TheSeychelles,Kenya,Mauritius,Somalia,andSomaliregionsconductedthemajorityofpiracytrialsthattookplacein2014.However,sincetheseproceedingsarestillfundedbytheUNODC,theyareincludedinthecostofcounter-piracyorganizations.Further,reflectingthistrend,alargeproportionofpiracyprisonerscontinuetobetransferredtonewlyconstructedprisonsintheregionsofSomaliaastheUNODChelpstobuildcapacityviainfrastructure,staffing,andtraining.

Thetrendassociatedwithprosecutionandimprisonmentworldwideindicatesacontinued,positiveshifttowardregionalownershipofthelegalcomponentofSomalipiracy.ThoughthethreatofpiracymaycontinuetodecreaseasUNODCmovestowardcompletionofitsMCPandhandoveroffinancialownershiptoregionalentities,thecostofprosecutionsandimprisonmentswilllikelyremainconsistentwith2014’scostuntilallprosecutionsarecompleteandconvictedindividualshaveservedtheirsentences.

50 ThistotaldoesnotincludetheUNODC-fundedcountriesofKenya,Mauritius,Seychelles,Somalia,andtheSomaliregions.

Total Cost of Prosecutions & Imprisonment$6.3 Million


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Key Findings:

• The cost of counter-piracy organizations was estimated to be $57,005,000 in 2014.

• Increased expenditure to support capacity-building shows continued international commitment to addressing the root causes of piracy.

Thecounter-piracyorganizationsinOBP’scostassessmentincludegovernments,industry,andnongovernmentalorganizationsthatcontributetothefightagainstpiracyintheWIOR.Theseentitiesseektoworkalongsidemilitaryandothersecurityoperationstobuildcapacity,supportinformation-sharingandsituationalawareness,andcoordinateinitiatives,withanoverallaimtoestablisharegionallyledandsustainableframeworktofightmaritimepiracy.

Table 17: Cost of Counter-PiracyOrganizationsAgency/Organization 2014 ExpenditureCGPCSMeetings $449,000CGPCSTrustFund $3,650,000CRIMARIO $5,951,000CRIMLEA $653,000CRIMSON $361,000MARSIC $1,258,000DjiboutiCodeofConduct $2,848,000EUCAPNESTOR $14,686,000MPHRP $186,000MASE $7,864,000OBP $729,000REFLECS3 $32,000UNDP $6,579,000UNODC $11,760,000Total Cost $57,005,000

Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia Meetings - $449,000.

TheContactGrouponPiracyofftheCoastofSomalia(CGPCS)wasestablishedinJanuary2009inresponsetoUNSecurityCouncilResolution1851inorder“tobettercoordinatetheresponsetopiracyoffthecoastofSomalia.”51Representativesfrommorethan80states,internationalorganizations,themaritimeindustry,NGOs,andacademiaparticipateintheplenarymeetingsandthespecializedandtechnical“WorkingGroups”oftheCGPCS.In2014,theCGPCSWorkingGroupscoveredcapacity-building,coordinationatsea,fightingbroaderpiracynetworks,andfurthering

51 UNSecurityCouncilResolution1851,S/Res/1851(2008),16December2008,http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1851(2008).

Total Cost of Counter-Piracy Organizations$57 Million


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coordinationofpiracyprosecutionsandcriminalinvestigations.52Thecostforattendanceatthesemeetingsin2014totaledanestimated$448,500.

CGPCS Trust Fund to Support Initiatives of States Countering Piracy off the Coast of Somalia - $3,650,000.

In2010atrustfundwasestablishedto“helpdefraytheexpensesassociatedwithprosecutionofsuspectedpirates,aswellasotheractivitiesrelatedtoimplementingtheContactGroup’sobjectives.”53TheprojectsfundedbytheCGPCSTrustFundareimplementedbyUNorganizationsoranimplementingpartner.54In2014,eightgovernmentsmadecontributionstotheTrustFund,thelargestofwhichcamefromtheGovernmentofJapanatover$1.5million.Intotal,$3,650,000wasdepositedinthefundin2014.

Table 18: 2014 Donations to CGPCS Trust FundContributor DepositsItaly $93,375Japan $1,626,800Norway $410,425Qatar $100,000RepublicofKorea $200,000Spain $19,169UnitedArabEmirates $445,376UnitedKingdom $754,860

Critical Maritime Routes Programme - $8.2 Million

TheCriticalMaritimeRoutes(CMR)ProgrammewassetupbytheEUundertheInstrumentforStabilitytoaddresstheoverallproblemofthesecurityandsafetyofmaritimeroutes.FourprojectsundertheCMRarerelevantforestimatingthecostofcounteringpiracyintheWIOR,namelytheCRIMARIO,CRIMLEA,CRIMSON,andMARSICProjects.55

CRIMARIO - $5,951,000

TheCriticalMaritimeRoutesintheIndianOcean(CRIMARIO)projectworksintheIndianOceantoserveasa“frameworktodevelopprojectsforthesecurityandsafetyofessentialmaritimeroutes,”56andisbasedonthenotionthatsafemaritimetraderoutesarenecessaryforlocalandglobaleconomicgrowth.57CRIMARIOseekstocreatecontinuityandhomogeneityinmaritimesurveillanceandvesseltrafficmonitoring,aswellaspromotenavigationalsafetyandimproved

52 “FAQ,”ContactGrouponPiracyofftheCoastofSomalia,2015,http://www.lessonsfrompiracy.net/faq/.

53 “TFtoSupportInitiativesofStatesCounteringPiracyofftheCoastofSomalia,”UNDPMulti-PartnerTrustFundOffice,http://mptf.undp.org/factsheet/fund/APF00(accessedMay7,2015).

54 Ibid.

55 “Homepage,”EUCMRCriticalMaritimeRoutesInformationPortal,http://www.crimson.eu.com/(accessedApril28,2015).

56 VéroniqueBrosetteetal.,“CriMaRIOBriefing–PMAR,”FranceExpertiseInternationale,1,https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/sites/default/files/CriMaRIO_presentation.pdf.

57 See“TheInstrumentContributingtoStabilityandPeace(IcSP),”EuropeanCommission,https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sectors/human-rights-and-governance/peace-and-security/instrument-contributing-stability-and-peace_en(accessedMay7,2015);see“Regulation(EU)No.320/2014oftheEuropeanParliamentandoftheCouncilof11March2014,”Official Journal of the European UnionL77/1(2011),http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/fpi/documents/140311_icsp_reg_230_2014_en.pdf.


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accidentresponsethroughenhancedinformation-sharingandtrans-regionalcooperation.58TheCRIMARIObudgetin2014was$5,591,000.

CRIMLEA - $653,000

TheCriticalMaritimeRoutesLawEnforcementAgency(CRIMLEA)isanongoingproject“enablingthenationallawenforcementagenciestoefficientlyrespondtomaritimepiracyattheregionallevel.”59ItisimplementedbyINTERPOLandfundedbytheEuropeanUnion.Amongotheraccomplishments,in2014,localEastAfricanlawenforcementofficialsweretrainedinutilizationofdigitalforensicsinmaritimepiracyinvestigations.60CRIMLEA’sbudgetin2014was$653,296.61

CRIMSON - $360,000

TheCMRMonitoring,SupportandEvaluationMechanismworksto“strengthentrans-regionalcoordination,coherenceandcomplementarities”bothwithintheCMRprogramsaswellasamongotherrelevantEUinitiatives.62TheMechanismalsoassessestheCMRlessonslearnedandimpactsofimplementationonmaritimesecurityissues.ItisfundedbytheEUandhasbeenconductedbytheDefenseConseilInternationalfortwoyears.63WehaveassessedthecostofthetwoCMRprojectsintheWIORforoneyear.CRIMSON’stotalbudgetwascalculatedtobe$360,681for2014.64

MARSIC - $1,258,000

TheCMRWesternIndianOcean(MARSIC)projectisthemaininstrumentpromotingtheresolutionsissuedbytheDjiboutiCodeofConductof2009.TheoverallobjectiveofMARSICistoreinforcethecapacityofregionalcoastalstates(maritimeadministrations,lawenforcement,andcoastguards)totacklepiracyandarmedrobberyagainstships,aswellasothermaritimesecurityandsafetythreats.ItisimplementedbyExpertiseFrance.TheMARSICprojectaimstosupporttheDjiboutiCodeofConductthroughinformation-sharingconductedbytheDjiboutiRegionalTrainingCentreandregionalcentersReMISCandISC,aswellascapacity-buildingtraininginSomalia.65TheMARSICbudgetfor2014was$1,258,000.66

Djibouti Code of Conduct - $2,848,000

TheDjiboutiCodeofConductconcerningtheRepressionofPiracyandArmedRobberyagainstShipsintheWesternIndianOceanandtheGulfofAden(DCoC)wassignedonJanuary29,2009andexpandedinthefollowingyearstoatotalof20signatorycountries.SignatoriesoftheDCoCagreetocooperateconsistentlywithinternationallawinmeasures

58 Brosetteetal.,“CriMaRIOBriefing–PMAR,”5.

59 “CMRWesternIndianOcean(CRIMLEA),”EUCMRCriticalMaritimeRoutesInformationPortal,http://crimson.pp.digitalmeanings.fr/projects/cmr-western-indian-ocean-crimlea/(accessedMay7,2015).

60 “INTERPOLHoldsTrainingonDigitalForensicsforMaritimePiracyInvestigations,”INTERPOL,16December2014,http://www.interpol.int/News-and-media/News/2014/N2014-242.

61 ThecurrencyconversiontocalculatethiscostwasdoneonMarch13,2015.

62 “DCIWinsMaritimeSecurityProject:CRIMSON,”DéfenseConseilInternational,22February2013,http://www.groupedci.com/en/event/DCI-wins-maritime-security-project-CRIMSON,11802.html;“About,”EUCMRCriticalMaritimeRoutesInformationPortal,http://crimson.pp.digitalmeanings.fr/about/(accessedMay7,2015).

63 Ibid.

64 Theoriginal€1,000,000budgetwasdividedbytwoyearsamongthreeCMRprogramsandmultipliedbytwoIndianOceanprograms.ThecurrencyconversiontocalculatethiscostwasdoneonMarch13,2015.

65 “CMRWesternIndianOcean(CRIMLEA),”EUCMRCriticalMaritimeRoutesInformationPortal,http://crimson.pp.digitalmeanings.fr/projects/cmr-western-indian-ocean-crimlea/(accessedMay7,2015).



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promotingmaritimesecurity.67In2014,signatorystatesagreedontheneedfordevelopmentofamechanismtoallowtheregiontodriveandimplementitsowncounter-piracystrategy.68TheDCoCisimplementedbytheInternationalMaritimeOrganizationProjectImplementationUnitandfundedthroughcontributionstotheDjiboutiCodeofConductTrustFund.Thebudgetin2014totaled$2,848,000.

EUCAP Nestor - $14,686,000

EUCAPNestorisaciviliancapacity-buildingmissionintheHornofAfricaandWesternIndianOceanundertheEUCommonSecurityandDefencePolicy(CSDP).“TheobjectiveofEUCAPNestoristoassistthedevelopmentinthecontinuedenhancementoftheirmaritimesecurityincludingcounter-piracy,andmaritimegovernance.”69In2014,itsbudgetwas$14,685,751.70

Maritime Piracy Humanitarian Response Programme - $186,000

MaritimePiracyHumanitarianResponseProgramme(MPHRP)worksgloballytoprovidesupporttoseafarersandtheirfamiliesintheeventofapiracyincident.Theirhumanitarianeffortsaimtohelpseafarerspriortoattackandduringhostagesituations,andprovideassistanceafteranattackorhostagerelease.Theirpost-incidentsupportoftenincludesmonetaryassistancetoremainingfamilymembersaswellasphysicalandmentalhealthtreatment.71

Inadditiontootheractivities,in2014MPHRPnotablyassistedthereleasedMV Asphalt VentureandMV Albedocrewswithnecessaryphysicalandpsychologicalaftercare.ThebudgetassociatedwithEastAfricaisestimatedtobehalftheirentirebudget,toequal$185,513in2014.72

Maritime Security Programme - $7,864,000

TheregionalMaritimeSecurityProgramme(MASE)isfundedunderthe10thEuropeanDevelopmentFund,withtheobjectiveofsupportingtheimplementationoftheEasternandSouthernAfrica–IndianOceanRegionalStrategyandActionPlan.MASEisimplementedbytheIntergovernmentalAuthorityonDevelopment,theEastAfricanCommunity,theCommonMarketforEasternandSouthernAfrica,andtheIndianOceanCommission.Thefive-yearplanwassignedinJune2013andbuildsonpreviousyears’MASEwork.73Its2014budgetwas$7,863,750.74

Oceans Beyond Piracy - Horn of Africa - $729,000

OceansBeyondPiracy(OBP)isprojectofOneEarthFutureFoundation,anon-profitorganizationbasedinColoradointheUnitedStates.OBPisdevotedtomobilizingmaritimepartnershipsandseekingsustainablesolutionstocountermaritimepiracyandviolentcrime.OBPworksontheissueofpiracyinWestAfricaandtheHornofAfrica,withasisterproject,SecureFisheries,workingtocounterillegal,unreported,andunregulatedfishingintheIndianOcean.TheHorn

67 InternationalMaritimeOrganization,Djibouti Code of Conduct,Annex,http://www.imo.org/OurWork/Security/PIU/Documents/DCoC%20English.pdf(Djibouti:IMO,2009).

68 “NewImplementationStructureforDjiboutiCodeofConduct,”World Maritime News,4June2014,http://worldmaritimenews.com/archives/126015/new-implementation-structure-for-djibouti-code-of-conduct/.

69 “FactsandFigures,”EuropeanUnionExternalActionEUCAPNestor,http://www.eucap-nestor.eu/en/mission/mission_facts_and_figures/facts_and_figures(accessedMay7,2015).


71 “AboutUs,”MaritimePiracyHumanitarianResponseProgramme(May2013),http://www.mphrp.org/about_us/.


73 “EuropeanIntegrationForum,” Delegation of the European Union to the Republic of Mauritius, for the Union of the Comoros and the Republic of Seychelles,Issue59(August2013),http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/mauritius/documents/press_corner/newsletter_issue_59_august_2013.pdf.



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ofAfricateamworksprimarilyonruleoflaw,maritimesecurity,seafarerissues,information-sharing,andregionalengagement.TheportionofthebudgetdedicatedtotheHornofAfricain2014totaled$729,005.

Regional Fusion and Law Enforcement Center for Safety and Security at Sea - $32,000

TheRegionalFusionandLawEnforcementCenterforSafetyandSecurityatSea(REFLECS3)strivesto“createamulti-disciplinaryandmultinationalcentreforlawenforcementcooperationinpartnershipwithSeychelles,widerIndianOceannationsandinternationalpartners”focusedoncombatingpiracyandothermaritimecrime.75ThethreeobjectiveareasofREFLECS3are:(1)intelligencedevelopment,(2)investigationandprosecution,and(3)capacity-andcapability-building.In2014,thebudgetofREFLECS3includedadonationofnearly$31,657(USdollars)fromtheAustraliangovernment.Inthepast,we’veincludedonlydonationsgiventoREFLECS3eachyear,sincetheymakeuptheoperatingbudget,andsocountAustralia’sdonationtowardthecostofcounter-piracyorganizationsin2014.76

United Nations Development Programme - $6,579,000

TheUnitedNationsDevelopmentProgramme(UNDP)receivedfouryearsoffundingfromtheDanishPeaceandStabilisationFundtolastfrom2011–2014tofurtherinternationalandregionalcooperationoncounter-piracy,maritimesecurity,andruleoflaw.Thecontributionfor2014totaled$4,578,818.77Additionally,aspartofaJointShippingInitiative,industrypartnersgaveUNDP$1millioninfundingtobedisbursedforcounter-piracyactivities.OBP’sStateofMaritimePiracy2013reportcountedhalfofthisforeachyear2013and2014.Theotherhalf,plusanadditional$1.5milliondonatedinSeptemberof2014fromtheindustrypartners,78bringsthetotalJointShippingInitiativecontributionof2014to$2million.Thus,thetotalcostofUNDPcounter-piracyeffortsin2014was$6,578,818.

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime - $11,760,000

TheUNODC’sMaritimeCrimeProgrammeworksintheHornofAfricatoimplementcapacity-buildingactivities,intheIndianOceantocontinuesupporttoregionalprosecutingstates,andthroughitsPiracyPrisonerTransferProgrammetobuildthecapabilityforhousingpiracy-relatedprisonersinSomaliaandthroughouttheregion.TheUNODCisalsoworkingthroughtheirMogadishuPrisonandMajorCrimesComplexProgrammetobuildcapacityfortheFederalGovernmentofSomaliatocreateaneffectivecriminaljusticesystemtorespondtopiracycrimes.UNODC’sbudgetJanuary–October2014totaled$9.8million.79Usingthisbudgettoapproximatethebudgetfortheentireyear,itisestimatedthatUNODC’s2014budgetwas$11,760,000.

75 “AboutUs,”REFLECS3,http://www.rappicc.sc/aboutus.html(accessedMay7,2015).

76 “Reflecs3GetsA$40,000fromAustralianGovernment,”Seychelles Nation,19March2014,http://www.nation.sc/article.html?id=241063.

77 MinistryofForeignAffairs&MinistryofDefence,“WholeofGovernmentStabilisationProgrammefortheWiderHornofAfrica/EastAfrica2011–2014,”December2011,http://etiopien.um.dk/en/~/media/Etiopien/Documents/Programme%20Document%20-%20Peace%20and%20Stabilisation%20Fund%20Horn%20of%20Africa.pdf.

78 “JointShippingInitiativeFundsNewPhaseofAnti-piracyProjectinSomalia,”ShellGlobal,25September2014,http://www.shell.com/global/aboutshell/investor/news-and-library/2014/joint-shipping-initiative-funds-new-phase-anti-piracy-project-in-somalia.html.

79 UnitedNationsOfficeonDrugsandCrime,“MaritimeCrimeProgrammeAnnualReport2014,”December2014,available athttp://www.unodc.org/documents/easternafrica//MCP_Brochure_December_2014_wv_6_1.pdf

THE STATE OF MARITIME PIRACY 2014 THE HUMAN COST OF PIRACY IN THE WESTERN INDIAN OCEAN REGION

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THE HUMAN COST OF MARITIME PIRACY IN THE WESTERN INDIAN OCEAN REGION

Four years were tough and brutal. They abused us. They manhandled us. . . Life in captivity was truly hell... Imagine eating that food and drinking contaminated water for four year[s]

-Bhimsen Singh, 45, electrical officer on MV Asphalt Venture. 80

Thehumancostsofpiracyaremoredifficulttoquantifythantheeconomiccosts,buttheyarealsopotentiallymorelong-lastinganddisruptive.Thehumancostsbornebytheseafarersattackedbypirates,theirfamilies,andeventhoseseafarerswhoaresimplyexposedtothestressoftransitingthroughthewatersoftheBMP4HRAmaybesevere.Althoughthenumberofattackshasdroppedsignificantlyfromthepeakofpiracyin2011,thehumancostofpiracyisnottiedtothepointoftheattackitselfand,insomecases,maypersistorworsenforyearsaftertheattack.Asaresult,thehumancostofpiracyoffthecoastofSomaliaremainssignificant.

IMPACT ON SEAFARERSSeafarers Exposed to Pirate Attacks

OBP’s2014datasetlists142incidentsofreportedpirateactivity.Thisdatasetincludesthesuccessfulboardingof2dhowsand16failedattacksoncommercialshippingvessels;theremaining124reportsarecategorizedas“softapproaches”or“suspiciousactivity.”Themajorreportingcenters,suchastheMSCHOA,IMB,andIMO,generallydonotreporttheseincidents,evenwhentheyaretheinitialrecipientofsuchareport,astheyareeitherunverifiableordonotmeettheirreportingstandards.OBPhasloggedtheseincidentsastheyrepresentasourceofanxietyonthepartoftheships’crews,whichhashumancostimplications,andbecauseitisdifficult,ifnotimpossible,tosaywithcertaintythattheincidentswerenotpiracyrelated.Thatsaid,asignificantnumberoftheseincidentslikelyinvolvedsightingsoflocalfishermen,particularlythosethatoccurredintheBab-el-MandebandtheGulfofOman.The“noise”generatedbypotentialover-reportingwithinthedataobscurestheactuallevelofpirateactivity,butdoesindicatethatseafarersintheGulfofAdencontinuetoconsiderpiracyarealandpresentthreatduringtransits.

80 P.R.Sanjai,“1,490DaysinaPirates’Den,”Live Mint,17November2014,http://www.livemint.com/Politics/7sWle32zIYu9v4i3CrzmfJ/1490-days-in-a-pirates-den.html.

THE STATE OF MARITIME PIRACY 2014THE HUMAN COST OF PIRACY IN THE WESTERN INDIAN OCEAN REGION

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Aswasthecasein2013,therelativelysmallnumberofreportedattacksbeliesthelargenumbersofpeopleaffectedbythecontinuedthreatofpiracy.Ofthe142vesselsreportingsomeformofpiracy-relatedincident,23vesselswith457seafarersaboardindicatedtheircrewcompositions.Includingestimatedcrewsfortheremainingvessels,2,458seafarersintotalwerelikelyimpactedbythethreatofpiracy.Ofthe16incidentsinvolvingcommercialvesselsthatweclassifiedasattacks,evenifunsuccessful,anestimatedtotalof302seafarerswereimpacted—adeclineof38%fromthe486seafarersaffectedin2013.Whilenomajorcommercialvesselsweresuccessfullyboarded,twolocalvesselswith18crewmembers,bothdhows,weresuccessfullyattacked.

AnassessmentofthedistributionofnationalitiesofcrewmembersaboardthesevesselssuggeststhatseafarersfromAsiancountries,particularlythosefromcountriesborderingtheIndianOcean,weredisproportionalityaffectedbypiracy.Oftheseafarersexposedtopiracy-relatedincidentsforwhichwehadnationalitydata,themajoritywerefromthePhilippines(25.9%),Bangladesh(17%),orIndia(13.8%).China(13.1%)andtheUnitedKingdom(11.7%)alsocontributedsignificantproportionsoftheseafarersexposedtopiracy.Ofthetworeportedpiracyattacksonregionalvessels,allofthevictimswereIndian.81

Injuries and Deaths in 2014

TherewasonereporteddeathassociatedwithpiracyintheWIORin2014.ThomasGlattusSoosai,anIndianfisherman,wasshotwhenhisdhow, Mesouth,wasboardedinthePersianGulfbypiratessuspectedtobeofIranianratherthanSomaliorigin.82Althoughthepiratesdidnotholdthevesselhostageforanextendedperiodoftime,Soosaidiedbeforehelpcouldreachhim.83Thisunderscoresanissuewithpiracyreportingworldwide:whilecommercialvesselsareablereportpiracyincidentstovariousregionalandinternationalreportingbodies,localandregionalvesselshavelesscapacitytodoso.ItalsounderscoresthepervasivenessofpiracyintheIndianOceanRegion:Mr.Soosaihadbeenattackedbypiratesontwoprioroccasionsbeforethefinalincidentthatledtohisdeath.84

TherewerenoadditionalreportsofbodilyinjuryordeathresultingfromapiracyattackintheWIOR.Thisissimilarto2013,whentherewerealsonospecificallyreportedinjuriesordeathstocrewofmajorinternationalvessels.Itisimportanttonotethatalackofreportedviolencedoesnotnecessarilyindicateitsabsence,asillustratedbythetestimonyofrecentlyreleasedseafarers.

81 Inaboutone-third(38.2%)ofpiracyincidents,thenationalitydatawasunreportedorunclear,reflectingadeficitinreportingthatmayleaveseafarersunabletosolicithelp,andnegativelyimpactinginternationalunderstandingofthescopeofthepiracyproblem.

82 J.Arockiaraj,“RisksAboundforIndiansFishinginPerilousGulf,”Times of India,29May2014,http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/madurai/Risks-abound-for-Indians-fishing-in-the-perilous-Gulf/articleshow/35699879.cms.ThefactthatMesouthmayhavebeenattackedbyIranianpiratesisimportanttonoteonlybecausethisparticularincidentmaynotcontributetotheSomalipiracymodel,andmayratherbeindicativeofregionalcriminalstargetinglocalvessels.

83 AniqaHaider,“SafetyAlertAfterFishermanKilled,”Gulf Daily News,23May2014,http://www.gulf-daily-news.com/NewsDetails.aspx?storyid=377588.

84 “‘Alarming’SurgeinPiracyReports,”Gulf Daily News,2June2014,http://www.gulf-daily-news.com/NewsDetails.aspx?storyid=378280.


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Hostages Held Captive in 2014

Overthecourseof2014,therewereatotalof65hostagesheldbySomalipirates.Atthebeginningof2014,48hostageswerestillbeingheldonshoreinSomalia,yearsaftertheirvesselshadinitiallybeenhijacked.Afterseveralyearsincaptivity,18hostageswerereleasedin2014,includingtheremainingcrewsofMV AlbedoinJuneandMVAsphalt VentureinOctober,afterbeingheldfor1,288and1,492daysrespectively.85Thirtyofthesehigh-riskhostagesremainedinSomaliaattheendoftheyear.86TheseincludedthefourThaicrewmembersofthefishingvesselPrantalay 12(capturedSeptember28,2010),and26hostagesfromthefishingvesselNaham 3withitscrewfromChina,thePhilippines,Indonesia,Taiwan,Vietnam,andCambodia(capturedMarch26,2012).87TheUNODChasconfirmedthattheremaininghostagesarebeingheldonlandinSomaliabecausetheirvesselswerebeached,sunk,orreleased.88

In2014,fourThaicrewmenheldhostageinSomaliawereallwhoremainedoftheoriginal24crewmembersfromFV Prantalay 12.Fourteenofthesehostages

werereleasedin2011,anotherfivediedwhentheirvesselcapsizedinastorm,subsequentlybeachinginSomalia,andoneThaicrewmandiedduringcaptivity.89Hersisterships,FV Prantalay 14and11,werecapturedwithheronApril18,2010.Prantalay 11 wasrescuedin2011,thoughtwohostagesweremissing,and Prantalay 14 wassunkwhilebeingusedasamothershipinafirefightamonthearlier.Ofthe26hostagesinitiallyheldaboard,only20wererescued.90WiththesupportoftheThaiembassyinNairobi,Kenya,theUNODCcontinuednegotiationswiththepiratesholdingthehostages.91OnFebruary25,2015,theremainingFV Prantalay 12hostageswerereleased,1,774daysafterbeingtakenhostage.92

85 ColinFreeman&MikePlanz,“SomaliPiratesReleaseCrewAfterNearlyFourYearsinCaptivity,”The Telegraph,7June2014,http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/piracy/10883414/Somali-pirates-release-crew-after-nearly-four-years-in-captivity.html;“ReleaseofMVAsphaltVentureSeafarersWelcomedbyMPHRP,”MPHRP,30October2014,http://www.mphrp.org/news_details/index.php?NewsID=210&utm_source=OCEANUSLive+Weekly+Report&utm_campaign=d1138e8005;RobynKriel,“PirateHostagesRescuedFromSomalia,”ENCA,7June2014,http://www.enca.com/africa/exclusive-pirate-hostages-rescued-somalia.

86 “HostageSupportProgramme,”UNODC,https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/piracy/hostage-support-programme.html(accessedDecember1,2014).

87 GirijaShettar,“LatestUSReleaseHighlightsPlightofMaritimeHostages,”IHS Maritime 360,24September2014,http://www.ihsmaritime360.com/article/14715/latest-us-release-highlights-plight-of-maritime-hostages.

88 Ibid.;“MaritimeCrimeReport,AnnualReport2014,”UNODC(2014),http://www.unodc.org/documents/easternafrica/MCP_Brochure_December_2014_wv_6_1.pdf.

89 “HostageSupportProgramme,”UNODC;JonGornall,“SomaliPiracyThreatAlwaysontheHorizon,”The National,16December2014,http://www.thenational.ae/world/africa/somali-piracy-threat-always-on-the-horizon#full;“UNSeekingReleaseofFourThaiCrewHeldbySomaliPiratesforOver4Years,”OceanusLive.org,9August2014,http://www.oceanuslive.org/main/viewnews.aspx?uid=00000910.

90 “SomaliPiratesHoldAtLeast56Vessels,886Hostages,”Eurasia Review,4April2011,http://www.eurasiareview.com/04042011-somali-pirates-hold-at-least-56-vessels-886-hostages/.

91 “UNSeekingReleaseofFourThaiCrewHeldbySomaliPiratesforOver4Years,”OceanusLive.org,9August2014,http://www.oceanuslive.org/main/viewnews.aspx?uid=00000910.

92 “OBPWelcomestheReleaseofRemainingMVPrantalay–12Hostages,”OceansBeyondPiracy,PressRelease,27February2015,http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/publications/obp-welcomes-release-remaining-fv-prantalay-12-hostages.

Injuries and DeathsRelated to Piracy

and Armed Robbery in theWestern Indian Ocean 2014

SEAFARERKILLED1PIRATESKILLED0

SEAFARERSINJURED0


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FV Naham 3’shostagesarethelastofthelong-term,high-riskhostagescurrentlyheldbySomalipirates.Originallycomprising29crewmembers,nowonly26remainasthreeoftheircolleaguesdiedduringcaptivity.93UNODChasprovidedmedicalsupporttothecrew,butlittleisknownabouttheircurrentcondition.94

Thoughnolargecommercialvesselswerecapturedin2014,tworegionalvesselswerehijacked,resultingin17seafarersbeingheldbrieflybypirates.ThedhowMesouthwasreleasedwithinadayafterpiratesorderedsixoftheIndiancrewmembersbelowdeckatgunpoint,lootedthevesselofitscatchandcrewvaluables,andkilledonecrewmember.95Theothervessel,Shane Hind,wascapturedinearlyJanuaryandthe11IndianhostageswererescuedafewweekslaterbyEUNAVFORforcesinthecourseofinvestigatinganattackonanothership.96

Physical Abuse of Seafarers

HostagesheldcaptivebySomalipiratesfaceroutineandsystematicabuse.Theescapeofthe11remaininghostagesfromMV AlbedoinJuneof2014broughttolightnewinformationabouttheinhumanetreatmentinflictedbytheircaptorsincludingmurder,brutalbeatings,andtorture.97Shortlyafterthecrewwastakenhostage,thepiratesfollowedthroughontheirthreattokillcrewmembersiftheshipownerdidnotmeettheirransomdemands.98RajuPrasadwasmurderedinfrontoftherestofthecrewofMV Albedo.99

93 “HostageSupportProgramme,”UNODC.

94 Ibid.

95 “‘Alarming’SurgeinPiracyReports,”Gulf Daily News,2June2014,http://www.gulf-daily-news.com/NewsDetails.aspx?storyid=378280.;“IndianFishermeninBahrainSeekEmbassy’sHelp,”Times of India,1June2014,http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/nri/Indian-fishermen-in-Bahrain-seek-embassys-help/articleshow/35896948.cms.

96 UnitedNationsSecurityCouncilRes.S/2014/726,para.86(October10,2014),http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/S_2014_727.pdf;“FrenchNavyVesselRescues11IndianSailorsFromSuspectedPirates,”ANI News,22January2014,http://www.aninews.in/newsdetail2/story151542/french-navy-vessel-rescues-11-indian-sailors-from-suspected-pirates.html.

97 TheSeamen’sChurchInstitute,“SeafarerVoices:PiracyontheHighSeas—Capt.JawaidKhanontheFatalityAboardtheMVAlbedo,”YouTubevideo,6:23,26February2014,https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VKvmFNqXuzI;TheSeamen’sChurchInstitute,“SeafererVoices:PiracyontheHighSeas—Capt.JawaidKhanonHowtheMVAlbedowasHijacked,”YouTube video,6:24,25February2014,https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I_b3AczOua0&feature=youtube_gdata_player;RobynKriel,“PirateHostagesAdapttoFreedom,”ENCA,8June2014,http://www.enca.com/exclusive-pirate-hostages-adapt-freedom;RamolaTalwarBadam,“‘Itwasdoordie’:SomaliPirates’HostagesTellofDramaticEscape,”The National UAE,10June2014,http://www.thenational.ae/uae/it-was-do-or-die-somali-pirates-hostages-tell-of-dramatic-escape;V.Narayan,“SailorHeldbySomaliPiratesforOverThreeYearsReturns,”Times of India,13June2014,http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/mumbai/Sailor-held-by-Somali-pirates-for-over-three-years-returns/articleshow/36451984.cms;FreemanandPlanz,“SomaliPiratesReleaseCrew.”

98 Seamen’sChurchInstitute,“Capt.JawaidKhanontheFatalityAboardtheMVAlbedo.”

99 “SailorHeldbySomaliPiratesforOverThreeYearsReturns,”Times of India,13June2014,http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/mumbai/Sailor-held-by-Somali-pirates-for-over-three-years-returns/articleshow/36451984.cms


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Onehostage,AmanSharmaofIndia,notedthathehadbeen“torturedandassaulted”bythepiratesand“[t]hereweredaysweallweregivennofood;wewerebeatendaily.”100MohammedBisthamy,60,describedbeingbeatenwithwoodenandmetalrodsandthat“[t]herewastortureallthetime,therewastoomuchtorture.”101CrewmemberShahriarAliabadihadbeenkickedinthemouth,suchthathisteethbegantofallout.102SomeofthecrewofMV Albedo“werebeatenwithgunbutts[or]lockedincontainers”whileotherswereforcedtocallfamilymembersandthenbeatenwhileonthephone.103

InadditiontothecrewofMV Albedo,thesevenremaininghostagesofMV Asphalt Venture,allfromIndia,werereleasedonOctober30,2014,afterfouryearsoftorture,physicalabuse,andprivationofadequatefoodorclothing.BhimsenSingh,45,electricalofficerontheship,recallsthatthe“fouryearsweretoughandbrutal.Theyabusedus.Theymanhandledus…Lifeincaptivitywastrulyhell…Imagineeatingthatfoodanddrinkingcontaminatedwaterforfouryear[s].”104SohanSinghreiteratedtheplightofthehostageswiththesimplephrase,“Therewasphysicaltorture.”105

Psychological Abuse of Seafarers

Pirates’treatmentofhostagesandthoseaboardvesselstheyattackoftenincludesdirectpsychologicalabusedesignedtoterrifyordegradeseafarers.Inaddition,thenatureofthehostageexperienceenduredbyseafarersdictatesthattheyaresubjectedtocontinuedindirectpsychologicalabuse:treatmentlikelytocausefear,distress,andemotionalupset,includingdeprivationfromfamilyandthefearanduncertaintythatcomewiththeunknowndurationofthehostageexperience.Inthecaseof Mesouth, theIndiancrewweresubjectedtodirectthreatsandorderedbelowdeckatgunpointafterMr.Soosaiwasshot.All18localseafarersexposedtohijackingin2014wereexposedtotheindirectpsychologicaldistressofuncertaintyabouttheirfutureandthehorrorofwitnessingothercrewmembersbeinghurtorkilled.

Thestoriesofthelong-termhostagesreleasedduring2014furtherdemonstratethevaryingdegreesofpsychologicalabuse,bothdirectandindirect,towhichcaptivesmaybesubjected.Forexample,thementalabusewassosevereforMV Albedo crewthatabrotherofoneofthehostagesexplainedafterspeakingtohisbrotheronthephonethatthecrewmemberswere“losingtheirmentalbalance.”106Oneofthehostages,AmanSharma,describedhowthepirates“threatenedtokillmeasmyparentscouldnotmeettheirransomdemands.”107Onsomeoccasions,thehostageswereforcedtocalltheirfamiliesathometosaytheyneededtopaythepiratesmoneyinordertobereleased,andthattheywereclosetodying,whilebeingbeatenastheywerespeakingonthetelephone.108ThefamilyofCaptainJawaidKhan’swifereportedthathecontinuedtosufferemotionallylongafterhereturnedhome,notingthat“[h]ewasdisturbed,mentally.”109

100 Narayan,“SailorHeldbySomaliPiratesforOverThreeYearsReturns,”Times of India,13June2014,http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/mumbai/Sailor-held-by-Somali-pirates-for-over-three-years-returns/articleshow/36451984.cms.

101 Badam,“‘Itwasdoordie’:SomaliPirates’HostagesTellofDramaticEscape.”

102 Verini,“EscapeorDie.”

103 FreemanandPlanz,“SomaliPiratesReleaseCrew.”

104 Sanjai,“1,490DaysinaPirates’Den.”

105 Ibid.

106 AnisurRahmanKhan,“SailorsAbductedin2010YettobeFreed,”The Independent,22May2014,http://www.theindependentbd.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=216008%3Asailors-abducted-in-2010-yet-to-be-freed&catid=129%3Afrontpage&Itemid=121#.U4Dy9aAUKtU.twitter.

107 Narayan,“SailorHeldbySomaliPiratesforOverThreeYearsReturns.”

108 FreemanandPlanz,“SomaliPiratesReleaseCrew.”

109 Verini,“EscapeorDie.”

There were days we all

were given no food; we were beaten daily.


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ThecrewoftheMV Asphalt Venture similarlysufferedfrompsychologicalabuse.BhimsenSinghrecalledthathewasthreatenedatgunpointseveraltimes.110SohanSinghdescribedtheemotionaltollofspeakingtotheirfamiliesfor“[t]wominutesinfourmonthsorsixmonths[or][s]ometimesafterayear.”111Hefurtherexplainedthatthere“wasmentaltorture,”suchasbeingforced“tocryoutwhile[ransom]negotiationswereproceedingoverthephone,”andthatbythelastyearthey“hadlosthope.”112

Whenconsideringphysicalandpsychologicalabuse,thestoriestoldbyhostagesreinforceakeypointinconsideringthehumancostofpiracyin2014:whilethenumberofnewattackswaslow,thoseseafarersheldbypiratesweresubjecttotortureandextremeabuse.Theremainingseafarersstillheldhostagerepresentanongoinghumancrisis,andonethatshouldnotbeignored.

OTHER HUMAN COSTSLong-Term Impact

Evidenceismountingthatpiracywillhaveanenduring,long-termimpactforatleastsomeseafarersaftertheirrelease.Asreportedinthe2013StateofMaritimePiracy,thereisalimitedamountofpublishedresearchonthistopic,butexistingresearchdocumentsthefactthat,foratleastsomeseafarers,theimpactsofpiracyattackslinger.Giventheextraordinarytrauma,orthreatsoftrauma,theseafarersmayendureatthehandsofpirates,thisshouldcomeasnosurprise.AsLeonardoHoy-CarrascofromtheUNODCexplained,“Afterspeakingwithdifferentseafarersfromdifferentvessels,differentnationalities,etc.,almostallofthemhaveconsideredtakingtheirownlivesatsomepoint,andfeelterriblyashamedforthinkingthesethoughts.”113

Inadditiontotheresearchdiscussedinpreviousreportsdocumentingthislong-termimpact,includingworkbyAntonioZiello114andbyMichaelGarfinkleoftheSeamen’sChurchInstitute,115severalstudieswerepublishedin2014documentingthelong-termimpactofpiracyonseafarersandtheirfamilies.AntonioZielloandhiscolleaguespublishedanarticlein2014thatdocumentedinterviewswith12familymembersofItalianseafarersheldhostagebypirates.Theresultsdemonstratedthatevenfivemonthsafterthereleaseoftheseafarers,familymembersshowedsignificantlong-termdistressincludingelevatedanxietyand,insomecases,diagnosedpost-traumaticstressdisorder(PTSD).116Additionally,SanleyS.AbilaandLijunTangpublishedananalysisofinterviewswith12seafarersheldcaptivebySomalipiratesandthreefamilymembersoftheseseafarersandfoundthatmanyshowedsymptomsofdistressconsistentwithPTSD.117

110 MamuniDas,“LivingWithPiratesandSurvivingtoTelltheTale,”Hindu Business Line,17November2014,http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/news/living-with-pirates-and-surviving-to-tell-the-tale/article6608730.ece.

111 Sanjai,“1,490DaysinaPirates’Den.”

112 Ibid.

113 OBPinterviewwithLeonardoHoy-CarrascofromtheUNODConApril15,2015.

114 AntonioRosarioZielloetal.,“PsychologicalConsequencesinVictimsofMaritimePiracy:TheItalianExperience,”InternationalMaritimeHealth64(3)(2013),136–141.

115 MichaelStuartGarfinkleetal.,The Psychological Impact of Piracy on Seafarers(NewYork,NY:Seaman’sChurchInstitute,2012).

116 AntonioRosarioZielloetal.,“PsychologicalDistressinFamiliesofVictimsofMaritimePiracy–theItalianExperience,”InternationalMaritimeHealth65(1)(2014),28–32.

117 SanleyS.AbilaandLijunTang,“Trauma,post-trauma,andsupportintheshippingindustry:TheexperienceofFilipinoseafarersafterpirateattacks,”MarinePolicy46(2014),132–136.NotethattheseinterviewsarethesameinterviewsreportedbyOBPin“TheHumanCostofMaritimePiracy2012.”

After speaking with different

seafarers from different vessels, different nationalities, etc., almost all of them have considered taking their own lives at some point.


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Theeffectsonseafarers’familiescanbedemonstratedbythefactthatthewifeofoneoftheMV Albedocrewmemberssufferedaheartattackuponseeinganewsreportaboutthevesselbeingcapturedbypirates.118Often,“thefamiliesfeelcompletelyhelplessbecausethereisnothingtheycando.Theystartsellingoffalltheirvaluablesorlandtotryandraisemoneyforthepirateransom.Thentheyevenpulltheirchildrenoutofschoolastheyrunoutofmoney.”119

AsnotedbyLeonardoHoy-Carrasco,thelong-termimpactextendsbeyondactualabuse,andmayalsorelatetoaseafarer’sinabilitytoprovideforhisfamilyafterbeingahostage.Forexample,afteroneseafarer’scaptivity,hiswifeexplainedthat:

[H]e was not the same. He was very possessive, started being very domineering, and they don’t want him to go back to sea and get worse, but he wants to go back to sea to earn money. She said he was completely transformed and was not the same man. Many seafarers come back and have to borrow money just to get bus fare or send his children to school, and they feel very ashamed of not being able to stand on their own.120

OBP’sanalysisofthelong-termimpactofpiracyonseafarersfoundthat16.67%ofseafarerswhowereaboardvesselsattackedbypiratesshowedlong-termpost-traumaticstresssymptoms.121Thiswouldsuggestthatofthe5,200seafarersreportedbyOBPtobeaboardvesselsattackedbySomalipiratesfrom2011–2013,therecouldbeasmanyas867seafarerswithsignificantdistressresultingfromtheseattacks.ThisisinadditiontotheenormousnumberofseafarersexposedtothestressoftransitingtheHRA.Thehumancostofpiracydoesnotsimplyendonceseafarersarereleased,andmanyseafarerswillneedadditionalsupport.

Financial Impact on Seafarers

Inadditiontothephysicalandpsychologicalabusesufferedbyseafarersattackedbypirates,manyendurefinancialdistresslongafterapirateattackorperiodofcaptivityduetothelossofexpectedwages.Forexample,theMozambicansurvivorsofFV Vega 5,whichwashijackedbySomalipiratesinDecember2010,havenotyetreceivedcompensationwhichwasrequiredintheircontractsfortheperiodtheywereheldashostages.122Allegedly,theshipownerpaidtheIndonesianandSpanishcrewmembers,buttheMozambicancrewmembersremainwithoutcompensationoverthreeyearslater.123Similarly,the22crewmembersofMV Iceberg 1,heldfortwoandahalfyearsafterbeingcapturedbySomalipiratesonMarch29,2010,todatehavestillnotreceivedcompensationfortheperiodoftheircaptivity.124

AmanKumar,oneoftheMV Albedocrewmen,explainedthatinadditiontofouryearsoftortureandnear-deathexperiences,hehasnotreceivedanyofhispast-duewages.125Henotedthatduringthecrew’scaptivity,theshipownerwouldaskthepirateswherehisauxiliarymachinesandenginewere,butfailedtoaskaboutthecrew.126Support118 Verini,“EscapeorDie.”



121 Formoredetailsonthisanalysis,seetheLong-TermImpactStudysectioninthisreport.

122 “Mozambique:Vega5SurvivorsStillWithoutCompensation,” allAfrica,24November2014,http://allafrica.com/stories/201411250215.html.

123 Ibid.

124 “Piracy:NotaThingofthePast,”Maritime Executive,16September2014,http://www.maritime-executive.com/article/Piracy-Not-a-Thing-of-the-Past-2014-09-16.

125 GirijaShettar,“HostageProgrammeSaysPartnerswillnotDiluteAction,”IHS Maritime 360,30September2014,http://www.ihsmaritime360.com/article/14810/hostage-programme-says-partners-will-not-dilute-action.

126 Ibid.

[H]e was not the same. He

was very possessive, started being very domineering, and they don’t want him to go back to sea and get worse, but he wants to go back to sea to earn money.


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programs,includingthoseinplacefromtheMaritimePiracyHumanitarianResponseProgrammeandtheCGPCSPiracySurvivorFamilyFund,existtoprovidefinancialsupportandassistancetoseafarers,butthesemaynotbeabletofullycompensateseafarersforwageslostduringtheirlongcaptivity.

Additionally,manyseafarerswhowereheldhostagefinditdifficulttoreintegrateintosocietyandstrugglefinanciallyforyearsaftertheattack.LeonardoHoy-Carrasconotedthat:

Seafarers are not receiving the support they need…because there is no comprehensive approach with absolute assistance to help them with aid for their family, money for documents, counseling, assistance with getting papers, etc. These seafarers are extremely strong people and usually what really breaks them in the end is the fact that…they cannot get back on their feet, their calls stop being answered, aid runs out, and they feel completely abandoned and useless. Seafarers believe that ILO Conventions will help them, they will get their back pay, any type of compensation, etc. But when they get home their families have lost everything. Most seafarers just wanted their base compensation and they rarely get these and they feel completely abandoned and have lost everything.127

Occasionally,theseseafarersdecidetoreturntoseafaring,buteventhistaskisdifficultduetothefactthatlong-termhostagesoftenlosetheirpassportswhileincaptivity,theircertificatesorlicensesexpire,etc.However,withalackoffinancialandotherresourcestoobtainnewdocumentation,theseformerhostagesfindtherearenumeroushurdleseventoreturningtotheirprioroccupation,whichonlycompoundsthefinancialimpactuponthem.Forinstance,BhimsenSingh,ahostagefromMV Asphalt Venture,explainedthatalthoughheisatrainedelectricalengineer,henowistakingcomputerclassesandtryingtoupdatehisbooksbecauseafterbeingcutofffromtheoutsideworldwithnocommunicationforoverfouryears,heisnowstrugglingtomakealiving.Heexplained,“Ihavelostfourvaluableyearsofmylife.Ilosteverythinginclud[ing]somepartofmymemory…NowIdon’thaveanyjobinhandandneedhelp.”128

Impact on Somalis: The Use of Children as Pirates

Inadditiontothemoreobviousimpactsofpiracyonseafarers,piracyhasnegativeeffectsonsomeSomalipopulationsaswell.Thoughtheexactextentofthesecostsisdifficulttoascertainorquantify,oneofthemoreunderstoodimpactsistheeffectsonSomalichildrenwhoarerecruitedaspirates.CharlesBrown,SeniorStateCounselfortheSeychellesOfficeoftheAttorneyGeneral,calculatesthatapproximatelyoneinfivepiratesisundertheageof18.129Otherestimatespositthatchildrencompriseasmuchasone-thirdofmanycrews,includingsomewhoareasyoungas10or11yearsold,130turningpiracyintoamore“complexissue”accordingtotheUNODC.131Childrencontinuetoberecruitedforpiracy,as


128 SNVSudhir,“HostageSurvivesitAll,”Deccan Chronicle,23November2014,http://www.deccanchronicle.com/141121/nation-current-affairs/article/hostages-survives-it-all.

129 CarlConradi,“MitigatingChildren’sInvolvementinMaritimePiracy,”Canadian Naval Review10(2014),16,available athttp://www.navalreview.ca/wp-content/uploads/public/vol10num2/vol10num2art3.pdf;GirijaShettar,“ProtectingtheRightsofChildrenSuspectedofPiracy,”IHS Maritime,10January2014,http://ihsmaritime.wordpress.com/2014/01/17/protecting-the-rights-of-children-suspected-of-piracy/.

130 “InternationalPiracyExpertsMeetinHalifax,”CBC News,24July2014,http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/nova-scotia/international-piracy-experts-meet-in-halifax-1.1169025;LetterfromShellyWhitman&SamHollandtoauthor,ExecutiveDirector,andProjectorOfficer–Research,TheRoméoDallaireChildSoldiersInitiative(March20,2015)(onfilewithauthor).

131 “HumanCostofPiracyoffSomaliCoast‘Incalculable’,FullRangeofLegal,PreventativeMeasuresNeededtoThwartAttacks,SecurityCouncilTold,”UNSecurityCouncil,PressReleaseSC/10551(February22,2012),http://www.un.org/press/en/2012/sc10551.doc.htm;EmilyHolland,

Seafarers believe that

ILO Conventions will help them, they will get their back pay, any type of compensation, etc. But when they get home their families have lost everything.


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demonstratedbyEUNAVFOR’sapprehensionoffivesuspectedpirateswhileinvestigatingtheattackonNave AtroposinlateJanuary2014,atleastsomeofwhomwerebetween16–18yearsold.132In2014,thereweresixjuvenilesinKenyaandtenintheSeychelleswhowereeitherprosecutedaspiratesorinvolvedinapendingtrial.133Childrenrecruitedaspiratesareexposedtoviolentsituationsandsometimesarethrownoverboardafterasuccessfulhijackingsothattheadultswillreceivealargerportionoftheransom.134Ultimately,thecontinueduseofchildrenaspirates,despitethedropinsuccessfulpirateattacks,isasignificanthumancostrelatedtoSomalipiracy.

CONCLUSIONThoughfewerseafarerswerereportedlyattackedin2014,thisdownwardtrendinnewlyexposedseafarersdoesnotaccuratelyreflectthecontinuingimpactonseafarersheldhostageandthosewhoarestilldealingwiththelastingfiscal,physical,andemotionalimpactsofpiracy.Asthenumbersofnewattacksdecline,thedominanthumanimpactshiftsincreasinglytothoseseafarersstillheldhostage,localseafarersandfishermenstillatriskofattack,andthosestilldealingwiththefalloutofapiracyincident.

“HijackedChildhoods,UndertheRadar:HowtheInternationalCommunityCanHelptheYouthAssociatedwithSomaliPiracy–andWhyitMust,”UCLAJournaloflnternationalLawandForeignAffairs17(2013),175;see also“ThisisBig…,”Child Soldiers Initiative,3March2014,http://www.childsoldiers.org/this-is-big/.

132 “FrenchNavyTransfersFiveSuspectedPiratestoSeychelles,”Seychelles Nation,30January2014,http://www.nation.sc/article.html?id=240529;“WeeklyMaritimeSituationalReport,”OceanusLive.org,January18–25,v.3No.4/14(2014).

133 AnswerstoQuestionnaire,FrancescaCaonero,UnitedNationsOfficeonDrugsandCrime,MaritimeandTransnationalOrganisedCrimeProgramme(HornofAfrica),RegionalOfficeforEasternAfrica(January27,2015)(onfilewithauthor).

134 LetterfromShellyWhitman&SamHollandtoauthor,ExecutiveDirector,and&ProjectorOfficer–Research,theRoméoDallaireChildSoldiersInitiative(Mar.20,2015)(onfilewithauthor).Thissubjectcontainsissuesmorecomplexandnuancedthancanbeaddressedinthisreport.Foranin-depthdiscussionofthistopic,see,e.g.,ShellyL.Whitman,“ChildrenandMarinePiracy,”CaseWesternReserveJournalofInternationalLaw46,217(2013),available at http://law.case.edu/journals/JIL/Documents/46CaseWResJIntlL1.10.Article.Whitman.Digital.pdf.

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GULF OF GUINEA: OVERVIEWTHE STATE OF MARITIME PIRACY 2014

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THE STATE OF MARITIME PIRACY IN THE GULF OF GUINEA OVERVIEW

ECONOMIC COST KEY FINDINGS:



• Regionsignificantlyincreasedpriorityindevelopingitsmaritimesecurityinfrastructure,butcapacitystilllacking.

• Overhalfofthetotaleconomiccostattributedtomilitaryoperations.

• Ransomcostsestimatedat$1.6Million,butconfidentialsystemsofpaymentmaketruecostdifficulttoobtain.

• OBPestimationsshow29%oftotalcostsattributabletoregionalstates.

• Informationrelatedtotheimpactofpiracyattacksonseafarersislimitedduetoreportingchallenges.

• SeafarerawarenessandadvocacymorechallengingintheGulfofGuinea.

• Regionalseafarersatgreaterriskduetointimidationfromlocalperpetrators.

• Nopiracyprosecutions/Noaccountabilityforcriminals.

• Declineinreportedattacksin2014,butconsistentwithhistoricalpatternsoffluctuationintheregion.

• Asmanyas70%ofattacksgounreported(PottengalMukundan-Director,InternationalMaritimeBureau-IMB).

• Increaseinnumberofattacksininternationalwatersrepresentspiracy’sexpandinggeographicalrange.

• 60%ofpiracyincidentsoccurredinthewatersoffNigeria.

THE STATE OF MARITIME PIRACY 2014GULF OF GUINEA: OVERVIEW

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ECONOMIC COST BREAKDOWN:



39

GULF OF GUINEA: OVERVIEWTHE STATE OF MARITIME PIRACY 2014

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OBP’sdataindicatesadeclineinthetotalnumberofreportedattacksfrom100incidentsin2013to67in2014.However,itisestimatedthatupto70%ofattacksgounreportedintheregion(PottengalMukundan-Director,InternationalMaritimeBureau).WhiletheestablishmentofinformationcenterssuchastheMaritimeTradeInformationSharingCentre(MTISC)inGhanahavemadestridestoimprovereporting,theunderreportingofpiracyincidentscontinuestobeacentralproblemindeterminingthetruedegreeofmaritimecrimeoccurringwithinthewatersofftheWestAfricancoast.

Whencomparingattacksbycountryinthegraphatthetopofthepage,60%(40outof67)ofthetotalattacksinWestAfricaoccurrednearNigeria,followedby10%(7)and9%(6)neartheRepublicoftheCongoandTogorespectively.Whenisolatingonlytheattacksthatweresuccessful(Seerightsideofpage),Nigerialedagainwith54%(14outof26)ofincidentsoccurringoffofitscoast.

Ofthe67reportedpiracyincidentsthatOBPloggedin2014,only42%occurredinterritorialwaters(Seepirateactivitybreakdownonpreviouspage).Thisisanoticeabletrendshowingincidentsexpandingbeyond12nauticalmiles,wherehistoricallyupto80%ofpiracyattacksoccurredwithinterritorialwaters.Ofthe67reportedattacks,26weresuccessfulinvolvingamixofrobberies,oiltheft,hostagekidnapping,andvesselsdetainedforuseasamothershipinfutureattacks.

REPORTING CHALLENGES

Thelackofreportingintheregioncanbeattributedtoseveralfactors:

• Manyregionalstateslackthenecessarynavalassetsandothermeanstoeffectivelyrespondtoanincident.

• Ininstanceswhenlawenforcementauthoritiesdorespondandanarrestismade,lengthyinvestigationsoftenfollow.Theseinvestigationsoftenresultinthedetainingofvesselandcrewandthecostlydelayofscheduledtransit.

• Theabsenceofproperlegislationpertainingtomaritimepiracymeansthatdespiteadequateresponse,arrestandinvestigation,theperpetratorsofsuchcrimesarenotprosecutedandareoftenreleased.

Theselimitationsreducetheincentiveforshippingcompaniesandtheirvesselstoreportattacks,particularlylesserincidentswhichresultinlimitedimpacttovesselorcrew.Buildingregionalcapacitytorespondtopiracyincidentsaswellasestablishingefficientsystemsforresponse,investigationandprosecutioncouldimproveincentiveforreportingandthereforeprovideamorecomprehensivelookatWestAfrica’smaritimesecuritypicture.

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OBP’sdatacollectionandanalysisalsolookedatattacksbyvesseltype(Seegraphtotheleft).Attacksontankersoccurredmostfrequently

at35,followedbyattacksonOffshoreSupplyVessels(10),GeneralCargo(5)andBulkCarriers(4).It’slikelythattheinterestintankervesselsasamaintargetforpiracystemsfromthehighvalueofthecargo.However,thehigherlevelofexpertiseneededtocarryoutasuccessfuloiltheftlimitsthesuccessrateofsuchattacks.Whenreferringbacktothepirateactivitybreakdowngraphic,notethatonly7%ofallpiracyincidentsin2014(5outof67)weresuccessfuloilthefts.

While2014sawcontinuedeffortsfromregionalandinternationalgovernmentsaswellasindustrytoimprove

maritimesecurityinWestAfrica,sustainedcommitmentfromkeystakeholdersisimperativetofurtherreducetherisk

toseafarersoperatingintheregionandestablishalong-termsolutiontopiracyandothermaritimecrime.

RIVERINE ATTACKSThereappearstobeasubstantialamountofoverlapbetweentheactorsresponsibleforpiracyatseaandforthoseincidentswhichtakeplaceintheriverineareasoftheNigerDelta.Asourreportsfocusesonpiracyininternationalwatersandarmedrobberyatsea,weexcludedriverineincidentsfromouranalysis.However,giventheapparent

similaritiesbetweenriverineandmaritimeattacks,theseincidentsdodeservemention.

OBPcompiledatotalof15attacksintheDeltain2014,withthemajority(10)ofthoseincidentstargetingpassengervessels.TheseincidentsresultedinthedeathsofatleastsixNigeriansandsixpirates.RiverineincidentsinNigeriaareparticularlyviolent,asdemonstratedbythefactthatallofthereportedattacksinvolvedtheuseofweapons,withallbutoneinvolvingguns.TheproliferationofviolenceinriverineincidentsisextremelyconcerningandundoubtedlyhasaprofounddetrimentaleffectonthosewhoworkandliveintheNigerDelta.

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THE ECONOMIC COST OF MARITIME PIRACYIN THE GULF OF GUINEATotal Cost Estimates Low Estimate High EstimateIndustryEmployedVesselProtectionMeasures $231,686,000 $314,181,000ArmedGuards $141,890,000 $172,790,000SecurityLiaisons $56,000,000 $88,000,000LagosEscortVessels $3,123,000 $5,949,000Delta-PortEscortVessels $8,517,000 $18,738,000SecureZones $17,970,000 $19,869,000SecurityEquipment $3,312,000 $8,835,000OtherIndustryCosts $136,385,000 $138,671,000Cargo(Oil)Theft $11,519 $13,038,000StolenGoods $364,000 $1,131,000RansomsandAssociatedPayments $1,680,000 $1,680,000Insurance $41,178,000 $41,178,000Labor $81,644,000 $81,644,000GovernmentandCivilSocietyCosts $380,021,000 $529,902,000MilitaryOperations $371,958,000 $521,839,000Prosecutions&Imprisonment $0 $0Counter-PiracyOrganizations $8,063,000 $8,063,000Total Economic Cost of Maritime Piracy in West Africa $748,092,000 $982,754,000

Transit Estimation

InordertocalculatetheeconomiccostsrelatedtopiracyintheGulfofGuinea,anaccurateestimationoftransitnumbersintheregionmustbeperformed.Thistask,however,iscomplicatedbythenatureofshippingpatternsinthisregion.VesselsoperatingintheGoGfrequentlymakemultipleportcalls,sotransitsoftenoriginateandterminatewithintheregion.Shipsmayalsoberequiredtospendextendedperiodsoftimedriftingoratanchorwhilewaitingforaberthorwaitingtoconductship-to-shiptransferoperations.StillothershipsaretransitingthroughtheregiononroutesbetweenEuropeortheAmericasandtheCapeofGoodHope.

Togenerateanaccuratetransitestimate,OBPusedtheaverageofthreeseparateestimationmethods:AIStransitalgorithms,Vesseltrackerportvisitdata,andAISestimatesofsecureanchoragetraffic.1Usingthismethodology,wegeneratedanestimatednumberoftransitsforthreeareasofinterestnecessarytocalculatetheeconomiccostsofpiracyintheGulfofGuinea:theOBPGulfofGuineaAreaofInterest,theJWCWRA,andtheIBFHRA.TheseestimatesaredisplayedinTable1.ThefinalestimatesarebasedontheaveragesoftheAIS,PortVisit,andSecureZoneestimates.

Table 1: Vessel TransitsAIS Estimate Port Visit Estimate Secure Areas Estimate Final Estimates Used

GulfofGuineaTransits 41,000 34,600 43,900 16,600 19,400 30,900JWCWRATransits 25,000 17,100 20,900 16,000 18,800 19,600IBFHRATransits N/A 14,800 18,600 11,400 13,000 14,500

1 AfullexplanationofourmethodanditslimitationsisavailableinAppendixH.

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COST OF INDUSTRY EMPLOYED VESSEL PROTECTION MEASURES (Guards & Liaisons, Escort Vessels, Secure Zones, and Security Equipment) $230,812,000 - $314,181,000 Key Findings:

• VesselprotectionmeasuresusedintheGoGareacombinationofpassivevesselhardening,armedguards,escortvesselservices,ship-to-shiptransferzones,securezonesanddriftingzones.

• SecurezoneswereestablishedinrecognitionofthefactthatasignificantportionofattacksintheGoG occurinanchorageswhileawaitingportcalls.

ComparedtotrafficintheWesternIndianOcean,vesselsintheGulfofGuineahavefeweroptionstoavoidordeterpirateattacks.OffoftheHornofAfrica,vesselshavebeenabletoincreasetheirspeedsandsailfartherawayfromthecoastofSomaliatodecreasetheirchancesofbeingpirated.Incontrast,theGulfofGuineaislessathoroughfarethanadestinationformerchantvessels.Asaresult,amulti-layeredapproachtosecuringvesselshasdeveloped.

Regionalcountrieshaveestablishedsecurezonesinwhichvesselscananchorwhilewaitingforaberthorduringship-to-shiptransfers,andasystemofescortvesselsprotectsshipscomingintoportandtravelingalongthecoast.Additionally,acomplexsystemofemployingarmedguardshasdevelopedaswell,wroughtwithsignificantlegalandpracticalcomplexities.Vesselscanhirelocalarmedteamswheninterritorialwaters,teamswhicharemadeupofthecoastalstate’snavalormaritimepolicepersonnel,supplementedinmanycasesbyanunarmedsecurityliaisonfromaninternationalprivatesecuritycompany.Outsideofterritorialwaters,thevesselsmayhireinternationalprivatesecurityteamsforprotectionduringtransit.Testimoniestellthatprivatecompanieshavingcommercialtieswithacoastalstatemaybecommittedtotakethecoastalstate’spublicprotection,forafee,ratherthanprivatecompanies.Passivedefensemeasures,suchasbarbedwiretodenyaccess,arealsoutilized.Altogether,vesselprotectionmeasuresconstituteasignificantcost,estimatedtobebetween$231and$315million.

Table 2: Cost of Industry Employed Vessel Protection Measures (VPM)

Type of Measure Low HighArmedGuards $142,890,000 $172,790,000SecurityLiaisons $56,000,000 $88,000,000SecureZones $17,970,000 $19,869,000LagosEscortVessels $3,997,000 $5,949,000Delta-PortEscortVessels $8,517,000 $18,738,000SecurityEquipment $3,312,000 $8,835,000TotalCost $230,812,000 $314,181,000

Key Findings:

• Embarkedsecuritypersonnelcostbetween$197,890,000and$260,790,000for2014.

• 35%–40%ofvesselsareestimatedtoemployguardteamsinterritorialwaters.

Total Cost of Armed Guards & Security Liaisons$198 to $261 Million

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Table 3: Cost Calculations for Local Guards, Unarmed Security Liaisons, and International Teams

Type of Guards Rate of Use Estimated No. of Days per team

Daily Cost per Team

Low/High Cost Estimate

LocalGuardTeams 35%-40%withintheWRA

5 $4,000 $124,940,000-$144,540,000

UnarmedSecurityLiaisons 56%-76%ofvesselsusinglocalguardteams

16 $1,000 $56,000,000-$88,000,000

InternationalTeams 7.5%-12.5%ofvesselsemployinternationalembarkedteams

5 $4,000 $16,950,000-$28,250,000

Total $197,890,000 - $260,790,000

The2014OBPestimateforthecostofembarkedguardsintheGulfofGuinearegionrangesfrom$198,190,000to$261,290,000.Theuseofguards,unarmedandarmedalike,isparticularlycomplexintheGulfofGuinea.Manyshipoperatorsfeelcompelledtoemployembarkedguardstocombatthethreatofpiracy.However,itisthepolicyofmostGulfofGuineacountriestoprohibittheuseofinternationalembarkedarmedguardsintheirterritorialwaters.2Inpractice,embarkedarmedteamsarecomposedofregionalnavalpersonnelormaritimepolicecontractedtoprovidesecurity.Thissystemhasdevelopedinasomewhatad hoc manneroverthepastfewyears,leadingtoamultitudeofarrangementsinvolvingnumerousagencies.Somereportshaveindicatedthatguardsandgovernmentforceshavesometimesmistakeneachotherforpiratesduetoalackcommunicationandsituationalawareness.3Asoneexpertcomments,“Fundamentally,theproblemisthat,whilelegislationandcapabilityexist,thepatchyenforcementoftheapplicablelawsencouragesshipoperators,agents,mid-rankingmilitarypersonnelandprivatesecurityproviderstosearchfor‘alternatives’whichtendtoemphasizepracticalityoverlegality.”4

Alongwiththelocallycontractedguards,manyvesselschoosetohireawesternsecurityadvisorthroughaninternationalprivatesecuritycompany.Theseunarmedembarkedadvisors,inteamsofoneortwo,maystayonboardforaslongasamonth,actingasliaisonswiththelocalarmedteamsandgovernmentofficials,trainingthecrewoncounter-piracyprocedures,andassistingwithstandingwatch.Additionally,somevessels—particularlythosetransitingtheGulfofGuinearegionoutsidetheWarRiskArea(WRA)—contractinternationalarmedguardteamstoprovidesecurityoutsideofterritorialwaters.Duetothecomplicatedregulationsintheregions,thesevariousarrangementsareattimessimultaneouslyinlinewithandincontradictionofthevariouspoliciesofnationalagenciesandthesecurityapparatus.

Local Security Teams

Nigeria

AsthelargestGulfofGuineacountryandthegreatestrecipientofmaritimetraffic,NigeriahasasignificantimpactonmaritimesecurityintheGulfofGuinea.Someofthechallengesrelatingtomaritimesecurityhavebeenabyproductofmultipledepartmentssharingresponsibilityforthissector.TheNigerianNavy(NN),theNigerianMaritimeandSafety

2 OBPreferstoterritorialwatersasconsistentwiththeUNCLOSdefinitionofterritorialseas,extending12nmfromthecoastlineofacountry.NotallGulfofGuineastatesutilizethisdefinition,furthercomplicatingthelegalimplicationsofarmedguarduse.SeeBenin:DecreeNo.76-92extendingtheterritorialwatersofthePeople’sRepublicofBeninto200nauticalmiles,1976,available athttp://www.un.org/depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/BEN_1976_Decree.pdf;Togo:OrdinanceNo.24delimitingtheTerritorialWatersandcreatingaprotectedEconomicMaritimeZoneof16August1977,Article1,available athttp://www.un.org/depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/TGO_1977_Ordinance.pdf(Article2istheEEZclaim).

3 ComfortOseghale,“NavytoStopPrivateGuardsonVessels,”Punch,17July2014,http://www.punchng.com/business/maritime/navy-to-stop-private-guards-on-vessels/.

4 DirkSteffen,“TroubledWaters?TheUseoftheNigerianNavyandPoliceinMaritimeSecurityRoles,”Center for International Maritime Security,1July2014,available athttp://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Detail/?id=181585.


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Agency(NIMASA),andtheNigerianMaritimePoliceeachhavearoleinsecuringNigerianwaters.NigeriahastakenstepstoaddressthejurisdictionalambiguitybyestablishingtheNigerianNavy’sexclusiveauthorityoverNigeria’sterritorialwatersandEEZ.AnalertfromBIMCOdescribesthisprocess:

Members operating vessels within the Nigerian EEZ and territorial waters should be aware...of potentially significant liabilities and delays if they employ armed guards on board their vessels who are sourced from the Nigerian Marine Police, the Nigerian Police or the “Joint Task Force”. The Nigerian Navy only provides vessel escorts and it is understood to have sole primacy and authority in the territorial waters and the EEZ. BIMCO has been advised that the Nigerian Navy does not provide or permit armed guards on merchant vessels. The Navy has seemingly begun enforcing its alleged authority to prevent the employment of armed guards on board and this has resulted in the arrest of members of the Nigerian Marine Police and consequent delays to the vessel and unresolved liabilities placed on the owners.5

AlthoughofficialNigerianpolicydictatesthatarmedprotectionshouldbeprovidedbynavalescorts,reportingandattackdatademonstratethatinpractice,VPDs(embarkedpoliceornavalpersonnelservingasguards),weresometimesfavoredovertheescortmodelofprotectionin2014.SomeoftheshipsintendingtocalluponaNigerianportwillusuallyapproachthecoastandateamof(usuallyfour)NNsailors—hiredthroughashippingagentorsomeotherintermediary—willcomeaboardtoprotectthevesselwhileitwaitsforaberth.Thoughthiswasthefavoredmodelofprotection,ithasaquestionablelegalbasis,leavingthevesseloperatorsopentopossiblelegalliabilityorinvalidationofinsuranceclaims.

Regional States

TheotherlittoralGulfofGuineastateshavetakenasimilarcourseinregulatinganyarmedsupport,requiringthatitbeprovidedbyregionalteams.Togo,Benin,andNigeriaallforbidinternationalteamsfrombringingweaponsintoterritorialwatersand,assuch,havealsoadoptedtheVPDmodel.6Guardssourcedfromthenavyorothermilitary/policeagencieswillembarkfromaportcity,stayaboardwhilethemerchantvesselwaitstoberth,andthendisembarktothatsamelocationwhenthevesseldepartsforitsnextdestination.

ExtensiveinvestigationhasledOBPtoestimatethat35%–40%ofmerchantvesselsenteringterritorialwatersenlisttheprotectionofanembarkedregionalteamorVPD.7Usinganestimated19,600transitsintheWRA,8wherevesselsaremostlikelytoemployembarkedarmedguards,weestimatebetween6,200and7,200teamsperyear.Accordingtocurrentcostestimatesof$4,000perday,andanestimated5dayspertransit,wederiveanestimatedtotalexpenditureofbetween$124,940,000and$144,540,000onembarkedvesselprotectiondetachmentsin2014withintheWRA.

Unarmed Security Liaisons

Inadditiontothearmedlocalteams,manyvesselschoosetohireanembarked,unarmedliaisontoprovideexpertiseandtohelpmanagetheembarkationoflocalteamsuponarrivalateachdestinationwithinthehighriskareasoffofTogo,Benin,andNigeria.OneortwoliaisonscomeaboardbeforeenteringtheWRAorduringaregionalportcall,inLomé forexample,andremainembarkedasthevesseltravelsamongvariousotherstopsthroughouttheregion,finallydisembarkingafteraperiodofuptoonemonthonthevessel.Theseunarmedsecurityadvisorsareusuallycontracted

5 “SecurityAlert–Nigeria,”BIMCO,16June2014,https://www.bimco.org/News/2014/06/16_Security_Alert_-_Nigeria.aspx?mobileToken=eOe7pBMM1LGb0DD5esXZ72b0DCd5VacibfkAD+DgqRY=%7C%7CLArE5EcvVQpkAkZVo7qi/SF5zDWn5zHggdk5cDSR/Ore4gbN3EhVEQ==&ResumePage=true.

6 Steffen,“TroubledWaters?”;DirkSteffen,“RisksinContractingGovernmentSecurityForcesintheGulfofGuinea,”CIMSEC,16September

2014,http://cimsec.org/troubled-waters-2-risks-contracting-government-security-forces-gulf-guinea/13016;RepublicoftheMarshallIslands,“UseofPrivatelyContractedArmedSecurityPersonnel(PCASP),”MarineNoticeNo.2-011-39,Rev.2/14,7,sect.7.3.1,available at http://www.ccs.org.cn/ccswz/font/fontAction!article.do?articleId=ff808081441f0f1e01446792ef770417.

7 Thisfigurewasdrawnfromextensiveinvestigationandconversationswithprofessionalsinvarioussectorsofthemaritimeindustry.

8 SeeAppendixHforinformationonhowthetransitnumberswerederived.

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throughalocallyregisteredinternationalprivatesecuritycompany,andoftenhaveexperienceservinginawesternmilitary.Theirpresenceissomewhatcontroversial,particularlyinNigeria,wherelocalofficialshavedetainedseveralsecurityadvisorsin2015,allegedlybasedonthesuspicionthattheymayhavecarriedweaponswithinterritorialwaters.Theseadvisorsareemployedatarateof56%–76%onvesselsemployingregionalarmedteams,varyingbasedonthestatewheretheportofcalltakesplace.Utilizingtheseratesweestimatethatunarmedsecurityadvisorswereusedon3,500to5,500transits.OBPcalculatesthatvesselsspent$56,000,000to$88,000,000onunarmedsecurityliaisons,inadditiontolocalarmedteams,in2014.9

International Security Teams

NotallmerchantvesselsintheGulfofGuineaoperateintheWRA;someonlypassthroughthesouthwestcorner,whileothersskirtitentirely.Assuch,thesevesselsfacealowerriskofpirateattack,andpresumablyhavealowerrateofemployingprivatearmedguardsforvesselsecurity,aratewhichweestimatetobearound10%.10Thisestimateindicatesthatbetween850and1,40011transitsin2014employedPCASPatacostofabout$20,000pertrip.12Wecalculatethattheadditionaltotalcostforprivatearmedguardsrangesfrom$16,950,000to$28,250,000.

AccordingtopolicystatementsfromNigeria,escortvesselsaretheonlyapprovedsecurityserviceallowedinterritorialwaters.PrivatecompaniessuchasOceanMarineSecurity(OMS),thecompanyadministeringtheNigeriansecurezones,regularlyescortsvesselstoandfrominternationalwaters,40nmout,tothesecurezonesbetweentheSecureAnchorageArea(SAA)andaberthinport,andbetweentheSAAandotherNigerianports.Thesearmedescortservicesareusedinlieuofarmedguards,andtendtocostmorepervessel,astheyarecoupledwiththeuseofsecureareas.OBPresearchindicatesthatover40vesselsareusedtoprovideescorts,conductpatrols,andpatrolsecureareas.Wefurtherestimatethatthesevesselsescortroughly1,100possibleshipsannually.13TwobasictypesofbluewaterescortservicesareprovidedbyOMSandsimilarcompanies:thoseoffofLagos,andthosebetweentheLagosSAAandotherNigerianportsintheNigerDeltaregion.

Lagos Security Escorts

OBPestimatesthat65%–85%ofvesselsusingtheSAAalsoemployanarmedescortbetween40nmout—internationalwaters—andthesecurearea,aswellasbetweentheSAAandtheport.Ofthosevesselsthatdonotutilizethesecurezones,OBPestimatedthat11%hireasecurityescort.ThecostperescortandthenumberofvesselshiringsecurityescortsaredisplayedinTable4below.

9 Wehaveprojectedthecostofunarmedliaisonsbasedona16-dayembarkationperiodandafeeof$1,000perday.

10 ThisestimateisbasedonconversationswithindustryprofessionalsandOBPresearch.Forthepurposesofthereport,weassess75%confidenceinthisrate,andhaveusedthelowandhighboundariesforouremploymentcalculations.

11 Thisnumberwasarrivedatbyusing31,100totalGulfofGuineatransitsless19,600WRAtransits,whichyields11,500non-WRAGoGtransits.Ofthese,10%areexpectedtohavecarriedPCASP.FormoreinformationonthevariousareasasdefinedforAISanalysisandtransitcalculationspleaseseeAppendixH.

12 Thisnumberisbasedona5-daytransitoftheGulfofGuineaanda$4,000dailyrate.

13 Weestimatethat1/3ofvesselswillbeoutofserviceforroutinemaintenanceandresupply,leaving28inservice.Ofthese,weestimatethatfourareemployedsecuringtheSAAandSTSZoneoffoftheLagosanchorage,sixareemployedinsecuringtheWarriandPortHarcourtdriftingareas,andeightareemployedinconductingpatrolsasindicatedbytheOMSPGSfootprint.Thisleavestenvesselsavailabletoconductescorts.

Total Cost of Security Escort Vessel Services$12 to $25 Million


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Table 4: Cost of Lagos Vessel Escort ServicesLagos Security Escorts Estimated Cost per Escort Number of Escorts40nmtoSAA $6,250 SAA Visits:40nmtoPilotStation $9,250 61340nmtoBerth $12,500 Lagos Port Visits:SAAtoPilotStation $4,500 2023SAAtoBerth $6,250 Total # of Vessels Employing a Security Escort:AverageCostperEscort $8,000 500* 744*Estimated Annual Cost of Lagos Escort Services $3,997,000 $5,949,000

*Based on OBP estimates that 65-85% of vessels employ Security Escorts for ports with SAAs and 5-11% for Non-SAA ports

Niger Delta Port Escort Services

InadditiontoescortstoandfromtheSAAoffofLagos,privatecompaniesalsooffervesselescortservicesfromLagostoriverineportswithintheNigerDeltaregion.Theseservicesaresignificantlymoreexpensive,rangingfrom$37,000to$64,000perescort.VerylittledataexistsregardingtherateofusefortheseservicesorthenumberofportcallstoWarri,Nigeria.OBPusedanestimatethat5%–11%oftankersover100minlengthcallingatOnneutilizethesecurityvesselescorts,andappliedthesamenumbertovesselscallingatWarri.TheseestimatesaredisplayedinTable5below.

Table 5: Cost of Delta Port Vessel Escort ServicesDelta Port Escort Services Cost Estimated Port Visits Using EscortsLagostoWarri $37,500 86 188WarritoOnne $56,000 21 47LagostoOnne $64,000 64 141Estimated Annual Cost of Delta Port Escort Services $8,517,000 $18,738,000

Inall,OBPestimatesthatsecurityvesselsescortedover900individualvesselsinNigeria.Someofthemorevaluablevesselswouldemploymorethanoneescortship,whilesomeoftheseescortmissionswouldhavelastedlongerthanaday,inparticularthoseinvolvingtheescortofavesselfromtheLagosSAAtoOnne,nearPortHarcourt,adistanceofnearly300nm.

Key Findings:

• Between4,500and5,000vesselspaidanestimated$18–$20milliontousesecureanchorageareas inNigeriain2014.

GulfofGuinealittoralstateshavetakenadditionalstepstoincreasemaritimesecuritywhilemaintainingtheirprohibitiononprivateguards.Mostnotably,Ghana,Togo,Benin,andNigeriahaveeachestablished“securezones”nearmajorports.14Theseareclearlydemarcatedareaswherevesselscansafelyanchortowaitforaberthorconductship-to-shipcargotransfers.Thissafetyisachievedwitharmedpatrolvessels.InNigeria,aprivatecompanyprovidesthephysicalships,maintenance,andlogistics,andperformsallschedulingandbillingofclients,whilethearmedforcessupplythepersonnelandweaponry.InTogo,Benin,Ghana,andCôted’Ivoire,thenaviesprovidepatrolvessels.Thecostassociated

14 RiskIntelligence,SecurityReport,Rev.5,1November2014(onfilewithauthor).

Total Cost of Secure Zones$18 to $20 Million

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withtheNigerianSAAandtheSTSZone–theonlysecurezonesforwhichwewereabletocalculatefees—isestimatedtobebetween$17,970,000and$19,869,000.

Navalvesselsarenotpresentinalloftheareasallofthetime,afactwhichmayexplaininpartthehighlydisparateusageratesfromzonetozone.Nonetheless,AISobservationsdemonstratethezones’perceivedvalue,withseveralareascontaininghalfadozenormorevesselsatanygiventime.Thesafetyrecordoftheseareas,whilenotwhollyunblemished,supportstheideathatvesselsinthezonesarelesssusceptibletoattackthanvesselsoutside.Forexample,administratorsoftheLagossecureanchorageareaclaimeditsawzerosuccessfulattacksfromMay2013toJune2014.15

Table 6: Cost of Secure AreasVessels 120-200m long Low Estimate (Based on Available data) High Estimate (Based on Available data)

Country Zone Annual Visits

Visit Cost Annual Cost Annual Visits

Cost Per Visit Visit Cost

Nigeria SecureAnchorageArea(SAA) 582 $10,500 $6,111,000 644 $10,500 $6,762,000STSZone 3,953 $3,000 $11,859,000 4369 $3,000 $13,107,000OtherAreas 6,100 N/A N/A 6081 N/A N/A

Benin SecureZones 600 N/A N/A 570 N/A N/ATogo SecureZones 4,600 N/A N/A 4,555 N/A N/AGhana STSZone&AnchorageArea 630 N/A N/A 628 N/A N/ATotal 16,369 $6,800.00 $17,970,000 19,660 $6,800.00 $19,869,000

Inadditiontotheareaslistedabove,OBPisawareofdriftingareasoffofWarriandPortHarcourtadministeredbyprivatecompanies,andanewsecurezoneoffofCôted’Ivoire,similartothesecurezonesandanchorageareasinBenin,Togo,andGhana,whichareadministeredbytheOMAGroup.16Weestimatethatatleasttensecurityescortvesselsareemployed.Thesethreeadditionalsecureareasarenotincludedinourcostcalculations,aswewereunabletoobtainanyestimatesofthenumberofvesselsthatutilizethem.

MARITIME SECURITY SCENARIOS

TheuseofmaritimesecurityservicesinWestAfricaiscomplexandinvolvesseveraldifferentcombinationsincludingtheemploymentofarmedguards(bothregionalandinternational),unarmedsecurityliaisons,escortvessels,andsecureareasthatvaryfromcountrytocountry.Whiletherearenumerouscombinationsoftheseservicesthatcouldbeemployed,wehaveusedthefollowingfourlikelytransitscenariosinordertocalculatetheestimatedcostsofmaritimesecurityforcesintheGulfofGuinea:

SCENARIO 1: Unarmed Security Liaison w/ Embarked Regional Security TeamsInScenario1,acargovesselintheGulfofGuineaisscheduledforaregionaltransitfromaportinCountryAtoaportinCountryB.Thevesselemploysanunarmedsecurityliasonfortheentiretyofthattransitwhichis14days.ARegionalSecurityTeamisalsoemployedwhilethevesseltransitsthroughCountryA’sterritorialwaters.OncethevesseltransitionsintoCountryB’sterritorialwaterstheRegionalSecurityTeamfromCountryAisreplacedbyaRegionalSecurityTeamfromCountryB.SecurityTeamBisemployedforthedurationofthetripthroughCountryB’sterritorialwaters.

15 “TheLagosSAA–100%Bulletproof,”World Maritime News,5June2014,http://worldmaritimenews.com/archives/126064/the-lagos-saa-100-bulletproof/.

16 “AboutOMA,”OMA,http://www.omagroup-wa.com/about-oma/(accessedMay8,2015).Thoughsomecostsareassociatedwiththeseareas,wedidnothavesufficientinformationtogenerateanestimate.


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SCENARIO 2: Embarked Regional Security Teams with No Security LiaisonSameasScenario1,butwithouttheemploymentoftheSecurityLiaison.

SCENARIO 3: Secure Anchorage Area and Security EscortInScenario3,thevesselgoesonthesame14daytransitasScenarios1&2.InsteadofemployingaSecurityLiaisonoranArmedRegionalSecurityTeam,ittransitsthroughCountryA’sterritorialwatersandintointernationalwatersonlyutilizingBMP.Onceitreachesadesignatedpoint40NMfromCountryB’sport,thevesselemploysanescortboattoaccompanyittotheSafeAnchorageArea(SAA).ThevesselremainsintheSAAawaitingberthfor5days.Oncethevesselisclearedforberth,itisagainaccompaniedbytheescortboatonitswaytoport.

SCENARIO 4: International Security Team (Armed)InScenario4,aninternationalsecurityteamisemployedforthedurationofthevessel’stransit.Theaveragetransitusinganinternationalsecurityteamis5days.ThedifficultywithemployinginternationalsecurityteamsintheGulfofGuineaisthatallcountriesintheregionprohibittheuseofarmedinternationalteamsintheirterritorialwaters.Inthiscase,thesecurityteammustdisarm(lockuptheirweapons)whiletransitingoutofCountryA’sterritorialwaters,re-armwhileinInternationalWaters,andagaindisarmwhenenteringCountryB’sterritorialwaters.

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Key Findings:

• MostvesselsintheGulfofGuineaarepresumedtohavebeenoutfittedwithvesselhardening measurespriorto2014.

• ReplacementorrefittingofsecurityequipmentaboardshipsintheGulfofGuineaisestimatedtohave costbetween$3.3and$8.8millionin2014.

Itisrecommendedthatforsuggestedplanningandoperationalpractices,includingthedeploymentofShipProtectionMeasures(SPMs),vesselsintheGulfofGuineautilizethe“Guidelines for Owners, Operators, and Masters for Protection against Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea Region” (TheGuidelines)inconjunctionwithBMP4.17

TheGuidelineslayoutafewsuggestionsinparticulartofacilitateasecuretransit,including:

1) Reporting movements to the Maritime Trade Information Sharing Center-GoG (MTISC) while in its Voluntary Reporting Area.

2) Reporting incidents to Regional Maritime Rescue Coordination Centers, the IMB, and/or other regional and national information-sharing and maritime situational awareness agencies (ICC, the Regional Center for Maritime Security in Central Africa, etc.).

3) Implementing SPMs such as watch-keeping and enhanced vigilance, enhanced bridge protection, physical barriers (for example razor or barbed wire, electrified barriers), water spray and foam monitors, and citadels.

4) Switching off or powering down AIS and limiting the use of lighting at night, as pirates use these mechanisms to identify vessels. AIS must be switched on immediately if the vessel is boarded.18

17 “GuidelinesforOwners,Operators,andMastersforProtectionfromPiracyintheGulfofGuineaRegion,”UK War Risks,17October2014,1,http://www.ukwarrisks.com/fileadmin/uploads/uk-war/Docs/News_etc/PiracyGulfGuinea_October_2014.pdf.Theintroductionexplainsthat,“AlthoughpiracyintheGulfofGuinearegioninmanywaysdiffersfromthatofSomalia-basedpiracy,largesectionsoftheBestManagementPracticesalreadydevelopedbyindustrytohelpprotectagainstSomalia-basedpiracyarealsovalidintheGulfofGuinearegion.Consequently,theseGuidelinesaimtobridgethegapbetweentheadvicecurrentlyfoundinBMP4andtheprevailingsituationintheGulfofGuinearegion.TheseGuidelinesshouldthereforebereadinconjunctionwithBMP4andwillmakereferencetoBMP4whererelevant.”

18 Ibid.

Total Cost of Security Equipment$3 to $9 Million


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ThenumberandtypeofSPMsavesselshouldimplementwillvaryfromshiptoship,andshouldbebasedonanindividualriskassessment,takingintoaccounttheroute,heightoffreeboard,andanyotherfactorswhichmightaffectthevessel’sindividualriskprofile.Thisyear,forillustrativepurposes,wehavecompiledalistofsomeofthemorefrequentlyrecommendedandusedSPMstoshowtheestimatedaverageacquisitionandimplementationcostpervessel.

Table 7: Cost, Units Per Ship, and Lifespan of SPMs192021

Type of SPM Unit Cost Units Per Ship Estimated SPM LifespanRazorWire20 $4/meter 550meters-1500meters(singletotriplelayers) 2yearsSandbags21 $1/bag 550 6-12monthsWarningSigns $140/sign 3 1-2years

PiracyhasbeenanacknowledgedhazardatfairlyconsistentlevelsintheGulfofGuineaforyears.Assuch,wepresumethatshipownerswhowantedtoinstallandimplementSPMsontheirvesselshadalreadydonesopriorto2014forexistingvesselsintheirfleet.Becausemostequipmentwouldlastforayearormore,onlyasmallfractionofSPMswouldhavebeenreplacedin2014.OBPestimatesthecostofsecurityequipmenttobebetween$3,312,000and$8,835,000.22

OTHER INDUSTRY COSTS (Cargo Theft, Stolen Goods, Ransoms, Insurance, and Labor) $136,385,000 - $138,671,000 Inadditiontovesselprotectivemeasures,shippersbearotherdirectandindirectcostsasaresultofpiracy.UnliketheSomalipiracymodel,GoGpiracyinvolvessignificantlevelsofcargotheftandrobbery,addingaseparatecategoryofeconomiccostsbornebyboththeshippingindustryandtheseafarersaboardpiratedvessels.Othercostsincludingransompayments,WarRiskinsuranceaddedpremiums,KidnapandRansominsurance,hazardpayforseafarers,andcaptivitypayowedhostages.Altogether,theseareestimatedtohavecostasmuchas$138.7millionin2014.

Key Findings:

• Between$11.5and$13millionworthofpetroleumproductwasstolenin2014.

19 Inpastreportswehavelistedlong-rangeacousticdevices(LRADs),electrifiedbarriers,andspecializedwater/foammonitors.However,asthesearelesscommonlyused(accordingtotheLRADCorporation,thecostofanLRADcounter-piracysystemrangesfrom$65,000-$75,000dependingontheacousticdevicemodels,andover65vesselshavebeenoutfitted),wehavedecidednottoincludetheminourlistofSPMsforthisyear’sreport,astheyarenotlikelytomakeupasignificantpercentageofestimatedSPMcostsfor2014.

20 Thisisbasedontheavailableonlinewholesalepriceof$3.55permeterofgalvanizedconcertinarazorwireandanaveragevessellengthof

230metersandwidthof35meters,whichisequalto530metersofrazorwiretocovertheentireexteriorofthevessel.

21 TheestimatednumberofsandbagsisbasedonareasonableestimationofthenumberofsandbagsrequiredtoconstructthreePCASPfiringpositions.

22 Thisestimateispredicateduponanestimated5,800–6,000individualvesselsoperatingintheGulfofGuineaandausagerateforrazorwire,warningsigns,andsandbagsof80%,asintheWIOR.Thecalculationfurtherassumesthatone-quarterofthesevesselsrefittedin2014,whichyieldsatotalcostbetween$3,311,800and$8,835,000.

Total Cost of Cargo (Oil) Theft$12 to $13 Million

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WestAfricanpiracyhasthreedistinct,butoftenoverlappingmodels:OilTheft,Robbery,andKidnapforRansom.Inthissectionwefocusonanalyzingcostsrelatedtooiltheft.OBPestimatestotallossesduetooilcargothefttobebetween$11,519,000and$13,038,000.

Oil Bunkering vs. Oil Theft

ItisimportanttonotethedifferencebetweenoilbunkeringincidentsinNigeriaandoiltheftfromcargoships.Inbunkeringincidentsonshore,thesuspectstypicallytapintotheoilpipelinesrunningthroughoutNigeriaandillegallytransferthestolengoodsontoships.Inpiracyincidents,theshipsarehijackedandthentheiroilcargoistransferredtoothershipstobefurtherdistributed.AccordingtoNigerianChiefofNavalStaffUsmanJibrin,thecountrylosesapproximately$2billiontooilthefteachyearbetweenland-basedbunkeringandpirateactivity.

Source:ISSAfrica.23

AnincidentonMTKeralatypifiesaroutineoilthefteventinWestAfricaandhighlightsthegrowingconcernofoilsiphoningintheregion.MT KeralawashijackedJanuary18th,2014,whileunderway,approximately15nauticalmilesoffthecoastofLuanda,Angola.Piratespaintedoverthevessel’sidentifyingfeatures,includingthefunnelcolor,theIMOnumber,andthename(makingitEralinsteadofKerala).ThevesselreappearedJanuary26thoffthecoastofNigeriamissingnearly12,300metrictonsofcargo.Itwaslaterdiscoveredthatthepirateshadmadethreeseparateoiltransferswhileincontrolofthevessel.24ThisattackisparticularlysignificantasitindicatesthecontinuingexpansionofoiltheftfromNigerianwaterstoalargergeographicarea.

OBP’sdatasetindicatesthat11tankersweresuccessfullyhijackedin2014,withfourtankersandonefishingvesselhavingatleastpart,ifnotall,oftheiroilstolen.Whileinthepastoilsiphoningfocusedalmostexclusivelyonrefinedproduct,nearlyhalfofthecargosiphoningincidentsin2014involvedcrudeoiltheft.OBPestimatesthatbetween$11.5and$13millionworthofoilwasstolenoffofvesselsthisyear.

Table 8: Cost of Cargo (Oil) Theft in 201425 26

Vessel Name Vessel Length Area of Operation Type of Product Amount Stolen Total CostMTKerala 228m International/GoG to US Diesel 12,271 mt $8,000,000MTFairArtemis 90-135m Coastal/GoG regional Crude 3,500 mt $2,709,200MTHaiSoon6 135m Coastal/Lomé to Lagos route MGO or MDO 808-2424 mt $759,500 - $2,278,60025

MT Strider 118m Coastal/Lagos to Port Harcourt Crude 38 bbls $3,100FVMarine711 49.25m Fishing Vessel MGO or MDO 50 mt $46,700TotalCostofCargo(Oil)Theft26 $11,519,000 - $13,038,000

23 “ISS:AHugeStepForwardinTacklingPiracyintheGulfofGuinea,”Institute For Security Studies,13March2015,http://www.issafrica.org/iss-today/a-huge-step-forward-in-tackling-piracy-in-the-gulf-of-guinea.

24 “LiberianRegistryConcludesKeralaHijackingInvestigation,”gCaptain,29May2014,http://gcaptain.com/liberian-registry-concludes-kerala-hijacking-investigation/.

25 TherewerenoreportsonhowmuchwasstolenoffMTHaiSoon6.However,itisknownthevesselwasattackedwhilerefuelinganothervesselandMTHaiSoon6isa3,232-tonnetanker.Withthatknowledge,OBPdeducedthatapproximately25%-75%ofherfuelwaslikelysiphonedbythepiratesbeforetheyfled.

26 NotincludedinourcountisafailedattempttosiphonoilfromSPBrusselsinwhichpiratestookoverthevesselandstartedashootoutwithlocalpolicewhileattemptingtosailthevesselawaytooffloaditscargo.Twopiratesdiedintheattemptedhijacking,whiletheremainingpiratesfledthesceneofthecrime.


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Key Findings:

• Sincebothshippropertyandpersonaleffectsaretargetedforrobberybypirates,seafarersbeara significantcostassociatedwiththiscrime,asanestimated$124,000to$156,000worthoftheirproperty wasstolenin2014.

• Robberyappearstobeasecondarypriorityinmanyinstances;piratesmightrobthecrewandship’sstoresafterdiscoveringthatatanker’sproductisunsuitablefortheft.

Thoughincidentsinvolvingtheactualorattemptedtheftofpetroleumproductsoftenalsoinvolvetherobberyandtheftofpersonaleffects,aswellasshipstoresandequipment,robberyatseaisapiratebusinessmodelinitsownright,withrobberiesmakingup50%ofsuccessfulattacks.Piratesstealthecrew’spersonalbelongingsandraidtheship’sstoresandbridgestotakewhatevertheycan.OBPestimatesthatbetween$364,000and$1,131,000worthofshipstores,equipment,andpersonaleffectswerestolenbypiratesin2014.27

Robberyisbrokenintotwocategories:thefirstisthetakingofshipstoresandequipment,suchaspaint,mooringlines,andnavigationandcommunicationsequipment;thesecondistherobberyofthecrew’spersonaleffects.Elevenattacksin2014involvedrobberyofvesselproperty.Whiletheships’cargo,equipment,andstoresrepresentthemajorityofthelossesduetopiraterobberies,thelossofpersonalbelongingsalsohasaprofoundimpact.Seafarerspacklightlyandliveoutoftheirbags,takingonlytheirmostvaluableandpreciousbelongingswiththemoneachnewvessel.Thelossofcellphones,wallets,personaldocuments,cash,electronics,andthelikeisnotamereinconvenience.Rather,acellphoneorlaptopmaybemuchmorevaluableasaconnectiontohome,containingpicturesoflovedonesandenablingcommunication.Thelossindollarsissignificant,butthetrueimpactonseafarersismuchhardertomeasure.

Table 9: Cost of Stolen GoodsCategory of Goods Cost Estimate, Low Cost Estimate, HighShipStoresandEquipment $260,000 $975,000PersonalEffects $124,000 $156,000Total $364,000 $1,131,000

Ship Stores and Equipment

Weestimatethatthereisapproximately$100,000to$250,000worthofshipstoresandequipmentonboardtheaveragevessel.OBPanalysisindicatesatypicalpirateattackinvolvesthetheftof20%–30%ofthenetworthofshipstoresandequipment.Manyrobberiesfocusonstealingmooringlines,paint,andliferaftsbecausemostexpensiveitemsintheshipstoresarelargeandimmovablewithoutconsiderableassistance,andmanytimesthecriminalsareonlyabletostealasmallsetofitemsbeforetheyarenoticedbythecrew.Thisresultsinanestimateofbetween$20,000and$75,000worthofshipstoresstoleninanaveragerobbery,andatotalof$260,000–$975,000stoleninthe13robberyincidentsinvolvingtheftofshipstoresandequipmentin2014.

27 Althoughtheexactvalueofstolengoodsisdifficulttoascertain,ouranalysisisbasedonthebestavailableinformationavailablefromincidentreportsandopen-sourceresearch.

Total Cost of Stolen Goods$364,000 to $1 Million

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Personal Effects

OBPnoted12incidentsinvolvingrobberyofpersonaleffectsin2014.Theseincidentsareexploredseparatelyfromvesselpropertytheftduetowhobearsthecost.Theftofcreweffectsdisproportionatelyimpactstheindividualseafarers;oftenpiratesstealtheircomputers,phones,wallets,orjewelry.Whilerobberyofaship’sstoresimpactsthecompany,theftofpersonaleffectshasasignificantemotionalandfinancialimpactonanindividualseafarer.OBPestimatesthatthestolencrewbelongingsfromonemanifesttotaledaround$13,500invalue.However,giventhatthisvaluewillvarysignificantlybyvesselandcrewsize,wehaveusedarangeof20%higherandlowerthanthisvalueinourcalculations.Additionally,weapproximatedthatpiratesareabletosteal80%ofthecrew’sbelongingsinarobberyincident.Thesefiguresindicatethatseafarersarerobbedof$8,640to$12,960worthofpersonaleffectsperincident.28Thisbringstheestimatedtotalvalueofpersonaleffectsstolenfromcrewsin2014tobetween$104,000and$156,000.

Key Findings:

• Thoughdataonransomsissparse,OBPestimates$1,680,000waspaidoutin2014.

• Ransomamountsappeartovarybaseduponthenationalityofthehostages,rangingbetween $30,000and$100,000.

Estimatingkidnap-for-ransomactivityintheGulfofGuineaisparticularlychallengingduetothehighlyconfidentialandsensitivenatureofthisinformation.Whilethepracticeofabductingandransomingseafarersislongstandingintheregion,boththepiratesdoingthekidnappingandthecompaniespayingtheransomshavetheirownincentivestoavoiddrawingattentiontothetransactions.Forpirates,publicattentionmayleadtomoreaggressivelawenforcementaction.Forshippingcompanies,negotiators,andinsurancecompanies,publicizedransompaymentscanresultinhigherransomdemands,whichservetoincreasecostsandprolongnegotiations,tothedetrimentofthehostages.29

Consequently,kidnappingincidentsoftenarenotpubliclyacknowledgedorreported;specificransomamountspaidaremorecloselyguardedstill.AsalludedtointhediscussionofWestAfricanpiracybusinessmodels,evenwhenashipishijackedanditscrewisheldcaptiveonboard—sometimesfordays—theirconfinementmaybeincidentaltothepirates’aimofstealingpersonaleffects,shipstores,orthemaincargo.Incontrast,piratesintendingtokidnapcrewforransomwillgenerallymovehostagesonshoreinordertonegotiate.Thissectionconsidersonlythelatterscenario.However,forcompleteness,AppendixGincludesallhostage-takingincidentswithinourpirateattackdataset.OBPestimatesthat2014sawtenconfirmedkidnapping-for-ransomincidentsintheGulfofGuinea,ofwhicheightappeartohavebeensuccessful.ThesearelistedinTable10below.

28 Thisisconsistentwiththe2013UNODCreportonorganizedcrimeinWestAfrica,whichestimatesthatpiratesstealbetween$10,000and$15,000perattack.NeilFord,“TransnationalOrganizedCrimeinWestAfrica:AThreatAssessment,”UnitedNationsOfficeonDrugsandCrime,February2013,51,http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/tocta/West_Africa_TOCTA_2013_EN.pdf.

29 Inpastreportswehavenotincludedthecostofransomsinthefinalcosttally.However,becauseoftheopacityoftheprocess,itisnotclearhowmanyofthesevesselshadK&Rinsurance—ourestimatesindicatethatonlyabout25%ofalltraffichasaK&Rpolicy—andassuchwehaveincludedthiscostinouroverallcostestimate.

Total Cost of Ransoms & Associated Payments$1.7 Million


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Table 10: Estimated Ransoms Paid in 2014Vessel Name (Type) Attack Date Hostages (Nationality) Estimated Ransom

AmountsUnknown(Tug) 26-Jan-14 2-Captain,Engineer(bothNigerian) $60,000CeeJay(OffshoreSupplyVessel) 29-Jan-14 2-Captain,ChiefEngineer(bothunknown) $200,000MarinerSea(OffshoreSupplyVessel) 06-Feb-14 2-Captain,ChiefEngineer(bothunknown) $200,000PrinceJoseph1(OffshoreSupplyVessel) 04-Mar-14 3-Captain(unknown),ChiefEngineer

(Panamanian),ChiefOfficer(Nigerian)$230,000

PrimeLady(OffshoreSupplyVessel) 06-Mar-14 3-Captain,Crewman,Crewman(allunknown) $230,000Unknown(Tanker) 12-Apr-14 2-Captain,ChiefEngineer(bothunknown) $200,000Unknown(OffshoreSupplyVessel) 18-Sep-14 5-Captain,TraineeCaptain,ChiefEngineer,

Electrician,Crewman(allunknown)$360,000

Basat(Tanker) 05-Nov-14 2-Crewman,Crewman(bothTurkish) $200,000

Inthecourseoftheseattacks,weestimatethat27seafarerswereabductedand21weresuccessfullyransomed.30Anumberofsecurityfirmsandcommentatorshavesuggestedthatkidnappersareoftentargetingofficers,particularlycaptainsandchiefengineers.31Indeed,nineofthetengroupsofhostagesincludedthevesselmaster.32Thispatternisattributedtothefactthatseniorofficersaremorelikelytobefromoutsidetheregion,andthusfetchahigherransom.33Itisdifficulttoestablishprecisevalues,butOBPresearchindicatesanaverageransomofbetween$30,000and$100,000perpersonisgenerallypaid.34Incombinationwiththeincidentdata,thesefiguressuggestthatpiratesextractedapproximately$1,680,000inransomsduring2014.35

Key Findings:

• $41millionwaspaidininsurancepremiumsrelatedtopiracyintheGoGregionfor2014.

• ThoughHullWarRiskinsurancepremiumshavedropped,K&Rinsurancecostshaveremainedfairlystable.

30 Inbothoftheunsuccessfulattempts,allhostagesweresafelyrescuedbygovernmentforcesbeforethepiratescouldsecurearansomfortheirrelease.

31 DavidRider,“WestAfrica:KidnappersTargetingCaptainsandChiefEngineers,”Maritime Security News,2February2014,https://maritimesecuritynews.wordpress.com/2014/02/12/west-africa-kidnappers-targeting-captains-and-chief-engineers/.

32 AppendixGincludesonaper-incidentbasisallavailableinformationregardingthecompositionofthehostages.

33 “SurgeinGulfofGuinea:KidnapIncidents,”Maritime Executive,7March2014,http://www.maritime-executive.com/article/Surge-in-Gulf-of-Guinea-Kidnap-Incidents-2014-03-07.

34 TheCatlinGroupestimatesthattheaverageransompaymentis$83,000.TheCatlinGroup,Dangerous Waters: A Catlin

Group Limited Guide to Kidnap and Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea(London:TheCatlinGroup,May2014),14,https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=6&ved=0CDQQFjAF&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.catlin.com%2Fflipbook%2Fpiracy-flipbook%2Ffiles%2Finc%2Ff8276c08a7.pdf&ei=aGNTVZO2LtDEogTmyICoCg&usg=AFQjCNGtNCglCa_Zx8nRpnqEYiIHPuSw8w&sig2=SRBpm47DG9PsZp1vqO72vA&bvm=bv.93112503,d.aWw&cad=rja.

35 Thisfigurewascalculatedusingtherateof$30,000forseafarersfromGulfofGuineacountriesand$100,000foreveryoneelse.Incaseswhere

hostagenationalitywasnotknown,seniorofficerswereassumedtobelongtothelattergroup,whileallothercrewwereassumedtobelocals.

Total Cost of Insurance$41.2 Million

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OBPestimatesthetotaladditionalpiracy-relatedinsurancecostsincurredbyvesselowners,charterers,andmanagersoperatingintheGulfofGuineatobeapproximately$41,178,000.Similartopastreports,thisreportassessesthiscostbasedontwotypesofcoverage,WarRiskinsuranceandKidnapandRansominsurance.

War Risk insurance: MostcommercialshipoperatorsacquireannualHullWarRiskinsurance,whichinsuresthephysicalvesselitselfagainstdamageorlossduetoactsofwar,invasion,insurrectionandotherinterventionsbyaforeigncountry,aswellaspiracy.36However,thistypeofpolicytypicallyexcludesfromcoverageseveralespeciallyhazardousregions,knownas“WarRiskAreas”(WRAs).37Theseareasareclearlydemarcatedwithineachpolicy,themajorityofwhichrefertothosedefinedas“listedareas”bytheJointWarCommittee(JWC),38thoughthereisnoglobalauthoritytodeterminetheseareasandunderwritersmaychoosetodefineotherareasattheirdiscretion.InordertomaintaincoveragewhiletransitingaWRA,ashipoperatormustinformtheinsurerofthevessel’spassageinadvance,atwhichpointtheymaybechargedanadditional“breachpremium”or“WarRiskAddedPremium”(WRAP)forthespecifictransit.TheJWCWRArelatedtothethreatofpiracyandarmedrobberyagainstshipsinWestAfricaremainedunchangedin2014andisshowninFigure1.39

Figure 1: Joint War Committee (JWC) War Risk Area (WRA)

Kidnap and Ransom (K&R) insurance: Thistypeofinsurancepolicyspecificallycoversthepaymentofransom40toensurethereleaseofcrewmemberstakenhostage.Additionally,K&Rpoliciesmaycoverrelatedcosts,suchasin-transitlossofransommoney,crisisconsultants,legalliabilities,andadditionalexpensesincluding,butnotlimitedto,deathandinjurytocrewmembers,aswellasrehabilitationcosts.41

36 “Warrisks”areusuallyexcludedfromnormalHullorHull&Machinerypolicies.Additionally,WarRiskpoliciesmayreimbursesomecostsassociatedwithrecoveryofavessel,cargo,andcrewfollowingasuccessfulpirateattack.Formoreinformation,seeJonathanS.Spencer,“Piracy,WarRisk&GeneralAverage”(presentation,NewYorkMarineInsuranceDay,September30,2011),http://www.aimuedu.org/aimupapers/PiracyWarRiskandGeneralAverage.pptx.pdf.

37 Alsoknownas“additionalpremiumareas,”“listedareas,”or“breachareas”.

38 JimMulrenan,“HellenicWarRisksClubSlashesAnnualPremiums,”Tradewinds,5December2014.

39 TheJointWarCommitteedefinestheGoGListedAreaasthecoastalwatersupto12nauticalmilesoffshoreofBenin,Nigeria,andTogo,andextendsintotheGulfofGuinea,butonlyincludesthewatersofTogo’s,Benin’s,andNigeria’sExclusiveEconomicZonesnorthoflatitude3°North.“HullWar,Piracy,TerrorismandRelatedPerilListedAreas,”JointWarCommittee,JWLA/021,12June2013,available athttp://www.lmalloyds.com/IMIS15/CMDownload.aspx?ContentKey=dfa8eb7f-0832-4bf9-a18e-7bf7f7c87ceb&ContentItemKey=8a6b56bc-7b03-4370-8ad5-2f31e7f2f8de.

40 Tobeprecise,K&Rpoliciesareindemnitypolicies,meaningthattheywillreimburseaspecifictypeofloss.Inthiscase,thatmeansthatthe

shipoperatorfirstpaystheransom,andthenmakesaninsuranceclaimontheloss.

41 “MarineKidnapforRansomandHijack(K&R)Insurance,”TheSwedishClub,http://www.swedishclub.com/upload/174/marien%20kidnap%20for%20ransom%20%28k&r%29%20&%20hijack%20insurance-2014-03.pdf.


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Cost of War Risk Insurance

Thetotalcosttoowners,charterers,andvesselmanagersofpiracy-relatedmaritimeinsuranceproductsremainsdifficulttoassessduetothemultiplerebatesanddiscountsonoffer,42thelackofpubliclyavailablemarketdata,andthefactthatwhatdataisavailabledoesnotsortWRAPsbyindividualWRA.Atthetimeofthiswriting,2014marketdatawasnotyetavailable.However,usingdatareleasedbytheHellenicWarRisksClub(HWR)for2013,43itispossibletoextrapolateandestimatethetotalamountofaddedpremiums(WRAPs)disbursedforWarRiskinsuranceoffWestAfricain2014.

GiventhetotalamountofbreachpremiumspaidbyHWRmembers,thepercentageofWRAPtransitsdeclaredthroughtheGulfofGuineaWRA,andthetotalmarketsharecontrolledbytheHWR,OBPcalculatedthetotalcostofinsuringpassagesthroughtheGoGWRAforallvesselswasapproximately$32,687,000in2013.AfulldescriptionoftheprocessforextrapolatingthiscostisfoundinAppendixI.

EarlyannouncementsfromboththeHWRandtheUKMutualWarRisksAssociationindicatedthatannualwarriskpremiumsdecreasedin2014.44WhileannualpremiumsaredifferentfromtheWRAPsdiscussedabove,thecontinueddecreaseinthenumberofpirateattacksinWestAfricaandincreasedcompetitioninthemarineinsurancemarket45indicatetheWRAPsassociatedwithWarRiskinsurancedeclinedaswell.However,thecontinuedhighlevelofcriminalactivityintheGulfofGuineahasledtolowerestimatedcostreductionsinthislocationascomparedtotheGulfofAdenandIndianOceanregions.Basedonthesefactors,OBPestimatesa10%percentreductioninthecostofWarRiskinsuranceattributabletopiracyandarmedrobberyintheGulfofGuinea,resultinginanestimatedtotalcostof$29,418,000in2014.

Table 11: Cost of War Risk InsuranceEstimated 2013 Total War Risk Added Premiums in GoG

Estimated Decrease in 2014 GoG War Risk Added Premiums

Estimated Total 2014 War Risk Added Premiums in GoG (USD)

$32,687,000 10% $29,418,000

Cost of K&R Insurance

InadditiontotheWarRiskinsurancepremiums,asignificantnumberofvesseloperatorstakeoutKidnapandRansominsuranceasadditionalprotectionforthevessel’screw.AswithWarRiskinsurance,thereislittlepubliclyavailabledatatofacilitateestimationofK&RinsurancepolicycostsrelatedtopiracyintheGoG.Toovercomethisinformationdeficit,OBPuseddatafrominterviewswithmaritimeinsuranceexpertstogaugetherateofuseofthesepoliciesandthecostpertransit.ThetotalcostwasthenmeasuredagainstanassessmentoftheglobalK&Rmarkettocheckforaccuracy.AfullexplanationofhowthesizeoftheglobalK&RmarketwasassessedisfoundinAppendixI.

GiventhatWestAfricaremainsasignificantglobalhotspotforkidnapping,andthatitrepresentsthelargestnumberofkidnappingsforransominglobalpiracyfor2014,weanticipatedthattheGoGmarineK&Rmarketsharewouldbe

42 Discountsforthesepoliciesincludeno-claimsbonuses,repeatvoyages,adherencetoBMP4,embarkedsecurityteams(armedorunarmed),andwhetherornotcomplementaryinsurancepolicieshavebeenpurchased.Totaldiscountscanbeupto90%oftheinitiallyquotedprice,accordingtoLloyd’sMarketAssociation.

43 WarRiskClubsaremutualclubswhere,traditionally,membershipwasbasedonaffiliationwiththecountryinquestion.Forexample,theHWRiscenteredontheGreekshippingcommunity,andtheNorwegianAssociationisopentocompanieswithintheNorwegianShippingCommunity.Otherclubs,suchastheUKClub,wereinitiallyopenonlyfornationally-flaggedvessels,butnowallowafullyinternationalmembership.

44 TheUKMutualWarRisksAssociationannounceda20%reductionin2014annualratesforitsmembers,whiletheHWRreducedannualpremiumsto45%.Inlate2014,bothclubsannouncedfurtherreductionsforthe2015year.See, e.g.,JimMulrenan,“UKMutualSlashesWarRatesfor2015Renewal,”Tradewinds,23January2015;JimMulrenan,“HellenicWarRisksClubSlashesAnnualPremiums,”Tradewinds,5December2014.

45 JudyGreenwald,“MarineInsuranceMarketRemainsCompetitiveDuetoAmpleCapacity,”Business Insurance,14September2014,http://www.businessinsurance.com/article/20140914/NEWS07/309149992.

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around5%oftheglobaltotal.46Basedoninterviewswithexpertsfromthemarineinsurancesector,weestimatethatin2014approximately25%ofallvesselstransitingthroughtheWRAboughtK&Rinsuranceatanaveragecostof$2,400pertransit,whichtotalsanestimated$11,760,000;afigureroughlyconsistentwitha4%–5%marketshareoftheglobalK&Rmarket.

Table 12: Cost of K&R Insurance in 2014Number of Transits Estimated Percentage of Transits

Buying K&R InsuranceAverage Cost Per Transit

Total Cost of K&R Insurance in the WIOR

19,600 25% $2,400 $11,760,000

Key Findings:

• AlackofseafareradvocacyresourcesforlocalseafarersandalackofinformationsurroundingthelengthofcaptivityforhostagesintheGoGmakeitimpossibletotracktheprovisionofpaymentsowedtoWestAfricanseafarers.

• OBPestimatesthatatleast$81,644,000wasowedtoseafarersforpiracyhazardsfacedwhileconductingtheirjobsintheGulfofGuinea.

Table 13: Cost of LaborTotalHazardPayEstimate $81,548,000TotalCaptivityPayEstimate $96,000Total Labor Costs $81,644,000

ThetotalestimatedcostofadditionallaborpaymentsdirectlyattributabletopiracyandmaritimecrimeoffWestAfricain2014totaled$81,644,000.Additionallaborcostsarepaidtoseafarersinrecognitionofthedangerstheyfaceinpiracyriskareas.Theseadditionalpaymentsaregenerallyclassifiedintotwotypes:hazardpayandcaptivitypay.

Hazard payistheadditionalsalarybonusseafarersshouldbepaid—regardlessofwhetherornottheirvesselisattackedbypirates—whiletransitingareassuchastheInternationalBargainingForumHighRiskArea(IBFHRA)intheGulfofGuinea,asdesignatedbytheInternationalTransportWorkers’Federation(ITF)andtheInternationalBargainingForum.47WhiletransitingtheGulfofGuineaIBFHRA,seafarersareentitledtoabonusof100%oftheirbasewageforthedurationoftimetheyareinthearea(intransitorforthedurationoftheirstayinthearea),doubledcompensationfordeathanddisability,andtherighttorefusetosailandtoreturntotheircountryoforiginatnocosttothemselves.

46 NotethatthisnumberisformerchantvesseltrafficonlyanddoesnotcoverK&Rpoliciestakenoutforshore-basedemployeesorthoseworkingonoffshoreoilandgasinstallations.

47 TheInternationalBargainingForum(IBF)istheforumthatbringstogethertheseafarersrepresentedbytheITFandtheinternationalmaritimeemployersthatmakeuptheJointNegotiatingGroup(JNG).Formoreinformation,see“AbouttheIBF,”ITFSeafarers,http://www.itfseafarers.org/about-IBF.cfm(accessedMay6,2015).

Total Cost of Labor$81.6 Million


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Captivity pay istheamountinadditiontobasepaythatseafarers(ortheirfamilies)areentitledtoforthedurationoftheircaptivityintheeventtheyaretakenhostage.

OffofWestAfrica,theIBFHRAcoverstheterritorialwatersofNigeriaandBenin,or12nauticalmilesoffeachcoast,aswellasportsandinlandwaterways.48UnlikeintheWIOR,inthisareathereisnoIBFWarlikeOperationsArea,noristhereanIBFExtendedRiskZone.49

Hazard Pay

Forourcalculations,wehaveusedanaveragedailyhazardpaypervesselof$2,812,basedoninflation-adjusted2010averagedailysalarynumbersprovidedbytheU.S.DepartmentofTransportationMaritimeAdministration,tocalculatethetotalpaypertransitthroughthearea.TheaveragetotaltransittimeoffivedayswascalculatedusinganestimateofaveragetimespentintheSecureAnchorageAreasandthetotaltransitswerebasedonportcallinformationprovidedtousbyVesseltracker.Thisresultsinatotaladditionalcostequalto$14,060pertransit.Consistentwithpreviousyears’calculations,weassumed40%ofvesselsdisbursedhazardpayfortimeinthearea.50Thispercentagetakesintoaccountthatthemajorityofvesselstransitingtheareaaresmaller,regionalvesselsthatarenotpartytointernationalbargainingagreements,andthusareunlikelytoagreetoahazardpayclauseasapartofemploymentagreements.

Table 14: Hazard Pay in 2014 Due to the Gulf of Guinea HRA51

TotalPayperTransitThroughtheHRA51 $14,060TransitsperYearThroughtheHRA 14,500PercentageofVesselsDisbursingHazardPay 40%Hazard Pay in 2014 Due to the Gulf of Guinea HRA $81,548,000

Captivity Pay

Captivitypayistheamountofmoneyseafarersareentitledtointheeventthattheyareheldhostage,forthedurationofthecaptivity.Thetotalcaptivitypaycalculatedhereincludesbasewagesperseafarerwhileheldcaptive.Thisiscalculatedasanopportunitycost,giventhatseafarersarenotengaginginproductiveworktogenerateearningsfortheiremployerwhileincaptivity.Thisisdifferentfromourhazardpaymethodologycalculations,whichexcludebasewageswhilecrewmembersengageinproductiveworkduringaHRAtransit.Consistentwithpastreports,wehaveassumed40%ofvesselsactuallydisbursecaptivitypaywhentheircrewisheldcaptive,andthatanadditional35%ofbasewagesarepaidtoseafarersonthosevessels.WeusedinformationfromtheU.S.DepartmentofTransportationMaritimeAdministrationtoidentifyanaveragedailybasewage,adjustedforinflation,of$124perseafarer.52

The$96,000ofcaptivitypaycostswehaveestimatedshouldrepresenttheamountoffundsdisbursedtoseafarerskidnappedbypiratesinGulfofGuinea.However,itisdifficulttoascertainwhether,infact,seafarerscapturedoffWestAfricaactuallyreceivedthesepayments.ThecomplexitiessurroundingWestAfricanpiracyandalackofconsistent,

48 “IBFListofWarlikeandHighRiskDesignations,withMainApplicableBenefits(asof1stJuly2014),Addendum2,”IBF,http://www.itfseafarers.org/files/seealsodocs/33553/IBF%20LIST%20OF%20WARLIKE%20AND%20HIGH%20RISK%20DEFINITIONS%20JULY%202014.pdf.

49 SeetheCostofLaborsectionintheEastAfricanEconomicCostofPiracyportionofthisreportforadescriptionofwhatthesezonesmeanforseafarerstransitingthatregion.

50 ThisinformationisconsistentwiththecalculationsmadeinboththeEconomicCostofPiracy2012reportandtheStateofMaritimePiracy2013report,andwasbasedonestimatesgiventousbyAnglo-EasternShipManagement.

51 TheHRAisdefinedastheITF/IBFHighRiskArea,whichistheterritorialwaters(12mn),ports,andinlandwaterwaysofNigeriaandBenin.

52 “ComparisonofU.S.andForeign-FlagOperatingCosts,”U.S.DepartmentofTransportationMaritimeAdministration(2011),5–6,13–14,http://www.marad.dot.gov/documents/Comparison_of_US_and_Foreign_Flag_Operating_Costs.pdf.OBPhasconfirmedthattheseestimatesareconsistentwiththoseofMooreStephens.See generally“MooreStephensCrewBenefits,”MooreStephens,http://www.mscb.im/(accessedMay27,2015).

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thoroughreportingmakeitdifficulttoassesshowmuchcaptivitypayisowed,muchlessactuallydisbursed.Inthecasethatnotallcaptiveseafarersreceivedcaptivitypay,thiswouldaddsignificantlytotheeconomicandpsychologicalstrainsufferedbyseafarersattackedoffWestAfrica.

Table 15: Captivity PayTotalBaseWages $84,00040%ofVesselsDisbursingandAdditional35%CaptivityPay 14,500Total $96,000

GOVERNMENT AND CIVIL SOCIETY COSTS (Military Operations, Prosecutions & Imprisonment, Counter-piracy Operations) $380,021,000 - $529,902,000Theinternationalcommunity—includingregionalgovernments,internationalorganizations,regionalcountries,andcivilsocietyorganizations—hasdedicatedsignificantassets,personnel,andfinancialresourcestocombatingpiracyintheGulfofGuinea.In2014theireffortstotaledoverhalfabilliondollars.

Key Findings:

• Counter-PiracyNavalOperationscostbetween$371,958,000and$521,839,000.

• Regionalnavieshaveinvestedinsignificantacquisitionstobolsterorganiccapacity.

• Multipleinformation-sharingandsituationalawarenesscentershavebeenestablishedthroughouttheGoGregionin2014.

OBPanalysisindicatesthatbetween$372millionand$522millionwasspentonnavaloperationsandinformation-sharingtocombatpiracyin2014.Inadditiontotheseexpenditures,theregioninvestedinsignificantnavalacquisitionstoimprovenavalcapacityandfurtherdevelopmaritimesecurityinfrastructure.However,duetoalackofinformationregardingthetotalvalueoftheassets,timeframesfortheacquisitions,orintendedmissions,theyhavenotbeenincludedintheoverallcost.

Table 16: Estimated Cost of Military OperationsLow Cost High Cost

RegionalNavalOperations $165,832,000 $236,903,000NIMASA $78,150,000 $156,300,000InternationalNavalCapacity-Building $78,573,000 $78,573,000Information-Sharing $49,403,000 $50,063,000Total $371,958,000 $521,839,000

Total Cost of Military Operations$372 - 522 Million


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Regional Naval Operations

Duetoinformationalconstraints,OBPhasestimatedthecostofdeployingindividualvesselsincounter-piracyoperationsratherthanattemptingtoidentifyapercentageofregionalnavalbudgetsdedicatedtocounter-piracyoperations.AISanalysisandanecdotalevidenceindicatethatseventotennavalvessels,fromvariousregionalnavies,arepatrollingatanygiventime,resultinginanoperatingcostofbetween$165,832,000and$236,903,000overthecourseoftheyear.53ThissumdoesnottakeintoaccountthecostofthenavalactivitiesofTogo,Benin,theRepublicoftheCongo,andotherswhoengageinirregularpatrolsorspecificincidentresponseratherthanacontinuousplatformpresence.

Table 17: Regional Naval OperationsDaily Operating Cost Annual Operating Cost

IndividualShipOperatingCosts $65,000 $23,690,000OperatingCostfor7Ships $454,000 $165,832,000OperatingCostfor10Ships $649,000 $236,903,000

NIMASA

InmostGulfofGuineacountries,thenavyistheprimaryagencytaskedwithcombatingpiracy.However,Nigeriahasseveralagencieswhosemandatesincludecombatingpiracy,whichprimarilyincludestheNigerianMaritimeAdministrationandSafetyAgency(NIMASA)andtheNigerianNavy(NN).

Table 18: Nigeria - NIMASA and Naval MandatesNIMASA NavyCollaboratescloselywithothergovernmentsecurityagencies,namelytheMarinePoliceandtheNigerianNavy,toregularlypatrolandprovideairsurveillanceforwaterfrontsandriverchannels.

TheNigerianNavyclaimsjurisdictionovertheterritorialwatersofNigeriaanditsEEZ.thenavymayalsoactwithintheNigerDeltaandriverineareaswhenauthorizedbyinter-agencyagreements.

NIMASA’s2014budgetwas$521million.54NIMASAisengagedinmanymaritimeactivities,fromInternationalShipandPortFacilitySecurityCodecompliancetothetrainingofseafarers.Intotal,NIMASAisresponsiblefortendistinctservices,ofwhichthree–maritimesafetyandsecurity,maritimelegislation,andmaritimecapacity-building–haveacounter-piracyaspect.Therefore,itisestimatedthatNIMASAspendsbetween15%and30%ofitsannualbudgetoncounter-piracyefforts.Basedontheseestimates,OBPapproximatesthatNIMASAspendsbetween$78.2millionand$156.3millioncombatingpiracy.

International Naval Capacity-Building

UnlikeofftheHornofAfrica,foreignnavalactivitiesinWestAfricanwatersgenerallycomprisecapacity-buildingexercisesandtraining,ratherthanlawenforcementaction.Weestimatethatcostfor2014tobe$78,573,000. PleaseseethesectionsbelowforinformationabouttheindividualoperationsorAppendixFfordetailsonthecostcalculations.OtherdeployersfromotherEuropeancountriesandBraziloccasionallypatroltheGulfofGuinea.Theirpresenceisirregularandlesspiracy-focusedand,therefore,theircostisnotincludedinthisreport.

53 ForamoredetailedexplanationonthemethodologyofcalculatingthisfigurepleaseseeAppendixF.ThisestimateonlyincludesGhana,Nigeria,Cameroon,andAngola,asthesearetheonlycountriesforwhichwehadnumbersforcontinuousnavalpresence.Thisnumberwillbehigherforperiodswhenotherregionalnaviesaredeployedandisdesignedtoprovideabaselineaverage.

54 TokunboOloke,“NPA,NIMASAtoSpendN231bnin2014,”Nigerian Tribune,26May2014,http://www.tribune.com.ng/news/news-headlines/

item/6177-npa-nimasa-to-spend-n231bn-in-2014/6177-npa-nimasa-to-spend-n231bn-in-2014;“AboutNIMASA,”NigerianMaritimeAdministrationandSafetyAgency,http://www.nimasa.gov.ng/about.php(accessedMay8,2015).ThetenservicesofNIMASAareasfollows:Cabotageservices,maritimesafetyandsecurity,maritimecapacity-building,marineenvironmentmanagement,shipsandshippingdevelopment,shipregistration,seafarersstandardandcertification,andSERVICOM.“Services,”NigerianMaritimeAdministrationandSafetyAgency,http://www.nimasa.gov.ng/service.php(accessedMay8,2015).

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Table 19: International Naval Assets in the Gulf of GuineaNaval Mission Surface Vessels HelicoptersOperationCorymbe 1.25 1AfricanPartnershipStation 0.25 0Other 1 1Total 2.5 2

Table 20: Cost of International Naval Assets in the Gulf of GuineaCategory Cost ($)Ships $77,796,900Aircraft $775,800UAVs N/ATotal $78,573,000

Operation Corymbe

OperationCorymbeisapermanentFrenchNavyoperationthathasbeenintheGulfofGuineasince1990.ItischaracterizedbytheconstantpresenceofaFrenchnavalforcethatisabletodetectandpreventcrisesand,ifnecessary,interveneintheareaatshortnotice.Themissionalsoorganizesexerciseswithregionalnavalforcestodevelopcounter-piracycapacity.

Africa Partnership Station

AfricaPartnershipStationisaU.S.NavalForcesmaritimesecuritycooperationprogramfocusedonAfrica.TheybuildmaritimesafetyandsecuritybyorganizingbilateralandregionalexerciseswithcountriesintheGulfofGuinea.

OneoftheprimaryexercisesorganizedunderAfricaPartnershipStationisObangameExpress,whichbringstogethernumerousnationstoimprovemaritimecooperationintheGulfofGuinea.In2014twentynationsparticipatedintheexercise:Angola,Belgium,Benin,Brazil,Cameroon,Côted’Ivoire,EquatorialGuinea,France,Gabon,Germany,Ghana,theNetherlands,Nigeria,Portugal,RepublicofCongo,SãoTomé&Principe,Spain,Togo,Turkey,andtheUnitedStates.55

Atlantic Patrol Tasking

AccordingtotheRoyalNavy,“ShipsandunitsonAtlanticPatrolTaskingprovideongoingprotectionandreassurancetoBritishinterestsintheAtlantic.”56WhileintheGulfofGuinea,patrollingBritishassetsparticipateinjointtrainingexercisesalongsidetheirFrenchandAmericancounterparts.57AsthesepatrolsextendasfarastheFalklandIslandsandtheCaribbeanSea,ourcostcalculationsonlyincludethefractionofdeploymentspentinWestAfricanwaters.

Information-Sharing/Maritime Situational Awareness

Anumberofnewregionalandnationalinformation-sharingcenterswerecreatedin2014.Thesearelistedinthetablebelow,andareestimatedtohavecostatotalof$50million.

55 WestonJones,“ObangameExpress2014Concludes,”UnitedStatesNavy,23April2014,http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=80539.

56 “AtlanticPatrolTasking,”RoyalNavy,http://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/news-and-latest-activity/operations/south-atlantic/atlantic-patrol-tasking(accessedMay24,2014).

57 See, e.g.,“BritishandUSNaviesCarryOutCounterPiracyTraining,”RoyalNavy,http://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/news-and-latest-activity/news/2014/november/18/141118-counter-piracy-training(accessedMay8,2015);“BritishFrigateTrainswithGhanaNavy,”GhanaArmedForces,18–20February2014,http://www.gaf.mil.gh/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=934:british-frigate-trains-with-ghana-navy&catid=13:news&Itemid=34.


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Table 21: Cost of Regional and National Information-Sharing Centers in 201458 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 Initiative Description Cost

Regional Initiatives RegionalCoordinationCentreforMaritimeSecurityinCentralAfrica

ImplementedthroughtheEconomicCommunityofCentralAfricanStates

$487,40058

Inter-regionalCoordinationCentre(ICC)

TheICCwasdevelopedoutoftheSummitofHeadsofStateandGovernmentonMaritimeSafetyandSecurityintheGulfofGuineaheldinYaoundéCamerooninJune201359

$1,300,00060

RegionalMaritimeRescueCoordinationCenters(RMRCC)

RMRCCsareoperationalinMonroviaandLagos $330,00061 Each

National Initiatives TheNIMASASatelliteSurveillanceCenter

AllowsNIMASAofficialstotrackallvesselsenteringtheirterritorialwaters62

$12,115,60063*

GhanaMaritimeAuthority VesselTrafficMonitoringandInformationManagementSystemthatensures24/7surveillanceofGhana’sterritorialwaters64

$35,000,000*

Industry Initiative MaritimeTradeandInformationSharingCentrefortheGulfofGuinea

ShippingIndustryinitiativecreatedbytheOilCompaniesInternationalMarineForum(OCIMF);wasatinitialoperatingcapacityasofApril2014.TheCentreoperates24/7andassistsshipsintheGulfofGuinea,andhelpsto“maintainandshareadetailedandaccuratemaritimedomainpictureofthewatersoffAfrica’sWesternseaboard65

$500,00066

Total $50,063,000 *Indicates one-time acquisition cost

Regional Naval Acquisitions

Beyondtheabove-mentionedinitiatives,GulfofGuineacountriesmadesignificantstridestoincreasetheirnavalcapacitythroughtakingdeliveryofnumerousvesselsin2014,aswellasplacingordersformorevesselswithlaterdeliverydates.Theseacquisitions,donatedandpurchased,willbeusedformissionsbeyondcounter-piracy.However,piracyisgenerallyunderstoodtobeoneoftheprimarymotivationsbehindtheseacquisitions.TheDirectorGeneralofNIMASA,Patrick

58 “UnitedNationsStandingAdvisoryCommitteeonSecurityQuestionsinCentralAfrica,”UnitedNations,http://www.un.org/Depts/ddar/stad-com/stadcom.htm(accessedMay27,2015).

59 OBPdiscussesthesecentersinmoredepthintheCostofCounter-PiracyOrganizations&MaritimeCapacity-BuildingEffortssectionofthisyear’sWestAfricanEconomicCostofPiracyreport.

60 Thisnumberincludesinitialset-upandacquisitioncosts.

61 RMRCCsareestimatedattwo-thirdsthecostoftheMTISC-GoG.

62 GodwinOritse,“NIMASABuildsSatelliteSurveillanceCentretoTacklePirates,”Vanguard,25July2014,http://www.vanguardngr.com/2014/07/nimasa-builds-satellite-surveillance-centre-tackle-pirates-2/.

63 OluwakemiDauda,“NIMASAAcquiresEquipmenttoFightOilTheft,Piracy,”TheNation,26August2014,http://thenationonlineng.net/new/nimasa-acquires-equipment-to-fight-oil-theft-piracy/.

64 “Ghana’sMaritimeHubConceptGetsUS$35mBoost,”GhanaWeb,26March2014,http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsAr-chive/artikel.php?ID=304346.

65 “MSG-GoG,”MTISC-GoG,http://www.mtisc-gog.org/msg/(accessedMay8,2015).

66 Theapproximatecostsforthesevesselshavebeenidentifiedthroughdiscussionswithvariousstakeholders.

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Akpobolokemi,indicatedthatfivenewwarshipshadbeenacquiredfortheuseoftheNigerianNavy,andotherrelatedagencies,tocombatpiracyandothermaritimecrimes.67AfulllistofregionalnavalacquisitionsidentifiedbyOBPcanbefoundinAppendixF.

CalculatingthecostsassociatedwithWestAfricanprosecutionsandimprisonmentsofpiratesisdifficultduetothefactthatWestAfricancountries’prosecutionactivitiesarenotobservedbyanyinternationalagencywhichcouldreportonthenumberofprosecutions,incarcerations,andthespecificlegislationinplacethatgivesthecountriestheauthoritytoprosecuteactsofpiracy.Moreover,neitherregionalpiracycourtsnorprisonshavebeenestablishedwhererecordsarekeptregardingthisinformation.Finally,WestAfricancountriesdonotpublishprosecutionorimprisonmentdatapublicly.Accordingly,forWestAfrica,itisdifficultgenerallytoascertainthenumberofpiracy-relatedprosecutionsandimprisonmentswhichhaveoccurred.

AnotherissueariseswhencalculatingprosecutionsandimprisonmentsforWestAfricaasitisunclearwhethertheseactivitiesareoccurring.UndertheYaoundéCodeofConduct,Articles4and6,WestAfricanStatepartieshavecommittedtocooperateinthearrestandinvestigationofpiracy,aswellasprosecutesuspectedpiratesintheirdomesticcourts.Despitethisagreementandmanycountries’efforts,mostcountriesintheregionstilllackeithersufficientinstitutionalcapacityorthenecessarylegalframeworktoprosecuteactsofpiracy.68

NumerousarrestsofsuspectedpiratesbyNigerianlawenforcementagencieswerereportedin2014,69suggestingtheremayhavebeenassociatedprosecutions.Forexample,thetankerSan MiguelwascapturedonJanuary3,2014bypiratesandthreecrewmemberswerekidnapped.TheJointMilitaryTaskForce(JTF)saidthesquadtrackedthepiratestotheirhideoutinAbissaandarrestedfivesuspects.70Inanotherincident,JTFpatrolboatswereattackedbyapproximately30piratesonJune24,2014,resultinginthedeathsofonesoldierandthreepirates.Fivesuspectswerearrestedinconnectionwiththeattack.71Additionally,Torm Republican,aDanish-flaggedtanker,wasboardedonNovember27,2014,andshortlyafterwardsaNIMASApatrolcraftinterceptedandarrestedfourmeninasmallvessel.72Finally,itwasreportedthattheNigerianNavyarrestedsixofthepiratesthathijackedSP BrusselsonApril29,2014.73

67 GodfreyBivbere,“TompoloPurchasedWarShipsonBehalfofNIMASA–DG,”Vanguard,17December2014,http://www.vanguardngr.com/2014/12/tompolo-purchased-war-ships-behalf-nimasa-dg/.

68 ForachartanalyzingthelegislationofWestAfricancountriesrelatedtoabilitytoprosecuteactsofpiracy,seeAppendixJ.

69 Notablytherewerealsoarrestsmadeforariverine-relatedincidentandanattackonatankerberthedinport,neitherwhicharecountedinOBP’sprimarydatasetduetothefactthattheyoccurredoutsideofinternationalwaters.

70 SegunJames,“JTFRescuesIndians,Arrests17OilTheftSuspectsinNigerDelta,”This Day Live,5February2014,http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/jtf-rescues-indians-arrests-17-oil-theft-suspects-in-niger-delta/170613/.

71 “SeaPiracy:ThreeShotDead,SoldiersInjuredasJTFFightsoffAttack,”Nigerian Times,24June2014,http://nigeriantimes.ng/news/sea-piracy-three-shot-dead-soldiers-injured-as-jtf-fights-off-attack/.

72 “WeeklyMaritimeSituationalReport,”OceanusLive.org,29November–5December2014,v.3,No.49/14.

73 DesDim,“2PiratesKilled,6ArrestedinGunDuelwithNigerianNavy,”Vessel Finder,http://www.vesselfinder.com/news/2089-2-pirates-killed-6-arrested-in-gun-duel-with-Nigerian-Navy.

Total Cost of Prosecutions & Imprisonment$0


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Despitethesereportedarrests,OBPwasnotabletofindanyevidenceofprosecutionsin2014inanyWestAfricancountry,afindingwhichhasbeensupportedbyvariousexperts.InNigeriaparticularly,NIMASAofficialshaveregularlylamentedthedearthofprosecutionsfollowingsuccessfularrestsofpiracysuspects.74Specifically,DirectorGeneralofNIMASAPatrickAkpobolokemi“expressedhisfrustrationatthelackofeffectivelegalsanctionsagainstpiratesandmaritimecriminalsintheGulfofGuinea”andexplainedthatNIMASAwill“arrestsomeoneforpiracywithguns,arms,andtherest,[but]thenextdayyouseethemonthestreet.”75Nigeria’sdomesticlegislationdoesnotallowittoprosecuteactsofpiracythattakeplaceoutsideitsterritorialwaters,whichmaycontributetothelackofprosecutions.NigeriahasdraftedabilltoimplementinternationalnormsrelatedtouniversaljurisdictionandUNCLOS’sdefinitionofpiracydomestically,whichwasproposedbyNIMASA.76Thebillhasnotyetbeenfinalizedorpassed.77However,theremaybesomeunreportedpiracyprosecutionsoccurringinNigeria,asindicatedbythefactthatatleastonegovernmentofficialnotedthata“trialformanysuspectsofoiltheftandpiracycomesseveralmonthsafter[an]arrestduetoinsufficientavailabilityofjudicialofficers.”78

Ultimately,becausemostWestAfricancountriesdonotcurrentlypossesslegislationallowingthemtoprosecuteactsofpiracyoccurringoutsideoftheirterritorialwaters,therecontinuestobealackofprosecutionsintheregion.Additionally,whilemostcountries’criminallawsdogivethemjurisdictiontoprosecutepiraticalactswithintheirterritorialwaters,itisunclearwhethertheselawsarebeingusedasawaytoprosecuteactsofpiracyorarmedrobberyatsea.Itispossiblethattrialsofsuspectedpiratesandsubsequentincarcerationsdidoccurin2014,butwerenotreported.Nonetheless,intheabsenceofanyconcretedataindicatingtheprosecutionorincarcerationofindividualsforactsofpiracy,OBPisunabletomakeanestimateforthiscostcategoryfor2014duetoalackofsufficientdata.

Key Findings:

• Theinternationalcommunitycontributed$8milliondirectlytocapacity-buildingprogramsintheGoGin2014.

74 E.g.,AndrewAirahuobhor,“NIMASASeeksJudicialSupportinSpeedyDispensationofJustice,”Daily Independent,28November2014,http://dailyindependentnig.com/2014/11/nimasa-seeks-judicial-support-speedy-dispensation-justice/;StephenSpark,“NigeriaSeeksaLegalFinishtoCounter-PiracyActions,”IHS Maritime 360,22November2014,http://www.ihsmaritime360.com/article/15543/nigeria-seeks-a-legal-finish-to-counter-piracy-actions.

75 Ibid.

76 JohnIwori,“Nigeria:BilltoDomesticateTreatiesonPiracy,WaterwaysRobberyUnderway,”This Day Live,21October2011,http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/bill-to-domesticate-treaties-on-piracy-waterways-robbery-underway/100993/;MojisolaJaiye-Gbenle,“TacklingthePerilsofPiracy,”International Law Office,28November2012,http://www.internationallawoffice.com/newsletters/Detail.aspx?g=f1e2890f-eac5-4703-ad34-c78b4349547c;RasheedBisiriyu,“NIMASAProposesAnti-PiracyBill,”Punch,23May2012,http://www.punchng.com/business/transport/nimasa-proposes-anti-piracy-bill/.

77 TheNigerianNationalAssemblydidresumediscussionofthisbillin2013but,todate,thebillhasnotbeenpassed.See“FGSetto

ForwardBillAgainstMaritimePiracytoNASS,”World Stage,24October2013,http://www.worldstagegroup.com/worldstagenew/index.php?active=news&newscid=11585&catid=35.

78 AdeniyiAdejimiOsinowo,“CombatingPiracyintheGulfofGuinea,”AfricaSecurityBriefNo.30(February2015),available at http://

africacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/ASB-30-Feb-2015-Combating-Piracy-in-GoG.pdf(citingauthor’sinterviewwithMr.DesmondAgu,Commandant,NigerianSecurityandCivilDefenceCorps,BayelaState,Nigeria,December19,2013).

Total Cost of Counter-Piracy Organizations$8 Million

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Maritimeinsecuritycontinuedtobeapriorityin2014inWestAfrica,andregionalandinternationalcapacity-buildingeffortsreflectedthis;atleast$8,063,000wasspentoncapacity-buildingefforts.79Asmaritimepiracyisaregionalproblemthatencompassesmanytransnationalorganizedcrimes,OBP’scostanalysisincludesassessmentofprogramsdirectlyrelatedtocounter-piracyaswellasthosedesignedtocombatmaritimecrimeingeneral.Whileitisdifficulttoidentifyspecificcostsrelatedtotheseefforts,wehavelistedsomeoftherelevantinitiatives.

Regional Capacity-Building (No economic cost estimates available)

WestAfricancountrieshavetakentheleadindevelopingcapacity-buildingprogramstocombatmaritimecrimeintheregion.TheseeffortsarehighlightedbytheYaoundéCodeofConduct,aswellasothernationalinitiatives.

Yaoundé Code of ConductSignedinYaoundé,Cameroon,in2013,the“CodeofConductConcerningtheRepressionofPiracy,ArmedRobberyagainstShips,andIllicitMaritimeActivityinWestandCentralAfrica”providestheframeworkforWestAfrica’seffortstoaddressmaritimeinsecurityintheregion.In2014,additionalstepsweretakentoadvanceimplementationoftheCodeofConductthroughtheestablishmentoftheInter-RegionalCoordinationCenter(ICC)inYaoundé,andthroughtheassociatedICCorganizingandfunctioningdocumentsbeingsignedbytheEconomicCommunityofCentralAfricanStates(ECCAS),theEconomicCommunityofWestAfricanStates(ECOWAS),andtheGulfofGuineaCommission.AnotherimportantstepinadvancingtheframeworkwastheSeptember2014openingoftheRegionalCoordinationCentreforMaritimeSecurityinCentralAfricabyECCASinPointe-Noire,Congo.

Operation Pulo Shield (Nigeria)OperationPuloShieldisledbytheJointMilitaryTaskForceinNigeria.Theongoingoperationcommencedin2012,andisfocusedoneliminatingoilbunkering,piracy,andillegalarmstraffickingfromtheNigerDelta.

Tenth Annual Maritime Law Seminar for Judges of the Superior Courts (Ghana)TheGhanaShippers’Authority(GSA),incollaborationwiththeMinistryofTransportandtheJudicialTrainingInstitute,conductedatwo-dayseminarforhigh-levelGhanaianjudgesinAccra.ItisthehopeoftheGSAthattheseseminarsboostjudges’knowledgeofmaritimeissuesanddecreasetheirreticencetoprosecutemaritimecriminals.GSAbelievestheseseminarswillbolsterGhana’sreputationintheshippingindustryandincreaseitsstandingininternationaltrade.80

High Council of the Sea (Togo)TogodevelopedtheHighCouncilwiththeobjectiveofcreatinganinstitutionthatfocusesexclusivelyonissuesoftheseainthearenasofgovernance,economics,environment,andmaritimesecurity.FortheHighCouncil,thenumberonepriorityiscombatingpiracyandmakingtheirwaterssaferfortheshippingindustry.IncreasingTogolesesurveillancecapabilitieswillhelptheHighCouncilfightagainstenvironmentaldegradationandincreasepressureonpiratesoperatingwithinTogolesewaters.81

International Capacity-Building

Inrecentyearstheinternationalcommunityhasalsocreatedanumberofinitiativesdesignedtosupportregionaleffortstocombatmaritimecrime.

79 Thistotalincludesonlythoseprogramsforwhichwehavebeenabletoidentifyadollaramount.Theactualtotalislikelyhigher.80 “GSAtoHold10thMaritimeLawSeminarforJudges,”SpyGhana,13October2014,http://www.spyghana.com/gsa-to-hold-10th-maritime-law-

seminar-for-judges/.81 “LesNouveauxDéfisDuSecteurMaritime,”République Togolaise,18September2014,http://www.republicoftogo.com/Toutes-les-rubriques/

Politique/Les-nouveaux-defis-du-secteur-maritime.


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IMO EffortsTheInternationalMaritimeOrganization(IMO)continuestoplayanimportantroleindevelopinggreatercapacitytocombatmaritimecrimeinWestandCentralAfrica.TheIMOisengagedinanumberofimportantcapacity-buildinginitiatives,whichincludeconductingtabletopexercisesinGulfofGuineacountriesinordertofurtherdevelopmaritimestrategies.Thetabletopsaredesignedtofacilitatediscussionanddemonstratetheneedforcooperationbetweengovernmentdepartmentsandotheragenciesandstakeholders;theIMOpushesforanintegratedapproachtomaritimelawenforcement.82Thetabletopexerciseshavebeenconductedin17WestandCentralAfricancountriessincethebeginningof2012.OBPdoesnotpossessclearestimatesofthecostsrelatedtotheseexercises.

TheIMOalsomaintainstheWestandCentralAfricaMaritimeSecurityTrustFund,establishedinDecemberof2013.Todate,thetrustfundhasreceivedcontributionstotaling$1.6million.In2014therewasacontributionfromJapanof$1million,83withAngola,China,Nigeria,theUnitedKingdom,Norway,andBrazildonatingotheramounts.84Afterdeductingdonationsmadein2013,thetrustfundraised$1,333,905in2014.

EU Maritime Transport SupportInJulyof2014,theEuropeanUnionbeganthreeprojectswithbudgetstotaling$6.6million.Theseprojectsfocusonmaritimesafety,portefficiencyandportstatecontrol,anddataupgradinganddataexchange.Theprojectsaresettorunthrough2016andarefundedbytheEuropeanDevelopmentFund.Assumingthesefundsareevenlydistributedoverthethreeyearsofoperation,$2.2millionwasspentin2014.AllMaritimeOrganizationforWestandCentralAfricacountriesareeligibletoparticipate.85

CRIMGOCRIMGOisaprojectundertheEuropeanUnion’sCriticalMaritimeRoutesinitiative.Itwaslaunchedin2012andhasathree-yearmandatewitha$6milliontotalbudget.86Aimingtocomplementandreinforceregionalandinternationalinitiatives,CRIMGOseekstoestablisharegionalmaritimesecurityandsafetytrainingsystem,initiatearegionalmaritimeinformation-sharingfunction,createanimprovedcoastguardfunctioninkeystates,andworktodevelopjointoperationalcoordinationcapacitythroughcommonexercisesorpilotoperations.87In2014,CRIMGOwasallocated$2million.

INTERPOL-WAPIS ProgramTheEuropeanUnionandInterpolpartneredtocreatetheWestAfricanPoliceInformationSystem(WAPIS).ThisplatformwillallowECOWAScountriesandMauritaniatocollect,centralize,manage,share,andanalyzepoliceinformation.With

82 “StrengtheningMaritimeSecurityinWestandCentralAfrica,”IMO(2013),http://www.imo.org/OurWork/Security/WestAfrica/Documents/23605%20African%20Maritime%20Security%20%28Web%20Version%29.pdf.

83 IMO,“JapanGivesOneMillionDollarBoosttoGulfofGuineaFund,”IMO.org,17March2014,http://www.imo.org/MediaCentre/

PressBriefings/Pages/06-japanfund.aspx#.VSP-CPnF-yo.84 “AngolaReaffirmsSupportforFightagainstMaritimePiracy,”Angola Press News Agency,28November2014,http://www.portalangop.

co.ao/angola/en_us/noticias/politica/2014/10/48/Angola-reaffirms-support-for-fight-against-maritime-piracy,425fdbcb-7688-4c80-85c9-3ff21ff8257c.html.

85 CounciloftheEuropeanUnion,GeneralSecretariat,“CouncilConclusionsontheGulfofGuineaActionPlan2015-2020,”16March2015,

para.37,available athttp://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/03/16-council-conclusions-gulf-guinea-action-plan-2015-2020/.

86 EuropeanCommission,“NewEUInitiativetoCombatPiracyintheGulfofGuinea,”PressRelease,10January2013,available athttp://europa.

eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-14_en.htm?locale=en.

87 “CMRGulfofGuinea(CRIMGO),”EU CMR Critical Maritime Routes Information Portal,http://www.crimson.eu.com/projects/cmr-gulf-of-guinea-crimgo-3/(accessedMay8,2015).

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thesegoals,theWAPISprogramhopestofosteranenvironmentofincreaseddata-sharingregionallyandglobally.88Thisprojectendeavorstomakecriminalinvestigationsmoreefficientand,hopefully,willincreasetheabilitytoprosecutemembersoftheECOWAScommunity.TheEUhaspledged$6.9milliontoWAPIS,with$2.9milliongoingtowardsPhase1,whichranfromSeptember2012toOctober2013.Currently,WAPISisinitspilotphase,withthesystemoperationalinsomecountries(thoughitdoesnotspecifywhichones),andoperatingontheremaining$4million.89Therefore,in2014WAPISoperatedwithabudgetof$1.7million.Thispilotphaseissettoendin2015,whenWAPISwillhopefullytransitiontofullfunctionality.

OBP West AfricaOceansBeyondPiracy,aprojectofOneEarthFuture,basesitsoperationsinBroomfield,Colorado,USA.OBPseekssustainablesolutionstomaritimepiracythroughresearchandanalysis,facilitatingandattendingmeetings,andencouragingcross-sectorpartnershipsamongstakeholders.OBPdirected$430,874towardsitsWestAfricaprogramin2014.

ASECMARSetupbytheFrenchgovernment,ASECMAR90lookstofightpiracythroughthreecomponents:providingtoolsandproceduresforadministration,implementingtraining,andsupportingregionalcoordination.TheprogramisscheduledtoendinDecember2015.91ASECMARtargetssixcountries(Benin,Ghana,Togo,Guinea,IvoryCoast,andNigeria)andhasafour-yearbudgetof$1.6million.Therefore,2014sawanallocationof$400,000.

The UNODC’s Maritime Crime Program (MCP) for West AfricaAtMCP’sinitialworkshop,theUNODCdiscoveredthegenerallackofprosecutioncapacityamongGulfofGuineastates.Therefore,theUNODCdecidedtorectifytheproblembystartingalegalreformprogramforTogo,Benin,Nigeria,andGabon.AccordingtotheUNODC,“Thesecountrieswillbeprovidedwithassistanceindraftingthenecessarylegislationandtheirprosecutorsandjudgeswillbetrainedinhowtoapplythislegalframeworkinordertobetterprosecuteandadjudicatepiracyandarmedrobberyatsea.”92Duetothefactthatthisprogramstartedattheendofyear,OBPhasnotallocatedcostsforthisprogramfor2014.

Table 22: Counter-Piracy Organization and their Associated Costs93

Counter-Piracy Mechanism Total Cost93

IMOWestandCentralAfricaMaritimeTrustFund $1,333,900EUMaritimeTransportSupport $2,200,000CRIMGO $2,000,000OBP $430,900INTERPOLWAPIS $1,700,000ASECMAR $398,000Total $8,063,000

88 INTERPOLOfficeoftheSpecialRepresentativetotheEuropeanUnion,“WAPISProgramme,”INTERPOL.int(2013).

89 “MillionsofEurosforNewPoliceDatabasesinWestAfrica,”Statewatch Journal,3July2013,http://www.statewatch.org/news/2013/mar/02eu-wapis.htm.

90 ASCEMARstandsforAssociationPourLaSécuritéMaritime.See“ASECMAR: Session De Formation Sur L’Action De L’Etat En Mer (AEM),” La

France Au Bénin Ambassade De France à Cotonou, 10 April 2013, http://www.ambafrance-bj.org/ASECMAR-session-de-formation-sur-l.

91 Ibid.

92 UnitedNationsOfficeonDrugsandCrime,MaritimeCrimeProgrammeAnnualReport2014(Nairobi:UNODC,2014),21,available athttp://

www.unodc.org/documents/easternafrica//MCP_Brochure_December_2014_wv_6_1.pdf.93 Thetableincludesonlyprojectsforwhichwehaveestablishedacost

THE STATE OF MARITIME PIRACY 2014THE HUMAN COST OF MARITIME PIRACY IN THE GULF OF GUINEA

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THE HUMAN COST OF MARITIME PIRACYIN THE GULF OF GUINEA

WestAfricanpiracyoperatesunderadifferentmodelthanpiracyoffofSomalia.WhilekidnapforransomisacommontacticoffofNigeria,thepiratestendtokidnaponlyafewcrewmembers,usuallythehighest-ranking,andleavetherest,asopposedtotakingthevesselandthewholecrewhostage.Forthemostpart,piratesintheGulfofGuineafocusonrobberyorcargotheft.Ineithercase,thecrewtendstobeancillarytotheobjectoftheattack,makingtheirsafetylessofaconcerntothepiratesand,ultimately,resultinginagreaterlevelofviolencetowardstheseafarersduringtheattackitself.Mostviolencetowardsthecrewtendstooccurwhilethepiratesareconductingtheactualrobberyoroilsiphoning,withpiratesoftenabusingthecrewortyingthemupduringtheattack.

Aswith2013,thelevelofviolenceassociatedwitheachindividualattackisnotablyhigherthaninattacksoffthecoastofSomalia:asignificantlyhighernumberofseafarerswereinjuredbyWestAfricanpiratesthanbySomalipirates.InpartthisisduetotheincreasednumberofsuccessfulboardingsinWestAfricanwatersascomparedtotheWIOR.Itmayalsoreflectdifferingattitudesonthepartofthepiratesandagreaterwillingnesstouseviolenceorengageinpitchedbattles.

Forexample,whiletherewerenocasesin2013ofasustainedexchangeofgunfirebetweenpiratesandarmedguards,in2014oneseafarerandtwopirateswerekilledinanexchangeofgunfirewitharmedsecurityaboardthetankerMT

SP BrusselsoffWestAfrica.TheattackonSP BrusselsisrepresentativeofthelevelsofsevereviolenceandunpredictabilityofWestAfricanpirates.EightheavilyarmedpiratesontwospeedboatsattackedSP BrusselsonApril29,2014,andsixofthosepiratesboardedthevessel.94FourofthosepiratesallegedlyengagedthetwoNigerianmilitarysecurityguardsonboardinashootout,leadingtothedeathofonecrewmemberandtheinjuryofanotherwhentwostraybulletshitthemaftertheyfailedtoreachthecitadelintime.95Twoofthepirateswerealsokilledinthegunfight.96

Further,itisreportedthatthepiratesareoftenintoxicateduponboardingavessel,eitherfromalcoholornarcotics,whichmaycontributetothelevelofviolenceperpetratedagainstthecrew.“Thepiratesbecameviolentaftertakingdrugs.Theypointedgunsnearourheadsandears,andfiredbullets,”saidCaptainSureshBiradarabouthisexperiencewithpirateswho

94 “SPBrusselsAttack:ShipOwnerSaysNoCrewwasKilledbyPirates,”Shipping Position Online,25May2014,http://shippingposition.com.ng/article/sp-brussels-attack-ship-owner-says-no-crew-was-killed-pirates.

95 EvelynUsman,“Nigeria:OilTankerHijack–NavyKillsTwoSuspectedPiratesDuringShoot-Out,”Vanguard,18May2014,http://allafrica.com/

stories/201405191147.html.

96 “SPBrusselsAttack:ShipOwnerSaysNoCrewwasKilledbyPirates.”

Thepiratesbecame

violentaftertakingdrugs.Theypointedgunsnearourheadsandearsandfiredbullets.

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capturedhimoffthecoastofNigeria.97ItislikelythattheunpredictabilityandviolenceofWestAfricanpiratesmaybeattributed,atleastinpart,tothepiratesbeingintoxicatedduringattacks.

“Theyweresmokingpotandcrackanddrinkingalot….Itmadethemrealerratic.Youknowdrugs,alcohol,weaponsandangerdon’tmix,”98explainedCaptainWrenThomasafterhewastakenhostagebyNigerianpiratesandtransferredtovariousholdingcamps,wherehewasmalnourished,tortured,andheldcaptivefor18days.99“IknewIwasgoingtodie.Weknewiteveryday,everynight.”100

Reporting Issues

Anecdotalstoriesfromlocalshaveturneduptroublingaccountsofdeathscausedbypiratesandviolentattacksthatappeartohavenoassociatedpublicrecord;perhapsareflectionofchronicunderreporting.Thisislikelytobeparticularlyacuteincasesoflocaltrafficandfishingvessels,whereinstitutionalreportingsystemsmaybepatchyorincomplete.Underreportingintheregionisthoughttobeendemic:CyrusMody,AssistantDirectoroftheInternationalMaritimeBureau,positedthatincidentsintheregionarelikelyhugelyunderreportedduetofearoffurtherattacks,concernsoverinsurancecosts,orabeliefthatinformationonvesselsispotentiallyproprietary.MichaelFrodlofC-LevelGlobalRisksindicatessimilarreasonsforunderreporting:

It is not unreasonable to estimate 70% underreporting for the Gulf of Guinea; that would bring it up from 1 in 10 being reported two or three years ago. Nigeria is a destination for shipping, not a transit area. So these shippers—and most importantly their crews—know that they will have to return, and so they rightfully worry about reprisals if they report an attack. This is even more true for a lot of the local seafarers; they who often won’t report because they don’t want to be found out. They fear not just for their own safety, but that of loved ones back ashore. (OBPphoneinterview,April24,2015).

ReportersandresearcherswhohavelookedintoWestAfricanpiracygenerallyacceptthatthereissignificantunderreporting,andsomereasonsforthisthathavebeenputforwardincludejurisdictionalconfusion,ageneraltendencyforlow-levelcrimetogounreported,thecostsforshippingcompaniesduetodelaysassociatedwiththeinvestigationbeingadisincentive,fearofreprisalsamonglocals,orabiasagainstreportingattacksthatprimarilyimpactlocals.Otherunderreportingreasonsmaystemfromashipowner’sconcernthatresultinginvestigationswillcausedelaysandlossinprofit,orageneral,knownlackofprosecutionsofsuspectedpiratesleadingtoaperceivedfutilityinreporting.OBP’sdataonattacksinWestAfricareflectsfewerreportedattacksoverall,aswellasfewerinjuriesanddeathsfor2014ascomparedto2013.However,givencontinuedchallengesrelatedtoreporting,itisdifficulttoconcludeadefinitivedownwardtrendexistsinrelationtobothattacksandviolence.

Sources:Reuters,GuardianGlobalResources,andtheAssociatedPress.101

97 MaryHarper,“DangerZone:ChasingWestAfrica’sPirates,”BBCNews,13November2014,http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-30024009.

98 RobAlmeida,“KidnappedOffNigeria–AnAmericanShipCaptainUnveilstheTruth,”gCaptain,4April2014,http://gcaptain.com/captain-wren-thomas-kidnapped-off-nigeria-c-retriever/?utm_source=OCEANUSLive+Weekly+Report&utm_campaign=b319372ed7-NL+2014&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_8a5b805281-b319372ed7-75994065.

99 Complaint,Thomas v. Chevron USA, Inc. et al.,CauseNo.2014-60458,D.C.HarrisCo.,Texas(October16,2014).

100 KyungLah&KathleenJohnston,“KidnappedShip’sCaptainToldRansomsMaybeFunneledtoBokoHaram,”CNN,25June2014,http://www.cnn.com/2014/06/24/world/africa/nigeria-kidnapped-captain/.

101 LibbyGeorge,“OilTankersRunGauntletinNigeria’s‘PirateAlley’,”Reuters,5February2015,http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/02/05/

nigeria-crude-pirates-idUSL1N0VF10820150205;“ABriefLookatWestAfricanPiracy,”Guardian Global Resources,9February2015,http://ggrwestafrica.com/2015/02/09/a-brief-look-at-west-african-piracy/;AnitaPowell,“Experts:NigerianPiratesMaybeExtendingReach,”Associated Press,27November2009,available athttp://www.timesfreepress.com/news/local/story/2009/nov/27/experts-nigerian-pirates-may-be-extending-reach/244390/.

IknewIwasgoingtodie.

Weknewiteveryday,everynight.


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Seafarers Attacked in 2014

TheOBPdataindicateatotalof67attacksin2014,including39successfulboardings.Therewerealso22failedboardingattemptsand6suspiciousapproaches,inwhichthecrewsfeltthreatenedbyothervessels.Specifically,these67attacksimpactedanestimated1,168seafarers.Oftheseseafarers,nationalitieswerereportedfor500,withmorethanone-thirdbeingFilipino(173,34.6%).AfterthePhilippines,thenextmostfrequentlyimpactednationalitieswereIndian(92,18.4%),Nigerian(53,10.6%),andGhanaian(46,9.2%).Overall,WestAfricanlocalscomprisedoverone-fifthoftheaffectedseafarers.

Whenconsideringonlythoseseafarersonvesselsboardedbypirates,thenationalitydistributionchangesslightly.OBPestimatesthat597seafarerswerelikelyontheseboardedvessels.Oftheseseafarers,weknowthenationalityof256whowereexposedtoboardingandpotentialabusebypirates:29.3%wereIndian,20%wereFilipino,14.8%wereGhanaian,and10.1%wereNigerian.

Ineachofthesecategoriesofviolence,morethanhalfofthereportedseafarerswerefromthePhilippinesandIndia.Inotherwords,themajorityofreportsofviolenceagainstseafarerswerefrominternationallycrewedvesselsandnotlocalones.Nonetheless,localnewsreportsandanecdotalaccountsindicatetherewasviolenceagainstlocalseafarersthatoccurredduringunreportedattacks.102Ouranalysisofapartialdatasetfindsthatatleastone-fifthtoone-quarteroftheseafarersimpactedwerefromtheregion.ThefactthattherearealargenumberofWestAfricanseafarersoperatingintheregion,combinedwithaccountsindicatingthatlocalsarebeingaffected,stronglysuggeststhattheseattacksarebeingunderreportedtointernationalpiracyreportingcenters.Itispossiblethatattacksonlocalsaresystematicallyunderreportedcomparedtoattacksoninternationalvessels.

Injuries and Deaths

TherewasoneseafarerreportedasbeingkilledaswellastwopiratedeathsassociatedwithWestAfricanpiracyagainstmerchantvesselsinthe2014OBPdataset.Thesedeathsoccurredduringthesameincident:anattackonMT SP Brusselswhichresultedinagunfightbetweenarmedguardsandthepirates.Theseafarerwhowaskilledappearstohaveattemptedtoretreattothecitadel,alongwithanotherwhowasinjured,buttheydidnotmakeitintimetoavoidthepirates.103Thecrewmemberwhodiedinthegunfight,VijaySinghRajput,wasaretirednavalengineerfromIndiawhohadjustsignedafour-monthcontractwiththeshippingcompany.104

102 See, e.g.,George,“OilTankersRunGauntlet”;Harper,“DangerZone:ChasingWestAfrica’sPirates.”

103 “WeeklyMaritimeSituationalReport,”OceanusLive.org,30August–5September,2014,v.3,No.36/14;“LivePiracy&ArmedRobberyReport2014,”IMB,https://www.icc-ccs.org/piracy-reporting-centre/live-piracy-report(accessedDecember15,2014).

104 “RetiredNavalEngineerKilledinAttackonthe‘SPBrussels’,”MarinersPlanetIndiaPvt.Ltd,6May2014,available athttps://www.linkedin.com/pulse/20140506114806-180247266-retired-naval-engineer-killed-in-the-pirate-attack-on-the-sp-brussels;P.Naveen,“PadhyaPradesh’sNavalEngineerKilledbyPiratesoffNigeria’sCoast,”Times of India,4May2014,http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/bhopal/Madhya-

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Overall,sevenattackshadinjuriesreported,affectinganunknownnumberofseafarers.OnemajorinjurywasreportedwhenpiratesattackedthefourthengineeraboardMTKerala,stabbinghiminthebackwithaknifeandthenhittinghimintheheadwiththebuttofagun.105AtleastonecrewmemberofMT Hai Soon 6wasinjured; YeoEuLooneofSingaporereportedthatwhenhisshipwashijackedinJulyhewasbeatenonnumerousoccasions,suchthathestillbearsscarsonhiskneesandarms.106

Hostages Held Captive

OneoftheprimarywaysthattheoperationsofpirategroupsinWestAfricadifferfromthoseofSomalipiratesisintheirapproachtokidnapping.UnlikeSomalipirates,whoprimarilykidnapseafarersforransomandholdthemforanextendedtime,WestAfricanpiratesmayholdseafarershostageforarelativelyshortperiodwhiletheylootthevesseloruseitforothercriminalpurposes.Toreflectthat,wehavedistinguishedbetweenhostage-takinginWestAfricabasedonthedurationofthetimethattheseafarerswereheld.Ineachcase,wedefinehostage-takingasasituationinwhichseafarersweredeprivedoftheirlibertybyarmedpiratesforatleastsomedefinedperiodoftime.Usingthisdefinition,170seafarersweredetainedorheldhostagein2014.

Hostages held for one day or less:59seafarersaboardthreevessels,MT Ungieshi,FV Marine 711,andMT SP Boston,werecapturedbypiratesandheldbrieflywhilethepirateslootedthevessel,siphonedoil,orbrieflyusedthevesselasamothership.

Hostages held for longer than one day and known to be released: 75seafarerswereheldhostagebypiratesforanextendedperiodoftime,downfrom95lastyear.Thedurationofcaptivityinourdatasetrangedfromtwodaystoeightdays,asignificantdeclinefromtheaveragein2013of22daysforseafarersheldforransomand17forthoseheldwhiletheirvesselwasusedasamothership.

Reasons why hostages were detained:Ofthe170hostages,26appeartohavebeentakenforkidnapandransom,66wereheldduringextendedrobberiesoroilsiphoningincidences,and78weretakenhostagewhilethepiratesusedtheirvesselasamothership.

Hostages Not Known To Be Released

ThereissignificantlylessinformationavailableaboutWestAfricanhostagesthanthereisaboutSomalipiracy.Asaresult,itisdifficulttostatewithcertaintythatweknowhowmanyhostagesweretaken,muchlesswhethertheyhavebeensubsequentlyreleasedorhowlongtheywereheldfor.Ourdatacontains23seafarerswhosereleasewehavebeenunabletoobtainanyinformationregarding.These23seafarerswerekidnappedoff10differentvessels.Themajorityarethecaptainorchiefengineerofthevessel.Inatleastonecase,aransomof$5millionwasdemandedforthereturnoftheTurkishcrewmembersofMalta-flaggedMTBasat,butitisunknownwhethertheseafarersofthisvesselwerereleased.Thesizeofthisdemandisunusualfortheregion,andmayreflectpiratessettinganunreasonablyhighopeningdemandratherthanarealisticcostfortheseafarers’release.However,giventhatthekidnapandransom“businessmodel”iswellestablishedinNigeria,itreasonabletoassume,asOBPdoesintheEconomicCostssection,thatatleastsomeransomwaspaidfortheirrelease.

Pradeshs-naval-engineer-killed-by-pirates-off-Nigerias-coast/articleshow/34618848.cms.105 “TankerHijackedoffAngolainJanReturned,Minus$8MillionofDiesel,”Reuters,25February2014,http://www.reuters.com/

article/2014/02/25/us-angola-sonangol-piracy-idUSBREA1O1IW20140225.106 PeiShanHoe,“CapturedandBeatenbyPirates,”AsiaOne,22October2014,http://news.asiaone.com/news/singapore/captured-beaten-

pirates.


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Physical Abuse

ViolenceinWestAfricanpiracyappearstobecommonandsignificant.Atleast55%ofincidentsinvolvedweaponsin2014,ofwhich70%werefirearms.Basedonthecasesofpiracyinwhichabusewasreported,atleast145seafarerswerepotentiallyabusedbypiratesin2014duringeightattacks.Thisestimatewasbasedonthenumberofcrewknowntobeaboardtheeightvesselsinwhichphysicalabusebypirateswasreported.Themajorityofinjuriessufferedbyseafarersoccurredwhenpiratesbeatcrewmembersastheyrobbedthevesselorsiphonedoil.Forinstance,NavigationOfficerRotimiGeorgereportedthatwhenhisvesselwasattackedbyNigerianpirates,manycrewmemberswerebeatenasthepirateslootedthevessel.107

Piratesalsophysicallyabusedhostagesduringtheircaptivities.InthecaseoftheMT Kerala hijacking,thefourthengineerwasstabbedandothercrewmemberswerebeatenwhilethevesselwascontrolledbypirates.108Similarly,YeoEuLooneofMTHai Soon 6describedthatthepiratessmashedhisheadwithaknifehandleuponboardingtheship,andthatwhilehewasahostagetheywouldregularlypunchhimintheabdomen,strikehimwiththebuttsoftheirrifles,orkickhimrepeatedly.109Afterninedaysofcaptivityandcountlessbeatings,hehadnearlylostanyhopeofmakingithomealive.110

Psychological Abuse

SeafarersintheGulfofGuineafacedsignificantlevelsofpsychologicalabuse,bothdirectandindirect,ofvaryingdegrees.Inatleasteightincidents,piratesdirectlythreatenedcrewmemberswithweapons.Forexample,whenMT Ungieshiwasboarded,twocrewmembersweretakenhostagebrieflyandtheirliveswerethreatened.Similarly,onMT SP Boston,theentirecrewwasheldhostagetemporarilyandthreatenedbypiratesarmedwithgunsduringthecommissionoftherobbery.

Theeffectsofthethreatsandotherpsychologicalabuseareapparentfromthereportsmadebytheimpactedseafarers.Forinstance,themasterofMT Keralawas“veryshocked”afterhewasthreatenedbythepiratesatgunpointwhilehewasontheground.111YeoEuLooneofMT Hai Soon 6 wasthreatenedandforcedatgunpointtorespondthatallwaswellwhenaNigerianNavyconvoyappearedandcalledouttothevessel.112Hesaysthatheisseekingpsychiatrictreatmenttohelphimrecoverfromtheordeal.113

RotimiGeorgedescribedthefearheexperiencedhidingfromthepirates,explaining,“Iwasscared.Iwasthinkingtheymightsinktheboat.Thatwouldbetheworstdeathformebecauseyouarehidingandyoudiethere.Iwouldn’twantsuchadeath.Iwouldwanttoseewhatiskillingme[rather]thanjusthideand

107 MaryHarper,“ChasingWestAfrica’sPirates,theDocumentary”BBC(audiopodcast),16November2014,http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p02bbxb2.

108 “LiberianRegistryConcludesKeralaHijackingInvestigation,”gCaptain,29May2014,http://gcaptain.com/liberian-registry-concludes-kerala-hijacking-investigation/.

109 Hoe,“CapturedandBeatenbyPirates.”110 Ibid.

111 “EngineerStabbedinPirateAttackNearLuanda,Angola,27CrewHeld,”SeaNews International Shipping Magazine,29January2014,http://www.seanews.com.tr/article/PIRACY/119861/Kerala/.

112 Hoe,“CapturedandBeatenbyPirates.”

113 Ibid.

Iwasscared.Iwasthinkingtheymight

sinktheboat.Thatwouldbetheworstdeathformebecauseyouarehidingandyoudiethere.Iwouldn’twantsuchadeath.Iwouldwanttoseewhatiskillingme[rather]thanjusthideanddie.It’sasaddeningexperiencebecauseyouwouldexpectmorefromlife.

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die.It’sasaddeningexperiencebecauseyouwouldexpectmorefromlife.”114

Piratesoftenshootintheairoratthehatches,sometimesinanefforttointimidatethecrewintounlockingstrategicdoorsonthevessel.Whenthepiratesareunabletostealthecargo,eitherbecauseitisnotvaluableorforlogisticalreasons,theywilloftenrobthecrewoftheirpossessions,potentiallycontributingtoseafarers’resultingemotionaldistress.

Atleast101seafarersaboardsevenvesselsweresubjectedtoattacksinvolvingpiratesusingthreats,violence,orotherformsofexplicitpsychologicalstressdistinctfromphysicalviolence.Itisnotclearifthisdropistheresultofreportingshortfallsorachangeinbehaviour,inadditiontothelowernumberofsuccessfulattacks.

Other Human Costs

Long-TermImpact

AsdiscussedinmoredetailinthesectiononthehumancostsofSomalipiracy,thereisbothstrongandincreasingevidencethatthekindsofabuseandstressassociatedwithpiracycanleadtolong-termdistressinseafarers.AsdiscussedintheLong-TermImpactStudysectionofthisreport,OBP’sanalysisofthelong-termimpactofpiracyonseafarersindicatesthat16.67%ofseafarerswhowereaboardvesselsattackedbypiratesshowedlong-termpost-traumaticstresssymptoms.Thiswouldmeanthatoftheestimated1,168seafarerswhowereexposedtoattackin2014,asmanyas194maybesufferingfromlong-termdistressin2015.

Forinstance,YeoEuLooneofMT Hai Soon 6 explainedinreferencetohishostageexperienceandbeingphysicallyabusedbythepiratesthat“[i]t’lltakeawhiletogetoverthis.”115Manyseafarerssubjectedtopiracyhavereportedcontemplatingsuicideafterwards,includingCaptainWrenThomas,whowasheldcaptivebypiratesinNigeriafor18days.Hediscussedthelastingimpactsafterhiscaptivity,explainingthat:

It was difficult not being able to find help or talk to anyone about my experience except friends and family….When I got home, I was on my own….Up until I got help and put on proper meds I wanted to end my life. Every time I was alone in my house, I was trying to figure out which gun I was going to use. When I was driving, I was trying to figure out how I could do it in my truck. I would get so engrossed in wanting to kill myself that I would get dizzy.116

Theseestimatednumbersofthosedistressedareinadditiontotheunknownnumberofseafarersandfamilymemberssufferinglastingdistressfrompreviousexposure.Forexample,whenthemotherandbrotherofYeoEuLoone,aseafareronMT Hai Soon 6, wereinformedofthevessel’shijacking,theybothexperiencedsignificantdistress.Hisbrotherexplained,“MymumspenteverydaycryingwhenshefirstfoundoutaboutthehijackingfromHai Soon,”andhe“wasataloss;ItreateditasifIhadalreadylostmybrotherandwaspreparedfortheworst.”UponhearingthatMr.Loonewasreleased,theybothbrokedownwithemotion.117

Mostimportantly,asthemajorityofpsychologicalservicesprovidedbyinternationalseafarerorganizationsarefocusedonhostagescapturedbySomalipirates,inadditiontothefactthatpiracyattacksappeartobesignificantlyunderreportedintheregion,itislikelythatmostseafarerssubjectedtopsychologicalabuseorstressarenotreceivinganytypeoftreatmentnecessarytoaddresspotentiallastingdistress.

114 Harper,“ChasingWestAfrica’sPirates,theDocumentary.”


116 Almeida,“KidnappedOffNigeria.”



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ImpactonWestAfricanCitizens

Inadditiontoitsimpactoninternationalseafarers,piracyhashadasignificanthumancostonlocalcommunitiesinWestAfrica.Piracyhasreportedlycausedadeclineinlocalfishing,afinanciallosstoWestAfricansduetosubstantiallyreducedfishingabilityandhavinggoodsstolenbypirates,andageneralsenseoffearandinstabilityinmanylocals.Fishermenfromnumerousregionsclaimtheyhavebeenstarvingsincetheironlymeansoflivelihoodhasbeenaffectedbypirates.118Forinstance,aNigerianshrimptrawlercaptainexplainedthathenolongerventuresfarfromthecoastduetopirateattacks,whichwere“toomanytocount.”119Hehasseenmanyfellowcaptainskidnappedandsometimeskilled.120Similarly,inBayelsaState,Nigerianlocalshaveclaimedthat“[p]iratesrampaginginthecreeksofBayelsaStatearedenyingfellowIjawsoftheirlivesandproperty.”121

Mr.EdetAmba,afishermanwholosttwoofhisoutboardenginestopirates,explainedthathewithdrewthreeofhischildrenfromtheirprivateschoolsbecausehecouldnolongergofishingforfearofbeingkilledbythepirates.122IntheOronnationregion,thebeachmarketwhichhasusuallyhadfullstallshasbeendesertedandboatsarenolongerberthingatthebeach.123Localtradersareespeciallyvulnerabletopiratesbecausethereisnobankattheport;theycarrycashandoftenloseseveralmillionnairatopirates.124Additionally,piratessometimesstealtheirboats,throwingoccupantsintothewater.125Alocalman,ObongEdetOkonEkpong,explainedthat,“InthepasttwoyearsIhavewitnessedalotofattacksbypiratesresultingin[lotsoflossof]livesandproperty….Inoneincident,awoman,whowantedtoprotecthermoney,putitinsideherchild’snapkinwhiletravelingandasthepiratesmetthem,theyfoundthemoneythere,theytookthemoneyandthrewthechildintotheoceanandhedrowned.Amanintheboat,whohadn’tmoney,hadhiswristdowntothefingersseveredbythepirates.”126

ThedisparateimpactonWestAfricansunderscoresthenecessityofreportingandprosecutingsuspectedpirates.However,reportingisdifficultduetothelocalsbeingconcernedaboutreprisals,aswellaslimitationsrelatedtotheveryspecificdefinitionsofpiracyrequiredforreportingbymostinternationalorganizationsandreportingcenters.Moreover,althoughnumeroussuspectedpirateshavebeenarrested,itisunclearwhetheranyprosecutionofthosesuspectshasoccurred.Ultimately,becausereportingandprosecutionofpirateattacksareproblematicwithinWestAfrica,thehumancostsrelatedtopiracywilllikelyremainforsometimeandwillcontinuetosignificantlyimpactlocals.

118 EtimEkpimah,“FishermenGroanasPiratesTakeOvertheSeas,”Punch,23June2014,http://www.punchng.com/metro-plus/fishermen-groan-as-pirates-take-over-the-seas/.

119 “TheWatersAroundSomaliaareCalmer,ButPiracyinWestAfricaisRising,”The Economist,29November2014,http://www.economist.com/

news/middle-east-and-africa/21635049-waters-around-somalia-are-calmer-piracy-west-africa-rising?fsrc=scn/tw_ec/the_ungoverned_seas.

120 Ibid.

121 SamuelOyadongha,“Piracy:BayelsansBegGovernmenttoDeclareStateofEmergencyonWaterways,”Vanguard,23July2014,http://www.vanguardngr.com/2014/07/piracy-bayelsans-beg-government-declare-state-emergency-waterways/.

122 Ekpimah,“FishermenGroanasPiratesTakeOvertheSeas.”

123 UdemeUtip-Uyo,“Piracy:TheManyAgoniesofOronNation,”Nigerian Tribune,1October2014,availableathttp://www.neptunemaritimesecurity.com/piracy-many-agonies-oron-nation/.

124 Ibid.

125 Ibid.

126 Ibid.

InthepasttwoyearsIhavewitnessedalot

ofattacksbypiratesresultingin[lotsoflossof]livesandproperty.

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CONCLUSIONCollectively,ouranalysisofthehumancostofWestAfricanpiracyin2014suggeststhatreportingchallengescomplicatetheabilityofinternationalobserverstoeffectivelyidentifylong-termtrends.Withthatcaveat,therewasadeclineinthereportednumbersofattacksoffWestAfricain2014.Ratesofviolenceremainparticularlyhigh,andanincreaseinreportedattacksandassociatedviolenceinriverineareassuggeststhatthedeclineinnumbersmaybedrivenmorebyunderreportingthanbyanactualdecreaseinattacks.

Regardlessofwhetherthedeclineisduetoanactualdeclineinattacksornot,piracyin2014andtheeffectsofpre-2014piracyhadasignificanthumanimpactonseafarers.Thelastingimpactofabuse,injury,andstressrelatedtopirateactivityforthoseseafarersdirectlyattackedislikelytobesignificant,andthecommunity-levelimpactonWestAfricahasbeensevere.AsnotedbyCaptainWrenThomas,“SomethingmorehastobedonetoprotectthemenandwomenwhoworkoffthecoastofWestAfricaandthentoprovideforthemwhentheyreturnfromaneventlikethis.”127

127 AlastairJamiesonandTracyConnor,“KidnappedCaptain:HowISurvivedDenofCrack-SmokingPirates,”NBC News,4April2014,http://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/kidnapped-captain-how-i-survived-den-crack-smoking-pirates-n71851.

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OBP has expanded its analysis into an assessment of the human cost of Southeast Asian piracy and maritime crime. The recent increase in the number of incidents of piracy and armed robbery against ships in Southeast Asia as reported by both the ReCAAP Information Sharing Centre (ISC) and the IMB Piracy Reporting Centre (PRC) raises significant concerns about the threat faced by seafarers in the region. The ReCAAP ISC in its 2014 Annual Report notes that there has been an increase in the number of Category 1 incidents, which are considered “Very Significant” based on the level of violence and/or the economic loss incurred. This is up from 2 in 2013 to 13 in 2014.1 According to the IMB PRC, “There’s a risk that the attacks and violence could increase if left unabated.”2

1 The ReCAAP ISC classifies all incidents into one of four categories based on an assessment of the intensity of violence involved in the attack, and the economic impact of the crime. ReCAAP ISC, Annual Report 1st January – 31st December 2014: Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in Asia (Singapore: ReCAAP ISC, 2014), 10, 47, available at http://www.recaap.org/Portals/0/docs/Reports/2014/ReCAAP%20ISC%20Annual%20Report%202014.pdf.

2 “One Coastal Tanker Hijacked Every Two Weeks in Coastal Asia,” ICC Commercial Crime Services, 21 April 2015, https://icc-ccs.org/news/1096-report-piracy-and-armed-robbery-against-ships-q1-2015.

THE STATE OF MARITIME PIRACY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA OVERVIEW



• OBP estimates that 40% of the seafarers affected by piracy were from countries within the SE Asia region.

• Physical abuse of seafarers was reported in 28% of incidents.

• The kidnapping for ransom model is absent in SE Asia, so pirates often show a callous disregard for seafarers.

• The complex nature of maritime jurisdictions in the region presents many challenges for the reporting and classification of events.

• SE Asia recorded the highest rate of successful attacks of the three regions OBP assessed in this year’s report.

• 93% boarding rate in SE Asia could be affected by reporting ambiguities and vulnerable shipping patterns.

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Our analysis shows that 93% of all reported attacks result in successful boarding of the victim vessel by criminals, significantly increasing the risk of direct, often violent, interaction between pirates and seafarers. Specifically, physical abuse was reported in 49 incidents (28% of all successful incidents), which resulted in the death of five seafarers and in 136 seafarers being forcibly detained. The data compiled by OBP also indicate that Southeast Asian piracy and armed robbery disproportionality impacts seafarers from non-OECD countries as well as seafarers from regional countries. Alarmingly, Southeast Asian pirates also achieved a 60% (103 of 173 successful boardings) success rate in stealing cargo or other property, including seafarers’ personal belongings. This represents the highest rates of boardings and successes per incident of any of the three regions OBP assessed for this year’s report.

Though the risk of piracy varies from region to region based on the volume of vessel traffic, this data demonstrates that in the event of a piracy or armed robbery attack, the chance of direct contact with pirates is significantly higher in Southeast Asia than in the Gulf of Guinea or Western Indian Ocean Region. Although in 21 of the successful boardings pirates escaped without any interaction with the crew, this was not the case for the remaining 164 incidents. Seafarers who experience direct contact with pirates face a high risk of abuse. Of the successful boardings, nearly one-third involved some form of violence, such as victims being assaulted, tied up, blindfolded, threatened, detained against their will, or experiencing other forms of physical or psychological abuse.

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Summary of Attacks

Based on research from a number of sources, OBP catalogued 185 incidents within our area of interest.3 OBP’s dataset excludes instances in which the target vessel is berthed in port, is in the riverine, or explicitly fails the “two boat rule” mandated by UNCLOS Article 101’s definition of piracy. OBP’s dataset also excludes incidents listed as “suspicious activity.” The full OBP dataset can be found in Appendix L. Of these 185 attacks, 173 incidents resulted in criminals successfully boarding the target vessel, with 164 cases, or 89% of the total, involving direct confrontation between the robbers and crews.

Southeast Asia is a very large region; the length of Indonesia alone spans more than 2,800 nm. By comparison, the

coastline between the Horn of Africa and the Cape of Good Hope is 3,300 nm long. A massive amount of vessel traffic flows through the Southeast Asian region, as demonstrated by AIS data indicating that over 4,000 ships can be in the Malacca and Singapore Straits at any given time. As another comparison, the size of the High Risk Area related to Somali piracy is 4 million square nm, while the area of interest used for Southeast Asia in this report is nearly as large: roughly 3.5 million square nm.4 Unlike Somali piracy, which occurs almost entirely in international waters, attacks on vessels in the SE Asia AOI primarily take place within the territorial seas, archipelagic waters, and Exclusive Economic Zones of at least nine different countries.5

Piracy and armed robbery against ships in the SE Asia AoI primarily follows three primary models, which, in addition to varying economic impacts, usually involve differing levels of violence and abuse.

3 Primary Models of SE Asia Piracy

3 Our sources include ReCAAP ISC, IMO, IMB, Oceanus, ONI, Suritech, and various open source news articles. For a full list of incidents, please see Appendix L: Master List of Events.

4 For the purpose of this report, OBP’s Southeast Asia Area of Interest (SE Asia AoI) is bounded by 21°30’N, 94°15’E; 10°S, 94°15’E; 21°30’N,

141°E; 10°S 141°E, excluding the Exclusive Economic Zones of Myanmar and Taiwan, as shown in Figure 1.

5 As stated in the definitions section at the beginning of this report, the terms “pirate” and “piracy” are used in a colloquial manner as opposed to a technically legal one. This is due to the fact that the definition of piracy, as traditionally defined by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), is a very narrow one. Many of the attacks counted and discussed within Southeast Asia are in fact “armed robbery” at sea, or a related form of maritime crime, because they fall within 12 nautical miles of a coastal country.

Figure 1: SoP 2014 SE Asia Area of Interest (AOI)

Incidents where pirates sneak aboard a vessel to steal effects from the ship’s stores or from

the crew’s personal belongings without direct confrontation

with the crew.

Incidents where pirates, frequently armed with firearms or knives, directly confront

the crew while stealing ship stores and equipment and the crew’s personal

effects, which routinely involves forcibly detaining and abusing the seafarers.

Incidents where armed pirates rob the vessel of its cargo, particularly marine fuels

and palm oil for resale, while holding the crew hostage for an extended period of

time by use or threat of violence.

THEFT AGGRAVATED ROBBERY HOSTAGE-TAKING ANDCARGO THEFT

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Though superficially similar to Gulf of Guinea piracy, the absence of a kidnap for ransom model among pirate gangs in Southeast Asia means that criminals have no financial incentive to refrain from using violence against crews. 6 This is particularly true in relation to cargo theft incidents where the robbers need prolonged time aboard the vessel while transferring cargo. Consequently, the crew is often tied up, blindfolded, detained, or physically abused during this process.7

6 Kidnap for ransom does occur in Southeast Asia. However, these incidents are generally related to insurgent and terrorist groups operating in the region. Though these incidents frequently resemble piracy, primarily targeting Westerners on yachts, they fail to meet UNCLOS’s Article 101 definitional requirement that the act be committed for private ends. These incidents are more appropriately categorized as political violence and are not covered in this report. For an example of ransoming by a political group, one can look to the incident where two German nationals were kidnapped from their yacht by a terrorist organization; “Philippine Police Identify Militants Who Seized 2 German Tourists, to File Criminal Complaints,” The Associated Press, 5 November 2014, http://www.foxnews.com/world/2014/11/05/philippine-police-identify-militants-who-seized-2-german-tourists-to-file/; “Philippine Militants Free Two German Hostages,” Reuters, 17 October 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/10/17/us-philippines-militants-idUSKCN0I607S20141017.

7 ReCAAP ISC, Annual Report, 3.

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THE HUMAN COST OF MARITIME PIRACY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Nationality of Seafarers Attacked in 2014

OBP identified 185 attacks in 2014 in the SE Asia AOI defined in Figure 1, and in those, the nationality of 1,551 seafarers was reported to the IMB. The five nations whose seafarers were most frequently on vessels attacked by pirates were the Philippines (458 seafarers, 29.5%), India (423 seafarers, 27.7%), China (167, 10.8%), Thailand (112, 7.2%), and Indonesia (105, 6.5%). In total, more than one-third were from the SE Asia AoI and more than 90% were from Asia.8

Overall, by using the average number of crew members per vessel-type for the attacks where the exact number of crew members is unavailable, OBP estimates that 3,654 seafarers were affected by piracy in the SE Asia AoI in 2014.9 According to IMB data, seafarers from 43 different countries were aboard vessels attacked by pirates.10 The data shows that over 88.6% of all seafarers whose vessels were attacked hail

8 Countries within the OBP SE Asia AoI are Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, Palau, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Timor-Leste, and Vietnam.

9 The estimated number of seafarers is calculated using data obtained primarily from the IMB. Of the 185 incidents, only 136 vessels reported their crew size. Of those, only 78 reported the exact composition of nationalities of their crew. There were 49 vessels which reported the nationalities aboard, but did not indicate the numerical breakdown of those nationalities. The estimated number of crew members aboard all vessels attacked in 2014 was arrived at by taking the known number of seafarers on each vessel type, creating an average amount of seafarers aboard particular vessel types, and then using that average crew size for that vessel type when crew size was not reported. There were 2,802 seafarers known to be aboard the 185 vessels attacked in 2014.

10 Note that crew nationalities were not specified in each reported incident. This number, therefore, only includes incidents where nationalities and number of seafarers are known. The 43 reported countries of nationality include: Bangladesh, Bulgaria, China, Croatia, Denmark, Egypt, Estonia, Ethiopia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mexico, Montenegro, Myanmar, Netherlands, Pakistan, the Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Singapore, Slovenia, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, Tuvalu, the United Kingdom, Ukraine, and Vietnam.

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from non-Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries. Previous Human Cost of Piracy reports have shown that post-attack resources available to seafarers from non-OECD countries have been consistently fewer than those available in OECD nations. (As another indication of this trend, the vast majority of “High-Risk” hostages held in Somalia have come from non-OECD countries). Additionally, as more than one-third of all incidents involved seafarers living within the SE Asia AoI, these individuals may be citizens of the country within whose territorial waters they were attacked. Due to the close proximity of attacker and victim, there is a significant increase in the possibility of post-attack intimidation and additional anxiety for seafarers from the region.

Attacks in Bangladesh

OBP did not include the attacks off Bangladesh in its primary dataset for two reasons. First, Bangladeshi maritime crime is geographically distinct from the rest of Southeast Asian piracy. It is also a separate issue with different drivers, models, actors, and solutions. Bangladeshi piracy and maritime crime are important to acknowledge in their own right due to the extremely violent and disturbing issues they represent. A substantial amount of violence is directed at local fishermen who do not have the resources to defend themselves or advocate for meaningful change to prevent such attacks. Mujibur Rahman, Chairman of Cox’s Bazar District Fishing Trawler Owners Association, estimated that in the last five years, pirates have killed at least 411 fishermen and wounded at least 1,000 more.

In 2014, there were 28 reported attacks in Bangladesh against 10 bulk carriers, 9 tankers, 3 container vessel, 2 tugs, 1 car carrier, and 3 local fishing vessels. In each attack, the vessel was successfully boarded and robberies occurred in 23 of the 26 incidents. These attacks impacted an estimated 529 seafarers from 15 nations. Of those, we have nationality data for 311; the majority of the seafarers were from the Philippines (108, 37.2%), followed by Bangladesh (50, 17.2%), India (46, 14.8%), Ukraine (29, 9.3%), and Romania (19, 6.1%).

The attacks in Bangladesh are particularly violent. For instance, pirates attacked 36 fishermen aboard three trawlers and hacked two fishermen to death, then threw 10 others into the sea. They are presumed dead. Only a few days before, 15–20 pirates had attacked local fishermen, who defended themselves by gouging out the eyes of 13 of the pirates.

While this report does not include a full examination of Bangladeshi piracy, we hope to be able to include one in the future given the grave nature of this issue.

Sources: International Policy Digest, Financial Express, and the Dhaka Tribune.11

Injuries and Deaths

In 2014, five seafarers were killed by pirates in the SE Asia AoI. On FV Ronald, three robbers in a speedboat ordered the two crewmen off the ship, and only one of the crew members was later rescued. Similarly, on FV Glen Mar-B, the crew jumped into the water when fired upon by pirates, resulting in the death of the vessel’s captain, and in another crew member being reported as missing and presumed dead. The three deceased crew members from each of these fishing vessels were from the Philippines. When the tug Ever Alpha was boarded by robbers, one of the crew members, whose nationality is unknown, was pushed overboard but his body was never found. Finally, during the robbery of MT VP Asphalt 2 pirates shot one of the Vietnamese crew members, Third Engineer Tran Duc Dat, in the head, and he subsequently died in a Singapore hospital.

Crew members reported receiving major injuries in six incidents and minor injuries in 20 incidents in which, overall, a minimum of 23 seafarers were injured. Of those injuries, the

11 Anurug Chakma, “Maritime Piracy in Bangladesh,” International Policy Digest, 24 June 2014, http://www.internationalpolicydigest.org/2014/06/24/maritime-piracy-bangladesh/; “2 Fishermen Killed by Pirates, 15 Rescued,” Financial Express, 28 August 2014, http://www.thefinancialexpress-bd.com/2014/08/28/52987; “Eyes of 6 Pirates Gouged out in Hatia,” Dhaka Tribune, 21 August 2014, http://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/2014/aug/21/eyes-6-pirates-gouged-out.

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majority occurred when pirates either assaulted the crew or tied them up during the robbery of the vessel. There are indications that reports have underrepresented the extent of injuries and assaults on seafarers affected by these attacks. On MT Ji Xiang, one Indonesian crew member was shot in the neck by the pirates, but was officially reported as having received only “minor injuries.”12 Two Vietnamese seafarers aboard MT Sunrise 689 sustained injuries while being held captive by pirates for a week, with one suffering from broken toes and a broken knee cap and the other from a sprained ankle.13 While robbing MV Jules Point, the pirates tied up the duty officer, put a bag over his head, and beat him, which reportedly resulted in minor injuries. Similarly, on Dews 3 the entire crew was tied up with their faces covered while the pirates slapped and punched them, resulting in an unknown number of injuries.

Hostages Held Captive

Pirate groups in Southeast Asia differ from both Somali and West African pirates in their methods related to hostage-taking. Somali pirates typically kidnap seafarers to obtain a cash ransom, and West African pirates engage in a kidnap-for-ransom business model as well, primarily targeting the most senior crew members. Conversely, Southeast Asian pirates almost exclusively hold crews hostage for the sole purpose of detaining them during the commission of the crime. Southeast Asian pirates tend to tie up the crew and, in many cases, place bags over their heads, which increases the level of anxiety during the attack.

We have separated the hostage-taking incidents in the SE Asia AoI based on the duration of time that the seafarers were held. In each case, we define hostage-taking as a situation in which seafarers were deprived of their liberty by pirates. Using this definition, we have calculated that 289 seafarers from 43 separate incidents were detained or held hostage in 2014:

Hostages held for a day or less: 165 seafarers aboard 32 vessels were captured by pirates and held briefly while the pirates looted the vessel, stole the cargo, or siphoned oil. The ReCAAP ISC Annual Report for 2014 indicates that during these incidents, pirates remained aboard for between four and ten hours.14

Hostages held for longer than a day and known to be released: 109 seafarers were held hostage by pirates for an extended period of time, ranging between 2–13 days, during nine separate attacks. Among all of the incidents, the average amount of time the seafarers were held was five days and pirates held the crews hostage while looting the vessel, stealing cargo, or siphoning oil.

Hostages not confirmed to be released: The fate of at least 15 hostages from two vessels remains unknown. Three Indonesian hostages were taken from MT Naniwa Maru 1, including the captain and chief engineer. No ransom was demanded for the crew and it has been speculated that it is possible that some or all of the crew may have been colluding with the pirates.15 Additionally, 12 crew members are presumed missing from MT Galuh Pusaka, which was found abandoned in the South China Sea.

12 “Indonesian Crew Shot in Pirate Attack Off Pengerang,” Malay Mail Online, 26 July 2014, http://www.themalaymailonline.com/malaysia/article/indonesian-crew-shot-in-pirate-attack-off-pengerang; “Anti-Shipping Activity Messages,” National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, http://msi.nga.mil/NGAPortal/MSI.portal?_nfpb=true&_pageLabel=msi_portal_page_65 (accessed November 10, 2014) (use date filter in query box, narrowing date range to 2014).

13 “Vietnamese Tanker Captain Tells of Harrowing Pirate Ordeal,” OceanusLive.org, 10 October 2014, http://www.oceanuslive.org/Main/ViewNews.aspx?uid=00000927.

14 ReCAAP ISC, Annual Report, 30.

15 “Pirates Kidnap 3 Indonesians From Tanker off Malaysia,” Khabar Southeast Asia, 24 April 2014, http://khabarsoutheastasia.com/en_GB/articles/apwi/articles/newsbriefs/2014/04/24/newsbrief-03; Farik Zolkepli, Natasha Joibi, and Nadirah H. Rodzi, “Cops Suspect Captain and Chiefs in RM8mil High-Sea Diesel Theft,” Star Online, 24 April 2014, http://www.thestar.com.my/News/Nation/2014/04/24/Cops-suspect-capt-and-chiefs-Skipper-first-mate-and-head-engineer-missing-after-pirates-flee/.


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Regardless of the amount of time or the reasons why hostages are held captive, the impact upon them can be significant. For example, Captain Thiwa Saman of MT Orapin 4 recalled that when his fuel tanker was hijacked by pirates, he was wrenched from his sleep by men with guns and swords banging on his cabin door.16 Captain Saman and his crew of 14 Thai seafarers were held for four days and he explained that afterwards, the crew was so shaken by the attack that nobody was ready to return to work.17 Out of 173 successful boardings, 25% involved the detention of hostages, demonstrating a significant impact upon seafarers.

Physical Abuse

Violence or the threat of violence against seafarers in the SE Asia AoI occurs frequently and in various forms. Of 185 incidents, 51% of attacks involved the use of weapons, at least 29% of which involved the use of firearms. Explicit physical abuse was reported in 49 of 173 boardings, impacting an estimated 833 seafarers who were present when abuse occurred. Abuse typically involved pirates assaulting, tying up, slapping, and punching the crew. At a minimum, pirates are known to have tied up at least 136 seafarers during 24 separate attacks.

The pirates also frequently used bags and blindfolds to cover the crew members’ faces, and occasionally pushed sailors overboard. For example, while attempting to siphon oil from tanker MT Dews 3, pirates slapped and punched the crew before tying them up and covering their faces. Crew members were beaten by pirates during attacks on MT Nordic Anne, MTS Many Plus 12, and MV Jules Point. During the initial attack by pirates on MT Sunrise 689, Thai crew member Luong Dai Thanh was assaulted, resulting in several broken toes and a broken kneecap.18 Captain Nguyen Quyet Thang recalled that the pirates “were aggressive, brandishing guns and swinging knives” and that they only fed the crew once a day.19

Psychological Abuse

Seafarers in the SE Asia AoI experienced both direct and indirect psychological abuse. Unlike typical Somali piracy, where psychological abuse is more explicit, most abuse in Southeast Asia appears to occur indirectly for crew members who are threatened by pirates or when hostages are detained during robberies or oil siphoning. Approximately 965 seafarers were onboard 55 vessels where psychological abuse occurred, with an estimated 3,241 seafarers aboard vessels where the crew had some form of contact with pirates when they were attacked, whether visual contact or a direct confrontation, as opposed to 413 seafarers who had no contact with pirates.20

As many as 405 seafarers were aboard 22 vessels during attacks where pirates directly threatened the crew with weapons, and another 317 were exposed to psychological stress distinct from physical violence, such as being tied up or being forced to help the pirates. At least 136 seafarers experienced situations where the pirates took the crew hostage, tied them up, and, in the case of 29 seafarers, placed bags over their heads or blindfolded them. The 11 crew members of MT Srikandi 515 were tied up and blindfolded after their vessel was captured by pirates. They were then locked in a room for 13 days and, eventually, thrown into a life raft by the pirates and set adrift in the sea before being rescued by a Malaysian fisherman.21

16 Andrew RC Marshall, “Piracy Attacks Surge in SE Asia’s Dreaded Malacca Straits,” Independent.ie, 11 June 2014, http://www.independent.ie/business/world/piracy-attacks-surge-in-se-asias-dreaded-malacca-straits-30422796.html.

17 Ibid.

18 “Vietnamese Tanker Captain Tells of Harrowing Pirate Ordeal.”

19 Ibid.; “Captain of Hijacked Vietnam Oil Tanker Recalls Horror of Attack,” Tuoitrenews.vn, 9 October 2014, http://tuoitrenews.vn/society/23116/captain-of-hijacked-vietnam-oil-tanker-recalls-horror-of-attack.

20 For purposes of this report, OBP considers that seafarers are exposed to psychological abuse when pirates directly threaten crew members,

tie up the crew, detain them against their will, cover their faces, force the crew to help them conduct the robbery or sail the ship to commit piratical acts against other vessels, or physically abuse the crew. Seafarers were considered to have “no contact” with pirates when the incident description identified that a robbery had occurred and the pirates had escaped “unnoticed.”

21 Milton Stuards, “Crew Held in Captivity for 13 Days Found, Tanker Srikandi 515 Missing,” Vessel Finder, 27 October 2014, http://www.vesselfinder.com/news/2448-Crew-held-in-captivity-for-13-days-found-tanker-Srikandi-515-missing.

[The pirates] were aggressive, brandishing

guns and swinging knives

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Long-Term ImpactThe high degree of violence associated with attacks in the SE Asia AOI underscores the likelihood of long-term impact on affected seafarers: research has established that severe emotional distress during an attack is more likely than less severe emotional distress to lead to long-term impacts. While the severity of the violence associated with an attack does not necessarily line up with the level of emotional distress experienced, in general the higher rates of violence and threats in Southeast Asian piracy would be likely to lead to higher rates of long-term impact.

As previously discussed, the existing research on the long-term impact of piracy is not well developed, and we have not been able to identify any research specifically on the long-term impact of Southeast Asian piracy on seafarers. However, our finding that seafarers attacked by pirates show long-term post-traumatic stress rates of 16.7% would suggest that as many as 610 seafarers attacked by pirates in 2014 will experience symptoms of PTSD or depression.22 Concern about pirate attacks in the SE Asia AOI may lead seafarers concerned about piracy in the region to decline jobs.23

The impact of piracy extends to the families of seafarers. Many seafarers are the primary providers for their families, and have little training or experience that is transferable to other industries. If seafarers are unable to return to sea, due either to psychological issues or pressure from their families, this may cause both financial hardship and feelings of inadequacy because they are no longer able to adequately support their families.24 As Captain Thiwa Saman, who was attacked by pirates in 2012, explains: “My family don’t want me to go back (to sea) [now] because it’s too risky,” explaining that pirates now often carry guns instead of knives.25 An example of the increased risk firearms place on seafarers’ lives is what happened on VP Asphalt 2 in December of 2014, where the armed criminals who boarded the vessel injured one crew member, then shot and killed Third Engineer Tran Duc Dat, a Vietnamese seafarer. When Mr. Dat’s body was repatriated to Vietnam his relatives greeted the plane, and his five-year-old daughter, holding a photograph of her father, repeatedly asked, “Where is my dad?”26

CONCLUSIONPiracy and armed robbery in Southeast Asia is characterized by the high likelihood that pirates will be successful in boarding a vessel once they attack: 93.5% of attacks resulted in pirates making it onto the vessel. This dramatically increases the risk of crews being subjected to physical and psychological violence. This is particularly true in incidents where pirates attack a vessel with the goal of stealing its cargo and, therefore, need to stay on the vessel for a prolonged period of time. A majority of the attacks in 2014 involved the use of weapons, further escalating the risk of injuries or death. Seafarers were detained against their will by pirates in one-quarter of successful boardings, and pirates regularly tied up, beat, and blindfolded crews. Overall, 28% of all successful boardings resulted in physical violence against seafarers and at least five seafarers were killed by pirates in the SE Asia AoI in 2014.

The human cost of piracy remains impossible to truly quantify. However, the impacts of piracy beyond the actual attack are long lasting. Based on preliminary numbers from an upcoming OEF study, it is estimated that more than 600 of the seafarers whose vessels were attacked in 2014 could experience lasting depression or symptoms of PTSD, potentially causing them to lose their primary source of income and their livelihoods as a direct result of being attacked by pirates in Southeast Asia. As is the case with piracy off the east and west coasts of Africa, the seafarers who encounter pirates are predominantly from non-OECD countries and often lack the resources needed after an attack. This also affects families who often rely financially on the income of the seafarer in their family.

22 For more information on this topic, please see the study in the Long-Term Impact section of this report.

23 See the study in the Long-Term Impact section of this report for more information.

24 See Interview with Leonardo Hoy-Carrasco from the UNODC on April 15, 2015.

25 Andrew RC Marshall, “Petro-pirates Plague Busy Southeast Asia Shipping Lanes,” Reuters, 9 July 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/07/09/us-indonesia-pirates-idUSKBN0FE19K20140709.

26 “Body of Sailor Killed by Pirates off Singapore Returned to Vietnam,” Tuoitrenews.vn, 11 December 2014, http://tuoitrenews.vn/society/24599/body-of-sailor-killed-by-pirates-off-singapore-returned-to-vietnam.

My family don’t want me to go back (to sea) [now]

because it’s too risky

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LONG-TERM IMPACT OF PIRACY ON SEAFARERS The cost of piracy may endure for quite a while after the attack itself: pirate attacks are extremely stressful events, and they may have long-lasting impacts. As discussed in the human cost sections of this report, a developing body of research exists demonstrating that some seafarers do experience lasting impacts from their piracy-related experiences that can hamper their abilities to return to happy and healthy lives. This research has tended to focus on seafarers held hostage by pirates, and the specific rates and lasting impact of piracy on seafarers in general is not yet known. To address this, OBP has for several years been conducting a study of the long-term impact of piracy on seafarers. This project is being conducted by OBP in partnership with the Maritime Piracy Humanitarian Response Programme and the Jaime C. Bulatao, SJ Center for Psychology Services at Ateneo de Manila University, and previous OBP State of Piracy reports have included information from interviews with seafarers about the impact of piracy and predictors of long-term distress.1 The data reported this year extend this to examine the impact on seafarers who were not held hostage, but who were instead exposed to piracy in other ways.

Our analysis of the data suggests that the long-term impact of piracy affects more than just seafarers directly exposed to piracy, but also indicates that those seafarers who transited the Western Indian Ocean Region HRA or who otherwise experienced some form of indirect exposure similarly demonstrate significant stress from these events. The threat of piracy, and the associated fear, may be enough to cause lasting psychological issues in at least some seafarers.

RESuLTS FROM CuRRENT SuRvEY

Long-Term Impact on Seafarers

An analysis of our extended sample finds that the long-term impact of piracy is not limited to those who have been held hostage. We looked at two of the most common impacts of traumatic events: post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and serious depression. While those seafarers in our sample who had the most extreme exposure to violence were the most likely to have post-traumatic stress symptomatology consistent with PTSD,2 less-direct forms of exposure also resulted in at least some seafarers showing significant signs of PTSD. Of the seafarers in our sample with survey scores consistent with PTSD, only half had been attacked by pirates and even fewer had actually been held hostage.

Similar findings were visible for probable depression: the results show that while seafarers held hostage by pirates were at greater risk of developing long-term problems, people with a variety of kinds of exposure demonstrated persistent psychological

1 See Kaija Hurlburt et al., Human Cost of Maritime Piracy 2012 (Broomfield, CO: One Earth Future Foundation, 2013), available at http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/publications/human-cost-maritime-piracy-2012; Jens Vestergaard Madsen et al., The State of Maritime Piracy (Broomfield, CO: One Earth Future Foundation, 2014), available at http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/publications/state-maritime-piracy-2013. These data were collected as a part of an ongoing research project on the long-term impact of piracy on seafarers that is funded by One Earth Future and the TK Foundation.

2 See Appendix K for technical information about the survey including how probable PTSD and probable depression were coded.

5

10

15

20

25

Transited a Risk Area

PERC

ENT

Probable PTSD

Probable Depression

Attacked, not held

Attacked and held hostage

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problems. For depression, it is important to acknowledge that it may be unrelated to pirate attacks – and indeed 17.65% of the non-exposed sample showed probable depression.

Exposure Number Number probable PTSD

Rate Number probable depression

Rate

No exposure 17 - - 3 17.65%Know a hostage, no other exposure 44 3 6.82% 0 0.00%Transited, no other exposure 48 4 8.33% 3 6.25%Viewed an attack but not attacked directly 4 0 0.00% 1 25.00%Attacked directly, not held 6 1 16.67% 1 16.67%Attacked and held hostage 31 6 19.35% 7 22.58%

The impact of indirect exposure reflects the significant stress and fear that some seafarers experience due to piracy. Developing research on post-traumatic stress has suggested that indirect exposure to traumatic events can lead to long-term impacts similar to those of direct exposure. For example, one study following Americans who had no direct exposure to the September 11th attacks found that quite a few people experienced sufficient fear related to the attacks that they showed symptoms of post-traumatic distress mirroring PTSD.3 There is evidence that for at least some seafarers, transiting high-risk areas or knowing someone held hostage by pirates can induce fear and stress significant enough to cause a similar impact.

An author aboard a vessel transiting the WIOR HRA noted that the “tension of pirate watch is hard on the crew” such that “[s]ome are genuinely unnerved, and being unnerved for a week out of every month is not nothing.”4 This may be due to the extraordinary measures implemented during the journey across the HRA, as demonstrated by one ship requiring the crew to perform “pirate watch” duty, covering all cabin windows with blackout blinds, and the captain ordering that they stay at least four miles away from small craft and “trust no one.”5 Beyond actual measures, the BMP4 guide itself may cause apprehension among seafarers in that it details that “there remains a serious and continuing threat from piracy,” “pirates increasingly fire at the bridge of a vessel,” pirates are increasingly using “small arms fire and rocket propelled grenades,” and that “pirates are likely to be aggressive, highly agitated, and possibly under the influence of drugs (including khat, an amphetamine-like stimulant).”6 According to a study by the Seamen’s

Church Institute, “when seafarers were asked if they felt they received adequate ‘mental preparation’ for traversing known zones of piracy, almost all respondents said they did not.”7 OBP’s Human Cost of Maritime Piracy 2012 report documented survey results from an International Maritime Bureau seafarer survey that showed high rates of fear among seafarers transiting the WIOR HRA.

3 Michael Suvak et al., “Indirect Exposure to the September 11 Terrorist Attacks: Does Symptom Structure Resemble PTSD?, ” Journal of Traumatic Stress 21 (2008), 30–39 http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/jts.20289.

4 Rose George, Ninety Percent of Everything (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2013), 114.

5 Ibid., 111–14.

6 MSCHOA, “BMP4: Best Management Practices for Protection Against Somalia Based Piracy,” Version 4, pp. 3, 5, 10, 45 (Aug. 2011), available at http://www.mschoa.org/docs/public-documents/bmp4-low-res_sept_5_2011.pdf?sfvrsn=0.

7 Michael Stuart Garfinkle, Craig L. Katz, and Janaka Saratchandra, The Psychological Impact of Piracy on Seafarers, Seaman’s Church Institute, 2012, available at http://seamenschurch.org/sites/default/files/sci-piracy-study-report-web_0.pdf.

...when seafarers were

asked if they felt they received adequate ‘mental preparation’ for traversing known zones of piracy, almost all respondents said they did not.

THE STATE OF MARITIME PIRACY 2014 LONG-TERM IMPACT OF PIRACY ON SEAFARERS

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Exposure and attitudes about piracy

In addition to tracking the long-term impact of piracy, this study also investigated seafarers’ attitudes toward piracy and related topics. An analysis of these findings confirms that indirect exposure to piracy has significant impacts on attitudes about piracy, and that the attitudes of seafarers directly exposed to piracy appear to be different from those who were not. People who have had more direct and severe exposure to piracy appear to be more concerned about piracy than those who have not: they rate their levels of concern about piracy as higher, and also appear to approve more of having armed guards aboard ships.8

Despite this higher level of concern there is an inverse relationship between exposure and actual impact on job decisions. Seafarers with indirect exposure, either through knowing hostages or having seen an attack, demonstrate the highest levels of considering piracy as a potential risk when accepting employment, while seafarers who were actually held hostage reported the lowest amount of concern about piracy when taking a job.9 However, seafarers who had been directly attacked by pirates were slightly more likely to have declined a job due to the threat of piracy than were those who had been indirectly exposed, although both categories did so at a rate lower than those with no exposure at all.

Attitudes About Piracy

Exposure Number Concern about piracy (Scale of 1-5)

Approve of armed guards(Scale of 1-5)

Think about piracy when taking a job (Scale of 1-5)

No exposure 17 3.2 3.88 3Know a hostage, no other exposure 44 3.53 4.41 3.89Transited, no other exposure 48 3.69 4.22 3.21Viewed an attack but not attacked directly 4 3.5 4.5 3.75Attacked directly, not held 6 4 4.57 3.17Attacked and held hostage 31 4.06 4.71 2.61

8 These differences are not statistically significant: an analysis of variance (ANOVA) comparing scores on concern across the different factors finds no significant difference between groups on either attitude about armed guards or concern about piracy. However, this is likely due to a ceiling effect in the data: while the means vary across groups, in each case the distribution was such that at least 25% of the sample rated their concern about piracy and approval of guards at the maximum score possible.

9 An ANOVA comparison found significant differences on thinking about piracy when taking a job by exposure category (F(4, 165)=3.015, p<.05). A Tukey HSD comparison found a significant difference between seafarers who were attacked and seafarers who were not exposed at all. Due to the large variability of scores in the other categories, no other pairwise comparison was significant.

Exposure No. No. who say they have declined a job b/c of piracy

Rate declining job

No exposure 17 3 18%

Know a hostage, no other exposure

44 1 2%

Transited, no other exposure 48 2 4%

Viewed an attack but not attacked directly

4 0 0%

Attacked directly, not held 6 1 17%

Attacked and held hostage 31 3 10%

THE STATE OF MARITIME PIRACY 2014LONG-TERM IMPACT OF PIRACY ON SEAFARERS

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Collectively, these data suggest that direct exposure to pirate activity leads to lasting concern about piracy, and may increase seafarers’ support for the use of armed guards. It may actually lower the overall impact of this concern on actual job decisions, possibly because these seafarers have a more realistic understanding of the scope and likelihood of the threat than seafarers who are indirectly exposed or not exposed at all do.

These data underscore the finding about the long-term impact on seafarers: direct exposure to pirate attack is not necessary in order for the impact of piracy to affect seafarers’ psychological well-being in the long term.

Limitations It is important to acknowledge the limitations of these data. The sample does not represent a random sample of seafarers with varying degrees of exposure to piracy, and in fact it is likely skewed by the fact that the seafarers most interested in or concerned about piracy are the ones most likely to provide answers to the survey. For that reason, these rates should not be considered as fully authoritative on estimates of the rates of long-term distress or disruption caused by piracy attacks. However, these data do represent the largest sample on these topics that we have been able to find to date and, at a minimum, they demonstrate that some seafarers experience psychological effects even if they have not been directly attacked.

CONCLuSION

Seafarers who transit the high-risk areas are exposed to significant stress: interviews with seafarers discussing their experiences suggest that they experienced an increase in overt concern about piracy due to anticipatory stress about transiting high risk areas.10 This is a fairly extreme environment, and one that most people are not exposed to in their day-to-day jobs. This survey indicates that such stress can cause a lasting impact: in at least some of the seafarers interviewed for this survey, long-term distress was associated with no identifiable exposure to piracy, and in others indirect exposure was sufficient to cause lasting distress.

Ultimately, this suggests that institutions interested in supporting seafarers affected by piracy should consider that it may be valuable to expand their focus by offering some services to seafarers who were not necessarily attacked to help them cope with piracy-related anxiety and stress.

10 Douglas B. Stevenson, Update on Seafarers’ Welfare: 2012 Report on Psychological Impact of Piracy on Seafarers, 3rd UAE Counter Piracy Conference, Briefing Paper, available at http://www.counterpiracy.ae/upload/2013briefing/Stevenson%20Douglas%20Sec3Ch4%20-Final%20Briefing%20Paper-En-Website.pdf; Andrew Guest, “Feature: Piracy Trauma Checks,” BIMCO, 24 October 2012, https://www.bimco.org/News/2012/10/24_Feature_Week_43.aspx.

THE STATE OF MARITIME PIRACY 2014 ACRONYMS

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AcronymsAFRICOM United States Africa CommandAIS Automatic Identification SystemAMISOM African Union Mission in SomaliaAOI Area of InterestAPS Africa Partnership StationBIMCO Baltic and International Maritime CouncilBMP4 Best Management Practices (version 4)CBCG Capacity Building Coordination GroupCGPCS Contact Group on Piracy off the Cost of SomaliaCMF Combined Maritime ForcesCoC Code of ConductCOMESA Common Market for Eastern and Southern AfricaCOT Crude Oil TheftCMR Critical Maritime RoutesCRESMAC Regional Coordination Centre for Maritime Security in Central AfricaCRIMARIO Critical Maritime Routes in the Western Indian OceanCRIMLEA Critical Maritime Routes Law Enforcement Capacity Building in East AfricaCRIMGO Critical Maritime Routes in the Gulf of GuineaCRIMSON Critical Maritime Routes Monitoring, Support and Evaluation MechanismCSDP Common Security and Defense PolicyCSO Chief Security OfficerCTF-151 Combined Task Force 151DCoC Djibouti Code of ConductDWT Dead Weight TonnageECCAS Economic Community of Central African StatesECOWAS Economic Community of West African StatesEEZ Exclusive Economic ZoneEU European UnionEU ISS European Union Institute for Security StudiesEU NAVFOR European Union Naval ForceFCI France Coopération InternationaleFV Fishing VesselG8PK/PB G8 Peace Keeping and Peace Building Experts GroupGCC Gulf Cooperation CouncilGGC Gulf of Guinea CommissionGMA Ghana Maritime AuthorityGoA/IO Gulf of Aden/Indian OceanGoG Gulf of GuineaGSA Ghana Shippers’ AuthorityHRA High Risk AreaHWR Hellenic War Risks ClubIBF International Bargaining ForumICC Inter-Regional Coordination CenterICoC International Code of Conduct for Private Security ProvidersIGAD Intergovernmental Authority on DevelopmentILO International Labour OrganizationIMB International Maritime BureauIMO International Maritime OrganizationINTERPOL International Criminal Police Organization

THE STATE OF MARITIME PIRACY 2014INTRODUCTION

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IOC Indian Ocean CommissionIRTC Internationally Recognized Transit CorridorISC Information Sharing CentreISO/PAS 28007 International Organization for Standardization: 28007 “Guidelines for PMSCs”IUU Illegal, Unreported, Unregulated FishingJTF Joint Task ForceJWC Joint War CommitteeK&R Kidnap and RansomLMA Lloyd’s Market AssociationLNG Liquefied Natural GasLONO Letter of Non-ObjectionLPG Liquefied Petroleum GasLRAD Long-Range Acoustic DevicelTF International Transport Workers’ FederationMARSIC Maritime Security and Safety through Information Sharing and Capacity BuildingMASE Maritime Security ProgrammeMCP Maritime Crime ProgrammeMEND Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger DeltaMLC Maritime Labour ConventionMMSI Maritime Mobile Service IdentityMOU Memorandum of UnderstandingMOWCA Maritime Organization for West and Central AfricaMPHRP Maritime Piracy Humanitarian Response ProgrammeMSCHOA Maritime Security Center - Horn of AfricaMT Motor TankerMTISC-GoG Maritime Trade Information Sharing Centre for the Gulf of GuineaMV Motor VesselNATO North Atlantic Treaty OrganizationNAVAF U.S. Naval ForcesNIMASA Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety AgencyNIO Northern Indian OceanNM Nautical MilesNN Nigerian NavyNTOA Nigerian Trawlers Owners AssociationOBP Oceans Beyond PiracyOCIMF Oil Companies International Marine ForumOECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and DevelopmentOEF One Earth Future FoundationOMS Ocean Marine SecurityOWWA Overseas Workers Welfare AdministrationP&I Protection and IndemnityPAG Pirate Action GroupPCASP Privately Contracted Armed Security PersonnelPiraT Project Piracy and Maritime Terrorism as a Challenge for Maritime Trade SecurityPIU Project Implementation UnitPMSC Private Maritime Security CompanyPOEA Philippine Overseas Employment AgencyPTS Post-Traumatic StressPTSD Post-Traumatic Stress DisorderRAPPICC Regional Anti-Piracy Prosecution & Intelligence Coordination CentreReCAAP Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combatting Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in Asia Information Sharing Center

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REFLECS3 Regional Fusion and Law Enforcement Centre for Safety and Security at SeaREMISC Regional Maritime Information Sharing CenterRMCM Regional Maritime Coordination MechanismRMRCC Regional Maritime Rescue Coordination CentreRO/RO Roll-on/Roll-offRPS Risk Placement ServicesSAA Secure Anchorage AreaSADC South African Development CommunitySAMI Security Association for the Maritime IndustrySHADE Shared Awareness and DeconflictionSMRSS Somali Maritime Resource and Security StrategySPM Ship Protection MeasureTCC Total Crew CostTFG Transitional Federal GovernmentUAE United Arab EmiratesUAV Unmanned Aerial VehicleUKAS United Kingdom Accreditation ServiceUKMTO United Kingdom Marine Trade OperationsUN United NationsUNCLOS United Nations Convention on the Law of the SeaUNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and DevelopmentUNDP United Nations Development ProgrammeUNODC United Nations Office on Drugs and CrimeUNPOS The United Nations Political Office for SomaliaUNSCR United Nations Security Council ResolutionVLCC Very Large Crude CarrierVPD Vessel Protection DetachmentVTMS Vessel Traffic Management SystemWAPIS West African Police Information SystemWCO World Customs OrganizationWFP World Food ProgrammeWIOR West Indian Ocean RegionWOA Warlike Operations AreaWRA War Risk AreaWRAP War Risk Added PremiumXRZ Extended Risk Zone

For more information on The State of Maritime Piracy 2014 report, please contact:

w w w . o c e a n s b e y o n d p i r a c y . o r g

MATT WALJEProject Officer, Oceans Beyond Piracy

Office: +1 720 274 8223Mobile: +1 913 909 1185

[email protected]

JENS VESTERGAARD MADSEN Senior Project Associate, Oceans Beyond Piracy

Mobile: +1 303 709 [email protected]

F U T U R Eone earth

APPENDICES

THE STATE OF MARITIME PIRACY 2014 APPENDICES

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APPENDICES A-LAPPENDIx A – ArEAS of INtErEStVarious costs and considerations assessed by this report are applicable only in specific geographical areas. For example, ship operators must pay an additional war risk premium to maintain coverage if they enter a designated War Risk Area, while several distinct zones all factor into seafarer hazard pay. Consequently, these regions are essential to our analysis, and for clarity this appendix provides the definition of each relevant zone, region, or area.

Western Indian ocean region

Best Management Practices Revision 4 High Risk Area

The Best Management Practices Revision 4 (BMP4) High Risk Area (HRA) “defines itself by where pirate activity and/or attacks have taken place,” and consequently defines the area where it is recommended that ship operators apply best management practices.

The BMP4 HRA comprises the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, Arabian Sea, Gulf of Oman, and the northern portion of the western Indian Ocean. Its precise limits are Suez to the northwest, the Strait of Hormuz to the north, 10°S, and 78°E.1

Internationally Recognized Transit Corridor

The Internationally Recognized Transit Corridor (IRTC), established effective February 1, 2009, supports United Nations Security Council resolutions 1814 (2008), 1816 (2008), 1838( 2008), and 1846 (2008).2 Though the IRTC is not a formal traffic-separation scheme, much like a freeway, two proximate, parallel lanes conduct traffic along opposite headings: 72° (east-northeast, roughly) for eastbound vessels and 252° (west-southwest) for westerly traffic. The eastbound lane begins at 45°E between 11°48′ N and 11°53’N and terminates at 53°E between

14°18’N and 14°23’N. The westbound lane begins at 53°E between 14°25’N and 14°30’N and terminates at 45°E between 11°55’N and 12°00’N.3

Figure A2: IRTC

1 Witherby Seamanship Intl., BMP4: Best Management Practices for Protection against Somalia Based Piracy, Version 4 (Edinburgh: Witherby Publishing Group Ltd., 2011), 7, http://www.mschoa.org/docs/public-documents/bmp4-low-res_sept_5_2011.pdf.

2 Lieutenant Dr. Ir. F. J. Sluiman et al., “Naval Vessel Traffic Services,” Naval War College Review, v. 63(3) (2010), https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/a3175659-caf1-4f1c-a0c5-f19f51d44ff5/Naval-Vessel-Traffic-Services--Enhancing-the-Safet.aspx.

3 Ibid.; U.S. Navy, “Special Maritime Advisory for Vessels Transiting Gulf of Aden and Somali Basin,” 19 January 2009, http://www.cusnc.navy.mil/marlo/Guidance/Corridor_files/JAN%2009%20MARAD%20UPDATE.txt.

Figure A1: BMP4 HRA

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IBF Areas

The IBF-designated risk areas identify where transiting seafarers are exposed to the risk of piracy and are thus entitled to additional compensation and other protections as a part of collective bargaining agreements. These areas are designated by the International Bargaining Forum (IBF), which brings together the International Transport Workers’ Federation and the international maritime employers that make up the Joint Negotiating Group. Depending on the risk assessed by the IBF, seafarers transiting these areas are entitled to varying levels of additional hazard pay, compensation for injury or death, and the option to elect to not transit the area at no expense to themselves.4

International Bargaining Forum List of Warlike and High Risk Designations5

These are defined as:

1. IBF WOAThe Warlike Operations Area (WOA) covers Somali territorial waters, which extend 12 nautical miles from the coast. The western boundary runs due north from the Somali–Ethiopian coastal border; the eastern, due north from Cape Guardafui in Puntland.

2. IBF HRAThe High Risk Area comprises the Gulf of Aden, excluding the IRTC, and the waters off the east coast of Somalia, out to 400 nautical miles. The chevron-shaped western boundary runs from the Djiboutian–Somali coastal

border to 11°48’N, 45°E, and from 12°00’N, 45°E to Mayyun Island in the Bab-El-Mandeb Strait. The eastern border runs from Rhiy di-Irisal in Socotra to 14°18’N, 53°E; from 14°30’N, 53°E to the Yemeni–Omani coastal border, and 400 miles off the Somali coast from due east of Socotra to due east of the Kenyan–Somali border.

3. IBF XRZThe Extended Risk Zone (XRZ) encompasses the HRA and more. The XRZ has the same western boundary as the HRA—from the Djiboutian–Somali coastal border to 11°48’N, 45°E, and from 12°00’N, 45°E to Mayyun Island in the Bab-El-Mandeb Strait—but includes the IRTC. The eastern border is the 78th meridian east (78°E), the northern border is the 26th parallel north (26°N), and the southern border is the 10th parallel south (10°S).

4 “IBF List of Warlike and High Risk Designations, with Main Applicable Benefits (as of 1st July 2014), Addendum 2,” IBF, http://www.itfseafarers.org/files/seealsodocs/33553/IBF%20LIST%20OF%20WARLIKE%20AND%20HIGH%20RISK%20DEFINITIONS%20JULY%202014.pdf.

5 Ibid.

Figure A3: IBF List of Warlike and High Risk Designations


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Joint War Committee Hull War, Piracy, Terrorism and Related Perils Listed Areas

JWC WRA:

The Joint War Committee (JWC) “comprises underwriting representatives...representing the interests of those who write marine hull war business in the London market.”6 This insurance industry body meets quarterly to define and review hazardous “war risk areas” (WRAs) around the globe—areas inside of which vessels must pay additional premiums to compensate for the elevated risk; these WRAs are then published as the “Hull War, Piracy, Terrorism and Related Perils Listed Areas” and integrated into hull war risk policies around the world.7

Territorial Waters:

• Eritrea, but only south of 15° N

• Somalia

Indian Ocean/Arabian Sea/Gulf of Aden/ Gulf of Oman/Southern Red Sea:

The waters enclosed by the following boundaries:

a) On the north-west, by the Red Sea, south of latitude 15° N;

b) On the west of the Gulf of Oman by longitude 58° E;

c) On the east, longitude 78° E; and

d) On the south, latitude 12° S.

This does not include the coastal waters of adjoining territories up to 12 nautical miles offshore unless otherwise provided.8

Gulf of Guinea

IBF HRA

The International Bargaining Forum designates only one zone in the Gulf of Guinea: the High Risk Area. There are no West African analogues to the WOA or XRZ near the Horn of Africa. The HRA is composed of the territorial waters of Nigeria and Benin, which extend 12 miles from the coast, as well as their ports and inland waterways—excepting secure berthages and guarded port areas.9

6 “Joint War Committee,” Lloyd’s Market Association, available at http://www.lmalloyds.com/Web/market_places/marine/JWC/Joint_War.aspx.

7 “Hull War, Piracy, Terrorism and Related Peril Listed Areas,” Joint War Committee, JWLA/021, 12 June 2013, available at http://www.lmalloyds.com/IMIS15/CMDownload.aspx?ContentKey=dfa8eb7f-0832-4bf9-a18e-7bf7f7c87ceb&ContentItemKey=8a6b56bc-7b03-4370-8ad5-2f31e7f2f8de.

8 “Hull War, Piracy, Terrorism and Related Peril Listed Areas,” Joint War Committee, JWLA/021, 12 June 2013, available at http://www.lmalloyds.com/IMIS15/CMDownload.aspx?ContentKey=dfa8eb7f-0832-4bf9-a18e-7bf7f7c87ceb&ContentItemKey=8a6b56bc-7b03-4370-8ad5-2f31e7f2f8de.

9 “IBF List of Warlike and High Risk Designations, with Main Applicable Benefits (as of 1st July 2014), Addendum 2,” IBF, http://www.itfseafarers.org/files/seealsodocs/33553/IBF%20LIST%20OF%20WARLIKE%20AND%20HIGH%20RISK%20DEFINITIONS%20JULY%202014.pdf.

Figure A4: JWC Listed Area for Indian Ocean (JWC WRA)


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JWC WRAThe Joint War Committee War Risk Area in the Gulf of Guinea covers the territorial waters of Nigeria, Benin, and Togo, as well as their exclusive economic zones (EEZs) north of the 3rd parallel north (3°N).

APPENDIx B – NAvAL CoStS, EASt AfrICAMilitary Assets

The tables below detail the cost calculations described in the main text. First, for naval vessels, helicopters and patrol aircraft, and unmanned aerial vehicles alike, the cost of operating a single unit for one year is estimated. Each such “unit cost” is calculated for an archetypal vessel class or model, which then serves as the cost estimate for all assets of that type. For example, all frigates are treated as Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigates, all helicopters as SA 341 Gazelles, and so on. This approximation is necessary given the variety of assets deployed within multinational forces and by the myriad individual countries. Then, for each archetype, the unit cost is multiplied by the average number of assets of that type conducting counter-piracy operations in the Western Indian Ocean Region during 2014. Note that lower operating costs for independent deployers are factored into the cost calculations. Finally, the costs of these different asset types are summed, giving a grand total cost of operating military assets.

Figure A5: JWC WRA, Gulf of Guinea


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Table B1: Ships 1011121314151617

Frigate10 (Oliver Hazard Perry class)

Destroyer (Arleigh Burke class)

Amphibious (Galicia class)

Patrol (Sukanya class)

Support

Daily Fuel Use (gal) 21,640.5511 4,909.90908 12 15,372.4 13 4,797.213509 14 16,911.8003 15

Annual Fuel Use (gal) 6,492,165 1,472,972.724 4,611,720 1,439,164.053 5,073,540.09Annual Fuel Cost ($) 24,832,531.13 5,634,120.669 17,639,829 5,504,802.501 19,406,290.85Personnel Aboard (#) 230 280 350 121 125Adjustment Factor 16 1 1.217391304 1.52173913 0.526086957 0.543478261Monthly Op. Cost ($) 1,734,071.39 17 2,111,043.431 2,638,804.289 912,272.34 942,430.1033Annual Op. Cost ($) 20,808,856.68 25,332,521.18 31,665,651.47 10,947,268.08 11,309,161.24Annual Unit Cost ($) 45,641,387.81 30,966,641.84 49,305,480.47 16,452,070.58 30,715,452.09

Coalition Units 7.547945205 3.624657534 0.260273973 1.257534247 1.17260274Coal. Unit Cost ($) 45,641,387.81 30,966,641.84 49,305,480.47 16,452,070.58 30,715,452.09Coal. Cost ($) 344,498,694.3 112,243,471.7 12,832,933.27 20,689,042.18 36,017,023.27Independent Units 3.243835616 2.978082192 0.405479452 0 2.468493151Ind. Unit Cost ($) 15,213,795.94 10,322,213.95 16,435,160.16 5,484,023.527 10,238,484.03Ind. Cost ($) 49,351,053.12 30,740,401.54 6,664,119.735 0 25,273,627.7Total Units 10.79178082 6.602739726 0.665753425 1.257534247 3.64109589Total Cost ($) 393,849,747.4 142,983,873.2 19,497,053.01 20,689,042.18 61,290,650.96Subtotal: $638,310,366.70

10 In recognition of the fact that many navies have lower operating costs than, for example, the United States or the United Kingdom, independent deployer assets are estimated to operate at one-third of the cost of coalition assets.

11 This cost was calculated using data from Navy Site. “The FFG 7 Oliver Hazard Perry-class,” Navy Site, http://navysite.de/ffg/ffg7class.htm (accessed May 7, 2015).

12 Calculated using data from Global Security. “DDG-51 Arleigh Burke – Specifications,” GlobalSecurity.org, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ship/ddg-51-specs.htm (accessed May 7, 2015); Schuyler Null, “Defense Sustainability: Energy Efficiency and the Battlefield,” Global Green USA (2010), http://www.globalgreen.org/docs/publication-112-1.pdf.

13 This cost was calculated using data from the Naval Institute. Eric Wertheim, The Naval Institute Guide to Combat Fleets of the World: Their Ships, Aircraft, and Systems, 15th ed. (Naval Institute Press, 2007).

14 This cost was calculated using data from the Naval Institute. Ibid.

15 This cost was calculated using data from the Naval Institute. Ibid.

16 This report assumes that operating cost is roughly proportional to crew size. Using the complement and operating cost of a frigate as a baseline, operating costs for other assets can be estimated, provided that the crew size is known. For example, a vessel with twice as many personnel as a frigate would have double the operating cost. The Adjustment Factor is this ratio between asset crew size and frigate crew size. The estimated monthly operating cost of a given asset is thus simply the operating cost of a frigate multiplied by this Adjustment Factor.

17 John Knott cites a frigate monthly operating cost of £1 million. Converting to U.S. dollars using the 2009 average exchange rate, as reported by OANDA, generates a monthly cost of about $1,584,949. Adjusting for inflation using the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics tool yields a final monthly operating cost of $1,734,071. John Knott, “Somalia: Clan Rivalry, Military Conflict, And the Financial and Human Cost of Piracy,” Mondaq, 17 March 2009, http://www.mondaq.com/x/76272/Marine+Shipping/Somalia+Clan+Rivalry+Military+Conflict+And+The+Financial+And+Human+Cost+Of+Piracy; “Average Exchange Rates,” OANDA, http://www.oanda.com/currency/average (accessed May 7, 2015); “CPI Inflation Calculator,” U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl (accessed May 7, 2015).


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Table B2: Aircraft 1819

Patrol Aircraft Destroyer (Arleigh Burke class)



Daily Fuel Use (gal) 6,334.8 18 1,900.44 3,357.44 189.54 19

Annual Fuel Use (gal) 1,900,440 570,132 1,007,232 56,862Annual Fuel Cost ($) 6,917,601.6 2,075,280.48 3,666,324.48 206,977.68Personnel Aboard (#) 11 2 2 2Adjustment Factor 0.047826087 0.008695652 0.008695652 0.008695652Monthly Op. Cost ($) 82,933.84909 15,078.88165 15,078.88165 15,078.88165Annual Op. Cost ($) 995,206.189 180,946.5798 180,946.5798 180,946.5798Annual Unit Cost ($) 7,912,807.789 2,256,227.06 3,847,271.06 387,924.2598Units 4 2 1 13Annual Unit Cost ($) 7,912,807.789 2,256,227.06 3,847,271.06 387,924.2598Annual Total Cost ($) 31,651,231.16 4,512,454.12 3,847,271.06 5,043,015.378Subtotal: 45,053,971.71

Table B3: Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) 2021

Land-based UAV (MQ-1B Predator) Ship-based UAV (ScanEagle)Hourly Op. Cost ($) 3,234 20 3,612.60 21

Mission Flight Hours 10 10Missions Per Day 0.333333333 1Daily Flight Hours 3.333333333 10Daily Op. Cost ($) 10,780 36,126Annual Unit Cost ($) 3,234,000 10,837,800

Units 0.5 3Annual Unit Cost ($) 3,234,000 10,837,800Annual Total Cost ($) 1,617,000 32,513,400Subtotal: 34,130,400

Table B4: TotalCategory Cost ($)Ships $638,310,367Aircraft $45,053,972UAVs $34,130,400Grand Total $717,494,738

18 This cost was calculated using data from the United States’ Navy Fact File. “United States Navy: Fact File,” Department of the Navy, http://www.navy.mil/navydata/fact_display.asp?cid=1100&tid=1400&ct=1; “P-3C Orion Maritime Patrol, United States of America,” Airforce-technology.com, http://www.airforce-technology.com/projects/orion-maritime-patrol/ (accessed May 7, 2015).

19 This cost was calculated using data from Airforce Technology. “Helicopter Specifications,” Rotor Leasing, http://www.rotorleasing.com/Specifications/SA341.html (accessed May 7, 2015); “Gazelle Multi-Role Helicopter, France,” Airforce-technology.com, http://www.airforce-technology.com/projects/aerospatiale-gazelle/ (accessed May 7, 2015).

20 Lieutenant Colonel Brett M. Clark, “Small Unmanned Aerial Vehicles; DHS’s Answer to Border Surveillance Requirements,” Strategy Research Project, United States Army War College, March 2013, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA589119.

21 “Questions in Writing (Question No. 1217),” Parliament of Australia, 9 October 2012, http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=Id%3A%22chamber%2Fhansardr%2F5a0ebb6b-c6c8-4a92-ac13-219423c2048d%2F0224%22.


©2015VII

SHADE

The calculation for SHADE conference costs was straightforward: we estimated the number of delegates traveling to the conferences—excluding those attendees already in the area—and the costs associated with that travel, as well as the cost of accommodations once in Bahrain. The sum of these travel and accommodation costs for a given conference was then multiplied by the number of conferences in 2014, yielding a total cost for the year.

Table B5: Attendance 22

Conference Month Delegates Countries31st March 90 3332nd June 140 3233rd September 103 3234th December 108 34Average, Total: 110.25 32.75Average, International: 22 82.6875

Table B6: Travel 23 24

Region Fraction 23 Count Flight Cost 24 ($) Flight Expenditure ($)Europe 0.47 39 793 30,927N. America 0.22 18 1,238 22,284Asia 0.12 10 415 4,150Africa 0.19 16 633 10,128TOTALS 1 83 67,489

Table B7: AccommodationTravelers Daily Cost ($) Days Accommodation Expenditure ($)

International 83 272 3 67,728

Table B8: Total 25

Cost Per Conference 25 ($) 135,217Number of Conferences 4Total Cost ($) 540,868

22 This number assumes that 75% of participants are international, i.e., must travel to the conference and pay for accommodations.

23 As this information was not available for the conferences in 2014, we used the continental proportions of attendance from the 2012 conferences.

24 This number is based on ticket prices for flights to Bahrain from a representative airport in each region, using the dates of the June conference. Prices represent the cheapest fare returned by a kayak.com search conducted in April 2014, although many attendees in fact fly business class and/or get governmental or corporate fares.

25 This is the sum of travel costs and accommodation costs for all international attendees.


VIII ©2015

APPENDIx C – INCrEASED SPEED, EASt AfrICATable C1: Speeds and Costs26 (all speeds in knots)Vessel Length (m) 120–200 200–300 300+Cargo

Observed Global Average Speed 12.94 13.21 14.88Observed Average Speed in WIOR 13.14 14.04 17.4Increased Speed Margin 0.5 0.75 1.0Increased Speed Threshold 13.44 13.96 15.88Tanker

Observed Global Average Speed 12.77 13.09 12.41Observed Average Speed in WIOR 13.15 13.19 14.06Increased Speed Margin 0.5 0.75 1.0Increased Speed Threshold 13.27 13.84 13.41380cst bunker, Rotterdam ($/Tonne) $532.14380cst bunker, Singapore ($/Tonne) $559.68WIOR traffic 380cst bunker, equal-weight average ($/Tonne) $545.91

The essence of our increased speed cost calculations was a comparison between ships’ behavior inside the BMP4 HRA, where piracy is a threat, and the rest of the world, where for the most part it is not.

Utilizing the global set of AIS data for a single day in June 2014, we compiled the average reported speed for each vessel of interest not transiting the HRA.27 To do so, we broke our AIS data into six vessel categories based upon the designated vessel type and length. In the absence of data relating to specific vessel type and dead weight tonnage, we used length as a proxy. This allows us to account for the variation in average steaming speeds between the various vessel types and increases the accuracy of our calculations. Table C2 demonstrates the variation in specific vessel type within the cargo category by length.

Table C2: Cargo Vessel Types By Length28

120–200m Bulk Carrier Handymax/Handysize PCC Vehicle CarrierGeneral CargoSmall Feeder/Feeder/Feedermax Container

200–300m Panamax Bulk CarrierPanamax ContainerPCTC/LCTC/ULVC Vehicle Carrier

300m + Capemax Bulk CarrierPost Panamax/New Panamax/ULCV Container

In previous reports we did not use vessel length categories, but these divisions provide a more accurate representation

26 All speed data in table was calculated using a global AIS sample containing all AIS reports from June 5, 2014.

27 “Vessels of interest” excludes, as usual, all ships less than 120 meters in length. Here, we also omitted all vessels moving at a speed below 8 knots, in order to eliminate any vessels entering or exiting port, in keeping with the attempt to characterize the behavior of vessels fully underway. Last, we excluded any reported speeds above 25.9 knots as unrealistic for commercial traffic.

28 “Our Fleet,” Wallenius Lines, http://www.walleniuslines.com/Fleet/Fleet-List1/ (accessed May 7, 2015); “GC0491 – General Cargo,” Vessel for Sale, http://www.vesselforsale.net/homepage/dry-cargo/general-cargo/gc0491-general-cargo.html (accessed May 7, 2015); “General Cargo,” Marin, http://www.marin.nl/web/Ships-Structures/Merchant-vessels-Work-boats/General-Cargo.htm (accessed May 7, 2015); “Feeder Vessel Data Sheet: Size Comparison,” Containership-info.net, http://www.containership-info.com/misc_publ_feedergrowth.pdf (accessed May 7, 2015).


©2015IX

of in

crea

sed

spee

ds a

s a p

roxy

for v

esse

l typ

e. T

his i

s an

attem

pt to

acc

ount

for t

he v

aria

tion

in “o

ptim

al”

stea

min

g sp

eeds

bet

wee

n, fo

r exa

mpl

e, a

n ar

chet

ypal

bu

lk c

arrie

r and

an

arch

etyp

al c

onta

iner

ves

sel,

two

very

diff

eren

t typ

es o

f shi

ps lu

mpe

d to

geth

er w

ithin

the

sam

e AI

S ca

tego

rizati

on.

After

gro

upin

g th

e ob

serv

ed v

esse

ls by

type

and

by

leng

th,29

we

calc

ulat

ed a

n av

erag

e sp

eed

for e

ach

grou

p, w

hich

we

iden

tified

as t

he sp

eed

ship

s tra

vel

whe

n no

t thr

eate

ned

by p

irate

s. S

hips

in th

e HR

A ob

serv

ed tr

avel

ing

abov

e th

at sp

eed,

then

, cou

ld b

e co

nsid

ered

to b

e m

odify

ing

thei

r beh

avio

r spe

cific

ally

in

resp

onse

to th

e ris

k of

pira

cy. H

owev

er, i

n or

der t

o en

sure

that

we

excl

uded

to th

e gr

eate

st d

egre

e po

ssib

le a

ny sh

ips t

rave

ling

sligh

tly a

bove

the

optim

um fo

r ot

her p

urel

y co

mm

erci

al re

ason

s, w

e al

so in

trod

uced

“th

resh

old”

val

ues.

Onl

y sh

ips t

rave

ling

abov

e th

e em

piric

al o

ptim

um b

y a

cert

ain

min

imum

am

ount

—th

e th

resh

olds

— w

ere

cons

ider

ed to

be

defin

itive

ly in

crea

sing

spee

d du

e to

pira

cy.30

Onl

y sh

ips m

eetin

g th

is cr

iterio

n w

ere

incl

uded

in o

ur fi

nal c

ost o

f inc

reas

ed

spee

ds, w

hich

was

sim

ply

the

valu

e of

the

extr

a fu

el th

ese

ship

s bur

ned

in o

rder

to m

aint

ain

spee

ds a

bove

the

optim

um.31

Table

C3: S

peed

& Fu

el Ca

lculat

ions,

2014

Data

2014

120–

200m

200–

300m

300m

+De

scrip

tion

In-s

ampl

eDa

ilyAn

nual

ized

In-s

ampl

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09.

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uel U

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ate

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rage

s

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Whi

le A

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ata

incl

udes

som

e sh

ip ty

pe in

form

ation

, mos

t sal

ient

her

e id

entif

ying

a sh

ip a

s “ca

rgo”

or “

tank

er”—

the

cate

gorie

s are

ver

y br

oad.

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exa

mpl

e, a

bul

k ca

rrie

r and

an

ultr

a-la

rge

vehi

cle

carr

ier w

ill b

oth

be c

lass

ified

mer

ely

as “c

argo

” de

spite

thei

r eno

rmou

s phy

sical

diff

eren

ces.

In a

n att

empt

to m

itiga

te th

is pr

oble

m, w

e us

ed le

ngth

as a

pro

xy fo

r typ

e, fu

rthe

r di

ffere

ntiati

ng w

ithin

the

“car

go”

popu

latio

n. A

lthou

gh th

is is

an in

here

ntly

impr

ecise

app

roac

h, o

bser

vabl

e di

scre

panc

ies i

n be

havi

or b

etw

een

thes

e le

ngth

gro

ups s

ugge

st th

at it

is n

ot e

ntire

ly

misg

uide

d. S

ee T

able

C2

(Car

go V

esse

l Typ

es b

y Le

ngth

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mor

e.

30

For e

xam

ple,

a sm

all (

120–

200m

) car

go v

esse

l has

an

expe

cted

opti

mum

spee

d of

12.

94 k

nots

, and

a 0

.5-k

not t

hres

hold

. A 1

20m

car

go sh

ip tr

avel

ing

13.0

kno

ts w

ould

not

be

incl

uded

in o

ur

set o

f shi

ps m

odify

ing

thei

r beh

avio

r exp

licitl

y du

e to

pira

cy, a

nd a

s suc

h th

e ex

cess

fuel

it e

xpen

ded

trav

elin

g ab

ove

the

optim

um sp

eed

wou

ld n

ot b

e ta

bula

ted

as a

“cos

t of p

iracy

.” Th

at

hypo

theti

cal c

argo

ship

wou

ld n

eed

to b

e tr

avel

ing

at o

r abo

ve 1

3.44

kno

ts (1

2.94

+ 0

.5) i

n or

der f

or it

s fue

l cos

ts to

be

cons

ider

ed a

“cos

t of p

iracy

.”

31

That

is, t

he d

iffer

ence

bet

wee

n th

e am

ount

of f

uel e

xpen

ded

to m

aint

ain

the

high

er sp

eed

and

the

less

er a

mou

nt o

f fue

l whi

ch w

ould

be

need

ed to

trav

el a

t the

opti

mum

spee

d—on

ly th

e co

st

of th

e ex

cess

fuel

exp

endi

ture

.


X ©2015

380c

st b

unke

r, $/

Tonn

e, R

otter

dam

532.

1438

0cst

bun

ker,

$/To

nne,

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gapo

re55

9.68

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R tr

affic

equa

l-wei

ght a

vera

ge54

5.91

To p

rovi

de a

bas

elin

e fo

r com

paris

on w

ith th

e 20

13 c

ost o

f inc

reas

ed sp

eeds

, we

have

incl

uded

the

tabl

es b

elow

. In

thes

e ta

bles

, we

ran

the

calc

ulati

ons f

or 2

013

incr

ease

d sp

eed

cost

s in

acco

rdan

ce w

ith th

e ve

ssel

leng

th g

ranu

larit

y ad

ded

in th

e 20

14 re

port

, in

addi

tion

to u

sing

the

obse

rved

glo

bal s

peed

as a

n em

piric

ally

de

rived

opti

mum

. Usin

g th

ese

num

bers

, we

estim

ate

that

the

cost

of r

erou

ting

decr

ease

d by

40%

from

201

3.

Table

C4: S

peed

& Fu

el Ca

lculat

ions,

2013

Data

2013

120–

200m

200–

300m

300m

+De

scrip

tion

In-s

ampl

eDa

ilyAn

nual

ized

In-s

ampl

eDa

ilyAn

nual

ized

In-s

ampl

eDa

ilyAn

nual

ized

Carg

oTo

tal V

esse

ls27

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4.18

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578.

4375

1928

120.

543

982.

535

622

.25

8121

.25

Vess

els s

team

ing

at in

crea

sed

spee

d17

8711

1.68

7540

765.

9375

1094

68.3

7524

956.

875

253

15.8

1357

71.5

625

Frac

tion

Vess

els s

team

ing

at in

-cr

ease

d sp

eed

0.64

120.

5674

0.71

07

Aver

age

Spee

d of

Ves

sels

stea

min

g at

incr

ease

d sp

eed

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713

14.1

711

17.7

437

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age

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ss S

peed

of V

esse

ls st

eam

ing

at in

crea

sed

spee

d-0

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71.

5711

3.52

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age

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ss F

uel U

sage

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e (to

ns/h

our)

0.25

651.

1091

3.22

63

Tank

erTo

tal V

esse

ls96

560

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522

014.

0625

938

58.6

2521

398.

125

375

23.4

3885

54.6

875

Vess

els s

team

ing

at in

crea

sed

spee

d 65

140

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514

850.

9375

617

38.5

6314

075.

3125

240

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75

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tion

Vess

els s

team

ing

at in

-cr

ease

d sp

eed

0.67

460.

6578

0.64

Aver

age

Spee

d of

Ves

sels

stea

min

g at

incr

ease

d sp

eed

11.8

9356

12.8

083

13.1

301

Aver

age

Exce

ss S

peed

of V

esse

ls st

eam

ing

at in

crea

sed

spee

d-0

.369

9-0

.556

50.

2101

Aver

age

Exce

ss F

uel U

sage

Rat

e (to

ns/h

our)

-0.0

366

0.48

860.

7113

Bunk

er F

uel P

rices

,20

13 A

vera

geW

IOR

traffi

c 38

0cst

bun

ker,

$/To

nne

equa

l-wei

ght a

vera

ge60

5


©2015XI

Table C5: Excess Fuel Cost, 2013120-200m 200-300m 300+m

Cargo Tanker Cargo Tanker Cargo TankerAverage daily number of vessels 174.1875 60.3125 120.5 58.625 22.25 23.4375

Fraction of vessels speeding 0.6412 0.6746 0.5674 0.6578 0.7107 0.64

Estimated daily number of speeders 111.6875 40.6875 68.375 38.5625 15.8125 15

Average daily excess fuel use (tons) 687.54825 -35.7399 1820.0331 452.1993 1224.38085 256.068

Average daily excess fuel cost $415,967 -$21,623 $1,101,120 $273,581 $740,750 $154,921

Estimated annual excess fuel cost $151,827,842 -$7,892,263 $401,908,809 $99,856,910 $270,373,901 $56,546,216

Estimated total annual excess fuel costs, cargo and tankers $972,621,416

APPENDIx D – rEroutINGWestern Indian ocean region

Gulf of Aden–Southern India Route

The methodology for calculating the cost of rerouting for traffic between the Gulf of Aden and the southern tip of India remained consistent with previous reports. However, we extended our analysis to include the Persian Gulf–South India route, addressed later in this appendix. Our baseline traffic patterns were based on 2004–2005 commercial shipping data from “A Global Map of Human Impact on Marine Ecosystems” by Benjamin S. Halpern et al.32 The 2014 traffic patterns were calculated using AIS data samples purchased from exactEarth. To analyze the Gulf of Aden route, we defined a number of cartographic zones, each a square three degrees of arc in length, along the direct route between the southern tip of India and the Gulf of Aden, and along the indirect route hugging the Indian and Pakistani coastline of the Indian Ocean. We then calculated what percentage of ships in our sample enters each zone, and used those figures to assess relative traffic flows.

Table D1: Zone DefinitionsVertices (latitude °N, longitude °E)Zone NW NE SE SW

Direct Route

D1 15, 56 15, 59 12, 59 12, 56D2 13.5, 60.5 13.5, 63.5 10.5, 63.5 10.5, 60.5D3 12, 65 12, 68 9, 68 9, 65D4 11, 69 11, 72 8, 72 8, 69

32 Benjamin S. Halpern et al., “A Global Map of Human Impact on Marine Ecosystems,” Science, v. 319 (15 February 2008) 948–952, http://www.sciencemag.org/content/319/5865/948.full (login required). The data is freely available at “Data: Impacts,” National Center for Ecological Analysis and Synthesis, https://www.nceas.ucsb.edu/globalmarine/impacts (accessed May 7, 2015).


XII ©2015

Indirect Route

I1 13, 72.5 13, 75.5 10, 75.5 10, 72.5I2 16.5, 71 16.5, 74 13.5, 74 13.5, 71I3 20, 70 20, 73 17, 73 17, 70I4 21.5, 66.5 21.5, 69.5 18.5, 69.5 18.5, 66.5I5 25, 63.5 25, 66.5 22, 66.5 22, 63.5I6 25, 60 25, 63 22, 63 22, 60

Table D2: Zone Traffic Percentages33

Percentage of total traffic within the sample by zoneZone Baseline (2004-05) 2012 2013 2014

Direct Route

D1 1.67% 1.46% 3.18% 8.96%D2 1.78% 1.19% 2.79% 7.58%D3 3.42% 1.05% 2.6% 7.42%D4 2.62% 1.08% 3.48% 7.5%

Indirect Route

I1 1.93% 1.71% 0.61% 1.91%I2 1.16% 1.41% 0.44% 1.44%I3 0.62% 1.01% 0.38% 1.12%I4 0.71% 0.59% 0.2% 0.69%I5 0.47% 0.36% 0.14% 0.43%I6 1.03% 0.42% 0.14% 0.52%

Persian Gulf–Southern India Route

To analyze rerouting trends we divided our AIS data into three groups based on vessel speed: 8–13 knots, 13–17 knots, and 17–25 knots. These were further subdivided into tankers and cargo vessels. We expected to see some difference in behavior between fully laden tankers and those in ballast. To test this we split the tanker data into vessels with northwest and southeast headings, under the assumption that vessels with a southeast heading would be full of petro-product, while those with a northwest heading would be in ballast. This data was then processed by a geospatial analysis program, which was used to generate heat maps

of the vessel traffic.

We used the average speeds for vessels traveling the direct 1405nm route and that of vessels along the more circuitous 1517nm route to calculate the indirect cost incurred by traveling the shorter distance at higher speeds, rather than steaming at the more fuel-efficient speed over the shorter distance.34

33 The percentage represents the percentage of traffic that falls within each zone as a fraction of the total traffic in our data sample.

34 Jeppesen Integrated Maritime Suite V1.2.0.146.

Figure D1: Persian Gulf to Southern India route

Figure D2: Traffic patterns for both NW- and SE-heading transits demonstrate that slower vessels hug the coastline, avoiding the more direct route.


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Table D3: Fuel CalculationsCargo (120–200m length) Tanker (120–200m length)

Direct Route Circuitous RouteDirect Route, Optimal Speed

Direct Route Circuitous Route Direct Route, Optimal Speed

Vessel Speed (knots) 15 13 13 14.5 13 13

Hourly Fuel Consumption (tons)

1.497942 0.791518 0.791518 1.673144 1.125888 1.125888

Transit Time (Hours) 93.67 116.69 108.08 96.90 116.69 108.08

Total Fuel Consumption (tons)

140.31 92.36 85.55 162.13 131.38 121.69

Fuel Cost $76,598 $50,421 $46,701 $88,507 $71,722 $66,430 Per-Vessel Cost $3,700 $5,300

We calculated a conservative estimate of these rerouting costs using these sums. AIS data was used to calculate the number of transits conducted by vessels within the 8–13 knot vessel speed group. The mean vessel length for these vessels is within the 120–200m group, and this speed group was most evidently engaged in rerouting based on our analysis.

The new analysis of the Persian Gulf to South India route used vessel speeds based upon observed mean speed over ground, as reported in AIS data captured on March 25, 2015,35 for vessels whose transit fell along one of the routes we were examining. From there we utilized maritime navigation software to measure the length of both of these routes.36 The same equations used to calculate the costs associated with increased speeds were used to calculate the fuel costs incurred by small cargo and tanker vessels steaming at the designated speeds along the designated routes. We estimated the cost vessels incur utilizing these behaviors as the difference between the cost of their current practices and the cost of traveling at optimal speeds along the shortest route.

Table D4: Persian Gulf–Southern India Rerouting CalculationsPersian Gulf to Southern India Rerouting CalculationsTotal Number of WIOR Transits 72,600 Selected AIS hits in Area of Interest

(AoI) 209,930

Number of AIS hits in WIOR 1,123,311 % of AIS hits in the AoI 18.69%Number of transits in the AoI 13,568% of slow vessels in the AoI 40.9% Number of slow tanker transits in AoI 2,672Number of slow vessel transits in the AoI 5,550 Number of slow cargo transits in AoI 2,060

% of transits along direct route in AoI 0.30%Number of slow tankers rerouting 1,870 Cost for Slow Tankers $9,898,521 Number of slow cargo rerouting 1,442 Cost for Slow Cargo $5,364,092 Total Estimated Cost of Rerouting $15,263,000

35 OBP acquired new software tools for observing ship behavior in 2015. Although the central analysis throughout the report relies on AIS data from 2014, in select places observations made in 2015 were used to inform vessel behavior and facilitate analysis of traffic patterns.

36 Jeppesen Integrated Maritime Suite V. 1.2.0.146.


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Area of Interest Direct route

AppEndIx E – LAboR

East Africa

Table D5: Per-Transit Hazard Pay 3738

Average daily crew cost 2010 37 Average daily crew cost, accounting for inflation, 2014 38

$2,590 $2,812

Average daily crew cost 2014 Average daily hazard pay per vessel$2,812 $2,812

Average daily hazard pay $2,812Average transit time through IBF HRA 2.6Hazard Pay per IBF HRA Transit $7,311Grand Total $717,494,738

Table D6: Total Hazard Pay39

Hazard Pay per IBF HRA Transit 39 $7,311Annual IBF HRA Transits 20,000Percentage of Vessels Disbursing Hazard Pay 70%Percentage of Vessels Transiting the IBF HRA through the IRTC 45–55%

Weighted Estimate to Include Non-IBF ITF Agreements 30%

Hazard Pay in 2014 Due to E. Africa HRA $71,650,000

37 Comparison of U.S. and Foreign-Flag Operating Costs, U.S. Department of Transportation Maritime Administration (2011), 5–6, 13–14, http://www.marad.dot.gov/documents/Comparison_of_US_and_Foreign_Flag_Operating_Costs.pdf.

38 “Inflation Calculator,” InflationData.com, http://inflationdata.com/Inflation/Inflation_Calculators/Inflation_Calculator.asp (accessed May 7,

2015).

39 This amount is less the IRTC. The HRA is defined as the ITF/IBF High Risk Area which follows a line of 400nm off the Somali coast along East Africa.


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Table D7: Captivity Pay

Vessel Name Number of Hostages

Days in Captivity in 2014

Base Wage per Person

Base Wages Accrued in Captivity

Additional Captivity Pay

Total

Albedo 11 157 $124 $214,148 $74,952 $289,100Asphalt Venture 7 303 $124 $263,004 $92,051 $355,055Prantalay 4 365 $124 $181,040 $63,364 $244,404Naham 3 26 365 $124 $1,176,760 $411,866 $1,588,626Total Captivity pay owed $1,834,952 $642,233 $2,477,185

Gulf of Guinea

Table D8: Daily Hazard Pay4041

Average daily crew cost, 2010 40 $2,590Average daily crew cost, 2014 (inflation-adjusted) 41 $2,812Average daily hazard pay per vessel, 2014 $2,812

Table D9: Per-Transit Hazard Pay42

Average Daily Hazard Pay $2,812Average Transit Time through HRA 5 days 42

Total Pay per Vessel per Transit through the HRA $14,060

Table D10: Total Hazard PayHazard Pay per IBF HRA Transit $14,060Annual IBF HRA Transits 14,500Percentage of Vessels Disbursing Hazard Pay 40%Total Hazard pay, 2014 $81,548,000

Table D11: Captivity Pay

Vessel Name Number of Hostages

Days in captivity in 2014

Average Daily Base Wage per person

Total Base Wages Accrued in Captivity

MT Fair Artemis 24 7 $124 $20,832MT Hai Soon 6 21 8 $124 $20,832MT Kerala 27 8 $124 $26,784OSV Prince Joseph 1 3 4 $124 $1,488MDPL Asha Deep 3 4 $124 $1,488Unknown MT 2 4 $124 $992Unknown OSV 5 4 $124 $2,480

40 Comparison of U.S. and Foreign-Flag Operating Costs, U.S. Department of Transportation Maritime Administration (2011), 5–6, 13–14,

41 Inflation calculated using CPI Inflation Calculator from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. “Inflation Calculator,” InflationData.com (Feb. 28, 2014), http://inflationdata.com/Inflation/Inflation_Calculators/Inflation_Calculator.asp.

42 Mary Harper, “Danger Zone: Chasing West Africa’s Pirates,” BBC News, 13 November 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-30024009.


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OSV Prime Lady 13 1 $124 $1,612

OSV Prime Lady 2 4 $124 $992San Miguel 3 2 $124 $744Unknown Tug 2 4 $124 $992OSV Cee Jay 2 4 $124 $992OSV Mariner Sea 2 4 $124 $992MT Basat 2 4 $124 $992MT Ungieshi 2 1 $124 $248SP Boston 16 1 $124 $1,984Total $84,400

*For captives held for an unknown amount of time, we’ve applied the average of those incidents we do know the amount of time of (4).

APPENDIx f – NAvAL CoStS, WESt AfrICANaval Acquisitions

Below are naval acquisitions made by Gulf of Guinea states in 2014. Acquisitions are neither generally made in one lump sum nor are vessels delivered the same year that they are ordered. Therefore, it is impossible to determine how much of a payment was made for each purchase in 2014.

Table F1: Delivered VesselsBuyer Country Seller Country Vessel Type Delivery Year Benin United States 1 Metal Shark boat 2014

Cameroon China 2 32-meter patrol boats 2014

Cote d'Ivoire France 2 RPB33 patrol boats 2014

30 inflatable speed boats 2014-2015

Nigeria Netherlands 5 K-47 boats 2014

Nigeria 1 Seaward Defence Boat 2014

Ireland 1 P22 patrol vessel 2014

South Africa 2 17-meter Sentinel Fast Patrol Vessels 2014

China 1 P-18N OPV 2014

Senegal France 1 58-meter 190 Mk II patrol boat 2014

1 45-meter patrol boat 2014

Togo France 1 RPB33 patrol boat 2014

United States 1 Defender 2014

Pending Vessels

Angola Brazil 7 Macae-class patrol boats Unknown

Benin France 2 LH-10 Ellipse after 2015

Cote d'Ivoire France 1 RPB33 patrol boat 2015

4 12-meter RPB 12 boats 2015

6 9.3-meter speedboats 2015

Gabon France 1 P400 patrol boat 2015


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1 OPV50 patrol boat 2016

Nigeria China 1 P-18N OPV 2015

Togo France 2 RPB33 patrol boats 2015

Donated Vessels

Nigeria United States 1 Hamilton class cutter 2014

1 Survey Ship 2014

Naval operating Costs

Our analysis of operating costs for navies in West Africa draws from two reports. The first is from a UN report on Benin and Nigeria’s joint operation called “Operation Prosperity.” It explains, “Benin’s contribution to the operation is estimated at CFA 234,347,490 per month (about $466,000) which is equivalent to 5% of the total cost of the operation.”43 The UN report also noted that Nigeria’s contribution was two maritime vessels, two interceptor boats, and two helicopters.

Table F2: Operation Prosperity ContributionsCountry Amount ShareBenin $466,000.00 5%Nigeria $8,854,000.00 95%Total $9,320,000.00 100%

The second source comes from an article where Nigeria’s Chief of Naval Staff, Vice Admiral Dele Ezeoba, offers a rare glimpse at operating costs. He noted that “putting eight ships at sea for the exercise for seven days, they were looking at about N600 million, which includes personnel costs, fuel, spare parts and other auxiliary requirements.”44

Table F3: Daily Operating Cost Calculations7 days, 8 ships $3,634,684.80 1 day, 8 ships $519,240.691 day, 1 ship $64,905.09 30 days, 8 ships $15,577,220.57 30 days, 4 ships $7,788,610.29Hazard Pay in 2014 Due to E. Africa HRA $71,650,000

These two sources seem to confirm each other, as they are within the same range for four ships in one month. We can extrapolate from this data that it costs $1,065,389.71 to operate two helicopters. Using the one day, one ship cost of $64,905.09, OBP built out the cost of deployed naval vessels in West Africa. Our estimation is that Nigeria has between four to seven vessels on patrol a day while Ghana, Cameroon, and Angola all operate one vessel per day on average. Therefore, there are seven to ten vessels operating within the Gulf of Guinea at an annual cost of between $165,832,504.95 and $236,903,578.50.

43 Ban Ki Moon, Report of the United Nations Assessment Mission on Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, U.N. Security Council, S/2012/45, 19 January 2012, http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/AUUN%20S%202012%2045.pdf.

44 “Navy Can Secure Nigerian Waters – Ezeoba,” Online Nigeria, 17 November 2012, http://news.onlinenigeria.com/nigeria-news/5734-navy-can-secure-nigerian-waters-%E2%80%93-ezeoba.html.


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Table F4: Total Operating Cost Calculations# of Ships Per Day Per Month Per Year1 $64,905.09 $1,947,152.70 $23,690,357.85 7 $454,335.63 $13,630,068.90 $165,832,504.95 10 $649,050.90 $19,471,527.00 $236,903,578.50

Naval Capacity-Building Deployments

The tables below detail the cost calculations used for foreign naval assets operating in the Gulf of Guinea (GoG). First, for naval vessels and helicopters—there were no patrol aircraft or unmanned aerial vehicles involved in these operations—the cost of operating a single unit for one year is estimated. Each such “unit cost” is calculated for an archetypal vessel class or model, which then serves as the cost estimate for all assets of that type. For example, all frigates are treated as Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigates, all helicopters as SA 341 Gazelles, and so on. This approximation is necessary given the variety of assets deployed by myriad individual states. Then, for each archetype, the unit cost is multiplied by the average number of assets of that type conducting capacity-building operations in the GoG across 2014. Finally, the costs of these different asset types are summed, giving a grand total cost of operating military assets.

Table F5: Ships45

Frigate (Oliver Hazard Perry class)

Destroyer (Arleigh Burke class)



Support (Fusu class)

Daily Fuel Use (gal) 21,640.55 4,909.91 15,372.40 4,797.21 16,911.80Annual Fuel Use (gal) 6,492,165.00 1,472,972.72 4,611,720.00 1,439,164.05 5,073,540.09Annual Fuel Cost ($) 24,832,531.13 5,634,120.67 17,639,829.00 5,504,802.50 19,406,290.85Personnel Aboard (#) 230 280 350 121 125Adjustment Factor 1.0000 1.2174 1.5217 0.5261 0.5435Monthly Op. Cost ($) 1,734,071.39 2,111,043.43 2,638,804.29 912,272.34 942,430.10Annual Op. Cost ($) 20,808,856.68 25,332,521.18 31,665,651.47 10,947,268.08 11,309,161.24Annual Unit Cost ($) 45,641,387.81 30,966,641.84 49,305,480.47 16,452,070.58 30,715,452.09

Units 0.2795 0.5397 0.4932 0.6719 0.4219Unit Cost ($) 45,641,387.81 30,966,641.84 49,305,480.47 16,452,070.58 30,715,452.09Total Cost ($) 12,754,579.61 16,713,502.58 24,315,031.46 11,054,439.21 12,959,396.22 SUBTOTAL ($) 77,796,949.08

Table F6: AircraftPatrol Aircraft (P-3C Orion)

Patrol Aircraft (Fair-child SW3 Merlin)

Patrol Aircraft (Casa CN-235 Vigma)

Helicopter (SA 341 Gazelle)

Daily Fuel Use (gal) 6334.8 1900.44 3357.44 189.54Annual Fuel Use (gal) 1900440 570132 1007232 56862Annual Fuel Cost ($) 6917601.6 2075280.48 3666324.48 206977.68Personnel Aboard (#) 11 2 2 2Adjustment Factor 0.047826087 0.008695652 0.008695652 0.008695652Monthly Op. Cost ($) 82,933.84909 15,078.88165 15,078.88165 15,078.88165Annual Op. Cost ($) 995206.189 180,946.5798 180,946.5798 180,946.5798

45 The tables in this appendix are dependent upon on a number of statistics and other figures which were also utilized in calculating the cost of military operations in East Africa. For the analysis of these data, please see Appendix B related to the East Africa portion of this report.


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Annual Unit Cost ($) 7,912,807.789 2,256,227.06 3,847,271.06 387,924.2598

Units 0 0 0 2Annual Unit Cost ($) 7,912,807.79 2,256,227.06 3,847,271.06 387,924.26Annual Total Cost ($) 0.00 0.00 0.00 775,848.52 SUBTOTAL ($) 775,848.52

Table F7: TotalCategory Cost ($)Ships 77,796,949Aircraft 775,849UAVs 0GRAND TOTAL 78,572,798

APPENDIx G – HoStAGE-tAkING INCIDENtS, GuLf of GuINEA

Table G1: Incidents46

Vessel Name (Type) Attack Date Hostages (Nationality) Outcome46 Source

San Miguel (General Cargo) 03-Jan-14 3 - Captain, Mechanic,

Welder (all Indian) Rescued

http://gcaptain.com/nigerian-authorities-free-indian-hostages-in-rare-victory-against-pirates/; http://equatorialguineaonline.com/martinez-hermanos-communicates-release-three-held-employees

Kerala (Tanker) 18-Jan-14 27 - Entire Crew (various) Released

http://www.maritime-executive.com/article/Liberia-Concludes-Kerala-Hijacking-Investigation-2014-05-29

Unknown (Tug) 26-Jan-14 2 - Captain, Engineer (both Nigerian) Ransomed

MARLO PATS Weekly 29-Jan-14; http://saharareporters.com/2014/01/26/pirates-attack-oil-tugboat-bayelsa-2-abducted

Cee Jay (Offshore Supply Vessel) 29-Jan-14

2 - Captain, Chief Engineer (both unknown)

Ransomed MARLO PATS Weekly 14-Feb-14

Mariner Sea (Offshore Supply Vessel) 06-Feb-14

2 - Captain, Chief Engineer (both unknown)

Ransomed MARLO PATS Weekly 14-Feb-14

Prince Joseph 1 (Offshore Supply Vessel) 04-Mar-14

3 -Captain (unknown), Chief Engineer (Panamanian), Chief Officer (Nigerian)

Ransomed OceanusLive Newsletter Vol. 3, No. 10

Asha Deep (Offshore Supply Vessel) 05-Mar-14

3 - Captain, Chief Officer, Chief Engineer(all Indian)

Rescuedhttps://maritimesecuritynews.wordpress.com/2014/03/08/nigeria-navy-rescues-3-kidnapped-indians/#more-369

Prime Lady (Offshore Supply Vessel) 06-Mar-14 3 - Captain, Crewman,

Crewman (all unknown) Ransomed OceanusLive Newsletter Vol. 3, No. 11

46 “Rescued,” as a term, indicates hostages were liberated via military intervention, without payment of ransom. “Released” means the hostages were let go after the pirates finished robbing the ship or stealing its cargo. “Ransomed” means hostages were returned after a payment was made to the pirates.


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Unknown (Tanker) 12-Apr-142 - Captain, Chief Engineer (both unknown)


Ungieshi (Tanker) 13-May-14 2 - Crewmen (both unknown) Released http://www.suritec.co.za/Suritec_Piracy_

Report_May_2014.pdf

Fair Artemis (Tanker) 04-Jun-14 24 - Entire Crew (various) Released http://www.spyghana.com/ghana-navy-

rescues-3-missing-vessels/ Marine 711 (Fishing Vessel) 05-Jun-14 41 - Entire Crew

(various) Rescued OceanusLive Newsletter Vol. 3, No. 24

Hai Soon 6 (Tanker) 25-Jul-14 21 - Entire Crew (various) Released http://gcaptain.com/pirates-release-tanker-

hai-soon-6-hijacked-off-ghana/

SP Boston (Tanker) 27-Aug-14 16 - Entire Crew (various) Released OceanusLive Newsletter Vol. 3, No. 36

Unknown (Offshore Supply Vessel) 18-Sep-14

5 - Captain, Trainee Captain, Chief Engineer, Electrician, Crewman (all unknown)


Basat (Tanker) 05-Nov-14 2 - Crewmen (both Turkish) Ransomed

http://dnc.nga.mil/MSISiteContent/StaticFiles/MISC/wwtts/wwtts_20141113100000.txt

APPENDIx H – trANSItSA transit, generally speaking, is a passage through a particular, demarcated area, or an entry into the area, and an exit from it. The concept of a “transit” is used as a very specific term throughout this report, because it is not just important for our ex post facto analysis, but this term is additionally utilized by maritime stakeholders in the conduct of their business. For example, hull war risk breach premiums are paid on a per-transit basis, just as a PCASP team may be contracted for a single transit. Some labor costs are also tied to transits. Accordingly, determining numbers of transits through various regions is an integral part of our analysis. Because of differences in both shipping patterns and available information, we were required to employ different approaches for calculating transit figures in both East and West Africa.

Automated Identification System (AIS) Data

Statistical analysis of AIS data was the primary method used to calculate transits for the WIOR, and one of three methods used in West Africa. AIS data uses a network of transceivers and geopositioning devices to track and identify vessels, particularly in the interest of avoiding collisions or other maritime accidents. AIS capability is mandatory for vessels over a certain tonnage, but its use is not, and a vessel master can turn the system on or off at will. Each AIS report, or “ping,” typically contains a vessel’s identification information—name, IMO number, vessel type, etc.—along with its position, speed, course, destination, physical dimensions, and hazardous cargo information.

OBP purchased four datasets from exactEarth, each spanning four days in a different quarter of 2014.47 These datasets comprise all AIS pings transmitted during those timespans from within our areas of interest off West Africa and in the WIOR.48 Additionally, we received a global sample containing all pings from all relevant vessels for one full day in 2014.49 These data were supplemented by exactEarth’s ShipView vessel tracking software, which enabled us to observe ship behavior, as reported via AIS, in real time.

47 The four data sets from 2014 covered the following (inclusive) ranges: January 28–31, April 29–May 2, July 14–17, and October 14–17.

48 For a detailed description of these areas, please see Appendix A.

49 Here “relevant vessels” means all ships 120 meters or more in length, as usual, which additionally are traveling no slower than 8 knots, in order to exclude stationary, berthed, and in-port vessels. The sample came from June 15, but that date has no particular significance.


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Cleaning the Data

AIS data are inherently “dirty.” The absence of reporting requirements or standards, along with manual entry of information, admits both accidental errors and intentional falsifications. Despite this, AIS remains one of the most reliable avenues for developing a picture of maritime traffic, and is used by industry and governments alike; nonetheless, inconsistencies and inaccuracies within the data do pose hurdles to analysis.

As such, our preliminary task was to clean the data by removing spurious, erroneous, or irrelevant reports. First, we eliminated all pings listing a common “dummy” value for the ship’s Maritime Mobile Service Identity (MMSI): 123456789, 111111111, 222222222, and so on.50 Second, any incomplete AIS reports lacking an entry for vessel name, IMO number, or length were excluded. We also removed all pings claiming a vessel length that was either ineligible or implausible, such as below 120 meters or above 400 meters. Last, in keeping with our focus on commercial shipping, we removed all reports listing a vessel type other than “cargo” or “tanker.”51 The remaining pings constituted our dataset for analysis.

transits: East Africa

Commercial passages52 through the WIOR are for the most part true “transits”: journeys that both originate and terminate elsewhere. Only a small fraction of vessels make port calls or other stops within the area of interest; roughly

speaking, the Gulf of Aden and the western Indian Ocean north of Madagascar.53 As the heat map below shows, most traffic in the region flows to or from the Suez Canal, with by far the greatest density of ships occurring in the Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor, a shipping highway of sorts running the length of the Gulf of Aden, which was created in response to the rise of Somali piracy.54 Some traffic rounds the Cape of Good Hope while other ships skirt the southern tip of India, but the essential feature of nearly all traffic in the region is that it is merely “passing through” the area.55 This holds true for the tanker-dominated traffic into and out of the Persian Gulf, which contains many active, major ports but lies beyond the BMP4 HRA.

This has important implications for our analysis. In the absence of calls on ports, stays in berthing zones, or other behaviors that would leave a paper trail, our East Africa assessment relies heavily on AIS data. However, we

utilized built-to-purpose algorithms, applied via R, for counting both individual vessels and overall numbers of transits, and later consulted with industry experts to confirm the results. For simplicity we have rounded the WIOR transit estimate to 72,600.

50 For more information about MMSIs, please see “Navigation Center Points of Interest,” U.S. Coast Guard Navigation Center, http://www.navcen.uscg.gov/?pageName=mtMmsi (accessed May 11, 2015).

51 The cargo and tanker categories correspond to values 70–79 and 80–89, respectively, for the “Ship Type” field in an AIS report. Other, excluded values cover everything from tugboats, yachts, wingships, naval vessels, etc. For more information, please see “Table 11. Codes for Ship Type” at: Eric S. Raymond, “AIVDM/AIVDO Protocol Decoding, Version 1.50,” April 2015, http://catb.org/gpsd/AIVDM.html.

52 As is generally the case throughout this report, our focus on commercial, international shipping means that our analysis excludes all vessels less than 120 meters in length.

53 See Appendix A for a detailed discussion of the various regions considered within this report.

54 “Update to Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor (IRTC),” MARLO, 3 February 2009, http://www.cusnc.navy.mil/marlo/Guidance/Corridor.htm.

55 For example, 2014 saw 16,000–17,000 passages through the Suez Canal, yet the Port of Djibouti, one of the largest in the area, recorded only 1,694 calls, of which 17% were naval vessels. Mombasa, another major regional port, had only 1,768 calls in 2013, according to the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics Statistical Abstract. “Monthly Number & Net Ton by Ship Type, Direction & Ship Status,” Suez Canal Traffic Statistics, http://www.suezcanal.gov.eg/TRstat.aspx?reportId=1 (accessed May 11, 2015); “Vessel Calls Per Category (2010-2014),” Port de Djibouti, http://www.portdedjibouti.com/PDF/2014%20VESSEL%20CALL%20PER%20CATEGORY.pdf (accessed May 11, 2015); Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstract 2014 (Nairobi: Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, 2014), 174, http://www.knbs.or.ke/index.php?option=com_phocadownload&view=category&download=609:statistical-abstract-2014&id=106:statistical-abstract&Itemid=1177.


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Table H1: AIS-Based Transit Estimates

WIOR Transits72,60081,30089,800

IBF HRA Transits17,90020,00022,000

transits: West Africa

Calculating West African transits is a complex endeavor given the diversity of traffic and the difficulty of defining what exactly constitutes a “transit” in the Gulf of Guinea. Traffic in the area frequently both originates and terminates within the region. Vessels also commonly make multiple port calls within the gulf, traveling relatively short distances in between. Ships calling on port may also be required to spend extended periods of time drifting or at anchor while waiting for a berth.

Figure H2 illustrates several different types of transits in the GoG, which can be roughly grouped into a few basic categories: vessels transiting between the GoG and Europe or southern Africa; those traveling to and from South America; ships bypassing the region almost entirely as they transit between Europe and the Cape of Good Hope; and, finally, Gulf of Guinea intra-regional traffic, which makes up a significant portion of total traffic volume.

The variety of behavior, long wait times, and multiple port visits make the algorithms used to calculate WIOR transit numbers less viable in West Africa. As a result, we employed several different methods of assessing transit numbers, then cross-checked results against each other. Specifically, we utilize AIS pings, port calls, and estimated secure-area visits.

AIS-Based Estimation

We calculated transit numbers for several precisely-defined zones designated to represent our specific West African areas of interest. These areas are depicted in Figure H3.

Figure 1: Examples of Vessel behavior in the GoG. Figure H2: AIS-Based Transit Estimates

Figure H3: Areas of Interest. The red “New Box” demarcates the Gulf of Guinea, as defined for this report

Figure 1 – Areas of interest. The red "new box" demarcates the Gulf of Guinea, as defined for this report.


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The 2013 report utilized, as its primary area of interest, the zone labeled in Figure H3 as the blue “Big Box.” We replicated the “Big Box” transit calculations for this year, but ultimately elected to shrink our area of interest to the red “New Box” zone. We determined that the 2013 “Big Box” captured too much traffic going to and from areas unaffected by piracy and far from the piracy risk areas. We also tested the zone bounded by the black, 2014 “GoG Traffic” box, but rejected it as also capturing an excess of unrelated traffic. The other area for which we calculated transit numbers is the Lloyd’s Joint War Committee WRA, identified by the smaller green rectangle in Figure H3.

ExactEarth reporting standards dictate that a three-day period without AIS reporting indicates that a vessel has made a port call or otherwise concluded its trip. OBP similarly considered a transit to be terminated after 72 hours without an AIS report. Herein lies a methodological limitation for the Gulf of Guinea, as vessels calling on ports in the region frequently experience berth waiting times in excess of four days. This wait period can result in unintentional double-counting, as a single transit may register twice: once when traveling from origin to berth waiting area, and again several days later going from waiting area into port. This in turn can inflate transit numbers, particularly for AIS pings sent from within the WRA and near ports. We also note that AIS data has limited accuracy due to the propensity of vessels, in accordance with the “Guidelines for Owners, Operators, and Masters for Protection against Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea Region,” to turn off their AIS transmitters when in piracy-prone waters. These limitations underline the importance of employing multiple means of calculation.

Our AIS-based estimates of transits are 27,900 for the WRA and 45,800 for the refined GoG “New Box”, for which we allow a 10% margin of error above and below this value. The IBF HRA is simply too small to practically attempt a transit calculation on the basis of AIS reports. In the interest of a conservative estimate, we use the lower bound as our final estimate.

Table H2: AIS Transit Estimates

Gulf of Guinea Transits41,00045,80050,500

WRA Transits25,00027,90030,800

IBF HRA TransitsN/AN/AN/A

Port-Visit-Based Estimation

The second method we used to calculate transits in the Gulf of Guinea was analysis of port visits. OBP bought 2014 port-call data from Genscape’s Vesseltracker service for 16 major West African ports. The data included individual vessel counts, as well as total port visits, broken down by vessel type and length. Given the nature of vessel traffic in the Gulf of Guinea, a single call on port should be a serviceable proxy for a single transit. The data were cleaned to exclude all vessels not categorized as cargo, tanker, unknown, or other. We then summed the number of visits to the ports enclosed in each zone to estimate the number of transits in the Gulf of Guinea, the JWC WRA, and the IBF HRA. Port visit numbers are mapped in Figure H4.

Figure H4 – Ports and Visits


XXIV ©2015

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©2015XXIX

Analysis of port data yielded an estimated number of transits between 34,606 and 43,935 for the Gulf of Guinea as a whole. For the WRA, the range is 17,140–20,949 while the IBF HRA totals 14,842–18,607 transits. It is worth noting that some of the listed ports fall outside the geographic area employed in the AIS-based transit calculations. It is equally important to note that the 16 ports for which we have data are not the only ports within our area of interest. Consequently, the estimate for transits within the entire Gulf of Guinea may be inflated, while those for the WRA and IBF HRA may understate traffic levels.

Table H4: Port Visit Transit Estimates

Gulf of Guinea Transits43,90034,600

WRA Transits20,90017,100

IBF HRA Transits18,60014,800

The dataset also included the number of individual vessels that called at each port. This data was cleaned and organized in a manner identical to the port visit data. The total number of individual vessels relevant to our report is between 5,797 and 6,058. The average number of port visits per vessel for 2014 is estimated at 7.5.

Secure-Area-Based Estimation:

The final method used to estimate transit numbers utilized AIS observation of vessels within secure areas in the Gulf of Guinea. OBP used ShipView to download data for stationary and drifting commercial vessels56 in the Gulf of Guinea on ten days within the first quarter of 2015.57 In this specific context we utilized data from 2015, as the 2014 equivalent was not available, and we presume that vessel behavior did not shift dramatically in the first quarter of 2015 as compared to 2014.

Using geospatial analysis software, we identified how many vessels appeared within each secure area; we averaged and then annualized these figures, as displayed in Table 5. This method estimates 19,400–16,600 transits for the Gulf of Guinea, 18,800–16,000 in the WRA, and 11,400–13,000 in the IBF HRA. Note that in these calculations, the only difference between the WRA and the GoG is the inclusion of Ghanaian secure areas, as all others examined fall within the WRA.

Table H5: Secure Area Transit Estimates

Gulf of Guinea Transits19,40016,600

WRA Transits18,80016,000

IBF HRA Transits13,00011,400

Analyzing this data requires recognizing that the number of vessels that exit and enter these areas each day is some function of the total number of vessels in the area each day. This function is assumed to be related to the average number of days that vessels spend in each area. We estimate the average stay in the Nigerian Secure Anchorage Area (SAA) to be five days, and the average stay in the other secure areas to be between four and five days. STS zone visits are likely to last only a single day, as that is sufficient time to conduct a ship-to-ship transfer. Variation 1 and Variation

56 “Drifting commercial vessels” refers to those vessels at least 120 meters in length reporting a speed no greater than 4 knots.

57 This data was captured on the following dates: 12/30/2014, 1/1/2015, 1/8/2015, 1/16/2015, 2/2/2015, 2/12/2015, 2/25/2014, 3/3/2015, 3/11/2015, and 4/6/2015.


XXX ©2015

2 represent the most reasonable assumptions, based on our research. It is important to note that these estimates represent the lower bound of transit numbers, since a significant percentage of vessels do not utilize the secure areas despite the security advantages they provide.

Table H6: Secure Area Observations and Calculations

Variation 1: All 5; Exceptions: STS 1, Zone 4, STS Ops Area

Variation 2: All 4; Exceptions: SAA 5, STS 1, Zone 4, STS Ops Area

Region ((VPD avg(365))/4)

((VPD avg(365))/5)

((VPD avg(365))/3)

((VPD avg(365))/2)

((VPD avg(365))/1) Variation 1 Variation 2

NigeriaSAA Total in Sample: 84Per/Day Avg 8 Vessels per Year 767 613 1022 1533 3066 613 613STS Zone Total in Sample: 114Per/Day Avg 11 Vessels per Year 1040 832 1387 2081 4161 4161 4161NPA Anchorage Total in Sample: 68Per/Day Avg 7 Vessels per Year 621 496 827 1241 2482 496 621No Anchorage Area Total in Sample: 765

Per/Day Avg 77 Vessels per Year 6981 5585 9308 13961 27923 5585 6981

BeninZone 1 Total in Sample: 0Per/Day Avg 0 Vessels per Year 0 0 0 0 0 0 0Zone 2 Total in Sample: 2Per/Day Avg 0 Vessels per Year 18 15 24 37 73 15 18Zone 3 Total in Sample: 71Per/Day Avg 7 Vessels per Year 648 518 864 1296 2592 518 648Zone 4 (STS) Total in Sample: 1Per/Day Avg 0 Vessels per Year 9 7 12 18 37 37 37

TogoTogo Waiting Zone Total in Sample: 0Per/Day Avg 0 Vessels per Year 0 0 0 0 0 0 0Lomé Berthing Zone Total in Sample: 624

Per/Day Avg 62 Vessels per Year 5694 4555 7592 11388 22776 4555 5694


©2015XXXI

GhanaTema Anchorage Total in Sample: 11Per/Day Avg 1 Vessels per Year 100 80 134 201 402 80 100STS Operation Area Total in Sample: 15Per/Day Avg 2 Vessels per Year 137 110 183 274 548 183 183

Total SAA Visits 16014 12812 21353 32029 64058 16243 19055WRA 15777 12622 21036 31554 63109 15980 18772IBF HRA 10083 8067 13444 20166 40333 11425 13078

Final Transit Estimatation:

To reach the final figures for Gulf of Guinea transits we averaged the estimates from each of the three methods. We used the high and low bounds for all but the AIS transit estimate, for which we used the lower bound. The final estimate for the number of transits in each area is listed in Table H7.

Table H7: Transit Estimation SummaryAIS Estimate Port Visit Estimate Secure Areas Estimate Final Estimate

Gulf of Guinea Transits 41,000 43,900 34,600 19,400 16,600 30,900WRA Transits 25,000 20,900 17,100 18,800 16,000 19,600IBF HRA Transits N/A 18,600 14,800 13,000 11,400 14,500


XXXII ©2015

APPENDIx I – INSurANCEThe methodology used in this year’s report represents a slight departure from last year’s, which was based on transits rather than a share of the insurance market. The method used this year is simpler, but produces a comparable final total. This year’s assessment of 2013 War Risk insurance costs estimated the cost to within $4-$7 million of last year’s methodology for the WIOR and GoG respectively.

Cost of War risk Insurance

WIOR

The first step in extrapolating the cost of War Risk insurance in the WIOR was to calculate the total amount of premiums paid by Hellenic War Risk Club (HWR) members in the WIOR WRA. In 2013, the HWR covered 2,259 member vessels. The breach premiums paid for vessels that transited a designated WRA totaled $17.69 million, constituting 88.5% of all premiums.58 According to the HWR, of the 6,000 total WRA transits declared by its members worldwide in 2013, about 50% were through the WIOR WRA.59 Thus, assuming that all breach premiums are similar, the total cost of transiting the WIOR WRA for HWR members was approximately $8.845 million.

The second step was to estimate the HRW’s share of all breach premiums in the WIOR WRA. For this section’s purposes, only vessels with a volume of least 5,000 gross tons are considered. The Baltic and International Maritime Council (BIMCO) estimates that there were approximately 27,827 such vessels globally in 2014, giving the HWR members’ 2,259 vessels a global market share of 8.1%. Based on this number, and the estimated value of $8.845 million collected from HWR members in the WIOR, the total amount of war risk premiums in the WIOR WRA was approximately $109 million in 2013.

GoG

The first step in extrapolating the cost of War Risk insurance in the Gulf of Guinea was to calculate the total amount of premiums paid by HWR members in the GoG WRA. In 2013, the HWR covered 2,259 member vessels. The breach premiums paid for vessels transiting a designated WRA totaled $17.69 million, constituting 88.5% of all premiums. 60 According to the HWR, of the 6,000 total WRA transits declared by its members worldwide in 2013, about 900, or 15%, passed through the Gulf of Guinea WRA.61 Thus, assuming that all breach premiums are similar, the total cost of insuring passages through the GoG WRA for HWR members was approximately $2.65 million.

The second step is to determine the HWR’s share of the total market for breach premiums in the Gulf of Guinea. For this section’s purposes, vessels transiting the Gulf of Guinea and needing War Risk Insurance are defined as vessels 5,000 gross tons and above. BIMCO estimates that there were approximately 27,827 such vessels globally in 2014, giving the HWR members’ 2,259 vessels a global market share of 8.1 percent. Based on this number and the estimated $2.65 million collected from HWR members, the total amount of breach premiums in the Gulf of Guinea would be approximately $32,687,000 million in 2013.

58 Hellenic War Risks, Building on Success – Review of the Year for the year ended 31 December 2013 (Bermuda: Thomas Miller (Bermuda) Ltd., 2013), http://www.hellenicwarrisks.com/fileadmin/uploads/hellenic/Docs/PDFs/2014-HWR_Review__8pp_VW.pdf; Hellenic War Risks, Fo-cused on the Future (Bermuda: Thomas Miller (Bermuda) Ltd., 2013), http://www.hellenicwarrisks.com/fileadmin/uploads/hellenic/Docs/PDFs/2014-HWR-R-A-web.pdf.

59 Ibid.

60 Hellenic War Risks, Building on Success – Review of the Year; Hellenic War Risks, Focused on the Future.

61 Hellenic War Risks, Building on Success – Review of the Year.


©2015XXXIII

Cost of k&r Insurance

According to K&R market leader Hiscox, the company commands a 60–70% global market share by premium income.62 Based on their 2014 annual report, out of a total income in 2013 of $3.28 billion, a total of 6%, equal to $196.3 million, came from their specialty business, which includes kidnap and ransom, contingency, and personal accident insurance.63 This equates to a global market of between $280.4 million and $327 million in this segment. Another estimate from August 2014 claims that global K&R premiums, including non-piracy threats, totaled “at least” $250 million.64 Because the Hiscox specialty business includes more than K&R products, it would appear realistic to assess the global K&R market as being between approximately $250 million and $292 million.

APPENDIx J – WESt AfrICAN LAWS rELAtED to ProSECutING PIrACyOBP has begun to research West African laws related to each regional country’s ability to prosecute acts of piracy, whether they occur in their territorial waters or on the high seas. Initially, OBP has reviewed the domestic legislation of 11 countries within the region. Our conclusions related to each country’s ability to prosecute acts of piracy and the limitations of jurisdiction are briefly assessed in the table below. OBP intends to review the remaining countries’ laws within the region. However, for purposes of this report, an analysis of the 11 countries’ laws demonstrates that only Liberia and Angola possess legislation that would allow them to prosecute acts of piracy regardless of where those acts occur. Conversely, the remaining nine countries do not currently have the ability to prosecute acts of piracy outside their territorial waters, save a few exceptions (usually if the piratical acts occur onboard a vessel with that country’s flag or are against that country’s nationals). The table below provides a cursory analysis of each country’s ability to prosecute acts of piracy.

62 “Kidnap and Ransom Insurance: Syndicate 33,” HISCOX, http://www.assicuro.nl/media/94.pdf (accessed May 6, 2015).

63 HISCOX, Hiscox Ltd Report and Accounts 2014 (Bermuda: Hiscox Ltd., 2014), 1, http://www.hiscoxgroup.com/~/media/Files/H/Hiscox/con-tent-pdf/annual-report-2014.pdf.

64 David Kravitz & Colm O’Molloy, “The Murky World of Hostage Negotiations: Is the Price Ever Right?,” The Guardian, 25 August 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/25/murky-world-hostage-negotiations-price-ever-right-insurance.


XXXIV ©2015

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ed in

Ang

ola’

s ter

ritor

y or

on

an A

ngol

a-fla

gged

ves

sel (

with

a fe

w o

ther

ex

cepti

ons i

f per

petr

ator

is a

rres

ted

in A

ngol

a’s t

errit

ory)

.71

Misc

ella

neou

s Law

s:N

one

Abili

ty to

Pro

secu

te:

Ango

la c

an p

rose

cute

:- Ac

ts o

f pira

cy in

terr

itoria

l wat

ers o

r on

the

high

seas

invo

lvin

g a

vess

el h

ijack

ing

or ro

bber

y of

a v

esse

l.- A

cts o

f pira

cy fa

lling

und

er th

e cr

imin

al la

w o

ccur

ring

with

in 1

2 nm

or o

n An

gola

-flag

ged

ship

s.An

gola

can

not p

rose

cute

:- Ac

ts o

f pira

cy o

n th

e hi

gh se

as w

here

ther

e w

as n

ot a

n ac

tual

hija

ckin

g of

a v

esse

l or r

obbe

ry (o

r atte

mpt

ed

robb

ery)

, suc

h as

an

attac

k sim

ply

for p

urpo

ses o

f kid

napp

ing

the

crew

.Be

nin

Ratifi

ed U

NCL

OS

Ratifi

ed S

UATe

rrito

rial S

ea C

laim

EEZ

Clai

m

Yes

Yes

200

nm 72

Non

e

Pira

cy L

egisl

ation

:Li

mits

pro

secu

tion

of p

iracy

to a

cts o

f “vi

olen

ce”

com

mitt

ed b

y or

aga

inst

Ben

in-fl

agge

d sh

ips.

73 T

he la

w st

ates

that

“con

vict

ed”

pira

tes

shal

l be

pros

ecut

ed a

nd p

unish

ed u

nder

Ben

in’s

crim

inal

law,

pot

entia

lly li

miti

ng a

ny a

pplic

abili

ty o

f thi

s law

. 74

Crim

inal

Law

:Cr

imin

alize

s mur

der,

assa

ult,

theft

, kid

napp

ing,

and

des

truc

tion

of p

rope

rty.

75 D

oes n

ot c

rimin

alize

robb

ery,

cons

pira

cies

, or a

cts b

y ac

com

plic

es o

r acc

esso

ries.

76

65

U.N

. Con

venti

on o

n th

e La

w o

f the

Sea

, Dec

. 10,

198

2, 1

833

U.N

.T.S.

397

, art

. 100

, ava

ilabl

e at

htt

ps:/

/tre

aties

.un.

org/

Page

s/Vi

ewDe

tails

III.a

spx?

src=

TREA

TY&

mtd

sg_n

o=XX

I-6&

chap

ter=

21&

-Te

mp=

mtd

sg3&

lang

=en

(acc

esse

d M

ay 1

1, 2

015)

.

66

“St

atus

of C

onve

ntion

s,” In

tern

ation

al M

ariti

me

Org

aniza

tion,

htt

p://

ww

w.im

o.or

g/Ab

out/

Conv

entio

ns/S

tatu

sOfC

onve

ntion

s/Pa

ges/

Defa

ult.a

spx

(acc

esse

d M

ay 1

1, 2

015)

.

67

“M

ariti

me

Clai

ms,”

The

CIA

Wor

ld F

actb

ook,

htt

ps:/

/ww

w.c

ia.g

ov/li

brar

y/pu

blic

ation

s/th

e-w

orld

-fact

book

/fiel

ds/2

106.

htm

l (ac

cess

ed M

ay 1

5, 2

015)

.

68

Ibid

.

69

Ango

la: L

AW 7

/78

of 2

6 M

ay 1

978,

Law

on

Crim

es A

gain

st S

tate

Sec

urity

, Arti

cle

15, a

vaila

ble

at h

ttp:

//w

ww

.issa

fric

a.or

g/cd

ct/m

ainp

ages

/pdf

/Ter

roris

m/L

egisl

ation

/Ang

ola/

Ango

la%

20La

ws%

20on

%20

Crim

e%20

Agai

nst%

20St

ate%

20Se

curit

y.pd

f.

70

Ango

la: P

enal

Cod

e, A

rticl

es 2

0, 1

40, 1

47–4

8, 1

49, 1

54, 1

59, 1

62, 1

64, 2

88, 3

78–8

0, 3

84, 3

87–8

9, 3

96, a

vaila

ble

at h

ttp:

//w

ww

.safl

ii.or

g/ao

/legi

s/nu

m_a

ct/c

p76.

pdf.

An E

nglis

h ve

rsio

n, a

nd

prel

imin

ary

draft

of t

his l

aw, c

an b

e fo

und

at h

ttp:

//w

ww

.sm

e.ao

/atta

chm

ents

/arti

cle/

249/

ANTE

PRO

JECT

O%

20DE

%20

C%C3

%93

DIGO

%20

PEN

AL.E

N.p

df.

71

Ibid

., Ar

ticle

4–5

.

72

Ben

in: D

ecre

e N

o. 7

6-92

ext

endi

ng th

e te

rrito

rial w

ater

s of t

he P

eopl

e’s R

epub

lic o

f Ben

in to

200

nau

tical

mile

s, 1

976,

ava

ilabl

e at

htt

p://

ww

w.u

n.or

g/de

pts/

los/

LEGI

SLAT

ION

ANDT

REAT

IES/

PDFF

ILES

/BEN

_197

6_De

cree

.pdf

.

73 N

ation

al A

ssem

bly,

Rep

ublic

of B

enin

: Loi

N. 2

010-

11, P

orta

nt C

ode

Mar

itim

e en

Rep

ubliq

ue d

u Be

nin,

Arti

cles

643

–44,

22

Sept

embe

r 201

1, a

vaila

ble

at h

ttp:

//w

ww

.ilo.

org/

dyn/

natle

x/do

cs/

MO

NO

GRAP

H/88

026/

1005

42/F

2406

8081

7/BE

N-2

010-

L-88

026.

pdf.


©2015XXXV

Misc

ella

neou

s Law

s:N

one

Abili

ty to

Pro

secu

te:

Beni

n ca

n pr

osec

ute:

- Act

s of p

iracy

occ

urrin

g on

the

high

seas

com

mitt

ed b

y or

aga

inst

Ben

in-fl

agge

d sh

ips.-

Act

s of p

iracy

falli

ng

unde

r the

crim

inal

law

occ

urrin

g on

or a

gain

st a

ny v

esse

l with

in 2

00 n

m.

Beni

n ca

nnot

pro

secu

te:-

Acts

of p

iracy

com

mitt

ed o

utsid

e of

200

nm

aga

inst

non

-Ben

in-fl

agge

d ve

ssel

s.- A

cts b

y pi

rate

s occ

urrin

g w

ithin

200

nm

aga

inst

non

-Ben

in-fl

agge

d ve

ssel

s tha

t wer

e no

t dire

ct a

cts,

but

inst

ead

wer

e m

erel

y in

supp

ort o

f the

crim

inal

en

terp

rise.

Cam

eroo

n

Ratifi

ed U

NCL

OS

Ratifi

ed S

UATe

rrito

rial S

ea C

laim

EEZ

Clai

m

Yes

No

12 n

m77

20

0 nm

78

Pira

cy L

egisl

ation

:Li

mits

pro

secu

tion

of p

iracy

to si

tuati

ons w

here

: 1) A

ct c

omm

itted

by

Cam

eroo

n ci

tizen

; 2) A

ct o

ccur

red

in C

amer

oon’

s ter

ritor

ial s

ea;

or, 3

) The

indi

vidu

al w

ho c

omm

itted

the

act i

s arr

este

d in

Cam

eroo

n. 79

Crim

inal

Law

:Cr

imin

alize

s con

spira

cies

, crim

inal

atte

mpt

s, to

rtur

e, u

se o

f exp

losiv

e su

bsta

nces

, mur

der,

man

slaug

hter

, neg

ligen

t or r

eckl

ess

hom

icid

e, a

ssau

lt, b

atter

y, ki

dnap

ping

/fal

se im

priso

nmen

t, de

stru

ction

of p

rope

rty,

theft

, and

robb

ery.

80

Misc

ella

neou

s Law

s:Te

rror

ism la

w w

hich

disc

usse

s “pi

racy

,” bu

t act

ually

onl

y ap

plie

s to

civi

l avi

ation

and

airc

raft

and,

thus

, is n

ot a

pplic

able

. 81

Abili

ty to

Pro

secu

te:

Cam

eroo

n ca

n pr

osec

ute:

- Act

s of p

iracy

on

the

high

seas

if c

omm

itted

by

a Ca

mer

oon

citiz

en, o

r if a

pira

te is

arr

este

d in

Cam

eroo

n.-

Acts

of p

iracy

falli

ng u

nder

the

crim

inal

law

occ

urrin

g on

or a

gain

st a

ny v

esse

l with

in 1

2 nm

.Ca

mer

oon

cann

ot p

rose

cute

:- Ac

ts o

f pira

cy o

n th

e hi

gh se

as w

here

the

pira

tes a

re n

on-C

amer

ooni

ans,

or i

f the

pira

tes a

re a

rres

ted

on

the

high

seas

or a

nyw

here

out

side

Cam

eroo

n’s t

errit

ory.

Cong

oRa

tified

UN

CLO

SRa

tified

SUA

Terr

itoria

l Sea

Cla

imEE

Z Cl

aim

Yes

No

12 n

m82

20

0 nm

83

Pira

cy L

egisl

ation

:Li

mits

pro

secu

tion

of p

iracy

to a

cts o

f “vi

olen

ce”

com

mitt

ed b

y or

aga

inst

Con

gole

se fl

agge

d sh

ips.

84

Crim

inal

Law

:Cr

imin

alize

s atte

mpt

s, m

urde

r, m

ansla

ught

er, k

idna

ppin

g, th

eft, r

obbe

ry, a

nd th

reat

enin

g ot

hers

. 85

Misc

ella

neou

s Law

s:N

one

Abili

ty to

Pro

secu

te:

Cong

o ca

n pr

osec

ute:

- Act

s of p

iracy

occ

urrin

g on

the

high

seas

com

mitt

ed b

y or

aga

inst

Con

go-fl

agge

d sh

ips.-

Act

s of p

iracy

occ

urrin

g on

the

high

seas

aga

inst

any

ves

sel,

as lo

ng a

s the

acc

used

is in

Con

go, u

nles

s the

re is

an

oblig

ation

to e

xtra

dite

.- Ac

ts o

f pira

cy fa

lling

un

der t

he c

rimin

al la

w o

ccur

ring

on o

r aga

inst

any

ves

sel w

ithin

12

nm.

Cong

o ca

nnot

pro

secu

te:-

Acts

of p

iracy

com

mitt

ed o

utsid

e of

12

nm a

gain

st n

on-C

ongo

-flag

ged

vess

els w

here

the

accu

sed

is no

t fou

nd

in C

ongo

.Cô

te d

’Ivoi

re

Ratifi

ed U

NCL

OS

Ratifi

ed S

UATe

rrito

rial S

ea C

laim

EEZ

Clai

m

Yes

Yes

12 n

m86

20

0 nm

87

Pira

cy L

egisl

ation

:Li

mits

pro

secu

tion

of p

iracy

to a

cts o

f “vi

olen

ce”

com

mitt

ed b

y or

aga

inst

flag

ged

Côte

d’Iv

oire

ship

s.88

Crim

inal

Law

:Cr

imin

alize

s mur

der,

assa

ult,

kidn

appi

ng, f

alse

impr

isonm

ent,

theft

, and

des

truc

tion

of p

rope

rty.

89 P

rohi

bits

exe

rcise

of p

rose

cuto

rial

juris

dicti

on fo

r act

s occ

urrin

g on

ship

s, e

ven

in te

rrito

rial w

ater

s, u

nles

s Côt

e d’

Ivoi

re a

utho

rities

resp

onde

d to

the

crim

e, th

e off

ense

w

as c

onsid

ered

a “d

istur

banc

e of

pub

lic o

rder

,” or

the

perp

etra

tor o

r vic

tim w

as Iv

oria

n.90


XXXVI ©2015

Misc

ella

neou

s Law

s:N

one

Abili

ty to

Pro

secu

te:

Côte

d’Iv

oire

can

pro

secu

te:-

Acts

of p

iracy

occ

urrin

g on

the

high

seas

com

mitt

ed b

y or

aga

inst

Ivor

ian

flagg

ed sh

ips.-

Act

s of p

iracy

fa

lling

und

er th

e cr

imin

al la

w o

ccur

ring

on o

r aga

inst

any

ves

sel w

ithin

12

nm if

, and

onl

y if,

Côt

e d’

Ivoi

re a

utho

rities

resp

onde

d to

the

crim

e, th

e off

ense

was

con

sider

ed a

“dist

urba

nce

of p

ublic

ord

er,”

or th

e pe

rpet

rato

r or v

ictim

was

Ivor

ian.

Cô

te d

’Ivoi

re c

anno

t pro

secu

te:-

Acts

of p

iracy

com

mitt

ed o

utsid

e of

12

nm a

gain

st n

on-C

ôte

d’Iv

oire

-flag

ged

vess

els.-

Act

s of p

iracy

co

mm

itted

with

in 1

2 nm

if C

ôte

d’Iv

oire

aut

horiti

es fa

iled

to re

spon

d to

the

crim

e, th

e off

ense

was

not

con

sider

ed a

“dist

urba

nce

of

publ

ic o

rder

,” or

non

e of

the

perp

etra

tors

or v

ictim

s wer

e Iv

oria

n.G

abon

Ratifi

ed U

NCL

OS

Ratifi

ed S

UATe

rrito

rial S

ea C

laim

EEZ

Clai

m

Yes

No

12 n

m 91

200

nm92

Pira

cy L

egisl

ation

:N

one

Crim

inal

Law

:Cr

imin

alize

s atte

mpt

s, m

urde

r, as

saul

t and

batt

ery,

man

slaug

hter

, kid

napp

ing,

theft

, rob

bery

, and

use

of e

xplo

sives

. 93

Misc

ella

neou

s Law

s:N

one

Abili

ty to

Pro

secu

te:

Gabo

n ca

n pr

osec

ute:

- Act

s of p

iracy

falli

ng u

nder

the

crim

inal

law

occ

urrin

g on

or a

gain

st a

ny v

esse

l with

in 1

2 nm

. Ga

bon

cann

ot p

rose

cute

:- Ac

ts o

f pira

cy w

hich

occ

urre

d ou

tsid

e of

12

nm.

Gha

na

Ratifi

ed U

NCL

OS

Ratifi

ed S

UATe

rrito

rial S

ea C

laim

EEZ

Clai

m

Yes

Yes

12 n

m94

20

0 nm

95

Pira

cy L

egisl

ation

:Gh

ana’

s Crim

inal

Cod

e pe

rmits

Gha

na to

pro

secu

te a

cts c

omm

itted

on

a cr

ew m

embe

r’s o

wn

ship

, to

acts

by

a sh

ip o

wne

r or m

aste

r, or

whe

re a

cre

w m

embe

r thr

ows g

oods

ove

rboa

rd o

f ano

ther

ves

sel a

fter f

orci

bly

boar

ding

. It i

s lik

ely

Ghan

a ha

s jur

isdic

tion

over

thes

e ve

ry li

mite

d ty

pes o

f act

s on

the

high

seas

bey

ond

its te

rrito

rial w

ater

s. 96

Crim

inal

Law

:Cr

imin

alize

s crim

inal

atte

mpt

s, a

betti

ng, c

onsp

iracy

, thr

eate

ning

oth

ers,

mur

der,

man

slaug

hter

, “ca

usin

g ha

rm”

to o

ther

s, “

use

of a

n off

ensiv

e w

eapo

n,”

assa

ult a

nd b

atter

y, ki

dnap

ping

, and

robb

ery.

97

Misc

ella

neou

s Law

s:N

one

Abili

ty to

Pro

secu

te:

Ghan

a ca

n pr

osec

ute:

- Act

s com

mitt

ed o

n a

crew

mem

ber’s

ow

n sh

ip, t

o ac

ts b

y a

ship

ow

ner o

r mas

ter,

or w

here

a c

rew

mem

ber

thro

ws g

oods

ove

rboa

rd o

f ano

ther

ves

sel a

fter f

orci

bly

boar

ding

, whe

reve

r the

se a

cts o

ccur

.- Ac

ts o

f pira

cy o

ccur

ring

with

in 1

2 nm

.Gh

ana

cann

ot p

rose

cute

:- Ac

ts o

f pira

cy o

ccur

ring

outs

ide

of 1

2 nm

, oth

er th

an th

ose

3 lim

ited

acts

des

crib

ed a

bove

.Li

beria

Ratifi

ed U

NCL

OS

Ratifi

ed S

UATe

rrito

rial S

ea C

laim

EEZ

Clai

m

Yes

Yes

200

nm98

Non

e99

Pira

cy L

egisl

ation

:Li

beria

’s Pe

nal L

aw fu

lly a

llow

s Lib

eria

to p

rose

cute

act

s of p

iracy

with

a d

efini

tion

near

ly id

entic

al to

that

of U

NCL

OS,

and

also

au

thor

izes u

nive

rsal

juris

dicti

on o

ver a

cts o

f pira

cy.

100

Crim

inal

Law

:Cr

imin

alize

s mur

der,

negl

igen

t hom

icid

e, m

ansla

ught

er, k

idna

ppin

g, fa

lse im

priso

nmen

t, as

saul

t, ro

bber

y, bu

rgla

ry, t

heft,

acc

ompl

ice

acts

, crim

inal

atte

mpt

s, a

cts o

f con

spira

cy, t

erro

rism

, arm

ed ro

bber

y, an

d hi

jack

ing.

101

Misc

ella

neou

s Law

s:N

one


©2015XXXVII

Abili

ty to

Pro

secu

te:

Libe

ria c

an p

rose

cute

:- An

y ac

t of p

iracy

occ

urrin

g on

the

high

the

high

seas

, in

its E

EZ, o

r in

its te

rrito

rial w

ater

s.Li

beria

can

not p

rose

cute

:- N

ot a

pplic

able

bec

ause

Lib

eria

can

pro

secu

te a

ny a

ct o

f pira

cy, u

nles

s it o

ccur

s in

anot

her s

tate

’s te

rrito

rial

wat

ers.

Nig

eria

Ratifi

ed U

NCL

OS

Ratifi

ed S

UATe

rrito

rial S

ea C

laim

EEZ

Clai

m

Yes

Yes

12 n

m10

220

0 nm

103

Pira

cy L

egisl

ation

:N

one10

4

Crim

inal

Law

:Cr

imin

alize

s mur

der,

man

slaug

hter

, the

ft, fa

lse im

priso

nmen

t, ki

dnap

ping

indi

vidu

als a

nd ta

king

them

out

side

of N

iger

ia, c

onsp

iracy

, as

saul

t, an

d m

oles

ting

crew

s of s

hips

.105

Misc

ella

neou

s Law

s:Ho

use

Bill

21:-

Crim

inal

izes r

eque

sting

, neg

otiati

ng, o

r col

lecti

ng ra

nsom

s on

kidn

appe

d or

abd

ucte

d pe

ople

.106 P

reve

ntion

of T

erro

rism

Bi

ll:- A

ny a

ct w

hich

can

be

cons

ider

ed to

forc

e a

gove

rnm

ent o

r int

erna

tiona

l org

aniza

tion

to c

arry

out

any

act

of t

erro

rism

. 107

Abili

ty to

Pro

secu

te:

Nig

eria

can

pro

secu

te:-

Acts

of p

iracy

falli

ng u

nder

the

crim

inal

law

occ

urrin

g on

or a

gain

st a

ny v

esse

l with

in 1

2 nm

. - A

ny m

embe

r of

a pi

rate

acti

on g

roup

whi

ch c

onsp

ired

to c

omm

it pi

racy

, reg

ardl

ess o

f whe

re th

ey a

re lo

cate

d, a

s lon

g as

a si

ngle

crim

inal

act

occ

urre

d w

ithin

12

nm.

Nig

eria

can

not p

rose

cute

:- Ac

ts o

f pira

cy w

hich

occ

urre

d ou

tsid

e of

12

nm.

Sier

ra L

eone

Ratifi

ed U

NCL

OS

Ratifi

ed S

UATe

rrito

rial S

ea C

laim

EEZ

Clai

m

Yes

No

12 n

m10

8 20

0 nm

109

Pira

cy L

egisl

ation

:N

one

Crim

inal

Law

:

The

crim

inal

law

crim

inal

izes m

urde

r, co

nspi

racy

to c

omm

it m

urde

r, sh

ootin

g or

atte

mpti

ng to

shoo

t at o

ther

s with

the

inte

nt to

do

grie

vous

bod

ily h

arm

, ass

aulti

ng a

“sea

man

,” an

d ba

ttery

.110 T

he L

arce

ny A

ct c

rimin

alize

s the

ft, la

rcen

y, an

d ro

bber

y.11

1 The

Crim

inal

Pr

oced

ure

Code

not

es th

at tr

ials

for p

iracy

, “as

defi

ned

by th

e la

w o

f nati

ons”

are

not

requ

ired

to b

e au

thor

ized

by th

e Att

orne

y-Ge

nera

l (w

hich

is n

orm

ally

requ

ired

for a

cts o

ccur

ring

agai

nst n

on-c

itize

ns in

terr

itoria

l wat

ers)

. 112

Misc

ella

neou

s Law

s:N

one

Abili

ty to

Pro

secu

te:

Sier

ra L

eone

can

pro

secu

te: -

Act

s of p

iracy

falli

ng u

nder

the

crim

inal

law

occ

urrin

g on

or a

gain

st a

ny v

esse

l with

in 1

2 nm

. Si

erra

Leo

ne c

anno

t pro

secu

te: -

Act

s of p

iracy

com

mitt

ed o

utsid

e of

12

nm.

Togo

Ratifi

ed U

NCL

OS

Ratifi

ed S

UATe

rrito

rial S

ea C

laim

EEZ

Clai

m

Yes

Yes

30 n

m 11

320

0 nm

114

Pira

cy L

egisl

ation

:Li

mits

pro

secu

tion

of p

iracy

to a

cts o

f “vi

olen

ce”

com

mitt

ed b

y or

aga

inst

Togo

-flag

ged

ship

s.11

5

Crim

inal

Law

:Cr

imin

alize

s hom

icid

e, m

ansla

ught

er n

eglig

ent h

omic

ide,

ass

ault,

batt

ery,

kidn

appi

ng, t

heft,

and

des

truc

tion

of p

rope

rty.

116

Misc

ella

neou

s Law

s:N

one

Abili

ty to

Pro

secu

te:

Togo

can

pro

secu

te:-

Acts

of p

iracy

occ

urrin

g on

the

high

seas

com

mitt

ed b

y or

aga

inst

Togo

-flag

ged

ship

s.- A

cts o

f pira

cy fa

lling

und

er

the

crim

inal

law

occ

urrin

g on

or a

gain

st a

ny v

esse

l with

in 3

0 nm

.To

go c

anno

t pro

secu

te:-

Acts

of p

iracy

com

mitt

ed o

utsid

e of

30

nm a

gain

st n

on-T

ogo-

flagg

ed v

esse

ls.


XXXVIII ©2015

74757677787980818283848586878889909192939495969798

74 Ibid., Article 644.

75 France: Penal Code of 1810, Original edition uncut, published under the title: Code Offences and Penalties, [Law decreed February 15th, 1810, promulgated February 25th, 1810], Articles 295, 309, 341, 379, 434–35, available at http://www.napoleon-series.org/research/government/france/penalcode/c_penalcode3b.html.

76 See ibid.

77 Cameroon: Law No. 2000-2 of 17 April 2000 relating to Maritime Areas of the Republic of Cameroon, available at https://www.cncc.cm/pdf/reglementation/TEXTES%20NATIONAUX/Loi_Espaces_maritimes_republique_Cameroun.pdf.

78 “Cameroon, Summary of Claims,” U.S. Navy Judge Advocate General’s Corps, April 2013, available at http://www.jag.navy.mil/organization/documents/mcrm/Cameroon2013.pdf.

79 Cameroon: Code Penal, n° 67/LF/1, Journal Officiel de la Republique du Cameroun, 12 juin 1967, Articles 10–11, available at http://www.vertic.org/media/National%20Legislation/Cameroon/CM_Code_Penal_Cameroun.pdf.

80 Ibid., Articles 9, 94–95, 132 bis, 229, 275, 278, 289–30, 291, 316, 318, 320.

81 Cameroon: Law No. 2001-19 of 18 December 2001 on the Punishment of Crimes and Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, Article 1, avail-able at https://www.unodc.org/tldb/showDocument.do?lng=fr&documentUid=7520&country=%20CMR.

82 “Maritime Claims,” The CIA World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2106.html (accessed May 15, 2015).

83 Ibid.

84 Congo: Loi 30-63 du 4 juillet 1963 portant Code de la Marine Marchande, Articles 270–73, available at http://www.cesbc.org/congo/Lois/Loi%2030-63.pdf.

85 Code Penal Congolais, 30 November 2004, Articles 4, 43–48, 52, 67, 80, 81–82, 160, available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/fr/cd/cd004fr.pdf.

86 Côte d’Ivoire: Law No. 77-926 delimiting the Maritime Zones placed under the National Jurisdiction of the Republic of Ivory Coast of 17 Novem-ber 1977, Article 1, available at http://www.un.org/depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/CIV_1977_Law.pdf.

87 Ibid., Articles 2–3.

88 Côte d’Ivoire: Le Code de la Marine Marchande, Loi N° 61349 du 9 Novembre 1961, Relative a l’Institution a d’un Code de la Marine Marchande, Articles 228–38, available at http://www.loidici.com/codemarine/codemarine.php.

89 Côte d’Ivoire: Code pénal [Côte d’Ivoire], 1981-640; 1995-522, 31 July 1981, Articles 26–27, 164, 342, 345, 373, 392, 423, available at http://www.refworld.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/rwmain?page=category&category=LEGAL&publisher=&type=&coi=CIV&docid=3ae6b5860&skip=0.


91 “Maritime Claims, The World Factbook,” CIA, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2106.html (accessed May 15, 2015).

92 Ibid.

93 Loi n° 21/63 du 31 mai 1963, telle que mise à jour jusqu’en novembre 1994, portant Code Penal, Articles 6, 223-24, 230-31, 232, 246-49, 250-54, 292, 295-96, 327, available at http://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/docs/ELECTRONIC/58661/116713/F703827742/GAB-58661.pdf.

94 Ghana: Maritime Zones (Delimitation) Act, 1986, P.N.D.C.L. 159, Section 1, available at http://www.ghanamaritime.org/assets/photos/forms/GMA_Laws/Ghana%20Maritme%20Zones%20(Delimitation)%20Act%201986%20(PNDCL%20159).pdf.

95 Ibid., Section 5.

96 Ghana: Criminal Code, 1960 (Act 29), Section 193, available at http://www.africanchildforum.org/clr/Legislation%20Per%20Country/ghana/ghana_criminal_1960_en.pdf; see also Ghana: Courts Act 1993 (Act 459), Sections 17, 56, 120(2), available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lex-docs/laws/en/gh/gh033en.pdf.

97 Ghana Criminal Code, Sections 17–18, 20, 23, 46–48, 50–51, 69–70, 72, 74–76, 84–87, 89–90, 149–50.

98 Liberia: Act to approve the Executive Order issued by the President of Liberia on 24 December 1976, approved 16 February 1977, available at http://www.un.org/depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/LBR_1977_Act.pdf; see also Act to establish and delimit the territorial sea and contiguous zone of the Republic of Liberia, approved 24 June 1968, available at http://www.un.org/depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDF-FILES/LBR_1968_Act.pdf.


©2015XXXIX

99100101102103104105106107108109110111112113114115116

99 See ibid.

100 Title 26 of the Liberian Code of Laws Revised, An Act Adopting a New Penal Law and Repealing Sections 31.3 & 32.1 of the Criminal Proce-dure Law, July 19, 1976, vol. IV, p. 725, Sections 1.4(1), 15.31(1), available at http://www.icla.up.ac.za/images/un/use-of-force/africa/Liberia/Penal%20Code%20Liberia%201978.pdf.

101 Ibid., Sections 3.1, 10.1, 10.4, 14.1–14.3, 14.20, 14.21, 14.54, 14.50, 14.52, 15.20, 15.30, 15.32, 15.33, 15.51; see also An Act to Amend Chap-ters 14 and 15 Sub-Chapter(C), Title 26 of the Liberian Code of Laws Revised, Known as the Penal Law of 1976, by Adding thereto Four New Sections thereby Making it the Crimes of Armed Robbery, Terrorism and Hijacking, Respectively, Capital Offenses, and Providing Punishment Thereof, 22 July 2008, available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/LBR_national_legislation.pdf.

102 “Nigeria,” The CIA World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ni.html (accessed May 14, 2015).

103 Ibid.

104 See John Iwori, “Nigeria: Bill to Domesticate Treaties on Piracy, Waterways Robbery Underway,” This Day Live, 21 October 2011, http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/bill-to-domesticate-treaties-on-piracy-waterways-robbery-underway/100993/; “Tackling the Perils of Piracy,” International Law Office, 28 November 2012, http://www.internationallawoffice.com/newsletters/Detail.aspx?g=f1e2890f-eac5-4703-ad34-c78b4349547c; Stephen Spark, “Nigeria Seeks a Legal Finish to Counter-Piracy Actions,” IHS Maritime 360, 22 November 2014, http://www.ihsmaritime360.com/article/15543/nigeria-seeks-a-legal-finish-to-counter-piracy-actions.

105 Nigeria: Criminal Code Act, (1990) Cap. (77) Sections 252–53, 306–18, 364–65, 383, 397, 401, 501(c)-(d), available at http://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/natlex_browse.details?p_lang=en&p_country=NGA&p_classification=01.04&p_origin=COUNTRY&p_sortby=SORTBY_COUNTRY.

106 Nigeria: An Act to Amend the Criminal Code Act, Cap. C38 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004, by Providing Punishment for the Offence of Kidnapping; and Matters Concerned Therewith (2011), Section 516.

107 Nigeria: An Act to Provide for Measures to Combat Terrorism and for Related Matters (2011), Section 2, available at http://www.nass.gov.ng/nass2/legislation2.php?search=An+Act+to+Provide+for+Measures+to+Combat+Terrorism+and+for+Related+Matters&Submit=Search.

108 National Provisional Ruling Council of Sierra Leone, Decree no. 11, The Maritime Zones (Establishment) Decree, June 6, 1996, Article 2, avail-able at http://www.sierra-leone.org/Laws/1996-NPRC11.pdf.


110 Sierra Leone: An Act to consolidate and amend the Statute Law of England and Ireland relating to Offences against the Person, 1861, Articles 1, 4–5, 9, 11, 15, 18, 20, 40, available at http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/1861/en/act/pub/0100/print.html.

111 The Larceny Act, 1916, [6 & 7 GEO. 5. Ch. 50.], Articles 1–2, 14, 23, available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1916/50/pdfs/ukp-ga_19160050_en.pdf.

112 Sierra Leone: The Criminal Procedure Acts, 1965, Article 53, available at http://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/docs/ELECTRONIC/65811/61760/F1739154701/SLE65811.pdf

113 Togo: Ordinance No. 24 delimiting the Territorial Waters and creating a protected Economic Maritime Zone of 16 August 1977, Article 1, avail-able at http://www.un.org/depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/TGO_1977_Ordinance.pdf.


115 Togo: Code de la Marine Marchande, Ordonnance No 29. du 12-8-71, Articles 147–57, available at http://www.un.org/depts/los/LEGISLATION-ANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/TGO_marine_marchande.pdf.

116 Code Pénal du Togo (révisé en Avril 2000), Articles 6, 44-49, 51–53, 60, 97–102, 126, 132, 224 available at http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=201335.


XL ©2015

APPENDIx k – SEAfArEr SurvEy

Participant recruitment and Participation

Seafarers recruited for the study were identified through two pathways. Seafarers in the Philippines known by MPHRP to have been held hostage by pirates were directly approached to participate. In addition, a comparison sample of seafarers not known to have been attacked by pirates was approached by members of the research team in person at manning and training agencies in the Philippines.

175 seafarers agreed to participate in this study, including 37 seafarers known to have been attacked by pirates and 138 not known to have been attacked.

Coding for Post-traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and Depression

PTSD was assessed using the Posttraumatic Checklist–Civilian scale,117 modified to ask specifically about piracy rather than a general traumatic experience. The PCL–C can be coded for the presence of probable PTSD by using an overall score for symptom severity, by coding for the presence of symptoms meeting the criteria for PTSD, or by both. We used the most restrictive approach of both: respondents were coded for probable PTSD if they had scores of 3 or greater on at least one item from the DSM-IV Axis B category for PTSD symptomatology, at least three items from Axis C, and at least two from Axis D; and also had an overall score for symptom severity of 35 or higher.

Probable depression was scored using the Center for Epidemiological Studies–Depression scale, a long-standing scale frequently used to assess depression.118 The CES-D has been used internationally and is accepted as a measure of depression for international samples, but there is a known issue that Southeast Asian populations tend to have higher mean scores on the CES-D than European populations.119 Data specific for what cutoff scores were appropriate for Filipino populations was not available, but recommended cutoff points for other Asian populations include using a score of 24 to diagnose probable depression in Korean populations120 and a score of 19 in Japanese populations,121 compared to a typical cutoff score of 16 in American populations. In order to maximize the specificity of this assessment, a cutoff score of 24 was used to code for probable depression.

117 Frank W. Weathers et al., PCL-M for DSM-IV (National Center for PTSD-Behavioral Science Division, 1994).

118 Lenore Sawyer Radloff, “The CES-D Scale a Self-Report Depression Scale for Research in the General Population,” Applied Psychological Mea-surement, v. 1 (1977), 385–401.

119 Andrew Mackinnon et al., “The Center for Epidemiological Studies Depression Scale in Older Community Samples in Indonesia, North Korea, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, and Thailand, ” The Journals of Gerontology Series B: Psychological Sciences and Social Sciences, v. 53 (1998), P343–52.

120 Maenge Je Cho and Kye Hee Kim, “Use of the Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression (CES-D) Scale in Korea,” Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, 186, 304–10.

121 Koji Wada et al., “Validity of the Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale as a Screening Instrument of Major Depressive Disorder among Japanese Workers,” American Journal of Industrial Medicine, 50 (2007), 8–12.


©2015XLI

APPENDIx L – MAStEr LISt of EvENtSKey: Successful IncidentUnsuccesful Incident

The incidents in the tables below were drawn from a variety of sources. Many of them were open-source news articles, for which the reporter name is listed. Upon request, OBP can provide these exact citations. The majority of sources, however, were from several reporting bodies. These specific citations are provided below. To access these databases, many require either login information or a subscription. Here are the full names and citations for those sources which are not from news articles:

• IMB: ICC International Maritime Bureau, Live Piracy & Armed Robbery Report 2014122

• IMO: International Maritime Organization, Piracy and Armed Robbery Database 123

• MARLO: U.S. Maritime Liaison Office (MARLO) Weekly, Piracy Analysis and Threat to Shipping (PATS)124

• NGA: National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, Anti-Shipping Activity Messages125

• ONI: Office of Naval Intelligence, Worldwide Threat to Shipping (WTS) Report126

• ReCAAP: Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combatting Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in Asia Information Sharing Center127

• Suritec: Independent Global Incident Analysis, Piracy Report128

122 “Live Piracy & Armed Robbery Report 2014,” ICC International Maritime Bureau, https://www.icc-ccs.org/piracy-reporting-centre/live-pira-cy-report (accessed December 15, 2014). The 2014 incidents are no longer available. For a complete list of these, please contact the IMB or OBP.

123 “GISIS Public Area, Piracy and Armed Robbery Database,” International Maritime Organization, https://gisis.imo.org/Public/PAR/Search.aspx (accessed May 15, 2015). You must create an account as a public user; once on the page select “search incidents” and search by date.

124 These reports can often be found online by searching for the name of the report, as well as adding on the pertinent year. To receive these re-ports on a regular basis requires a subscription. To subscribe, visit the website for the office’s contact email. “Essential Contact Information,” Maritime Liaison Office Bahrain, http://www.cusnc.navy.mil/marlo/guidance.html (accessed May 15, 2015).

125 “Anti-Shipping Activity Messages,” National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, http://msi.nga.mil/NGAPortal/MSI.portal?_nfpb=true&_pageLa-bel=msi_portal_page_65 (accessed November 10, 2014). To access, you must use the date filter in the query box, and narrow the date range to 2014.

126 One can access these reports through the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency’s website. “Worldwide Threat to Shipping Reports,” National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, http://msi.nga.mil/NGAPortal/MSI.portal?_nfpb=true&_pageLabel=msi_portal_page_64 (accessed May 15, 2015).

127 OBP acquired information from ReCAAP’s various incidents reports, which can be accessed through ReCAAP’s website. “Incident Reports,” Re-CAAP, http://www.recaap.org/AlertsReports/IncidentReports.aspx?EntryId=11 (accessed May 15, 2015).

128 To subscribe to the monthly reports, email Lydelle Joubert at [email protected].


XLII ©2015

Western Indian ocean region Piracy and Maritime Crime Incidents Database**The Suspicious Incidents Database can be made available upon request

Date Ship Name Ship Type Flag State Activity Type Number of Hostages

Sources

10/01/2014 Shane Hind Dhow India Hostage/All Crew, Mothershipped 11 Oceanus; Znews; defenceWeb

17/01/2014 Nave Atropos Tanker Marshall Islands Failed Boarding NGA; Oceanus; IMB; MARLO;

ANI News; IMO

08/02/2014 Geise General Cargo Gibraltar Failed Boarding NGA; IMB; MARLO; IMO

13/02/2014 Andrea Ro-Ro Sierra Leone Failed Boarding NGA; CRIEnglish.com; IMB; MARLO; IMO; Oceanus

03/03/2014 Unknown Failed Boarding Oceanus

07/03/2014 Jolly Quarzo Ro-Ro Italy Failed Boarding Oceanus; IMB; IMO

30/03/2014 Album Tanker Panama Failed Boarding Oceanus; Bloomberg; IMB; IMO


17/04/2014 Flag Thenia Bulk Carrier Malta Failed Boarding NGA; IMB; MARLO; IMO

22/05/2014 Mesouth Dhow Bahrain Robbery 6 Gulf Daily News; Times of India; Suritech

08/06/2014 Orinco Star Tanker UK Failed Boarding Moran Security Group


12/08/2014 Unknown Tanker India Failed Boarding Oceanus


18/08/2014 Priceless Sea Bulk Carrier Liberia Failed Boarding NGA; IMB; MARLO

25/09/2014 Ocean Queen Tanker Singapore Failed Boarding Oceanus; IMB; IMO


30/12/2014 Captain Nikolas I Tanker Malta Failed Boarding IMO; Oceanus; IMB; IMO

Related Incident

10/07/2014 Semlow General Cargo Kenya Hostage/All Crew,

Robbery 11* World Bulletin; Qarancusub.com; Africa News Post; Harar24news

* Kenyan ship stranded from mechanical difficulties, looted by local fishermen. Al-Shaba’ab took possession of crew. Crew taken hostage, including captain and engineer. The exact number of hostages is not entirely clear. They appear to have been released 9 days later.


©2015XLIII

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