Aseel AlYaqoubGlobalization/Contemporary Economies

Prof. Gabriel HernandezFall 2013

Kuwait, A Dependent Semi-DemocracyIntroduction

“The construction of identities is fundamental to the dynamic of societies and that cultural identity is the process by which social actors build their own meaning according to cultural attributes.” – Castells (2004)1

Castells has devised a typology to understand the identities of collective projects. They are: identities of legitimization, introduced by institutions in order toextend their domination over social actors, identities ofresistance, generated by actors which are constituted forcultural survival, to withstand social, religious, territorial and linguistic domination, and new identities, constituted when social actors build a new identity often based on identities of resistance by transcending them.

Kuwait, unlike most of its neighbors, has a well-established national identity and a long history as a nation, dating back to the eighteenth century. This paperanalyzes the nation’s transformation from a pre-oil to anoil economy; its social structure and composition, including the country’s tribal roots and key divisions involving class and immigrant labor; and political tensions resulting from the nation’s sudden wealth and the accompanying changes in social structure. I will regard Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in the context of

1 Castells, Manuel. “The Power of Identity.” Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1997. Print.

1

Kuwait’s historical foreign policy and examine the invasion’s legacy, arguing that it reinforced Kuwaiti nationalism while renewing public demand for greater political participation.

The paper is focused on two recurring themes in Kuwaiti history: one, the preservation of a sense of community in the face of radical economic, social, and political transformations; the second, internal rivalry over the conventions governing relations among members ofthe community.

Pre-Oil Kuwait

Prior to Interruption

For Centuries, the Arabian Gulf region was a distinctive area isolated from outside influences and contained homogenous groups of people (Bedouin tribes) who shared many cultural and social values. Communal in character, the pure nomadic life of the Arabian tribes was organized around pastoral wanderings as the basic means of subsistence within the harsh desert environment. There existed within this arid ecological zone two distinct patterns of socioeconomic activity: sheep herding and camel herding. The history of the entire Middle East is intimately connected with the ebb and flow of the Bedouintribes who were both the scourge to and the well-spring of the great urban civilizations that dominate it’s history since antiquity.

From this turbulent background of nomadic tribal life emerges the origin of Kuwait’s history. Kuwait was

2

in the domain of the Bani Khalid, a powerful tribe that dominated northeast Arabia. There was a supply of sweet water and a natural landlocked harbor and the shaikh (leader) of Bani Khalid maintained a small fort (Kut) for storage of food and ammunition. In the late seventeenth century, he afforded protection to the Bani Utub tribe and gave them the fort and surrounding area. By the time they arrived to Kuwait, the Bani Utub had moved significantly away from camel pastoralism, acquired a cohesive tribal identity of their own and were accompanied by a diverse cross-section of economic groupsattached to them in a client-tribal relationship.2

The isolation of the desert rendered the tribes in Central Arabia largely independent and impervious to foreign interference. However, the caravan trade routes which began withering with the shift from Mediterranean to Atlantic trade in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries were enjoying a renaissance as a result of the imperialistic competition between the expansive mercantile powers of Western Europe. With the resurgence of trade through the area, the Bedouin tribes were being drawn out of their desert isolation and into the mainstream of history.

Tribal Power Play

The transition from nomadic to sedentary settlement was already well underway by mid-seventeenth century. The town of Kuwait grew rapidly in wealth and importance within fifty years after its foundation. It became a thriving commercial port that sustained itself on pearl diving, trading and fishing. In the year 1716, the chiefsof the most important three tribes that inhabited Kuwait entered into alliance. These were Sabah bin Ahmad, Khalifah bin Mohammed and Jaber bin Rahmat al’ilbi, and were all part of the Bani Utub tribe. The conditions of the alliance provided Sabah with leadership of government2 Bani Utub were seeking refuge after an intra-tribal conflict withinthe Anizah tribe (one of the largest Bedouin tribes inhabiting Najd and North Arabia) that resulted in the dispersal of a federation of families. They emigrated to Qatar for 50 years but were forced to leave by the Ottoman Government. They re-grouped in Subiyah but were threatened by its tribal occupants and were compelled to keep moving.

3

affairs, Khalifah with financial affairs in commerce and Jaber will control affairs of work on the sea. All profits were to be equally divided among them.3

In the sedentary community, the nomadic tribal structure of classes of producers became the basis of a nascent social class structure articulated in tribal context. In effect, the Bani Utub became a class in themselves by their asserted right of control over the factors of production – fishing, pearling, and commerce. The productive forces maintained the tribal character of the desert, providing a tribal pattern to the organization of labor and politics.

In it’s formation, Kuwait served as a trading centerfor the tribes of Bani Khalid. However, throughout the eighteenth century intra-tribal strife and growing Wahhabi power in Central Arabia weakened the tribe’s authority in the area. As Bani Khalid could no longer protect the port, Kuwait required a shaikh both respectedand feared for the number of tribesmen he could call intoarms in an emergency. The community also depended on the tribesmen for the production of basic necessities and relied on the labor for pearling, fishing and commerce. This labor was provided by the Bani Utub tribe, which in turn led the community to elect Sabah I as their shaikh.

Sabah’s interests lay in the desert, and pearling and maritime commerce were only tangential to this. From Sabah’s death in 1762, there were five Amirs in a direct line of descent from him who were selected in the traditional tribal manner. They were not privileged from most of the Kuwaiti population in any way. The power of the ruler was limited, and there were some Kuwaiti leaders who had more authority than the ruler himself. Nevertheless, the community had in fact surpassed the subsistence character of tribal relations, and this was based upon the sea, not the desert. The substructure of productive forces in Kuwait had, over the period, developed well beyond the political superstructure of tribal sheikhdom, and the Sabah house had only a peripheral relationship to this development. The real

3 Khazal, Husayn Khalaf al-Shaykh. 1962-1970. “Tarikh al-Kuwayt al-Siyasi (The Political History of Kuwait),” 5 vols. Beirut: Matabu Dar al-Kutub (p.45)

4

power in the community resided in the financial-commercial class that in effect controlled the development of productive forces.4

British Imperialism

The internal state and consequent lack of centralized power in Persia and Ottoman ‘Iraq and Arabia’ was one of the main factors allowing the establishment of the Utub at Kuwait. Throughout the eighteenth century, the main external impact on Kuwait was tribal, not state. By the nineteenth century this was rapidly changing and Kuwait was increasingly drawn into the vortex of the region’s international politics. The impact was influenced by the growth of British imperialism in the Gulf.

The British were in competition with the Dutch, French, Russians and German. Its colonization of India became a geographical advantage that led to bringing the Arabian Gulf under the domain of British hegemony. In thebeginning, the British regarded Kuwait as an insignificant, relatively peaceful fort and a dependency of Basra (Iraq). It appeared as though Kuwait paid nominal recognition to Ottoman authority, though in fact it pursued an independent policy. Kuwait had it’s own basic autonomy, and it’s relationship with Basra was based upon commercial, not political ties.5

In 1779, Basra was under siege by the Persians, which transferred the bulk of caravan trade to Kuwait andincluded the merchandise of the British East India Company. The British maintained friendly relations with the ruler of Kuwait and would extend presents to the Shaikh from time to time as a means of securing their dispatches. Difficulties arose between the Pasha of Baghdad and the British Companies, which led to the removal of their factory from Basra to Kuwait. In parallel, the Wahhabi tribe during this period had become

4 Ismael, Jacqueline S. "Origins and Structural Development." Kuwait:Dependency and Class in a Rentier State. Gainesville: University of Florida, 1993. 36. Print.5 Basra was the hub for most of the caravan trade in the region and the British would use it as a means of transporting their goods from India. Basra was under Ottoman rule.

5

a power on the coast and a menace to British activity. The British proposed to protect the sheikhdom of Kuwait from desert attacks and extended a treaty of friendship with Kuwait. Shaikh Abdullah refused the British on both accounts, as he was well aware that the Wahhabis would not launch a serious attack on the port, no doubt from the fear of large-scale Ottoman and British reprisal and occupation of the Port. Neither the Ottomans nor the British would have allowed the establishment of a Wahhabistronghold so close to Basra.

If Britain could not bring Kuwait under direct protection, then it was in its interests to preserve the autonomy of the sheikhdom vis-à-vis the Ottoman Empire. However, in 1871, Shaikh Abdulla accepted the Turkish title of sub-governor and Kuwait became an administrativeunit of the Ottoman Empire. There appeared no further contact between Kuwait and British authorities until 1896, Mubarak’s coup d’état.

Introducing Capitalism

Mubarak Al-Sabah was son of Shaikh Sabah II and was primarily placed as a military leader in many tribal operations. In 1896, Mubarak assassinated his half-brother Mohammed and Jarrah. The death of his brothers enabled Mubarak assumption of the Kuwaiti throne, howeverthe act proved a serious obstacle in establishing his legitimacy as a ruler.6

Mubarak used his late brother’s wealth to bribe the Ottoman bureaucracy in order to receive his appointment as sub-governor of Kuwait like his previous brothers. He vowed loyalty to Istanbul, but the Ottoman Council was reluctant due to lack of information and confusing accounts surrounding Mubarak. Yusef Al-Ibrahim, a wealthyIraqi merchant and advisor to the late shaikh Mohammed, fled Kuwait to seek Turkish assistance in removing the usurper. However, suspicious of British intervention in

6 There was no definitive proof that Mubarak assassinated his brothers, however rumors spread to the Ottoman Empire who questioned his authority.

6

Kuwait, the Ottomans granted Mubarak the title of sub-governor in 1897.7

Mubarak’s vulnerability during the yearlong indecisiveness of the Ottomans paved the way for the perusal of British ties. In 1899, Mubarak signed a secretprotection treatment with the British against any external foreign aggression. In return, Mubarak and his successors could not obtain foreign representatives or sell territory without the British government’s approval.The Anglo-Kuwaiti Agreement of 1899 established Kuwait asan official British protectorate, and became the base forBritish colonial expansion. Backed by the British, Mubarak transformed himself from a community leader into an autocratic ruler, in effect transforming the Sabah house into a centralized power structure in the society. This transformation facilitated the integration of Kuwaitinto the emerging world capitalist system of production.

Mubarak’s usurpation of power served the dynamic link between Kuwait’s development and regional development, and fostered in its place a link with the British system of production. As a class, the Utbi merchants represented a local bourgeoisie whose interestswere narrowly defined in terms of the local market and subsistence consumption. Their linkage with the British system of production rendered Kuwait politically alienated from the development of productive forces in the region, in effect placing them in contradiction with the regionally oriented forces of Arab nationalism emerging in both the Arab centers of the Ottoman Empire and the peninsula hinterland. It was the new structure ofcolonial relations forged by the linkages with Britain that inhibited the development of productive forces in Kuwait and the region as a whole, initiating the historical process of the underdevelopment of not only Kuwait but also the entire region.

Mubarak died in 1915, and the amirship of Kuwait passed to his son Jabir. With his death the transformation-integration process was essentially complete and Kuwait had been transformed from an

7 Anscombe, Frederick F. (1997) [1997]. “The Ottoman Gulf: The Creation of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar.” New York City: Columbia University Press.

7

autonomous merchant community to an outpost in what was principally Britain’s Gulf colony.

A Drawn Out Nation

The First World War changed the power configuration in the region. With the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire,the creation of Iraq as a kingdom under British mandate and the rise of Ibn Saud and Ikhwan power in Central Arabia, Kuwait was no longer a strategic importance from the British standpoint.

Sir Percy took a red pencil and very carefully drew in on the map of Arabia a boundary line. This gave Iraq a large area of the territory claimed by Najd. Obviously to placate Ibn Saud, he ruthlessly deprived Kuwait of nearly two thirds of her territory and gave it to Najd, his argument being that the power of Ibn Sabah was much less in the desert than it had been when the Anglo-Turkish Agreement had been drawn up.8

The red line was a fait accompli for Iraq and Kuwait, both puppet states of Britain. The Kuwaitis were in no position to protest: Percy Cox might very well have incorporated Kuwait into the new state of Iraq, or just as threatening, he might have left the sheikhdom unprotected from the fierce (Wahhabi) Ikhwan, the militiamen of Ibn Saud. This settlement did not pacify Ibn Saud or the Ikhwan, however, and since Kuwait was economically, geographically and culturally an integral part of the desert, Saudi pressures on Kuwait continued. Saudi banned the Najd tribes from trading in Kuwait, in effect attempting to force Kuwait for economic reasons toforgo its ties with Britain and ally itself with the expanding Saudi empire. By 1933, it appeared to British officials that there was growing sympathy in Kuwait for allying Kuwait with Saudi Arabia, and Shaikh Ahmad and Ibn Saud were secretly negotiating such arrangements.

8 Ismael, Jacqueline S. "The Underdevelopment of Kuwait." Kuwait: Dependency and Class in a Rentier State. Gainesville: University of Florida, 1993. 70. Print.

8

To forestall any agreement between Kuwait and Saudi,Britain asserted its right by Mubarak’s 1899 agreement tohandle Kuwait’s foreign policy. However, the growing force of the pan-Arab, anti-imperialist movement, and theincreasing radicalism movement resulting from the Palestine and Israel issue threatened Britain’s hold on Kuwait. There was also growing anti-British, pan-Arab sentiment in Kuwait itself, which had assumed organizational form by the late thirties and was manifesting itself through growing links with the Arab nationalist movement in Iraq.

Oil: The New Integration

Prior to the First World War, British oil companies, backed by the power of the British Government, were securing vast oil concessions in the Middle East, and theentire region took on a new strategic importance in the competitive imperialist framework of the time. The entirerecord of the complex oil concession negotiations startedin 1923 and culminated in the 1934 agreement. Shaikh Ahmed Al-Jabir Al-Sabah carried out the entire negotiations and the territory of Kuwait and the remunerations from the concession were treated as privateproperty of the Shaikh of Kuwait. Furthermore, the concession was for the whole of Kuwait, which gave exclusive rights to the Kuwait Oil Company (KOC, an American-British consortium) for oil exploration and exploitation in Kuwait territory.

KOC drilled its first well in 1936, but oil was not discovered until 1938. During that year, a rebellion known locally as the Majlis Movement was developing against the ruling family in Kuwait due to the serious recession that resulted from the general decline of the pealing industry, the Great Depression, and the Saudi embargo. The recently signed oil concession with KOC promised better times ahead if the subsequent income werenot monopolized by the ruling family. To prevent that from happening, the leading merchants began petitioning the ruler for a series of reforms. The merchants took their protest a step further, holding elections for a legislative assembly to implement the desired reforms

9

using these new revenues. The Legislative Assembly ruled for six months until finally put down by the ruler and his tribal backers. The assembly, however, came to be viewed as Kuwait's first prodemocracy movement. Its popularity gave the idea of formal representation a placein Kuwaiti popular history.9

Post-Oil Kuwait

The New Political Structure

The transition of the new basis of integration in the world division of labor was made within the framework of the continuity of autocracy in Kuwait, but the structure of autocracy has undergone progressive modifications. In June 1961, Kuwait and Britain signed a Treaty of Independence terminating the 1889 Exclusive Agreement, transforming Kuwait into a sovereign independent state, and guaranteeing British military assistance if the Amir requested it. Within a month Kuwait joined the Arab league and in 1963 became a member of the United Nations.10

In 1961, a Constituent Assembly was created to drafta constitution and was signed a year later by Shaikh Abdullah Al-Salem. The constitution divided government into executive, legislative and judicial functions. Executive powers were vested in the hand of the Amir, as the Head of State, and a Council of Ministers who were appointed and dismissed by the Amir. The Prime Minister

9 Alan Rush, Al-Sabah: Genealogy and History of Kuwait's Ruling Family, 1752-1987, Atantic Highlands, 1987

10 The Arab League is a regional organization of Arab countries in and around North Africa, the Horn of Africa, and Southwest Asia and was formed in Egypt in 1945.

10

(always the Crown Prince by tradition), a minister without portfolio appointed by the Amir, served as President of the Council of Ministers, and liaison between the Amir and National Assembly. The legislative powers were to be shared by the Amir and the National Assembly, which was to be elected every four years. The first general election of the newly created, 50-member National Assembly was held in 1963.

Although technically all legislation must be approved by a two-third vote of the Assembly, in actuality the Assembly’s legislative powers were significantly curtailed by the powers of the Amir. Furthermore, in addition to his executive powers, the Amir has the right to initiate, sanction, and promulgate laws, and to rule by decree when the Assembly is not in session. In fact, the Assembly could not promulgate any law unless sanctioned by the Amir, and the Amir could dissolve the Assembly at will. Although disposition of the state’s financial resources resided with the Assembly, this was based on recommendations by the Council of Ministers.

Dependency and Class

The new integration of Kuwait into the world division of labor as an oil producer rendered the ruling family economically independent of financial and commercial interests in Kuwait and consolidated the relationship between central capitalism (in the form of monopoly capital – the oil companies) and primitive accumulation in Kuwait. In transforming the basis of power from ownership of the means of production to the control over the means of allocation, the new integration also consolidated the articulation of political and economic power behind the ruling family.

In this situation, the dominant class interests remained essentially the same. That is, the basis of power remained externally mediated through Britain (and the oil companies), the basis of production remained the creation of exchange value for expropriation, and the basis of accumulation remained the transfer of commodities from the industrial nations to the local

11

markets. As a class, peripheral capitalists in Kuwait aredependent upon the maintenance of the structure of dependency and fundamentally antagonistic to any development of productive forces in Kuwait that alters this structure.11

Within the structure of peripheral capitalism, development took the form of the expansion of the consumer market for the commodities of the industrial world. In the fifties and early sixties, both the physical infrastructure of the affluent society and the bureaucratic infrastructure of the welfare state were created from the huge oil revenues flowing into the nation. Both facilitated private accumulation from publicrevenue and expropriation to the world centers of capitalism.

Labor and Immigration

Kuwait’s population increased 557 percent between 1957 and 1975 and foreign immigration constituted the largest component of the increase. By 1965, Kuwaiti nationals constituted a minority in the nation. The large-scale immigration into Kuwait resulted from the demands for labor emanating from the ambitious development programs undertaken by the government. In 1954, uproar by unskilled Kuwaiti labor over high unemployment in their ranks due to competition with foreign labor drew the government’s attention to the issue of immigration. Having made the commitment to modernization, the ruling class faced the problem of maintaining class legitimationbased essentially upon tribal ideology within a modernizing institutional infrastructure. This was compounded by the pervasive influence of cultural diversity, and influence that is most prominent in the elite occupations that were in fact creating and administering the institutional transformation to the consumer society.

11 Ismael, Jacqueline S. "The Underdevelopment of Kuwait." Kuwait: Dependency and Class in a Rentier State. Gainesville: University of Florida, 1993. 100. Print.

12

Kuwait is not open for immigration, although she welcomes all those who wish to stay and work or operate a business, provided their stay is temporary.12

While highly skilled non-Kuwaitis are lured to Kuwait by high salaries and standards of living, a system of job insecurity and political disenfranchisement function to control their political involvement. Kuwaitis represent not only a numerical minority in the nation, but also a leisured minority dependent upon immigrants to administertheir health, welfare and security. The dynamics of dependency in Kuwait continued to generate greater demands for imported labor, and by 1970, non-Kuwaitis represented 53 percent of the population. The effective result is that the economy of Kuwait has developed independent of the labor of the society’s population. Thepopulation functions as consumers, not producers, in an economy that is organized around externally developed andoriented forces of production. Like most everything else in Kuwait, an exploitable labor force had to be imported too.

War Leads To Demographic Change

The Iranian revolution of 1979 ignited throughout the Gulf the fear of an Islamic revolutionary tide spearheaded by Iran. While Kuwait remained nominally neutral during the 1980 Iran-Iraq war, it provided the material support that Iraq needed to sustain its war efforts. Prompted by the regional security and strategic situations, the conservative Gulf sheikhdoms – Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain, Qatar and Oman – formed the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). The Iran-Iraq war dominated the council’s agenda throughout the eighties.

By mid-1986, Kuwaiti shipping in the gulf became a target of Iranian air attacks. In response, Kuwait soughtsuperpower protection for it’s shipping and invited the Soviet Union and the United States to provide escort and protection. In 1988, UN secretary-General Javier Perez deCuellar announced a ceasefire in the Iran-Iraq war. Two

12 Anon, A view of Kuwait (Washington, D.C.: Embassy of the State of Kuwait, n.d.), p.31.

13

years later, President Saddam Hussein issued a blisteringindictment of Kuwait over the oil production quotas. Iraqsent a letter to the Arab League accusing Kuwait of causing a drop of $14 billion in Iraq’s oil revenue and of border violations, including theft of $2.4 billion worth of oil from a field near Kuwait-Iraq border. A meeting in Saudi Arabia was hastily arranged between Kuwait and Iraq, but talks broke down on August 1. Withintwelve hours, in a blitzkrieg attack, Iraq invaded and occupied Kuwait.

For the first time in it’s history, Kuwait was placed under foreign rule. Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait lasted seven months. Bush’s foreign policy team forged anunprecedented international coalition consisting of the NATO allies and the Middle Eastern countries of Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Egypt to oppose Iraqi aggression. Although Russia did not commit troops, it joined the United States in condemning Iraq, its long-time client state. The Department of State orchestrated the diplomacyfor this grand coalition’s effective air campaign in January 1991, which was followed by “Operation Desert Storm,” a 100-hour land war, which expelled Iraqi forces from Kuwait.13

The United States became the cornerstone in Kuwait’sforeign policy and was the major economic benefactor of Kuwait’s reconstruction, as well as of the arms race set off in the region after the war. The U.S. and Kuwait worked out the details of a security arrangement which provided for U.S. access to Kuwait’s ports and air bases,U.S. training of the Kuwaiti military, joint military exercises, and the prepositioning of U.S. military equipment in Kuwait.

Kuwaitizing

Following the liberation, a campaign against expatriates served to “Kuwaitize” the population rapidly, a long-sought but elusive ideal of population policy and a manifest objective of the restored government. The combination of flight from occupied Kuwait and mass

13 "The First Gulf War - Short History - Department History - Office of the Historian." U.S Department of State: Office of the Historian. N.p., Web.

14

expulsions after liberation (due to paranoia) had reducedthe expatriate population by almost 1 million. To maintain a population balance between Kuwaitis and non-Kuwaitis, an optimum population level of 1.5 million was set. Palestinians had compromised the core of Kuwait’s managers, professional and technical workers and senior servants; the bedoon had made up the ranks of the military and police.14

The effect of the absence of these groups from Kuwait’s labor force were evident in the lack of planningand coordination of normalization efforts, and in the sluggish pace of revival of commercial activity. With a predominantly marginal labor force, composed of a majority of unskilled, single, non-Arab-speaking males, Kuwait’s demographic structure is inadequate to move the economy beyond the normalization and reconstruction stages of post-liberation and into the strategic development stage of a capital-intensive economy. Of course, the unskilled labor force structure may be suitable economically and desirable politically to serve the personal service needs of a pampered leisure class ina rentier economy. This after, all, was the economic character of the status quo ante.

Identity In The Technological Age

Communication is the cement of identity. It is through communication that cultures define themselves.15

During the Gulf War, Kuwait’s aptitude to communicate with the outside world became a target of Iraqi control and subsequently a source for Kuwaiti resistance. Iraq destroyed Kuwait’s ability to represent itself within thewar by destroying its satellite feeds, phone lines and radio stations. Iraq burned and destroyed archives containing records of Kuwait’s history and public discourse and the press was dominated and put into the 14 The ‘bedoon’ are stateless Kuwaitis who have lived in administrativelimbo since independence and are isolated from the rest of Kuwaiti society politically, socially, and economically.15 Benedict Anderson, “Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism.” (London: Verso, 1983).

15

service of defending the occupation and using it as a propaganda tool to convince Kuwaitis that they were now Iraqi citizens. The first act of the Kuwaiti resistance was to re-establish communication links with the government in exile and the allied commanders. Thus, partially due to Kuwait’s experience of being cut off from the world, it became an important security concern to insure the country’s access to the latest communications technologies.

With the introduction of the Internet, Kuwaitis wereable to sample a broader range of foreign ideas and concepts. In 1992, Kuwait became the first state in the region to award all students and faculty at its University free access to the Internet. The high penetration of foreign media in the local environment became a symbol of Kuwait’s openness to globalization, and the desire to be globally linked to the latest communication technologies became an important part of Kuwaiti national consciousness. Foreign media penetrationis not symptomatic of a loss of cultural autonomy, but rather, illustrates a compulsion to have the latest technologies and global media texts immediately availablefor the purpose of developing Kuwaiti national capabilities to their fullest. 16

Social Media In The Context of the Arab Spring Era

The ubiquity of technology now goes hand-in-hand with theubiquity of social media. Kuwait has the highest percentage of social media users, in proportionate to thepopulation, in the Middle East.  With itsfastness, viral results, inexpensiveness and seemingly easy usage, socialmedia has become an extraordinarily attractive platform for news, experience-sharing, social interaction and promotion of businesses of all sizes. Twitter, for example, became a large part of the political landscape and Kuwaiti Members of Parliament developed more followers on this social platform than their British MP counterparts.17

16 Wheeler, Deborah. "New Media, Globalization and Kuwaiti National Identity." TheMiddle East Journal 54.3 (2000): 441. JSTOR. Web.

16

In 2011, the Kuwaiti Prime Minister Shaikh Nasser Al-Mohammed survived a parliament vote of no confidence by the Kuwaiti parliament. The parliamentary grilling came in response to his government's use of violent forceto break up a meeting of academics and parliamentarians, a gathering which itself was called to protest alleged constitutional violations by the government (Black Wednesday). Decades of economic malaise, political repression and decaying institutions had been a symbol ofgovernance that has been intensely disliked by Kuwait’s citizens. 18

In parallel, another fragment of Kuwaiti society marched into protest demanding reforms, the resignation of the Prime Minister and the swift nationalization of the bedoon. On January 13 and 14, 2011 as well as May andOctober 2012, hundreds of bedoon protestors turned out enmass despite a protest ban that pushed the government to send in security forces. In an appalled response, the Kuwaiti youth congregated and discussed a course of action concerning Black Wednesday and the larger political issue at hand. The Kuwaiti government announceda $5 billion domestic aid package in an effort to quell any grievances against the government that in turn inflamed the youth activists and many other Kuwaitis, as they saw this tactic as an insult to their intelligence.

Although the Kuwaiti youth activists had protested against the government policy before, there wasn’t a popular movement that was capable of mobilizing the public for more substantial change. The Civil Democratic Movement became a powerful force in Kuwaiti politics and included Islamists, liberal, tribal, bedoon and the youth, bridging a wide swathe of Kuwaiti society. Throughthe use of social media, the movement presented its one objective: constitutional monarchy with no concessions. In an attempt to appease the opposition, the Amir accepted the resignation of the Prime Minster Shaikh Nasser Al-Mohammed.19

17 Baker, Frank. "Freedom of Expression in the Era of Social Media." Foreign and Commonwealth Office. N.p., 3 Feb. 2013. Web. 18 Diwan, Kristen S. "Kuwait: Too Much Politics, or Not Enough?" Foreign Policy. N.p., 10 Jan. 2011. Web. 07 Dec. 2013.

17

Dignifying the Nation?

In 2012, tensions grew further as the parliamentary tribal and Islamist segments of the opposition, now aligned with the protesters, cemented their gain less than three months later when they won the majority of seats in the February 2012 parliamentary elections. The current Amir, Shaikh Sabah Al-Ahmed, dissolved the parliament under an emergency decree and unilaterally amended the electoral law that reduced the number of votes per person from four to one. The country was slicedinto pro-government supporters versus the Opposition and the emergency decree was questioned legally under the umbrella of the constitution.

The “Dignity Marches” took place throughout the country in late 2012 where hundreds of thousands of Kuwaitis turned out, emulating the smaller protests from the year before on a much larger scale. The protesters directly questioned the Amir, no longer limited by any ceiling rhetoric as in the past, and called for “dignity”and accountability for all. There was an unmistakable newsocial mobilization that empowered Kuwaitis to voice their opposition to the government and constituted the emergence of the first genuine social movement in Kuwait’s history.20

Yet the outcome of these events led to uneven results for activists. In response to the protests, the government security forces used tear gas, rubber bullets,sound bombs, beatings, detentions and trials to quell theactivists’ assembly. New media controls, widespread arrests of activists on Twitter, and continued repressionat protest marches hindered the movement. Because violence was not a factor considered by activists and there is a lack of substantive elite divisions in Kuwait,there was no real opportunity for democratization events to take place. Although shaken, the ruling class was not pushed to collapse and remains very much an autocracy.

19 Martin, Geoff. "Instrument or Structure? Investigating the Potential Uses of Twitter in Kuwait." Thesis. The University of Guelph, 2013. Web.20 Kareem, Mona. "Kuwait: The Country's Biggest Protest?" Global Voice. N.p., 23Oct. 2012. Web.

18

Conclusion

The class dynamic of Kuwait’s peripheral role in the whole economy as an oil exporter generated a pattern of development dependent upon capital expropriation. At the same time, changes in the political economy of the Gulf (typified by the revolution in Iran) threatened the political substructure of the region (constituted of absolutist monarchies in rentier states). Iraq’s invasionof Kuwait was, in essence, a product of the process of regional transformation set off by the dynamic revolutionand counterrevolution. It culminated in the violent reassertion of colonial hegemony in the Gulf to maintain status quo.

The reconstruction of the status quo ante in Kuwait is a part of this larger political reality in the Gulf. That is, changes in the political economy of the region will be forestalled by the Western industrial powers at any price. In the meantime, the mechanisms of expropriation of the region’s unprecedented scale of

19

wealth have been expanded to include war, and with the Gulf war this mechanism has been taken out of the controlof regional regimes.

Re-establishment of the parliamentary process, whichpreoccupies the disenfranchised and privileged Kuwaitis, will be tolerated only so long as it does not interfere with expropriation. Maintenance of the status quo is now dependent on military force mediated externally, not political processes mediated internally. Furthermore, expropriation via military means is more efficient than expropriation via political means. In other words, capital transferred to the private sector to sustain political legitimacy is no longer a function prerequisiteof the status quo and will increasingly be diverted to the military sector. The corollary to this change is thatthe mechanism of overt repression will increasingly replace the mechanisms of cooptation as the means of quieting any opposition whether external or internal.

While popular protests shook the political elites ofthe region and resulted in repression, civil war, international intervention, elite rotations and more inclusive bases of regime support, the fact remains that none of the countries affected during the Arab Spring have democratized or enacted more than surface level reforms that would achieve an orderly transition. It is difficult to make any assumptions about the process of transitions in Kuwait and the region, or the facilitationof democratic norms to make any substantive generalizations about transitions. The same can be said of Internet technology’s capability of fueling social movements. As the saying goes ‘the devil is truly in the details’.

Bibliography

20

Castells, Manuel. “The Power of Identity.” Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1997. Print.

2 Khazal, Husayn Khalaf al-Shaykh. 1962-1970. “Tarikh al-Kuwayt al-Siyasi (The Political History of Kuwait),” 5 vols. Beirut: Matabu Dar al-Kutub

3 Ismael, Jacqueline S. "Origins and Structural Development." Kuwait: Dependency and Class in a Rentier State. Gainesville: University of Florida, 1993. Print

4 Anscombe, Frederick F. (1997) [1997]. “The Ottoman Gulf: The Creation of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar.” New York City: Columbia University Press.

5 Alan Rush, Al-Sabah: “Genealogy and History of Kuwait's Ruling Family,” 1752-1987, Atantic Highlands, 1987

6 Anon, “A view of Kuwait” (Washington, D.C.: Embassy of the State of Kuwait, n.d.)

7 "The First Gulf War - Short History - Department History - Office of the Historian." U.S Department of State: Office of the Historian. N.p., Web.

8 Benedict Anderson, “Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism.” (London: Verso, 1983).

9 Wheeler, Deborah. "New Media, Globalization and Kuwaiti National Identity." The Middle East Journal 54.3 (2000): 441. JSTOR. Web.

10 Baker, Frank. "Freedom of Expression in the Era of Social Media." Foreign and Commonwealth Office. N.p., 3 Feb. 2013. Web.

11 Diwan, Kristen S. "Kuwait: Too Much Politics, or Not Enough?" Foreign Policy. N.p., 10 Jan. 2011. Web. 07 Dec. 2013.

12 Martin, Geoff. "Instrument or Structure? Investigating the Potential Uses of Twitter in Kuwait." Thesis. The University of Guelph, 2013. Web.

13 Kareem, Mona. "Kuwait: The Country's Biggest Protest?" Global Voice. N.p., 23Oct. 2012. Web.

21