Pursuant to Rule 86(B) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.

UNITED NATIONS NATIONS UNIES

Int for Rwanda Tribunal PCnal International pour le Rwanda

efore: TRIAL CHAMBER I1

Judge William H. Sekule, President Judge Winston M. Maqutu Judge Arlette Ramaroson

: AdamaDieng

2 July 2003

THE PROSECUTOR vs.

JEAN DE DIEU KAMUHANDA

Case No. ICTR-99-54A-T

PROSECUTOR'S CLOSING BRIEF Pursuant to Rule 86(B) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.

ore Senior Trial Attorney Alao Babajide Trial Attorney

s. Dorothke Marotine Case Manager

Lead Counsel Co Counsel

rosecutor v. KAMUHANDA, ICTR-99-54A-T

PROSECUTOR'S CLOSING BRIEF Pursuant to Rule 86(B) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence

utor respectfully files this Closing Brief pursuant to Rule 86( ) of the Rules of Procedure

Dated in Arusha, Tanzania on the znd day of July 2003

Trial Attome y

MUHA NDA, ICTR-99-54A-T

CEDURAL HISTORY

TABLE OF CONTENTS

AND ASSESSMENT OF THE EVIDENCE

Page 4

Page 4

1. Identification evidence ii. Eyewitnesses iii. Hearsay iv. Witness Statements v. Affirmed or Sworn Oral Testimony vi. Expert vii. Photographs, Videos, Diagrams, and Sketches

ACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

i. Admissions . . a l . Defence Case in Summary . . . 111, De Facto and De Jure Power iv. Recognition, Dock Identification, and Identification

'"d PROSECUTION'S CASE

V DEFENCE CASE

V CUSSION OF THE LAW

ENTENCING

Page 5 Page 7 Page 8 Page 10 Page 12 Page 12 Page 12

Page 13 Page 17 Page 17 Page 17

Page 18

Page 74

Page 13 1

Page 177

i. The Indictment Page 179 ii. Prosecution And Defence Exhibits Index Page 180 iii. Schedule of evidence given by witnesses concerning the identification

of the Defendant Page 181


NTRODUCTION

e case against Jean de Dieu KAMUHANDA principally alleges his involvement in two massacres at the Gikomero and Gishaka churches within the Gikomero Commune.

rosecution case is that he, like many other important individuals in Rwanda at that time, d to the location where they considered they could exercise personal influence on ethnic and

olitical sympathizers. For Mr. KAMUHANDA it was the place of his birth and the area in which ew up and still retained strong familial and political links. It was to GIKOMERO that he

d to organize, influence and involve himself in the targeting of innocent persons whose only crime was to be born a Tutsi or express political opposition to the previous government of President Habyarimana. Such individuals were seen in the wake of the death of the President as being accomplices to the RPF, perceived by many Hutus as being responsible for the destruction of the lane in which he was being carried.

n former occasions such acts of influential persons went unpunished. On this occasion the temational Community acted and he, with many other influential and allegedly guilty persons face la1 before I.C.T.R.

. The main evidence presented by the Prosecution against the Accused is one of identification ce by the very persons he believed would either be too afraid to give evidence against him or ed as a result of his actions. Most of these witnesses came from his home area, they are

dividuals who either knew or recognized him at both the massacre sites and subsequently identified tionally there are other witnesses who, whilst not knowing his identity, give

and salient evidence of what they heard from others who were later killed and who clearly

iven and called evidence protesting his innocence. The Prosecution submit en his account and declaration of innocence, his evidence of alibi does not have the hallmark

Additionally, whilst it is for the Prosecution to prove this defendant's guilt, an innocent ith his family and children beside him does not remain at his home in Kigali in a passive

er for a period of one and a half weeks. Neither does he subsequently flee the country of his ing his extended family and that of his wife for a period of 4 years without contact, except m the crimes, which the Prosecution allege he so clearly committed.

ution submit that such actions, taken in conjunction with other evidence, should lead the inescapable conclusion that Jean de Dieu KAMUHANDA is guilty of these

mits the evidence called accurately reflect and support the individual Counts encapsulated within the Indictment and his participation under Article 6(1)

EDURAL HISTORY

Date 1. 27 September 1999

2. 01 October 1999

3, 01 October 1999

Event Indictment against Jean de Dieu KAMUHANDA and Augustin Ngirabatw are Confirmation of the indictment against Jean de Dieu KAMUHANDA Warrant of arrest and order of transfer and detention of Jean de Dieu KAMUHANDA

4

MUHANDA, ICTR-99-54A-T

. 26 November 1999 Arrest of Jean de Dieu KAMUHANDA in Bourges, France , 26November 1999 Interview of Jean de Dieu KAMUHANDA by ICTR

investigators Moussa Sanogo and Jean-Guy Foy . 07 March2000 Transfer of Jean de Dieu KAMUHANDA to the UNDF

10 March 2000 Initial appearance of Jean de Dieu KAMUHANDA, postponed to entitle KAMUHANDA to get a redacted copy of the indictment

24 March 2000 Initial appearance of Jean de Dieu MUHANDA, where KAMUHANDA pleaded not guilty on all the counts

. 29 September 2000 Defence motion for severance of the indictment and separate trial of KAMUHANDA

10. 31 October 2000 Prosecutor's reply to the Defense motion for severance of the indictment

. 07 November 2000 Decision on Defense motion for severance of the indictment and separate trial of KAMUHANDA, granting the motion

14 November 2000 Indictment against Jean de Dieu KAMUHANDA . 29 December 2000 Defense notice of intention to enter a defense of alibi . 26 March 2001 Prosecutor's request to admit facts

30 March 2001 Prosecutor's pre-trial brief 10 April 2001 Defense notice of alibi 17 April 2001 Prosecutor opened her case 24 April 2001 Prosecutor's request to admit facts as completed by the Defense

. 16 May 2001 Election of Judge Sekule as President of Trial Chamber I1

. 04 June 2001 Assignment of Judge Maqutu and Rarnarosson to Trial Chamber I1

. 20 August 2001 President's order for Trial Chamber I1 to determine whether to continue or restart the trial

. 03 September 2001 Restart of the trial after the Defense opted to recommence the trial. Prosecutor opened her case.

12 March 2002 Defense motion to rectify material error in the notice of alibi 13 March 2002 Prosecutor's response to Defense motion to rectify material

error in the notice of alibi . 08 April 2002 Decision on Defense motion to rectify material error in the

notice of alibi, taking note of the changes . 15 April 2002 Defense notice of two other alibi witnesses

15May2002 Defense notice of two other alibi witnesses 28. 14 May 2002 Prosecutor closed her case 29. 01 July 2002 Defense request to admit facts

01 July 2002 Defense pre-trial brief . 01 July 2002 Defense motion for partial acquittal . 18 July 2002 Prosecutor's response to Defense's motion for partial acquittal

3. 20 August 2002 Decision on Defense motion for partial acquittal, acquitting KAMUHANDA of c onspiracy to commit genocide (Count 1) but denying the request to acquit on crimes against humanity (Count 6)

34. 20 August 2002 Defense opened their case Defense closed their case

SESSMENT OF THE EVIDENCE

Identification evidence

C

Prosecutor v. KAMUHANDA, ICTR-99-54A-T

e case against Mr. KAMUHANDA is principally one of evidence of identification. The secution submits that in this case there are no less than four categories of Identification evidence,

hich individually and collectively indicate the involvement, and participation of the accused in these offences. They are:

) EVIDENCE OF IDENTIFICATION BY WAY OF RECOGNITION by individuals who had previously known, seen, or met Mr. KAMUHANDA on previous occasions and who recognized him on his amval at one of the two massacre sites at Gikomero and Gishaka churches. It is submitted that this is the highest quality of identification evidence as it relies upon the previous experiences of the identifying witness with the accused.

The following prosecution witnesses gave evidence of this character:

GEK, GAB, GEB, GAF, GAA, GAD, GES, GEL, GAC, GKL, and DAL.

EVIDENCE OF IDENTIFICATION IN C OURT this i s e vidence given b y w itnesses who stated on oath that the man they have identified in the dock was the same person they had seen participating in the offences as alleged by the Prosecution. Whilst it is accepted by the Prosecution that a courtroom identification prima facie does not carry the same evidential weight as (1) ante, nevertheless it is the Prosecution's submission that if the Court having considered all the surrounding factors which it deems to be relevant comes to the considered opinion that the witness in question is;

i. Truthful;

ii. Was in a location that permitted the witness to have a view of the Accused consistent with the witness's testimony;

iii. Such evidence can of itself, provide evidence of sufficient weight to permit the Court to conclude a Defendant's guilt, provided that on each occasion the Court evaluates the criteria specified above and any other matters that it deems to be relevant as per Rule 89(c) in determining whether the Prosecution has proved it's case to the required standard.

The following prosecution witnesses give evidence of this character:

GEK, GET, GAB, GEB, GAF, GAA, GAD, GES, GEI, GEL, and GAC.

(3) EVIDENCE OF IDENTIFICATION OF THE DEFENDANT BY OTHERS is evidence which has been placed before the Court by witnesses of what they had heard said by a third party, the context in which it was spoken, thereby demonstrating the third party's knowledge of the Accused and which goes to a relevant issue before the Court, namely the issue of identification (See Heresay, ante.)

It i s accepted b y the P rosecution that this i s e vidence that should b e treated w ith c aution. However i f t he C ourt h aving c onsidered all m atters they d eem t o b e r elevant, b eing fully cognisant of its potential dangers and having evaluated whether there are appropriate indicia of reliability and accuracy, such evidence is capable, not only of:

1) Supporting 1 corroborating other evidence (1 &2 ante), but

6

MUHA NDA , ICTR-99-54A-T

2) Also of its own motion sufficient to prove, to the required standard, the Defendant's guilt.

The following prosecution witnesses give evidence of this character:

GET, GEB, GEE, GAA, GEA, GEC, GEG, GEI, GAG, GEV, GEP, GEH, GEM, GEU, GEG, GKL, GKJ, GKI, and DAL.

(4) ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE OF IDENTIFICATION of the Defendant from witnesses who were neither at Gikomero or Gishaka on the relevant dates, but who give independent and corroborative evidence of what they saw and heard in the period prior to to atrocities in the above locations. It is submitted that such evidence demonstates a course of conduct by this Defendant that is consistent with subsequent evidence of his participation and the correct identification of him by other witnesses.

e following prosecution witnesses give evidence of this character:

GKL and DAL,

n total there are 25 witnesses who testified as to fact, 1 1 of these fall within witnesses in category 1 ; another 11 witnesses gave testimonies that fall within category 2; 19 witnesses within category 3; and 2 witnesses in category 4. Obviously, there are overlaps within categories.

ii. Eyewitnesses

e main corpus of evidence was by eyewitnesses who in the main were victims themselves, who narrowly escaped the terror unleashed at the Gikomero protestant parish church and school and the

a catholic parish church and school where many refugees, principally Tutsis were targeted and

e survivors testified about events they lived through and witnessed. Testimony of a witness is always an approximation of facts and never the exact reproduction of reality because individual

onal circumstances at the time of observation, perception, memory and expression are fficient to exactly reproduce a very complex and horrific reality. Therefore given the ounding circumstances, in the Prosecution's submission it is natural that there will be

crepancies in witness testimonies, however these should be distinguished from lies.

. In relation to the events, some witnesses were unable to give precise dates but nonetheless gave estimation of the time periods and time frames that is sufficiently accurate to ground the charges against the Accused. The law clearly does not require that the exact date of the commission of a

e crux of the determination of this case is the identification of the Accused person at the crime scenes. Mr. KAMUHANDA (whose family lived in the Gikomero hinterland) was an important, influential and well-known person within the Gikomero community. As a direct consequence he was

wn to and recognised by, a large number of persons at the scenes of the attacks, a number of m gave direct evidence of recognising him and others who gave evidence of hearing persons also

resent indicating their recognition of him upon his arrival, prior to the commission of these offences.

7


arsay evidence is admissible under the rules provided such hearsay evidence has probative value.

he leading authority on the relevance of heresay evidence within the Common Law system is the case of:

Ratten v.

PC, R's wife died from a gunshot wound. R asserted that the discharge was accidental and had occurred while he was cleaning the gun. He was unable to explain why the gun had been loaded. R was charged with murder. Evidence relating to three telephone calls was adduced at the trial. (a) At 1.09 p.m., R's father telephoned, spoke to R and heard the deceased's voice in the background. All appeared to be normal. (b) At 1.15 p.m., a telephone call from R's house was received at the local exchange. The caller was hysterical, said "Get me the police," gave R's address as the telephonist was connecting the call to the police, and then hung up. The telephonist gave the police the address. The telephonist, in her evidence, referred to the caller as "she" and the jury were properly directed upon the question as to whether they should accept that evidence as establishing that the caller was the deceased. (c) At 1.20 p.m., the police telephoned R's house and spoke to R who asked them to come immediately. R's wife, by then, was dead. The appellant, who denied that the second call was ever made, contended that the evidence relating thereto was hearsay and did not fall within any recognised exception thereto. Held, (a) the evidence was not hearsay. It was admissible as evidence of fact relevant to an issue. The mere fact that the evidence of a witness includes evidence as to words spoken by another person who is not called is no objection to its admissibility. Words spoken are facts just as much as any other action by a human being. If the speaking of the words is a relevant fact, a witness may give evidence that they were spoken. The question of hearsay only arises when the words spoken are relied on "testimonially", i.e. as establishing some fact narrated by the words. (b) Even assuming that there was a hearsay element (i.e. that the words said to have been used involve an assertion of the truth of some facts stated in them, viz. that the deceased was being attacked by R) in the evidence, it was properly admitted as part of the res gestae.

The rule in Ratten

Lord Wilberforce, delivering the opinion of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council said (at p. 389) that where a hearsay statement is made either by the victim of an attack or by a bystander, indicating directly or indirectly the identity of the attacker, the admissibility of the statement is said to be dependent on whether it was made as part of the res gestae (all facts so connected with a fact in issue as to introduce it, explain its nature, or form in connection with it one continuous transaction).

His Lordship said that there were two objections to such evidence. The first is that there may be uncertainty as to the exact words used because of their transmission through the evidence of another person than the speaker. The second is the risk of concoction of false evidence by persons who have been the victims of assault or accident. The first matter goes to weight. The person testifying to the words used is liable to cross-examination; the accused, if he was present, can give his own account, if different. There is no such difference in kind or substance between evidence of what was said and evidence of what was done (for example

d Rules 89(B) and (C) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the ICTR as amended and applicable during the trial hereinafter referred to as "the Rules"

2 I19721 A.C. 378,

8


between evidence of what the victim said as to an attack and evidence that he was seen in a temfied state or was heard to shriek) as to require a total rejection of one and admission of the other.

His Lordship c ontinued by s aying that the p ossibility o f c oncoction, where i t exists, i s an entirely valid reason for exclusion. It was their Lordships' opinion that this should be recognised as the relevant test; the test should not be the uncertain one of whether the making of the statement was in some sense part of the event or transaction. This may often be difficult to establish: such external matters as the time which elapses between the events and the speaking of the words (or vice versa), and differences in location being relevant factors but not, taken by themselves, decisive criteria. As regards statements made after the event it must be for the judge, by preliminary ruling, to satisfy himself that the statement was so clearly made in circumstances of spontaneity or involvement in the event that the possibility of concoction can be disregarded. Conversely, if the judge considers that the statement was made by way of narrative of a detached prior event so that the speaker was so disengaged fiom it as to be able to construct or adapt his account, he should exclude it. The same must in principle be true of statements made before the event. If the drama, leading up to the climax, has commenced and assumed such intensity and pressure that the utterance can safely be regarded as a true reflection of what was unrolling or actually happening, it ought to be received.

As to the nature of proof required to establish the involvement of the speaker in the pressure of the drama, or the concatenation of events leading up to the crisis, facts differ so greatly that it is impossible to lay down any precise general rule: "It is difficult to imagine a case where there is no evidence at all of connection between statement and principal event other than the statement itself, but whether this is sufficiently shown must be a matter for the trial judge. Their Lordships would be disposed to agree that, amongst other things, he may take the statement itself into account" ([I9721 A.C. 378 at 391). In addition the House of Lords in R. v. Andrews (D.) [I9871 A.C. 281, applied the decision in Ratten. Lord Ackner, with whose speech the remainder of their Lordships concurred, having reviewed the authorities, summarised "the position which confronts the trial judge when faced in a criminal case with an application under the res gestae doctrine to admit evidence of statements, with a view to establishing the truth o f s ome fact thus narrated, such evidence b eing truly c ategorised as 'hearsay evidence1 ".

"1. The primary question which the judge must ask himself is - can the possibility of concoction or distortion be disregarded?

2. To answer that question the judge must first consider the circumstances in which the particular statement was made, in order to satisfy himself that the event was so unusual or startling or dramatic as to dominate the thoughts of the victim, so that his utterance was an instinctive reaction to that event thus giving no real opportunity for reasoned reflection. In such a situation the judge would be entitled to conclude that the involvement or the pressure of the event would exclude the possibility of concoction or distortion, providing that the statement was made in conditions of approximate but not exact contemporaneity.

order for the statement to be sufficiently 'spontaneous' it must be so closely associated with the event, which has excited the statement, that it can be fairly stated that the mind of the declarant was still dominated by the event. Thus the judge must be satisfied that the event, which provided the

er mechanism for the statement, was still operative. The fact that the statement was made in answer to a question is but one factor to consider under this heading.

Prosecutor v. KA MUHANDA, ICTR-99-54A-T

16. e apart from the time factor, there may be special features in the case, which relate to the ibility of concoction or distortion .... The judge must be satisfied that the circumstances were

such that having regard to the special feature of malice there was no possibility of any concoction or distortion to the advantage of the maker or the disadvantage of the accused.

17. As to the possibility of error in the facts narrated in the statement, if only the ordinary fallibility of man recollection is relied upon, this goes to the weight to be attached to and not to the

issibility of the statement and is therefore a matter for the jury. However, here again there may e special features that may give rise to the possibility of error. In the instant case, there was

dence that the deceased had drunk in excess.... Another example would be where the ntification was made in circumstances of particular difficulty or where the declarant suffered from

efective eyesight. In such circumstances the trial judge must consider whether he can exclude the possibility of error. "3

18. His Lordship added that once the trial judge had ruled that the statement was admissible it was his uty to make it clear to the jury that it is for them to decide what was said and to be sure that the

witnesses w ere n ot m istaken i n what they b elieved h ad b een s aid t o them. F urther, they must b e satisfied that the declarant did not concoct or distort to his advantage or the disadvantage of the accused t he s tatement relied upon and w here t here i s m aterial t o r aise t he i ssue, t hat h e w as n ot activated by any malice or ill will. Where there are special features that bear on the possibility of

istake then the jury's attention must be invited to those matters.

ordship concluded (at p. 302) by saying that any attempt to use the doctrine as a device to avoid the maker of the statement, when he is available, is to be deprecated. Thus to deprive the

defence of the opportunity to cross-examine him, would not be consistent with the fundamental duty f the prosecution to place all the relevant material facts before the court.

20. cution submits that whilst Rule 89 of the Statute directs that the sole test of admissibility is , never the less "heresay" is a factor that the Courts have considered and clearly taken into

account when assessing the overall credibility of witnessles. The Prosecution further submits that the above authorities whilst directing their rulings to the principle of one of the exceptions to the rule against heresay (Res Gestae) they should be considered to be of persuasive authority. In particular indicating the criteriahdicia to be applied when considering the overall veracity and

itworthiness of a statement made by a person who was not before the Court, but heard and ated by a witness a s evidence of the truth o f its content and the extent it can be relied upon

testimonially as part of the Prosecution case against the Defendant.

iv. Witness statements

itness statements are a mere guide to what the witnesses recollect at the time they are questioned asked to give an account of their recollection of relevant events. It is neither sworn nor taken

before a j udicial o fficer. T he p rocess o f t aking w itness s tatements that are p resented b efore this Tribunal is complex, complicated and riddled with language translation difficulties. The witnesses speak in Kinyarwanda to FrenchKinyanvanda interpreters who translate to either French or English speaking investigators who write down the statements. A great deal of factual substance is sacrificed through interpretation and the necessity of brevity, economy of space and time and the necessity to fit the statements into a universal format.

3 Raifen v R [I9721 A.C. 300-301

. Almost all prosecution witnesses made statements to before testifying in coirt. These were ced in writing to varying degrees of accuracy but the oral testimony in court (under oath or

ation and tested by cross-examination) is the definitive evidence4. In some instances, a witness more than one written statement and details omitted in a statement may be remembered later.

is applies to significantly relevant matters in the case. More importantly, the victims lived orrific days of unimaginable atrocities of exceptional and outstanding nature. Statements

ed by investigators from field interrogations of witnesses should not be equated with a contemporaneous recording of such interview.

Investigators conduct open ended questioning and at the time of their interview, they gather available information that may not be tailored or case specific. Therefore, the investigator is not necessarily collecting information for a specific trial strategy nor does he know how and what the collated information will be deployed at the time of trial.

ritten statements may be affected by time constraints, interview logistics especially between the terview to the signature stages (often months after), use of different interpreters, travel to far away aces to interview witnesses, and then return again with the reproduced written statement for

ature. All these contribute to the quality and probative value of the statements.

e statements were taken in French or English, often depending on the language skills of the mvestigators. In many cases, as became clear at trial, witnesses could not read the statements they

. The statements had to be translated to them before signature, and in some instances, the statements might not have been read back to them.

. It is submitted that the prior written statements of witnesses, who had the opportunity to testify the hamber, as a general rule, should not be considered as evidence, but merely as a means to challenge itness credibility. The law is that witnesses, as a general principle, shall be heard directly before

the Trial chamber.' Indeed, the Appeals Chamber in Akayesu, and Chamber I1 in Kahishema and uzindana, held that a prior statement by a witness who testifies before the Tribunal is not evidence, ut may serve to test the credibility of the witness who made the statement! The Chamber held in

e Prosecutor vs Jean-Paul Akayesu, ICTR-96-4-A, Judgement dated 2 September 1998 paragraph 7 thus:

137. During the trial, the Prosecutor and the Defence relied on pre-trial statements from witnesses for the purpose of cross-examination. The Chamber ordered that any such statements to which reference was made in the proceedings be submitted in evidence for consideration. In many instances, the Defence has alleged inconsistencies and contradictions

4 Any inconsistency between a witness's evidence and an earlier statement goes to credibility and the earlier statement cannot be treated as evidence of the truth of it's

contents. (R v. O'Neill [I9691 Crim. L. R. 260, North Australian Territory Co. v. Goldsbrough, Mort & Co [I8931 2 Ch. 381, 358-386, Wright v. Beckett (1834) 1 M & Rob.

414, Lord Denman, Ewer v. Ambrose (1825) 3 B. & Co. 746.) The terms of the proviso to section 5 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1865 (which provides for previous

inconsistent statements of witnesses to be used in criminal trials) do not permit the Judge to treat the earlier statement as evidence of its contents. (R v. Birch (1924) 18

Cr. App. R. 26, R v. Golder & Others [I9601 1 W.L.R. 1169.) Concerning a statement admitted as evidence which affects the credibility of its maker, the Criminal Justice

Act 1988, Schedule 2, paragraph 3 provides that in estimating the weight to be attached to a statement, regard shall be had to all the circumstances from which any

inference can reasonably be drawn as to its accuracy. See: Phipson on Evidence, The Common Law Library, No. 10, 15th Edition, 2002, Sweet and Maxwell, pp255-

257, and p696.

5 Rule 90(A) also provides that a Trial Chamber can order that evidence of a witness be by means of a deposition as provided for in Rule 71. Further, although Rule 90(A)

only mentions one exception - depositions under Rule 71 -the Appeals Chamber in Akayesu held that the admission of hearsay evidence under Rule 89(C) constitute

an exception to Rule 90(A) (see Arrdt, Le Procureur c l Jean-Paul Akayesu, ICTR-96-4-A, App. Ch., 1 June 2001, paragraph 134). Hearsay evidence can originate either

from a witness, who testifies about what he or she has heard from others. It may take the form of a written statement from the person who saw the event, but is not a

witness for example the two statements by Defence witness GER and excerpts of Jean Kambanda's audio tape interview that were admitted in the present case. Both

exceptions to Rule 90(A) it is noted, concern evidence that substitutes evidence of a witness, i.e. where the direct evidence of witnesses is substituted by evidence by

other means.

6 Arret, Le Procureur c l Jean-Paul Akayesu, ICTR-96-&A, App. Ch., 1 June 2001, para. 134; 1 Judgement, The Prosecutor Clement Kayishema and Obed Ruzindana,

ICTR-95-1-T, T.Ch. 1,21 May 1999, paragraph 77.

Prosecutor v, lej;LMUWANDA, ICTR-99-54A-T

between the pre-trial statements of witnesses and their evidence at trial. The Chamber notes that these pre-trial statements were composed following interviews with witnesses by investigators o f t he 0 ffice o f t he P rosecution. These i nterviews w ere m ostly conducted i n Kinyarwanda, and the Chamber did not have access to transcripts of the interviews, but only translations thereof. It was therefore unable to consider the nature and form of the questions put to the witnesses, or the accuracy of interpretation at the time. The Chamber has considered inconsistencies and contradictions between these statements and testimony at trial with caution for these reasons, and in the light of the time lapse between the statements and the presentation of evidence at trial, the difficulties of recollecting precise details several years after the occurrence of the events, the difficulties of translation, and the fact that several witnesses were illiterate and stated that they had not read their written statements. Moreover, the statements were not made under solemn declaration and were not taken by judicial officers. In the circumstances, the probative value attached to the statements is, in the Chamber's view, considerably less than direct sworn testimony before the Chamber, the truth of which has been subjected to the test of cross-examination.

v. Affirmed or Sworn Oral Testimony

7. In the Niyitegeka judgement dated 16 May 2003, paragraph 40 at pages 6-7 the Trial chamber held hat:

"The Defence made submissions as to the discrepancies between a witness's prior written statement d his testimony. The Chamber has considered all discrepancies raised and any explanations

red for the same in its deliberations. The Chamber considers that sworn testimony before the amber has considerably more probative value than the witness's declarations in prior written

statements."

testimony provided in Court by the witnesses is the evidence of the witness. It is the ny that is provided under the threat of legally enforceable penal sanctions that are designed to

extract the truth. This is the real evidence and that which attracts the highest level of believability. It ust be noted here that the nature of the Genocide in Rwanda was to ensure that no one survived to

ell the tale. It is also a peculiar African cultural phenomenon that in the absence of writing, events, istory, and culture are transmitted through the oral tradition. It is a cultural imperative and in ractical terms impossible to establish any factual scenario without significant weight being accorded

arsay evidence. The Prosecutor submits that such evidence should not only be admissible but accorded significantly stronger weight that would be the case in jurisdictions in societies with

y sophisticated traditions of writing.

Defence called one expert witness, Dr. Nkiko Nsengimana a doctor of political science to testify e trial about facts that he established, and his conclusions based on issues within his professional

owledge (see para 56 post.).

vii. Photographs, Videos, Diagrams and Sketches

otographs, videos, diagrams and sketches presented by both parties were obtained and prepared ost-facto the events by investigators. They were recorded to document the crime scenes and give an verview of the case for, and against the Accused. In spite of the time lapse between the occurrence f the events and the time the photographs, videos, diagrams and sketches were prepared, the

erials nonetheless have significant evidential value.

Prosecutor V . KAMUHANDA, ICTR-99-54A-T

V FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

i. Admissions

3 1. ased on the jurisprudence of the ~ribunal,' on 26 March 2001 the Prosecutor served on and the Defence replied on 01 July 2002, and admitted to the Notice to admit Facts mirroring parts 1 to 4 of the Indictment the allegations8 set out below (to assist the Court) which are aforetion' established eyond reasonable doubt, namely:

- Historical Context

32. e early part of 1973 in Rwanda was again marked by ethnic confrontation between Hutu and utsi, as alleged in paragraph 1.3 (in part).g The new outburst of ethnic and political tensions

een the North and South resulted in a military coup by General Juvenal Habyarimana on 5 July

1975, President Habyarimana founded the Mouvement Revolutionnaire National pour le eveloppement (MRND), a single party and assumed the position of party Chairman, as alleged in

agraph 1.4 of the Indictment. The administrative and party hierarchies were indistinguishable in 1s single party state from the level of Prefet to the bourgmestre, and down to that of the conseillers secteur and responsables de c e l l ~ l e . ~

. In 1990, the President of the Republic, Juvenal Habyarimana, and his single party MRND, were facing mounting opposition, including from other ~ u t u , ' ~ according to paragraph 1.6 of the

n 1 October 1990, the Rwandan Patriotic Front ("RPF"), made up mainly of Tutsi refbgees, attacked Rwanda, according to part of paragraph 1.7 of the Indictment. Within days of the invasion, the government began arresting thousands of people presumed to be opponents of Habyarimana and suspected of being RPF accomplices.13 While refising to admit that Tutsis were the main targets, the Defence admits that in addition to Tutsis, Hutu political opponents were also arrested.I4

36. Following pressure from the internal opposition and the international community, and the RPF attack ober 1990, President Habyarimana permitted the introduction of multiple political parties and

he adoption of a new constitution on 10 June 1990, as alleged in paragraph 1.8 of the Indictment. uvement Revolutionnaire National pour le Developpment (MRND) was renamed Mouvement

ulicain National pour la Democratie et le Developpement (MRND). The first transitional ernrnent was made up almost exclusively of MRND members, following the refusal of the main

pposition to take part. With the second transitional government formed in April 1992, the MRND a minority party for the first time in its history, with nine (9) ministerial portfolios out of

nineteen (1 9). l5

. According to paragraph 1.9 of the Indictment, the new government then entered into negotiations the RPF, which resulted in the signing of the Arusha Accords on 4 August 1993. The Accords

7 See e.g. Prosecutor v. Alfred Musema, Trial Chamber Judgement, paras. 304-316 inclusive; 355-361 inclusive, and 363.

8 See the Defence's Reply to the Prosecutor's Request to Admit Facts.

9 See para. 2 of the Defence's Reply to the Prosecutor's Request to Admit Facts


11 See paras. 6-9 of the Defence's Reply to the Prosecutor's Request to Admit Facts.

12 See paras. 14 and i 5 of the Defence's Reply to the Prosecutor's Request to Admit Facts

13 See para. 16 of the Defence's Reply to the Prosecutor's Request to Admit Facts.

14 See paras. 17 and 18 of the Defence's Reply to the Prosecutor's Request to Admit Facts.

15 See paras. 19, 20, 21, and 22 of the Defence's Reply to the Prosecutor's Request to Admit Facts.

rovided for a new system . * of sharing military and civilian power between the RPF, the opposition arties and the MRND. Ib

. As alleged in paragraph 1.10 of the Indictment, by the terms of the Arusha Accords, r the integration of the armies of both sides, the new national army was to be limited to 13,000 en, 60% Forces Armee Rwandaise (FAR), 40% RPF. The posts of command were to be shared

ally (50% - 50%) between the two sides, with the post of Chief of Staff of the Army assigned to FAR. The Gendarmerie was to be limited to 6000 men, 60% FAR and 40% RPF, with the posts

command shared equally (50% - 50%) between the two sides and the post of Chief of Staff of the endarmerie assigned to the RPF.'~

As regards representation within the government, the Arusha Accords limited the number of terial portfolios to be held by MRND to five, plus the Presidency, as alleged in paragraph 1.1 1

Indictment. The other portfolios were to be shared as follows: RPF (five); MDR (four) (including the post of Prime Minister); PSD (three), PL (3) and the PSD (one).'*

e defence refuses to admit that the widespread massacres of April 1994 were a culmination of a ulti-faceted strategy adopted in the early 1990s, which entailed inter alia incitement to ethnic

iolence. The defence admits that the incitement to ethnic hatred took the form of public speeches e sharing the extremist ideology,lg as alleged in the first part of paragraph 1.16 of the

1. The defence admits that as a perfect illustration of a strategy to incite the killing of Tutsis, in ember 1992, Leone Mugesera, vice-chairman of the MRND for Gisenyi prefecture, incited the ic to exterminate the Tutsis and their "accomplices"~O as alleged in paragraph 1.16 of the

Indictment.

According to paragraph, 1.22 of the Indictment, on 6 April 1994, the plane carrying, among other assengers, the President of the Republic of Rwanda, Juvenal Habyarimana, was shot down on its

roach to Kigali airport.2'

3 , e Defence denies the contents of paragraphs 1.23 and various aspects of paragraph 1.24, including illings by groups of military personnel of political opponents, both Hutu and Tutsi on the ng of 7 April 1994 (including the Prime Minister, Agathe Uwulingiyimana). It admits that at

e same time, the military were evacuating prominent members of the dead President's circle, including the MRND Ministers, to safe locations,22 as alleged in Paragraph 1.24 of the Indictment. n addition, the Defence admits that the Belgian UNAMIR soldiers sent to protect the Prime Minister ere disarmed, arrested and taken to Kigali military camp, where they were massacred, prompting

withdrawal of the Belgian contingent in the days that followed.23 After the withdrawal of the gian troops, the UN Security Council drastically reduced the number of UNAMIR personnel in

~ w a n d a ? ~ as alleged in the last part of paragraph 1.24 of the Indictment.

osed solely of Hutu, a new Government [the Interim Government] was sworn in on 9 April . The MRND held nine ministerial posts, plus the Presidency of the Republic, while the

l 6 See paras. 24 and 25 of the Defence's Reply to the Prosecutor's Request to Admit Facts.


18 See para. 26(e) and (f) of the Defence's Reply to the Prosecutor's Request to Admit Facts.

I 9 See para. 39 of the Defence's Reply to the Prosecutor's Request to Admit Facts.






14


remaining 11 positions, including that of the Prime Minister, went to the Power factions of the other a r t i e ~ , ~ ~ as alleged in the last part of paragraph 1.25 of the Indictment.

5. The defence admits the occurrence of genocide in Rwanda as alleged in paragraph 1126 and subsequent paragraphs of the Indictment. In the hours following the crash of President Habyarimana's plane, military and militiamen set up roadblocks and began slaughtering Tutsi and members of the Hutu opposition in Kigali and in other parts of Rwanda, thus marking the beginning f the genocide.26 At the roadblocks, they checked the identity cards of passers-by and Tutsis or

people identified as such were killed.27 Military patrols, often involving militiamen, scoured the city, lists in hand, to execute the Tutsi and certain political opponents.28

6. During the entire period of the genocide, FAR military, particularly units of the Presidential Guard, the Para-Commando Battalion and the Gendarmerie, in complicity with militiamen, actively

articipated in the massacre of Tutsis throughout ~ w a n d a , ~ ~ as alleged in paragraph 1.27 of the

rt 2 - Tribunal's Territorial, Temporal and Material Jurisdiction

e Defence admits that the crimes referred to in the Indictment took place between 1 January and 1 December 1994, (as alleged in para. 21 of the Indictment), and particularly between 1 January

4 and July 1994.~'

8. The Defence further admits the temtorial demarcation of Rwanda into 11 prefectures, the division of refectures into communes, the sub-division of communes into secteurs, and the division of secteurs

into ~ e l l u l e s , ~ ~ as alleged in paragraphs 2.2 and 2.3 of the Indictment.

he defence M h e r admits that during the events alleged in the Indictment, the Hutu, Tutsi and Twa were identified as racial or ethnic groups,32 as alleged in para. 2.3 of the Indictment.

e defence admits that genocide and crimes against humanity, took place between 1 January and ecember 1994 in Rwanda, as alleged in paragraph 2.4 of the Indictment, as follows: during the said eriod, there were throughout Rwanda widespread or systematic attacks directed against a civilian opulation on the following grounds: political persuasion, ethnic affiliation and/or racial origin.33 he defence further admits that the said attacks had a specific objective of extermination of ~ u t s i . ~ ~

1.. the same context in respect of genocide, the defence admits that between 1 April and July 1994, Rwandan citizens committed genocide, to wit, the following acts were done with the intent to y wholly or partially in Rwanda the ethnic group identified as Tutsi: killing persons perceived

s Tutsi; occasioning serious bodily or mental harm to them; inflicting conditions of life calculated to ring about the whole or partial physical destruction of Tutsi in ~ w a n d a . ~ ~ In addition, some

an citizens did directly and publicly incite others to commit genocide.36






30 See para. 86 of the Defence's Reply to the Prosecutor's Request to Admit Fads.



33 See para. 89(a), (b) (i)-(iii), (c) and (a) of the Defence's Reply to the Prosecutor's Request to Admit Fads.

34 See para. 89 (a) of the Defence's Reply to the Prosecutor's Request to Admit Facts.

35 See para. 91(a) of the Defence's Reply to the Prosecutor's Request to Admit Facts.

36 See para. 91(b) of the Defence's Reply to the Prosecutor's Request to Admit Facts.

rosecutor v. KA MUHA NDA , ICTR-99-54A-T

Respecting crimes against humanity, the defence admits that some Rwandan citizens committed the following crimes as part of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population on ethnic, political, national or racial grounds: murder, extermination, rape, political and racial persecution and inhumane acts.37

During the time of the events alleged in the Indictment, Rwanda was a state party to the Genocide Convention of 1948, having acceded to it on 16 April 1 975.38

During the time of the events alleged in the Indictment, a state of non-international armed conflict existed in Rwanda, and the victims referred to respecting violations of Article 3 common to the

eneva Conventions and Protocol I1 thereto, were protected persons.39

rt 3 - Under Power Structure

ce admits the entirety of the power structure, both national and local, as alleged in s 3.1 to 3.5 of the ~ndictment.~' The defence further admits the powers and functions of the , the Prime Minister and members of the Government, as laid down in the Constitution of

Jun 1991, and as alleged in paras. 3.1 and 3.2 of the ~ndictment? Executive power is exercised y the President of the Republic, assisted by the Government, composed of the Prime Minister and e Ministers. The President upon the proposal of the Prime Minister appoints the members of the overnment. The Prime Minister directs the Government's program. The Government determines

and applies national policy. To that effect, it controls the civil service and the armed forces. The me Minister decides the functions of the Ministers and officials under the Prime Minister's

authority. The resignation or termination of tenure of the Prime Minister, for whatever reason, causes the Government to resign. The Ministers implement the Government's policy, as defined by

e Prime Minister. They are answerable to the Head of the Government for doing so. In discharging their duties, the Ministers stand by the President of the Republic. Before taking up their posts, they take an oath promising to uphold the interests of the Rwandan people and to respect the constitution and the law. In carrying out their duties, they have at their disposal the civil service and local administration corresponding to their functions.

functions,

as alleged

he defence admits all aspects relating to local administration, including the status quo, owers ofprefets in the prefectures, as alleged in paras. 3.3 to 3.5 of the ~ndictrnent.~~

imilarly, the defence admits all aspects relating to the Forces Armees Rwandaises (FAR), aras. 3.13 (in part), 3.17, and 3.18 of the ~ndictment?~ excepting the allegations that: the FAR

was composed of the Arrnee Rwandaise (AR) and Gendarmerie Nationale (GN); the FAR did not have a unified command and that it came directly under the Minister of Defence; in case of

ergency the prefect could request the intervention of the Gendarmarie Nationale verbally, notably

Further, the defence admits all aspects relating to political parties, the militia and RPF as alleged in paras. 3.6 and 3.10 of the ~ndictment .~~ However, while admitting that the youth wing of the MRND

37 See para. 91 O to (h) of the Defence's Reply to the Prosecutor's Request to Admit Facts.


39 See paras. 90 and 93 of the Defence's Reply to the Prosecutor's Request to Admit Facts


4 1 See paras. 94-1 03 of the Defence's Reply to the Prosecutor's Request to Admit Facts.

42 See paras. 104-1 13 of the Defence's Reply to the Prosecutor's Request to Admit Facts.

43 See paras. 116, 117, 118, and 121 of the Defence's Reply to the Prosecutor's Request to Admit Facts.


Prosecutor v. UMUHANDA, ICTR-99-54A-T

ere the Interahamwe, the defence refused to admit that they received military transformed them into militias.45 I - The Accused

esides the date and place of birth, the defence admits that in late May 1994 to midJuly 1994, the ccused held the office of Minister of Higher Education in the Interim Government, having replaced

Dr. Daniel Mbangura, as alleged in paragraphs 4.1 and 4.2 of the ~ndictment .~~

e defence further admits that in his capacity as Minister of Higher Education, the accused was responsible for the articulation and implementation of the government policy concerning post- secondary school education and scientific research in Rwanda for the Interim ~overnment:~ as lleged in paragraph 4.3 of the Indictment.

Defence Case in Summary

Defence case rests on an evidential tripod. The first leg is alibi expressed through witnesses aw him at his home when he was supposed to have committed offences he is charged with.

second is that the road from his home to the scenes where he was supposed to have committed s could not have been navigated and traversed by him at the relevant periods; and the third is was at all relevant times not at the scenes of the locations where he committed the offences.

tion, he was of little consequence pressured into government as a minister.

a o e . De Facto and De Jure Power

2. Accused at all relevant times in April 1994 was a highly educated person and native of omero, a rural commune near Kigali city. By virtue of his education and influence in this

e, he rose to the position of Director General for Education in the Education Ministry. He an active member of the MRND at the local and national levels. It is therefore the

osecutor's submission that he is a man who wielded considerable influence and power over all inistrative and police organs and the machinery of state at the local level. He exercised

ctual power over all the organs irrespective of the fact that he might not have actually had direct responsibility or defined hierarchical position as an operative in the commune. His influence and stature in his native region, education, position in government, position in the MRND party, and his

litical activities in the local area placed him in authority over those who he ordered to commit the es charged.

rther submitted that given the Accused's own admission and the evidence of the defence ert witness Mr. KlAMUHANDA was sworn in as a Government Minister on or about the 25"

1994 and consequently as per all other Government Ministers responsible for the well being and fare of the people of Rwanda as encapsulated by the Rwandan Constitution. With his state of wledge that the atrocities had been and were continuing to occur, he had a constitutional duty to

otect those existing rights of the people of Rwanda. At no time did he attempt to dissavow himself m the policies of the then Government, attempt to resign or flee (even though by his own

ission he had left Rwanda on the 2sth June by car and then returned). Such failures by the ccused clearly demonstrated his support for the Government and gave active encouragement to the

s by his omission to act (see para 846 below).

. Recognition, Dock Identification, and Identification




17


44. any witnesses knew the Accused before, during and after the relevant period in not know him had heard of his influence and authority in their locality. Many witnesses

sitively identified him in the dock during trial as the person who planned and executed massacres two main sites (Gikomero protestant and Gishaka catholic parish churches and schools),

distributed weapons and masterminded the massacres that happened throughout the wider Gikomero ea. They placed him at these two places. He brought Interahamwe militia to effect massacres. He

ordered the murder of the Tutsi protestant pastor Bucundura. He ordered the extermination of the refugees at the massacre sites. The Accused committed the acts charged in his indictment.

V PROSECUTION'S CASE

5. etween the period of 8" and 20" of April 1994, by his acts and omissions in the wider Gikomero and more particularly at the Gikomero protestant and Gishaka catholic parish churches and

01s r espectively, the A ccused acted and engaged i n activities that m ake h im guilty o f a 11 the extant charged offences. On the 12" of April, the Accused a very powerful MRND man went to the

o parish church and school where he condoned the shooting of an elderly Tutsi who was intervene and ordered the massacres of the refugees at the place. It is the Prosecution case d the same as the Gishaka catholic parish and school.

6. first prosecution witness4' Upendra Baghel an experienced police officer and engineer tendered , his Curriculum Vitae, PX2 and PX3, Maps, Sketches and Still Photographs of Gikomero

otestant Parish and Gishaka Parish respectively. Under cross-examination he was shown a video footage of Gikomero Protestant Parish Church and School admitted as DXl.

67. 2, Toch Martin took statements fiom GEB and GEP who identified the Accused in two tographs taken at a burial site PX4 (one an enlargement of the other) which he tendered and the

amber admitted into evidence. Under cross-examination, he noted that the photograph ification process was not ideal in terms the age and number placed before the witnesses.

However in view of the fact that these we5re the available material, it was within acceptable limits to ace them before the witnesses, especially as "We were working in very peculiar condition^,"^^ as a atter of commonsense, he showed the group one first.

68. Her husband was a member of KAMUHANDAYs family and she knew KAMUHANDA before the Genocide. She identified him in the dock.

Prosecutor: "The Defendant, Jean de Dieu KAMUHANDA, in April 1994, at the start of that month, had you met him prior to that date?" Witness (GEK): "My husband was a member of his family and KAMUHANDA usually came to the house to say hello when he -- on his way home just around Muhazi." Prosecutor: "How many times would you have seen him or met him prior to April 1994?" Witness (GEK): "About four times."

Transcript of 03 September 2001 Page of transcript in English (PTE) 159-160, Page of transcript in French (PTF) 1 84- 1 86.

48 Abbreviations: Prosecution witness "PW", Defence witness "DW", Prosecution exhibit "PX, Defence exhibit "DX, Personal Information Sheet "PIS". Page of Transcript

English "PTE", Page of Transcript French "PTF"

49 English Transcript of 3 September 2001 page 133, lines 5 and 6.

50 GEK is PW3. Her sealed personal information sheet "PIS is PX5.

osecutor v. KAMUHANDA, ICTR-99-54A-T I Witness (GEK): "Even at the inauguration of the dispensary of Gikomero, it was KAMUHANDA who introduced the President of the Republic to the population in attendance." Prosecutor: "And did you see KAMUHANDA; were you present when that occurred?" Witness (GEK): "Now, for the Gikomero communal office, I wasn't personally there. It was an event that I was told about. But as for the dispensary, I was there and it was on the occasion of the visit of the President of the Republic."

Transcript of 04 September 2001 PTE 15, PTF 18.

Witness (GEK): "KAMUHANDA's mother was the aunt, the maternal aunt of my husband; in other words my husband and KAMUHANDA were cousins."


Witness (GEK): "There is a sister of KAMUHANDA that got married, I believe either in 1992 or 1993. She is a neighbour to us, and when she got married, KAMUHANDA was there for the occasion and I was there also."


Witness (GEK): "Since the situation had changed and there was gunfire being heard in Kigali, it was important for me not to move too far away, so as to be able to follow what was being discussed in the salon."

Transcript of 04 September 2001 PT 78, PTF 89-90.

met with KAMUHANDA on the 5th or 6th of April 1994 when KAMUHANDA visited mero. This is positive identification of KAMUHANDA in Gikomero. KAMUHANDA spent 2

ours before departure. Between the 6th and the 10th of April, KAMUHANDA came in a white k up van to GEK's home and was joined later by four named persons. They all discussed with K's husband in GEK's home. She hid but could hear the conversation.

Witness (GEK): "I saw KAR/rllUWANDA again at another time between the 6th and the 10th. At that time he came to our residence and he stayed to talk to my husband." (. . .) "when he entered the house my husband requested me to go inside, the room, because, at that time, war had erupted, so he asked me to hide myself. But I was not far away and I could hear what they were saying to each other."

Transcript of 03 September 200 1 PTE 167- 168, PTF 193.

Witness (GEK): "The conversation lasted between 20 and 30 minutes."


Witness (GEK): "But the fact that I was at the corridor and that I was there at my husband's request didn't mean that I wasn't able to hear what was being discussed between my husband and KBMUHANDA."

Transcript of 04 September 2001 PTE 63, PTF 73-74.


MUHANDA asked why killings had not begun in the Gikomero Commune and s ecause those who should start the killings were married to Tutsi women and that he would

ring the equipment to be used in the killings. In response, GEK's husband said KAMUHANDA rsecutes GEK because she was a Tutsi he had married against the KAMUHANDA's will.

UHANDA distributed weapons (machetes, firearms and grenades) in and outside GEK's house and had more weapons behind his car.

Witness (GEK): "He told Kamanzi that in the Gikomero commune the killing had not yet started" (. . .) "He went on to say that those who were to assist them to start had married Tutsi women." (. . .) "He went on to say that he would bring equipment for them to start, and if their women were in the way they should, first, eliminate them."

Transcript of 03 September 2001 PTE 171, PTF 197-1 98

Witness (GEK): "When I went outside I was able to see firearms, grenades, and machetes, which they distributed when he went outside the house."


UHANDA ordered the distributed weapons to be distributed widely to others. He returned to ikomero again to arrange for, and when the killings started. He led a large group of people in a

Diahatsu truck to kill at the Gikomero protestant primary school.

Witness (GEK): "I saw him on that day, when he left the weapons, and I saw him again when the killings started in Gikomero."


Witness (GEK): "Now, when you are at my house, at my home, you can see the road that passes by Kalikezi's house and moves in the direction of the school, and the road is seen clearly. It is not untruth. You can come and see for yourself."


he later heard gunshots, noise and saw injured children and people running in the direction of the town. She could not venture out (being a target Tutsi) and a girl with an amputated leg sought refuge in her home.

Witness (GEK): "He distributed firearms and grenades inside the house." (...) "I saw my husband carrying four grenades." (. . .) Prosecutor: "Had you seen those four grenades or were those four grenades inside your house before Mr. KAMUHANDA arrived?" Witness (GEK): "No." (. . .) "When KAMUHANDA went outside he went to Karakezi's home, a distance of about between five and ten steps. He had distributed, given, distributed a weapon, a gun I should say, inside our house." (. . .) "I am referring to KAMUHANDA. It is him who distributed them and unloaded them from the vehicle." (. . .) "He distributed these weapons to four persons, but he left them other weapons that these four people were to distribute to others, other persons." (. . .) "From where I was, from where they were, I could see what they were saying. He said to them to distribute those weapons and said that he would return and assist them" (. . .) "He said that he would return to see if they had started the killings or that he would return to -just so that the killings would start."


Transcript of 03 September 200 1 PTE 174- 177, PTF 20 1-204.

Witness (GEK): "I heard gunshots and noise." (...) "I heard the gunshots and the noise for between twenty

Transcript of 03

Witness (GEK) (. . .) "I also saw house."

Transcript of 03

Witness (GEK):

and forty minutes."

September 2001 PTE 184, PTF 212

"I could see children that were wounded and that were fleeing towards us." a young girl whose legs were cut, amputated. She came to seek refuge in our

September 2001 PTE 185-186, PTF 214

"Subsequently, the Interahamwe that came fiom Rubungo commune came after us and we immediately ran heading for Kibobo. It was during that chase that we found bodies that were in the school." (. . .) Prosecutor: "How soon after the shooting did you see the bodies at the school?" Witness (GEK): "It was three days afterwards." (. . .) "I will reckon the number of bodies at four to five thousand." (. . .) "Subsequently I went back to the village with my husband."

Transcript of 04 September 200 1 PTE 8-9, PTF 9- 1 1

73. e four people who met with KAMUHANDA in her home killed Tutsis. Four to five thousand were killed at the school while another 50 were led to the town centre and killed.

UHANDA was an important personality in the Gikornero area who was in charge of protocol whenever dignitaries came to the village and was therefore an influential man. Cross-examination did not detract from this testimony but instead reinforced the veracity of the witness and highlighted

il the names and individuals that KAMUHANDA distributed weapons to including one , a n otorious Interahamwe i n h er 1 ocality. S he was t raumatised and i n great fear b y being a Tutsi. She attributes this state of mind to KAMUHANDA who was a de facto d very powerful person even if he held no de jure position locally.

Witness (GEK): "I mentioned that he came to distribute the weapons on the 10th and came back to arrange for the killings to start between the 10th and the 14th at the primary school." Prosecutor: "On this third occasion, and it's my counting, on this third occasion did you see Mr. KAMUHANDA arrive?" Witness (GEK): "I saw him arrive, but he did not come to our house. He went to the house of a neighbour named Karakezi."

Transcript of 03 September 2001 PTE 180, PTF 207-208.

Witness (GEK): "KAMUHANDA amved and went to the home of Karakezi, and there that's where he parked his vehicle and when he arrived his vehicle was followed by another vehicle, a Daihatsu make, blue, a blue colour, and it was carrying a large number of people." (. . .) "In the vehicle not everyone was armed, but I saw people who were carrying machetes, clubs, and guns in the same vehicle, in that same vehicle." (. . .) "Many of them were wearing ordinary clothes, others were wearing the Interahamwe uniform." (...)"He came from the direction of Kigali, on the road coming from Kigali." (. . .) "So he went, entered his vehicle and headed for the primary school, where there was a large number of refugees."

Transcript of 03 September 200 1 PTE 1 8 1 - 182, PTF 209-2 10.

K's testimony should be believed. The meeting held by KAMUHANDA in her home is evidence ing, participation, and incitement. His presence in Gikomero at the relevant time is d. His pronouncements in respect of those in attendance with him, mamed to Tutsi women the killings with their Tutsi wives, if they would constitute obstacles proves that

HANDA had the requisite criminal intention. The witness recognised one dead Tutsi at the ool and several dead Tutsi women at the town centre, all attributable to the acts and

issions of KAMUHANDA in Gikomero.

is evidence is significant. It is highly credible and corroborative of other witnesses' evidence and by the Chamber is sufficient to establish the state of mind, the knowledge, and in the acts of KAMUHANDA that ground all the counts that he is charged with.

T9s personally knew KAMUHANDA a schoolmate in the local secondary school and as friends they were both on holidays while KAMUHANDA studied for his university education.

UHANDA invited him to his wedding. He visited KAMmANDA when KAMUHANDA was the Director General in the Higher Education and Scientific Research Ministry. B y virtue of the osition and education of KAMUHANDA, he was feared at his local community in Gikomero. itially KAMUHANDA was a "good" man but he changed and took part in genocide. Despite the fence objection, GET identified KAMUHANDA in the KAlMUHANDA was so powerful at with instructions from the upper echelons of the MRND in Kigali, he influenced the election of

1s own preferred candidate, Rutaganira as the local Bourgmestre. He was the Master of Ceremonies e opening of the Gikomero Communal Offices. GET recognised the photo of the said offices is tendered as PX7. The connection between KAMUHANDA and the local Bourgmestre

utaganira is crucial. Rutaganira informed GET of the Genocide plans of the M R N D . ~ ~

7. After the death of President Habyarimana, Gikomero was polarised into those who were to be killed those who wanted to kill them. Two days later killings began. Bourgmestre Rutaganira Telesfos

rior to the killings held a meeting to plan the killings. Tutsis were targeted and killed. Being a tsi, former ex Forcees Armees Rwandaise FAR killed a person thinking it was GET while he was anging escape for fellow Tutsis after the attack. In his capacity as Bourgmestre he made enquiries ut those responsible for the Genocide in Gikomero. He was told that KAMUHANDA brought

distributed the "instruments" to be used in the killings. KAlMUHANDA is a strong and ential m ember o f MRND a p arty that h ad b y 1993 a v ery s trong ideology o f genocide. He d the population and ensured that Telesfos Rutaganira became Bourgmestre to make sure that RND Genocide policy happened in Gikomero.

Witness (GET): "Now among those persons I would cite UHANDA Jean de Dieu about whom it was said that he brought in instruments to be used for the killing of people."

Transcript of 6th September 2001 PTE 39, PTF 44.

51 Witness GET is PW4. Her PIS is PX6. He occupied the position of Bourgmestre from the 29th of September 1994 until February 2001. Born in Gikomero a Tutsi, was a

teacher in April 6 1994, and has lived all his life in the locality where he was Chairman at the local level of the Liberal party for a while. Prior to this, he was a member of

the MRND, when Rwanda was a single party state but he fell out with the party because it practiced exclusion and discriminated against Tutsis. The Accused was

among the influential MRND members in his locality.

52 The Defence objected to dock identification based on the fact that it has a female team and the Accused was the only male on the Defence corner. This is not a valid

basis for objection. Gender equality and equality of arms forbid such an objection. At any rate, witnesses identified the Accused and they did this because they knew

him.

53 "I can say that he personally told me that in order that there be peace in Rwanda, one ethnic group must exterminate the other. By that he meant that the Hutu should

exterminate the Tutsi and moreover, I heard what he said everywhere else in his intercourse with his conversations with other people" Page 28, Lines 14 to 21 Transcript

of 6th September 2001.

22


. GET confirms GEK9s identity, corroborates her marital status in 1994 and the account o"f the killings that occurred in front of GEK's house as the same as what she reported to him in 1 9 9 4 . ~ ~ GET

d that the Gishaka Catholic Parish School and Church as well as the Gikomero Protestant School and Church, and a road checkpoint between Gishaka and Gikomero were major

assacre sites but killings ensued everywhere. Corpses of victims were buried in the courtyard in ont o f t he C atholic P arish C hurch, b ehind the p rimary s chool and b ehind the C ERA1 p remises.

e witnesses also corroborated this and the prosecution formal exhibits showed all the places ass graves were situated. GET testified that corpses were buried in anti erosion ditches, as

ass graves and that majority of the Gishaka victims were Tutsi refugees fiom neighbouring villages. Although no official exhumation was done, individuals who knew where their relatives were buried privately exhumed and re-buried them. GET identified photo 2 but noted that it had hanged but when he saw that place first there were the corpses and bones of victims there. GET

also identified photos 19 and 20 where he noted were pit latrines where people killed in the Church ere buried. The bones were "glaringly clear'' those of people killed in the Genocide. GET entified sundry other places where there were bones of victims. As Bourgmestre he conducted a

census and found out that about 1,200 Tutsis native to Gikornero were killed. This figure does not e non-Gikomero indigene Tutsis who were killed in Gikomero. The total will be in the region

to 5 thousand Tutsis killed by Hutus. Defence Cross Examination did not subtract from the ess's testimony. Instead, it reinforced the testimony and showed the witness as deeply

owledgeable and familiar with the activities of KAMUHANDA person at the relevant time.

Witness (GET): "Apart fiom the fact that KAMUHANDA brought in instruments that were to be used for the genocide; the very fact that he supported the person that had been prepared to participate to see the genocide through, means that he had already become a bad man." Prosecutor: "How did you get the information that he supplied weapons for the killing?" Witness (GET): "I obtained that information from people that were able to see him, those persons among the s urvivors o f t he genocide i n o ur r egion and i n o ther communes." ( . . .) "Following the investigation, I was able to meet people that asserted having seen him personally, so that it was no longer hearsay."

Transcript of 6 September 01 PTE 42-43, PTF 47-48

he Prosecution submits that considerable weight should be attached to the testimony of this witness. He was a friend of KAMUHANDA, knew him privately over a number of years as well as being in a

n to understand and appreciate the influence exercised by KAMUHANDA and his family the Gikomero commune. In his capacity of Bourgmestre he conducted investigations shortly

r the genocide occurred, in an endeavour to identify the persons responsible for the attacks. ilst not being in a position to implicate KAMUHANDA directly, during these investigations he

rmation from persons who were able to see him (KAMUHANDA), they being survivors cide from their region and other Communes. He gave evidence of personally seeing

ANDA at the opening of the Kayanga Health Centre. KAMUHANDA was at this opening ce of the President thereby corroborating GEK's evidence on this matter.

ly, GEK whose identity was being disputed by the Defence was brought before the court, GET nfirrned that she was a person that he had spoken to on previous occasions and that he knew her by

name she had given the Court. Considering the level of chaos and the destruction of valuable rds after the genocide, GET is a reservoir of very useful evidence of the events at that time.

54 GET again identified GEK in the Courtroom as the individual he interviewed in 1994. He further identified her identity card and noted that his signature was on it. GEK

refused her 10 card to be photocopied and the matter could not be pursued.

55 GAB, PW5 is a Tutsi, 17 years old at the time of the killings and the PIS is PX8.

osecutor v, KAMUHANDA, ICTR-99-54A-T

explained the meaning of Inkotanyi, Nyenzi and Interahamwe, identified KAMUHANDA in ock, and testified that the MRND party was dominant. He knew KAMUHANDA for a long

time right from when he, GAB was a young boy. KLWIUHANDA was a top MRND member at the national level. There was a build up of tension and polarization between Gikomero Hutus and Tutsis

se of the incitement to hatred that occurred at an MRND political rally in August 1993'~ where UHANDA was a guest of honour. At this rally, KAMUHANDA noted that the MRND had

sealed the fate of the Tutsis and that the final solution would be announced later.

Witness (GAB): "Then there was a statement by the guest of honour KAMUHANDA, who was an envoy of the MRND party officials at the national level. I need to point out that he was a native of that commune. He talked about the problems that had been alluded to by the previous speakers and he laid particular emphasis on the security problems. Now regarding the security problems or situation, he said, "Let these Tutsis not bother you because their own fate have been considered by the appropriate authorities. A solution has been found to the problems that they are raising and this will be conveyed to you in the not too distant future"."

Transcript of 1 1 September 01 PTE 49-50, PTF 58-59

Hutus were invited to meetings and the Tutsis were excluded. At the particular rally, UHANDA consulted with other MRND party stalwarts in the area. Some of them asked him

arms and ammunition such as machetes, grenades, guns and rifles for the defence of the locality. er the death of President Habyarimana, GAB went to Ntaruka, the town centre to play football on ate between 9th and 1 lth between 2 and 2.30pm. He saw KAMUHANDA come with a truckload soldiers and police and Interahamwe. KAMUHANDA discussed with the Commune Brigadier

yarugwaya, Councillors Rubanguka Mathias and Mabango ~ h o m a s ~ ~ and distributed the weapons e had earlier promised to them. He promised to bring more later. GAB moved closer to the vehicle

to observe rifles, grenades and machetes that were partly covered. He heard KAMUHANDA say:

Witness (GAB): "In our region, there were not such arms so that they were asking for rifles, they were asking for rifles." (. . .) "Well, he was talking to the envoy of the MRND, that is, KAMUHANDA, so that his utterances were directed at KAMUHANDA because it was KAMUHANDA that was sent by the party." (. . .) "Well, W U H A N D A promised him that he was going to talk to the leaders of the supreme bodies of the party about it and that he will give him an answer as soon as possible. And in a nutshell, he promised to give him what he requested."


Witness (GAB): "Well, we were playing football, soccer, that is, between 2 o'clock and 2:30, I cannot remember the date, it must have been between the 9th and the 1 lth, we saw KAMWANDA coming out of a vehicle, he was accompanied by soldiers" (. . .) "There were Interahamwe there to just - near where we were playing soccer and he talked to these people and in the course of their discussion, he gave them the instruments, the means that he had promised them beforehand, that is, means to defend themselves, as he had promised them before."


56 Despite 1993 being out of the temporal jurisdiction of the ICTR, it is valid evidence of the state of mind of the Accused and his state o f mind during January and

December 1994.

57 These individuals were confirmed by both Prosecution and Defence witnesses as key participants in the genocide and killings in the Gikomero area.


"Everywhere I went, even in Kigali, the Interahamwe and CDR have been killing people. What are you doing? How far have you gone."

Transcript of 11 September pages 66/67 Lines 23,24,25 and Line 1 on page 67.

Witness (GAB): "Now, I am talking about facts that I personally witnessed. When we observed, we saw that there were rifles, grenades. machetes in that vehicle." (. . .) "He said that, "Everywhere I went, even in Kigali, the Interaharnwe and CDR have been killing people. What are you doing? How far have you gone?"." (. . .) "Well, KAMUHANDA went on and asked them whether they had people available to whom they could entrust the instrument, and the accountant answered that there were people who were trained to fill up that purpose." (. . .) "What ensued was that KLAMUHANDA took two Kalashnikov weapons, two grenades and two machetes and gave the package to the accountant that in turn handed these arms to these people, those young people."

UHANDA then asked if there were trusted people who could use the weapons and the ccountant collected the rifles and grenades and handed them over to named trusted persons in the resence of KAMUHANDA. He further said at the spot:

Witness (GAB): "KAMUHANDA was there when these arms were distributed. He only left after the arms were distributed and before he left, he asked those people that he was talking to, he told them, "I don't want to hear that any single Tutsi has escaped you. You should make sure that no Tutsi escapes you"."

Transcript of 11 September 01 PTE 68, PTF 81

"I don't want to hear that any single Tutsi has escaped you. You should make sure that no Tutsi escapes you."

Transcript of 11 September 2001 page 68 Lines 13-15.

Witness (GAB): "Rutaganira said, "We will do all in our power and just in case the instruments which you have given us were to turn out to be insufficient, we shall resort to you again." (. . .) "To that KAMUHANDA said, "I shall wait for initiative, your reaction"." (. . .) "And I do remember that about a day after that, they started killing us in our region."

Transcript of 11 September 2001 PTE 69, PTF 82-83

Prosecutor: "Are you able to say if the weapons distributed by KAMUHANDA were used by the people who killed you, according to your testimony?" Witness (GAB): "Yes, those weapons were used to that end."


e audience responded favourably to this incitement and promised to revert to him in the event that e weapons were insufficient. This was between 9th and 1 lth April 1994. Shortly afterwards mass llings started in the locality. GAB testifies that the weapons brought by KAMUHANDA were

in the massacres in the area. Hutus civilians and Hutu Interahamwe Hutus killed Tutsis.

the 13th there were widespread attacks by Hutus against Tutsis. GAB'S father was killed on that . Four out of nine nuclear and almost one hundred and eighty extended family members were

25

*"d- \%,%"- "b,%M",Te..- m" Y *-%-* a -- > - - - "----- . . -

secutm v. UMUHANDA, ICTR-99-54A-T

illed on the days following the 13th of April 1994. Under cross-examination ony was d by revealing that KAMUHANDA at close proximity asked a ten year old GAB and other

1s attending the inauguration of the opening of some government building attended by the late ident to keep quiet. This event imprinted the image of KAMUHANDA in his memory. Cross-

ation fiather revealed that the Interahamwe were allowed to move about freely with grenades e to kill fellow civilians with impunity. They were given military training at a lace called

tara. Only Hutus were selected and trained for the planned ultimate killing of Tutsis. 5:

is witness should be believed. He saw and heard KAMUHANDA incite the population to hatred, ~nstruct the Hutus to kill Tutsis, distribute weapons for the killing of Tutsis. Geb puts

UHANDA at Gikomero during the period when he committed the offences charged. His renouncements are proof of his intentions to commit all the crimes he is charged with. The rosecution submit that GEB is an extremely important witness in that he knew KAMUHANDA rior to the events of 1994, as he came from a neighbouring secteur, he correctly identified the ccused in Court. GEB gives clear evidence of seeing KAMUHANDA in a passing vehicle along

with Interahamwe going in the direction of Gikomero Parish. After approximately 30 minutes, he his friends heard gunfire from that same location. Later that same day GEB met survivors of the

attack at the Parish who stated that KAMUHANDA and the Interahamwe he had brought, had been onsible for the attack on the Parish. Consequently, his evidence of recognition of the Accused is

mutually corroborating of other witnesses present at the Parish. His evidence has both proximity of

59 is a native of Gishaka where he lived on the 6th of April 1994 (the day president arimana died). He learnt of his death the next day. The Hutus changed their attitude towards utsis and wanted to kill them. Married without an issue, he and his wife began to hide in the

h from Hutu attackers at night. He hid from the 7th of April 1994 until the 12th when with four ing their spouses and children at the town centre in Gahinye) he went to Gikomero

On his way to Gikomero, he met KAMUHANDA with Interahamwe. He identified HANDA in the dock because he knew KAMUHANDA well as a neighbour and he even

tended KAMUHANDA's wife-introduction ceremony. KAMUHANDA sat in the middle of two them in front of the vehicle.60 GEB was a step away from the vehicle when it passed and saw

approximately 20 people in the rear of the vehicle. The vehicle was an open pick-up and the rear ccupants were wearing Kitenge, trousers, and military uniforms. They carried weapons and about 5

em had Kalashnikov rifles. The rear occupants were singing Interahamwe songs.

d his companions hid at the point where the vehicle passed them by for 30 minutes. The continued towards Gikomero Parish Church and School and just about 30 minutes later, the heard gunshots from the direction of the Gikomero Parish. The shots were in salvos and it

de a lot of noise. They were approximately 1 % kilometre to the Gikomero Parish. They promptly umed to Gahini the town centre where they had left their wives and children. At about 18:OO to

1830 hours in the evening, injured survivors of the Gikomero Parish massacre met them and informed them that KAMUHANDA and the Interahamwe he brought from Kigali had shot at them.

UHANDA led the operation.

Witness (GEB): "I didn't count the number of people in the vehicle because it just went by me. But if I could give an approximate figure, I would say about twenty people." (. . .) "Some of them were wearing Kitenge material, others were wearing trousers and some others were

The highlighted statement of GAB in French and English were admitted as DX5

GEB is a Tutsi, PW6 and PIS is PXQ.

This testimony suggests that the Accused might not have driven the vehicle


wearing military uniforms." (. . .) "Some of them were carrying weapons." (. . .) "They were singing some songs that are known to the interahamwe, of course."


Witness (GEB): "At the spot at which we were when the vehicle passed by, we remained there hiding and 30 minutes approximately after that, we heard some gunshots." (.. .) "The gunshots noise came from the parish." Prosecutor: "When you say the parish, do you mean the Gikomero Parish, for clarification?" Witness (CEB): "That is correct."


Prosecutor: "Later that day, did you meet any persons or people who had come from the Gikomero Parish at the time of the shooting?" Witness (GEB): "Yes, between 1800 hours and 1830 hours people came and found us where we were at Gahini and they came from the parish." Prosecutor: "To which ethnic group did they belong?" Witness (GEB): "They were Tutsi survivors." Prosecutor: "Did they tell you what had happened that afternoon at the Gikomero Parish?" Witness (GEB): "Yes, when they came, some of them were wounded and they told us that it was the Interahamwe that KAMUHANDA had brought from Kigali that had shot at them." Prosecutor: "Did those people tell you about any person whom they considered the leader or responsible for that shooting, and if they did, what were the names given?" Witness (GEB): "The leader of those Interahamwe who was the very person that brought them was KAMUHANDA."


. Cross-examination did not detract from this testimony. The witness confirmed the truthfulness of his ony by elaborating that if he and those in his company had run at the sight of UHANDA's pick-up, they would have alerted the Interahamwe of their identities and attracted

gunfire. Further, he explained that KAMUHANDA's vehicle approached him from behind causing him to look back and identify KAMUHANDA in the ~ehicle .~ ' He confirmed that ~ c i e 1 ~ ~ (as set out in the witness statement) was one of many who told the tale of the massacre.

The identification and recognition of KAMUHANDA was strengthened by the fact that GEB knew UHANDA w hom h e h ad a gain s een a t the opening o f t he Kayanga H ealth C entre. C ross-

xamination revealed that the RPF were fighting and advancing towards Gikomero from the other e of Lake Muhazi in Yuma. Yuma is divided into two regions, namely, RUKTGA and BUGANZA. e area of Gikomero adjourned a war zone and KAMUHANDA's acts of massacres were done in

ht of the fact that RPF troops were advancing towards ~ i k o m e r o . ~ ~

also maintained that they remained on the road when walking to the Gikomero parish church chool, i nstead o f t aking b ush p aths i n o rder n ot t o r aise a l a m and attract attention o f H utu s. It transpired also under cross-examination that refugees from Gikomero were being ferried

across Lake Muhazi towards the advancing RPF - Rwandan Patriotic Front soldiers and they brought

61 This is a very natural reaction and it enhances the truthfulness of the witness's account.

62 The role of Aciel Sibomana as a communal police officer who spread news of the killings and partook in killings is corroborated by GEU PW 21 in paragraph 149 below,

GEU P\N 22 and GEQ PW24

63 This witness should be believed. His account contradicts the Defence witnesses who tried to place the RPF advance within the Gikomero heartland in a bid to falsely

give the impression that Gikomero could not be approached from Kigali city. The Accused was in Gikomero at the relevant period.

27


news of the dead of Gikomero from across the lake. In response to Judge ~arnarosion, GEB stated at there were no nearby Parish churches except the one at Gikomero and that the colour and make

of the vehicle that KAMUHANDA rode in past them was a white pick up. KAMUHANDA sat next the driver. The vehicle passed in the afternoon, KAMUHANDA did not recognise the witness d the other occupants too did nof4.

Witness (GEB): "I didn't count the number of people in the vehicle because it just went by me. But if I could give an approximate figure, I would say about twenty people." (. . .) "Some of them were wearing Kitenge material, others were wearing trousers and some others were wearing military uniforms." (. . .) "Some of them were carryin weapons." (. .:) "They were singing some songs that are known to the Interahamwe, of course."

Transcript of 12 September 2001 PTE 71 -72, PTF 8 1-83

Witness (GEB): "At the spot at which we were when the vehicle passed by, we remained there hiding and 30 minutes approximately after that, we heard some gunshots." (. . .) "The gunshots noise came fiom the parish." Prosecutor: "When you say the parish, do you mean the Gikomero Parish, for clarification?" Witness (GEB): "That is correct."


Prosecutor: "Later that day, did you meet any persons or people who had come from the Gikomero Parish at the time of the shooting?" Witness (GEB): "Yes, between 1800 hours and 1830 hours people came and found us where we were at Gahini and they came from the parish." Prosecutor: "To which ethnic group did they belong?" Witness (GEB): "They were Tutsi survivors." Prosecutor: "Did they tell you what had happened that afternoon at the Gikomero Parish?" Witness (GEB): "Yes, when they came, some of them were wounded and they told us that it was the Interahamwe that KAMUHANDA had brought fiom Kigali that had shot at them." Prosecutor: "Did those people tell you about any person whom they considered the leader or responsible for that shooting, and if they did, what were the names given?" Witness ( GEB): "The 1 eader o f t hose Interahamwe who w as the v ery p erson that b rought them was KAMUHANDA."


rosecution submit that GEB is an extremely important witness in that he knew KAMUHANDA to the events of 1994, as he came from a neighbouring secteur, he correctly identified the

Accused in Court. GEB gives clear evidence of seeing KAMUHANDA in a passing vehicle along with Interahamwe going in the direction of Gikomero Parish. After approximately 30 minutes, he and his friends heard gunfire from that same location. Later that same day GEB met survivors of the attack at the Parish who stated that KAMUHANDA and the Interahamwe he had brought, had been responsible for the attack on the Parish. Consequently, his evidence of recognition of the Accused is

utually corroborating of other witnesses present at the Parish. His evidence has both proximity of m e and location.

64 GEB's highlighted statement was admitted as DX6.

65 Witness GAF is PW7 and his PIS is PX 10.

Prosecuto'or v. KAMUHANDA, ICTR-99-54A-T

etween 8.30 and 9.00 pm on 6 April 1994 while accompanying his elder brother who had come to him off, the witness saw the President's plane on fire and falling from the sky. His elder er, a teacher confirmed the death of the President to him on 7 April by 7am when Radio

anda issued a communiquk instructing people to stay at home. He stayed at home as instructed. anwhile between 6 and 7 am, shooting could be heard from Kanombe. Houses were being burnt, ting was going on and killings had started in some areas. Refugees moved from Kabuga and ra r egions t o s afe areas o n 8 April. T hat s m e d ay, w itness and o ther p eople i n h is v illage, us, Tutsis and was^^ and their livestock joined the refugees ffom Kabuga and Ndera to mero hill.

e witness next moved on to Gikomero Protestant church parish leaving his wife and family with Rutabinwe, son of a relative Antoine Gakwene. He returned to Rutabinwe's house to spend the

with his family and returned to Gikornero parish on 11 April where he spent the night. On ight of 1 1 April 1994, he and other refugees were listening to Radio Muhabura and Pastor

ranga Charles in charge of the Gikomero parish came and shouted at them saying, "Now that I ve given you shelter, you are listening to the radio Inyenzi which means that you yourselves are

zi." They shut the radio after that. On 12 April at the Gikomero parish premises when at about , he heard the noise of approaching vehicles. He felt uneasy and wanted to leave with some

w cattle but Pastor Nkuranga said that they should wait and see the business of those coming in the vehicles.

. He saw clearly four vehicles arrive. He described the make and colour of the first three. The first vehicle had headlights on and was a white Pajero, second was a white Hilux pick-up truck with the letters "UN marking, the third was also a white Hilux pick-up and the fourth was a Daihatsu. He

as about 15-20 meters from the vehicles when they stopped. The fourth vehicle was full of terahamwe militia armed with clubs, grenades, guns, and machetes. When the vehicles arrived,

or Nkuranga was with his assistant, Bucundura, also a preacher. One of the people in the cles shot at Bucundura who fell. This was before the vehicles stopped. When the vehicles

stopped KAMUHANDA got down from the vehicle with the UN marking. The witness had rsonal knowledge of KAMUHANDA dating back to the time when KAMUHANDA was a

period when KAMUHANDA started working until he got involved in politics and ctor General at the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research. Witness ANDA on several occasions when the latter came to attend social and official

nctions, ceremonies, and festivities at Gikomero, his native area.

r instance, in 1991, witness met KAMUHANDA at the inauguration of the communal office. so in 1992, witness again met KAMUHANDA when Kayanga Health Center was inaugurated. itness knew KAMUHANDA as an influential politician and an influential MRND party member

ikomero area. Witness testified that when the vehicles stopped, KAMUHANDA got down e vehicle and made a gesture by raising his hands and spoke to the people who came with e said 'mukore' in Kinyanvanda, meaning, "work." Witness understood the word work to

an kill and indeed the people who came with KAMUHANDA started killing the refhgees with nades, machetes and spears. At this point, three of the vehicles, including that of

NDA left leaving one vehicle behind. In all KAMUHANDA spent about 2-3 minutes at Protestant church premises. That was the last time the witness saw KAMUHANDA

until 13 September 2001 at his trial.

er the departure of KAMUHANDA, the killers continued killing. They killed about 1000 people amly Tutsis and Hutus who did not do what they wanted. They also killed cattle and carried the

66 These are the three established ethnic groups in Rwanda.


in the vehicle that remained behind. Witness testified that it was KAMUHANDA who incited illings because before he came, there were no killings; Hutus and Tutsis were together and

Hutus of the area set up a market and sold food to the refugees. The killers wer soldiers and communal police, some of whom he recognized and named.

ess identified KAMUHANDA in court despite Defence objection and identified specific land s i n the c hurch area i n t he v ideo c lip s hown i n c ourt. H e i dentified t he p astor's h ouse, t he

arket set up by the local Hutu population to sell food to the Tutsi refugees, the school building, and e classrooms, distinguishing the older buildings on the premises in April 1994 from the new ones

uilt after the war. He pointed out where KAMUHANDA's vehicle stopped on entering the ound and showed where the refugees and the cattle were when KAMUHANDA's vehicle and

the other vehicles arrived. Finally, the witness pointed out the spot where the preacher, Bucundura was shot and killed and where KAMUHANDA jumped down from his vehicle, raised up his arms,

d shouted "Mokore!" "Go to work." The Interahamwe killed two of his brothers. Defence cross- ination did not detract from the evidence of the witness,

Witness (GAF): "Then I saw a gentleman whose name was Jean de Dieu KAMUHANDA alight fkom one of the vehicles, that was the vehicle which the markings of the UN." Prosecutor: "Could you tell who shot the assistant of the Pastor Augustine Bucundura that you have just mentioned?" Witness (GAF): "On that point, I really cannot say who shot at him, but I can say that it is the people who came with KAMUHANDA who shot at him."


Witness (GAF): "I remember that he came down from the vehicle and raised his hands and spoke to those who came with him, particularly the Interahamwe and other people and he told them, and I am quoting him, "Work"." (. . .) "In view of the fact that he had come with killers and that he was the leader, by so saying, he was telling them that they should begin the killings because as a matter of fact, it was after he pronounced that word that the killings started and all the vehicles went away except for one."


Witness (GAF): "As far as he was concerned, he did not carry any weapons but he did raise his a m and ordered or gave orders to the people." (. ..) "He made that gesture, that was to incite the people that were there." (. . .) "So that they immediately began killing as soon as he gave the order."


Witness (GAF): "And in short, I can say that it was him that brought instruments to give to people who didn't have any." (. . .) "I am saying so because before his arrival, there were no rifles, no grenades, there were no guns, there were no machetes or Rwandan clubs."

Transcript of 13 September 20001 PTE 52-53, PTF 67

This witness should be believed. His testimony is truthful and strong on the recognition and identification of KAMUHANDA. He has placed KAMUHANDA at the location where he

itted the charged offences. He knows KAMUHANDA and placed him in the vehicle that was used by KAMUHANDA to traverse the wider Gikomero area to incite the populace, distribute weapons, order and generally facilitate the killing of Tutsis.

Prosecutor v. KA MUHA NDA , ICTR-99-54A-T

He volunteered his statement to the ICTR Investigators of his free will. He was at his home'between d 9.00 on 6 April 1994, when RTLM radio announced at about 9.30pm that the plane carrying sident of the Republic had been downed but were unsure whether the President was dead.

Next day, 7 April, some Tutsi refugees came to his house but they were attacked and killed along with other people who were in the house by the Interahamwe. GEE provided names of three Hutu

terhamwes who did the killing.

1. He went to Gikomero on 7 April where he thought he would meet the Ikontanyi (RPF soldiers) for ssistance. Instead of the Inkontanyi soldiers he met about 100 refugees from the Kabuga region.

oined their group then met with more Interahamwe who detained them, took their belongings, later released them. He and the Kabuga refugees then went to Burunga in the Jurwe secteur. At location they saw a taxi (the type of vehicle used to carry about 8 passengers in Rwanda) coming

towards them. When the taxi occupants disembarked, the refugees ran to Samutuha because the vehicle occupants were distributing weapons? The refugees split into two groups at Sumutuha. He

group that went to Chabatanzi, spent a day at Chabatanzi, where they were attacked by amwe and they moved to Gishaka. The Interahamwe attacked them again the next day at

ishaka and they ran to Gikomero on 1 1 April 1994.

is first visit to Gikokmero where they met many more rehgees and Pastor Nkuranga a classroom to sleep and a water tank where they could fetch water. He noticed that utu refugees were arrned. He spent the night in the classroom. The next day, 12 April 2 -3 p m, KAMUHANDA c ame with s oldiers and communal p olice o fficers i n h is d by two other vehicles carrying Interahamwe. He did not know KAMUHANDA

that was his first time of seeing him but when KAMUHANDA arrived, other refugees who ew him exclaimed "We are going to be killed! KAMUHANDA has arrived!" and that was how

witness knew KAMUHANDA for the first time.

Witness (GEE): "the Interahamwes attacked and the refugees exclaimed, they were saying, We're going to be killed. KAMUHANDA is coming."


MUHANDA came out of his vehicle, Pastor Nkuranga and his assistant Bucundura, came eet him but as the vehicles were arriving one of the police officers shot him on the spot.

Witness (GEE): "One of the policemen who came with KAMUHANDA shot at Bucundura."


Witness (GEE): "KAMUHANDA's vehicle came in first. It was followed by two other vehicles. In KAMUHANDA's vehicle, there were soldiers and communal policemen. So when he came out, the soldiers and communal policemen came out, and from the two other vehicles Interahamwes and soldiers also came out. One of the policemen shot at Bucundura, who died on the spot."


67 Witness GEE is PW8 and his PIS is PX12.

68 Under cross-examination GEE attributed the source of this information about the distribution of weapons to other Kabuga refugees.

31


104. He and other refugees moved into the classrooms after the death of Bucundura. The police officers e into the classroom and started shooting at them in order to flush them out. They got out and

were ordered to lie on the ground. A young girl who tried to escape was shot. An old lady and her aughters and sons were also shot. KAMUHANDA then left at this point.

Witness (GEE): "That noise was being made by Hutus because K A M U H ~ D A and his companions had asked the Hutu to keep a watch and to kill Tutsi. So that there was an attack that m oming, 4 -00 a .m., b y the Interahamwe b ecause the Interahamwe were t old t o c ome back to finish off the people that managed to survive."

Transcript of 1 8 September 200 1 PTE 1 1, PTF 12- 13

e rest of the refugees lying on the ground were attacked with machetes and cudgels and killed. GEE spent the night among dead bodies pretending to be dead at about 4.00am, the attackers returned and started killing those who survived the previous day's killing but he escaped into a sorghum field as the attackers continued their killings.

Witness (GEE): "It was KAMUHANDA that called upon the Hutu to carry out the attack. He told them to stay up all night and he said so in the presence of the people that were with him."


rn the sorghum field, he went to Muhazi. On his way to Muhazi, he met a young man armed with ouble-edged spear. The man threw the spear at him and it hit his left arm. Due too the shape of spear, witness could not remove it from his arm and had to drag it to Lake Muhazi where he

managed to pull it put. He then stayed at the lake-side for two weeks nursing the wound before deciding to go back home. On the way he met some Inkontanyi soldiers who took him to the house f one local resident and from there, he went home where he saw about thirty dead bodies in the urnt family house. He recognized 15 of the dead bodies but other dead bodies had been thrown into

its. He got coffins to bury the dead. He showed the court the scar sustained from the spear attack.

Prosecutor's submissions

107. This witness gives credible evidence which support other witness's evidence on the recognition of MUHANDA at the Gikomero Parish and his participation in the alleged offences. In his earlier

testimony he gives clear evidence of the period immediately after the death of the President of a widespread and systematic attack on refugees and in particular, Tutsis.

. He was in a cousin's house on 6 April when they heard a loud noise and saw a plane on fire. At his own house on 7 April it was being said that the Inkontanyi had killed the head of state. The atmosphere was tense as Kabuga refugees came to his village, Mbandazi. The refugees told him that they had been attacked by the Interahamwe who killed some Tutsis, and destroyed and burnt their

ses. He was told that he was being sought by the Interahamwe because he was a Tutsi and a ti Liberal party representative. He fled from Mbadanzi to Kabuga to visit his wife who had gone

ere to visit her parents.

69 Witness GAA is PW9 and his PIS is PX 13.

Pmsecutov v. KAMUHANDA, ICTR-99-54A-T

I i .a . - . &

n his way, he saw dead %dies, twelvk of whom he recognized on the roadside lso saw ra,hamhe. On arrival at his in-laws' house, he met no one so he returned to Mbadanzi on 9 April then proceeded to Gishaka because he was informed again that the Interahamwe were still

looking for him. He spent a night in Gishaka and went to Gikomero Protestant church premises.

the troubles, he had visited Gikomero to see his grandfather, relations and other people like astor Nkuranga a Hutu he knew. On arrival on 10 April, Pastor Nkuranga told him that things ere safe in Gikomero and that the refugees could go and stay there without any problems. He left ikomero on 10 April and went back to Kibira despite the assurances by Pastor Nkuranga because

not feel safe on seeing previously known Gikomero people. He knew them at party meetings e recognized known Interahamwe who were at the roadblocks.

. He left about thirty members of his family behind in Gikomero. When he returned to Gikomero on 2 April 1994 to see his family members, Pastor Nkuranga spoke to him again while he, and other

refugees were listening to BBC news fiom radio Muhabura. Because Pastor Nkuranga was annoyed to see them listening to the news, they switched off the radio. While in Gikomero on 12 April, he aw the arrival of some vehicles. The first one carried Interahamwe, soldiers, and communal police

officers armed with cudgels, machetes, knives, rifles and firearms.

UHANDA arrived in the second vehicle, came out, and threw up his hands as though to greet the people. Pastor Nkuranga came out of his house in the company of an old man called Bucundura and shouted "I am Pastor Nkuranga do not shoot me." A soldier shot the old man Bucundura. When

people were shot, KAMUHANDA did not stop them; he rather shouted "get to work! ANDA is here." Three more people were shot in the presence of KAMUHANDA before nto his vehicle and left. When KAMUHANDA left, the shooting of the Tutsis by the

eople brought by KAMUHANDA continued. About 3000 people were shot with rifles.

itncss knew KAMUHANDA prior to 12 April 1994. He first saw KAMUHANDA when he rought some gifts to his sister Mukabandora on the occasion of the birth of her first child. ukabandora i s m arried t o V incent N girumpatse and the c ouple 1 ived i n M badanzi v illage. T he

second occasion he saw KAMUHANDA was when KAMUHANDA came to Mbadanzi to take the ster to Kigali and then returned the body for burial in Mbadanzi. He was present on

occasions, and he saw KAMUHANDA but did not speak to him on either occasion. After the urial of Accused's sister, the witness read KAMUHANDA's name in newspapers fiom time to time ut never his picture in television or in newspapers. GAA recognized and identified

A in court. GAA identified the photograph of the burial of KAMUHANDA's sister in the photograph, Vincent Ngirumpatse, the husband of KAMUHANDA sister. He

lost family members including two younger brothers, all the family livestock but he managed to run away and escape being killed. He first got to Lake Muhazi and then crossed to Giti on 13 April.

Prosecutor: These Interahamwe that you saw at Gikomero on the loth, are you able to say whether they had any weapons with them on the 10th or not? Witness (GAA): "Apart from the fact that they were wearing uniforms, on that day they were not carrying weapons."


Prosecutor: "When these others were shot and I am talking at the beginning of the shooting, was KAMUHANDA present at that time?"

osecutor v. MMUHANDA, ICTR-99-54A-T

Witness (GAA): "Yes, Mr. KAMUHANDA was there." (. . .) "They starteh by shooting Bucundura and then they shot three other persons and it was after that, that KAMUHANDA went back into his vehicle and went away and the others continued to shoot." (. . .) Prosecutor: "did you see at any time Mr. KAMUHANDA try to stop the shooting?" Witness (GAA): "No, he didn't do that. On the contrary, the people were shouting: "Get to work, KAMUHANDA is here now."


Prosecutor: "You have told us that the first time you went to Gikomero, you saw Interahamwe but they had no weapons. On this occasion, did you see some of those same Interahamwe when the firing started?" Witness (GAA): "This time around, they had rifles."

Transcript of 19 September 2001 PTE 1 l6- 1 17, PTF 144

rosecutor's Submission

once again recognize KAMUHANDA from his previous dealings with him. His evidence on e events of that day corroborates evidence from other prosecution witnesses, in particular, his ference to KAMUHANDA's arrival with others and their subsequent attack on the refugees. nally he gives evidence on two other important topics, firstly he demonstrates Pastor Nkuranga's

involvement ans sympathy to the attackers by referring to the pastor's anger at the refugees listening to Radio Muhabura, and ordering them to switch it off. Secondly, he gives evidence of hearing other

rsons present recognising KAMUHANDA upon his anrival, and starting to "work".

een 7-8pm on the evening of 6 April 1994, at his home with his two brothers, they heard a large sion and saw a bright light in the sky. They left home, went uphill and saw a bright light and

burning from Kanombe near the airport area. Later that day a radio RTLM presenter, Noel unced that the P resident's p lane had b een b rought down b y the Inyenzi (meaning the T utsi.) g a Tutsi, he was afraid. He heard the sounds of grenade explosions in the night and spent the

night in a sorghum field. During the day, he came out to observe the situation and met Mugabo, a Hutu and conseiller of the secteur who informed him that the people from Ruhengeri, President

a's region, held a meeting at which it was decided to kill people with machetes as they 963.'' Mugabo though a Hutu said he refused to join the decision but Mugabo was killed the

refusing to be part of the decision to kill Tutsis. Due to the situation, he went to an old ouse the night Mugabo was killed.

n a banana plantation in the day time. From his hiding place he overheard the Interahamwe lers asking the old lady where the Inyenzis were and they asked if no soldiers had come to work in

. He learnt later that the Interahamwe went to his house and killed the two people he left looted his property. He then fled to Cgisure on 8 April where he found about 3000 Tutsi On 10 April, the refugees were attacked with machetes and grenades by the Interahamwe, d communal police, but he was able to escape to Gikomero Protestant church and school

remises on 1 1 April where he met many other refugees.

70 Witness GEA is PWlO and his PIS is PX14. He is a Tutsi.

71 This is evidence of government sponsored planning of the genocide. The Conseiler knew beforehand that the killings were going to take place.

34


n 12 April 1994, the refugees were attacked by people brought in three vehicle vehicles was a white pick-up with "UN" inscriptions on it and carried many soldiers and police officers. The second vehicle carried Interahamwe. Although GEA did not know KAMUHANDA, a boy refugee now dead identified KAMUHANDA and besides the information by the boy, the other refugees shouted " ~ A N D A has arrived our lives will no longer be peaceful."

UHANDA got down fiom his pick-up vehicle and went towards the house of Pastor Nkuranga. ked to Pastor Nkuranga for a moment and an old man called who was with Pastor Nkuranga,

was shot. The people who were in the vehicles then attacked the refugees. Shooting them with rifles and cutting them with traditional weapons. When the attack started, KAMUHANDA took his vehicle and left. The attackers encircled the refugees making escape difficult but the witness

aged to slip away into a cactus field and then went to Gihini where he took refuge. Before the attack, Pastor Nkuranga had assured the refugees that they could stay in the premises of the church, as it was safe. GEA lost his two brothers and wife in the attack.

Witness (GEA): "And the others shouted here, "KAMUHANDA has just arrived, our lives will no longer be peaceful and safe."


Witness (GEA): "He talked to the pastor for a moment or two and then an old man that was there was shot and the people that were in the vehicle rushed towards the people who were there." (. . .) "They started cutting them up, shooting and then maltreating them." Prosecutor: "Did you see this person leave that location? Witness (GEA): "Well, when they started shooting, he took his vehicle and went away."


Prosecutor: "Who led the attackers? Witness (GEA): "They were led by KAMUHANDA."

Transcript of 20 September 2001 PTE 8 1, PTF 108

Witness (GEA]: "Now those who recognized him or knew him, knew him as a killer. That is why they said here, "KAMUHANDA has just arrived, we will never live in safety any more"."

Transcript of 24 September 200 1 PTE 4 1, PTF 50

The significance of this testimony is that there was pre-determination of a policy of extermination. eetings had been held to effect this along the lines of previous killings in 1963. KAMUHANDA

was aware of this by virtue of his position in the Gikomero area. The witness identified MUHANDA and recognized him at location where the crimes occurred.


significance of this evidence is three fold. Firstly, by the nature and extent of the testimony, it th th emonstrates the targeting and killing especially of Tutsi fiom the 7 -8 April, in other areas.

econdly, by his own account it supports evidence tending to suggest that Pastor Nkuranga knew of, was sympathetic to the attack on the refugees. Thirdly, by giving evidence of what he heard,

GEA clearly corroborates once again the recognition of KAMUHANDA by other persons present, and his direct involvement in this attack. There was a pre-determined policy of extermination.

. .. I * 4 ' s I I ,, , V ~ L / ' ,

Prosecutor v. KAMUHANDA, ICTR-99-54A-T - -- 1

. , ., l'w , r

werer held 'to kffict this along the 'lines df 1963 killings. KAMUHANDA was this. by virtue of his position in the Gikomero area.

, _ - - . * - ,

r

* . .

At about 7 a i on 7,April 1994 herdmoth& ;old her the president's plane had b.een shpt d*wn. She d her fellow Tutsis were frightene,d. The Hutus said all Tutsis shouId die: ~ e h ~ e k s , @ o m Kigali d Remera informed them that war had erupted. They meant that killings of ~'utsis,be~an in Kigqi

immediately after the president's plane has shot down. She and others ran away and 1ater'sepyat:ted into different groups. 'Hutus killed Kigali Tutsis and the Tutsis in her locality ran away kid sep&ated into groups. Her group returned subsequently. The Hutu group returned but the Tutsis remained in

ng. The remaining members of her group were later rescued by the military after others had been slaughtered.

She took refuge at Gikomero on 11 April 1994, her first time of being there. She was in the company of three thousand others, some of her company and others already there. She spent the night in the classrooms of the primary school remaining there until 12 noon the next day when she escaped to

isagava not far from the school. A policeman shot at us and we returned to the school. On 12 of April 1994, the Interahamwe found the witness at the school in Gikomero. They came on board four vehicles and found us at the location. The first vehicle was white in colour with a UN logo and the

up was full of hterahamwe and soldiers.

itness recognised Severin Nzaramba who was with her and other refugees at the Gikomero church d school. She did not recognise the occupants of the trucks. However, Severin Nzaramba

recognised KAMUHANDA. All the dead rehgees also recognised him and said it was all over for ecause KAMUHANDA had arrived before they were killed. Witness saw pastor Nkuranga. She

also saw KAMUHANDA raise his hand and say start working after the killing of Bucundura and his family. She and others were taken out of the classrooms and asked to lie face down.

The order to start working was directed at those who came with KAMUHANDA and these included iers and civilians all armed with assorted weapons. GEC heard KAMUHANDA issue the order

she was struggling to move out of the classroom. While the refugees were lying on the ground, ey were undressed. GEC was hit with a club to the chest and a spear to the leg. She survived

because the attackers thought she was dead. In the middle of the night, she moved into pastor 's house but felt unsafe there and went to a nearby sorghum field. Fellow refugees were h machetes and those who tried to run away were shot at and killed with bullets. Clubs,

enades, and guns were used.

Witness (GEC): "As for the person who went by the name - who was said to go by the name "KAMUHANDA", well, he was the one who raised his hand and said "start working". He said these words after they had shot at a man by the name Bucundura, his wife and members of his family in front of the classrooms."


Witness (GEC): "He did it this way when he came out of his vehicle and he said "start working". And then they started shooting and cutting up people who were in the classrooms."


72 GEC is P W l l and PIS is PX15.


. The attack lasted from between land 2pm until about 5pm in the evening and when thd soldiers and licemen withdrew, the local Hutu people continued, looting the properties of the victims that were tered around including their clothing. GEC left the scene wearing only a tom skirt tom by the

attacker^.'^ Out of an estimated 3000, people who were at that location 2,500 must have been killed. ut of the 500 that escaped, some were killed at other locations. Witness was about 5 metres to

ANDA when KAMUHANDA gave the order to get to work.

5. Cross-examination reinforced her testimony. She revealed that the Kigali refugees in their hurry in search of refuge informed of the killings in Kigali but not about roadblocks. Initially, Hutus and Tutsis took refuge but later the Hutus were able to retum but the Tutsis remained in hiding. Between 7 and 11 April 1994 when GEC arrived with her party of 25 (from her village and others from Gashogi, Karama, Musave and Kabuga) at the Gikomero School at about 5pm in the evening. She

ent time hiding in the bushes and only spent one night with Mugirente. [A short closed session ensued]

She vividly described the location as a huge compound, a playground for the pupils, in front of the ayground was pastor Nkuranga's home and below that home were classrooms built of burnt bricks. n another side, there were classrooms painted in white. Between the two rows of classrooms, there

was a path leading to CERAI and also below the house of Nkuranga there was a church. About fifty ple s pent t he n ight with t he w itness i n h er o wn c lassroom, i t w as a t ight fit, and t hey h ad to eeze themselves in the little space. She cannot tell the number in other classrooms, as she was

not there with them but there were people in the other classrooms also. GEC testified that the pastor ucundura and his family who had been hiding in his colleague Nkuranga's home were brought out

and killed as a precursor to the massacre.

on being shown photographs, GEC said she did not take a great deal of time observing the structures when she took refuge and as such did not recognise the photos shown to her. Witness and other survivors approached pastor Nkuranga's house to be killed there. She saw a known neighbour and diverted to a nearby sorghum field. All the others who went to pastor Nkuranga's house were killed that night. The witness corroborated her witness statement and alluded to the fact that the investigators might not have recorded all she told them. Witness explained that because of the lapse of time from 12 April 1994 and her testimony she could not be accurate in giving descriptions from photographs as the location might have changed.

28. Re-examination, confirmed that the blows she received sometimes affect her sight and memory which is sometimes very good but at other times, poor. Witness reiterates that she was at the

ation on the day. This testimony should be believed as truthful. It corroborates earlier witnesses o saw KAMUHANDA at the location and heard him give the order "Mukore" go to work which ant start killing.


he evidence of GEC is important in the following ways: she, like other witnesses, testified of the attack on Tutsis in other areas. Thereby, reinforcing the prosecution's allegation (and Defence

tanceladmission) that genocide was committed. Additionally she gives evidence of killings at astor Nkuranga's house, and the clear inferance that he was involved. Finally she was five metres

rox.) distant from KAMUHANDA when he gave the instruction to work (see also GEI) stating erin NZARAMBA and others s ubsequently k illed had a 11 recognized the man a s

73 This amounts to inhuman and degrading treatment and subjection to indignity.


130. After the death of president Habyarimana on 6 April 1994, as he drank with others a't a bar he heard 3 gunshots. He ran out and saw the president's plane falling down from the sky. The president's death was later confirmed on radio. By the 8th of April 1994, killings began in the locality. His regnant wife was killed, some older children escaped and he hid in a banana bush behind his house.

He heard the wife scream once as she was hit with a machete stroke to her neck, two children near er were clubbed to death and a third child behind the house was also killed. By 8pm though fatally

wounded, the wife and children were not dead and he took them into the sitting room of his house. A fourth child was killed near the house. He left the bodies in the house and sought refuge but when he returned to his home after the killings, he found the corpses of his wife and children dumped in a it latrine.

e attackers were Hutus and Hutu Interahamwe with distinctive uniforms. He proceeded with two surviving children to the Gikomero Protestant Parish Church and arrived there on the 1 lth of April 1994. The place had about 2000 refugees, majority of who were Tutsis. The next day, he placed

stor NKURANGA who was the parish pastor on the scene and later after the pastor assembled le, he testified to the arrival of vehicles bearing armed Interahamwe brought by UHANDA who was well known by the refugees. The Interahamwe were armed with guns, nal weapons, bows and arrows, cudgels, machetes and like weapons.

f 32, knew some of the individuals KAMUHANDA brought to the scene. The attackers were Hutu hey surrounded the refugees making escape impossible. KAMUHANDA spoke to pastor

ucundura and in his presence a Tutsi pastor, Augustine Bucundura was shot dead. After this ncident, the attackers launched the attack on the refugees. People were killed and others trying to ee were killed. He was wounded and his other two children were killed on that spot. The attackers

used grenades, guns and traditional weapons. Several people were killed as they ran but he made it cross Lake Muhazi. The witness and his children are Tutsis while the killers were Hutus.

33. Cross-examination did not detract fiom the evidence of the witness however, reinforced by painting ic picture of the parish at the relevant time with cattle and people dispersed around the . Further, it was made clear that KAMUHANDA rode in the first vehicle, a pick up while

other vehicles carrying Interahamwe, soldiers and commune police officers followed behind . In addition to the testimony of the killing of Bucundura's wife and children emerged. The

Gikomero refugees were from different locations and as far afield as Rutare. Under cross- examination, it was elicited from the witness that the Interahamwe chased fleeing refugees to the shores of the lake and killed many there."


EG's evidence once again is mutually corroborating with other witnesses's testimony. In particular he also gives evidence o f hearing refugees identify KAMUHANDA and specifying the important and influential role he played in the attack at the Parish. It is also important to note that many of the refugees came from other areas demonstrating that the Roads were open or under the control of pro government supporters.

74 GEG is PWI2 and PIS is PX16.

75 Photograph 6 in PX2 as marked by the witness was admitted as DX12. The marked witness statement was admitted as DX13. Marked parts of the transcripts of the

aborted trial of April 17th were tendered, admitted as DX14 and sealed. The September 2001 session ended at this point and the case resumed on the 28th of January

2002.

76 GAD is PW 13 and PIS is PX17.

38

Prosecutor v. KAMUHANDA , ICTR-99-54A-T

1 135. There was war throughout Rwanda and the president's plane crash of 6th April 1994 r into an influx of refugees into the witness's locality and killings by the 12" e specially o f t hose who

ght refuge in the church. Witness is KAMUHANDA's neighbour, knew him very well since were young and attended primary school together. The witness lived at different points near

the road. The road leads to KAMUHANDA's family house and was at the family house during the wedding of KAMUHANDA's sister.

136. He saw KAMUHANDA in their locality on the 9th driving to, from the family house, and at the town centre when KAMUHANDA visited the brother who had a business there. Many of his relations came from areas of killings to stay with him and he promptly reported their arrival to the authorities. He had to d o this at a bar in town. The head of the cellule asked him to take the relations to the Gikornero parish. He saw and heard Interahamwes. He further heard people talking

MUHANDA had distributed machetes to people in the locality. Shortly afterwards, he heard oting and noise of gunfire from the Gikomero Parish. Hutus killed Tutsis who ran across the hazi Lake in the direction of Rutare.

Witness (GAD): "The people who were talking about the distribution of machetes said elsewhere there had been a distribution of machetes. But then, they, for their part, had not received anything, had not received any machetes. They said that the distribution of the machetes was done by KAMUHANDA and that the machetes had been kept in the house of the accountant of Gikomero, who lived at place called Kayanga. Kayanga is spelled K-A-Y- A-N-G-A."

Transcript of Monday 28, January 2002 PTE 102, PTF 1 1 5- 1 1 6

7. ss-examination entrenched his testimony. He identified K-LAMUHANDA in the dock and also gnized him in a photograph, he fiuther named several of KAMUHANDA's brothers who live in

abroad and noted their vocations. In response to Judge Rarnarosson, he explained DA's position in the Education Ministry. He further explained that there were killings

d fighting on the Gikomero side of Lake Muhazi. Under questioning from the President Judge ekule, in the early years GAD merely moved from one area to another within Rwanda and not

outside.


. This witness knew KAMUHANDA prior to April 1994 through the proximity of his home to the NDA family household and seeing KAMUHANDA visit his family. His evidence is

t in several respects. Firstly, he saw KAMUHANDA 3 days prior to the attack at the Parish en he was at a bar in Gikomero, this evidence of recognition and independent of other

ion if believed and taken in conjunction with other identification evidence is significant ecause it demonstrates that the alibi of KAMUHANDA is false, and furthermore indicates a level

of preparation for attacks on Tutsi, almost certainly in the Gikomero hinterland. This evidence of distribution of weapons supports GAC's testimony on this matter. Finally he also gives evidence

at at the Gikomero Parish it was KAMUHANDA whom he again recognized that issued the Working". I t is submitted that the Defence made no significant 'inroads' into

77 GES is PW14 and PIS is PX18.

39


. When the radio announced the president's plane was shot down on 6 April 1994, the area changed, Hutus began to sharpen their cutlasses against the Tutsis. He ran from his home in the company of 5 other Tutsis and arrived at Gikomero parish on the night of the 11" and left in the evening of the 12" of April 1994. On arrival all was calm but early in the morning on the next day,

astor in charge no longer wanted to supply water and their needs of the refugees at the location. Hutus began to loot the belongings of the refugees. Between 12noon and 2pm a pick up arrived at the parish with armed people at the back and a few in front. They were armed with guns, cudgels, grenades and other weapons.

rom a distance of about 50 meters, KAMUHANDA came out of the pick-up and those behind him covered in banana leaves. KAMUHANDA went to speak with the pastor and later the arrned men from behind the pick up shot at Bucundura and the refugees at the spot. A civil servant of many years he knew KAMUHANDA from the civil service and was sure he was the one who led the armed men to the Gikomero parish. He knew him very well from the workplace and he recognized im at the scene of the massacres at the Gikomero protestant parish church on the 12 April 1994.

e refugees were Tutsis and the massacre was very traumatic for them. They died in the srooms and on the fields and a few escaped. He identified KAMUHANDA in the dock. The s examination of this witness did not detract from his testimony. H e however reinforced his

testimony and explained to the Chamber about the locations of nearby military camps belonging to the ex FAR - Forcees Armies Rwandaise.

2. The Defence showed him different pictures of Toyota Hilux vehicles and he extensively identified e vehicle used by KAMUHANDA and further specified the places where KAMUHANDA's

vehicle stood as well as the spot where Bucundura was killed from photographic exhibits. The estion that because KAMUHANDA worked in Butare outside Kigali Kacyiru secretariat meant

did not know KAMUHANDA was effectively demolished by the witness under cross- examination. GES clearly testified that he saw KAMUHANDA during "Umuganda" and ';lnimati~n"'~ which brought civil servants from several ministries together.

He sighted KAMUHANDA often in different cars and also often on foot and at these "Umuganda" "Animation" events. Cross-examination established the fact that KAMUHANDA is driven by a

river and was indeed driven by a driver to the Gikomero parish church. Attempts to show inconsistencies between the witness statement and the testimony was unsuccessful and he maintained

at KAMUHANDA (LIKE MANY ACCUSED PERSONS) made a mistake to commit offences in is own home locality where he would be recognized instead of other locations where he might have

been unkn~wn.'~ Prosecution submit perfectly logical as for a person to exert influence in a articular area, the fact that he is known and influential makes the process easier to achieve.

Witness (GES): "Bicindira was killed by one of the persons who came in with KAMUHANDA." Transcript of 24 September 2001 PTE 112, PTF 122

Prosecutor: "Was KAMUHANDA still in the Gikomero parish area when Bicindira was shot? Was he still there?" Witness (GES): "Yes, sir, he was still there."

Transcript of 24 September 2001 PTE 1 13, PTF 123

78 Umuganda was when civil servants come together with their staff to clean the environment. Animation is when they did the same with members of the public by dancing

and singing for the good of the country.

79 Highlighted parts of GES's witness statement was tendered and admitted as 0x16.

40



144. 16

e Prosecution submits this is another one in a long line of witnesses who give co of recognizing KAMUHANDA and supporting other witnesses' testimony of

ANDA's involvement in the Gikomero killings.

itness was persecuted before the events of 1994 because he was Tutsi. He learnt of president Habyarimana's death on the news hour on 6th of April 1994. He fled with his wife, children and 4 sisters. H utus k illed T utsis a long the way. He arrived for the first t ime a t the Gikomero p arish church and school at about the 11 th or the 12th of April 1994. He knew pastor Nkuranga who refused water to some refugees and his sisters spoke with Nkuranga. He saw a white pick up arrive on the 12th of April at about 1.00pm in the afternoon. He observed 4 people behind the pick-up in

ilitary and police uniforms and there were Interahamwe clad in banana leaves.

6. UHANDA was in the pick-up with a driver. As he approached pastor Nkuranga, the refugees ed, "Since KAMUHANDA is here our fates are sealed."81 Several refugees recognized

UHANDA but out of curiosity he moved close to KAMUHANDA while he was talking with or Nkuranga and heard KAMUHANDA say to the pastor, "What are these people - what are

se people still doing here?"82 He also heard KAMUHANDA call on, and give an order to the terahamwe he had brought to the place in these words, "All these people here are Tutsis, kill

them."83 On this order, the armed men he brought to the scene killed Bucundura and began to shoot into the crowd.

e witness fled while other refugees were killed at the scene, many fell hit by bullets and others ipped over the injured. He lost 3 sisters at Gikomero and when in the year 2000 he attended the

exhumation of 41 corpses, he recognized the clothing of his sisters. His wife survived but he lost a child. He pointed84 out the parish church, the road at the lower side of the church, pastor Nkuranga's house, and the classrooms that existed at the location in April 1994. He was also able to point out the classroom where he was before he went out to see and listen to KAMUHANDA. He also ointed out where Nkuranga and KAMUHANDA stood when they spoke and the point where ucundura fell. He identified KAMUHANDA in the dock, picked out vehicle 5c from a bundle of

car drawings. 85

Witness (GEI): "The refugees immediately got astounded and said something like "Since KAMUHANDA is here, our fate is sealed," sir." "Several refugees recognized him." "I immediately got near them, up to about 4 metres, in order to eavesdrop on their conversation." "KAMUHANDA spoke to Nkuranga as follows: he said, "What are these people -- what are these people still doing here?"" "KAMUHANDA immediately ordered the Interahamwe to come down from the vehicle and he told them, "All these people here are Tutsis, kill them."

Transcript of 3 1 January 2002 PTE 12-14, PTF 14-1 5

80 GEI a Tutsi is PW15 and PIS is PX19.

8 4 Transcript of 31 January pages 12 and 13 Lines 25 and Line 1 respectively.

82 Transcript of 31 January page 14 Lines 4 and 5

83 Transcript of 31 January page 14 Lines 10 and 11

84 Prosecution Exhibit 20, a sketch of the scene of the massacre drawn by GEI,

05 The bundle of car drawings was admitted into evidence as DX 17 and the highlighted portions of GEl's witness statement was tendered

41

and admitted

Prosecutor v. KAMUHA NDA , ICTR-99-54A-T

Prosecutor: "How was Pastor Bucundura killed and where was he located?" I Witness (GEI): "He was shot at and he was close to the place where KAMUHANDA was before KAMUHANDA and the others got close to the vehicle"

Transcript of 3 1 January 2002 PTE 15, PTF 16

Witness (GEI): "Bucundura died after KAMUHANDA gave the order"

Transcript of 3 1 January 2002 PTE 100, PTF 120

s-examination did not detract fiom his testimony instead it indeed enhanced and strengthened it ficantly. Re-examination confirmed that KAMUHANDA ordered Bucundura to be killed. This

testimony is of consequence because it shows KAMUHANDA was at the location to order the killing of the Tutsi refugees who were there. He ordered the execution of Bucundura a Tutsi cleric and the extermination of the Tutsis located at this place.86

rosecution's Submission

. It is submitted that cross-examination did not significantly diminish the witness's evidence. He still aintained that others had recognised KAMUHANDA. He reinforces in terms of previous

ces (GEC ante), about the instructions to start killing the refugees. His evidence is mutually corroborating of other witnesses, and he identified in Court, KAMUHANDA as being the one and

e man. While dicta exists that identifications in Court may have little evidential value. It is tted that if the Court concludes that this (as per other witnesses who identified UHANDA in Court) is a truthful witness such identification may have significant weight in

ng other more direct identifications.

informed the court that the beatings she sustained during the Genocide led to waterlogged lungs. n it was drained, a side of her lungs shrank. She suffers from hypertension and heart troubles

ctant to testify because of her health but she insisted that the Bible advocates justice along rgiveness. In the company of her children and relations, she saw a lightening-like flash in the

ening sky of 6 April 1994. Later what she saw was confirmed as the president's plane being shot wn. Out of fear, she locked herself and her children indoors as terrible repercussions had attended

he deaths of high MRND officials in the past.

terahamwe blamed innocent people and killed them in revenge attacks. Now that the resident died, the killings were going to be on a bigger scale than in the past. The Hutus kill the utsis and on this occasion, it would be grave and worse than in the past. The military especially the

ial guard take the liberty to go around and kill Tutsis. On 7 April, she sent her son to stock with provisions in anticipation of the impending bad situation. Her son returned with news

hat the situation had deteriorated and that people were fleeing their homes and there was gunfire in

other woman arrived and confirmed the situation, reporting that known people had been killed. e then went out and met others including the woman's husband who confirmed killings and told

86 At this stage of the proceedings, the Prosecution did not object to Defence oral motion for the recall GEK, the Chamber ordered that GEK be recalled solely to testify on

the point of whether she was, or was not in Gikomero at the relevant time. A document concerning Pastor Nkuranga's trial in Rwanda upon which GAG may be cross-

examined was quickly read by the Prosecution prior to the witness being put on the stand.

87 GAG is PW16 and the PIS is PX21.

42


er about how he narrowly escaped being killed by hitching a ride on a bicycle. with the help of a neighbour who assisted, her in her state of shock and confusion (GAG who had earlier been told was

a list of those to be killed) picked a few items and decided to flee. She moved in and out of her me not sure on how to flee, She returned to milk her cows and visited the town centre where she t officials asking her to return to her home. She was told that in other Collines (Hills) Tutsis are ng killed and she was still alive.

described the Interahamwe and testified that their main work was killing civilians during the od. They killed Tutsis and Hutus opposed to the government. They killed others in her company some were lucky to escape. She ran into the forest with other refugees, saw burning houses and all moved towards Gikomero. Refugees from different Hills where the killings were going on

converged at hills where the killings had yet to start leading to a situation of great disorder. She and refugees went to Gikomero but met Interahamwe on the way. They feared they would be , but these Interahamwe carrying axes, clubs and spears abused them and spared them.

the way, a pastor named Bucundura met with their group and asked them to follow him to ikomero parish to seek refuge from the parish priest. He led the group to the Parish church where other pastor, Nkuranga offered refuge. She arrived at the parish on 9 April 1994. There was an

of more refugees over-night and the in the next two days. They were mainly Tutsis and those osed to the regime in power. The Interahamwe had earlier threatened her that if she were caught, would hang on a cross. They arrested her son who managed to escape and join her at the

ikomero parish later.

use was looted and her son told her that a white vehicle had come and weapons were ed to named individuals. The Hutus who were selling food to the refugees at a makeshift

arket were dispersed by the parish Pastor and another man called Kabano. The pastor kept assuring them that they would be all right. She drew close to the pastor and as she did that, a white ick up drove into the compound. There were soldiers, communal police and Interahamwe in the

vehicle. They alighted, and there was a man who walked towards the pastor and the pastor walked to meet up with him. Other refugees identified the man as KPiMUHANDA.

Witness (GAG): "The persons who were present there, including my son, told me that a white truck arrived and that guns had been distributed, and these were given to famous interahamwe - or well known, rather, interaharnwe."

Transcript of 04 February 2002 PTE 49, PTF 58

Witness (GAG): "I said that KAR/IuIE.I:ANDA had left the Interahamwe militiamen because he moved and stood behind the line occupied by the Interahamwe and, from where I was, I noticed that KAMUHANDA had not left, because the vehicle, on which he was, was still there."

Transcript of 05 February2002 PTE 97, PTF 11 5

e pastor repeated to her there was nothing to fear. Bucundura was all along in their company and Interahamwe who alighted from the vehicle surrounded the refugees. One among them shot

ucundwa and they launched an attack on the refugees using grenades and all the weapons at their sal. She ran into the classroom to pick up her 4-year-old child. She was hit by shrapnel from a

ade lobbed into the classroom (she did not realise she had been hit then, as she was terrified). y of the refugees knew KAMUHANDA. Three vehicles in total came loaded with the armed

rs, communal police and the Interahamwe. They were many. KIAMUI-IANDA was at the scene of the shooting and he did not do anything at all to stop the massacres.


Prosecutor: "Was the man KAMUHANDA still there when Bucundura was shot?" Witness (GAG): "I believe he was there sir.. ." Prosecutor: "When Bucundura was shot, were you able to see whether the man that you've called KAMUHANDA did or said anything to stop the shooting?'' Witness (GAG): "No, sir, he did nothing." Prosecutor: "And the person who shot Bucundura, do you know where he had come from?" Witness (GAG): "He had come down fiom KAMUHANDA's vehicle. They were together, sir."


The killers stood in fiont of each classroom and slashed and killed but spared young girls who were to be raped later. They said,

"We are going to rape you and taste Tutsi women."

Transcript of 4 February 2002 at page 61 Lines 4 and 5

The girls responded by saying,

"Instead of raping us, it is better that you kill us once and for all."

Transcript of 4 February 2002 at page 61 Lines 7 and 8

Witness (GAG): "It was on my return that I learned, through a young girl who survived and, subsequently, through some other survivor who died shortly thereafter, that those girls were raped and, subsequently, killed."


discovered, stripped of all her money and belongings and slashed with machete and she fell own as thought she had died. She gained consciousness later and found herself on a pile of dead odies. The attackers turned her around, hit her again on the head and left her for dead. A friend

son to come and look for her. The boy picked her up and helped her towards pastor a's house, stepping on corpses that littered everywhere including the whole compound and

children crying near a staircase.

val, the place was littered with dying and wounded people with limbs chopped off. The astor refused to offer water to the dying, and injured, saying they were all supposed to die. He later rought the identity cards that were found at the massacre site and gave hers back to her telling her to

ith her at all times. He then chased her and others away from his house to be killed outside. as too wounded to leave so he had no choice but to allow her remain until the next day when

ought two named police officers who dragged her away.

Nkuranga then addressed the Interahamwe that KAMUHANDA had ordered that everyone to be killed including the disabled and the children. He asked her to go and be killed and said

at the God of the Tutsis had (released) abandoned her. She emphasised that Nkuranga said UHANDA's orders was that the children, the wounded and all should be killed and none

44

88 She was again hit and left for dead and she survived and was alone in the b he RPF came to rescue her.

Witness (GAG): "And then Nkuranga said to the interahamwe, he told them that an order issued by KAMUHANDA said that everyone had to be killed, including the disabled and the children. He then turned to me and said, "go, for them to kill you"." Witness: "He was talking to the Interahamwes, who had come to pick up or to take those who had survived and the wounded and a lot of children that were scattered around there and who had survived the massacres of the day before."

Transcript of 04 February 2002 PTE 71, PTF 84,87

60. r on her return, she learnt from other survivors that the young girls set apart earlier were raped killed. Her child was later killed. Due to the passage of time, she was unable to identify

UHANDA in court. Cross-examination entrenched her testimony and it was not in any way shaken. Her testimony established that Pastor Nkuranga a Hutu was hostile to the refugees despite is work and vocation in an Episcopal capacity, he was unkind to her and other injured Tutsis. All

tempts to shake the witness9 testimony failed.

Defense: ". . .which of your children told you about the rape?" Witness ( GAG): " It w as A ngelique Umuhire w ho t old m e. I s hould m ention that s he h ad heard this piece of information from the Refugees when they were sharing or talking about the events that had occurred." Defense: "You have also stated that you heard about the rape from two young girls who were still alive. , . " Witness (GAG): "I do not remember the names of these young girls, but they were from my region."

Transcript of 06 February 2002 PTE 10- 1 1, PTF 12- 13


cution submits that the evidence of GAG is highly significant for the following reasons: evidence of the targeting of Tutsis and opponents of the govemement (para 1 1 1 ante) prior a1 at Gikomero. On the 12" April, she (as with others) gives evidence of hearings person KAMUHANDA when he arrived with interahamwe. More particularly, she had

ificant dealings with Pastor Nkuranga and gives incriminating evidence against him, in particular s statement much later that evening to Nkuranga indicating that KAMUHANDA was instrumental

in the attack on the refugees. Finally she gives evidence of hearing some of the attackers stating they ere going to rape "Tutsi women", and her subsequent confirmation of this fact from other refugees

articular GEP (P W 1 8).

. He learnt of the death of the president at his home on 7 April 1994 from a neighbour who had llowed the news on radio. Initially residents stayed in their homes awaiting further instructions

refugees from Rusororo arrived to inform him that the president was shot down by Tutsis and as , Tutsis had to be killed. They informed him of massacres. On 8 April 1994, he along with

some family members, (two elder brothers, one sister and her two children and neighbours and their

88 This underlines the peculiar and unique nature of the genocide in Rwanda. It was conceived to kill all and leave none to tell the story. Only fortuitiousness allowed a few

witnesses who escaped.

89 GEV is PW17 and PIS is PX22.

45


children other family members, wife and 4 infant children stayed behind) left for Mbandazi with the refugees. At Mbandazi the Conseiller of Rusororo, a Hutu tried to woo them back to their homes. Majority of the refugees were Tutsi with a few Hutus. The Tutsis told the Hutus that they were not targets. They moved to Gikomero via Gishaka where they spent a night and on anival found an stimated 5,000 Tutsi refugees already at the parish church and school.

163. The Hutus did not leave their homes. Apart from a sister who went to Ruhanga, all in their party stayed at the parish where they met with pastor Nkuranga. While at the parish, in the church a white pick up arrived (almost immediately after two other trucks followed) and a man alighted from the vehicle. A Gikomero indigene he had known for a long time told him that the man who alighted was

ANDA in the following words,

"KAMUHANDA has just arrived our fate is sealed."

Transcript of 6 February 2002, page 54, Lines 19 and 20

4. refugees also recognised KAMUHANDA who took a minute to walk towards pastor nga. He was at an approximate distance of 15 to 20 metres and quickly moved away because

of the earlier news of KAMUHANDA and because two more vehicles filled with Interahamwe wearing their Kitenge uniforms and armed with guns, grenades, axes and traditional weapons arrived at the scene.

Witness (GEV): "I saw a man alight from the vehicle, and that man is KAMUHANDA. I was in the church with other people, a man from Gikomero informed me that it was KAMUHANDA, and he said, "KAMUHANDA has just arrived, our fate is sealed"."


Witness (GEV): ". . .after the conversation with Nkuranga, KAMUHANDA went back to his vehicle and the vehicle moved; that is, it reversed. And, after that, the interahamwe shot at Bucundur a"


ANDA and Nkuranga spoke for about 3 minutes. At this time, a Tutsi preacher Bucundura by someone Erom KAMUHANDA's entourage. At this stage, he ran for dear life and did e KAMUHANDA's whereabouts but recognised two out of the communal police officers t of the attackers. From Prosecution photographs, he identified the church but noted that

e church had no windows or doors at the time of the attack and identified Nkuranga's residence. out the spot that KAMUHANDA's vehicle parked, between but nearer the church than residence. Cross-examination revealed past Tutsi persecutions. In 1962 there was one sacres when Tutsis were killed. However, in previous massacres, children were spared.

66. GEV gave evidence of KAMUHANDA being identified by refugees.

rosecutior's submissions

167. The witness gave a graphic description of the chaotic situation at the parish with approximately 5000 ore people scattered all over in the church, classrooms and the grounds and livestock and

roperty strewn all over the area. A few who knew Nkuranga were in his house. Cross-examination confirmed that the man from Gikomero who identified KAMUHANDA was also a refugee. The

terahamwe were many and were assembled from various locations making identification difficult.

e testimony of the witness remained consistent and in re-examination, he clarified minor iscrepancies between his testimony and his witness ~tatement.~' His evidence corroborates and

supports much of the testimony of the other witnesses.

I heard on 6 April 1994 over the radio the president had been shot down. She slept through the

night but in the morning of 7 April, three Tutsi informants, a young man who worked with her other informed her at her house that all his family members had been killed, two other women om another region joined this man with news that the Interahamwe had begun killing people in

own region too. The Interahamwe are Hutus who allied themselves to kill Tutsis. On receipt of ews from these informants, she was frightened. Her father decided to flee because they were all

out to be killed. Her father instructed that they move towards Yuma across the Muhazi Lake via tkomero where it was safe. Their whole party comprising of her father, her family and the three

informants fled as instructed.

9. The party stayed at a man's house along with other 200 refugees, majority of who were Tutsis. As e refugees arrived, her father advised their party and others to move away fiom this location. ut 20 people followed her father. Her mother with two children, a boy and a girl remained at the

cation. She followed her father. On the way, they met dubious security agents in mufti who asked r their identity cards. They refused to oblige because they were anxious their cards showed they re Tutsis. It was customary in Rwanda at the time for identity cards to say whether one were Tutsi Hutu and on this occasion, they were afraid given the situation that if they showed their Tutsi

ification, they would be killed.

se the refugees outnumbered the dubious security agents, they instructed the refugees to ceed to Gikomero parish school and church. They arrived at the parish church and school on 9 ril 1994. This was her first time of going to this place and she met a large number of refugees. e was not able to estimate the number of refugees but there was a constant stream of more

es arriving at the location on 10 and 1 1 April.

2 April 1994, in the morning about 20-armed Hutus arrived and tried to steal the property of the refugees. They were armed with cudgels, machetes, axes meant for killing. These armed men apart from looting separated the Hutus fiom the Tutsis. A majority of the Hutus followed the armed men,

few who were mamed to Tutsis remained with their families. It was a horn of dilemma ion for the Hutus mamed to Tutsis because if they left, they joined the killers,92 their children

and spouses would be killed, and if they remained, they risked being killed.

t lunchtime, in the afternoon, a vehicle packed with Interahamwes arrived at the location. them to be Interahamwe because of their uniforms and some were clad in banana leaves

carried weapons. A man identified by the refugees as KAMUHANDA came out of the vehicle. e refugees local to the area who knew him said:

"This is KAMUHANDA who has arrived. We are going to ." Transcript of 7 February 2002, page 34, lines 13, 14, and 15. At the arrival of KAM NDA and the Interahamwe that he brought, there was panic among the refugees.

90 Highlighted parts of his testimony was admitted as DX20.

9 1 GEP is lutsi and PW18. Her PIS is PX23.

92 This puts a lie to Defence witnesses who testified that it was possible to remain at the massacre location without engaging in the killing.


173. She was in one of the classrooms but had a clear view of the arrival of KAMUHANDA who alighted from his vehicle and walked to speak to a man and as he was going, another man who was in the vicinity was shot dead.

Witness (GEP): "When he arrived, after he was finished speaking to a man, one of the passengers who was in the vehicle that he had come in, fired on the man, shot at the man and he died. KAMUHANDA did nothing, he did not ask the passenger why h e had killed the man." Prosecutor: "Did he say anything, at all?" Witness (GEP): "He turned around and he told those who were there, so, as if to say, so why aren't you helping your friends in these killings?" Prosecutor: "Can you remember the exact words that he used?" W&ness (GEP): "He told them, "start working", as if to incite them to kill, because he was their leader.. ." Witness (GEP): "We were used to Interahamwe attacks and when they said "work" we knew that they meant to kill people."

Transcript of 07 February 2002 PTE 38-39, PTF 41-43

174. UHANDA as their leader incited and ordered them to kill. By "work", he meant that they should kill. At this point, KAMUHANDA's vehicle was removed from the immediate vicinity; two other vehicles filled with Interahamwe arrived to help the others already at the location.

175. They all engaged in killing the refugees. After the killings had begun, one among the Interahamwe stopped the killings for a short time to pick about 20 girls who were driven away and the massacres resumed. The refugees in the classroom with GEP were slashed and killed and a few fell over her after she had been wounded. Grenades, hoes, cudgels, machetes were used to kill people.

MUHANDA as the leader of the killers had given instructions and left. Later four men, two omen, and two young girls who survived made their way from the location, houses were burning

everywhere, and they hid in a sorghum field.

Witness (GEP): "When the vehicle amved a man stepped out of the vehicle and asked them to stop the massacres for a moment, because he wished to choose some girls." Witness (GEP): "They loaded them up in a vehicle and took them away."


he party separated into two groups, the killings continued and the Interahamwe came with dogs to sniff out survivors. The other group was discovered and killed. She walked during the night and hid during the day until they were rescued by the Inkontanyi, RPF - Rwandan Patriotic Front soldiers.

he lost her father and two older brothers at the Gikomero parish on 12 April 1994. Her mother survived with one child. She heard news of the girls who were taken from the massacre site. All were raped and killed except one who survived. Cross-examination did not detract from the estimony of the witness; rather she established that the RPF were at the other side of Lake ~ u h a z i . ' ~

addition, this area was still in control of pro-government sympathisers.

Prosecutor: "And before you were struck down, did you observe the departure of KAMUHANDA?"

93 The witness establishes that as at 12 April 1994 , there was no armed fighting between the ex FAR and the ex RPF at the Gikomero end of Lake Muhazi.

Prosecutor v. IWMUHA NDA , ICTR-99-54A-T

Witness (GEP): "The vehicle had already left and it is understandable that the leaders had given an order to these persons to kill and then the leaders left and I never saw him after that point." Prosecutor: "Did he leave before or during or after the killings had ended?" Witness (GEP): "The vehicles left after the girls had been loaded into them."

Transcript of 07 February 2002 PTE 43, PTF 47-48

Witness (GEP): "Yes, I learnt the fate of those young girls. I learnt that all the girls, except one, were raped and killed by the attackers."


74. Her mother remained behind because she was unable to flee with the two infants in her care. She further established that the refugees had put in place some rudimentary security arrangement with men outside and women in the classrooms. Some of the refugees had food supplies while others

om the vicinity went home to bring food. The witness also established that KAMUHANDA came m a white pick up followed by two other trucks full of many interahamwe. They had weapons

ich included cudgels studded with nails. They overwhelmed the refugees and their rudimentary security arrangement.

UHANDA was at the massacre scene when the killings stopped and young girls were picked and taken away. Cross-examination established that the person in PX4 (the two photographs of

at a burial) were shown to her by ICTR investigators and she identified in them." Particular excerpts of the testimony are set out below:

Witness (GEP): "When he arrived, after he was finished speaking to a man, one of the passengers who was in the vehicle that he had come in, fired on the man, shot at the man and he died. KAMUHANDA did nothing, he did not ask the passenger why h e had killed the man." Prosecutor: "Did he say anything, at all?" Witness (GEP): "He turned around and he told those who were there, so, as if to say, so why aren't you helping your friends in these killings?" Prosecutor: "Can you remember the exact words that he used?" Witness (GEP): "He told them, "start working", as if to incite them to kill, because he was their leader. . ." Witness (GEP): "We were used to Interahamwe attacks and when they said "work" we knew that they meant to kill people."

Transcript of 07 February 2002 PTE 38-39 PTF 41-43

Witness (GEP]: "When the vehicle arrived a man stepped out of the vehicle and asked them to stop the massacres for a moment, because he wished to choose some girls." Witness (GEP): "They loaded them up in a vehicle and took them away."

Transcript of 07 February 2002 PTE 40-42 PTF 45-46

Prosecutor: "And before you were struck down, did you observe the departure of KAMUHANDA?"

- 94 The President reflected in the record of proceedings that the witness identified the Accused in the photos shown.

49


Witness (GEP): "The vehicle had already left and it is understandable that the leaders had given an order to these persons to kill and then the leaders left and I never saw him after that point." Prosecutor: "Did he leave before or during or after the killings had ended?" I Witness (GEP): "The vehicles left after the girls had been loaded into them."

Transcript of 07 February 2002 PTE 43 PTF 47-48

Witness (GEP): "Yes, I learnt the fate of those young girls. I learnt that all the girls, except one, were raped and killed by the attackers."

Transcript of 07 February 2002 PTE 47 PTF 53


179. GEP's evidence is comprehensive and credible. She did not know KAMUHANDA B before this incident, but did identify him in Court. In addition, the evidence she gives supports the identification in the following ways:

(a) She as with others gives evidence of hearing other refugees recognise and name KAMUHANDA as 'the man' who arrived, and therefore is corroborating other identification evidence.

he content of her testimony matches in many significant ways other witness's testimony in many details. She supports the evidence GAG PW.16 regarding the allegations of rape and the facts that young girls were picked and isolated by an Interahamwe.

he gave evidence that she had heard the girls were raped. It is submitted by the Prosecution in any event that this is a proper inferance to draw given the nature and conduct of the attackers.

He testified that on 6 April 94, around 8.30 p.m, he heard an explosion and subsequently, gunfire that inued throughout the night. The explosion and the gunfire came from Kanombe military camp

In the morning, he heard over Radio Rwanda that President Habyarimana's plane had been shot down. At about 8.00 am, refugees came fiom Rusororo area and told the people in his locality that killings were going on in Rusororo. Tutsis were being killed by soldiers and Interahamwe of

usororo so refugees had to flee. He defined Interahamwe as Hutus trained in military techniques y President Habyarimana. They carried guns and worked with soldiers. When he heard the news

from the refugees that Tutsis were being killed in Rusororo, he did not feel at peace and he fled towards the Gikomero parish school and church compound.

0 April 1994, he saw refugees at the Gikomero parish school and church compound. On arrival, Hutu Pastor named Nkuranga welcomed the witness and the other refugees who came with him

t he s ame 1 ocality. D uring t he d ay, m ore r efugees arrived until a n e stimated the number o f 10,000 was reached. They also had their livestock. Twelve family members were at the

ocation including his wife and six children. By 11 April 1994, the Gikomero compound was full and no more refugees came there. It was peaceful on 11 April although the atmosphere was tense.

12 April, between 1.00 and 2.00 pm, he saw a white pick-up vehicle arrive with some terahamwe on board the vehicle. He identified them by their uniform. He also saw a man in the

95 Witness GEH is PW19. His PIS is PX 24. He gave one statement to ICTR Investigators willingly.


in of the driver, who he later learnt from some of the refugees, was KAMUHANDA. That was first time the witness saw KAMUHANDA. On the arrival of ISAMUWANDA, some of the

refugees said, "this man is after us". The vehicle stopped between the church and the residence of stor. KAMUHANDA met Pastor Nkuranga then in front of his house with someone else Bucundura. KAMUHANDA greeted the Pastor and returne to the parked vehicle. He

returned with the Interahamwe and had a short conversation with th astor while at this point the Interahamwe shot at a Tutsi preacher called Bucundura who was with the pastor at the time of

's arrival. The man shot dead lived in the Pastor's house. The witness and other d and ran away when the Interahamwe started shooting. The killers ran after them

shooting.

an to Kibira with between 200-250 other refugees, where they were chased and they crossed e Muhazi and got to Rutare commune, in the Byumba prefecture. B 0th pastor Nkuranga and cher Bucundura were well known to the witness prior to meeting them at the Gikomero School

hurch compound contrary to what was recorded in his statement that he did not know them re. He infomed the Prosecutor to correct these mistakes sometime when the statement was read

cross examination, the witness explained that although killings had not started in his area, the refugees from Roseboro and the tension at the time made him, his immediate family consisting

s wife and six children and fellow Tutsis in his area flee on 7 April and arrive at Gikomero on 1. He gave a graphic description of a chaotic over-crowded space with livestock grazing and

too many people than the area could contain struggling to live in the compound. Witness established that the refugees were Tutsis and the Tutsis were being chased and killed. Witness

er established that the Gikomero Church and School compound was a place of refbge where all thought they would be safe.

We also established under cross-examination that KAMUHANDA was at the location when ucundura was shot dead because he was a Tutsi and lived with Nkuranga the parish priest. The

cross e xamination d id n ot d etract from h is t estimony. In re-examination, h e t estified that a 11 the is left in his area were killed after he fled. He lost many members of his immediate family at the

omero massacre site. Upon questioning from the Judges, he recalled that there were two school uildings and the Church which was a bit higher than the school. KAMUHANDA came to kill and

he went back to the pick-up van to fetch the Interahamwe that did the killings at his behest.96

Witness (GEH): "He came back with the Interahamwes and had a brief conversation with the pastor, and it was that time that the Interahamwes shot at Mr. Bucundura. Bucundura is spelled B-U-C-U-N-D-U-R-A."

Transcript of 1 1 February 2002 PTE 14, PTF 17

Witness (GEH): "Well, he went back towards his vehicle. And, when he came back, he came back with the killer, and I believe that he was the one that gave the order for the killing, sir."

Transcript of 1 1 February 2002 PTE 16, PTF 19

Witness (GEH): "It was the Interahamwe, sir, that shot at us. And they were with the person that fetched them from the vehicle, and that person was KAMUHANDA, sir."


96 The witness statement was highlighted and tendered and admitted as DX22.

51


Witness (GEH): "It was the refugees from Gikomero who told us his name." Witness (GEH): "I also stated that, since he was the one who brought those interahamwes, he must be the one who issued the order that the killings start. But I did not, personally, hear him make any such statement." Witness (GEH): "And, after their discussion, the man went back towards the vehicle where the interahamwes were and they all came back together and that's when they shot at Bucundura,"

Transcript of 11 February 2002 PTE 39- 40, PTF 45-47

Witness (GEH): "That man (KAMUHANDA) was with Pastor Nkuranga when they shot at the old man."

Transcript of 1 1 February 2002 PTE 4 1, PTF 48

secutor's Submission

idence gives clear evidence of what happened at the Parish and which supports the account many other witnesses. It is tht his evidence despite cross-examination is highly credible. ore, the Prosecution submit that GEH's testimony that - it was the refugees from Gikomero

recognised and identified KAMUHANDA, as being the leader who brought the Interahamwe - very cogent piece of evidence and entirely consistent with a large number of other witnesses'

7. aw flashes in the sky and heard the noise of the explosion of the president Habyahma's plane out 8.30 pm on 6 April 1994. Later she heard that it was the president that had been shot down

a communique' on the radio and everybody were instructed to remain in their homes. The Hutus killed the local conseiller because he had refused to allow the killing of Tutsis in and had preached harmony between Hutus and Tutsis. The witness observed the killing of

utsis in a near by bar one of whom was her cousin. She immediately fled her home spending nights in a sorghum field with many others who fled with her. She first fled to Mbandazi, then Gishaka and

up at the Gikomero on 11 April 1994. On arrival at the church the parish pastor, Nkuranga and informed them that they would be killed the next day. I n his words he said "God has

andoned you; wait for what will happen to you tomorrow."

ere was a great deal of people in that location. On 12 April at about 1 lam KAMUHANDA amved with interahamwe. The local population recognised KAMUHANDA and they said in one voice on his amval, "Our fate is sealed," meaning they all had to die. She graphically described her state o f p anic and s hock a s w ell a s the s ame feeling o f s hock and h opelessness among the o ther

fugees. They were all afraid and could not speak. KAMUHANDA came with armed Interahamwe ressed in their distinct and identifiable uniform. While at the scene KAMUHANDA moved back a

little and then Bucundura, his wife and children were shot dead and the killers shot into the crowd.

Witness (GEM): "It was at about 11.00 a.m. when a vehicle arrived and the man who alighted from that vehicle moved towards Nkuranga. They held a discussion, but I am not aware of the topic of their discussion. The population who were there said that was KAMUHANDA, and since KAMUHANDA is here, "Our fate is sealed.""

97 GEM is PW20 and PIS is PX25. The witness statement as highlighted was tendered and admitted as DX23.

52


Witness (GEM): "By that we understood that we had to die. That we had been betrayed."

Transcript of 1 1 February 2002 PTE 75, PTF 88-89

Witness (GEM): "He came with Interahamwes, sir, and the Interahamwe were armed."


Witness (GEM): "I saw them shoot a person from Rusororo called Bucundura."


ed to Kibara. The people in the classrooms were killed with clubs and machetes and after me difficulties, she was lucky to be ferried across the lake to Byumba. Under cross-examination, e witness testified that the refugees had run from one place to the other before arriving at ikomero and they were tired of running and at any rate they did not know of a safe place to run

owards again. The cross examination did not detract from the testimony of the witness. Her testimony remained consistent and truthful. On re-examination, she indicated that the figures of

she gave were with her in the sorghum field and at Gikomero and the timing of the UHANDA's arrival at the massacre scene were approximations as she did not count people

hysically. KAMUHANDA was there.


e that not only implicates Nkuranga, thereby supporting other witnesses but also A was identifiedhecognised by 'the local population'. Again, this witness

rroborates other witnesses' testimony of the recognition of KAMUHANDA in the Gikomero

He heard of the death of the president at about 5am on an international radio station on 7 April 1994 s a student on holidays in his native hill. All activities came to a halt and the people waited er instructions from the administration. Farmers and traders did not go to work and the radio 1 to remain in their homes. Any leader at that time could have given instruction and the

place would have listened and followed those instruction^.^^ The witness expected Hutus to kill e Tutsis as it had happened in the past and at any rate, Tutsis were stopped at roadblocks that had

been set up. Tall people with long or aquiline noses were stopped, beaten up, tortured, and killed at these roadblocks. They were called Inyenzi.

here was a war going on between the government and the Inkontanyi and all Tutsis were labelled as accomplices or Inyenzi. The roadblocks had been set up before January 1994. At the roadblock situated at the Nyabarongo river Tutsis were beaten up, tortured, and they disappeared because they were Tutsis. Inyenzi is Habyarimana g overnment

98 GEU is PW21 PIS is PX26.

the term used to describe at the time. Generally, the

the Inkontanyi fighting a war against the word r eferred to T utsis. The word Inyenzi

99 This underscores the the de jure and de facto power the Accused could wield his his native area. He wielded these powers to devastating effect.

5 3


eant i . nsect, - - d omestic p est that u sually e at up clothing, v ermin. It i s c ockroach and t his m ems

April 1994, the witness was apprehensive that Tutsis would be killed but hopef;l-that the nsion would subside while he was petrified as anyone would a t the prospect of dying. He felt

er at the prospect of Tutsis and himself being killed. The roadblocks were manned by soldiers endarmerie of the Habyarimana government. Witness is considered a Tutsi. On 8 April 1994,

itness saw Tutsi refugees fiom Bicumbi, Kabuga and Mbandazi, streaming into his native hill with their luggage saying that the Interahamwe had begun killing the Tutsis in these places.

cribed the Interahamwe as MRND youths who had undergone military training. The refugees oved fiom one colline or hill to the other and some stayed at his local area in the hope that the

ituation would improve. They informed the witness that Hutu Interahamwe had killed Tutsis, their goods, and burned their houses. On 8 April 1994, while he was with seven of his nuclear any members of his extended family, his his parents set him on an errand to the town centre.

entre people gathered to obtain information about what was going on.

April 1994, just coming on to about 1.00pm while at Gishaka witness saw KAMUHANDA ive in a white pick-up and the populace embraced him. He spoke with them for a short time of ut three minutes and departed in the direction of Gikomero. Those he spoke with came and

ed the witness and others that, "You've heard yourself; KlAXlUHANDA has just confirmed t that the Tutsis had to die." H e felt sidelined and marginalised when such a well-known

erson made such a statement. He ran home to inform his parents of this news.

Witness (GEU): "On that day; namely, on the 12th, while I was at Gicaca, a white-coloured vehicle arrived and people approached the vehicle. I would even say before they got close to that vehicle, people shouted out, "That is KAMUHANDA, that is KAMUHANDA who has arrived." It was as if they were pleased to see him. Those people talked for a short time with KAMUHANDA and the vehicle left. When the vehicle left, those who had surrounded, gathered around KAMUHANDA, came back and told us, "You've heard yourself, KAMUHANDA has just confirmed the fact that the Tutsis had to die.""

Transcript of 12 February 2002 PTE 18- 19, PTF 2 1-22

Witness (GEU): "The populations attitude changed significantly because the people were saying to themselves that that information was conveyed by someone who was highly influential and who was, at the same time, saying that all Tutsis had to die."

Transcript of 12 February 2002 PTE 20-21, PTF 24

Witness (GEU): "KAMUHANDA clearly explained that it was the Tutsis who had to be killed. Consequently, it was the Hutus who started getting ready, prepared to kill. And when I talk about preparation, I say so because I had heard some Hutus who were saying that they would start sharpening their knives because they now understood who was the target."


or to then, the witness had only heard of KAMUHANDA as an influential intellectual and turer whose name was familiar and well known in the locality. His position and stature in society

influenced the Hutu populace at Gishaka on the day to prepare to kill Tutsis. The witness had to

100 This is a derogatory term that was used to vilify and characterize the Tutsis as vermin that must be killed and eradicated.

54

- - * - -


home through back paths. The Hutus had been told by K_AMUWANDA who their'tGget was, ey started sharpening their knives and machetes. The witness felt pain and anguish at his own ding death. He was now fully appraised of the situation and was afraid. He had now to hide

people on the way in order to avoid being killed. On his way home, he heard explosions and enade explosions and gunshots from the direction of Gikomero Colline (hill).

7. Later in the evening refugees who survived the massacres at that location came and informed them ANDA ordered the killings at this location. They also said he was the one who

stributed weapons and arms like grenades and guns to the Hutus. A communal police officer, ciel SIBOMANA, also incited the Hutu populace to kill Tutsis and even said that KAMSJHANDA

decreed the death of Tutsis and it was no longer a secret. This police officer went from hill to eading the information that W U H A N D A had decreed that Tutsis had to be killed. On the 1 1994, there was widespread killings, looting and burning of Tutsi houses.

Witness (GEU): "While I was still on my way to the family home, I heard grenade explosions and gunshots, which came from the direction of Gikomero. And, in the evening, some of the refugees, who were on the Gikomero colline, told us that it was KAMUHANDA who had ordered that Tutsis be killed. There were a lot of Tutsis at that area because they had been asked to assemble in the churches. So the refugees I have just referred to also told us that it was KAMUHANDA who had embarked on the distribution of weapons to the Hutus, and those weapons included grenades and guns."


Witness (GEU): "A certain communal policeman came to the location and he told the Hutus, as a form of incitement to embark on the killings. He told them that even KAMUHANDA had said that it was the Tutsis who had to die. It was no longer a secret.. .He said that he came from the place where that information had been communicated, and he was saying that KAMUHANDA, himself, had said that it was the Tutsis who had to be killed and that no mistake should be made any longer with regard to the target."


ext day he ran away with his family in the direction of Yuma where killings had not started. felt safety lied in Yuma across Lake Muhazi. Hutu ferrymen with canoes on the Lake hiked fees but ferried people across. They made huge profits possibly because they were not filly

informed of the decree that all Tutsis had to die. Instead, they mmercial profit from the situation by ferrying Tutsis across the lake at exorbitant fees. The were the ones who began

e killing of Tutsis. Other parties initially did not join in the killings but later MDR youth wings also joined.

He moved in the direction of the Inkontanyi frontline in the Yuma area because he felt the advancing Inkontanyi might be more understanding than the Hutus who killed in his area and at any rate, he was

ed to risk being killed by a bullet instead of being chopped to bits by the Interahamwe. He over to Giti commune on the other side of Lake Muhazi where he observed the houses on the side he ran away from and those who could not cross the lake being killed at the other

ion established the existence of Radio Muhabura the Tutsi radio set up by the da Patriotic Front ("RPF") but he hardly tuned into the station. He also established that

set up long before January 1994 as the intensity of the war between the W F and the overnment army increased. The word Inyenzi was not used in any p ositive or to show pride in

rosecutor v. AXMUHANDA, ICTR-99-54A-T

describing the stealth of the RPF but it was a vituperative and derogatory tern used Tutsis who are to be killed anyway. He further established that refugees came from diverse

rections and he was not monitoring the situation but there was a chaotic dispersion of refugees. fter crossing the lake, the witness saw houses burning in places across the lake like Kayanga,

Rutunga, Kibara, Fumbwe and all neighbouring localities as far as the eye could see.

Cross-examination revealed the fact that the witness was still in secondary school at the age of twenty-two. Re-examination revealed that well before 1994; Tutsis were discriminated against in terms of educational opportunities. He passed entrance examinations several times but was not

lowed to proceed to secondary school to study, the minister in charge of secondary education then was Colonel Nsekalige. When he gained access to formal education, the history curriculum was that

were bad and they subjugated and maltreated Hutus. When KAMUHANDA at Gishaka the populace to kill Tutsis, he spoke for about three minutes. Those who heard him

ly relayed the contents of his utterance to the witness and others. Cross-examination the testimony of the witness and did not detract from it. Relevant excerpts ot the

follows:

Prosecutor: "Do you have any doubts in your mind that, the person the crowd met with in Gicaca, would be anybody else other than KAMUHANDA?" Witness (GEU): "I have no doubt, whatsoever, that it was him. I have reasons to say so." Prosecutor: "And how soon, after the three minute discussion with him, did the crowd come back to tell you and give you information about what he told them?" Witness (GEU): "It was at the same time as he, himself, must have heard what the people were saying to us, it was at the same time, sir."

Transcript of 12 February 2002 PTE 102, PTF 1 1 8

rosecutor' Submission

GEU's evidence is extremely significant in the 3 following ways: relates to a different geographical area, and therefore is free from the suggestion of verbal

adulteration. The recognition of KAMUHANDA by the populace is in Gishaka not Gikomero Parish and the recognition is prior to the attack on the Parish Church.

) What makes his evidence important is that the "Gishaka" identification, of KAMUHANDA is confirmed by accounts given by fleeing refugees from the Gikomero attack. It is submitted that this witness knew the name of KAMUHANDA only as being a well-known person in the district. This is important as the danger of mishearing of the person responsible is substantially iminished.

(c) Finally, GEU gave evidence that a communal policeman had independently indicated that A was one of the persons responsible for the attack. Despite vigorous responsible ion, the Prosecutor submits that GEU is a credible witness who gives crucial

vidence of identification of KAMUHANDA.

GEL saw the president's plane shot down on 6 April but confirmed the next day 7 April 1994 on radio news and people were told to remain in their homes. MRND, MDR-Power, PL-Power wings who were Interahamwe began to kill and burn Tutsis houses. He fled with five immediate family

l a? GEL is PW22 and PIS is PX 27.

bers and more than twenty of his uncle's family but on the way, some of them were killed. The fled to Jurwe, then Kayanga via Gikomero commune office (in Gishaka) and ended up in ka.lo2 At Jurwe the population had already been told to kill Tutsis so the Interahamwe ed the party of the witness for a whole day with guns, grenades, machetes, clubs, spears, and raditional w eapons. T he r efugees w ere able t o c apture three grenades and a gun from the attackers but these were taken away in Kayanga. The attackers were many but they were led

tanislas MBONAMPEKA, the president of the Parti Liberal - power wing ("PL-Power"). here was also Bernard who was the Brigadier in charge of the comunal police force in

UNGO (Jurwe is in Rubungo) also known as BISERURANDE.

. He and his party were disarmed calmly and peacefully at the Gishaka communal office by the accountant, Bougermestre, and B rigadier NYARWAYA head o f the c ommunal police. promised the protection of UNAMIR - United Nations Armed Monitoring Force in

anda at the communal office by the three officials. On arrival at the Gishaka communal office, ere were no UNAMIR soldiers there but they met about a thousand other Tutsi refugees fkom icumbi, Kanombe, Rubungo, Gikomero, and various other locations camped there.

e recognised KAMUHANDA. He had seen KAMUHANDA for the first time viously about 1991 and 1992 when a friend pointed him out as a senior official in the ministry.

friend informed him that KAMUHANDA is a native from a place near his in case he required KAMUHANDA's identity was confirmed by others in his party at the location.

UHANDA was pointed out to the witness at a distance of about five and ten metres from UHANDA.at the ministry by a friend when he went to the ministry on a matter regarding

itness also met KAMUHANDA at a ceremony in a project was being aunched. Immediately he was introduced at this ceremony, A stood up and I

as the man I had previously seen. The witness remained at this ceremony for twenty inutes but left five minutes after KAMUHANDA had been introduced.

n from a distance of about 50, 20 and 10 metres the witness again saw KAMUHANDA at the aka communal office he was conversing with the communal authorities consisting of the

ourgmeistre, the communal accountant, the communal police gadier and soldiers of the residential pard. lo3 T he r efugees t hought t hat M U H A N D A come there t o i ntercede on

He saw KAMUHANDA and was surprised to see him at this place given that DA lived in Kigali far from this locality.

ceeded to the Gishaka church where he met about one thousand Tutsi refugees and his own f almost another thousand refugees joined them because there was not enough space at the

communal offices and everybody streamed towards the church. The next day 10 April 1994, GEL aw the leader of the Jurwe attack, Stanislas MBONAMPEKA at the Gishaka church but by this

UHANDA had left. Stanislas MBONAMPEKA came with Interahamwe armed with eapons like spears and machetes, informed the refugees that president Sindikubuabo had

ed and that he was killed by Tutsis. Soldiers and police officers armed with guns and grenades

erahamwe, police officers and soldiers killed everybody in the church. On arrival at the h e se ttled down i n the c hurch and h e saw K AMUHANDA through the w indow walking the church courtyard. KAMUHANDA departed and MANLTKA (Mbonampeka) made the

statement about the death of the president. KAMUHANDA conversed with the Bougermestre, olice brigadier, and communal accountant before the attack on the church. The police, soldiers and

102 The witness identified these three places on the sketch PX2.

103 The witness identified on photograph 16 in PX3 the spot where the Accused stood vis a vis himself as he moved along and this was admitted as PX28.

MUHANDA, ICTR-99-54A-T I e Interahamwe surrounded the church after ensuring the doors were closed and they threw in nades and those who tried to escape were cut down with machetes. Hutu refugees at the site also

a role in killing the Tutsis but about 200 refugees like the witness escaped the massacre by

nt to Yuma where he met other survivors from different localities who seldom met to talk and ey did had divergent opinions. They all agreed however, the intellectuals had acted badly

ainst their interests at the time. One of the refugees at the church shouted on seeing UHANDA, "That is KAMUHANDA; he is coming to see us. Probably he is going to give us a

essage of salvation. Perhaps we are going to be given some food and some water." The entification was both within the church and outside at the communal offices. The witness

d KAMUHANDA in the dock but the defence objected. Under cross-examination, he confirmed the names of the dignitaries at the Rubungo inauguration where he saw KAMUHANDA

explained that even if as suggested by defence counsel, KAMUHANDA worked in Butare, he could be at the ministry precincts when he sighted him there.

ss-examination reinforced his testimony and the attempt to shake his testimony in respect of otograph 16 was unsuccessful as he noted that he was not a photo expert but made simple roximations of distances and locations from his memory. The witness was able to offer a clear detailed route of his itinerary from Junve to Gishaka. He confirmed KAMUHANDA was on

ard a hilux double cabin vehicle that was on the move at the church premises with soldiers of the

en confronted with his witness statementlo4, he asserted that the refugees were attacked in the church and not at the commune offices. Under re-examination, he asserted the truth of what he

itnessed. The refugees were surrounded in the church and the church compound. Answering a tion from Judge Rarnarosson, he confirmed KAMUHANDA moved in a vehicle and not on . He did not see KAMUHANDA talk to anyone. He, (the witness) was injured possibly by

made shrapnel. He showed his wounds and scars to the chest, chin, and neck. The evidence of is witness is true. He placed KAMUHANDA in Gishaka catholic parish church talking with the

ey officials of the Commune who actively implemented his orders to kill the refugees. Particular ts of his testimony are set out below:

Witness (GEL): "When I got to the church, I settled down inside the church. And it was when I looked through a window of the church, because there were many people inside the church, w hen I 1 ooked outside, I s aw M r. K AMUHANDA w alking around the c ourtyard. KAMUHANDA didn't say anything at that time, he just left immediately."


Witness (GEL): "Between thirty minutes and one hour elapsed between the arrival of KAMUHANDA and the attack, sir."


Prosecutor: "YOU have told us about seeing the Bourgmestre, the accountant and the brigadier on two p revious o ccasions. C an you r emember i f you s aw any o f t hese i ndividuals a t the same time as you saw Mr KAMUHANDA? Witness (GEL): "They were together when I saw them at the communal office, sir."

I 04 The highlighted portions of the witness's statements in English and French were tendered and admitted as DX24

58

Transcript of 13 February 2002 PTE 97, PTF 108- 109


evidence relates direcitly to the attack at Gishaka, and is important in at least THREE

y, he knew KAMUHANDA prior to April 1994, and recognised him in Gishaka at the o m u n e office. He displays no animus towards the Defendant believing that he had travelled om Kigali to intercede on behalf of the refugees. This recognition is reinforced by a subsequent

recognition of KAMUHANDA when the witness was at the Gishaka Church.

econdly, this recognition is supported by the identification of KAMUHANDA by others located in Gishaka.

6) Thirdly, these identifications again have and share proximity of time and location to the attack at the Gikomero Parish, which is also located within the Gikomero commune area.

the explosion of the presidential plane being shot down on 6 April 1994. The next day, le who listened to the radio told him that the plane caught fire. This led to serious repercussions

a. The Interahamwe misbehaved and stopped greeting. The witness, who lived in the anga Secteur, drank a local brew called W-A-R-A-G-I between 8 and 13 April 1994 at a local located at the Kayanga trading centre owned by one local man named Damien. GAC knew

UHANDA and saw him three times between 8 and 13 April 1994. First, in Gatanga, in a vehicle, then KAMUHANDA got out, approached, and greeted one Daniel are your Interahamwe. " Daniel responded, 'Some are here and the others

whom he asked, are on their way

from this list.lo6

ere. "

brought out a list from his pocket and started reading out names ed weapons like guns and grenades to seven people who were Interahamwe. This s as he went to each person and spent a few minutes distributing the weapons. One

e asked KAMUHANDA whether consequences would attend their use of the ANDA replied that it was the instruction from the national level of the MRND to

d no consequences will follow those who use the weapons to kill Tutsis. He tributed weapons everywhere he went and he intends to distribute more. In so

the Hutu majority will come and wonder what a Tutsi looked like. When asked whether to e killings immediately, he responded in the negative and told the party that he would tell them

of the Interahamwe who received weapons were Bugingo, Emanuel, Nshokeyinka, nurana, Nsengiyumva, Murekezi, Kibaganyana, Mutabmka, and Habineza, these being the

nes out of many more he could remember. Thereafter, KAMU A said he would, and did istribute weapons at other locations. He saw KAMUHANDA komero on his way to his arent's house; people who milled around KAMUHANDA pointed KAMUHANDA out. At this me, he stayed within the vehicle and stretched his hands out to greet a few people before

ing along. Witness was in close proximity of about 25 feet or 8 metres when he saw HANDA greeting people for a few minutes.

105 GAC is PW23 and the PIS is PX29. The highlighted last line of the witness statement was tendered and admitted as DX25.

106 The use of prepared lists is the usual way that pre-determined Tutsis were eliminated. It is proof that the Accused had a pre planned killing programme.

59


. At a second time, the witness saw KAMUHANDA standing in Kayanga at an MDR political eeting when KAMUHANDA, Twagiramungu alias Rukokoma along with other dignitaries were

introduced to the populace. The third sighting was at Darnien's bar between 8 and 13 April 1994. The witness saw one Etion Kamanzi, a good friend at a place known as Ntaruka where two women

f the Twa ethnic group fought. Etion Kamanzi came with his machete thinking "the work" had already started. He then looked at the witness and said "You Tutsi what are you doing here." The

itness replied, "What do you want you Hutu." Then a scuffle ensued and the witness disarmed Dmien of his new (machine) the sharpened machete. Damien offered the witness a beer but he

ed and their relationship was no longer cordial. People were surprised to see Etion Kamanzi a new machete, they asked him where he got it from, and he informed them that they w ere distributed at the Kayanga Secteur offices and they should go and collect theirs there. As at

, Etion was in prison in Rwanda.

April 1994, the witness saw Gasogi refugees arrive at the Secteur office and they informed that Tutsis in their area were being exterminated and they had left dead bodies in houses and on

e way and soon the same would happen in the witness' locality. These refugees were taken in s to Gishaka but the first two groups were killed on their way to Gishaka. Hutus killed Tutsis ocality as predicted by the refugees. It lasted for about 4 to 5 days until the Inkontanyi amved

stop the massacres. The killings began on the same day at all the places where KAMUHANDA istributed weapons. The corpses of the killed Tutsis were deposited in composts, latrine pits, anti-

erosion ditches, ditches previously dug (mass graves) for the purpose. They were filled up.

rpses were also thrown into Lake Muhazi. Initially, women and young girls were spared while en and male children were killed. They were spared so their attackers could marry them. Later,

women and young girls were raped and drowned in Lake Muhazi. The wife and cousin of the witness were among those that were to be drowned at Lake Muhazi. They survived and told the witness about how the men and young boys were killed and the women and young girls initially

d. Later on, the attackers demanded money from the women and girls and drowned them in the The witness hid in the sorghum fields, met a man who hid him for a day or two, had to leave

'Good Samaritan's" house at two in the morning and circumvented roadblocks and walked a small river course in a ravine to the shores of Lake Muhazi where he hired a canoe to cross

the lake.

. He identified KAMUHANDA in the dock. Cross-examination made no significant inroads into his testimony. It confirmed he knew and recognised KAMUHANDA in April 1994 and knew the

rsons who were Interahamwe long before they were recruited, when they were recruited and after participated in killings in April 1994. He met KAMUHANDA for the first time at the

mero secteur there was a downpour, he sheltered against the rain at the veranda of a building others, and it was then that he surely saw KAMUHANDA. He also saw KAMUHANDA at

the Interahamwe Damion Nsengiyumva's bar. He confirmed knowing definitely (despite secret g received by the Interahamwes) that the seven other Interahamwes whose names he had given in examination in chief were interahamwe. He also saw KAMUHANDA again at the me. During questioning about Damion Nsengiyumva's Interahamwe, he re-confirmed the of the Interahamwes.

He testified that the Interahamwes were widespread and initially not very violent as they waited for instmctions to start the violence. It was possible to drink at any bar with them peacefully prior to the

a1 for them to unleash violence on the populace. Under cross-examination, the witness aintained his position re- recognition and identification of KAMUHANDA. He established that

ven though his wife survived, only five out of about three hundred relations survived the massacres. e-examination clarified what he meant by loved ones as many non-blood related friends and


relations. He approximated twenty-five households or families and several of them decimated and exterminated while only one or two persons survived from other families.

2 1. He c onfirmed that KAMUHANDA w as a n i nfluential m ember o f t he MRND p olitical p aAy. In swer to Judge Rarnarosson's questioning, the witness testified that KAMUHANDA got the

weapons from Kigali. The Interahamwe inside the vehicle handed the guns to KAMUHANDA who stood near the vehicle and he in turn gave them to the other Interahamwes. To some, a gun and

grenade or two grenades, all these people already had traditional weapons on them. had a list of people he read out names fiom and the witness did not see the quantity

of arms in the vehicle. In response to Judge Maqutu on the issue of KAMUHANDA attending an MDR p olitical m eeting, he gave an example o f one M UGENZI who was a m ember o f t he Parti Liberal PL party whose party worked closely with the Inkontanyi but when he was corrupted split the

arty into two. It is along this framework that KAMUHANDA attended an MDR meeting.lo7

plans to kill the Tutsis were at a preparatory stage, a Hutu allowed him into a bar to drink. ne of the recipients of weapons asked KAMUHANDA if they should begin "the work" but

ANDA told him to wait for instructions on the date to begin. The killings started countrywide on the same day and ended likewise except for Kigali where killings started earlier.

Witness (GAC): "No, he didn't make any other statements, apart from the fact that he reached out for a list from his pocket and they read out the names and they started distributing weapons to the Interahamwe, sir." (. . .) Prosecutor: "And who read out the names?" Witness (GAC): "It was KAMUHANDA, himself, sir." (. . .) Prosecutor: "Did you see any guns being given out on this occasion?" Witness (GAC): "Yes sir I saw that sir." (. . .) Prosecutor: "Did you see any grenades being handed out that day?" Witness (GAC): "Yes, sir, he did distribute some, sir."


Prosecutor: "...were any of the people who received the weapons members of the Interahamwe?" Witness (GAC): "With all those people were Interahamwe, sir."


Witness (GAC): "It took some time, because he went to every person, himself, to give them weapons." Prosecutor: "And, were you present, from beginning to end of the handing out of these weapons?" Witness (GAC): "Yes, sir, I was there throughout."


Witness (GAC): "I didn't hear anything, apart from a question raised by one of the Interahamwe, sir." (. . .) "He said, now these weapons you have just given us, would there be any consequences if we were to use these weapons?" (...) "He answered that that was an order issued at national level and that all that used those weapons will suffer nothing." (. . .)

107 Ail the political parties split into two main factions comprising of the "Hutu Power faction and the main party. The "Hutu Power" factions of all the political parties worked

together to eliminate and exterminate the Tutsis.

MUHA NDA , ICTR-99-54A-T

"He told them that they were going to use those weapons to kill the Tutsi, majority would come and wonder what a Tutsi looked like."


so that the Hut

Witness (GAC): "He was asked, "Can we start now"? And he said, "No, don't start now, I shall tell you the dates at which you start". (. ..) "He said there will be no consequences because everywhere I have went I have distributed weapons and I am going to distribute more weapons elsewhere, sir."

Transcript of 14 February 2002 PTE 8 1, PTF 97-98

Witness (GAC): "He said he was going to continue with the distribution of weapons in other locations where he had not done so."


Prosecutor: ". . .you told us that KAMUHANDA had indicated, at one stage, that he was going to distribute weapons to various districts in the area. Are you able to say whether those same districts had massacres of Tutsis through that period?" Witness (GAC): "The massacres took place on the same day in all the various districts, sir."

Transcript of 14 February 2002 PTE 103, PTF 12 1


s evidence is extremely comprehensive and far-reaching. It emanates from the Gishaka area, d supports the allegations against KMUHANDA in many respects. Fristly, re- the distribution of eapons - GAC's evidence supports GAD'S similar evidence on this topic. Secondly GAC

reviously kenw KAMUHANDA, and recognised him in the Gikomero/Gishaka area prior to the attack on two separate occasions in the presence of the Interahamwe. Thirdly, he gives evidence of

UHANDA being an influential member of the MRND locally, thereby supporting other similar testimony, in particular GET. Fourthly he indicated that the killings lasted 4-5 days until the "lnkontanyi" amved, thereby rebutting the suggestion that the RPF controlled this immediate area.

. President Habyarimana's plane was shot down on 6 April but he heard about it on the radio on 7 ril 1994 that announced that people stay indoors and movement restricted in his locality but there

as looting by the Interahamwe. They wore a uniform made from Kitenge and with the MRND go. They were members of the MRND militia and looted, destroyed houses and killed people. The terahamwe came in a Diahatsu vehicle and looted the shop of local shopkeeper. On 7 and 8 April

1994, the shopkeeper came and after discussing with two people, on of whom asked the witness and thers to report at the secteur office with the Red Cross. They went there and on arrival, the leader

of the Interahamwe arrived there and informed them that only the Tutsis and not the Hutus had to register. log

5. Hutu leader of the Interahamwe Semana used his dagger to stab a Tutsi named Gatsinzi and ained that this was the way he wanted the Hutus to kill the Tutsis and the secteur conseiller

Atenez Niyoniringira fired a shot in the air and people including the witness who was in mortal fear

108 GEQ is PW24 and PIS is PX30.

109 This was a ruse to separate the Hutus from the Tutsis in order to easily exterminate the Tutsis.


his life scattered. He ran to Kibara Hill. Here, the conseiller of Gishaka secteur, Rutsinga Joel ved and informed the refugees that because he had tried to stop the killings, he was being

moved and replaced by the Interahamwe leader called Rugambage. The old conseiller then told em that he had done his best to save the refugees but now they have to save themselves."0 A

unal police officer by the name Aciel Sibomana came and informed the refugees that he was oing to obtain guns from the commune for their protection. This gave the witness some assurance

he decided to spend the night with a friend.' ' ' are o f h is p resence i n a friend's h ouse, A ciel S ibomana t he p olice o fficer ( Ssee a lso G EU)

came in to drink beer. Aciel informed the friend that he; Aciel Sibomana had gone round to inform pulace that whosoever hid Tutsis would be burned along with the Tutsis because the fate of

utsis was sealed. He further said that ICAMUHANDA would bring reinforcements, supply arms, machetes the next day.

Witness (GEQ: "He added that the next day some reinforcement would arrive led by KAMUHANDA. That was reinforcement in terms of weapons, especially machetes that were to be used for the killings."

Transcript of 19 February 2002 PTE 18, PTF 2 1-22

After Aciel's departure, the witness was panic-stricken and he ran to take refuge and hid in a field. The information from Aciel Sibomana, a police officer struck fear in him. He knew ANDA as a native of an adjoining hill and knew KAMUHANDA's father as Mureramanzi.

escaped the massacres and met up with him at Giti informed him that 's vehicle was used to transport and distribute machetes in Gikomero.

Witness (GEQ: "And we saw on the lake, dead bodies that were floating, and the escapees that came from Gikomero by crossing the lake, told us that it was KAMUHANDA's vehicle that was used to distribute machetes in Gikomero, sir."


Witness (GEQ): "They merely told me that KAMUHANDA had distributed machetes in the Gikomero Commune. "

Transcript of 19 February 2002 PTE 42-43, PTF 50

UHANDA an intellectual was influential within the MRND party. Cross-examination revealed inability to cross the lake immediately especially as the authorities had requested that they go to ara a place that was as much his home as where he lived. He confirmed Sibomana's office and ere he was collecting arms from and his state of fear in his friend's house did not stop him from

ising KAMUHANDA.

e finally crossed the Muhazi Lake, he saw on the other side of the lake houses in all the many g communes burning and corpses floating on the lake. The refugees did not give a date but

KAMUHANDA used a pick up to distribute weapons in the Gikornero area. UIIANDA an influential M R . member also worked in the ministry of education. Cross-

xamination revealed that he knew two KAMUHANDAs in his locality, one a farrner and the other

110 This is the further fulfillment of the MRND planned programme to remove non extremist local officers and replace them with the extremists. The Accused worked to

achieve this objective in Gikomero where he installed an extremist Prefet who would facilitate the killing of Tutsis in the Prefecture.

I I f Aciel Sibomana is the hand of officialdom in the prepared killings. He was aware well before the killings began that state machinery would be used in the killings of the

Tutsis. He also gave false information to the Tutsis to lure them into a state of false security in order to facilitate killing them.

Prosecutor v. I;CAMUHAIVDA, ICTR-99-54A-T

chieftain from Gisagara and this was the one that Aciel Sibomana talked about when he g for b eer a t the friend's house. In response t o Ju dge R amarosson, h e explained that

was the only party of the state prior to multi-party era. The MRND party in that area d all the positions and were able to remove the conseiller who did not cooperate in the


gave important corroborating evidence concerning the level of preparation prior to the attacks ga~nst the refugees. In particular, he supports evidence given by GEU about the participation of

Aciel Sibomana, and the overhearing of Sibomana's c omments that W U H A N D A would bring reinforcements and weapons. Additionally he supports other witness's evidence that

WANDA was influential member of the MRND. Finally, he gives evidence that he was told y s urvivors o f t he m assacres, that K AMUHANDA and h is v ehicle h ad b een i nstrumental i n the istribution of machetes within the Gikomero Commune.

ard the news, that is, the information the President's plane in the morning of the 7th of April He and some friends earlier in the night of the 6th had heard this sound. They asked the

e to refrain from forrning groups and they asked each and everyone to remain in their houses. lived in Karama secteur at the time. On 7th of April soldiers came to his cellule, searched their se and beat them. They then they told their mother that they were going to spend the night killing sis. They went to search other houses in the area after they had searched theirs. He did not know

specific houses. In the close proximity where they lived, they were the only Tusti house in at close proximity. The other Tutsi houses were far away from where they lived. He did not see utu houses being searched. He would have seen it if Hutu houses were searched, as they were near is house. The Tutsi houses were burnt.

en they saw that there was no security in the area, they decided to leave but before they departed le from different regions arrived in his area and informed them that Hutus were chasing after the s. Subsequently their secteur councillor Celenista Nivuga also informed them that the Hutus

ere attacking Tutsis. That was why they fled (due to lack of security), towards the Jurwe secteur they stayed for a while. They were the target of attacks from various places. As a result of

e attacks, the security situation was not good in that area, they decided to leave. Approximately of them traveled towards Jurwe but along the way, some died. At that point, the refugees were

utsis who had come from different areas. There were no Hutus amongst them because only the utsis were being attacked and everyone knew this.

eir attackers on the way to Jurwe were Hutu Interahamwe, who initially targeted their cattle that ed to eat the meat. Subsequently, they attacked with sharp objects and ran after them a great deal. e refugees tried to fight them, to face them, but they were stronger because they were arrned with

s and grenades. The walk from their secteur to Jurwe where they met other refugees who had ith their cattle took two days. On arrival at Jurwe, they were still targeted and attackers came their livestock and killed people. They therefore, decided to leave that location and head

towards Kayanga in order to find a much safer location. The Hutu attackers were from various ut p olicemen and s oldiers a lso w ent through that area b ut they d idn't c ome t o attack u s. not protect us either. They passed through the area but were not there to protect. They

to Kayanga while the police and the soldiers headed towards the Burunga market in Kabuga direction of Kayanga.

112 GKL is PW 25 and his PIS is PX 31. His highlighted statements in English and French jointly admitted as DX26.

64

oseeutor V , KAMUHANDA, ICTR-99-54A-T

a1 at Kayanga, the number of refugees in their party had diminished to about two hundred but found many more when they arrived. He left Jurwe on the night of 7th on the third day. ived at Jurwe on the 7". That was in the Bushyantobo cellule that is situated in Jurwe.

ed for the school. The timings were, he heard of the President's death on the radio on the vening of the 7th, he left his home area. On the 8th, they were in the Bushyantobo cellule. they went to the Jurwe secteur and it was on the 9th at 2 o'clock in the morning that they a. They arrived at Jurwe on the 9th of April. They were at the school. They left on the to arrive at Kayanga the following day the loth. Approximately 20 Interahamwe and

olice officers manned the roadblock at Kayanga and he was able recognise some of the terahamwe. They were armed with traditional weapons especially the Interahamwe armed with

ears and clubs and hoes but the policemen had modem weapons. When they arrived at anga, at the roadblock, they were in a line. We were in a line and were asked to stop, we

ed, and the Interahamwe there pulled people from the line. People struggled to go back to the ne and there was a lot of noise.

A realised the chaos that obtained, he told the Interahamwe to order the owards Gishaka parish where KAMUHANDA said he would ensure their safety. imself said that. He said,

"Go to Gishaka there you will find protection, sir"

Transcript of 6 May 2002 page 19 Lines 23 and 24

erahamwe pulled people from the line. When they pulled people from the line, he did not see 11 the people, but he never saw those people again. He could not give a figure of the number

refugees pulled out of the line but two people that he knew personally who were pulled out were ziga and another Muhire. Many people were dragged down from the line and people screamed.

, including KAMUHANDA did anything to prevent the Interahamwe dragging or pulling om the line because they did what they deemed. KAMUHANDA was approximately 20

ekes away right in front from him, but he had seen him before on the way. Actually, they were in a one-queue line heading towards the roadblock. KAMUHANDA was on the side of the roadblock.

7 , ascal, Brigadier Nyagwanya, another Interahamwe talked with KAMUHANDA at the ck but he was not able to hear what they were saying. Self-evidently KAMUHANDA was in

a g e of the roadblock because everything took place during the daytime and not at nighttime. erefore, it was obvious to him and other people that who were with him that KAMUHANDA was

tn charge. Two refugees who later died, Muyanga, Michel Kanango recognized KAMUHANDA at e. Those who recognized KAMUHANDA exclaimed, "KAMUHANDA is also at that k" ICAMUHANDA became a Minister of Education in the Government of the Abatabazi

m government). When the witness saw him, he realised that KAMUHANDA was the man that he saw usually at the communal office at Gishaka. He knew the two refugees who nized KAMUHANDA. They had met during the flight to the location and during the events.

ew them long before the events as having their occupations and professions. He did not hen they came for a drink at the bar that after work. They were pretty well off; indeed

ey were wealthy. They had occupations in town. He did not know what business they were in, but e believed they were engineers. Be that as it may, just by seeing them one could tell that they were uite well-off.

anga and Muyango said,

"that is IKAMUHANDA"


ANDA when they were in front of me in the queue and if memory served consideration that at the time it was difficult to assess things clearly, he would

were only two or three people between himself the two, approximately 18 meters ay. The refugees eventually passed through the roadblock. They were told to go to the Gishaka sh where their s ecurity would b e guaranteed. In v iew o f t he fact that the s ituation w as v ery

ectic and everything was being done in a hidden manner, and as he wasn't carrying a watch at the me, he could not give an accurate timing but they remained for approximately fifteen minutes.

A was in view as Kayanga and Muyengo and he moved in the queue towards the

anga and Muyengo never said that their identification of KAR/I.UHANDA was wrong or that they made a mistake and that it was not KAMUHANDA at the roadblock. They never changed their

was KAMUHANDA at the roadblock, either before they reached the roadblock or rwards. All the Interahamwe and people at the roadblock had dealings with KAMUHANDA they did everything after consulting with KAMUHANDA. KAMUHANDA made hand

estures and he was either pointing in the direction in which they should be led or what should be one. It was obvious that KAMUHANDA was their leader even though he was not personally

0. were dead bodies of persons that they killed but when we arrived in that location he saw s that were slightly down -- slightly below fiom where they were. The bodies were lying on the d. The bodies were slightly below the roadblock at approximately twenty meters below the While on the queue, he saw KAMUHANDA in front of him, but it was true that there were

le in front of him that obstructed the view of him but as he moved forward, he could see the eople that were at the roadblock.

known KAMUHANDA from when he was a 19 year old student at CERAI school. When through the roadblock they were told to go to the Gishaka Parish and that their security ensured there. They left the place and went through another smaller roadblock at a place egeka, but this is still in Gishaka secteur. It took them only one day to go fiom Kayanga to

shaka and as they left they encountered more roadblocks manned by the Interahamwe as well as e Abakiga people fiom Rukiga more precisely fkom Byurnba. These people were displaced by the r. They fled Byumba when war reached that area. They ended up in the Gishaka Parish in the emoon. They went up to Rwegeka, and then they reached Gishaka secteur. A little bit before that

lace, the Interahamwe manned a roadblock made of a rope across the road. The Interahamwe em a road that goes off to the right and that was the road they took to the Parish and more

recisely to the school.

rahamwe led them on arrival into the church to join others already in there, probably as they had been told their security would be ensured there. The numbers of the refugees nished because some people had been killed on the way and others had fled towards other

ations. In the courtyard, he saw cattle belonging to Tutsis. He is unable to tell how many of were in the church because he did not count, but the church was full of Tutsis. The

teraharnwe stole cattle and the property. Some would leave with the cattle while others pushing o the church. They rejoiced in the evening about the work they had accomplished. At as able to hear noises of people shouting and some were dying. There was a lot of noise. zed and identified the Gishaka catholic parish on PX3 (K20785 of Gishaka parish). He

as able to escape the next day when Bizimana came to where they were and told the people that were there they should no longer kill people at the church.


ey were called, and ordered to come out. They did and sat on a small wood of Cyprus trees near e convent. At this location they were separated into men on one side, women, and children on the

other. The Interahamwe took their money, property -- belongings, especially clothes, and the clothing that was still new, and that was where he saw KAMUHANDA with the Interahamwe and several policemen. KAMUHANDA was going around at the location where they were, but the

amwe came amongst them to take away their money and belongings. He recognised certain who were with KAMUHANDA. These were Bizimana who was a guard at the convent and

a who was the driver of the ambulance of the health centre, some policemen and another aya. He was also able to recognise some members of the Hutu community, one

Hawachiga. After some time Bizimana came back and said, leave these people to go back to their m u n e and lead them to their commune.

were taken to the commune that is at the level of the canton tribunal. There that they were told towards the football field and all the men went to the football field. The women were told to

ack home. They arrived at the football field where the Abakiga had already built some ommodation -- make-shift -- they used to call them ''Blandly", in other words, bullet proof. Once

ot to the football field, they started pushing and beating them up, but he was able to sneak out rowd and run away. He took refuge in the woods and it was thus that he was able to reach the

of the women. When he left, policemen were already leading the men and KAMUHANDA ere and he did not see any of those men again. He said himself that they had been must have

een killed at that football field. After the war some bodies were exhumed from that football field to

5. He was not in a position to know the number of men taken to the football field, as the situation was critical at that point in time and everyone was trying to save his or her life. They were with

se who were leading them to the location. Some Abakiga (war displaced Hutus) that used to live football were in their midst. He estimated and reckoned that there were between eighty and Actually, he reckoned that is fiom the time they left the Presbyterian Institute, they were that time, and most of them, were women and children. He knew KAMUHANDA and

zed him because he had seen him before in Kayanga, so when I he saw him again at that he recognised him. He recognised him as the same person who had gotten to that location

e reiterated before that he had seen him before when he was a student or a pupil in Gishaka. UHANDA was present throughout the time they were taken in groups out of the church,

eventually being taken to the football field. All these took about one hour actually it happened etween 8 and 10 and they left that location by 9 o'clock.

. Be caught sight of KAMUHANDA as he passed by the place while the witness was in the midst of wd. The Interahamwe escorted KAMUHANDA as he was making rounds, he was made inspecting the refugees, sometimes he would be at a spot that he wouldn't see, but

UHANDA was with the Interhamwe, and the other In ivesting refugees ir belongings especially clothes and money. When he , he had his hands

ocket and he was making his rounds among the refugees. He did not see him doing anything from just going around, he added that he was with other people -- other Interhamwe who were

efugees' property and it was very clear that they were doing so under his authority, at least he allowed them to do so. He permitted -- those people took, also, from the refugees ID cards.

7. Himself, Kayanga and Muyango (who had not been killed at that point in time) and people in the as well knew Accused as well. He escaped but has no doubt that the man at the Gishaka church was KAMUHANDA. He saw him and had seen him on several occasions. One cannot

see somebody and not be able to recognise that somebody just a few moments or some time after that. Because of the lapse of time, 8 years ago he was not in a position to point KAMUHANDA out in the Court. It was a long time since he had seen him and KAMUHANDA might have changed.


s-examination did not detract from the testimony of the Witness. Instead, it reinforced it ficantly. He confirmed his arrival in Kayanga and reiterated the same itinerary that he had

earlier given in his examination in chief. He confirmed that he had seen KAMUHANDA on four occasions, that is whilst he was attending school and it was at the time that they used to walk around with other students and they passed by and saw him with other people. Apart from those, four times he saw him again during the war. He recognized the same exhibits that he had been shown earlier hotographs P2 and P4.


. GKL is an important witness because he gives an extensive account of the targeting of refugees in the several areas through which he travelled, as well as the organization in being for direct and control of their movement. It is submitted his evidence is important in the following ways:

. That the tusi population were being targeted for attack in all the areas in which he travelled.

. On his route from his home towards gisaka via Jurgwe and Kyanga, there was no protection from the RPF - and supports the prosecution submission that pro-government sympathizers had freedom of movement to and from Gikornero.

c. At the Kayanga roadblock it was controlled by the Interahamwe, and the refugees were obliged to line up to pass through

. Two businessmen whom he was travelling with recognised KAMUHANDA. Neither of them apparently came from the Gikomero area, both apparently were engineers (they were subsequently killed). Their recognition of KAMUHANDA was in daylight and over a period as they passed through the roadblock.

e. GKL had seen KAMUHANDA on previous occasions and confirmed their recognition of him. He stated that KAMUHANDA appeared to be in control of the roadblock and was directing the refugees to Gishaka

f. At the Gishaka church, he was able to see KAMUHANDA on several occasions and confirmed it was one and the same person that he had seen at the roadlock.

By looking at the defendant for a significant period of time and then stating he could not be sure of identification demonstrates the integrity of this witness and the high credibility of his evidence.

n 7th April 1994 GKJs husband's brother came to tell the family of the President's death, and that in Kigali the Tutsi were being blamed and to advise them to run away. They did so because attacks and demonstrations had started in the area in which Interahamwe were involved. In a few days they

ved at Jurwe. There were about 3,000 Tutsis running from the attacks, and the attackers had guns and grenades in addition to traditional weapons. The witness testified that they then had to leave Jurwe because of attacks against them, and they went to Gasagara, then on to Karanga, where they were told by the attackers to go to Gishaka communal office where they would find safety.

1 13 GKJ is PW26 and PIS is PX32.

Prosecutor v. KAMUHANDA, ICTR-99-S4A-T

n the road to Kayanga, the witness saw a blue Daihatsu pick-up. KAMW iANDA was in the front between the driver, Nzaramba, and the police brigadier, Nyarwiya. The people in the vehicle said

e refugees should be led to Gishaka for their security. At Kayanga, there was a roadblock, where some refugees were killed by Interahamwe. From there the refugees were led to Gishaka by a group

Interahamwe. Some of the people there recognised KAMUHANDA when they saw him in the -up. Approximately 20 mentioned him by name.

ce at Gishaka they were told to go to the church, where they arrived in the afternoon. The witness anived with about 300 other Refugees, and there were already refbgees inside and outside of the church. They were inside the church with the doors closed when they heard the some vehicles arriving. People ran to the windows to see what was happening, and then the witness heard people

"Our fate is sealed because KAMUHANDA has arrived"'. The witness could see UHANDA through the window, and testified that he was in charge, and was in front of the

others. This happened on the same day that he had been seen in the vehicle, and witness GKJ had no he same man. He was also with Nyarwaya again. There were others in the church sed KAMUHANDA - people saw him through the windows and were saying , KAMLTHANDA, there goes KAMUHANDA".

253. After the vehicles arrived the attackers tried to break the doors of the church, but it was night and the ish priest asked them not to kill people inside the church. There were numerous attackers, and

had traditional weapons and guns. That night some children died of asphyxiation in the church, and the massacre continued the next morning. The priest tried to stop the assailants from attacking,

e told the refugees "You are going to be exterminated because KAMUHANDA has come" and asked them to pray.

e church, the men were separated from the women while the killings were taking place. The assailants killed those they could reach and sent the others home. When the witness was leaving the church she saw KAMUHANDA in the courtyard with Interahamwe. Witness GKJ heard

AM)A tell them to kill people, and to send the rest of the people home. There were many odies in the courtyard, and the men were taken away and killed in another place. The witness fled

the church. She was taken to a house, where they were attacked again, and she was thrown in a ditch 1 eft for d ead. From t here s he w as able t o drag h erself a way from t he d itch and t ake refuge

behind a bush, where the Inkotanyi found her. Her children had been killed and thrown in a latrine.

n cross-examination, the witness testified that the vehicle she saw KAMUHANDA in on the road was coming towards her, and that the occupants of both the blue Daihatsu and a white vehicle following it told them to go to Gishaka. She arrived at Gishaka on 11" April. At the church, the assailants did not enter the building; the refbgees exited the church when they were told to in the

orning. The witness testified that KAMUHANDA told the Interahamwe "kill them and when you are tired of that you can send them back to other regions where other killers will kill them".

Witness GKJ: "In just a few moments after that, we heard the engines of the vehicles arriving, and then people ran to the windows to see what was happening outside. And I heard people saying, this is our dawn, this is -- our fate is sealed, because KAMUHANDA has arrived, sir." (. . .) "Yes, sir, I could see him through the window, but there was a lot of hustle and bustle, sir." (. . .) "At that time, KAMUHANDA was not alone, sir. But let me explain that he was in charge, because he was in front of the others, sir."

Transcript of 7 May 2002 PTE 36-37, PTF 42-44

Witness GKJ: "He (the priest) added, "Rwandans are bad. You are going to be exterminated because KAMUHANDA has come"."


Transcript of 7 May 2002 PTE 49, PTF 58

Witness GKJ: "At the time I left the church, I saw him outside in the courtyard with other persons and this was as I left the church" (. ..) "He was with Interahamwe" (. ..) "He only spoke to those Interahamwe. He told them to kill people and to send the rest of the people home. "

Transcript of 7 May 2002 PTE 52, PTF 6 1 -62

secutor9s submissions

ives evidence of identificationby other persons of Kamuhanda on two separate occasions ilst at Gishaka Church. He was clearly in the presence of the Interahamwe, and was heard giving

instructions to kill some person, and let others go home. Her evidence is corroborative of other witnesses' testimonies.

7. e witness lived in Gikomero Commune, Gishaka secteur in 1994. On 30" March 1994, she had a onversation with her brother between 9 and loam at the Health Centre. Her brother told her that

da, the wife of the bourgrnestre, Telesphore Rutaganira, had told him that KAMUHANDA had to talk to her husband and said there were many accomplices of Tutsi living in Nkuzuzu, and e Interahamwe from Remera will come to kill them. Florida had then advised him to run away

for his own security. Before they went home after the conversation, a vehicle went past and the itness's brother said that KAMUHANDA was in that vehicle and pointed him out. The witness

sight of KAMUHANDA as he went past.115 The witness's brother knew KAMUHANDA, although she did not know how. Her brother had worked at the Health Centre for at least 10 years.

. From that time, tension was very high in the secteur. Witness GKI testified that people usually lived in harmony, but now some began r u ~ i n g away. She stayed in the area, but moved fiom one bush to

other hiding. After the President's death, there were violent acts in that area. She knew one erson who was killed, called Munyongeyo. On the 1 1" April Bourgmestre Rutaganira come to the

colline and called Hutus aside to talk to them. ARer that, Hutus started separating themselves from utsis and mounting roadblocks. At this time Tutsi men started telling their wives and children they ad better run away, and that they would stay and monitor the situation. So at 4 or 5am the witness oved t owards the c hurch i n the G ishaka s ecteur. S he arrived v ery e arly o n 1 2" April, t he d ay

efore her birthday. She arrived with 50-80 other refugees, and they were the lSt to arrive. The itness spoke to the priest, Michel Denis, whom she knew from attending church. There were also

aced persons there from Byumba, and after them, another 800-1000 refugees arrived. Some of were injured from Interahamwe attacks, and they were Tutsi.

itness had gone to the church with her mother, brothers and sisters. The children fell ill, so she to the Health Centre where she had done some training to ask for some medicine. She was told ould find Rusatsi, who was in charge of the Health Centre, at the canteen. When she got there,

here were 15-20 people talking with him, but they fell silent and withdrew. The people she recognised were Hutu. Rusatsi gave her some medication and she left towards the church. As eople in the canteen were coming out she went to speak to Bourgmestre Rutaganira, and he was alking to a man who he called "Mr KlAMUHANDA". This man had the same face as the man who

114 GKI is PW 27 and PIS is PX33.

115 The witness was able to describe the area, pointing out both the health centre and the communal office, on photographs 15 and 16.

70

er brother had pointed out to her in on 13 '~ March. The witness testified that Rusatsi hated Tutsis would openly threaten them, and that he was a friend of KAMUHANDA's.

got back to the church at about 5pm. An hour later a blue minibus arrived that was used as an bulance, and it was carrying the bourgmestre and policemen carrying rifles. The bourgmestre said

e Tutsis should go into the church and the Hutus should go to the commune office. The refugees were pushed into the church, the doors were closed, and the witness could see armed people surrounding the church. Throughout the night, they would take people out of the church and she

uld hear screaming and shots being fired. Between 5 and 6am there was a lull. GKI saw the priest sing people, so she went to ask for some water to drink. He told her to come to his house for ing water. While at his house, she heard shots and screaming - the people still at the church

ere being attacked. People in the church the night before had been saying that KAMUHANDA had

m someone came to tell the Priest that if he hid a Tutsi he would be killed, so he GKI to hide somewhere else and sent someone to go with her. As she left the witness saw en 50 and 100 bodies, and she had to step over her mother. The attack had begun between 4-

s intense for 3 hours. After that the witness could still hear shots, but not as intensely as g and shots before. After leaving the priests house the witness returned to Nkuzuzu, her

n cellule, and an old woman called Helen took her in for the night. The next day the house was acked. The witness had a bible and rosary beads on her when the house was attacked, and was ared because of her pious acts. The attackers said she was a nun. Therefore, she must be spared so at she could care for them. One of the attackers, Murokore, escorted her to Gishaka, back to the

riest's house. She went there with the old woman's child. They stayed less than an hour at the re he asked her to leave because if the attackers found her there they might kill she saw Rutazana and his 3 children being chased and killed, 30 metres away from

ss-examination, the witness was able to identify the priest's house and the courtyard on photo She also clarified that the Hutus sent to the commune by the bourgmestre were displaced

ersons, and that the brother she had the conversation with was a cousin, but in Kinyanvanda, they all them brothers. She also testified that Rusati gave her medicine because people veiled their true

lings towards each other at the time, and he would not have a good excuse not to give it to her. sati was a Tutsi who claimed to be a Hutu - the witness only found out he was actually a Tutsi

stated that she had gone through training as a nun, but in 1994, she had suspended her lp her parents. She also said that there were two other foreign priests at Denis' house,

it was on the 14th, at Helen's house, that the attackers found her ID card, not on the 13". The ies she saw on 13 '~ were in front of the church in the courtyard. In addition, the people in the

urch on the evening of the Uth said KAMUHANDA had distributed weapons had allegedly seen and knew him very well.

Witness GKI: "KAMUHANDA said, the inhabitants of Nkuzuzu or among the inhabitants of Nkuzuzu, there were many accomplices. Arnong the Nkuzuzu inhabitants, there were many accomplices of Tutsi and for that matter the Interahamwe from Remera will come to kill them.. ."

Transcript of 8 May 2002 PTE 14-15, PTF 15


Witness GKI: "While we were at the church during the night people were screaming saying we must pray because we are about to die and these people said that KAMUHANDA had brought weapons."


Witness GKI: "These are rumours spread throughout the night inside the church. There was no light, and among us inside the church some knew KAMUHANDA very well and allegedly saw him. And they were saying that KAMUHANDA had helped to distribute the equipment to kill people in the Gikomero region."

Transcript of 10 May 2002 PTE 74-75, PTF 86-87

rosecutor's submissions

I gives evidence of Kamuhanda's visit to the then Bourgmestre of Gikomero on the 30" March, and the fact that she was informed that the Accused had stated Tutsis were to be attaked. Kamuhanda w as i dentified b y h er b rother a s h e d rove b y. F urthermore s he gives t wo additional

ces of identification evidence. The first relates to the Accused being addressed by name by aganira. Secondly, he was identified, again by name, by refugees who saw him when they sought

sanctuary with the Church. The Prosecution suggests that GKI is an important witness who adds to the identification evidence against Kamuhanda.

265. DAL was in Giti commune, Byumba prefecture to visit family on April 6th, 1994. He is a gendarme. He left Giti commune around April 21''. One day later, en route from Kanombe (Kigali prefecture) to Gisenyi, accompanied by Innocent Buseni, DAL stopped a white vehicle at the Kigali roundabout.

his vehicle held four men in uniform, one of which was Muyandikwe, a friend of DAL's. UHANDA was also in the vehicle (not in uniform), and was returning from a meeting

convened by the prefet of the city (apparently Kigali). DAL and Buseni got a lift in this car.

was taken through more than 10 roadblocks in the car. The roadblocks were manned by hamwe, who asked for identification from the occupants of the car. Each time,

identified himself as a government minister and the car passed through. At the first abugogo (near Kanombe, either in or just outside the city of Kigali), DAL observed

terahamwe armed with "firearms, grenades, and clubs". DAL also saw a pile of bodies not far from the roadblock. Upon seeing the bodies:

KAMUHANDA spoke to the Interahamwe. When he saw the bodies that were piled there, he said, "These young men have done a good job. At the meeting, we discussed this matter"


At each subsequent roadblock, DAL noticed people sitting on the side of the road, apparently having been arrested by the Interahamwe and awaiting execution. At various points, KAMUHANDA told the Interahamwe, "Go on, do not give up to fatigue," and at one of the roadblocks, he asked the Interahamwe whether they had enough weapons, sir, and he added, "Nobody should go through without showing you his or her papers", sir."

1 16 DAL is PW28 and PIS is PX 34


Transcript of 13 May 2002 PTE 20, PTF 23-24

Witness: "There were more than ten roadblocks and none of the persons from the escort ever disputed. After words were mentioned, the roadblocks were opened and we were let through. No one ever disputed the fact that he was KAMUHANDA."

Transcript of 14 May 2002 PTE 52, PTF 57-58

DAL got out of the car at Gitarama (apparently the city). DAL is a Hutu.

oss-examination there was some disagreement between DAL and defence counsel as to when ril 1994 Byumba prkfecture generally and Giti commune in particular came under RPF control.

en he flagged the vehicle, DAL did not have his uniform with him. When DAL arrived in be, he went to a military camp, rather than a gendarmerie, because there was no transport

available to go to the gendarmerie. Buseni, the person with whom DAL had been travelling from Kanombe to Gisenyi, was a soldier assigned to the Nyabugogo checkpoint, and invited DAL along. Nyabugogo is not far from Kanombe. Buseni had been in Kanombe camp on a private matter.

were a total of eight people in KAMUHANDA's vehicle after it picked up DAL and Buseni: UHANDA, four bodyguards, a driver, and DAL and Buseni. DAL states that UHANDA's vehicle most likely stopped because of Buseni, who was in uniform, not for DAL,

was in civilian clothes. DAL had never been on the road upon which the Nyabugogo roadblock een erected. DAL did not see any roadblocks at the income tax office or at "Kabuga's". se counsel states that KAMUHANDA was appointed government minister only on May 25th,

94, about a month after the events being described transpired. DAL testifies that KAMUHANDA ed himself as a minister at each roadblock.

efore DAL and Buseni entered KAMUHANDA's vehicle, the occupants of the car were arranged wing way: the driver (driver's seat), KAMUHANDA (front passenger seat), two

KAMUHANDA's escort (middle set of seats), and the other two members of UHAEDA's escort, one of whom was DAL's acquaintance Muyandikwe (third row of seats).

hat the road from Kimisagara to Nyamirambo (two neighbourhoods within Kigali) is the road from Kigali to Gitarama; DAL had testified that he noticed the bodies at the checkpoint (on the Kimisagara-Nyarnirambo road) while travelling on the Kigali-

n April 5", DAL was in Byumba prqecture (in the commune of Giti). In response to RPF infiltration o f c ommunes n ear G iti, D AL 1 eft B yumba t o go t o G isenyi. In o ne o f D AL's sworn tatements, (dated July 12", 1995, produced by a Rogatory Commission of a Belgian Trial Chamber)

(somewhat unclear), DAL did not mention that he saw massacres in Kigali (apparently at the ugogo roadblock). In response to the question "Did you s ee any massacres?" p osed b y t he

ector of the Police Judiciaire back in 1995, DAL stated, "I saw some in Gisenyi". DAL declares re that he did not volunteer then that he saw massacres in Nyabugogo and other places outside of

Gisenyi because he could not answer a question that had not specifically been asked. In another of DAL9s sworn statements (taken May 12", 1999), DAL stated that on the morning of April 7", the

rgmestre of Giti commune gave DAL and other policemen weapons to try to prevent killings. In L's May 1999 statement, DAL mentioned more than 15 people, including Interahamwe and

liticians, but did not mention KAMUHANDA giving DAL a lift. DAL states here that he merely answered questions put to him, and could not volunteer information that had not been requested.

Prosecutor v. KAIMUHANDA, ICTR-99-54A-T

n Re-examination DAL, testified that he was not asked about UHANDA when he was interviewed in 1995 at Gisenyi (unclear whether or not this particu taken by the Belgian Rogatory Commission mentioned earlier in the transcript). When DAL left Giti commune around April 21St, he was given travel authorization from the bourgmestre. DAL does not

the exact date. At no point did anyone in the vehicle voice objection to or dispute UHANDA's identification of himself as a government minister to the Interaha

the ten or so roadblocks.

to questions put by Jud e Ramaroson, DAL sai aware that a transitional rnment was formed after April 6tE, 1994, and learned that ANDA had been named a

ister only when he reached Kigali (apparently before encountering KAMUHANDA in the m Kanombe to Gisenyi). DAL does not know how far the spot where DAL claims to have UHANDA is from Nyabikenge, the place in Gitarama pre'fecture where the defense

counsel alleges KAMUHANDA had been on or about April 21''.

rosecutor's Submission:

DAL is a witness who is wholly independent of the allegations surrounding the massacres in ikomero and Gitarama. His evidence is important, because of its independence. The attitude of

UHANDA is entirely consistent with evidence given by other witnesses, and secondly is in a graphical location (i.e Gitarama), which is consistent with the evidence given by various Defence

V DEFENCE CASE

e Defence Evidence in summary

ed 36 witnesses including the Accused himself and an expert in political science. e testimony aims to prove - alibi - that during the period of time the Prosecution claims UHANDA was leading and organising the killing of Tutsis in the Gikomero area,

was not in the wider Gikomero area (neither at Gikomero or Gishaka parish), but in . KAMUHANDA was not seen at either Gikomero or Gishaka parish; and finally,

UHANDA could not have been able to go from Kigali to the Gikomero area, because of the wen circumstances at the time. The defence fails to show that KAMUHANDA was at the relevant eriods absent from the scene of crime.

evidence given by the defence-witnesses should be given very low probative value. The ot inclined to tell the truth. They all have a motive to lie because they ALL had a

relationship with KAMUHANDA. In actual fact, they lied. They did not tell the truth on a consistent basis, and even if the Chamber believes their testimony for the most part, it should not

ermine the prosecution case.

Important broad Observations on defence witnesses

"' - This witness had known the Accused for a long time. He lives close to the Accused's ther's h~use . ' ' ~ A very close relation of the Accused (who is in the African traditional context the used's brother or uncle - his father's younger brother) saved the life of GPT's mother because he he husband of GPT's sister. The Accused and the witness are in-laws and GPT explicitly resses gratitude towards the Accused whose family and influence saved his mother's life. The

"17 Defence Witness 9 ("DW9") and Personal Information Sheet ("PIS") of witness GPT is Defence Exhibit ("DX51")

2 18 Transcript of 14 January 2003 p. 15

74

Prosecutor Y. KAMUHANDA, ICTR-99-54A-T

ility o f t he A ccused and h is family t o p rotect and s ave p articular T utsis i s further p roof o f h is e in his locality. ' lg

- GPR knew the father of the Accused very well. They were neighbours ght of as a very influential and powerful person.'21 GPE - GPE9s husband knew the Accused. They a [close] working relationship and regularly spoke to each other on educational issues and GPE

two of the Accused's sisters.122 GPC - GPC9s father and the Accused's father are cousins. the events of 1994 these two parents were neighbours. The Accused is GPC's ~ n c 1 e . l ~ ~

- GPG is a friend of Xavier the Accused's younger brother. 124 - PCE is the cousin of the ed. They have a close relationshi and her husband was a f the ~ccused. 12' GPB -

is married to the Accused's sister." GPI - GPI is the Accused's friendly. Whenever he came o t o v isit his m other, the Accused p assed b y GPI's shop and they always h ad a b eer

ther reasons and motives for distorting the truth

the tenth defence witness is the aunt of Rutayisire. Rutayisire is accused of being involved in ikomero parish massacre. In a bid to protect Rutayisire (and in the same breadth the Accused),

she emphatically stresses Ritayisire's innocen~e . '~~ GPE is the wife of the deceased GER'~', who is ccused of being involved in the Gikomero parish massacre. GPE understandably emphatically

stresses her husband's innocence and in her bid to establish her husband's innocence, she exposes er motive to do the same for the ~ c c u s e d . ' ~ ~ It is significant to note that before his death, GER enied in his statements to ICTR investigators to have ever seen the Accused at the parish. GPE is

of her husband's signed statement. GER in his own defence always claimed not to have any of the attackers.13'

- GPF is the son of the deceased GER. His testimony mirrors that of his mother, GPE and he also like his mother stresses his father's i nn~cence . ' ~~ GPK - GPK was friend and neighbour of the

others Kamanzi and Karakezi, both of whom are the nephews of the Accused and were allegedly involved in the Gikomero parish massacre. GPK himself was brought to the parish by the Interahamwe, but claims to have been one of the very few who were not actively involved in the

illings. GPK's testimony is wholly unbelievable. He was brought to the scene of the crime, he was sent throughout the killings and yet he was able to stand by while others in his party to the ation killed. His claim not to have ever been accused of killinmgs at the Gikomero parish suggests

at he feels that his escape from formal prosecution is a cover for his participation in the 133

D - NTD who was accused of participating in the Gikomero parish massacre bears a grudge ainst prosecution witnesses GEK and GET. They had given information against him in

119 Transcript of 14 January 2003 p. 19-23

1 20 GPR is DWlO and PIS D52

425 f ranscript of 15 January 2003 p. 13-14 and 36

2 22 GPE is DW11 and the PIS is DX53. Transcript of 16 January 2003 pp. 14-15

2 23 GPC is DW14 and the PIS is DX57. Transcript of 22 January 2003 pp. 32-33 and 56

5 24 GPG is OW15 and the PIS is DX58. Transcript of 23 January 2003 p. 18)

125 PCE is DW20 and the PIS is DX64. According to the testimony of GPK DW13 whose PIS is DX55 See transcript of 21January 2003 p. 50-53

126 GPB is DW17 and the PIS is DX DX60. Transcript of 28 January 2003 p. 16-17

127 GPI is DW18 and the PIS is 062. Transcript of 29 January 2003 p. 12

128 Transcript of 15 January 2003 pp 25-26

4 29 GER is Pastor Charles Nkuranga who was accused of participation in the massacres at his Gikomero protestant parish church and school.

130 Transcript of 15 January 2003 p. 45-53; 56-59; Transcript of 16 January 2003 pp 11-14 and 17-19

131 Transcript of 16 January 2003 pp 21-22; and 39

132 GPF is DW12 and the PIS is DX54. Transcript of 20 January 2003 pp 8-1 1; 17; 19-22; and 25-33 (GER, GPE and GPF are father, mother and son)

4 33 GPK is DW13 and the PIS is DX55. Transcript of 21 January 2003 pp 9-13; 52-56

B-osec~tor V. KAMUHANDA, ICTR-99-54A-T

proceedings before the national courts of Rwanda. NTD claims these prosecution wit lsely accused him.134 GPB - GPB was brought to the parish by the - interahamwe. - He claims to be one of the very few who were not actively involved in the killings.lj5 GPI - GPI is accused of playing a

ing role in the Gikomero parish massacre and arrested. He bears a grudge against prosecution itness GET. He claims GET falsely accused him, and GET wanted to make him testify against the

A c ~ u s e d . ' ~ ~ EM - EM bears a grudge against prosecution witness GEK, whom she worked for as a omestic help. There were "difficulties" and "problems" between EM and GEK. GEK was mean

to her and occasionally wouldn't pay her wages on time.137 EM was a young girl who had been ssurized into falsifying her testimony by the overwhelming and overbearing adults surrounding KAMUHANDA defence.

other and son. GPK's sister-in-law is PCE. GPR attended the church of GER husband) and GPF's father Transcript of 15 January 2003 pp 28-29. GPC had great respect the Accused as well pp 14-15 and 40 and the same appears to be true for GPK Transcript of

19. GPG and NTD are good friends. NTD is GPI's son-in-law. GPB i s married to Xaviera Mukaminani the sister of the Accused. GPI and GPR are neighbours.

The defence witnesses in summary

e m de Dieu KAMUHANDA'~~

NDA's family was well known in the Gikomero area, his grandfather and great- also lived there. KAMUHANDA accepted that people in the Gikomero commune

would come to greet him, and he accepted he personally was well known within the Gikomero locality. (26" August P TE 4 1). He was o ne o f t wo b oys i n the area who p assed a c ompetitive examination to gain admission to the seminary before moving on to Butare to conclude his studies in Rwanda. Subsequently, he went to study in Nice.

83. He married his wife on the 15" August 1983 in Nyabikenke.

was recruited into the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research. Mr. accepted that he was promoted within the Ministry "very, very quickly". He did

not accept that his fast promotion was as a consequence of being an active supporter of the MRND. During this period when he was married he lived in Kigali, he would regularly visit his parents. His

er died on the 14 '~ July 1984, but he continued to seelvisit his mother who still lived in Gikomero s often as he could.

. At that time towards the end of the 1980% four brothers and three sisters lived with his mother in ikomero. He would visit them, and on occasion attend mass in that general area. His mother and

members of his family still lived there in April 1994.

86. Mr. KAMLTHANDA accepted that he occupied a position in charge of the Technical Committee, an influential body whose members were chosen for their expertise and various skills. Despite being ased in Butare 1990-1992 he was not replaced as a member. The Prosecution submit that a proper

134 NTD is DW16 and the PIS is DX59. Transcript of 27 January 2003 pp 17-22.

135 Transcript of 28 January 2003 pp 12-13

136 Transcript of 29 January 2003 pp 8-1 1

137 Transcript of 30 February 2003 pp 3; and 21-23

'i 38 Jean de Dieu KMUHANDA testified on his own behalf and he is DW1

76

h s e c u t ~ r v. KAMUHANDA, ICTR-99-54A-T

realistic inference to draw is that KAMUHANDA was not replaced due to ence within the Gikomero Community both politically and socially.

7. His influence can further be demonstrated by the fact that in 1993 Mr. KAMUHANDA was ed in the selection process of the new Bourgmestre, whilst it is accepted that all members of

ical Committee are automatically members of the electoral college, it is significant to note s elected to be Chairman of that same committee, despite the fact he had been in Butare for us two years. GET gave evidence that KAMUHANDA who by his own admission was

er of the MRND was instrumental in the MRND candidate getting elected on this

ot an isolated incident in demonstrating his local influence. As early as UHANDA was chosen as head of Protocol for the opening of the Communal centre by

KAMUHANDA stated in his evidence that he had not been invited to the opening of the YANGA health Centre in 1991 as he was in Butare at that time. It is submitted by the ecution, this was not the case, given his position within the community and especially the fact he remained with the Technical Committee at that time; it is inconceivable that he had neither

een invited or attended this opening. The Prosecution suggests that his evidence on this topic is untrue as several witnesses gave clear evidence that they saw him at the Centre, and these

ifications are the basis of later identification evidence by them demonstrating his involvement in the attacks in Gikomero and Gishaka. His denial is an attempt to distance himself from these accurate identifications of him at the sites of the massacres by some of the Prosecution witnesses.

t is submitted by the Prosecution that given KAMUHANDA's position within the Community in which he grew up; the fact that a large number of his family still resided there prior to April 1994, whom he regularly visited and above all, his rise to a position of significant authority, known by a

e number of people within the community, he was a person who was recognized and known to many persons, not only within the immediate area, but also a much larger hinterland.

MUHANDA's defence is principally one of alibi. In general terms he states that with one xception where he collected his son, he remained with his family and various neighbours from the th April. He called several witnesses to this fact. Helthey stated that the days were very similar to a

ent and little of any significance happened throughout this period. His family and himself oved to a neighbour's house (ALS) for protection against stray bullets and other forms of attack.

ecution submits that, given that his neighbour's house had no wall around it to protect the ilies including numerous children against any form of attack from potential assailants, whereas a

1 wall on three sides surrounded KAMUHANDA's home. His evidence is surprising especially as KAMUHANDA's house was made of fired brick as opposed to ALS's home, which

s constructed of inferior and weaker building material. It was said by ALS and KAMUHANDA at the reason for the choice her house was to obviate the danger of bullets fkom nearby gunfire.

However in their evidence that was a marked inconsistency in the direction of the hostile fire, on one account, stray bullets could have struck both houses with relative ease.

e illogicality and inconsistency of this explanation taken in conjunction with other evidence both rosecution and Defence, demonstrates the falsity of the account given by the Accused and his

witnesses. In support of this the Prosecution seek to rely upon the inconsistencies and submissions he end of each summary of the alibi witnesses called and hereafter mentioned in this


UHANDA gave evidence that he, his family and others eventually left on the 17~~118'~ April, contacting Col. Gatsinzi and managed to obtain a ride for them all in a bus that was destined to

~tarama, it being their intention to go to his mother in law's house in Nyabikenke near to Gitarama, where atrocities had just occurred. ALS gave evidence that she had been made aware upon her

val in Gitarama that atrocities had occurred there and consequently she decided to go to Butare instead,

rosecution submits that it is inconceivable that a father having been informed that atrocities had almost certainly were continuing to occur in the Nyabikenke area would seek to take his family

ife being Tutsi) to such a dangerous location from Gitarama, which was clearly perceived as an of safety. Such a decision, if true, demonstrates once again that the Accused's political iance and reputation was of such a nature as to not place his family at risk especially as he left

ere while he returned to Gitarama, or the account is untrue.

tion further submits that given the hostilities in and around the Kigali area it defies logic of young children and a Tutsi wife to remain in a neighbour's house until the 17" April

make no attempt to escape. Especially as given his MRND 'credentials' and important position, e would be able to approach persons in authority for assistance. It is also submitted given his

icity, he would be in a position to move relatively freely and pass through roadblocks without ndrance as ALM stated he had done.

rs. Kamuhanda gave evidence on her husband's behalf and indicated that she was very ill at that time and that her condition progressively worsened throughout this period. She later discovered that she was pregnant; unfortunately she had a miscarriage in July. She gave evidence to the Court that

e h ad i nformed h er husband b 0th a t o f h er i ncreasing p ain, and t fact that s he w as b leeding egularly and this continued into July when she received treatment in

A gave evidence that he was aware of his wife's condition yet he continued with to resolve difficulties concerning Rwandese students abroad and he would return

see his wife 213 times a week. Furthermore he "drove" his sister in law across the border at Goma the 15" June to enable her to fly to safety and he then returned to Rwanda. The Prosecution

submit that this evidence is important for two reasons: firstly, given the opportunity to take his children to safety and obtain medical assistance for his wife it demonstrates a callous disregard for

r welfare. Secondly, it totally refutes his suggestion that he was a reluctant Government Minister did not wish to participate in the Government's decision-making process.

UHANDA was arrested on the 26th November 1999 whilst in France. The family had reviously stayed in Nairobi, Kenya and also Cameroon. Despite the fact that there had been killings

scale within Rwanda, at no time was there any attempt to ascertain if any of their or extended families were safe or indeed to inform them that they had survived and were

now living safely abroad.

e Prosecution submits that this admission by both Mr. and Mrs. Kamuhanda is significant, because an appropriate inference for the Court to draw is that given the closeness of their families, such an

ion demonstrates an intention by them not to be located. It is even more significant, in that if urt accepts that such an inference is reasonable, it corroborates the Prosecution allegations of

s involvement in Gikomero and Gishaka and the clear knowledge by him that it was he had been identified as being involved in the attacks and his natural fear that the

relevant authorities were almost certainly seeking him throughout this period.

rosecutor v. KA MUHANDA , ICTR-99-54A-T

y, at no time did Mr. KAMUHANDA either contact or indicate that he would be willing to to, or assist investigators of ICTR in their pursuit of certain suspects, many of whom were

Government Ministers during the same period as the Accused.

4, ALS was a fiiend and neighbour of KAMUHANDA. She testified that on 8" April ALR's ly was attacked, so ALS's family, ALR's family and KAMUHANDA's family decided to

at her (ALS's) house. They left the house on the evening of 17", and left the area on lgth. UHANDA and ALR went to KAMUHANDA's friend General Gatsinzi and returned with two

Jeeps. They then took a bus from Camp Kigali to Gitarama. They passed through one roadblock. She spent one night at Gitarama Stadium, and then they went their separate ways.

oman had told them of massacres in Nyabikenke and warned them not to go there. e, ALS decided to return to her own house and took a bus to Butare. She left without where the others were going. ALS saw KAMUHANDA again in Cyangugu in July, and

vu. She also visited them in 1999 in Bourges, France. She heard of s arrest when Mrs. KAMUHANDA called her to tell her. She found out the

ough the internet.

. On Cross Examination ALS testified that she arrived in Butare on lgth April, and left on 3rd July 94. At first, she states that she was not aware of any killings in Butare, but she then says she did

not see any bodies or massacres of civilians, but she did have information that it was principally Tutsis and some moderate Hutus being killed in Butare in April and May. Such a denial demonstrates her sympathy to such a course.

. ALS agrees that she felt safe living in Butare with Hutus for seven weeks with no problems, but that as soon as the RPF are coming to the area she leaves. Although she denies the reason she felt safe was because she was known to be sympathetic to the Government and its actions. ALS is a Hutu.

rosecution suggest that, in accordance with ALS's description of the direction the bullets were g from in Kacyiru, ALS's house, and KAMUHANDA's house were equally vulnerable to hit - the mound next to ALS's house had no affect on the situation. In addition,

UHANDA's house was made of burnt bricks, whereas ALS's was made of mud bricks, and UHANDA9s house had a wall and a steel gate, which ALS's house did not. It does not make

sense that the KAMUHANDA family moved into a house that offers less security and protection than their own.

tated that the men took part in patrols during the night, but that there were not patrols during . KAMLTIIANDA would always come back to her house in the morning after the patrols, and rest at the house during the day. In her earlier interview, ALS had stated that if

UHANDA had left the house she would have noticed his absence.

oma Commune in Butare, where ALS lived, there were a large number of people, principally is, killed during the period she was there. ALS stated she heard of massacres, but did not see

She claims to be unaware of a massacre at the Moslem Quarters, very near to where she lived.

. The prosecution submit that the ALS pretended to be unaware of massacres in Butare because she was actually sympathetic to them, and therefore strikes at the credibility of her evidence. She was iving in an area that arguably could be described as having some of the worst atrocities of the

139 ALS is DW 2.


Rwandan Genocide, and she claims to be largely unaware of them. The prosecution further submit LS fled when the RPF were advancing on Butare because she had been aware of the atrocities are, and she knew that there would most likely be revenge taken against those who had

sympathised with them. This is also the reason why she has never gone back to Rwanda since eaving in July 1994.

sponse to questions by Judge Ramarosson, ALS stated that she listened to Radio Muhabura and M, but that neither of these stations talked about Hutus killing Tutsis.

rosecutior further submits that:

came to give evidence because she knows KAMUHANDA and his family so well, and because er political leanings.

ere are a number of inconsistencies between ALS's evidence and that of KAMUHANDA himself. or example, ALS stated that KAMUHANDA went to collect Rene with Canisius both times on the ", whereas KAMUHANDA stated the second time he went with Juif(a local Interahamwe). ALS

stated that she discussed moving into her house with KAMUHANDA, but lLWWHANDA es that there was any discussion. KAMUHANDA stated that during the day he and the other would sleep outside, while ALS asserted that the men would return at dawn and sleep in her g room. On the bus trip to Gitarama ALS stated that KAMUHANDA remained standing, and they did not have to show their ID cards, but KAMUHANDA testified that he was sitting and ot get up, and that the group had to show their ID cards.

ere are also inconsistencies within ALS's own evidence. She stated that KAMUHANDA could t have left in a vehicle without being seen, but later says she did not know how he went to find

atsinzi because she could not see KAMUHANDA when he left the house. She also states that it is impossible to see someone on the road fiom the house.

. Her sympathies lie with the policies of the Interim Government. This is evidenced by the fact that as able, with her group to go through the roadblock on the way to Gitarama, and by the fact

that she felt safe being in Butare throughout a period of intense violence and massacres, but fled as as the RPF were approaching. That her political leanings are also evidenced by the reason she herself for giving evidence on behalf of KAMUHANDA, namely ". ..that my testimony may

e one of the thousands of people, thousands of people who are aggrieved and who are detained." rosecution submits that she is here referring to those in Rwanda who have been accused and

etained on charges of genocide, and that this shows her sympathies with those people.

was neighbours with JDK in 1994. On 8th April 3 armed soldiers came to his house, said they come to kill him, went through his rooms, and left after ALR gave them 200,000 Francs. Later

hamwe came and took whatever they found in the house. The family moved to ALS's house. states that by the time they arrived at this house, JDK's family were already there, and that they with JDK until he left on 18th April.

8th JDK went in ALR's vehicle, with a military to drive him, to ask Gatsinzi for help. Gatsinzi t a vehicle at their disposal and they went to Gitarama with JDK's family, ALS and her family, trice and A LR's family. A LR s tayed b ehind. A LR stated that h e heard o f JD K's arrest from

le, and later from newspapers. He claims that he does not know the charges against JDK.

140 ALR is DW 3

rosecutor v. IYAMUHANDA, ICTR-99-54A-T

7 . On Cross Examination ALR admits that he is on provisional release for charges ending against him. He allegedly abused his position as a judge to alter judgements.

interview with OTP investigators, ALR's account differs on a number of points from his ce in court. He stated to the investigators that JDK left the area on 12th April, not the 18th.

He also said that JDK left with his own family and ALR's family, failing to mention ALS and her The date he gave for JDK's trip to Kimihurura was the 9th or loth, instead of 8th. His

ation for these discrepancies was that he was mistaken, and that his wife corrected him that evening.

ALR states that he knew that the investigator was asking about the genocide, and the events in April, and that after talking to his wife he realised he had given the wrong dates, by almost a week. The rosecution submit that as a lawyer ALR would know how important dates can be, and that he would ave realised that giving the right dates for events could be crucial for JDK's case. It is extremely

unlikely that on realising his mistakes ALR would not have worried about his error in any way, as he

e Prosecution further submit the following:

at the reason ALR did not take measures to correct the information he gave to the ICTR nvestigators is because he had not yet put his alibi story together with JDK.

321. That this is endorsed by the fact that, as a lawyer, ALR would realise the importance of the dates he gave, and yet he did not attempt to contact the ICTR in Kigali to inform the investigators of his

istakes. His assertion that he did not deem it necessary to approach the ICTR to correct his statement is illogical. A man with a legal mind who is keen to clear his neighbour of false genocide charges would have taken pains to correct such mistakes as a matter of urgency.

2. That the mistakes he claims to have made are not understandable mistakes. It seems unlikely to say the least that ALR would fail to mention ALS and her family as a part of the group that left with JDK, after having lived with them for 10 days. Such people should not be easily forgotten.

hat ALR is not a credible witness, that the statement he gave to the ICTR Investigators, as with other witnesses, is closer to the truth, and that he changed his evidence later to back up JDK's alibi.

ed 1 Skm away from JDK in 1994. He left Kacyiru on 15" or 16" April. On 7" April iers came to his house - he claims they came because he is a member of an opposition party; he

was the Vice President of the MDR in Gitarama area. On 10" April, ALM went to JDK's area (an ea allegedly subject to continuous gunfire) and talked with JDK for 20 minutes.

later met JDK again in Cameroon. He learnt of JDK's arrest in a Belgium newspaper, called s wife, got the lawyers address from her, and contacted the lawyer to protest.

n Cross Examination ALM testified that he was Hutu. When questioned on why the soldiers did not kill him for being in an opposition party, ALM claims it was because people around him started yelling. He denies that it was because he told them he was a syrnpathiser.

541 ALM is DW 4.

81

rosecutor 9. KAMUHANDA, ICTR-99-54A-T

states that he went to JDK's area to see what had happened to JDK's family, and denies that it ause he was an extremist. The prosecution submit that it is extremely surprising that ALM,

owing he is considered to be a target as someone who is in opposition, would walk lSkrn, not owing if he would be stopped or if there would be road blocks and his name on a list, just to see

a friend was. This situation is rendered even more absurd by the fact that when ALM reaches 's house safely, he talks with JDK for 20 minutes, then leaves without even going into the house

o see Mrs KAMUHANDA, his "close family friend".

JDK once again on 13" April. This time the fighting was getting closer to his home, yet claims he walked the 1.5km to check on the situation in JDK's area, not even knowing if

hey w ould s till b e t here, and a gain risking b eing s topped and k illed, b ut a lso 1 eaving h is f arnily lone in an area where the fighting is heading towards. The Prosecution submit that if ALM went to

K's area it was to talk with JDK and because he was an extremist, and if he got there with ease it is e knew who he was, that he was a sympathiser, and therefore it was safe for him to

testified that most of the city officials had access to a vehicle, including JDK. On 15" or 16 '~ 1, ALM went in a vehicle to Gitarama. He went through 10 roadblocks, and showed his ID on

ccasion. The Interim Government had moved to Gitarama on 12, 13, 14 '~ April. Once again, eets JDK, on the 20", and once again, he states they met by chance. He then states that he

could n ot find a v ehicle t o c ollect h is family w ith, b ut t hat they w ere p icked up and m et h im i n Gitarama, again by chance.

hen asked about the system for the election of a Bourgmestre under the multi-party system ALM, e Vice President of MDR for the Gitarama area, stated that he could not remember who oversaw

the election process, what sort of person would be chairman of the committee, and if it would be a rson of authority in the commune. The prosecution submit that a political man like ALM would be le to answer these simple questions, and that he is simply being evasive.

rosecution submit the following:

ALM was not known for being in opposition, on the contrary, he was known as a person who athised with what was happening at the time.

this is evidenced by the fact that he was both willing and able to walk from his area to JDK's in a time when someone in opposition could easily be recognised, stopped and killed. It is also

videnced by the fact that the soldiers who visited him refrained from killing him. The fact that he survived places a significant questionmark on the veracity of his account of political impartiality.

at ALM went to JDK's area because he was a sympathiser with the extremists and to talk to the extremists he knew there, not to check on the welfare of Mrs lCAMUHANDA. Given the prevailing ircumstances it is unlikely that he would risk his life to check on a friend, then not even go into the

use to see her, and at the same time leave his own family alone at home in a time of war.

LM did not meet JDK by chance on 13", by chance in Gitarama, and again by chance in eroon, but that they were in contact because of their mutual sympathies with what was

pening in Rwanda. These sympathies are also the reason why ALM is testifying on behalf of d is evidenced by the evasive nature in which he answered some of the questions put to him


h as known JD K s ince 1 975 and i n 1 994 JD K w as his n eighbour. T hey u sed t o t alk a bout cs. ALB learnt of the Presidents death very early on the morning of the 7th on the radio and ed the instruction on the radio to stay at home. Later in the morning, he went out and saw n the street, and they were joined by others, including ALR and ALA. On 7th there was no

urity i n their neighbourhood, but they learnt that elsewhere there were killings ings. left Kicyiru on 14th.

DKs son, Rene, was in Kimihurura, where they had heard there had been a lot of killings on 6th and 7th. So on the morning of 8th JDK went with members of his wife's family to fetch him. He was unsuccessful, but in the afternoon, he went again with members of the neighbourhood and returned

him at 3. He went with Juif and a person from the family of the spouse. ALB stated that the en participating in the patrols included ALB, JDK, ALR, and ALA. JDK's house was 2-300 etres from ALB 's house.

left on the 14th because the security situation had worsened. He met JDK again on 19th April in Gitarama, in the morning. ALS said they had arrived at 8pm the day before. All the refugees had one to Gitarama because if was the only exit from Kigali. JDK asked ALB if he could take his

ly to Nyabikenke, so he did, then brought JDK back to Gitarama. ALB returned to Kigali, to his , around mid-August 1 994.

ss-examination, ALB testified that after hearing of JDK's arrest ALB called Mrs JDK and he dates of JDK's alleged offences and the nature of the allegations against him. He found ut the arrest within a couple of days, and contacted JDK7s lawyer two months later. ALB

ies the suggestion that it took two months to write to the lawyer because he needed time to put an ether with others.

saw the ICTR investigators twice, the first time in January 1997. He did not tell the investigators about protecting the neighbourhood, but just said he was in the house with his wife and children. He also never mentioned that gendarmes came to his house, or that he was suspected of

ing pro-RPF. He was however, asked if anything specific happened. He believes the gendarmes ad come to his house to see what they could steal. He also states that no one in the area was killed, ut this is at odds with ALM's assertion that soldiers killed innocent people nearby.

ecution assert that ALB was an extremist; he came from the following family: one of ALB's is in Gitarama prison charged with genocide, and another brother was a soldier and is now . ALB has not heard from them since 1995. His father was arrested for having military

uniforms. ALB says his brother must have left his clothes at his father's house. ALB denies the stion that he came from an extremist family. He also denies that soldiers came to that area to saying that he and some others organised the patrols.

1. used to have political discussions with some friends from university. Some of the individuals ew from the University later became government officials, including Bizimungu and Bizimana.

Also knew Kasana who he thought was from the same commune as JDK.

2. e people who visited his neighbour and himself were arrned with rifles, and he knew there was a er that arrned gangs would come to his area and kill, just as they had been doing in other areas. ever, he never tried to get the 2 or 3 soldiers in his area to protect the area. He doesn't know

y armed gangs didn't come to their area but, contrary to other witnesses, ALB claims it wasn't an


ea known to be sympathetic to what was going on at the time and that there were never any adblocks i n t heir area. T he d istance from K acyiru t o G ikomero m ay be 2 8 k m and i n n ormal

circumstances would take 30 minutes. He does not know whether a well-known person could go through without interference.

e prosecution submit that it is surprising that someone as articulate as ALB, when he wrote to DK's Defence Counsel, did not mention ALS, ALR or ALA, even though he wrote an extensive

statement. He claims the reason for this is not that he had not put in place an alibi yet, but because is was a personal engagement, and he did not want to involve anyone else. This is a ludicrous

ubmission. In addition, in contradiction with this, he says that if he had been asked if anyone else could testify, he would not have hesitated. He also failed to mention that JDK was residing at

other person's house. It is inconceivable that these factors would have been omitted, and the rosecution submit that this demonstrates the untruth of the alibi. He had had 2 conversations with DK on the phone before his arrest. The statement of ALB dated 5/1/97, as highlighted, is tendered

as exhibit P42.

ponse to questions by Judge Ramaroson his explanation for why they were, murdering Tutsi in mero, despite the fact that he claims the area was occupied by the WF from the beginning, is it was probably Hutus taking their revenge. Interahamwe were trained to kill anyone who

osed the MRND, and the RTLM incited to kill Tutsis. The people passing his area who talked ut massacres were, he believed, Hutus. It would have been suicidal for a Tutsi to go into the

treet.

e Prosecution submits the following:

e are a number of inconsistencies in ALB's testimony, when compared to those of the other efence Alibi witnesses. ALB states that JDK first goes to collect his son with Innocent Karemera,

JDK himself testified that he went with Karemera and Canisius, a houseboy. ALS only mentions Canisius. ALB also testifies that JDK had to return, unsuccessful, because of shooting, but

attributes the failure of the first attempt to soldiers that sent them back. The second attempt so has its inconsistencies as ALB says JDK was accompanied by Juif, while ALS states that it was

testified that he spoke with JDK about moving to ALS' house before they decided to move. also testified to this fact. JDK, however, denies that any such discussion took place. In

ion, whereas ALB stated that he lived in his own home during the period following the 7th (both ring h is i nterview w ith 0 TP p ersonnel o n 2 1/08/01, and i n c ourt), JD K a t first, i n h is o riginal otice of Alibi, stated that ALB too was a resident of ALS' house. JDK later changed his evidence

tated that ALB was not a resident in ALS' house. ALB also testified that there were no deaths area, whereas ALS stated there were people killed. It also seems strange that in his original

witness statement ALB fails to mention the neighbourhood patrols that he now claims to have been involved in setting up - he simply states that he stayed in his house for a week. This is a crucial

ission.

here are also internal inconsistencies in ALB's testimony. For instance, he claims that it would be suicide for a Tutsi to go out in the street, so the people passing the area must ALL have been Hutus. However, he also testified that there were no deaths in his area, that there were no roadblocks, no

ed gangs, and that people could move around fieely. If this was the case, why could Tutsis not o out in the street?

so disagreement about the relationship ALB has with KAMUHANDA. While ALB and ANDA claim that they were not friends, and there was no special relationship apart fiom

84

Prosecutor v, KAMUHANDA, ICTR-99-54A-T

the fact that they were neighbours, Mrs. KAMUHANDA states that ALB was a long time friend of KAMUHANDA' s,

S is the prosecutions submission that ALB was friends with JDK, and when he heard of his arrest on e radio, he contacted Mrs JDK to see how he could help his fiend. The reason it took ALB so

to write to JDK's defence counsel was that he needed time in which to establish an alibi for . ALB is lying about the period between 7th and 14th April, and this is illustrated by the

inconsistencies in the alibi witnesses testimonies.

te Ingabire has been married to KAMUHANDA since 1983. She is Hutu, with a Tutsi mother. KAMUHANDA comes from Gikomeuo. In Kigali, they have a house in Kacyiru. They lived there in 1994. KAMUHANDA was member of the MRND. They heard of the President's eath on the radio on morning of 7th. KAMUHANDA went to get Rene from ALF's sisters the next ay. They joined Irene at Mrs KAMUHANDA's mothers when they went to Nyabikenke. The first

time KAMUI-IANDA went to get Rene, with Innocent Karamera, he had to return because of shooting. He went again with Juif in the afternoon. On 8th, the family moved to ALR's house, with

efamilyofALS,and stayedthereuntiltheyleftKigalion18thApril. TheymovedtoALSYs cause it was in a safer position, and to offer ALS support. The men would sleep outside, near the use, as a system of protection. They did patrols. ALR, ALB, and ALA would participate in the trols w ith K AMUHANDA. M rs K AMUHANDA c ould n ot s ee t hem o utside from w here t hey ere, but she could hear them. It was brought out during cross-examination that throughout this

Mrs KAMUHANDA was indeed very ill, and that her health was deteriorating continuously. osecutor submits that the whole idea of these patrols was a carefully contrived falsehood to

create an alibi for KAMUHANDA. - p p p p p p p p p p - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - p p

p p p p p p - - - - - - - - - - - - -

1. They could feel insecurity around them. They eventually left on 18/04/94, KAMUHANDA got help from Colonel Gatsinzi, who knew him well. He came back with a jeep that took them to Camp

ali the following day.

he prosecution submit that it seems surprising that there is no reference whatsoever to an attempt to leave earlier, considering the contacts and friends that KAMUHANDA has. From Camp Kigali, they went in the bus moving the soldier's families to Gitarama. They intended to go to her mother's in Nya biken ke.

y left with the wife and children of ALR, ALS and his children, and ALA to go to Gitarama. ey encountered 2 roadblocks. Some of the guards were arrned, but not in uniform, and they had to

show their ID and give an explanation. There were dead people at the 2nd roadblock. In Gitarama, soldiers directed them t o the s tadium. T he n ext d ay K AMUHANDA found A LB who a greed to r ive them to Nyabikenke. Mrs KAMUHANDA stayed with her children, but KAMUHANDA

returned to Gitarama. She saw KAMUHANDA again the following day. They arrived in Gitavama n 18th April, left for Nyabikenke on 19th, and saw KAMUHANDA again on 20th. KAMUHANDA

then went back to Gitauama, but he would come and spend the night in Nyabikenke regularly, 2 or 3 times a week. He used a vehicle and driver from the ministry.

he prosecution submit that this demonstrates the ease of movement that JDK enjoyed due to his importance and contacts, both with regard to the availability of transportation and access to roads and through roadblocks. He was actively part of the whole planning and execution of the genocide. He

t 43 ALE: is DW6 and she is Mrs Kamuhanda.


ntinues to work within the general scheme of the genocide and was so immersed in the whole nocidal arrangement that he was prepared to abandon his wife who was in poor health and children Nyabikenke and traverse in and out to continue his involvement in the genocide.

5. He continued his work until being appointed minister on 25th May. He had to go to the HO of the overnrnent in Murambi. In Nyabikenke, there were some killings. In mid-June, they went from

Nyabikenke to Cyangugu, going through Kibuye. Around 13-15th June KAMUHANDA took Mrs ANDA's sister to Goma where she could leave for Kenya. The prosecution submit that this ates KAMUHANDA's ability to move easily and to have access to a vehicle. The

secution also submit that for a man who allegedly was forced into a government position that he not want, it seems strange that he did not take this opportunity to flee the country with his family disavow himself from the interim government. Not only this, but KAMUHANDA did not even

take his poorly and sick wife to Goma to receive medical treatment. The Defence expert, Dr. Nkiko Nsengimana stated that government ministers had a constitutional right to resign, and if he wished to dissociate himself from the government, he could have left the country. KAMUHANDA

both these options and did neither. He had the opportunity but refused to avail himself of it. It is submitted that this is an indication of KAMUHANDA's sympathy to, and active participation in the Interim Government and its policies.

y stayed in Murambi for a week. They went until Murambi in a car and from Murambi to oma in a car. They went from Murambi to Cyangugu in a mini-bus, and Cyangugu to Goma. In yangugu ALB, a long time friend of KAMUHANDA, recommended her a good doctor. They

the Hotel du Lac, not far from the border with Zaire (All the key fmctionaries who cipated in the genocide stayed at this hotel as part of their planned escape). She was treated in

kavu - she would cross the border, it was only half an hour in the car. They arrived in Cyangugu mid-July, and left on 17th July. KAMUHANDA dropped them off at Cyangugu, went back to

and then came back quickly to stay with them. On 17th July, they went to Bukavu, and arranged travel to Nairobi. Mrs ICAMUHANDA and the children arrived in Nairobi on

th July 1994, and KAMUHANDA joined them on 5th August 1994. On 16/04/95, they left for ameroon, and stayed there for 3 years, then they went to France, where KAMUHANDA was

arrested.

n cross-examination, the witness testified about her illnesses during April 1994. She had suffered om hypertension and migraines due to stress previously, since 1990, meaning it was very difficult

for her to see. She would lie down and close her eyes to relieve herself. She was also suffering from stomach pains and unnatural bleeding because of her pregnancy. Her health was deteriorating on a aily basis. When she was ill in Gitarama, and they heard of killings in Nyabikenke,

UHANDA never suggested that he fetch her mother and bring her to them. Mrs UHANDA testified that after his appointment as a minister KAMUHANDA would come to

bikenke accompanied by a soldier. KAMUHANDA had to continue working because of an rgency in Gitarama regarding the care of scholars abroad. This is the reason Mrs

UHANDA gives for KAMUHANDA not taking her to a doctor or taking her outside Rwanda even though he had a vehicle and was aware of the deterioration of her health.

UHANDA crossed the border to Goma. He did not escape with his wife and his children. He also did not take Mrs KAMUHANDA to one of the aid agencies. He chose to go back to Murambi

w here the Interim Government w as a ctively implementing and executing the genocide. H e settled his family into the Hotel du Lac, where other members of the Interim Government were staying, including Mbangura, Mugiraneza, and Mugenzi. When asked if KAMUHANDA went back

Murambi, Mrs KAMU-HANDA states that she did not know where he went.

86

-------------.--.-----


e UHANDA family stayed in Nairobi until 1995. They listened to the radio and it was common knowledge that there were allegations that the interim government were instrumental in the enocide. Despite this they were friendly with Prosper Mugiraneza and Rwamakuba (both accused

before the ICTR), rather than dissociating themselves from the interim government. Whilst in Nairobi KAMUHANDA and his wife also did not try to contact their families by contacting the

e office of Gikomero, or by going to the Rwandan, French, or Belgium embassy. Mrs UHANDA stated that this is because there was no one to contact to get news, not because they trying not to draw attention to where they were or because KAMUHANDA was known for

rocities in Gikomero. They also did not contact the Rwandan, French, or Belgian Embassies, or the ikomero office, during their 3 years in Cameroon. The prosecution suggest it is a logical inference

that this was to avoid detection by the Rwandese and International Prosecuting Authorities.

re3 rs KAMUHANDA testified that she was unaware of the pending arrest of her husband

MCTHANDA. She also states that neither she nor her husband asked what the allegations were st him when he was arrested. After KAMUHANDA's arrest, she received phone calls from and ALB. After a week or more, the lawyer contacted Mrs KAMUHANDA and gave her his

contact information. She gave these details to ALB. She did not find out what the allegations ainst JSAMUHANDA were until she visited him in late December. She did not ask the lawyer fore this point. She also did not give the lawyer the names of ALS, ALR, or ALB; even though

knew, they could give evidence to show her husband's innocence.

e prosecution submits that it is inconceivable that KAMUHANDA's highly intelligent wife, owing that she could give the names of people who could prove her husband's innocence, does not

inform his Defence Counsel as a matter of urgency these names. It is further submitted, in conjunction with the evidence of ALS and ALB, and the delays by all parties in informing the

authorities that there were witnesses who could immediately demonstrate ANDA's non-involvement and provide an alibi in inconceivable. The whole alibi story was

er on in a desperate bid to cover KAMUHANDA's tracks for his genocidal activities in

killings, KAMUHANDA would visit his mother as often as possible, but with the family, They went to the weddings of at least 4 of his sisters. There may have been one in the

I(AMUHANDA states that he seemed to be well known, although not by the whole the commune. M U H A N D A was involved in the technical committee for the

evelopment o f t he c ommune and h e w ould g o there for m eetings. A LF s tates that s he w as n ot are that KAMUHANDA was chairman of the committee to elect the bourgmestre or that he was in

charge of protocol when the president came, but she agrees that KAMUHANDA kept his political life separate from his private life. While KAMUHANDA worked at the ministry, he had access to

e official vehicle. This was true on 617th April 1994. This was not just for official purposes, but Iso in exceptional circumstances.

s that there was a discussion about moving to ALS' house, and that their principal concern s the shooting and not robbers. ALF accepts that ALS' house was made of mud bricks, while

eirs was of fired bricks. She denies that the two houses were virtually identical, and therefore the rick house would be safer. ALF was not aware that soldiers had visited ALB's house. She

she did not hear of the need to patrol to stop RPF infiltration. She did not see anyone else d (any refugees) except the men. ALF denies the suggestion that because of her illness,

because she often lay down to close her eyes, she did not keep as much contact with ANDA as she suggested and was not aware of what was happening.

rosecution submits the following:


ANDA is placed in an impossible situation. She was clearly extremely ill during the d, and her health was deteriorating on a daily basis. She had also informed her

sband of this fact. Therefore, it is inconceivable that KAMUHANDA chose to continue doing nor administration work throughout this period, especially as he had access to a vehicle, and the

ability to travel to Zaire with his wife as he did on 25th June with his sister in law.

t is also unlikely that Mrs KAMUHANDA would have failed to give the names of the other alibi witnesses to the Defence Counsel, when these people could have given Alphonse NTEZIRYAYO another accused before the ICTR) account to the relevant authorities, demonstrating her husband's

he fact that KAMUHANDA makes no attempt to contact his wider extended family while he was in Nairobi, or during his 3 years in Cameroon demonstrates an avoidance of being located -

ally his failure to contact the Gikomero commune office to receive news of his family. He was ly hiding and avoiding detection.

, if JDK had truly wished to disavow himself from the Interim Government, knowing that it generally alleged that they were responsible for orchestrating the genocide, he would not have inued or established friendships with Interim Government Ministers while he was in Nairobi. hermore, he would have attempted to assist the ICTR or other relevant prosecuting authorities of

curred when he was a Government minister and party to discussions from the 25th May.

UHANDA is AG's son-in-law. Witness AG is a Tutsi, KAMUHANDA was more like a son Nyabikenke in Gitarama, and KAMUHANDA and her daughter would come and

visit her sometimes, borrowing a vehicle from friends. She saw KAMWANDA in April 1994 when d took his family to her house. They arrived in Nyabikenke on 19" April.

and his wife and family arrived at her house in a car - she did not know the driver. His family stayed for the night, but IOZR/IUHANDA left in the same vehicle. He often came to visit is children - twice a week, and he would spend the night. The prosecution submits that this emonstrates the ease of movement KAMUHANDA enjoyed due to his importance and contacts,

regard to availability of transportation and access to roads and through roadblocks. The of the state of his wife's health is significant. The wife's mother testifies of her daughter

g weak and in a poorly state of health. The fact that Kjl\̂ MUHANDA left his wife in such a state returned to work in the Interim Government suggests that he was deeply involved and was part

n Mrs KAMUHANDA arrived, AG recognised that she was weak and suffering. The situation 4 was critical. As long as KAMUHANDA was in Gitarama, he visited

left, they did not see him again. After her daughter left with she did not hear from them until a letter was eventually brought to her by a priest

, she did not hear from them again until after the arrest and detention of A in Arusha, and another letter arrived from France. She learnt of KAMUHANDA's

est and detention on the radio. The prosecution submit that this lack of correspondence with their mily is indicative of the attempt by the KAIvlUHANDA family not to draw attention to where they

were residing.

cross-examination, AG testified that she hid in the bushes for some days before KAMUHANDA ved because of the killing of Tutsis and looting. The prosecution submits that Mrs

144 AG is DW7 and the PIS is D50.


UHANDA's mother was a Tutsi, and it is a curious assertion that I(AMUHANDA would leave fe and children in an area and a situation where it had been necessary for their family members e in bushes. KAMLTHANDA's wife at her mother's was to guarantee their safety because of

is stature and influence in the genocidal arrangement and the Interim Government.

en the witness statement she made to the ICTR Investigators was read back to her, AG stated that did not say the Government put a vehicle at KAMUHANDA's disposal, but that the Government w where KAMUHANDA was when he was looking for a vehicle to move his family. AG says

e told the investigators the truth "according to the information I had". However, she never entioned in that witness statement that KAMUHANDA and other neighbours had gathered in

er house, and she never mentioned Gatsinzi, These were information she would have had at the

ates that she does not know the dates of the alleged offences. She did not talk to her daughter nce counsel about it. She forgot where her daughter stayed in Kigali, even though the stories

in the area and the house being partly destroyed were so detailed. The prosecutor asks if her ever did tell her they spent some nights in another house in Kigali. AG states that she told

. She signed the statement as being truthful and accurate, but there were some contradictions ith her testimony, which, at the time, she did not see. AG states that on one occasion she saw

UHANDA accompanied by a soldier. AG states she does not know who operated the ks, or whether the MRND controlled the prefecture.

rosecutor suggests that AG talked to the investigators before she talked to the Defense counsel, lSt account was truthful, and that she had to change it. AG states that she changed

se to Judge Ramarosson AG states that the troubles were between the Hutus and the Tutsis, ut that Hutus who did not share the same party would also kill each other.

esponse to Judge Maqutu AG testified that she was married to a Hutu (her daughter said she was utu) but even for Hutus there was danger, although looting was the main thing.

e Prosecution submit the following:

y of the Defence witnesses, AG has a very close family relationship with KAMUHANDA - e is married to her daughter, father to her grandchildren, and she regards him as more of a son than

on-in-law; therefore she is a witness who, through misguided loyalty, attempts to assist UHANDA. In evidence of this, there are a number of inconsistencies between AG's 31/07/02

ess statement to the ICTR Investigators and her testimony in court. In the witness statement she her daughter "never told me that she spent a few nights in another house in Kigali", but during

testimony she indicated that the KAMUHANDA family told her that they took residence with er neighbours in a neighbour's house (pte 13, 12/09/02). She had also stated in her witness

"That time KAMUHANDA was not a minister and I never saw him driving a vehicle. I do who was driving the vehicle on that day, but the vehicle was given to him by the interim

overnment as told to me by them". However, during her testimony she denies having made any ention of the interim government and says that "KAMUHANDA came in a friend's vehicle and it

end actually who was on the driving seat" (pte 55, 12/09/02). When questioned on how ANDA could get through the roadblocks to Nyabikenke without being accompanied by a

ier, AG states that people could move around and that it was more dangerous at night - but she also testified that the KAMUHANDA family had not even left the house to run errands while in

145 Investigators notes of 20106/02 are tendered as exhibit P46, and witness statement of 31/07/02 is tendered as P47, under seal.

89

i* h bL"""E**Lx**- x--.- " r u r h - - ill -- n " * m w ? l r ' F . - ~ - ~ " ~ -*-- - . - - -


ali because it was too dangerous. These inconsistencies, taken alongside AG's relationship with UHANDA, suggest that the statement given to the ICTR Investigators was accurate, but AG

later changed her account in order to offer a false account that is consistent with m A N D A ' s 4 .. .

all bl.

7. e prosecution submit that the original statement reflects more accurately the truth of arrival. In addition to this, AG only claims to have seen KAMUHANDA on the brought his family to her house and then left the same day, and twice a week after

at when he visited. Therefore, she cannot account for KAMUHANDA's movement or actions efore the 19" April, and even after that, she cannot have known what he was doing as he was

ays travelling back and forth. Her evidence only relates to events after 19" April.

RA Augustin - 13 January 2003

amination-in-chief on 13 January 2003 revealed that in April 1994, Augustin Karera was a civil servant with the Ministry of High Education in Kigali. He is a friend of KAMUHANDA. They met

the national teaching institute (IPM). KAMUHANDA was elected the president of the student ssociation in 1975. In 1992, Karera a member of MRND was one of the twenty members of the refectural committee of Gikongo.

12 April 1994, Karera went to Gitarama and then Kibuye where he stayed through May and June. ound 26 April 1994, K arera met K AMUHANDA in GITARAMA and talked to him about the

roblem Minister Mbangura raised concerning students with scholarship abroad. Karera alleges that cyiru was a zone occupied by the RPF.

24 December 1996, once back in Rwanda, Karera was arrested and accused of having played a in the genocide. He was released on 24 June 1997, without a trial taking place. Karera was an

estigator for the Defense team of KAMUHANDA and ceased to be one on 16 July 2001. During is tenure as an investigator, Karera met with Minister Mbangura who denied that KAMUHANDA

ever occupied the post of advisor to the President in April and May 1994.

. Under cross-examination, Karera admitted that his name still appears in the official gazette on the list f first-class offenders. As a consequence, the Registrar of the Tribunal removed Karera from the 1st of investigators employed by the Tribunal. It was also revealed that there was an extant

allegation that witnesses saw Karera take gendarmes in the Kibeho area t o kill Tutsis and Karera ervised the attack.

Karera denies that the Interim Government was responsible for the massacres of 1994.

rosecutor's submission

. Karera was sympathetic to the Interim Government and did participate himself in the genocide. urrently resides in Nairobi, Kenya. As a former member of the Defense team of ANDA, he is aware of the Defense strategies and particular points that the Defense needs to

to help their client. Karera was removed from the list of investigators by the Registrar of the 1 following h is appearance o n the Rwandan 1 ist o f first o ffenders o f t he genocide. He i s

therefore a tainted witness and should not be believed.

146 GPT is DW9 and his PIS is DX51


1994, GPT lived in Gikomero commune. He is a Tutsi. After the 6th of April there were many assacres in the commune. The worst was at the parish, on the 12th. The parish is close to his

. GPT knew GER (the pastor) very well. Tutsi refugees from Rubungo, Gasogi, Ndera, and dazi communes were killed at the parish. They arrived at the parish after the 6th. Before the

the local Hutus and Tutsis lived in harmony and no Tutsis from Gikomero had sought refuge at arish. On the 1 2th h e got up at a bout 9 i n the m orning and w ent t o v isit a friend, M attias

iyimana who lived near the market. At about 1 p.m. he went home and on his way he heard being fired from the direction of the parish. He also heard the sound of vehicles driving very

st. He went home to inform his family and they fled to the other side of Lake Muhazi. He hid in shes with his eldest son and older brother. On the 13th he managed to get across the lake as well.

n and brother were not that lucky as they were killed in the genocide. Because the RPF arrived early, all the refugees who sought refuge across the Muhazi Lake in Giti, survived. He did not

e anyone from the parish among the survivors. On the 2nd August he and his family returned me to Gikomero. Some Hutus had fled as well, but they got back earlier. On return he found his

cattle stolen and his house destroyed. In Gikomero everybody suspected each other of being involved in the killing and pillaging.

. His neighbours told him who had killed his family members and he knows most of the attackers. He resents the survivors of the genocide in his secteur within the IBUKA and FARG organizations. is also the vice-president of the Gacaca tribunal as well as the promoter of the Commission for

Unity and Reconsiliation in Gikomero secteur. He was also in charge of the census of the victims making him well informed about the massacres.

6. During his census taking, he went past every cellule in the secteur and talked to the survivors. Apart from the census, he was not aware of any other official investigation.

ows Nyagatare. He was one of the people detained. Nyagatare pled guilty for crimes committed in April 1994 and revealed some names of other perpetrators.

knows the Accused. He has known him for a long time. The parents of the Accused live near his use. Before h e fled t o c ross Lake Muhazi, h e d idn't s ee the Accused i n G ikomero during t he onth of April 1994.

. After the genocide GET was appointed as the bourgmestre of Gikomero. The people of Gikomero id not want to elect him later on. When GET heard that he was coming to testify before the ICTR, e came over to intimidate him but when he told him he could only speak the truth and GET never

ally, G PT's m other s ought r efuge a t b 0th K AMUHANDA's father's younger b rother's h ouse then she went to KAMUHANDA's family house in Gikomero as this place was safer. His

other sought refuge there on the 13th. KAMUHANDA's father's younger brother is called acandaga and he is married to GPT's sister. He knows the KAXIUW[ANDA family very well and e is very grateful to KAMUHANDA for the kindness and protection he has given to his mother. He

saved her life. He was not offered any money to testify on KAMUHANDA's behalf.

sis from Gikomero fled to the other side of Lake Muhazi after the Interahamwe attacked on th. Some of them, who lived within a kilometre of the church, were killed. Local Tutsis were

only killed after the 12th. Before that time he did not talk to any of the refugees. He heard about illings in Rwanda, but only encountered them on the 12". From the census, he estimates that 149 ocal Tutsis from Gikomero were killed and he did not count the number of Hutus killed. He was

ly involved in the assessment of the genocide. Most of these Tutsi victims were killed on the 12th, h and the 14th, by the Interahamwe and local people.

91

Pmseeutar v. KAMUHANDA, ICTR-99-54A-T

. He agreed that the KAMUHANDA family is a powerful family in the area with two younger brothers, sisters, a paternal uncle, and other members of the extended family of KAMUHANDA still living in the area.

e census he conducted did not cover Gishaka. He did not know about the events that took place in shaka. However, he heard mention of killings at the Catholic church but because he only

investigated in the secteur was assigned to him. He knows a few names of persons who participated in the Gikomero massacre. They are Nyagatare, a certain Canisius and someone called Uwimana. Canisius lives close to the parish.

mother sought refuge during the massacres in Gikomero in 1994 and she went to seek refuge house of the younger brother of KAMUHANDA's father on 13 April 1994. After about 2 she w ent t o the h ouse o f K AMUHANDA's m other where s he st ayed for a bout another 2

weeks. She remained there until RPF soldiers arrived, sometime about the start of May.

395. As GPT took the census, he filled out forms. He handed out these forms to the bourgrnestre, GET. During his investigation, GPT worked with people like Leonard Habiyarnbere, Augustin Mugunga, oel Mugemana and Aloys Ndindabahizi and others. They spoke to about a 100 people in several

. GPT knows the communal policeman called Assiel but he does not know about him going and telling about KAMUHANDA's arrival in April 1994.

396. GPT denied knowing Damien's bar. He denied knowing GAC, GAB, or GEB but he does know EK. He also knows Kamanzi and his brother Karekezi, both alleged to have been involved in the ikomero massacre. GPT remembers that there was some relationship between KAMUHANDA,

Karekezi and Kamanzi, but does not know exactly what kind of relationship they had.

e in Gikomero knew about KAMUHANDA's high position as director general at the y of Higher Education. Everybody respected him. The Accused would come and visit his , who was ill. She had been sick prior to 6 April 1994. He did not visit her on a regular basis.

en he came, he would not stay long. During the month of April, KAMUHANDA's mother was senously ill, bed-ridden. Around 20 May soldiers of the RPF brought her back home from the other

e of Lake Muhazi.

398. expressed problems with his eyesight, with regard to distant vision and he is not able to identify one on the picture showed to him by the prosecutor. Despite his vision problems, he could not

w e missed KAMUHANDA and would have known whether KAMUHANDA had been in komero at the relevant time, because KAMUHANDA would have arrived in a car with a auffeur. Everybody knew whenever KAMUHANDA came to town.

399. GPT estimated the distance from Gikomero secteur to Gicaca secteur is about 15 kilometres. GPT knows GAD. GAD lives below GPT's house and if GAD testified that he had seen KAMUHANDA at the relevant time, GAD is a liar. GPT concludes that people like Nyagatara who pled guilty collaborated with the Interahamwe. They joined the crowd and brought their own weapons. GPT

ears before the court as an individual and not on behalf of the organisations, he worked for. It his testimony that more Gikomero Tutsis survived than those who died in the massacres.



0. hamber should reject GPT's testimony on the presence of and prefer that of 47. GPT has admitted that his motive is to show gratitude to for the protection

f his mother. This is a very strong motive and detracts from the truthfulness of his testimony. The otive to protect and testify in favour of KAMUHANDA is too obvious and strong. It should be

taken into consideration when assessing the credibility of this witness.

. In 1994, GPR lived in Gikomero commune. In April, on a Tuesday, a massacre took place in parish. Before that, Tutsis and Hutus lived in harrnony. GPR's house is alongside the to the parish. It is very close to the parish. She was at home on the day of the killings.

e refugees at the parish were from Mbandazi and Musave in Rubungo commune. The refugees for about a week. There were no Gikomero Tutsis at the parish. They were all at their

omes. GPR knew some of the refugees personally, especially those from Mbandazi. She spoke to some of them and they came to her house. GPR gave bananas and sorghum to them. GER gave food

the older refugees and shared his meals with them while some refugees like Augustin Bucundura, s wife Elvania Mukakabaka and his mother Kanakuze stayed at his house. They came by GPR's

owe as well, and they would talk to her.

e Gikomero attack started at about 1 p.m. GPR was at home, when she saw vehicles passing by ckly on the road next to her house. They were heading for the parish. There were 4

One stopped in front of GPR's house and a young man asked her, where GPR's daughter tephanie was? She knew the young man whose name was Nduwayezu. Stephanie and GPR's ounger daughter had escaped as the vehicles of the attackers came by. GPR and her husband

'ned behind at home. Stephanie had been m arried to Nduwayezu's paternal uncle, who had . There were some issues between Stephanie and her husband's family about certain property.

duwayezu heard Stephanie was not a t home, he grabbed GPR and threatened to kill her. threatened her husband. He shot at GPR's husband and told her he would kill her just like

e others. GPR's husband was Edouard Gashikazi.

rsons in the vehicles were wearing military clothing and caps. GPR's husband Edourd zi died. After the death of her husband, someone found GPR at her house and took her to the

arish. There she saw greenish, military-type vehicles, parked next to the church. Nduwayezu returned to GPR's house and asked Rutayisire, who lived in the vicinity, to show him where

tephanie was. Then they stole Stephanie's suitcases and GPR's goats.

e p arish, the r efugees h ad already b een k illed and t he attackers w ere c utting up s laughtered cattle and looting the pastor's house. GPR never heard any shots being fired. In fact, she did not even hear her husband being shot, right next to her. Still, it was clear that the refugees were killed by

because the attackers were carrying firearms. As the vehicles left, Nduwayezu told GPR he ill her if she did not find and produce her daughter Stephanie. Thereafter, GPR looked for

eople to help her look after her husband's body. It was put on their bed and she stayed next to it. He was only buried three days later.

y two people Karangwa and GAG survived the attack. There were no local people among the attackers. They were from Rubungo and Karama who were chasing those who had fled from their

ion. Nduwayezu was from Karama. GPR does not know W U H A N D A . She has never seen im in her life but she does know his father, Mureramanzi, who lives near her.

147 PX13

148 GPR is DXlO and her PIS is DX52

93

rosecutor %I. KAMUHANDA, ICTR-99-54A-T

r GPR and others had buried their loved ones, they fled to seek refuge. No one slept at home all the local Tutsis went to the other side of Lake Muhazi. A responsable approached GPR and

her questions about the death of her husband. She also talked to bourgmestre GET about that. never asked her anything about I(AMUHANDA. They only wanted the name of the man who h er husband. G PR a H utu d id n ot b elong t o any p olitical p arty before 1 994, n or was s he ed in politics. GPR recently had problems with her eyesight and she could not

2 when shown to her.

ghter, Stephanie was married to Muhutu. He was a Hutu and a soldier in the e died. Muhutu's family wanted the land jointly owned by Stephanie and her late husband

R is (in Rwandan culture) Rutayisire's aunt because she married his father's younger rother. He is in prison, because he w as accused of having participated in the massacre. These ccusations are false. Nduwayezu forced him to go to GPR's house to pillage. He did not kill yone at the parish. The refugees killed at the parish were Rubungo Tutsis who sought refuge there. zkomero, Hutus and Tutsis lived in harmony.

R was a member of the parish of pastor GER. GER was wrongfully accused of participation in re. GPR did not talk to all the refugees. She was not able to find out where each refuge but she knew that Bucundura, Elvania and Kanakuze, who stayed at the pastor's house,

were all Tutsi. GPR did not know the attackers but because Nduyawezu was from Rubungo, she surmised that they all were from the same place. GPR did not hear the gunshots because she was in total shock. At the parish, she could see that some refugees and cattle were killed with guns.

9. eramanzi the father of KAMUHANDA was a very important person in the area. He was the ne to have his son, KAMUHANDA to study abroad. Anyone with a good education like

UHANDA was very powerfbl. GPR cannot confirm whether KAMUHANDA himself was y powerful. GPR did not give shelter to any of the refugees. Before the attack, she did not go to parish. She only met some refugees at her house.


R was an old woman who was in complete and total shock. The trauma she suffered when her was killed in her house almost certainly affected her observations on the day of the

assacres. She could not hear gunshots at close quarters and was not present when the massacres at h happened. She later visited the place and saw many Tutsi refugees who had been killed shots. She could not have identified KAMUHANDA at the location. She arrived late and ot know him. She had a motive to testify in favour of her relation Rutayisire who is a

suspect in the massacres and wanted to give a flattering testimony in favour of GER her parish astor. Her testimony did not say her husband was killed at the door. Her evidence of the influence

of the Kamuhanda family corresponds with similar evidence from Prosecution witnesses.

e the massacre on the 12" of April at the parish, Gikomero Tutsis and Hutus lived in harmony. is a Hutu, but the locals thought she was a Tutsi, because she arrived in the area as an adult. In , GPE lived close to the Gikomero parish. She is the wife of GER who died in 2000. On a

day, refugees from Rubungo amved at the parish. GPE and her husband GER gave them water firewood. The refugees were set up in the school buildings. GER had a good relationship with

gees. GPE did not know all Tutsis in the area, but there were only a few in the region and a few of them. She did not recognize any local Tutsis among the refugees. Those were

still at their homes, because they did not have any problems up to the 12'~. From some of the

I49 GPE is DW11 and her PIS is DX53

94


refugees she heard they had fled fiom a terrible situation. In GPE's view, the attack came as a total rise, though others might have known about it, since some people followed the attackers to the

Id see fires in areas such as Musha, Baganza, and Rubungo, and heard that war had broken Gikomero still seemed safe. GER took in refugees on the gth. Among them was Bucundra, a f the family, with his mother and wife. GPE and GER took them in into their house. Some

ounger members of Bucundra's family stayed in the classrooms.

at Gikomero took place between 1:00 and 2:00 pm. A few moments before the attack, home for lunch, after earlier looking after the refugees. As she and GER sat down to eat,

ey heard vehicles arriving. GER and Bucundra went out. Vehicles arrived and other people came er side. One of them spoke to GER to the effect: "are you still there when you are

ongst those persons meant to be killed?" At this point Bucundra turned to come back into the ouse. He was shot dead, and then the attackers grabbed GER and told him to point out any

y moved into the house, found an old woman, killed her, and started taking their king for the GER's money. They took everything and then argued whether they

E fled with one child in her arms and two others following her and went through the fence at the e. She ran into some of the attackers. They were not from the area. She mistook

em for refugees, and approached them. They hit her on the head with a club. As soon as they saw people running with bags, they stopped hitting GPE and chased after them. GPE was carrying herself, containing some clothes. She knew some of the men that attacked her and they knew

of them was Gateseye. He lived behind their house. After her attackers had let her go, she me, because she still heard many shots being fired. She went back to her house at een hiding with a certain Bitorwa, and he went out to see whether GER was still

we. As he came back he reported that GER was alive, but a lot of other people were dead, including their neighbour Edouard Gashikazi. As she got back, she saw the dead bodies scattered

und the courtyard and she met a few survivors.

kers were from Rubungo because Edourd Gashikazi could not have been killed by someone omero. There were a few survivors at GPE's house. Some of them were GAG Kabahira,

arangwa, and some others, among whom were two daughters-in-law of Bucundura. During the night after the attack GER and his neighbour, Samuel Rutayisire, walked around the compound at one point, they overheard some people say that they would finish off the survivors. They

came back to the house and GER pastor told the people staying there that they had to leave, for their own sake. The survivors understood, and left. There was no further attack on their house. The survivors crossed Lake Muhazi and sought refuge there.

. Karangwa stayed, because he had a bullet in his leg and could not move without assistance. GAG to leave, although GPE and the GER had the impression that she was still able to walk and

seek refuge elsewhere. Eventually they managed to persuade her to leave in her own interest. Later on, GAG accused GPE and GER of sending her off.

995, GER was accused of bringing in the attackers to the church. He was arrested and put in rison until he was released in January 2 000. Earlier GER had received a document fiom GET,

ich exculpated him. GET came around their house and said GER could always come and get a aissez-passer from him. During GER's imprisonment, GPE received similar documents and because f those documents, the judicial authorities released GER. GPE knows KAMUH.ANDA. She only

him once, a long time ago, at his sister's wedding. GER knew W U H A N D A him as well.


ey saw each other at meetings on educational issues. GPE only knows two of KAMUHANDA's sisters.

kers arrived from t he d irection o f R ubungo b ecause they w ere i n c hase s. They came by car. GPE could hear the engines. In 1995, GER was accused of bringing in

e attackers. GAG'^' was the instigator of all the accusations. She told everyone that ER had forced the wounded refugees to leave had sold them water, which was not true. GAG first

lained about GER to the responsable of the cellule, but GER was found innocent. Then she a formal complaint with the conseiller of the secteur and finally she went to the Gacaca where used GER of bringing in the Interahamwe as well.

. GER met his parishioners on a daily basis. He also visited various parishes in the area on his icycle. Nobody was informed about the attack. It came as surprise. People living near the road

followed the attackers' vehicles. They were from places like Kiziba, Jurwe, and Rugurama or from the area near the 'Gikomero drinking place'. The people living in the immediate vicinity did not

about the attack. When they heard gunshots, they ran away with the other refugees. The areas used to visit, and where the crowds fled fiom are not connected.

Reuben was the name of the attacker who, at their arrival, spoke to GER. The bag GPE took in her ht only contained a few pieces of clothing. People who frequented the 'Gikomero drinking place'

were not all inhabitants of Gikomero. It is in Gikomero, but borders Rubungo area and is about a one half-hour walk from GPE's house. GPE does not know anything about local people taking part massacre. She did not know any local participant then and she does not know any now. If

re were, she would have known them. During her flight, GPE was away from home for 4 to 5 rs. G ER c ame and picked h er up and they went home together. When they came b ack, the

hicles had left, and there were no more killings since. GER was present during the massacre etween 1:30 and 6 p.m. Later on, he did not mention any name of the people being involved, ecause he actually did not know any of the attackers. Otherwise, he surely would have given their ame. GER did not for fear of his own life ask the refbgees to leave, he wanted to save theirs. GPE oes not know how they managed to survive the massacre despite the fact they hid Tutsis. God

cted them. Reuben who informed them the attackers were around was from Gikomero but is not sure whether he was one of the attackers. He did not arrive in one of the vehicles, but

e from the north. Bucundura was shot in the courtyard. The Accused was well known in the mero area. He only came by to attend weddings in his family.


is witness only gave half-truths and was obviously intent on absolving her husband and to a lesser extent KAMUHANDA. Her reference to her husband not knowing the name of the attackers contradicts another Defense witness GPK. Her testimony in these two regards should be discounted.

4, GPF lived in Gikomero, at Gikomero parish. He is the son of GER. GPF knows cundura and GAG Kabahire. GER knew them as well. Bucundura was a lay preacher

Church. The GER and Bucundura already knew each other from way back as in GPF was still young. Apart from church, they knew each other from a brick

cturing-cooperative. In 1985, the pastor was ordained in 1985 and sent to Gikomero after he his first service in Bucundura's parish, in Mbandazi.

150 PW16

151 GPF is DW12 and his PIS is DX54


3. father, GER did not know of the attack at the parish. GER did not know the killers. GER was rised and very upset by the death of his friend Bucundura. When GPF returned from where he

asked everyone there to pray for the people that had been killed. After the arrest of GER, in touch with Bucundura's family and Bucundura's two daughters-in-law and his grandson

ified on the GER's behalf by written statements. They were all present at the parish at the time of attack. GPF knew GAG who had sought refuge at the parish. She came to their house at 9 April. told them the Interahamwe had attacked. They gave her firewood and water. GER (GPF's

er) could not have sold her water, because there was water in abundance. When GPF came back hiding, he found GAG on GER's bed and she told him she was attacked. GPF gave her water

rink and ever since then GAG does not have any problem with him.

kept GAG'S suitcase at their house but GAG had informed them that her suitcase contained objects. In 1995 returned to recover her suitcase but GER explained to her that it had been by the Interahamwe, just as his own belongings too had been stolen. GAG held GER

onsible and wanted him to pay her damages. She went to the responsable of the cellule and a complaint. When the responsable dismissed her complaint, she went to the secteur

thority. On 20 July 1995 GER was summoned by the Gishaka communal office, because GAG ad accused him of being the one who brought in the Interahamwe. That was the first time GER had em accused of that. The Accused was not mentioned in the context of these accusations. GER

tained, and after his release, GAG came to see him. She told him he had to tell her how many were killed at the parish and what the names of of the attackers were. If GER would not, she

ould have him arrested once again. GER was afraid she could do that.

r his education GPF became a farmer. He worked on two fields; one at the parish and the other asagara. He was not too occupied not to know the relationship his father had with Bucundura.

ther, GPE is a Hutu and his father never participated in the genocide. Both Hutus and Tutsis lled at the parish, the majority being Tutsis. The majority of the Interahamwe were Hutus.

No other attack took place after the one at the parish. The attackers left after that.

knows a Rueben. He is a Hutu. GPF knows that on the day of the attack Rueben shouted at his er: "What are you still doing here?". Still, GER did not know about the attack. On the day of the

tack, GPF was at home. The attack started at about 1:30 in the afternoon. When he heard the shots, he tried to hide the bicycle. They were having a meal, when Rueben shouted and

cundura and GER went out. Then GPF tried to hide the bicycle, GER told him that it was too late that and that he should go and hide himself. GPF went through the back of the hedge and fled. s father knew GAG fiom Mbandazi, before he became a pastor in Gikomero. She was

elcomed as a friend of the family. GAG stayed in the classroom and later on, she gave her suitcase the GER to keep it in his house. GAG said good things about GPF, but since his father GER was

son, she realized no one else could pay up for the lost suitcase. That's why she accused him.

knows defence witnesses GPR, a Tutsi, GPE but he did not talk to them before he came t o

st refugees arrived at the parish on 9 April. GPF's father, GER went around and spoke to the refugees. GPF did not come along. He stayed at home. GPF accompanied his father when he was summoned before the responsable. The things said at the conseiller were reported to him by his

other. He was not there. GPF did not discuss the testimony he would give. GER asked the ees at his house to leave, because he had heard the Interahamwe would return to kill any

survivors. For GAG, the suitcase-issue was a pretext to have GER arrested.

UHANDA , ICTR-99-54A-T

e Interahamwe came from Rubungo. A Rubungo-policeman was the first to shoot and kill ouard Gashikazi. GER told the refugees to leave, the day after the attack. During the night he

been coming and going from and to Edouard Gashikazi's house, who had been killed, Rutayisire R that people were saying that the Interahamwe would return to kill any survivors.

Rutayisire was not a policeman. GPF did not see the Interahamwe come back.

Not all refugees were killed at the spot. Some were killed in their flight; others survived. Sometimes PF left the house and spent some time with the refugees. From time to time he did this in the

any of GER, his father. There was no argument between GER and GAG before she left. She left as soon as she heard from Rutayisire she had better leave before the Interahamwe got back. After the attack only Nukayiranga was seriously wounded; he had a bullet in his leg. GER treated is wound.

K lived in Gikomero commune in April 1994. The massacre took place on the 12th. Refugees Rubungo commune started coming in three days before. There were no refugees fiom

ornero, because there were no security problems there at the time. The attack took place between and 3 p.m. GPK was near his workplace at the time, about 300 to 350 metres fiom the parish. He

saw vehicles carrying people with firearms, grenades, and clubs. Some 50 metres from GPK they out of one car, and surrounded the people. They said they were only to kill the Tutsis. GPK their instructions and followed them to the centre. There, people had already begun killing. ey went to the secteur office and there GPK and others were divided into two groups. One

roup would go in front and behind of the vehicle to the parish and the other would go and cut off e who would flee fkom the parish.

n GPK arrived at the parish with the others brought there, the killings had already started. He two vehicles there, a white Hilux pick-up truck near the entrance of the parish pastor's house, white Suzuki next to the church. GPK points out were he was standing on sketch B, PX2, next er G. At his arrival, GPK saw a huge massacre. Though they forced him to, by giving him a

e did not participate. Others, who were brought in there with him, did. He saw killings e pastor's house being looted. He heard and saw grenades exploding and guns being fired.

ere about 30 to 50 attackers. The massacre lasted about 2 hours. The attackers left between 0 p.m. GPK did not see them take any girls or women with them.

3. e people survived. The Interahamwe gave him three children to look after and GPK left them at e pastor's house. After the attackers left, Karekezi, a policeman, came to see what had happened. e had not been there during the massacre. GPK went with Karekezi to look whether his wife

rcilla Mukayirange) and his brother (Kamanzi) and his brother' s wife (Mukamazimpaka) in obo were all right. They also jointly looked for the body of Edouard Gashikazi who had been

. After that, they left for Karekezi's house. Kamanzi and Karekezi's house are about 80 to 100 etres fkom GPK's workplace. He went by these houses almost every day.

the people forced by the attackers to go to the parish were several from Gikomero. They up people wherever they went. All of those from Gikomero who participated in the killings

were recognized as such, ended up in prison. After the war, GPK helped the military and cia1 authorities by giving names of persons he had seen at the parish. He did not mention

's name, and neither did these authorities. The Interahamwe attackers were not from did not know them. GPK passed by Kamanzi and Karakazi's house frequently, but

not on the 12th. He did see them between the 7th and the 12th. They met in the evening on two

They never met all together. GPK does not consider himself as a good friend of Kamanzi ezi. They were just good neighbours. During the investigations after the war GPK did not

ention Kamanzi or Karekezi. The allegations against Karekezi are false. GPK himself was never of participation in the Gikomero massacre.

il and including the 12th there were no local Tutsis in the area of the parish and school, ause they were at home and were not concerned about their safety. The Interahamwe specifically

acked the parish; not the Gikomero area in general. There they killed both Hutus and Tutsis and ot select on ethnic basis. GPK does not know how the Interahamwe knew there were refugees

e parish. No one advised the refugees to stay at the parish. GPK did help the refugees as they ived and passed by his workplace, if he could. He gave them information about how to get

somewhere. The day after the massacre, he closed his shop and moved, because of security reasons. PK did not know the children the Interahamwe handed over to him and assumed their parents were illed. The majority of the refugees managed to survive by fleeing the killing site. Some others

were only wounded and were looked after by the pastor, who helped them to find a place of refuge.

else was present at the massacre but the Interahamwe and the local people they brought with by force. All the locals did not know who were being targeted and fled after hearing the

shots. GPK did not take the children in; because he was afraid, they would be killed if the ahamwe would come back. The pastor would take good care of them and would ask the killers are them. The pastor knew most of the local killers, as they all lived in that area.

2th GPK did not hear gunshots while he was at the parish. He heard shots in the area, and in ighbouring areas. Before he was approached by the Interahamwe, he did not hear any gunfire in ikomero secteur. While they went towards the church, GPK heard the sound of a number of shots

ed from that direction. The distance between the place where GPK saw the Interahamwe ocation o f t he dead b odies i n the c entre, n ear h is s hop, i s a bout 1 k ilometre. F rom t he

cation of the dead bodies, GPK could not hear gunfire, but as he went up towards the centre, he could hear the sound of shooting coming from the parish.

K's shop is situated, at a place called Kurupango, lower than the Gikomero market site, about 80 100 metres apart. The distance between Kurupango and the parish is 300 to 350 metres. The

istance between GPK's shop and the secteur office is about 60 to 80 metres. As the Interahamwe approached and surrounded him and others, GPK tried to flee, but was caught before he could

y get away. Some of the Interahamwe stayed in the car and they went on down to the area of shop, where they killed people. About twenty minutes later, when he followed the

Interahamwe, GPK found the dead bodies there, between 10 and 20 of them. From here, it took them more than 30 minutes to reach the parish. GPK heard the first shots 10 minutes after they reached

trading centre. Between hearing the shots and arriving at the parish was a lapse of 40 minutes. K could see that the killers of the people near the trading centre used both firearms and traditional

. At Gikomero parish, GPK arrived with his group, coming from the path. In his group, there were no ore than 5 locals, including GPK. Other local people were scattered around the parish massacre te. GPK cannot tell how many they were, nor can he identify them. As GPK arrived at the parish,

saw that most people were killed, but not all of them. The attack was still in progress. He saw en throwing grenades inside the classrooms and finishing off the wounded lying in the courtyard. nly the Interahamwe had firearms and grenades. Out of the classrooms came out people, begging

for mercy GPK and the four people with him refused to kill, though they were beaten by the Interahamwe.


tions three locals he saw participating in the massacre: Nyagatare, Canisius, Gatenseri, and Others died in detention. Nyagatare and the other three were all involved in finishing off in the courtyard, using a club. One of the people GPK was rounded up with was Canisius.

atenseri and Gihanga were brothers. They were not part of their group and GPK does not know ow they ended up there. GPK knows a Reuben. He is Nyagatare's neighbour. GPK did not see im at the parish. He does not know to GPC, GPG, and GPB. GPK is not related to

UHANDA. PCE is the younger sister of GPK's wife and she is related to KAMUHANDA. ey are cousins and have a close relationship. Her husband was killed in 1994. GPK does not ow anything about the friendship between W U H A N D A and PCE's husband (PCE is the

ounger sister of GPK's wife). During the investigations after the war, nothing was asked about ANDA's participation in the massacres. Many people in Gikomero only got to know about ANDA's involvement when they heard the news about his arrest. He was not that well

own. GPK heard that the period after the massacre, roadblocks were set up. Near his shop, a roadblock was set up before, only to prevent RPF infiltration, not to catch Tutsis. Weapons were only distributed to the local people at the parish, not at the centre. These weapons were bludgeons that the Interahamwe carried with them.


is w itness a lmost c ertainly p articipated i n the m assacres. He w as an a ctive Interahamwe who illed at the location. He has been recruited to distort the truth and obfuscate the facts. His account

the massacres and the absence of roadblocks at the relevant time cannot possibly be true. He worked actively with KAMUHANDA. Therefore, he cannot be expected to tell the truth about their joint enterprise in genocide. Furthermore he spoke to GER, who indicated that he (GER) did know the names of the killers.

is a teacher in Gikomero parish primary school EER. GPC lived in Gikomero in April 1994. re the killings on the 12" the atmosphere was peaceful and secure. Hutus and Tutsis lived in

amony. Following the 9" refugees &om neighbouring communes Rubungo, Gikoro and Bicumbi pouring in and settled in Gikornero parish. GPC did not go to the parish to see the refugees. were no Gikomero Tutsis in the parish. GPC's Tutsi neighbours stayed in their house and

went about their business. GPC knew the parish priest and up to April 1994 saw him often, as he rovided GPC and others with a room in which they could perform plays. The priest received the

refugees and set them up in the classrooms of the parish.

At the time of the attack, GPC and his mother were harvesting in the neighbouring fields, less than a etre away. He heard gunshots and approached the road. There he ran into a certain Ntagara, old him that the Rubungo Interahamwe would kill the Tutsis in the parish and that they had said

er Tutsis wandering about should be killed as well. GPC did not follow this advice and went ut to find out more so he could warn his neighbours. As he had gathered information at the parish, e warned two families, and they fled to the other side of Lake Muhazi.

C left his field and followed the footpath, which leads to the parish, going through the banana tation. He arrived at the parish close to the pastor's house and went by the back of the school dings, through the pastor's house. In the courtyard the killers already started surrounding people,

ere were still some people left in the classrooms. It took GPC 15 minutes to get from his field parish. There he saw that the people in the courtyard were being killed with guns, grenades,

machetes and other weapons. The attackers were Rubungo Interahamwe, since they had come by

253 DW14 and the PIS is DX57

rosecutor v. KAMUHA NDA , ICTR-99-54A-T

car. Some were in uniform, others were not, but GPC did not recognize any of them. He saw four vehicles; a double-cabin pick-up, a white Suzuki, a blue Daihatsu, and a red motor car. GPC only

ed at the parish for 5 minutes.

has never been accused of participating in the Gikomero massacre. Several locals have been ested because of the killings. One of them, Nyagatare, confessed during the Gacaca proceedings re GPC was present. As his accomplices, he named several Rubungo policemen Biserurando, T wagirayezu. G PC knows K AMUHANDA. H e h as n ot s een K AMUHANDA i n G ikomero

since the beginning of his holidays a few days before the 6th of April. GPC is an official at the Gacaca court. G PC's father and KAMUHANDAYs father are cousins and i n 1 994, their p arents

ere neighbours. In 1994, GPC attended secondary school in Bicumbi, but in April, he was at home r the holidays. The Accused came over to Gikomero occasionally to visit his mother, who was ill

he would take her to the doctor, or he would come to his sisters' weddings. Before the 6". the ionship between Hutus and Tutsis in Gikomero was good. There were mixed marriages.

llowing the 6" people from other areas who did not feel safe came to seek refuge in Gikomero and they were welcomed. In Gikomero, the situation was peacefbl.

until the 6", despite of the announcements on the radio that roadblocks were to be set up against F infiltrators, none were set up in Gikomero. GPC did not see any, or heard of any, until that date.

r the 6 th, r oadblocks w ere s et up. G ER w as a v ery good and r eligious m an. H e t reated t he ees well, in spite of them using the desks in the classroom as firewood. He allowed them to use

ater from the tank in the office. GPC was not there, but he heard about this and afterwards he saw that the desks and other equipment were damaged. The person GPC ran into as he went to the

h, Ntagara, lived near GPC's fields. They knew each other. GPC did not meet anyone but ara. As he arrived at the parish, GPC knew the attackers were interahamwe, because Ntagara

d him so and some of them were wearing uniforms. Ntagara was not an Interahamwe at the ewasonlyanactivememberoftheMRND. IfKAMUHANDAhadbeenpresentatthe

sh, but had he left before GPC arrived there, GPC would have known. He has heard nobody say C considers KAMUHANDA's father as his paternal uncle in an extended family, but is not

sure about the exact relationship. Three out of four of KAMUHANDA's direct brothers were resent in Gikomero during the events of 1994. One of the three fled with his Tutsi wife.

rssecutor's submission

is witness' evidence does not deal specifically with the incidents of the 12'~ April. He is related to Kamuhanda, consequently his evidence may be unreliable. However he clearly confirms the date of the massacre at the Gikomero parish, 12" April, and the number and type of vehicles used.

G lived in Gikomero in April 1994. Before the 12" the relationship behveen Hutus and Tutsis in area was good. A group of refugees settled at the parish, others stayed with familylfriends or at secteur office. GPG did not visit the parish, but he did go the secteur office twice, on the evening he 11" and the morning of the 12th, to visit his brother and bring him some food. His brother was

one o f t he T utsi refugees. 0 n the 1 2" G PG met a 1 arge group o f about 7 0-90 p ersons who h ad ested a policeman of the Rubungo commune office, named Habyarimana, for killing people, and

him down. GPG had heard about this before, at the secteur office. He knew this man; they were part of the same Xaveri movement at the Catholic Church. GPG also knew the man holding the oliceman's gun, named Munyanjeyo, and the one holding the magazine. Both were from Junve

154 GPG is DW15 and the PIS is DX58

101

,*x m * ~ ~ ~ > a * " i * " i w w + ~ w ~ ~ - w x I - ~ - ~ - a * s * - * - w ~ x - a- r w r n ~ ~ ~ - - - , , . - - - - . "-. . - -- --._̂.- - _ _ .


secteur, Rubungo commune. Some other members of this group GPG knew by face; they all came

. As he had seen this, GPG went home to tell his family and the refugees from ~ u n v e ' s t a ~ i n ~ at his neighbours' house about it. At about 9:30 or 10:OO o'clock GPG left again to visit his friends, who were all students on holiday. First he went to visit NTD, and together they went to meet Xavier, another whose name he cannot recall, Elie, and Pascal. GPG and NTD passed by Gikomero town centre and saw the policeman again. He was surrounded by soldiers who appeared to have freed him

the mob that had arrested him earlier. The policeman looked very angry and said he would go ake revenge. The soldiers told that the RPF was approaching and they had confiscated a atsu car. Consequently, GPG and NTD went on their way again to their friends' house near

e Muhazi. GPG did not feel the need to tell the refugees from Junve about this incident, as he done before. He thought the policeman was exaggerating and that his brother was not really

~nvolved in this. At their fkiends' house, they stayed for two to two and a half hours. They could not Pascal there and left again at 1 :30. After a small chat, they parted ways and went off in the

ection of Gikomero.

they arrived in Kumunyinya, they heard shots being fired. First, one shot, and five minutes later several other shots, they got scared and decided to go back, thereby joining other people who

fleeing the scene. These people told them they were escaping from the Interahamwe who had just arrived in Gikomero and were surrounding p eople in the parish. In their flight, they crossed

e Muhazi. The distance between the Gikomero parish and Lake Muhazi is about 7 kilometres and out an hour to an hour and a half. As GPG turned back, he was at situated at about half the from the lake to the parish. Across the lake, there were no disturbances that night. The

ening, at around 6 o'clock, they crossed the lake again and spent the night at Xavier's house. ext day GPG got up at around 9 or 10 and on his way home, as he reached Kurumpango, he several dead bodies. At home, he finally heard what had happened from, among others, a

in Rukara, who was an eyewitness of the events. They told GPG that the Interahamwe and ungo policemen had come to the parish to kill people. The policeman, Habyarimye was one of


should be disbelieved in his attempts to absolve the Accused for the following reasons. He nows KAMUHANDA. His friend Xavier is lL4.MUHANDA's younger brother. He had seen

UHANDA on three or four occasions. One got to know about the killers later, as some of them in prison, and lL4.MUHANDA was not one of them. GPG had seen Xavier during their

nce before the twelfth. GPG's younger Tutsi brother had fled to Gikomero on his own. He o stay with the other refugees, so he did not come to GPG's house. GPG does not deny the local Hutus were involved in the killings. There were local Interahamwe.

knew of KAMUHANDA having one sister and three brothers, living in Gikomero. He did not now any other relatives. GPG walked passed NTD's house on the way back from the secteur's

office, but did not speak to NTD and walked on this parents' house where he stayed for a few inutes to return to pick up NTD. He was prepared to walk that day a distance of 22 kilometres to eet three friends, who he was not sure if they would be there or not. The number of people fleeing

the Interahamwe and reached the other side of the lake was about 150 in total. GPG was part first group of 20.

155 NTD is DW16 and his PIS is DX59


April 1994, NTD lived in Gikomero commune. On the 12" of April, killing komero parish. Before that, people got along well. Hutus and Tutsis lived in harmony in NTD's teur. The victims of the parish massacre were Tutsi refugees from Rubungo. They were attacked the Rubungo Interahamwe. The first refugees arrived on the 9". NTD saw them personally, as he

went to parish on two occasions. He knew some of them, for instance his old primary school er, Sevenile Nzaramba. NTD spoke with Nzaramba. Nzaramba told him that he fled the

ubungo Interahamwe, who wanted to take their cattle. Another acquaintance, named Dennis kucunde, told him the Interahamwe were killing people as well. There were about 300 to 500 ees at the parish and they stayed in the classrooms and the pastor's home. Gikomero Tutsis

were still at home; they did not have any problems before the 12". The attack took place at about 2

12" of April 1994, between 9:30 and 10 o'clock in the morning NTD was at home and a tudent G PG who h ad c ome t o 1 ook h im up. T ogether t hey decided t o go and v isit their

ends in Gasagara. On their way, in Kurupango trading centre, they saw soldiers and an armed liceman in a Daihatsu telling the bystanders that they freed the policeman from the 'Inyenzi' and

policeman was saying he would take revenge. They were about eight persons in total. The s were based in Rutunga. NTD did not know the policeman, but GPG told him he was called Habyarimana from Rubungo and that he had seen him being attacked by Tutsis that same

ing. After staying in Kurupango for five minutes, they continued their way to their friends, , Pascal, and Xavier. There, they stayed for about two to two and a half hours and left again at ut l3:3O p.m. As they head home, at about half the distance, NTD and GPG heard gunshots.

ey stopped, waited, and saw some Rubungo refugees coming from the parish and some local fleeing. They turned around, fled with them to Gasagara, and crossed Lake Muhazi. The s told them they were fleeing from the Rubungo Interahamwe who came to kill the refbgees

at the parish. Both Hutus and Tutsis fled, because they all got scared of the gunshots.

NTD and GPG stayed on the other side of the lake for 3 hours and a t 6 p.m. they w ent back to Gikomero. They were afraid to go home and stayed at Gasagara, at Xavier's house. The next day they left at about 8 a.m. On his way home NTD saw dead bodies in Kurupango. At home, he found out his paternal Uncle Edouard Gashikazi had been killed. He then went to his house to bury him.

ere he found the pastor and several relatives and heard from Edouard Gashikazi's wife, who was that a policeman from Rubungo had killed him. NTD believes this policeman was called

wagirayezu. This was the younger brother of the husband of Edouard Gashikazi's daughter anie. The attack was led by a Brigadier called Bernard, the policeman Pascal Habyarimana, wagirayezu. This NTD heard from all the people who had seen them.

D knows KAMUHANDA and his brothers and sisters. He is not related. The Accused's brother Xavier is of the same age as NTD. They were both students, but he is not a close friend. There was no distribution of weapons in Gikomero, because before the 16" there was only one gun and was Ngarambe's, the Gikomero commune policeman. In a period of war you could not be having a gun without showing it openly a given moment. Following the 16'~ refugees from Kayanga, Rutunga,

sabo and Gishaka came to Gikomero, fleeing from the RPF. Among them, there were policemen, carried guns. On the lgth NTD saw two guns, taken away from the RPF during fights near Lake

hazi, being distributed to Karnanzi and Karekezi. Karekezi told NTD that he was arrested for ossession of a weapon and fighting the RPF. According to Karekezi and his wife, he was not

accused of participating in the parish massacre. Karnanzi is missing and presumed dead. The allegation of NTD's involvement in the massacres is false.

The Accused was accused by GEK and GET. They made up the allegations together. As NTD went university, GET started accusing him of throwing a grenade at the RPF and of taking weapons


the RPF. GET called upon GEK and NTD's stepmother to go and accuse NTD at the rosecutor's office in Kigali. From June 1994 to September 1997 NTD reported to the prosecutor

gave information. After that, no charges were brought against him. NTD does not know that Karekezi is accused of being involved in the massacre, nor has he ever heard he was. He does not

ow about the allegations against the pastor. In any case, the pastor was falsely accused. The same goes for Telespore Rutaganira.

oes not know about his father-in-law GPI testifying. He has heard he could be in Arusha, but s nothing about his testimony. NTD knows GPI was accused of being involved in the parish

massacre and arrested. GPI was released because it became clear he was not there at the time. He nows Mukamusana. She was married to his father after his mother's death, and she testified against

was only accused of throwing a grenade at the RPF. NTD denied having any grenades in is possession. In the morning of the 12", NTD did not know of the acts of violence being

in Junve and Rubungo. He on1 heard it later on from his friend as they saw the K . NTD was at the parish on the 10' and the 11". He did not know of any killings in the Jurwe area close to their secteur before the 12". No refugees at the parish came from Jurwe; they all came from Rubungo.

458. In 1994, NTD lived with 4 children in his parents' house. They were about 4 months, 2, 8 and 10 years old at the time. There were no weapons in their house. Before the 12 '~ NTD was aware of significant violence in various areas in the country from Rubungo, passing by about 500 metres from NTD7s house, refugees were fleeing to Gikomero. From their house, NTD could not see any fires

urning in the area. Only on the 12", in Gasagaua, did he see those in the direction of Gikomero ommune. NTD did not feel the need to stay home and protect his family. They were safe. He

himself felt safe enough to go for a walk and visit his friends, since there were no problems in their secteur. They had not arranged between them on beforehand. NTD's friend only told him of the policeman after they had seen him. The policeman's words did not worry him either. NTD would

ot know whether his friends are Hutu. He never went around asking others what their ethnicity as. The distance from NTD's house to the parish or to Kumpango is 1 kilometre. From there to asagara is 6 to 7 kilometres. That makes a round trip of 16 kilometres to meet his friends. As

ents on holiday they did not mind the risk of any of them not being home.

the 13 '~ Interahamwe did not return to Gikomero. Nor were there any Tutsi refiigees at the parish y had died or fled. The Tutsis, who were killed, were killed by local persons from Gikomero. ese killers have been detained and tried. The Interahamwe did not chase the people fleeing to

ake Muhazi. NTD was running for three and a half to four kilometres and because everybody was eeing, he did not stop either. GEK was married to Kamanzi. In April 1995, she handed over her

husband to the authorities. NTD visited the parish, but did not know each and every refugee.


. NTD is one of the young educated Hutus in Gikomero at the time and he was friend with Kamuhanda's brother. His testimonrny is geared towards absolving KAMUHANDA while attacking all the credible prosecution witnesses. He makes assertions that are wholly unbelievable in the light of the reality of occurrences in Gikomero in April 1994. His movements on the 12 '~ and 13 '~ are contrived in order to provide cover for the Accused. He should be disbelieved in this regard.

156 GPB is DX17 and the PIS is DX60

104


ril 1994, GPB lived in Gikomero commune. Refugees from surrounding areas like Mbandazi, mungu and places beyond Kanombe stayed at Gikomero parish, and they were killed by the

Interahamwe on the 12'~. The refugees arrived on the 9". Before the attack GPB passed by the arish once. He saw that the refugees stayed in the classrooms and the pastor's house. Before the 2" there was peace in Gikomero. There was no problem between the Hutus and Tutsis. There were

no local Tutsis among the refugees. The attack took place between 1 and 2 p.m; probably closer to 1

e 12" between 1 and 2 p.m., GPB was on the road going home, near the S.O.D.E. VAT project He heard a vehicle approaching from behind. When he turned around, he saw a blue Daihatsu,

wed by a red car. The cars stopped, a few people came out the Daihatsu, and told GPB and living nearby and standing by to follow them. The persons inside the vehicle were wearing

hamwe uniforms. He saw them carrying firearms and grenades. They took them to the parish. A large group of persons followed the attackers there. Underway the vehicles stopped near Rutayasire's house. Then they went up to the parish and there they waited for a short while until two ther vehicles showed up. One of them parked in fiont of the church, and the other in front of the astor's house. The group of local people following the attackers was about 40. With the

Interahamwe, they were about 60.

and his group followed the Interahamwe in the vehicles. They were the first to get to the sh. Once they were all there, the attackers surrounded the classrooms, made the refugees come

directed them to the courtyard. There they opened fire on the crowd, and threw grenades. y killed the people, they butchered the cattle and loaded it into the trucks together with other s of the refugees. They took the pastor's belongings as well. GPB did not see any of the fleeing from the scene. Afterwards, GPB went home. He does not know whether there are vors. The attack began at about 2 p.m. and the attackers left around 4 or 4:30. During these

o hours GPB was there. He remained on the same spot, the whole time. In front of him a line of ackers was surrounding the refugees, and behind him was another line of attackers. Some of the

followers helped them and participated in the killing, the rest, including GPB, stayed in the same lace. GPB refused to take part in the massacre. The ones that did were later detained and tried.

was elected to take part in the Gacaca proceedings, which are covering these events. He does ow the names of all the participants in the killing, but he can mention one, Nyagatare. As the rs left, GPB did not see them taking any young women. He knows Gerard Gashumba as well.

was not in Gikomero most of the time, because he usually worked elsewhere. Gashumba was not e on the 12th. His daughter Muteteli went to the same church as GPB, and she told him

erything. So if he would be there, he would have known. He knows W U H A N D A . In 2001, married KAMUHANDA's sister.

. In 1994, GPB was 18 years old and did not go to school at the time, nor had he a job. He was born in ikomero and lived there all of his life. He knows the place Mutokerezwa. His wife is called Savera

aminani. He is from Mununi cellule. He lived there in 1994. GPB does not know in 1994 his was married to a certain Charles (a gendarme who participated in the killings). He did not ' e about her past and nobody told him about this either. GPB knows GPR and GPE. He never

to GPR or GPE, but he saw the latter in church regularly. GPB knows GPF, the son of GER GPE. He had no ties with him. He also knows GPK. GPB would sometimes go by his shop to

uy something. He did not speak to him on a certain time. GPB knows GPC. He would not know whether he was a Hutu. They never spoke about their ethnicity. GPB knows GPG, but he did not in April 1994. He only came to know him after the war. He also knows NTD. They were students ogether. GPB's paternal uncle, a headmaster and inspector, assigned NTD as a teacher. His uncle orked within the same Ministry of Education where KAMUHANDA was a senior officer. GPB ows GPI. GPI lived and sold beer in Kurupangu. GPB often saw him. He knows NTD is married

rusecator v. KAMUHANDA, ICTR-99-54A-T

's daughter. GPB knows of the Gikomero protestant church and school being in Mutokerezwa. d Gashikezi and Rutayisire lived nearby, by the road leading to the parish.

After the 6 April, the relationship between Hutus and Tutsis remained unchanged. The ony in Gikomero up to the 12th. GPB did nothing on the 7th, 8th, and 9th of April 1994. On 0th he walked by the parish. He knows that the refugees came from Mbandazi, Rubungo,

ecause the refugees passed by his house as they came in on the 9th and he could see they were from at area. As he walked by on the loth, he did not recognise any Tutsis from Gikomero and that is y he can say they were not there. From the road, he could see the refugees in the courtyard and

e classrooms. He could not see, in actual fact that there were any refugees in the pastor's house. r under cross-examination admitted that on the loth, he could not determine whether there komero Tutsis in the classrooms, the church or the pastor's house.

1 Oth, he went to the trading centre to buy s ome batteries. On his way, he passed by the arish, he did not meet anyone he knew. There were about 80 persons. 60 Interahamwe and 20

locals on the road that led to the parish, the extra twenty amved in two cars that passed by him as he others walked up towards the church. The attackers wore Interahamwe uniforms, but some

of them were dressed in ordinary clothes. GPB recognised one of them, Twagirayezu, the police fficer who killed Edouard Gashikazi. GPB had been forced to follow the attackers. Amongst those

were forced to follow, there were some faces, about six that were familiar, one of them, he knew ame and he mentioned it before in his testimony. These people were from his area, but most of

d not live in his cellule. That was why he recognised only about six faces.

terahamwe gave weapons to those who were willing to participate in the killings at the parish. irst, they were told to slaughter the cattle and cut it into pieces, and then they were to attack the

s. They did. GPB testified that he saw how Edouard Gashikezi was killed by Twagirayezu. e was shot while standing in the entrance of his house. The first event of the attack in the parish as the Interahamwe surrounding the classrooms and pushing everybody out. GPB does not know

tor Bucundura. He did not see the pastor at the scene. The killings continued until between 4 and 0p.m. All 4 vehicles at the parish left at the same time. Altogether, these vehicles conveyed

d not see any refugee flee. They were all surrounded and there was no escape-route. On it D 1, he identifies the road to the parish and he admits that it was there on the isolated road

local people were assembled and located when the Interahamwe picked them up and forced follow to the parish for the massacres.

e heard of KAMUHANDAYs arrest, he did not inform any authority of his innocence. When atsu amved, there were about 33 people in it. About 20 got off. About 40 locals were

. In the double cabin pickup, the Isuzu, and the red car were the amount of people left to come to the total of about 80 people. The Interahamwe did not ask the ethnicity of the people they

ere rounding up. They took anyone they could find. Their main objective was killing the people at arish. There could have been Tutsis amongst the local attackers. The Interahamwe did not in anything; they only said, "follow us". He did not see anyone lead the attack.

rosecuor ' s submissions

was almost certainly an Interahamwe who actively participated in the massacres of the 12" at komero protestant parish church. It appears that KAMUHANDA and the other leaders of the

assacres had asked this witness and others like him to assemble at the deserted road leading to the to perform Mukore, "the work" of killing the Tutsis assembled at the location. All his

testimony is geared to absolve himself of his own involvement and culpability. However, it was

lo6

"X i*"***vM*I* .V,*Uihni x*--rX'- .r *- r- sn-*."a r - r - - r m " m w a s P - - - " - - . - - - - r - P - - ~ - - ~ ~ . ~ % ~ ~ ~ . * . ~ - - _ -


impossible for him to achieve this objective withouy telling outright lies. The utter improbable coincidence of being found with so many other people at that deserted location. He was forced to the

assacre location and he refused to kill while others killed. He should be disbelieved.

I lived in Gikomero. On the 6th of April 1994, he went to visit relatives in Munini, in Ndera cteur, Rubungo commune. He returned on the 16th at around 12 noon. When the RPF took ikomero on the 19th, he hid in the bushes until the end of the war on the 19th of July and returned

Gikomero on the 25th of August, after having spent time in a camp. Two months after he returned, the former Bourgrnestre GET accused him of leading the Interahamwe. He was arrested and detained until the 26th of February 2000, but today no trial has occurred.

473. I knows GPB but not very well. GPB lives in Munini, about two kilometres from GPI's house. knows NTD who is his son-in-law. He also testified that he knew GPG who was NTD's olmate in 1994 and GPR, his neighbour, who lives less than 2 kilometres from his house. He

Iso knows GER. He knows GER's wife GPE only facially. He also knows GPK and GPC as well ut vaguely remembers PCE. The names of GPE (GER's wife), GPF, and PCB do not ring a bell.

. During his stay in Rubungo, from the 6" to the 15" GPI did not notice any houses burning in their ea, only in the Ndora area. He did hear gunshots. On his way from Rubungo to Gikomero, he did

not notice any disturbances. He stayed in Rubungo because he had heard that there was a terrible war going on. He eventually went back to Gikomero. He saw a great number of people there and found out they were seeking refuge.

Prosecutor's submission

This witness is unable to give any significant evidence on what occurred in Gikomero.

76. was the domestic help in the Kamanzi-household in 1994. She was 14 at the time of the genocide and had started working for the Kamanzi's in 1992 when she was 12. She was at Kamanzi's house in Gikomero the 6" of April when they heard about the president's death. The next

y Kamanzi took them to Kibobo cellule where they spent the nights of the 7th, the 8" and the 9". wing the day they would return home, which was a two hours walk. GEK was nine months regnant and EM would carry her other child. On the 12" there was an attack and on the 13"

Kamanzi took them back home.

itially they had left Gikomero with Karekezi's wife, GEK separated from Karekezi's wife but GEK and EM remained in Kibobo. From the gth to the 13 '~ the two of them did not return back to the house in Gikomero and Kamanzi would sometimes come over to bring them food. GEK gave birth on the night of the 12", the day of the Gikomero attack. EM knows KAMUHANDA. She had seen him in 1993 as he visited his mother, who was ill, and as he attended, his sister's wedding. He came in a vehicle and he told her and other children he would give them sweets.

he period after the 6" EM was not very busy, so she would have known of anyone passing by. rom the time she was in Kibobo during the day, she would be informed the following day about

whoever had visited where they lived in Gikomero.

157 GPI is 0x18 and the PIS is DX62

158 EM is DW19 and her PIS is DX63

107


hey left Kibobo on the 13", after a stopover at their house in Gikomero, they went to Kibaro. zi came to the house where EM and GEK were staying on the 12". He di

the killings. Following the 9" EM did not see Karekezi.

. A certain Ncogoza and Mugabo contacted EM to come and testify in the had a child on the 13" of April 1994, not the 12", around 8 in the morning. The nickname of hild was Rujangwe. Her other child was called Lydia. GEK sometimes called her Mummy.

After they had left Kibobo, they came back to Gikomero and stayed there for a week.


lied about the date GEK had her baby and the lie is accentuated by the fact that it was on the very day that KlAMUHANDA led the killings at the Gikomero parish church. This is significant in

ways, first it shows that she was coached to offer that date as it supports the defence alibi theory secondly, it is a convenient date that the young woman would remember in court. She should be

mpletely disbelieved. Her evidence regarding the birth of GEK's child is totally at variance with irth date of the child on GEK's ID document.

lived in Rubungo commune in April 1994, on the border of Rubungo and Gikomero. Gishaka olic parish is her parish. She lives near the parish, approximately 2% - 3 kilometres away, a 30

inutes walk. There were killings in April 1994 at the roadblocks at the Gishaka secteur office, the ikomero commune office, and the one at Karama. There were also killings at places PCE can not

recall. The killings took place on the 13". Near the offices of the Gishaka secteur and Gikomero commune, there were camps for war-displaced persons.

ing the death of p resident Habyarimana refugees c ame in from Zhowe secteur of Rubungo une, and Karama, Bumbogo and Shango secteur of Gikomero commune. Because of the

mng of a certain Munyangeyo in Bumbogo by the Interahamwe, people got frightened and fled. ollowing the 9" they came streaming into Gishaka. They all went to Gishaka parish church. PCE

met several refugees in Gishaka as she went to look for members of her (maternal) uncle's family, o is a Tutsi. There were no family members there. There were approximately 300 refugees at the

arish. PCE knew some among them.

war-displaced persons in the camps near the two offices were Hutu who had come into the on following the taking over of the localities in Byumba prefecture by the RPF in 1992. They

ere approximately 400. The distance between the parish and the secteur office is about 200 metres, etween the parish and the commune office is about 400 to 500 metres. Before the death of

yarimana the two communities of war -displaced persons and Tutsi refugees got along well but the president's death they did not get along, but before the 13 '~ of April there were no clashes

etween the two communities. Refugees, war-displaced persons and local people manned the andatory roadblocks. Before the first Tutsis were killed, Tutsis manned the roadblocks as well but

the death of Munyangeyo (right before the 9" they abandoned their positions and fled.

re the 13" there were no killings at the roadblocks. PCE does not know when the killings egan. People fleeing came by her house at around eleven. They did not have time to talk, but one f them told her someone had come and chased them away from the parish. There were no

ssacres at the parish. They were just chased away, according to the passer-by. Others passing by

159 PCE is DW20 and her PIS is OX64


confirmed this. The massacres only took place at the roadblocks. PCE did not hear any gunshots or explosions on the 13". Neither did she on the night of the day before.

e 13 '~ PCE stayed at home. She hid when she heard noises of people passing by. She remained m her house until the 16", when she left to seek refuge in Gikomero. According to the passers-by

ed because of the brigade commander of Gikomero commune, Nyarwaya, and his team, among whom Rwanyange (a Gishaka farmer) and Ephrem (a Gishaka farmer and tradesman). On

e 12" PCE went to visit her uncle Rusatsi who was in charge of the Gishaka health centre at the . It was common knowledge he was a Tutsi. She went to his house, close to the health centre, as she was there, he distributed biscuits to refugees and drugs to GKI. GKI had come from the

arish. Consequently, they went to the parish together to look for family members. There PCE met several people she knew, but found none of her relatives and so returned to her uncle Rusatsi's ouse. After that she returned to her home.

e 15" her uncle moved from Gishaka to the trading centre in Rugogwe, on the border between and Gikomero communes. In the night of the Rwandan government forces there

fought RPF forces and her uncle and other refugees fiom Gishaka returned to Gikomero. On the 16 '~ PCE and her family met her uncle again in Gikomero. On the 12" GKI visited PCE's uncle Rusatsi at around eleven, before noon. No one else was there but PCE. She saw GKI leave.

en she went to Gikomero the 16", PCE went to stay at the house of her cousin, Kamanzi. He was like her brother and she knew him and his wife very well. She has Kamanzi's original baptismal card in her possession. She got it fiom the parish. PCE did not stay in Gikomero. She went back ome and left for Bumbogo. On the 28" of April she left again for Rutare, where she arrived on the

29". There she was in a RPF camp until the end of July, beginning of August. In Rutare PCE met several people fiom her secteur. One of them was GKJ.

e road to the parish stops in front of PCE's house and right by her house passes a footpath. The fugees came from the road and took the footpath fiom there. PCE stayed at Kamanzi's house fiom e 16" for about a week. In Rutare PCE would occasionally meet GKJ and have a chat. GKJ told

er that she left the parish and that when she got to Karama her children had been killed and she had een wounded. GKJ got treatment at the house of Niyivuga and stayed there. GKJ told her she had

left the parish before it was attacked. When PCE returned fiom Rutare Niyivuga, who offered treatment to GKJ during the killings informed PCE that GKJ whom he treated had her arrested.

knows KAMUHANDA. They are cousins because their paternal grandmothers are sisters. She ot see lGWUHANDA in April 1994. Not everybody in Gikomero knew they were related. He

came over to her house from time to time. The people who fled with PCE did not know about her ties to KAMUHANDA. Therefore, they would have told her about him, if they had seen him during the attack. On the 12" she went to the parish and stayed there for 20 minutes. She stayed with her uncle fiom 11:OO a.m. to 3:00 p.m. PCE knew EM. They met again in November 2002. She knew

G EO, G PC, a nd G PD. G PD is m arried t o h er c ousin, a s ister o f KAMUHANDA. D uring this sister was married to a gendarme named Charles who was killed by a bomb in Gikomero. ows NTB only superficially. She does not know GBK, GPE, GPR, and GPG. Of the latter, y knows his older brother.

eak about KAMUHANDA's arrest only with her own brothers, GEO and KAMUHANDA's and sisters. PCE and GKI attended the Gishaka parish church together. PCE knew her

brother Charles Kayiranga as well. He worked with her uncle at the health centre. Kayiranga could not have seen the bourgmestre in the period of the killings. Kayiranga was killed around that time, ut only after the 13". On the 3oth of March 1994, the people of Nkuzuzu fled. A soldier told a

policeman that he heard the Interahamwe of Remera said that they would attack the people of


zuzu. The policeman told the bourgrnestre. Consequently, her uncle and Kayiranga were ed at the health centre.

en PCE arrived at her uncle's workplace, there were no refugees. They were at the parish. Some were inside the church, others outside. PCE's uncle was not a fiiend of KAMUHANDA. At Kamanzi's house, PCE did not ask any questions about where the new baby was born, or when it was

She was not informed about that either. When she met Kamanzi's wife GEK, who just had a aby a few days before, she was in a normal physical state. Women in her condition, and under

circumstances, could walk 2 to 3 kilometres. At Kamanzi's house PCE met EM.


give n o e vidence regarding t he i ncidents o f 1 2" A pril 1 994. T his w itness w as single purpose of significance and that is to negate the testimony of GKI in respect A's trip of 30 March 1994 to plan with the local authorities the killings of the 12" 1994. She has told half-truths about the visit of W U H A N D A to plan with the She should not be believed in this regard, as she was attempting to cover up for

ANDA. However, she establishes and reinforces the credibility of GKI and places here said she was at the relevant time.

ew KAMUHANDA. They were both members of the technical committee for Communal entre for Permanent Development and Training. KAMUHANDA was the Chairman from 1987 to

They were both on the electoral committee as well, in 1993. That was the last time they saw each other. KAMLTHANDA was the Chairman. The Hutu war displaced persons had been living in

since 1992. Tutsi refugees started arriving on 7", 8" and gth, at first from Rubungo e, then from Gikomero commune. There were about 500 to 1000 of them. They stayed in h building and large meeting room. Tension arose between the Tutsi refugees and the Hutu aced persons. So on the 10" and 1 lth, the displaced persons were moved.

e massacre occurred on the 13" of April, but not in the parish compound, but in the hills. Some were in their homes, some were hiding in the bushes, and most of them were taken from Gishaka

'sh to a place where they were killed. Between 9 and 10 a.m. 50 - 100 Interahamwe arrived, ught in by a Lieutenant from Rutungo. Most of them were youths and PC recognised none of

They had machetes, spears, scythes, and clubs with nails in them, guns, rifles and grenades. ees came out, unarmed, and the two groups clashed. PC tried to negotiate with the attackers, y were beyond reason, and he suspects that some of them were on illegal inebriating drugs.

he attackers made all refugees show their identity cards. One woman was dressed as a nun in her hoto. So the attackers gave handed her over to PC who was told to take her to his home. Later PC

was told the refugees had been taken to a place near the communal office and executed.

. He suggested that there was no person injured or killed on the field of the parish, and no shots fired. the 12 '~ of April, PC had seen someone watching the refbgees. When he made enquiries of this son, he informed PC that he was making sure they did not flee. Although this person did not wear

uniform, PC was sure he was an interahamwe. Survivors of this massacre told PC about the assacre on the 17th. On the 14" of April, Interahamwe returned to attack the parish. On the 15th, F reached the commune. On the 16", PC met the RPF. On the 17th, PC was asked to leave, so he

ent to Bumbogo with survivors. On the 26th, RPF made them leave for Byumba, and then PC went to Uganda, and later, to Belgium.

160 PC is DW21 and his PIS is DX66

s the nun he had to take home. She was only in his house for less than an hour. He had ted her to hide but she disobeyed and a neighbour sighted GKI in PC's house so PC told GKI and hide elsewhere. Soldiers brought her back. In 1995, he heard from her that they had er to a convent. PC did not see GKI's mother there on the day of the massacre. The only

ttackers he recognised on the 1 3th and 14" were And eone from Nduba, and the lieutenant. PC denied ever shouting, "KAMUHANDA, has arrived, say your last rayers". There were no Interahamwe until the 13" an ed, before the morning of

that day.

es that in the Kinyanvanda language, the phrase "look at KAMUHANDA, we are finished" confused with another Kinyarwanda phrase meaning, "they are coming" or "they are here ad", just by changing a couple of letters. The same could apply to what was said at the

assacre site in Gikomero. This the prosecution submits is wholly untrue and has an uncanny resemblance to the testimony of W U H A N D A himself when he tried to falsely claim that those

him at the massacre sites could have mistaken his name for "Umuhanda" meaning "the refore, this shows that there is some pre-determined scheme and logic between

UHANDA's testimony and that of PC. This shows that this piece of testimony is tainted.

ICTR officials interviewed PC in September 2001. They made notes at the meeting, and on these notes, in PC's handwriting, were his contact details. PC does not remember the notes being read

ck to him. Even though he signed the document, PC does not remember the first few questions, or rs, but whatever answers he might have given were truthful answers. In the interview, PC

as not sure about the date of the massacre. It could have been the 13" or the 14". In the interview, European friend was killed. According to PC, he must have been talking about his priest died of illnesses emanating from the after effects of the genocide. In the interview, PC

ered, "I myself did not see W U H A N D A . I am not saying he was not there but I did not see However, if KAMUHANDA was there he would have seen him, or he would have been told

accepts the fact that he was unaware of a huge amount of information despite the fact that he had wed among Rwandans for a very long time. PC felt like a foreigner, and was treated, as a foreigner.

uld be the last person to know what the locals thought or planned. He does not know that was in charge of the Interahamwe in Gishaka secteur, long before the 13". PC was not

interested in finding out who was manning the roadblocks in the area. He was worried for his own safety, as Belgians were seen as collaborators with the RPF. Witness GKI is a reasonable woman, a ormal person but she must be confused if she said she stepped over her mother's body at the church, ecause there were no bodies at the church. Maybe some people were mistaken because it might be

er to recall things when you are more involved in the events yourself.

oes to bed normally around 9p.m. Therefore, he had no way of knowing whether people were from the church and killed during the night of the 12" and 13". When PC asked GKI to leave, so because she had disobeyed his instructions to her to hide and she had been seen, and he was

concerned for his own safety. PC is not aware of the mass graves behind the school and very the parish, even though he had been round there several times. He is always the last to be told

gs like he had said earlier; it is impossible to be fully absorbed by the Rwandans. He does why the Interahamwe did not just kill the refugees at the church.


C was completely shocked by the scale of the killings and was affected by the death of his friend. The sheer enormity of these events has caused his recollection of the events to be hazy and selective.

rosecutor v, KAMUHANDA, ICTR-99-54A-T

is testimony about the fact that he did not hear gunshots at close proximity is also further proof of s selective recall. He could not say of Kamuhanda was present or not during the massacre, and

oes not know how the refugees went so passively to their death.

161

B heard of the president's plane being shot down, she and her husband were afraid - the atmosphere in Gishaka was fine. On the 9", they heard that Hutu war displaced

persons, who had earlier settled in Gishaka, had started attacking Tutsi homes to loot and kill. The ar displaced Hutus had been in Gishaka since 1992 and had come from Byumba, but left when the F took over the region. There were between 400 and 500 war displaced persons in the area. On ", PCB received one Tutsi refugee in her home. Later other Tutsi refugees arrived, and set up in of the bureau communal and at the parish. They came from Nkuzuzu, Bumbogo, Nduba,

ago, and Karama (neighbouring communes) and arrived on 9", loth, and 1 1". There were about of them at the bureau communal, but PCB did not go and see the ones at the parish.

isplaced persons were behind the communal office, close to the health centre, and at the secteur office, only a hundred metres from the refugees. There were clashes between the Hutu and Tutsi

unities. The war displaced persons wanted to provoke the refugees, but the bourgrnestre, husband, threatened to chase them out of his commune if they continued with this action. The

ar displaced persons respected his instructions, but were angry and called her husband and her accomplices of the Inkotanyi. However, the bourgmestre told the communal policemen to punish anyone who got too close to a Tutsi refugee. One policeman was called Jean Baptiste Muhizi. The

ar displaced persons got angrier by the day. Then the brigade commander of the commune, yarwaya, came to the house on the 11" and complained. He asked, "why do you stop us from

working (killing)". When the bourgmestre said his job was to ensure people's safety, and therefore e would protect them, Nyarwaya left. He was angry and went to fetch the Interahamwe at Remera

to come and eliminate her husband and her. Ephrem was an Interahamwe who her husband had rrested and incarcerated on the 6" when he had attacked some Tutsis in a place south of Gishaka.

knew of Nyarwaya's intentions after he had departed, a man who lived nearby came to them at out lp.m., and said Nyarwaya had left in a very angry mood and was going to get the Interahamwe

them first, and then the Tutsis they were trying to protect afterwards. Then he came again at out 4pm and said that Nyarwaya had left. Therefore, their family fled. PCB's husband, her own

, her brother's child, the domestic servant and a driver, called Janvier Munyeshyaka. They took alth centre ambulance from the health centre and fled with it.

ent to Kayanga and stayed in Rubanguka S house. Then on the 12'~, they went to the house nguka S mother in the hills of Kayanga secteur. On the 13", they went towards Gikomero, ey were stopped, so they had to return towards Rubungo. Therefore, PCB was in Kayanga

secteur from 1 lth to 13". Her husband did not go back to their home; he was always with them and never went to attend a meeting in Gishaka on the 12". They were accused of being Inkotanyi accomplices because her husband had objected to the killing of the Tutsis. Eventually they fled to

tale in Congo.

7. les Kayiranga came to PCB's husband on the 3oth of March to tell him that he had heard that the is were going to be killed. Her husband said he was not aware of this, but if it was true, he

flee the area because his few policemen could not stop the Interahamwe. PCB did not give or volunteer this information to anybody. PCB saw KAMUHANDA once, at the burial ceremony of

1651 PCB is OW22 and the PIS is OX67


ichel Rukabayihunga (the previous bourgmestre) in 1992. Her husband knew KAMUHANDA, ut not very well.

found out that KAMUHANDA had been arrested when ICTR officials came to interview her in 001 or 2002. They questioned her about Charles Kayiranga and KAMUHANDA. She told them

UHANDA did not store weapons in her house, that there were no weapons in their house, and d not see any in the communal office, and as an employee she had access to all the rooms in the

a1 office. Then she found out GET had sent them. Therefore, PCB avoided seeing the hen they returned.

. She s aw the o fficials t aking notes, b ut they did not read them b ack t o her, and she n ever s igned anything. Her Husband is probably dead; she left him in the Congo. He is as a 'No. 1' on the list of genocide perpetrators because GET caused his name to be put there. She knows GET had sent the officials to her because before they came he sent the conseiller, Gatambara, to her to tell her not to leave the house because he was sending some visitors over.

and her husband are Hutu. In 1994, she was a court registrar, so she is very familiar with edure. In 1990, she moved to Nyagasozi cellule, in Gishaka secteur, Gikomero commune. ed Rutaganira on the 27" of February 1993. She was a Catholic at the time, and Father onnet married them. She knew him very well. He was a man who loved his church, his

ock, and development in the area. Her husband and the Father would exchange ideas about rojects. PCB is absolutely certain that Father Michel was not on the Electoral College

er husband, b ecause h e w as n ot i nterested i n p olitical activities. S he d id n ot know UHANDA was on the Electoral College, so she could not comment on that.

and is neither a coward, nor lazy. He fled on the 11" because the Interahamwe came to m and wanted to kill them. He put all his energy before then into ensuring the security of

e Tutsi refugees within his commune. Actually, there was never an attack on her home. She and r family fled through fear of attack because of the information they had obtained about their safety.

CB admits others may have made allegations against her husband, but GET always set these people . She does not know GPI.

's husband never drafted a radio communiqut, together with Andre Rwamakuba, calling on the ahamwe t o c ontinue the k illings. If h e w as s till a live h e w ould r eturn, and P CB i s s ure the

people who are thankful for the good things he did to help them will ensure his name is taken off the list of category- 1 genocide suspects.


is witness should be disbelieved. She gave testimony to absolve her husband who was the local authority presiding over the genocide in the Gikornero area. Her testimony of the flight of her family is wholly unbelievable. The fact that she stayed with the mother of the Commune accountant who was heavily involved in the genocide suggests that they were all in the killings together. She is not a

itness of truth and she merely came to testify in support of KAMUHANDA who was her husband's nefactor and godfather.

Q-1 is an ICTR investigator who observed the arrest by the French police of KAMUHANDA in Bourges on the 26" of November 1999. KAMUHANDA was there with his family. His house was

182 ENQ-1 is DW23 and his PIS is OX68


1 spoke to KAMUHANDA at the police station, before he was taken into custody. official interview and therefore not recorded but it was to find out whether was willing to cooperate with the Tribunal by giving evidence against other

suspects. The interview took more than an hour. KAMUHANDA was not took notes and a report was written in English for the director of investigations.

did not verify KAMUHANDA's statements in the report himself because he was working in r team and was just on a temporary assistance with the arrest team. He does not know what

the team did with the report. ENQ-1 and the other investigators did not give KAMUHANDA the indictment. It was up to the French police to tell him why they were arresting him. Reading back

e report, ENQ-1 is quite sure they asked KAMUHANDA about events in Gikomero. He thinks ey did not ask him about what had happened on the 12" of April. KAMUHANDA did not give

ny information other than his statements in the report. He did not offer to help by giving any more information on the events in the months April to July of 1994.

-2 was present with ENQ-1 at the arrest of KAMUHANDA by the French authorities. It was t a formal interview and they told KAMUHANDA explicitly that he was not obliged to speak to em. ENQ-2 took notes. As far as he knows, no records were made. He recognizes DX 40 as the

he drafted. The interview lasted over two hours. KAMUHANDA spontaneously accepted to answer. He did not say he was ready to cooperate, but just stated he would answer the questions put

. ENQ-1 and ENQ-2 did not prepare any questions beforehand. KAMUHANDA understood that they wanted to know more about what happened in the period of April 1994, but ENQ-2 did not

ention any specific names to him.

he report is a truthful reflection of what KAMUHANDA said. ENQ-2 did make a mistake, concerning the ethnicity of KAMUHANDA's wife and KAMUHANDA mentioned three names of ersons who knew where he was around the 1 gth of April 1994. This information was never verified. NQ-2 remembers talking to KAMUHANDA's wife on the phone. On the 1'' of December he

informed her, her husband had been detained. He talked to her for the second time on the 8" of December. On that occasion he did not tell her KAMUHANDA was innocent. Sometime in March

4-2 received a letter from her, saying that her husband was innocent. Apart from the arrest, -2 was not involved in the investigations in KAMUHANDA's case.

cognizes the interview report dated 26 November 1999, showed to him by the defense (DX ies his signature, page 3 mentions three defense witnesses viz, ALR, ALB and ALS. He zes the interview reports of 5 May 1995 and those of 7 and 13 May 1999, which carry s. The names mentioned in these reports are of persons ENQ-2 met in the course of the igations o f KAMUHANDA. 0 ne of t he three names m entioned b y KAMUHANDA

uring the interview of the 26th of November is of a person previously interviewed on the 12" of May. ENQ-2 prepared a report on this interview. The interview on the 12" of May 1999 was held with ALR. The purpose of this interview was to find out where KAMUHANDA was in April 1994

hat he was doing.

-2 wrote the notes down verbatim, as the witness was talking. The notes show that ALR told e investigators that he was KAMUHANDA's neighbour. He lived opposite to him. ALR did not ow that KAMUHANDA was a member of the MRND. On the 6" of April 1994 nothing unusual

163. Exhibit DX40 is a summary of this interview.

I64 ENQ-1 is OW23 and his PIS is DX68

pened in ALR's neighbourhood. On the 8" six soldiers came by his house to kill h& and his LR gave them 200.000 Rwandan Francs to spare their lives. After the soldiers had left,

ANDA came by to see whether he was all right. He c ame over again in the afternoon, en a part of ALR's house had been blown up by a grenade, thrown by soldiers. Significantly,

according to ALR in the report, on one of the days following the 8"' probably the 12", ANDA left with his family for Gitarama. ALR did not expand on this. If he had said

about KAMUHANDA staying in the house of ALR's neighbour to avoid incoming ullets, ENQ-2 would have taken note of that. A certain brigadier Gatsinzi facilitated

WANDA'S trip to Gitarama. ENQ-2 agrees with the Prosecutor that KAMUHANDA's contact with Gatsinzi must have been either on the 12" or before and not on the 18". ALR states in the report that he remained in Kigali following the 12" and he only went to Gitarama occasionally to take food to his family.

R saw KAMUHANDA later on the road to Kibuye in June. They had a beer, but did not talk out his appointment as a minister. By mentioning that the only trip undertaken by

UHANDA between the 7th and the 12" was the one to Kimiruriha to his brother-in-law's place 9" and 10" of April, ALR only reconfirmed the dates put to him by ENQ-2. The previous day

-2 spoke to another witness (ALA) to find out about the whereabouts of KAMUHANDA. am an interview report was made.

rosecutor's submissions on ENQ- 1 and ENQ-2

accounts are the most reliable indicators of the true attempts by KAMUHANDA to establish alibi for himself and cover his tracks. He did not give vital information about his alibi.

ously, because he contrived and formulated his alibi later after his arrest and contact with these tigators. He was not able t o adequately justify h is whereabouts d wing the r elevant p eriods h e c o-ordinated and 1 ed attacks i n G ikomero. T he reports o f t hese Investigators should b e upon as the truthfit1 account of the arrest and compared and contrasted with the accounts given s Karnuhanda, regarding the delay in the transmission of the alibi details to the Defense ey*

Xaviera ~ u k a r n i n a n i ' ~ ~

s KAMUHANDA's sister and there are five brothers and eight sisters. KAMUHANDA is the . XM is the eighth in the family. Their father died in 1984, their mother in 1997. XM moved the family home in 1993. KAMUHANDA did so some years before her, somewhere between

4 and 1985. KAMUHANDA visited the family home often. He was the head of the household er the death of their father and was very close with his family. He came by to take their mother

for treatment to Kigali when she had difficulty breathing because of her asthma. When he would isit, KAMUHANDA always came in his official car of the Ministry of Education, with a

lived in Kurupango, Gikomero. She had lived there for a year then. After her aniage, she would come by three times a week to look after her mother. At the time, eight out of e thirteen of her mother's children were living in Gikomero. Five of them lived at the family

, KAMUHANDA and Mpanganza were the only two of the family who had studied at Gikomero were other successful people with the social stature like that of

ANDA, they are like doctors and members of parliament. Many people considered ANDA highly influential.


HANDA's last visit to Gikomero was at Easter in 1994. XM met him and sp for fifteen minutes. He was bringing some gifts over for Easter to their mother. On his earlier visits, he

ould usually come by XM's house first, before he went to the family house. XM always knew UHANDA would be in Gikomero, because before she moved out, she was the only adult hildren and she would be the person to inform him when their mother got sick. On the

f April, around 1 p.m. the Interahamwe arrived in Gikomero. People were screaming, "We're we're dead" and ran away. Everybody fled and so did XM with her family. Only her husband

not come with them, because he worked as a gendarme. He died during the war. XM fled to asagara, in the direction of her mother's house. Others fled towards Lake Muhazi or Kibobo. XM

house and found her mother and some older Tutsi women there. Those of the family o could swim had fled and crossed Lake Muhazi, Those who could not remained at home. ound 5 p.m. the boys returned home and in the evening XM went back to her house in Kurupango

s well. It was said that the Interahamwe had left. As she got back, she saw the bodies of both Hutus and Tutsis who had been killed by the Interahamwe at the parish school. On the 13" XM fled

n, since she was afraid the Interahamwe might return. While on the run, she checked up now then with her mother to see whether she was all right. At a certain point she found out that, RPF iers who had arrived in Gikomero had taken her mother to Byumba.

lives next to three of her cousins. Two of them are Kamanzi and Karekezi. Their houses are nly separated fiom XM's by one road.

. As XM heard about ISA.MUEI.ANDA's arrest she got sad, but accepted the situation as it was. From until his arrest in November 1999, XM did not hear of any allegations against . She thought he had gone into exile, like other Rwandans.

d not answer the prosecution question about the involvement of her first husband in the enocide in Rwanda. He was not in Gikomero at the time. XM's second and current husband was

not involved in the killings in Gikomero on the 12". Quite the opposite, local people were helping r efugees w here they c ould b y b ringing them food. XM d id not sa y that s he and h er current

usband did the same. From her home in Kurupango, at the trading centre, XM saw a vehicle th Interahamwe shouting and waving flags. They went to the parish. The killings took ere; no Tutsis were killed in Kurupango. The Tutsis who lived in Kurupango had fled

es not know which political party KAMUHANDA belongs to as he never mentioned any her and he never told her he was a member of the committee that elects the bourgmestre of . No weapons were distributed in Gikomero. The attackers from Rubungo brought their

n. No weapons were distributed in Kamanzi and Karekezi's house. Many Tutsis fled from sagara to the other side of Lake Muhazi.

i's second child is called Nadia Uwase, nicknamed Rujangwe, or Mummy. (XM was ooking at the identity card while saying this and the identity card says Kamanzi Uwase). XM

contests GEK's name and says it her name has a male and female variant but what she uses a man's rom the parish to the house of XM's mother is a 45-minute walk. At the time, in 1994, there

of XM's brothers living in that house. None of them was charged of being involved in the the attackers arrived, nobody knew their objective. Tutsi refugees earlier informed the

they had been chased by bandits, and that as these bandits had been driving in the area, ody fled. XM went to her mother's house near Lake Muhazi and saw people crossing the

e. Nobody was killed there. She also confirmed that they all abandoned KAMUHANDA's mother in her house when they fled from the Interahamwe and when they returned they met her alive and unharmed.

116

-- - -


is is another in a line of witnesses who are close relations or good friends of KAMUHANDA. e has testified to favour her brother who she holds in the highest esteem. Her self-serving

testimony is tainted. The Chamber should disregard it in its entirety as she is motivated by adverse

from Gikomero commune. In 1994, he lived in Kigali but was still in touch with events ening in Gikomero, since his family lived there and he was a member of the technical committee the Electoral College, which chooses the bourgrnestre. Other members of the Electoral College e KAMUHANDA, Gasana Anasatasie, DX PC, and Murenzi Desire. During the elections of

e four political parties that participated were MDR, MRND, PL and PSD. Representing the was Telesphove Rutaganira, and representing the PL was GET. The atmosphere during the

electrons was tense. There was a lot of rivalry between the parties and the individuals contesting. Aloys Munyengegu the MDR representative was a paternal uncle. VPG knew the PL representative

ecause he was a qualified teacher in the primary school and both the PSD and MRND candidates were VPG's schoolmates. The MRND representative Telephore Rutaganira won the elections. VPG

of the MRND. The whole of Gikomero and Kigali rural area was dominated by the re victory was certain. The MDR was the second party; the other parties had hardly

any support in the area.

n 1994, there were several inhabitants of Gikomero with a university degree. Murenzi Desire, for le, worked as a managing director for the BP FINA fuel company; Gasana Anasatasie was the

minister of Foreign Affairs; Nkubana worked for the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa; Kalinjabo was a university professor. They were all members of different political parties or

member at all. None of them was a member of the MRND and all were members of the ical committee.

RND party was organized from the grassroots up to the top, the national level. Each cellule, secteur, commune and prefecture had its own administrative committee and youth representative.

commune was autonomous. KAMUHANDA was a member of the party, but had no specific n it. He was not part of the organizational structure of the party neither at the national, nor at

e communal level. He was just a member like any other. KAMUHANDA did not have any formal influence either. He did not go to the communes, where the political life of the MRND was

ed. He stayed at Kigali. During the days of the multi-party system, between 1991 and were MRND rallies in Gikomero. VPG participated in several of them, like the one in

anga in 1993, and the one at the stadium of Nyamirambo, shortly after the Arusha Peace ccords. The latter was organized by the national administrative body of the MRND and aimed at

the power of the party, as the Peace Accords had paved the way for a shared

e rally in Kayanga was organized by the prefecture committee. VPG and some friends, including a utsi couple, went there by car and VPG decided to pick up ISAMUHANDA. KAMUHANDA did

not intend to go, but was eventually convinced to come along. He made a brief address to the crowd, ore of an introduction of himself and VPG. They wanted to show the people that the

mor, spread by the MDR, of intellectuals defecting from MRND to MDR and leaving the MRND arty was false. They were at the Kayanga rally for about two hours and VPG never left

ANDA's side. In 1994, VPG lived in the same area as KAMUHANDA. On the 6" of

166 VPG is OW26 and the PIS is DX70

MUHANDA , ICTR-99-54A-T

ril, VPG was at home. Because of the artillery fire that had shelle one of his neighbours, VPG left Kigali on the 25" of April and went to Gitarama. VPG lived virtually on top of the hill and he could see the shells coming from the Gendarmerie on the very top of the hill, and fiom Kimonyi,

tsosukabugo and other places.

ed close to the ministries, south of Kacyiru camp, with the Ministry of ducati ion on one Public Works and Social Funds on the other. This area became an area of great insecurity ". It was inaccessible. There are two main routes from Kigali to Gikomero. One starts of levard of Umuganda, and goes past Remera and up to Ndera. The other is the way to

a, with a turn at Kabuye. VPG usually takes the first route. On the 12" of April 1994 , it was impossible to go this way, because it was in the middle of the combat zone. The

uganda Boulevard separated the two fighting parties exchanging fire, and the Remera darmerie had already been taken by the RPF. The ministries area was a combat zone and essible fiom the 9" or 10" of April onwards. Following that date, people came fleeing from

li to VPG's side of town, where the RAF was located. From KAMUIHANDA's house, the to Gikomero is via the Umuganda Boulevard. He could not have gone the other way Kanombe airport; it was not possible.

gee and his father and brother have been arrested. His father was later released. UHANDA is a friend of VPG's, but they are not very close. He knows KAMUHANDA was

ent to Gitarama. They saw each other there. Shortly after the 19" of April he

f the fact that he, VPG was on the wanted list in Rwanda for his involvement in tact with the Rwandan embassy in his land of refuge. They never

sought refuge because he was afraid he would be arrested like his father and r political asylum. When the arbitrary arrests will stop and justice restored in

Rwanda, VPG will return to Rwanda.

ANDA on the loth between 15:30 and 16:OO. He found him outside with other e area. VPG greeted everybody and left after 15 minutes. It was the last time he saw A, until they met again in Gitarama after the 25". VPG never tried himself to get to

assing through friendly, FAR controlled, area would have enabled him A would have gotten there, but to get to Gikomero he had to pass

, so he did not. KAMUHANDA eventually escaped fiom Kigali through the . It was the only route possible. This road also leads to Gikomero, but in

er to g et there in 1994 you w ould have had to pass Kabuye and Nyaconga, which were areas 1994, VPG was not in the military, nor was he at any time engaged in

. Still, he knew about the military operations taking place in the different locations mentioned, se of his neighbours, who were Gendarmes and who reported to VPG and others what they had to know fiom visiting the battlefront. VPG also gained information by looking at air strikes

artillery fire from his house, but since he was not a soldier, this was not a reliable source of infomation..

lectoral college was appointed by governmental decision and consisted of members of the cal committee, the communal council, heads of communal departments and members of civil

soc~ety; 29 members in total. The majority of them were MRND. The tension during the elections s because of political clashes between the two rivaling parties, the MRND and MDR, not because

wing Hutu extremism and hatred against Tutsis. VPG heard on the radio about the Arusha Accords, and about the agreement of power sharing between the M and other parties, but the

irit of multi-partyism was promulgated already in June 1991. In lections the MRND came first, the MDR came second, and the PL and PSD both only got one vote. There was no deliberate


effort or plan made by the MRND to put in a majority of MRND members in the Electoral College to ensure that an MRND bourgmestre would be elected.

multi-partyism, VPG, as a Rwandan, automatically was a member of the MRND. Within the , one's administrative rank corresponded with one's party rank. Administrative orders were

party orders. As the system of multi-partyism was introduced this overlap between state and party ended. With respect to the Gikomero Electoral College, there was no fear in the MRND ranks of

their former control. They went along with the new multi-party system. VPG does not er the names of the Tutsi couple that went along to the party rally at Kayanga with him. The

friend, who owned the car they went with, was called Athanase. VPG does not know his ethnicity. Both Athanase and the Tutsi couple were members of the MRND. KAMUHANDA and VPG were introduced to the crowd as natives of Gikomero, who were intellectuals and members of the MRND from Gikomero and not as important persons as such.

Prosecutor's submission

ess has shown clearly the influence and importance of KAMUHANDA in Gikomero. He is d an intellectual and he was of considerable importance in the political affairs of his . He attended political rallies and was a core MRND party member and activist. With

regards to routes to Gikomero, VPG at no time attempted to go there and his conclusions are pure speculation.

April 1994, RGS lived in the Gatsata district of Kigali. On the evening of the 6", RGS was at ome, and heard on the radio about the death of President Habyarimana. A communiquk was issued lling everybody to stay at home. On the 9th and 10" there was a great number of refugees from the

ed persons camp of Nyaconga coming in. They told them the camp had been destroyed by the aconga is 10 kilometers fkom Gatsata. RGS was worried Gatsata would be taken as well,

confident that the government would make every effort to defend the district. On the night 1" though, the district was taken by the RPF and the population fled. In the morning of the S, his wife and the children went by car to the Nyabugogo crossroads. They were heading

r Kiyovu in the centre of Kigali.

43. e battle appeared to take place on the Kimihurura side of town, in the direction of Remera. Smoke ing from the parliament building (CND) at Kimihurura. An RPF battalion was based there. been there since 1993, because of the Arusha Accords. Near the parliament, building there

as a base of the Presidential Guard, and both sides exchanged fire. RGS could observe this from s house. RGS did not make it to Kigali centre. When he got to Nyabugogo, he ran into a huge

crowd. A soldier told him that Kiyovu was not safe and that everybody went to Gitarama. Therefore, RGS went to Gitarama as well and within a day, he was there. RGS knows how to get from Kigali to Gikomero. From Nyabugogo, one takes the road to Byumba. In Gatsata one makes a turn towards Nyaconga and at the Kajevuba marshes, one goes right to get to Gikomero. There is also another route, via Rubungo and Jurwe. Around the 12" of April 1994, it was impossible to take

t route along Byumba road, because Nyaconga camp was destroyed and the area occupied by . You had to be a member of the RPF to get through. The only safe way out of Kigali was to

Gitwama.

544. RGS knows KAMUHANDA. They were students together. They first met in 196811969. In 1994 the RPF approached Kigali fi-om the north, and there was already a battalion in the outskirts of

- 167 RGS id DW27 and the PIS is DX 72

119

MUHANDA , ICTR-99-54A-T

Kigali, located in the CND. After they had taken Nyaconga, Gatsata lay on their way to the centre f Kigali and they took it. On the map shown to RGS, the RPF forces came from the north and they ent in the direction of the west, but on the 12 '~ the road to Gitarama was still safe and open and

under the control of government forces. RGS only saw armed soldiers at Nyabugogo. He did not see locks or Interahamwe. It took RGS about one hour and 45 minutes to get to Gitarama. ecked his papers, and he did not see anybody else being checked along the way. Neither

corpses lying alongside the road. I stayed in Gitarama town centre from the 12" of April up to the 3 1 st of May 1994. Gitarama

safe, so RGS did not drive on and cross the border. Although he did not see any acts of being committed, but knows, they took place. During his stay in Gitarama he saw

ANDA once, sometime between the 2oth and the 30" of April. It must have been over a week after the arrival of RGS. RGS comes from Bicumbi, close to Gikomero. They organised

r meetings for students from the same region at the Gikomero parish. These meetings were tical in nature, but purely recreational, and they were held every summer, from l968/1969 up . RGS did not attend all of them. KAMUHANI>A was not very active either. From 1 974 to GS 1 ived w ith KAMUHANDA a t university i n B utare. S till, h e w as not a friend. R GS o work in Kigali in 1977. He worked for the same company from 1977 to 1994. Under the

y system, RGS became a member of the MDR, but not an active one. During this period in Kigali, he saw KAMUMANDA occasionally. RGS met KAMUH A's wife every other day, because she worked at a bank he used to visit.

heard of KAMUHANDA becoming a government minister when he was in Gitarama. He was not aware of the government's involvement in the genocide. RGS never heard anything like that on the radio. The Interahamwe committed the genocide, but RGS did not know from whom they were receiving their orders, and still does not know. RGS left Rwanda in July 1994. When RGS met

in Gitarama they just had a short chat. KAMUHANDA told him that his wife and Nyarugenge. RGS used to work for BP FINA as the head of sales. In Gitarama BP

A had a big petrol station and the large depot was in Butare. The petrol station in Gitarama remained operational until RGS left in the end of May 1994. He was responsible for the supply of petrol to the Gitarama petrol station from the big depot in Butare. He ensured that all clients who came with money would be served, includin soldiers or the Interahamwe. For him it was a purely P commercial activity. From the 6" to the 12' of April 1994 there were killings of Tutsis in Gatsata by the Interahamwe. RGS did not leave the house. They only came out to bury the dead, as was told to them on the radio.

Prosecutor's Submission

547. RGS is a long standing friend of Kamuhanda. At no time did he go to Gikomero. His views on routes are pure speculation. As head of B P sales in Gitarama during the genocide, he was quite prepared to sell fuel to anyone, including Interahamwe, as he viewed it as a purely commercial transaction.

aurent EIitimanal6*

April 1994, Laurent Hitimana lived in Remera 3 Kigali, in a place called Bibare. On the 7" at about 1 p.m. he realised there were people fleeing. These people told Laurent Hitimana that the RPF battalion in the CND building had invaded their neighbourhood of Remera, the areas 1 and 2. It was

uge crowd of people moving continuously; they were all on foot, carrying their belongings. At out 4 o'clock, Laurent Hitimana decided to flee himself. His wife and family had left an hour

168 Laurent Hitimana is DW28. He waived witness protection and gave evidence in the open court.

120

rosecutor v. UMUHANDA , ICTR-99-54A-T

before. Laurent Hitimana went by foot and did not take his car. There were only two ways out of the area, and neither would allow him to use his car. One way was taken by the fleeing crowd, so there

as not any room to drive on this road; the other was the road towards Kanombe and here the exit closed by soldiers of the government. This exit was at the junction on the road from Kimihurura the road from Kigali centre. The crowd was fleeing towards the west; Laurent Hitimana went to

e east, to Gasogi.

9. Laurent Hitimana arrived at Gasogi in the morning of the 8", after having stayed at the Rubungo u Communal. Laurent Hitimana reached Rubungo at about 7 p.m. There was not anything on in Rubungo. He left on the 8" at about 8 o'clock in the morning. Laurent Hitimana and his

family stayed in Gasogi until about the 1 lth, when a growing number of refugees arrived. They told Laurent Hitimana they were fleeing from the RPF who had reached Jurwe area.

ince he heard on the radio that his neighbourhood was still under government control, he decided to k. They got home in the evening of the 11". Government soldiers were positioned on the ming from Amahoro stadium, in the direction of Kimironko, and were patrolling in the area. few people had not fled and were remaining in their houses. The RPF was at the Amahoro

um and they exchanged fire with the government forces in Laurent Hitimana's neighbourhood. ent Hitimana stayed at home until the 27". Then he left for Gitarama, because from what he

had heard on the radio, everyone fleeing from Kigali went there.

551. To get from Kigali to Gikomero, one goes through Remera in the direction of Kimironko, up to rama to end up in Gikomero. On the 12" of April 1994, it was impossible to take this route,

ecause the intersection of the road from Kimihurura to Kanombe and the road that goes from Kigali centre through Rernera was blocked. There is also another route to Gikomero, but the road had been locked at Kicukivo junction by the RPF, who had taken that area. This was the situation as Laurent

Hitimana found it when he got back on the 11". To pass through the government roadblock, one needed a special permission, and to pass through the RPF roadblock, one had to be RPF.

. Laurent Hitimana knows KAMUHANDA. They are not close friends. He was very surprised to hear of his arrest, as KAMUHANDA could not have done what he is accused. Laurent Hitimana is a Hutu. In 1994, he owned a shop and worked as a civil engineer. Currently he lives in Nairobi. His request for asylum w as d enied and n ow h e i s i n the p rocess o f getting back t o Rwanda n ow the

litical situation seems to be changing. First, he wants his children to complete part of their cation in Kenya. In 1994, he was a member of the MDR and politically involved at the

communal level. He studied other political parties. KAMUHANDA was not in any of the MDR urnentation, so Laurent Hitimana does not consider him an influential member of the MRND.

Before the MDR split up in two factions, Laurent Hitimana resigned from the party. He was not a member of the MDR Power faction.

3. As Laurent Hitimana went back from Gasogi to Remera on the 1 lth, the road he took was open.

. In 1994 Laurent Hitimana was not in the army or a member of the Interahamwe, but he knows about ositions of the government and RPF forces because they were either commonly known official

ositions or he heard of them from refugees who were from those places. Laurent Hitimana went to Rubungo by footpaths, so he did not run into any roadblocks. A vehicle could not have gone by these paths.

rosecutor's Submissions

e testimony of this witness is unreliable. He was at too many places that support the Defence eory of blocked access. When under cross-examination he was confronted with the fact that

Prosecutor V. KAMUHA NDA , ICTR-99-54A-T

ubongo Tutsis ran first towards Gikomero, he changed his story, he said he tra~eled through aths. He should be totally disbelieved.

n April 1994, CLA was the national coordinator of the Francophone programme (issued by the International Agency of Francophonie) which aims at building a network of cultural centres called

C (Centre de Lecture Animations Culturelles). He took office in 1992 and worked for the istry of Higher Education under KAMUHANDA. KAIMUI-IANDA was in charge of setting up

amme, while CLA was doing fieldwork. He would visit the different centres, often in the of KAMUHANDA, and assess their progress. Their last field mission started on the 25" of

as abruptly ended on the 6" of April because of the war.

7 . ch they visited Gikongoro prefecture and got back to Kigali; they had a break the to Byimana, in Gitarama prefecture, on the 27". After a break on the 28", they and got back to Kigali on the 3oth. Another break on the 31St and then to Save, in and back on the 1'' of April. From the 2nd to the 4" it was Easter holiday, and on

UHANDA went to Murambi, in Byumba prefecture, and Gikoro. On the 6" d the Director of Culture went to Zaza, in Kibungo prefecture, and they got

in Kigali in the evening. CLA drew up the timetable himself, so he is certain of the dates given. cannot have seen KAMUHANDA in the morning of the 30" of March in Gikomero. He was in

LA, 300 kilometers away from Gikomero. Because Cyangugu was so far this trip lasted two days. Aside fiom the CLAC programme, CLA worked with

ANDA a t the Education M inistry. He s tarted working there i n 1 990. C LA remembers A being transferred to Butare. He got back to Kigali as at the end of 1992. CLA

ANDA was a member of the MRND, but before the multi-party system, so was . The Ministry of Higher Education was an MRND ministry, but apart from the posts of and Director-General, posts were assigned to members of all parties and people of different

g the field missions, CLA used an official car, a red four-wheel drive Toyota pick up truck. ther cars the Ministry used were Peugeots 305 and 505 and Toyota Corollas. They were not many.

ve the pick up himself. On the 7th of April, the car was burnt down close to his house. CLA s wife were attacked by men with machetes. They threw grenades in his house. There was no eason for this attack. After 1994, CLA returned to his post. In 1998, he quit, because he was

ed about his personal safety.

LA was a good colleague, rather than a good friend of KAMUHANDA. Their relationship was ely professional.

A left Rwanda in May 1998, after threats and attempts to kill him. After 1994, he had gone to in and France for his work for the Francophonie programme and when he would come back, he accused of collaborating with infiltrators who were staying abroad and were planning to launch

ck. He was accused of working for a certain general Bizimungu and of having been a member Interahamwe. In August 1997, CLA's brother in law was killed with a grenade after they had a beer together. In May 1998, a lieutenant of the RPF came to visit him at his bar and soldiers

outside started shooting in the air for half an hour. By doing this, they were showing him he could ed anytime, anywhere. After this, CLA decided to leave. Up to August 1997, CLA had not

felt threatened. All the attempts on his life were reported to the authorities, but CLA does not


remember the dates he did so. Actually, he did not exactly file complaints, but since the authorities ust have seen the attacks, they were informed.

ad a bar. It was near his house in the centre of Kigali town. CLA did not nce tness Laurent Hitimana, but has come to know him later. He does know him now. CLA denied

gations that he embezzled money belonging to the programme. Nor did he leave Rwanda, se he was about to be caught for that. He also denied he was part of the group of Hutu rebels in a, planning to invade Rwanda. He is applying for asylum in Kenya. His request was rejected

urrently he is appealing this decision.

formal allegations were made against CLA after the genocide in 1994 but there were only ours and false accusations. He heard from a friend that he was wanted for collaboration with the

infiltrators in Zaire and Congo planning an invasion and that he could be arrested at any given time. were no official investigations. The cultural activities of the Francophone programme in

da were not focused on promoting the MRND. Each of the ten centres across the country was aged by a committee, which was headed by either the local bourgrnestre or the parish priest.

rnbers of these committees were both Hutus and Tutsis. Of the ten Chairmen, seven were Hutu, Tutsi, and one was a foreigner. As he worked for the project, CLA received instructions s from Paris, rather than fiom KAMUHANDA. KAMLTHANDA only facilitated CLA's was the link with the agency in Paris, but was not directly involved in the activities in the

supervised and evaluated the project. When CLA started to work at the Ministry, A was Director-General of Culture and Arts. He was his senior, but CLA was not a

e subordinate. CLA was assigned to another department and had a different boss. He started working with KAMUHANDA in 1992, as a coordinator of the Francophone project.

A has come to know Laurent Hitimana, as they travelled together fiom Nairobi to Arusha. They ke a little about everything, but not about the case. They knew they were both protected

rosecutor's Submissions

is witness is not a witness of truth. He was a subordinate of KAMUHANDA who has gone out of up an alibi for him in respect of one piece of prosecution evidence when GKI placed A in Gikomero on 30 March 1994. The sister of KANUWANDA placed

UHANDA in Gikomero at Easter. Judicial notice should be taken of the size of Rwanda. omero is placed in the country in a way that with a car one can travel from any part of Rwanda to

in a maximum of 3 to 4 hours.

5 . In 1994, RGB lived in Rutongo commune. Before the 8" of February 1993, RGB lived in Mbogo, ut he left when the RPF attacked and occupied the neighbouring commune of Tumba. The area had ecome a battlefield and he lived only 500 metres away from the hostilities. He had been ourgmestre of Mbogo since May 1991 and was still at that post in April 1994, when had left the ea. He moved the communal office southwards, behind government's forces' lines. In 1994, RGB as a member of the MRND. After the death of president Habyarimana, it remained calm in

until the 9 " o f April. T hat d ay, R GB s aw R PF s oldiers coming d own the m ountain of . As they came closer, they opened fire at a red Toyota pickup truck of the local mining

any. The soldiers occupied the area and went to Rutungo parish. Ten RPF soldiers passed as he ran off. He was heading for Kigali, but as he noticed that the RPF was not following him,

e changed his mind and went towards Remera-Mbogo commune, where the government army was

170 RGB is DW30 and the PIS is DX 76


ioned. He fled alone and arrived in Remera the same day at about 7 .m. The situationwas calm e; there were no sounds of fighting. The next morning the g o v e r n positions in Remera were

attacked by the RPF, the commanding officer advised RGB to go, and so he did, this time to Jari, to a m e camp. He went there with others in a pick up and arrived at 7 a.m. There were other s as well. Amongst them was the bourgmestre of Rutungo commune, who told him that the f Nyacyonga was occupied by the RPF. On the 1 lth, in the afternoon, gendarmes told RGB were informed that their camp was going to be attacked the next day. The only option that

seemed to be left was going to Kigali town.

got dark, RGB reached Karuruma, at the outskirts of Kigali. The place was packed with ees from places like Nyacyonga and Rutungo. The next morning, on the 12", the RPF attacked

the area and shot at the house RGB was staying. He ran out and fled towards Gastyata, in Kigali town. On the 12" the RPF had closed off the roads from Karuruma to Kibuye and Byumba, and from

ma to Nyacyonga. It was not so much a question of roadblocks, as of mere presence of RPF in the area. The road to Kigali was still open. RGB ran through the bush and as he got to

e neigbourhood of Gastyata, he found it was deserted, so he moved on to Gitarama and arrived ere on the same day. On the road to Gitarama, there were no roadblocks, except for the one on

ngo Bridge manned by government soldiers.

da eventually on the 14" of July 1994, when the RPF amved at Gisenyi, where he time. RGB knows two routes from Kigali to Gikomero. One is towards Byumba,

a, Nyacyonga and Kajeveba. The other is through Remera. The route from Kigali is for the first part the same as the one to Gikomero. RGB would take a left at to his house. On the 12" of April 1994, early in the morning, this road was blocked

No one could go down that road to Byumba. RGB knows KAMUHANDA. A taught him in 1977 or 1978 when he was doing his teacher training internship at the

ge d u C hrist R oyal. Later, R GB s aw him occasionally a t the M inistry o f H igher E ducation, he would be there in his capacity as a teacher. KAMUHANDA would not have remembered

im. R GB d oes n ot know what p arty K AMUHANDA i s a m ember. He knows s ome n ames of influential members of the RPF at prefectural level. He also knows the names of influential

embers of the MRND at national level.

did not know he is on the list of those who planned the genocide. The defense council d him about that when he arrived in Arusha. He is surprised, because he was a refugee at the

e and he did not witness any killings. It is probably because he was a bourgrnestre and all urgmestres were put on the list, even though most of them were not involved in the planning of the

art fiom the roadblock at Nyabarongo, there was only one other ro lock, at Murambi. RGB did tention as to who were operating this second roadblock. vernment forces must have

the roadblock at Murambi, since the government had moved there and the roadblock was intended to protect them. He never saw the RPF around Gitarama. There was no mention of them either. He saw some corpses alongside the road near the Nyabarongo Bridge but further up to

tarama there were none. RGB did not see any Interahamwe. RGB arrived at Gitarama on the " and left on the 24" of April. He had to go back, because he did not know where his family was.

He received information about them and went to Kayenzi commune via the Gitarama-Kigali road, and from there to Musasa commune, where he found them.

4" again, he did not see any roadblocks on the Gitarama-Kigali road, or corpses alongside situation was still secure here. As RGB had found his family, he stayed in Musasa until the e war. When their army was defeated, they fled to Zaire, on the 6th or the 7" of July 1994.

n second thought, they left from Rushashi on the 7".

124

Prosecutor v. KA MUHANDA , ICTR-99-54A-T

ogo commune, there were no killings in the period from the 7th of February i993 upuntil the oment RGB left, on the 10". He did not hear of any allegations against him, saying he was

involved in the killing of Tutsis as an administrative official in this commune. Only when he got in a, did he hear about the fact that he was mentioned on a list drawn up by the overnment as a P ategory 1 genocide suspect. RGB knows a man called Muzigandonyi. On the 7' of April 1994,

this man was working at the Ministry of Interior. He was a former bourgmestre of Mbogo commune. Currently he is a refugee and in exile, but RGB does not know in which country he staying. He is not in Congo, where RGB is residing. Neither does RGB know that Muzigandonyi is also held responsible for the atrocities at Mbogo, just like him. RGB also knows Constatine Kayibanda, the

an of the MRND in Mbogo in 1994, and Theodomir Ruzirabowooba, a conseiller who RGB when he was absent. Concerning the latter, he did not leave the country and in r 1996, RGB heard he was in prison on allegations of genocide. During his trial, it was said

that the bourgmestre of Mbogo at the time was not responsible, because he was not present. RGB is lly aware of the massacres having taken place in the commune in 1994. He did not follow the oceedings against Ruzirabowooba. He does not know anything about the sentence in that case but

ming the list, which mentions him as a suspect these are arbitrary and often full of mistakes. knows Kayinamura. He was a teacher in Mbogo commune. RGB fled from Rwanda and did

not return, because of the numerous violations of human rights in his home country. Many innocent Rwandans have been killed and a lot of them are being detained.

ourgmestre of Rutungo in 1994 was called Theoneste Balinda. RGB does not know whether he en arrested or not. In April 1994, both the RPF and the Tutsis were considered the enemy, the

'Inyenzi', in Kinyarwanda. As far as RGB was concerned though, Tutsis were fellow citizens. He never used the word 'Inyenzi'. RGB remembers being interviewed on Radio RTLM on the 4" and

th of June 1994. He does not recall using the word 'Inyenzi', and even if he did, he would only have een referring to the RPF and not to Tutsis. Confronted with a printed copy of the interview, RGB

admits he has used the word 'Inyenzi', but maintains he only referred to the RPF. The young men, who RGB mentions in the interview, and who, according to him, were to be militarily trained to face

'Inyenzi', were not Interahamwe. RGB just wanted to recruit new soldiers for the government

accepts that, in the written version of the interview, he says that he went back to Mbogo to take control from conseiller Ruzirabowooba who replaced him. Still, in fact, RGB did not go back.

He only got back to the commune to find that the organisation of recruitment for the army was already in place. As he was there, nobody died. When he got back, he heard about the atrocities. He did not get to know how many had died and whether there were women and children among the

s. RGB knew some of the perpetrators, but he could not arrest them, because his commune was a war zone. The route from Karuruma to Gitarama involves going up northwards in a big circle and going down southwards on the other side, to Gikomero. The RPF was coming north-east from

soro down to the south-west. RGB went in western direction, ending up in Jari. He did not actually follow the road in towards Gikomero, but he met people at Jari, who did, and they told him the road was inaccessible; one could not proceed in northern direction.

74. w as a very w ell known m an i n the M inistry o f H igher E ducation. R GB knows anza. He was the bourgmestre of Bicumbi. He was one of the influential members of

. After the introduction of multi-party politics, RGB was a member of the MRND. He girurnpatse of the MRND. He lived close to RGB. They do not have any relation uring his absence from Mbogo, RGB was replaced by the conseiller. He went back to eginning of May 1994. The influential members of the MFOD RGB mentioned were im personally. He did not have any relations with them.



occupied a similar position to KAMUHANDA as a person in authority and he played akimilar role to KAMUHANDA in the genocide. His testimony is aimed at distorting the truth and painting wholly inaccurate and false impressions of the events of April and May 1994. He knew the accused since 1977. He stated that the first time he became aware he was on the Category I list for suspects involved in the genocide was when he was in Arusha to give evidence. The fact that he had been a

ourgmestre in a commune where significant killings happened was the reason he gave for his mclusion. Curiosly, he left Rwanda in 1998 for security reasons. He has not returned. The

rosecution submits that RGB is a wholly unbelievable witness.

ng examination-in-chief on 28 April 2003, it transpired that in April 1994, TMB was a ConseiNer in charge of technical matters in the Ministry of Environment. TMB was a member of the opposition party PDC. TMB met KAMUHANDA in 1988 when they both worked at the Ministry of Higher Education. He describes KAMUHANDA as a competent person with "a great deal of personal skills"172. KAMUHANDA was a guest at TMB's engagement and wedding and is the godfather of TMB's son. TMB confirmed that KAMUHANDA was an ordinary member of the

TMB and KAMUHANDA had opportunities to discuss political matters but ANDA did not seem interested in that subject. TMB related an event that occurred on 07

April 1994 at his house, where about ten Tutsis from a family had taken refuge.

n 24 April 1994, TMB left Kanombe to go to Gitarama to his in-laws. Many roadblocks were set up on the road. TMB saw KAMUHANDA briefly in Gitarama afier he was appointed Minister of Education and again in Nairobi after July 1994.

. Under cross-examination, TMB did not believe that there is peace, security, or justice in Rwanda now so he cannot return. TMB saw people in Kitenge clothing at roadblock^'^^. TMB confirmed that the roadblock at Nyabugogo was manned by the interahamwe, but did not say that everyone at the roadblock was an ~nterahamwe'~~. TMB stated that KAMUHANDA was his "very intimate friend''175. When questioned by Judge Ramarosson, TMB described the Interahamwe as the youth

oup of the MRND.


is a character witness and extremely close acquaintance of Kamuhanda; Kamuhanda is the er to TMB's son. Inferentially TMB is a Hutu sympathizer of the hterim Government.

does not believe that the Tutsis were targeted as such during the killings of 1994. He gives highly relevant evidence that the roadblock at Nyabugogo was manned by the Interahamwe.

ng examination-in-chief on the 28" to the 29" of April 2003, it transpired that RGM was in 1 1994, young a gendarme of low rank in the Jari Camp, in Rutongo commune (6 to 7 kilometers

om Kigali town). On 07 April 1994, he heard that the gendarmes posted at the Mugambazi

171 TMB is DW31 and the PIS is DX78

4 72 Transcript of 28 04 2003, PTE 11.



175 Transcript of 28 04 2003, PTE 43.

176 RGM is DW32 and the PIS is 0x79


displaced persons camp and at the Nyacyonga refugee camp had seen lines of RPF troops coming from the mountains. The RPF was coming from Byumba going towards Kigali. On 08 April 1994,

heard that the RPF had already taken over the Mugambazi and Nyacyonga camps. The RPF would force people to go behind their lines. Also on that day, the RPF attacked the Cyangugu battalion, which had positions on the road fiom Kigali to Byumba, beyond Nyacyonga camp. The

yangugu battalion withdrew from its positions.

n 09 April 1994, the commander of the Jari camp sent a vehicle to Kigali to bring back supplies. t 1 lam, before reaching Karuruma road, the RPF ambushed the vehicle. On 12 April 1994, attacked the Jari camp and there was an exchange of fire between them and the gendarmes

for about 30 minutes, after which the gendarmes abandoned their camp. They withdrew to Shyorongi OPS, next to Jari camp on the road leading to Ruhengevi prefecture. On 04 July 1994,

s fighting the RPF in Tare commune, Kigali prefecture and his unit had to withdraw to RGM testified that the FAR had a position in Muhima camp, and the military in Kacyiru.

F had positions in Kanombe camp, Gisozi, CND, and Murebero. RGM affirmed that the in Kigali lasted for three months and four days. On 12 April 1994, the road from Byumba to

Kavuma was not open. RGM added that a vehicle could not go on that day fiom Kigali to Nyacyonga through Karurama, as the RPF had captured the area. RGM identified the various locations on a map tendered as exhibit D90. RGM does not know KMUHANDA.

. Cross-examination revealed that RGM was not present at ANY of the events that he testified about, ecially the the Mugambazi and Nyacyonga camps or the ambush at the Karuruma junction. He not witness what happened at these places particularly the alleged ambush of the vehicle by the

RPF.


timing of this witness' testimony is very significant. RGM, a very young gendarme of very low in April 1994 was one of a series of low ranked quasi-military personnel. He did not have any

ersonal knowledge of the events he testified about, including the Karuruma junction being occupied by the RPF. He was a low-ranking gendarme and his superiors did not keep him informed of the events he attempted to claim personal knowledge about in his testimony. The Karuruma junction was significant. KAMUHANDA could travel in and out of Gikomero through this open route.

4. It is further submitted that the military situation in the area at this time was fluid, large expanses of were not manned by RPF soldiers on a 24-hour basis, and it was very possible to gain ingress

and egress from Kigali to Gikomero through the roud adjoining the Jari camp.

e 29th - 30" April 2003, during exarnination-in-chief RGG testified that in April 1994, he was a a1 in the gendarmerie at the Muhima camp, in Kigali. On 07 April 1994, the road passing by

the National Assembly building (CND) was occupied by the RPF. On 09 April, the RPF blocked the road near the Egyptian Embassy towards Kacyiru. The gendarmerie controlled the following routes:

ali-Git arama, Kigali-Ruhengeri, and Kigali-Kicukiro fiom Sonatube to Nyanza.

Under cross-examination RGG testified that on 07 April 1994, after returning the previous night from where he went to watch the African Nations Cup football match on television and serving in the trenches, h e w as s ent o n a mission from Muhima to R emera c amp t o c ollect special b ullets. He voided successfully the RPF positions and therefore any conflict. Immediately as he left Remera

177 RGG is OW33 and his PIS is DX81

127


ecampfel l totheRPF. Onhisreturn toMuhima,hewas t 0 r dive and d efend t he arie headquarters in Khimirurha where he fought against the and was oblivious of the

soldiers in the adjoining Presidential Guard camp who killed Belgian UN soldiers. From there e was yet again sent to defend the gendermarie outpost in Kicukiro. Here also he fought with the

lso admitted that a dirt road from Kanombe to Kicukiro through Rubirizi was open. This road sed to ferry wounded soldiers from Kanombe military camp to CHK - Kigali General Hospital

t in the middle of Kigali town.

He testified on the road Karuruma-Byumba, and agreed that other roads that branch out to Gikomero ugh that route. He gave a wholly different account about the Karuruma junction ambush. In

answer to Judge Ramaroson's, question about why the Tutsis from Rubungo fled to Gishaka and ro i f t he RPF h ad a p osition n earby R ubungo, h e h ad n o c redible answer. W hen h e w as b y Judge M aqutu that there s eems t o b e a n exaggeration from the w itness a s t o the p art

layed by the gendarmes in the fighting, he also had no credible answer.

concede under cross-examination that some roads could be used to go to Gikomero. Judge oson also pointed out the illogicality of his allegations that certain positions near Rubungo

were occupied by the RPF whereas all the prosecution and defence witnesses had consistently stified that the refugees fled from the Rubongo area right across Gikomero and crossed the Muhazi

Lake to Giti to find rehge with the RPF.

rosecutor9s submission

is witness was a corporal in the Gendarmerie, and therefore not fully aware of the situation movement. He did however accept that certain roads were open which permitted to Gikomero contrary to other Defence testimonies, and his evidence concerning the

ubungo area is unbelievable.

xamination in chief RKF testified that his position at the Ministry of Defence of Rwanda in April 4 entailed intelligence analysis.179 RKF testified that his position at the Ministry made him well

know which roads were controlled by the RPF at which time during the armed conflict. presumably would not have been available to KAMUHANDA. The Prosecution submits

's grasp of events on the ground during the hostilities was limited to analysis of documents may have received in his office at the Ministry. RKF conceded on cross-examination that "I

as a technical person and I did not have the means - you know, the officers of the Ministry of Defence a re n ot o n t he field. T hey a re b ureaucrats and j ust w orking a t t he 1 eve1 o f i deas, t hat's

Questioning by Judge Maqutu confirmed that RKF's testimony as to RPF and FAR positions uring the war in 1994 was derived solely from reports RKF read in ISigali.l8l

rosecution M h e r submits that the limitations on the depth of intelligence available to RKF is r demonstrated by RKF's inabilit even to identify the major figures in the Rwandan

overnrnent associated with the genocide.k2 RKF conceded that in the context of armed conflict, as escribes the situation in April 1994 and the following three months, battle lines were not firmly

.- 178 RKF is DW34 and his PIS is DX83

179 Transcript of 5 May 2003, p. 4.

8 80 Transcript of 5 May 2003, p. 29.


9 82 f ranscript of 5 May 2003, p. 29.

128

drawn. Either side did not exclusively hold territory. In RKF's own words: "When there are two warring parties in any war, you can never say that anything is airtightly closed, there is always infiltration."' 83 In response to questioning from Judge Ramaroson, RKF advanced the unlikely roposition that Tutsis in Rubungo were fleeing from an area controlled by the RPF?~

593, also admitted under questioning from Judge Ramaroson that regardless of which olled which major roads at which time, there were "a lot of small roads - there are a lot of small

s, s econdary roads, not m any, b ut - well, r oads a re p assable, that could b e u sed.. . . "185 T he

ecution submits that RKF's testimony as to the purported impassibility of certain roads is rendered less relevant by the existence of "passable" "secondary roads." The Prosecution therefore submits that the extremely detailed testimony provided by RKF on direct examination as to which

s w ere c ontrolled b y RPF, and b y extension, n ot p assable b y K AMUHANDA, i s s imply not ble. The Prosecution submits that RKF was not in a position to know exactly which roads were

controlled at any given time by which army sitting in his office in Kigali, and further that lines of control were ill-defined and fluid, as is often the case in armed conflict. In addition, regardless of the state of main roads, KAMUHANDA would have had "passable" "secondary roads" at his disposal to get wherever he needed to go.

. Witness VPM testified that he became a founding member of the National Republican Movement for Development and Democracy, or MRND, on 5 July 199 1. lg7 VPM's initial position within the party

airman for Kigali refecture. lsg KAMUHANDA also became a member of the newly-formed on 5 July 1991.PX9 The Prosecution submits that the close partisan relationship between d KAMUHANDA accounts for the former's favorable testimony in defense of the latter. tified that on 17 April 1994, in an effort to travel along the road from Kigali to Gitarama, ed to God, who provided for his safety.lgO

. Despite his MRND credentials, VPM testified that he was unable to find out who was perpetrating massacres of civilians at the myriad roadblocks he encountered traveling through ~wanda . '~ ' VPM testified that he could not find out about nearby massacres while in Butare in April 1994 because he

een in flight from the war zone.192 Upon further questioning, VPM admitted that he had actually spent nearly a month in ~ u t a r e . ' ~ ~ The Prosecution submits that a month-long stay stretches the definition of "flight." In response to questioning from Judge Rarnaroson, VPM testified that he

not know why nearly a million Tutsis were killed in Rwanda, in 1994.'" In response to uestioning from Judge Maqutu, VPM agreed that there were "no static lines; it was a fluid fighting

situation. 9 9 195

rosecution submits that VPM's testimony of ignorance to the authorship of the genocide is not credible. Given VPM's intimate connections to the MRND, the architects of the genocide and the




186 VPM is DW35 and his PIS is DX85


188 Transcript sf 6 May 2003, p. 9.








Prosecutor Q, KAMUHANDA, ICTR-99-54A-T

olitical arm of the Interahamwe, the Prosecution submits that VPM is being uncooperative simply ecause he does not wish to be identified with the genocide.

97. ecution submits that such fluidity belies the suggestion that certain roads, controlled by the uld have been inaccessible to KAMUHANDA.

imana Nkiko (Defence ~ x ~ e r t ) ' ' ~

ect examination, Nsengimana testified that in October 1993, the Hutu leadership of Rwanda created an extremist political entity called "Power," comprising several Hutu political parties, by

hich it sought to legitimize anti-Tutsi race-baiting among ~ u t u s . ' ~ ~ Nsengimana further testified the term "accomplices" had initially been limited to Tutsis, presumed to sympathize with the

argely-Tutsi RPF, but between October 1993 and April 1994, Hutu "Power" broadened the label to encompass all who did not subscribe to the racist "Power" ideology, including many ~ u t u s . ' ~ ~

imana testified that in preparation for its campaign of genocide against all "accomplices," "Power" provided arms and military training to a number of extremist youth movements, the most famous being that of the largest political party, the MRND, known as the In te raham~e. '~~ The Interahamwe commenced the perpetration of genocidal massacres of civilians on April 6, 1994, the

t of the murder of President Habiyaramana.

n cross-examination, Nsengimana conceded that regardless of whether or not the Interim overnment had instigated the genocide, as the highest political authority in Rwanda fiom April to

July 1994, the Interim Government bore ultimate responsibility for failing to end the killings.200

a also admitted that given the extent and the barbarity of the killings, it would not have een possible for the average person in Rwanda, let alone Ministers in the Government, to remain

of the genocide more than two weeks after it began in early ~ ~ r i l . ~ " Defendant ANDA was first appointed to the Interim Government as Minister of Higher Education and

cientific Research on May 25, 1994, several weeks after the start of the genocide, but over a month

. The P rosecution s ubmits that K AMUWANDA m ust h ave known a bout t he m assacres o f c ivilians being committed throughout Rwanda throughout his tenure as Minister. Nsengimana testified that

e provision of the Rwandan Constitution providing KAMUHANDA a legal means to resign his ministerial position was in force between April and July 1 994.202

secution acknowledges that Nsengimana's testimony as to the personal danger ANDA would have faced in resigning or otherwise opposing the policies of "Power," even ster in the Interim Government, could suggest that KAMUHANDA should not be held e for the genocide.

4. However, Nsengimana volunteered without prompting fiom the Prosecution that a Minister c ould ave disassociated himself from the Interim Government and the genocide by leaving the country.203

196 This is DW36 and the Expert whose area of specialization is political science.

197 Transcript of 7 May 2003, pp. 66-7.




201 Transcript of8 May 2003. p. 52.



Prosecutor v. XAMUHANDA , ICTR-99-54A-T

cross-examination, Nsengiman a affirmed that any g nent official who had managed to secure the proper permits to leave Rwanda between April 9 and July 4 would have had the opportunity to resign or alert the international community of the events going on in R

ANDA did in fact have such an opportunity; he visited Goma, Congo, on ANDA could have resigned his position or warned the international press that genocide was

etrated in Rwanda and that the Rwandan government, of which he was a member, was oing nothing to prevent it.

UHANDA did neither, and returned to Rwanda from Goma maintaining his official position as inister of Higher Education.

07. The Prosecution submits that KAMLTHANDA's failure to resign or warn the international community about the genocide while outside of Rwanda, and his decision to return to Rwanda as a

inister in the Interim Government, establishes KAMUHANDAYs endorsement of "Power's" campaign of genocide.

Prosecution Submission:

rosecution therefore submits that KAMUHANDA's willful membership in the Interim Government, which failed to take action to prevent the massacres of civilians during the genocide,

ens KAMUHANDA with criminal liability for the genocide under Article 6(3) of the Statute of this Tribunal.

N OF THE LAW

e Defence of Alibi

e of alibi is in issue in this trial. The purport of that alibi is this: that with his family, ANDA remained at or around his residence in Kacyiru a suburb of Kigali and was not in

ommune on or about 30 March 1994 and between 6 April to 18 April when he fled from Kigali to Gitarama. As alibi goes, this would involve the latent suggestion that KAMUHANDA was

t in Gikomero when the crimes with which he is indicted were committed.

. It is the Prosecution submission that both the legal and factual circumstances of this defence warrant no weight from the Tribunal.

e Alibi Defence Warrant No Weight

efence alibi was concocted and contrived after the Accused knew the nature of the case against irn and he went out of his way to procure witnesses to bear his concocted and contrived alibi

ce. Even as far as the merits go, not all the evidence called in the case support the Defendant's defence. The evidence called during the Prosecution case-in-chief did not place him at his

residence AT ALL RELEVANT TIMES. He had ample opportunity to travel to Gikomero to ommit all the crimes alleged against him.

e thrust of the defence case was that Mr KAMUHANDA was not at the scenes of the crime as and on the dates of the crime as alleged, leading or participating in the crimes as alleged.

osecution witnesses placed him in the area and at the scenes as alleged.


13 1

Prosecutor v, KilMUHANDA , ICTR-99-54A-T

e testimonies of Defence alibi witnesses lack credibility and the Chamber should not rely on them in any effort to do justice for the following reasons:

CEB lKAMUHANDA is the accused. He will understandably say what he needs t i say in order to avoid conviction, without regard to the real facts of the matter.

B, KAMUHANDA's testimony came first in the order of Defence witnesses. Every Defence alibi witness was either a friend or colleague and a Hutu who shared his political leanings and sympathizer.

a ALS was beholding to him because he was looking after her when her husband was away and ould want to return the favour by upholding KAMUHANDA's fabricated alibi. She tailored

her testimony to suit.

B) It is clear from the evidence of KAMUHANDA himself that he had indeed very well thought out his own alibi after the event in a bid to cover his own tracks

he testimonies of the other Defence witnesses should not be given credence because they contradicted each other and were simply attempting to make the situation fit KAMLTHANDA's contrived story.

ore, the alibi defence does not exclude the possibility of him travelling back and forth etween Kacyiru and Gikomero. The Defence attempted a three-prong attempt to say that

UHANDA was at home, the routes were impassable, and he was not seen in Gikomero. However, Defence witnesses testified that they did not see him ALL the time, there were many gaps through which he could have travelled to and from, and Prosecution witnesses placed him in

ikomero.

redible Account

he credible account is that KAMUHANDA went to Gikomero to distribute weapons and incite the opulation of the commune. There is consistency in this account. Prosecution witness saw him and laced him there. All the Prosecution witnesses in the case support this account and the Defence

witnesses over-stretched themselves in a bid to cover ALL routes in and out of Gikomero, to the extent of placing the RPF in Rubongo where it was obvious that Hutus massacred Tutsis who fled to

omero.

n sum then, the Prosecution urges the Chamber to disregard the alibi defence.

LAW

de Dieu KAMUHANDA is charged with genocide, for the killing and causing of serious bodily mental harm to members of the Tutsi population, with intent to destroy, in whole or part, the

Tutsi ethnic group.

order to prove that Jean de Dieu KAMUHANDA committed the crime of genocide, the rosecution must establish that Jean de Dieu KAMUHANDA killed and caused serious bodily and

mental harm to members of the Tutsi population with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, the Tutsi ethnic group. There are therefore two elements of the crime of genocide under Article 2(3)(a): first, the actus reus or objective element, requiring that one or more genocidal acts (the underlying


offence) was committed and, second, the mens rea or subjective element, requiring a particular mental state.

JECTIVE ELEMENT OF THE CRIME:

It is submitted that the subjective element under Article 2 is the "intent to destroy, in whole or in part a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such" in the instant case, the Tutsi ethnic group in Rwanda.

tent to destroy in whole or in part ' 05

Genocide is distinct from other crimes because it requires a special intent206 "to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as by committing any of the acts enumerated in Section 2(2) of the Statute, which in the instant case, relates to the killing and causing of serious bodily and mental harm.

This special intent is a key element of an intentional offence, which is characterized by a psychological nexus between the physical result and the mental state of the perpetrator.208 The special intent of a crime is the specific intention, which, as an element of the crime, requires that the

etsator clearly intended the result charged.209 A person may be convicted of genocide only where it is established that he committed one of the acts referred to under Article 2(2) of the Statute with the specific intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a particular There is no requirement of premeditation for the crime of genocide.21'

It is further submitted that the term "as such", means that the intention must be "to destroy a group not one or more individuals who are coincidentally members of a particular group. The

prohibited act must be committed against an individual because of his membership of a particular group and as an incremental step in the overall objective of destroying the group as a whole. It is submitted that it is the group itself that is the ultimate target or intended victim of this kind of massive criminal conduct. "21

The Prosecution submits that the intent of Jean de Dieu KAMUHANDA can be inferred fiom a certain number of presumptions of fact. It is possible to deduce the genocidal intent inherent in a particular act charged fiom the general context of the perpetration of other culpable acts systematically directed against that same group, whether these acts were committed by the same offender or by others. Other factors, such as the scale of atrocities committed, their general nature, in a region or a country, or furthermore, the fact of deliberately and systematically targeting victims on account of their membership of a particular group, while excluding the members of other groups, can enable an inference of the genocidal intent of a particular act.213

205 The Appeal's Chamber in the matter of The Prosecutor v. Jelisic held that the use of the term dolus specialis by the Trial Chamber in its judgement did not imply or

impose a higher standard of proof of intent to commit genocide, but rather only referred to the Latin phrase to express the same specific intent to destroy a group as

defined by the Article 4 of the ICTY Statute.

206 Prosecutor v. Rutaganda. Judgement and Sentence, Case No. ICTR-96-3-T, T.Ch. 1, 6 December 1999, paras. 59-61 (hereinafter referred to as the Rutaganda

Judgement); Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Judgement, ICTR-96-4-T, 2 September 1998, para. 498 (hereinafter referred to as the Akayesu Judgement).

207 Akayesu Judgement, para. 498.

208 Akayesu Judgement, para. 518; Rutaganda Judgement, paras. 61.

209 Rutaganda Judgement, paras. 59-61

210 Akayesu Judgement. para. 520

214 ILC 1996, page88 Sixth Committee Debate on the Genocide Convention, page 90 See also the Akayesu Judgmenf at para. 501 that notes that the travaux preparatoires

of the Genocide Convention 'show that the proposal by certain delegat~ons that premeditation be made a necessary condition for there to be genocide, was rejected".

22 2 I IC 1996, page88

213 Akayesu, Judgement, para. 523, see also para. 524, quoting ICTY decisions.


The words "in whole or in part" indicate that it is not necessary "to intend to achieve the complete 9 9 214 annihilation of a group from every comer of the globe . It suffices to intend the destruction of a

stantial part of a particular group.

Provided the intent to destroy the group, in whole or part, was present, it is unnecessary that the acts in fact threaten such destruction. Indeed, there is no need that the acts were capable of achieving

Intention to destroy a group should be broadly interpreted and encompasses acts that are undertaken not only with the intent to cause death but also acts which may fall short of causing death, such as sexual violence targeting the female members of the group and contributing to the destruction of the

oup as such.216 It is not necessary to intend to achieve the complete annihilation of a group from very comer of the globe. 217

Sufficient evidence of the requisite intent may be provided by the Accused's actions; including ircumstantial evidence; the number of group members affected; a pattern of purposeful action (such

as the physical targeting of the group or its property, the use of derogatory language towards members of the targeted group, the weapons employed and the extent of bodily injury, the

odical way of planning or systematic way of killing)?

A national, ethnic, racial, or religious group

intention of the drafters of the Genocide Convention was patently to ensure "the protection of stable or permanent An ethnic group is "a group whose members share a common age or culture", while a racial group is identified "based on hereditary physical traits often

with a geographical region, irrespective of linguistic, cultural, national or religious

icity as a distinctive identity is a subjective concept determined primarily by self-identification and community acceptance rather than by objective factors.221 The perpetrators of genocide may characterize the targeted group in ways that do not fblly correspond to conceptions of the group

ared generally, or by other segments of society. It suffices that if a victim was "perceived by a perpetrator as belonging to a protected group, the victim could be considered by the Trial Chamber as a member of the protected group, for the purposes of genocide"222.

JECTIVE ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME:

Article 2(2) of the Statute of the Tribunal enumerates a number of acts, which if committed with the requisite intent would constitute the objective element of the crime of genocide. In this regard Jean

214 ILC Draft Code of Crimes, p.42, para. 8; See also Akayesu Judgement at para. 497 which states that "contrary to popular belief,, the crime of genocide does not imply the

actual extermination of a group in its entirety"; Bagilishema Judgement, para. 64; Kayishema and Ruzindana Judgement, para. 97.

215 cf. Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its Forty-Eighth session, 6 May-26 July 1996, supra.

21 6 Kayishema Rutaganda Judgement, para. 95; See e.g. the Akayesu Judgement in which the Chamber stated that "sexual violence was a step in the process of

destruction of the Tutsi group - destruction of the spirit, of the will to live, and of life itself', para. 732.

217 ILC Draft Code of Crimes, p. 42, para. 8; Kayishema and Ruzindana Judgement, para. 95.

21 8 Kayishema and Ruzindana Judgement, para. 93 (also para. 527).

219 The Akayesu Judgement, para. 516.

220 The Akayesu Judgement, paras 513 and 514.

221 Sixth Committee Debate on the Genocide Convention, page 115: " The concept of a racial group was often ill-defined. Its race was not always the dominating

characteristic of a group, which might rather be defined by the whole of its traditions and its cultural heritage.

Advisory Opinion concerning the Greco-Bulgarian "Communities", (1930) Permanent Court of International Justice, Series B., no 17 at 21. See also United Nations Human Rights

Committee, Sandra Lovelace vs Canada, United Nations General Assembly Official Records, 36th Session, Supp. No. 40, Annex 18 at I73 (1981).

222 Bagiiishema Judgement, para. 65.


de Dieu KAMUHANDA is charged with the killing and causing of serious bodily and mental harm to members of the Tutsi population, with intent to destroy, in whole or part, the Tutsi ethnic group.

rove killing, the Prosecutor must establish beyond reasonable doubt that a person is dead; that the death resulted from the acts or omissions of the Accused; and that the Accused intended that the victim should die. No further intent, such as premeditation is required.223 Sub-paragraph (a) of

icle 2(2) proscribes "killing of members of the group" which is broader than "murder" and 9 9 224 includes all forms of "wilful killing .

Causing serious bodily or mental harm

t is submitted that what amounts to serious harm must be determined by the Trial Chamber on a case-by-case basis.225 The harm inflicted may be physical, mental or both. In this regard, there is no prerequisite that mental suffering be the result of physical harm.226

er submitted that an accused can be held liable for genocide based on infliction of serious only where, at the time of the act, the accused had the intention to inflict serious mental

in pursuit of the specific intention to destroy a group in whole or in part.227

rosecution submits that the phrase 'serious bodily or mental ham' may be construed as vering "harm that seriously injures the health, causes disfigurement or causes any serious injury to

al, internal organs or senses"228 or "acts of torture, be they bodily or mental, inhumane or ing treatment, persecution"229. In the Eichman case, it was found that serious bodily harm was d "by the enslavement, starvation, deportation and persecution ... and by their detention in

ansit camps and concentration camps in conditions which were designed to cause their on, deprivation of their rights as human beings, and to suppress them and cause them

9 , 230 suffering and torture .

. It is further submitted that the harm caused need not be permanent. The jurisprudence of the ICTR icates, "causing serious bodily or mental harm does not necessarily mean that the harm is

permanent or irremediable. "23

ber of a group

7. As indicated by the reference to "the group" in subparagraphs (a) through (e) of Article 2(2), the victims of the crimes alleged against the Accused must be members of the

PLICITY IN GENOCIDE

223 Akayesu Judgement, paras. 500 and 501.

224 ILC 1996, page 91, para. 13, with note 122, and Nehemia Robinson, The Genocide Convention: A Commentary, 1960, page 63: "The act of 'killing' (subparagraph (a)),

is broader than 'murder'; and it was selected to correspond to the French word 'meurtre' which implies more than 'assassination'; otherwise it is hardly open to various

interpretations."

225 Kayishema and Ruzindana, Judgement, paras. 108 and 110.

226 Kayishema and Ruzindana, Judgement, para.. 110.

227 Kayisherna and Ruzindana, Judgement, paras.. 110-1 13.

228 Mayishenla and Ruzindana, Judgement, para.. 109.

229 Akayesu Judgement, para. 504; Rutaganda Judgement, para. 512; Musema Judgement, para. 156

230 Attorney General of the Government of Israel vs Adolph Eichman, District Court of Jerusalem, 12 December 1961, quoted in International Law Reports, vol. 36, 1968 p.

340. Cited in Akayesu Judgement, para. 503.

231 The Akayesu Judgement, para. 502; See also, Kayishema and Ruzindana, Judgement, para. 108; Rutaganda Judgement, para. 51; Musema Judgement, para.. 156.


135

Prosecutor v. KAMUHANDA , ICTR-99-54A-T

e Dieu KAMLTHANDA is charged in the alternative with complicity in genocide.

SUBJECTIVE ELEMENT

9. The intent or mental element of complicity implies that the accomplice must act knowingly. 233 I,

er words that at the moment he acted, the accomplice was aware of the assistance that he was roviding in the commission of the principal offence of genocide.

0. It is submitted that the accomplice need not necessarily possess the dolus specialis of genocide, namely the specific intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group, as such. Rather what is required is knowledge of the genocidal plan, coupled with the actus reus of articipation in the execution of such plan.234

refore, Jean de Dieu KAMUHANDA is liable for complicity in genocide if he knowingly and tarily Aided or Abetted or instigated one or more persons in the commission of genocide, while

owing that such a person or persons were committing genocide, even though the accused did not possess the specific intent to destroy, in whole or in part, the Tutsi ethnic group as

E OBJECTIVE ELEMENT

2 . It is submitted that three forms of actus reus are recognized with regard to complicity in genocide. These are: i) complicity by instigation, ii) complicity by aiding and abetting, iii) complicity by rocuring the means.236

mplicity by Instigation

tigation will only give rise to liability for complicity in genocide in circumstances where a person, ugh n ot d irectly p articipating i n the c rime o f g enocide, gave i nstructions t o c ommit g enocide, ugh gifts, p romises, threats, abuse o f authority o r p ower, m achinations o r c ulpable artifice o r

who directly incited to commit genocide.237

Complicity by Aiding and Abetting

44. Aiding and Abetting implies a positive act that excludes, in principle, complicity by failure to act or However, aiding and abetting may also consist in failing to act or refraining from action

where the accused had a duty to act.239

omplicity by Procuring of Means

curing of means includes those persons who procure, inter alia, weapons, instruments, or other means to be used in the commission of an offence, with the full knowledge that they would be used for such purpose.240

233 Akayesu Judgement, para. 538; Musema Judgement, para. 180.

234 Akayesu Judgement, paras. 540 and 544-545.

235 Musema Judgement, para. 183.

236 Akayesu Judgement, para. 537; See aiso, Musema Judgement, para. 176.



239 Akayesu Judgement paragraph 548; Kayishema and Ruzindana para.202



According to the Akayesu judgement in order for the accused persons to be fo of complicity in genocide, it must, first be proven that the crime of genocide has, indeed been committed.241 It is however noted that in the instant case, the Defence admits that genocide occurred in Rwanda in 1994 although they denied that the Accused was guilty thereof. It is the Prosecution's osition that an accomplice may be tried even when the principal perpetrator of the crime of

genocide has not been identified, or where, for other reasons, guilt of the principal perpetrator could not be proven.242 Complicity may also in some instances include the mere presence at the crime scene. 243

Criminal liability for complicity in genocide will arise, irrespective of the extent of participation of the accused in the execution of the genocidal plan. It is further submitted that a difference exists between (1) complicity in genocide pursuant to, Article 2(3)(e) of the ICTR Statute; and (2) Aiding

Abetting in the planning, preparation or execution of genocide under ICTR Statute, pursuant to cle 6(1) of the ICTR Statute.

Although the material elements of both are similar, in order to found guilt for aiding and abetting in the planning, preparation, or execution of genocide under Article 6(1) of the ICTR Statute, it must be proven that the accused acted with specific genocidal intent. In other words, that he possessed the requisite intent to destroy i n whole or in part, the Tutsi ethnic group, a s such. There is no such

uirement to found guilt in complicity in genocide.

In order to found guilt for aiding and abetting in the planning, preparation, or execution of genocide under Article 6(1) of the ICTR Statute, the actus reus of the illegal act or offence may include an omission to act or failure prevent the commission of the illegal act. In contrast complicity in genocide implies a ositive act, which in principle, excludes the failure to act or an omission on the art of the accused. E

A person who, by his or her mere presence amongst a group of aggressors gives moral support to the assailants and hlly supported the criminal intent of the group, may also be liable for Aiding and Abettin in the planning, preparation or execution of genocide under Article 6(1) of the ICTR Statute. %5

ONSPIRACY TO COMMIT GENOCIDE^^^

MES AGAINST HUMANITY

ean de Dieu KAMUHANDA is charged with Crimes against Humanity, for the murder, extermination and other inhumane acts of civilians, as part of a widespread and systematic attack against the civilian population on ethnic grounds.

UBJECTIVE ELEMENTS

The elements common to all three crimes defined as Crimes Against Humanity above are the following:

24 1 Akayesu Judgement, para. 530


243 See e.g., Prosecutor vs Furundzija, Case No, where it was held, "...an approving spectator who is held in such respect by the other perpetrators that his presence encourages them in their

conduct, may be guilty of complicity in a crime against humanity". Furundzija, para. 207, quoted in Kayishema and Ruzindana, Judgement at para. 200.


245 Akayesu, Judgement, paras. 546-548, 726.

246 The Chanmber dropped this charge after the close of the perosecution case, therefore no legal arguments are necessary in this regard.


(a) The actus reus of the offence must be committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack; ) The actus reus of the offence must be committed against the civilian population;

c) The actus reus of the offence must be committed on one or more illegal discriminatory grounds namely for reasons based on the targeted group's nationality, political affiliation, ethnicity, race or religion

) The actus reus of the offence must be inhuman in nature and character, causing great suffering or serious injury to the body or to mental or physical health.247

hese elements will now be analysed ad seriatim -

e actus reus must be committed aspart of a widespread or systematic attack

tus reus of an offence committed as a crime against humanity cannot be a random inhumane rather an act committed as part of an attack. The attack may be either of a widespread

systematic nature and but need not be both.248

idespread", nature of a crime against humanity, may be defined as a massive, ftequent, large-scale ction, carried out collectively with considerable seriousness, and directed against multiple

victims.249

ystematic", nature of a crime against humanity, constitutes organized action, following a regular , on the basis of a common policy and involves substantial public or private resources. It is

not essential for such policy to be adopted formally as a policy of a State. However, there must exist some form of preconceived plan or

"Attack", as an element of a crime against humanity, may be defined as an unlawful act of the kind enumerated in Article 3(a) to (i) of the Statute. An attack may also be non-violent in nature, such as imposing a system of apartheid, which is declared a crime against humanity in Article 1 of the

eid Convention of 1973, or exerting pressure on the population to act in a particular manner, ay come under the purview of an attack, if orchestrated on a massive scale or in a systematic

this regard, the Trial Chamber in the Kayishema and Ruzindana case held that part of what transforms an act into a crimes against humanity is "the inclusion of the act within a greater

on of criminal conduct; therefore an accused should be aware of this greater dimension in be culpable thereof '.252

erpetrator of an act falling within the ambit of crimes against humanity must have "actual or nstructive knowledge of the broader context of the attack, meaning that the accused must know at his act[s] is part of a widespread or systematic attack on a civilian population and pursuant to

9 , 253 some kind of policy or plan .

act of mass victimization to be a crime against humanity, it must include a policy element. e requirement that the attack must be committed against a "civilian population" inevitably

247 Musema Judgement, para. 201; Akayesu Judgement, para. 578; Rutaganda Judgement, para. 66.

248 See Article 18 I.L.C. Draft Code of Crimes which requires that the act be committed "in a systematic manner or on a large scale" and explicitly states that these are two

alternative requirements; See also, Akayesu Judgement, para. 579; Musema Judgement, para. 203; Rutaganda Judgement, para. 68.

249 Akayesu Judgement, para. 580; Musema Judgement, para. 204; Rutaganda Judgement, para. 69.


251 Musema Judgement, para. 205; Akayesu Judgement, para. 581.

252 Kayishema and Ruzindana Judgement, para. 134. See also the Tadic Judgement, para. 656 where the court stated that the requisite mens rea for crimes against

humanity appears to be the intent to commit he underlying offence, combined with the knowtedge of the broader context in which that offence occurs.



emands some kind of plan and the discriminatory element of the attack is, by its v ossible as a consequence of a

ICTR Statute does not require the involvement of a state.255 The International L ed in the Draft Code of Crimes, that crimes against humanity are inhumane acts "instigated or

'7 256 ected by a Government or by any organisation or group . Therefore, the Tribunal's jurisdiction covers both State and non-State actors.257

e actus reus must be committed against the civilian population

us reus for any of the enumerated acts in Article 3 of the Statute must be directed against the civilian population for it to constitute a crime a gainst humanity. I n the Akayesu, Rutaganda and

sema judgements, "civilian population", pursuant to Article 3 of the Statute, was defined as who were not taking any active part in the hostilities.258 Indeed the fact that there are

uals among the civilian population who themselves are not civilians does not deprive the opulation of its civilian character.

the Statute, crimes against humanity may be committed inside or outside the context of an onflict. Therefore, the term civilian must be understood within the context of war as well as

ative peace. A wide definition of civilian is applicable and includes all persons except those who e the duty to maintain public order and have legitimate means to exercise force.259

e actus reus must be committed on discriminatory grounds

tatute stipulates that inhumane acts committed against the civilian population must be committed on "national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds". Discrimination on the basis of

a1 ideology satisfies the requirement of "political" grounds as envisaged in Article 3

4. Inhumane acts committed against persons not falling within any one of the discriminatory categories constitute crimes against humanity if the perpetrator's intention in committing such acts was to er his attack on the group discriminated against on one of the grounds specified in Article 3 of

e. T he p erpetrator must h ave the r equisite i ntent for the commission o f a c rime a gainst 261

crimes themselves need not contain the three elements of the attack (i.e. widespread or systematic, against any civilian population, on discriminatory grounds), but must form part of such an attack. Indeed, the individual crimes contain their own specific elements. For an accused to be

guilty under crimes against humanity, the Prosecution must prove that the accused is sible for one of the crimes charged pursuant to Article 6(1) and/or 6(3) of the

OBJECTIVE ELEMENTS

254 Kayishema and Ruzindana Judgement, para. 124.

255 Musema Judgement para. 204

256 ILC Draft Code of Crimes, Article 18.

257 Kayisherna and Ruzindana Judgement, paras. 125-1 26.




26 1 Musema Judgement, para. 209; See also Akayesu Judgement, par.584 and Rutaganda Judgement, par. 72.

262 Kayisherna and Ruzindana Judgement, para.135.

139

- - - " - - " - - - - - - - -. - - .- - -


66. The Akayesu Judgement, defined murder as the unlawful, intentional killing of a human being263. e requisite elements of murder as a crime against humanity, established in this case, are as

follows:

(a) The victim is dead; ) The death resulted from an unlawful act or omission of the Accused or a subordinate;

At the time o f t he killing the Accused o r a s ubordinate h ad the i ntention t o kill o r inflict grievous bodily harm on the deceased having known that such bodily harm is likely to cause the victim's death and is reckless as to whether or not death ensues.264

Thus, a premeditated murder that forms part of a widespread or systematic attack against civilians on iscriminatory grounds will b e a c rime a gainst humanity. A lso i ncluded i n this c ategory w ill b e

"unlawful and deliberate killings carried out with the order of a Government or with its complicity or 9 , 265 acquiescence often referred to as extra-judicial killings.

An act or omission of the accused or a subordinate of the accused caused the death of the victim

. It is submitted that conclusive proof that the victim in fact died via mechanisms which are familiar within municipal systems (such as death certificates) can frequently be problematic or impracticable within the context of mass crimes and confinement of prisoners and civilians within camps, where large numbers of victims may have been summarily killed, buried in makeshift graves, or the whereabouts of their remains unknown.

In the ICTY case of Prosecutor vs. Tadic, the Trial Chamber was cognizant of the reality that during arrned conflict, widespread beatings, killings and indifferent, callous treatment of the dead may be widespread. Since these are not times of normalcy, it was deemed inappropriate to strictly apply mles of some national systems that require the production of a body as proof to death.266 In these circumstances, death may therefore be proved either directly or circumstantially, provided there is evidence to link the accused's conduct to a resulting death. It is therefore submitted that the relevant standard to be applied is that of sufficiency of proof rather than a strict delimitation of the means by which proof may be established.

It is further submitted that omissions as well as concrete acts can satisfy the actus reus element of wilful killing and murder.267 For example, when an accused, rather than actively killin the victim, instead withholds the necessaries of life (such as food, shelter, and medical the actus reus of the offence of murder pursuant to Article 3(a) of the Statute may thereby be satisfied.

articular difficulties of proof of causation may occur where the accused acts in concert with others; for instance, in situations of mob violence or other forms of joint offending. In such cases, it may be difficult to pinpoint the precise contribution of each accused to the victim's eventual death. The Appeals Chamber in Tadic has nevertheless held that where each accused acts pursuant to a common


264 Akayesu Judgement, paras. 589 and 590, Musema Judgement para. 215.

265 Kayishema Ruzindana Judgement, para. 140.

266 Tadic Judgement, paras. 240-1.

267 Prosecutor vs. Delalic et al, Case No. It-96-21, 16 November 1988, paragraph 424 (hereinafter referred to as "Celebici Judgement"). The Commentary to the Fourth

Geneva Convention states, "wilful killing would appear to cover cases where death occurs through a fault of omission" (at p. 597).

268 A parallel may exist in this regard visd-vis the offence of murder and the un-enumerated violation under Article 3 of starvation of civilians, which is outlawed by Additional

Protocols I and II. With regard to the latter violation, it is arguably unnecessary, as a matter of strict law, to establish that persons actually died of starvation, on the

grounds that where the starvation of civilians resulted in actual deaths, this would instead comprise the actus reus of murder.

140


criminal design, each carrying out complementary and distinct parts of this plan, the actus reus of murder may be attributed to each individual accused.269

The accused intended to kill or inflict serious injury in reckless disregard of human life

e necessary mens rea for murder is wilfulness. That is a direct intent to kill or recklessness that ath may ensue as a foreseeable consequence of the accused's conduct. According to the case law,

is demonstrated by "an intention on the part of the accused to kill or inflict serious injury i n 3, 270 reckless disregard of human life .

. The Akayesu Judgement defined the essential elements of extermination as follows:

(4 accused or his subordinate(s) participated in the killing of certain named or described ons.

(b) The act or omission was unlawful and intenti~nal.~~'

The Rutaganda and Musema Judgements fwher held that extermination "can be any act or omission, 9 , 272 or cumulative acts or omissions that cause the death of the targeted group of individuals . The

ishema and Ruzindana Judgement in turn defined the requisite elements of extermination thus:

The actor participates in the mass killing of others or in the creation of conditions of life that lead to the mass killing of others, through his act(s) or omission(s); having intended the killing, or being reckless, or grossly negligent as to whether the killing would result and; being aware that his act(s) or omission(s) forms part of a mass killing event; where, his act(s) or omission(s) forms part of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population on national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds.273

E:

Extermination is a form of killing. The conduct of killing could be committed by different methods, either directly or indirectly. The ICC Statute (Article 7(2)(b) upholds the view that extermination includes inflicting conditions of life calculated to bring about the destruction of part of a population.274

676. The creation of conditions of life that lead to mass killing includes, for example imprisoning a large er of people and withholding the necessities of life or introducing a deadly virus into a

opulation and preventing medical care, which thereby results in mass death.275

269 Ibid, at paras. 190-229

270 Cetebici Judgement, para. 439. Other examples: Participation in the killing of three civilians held in the circumstances to be a crime against humanity (murder).

Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Judgement, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, T. Ch. I, 2 Sep. 1998, paras. 645653. Taking eight detained civilian refugees and handing them over to the

local militia with orders that they be killed held in the circumstances to be a crime against humanity (murder). Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Judgement, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T,

T. Ch, I, 2 Sep. 1998, paras. 654-661. Giving orders to the local militia to kill intellectual people, leading to the killing by the local militia of five teachers, held in the

circumstances to be a crime against humanity (murder). Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Judgement, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, T. Ch. 1, 2 Sep. 1998, paras. 662-671.

27 1 Akayesu Judgement, para. 592; See also the Rutaganda Judgement, para. 83 and the Musema Judgement, para. 218, which reinforce this definition.

272 Rutaganda Judgement, para. 84, Musema Judgement, para. 219.


274 See also Kayishema and Ruzindana Judgement, para. 146, which states that "the 'creation of conditions of life that lead to mass killing' is the institution of circumstances

that ultimately causes the mass death of others".


141


xtemination includes not only the implementation of mass killing or the creation of conditions of life that leads to mass killing, but also the planning thereof. In this event the Prosecutor must prove a ausality or nexus between the planning and the actual killing.276

in named or describedpersons

ination is a crime, which, by its very nature, is directed against a group of individuals. xtermination differs from murder in that it requires an element of mass destruction, which is not

required for murder.277 However the term b'mass" or "on a large scale" does not command a numerical imperative but may be determined on a case-by-case basis using a common sense

roach. The actor need not act with a specific individual(s) in mind.278

le, in the Akayesu Jud ement, the Accused was found guilty of extermination for ordering of sixteen people?7F Similarly, in the Musema Judgement, the attacks resulting in f deaths and numerous injuries were held to have constituted ex te rmina t i~n .~~~

. Although as a murder on a large scale, extermination normally involves a number of victims, it is ant to note that a perpetrator may also be guilty of extermination if he kills, or creates the ons of life that kills a single person providing the actor is aware that his act(s) or omission(s)

s part of a mass killing event. Such an "event" is considered to exist where the (mass) killings close proximity in time and place.281

tims can be "described" individuals, i.e. the victims can be a group of people categorized in a certain way as s uch b y the p erpetrator. For example, the A kayesu T rial C hamber found that the killing of five teachers by the local people and militia on the perpetrator's order to kill "intellectual

influential people" constituted e~termination.~'~

regards to the distinction between extermination as a c rime a gainst humanity a nd g enocide, its systematic and widespread characters make the offence of extermination closer to that of

de, there are several elements that distinguish it from the crime of genocide.

. In this regard, killings of members of protected groups that can amount to genocide under Article 2 would, if committed on a large scale, also constitute extermination within the meaning of article 3(b).

wever killings do not need to be on a large scale to constitute genocide and not all extermination would amount to genocide under the Statute. In the case of extermination, the members of the group would not have to share common characteristics and could simply be groups that existed as groups

n the mind of the person responsible. When killings are directed at groups of individuals, these s could include not only the national, ethnical, racial and religious groups which are protected

y the Convention on Genocide, but a wide variety of other groups, such as political, social, rnguistic groups, or groups based on their sexual orientation; it can also comprise the likes of all ersons believed to be traitors to the State or subversives in the mind of the perpetrator.


277 Akayesu Judgement, para. 591; Musema Judgement para. 217; Rutaganda Judgement, para. 82.

278 Kayishema and Ruzindana, Judgement, para.145.

279 Akayesu Judgement, para. 735-744

280 Musema Judgement, para. 942-951.

28 1 Kayishema and Ruzindana Judgement, para. 147.

282 Akayesu Judgement, para..313: On counts in para. 19 and 20 of Indictment the Chamber finds that "it has been proved beyond reasonable doubt that on or about 19

April 1994 Akayesu ordered the local people and lnterahamwe to kill 'intellectual people.' The Chamber finds that it has been proved beyond reasonable doubt that

teachers from the commune of Taba were killed pursuant to the instructions of Akayesu and that the teachers were killed because they were Tutsi."


84. In addition, extermination also covers situations in which a group of individuals who do not share any common characteristics are killed. It also applies to situations in which some members of a group are killed while others are spared.

The act or omission was unlawful and either intentional or done with recklessness, or- gross negligence

ns Rea

act or omission that intentionally and knowingly causes mass destruction, directed against certain oups of individuals constitutes the crime of extermination under Article 3(b).283 The accused

should know that the act or omission is committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against the civilian population.

6. Alternatively, an act or omission done with "recklessness or gross negligence" that causes mass destruction with respect to a certain group of individuals may also constitute extermination under

icle 3(b) of the

THER INHUMANE ACTS

687. The sub-characterization 'other inhumane acts' laid down in Article 3(i) of the ICTR Statute is a generic charge encompassing a series of criminal activities not explicitly enumerated.285 Other inhumane acts can include those crimes against humanity that are not otherwise specified in Article 3 of the Statute, but are of comparable seriousness.286

88. An act or omission will fall within the ambit of "other inhumane acts", as envisaged in Article 3(i) of the Statute, provided the nature and character of such act or omission is similar in nature, character, - -

- - - - - - gyavity ad seriousness 10 the other a&+ as enumerated-in sub-articles (a) to-(h) of Article 3 I - - - - - -

. In addition,

. The inhumane act or omission must be directed against member(s) of the civilian population;

. The perpetrator must have discriminated against the victim(s), on one or more of the enumerated discriminatory grounds; and

c. The perpetrator's act or omission must form part of a widespread or systematic attack and the perpetrator must have knowledge of this attack.287

90. Other inhumane acts include acts that are of similar gravity and seriousness to the enumerated acts of murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, imprisonment, torture, rape, or persecution on political, racial, and religious grounds. These will be acts or omissions that deliberately cause serious mental or physical suffering or injury or constitute a serious attack on human dignity. The


284 Kayisherna and Ruzindana Judgement, para. 146.

285 As the commentary on Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions states regarding the notion of 'inhumane treatment', "[ ...I it is always dangerous to try to go into too

much detail - especially in this domain. However much care were taken in establishing a list of all the various forms of infliction, one would never be able to catch up with

the imagination of future torturers who wished to satisfy their bestial instincts; and the more specific and complete a list tries to be, the more restrictive it becomes". See

Jean Pidet, Commentary on the 1st Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949, Geneva, 1952, p. 54.

286 KayishemaIRuzindana Judgement, para. 150.



rosecution must prove a nexus between the inhumane act and the great suffering or serious injury to mental or physical health of the victim. The acts that rise to the level of inhumane acts should be

etermined on a case-by-case basis.288 15 691. A third party could suffer serious mental harm by witnessing acts committed against others,

particularly against family or friends. However, to find an accused responsible for such harm under crimes against humanity, it is incumbent on the Prosecution to prove the mens rea on the part of the accused. Inhumane acts are, inter alia, those that deliberately cause serious mental suffering. An accused may be held liable under these circumstances only where, at the time of the act, the accused had the intention to inflict serious mental suffering on the third party, or where the accused knew that his act was likely to cause serious mental suffering and was reckless as to whether such suffering

r esult. Accordingly, i f a t the t ime o f t he a ct, t he accused w as unaware o f t he third p arty bearing witness to his act, and then he cannot be held responsible for the mental suffering of the third

289

92. The elements of inhumane acts under Article 5(i) are the same as those for inhuman treatment under icle 2(b) and the breach of the obligation to provide "humane treatment" contained in Common icle 3 of the Geneva

The elements are:

the accused or a subordinate inflicted serious mental or physical suffering or injury, or a serious attack on human dignity

The offence of inhuman treatment constitutes ". . .an intentional act or omission, that is an act which, ged objectively, is deliberate and not accidental, which causes serious mental or physical suffering

or injury or constitutes a serious attack on human dignity.291

Graviiy threshold

95. With regard to the required gravity of "other inhumane acts," the Trial Chamber noted in Prosecutor v. Tadic that, on considering Article 5 as a whole, "as a minimum, the last of these crimes, 'other inhumane acts', must consist of acts inflicted upon a human being and must be of a serious nature. 99292

question of whether any particular act constitutes inhumane treatment is a question of fact to be ed in all the circumstances of the particular case.293 Acts such as "mutilation and other types of

3, 294 severe bodily ham", "beatings and other acts of violence , and "serious physical and mental '295 have been considered as constituting inhumane acts.

288 KayishemalRuzindana Judgement, para. 151; Musema Judgement, para. 233.

289 KayishemaIRuzindana Judgement, para. 153.

290 Aleksovski Appeals Judgement, para. 26, citing the Celebici Judgement, para. 543. See also Celebici Judgment, para. 532: "the principle of humane treatment

constitutes the fundamental basis underlying common article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. This article prohibits a number of acts, including violence to life and to the

person, such as murder, mutilation, cruel treatment, torture and outrages on personal dignity, and humiliating and degrading treatment" and Prosecutor v. Jelisic, IT-95-

10, para. 52: "The subcharacterisation "other inhumane acts" specified under Article 5(i) of the Statute is an generic charge which encompasses a series of crimes. .... The Trial Chamber considers that the notions of cruel treatment within the meaning of Article 3 and of inhumane treatment set out in Article 5 of the Statute have the

same legal meaning."

29 4 "Judgement", Prosecutor v DelaliC et al, Case No.: IT-96-21-T, Trial Chamber, 16 Nov. 1998 ("CelebiCi Judgement"), para. 543.

292 Tadic Trial Chamber Judgement, at para. 728.

293 Id. See also Kayishema and Ruzindana, Judgement, 21 May 1999, at para. 151: "[Tihe acts that rise to the level of inhuman acts should be determined on a case-by-

case basis".

294 Tadic Trial Chamber Judgement, para. 730.

295 BlaSkiC, para. 239.


7. The Trial Chamber in KupreSkiC took a broader approach as to which acts may fall into the category of other inhumane acts in concluding that acts such as the forcible transfer of groups of civilians, enforced prostitution, and the enforced disappearance of persons, may be regarded as "other inhumane acts."296

(b) the accused or a subordinate intended unlawfully to inflict such suffering or to attack human dignity

. The requisite mens rea is willfulness; the accused must have intentionally or recklessly inflicted such suffering or attack upon human dignity. The Trial Chamber in BlaSkiC interpreted this requirement as rn eaning that the a ccused " must h ave b een motivated b y t he i ntent to i nflict s erious b odily or

ental harm upon the victim."297

OUS VIOLATIONS OF ARTICLE 3 COMMON TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS AND OF ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL I1

de Dieu KAMUHANDA is charged with violence to life, health and physical or mental well- ing of persons, including murder and serious bodily and mental harm, and is thereby alleged to

ave committed Serious Violations of Article 3 Common to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol I1 thereof, contrary to Article 4 (a) of the Statute.

0. Jean de Dieu KAMUHANDA is a university graduate and a seasoned civil servant. It is the Prosecutor's view that there is no general requirement that the perpetrator of a crime under Article 4 of the Statute belong to a particular class of persons. The only general requirement under Article 4 of the Statute is that there exists a link or nexus between the crimes committed and the armed conflict in Rwanda.

701. The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda has the power to prosecute persons committing or ordering to be committed serious violations of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 for the Protection of War Victims and of Additional Protocol I1 thereto of 8 June 1977. These violations include, but are not limited to:

a. Violence to life, health and physical or mental well-being of persons in particular murder as well as cruel treatment such as torture, mutilation or any form of corporal punishment.

. Collective punishments

c. Taking of hostages

d. Acts of terrorism

e. Outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment, rape, enforced prostitution and any form of indecent assault;

fa Pillage;

296 KupreSkit, para. 566.

299 BlaSkit, para. 243.

Prosecutor v. XAMUHANDA, ICTR-99-54A-T

. The passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgement pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilised peoples;

/4 . Threats to commit any of the foregoing acts.

icle 1 of the Statute does not contain any limitation upon the class of perpetrators the Tribunal can e but rather seems to imply that the Tribunal can try any person who committed crimes in

ub-paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article 6 (Individual Criminal Responsibility) of the Statute contain certain provisions concerning government representatives. The purpose of these provisions is,

wever, not to limit the scope of the Statute, but, on the contrary, to expressly ensure that Heads of tates or government officials or agents of Governments or States are not immune from criminal

responsibility under the Statute.

en the Security Council established this Tribunal it intended it to have jurisdiction over any class of individuals, by deciding "to establish an international Tribunal for the sole purpose of prosecuting

sons responsible for genocide and other serious violations of international humanitarian law mmitted in the territory of Rwanda .... and to this end adopt the Statute of the International

3,298 Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.. . In the Akayesu Judgement the Trial Chamber found, rightly, that " the four Geneva Conventions - as well as the two Additional Protocols were adopted primarily

rotect the victims as well as potential victims of armed conflicts" and that "due to the overall ective and humanitarian purpose of these international legal instruments the delimitation of this

ry of persons bound by the provisions in Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol I1 should too re~tricted."~~'

icle 4 of the Statute pertains to violations of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and onal Protocol 11. The general rules for application of the provisions of Common Article 3 of neva Conventions and the rest of the Geneva Conventions are the same, with the natural

ifferences that follow from the fact that Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol I1 are applicable in non-international armed conflicts while the rest of the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I apply in international armed conflicts only.

the Rutaganda Judgement the Chamber stated that offences covered by Article 4 of the Statute must have been committed in the context of a conflict of a non-international character satisfying the requirements of Common Article 3, which applies to " armed conflict not of an international

aracter" and Additional Protocol I1 applicable to conflicts which " take place in the temtory of High Contracting Party between its armed forces and dissident armed forces or other organized

ups which, under responsible command, exercise such control over a part of its territory as em to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement this

N m - international Armed Conflict

e notion of armed conflict is defined in the Tadic Jurisdiction Decision partly that it exists enever there is a resort to armed force between States or protracted armed violence between

3, 301 overnmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within a State . 298 Refer to SIRES 955(1994) of 8 November 1994, at 1.

299 paragraphs 630 and 631 of the judgement thereof.

300 paragraph 91 of the Rutaganda judgement.

30 1 paragraph 70 of the Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction dated 2.10.1995

146

--------------- --- --------- --


This definition was adopted in the ICC Statute in Article 8(2)(fJ302 International humanitarian law applies from the initiation of such armed conflicts and extends beyond the cessation of hostilities until a peaceful settlement is reached.

Nexus Between the Offences and the Armed Conflict

8. For an accused to be held responsible for a crime under Article 4 of the Statute it is insufficient for the crime to have been committed in the temporal and geographical context of an armed conflict. There must also be a link between the armed conflict and the offence. It is undoubtedly necessary for a nexus to exist between the offences and the armed conflict but not to establish a direct link in each and every case. For instance, the acts need not be committed in the midst of the fighting. What is required is merely that the alleged crimes are somehow "closely related to the hostilities occurring

9 9 303 in other parts of the temtory controlled by the parties to the conflict . Nor is it necessary that the accused be part of the armed forces, or be entitled to combatant status in terrns of the Geneva

onventions, to be capable of committing war crimes. It suffices for him to belong to one side of the conflict whereas the victims belong to another.304

. Further, a war nexus is established between the alleged offence and the non-international armed ict, if, as the Appeals Chamber has held in Kunurac case, the existence of armed conflict:

"[. . .] at a minimum, ....p layed a substantial part in the perpetrator's ability to commit [the offence], his decision to commit it, the manner in which it was committed or the purpose for which it was committed. Hence, if it can be established . . . that the perpetrator acted in furtherance of or under the guise of the armed conflict, it would be sufficient to conclude that his acts were closely related to the armed conflict.305

e Class of Victims

10. The victims in this indictment were all Tutsi civilians. There is no concise definition of "civilian", in the Protocols. A definition has, however, evolved through a process of elimination, whereby the civilian population is made up of persons who are not combatants or persons placed hors de combat, ih other words, who are not members of the armed forces. Pursuant to Article 13(2) of Additional Protocol 11, the civilian population as well as individual civilians shall not be the object of attack. In the Akayesu Judgement, the Trial Chamber found that, the Tutsi, as an ethnic group were the targeted victims.306

Elements of offence Under Article 4(a) of the Statute

71 1. The mens rea of the offence requires that the accused acted knowingly or deliberately. The Blaskic Trial C hamber h eld that t he m ens r ea o f v iolence t o 1 ife and p erson i s satisfied o nce i t h as b een

lished that "the accused intended to commit violence to the life or person of the victims

302 Among the salient features of this definition is the lowering of the threshold of application of humanitarian law in situations of internal armed conflicts (cf. Article I of

Additional Protocol II; see also ICRC Commentary to Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions ), and that it increases the number of cases covered by the norms of

humanitarian law to include those of non-state entities fighting among themselves.

303 paragraph 70 of the Tadic Jurisdiction Decision, supra.

304 This position is widely accepted and is based upon several post-world war cases such as the Essen Lynching case, the Tokyo Judgement, the trial of Robert Wagner, the

Flick, I. G. Farben case, Krupp Trials and others. In the Krupp Trial, for example, the judgement stated, inter ala, that, " the laws and customs of war are binding no less

upon private individuals than upon government officials and military personnel. In case they are violated, there may be a difference in the degree of guilt, depending upon

the circumstances, but none in the fact of guilt.

305 Kunarac Appeal Chamber Judgement, para. 58.

306 refer to paragraphs 116 - 129 for a discussion and determination of Tutsi ethnicism by the Trial Chamber, and the finding that it was Tutsi civilians who were the 1994

Rwandan genocide targets. Hugh McCullum, in his Expert Report, Exhibit P 27 produced in this trial explores the question of Tutsi as "victims" at length.

147

mecutor v. KAMUHANDA, ICTR-99-54A-T

9 9 307 Is12 ely or through recklessness . The mens rea could be satisfied by direct or circumstantial the accused was aware or willing to risk the foreseeable consequences of his or her acts or

712. The actus reus of violence to life and to person is purposely broad, encompassing such conduct as murder, cruel treatment and torture and which is accordingly defined by the culmination of the elements of these specific crimes. Although some cornrnentat~rs~~~ argue that the prohibition of violence to life and person covers only "physical violence" Tribunal jurisprudence has not elaborated an interpretation of violence to life or person that addresses this distinction. The Prosecution submits that violence to life and person can be satisfied and are exemplified by acts of torture or cruel treatment. The very elements of these underlying crimes envision acts or omissions that could inflict mental injury or suffering as well as physical violence309.

crime of violence to life and to person consists of the following elements:

(i) That the act or the omission of the accused or his or her subordinate caused deprivation of life, o r s erious p hysical or m ental i njury, h arm or s uffering o r attacked the d ignity of t he person, and

(ii) The accused or his or her subordinate intended to commit violence to the life of the person of the victims deliberately or through recklessness.310

t is incumbent on the Prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the actions of the accused person during the month of April 1994 in Gikornero commune, Kigali Rural Prefecture amounted to violence to life or person as averred in the indictment.

ULATIVE CHARGES

5 . The acts or omissions relied upon by the Prosecutor to support the charges of genocide (alternatively, complicity in genocide) crimes against humanity and war crimes in the indictment are, in most instances, the same for all counts against the accused.

Rationale for cumulative charges

. It is submitted that the provisions of the Statute, outlining the different offences under the jurisdiction of the Tribunal- i.e. Article 2 (genocide), Article 3 (crimes against humanity) and Article 4 (war crimes) protect different societal interests. In that regard, it is further submitted that, an accused person can therefore be charged and convicted of the same conduct, under any or all categories of offences under the Statute.

e Appeals Chamber decision in Prosecutor v. Alfred usem ma^" rejected the argument that that rial Chamber erred in law by convicting for genocide and extermination based on the same set of

facts. In upholding the convictions, the Appeals' Chamber found that where two crimes have at least

307 paragraph 182 of the judgement; confirmed by the Kordic Judgement, paragraph 260. Note that reference is made to ICTY decisions on the authority of the ICTY

Appeals Chamber Decisions in Tadic (para94) and Celebic (paragraphs 135, 141, 144 and 150) where it was held that Article 3 of the ICTY Statutes (which relates to

international armed conflict) covers serious violations of international humanitarian law whether the breach occurs in an internal or international war. The Tadic Decision

cited in support the ICJ Decision in the Nicaragua case (ICJ Reports 1986 p.114) that Common Article 3 had become part of customary law that is applicable in internal

and international armed conflicts. In addition Common Article 3 contains "elementary considerations of humanity" having the force of jus cogens.

308 Andreas Zimmermann in Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Otto Triffter, ed., Nomos Verlagsgellschaft 1999) page 272.

309 In the Akayesu, Kayishema and Ruzindana , and Musema cases the provisions of Article 4 of the Statute were adjudicated on. In each case, the ICTR Trial Chambers

did not go further than saying that the Prosecution did not prove the jurisdictional element, namely, nexus to the armed conflict.

310 See paragraph 182 of the Blaskic judgement and paragraph 260 of the Kordic Judgement for a discussion of these elements

31 1 See judgement of 16 November 2001


one element that the other crime does not, an Accused could be convicted for both based on e facts. The objective or abstract elements of the crimes matter more than the facts of the

e. The Musema appeal followed a previous Jelesic Appeal decision and the Kunarac, Kordic and tic cases312 on the question of cumulative charges. The Musema Appeal decision overruled the

rial Chamber's finding in the Clement Kayishema and Obed ~uzindana"~ case that an accused person could not be charged and convicted of more than one crime in respect of offences arising from the same conduct. Indeed the Trial Chamber's decision in the Kayishema and

windana case is not supported by other decisions by the Tribunal, the ICTY, and the Appeals h~imber .~ '~

8. The jurisprudence of the Tribunal has also extended the principle of cumulative charging to cover war crimes. In Prosecutor vs. Jean-Paul ~ka~esu" ' the Chamber held that;

"a single event could be qualified both as a crime against humanity and as a war crime".

VIDUAL CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY

. In relation to all the offences in the indictment, the accused is alleged to be individually responsible r the crimes pursuant to Article 6(1) of the Statute. Article 6(1) states the following:

A person who planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, preparation or execution of a crime referred to in articles 2 to 5 of the present statute, shall be individually responsible for the crime.

HORITY OF THE TRIAL CHAMBER TO CHOOSE THE APPROPRIATE LEGAL HARACTERIZATION OF THE CONDUCT UNDER ARTICLE 6(1)

secutor submits that a Trial Chamber may find an accused guilty if it determines that he or cipated in a crime through any action encompassed by the Statute, even if it differs from the

articular theory supported by the Prosecution. The Trial Chamber, as the finder of fact and trier of aw, is free to apply any theory it finds applicable to the facts of a case as long as it fits within the

confines of Article 6(1). As a rule, there is no problem with notice to the accused. The Defence is on sufficient notice through the pleading of Article 6(1) that any one of the theories of direct

sponsibility could apply.) ' is regard, it is submitted that the position taken by the ICTY in the Celebici Judgement that

individuals may be held criminally responsible for their participation in the commission of offences in any of these capacities is in conformity with general principles of criminal law. To determine the

ividual criminal responsibility of an accused for a crime based on Article 6(1) of the Statute, it is submitted that it is necessary to read the elements in this document in conjunction with the elements of the underlying offence(s). The common elements under Article 6(1) are as follows:

31 2 See para 358-369 French version of judgement of 16 November 2001

313 Case no. ICTR-95-1-T dated 21 5.99, paragraphs 576- 579 and 649 of the judgement.

314 In Prosecutor vs. Jean Kambunda the accused, following a guilty plea, was convicted cumulatively, in respect of the same conduct, for genocide, complicity in genocide, conspiracy to

commit genocide and crimes against humanity, murder, and extermination. The decision in Prosecutor vs. Omar Serushago is to the same effect. In Prosecutor vs. Ntagerura, Prosecutor

vs Bugambiki and Prosecutor vs. Ntabukuze and Kabiligi this Tribunal determined that an accused person can be charged with and convicted of several counts arising fiom the same

conduct and that the question of cumulation of charges is only relevant to penalty, if the accused is ultimately found guilty. The practice in the ICTY is similar to this Tribunal's as is

discernible in its decisions in Prosecutor vs. Dusko Tadic Prosecutor vs. Dusko Tadic, Prosecutor vs. Delalic et al. The ratio decidendi in the Tadic case shows that it is possible in the

legal system of the Tribunal for an accused person to be charged and convicted cumulatively, in respect of the same conduct of more than one crime. The decisions in Prosecutor vs.

Furundziju Prosecutor vs. Aleksovski and Prosecutor vs. Jelisic are to the same effect.

31 5 Case no. 1CTR-96-4-T, paragraph 465 of the judgement, quoting the Barbie case.

316 See Prosecutor V. Kordic and Aerkez, Decision on the Defence Motion to Strike the Amended indictment for Vagueness, Case No. IT-95-1412-PT, T. Ch. 111,2 Mar. 1999.

Prosecutor v. KANUHANDA, ICTR-99-54A-T

1. Requisite mens rea

a) Direct intent b) Indirect intent, or dolus eventualis

2. Omission as culpable conduct

Requisite mens rea

All forms of criminal participation under Article 6 (1) may be performed with either:

Direct intent - where the accused intends his or her acts to produce the relevant result or consequence; or

(2) Indirect intent, or dolus eventualis - where the accused is aware of the substantial likelihood that his or her acts will produce the relevant result or consequence, and willingly accepts that risk.

3. For a joint criminal enterprise, the Appeals Chamber has found that the required mens rea for each co-participant is satisfied when a member of the group is able to predict the result:

'Ilt should be noted that more than negligence is required. What is required is a state of mind in which a person, although he did not intend to bring about a certain result, was aware that the actions of the group were most likely to lead to that result but nevertheless willingly took that risk. In other words, the so-called dolus even tualis is required (also called "advertent recklessness" in some national legal systems) "3 17.

724. This finding should be applicable to all forms of participation under Article 6(1), a person may plan, instigate, order, commit or otherwise aid and abet the execution of a crime either:

(i) With direct intent; or (ii) With awareness of the substantial likelihood that a crime would be committed as a

consequence of, or in connection with, his or her conduct."318.

. . . ."any person who, in ordering an act, knows that there is a risk of crimes being committed and accepts the risk, shows the degree of intention necessary (recklessness) so as to incur responsibility for having ordered, planned or incited the commitment of the crirnesfl3l9.

ission as culpable conduct

n the overwhelming majority of national legal systems it is a fundamental principle of law, that an ndividual can commit a crime by either acts or omissions.320 This principle can also be found in arious Declarations and ~onvent ions.~~' Moreover, several cases relating to crimes committed uring the Second World War confirm that a failure to act may constitute a criminal omission, which

may be prosecuted with a conviction for war crimes as a result of that.322 It has also been

3.1 7 Appeals Chamber, Prosecutor v. Tadic, Judgement, Case No. IT-94-I-A, 15 July 1999, para. 220.

318 Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Judgement, Case No. IT-95-14-T, 3 March 2000, para. 278 (emphasis added). The Trial Chamber deliberately confined its analysis to "planning",

"ordering", "instigating" and "aiding and abetting", since these were the only forms of participation charged by the Prosecution. S. para. 277.

319 id., para. 474 (emphasis added).

320 See below, at 3-4.

3% 1 See below, at 7.


150


acknowledged in the jurisprudence of this Tribunal and the ICTY that culpable omission may under certain conditions constitute a criminal act for which responsibility may be found under Article 6(1) of the 450

he Prosecution therefore that in each form of participation under Article 6(1) of the Statute, individual responsibility arises, not only for positive acts, but also for culpable omissions.

A variety of national legal systems explicitly contain the general principle that a criminal offence can be committed by act or omission32s. The general inclusion of "omission" in the concept of criminal offence is not only present in civil law legal systems, but is also found in legal systems based upon common Finally, a culpable omission may constitute an act, which may trigger individual criminal responsibility pursuant to Islamic Law. For instance, the Penal Code of the Islamic Republic of Iran states in Article 2:

"Every act or omission which is punishable according to the law constitutes a criminal offence.11327

e jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunals, the legal principle of equal criminal responsibility for acts as for omissions has already been acknowledged. In the Tadic ~ u d ~ r n e n t , ~ ~ ~ the Trial Chamber referred to the aforementioned "Borkum Island Case" and concluded:

"In this case, the lack of action on the part of the guards and commander amounted to a sufficient degree of participation for the purposes of criminal liability" (para 686). Moreover, the Trial Chamber expressly acknowledged criminal responsibility for culpable omissions spec@cally with regard to the crime of persecution under Article 5 of the Statute by stating: 'Yn order to constitute persecution there must be a persecutory act or omission, and that act or omission must be based on one of the listed grounds" (para. 694).

9. The Tadic Appeals ~ud~rnent.'~' upheld this notion expressly. With regard to the ambit of Article 6(1) of the ICTY Statute, the Appeals Chamber held that "this provision covers first and foremost the hysical perpetration of a crime by the offender himself, or the culpable omission to act that was

mandated by a rule of criminal law" (para. 188).


324 Prosecutor v. Kupreskic et a/, Prosecutor's closing brief, Section XI.

325 For instance, the Penal Code of the Republic of Croatia of 1997 states in Chapter 3, Article 25: "A criminal oflence can be committed by an affirmative action or an omission to act."

Sinufarly, the Penal Code of the FRY of 1964 states in Chapter Three, Article 13 para. 1: "A criminal offence may be committed by aposifive act or by an omission." Other Continental-

European and African civil law systems enshrine the same principle in different language. Article 40 para. 2 of the Italian Penal Code lays down that "failing to prevent an event which

one has a legal obligation to prevent shall be equivalent to causing it." According to Section 4 of the Norwegian Penal Code "wherever this code mentions the word act, it thereby also

includes omission to act unless it is otherwise expresslyprovided or evidentflow the context."325 The Dutch Penal Code implies in Article 1 that an omission to act may constitute a

criminal offence, since it states that: " No act or omission is punishable which did not constitute a criminal offence under the law at the time it was committed."325 The German Penal

Code states in Section 13 para 1. that: "Whoeverfails toprevent a harm which is part of the constituent elements of a crime may be punished under this Code ...". 325 Section 2 of the

Austrian Penal Code contains similar language.325 Finally, the Rwandan Code Penal codified the principle in its Livre Premier, Article 1: "L'infraction est une action ou une omission

qui se munifeste comme une atteinte a I'ordre social et que la loi sunctionnepar unepeine."

326 The Pakistan Penal Code, for instance, enshrines the same general principle in Para. 32 which reads: "Words referring to acts include illegal omissions. In every part of this Code, except

where a contrary intention appears from the context, words which refer to acts done extend also to illegal omissions." Moreover, the United States Model Penal Code of 1985 includes

omission as basis of criminal liability pursuant to Section 2.01 para. 1 in stating: "A person is not guilty of an offense unless his liability is based on conduct that includes a voluntary act

or the omission to perform an act of which he is physically capable." Similarly, the Australian Criminal Code Act of 1995 accepts omission as possible form of criminal conduct as is

stated in Division 4, No. 1.290 para. 1 and 2: "A physical element of an offence may be: (a) conduct ... (para.1). In this Code: "conduct means an act, an omission to perform an act or a

state of affairs." (para. 2). The Penal Code of Zambia in Chapter IV concerning General Rules as to Criminal Responsibility refers to omissions recurrently as, for instance, in Article 7

("my act or omission"), Article 8 ("the act done or omitted to be done by him"), Article 9, 10, 12 and 12 A.

327 Criminal law of the Islamic Republic of Iran concerning penalties of 8th Mordad 1370130. Juli 1991, in Tellenbach, Strafgesetze der lslamischen Republik Iran, 1996

328 IT-94-1-T, 7 May 1997

329 IT-94-76, 15 July 1999

Prosecutor v. KA MUHA NDA , ICTR-99-54A-T

. Additionally, the ICTR ruled in the Akayesu ~ u d ~ e m e n t ~ ~ ' that his failing to oppose the killings incurred individual criminal responsibility of Akayesu pursuant to his capacity as bourgmestre: " . . . throughout the period covered in the Indictment, Akayesu, in his capacity as bourgmestre, was

ble for maintaining law and public order in the commune of Taba and that he had effective y over the communal office ... Akayesu himself admitted before the Chamber that he had the

wer to assemble the population and that they obeyed his instructions ... Indeed, the Chamber holds at the fact that Akayesu, as a local authority, failed to oppose such killings and serious bodily or

mental harm constituted a form of tacit encouragement, which was compounded by being present to such criminal acts. "33

73 1. Further, both the Kordic and Kunarac Trial Chambers have admitted that criminal liability may stem from omissions, following the Tadic Trial In sum, individual criminal responsibility under International Criminal Law, in general as well as under Article 6 (1) of the Statute, exists for both acts and culpable omissions. The description of the cases and international instruments above shows that the wording of Article 6(1) must be interpreted as to generally include acts as well as missions with regard to the forms of participation included therein.

ELEMENTS OF THE SPECIFIC FORMS OF PARTICIPATION UNDER

e elements of participation through '$.~lanning" are as follows

I . Actus reus:

1 . The accused, either alone or in concert with others, planned, designed or organised the commission of the actus reus of a crime.

' e

II The actus reus of a crime was committed, with or without the participation of the accused, within the execution of the plan.

2. Mens rea:

i. The accused, had the mens rea of the crime, or was aware of the substantial likelihood that the crime committed would be an adequate consequence of carrying out the plan.

s submitted that the notion of planning implies that one or several persons plan, design or organise commission of the actus reus of a crime.333 The crime, however, need not be executed by the

lanners, nor is their intervention in the commission of the offence required in any other way (e.g., they need not make any other additional contribution to the event as co-perpetrators or aiders and

ettors - to be punishable).334

330 ICTR-96-4-T, 2 September 1998

33 1 supra note, p. 282 paras. 704 and 705

322.. - See Kordic J udaement,ara. 3 76, ref err in^ to "the c ulpabie o mksion o f a n act that was m andated b v a rule a f criminal law" ( cite f ram t heTadic Trial C hamber's

J u & e m , and Prosecutor V. Kunmc. Case No. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-2312-T. Judaement. 22 Februaw 801. para. 390: an accused also "commits" a crime where he or - she " e n ~ ~ d e r s a culpable omission of a rule of criminal law" (citina the Tadic Trial Chamber's Judae tnm ".--

333 Prosecutor V. Akayesu, Judgement, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, T. Ch. 1,2 Sep. 1998 ("Akayesu Judgement'), para. 480.

334 See Trial of Joseph Altstotter and Others (Justice case) VI Law Reports 1 and XV Law Reports 55 (in which the accused were found guilty, inter alia, in respect of their

participation in the design of the Nacht und Nebel plan, which, as the Tribunal acknowledged, was executed mainly by the Gestapo). See also Trial of Dr Joseph Buhler,

XIV Law Reports 23.

152


. Thus, when a person plans and co-ordinates the attack on a village with a predominant civilian opulation, and the killing and injuring of civilians occurs during the attack, that person performs the

actus reus of "planning" an unlawful attack on civilians under Arts.3 and 6(1) of the Statu

. The crime planned must, however, be committed in order to make the planner puni is no criminal responsibility for attempted offences under the with the enocide under Article 2.

. For a person to be criminally liable for "planning" a crime, it is not necessary to prove that any of the ersons executing the plan had the requisite mens rea. Thus, a person can be criminally liable for laming, even though no one is criminally liable in respect of its execution. Further, circumstantial

evidence may provide sufficient proof of the existence of a plan336.

has been held that "planning constitutes a discrete form of responsibility under Article 6 (1) of the tatute" and that accordingly "an accused may be held criminally responsible for planning alone.337.

elements of participation through "instigation" are as follows:

. Actus reus:

i. The actus reus of a crime was performed by a person or persons other than the accused.

a "

11. The accused directly provoked or induced the conduct of the other person(s), in the sense that the conduct of the accused was a clear contributing factor of the conduct of the other person or persons.

. Mens rea:

1. The accused intended to provoke or induce the commission of a crime, or was aware of the substantial likelihood that the commission of a crime would be an adequate consequence of his or her acts.

* .

11. The accused had all elements of the mens rea of a crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, which the accused intended to provoke or otherwise induce.

... lax. The accused was aware of the substantial likelihood that the crime committed would be an

adequate consequence of the provocation or inducement.

. The essence of "instigation" is that the accused caused another person or persons to commit a crime. t need not be proved that the crime would not have been committed at all if the accused had not

ated it. It need only be proved that the instigation was a clear contributing factor the commission of the crime.

335 Akayesu Judgement, para. 473: "However, the principle of individual criminal responsibility as provided for in Article 6 (1) implies that the planning or preparation of the

crime actually leads to its commission". This is a consequence of the fact that responsibility for attempt and (other) inchoate crimes only applies to genocide, thus in

respect to any other form of criminal participation "the perpetrator would incur criminal responsibility only if the offence were completed". Similar findinas can be found in

ttBlaskicJgdaement. Dam. 278 and the Kordic Judqement, Dara. 38&

336 Prosecutor v. Biaskic, Judgement, para. 279.

337 Kordic Judaernent, oara. 386. - 153

I


ase of instigation, the accused may have committed none of the elements of the actus reus sonally. The person(s) whom the accused has instigated will perform the elements of the actus

instead. Where the accused performs some elements of the actus reus, and instigates others to the other elements, the accused should normally be regarded as having "committed" the

ffence as a co-perpetrator, rather than as having instigated it.

here the elements of the actus reus are performed by more than one person, it is unnecessary to rove that the accused instigated the conduct of all of them. It is sufficient that the accused

instigated the conduct of any one of them.

o be criminally liable for "instigating" a crime, it is not necessary to prove that any of the persons executing the plan had the requisite mens rea. Thus, a person can be criminally liable for instigating, even though no one is criminally liable in respect of its execution. But there must be a causal

ection between the instigation and the execution of the crime, although this connection need not ount to a condictio sine qua non one338.

"Instigation" can take a variety of different forms. Indeed, the forms that instigation can take are en-ended. Instigation includes incitement, but is much broader than the latter. In particular, there uld be no requirement that an instigation be "direct" and "public" to be punishable under Article

7 (I), as concluded by the Akayesu Trial Chamber.

3. Any conduct by an accused can be regarded as "instigation" if it is intended to cause another person to act in a particular way, and has that result. Thus, instigation can take the form of promises of

nancial o r o ther a dvantage, o r b ribery, o r threats o r m en ace^.^^' I nstigation c ould a lso t ake the form of simple persuasion, for instance, by appealing to the other person's "patriotic duty", or by appealing to the other person's personal or family loyalty to the instigator.

igation c an b e express o r i mplied, and c an also b e b y o mission rather than b y a p ositive act, rovided that it is proved that the conduct of the accused was intended to cause the direct perpetrator

act in a particular way, and had that result340. If it can be shown that the accused's conduct did ence the conduct of the direct perpetrators, the accused would be criminally liable for gating" the crimes, provided that the accused had the requisite mens rea.341 In accordance with

eneral principles, proof of the accused's intention can be a matter of inference from all the evidence. The Kordic Trial Chamber has also held that Article 7 (1) constitutes lex specialis vis-8- vis Article 7 (3) responsibility:

he Trial Chamber is of the view that in cases where the evidence presented demonstrates that a superior would not only have been informed of subordinates' crimes committed under his authority, but also exercised his powers to plan, instigate or otherwise aid and abet in the planning, preparation or execution of these crimes, the type of criminal responsibility incurred may be better characterised by Article 7(1). Where the omissions

an accused in a position of superior authority contribute (for instance by encouraging

338 Prosecutor v, Blaskic, Judgement, para. 280: "The ordinary meaning of instigating, namely, "bring aboutn the commission of an a d by someone, corroborates the opinion

that a causal relationship between the instigation and the physical perpetration of the crime is an element requiring proof'"

339 See, for instance, Rwandan Penal Code, Article 89(1), which treats equally those who by promises, threats, or abuse of power, directly provoke a crime. S. also Andrew

Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law, third edition, Oxford University Press, 1999, p. 481: threats or other forms of pressure may also be considered as incitement.

340 Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Judgement, para. 280.

341See e.g., Trial of' Brigadefuhrer Meyer (the Abbaye Ardenne case) IV Law Reports 97 (where a commander was found liable for counselling and instigating the mistreatment of

prisoners by his subordinates, in circumstances where the superior had made known to the subordinates his hostile views towards the prisoners).

154


the perpetrator) to the commission of a crime by a subordinate, the conduct of the superior may constitute a basis for liability under Article 7 ( 1 ) . " ~ ~ ~

ments of participation through the act of "ordering" are as follows:

i. The actus reus of the crime was performed by a person or persons other than the accused (the perpetrator(s)), with, or without the participation of the accused.

. . 11. The perpetrator(s) acted in execution of an express or implied order given by the

accused to a subordinate or other person over whom the accused was in a position of authority.

2. Mens rea :

I. The accused had all the elements of the rnens rea of a crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.

. . 11. The accused was aware of the substantial likelihood that the crime committed would be an

adequate consequence of carrying out the order.

5. The proposed actus reus of "ordering" is composed of three elements: (a) the actus reus of the crime was performed by a person or persons other than the accused; (b) there is a superior-subordinate relationship, or a position of authority vested in the person that "orders"343, and (c) the perpetrators acted in execution of an order given by the accused.

his definition encompasses, in addition to orders given by regular military commanders, situations of "irregular" bodies, such as paramilitary forces, in which there is no de jure superior-subordinate relationship, but nonetheless the person located at the head of the organisation is vested with an authority that enables him or her to give orders to the other members of the same

7. The position of authority may also be construed as including situations in which the accused has a significant influence upon a person or group of persons that would prompt them to obey an instruction coming from him or her345. Particularly relevant is the finding of the Kordic Trial

hamber, whereby "no formal superior-subordinate relationship is required for a finding of 'ordering' 9 9 346 so long as it is demonstrated that the accused possessed the authority to order .

While this form of participation under Article 6 (1) requires that the accused actually gave an order, the giving of an order may be proved circumstantially, and there is no requirement of direct evidence that it was given347. Furthermore, there is no requirement that the order be in writing or in any particular form348.

342 -- Kord icaement , para. 371, footnotes omitted. See also Blaskic judgement paras337-339.

343 According to the Akayesu Trial Chamber, "Ordering implies a superior-subordinate relationship between the person giving the order and the one executing if'; s. I

Judgement. para. 483.

344 This is the Article 7 (1) equivalent of the CelebiciTrial Chamber's finding on de facto authority for the purposes of asserting criminal responsibility under Article 7 (3). See

Celebici Judgement, para. 354.

345 It has been stated that a central feature of ability is "its right and ability to activate a duty to obey among those over whom it holds swayn; s. Herbert C. Kelman 8 V. Lee

Hamilton, Crimes of Obedience, Yale University Press, Binghamton, 1989, p. 77.

346 - Kordic Judaement. para. 388. At footnote 533 the Trial Chamber exurosslv states its disaareement with tho Akavesu and Blaskic Trial Chambers on this oarticular ~oint.

347 Special International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Judgement: "During a period of several months the Tribunal heard evidence, orally or by affidavit, from witnesses I

who testified in detail to atrocities committed in all theatres of war on a scale so vast, yet following so common a pattern in all theatres that only one conclussion is


order to commit a crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal may be express or implied349, i.e., an accused may be held responsible for ordering the commission of a crime if the conduct of the accused vis-a-vis his or her subordinates is intended to be, and understood as, an implicit order.

0. The fact that an accused in a position of authority "ordered" a particular crime may be inferred, inter aha, from the following factors:

The number of illegal acts;

(2) The number, identity, and type of troops involved;

The logistics involved, if any;

(4) The widespread occurrence of the acts;

(5) The tactical tempo of operations;

(6) The modus operandi of similar illegal acts;

(7) The officers and staff involved; and

(8) The location of the superior at the time350.

e importance of ordering the commission of a crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal could similar to that of its actual perpetration: "A person who gives the order to commit a war crime or a

crime against humanity is equally guilty of the offence with the person actually committing it"351.

752. The level of individual criminal responsibility will actually increase as one moves upwards in the chain of command.352 In giving the order, the accused must have all the elements of the mens rea of an offence within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, which the accused ordered. Under strict

ditions, the accused will have the requisite mens rea 353 even if the crime committed was another initially contributed to by the accused. If the accused orders the "ethnic cleansing" of a village

y force, he or she could be held responsible for "ordering" the wilfbl killings of any of the civilians who are killed in execution of the plan. Further, giving attack orders to a particular unit in the awareness of the existence of criminals in its ranks amounts to accepting the risk that very violent crimes may result from their participation in the offensive354.

possible- the atrocities were either secretely ordered or wilfully permitted by the Japanese Goverment or individual members thereof and by the leaders of the armed

forces", quoted in Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, Volume XV, London, 1949,p. 65, emphasis added by the commentator. As stated in the commentary therein,

the decision deals with circumstancial evidence as a basis for the conclusion that "a superior must be taken to have ordered or connived at offences on the parts of his

subordinates", Ibid. Emphasis in the original. See also, Trial of Brigadefuhrer Meyer (the Abbaye Ardenne Case) IV Law Reports 97, at 108: "There is no evidence that

anyone heard any particular words uttered by the accused which would constitute an order, but it is not essential that such evidence be adduced. The giving of the order

may be proved circumstantially; that is to say, you may consider the facts you find to be proved bearing upon the question whether the alleged order was given, and if

you find that the only reasonable inference is that an order that the prisioners be killed was given by the accused at the time and place alleged, and that the prisoners

were killed as a result of that order, you may properly find the accused guilt" (emphasis added). See also Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Judgement, para. 281, quoting with

approval the Akayesu Judgement.

348 Prosecutor V. Blaskic, Judgement, para. 281.

349 Id.

350 UN Commission of Experts, Final Report, p. 17. The same indicia are relevant for the purposes of establishing individual criminal responsibility for "planning" a crime

within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.

352 UN Commission of Experts, Interim Report (S125274, 10 February 1993, para. 51).

352 Kupreskci Judgement, para. 862. Emphasis added.

353 Blaskic Judgement, para. 474.

354 Id., para. 592.

156


753. It is unnecessary to prove that the subordinates who executed the order also had the same mens rea.355 Thus, it is not necessary that the order given by the accused, en facie, required the commission of a crime3? The order may simply be to shell a particular building or position. The unlawfulness o f t he o rder m ay a rise from facts, which are n ot apparent from the o rder i tself ( for instance, the fact that there are unarmed civilians in the relevant building or position). Provided the accused had the requisite mens rea, it is irrelevant that no one else could tell merely from looking at the order that it ordered the commission of a crime.

754. The order need not be given by the accused directly to the person or persons who perform the actus reusgs7. For instance, the order may be handed down through several levels of the chain of command efore it reaches those who actually implement it. In such cases, each intermediate commander who ransmits the order received from above to the next level below in the chain of command may be liable for "ordering" the commission of the crime, since each intermediate commander is in a

sition to manoeuvre the part of the system that is subordinated to him or her. Thus, the person that ceives the order to commit crimes and accordingly instructs his or her subordinates to perform it,

oes not merely "pass it on", but rather uses his or her own powers to "order the commission of a crime", and may therefore be criminally responsible under Art. 6(1)'~~.

5 . The essence of "ordering" is not that the accused had authority over those who actually perpetrated physical elements of the crime. Rather, the essence of ordering is that an order given by the

used to a subordinate was a substantial cause of the conduct of others because of his or her superior authority. As it is in the case of "instigating", liability attaches to "ordering" the commission of a crime on the basis that the accused was the "moral author" of the crime. As a rule, it is not necessary that the accused was vicariously responsible through a chain of command for the conduct of those physically committing the relevant acts.

e elements of participation through "comrn ission " through individual perpetration are

i The accused performed all elements of the actus reus of the crime.

2. Mens rea:

1. The accused had all elements of the mens rea of the crime, or was aware of the substantial likelihood that a crime would occur as an adequate consequence of his or her conduct.

. This is the most straightforward form of criminal participation, e.g., for wilful killing, the specific actus reus is "conduct resulting in the death of the victim, in the sense that the conduct is a

99 359 stantial cause of the death of the victim , and the specific mens rea is intention "to kill, or was 9, 360 reckless towards the death of the victim as a possible consequence of his or her conduct .

e conduct of the accused will satisfy the actus reus for wilful killing if it substantially contributed to the victim's death.361 Even if the accused did not intend to kill the victim, the mens rea of wilful

355 Id., para. 282.

356 Id.

357 Id.

358 Kupreskic Judgement, para. 827 and 862; See German Federal Supreme Court, BGH NJW 1996,2042,2043; See also The German High Command Trialat pp. 74-75.

359 Celsbici Judgement, paras. 424, 909.

360 i d , paras. 437,439.

36 1 I d , para. 909.

Prosecutor v. IZAMUHANDA, ICTR-99-54A-T

illing will be satisfied if the accused's conduct "manifested extreme indifference to the value of uman life", in the sense that the risk taken by the accused that his or her actions will result in death

was in all the circumstances excessive.362

accused could be regarded as having personally performed the elements actus reus, even though the accused used an agent to perform the relevant conduct.363 The als Chamber has clarified in the Celebici Judgement that in the case of "primary or direct responsibility, where the accused himself commits the relevant act or omission, the qualification that his participation must 'directly and substantially affect the commission of the offence' is an unnecessary one"364. That articular requirement rather applies to lesser degrees of directness of participation, which will

ordinarily give rise to accomplice liability.

e elements of participation through "aiding and abetting" are

I . Actus reus:

i. The accused, by his or her conduct, directly and substantially contributed to the commission by another person of the actus reus of a crime.

2. Mens rea :

1. The accused knew that his or her conduct would substantially contribute to the commission by another person of the actus reus of a crime, or was aware of the substantial likelihood that this would be an adequate consequence of his or her conduct.

son can only be responsible for "aiding and abetting" a crime which was actually committed.365 and abetting'' are two distinct concepts. "Aiding" means giving assistance to someone;

ng", on the other hand, would involve facilitating the commission of an act by being etic thereto. Either aiding or abetting alone is sufficient to render the perpetrator criminally

liable.366

, even if mere presence at the scene of a crime is not per se sufficient to render an accused liable aiding and abetting, presence during the commission of the crime can constitute "abetting" if it an e ncouraging effect o n the p e r p e t r a t ~ r s , ~ ~ ~ o r g ives them m oral s ~ ~ ~ o r t ~ ~ ~ o r sychological

99 3 0 13,'~' or "a significant legitimizing or encouraging effect on the principals , ' even if the accused takes no active part and provides no material assistance.

versely, presence at the scene of the crime is not a requirement of liability for aiding and tting. In some circumstances, mere absence from the scene of the crime may itself have provided

ect and substantial contribution to the commission of a crime by another person. An accused

362 Id., para. 436 (also e.g., paras. 855,890, 902-903).

353 In some jurisdictions, this is considered as a separate form of perpetration known as perpetration by "means" or "intermediate perpetration" (autoria mediata, mittelbare

Tgterschaft). See also Rome Statute of the ICC, Article 25(3), which provides that "a person shall be criminally responsible and liable for punishment ... if that person:

(a) commits such a crime ... through another person, regardless of whether that other person is criminally responsible". An analysis of this particular provision can be

found in Otto Triffterer (ed), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, p. 479 et seq. (Kai Ambos).

364 -.--_ &ge&Charnber,Celebici Judaement. oara. 345.

365 Akayesu Judgement, para. 473 (referring to authorities at paras. 474-475). I

365 Ibid., paras. 484-485.

387 Tadic Judgment, paras. 689-692 (see also paras. 678-687).

388 Akayesu Judgement, paras. 546-548; Furundzija Judgement, paras. 232-235.

359 Celebici Judgement, para. 327-328.

370 Furundfja Judgement, paras. 205-209,232-235.


ho is on duty guarding prisoners in a prison camp, who deliberately leaves his or her post in order to enable others to come and mistreat the prisoners in his or her absence, may be liable for aiding and abetting those others in the mistreatment of the prisoners.

2. To be liable for "aiding and abetting" generally, the conduct of the accused (acts or omissions) needs to materially assist, encourage or support the perpetrator in the commission of the crime.371. This means that the assistance needs to be real or genuine, not merely speculative or possible. However,

e degree of assistance can be slight. Provided that the assistance is direct and substantial, the egree to which it aided in the commission of the crime would be relevant to sentencing, but not to

culpability. The conduct of the accused need not be a conditio sine qua non of the conduct of the perpetrator(^)^^^.

763. The culpability of an Aider and abettor is not negated by the fact that his or her assistance could easily have been obtained from another person.373 As long as it can be found to have contributed to, or have had an effect on, the commission of the crime, the relevant act of assistance may be removed both in time and in place from the actual commission of the offence.374

e following are examples of the kinds of assistance that may constitute aiding and abetting:

- Su plying the accused with the weapon or other instruments P75

used in the commission of the crime;

.. Keeping watch while the perpetrators commit the crime;376

..w Driving the perpetrators to the scene of the crime, or providing any other service to the perpetrators in its commission;377

- Failing to prevent others from perpetrating crimes upon the victim, in circumstances where the accused is under a legal obligation to protect a

e mens rea of aiding and abetting is satisfied if the accused knew that his or her conduct would materially assist, encourage, or support the commission of a crime, or of one of a class of crimes that encompassed the crime committed by the perpetrator, or by members of a class of persons, which included the p erpetrator. It i s n ot n ecessary that the A ider and A bettor s hould know the p recise crime that was intended and which in the event was committed. If the accused is aware that one of a number of crimes will probably be committed, and one of those crimes is in fact committed, he or she will have intended to facilitate the commission of that crime, and will be guilty as an Aider and

e t t ~ r . ~ ~ ' .

765. The Appeals Chamber has stated that the relevant issue is the "awareness by the Aider and Abettor of the essential elements of the crime committed by the principal"380. There is no requirement that

371 Tadic Judgement, paras. 689-692; Celebici Judgement, para. 326 (footnotes omitted) (also para. 329).

372 Furundzija Judgement, paras. 232-235.

373 Ibid., para. 224.

374 Tadic Judgment, para. 687; Celebici Judgement, paras. 327-328.

375 Tadic Judgment, paras. 680,684, referring with apparent approval to the Zyklon B and Mulka cases.

376 Ibid, para. 685, referring with apparent approval to the Almelo case; Furund'ija Judgement, paras. 200-303; Celebici Judgement, para. 842.

377 Furundzija Judgement, paras. 200-303. It may be argued that such a case could more appropriately be considered under "committing" (by omission).

378 Tadic Judgment, p ara. 6 86, referring w ith a pparent a pproval to the B orkum I siand c ase. S ee a Iso A kayesu Judgement, paras. 7 04-705 (failure of b ourgmestre to

maintain taw and order in a commune, and failure to oppose killings and serious bodily or mental harm, found to constitute a form of tacit encouragement, which was

compounded by being present at such criminal acts).

379 Furund'ija Judgement, para. 246.

380 - Aleksovski Arjoeal Judaement. uaras. 163-1 64. See also Kordic Judaement. para. 400. I


the accused share the mens rea of the perpetrator (s); it is sufficient that he or she has knowledge that his or her actions will assist the perpetrator in the commission of a crime3? The trier of the fact can infer this intent.382~ccordingly, the required mens rea need not be explicitly expressed, but may be inferred from all relevant circumstance^^^^.

. Aiding and abetting does not require a pre-existing plan or arrangement to engage in tne criminal conduct in u e ~ t i o n ~ ~ ~ . Aiding and abetting can take place before, during or after the crime has been 4 ommitted3 '; assistance ex post facto can take place either due to a previous agreement by the erpetrator and the accomplice prior to the commission of the crime,386 or simply to a decision by the

accomplice to provide assistance to the perpetrator after the offence has been completed.

e liable for aiding and abetting, the accused need not know precisely who the perpetrators of the crime will be, or who the specific victims will be. The Appeals Judgement in Tadic has brought further clarification as to the main features of this form of participation when being compared to a theory of common criminal plan or purpose:

The Aider and Abettor is always an accessory to a crime perpetrated by another person, the principal.

b) In the case of aiding and abetting no proof is required of the existence of a common concerted plan, let alone the pre-existence of such a plan. No plan or agreement is required: indeed, the principal may not even know about the accomplice's contribution.

c ) The aider and abettor cames out acts specifically directed to assist, encourage or lend moral support to the perpetration of a certain specific crime, and this support has a substantial effect upon the perpetration of the crime. By contrast, in the case of acting in pursuance of a common purpose or design, it is sufficient for the participant to perform acts that in some way are directed to the furthering of the common plan or purpose.

In the case of aiding and abetting, the requisite mental element is knowledge that the acts performed by the aider and abettor assist the commission of a specific crime by the principal. In the case of common design more is required, i.e., either intent to perpetrate the crime or intent to pursue the common criminal design plus foresight that those crimes outside the criminal common purpose were likely to be committed387

finding of responsibility under Article 6(1) of the Statute does not prevent the Chamber from ing responsibility additionally, or in the alternative, under Article 6(3). The two forms of

responsibility are not mutually exclusive. Both forms of responsibility charged must be considered in order to fully reflect the culpability of the accused in light of the

ERIOR LIABILITY UNDER ARTICLE 6(3) OF THE STATUTE

Jean de Dieu KAMUHANDA is charged, with criminal liability for the criminal acts of his subordinates in Gikomero and Gishaka parish churches pursuant to Article 6(3) of the Statue.

38 1 Ibid., para. 245; Celebici Judgement, para. 327-328. Kiinarac Judclemont. Dara. 392.

382 Celebici Judgement, para. 327-32.

383 Tadic Judgement, paras. 675-676; Celebici Judgement, paras. 327-328.

384 Tadic Judgement, para. 677; Celebici Judgement, paras. 327-328.

385 Id.

386 Furundzija Judgement, paras. 204,229.

387 Tadic Appeals Decision, para. 229.

38 KayishemaIRuzindana judgement para 210


9. Article 6(3) of the Statute states as follows:

The fact that any of the acts referred to in articles 2 to 5 of the present Statute itted by a subordinate does not relieve his superior of criminal responsibility if he knew or had reason to know that the subordinate was about to commit such acts or had done so and the superior failed to take the ecessary and reasonable measures toprevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof:

The jurisprudence of this Tribunal and that of the ICTY have established that for an accused to be found criminally responsible as a superior, it must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt that:

A crime under the Statute was committed;

A superior-subordinate relationship existed in the sense that the accused exercised "effective control' over the perpetrator(s) of this crime;

The mental element (mens rea): the accused knew or had reason to know that perpetrator was about to commit the crime or had done so; and

The accused failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the offence or to punish the perpetrator.389

An offence was committed

This requires proof that a certain offences, punishable under the Statute were committed, by a certain perpetrator or group(s) of perpetrators.390

The accused exercised superior authority over the perpetrator(s) of the offence

e concept of "effective control" or "material ability "

771. The Prosecutor submits that for an accused to be found criminally liable in accordance with Article 6(3) of the Statute, a superior-subordinate relationship must have existed between the accused and

perpetrator at the relevant time. It is submitted that the relevant criterion to be applied by the trial chamber in determining whether a person is liable as a superior under Article 6(3) of the Statute is one of his or her "effective control" over the said subordinates. The Prosecutor submits that this criterion applies, regardless of, origins or title, or whether that person exercises control by virtue of de jure or de facto powers. In effect, the same legal standards under Article 6(3) of the Statute, binds

ersons exercising the requisite effective control regardless of origins or title, and regardless of whether the requisite control is exercised by virtue of de jure or de facto powers. All superiors are under the same affirmative duty to conduct and conclude further inquiries once they are put on notice s f the likelihood of subordinate offences.

72. The Prosecution's position, in other words, is that for the purposes of Article 6(3) of the Statute, there are no distinct legal regimes for the requisite mens rea depending on the formal or technical status of the superiors.

389 Celebici Judgement. para. 346; Aleksovksi Judgement. paras 69-71.

390 Aleksovski Judgement, paras. 103-106, 107-1 11. Kayishema and Ruzindana Judgement, paras. 476-516,555,559,563,569.

161

773. eriors can only be liable when they possess a personal responsibility in relation to the etrators on the basis that the offenders are under the superior's control and authority.391 What

counts is a superior's material ability,392 which may entail issuing orders or taking disciplinary action s well as for instance, submitting reports to the competent authorities in order for proper measures

. It is further submitted that the doctrine of command responsibility is ultimately predicated upon the ower of the superior to control the acts of his subordinates.394 In this regard the Prosecutor submits

that both those permanently under an individual's command and those who are so only temporarily or on an ad hoc basis can be regarded as being under the effective control of that particular individual.

o that end it has been held that the temporary nature of a military unit is not, in itself, sufficient to xclude a relationship of subordination between the members of a unit and its commander. To be eld liable for the acts of men who operated under him on an ad hoc or temporary basis, it must be

shown that, at the time when the acts charged in the Indictment were committed, these persons were 9 9 395 under the effective control of that particular individual .

e factor that determines superior responsibility is the actual possession, or non-possession, of wers of control over the actions of subordinates. In order for the principle of superior sponsibility to be applicable, it is necessary that the superior have effective control over the

ersons committing the underlying violations of international humanitarian law, in the sense of aving the material ability to prevent and punish the commission of these offences.396

ore than one superior can therefore, be responsible for the acts of the same subordinates. The Trial hambers in the Aleksovski and the Blaskic cases affirmed this.397

De jure and/or de facto authority

rosecutor submits that a formal designation as a superior is not a prerequisite. As such, an accused can be a superior based on de jure andlor de facto authority.398 The jurisprudence of the

ribunals has clearly established that a formal designation as a commander (or a superior) is not a necessary prerequisite for superior responsibility, and that such responsibility may be imposed by virtue of a person's de facto, as well as de jure, position of authority or powers of

erior authority under Article 6(3) is therefore not reserved for official authorities.400

e Celebici case, the Trial Chamber held that criminal responsibility can be attributed: "(. . .) on asis of either their de facto or their de jure positions as superiors. The mere absence of formal

39 2 Celelbici Appeal Judgement, para. 303.

392 Celebici Judgement, para. 395: "a superior may only be held criminally responsible for failing to take such measures that are within his powers" (emphasis added).

Likewise, Article 86(2) of Additional Protocol I refers to superiors and "feasible measures within their power to prevent or repress" (emphasis added).

393 Blaskic Judgement, para. 302; see also Aleksovski Judgement, para. 78, concerning reporting to the appropriate authorities the commission of crimes.

394 Celebici Judgement, para. 376; Kayishema and Ruzindana Judgement, para. 21 7 Musema Judgement, para. 148.

395 Kunarac Judgement, para. 399. Note that the Trial Chamber found that in this case, the Prosecutor failed to prove that Kunarac exercised effective control over the

soldiers (which were under his command on a temporary ad hoc basis) at the time they committed the offences: Kunarac Judgement, para. 628.

396 iCRC Commentary to Additional Protocol I, Art. 86 para. 3544, p. 1013; Celebici Judgement, paras. 377, 378, 736.

397 Akeksovski Judgement, para. 106; Blaskic Judgement, para. 303.

398 ICRC Commentary to Protocol I, p. 101 3 (emphasis added).

399 Celebici Judgement, paras. 353, 364-371, particular para. 354; Aleksovski Judgement, paras. 76, 101, 103; see also Kayishema and Ruzindana Judgement, paras. 218-

222,230,478,490-507.

400 Aleksovski Judgement, para. 76.

162


legal authority to control the actions of subordinates should therefore not be understood to preclude the imposition of such re~~onsibility.'"~' N

is position was endorsed by the Appeals Chamber in the same case: In this regard peals found "Under Article 7(3), a commander or superior is thus the one who possesses the power or authority in either a de jure or a de facto form to prevent a subordinate's crime or to punish the perpetrators of the crime after the crime is

1. It is further submiited that the juridprudence of the ICTR support the motion that the absence of de jure authority does not prevent a finding by the Trial Chamber of de facto authority.403 The

secutor submits that in relation to Article 6(3), it is necessary to assess the nature and extent of the authority, whether de facto or de jure, and the effective control exercised by the accused in the ontext of the events alleged in the indictment.404 In the recent Kordic & Cerkez Judgement the Trial hamber referred to the Celebici case in which the Appeals Chamber held that;

"the degree of de facto authority or powers of control required under the doctrine of superior responsibility is equivalent to that required based upon de jure authority: Although the degree of control wielded by a de jure or de facto superior may take different forms, a de facto superior must be found to wield substantially similar powers of control over subordinates to be held criminally responsible for their acts. '"05

ry and/or civilian leaders

782. The accused charged under Article 6(3) of the Statute may be either a civilian or a military superior.406 The jurisprudence of the tribunals have established that the applicability of the principle of superior responsibility in Article 6(3) extends not only to military commanders but also to individuals in non-military positions of superior authority.407 All that is required is that "the

erior have effective control over the persons committing the underlying violations of international humanitarian law, in the sense of having the material ability to prevent and punish the commission of those offences."408

3. It is hrther submitted that The Statute of the Tribunal rather than limiting reference to the superior responsibility to be incurred, to military commanders alone, uses the more generic term of "superior". In this regard, it is submitted that the intention of the drafters was to extend this

sion of superior responsibility beyond military commanders, to also "encompass political rs and other civilian superiors in positions of authority".409 The crucial question in the

jurisprudence of both the ICTR and ICTY~" was not the civilian status of the accused, but of the degree of authority, he exercised over his subordinates. 411 Therefore, a civilian in a position of uthority may be liable under the doctrine of command responsibility.412

404 Celebici Judgement, para. 354.

402 Celebici Appeal Judgement, para. 192. See also, Kunarac Judgement, para. 396; Kordic & Cerkez Judgement, paras. 405-406.

403 Kayishema and Ruzindana Judgement, paras. 218-222.

404 Musema Judgement, paras. 866-867.

405 Kordic & Cerkez Judgement, para. 416.

406 Aleksovski Appeal Judgement, para. 76., ICRC, Commentary to article 86 of Additional Protocol I , p. 1010, footnote 16 (citation omitted)



409 Kayishema &Ruzindana para 214

410 Kambanda, Serushago, Celebici

41 1 Kayishema and Ruzindana Judgement para. 216. Musema Judgement, para. 132

412 Kayishema and Ruzindana judgement para216.


It is further submitted that the "sanctioning power," i.e. ", the power to prevent or punish" of the civilian superior must necessarily be lower or viewed more liberally than a military superior in the same position.413

Provisions not limited to "war crimes" committed in international armed conflc

. The Prosecutor submits that the doctrine of superior responsibility is applicable to all serious violations of International Humanitarian Law punishable under the Statute. The Prosecutor further submits that doctrine of superior responsibility is applicable regardless of the character of the armed conflict414 (International or non-international). The Prosecutor submits that the principle of individual criminal responsibility of superiors for failure to revent or repress the crimes committed P by subordinates forms part of customary international law."4

Concurrent application of Article 6(1) and 6(3)

rosecutor submits that based on the jurisprudence of the ICTY an accused can be charged in relation to the same conduct both under Articles 6(1) and 6(3).416 An accused can also be convicted in relation to the same conduct both under Articles 6(1) and 6(3).417 Further, where the accused was either the de jure or de facto superior and atrocities were committed pursuant to his orders, then this must suffice to establish command responsibility. In such a case, the Trial Chamber need only consider whether he knew or had reason to know and failed to prevent or punish the commission of the crimes if he did not in fact order them.418

e accused knew or had reason to know that the perpetrator was about to commit the offence or done so (knowledge requirement)

mens rea requirement for superior responsibility under Article 6(3) is that the accused either ew" or "had reason to know" that a subordinate was about to commit a crime or had done so.

he term "knew" implies actual knowledge. Actual knowledge can be established through direct or umstantial evidence. In this regard, it is incumbent upon the Trial Chamber to apply the law on mental element of Article 6(3) to the facts of this case by examining the first and second otheses, namely whether or not Jean de Dieu KAMUHANDA had "actual" or "constructive"

owledge of fact that the perpetrators had or were about to commit the offence(s). Or that Jean de Dieu KAMUHANDA had reason to know, in that he possessed information which put him on notice of the risk of such offences being committed, or that they were about to be committed.

owledge

ledge may not be presumed. However, actual knowledge can be established either through: (1) evidence of actual knowledge; or (2) circumstantial evidence from which it can be inferred e commander must have had actual knowledge.419

413 Aleksovski Judgement, para 78.

414 See in particular, the convictions of Kambanda, Kayishema, Sherushago and Musema.

41 5 Celebici Judgement, para. 343. Blaskic Judgement, para. 290

416 Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Decision on the Defence Motion to Dismiss the Indictment Based upon Defects in the Form Thereof (VaguenesslLack of Adequate Notice of

Charges), Case No. IT-95-14-PT, 4 Apr. 1997, para. 32.

417 Celebici Judgement, paras. 1221-1223. See also, in the same case, Prosecutor v. Delalic, et at., Decision on Motion by the Accused Hazim Delic Based on Defects in

the Form of the Indictment, Case No. IT-96-21-T, 15 Nov. 1996, paras. 16-18.


41 9 Aleksovski Judgement, para. 80; Blaskic Judgement para. 308; These Judgements indicate that the position of authority of the superior over the subordinate may in

some circumstances of itself be an indicator that the superior must have known of the subordinate's conduct; Kayishema and Ruzindana Judgement, para. 225.

164


e F inal R eport o f t he C ommission o f E o utlined s everal r elevant factors that c ould b e used in determining the extent to which actual knowledge can be inferred from circumstantial evidence. These include but are not limited to:

- The number of illegal acts - The type of illegal acts - The scope of illegal acts - The time during which the illegal acts occurred - The number and type of troops involved - The logistics involved, if any - The geographical location of the acts - The widespread occurrence of the acts - The tactical tempo of operations - The modus operandi of similar illegal acts - The officers and staff involved; and - The location of the commander at the time.421

he ICTY judgements in the Blaskic and Aleksovski cases further indicate that the nature and scope of the particular position held by the superior is a significant indicator of the superior's actual knowledge of crimes that may have been committed by his or her subordinates.422

1. The Commentary to the Additional Protocols also list as additional factors tending to indicate that an accused had the requisite knowledge to entail superior responsibility: (a) character traits of

) events taking place during any temporary absences and (c) the lack of instruction of

Trial Chamber in the Kordic and Cerkez case found that depending on the position of authority by a superior, whether military or civilian, de jure or de facto, and his level of responsibility in

chain of command. The evidence required to demonstrate actual knowledge may be different. r instance, the actual knowledge of a military commander may be easier to prove considering the

fact that he will presumably be part of an organised structure with established reporting and onitoring systems. In the case of de facto commanders of more informal military structures, or of

ivilian leaders holding de facto positions of authority, the standard of proof will be higher!24

reason to know

The Prosecution notes that the question of the exact meaning of the concept "had reason to know" as been the subject of some controversy, particularly in the framework of Article 7(3) of the ICTY tatute. The controversy centred around the question of whether the concept encompassed a notion

of "duty to know", leading to liability where a superior could be found liable in cases where the erior failed to obtain the necessary information. This question has been resolved by the

Judgement rendered by the ICTY Appeals Chamber in the case of Prosecutor v. Delalic, et al!25 It is submitted that this jurisprudence should be followed in interpreting the proper meaning of the identically worded provision, set forth in Article 6(3) of the ICTR

420 See para. 58 of that UN Final Commission of Experts Report.

421 Celebici Judgement para. 386; Blaskic Judgement, para. 307; Kordic and Cerkez Judgement, para. 427.

422 Blaskic Judgement, para. 308.,Aleksovski Judgement, para. 80.

423 ICRC Commentary to Protocol I, Art. 86, para. 3545.

424 Kordic and Cerkez Judgement, para. 428.

425 Case No. IT-96-21-A, Judgement of 20 Feb. 2001, paras. 216- 240 (hereinafter Celebici Appeal Judgement).

426 The Appeals Chamber of this Tribunal has endorsed the jurisprudence of the Celebici Appeal Judgement in relation to Article 7(3) of the ICTY Statute and confirmed that

it contains pertinent principles for the interpretation of the elements of Article 6(3) of the Statute: Le Procureur c. Clement Kayishema et Obed Ruzindana, ICTR-95-I-A,

Jugement oral du ler juin 2001, Motifs de /'an&, 19 juillet 2001, para. 294.

Prosecutor V . UMUHANDA, ICTR-99-54A-T

e Celebici standard of "inqui y notice"

lebici jurisprudence articulates in unambiguous terms conditions under whicli it cah be shown at subordinates put a superior on notice of the likelihood of crimes, thereby triggering his

ffirmative duty to inquire further. The Celebici Appeals judgement endorses and clarifies the tation given by the Celebici Trial Chamber of the "had reason to know" concept set forth in

e 7(3) of the ICTY

. A construction of the relevant provision in light of the content of the doctrine under customary law in Celebici to the conclusion that a superior may possess the mens rea required to incur criminal ility. This is not the case only where he had actual knowledge, established through direct o r umstantial evidence, that his subordinates were committing or about to commit crimes referred to er the Statute, but also where;

... he had in his possession information of a nature, which at the least, would put him on notice of the risk of such offences by indicating the need for additional investigation in order to ascertain whether such crimes were committed or were about to be committed by his subordinates .428

he Celebici Trial Judgement further held that:

An interpretation of the terms of this provision in accordance with their ordinary meaning thus leads to the conclusion, conjimed by the travaux prbparatoires, that a superior can be held c riminally r esponsible o nly i f s ome specific i nformation w as i n f act a vailable t o h im which would provide notice of offences committed by his subordinates. "'

n addition, the Celebici Trial Chamber pointed out that:

This information need not be such that it by itself was sufficient to compel the conclusion of the existence of such crimes. It is sufficient that the superior was put on further inquiry by the information, or, in other words, that it indicated the need for additional investigation in order to ascertain whether offences were being committed or about to be committed by his subordinates. This standard, which must be considered to reflect the position of customary law at the time of the offences alleged in the indictment, is accordingly controlling for the construction of the mens rea standard established in Article 7(3).430

peal, the construction given by the Celebici Trial Chamber was expressly endorsed and further ed. The ICTY Appeals Chamber's construction of the "had reason to know" standard in

customary law was based on its analysis of relevant case law, the text of Articles 86 and 87 of Additional Protocol I, the ICRC Commentaries thereto, as well as the commentary to the ILC's draft

ode of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind. 431 The ICTY Appeals Chamber's ysis is incorporated herein by reference. The ICTY Appeals Chamber expressly approved of the 1 Chamber's conclusion that "had reason to know" stood for the hypothesis in which a superior information which put the superior on notice or which suggested to the superior that rdinates were about to commit or had committed crimes.432

427 Case No. IT-969-21- T, Judgement of 16 November 1998, paras. 383-393 (hereinafter: Celebici Trial Judgement). It should be noted that the ICTY Appeals Chamber

decided that the concept of "had reason to know" does not encompass a "duty to know". The Prosecution fully accepts this decision.

428 Ceiebici Trial Judgement, para. 383.

429 [bid., para. 393.

430 Ibid., para. 393.

431 Ibid., paras. 228-239, para. 241.

432 Celebici Appeal Judgement, paras. 224, 226, 228-239. At the same time the Celebici Appeal Judgement rejected the Prosecution's contention that the concept of "had

166

Prosecutor v. KAMUHA-IVDA , ICTR-99-5 4A-T

799. In clarifying the scope of this hypothesis, the Appeals Chamber held that;

Article 7(3) of the Statute is concerned with superior liability arising re to act in spite of knowledge (...) The point here should not be that knowledge may be presumed if a person fails in his duty to obtain the relevant information of a crime, but that it may be presumed if he had the means to obtain the knowledge but deliberately refrained f r o doing SO. 433

In reviewing the decisions of the Trial Chamber, the Celebici Appeal Chamber confirmed that the ticipated elucidation and consolidation of the law on the question of the meaning of "had reason to

know" came with Additional Protocol I . ~ ~ ~ The Appeals Chamber confirmed that the rationale of the e m s "had information enabling them to conclude" was plain:

(. . .) failure to conclude, or conduct additional inquiry, in spite of alarming information constitutes knowledge of subordinate offences. Failure to act when re uired to act with such knowledge is the basis for attributing liability in this category of case? (Italics added)

801. The Appeals Chamber further confirmed that the phrase "had information", as used in Article 86(2) f Additional Protocol I, presents little difficulty for interpretation. To be specific, it means that:

(. . .) at the critical time, the commander had in his possession such information that should have put him on notice of the fact that an unlawful act was being, or about to be, committed by a subordinate (. . .) This is a reference to information, which, if at hand, would oblige the commander to obtain more information (i.e. conduct further inquiry), and he therefore "had reason to

802. Like the Trial Chamber, the Appeals Chamber placed further reliance on the commentary to the e on Crime against the Peace and Security of Mankind, which was adopted by the International

Law Commission in 1996. The Appeals Chamber observed that the formulation of the principle of erior responsibility in the ILC Draft Code is very similar to that in Article 7(3) of the ICTY ute. Further, as the ILC comments drew from existing practice, they deserved close attention in

peals Chamber's

e Prosecution deems it important to draw attention to a number of further clarifications of the "had reason to know" standard by the Celebici Appeal Judgement. First, as to the form of the information available to a superior, the Appeals Chamber held that this;

(. . .) may be written or oral, and does not need to have the form of speciJc reports submitted pursuant to a monitoring system.438

econd, as to the nature and the content of the information, the Appeals Chamber held that this information does not need to point to specific crimes. A superior may be regarded as having "reason to know" if he or she is in possession of suflcient information to be on notice of the likelihood of

reason lo knoww also covered the hypothesis in which a superior lacked such information as a result of a serious dereliction of his duty to obtain the information within his

reasonable access.

433 Gelebici Appeal Judgement, para. 226.

434 ld., para. 231.

435 Id., para. 232.

436 Id., para. 232

437 Id., para. 232 with reference to the ILC Report. pp 34 ff.

438 Id., para. 238.


subordinate illegal acts, i.e., if the information available is sufficient to justify m h e r inquiry. This interpretation is confirmed by . - the Judgement rendered in Kordic and Cerkez, shortly after the

lebici Appeal Judgement. 4.39

dly, as regards the factors or indicia that could be held to constitute suffici tting a superior on notice, the Appeals Chamber held as follows: The IC

ditional Protocol I) refers to "reports addressed to (the superior), (...) the tactical situation, the eve1 of training and instruction of subordinate officers and their troops, and their character traits" as otentially constituting the information referred to in Article 86(2) of Additional Protocol I. (. . .)

s information does not need to provide specific information about unlawful acts committed or ut to be committed. For instance, a military commander who has received information that some

the soldiers under his command have a violent or unstable character, or have been drinking prior being sent on a mission, may be considered as having the required knowledge.440

. h this regard the Prosecution agrees with the Trial Judgement rendered in the Kordic and Cerkez 44 1 case, that the indicia listed in the United Nations Commission of Experts Report - which are

usually cited as factors to prove actual or circumstantial knowledge - can also be used in this context to determine whether knowledge of the underlying offences alleged could be imputed to an accused.442

ourthly, the Appeals Chamber stressed that there is no requirement that the superior be in actual possession of information of subordinate offences. It would be sufficient to prove that the superior

as provided with relevant information, or that this information was made available: (. ..) the levant information only needs to have been provided or available to the superior, or in the Trial amber S words, "in the possession o f '. It is not required that he actually acquainted himself with information. In the Appeals Chamber's view, an assessment of the mental element required by icle 7(3) of the Statute should be conducted in the specific circumstances of each case, taking into

account the specific situation of the superior concerned at the time in question.443

It follows from the Celebici standard of inquiry notice that what needs to be shown is that there was alarming information available to the superior. There is no requirement that the superior took the information seriously or that believed the information to be of an alarming nature. If the information is of an alarming nature then the duty to inquirehvestigate is triggered.

rosecution further submits that the Celebici jurisprudence on the meaning of "had reason to ' shows that (actual or potential) unlawful conduct by a subordinate can trigger duties of the

superior at different times and at several levels. A superior's duty to inquire further - once sufficient information is available putting the superior on notice - must be legally distinguished from a superior's more general duties to prevent or punish. A superior's duty to inquire is chronologically effective even before the obligation to prevent or punish is triggered. The duty to inquire serves as a

ing point for the establishment of the mens rea relating to the failure of the subsequent duties to revent or punish. This can be inferred from the Celebici Appeal ~ u d ~ e m e n t . ~ ~ ~

439 KordQ and Cerkez Judgement, para. 437.

440 Gelebici i Appeal Judgement, para. 238.

44 6 Kordo and Cerkez Judgement, para. 437.

442 These indicia are: the number and type of troops involved; the logistics involved, if any; the geographical location of the acts; their widespread occurrence; the tactical

tempo of operations; the modus operandi of similar illegal acts; the officers and staff involved and the location of the commander at that time: Commission of Experts

Report, para. 58.

443 Celebicii Appeal Judgement, para. 239.

444 See Ibid., para. 226: " The point here should not be that knowledge may be presumed if a person fails in his duty to obtain the relevant information of a crime, but that it

may be presumed if he had the means to obtain the knowledge but deliberately refrained from doing so. The Prosecution's argument that a breach of the duty of a

superior to remain constantly informed of his subordinates actions will necessarily result in criminal liability comes close to the imposition of criminal liability on a strict or

negligence basis. It is however noted that although a commander's failure to remain apprised of his subordinates'action, or to set up a monitoring system may constitute


er words, if the superior fails to remain apprised of his subordinates' unlawful conduct and the or had the means to obtain the knowledge, but deliberately refrained from investigating further, be presumed that he had the required mental element during his failure to prevent, report, or

unish.

other important point that flows from the Celebici Trial Judgement is the tuestion of the relevance of the element of causation. The Celebici Trial Judgement expressly rejected the claim of a need to prove a causal link between the subordinate offences and the inaction of the superior.445

onsequently, under customary law, the Prosecution does not need to show that the offences would not have occurred if the superior had not failed in the duty to prevent or punish. In other words, a showing that the offences would have been committed regardless of the superior's intervention does

t absolve the latter of liability under Article 6(3) of the Statute for the subordinate offences.

e accused failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the offence or to the perpetrator

requirement overlaps with the requirement of "effective control". The doctrine of command nsibility is ultimately predicated upon the power of the superior to control the acts of his

in ate^.^^^ As a rule, a superior can only be required to take preventive measures, which are his or her power. Article 6(3) provides the legal criteria for command responsibility, thus

iving the word "commander" a juridical meaning, in that the provision becomes applicable only a superior with the required mens rea, failed to exercise his powers to prevent subordinates

om c ommitting o ffences o r t o p unish them a fterwards. T his n ecessarily i mplies that a superior must have such powers prior to his failure to exercise them:47

"necessav and reasonable measures to prevent or punish"

erning the meaning of necessary and reasonable measures to prevent or punish, (....) The urisprudence of the ICTR and ICTY is indicative of the fact that factors such as a commander's

gree of effective control, his material ability, will guide the Trial Chamber in determining whether e reasonably took the measures required either to prevent the crime or to punish the

ator.. . this implied that, under some circumstances, a commander may discharge his obligation nt or punish by reporting the matter to the competent authorities."*

None of the ICTY and ICTR Judgements lay down general standards for the necessary and reasonable measures fact0r.4~~ The Trial Chamber in the Celebici case held;

that the legal duty which rests upon all individuals in positions of superior authority requires them to take all necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the commission of offences by their subordinates or, if such crimes have been committed, to punish the perpetrators thereof: It is the view of the Trial Chamber that any evaluation of the action taken by a superior to determine whether this duty has been met is so inextricably linked to the facts of each particular situation that any attempt to formulate a general standard in abstract0 would not be meaningful.450

a neglect of duty which results in liability within the military disciplinary framework, it will not necessarily result in criminal liability."

445 Gelebici Trial Judgement, paras 396-400.

446 Celebici Judgement, para. 376; Kayishema and Ruzindana Judgement, para. 217.

447 Aleksovksi Appeal Judgement, para. 76. Blaskic Trial Chamber Judgement, para. 335.

448 Aleksovksi Judgement, para. 78; Blaskic Judgment, para. 302; Celebici Judgement, para. 302.

Aleksovski Judgement, para. 81 ; Celebici Judgement, para. 394; Kayishema and Ruzindana Judgement, para. 231.


e Celebici Trial Chamber further found that;

It must, however, be recognized that international law cannot oblige a s the impossible. Hence, a superior may only be held criminally responsible for failing to take such measures that are within his powers. The question then arises of what actions are to be considered to be within the superior's powers in this sense. As the corollary to the standard adopted by the Trial Chamber with respect to the concept of superior, we conclude that a superior should be held responsible for failing to take such measures that are within his material possibility. The Trial Chamber accordingly does not adopt the position taken by the ILC on this point, and finds that the lack of formal legal competence to take the necessary measures to prevent or repress the crime in question does not necessarily preclude the criminal responsibility of the superior.451

eed the ICRC c ommentary t o the additional Protocol o utlines s everal m easures, which c an b e by a commander to "prevent" the commission of crimes by subordinates. These include

ensuring that members of the armed forces ... are aware of their obligations under "international 9,452, urnanitarian law , remaining constantly informed of the way in which their subordinates carry

out t he t asks e ntrusted t o t hem, and t o t ake t he necessary m easures for this p ~ r ~ o s e ; ~ ~ ~ i m osing iscipline to a sufficient degree to enforce compliance with international humanitarian law?' and 'at any level, informing superior officers of what is taking place ..., drawing up a report in the case of

reach, or intervening with a view to preventing a breach from being committed, proposing a on to a superior who has disciplinary power, or - in the case of someone who holds such power

imself - exercising it, within the limits of his competence, and finally, remitting the case to the a1 authority where necessary with such factual evidence as it was possible to find.455

is submitted that "necessary" measures can be described as those required to discharge the ligation to prevent or punish, in the circumstances prevailing at the time, whilst "reasonable" easures are those, which the commander was in a position to take in the circumstances prevailing at

er the Trial Chamber in the Blaskic case held that the obligation to "prevent or punish " does ovide the accused with two alternative and equally satisfying options: "Obviously, where the

cused knew or had reason to know that subordinates were about to commit crimes and failed to revent them, he cannot make up for the failure to act by punishing the subordinates

submitted that the duty to "punish" after an offence has been committed consists of a threefold ion (1) to establish the facts, (2) to put an end to violations, and (3) to repress. The ibility o f t he c ommander does not end w ith the transfer o f t he perpetrator t o a c ompetent

ial organ, but continues until all three of these obligations have been properly discharged. ever, the commander is only required to take such measures, as are "necessary and reasonable".


452 Additional Protocol I, Art. 87

453 ICRC Commentary to Additional Protocol I (ICRC), Art. 87, p. 1022

454 ICRC Commentary to Additional Protocol I (ICRC), Art. 87, p. 1018

455 ICRC Commentary to Additional Protocol I (ICRC), para 3562

456 Celebici Judgement, Para. 395, p. 147; Kayishema and Ruzindana Judgement, para. 511; In re Yamashita, 327 US. 1, 15 (1945) (referring to the "duty to take such

appropriate measures as a re within his power to control the troops under his command"); Medical Trial, The Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military

Tribunals, Volume 11, p. 212 ("the law of war imposes on a military officer in a position of command an affirmative duty to take such steps as are within his power"); W.H.,

Parks, op.. cit., p. 84 ("a commander "will be expected to take such measures as are within his physical power under the circumstances to prevent or stop war crimes ... [Llack of administrative control ... does not foreclose or preclude use of other measures").

457 Blaskic Judgement, para. 336.


820. The Trial Chamber in the Kordic and Cerkez case found that the duty to pre understood as resting on a superior at any stage before the commission of a subordinate crime if he acquires knowledge that such a crime is being prepared or planned, or when he has reasonable grounds to suspect subordinate crimes.458 Similarly, the Trial Chamber also found that the duty to unish naturally arises after a crime has been committed. Persons who assume command after the

commission are under the same duty to punish. This duty includes at least an obligation to investigate the crimes to establish the facts and to report them to the competent authorities, if the superior does not have the power to sanction himself. Civilian superiors would be under similar obligations, depending upon the effective powers exercised and whether they include an ability to require the competent authorities to take action.459

e individual responsibility of the accused for the crimes charged

ach of the offences outlined in the indictment, the accused is alleged to be individually r the crimes pursuant to Article 6(1) of the Statute. In addition, Jean de Dieu A is alleged to be individually responsible for the criminal acts of his subordinates at Gishaka in April 1994 pursuant to Article 6(3) of the Statute.

Characterization of the 6(I) and 6(3) responsibility of Jean de Dieu XAMUHANDA

Jean de Dieu KAMUHANDA is individually responsible pursuant to Article 6(1) of the Statute for e acts outlined in ALL the counts in the indictment, by having either planned, instigated, ordered,

committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, preparation and execution of the said crimes as outlined in the counts set out in his Indictment. In this regard, the Trial Chamber has the authority to choose the appropriate legal characterization of the alleged conduct of the accused under Article 6(1) even if such action differs from the particular theory advanced by the Prosecutor in support of her case.

e Dieu KAMUHANDA is individually responsible pursuant to Article 6(3) of the Statute for the acts outlined in ALL the counts in the indictment, by virtue of the fact that those who were in the position of subordinates and over whom he had de facto and/or de jure authority over either planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, preparation and

the said crimes as outlined in the counts set out in his Indictment. In this regard, the er has the authority to choose the appropriate legal characterization of the alleged e accused under Article 6(3) even if such action differs from the particular theory e Prosecutor in support of her case.

ocide and Complicity in Genocide - Art. 2(3)(a) and (e)

ieu KAMUHANDA 's 6(1) and 6(3) responsibility for genocide / complicity in genocide - unts 2 and 3

s acts of encouraging people to gather at the Gikomero parish church, school, and the ishaka parish church Jean de Dieu KAMUHANDA directly and substantially contributed to the

civilians in the Gikomero commune. He thereby incurs liability for having aided in n of genocide and complicity in genocide. It is further submitted that Jean de Dieu A knew that by conveying attackers to the Gikomero parish church, school, and the

church in his vehicle such conduct would materially assist the said attackers in the si refbgees at these locations.

458 Kordic and Cerkez Judgement, para. 445.

459 [bid., para.446.

171

Prosecutor v. IYIAMUHANDA, ICTR-99-54A-T

rosecution's case that Jean de Dieu KAMUHANDA's presence at Gikomero rior to the commencement of the attack on Tutsi refugees in April 1994, had a significant

itmizing and encouraging effect on the perpetrators thereof in the commission of the said crimes. ddition, that Jean de Dieu KAMUHANDA was aware that his presence as top civil servant was

have that effect. As such, Jean de Dieu KAMUHANDA incurs criminal responsibility for in the execution of the crimes outlined in the indictment.

e Prosecution's case that in light of the factual allegations outlined against Jean de Dieu UHANDA, the killings that took place at the Gikomero commune during 12th and 13th April , were committed with the intent to destroy the Tutsi group in whole or in part. It is the

rosecution's case that Jean de Dieu KAMUHANDA caused the death of Tutsi at the Gikomero une. It is the Prosecution's case that Jean de Dieu KAMUHANDA caused these deaths by itated acts and intended to commit the said acts.

Prosecution's case that Jean de Dieu KAMUHANDA is responsible pursuant to Article 6(1) of the Statute for aiding and abetting in the killing and injuring of Tutsis during the attacks that took

lace at the Gikomero commune on 12th and 13th April 1994. It is the Prosecution's case that Jean e Dieu KAMUHANDA committed one or more of the following acts:

Transported attackers to the massacre sites in his vehicle; . It is the Prosecutions case that these facts prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Jean de Dieu

ANDA, aided and abetted in the preparation and execution of the massacre at the ikomero commune which resulted in the deaths of many with the intent to destroy the Tutsi

ethnic group.

es Against Humanity - Counts 4,5, 6, and 7

rosecution submits that there exists in this case, all the necessary elements to prove that Crimes ainst Humanity were committed by Jean de Dieu KAMUHANDA at the Gikomero commune. In

this regard, it is the Prosecution's case that the offences outlined in his Indictment were committed within the context of widespread and systematic attacks on Tutsi in Rwanda generally and in

articular within Kigali rural Prefecture during the periods alleged in the Indictment. It is the rosecution's case that the said attacks on Tutsi civilians where carried out in a systematic manner as art of a pre-arranged broader policy or plan instigated and directed by the CentralIInterim

Government. Jean de Dieu KAMUE-]:ANDA later joined and became a minister in that government.

the Prosecution's case that Jean de Dieu KAMUHANDA had knowledge that his conduct ed part of that attack. The Prosecution's case is that the evidence in this case indicates that the

acks in Rwanda and in particular in Gikomero commune were directed and aimed at the civilian pulation. The evidence also show that most victims were Tutsi civilians and consisted of ordinary

ant fanners, and those seeking refugee from attacks, including the elderly, women and children. attacks against Gikomero Tutsis were carried out based on their ethnicity.

Dieu hL4MUHANDA9s 6(1) and 6(3) responsibility for Murder - Art3 (a)

s the P rosecution's c ase that Je an d e D ieu K AMUHANDA's p resence a t G ikomero commune immediately before the massacres started and his ferrying of attackers to the protestant and catholic arish churches on 12th and 13th April 1994, had a significant legitimizing and encouraging effect n the perpetrators thereof in the commission of the said crimes. That Jean de Dieu KAMUHANDA

was aware that his presence as a top civil servant was likely to have that effect. As such, Jean de


Dieu UHANDA incurs criminal responsibility for aiding and abetting in the execution of the es outlined in his Indictment.

. It is the Prosecution's case that Dr. Jean de Dieu KAMUHANDA participated ral Tutsi individuals including the Tutsi pastor Bucundura, and thus committed the offence of

urder charged in his Indictment. He led the party of attackers who killed Edouard Gashikezi. It is the Prosecution's case that these murders were committed in the course of a wide spread and systematic attack on the Tutsi based on ethnic grounds. It is the Prosecution's case that Jean de Dieu

UHANDA intended to kill the said victims and was aware that death would occur because of is actions. As such, Jean de Dieu KAMUHANDA incurs criminal responsibility for committing

and ordering the crimes outlined in his indictment.

an de Dieu KAMUHANDA 's 6(1) and 6(3) responsibility for Extermination - Art.3 (b)

. In addition to his acts of encouraging people to gather at the Gikomero commune prior to 12th and 13th April 1994, it is the Prosecution's case that by conveying attackers to the Gikomero protestant and catholic parish churches on 12th and 13th April 1994 Jean de Dieu KAMUHANDA directly and

tantially contributed to the killing of Tutsi civilians gathered at these churches. He thus incurs ility for having aided and abetted in the commission of the offences outlined in his indictment. It

is further submitted that Jean de Dieu KAMUHANDA knew that by conveying attackers to these locations in his vehicle such conduct would materially assist the said attackers in the killing of Tutsi

the locations on 12th and 1 3th April 1994.

. In light of the factual allegations outlined against Jean de Dieu KAMUHANDA, the killings that at the Gikomero commune on 12th and 13th April 1994 were committed in the context of ad and systematic attack on Tutsi civilians. It is the Prosecution's case that Jean de Dieu

UHANDA caused the death of the Tutsi at the Gikomero commune by premeditated acts and nded to commit the said acts.

. It i s P rosecution's case that Je an d e D ieu K AMUHANDA's p resence a t the G ikomero c ornmune uring the killing of Tutsi rehgees on 12th and 13th April 1994, had a significant legitimizing and

encouraging effect on the perpetrators thereof in the commission of the said crimes. That Jean de Dieu KAMUHANDA was aware that his presence as a top civil servant was likely to have that ffect. As such, Jean de Dieu KAMUHANDA incurs criminal responsibility for abetting in the xecution of the crimes outlined in the indictment. The killing of Gikomero Tutsi refugees on 12th

d 13th April 1994 was done in the context of a widespread and systematic attack on Tutsi civilians.

n de Dieu KAMUHANDA 's 6(1) and 6(3) responsibili@ for Rape - h t . 3 (g)

is the Prosecution's case that Jean de Dieu KAMUHANDA participated in the killing of several Tutsi and during the killings at the Gikomero protestant parish church and school he participated in the attacks against Tutsis in Gikomero commune while the female at the Gikomero protestant parish church were removed and rapes inflicted upon them. It is the Prosecution's case that these rapes were committed in the course of a wide spread and systematic attack on Tutsi based on ethnic

ounds. It is the Prosecution's case that Jean de Dieu KAMUHANDA intended that the said victims should be raped and was aware that rapes could and would occur because of his actions. As such, Jean de Dieu KAMUHANDA incurs criminal responsibility for committing and ordering the

es outlined in his indictment.

an de Dieu KAMUHANDA 's 6(I) and 6(3) responsibility for other inhumane acts -Art. 3(i)


Various Gikomero Hutus, police, gendarmes, and local authorities participated in the attacks and illings of Tutsi civilians on 12th and 13th April 1994 at Gikomero commune.

It is the Prosecution's case that Jean de Dieu K A m A N D A despite having no formal appointment at the commune level in April 1994, manifested all the powers and functions of a formal appointment

y virtue of his influence and position as a top civil servant in the Ministry of Education. It is the rosecution's case therefore, that Jean de Dieu KAMuE.I[AmA had defacto and de jure authority ver the killers during the period 9-30 April 1994. It was within Jean de Dieu KAMUHANDA's wer to prevent these subordinate employees and the various Gikomero Hutus, police, gendarmes, d local authorities who participated in the attacks and killings of Tutsi civilians on 12th and 13th

April 1994 at Gikomero commune. That the subordinates outlined above, committed acts of enocide, extermination and murder of Tutsi civilians on 12th and 13th April 1994. That during the

od 9-30 April 1994 Jean de Dieu KAMUHANDA had effective control over the named rdinates during the commission of the said offences. That Jean de Dieu KAMUHANDA had

actual knowledge that his subordinates were committing or had committed the crimes in his Indictment.

e wholly unlikely alternative, it is the Prosecution's case, that the absence of knowledge on the of Jean de Dieu K A m A N D A of the commission of the said crimes on 12th and 13th April

1994, is the result of negligence in the discharge of his duties as an indigene of Gikomero commune who is a top civil servant, by virtue of having failed to exercise the means available to him to learn of the offence and under circumstances that he should have known of their commission.

It is the Prosecution's case that Jean de Dieu KAMUHANDA as an indigene of Gikomero commune who is a top civil servant, possessed the requisite authority to prevent the commission of the said

ffence from occurring at the Gikomero commune and could have taken necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the commission of and/or punish the perpetrators of the said crimes.

is the Prosecution's case that Jean de Dieu KAMUHANDA is responsible for Crimes Against umanity murder, extermination, and other inhumane acts pursuant to Article 6(3) of the Statute, as superior for the acts of his subordinates that took place at the Gikomero commune on 12th and 13th ril 1994. The assailants in Gikomero included in the main the Interahamwe. It is the secution's case that Jean de Dieu KAMUHANDA had de jure and defacto control over all these

subordinates. It is the Prosecution's case that Jean de Dieu KAMUHANDA knew that an attack was nent by virtue of his presence before and during the massacre and as such knew that his

subordinates were about to attack the Gikomero refugees and failed to take reasonable and necessary measures to prevent them, despite his ability to do so.

. The evidence indicates that Jean de Dieu KAMUHANDA and the Interahamwe who in the main are Hutus, were responsible for the massacres of the Tutsis of Gikomero commune and all the inhumane treatment meted out to the dead and surviving refugees. Jean de Dieu KAMUHANDA being a top civil servant was well aware of the potential and likely consequences of his actions especially at a time when the evidence shows that several Tutsi refugees from other communes within and without Gikomero had arrived the at Gikomero protestant and catholic parish churches seeking shelter and refuge.

r Crimes - Counts 8 and 9 - Arts. 4(e) and (a)

(1) Responsibility against Jean de Dieu KAMUHANDA for Count 7 Outrages upon personal ignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment, rape and indecent assault, as part of an

armed internal conflict.

Prosecutor v. IGfMUHANDA, ICTR-99-54A-T

(1) Responsibility against Jean de Dieu KAMUHANDA for Count 8 for killing violence to health and to the physical or mental well being of civilians, as part of an armed internal

evidence shows that the accused person participated in the attacks against Tutsis in Gikomero mune. The female at the Gikomero protestant parish church were removed and rapes inflicted

on them. The other surviving refugees were also subjected to humiliating and degrading treatment. The Tutsi civilians in Gikomero were killed and violence was caused to their health and to their physical or mental well being of civilians, as part of an armed internal conflict.

UHANDA AS A GOVERNMENT MINISTER

addition to the allegations relating to Gikomero and Gishaka, the Prosecution submits that uhanda, as a Minister of the Interim Government as of 25 May 1994, had the following duties:

HORITY AND LEGAL DUTIES OF THE ACCUSED

e Prosecutor submits that from the accused's voluntary membership in the Interim Government arise two legal duties:

onstitutional and international law legal duty to protect the rights and security of all Rwandan le without distinction, and in this regard the legal duty to prevent and/or punish genocide and transgressions of international humanitarian law; resulting in liability under Article 6(1) and

v irtue o f h is p osition a s M inister, the accused w as a s uperior i n r elation t o the A rrny (FAR), embers of Presidential Guard, Gendermarie, prefets, bourgmestres, communal police, conseillers

secteur, administrative personnel, interahamwe, militias, armed Hutu civilians and other Hutu civilians, and the accused could order such persons to commit or refrain from committing unlawful acts and could discipline or punish them for unlawful acts or omissions. As a superior the accused

the legal duty to ensure that his subordinates did not commit crimes. In this regard, the accused the duty t o t ake n ecessary and r easonable steps t o p revent h is s ubordinates from c omitt ing es or to punish them for perpetrating crimes. Resulting in liability under Article 6(3).

rosecutor submits that the accused failed in both duties above, and must incur criminal

rosecutor submits that the legal bases for the above legal duties, which are interrelated, are established both under Rwanda's national law and international law, as follows:

1. Rwanda's Constitution of 10 June 1991 which governed the Interim Government of April to July 94, guarantees various rights to all Rwandan without distinction, and in this regard obligates as a atter of law those constituting government to protect those rights without discrimination.

reamble to the Constitution expresses faith in the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the African Charter on

an and People's Rights.

itle I1 of the same Constitution guarantees the right to human dignity, providing that the human eing shall be sacred, and that the human being shall be inviolable, pursuant to Article 12. Article 16

of the Constitution enshrines the right to equality of Rwanda's citizens, and no Rwandan shall be iscriminated according to race, color, origin, ethnic background, clan, sex, opinion, religion, or

social status.


les I1 and I11 of the Constitution invest in those constituting government various legal igations to ensure the protection of the above rights of all Rwandans without distinction. The

rosecutor submits that the powers invested in those constituting government as highlighted below, involve the protection of all Rwandans as a principle legal duty.

re assuming office, all Ministers take oath, undertaking to ensure the rights and security of all andans without discrimination, and to uphold the rule of law and the Constitution, pursuant to icle 56 of the Constitution. The accused took such oath, voluntarily becoming member of the

overnment, and undertaking to uphold the rule of law and the Constitution, including the protection of the rights and security of all Rwandans.

onstitution provides for voluntary membership in the Government, and allows any member issatisfied with the policies of the Government to express dissent, or resign therefrom. Thus, under

icle 65(4), a Minister may tender his or her resignation to the President at any time. The accused t resign from the government even when it was clear that it was involved in and/or condoned ling of Tutsis, thereby demonstrating his support of the massacres. The accused failed in his

duty to ensure the rights and security of the Rwandan people.

er the Article 35 of the Constitution of 10 June 1990, executive power is invested in and xercised by the President assisted by the Government composed of the Prime Minister and inisters. Under Article 50 of the same Constitution, the Government has the power to determine d conduct national policy. It also has at its disposal the administration and the armed forces. The inisters implement the Government policy and they are answerable to the Head of Government in

le 45 of the same constitution, the President is the Supreme Chief of the Armed Forces, ut this is all part of the exercise of executive powers/fbnctions that are invested in both the

and the Government composed of the Prime Minister and Ministers. Government s and applies national policy, and as a result, it controls the civil service and the armed

forces.

er, as part of the exercise of executive powers/functions which are invested in both the nt and the Government composed of the Prime Minister and Ministers, the President of the

lic appoints the Prefet on the recommendation of the Minister of the Interior. The Prefet nts executive power at the prefectural level, with the responsibility of ensuring peace and

lic order and safety of people and property in the entire prefecture. In the discharge of his nctions, he may request the intervention of the army and of the Gendermerie Nationale. The refet hierarchical authority over all civil servants and all persons holding public office within the undaries of the prefecture, including the bourgmestres and counseillers de secteur.

ermore, as part of the exercise of executive powers/functions which are invested in both the esident and the Government composed of the Prime Minister and Ministers, the President appoints

urgmestre on the recommendation of the Minister of the Interior, and represents the executive ower at the communal level. The Bourgmestre is under the hierarchical authority of the Prefet, and

authority over all civil servants posted in his commune. He also had policing duties in regard to ntaining order and law enforcement.

cused was a member of the executive branch of the govemment, and exercised control over various subordinates. As a result of the links and interactions between the President and the Government composed of the Prime Minister and Ministers inter se on the one hand, and between

central government and the local government (the prefectures, communes, etc), on the other as A,..-

secutor v. KAMUHANDA, ICTR-99-54A-T

set out above, by virtue of his position as members of the Government, the accused eiercised de jure de facto controUpowers over Army (FAR), members of Presidential Guard, Gendermarie,

prefets, bourgmestres, communal police, conseillers de secteur, administrative personnel, Interahamwe, militias, armed Hutu civilians and other Hutu civilians. The power/control exercised

e accused included a right to direct to do and not to do, and the right, power and duty to punish r prevent transgressions.

er, by virtue his position above, the accused also exercised power and control over Interahamwe armed civilians who executed many killings in Rwanda. The power/control exercised by the

accused over the Interahamwe and civilians included a right to direct to do and not to do, and the t, power and duty to punish and/or prevent transgressions.

he Prosecution requests that the Trial Chamber sentence Jean de Dieu KAMUHANDA to terms of ife imprisonment, pursuant to Article 23 of the Statute and Rule 101 of the Rules.

. Under Rule 10 1 (A), the maximum penalty that can be imposed is a term up to and including the remainder o f t he c onvicted p erson's 1 i fe. T he Trial C hamber h as t he discretion a s t o w hether t o

ose one global life sentence or concurrent life sentences or consecutive life ~entences.4~~

rosecutor submits that the most appropriate sentence in this case taking into account all elevant factors are consecutive life sentences for each count of the Indictment under which Jean de

eu KAMUHANDA is found guilty. This submission is based on the aggravating circumstances the gravity of the crimes committed; the Defence omitting to provide any mitigating evidence.

e Gravity of the Offences

gravityper se of the offences of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes with which e m de Dieu JSAMUHANDA is charged are self-evident. The charge of genocide "constitutes the

e of crimes, which must be taken into account when deciding the sentence.""'

7 . in personam gravity of the offences is also a relevant factor. No other sentence other than that secutive life terms can properly reflect an appropriate punishment for the heinous crimes that e Dieu KAMUHANDA was integral in committing. He was central in the commission of the

urders o f m any T utsis i n G ikomero c ommune through h is d irect p articipation, p rocurement and istribution of weapons, incitement, planning and ordering of the attacks.

ravating circumstances

fact that was for many years a top civil servant and rose to the highest position of Minister in ge of the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research prior to and during the events

in the Indictment is a strong aggravating factor that must be considered by this Trial r in its deliberations.

top civil servant ad1 latterly as a Minister, Jean de Dieu KAMUINTANDA held very high public ffice and was a prominent figure within Rwandan society generally and the Gikomero community

460 The Appeals Chamber interprets Rule 101 as granting discretion to impose concurrent, consecutive sentences or a single, global sentence with respect to the counts for

which an accused has been found guilty. Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Judgement, Case No, ICTR 97-23-A, 19 Oct. 2000, paras 101-103; Celebici, Appeals Judgement, IT-

96-214, 20 Feb. 2001, para. 429. Accordingly, ''the overarching goal in sentencing must be to ensure that the final or aggregate sentence reflects the totality of the

criminal conduct and overall culpability of the offender." Celebici Appeals Judgement, para. 430.

46 4 Kambanda Judgement, paras. 9,16.

Pmsecutor v. KAMUHANDA, ICTR-99-54A-T

particularly. He was popular462 and renowned in Gikomero, his home commune, whe 82 held the

osition of Chairman of the Commune Electoral college and the Technical Committee. As a top civil servant and as a Minister he was under an obligation to espouse the principles laid down in the

to uphold a higher than average degree of morality. Instead Jean de Dieu failed to do so. He supported the genocidal campaign against the Tutsis, actively

engaging himself in the killings of Tutsis and inciting others to kill.

to Rule 86(B) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, the Prosecutor submits the Final f in the case against the Accused, Jean de Dieu KAMUHANDA.

Dated in Arusha on the 2nd day of July 2003.

or the Prosecutor,

Douglas Marks Moore

462 All the witnesses in this case testified to this effect.

Trial Attorney

International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda Tribunal P b a l International pour le Rwan

UNITED NATIONS NATIONS UNIES Before : Judge William H. Sekule, Presiding

Judge Winston M. Maqutu Judge Arlette Ramaroson

THE PROSECUTOR v.

JEAN DE DIEU KIAMUHANDA


ANNEX 1 INDICTMENT

B U N a FOR RWAYDA

Case No.: ICTR-99-54A

THE PROSECUTOR

AN DE DIEU U M U H A I W A

'a

NDICTMENT

The ,Drosecuior of the fntematior?a! Criminal Tribunal for Xwanda, pursuant to the authoriry stipuiated in & M e -27 of the Statute of the international Criminal Tribrrnal for Rwanda (the Stacute of rhe Tribunaf) charges: -

r -3

CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT OZiiE; GENOCIDE, or alternatively

CB;tl[PLICITY IN GENOCIDE; CRIiMES AGAINST HUMANITY and VIOLATIONS OF ARTICLE 3 CO-MMON TO THE

CONVENTIONS AYD NAL PROTOCOL 11, offences

stipulated in Articles 2 , 3 , and 4 of the Statute of the Trrbranal.

No, de dossier: KTR-99-54.4

Le Proc~?reur du Tribunal Pinal Lirernational pour le Rwanda, en v e m ddes powoirs que iui confire ['article 17 du Statut du Tribunal PBnai hernational pour Ic Rwmda (la S tatut du Tribunal) accuse:

JEAN DE DIEU K.AiM:UH-kUDA

D'ENTENTE EN VUE DE COMNETTW LE G ~ O C I D E ; GENOCIDE ou alternativement, COWIPLICITE DE GENOCIDE; CRllMES COYTRE L~HUMANITE, et de VIOLATIONS DE L'ARTICLE 3 COLMIMUN AUX CONVENTIONS DE GEXEVE ET DU PROTOCOLE ADDITIONEL 11, crimes prevus aux articles 2, 3 et 4 du Statut du Tribunal.

P

'HXSTONCAL, CONTEXT

.I The revolution of 1959 markzd the beginning of a period of ethnic clashes between the Hutu and the Tutsi in Rwanda, causing hundreds of Tutsi to die and thousands more to flee the country in the years immediately following. The revolution resulted in the abolition of the Tutsi monarchy and the proclamation of the First

epublic in early 1961, confirmed in a rendum held in the same year. 'slative elections held in September

$ 3 \ .

1 confirmed the dominant position of the R-PARMEHUTU (Mouvement

Dimocmtique Ripublicain- Parti du &fouvement d 'Emancipation Hutu), led by GrOsooire Kayibanda, who was subsequently elected President of the Republic by the Legislative Assembly on 26 October 196 1.

elimination of the opposition parties in those early years confirmed the MDR-

EHUTU as the single party, the only to present candidates in the elections

o f 1965,

The early part of 1973 in Rwanda was again marked by ethnic confi-ontations between the Hutu and Tutsi, prompting another exodus of the Tutsi rninori~j f;om the country, as had occurfed between 1959 and 1963. This new outburst of ethnic and political tension between the North and

1.2 The early years of the First Republic, which was under the domination of the Hutu of central and southern Rwanda, were agsin marked by e t h c vioience. The victims were predominantly Tutsi, the former ruling elite and those related to them, who were

ed, driven to other regions of Rwanda or ' 3 forced to flee the country. The gradual

1. CONTEXTE HISTORIQUE

1.1 La revolution de 1959 marque le debut d'une periode d'aftionternents ethniques cntre les Hutu et Les Tutsi au Rwanda, provoquant au cours des amees qui om imediatement suivi, des centaines de morts chez les Tutsi et l'exode de milliers d'entre eux. Cette revolution entraine l'abolition de la rnonarchie Tutsi et la proclamation de la Premiere ~epubliquc' au debut de l'annte 1961, confirme- par refirendurn au cows de la meme annie. Les elections Mgisiatives de septembre - 196 1 . confinne la domination du MDR- PARMEKUTU (Mouvement DBrnocratique R6pub licain-Farti du Mouvement d~manc i~a t i on Hutu) de !': Gr6goi;e Kayibanda, qui est Blu President de la R$ublique par l'assemblt:: 1Ogislativc !e 26 octobre 196 1.

1.2 Les premieres am& d'existence de cetta r6publique, dorninCe par les Hutu du centre et du sud du Rwanda, sont de nouveau maiquies par la violence ethnique. Les victimes furent principalement des Tutsi, l'ancieme tlite dirigeante, et leurs allits; ceux-ci &rent tuls, chasses vers d'autres rCgions du Rwanda ou forcls de 'a

s 'enfiir du pays. L'blimination progressive des partis d'opposition durant ces premieres amees confinne le MDR-PARMEHCiTU comrne parti unique, qui est le seul prtsenter des candidats aux elections de 1965.

1.3 LC debut de l'annke 1973 au Rwanda est de nouveau marque par des affionternents ethniques entre Hutu et Tutsi qui provoquent, aprks ceux de 1959 A 1963, un nouvei exode de la minorite Tutsi. Cettz recrudescence des tensions ethniques :t politiques (entre le Nord et le Sud) aboutit,

1. CONTEXTE HISTORIQtiE

~ b u t h resulted in a military coup by General JuvCnal Habyarimana on 5 July 1973, shifting power from civilian to military hands and from Hutu of central Rwanda to Kutu of the northern*prefectures of Giseny (Habyarimanas native region) and Ruhengeri.

1.4 In 1975, President Habyarimana founded the Mouvement Re'voltctionnaire National pour le Diveloppement (MRND), a

, f single party, and assumed the position of ! Chairman. The administrative and

party hierarchies were indistingishable in this single party state korn the level of the Pre'feet to the bourgmestres, and down to that of the conseillers de secteuv and responsa bles are cellule.

1.5 From 1973 to 1994, the government of President Habyarimana used a system of ethnic and regional quotas which was

- - - - - - -

supposed Jo provide educational and - - -

xnployment opportunities for ali bur which was used increasingly to discriminate against both Tutsi and Hutu from regmns outside the northwest.

\ , - In fact, by the late l98Ofs, persons -

kom Giseny and Ruhengeri occupied many of the most important positions in the military, political, economic and administrative sectors of Rwandan society. b o n g the privileged elite, an inner circle of relatives and close associates of President Habyarimana and his wife, Agathe Kanziga, known as the Akazu, enjoyed great power. This select goup, almost exclusively Hutu, was supplemented by individuds whc shared its extremist Hutu ideology, and who came mainly from the native region of the President and his wife.

le 5 juillet 1973, a un coup d ' ~ t a t militaire men6 par le Gendral luvinal Habyarimana Le coQt dY6tat entraine un renversement du pouvoir, qui passe des mains des civils a d i e s des militaires et de celles dss Hutu du centre du Rwanda a celles des Hutu des prefectures de Gisenyi et Ruhengeri au nord du pays (rigion natale du Prisidenr Hab yarimana).

1.4 En 1975, le prksident Habyarimana fonde fe blouvement Revohtiomaire National pour le DCveloppement (MRND), parti unique, dont il assume la presidence. La structure administrative et la hierarchic du blRND ss confondent en un vkritable parti-~tat a tous les niveaux de l'administration terr i toriale, du &fet aux Bourgnestres, j usqu' aux conseille:~ de szcteurs et responsables de cellule.

1.5 De 1973 a 1994, le gouvemement du President Habyarimana applique un systbme

de quotas bas& sur Yorighe ethnique et regonale qui etait cense offrir des chances egales a tous en maribre d'iducarion et d'emploi, mais qui f'bt utilise progressivement de manikre discriminatoire a l'encontre des Tutsi et des Hutu originaires d'autres rigions que le nard-ouest.

De fait, a la fin des amees 1980, plusieurs des postes les plus importants dans les secteurs militaires, politiques, economiques et administratifs de la socitte rwandaise etaient occupes par des personnes originaires da Gisenyi et Ruhengeri. Parmi M i t e privildgiee, un noyau, connu sous l'appellation Mazu, compose de membres de la farnille et d'intimes du Prlsident Habyarimana et de son epouse, Agathe Kanziga, jouit d'un grand pouvoir. Aux membres de ce groupe, presque exclusivement Hutu, se joiyent d2s personnes qui en partagent l'ideologie Hutu

1. HISTORICAL COIYTEXT

extrCmiste et qui sont principalement originaires de la region nataie du Presidsnt et de son Cpouse.

6 In 1990, the President of the 1.6 Au cours de l'annee 1900, ic epub lic, Juvenal Habyarirnana, and his P k i d e n t de la Rbpubique, juvixal

siilgle party, the LWWD, were facing Habyarirnana, er son parti unique, le ounting opposition including €?om other LMRND, font face a une opposition

grandissante, notarnment de la part d'autres Hutu.

1.7 On 1 October 1990, the Rwandan 1.7 Le ter octobre 1990, is Front atriotic Front (RPF), made up mainly of - Patriotique Rwandais (FPR), composC

, I utsi refhgees, attacked Rwanda. Within majoritairement de refugiis Tutsi, attaque le ys the government began arresting Rwanda. Dans les jours qui suivent, le ousands of people, presumed to be gouvemement procede 4 l'arrestation de

opponents of Habyarimana and suspected of milliers de personnes presumees. 6tre des eing EWF accomplices. Although the Tutsi adversaires d'Habyarimana et sdup~omtes

were the main target, Hutu political de complicitd avec le FPR. Pami les opponents were also arrested. personnes ar;t5tkes, majori tairment

d'orig-ine Tutsi, il y a Cgalement des opposants politiques Huh.

1.8 Following pressure from the internal opposition and the international community, and the RPF attack of October 1990, President Habyarimana permitted the introduction of multiple political parties and

e adoption of a new constitution on 10 June 1991. The Mouvernent

kvolutionnaire National pour le Dkveloppement (MRND) was renamed ikfouvernent RPpublicain National pour la Dim ocrarie er le DBveloppemen t (MRM1)). The first transitional government was made

1.8 Suite aux diff6rentes pressions de !'opposition interne et de la cornrnunautt internationale, et l'attaque du FPR doctobre 1990, lc Prbident Habyarimana autorise 1' introduction du multipartisme et I' adoption dune nouvelle constitution le 10 juin 199 1. Le Mouvement Re'volutionnaire National pour le Diveloppenrent (MRM)) est alms rebaptise Mouvement Rbpublicain National pour la Dkmocratie et le Diveloppement (MRND). Le premier Gouvernement de transition est compose

almost exclusively of MRND members, foilowing the refusal of the main opposition

rties to take part. With the second nsitional Qovernment in April 1992, the

became a minority party for the first time in its history, with nine ministerial ortfolios out of 19. By contrast, the

MRND retained its domination over the local administration.

presque exclusivement de membres du MRND, suite au refus des principaux partis d'opposition d'en faire partie. Avec la mise en place du second Gouvernement de transition en avril 1992, le h1RW se retrouve minoritaire pour la premiere fois de son histoire, avec neuf porteftuilles rninisteriek sur 19. Par contre, le MRXD demeure fortement dominant au niveau de

1. The new government then entered into negotiations with the RPF, which resulted in the sighing of the Arusha Accords on 4 August 1993. The Accords provided for a new system of sharing military and civilian power between the RPF, the opposition parties and the LMRLND.

. f 0 By the terms of the b s h a Accords, which provided for the integration of both sides armed forces, the new national army

1 was to be limited to 13,000 men, 60% FAR (Forces Armkes Rwandatses) and 40% RPF. The positions of command were to be shared equally (50%-50%) between the two sides, with the post of Chief of Staff of the ~~y assigned to the FAR.

The Gendmerie was to be limited to 6,000 men, 60% F A = and 40% RPF, with the positions of command shared equally (50%-50%) between the two sides and rhe post o f Chief of Staff of the Gendme-rie assiped co the WF.

1.1 1 As regards representation within the government, the Antsha Accords limited the number of ministerial portfolios to be held by the MRND to five, plus the Presidency.

e other portfolios were to be shared as follows: RPF, five; MDR (Mouvement dernocratique ripubiicain), four (including

,_- the post of Prime Minister); PSD (Parti socia/-democrate), three; PL (Parti libe'ral), three; and the PDC (Parti dirnocrate- chretien), one.

1.12 For the men and women close to President Habyarimana, including the members of the Akazzr, who held positions

l'adrninistration temtoriale.

1.9 Le nouveau Gouvernement entarne alms des negotiations avec !e FPR qui aboutissent le 4 aout 1993 a la signature des Accords d ' h s h a . Ccs Accords privoient un nouveau partage des pouvoirs mili taires ct civils entre le FPR, les partis d'opposition et le IMRND.

1.10 Aux termes des Accords d3Xrusha qui privoient 1'intCgration des forces arinees

- des deux parties, 19effectif de la nouvelle annke nationale est limit(: a 13 000 hornmes

-dont 60% proviennent des F-NX (Forces b e e s Rwandaises) et 40?41 du FPR. Quant aux postes de cornmandement,, ils sonr attribuis a pans @ales (50%-SO%)! aux deux parties, 12 poste de Chef d ' ~ t a t Major de l'armee revenant aux F-M.

L'effectif de la Cendmerie esi limit6 9.6 000 homes, compose de 60% des FAR et 40% du FPR, avec les postes de cornandement repartis iquitablement (50%-50%) ectre les dzux parties, le puste de Chef d ' ~ t a t Major de la Gendarmerie revenant au FPR.

1.11 Au niveau de la reprisentation au sein du gouvernernent, les Accords d ' h s h a limitent B cinq le nombre de portefeuilles rninist6riels du MRMI en plus de la Prbsidence de la Rdpublique. Les autres portefeuilles se repartissent ainsi: cinq pour le FPR, quatre pour le MDR (Mouvement dPmocra~ique r6publicain) dont le poste de premier Ministre, trois pour le PSD (Parti social-democrate), trois pour le PL (Parti libbra[) et un pour le PDC (Parri democrate-chrktien).

1.1 2 Pour les hommes et les femmes proches du President Habyarimana, parmi lesquels les membres de l 'Akax, qui

1. HISTORICAL CONTEXT

of prominence in the various sectors of Rwandan society, this new power sharins

Ian, as demanded by the political opposition and as stipulated in the . b s h a Accords, meant a relinquishment of power and the loss of numerous privileges and benefits. With political changes following

e establishment of the multi-party government of April 1992, several important

ilitary officers from the north had been forced to retire. At the same time, many of

military were facing massive the implementation of

President Habyarimana several of his close associates devised

g hatred and fear of the Tutsi minority as a way of rebuilding solidarity among Hutu and keeping themselves in power. They strongly opposed any form of power sharing, including the one envisaged by the h s h a Accords.

Detemined to avoid the power A

aring prescribed by the Arusha ~ c c o i d s , veral prominent civilian and military

figures pursued their strategy of ethnic division a d incitement to violence. They targeted and labeled as RPF accomplices the entire Tutsi population, and also Hutu

osed to their domination, particularly those from regions other than northwestern

wanda. At the same time, they sought to divide Hutu opposition parties, attracting some of their members back to the support of Habyarimana. These efforts to divide the

utu opposition were favored by the assassination of Melchior Ndandaye, a dernocraticaily elected Hutu President in neighboring Burundi, by Tutsi soldiers of the Burundi army. By late 1993, two of the

1% occupaient des fonctions importmtes au sein des divers secteurs de la societe rwandaiss, ce nouveau partage du pouvoir, tel qu'exige par les opposants politiques et stipulk par Les Accords d' Arusha, s i p fie ['abandon du pouvoir et la perte de nombreux privileges et d'importants benkfices. Les changements politiques conslcutifs a l'etablissement dun rCgirne rnultipmite en avril 1992 obligent plusieurs o fficiers militaires imponants. originaires du Nord, a prendre leur retraite. En mZme temps, I'application des Accords d ' . h s h a confionte plusieurs militaires a une ddmobilisation massive.

1.13 A partir de 1990, le PrCsident Habyarimana et plusieurs de : ,'ses plus proches collaborateurs con~oivmt uile strat6gie d'incitation Q la haine et ii la peur fice a la rninorit6 Tutsi, afin d~u retablir la solidaritC parmi les Hutu et de se maintenir au pouvoir. Ils s'opposent fortement a toute foime de partage du pouvoir et

particulibrsrnent au partage prevu par les Accords d' Ansha.

1.14 DCteminees a tviter le partage des pouvoirs prevu par les Accords d ' h s h a , plusieurs personnalites civiles et. militaires en we poursuivent leur stratkgie de conflit e th ique et d'incitation a la violence. Elks visent la population Tutsi tout entikre, qui est qualifiie de complice du FPR, de meme que les Hutu opposts a leur domination, particulierement ceux qui sont originaires d'autres regions que le nord-ouesr du Rwanda. Parallelement, e lles tentent de diviser les partis d'opposition Hutu, en ramenant certains de leurs membres dans le camp d7Habyarimana. Les efforts destines a diviser I'opposition Hutu sont favorises par l'assassinat, par des soldats Tutsi d t l'armee burundaise, de ~Melchior Ndandaye, president Hutu democratiquement e l u dans 1

'4

three major parties opposed to the IMRW had each split into two factions. The faction of each known as the Power faction aligned itself with the MRND.

1.15 The strategy adopted in the early i99Os, which culminated in the widespread massacres of April 1994, comprised several components, which were carefully worked out by the various prominent figures who shared the extremist Hutu ideology, including the members of the Akazu.

In addition to incitement to ethnic violence and the extermination of the Tutsi and their accomplices, was the organization and military training of the youth wings of the political parties, notably the Interahamwe (youth wing of the MRIhD), the preparation of lists of people to be eliminared, the distribution of weapons to civilims, the assassination of cenain political opponents and the massacre of many Tutsi in various pats of Rwanda between October 1990 md April 1994. -

1,16 Incitement to e t h c hatred took the form of public speeches by people shari'ng

e extremist ideology. These political and military figures publicly appealed to hatred and fear of the Tutsi and urged the H u h majority to finish off the enemy and its accomplices. A perfect illustration is the speech made in November 1992 by Leon Mugesera, vice-chairman of the MRND for Gisenyi prt;f'ectzrre, who at the time was already inciting the public to exterminate the Tutsi and their accomplices.

With the intention of ensuring widespread dissemination of the calls to ethnic violence, prominent figures from the Presidents circle set up true hate media.

e Burundi voisin. A la fin de 1993, deux des trois principaux partis opposes au ;\.R\iD s'etaient divises en deux factions chacun. Les factions connues sous ie nom de Power s'allient au hfRW.

1.15 La strategic adoptkc au debut des amees 90, qui va comaitre son apogee avec les massacres ginlralises d'avril 1994, cornporte plusieurs elements qui sont soigeusernent ilabores par les diffirentzs persomalitis qui panazent cette idiologie extremiste, dont les membres de 1'Akazu.

A l'incitation a la violence cthnique st Q l'extermination des Tutsi et de Ieurs cornplices, s'ajoutent I'organisation et l'entrainement militaire des . jeunesses politiques, notamment les hthrahamwz (jeunesses du Ml l lD) , la prtparation de listes de personnes a dliminer, la distribution d 'ames a des civils, l'assassinat de certaim opposants politiques et le massacre de nornbreux Tutsi dans diverses regions du Rwanda entre octcbre 1990 et avril 1994.

1.1 6 L'incitatioil a la haine ethnique prend la forme de discours publics prononces par des personnalitds partageant cette idCologie extremiste. Ces persomalitds politiques et militaires appelienc publiquement a la haine et a la peur des Tutsi et exhortent la majorit6 Hutu a en finir avec I'ennemi et ses cornplices. LC discours prononce en novembre 1992 par Leon Mugesera, vice-pr6sident du MRliD pour la prefecture de Gisenyi, qui des cette Cpoque incitait publiquement a I'extermination des Tutsi et leurs complices, en est la pariaitz illustration.

Dans le but d'assurer une large diffusion de ces appels a la violence ethnique, des personnalites de I'entourage du President mettent sur pied de veritables

I. HISTORICAL C0;YTEXT

Thus the creation of Radio Te'l&ision Libre des MiNe Coilines (RTLM) and of the newspaper Kangura was a part of the stralegy and pursued the same logic.

l . i 7 The creation of the youth wings of the political parties, originally established to encourage or even force adherence to one or another party in the newly-established multi- arty system, provided Habyarimanas circle

with a large, devoted and effective workforce to implement the adopted strategy. These youth organizations, which were affiliated' to the political parties, were soon manipulated as part of the anti-Tutsi campaign. Some of the members of these organizations, notably the lnteraham we

) were organized into militia groups, which were financed, trained and led by prominent civilians and rni1ita-y fi.grcs &om the President of the Republics entourage. They were issued weapons, with the complicity of certain military and civilian authorities. The militia groups were transported to training sites, ificluding certain military camps, in public administration vehicles or vehicles belonging to companies controlled by the

residents circle.

During the mass arrests of October 1990, the civilian and military authorities followed lists that had been drawn up in order to identify and locate the presumed

ornplices of the RPF, the majority of rn were Tutsi. Later, Army,

endarmerie, local authorities and h terahamwe were given orders to prepare new lists or update the existing ones, which were subsequently used during the massacres of 1994. In March 1993, such. a: k t was found Chief of Staff.

in the vehicle of the Army

media de la haine. La creation he la Radio Tdtvision Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM) et du jolimal Kangura participe de ccae strategic ct s'inscnt dans certe lozique.

1 .I7 La creation dss ailes jeunesses des partis politiques, qui avait a I'origine pour objectif d'encourager ou meme de forcer l'adhbsion a I'un ou l'autre des partis du nouveau regime multipartite, va fournir a l'entourage d'Habyarimana une main d'oeuvre devouee, nombreuse et efficace pour mettre en oeuvre la strattgie adoptee. -

Ces organisations de jeunesse affilites aux partis po li tiques sont tres vite rnanipul6es dam le cadre de la campagne anti-Tutsi. Des membres de ces organisations, particuIi&rement les Interahamw(t-m\3, sont organis6.s en milices, financtes, entrainees et dirigees par des personnalitds civiles et rnilitaires de I'entourage du - PrCsident de la RCpublique. Des armes leur sont distribukes avec la complicitk de certaines autoritks militaires et civiles. L e u transport vers les sites d'entninement, dont certain$ camps militaires, est assure par des vehicules de l'administration publique ou appartenant a des socit tb contr616es par l'entourage du Prbident.

' ?

1 . l 8 Lors diss anestations massives .

d'octobre 1990, les autoritts civiles et militaires se rkferent a des listes itablies pour identifier et localiser les presumes cornplices du FPR, en majorite Tutsi. Par la suite, l'A.rmCe, la Gendarmerie, les autoritis locales et les Interahamwe regoivent des directives pour prkparer de nouvelles Listes ou tenir a jour les listes existantes, qui vont servir lors des massacres de 1994. En mars 1993, une telle liste est retrouvee dans le v6hicule du chef d'itat Major de l ' h e e .

P

Towards the end of 1991, certain ndan authorities distributed weapons to

certain civilians in the north-eastern region of the country as part of a civil self-defence campaig, in reactiori to the RPF attack of October 1990. Later, some authorities distributed weapons nationwide, notably to the Interahurnwe and carefully selected individuals, even in regions distant from the war zone. Towards the end of 1993, the Bishop of Nyundo criticized the distribution of weapons in a public letter and questioned its purpose.

: i

1.19 Vers la fin de 199 1, certaines autoritks rwandaises distribuent des armes a certains membres de La population civile du nord-est du pays dans le cadre de la campage d' auto-dl fense civile en reaction a l'attaque du FPR d'octobre 1990. Plus tard, en dehors du cadre de ['auto-defense civile, des annes sont distribuies dans ;out le pays par des autoritks, notamrnent aux lnterahamwe et a des personnes soigneusement choisies, m3me dans des regions eloignees de La zone de guerre. Vcrs

- la fin de 1993, l '~v8que de Nyundo critique dans une lettre publique cette distribution d'armes, s'interrogeant sur sa finalite

The pursuit of the strategy thus 1.30 La mise en place de la stra,Ggie ainsi ribed played a catalytic role in the ddcrite joue un rBle de catalyse& dans la

political and ethnic violence of the time, violence politique et ethniqae de cette which climaxed in April 1394 massacres. ipoque qui atteint son paroxysme me:: Ies Tne early pan of the 90s was narked by massacres d'avril 1994. Lc debut des a,mies numerous political assassinations md large 90 est marquC par de nornbreux assassinats massacres of the Tutsi minority, including politiques et d'irnportants massacres de la the that in Kibilira (1990), that of the minorit6 Tutsi, dont ceiui de Kibilira (l990), Bagogwe (1991) and that in Bugeserz - . ceux des Bagowe (1991) et celui du (1992). The massacres were icsiigated and Bugesera (1 992). Ces massacres sonr organized by local authorities with the suscitCs et organises par des autorites locales complicity of certain persons avec la cornplicite de certaines personnalitCs

, . from the Presidents circle. Therein can be de l'entourage du Prisident Habyarimana. - i found the components of the strategy which On y retrouve tous les elCments de la

' culminated in the genocide of 1994. strattgie qui -va aboutir au genocide de 1994.

1.21 h early 1994, certain prominent 1.21 Au d6but de 1994, des people from Habyarimanas circle instigated violent demonstrations in Kigali aimed at preventing the implementation of the Arusha Accords. Soldiers in civilian clothes and militiamen took part, seelung to provoke confrontations with the Belgian WNAMR soldiers. These incidents were partially the cause of the postponement of the establishment of the institutions foreseen by the Anrsha Accords.

manifestations violentes visant a emptc her La mise en place des Accords dlArusha se d6roulent a Kigali a l'insti,oation de certaines persomalites de L' entourage d'tfabyarirnana. On y retrouve des rnilitaires en civil aux cBtQ des miliciens qui cherchent B provoquer des affrontemenrs avec les soldats beiges de la LMG\~TUAR. Ces incidents sont en partie a l'origine du report de la mise en place des institutions prevues

1. HISTORlChL CONTEXT

dans les Accords d 'kusha . l!m On 6 April 1994, the plane carrying, 1.22 Le 6 avril 1994, I'avion transponant,

among other passengxs, the President of the entre autres passagers, le President de la Rcpub lic of Rwanda, Juvenal Habyarimana, ROpublique du Rwanda, juvenal was shot down on its approach to Kigali Habyarimana, est abattu peu avant son airport. attenissage a 1' aeroport de Kigali.

2 3 In the hours which followed the 1.23 Dans les heures qui suivent la chute crash of the Presidents plane, the senior de l'avion presidentiel, les principaux officers of the FAR convened to assess the officiers des FAR se reunissent pour evaluer ituation. Those who shared the extremist la situation. Ceux qui partagent 1'idCologie utu ideology, generally &om the North, - sxtrhniste Hutu, gentralernent les militaires

proposed an h y take-over. During a du nord du pays, proposent la prise du second meeting which took place on the pouvoir par I ' h C e . Le 7 axi l au matin, morning of 7 April, that option was rejected lors dune deuxi6me riunion, cette option est in favour of setting up an interim rejetie au profit de la mise sur .pied d7un Government. ; +

gouvemernent interimaire. . :

1.2 Already on the morning of 7 April 1.24 Des le 7 avril au matin, and whle these discussions were taking parallelement A ces discussions, des goupes place, groups of military, lists in hand, de militaires, listes cn main, proctdent i proceeded to a n s t , confine and carry out l'arrestation, a la skquesrration et a systejmat@ assassin~ions of-a large number - - - l'asszssinat de nombreax opposants

- - -

of political opponents, both Hutu -and politiques, Hutu et Tutsi, parmi lesquels le Tutsi, including the Prime Minister, some of Premier Ministre, certains des ministres de the kfinisters in her Govemrnent and the son gouvernement et le Pr&ident.de la Cour President of the Constitutional Court. At'the Constitutionnelle. Par contre, au meme same time, however, the military were moment, des militaires ivacuent dans des

* - , evacuating prominent members of the dead endroits sirrs des persoma1itQ de Presidents circle, including the I\/T;R,r\C1) !'entourage du d & h t Prtsident, y compris Ministers, to safe locations. les ministres du MRND.

The Belgian ISNAMIR soldiers sent Les militaires belges de la MINUAR to protect the Prime Minister were disarmed, envoyis pour protkger le Premier Ministre arrested and taken to Kigali military camp, sont disarmis, arrBtes et conduits au camp where they were massacred, prompting the militaire de Kigali oh ils sont massacres. Cet withdrawal of the Belgian contingent in the incident prCcipite le retrait du contingent

that followed. After the withdrawal of beige dam les jours qui suivent. Apres le elgian troops, the UN Security Council retrait des troupes belges, le Cons 4 de

drastically reduced the number of U'NAVlm sicurite des Xations-hies rtiduit de fason ersonnel in Rwanda. draconieme le nombre de personnel de la

L\ilNUAR au Rwanda.

.25 The leaders of various political 1.25 Les dirigeants des divers partis

01 1 0

1. CONTEXTE HISTORIQUE

not targeted in the assassinations assembled at the request of military officers. Other than members of the IMRL"\~D, most participants were members of the Power wings of their respective parties. Given the political and constitutional void created by the deaths of most national political authorities, they set up a government based on the 1 99 1 constitution. Composed solely of Hutu, the government was sworn in on 9 April 1994. The MRMI held nine ministerial posts, plus the Presidency of the Republic, wtule the remaining 11 positions, including that of Prime Minister, went to the

ower factions of the other parties.

politiques non vises par ies assassinm se riunissent a ia demande d'officiers militaires. En dehors des mernbres bu IVLRND, la plupart des participants sont membres des ailes Power de leurs panis respectifs. ~ t a n t don& le vide politiquz et constitutiomel crek par la mort de la plupart des persomaiites politiques nationales, ils mettent sur pied un gouvemement fond6 sur la constitution de 199 1. LC gouvernement,

exclusivement compos6 de persomalit& Hutu, prZte serment le 9 avril 1994. Neuf postes minist6riels sont attribuis au M R W , en plus de la ?residence de la Republique, zt les onze postes restants, incluant ceiui de premier ministre, reviennent aux factions Power des autres partis.

, .

1.26 In the hours that following the crash 1.26 Dans les heures qui suivent la chute of President Habyaimanas plane, military de l'avion du President Habyarimana, tes and militiaxen set up roadblocks and began miiitaires e: les miliciens irigen: des slaughtering Tu.tsi and members of the Hutu barrages et commenccnt a massacrer tes opposition in Kigali and in other parts of Tutsi et les membres de l'opposition Hum a Rwanda. At the roadblocks, they checked Kigali et dam d'autres rtgons du Rwanda,

- - - - -

- - - - - - - the -identity c a d s of pssers-b.j-am-kHe& - - - - - K u ~ b a i r a g e 3 , il< proikdent a la virification those or most of those who were identified des carks d'identite de tous les passants e: as Tutsi. military patrols, often involving exicutent toutes les penonncs, ou la plupart rniiitiamen, scoured the city, lists in hand,. to des personnes, idcntifikes c o m e itant

, j execute the Tutsi and certain political Tutsi. Des patrouilles de militaires, souvent - 3

C I opponents. accompagnCs de miliciens silloment la ville, tistes en main, pour executer les Tutsi et certains opposants politiques.

1.27 During the entire period of the 1.27 Durant toute la pdriode du genocide, genocide, FAR military, particularly units of des militaires des FAR, particuli2rernent des the Presidential- Guard, the Para-Commando unites de la Garde Presidentielle, du Batallion, Reconnaissance Battalion and the Bataillon Para-Commando, du Bataillon Gendarmerie, in complicity with militiamen, reconnaissance et de la Gendarmerie, avec la actively participated in the massacres of the complicite de miliciens, participent Tutsi throughout Rwanda. activement aux massacres de Tutsi sur toute

1' ktendue du Rwanda.

As soon as it was formed, the 1.28 Des sa formation, le Gouvzrnernent lnterim Government espoused the plan for hterimaire Fait sien le plan d'extzrminacion

I. HISTORIC.4 'w CONTEXT ~dvernment incited the population to eliminate the enemy and its accomplices, some of them participating directly in the massacres.

2 9 Local authorities, including prefers, bourgmestres, conseillers and responsables de cellule applied the Government-issued directives in execution of the plan for the extermination of the Tutsi population. They incited and ordered their subordinates to

etrate the massacres and took a direct

.30 Having been psychologically and militarily prepared for several months. the groups of militiamen spearheaded the execution of thz extermination plan and were directly involvzd in the massacres of the civilian Tutsi population and of moderate Hutus, thus causing the deaths of hundreds of thousands of people in less than

ce gouvernement incitent la population j.

Clirniner l'cnnemi et ses cornplices, certains d'entre sux prennent part directement aux massacres.

1.29 Des aurontes Locales, telles que les Prefets, les i3ourgrnestres, les conseillers dc secteur et lcs responsables dz ctllule, appliquent les directives du Gouvernement visant A extcuter Ie plan d'extermination de la population Tutsi. Ils incitent et ordonnenr 5 leurs subordonn6.s de se livrer aux massacres et y prennent eux-mgmes part directement-

1.30 Les groupes de miliciens. psycho10,oiquemcnt et militairement pr6par6s depuis plusieurs mois, cpnstituent le fer de lance dam l'exCcurion! du plan d'cxterrnination et sont directernent impliquks dans les massacres ds la populaiion civile Tutsi et des Hutu modbris, causant ainsi la mort de centaines de milliers de personnes en rnoins de 100 jours.

2.1 The crimes set ou t against the 2.1 Les crimes imputes aux accus+s Jans accused in this indictment took place in le prlsent acte d'accusation ont Cte commis Rwanda between 1 Januxy and 3 1 au Rwanda entre Ie ler janvier 1994 et le 3 1 December 1994. dkcembre 1994.

3.2 During the events referred to in this 2.2 Lors des evenements auxquels se indictment, Rwanda was divided into , 11 rlGre le present acte d'accusation, le prifecrures: Butare, Byurnba, Cyangugu, Rwanda 6tait divise en 11 prefectures: Gikongoro, Gisenyi, Gitararna, Kibungo, . Butare. Byumba, Cyangugu, Gikongoro,

. 1 Kibuye, Kigali-Ville, Kigali-Rural and Gisenyl, Gitararna, Kibungo, Kibuye, Ruhengeri. Each prifecture was subdivided Kigali-ville, Kigali-rural et Ruhengeri. into commzrnes and secteurs. Chaque prefecture est subdivisie en

communes et en secteurs.

3.3 During ths events referred to in this 2.3 Lors des evenemenrs awcquels se indictment, the Tutsi, the Hutu and the Twa r6Ere le present acte d'accusation, les Tuisi, were identified as racial or e b i c groups. les Hutu et les Twa itaient identifiis comme

des o u p e s ethniques ou raciaux.

During the events referred to in this ictment, &ere_ wem throu&aut Rwarda

widespread or systematic attacks directed against 2 civilian popuiztion on politicn!, ethnic or iacial grounds.

3 L ,

2 , During the events referred to in this indictment, a state of non-international m e d conflict existed in Rwanda. The victims referred to in this indictment were protected persons, according to the provisions of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol LI.

2.4 Lors des ivenements auxqusls se - - - r d k e le present acte d'accusation, i l y a eu

sur tout 12 t e r h i r e du Rwanda 6.2s attzques sys~ematiqus ou g6neralisits contre une population civile, en raison de son appartenance politique, ethnique ou raciale.

2.5 Lors des CvCnements auxquels se refere le prksent acte d'accusation, il y avait un conflit axmi non international sur le temtoire du Rwanda. Les victimes auxquelles se refire le prtsent acte d'accusation Btaient des personnes protegees, au sens de l'article 3 commun aux Conventions de Geneve et du Protocole additiomel TI[.

B

THE POWER STRUCTURE

e Government

According to the Constitution of anda of 10 June 199 1, executive power is rcised by the President of the Republic,

assisted by the Government, composed of the Prime minister and the ministers. The members of the Government are appointed by

resident of the Republic upon the proposal of the Prime Minister. The Prime

nister directs the Governments program. e Government determines and applies

national policy. To that effect, it controls the civil service and the armed forces. The Prime Minister deciaes the hnctions of the ministers

officials under the Prime Ministers authority. Thz resigation or termination of tcnure of the Prime Minister. for whatever reason, causes the Government to resign.

3 , The Ministers implement the Governments policy, as defined by the P,rirne Ministm. They are answenble to the Head of the Government for doing so. Li the discharge of their duties, the ministers stand by the

resident of the Republic. Before taking up their posts, they take an oath promising to uphold the interests of the Rwandan people and to respect the Constitution and the law. Further, in carrying out their duties, they have at their disposal the civil service and local administration corresponding to their functions.

acal Pu biic Administration

-3 The Prt;/et represents executive power at prefectural level. The Prifet is appointed

Le Gouveraement

3,1 Sslon la Constitution du Rwanda du 10 juin 1991, 1e pouvoir executif est exerci par le President de la RCpublique, assisti du gouvemement compose du Premier hlinistre st des ministres. Les membres du gouvemement sont ~ommes par le President de la Rkpublique sur proposition du Premier Ministre. Le Premier Ministre est charge de diriger {'action du gouvemement. Le gouvemement determine et conduit la politique de la nation et dispose, cet effet, dz l'administration publique et de la force m 6 e . Le Premier Ministre d i t ep ine les attributions dcs ministres et des agents placCs sous son autorite. La dimission ou la cessation dss fonctions du Premier Minisire, pour quelque cause que ce soil, entrdne la d6mission du gouvemement.

3.2 Les ministres executsnt du Gouvemernent dkfinie par Ministre. 11s rdpondent devanr

la politique ie Premier le Chef du

Gouvemernent de cette exkcution. Dans l'exercice de leurs fonctions les ministres sont soiidaires du Prksident de la Ripublique. 11s prZtent serment avant de pouvoir assurner forrneilernent leurs fonctions. 11s sont tenus, en vertu de ce serment, 'de promouvoir les interets du peuple rwandais dam le respect de la Constitution et des lois. En outre, dans I'exercice de leurs fonctions ils disposent de l'administration publique et temtoriale correspondante a leurs attributions.

i'adrninistration territoriale

3.3 Le prefet est le reprkssntant du pouvoir executif au niveau de la prifecrurs.

B

by the President of the Republic on the 146 El est nomme sur proposition du 'ministre de . . recommendation of the Minister of the interior l'Int6rieur par le President de la Ripublique and canies out his duties under that Ministers et exerce ses fonctions sous l'autoriti hierarchical authority. The Prt;fefs authoriry hierarchique du ministre de 1' lntirieur. covers the entire pri:fecture. L'autorite du prefet s'ttend sur Ifensemble de

la prefecture.

3. In his capacity as administrator of the prbfecture, the Prifet is responsible for e n s u ~ g peace. public order and the safety of people and property. he Prqet, in the discharge of his policing duties, maintainins peace and public order, may request the - intervention of the army and of the Gendarmerie Nationale. The Pr4fet has hierarchical authority over all civil servants ;~d all persons holding public office within the boundaries of the prifecture, including the hourgmestres and the conszi!lers de secteur.

3.4 En sa qualite d'administiateur dc la prefecture, le prefet est charge d'assurer La tranquillit& l'ordre public et la sCcuritC des personnes et des biens. Dans l'exercice de ses attributions de police, le maintien de l'ordre et de la paix publics, le prefet peut requkrir Pintemention de l'axmie ou et de la Gendarmerie Nationale. Le pr6fet exerce son autorite hierarchique sur tous les agents de 17administration publique et toutzs les personnes ditentrices de la pcblique officiant dans la prCkcture, parmi lcsquels les Bourmcstres st 13s Consaillzrs de secteur.

3.5 Similarly to the the Pre'feet, the 3.5 -4 I'instar du prkfet, le bourgnestre Bourgntestre reprzsents executive power at est le reprksentant du pouvoir executii. au the cornmzme level. He is appointed by the niveau de la commune. I1 est nommC par lz President of the Republic on the President de la Repub!ique sur proposition recornendation of the ~Minisrer of the du ministre de llIntCrieur. 11 est place sous Interior. He is under the hierarchical authority i'autoritk hierarchique du prefit. L1 a autoritC

1

" 3 - I of the Prifet. He has authority over the civil sur Les agents de I'administration officiant

- ,

servants posted in his commune. Moreover, dam sa commune. I1 a par aiileurs des he has policing duties in regard to maintaining attributions de police dans le cadre du order and law enforcement. maintien de l'ordre et de l'exicution des

lois.

e Political Parties, Youth Wings and Les Partis Politiques, les ailes jeunesses et les Wfilices

Political Parties Les Partis Politiqzres

3.6 Dunn,o the events referred to in this 3.6 Lors des ivenements vises dans le indictment, the main political parties in present acte d'accusation, les principaux Rwanda were the MRND (Mouvernent panis politiques au Rwanda itaient: Ic Reprlblicnin ivatiunal pour in Dimocmtie et le MRND (Mouvernent Republicain National

I4

8 t

I - *

L

\

3. STRUCTURE DU POWOIR

1

DQveloppementJ, the CDR (Coalition pour la Difense de la Riprcblique), the MDR (ikhuvement Dkrnocrarique R$ttblicain), the

S D (Parti Social-Dimocrate) and the PL (Parti Libera(). The RPF (Rwandan Patriotic Front) was a politico-military opposition organization.

.7 The MRND (Mo uvem en t RQvolutionnaire ~Vational pour le De'veloppernent) was founded by Juvenal

I ) 5 Habyarimana on 5 July 1975. The I organization was in fact a true Party-State. Its

was to provide the President of the Republic with a powerfiA apparatus intended to control the workings of the State. The

overnents objectives were, among others, to support and control the actions of the various State powers. Only the Chairman of the

could stand for the Presidency of the c. All Rwandans were members of the from birth.

r46s pour la DCmocratie et le D6veloppcment), la CDR (Coalition pour la DCfense de la Republique), le MDR (Mouvement DCrnocratique RBpublicain), le PSD (Pani Social-Democrate) et le PL (Parti Liberal). Le FPR (Front Patriotique Rwandzis) Ctair une organisation politico-militair- d'opposirion.

3.7 Le LMR.;UD (Mouvcnent R6vo!utiomaire National pour Le D6veloppernent) Ctait m e organisat ion criCe par Juvenai Habyarirnana le 5 juillet 1975. Cette organisation etait de fait un v6nrzble Parti-Etat. If visait A doter le President de la Republique d'un appareil puissant destini 2i contr6ier tous les rouages de 1'Eiat. Parrni les objcctifs du mouvernent, il avait le soutien et le contrde des activitks des divers pouvoirs de I'Etat. Szul le Prdsidsnt du bC%W pouvair $tre candidat B la Pr6sidence de la R&ublique. Le Rwandais Ctait membre du LMRLW dks sa naissmce.

.8 The organs of the MRND (ikfouvement RQvolutionnaire iVational pour b DQveloppernent) were very centralized at the top and spread out at the bottom. 'This

/ .. - ) pyramidal structure enabled all Rwandan : -&' citizens to be involved in political life. The

national organs included the chairmanship, the general secretariat, the national congress and the central committee. The central committee was made up of the Chairman, other members appointed by the Chairman, the Secretary Genera1 and the Speaker of Parliament (the Conseil National de Dheloppement - CND ). At local level, there were organs at

prkfecture, comm ttne and cellule levels. The Prifei and Bourgmertre were each responsible

3.5 i e s crgmes du LMRND (Mouvement RCvolutiomaire National pour le Dlveloppement) etaient tres centralises au somrnet et trbs ramifies B la base. I1 s'agit d' une structure pyramidale pennettant l'inttgration de tous les citoyens nvandais A la vie politique. Les organes nationax comprenaient la Pr6sidence du Mouvement, le Secretariat Gbnerale, le Congres National et le Comite Central. Le Cornit6 Central Ctait compost5 du President du Mouvement, d'autres rnembres nommis par lui, du Secritaire Gineral et du President du CND (Conseil national de Dtveloppement). Xu niveau local, il y avait des organes au niveau de la prefecture et a la base au niveau de La

for the movenlent in their respective commune et de la cellule. Le prefet st le administrative districts. These two figures bourgmestre ttaient chacun responsabls du were civil servants directly appointed by the mouvernent au niveau de sa circonscription President of the Republic, who was also the administrative. Ces deux persomalitis

*

Chairman o f the IMRND,

.9 With the institution of the multiparty system and the adoption of a new Constitution

10 June 1991, the itiozrvernent evolutionnaire ~Varional pour lz

Divebppement (MRND) was rsnarned the kiouvement R$ublicain National pour la DPmocratie et le Diveloppement (MRND). Although its statutes were amended, the structure of the new party remained essentially the same.

e Youth Wings and the Militia

3.10 iMost of the political parties had created their own youth wings. The members of the M R N D s youth wing were known as the ' interahamwe, while those of the CDR were k!xxms as the impuzamugarnbi. The youth

- - - wing were -%me& i n - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

A rzsponse to.. b io conccms within the political parties: sensitizing the youth to politics and mobilizing them. The MRND and 'CDR followed the example set by the MDR and the

F, which had already insituted their youth movements.

The Interaham we-MRND were rmed in late 1991 on the initiative of the

central committee, following the advent of multiparty politics. The In teraham we-MRND were highly structured, along the same lines as the MRND party. At national level, they had a chairman, two vice- chairmen, a secretary general and a treasurer. The chaiman was to liaise with the MRHD central committee, among other things. In June 1993, to ensure better temtorial coverage and gea ter effectiveness, the MRND central

6taient des fonc tiormaires publics nommCs directement par le President de la RCpublique qui &zit en meme temps le President du ~IR_IiT.

3.9 Avec l'instaurztion du multipanisrne et l'adoption d'une nouvelle constitution lz 10 juin 199 1, Is Ltlurtvernent Revolurionnaire National pour le Deveioppernent (hR"iD) est a l a s rebaptist Mouvement R$ublicain

. National pour la Dimocratie et le D&veZoppement (MRND). Les Statuts ont 6te arnendes mais la structure du nouveau parti est demeure essentietlement la mime que celle de l'ancien.

P

Les ailes jeunesses et Zes niilices

3.10 La plupart des pvt is politiqlies avaient crei une aile jeunesse en leur xin. Celle du hIRND etait comue sous l'appellation Interahamwe et celle de la CDR sous l e no-n? de impuzamugarnbi- La - - - - - - - -

creation des ailes jeunesses r6po~dait B deux prdoccupations au sein des partis poiitiques: sensibiliser les jeunes a la politique et les rnobiliser, Le I~YGWD et la CDR ont suivi l'exemple du MDR et du FPR qui avaient d6ja institue leur mouvement de jeunesse.

3.1 1 Les hterahamwe-IMRND ont ete crkes la fin de 199 1 a l'initiative du comitk central du MRND suite a l'avenement du multipartisme. Les interahamwe-MRND avaient une organisation bien structuric a l'image du parti MRND. Ils avaient au niveau national un Prksident, deux vice- prksidents, un Secretaire General .et un TrCsorier. Le president devait, entre autre, assurer la liaison avec le comite central du MRND. En juin 1993, pour garantir une meilleure couverture du territoire et une plus

16

3. STRUCTURE DU POWOIR

a

committee decided to create Interahamwe- branches in the various prefectures in

the country.

2 Beginning in 1992, numerous &fR-iY-D youth wings members received military training and weapons and were thus

formed f?om youth movements into militias.

e Forces Armies R wandaises

.13 The Forces Arrnbes Rwandaises (FAR) were composed of the Rwandan Axmy (MX) and the Gendarmerie Nationale (GN). The Forces Arme'es Rwandaises did not have a unified comkand and came directly under the minister of Defence, and consequently the Government. The Commder-in-Chief of the Forces Arme'es Rwandaises was thf: President of the Republic.

-. . The General Staff of the W a n d m

Army was headed by the Chief of Staff, assisted by four senior officers in charse of four bureaux: G-l (Personnel and Administration), G-2 (Intelligence), G-3 (Military Operations) and G-4 (Logistics).

The territory of Rwanda was divided mto various military operations sectors, each headed by a military sector commander. Also,

were elite units within the Rwandan namely the Presidential Guard, Para-

o m a n d o Battalion and Reconnaissance attalion. The troops were divided into

companies within the sectors and the units.

gande efficacite, le Cornite Central du MRND a dkide de creer des sections U n t e r a h a m t v e - M m au niveau dzs difErentes Prefectures du pays.

3.12 k partir de 1992, plusiecrs rnembres de l'aile jeunesse du iMRE.73 ont r q u un entrainement militaire et des armes; ce qui a transform6 ces mouvzments de jeunesse en milices.

Les Forces Armees Rwandaises . I

3.13 Les Forces h 6 e s Rwandaises (FAR) ttaient composees de 1'ArrnCe Rwandaise (AR) et de la Gepdarmerie Nationale (GN). Les Forces:! ArmCes Rwandaises ne disposaient pas d'un Etat- Major uiifi6 et relevaient direciement du Ministre de ia DCfense, et par conslquent du gouvernement. Le chef supreme des Forces Annkes Rwandaises ktait le Prksident de fa Rkpub liquz.

3.14 L'Etat-Major de l ' h e e Rwandaise etait dirise par un Chef d'Etat-Major assiste par quatre officiers superieurs responsables de quatre bureaux: le bureau du G-1, (Personnel et Administration), le bureau du G-2 (Renseignernents et Intelligence), le bureau du (3-3 (Op8rations militaires) et le bureau du G-4 (Logistique) .

3.15 Le temtoire du Rwanda etait divise en diffCrents secteurs d'opbations militaires. Chaque secteur etait ding6 par un commandant militaire. En outre, i l y avait des unitis d'klites au sein de I ' h n e e Rwandaise: le bataillon de la Garde PrCsidentielle, ie bataillon Para-Commando, et le bataillon de Reconnaissance. Les troupes Ctaient divisees en cornpapies au sein des secteurs et des unites.

17

-4

3.16 The General Staff of the Gendarmerie Nntionaie was headed by the Chief of Staff, assisted by four senior officers in charge of four bureaux: G- 1 (Personnel and Administration), G-2 (Intelligence), G-3 (Military Operations) and G-4 (Logistics).

7 The Gendarmerie iVationale was onsible for maintaining public order and e and the observance of the laws in effect

in the country..

The Gendarmerie 1VationaZe was under the iMinister of Defence but could carry out its duties of ensuring public order and peace at the request of the local government authority having jurisdiction, namely the Prefer. In cases of .mergency, ihis request could be made verbally, notably by telephone. Such requests had to be carried out immediately. In addition, the Gendarmerie Mationale was obliged to transmit to the Prkfet all inionnation rclatins to public order. It had the dury to assist aayone in dmger.

' 1 : r i

\

: 3

By virtue of their rank and their Eunctions, the Minister of Defence and the officers of the Rwandan Army and the Gendarmerie Nationale had the duty to enforce the general rules of discipline for all soldiers under their authority, even those not belonging to their units.

3.16 L'Etat-Major de la Gendarmerie etait dirigt par un Chef dEtat-Major assisti par quake officiers superieurs responsablzs de quatre bureaux: le bureau du G- 1, (Personnel et Administration), le burezu du G-2 (Renseignernents et htelligence), le bureau du G-3 (Operations militaires) st 12

bureau du G-4 (Logistique).

3.17 La Gendakmerie Xationale etait chargCe du maintien de l'ordre et de la paix publics et de l'axecution des Lois en vigueur dans lepays.

3.18 La Gendarmerie Nationale relevait du Ministre de la Defense, mais pouvait exercer ses attributions de maintien de l'ordre et de la paix publique i la'requ&t de 17autorir6 - administrative itrr;i tonale compi.iente, en la persome du prtkt. En cas dfur~:nce, cette requisition pouvzii Brre faite verbalement, notarnrnent par tiliphone. Cette riquisition devait btre exCcutee sans dtlai. En outre, ]la Cendmerie Nationaie devait porter a la cormaissance du pref2t tout renseignernent concernan: l'ordre pub iic. Elle devait assistance a toute personne en danger.

3.19 Le Ministre de la Defense et Ies officiers de lJLLmee Wmdaise et de ia Gendarmerie Nationale, de par leur grade et leurs fonctions, avaient le devoir de faire respecter les regles gCnCrales de discipline pour tous les rnilitaires sous leur autorite, mOme s'ils n'appartenaient pas 6 leurs

4. LES ACCCSE?

, . THE ACCUSED

Jean de Dieu Kamuhanda

Jean de Dieu Karnuhanda was born on 3 tl/Iarch 1953 in Gikomero cornmrtne, Kigali-Rural prefecture, Rwanda.

2. In late May 1994, Jean de Dieu nda held the office of Minister of ducation and Scientific Research in

Interim Government, replacing Dr. Daniel angura. Jean de Dieu Kamuhanda held

the office until mid-July 1994. He was the irector of Higher Education and Scientific esearch before the events of 2994, and then

counselor to President Sindikubwabo durins the events until late May 1994.

Jean de Dieu Kamuhanda influential member of lMRND

was an

Rurai.

.3 In his capacity as Minister of Higher ducation Jean de Dieu Kamuhanda was

responsible for the articulation and the implementation of the government poiicy concerning post-secondary school education and scientific research in Rwanda for the Lnterirn Government.

In his capacity as Minister, Jean de eu Kamuhanda attended Cabinet

meetings where he was informed about the socio-political situation in the country and where he was apprised of government policy and participated in formulating the policies adopted and implemented by the Interim Government. In the exercise of his powers,

Jean de Dieu Kamuhanda

4.1 Jean de Dieu Kamuhanda est n6 le 3 mars 1953 en commune Gikomero, Kigali- Rural prefecture, Rwanda.

4 Vers fin rnai 1994 Jean de Dieu Karnuhanda a 2te nornme ~Uinistre de 17Enseignement Sup6rieur au sein du Gouvemement intbrimaire, remplaqant dans ce poste le Dr Daniel Nbangura. Jean de Dieu Kamuhanda a exerce ses fonctions de Ministre de 1'Enseignement Supkieur au sein du Gouvemement htlrimaire jusqu'a la mi-juillet 1994. Auparavant il a Cte Directeur GCnbal de 1'en&ipement supCrieur et . de la recherche &ientifique avafit les CvCnernents de 1994, puis Conseiller du Prisident Sindihbwabo durant ces Cvinenenrs jusqu7i la fin mai 1994.

Jean de Dieu Kamuhanda 6t;zit un rnembre influent du b1RLCD B Kigali Rural.

4.3 En sa qualite dz Minisire de I'Enseignement Superieur Jean de Dieu F ' \

Kamuhanda Btait responsable de la tbrmulation et de la mise en oeuvre de la politique de l'enseignernent et de la recherche scientifique au Rwanda au sein du gouvernernent.

4.4 Par ailleurs, en sa qualite de Ministre, Jean de Dieu Kamuhanda assistait au Conseil des Ministres ou il a C t t informt he la situation socio-politique du pays et oh il a Cte rxis au courant de la pclitiqge gouvemernentale et participait dans la fornulation de la politique adoptte et mise en oeuvre par le gouvemernent interirnaire.

&THE ACCUSED

he never publicly disavowed the policies of the Interim Government and did not resign, as permitted by the Constitution. Jean de

ieu Karnuhanda never criticized or reproached the policies of the Interim Government when he was Counselor to the Interim President, and did not resign until late May 1994, when he accepted h s nomination as Minister of Higher Education. Rather than distancing himself From the policies of the Interim Government, Jean de

ieu Kamu handa instead reinforced his support of those policies by accepting a ministerial post almost two months after the Interim Govemen t was formed when its policies were already clearly demonstrated by its ,oovemental directives, proclamations, acts and omissions.

4.5 Ln his capacity as Minister of Higher Education, Jean de Dieu Kamuhanda, exercised - - - - - - authority g d contiol over all the- Institutions and staff filembers under his minis try.

l1 n'a jarnais desavoue publiquement la politique du gouvemement interimaire et n'a jamais prisente sa demission, alors que la constitution h i permettait explicitemenr de le faire. Par ailleurs, Sean de Dieu Kamuhanda n'a jamais critique ni remis en cause la politique du gouvemement interimaire lorsqu'il Btait Conseiller du President IntCrimaire et n'a pas demissione de ce poste. En fin mai 1994, il a accept6 sa nomination c o m e Ministre de l1Enseignement supirieur. Au lieu de se dkmarquer de la politique du gouvemement iilterimaire, Jean de Dieu Kamuhanda l'a appuyee en acceptant un poste ministeriei deux mois & peine aprb la formation dudit gouvemement intkrimaire, aiors.! que les directives, 1 ~ s proclamations, ei les actes et omissions de ce demier indiquzknt c:airement sa l i p s politipe.

1.5 En sa qualit6 de Ministre de I ' E n ~ e i ~ e m e n t SupCrieur Jean de Dieu

- -Kamuhanda, exerqait une autoris6 et un cont5le sur l'ensemble des dCpariernsnts et du personnei de son ministkrs.

5. E.YPOS& SUCCINT DES FATS: P R ~ P . W T I O ~

3. CONCISE STATEMENT OF THE ACTS:: PREP,jiR,ATION

From late 1990 until July 1994, imir Bizimungu, Justin Mugenzi, Jer6me

Bicamumpaka, Prosper ~Mugiraneza, Xndrt Xtagerura, Pauline Nyirarnasuhuko and Eliezer Niyitekega, conspired among themselves and with others, notably Thloneste Bagosora, Edouard Karemera, Andre Rwamakuba, ~Mathieu Ngirumpatse,

h Nzirorera, Augustin Ngirabatware, de Dieu Kamuhanda, J'uvCnal

Kajelijeli, Felicien Kabuga, Augustin Bizirnana, and Callixte Nzabonimana to work out a plan with the intent to exterminate the civilian Tutsi population and eliminate members of the opposition, so

at they could remain in power. Thz components of this plan consisted of, among other things, violence, the weapons to preparation eliminated.

recourse to hatred and ethnic training of and distribution of militiamen as well as the

~f lists of people to be In executing the plan, they

organized, ordered and participated in the massacres perpetrated against the Tutsi opulation and of moderate Hutu.

5.2 in a letter dated 3 December 1993, and addressed to the UNAMIR Commander, with copies to all the Ministers, certain FAR officers revealed the existence of what they called a Machiavellian plan conceived by military who were mainly from the North

who shared the extremist Hutu ideology. The objective of the Northern military was to oppose the Arusha Accords and keep themselves in power. The means to achieve this consisted in exterminating the Tutsi and their accomplices. The letter indicated

5. EXPOSE S'UCCfNT DES FAITS : PREPAR.4TION

5.1 Des la fin de 1990 jusqu'a juillst 1994, Casimir Sizirnungu, jus tin Mugenzi, Jkr6me Bicamumpaka, Prosper Mugiraneza, Andre Ntagerura, Pauline Nyrarnasuhuko et Eliezer Niyitekega, se sont sntendus entre eux et avec d'autres, notamment Thdoneste Bagosora, Edouard Karemera, h d r 6 Rwamakuba, Mathieu Ngjrumpatse, Joseph Nzirorera, Augustin Ngirabatware, Jean de Dieu Kamuhanda, Iuvenal Kajelijeli, Felicien .

Kabuga, Augustin ~izimana, et Callixte Nzabonimana pour elaborer un plan dam l'intention d'exterminer la . kpulation civile Tutsi- et d'kliminer des biembres de l'opposition et se maintenir ainsi au pouvoir. Les ilkments de ce plan comportaient, entre autres, le recours a-la haine et ?i la violence ethnique, l'entrainement et la distribution d'ames aux miliciens ainsi que la conkction de listes de personnes a &miner. Dans I'exCcution de ce plan ils ont organis&, ordome et participe aux massacres perpitres a l'encontre de la population Tutsi et des Hutu moderis.

5.2 Dans une lettre datie du 3 decembre 1993 et adressee au Commandant de la MIl?lUAR avec ampliation a tous les Ministres, des officiers des FAR ont rtivtli l'existence d'un plan machiavelique c o q u par des militaires essentiellement originaires du Nord et partageant l'id6oloije Hutu extremiste. L'objectif de ces militaires nordistes Ctai! de s'opposer aux Accords d 7 h s h a et de se maintenir au pouvoir. Le moyen pour le realiser consistaient a

5:CONCISE STATEMENT OF FACTS: / 4 ~ PREP.\ TION

*

moreover the names of political opponents to be eliminated. Some of them were in fact killed on the morning of 7 April 1994.

Speeches and Incitemeut

incitement to ethnic hatred and vlolence was a Fundamental part of the plan put in place. It was articulated, before and

ng the genocide, by elements of the F U on the one hand, and by members of the Government and local authorities on the other.

5 On 4 December 199 1, President Juvinal Habyarimana set up a military commission. The commission, presided over by Theoneste Bagosora, was given the task of finding ul answer to the following question: What do we need to do in order to defeat the enemy militarilv, in the media and

5.5 in a letter dated 21 September 1992, the General Staff of the Rwandan . M y ordered that an extract fiom the commission report be circulated among the troops. The extract defined the main enemy as follows:

e Tutsis from inside or outside the country, who are extremists and nostalgic for power, who do not recognize and have never recognized the realities of the Sociai Revolution of 1959, and are seeking to regain power in Rwanda by any means, including taking rip arms. The secondary enemy was defined as: Anyone providing any kind of assistance to the main enemy. The document specified that she enemy was being recruited fiom within certain social goups, notably: the Trirsis inside the corrrrtry. Hiitris who are dissatisfied with the present regime, foreigners married to Ttt tsi women.... Among the activities the enemy

exterminer les Tutsi et leurs complices. La lettre mentiomait, par ailleurs, les noms d'opposants politiques a Clirniner. Ctrtains d ' e n t d e f f e c t i v e r n e n t ete assassinks dans la matinee du 7 avril 1 994.

Discours et Incitation

5.3 L'incitation i la haine et ii la violence ethniques a constitue un elinent essentiel du plan mis en place. Elle a i t6 articulee, avant et durant lz ginocide, dune part par des tltments des FXR, et d'autre part par des rnembres du gouvernement et des autoritts locales.

$

5.4 Le 4 dkcembre 1991, le.!PrCsident Juvknal Habyarimana a mis en place une commission militaire. Cette commission, presidCe par ThConeste Bagosora, etait chargee de ripondre a la question suivante: Que faut-ii faire pour vaincre lennemi sur le plan militaire. me'diatiatle - - - - - - - - -

et ~olitique?.

5.5 Dans une lettre datCe du 21 septembre 1992, I'Etat-Major de I'Armee Rwandaise a ordomt la diffusion, panni les troupes, d'un extrait du rapport produit par cstte commission. Ce doccment -

definissait I'ennemi principal comrne 6tant le Tutsi de i'int&riettr ou de I'extbieur, extrhiste et nostalgiqtie du pozivoir, qui n'a jarnais reconnu et ne reconnaif pas encore les realitis de la Rhvolution Sociale de 1959 et qtti veut reconquerir le pouvoir au Rwanda par &oris les moyens, y compris les arnres 2t

l'smemi secondaire c o m e etant totite

personne qrti apporte tout concorm ff I 'ennerni principal. Le document precisait que le recrutement de I'ennerni se faisait pami certains goupes sociaua, notarnrnent : . . .Les Tutsi cie l 'itlterierrr, les M i t t 4 micontents dl6 rigime en place, les

5:CONCISE STATEMENT OF FACTS: PREP.ARATIO1U

* jq9 In February 1994, Mathieu 5.9 En fevrier 1994 Mathieu Ngimrnpatse chaired an :MRW gathering at Ngirumpatse a preside un rassemblement Nyamirambo stadium, where speakers took MRND au stade de Nyamirarnbo ou des the floor and incited violence against the orateurs ont pris la parole pour inciter a la Tirtsis. violence contre les Tutsi.

From April to July 1994, incitement 5.10 D'avril a juillet 1994, cette to hatred and violence was propagated by incitation a la haine et i la violence a ece various prominent persons, including propagee p s diffirentes persomalitls,

embers of the IMW'D, the Government dont des membies du MRND, du local authorities. The President, Gouvernement et des autoritis locales. Le

eodore Sindikubwabo, the Prime PrQident, Theodore Sindikubwabo, Ie inister, Jean Karnbanda, Ministers * Premier Ministre, Jean Kambanda, les ,

; uy.cstin Ngirabatware, Jean de Dieu minis tres, Augstin Ngirabatware, ~ e a n

Kamuhanda, Andre Rwarnakuba, Eliezer de Dieu Kamuhanda, -Andre Niyitegeka and Andre Ntagerura and local Rwamakuba, Eliezer Niyitegeka st And& authorities publicly incited the people to Ntagerura et des repr8sentants de exteminatc the Tutsi population and its l'autorite locale ont incite publiquement la accomplices. population * a exterminer la populahn

Tursi et ses complices.

P r o p a ~ a n d a La proaacande

1 The creation of media, such as the 5.1 1 La creation de rnoyens newspaper Kan,gtra and Radio Til4vision mldiatiques, tels que le journal Kanpra Libre des ~VfiZi'e Colhes (RTLM), launched et la Radio T&!kvision Libre des Milles and directed by MIiiW and CDR leading Coilines (RTLLM), fondde et dinsee, par Ggures, helped to propagate the extremist de hautes personnalitCs du MRND et du

L Hutu ideology and its message of ethnic CDR, a aid6 a propager l'idtologie Hutu .i hatred and violence, and contributed to the extrkmiste et son discours de haine et de , j . r

indoctrination of the Rwandan people. violence ethiques, et a contribd 5 TLM was openly designed and used by endoctriner la population nvandaise. La

many .MRW leaders and members of the RTLM a kt6 ouvertement con~ue et government a means of propagandizing utilis6e par plusieurs leaders du MRiSD et Hutu "Power". les rnembres du gouvemement comme un

moyen de propagande du Hutu "Power".

5 12 The private company RTLLM S.A. and 5.12 La sociite civile RTLM S.A. et sa its radio station were founded by statute station radio ont Cte fondees par statut signed on 8 April 1993. The media signe le 8 avril 1993. Cette sociirl company was largely financed by Felicien mediatique dtait largernent financee par Kabuga. FClicien Kabuga.

.13 The broadcasting studios of RTL>I 5.13 Les studios de RTLM itaiznt were connected to the electric generators of connectes, directement a travers la me, au the Presidential Palace, directly across the generateur l l tc t r ique du Palais

14s 5. EXPOS$ SUCCXNT DES FAJTS: P&PARATION

1

was accused of, the document mentioned the &rangers marigs aux fernmes Tutsi ... diversion of national opinion from the Parmi les activitks reprochkes a l'ennemi, ethnic problem to the socio-economic le document mentionnai t le roblem between the rich and the poor. ... D&toumement de I 'opinion nationale du

probldme ethnique vers le problGme socio- 4conomique entre les riches et Zes pauvres.

.6 The letter of 21 September 1992, and 5.6 La lettre du 2 1 septembre 1992, et the way that the senior officers used it, l'utilisation qu'en ont faite les officiers aided, encouraged and promoted ethnic superieurs, ont aid&, encourag6 et favoris6 hatred and violence. la haine et la violence ethnique.

.7 Colonel a Thkoneste Bagosora 5.7 Le Colonel ThConeste Bagosora a icipated in the Arusha talks, and openly participb aux nCgociations d ' h s h a et a

anifested his opposition to the concessions manifest6 ostensiblement son opposition ade by the Government representative, aux concessions faites par le re~rbsentant oniface Ngulinzira, Minister of Foreign du Gouvemement, Boniface N&ulhzira,

Affairs, to the point of leaving the Ministre des Affaires ~tran~bres, au point negotiation table. Colonel Thdoneste de quitter la table des n6gociations. Le

agosora left Arusha saying that he was Colonel Th6oneste Bagosora a quitt6 returning to Rwanda to prepare the Arusha en dCclarant qu'il rentrait au apocalypse. On 11 April 1994, Boniface Rwanda pour prtparer Z'apocalypse. Le Ngulinzira was assassinated by the military. 11 avril 1994, Boniface Ngulinzira etait

s death was announced on RTLM in these assassin6 par les militaires. La RTLM a terms: We have exterminated all the annonce sa mort en ces temes: nous accomplices of the RPF', Bonface avons extermink tow les complices du Ngulinzira will no longer go and sell the FPR, Boniface Ngulinzira n'ira plus country to the RPFs advantage in Amsha. vendre le pays au profit du FPR ZI Amsha.

e Peace Accords are only scraps of Les Accords de paix ne sont pliis que ties paper, as our father, Habyarimana, had chz$ions de papier comme i'avait prkdit predicted. notre papa Habyarimana .

The characterization of the Tutsis as 5.8 La qualification des Tutsi c o m e enemy and of members of the opposition Ctant l'ennemi et des membres de their accomplices was echoed by I'opposition c o m e &ant leurs complices,

ians, notably by L6on Mugesera, a 6tC reprise par des politiciens, Vice-chairman for Gisenyi notamment LCon Mugesera, Vice

prdfecture, in a speech he made on 22 President du pour la prbfecture de November 1992. Broadcast on the state Gisenyi, dans un discours prononcC le 22 radio and therefore reaching a much larger novembre 1992, Difks6 sur la Radio audience, Leon Mugesera's speech, already d'Etat et s'adressant ainsi a un public at that time, incited others to exterminate the beaucoup plus large, le discours de LBon Tutsi population and its accomplices. Mugesera, a incit6, dbs cette hpoque, i

exterminer la population Tutsi et ses complices.

)4'= 5. EXPOSE SUCCINT OES FAfTS: P&P.~\~UTIOIY

skeet, permitting it to continue to operate in case of power failure. In the latter half of 1993, the RTLiM began broadcasting from Kigali across Rwanda through a network of transmitter owned ' and operated by sovenunent owned Radio Rwanda. It later V

became a mobile station, installed in an armored car of the Rwanda Armed Forces (RAF). It sought refuge in what laser became the Turquoise Zone set up in the jungle of Gikongoro and Kibuye Prefecture. Radio broadcasts by RTLM disappeared after mid-July 1994.

I

PrCsidentiel, ce qui leur permettait de rester operatiotxilels en cas de panne de courant. Durant la seconde rnoititi de 1993, RTLM comrnenca a diffuser de Kigali ses programmes au Rwanda, y%ce a un rCseau de transmetteurs possides et

utilisis par la Radio Rwanda proprikte de 1'Etat. Plus tard RTLM s'est transforme en station mobile installke dans une voiture blind& appartenant aux Forces bees Rwandaises (FAR). Elle s'ttait refugiee dans un espace, situe dans la jungle de Gikongoro et la Prefecture dz Kibuye, qui allait devenir la -zone turquoise. Les emissions de RTLM ont pris fin apres la mi-juillet 1994.

5.14 Behveen 9 April and mid-July 1994, the President, ThCodore S indihbwabo, the

Prime Minister, Jean Kambznda Ministers, . hd r6 Rwamak-iiba and Justin Musemi and radio announcers, among whom, Georges Ruggiu and Hassan Ngeze, used RTLM to incite, aid and abet the extermination of the Tursi population and the elimination oi -_ . numerous moderate S u t u .

5.14 Entre 9 avril et mi-juilldt 1994, ic President, - ThCodore ~indikubwabo, Le Premier Ministre, Jean Kmbafida, les Ministres Andre Rwamakuba et Justin Mugenzi, des joumalistes, parmi lesquels, Georges Ruggiu et Hassan Ngeze ont utilise la RTLM pour inciter, aider et encourager a exteminer la population Tutsi et a ilirniner de nombreux Hutu

I / . The Militia Groups )

5 Politicai rivalries during the multi- parry period exacehated tensions among the various political parties. Thus, in a climate of almost total impunity, the hteraham we- LVRW were encouraged to use violence to -

oppose the political demonstrations

Les milices

5.15 Les rivalitks politiques de la periode du multi-partisme ont exacerbe les tensions entre les diffirents partis politiques. Ainsi les interahamwe-MEW ont 6te encourages, dam un climat d'impunitk quasi total, a s'opposer

organized by parties of the opposition and vio lemment aux manifestations politiques to tenorize Rwandan citizens in order to organisies par les partis de l'opposition et prevent them from joining parties other than a semer la terieur parmi les citoyens the MRND. rwandais pour les empZcher d7adhirer a

d'z~rr-s partis que le EXRhD.

5.16 The transformation of the 5.16 La trans fornation des ltrternhanrwe to serve the interests of the lnterahamwe au service du ?vtR;\PD h i t MRW was an illicit operation formally une entreprise illicite formellzrncnt forbidden by the law. Further, to extend the interdite par la loi. En outre, pour Ctsndre

25

ivities of the militia group, the MRND central committee fonned Interdramwe- MRW committees at prefecture level in June 1993. This decision was carried out in their localities by political figures including among others Pauline Nyiramasuhuku in Butare and Joseph Nzirorera in Ruhengeri.

7 In order to ensure that, when the time came, the extermination of the enemy and its accomplices would be carried out swiftly and effectively, it was necessary to turn the Interahamwe-LMFGW into a militia group, structured, armed and complementary to the

ed Forces. As from 1993, and even before that date, the leaders of the MRLW, in collaboration with officers of the FAR, decided to providz military training to those members most devoted to their extremist causc znd to other idle youths. Furthermore, weapons were distributed to them.

Tmin ing ofthe iMilitia Groups

he training of Interahamwe- , . and impuzamugarnbi-CDR was : ; -.- J sed and encouraged by civilian and

authorities, including Joseph Nzirorera, Juvenal Kajelijeli and Andre Ntagerura. Training was conducted sirnul taneously in several prifectures around the country: Kigali, Cyangugu, Gisenyi and

utate, as well as in the Mutara sector. Training also took place in military camps, no tab ly Gabiro, Gako, Mukamira and

igogwe, as well as around these camps or in neighbouring forests.

L'action de cette milice, le Cornit6 Central du MIUW a cred en juin 1993 des cornites d'lurteraharnwe-bI1ICUD au niveau de chaque prefecture. Cctte dkcision a it2 mise en oeuvre par des personnalit2s poiitiques du MRND au niveau de leur circonscription p a m i lesqurllrs Pauline Nyiramasuhuku a Butare et Joseph Nzirorera a Ruhengeri.

5.17 Afin de s'assurer qu'a terme, l'exterrnination de l'ememi et de ses complices se ferait rapidement et

F 1

efficacement, il Otait necessaire de constituer fes I n t e r a h a m w e - ~ ~ en milice, s truc turee, annee et compltmentaire aux Forces Armies. Db 1993 et mZme avant, les dirikeants du MRND en collaboration avec dis officiers des FAR, ont d i d 6 ds faire suivre aux dements Les plus dCvouCs a leur cause extrimiste et a d'autras jeunes dtsoeuvr&s, un sntraL,nement militaire. En outre, des armes lcur ont it2 distribuees.

L 'enfrar^nement des milices

5.18 L'zntrainement des Interahamwe- M I I W et impuzarn zgaambi-CDR ttait facilitk et encourage par des autoritts : miltaires et civiles dont Joseph Nzirorera, , '

Juvenai Kaj elij eli, et Andre Ntagerura. Ces entrainements ont eu lieu simultanlment dans plusieurs prefectures du pays : Ki,oali, Cyangugu, Gisenyl, Butare et dans le seeteur du Mutara. Ces entrainements se tenaient dans dss camps militaires, notamment les camps de Gabiro, Gako, ~Mukamira et de Bigogve et egalernent aux alentours de ces camps ou dam les forkts avoisinantes.

5.19 On LO January 1994, a leader of the hteraharnwe-MRND militia informed LXAiifR that 1,700 militiamen had

5.19 LC 10 janvier 1994, un dirigeant des milices interahamwe-MRi\D a infome la MIXWAR que 1,700 milicizns avaient suivi un entrainement et qu'ils pouvaient Climiner 1,000 Tutsi toutes les vingt minutes. Cet inforrnateur affirmait recevoir ses ordres de hlathieu Nsjrumpatse, Prdsident du i\/IitUD.

undergone training . and that they could eliminate 1,000 Tutsis every hvsnty minutes. This informer stated that he took his orders &om lMathieu Ngirumpatse, Chairman of the LMRND.

The secret training of the militiamen became more and more notorious. They

3.30 Les entrainements secrets des miliciens sont devenus de plus en plus de notoriete publique. On a pu les voir s'entrainer, a certaines occasions, dans des endroits publics ou se diriger vers les sites d'entrainement, en chantant des slogans incitant i l'extermination de Yememi.

I , - , ' , '

La distribution d'armes

could on some occasions be seen training in public places or on their way to the training sites, while chanting slogans inciting the extermination of the enemy.

Distribution of Weapons

5.21 in order to implzment the plan for 5.2 1 P Q U ~ mettre en oeuvre le p l m thc externination of the enemy and its d7extemination dcs l ' s~aerni et ses accomplices, the militiamen were to receive weapons, in addition to military training.

comptices, les miliciens devaient recevoir, en plus dun entrainement militaire, des

Hence, the civilian and miljtgry a_u&oOrit~es - - - - - - - - - - -

disiribuied weapons to thz militiamen and certain carefully selected members of the

- a~mes. - D&s IOFS, les autoritks civiles et militairts ont distribuk des annes aux niliciens et a certains + membres soigneusement choisis de la population civilian population in various prefectures of

the country. Berween April and July, ~ k d raising activities were organized by MRND

civile, dans diffkrentes prefectures du pays. Entre avril et juillet 1994, des campagnes de collecte de fonds ont Cte organistes par des membres itrninents du IvZitW a£in d'anner

leading figures in order to bolster the armament of the militiamen who were

d'avantage les rniliciens qui se livraient ii

des massacres de la population Tutsi et de Hutu moderis.

5.22 En 1993, le President Habyarimana

committing massacres of the Tutsi population and of moderate Hutu.

5.22 In 1993, President Habyarimana declared in Ruhengeri that the interaham we- MRND had to be equipped so that, come the right time, ib descendent.

declarait a Ruhengeri qu'on devait Pquiper les interahamwe-LMRND pour qu'au moment opportun, ils descendent.

5.33 Le ou vers le 12 avril 1994 le 5.23 On or about 12 April 1994, the Ministre des Finances du Gouvernement LntCrimaire s'est pr6senti persomellement a

Minister of Finance in the Interim government personally went to Gitarama

ahd ordered that all the money in the safe la Prefecture de Gitarama et a ordonne deposit be given to him. He said that the qu'on lui remette tout l'argent depose dans money collected was meant for the purchase son coffre fort. I1 a affirm6 que l'argent ainsi of weapons and that Casirnir Bizimungu was collecte est destind a l'achat d'armes et que instructed to travel- abroad in order to Casimir Bizimungu dtait charge de voyager negotiate the purchase. a l'ktranger pour negocier ces achats.

5.24 Before and during the events referred to in this indictment, some members of the Interim government, MRM) leaders and some soldiers participated in the distribution of weapons to the militiamen and certain carehlly selected members of

1 J

the civilian population with the intent to - -

terminate the Tutsi population and eliminate its accomplices.

5.24 Avant et durant les evenements visis dans le present acte d'accusation, des membres du gouvemement intirimaire, des leaders du hZRtW et des militaires ont participe a la distribution d'armes aux

. miliciens et a certaines personnes soigneusement choisies parmi la population

- civile dans l'intention d'exterminer la population Tutsi et d'iliminer ses complices.

p , ' .

Towards the end of 1993, in an open 5.25 Vers -la fin 1993, dans une lettre letter broadcast on national radio, the Bishop ouverte difhsbe sur les ondes de la Radio of the diocese of Nyundo, in Gisenyi Nationale, lYt$2que du diocbse de Npndo, prkfecture, denounced the distribution of prefecture de Gisenyi, a denonce la weapons in that pr<fectut-e. distribution d'armes dans cette prefectur-e.

5.26 Further, in a letter from Prine Minister ..\garhe Uwilingiyimana dated*. 13 January 1994, the Minister of Defence, Augstin Bizimana, was reproached .for refusing to c a w out a Cabinet decision to

I * P recover all firearms distributed ilZegally to

the civilian population.

5.36 Par ailleurs, dans une lettre du Premier Ministre Agathe Uwilin,oiyirnana datee du 19 janvier 1994, le Ministre de la D6fense Augustin ,Bizimana s'est vu reprocher son refus d'extcuter une decision du Conseil des Ministres de vetirer toutes lesarmescifeudistribuiesiill&galementala ,

population civile.

2 7 Due to the proliferation of weapons 5.27 En raison de la prolifiration des in Kigali-ville prifecture, UNWR put in armes dam la prefecture de Kigali-ville, la place a disarmament program, titled Kigali MIHUAR a rnis en place un progarnrne de Weapon Security Area (KWSA). disarmement, denomme Kigali Weapon

Security Area (KWSA).

On 7 January 1994, Mathieu 5.28 Le 7 janvier 1994, Mathieu mpatse, Augustin Bizimana, Augustin Ngimmpatse, Allgustin Bizimana, Atgust in

Ndindiliyimana, DCogratias Nsabimana, Ndindiliyimana, Deogratias Nsabirnana, obert Kajuga and other influential l C I W Robert Kajuga et d'autres membres influsnts

5. EXPOS& SUCCliYT DES FUTS: PREP.LRATIOIY

Q

members participated in a meeting at the MRND headquarters in opposition to the disarmament program. It was decided at this meeting to use all possible means to resist the implementation of the disarmament, and also to hide weapons at various locations.

5.29 On 10 January 1994, UNAi'fTR was informed by an Interahamwe-MRM) leader of the existence of weapons caches in Kigali and a plan to eliminate the Tutsi population.

1 It instructed one of its officers to uncover the exact locations of the weapons. That officer identified several caches throughout Kigali, in places controlled by members of the hfKND, notably at the party headquarters in Kimihurura, in a house belonging to General Augustin Ndindiliymana. D ~ r i n g the search of that house, the U N M I R officer discovered several firearms and cases of ammunition. The informer asserted ihat, as regards the military aspects of his duties, he was under the orders of MRLUD Chaiman, Mathieu Ngintrnpatse, and the Army Chief of Staff, Ddogratias Nsabimana. Moreover, . he informed UNAMIR that the weapons that

i '. I II had been distributed came from the Army.

du MRND ont participd a une reunion au quartier gCn6ral du ICfEWD, pour s'opposer au programme de d6samement. 11 y a i t i ddcid6, d'une part, de resister par tous les moyens a 17CxCcution du programme de dbarmement, et d'autre part de dissimuler des annes a diffkrents endroits.

5.29 Le 20 janvier 1994, la bll3.iLRR a Cte informee, par un dirigeant des hreraharn we-iMRND, de l'exis tence de

- caches d ' m e s a Kigali, et d'un plan pour eliminer la population Tutsi. ElIe a mandati un de ses officiers pour s'assurer de l'emplacement exact des armes. Cet oficier a localise plusieurs caches d'armes a travers la ville de Kigali, dam des lie~,'contrdt6s par des rnernbres du MXhD, not&ent au quartier general du parti, situ6 a Kimihurura, dans unz maison appartznant au GinCrzl Augustin Ndindiliyimana. Lors de la fouille, l'officier de la L M W A R a dCcouvert, a cet endroit, plusieurs m e s . a feu et des caisses de munitions. L' informateur a affim6 travailler sous tes ordres du President du MRBD, Mathieu Ngirurnpatse, et du Chef dEtat Major de lYArmee, DCogatias Nsabimana pour les aspects militaires de ses tiiches. I1 a, en outre, inform6 la MNUAR que les armes distribudes provenaient de l 7 h 6 e .

Establishment o f Lists Confection de listes

5.30 Having identified the Tutsi as the enemy and the members of the opposition as their accomplices, members of the Army General Staff, civilian authorities and militiamen established lists of people to be executed.

In 1992, at a meeting, Colonel Thioneste Bagosora instructed the two

5.30 Apres avoir identi fie le Tutsi cornme Ctant l'ennemi principal et les rnernbres de l'opposition comme ses complices, des rnernbres de 1'Etat-Major de I ' h e e , des autoritis civiles et des rniliciens ont dresse des listes de personnes a exbcuter.

5.31 En 1992, tors d'une rlunion, le Colonel ThConeste Bagosora a demande aux

eneral Staffs to establish lists of people identified as the enemy and its accomplices. The Intelligence Bureau (G-2) of the

wandan h y established the lists under the supervision of Anatole Nsengyumva. T h i lists were regularly updated during the time that Augustin Bizimana was Minister o f Defense.

2 On 10 January 1994, an Inter~hamwe-MRND leader informed

AMR that he had received orders to establish lists of Tutsi to be eliminated.

On 25 February 1994, at a meeting at headquarters in Kimihurura, chaired

Chairman of the Interahamwe- , Robert Kajuga, Interahamwe-

& W ? W leaders of Kigali-ville ordered their militants to establish lists of names of Tutsi with the intent to eliminate them.

5. CONCISE STATESfE3T OF FACT: PREP.UUTIOIY

deux Etats-Majors d'itablir des listes de personnes identifiees cornme Ctant 1 ' ememi et ses complices. Les agents du service de renseignements du G-2 de l ' b l e Rwandaise ont procedt a la confection de ces listes, sous la supervision d ' h a t o l e Nsengiyurnva. Ces listes ont 2tC rigulierement mises a jour durant la penode ou Augustin Bizimana Ctait ministre de la defense.

5.32 Le 10 janvier 1994, un dirigeant des - lnteraharnwe a infome la MIWAR qu'il

avait requ I'ordre de preparer des listes de Tutsi eliminer.

5.33 Le 25 fivrier 1994, lors d'une r6union i la permanence d u , . 6fRND I i Kimihurura, .pr6sidte par 1s President des Interahamwe-MIUVD, Robert Kajuga, des dirigeants des Interahamwe-?dK;VD de Kigali-ville ont dome ordre leurs militants de prgparer des listes nominatives de Tutsi dans le but de les dliminer.

5.34 From 7 April to late July, military 5.34 Du 7 avril a la fin juillet, des and In terahamwe-i"./IRND massacred militaires et des Interahamwe-kRiW ont members of the Tutsi population and. of perpCtr6 des massacres de membres de la

erate Hum by means of pre-established population Tutsi et des Hutu moderis, entre

..I -B" lists, among other things. autres a h i d e de listes prC-Gtablies.

Antecbdents r4v6Iant une conduite Course of Action dClibCrCe

5 The political and ethnic violence of 5.35 La violence ethnique et politique du the early 1990s was characterized by the use debut des annees 90 a ete caracterisee par o f the elements of the strategy which l'utilisation des 6ltments de la stratigie qui achieved its finality in the genocide of April allait connaitre son aboutissement avec le 1994. The massacres of the Tutsi minority genocide de 1994. Les massacres de la

.at that time, including those in Ktbilira minorite Tutsi perp6tres a cette epoque, tels (L990), in Bugesera (l992), and those of the que ceux a Kibilira (1990), a Bugesera Bagogwe (1 99 I), were instigated, facilitated (1992), et ceux a l'encontre des Bagogwe

P

and organized by civilian and military authorities. On each occasion, a campaign of" incitement to ethnic violence, conducted by local authorities, was followed by massacres of the Tutsi minority, perpetrated by goups of militiamen and civilians, armed and assisted by the same authorities and by certain military personnel. On each occasion, these crimes remained unpunished and the authorities implicated were generally not taken to task.

(1991) ont Cte suscites, facilites et organisis par des autorites civiles t t militaires. A chaque occasion une carnpagne d'incitation a la violence ethnique menee 'par des autorites ilocales a ite suivie de massacres de la minorite Tutsi, perpetr6s par des groupes de miliciens et de civils, a m e s et aides par ces memes autontks et certains militaires. A chaque occasion, ces crimes sont demeures impunis et les autorites irnpliquees n'onr giniralement pas et t inquiC t8es.

A 5.36 Cooperation between the 5.36 La collaboration entre des 3

Interahamwe-MRND and certain military Interahamwe-kIR.lVD et certains militaires, personnel, particularly those in the particulikrement de la Garde Presidentielle Presidential Guard and the Para-Commando et du Bataillon Para-Commando, s'est de Battalion, was manifested in early 1994 in nouveau rnanifestie au debut de 1991 pour opposition to the implementation of the s'opposer a la mise sn place des institutions institutions provided for under the Arusha prkvues par les Accords d'Arusha. Lz 5 Accords. On 5 January 1994, at the time of janvier 1994, lors de la ceremonic prtvue rhe swearing-in ceremony of the Broad- pour la prestation de serment du Based Transitional Government, the Gouvemement de Transition B Base Elargie, h t e r a h a m w e - W ~ ~ organized a les interahamwe-LKQD ont organise une demonstration in cooperation with members manifestation en collaboration avec des of the Presidential Guard. They prevented ilkments de la Garde Prisidentielle. 11s ont political opponents from enterins the interdit i9acc5s au CND (Conseil national de Conseil national de diveloppernent (CND) . dbveloppement) aux oppo~ants politiques. The swearing-in of the members of ihe La prestation da serment des membres du

'-Yi

- 3 ovemment did not take place. In the end, Gouvemement na pas eu lieu. Finalement

only the President, JuvOnal Habyarimana, seul le President, Juv6nal Habyarimana, a was sworn in. prlte serment.

537 On 8 January 1994, Interahamwe, in 5.37 De nouveau, le 8 janvier 1994, les complicity with elements of the Presidential lnterahamwe en complicite avec des Guard and the Para-Commando Battalion ilernents de la Garde Presidentislie et du dressed in civilian clothes, again organized a Bataillon Para-Commando habillis en civils, demonstration near the CND. On that ont organise une manifestation pres du occasion, the Interaham we-MRND had 0. A cette occasion, Ies Inferalznmrve- hidden weapons very nearby and were MRND avait dissimule des arrnes a equipped with radios provided by the proximite et etaient equipes de radios Presidential Guard. That demonstration was fournies par la Garde Presidentielle. Cette intended to provoke and cause injury to the manifestation visait a provoquer et agesssr

elgian UNAMIR soldiers. les soldats belges de la i\/fNUAR.

Y

5. CONCISE STATELMEST OF F.4CT: P R E P . W Y I O Y

3.38 Finally, as of 7 April 1994, 5.38 Finalernent, dks l e 7 avril 1994, sur throughout Rwanda, Tutsis and certain tout le temtoire du Rwanda, des Tutsi et moderate Hutus began to flee their homes to certains Hutu rnodCrQ, pour Cchappcr a in escape the violence to which they were violence dont its ktaient victimes sur leurs victims on their hills and to seek refuse in collines, ont commence ir h i r leurs rnaisons places where they had traditionally felt safe, pour chercher refuge dans des endroits ou notably churches, hospitals and othcr public traditionnellement ils s'itaient sentis en buildings such as commune and preyecture securite, notamment des bglises, des offices. On several occasions, gathering h8pitaux et d' aurres Bdifices publics comme places were indicated to them by the iocal les bureaux comrnunaux et prefectoraux. A authorities, who had promised to protect plusieurs occasions, des - endroits de them. For the initial days, the refugees were rassemblement leur avaient etO indiques par protected by a few gendarmes and - des autoritts locales qui avaient prornis de

* ?'

\ * j. communal police in these various locations, les proteger. Durant les premiers jours, les

but subsequently, the rehgees were r t h g i b ont Cte proteges par quelques systematically attacked and massacred by gendarmes et policiers communaux dans ces militiamen, often assisted by the same differents endroits, mais par la suite,

8 '

authorities who had promised to protect the systimatiquement, les refi$is+ ont ere refugees. During the numerous attacks on attaques et - massacrks par des miliciens, the rehgees throughout the country, souvent zidts par ces m&mes autoritis qui personnel of the FAR, military or avaient prornis de prot6ger ies r6hgiCs. ..\u

- sendarmes, who were supposed to protect cours des nombreuses attaques rnenkes them, prevented the Tutsi from escaping and contre les rbfigiCs partout a travers le pays, facilitated their massacre py thc - - - - -

- - - des rnernbres - des - EAR, - mi-litaires - ou -

- - - - - - -

- hreycph-umwe-LqmRND - - - - - On several gendarmes, qui devaient les prottger, ont occasions, these FAR personnel participkd cmpiiche les Tutsi de h i t et faciliti l e u directly in the massacres. massacre par les interahamwe-MRW. A

plusieurs occasions, ces membres des FAR

Furthermore, soldiers, militiamen gendarmes raped or sexually assaulted

or committed other crimes of a sexual nature against Tutsi women and girls, sometimes after having first kidnapped them.

ont participC directement aux massacres. '!

5.39 De plus, des militaires, des miliciens et des gendarmes ont commis des viols, des agressions sexuelles et d'autres crimes de nature sexuelle a l'encontre de certaines fernrnes et jeunes filles Tutsi et ce parfois apres les avoir enlevees.

6: EXPOSE SUCCIYCT DES F.UTS: AUTRES VIOLATIONS DU DROIT t-IUM&YIT..URE ~NTERNATTOML

6. CONCISE STATEMENT OF THE ACTS: OTHER VIOLATIONS OF

INTERii ATIONAX, . HU3IGLUITMAi LAW

Power Crisis

6.1 On 6 April 1994 at about 8:30 p.m., the plane carrying, among other passengers, the President of the Republic, Juvlnal Habyarimana, was shot down on its approach to Kigali Airport, Rwanda.

Following the crash of the Presidents plane, the Forces Armies Rwandaises were left without. 4eadership. The President was dead, along with the Chief of Staff of the Rwandan y , Colonel DCogratias Nsabirnana. The Minister of Defence, Augustin Bizimana, and the Chief of intelligence Services (G2) in the Rwandan Army, Colonel Aloys Ntiwiragabo, were on mission in the Republic of Cameroon. They returned to the country in the days that followed. Gratien Kabiligi, the officer in charge of operations (G3) in the wanda an Army General Staff, was also on mission in

* .. I - . , gyp. In the absence of the Minister of

' Defence, Colonel Thioneste Bagosora, directeur de cabinet, asserted himself as the man of the moment capable of managing the crisis.

fitary Takeover A tternpt

Within the first hours following the death of the President, two important meetings took place in Kigali where Colonel Theoneste Bagosora and several Army o ffciers attempted to seize power. While the

6. EXPOSE SUCCINCT DES FAITS: AUT'RIES VIOLATIONS DU DROIT INTERiATIONrll, HUitIAi1TiUR-E

Crise du pouvoir

6.1 Au soir du 6 avril 1994 vers 2050 heures, l'avion transportant entre autres passagers le Prisident de la Rbublique du Rwanda, Juvenal Habyarimana, a Bte abattu peu avant son attemssage a l'droport de Kigali, Rwanda.

6.2 Apres la chute de l'avion prisidentiel, les Forces Armtes R~andaises se sont retrouvkes sans dir&tion. LP President ~ t a i t mort ainsi que le chef d7Etat- Major (LUX), le Colonel DCogatiai Nsabirnana. Le mini st re de la Defense, Augustin Bizimana et le responsible des renseignements (G2) d e 1 'E tat-Maj or (AR), le Colonel Aloys Ntiwiragabo, Btaient en mission en RCpublique du Cameroun. [Is sont revenus au pays dans les jours qui ont suivi. Gratien Kabiligi, responsable des operations (G3) de 1'Etat-Major (AR), Otait Bgalement en mission en Egypte. En i'absence du Ministre de la DCfense, le Colonel ThConeste Bagosora, airecreur de cabinet, s'est impose cornme l'homme de la situation a m8me de g6rer la crise.

Tentative de prise du pouvoir par les

6.3 Au cours des premikres heures qui ont suivi la mort du Prisident, deux reunions importantes ont eu lieu a Kigali, au cours desquelles le Colonel ThConeste Bagosora et plusieurs officiers de l'armle ont tenti de

6: CONCISE STATEME3'T OTHER VOLATIOIYS OF tiVTEWAT1ONAL Hli>lAWI'ARI.LU LAW

second meeting was going on, the Prime prendre le pouvoir. Alors que la seconde Minister Mrs Agathe Uwilinsjyimana, the reunion se dkroulait le Premier Ministre President of the Constitutional Court, other Madame Xgathe Uwilingiyimana, lz leading political figures and ten UN&VIR President de la Cour Constitutionnelle, Blue Helmets were brutally massacred. d'autres persomalit& politiques idportantes

ainsi que dix casques b l e w appartenant au contingent de la M N U M ont ete brutalement massacres.

6.4 The elimination of political 6.4 L'Climination des opposants opponents made it possible to set aside the politiques a permis d'kcarter la mise en establishment of the Broad-Based place du Gouvemement de Transition a Transi tionai Government (BBTG), Base Elaigie (G.T.B.E.), prevu aux Accords stipulated in the h s h a Accords, in favour d ' h s h a , au profit d'un Gouvernement u . of an Interim Government- The murder of IntCrimaire. L'assassinat des militaires ' the Belgian soldiers prompted the belges a provoque le retrait de la majeure withdrawal of most of UNAiiIR's partie des contingents de la ~MfivfiAR. Ccs contingents. Those two events removed the deux ivCnements ont lcarte : fes deux two major obstacles to the pursuit of the obstacles majeurs ii la pou&uire des massacres. massacres.

ormatiun o f the Interim Government Formation du Gouvernem ent Intkrimaire

Making up for the failure of the attempt at a military takeover by certain military personnel, the leaders of the &END and of other political parties and military officers, including Colonel ThConeste Bagosora, put in place an interim Government which would aid and abet the continuation of the massacres.

6.5 Faisant face a I'khec de la tentative de prise du pouvoir par certains militaires, les dirigeants du IvllClUD et d'autres pvtis politiques et des officiers militaires parmi lesquels le Colonel Theoneste Bagosora, ont mis en place un Gouvemement Inttrimaire qui allait aider et encourager la continuation des massacres.

Already, in the night of 6 to 7 April, 6.6 Dts la nuit du 6 au 7 avril, a Kigali, gali, the Presidential Guard (PG) la Garde PrQsidentielle (GP) a deplace les

moved the IMRND ministers, members of Ministres du IMRND, des membres des ailes the Power wings of the other political dites power des autres parties politiques, parties, including Casimir Bizimungu and parmi lesqueis, Casimir Bizimungu et Justin Justin Mugenzi and prominent members of ~Mugenzi ainsi que des persomalitts de the deceased President Habyarimanas circle. ['entourage du defunt President Some were taken to military camps. They Habyarimana. Certains d'entre eux ont 6td were subsequently moved to the Hdel conduits dam des camps rnilitaires. Ils ont Diplomate, where they were guarded by Cte transfbk, par la suite, a I'hdtel members of the Reconnaissance Battalion. Diplomate oh leur sicuriti a ete assuree par

des membres du Bataillon de

34

6: EXPOSE S U C C ~ C T DES FUTS: AUTRES WOLATIONS OU OROIT HUMltYITcL[RE tNTEKYATIONAL

Reconnaissance.

.7 On 7 April, at about 7:00 a.m., Colonel Thioneste 8agosora called a meeting at the Ministry of Defence o f the members of the MRND executive committee, including Mathieu Ngirumpatse, Edouard Kaemera and Joseph Nzirorera. The purpose of the meeting was to appoint a new President of the Republic.

On 8 . April, Colonel TbConeste agosora summoned political party

representatives to a meeting to form a new Government. To that effect, he arranged their transport to the Ministry of Defence.

e members of the Government were appointed at the meeting in the presence of hSRNC, representatives Mathieu Ngirumpatse, Edouard Karemera and Joseph

, Nzirorera. They were almost all members of the h4lWD and of Power wings of the other political parties. 30 one pf _Tutsi -descent -

p p p p p - p - - -

- - - - - - - -

was included either in the talks or in the ntw Covement .

f -1 i . \

- . )' _ Jean Karnbanda was appointed

Prime Minister of the lnterirn Government of Rwanda formed on 8 April 1994. The

ovemment was officially sworn in on 9 ril 1994. It was composed of 19 cabinet nisters. Augustin Ngirabatware, Prosper

~Mugiraneza, Casimir Bizimungu, Andre Ntagemra et Pauline Nyiramasuhuko were among the nine L V ~ W ministers. As the designated Minister of the Interior did not. take up office, he was replaced by Edouard .

Karemera, Vice-Chairman of the MRND. r. Daniel Nbangura, originally

6.7 Le 7 avril aux environs de 07.00 heures, le Colonel ThConeste Bagosora a convoqud au Ministere de la DCfense, une riunion des membres du cornit6 executif du parti MRND, parmi lesquels, Mathieu Ngimmpatse, Edouard Karemera et Joseph Nzirorera. L'objet de la riunion Ctait de designer le nouveau Prisident de la R6publique.

6.8 Dans la journke du 8 avril, le Colonel ThConeste Bagosora a convoqui des representants des partis politiques i une r&union afm de former un nouveau gouvemement. 11 a, cet effet, o r 3 ~ s t leur dCp1 acement au Ministl.re d e la D6fense. Les membres du Gouvemement ont it6 dksigriis lots de la rCunion en prCsence des reprCsentants du MRND Mzthieu Ngirumpatse, Edouard Karemera et Joseph Nzirorera. Les persormes choisies po ur

- -

- - - composer I e Gouvernement Iiifefimaire Ctaient presque toutes issues du MRND et des ailes dites power des autres partis politiques. Aucune persomalitk d'origine Tutsi n'a ttd associCe aux discussions ou n'a fait partie du nouveau gouvemement.

6.9 Jean Kadmida a etC design6 Premier Ministre du Gouvernement IntCrimaire de la. Rtpublique Rwandaise constituC Le 8 avril 1994. Le Gouvernement a officiellernent prZtt serment le 9 avril 1994. I1 comptait 19 ministres. Augustin Ngirabatware, Prosper Mugiraneza, Casimir Bizimungu, Andr6 Ntagerura et Pauline Nyiramasuhuko faisaient partie des neuf ministres du MRND. - Le -.Ministre de l'lnterieur ddsipnd.' n'ayant pas assume ses fonctions, it a Ctd rempiace par Edouard Karemera, Vice-PrCsident du MK\D.

6: COtYCISE OTHER VIOLATIONS OF INTEHNATIONAL HUMAYIT;UIIAY L.\w

ated Minister of Higher Education, Quand le docteur Daniel Nbangura, d in rnid-May 1994 to become the initiaiernent nomme Ministre de 1

ef de Cabinet to Interim Government I'Enseignement Superieur, a demission6 cn resident Sindikubwabo, he was replaced as rni-mai 1994 pour occuper le poste dz Chef

government minister by Jean de Dieu de Cabinet du PrQident lnterimaire uhauda, also of MRND. The MDR Sindikubwabo, il a et6 remplace par Jean de

war represented by three ministers, Jtr6me Dieu Kamuhanda, qui faisait partie, lui icamumpaka, Andr6 ~wamakuba and aussi, du MRND. Le MDR 6tait represent6 liizer Niyitegeka. Three Ministers, par 3 minisees, Jkrdme Bicamumpaka,

inc luding Justin Mugenzi, represented the h d r 6 Rwamakuba et Elidzer Niyitegeka. Trois ministres, dont Justin Mugenzi, reprisentaient le Parti LibPral.

As soon as the interim Govenunent 6.10 Dts la formation du Gouvernement as formed, numerous Cabinet members IntBrimaire, plusieurs membres du Cabinet

rted the plan of extermination in place ont adh& au plan d'extermination mis en took the necessary steps to execute it. place et pris les moyens nicessaires pour

incited the people to eliminate the I'executer. Us ont incitC la po~ulation B and its accomplices, distributed eliminer I'egnerni et ses cornptices, lui ont

eapons to them, dismissed local distribui des m e s , ont rivoque des government authorities that were opposed to autoritks administratives locales opposees

massacres, re~lacing them with others aux massacres pour les rempiacer par o were devoted to the cause, and adopted d'autres acquises a la cause et ont adopt6

tives intended to facilitate the massacre des directives visant Ei faciliter les massacres civilian Tutsi population. de la population civile Tutsi.

Ridit ciion des effect f fs de la ~tIAVUA R

UNAMIR was established in ordkr to cilitate the peaceful implementation of the

tutions foreseen under the h s h a cords. This United Nations military force

erceived as an obstacle by certain rs of the extremist political circles.

rtain eminent figures in this circle thus a strategy intended to provoke the

elgian military contingent, UNAMIR's st effective and best-equipped contingent. eir ultimate goal was to force them to

6.11 La MNUAR avait Cte instituie dans le but de faciliter la mise en place pacifque 3

des institutions prkvues aux Accords ! . *

d'Arusha. Cette force militaire des Nations Unies ktait pergue comme un obstacle par

-certains membres de la ciasse politique extrimiste. Aussi des personnalit6s de ce goupe ont adopt6 une stratigie visant a provoquer les militaires belges qui wait le contingent le plus efficace et ie rnieux 6quipk de la 1MINtfA-R. L'objectif a terme etait de forcer leur retrait.

.12 Hence, an anti-Be lgian propaganda 6.12 Dans cet esprit, une campagne de was carried out, particularly through some propagande anti-beige a 6ti menie,

edia and Radio Televesion Libre ties &Me notamrnent par le truchement des medias et

6. CONCISE STATEMEIYT OF THE FACTS: OTHER VIOL.ATIONS OF INTERYATIONA.L HUM.&VIT.W.&Y LAW

Commission des massacres

6.14 As fiom 7 April 1994, massacres of 6.14 k partir du 7 avril 1994, des the Tutsi population and the murder of massacres de la population Ttltsi et numerous political opponents were l'assassinat de nombreux opposants perpetrated throughout the temtory of politiques ont kt6 commis sur tour le Rwanda. These crimes, which had been territoire du Rwanda. Ces crimes planifids er planned and prepared for a long time by prQares de longue date par des prominent civilian and military figures who personnalites civiles et militaires panageant shared the extremist Hutu ideology, were l'id8ologie hutu extremiste ont Bte perpetres carried out by militiamen, military personnel par des rniliciens, des militaires 2t des

, - -, and gendarmes on the orders and directives . ,aendarrnes suivant les ordtes t t les h \-- 2

or to the knowledge of some of these directives ou a la connaissance de cenaines . authorities, including Jean de Dieu de ces autoritks dont Jean de Dieu Kamuhanda, Augustin Ngirabatware, Kamuhanda, Augustin Ngirabanvare, Justin Mugenzi, Casimir Bizimungu, Justin Mugenzi, Casimir Bi,zirnunsu, Prosper Mugiraneza, Jir6me Bicamurnpaka, Prosper bfusiraneza, JCrBrne Bichumpaka, E f iezer Ni yitegzka, Edouard Karemera, Eliezer Niyitegeka, Edouard : ~aremera. h d r C Rwamakuba, Mathieu Ngirumpatse, Andre Rwamahba, Mathieu Ngirumparse, h s e p h Nzirorerz, and Juvenal Kaj elij eli. Joseph Nzirorera et Juvenal Kajelijeli.

5.15 Asoftheni*tof6 to7Apri1,in the 6.15 Des la nuit du 6 au 7 avril, dms la capital, elements of the FAR and capitale, des elements des FAR et des Interahamwe-ai l3 set up roadblocks, In terahamwe-L~\D ont erigt des barrages, reinforced with vmored vehicles, on -the renforces par des vlhicules blindis, sur les major roads, controlling peoples principaux axes routiers, contrBlant le movements. At these places, peoples deplacement de la population. A ces

,,- -. identities were checked, notably by means of endroits, on vdrifiait l'identit0 des passants . >

a $ . , verification of identity cards, and the Tutsi notarnment en contrdlant les cartes ;: or those identified as such were summarily d'identitt et on y executait sornmairernent executed. Concurrently, groups of soldiers les Tutsi ou ceux reconnus c o m e tels. and interahamwe-MRND scoured the city Parallelement, des groupes de militaires et and murdered civilians. des milices i n t e r a h a m w e - ~ ~ U D ont

sillonni la ville et se sont livres a des assassinats de civils.

6 Between April and July 1994, the 6.16 Entre avril et juillet L 994, les rnilices Internhamwe-MRND and impuram tgambt- Internhamwe-MRND et hptnarnugnrnbi- CDR militia spearheaded the massacres, CDR, armies et bien entrainees dans le but having been armed and well trained to de servir, au moment juge oppoi-tun, B exterminate the enemy and its accomplices exterminer l'emerni et ses complices, ont when the time was deemed to be constitue le fer de lance des massacres. Lzs appropriate. The lnternhamwe had a visible hterahamwe etaient dotes d'une structure

. .

. FPI i

r

~..E?(Pos E SUCCINCT DES F.UTS: .AUTRES VIOLATIONS DU DROIT IIYTE RvATIOIY.At HC'MAiy lTA1RE

m

national, prefectural and local structure, as /4q/

visible a l 'khelle nationale, p efectorale et well as a secret parallel structure in which locale, et d'une structure parallele occulte oh the most influential members of the MRND les rnembres Les plus influents du bfRW

layed a leadership role. Thanks to that very jouaient un r d e de leadership. Gr3c.c- a cette iaborate structure, supported by the existing structure tres elaboree, soutenue par cellz

broad-based structure of the M R W , d6ja existante et tres ramifiee du MRND, les directives circulated easily and were directives circulaient facilement et eraient implemented effectively withn the militias efficacement mis en oeuvre au sein des organs. The Interahamwe-M'RND organes de la rnilice. Les Interahamwe- participated actively and massively in the I ~ P N D ont tres' activement et tris massacres of 1994. massivement participe aux massacres de

1994. , \

\ . . j 7 Fearing the opinion of the 6.17 Par crainte de I'opinion de la

international community, certain leaders comrnunaute internationale, certains attempted to conceal the massacres in dirigeants ont tente de dissimuler les Kigali. Thus, as early as 9 April 1994, the massacres a Kigali. Ainsi, des 11: 9 avril Secretary General of the rLIRND, Joseph 1994, le secrktaire-glneral d d MRND, Nzirorera, ordered the lnterahamwe to stop Joseph Nzirorera, a ordome aux the massacres. The order was respected md Interahamwe d'arrster les massacres. Czt made it possible to sather up the corpses in ordre a C r l respect5 et a permis le rarnassage the streets and conceal them in mass graves. des cadavres dans les rues pour les The Interahamwe reported the success of the dissimuler d a s des fosses communes. Le mission to Joseph Nzirorera and Justin succbs de la mission a ete rapporte par les Mugenzi. Justin Mugenzi openly expressed lnterahamwe a Joseph Nzirorera et Justin his satisfaction that many Tutsis had already Mugenzi. Ce denier exprimait ouvertement been killed. sa satifaction devant le fait que beaucoup de

tutsi ont ttC dkja elimines. / -

[ 1 ! Gou vern em ett t In tirim aire

f

e swearing in of the 6.18 Suite a la prestation de serment des ministers of the Interim Government, ministres du Gouvernement IntCrirnaire, les Cabinet members supported the plan of rnembres du Cabinet, parmi lesquels ex termination in place, including Augustin Augustin Ngirabahvare, Justin Mugenzi,

irabatware, Justin Mugenzi, Casimir Casimir Bizimung, Prosper ~Mugiraneza, B izimungu, Prosper Mugiraneza, JerBme Jer6me Bicamumpaka, Edouard Karemera, B icarnurnpaka. Edouard Karemera, Andre Andre Rwamakuba, Andre Ntagerura, Rwarnakuba, Andre Ntagerura, Pauline Pauline Nyiramasuhuko, Elikzer Niyetegeka Nyiramasu huko, ~ l i e z e r Niyetegeka and et consieller au President Sindikubwabo special advisor to President Sindikubwabo Jean de Dieu Karnuhanda, ont adhire au Jean de Dieu Kamuhanda. Thus, several plan d'extermination mis en place. Dans ce members of the government incited the sens plusieurs membres du gouvzmement people to eliminate the enemy and its ont incite la population a eliminer I'ennemi

6, CONCISE ST.ATEMEIYT OF THE FACTS: OTHER VIOLATIONS OF f;YTERNATIO!YAL HUhl.-WITMI.W LAW

$xomplices and distributed weapons to ct ses cornplices et lui ont them. The Government dismissed local armes. Le Gouvernement a revoqut des government authorities that were opposed to autorites administratives locales opposees the massacres and replaced them with others aux massacres pour les remplacer par who were devoted to the cause. d'autres acquises a la cause.

Already, on 8 April, the new 6.19 Des le 8 avril, le nouveau Government summoned all the prefers to a Gouvemement a convoque tous les prefers meeting. in Kigali for the purpose of pour une reunion a Kigali, dans le but assessing the situation in the country at the devaiuer la situation qui prevalait dam le

e. The emergency meeting was held on pays. Cette rkunion de crise tenue le 11 l l April 1994 and recorded the participation avril 1994, a enregistre la participation de

ail the Government ministers and all the . tous les ministresk et celle de tous les , >

j prcifets, except those of Ruhengeri, pr6fets, exception faite de c e u de ,

Cyanpgu and Butare. At this meeting, the Ruhengeri, de Cyangugu et de Butare. Lors situation as regards the massacres in each de cette -reunion, la situation des massacres pr&fecture was analyzed. dam chaque prefecture a Cte anaiys#e.

t , . , :

On 17 April, EliCzer Niyitegeka, as 6.30 Le 17 avril, Elitzer Niyitegeka, en inister of Information and spokesperson tant que Ministre de lfInfomation et pone-

for the ,aovernment, read out an or'ficial parole du govcnement, a lu un communiqui communique of the 'Interim Gove-ent in o fficiel du Gouvernement Intkimaire dans which he congratulated the Prefets of Kigali. lzquelle il a feliciit6, entre autres, les prifets I(lbuye and Cyanpgu for the excellent de Kigaii, Kibuye et Cyangugu pour work done. l'exceileni travail qu'ils ont fai t.

6.211 Rather than take immediate action to an end to the massacres, on 17 April,. the

erirn Government dismissed several i thorities, among them the Pre'fet of

tare, Jean Baptiste Habyarimana, for their refusal to take pan in the massacres so that the killings could spread to the country

6.21 Le 17 avril, au lieu de prendre des mesures immtdiates pour mettre fin aux massacres, le gouvemement intlrirnaire a plut6t limoge plusieurs responsables, dont le :

prCfet de Butare, Jean Baptiste *

Habyarimana, parce qu'ils avaient rehs t de prendre part aux massacres et ce, afin que les tueries s'ttendent B l'ensemble du pays.

Between 9 April and 14 July 1994, numerous Cabinet meetings were held successively in Kigali, Gitarama and Gisenyi. During this period, the Prime

inister, Jean Kambanda, and ministers Augustin Ngirabahvare, Augustin Bizimana, Edouard Karemera, Callixte Nzabonimana,

dre Rwamakuba, Andre Ntagerura, auline Nyiramasuhuko, Jean de Dieu

6.12 Entre le 9 avril et 14 juillet 1994, de nombreuses reunions du Conseil des ~Ministres se sont tenues successivement a Kigali, Gitarama et Gisenyi. Durant cette periode le Premier Ministre, Jean Kambanda, les Ministres - Xugustin Ngirabatware, Augustin Bizimana, Edouard Karemera, Callixte Nzabonirnana, Andre Rwamakuba, Andre Ntagerura, Pauline

EXPOSE SUCCIlYCT DES F;UTS: AUTRES triOLATlONS OU DROtT 1~TERYATION.LL HUM.&"IT.4IRE

11

Kamuhanda, and Eliezer Niyitegeka were regularly briefed on the situation in regard to the massacres of the civilian population. On several occasions during these meetings, the Ministers demanded weapons to distribute in their respective home pr&fectures, knowing that the weapons would be used in the massacres.

Nyiramasuhuko, Jean de Dieu Kamuhanda, et ~ l i e z e r Niytegeka etaienr rlgulierernent tenu inform& de la situation des massacres de la population civile. A plusieurs occasions lors de ces reunions, les Ministres ont exige des armes pour les distribuer dans leur prefecture d'origine, sachant qu'elles seraient utilisdes dans les massacres.

During these numerous Cabinet 6.33 A cours de ces nornbreuses meetings, the Interim Government adopted reunions du Conseil des Ministres, le directives and gave instructions to the - Gouvemement interimaire a adopte des pr4fefet.s and the bourgmestres. The directives et dome des instructions aux decisions, which were then passed on to the prefets et aux bourgmestres. Ces dkcisions, general public, were intended to incite, aid rkpercutkes i. la population, visaient a and abet the perpetration of the massacres. inciter, encourager et aider a cornmettre les h order to ensure that the directives and massacres. Pour s'assurer de Id' rnise en instmctions were carried out, the Cabinet of oeuvre de ces directives et instructions, le the L~terim Government desipated a Conseil dss Ministres du Gouvernement Minister for each prt;/kcfure to be hterimaire de Jean Kambanda a d i s i g i responsible for what was termed pour chaque prefecture, un Ministre

acification. Callixtc: Nzabonimana for responsable de ce qu'on appelait la Gitararna, Pauline- Nyirarnasuhuke - f o r - - - - pacification: - Callixte Nzabonimirii 5 - - - - - - - - -

Butare and Andr8 Ntagerura for Cyangugu Gitarama, Pauline Nyiramasuhuko a Butve were among those assigned this task. et Andre Ntagerura a Cyangugu, entre

autres, devaient assumer cette mission.

On 27 April 1994, the Interim 6.24 Le 27 avril 1994, le gouvemernent Government ordered roadblocks to be set inttrimaire a ordome l'trection de barrages up, knowing that the roadblocks were being routiers, sachant que ceux-ci etaient utilists used to identifL the Tutsi and their pour identifier les Tutsi et leurs "accomplices" for the purpose of "complices," afin de les 6liminer. Entre avril eliminating them. Between April and July , .

et juillet 1994, un barrage routier a 2tC enge 1994, a roadblock was set up near the a proximite du domicile du Ministre Pauline residence of Minister Pauline Nyiramasuhuko et d' Arsene Shalom Nyramasuhuko and Arsene Shalom Ntahobali dans la ville de Butare, tenu et Ntahobali in Butare town, manned and controle par eux. controlied by them.

6.125 On 25 May 1994, the Lnterim 6.25 Le 25 mai 1994, l e Gouvernement Government adopted directives concerning Interimaire, a adopt6 des directives pour k the civil self-defence program. Its purpose programme d'auto-defense civile. Ce was to legalize the distribution o f weapons progamme visait a legaliser d'une pan la

6. CONCISE STATEMEX' OF THE F.\CTS:- OTHER VIOLATIOVS OF INTERNATIOIUrV. HU~~AYIT.L \R~A,% LAW

td the militiamen on the one hand and to legitimize the massacres of the civilian population on the other. As part of the civil

If-defence program, the Interim Government, by -ministerial decision, appointed several military officers to lead the self defence committees established in each prL;/eecture. Some of these officers took an active part in the massacres, including Alphonse Nteziryayo in Butare.

r41t8 distribution des armes aux rnrliciens et d'autre part a lkgitimer lzs massacres de la population civile. Dans le cadre du programme d'auto-defense civile, le Gouvenement Interimaire, par decision ministCrielle, a nomme plusieurs o Ecicrs militaires pour diriger des ComitCs d'auto defense install6s dans chaque prefecture. Certains de ces officiers, tels quYAlphonse Nteziryayo a Butare, ont participe activement aux massacres.

, \

Between 1 1 April and 14 July 1994, 6.26 Entre le 11 avril et le 14 juillet 1994, , ,I Jean Kambanda,. Justin Mugenzi, Casirnir Jean Karnbanda, Justin Mugenzi, Casimir

izirnungu, Prosper Mua&aneza, JCr6me Biiimungu, Prosper Mugiraneza, JOrdme icamurnpaka and other ministers notably Bicamumpaka et dautres ministres

ezer Niyetegeka, Edouard Karemera, notamrnent ~ l i e ze r Niyetegeka, Edouard dri Rwamakuba, Andre Ntagerura and Karemera, h d r i ~wamakuba; k d r 8

Pauline Nyiramasuhuko, travelled officially, Ntagerura et. Pauline ~~i ramasbhuko , se either on their own or with others, to several sont rendus officiellement, seuls ou avec pr4fecnlres, including Butarz, Kibuye and d'autres, dam plusieurs prkfectures du pays Gitarama, in order to monitor the - telles que Butare, Kibuye et Gitaruna, en implementation of the Government-issued vue de contrbler la mise en oeuvre des

tions, directives and guidelines, instructions, directives et orientations y with regard to civil defence and domkes par ie Gouvemement, notarnment

security. During the many visits they mZde, en matikre de dkfense civile et de securiti. these personalities h e w or had reason to Au cours de Leurs nombreux diplacements,

ow that massacres were perpetrated ces personnalitbs, savaient ou devaient against the civilian Tutsi population. At no savoir, que des massacres de la population

- r- time did these ministers take any action to civile Tutsi etaient en train de se cornmettre.

those massacres nor to punish the En aucun moment ces ministres n'ont-ils persons responsible. agit pour faire cesser ces massacres ou pour

en punir les personnnes responsabies.

7 Thus, in May 1994, in Kibuye, Jean 6.27 C'est ainsi qu'en mai 1994, a Kibuye, Karnbanda attended a meeting of heads of Jean Kambanda a assiste a une reunion de government departments regarding security chefs de services administratifs consacree a issues. Among the other participants at the l'examen de questions de securite. Parmi meeting were Clement Kayishema, Prefet of les autres participants a cette reunion il y Kibuye, Edouard Karernera, Vice-Chairman avait ClCment Kayishema, Prefet de Kibuye;

the LMRW (subsequently appointed Edouard Karemera, Ministre de I' Lqteriew; nister of the interior), Emmanuel Ernmanuel Ndindabahizi, Ministre des

Ndindabahizi, Minister of Finance, E liezer Finances; Eliezer Niyitegeka, klinistre de Niyitegeka, Minister of hformation, and l'lnformation et Donat blurego, Secretaire

&.EXPOS& SUCCIlNCT DES F.\ITS: AUTRES VTOLATIONS DU DROlT ~NTERNATIONAL HUM-LVIT.URE

*

Donat Murego, Executive Secretary of the , 11/33

Exkcutif du MDR. A cette occasion, un [ W R . In the course of the meeting, a participant a demand6 directement au participant asked the Prime Minster outright Premier Ministre c o m e n t assurer la how to ensure the protection of the children protection des enfants rescapls des who had survived the massacres and were at massacres qui se trouvaient a 17h6pital. Jean the hospital. Jean Karnbanda did not reply. Kambanda n'a pas repondu. Par contre, hstead ~ l i e z e r Niyitegeka, seated on the ~ l i e z e r Niyitegeka, assis aux cBtts du podium alongside the Prime Ministsr, Premier Ministre, a repondu que les rescapes replied that the survivors were the enemy etaient des Cnemies et a accusC la persome and accused the person who inquired about qui a demande du sort des rescapCs dz their welfare of "protecting the enemy." 4 4 proteger I'knemie." Aucun autre $1 inistre None of the other ministers at the meeting present dans la salle n'a propose des moyens proposed taking any measures to ensure the

- quelconques pour assurer la slcuritk des

safety of the survivors. On the same day, rescapks. Dans la mBme joumle, apres cette after the meeting, the chiIdren were hlled, r&union, les enfants ont ete tuds.

Furthermore, between 24 April and 6-28 En outre, entre le 24 avril' et le 14 14 July 1994; ThCodore Sindikubwabo, Jean juillet 1994, Theodore ~indikub&bo, Jean Kmbanda, Edouard Karemera, Andre Kambanda, Edouard Karemera, Andri Rwanakuba, Andre Ntagerura, .4uystin Rwamakuba, Andre Ntagerura, Augustin Ngirabatware, Pauline Nyiraasuhuko, Ngrabatware, Pauline Nyiramasuhuko, Ius tin Mugenzi and ~l iezer &liyttegeka, Justin Mugenzi et ~ l i e z e r Niyitegeka, se travelled, either on their own or with others, smt rendus, seuls ou avec d'autres, dam to several p@fkrures, including Bume, plusieurs prgfectclrxx - telles qw- Butare, - - -

- - - - - - - - Gifafamay GisenFi Kibuye and Cyangugu, Gituama, Gisenyi, Kibuye et Cyangup, to incite and urge the population to commit pour inciter et encourager la population a massacres, notably by conmending the commettre des massacres, notamment en perpetrators. feiicitant leurs auteurs.

'. * - I '

i 6,29 Between April and July 1994, Justin 6.29 Entre avril et juillet 1994, Justin ugenzi, Minister o f Trade & Ldustry ~Mugenzi, Ministre du commerce, de

made statements inciting people to kill the l'industrie et de l'artisanat a tenu des propos Tutsis, notably in Gisenyi, Kigali and incitant a tuer les tutsis, entre autres, a

urambi. Some of his inflammatory Gisenyi, Kigali et Murarnbi. Certains de ces tements were broadcast on RTLM. propos incendiaires ont i t 6 diffuses a

l'anteme de RTLIV.

On 2 1 April 1994, Jean Kambanda, 6.30 Le 2 1 avril 1994, Jean Kambanda, en in his capacity as Prime Minister, clearly sa quaiitk de Premier Ministre, a clairement demonstrated his support for Radio manifeste son soutien a Ia Radio television ?"ii&ision Libre des MiUe CoUines fR TLi\.I), libre des Mille collines (RTLM) fondle et founded and directed by FeIicien Kabuga, dirigee par Felicien Kabuga, tout en sachant while knowing the radio station incited to qus cette station appelait a l'extermination exterminate and persecute the Tutsi and et a la persecution des Tutsi et lsurs

6. CONCISE STATEME3T OF THE FACTS2 - - OTHER VIOLATIONS OF INTER;Y.-\TIO1UAL HU>l.&YITARI,tY LAW

th'eir accomplices. On that occasion, Jean << cornplices D. Jean Karnbanda described the radio station as an occasion, qualifie la Radio d'arme indispensable weapon in the fight against indispensable pour corn battre I 'ennemi. the enemy. Between 8 April and 14 July Entre le 8 avril et le 14 juillet 1994, lors de 1991, at meetings in. various places in the reunions tenues a divers endroits du pays st country and over the radio, Jean Karnbanda sur ies ondes de la radio, le Premier Ministre directly and publicly incited the population Jean Kambanda a directement et to carry out acts of violence, i.e. murders publiquement incite la population a and assaults, against the Tutsis and their commertre sur les Tutsi et leurs complices accomplices. In the radio broadcasts, the des actes de vialence, en l'occurrence des

rime minister called on the Rwandans to meurtres et des agessions. Durant 12s rise up and mobilize against the enemy; he radiodifhsions, le Premier rninistre a inviti appealed to the chefs de cellule to dedicate

, - . . les Rwandais a se soulever et a se mobiliser

' 3. themselves to the work. contre l'ennemi, et les chefs de celIule a se , ;)

consacrer au travail. n several occasions, the Minister of A plusieurs reprises le Ministre de

Education, Andre Rwamakuba, also I'Education, h d r 6 Rwamakuba, avait encouraged the massacre of the Tutsis over tgalernent encourage a l'antbme les the radio. Around late May 1994, he was massacres des Tutsis. Aux alentours de fin appointed Government spokesman and mai 1994 il a ete nomrn6 porte parole dl! continued to make inflamiiz:ory speeches Gouvernement et a continui i tenir des over the Radio Rwanda m d RTLM discours incendiaires a travers les oncies de

aves. Following all these repeated Radio Rwanda et sur RTLlM. Suite B tous appeals. massacres were perpetrated against the civilian population.

1 Between 8 April and 14 July 1994, In several prdfectures, including Butwe, Kibuye, Kigali, Gitarama and Gisenyi,

x -\ r P s ministers, prkfets, bourgmestres, civil

servants and soldiers gave orders to commit, stigatcd, assisted in cornmiaing and did ernselves commit massacres of members

of the Tutsi population and moderate Hutu ulation. Jean Karnbanda Jean de Dieu

uhanda, Augustin Ngirabatware, Justin Mugenzi, Casimir Bizimungu, Prosper Mugiraneza, Jer6rne Bicarnumpaka Edouard Karemera, Andre Rwamakuba, AndrC Ntagerura, Pauline Nyiramasuhuko and Gliezer Niyltegeka knew or had reason to h o w that their subordinates had

ces appels rCit6rbs, des massacres de la population civile ont BtC cornmis.

6.31 Entre le 8 avril et le 14 juillet 1994, dans plusieurs prefectures telles que Butare, Kibuye, Kigali, Gitarama et Gisenyi, des ministres, des prtfets, des bourgmestres, des fonctionnaires de 1'Etat et des militaires ont d o m i l'ordre de cornrnettre, ont incite, ont aid6 21 commettre et ont cornrnis des massacres de Tutsi et de Hutu moderes. Jean Kambanda, Jean de Dieu Kamuhanda, Augustin Ncjrabatware, Justin Mugsnzi, Casimir Bizimungu, Prosper Mugiraneza, Jtr6rne Bicamumpaka, Edouard Karemera, h d r 6 Rwamakuba, Andre Ntagerura, Pauline Nyiramasuhuko et ~l iezer Niyitegeka savaient ou devaient savoir que leurs subordomes avaient cornrnis ou

committed or were preparing to commit s'appretaient a cornmettre des crimes et ont crimes, and failed to prevent these crimes omis d'en prkvenir la commission ou d'en

~. .EXPOSE SUCCIlYCT DES FMTS: AUTRES VIOLATIOM DU DROtT l!YTERNATION,UL HUMA~IT.4IRE

From being commitxed or to punish the perpetrators thereof.

6.32 Ministers . Jean de Dieu Kamuhanda, Augustin Nsirabatware, Justin Mugenzi, Casimir Bizimungu, Prosper Mugiraneza. JkrBme Bicamumpaka, Edouard Karemera, Andre Rwamakuba, Andre Ntagerura, Pauline Nyirarnasuhuko and ~ l i e z e r Niyitegeka, members of Jean Kambandas Government, failed in their duty to ensure the security of the Rwandan

i people.

3 In June 1994, Interior Minister Edouard Karemera ordered the Commander in Gisenyi, Anatole Nsengiyumva, to send troops into the Bisesero area, in Kibuyc prefecture, supposedly to combat the enem): although the RPF was in fact never in Bisesero. There was only a group of Tutsi refusees who had gathered in that region, fleeing the massacres.

From May to July 1994, in Butare and Gi tarama pr-ifectures, Jean Karnbanda distributed weapons and ammunition* to

E Xi ) members of the civilian population, L militants of the political parties and

militiamen. These weapons distributions received wide media coverage and could not have gone unnoticed by the members of the Interim Government, who had to know that the weapons would be used to massacre civilians, the majority of whom were members of the Tutsi population.

4.35 In the course of the massacres, behveen April and July 1994, Minister Andr l Ntagerura authorized the use of vehicles belonging to the State company, ONATRACOM, in order to transport either

punir les auteurs.

6.32 Les i34inistre.s Jean de Dieu Kamuhanda, Augustin Ngirabatware, Justin Mugenzi, Casimir Bizimungu, Prosper Mugiraneza, j6r6me Bicamurnpaka, Edouard Karemera, Andre Rwamakuba, Andre Ntagerura, Pauline Nyiramasuhuko et ~ l i e z e r Niy tegeka, membres du Gouvernement de Jean Kambanda, ont failli a leur devoir dassurer la securite de la population nvandaise.

6.33 En juin 1994, le Ministre de 1'Interieur gdouard Karemera a ordome au Commandant de Gisenyi, * ' Anatole Nsengiyumvrl, l'envoi de troup& dam la region du B~scsero, prifecture de Qbuye, Gans ie but suppos6 de combattre l'ememi alors que le FPR ne s'ktait, en Fait, jamais rendu a Bisesero. 11 n'y avait dans cette zone qu'une concentration de refigit% Tutsi qui hyaient les massacres.

6.34 De rnai B juillet 1994, dam les prefectures de Butare et de Gitarama, Jean Karnbanda a distribue des armes et des munitions a des membres de la population civile, a des militants de partis politiques et & des miliciens. Ces distributions d'armes, fortement rnediatiskes, ne pouvaient kchapper B ['attention des membres du Gouvernement Interimaire qui devaient alors savoir que ces ames seraient utilisies dam les massacres de civils, en majorite, des membres de la population Tutsi.

6.35 Pendant les massacres, entre avnl et jui'llet 1994, le Ministre h d r i Ntagerura, a autorise I'utilisation de vehicules appartenant a I'ONATRACOM, societe d'Etat, pour effectuer le transport d'une part,

6. CONCISE STATEMENT OF THE FACTS: OTHER VlOL.4TIOtuS OF 1:YTEKVATIONAL HU&f.-WIT;UUAY LAW

~riilitiamen, weapons and ammunition or de miliciens, d'armes et utsi victims to certain execution sites in d'autre part de victimes Tutsi vers certains

C yangugu prifecture and other prt;/ecrrires lieux d'execution, dam la prefecture dz such as Butare, Ruhengeri and Kibuye, with Cyangugu et dans d7 autres prefectures tellss the intent to facilitate, the extermination of que Butare, Ruhengeri et Kibuye dans the Tutsi population and the elimination of l'intention de faciliter l'sxtermination de la its accomplices. population Tutsi et 17elimination de ses

-36 On 25 April 1994, in Gisenyi prefecture, F6licien Kabuga, Mathieu Ngirumpatse, Edouard Karemera and

atote Nsengiyumva agreed together and with others t o . establish the Fonds de Dkfense Narionaie (FDN), for the purpose of roviding assistance to the Interim ovemment to fight the enemy and its

accomplices. s Fund would serve to buy weapons,

vehicles and unifonns for the hterahamwe mi!itia and the b y in all pr e ectures ~n the country.

n 20 May 1994, FBlicien Kabuga informed the Interim Government of the establishment of the fund and advised it how it should be managed 2nd operated.

6.36 Le 25 avril 1994, dans la prefecture de Gisenyi, Fdicien Kabuga, Marhieu Ngirumpatse, Edouard Karemera et Anatole Nsengiyumva se sont mis d'accord ent- ~e cux et avec d'autres personnes pour creer le Fonds de Defense Nationale (F.D.N.), dans le but de fournir assistance au Gouvernement IntCrimaire pour combattre l'ennemi et ses compiices. ,

Ce Fonds devait servir a l'achat di&es, de vChicules et d'uniformes pour les milices hterahamwe e t l'armee dans toutes lzs prdfectures du paps. Le 20 mai 1994, Felicien Kabuga a informe le Gouvemernent Interimaire de la creation du Fonds et a conseill6 le gouvememenr sur la manitre de le g6rer et de s'en servir.

6: COWCISE ST.ATE?AE.UT OF THE F.ACTS: OTHER VIOLATlONS OF INTERNATIONAL H U S l . ~ ~ I T A R I A . Y Cdtv

.37 From April ro July 1994, by virtue of 6.37 D'avril A juillet 1994, de par l e u their position, their. statements, the orders fonctions, leurs propos, les ordres et they save and their acts and omissions, directives qu'ils ont domes et leurs actes et members of the fnterirn Government and influential members of MRND, IW)R(hutu) and PL (hub) including Jean de Dieu

arnuhanda, Augustin Ngirabatware, uspstin Bizimana, ~ d o u a r d Karernera, allixte Nzabonirnana, Andre Rwamakuba,

Mathieu N,oirumpatse, Joseph Nzirorera, . ' ,

37 F6licien Kabuga, JuvCnal Kajelijeli, Eliezer

i Niyitegeka, Casimir Bizirnungu, Prosper

~Mugiraneza, JirBme Bicamumpaka and

omissions, les membres du Gouvemernent Interimaire (st les membres influents du MR.?\?>, MDR (hutu) et PL (hutu) dont Jean de Dieu Kamuhanda, Augusrin N~irabatware, Augustin Bizimana, ~douard Karemera, Callixte Nzabonimana, Andri Rwamakuba, Mathieu Ngirumpatse, Joseph Nzirorera, F t licien Kabuga, Juvenal Kajelijeli, Eliezer Niyitegeka, Casimir Bizimungu, Prosper Mugiraneza, JCr6rne

Justin Mugenzi exercised authority over the Bicamumpaka et Justin ~Mugenzi ont exerce local authorities and the militia, including une autorite sur les autorites loc$es et les the Interahamwe-MhW militia. These milices, don't les milices interahamwe- local authorities and militiamen, in > L R L i . Ces autoritis e: ccs miliciens, en complicity with :he military, as kom 6 cornpliciti avec dss miiitaires, ont commis April, committed massacres of the Tutsi population and of moderate Hutu which extended throughout Rwandan territory, with the knowledge of members of the Lnterirn Government, including, Augustin . Bizirnana, ~ d o u a r d Karemera, Callixte Nzabonirnana, Andre Rwamakuba, Eliezet Ni yitegeka, Casimir Bizimungu, Prosper

,".'- Xi r, ugiraneza, J b r h e Bicarnumpaka and

$ Justin Mugenzi.

The massacres of members of the Tutsi population and the murder of the moderate Hutu extended throughout the territory of Rwanda. In every prifecture, local civil and military authorities and miii tiamen, including interahamwe-MRND,

owed the plan of extermination and folfowed the directives and orders in order to execute it. They called on the civilian population to eliminate the enemy and its accomplices. They distributed weapons to

dis le 6 avril des massacres contre la population tutsi et des hutu rnodCrOs qui se sont itendus sur l'ensembfe du tenitoire rwandais a la connaissance des membres du Gouvemement hterimaire dont Augustin Bizimana, ~ d o u a r d Karernera, Callixte Nzabonimana, Andre Rwamakuba, Eliezer Niyitegeka, Casimir Bizimungu, Prosper Mugiraneza, JdrBrne B icamumpaka et Justin Mugenzi.

6.38 Les massacres de membres de la population Tutsi et les assassinats des Hutu rnoderes se sont etendus sur l'ensemble du territoire du Rwanda. Dans chaque prefecture, des autorites locales, civiles et militaires et des miliciens, dont les Internhamwe-MRND, ont adhere au plan d'extermination et ont suivi Ies directives et les ordres afin de I'exCcuter. Ils ont appele la population civile a eliminer l'ennemi et ies complices. Ils ont distribue des armes a des

civilians and militiamen. They gave orders civils et des miliciens. 11s ont ordonne, to commit, aided, abetted and participated in encourage, aide et participe aux massacres.

47

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AUTRES WOLATIONS D U DROIT HU,MXIiITAIRE IIYTERi.~TIONxt

a

9 From April to July 1994, in all the regions of the country, members of the Tutsi popuiation who were fleeing fiom the massacres on their hills sought refuge in

- locations they thought would be safe, often on the recommendation of the local civil and military authorities. In many of these places, despite the promise that they would be protected by the local civil and military

es, the rehgees were attacked, and massacred, often on the orders the complicity of those same

, , I authorities.

6.39 D'avril a juillet 1994, dans toutes les regions du pays, des mernbres de la population Tutsi qui hyaient ics massacres sur leurs collines ont cherchC refuge dam des endroits qu' ils cro yaient s h , souvent sur recommandation des autorites locales, civiles et militaires. Dans plusieurs de ces endroits, malgre la promesse qu'ils seraient proteges par les autorites locales, civiles et rnilitaires, les refugies ont ete attaquis, enleviis et massacres, souvent sur les ordres

. ou avec la complicite de ces m6mes autorites.

GAL1 KIGALI

y virtue of the fact that Kigali was 6.40 Du fait que Kigali Ctait la itale ale du the capital of Rwanda, seat of the Rwanda, le sikge du Gouvernement jusqu'au Government till 12 April 1994, the place 12 aqnl 1994,. ou ktaient basis, de plus, 1es where the elite mits of the Rwandan Army unit& dtilites de l ' h n 6 e rtvandaise et les were based and where the headquarters for ~ t a t s - ~ a j o r dz l ' h t e et de La 0th the Army and the Gendarmerie were Gendarmerie, plusieurs des persomalites

situated, several of the civilian and military civiles et militaires qui avaient planifie et figures who had planned and organized the oganis6 les massacres ont jouC un rble de massacres played a leading role in cafijing premier plan dans l e u execution a 'Ki,oali. out the massacres in Kigali.

Starting on 7 April, in Kigali, ! f Interahamwe-MRND, elements of the

andan Army and Gendarmerie etrated massacres of the civilian Tutsi lation. Concurrently, elements of the

residential Guard, Para-Commando attalion and Recomaissance Battalion and

Interahamwe-MRND murdered political opponents. Numerous massacres of the civilian Tutsi population took place in

laces where they had saught refuge for their safety.

Centre Hospitalier de Kigali

6.41 Dbs le 7 avril, 2i Kigali, des h t e r a h a r n w e - m , des illments de l'Arrn6e Rwandaise et de la Gendarmerie se sont l ines a des massacres contre la population civile Tutsi. Parallelement, des Clkments de la Garde Prisidentielle, du Bataillon Para C o m a n d o et du Bataillon de Reconnaissance et des Interahamwe-MRXD ont assassine des opposants politiques. De nombreux massacres de la population civile Tutsi se sont d6rouik.s dam des endroits ou ils s'itaient r6hgii.s pour leur securite.

Centre Hosp italier de Kigali

2 When the massacres started, the 6.42 Des le debut des massacres, IC Cmtre Hospifalier de Kigali (CHK) took in Ctntre Hospitalier de Kigali (CHK) 2

numerous wounded Tutsi from various areas accueilli de nombreux Tutsi blessis tenant

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of the city. On several occasions, soldiers de diffirents quartiers who were supposed to be zuarding the p lusieurs reprises, dts militaires qui hospital selected Tutsi patients and killed devaient assurer la protection de l'hdpital them on the spot. A list of the staff of Tutsi ont selecriom6 des patients Tutsi et ics ont descent was drawn up and several of the tues sur place. Une liste des membres du people on the list were killed. Each personnel d'origine Tutsi a etC dress& et morning, the officer in charge reported to plusieurs d'entre eux ont Cte tuis. Chaquc CvfNADEF (Ministry of Defence) on the matin, ['officier responsab le adressait un number of Tutsi who had been killed. rapport au IMINWEF (Ministkre de la

Defense) sur le nombre de Tutsi qui avaient 6 t i tuks.

. >t A3 The massacres at the CHK were reported to the Interim Government,

rticularly to the Minister of Health asimir Bizimungu, during the Ministerial

meetings. lMinister of Health Casimir Bizimungu did not take any sreps to stop the crimes being committed in this public hospital or to punish the perpetrators.

6.43 Les massacres survenus au CHI( ont it6 rapportks au gouvemement interimaire, et notamment au Ministre de la Sante Casimir Bizimunp, lors des conseils des ministres. Casimir Bizimungu, Ministre dz la Sant6, n'a jarnais pris les mesurcs ndcessaires pour emp5cher la commission aes crimes qui se perpetraiznt azns cet I?Bpital public ou pour en punir les auteurs.

6.44 Interim Government Minister JeaGde 6.14 Le nouveau ministre du gouvemement ieu Kamuhanda had family ties to interimaire, Jean de Dieu ~ a m u h a n d a

Gikornero commune, Kigali-Rural avait des attaches farniliales dans la prefecture. During the month of April 1994 commune de Gikomero, prefecture de Kigali

'? .: 2 e supervised the killings in the area. On rural. Pendant ik mois d'avril 1994, il a 1

. I several otaqsions he personally distributed supemis6 les meurtres dans cette zone. A firearms, grenades and machettes to civilian p lusieurs occasions, il a distribul l u i - m h e militia in Kigali-Rural for the purpose of "killing all the Tutsi and fighting the FPR."

6,<5 Furthermore, Jeau de Dieu Kamuhanda personally led attacks of soldiers and Interahamwe against Tutsi refugees in Kigal i-Rural pre fee ture, notably on or about April 1zCh at the parish church and adjoining school in Gikomero. On that

des armes B feu, des grenades et des machettes aux milices civiles de Kigali-rural aux fins de faire "tuer tous les Tutsis et de combattre le FPR."

6.43 En outre, Jean de Dieu Karnuhanda a dirige personnellement des attaques perpetries par des soldats et des interahamwe .et dirigees contre les rCfugiis tutsis dans la prefecture de Kigali rural, notamment a la paroisse de Gikomero et a

occasion Jean de Dieu Kamuhanda amved l'icole attenante, autour du 13 avril. A cettz at the school with a group of soldiers and occasion, Jean de Dieu Karnuhanda est hterahamwe armed with firearms and amve a I'Ccole accompagne d'un groupe de

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3enades. He directed the militia into the courtyard of the school compound and gave them the order to attack. The soldiers and Interahamwe attacked the refugees. Several thousand persons were killed.

During the attack on the school in omero the militia also selected women

From among the rehsees, carried them away and raped them before killing them

.47 Three important factors delayed the start of the massacres in Butare prifecture.

istorically, this prkfecture had a large Tutsi population living in harmony with the Hutu majority. Since the inception of the multiparty system, the Parti Social D h o c m r e (PSD) dominated the political scene in Butare and the iMouvement r$ublicain national pour Za d&mocratie et le diveloppement (MRND) played a lesser rols in that area than elsewhere in the country. Hence, the Interahamwe organizational structure was less elaboiate and its membership was smaller.

urthermore, the Prkfet of Butare, Jean tiste Habyalirnana (PSD), the only

Pr4fet of Tutsi descent in the country, had openly opposed the massacres in his refecttwe, where he had succeeded in

maintaining calm, with a few exceptions, notably Nyakizu commune. Thus. thousands of people, the majority of whom were Tutsi, came fi-om other prefectrires to seek refuge

utare in the days which immediately followed the start of the massacres.

The country civil and military leaders became aware of the exceptional 'tuation in Butare. Thus, the 'Jhterim ovemment, of which Jean de Dieu

soldats et d'interahamwe armes de hsils a de genades. 11 a conduit les miliciens dans la cour de l'icole et leur a dome l'ordre d'attaquer les refugies. Les soldats 2: les miliciens lui ont obei et plusieurs rnillisrs de personnes ont I t6 tuees.

6.46 Au cours de I'attaque menee a l'icole de Gikomero, les miliciens ont choisi des femmes parmi les refigits, les ont ernmenies ailieurs et les ont violies avant dc les tuer.

6.47 . Trois facteurs importants ont retardd le debut des massacres dam la pr8fecture de Butare. Historiquement, cette 'prefecture comptait une forte reprlseniation de la population Tutsi qui y cohabitait paisiblement avec la majorite Hutu. Depuis le multipartisme, le Parri Social Ddmocrate ( P S D ) dominait la scene politique a Butare, le Mouvement republicain national pour la dhocratie et le de'veloppement (MRND) y jouant un r8le moins important par rapport au reste du pays. Ainsi, la structure organisationnelle des Interahamwe y itait moins klaboree et ses adhkrents moins nombreux. En outre, le Prlfet de Butare, Jean Baptiste Habyalimana, (PSD), seul prifet d'origine Tutsi dans le pays, sitait ouvertement oppose aux massacres dans sa prefecture et avait reussi Q y maintenir le calrne, a quelques exceptions pres, parmi lesquelles, la commune de Nyakizu. Aussi, des rnilliers de personnes, en majorite Tutsi, venues d'autres prefectures, avaient cherche refuge a Butare des les premiers jours qui ont suivi le debut des massaciss.

6.18 Les dirigeants civils et militaires du pays ont pris conscience de la situarion particuliere qui rkgnait a Butare. Ainsi lc Gouvemernent Interimaire, dont Jean de

6: EXPOSE SUCCINCT DES FAITS: AUTRES vrourrons ow D R O ~ T HUMAUITAIRE INTER,YATIO,YAL ,

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.31 Because the members of the lnterim Government, including Augustin B izimana, edouard Karemera, Callixte Nzabonirnana, iindre Rwamakuba. Eliezer Niyitegeka, Casimir Bizimung, Prosper Mugiraneza, JerBme Bicarnumpaka and Justin Mugenzi did not dissociate themselves from this statement of the President of the Republic, at any time, they gave a clear signal to the people that the massacres were ordered and

'P5 6.51 En ne se dissociant pas, en aucun moment, des propos ainsi tenus par le Prbident dc la Republique, les rnembres du Gouvemement lnterimaire dont Augustin B izimana, fjdouard Karemera, Callixte Nzabonimana, h d r C Rwamakuba, Eliezer Niyitegeka, Casimir Bizimungu, Prosper ~Mugiraneza, J8rBrne Bicamumpaka, et Justin lMugenzi ont clairement indiqul a la population que les massacres itaient

condoned by the Government. ordonnes et cautionnes par le . Gouvernement.

- r' 2 The next day, two military planes

landed in Butare with numerous Presidential Guard and Para-Commando Battaiion soldiers on board. These soldiers, in tandem with the Interahamwe of Butare, took part in

urdering and massacring civilians, no tab ly e former Queen of Rwanda, Rosaiie icanda, a historical symbol For all Tutsi.

6.52 Le lendernain, deux avions militaires "

ont atterri a Butare, avec a leur bord des dizaines de niilitaires de la Garde PrCsidentielle et du ~ a t a i l ~ o h Para- Commando. .Ces militaires ont participe aux c6t6s des lnterahamwe de Butare, aux meurtres et aux massacres de civils, parrni lesquels, l'ancieme Reine du Rwanda, Rosalie Gicanda, syrnboie historique pour

6.53 in the days that followed * the 6.53 Dam les jours qui ont suivi le unleashing of the massacres, interahamwe- dklenchernent des massacres, des

from outside the prefecture, notably I n t e r a h a m w e - r n de l'extirieur de la gali, came in to reinforce their prefecture, notamment de Kigali, sont Venus -.

- 3 llow militiamen in Butare in perpetrating priiter main forte aux miliciens de Butare %i

the massacres. This included a detachment pour i'exkcution des massacres. Ce fut le cas of tnteraharnwe-bllWD that was entre autres, d'un detachernent accompanying their Chairman, . Robert d'lnterahamwe-MRND accompagnant leur Kaj uga. prksident, Robert Kajuga.

.54 From 20 April the massacres became 6.54 A partir du 20 avril, les massacres se widespread within the prifecture. In Butare, sont propages dans la prefecture. k Butare, as in all the regions of the country, comrne dans toutes les regions du pays, numerous people sought refuge in locations plusieurs personnes ont cherche refuge dam they thought would be safe or impregnable, des endroits qu'ils croyaient securitaires ou

en locations that had been indicated to inviolables, souvent sur. indication des them by the authorities, such as Butare autorites, tel que I'H6pital Universitaire de university hospital and the premises of the Butare et l'enceinte du bureau ds Ia prefecture offices in the town of Butare. h prefecture dans la ville de Butare. Dans ces these places, despite the promise made by endroits, malgre la promesse faite par les the authorities that they would be protected, autorites qu'ils seraient proteges, les

6: CONCISE ST.4TE.MENT OF THE FACTS: OTHER VIOLATIONS OF (~VTEWATIONAL HU;\II.-LYITARI.&'l LAW

Mamu handa, Augustin Ngirabahvare, Augustin Bizimana, ~ d o u a r d Karemera, Cailixte Nzabonimana, Andre Rwamakuba, Eliezer Niyitegeka, Casimir Bizimungu, Prosper Mugiraneza, JCrBme Bicamumpaka and Justin Mugenzi were members, removed Prifeiet Habyalimana from office and incited the people to get involved in the massacres. Prifet Habyalimana was subsequently arrested and never seen again. Moreover, dements of the Army and Interahamwe militiamen were sent to Butare as reinforcements to start the massacres.

Dieu Kamu h aoda, Augustin bkjrabanuare, Augustin Bizimana, ~douard Karernera, Callixte Nzabonirnana, Andre Rwamakuba, Eliezer Niyitegeka. Casimir Bizimungu, Prosper Mugiraneza, Ier6me Bicamumpaka et Justin Mugenzi etaient nernbres, a revoque le Prekt Habyalimana et a incite les populations 2i s'impliquer dam les massacres. Par la suite, le Prefet Habyalimana a it6 anete et n'a jamais dtd revu depuis. En outre, des dements de

. l'arrnee et des miliciens ltlterahamwe ont ite envoyes en renfort pour commencer les massacres.

.49 In order to incite and encourage [the 6.49 Pour inciter et encourager la Butare people to massacre the Tutsis, population de Butare a rnassacret. les Tutsi Casimir Bizimungu and Joseph Nzirorera Casimir Bizimungu et Joseph Nzirorera ont insisted that the government delegation insiste pour quc la delegation should include President Sindikubwabo gouvernementaie incIut le Prkident himself so that the speeches could have Sindibukwabo hi-m8me afin que izs maximum impact on the people. discours aient le maximum d'impact sur la

population.

6.30 Thus, on 19 April 1994, -the swearing-in ceremony in Butare for the new Preyet* Syivain Nsabimana, was .the occasion of a large gathering that had been

A/ '* : % announced and organized by the Interim ,

y Government. On that occasion, President Theodore Sindikubwabo made an inflammatory speech, openly and explicitly callins on the people of Butare to follow the example of the other priifectures and begin the massacres. He violently denounced the banyira ntibindeba, meaning those who did not feel concerned. He asked them to get out of the way and let us work. Prime Minister Jean Kambanda, who subsequently took the floor, did not contradict the President of the Republic, nor did any of the Ministers present, including Justin ~Mugenzi. Shortly thereafter, the massacres of Tutsis began in the prefecture.

6.50 Dans cettz perspective, le 19 avd , la ciremonie d'investiture du nouveau Prefet, Sylvain Nsabimana, a Butare, a donne lieu a un grand rassemblement annonce et orsanise par le Gouvernernent Intirirnaire. A cctte occasion, le Prksident Thiodore Sindikubwabo a prononce un discoun incendiaire, appelant ouvertement et explicitement la population de Butare a suivre l'exemple des autres prefectures et a commencer les massacres. 11 a violemment dinonce les Banyira Ntibindebn, autrement dit ceux qui ne se sentent pas concemes. I1 leur a demande qzc'iis cedeent in pface st qn 'ils nous laissent travoiiler. Le Premier Ministre lean Kambanda a ensuite p i s !a parole st n'a pas contredit le President de Ia Ripublique, non plus qti'aucun c i a Ministres presents, dont Justin Mugcnzi. Peu apres, les massacres dz Tutsi on[ commence dans la prefecture

6: CONCISE STATEMENT OF THE FACTS: OTHER WO LATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HU~I.&Y~T.ARIA,V LAW

- the refugees were attacked, abducted or rehgies ont ete attaques, enleves ou tues jlled by soldiers and militiamen, often on par des rnilitaires et des miliciens souvent

the orders or with the complicity of those sur ordres ou avec la complicite de ces same authorities. mzmes autorites.

6.55 Between April and July 1994, Prime 6.55 Entre avril et juillet 1994 le Premier ~Vinister Jean Kambanda, often ..Ministre Jean Kambanda, souvent accompanied by other ministers, visited accompagnk d'autres ministres, a visite several communes, including Ndora and plusieurs communes dont Ndora et Muganza M u g m a , in May and June 1994. These en mai et juin 1994. Ces visites marquaient visits demonstrated his governments support le soutien de son gouvernement aux

r the massacres of the Tutsi and moderate . massacres des Tutsi et des Hutu moderes. tu. The approval of the massacres was Cette approbation des massacres sz

[so made manifest by the dismissal of traduisait Cgalernent sous forme de estres who dared oppose the lullings destitution de bourgmestres qui osaient

and by the appointment of bo~r~mestres sopposer aux tuzries et par la nomipation de who were more cooperative. bourgrnestres plus coop6rants ::dam ce

. . dornaine. -

6.56 On or about 15 May, Prime Minister 6.56 Vers ou le 15 mai, le Premizr an Kambanda made a speech at Butare Ministre Jean Kambmda a tenu un discours

University. He urged the civilian population lors d'une reunion qui a eu lieu a to take up arms. Subsequently to this I'universit6 de Butare. I1 a inciti Ia meeting he adopted the slogan, "Wirna population civile B prendre les armes. A la ighigu amaraso irnbwa zikayanpkrz suite de cette rkunion, il a adopte Le slogan, ubusa," (You refuse to spill your blood for "Wima igihigu anaraso imbwa your country and the dogs drink it for zikayangwera ubusa," (Tu refises de verser nothing). The slogan then became a watch- ton sang pour ton pays et les chiens le

of his government, included in many boivent pour rim). Ce slogan est ainsi his public pronouncements. In the devenu le leitmotiv de son gouvemement,

context of the civilian massacres that had souvent repris dans ses discours publics. overtaken Rwanda during the period of early Dans le contexte des massacres qui se April through late July, these incendiary dtroulaient dans tout le pays pendant la words were a clear -signal of support and pdriode d'avril a juillet, ce discours encouragement of the massacres by the incendiaire Ctait un soutien clair et un lnterirn Government. During this period no encouragement aux massacres de la part du member of the Interim Government, gouvemement intkrimaire. Pendant toute including Jean de Dieu Kamuhanda, Augustin Ngirabatware, Augustin Bizimana,

ouard Karemera, Callixte Nzabonimana, wamakuba, Eliezer Niytegeka, izimungu, Justin ~Vugenzi, Jir6me

icamumpaka and Prosper Mugiraneza, expressed dissention or

disagreement or criticism of any of the

cette periode aucun mernbre du gouvemement inttrirnaire, Jean de Dieu Kamuhanda, Augus-tin -Ngirabatware, Augustin 3 izimana, ~ d o u a r d Karemera, Callixte Nzabonimana, Andre Rwamakubct, Eliezer Niyitegeka, Casimir Biz i rnung~~. Justin Mugenzi, JerBrne Bicamumpaka et Prosper Mugiraneza, faisaient partie, n'a

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P

policies that were endorsed by Jean I Y Z

exprime ni dissension ni opposition ni Karnbanda on behalf of the hterim critique a la politique qui a ete publiquement Government. exposee par Jean Kambanda au nom du

gouvernement interimaire.

utare Lin iversity Hospital HGpital Universitaire de Brirare

.57 In late April 1994, numerous Tutsi went to the Butare university hospital to seek refuge or to receive treatment for their wounds. On several occasions, various

thorities, including Minister Andre - 1 warnakuba demanded that the refugees and

patients identify themselves. Those identified as bein3 Tutsi were killed on thz spot or abducted and executed elsewhere. Casimir Bizimungu did not take any steps to stop the crimes being committed in this public hospital or punish the perpetrators.

6.57 Vers la fin du mois d'avril, plusieurs Tutsi se sont rendus. a l'h6pital universitaire de Butare pour y chercher refuge ou y Otre soignes de leurs blessures. A plusieurs reprises, diffkrentes autoritks, dont le mini st re Andre Rwamakuba, ont exigt que '

les r6hgids et ies patients diclinent leur '

identit&. Les Tutsi ainsi identifies ont soit et6 tuCs sur place soit Cte enlevis pour 2tre executes ailleurs. Casimir Bizimungu, Ministre de la SantB, n'a jarriais pris les mesures necessaires pour emp2ch-r la commission des crimes qui se perpetraient dans cet Mpital public ou pour en punir les auteurs.

GIT-VW,

As from 12 April 1994, the Interim ovemment, reacting to the pressure of the

attacks on the capital and in order to - 1 . , continue to carry out its duties, moved to

Gitarama prifecture, west of Kigali. The Interim Govemen t was based in Gitarama From 12 April through late May. Gitarama was the home prifectzrre of Gregoire Kayibanda, President of the First Republic, and an MDR stronphold. The MRM) was not well represented in the prifecttrre in the period leading up to the events of 1994. As from April 1994, the iMRW spared no effort to drive out the bourgrnestres who were opposed to its policy with regard to

acres and to replace them with loyal

6.55 Des le 17 avril 1994, sous la pression des attaques du FPR sur la capitale, pour pouvoir continuer a exercer ses fonctions, le Gouvemernent IntCrimaire s'est deplac6 a Gitarama prifecture qui se trouve a l'ouest de Kigali. Le gouvemement interimaire sihgait a Gitarama a partir du 12 avril jusqu'i la fin du mois de mai. Gitarama etait la prefecture d'origine de Gre~oire Kaylbanda, Prlsident de la premiere RCpublique, et un bastion du MDR. Le M&UD y etait tres minoritaire a la veille des evenements de 1994. Des avril 1994 le lMFWD va dtployer le maximum d'efforts pour y chasser les b~ur~mestres opposes i sa politique de massacres st izs remplacer par des hommes qui lui sont fideles.

As in other regions of Rwanda, 6.59 A l'instar de ce qui s'itait deroule ral meetings were held in Gitarama, dans d'autres regions du Rwanda plusizurs

54

6: CONCISE STATEMEYT OF THE FACTS: OTHER WOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HU.tIAZclTARl.LY LAW

- I with members of the Government, senior reunions, auxquelles ont participe des MRND officials and representatives of the membres du Couvernement. de hauts local authorities in attendance. The purpose responsables du MRW et des represzntants of the meetings was to supervise the des autorites locales, ont ite tenues a

progress of the massacres in the region and Gitarama. Elles avaient pour objectif a la encourage the population, the militia and the fois de superviser le ddroulement des army to continue committing them. massacres dans la rigion et d'encourager la

population, les milices et l'armee a continuer a les comrnettre.

tween April and July 1994, in 6.60 Entre avril et juillet 1994, i a, bourgmestres who had refused . Gitarama, les Bourpmestres qui avaient

to carry out the Governments directives to refuse d'executer les directives du massacre the Tutsi, or who had not shown Gouvernement, tendant A massacrer les sufficient zeal in canying them out, were Tutsi ou qui n'avaient pas montri reprimanded and even on occasion attacked suffisamment de zele dans I'exe~ution de in front of their citizens, then dismissed or, ces directives, comrne dans : beaucoup worse yet, physically eliminated. During a d'autres rkjons, se sont vus reprimand6s ou meeting held at Murambi around mid-April mdme parfois molestds dcvant leurs 1994, Minister Justin Mugenzi clearly acirninistres avant d76tre limogCs ou pire supported the massacres committed by the encore liquid6.s physiquement. Lors d h z lnterahamwe in Gitarama prefecture and rlunion tenue B lMurambi vers mi-avril asked for the sacking of the PrCfet and the 1994, te Ministre Justin Mugenzi avait

- - - - - - - - - - -

- - - ~ u ~ ~ e s t r e s a p p o s e d r e tkmassaeres . - - - - - - - nettementrprisr position-pour les massacres - perpetres par Ies hterahamwe dans la PrCfecture de Gitarama et a demande la destitution du prefet et des bourgmestres opposes a ces massacres.

Nursing School

6.61 Between April and June 1994, several people found refuge at the secondary nursing school in Kabgayi, Gitarama prifecture, where students and staff were already located. On several occasions during this period, soldiers and lnterahamwe

ilitiamen abducted and raped female Tutsi dents and refugees. Minister of Defense

Augustin Bizimana and the General Staff of the Rwandan Amy were informed of this situation but did not take any effective steps to end the crimes once and for all. Casirnir

izirnungu, Minister of Health, did not take any steps to stop the crimes being

6.61 Entre avril et juin 1994, plusieurs personnes ont trouve refuge a l k o k secondaire des infirmieres de Kabgayl, prkfecture de Gitarama, oh se trouvaient deja des etudiants et du personnel. A plusieurs reprises durant cette periode, des rnilitaires et des miliciens lnteraharntve ont enlev6 et viole des itudiantes et d5s refugiees Tutsi. lnformes de cette situation le Ministre de la Defense Augustin Bizirnana et I'Etat-Major de l'.&-mee Rwandaise n'ont pris aucune mesure efficace pour mettre un terme definirif 6 css crimes. Casimir Bizimungu, Ministre de la

6 : EXPOSE SUCCIYCT DES FIUTS: .- .-4lr'TRES VIOLATIONS DU DROIT HU3IAIYITXIRE INTERVATIO~AL

*

committed in the Kabgayi School of Nursing or punish the perpetrators.

2 Giseny, the prefecture of origin of the deceased President, Suvenal Habyarimana, is located in northwestern

wmda. From the time of the coup d9Ctat *

in 1973, Gisenyi was the bastion of the lMouvernent rippublicain national pour la dkmocratie ef le developpernent (MRND)

the Coalition pour la difense de la republzque (CDR). Several prominent civil and military figures that had espoused the extremist Huh1 ideolog were from this prifecturz. After 1990, the preficrure was the theatre for much inter-ethic tension and violence, causing the death of many Tutsi. This was the case with the Bagogwe in 1991, In exly June 1994, the Interim Government moved to Gisenyi. -

6.63 'The massacre of the Bagogwe was a precursor to the massive killings that overcame Gisenyi during the period of 7 April to mid-July 1994. In both cases the killings were planned, ordered and coordinated by governmental authorities within the upper echelons of the MRND. During an LMRND prefectural meeting in 1993 Augustin Ngirabatware reassured party - -

members by publicly stating that only the Tutsi and their "accomplices" were targeted

en the Bagogwe were killed.

J On several other ohgions, notably at ublic rally at Umuganda stadium in

November 1993, Augustin Ngirabatware stated that "the enemy in this country is the Tutsi, and its accomplices are Hutu mamed

Sant6, n'a jarnais pris les mesures nkcessaires pour empecher la commission des crimes qui se perpetraient dans t&ole d'infirmiires de Kabgayl ou pour en punir les auteurs.

6.62 Pr6fecture d'origine du dehn t PrCsident, Juvenal Habyarirnana, Gisenyi est situee au nord-ouest du Rwanda. Depuis le coup dTEtat de 1973, elle est le bastion du Mouvement Ripzrbiicain Marional pour la Dimocratze et le Ddveloppement (>fR;C2,)

et de la Coalition pour la Difeense de la R$ublique (CDR). P lusieurs personnalitb civiles et militaires parrageant 1':ideologie Hutu extremiste sont ori$naires de cette prefecture. Depuis 1990, e1le.a i t e le thiarre de nombreuses tensions et violences inter- ethniques rnrrainant la mon de nombreux Tutsi. Ce fbt ~e cas en 1991 avec les Bagogwe. Au debut de juin 1994, le Gouvernement Intkrirnaire s'est installe a Gisenyi.

6.63 Le massacre des Bago3we itait prCcurseur dcs tueries de masse perpetrees a Gisenyi au cours de la periode comprise a

entre le 7 avril et mi-juillet 1994. Dans les deux cas, les massacres ont Cte planifies, ordonnds et exCcutCs par les autorites gouvernementales qui itaient drs hauts responsables du MRND. Au cours d'une reunion prefectorale en 1993 Augustin Nsirabatware a rassure Ies membres de son parti en diclarant publiquement, apres le massacre des Bagogve, que seuls lzs Tutsi et leurs "complices" etaient visls.

6.64 A plusieurs autres occasions. notamment lors d'une reunion publiqus au stade Umuganda, en novcmbrz 1993, Augustin Ngirabhiware a diclarl quz "l'ememi dans ce pays est le Tutsi. st jcs

6: CONCISE STATEMEXT OF THE F.4CTS: OTHER WOLXTIONS OF IYTERNATIONAL HUMXNIT.ARlcLY LAW

- to Tutsi women," and warned the crowd, complices sont 1es Hutus manis aux "don't look far away because the enemy is femrnes tutsies", et a averti la foule en disant

r next to you." Significantly, the " ne cherchez pas loin, car l'ennemi est tour eches at this meeting were rebroadcast by pres de vous". Fait rgvelateur, les discours

the following day. prononcis tors de cette riunion ont C t l rediffuses sur RTLM le jour suivmt.

Augustin Ngirabatware repeated 6.65 Augustin Ngirabatware a fait des ar statements in March 1994 at MKW dklarations similaires en mars 1994 au

meetings in Nyarnyumba commune. cdurs de reunions du MfiW dam la aracterizations of the Tutsi as an "enemy" commune de Nyamyurnba. Les descriptions

o be exterminated made by highly placed, - du Tutsi c o m e etant "l'ennemi" a titiminer powerhi government officials such as faites par des rnembres du gouvemement. Augustin Ngirabatware were public influents et haut placks tels que hugustin invitations to kill with impunity, and were NgirabahKare itaient des invitations

of a larger campaign to organize and publiques Q tuer impunkment, et, faisaiznt prepare the civilian population and civilian partie d'une plus grande campagb visant a militia to commit genocide against the Tutsi. organiser et pr6parer la population civile et

les rnilices civiies a comrnettre le ggnocide contre les Tutsis.

.66 Part of the preparation for the genocide 6.66 Une partie des priparatifs du genocide in Gisenyl was the appointment of a Gisenyi a consist6 a nommer des prefets et prefectural and local authorities that would des autorites locales pr5ts a appliquer, au impliment the anti-Tutsi policies and niveau national, les politiques et les irectives of the iCiRW leadership at the instructions anti-tutsies des dirigeants du

1 level. Since his family originated MRND. Sa famille itant originaire de nyi, Augustin Ngirabatware often Gisenyi, Augustin Ngirabatware retoumait

to his home commune of souvent chez lui dans la commune de mba, where he - continued to Nyamyurnba oh i! continuait d'-, wercer une

xercise considerable influence in local influence considerable sur les affaires Augustin Ngirabatware was locales. Augstin Ngirabatware a contribuk

instrumental in having Faustin Bagangu a la nomination de Faustin Bagangu au poste appointed bourpestre in Nyamyumba. de bourgmestre de Nyamyumba. Faustin Faustin Bagangu, who had a established Bagangu, qui s'itait rendu celebre pour record of persecuting the civilian Tutsi avoir persecuti la population civile tutsie,

ulation, was percieved by local residents 6tait perqu par la population locale comme as the eyes and "arms" of Augustin etant l'oeil et le bras d'Augustin Ngirabatware in the commune. Ngirabatware dans la commune.

Augustin Ngirabatware's open support .+ 6.67 Le soutien flagrant accorde par of Faustin Bagangu, the known president of Augustin Ngirabahvare a Faustin Bagangu,

hterahamwe in Nyamyumba, was part qui etait le president des interahamwe e larger plan to prepare and orchestrate Nyamyumba, faisait partie d'un plan plus killings of the Tutsi. Given the important visant a preparer et 6 orchestrer

57

6: EXPOSE SUCCINCT DES F.%ITS: .aC;'TRES WOLATIO!VS DU DROET HUhtWITMXE K'UERYATIO~AL

predominance of the MRND in Gisenyl and the demonstrated capacity of Augustin Ngirabatware to direct development funds and projects to his native commune, Augus tin Ngirabatware's anti-Tutsi pronouncements were a clear message to local residents of the likely rewards that would follow their support for the MRND policy of exterminating the "enemy".

les massacies des Tutsi. ~ o & p e tenu de la predominance du MKLi a Gisenyi et de la c apacite avCree d' Augustin Ngirabatware a ranener les projets et les fonds de developpement vers sa commune d'origine, ies declarations anti-tutsies de ce dernier 6taient un message clair adresse a la population locale pour lui indiquer les recompenses probables promises a ceux qui apporteraiznt leur soutien a la politique d'extermination de "l'ennemi" prdnCe p a . le MRND.

' f Augustin Ngirabatware funneled state 6.68 Augustin Ngirabatware a achemine deveiopment funds in the portfolio of his vers le L\/lRND les fonds de divsloppement

instry to the MRND for the purchase of de 1'Etat alloues a son ministere, pour servir weapons and medicines for the "civilian Q l'achat d'armes et de medicapents au defense program". The arms purchases benefice "du propramme de difense civile". were not for legitmate purposes of national Les armes ainsi achetkes ny&aient pas defense, but were instead intended and used affsctdes aux objectifs ltgitimes de defense to arm the civilian population and civilian nationale, mais destinies et utilisies plut6t militia to commit crimes against the Tutsi, pour armer la population civile et Ies milices

civiles aux fins qu'elles cornmettent des

- p p p p p p p p p p p p - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - crimes-contre les Tutsi.

9 Between 7 April and mid-~ulfthe 6.69 Enti:: le 7 avril et mi-juillet la Gisenyi prefecture was the theater of prefecture de Gisenyi a ete le thiatre de

sacres of the civilian Tutsi population its massacres de la population civile Tutsi et complices." During this same period the . ses "complices7'. Durant la meme periode les

'3 . -men pursued, kidnapped, raped and miliciens y ont traqut, enlevt, viol6 et tue many members of the Tutsi plusieurs rnembres de la population Tutsi et

tion and the moderate Hutus. Hutu modCree.

The rampant violence in Gisenyi was 6.70 La violence qui sevissait a Gisenyi both widespread and systematic, and was etait a la fois generaliste, systematique et directed from above. Rather than putting dirigee d'en haut. Au lieu de conjuguer

efforts to contain the rampaging and leurs efforts pour contenir sa proliferation et the killing, authories of the civilian 1es meurtres, les autorit6s de governmental administration, the military l'administration gouvemementale civile, les and MRND, the reigning political party in militaires et le MR,;\TT), le parti politique le

prefecture, instead organized, plus populaire de la commune, ont ptut6t encouraged, planned and instigated the organise, encourage, planifie et suscitC des attacks on the civilian Tutsi population. attaques contre la population civile tutsie.

h the night of 6 to 7 April 1994, in 6.71 Dans la nuit du 6 au 7 a t -d 1994 Gisenyi prbfectrrre. Military Commander dans la prefecture de Gisenyl, led-

6: CONCISE STATEMENT OF THE FACTS: OTHER WOLATIONS OF INTERVATIONAL Hti>lrLUtTARLLY LAW

Anatole Nsengiyumva ordered certain political leaders, local authorities and militiamen to assemble at Gisenyi military camp. At t h i s . assembly, h a t o l e Nsengiyumva ordered the participants to kill all the RPF accomplices and all the Tutsi. At the end of the meeting, Anatole Nsengi yumva ordered his subordinates to distribute weapons and grenades to the militiamen who were present.

.72 Furthermore, on 7 Aprii 1994, Anato le Nsengiyumva received a telegram from Kigali ordering him to start the massacres. Between 7 Aprii and mid-July 1994, in Gisenyi, Anatole Nsengiyumva ordered militiamen and soldiers to exterminate the civilian Tutsi populztion and its "accomplices". Between April and July 1994, the militiamen, on the orders of Anato le Nsengiyurnva, hunted down, abducted, raped and killed several members of the Tutsi and moderate Hutu population

- - - - - - fnGiSenylr - - - .

6.73 From May to July 1994, Joseph Nzirorera gave orders to militiamen to lull members of the Tutsi population. He furthermore commended them for their work. He gave them money in proportion to the number of Tutsi killed.

6.71 In late May and early June, several Tutsi and moderate Hutus attempted to flee their preyectztres and take refuge in Gisenyl. [nfoimed of this, Joseph Nzirorera ordered

militiamen to continue to search for the Tutsi and eliminate them.

.75 in June 1994, FBlicien Kabuga, Joseph Nzirorera. h a t o l e Nsengiyumva and Juvktal Uwiligimana held a meeting in+

Commandant militaire Xnato le Nsengyumva a ordome le rassemblement au camp militaire de Gisenyi de certains dirigeants politiques, des autorites locales et des rniliciens. Lors de ce rassemblement Anatole Nsen~iyurnva a dome l'ordre aux participants de tuer tous les complices du FPR et tous les Tutsi. k la fin de la reunion, Anatole Nsencjyumva a ordome a ses subordom6s de distribuer des armes zt des grenades aux miliciens prksents.

6.72 De plus, le 7 avrii 1994, Anatole Nsengiyumva a requ un telegramme de Kigali Iui ordonnant de commencer les massacres. Entre le 7 avril et la mi-juillet L994, a Gisenyi, Anatole ~ s e n $ ~ u r n v a a dome t'ordre a des miliciers ' et a des militaires d'exterrniner la population civile Tutsi et ses "complices". Entra avril et juillet 1994, les miliciens sous ies ordres d ' h a t o t e Nsengiyumva ont traque, enlevk, viole et tu6 plusieurs membres de la population Tutsi et Hutu moderie de Gisenyi.

6.73 Du mois de mai a juillet 1994, Joseph Nzirorera a dome ordre a des rniliciens de tuer des rnembres de la population Tutsi. I1 les a par ailleurs felicites pour leur travail. 11 leur a rernis de l'arsent proportionnellernent au nombre de Tutsi tues

6.74 A la fin du mois de rnai et debut du mois de juin, plusieurs Tutsi et des Hutu moderes ont tente de fuir leur prefecture pour se refugier a Gisenyi. Informe, Joszph Nzirorera a donne l'ordre a des miliciens de continuer de chercher les Tutsi et de les eliminer.

6.75 En juin 1994, Felicien Kabuga, Joseph Nzirorera, Anatole Nsengiyumva st Juvenal Uwiligimana ont tenu une reunion a

6: EXPOSE SUCCINCT D E S FAITS: AUTRES VlOLATIOlvS DU DROIT HUSIX:YITAlRE I:VTEItVATIOX.4L

u

Giseny. During the meeting, Joseph Nzirorera and Juvenal Uwiligimana took note of the names of the Tutsi and moderate

utu who had come .from other prkfectures. They drew up a list of people to eliminate, which they handed over to the interaham we.

Gisenyi. Au cours de cet 'Yw e reunion. Joseph Nzirorera et IuvCnal Uwiligimana ont relevi les noms des Tutsi et dss Hutu moderes Venus d'autres prefectures. 11s ont dresse une liste de personnes a eliminer qu'ils ont remis aux herahamwe.

Ruhengeri Prefecture is located in 6.76 La Prefecture de Ruhengeri, situke rth Western part of Rwanda and has au Nord-Ouest du Rwanda a historiquement

istorically been the site of periodicals Cte te site de massacres pdriodiques de ses massacres of its. tutsi population.This was - habitants tutsi. Cela a egalement Ctt 12 cas

e as well in 1994. en 1994.

E KIBUYE D

I , 7 Kibuye region is located on the 6.77 La rCgion de Kibuye se'! trouve B res of Lake Kivu in western Rwanda. i'ouest du pays au bord du Lac Kim. Entre

Between April and July !S94, large-scale avril et juillet 1994 des massacres de Tutsi assacres of Tutsi took place in this region, de gande envergure se sont dlroules dans

particularly in Bisesero. cette rigion et notamment a Bisesero.

Bisesero is located in two communes in Kibuye prefecture. Because it was home to a large Tutsi community, it attiacted a large mass of Tutsi refbgees trying

arately to escape the killings under ivay everywhere else in the prficture. However,

9 April to 30 June 1994, the Tutsi refugees in Bisesero were the target of repeated attacks by soldiers, gendarmes, dice and Interahamwe-MRW.

From 9 April to 30 June 1994, the Tutsi refugees in Bisesero were the target of repeated attacks by soldiers, gendarmes, d ice and militia. Buses from

ONATRACOM, a state company, were used to facilitate transportation of the attackers. Prominent figures such as the Minister of Lnformation, Eliezer Niyitegeka, were seen

ong the attackers on several occasions.

6.78 Bisesero s'ktend sur deux communes de la prkfecture de Ktbuye. Parce qu'elle abritait dkja une communautk Tutsi nombreuse elle avait attire une masse importante de refugies Tutsi qui tentaient dksespdrkment d'ic happer aux tueries en progression partout ailleurs dam la prefecture. Cependant, depuis le 9 aviil au 30 juin 1994 les Tutsi refugiis a Bisesero ont 6tC une cible d'attaques rtiteres de la part des militaires, des gendarmes, d t s policiers et des Interahamwe-MRND.

6.79 Depuis le 9 avril au 30 juin 1994 les Tutsi rdfugi6s a Bisesero ont it6 une cible d'attaques riiterees de la part des militaires, des gendarmes, des policiers et des milices. Les bus de l'OZ\lATRA.COM, sociite de I'Etat, ont CtB utilises pour faciliter 12s dOplacements des assaillants. Des personnalites importantes telles que k Ministre de I'hformation Eliezer Niyitegeka

6: CONCTSE ST,-\TE?/fEIYT OF THE FACTS: OTHER WOLATIONS OF I N T E R N x T I O N ~ HU:~~ , -~YITARI .&,~ LAW

I

y their presence and their speeches, they ont ete vus a plusieurs reprises parmi les encouraged the attackers to perpetrate the assaillants. Ils les encourageaient par leur massacres. prisence et par leurs discours a perpktrer les

massacres.

Ln May 1994, Eliezer Niytegeka, 6.80 En mai 1994, Eliezer Niyltegeka, Minister of Information in the lnterim Ministre de 1'Information au sein du Government, personally participated in the gouvernement Interirnaire, a personnellemnt massacres that took place in Kibuye, by participi aux massacres qui se sont diroules shooting at Tutsis. a Kibuye en tirant sur des Tutsi.

Sexual Violence as a Policy of Genocide La violence seruelle cornme politique de , .'\

% , J la ghocide

During the events referred to in this indictment, rapes and other forms of sexual violence were widely and notoriously committed in Rwanda against the Tutsi population, in particular Tutsi women and girts or Hutu women married to Tutsi men. These acts were often accompanied by killing or were themselves used as a method of killing. They were perpetrated by, among

militiamen, including hterahamwe- , so ldiers and gendarmes. -

6.81 Lors des 6venements auxquels se rifere le present acte d'accusation, des viols, et d'autres formes de violences seguelles ont CtC comrnis, d'une faqon gdn6ralisCz ct notoire contre la population tutsi notamment ies fmmes et tes filles ou contre des f:::rnmes hutu mari6es B des tutsi. Ces actes 6taient suivis de rneurtre ou servaient de moyens de tuer les victimes. Ces crimes ont kt6 perpCtrCs, entre autres, par des miliciens, dont 1es Interahamwe-t\/lR.W, des militzires et des gendarmes.

". Members of the Interim Government 6.82 Des rnembres du gouvemement

: ') . > 3 -

enerally instigated, encouraged, facilitated, inttrimaire ont suscitd, encourage, facilitC et d acquiesced to, among others, the acquiesce aux viols et violences sexuelles

Interahamwe-MRLW, soldiers, and commis a I'encontre de femmes tutsi, entre gendarmes raping and sexual violating autre, par des miliciens, des ikreralznnnve- Tutsi women. Government ministers even MRND, des militaires et des gendarmes. Des sometimes committed these acts themselves, ministres du gouvemernent ont eux-msmes thereby encouraging by their own example a I'occasion comrnis de tels actes, the commission of such acts by, among encourageant par leur exemple la others, milicia, Interahamwe-MRND, commission d'actes sirnilaires par, entre soldiers and gendarmes over whom they had autres, des miliciens, des Internhnm:ve- de facro and de jure authority. For example, MRND, des soldats et des gendarmes jur on or about 20 May 1994, political party q u i ils avaient une autorite de fait et de j w e . affiliates and militia men working directly Ainsi le ou vers Ie 20 mai 1994 des militants under the supervision of ~ l i eze r Niyitegeka politiques et des rniliciens travaillant jous la fbrced a young girl to get into his car, supervision de Eliezer Niyitegeka ont force whereupon ~ l i e ze r Niptegeka raped her, une fille a monter darts le vehicuk dz ce and when she got out of the vehicle ~ l i eze r dernier oh Niyitegeka I'a violCe; qiiand la

i

' -*

9 e

L 1

6: EXPOSE SL'CCIIYCT DES F.UTS: -

AUTRES t'lOLATIOt\iS DU DROlT HC'.~~AYITXIRE IZ~TERNXTIONAL

Niyitegeka himself shot and killed her.

3 3 Similarly, on several ocassions htenm Government minister of Family Affairs and Gender Pauline Nyramasuhuko personally ordered Interahamwe to kill Tutsi men and to rape Tutsi women before killing them. Once the Minister publicly exhorted Interahamwe to rape Tutsi women, stating to

- - a small crowd, "you need to rape these Tutsi

1 - 1 women because they are arrogant . . . this is your opportunity to see what they are like." As soon as Pauline Nyiramasuhuko concluded her inciting address and returned to her vehicle, the soldiers and lnterahamwe began to rape the Tutsi refugees.

Rape and other forms of sexual violence, including sexual torture, degrading sexual acrs and indecent exposure were integral to the genocidal policy of the conspirators that seized political power &om

; 1 _,

the first moments of 7ch April, 1994 when - - olitical assassinations began. Not even the

r ime Minister Agatha Uwiligimana was . Her body was discovered on the

ornlng of 7 April 1994 with indicia of sexual torture and sexual degradation.

5 From April to July 1994, several dred thousand people were massacred

throughout Rwanda. The majority of the victims were killed solely because they were Tutsi or appeared to be Tutsi. The other victims, nearly all Hutu, were killed because they were considered Tutsi accomplices,

victirne sortit du v&icule, Eiiezer Niytegeka-lui meme la tua d'un coup de feu.

6.83 De mime, a maintes reprises le ministre de la Promotion de Ia Famiile ct dc la condition feminine au sein du go uvernement intkrirnaire, Pauline Nyiramasuhuko, a persomellement intime aux Interahamwe I'ordre de tuer .les hommes tutsis et de violer tes femmes tutsies avant de les tuer. A une occasion pricise elle exhorta publiquement les interahamwe B ,

violer tes femmes tutsies en s'adressant a eux dans tes temes suivants: "I1 faut violer ces femmes tutsies parce qu'elles sont arrogantes . . . c'est une occasion qd vous est offerte pour savoir comment elles'sont". k la fin de son discours Pauli~e Nyiramasuhuko est retournee ii sa voiture et les militaires et les lnterahamwe ont aussitdt commenc6 a violer les tutsies rkiugiees.

6.84 Le viol et autres formes de violence sexuelle, torture sexuelle, actes sexuels dbgradants, outrage a La pudeur ont fait partie de la politique genocidaire de ceux qui se sont entendus pour prendre le pouvoir dks le 7 avril 1994 quand les assassinats politiques ont commence. MCme le Premier Ministre Agathe Uwiligimana n'a pas ite tpargnde. Son corps a ete d6couvert dans la matinke du 7 avril 1994 avec des indices de torture et de violence sexuelle.

6.85 D'avril a juillet 1994, plusieurs centaines de milliers de personnes ont CtC massacr6es sur tout le territoire du Rwanda. La piupart des victimes ont Cte tuees pour la seule raison qu'elles Btaient des Tutsi ou ressemblaient a des Tutsi. Les autres victimes, surtout des Hutu, ont kte tuees

6: CONCISE STATEMENT OF THE FACTS: OTHER VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMILUIT.ARI,LU t .4W

P

were linked to them through marriage or parce qu'eiles etaient were opposed to the extremist Hum des Tutsi, likes a ces derniers par mariage ou ideo logy. opposees B I'idCologie Hutu extr6misrz.

6.86 From 7 April 1994 around the 6.86 Des le 7 avril 1994, partotit au country, most of the massacres were Rwanda, la plupart des massacres ont eti perpetrated with the participation, aid and comrnis avec la participation. {'aide ct ins tigation of inreraham w~-LWLUD 1' encouragement des miliciens militiamen, military personnel and (nterahamwe-MRND, des mili~aires et des sendannes. gendarmes.

7 The massacres thus perpetrated were - 6.87 Les massacres perpetres Ctaient le " result of a strategy adopted and rksultat d'une stratigie adoptCe et elaboree

elaborated by political, civil and military par des autoritis politiques, civiles et authorities in the country, such as Jean de rnilitaires du pays dont Jean de Dieu

eu Kamu h anda, Augustin Ngirabatware, Kamuhanda, Augustin Ngirabatware, Casimir Bizimungu, Prosper Mugiraneza, Casimir B izimungu, Prosper Mugiraneza, Jer6rne B icknumpaka, Justin Mugenzi, JirBrne Bicamumpaka, Justin* Mugenzi

uard Karernera, Andrb Rwamakuba, Edouard Karemera, Andrl Rwamakuba, hieu Ngirurnpatse, Joseph Nzirorera, Mathieu Ngirumpatse, Joseph Nzirorera. ,

Juvenal Kaj elij eli, h d r b Ntagerura, Pauline Juvenal Kajelijeli, h d r e Ntagerura, Padine Nyiramasuhuko and ~ l i e ze r Ni yitegeka, Nyiramasuhuko et ~ l i e z e r Niyitegeka, qui sc who conspired to exterminate the Tutsi sont entendues pour exterminer la

p p u i a t i o a A s frm 7 A p d , ~ t h e ~ - - - popufation Tutsi. A partir du' 7 a v d , authorities at the national and local 1ei;els d'autres autoritis nationales et locales ont espoused this plan and joined the 'first g o u p adher6 i ca plan et se sont jointes au premier in encouraging, organizing and panicipat-ing groupe pour encourager, orgmiser et in the massacres of the Tutsi population and participer aux massacres de la population

" 1 = ? its accomplices. Tutsi et ses complices.

Members of the Interim Government, 6.88 Des membres du Gouvernement political leaders, military officers and Local hterimaire, des dirigeants politiques, des authorities aided and abetted their officiers militaires et des autorit6s locales subordinates and others in carrying out the ont aid& et encouragk leurs s u b o r d o ~ i s c t

massacres of the Tutsi population and its des tiers a cormnettre les massacres de la accomplices. Without the complicity of the population Tutsi et de ses complices. Sans la local and national civil and military complicite des autorites locales et authorities, the principal massacres would nationales, civiles et militaires, les not have occurred. principaux massacres n'auraient pas eu lieu.

.89 Knowing that massacres of the civilian population were being committed, the political and military authorities, including Augustin Ngirabatware, Jean de

ieu Kamu handa, Augustin Nsirabatware,

6.89 Sachant que des massacres itaiznt commis contre la population civile. Ies autorites politiques et militaires dont Jean de Dieu Kamuhanda, Augustin Ngirabatware, Casimir Bizimungu, Projper

*

Casimir Bizimungu, Prosper Mugiraneza, JirBme Bicamumpaka, Justin Mugenzi, Eliezer Niyi tegeka, Edouard Karemera, h d r d Rwamakuba, lMathieu Ngirumpatse, Iosep h Nzirorera and JuvCnal Kajelijeli took no measures to stop them. On the contrary, they rehsed to intervene to control and

eal to the population as long as a cease- had not been declared. This categorical

refha1 was communicated to the Special Rapporteur via the Chief of Staff of

andan b y , Major-General Augustin i l B izirnungu.

Mugiraneza, Jlr6rne Bicamumpaka, iustiil Mugenzi, Eliezer Niyltegeka, Edouard Karemera, Andre Rwamakuba, Mathieu Ngirumpatse, Joseph Nzirorsra, st Juvenal Kajelijeli n'ont pris aucune disposition pour les arr6ter. Au contraire ils ont rehsi d'intervenir pour contrder et hire appcl a la population tant qu'un accord de cesssz-le- feu ne serait pas ordonne. Ce rehs cattgorique a ete 'transrnis au Rapporteur special par i'intermediaire du Chef de 1'Etat- Major de 1'ArrnCe Rwandaise, le Major- GlnCral Augustin B izimungu.

ean de Dieu Kamuhanda, Augustin 6.90 Jean de Dieu Kamuhanda, Ngirabatware, Casimir Bizimungu, Prosper

ugiraneza, JerBme Bicamumpaka, Justin ugenzi, Edouard Karernera, Andre

Rwamakuba, Mathieu Ngirumpatse, Joseph Nzirorzra and Juvenal Kajzlijeli, in their position of authority, acting in concert with, notably ~ n d r ~ Ntagerura, Pauline Nyiramasuhuko, ~ l i e ze r Niyitegeka, Tharcisse Renzaho, Felicien Kabuga, Augus tin Bizimana, Callixte Nzabonimana and Theoneste Bagosora, participated in the planning, preparation or execution of. a common scheme, strategy or plan, ' to

: ) t the atrocities set forth above. The --i were committed by them personally,

y persons they assisted or by their subordinates, and with their knowledge or

Augustin Ngirabatware, Casimir Bizimungu, Prosper Mugiraneza, JirBme ~ i c a h u m ~ a k a , Justin Mugenzi, Edouaxd ~aremira , Andr6 Rwamakuba, Marhieu Ngirumpatse, loszph Nzirorera st Juvenal Kajelijeli, dans leur position d'autoriti, en agissant de concert avec notamment Ntagerura, Pauline Nyiramasuhuko, ~ l i e ze r Niyitegeka, Tharcisse Renzaho, Felicien Kabuga, Augustin Bizimana, Callixte Nzsbonimana et Thioneste Bagosora ont partkip6 a la planification, la priparation o u I'execution d'un plan, d'une strategic ou d'un dessein cornmun, afin de perpetrer les atrocitis ,

inonc6es ci-dessus. Ces crimes ont it6 perp6trts par eux-m8mes ou par des personnes qu'il ont aidkes ou par leurs

consent. subordonnes, alors qu'ils en avaient comaissance ou y consentaient.

7: CHARGES

.?: CHARGES

y the acts or omissions described in paragraphs 5.1 to 6.90 and more specifically in the paragraphs referred to below:

ean de Dieu Karnuhanda: I *

f ursuant to Article 6(1), according to paragraphs: 5.1,5.2, 5.11 to 5.13, 5.16, 5.18, 5-21, 5.23, 5.24, 5.30, 5.33, 5.34, 5.38, 6.5, 6.7 to 6.10, 6.14 to 6.19, 6.21 to 6.26, 6.28, 6.30 to 6.39, 6.41 to 6.46, 6.48 to 6.51, 6.54, 6.56,6.61 to 6.68,6.75, 6.79 to 6.90.

' -pursuant to Article 6(3), according to aragraphs: 5.1, 5.2,5.11 to5.13,5.16, 5.18,

5.21, 5.23, 5.24, 5.30, 5.33, 5.34, 5.38, 6.5, - - - - - - - - - - 6Tto -610- -6-1-4f - - - - - - . , . 06.19,6.21to6.26,6.38,

6.30 to 6.39, 6.41 to 6.46, 6.48 to 5.51, 6.54, 6.56,6.61 to 6.68, 6.75,6.79 to 5.90.

5' ) . .- conspired with others to kill and cause serious bodily o i mental ham to members of the Tutsi population with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a racial or ethnic proup, and thereby committed CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT

NCODE, a crime stipulated in Article 2(3)(b) of the Statute of the Tribunal, for which he is individually responsible pursuant to Article 6 and which is punishable in reference to Articles 22 and 23 of the Statute

7: LES CHEFS D'ACCU ?lr ATION

PREMIER CHEF D'ACCUSATION:

Par Ies actes et omissions dicrits aux paragraphes 5.1 a 6.90 et plus particulibrernent aux paragaphes r6fkrenciks ci-dessous:

Jean de Dieu Kamuhanda:

-confomirnent 1 I'article 6(1), selon les paragaphes: 5.1, 5.2, 5.11 to 5.13, 5.16, 5.18, 5.21, 5.23, 5.24, 5.30, 5.33, 5.34, 5.38, 6.5, 6.7 to 6.10, 6.14 to 6.49, 6.21 to 6.26, 6.28, 6.30 to 6.39, 6.41 td 6.46, 6.48 to 6.51, 6-54, 6.56,6.61 to 6.68, 6.75, 6.79 to 6.90.

-conformernent a l'articie 6(3), selon les paragraphes: 5.1, 2 5 . 1 to 5.13, 5.16, 5L8, 5.21, 5.23, 5.24, 5.30, 5.33, 5.34, 5.38, 6.5, 6.7 to 6.10, 6.14 to 6.19, 6.21 to 6.26, 6.28, 6.30 to 6.39, 6.41 to 6.46, 6.48 to 6.51, 6.54, 6.56,6.61 to 6.68, 6.75, 6.79 to 6.90.

s'est entendu avec d'autres pour tuer et porter des atteintes graves a l'intdgritl physique ou mentale de membres de la population tutsi dms l'intention de ditruire en tout ou en partie ce groupe ethnique ou racial, et a, de ce fait, comrnis le crime D'ENTERTE EN VUE DE COMMETTRE LE GENOCIDE tel que pr6vu ii I'article 2(3)(b) du Statut du Tribunal pour lequel il est individueilement responsable en vertlr de I'article 6 et --

punissable en verb des articles 22 et 22 du S tatut.

7. LES CHEFS DACCUSA1'10:y

By the acts or omissions described in paragraphs 5.1 to 6.90 and more specifically in the paragraphs referred to below:

de Dieu Karnuhanda:

-pursuant to Article 6(1), according to

-pursuant to Article 6(3), according to hs: 5.1, 5.2, 5,fl to 5.13, 5.16, 5.18, 3, 5.24, 5.30, 5.33, 5.34, 5.38, 6.5,

6-7 to 6.10, 6.14 to 6.19, 6.21 to 6.26, 6.28,

is responsible for killing and causing serious \

7 j bodily or mental harm to members of the Tutsi population with the intent to destroy,

- in whole or in part, a racial or ethnic group,

ereby committed GENOCIDE, a crime stipulated in Article 2(3)(a) of the Statute of the Tribunal, for which he is individually responsible pursuant to Article 6 and which is punishable in reference to

ides 22 and 23 of the Statute.

Par les actes et omissions decrits aux paragraphes 5.1 a 6.90 et plus particulikrement aux paragrap hes r e ferencies ci-dessous:


-conformement a l'article 6(1), selon les paragraphes: 5.1, 5.2, 5.11 to 5.13, 5.16, 5.18, 5.21, 5.23, 5.24, 0 5.33, 5.34, 5.38, 6.5, 6.7 to 6.10, 6.14 to 6.19, 6.21 to 6.26, 6.28, 6.30 to 6.39, 6.41 to 6.46, 6.48 to 6.51, 6.54, 6.56,6.61 to 6.68, 6.75, 6.79 to 6.90. . -confoimement a l'article 6(3), selon les paragraphes: 5.1, 5.2, 5.11 to 5.13, 5.16, 5.18, 5.21, 5.23, 5.24, 5.30, 5.33, 5.33, 5.38, 6.5, 6.7 to 6.10, 6.14 to 6.19, 6.21 to 6.26,628,6.30 to 6.39, 6.4t to 6.46, 6.48 to 6.51, 6.54, 6.56,6.61 to 6.68, 6.75, 6.79 to 6.90.

est responsable de rneurtres et d'atteintes graves a l'intCgiti physique ou mentale de membres de la population tutsi dam I'intention de dCtiuire en tout ou en partie ce groupe ethnique ou racial et a, de ce fait, cornmis le crime de G ~ N O C I D E tel que prlvu a larticle 2(3)(a) du Statut du Tribunal pour lequel il est individuellement responsable en vem de l'article 6 du Statut et punissable en vertu des articles 22 et 23 du Statut. .

r, alternatively OU, aiiternaiivement 14B

By the acts or omissions described in Par les actes et omissions dicrits aux paragraphs 5.1 to 6.90 and more specifically paragraphes 5.1 Q 6.90 et plus in the paragraphs referred to below: particulierement aux paragraphes

r6firenci6s ci-dessous:

ean de Dieu Kamuhanda: Jean de Dieu Karnuhanda:

f i -pursuant to Article 6(1), according to -conform6ment a l'article 6(1), selon les 8

paragraphs: 5.1, 5.2, 5.11 to 5.13, 5.16, 5.18, paragraphes: 5.1, 5.2, 5.11 to 5.13, 5.16, 5.21, 5.23, 5.24, 5.30, 5.33, 5.34, 5.38, 6.5, 5.18, 5.21, 5.23, 5.24, 5.30, 5.33, 5.34,

to 6.90.

-pursuant- to Article 6(3) , according to -confom6ment ii l'article 6(3), selon les paragraphs: 5.1, 5.2,5.11 to 5.13,5.16, 5.18, paragraphes: 5.1, 5.2, 5.11 to 5.13, 5.16, 5.21, 5.23, 5.24, 5-30, 5.33, 5.34, 5.38, 6.5, 5.18, 5.21, 5.23, 5.24, 5.30, 5.33, 5.34, 6.7 to 6.10, 6.14 to 6.19, 6.21 to 6.26, 6.28, 5.38, 6.5, 6.7 to 6.10, 6.14 to 6.19, 6.21 to 6.30 to 6.39, 6.41 to 6.46, 6 .48~0 6.51, 6.54, 6.26, 6.28, 6.30 to 6.39, 6.41 to 6.46, 6.48 6.56,6.61 to 6.68, 6.75,6.79 to 6.90. to 6.51, 6.54, 6.56,6.61 to 6.68, 6.75, 6.79

to 6.90. ;' .) t , i

is responsible for killing and causing serious est responsable de meurtres et d'atteintes odily or mental harm to members of the graves a 1'intCgritC physique ou mentale de

Tuisi population with the intent to destroy, membres de la population tutsi dans in whole or in part, a racial or ethnic group, I'intention de dCtruire en tout ou en partie

thereby committed COMPLICITY IN ce groupe ethnique ou racial et a, de ce fait, OCIDE, a crime stipulated in Article commis le crime de COMPLICIT~

2(3)(e) of the Statute of the Tribunal, for DANS LE GENOCIDE tel que prevu a which he is individually responsible l'article 2(3)(e) du Statut du Tribunal pour pursuant to Article 6 and which is lequel il est individuellement responsable punishable in reference to Articles 22 and 23 en vertu de l'article 6 du Statut et of the Statute. punissable en vertu des articles 22 et 23 du

S tatut.

7. LES CHEFS DACCGSAI'IO~~

OUNT 4: D'ACCUSATION:

By the acts or omissions described in paragraphs 5.1 to 6.90 and more specifically in the paragraphs referred to below:

e m de Dieu Kamuhanda:

-pursuant to Article 6(1), according to aragTaphs: 5.1, 5.2, 5.1 1 to 5.13, 5.16, 5.18, 21, 5.23, 5.24, 5.30, 5.33, 5.34, 5.38, 6.5, -7 to 6.10, 6.14 to 6.19, 6.21 to 6.26, 6.28,

6.39, 6.41 to 6.46, 6.48 to 6.51, 6.54, 61 to 6.68,6.75,6.79 to 6.90.

ursuant to Article 6(3), according to paragraphs: 5.1, 5.2, 5.11 to 5.13, 5.16, 5.18, 5.21, 5.23, 5.24, 5.30, 5.33, 5.34, j.38, 6.5, 6.7 to 6.10, 6.14 to 6.19, 6.21 to 6.26, 6.28, 6.30 - - - - - to 6:3P, 6.41 to 6.46,648-to651.6.54,- 6.56,6.61 to 6.68, 6.75, 6.79 to 6.90.

is responsible for the murder of persons as of a widespread and systematic attack

against a civilian population on political, racial grounds, a d thereby

a CRIME AGAINST ITY, a crime stipulated in Article

3(a) of the Statute of Tribunal, for which he is individually responsible pursuant to

icle 6 of the Statute and which is unishable in reference to Articles 22 and 23

ofthe Statute.

Par les actes et omissions dkcrits aux paragraphes 5.1 A 6.90 et plus particulikrernent aux paragraphes rif6renciks ci-dessous:


-conformement a l'article 6(1), selon les - paragraphes: 5.1, 5.2, 5.11 to 5.13, 5.16,

5.18, 5.21, 5.23, 5.24, 5.30, 5.33, 5.34, 5.38, 6.5, 6.7 to 6.10, 6.14 to 6.19, 6.21 to 6.26, 6.28, 6.30 to 6.39, 6.41 to 6.46, 6.48 to 6.51, 6.54, 6.56,6.61 to 6.68475, 6.79 to 6.90. . .

-conformexnent B l'article 6(3), selon les paragraphes: 5.1, 5.2, 5.11 to 5.13, 5.16, 3.18, 5.21, 5.23, 5.24, 5.30, 5.33, 5.34, 5.38, 6.5, 6.7 to 6.10, 6.14 to 6.19, 6.21 to

- -&2& 6223; 6 ~ 3 0 to 6.39,6.41 €0- 6.46,-6.48- - to 6.51, 6.34, 6.56,6.61 to 6.68, 6.75, 6.79 to 6.90.

est responsable d' assassinats de personnes dans le cadre d'une attaque systematique et gknthlisie contre une population civile, en raison de son appai-tenance politique, ethnique ou raciale, et a, de ce fait cornmis un CRIME CONTRE L ~ H ~ I A ~ Y I T E , tel que p r 6 w l'article 3(a) du Statut du Tribunal pour lequel il est individuellement -

responsable en vertu de l'article 6 du Statut et punissable en vertu des articles 22 et 23 du Statut.

1)

OUNT 5: /y 11

CINQIEME CHEF D'ACCUSATION:

y the acts or omissions described in Par les actes et omissions decrits aux aragraphs 5.1 to 6.90 and more specifically paragraphes 5.1 a 6.90 et plus

in the paragraphs referred to below: particulierement aux paragrap hes re fkrencies ci-dessous:

e m de Dieu Kamuhanda: Jean de Dieu Kamuhanda:

-pursuant to Article 6(1), according to aragraphs: 5.1, 5.2, 5.11 to 5.13, 5.16, 5.18, -21, 5.23, 5.24, 5.30, 5.33, 5.34, 5.38, 6.5,

,, ., 1 -7 to 6.10, 6.14. to 6.19, 6.21 to 6.26, 6.28,

to 6.39, 6.41 to 6.46, 6.48 to 6.51, 6.54, ,6.61 to 6.68,6.75, 6.79 to 6.90.

ursuant to Article 6(3), according to paragraphs: 5.1, 5.2, 5.11 to 5.13, 5.16, 5.18, 3.21, 5.23, 5.24, 5.30, 5.33, 5.34, 5.38, 6.5,

is responsible for the extermination of ersons as part of a widespread ,and

fl -, systematic attack against a civilian

- j . i opulation on political, ethnic or racial \ s, and thereby committed a CRIME

ST H I , a crime stipulated in Article 3(b) of the Statute of Tribunal, for which he is individually responsible pursuant to Article 6 of the

tatute and which is punishable in reference ides 22 and 23 of the Statute.

-conformement H l'article 6(1), selon les paragraphes: 5.1, 5.2, 5.21 to 5.13, 5.16, 5.18, 5.21, 5.23, 5.24, 5.30, 5.33, 5.34, 5.38, 6.5, 6.7 to 6.10, 6.14 to 6.19, 6.21 to 6.26, 6.28, 6.30 to 6.39, 6.41 to 6.46, 6.48 to 6.51, 6.54, 6.56,6.61 to 6.68, 6.75, 6.79 to 6.90.

I

-confom&nent a l'article 6(3)i ' selon les paragraphes: 1 2 1 to 5.13, 5.16, 5.18, 5.21, 5.23, 5.24, 5.30, 5.33, 5.34, 5.38, 6.5, 6.7 to 6.10, 6.14 to 6.19, 6.21 to 6.26, 6.25, 6.30 to 6.39, 6.41 to 6.46, 6.48 to 6.51, 6.54, 6.56,6.61 to 6.68, 6.75, 6.79 to 6.90.

est responsable d'extermination de persormes dam le cadre d7une attaque systkmatique et gkndraliste contre une population civile, en raison de son appartenance politique, ethnique ou raciale, et a, de ce fait c o m i s un CRIME CONTRE L'HU~MANIT~, tel que prevu A l'article 3(b) du Statut du Tribunal pour lequel il est individuellement responsable en vertu de l'article 6 du Statut et punissable en vertu des articles 22 et 23 du Statut.

7. LES CHEFS DACCUSA~'ION

y the acts or omissions described in Par les actes et omissions dkcrits aux paragraphs 5.1 to . 6. 6.90 and more paragaphes 5.1 a 6. 6.90 et plus specifically in the paragraphs referred to particulikrement aux paragap hzs betaw: referenciks ci-dessous:

ean de Dieu Kamuhanda: Jean de Dieu Karnuhanda:

-pursuant to Article 6(1), according to -conformdment a l'article 6(1), selon les aragraphs: 5.1,5.2, 5.11 to 5.13,5.16, 5.18, paragraphes: 5.1, 5.2, 5.11 to 5.13, 5.16, 21, 5.23, 5.24, 5.30, 5.33, 5.34, 5.38, 5.39, . 5.18, 5.21, 5.23, 5.24, 5.30, 5.33, 5.34,

'i

/p" 5, 6.7 to 6.10,.6.14 to 6.19, 6.21 to 6.26, 5.38, 5.39, 6.5, 6.7 to 6.10, 6.14 to- 6.19, , 6.30 to 6.39, 6.41 to 6.46, 6.48 to 6.51, 6.21 to 6.26, 6.28, 6.30 to 6.39, 6.41 to , 6.56,6.61 to 6.68,6.75,6.79 to 6.90. 6.46, 6.48 to 6.51, 6.54, 6.56,6.61 to 6.68,

6.75,6.79 to 6.90. e

, '

-pursuant to Article 6(3), according to -confomtment h l'article 6(3), sclon les paragraphs: 5.1, 5.2, 5.1 1 to 5.13,5.16, 5.18, 5.22, 5.23, 5.24, 5.30, 5.33, 5.34, 5.38, 5.39,

paragraphes: 5.1, 5.2, 5.11 to 1 5.16, 5.18, 5.22, 5.23, 5.24, 5.30, 5.33, 5.34,

sponsibie for rape as part of a est responsable de viols dam le cadre d'une idespread and systematic attack against a attaque systtmatique et gdnkralis6e contre

civilian population on political, ethnic or L ' )

une population civile, en raison de son ounds, and thereby committed a appartenance politique, ethnique ou raciale, \

AGAINST HUMANITY, a crime - et a, de ce fait commis un CRIME in Article 3(g) of the Statute of CONTRE L'HUIMANIT~, tel que prevu B

unal, for he is individually I'article 3(g) du Statut du Tribunal pour responsible pursuant to Article 6 of the lequel il est individuellement responsable Statute and which is punishable in reference en vertu de I'article 6 du Statut et

ides 22 and 23 of the Statute. punissable en vertu des articles 22 et 23 du - meme Statut.

7: CHARGES

y the acts or omissions described in paragraphs 5.1 to 6.90 and more specifically in the paragraphs referred to below:


-pursuant to &tide 6(1), according to paragraphs: 5.1, 5.2, 5.1 1 to 5.13, 5.16, 5.18, 5.21, 5.23, 5.24, 5.30, 5.33, 5.34, 5.38, 6.5, 6.7 to 6.10, 6.14 to 6.19, 6.21 to 6.26, 6.28, 6.30 to 6.39, 6-41 to 6.46,6.48 to 6.51,6.54, 6,56,6.61 to 6.68, 6.75, 6.79 to 6.90.

-pursuant to Article 6(3), according to : 5.1, 5.2, 5.11 to 5.13, 5.16, 5.18, 5.24, 5.30, 5.33, 5.34, 5.38, 6.5,

6.7 to 6.10, 6.14 to 6.19, 6.21 to 6.26, 6.28, 6.30 to 6.39, 6.41 to 6.46,6.48 to 6.51, 6.54,

,6.61 to 6.68, 6.75,6.79 to 6.90.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

..

is responsible for inhumane acts against persons as part of a widespread *and systematic attack against a civilian population on political, ethnic or racial gosounds, anO thereby committed a CRIME

AlNST HUMANITY, a crime stipulated in Article 3(i) o f Statute of the Tribunal, for whch he is individually responsible pursuant to Article 6 of the Statute and which is punishable in reference to Articles 22 and 23 of the Statute.

Par les actes et omissions dkcrits aux paragraphes 5.1 a 6.90 et plus particuliixernent aux paragraphes re fkrencies ci-dessous:


-conformirnent a 1' article 6(1), selon les parapraphes: 5.1, 5.2, 5.11 to 5.13, 5.16, 5.18, 5.21, 5.23, 5.24, 5.30, 5.33, 5.34, 5.38, 6.5, 6.7 to 6.10, 6.14 to 6.19, 6.21 to 6.26, 6.28, 6.30 to 6.39, 6.41 to 6.46, 6.48 to 6.51, 6.54, 6.56,6.61 to 6.68, 6.75, 6.79 to 6.90.

,

-conform&nent B l'article 60): ' selon les paragraphes: 5.1, 5.2, 5.11 to 5.13, 5.16, 5.18, 5.21, 3.23, 5.24, 5.30, 5.33, 5.34, 5.38, 6.5, 6.7 to 6.10, 6.14 to 6.19, 6.21 to

est responsable d'actes inhurnains contre des personnes dans le cadre d'une attaque systtmatique et generalisee contxe une population civile, en raison de son appartenance politique, ethnique ou raciale, et' a, de ce fait commis un CRIME CONTRE L~HUIMANITE tel que prkvu Q l'article 3(i) du Statut du Tribunal pour lequel il est individuellernent responsable en vertu de l'article 6 du Statut et punissable en vertu des articles 22 et 23 du mcme Statut.

7. LES CHEFS DACCUSAI'ION

y the acts or omissions described in Par les actes et omissions dkcrits aux paragraphs 5.1 to 6.90 and more specifically paragraphes 5.1 a 6.90 et plus in the paragraphs referred to below: particulierement aux p aragrap hes

r6firenciis ci-dessous:

u de Dieu Kamuhanda: Jean de Dieu Kamuhanda:

to Article 6(1), according to -conformement a l'article 6(1), selon les s: 5.1, 5.2, 5.11 to5.13, 5.16, 5.18, paragrap hes : 5. , 5.2, 5.11 to 5.13, 5.16,

,/ '1 , 5.24, 5.30, 5.33, 5.34, 5.38, 6.5, . 5.18, 5.21, 5.23, 5.24, 5.30, 5.33, 5.34,

y , 6.14 to 6.19, 6.21 to 6.26, 6.28, 5.38, 6.5, 6.7 to 6.10, 6.14 to 6.19, 6.21 to -

,6.41 to 6.46, 6.48 to 6.51, 6.54, 6.26, 6.28, 6.30 to 6.39, 6.41 to 6.46, 6.18 6.68,6.75, 6.79 to 6.90. to 6.51, 6.54, 6.56,6.61 to 6.68, 6.75, 6.79

to 6.90. t

8

. I

-pursuant to Article 6(3), according to agraphs: 5.1, 5.2, 5.11 to 5.13, 5.16, 5.18,

5.21, 5.23, 5.24, 5.30, 5.33, 5.34, 5.38, 6.5, 6.7 to 6.10, 6.14 to 6.19, 6.21 to 6.26, 6.28,

to 6.39, 6.41 to 6.46, 6.48 to 6.51, 6.54, ,661 to 6.68,6.75,6.79 to 6.90,

is responsible for outrages upon personal cular humiliating -and

eatment, rape and indecent of an armed internal conflict,

thereby committed SERIOUS NS OF ARTICLE 3

TO THE GEMEVA AND OF

OTOCOL 11, a crime stipulated in Article 4(e) of the Statute of the

unal, for which he is individually sponsible pursuant to Article 6 of the

Statute and which is punishable in reference to Articles 22 and 23 of the Statute.

*-' -conform&nent B l'article 6(3),' selon les paragraphes: 5.1, 5.2, 5.11 to 5.13, 5.16, 5.18, 5.21, 5.23, 5.24, 5.30, 5.33, 5.34, 5.38, 6.5, 6.7 to 6.10, 6.14 to 6.19, 6.21 to 6.26, 6.28, 6.30 to 6.39, 6.41 to 6.46, 6.48 to 6.51, 6.54, 6.56,6.6i to 6.68, 6.75, 6.79 to 6.90.

est responsable d'atteintes a la dignite de la persome, notamment de traitements humiliants et dggradants, de viols et d'attentats A la pudeur dam le cadre d'un conflit arm6 interne, et a, de ce fait, .

commis le crime de VIOLATIONS GRAVES DE L'ARTICLE 3 COMMUNE AUX CONVENTIONS DE GENEVE ET DU PROTOCOLE ADDITIONNEL I1 tel que prevu a l'article 4(e) du Statut du Tribunal et pour lequel il est individuellernent responsable en vertu de l'article 6 du Statut et punissable en vertu des articles 22 et 23 du - - -

mZme ~tatut .

By t h ~ acts or omjssioas deffiibtd in paragraphs 5.1 to 6.90 and m m specifically

ursuanL tn Articla 6(1), according to paragnqrhs:5.1,5.2, 5.11 to5.13,5.16,5.18, 5.21, 5.23, 5.24, 5.30, 5.33, 534, 5.38, 6.5, 6.7 to 6.10.6-14 to 6.19, 6-21 to 6.26, 6.28, 6.30 to 6,39; 6.41 to 6.46,6.48 to 6.51, 6.54, 6.56,6.61 to 6.68,6.75, 6,7930 6.90.

-pmuant fb Article 6(3), accarding to ~ h a : 5 . 1 , 5 . 2 , 5 - 1 1 to5.13,5.16,5.13, 5.21, 5.23, 524, 5.30, 5.33, 5.34, 538, 6.5, 6.7 to 6.10, 6.14 to 6.19, 621 to 6.26;628, 6.30 to 6.39,6.41 to 6-16,6.48 bo 6-51, 6.54, 6.56,GAl to 6,68,6.75,6.79 to 6.90,

-_ %

is responsible for killing and causing vi~lenca to hcllth wd to the physical or mental well-being of civilians as part of an

ed internal conflict, and thereby ccrmmitted SERIOUS VIOLATION OF AEi'IXm 3 COLWMOS TO

DITIONAL PROTOCAL II, a crime pulated in Article 4(a) of the S e t e of the

Tribunal, for which he is am indiviWy responsible ptmusnt ta Article 6 of thc Status &d which is p-able in rafetenc a to Articles 22 and 23 of the StatutE.

F D' ACCUSATION:

Pal: lee actis ct omissians d4ai-b aux pamgmpbw 5.1 h 6.90 et plus particu3ihent am pmgraehes rC&~ncies cidessous:

I

-confmmimat B l'article 6(3); sdon les pzr~~griqp'w: 5.1, 5.2, 5.11 to 5-13, 5.16, 5.18, S.Zf, 523, 524, 5.30, 5.33, 5.34, 5.38, 6.5, 6-7 to 6.10, 6.14 to 6-19, 6.21 ta

6.26, 6.28, 6.30 tc 6.39, 6.41 to 6.46, 6.48 to 6.57, 6.54, 6,56,6.61 to 6.68, 6.75, 6.79 to 6-90,

cst rcaponsablc de me- d ' w t e s B la sa&6 et au bibim &re physique ou mental de porsonncs civ31c;s dam le cadre d'm connit d iflfemc, ct 4 & cc f a i t commis It crime de VIOtA'fffONS GRAVES DE LsARTICX+E 3 Cr3MMON ALX CONVENTIONSS DE GEN~VE ET DU PROTOCOLE GDDlTIONNEL U tel qua prtvu Partitide 4(a) du Statut du Tribunal et our 1-1 il es? individuellm& rospansabh en vatu de l ' d c l e 6 du St- et punissable en vertu des articles 22 ct 23 du Statut.

Prosecutor v. &4MUHANDA, ICTR-99-54A-T

International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda Tribunal PCal International pour le Rwanda

UNITED NATIONS NATIONS UNIES Before; Judge William H. Sekule, Presiding


Registrar: Adama Dieng

Date: 2 July 2003

THE PROSECUTOR v.



ANNEX 2 PROSECUTION AND DEFENCE EXHIBITS

PROSECUTOR V. JEAN DE DIEU KAMU ICTR-99-54A-T

List of Prosecution trial witnesses

THE PROSECUTOR V. JEAN DE DlEU KAMUHANDA CASE NUMBER: ICTR-99-54A- T

PROSECUTION EXHIBITS INDE

: DESCRIPTION: DATE:

1. CV of Upendra Baghel, PW 1, exhibit P I 0310910 1

Maps, sketches and still photographs of Gikomero Parish, exhibit P2 03109/0 I

Maps, sketches and still photographs of Gishaka Parish, exhibit P3 0310910 1

Photos of the accused, KO168412 and KO1 68413, exhibit P4

PIS of witness GEK, PW3, exhibit P5

PIS of witness GET, PW4, exhibit P6

Photos of Gikomero communal office, exhibit P7

PIS of witness GAB, PW5, exhibit P8

PIS of witness GEB, PW6, exhibit P9

PIS of witness GAF, PW7, exhibit PI0

4 1 . Photos from exhibit P2, K0184575/457714579, as marked, exhibit P I 1

PIS of witness GEE, PW8, exhibit PI2

PIS of witness GAA, PW9, exhibit PI3

4. PIS of witness GEA, PW 10, exhibit PI4

PIS of witness GEC, PW 11, exhibit PI5

PIS of witness GEG, PW12, exhibit PI6

PIS of witness GAD, PW13, exhibit PI7

PIS of witness GES, PW14, exhibit PI8

PIS of witness GEI, PW 15, exhibit PI9

Sketch drawn by witness GEI of Gikomero Parish, PW15, exhibit P20 Y

31/01/02

PIS of witness GAG, PW16, exhibit P21 04/02/02

PIS of witness GEV, PW17, exhibit P22 06/02/02

PIS of witness GEP, PW18, exhibit P23

PIS of witness GEH, PW19, exhibit P24

PIS of witness GEM, PW20, exhibit P25

PIS of witness GEU, PW21, exhibit P26

PIS of witness GEL, PW22, exhibit P27

Photograph of IGA Office, Commune Office as marked by witness GEL, PW22 1 3/02/02

PIS of witness GAC, PW23, exhibit P29 14/02/02

PIS of witness GEQ, PW24, exhibit P30 1 9/02/02

PIS of witness GKL, PW25, exhibit P31

PIS of witness GKJ, PW26, exhibit P32

PIS of witness GKI, PW27, exhibit P33

PIS of witness DAL, PW28, exhibit P34

Partial translation of Pro Justitia of witness DAL, PW28, exhibit 031, exhibit P35

Photographs of the locality of the house of JDK, exhibit P36

Defense notice of alibi signed 29/03/01, exhibit P37

Defense motion to rectify material error, exhibit P38A and P38B

Exhibit P39

Interview with Marie-Jeanne Mukarugomwa, as highlighted, exhibit P40AIB

Warrant of arrest and provisional release for witness ALR, exhibit P41NB

Witness statement of ALB dated 05/01/97, exhibit P42

Witness interview of ALB dated 21/10/01, exhibit P43

Exhibit P36 as marked by witness ALF, exhibit P44

Map of Rwanda, exhibit P45

Notes of investigators of interview with AG dated 20/06/02, exhibit P46 12/09/02

Statement of AG dated 31/07/02, exhibit P47 12/09/02

Map of Gikomero as marked by witness GPG, DW 15, exhibit P48 2310 1/03

True certified copy identity card of witness GEK, exhibit P49 1 0/02/03

0. Administrative and road maps of Rwanda, exhibit D50 18/02/03

Map of Kigali ville as highlighted by witness RGG, DW33, exhibit D51 30/04/03

Constitution of Rwanda of 10 June 1991, in French and English, exhibit D52 07/05/03

List of members of the Rwandan interim Government, exhibit D53 07/05/03

PROSECUTOR V. JEAN DE DIEU KAMU

List of Defense trial witnesses

HE PROSECUTOR V. JEAN DE DlEU KAMUHANDA CASE NUMBER: ICTR-99-54A-T

DEFENSE EXHIBITS INDEX

DESCRIPTION:

Video of Gikomero Parish, recorded by Grace Amakye, exhibit D l

Statement of witness GEK (03/02/98), PW3, exhibit D2

Certification by witness GET, PW4, exhibit D3

DATE:

03/09/0 1

05/09/0 1

1 0/09/0 I

I 0/09/0 1

I 2/0910 1

1 3109/0 1

1 7/09/0 1

1 9/09/0 1

I 9/09/0 1

20/0910 1

24/09/0 1

25/09/0 1

25/09/0 I

25/09/0 1

2910 I 102

3010 I 102

31/01/02

31/01/02

06/02/02

Sketch A of exhibit P2, as highlighted by GET, PW4, exhibit D4

Statement of witness GAB, PW5, as highlighted (24/06/99), exhibit D5

Statement of witness GEB, PW6, as highlighted (07/02/00), exhibit D6

Photo KO184575 of exhibit P2, as marked by GAF, PW7, exhibit D7

Statement of witness GEE, PW8, as highlighted (28/02/00), exhibit D8

Sketch of the Gikomero complex drawn by witness GEE, PW8, exhibit D9

Statement of witness GAA, PW9, as highlighted (06/07/99), exhibit D l0

Statement of witness GEC, PW 11, as highlighted (1 5/08/99), exhibit D l 1

Photo K0184577, as marked by GEG, PW12, exhibit D l 2

Statement of witness GEG, PW12, as highlighted (23/02/00), exhibit D l3

Transcripts of 17 April 2001, as highlighted, exhibit D l 4

Statement of witness GAD, PW13, as highlighted (07/06/99), exhibit D l 5

Statement of witness GES, PW 14, as highlighted, exhibit D l 6

Bundle of photos of different types of cars, exhibit D l 7

Statement of witness GEI, PW 15, as highlighted (29/02/00), exhibit D l 8

Statement of witness GAG, PW 16, as highlighted (1 2/07/99), exhibit D l 9

Statement of witness GEV, PW17, as highlighted, exhibit D l 9 9

07/02/02

Statement of witness GEP, PW 1 8, as highlighted (09/02/00), exhi bit D20 07/02/02 1

Statement of witness GEH, PW 19, as highlighted (28/02/00), exhibit D22

Statement of witness GEM, PW20, as highlighted (23/02/00), exhibit D23

Statement of witness GEL, PW22, as highlighted (09/09/99), exhibit D24

Statement of witness GAC, PW23, as highlighted (29/06/99), exhibit D25

Statement of witness GKL, PW25, as highlighted (17/07/01), exhibit D26

Statement of witness GKJ, PW26, as highlighted (17/07/01), exhibit D27

Statement of witness GKI, PW27, as highlighted (03/07/01), exhibit D28

Two maps of Kigali ville, exhibit D29

Statement of witness DAL, PW28, as highlighted (18/07/00), exhibit D30

Pro Justitia of witness DAL, PW28, as highlighted (12/06/95), exhibit D31

Statement of witness DAL, PW28, as highlighted (21/05/99), exhibit D32

Map of Kigali ville as marked by Jean de Dieu Kamuhanda, exhibit D33

Copy of Journal Officiel dated 15 November 1992, exhibit D34

Protocol of Agreement between the political parties, exhibit D35

Extract of "The Political Crisis in Burundi and Rwanda" by Andre Guichoua, exhibit D36

Paper granting refugee status to JDK, exhibit 037

Letter of reference by UNHCR, exhibit 038

Preliminary report on identification of the massacres sites, exhibit D39

Interview report of Kamuhanda dated 26 November 1999, exhibit D40

Videotape indicating Jean de Dieu Kamuhanda's home in Kacyiru, exhibit D41

PIS of witness ALS, DW2, exhibit D41

Photos 13 and 18 of exhibit P2, as marked by ALS, exhibit D42

Diary of witness ALS, exhibit D44 29/08/02

PIS of witness ALR, DW3, exhibit D45 03109102

Sketch drawn by witness ALR showing the shooting direction of d ifferent groups of FAR and RPF, exhibit D46 03109102

PIS of witness ALM, DW3, exhibit D47

PIS of witness ALB, DW4, exhibit D48

Letter of witness ALB to lawyer Cukier, dated 21/01100, exhibit D49 09/09/02

PIS of witness AG, DW7, exhibit D50 1 2109102

PIS of witness GPT, DW9, exhibit D51 1 310 1103

PIS of witness GPR, DWIO, exhibit D52 1410 I 103

PIS of witness GPE, DW11, exhibit D53

PIS of witness GPF, DW12, exhibit D54

PIS of witness GPK, DW13, exhibit D55 2010 1/03

Sketch of the road leading to Gikomero parish (K018-4565) as marked by witness GPK, exhibit D56 2210 1/03

PIS of witness GPC, DW14, exhibit D57 2210 1/03

PIS of witness GPG, DW15, exhibit 058 2310 1/03

PIS of witness NTD, DW 16, exhibit D59 2710 I 103

PIS of witness GPB, DW17, exhibit D60 2710 1/03

Sketch of Gikomero parish (K018-4566) as marked by witness GPB, exhibit D61 2810 1/03

PIS of witness GPI, DW 18, exhibit D62 2910 1 103

PIS of witness EM, DW19, exhibit D63 3010 1/03

PIS of witness PCE, DW20, exhibit 064 3010 1 103

Certified true copy of a baptismal certificate of the children of GEK, exhibit D65 3010 1 103

PIS of witness PC, DW21, exhibit D66

PIS of witness PCB, DW22, exhibit D67

PIS of witness ENQ-1, DW23, exhibit 068

PIS of witness ENQ-2, DW24, exhibit D69

PIS of witness VPG, DW26, exhibit D70

Map of part of Kigali ville as marked by witness VPG, exhibit D71

PIS of witness RGS, DW27, exhibit 072

Map of Kigali ville as marked by witness RGS, exhibit D73

Map of Kigali ville as marked by witness Laurent Hitimana, exhibit D74

PIS of witness CLA, DW29, exhibit D75

PIS of witness RGB, DW30, exhibit D76

Two maps of Kigali ville as marked by witness RGB, exhibit D77

PIS of witness TMB, DW31, exhibit D78

PIS of witness RGM, DW32, exhibit D79

Map of Kigali to G ikomero routes as h ighlighted b y witness R GM, exhibit D80 28/04/03

PIS of witness RGG, DW33, exhibit D81 29/04/03

Map of Kigali as highlighted by witness RGG, exhibit D82 30/04/03

PIS of witness RKF, DW34, exhibit D83

Map of Kigali as highlighted by witness RKF, exhibit D84 05/05/03

PIS of witness VPM, DW35, exhibit D85

CV of expert witness Nkiko Nsengimana, DW36, exhibit D86

Expert report of N kiko N sengimana, in French and English, exhibit D 87A and B 08/05/03


International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda Tribunal PBnal International pour le Rwanda

UNITED NATIONS NATIONS UNIES Before: Judge William H. Sekule, Presiding


Registrar: Adama Dieng

Date: 2 July 2003

THE PROSECUTOR v.



ANNEX 3 EDULE OF EVIDENCE GIVEN BY WITNESSES CONCERNING THE

IDENTIFICATION OF THE DEFENDANT

Quotation

GIKOMERO C

GEK 1

2

3

Prosecutor: "The Defendant, Jean de Dieu KAMUHANDA, in April 1994, at the start of that month, had you met him prior to that date?" Witness: "My husband was a member of his family and KAMUHANDA usually came to the house to say hello when he -- on his way home just around Muhazi." Prosecutor: "How many times would you have seen him or met him prior to April 1994?" Witness: "About four times." Prosecutor: "Would you be kind enough, please, to look around the courtroom and see if you can identify that same Mr. KAMUHANDA? Witness: "Now, from the rear he is sitting at the first row and he's second in that row. President: "Maybe for the record the Trial Chamber notes that the witness has ~ointed out Mr. KAMUHANDA in the dock" --

Witness: "I can't remember whether it was the 5th or the 6th; I'm not very sure, but on one of those two days he came to take his brother-in-law, who was our neighbour. (. . .) Yes, he came into our house. (. . .) Well, he stayed at our house between five and ten minutes. We talked with him and then he went on to see his brother-in-law." Witness: "I saw MUHANDA again at another time between the 6th and the 10th. At that time he came to our residence and he stayed to talk to my husband." (. . .) "when he entered the house my husband requested me to go inside the room, because, at that time, war had erupted, so he asked me to hide myself. But I was not far away and I could hear what they were saying to each other."

Date of testimony

03 September 01

03 September 01

03 September 01

03 September 01

PTE PTF

KEY: PTE: Page Transcript (English) age Transcript (Frellch)

VV itness

GEK (Cont.) 5

Quotation

Witness: "He told Kamanzi that in the Gikomero commune the killing had not yet started" (. . .) "He went on to say that those who were to assist them to start had married Tutsi women." (. . .) "He went on to say that he would bring equipment for them to start. and if their women were in the way thay should, first, eliminate them." Witness: "The conversation lasted between 20 and 30 minutes." Witness: "When I went outside I was able to see firearms, grenades, and machetes, which they distributed when he went outside the house." Witness: "He distributed firearms and grenades inside the house." (. . .) "I saw my husband carrying four grenades." (. . .) Prosecutor: "Had you seen those four grenades or were those four grenades inside your house before Mr KAMUHANDA arrived?" Witness: "No." (. . .) "When KAMUHANDA went outside he went to Karakezi's home, a distance of about between five and ten steps. He had distributed, given, distributed a weapon, a gun I should say, inside our house." (. . .) "I am referring to KAMUHANDA. It is him who distributed them and unloaded them from the vehicle." (. . .) "He distributed these weapons to four persons, but he left them other weapons that these four people were to distribute to others, other persons." (. . .) "From where I was, from where they were, I could see what they were saying. He said to them to distribute those weapons and said that he would return and assist them" (. . .) "He said that he would return to see if they had started the killings or that he would return to -just so that the killings would start." Witness: "I saw him on that day, when he left the weapons, and I saw him again when the killings started in Gikomero."

- -

Date of Testirnon y

03 September 01

03 Sentember 01 03 September 01

03 September 01

03 September 01

PTE PTF

197- 198

201 201

201 -204

205

Witness

GEK (Cont.) 10

Quotation

Witness: "I mentioned that he came to distribute the weapons on the 10th and came back to arrange for the killings to start between the 10th and the 14th at the primary school." Prosecutor: "On this third occasion, and it's my counting, on this third occasion did you see Mr. KAMUHANDA arrive?" Witness: "I saw him arrive, but he did not come to our house. He went to the house of a neirrhbour named Karakezi." Witness: "KAMUHANDA arrived and went to the home of Karakezi, and there that's where he parked his vehicle and when he arrived his vehicle was followed by another v ehicle, a D iahatsu m ake, b he , a b lue c olour, and i t w as c arrying a large number of people." (. ..) "In the vehicle not everyone was armed, but I saw people who were carrying machetes, clubs, and guns in the same vehicle, in that same vehicle." (. . .) "Many of them were wearing ordinary clothes, others were wearing the lnterahamwe uniform." (. . .) "He came from the direction of Kigali, on the road coming from Kigali." (...) "So he went, entered his vehicle and headed for the primary school, where there was a large number of refugees." Witness: "I heard gunshots and noise." (. . .) "I heard the gunshots and the noise for between twenty and forty minutes." Witness: "I could see children that were wounded and that were fleeing towards us." (. . .) "I also saw a young girl whose legs were cut, amputated. She came to seek refuge in our house.99 Witness: "Subsequently, the Interahamwe that came from Rubungo commune came after us and we immediately ran heading for Kibobo. It was during that chase that we found bodies that were in the school." (. . .) Prosecutor: "How soon after the shooting did you see the bodies at the school?" Witness: "It was three days afterwards." (. . .) "I will reckon the number of bodies at four to five thousand."

Date of Testimony

03 September 01

03 September 01

03 September 01

03 September 01

04 September 01

PTE PTF

KEY: PTE: Page Transcript ('E~~glish) PTF: Page Transcript (French)

Witness

GEK (Cont.) 15

Witness: "even at the inauguration of the dispensary of Gikomero, it was KAMUHANDA who introduced the President of the Republic to the population in attendance." Prosecutor: "And did you see KAMUHANDA; were you present when that occurred?" Witness: 'Wow, for the Gikomero communal office, I wasn't personally there. It was an event that I was told about. But as for the dispensary, I was there and it was on the occasion of the visit of the President of the Re~ublic." Witness: "KAMUHANDA's mother was the aunt, the maternal aunt of my husband; in other words my husband and KAMUHANDA were cousins." Witness: "There is a sister of KAMUHANDA that got married, I believe either in 1992 or 1993. She is a neighbour to us, and when she got married, KAMUHANDA was there for the occasion and I was there also." CROSS EXAMINA TIQAJ Witness: "But the fact that I was at the corridor and that I was there at my husband's request didn 't mean that I wasn 't able to hear what was being discussed between my husband and KAMUHANDA. " Witness: "Since the situation had changed and there was gunfire being heard in Kigali, it was important for me not to move too far away, so as to be able to follow what was being discussed in the salon. " Witness: "Now, when you are at my house, at my home, you can see the road that passes by Kalikezi's house and moves in the direction of the school, and the road is seen clearly. It is not untruth. You can come and see for yourself:"

04 September 01

04 September 01 / 16

04 September 01 1 04 September 01 r 04 September 01

TE: Page 'Transcript (English) age Transcript (Frenc

GEK (Cont.) 21

Testimony Quotation Date of

saw Mr UMUHANDA as a very important personality, is that correct? Witness: "Yes, that is correct. " Defence: "I suggest he was considered as a very important person by virtue of the fact that he was educated? Witness: "I am not denying that, and I even gave you the reasons. It was he that

9 , re~resented the commune.

I Defence: "Witness GEK, in your evidence yesterday you indicated that the villagers

Defence: "The point that I wish to explore with this witness is that, bearing in mind the rural nature of Gikornero, any person who attains or achieves well in their

05 September 01

education automatically is respected by the community. That is the point that I wish to make to this witness; is that correct? Witness: "You would understand, yourself that there's a difference between a farmer or an educated person that drives a vehicle around. You understand -- that a farmer would respect that educated person. " Defence: "Thank you. So, by that proposition does the witness accept that the villagers tended to look up to those who had educationally achieved in the commune? Witness: " The v illagers in q uestion d o n ot o nly -- d o n ot respect KAMUHANDA alone, they also respect any educated person from elsewhere. RE-EXAMINATION Witness: "But the situation changed when DA met the people, from that time onwards one began to say that it was the Tutsi who were to die."

05 September 01

05 September 01

PTE PTF

e Transcript (EngBis e Transcript (Frenc

W itness

GET 24

Quotation

Witness: "I knew him when we were still young when we were still in the secondary school. I also knew him as a member of the association of students on holidays. I also knew him as a student at the university. I knew him when he started working, after his studies; I knew him as part of -- in the course of various activities when we met in region. I knew him because we shared quite a number of things. I do recall that during his wedding, he invited me and I went there. I do remember that when I was passing through Kigali, I went to the Ministry where he was working to say hello to him." Witness: "KAMUHANDA was an influential person, respected, feared in the community because he was someone occupying the office of director-general for five years and more, and in the area he was someone who had gone far in education and that was a rare thing in that area. He came from a huge family that threw marital links. And as far as I can recall he was a good man. So he was influential in the community." President: "The Trial Chamber notes that the witness has recognized the accused, KAMUHANDA, in court here." Witness: "Let me give you two examples which I fully well recall. The first one is with regard to the inauguration, the opening of the Communal Office. So when Habyarimana came to open the office of our commune. Now, the second example is in connection with the opening of the Kayanga health centre and Habyarimana, President Habyarimana was present at both places; and at both places, KAMUHANDA was master of ceremonies and he urged the population to sing the praises of M W and President Habyarimana." Witness: "Now among those persons I would cite KAMUHANDA Jean de Dieu about whom it was said that he brought in instruments to be used for the killing of oeoole."

Date of Testimony

05 September 01

05 September 01

05 September 01

06 September 01

06 September 01

PTE PTF

113-1 14

115

119

27

KEY: PTE: Page Transcript (English) PTF: Page TI-anscript (French)

prepared to participate to see the genocide through, means that he had already become a bad man." Prosecutor: "How did you get the information that he supplied weapons for the killing?" Witness: "I obtained that information from people that were able to see him, those

PTF

47-48

persons among the survivors of the genocide in our region and in other communes." (. . .) "Following the investigation, I was able to meet people that asserted having seen

Witness

GET (Cont.)

I him personally, so that it was no longer hearsay."

Date of Testimony

06 September 01

Quotation

Witness: "Apart from the fact that KAMUHANDA brought in instruments that were to be used for the genocide; the very fact that he supported the person that had been

PTE

42-43

E,: Page Transcript (English) TF: Page Transcript (French)

W itness

GAB 30

Quotation

Witness: "I knew him during inauguration of the communal office. I was a primary school pupil at the time and he came. He was present. He actually accompanied the President of the Republic." President: "The Trial Chamber notes that the witness has otherwise identified the Accused in the courtroom." Prosecutor: "What date was this particular meeting you are talking about?" Witness: "The meeting took place in August 1993." Prosecutor: "Did you attend this meeting?" Witness: "Yes." Prosecutor: "Where did the meeting take place?" Witness: "The meeting took place at the Kayanga sector in the Gikomero commune." Prosecutor: "Did you see the people who spoke at this meeting?" Witness: "Yes." (. . -1 Prosecutor: "Who are people who spoke at this meeting?" Witness: "( ...) then that is the guest of honour at the meeting who was Mr. KAMUHANDA." Witness: "Then there was a statement by the guest of honour KAMUHANDA, who was an envoy of the MRND party officials at the national level. I need to point out that he was a native of that commune. e talked about the problems that had been alluded to by the previous speakers and he laid particular emphasis on the security problems. Now regarding the security problems or situation, he said, "Let these Tutsis not bother you because their own fate have been considered by the appropriate authorities. A solution has been found to the problems that they are raising and this will be conveved to vou in the not too distant future"."

Date of Testimony

11 September 01

11 September 01

11 September 01

11 September 01

PTE PTF

KEY: PTE: Page Transcript (English) PTF: Page Transcript (French)

VV itness

GAB (Cont.) 34 35

36

37

Quotation

Witness: " I left my parents' house at about 10 o'clock to go to the centre (Rutarzga) that I mentioned to buy provisions. And when I arrived at the centre, I met KAMUHANDA." Witness: "In our region, there were not such arms so that they were asking for rifles, they were asking for rifles." (. . .) "Well, he was talking to the envoy of the MRND, that is, KAMUHANDA, so that his utterances were directed at KAMUHANDA because it was KAMUHANDA that was sent by the party." (...) "Well, KAMUHANDA promised him that he was going to talk to the leaders of the supreme bodies of the party about it and that he will give him an answer as soon as possible. And in a nutshell, he promised to give him what he requested." Witness: "Well, we were playing football, soccer, that is, between 2 o'clock and 2:30, I cannot remember the date,-it must have been between the 9" and the 1 lth, we saw KAMUHANDA coming out of a vehicle, he was accompanied by soldiers" (. . .) "There were Interahamwe there to just - near where we were playing soccer and he talked to these people and in the course of their discussion, he gave them the instruments, the means that he had promised them beforehand, that is, means to defend themselves, as he had promised them before." Witness: "Now, I am talking about facts that I personally witnessed. When we observed, we saw that there were rifles, grenades. machetes in that vehicle." (. . .) "He said that, "Everywhere I went, even in Kigali, the Interahamwe and CDR have been killing people. What are you doing? How far have you gone?"." (. . .) "Well, KAMUHANDA went on and asked them whether they had people available to whom they could entrust the instrument, and the accountant answered that there were people who were trained to fill up that purpose." (. . .) "What ensued was that KAMUHANDA took two Kalashnikov weapons, two grenades and two machetes and gave the package to the accountant that in turn handed these arms to these people, those young people."

Date of Testimony

11 September 01

1 1 September 01

11 September 01

1 1 September 01

PTE PTF

P KEY: PTE: Page Transcri PTF: Page Transcript (French)

Witness

GAB (Cont.) 38

I Testimonv / I Witness: "KAMUHANDA was there when these arms were distributed. He only left 11 September 01 68 81 after the arms were distributed and before he left, he asked those people that he was talking to, he told them, "I don't want to hear that any single Tutsi has escaped you. You should make sure that no Tutsi escapes you"." Witness: "Rutaganira said, "We will do all in our power and just in case the 11 September 01 69 82-83 instruments w hich you have g iven u s w ere t o t urn o ut t o b e i nsufficient, w e s hall resort to you again." (. . .) "To that KAMUHANDA said, "I shall wait for initiative, your reaction"." (. . .) "And I do remember that about a day after that, they started killing us in our region." Prosecutor: "Are you able to say if the weapons distributed by KAMUHANDA were 1 1 September 01 70 84 used by the people who killed you, according to your testimony?" Witness: "Yes, those weapons were used to that end."

KEY: PTE: Page Transcript (English) PTF: Page Transcript ( French)

VV itness

GEB 41

42

43

Quotation

Witness: "(on 12 April) We went uphill and when we got to a placiknownas Kagikomero, and let me spell that one, K-A-G-I-K-0-M-E-R-0, we met a vehicle on which there were KAMUHANDA and Interahamwe." Prosecutor: "How did you know -- or had you ever met or seen Mr. KAMUHANDA before this occasion?" Witness: "I had known him previously because the secteurs we come from are neighbours -- are neighbouring secteurs." Prosecutor: "How long had you known or seen Mr. KAMUHANDA prior to April 1994?" Witness: " In fact, prior to the war, I knew him." Prosecutor: "For how long?" Witness: " In a ctual fact w e w ere n eighbours. I d o r emember h im o n a p articular occasion; on that day he came to show his wife -- to introduce his wife to his family. And so we went to his household, to his family residence, and that was the last time we saw each other." Prosecutor: "How many years, if it be years, how many years have you known Mr. KAMUHANDA before April 1994?" Witness: " I think I knew him about three years." President: "Court further notes that the witness has otherwise pointed out the Accused in the court well." Witness: "I didn't count the number of people in the vehicle because it just went by me. But if I could give an approximate figure, I would say about twenty people." (. . .) "Some of them were wearing Kitenge material, others were wearing trousers and some others were wearing military uniforms." (. . .) "Some of them were carrying weapons." (. . .) "They were singing some songs that are known to the Interahamwe, of course."

Date of Testimony

12 September 01

12 September 01

12 September 01

PTE PTF

age Transcript (English) PTF: Page fianscri

Witness

GEB (Cont.) 44

Quotation

Witness: "At the spot at which we were when the vehicle passed by, we remained there hiding and 30 minutes approximately after that, we heard some gunshots." (. . .) "The gunshots noise came from the parish." Prosecutor: "When you say the parish, do you mean the Gikomero Parish, for clarification?" Witness: "That is correct." Prosecutor: "Later that day, did you meet any persons or people who had come from the Gikomero Parish at the time of the shooting?" Witness: "Yes, between 1800 hours and 1830 hours people came and found us where we were at Gahini and they came from the parish." Prosecutor: "To which ethnic group did they belong?" Witness: "They were Tutsi survivors." Prosecutor: " Did t hey t ell you w hat h ad h appened that a fternoon a t t he Gikomero Parish?" Witness: "Yes, when they came, some of them were wounded and they told us that it was the Interahamwe that KAMUHANDA had brought from Kigali that had shot at them." Prosecutor: "Did those people tell you about any person whom they considered the leader or responsible for that shooting, and if they did, what were the names given?" Witness: "The leader of those Interahamwe who was the very person that brought them was KAMU

Date of Tes timonv

12 September 01

12 September 01

PTE PTF

R a EV: PTE: Page Transcript (English) PTF: Page Transcript (French)

Witness

GAF 46

Quotation

Witness: "Then I saw a gentleman whose name was Jean de Dieu KAMUHANDA alight from one of the vehicles, that was the vehicle which the markings of the UN." Prosecutor: "Could you tell who shot the assistant of the Pastor Augustine Bucundura that you have just mentioned?" Witness: "On that point, I really cannot say who shot at him, but I can say that it is the people who came with KAMUHANDA who shot at him." Prosecutor: "Prior to that day, how did you know him?" Witness: " Prior to that day, I knew him very well, when he was still in school. He was a student at the IPN. I also knew him when he started working after his studies and I met him on several occasions when he got involved in politics. I knew him as Director General at the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research. I knew him when he came to his area, the area where he was born, to attend to various ceremonies of a social nature. I knew him, I met him on several occasions at the Gikomero when there were official ceremonies, festivities. For instance, in 1991, I met him when there was an inauguration of the commune office, in 1992 when the Kayanga Health Centre was inaugurated. So, I met him at all these places. And let me add, that he was a man who was very well known in his area, in the area where he was born. He was known to be a very influential politician. He was an influential member of the MRND party from the Gikomero area. I think that is enough." Witness: "I remember that he came down from the vehicle and raised his hands and spoke to those who came with him, particularly the Interahamwe and other people and he told them, and I am quoting him, "Work"." (. . .) "In view of the fact that he had come with killers and that he was the leader, by so saying, he was telling them that they should begin the killings because as a matter of fact, it was after he pronounced that word that the killings started and all the vehicles went away except for one."

Date of Testimony

13 September 01

13 September 01

13 September 01

PTE PTF

TE: Page Transcri PTF: Page Transcript (French)

Witness

GEE 52

Quotation Date of / Testimony

Witness: "the Interahamwes attacked and the refugees exclaimed, they were saying, 1 18 September 01 We're going to be killed. KAMUHANDA is coming." Witness: "One of the policemen who came with KAMUHANDA shot at 18 September 01 Bucundura." 1 Witness: "When his vehicle arrived, the refugees exclaimed saying, "We're going to 18 September 01 be killed. KAMUHANDA has just amved". He came out of the vehicle and I saw him and it was in that location that I got to know him." Witness: "KAMUHANDA's vehicle came in first. It was followed by two other 18 September 01 vehicles. In KAMUHANDA7s vehicle, there were soldiers and communal policemen. So when he came out, the soldiers and communal policemen came out, and fi-om the two other vehicles Interahamwes and soldiers also came out. One of the policemen shot at Bucundura, who died on the spot." I Witness: "That noise was being made by Hutus because KAMUHANDA and his / 18 September 01 companions had asked the Hutu to keep a watch and to kill Tutsi. So that there was an attack that morning, 4.00 a.m., by the Interahamwe because the Interahamwe were told to come back to finish off the people that managed to survive." CROSS-EX4 MINA TlTlN 19 September 01 Witness: "It was KAMUHANDA that called upon the Hutu to carry out the attack. He told them to stay up all night and he said so in the presence of the people that I were with Izim. "

PTE PTF

age Transcript (English) TF: Page Transcript (French)

Witness

GAA 58

Quotation

Prosecutor: These Interahamwe that you saw at Gikomero on the 10'" are you able to say whether they had any weapons with them on the loth or not? Witness: "Apart from the fact that they were wearing uniforms, on that day they were not carrying weapons." Prosecutor: "Did you recognise anyone in that second vehicle; and if so, who was it?" Witness: "I recognised KAMUHANDA." Prosecutor: "Do you know Mr. KAMUHANDA's full name or did you know it at that time?" Witness: "Yes, I knew his whole name." Prosecutor: "Can you tell us his whole name, please?" Witness: "It is Jean de Dieu KAMUHANDA." Prosecutor: "Had you met Jean de Dieu KAMUHANDA prior to April 1994?" Witness: "Yes, we had met. Can you tell the Court please, of your first meeting with Jean de Dieu KAMUHANDA? I don't remember the year quite clearly during which we met, but there was a sister to KAMUHANDA who was called Mukabandora, let me s pel1 i t: M -U-K-A-B-A-N-D-0-R-A. S he w as married and 1 ived i n Mbandazi and I met KAMUHANDA for the first time, when he came to bring some gifts to his sister's family on the occasion of the birth of their first child. I met KAMUHANDA for the second time when e came to bury his sister who died."

Date of Testimony

19 September 01

19 September 01

PTE

102

106- 107

PTF

Witness

GAA (Cont.) 60

61

62

Quotation

Prosecutor: "You have told the Court about this first meeting when KAMUHANDA brought presents to his sister on the birth of the child; were you at any time present in the same house or at the same location as Mr. KlAMUHANDA on that occasion?" Witness: "Well, we had gone there as persons who went to attend a ceremony to which we were not officially invited, so that we were there seated outside the house, whereas they were inside the house, but we could see him." Prosecutor: "And how long did you stay there when Mr. KAMUHANDA was in those same premises?" Witness: "Well, I stayed there for about an hour." Prosecutor: "And throughout that hour, were you able to see Mr. KAMUHANDA for most of the time or not?" Witness: "No, I was not able to see him most of the time that I was there, but I saw him for a short while. I saw him." Witness: "Well, when his sister died he came to collect the body to take it to Kigali. As a matter of fact, his sister died pregnant, and I saw him on that occasion, that is when he came to take the body to Kigali. I saw him again when he came back for the burial." President: "let it be noted also that the witness has recognised the Accused in the Courtroom."

Date of Testimony

19 September 01

19 September 0 1

19 September 01

PTE PTF

133-134

TE: Page Transcript (English) PTF: Page Transcript (French)

Witness

GAG (Cont.) 63

64

Quotation

Prosecutor: "When these others were shot and I am talking at the beginning of the shooting, was KAMUHANDA present at that time?" Witness: "Yes, Mr. KAMUHANDA was there." (. . .) "They started by shooting Bucundura and then they shot three other persons and it was after that, that KAMUHANDA went back into his vehicle and went away and the others continued to shoot." (. . .) Prosecutor: "did you see at any time Mr. KAMUHANDA try to stop the shooting?" Witness: "No, he didn't do that. On the contrary, the people were shouting: "Get to work, KAMUHANDA is here now." Prosecutor: "You have t old u s that the first t ime you went t o G ikomero, you s aw Interahamwe but they had no weapons. On this occasion, did you see some of those same Interahamwe when the firing started?" Witness: "This time around, they had rifles." Prosecutor: "Witness, when you saw the two vehicles amve, one was a pick-up with people on the back, Interahamwe and others; the second was a man you said was Mr. KAMUHANDA. At that time, did you have any doubt that that was the Mr. KAMUHANDA you had met previously?" Witness: "I did not have any doubt."

Date of Testimony

19 September 0 1

19 September 01

19 September 01

PTE PTF

142

144

149-150

E: Page Transcript (English) TF: Page Trai~script (French)

W itness

GEA 66

Quotation

Witness: "When the vehicle arrived, it stopped just at the church and somebody came out of it and went towards the pastor's house." (. . .) Prosecutor: "And who was this person?" Witness: "That was one KAMUHANDA." Prosecutor: "How did you know he was KAMUHANDA?" Witness: "Well, I was informed by a boy with whom we were. He told me that that was KAMUHANDA." Prosecutor: "And where is this boy now?" Witness: "That boy died." Witness: "And the others shouted here, "KAMUHANDA has just arrived, our lives will no longer be peaceful and safe." Witness: "He talked to the pastor for a moment or two and then an old man that was there was shot and the people that were in the vehicle rushed towards the people who were there." (. . .) "They started cutting them up, shooting and then maltreating them." Prosecutor: "Did you see this person leave that location? Witness: "Well, when they started shooting, he took his vehicle and went away." Prosecutor: "Who led the attackers? Witness: '‘They were led by KAMUHANDA." RE-EXAMINATION Witness: "Now those who recognized him or knew him, knew him as a killer. That is why they said here, " DA has just arrived, we will never live in safety any more"."

Date of PTE PTF Testimony

20 September 01 77-78 104- 105

20 September 01 1 79 1 105

20 September 01 79 105-106

20 September 01

24 September 01

HAND E: Page Transcript (English) PTF: Page Transcript (French)

Witness

GEC 71

Quotation

Prosecutor: "You have told us that you did not recognize anyone who got out of the trucks, did Nzaramba recognize anyone who got out of the trucks, and if he did, did he tell you who it was?" Witness: "He recognized an individual by the name KAMUHANDA. And it was that individual, that person, who was referred to by all those who died before dying. They said, it's all over for us because KAMUHANDA has amved. Personally, I did not know him." Witness: "As for the person who went by the name - who was said to go by the name "KAMUHANDA", well, he was the one who raised his hand and said "start working". He said these words after they had shot at a man by the name Bucundura, his wife and members of his family in front of the classrooms." Witness: "He did it this way when he came out of his vehicle and he said "start working". And then they started shooting and cutting up people who were in the classrooms."

Date of Testimony

24 September 01

24 September 01

24 September 01

PTE PTF

KEY: age Transcript (Englisli) : Page Transcript (French)

Witness

GEG 74

Quotation I Prosecutor: "Did the people come down from this car?" Witness: "Yes, there was only one person that alighted from that vehicle." Prosecutor: "Who was this person? Could you tell?" Witness: "The people who were there, that is refugees that were there, shouted in a monolithic manner said, "That is KAMUHANDA. Now that KAMUHANDA is here, we are finished."" Prosecutor: "Did you know this KAMUHANDA before?" Witness: "I didn't know him before." Prosecutor: "Why did they say so?" Witness: "They shouted out because they knew him. They knew that he was a personality, but I didn't know him myself."

Date of Testimony

25 September 01

PTE PTF


Witness

GAD 75

Quotation

Witness: "Yes, I know him. He is a neighbour or neighbour. And he lived in that region." Witness: "I know KAMUHANDA very well since he was young. I was very young myself. We were neighbours. I know him very well as neighbours and citizens of the same country and the same area." Witness: "The people who were talking about the distribution of machetes said elsewhere there had been a distribution of machetes. But then, they, for their part, had not received anything, had not received any machetes. They said that the distribution of the machetes was done by KAMUHANDA and that the machetes had been kept in the house of the accountant of Gikomero, who lived at place called Kayanga. Kayanga is spelled K-A-Y-A-N-G-A." President: "The witness identified the Accused, KAMUHANDA, in the dock."

Date of Testimony

28 January 02

28 January 02 1 79 1 28 January 02

29 January 2002 1 37

PTF

-

Witness

GES 79

uotation

Witness: "I saw him at the church when he was stepping out of the vehicle to speak to the pastor, who was responsible for this church. (. . .) he was, I reckon, about 50 metres awav." Witness: "Bicindira was killed by one of the persons who came in with KAMUHANDA." Prosecutor: "Was KAMUHANDA still in the Gikomero parish area when Bicindira was shot? Was he still there?" Witness: "Yes, sir, he was still there." Witness: "I know KAMUHANDA because we're all from the sameprbfecture. I also know him as a civil servant and my place of work was very near his." Witness: "Well, I saw him very often. I saw him when people went to work in the morning. I also saw him at midday when one went for lunch break. I saw him at 2 o'clockwhen one went back to the office, after lunch, and I saw him at 5 p.m., when civil servants left the offices to go home." President: "Let the record reflect that the witness has identified KAMUHANDA in the dock."

Date of Testimony

29 January 2002

29 January 2002

29 January 2002

29 January 2002

29 January 2002

29 January 2002

PTE

GEI Witness: "The refugees immediately got astounded and said something like "Since KAMUHANDA is here, our fate is sealed," sir." "Several refugees recognized him." "I immediately got near them, up to about 4 metres, in order to eavesdrop on their conversation." "KAMUHANDA spoke to Nkuranga as follows: he said, "What are these people -- what are these people still doing here?"" "KAMUHANDA immediately ordered the Interahamwe to come down from the vehicle and he told them, "All these people here are Tutsis, kill them."

86 Prosecutor: "How was Pastor Bucundura killed and where was he located?" Witness: "He was shot at and he was close to the place where KAMUHANDA was before KAMUHANDA and the others got close to the vehicle" President: "Yes, the accused -- the witness points to the accused in the dock, KAMUHANDA."

88 RE-EXAMINATION Witness: "Bucundura died after KAMUHANDA gave the order" (to kill the Tutsis.)

Testimony 3 1 January 2002 12- 14

3 1 January 2002 0 3 1 January 2002 3 1

-100 3 1 January 2002

pe Transcript f Engf ish) ge Transcript (Freaxh)

witness

GAG 89

Quotation

Witness: "The persons who were present there, including my son, told me that a white truck amved and that guns had been distrinuted, and these were given to famous interahamwe - or well known, rather, interahamwe." Witness: " Personally, I did n ot know this m an, but o ther p ersons w ho h ad s ought refuge with me knew him and when they saw him they said "There is KAMUHANDA. "" Witness: "The refugees that recognized KAMUHANDA were many because they all shouted out at the same time in a chorus that they knew him. They all knew him because some knew him because he was a neighbour and others knew him because he was a colleague and others knew him because they met with him. At any rate, all those people were from the same area." Prosecutor: "Was the man KAMUHANDA still there when Bucundura was shot?" Witness: "I believe he was there sir.. ." Prosecutor: "When Bucundura was shot, were you able to seewhether the man that you've called KAMUHANDA did or said anything to stop the shooting?" Witness: "No, sir, he did nothing." Prosecutor: "And the person who shot Bucundura, do you know where he had come from?" Witness: "He had come down &om KAMUHANDA's vehicle. They were together, sir." Witness: "And then Nkuranga said to the interahamwe, he told them that an order issued by KAMUHANDA said that everyone had to be killed, including the disabled and the children. He then turned to me and said, "go, for them to kill you"." Witness: "He was talking to the Interaharnwes, who had come to pick up or to take those who had survived and the wounded and a lot of children that were scattered around there and who had survived the massacres of the day before."

Date of Testimony

04 February 2002

04 February 2002

04 February 2002

04 February 2002

04 February 2002

PTE PTF

TE: Page Transcript (English) PTF: Page Transcri

PTF Date of PTE W itness Quotation

Witness: "It was on my return that I learned, through a young girl who survived and, subsequently, through some other survivor who died shortly thereafter, that those girls were raped and, subsequently, killed." CROSS-EXAMINA TTON Witness: "I said that KAMUHANDA had left the Interahamwe militiamen because he moved and stood behind the line occupied by the Interahamwe and, from where I was, I noticed that KAMUHANDA had not lep, because the vehicle, on which he was, was still there. " Defense: "...which of your children told you about the rape?" Witness: "It was Angelique Umuhire who told me. I should mention that she had heard this piece of information from the Refugees when they were sharing or talking about the events that had occurred. " Defense: "You have also stated that you heard about the rape from two young girls who were still alive.. . " Witness: "I do not remember the names of these young girls, but they were from my

9 1 region.

Testimony 04 February 2002 GAG

(Cont.) 94 95 05 February 2002

06 February 2002


W itness

GEV 97

Quotation

Witness : "1 saw a man alight from the vehicle, and that man is KAMUHANDA. I was in the church with other people, a man from Gikomero informed me that it was KAMUHANDA, and he said, "KAMUHANDA has just amved, our fate is sealed"." Prosecutor: "How close were you to this man called KAMUHANDA when you first saw him and how close did you eventually get to him? Can you tell us?" Witness: "At the time I was at a distance that I would approximate as being 15, maybe 20 metres from the point where KAMUHANDA and Nkuranga were, but I did not measure the distance. So this is an approximation." RE-EXAMINATION Witness: ". . .after the conversation with Nkuranga, KAMUHANDA went back to his vehicle and the vehicle moved; that is, it reversed. And, after that, the interahamwe shot at Bucundura."

Date of Testimony

06 February 2002

06 February 2002

07 February 2002

PTE PTF

KEY: PTEt Page Transcri PTF: Page Transcript (Ft.ench)

- Witness

GEP 100

101

Quotation

Witness: "In that vehicle, in the cabin, there was a man who came down from the vehicle i mmediately. A nd i mmediately h e c ame o ut o f t he v ehicle, r efugees w ho were from that area, and, who knew him, shouted out, "This is KAMUHANDA who has arrived. We are going to die." I did not know him because it was the first time that I saw him." Witness: "I, myself, I saw him immediately because I was with a number of other people in a classroom that was close to the place where he was standing." Witness: "When he arrived, after he was finished speaking to a man, one of the passengers who was in the vehicle that he had come in, fired on the man, shot at the man and he died. KAMUHANDA did nothing, he did not ask the passenger why he had killed the man." Prosecutor: "Did he say anything, at all?" Witness: "He turned around and he told those who were there, so, as if to say, so why aren't you helping your friends in these killings?" Prosecutor: "Can you remember the exact words that he used?" Witness: "He told them, "start working", as if to incite them to kill, because he was their leader. . . " Witness: "We were used to Interahamwe attacks and when they said "work" we knew that they meant to kill people." Witness: "When the vehicle arrived a man stepped out of the vehicle and asked them to stop the massacres for a moment, because he wished to choose some girls." Witness: "They loaded them up in a vehicle and took them away."

Date of Testimony

07 February 2002

07 February 2002

07 February 2002

PTE PTF

E: Page Transcript (English) TF: Page Transcript (French)

GEP Prosecutor: "And before you were struck down, did you observe the departure of KAMUHANDA?" Witness: "The vehicle had already left and it is understandable that the leaders had given an order to these persons to kill and then the leaders left and I never saw him after that point." Prosecutor: "Did he leave before or during or after the killings had ended?" Witness: "The vehicles left after the girls had been loaded into them." Witness: "Yes, I learnt the fate of those young girls. I learnt that all the girls, except one. were r a ~ e d and killed bv the attackers."

PTF

07 February 2002 1 43 1 47-48

PTE

1 07 February 2002

Date of Testimonv

Witness Quotation

KEY: PTE: Page Transcr PTF: Page Transcript (French)

Witness

GEH 105

106

Quotation

Witness: "He came back with the Interahamwes and had a brief conversation with the pastor, and it was that time that the Interahamwes shot at Mr. Bucundura. Bucundura is spelled B-U-C-U-N-D-U-R-A." Witness: "I did not know him, sir. But we were with some refugees from Gikomero and those were the refugees that told us that the man was called "KAMUHANDA,"

Witness: "Well, he went back towards his vehicle. And, when he came back, he came back with the killer, and I believe that he was the one that gave the order for the killing, sir." Witness: "It was the Interahamwe, sir, that shot at us. And they were with the person that fetched them from the vehicle, and that person was KAMUHANDA, sir." CROSS-EX4 MINA TION Witness: "It was the refugeesfrom Gikomero who told us his name." Witness: "I also stated that, since he was the one who brought those interahamwes, he must be the one who issued the order that the killings start. But I did not, personally, hear him make any such statement. " Witness: "And, after their discussion, the man went back towards the vehicle where the interahamwes were and they all came back together and that's when they shot at Bucundura. " Witness: "That man was with Pastor Nkuranga when they shot at the old man. "

Date of Testimonv

1 1 February 2002

1 1 February 2002

1 1 February 2002

1 1 February 2002

1 1 February 2002

1 1 February 2002

PTE PTF


Testimony GEM Witness: "It was at about 11.00 a.m. when a vehicle arrived and the man who 11 February 2002 111 alighted from that vehicle moved towards Nkuranga. They held a discussion, but I

112 113

am not aware of the topic of their discussion. The population who were there said that was KAMUHANDA, and since KAMUHANDA is here, "Our fate is sealed."" Witness: "By that we understood that we had to die. That we had been betrayed." Witness: "He came with Interahamwes, sir, and the Interahamwe were armed." Witness: "I saw them shoot a person from Rusororo called Bucundura."

11 February 2002 1 1 February 2002

76 77

90 91

EY: PTE: Page Transcript (Engiish) age Transcript (French)

Witness I Quotation

GISHAKA 1 GEU 114

Witness: "On that day; namely, on the 12th, while I was at Gicaca, a white-coloured vehicle arrived and people approached the vehicle. I would even say before they got close to that vehicle, people shouted out, "That is KAMUHANDA, that is KAMUHANDA who has arrived." It was as if they were pleased to see him. Those people talked for a short time with KAMUHANDA and the vehicle left. When the vehicle left, those who had surrounded, gathered around KAMUHANDA, came back and told us, "You've heard yourself, KAMUHANDA has just confirmed the fact that the Tutsis had to die."" Witness: "I had never met him personally so as to know him. But, I had heard mention made of him in my area; specifically, in the secteur where I lived. People were saying that he was an influential person, an intellectual, and a university lecturer. So his name was familiar, as far as I was concerned, because he was someone who was known by everyone. And I wasn't the only one to know him in that way, because even the young children had heard mention made of him because of his influence, his dimension and his personality, you know, within the area." Witness: "The populations attitude changed significantly because the people were saying to themselves that that information was conveyed by someone who was highly influential and who was, at the same time, saying that all Tutsis had to die."

MUHANDA clearly explained that it was the Tutsis who had to be killed. Consequently, it was the Hutus who started getting ready, prepared to kill. And when I talk about preparation, I say so because I had heard some Hutus who were saying that they would start sharpening their knives because they now understood who was the target."

Date of testimony

12 February 2002

12 February 2002

12 February 2002

12 February 2002

PTE PTF

KEY: PTE: Page Transeri PTF: Page Transcr

Witness

GEU (Cont.) 118

Quotation

Witness: "While I was still on my way to the family home, I heard grenade explosions and gunshots, which came from the direction of Gikomero. And, in the evening, some of the refugees, who were on the Gikomero colline, told us that it was KAMUHANDA who had ordered that Tutsis be killed. There were a lot of Tutsis at that area because they had been asked to assemble in the churches. So the refugees I have just referred to also told us that it was KAMUHANDA who had embarked on the distribution of weapons to the Hutus, and those weapons included grenades and guns ." Witness: "A certain communal policeman came to the location and he told the Hutus, as a form of incitement to embark on the killings. He told them that even KAMUHANDA had said that it was the Tutsis who had to die. It was no longer a secret. ..He said that he came from the place where that information had been communicated, and he was saying that KAMUHANDA, himself, had said that it was the Tutsis who had to be killed and that no mistake should be made any longer with regard to the target." CR OSS-EM MINATION Defense: "What distance away were you from the vehicle when he spoke to the people present?" Witness: "I was not too far from the vehicle. I would say between myself and the vehicle the distance could be estimated or say the same as the distance between myself and the bench where the judges are. " President: "So let the record reflect 5 metres on this issue. "

Date of Testimony

12 February 2002

12 February 2002

12 February 2002

PTE PTF


Witness

GEU (Cont.) 121

Quotation

RE-EXAMINATION Prosecutor: "Do you have any doubts in your mind that, the person the crowd met with in Gicaca, would be anybody else other than KAMUHANDA?" Witness: "I have no doubt, whatsoever, that it was him. I have reasons to say so." Prosecutor: "And how soon, after the three minute discussion with him, did the crowd come back to tell you and give you information about what he told them?" Witness: "It was at the same time as he, himself, must have heard what the people were saying to us, it was at the same time, sir."

Date of Testimony

12 February 2002

PTE

102

PTF

Witness

GEL 122

Quotation

Witness: "And there, at the communal office, I was able to recognise Jean de Dieu KAMUHANDA." Witness: "I had met him previously, not a long time before that latter time, and the companions, those who were in my company, confirmed that it was, indeed, him, because they knew him." (. ..) "I saw him the first time at the ministry, where he was working, but he was pointed out to me by someone else." Witness: "He pointed him out to me indicating that he was a senior official and also saying that he came from an area that was close to mine. I believe he did so to suggest that if my problem was not resolved, I could turn to Mr. KAMUHANDA." Prosecutor: "how close were you to Mr. KAMUHANDA when he was pointed out to you?" Witness: (. . .) "It's a mere estimate, say between five and ten metres." Prosecutor: "I want to know, please, when it was that this witness saw Mr. KAMUHANDA for the first time, obviously not Gishaka, the first time, at the ministry." Witness: "It was before the war, between 1991 and 1992." (. . .) "When I met him the next time it was at a ceremony, a ceremony that was taking place in an office located in Rubungo. I believe it was during the launching or inauguration of a project." Witness: "Well, between the first and second time that I saw KAMUHANDA wasn't a long time, not a long time had elapsed between those two periods when I saw hi (. . .) "We're talking years." Witness: "I believe I know that on that occasion it was a question of inaugurating a centre that was called CCDFP is the acronym." (. . .) "The main thing is that I saw KAMUHANDA there on that day, sir."

Date of Testimony

13 February 2002

13 February 2002

13 February 2002

13 February 2002

13 February 2002

PTE PTF

66

ge Transcript (English) ge Transcript (French)

Witness

GEL (Cont.) 127

Quotation

Prosecutor: "How close were you to Mr. KAMUHANDA when you saw him?" Witness: "I was in the midst of the crowd, which was quite huge on that occasion, and I w as a t a d istance of about t en t o twenty metres a way, t en to twenty m etres

. -- away, sir." Prosecutor: "So, can you tell us, please, how do you say that this man was called KAMUHANDA." Witness: "He was introduced to the attendants with all the VIPs that were there at the ceremony, he was introduced." (. . .) "When he was introduced I recognised him, sir." Witness: "When he was introduced to the people, he had to stand. He stood, to show himself, and those that introduced him said that he was working at the Ministry of Education." (. ..) "When I amved there he was standing and I heard the person introducing him say that he was working at the Ministry of Education." Witness: "When I got to the church, I settled down inside the church. And it was when I looked through a window of the church, because there were many people inside the church, when I looked outside, I saw Mr. KAMUHANDA walking around the courtyard. KAMUHANDA didn't say anything at that time, he just left immediately." Witness: "Between thirty minutes and one hour elapsed between the amval of KAMUHANDA and the attack, sir." Prosecutor: "You have told us about seeing the bourgemestre, the accountant and the brigadier on two previous occasions. Can you remember if you saw any of these individuals at the same time as you saw Mr KAMUHANDA? Witness: "They were together when I saw them at the communal office, sir." Prosecutor: "Can I ask, for the record, that this witness has identified the defendant, Mr. KAMUHANDA." President: "Yes, let the record so reflect."

Date of Testimony

13 February 2002

13 February 2002

13 February 2002

13 February 2002

13 February 2002

13 February 2002

13 February 2002

PTE

67

68

69-70

96

97

97

PTF

TE: Page Transcript ( Englis PTF: Page Transcript (Frenc

PTE PTF Witness Quotation Date of Testimony

14 February 2002 GAC 134

Witness: "I saw him for the first time it was in Gatanga, Gatanga, sir."

Witness: "No, he didn't make any other statements, apart from the fact that he reached out for a list from his pocket and they read out the names and they started distributing weapons to the Interahamwe, sir." (. . .) Prosecutor: "And who read out the names?" Witness: "It was KAMUHANDA, himself, sir." (. . .) Prosecutor: "Did you see any guns being given out on this occasion?" Witness: "Yes sir I saw that sir." (. . .) Prosecutor: "Did you see any grenades being handed out that day?"

14 February 2002

Witness: "Yes, sir, he did distribute some, sir." Prosecutor: "...were any of the people who received the weapons members of the Interahamwe?"

14 February 2002

Witness: "With all those people were Interahamwe, sir." Witness: "It took some time, because he went to every person, himself, to give them 14 February 2002 weapons." Prosecutor: " And, w ere you p resent, from b eginning t o end o f the h anding o ut o f these weapons?" Witness: "Yes, sir, I was there throughout." Witness: "I didn't hear anything, apart from a question raised by one of the 14 February 2002 Interahamwe, sir." (. . .) "He said, now these weapons you have just given us, would there be any consequences if we were to use these weapons?" (. . .) "He answered that that was an order issued at national level and that all that used those weapons will suffer nothing." (. . .) "He told them that they were going to use those weapons to kill the T utsi, s o that the H utu m ajority w ould c ome and w onder w hat a T utsi 1 ooked like. "

age Transcript (Emglish) PTF: Page Transcript (French)

Witness

GAC (Cont.) 139

140

Quotation

Witness: "He was asked, "Can we start now"? And he said, "No, don't start now, I shall tell you the dates at which you start". (...) "He said there will be no consequences because everywhere I have went I have distributed weapons and I am going to distribute more weapons elsewhere, sir." Witness: "He said he was going to continue with the distribution of weapons in other locations where he had not done so." Witness: "I saw him the first time when I was at Gikomero, and there KAMUHANDA went by in a vehicle. He was going to the house of his parents. And those who knew him said "That's KAMUHANDA who is arriving."" Prosecutor: "can you say the next time that you saw Mr. KAMUHANDA after that date, please?" Witness: "I saw him in Kayanga in the course of a meeting." (. . .) "It was a political meeting." Witness: "in the course of the rally, there was a master of ceremonies. (. . .) He introduced the guests to the population and he did so in turn." Prosecutor: "By your answer, do we take it that Mr. KAMUHANDA was introduced to the crowd?" Witness: "Absolutely, yes." (.. .) "He was standing and everyone could see him clearly." Prosecutor: "Were you able to see hi Witness: "Definitely." Prosecutor: ". ..you told us that KAMUHANDA had indicated, at one stage, that he was going to distribute weapons to various districts in the area. Are you able to say whether those same districts had massacres of Tutsis through that period?" Witness: "The massacres took place on the same day in all the various districts, sir."

Date of Testimony

14 February 2002

14 February 2002

14 February 2002

14 February 2002

14 February 2002

14 February 2002

14 February 2002

I PTE / PTF

UHAPd$OA KEY: PTE: Page Transcript (English) PTF: Page Transcr

Witness Quotation

Witness: "He added that the next day some reinforcement would arrive led by KAMUHANDA. That was reinforcement in terms of weapons, especially machetes that were to be used for the killinm." Prosecutor: "And you mentioned the name, KAMUHANDA. Is this a person known to YOU?" Witness: "Yes, sir, I knew him. I knew him." Prosecutor: "And how do you know him? Please tell this Court." Witness: "It was not difficult for me to know KAMUHANDA, sir. That is simply because we are natives of the same commune and our native hills are face-to-face, so to speak, sir." Prosecutor: "And what is KAMUHANDA's native hill?" Witness: "KAMUHANDA is a native of the Gasagara Hill. Gasagara is spelled G- A-S-A-G-A-R-A, sir." Witness: "And we saw on the lake, dead bodies that were floating, and the escapees that came from Gikomero by crossing the lake, told us that it was KAMUHANDA's vehicle that was used to distribute machetes in Gikomero, sir."

CR OSS-EX4 MINA TION Witness: "They merely told me that KAMUHANDA had distributed machetes in the Gikomero Commune. "

Date of Testimony

19 February 02

19 February 02

19 February 02

19 February 02

PTE

24 bp.22-26

had no printed page

numbers) 42-43

PTF

KEY: PTE: Page Transcript (EngEis PTF: Page Transcript (Frclzch)

A

Witness

GKL 151

152

153

154

155

156

Quotation Date of I PTE I Testimonv I

Y

Witness: "And then having realised the chaos that obtained, KAMUHANDA who 06 May 02 19 was there told them that is to the Interahamwe told these people to move towards Gishaka parish and there we are going ensure their safety. He, himself said that. He / I said, "Go to Gishaka there you will find protection", sir" Witness: "When they pulled people from the line, I did not see them kill the people, 06 May 02 20 but I should like to say that I never saw those people again, sir."

Prosecutor: "When this pulling and the screaming of people being dragged form the 06 May 02 21 line was occurring, did KAMUHANDA do anything to try and stop these people being pulled ffom the line, did you see or hear him do anything to prevent these actions?" Witness: "No sir, nobody prevented them from dragging or pulling the people from the line because they were doing what they deemed fit, sir." Witness: " KAMUHANDA w as approximately 20 m etres away from m e s ir, b ut I 06 May 02 23 had seen him before on the way, sir." (. . .) "He was right in front of me."

Witness: "It was KAMUHANDA, sir. He was in charge of that roadblock sir, and I 06 May 02 24-25 was not the only one to realise that there other people that were with me, who did realise that he was in charge, sir." Witness: "When we arrived at the spot, those people exclaimed, "KAMUHANDA is 06 May 02 25-26 also at that roadblock" and it was UHANDA that was Minister of Educati the Government of the Abatabazi that is the interim government. When I saw myself, I r ealised t hat i t w as a m an t hat u sually I saw a t the c ommunal o ffice at Gishaka."

PTF

23

KEY: PTE: Page Transcript (E~~glish) PTF: Page Transcript (French)

NG

Witness Quotation

GKL Witness: "The situation as I was able to observe it was such that all of those who (Cont.) were with KAMUHANDA, everything they did, they did this after consulting with 157 KAMUHANDA and KAMUHANDA was there making hand gestures and he was

either pointing in the direction in which we should be led or what should be done. It was obvious he was their leader even though he was not personally carrying any weapons."

158 Witness: "I was not able to see the bodies of persons that they killed but when we arrived in that location I saw bodies that were slightly down - slightly below from where w e w ere and t he b odies w ere 1 ying o n t he g round." ( . . .) " The b odies w ere slightly below the roadblock at approximately twenty metres below the road."

159 Witness: "Yes, I saw him in front of me, but it's true that there were people in front of me that obstructed my view of him but as I moved forward I could-se; the people that were at the roadblock."

160 Witness: " When I w as a s tudent a t that s chool I w ould go from the s chool t o the commune office with the other -- with my fellow students and it was in front of the commune office that we would often see people speaking and on one occasion we saw a group of people having a conversation and the students I was with told me that amongst those persons there was a man named KAMUHANDA."

161 Witness: "The Interahamwe that were there took the money that we had. The property -- belongings, rather, especially our clothes, and the clothing that was still new, and that was where I saw KAMUHANDA enter with the Interahamwe and

I several oolicemen."

Date of Testimony 06 May 02

06 May 02

06 May 02

06 May 02

06 May 02

PTE

30

PTF


Witness

GKL (Cont.) 162

163

Quotation

Witness: "Once we got to the football field, sir, they started pushing us, beating us up. But I was able to sneak out of the crowd and run away. I took refuge in the woods and it was thus that I was able to reach the group of the women. But when I left there were policemen that were already leading the men away and KAMUHANDA was there, sir." (. . .) "Now, in view of the fact that at the end of the war, sir, I did not see any of those men again I said to myself that they had been killed at that football field. Then after the war some bodies were exhumed from that football field.. ." Prosecutor: "I want to deal with when you came out the church and you said that you saw KAMUHANDA with the Interahamwe and several policemen. How did you know that it was KAMUHANDA, how good a view did you have of him?" Witness: "I had seen him in Kayanga, so when I saw him at that location I recognised him. I recognised him that it was the same person that had got to that location and moreover, sir, I said before that 1 had seen him before when I was a student or a pupil in Gishaka, sir." Witness: "I caught sight of him when he passed by the place I was at in the midst of the crowd. He was escorted by the Interahamwe but I should say that he was making rounds, he was making rounds inspecting the refugees, sometimes he would be at a spot that I wouldn't see, but he was with the Interhamwe, and the other Interhamwe were busy diverting refugees of their belongings especially clothes and money, sir." Witness: "But let me add that he was with other people - other interahamwe who were taking refugees' property and it was very clear that they were doing so under his authority, at least he allowed them to do so. He permitted - those people took, also. fiom the refugees' ID cards, sir." - --

Witness: "At that time, sir, I was always with Kayanga and Muyango, because they had not been killed at that point in time and those two knew KAMUHANDA as well. But plus other people in the crowd as well knew KAMUHANDA, but I did not hear them talk about him, sir."


06 May 02

06 May 02

06 May 02

06 May 02

PTE

46

PTF

KEY: PTE: Page Transcript (Englisft) PTF: Page Transcript (French)

Date of Witness Quotation

Witness: "between the two people was another person and this person was Testimony

GKJ 167 168

07 May 02 KAMUHANDA." Witness: "With respect to KAMUHANDA, I told you that we were walking with several people, and that these people came from different hills. Amongst those

07 May 02

persons, some knew KAMUHANDA." Witness: "Approximately 20 people mentioned KAMUHANDA's name." Witness: "In just a few moments after that, we heard the engines of the vehicles

07 May 02 07 May 02

arriving, and then people ran to the windows to see what was happening outside. And I heard people saying, this is our dawn, this is -- our fate is sealed, because KAMUHANDA has arrived, sir." (. ..) "Yes, sir, I could see him through the window, but there was a lot of hustle and bustle, sir." (...) "At that time, KAMUHANDA was not alone, sir. But let me explain that he was in charge, because he was in front of the others, sir." (. ..) "When KAMUHANDA arrived at that location, one person recognized him, sir." Prosecutor: "When you saw the man called Mr. KAMUHANDA walking at Gishaka, 07 May 02 had you any doubt it was the same person you had seen in the vehicle on that same day? Witness: "No, I had no doubt, sir." Witness: "There were other persons inside the church that were able to recognize 07 May 02 KAMUHANDA." Witness: "Those persons recognized him and they talk about him. The church had 07 May 02 windows and those people saw him through the windows and talked about him, sir."

Witness

E: Page Transcript (Engli TF: Page Transcript (French)

GKJ (Cont.) 174

I Testirnonv PTF PTE Quotation

KAMUHANDA, that is KAMUHANDA." The church had doors, it had windows and people could see him, and when the Interahamwe tried to push the doors, we tried to resist and prevent them from pushing the doors. But people were saying "KAMUHANDA, KAMUHANDA, there goes KAMUHANDA" all over the place, .

Date of

Witness: "They said "KAMUHANDA, there comes KAMUHANDA," and he was making his rounds and people were saying, "That is KAMUHANDA, that is

.I

07 May 02

sir." Witness: "He [the priest] added, "Rwandans are bad. You are going to be

persons and this was as I left the church" (. . .) "He was with Interahamwe" (. . .) "He only spoke to those Interahamwe. He told them to kill people and to send the rest of

07 May 02 exterminated because KAMUHANDA has come"." Witness: "At the time I left the church, I saw him outside in the courtyard with other 07 May 02

--

--

the people home."

UHANDA PTF: Page Transcript (French)

Witness

GKI 177

Quotation

Witness: "He told me that the wife of the then bourgmestre and that woman was called Florida, and Florida told my brother that KAMUHANDA had come to their house and had talked to her husband and that the conversation were as follows." (. . .) "KAMUHANDA said, the inhabitants of Nkuzuzu or among the inhabitants of Nkuzuzu, there were many accomplices. Among the Nkuzuzu inhabitants, there were many accomplices of Tutsi and for that matter the Interahamwe from Remera will come to kill them.. ." Witness: "But before going back home, there was a vehicle that passed by from the residence of the bourgmestre and my brother told me, "Look, here, that is KAMUHANDA that has just passed by"." Prosecutor: "Do you know how your brother was able to identify KAMUHANDA? How did he know him?" Witness: "Yes, they knew each other." Witness: "In fact, when I greeted the bourgmestre I also greeted the persons that were next to him and he told me that he had just reviewed our problem and at that point he was speaking to the person that was next to him saying as follows: "Mr. KAMUHANDA, we will see you. We will meet again later"." Witness: "The person who was next to the bourgmestre was the person whom he spoke to. This person was KAMUHANDA, and when he said this person's name I turned around and looked at the person he was speaking to. I saw this man's face, and this was the face that had been pointed out to me on 13th March when I was told that KAMUHANDA had just gone by." Witness: "While we were at the church during the night people were screaming saying we must pray because we are about to die and these people said that KAMUHANDA had brought weapons."


08 May 02

08 May 02

09 May 02

09 May 02

09 May 02

PTE PTF

KFX: PTE: Page Transcript (English) PTF: Page Transcr

PTF

86-87

distribute the equipment to kill people in the Gikomero region. "

PTE

74-75


Witness

GKI (Cont.) 183

Quotation

CR OSS-EX4 MINA TION Witness: "These are rumours spread throughout the night inside the church. There was no light, and among us inside the church some knew KAMUHANDA very well and allegedly saw him. And they were saying that KAMUHANDA had helped to

age Transcript (English) PTF: Page Transcript (Frexfa)

was sitting. He was sitting in the front seat of the vehicle."

were piled there, he said, "These young men have done a good job. At the meeting, we discussed this matter."" Witness: "They went to the side of the vehicle in which KAMUHANDA was and said, "Who are you? Show us your papers." KAMUHANDA answered, "I am Minister KAMUHANDA. Let us through. "" Witness: "The number of roadblocks were more than ten, sir." (. . .) "At every time we were stopped at the roadblocks, the Interahamwe came to the vehicle and when they realised that there were soldiers in the vehicle, they asked, "Who are you?" And then KAMUHANDA would tell them, I am Minister KAMUHANDA. Please open

Witness: "He told me that Minister KAMUHANDA was with him - was returning from the meeting." (. . .) "The prefet of the city had convened the meeting and he had asked the Interahamwe to respond to his call to attend the meeting." Witness: "KAMUHANDA spoke to the Interahamwe. When he saw the bodies that I 13 May 02

Witness: "There were more than ten roadblocks and none of the persons from the 1 1 1 I

13 May02

14

the road block." Witness: "During our trip when we got to roadblocks, he talked to the Interaharnwe and told them, "Go on, do not give up to fatigue," and at one of the roadblocks, he asked the Interahamwe whether they had enough weapons, sir, and he added, "Nobody should go through without showing you his or her papers", sir." RE-EXAMINATION

escort ever disputed. After words were mentioned, the roadblocks were opened and we were let through. No one ever disputed the fact that he was KAMUHANDA."

17

12-13

13 May 02

14 May 2002

14-15

20

52

23-24

I

57-58

NSMlSSION SHEET FOR OFFICIAL FILING OF DOCUMENTS WITH CMS L

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Reference material is provided in annex to

nslation fees will ame of contact person:

C \inndows\TEMP\CMS F h g En JDK O2July03 doc

CMS1 ( O W 212002)

International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda Tribunal Penal International pour le Rwanda

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PROOF OF SERVICE - ARUSHA PREUVE DE NOTIFICATION - ARUSHA

-

+om: Oe: -

Jc:

j,bject 3bjet: -

1 Case Name /Affaire: The Prosecutor v

Case No /Affaire Nr : ICTR-99-54A-T

[7 TC1 received by 1 regu par: .................................. Judge E.Mase, President .................................. 0 Judge J.R. Reddy

Judge S.A. Egorov .................................. E. Nahamya. Co-ordinator ..................................

..................................

rn TC2 Judae W. H. Sekule - -

[XI Judge W. C. Maqutu IXI Judge A. Ramaroson H C. Eboe-Osuji, SLO IXI A.Leroy, Co-ordinator

BT?;dge I.. G Williams .................................. Judge A. Vaz .................................. Judge SA. Egorov (Temporarily) .................................. ..................... Co-ordinator ..................................

OTP I BUREAU DU PROCUREUR . ,O ,I

JEAN DE DlEU KAMUHANDA

-

ALO: received by I r e p par

Trial Attorney in charge of case:

DEFENCE I DEFENSE:

Accused / AccusB: JEAN DE completelremph 'CMM FORM

rn Lead Counsel / Conseil Principal: AlCHA CONDE I

in I a Arusha ................................................ jagnature) by fax mmp~ete lremp",o.wb#n FORU.

[XI Co-Counsel I Conseil Adjoint PATRICIA MONGO

01 h / a Arusha ................................................ (s,gna~um) C] by ~ ~ X M ~ ~ I ~ ~ ~ / ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ . C M S ~ ~ I ~ F O R M

All Decisions: OAppeals Chamber Unit, The Hague Suzanne Chenault, Jurist Linguist i

C] JP. Fornete (Chief, CMS) F. Talon (Appeals)

p~~ ~-p ~~~~pp-~~ .

Kindly find attached the following document(~) 1 Veuillez tmuveren annexe la@) document@) suivantfs):

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PROSECUTOR'S CLOSING BRIEF Pursuant to Rule 86(B) of the Rule of Procedure 02/07/2003 and Evidence

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~ ~ D N A T ~ N S Arusha International Conference Centre N A T ~ O ~ T LXFS P.O.Box 6016. Arusha, Tanzania - B.P. 6016. Arusha. Tanzanie

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, Case No /Affaire Nr ICTR-99-54A-T

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To: A:

KAMUHANDA

Name of detainee / nom du detenu

document(s) listed below.

Je confirme r h p t i o n du/des documents mentionnels) cidessous.

03 I I . .

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Prfihname I nom Signature Date , Time l Heure

..................... SAIDOU GUINDO I I I

Documents name 1 litre du document Date Filed I Date enregislrd Pages

PROSECUTOR'S CLOSING BRIEF Pursuant to Rule 86(B) of the Rule of 0210712003 312 Procedure and Evidence

From: De:

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UJP. Fornet6 (Chief, CMS) O N . Diallo (TC1) R. p m b o (TCZ) OF. Talon (TC3) z I

O F . Talon (Appeals) .....................

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