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Sociological Spectrum

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RELIGION AND SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY: ACROSSNATIONAL EXAMINATION

Katherine Meyer , Daniel Tope & Anne M. Price

To cite this article: Katherine Meyer , Daniel Tope & Anne M. Price (2008) RELIGION ANDSUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY: A CROSSNATIONAL EXAMINATION, Sociological Spectrum, 28:5,625-653, DOI: 10.1080/02732170802206260

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02732170802206260

Published online: 30 Jul 2008.

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RELIGION AND SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY: ACROSSNATIONAL EXAMINATION

Katherine Meyer

Department of Sociology, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio, USA

Daniel Tope

Department of Sociology, Florida State University, Tallahassee,Florida, USA

Anne M. Price

Department of Sociology, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio, USA

This article examines citizens’ support for democracy across forty-sixnations. The authors use multilevel modeling and data from the WorldValues Survey and other sources to assess individuals’ support fordemocracy in light of broader country-level factors as well as individualproclivities toward religion, politics and community. Findings suggestthat the predominance of a particular religion in a nation does notinfluence individuals’ views in and of itself. It does, however, matterwhen individuals’ religious beliefs and practices as well as their civicengagement are taken into account. These factors, even in predominantlyMuslim countries, appear to foster rather than hinder positive viewstowards democracy. But individuals seeking a prominent role for religionin government are likely to be substantially less supportive of democracy.

This research was supported by the National Science Foundation under Grant

SES–0300072. We thank Cheryl Sowash for data management.

Address correspondence to Katherine Meyer, Department of Sociology, 300 Bricker Hall,

190 North Oval Mall, Columbus, OH 43210, USA. E-mail: meyer.23@sociology.osu.edu

Sociological Spectrum, 28: 625–653, 2008

Copyright # Taylor & Francis Group, LLC

ISSN: 0273-2173 print/1521-0707 online

DOI: 10.1080/02732170802206260

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Such antidemocratic attitudes appear countered in a citizenry wheremany are engaged in conventional political activities, have attainedhigher social statuses and reside in highly globalized states withProtestant or Muslim majorities and without a Communist legacy.

The relationship between religion and democracy has been longrecognized and much debated (Fradkin 2000; Huntington 1991;Stepan 2000; Tocqueville 1832). The discourse focuses mostly onthe procedural definition of democracy, measured by the existenceof legislative bodies or free and fair elections in particular countries.While important, such discussions overlook other components ofdemocratic systems. Stable democracies not only require participativestructures of governance but also rely upon citizens’ acceptance ofsuch a system (Weber 1958). In fact, Bratton and Mattes (2001) notethat researchers argue that citizen support for a political regime is themost important factor for successful democratic consolidation and isalso the most appropriate measure of its legitimization by the people.

STRUCTURAL AND CULTURAL EXPLANATIONS

Religion is one element in a set of structural conditions which areviewed as important to legitimizing democracy and a key culturalcomponent shaping norms, values, and beliefs about appropriatemeans of governance. Other structural conditions include nationallevels of human and economic development, countries’ degree of glo-balization, and their historical experiences (Barro 1999; Bollen 1983;Dalton and Ong 2002; Lipset 1959, 1994). Scholars have studied theassociation between the predominant religious affiliation of nationsand their political structures, such as the rights and freedomsaccorded to citizens, the independence of judicial and legislativebodies, and citizens’ participation in routine procedures for replacingleaders (Burstein 1998; Hassouna 2001; McAdam 1982). Some notethat democratic structures are in place either weakly or barely in pre-dominantly Muslim nations (Huntington 1996; Kedourie 1994) orpredominantly Catholic prior to World War II, or in post 1989 East-ern and Central Europe (Fukuyama 2001; Huntington 1991, 1996;Karpov 1999; Kedourie 1994; Lipset 1994). They attribute the lackof democratic consolidation partly to the existence and culturalascendancy of religious belief systems which favored hierarchicaland=or authoritarian governance. Others disagreed (Esposito andVoll 1996; Filali-Ansary 1999). Less attention has been paid to theassociation between national religious predominance and citizens’support for democracy. Recently, however, scholars questioned

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whether or not Islam was a barrier to individuals’ support for demo-cracy; (e.g., Huntington 1996) some found it was not (e.g., Inglehartand Norris 2003; Meyer et al. 2007; Tessler 2003).

Overall, the research literature on structural and cultural explana-tions of democracy and individuals’ support for it points out thatlegitimization of democracy flourishes in nations where human devel-opment is coupled with globalization and where stable histories, lack-ing a recent authoritarian past, exist. Debate continues aboutwhether or not some religions are an impediment to democraticdevelopment. Might the prevalence of particular religions, such asIslam, present barriers to the expansion of democratic political ideals?

We tackle that question using indicators that represent bothappropriate conceptualizations of complex social structural elementsand strongly reliable data. In particular, we utilize frequentlyemployed measures, such as the Human Development Index, GDP,and the Freedom House Index. In addition, we draw from Barro’s(1999) work on state religions and the University of Maryland’s StateFailure Task Force data (1995–2000), less widely used measures. Andwe introduce a measure of globalization based on the A.T. KearneyGlobalization Index, an index which views globalization as a morecomprehensive process than most measures do. Rather than concen-trating solely on the economic aspects of globalization, this measureincludes technology, political engagement and interpersonal contactas well. Utilizing these structural indicators (and testing similar onesin preliminary analyses not presented here), we develop a model of afrequently debated issue; i.e., whether or not the majority religiousaffiliations of nations correspond to and shape individuals’ senti-ments toward democracy within those nations. We test it using datafrom forty-six nations which comprise a large cross-section of theglobe and are diverse in terms of historical experiences, politicalregimes, and culture. Each included nation contains enough datafor analysis on every structural measure, particularly globalization,as well as for analysis of the World Values Survey data onindividuals’ support for democracy.

INDIVIDUALS’ RELIGION

Regardless of whether the religious culture of nations influences indi-viduals’ support for democracy or not, some argue that individuals’religious behaviors, beliefs, affiliations, and social networks shouldbe taken into account. A second body of literature devotes itself tothat. Billings and Scott (1994, p. 173) note that Marx, Weber, andDurkheim all ‘‘recognized the ‘double function’ of religion in the

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legitimation of power and privilege and in protest and opposition.’’Religion is routinely included in research on the formation of polit-ical attitudes and in studies of legitimization of political regimes(see Billings 1990; Stepan 2000). Although the role of religion seem-ingly declined in the 1960s and early 1970s and researchers believedsocieties were becoming increasingly secular, there was an ‘‘inter-national resurgence of religious activism symbolized by the revolu-tions in Iran and Nicaragua’’ in the late 1970s (Billings and Scott1994, p. 174). Comparative researchers report that the effect of indi-vidual religious identification may not be uniform across diversesocieties, and accordingly have examined the varying influence ofreligious affiliation on political attitudes across nations (see Hayes1995 for an example).

In this article, we examine the relationship between nationalreligious predominance, individuals’ religious beliefs and practices,and affinity for democracy. Specifically, as an element of nationalsocial structures and as a characteristic of individuals’ beliefs and beha-viors, does religion promote or impede support for democracy? Studiesof political sentiments that simultaneously address the influence ofnational-level structural arrangements and the activities and attitudesof individuals are rare (Wejnert 2005 is an important exception).Because this article examines the effects of both, it bridges the litera-tures on the effect of state predominant religions that mostly addressprocedural measures of democracy and the literature on the effect ofindividuals’ religion on political attitudes.

Scholars and people everywhere manifest interest in the spread ofdemocracy. It is often associated with less warfare, greater geopoliticalstability, widespread human rights, and economic development(O’Loughlin et al. 1998, p. 546). Consolidated democracies are morelikely to achieve economic stability and civilian control over the mili-tary (Schedler 1998). In general, despite problems that accompanydemocratic transitions, the benefits are viewed as far outweighingthe costs. However, not all share this view. Some individuals’ concernwith the spread of democracy (particularly Western-style) stems fromtheir dislike for aspects of this system. Case studies of particularnations attest to such sentiments. In modeling support for democracy,if only variables which may or may not promote support are included,it is not possible to address the question, ‘‘if not, why not?’’ Here, weinclude structural and individual variables which we expect to dampenenthusiasm for democracy to examine this issue. Our indicatorsinclude adverse regime change, a Communist legacy, and individuals’beliefs that religion and governance should be united in politicalstructures, especially when these beliefs are coupled with activism.

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CIVIC ENGAGEMENT

A third body of literature concerned with individuals’ support fordemocracy centers on the importance of civic engagement whichincludes membership in religious groups and religiously motivatedgroups. Numerous scholars have examined the relationship betweenassociationalism and democracy; its importance was noted byTocqueville (1832) and more recently underscored by Putnam whodescribed voluntary associations as ‘‘schools for democracy’’ (2000,p. 338). Social and civic skills, such as speaking in public, runningmeetings, writing letters, organizing projects, and debating issues,are learned. Other scholars have found that civic engagement throughmembership in organizations is important to democracy (Rice andFeldman 1997; Schofer and Fourcade-Gourinchas 2001; Siemienska2002). Putnam (2000) also notes that networks and associationsprovide strength in communities that keep extremist groups fromtargeting isolated and unattached individuals.

Most research on associationalism and democracy centers onmacrolevel dynamics between organizations and democratic struc-tures. Marsh (2002), studying more localized or mesolevel processesin Russia, found that variability in civic engagement in Russia’sregions explains variations in grassroots democracy. But questionsremain when one aims to understand individuals’ legitimization ofdemocracy: does civic engagement advance democratic sentiment?Can it counter the effects of historical adversity and=or individuals’beliefs in religiously motivated politics which are correlates of dimin-ished enthusiasm for democracy? We examine these questions byincluding measures of civic engagement in the models presented here.

We use Marsh’s (2002) conceptualization of civic engagementwhich accommodates a broad view of involvement includingmemberships in organizations of various kinds (religious as well asothers), participation in political activities ranging from signingpetitions to taking part in strikes, and civic interest manifest throughdiscussion and debate. Welsh (1996), Booth and Richard (1996), andInglehart and Norris (2003) found that political participation ispositively associated with democratic norms in Malaysia, CentralAmerica, and nine Western and Muslim societies, respectively. Boothand Richard (1996) also reported that respondents who are informedabout politics favor democracy more than others.

Not all research findings support the positive impact of civic engage-ment whether broadly or narrowly defined. Some found no effect.Encarnaci�oon (2001) studied Spain during its transition from dictator-ship to democracy found that historical legacies, political systems,

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and institutions structure preferences, interests, and values despite theabsence of civil society. Dalton and Ong (2002) found little effect ofgroup membership on democratic values in the East Asia. Others havesuggested that civic engagement, which is motivated by and linked toworld views that emphasize a fusion of religion and politics, actuallyreduces support for democracy. For example, Demerath (2001) ana-lyzed the negative outcomes of connections between religion and poli-tics at the national level and established that they correspond to unrest,violence, and antidemocratic sentiment among populations.

Exploration of the connections between individuals’ desire to com-bine religion and politics with their activism and antidemocratic sen-timent remains largely unexplored in crossnational studies. The topicis examined almost exclusively in studies of one nation, region, orsocial movement. Yet, concern with antidemocratic sentimentcoupled with activism that is religiously motivated has fueled fearof terrorism among U.S. and other populations since 2001 andbefore. The question is: Does the willingness of individuals who favorcombining religion and politics to be politically engaged correspondto their lack of support for democracy as a form of governance?

In sum, this article examines whether:

. the national prevalence of particular religions and other struc-tural=cultural factors correspond with positive sentimenttoward democratic political ideals;

. individuals’ religious beliefs and behaviors promote support fordemocracy;

. certain religions or religious beliefs and practices dampenenthusiasm for democracy;

. civic engagement advances democratic sentiment and mightserve to counter negative influences on support for democracy;and

. beliefs that religion and politics should be intertwined deter sup-port for democracy, especially when held by individuals who arewilling to be politically active.

THEORETICAL EXPLANATIONS OF DEMOCRATICOR ANTIDEMOCRATIC SENTIMENT

Substantial bodies of literature about what promotes democracy orlegitimization of it exist, but seldom are structural and individualinfluences on democratic support combined in one study. The sameholds true regarding literatures about what counters enthusiasm

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for democracy. We bring together these elements in developinghypotheses about individuals’ proclivity for democracy.

What National Traits Engender Support for Democracy?

Classic and contemporary work on democratic development suggeststhat large-scale processes set the stage for public political beliefs andcultures, as well as societal propensities toward democratic develop-ment (Lipset 1959; Sorensen 1998). Since citizen support is at leastone key element of democratic development and maintenance,macroconditions that matter for such development should similarlymatter for individuals’ political sentiments. We expect high levels ofhuman development and strong evidence of globalization to engenderdemocratic support based on the bulk of evidence from other research.

The vast majority of crossnational research on democratic devel-opment suggests that high levels of human development are linked todemocracy. Inglehart (1990), Kitschelt (1993), and Muller (1995)demonstrate the importance of high levels of economic growth.Diamond (1992) points out that people who are more economicallyadvantaged tend to favor and attain a democratic system. Nationaleconomic gains are tied to higher educational attainment and literacyrates of citizens, which are related to the development and acceptanceof democratic ideals (Inglehart and Welzel 2003).

Globalization became an important focus for scholars that studieddevelopment in the 1990s, especially in Eastern and Central Europeand also in Asia and Africa. Researchers acknowledge that throughspatial, temporal, and cultural diffusion, ideals and attitudes arespread across societies (O’Loughlin et al. 1998). Huntington (1991)argues that the third wave of democratization was heavily influencedby globalization via an increase in the crossnational flow of peopleand information across nations driven largely by technologicaladvancements. The Internet and the increased international com-munication that accompany it make it more difficult to withholdinformation from the public, and increased information and knowl-edge facilitate the development of democratic ideals (Schwartzman1998). For many, the technological advancements that accelerateinformational diffusion contribute to cultural changes whereby‘‘democratization becomes the common linguistic currency todescribe social struggles and political change’’ (Held 1996, p. 297).The diffusion of democratic ideals and practices across societies alsoallows pressure for democratization to come from the lower classes.

The degree to which a nation is politically engaged within theinternational community, or the world polity, is another factor of

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globalization with important implications. Involvement may includeparticipating in international talks on significant issues or moreformalized engagement, such as membership in The United Nationsor other international intergovernmental organizations. Researchshows that membership in international organizations affects statepolicies in many different areas, such as education, environmentalprotection, women’s suffrage, welfare coverage, beliefs about same-sex intimate relations, population, and war (Beckfield 2003, p. 401).Belonging to the world polity provides nations with ideas of how they‘‘should’’ or ‘‘must’’ act in order to retain their position and status.For example, more globalized nations are more likely to adopt popu-lar or progressive ideas about current issues—such as women’srights—and to adopt policies accordingly (Beckfield 2003). It followsthat nations which are well-connected to the international communitymay be more likely to have consolidated democracies.

What National Traits Contribute to Dubious AttitudesToward Democracy?

Regarding the amount of political and civil rights available and thepredominance of religion in nations, theoretical expectations andresearch findings are divided. Because individuals’ experiences witha given political system color their opinions of that system, muchscholarly work underscores the importance of political and civil rightsin consolidated democracies. Yet, dissatisfaction or contentment witha particular regime does not necessarily dampen or enhance indivi-duals’ basic political values because basic political orientations areseparate phenomena from opinions of specific political leaders or sys-tems (Klingeman 1999). Dalton and Shin’s (2004) analysis of EastAsian nations notes that basic democratic values remain stable evenwhile some citizens voice concerns over democratic performancein their own nations. They also point out that citizens express demo-cratic ideals and aspirations even in nondemocratic societies.Globally, public sentiment increasingly equates democracy with econ-omic affluence and individual freedoms, and this is evidenced in thegrowing democratic aspirations among those who witness the short-comings of their own nondemocratic governments. This hope fordemocratic development provides a foundation for developing ademocracy, for example, Eastern Europe in the 1990s. Thus, weexpect low levels of political and civil rights will be positively associatedwith increased support for democracy. We test for a curvilinear associ-ation with individuals’ support for democracy.

Religion’s role in the establishment and maintenance of systems ofgovernance has a long tradition in the social sciences, beginning at

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least with Max Weber (1934) who observed that political arrange-ments often have elective affinities with other aspects of nationalculture. More recent research on religion and democracy addressesWeber’s observation directly or indirectly (see Hassouna 2001;Burstein 1998; McAdam 1982; Kedourie 1994; Huntington 1991;Fukuyama 2001; Karpov 1999; Lipset 1994; Esposito and Voll1996; Filali-Ansary 1999). Some studies examine the link betweennational religious predominance and citizens’ support for democracy,a concern inherent in Weber’s interest in legitimacy (see Huntington1996; Inglehart and Norris 2003; Meyer et al. 2007; Tessler 2003).

Kedourie (1994) and Huntington (1996) observed the lack ofdemocratic development in the Arab world and argue that the sharedcultural values of Muslims are antithetical to democratic develop-ment and stability. They argue that this situation stems from the aimsof Islamic law to regulate the personal, the social, and the politicalaspects of daily life in an authoritarian manner. Their observationsraised concerns in political and public communities worldwide andspawned research on the topic. Presently, there is increasing evidencethat most populations around the world, including those living inpredominantly Muslim countries, are supportive of democracy(Inglehart 1999) or important components thereof (Meyer et al.1998; Tessler 2002). Evidence from such studies confirms that Islamis far from monolithic. It demonstrates that significant proportionsof the population in Muslim-majority countries embrace importantdemocratic values. Because of the centrality of Islamic culture in cur-rent debates on the growth of democratization, we give particularattention to Muslim majority nations here. Our expectations regard-ing citizens’ attitudes toward democracy in predominantly Muslimnations are uncertain; do they favor democracy more, less, or the sameas those from nations where other religions predominate?

What National Traits Discourage Support for Democracy?

A number of analysts examine the importance of stable politicalarrangements for citizen well-being and regime support. Citizensexperience markedly different political contexts if they inhabit longterm, uninterrupted democracies (Braizat 2002), as opposed to livingin nations that made a relatively recent democratic transition (Dalton1994; Siemienska 2002). Perhaps even more important than the tim-ing of a democratic transition is the political and economic environ-ment under which these transitions occur. ‘‘Democracies emergingunder adverse conditions are likely to be highly unstable, frail, andvulnerable’’ and such conditions have serious implications for citi-zens’ political attitudes (Sorensen 1998, p. 27). Legacies of violence

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and economic hardship may inspire hope in the citizenry for abrighter future, but such circumstances are also likely to engendercautiousness and uncertainty about new political arrangements. Aftera democratic transition, individual perceptions of the country’s econ-omic performance, whether one’s standard of living has improved,and the responsiveness of the political system, all influence individualsupport for democracy (Evans and Whitefield 1995).

The effects of a communist legacy on support for democracy canbe seen as similar to the effects of an adverse regime change. Forexample, socialization of younger generations to democracy is oftenabsent in both (Mishler and Rose 1999). There can be economic stag-nation or other challenges in Communist or post-Communist socie-ties which dampen enthusiasm for, and divert attention away from,developing democratic institutions. Also, governmental institutionsare frequently either authoritarian as in Communist societies, or fra-gile as in many post-Communist societies. Therefore, we expect thatindividuals residing in nations with recent adverse regime changes orwith Communist legacies will be less likely to support democracy.

What Individual Traits Encourage Support for Democracy?

Researchers routinely examine the association between individuals’religious beliefs, identities and practices, and their attitudes. Distinc-tions are made among different aspects of beliefs, such as individuals’theological orthodoxy, their adherence to particular moral teachingsand principles, and the importance of religion in the scheme of life.They examine individuals’ beliefs about the interconnection of religi-on and politics. And they distinguish among different practices, suchas observance of rites and rituals, church-synagogue-mosque attend-ance, the rearing of future generations, etc. Here, we examine theimportance of individuals’ attachment to religion, their attendanceat religious services, and their views toward integrating religion andpolitics.1

We expect that World Value Survey respondents who are attached totheir religion and attend religious services will be supportive of democ-racy. In work relevant to the international focus of this article,

1 In preliminary analyses, not presented here, we examined the full range of indicators from

the 2000 WVS which pertain to individuals’ religion including: whether or not one was brought

up religiously at home; frequency of attending religious services; religious affiliation; whether

or not one views oneself as a religious person; whether or not the individual believes in god, life

after death, souls, the devil, hell, heaven, or sin. These indicators either did not sufficiently

vary, did not correlate with support for democracy, or failed to be predictive in preliminary

model testing. Also, we examined the effect of numerous interaction terms related to indivi-

duals’ religious behavior in earlier analysis and found insignificant outcomes.

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Patterson’s (2004) study of political attitudes in Argentina, Chile, andMexico found that religious intensity or devoutness rather thanreligious affiliation influences democratic values. He points out thatdevout people express confidence in various governmental and publicagencies and perceive others as law-abiding citizens who stand up fortheir rights. (Religious affiliation accounted only for interest in politicsand feelings of efficacy and only in Chile.) Karpov (1999) utilizing datafrom the 1993 Polish General Social Survey studied political tolerance,an attitudinal component of democratic governance. He found thatreligious commitment, that is, the importance of religion, and strengthof beliefs and firmness of belief in an afterlife, was only weakly andindirectly connected with intolerance of atheists and communists.

Regarding Muslims, Africa Action’s (2002) briefing paper showsfindings from Mali, Nigeria, Tanzania, and Uganda where seventypercent of both Muslims and non-Muslims agree that democracy ispreferable to other types of government, were satisfied with theworkings of democracy, and equally supported having a competi-tive multiparty electoral system. Numerous other scholars, suchas Rose (2002) studying Central Asia; Tessler (2002) examiningAlgeria, Egypt, Morocco, and Palestine; Meyer, Rizzo, and Ali(1998) focusing on Kuwait; and Braizat (2002) utilizing WorldValues Survey 2000 data also did not find that being Muslim,adhering to Islamic beliefs, or being devoted to religion discouragedsupport for democracy.

Some scholars who focus on the importance of civic engagement todemocratic support consider attendance at religious services to be a formof civic engagement or ignore it entirely. Those who study religion oftenseparate it out for analysis as we do here because, although Smith(2003), Putnam (2000), and others demonstrate the association betweenattendance at religious services and other forms of participation in thelocal communities, there remains empirical evidence that attendingreligious services is not the same as joining voluntary associations. Inpreliminary analyses, we did not find that attending church, mosque,synagogue, etc. were strongly correlated with belonging to organizationsor being politically active. Also, in Poland, Karpov (1999) found thatthose who attend church frequently are more tolerant than others.Africa Action (2002) reports that when respondents were asked aboutmosque attendance, the more often Muslims attended prayer meetings,the more supportive they were of democracy.

Does Civic Engagement Predict Support for Democracy?

Civic engagement, including involvement, interest, and participationin activities and organizations, has come to the fore in recent years

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largely due to Putnam’s (2000) emphasis on its importance to democ-racy. Research findings are equivocal about the effects of civicengagement in comparative studies. As mentioned previously, manyhave found it to be an important predictor of democracy (Feldman1997; Seimienska 2002; Schoefer and Fourcade-Gourinchas 2001).However, Encarnacion (2001) and Dalton and Ong (2002) found ithas little effect on democratic values. Case studies, such as those doneby Demerath (2001), point out the potential for civic engagement togenerate negative sentiments. The issue seems to be that civic engage-ment in and of itself cannot predict sentiments in positive or negativedirections. Rather, it supports and expands opportunities to developbeliefs and put them into action. In general, we expect that individualswho are politically active, involved in political discussions, and membersof voluntary organizations would support democracy. Although thereare exceptions, studies generally find that organizational member-ships and networks support democratic sentiment; although, thereare exceptions.

When Do Religious Beliefs and Civic Engagement Predict Lackof Support for Democracy?

We expect that those who favor a blending of Church and state, thatis, a governmental integration of religion and politics, will be lesssupportive of democracy. Karpov (1999) reported significant levelsof intolerance in the small proportion of Polish respondents whowanted the Catholic Church to be a powerful political entity. Barroand McCleary (2004), Smith (1996, 2000), and Meyer, Rizzo, andAli (2001) demonstrate that when individuals believe that religionand politics should be united in structures of governance, they tendnot to support democracy. Further, we expect individuals who favora blending of national politics and religion, and are politically active,to not support democracy. Because antidemocratic political activistsare frequently assumed to be from predominantly Muslim countries,we also tested for that interaction effect with the question: wereactivists from predominantly Muslim nations antidemocratic?

In sum, we expect that the predominant religion of nationsin addition to other structural and cultural characteristics matterto the legitimization of democracy. When individuals’ religious beliefsand practices are taken into account, more nuanced outcomesare anticipated. Individuals who are religiously attached, attendtheir places of worship and are engaged in their communities aremost likely support democracy; whereas those who believe that statestructures should blend religion and politics do not.

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DATA AND SAMPLE

We employ data from several sources that contain structural and cul-tural measures for the year 2000; in particular, the UN’s HumanDevelopment Report, the Freedom House Report, the University ofMaryland’s State Failure Task Force dataset, Barro’s categorizationof religious affiliation from World Christian Encyclopedia data, theA. T. Kearney Index from Foreign Policy, and the U.S. State Depart-ment’s list of Communist and formerly Communist regimes. Becausestructural data from all these sources are available only for 2000, weuse World Values Survey (WVS) Wave III which contains data from1999 through approximately 2001 in order to match closely the timeperiods of the structural with the individual level data.

The WVS contains individual-level attitudinal data on societiesfrom which national data can be ascertained; for example, both EastGermany and West Germany are counted as societies and can becombined as the nation, Germany. Because of the distinction between‘‘societies’’ and ‘‘nations,’’ it sometimes is unclear how many casesare reported in studies using the data. In WVS III, there are over sixtysocieties, which represent about seventy percent of the world’s popu-lation. The data are collected by networks of social scientists thatinterview nationally representative samples of at least 1,000 respon-dents in their own societies. Most societies provide a weight variableto correct samples so that they reflect the national distribution of keyvariables used. We use the weights in this study.

The analysis presented here relies on a sample of forty-six nations,resulting in 72,251 individual surveys. The sample size comes frombeing able to match the structural indicators for nations with societiesstudied in the WVS. The WVS data come from North America, theCaribbean, Central and Latin America, broad regions of Europe,Southwest and Southeast Asia, as well as Northern, Central, andSouthern Africa.2 The forty-six nations comprise a large cross-sectionof the globe and are diverse in terms of historical experiences, polit-ical regimes, and culture.

The World Values Survey data gathering process in each nationyields a substantial amount of information from nationally represen-tative samples. All survey items were employed using culturallyspecific operationalizations. Because these surveys were tailoredspecifically for each nation in the study in order to insure reliability,this lends confidence that the insights gained here provide a

2The full listing of nations in this study is included below in the discussion of predominant

religions. And the descriptive statistics for all measures are in the Appendix.

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foundation from which attitudes toward democracy can begeneralized to multiple regions of the globe.

Measurement

All variables measured by multiple indicators were developedthrough multivariate scaling techniques via exploratory factor analy-sis. Following Tessler (2003), support for democracy, the dependentvariable, consists of a five-item additive scale with an alpha reliabilityof 0.72 (scores ranged from 1 to 2.8 with a mean of 1.87, s.d., .40).This measure asks respondents the following questions: Would yousay that having a democratic political system is a very good, fairlygood, fairly bad, or very bad way of governing this nation? Couldyou please tell me if you agree strongly, agree, disagree, or disagreestrongly, with each of these statements? In democracy, the economicsystem runs badly. Democracies are indecisive and have too muchquibbling. Democracies aren’t good at maintaining order. Democ-racy may have problems, but it’s better than any other form ofgovernment.

Structural=Religion MeasuresResearch that documents the effect of social and political contexts oncitizen attitudes influenced our emphasis on the need to examinenational structural arrangements (e.g., Peffley and Rohrschneider2003). We measure the level of political and civil rights with the com-monly used Freedom House Index for 2000. Country rating scoresrange from 1 (most free) to 7 (least free). (In our data, scores rangedfrom 1 to 6.5 with a mean of 2.84 and s.d., 9.62.) The status designationof Free, Partly Free, or Not Free, is determined by a combination ofpolitical rights and civil liberties ratings (www.freedomhouse.org).

We use data from The University of Maryland Task Force onPolitical Instability (also known as the State Failure Task Force) totap whether a given nation has a history of adverse regime changebetween 1985 and 2000. While regime instability, or violent shiftsin a nation’s power structure, may be a long-memoried process, weview this item as a general indicator of regime instability within citi-zens’ recent collective memory. Thus, the fifteen-year interval isreasonable. Nations having experienced an adverse regime changeare coded as a 1 and those without such a change are given a 0 (meanof .11).

The A. T. Kearney=Foreign Policy Magazine Globalization Indexfor 2000 makes use of several indicators spanning information tech-nology (IT), finance, trade, personal communication, politics, and

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travel to determine a nation’s ranking. In addition to giving eachnation an overall score, it provides a multifaceted view of a nation’slevel of global integration by combining these indicators into foursubcategories: economic integration, technology, personal contact,and political engagement. This combined index results in the nationrankings that we utilize here (see www.foreignpolicy.com). Forexample, Ireland ranked sixty-two and was considered the most glo-balized nation (scoring was based on a range of sixty-two nations),while the least globalized, Iran, was ranked 1. (The mean globaliza-tion score of the nations in our data is 29.92, s.d. 18.62.)

Although globalization processes are arguably more complicatedthan this index, it encompasses nations representing eighty-five per-cent of the world’s population, while attempting to capture nations’involvement in international relations, trade and financial linkages,and the stream of ideas, information, and persons flowing acrossnational borders (see http://www.foreignpolicy.com=wwwboard=g-index.php). This is a relatively new measure that permittedsome insight into globalization’s complex relationship to democraticsupport.

We also use the year 2000 Human Development Index (HDI), whichwas developed by the United Nations as a general quality of life indi-cator. It includes literacy rate, education (tertiary gross enrollment),life expectancy, and standard of living as indicated by GDP andPPP (Human Development Report 2001). The nations in this studyhad HDI scores ranging from .44 to .94 where a higher score repre-sents higher human development (with a mean of .78, s.d.,.14).

We included a dichotomous measure for whether or not a nationwas governed by an overtly Communist regime. Nations with such alegacy included: Hungary, China, Russia, Poland, Ukraine, CzechRepublic, Slovenia, Germany, Croatia, Slovakia, and Romania. For-mer and current Communist nations receive a score of 1 and nationswithout such a history receive a 0 (mean of .21).

Barro developed a somewhat debated measure of religious affili-ation from data drawn from the World Christian Encyclopedia of1982. Barrett, Kurian and Johnson (2001), Barro (1999), and Barroand McCleary (2004; also McCleary and Barro 2003) use it effectivelyin numerous considerations of national religious contexts. One mightconsider the importance of the concentration of religions in nationsby using a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), especially if inter-ested in possible competition among them. Instead, we followedBarro (1999) as a general guide for grouping nations into categoriesaccording to the prevalence of a particular religious faith, that is, thereligious faith claimed by the largest portion of the population.

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Predominant religion indicators are coded as 1 for the predominantreligion and 0 for other religions. The nations in the sample representan array of religions. Bangladesh, Indonesia, Iran, Morocco,Pakistan, Turkey, and Egypt are predominantly Muslim countries.Predominantly Catholic nations are represented by Argentina,Austria, Canada, Chile, Croatia, Czech Republic, France, Hungary,Ireland, Italy, Mexico, Netherlands, Peru, Philippines, Poland,Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Uganda, and Venezuela. Thepredominantly Protestant countries included are United Kingdom,Denmark, Finland, Germany, Republic of Korea, Nigeria, SouthAfrica, Sweden, and United States. Eastern religions are representedby India, Singapore, Japan, and China. Israel is the only predomi-nantly Jewish nation. Finally, Greece, Romania, Russia, and theUkraine represent nations with predominantly Orthodox faiths.

Individuals’ Religious Beliefs=PracticesInformed by literature that examines linkages between various aspectsof religion and democracy (e.g., Juergensmeyer 1995; Patterson 2004),we examined indicators of individuals’ religious beliefs and practices.Measures include respondents’ attachment to religion, attendance atreligious services, and beliefs about blending religion and politics.The indicator for religious attachment was a four-item scale(alpha ¼ 0.7697). The four items were: (1) How important is religionin your life? (2) How important is god in your life? (3) Do you find com-fort and strength in religion? (4) How often do you pray to god outsideof religious services? This item ranged from .25 to 5.00 with a mean of3.48; s.d., 1.59). We view measure attendance at religious services by asingle item: ‘‘Apart from weddings, funerals, and christenings, abouthow often do you attend religious services these days?’’ Responsesrange from 1 to 4 with a mean of 2.77, s.d., .87.

In earlier analyses not presented here, we examined variousother indicators from the WVS which manifest religion including:whether or not one was brought up religiously at home; frequencyof attending religious services; religious affiliation; whether or notone views oneself as a religious person; whether or not the individualbelieves in god, life after death, souls, the devil, hell, heaven, or sin.These indicators either did not vary, did not correlate with supportfor democracy, or failed to be predictive in preliminary model testing.Also, we examined the effect numerous interaction terms relatedto individuals’ religious behavior in earlier analysis and found insig-nificant outcomes.

Recent discussions about religion and democracy (e.g., Juergensmeyer1995) have noted that many individuals desire a mixing of religion

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and politics. These individuals do not believe in a strict separation ofchurch and state, and they see a benefit in having religious individualshold public office. We developed a scale that taps citizens’ desire for ablending together of religion and politics. The following questions con-stitute the scale: Politicians who do not believe in god are unfit forpublic office; Religious leaders should not influence how people votein elections; It would be better for [this country] if more people withstrong religious beliefs held public office; Religious leaders shouldnot influence government decisions. Responses to these items rangefrom 0 to 4 with a mean of 1.45, s.d., .82 (alpha ¼ .62).

Individuals’ Civic Engagement=NetworksCivic engagement and social networks are measured by exploring indi-viduals’ levels of political activism, their interest in discussing politics,as well as their memberships in a variety of organizations. Indivi-duals’ political activist orientation is captured by a four-item additiveindex developed through factor analysis. This indicator includesrespondents’ willingness to sign petitions, participate in strikes, joinboycotts, and attend lawful demonstrations (alpha ¼ 0.75). The acti-vism item range from 0 to 2 with a mean of.62, s.d., .53.

We also considered the potential for the interaction of several itemsto influence citizen’s democratic support. We use an interaction vari-able that incorporates political participation and a desire for a blendingtogether of religion and politics. The variable ranges from 0–7.5 with amean of .91. We tested another interaction term that incorporatesMuslim national predominance and individuals’ political activism.

Respondents’ frequency of discussing politics with others is drawnfrom a single survey item: ‘‘When you get together with friends,would you say you discuss political matters frequently, occasionally,or never?’’ We transform this item into a dummy indicator of 1 forthose who discuss politics and 0 for those who do not (mean of .60).

Organizational memberships are gauged by one multi-part surveyquestion. The item is: ‘‘Please look carefully at the following list ofvoluntary organizations and activities and say which, if any, youbelong to’’ (Yes ¼ 1, No ¼ 0). Respondents selected from a listincluding: (1) Religious or church organizations; (2) Social welfareservices for the elderly, handicapped, or deprived people; (3) Edu-cation, arts music, or cultural activities; (4) Labor unions; (5) Politicalparties or groups; (6) Local community action on issues like poverty,employment, housing, or racial equality; (7) Third world develop-ment or human rights; (8) Conservation, environment, or animalrights groups; (9) Professional associations; (10) Youth work(e.g., scouts, guides, youth clubs, etc.); (11) Sports or recreation;

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(12) Women’s groups; (13) Peace movement; (14) Voluntary organi-zations concerned with health; or (15) Other groups. These itemsare combined into a single scale (alpha ¼ 0.71). To correct forskewness this scale is broken into high, medium, and low levels ofengagement. It ranges from 0 to 2 with a mean of .68, s.d., .82.

Individual TraitsWe include information about respondents’ gender (male ¼ 1), occu-pational status, income, and education. To measure occupation, wefollowed Hsin-Chi and Siu-Kai (2002) who found that identifyingwhether or not individuals work in white-collar occupations is auseful distinction in analyzing individual attitudes. Thus we constructa dichotomous indicator where individuals working in manage-rial=employer roles, as well as people in professional occupations(e.g., law) and supervisory staff in office settings, are included aswhite-collar workers (scored as 1) and other occupations are codedas nonwhite collar (scored as 0). The mean is .23.

Education scores range between values of 1–9 with the lowest levelbeing ‘‘no formal education’’ and the highest level being ‘‘university-level education, with degree.’’ The education indicator is dividedinto low, medium, and high levels (ranging from 1 to 3 with a meanof 1.89, s.d., .69). The indicator of income is similarly divided intolow, medium, and high (range of 1 to 3 with a mean of 1.88, s.d., .77).

ANALYSIS

Analysis proceeded in several stages. First, we examined descriptivestatistics to assess all variables’ capacity for multivariate analysis.(See Appendix for descriptive statistics.) We tested for nonlinear=curvilinear associations between support for democracy and all struc-tural and individual-level variables. No associations depart signifi-cantly from linearity nor is there notable heteroscedasticity. For theindividual level variables, we created scales through both exploratoryand confirmatory factor analysis; among them were measures fortolerance, institutional trust and interpersonal trust, attitudes thatothers have found predictive of democracy, but in preliminaryanalysis, we did not. Multiple random imputations were used to dealwith missing data (Allison 2001).3

3Multiple imputation (MI) techniques are among the best tools researchers have to contend

with missing data. MI tends to produce estimates that are consistent, asymptotically efficient,

and asymptotically normal (Allison 2001, p. 27). We used a standard approach whereby the

SAS proc mi procedure creates five separate models and then combines them via the mi analyze

procedure into a single mode.

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We constructed numerous preliminary models and retained forpresentation here those which are predictive and=or directly addresspertinent and theoretically important findings. We follow the theor-etical rationales of others in selecting independent variables thatmight predict support for democracy. Some might argue for feedbackor the causal priority involved; only statistical probability is intendedin the models. We tested for multiple interactions that other researchsuggests, particularly among individual-level religion variables, andfound no significant outcomes. Our own reading of case studiessuggested the importance of testing the interaction between beliefsin fusing religion and politics and activism.

We employ multilevel linear mixed-models for dealing with multi-level data structures (Hamilton 2003; Singer 1998). The primaryadvantage of the approach is the consideration that citizens arenested within nations (Kreft and De Leeuw 1998). This allowed usto examine the proportion of variance explained by macrolevel indi-cators versus the proportion of variance explained by microlevel indi-cators. A number of analysts have argued that this sort of modelingprovides more consistent standard errors for hierarchical data struc-tures than do more traditional approaches such as OLS (Bryk andRaudenbush 1992; Allison 2001; Hox 2002).

FINDINGS

Two findings about the association between individuals’ support fordemocracy and the structural arrangements of nations stand out asconsistently important. Citizens from globalized nations view democ-racy very positively but citizens from nations with a recent Commu-nist past do not. In contrast, the lack of political and civil rightsprompts support for democracy to a lesser degree and inconsistently.Human development and the experience of adverse regime change arenot predictive. (See Models 2 through 6, Table 1.)

No predominant religion establishes a cultural context forindividuals’ support for democracy to a greater degree than Islam.(See Model 3, Table 1). Academic discourse suggesting that predomi-nantly Muslim societies are inimical to democracy is not buttressedby our findings. However, when individuals’ own beliefs and prac-tices are taken into account in Model 4, Table 1, the predominantreligions of some nations predict less support for democracy thanIslamic nations.

When variables that account for individuals who pray often, findreligion important, strengthening and comforting to them, and thosewho strongly favor involvement of religion in politics and political

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Table 1. Restricted maximum likelihood estimates from multilevel regression

predicting citizen support for democracy (N ¼ 72,251 in forty-six nations)

Model 1 (intercept only) Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6

National structural arrangements

Low political & civil rights .033� .027 0.032� .028 .027

(.016) (.016) (.016) (.015) (.015)

Adverse regime change �.097 �.056 �.060 �.056 �.053

(.059) (.055) (.055) (.053) (.054)

Globalization .004�� .004��� 0.004��� .003�� .003��

(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)

Human development index �.075 .030 �.008 �.008 �.034

(.183) (.165) (.163) (.156) (.160)

Communist legacy �.159��� �.102�� �.109�� �.100�� �.090�

(.041) (.039) (.039) (.037) (.040)

Predominant religions

Protestant �.103 �.079 �.110 �.109

(.067) (.066) (.064) (.065)

Catholic �.129 �.117� �.128� �.129�

(.060) (.060) (.057) (.060)

Eastern religions �.147 �.141� �.155� �.149�

(.067) (.070) (.063) (.065)

Jewish .191 .173 .150 .184

(.197) (.188) (.187) (.197)

Orthodox �.187 �.160� �.171� �.188�

(.077) (.076) (.073) (.075)

Individuals’ religious beliefs=practices

Religious attachment .005�� .010��� .012���

(.002) (.002) (.002)

Attendance at rel. services .008 .008 .008

(.004) (.004) (.004)

Blend religion & politics �.066��� �.050��� �.044���

(.003) (.004) (.004)

Political=civic engagement=networks

Political activism .107��� .100���

(.007) (.007)

Activism � Blend religion &

politics

�.020��� �.020���

(.004) (.004)

Discuss politics .052��� .040���

(.004) (.004)

Organizational memberships .020��� .006�

Individual traits

Gender .008�

(.003)

White Collar .050���

(.004)

(Continued)

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office are included in Model 4, predominantly Islamic nations aredistinguished from some others. There are significant differences inindividuals’ support for democracy between Muslim nations andpredominantly Catholic, Eastern religion, or Orthodox ones. Thelack of significant differences in support for democracy in Muslim,Protestant, or Jewish nations remains.

With Model 4, the importance of personal beliefs and practicesbecomes evident and persists across subsequent models. People whofind religion central to their lives and those who find it central to theirpolitics think differently about democracy. The former favor democ-racy while the latter do not. Each group’s adherence to what it sees asreligion’s place in life matters much more to its viewpoint thanattending religious services which apparently have no impact.

Models 5 and 6 show that civic and political engagement, personal net-works, and individual traits are important correlates of attitudes towarddemocracy. As expected, politically engaged citizens exhibit strongsupport, unless they favor a blending of religion and politics and becomeactivists. We find that belonging to organizations, being politically activeand discussing politics with others positively influences people’s attitudes.So does being male and occupying higher social statuses.

Finally, in these models, we can see if theoretical expectations andscholarly findings are confirmed regarding how important nationalstructures and cultural elements, such as religion, are to the legitimiza-tion of democracy. Is the importance retained when hypotheses aboutthe importance of individual and personal beliefs and behaviors are

Table 1. Continued

Model 1 (intercept only) Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6

Education .032���

(.003)

Income .030���

(.002)

Intercept 1.751��� 1.766��� 1.846��� 1.752��� 1.628���

Random Variance Components

Between Nations 0.016��� 0.013��� 0.012��� 0.012��� 0.012���

Within Nations 0.184��� 0.187��� 0.188��� 0.188��� 0.188���

Percentage of Baseline Variance Explained

Between Nations 12% 8% 6% 6% 6%

Within Nations 88% 92% 94% 94% 94%

�p < .05; ��p < .01; ���p < .001 (two-tailed tests); Results are unstandardized coefficients

and standard errors are in parentheses.

Note: Muslim is the comparison group for Predominant Religions.

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introduced? We find that only a small percentage (six to eight percent) ofbaseline variance is explained by the structural components of nationstates. However, the variables responsible for it are persistently impor-tant. Residing in globalized nations without Communist legacies andwith predominantly Protestant, Muslim, and Jewish (only Israel) engen-ders positive views about democracy. These national characteristics arethe context within which individuals’ beliefs, engagements, and socialstatuses are formed and their views towards governance are shaped.

DISCUSSION

The crossnational, multilevel analysis presented here demonstrates that thepredominance of religion in nations and their historical experiences providea context in which citizens’ opinions about democracy can be explored.Although numerous surveys demonstrate that democratic ideals havebroad support globally, nations’ ties with other societies and the legaciesof their regimes contribute to variations in adherence to those ideals.

Globalization and Communism

The findings presented here add credibility to theoretical explana-tions and research about why the diffusion of globalization is impor-tant to democracy and to empirical work that examines theconsequences of the struggles to democratize in formerly Communistnations of the Soviet Union, Central Europe, and Eastern Europe.Regarding globalization, scholarly work shows that membership ininternational organizations affects state policies in many differentareas (Beckfield 2003). Belonging to the world polity provides nationswith norms of how to act in order to retain their position and status,which means they are more likely to adopt popular or progressiveideas about current issues and to enact policies that align with theseideas (Beckfield 2003). Relatedly, the fluctuating legitimacy of alter-native political structures may make authoritarian societies morereceptive to a democratic regime. For example, in examining EastEuropean democratic transitions, Holmes (1997) argues that MikaelGorbachev’s public statements criticizing socialism provided apolitical opening for the acceptance of democratic ideals that diffusedacross numerous nations. It follows that nations which are well-connected to the international community are likely to have consoli-dated democracies and citizens who approve of them.

Regarding a Communist legacy, Klingeman (1999) illustrated gen-erally low democratic support in the recently democratized nations of

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Eastern Europe. Most countries did not experience immediate andwidespread economic benefits, a predictor of citizens’ support fordemocracy (Evans and Whitefield 1995). Also, some generationsof the citizenry were not socialized as children to value democracy,so popular support for democratic regimes is not inherent(Mishler and Rose 1999). Further, new democracies lack seasonedleaders and institutions that facilitate the workings of democracy(Mishler and Rose 1999). All of these conditions make it unlikely thatindividuals have great faith in democracy, especially when confrontedwith economic downturns or problems related to the transition, suchas establishing new constitutional and electoral systems.

Islam and Other Predominant Religions

This research demonstrates that individuals in predominantly Islamicnations are no more or less favorable to democracy than peopleelsewhere. This finding challenges the theoretical speculations ofKedourie (1994), Huntington (1996), and others. It confirms empiri-cal results of Meyer, Rizzo, and Ali (1998), and Tessler (2003) onMiddle East samples; Rose (2002) studying Central Asia; and Braizat(2002) utilizing World Values Survey 2000 data. None of these studiesfound Muslim identity, Islamic beliefs, or devotion to the Muslimreligion discourages support for democracy.

However, when individuals’ attachments to their religion or theirbeliefs that religion should be influential in politics are brought intothe equation, they isolate the contribution which individuals who canbe described as ‘‘strong religious adherents’’ make to democratic sup-port. When that is done, the prevalence of Catholicism, Eastern reli-gions, and Orthodoxy in nations corresponds to more negative affecttoward democracy than is found in largely Muslim nations. It wouldseem that exposure to hierarchical, authoritarian organizationalstructures that stress conformity dampens enthusiasm for democracyamong the population not classified as strongly religious adherents.That is particularly true in nations with a Communist legacy.

Forces and Counterforces

This study confirms many research findings on the relationshipbetween religious beliefs and support for democracy, or between civicengagement and democratic support, or the lack of it. It advancessuch research by combining hypotheses from multiple literatures,including structural=cultural explanations, in explanatory models.The consequence is that we can speculate about the global divisions

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surrounding the legitimization of democracy and forces and counter-forces surrounding the legitimization of democracy in new ways.

Nations which are well-integrated into the global structure of themodern world, predominantly Protestant or Muslim, and lack a Com-munist legacy, house citizens who by and large support democracy.That is particularly true of those residents who are religiously dedi-cated, engaged in political and social networks, and hold higher socialstatus, especially men. The probability is that the national structure, theenthusiasm of those who are attached to religion and involved in civilsociety, and the general structural, cultural, and popular environmentsurrounding the rest of the population serve to counter the negativityof religio-political advocates, even active ones. (Activists who favor afusion of religion and politics are one percent of our sample.)

In contrast, nations carrying a Communist legacy, especially thosewith largely Catholic, Eastern, or Orthodox religious majorities, arelikely to experience more serious divisions over the legitimization ofdemocracy. These nations cannot escape the processes and pressuresof globalization; yet, there seem to be obvious sources of conflict.Some residents (those who are religiously devoted, active and engagedin society, and commanding more social resources) appear to favordemocracy in spite of complexities in their nations. A second group,not so active, affluent, or religious, might find the structures and cul-ture of the predominant religion and=or experiences with Communistgovernance to be more problematic, especially given their personallack of religious attachment and=or civic engagement. Their viewtoward democracy is likely weakly positive, negative, or open to per-suasion. Still others, strong believers and activists regarding therelationship of religion to politics, could find support for their posi-tions among members of that second group. Whether our suggestionof different ‘‘groups’’ within these nations is correct, it seems apparentthat nations with Communist and=or Catholic, Eastern religion, orOrthodox religious predominance lack the resiliency which comesfrom strong counterforces to the antidemocratic sentiments of the reli-giopolitically activists in their midst.

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APPENDIX: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

Variable Min. Max. Mean SD

Level 2 Measures (N ¼ 46)

Political & Civil Rights 1.00 6.50 2.84 1.62

Adverse Regime Change 0 (no) 1 (yes) 0.11 –

Globalization 1.00 62.00 29.22 8.62

Human Development 0.44 0.94 0.78 0.14

Communist Legacy 0 (no) 1 (yes) 0.21 –

Muslim 0 (no) 1 (yes) 0.23 –

Catholic 0 (no) 1 (yes) 0.40 –

Protestant 0 (no) 1 (yes) 0.19 –

Jewish 0 (no) 1 (yes) 0.02 –

Eastern Religions 0 (no) 1 (yes) 0.08 –

Orthodox 0 (no) 1 (yes) 0.08 –

Level 1 Measures (N ¼ 72251)

Support for Democracy 1.00 2.80 1.87 0.40

Political Activism 0.00 2.00 0.62 0.53

Discuss Politics 0 (no) 1 (yes) 0.60 –

Organizational Memberships 0.00 2.00 0.68 0.82

Religious Attachment 0.25 5.00 3.48 1.59

Attendance at Religious Services 1.00 4.00 2.77 0.87

Blend Politics & Religion 0.00 4.00 1.45 0.82

Gender 0 (F) 1 (M) 0.48 –

White Collar 0 (no) 1 (yes) 0.23 –

Education 1.00 3.00 1.89 0.69

Income 1.00 3.00 1.88 0.77

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