PROVINGthe PRINCIPLE - Bunny.net

PROVING the PRINCIPLE

PROVING the PRINCIPLEby Susan M. Stacy

Idaho Operations Office of the Department of EnergyIdaho Falls, Idaho

DOE/ID-10799

The author is grateful to John W. Simpson and to the American Nuclear Society for permission

to reprint excerpts from Nuclear Power from Undersea to Outer Space by John W. Simpson,

copyright 1995 by the American Nuclear Society, La Grange Park, Illinois.

Published 2000

Printed in the United States of America

DOE/ID-10799

ISBN 0-16-059185-6

Prepared under contract by Jason Associates Corporation for the

U.S. Department of Energy, Idaho Operations Office.

Contract Number DE-AM07-97ID13472,

Task Order Number DE-AT07-98ID60300 (Task 14)

Photographs and drawings reproduced in this book are the property of the Idaho National

Engineering and Environmental Laboratory unless otherwise noted in the photo credit.

This information was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the U.S.

Government. Neither the U.S. Government nor any agency thereof, nor any of their employees,

makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the

accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or process disclosed,

or represents that its use would not infringe privately owned rights. References herein to any

specific commercial product, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or other-

wise, does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the

U.S. Government or any agency thereof. The views and opinion of the author expressed herein do

not necessarily state or reflect those of the U.S. Government or any agency thereof.

Stacy, Susan M., 1943-

Proving the Principle: a history of the Idaho National Engineering and

Environmental Laboratory, 1949-1999 / Susan M. Stacy.

p. cm.

Includes index.

ISBN: 0-16-059185-6 (pbk:alk. paper)

1. Stacy, Susan M., 1943- 2. Nuclear reactors—History.

3. Nuclear energy—Research laboratories—Idaho. 4. Radioactive

waste disposal—Idaho. I. Idaho National Engineering and

Environmental Laboratory (INEEL). II. Title.

TK9202.S73 P76 2000

621.483—dc21 CIP

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, Mail Stop SSOP,Washington, D.C., 20402-9328

v

To the pioneers ofthe NRTS who were part of the nuclearscience adventure, and to the employ-ees of the INEEL who continue theadventure of science.

D e d i ca t i o n

P R O V I N G T H E P R I N C I P L E

v i

v i i

Ta b l e o f C o n t e n t s

I N T R O D U CT I O N I X

A C K N O W L E D G E M E N T S X I I

C H A P T E R S

1 • A V I A T O R ’ S C A V E 2

2 • T H E N A V A L P R O V I N G G R O U N D 8

3 • T H E U R A N I U M T R A I L L E A D S T O I D A H O 1 8

4 • T H E P A R T Y P L A N 2 8

5 • I N V E N T I N G T H E T E S T I N G S T A T I O N 3 6

6 • F A S T F L U X , H I G H F L U X , A N D R I C KO V E R ’ S F L U X 4 4

7 • S A F E T Y I N S I D E A N D O U TS I D E T H E F E N C E S 5 4

8 • T H E R E A CT O R Z O O G O E S C R I T I C A L 6 4

9 • H O T S T U F F 7 4

1 0 • C O R E S A N D C O M P ET E N C I E S 8 6

1 1 • T H E C H E M P L A N T 9 4

1 2 • R E A CT O R S B E G E T R E A CT O R S 1 0 6

1 3 • T H E T R I U M P H O F P O L I T I C A L G R A V I T Y O V E R N U C L EA RF L I G H T 1 1 6

1 4 • I M A G I N I N G T H E W O R S T 1 2 8

1 5 • T H E S L- 1 R E A CT O R 1 3 8

1 6 • T H E A F T E R M A T H 1 5 0

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1 7 • S C I E N C E I N T H E D E S E R T 1 5 8

1 8 • T H E S H A W E F F E C T . . . 1 7 4

1 9 • . . . A N D T H E I D A H O B O OS T 1 8 4

2 0 • A Q U E S T I O N O F M I SS I O N 1 9 2

2 1 • B Y T H E E N D O F T H I S D E C A D E 2 0 4

2 2 • J U M P I N G T H E F E N C E 2 1 2

2 3 • T H E E N D O W M E N T O F U R A N I U M 2 2 2

2 4 • T H E U R A N I U M T RA I L F A D E S 2 3 4

2 5 • M I SS I O N : F U T U R E 2 4 4

A P P E N D I C E S

A • I N E E L M A N A G E R S A N D C O N T RA CT O R S 2 5 7

B • F I F T Y Y E A R S O F R E A CT O R S A T T H E S I T E 2 5 9

C • P R O C E SS I N G R U N S , I D A H O CH E M I C A L P R O C E SS I N G P L A N T 2 6 9

D • C R I T I C A L I T Y A C C I D E N T S, I D A H O C H E M I C A L P R O C E SS I N G P L A N T 2 73

E • R & D 1 0 0 A W A R D S 2 7 7

N O T E S 2 8 1

A C R O N Y M S 3 0 5

G LO S S A R Y 3 0 7

S E L E CT E D B I B L I O G RA P H Y 3 1 3

I N D E X 3 17

i x

“What did they actually do there?” Thisquestion has come my way frequently while researching and writing this history.Idahoans seem to have a sense of continuity with their mining and timber roots,their agricultural heritage, and the great themes of the West—Lewis and Clark, theOregon Trail, Reclamation. But when it comes to their nuclear heritage, connec-tions seem vague. The Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory(INEEL) was set up deliberately in a remote area. Fifty years later, it still isremote, in more ways than one.

I became curious about the INEEL after hearing a lecture about Hanford, the gov-ernment’s other nuclear facility in the Pacific Northwest. The speaker describedHanford’s secret war-time mission to manufacture plutonium for weapons andcriticized its later environmental record. The talk made me wonder about the roleof INEEL in the nuclear world, for I knew little of its history. Therefore, when Iwas asked in June 1998 to prepare a history of the INEEL on the occasion of its50th anniversary in 1999, I was ready with questions to ask of the past.

The story of the INEEL, originally named the National Reactor Testing Station(NRTS), is really a thousand stories. Sadly, not all could be in this book. Amongthose not here are certain defense research topics—the Centaurus laser-pumpingexperiments, for example—and medical topics like the campaign to recycle thePower Burst Facility for Boron Neutron Capture Therapy, a potential treatment fora deadly type of brain tumor. The accomplishments of the Radiological andEnvironmental Sciences Laboratory and a kaleidoscopic array of recent non-nuclear research are likewise missing. Recent decades in general receive lessattention than the early days. But then, recent decades are full of programs andissues that continue to evolve, so perhaps it is better to let them mellow before ahistorian tries to characterize them.

This book is neither a technical report nor a scientific assessment. It is intendedfor the general reader with no background in physics, chemistry, or any other sci-ence. It aims to trace the changing relationship between a federal nuclear laborato-ry and its home state. Nuclear science is a character in the story, however, but notdressed in all its technical finery. A glossary and acronym list are available at theback of the book for those who wish an occasional reminder.

I n t ro d u c t i o n

x


It is the question “What did they do?” that produces the thousand stories. TheINEEL was the scene of thousands of scientific experiments. I learned to correctmy notion of an “experiment.” The word brought up vague memories of highschool chemistry class—pouring a liquid of one color into a glass filled with a liq-uid of another color. The result was a third color, and that was it. In nuclear mat-ters, however, an experiment may require acres of land, huge buildings, hundredsof people, and millions of dollars. It may take years to conceive, design, andbuild. After all that, the action phase of an experiment might take about the sametime it took to pour liquid A into liquid B.

Large-scale laboratory work requires the well-orchestrated efforts of teams.Nevertheless, a historian, particularly when commissioned for a golden anniver-sary, looks for insight by talking to individuals. Who can interview a team thatexisted and dissolved forty-five years ago? Yet accomplishments are so often theproduct of teams, working groups, task forces, and committees, that it is hard toidentify the individual who might have flashed the first break-through light on aproblem. Team work is a fact of life in Big Science, perhaps most science. Peopledemonstrate creativity and imagination in ways not often recognized. This bookdoes not mention all the times that someone said of another, “He was the mostbrilliant physicist I’ve ever known,” “We had superb back-up from our radio-chemists,” “The weather service sent their best meteorologists to the NRTS,”“Our welders were the best in the business.” I heard that sort of thing frequently.

Therefore, I regret the many stories not recorded here, the many exceptional indi-viduals not acknowledged, the many discoveries and engineered systems not men-tioned, the many ingenious experiments not described. I hope that the all-too-fewnames and episodes that do appear in the book will be understood partly as stand-ins for the many others that could just as well have been included—and stand-ins,as well, for the teams that made it possible for individuals to have stories to tell.

All historians of the Atomic Energy Commission or the Department of Energy(DOE) and its laboratories have had to cope with the multiple-arena aspect oftheir subjects: activity moves on several fronts at the same time. At the INEELthis is notably the case. Major programs were under different contractors and pro-gressed simultaneously, sometimes having little more in common than the desertscenery and the landlord. Rather than chart INEEL history using internal benchmarks such as the change in DOE secretaries or the five-year increments of oper-ating contracts, I tried to keep in mind the general reader and the non-scientist, formost of whom this book will be an introduction to the INEEL.

As this manuscript neared completion, a criticality accident occurred inTokaimura, Japan, in a plant fabricating highly enriched nuclear fuel. Havinglearned some basic nuclear language, I saw how carelessly many journalistsreported this news. They used the word “contaminated,” for example, when theymeant “irradiated.” The Idaho Chemical Processing Plant (renamed Idaho Nuclear

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Technology and Engineering Center, INTEC, in 1998) at the INEEL has been thescene of three accidental criticalities. These episodes, although as grave as anyunintentional criticality, were not germane to the general flow of the history andwere piled on the stack of untold stories. Lest anyone believe that these weredeliberately omitted, information about them is supplied in the appendix.

Associates have asked if my research exposed any “secrets” at the INEEL. DOEsupplied me with no security clearance. Considering the broad scope of the histo-ry—and the time given in which to complete it—this was not a concern. I consult-ed many documents that were at one time classified and subsequently declassified.Nevertheless, the manuscript managed (inadvertently) to arouse classification con-cerns in connection with certain activities at the Chem Plant in the 1950s. For therest, the selection of material, its interpretation, and any errors it may contain areentirely my own responsibility.

It was a special privilege to become acquainted with dozens of retired and currentemployees at the INEEL. Selected excerpts from some of these conversationsappear in the book. If these in any way encourage INEEL people to record theirown memories and their own explanation of why things were done the way theywere, I say, “Get busy.” The tons of scientific reports on the shelves omit all toowell the flavors of human experience, be they disappointment, tedium, or exhila-ration.

Now at the end of the project, I reflect once more on the lecture about Hanfordand consider what I learned about the INEEL. In trying to understand environ-mental and other events within the context of their time and place, it seems to methat the managers and scientists of the INEEL were neither careless nor casualabout the disposition of hazardous materials, radioactive waste, or radioactivereleases. Some people account for this by remarking, “This was not a weaponsproduction site.” This explanation, expressed as a negative, gives insufficientcredit to more positive themes in INEEL history. A research mentality, the dailyuse of the scientific method, the safety traditions established by the founders, andthe integration of Site employees into surrounding communities—all of thesemust count for something.

Environmental concerns are surely important, but it is possible that when futuregenerations consider the impact of the INEEL on the environment, they will findthat impact to be far outweighed and outlived by the laboratory’s remarkable legacy of scientific discovery and engineering achievement.

Susan M. Stacy

I N T R O D U CT I O N


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A c k n o w l e d g m e n t s

The one-year horizon for preparing thisbook required some serious help from a lot of people. Greg Hula, the DOE/IDproject manager, asked DOE/ID’s contractor Jason Associates to supply a lot of it.Nelson Soucek managed the project for Jason, sensitive always to the tensionbetween the deadlines that crowd and the space required to do work. I appreciatethe many quiet ways he kept these contending forces in a productive balance.Greg Hula was on the other side of that coin, and I thank him for the many wayshis kind patience, guidance, and astuteness helped to improve the manuscript.

Jason placed Lori McNamara on the project as research assistant and photoresearcher. Lori and Kris Burnham compiled the information on historic NRTSreactors found in Appendix B. Assisted by Terese Nield, she located most of thephotos appearing in the book. This task took her into many private homes, and wethank all of those generous people, including Bertie Lee Marvel, Pat Gibson, theThomas Sutton family, the Ada Marcia Porter family, Orville and MargaretLarsen, and William Holden, Jr., who permitted the use of their photos.

Kris Burnham also designed the book and cover. She, along with others at Jason,also undertook the task of preparing the index. In addition to her talent, Krisbrought her own considerable knowledge of NRTS/INEEL resources to bear onmany details of the book, for all of which I thank her.

The INEEL Photo Lab was a major partner in this project. We are grateful toJoyce Lowman and the rest of the Photo Lab crew: Cindy Copeland, Mike Crane,and Ron Paarmann. My personal thanks to Joyce for giving me access to the spe-cial treasures she preserved over the years because she thought they might be use-ful someday. Her encouragement meant a lot to me.

Thanks also to Jerry Russell of the Rock Island office of the U.S. Army Corps ofEngineers, Ed Hahn at Argonne-West, Dave Baurack of Argonne-East, Mary JaneFritzen of the Bonneville Historical Society, Kirk Clawson of the NationalOceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Marie Hallion of DOE Headquarters,who rendered additional help with photos, Clarence Mike of the IdahoTransportation Department, and Pixanna Walker of the Lost River Visitors Centerfor help locating people and pictures.

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A C K N O W L E D G E M E N T S

Librarians sometimes take their helping work for granted, but the researchers theyhelp don’t. I thank Teresa Oh and Bernice Kunkel at the INEEL TechnicalLibrary; Judy Krieger at the Argonne-West library; Alan Virta and Mary Austin atthe Boise State University Special Collections Library; Carol Silvers and all thereference librarians at the Idaho State Library; Judy Austin, Carolyn Bowler,Kathy Hodges, Linda Morton-Keithley, Angela Carney, and John Yandell at theIdaho State Historical Society Library.

I asked Greg Hula to gather a group of people willing to review the manuscript fortechnical accuracy. This group began small and then grew. I would like to thankespecially C. Wayne Bills, Theron Bradley, Julie Braun, John Byrom, JohnCommander, Don Dahl, Bill Ginkel, Joe W. Henscheid, Greg Hula, Bill Jensen,Ron King, Jay Kunze, Leroy Lewis, Richard Lindsay, Brent Palmer, Bill Parmley,Paul Pugmire, Carl Robertson, Robert Stallman, Bob Starck, Harlin Summers,Tom Wichmann, and Diana Yupe. The late John Horan was the first in this group.It was my good fortune to have many hours of conversation with him. He was aperson of moral discernment, common sense, and great generosity of spirit. Hisdeath occurred just as the first chapters were materializing; he left far too soonand I have missed him very much. To him and his wife, Kathy Horan, I cannotadequately express my thanks.

Talking with people connected with the Site as retirees, state officials, or currentemployees was the choicest part of this work. Many generously loaned me docu-ments and reports from their own collections. I thank them all: Tony Allen, BoydAnderson, Cecil D. Andrus, Al Anselmo, Jacqui Johnston Batie, Jerry Batie, RayBarnes, C. Wayne Bills, Brett Bohan, J. Robb Brady, Robert Brugger, JohnByrom, John Capek, David Cauffman, Terrell Carver, Jack Clark, Jack Combo,John Commander, Clay Condit, Beverly Cook, Deslonde deBoisblanc, DonDeming, Pete Dirkmaat, Kenhi Drewes, George Freund, Mary Freund, BillGinkel, Merle Griebenow, Clyde Hammond, Orval Hansen, Joe W. Hensheid,Kathy Horan, King House, Dennis Keiser, Larry Knight, Jay Kunze, GloriaLambson, Kay Lambson, Margaret Larsen, Orville Larsen, Leroy Lewis, JerryLyle, Phil McDonald, Mary McKnight, the late Fred McMillan, Clayton Marler,Dick Meservey, Michael Moore, Clay Nichols, Warren Nyer, Don Ofte, GordonOlsen, Hal Paige, Bernice Paige, Myrna Perry, Henry Peterson, Augustine Pitrolo,Susan Prestwich, Paul Pugmire, John Ray, Chuck Rice, Bryce Rich, Walter Sato,Bruce Schmalz, Jeff Schrade, Robert Skinner, Robert Smylie, Susan Stiger, HarlinSummers, John Taylor, Charles Till, Marvin Walker, George Wehmann, JohnWilcynski, Kirby Witham, and others.

Then there were the members of the Arrowrock Group, historians MadelineBuckendorf, Barbara Perry Bauer, and Elizabeth Jacox, who provided documentsfrom their previous research and much personal encouragement; Jeff Bryant, whointroduced me to Chem Plant historical resources; Nolan Jensen, for photo inter-pretation and for a uranium rock sample; Eric Simpson of Bechtel BWXT’s


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Community Relations group, for helping make connections; Roger Anders, whosent draft manuscript chapters of an in-progress volume on the history of theNuclear Regulatory Commission; Paul Zelos of Idaho State University for provid-ing back issues of Site Impact studies and other valuable bibliographical materials;John Simpson, for permission to quote from his book and for putting me in touchwith John Taylor; Jeanette Germain and Todd Thompson for editing; DinoLowrey, for making certain important arrangements; James M. Stacy and JohnMcKinley, who sent me several NRC documents; Hollie Gilbert, for help withArgonne photos and help with laughter. Thank you all.

Many others from DOE or its contractors answered questions, sent reports, orfound photos. Every contact helped, and I am grateful.

The people at the Cultural Resources Department of Lockheed Martin Idaho, nowBechtel BWXT Idaho, were of special help in this project. Clayton Marler,Suzanne Miller, and Julie Braun considered years ago that a history would be along-lasting way to commemorate INEEL’s 50th anniversary. They promoted theidea beyond their department and joined others, not all of whom are known to me,who shared the same view. Along with Greg Hula and others, they look like god-parents of a book. Beyond that, Julie’s personal encouragement and wise counselhave been graces in my life. I’m plain lucky to have them.

At home, my husband Ralph McAdams has kept our household from becoming aproof of entropy. Assuming more than his share of chores was the least of it; I ammost grateful for the island of peace, the cups of tea, the chocolate eclairs, and hisconstant loving support.

C H A P T E R O N E

Mike Atwood, thechief pilot, and his co-pilot, a serg e a n twith the Special Response Te a m ,boarded their Bell 222 helicopter atCentral Facilities Area (CFA) to begina routine perimeter sur-veillance of the Site. T h etwo were part of theAirborne SecurityProgram, a system thatthe Department ofE n e rgy had installed in1984 to beef up the secu-rity of A m e r i c a ’s “spe-cial nuclear materials,” aphrase referring to urani-um, plutonium, and afew other elements.1

It was January 1985,four years before the col-lapse of the Berlin Wall and the begin-ning of the end of the Cold Wa r. T h eproper name of the Site, also referredto as “the desert,” was Idaho NationalEngineering Laboratory (INEL). T h epilots flew the perimeter several timeseach day—and each night, equippedwith night vision goggles—to check

for unauthorized entry, lost hunters, oranything else unusual. Fencing for the894-square-mile Site had never beenconsidered necessary—despite theclassified nature of much that went ont h e r e .

The pilots and their helicopters werecomponents of a new special responseteam trained in counter-terrorism. In thewake of the killing of over 240 U.S.Marines in Lebanon in October 1983,this heightened level of protection nowlay over more traditional security mea-sures: passes, badges, personnel securi-

ty clearances, armed guards at entrygates, secure radio channels, “KeepOut” warning signs, and a “need toknow” approach to information.

Security fences topped with barbedwire did exist around several small

acreages within theperimeter where thebusiness of the Site wasconcentrated. Outsidethose fences, the landwas mostly open desert.A few neighboringranchers had privilegeson the premises, enjoy-ing concessions madeduring the early yearswhen the ranchers hadpersuaded the A t o m i cE n e rgy Commission(AEC) that there was nogood reason to keep cat-

tle and sheep from grazing the landduring the few months of the year thatthe climate permitted.2

As the helicopter ascended, it hoveredmomentarily and then tilted eastwardinto forward flight about five hundredfeet above the desert floor. At this low

AV I A T O R’S CA V EPeople had to be strong to walk, for they walked in great strides... They would dehydrate roots and fruits for winter storageand put them in caches up and down the valleys or across the mountains. That was done so we would be noticed as being

poor and without food. People did not know at the time that my people had caches. After the fruits were dehydrated, then they would go up into the mountains, over the summits, and into the meat world.

—Emma Dann—

2

INEEL 89-329-2-2

Shoshone and Bannock encampment near Pocatello, Idaho.Idaho State Historical Society 79-148.8

altitude, the landscape retained its defi-nition of shallow swales, knolls, smallridges, an occasional crater, and lowhills. Sometimes the pilots flew twicethat high, and then these details dis-solved, and the desert appeared as “abroad, nearly flat plain,” a phrase usedoften to describe this part of the SnakeRiver Plain. It was true, however, thatpancake-flat floors of undrainedbasins—playas—were also a feature ofthe landscape at many places.3

In the sub-zero temperatures of themorning, the pilots swept over the Site,aided by the blazing blue brightness ofthe Idaho sky. A glance to the southalways afforded a stunning view of BigSouthern Butte, impressive in any sea-son. Further east were two more buttes,named East and Middle for their rela-tionship to Big Southern and eachother. Rising over 1,400 feet from theflatness of the desert, the ancient volca-noes had been reliable landmarks fortravelers through the centuries.

Below the helicopter, a carpet of snowcovered the straw-toned and gray win-ter colors of desert grasses and lowshrubs. Here and there the snowyexpanse gave way to an industrial com-plex, its square corners and rectangularshapes contrasting sharply with thesofter contours of the surrounding ter-rain. Approaching such a cluster from alow altitude, one might imagine anencounter with a kind of enclosed city,with towering exhaust stacks taking theplace of spires and steeples, and chain-link fences surrounding the buildingsinstead of high stone walls.

Flying past each cluster, the pilotslooked for signs of disturbance. Eacharea contained at least one buildingwith a unique and unexpected shapethat rose up on the horizon and drewthe eye. At one, it was a large silverdome. At another, it was the dark-ribbed roof of an immense barrel-vault-ed building with the doors of anairplane hangar. At another area milesaway, one could see a row of roundwooden cooling towers with steamywater vapor boiling into the frigid airlike so many cauldrons of hot soup.

The pilots were flying a random pat-tern. They had observed herds of deerand elk near the eastern boundary, butno sign of poachers. They were headingback to CFA when Atwood noticed afaint wisp of steam rising from—what?Apparently nothing. The spot was sev-eral miles from one of the activity clus-ters, and no ribbon of road wentanywhere near it. He would haveknown if it were the scene of some spe-cial test or experiment, so he tilted clos-er and circled the plume. He saw asmall ridge formed by what seemed tobe a lava tube. The steam drifted from ahole in the top of the tube. He decidedit was merely the condensation of warmair from a void under the tube meetingthe cold air outside.

Atwood noted the spot with the globalpositioning gear in the helicopter. Hereturned to base and promptly forg o tabout it. Something made him think ofit again in 1988 and he decided torevisit the place. This time it wasspring. The desert was green, almostlush-looking from the air. Again thesun was bright, but a temperature of


4

Containment dome and emission stack for Loss of

Fluid Test at Test Area North.

INEEL 89-582-7-1

INEEL 73-3049

INEEL 75-3690

Test Reactor Area in foreground. Idaho Chemical

Processing Plant, (now Idaho Nuclear Technology

Engineering Center) in middle distance. East and

Middle buttes on horizon.

Naval Reactors Facility. Building in center houses

S1W, the prototype for USS Nautilus.

seventy degrees made the expedition amore pleasant outing than it wouldhave been before. As he hovered overthe hole, he noticed that the vegetationgrowing near it was unusual, a diff e r-ent color than the sage and rabbit brushso common on the desert, a brightershade of green.

He set the helicopter down on a flatspot about thirty feet from the hole.Lava tubes are common on this part ofthe Snake River Plain. These wereformed as recently as 200,000 yearsago when basalt magma oozed quietlyout of the earth from thirty miles below,filling up low stream valleys andcanyons. The outer portion of the flowcooled and hardened more quickly thanthe inside, providing tunnels for the hotmolasses-like fluid within to move longdistances before it cooled. Eventually,the magma stopped erupting and thetunnels drained. Often, all or part of theroof collapsed.4

As they approached, Atwood and hisco-pilot saw a cairn near the hole. Therocks were stacked nearly three feethigh. Their first thought was that anold sheepherder had erected the mark-er. The Snake River Plain had been awell-used crossing beginning in thelate decades of the 19th century andthe early 20th. Stockmen had drivencattle and sheep to the shipping centersof Montana from Oregon, Washington,and western Idaho; and their cairns hadbeen found elsewhere on the Site.

But then the two men noticed piles ofobsidian chips, thousands of them,strewn about. Suddenly they knewthey would need flashlights. Fetchingthem from the helicopter, they returned

to the hole and beamed the light intothe cavern below.

I saw buffalo skulls with horns and alot of other bones. You can tell buffaloby the way the horns come out lower onthe skull than other animals. Weclimbed into the hole, stepping on rocksthat led you down into it. I could smellbobcat. You had to stoop a little to getinto the cave, but then the cavity reallyopened up and we could stand up easi -ly. We saw a lot more bones and what

looked like a fireplace the waythe rocks were placed.

There were all kinds ofthings in there.5

The floor of the cave contained moreobsidian chips. Amidst the thick scatter,they found what many people call“arrowheads” and what archaeologistscall “projectile points.” The skulls androcks and other objects on the floorwere covered lightly with a thin film ofdust. Upon exploring briefly, they real-ized that the lava tube had a large high-ceilinged central area and threearm-like extensions. Crevices in therock walls contained mysterious objectsmade of twine, bone, and pieces ofwood. Whoever had put them there haddone so many hundreds of years before,and the pilots may have been the firstto see them since then.6

C H A P T E R 1 • A V I A T O R ’ S C A V E

5

Left. Projectile points found on the INEL site. Below.

Archaeologists and members of the Shoshone-

Bannock Tribe get acquainted with the interior of

Aviator’s Cave.

INEEL89-329-1-9

INEEL Cultural Resources

The ancestral homelands of theShoshone and Bannock people extendacross the entire length and width of theSnake River Plain, across the Site, andinto the north well beyond the ruggedmountains of the Bitterroot, the Lemhi,and the Lost River rangesand the valleys betweenthem. To the south and east,they include the grassy landsaround Bear Lake, thenorthern fringe of the GreatBasin, and the bison countryof Wyoming and Montana.7

It was a generous territoryupon which they built theireconomy. They werehunters and gatherers, andthe land supplied subsis-tence and more. The moun-tains and streams suppliedsheep, deer, squirrel,salmon, fiber, grasses,watercress, fruit, obsidian,and fuel. Rabbits, marmots,small mammals, reptiles,and sage brush inhabitedthe dry desert. All thesewere useful. The river bot-toms around the SnakeRiver were rich in roots, camas, tules,grasses, hawks, and eagles. The peoplehunted bison and used its flesh andbone for food, tools, and clothing.

With these riches, the people ate anddressed well during all seasons and hadchoice materials with which to makethe tools and goods of everyday life.They crafted baskets and pots to carry,store, and prepare food. They trappedgame with snares and heated theirdwellings comfortably with wood in thewinter. They made spears, bows,

arrows, knives, scrapers, awls, needles,and other tools with obsidian, chert,bone, and wood. The botanical varietyin the region supplied a pharmacy aswell as food.

To live with the rhythm of the land wasto understand the seasonality of theresources, and to walk from place toplace accordingly. Each direction of thecompass pointed to special gifts—camasto the west, bison to the north and east.When the people walked through thearid desert between the winter villagesin the Fort Hall bottomlands and the

mountains to the north, they cached foodand knew where to find water.

They traveled in family groups. Fromthe winter villages, some paths tookthem across the Site towards the Big

Lost River, one of thewaterways that flowed withsome reliability in thespring of the year. Thedesert was hot in summerand unthinkably cold in thewinter. This and other cavesin the area must haveoffered considerable com-fort in either season and auseful camp for a moreextended stay.

The cave contained perish-able items of great age in areasonable state of preserva-tion. These provide someinsight as to how the earlytravelers spent their time.When people stopped at thecave, where water fromsmall natural basins nearbymight have been available inthe spring and fall, theyworked. They made and

repaired clothing, snares, bows andarrows, knives. Over the years, the peo-ple left rush mats, hides, rabbit-furrobes, and pottery behind. The plantsgrowing near the mouth of the cavewere saltbush, which for some reasonfound this spot unusually hospitable.

Charred bison bones speak of goodmeals. On fine days, flint knappersworked outside; on days too cold,inside near the fire. Artisans in stone,they had no idea that people of thenuclear age would give names to their


6

Until they began using horses in the early 1800s,

Shoshone and Bannock people traveled on foot.


tools—Avonlea, Desert Side-notched,Rosegate—or that their sizes andshapes would tell a story about the passage of time.8

In the air once more, the pilots couldsee in the land below the subtle scarsthat marked the changing fortunes ofthe Shoshone and Bannock people.After the trappers had come, and afterEliza Spalding and Narcissa Whitmanhad proved in 1836 that families couldcross the continent in wagons, theOregon Trail brought a vast invasion ofnative lands. The wagon ruts ofGoodale’s Cutoff, one of its branches,is still recognizable at the southwesterncorner of the Site. After the first wavesof settlers, great herds of cattle andsheep moved along the trail.

The mountains to the north containedgold, and when prospectors discoveredthis in the 1880s, they stimulated asubstantial freighting industry betweenthe mining towns and supply centers atEagle Rock (now Idaho Falls) andBlackfoot. Wagon roads began to criss-cross the Site, carrying food and drygoods, mining gear, and hopeful pas-sengers. The desert remained primarilya corridor, as it had been for the

Indians, a place for temporary campson the way to somewhere else.9

Someone eventually did try, however, tohomestead in the desert. The landseemed good, and all that was neededwas to transport water to it. The serpen-tine tracings of old canals in the westernregion of the Site were easy to pick outfrom the air. It had required the resourcesof the federal government to make suchirrigation projects feasible. The CareyAct of 1894 and the Reclamation Act of1902 provided the legal framework toimagine that water from the Big LostRiver could be dammed, diverted into acanal, and sent to transform the desertinto a garden. The effort was doomedbecause the engineers miscalculated theamount of water available. They didn’tunderstand the wind-blown soils of thedesert and the layers of fractured basaltbeneath the reservoirs and canals. Soilswere too porous or contained too muchc l a y. Disappointed, the settlers driftedaway in the 1920s, having failed to find“salvation from the application of sci-ence and engineering expertise.” So theSite lost the few inhabitants who hadever thought of residing permanently onthe desert.1 0

Atwood reported the cave to archaeo-logical authorities, who in turn notifiedmembers of the Shoshone-BannockTribe at the Fort Hall IndianReservation in southeast Idaho. He andother pilots of the Special ResponseTeam flew back to the place manytimes, carrying members of the tribeand archaeologists to the cave for visitsand work trips. As the one who redis-covered the cave, he had the privilegeof naming it. He chose Aviator’s Caveas a gesture of acknowledgement to allthe pilots in his unit.

The successive waves of trappers, pio-neers, miners, and settlers in southeastIdaho had long since changed the land-scape and restricted the seasonal round,although Shoshone and Bannock peoplecontinued to use some of their tradi-tional routes. Memories of the cave livein legends. Gold had played out.Dreams of agrarian abundance hadgone bankrupt. The Lost River Desert,sometimes called the Arco Desert forthe village on its northern fringe,became another “remote” place in along list of remote places in theAmerican West. But with the coming ofWorld War II, remoteness would proveto be its most appealing attraction.11

C H A P T E R 1 • A V I A T O R ’ S C A V E

7

Archaeologists don’t know the purpose of the gorge

hook device found in Aviator’s Cave. A carved wood

splinter is attached to a fiber line running through a

reed shaft. The opposite end of the line is tied to a

tuft of fur, which plugs the end of the tube,

preventing the line from pulling out.


C H A P T E R T W O

8

As tensions builttoward world war in the late 1930s, theU.S. Navy hired contractors to buildnaval bases on the Atlantic and Pacificcoasts, Hawaii, Guam, and at fivePacific atolls named Johnston, Palmyra,Samoa, Midway, and Wake. The baseswere to implement a war plan namedRainbow Five. In the event of war withJapan, the five westerly bases wouldform a kind of defensive curtain pro-tecting the Navy’s major fleet base inHawaii. Offensively, they were to betake-off points for bombers to hitJapanese targets in the MarshallIslands and Kwajalein.

The war startedbefore the baseswere ready. InDecember of 1941,Japan crippled thefleet in PearlH a r b o r, attackedM i d w a y, and cap-tured Wake and Guam,preventing the United States from carry-ing out Rainbow Five. The Navy quicklyexpanded its West Coast bases and also

looked inland for support facilities. Gunfactories, for example, needed to besecure from potential enemy raids by sea.1

The Sixth Supplemental NationalDefense Appropriation Act of 1942placed two support facilities in Idaho.One was the Farragut Naval TrainingCenter, a training base for sailors at thesouthern end of Lake Pend Oreille. Theother was the Naval Ordnance Plant atPocatello, established on April 1, 1942,under the command of the Navy’sBureau of Ordnance.2

Built by the Morrison-KnudsenCompany of Idaho, one of the Navy’smajor contractors, the ordnance plant

was situated on 211 acres about threemiles north of Pocatello. The Navychose the site because Pocatello washome to one of the largest UnionPacific Railroad terminals in the coun-try and on the route of a transcontinen-tal highway. Lying east of the coastalmountain ranges, it was reasonablysecure, and the plant could take deliv-ery of steel, chemicals, ordnance, andbattleship guns shipped from the WestCoast.

The guns came from such fighting shipsas USS Missouri and USS Wisconsinwhose revolving armored turrets, stud-

ded with sixteen-inch guns, theNavy’s most powerful,

helped win the Pacificwar. Repeated firing

of the guns erodedthe bore, wore outthe rifling, andcompromised theaccuracy of thegun. ThePocatello plant

removed the dis-torted inner sleeves of the gun barrels,relined them with fresh metal, rifled thenew linings, and then tested them for

TH E NA V A L PR O V I N G GR O U N DThey had a place where civilians could watch them fire the guns occasionally. I remember how theground would shake; it was a terrific concussion. Your eyes sort of vibrated and your vision was

blurry. After the shot, you could see a poof of dirt in the desert.

—Kay Lambson—

The battleship USS Missouri wears out the linings in its guns. Naval Historical Center 80-G-421049

accuracy. In addition, the plant ware-housed ordnance and manufacturednew guns and gun mounts—large andsmall—for service on Pacific fleet bat-tleships.3

As an accessory to the plant, the Navyneeded a firing range on flat terrain andabout thirty miles long to proof fire theguns. It first considered a site nearTaber, a tiny settlement about fortymiles northwest of Pocatello. But theground there was uneven, and lava rockwas too close to the surface for ease ofconstruction. The Navy looked furthernorth and found an ideal site: flat,remote, and unpopulated. What fewacres were in private hands had to becondemned, but most of the land was inthe public domain.4

On the southern edge of the site, aUnion Pacific branch line passed by on

its way from Pocatello northwest to thetowns of Arco and Mackay. The placewas sixty-five miles from Pocatello,and it would be easy to extend a spurline and build a siding. The Navy with-drew about 271 square miles from thepublic domain and built the NavalProving Ground (NPG). Its acreage cuta jagged-edged swath into the desertroughly nine miles wide and thirty-sixmiles long. From the firing point at thesouth end, the guns had an unobstruct-ed range toward the northeast.

The Navy intended to house some ofits employees, both military and civil-ian, at the proving ground with theirfamilies. The facility was divided intotwo parts: the residential area and theproof area. As at Pocatello, theMorrison-Knudsen Company builteverything at the site, subcontractingsome of the work to the J.A. Te r t e l i n g

C o m p a n y, another Idaho constructionfirm. The place was dedicated andready for business on August 2, 1943.5

The eighty-five-acre proof area wasnorth of the residential area and fenced;anyone entering had to pass a guard-house. It contained a battery of gunemplacements, a concussion wall andcontrol tower, and magazines forsmokeless powder, fuzes, and charges.An office building, railroad trackage,oil storage tanks, electrical substation,and other facilities supported the opera-tions. A locomotive hauled the gunsand other loads from place to placearound the proof area. Most of thebuildings were made of reinforced con-crete to withstand the vibration andshock from the guns and potentialmunitions explosions.

The concussion wall, designed toabsorb blast and protect those whofired the guns, was a particularly for-midable piece of architecture. Standingbetween the gun emplacements and theresidential area to the south, it was 315 feet long, 8 feet thick, and 15 1/2feet high. Its rebar was doubled andplaced in a close eight-inch grid. Thosein the control tower behind the wallcould peer out of narrow window slitsat the emplacements, each painted witha letter to make up the slogan “SAFETY FIRST.”6


1 0

Residential area of the Naval Proving Ground as it

looked in July 1951, view to southwest. Older

section is at right near water tower.INEEL 2974

The railroad brought the guns andother material from Pocatello to a sid-ing dominated by a 250-ton gantrycrane. A gun ready to be proofed waspositioned on one of the ten emplace-ments and loaded with a charge, mostlikely prepared by a “WOW,” a civil-ian Woman Ordnance Worker. Downthe range, to the east and west of thecenterline, were rows of concrete mon-uments, marked and placed at regulardistances. To prepare for a test, spot-ters drove down dirt roads namedCenterline, West Monument, and EastMonument. From observation posts,they communicated with operators inthe control tower and used the monu-ments to triangulate the location ofimpact. In this way, they evaluated andrecorded the performance of the gun.7

Less than half a mile from the concus-sion wall was the residential area,divided into two sections by the rail-road spur coming in from the UnionPacific branch. The officers and severalcivilian families lived on the west sideof the tracks in brick houses with whiteshutters. The Navy built for perma-nence, planting the grounds with treesand shrubs. The northern-mostdwelling, the one with a matchinggarage, was reserved for the command-ing officer. The southern-most was abarracks and mess for up to fourteenenlisted marines. Beyond the barrackswere a kennel for the marines’ patroldogs and a well-supplied commissary,which the civilians called “the store.”8

After the war, the Navy built morehouses, wanting to alleviate winter trav-el problems for employees who com-muted between the site and Arco. Itbuilt a loop road on the east side of the

railroad tracks and arranged nineteenwhite-painted wood-frame housesaround it, back yards facing to the spa-cious interior of the loop. Most of thehouses, if not all, had basements, andeach had generous yard space to growgardens. The Navy finished installingthe lawns and sidewalks in October of1946.9

The main landmark for “the Base” wasan elevated water tank perched on awooden tower in the residential area.Officially, the railroad siding and vil-lage were named “Scoville” afterCommander John A. Scoville, theOfficer in Charge of Construction ofthe Pocatello plant and the provingground. The Navy named the mainroads Lincoln Boulevard, FarragutAvenue, and Portland Avenue, a legacythat remained—along with the nameScoville—after the Navy left the site.10

In this setting, the wartime business offiring lethal weapons and detonatinghuge explosive charges co-existed witha small—and unique—Idaho village.The Navy shipped first-run movies tothe residents twice a week. These wereshown in the locomotive shed next tothe spur line. On movie nights, thelocomotive was parked outside, dis-placed by the movie projector and rowsof benches. The versatile building alsoserved as a fire station and garage.11

C H A P T E R 2 • T H E N A V A L P R O V I N G G R O U N D

1 1

INEEL 3629

Proof area in October 1951. Gantry crane at lower

left. Gun emplacements in foreground. Buildings in

center are behind concussion wall. Storage area at

upper right.

Children were an integral part ofthe community. The marines madeskating rinks for them in the winter.Students filled up a gun-metal-graybus and went to school at Arco sev-enteen miles away, sometimesaccompanied by a marine when cer-tain boys got out of hand. In typicalmilitary fashion, the bus stopped oneday each year in front of the marinebarracks, where no child couldescape the dreaded “tick shot,” abooster to prevent Rocky Mountainspotted fever.12

Trouble was easy for children to find,what with forbidden piles of railroadties lying about and Navy floats andbuoys awaiting repair on the drydesert ground. One year, one of thelieutenants tried to grow freshwaterclams in a pond made from a gravelpit, but was thwarted when some of thechildren discovered them and opened

every one, amazed at the beautiful pur-ple luster inside. Another temptationwas the water tower. At least one pairof enterprising young girls sneakedaway from home one night, thinking itwould be a good idea to climb to thetop. They tripped an alarm, and themarines came after the intruders withflashlights and guns, shouting “Halt!”High in the air and giddy from excite-ment, the girls couldn’t manage thedescent, so the marines had to fetchthem down.13

Characteristic of its civilian/militaryblend, the settlement found ways todeal with remoteness and isolation. Oneof the civilian families kept a smallherd of dairy cows a mile or so north-west of the village. The father and hissons went each day to collect the milk,brought it home to the basement oftheir house, separated and pasteurizedit, and delivered it to the other residentsin a milk truck. In summers, the menorganized baseball teams and playedteams from Arco, Mackay, and othertowns. When not otherwise working,women entertained each other atsewing circles. During one winter, anunusually heavy snow storm closed theroads to the base, isolating it for nearlya month. The residents offered refugeto travelers stranded on the road andsheltered them in their homes for theduration. The Navy dropped food bun-dles from airplanes into snowbanks. Allwere relieved when the roads openedbefore a woman who was pregnant hadto leave for the hospital.14


1 2

Margaret Larsen, the NPG’s first Woman Ordnance

Worker, and her son John pose in the shadow of the

water tower in 1949.

The extraordinary winter of 1948. The Navy dropped

food and other supplies when snow blocked roads to

Arco and Blackfoot.

Meanwhile, the Bureau of Ordnancefound many ways to exploit its expanseof desert. The proofing of guns com-menced on November 20, 1943, withthe shooting of an anti-aircraft gun highinto the air. Proofing continued after thewar ended in 1945; the Naval ProvingGround eventually fired 1,650 minorand major caliber gun barrels. For 1944alone, the commander ordered over15,000 projectiles, to be used for guntests and target practice.15

Bomb groups and fighter squadronstraining at the Pocatello Army Air Baseregularly blasted two areas of the proving ground as they practiced high-altitude bombing techniques. Residentsgrew accustomed to the drone—dayand night—of B-24 Liberator bombersand B-17 Flying Fortresses as theydropped hundred-pound sand-filledpractice bombs with black powder spot-ting charges, trying to hit wooden pyra-mid targets.16

The Navy permitted the U.S. Army touse part of the grounds for detonationresearch. At ordnance centers else-where, the Army managed loadingplants, where charges of T N T a n dother explosives were packed into theirshells and cartridges. Freshly loadedprojectiles were stored within safetycells separated by concrete barrierwalls. Should the contents of one cellignite or explode accidentally, the wallwas supposed to prevent the contentsof the adjacent cell from detonating.The Army Safety and Security Divisionhad reason to believe in 1944 that thequantities of explosives accumulatingin the safety cells of its loading plants,

while within the specifications ofthe safety manual, wereexceeding the limits of safety.Possibly the safety manualneeded to be revised or barrierstandards improved.

To test this premise,Lieutenant Colonel ClarkRobinson, who before the war was aprofessor of chemical engineering atthe Massachusetts Institute ofTechnology, came to the Naval ProvingGround. He built a concrete safety wall.On one side, he stacked 25,000 poundsof TNT against the wall to representfresh-loaded bombs. On the other side,he placed 5,000 more pounds of TNT.In the first test, setting off the 25,000pounds resulted in the detonation of thesmall pile as expected, and the barrierwall turned to dust and very small rub-ble. The test confirmed that the barrierwall could not isolate the impact of a25,000-pound explosion. He built moretests and experimented with air gaps—leaving several feet of air between thepile of TNT and the concrete wall—and different amounts of TNT. It wasall to find a safer way to store bombs.

Typical of scientific experiments, thetest engineers predicted how each testwould perform and then comparedpredictions to the actual results. Witheach main test, Robinson used theopportunity to do side experiments.One day, he set out small tokencharges at varying distances from alarge TNT charge, expecting the closestones to go off by sympathetic detona-tion. On the day of the test, the blastwent off as planned, but some of the


1 3

Pat Gibson, daughter of a civilian ordnance worker,

and her horse, Ginger. Marine barracks in distance

at right.

B-24 Liberator.

Courtesy of Wright-Patterson Air Force Base

results were unexpected. The blasteffect of the detonation was lower thanhe predicted.

This is presumably because of our alti -tude (4,950 feet) and the consequentlower density of air over that at sealevel where most of the blast effectshave been noted. Incidentally, this is inline with our observation obtainedwhen firing guns at the ProvingGround... Not only were no windowsbroken, but the windows at the ProvingGround approximately 6 miles from the

scene of the explosion were not evenrattled, and at the very small settlement[Midway] some 12 miles from thescene...they barely heard the noise.

Another surprise was that none of thesmall token charges went off during theblast. Robinson concluded that the for-mula he had been using to determinesafe air-gap distances, while correct atsea level, was probably not correct for ahigher altitude. He concluded that itmight be safe to permit closer spacingof magazines at high altitudes with thesame degree of safety. He and the Navycommanding officer immediately askedfor more explosives to do more air-gaptests.17

And so it went. The Army and Navywent on to do more barrier-wall tests,some using slabs of 3/8th-inch steelplate as part of the wall. They did box-car tests, wanting to identify the blastcharacteristics of projectiles stored lon-gitudinally on a boxcar. Results helpedthem advise how far from depot build-ings a loaded boxcar should be parkedto be safe. Later they sent up illuminat-ing star shells and white phosphorusprojectiles to find out how well theywould perform as a smoke screen.18

Perhaps the most spectacular tests werethe ones that blew up igloo-type maga-zines loaded with explosives. OnAugust 29, 1945, at 9:36 a.m. MountainTime, the Navy exploded 250,000pounds of TNT. After the atomic bombitself, this blast was said at the time tobe the next largest deliberate detonationever set. Seismologists, geologists,meteorologists, and ordnance depotrepresentatives from all over the coun-


1 4

Combining gun proofing and civilian habitat

sometimes presented special hazards.

try converged at the test site to observeand take measurements. The publicfound perches on East and Middlebuttes and along the highway. At Boise,two hundred miles away, a small groupclustered atop Table Rock Mesa east ofthe city to watch and listen. None weredisappointed. The blast produced a pur-ple-gray cloud a mile wide and morethan a mile high. It left a crater fifteenfeet deep. The group on Table RockMesa heard the report fifteen minutesafter the blast. None of the other igloosconstructed as close as two hundredfeet away ignited, but the windowsblew out of a test barracks erected ahalf mile away.19

Other experiments tested the perfor-mance of different kinds of projectiles,fuzes, and explosive loads. The engi-neers and chemists tested smokelesspowder and amitol charges, and testedfor fragmentation of projectiles. T h e ysought ways to store large quantities ofprojectiles—or redesign the projec-tiles—to prevent all of them from det-onating at once in case of an accidentaboard a ship or other place wherethey had to be stored “in intimate con-tact” with each other. Test by test, theyrefined their understanding of howexplosives might safely be stored andt r a n s p o r t e d .20

Although technicians tried to collectunexploded ordnance after each test,they often failed to find it all.Occasionally a projectile was “initiatedby desert heat,” as someone wrote in1949. “It is possible that some [unex-ploded projectiles] may be lying loosein the area.” To the cairns and dry irri-gation canals already in the landscape,the years of explosives experimenta-tion added huge craters, piles of shat-tered concrete and twisted metal, andbomb shells.21

After the American victory over Japan,naval vessels were quickly decommis-sioned. Coastal bases started shippingto Pocatello one trainload after anotherof guns, armor plate, gun housings, and“miscellaneous” materials for storage.Much of this material—nets, floats,anchors, mooring rings, buoys—wentto the Naval Proving Ground to awaitsandblasting and repainting.Experiments continued into 1947 and1948, but at a slower pace than beforeand no longer in association with thePocatello gun plant, which curtailed itsoperations in late 1949.22

Some of the later tests were classified.Project Elsie is thought to have testedthe performance of sixteen-inch shellsmade with depleted uranium. The pur-pose of Project Marsh is still generallyunknown. In 1947, the Naval ProvingGround was designated a depot forstockpiling surplus manganese for theUnited States Treasury—starting withnearly twenty-five tons. In 1948 therewere tests of influence fuzes and coun-termeasures for guided missiles.23


1 5

The Atomic Energy Commission adapted one of the

Navy’s ordnance storage bunkers as a laboratory for

calibrating dosimetry equipment.

One of ten craters in Mass Detonation Area, where

an igloo-type magazine containing up to 500,000

pounds of TNT was detonated in October 1946.

This 500-pound semi-armor-piercing bomb was

found near the Experimental Dairy Farm during the

ordnance cleanup of the 1990s.

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Rock Island District

INEEL Cultural Resources 4A-18



1 6

Ahuge chocolate colored cloud of dust, shaped like a

mushroom, followed by two muffled thuds, was what al a rge group of navy and army officials, scientists, pho-

tographers and others experienced Wednesday morningwhen a cache of 250,000 pounds of T N T were exploded onthe desert near the gunnery range. For several days all ofEastern Idaho excitedly awaited theblast, as this was the largest collec-tion of powder ever set off by man.

On the desert area about 10 mileseast of the gunnery range the navyhad constructed four igloos. Tw owere of a design approved by thearmy and two were of a navy design.They were in proximity of about 500yards. Each was built of reinforcedconcrete and stored 250 thousandpounds of powder. The one explodedwas the army type, and the purposeof the experiment was to determinethe strength of the igloos and how farthe earth would be shaken.Seismographs had been placed at var-ious places in the surrounding area,and a series of blast meters, likespokes in a wheel, extended from theigloo area to a distance of approxi-mately one-half mile.

Within close proximity of the blastedigloo were installed concrete shelterproofs for military photographers, andabout a quarter of a mile distant wasthe dug-out where the men who setoff the charge were housed. The dug-out was of reinforced concrete, and sandbags protected the entrance-way.

Promptly at 9:30 the signal to touch off the explosion wasradioed to the control dug-out and the first sight was a huge,billowing cloud of dust which resembled an enormous mush-room. In approximately 15 seconds the explosion washeard—two muffled reports. Capt. Walter Brown, comman-dant, was certain that the second blast heard was an echo.

The huge cloud of dust seemed tohover over the spot for about tenminutes and gradually moved west-ward toward the Arco community, asthe air currents destroyed the sym-metry of the cloud and it began toresemble a huge dust storm.

An inspection of the spot where theigloo stood showed a pit approxi-mately 15 feet deep which wasstrewn with large chunks of rein-forced concrete, steel and wire rein-forcing material. Most of the steelsurrounding the bombs of T N Tseemed to have been completelydestroyed, although small fragmentswere found a half mile distant.

H u g e P o w d e r B l a s t R o c k e d W i d e A r e afrom Arco Advertiser, August 31, 1945

Above. Cloud from one of the mass detonation

experiments. Middle. Largest of the craters in

Mass Detonation Area was later enlarged and

graded by IDO for use as a demolition range.

Photo circa 1995. Below. Ruptured and empty

cans of smokeless powder partially fill a crater.

Photo circa 1995.

Courtesy of Orville and Margaret Larsen



Although another war would bringl a rge Navy guns back to the oldProving Ground in the late 1960s, theNavy would no longer own the facili-t y. By that time, the original firingrange was dotted with laboratories andother buildings, so guns could nolonger be fired to the north and had tobe pointed south. A new federalagency had acquired the Navy’s desertproperty and was using this remoteregion of Idaho for an altogether dif-ferent kind of scientific “proofing.”


1 7

From 1968 to 1970, during the Vietnam War, the Navy test-fired sixteen-inch guns from the battleship USS

New Jersey. The firing point, named the Naval Ordnance Test Facility, was south of the Experimental Breeder

Reactor-I complex, and the target was the northern flank of Big Southern Butte. Sixteen-inch guns were the

only World War II-era naval weapons used during the Vietnam War. The Navy moved the old gantry crane

(photo left) from its original location and used it again to unload guns brought from Pocatello by rail. The

purpose in reworking the guns was to extend their range for use in clearing 200-yard-diameter landing zones

in the heavily canopied jungles of Vietnam.

INEEL 70-59

C H A P T E R T H R E E

Archaeologistsexcavated the Imperial Roman Villanear Naples in 1910. In a first-centuryA.D. mosaic mural, they found paleyellow-green glass containing one per-cent uranium. Roman artisans probablyused a uranium-bearing mineral inten-tionally to obtain the color. The tech-nique may then have been lost.1

Uranium, when it was discovered as anelement and named in 1789, had noknown use. Someone eventuallylearned—again—that it produced apleasant orange or yellow glazeon ceramic goods.Photographers used it totint photographs. Forsuch aesthetic uses, theworld required only afew hundred tons of orea year. Mines inBohemia, Portugal, andColorado supplied themodest demand. ThenHenri Becquerel discovered itsproperty of radioactivity. In 1898 MarieCurie, investigating further, discoveredradium in uranium ore and began toelucidate its decay products. Everythingchanged.

Uranium is dispersed widely over theearth; the soil in the average backyardhas 2.7 parts per million. It is morecommon than tin. But backyard concen-trations are hardly worth mining. Agood uranium mine might have 30,000parts of uranium per million, but abonanza-class uranium mine wouldhave 100,000 partsper million—tenpercent of theore.

Such a mine was discovered in Zaire(formerly, the Belgian Congo) about thetime that the world was learning thatradium might have wonderful curativeproperties. Because of its richly concen-trated ore, the Shinkolobwe mine pro-duced uranium far more cheaply thananywhere else. Other uranium minesclosed, and the Shinkolobwe satisfiedmost world demand until well afterWorld War II.2

The discovery of radioactivity was aprelude to other discoveries that led to a

new twentieth century mar-ket for uranium. First, the

world learned that atomsdefinitely are not the

smallest particles ofmatter—rather,

atoms are built ofelectrons, protons, and neu-

trons, with most of the weight in theprotons and neutrons.

Next, uranium, like most elements, hasmore than one isotope. Some atomscontain more neutrons than others andweigh slightly more. Uranium-235weighs less than uranium-238, forexample, and more than uranium-233.Although different isotopes act andreact the same way when combining

TH E URA N I U M TRA I L LEA DS T O ID A H OUranium: a heavy, slightly radioactive metallic element...

—Encyclopedia Britannica—

The Homer Laughlin Company, maker of Fiesta

Ware, used uranium to obtain the bright orange

glaze known as “Fiesta Red.” In 1943, the company

obtained a license from the Manhattan District and

used depleted uranium until 1972.

1 8

INEEL 99-320-1-8

The Trinity fireball, fifteen seconds after detonation on July 16, 1945, rises above the

New Mexico desert. The bomb was an implosion device using plutonium made

by the reactors at the Hanford Engineering Works. U.S. Department of Energy

chemically with other elements, theprotons and neutrons in their nuclei canbehave very differently upon being pro-voked in certain ways.

Scientists soon found that they couldstrip the electrons or neutrons from cer-tain atoms and bombard other elementswith them. In the 1930s they built great

machines—atom smashers—to find outwhat would happen when they firedstreams of neutrons into various ele-ments at high speeds.

Upon bombarding uranium with neu-trons moving at a certain speed, theyfound that some of the uranium atomsbreak apart (fission). The debris

arranges itself into pairs of elementswith roughly half the mass of uranium,such as (but not always) barium andkrypton. Energy is released in the formof two—sometimes three—neutrons,heat, and other leftover particles. Manyof the fission products are themselvesradioactive. Of all the uranium iso-topes, it appeared that only uranium-235 fissioned.

The ancient quest for some sorcery thatwould transmute one kind of matterinto another was over. Traditionally thequest had been to make gold. Perhapsironically, however, it turned out thatthe nuclear sorcerers could turn goldinto mercury, but couldn’t turn mercury(or lead) into gold.


2 0

After physicists had sorted out thekinds of particles that made up anatom, they learned that they could

separate electrons or neutrons or pro-tons from certain atoms. Then theyinvented ways to shoot the particles atsamples of other elements.

The faster a beam could travel, themore energy it had when it struck thetarget, and the more interesting theresults. Most of what we have learnedabout energy and matter in the twenti-eth century, we have learned by bom-barding samples of matter withatomic particles.

Particle accelerators, also called“atom smashers,” shoot streams ofelectrons, protons, deuterons, alphaparticles, or heavy ions at their tar-gets. The machines that create thesefast-moving streams rely on the appli-cation of an electric field, whicheither attracts or repels particles oflike charge.

Van de Graaff generators, cyclotrons,synchrotrons, and betatrons are typesof particle accelerators.

Nuclear reactors split atoms apart,producing streams of neutrons (andlarge amounts of heat). Targetsare placed inside thereactor close to theflow of neutrons.

The neutronwas discov-ered in the1930s, thelast of thetrio of elec-trons, protons,and neutrons tobe found out.Because it had no elec-tric charge, the neutron couldpenetrate the nucleus of atoms, some-thing other particle accelerators hadnot been able to do. The big surprisein the 1930s was to learn that shoot-ing a neutron at uranium-235 atomscaused them to split apart.

P l a y i n g M a r b l e s w i t h A t o m i c Pa r t i c l e s

The central portion of the atom depicts the nucleus,

consisting of protons and neutrons, which give the

atom most of its weight. Electrons orbit the nucleus

and are considered weightless.

With the discovery that a neutron couldsplit uranium and generate more neu-trons, a new demand for uranium wasinevitable. Provided that enough urani-um-235 is packaged in just the rightway, the liberated neutrons are likely tohit one or two other atoms and causethem to fission also. This was the phe-nomenon of the chain reaction. Fissionreleased an amount of energy far largerthan the energy obtained from chemicalreactions of the same mass. Scientistslearned that it is possible to create anenvironment in which to start such areaction, whereupon nature—andskilled operators—keep the reactiongoing.

In the late 1930s, events in Europewere pointing to a German war of con-quest. It required no great leap of imag-ination to realize that a chain reactioninitiated in a well-engineered containercould explode as a bomb. If chain reac-tions could be controlled, on the otherhand, they could produce electricity orhelp build canals and harbors.

Developing any of these ideas wouldrequire a great deal of uranium. One ofthe inconvenient things about naturaluranium is that 99.3 percent of it is ura-nium-238, an isotope that resists split-ting apart under neutron bombardment.For every 140 atoms of U-238, there isonly one atom of U-235.3

Early in 1939, scientists of the UnitedStates Naval Research Laboratory inWashington, D.C., met with scientistsfrom Columbia University and EnricoFermi, Nobel laureate nuclear physicist.They discussed how the heat of fissionmight produce steam for a turbine andpropel a ship or submarine. Navy scien-

C H A P T E R 3 • T H E U R A N I U M T R A I L L E A D S T O I D A H O

2 1

Above. In the 1950s, the AEC published films and

booklets to help American citizens understand

nuclear energy. Left. The USS Bang, a pre-nuclear

U.S. Navy submarine built in 1943, used diesel fuel

to generate electricity. When submerged, it ran on

battery power and had to surface every 48 hours.

Courtesy of Department of the Navy, Submarine Force Museum

tists Ross Gunn and Philip Abelsonconcluded that the Navy should pursuethe idea. The fission reaction needed nooxygen, which all other fuels need toburn. The benefit of such a fuel in asubmarine was obvious. The two real-ized that the lighter fissionable isotopeof uranium would have to be separatedfrom the heavier one in order to createa mass that would fit in a submarine—or a bomb—and begin a chain reaction.They considered how this might bedone.4

As Adolph Hitler’s war grew moremenacing in 1939, the scientists inAmerica who had fled Europe grewmore fearful that German scientistsmight produce an atomic bomb. AlbertEinstein wrote a letter to PresidentFranklin Roosevelt urging upon himthe importance of securing a supply ofuranium. “The United States has onlypoor ores of uranium in moderatequantities,” he wrote.

The government should secure a sup-ply of the ore for the United States. Hecontinued:

I understand that Germany has actual -ly stopped the sale of uranium from theCzechoslovakian mines which she hastaken over. That she should have takensuch early action might perhaps beunderstood on the ground that the sonof the German undersecretary of state,Von Weizsacker, is attached to theKaiser-Wilhelm-Institut in Berlin,where some of the American work onuranium is now being repeated.5

Roosevelt understood the threat andauthorized secret research work tobegin. By 1942, production seemed fea-

sible, and the job went to the U.S.Army, which created the ManhattanDistrict of its Corps of Engineers.General Leslie Groves took charge ofthe project and monopolized most ofthe uranium then in the United States.The Manhattan District bought 1,250tons of uranium ore from the Belgianowner of the Shinkolobwe mine for$1.60 a pound. As the war progressed,

Groves bought more, placing annualorders amounting to $200 million.Scientists Gunn and Abelson had nofurther access to uranium, so Navystudies of ship propulsion had to pausefor the duration of the war.6

The Manhattan Project was a success.Enrico Fermi and others built theworld’s first nuclear reactor in Chicago


2 2

No one took photographs when Enrico Fermi and the Met Lab brought Chicago Pile Number One (CP-1) to

criticality on December 2, 1942. Artist Gary Sheehan shows the cramped quarters in the squash court

underneath the stadium at the University of Chicago. Fermi and the others concentrate on instruments

indicating the increasing rate of neutron fission. Three young physicists stationed on the right were the “suicide

squad,” prepared to pour jugs of cadmium-sulfate, a neutron absorber, onto the pile and kill the chain reaction

if the control rods didn’t work for some reason. The person below the balcony is prepared to operate a control

rod by hand, another precaution. Some employees who participated in the creation of CP-1, not necessarily in

the painting, eventually moved to Idaho to become pioneers at the National Reactor Testing Station.

in December 1942. After that, anunprecedented collaboration of military,scientific, and corporate resources man-aged to build a weapon. A version ofthe Navy scientists’idea for separatingthe light from the heavy isotope of ura-nium was built at Oak Ridge,Tennessee. The technique produced thefew pounds of “enriched” uraniumneeded for one bomb.

Uranium had another useful quality. Ina chain reaction, it could manufactureanother fissionable element. Some ofthe liberated neutrons entered thenuclei of uranium-238, not splitting itbut eventually changing it into plutoni-um, a new element not found, it wasthought at the time, in nature. T h i splutonium activation product, uponbeing bombarded with neutrons,proved to be fissionable. Therefore, a

bomb might also be made with pluto-n i u m .

The government built huge “atomicpiles” (later called reactors) of ura-nium and graphite atHanford, Washington, tomanufacture plutoni-um. The procedurewas extremely cost-ly. Despite themassive size of theHanford reactors,their daily output ofplutonium was rarelyenough to fill a shotglass. Once plutoniumatoms had been created, theyhad to be separated from the uraniummatrix in which they had originated—and from the fission and other activa-tion products. Chemists devised waysto do this. The Manhattan District builttwo bomb designs, each using one ofthe two fuels. On July 16, 1945, theteam at Los Alamos, New Mexico, test-ed a plutonium device. On August 6and 9, 1945, respectively, the UnitedStates dropped Little Boy, a uranium-charged bomb on Hiroshima and FatMan, containing plutonium, onNagasaki. Hiroshima received thedestructive power equivalent to 12,500tons of TNT; Nagasaki, 22,000 tons.7

During the war and immediately after-ward, the assumption that uranium wasscarce continued to influence the waygovernments and scientists regarded it.The scarcity was felt to be so seriousthat General Groves, who continued toadminister the Manhattan District afterthe war, approved a proposal in 1946 tobuild a reactor that would help solvethe uranium shortage.8

The proposal came from Walter Zinn,one of the physicists who had beenwith Enrico Fermi in Chicago. TheManhattan District had organized a

“Metallurgical Laboratory”there, a name intended to

disguise its true pur-pose. After the war,

the governmentassignedweapons workto other labora-tories, and theMet Lab ceased

to exist. Its assetswere reorganized as

the Argonne NationalLaboratory with a mission

to develop reactors, supported byresearch in chemistry, physics, metal-lurgy, and other fields. Zinn became itsfirst director.9

Zinn could see that the nation’s firstpriority for uranium would continue tobe for weapons. Any use of it for otherpurposes would have to promotedefense goals or make extremely effi-cient use of uranium. He proposedtherefore to design and build atArgonne an experiment to prove that areactor could generate electricity andmanufacture plutonium at the sametime.

It was an astonishing idea. The reactorwould be built so that the non-fission-ing U-238 would be tucked in close tofissioning U-235 fuel rods and also sur-round them like a blanket. During thechain reaction, one liberated neutronwould keep the chain reaction goingand another one or two would hit theU-238 and create new atoms of plutoni-um fuel. It would solve the scarcity of


2 3

Chicago Historical Society P&S-1964.0521

uranium, because now the abundantnon-fissioning isotope could becomefuel. More profoundly, it would providea revolutionary abundance of energy ina world constantly craving more. That afuel could replace itself in the veryprocess of consuming itself, perhaps“breed” even more than the originalamount, was a fabulous possibility.

General Groves approved Zinn’s pro-posal, observing that independentreviewers would have to agree the reac-tor could safely operate near Chicago.As it turned out, the decision would notbe Groves’ to make, and Zinn’s idea—along with many others—had to wait afew years while Congress rearrangedthe nuclear enterprise as a peace-timeinstitution. Those years brought a morepessimistic outlook for world peace andmany other changes, but none of themchallenged Zinn’s logic. Uraniumremained costly, and the breeder projectremained high on any list of proposedexperiments.10

Congress passed the Atomic EnergyAct in August 1946. The governmentcontinued to monopolize uranium andplutonium. The military handed controlof atomic weapons factories and labora-tories to a new civilian agency, theAtomic Energy Commission (AEC),headed by five commissioners.Advisory committees assured that themilitary would influence the distribu-tion of uranium for defense purposes—and help decide on the allocation ofresources for defense research.


2 4

M a k i n g E n r i c h e d U r a n i u m

Throughout the Cold War, gaseous diffusion was areliable way to make enriched uranium. The firststep was to change the solid urani-

um oxide into a gas called uraniumhexafluoride. The gas was then circu-lated thousands of times through finefilters with tiny openings. The lighterU-235 atoms passed through the fil-ters slightly more easily than U-238.

Gradually the percentage of U-235 inthe gas increased, and it was said tobe “enriched.” The gas was then con-verted back to a solid form andshaped into rods or pellets. Thesewere placed in tubes made of alu-minum, zirconium, or stainless steel.These cladding metals do not inter-fere with the passage of neutrons, butthey do protect the uranium from airand water corrosion and provide apath for the heat to leave the fuel.

Depending on its intended use, urani-um can be enriched to any percentagedesired. The uranium in bombs is onehundred percent enriched. Test reac-tors, which require a rich flow ofneutrons, need uranium enriched up to ninety-five per-cent. Uranium in commercial power reactors is typical-ly two percent to four percent enriched.

Above. Worker holding

simulated nuclear fuel

pellets. Below. Exterior of

the Gaseous Diffusion

Plant in Oak Ridge,

Tennessee.

U.S Department of Energy 094 054 001

Oak Ridge National Laborator y

The Act created a special committee inCongress called the Joint Committee onAtomic Energy (JCAE) to prepare bud-gets and approve AEC policy direc-tions. The committee was unique.House and Senate members typicallycreated committees as convenient waysto divide their work; this one was man-dated by law. Nine members from eachchamber sat on the JCAE, concentrat-ing a great deal of authority amongvery few legislators.11

In due course, the new commissionerstook their seats, hired their staff, anddecided on a plan of action.Everyone—President Harry S. Truman,the scientists who had developed thebombs, and the corporations that hadhelped build them—desired to developpeaceful uses of nuclear energy.Congress hoped thatresearch and develop-ment would eventuallyshow that a civiliannuclear power industrycould generate electri-cal power economical-ly enough to competewith coal and gasfuels.12

But such peaceablesentiments were not todominate the earlyyears of the A E C .Instead, the UnitedStates and the Union of SovietSocialist Republics (USSR), allies inWorld War II, became antagonists in atense ideological and geo-political con-flict that came to be called the ColdWa r. One of its major battlegrounds

was nuclear weapons technology. T h etwo nations raced to be first to possessand command the most destructivepossible power against the other.1 3

When David Lilienthal became the firstAEC chairman, he learned how littledestructive atomic power the UnitedStates actually possessed. The world,including President Truman, assumedthat the nation had a sizeable stockpileof atomic bombs. But on April 3, 1947,it was Lilienthal’s duty to tell the presi-dent that the United States had exactlyzero atomic bombs ready for use andthat it would be several months beforethat number could improve. Not sur-prisingly, the production of bombsbecame the AEC’s most urgentpriority.14

The U.S. Air Force became interestedin uranium. Colonel Donald J. Keirn, avisionary in the field of jet aircraftpropulsion, realized that if nuclearpower could be linked with jet enginetechnology, the country would have anunparalleled offensive weapon.Uranium fuel would occupy less spacein an airplane than a baseball. A poundof enriched uranium could replace theenergy in 1.7 million pounds of stan-dard chemical fuel. A nuclear-poweredairplane could stay aloft for days at atime, ending flight-distance limits. In1945 J. Carlton Ward, Jr., president ofFairchild Engine and AirplaneCorporation, told a senate committeethat the range of an atomic plane wouldbe limited only by its ability to carryenough “sandwiches and coffee for thecrew.” It could deliver bombs anywhere

in the world, approacha target from anydirection, and neverhave to rely on a refu-eling base outside theUnited States. Abomber combining jetspeed with long rangewould be a usefulweapon indeed.15

The U.S. Army wassimilarly tantalized bythe idea that a handfulof fuel could end thelogistical headache of

transporting fuel to remote locations.Perhaps nuclear power plants could bemobile, able to travel with a field hos-pital or command center. If so, a powerplant could be mounted on a barge andtowed from one port to another,


President Harry S. Truman appointed the first five

AEC commissioners. From left to right, William W.

Waymack, Lewis Strauss, Chairman David E.

Lilienthal, Robert F. Bacher, and Sumner T. Pike.

2 5

U.S. Department of Energy

supplying emergency electrical powerto on-shore operations after earthquakesor other disasters. Reactors could besmall, medium, or large, depending onthe need. Perhaps they could be loadedinto trucks or airplanes and thenreassembled in the Arctic or in adesert.16

The Navy andthe Air Forcewere first tomobilize theirinterests. Theyasserted them-selves as theAEC struggled toget organized.The growing fearof communismcontributed totheir causes. Butbefore the AECcould applynuclear energy tothe goals ofeither service, ithad to accom-plish a hugebacklog of pre-liminaryresearch.

The central fact was that the scientistshad produced only a bomb, a suddenexplosion finished in seconds. Makingelectricity had little in common withmaking bombs. Could a reactor be reli-ably controlled for long periods oftime? What metals and materials couldwithstand the corrosive forces of heatand radiation for long periods of time?What form should uranium fuel take?What was the best way to carry heat

away from the reactor? Could powerplants be safe enough to operate nearpopulated areas? Could uranium pro-duce electricity cheaper than coal ornatural gas? In sum, the science ofnuclear reactors had to be developednearly from scratch.

The new AEC began to set priorities forexperimental reactors and assign pro-jects to its laboratories. These tasksconfounded the commissioners formore than two years. They seemedunable to settle on a program. Finally,the AEC’s Reactor SafeguardsCommittee advised that, for safety rea-

sons, the AEC shouldbuild proposed reac-tor experiments at aremote location, notat any existing labo-ratory. Nuclearresearch would bringwith it nuclear wasteand chemical pro-cessing, neither ofwhich were suitableby-products forheavily populatedareas. Most impor-tantly, if an accidentwere to occur, itshould not endangerlarge numbers ofpeople. Walter Zinnhimself agreed withthis:

I am inclined to theopinion that for a

nation with the land space of ours andwith the financial resources of ours,adopting a very conservative attitudeon safety is not an unnecessary luxury.17

Or, as AEC Commissioner Sumner Pikeput it, “We didn’t want to put work likethis next to a high school.” The deci-sion to build a “testing station” forreactors seemed to liberate the AEC,unsticking it from a two-year habit oftalk and no firm decisions. In January1949 the commissioners created a


2 6

Once the announcement was made that the atomic

reactor station would be in Idaho, the AEC had to

decide where to locate its headquarters.

Division of Reactor Development andhired Lawrence R. Hafstad to be itsdirector. Lilienthal gave him his firstassignment: recommend a site for thetesting station.18

The site had to meet safety criteria.Fewer than 10,000 people should residein the nearby area. No other nationaldefense sites should be in the vicinity.The AEC must have complete controlof the property. Fuel, water, and electri-cal power should be plentiful. Weatherand geological conditions should pre-vent contamination of lakes and water-ways. Earthquake-prone sites wereout.19

By the time Hafstad was on board, alist of some twenty sites had shrunk totwo candidates: Ft. Peck, Montana, andthe Naval Proving Ground in southeastIdaho. Sentiment seemed to favor Ft.Peck. By this time, frustration overinaction was palpable. Still, the AECpaused and asked an engineering firmfrom Detroit to compare the virtues ofthe two sites.20

The Detroit firm quickly rounded up animpressive array of facts on climate,geology, labor, land, and constructionmaterials. They evaluated rail and high-way connections and assessed thesocio-economic characteristics of near-by towns. The analysts even took thetrouble to ask the commanding officerat the Naval Proving Ground if therewas much fog at the site during thewinter.

With all the data gathered, the bottomline was that the Montana site wouldcost the AEC $50 million more than ifit built in Idaho. After that, annualoperating expenditures in Montanawould cost a significant premium.Furthermore, the Idaho location had afar superior socio-economic profile;nearby towns could provide a betterbase to absorb new population.21

The AEC decided on the Idaho site onFebruary 18, 1949, and called it theNational Reactor Testing Station(NRTS). The local press called it the“atom plant.” Lewis Strauss, one of thecommissioners, had old friends at theNavy’s Bureau of Ordnance and feltthat the Navy would surrender itsinvestment peacefully. He was mistak-en; the Navy resisted. It demanded thatthe AEC support a congressional autho-rization for funds the Navy could useelsewhere.22

Despite the secrecy of AEC delibera-tions, Montana and Idaho interests bothknew that their territory was in the run-ning for something big. The Idaho Fallsand Pocatello chambers of commercehad retained former senator D. WorthClark and his law partner ThomasCorcoran to represent them inWashington and find out if any influ-ence could be exerted, and if so, how.The Montana congressional delegationhad been aware of the early tilt towardFt. Peck and thought the deal was set.Suddenly news leaked out that Idahowas the “top favorite.”23

Upon the uproar that arose whenMontana discovered its loss, ChairmanLilienthal tried to quiet the ruckus byexplaining the decision to MontanaGovernor John Bonner and making theannouncement public, which he did onMarch 22. Montana kicked for anothertwo months, appealing fruitlessly toPresident Truman and to the JCAE athearings in April and May.24

On April 4, the AEC named Leonard E.Johnston as the man to open and man-age an AEC field office near the testingstation. His mission was to adapt theNaval Proving Ground for scientificexperiments involving nuclear reactorsand using uranium.25


2 7

C H A P T E R F O U R

2 8

It must be at leasthumorous, if not pathetic, to the engi-neers in charge...to observe so muchfalderol,” wrote the editor of the ArcoAdvertiser. His scorn wasaimed at the Idaho FallsChamber of Commerce,which had created a presump-tuous new letterhead for itsstationery. A map of the stateshowed Idaho Falls, designatedwith a heart, as the only city inthe region and named “TheAtomic City.” The town wasgoing too far in its campaign toheadquarter the AEC’s newatom plant. The AEC could notpossibly be influenced, the edi-tor felt, “by the bowing andscraping of two-bit bigwigs inany of the prospective towns ofthe area.”1

If Leonard E. Johnston, the chiefengineer-in-charge, felt eitheramusement or pathos as he sur-veyed the towns of southeastIdaho, he never revealed it. He wassupremely a diplomat, and this qualitywas to serve him often in the next fiveyears. He had to invent a reactor testing

station—an entirely new concept in thehistory of the world—out of nearlynothing. Soon construction workerswould be flooding into the desert by thethousands and looking for places to

live. The Manhattan Project had builtgovernment towns at its isolatednuclear sites, but this time the AECplanned to let the private market pro-vide housing. Johnston needed all the

nearby towns as allies.2

He and five AEC colleagues arrivedin Idaho in mid-April. They had alot of exploring to do. Besides sur-veying their hoped-for inheritancefrom the Navy, they had to figureout where they were going tohouse people—and where theywould settle their own IdahoOperations field office, officiallyabbreviated as IDO.3

Leonard Johnston, born in SouthDakota in 1911, cared little forhis given name and liked to becalled Bill, after his father. Hewas a visionary and completelyunflappable, intense withoutbeing provocative. He had beenassociated with very large pro-jects for most of his career. Hehad worked on the U.S. ArmyCorps of Engineers’ Ft. Peck

Dam in Montana during the 1930s,eventually becoming executive officerof the Corps’ Ft. Peck District. Duringthe war, the Corps sent him to Oak

TH E PA R TY PL A NThere is nothing to get excited about.

—J.S. Gardner, Blackfoot legislator—

Bill Johnston, his wife, and their two children along

with the children of Arco’s Mayor Winfield Marvel.

E.F. McDermott, Mayor Tom Sutton and Bill Holden (left to right) congratulated each other after the AEC

chose Idaho Falls as the headquarters for the NRTS.Courtesy of the William Holden Family

Ridge, Tennessee, where he was assis-tant unit chief of the Gaseous DiffusionPlant K-25, a giant facility of over twomillion square feet. Later, he becamedeputy director of operations for theManhattan District. In 1946, as a civil-ian, he opened up and managed the newSchenectady Operations office for theAEC in New York, the site of theKnolls Atomic Power Laboratory(KAPL), an experience that proved,among other things, that he could sur-vive face-to-face contact with theNavy’s formidable Captain HymanRickover. As an ex-military employeeof the Manhattan Project, Johnston wastypical of the executives in the manage-rial ranks of the AEC.4

As soon as he was named, Johnstonbecame the focus of great interest fromthe communities of southeast Idaho. Allof them were wide open to the opportu-

nities about to come their way. Likemany regions of the American West,the history of the area was a tale ofeconomic booms brought about by out-side investment in mining, railroads, orirrigation. It had been some time sincethe last good boom in southeast Idaho,but no one had forgotten how to hustle.

Johnston toured the towns east, west,and south of the site. Community lead-ers everywhere welcomed him withgratifying enthusiasm. If warmth andgood will could build houses, the gov-ernment would have no trouble at all.The business people in the region hadplenty of energy and ambition.5

The town of Arco flung itself into a fes-tive celebration only hours after itheard that the AEC had selected the“Arco site.” State Senator E.J. Soelbergdeployed the Arco High School band

for a torchlight parade down the mainstreet of the town. En masse, the citi-zens had themselves a dance in therecreation hall. Someone had calculatedthat the $500 million that the AEC saidit would spend on the site was greaterthan the assessed valuation of the entirestate of Idaho. Arco saw the AEC pro-ject as a boom to outclass all otherbooms. Being the town closest to thesite, it felt sure that good fortune wason the way. No longer would the IdahoState Encyclopedia say of Arco: “Pointsof Interest—There are none of note inthe town.”6

Arco had fewer assets than Idaho Fallsbut nevertheless felt that it could reme-dy its deficiencies. Arco mayorWinfield Marvel and others flew toHanford to look around and solicitadvice. Soelberg went to the state capi-tol at Boise to meet with Governor


3 0

Courtesy of the Winfield Marvel Family

Above. Torchlight parade in Arco. Left. Arco and

Butte County leaders undertook a comprehensive

planning process to prepare for growth.

Courtesy of the Ada Marcia Porter Family

C.A. Robins and the state’s Director ofAeronautics, Chet Moulton, to discussairport development. Later Arco wel-comed an urban planner from theFederal Housing Administration to helpprepare a comprehensive land use andutility expansion plan. Despite thesmall size of the town (548 inhabitants,according to the AEC’s Detroit consul-tant), its citizens were ready for action.They started swapping real estate andexpanding their businesses within daysof the announcement.7

The leaders of the Idaho Falls Chamberof Commerce, particularly Bill Holden,an attorney, and E.F. McDermott, thepublisher of the Idaho Falls Post-Register, were equally quick to react,but not by dancing. They started orga-nizing themselves and their regionalallies. Making the most of the prizedopportunity at hand was going to

require careful attention to detail. Theyknew that it would “probably takesuper-human efforts on the part ofeveryone to digest this large assignmentwhich has been served to us.” Theyfocused quickly on the target of landingthe operations field office in IdahoFalls. One of the barriers to that goalwas the unhappy fact that no properroad connected Idaho Falls to the Site.8

The chamber organized a specialAtomic Energy Plant Committee con-sisting of sixteen past chamber presi-dents “to work with and for the orderlyand complete integration of our com-munity in the overall development.”Within days of the AEC announcement,

C H A P T E R 4 • T H E P A R T Y P L A N

3 1

Mayor Winfield Marvel on his way to Hanford,

Washington, to learn what Arco might expect with

the NRTS as a neighbor.

The Idaho Falls plan to win the IDO took shape

early. Delbert Groberg, a past president of the Idaho

Falls Chamber of Commerce, offered his advice for

attracting the AEC to Idaho Falls.

Idaho Falls sent a delegation from thetowns north of Idaho Falls to meetwith the governor. These towns wereon the route between Idaho Falls andthe west entry to Yellowstone NationalPark. They had for some time desired adirect highway connection to Arco,and this obviously was the time torenew the campaign. Urgent and unan-imous, the towns petitioned Robins toenlist the State Highway Departmentin the task of building the new road.9

The town of Blackfoot was only thirty-six miles from the site—and connectedto it by a paved, albeit primitive, road.With a population of 5,500, the agri-cultural center also was home to theIdaho State Hospital South, originallynamed the Blackfoot Asylum for theInsane, and thus had a good-sizedcommercial center.

Pocatello was larger than Idaho Falls’19,000 people by a few thousand, andwas home to the growing Idaho StateCollege. The Naval Ordnance Plantcomplex included office space, transferwarehouses, and other facilities thatcould serve the IDO immediatelydespite being sixty-five miles from thetesting station. The town leaders wel-comed the prospect.

So the four contenders for the IDO’shome town were Arco, Idaho Falls,Blackfoot, and Pocatello. The winnercould look forward to a multitude ofcommercial opportunities, not to men-tion heightened prestige and a generalboost in the cultural evolution of thetown. The AEC officially activated theIDO on April 4, but it was up toJohnston to choose its permanent home.

By the time Johnston arrived for hisfirst visit, competition among the fourcities already was getting rough. OnApril 6 the mayors and newspaper pub-lishers of the four towns met togetherto “overcome the selfishness whichseems to abound in all our communi-ties.” Together they sent a telegram toJohnston to say they had all united towork with him on the project he was tosupervise. It would help, they said, if hecould tell them what to expect. An AECnews release followed, indicating thatin all of 1949, only fifty people wereexpected to arrive for work. Growthwould be gradual and there was time toget organized. Once more, a delegationwent off to Boise for another planningsession with the governor.10

Despite the official declaration ofamity, each town did its best to win theheadquarters. As Johnston and his smallentourage made their first round of vis-its during the week of April 18 (begin-

ning respectfully with GovernorRobins), the towns prepared to maketheir welcomes and their first impres-sions.11

Arco took the approach that its proxim-ity to the site was so self-evident thatthe plum would have to fall on its sideof the fence. The committee rounded upold college friends of Johnston whohappened to live in Arco and deployedthe town’s most distinguished citizens,Idaho’s former governor Clarence A.Bottolfson and his wife, Elizabeth.They prepared an evening’s dinner andthe next day a cordial breakfast gather-ing for the visitors. 12

The Idaho Falls Chamber busied itselfcreating happy memories and magicalillusions for the visitors. Some called it“the party plan,” as it included roundsof luncheons, cocktail parties, dinners,and tours showing the sunniest andmost appealing features of the city.


Future site of the NRTS is imposed

on map showing towns and state

highways in 1949.

3 2

Guest lists were carefully crafted toinclude the young wives in town whowere “as winsome as possible.” Thevisitors were shown the site of the newcivic auditorium, where 2,500 peoplecould be seated. The high school artteacher, a talented artist and the nucleusof a group of mature artists, organizedan art exhibit, to which the guests wereadroitly exposed. “Yes, we absolutelycan and will build new houses fast,”was the consistent message. The menfrom the AEC heard good things aboutthe schools, saw the city’s parks, andhad a look at the spectacular

Yellowstone country just up the road.In Idaho Falls, AEC scientists wouldnot be destitute denizens of a culturaldesert, but would be eagerly embracedby a friendly and hospitable town witheverything going for it. 13

Idaho Falls’most important illusionconcerned the existence of a road to theProving Ground. To weave that magic,the chamber arranged for BonnevilleCounty road grading vehicles to go tothe western edge of town where theymoved sufficient dirt around to give aconvincing impression that the road to

Arco already was under construction, atleast to the county line. Activity wasparticularly heavy on the day that thevisitors were brought to see for them-selves. The road seemed, for all practi-cal purposes, a fait accompli. Holden’sorchestration was so thorough thatsome of the vehicles appeared to beregular daily traffic already using theroad for routine business. 14

Blackfoot’s Chamber of Commerceheld a public meeting (which was cov-ered thoroughly by a reporter from theIdaho Falls paper) more to persuade thepopulace that little further needed to bedone than to rouse them to action.“There was no dither,” said the reporterof the meeting. Blackfoot felt confidentthat its sewer and water planning,which pre-dated the AEC announce-ment, and a school system with acapacity for three hundred more chil-dren meant that it already was preparedfor growth. But the road to the site wasits ace in the hole. It would take IdahoFalls and the state too much time tobuild a new road to the site. Pocatellotoo would require a more direct road,and it would have to bridge the wideSnake River, another project that wouldtake too much time and money before itcould meet AEC needs. Therefore, theBlackfoot chamber concluded,“Blackfoot, willy nilly, looked like theport of entry.”15


3 3

Street map of Idaho Falls circa 1949.

At Pocatello, the obvious attractions,aside from its size, were the facilities ofthe Naval Ordnance Plant and the col-lege. The Pocatello leadership, however,was reluctant to make any guaranteesabout housing or expanding urbaninfrastructure for the rapid populationgrowth sure to come. And, it was said,Pocatello parties tended to excludewomen and were, as a result, “ratherstiff” affairs.16

The AEC must have noticed a missingairport in Blackfoot, a too-small hospitalunder construction, and too few businessservices in the little town. A r c o ’s whole-hearted commitment and desire, with itsrational approach to sound planning,

could not overcome its smallsize, even with the state’spledge to finance a small

airport. From Pocatello,the AEC could not detect

the commitments itwould need.

The party plan worked, or at least it didnot fail. On May 18, 1949, after cir-cumspect deliberations, Johnstonannounced that the field office wouldlocate in Idaho Falls, leasing officespace at the Rogers Hotel downtown. A new road to the site would improvetravel time, and construction workerscould live conveniently at Arco andBlackfoot. Rail connections would behandled from Pocatello.17

The craftsmanlike execution of a cleverstrategy in Idaho Falls contrastedsharply with the serene, perhaps passive,attitude at Idaho’s Statehouse. ChairmanLilienthal also had been one of Robins’mid-April visitors. Writing of theencounter in his journal, Lilienthal saidRobins impressed him as a “relaxed,easy-going kind of man.” The governorhad refused to send Idaho promoters toWashington to pressure the AEC. Hed i d n ’t believe the AEC would decideanything on the basis of politics, and he

was baffled as to why theMontana delegation,

which at thatm o m e n t

was “trying to raise enough Ned” to getthe testing site relocated to Ft. Peck,c o u l d n ’t see that. Montana’s governorhad even telephoned Robins to ask himwhat Idaho’s angle had been. Then herefused to believe Robins’denial thatthere had been any angle at all.1 8

With no evidence to the contrary, theAEC had every reason to believe that itcould continue its tradition of indepen-dent operations in Idaho. No oppositionappeared anywhere. The government’shabit of secrecy in atomic matters hadoriginated during a patriotic war. Withthe growing threat of a communistenemy, secrecy would have to continue.Johnston told one of the Rotary clubs inAugust that employees “must at alltimes be checked and double-checkedon our loyalty standing.” Citizensseemed content to accept details aboutthe testing station whenever Johnstonfelt free to provide them.19

Scientists had produced the awesomebombs that ended the war, and theyenjoyed an image as being far above thedaily play of political persuasion—atleast in southeast Idaho. Bill Johnston’sconduct did nothing to dispel that notion.People instinctively trusted him as soonas they met him. He didn’t fit the stereo-type of an engineer with a single-facetedp e r s o n a l i t y. He was stylish in dress—even the frames around his eyeglasseswere au courant. He and his equallypopular wife Helene enjoyed entertainingIdaho Falls associates and the manypolitical and industrial visitors who camethrough the city. His friendly and candid


3 4

This logo appeared on the cover of the Idaho Falls

Chamber of Commerce’s 1949 Annual Report.

m a n n e r, easy sense of humor, and theabsence of anything officious about himall went a long way to creating a promis-ing start for the AEC in Idaho Falls. Hefelt that IDO employees should becomepart of the fabric of town life, so he setthat example and encouraged it ino t h e r s .2 0

Leaders in Idaho Falls, for their part,turned from parties to the soberingduties of development. The editor ofthe Post-Register wrote:

But once the flush of excitement hasgiven way to sane analysis it becomesi n c reasingly apparent that the first phaseof the program was by all odds the easi -est. Now that we have the headquart e r sof this mammoth project located here wea re confronted with the greatest civicp roject that we have undertaken. Tohouse all the people who are bound tocome here to live, to see that our schoolfacilities are quickly expanded, thatwater and sewer lines are extended intonew areas, that sidewalks and roads arebuilt... The city—and in fact, this entirea rea—is on the threshold of its gre a t e s tera of development.2 1

It was clear that Idaho Falls and theother nearby towns viewed the AEC asthe region’s next source of growth. Infact, Idaho Falls delivered on its promis-es, building 1,648 new houses between1949 and 1951. With this beginning,town leaders hoped that the momentumwould carry farther than previous boomsthat had gone bust, and they were eagerto nurture this promising sprout in theirmidst. Besides, developing atomicpower for peaceful uses was a worthyadventure for patriotic citizens.2 2


3 5

H i r i n g O n a t t h e N R T S

In 1949 the Navy put its civilian employees on notice that the AEC was comingand that they would lose their ordnance jobs. One of them was Al Anselmo.

Around September 1949, the [Ordnance Plant] boss asked if I had a job yet. Isaid, “No.” He had met a man named A.R. Tuttle, who worked with the AEC.“They are taking over the Site soon and they have problems because they willbe shipping things into the Site right away. I volunteered you.”

Tuttle rode with me a few times out to the Site. One time I asked him if hewould need a traffic manager or warehouse manager. “I can’t talk to you. Youhave to have Q clearance,” he said, and he handed me some forms. By thetime the job opened, the paperwork was done. I started on October 10, 1949.

At first we had no badges. Then they issued badges numbered 1 to 99 for theIdaho Falls employees. Numbers 100 and up were for the Site employees.Mine was 100.

After I was hired, I said to Tuttle, “I don’t have a job title.” He told me I hadsix jobs—property management, surplus, excessing, warehouse, traffic, andreceiving. He said when I got too busy to do them all, I should let him knowso we could hire people to do them, and to keep the one I wanted. So I kepttraffic and receiving and assisted him in hiring the rest.

The first time I had to deal with a shipment of radioactive materials, I wasscared—not of the stuff, but of violating the regulations unintentionally. Eventhen, there were lots of regulations. In those days, the AEC sent securityescorts with the truckdrivers. We shipped stuff all over the United States—toChicago, New York, Oak Ridge, Hanford.

As the years went on—especially during the ten years we shipped Three MileIsland debris to Idaho—I developed contacts in the governor’s office of eachstate our shipments went through. I had good rapport with all of them. Wetrained the various state police departments in how to handle an accident ifthere were any.

Al Anselmo

C H A P T E R F I V E

3 6

Settling into thefourth floor of the Rogers Hotel on July16, 1949, the IDO staff, now grown totwenty-five members, suddenly foundthemselves needing to execute somesort of “party plan” of their own. Theyhad to reassure a number of eastern vis-itors with second thoughts about Idaho.A rumor had surfaced in Oak Ridge that“bubbles in the lava beds” made itunsound for the reactor building’s foun-dation. John Huffman, one of the OakRidge scientists responsible for one ofthe proposed reactors, came to have alook. The Idaho group took him to thereactor site, where a careful examina-tion alleviated his concerns. They alsomade sure he understood the nature ofthe superb fishing country just up theroad past Arco, a trick they may havelearned from the Idaho Falls Chamberof Commerce.1

Aside from bursting bubble rumors,Johnston had to deal with waves ofdoubt coming from AEC Headquartersin Washington. Despite the AEC’sapparently irrevocable decision inFebruary, resistance to the idea of atesting station was growing: it wouldcost too much money, the Navy wantedto keep its property, the estimates of

safety hazards were overblown and atesting site really wasn’t needed.Scientists continued to propose thatreactors be built at their Argonne orOak Ridge labs.2

Worse, a turf war had erupted. Wa l t e rZinn learned that Hafstad intended forJohnston and other AEC field managersto wield a controlling amount of authori-t y. They would select the contractors todesign and build the reactors, therebyretaining direct AEC control over reactorresearch. Zinn cared little for this idea.Not one to say diplomatically what he

could say bluntly, he wrote Hafstad, “Ibelieve it would be unsatisfactory to askunqualified people to take responsibilityfor approvals.” In the ensuing tussle,Zinn threatened to withdraw the breederr e a c t o r, but Hafstad made compromisesfavoring A rg o n n e ’s choice of contractorsand calmed the waters.3

Zinn vs. AEC Managers was only thefirst eruption to set the ideals of scien-tists at odds with the ideals of adminis-trators at the NRTS. Scientists thoughtadministrators had little appreciation forscientific sensibilities or the creativeprocess; managers thought scientists hadno public relations moxie and an insuff i-cient devotion to budgets and schedules.

The conflict played out strictly withinthe AEC family, but it delayed firm deci-sions about the Idaho reactor program. Ithad seemed in April that three reactorswere slated for the proving ground, butin June the number was up in the airagain. With Washington in a shuff l e ,Johnston used his podium time beforeRotary clubs and other local groups toprovide general updates on the purposeof the Site, but couldn’t announce a con-struction start on the first project untilS e p t e m b e r. Eventually, the hash andrehash in Washington at last dissolvedinto decisions to build four major pro-

IN V E N T I N G T H E TE S T I N G ST A T I O NThe desert is starting to show some small signs of activity.

—Bill Johnston, July 1949—

Leonard “Bill” Johnston

Courtesy of the Winfield Marvel Family

The excavation for EBR-I began in 1949.INEEL 225

jects: Zinn’s Experimental BreederReactor (EBR, later called EBR-I), theMaterials Testing Reactor (MTR), theIdaho Chemical Processing Plant (ICPP,or Chem Plant), and the SubmarineThermal Reactor (STR, later namedS 1 W ) .4

Johnston pressed forward, even thoughthe Navy continued to occupy the sitethrough most of 1949. The NavalProving Ground families graduallymoved away, but the last one didn’tleave until the night before the Navy’slast official day of possession onDecember 1, 1949. Johnston carried onas though the testing station were agoing concern. He moved his staff intothe Rogers Hotel and moved his familyto Idaho Falls from Schenectady.5

Johnston’s effort to secure a dependablesupply of electricity brought him intothe middle of a regional strugglebetween public and private suppliers ofpower. The Idaho Power Company waswilling to cooperate only if the AECpaid for every bit of the investment andguaranteed a ten-year contract. Thecompany feared that the BonnevillePower Administration (BPA) would stepin and offer public power at cheaperrates, wiping out Idaho Power invest-ments. The negotiation, which alsoincluded Utah Power and Light(UP&L), extended well into 1950.Before it was over, Johnston’s andAEC’s legal counsel, Bigelow Boysen,went so far as to prepare a case againstthe two private companies condemningall or part of each company’s properties.


3 8

In the early years, the fourth floor ofthe Rogers Hotel provided an unusu-al environment for an office. The

available rooms were generally smallwith an adjoining bathroom. The toi-lets were of the noisier power-flushrather than the gravity type. This madefor embarrassing incidents, such aswhen you were on a long distance calland the unknowing caller would com-ment about the sound of a flushingtoilet. In the summer when windowsand doors were open you could heareven more flushing sounds fromadjoining rooms, across the hallway,and across the narrow break betweenbuilding sections.

Since filing space was at a premium,the secretaries put file cabinets andboxes in the bathtubs, which some-

times produced complicated trafficproblems. Sometimes you’d have togo, and you’d find blueprints andplans spread out all over the fixtures.Window screens weren’t tight, and thesecretaries didn’t appreciate the deadflies that greeted them in the tub everymorning. The downtown eateries wereoverwhelmed at lunch hour, so manyemployees brought lunches, and thatcertainly helped attract the flies.

Air conditioning was very limited, sothe major saving feature of the placeduring the very hot days of summerwas the existence of the White HorseBar in the lower level of the hotel,where a cool beer was always avail-able at the end of a long hard day.

Anonymous

A M e m o i r o f t h e R o g e r s H o t e l

INEEL 0133

Drill rig crew takes core sample from spillway on an

old irrigation canal.

But before the AEC carried out thatunfriendly step, it compromised by pay-ing for new transmission lines andcapitulating to a ten-year contract.6

Finding satisfactory reactor sites wasthe immediate priority. Each wouldneed water, electricity, access, andsecurity. As many as ten reactors mightbe built eventually. Although the desertseemed vast, the reactors couldn’t gojust anywhere. Above all else, reactorbuildings would be dense and weighty.Each needed a rock-solid earthquake-proof foundation for reinforced con-crete basements, lead and concreteshields, and heavy steel frames. Someof the desert’s windblown soils layrather thinly on the lava rock, and noone wanted to spend a lot of moneyblasting basalt.7

The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers senttwo core drilling crews to Idaho, onefrom each of its Sacramento and Wa l l aWalla district offices. The Navy had notneeded to explore below the surface atthe proving ground, so it was unchartedt e r r i t o r y. Core samples revealed thedepth of the soils overlying the lava rockand profiled the alternating layers of sed-iments, basalt, and water-bearing gravels.The crews also evaluated spillway andbridge structures already on the Site.8

When they tested the land east of theBig Lost River, the drillers discoveredthat the depth to bedrock was greatestnear the creekbed and diminished withdistance. Therefore, once the architectshad decided on the desired depth of abasement, they could put the buildingwhere the depth of overlying gravelsmatched the basement depth, minimiz-ing the blasting of lava rock. The civil

engineers bragged for years about howthis procedure had helped to savemoney. Other areas proved suitable aswell, including one near the placewhere the new highway from IdahoFalls was expected to intersect with theroad from Blackfoot.9

The reactor sites had to meet safety criteria. The Reactor SafeguardsCommittee, which had recommendedthe remote testing station in the firstplace, required that two concentric zonessurround any reactor site. The near zonewould be a controlled-access area wherean accident might pose severe danger.The radius of this area was determinedby a formula based on the reactor’spower level. The second zone would bedetermined by a combination of reactortype, meteorology, hydrology, and seis-m o l o g y. Danger within this zone wasl o w, but nevertheless should containonly a limited population. To make surethis secondary zone was large enough,the AEC arranged to buy additional landeast and west of what the Navy hadwithdrawn from the public domain.F i n a l l y, an informal practice hadevolved during the Manhattan Project ofsiting reactors no closer than five milesfrom one another when this was feasi-ble. This may explain why the MTR andthe S1W were located five miles apart.1 0

The safety principle of isolationapplied to all future reactor experi-

ments (if not always at five-mile incre-ments), establishing the testing station’scharacteristic land-use pattern of widelyseparated clusters of buildings. Eachproject settled into its own “desertisland,” connected to central servicesby roads and utility lines.

A site was good only if water could bebrought to it. Idaho geologists familiarwith the desert area of which the prov-ing ground was only a small part hadtold the Detroit consultants that a fewdry wells had been drilled here and therealong with some productive ones but thedata was scant. They spoke of an“ u n d e rground stream” flowing between

C H A P T E R 5 • I N V E N T I N G T H E T E S T I N G S T A T I O N

3 9

Courtesy of National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration/INEEL 60-1100

Above. National Oceanic and Atmospheric

Administration wind rose depicts wind patterns at the

n o rth end of the Site. Right. In the early years, U.S.

Weather Bureau employees launched helium-filled

balloons twice a day to measure the upper level wind

speed, direction, temperature, pre s s u re, and humidity.

the mountains to the north and the SnakeRiver to the southwest and told theDetroit consultants that water would beplentiful if the wells tapped the stream.11

In May Johnston announced that the firstcivilian contract would go to A . J .Schoonover and Sons of Burley, Idaho,to drill a well at the site selected forZ i n n ’s breeder reactor. Johnston had toldlocal business leaders that most of theIDO contracts would be for amounts lessthan $100,000, intentionally within thecapability of Idaho’s small businesses,and he was as good as his word. T h ewell was exploratory but, if successful,would convert to a production well. ByAugust, it had proven itself. Johnstonwas pleased. “Each new development todate,” he said, “has indicated that theIdaho site will meet every expectation ofthe AEC as an ideal location for thereactor testing station.”1 2

Finding water was far easier than any-one had imagined. The “undergroundstream” proved to be more like anunderground ocean, and the IDO wasnever at a loss to find water for build-ing sites. It did, however, have to blastlava rock at times. Bill Johnston alongwith his driver, Marvin Walker, wit-nessed one of them at the Chem Plant:

I was still Johnston’s driver and docu -ment courier when they started the base -ment for the Chem Plant. They flew ane x p e rt in from somewhere to oversee theblasting of the rock. There must havebeen a carload of explosives in thatblast. Just placing the charges had takenseveral days, and when it was ready togo, Johnston and I watched. We wered i rected to a spot quite a distance away,and Johnston’s AEC car, a black 1950

Buick, was parked between us and theblast. We were at least 50 yards beyondthe car. The expert hadn’t expected muchto come up, and all that did come upwas dust and small debris and one veryl a rge surprise boulder that must havebeen encased in the lava. It flew toward sthe Buick. “Another hundred yards, andyou’d have made a direct hit on myc a r,” said Johnston to the expert. Later,when we examined the results, the lavalooked as clean as if a saw had cut it.He did a beautiful job.1 3

In August 1949, the USSR detonated anatomic device. The news shocked thecitizens of the United States. At AECHeadquarters, a sense of urgencyinfused the reactor program. Prioritiesclearly had to favor defense goals.President Truman ordered the AEC todevelop a hydrogen bomb, also knownas the Superbomb. With 1950 came theKorean War. The U.S. Army sent mili-tary advisors to the NRTS to facilitateprocurement and otherwise move theconstruction schedule as rapidly as pos-sible. The MTR and the Chem Plant,aside from their major research mis-sions for peaceful purposes, also hadsubsidiary defense-related missions ofurgent interest to Los Alamos weaponsresearchers.14

Johnston continued master planning theSite, enlisting other federal agencies forhelp. The U.S. Soil ConservationService advised on the re-seeding ofdisturbed construction sites. The U.S.Weather Bureau studied wind andweather patterns across the Site.Exhaust stacks would soon become partof the landscape, and the architectswould need to know how high to buildthem and which directions were down-

wind and upwind. The winds wouldplay a major role in diluting the gasesand particulates that would exit thestacks.15

The U.S. Geological Survey (USGS)analyzed the structure of the SnakeRiver Plain aquifer and layers of lavarock beneath the site, drilling thirty-threetest wells. At a meeting of the Rotaryclub in Pocatello, someone askedJohnston about the projected use ofwater and if the wastes might contami-nate the underground supply. He replied,“ Waste water returned to the desertdrainage will be clear and [as] free offoreign matter as pure spring water.” Itwas the thinking at the time that thesoils would absorb “atom waste” longbefore the water that might contain itcould reach the aquifer.1 6

The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, withthe Bureau of Land Management, helpedwith the purchase of surrounding stateand private lands. With new acquisi-tions, the AEC would control a total of400,000 acres, more than doubling theN a v y ’s holding.1 7

In October Johnston reported to his var-ious Idaho audiences that three reactorsites had been selected. Hanford wasdismantling its concrete batch plant andshipping it to Idaho. The engineers hadfound good sources of sand and gravelnot far from the Navy’s circle of smallwhite houses. Cement would arrive byrail and be conveyed conveniently tothe mixing vats. The pace began toquicken. Johnston hired another localfirm to excavate the basement forZinn’s breeder, even before Bechtel hadbeen selected as the construction con-tractor.18


4 0

When the Navy handed over the prov-ing ground on December 1, they left itmostly as it had been, and the AECreaped the cost savings that the Detroitconsultants had predicted. The Navybuildings became the staging area forthe construction that began in earnest in1950. The area continued to expand asa central service area for the NRTS.Eventually it acquired the name“Central,” or more officially, “CentralFacilities Area (CFA).” Its functionsgrew to include a fire station, dispen-sary, technical library, cafeteria, ware-houses, offices, laboratories, and amaintenance shop for the fleet of busesthat would take workers to and fromthe Site. The contractors quickly appro-priated the houses, marine barracks,magazines, cranes, roads, and utilitiesfor service. The industrial odds andends lying about the Navy’s storageyards supplied treasures for scroungingscientists for many years to come.19

Whether Johnston ever was under anyillusions about the true status of the roadfrom Idaho Falls to the Site is lost toh i s t o r y. One day in the spring, not longafter he had arrived, he had his drivertake the Buick past the point where thec o u n t y ’s roadwork had ended. The carbumped along on an old stock trail thatwound westward through the mix oflava fields and grazing lands. Johnstonmet one of the ranchers, and they talkedabout the road. “Just tell the engineers tofill, don’t cut,” warned the rancher.Snow drifted badly in the winter andwould fill low spots. Johnston kept it inm i n d .2 0

First, the road had to be financed.Johnston told the Governor Robbins thatthe project would be handicapped with-

out good roads. He needed a new roadto connect the Site to what BonnevilleCounty had already graded and graveledwest of Idaho Falls. Also, the shoulder-less road between Blackfoot and A r c o ,which probably followed the meander-ing path of an old wagon road, neededto be upgraded to a standard, two-lanecondition. Robins replied that Idahowould devote some money to the roadsif the federal government would acceptthem into the Federal Aid PrimarySystem and help with federal funds.Johnston pressed, “I will appreciate anyspecial expediting methods your staffcan use...”2 1

Johnston’s program director, J. BionPhilipson, took over the conversationwith the governor. The road had to beavailable by the end of summer in1950, he said. If the state would pre-pare bid specifications in the winter of1949, this would be possible. Philipsonsuggested that the state hire severalcontractors, each to build one section ofthe road. In that way the job would getdone faster than if only one contractorwere hired to do the entire job. Heoffered the AEC’s own survey partiesto work under state supervision, and hesaid the AEC would supply at least$700,000 from its own funds for theroad, over-matching Idaho’s $500,000.22

But the negotiation between the AECand the State of Idaho was only begin-ning. Governor Robins became far lesseasy-going than the gentlemanLilienthal had met. He complained thatthe AEC schedule “makes a stiffdemand” on the state. It would upsetprevious budget plans and “will certain-ly strain us to the limit” and “expose usto considerable maneuvering in the


4 1

Above. The batch plant from Hanford is reassembled

at the NRTS and nearly ready for action in November

1949. Middle. Inherited from the Navy, houses like

CFA 609 were later used as offices. Below. By

January 1952, a new cafeteria was operating at

Central. The kitchen included a pastry section.

INEEL 4116

INEEL 0111

INEEL 12665

handling of funds and arouse somecommunity criticisms.” The highwaydepartment had obligations in otherparts of the state, and “can’t go higherthan $300,000.” The state intended torelocate most of the Blackfoot road andthought the actual cost of all the workwould exceed early estimates. Still, thegovernor asserted that the state woulddo its best to meet “reasonable”demands.23

The dickering continued through 1950and into 1951 and beyond, engulfingthe three counties through which theroads would pass (Bonneville,Bingham, and Butte), Idaho’s congres-sional delegation, the federal Bureau ofPublic Roads, and a host of chamber ofcommerce committee members, theIdaho highway commissioners, contrac-tors, and others. Resentment flared inBlackfoot as the IDO seemed to favorthe Idaho Falls road at the expense ofthe Blackfoot road, on which ninetypercent of the freight to the site washauled. “They wined and dined those[AEC/IDO] people,” accusedBlackfoot, hinting of legal lapses.24

Struggles over right-of-way and whowould pay what and when strained thepolitical skills of the Idaho Falls civicleaders to the utmost. When the winterof 1950-51 arrived, the new road wasnot ready, and the Blackfoot road hadnot been improved. Site employees fromIdaho Falls had to travel south to

Blackfoot and then dogleg west on theBlackfoot road to get to the Site. T h eroad opened finally on October 8,1 9 5 1 .2 5

The AEC ended up spending $1,141,000for the road from Idaho Falls, while theState of Idaho’s share was $337,000 anda promise to improve the Blackfoot road.The federal Bureau of Public Roads con-tributed $563,000, an amount widelyperceived as a “higher-than-usual per-centage in relationship to Idaho’s por-tion.” In 1952 the state managed to gradeabout twenty miles of the new Blackfootroad but announced that if Idaho fundswere the only ones brought to bear onthe problem, the state would have topiece the repairs over the next threeyears, and even then not necessarily getthe job done by 1955. Meanwhile, theroad continued to deteriorate dramatical-ly under heavy Site traff i c .2 6

Prodded by an indignant Blackfoot,which wondered all over again why theAEC had chosen Idaho Falls as itshome city, Johnston promised to per-suade AEC headquarters to support aspecial federal appropriation through theBureau of Public Roads. This he did,with the Idaho congressional delegationbacking the proposal “to the hilt.”2 7


4 2

INEEL 99-344-10-14

Above. Excavation for MTR in October 1950 shows

concrete work in progress and location of future

fuel-storage canal. Left. The CFA in 1999 was the

home of Site support services such as

environmental monitoring and calibration

laboratories, communication systems, security, fire

protection, medical services, warehouses, cafeteria

and laundry services, vehicle and equipment pools,

and bus operations.

INEEL 0695

By early 1953 a more comprehensiveapproach to road planning was evident.The IDO was getting ready to open anew reactor complex at the northernedge of the Site. State and federal roadauthorities prepared to extend a newroad west from Rexburg towards theTerreton and Mud Lake area, as well asmake other improvements to the con-nections from the Site to Arco, IdahoFalls, and Blackfoot.28

Although anticipating new roads, theIDO decided early that it would busemployees to the Site from surroundingtowns. Considering the thousands ofemployees on the way—and the narrowcondition even of new roads—it was thesafest alternative. Bus service beganearly and continued, the fare always setso low that most employees would findthe buses far more attractive than car-pooling. Although Johnston had passedalong to the engineers the rancher’swarning about snow drifts, the messagewas lost. During the first winter of thenew road, drifting snow closed it, forcingemployees to go the long way oncem o r e .2 9

Thus, the first transactions between theAEC and the State of Idaho involvedlong haggles over who would pay thecost of infrastructure. The accommoda-tion from Boise was reserved, perhapsunavoidably stinting. Equally, the A E Cmade clear that it intended to avoid asmuch off-site expense as possible, andnot only for roads. Asked if the A E Ccould help impacted school districtscope with rapidly rising enrollments,the answer was an unequivocal “No.”3 0

Johnston, however firm his privatedemeanor during negotiations, oftenemphasized more harmonic chords inpublic. “We have here in our westerncountry,” he would say, “a projectwhich is destined to bring to life someof the great things that the atomic ageholds for the world.” 31


4 3

Idaho State Historical Society MS326 Box 5

Right. Governor C.A. Robins. Below. On October 8,

1951, the road linking Idaho Falls to the Site was

officially opened, ending long months of

negotiations.Idaho State Historical Society G2-20.28827 Box 5

C H A P T E R S I X

4 4

As director of theArgonne Lab in Chicago, Walter Zinnran weekly seminars for his scientists,assigning topics such as, “If you weregoing to cool a reactor with an organicsubstance, what substance would youuse?” It wasn’t academic; Zinn waslooking for real answers. Reactordesigners in the late 1940s all had morequestions than answers.

A few years later, Zinn’s staff had anopportunity to run an experiment sub-jecting a certain promising organic (a diphenyl) to irradiation to see whatwould happen. They noticed right awaythat the material started to break down.The hydrogen in the compound turnedinto a gas and formed little bubbles,each of which stole neutrons and madeit harder for the reactor to continue itschain reaction. Then the stuff turnedfrom its original clear liquid into some-thing gummy and black. Conclusion: if

you had a ship reactor using this partic-ular material as a coolant, you couldn’tput enough barges behind the ship totow away the tar.1

The experiment ruled out one optionfor cooling a reactor. Therefore, the sci-entists chalked it up as a success. Inscience, identifying a weak idea is

often a move closer to finding a better one.

A reactor is a machine that producesneutrons and makes heat. In reactordesign, much depends on just what kindof work—or research—the neutrons andheat are expected to do. The first threereactors at the NRTS each emphasized ad i fferent kind of work. The Navy wantedto make heat. Walter Zinn and the incipi-ent nuclear power industry wanted tomake heat and new fuel at the sametime. Just about everyone wanted tobombard something with neutrons.

And everyone was impatient. After A E CHeadquarters finally made firm decisionsabout what reactors would go to Idaho,the IDO was ready. Infrastructure plan-ning was under control, and Johnston’sgroup was ready with management pro-cedures that would govern the testingstation. Unlike the field offices for otherAEC facilities, where operations wereunder the guiding vision of one contrac-

NE U T R O N S: FAS T FLU X, HI G H FLU XA N D RI C KO V E R’S FLU X

Pile research is not for us’ums, Fa la...Leave it for our Argonne cousins, Fa la...

Engineering is for us’ums, Fa la...We’re a bunch of dirty peons. Fa la...

—Ditty sung by Oak Ridge physicists to the tune of Deck the Halls, Christmas 1947—

Walter Zinn

U.S. Department of Energy 201-23

Installing the reactor vessel into EBR-I.Argonne National Laboratory-West 1016

t o r, the IDO had to supply central ser-vices to many laboratories and contrac-tors simultaneously. To make thingseven more complicated, other AEC fieldo ffices actually had cognizance over anumber of NRTS activities.

For example, an AEC field office inChicago managed the AEC’s relation-ship with the Argonne NationalLaboratory, including its Idaho experi-ments. The Navy’s submarine projectshad a similar relationship with the AECoffice in Pittsburgh. Thus, in addition tocoordinating the activities of its owncontractors, the IDO had to coordinatewith a whole cocktail of sister fieldoffices, other laboratories and theirdirectors and contractors. Johnston hadto develop a consistent approach tolabor relations and cope with differen-

tials in the benefits each contractoroffered its NRTS employees. The dailytask of IDO management was to defineand refine the nature of all these rela-tionships and determine who would dowhat inside vs. outside the contractors’fences. This was a thoroughly impossi-ble job, but it was done.2

Over time, an accumulation of loyaltiesto a home lab and small frictions overhow the Idaho “landlord” preferred tohandle things tended to produce sepa-rate cultures among the separate com-plexes that grew up on the desert. Butcommon experiences among allemployees—such as being neighbors intown and riding the bus together towork—tended to overlay separate loy-alties with a site-wide sensibility. Manyan employee found, for example, that a

career stalled with one contractor couldbe reinvigorated by a transfer to anoth-er—without the employee having topull up roots and move the family toanother state.

In 1950 the builders were busy—at leasttrying to be busy, for they often wereahead of blueprints. Laborers began fill-ing up barracks in Arco and Atomic City(the new name for Midway), and unionhalls were busy. The first reactor,A rg o n n e ’s, already was under construc-tion. As would be the pattern for most ofthe reactors to come, the complicatedwork began with a team of physicistsand others at the home lab, whodesigned the reactor and the supportbuildings it would need. When the A E Capproved the project, it selected anarchitect/engineering (A/E) firm to


4 6

Cross-section schematic of the EBR-I reactor core.

Fuel rods in the center were made of enriched

uranium (U-235). The “blanket” surrounding them

were rods made of

ordinary uranium.

design the reactor building and associat-ed buildings in the complex. Then a con-struction contractor, usually diff e r e n tthan the A/E firm, built the project andhired local labor. The home-lab scien-tists designed and often fabricated thereactor itself. Ty p i c a l l y, they disassem-bled the reactor and shipped it in piecesfor reassembly in Idaho.

The Argonne team had spent years con-sidering every detail of the breederreactor. Their main goal was to provethat the reactor could produce new fuelfrom the abundant isotope U-238. Alldesign decisions promoted this goal. Asecondary goal was to produce electri-cal power, since that was the ultimateeconomic mission of the breeder. Thiswasn’t expected to be hard to do,because conversion technology forreactor-generated power (turbines andgenerators) already existed.

The reactor would have pencil-thin rodsof fuel enriched to more than 90 per-cent U-235. These would be arrangedclose together in the core of the reactor.Similarly shaped rods of U-238 wouldsurround them. Each neutron wouldhave to count; none could be wasted.Either the neutron fissioned another U-235 atom to keep the chain reactionalive or it penetrated a U-238 atom andchanged that into plutonium.3

By this time, physicists knew that ifnothing slowed down the neutrons dur-ing the chain reaction, each fissionedatom was a little more likely to producethree neutrons than two. The naturalspeed of the neutrons is almost beyondimagination. They sprint away at 44million miles per hour. Physicists callthem “fast.” Until the reactor acquired

its official name, the AEC communitycalled it “the fast flux,” flux being theword to describe the flow of neutrons.4

U n f o r t u n a t e l y, it was all too easy towaste or lose neutrons. The claddingsurrounding the fuel could absorb neu-trons. So could the coolant and the struc-tural metal holding the rods in place.Neutrons could leak from the core into

the container surrounding the reactor.O b v i o u s l y, the materials of which theseitems were made had to be chosen fortheir reluctance to absorb neutrons—ortheir willingness to reflect them backinto the core. The designers chose stain-less steel for the cladding. They sur-rounded the core with a “blanket” madeof natural uranium to catch the neutronsthat would leak from the core. Any neu-trons that shot past the U-238 rods with-in the core would have another chanceto hit U-238 atoms in the blanket.

With the fuel rods close together and theneutrons moving fast, the core wouldgenerate a lot of heat. A coolant wouldhave to flow through the small spacesbetween the rods and carry this heat

C H A P T E R 6 • N E U T R O N S : F A S T F L U X , H I G H F L U X , A N D R I C KO V E R ’ S F L U X

4 7

Cutaway view of EBR-I power plant.

away to keep the fuel from melting. Itc o u l d n ’t be a material such as water orgraphite that stole neutrons or slowedthem down. Rather, a liquid metal waschosen, a eutectic alloy of sodium(chemical symbol: Na) and potassium(K) called NaK (pronounced “nack”).

NaK was liquid at room temperature. Itcould easily pass between the fuel rodsand collect the heat eff i c i e n t l y, and itd i d n ’t absorb many neutrons. But it w a s n ’t perfect. NaK tended to burnwhen it came into contact with air. T h epipes containing the NaK—and thepumps moving it—would have to workperfectly for a long time. In case thepipes did fail, the atmosphere into whichthe NaK leaked should not contain air.5

And on it went. Physicists chose eachfeature of the reactor for a reason basedin physics, whereupon each feature

inevitably handed an engineer a majorchallenge. For example, what specifickind of pump should circulate theNaK? The liquid would flow at veryhigh temperatures. Traditional mechani-cal pumps would not hold up. The EBRused them, but Argonne engineerseventually invented an electromagneticpump as well. This pump had no mov-ing parts, was completely sealed, andwas made entirely of metal.6

But that wasn’t all. Eventually the NaKwould absorb enough neutrons tobecome radioactive. What if a pipe didbreak or the NaK had to be replaced?How could people do the work withoutexposing themselves to danger? Whatkind of container should store the oldNaK?

Every feature of the reactor had a cas-cade of consequences, each of whichhad to be confronted and solved. In theend, each reactor was the creation notonly of a presumed brilliant physicist,but of a team of engineers with many

different specialties. As the purported“dirty peons” at the low end of the sci-entific pecking order, engineers hadthousands of opportunities to be bril-liant at the NRTS.

The Bechtel Company announced itwould finish erecting the EBR build-ings in February of 1951. Zinn, recalledchemist Kirby Witham, had chosen theEBR site to be near the anticipatedjunction of the new road and the oldroad from Blackfoot, cutting travel timeas short as possible. 7

[Zinn] didn’t want to travel pastCentral. The [IDO] had several sitesavailable, mostly along the Big LostRiver north of Central... Zinn picked aplace where we wouldn’t have localtraffic passing us all the time. He want -ed to be regarded strictly as a landrenter. It would cause less friction.8

U n f o r t u n a t e l y, the highway departmentchanged the highway route, leaving Zinna little more isolated than he had intend-ed—and obliging him to explain foryears why the EBR was left “hangingout there away from everybody. ”9

The designers of the MTR, the secondr e a c t o r, were content with their sitefive miles north of Central despite thelonger ride from town. It was as flat asa floor—no rolling hills or low ridgeshere. They had thought that some oftheir experiments might involve theprojection of a neutron beam from thereactor across distances of up to aquarter mile. The ground needed to beflat in at least one direction from thereactor building.1 0


4 8

INEEL 13185

EBR-I building at photo right, with supporting

Reactor Test Facility to left. November 1954.

The majority of the MTR’s experimentswould be more like Argonne’s tar-mak-ing investigation. The nuclear commu-nity needed to learn a great deal moreabout how the fission environmentwould affect the materials of which thereactor was made, including the urani-um fuel. The work of its neutrons wasto bombard and irradiate.

Uranium could take the form of a solid,gas, or liquid. Which would be thebest? How long would a fuel elementlast before it lost its reactivity? Howwould fission-product build-up affectthe ability of the fuel to do its work?What kind of beta or gamma radiationwould result from the decay of fissionproducts? What was the best shape forfuel elements? Rods? Flat plates?

Curved plates? Over time would thefuel element shrink or stretch? Bendinward or outward? Crumble? Thecladding had to protect the fuel andprevent the fission products—theradioactive krypton and barium andother elements—from escaping into thecoolant or the environment.

Then there were endless questions aboutcoolants and piping. Was there a liquidmetal more convenient and safer thanNaK? Advancing the art and science ofnuclear reactors required answering onequestion after another, building a wholenew body of knowledge.

The way to start was to bombard candi-date materials with neutrons in theMTR, and the more neutrons the better.

If they could tuck the sample near thecore of the reactor and subject it to asmany neutrons in a week as it wouldotherwise receive in a year in a regularr e a c t o r, physicists could learn quickly ifradiation would damage the material,and if so how soon and how badly. Ifthey irradiated a sample fuel element,they would learn exactly how a curvedfuel plate made of a certain alloy wouldshrink or expand or bend. Aside from itsgenerous neutron flux, the defining char-acteristic of the MTR was the fact that ithad about a hundred sample holes.11

Scientists at the Clinton Laboratory atOak Ridge had been working on the“high-flux” reactor since 1944. It calledfor highly enriched uranium fuel and anoperating power level of 30 megawatts.


4 9

Early MTR Site Plan shows

substantial complex of support

buildings required to operate a

reactor. For safety, “hot”

functions were on one side

of interior exclusion fence,

while “cold” functions were on

the other.

At this power level, the fuel would haveto be replaced fairly often—about everyseventeen days—because fission prod-ucts would build up in the fuel anddampen the chain reaction. A“ s p e n t ”fuel element would consume only fivepercent of its U-235 atoms.1 2

Compared to the EBR, the MTR’s neu-trons needed to be slowed down. T h eslower it traveled, the bigger a neutronlooked to a target nucleus, and the easierto grab. The MTR required a feature notpresent in the EBR—a moderator toslow the neutrons. The designers chose

w a t e r, which could do double duty andcarry away heat as well. Neutrons wouldstrike the lightweight water molecules,bounce around, and lose energy witheach little bounce.1 3

In 1946 the Clinton Lab, directed byAlvin We i n b e rg, proposed that theAEC build the MTR along with a com-panion chemical processing plant torecover the enriched uranium from ther e a c t o r’s spent fuel. The A E Capproved, and by Christmas 1947 bothprojects were at an advanced stage ofdesign. Naturally, the Clinton scientistsexpected to build the entire complex atOak Ridge. When the AEC announcedthat it intended to centralize all reactordevelopment at A rgonne, the angryOak Ridgers felt demoted and com-plained bitterly that the AEC “stole allour reactors.”1 4

The decision to centralize reactordevelopment at Argonne soon weak-ened. By 1949, the Reactor SafeguardsCommittee deemed it best that theMTR neither go to Argonne nor OakRidge. It was better suited to theremoteness of the Idaho provingground, chiefly because of its 30-megawatt operating level. Zinn was justas glad the complex didn’t end up atArgonne because he didn’t relish


5 0

Above. Horizontal section of the MTR (bird’s eye

view). Beam holes provide access for test samples

near the reactor core. Left. The MTR before it went

critical and before experiments began. The “coffin” at

center floor level is a shielded device for loading a

test sample into the beam hole. It replaced the hole’s

plug, which was stored during the experiment in a

special building. The MTR had three working levels.

Note control room at upper right.INEEL 6196

having the MTR’s chemical processingplant on the Argonne premises. Theplant would separate unfissioned U-235from spent fuel elements and send it offto be recycled into new fuel elements.It would be a heavy industrial complex,and it would generate a great deal ofwaste, radioactive and otherwise.1 5

The Fluor Corporation, hired to buildthe MTR, broke ground about fivemiles north of Central in May 1950.The site for the Chem Plant was aboutone and a half miles away on the oppo-site side of the access highway. Thetwo complexes were situated so thatneither the MTR nor the Chem Plantwere downwind of each other in theprevailing daytime wind, which camefrom the southwest. If an accident wereto occur at either place, any release ofairborne fission products would be lesslikely to harm workers elsewhere.16

Progress on all Site construction—including excavation work by the F. H.McGraw Company for the NRTS’sthird reactor—was interrupted by anunusually cold winter in 1950-51, agreat disappointment because this wasthe Navy’s submarine reactor and theKorean War had begun. Bechtel had topostpone its work on the Chem Plant,and both projects waited until spring.17

The Navy’s reactor complex was fivemiles north of the MTR. Guided anddominated by the energy and vision ofCaptain Hyman Rickover (RearAdmiral after July 1953), the Navy hadasked the Westinghouse Company toapply nuclear fission to the “steady,well-regulated release of energy to runan engine—safely.” The engine was torun a submarine at a certain speed and

use two propellers. John Simpson,assistant manager for technical opera-tions at Westinghouse, described theproblem:

The concept of a nuclear pro p u l s i o nplant was disarmingly simple. Just putenough uranium, enriched to the pro p e ramount of the uranium-235 isotope, intofuel elements; the fissioning of the ura -nium will produce heat. Then flow acoolant over these hot fuel elements togenerate steam that will then drive aturbine. The turbine turns the pro p e l l e rshaft...Sounds easy, doesn’t it? The tro u -ble was, none of this theory was wellenough advanced to know precisely howmuch or how many, or how big or howsmall... Most of the hard w a re we neededd i d n ’t exist. Some of the materials weneeded didn’t exist either. They had to bei m p roved or developed from scratch.They had to be tested.1 8

Many of the hardware components weretested in the MTR. One problem wasthe choice of coolant. Each of the majorpossibilities—water, helium gas, or liq-uid metal—had the familiar cascade ofimplications and drawbacks. Waterwould have to be kept under pressure tokeep it from boiling in the core of thereactor. Helium was hard to procure andhard to contain. Liquid metal conductedheat well, but it would take longer todevelop into a safe system.19

Rickover, who felt that corporate com-petition served the Navy well, assignedGeneral Electric (GE) to develop a liq-uid metal concept; Westinghouse, pres-surized water. Each company built anAEC-owned and -financed nucleardevelopment laboratory. Westinghousepurchased the original site of the

Allegheny County Airport in a suburbof Pittsburgh for what became knownas the Bettis Atomic Power Laboratory.GE built Knolls Atomic PowerLaboratory in New York.20

As expected, the Westinghouse programproduced results first. In a daring depar-


5 1

Naval Historical Center 80-G-K-18497

Rear Admiral Hyman Rickover

G e t t i n g H e a t f r o mN e u t ro n s

The work of the SubmarineThermal Reactor was to makeheat. It takes thirty trillion fis-

sions (3 x 101 3) to release 1 Btu ofheat. The fissioning of one poundof U-235 can produce the Btuequivalent of burning 1,400 tons ofcoal or 260,000 gallons of oil.

ture from standard practice, Rickoverinsisted on skipping certain steps intransforming the idea into a finishedproduct. Tr a d i t i o n a l l y, scientists tested anew idea to “prove the principle” that itwould work. Then they built a proto-type, usually not full size, to test fuelsand components. Next came a demon-stration plant, large enough to establishthe economics of operation and to putthe components to a long-term test. Ifthe idea still had vitality, the sponsorfinally built a full-scale operating plant.The process usually took years.

But Rickover wanted to buy time. “Thenation that first develops nuclearengines,” he said, “will rule the oceansof the world; our enemies are workingon such engines; we must be first.” Hediscarded the neat sequential view ofresearch and development and ordereda full-scale “proof of principle” reactorto be built in tandem with a full-scalesubmarine, USS Nautilus.21

The project was spread out all overthe country. The A rgonne reactordesigners were in Chicago;Westinghouse and Bettis were inP i t t s b u rgh; the reactor prototype wasin Idaho; and the N a u t i l u s s h i p y a r dwas in Connecticut. To make sure themate to the Idaho-tested reactor wouldfit into the Connecticut hull, Rickoverrequired that each have identicaldimensions. The sizes and shapes ofparts, the piping, pump and controlconnections, shielding, the mainte-nance routines, and the training of thecrew—if they worked in the Idahoprototype, they would work inConnecticut. So the Idaho reactor wascocooned in a full-sized replica of twoN a u t i l u s hull sections, those contain-ing the engineering room and thereactor compartment.

On the matter of perfect congruencebetween Idaho and Connecticut,Rickover reinforced the principle over

and over. During one of his inspectionsin Idaho, he stopped in his tracks.

“What’s that equipment over there bythe bulkhead?” he asked, although heobviously knew what it was.

“That’s a coffee maker we use duringwork,” a supervisor assured him.

“Get it out of here,” the Admiral insist -ed. “You know the rules. Move it out -side the hull.”22

The hull section containing the reactorrested in a “sea tank” (originally calledM c G a r a g h a n ’s Sea after CommanderJack McGaraghan, the Navy’s executiveo fficer in Idaho) of water forty feet deepand fifty feet in diameter. The purposeof the water was to help shielding spe-cialists study “backscatter,” radiationthat might escape the hull, bounce offwater molecules, and reflect back intothe living quarters of the ship. The tests


5 2

Above right. Officers enter hull of Nautilus prototype.

Note rim of sea tank at upper left. Above. Reactor is

in hull section surrounded by water.

INEEL 56-2744

INEEL 09582

began with careful monitoring and mea-suring of various radiation sources whilethe reactor operated at low power. T h e nfull-power operation allowed for mea-suring the levels outside the hull shield-ing. By this method, the sea tank helpedN a u t i l u s engineers design the shieldingand arrangement of equipment thatwould best protect the crew.2 3

In the cramped quarters of a submarine,shielding should occupy just enoughprecious space, but not a square foottoo much. Most shielding—and humanactivity—aboard submarines is fore andaft the reactor, not along the sides.Years later, the Navy’s orientationhandbook for sailors, The Bluejacket’sManual, would say, “Heavy shieldingprotects the crew so that they receiveless radiation than they would from nat-ural sources ashore.”24

Not surprisingly, using pressurizedwater as the coolant handed another setof engineers opportunities to be bril-

liant. At the time, no one understoodjust how corrosive hot water could beon the metal cladding surrounding thefuel. In dealing with the problem,Westinghouse discovered that pure zir-conium resisted such corrosion. No onesupplied the material, so Westinghousebuilt its own facility to produce it. Thepure metal formed the cladding for thefuel elements in the Idaho prototypereactor. Later, Westinghouse developeda zirconium alloy that improved itsperformance further.25

The rectangular buildings at the Navy’sprototype complex and at all the otherreactor sites at the NRTS were represen-tations of the low bid and had no kin-ship with aesthetics or high-stylearchitecture. Buildings were basic shellsof reinforced concrete, pumice block,wood, or metal. Excitement and valueresided entirely inside, in reactor rooms,laboratories, and operating corridors.These places were full of the best, thenewest, the first, and the only. It fit the

times, for as so many people would laterrecall, “Everything we did was new.”

The testing station was about to go intobusiness. Argonne would operate thebreeder; Bettis, the Nautilus prototypereactor. For the MTR, the AEC intend-ed to select the company that employedthe best industrial research manager inthe nation.


5 3

Th e M ai l G o e s T hr o u g h

The dedication of those Idaho peo-ple was amazing. Once, we need-ed to get some data to Pittsburg h

by the next morning. Remember,this was before fax machines. T h elast plane for Salt Lake City hadalready left Idaho Falls, so we sentthe data to Salt Lake City by a dri-v e r, who could still make the con-nection with the midnight plane forP i t t s b u rgh. Unfortunately he ran outof gas while still in Idaho. But hewas undaunted.

The state police came by, and he per-suaded them to drive him to the stateline and to radio ahead for the Utahstate police to meet him and takehim on to the airport. He reached theairport just in time and found theWestinghouse courier. The ponyexpress had nothing on these guys.

John Simpson26

Naval personnel operating S1W equipment.INEEL 56-2743

C H A P T E R S E V E N

5 4

On a fall day in1950, a research physicist namedDeslonde deBoisblanc picked up theBartlesville, Oklahoma, morning paperand read that the AEC had chosen hisemployer, the Phillips PetroleumCompany, to manage a classified gov-ernment project. He went off to workcontemplating this news with greatinterest.

When I reached the laboratory therewas a note that I was to attend a10:00 a.m. meeting in Dr. Doan’s con -ference room. That meeting was unlikeanything that I had ever experiencedbefore, or have since. About thirtypeople, not all from the ResearchDivision, were seated, wondering whythey were there, some having guessedthat it was related to the announce -ment, but still puzzled.

At ten o’clock sharp, Doan strode intothe room, went to the head of the table,and delivered what might have been theshortest briefing in history. He sup -

posed by now everyone knew that some -thing was going on in Idaho and thatPhillips had been chosen to be part ofit. He said that each of us had beenselected but that until we receivedSecret clearances, the nature of the pro -ject couldn’t be revealed. Furthermore,arrangements had been made for the lotof us to go to Oak Ridge, Tennessee,without spouses, for an acceleratedcourse in nuclear technology as well asspecialized training tailored to our indi -vidual assignments.1

Others of the chosen group were onfield trips, and to these Doan placedphone calls and said, “I’ve got news foryou. You’re going to Idaho.” They soonlearned that their mission was to run theMTR reactor.2

Doan, a man apt to be seen in his off-hours wearing blue jeans, western-styleshirts with scalloped pockets, and a ten-gallon hat pushed back on his head, told

SA F ETY IN S I D E A N D OU TS I D ET H E FE N C E S

Was it dangerous? Against today’s climate of ‘guaranteed safe, predicted, nuclear operation’we would have to be judged somewhat open loop. Dick [Dr. Richard Doan] must have

realized that the key to safe operation in a game still subject to surprises was to tap thatinsatiable desire of some people to explain even the most trivial

departure from the known and understood norm.

—Marion E. Thomas—

Dr. Richard Doan

Bonneville Museum - Bonneville County Historical Society, March 1963, P h i l t ro n

A portal personnel radiation monitor. Detector searches from head to foot. “Counting” equipment is

overhead and alarms if count exceeds background level of radiation. Employees were monitored upon

entering and leaving work areas.U.S. Department of Energy 74-10537 Photo for AEC by Milt Holmes

his group that housing forthem and their families mightbe a problem, although anIdaho Falls developer wasbuilding a subdivision thatwould contain enough afford-able homes for each of them.3

Despite their unfamiliaritywith Idaho, the mystery aboutthe project, and the promisedd i fficulty with housing, no onewhom Doan beckoned choseto decline. To a man, they trooped toOak Ridge, where they slept in barracksby night and hovered around a mock-upof the MTR by day. Architects fromIdaho Falls came to consult each manabout the kind of house his familywould need. When they got to IdahoFalls, the city gave them its usual warmwelcome, printing their names in thepaper along with necessary social dataabout club memberships and street ofr e s i d e n c e .4

Richard Doan, a fully matured scientistand administrator at fifty-two years old,arrived early in January 1951. Born andraised in Indiana by a family withQuaker roots, he taught high-school andcollege physics while earning a doctor-ate at the University of Chicago. It wasthe right place to be for a young physi-cist in the 1930s. He worked with Dr.Arthur Holly Compton on X-ray andcosmic ray research. Doan built, cali-brated, and tested cosmic-ray metersdestined for Peru, Greenland, and otherexotic places around the globe. He madehis reputation as a scientist by develop-ing useful methods of measuring X-raywavelengths. In 1936 he went to workfor Phillips’research division. 5

Compton, a Nobel laureate, was amember of the Manhattan Project’s S-1Committee, the group that guided theprogram. When Compton organized thesecret Metallurgical Laboratory inChicago, he asked Doan to leaveOklahoma and direct the lab. One ofDoan’s unique managerial duties was tohunt for any pure uranium that mightbe found in the industrial closets of thecountry, a pursuit that was said to haveturned his hair gray. In 1943 he movedto Oak Ridge to direct the scientistsdeveloping the Hanford plutonium-sep-aration process.6

After the war, Doan returned to Phillipsand became director of research overthe company’s work on geophysics,hydrocarbon conversion, chemicals,and rubber. Phillips aimed to be a new-products leader in the energy industry,which in the early 1950s meant gettinga foothold in nuclear energy. WhenPhillips bid for the AEC contract tooperate the MTR—one of thirty-fourfirms to do so—Doan was, perhaps, the

single most important asset inPhillips’package. The compa-ny expected to benefit from thebroad exposure and invaluabletraining the experience wouldprovide its scientists.7

Once in Idaho, Doan proceed-ed to set the standards for test-reactor operations and Phillips’employees. If Bill Johnstonhad invented the testing sta-tion, Doan transformed it into a

genuine scientific laboratory. Runningreactors was still a profoundly new andpotentially dangerous enterprise, andDoan felt that safety had to be institu-tionalized at every level. He insistedthat engineers and physicists be on-lineat the MTR twenty-four hours a day.Excellence in every part of the opera-tion, he felt, was the only sure way tosafety.8

Doan’s interest in safety, combinedwith his status as a Manhattan Districtalumnus and wide-ranging connectionsin the AEC and industry, led to newprojects and new missions. Many ofthem had to do with reactor safety, butothers were in the realm of pureresearch. He set the NRTS on a trajec-tory of growth far beyond the AEC’soriginal vision for the place.9

Doan, sometimes referred to as“Pappy” by employees, had acquired acertain charm and a talent for persua-sion, but that veneer was rarely mistak-en for softness. He was willing to beunpopular for his decisions, and thisquality made him seem either “aloof”or “tough, but fair.” He understood thetension between logical scientificdevelopment and the role of individual


5 6

Ponderosa Drive, Idaho Falls. New subdivisions

around Idaho Falls kept pace with the growth in

employment at the NRTS.

Idaho State Historical Society/INEEL 57-1216

initiative. Eventually he had over 2,000people working for him. He had to bal-ance the practical facts of business withthe unbusiness-like fact that virtuallyeverything the 2,000 people were doinghad never been done before.10

Doan insisted that Phillips employeesintegrate themselves into the communi-ties in which they lived. He bought ahouse as soon as he could and joined thePresbyterian Church, the Kiwanis Club,the Idaho Falls Chamber of Commerce,the country club, and civic life in gener-al. He expected other Phillips people tofollow his example.

Equally, Doan committed himself to thePhillips corporate culture, whichregarded every employee as part of thefar-flung Phillips “family.” The compa-ny practiced a brand of welfare capital-ism it had inherited from its founder,Frank Phillips. In addition to pension,health-care, and education benefits, thecompany sponsored intramural athleticteams, company picnics, a monthlymagazine promoting esprit d’corps, andmemberships in athletic and self-improvement clubs called the FrankPhillips Men’sClub and theJane PhillipsSorority forwomen, Janehaving been thefounder’swife.11

C H A P T E R 7 • S A F E T Y I N S I D E A N D O U TS I D E T H E F E N C E S

5 7

A P h i l l i p s W o m a n

My secretarial career began with Phillips Petroleum Company the summer of1960. All new secretaries were trained at Central Facilities as a group,learning the “Phillips” procedures of office work.

My first permanent assignment was in the Project Engineering Department of theMTR reactor project. The facility was housed in an abandoned temporary con-struction barracks covered with tar paper, thus its nickname, the Tarpaper Palace.Temperatures rose to well over a hundred degrees in the summer, and winterfound us freezing in this single-walled structure using only tar paper to cover thecracks. The Palace was the farthest distance from the guard house/bus stop. Foottravel was over gravel roads and through the MTR reactor building. The dresscode for female workers was dresses, heels, and hose. This made the walk doublyhard. The wind blew mightily on the desert, and since full skirts and crinolineswere the style, many of us would wrap masking tape around the bottom of ourskirts to keep them down when walking out-of-doors between buildings.

Pregnant women were not allowed to work near the reactor areas because of theradiation. When a woman reported she was pregnant, termination occurred thesame day.

The Jane Phillips Sorority was a women’s group named after the wife of thefounder of Phillips Petroleum Company. Monthly business/social meetings wereheld at the Bonneville Hotel in Idaho Falls. Yearly convention meetings wereheld throughout the country, two of which I attended as a delegate. One trip wasby bus to Odessa, Texas, and the other was by car to Bartlesville, Oklahoma, the

home office of Phillips. Because the company helped tofinance these trips, we stopped at Phillips gas stations andcharged our gas to Phillips credit cards. These conventionswere to educate us on company history and progress as wellas provide helpful training. We returned to our jobs withenthusiasm and more enlightened.

Myrna Perry

Bonneville Museum - Bonneville County Historical Society, Dec. 1956, P h i l t ro n

A Jane Phillips Society social.

As the contractor for the MTR, Phillipswas responsible for hazard managementand safety operations within the fenceof the MTR complex. Outside thefence, the IDO took over. Bill Johnstonhad decided early that safety outsidethe contractor fences would be a directIDO responsibility. Safety, assigned tothe Health and Safety Branch, was abroad concept and included employeehealth, operational safety, radiologicalprotection, and environmental protec-tion.

One of the first tasks of the Health andSafety Branch was to discover the pre-reactor level of background radioactivi-ty in the Site’s environment. Theoperation of reactors and the ChemPlant would certainly release radioac-tivity into the air, soil, and water. It was

necessary to survey the desert beforethe first reactor went critical and estab-lish a baseline for future comparisons.The Branch asked biophysicists andbiologists from Hanford, who had donea similar survey at that site, for help.12

Ateam from Hanford’s RadiologicalSciences Department went to the RogersHotel in May 1950 to work out thedetails of the survey. As yet, the NRT Shad no laboratories, so samples had togo to Hanford for analysis. In the nextfew months, a truck was sent from Idahoto Hanford every two weeks loaded withtapes of data, vials of water, and card-board ice-cream cartons filled with plantand animal samples.

The scientists in charge handed severalstudents from Idaho State College atPocatello excellent summer jobs col-lecting samples and classifying plantand animal species populating the site.They adapted one of the Navy’s whiteclapboard houses as a field station, andstudents were seen all summer enteringwith armloads of sagebrush and otherplants. The little kitchen now containedautoclaves and other lab-like gadgetryused to prepare samples. The refrigera-tor held packets of animal parts await-ing the next truck to Hanford.

The samples came from 107 plots ofground, staked at intervals of a quarterof a mile in two perpendicular transectsacross the testing station. In thekitchen, the students weighed out atwenty-gram specimen of each plant,put it into a fresh carton, daubed it witha drop or two of formaldehyde, andlabeled the carton. Elsewhere in thehouse were stores of air filters, air-

monitoring equipment, X-ray film, andinstruments to record the amount ofradiation in the air.

With the help of IDO and USGSemployees, samples came from loca-tions far beyond the boundaries of thetesting station. Air samples came fromDubois, sixty miles away, as well asfrom the EBR- and MTR- constructionsites. Water samples came from everywell at the Site and from wells inPocatello, Blackfoot, Atomic City, andIdaho Falls; from wells at farm homesbetween the Site and the Snake River;and from the Thousand Springs gushingfrom vertical lava-rock walls into theSnake River Canyon down-gradientmore than a hundred miles away.

The Hanford laboratories counted anddissected and measured. Sampling con-tinued from May to November becauseof the cyclic presence of some isotopes.The findings were published in a reportmuch consulted in succeeding years.13

The first increase in the level of back-ground radiation at the Site came notfrom NRTS experiments but from thedetonations of nuclear weapon tests atthe AEC’s new Nevada Test Site in1951. The NRTS and other air monitor-ing stations in southern Idaho detectedthe fallout from these tests. One secretNevada test generated readings so highat the Idaho Falls airport that an airportofficial, as yet unaware of the test,decided that the detection equipmentwas malfunctioning. On another occa-sion, a truck loaded with spent fuelfrom Hanford was headed for theNRTS and passed through a rainstormbetween Boise and Twin Falls. The rain


5 8

One method that Phillips used topromote a family feeling amongemployees was to sponsor intra-

mural athletic competitions. TheAugust 1960 issue of the PhillipsPhiltron reports the current progressof the teams.

N R T S I N T RA M U RA L SO FT B A L L L E A G U E

S T A N D I N G S A S O F AU G U S T 1 9 6 0Won Lost Pct.

MTR Robins 10 1 .910CF Canaries 8 3 .728MTR Pelicans 6 5 .700CPP Eagles 6 5 .546ETR Seagulls 4 6 .400SPERT Bluejays 3 7 .300Hdqrts. Cardinals 3 7 .222CPP Orioles 1 9 .100

washed radioactive particulates out ofthe fallout cloud and contaminated thetruck. The truck arrived at the NRTSwith a detectable radiation field on allof its exterior surfaces, up to 10 mil-lirem per hour in spots. It took sometime before the puzzled analysts figuredout what had occurred.14

The AEC kept the tests secret in aneffort to deceive the USSR, whosephysicists, it was feared, could learn thesize and other features of a detonationfrom the fallout that reached its ownatmosphere. If the AEC had made pub-lic announcements before the tests, itwould have made Soviet work easier.But by keeping the secret from theNRTS as well, it presented the Site’senvironmental monitoring personnelwith similar challenges.

The IDO continued an active programof sampling, regularly testing the air(using film badges located on perimeterfences and other areas), on- and off-sitewells, dairy milk from cows at nearbyfarms, and tissue from trapped or road-killed jack rabbits and other animals onthe Site. After 1959 the IDO distributedquarterly tabulations of the monitoringresults to the press, the IdahoDepartment of Health, and members ofthe Idaho congressional delegation. 15

Questions of safety interested nearbytowns as well, and southeast Idahonews reporters covered the story of thebackground radiation survey with greatinterest. Reporters wrote several articlesabout radioactivity, teaching themselvesand their readers how to understand thespecial hazards associated with “atomwork,” and the difference between

alpha, beta, and gamma radiation. Theydescribed various methods of shieldingand how remote-controlled devicesmanipulated hazardous materials whilethe operator stood behind thick panelsof leaded glass.16

Reporters described the job of the healthphysicist (HP), who regularly measuredthe doses of radiation each workerreceived. The HPs issued everyone asmall ionization chamber resembling apen that was carried in a shirt pocket.Together with a badge lined with specialfilm, the HP could determine and recordthe radiation each employee had beenexposed to in a day, a week, a quarter, ora year. The AEC issued regulations pro-viding maximum exposure limits forgiven periods of time, and each contrac-tor was obligated to protect its workersand its safety record accordingly. In1955 the National Committee onRadiation Protection, whose adviceguided the AEC, adopted exposure stan-dards for the general public for the firsttime. These were an arbitrary ten percentof the permissible occupational exposurelevel. The IDO philosophy was that theN RTS was not engaged in weapons pro-duction and should operate as a modelfor civilian and peaceful operations, sothe Site used exposure standards thatwere more restrictive than those permit-ted by the AEC. Another reason for pre-venting workers from exceedingexposure limits was to avoid having totransfer them to non-nuclear work, a sig-nificant administrative annoyance.1 7

The public read about emergency evac-uation plans, new microwave commu-nications technology, the use of airfilters, and the large ionization cham-


5 9

Calibration technicians check ionization chambers of

a minometer. Site employees wore them in their

pockets. The devices were checked daily for possible

exposure to radiation.

Idaho State Historical Society MS 326 Box 5/INEEL 3479

INEEL 59-1619

IDO 21221

A house in the former residential part of the Naval

Proving Ground became a field station, its kitchen a

laboratory for the 1950 radiation survey.

Film badges measured personal radiation dose

levels.

bers being set up in the region’s air-ports to monitor radiation. In addition,the U.S. Weather Bureau, which set upa permanent weather station at the Site,was studying every breeze that blew,launching balloons and setting up per-manent instrumentation. Some of thefirst gauges went up on the Navy’s oldwooden water tower, for example, andmeasured air movements at 75-foot and150-foot elevations.18

The State of Idaho also had early con-cerns about safety, and these had to dowith construction workers. The Idaholegislature had created a Department ofLabor early in 1949 with a tiny staff ofthree: a commissioner, a safety advisor,and an office secretary.19

When W.L. Robison, the first commis-sioner, realized the impending size ofthe construction program, he and hissafety advisor made their own trekfrom Boise to the Rogers Hotel for abriefing. “After being identified by aformidable array of guards,” Robisonwrote later to Governor Robins, “wewere ushered into Mr. Hostetter’soffice.” Using a large map showingproposed buildings, G.M. Hostetter,chief of the IDO Safety Division,explained how the work wouldprogress. He showed Robison wherethe first-aid station was located, andhow it soon would be enlarged, a full-time nurse and doctor hired, and twoemergency ambulances purchased.Until the road to Idaho Falls was fin-ished, emergencies would go to thehospital in Blackfoot. One of the bigdangers was lead poisoning. “All wallsare to be lined with heavy sheet lead,”said Robison of one project. Workers


6 0

Penetrating power of various types of radiation.

P e o p l e a n d R a d i o a c t i v i t y

If a lump of radioactive material sits on a dish on a table, a person nearby wouldwant to measure, first, just how radioactive is the material? and second, if theperson walks or stays too near it, what “dose” of radioactivity might be received?

“Curies” measure the rate at which atoms in the lump are decaying. “Rems”measure the dose that a person might receive from exposure to it. Much dependson whether the person eats, drinks, breathes the material or simply walks past it.

People in the United States receive an average yearly dose of radiation of 360thousandths of a rem, or millirem. About 82 percent of it is from natural sourceslike radon, cosmic rays, rocks, soil, and food. Radiation has been part of the nat-ural environment for millions of years. Many foods contain radioactive isotopes.The amount is so small that it is measured in trillionths of a curie, or picocuries.

We receive doses from other sources:

Beer 390 pCi/literTap water 20 pCi/literMilk 1,400 pCi/literSalad oil 4,900 pCi/liter

Whiskey 1,200 pCi/literBrazil nuts 4 pCi/gramBananas 3 pCi/gramFlour .14 pCi/gram

Cigarettes, 2 packs/day 8,000 mrem/year polonium-210Living in Salt Lake City 46 mrem/year cosmic radiationLiving at sea level 26 mrem/year cosmic radiationDental bite-wing X-ray 2-4 mremChest X-ray 6 mremU.S. Capitol Building 20 mrem/working year graniteBase of Statue of Liberty 325 mrem/year graniteThe Vatican 800 mrem/year granite

Source: DOE/EM-0065P and other

handling it would have medical exami-nations before they started and “proper[safe] guards” to prevent them frombeing poisoned. The IDO would sendthe state monthly reports of accidents,first-aid treatment, and hours worked.20

Hostetter’s initial reports were good.From the start of the work toSeptember 1950, the IDO reported15.06 accidents per million man hoursworked. This compared favorably to anational average of 36 per millionhours and very favorably to an Idahoaverage of 70 accidents per millionhours. The Site continued to breakIdaho safety records. Robison reportedthat on July 3, 1954, Phillips employeeshad worked one million man-hourswithout any disabling injuries. This wasa first in the history of Idaho, and itwas duly celebrated with visiting digni-taries and ceremony a few weeks later.21

Johnston created an Idaho Environ-mental Advisory Committee to advisehim on matters regarding public health.The members—who included the IdahoDirector of Public Health and otherstate health officers, a USGS geologist,a meteorologist stationed with the U.S.Weather Bureau in Boise, the IdahoState Reclamation Engineer, and a pri-vate physician—met for the first timein March 1954. They received an intro-ductory tour of the NRTS and the activ-ities that potentially involved publichealth. Their first impressions werefavorable, and after the meeting, com-mittee members told the press that“controls enforced by the NRTS appearadequate to prevent exposure of thesurrounding area to health hazards.”

The group met quarterly after that, usu-ally in two-day meetings, typicallyreporting afterwards to the press ontheir commendations and critiques. 22

Before the advent of the AEC, the Stateof Idaho had little reason to becomeinterested in radioactivity. Throughoutthe 1950s, few hospitals in the state, ifany, used radioisotopes for the treat-ment or detection of disease. The IdahoDepartment of Health’s first regulationspertaining to radioactivity were adopted

in 1954 when it set standards for X-raymachines used in shoe stores. A parentor sales clerk could fit a child withshoes, place the child’s feet into anopening at the bottom of the machine,and then look through a viewer to see ifthe shoes crowded the bones. Themachines became notorious for expos-ing children’s feet to alarmingly-largedoses of radiation. Through the depart-ment’s educational efforts, Idaho shoestores discontinued the use of themachines.23


6 1

Graph published in radiation

survey report (HW-21221)

shows average daily

background radiation at Dubois.

Count rises in early morning

and falls at night. Transect,

below, shows plot locations for

soil and vegetation samples.

In 1955 the Idaho Department ofHealth was reorganized as a Board ofHealth, giving it more authority inwatershed protection, sewage collectionand disposal. Dr. Terrell O. Carver, theadministrator for the Board of Healthafter 1958, began to promulgate theBoard’s policies formally, holding hear-ings on a spectrum of issues, includingcrematoria, nursing homes, water pollu-tion, cleaning of septic tanks, and radia-tion protection.24

The Board of Health adopted radiationprotection rules in August 1958 after afew industrial users elsewhere in thestate accidentally spilled radioactivematerials into the environment. Suchusers were henceforth obliged to regis-

ter themselves with the Board. T h ebrief set of rules prohibited discharg i n gradioactive wastes to the environmentwithout prior approval of the Boardand required that the board beinformed in the event of an accident.After 1961, by which time hospitalswere more involved with radioactivesource materials (nuclear medicine),the Idaho legislature directed the Boardto establish more-comprehensive stan-dards. That was also the year that theBoard of Health purchased its firstequipment for conducting a few basictypes of radiological analyses.2 5

The managers of the NRTS spent the1950s being cordial to the succeedinggovernors who entered and left theStatehouse. Len B. Jordan followedRobins, and after him came RobertSmylie, elected in 1954. New gover-nors were routinely congratulated on

their elections and invited to tour theSite. They presented awards and attend-ed ceremonial functions at the NRTS.Governor Smylie in particular was anadvocate of industrial safety and recog-nized the unprecedented safety recordmaintained at the NRTS. At times, theIDO and the AEC in Washingtoninformed the governor and Dr. Carverwhen spent fuel was being shipped intoIdaho.26

When Smylie created a Governor’sCommittee on the Use of Atomic Energ yand Radiation Hazards in 1959, the IDOsupplied three of its high-level staff spe-cialists in health physics and waste dis-posal to serve on the committee alongwith his other appointees from stateagencies and industries. Smylie askedthe committee to examine how otherstates set radiation standards and then torecommend improved control measuresfor Idaho. With input from this commit-tee, the Board of Health adopted a moredetailed set of standards and regulationsin 1964. These refined the earlier rulesand exempted federal agencies and theircontractors from having to register withthe state. The committee discussed thes t a t e s ’ rights issue and concluded thatthe state should not restrict the A E Cbecause federal rules already governedit. According to committee minutes, themembers were “not disposed to enactregulations that might discourage indus-trial development within this state.”2 7

Although the relationship between thegovernor’s office and the NRTS wascourteous, it was also distant. The issueof waste disposal did arouse states’rights sentiments in government circles.


6 2

The IDO ambulance in 1959, fully loaded with

emergency equipment when ready to roll.

INEEL 59-3091

Dr. Carver was well aware that “under-ground waters” were receiving radioac-tive waste at the Site. He wrote in 1959to Senator Clinton P. Anderson, thechair of the JCAE, “In our relationshipwith the AEC we have been led tobelieve that the state need not concernitself with atomic energy installationsnor their operation. We think that iswrong.”28

Governor Smylie likewise did not carefor AEC policies excluding the statefrom a role in water pollution control.In November 1963, he said as muchbefore a hearing by Congress’NaturalResources and Power Subcommittee ofthe Committee on GovernmentOperations. He described the state’srecent progress—and the role of feder-al funds—in reducing sewage andother wastes going into the state’swaterways but then cited problems thatremained. One of them was the contin-uing practice by the AEC and theBureau of Reclamation of dischargingwastes directly to underground watertables. These agencies, he said, operat-ed “in opposition to state policies” andhandicapped the state’s efforts.29

Clearly, the IDO had allowed no one todoubt that federal authorities alonewere responsible for operating prac-tices and standards governing theNRTS. The State of Idaho was outsidethe fence.


6 3

Phillips campaigns promoted safety in construction

and shop settings. Philtron magazine published this

1957 reminder.

Bonneville Museum - Bonneville County Historical Society, March 1957, The Philtron

C H A P T E R E I G H T

6 4

Walter Zinn’sestimate was too low. He thought thebreeder reactor was ready for action inlate May 1951. He had ordered fortykilograms of enriched uranium packedinto 179 fuel rods and some extras as amargin for error. His crew placed theminto the core one after the other, mea-suring reactivity effects each time. Asthe supply of rods dwindled, dignifiedguests and visitors waited expectantlyin the control room, watching needlestrace ink on scrolls of data paper. Theextra rods went into the reactor. Withthe last one inserted, the reactorremained calm.

Any reactor has several milestonemoments in its early life. The first is theday and the hour it attains criticality forthe first time. After that, the operatorspass mini-milestones as they graduallystep up the power levels, calibrateinstruments, and run safety tests. A finalmoment of truth arrives when it runsunder perfect control at its maximum-rated power level.

Going critical for the first time is signif-icant because it shows that the physi-cists have loaded the reactor withenough fuel and arranged it suitably.

The first criticality runs at a “zeropower” state, meaning that the reactionproduces just enough neutrons to keepthe chain reaction alive. This generatesvery little heat. In the early 1950s,when every reactor—along with itsfuel—was a first of its kind, reactordesigners could only estimate howmuch uranium would form a criticalmass.

Zinn figured he needed seven and a halfmore kilograms of enriched uraniumand asked the AEC to release it frommilitary supplies. The material went tothe Argonne Laboratory in Chicagowhere the engineers fabricated morefuel rods. These procedures cost himthree months.1

The deed was done. Finally, on August24, 1951, the EBR went into history asthe first reactor to go critical at theNRTS, the first to use U-235 fuel, andthe first to use a liquid-metal coolant.The physics measurements indicatedthat the arrangement and shape of thefuel rods needed improvement beforethe reactor could be connected to anelectrical generator. Two-thirds of thefuel rods were shipped back to Chicagowhere the fuel was removed from itsstainless-steel cladding, placed in ahydraulic press and die, and madeslightly shorter and fatter. Returned toIdaho, the rods were arranged in a beltaround the original rods. The new mass-ing of uranium allowed the reactor toproduce the core temperatures requiredto power the generator.2

On December 20 the reactor was con-nected via the generator to a string offour lightbulbs. At 1:23 p.m. the bulbsglowed brightly, and Zinn wrote in the

TH E REA CT O R ZO O GO E S CR I T I C A LThen gradually construction workers were replaced by operations people.

—Idaho Department of Labor, 1951—

INEEL 4053

The four famous lightbulbs at EBR-I were strung up

between the generator (out of picture) and the

handrail.

INEEL 4051

log book, “Electricity flows from atom-ic energy. Rough estimate indicates 45kw.” After a second experiment thenext day, Zinn took up a piece of chalkand wrote his name on the concretewall of the reactor building and invitedthe crew present to follow, one by one.3

Atomic power was a reality. The NRTShad its first stunning success. The first

nuclear reactor in the world to generatea useable amount of electrical powerwould forever be linked to Idaho andthe NRTS. A few days later, the excite-ment over, the reactor began producingthe electricity needed for routine opera-tion of the EBR complex.

The MTR went critical for the first timeon March 31, 1952, the first of manymilestones. Visitors from Oak Ridgeand Argonne, who had cooperativelybuilt the project, along with BillJohnston, Richard Doan, BionPhilipson, and others crowded togetherto listen to the clicking of an instrumentcounting the fissions taking place insidethe core. Physicist Fred McMillan oper-ated the reactor’s control rods. Thistime, the reactor didn’t disappoint.Johnston said, “Well, we got us a reac-

tor.” And that was that—no chalk, nochampagne. The newspaper reporterwas more effusive, recognizing the“new atomic egg they were hatching”as a historic event: mankind’s firstmaterials testing reactor. The wearyteam that had been working nineteen-hour days after months of preparationsimply went home to their beds.4

But they were back soon. Doandemanded that the stepped-up progressto full-power operation must also provethat the people working near the reactorwould be safe from radiation. Thiswork was the province of five HPs.Doan had them report directly to hisoffice and not to the reactor manager.Their sole mission was to prevent allworkers, including absent-minded sci-entists whom the HPs sometimesreferred to as “squirrels,” from suffer-ing the potentially harmful effects ofradiation. For this, they had the powerto evacuate work areas and scram (shutdown instantly) the reactor if theythought it necessary.5

One of many safety tasks was to testthe shielding around the MTR. Thisassignment fell to HP John Byrom, anew Phillips employee in 1952. He hadtrained in radiological physics in a spe-cial class of twelve people at OakRidge and then moved to Idaho Fallswith his family. Like most other NRTSemployees, he began the daily habit oftraveling to work on a Site bus.


6 6

INEEL 04517

Above. MTR control room as reactor goes critical on March 31, 1952. Below. The top of the MTR, as seen

from catwalk above it. A crane (unseen) lowers the top plug over the reactor core. Taken on March 31, 1952,

engineers were making a final check of the control rod drive. Apparatus above round plate is the control rod

mechanism that ensures the control rods are attached to the drive mechanism.

INEEL 4502

Getting to the MTR operating floorrequired passing several safety andsecurity barriers. The MTR complexwas enclosed behind a chain-link fencestudded with night lights and furtherdefended by a ten-foot-wide patrolroad. The bus dropped him at the MTRgatehouse, where a guard checked hissecurity badge each day. If anyonecared to notice, they could see that the250-foot MTR exhaust stack stood onthe downwind side of the complex and,for security reasons, showed no aircraftwarning lights. To get to the reactor,Byrom passed into the “exclusion” areathat contained the MTR building withits laboratory wing and fuel storage“canal,” along with other special labsand storage buildings. The building wasabout 130-feet square and made of pre-fabricated concrete slabs.6

Inside, the enriched uranium core of thereactor was like a small jewel wrappedin successively thicker layers of wrap-ping. Surrounding the fuel was a steeltank thirty-feet deep and six feet indiameter. A steel lid fit over the top.Pumps forced cooling water throughthe tank under pressure to keep it fromboiling. Two types of reflectors sur-rounded the tank to bounce neutronsback toward the core. The closest to thefuel was made of beryllium metal. Justbeyond was an outer zone of graphite,cooled by forced air. Then came tenfeet of dense concrete and gravel—themain biological shield. A casing of steelenclosed the whole contraption, whichlooked like an oversized cube thirty-two feet to the side.7

It was the one hundred holes piercingthe reactor that were Byrom’s specialconcern. Acomplicated plug stoppered

each hole, made up of the samesequence of materials as those adjacentto it in the reactor cabinet. While thereactor was shut down, operatorsremoved a plug and inserted a test sam-ple toward the core. Overhead, a thirty-ton crane helped maneuver the heavyplugs into and out of shielded containerscalled “coffins.” The plugs were sup-posed to prevent neutrons from strayingto the outer edge of the plug openings.But would they?

Byrom used X-ray film to check forleaks, the same 14x17 inch size thatphysicians used for chest X-rays. Heordered dozens of boxes. In the MTR’s

photographic darkroom, one of severallabs in the MTR laboratory wing, heloaded each sheet into a light-tightholder containing a thin lead foil back-ing. He matched the film to grid markson the cabinet and numbered each gridcell. When the reactor operators started“noodling” the control rods, movingthem up and down to get familiar withthe MTR as they advanced toward fullpower, Byrom was ready.

C H A P T E R 8 • T H E R E A CT O R Z O O G O E S C R I T I C A L

6 7

Above. The thickest wrapping around the MTR is the

biological shield. Right. The MTR hot cells. Behind

viewing windows three feet thick, operators examine

test samples. Note shield plugs above and below

windows for electrical leads, instrument air, oxygen,

or other requirements.

INEEL 61-4707

INEEL 55-432

We had already surveyed to see if wehad any heavy leaks. For that we usedseveral kinds of meters—GM meters,cutie pies, and something we called arudolf. The barytes concrete in theshield, which had been packed in therepretty well to eliminate bubbles, did apretty good job. Still, neutrons cansquirt around corners and come out theholes, so we had to check those verycarefully.

I plastered that reactor. We marked itoff and pasted these films all over the

reactor—holes, every place that wasdesigned to give access into the reactorcore. We used a lot of duct tape.

Then we ran the reactor at low powerwith the reactor holes closed up tight.Any radiation coming through theopenings would produce an image onthe film, black rings or dots, or whatev -er the shape of the leak. It took monthsof the physicists playing around withthe reactor to give all of the film anequal amount of time. They were mak -ing their own tests of reactor fluxes inthe different parts of the reactor, so onany given day, one side of the reactormight get more neutron flux than theothers.

We found many places where the designwas a little bit inadequate. I turnedover this data to the engineers, andthey designed better, more efficientplugs. But we still had to add extrashielding against some of the biggeropenings. We stacked boxes of paraffinand sheets of cadmium, which absorbneutrons, and then blocks of lead andconcrete in front of that. That was a lotof weight, and it had to be moved awaywhenever it was time to load or unloadthe experiments.8

Paraffin itself was a hazard. Someoneoccasionally left a box near a hot waterpipe, where it would get too warm andcombust. Word of one too many paraf-


6 8

INEEL 13405

Radiochemist loads an irradiated MTR flux wire into

a scanner. The machine will “count” how many of

the wire’s atoms absorbed neutrons while in the

reactor.

Power is the time rate at which ener-gy is converted from one form toanother; it is commonly measured

in “watts.” Reactor power is the rate atwhich work can be done by the heatthat the reactor generates. It is mea-sured in “thermal” watts. If the reactorproduces steam to drive generators, theoutput is measured in “electric” watts.

A related concept is the “reactor peri-od,” once called the “doubling period.”This is the amount of time it takes forthe neutron flux to double (approxi-mately). The art of reactor start-up andcontrol is to keep the chain reactionfrom doubling at too rapid a rate. T h eoperator adroitly moves regulating(control) rods in and out of the core tomaintain a constant power level. If theneutrons multiply too fast, they will

outpace the ability of the coolant tocarry away heat. Therefore, it is notdesirable to allow the neutrons to mul-tiply at an ever-smaller doubling time.

A reactor operator is concerned withthree basic measurements of neutronflux: the doubling period, the watertemperature, and the water flow. Thereactor is set to shut itself down auto-matically if any of these reaches cer-tain previously established values.

Someone coined the dainty term“excursion” to describe a sudden andunplanned rapid rise in the powerlevel. Many experiments at the Siteinvolved deliberately planned excur-sions, one purpose of which was tolearn the safe operating limits ofnuclear reactors.

R e a c t o r P o w e r !

fin fires reached the ears of Dr. Doan,who reportedly issued a terse memoran-dum stating, “There will be no moreparaffin box fires.” And apparently,there were none.9

Another aspect of safety was for reac-tor operators to understand exactly howneutrons moved about inside the reac-t o r. The one hundred openings led tod i fferent positions near the core or inthe graphite around it. Flux differed atevery spot, which was desirablebecause not all experiments wouldneed the same exposure. The scientistscould tailor an experiment to the mostappropriate flow of neutrons. The reac-tor designers at Oak Ridge had predict-ed where the flux would be weak orintense. Now their work had to be t e s t e d .

Technicians placed tiny strands ofcobalt wire in hundreds of locations inthe graphite and inside the core, gain-ing access via small holes in the beryl-lium reflector. The reactor was made togo critical for a few minutes to irradi-ate the cobalt. The cobalt wires werewithdrawn and sent to a laboratorydown the hall for counting. Measuringinstruments could detect how manyatoms in each wire had absorbed neu-trons. After months of doing this, thephysicists plotted a map of the MTR’sneutron flux. It pleased the Oak Ridgedesigners to learn that their predictionshad been reliable.10

Handling spent fuel also required safe-ty procedures. When the reactor wasfully in business, the operators shutdown to replace the fuel about everyseventeen days. Using remotely-con-

trolled equipment, operators openedthe lid of the reactor and transferredthe hot fuel into lead-lined containers.These were lowered into a water- f i l l e dtrough, called a canal, where the con-tainers ejected their fuel elementsunder cover of sixteen feet of water.Workers, shielded by the water, leanedover the canal with long-handled toolsand moved the fuel to its resting place.The fuel, referred to as “green”because it was fresh from the reactor,emitted gamma radiation and lit up thewater with the soft glow of Cerenkovr a d i a t i o n .

After about three months in the canal,the fission products with short halflives lost their radioactivity, leavingthe fuel safer to handle. Wo r k e r sloaded the fuel into a special cask andtrundled it over to the Chem Plant,which recovered its unused U-235.

Phillips took the MTR up to its fullpower of 30 megawatts on May 22,1952, another landmark day at theN RTS. The MTR was ready in A u g u s tfor its mission to assist other reactordesigners by testing the materials ofwhich their reactors would be composed.

The first reactor the MTR assisted wasthe Rickover reactor five miles up theroad, the S1W (S for submarine, 1 forfirst prototype, W for Westinghouse).Westinghouse physicists had deter-mined that the predominant source of


6 9

INEEL 57-5342

Two versions of the MTR canal. Above, as depicted

in Site newspaper; left, a technician poses with

“cutie pie,” a beta and gamma radiation detector. His

colleague withdraws capsule of cobalt-60. Lights

and tools dangle down side of canal.

NRTS News, August 1968

gamma radiation from the reactor wasnitrogen-16, which was generated in thereactor cooling water when a stray neu-tron struck an atom of oxygen-16. Whatthey didn’t know was how likely it wasfor any given number of nitrogen atomsto capture neutrons and therefore howbig a problem nitrogen-16 would be.Dr. John Taylor, responsible for theNautilus shielding studies, recalled:

Because the half-life of nitrogen-16 isonly 7.35 seconds, the capture cross-section [probability of capture] couldnot be measured by the normal acceler -ator methods. Without that informationthere was no way to design the majorcomponents of the shielding for thesubmarine. Thus, a closed loop wasinstalled in the MTR to circulate waterthrough the MTR neutron flux so as tobe able to measure the nitrogen-16activity generated in the water. The

inferred cross section was used todesign the shielding. The facilities atthe NRTS were essential to solving thiskey question bearing on the radiationsafety of the Navy crew.11

Another issue for the Navy was thelong life of the reactor and its fuel.Changing fuel in the cramped spaces ofa submarine was extremely inconve-nient, not to mention hazardous.Replacing the entire core was worse.

The boat had be dry docked whilewelders cut open the skin of the boatand removed the reactor the same waya surgeon might remove a bad appen-dix. The procedure would tie up theboat for up to two years, hardly theplace for a weapon system during waror an international crisis.

The Navy’s Westinghouse team sentsample capsules to the MTR for irradia-tion for the requisite number of weeksor months, whatever would duplicatethe capsules’lifetime radiation in aship. The team sent fuel alloys, controlrod materials, and structural metals.The work was highly classified; MTRworkers sometimes did not know whatwas inside the test capsules.

Westinghouse scientists took the cap-sules back to their own labs, dismantledthem, and studied them in minutedetail—weigh, X-ray, measure, count.Little by little, they learned whichmaterials would hold up and whichwould not. The scientific habits of mak-ing predictions, observing closely, andkeeping detailed records were the sameas those so recently practiced by theBureau of Ordnance. Every experimentat the MTR—and everywhere else atthe NRTS—began with the sponsor’sprediction and ended with some incre-ment to the world’s store of knowledge,however large or small.


7 0

INEEL 55-973

Above. A straddle carrier transported spent fuel

elements from the MTR to the Chem Plant. Left.

Fuel elements cool in the MTR canal. As a side

experiment, a can of food rotates in a special rig so

that contents get equal exposure to gamma

radiation.

INEEL 64-2056

The Navy experiments were costlybecause the conditions in the capsuleduplicated the effect of pressurizedwater on the sample. One of the Navy’suseful early findings was to discoverthat radiation affected stainless-steelwelds by making them stronger, butalso made the metal more brittle.12

The S1W had gone through the samekinds of start-up and safety proceduresas the EBR and the MTR. It was sched-uled to go critical on March 29, 1953,but Rickover’s approach to milestonemoments was rather more calculatingthan either Phillips’or Argonne’s. Hefelt the occasion to be of extremeimportance. Certain people who shouldhave been there were not. Some ofthose who were present should not havebeen. So he postponed the procedurefor a day and adjusted the mix of peo-ple in the control room. The reactorfirst went critical shortly before mid-night on March 30, 1953.13

Two months later it was time to provethat the high-temperature reactor couldproduce enough power to turn a pro-peller shaft. Rickover was again in thecontrol room, along with AEC commis-sioner Thomas Murray. At the epochalmoment, Rickover instructed Murray toopen a certain valve. John Simpsonlater wrote:

The commissioner was thrilled at thechance to play an active role in makinghistory. Murray stepped forward,grasped the valve handle, and slowlyturned it.

In the adjoining area, inside the hull ofthis submarine-on-land, steam hissedagainst the turbine blades. A propellershaft began to turn.14

The heat of the reactor was doing mus-cle work. A hasty champagne made ofalcohol from the chemistry lab andsoda water from a soft drink dispenserwas mixed for a toast.15

When Westinghouse was ready in Juneto take the reactor to its next milestone,full operating power, it began a 24-hourendurance run. Again Rickover inter-vened. He was anxious to convinceskeptics that nuclear-powered propul-sion was truly reliable—that a boatcould remain submerged for a protract -ed run and the crew come safely home.He decided suddenly to extend the runand simulate a crossing of the AtlanticOcean. This would take nearly a hun-dred hours at full power.16


7 1

Above. The S1W building, camera facing southwest.

Note MTR area in background. Below. Inside the

S1W hull during construction.

Naval Reactor Facilities

INEEL 6477

Charts went up on the wall of the reactorcontrol room for plotting a 2,500-mileroute from Nova Scotia to Ireland, andthe Navy men who happened to be therefor training began four-hour watches.For sixty hours, the run went well. T h e na condenser tube began to leak, and radi-ation was soon detected near it. Next asteam generator sprung a few smallleaks. The Westinghouse people arg u e damong themselves: should they shutdown the reactor? Given the location ofthe leaks, neither public nor personnelsafety was at stake. The run continued.1 7

Then the control for one of the steamgenerators failed, causing the water levelto drop and the reactor power level tobecome erratic. Debate about shut-downbecame more heated. The crew reducedthe power level to half and restored thewater level. In the end, the reactor“crossed the Atlantic” in ninety-sixhours, but not entirely at full power. T h ecrew had resourcefully fixed emerg i n gproblems and kept the reactor running.Had there been an accident, the nuclearnavy might have become a politicali m p o s s i b i l i t y.1 8

But there was no accident, and therewould be none. Rickover was wellaware of the engineering work yet to bedone. “We are having trouble withvalves and with controls,” he wrotesoon after the run, “but we are solvingevery one of them, and as fast as welearn anything that needs modification,we are incorporating it into theNautilus.”19

The success of the S1W led to thelaunch of USS Nautilus on January 21,1954, five years after design had start-ed. The Navy was proud of its innova-tion, and the public eagerly consumednews of its many “firsts.” One of themoccurred in 1958 when the submarinebecame the first to travel beneath theice at the North Pole. After the ship’scelebrated return, skipper WilliamAnderson sent a telegram to Idaho, pay-ing tribute to those who had engineeredthe S1W prototype.

... during Nautilus’ North Pole sub -merged transit from Pacific to Atlanticthe performance of our engineeringplant exceeded all expectations. To thefirst manufacturer of naval nuclearpropulsion our sincere thanks for pro -viding the plant that made possible thisfirst transpolar crossing.20

In the roster of reactor concepts“proved” for the first time at the NRTS,the S1W was the first to use waterunder high pressure as a coolant.Because it succeeded so well, Rickoverand the AEC chose the same technolo-gy to demonstrate that the conceptcould support a civilian power industry.In December 1957, the ShippingportAtomic Power Station went critical inPennsylvania, operated by theDuquesne Light Company. Rickoverinvested in it the same attention todetail he had with the submarine. Heobliged the company to allow his ownrepresentative access to the controlroom at any time with full authority to


7 2

Above. The launching of USS Nautilus, January

1954. Left. USS Nautilus at sea and at speed.Naval Reactor Facilities

Department of the Navy, Submarine Force Museum

shut down the plant if he thought it wasnot operating safely. Rickoverexplained himself clearly: the “wholereactor game hangs on a much moreslender thread than most people areaware. There are a lot of things that can go wrong and it requires eternalvigilance.”21

In 1956 Congress proceeded with theconstruction in Idaho of the prototypereactor for the aircraft carrier USSEnterprise. Thereafter, an entirenuclear-powered fleet slid down theshipyard ways into the sea.22


7 3

C e re n ko v R a d i a t i o n

In 1934, a Russian physicist named P.A. Cerenkov placed some radium in aflask of water. He saw a bluish-white glow in the water.

Cerenkov learned that this glow was caused when the gamma rays hit electronsin the water. The energy of the gamma rays was so great that the electronsmoved through the water faster than light moves through water.

This beautiful blue light was a common sight around the NRTS. Whenever anirradiated fuel slug was removed from a reactor and placed into a water-filledstorage canal, the diffuse blue glow surrounded the slug. Cobalt-60, which alsoemits gamma rays, also produces the light when it is stored in water. The mostbrilliant display of “Cerenkov radiation” appeared when a reactor operated with-in a tank of water. NRTS photographers prized certain photographs of this effectand used them frequently in pamphlets and public information brochures.

Argonne National Laboratory-West 9112

Humorous road sign, erected by an Idaho business

owner on Highway 20 near the Site, entertained

tourists and Site workers alike.

C H A P T E R N I N E

7 4

Dr. Richard Doanand John Horan, director of the Healthand Safety Branch of IDO, were inWashington, D.C., to address a JCAEsubcommittee studying industrialradioactive waste disposal.Representatives from the AEC’s nation-al laboratories and from private indus-tries described for the committee thepractices and standards prevailing attheir sites. It was 1959. The hearingswere part of a series that had begun twoyears earlier with inquiries on theeffects of fallout from nuclear weaponstesting. Judging by their questions, thecommittee was interested in the grow-ing volume of waste, the consequentlygrowing costs of managing it, and itsimpacts on the environment. 1

The disposal of radioactive wastealready was a subject the public knewsomething about. During the ManhattanProject days, Hanford had committedsolid and liquid waste to the ground, apractice that relied on the ion-exchangecapacity of the soil to hold radionu-clides and keep them from migratingmore than a few inches from theirsource. The practice continued duringthe 1950s and was reported freely to the

public. Popular Mechanics magazine,for example, described Hanford’s “hotgarbage” in one of its 1955 issues.Using the sort of exaggeration that dis-mayed scientists, the article tried to getthe point across: “Desert soil soaks upthe deadly wastes with sponge-likerapidity, and earth particles trap and fil-ter much of the radioactive material onthe way down.” In the late 1940s,Argonne scientists in Illinois packedwaste into special containers andthought about placing these in aban-doned salt mines or rocketing them intoouter space.2

The AEC in its early years took littleinterest in waste disposal and declined toestablish uniform policies for its labora-tories. In 1948 the AEC asked its labora-tory directors to meet together and

suggest something. Upon taking a voteat the end of this discussion, the majoritydecided that each lab should solve wastedisposal problems in its own way. T h eAEC went along with this democraticidea. By the time Bill Johnston tookc h a rge of the Idaho station, nothing hadchanged, so the NRTS evaluated itsoptions without reference to prescrip-tions emanating from Wa s h i n g t o n .3

With reactors going critical at theNRTS, radioactivity became a part ofdaily life and had to be understood,controlled, and minimized. Radioactivewaste of various kinds was going to begenerated. It would come in the form ofsolids, liquids, and gases. Like anyother hazard, it could be managed safe-ly if it was respected. The task ofinventing the testing station wasn’t fin-ished until all waste had a destination.Not only did workers have to be pro-tected, but also the nearby populationand the environment they all shared.

For solids, the IDO decided to employ alandfill. IDO’s Division of Engineeringand Construction developed a set of cri-teria and asked the USGS to find agood spot. It should be at least tenacres. Fifteen to twenty feet of sedimen-tary overburden should lie over the lava

HO T ST U F FHeck, we weren’t afraid of it. You just had to be schooled in it. I knew the

HPs were looking out for us.

—Clyde Hammond—

When needed for protection in radiologically contaminated areas, workers wore anti-contamination (anti-C)

clothing including taped shoe covers and gloves, hair coverings, respirators,

and Scott Air-Paks.Argonne National Laboratory-West 9079

rock, and it should contain plenty ofclay. Workers should be able to dig ver-tical-walled trenches and not have themcollapse. Naturally, the area neededgood surface drainage and couldn’t beupstream of any reactor sites. The IDOwanted to be able to get to the landfillwithout having to build a long, expen-sive road.4

The USGS suggested a one-hundred-acre area about two miles southwest ofEBR-I and five miles west of CentralFacilities. The site met most of the crite-ria. The depth of sediment above thelava rock, having been blown by thewind for thousands of years, was notuniformly twenty feet. However, the soilcontained clay, which provided goodion-exchange and absorptive capacity.Any moisture that managed to saturatethe waste and suspend radioactive iso-topes would travel into the soil, wherechemical reactions would tend toremove radionuclides from the waterand bind them to the soil. The waterwould move on, albeit slowly, becausefissures in the lava rock had filled withsediments, and this too would retard themovement of contaminants. The desertclimate, which contributed about eightinches of precipitation per year over theSite, was an ally of the landfill plan, asvery little moisture sank deeply into thesoil. The geologists noted that it wasu n l i k e l y, but possible, that water reach-ing the soil could carry contaminationdownward to the water table (of theSnake River Plain A q u i f e r ) .5

The IDO accepted the USGS recom-mendation and in May 1952 fenced offthe first thirteen acres of the controlledaccess area that soon became known asthe NRTS Burial Ground. In July work-


7 6

R a d i o a c t i v e H a l f - L i f e

Radioactivity is a natural characteristic of elements like radium and uranium. Italso is a characteristic of many elements that have absorbed neutrons while ina nuclear reactor.

The nuclei within radioactive atoms are unstable. They disintegrate (decay) bythrowing off one or more of their constituent particles spontaneously. As timepasses, the material actually changes from one element or isotope into another,one atom at a time.

No one can predict when a specific atom will decay, only the probability that acertain percentage of atoms will disintegrate within a certain period of time.

Physicists decided that the “half-life” of a radioisotope would be a convenientway to describe the decay of a substance: the time required for one half of theatoms to disintegrate.

The process of decay takes place regardless of the temperature, the pressure, orchemical conditions surrounding the substance. Different authorities identifyslight differences in half-life depending on the method used to count. The num-ber following the name of the element identifies a specific isotope that isradioactive. It is the combined number of neutrons and protons in the nucleus ofeach atom.

R a d i o i s o t o p e H a l f - l i f e

Silver-110 24.6 secondsIndium-114 1.198 minutesBarium-137 2.6 minutesLanthanum-140 1.687 daysCadmium-115 2.228 daysRuthenium-97 2.44 daysIodine-131 8.040 daysNiobium-95 34.97 daysHafnium-181 45 daysPolonium-210 138.38 daysCobalt-60 5.271 years

R a d i o i s o t o p e H a l f - l i f e

Krypton-85 10.73 yearsHydrogen-3 (Tritium) 12.32 yearsStrontium-90 25 yearsCesium-137 30 yearsAmericium-241 432.2 yearsRadium-226 1599 yearsCarbon-14 5715 yearsPlutonium-239 24,400 yearsIodine-129 1.72 x 107 yearsUranium-238 4.46 x 109 yearsUranium-235 7.04 x 108 years

ers opened the first trench, six feet wideand nine hundred feet long. The placewas in business. Waste disposal becameanother of the central services providedto contractors doing experiments in thed e s e r t .6

Solid items came from daily routines aswell as one-of-a-kind experiments. T h e yranged from tiny scraps of paper toheavy pieces of equipment. Around thereactor sites, the simplest wastes resultedfrom the very work of trying to preventthe spread of radioactivity in work areas.HPs made daily rounds of reactor areasand laboratories to check for leaks, hotspots, and radioactive dust. Using thinsheets of filter paper, they took hundredsof “swipes” every day. They also wentbeyond the reactor areas. One of theHPs, Henry Peterson, recalled:

Once a week at the Test Reactor A re a[TRA, site of the MTR], we also sur -veyed the areas that were supposed to beclean. We swiped the cafeteria and allthe offices. We swiped desks, drawerhandles, any place where people wereand the things they touched. You’d putthe swipe in a little envelope, label it,and put it in your shirt pocket until youwent to the lab and put it in the counter.It was no big deal—these were micro -curies we’re talking about. Then you’ddo the floor with a wide-area detectorand look for hot spots. If you found one,you used masking tape to pick it up. Ifthat didn’t do it, you’d rope off the are afor cleaning later. We had to prove everyweek that a place was clean.

I remember one time we had to rope offthe entire MTR lab wing because ananalyst was sloppy. He crapped up[contaminated] a hallway by spilling

something on the floor and then walkedaround with it on his shoe.

We also checked dust mops.Maintenance people were pretty thor -ough. Most of the time, we’d find noth -ing, but occasionally we did. Thosekinds of practices were effective [incontrolling radioactivity]. HPs didn’thave a head-hunter mentality. We triedto do critiques that helped reactoroperators solve problems.7

To find some radioactive speck was tocontaminate the smear paper, howevers l i g h t l y. The same was true of mopheadsthat had done their intended job after aspill. Hot-cell work produced waste:beginners as well as experienced opera-tors sometimes spilled a radioactivesample or broke glassware. Some items,even unbroken, were not reused oncethey had been contaminated. The Navyused disposable baby diapers as soak-uprags, although at other hot cells, techni-cians preferred women’s sanitary nap-kins and ordered them by the gross.These, along with smear papers, glovesand glass shards, were tossed into waste

bins marked with the standard yellowand magenta warning symbol and postedfor radioactive waste.8

Larger objects included particulate fil-ters. Having trapped radioactive dustfrom gases sent up laboratory vents andprocess stacks, these were regularly

C H A P T E R 9 • H O T S T U F F

7 7

Above. Aerial view of the Burial Ground in 1973.

Triangular shaped area is the Subsurface Disposal

Area, where transuranic (TRU) wastes were buried

before 1970. Foreground shows the above-ground

Transuranic Storage Area, where TRU wastes were

stored after 1970. Below. Reminders such as this

were placed in Site publications to make employees

aware of the responsibilities associated with

radioactive materials.

INEEL 73-1552

Health Physicists are

your radiation

detectives.

removed and replaced. Nuclear experi-ments generated contaminated debrisand machinery, some of it in large andawkward shapes. Discarded pipe fit-tings resulted from the repair of linesthat had carried contaminated fluids.Structural metal that once had been partof an irradiated fuel assembly had to bediscarded. It all went to the BurialGround.9

Twice a week, someone went to all ofthe reactor buildings and labs, emptiedthe radioactive waste bins, boxed thecontents, and trucked the load to theBurial Ground. Cardboard was suffi-cient for regular items, but woodencrating was used for bulky larger items.An HP went with the truck driver andtook radiation readings near the wastecontainers and in the cab of the truck.Like everyone else, trash haulers werenot allowed to exceed daily radiationdose limits. If a load, such as one con-taining metal parts that had becomeradioactive in the neutron environmentof a reactor, had too high a reading, thedriver used shielded containers andhauled them behind his pick-up truckon a long-tongued trailer. These loadswere then transferred from the truck totheir burial place with the help ofcranes. Depending on how strong theradiation, workers covered the loadwith earth immediately or waited untilthe end of the week. The Burial Groundwas designated for solids only, but afew sealed containers of liquid appar-ently found their way into the firsttrench.10

When the first trench was full, a coverof earth went over it and it was plantedwith native grasses. Another wasopened, and then another, each locationidentified with the help of tags placedon the perimeter fence. The first trenchserved until October 1954. 11

One trench every one or two yearsmight have met local needs at theNRTS, but the AEC had a problemelsewhere that intruded into IDO plans.In 1951 President Truman and thedefense establishment decided that thenation’s security required enlarging itsstockpile of nuclear weapons. Theybegan building new weapons produc-tion plants around the country, one ofthem the AEC’s Rocky Flats FuelFabricating Facility near Golden,Colorado, about sixteen miles north-west of Denver.

The plant went under construction in1951 and began operating in 1952. Herethe AEC manufactured hollow plutoni-um spheres that served as trigger devicesfor nuclear warheads. Rocky Flatsmachine shops also made other weapon


7 8

Above. Open trenches occasionally became

susceptible to flooding from rapid snowmelt or

heavy rains. Below. Workers check radioactivity at a

long-tongued trailer.

INEEL 62-2132

INEEL 09768

parts from stainless-steel, beryllium,depleted uranium, and other metals.Waste materials were contaminated withplutonium, solvents, and other industrialchemicals. Although Rocky Flats operat-ed no nuclear power reactors, its scien-tists conducted criticality experiments inconnection with weapons development. 12

At the time, the Rocky Flats plant occu-pied only four square miles. The watertable beneath the surface was high andknown not to be isolated. Furthermore,a civilian population resided near theplant. Burial of waste on-site obviouslywas a poor option.13

The AEC calculated the cost of landburial at the NRTS and at the NevadaTest Site, another AEC facility. Of thetwo, the NRTS was closer. In April1954 Rocky Flats shipped severaldrums of low-level plutonium waste tothe NRTS in a trial run. The shipmentwent well, the costs were reasonable,and the decision stuck. It was the firstin a steady stream of shipments thatflowed into the Burial Ground fordecades to come. Like it or not, theIDO accommodated Rocky Flats deliv-eries. John Horan said later that theIDO did not like it. Rocky Flats wasnever consistent in how it characterizedits shipments and refused to identify thecontents in any meaningful detail.14

Some of our people got rather orneryabout that, dug their heels in, and thre a t -ened not to accept it at one point. Wed i d n ’t always feel they were honest aboutwhat they were sending us. We had crite -

ria for the Burial Ground, such as “noliquids.” But they did send liquids—t r i c h l o roethylene [was one of them].1 5

Rocky Flats justified keeping secretsfrom IDO managers as a matter ofnational security. The NRTS was notconsidered a weapons laboratory anddid not have access to many of thedetails concerning the waste or how itwas generated. After considerable hag-gling between IDO and Rocky Flatsover this, Rocky Flats finally agreed tosupply IDO with an annual memoran-dum summarizing the waste that hadbeen shipped during the previous year.16

The fact that waste shipments came toIdaho from Rocky Flats, however, wasa matter of public record. At the 1959hearing, which was public, the chair-man of the subcommittee, Carl T.Durham, interrupted a discussion on thecost of waste disposal to ask Horan:

Chairman Durham: Are you receivingany material from any other operationsexcept what is going on at Idaho?

Mr. Horan: Yes, sir; we do. We receivea large volume of waste from the RockyFlats plant near Denver, Colorado, butthis is the only other contributor ofwaste at our location.

Representative [Chet] Holified: Is thata processing plant?

Mr. Horan: It is a weapons fabricationfacility.17

Plutonium and other human-made ele-ments have an atomic number greaterthan that of uranium, which is 92, andare thus referred to as “transuranic” ele-ments, or TRU. All are radioactive, andmany have extremely long half-lives.Plutonium emits alpha particles, forwhich a piece of paper or three inches


7 9

INEEL 61-1824

Dumpster waste included boxed items, metal

containers, and other scraps.

of air is sufficient shielding. This char-acteristic differentiated Rocky Flatswaste from fission- or activation-prod-uct waste producing beta particles orgamma rays, which required strongershielding. When the sealed drums ofTRU waste arrived at the BurialGround, workers handled them withnothing more than a gloved hand.Typically drums were taken off theback of the truck and hand stacked inrows in the center of a pit. Material thatarrived in wooden crates went aroundthe edge of the pit. Sometimes, workershandled unusual volumes—and pack-ages—of waste, as labor foreman ClydeHammond recalled:18

Once we got a bunch of stuff from aCalifornia contractor who buried wasteat sea. He had it all ready to bury andthen he went broke. He had it alreadyloaded, so it came out to the Site, andthey were all concrete barrels. Some ofthose barrels weighed more than a tonapiece. So we buried them out here.

They had a big spill at Rocky Flats,Colorado, and we got their whole plantout there, lathes even. It was a bigmess. Truck after truckloads of stuff.19

The “big spill” at Rocky Flats wascaused by a fire in September 1957. Asmall pile of plutonium shavings ignit-ed spontaneously in a glove box.Inexplicably, the glove box was madeof acutely flammable plexiglas, and thefire raced out of control through thebuilding. The fire blew out or burnedhundreds of ventilation filters and melt-ed the top of an exhaust stack. Thebulky clean-up debris went to theNRTS Burial Ground packed in thou-sands of barrels.20

By the time of the fire, the BurialGround’s first thirteen acres—and tentrenches—had been filled up. InNovember 1957, two months after thefire, the IDO opened up new acreage.Workers began digging pits for thebulky post-fire increase of TRU waste.They continued using trenches for theNRTS’s own fission- and activation-product waste. However, when some-one at the NRTS generated an item toobulky for the narrow trenches, the prac-tical thing to do was to place it in oneof the Rocky Flats pits. Thus, differentwaste types were mixed together insome areas. The main differencebetween a trench and a pit was theshape of the excavation. Pits were ofvarying sizes. Some of the large oneswere up to 300 feet wide and 1,100 feetlong. Others were as small as 50 feetwide by 250 feet long. The work pre-sented certain challenges to equipmentoperators. Hammond recalled how theysolved one of them:21


8 0

Above. Work stations inside the Rocky Flats

fabrication plant had numerous glove ports. Below.

Sealed enclosures called glove boxes allowed for

workers to handle plutonium without direct exposure

to it.

Courtesy U.S. Department of Energy-Rocky Flats 26568-02

U.S. Department of Energy 350 074 001

We had to keep two feet of dirt betweenthe solid rock and the barrels. Well,nobody knew how to do that, since wedidn’t know where the rock was andwhether it laid evenly beneath the sur -face. So we drilled holes down to therock... We’d measure the hole and thenpour corn seed in the hole to fill thebottom two feet. Then when we dug thepits, the equipment operators wouldcome in with cats and cans [tractorsequipped with scrapers]. We took allthat dirt off. When we hit the corn, weknew we had two feet left to the rock.That’s how we dug the pits and kept ourtwo feet of dirt on top of the rock. Itworked. It was an HP’s idea.22

This application of Yankee ingenuityeventually changed. Later excavationswere made to bedrock and then back-filled with soil and clay. Another once-practical technique that flourishedduring the 1960s also gave way. In1963, some combination of labor short-ages (caused by strikes) and fundingproblems led Burial Ground operatorsto start rolling waste drums off thebacks of trucks and let them lay in thepits where they landed. With RockyFlats barrels coming in by the thou-sands, tipping them out was faster andcheaper than manhandling every barrel.The practice, which continued until1969, was further justified by the factthat it reduced potential exposure ofworkers to radiation. The barrels,regarded as settled in their final restingplace, were expected to deteriorateeventually, so the environmental impactof the procedure, which damaged ordented some of the barrels, was regard-ed as of no serious consequence.23

Between 1960 and 1963 the AEC des-ignated the NRTS, along with OakRidge, as a disposal area for commer-cial radioactive wastes from suchplaces as hospitals and universities.Previously, commercial businesses hadplaced this material in the oceans, butthe practice was too costly to continue.No commercial landfill sites wereavailable anywhere else in the countryat the time. The designation resulted inrelatively little new waste for the BurialGround, but it provoked NRTS man-agers to remind the AEC that the NRTSfacility lay over an aquifer. Eventhough the NRTS was taking no unduerisks, the AEC should look for perma-nent waste disposal sites elsewhere.24

Gradually, improvements and changesoccurred over the years. Different typesof waste were segregated, record keep-ing methods grew more sophisticated,procedures and requirements becamemore formal. Upper limits on the level

of radioactivity handled at the BurialGround went into effect after 1957. InFebruary 1962 nearly two inches of rainfell on snow and frozen ground, causinglocalized flooding. One pit and twotrenches were open at the time, allowingpools to form, overflow, and carrydumped items beyond the excavatedarea. After this, a diversion drainagesystem was constructed in hopes of pre-venting another such episode.Guidelines were established for fission-able material (U-235, Plutonium-239) toprevent the possibility of accidental crit-icalities. Decades later, analysts study-ing the waste regretted thatstandardization had not arrived earlier;they could have used better informationabout early waste types and their specif-ic locations. Early records of what wentinto the trenches were not complete. But


8 1

A crane helps workers unload Rocky Flats barrels in

1961.

INEEL 61-1650

the Burial Ground was intended to be apermanent facility. No one at the timeimagined that someone would ever wishto disturb it.25 As John Horan said to theJCAE at the hearing:

Senator [John O.] Pastore: For howlong will that burial ground be consid -ered quarantined?

Mr. Horan: Indefinitely.26

Likewise, environmental monitoringimprovements came gradually to theBurial Ground. The USGS drilled asystem of ten monitoring holes west ofthe burial trenches in 1960 so that theprogress of any subsurface moisturecould be detected. Film badges went uparound the perimeter fence to monitordirect radiation levels at the boundaryof the Burial Ground. Later yearsbrought additional monitoring holes,test wells, and more sophisticated mon-itoring techniques, particularly after the

public became more concerned aboutthe possible migration of contaminantsto the aquifer.27

With respect to the liquid wastes gener-ated at the NRTS, Doan and Horandescribed for the JCAE the NRTS strat-egy. The philosophy was similar to thatfollowed at AEC facilities elsewhere. Itdepended on whether the waste wascontaminated with radioactivity or not,and if so, whether the hazard was“high-level” or “low-level.” If it werelow-level, the strategy was to dilute itand disperse it to nature—into the air,water table, or soil. High-level wasteswere those for which such dispersionwould endanger the environment. Here,the strategy was to hold onto the mater-ial, typically in stainless-steel tanks atthe Chem Plant, concentrating it if pos-sible to reduce the cost of managing it.28

Water was by far the major constituentof most low-level liquid radioactive(and non-radioactive) waste. Reactoroperations used water by the billions ofgallons every year as a reactor coolantand in canals to store irradiated fuel.Water was used in decontamination. Atthe Chem Plant water was used in avariety of ways—for cooling, to makeup chemical reagents, for dilution, andto clean up process equipment.Evaporator condensate at the ChemPlant produced large volumes of water.

Depending on how it had been used, astream of waste water might be contami-nated by virtue of irradiation, as when itpassed through a reactor, or because ithad picked up particles in the clean-up ofspills or equipment. To determine whatlevel of dilution, if any, were neededbefore a watery waste could be dispersed


8 2

Above. Workers unload and stack drums of Rocky

Flats waste in 1958. Delivery truck required no

shielding. Below. A load of drums containing 1969

fire debris tumbles into a burial pit.

INEEL 69-6138

INEEL58-1450

to the environment, the IDO used as itsguide a National Bureau of Standardshandbook known as Handbook 52. T h i sbook identified the maximum allowableconcentrations of each radioisotope thatcould be permitted in public water sup-plies. In lieu of any other guidance fromAEC Headquarters, the NRTS used thishandbook in its own way, as Horandescribed for the JCAE:2 9

Liquid radioactive wastes discharged tothe ground are maintained at such levelsthat the concentration in water at then e a rest point of use down gradient willnot exceed one-tenth of the maximumpermissible concentration... Solutionswhich are within the prescribed limitsmay be discharged to the gro u n d w a t e rtable through wells, pits, or ponds.Adsorption, dilution, and decay factorsdetermined by IDO may be used inestablishing allowable concentrations atpoints of discharge in order to complywith our basic guide...3 0

The USGS had advised the IDO thatwater flowed through the aquifer at arate of thirty-five feet per day. Horancontinued:

Since this cannot be a precise determi -nation, and recognizing that there arevariations from location to location, asafety factor of 10 has been incorporat -ed into our calculations. Therefore, wehave assumed a linear velocity of 350feet per day.31

Thus, the IDO had evaluated the riskinherent in discharging above anaquifer and developed formulas con-taining several safety factors. The for-mulas exaggerated the rate of flow byten times and reduced the allowablemaximums (at the point of use) by tentimes. Against these factors, the half-life of each isotope was considered.The IDO Health and Safety Divisionthen translated all of these factors into aset of disposal guidelines for each

radioisotope and obliged all of its con-tractors to follow them when sendingany liquids into the environment.32

To reduce the uncertainties pertainingto water flow in the aquifer, Horanstepped up environmental research. Hehired, among other specialists, soils sci-entist Bruce Schmalz to work with theUSGS on further investigations of theinterplay between the waste, the soils,and the aquifer. Early research was con-ducted at a 600-foot-deep low-levelwaste injection well at the Chem Plant,into which went water that had beentreated with sodium chloride—salt. TheUSGS drilled fifteen monitoring wellsdown-gradient from the injection well,thinking that the salt in the injectedwater would act as a convenient tracer.Each day, the Chem Plant dischargecontained up to two tons of salt. Whennormal sampling methods repeatedlyfailed to detect any salt in the monitor-ing wells, Schmaltz tried somethingelse:

One of the first things I did was todecide that something different neededto be done. We weren’t getting any -where, so to speak. I’d heard about theuse of a florescent dye. So I and anoth -er fellow mixed up a fifty-gallon drumof this fluorescent dye and put it downthe well together with a big slug of salt.The slug was, I think about fifteen tonsall at once. We never did find the salt,but we found the fluorescent dye... Thisstarted the analysis of the rate of move -ment [of water in the aquifer] and thediminution of concentrations as a func -tion of distance.33


8 3

Settling pond at the Test Reactor Area in 1967.INEEL 67-5191

Elsewhere at the NRTS, settling pondsor disposal to a drain were used insteadof injection wells. This was done main-ly to prevent accidental discharges ofconcentrations above the allowed con-centrations. The ponds worked in con-cert with holding tanks and monitoringroutines. Horan described the early sys-tem used at the Naval Reactors Facility(NRF):

The NRF had two waste tanks, 125,000gallons each, into which all of the liq -uid drainage of the reactor buildingwere collected. The liquid was thensampled when a tank was filled andanalyzed in the health physics countingroom...[The analysis determined whatradioactive constituents were in thewater.] After measurement, the waste

could be pumped out in a pipe that ranunderground until it reached a Frenchdrain in the southeastern area outsidethe fence. The Navy reactors that cameafter the STR [S1W] were held to azero-leakage design standard. Littleradioactive material appeared in thewaste holding tanks from those plants. 34

At TRA, Phillips used retention basins.MTR operations used demineralizedwater to cool the reactor and to shieldthe spent fuel in the canals. Despite thispretreatment to remove impurities, thewater contained traces of sodium thatwere activated while passing through thereactor core and had a half-life of aboutfifteen hours. This then became part ofthe waste stream, but had to be helduntil the sodium had time to decay,

about a week. In the canal, the claddingon a spent fuel element occasionallydeveloped a pinhole leak. Fission prod-ucts within the element then leached intothe canal water. The water was constant-ly bled off and replaced with freshw a t e r, so after such a leak, it containedtraces of fission products. The waterwent to a soil-lined pond after passingthrough a filtration system. Solids settledto the bottom of the pond, the smallerparticles adsorbed or absorbed by thec l a y. The particles continued theirradioactive decay while the water evapo-rated. These procedures were part of thegeneral routine, although unofficial sideexperiments were not unknown, accord-ing to HP John Byrom.3 5

Some interested fisherman conductedhis own experiment by dumping a fewfertilized trout eggs into one of the hotsettlement ponds. We noticed a fewlarge healthy(?) trout swimming aroundin the pond for several years after.These ponds were sampled monthly formany years—or more frequently whenan incident indicated that radioactivematerial greater than normal had beenaccidentally released to the ponds.36

The IDO operated a hot laundry towash coveralls and other protectiveclothing that had served its mission inthe course of someone’s work. Locatedat Central Facilities, the laundry drainwent to a septic tank and drainfieldwith other sanitary waste. 37

Also at Central was a landfill for non-radioactive waste. As a fully equippedindustrial complex, the NRTS support-ed machine shops, carpentry shops, fab-ricating centers, paint shops,automotive and bus garages, electric


8 4

Sodium potassium (NaK) waste is flammable and potentially explosive in contact with water or moist air.

Shooting the barrels containing it introduced air in the container, causing combustion. A fire hose was used to

complete the burn of any waste not initially burned. This Nak disposal took place in Trench 7 in 1956.

INEEL 56-3203

substations, and every conceivable kindof non-radioactive laboratory—chemi-cal, metallurgical, photographic, anddosimetry. All of these activities gener-ated their own typical wastes—metaland wood scraps, solvents, resins,acids, caustics, broken tools, emptycontainers, and the like. Depending onthe material, it was disposed of in thevicinity of the particular work area or itwent to the landfill at Central. Sanitarywaste went into sewage lagoons at eachreactor complex. Even paper productshad a treatment protocol. Some wasshredded and incinerated; in later years,some of it was compressed, made intopellets, and sent to fuel the coal-firedpower plant at the south end of theChem Plant.38

Some varieties of chemical waste posedexplosive hazards, and these werestored or treated by methods unique tothe substance. Sodium potassium alloy(NaK), for example, could react explo-sively when placed in contact withwater. Occasionally, small flasks ofNaK had to be discarded. On one occa-sion, five such flasks went into a con-tainer which was then isolated in atrench at the Burial Ground. A securityofficer fired upon the container with acharge intended to ignite the contentsand burn it. A small water supply and ahose stood by to give the NaK furtherencouragement to burn.39

Finally, wastes could take the form ofgases. Procedures for releasing gaseswith radioactive elements, most ofwhich were relatively short-lived, fol-lowed a similar logic as that for liquids.The dilution medium was air ratherthan water. These releases were subjectto continuous study and research con-

ducted jointly by the IDO and theWeather Bureau. Mechanical measuresfor holding, filtering, and scrubbingparalleled the measures used for aque-ous wastes, as did the monitoring activ-ities that accompanied all releases.

In the 1990s, the National Center forDisease Control undertook to identifythe radiation dose to a hypotheticalindividual located off-site at a point ofmaximal exposure to Site releasesbetween 1952 and 1989. To do thismeant identifying the possible path-ways by which radiation might havetraveled away from the Site. The ana-lysts who performed the retrospectivestudy concluded that of all the potentialpathways by which radiation mighthave reached off-site citizens, only thegaseous releases were of potential inter-est, and even those had been small.Solid and liquid waste disposal prac-tices had not, at least until that time,provided a pathway to human popula-tions, and were therefore of no conse-quence to the study. Solid and liquidwaste practices had produced no mea-surable exposure to anyone beyond theboundaries of the Site.40


8 5

C H A P T E R T E N

8 6

By February 1957,USS Nautilus had run as far as her firstloading of fuel would allow. The boathad traveled 62,562 miles, more thanhalf of them submerged. She had hostedroyalty, entertained political leaders,and convincingly played the role of ahigh-speed enemy submarine in Navywar games. Now she sailed home toGroton, Connecticut, for thedelicate process of removingthe reactor core and replac-ing it with a new and betterone.

Fuel in the unshielded coreemitted gamma radiation sointense that a few momentsof close exposure wouldcause death. The procedureto remove the core from theboat was pre-planned in end-less detail. The objectivewas to move the core into ashielded transport cask and hoist thecask onto a truck. This conceptuallysimple—but highly complex—task tooktwo months to accomplish. Nautilus

then sailed away to the Pacific Ocean,and the old core was sent across thecountry to Idaho.1

A brand new facility, the ExpendedCore Facility (ECF), was being readiedat the NRTS to undertake the equallydelicate task of unloading the cask andplacing it safely in a deep pool of water,a procedure that took about three days.

Within the Navy’s complex, the ECFwas located near the north fence. Itbegan as a building 340 feet long,although its designers expected it toexpand as the workload grew. Theyconsidered the facility an importantcontinuation of the research and devel-opment phase of the nuclear industry.Here were complete reactor cores thathad served their missions, not merelysample elements tested in the MTR. Did

the fuel operate as predict-ed? How well did thecladding hold up? Howmuch beyond its design lifemight the core have lasted?By no means would theNavy rest on the perfor-mance of the first cores.2

Nor would a commercialpower industry, once it hadbegun. The designers visit-ed Hanford and other placesto study how they handledirradiated cores. They

hoped the ECF would become a modelsystem, a sound demonstration for theindustry sure to come in the future.3

CO R E S A N D CO M P ET E N C I E SWith atomic energy in the engine room, guided missiles in the hangars to

topside, and the target-seeking homing weapons in the torpedo tubes, the submarine of the future figures to be the instrument of war

most benefitted by atomic era science.

—All Hands, Oct. 13, 1951—

The ECF under construction, looking east toward

S1W. Equipment and water pits take shape.

Naval Reactor Facilities 10024

ECF railcar defueling station. Transfer cask is positioned over top of railcar.Naval Reactor Facilities

The action was definitely underwaterwithin the ECF. The safest way to storethe cores and have access to them wasto place them in “water pits,” the Navyequivalent to the MTR “canals.” Thebasic problem was getting close enoughto the fuel to handle or study it. When atruck or train car arrived with a load,the first move was to hoist the entiretransport cask into the water of areceiving pit and set it down on the(heavily reinforced) concrete floor.After that, subsequent manipulationsextracted the fuel from the cask andmoved it from one water-pit work sta-tion to the next. 4

Engineers constantly invented or adapt-ed gadgets and machines to do under-water what was taken for granted in thedry, non-radioactive world. Becauseworking with a whole core or fuel ele-ment was too dangerous or bulky, theywould shear a piece off or punch apiece out. Hack saws and band saws cutand chopped to obtain representativesamples. Other instruments measuredand weighed them. Periscope ports andobservation windows with shieldingpower equal to the concrete walls of thepits gave visual access into the water.Workers guided the remote manipula-tors by the light of standard divinglamps. They were quick to try newways to see through the water. Whentelevision cameras were commerciallyavailable, they bought one from thelocal Farnsworth Electric Company,encased it in a stainless-steel can,installed a window in one end, anddipped it into the water. Experimenta-tion was a part of daily work:

ECF Engineering designed an under -water core-component de-scale system[to remove hardened incrustation onmetal parts] in late 1962. This includedan inner vessel ...encased in an outervessel, [each] with a bolt-on top andseal. The void space between the ves -sels was pressurized with air to dis -place the water after the componentwas loaded; then the inner vessel waspumped full of de-scale solution andcirculated while being heated...

It operated for a time with moderatesuccess...until the inevitable happened,the top cover seals failed. Water pits #1and #2 were “deep purple” for a week,and it was several months before alltrace of purple color was gone. Thatevent ended the underwater de-scaleoperation.5

And unusual events occasionally pro-duced a “lesson learned.”

A rail car container crashed throughthe closed west-end roll-up door num -ber 6 one morning during car switchingoperations. The rail car uncoupledfrom the switch engine and slowlyrolled through the closed gate and theclosed door. The surprised crafts fore -men and others threw tools and woodblocks in front of the wheels to bringthe railcar to a stop before it ran off theend of the rails and into the water pit.One immediate corrective action was toinstall rail stops at the end of the tracksby the craft offices, and of course theother actions were to replace the fencegate and the roll-up door.6

After the shearing and milling opera-tions, the portions of fuel that wouldnot be examined further were movedthrough the pits and out of the buildingto the Chemical Processing Plant. Othernon-fuel solids went to the NRTSBurial Ground.

The ECF inspected and analyzed thefuels from S1W and the other Idahoprototype reactors in addition to fuelfrom Nautilus, USS Seawolf, and othervessels. The original plant wasdesigned to process three cores a year


8 8

ECF workers on the defueling platform above an

M-140 railcar prepare to receive fuel into a transfer

cask.


per shift, but new business requiredexpansion. In addition to fuel from thevessels of the growing Nuclear Navy,MTR-irradiated specimens came toECF scientists. Spent fuel from theShippingport reactor was shipped to theECF from Pennsylvania for examina-tion. The detailed examination ofnuclear fuels accomplished its purpose.Reactor fuel improved. Structuralalloys and cladding improved. Overtime, inspections grew more preciseand more exacting. The life of a shipcore eventually matched the design lifeof the ship itself, twenty years or more.By 1989, the ECF building had grownto a length of a thousand feet.7

Greater work loads—and larger cores—generated more risk of exposure toradiation, and protection strategiesgrew ever more sophisticated. In theearliest days, people leaving workareas—not only at the Navy facility butelsewhere at the NRTS—submittedthemselves to “friskers,” hand-heldprobes that scanned hands, shoes, andperhaps the whole body for radioactivi-ty. Nearby were rolls of tape, so that aworker could remove a hot particle by apress of the tape and leave it in a col-lection can. But experience and innova-tion produced ever cleaner work areas.

It was not uncommon to press off a hot[particle] almost every time one left thehigh bay. Next came shoe covers forentry into the high bay. Then came therequirement to cover the hot spot withtape and proceed to the radcon [radia -tion control] field office, where the rad

techs removed the particle and saved itfor isotope identification and foot trailmapping for possible pickup location.Better radiological work practices,deck oil mopping, and improved anti-C[ontamination] clothing and launder -ing all contributed to significantreductions in particle spread.8

Elsewhere in the Navy complex, thereactor prototype program also wasgrowing. Admiral Rickover had sentthe first crew of the Nautilus to train atS1W in Idaho. After that, trainingseemed an obvious mission for thereactor, to the lifelong gratitude of gen-erations of young women in the neigh-boring towns. When each traineearrived in Idaho, he had a few days tofind and settle a place to live. One infour of the trainees married before hissix months of training were over, and itwasn’t unheard of for a man to meet,court, and marry, all in his first twoweeks.9

Rickover’s ideas about the training ofnuclear plant operators were controver-sial within the Navy. He wanted to traina new type of naval officer, unfetteredby what Rickover saw as the uselesstraditions embedded in regular Navytraining. On the basis that assuringsafety aboard ship required that all shippersonnel be able to evaluate potentialhazards, Rickover had his way. He

C H A P T E R 1 0 • C O R E S A N D C O M P ET E N C I E S

8 9

Right. Rickover at hull entrance to S1W prototype.

Below. Navy students in training onboard S1W

prototype.



established a system of nuclear trainingschools, and the desert prototype wasan essential part of it. Rickover super-vised the preparation of textbooks andordered that no examinations containmultiple-choice or true-false questions.Tests required essays, definitions, state-ments of fact, or calculations.Homework was required, and since itoften involved classified material,trainees had to do it on the premises,not at home.10

The controlling philosophy was self-responsibility. Rickover rejected simu-lations in favor of real reactors. “Youhave to train people to react to the realsituation at all times. But if they aretrained with a simulator, they tend toexpect there will be no consequences,”he said. Rickover didn’t want to trainthe wrong instincts by using a machinethat could not mimic a real nuclearpower plant under real-time conditions,including casualties. Computers capa-

ble of doing this were not available atthe time. Cross-training also wasimportant. Electricians should knowmechanical systems, for example.Trainees came to the desert after sixmonths of theoretical instruction from aspecialty school elsewhere in the sys-tem. In Idaho a trainee began by pick-ing up—or trying to—a “triple-hernia-sized” crate of operating manuals,instructions, and schematics.11

Using the books and seeking theinstructors he needed, the trainee tracedevery system, component by compo-nent. Enlisted men, no less than offi-cers, learned and used technicallyaccurate vocabulary, no nicknames orshortcuts. Common language tended tolevel everyone; it wasn’t unusual for apetty officer 3rd class to be instructingan officer. Due to the prevailing Idahopractice—at least in the early years—ofwearing civilian clothes, visiting Navybrass from the regular Navy were in for


9 0

S o m e o f A d m i r a lR i c ko v e r ’s F a v o r i t e

A p h o r i s m s

Employees at the NRF used tohang plaques around the place toremind themselves of the

Admiral’s philosophy on Life andTime.

Heaven is blessed with perfect rest.The blessing of earth is toil.

Every hour has sixty golden min -utes, each studded with sixty dia -

mond seconds.

When you waste your time, remem -ber even God cannot undo the past.

In this school, the smartest work ashard as those who must struggle to

pass.

The secret of success: late to bed,early to rise, work like hell and

you’ll be wise.

Hal Paige

A1W under construction. Photo, circa 1956,

shows S1W spray pond in foreground.Naval Reactor Facilities

new experiences. An admiral oncetoured the S1W prototype and thenstayed for lunch with his guides. Laterhe learned who the men were. “Enlistedmen! I thought they were college physi-cists!”12

When he felt competent in a system,the trainee sought an instructor toexamine him and sign his checklist.Mastery gradually produced a long listof signatures. The trainee then stoodwatch at one of the operating stations inthe hull. At first, he was paired with amore experienced mate, but then hehimself was in charge. Learn one sta-tion, move to the next. The traineesstarted the reactor plant, took it up tofull power, maneuvered, shut it down,repaired it, maintained it. Although thenuclear program attracted the top twopercent of the Navy’s enlistees, somemen wiped out, usually because of afailure of self-initiative, not academicinsufficiency. There were few secondchances. The story is told that one hotsummer day, a few sailors took arefreshing but forbidden dip in a cool-ing-water pond on their way home.Caught, they were dismissed.13

The training program grew more com-plicated as nuclear fuel evolved and asthe Navy adapted nuclear power to sur-face vessels. In 1958 a second proto-type, A1W (Afor aircraft carrier), wentcritical in a new building west of S1W.The prototype actually consisted of tworeactors, “A” and “B,” which poweredone propeller shaft, a “first” that theNRF quickly added to its list of credits.The arrangement simulated EngineRoom Number Three of an aircraft car-rier, the first of which was USS

Enterprise, a mammoth ship containingeight reactors and four engine rooms.On aircraft carriers, there is room out-board of the reactor compartments toput other equipment or offices. Tomake those areas habitable withoutstay-time restrictions, the compartmentsneeded to be shielded on the sides. TheA1W prototype, therefore, did notrequire testing in a tank of water.14

The conventional steam plant aboardnon-nuclear aircraft carriers suppliedenergy to catapult airplanes off thedecks. When nuclear reactors took theirplace, they operated at temperatures notas high as conventional plants.Producing a sufficiently powerful headof steam for the catapult thereforerequired some adaptation of operations.A series of experiments at A1W simu-lated catapult launches using steamdraw-down from the reactor. Each test

produced a terrific boom that rolledacross the desert and might havereminded Naval Proving Ground veter-ans of the good old days at the gunneryrange.15

Then in 1961 came the S5G prototype(the 5th submarine design, made byGeneral Electric). As the Cold Warintensified, the United States and theUSSR poured their latest technologyinto the theory and practice of underseawarfare. They wired the ocean floorswith sound detectors. These called forthtechnology to quiet the submarines.One source of noise came from thepumps that circulated the coolantthrough the reactor and kept it underpressure. The art of sound detectionbecame so refined that skilled listenerscould identify the unique sound pat-terns of individual boats. So the mis-sion of S5G was to eliminate noise.16


9 1

1950s photo showing A1W in center view. Round-top structure on roof is an all-weather shelter for a crane.


S5G, like S1W, was built in a huge boxof a building, its roof presenting aninscrutable flat surface to satellite cam-eras passing overhead. The reactor wentcritical for the first time in September1965. The hull section floated in a“basin” of water. Operators inside thehull used equipment to make the hullrock back and forth, adding more real-ism to the simulation. In this setting,the Navy developed a method of circu-lating the reactor’s cooling water with-out using a pump and exploiting theprinciple that warm water rises. USSNarwhal was the first boat equippedwith the system. At high speeds, pumpswere still needed, so the controllercould move the coolant either by so-called “forced” or “natural” methods.17

Rickover made sure that the thousandsof Navy trainees who came through theprogram at Idaho—and the contractorswho designed and built the Navy’s

reactors—were exposed to his philoso-phy of safety. The men in a nuclear-powered submarine had no avenue ofescape in the event of an accident.Therefore, safety engineering and train-ing had to guarantee that accidentswould not happen. Every feature of themachine, beginning with its design, hadto be completely free of error. Safetylay in the perfection of parts, compo-nents, and assemblies. Ultimately, themost important safeguard was humancompetence—trained, tested, reliable.18

This approach contrasted somewhatwith the general philosophy employedby the AEC in creating the reactor test-ing station in a remote location. If acci-dents were to occur, then a combinationof isolation and engineering safeguardswould reduce the consequences. Later,when the AEC began to license com-mercial reactors, its approach to thepublic’s safety continued to rely on


9 2

R i c k o v e r o nR e s p o n s i b i l i t y

Responsibility is a unique concept:It can only reside and inhere in asingle individual. You may share

it with others, but your portion isnot diminished. You may delegate it,but it is still with you. You may dis-claim it, but you cannot divest your-self of it. Even if you do notrecognize it or admit its presence,you cannot escape it. If responsibili-ty is rightfully yours, no evasion orignorance or passing the blame canshift the burden to someone else.Unless you can point your finger atthe person who is responsible whensomething goes wrong, then youhave never had anyone reallyresponsible.19

Admiral Hyman Rickover


The S5G prototype floating in its basin.Naval Reactor Facilities

S1W on the day of Admiral Rickover’s death,

July 8, 1986.

remoteness and engineering safeguards.Rickover, by instituting managementsystems for “quality,” was considerablyahead of the rest of American industry.20

Rickover preferred to visit the NRFwith little or no advance notice, partlyto avoid wasteful ceremony and partlyto observe conditions as they were,unvarnished and unpolished. However,this didn’t mean that his hosts preferredto be surprised. People did what theycould to predict his trips to the NRTSso they could be as well-prepared aspossible.21

Whether he was expected or not,Rickover visits left memorable impres-sions on the people who met him.Stories about the man were passed onto a new generation of NRF workerswho had not known him. Secretariesfrom steno pools recalled standing byto take dictation while he waited forairplanes. He liked to collect silver dol-lars, commonly in circulation in the1950s, so office cashiers checked theirsupplies and polished them up.Outdoors, groundskeepers gathered upcigarette butts and repainted firehydrants if they didn’t look brightenough. One story (among many oth-ers) is retold with many variations in it:

Admiral James D. Watkins, Chief ofNaval Operations, came to the NRF tospeak at an officer graduation ceremo -ny [or for a visit.] On his way to theNRF, a guard stopped him for speeding[or for not having a security badge].“Do you know who I am?” Watkinsasked the guard. The guard said, “Nosir, but you’re not short and you don’thave white hair, so you’re not AdmiralRickover.”

“What would you say if I told you Iwere Rickover’s boss?” said Watkins.“Then I’d know you were lying, sir.Rickover ain’t got no boss.”22

The stories celebrate a man who by thesheer force of his brilliance, wit, anddedication created an institution ascomplex and world-changing as theNuclear Navy. An abiding respect con-tinues for Rickover’s simple belief thatthere was no room for error aboardnuclear-powered submarines.


9 3

C H A P T E R E L E V E N

9 4

It was 1950. ChemistDon Reid and others at Oak Ridge werenearing the end of four years’ work toinvent and design a pilot chemical pro-cessing plant for MTR fuel. They hadfound a work place in what Reid called“a little bit of a shed” on a hill over-looking the Oak Ridge plant and nextdoor to the shed commandeered byCaptain Rickover for his early studiesin naval nuclear propulsion. Reidrecalled how they got started.

After looking around the laboratory andother areas in Oak Ridge...and seeingwhat was available in the way of mater -ial, it was decided to use old bismuth-phosphate plant equipment stored in thefield west of the laboratory... We foundsome old...columbium-stabilized stain -less-steel plates out in the field and thiswas to be used for the dissolver. Thiswas taken by R.M. “Murph” Jones,later of MTR Engineering, to NooterEngineering Works in St. Louis, a fabri -cator for Monsanto. Jones followed thefabrication of this special piece ofequipment, and it was a very successfulprototype of the [Chem Plant] dis -solvers.1

The group patched the equipmenttogether and began their experiments.The goal was to design a process fordissolving MTR fuel and extractingfrom it the substantial percentage of U-235 that had not fissioned during itsseventeen days in the reactor. The hugeexpense of gaseous diffusion wasinvested in the fuel, so the effort torecover and recycle unused fuel waswell justified.

The dissolver vessel was important. Ithad to contain the powerful acids thatwould dissolve sturdy metal alloys andnot itself dissolve. Also it had to besmall enough that the uranium inside itcould not accidentally form a criticalmass. Engineering was at least as impor-tant as the chemistry.

Dealing with the waste that the dissolu-tion process would produce also occu-pied the group. They experimented withevaporators to reduce the volume ofwaste, much of which would be water.They articulated the principle of “holdingthe concentrate and discharging the con-densate,” a philosophy consistent withthe AEC facilities’general approach towaste management—retaining high-levelwaste and dispersing low-level waste.

The group erected a pilot plant and afterconsiderable experimentation, decidedon the chemicals, the design of vesselsand pipes, and the sequence of stepsthat would separate the uranium fromthe dissolved solution. They testedvalves and instrumentation in a seriesof “cold run” tests using natural urani-um and “warm runs” using low levelsof irradiated uranium. Then they askedthe AEC for five kilograms of irradiatedU-235 from an Oak Ridge reactor.

TH E CH E M PL A N TThe crew is versatile, processing various types of fuel at different times...

—Phillips Petroleum Company—

Dissolver vessel for zirconium-alloyed fuels is in the

foreground in this view inside a processing cell. The

cells were entered rarely, and only after thorough

decontamination.

INEEL 64-1808

Chem Plant technician demonstrates use of master-slave manipulator. Photographer entered hot cell

before cell became “hot.”INEEL 68-1275

We were down in the cells one daywhen Miles Leverett brought in DavidLilienthal, the chairman of the AEC. Helooked around and said, “You are mov -ing along pretty well.” We said, “Yes,but we want to get five kilograms of U-235 irradiated, but we can’t get itthrough the bureaucracy. He went backto Washington and three days later wehad approval...

Somebody got the idea that if we couldget this material irradiated in aHanford production reactor where theflux was ten to fifty times higher thanOak Ridge’s, we would get a biggerburn-up and a better demonstration. Imade a trip to Hanford to look intothis, but Hanford was not interested indoing outside irradiation. They had to

use all their neutrons for the productionof plutonium. It was brought out thatwe were not asking for neutrons butgiving them. They took a new look at itand pretty soon we had approval to gointo the Hanford reactor.2

Upon seeding the reactor with enrichedU-235 fuel elements, called slugs,Hanford happily discovered that theslugs helped increase the production oftritium. Tritium was a radioactive iso-tope of hydrogen used in bombs toboost the explosive power of the pluto-nium chain reaction. The AEC wasbuilding a reactor plant at SavannahRiver, South Carolina, to produce tri -tium, but until it was completed, theAEC was counting on Hanford. Thus itwas decided that the Chem Plant, when

it was completed, would recover theunfissioned U-235 in the Hanfordslugs.3

At AEC Headquarters, meanwhile, thestaff concerned with weapons researchwas thinking about the Chem Plant inconnection with an altogether differentissue. It was trying to decide which ofthe AEC facilities should produceradioactive lanthanum-140, called RaLafor short, a material needed at LosAlamos for weapons experiments. OakRidge had been producing RaLa, but itsequipment was hard to decontaminate,couldn’t keep a predictable schedule,and was exposing workers to too muchradiation. The bomb scientists at LosAlamos needed a more reliable source.The AEC had initially decided to builda new RaLa facility at Hanford, butwith the MTR and the Chem Plantmaterializing in Idaho, they had anotheroption to consider.4

RaLa is a fission product. After urani-um atoms split and form (among oth-ers) isotopes of barium, the barium-140isotope continues to decay into otherisotopes, one of which is lanthanum-140. The problem with RaLa was thatits mother isotope had a short half-life,and the half-life of RaLa also wasshort—about forty hours.

Spent MTR fuel fresh out of the reactorwould contain RaLa. Up to this time,AEC Headquarters had not consideredharvesting RaLa from the MTR. Theplan was just the opposite. Spentnuclear fuel from the MTR would sit


9 6

INEEL 55-3549

Shipping cask used to transport “green” MTR fuel

elements. Note cooling coils.

quietly in the storage canal for a fewmonths just so that short-lived isotopeslike RaLa could decay out of existence.After that, the fuel could go to theChem Plant less hazardous to handle.

But the Korean War began in 1950. TheAEC needed RaLa for weapons devel-opment. During World War II, scientistsat Los Alamos had perfected the pluto-nium bomb as an implosion device.Explosive pressure from outside thesmall plutonium-239 core pushed thenot-yet-critical mass into a criticalmass. The bomb worked only if thesphere were compressed at the sameinstant from all sides. This was a prob-lem solved with much trial and errorand hundreds of (non-nuclear) testexplosions. The experimenters usedRaLa in test cores to help diagnose theefficacy of their gradually improvingtechniques. Work at Los Alamos nowfocused on creating thermonuclearweapons, and the scientists stillrequired RaLa.5

Because RaLa decayed so quickly, thesupplier and the user had to coordinateclosely. When Los Alamos needed aquantity of RaLa for a pending experi-ment, it would inform Oak Ridge (orlater, Idaho). Oak Ridge would removefuel elements from a reactor, cool thema day or two, and drop them into acaustic bath. The caustic dissolved thecladding and the fuel, releasing the

C H A P T E R 1 1 • T H E C H E M P L A N T

9 7

Samples were drawn from all stages of the uranium

extraction process and sent to the Remote Analytical

Facility (until 1986). Here, technicians and scientists

examined the hot samples to help determine the

effectiveness of the process and ways to improve it.

In a typical office setting in the mid-dle of a city, “support” means theadministrative functions provided

by the personnel, legal, accounting,payroll, and similar departments. Inan industrial plant like the CPP, “sup-port” meant a variety of laboratorieswith special equipment and functions.

“Process” support meant working outways to improve the chemical process-es that are the main mission of theplant. This group designed bench-scalepilot experiments and tests to evaluateand compare with current practices.

“Analytical” support meant taking asample of waste, water, or other sub-stance and determining exactly whatwas in it and how much and whatconcentration. Laboratories were

loaded with X-ray equipment, shield-ed boxes, spectrometry, and chro-matography instruments.

“Radiochemical” support could iden-tify alpha, beta, and gamma-emittingradionuclides in any solid, liquid, orgas substance. People in these andother labs had to use alpha-tight con-tainment cells and learn to use gloveboxes and remote manipulators toprotect themselves from radiation.

Another form of support peculiar to anenvironment with radioactivity camefrom safety specialists, who not onlyexamined the accumulation of expo-sure on personnel badges, but evaluat-ed techniques and procedures for safeoperation of equipment and processes.They reviewed construction plans tosee what the safety impacts would bewhen parts had to repaired or replacedin case of an accident.

INEEL 62-6349

S u p p o r t

lanthanum and (about 250) other fission products into the soup. The lan-thanum was then recovered in a cen-trifuging process and shipped quicklyto Los Alamos.

The dissolving process also liberatedgases, among them radioactive iodine-131. The gas went through a filter andup a stack into the environment. It wasthe filtration system at Oak Ridge thatwas so ineffective. With a half-life ofabout eight days, iodine could settleonto blades of grass and eventuallycontaminate the milk of cows that atethe grass. Hanford’s virtue, aside fromits ready supply of fuel, was its isola-tion.6

Oak Ridge scientists persuaded AECHeadquarters that it would be moreeconomical to produce RaLa in Idaho.They could add a RaLa capability tothe Chem Plant for perhaps $20 millionless than building a plant at Hanford.The MTR could supply spent fuel everyseventeen days. So it was done. TheAEC assigned the RaLa operation tothe Chem Plant, adding a small sub-sidiary defense mission to its originalpeaceful purpose.7

The Chem Plant might be thought of asa kitchen-in-reverse. Instead of puttingingredients together to make bread orcookies, the system was designed tobegin with a finished product andrecover only one of the original ingre-dients, say the sugar, and refine it so itcould be used again. As in the case ofRaLa, a secondary ingredient mightalso be retrieved. The rest of the ingre-dients and whatever chemicals it tookto recover the prized ones wouldbecome wastes.

The Chem Plant removed the U-235 ina sequence of steps. Upon dissolvingthe fuel and its cladding in an acid, thenext steps, called extraction cycles,introduced a chemical solvent thatwould form a compound only with theuranium. Then the compound wasextracted and refined. Along the way,water was added to dilute the solutionsto a composition suitable for extractionand to help prevent accidental criticali-ties. Later in the process, some of thewater was evaporated. At first the sol-vent was hexone (methylisobutylketone), a chemical cousin of acetone(used in nailpolish remover). In 1955,the Chem Plant was modified and theextraction process improved with theuse of tributyl phosphate in the firstextraction cycle. Among other effectsof this new process, the changesexpanded the capacity of the plant.8

The Foster Wheeler Company designedthe origianl plant. The Bechtel Corpora-tion built it. The first operator, A m e r i c a nCyanamid, managed construction, hiredoperating personnel, and developed thefirst safety procedures and operatingmanuals. It took thirty-one months tobuild and cold-test the plant, making itready for the first hot run. The designershad borrowed freely from existing tech-n o l o g y, as Don Reid recalled.9

Foster Wheeler...took the flow sheetsdeveloped by Oak Ridge and, usingtheir oil refinery knowledge, convertedthese flow sheets to a commercial plant.Their nomenclature and drawings arestill in use at ICPP. It was started inhaste because it was a war plant—theKorean War was on...


9 8

The Chem Plant in 1956 with Big Southern Butte to

the south. The process building is at center right; the

storage basins, at the southern edge of the complex.

INEEL 56-112

The plant construction started, but thedesign was done in New York City. Itwas a conglomeration of problemsbecause most of the Foster Wheelerpeople were not security-cleared. Wehad to do everything unclassified,resulting in numerous trips back andforth between Oak Ridge, Washington,and New York.

...we had to use existing techniques andknowledge. The stack [design] was lift -ed right out of Hanford specificationsand installed without change. The

waste evaporator was a development atKAPL [Knolls Atomic PowerLaboratory] for their waste evaporatorand was just lifted in total and fabricat -ed as such. The storage basin was atake-off from the storage basins atHanford, even the buckets and mono -rail system. We bought an absoluteduplicate of the original Hanfordcrane...The high priority of the CPPoverrode all opposition.10

The plant was expected to process fuelswith different types of cladding—alu-minum, zirconium, stainless steel. Eachtype called for a different process for-mula, and the fuels of different typescould not be mixed. Therefore, the oper-ators had to accumulate enough of eachtype to make it worthwhile to run abatch through. This meant that fuelarriving at the Chem Plant had to bestored someplace until enough had accu-mulated for a run.

So, part of the Chem Plant complexincluded a special fuel-storage buildinghousing basins of water twenty feetdeep. On the Chem Plant’s 82-acre site,the basins were located about a third ofa mile south of the main processingbuilding. A y e a r’s accumulation of fuelwas needed for the first production run,so the basin was finished first andopened for business while the rest ofthe plant was still under construction.The first shipment arrived inNovember 1951. Security was heavy.Said Reid, “None of the constructionpeople could be allowed anywhere nearthe vicinity.” One of the first securityguards at the Chem Plant was Mark L.Sutton (later an Operator Helper), whor e c a l l e d :

I was often assigned to the ICPP areafor patrol and exit/entry control at theguard house or gates. The whole ICPParea seemed to be a maze of pipetrenches, cement pours, worker’s toolsand office shacks. The [fuel storagebuilding] was perhaps already com -plete and had some Hanford “J” slugfuel elements stored under water in it,but at that time I was not acquaintedwith the intended activities and theterms describing them.11


9 9

Above. Storage pool at the Fuel Storage Building. At

center is a transfer crane with a riding cab. The fuel

is stored in cadmium-lined racks under 20 feet of

water. Left. Schematic view shows unloading pools,

canal, and other features of the Fuel Storage

Building.

1. Storage basins2. Crane building3. Canal4. Platform5. Unloading basins6. Scale7. Monorail track8. Fuel bucket9. Crane rail10.Roadway

5

45

38

7

9

1

1

6

1

2

2

10

INEEL 62-5029


1 0 0

Irecall reporting to Shift Supervisor

Archie Larson on a Sunday day shift.He gave me an orientation in the

works of the Process Makeup area,where non-radioactive chemicals weremeasured and mixed for use...

...Operator Helpers wereshown how to air sparge[agitate a liquid by pump-ing air into it] solutions invessels so as to mix thechemicals into a homoge-nous solution, and thenwhere and how to drawsamples and to take themto the Shift Lab for analy-sis. This work was consid-ered entry-level, andtraining was “on the job,”usually by experiencedhelpers and/or Operators.Experienced personnelwere most always anxiousto be relieved of this type of workbecause of the tedium [and] ever-pre-sent risk of radioactive contamina-tion—analogous to “dirty work.”

One other usual job for OperatorHelpers was to mop up radioactivematerials when they were inadvertentlyreleased from the intended confines ofthe process piping, vessels, samplegarages, sample bottles, and cell ventsystems. There was a sort of unwrittencode that whoever caused a “spill” orrelease of radioactive material, thuscreating radioactive contamination ofan area, should be the one to clean it

up. This, often as not, fell to the lowlyHelper because he was the one delegat-ed to do that “dirty radioactive sam-pling” work, but whenever the Helpercould pin the cause on an Operator, hedid get some help.

...I was also assigned [to] the WasteProcessing building. This work, ofcourse, included the usual sampling,mopping, and routine shift readings.Waste collection was an on-going con-tinuous operation, if not the surveil-lance of filling vessels or pump-outs,then periodically the operation of thelow-level liquid waste evaporator...withthe attendant collection of “clean” non-radioactive condensate...and disposal tothe service waste well—or re-run, if it

was not within specifications as ascer-tained from the samples submitted bythe Helper to the Shift Lab.

Most plant work was done on a 24-hour day coverage by three crewsworking eight-hour shifts... [rotating

shift work was less desir-able than straight daywork but better than[straight evening orstraight midnight shifts].

I also worked as anOperator Helper on analuminum-clad radioac-tive fuel element process-ing campaign...I helpedcharge fuel elements tothe dissolvers for batch-wise dissolution, pulledinput feed samples,helped with routine read-ings, and made some of

the acid or base feed adjustment addi-tions...

Vessels, pumps, etc, in each cell orProcess Makeup area weretitled/labeled with those respective areadesignations and followed by three-digit numbers, the first digit...designat-ing the type of equipment as follows:1-vessel, 2-pump, 3-heat exchanger, 4-agitator, 5-jet, 6-sampler, 7-burrette, 8-funnel, 9-special. Thus C-101 was avessel in C Cell, D-301 was a heatexchanger in D Cell.

Mark L. Sutton

M e m o r i e s o f a n O p e r a t o r H e l p e r a t t h e C h e m P l a n t

Water and mopheads were basic aids for

decontaminating spills.

INEEL09662

Cask-heavy trucks rumbled past thesecurity gate at the Chem Plant’s westfence and disappeared into specialentry bays at the storage building.Cranes removed the casks from thetrucks and deposited them underwater,where mechanical hands removed thefuel and placed it into stainless-steelbuckets suspended from overheadtracks. The fuel moved along to itsassigned resting space. The shieldingwater carried away heat and was recir-culated and refreshed daily, the over-flow injected to a disposal well justsouth of the building. To the water hadbeen added chlorine to prevent thegrowth of algae. Sodium nitrate wasadded to prevent the chloride from dis-solving the stainless-steel cladding oraccelerating the corrosion of the alu-minum cladding. The building had itsown motor generator set for an emer-gency power supply.12

In February 1953 the operators wereready for their first hot run. They hadtest-run the plant using non-irradiateduranium, and by trial and error, cali-brated all of the instrumentation. Theyhad checked out the plant’s fifty-plusmiles of piping and tubing. Using mag-nets and nitric acid, they made sure allthe pipe fittings were made of stainlesssteel. Despite previous inspections andcontrols, they found a few fittings madeof the wrong material, and the pipe fit-ters had to cut them out and replacethem.13

After the AEC decided to equip theChem Plant with a RaLa facility, mili-tary officers arrived on the scene tohelp expedite procurement and other-wise remove barriers to early comple-tion. They proposed that government

employees run the plant instead ofcontractors. Despite the country’swartime footing, the AEC rejected theidea because the recycling of uraniumwas intended eventually to be a com-ponent of the commercial power indus-try, and civilian companies would haveto learn how to do it. Besides, contrac-tors had a good war record, havingproduced the atom bomb.14

American Cyanamid thus recruitedengineers, chemists, and mechanicsfrom industries all over the UnitedStates. The recruits went to a specialschool at Oak Ridge to learn basicnuclear technology and how to handleradioactive material. Arriving in Idahoin 1951 with the plant still under con-struction, they set up their first officesat the Central Facilities Area in theNavy’s handy white houses. They pre-pared to train others, writing safetymanuals, operating procedures, andprocess specifications. Someone decid-ed the Chem Plant would use the metricsystem, which was somewhat unusual


1 0 1

Above. Shipping cask arrives at the CPP. Below.

Pneumatic instrument tubing is installed behind the

facade of the operating corridor where operators will

control process.

INEEL 56-34

INEEL 4144

for American chemical companies atthe time, so that became part of thetraining, too.15

Straddle-carriers, long-legged trans-porters adapted from timber industrylumber-handlers, brought casks loadedwith the first fuel elements from thestorage basin to the head end of theprocess building, where fuel wasdropped remotely into the dissolver inthe first cell. Remotely operated cuttersat the basin had trimmed as much struc-tural metal from the fuel as practicalbefore the fuel headed down the chuteinto the dissolver vessel.

The work with the highly radioactivematerial was mostly below ground level,so that the earth formed part of theshielding. Each vessel was isolated in itsown shielded room, or cell, typicallyabout twenty feet square. During a run,

operators stood attentively in an operat-ing corridor between the banks of cells,facing gauges and other instruments,their hands on levers that would open orshut pertinent valves by remote control,heat up certain solutions and cool downothers. Pumps, steam jets, or airliftsadvanced the feed from one vessel to thenext. The pipes penetrated the denseconcrete walls, five feet thick aroundeach cell. Piping also brought the water,a i r, or chemical additives to the cellsfrom upper-level storage tanks. Certainreactions produced gases, and pipes car-ried it away. Each of the original twenty-four cells had a name, beginning with ACell and proceeding through the alpha-bet (skipping I and O). As the ChemPlant opened, several spare cells awaitedfuture developments.1 6

The first run dissolved Hanford slugs. Itlasted six months and recovered over

240 kilograms of U-235 in the form ofuranyl nitrate, a thin yellow liquid. TheChem Plant shipped it unshielded toOak Ridge, although it was packaged inten-liter stainless-steel bottles encasedin a “birdcage” framework designed toprevent accidental criticalities.17

The liquid waste, of course, remained atthe Chem Plant. As in so many other cor-ners of the NRTS, this was one moreplace where scientists and engineerscould say they were doing somethingn e w. Pipes conveyed the waste under-ground into a 300,000-gallon stainless-steel storage tank (nested within aconcrete vault) east of the process build-ing. Stainless steel had become moreavailable after World War II. Hanfordhad used carbon steel, having no otherchoice, and then neutralized its acidicwaste with caustic. This increased itsvolume, caused solids to form a sludge,


1 0 2

Chemist Bernice Paige was the first woman to win a

lifetime achievement award from the American

Nuclear Society for her technical contributions to

nuclear science.

Lowering slug charger over the slug chute above a

dissolver.

November 1952. CPP operators transfer a filled

bottle of concentrated uranyl nitrate product into a

“bird cage” for shipment to Oak Ridge.

INEEL 57-112 INEEL 06940 INEEL 06971

and made future retrieval hazardous andc o s t l y. The Chem Plant spared itselffrom these particular problems, perhapsbecause its research mission generatedd i fferent decisions. The stainless steeltanks allowed the storage of waste inacidic form and resisted corrosion.Scientists assumed that disposal to theenvironment was “out of the question,”that tanks were not the final resting placefor the waste, that isotopes in the wastemight have further use and should beretrievable, and that nothing should pre-clude the option of transforming the liq-uid into a safer, more stable, solid form.18

When the run was over, the operatingcrew decontaminated cells, vessels, andpipes and prepared for the second run,slated for MTR fuel. The plant was part-ly an experiment in direct maintenance;it minimized the use of expensive,remotely operated maintenance equip-ment as at Hanford and, later, SavannahR i v e r. After each run, jets sprayedwater and cleaning solutionsinto the cells, whichwere lined

with stainless steel. Then crews enteredthe cells from the access corridor torepair valves and other fixtures v i adirect physical contact. For the benefitof future commercial plants, the A E Choped to demonstrate that this methodcould potentially reduce operating costsand not overexpose employees.1 9

Subsequent runs filled the first storagetank with liquid waste. Ten more werebuilt; one of them always stood emptyin case of a leak. Operators could trans-fer the liquid either from a leaking tankor the concrete vault into which the liq-uid had accumulated. When full, eachtank contained only a few gallons ofpure radioactive fission products. Therest of the solution was dissolvedcladding-metal ions, process addi-tives, and water. The tanksthat received wastefrom the

first cycle extraction, which accumulat-ed most of the fission products, hadcooling systems to carry away decayheat to minimize corrosion. Other liq-uid wastes included condensate (con-taining low levels of radioactivity), andthose went into a disposal well.20

The Chem Plant was launched. Overtime, the plant recovered U-235 frommany new types of fuel. Each hadunique cladding and fuel chemistry,challenging the chemists and engineersto develop new formulas in small-scalepilot plant workshops, most of whichalso required modifications in the phys-ical plant. Process development becamea regular Chem Plant activity.21


1 0 3

An early drawing of the Chem Plant’s main process

building. The function of various cells changed over

time, as process requirements changed. For

example, T Cell was later used for hexone storage.

Sometimes the task seemed deceptivelysimple, such as a request later in the1950s to process spent fuel fromSavannah River reactors. The fourteen-foot-long elements were clad in alu-

minum and had to be cut to eighteen-inch lengths to fit into the dissolvervessel. The engineers practiced the cut-ting procedures with non-irradiated ele-ments and built a special cuttingmachine to do the job. As they beganpreparing for the hot run, said DonReid,

...we soon found out that we hadexceeded the technical knowledge ofthe materials. We found that theSavannah tubes, while being irradiated,had changed metallurgical characteris -tics. Instead of cutting like regular alu -minum—on which the cutters had beentested—they crumbled like grahamcrackers, so a whole new technique andprocedure had to be developed.Maintenance was extremely difficultbecause of the crumbling, and a veryextensive complete modification [of theprocess was] required.22

But the requisite persistence and inge-nuity were available, and the ChemPlant crew eventually conducted anoth-er successful run. Such accomplish-ments helped move the Chem Plantbeyond its original mission to recoverjust two or three types of fuel. Itbecame a permanent fixture—and arevenue generator—at the NRTS. Theplant processed at least a hundred vari-eties of spent nuclear fuel. It came fromuniversity and test reactors all over theworld, from commercial power plants,from most of the reactors at the NRTS,and from Navy ships.

The RaLa program lasted from 1956 to1963, the province of the complicated LCell, which had a remote viewing win-dow and several miles of piping. In theearly days, each time green MTR fuelclattered into the vessel to be dissolvedin acid, a puff of radioactive iodineblew out the Chem Plant stack. Theway to control a release was to time itin concert with benign weather condi-tions. Managers evacuated outdoor con-struction workers who might be aroundthe area. The IDO Health and SafetyBranch required that iodine releasesoccur only when the weather—winddirection and speed—fit a certain pro-file to promote dilution and movementtowards unpopulated areas. Later, acti-vated charcoal scrubbers absorbediodine, and a special tank was installedto retain the gas for later release.23


1 0 4

Above. Cooling pipes inside 300,000-gallon waste

tank. Left. “Pillar and panel” vault under construction

in 1955 for one of the Chem Plant’s eleven 300,000-

gallon waste tanks. Concrete components were

precast.INEEL 55-610

INEEL 10317

Monitoring the iodine releases to makesure operating contractors kept withinIDO-set guidelines was the task ofhealth physicists. Monitoring teamscarried radiation detectors and patrolledsite roads and the public highway nearMud Lake during a release. When theirmeters detected a radioactive cloud,they took the highest reading and col-lected air samples. They collected jackrabbits and analyzed their thyroids,often finding these to be better indica-tors of off-site exposure to iodine thanwere their meters. Of course, collectingthe jack rabbits also required specialtechniques, as HP John Byrom recalledlater:

One method used was with a seatanchored to the front fender of a truckand a gunner with a shotgun strappedto the seat...The driver would head outacross the sagebrush until the rabbitwas flushed. Then it was up to the gun -ner to harvest the bunny. Much powderwas probably burned before the gun -ners got very good at this sport. Talkswith the gunners indicated it was...rather hard on the seat of understand -ing. All in all, the method was quitesuccessful and many specimens werecollected, whether in self-protection orskill I could never learn.24

The march of progress eventually madebunny gunners obsolete. Like muchelse at the Site, pioneering methodsgave way to more economical or moreeffective improvements. To detect theiodine cloud as it exited the Chem Plantstack, for example, someone devised a“scintillation sky scanner.” The deviceused a pivoting gun barrel as a shield. Itwas erected just outside the Chem Plantfence and trained on the top of the

stack. The RaLa operators were in radiocontact with an HP at the scanner. “Wedropped it!” they would say. The scan-ner detected the iodine cloud themoment it exited the stack. This devicewas also responsible for revealing thatthe stack released iodine while processvessels inside L Cell were being decon-taminated. Learning this, the RaLaoperators changed the decontaminationschedule, doing it just before the nextrun, giving the iodine more time todecay.26

Iodine-131 (I-131) was potentially themost hazardous of the isotopes releasedto the atmosphere by any of the opera-tions at the NRTS, and the RaLa pro-gram was the major contributor.However, the releases were not a secret.When the IDO began distributing quar-terly environmental reports in 1959, thereports identified the curies of iodinereleased by these runs and maximumlevels that had been observed.26

None of the iodine releases at the ChemPlant (or anywhere else at the NRTS)crossed the boundaries of the Siteexceeding the radiation protection stan-dards applicable at the time. In theRaLa days, the highest dose to drift off-site may have been nine percent of theallowable concentration.27


1 0 5

C H A P T E R T W E L V E

1 0 6

Bill Johnston got anoffer he chose not to refuse. After twen-ty years with the government, he wentto Duluth, Minnesota, in 1954 to workfor the Taconite ContractingCorporation. Taconite was preparing tobuild a pelletizer plant, an undertakingof such size that the company needed tobuild a town to go with it. The con-struction phase at the NRTS had by nomeans ended, but the organization itself was well rooted and on the vergeof shifting into an expansive opera-tional mode. Some of Johnston’s col-leagues felt that he left because he haddone what he came to do and that hisbackground, after all, was civil engi-neering. Others added that the offer was extraordinarily sweet.1

Johnston had spent a good part of hisenergies in 1953 simplifying the man-agement of the testing station. The IDOhad set up a technical library, documentcontrol systems, and a print shop.Procurement, warehousing, and mainte-nance systems were in place. The LostRivers Transportation Company ran thebuses under an IDO contract. Instead ofmanaging these functions itself, the

IDO decided to consolidate and placeall these activities under the responsi-bility of Phillips.

The Argonne and Navy programs wereunder the aegis of AEC offices inChicago or Pittsburgh, and if the IDO

moved to consolidate them under itsown jurisdiction, it did not succeed. TheChem Plant was an IDO project, how-ever, and fell into the Phillips net.Chem Plant employees noticed thatPhillips’benefits were better thanAmerican Cyanamid’s, and the transi-tion went fairly smoothly. NRTS

employees numbered 1,700 by thistime, and the consolidation affected athousand of them. Dr. Doan assuredthem that Phillips would “fill jobassignments...as far as practicable fromapplications by present employees.”The IDO announced that the change, totake effect in October 1953, would savethe government $250,000 a year. Thusstreamlined, the NRTS was ready forthe changes coming in 1954.2

The industrial leaders in the electricalutility business were impatient to devel-op a nuclear power industry. The spec-tacular success of the NRTS’s first fourprojects had awakened considerableoptimism that nuclear energy, with fed-eral support of nuclear research, wouldsomeday mature into a commercialproposition. Largely because of militaryrequirements for nuclear applications,such research funds were plentiful.Companies that wished to enter thenuclear field had many opportunities todo so.

President Dwight D. Eisenhower domi-nated the formulation of nuclear mili-tary policy during the 1950s. Trumanbefore him had felt that atomicweapons would help keep peace, and

REA CT O R S BE G ET REA CT O R SYou couldn’t move forty bright people to Idaho and expect them to quit

thinking for themselves or stop being bright.

—Deslonde deBoisblanc—

President Dwight D. Eisenhower before the General Assembly of the United Nations delivering his address

on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, New York City, December 8, 1953.Dwight D. Eisenhower Librar y

had committed the country to the devel-opment of a hydrogen bomb. He feltthat the Soviet Union aspired to domi-nate the world and regarded the UnitedStates as an enemy to be destroyed. InTruman’s last three years, annualdefense spending went from $13.5 bil-lion to $50 billion. Eisenhower, assum-ing office in 1953, felt that such hugedefense budgets would weaken theeconomy. “Long-term security requireda sound economy,” he wrote in hismemoirs. His New Look fordefense emphasized a militarycapability to inflict “massiveretaliatory damage” on anyoneinitiating an offensive strike onthe United States. The policylowered the total expenditureon defense but changed theallocation of resources fromconventional to nuclear force.The shift fattened the budgetsof the U.S. Air Force in partic-ular, because it was the servicethat would inflict the retaliato-ry damage.3

Eisenhower did not wish to“scare the country to death” bysharing with the public thegruesome scenarios that wouldcome of a nuclear war. He wassensitive to growing businesspressure and shared the hopesof scientists for the peaceful atom. TheAEC recognized economic nuclearpower as a national objective and dis-cussed it with the JCAE in May 1953.Then in December, Eisenhower pro-posed that the United States and othernations surrender some of the uraniumin their stockpiles to international con-trol, thus “dedicating some of theirstrength to serve the needs rather than

the fears of mankind.” The SovietUnion didn’t agree to the scheme, and itnever materialized. Nevertheless,Eisenhower affirmed “Atoms for Peace”as a banner for nuclear commerce.4

So the country had two urges, atoms forpeace and atoms for war. Both helpedgrow the NRTS. For the next thirtyyears, the question of whether nuclearpower would eventually produce elec-tricity more cheaply than coal or oil

was rarely in doubt; the politicaldebate, rather, was when it would hap-pen and whether AEC policy was help-ing or hindering the process.

Congress’s major step toward a nuclearpower industry was to replace theAtomic Energy Act of 1946. The origi-nal act had emphasized secrecy andgovernment control of scientific infor-mation. It forbade the private owner-ship or use of nuclear fuel. Clearly, thisdid not encourage private enterprise.The government’s monopoly on nuclearpower was once described as “an islandof socialism in the midst of a freeenterprise economy.”5

The AEC needed a new legalframework for the federallicensing of power plants andfor promulgating safety stan-dards—and for maintaining theUnited States as a world leaderin these areas. As a matter ofprestige, it was important thatthe nation maintain a techno-logical lead in peaceful arenasas well as military. The state ofAmerican technology wasbelieved to reflect the superi-ority of American democracyand capitalism over commu-nism. The new Atomic EnergyAct of 1954 shifted Americanpolicy and the AEC in thisdirection.6

The NRTS already was on agrowth trajectory partly driven

by creative impulses from within itswork groups. At the Test Reactor Area(TRA), the MTR was an instant hit.Like Sun Valley, another Idaho land-mark with a global identity, the MTRbecame so essential and so famous thatnuclear literature in the 1950s and1960s often didn’t bother to mention itscountry or state.


1 0 8

Delegates at the United Nations Conference on the

Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy (1955, Geneva)

admire Cerenkov radiation from the small reactor

operated by Oak Ridge National Laborator y.

Courtesy of Oak Ridge National Laboratory 55-515

Being at the leading edge of a newindustry was impressive enough, butthe sheer search for knowledge was thereason Phillips people went to workevery day—and stayed all night if aresult or reactor startup was expected atmidnight or two a.m. For such devo-tees, there was a bunkhouse at Central,and if those beds were full, it was wellknown that women’s restrooms con-tained cots.7

The pioneering work at theMTR influenced reactor designall over the free world. T h eSylvania Electric ProductsCompany was typical of theM T R ’s many commercial cus-tomers. Sylvania wished tomanufacture fuel elements.Using two different techniques,the company made eighteenfuel elements using natural ura-nium. The MTR subjected themto prolonged high-flux expo-sure—and the scientistsobserved how both types gradu-ally increased in diameter anddecreased in length. Findingssuch as these helped Sylvaniadesign fuel assemblies thatallowed for swelling, whichotherwise would choke off theflow of coolant.8

If the AEC or home lab scientists atOak Ridge and Argonne had thoughtthat the Idaho desert would be a passiveslate on which experiments would bebuilt, run, and shut down, the Phillipsgroup soon corrected this notion.Opportunities had to be created, prob-lems had to be solved. Innovation wasthe only answer, and it brought growth,as Deslonde deBoisblanc recalled.

We had a problem at the MTR canal.Apparently the cladding on one of thefuel elements stored there had failed.The fuel was leaching radionuclidesinto the canal water, but we had no wayof determining which element was thebad one. We needed what we didn’thave, which was instruments that weresensitive enough to detect a mixture ofminute quantities of radioactive ele -ments and tell us what they were. Wefound a way to solve this problem, and

in doing so initiated a program to studythe “decay schemes” of the radioactiveisotopes which put nuclear spec -troscopy on a firm basis.

The AEC Division of ReactorDevelopment funded a special labora -tory and a staff for it. This programwas very broad and permitted theoreti -cal and experimental studies of the fis -sion products as well as the neutrondeficient isotopes produced by bom -barding samples in the MTR. Thisaccess to the world’s highest continu -ous source of neutrons was just tootempting to resist. But background radi -ation from weapons tests was a con -

stant annoyance. The solutionof that problem was found tobe lying on the ground atCentral Facilities Area.

We found some thick steel platethat the Navy had left behindfrom its proving ground days.That stuff was an absolutetreasure. It was pre-war steelmanufactured before any bombtests and completely free ofman-made radiation. With thatwe built a special room inwhich background radiationwas reduced to an absoluteminimum.9

In that special room, physicistRussell Heath led a team ofscientists who learned to dis-criminate among the diff e r e n te n e rgy levels in the radiation

being emitted by the several isotopes inthe MTR canal water. They alsolearned the half-life for each and wereable then to determine when the dam-aged fuel element had been placed inthe storage canal. Thus, they were ableto retrieve it.

C H A P T E R 1 2 • R E A CT O R S B E G E T R E A CT O R S

1 0 9

Health physicists scrounged the lining of an old

Navy gun barrel and invented a whole body counter.

Employees were examined regularly.

INEEL60-873

Heath went on to standardize the waymeasurements were made. He prepareda catalog containing the gamma energyspectrum and half-lives of hundreds ofradionuclides. Phillips published thefirst edition in 1958 and several there-after. The “Blue Book,” as the catalogwas known, made it possible forresearchers elsewhere to profile andidentify mysterious elements withoutspending tedious weeks or monthsdoing so. It was a valuable contributionto the world’s store of informationabout the nature of matter. The catalogcontinued in use over forty years later.10

Another group of physicists under theleadership of Dr. Robert Brugger tookfull advantage of the MTR’s high neu-tron flux and its beam holes. Whenunobstructed by shielding, a beam ofneutrons streaming out of the reactorwas a tool useful for exploring thenature of matter at the level of thenucleus. Although scientists elsewherehad access to spectrometers and otherinstruments, they did not have accessto the neutron flux of the MTR or theavailability of hot samples producedwithin the MTR. The basic idea was tobombard isotopes with neutrons. Theatomic nuclei sometimes absorb theseneutrons, sometimes bounce them off.Brugger’s group studied these interac-tions and calculated the probabilitiesfor each reaction. This was called

“measuring cross-sections,” a termoriginating from the graphic methodused to depict the process.

To complicate matters, the probabilitiesof absorption or scattering are differentdepending on the energy of the neu-trons. The group selected the neutronenergy with an instrument called a neu-tron crystal spectrometer. Anotherinstrument was the fast neutron chopperand time-of-flight spectrometer. Here, itwas possible to “chop” the beam ofneutrons into pulses as short as a mil-lionth of a second. These pulses wouldthen spread out in time as the neutrons,with different velocities, traveled downa long flight path to the detector array.Whenever the scientists put a sample inthe beam, some of the neutrons wereremoved. From the ratio of the sample-in to sample-out detector signals, thescientists could calculate the total cross

section as a function of neutron energy.(This “total” cross section is the sum ofthe absorption and scattering cross sec-tions.) In the case of samples that scat-ter the neutrons, the scientists measuredthe angular distribution of the neutronsand the energy difference between inci-dent and scattered neutrons with a slowneutron velocity selector developed byDr. Brugger. Brugger also developed atechnique to expose samples under mil-lions of atmospheres of pressure to theneutron beams of the MTR.11

The work opened a new frontier. Noone previously had such access to theexotic radioactive nuclides that the sci-entists studied at the MTR—or such ateam of chemists and physicists makingthe most of the opportunity. The find-ings were of incalculable value in thedesign of reactors. If fertile uranium (orthorium) were to be packed around the


1 1 0

The MTR is all but hidden by experimental

apparatus. Samples are being irradiated through

beam port at right. Another port is being prepared

for an experiment near stile-like stairway. Boxes

contain paraffin and other shielding materials. Rack

of handling tools stands ready at balcony level.INEEL 61-2056

core of a reactor, it was essential toknow whether the reactor would createmore fuel than it consumed and howlong the “doubling time” would be. Ifthe process were to take forty years ormore, the commercial economics werefar less attractive than if the processtook, say, fifteen years. Brugger’s workmeant that reactor designers couldselect fuels and other materials withsome confidence that the reactor wouldbe economically viable. Consequently,scientists from all over the world beat apath to the door of the NRTS.

Phillips scientists made many othermoves to expand the capabilities of theMTR. Engineers added a “hydraulicrabbit,” which allowed them to runspecimens into the reactor without shut-ting it down. Argonne installed a high-temperature, high-pressure circulatingwater loop in position HB-2 of the reac-tor. This permitted a specimen to beexposed to neutron flux along withhigh-temperature circulating water. Thecomplex apparatus included a heatexchanger, pumps for circulating thewater, and the means of regulating tem-perature, pressure, and other parametersin the water. A Hot Cell Building wentinto use in the summer of 1954.Operators, shielded behind thick con-crete walls and special viewing win-dows, could handle, photograph, mill,measure, and weigh radioactive samplesusing remotely operated manipulators.12

The AEC authorized Phillips to build asecond reactor at the MTR site, theReactivity Measurement Facility(RMF). Started up in February 1954,this was a small, very low-power reac-tor located in the east end of the MTRcanal. Water was its moderator, reflec-tor, and shield. The RMF used the samekind of fuel assembly as the MTR, butoperated only at power levels of one ortwo hundred watts.

The small reactor, the first of manylow-power reactors at the Site, comple-mented the MTR in that it had a highsensitivity to subtle changes in reactivi-ty. The RMF functioned as a “detector”of neutrons, whereas the large MTRfunctioned as a “source” of neutrons.The two functions could not be maxi-mized in the same reactor. The RMFenabled analysts to assay new and spent


1 1 1

Right. Technician demonstrates removal of a fuel

element from cask. Crane holds lid while worker

uses special tool to remove element. Cask held six

to eight elements. Below. The MTR canal contained

the small Reactivity Measurement Facility, a low-

power reactor. The flat plate in front is a boron-

aluminum control element. Samples to be measured

went into a “water hole,” here filled with a plug.

INEEL 56-3697

INEEL 55-1989

fuel and to study reactivity changes inhafnium, zirconium, and other fuelmaterials as a function of their totalirradiation. One of its first operators,Joe W. Henscheid, recalled:13

We’d irradiate a small piece of uraniumfuel for several days in the MTR, thentake it out and quickly insert it in theRMF. Some of the fission products inthe hot fuel sample, although relativelyshort lived, would decay into very high-cross-section neutron absorbers (so-called “neutron poisons”). Reactordesigners, especially in the Navynuclear program, were interested inknowing more about the adverse effectthese neutrons could have in powerreactors. In the RMF, as these poisonsbuilt up, we had to withdraw controlrods to keep the reactor critical. Thisprovided a very precise way to trackand measure the effect of these poisons.Recall that this was all being done

before we had high-speed computersand elaborate computational modelingthat now replace such experimentalprograms.14

The spent fuel cooling off in the MTRcanal opened up other research oppor-tunities. The fuel emitted gammarays—the fresher the fuel the strongerthe radiation. They had a penetratingpower similar to X-rays and could,among other things, kill pathogens.Many industries in America wanted toknow if gamma radiation could dosomething beneficial for their products.The U.S. Army hoped irradiation wouldimprove the safety and shelf life offood. Phillips built a special GammaFacility and opened it in 1955. Thebuilding was placed outside the MTRexclusion area so that industrial scien-tists without security clearances, whowere not allowed near the MTR, couldenter the building and do work.15

The spent MTR fuel went to theGamma building in 26,000-pound carri-ers shielded with lead, steel, concrete,and water. In the Gamma canal, six feetwide and about sixteen feet deep, thefuel rested near the bottom. Operatorsplaced the elements, now referred to as“gamma sources,” into cadmium boxesand parked them at safe distances fromeach other. Experimenters then dippedtheir samples into the canal at a pre-selected distance from the fuel element.Depending on how long the sample wasto be exposed, its package could be aplastic bag, a can, or a special containerwith a corrosion-resistant coating. Anexperimenter could specify the degreeof “aging” or “freshness” in the fuelneeded for a given test.

Sponsors paid non-profit rates (40 centsper million roentgens plus shipping; $10minimum charge) and waited their turnon a first-come, first-served basis. Theysubjected nearly everything imaginableto gamma radiation—meat, grain, fruit,plastics, drugs, coal, gold, diamonds.Hawaii wanted to know if it couldimprove the shelf life of papayas andmangos and build its export trade.Restless visitors were always on thescene, anxious to learn how gamma rayshad changed their product. Typically,the canal contained forty to fifty fuelelements and scores of samples.16


1 1 2

Typical 1955 scene at the Gamma Facility. Sacks of

potatoes await experimental irradiation in the canal.INEEL 55-1672

The pressing question in Idaho con-cerned potatoes. Could irradiation pre-vent stored potatoes from sprouting?Idaho growers had built their mega-mil-lion-dollar industry by learning how tostore potatoes for several months, keep-ing frozen-food plants open profitablylong after the glut of the harvest. By thelate 1940s, scientists had developed

chemical inhibitors to suppress sprout-ing and other problems for up to ninemonths. But the goal was a twelve-month industry.17

The University of Idaho owned its own“column” at the Gamma Facility.Walter C. Sparks, one of the researchersat the university’s Research andExtension Center at Aberdeen, Idaho,would take ten-pound lots of potatoes,confined in nothing more than openmesh sacks, to the Gamma Facilitycanal. In an hour’s work, he would leanover the railing and lower each sackinto the water by means of a long cord.Distance between fuel and potatoes wasadjusted for the selected exposure.Some sacks got five minutes, others tenor fifteen. Elsewhere in the canal peo-ple might be dunking strawberries orbacon. Sometimes a potato got loosefrom the sack. Long-handled forcepswere handy, and someone would grabthe tool and fish for the potato.18

These early experiments demonstratedthat irradiation did inhibit sprouting.Another round of experiments in 1963by the Potato Processors of Idahodemonstrated that irradiated potatoescould be used for satisfactory frozenfrench fries and some other processedproducts. However, parallel researchwith chemical inhibitors had demon-strated that a chemical called CIPC wasrelatively more simple, required lesshandling of the potatoes, and presentedfewer complications in protectingworkers. So the Idaho industry discard-ed irradiation as the more costly of thetwo methods despite continuing investi-gations by competing growers inCanada and Japan into the possibilitiesof irradiation.19

Back at the MTR, the constant cry fromcustomers was “More neutrons! Moreflux! Faster results!” In response,Phillips modified the reactor to operatesafely at forty megawatts. The barrageof questions continued. Will irradiationmelt fuel pellets made of this alu-minum-uranium alloy? Can we usethulium-170 as a source in medicalradiography? Will neutron and gammaradiation improve the coking character-istics of Sewickly coal? How can wedesign our reactor so it will operate attemperatures of 650 degrees? How willtwenty-percent-enriched fuel perform ina high-flux reactor?20


1 1 3

INEEL 55-1672

INEEL 57-2619

Above . A rack of canned food is ready to plunge

into a “water column,” a rectangular shaft of metal.

Air columns also were available. Left. Walter Sparks

(in truck) loads up the afternoon’s experiment.

Because the MTR itself was an experi-ment, Phillips tested how well theMTR’s own components were holdingup. Had the high flux of neutronscaused any structural weakness in thematerials within the core area? Usingits findings on this and other accumu-lated experience, Phillips was ready todesign the next generation test reactor.21

Phillips wanted the nextreactor building to havemore room on the reac-tor’s operating floor. TheMTR work area wascrowded with gear, equip-ment for experiments, andblocks of extra shielding.Office space was in shortsupply, and people set updesks and work spacesquatter-like in odd cor-ners, hallways, and at theedges of precious assem-bly space. The next reac-tor would have a moregenerous floor plan.

As for the reactor itself,two of the MTR’s chieffeatures—the power leveland the test space—weretoo small. The power levelof forty megawatts wastoo low, unable to producethe concentrated neutronflux required by the mili-tary, which was typically on an acceler-ated schedule. Proposed militaryapplications were pointing in the direc-tion of fuel elements much larger indiameter than the early ones. The testholes in the MTR were no larger thanone inch in diameter. “Advanced”

research was calling for test holes andloops for thicker and longer elements,more exotic metal alloys, and fuel thatwould be cooled by gas or air, not onlyliquid metal or water. These items weresimply not going to fit into the MTR.Also, it was difficult in the MTR, if notimpossible, to expose the entire lengthof longer samples to a uniform flux.

At the same time, demands for low-fluxirradiation in the MTR’s graphite zonewere in less and less demand. That partof the reactor was becoming obsolete.By the end of the 1950s, these zoneswere used mainly as a place to parkcobalt and other isotopes requested formedical uses, a function that reactorselsewhere in the country could perform

as well as the MTR.22

Thus in 1954, the Phillipsteam was developing thenext test reactor, named theEngineering Test Reactor(ETR). After the AECapproved Phillips’concept,Kaiser Engineers finishedthe design and built it.General Electric designedthe reactor core and its con-trols. From design to com-pletion, the project tookonly two years. Like theMTR, the ETR reactor waswater-cooled. Unlike theMTR, its control rods weredriven through the corefrom below the reactor, notfrom above. This arrange-ment left the area above thereactor available for experi-ments.23

Aside from its higherpower level of 175megawatts, the big change

with the ETR was that the samplescould be placed directly into the core ofthe reactor, not just next to it, as withthe MTR. The MTR operating experi-ence had indicated that this would besafe and effective.


1 1 4

ETR reactor vessel being raised to vertical position

during construction in 1956.

INEEL 56-4149

The ETR fuel was arranged in a rectan-gular grid with holes here and there forinsertion of loops and capsules. Manyof the ETR holes were large enough tocontain entire fuel elements, not justsamples, and the experiments couldoperate with their own cooling systemsindependent of the reactor ’s own cool-ing system. Like the MTR, the ETRhad a companion low-power reactor,the ETR Critical Facility (ETRC), inwhich the power-perturbing qualities ofproposed experiments could be mea-sured safely in advance before beingtested in the ETR.

The ETR generated a neutron flux fourtimes greater than the MTR. It wentcritical for the first time on September19, 1957. It would serve many of theMTR’s old customers, including theU.S. Navy, but the new kid on theNRTS block was the U.S. Air Force,and many of the special ETR loops hadbeen designed to test the fuels requiredfor a special airplane. 24


1 1 5

Above. The ETR being assembled, top removed. Fuel elements were lifted from reactor core and sent through a

chute into the canal—all under shielding water. This improved safety and convenience over MTR methods.

Below. The ETR with experiments in progress.

INEEL 57-4984

INEEL 59-5513

T h e N o b l e S k yOh come with me

to watch the first RADONWhen the stars ARGONAs the day KRYPTON

And if the morn be cloudyYou won’t ZENON.

MTR shift supervisor’s log: May 6, 1952

C H A P T E R T H I R T E E N

1 1 6

When IDO HPsunderstood that the NRTS was going tobe home base for a nuclear-poweredairplane, they researched the hazardsthis might bring to the desert. Test air-craft, they found, crashed most typical-ly on takeoff or landing. What wouldhappen to the nuclear fuel in a crashinvolving fire, and what kind of emer-gency response would be needed? In1957 Dr. Victor Beard, IDO director ofHealth and Safety at the time, organizeda pair of Fuel Element Burn Tests, soondubbed by the participants as OperationWiener Roast. John Horan, Beard’s suc-cessor, was then working at the NRFand observed the tests. He recalled howBeard obtained a well-aged MTR fuelelement for an experiment.

The key idea was to burn it. For thefirst test, a pool of [jet fuel] was used(500 gallons, I think) and part of analuminum fuselage...The element wassuspended directly over the center ofthe fuel and then [the fuel was] ignited.

This was done at Test Grid No. III outon Lincoln Boulevard...The Y axis wasa few miles east of NRF...and highlyinstrumented.

Movie cameras were operating [when]they set the thing on fire. Basically,there was no release. That was Wiener

Roast No. 1...[The fuel reached a tem -perature of 2,250 degrees F., but afterthe fire burned two hours, the elementwas essentially intact.]

The second time, they used an inductionfurnace to supply higher heat to the fuelelement. This time, success. A release[was attained. The fuel melted withinninety seconds.] When I returned toNRF, the security guard told me we hadan alarm on the portal monitor. I asso -ciated it with the Wiener Roast release.I took a sample from our continuous airmonitor. It turned out to be cesium-137.At eight p.m. I called Beard at homeand told him the cloud came over theNRF. He said, “Impossible.”

The cloud had gone out on the grid.The weather changed, a shear hadcome in and it went back over NRF. Itwas barely detectable over background,so there were no health concerns.1

Elsewhere at the NRTS, preparationsfor the project were somewhat moreprosaic. Bill Johnston had informed

TH E TR I U M P H O F PO L I T I C A L GRA V I TYOV E R NU C L EA R FL I G H T

If everything had worked out perfectly, it still would have been a bum airplane.

—Charles Wilson, Secretary of Defense—

Operation Wiener Roast

INEEL 57-1305

Aircraft Nuclear Propulsion crew poses in front of Heat Transfer Reactor Experiment No. 1INEEL 89-79

southeast Idaho in July 1952 that anuclear airplane station was coming.Soon he and his staff, particularly AllanC. Johnson, his director of Engineeringand Construction, were calling for bidson new roads, wells, power lines, a sub-station, and finally for construction of ahuge assembly complex and a test pad.The project was called the AircraftNuclear Propulsion (ANP) Program.2

The program brought a substantial burstof growth to the NRTS, occurring justas construction payrolls for the firstthree reactors and the CPP had dimin-ished. The airplane station wouldemploy a thousand laborers. When BillJohnston left the NRTS in the spring of1954, the AEC appointed AllanJohnson, who was well into the swingof things, as the new manager.

Allan Johnson had been an NRTS pio-neer, in charge of construction sinceJuly 1949. An architect by training, hehad earned a year of post-graduatework at Princeton University by win-ning a national design competition in1937. With the Corps of Engineers dur-ing the war, he had run the Washingtonoffice of the Manhattan District. Afterthat he joined a New York companyprimarily concerned with the design ofhospitals.3

Johnson had been recruited to Idaho,done well, and now it was his turn tocope with a see-saw situation inWashington. Fortunately, he could bejust as smooth with Congressional rep-resentatives as was his predecessor BillJohnston. This time, the waffling aboutpolicy wasn’t confined within the AECfamily but involved a huge array ofconflicting interests at the center ofnational power.4

The main issue was the timing andstructure of the project. The Air Forceeven in 1947 insisted that it would takeonly five years to transform paper plansinto an actual demonstration of nuclearflight. “Fly early!” was its theme. Thephysicists who knew what there was toknow about reactor development at thetime, including J. Robert Oppenheimer,felt that such a schedule—and perhapsthe idea of nuclear flight itself—bor-dered on lunacy. They proposed that anorderly technical program be integratedinto the rest of the AEC’s reactorresearch, where high-temperature mate-rials would evolve in due course. Thestate of reactor physics and materialsscience was then far too primitive.Applied research should come beforeany flight plans.5

To help settle the matter, a group ofexperts convened at MIT in 1948 toevaluate the feasibility of the airplaneproject. Known as the LexingtonProject, the group predicted that theproject would consume at least a bil-lion dollars and fifteen years before allof the theoretical problems were solvedand an airplane flew. It also noted thatin fifteen years guided missiles mightmake an atom-powered bomber obsolete.

Instead of drawing together, the antago-nists each emphasized different parts ofthe Lexington Report. The Air Forceliked the sentence saying there was “astrong probability that some version ofnuclear-powered flight can beachieved.” The scientists and budgetmanagers pointed out the report’s warn-ing: “It is to be expected that crashesmay occur, and the site of a crash willbe uninhabitable.”6

The Air Force forged the politicalalliances needed to overrule the scien-tists. It was a poor start for a complicat-ed project, because the scientists alsohad their allies, and the two sidesremained in a state of tension through-out the 1950s. The Air Force teamincluded the airplane manufacturers andthe members of the JCAE. The scien-tists’allies were the Bureau of theBudget and Eisenhower’s Secretary ofDefense, each of which, for its ownreasons, tried to keep military budgetsunder control.

Throughout the 1950s, one or the otherside in this conflict was ascendant inWashington, and neither side remainedin the saddle for long. Therefore, thespecific objectives of the ANP mission


1 1 8

Allan C. Johnson

INEEL 57-4927

changed frequently. In the field, scien-tists complained that this was no way torun a technical program. Money eitherflowed copiously from Washington or itdribbled out, choked and stinted. Idahosupporters of the NRTS observed thisand learned a valuable lesson.

One of the policy shuffles occurred in1953. Rumors reached Idaho Falls inMay that the AEC was preparing tosuspend the program and reduce itsbudget in Idaho. The AEC was nowspending millions of dollars a year inIdaho and was fast becoming thelargest employer in the state. Fat con-struction payrolls were extra fodder forthe growth machine. Retrenchment wasunthinkable.

The program survived, but in the face ofthe airplane’s shiftable fortunes, thepolitical and economic leaders in south-east Idaho now realized that the NRT Scould shrink as well as grow. Old 1949

views that AEC decisions were basedpurely on technical grounds were thor-oughly discredited. To defend and nur-ture its federal growth machine, theregion needed an insider. Idaho neededrepresentation on the JCAE itself. Idahosenator Henry Dworshak looked for hischance and wrote, with some understate-ment, to a senate colleague in 1956 that“there is sentiment in my state for me tosit on the Joint Committee on A t o m i cE n e rg y.” Upon his appointment, south-east Idaho was well pleased.7

Not all the Wa s h i n g t o nmoney for the A N Pprogram was spent inIdaho. Pieces of theproject were flungall over the nation.Engineers had con-ceived twoapproaches for the air-p l a n e ’s propulsion sys-tem, and only the groundtests for one approach were sched-uled for the NRTS. Tu r b o m a c h i n e r y, air-

frame, shielding, and other studies tookplace in many other states.

In a conventional airplane, the combus-tion of chemical fuel produces heat.Hot compressed air passes through aturbine and is exhausted through anopening (nozzle) at the rear of the air-craft, providing thrust in the oppositedirection. The function of a nuclearreactor was to produce heat, replacingthe combustion chamber. It would haveto fit within an airframe and generate

extremely high temperatures.Shielding to protect the crew

had to weigh as little aspossible, or the planecouldn’t get off theground. The reactorand turbomachinerymaterials had to per-

form reliably amidstextreme heat, compres-

sion, and stress.

Akey engineering problem was howbest to transfer the heat to the air. In the

“direct cycle” approach, com-pressed air would flow

through the reactor andabsorb heat directly from

the fuel elements. It wouldthen pass through the turbine

and be expelled through thenozzle. By contrast, the “indi-

rect cycle” provided an interme-diate heat exchanger between the

air and the reactor, using a closedloop of liquid metal as the medium

of exchange. The direct cycle wasassigned to General Electric in 1951

and was to be tested in Idaho. (Pratt &Whitney of Massachusetts undertook theindirect cycle, which didn’t progress asfast as the direct cycle testing.)8

C H A P T E R 1 3 • T H E T R I U M P H O F P O L I T I C A L G R A V I T Y O V E R N U C L EA R F L I G H T

1 1 9

The ANP program was spread widely across the

nation, with the ANP office in Washington, D.C.

GE built a huge laboratory for the pro-ject in Evendale, Ohio, where itdesigned the reactor and the experi-ments that would run in the remotenessof Idaho. A new set of home-lab scien-

tists began traveling to Idaho Falls,sometimes on a C-54 aircraft officiallycalled “Site Flight” and unofficially,“Slite Fright.”9

Donald Keirn, the earliest promoter ofthe project, was now a major generaland the director of the program. He sentAir Force liaison officers to each fieldl a b o r a t o r y, including Idaho, to monitorprogress. The Air Force desired to be asindependent of its NRTS landlord aspossible and declined to use most of theI D O ’s central services. Autonomy wasimportant. Secrecy was important.Planners wanted plenty of room toexpand. They would need to build a run-w a y, for example. Although the purposeof the project was known to the public,the goal was to produce a weaponsdelivery system. Technical work wasclassified. GE wanted to be as distantfrom everyone else at the NRTS as pos-sible. GE manned its own fire station,

provided its own food service, suppliedits own security force, and built its ownfabrication shops and health physicsl a b s .1 0

So the IDO opened up Test Area North(TAN), thirty miles northeast ofCentral. Lincoln Boulevard cut a newribbon of asphalt across the desert, andState Highway 33 connecting Arco,TAN, Mud Lake, Terreton, andRexburg took on new importance. Thefirst phase of the project was calledInitial Engine Test (IET), and the mis-sion was simple: prove that nuclearheat could run a turbojet engine. Thetests involved a modified J-47 engine,but no airplane and no flight.

The big difference between this reactorand all the other reactors then at theNRTS was that it was mobile.Contaminated air could not be allowedto blow out the nozzle indoors—or nearwork areas. Rather, the reactor-cum-engine traveled back and forth betweenan assembly area and the test pad, adistance of a mile and a half. A mandriving a shielded locomotive hauled adolly carrying the eighty-ton assemblyon four-rail tracks. At the test pad, theengine connected to a “coupling sta-tion” where the exhaust was filtered,went up a 150-foot stack, and wasreleased to the open air.

After the first test, the test engineassembly would become a mobileradioactive hazard. This situation calledfor a new safety philosophy: place theshielding around people rather thanaround the reactor. Thus, the IET con-trol-room building and its entrancewere well shielded. Near the test pad,


1 2 0

The IET in 1957. The reactor-jet engine assembly was sheltered in the mobile aluminum building. Exhaust went

through the horizontal pipe to the stack. The control building is buried under earth shielding.

Major General Donald Keirn

INEEL 57-1780

Courtesy of Wright-Patterson Air Force Base

the control room was an elaboratebunker, its walls and ceilings made ofthick reinforced concrete and coveredwith earth. Remote-control techniquesconnected dials and switches to leadsfor fuel, air, water, electricity, and mon-itoring devices.11

The first Heat Transfer ReactorExperiment (HTRE-1), “Heater One” ininformal parlance, proved it could gocritical on November 4, 1955, not yetattached to an engine. The enricheduranium fuel was clad with nickel-chromium. Water was the moderatorand coolant. The engineers made noattempt to restrict the size or weight ofthe assembly or to approximate a flightversion. The assembly was deliberatelylarge so that crews could easily installmonitoring devices and instrumenta-tion.12

On December 30, 1955, HTRE-1 sat onits dolly at the test pad. The locomotivedriver had taken cover. Inside thebunker, the scientists had checked anddouble-checked all systems. The enginebegan operating on chemical fuel.Operators gradually withdrew the con-trol rods, taking the reactor critical. Asthe temperature rose, an automatic sen-sor closed the chemical fuel valve. Thecontraption worked. For the first timein the world, the heat of fissioning ura-nium alone powered an airplane engine.The GE test team had proven the prin-ciple. They cheered each other, but-toned up, and went off to celebrate atthe nearest bar, which was ten milesaway at Mud Lake. 13

The test results went out to the rest ofthe ANP network. The reactor had pro-duced more gamma radiation thanexpected. Oak Ridge, the scene of themajor shielding research, consideredthe implications: additional shieldweight would have to burden the air-craft unless ways could be found toreduce it. Experimentation with theHTRE-1 reactor, its fuel, and theengines continued. With this initial suc-cess, it was reasonable to plan the nextphase of the Idaho program: an airplanehangar, a runway, and most obviously,an airplane.14

GE and the Air Force were imaginingw a r-time scenarios: Suppose the bomberpenetrates enemy territory and drops itspayload of atomic bombs. Perhaps ittakes a hit. Crippled, trailing contami-nated exhaust, it nears the United States.What was the best route to Idaho? GE’schief HP, Carl Gamertsfelder, consid-ered the implications.


1 2 1

Courtesy of General Electric Aircraft Engines Division

Right. TAN Hot Shop just after completion in 1955

and before operation began. Below. Jet engine before

assembly with reactor.INEEL 55-73

The mission was...to fly [reconnais -sance] around Russia... If necessary,they would come in, dive down low,deliver a few bombs in strategic spotsand leave. And then come back [to theAmerican coast], turn off the reactors[to] let them cool off some, and flythrough a corridor [on chemical fuel]back to our site.

We looked at population densities alongthe [possible corridor routes]. The air -plane would have been escorted in[and] escorted out. [If it crashed] wewould have been able to dump tons andtons of foam, things of that kind... Thiswas during the Cold War. People wereserious.15

During 1955 and 1956, the Air Forcewas ascendant once more in Wa s h i n g t o n ,so “Fly early” was the order of the day.If for no other reason than to invent andrehearse the procedures on the groundwhen an airplane returned from its mis-sion, GE needed a special hangar—aFlight Engine Test (FET) facility. T h epower plant inside the airplane, crippledor not, would somehow have to beremoved from the airframe and taken toG E ’s huge Hot Shop, disassembled andstudied, repaired or replaced. Hangarcrews would have to handle the ordinarymaintenance of a hot airplane, not onlyits nuclear features. Such problems asextracting crew members from theirshielded cockpit without exposing themto a gamma field had to be solved.Nothing about nuclear flight could betaken for granted. Money flowed, andN RTS construction payrolls bulgeda g a i n .1 6

Meanwhile, HTRE experiments contin-ued, but reactor fuel and materials hada long way to go. GE wanted to irradi-ate fuel elements in the MTR, but theywere too large to fit in the MTR’s testholes and the ETR was not yet ready.So GE retooled the HTRE as a materi-als test reactor. Machinists drilled ahexagonal space in the center of thereactor. GE called it HTRE-2. The holewas a generous eleven inches wideacross the sides of the hexagon.Physicists inserted various metals andfuel elements, subjecting them to neu-tron flux and temperatures up to 2,800degrees F. for sustained periods of time.Their work moved high-heat reactormaterials into the realm of ceramics.


1 2 2

Above. Typical mission profile envisaged by U.S.

Air Force for a nuclear-powered aircraft flight.

Below. HTRE-3 components: reactor shield, single

chemical combustor mounted behind the reactor-

shield assembly, two modified J-47 turbojet

engines, and interconnecting ducting.

APEX-901

Courtesy of General Electric Aircraft Engines Division

Moving closer to its flight objective,GE built a completely new experiment.HTRE-3 operated between September1959 and December 1960. The enginesand the reactor were arranged horizon-tally, more typical of an aircraft, andhad a flight-type shield. The reactorvessel was double-walled, with a gap ofabout seven inches between the twowalls. When the reactor was running,operators filled the space between thetwo walls (the annulus) with water,which acted as a moderator and ashield. Richard Meservey, an instru-mentation engineer, recalled how theoperators managed to conduct numer-ous tests in fairly rapid order.

As soon as a test was finished, theydrained the water from the annulus andpumped the space full of mercury.Mercury is a high-density material, andit made a great shield. It allowed theworkers to climb back up on the assem -bly sooner to change out the instrumen -tation or make other adjustments. Themercury reduced their exposure. Theydidn’t have to wait for the short-livedisotopes to decay away. As soon as theywere finished changing the instruments,they would drain out the mercury andpump water back in. Then they’d haulthe reactor back down the track to thecoupling station and run another test.

We had three-quarters of the freeworld’s supply of mercury here at theSite at one time. We had so much, thatwhen the program was over, we had torelease it slowly back on the market sothat it wouldn’t cause an economicupheaval. It wasn’t radioactive becausethe mercury wasn’t in the annulus whenthe reactor was running, so it wasn’tirradiated.17

The HTRE-3 experiments eventuallyran two turbojet engines at a time at2,000 degrees F. In December 1960, theexperiments hit another milestone whenthe reactor started the engines withoutthe help of any chemical fuel at all.18

All GE tests involved IDO’s Health andSafety personnel because the exhaustreleases affected territory beyond theGE fence. Each time the jets operated,argon and other constituents of the airpassing through the reactor became

radioactive. Fuel elements occasionallyruptured or melted, discharging fissionproducts. Some tests imitated accidentsby deliberately blocking the flow of airto fuel elements, which also causedreleases. The HPs collaborated with theU.S. Weather Bureau and defined themeteorological conditions under whicheach test could run. The Air Forcechafed under this regimen and regardedJohn Horan, Dr. Beard’s successor, asfar too conservative. Horan recalled:


1 2 3

Above right. Shielded locomotive with turntable in

background. Snow plow in front. Right. Looking east

past the railroad turntable toward doors of ANP

Assembly and Maintenance Building. INEEL 12139

INEEL13245

We had a captain from the Air Forceout there [at TAN] in charge, and peri -odically he would call me in town whenwe would not allow them to start up[because] the meteorology wasn’t rightfor them to be running. He would...say,“I’m sitting here in my office lookingout and the flag is in the right directionand it is standing straight out andexactly meeting your conditions.”

I’d reply, “I’m sorry, but that is not thesituation at 150 feet, where the effluentwill be released.”

The Air Force appealed unsuccessfullyto the AEC operations office atCincinnati for relief. Horan continued:

We told GE that they couldn’t plan onusing their full 500 mR exposure off-site. We said, “Yo u ’ re allowed ten per -cent [of that].” To the public, the NRT Swas one site, and we interfaced with thepublic, not Cincinnati. We had to knowwhat was going up the stacks, and wehad to have shutdown authority.

One time I was in the office [of the GEmanager] and he said, “By God, youbetter not shut us down.” And I said,“Sam, you give us a reason to do it, andyou will see it’ll be done.”1 9


Above. The hangar under construction in 1958.

Middle. The hangar as it was completed in 1959.

Control building is shielded by earth. Access to

it was via a shielded tunnel. Right. The

“Beetle.” This manned, shielded vehicle

was designed for use in the hangar. Its

purpose was to remove the reactor and power

plants from the aircraft mockup, and eventually,

from an actual aircraft. It was never used

in Idaho, but moved to the nuclear

rocket program.

1 2 4

INEEL 59-5596

INEEL 59-5596

The $8 million hangar was finished inJuly 1959. The graceful barrel-vaultedbuilding had a clear space of 320 feetby 234 feet. The designers figured theplane would weigh at least 600,000pounds. It would reach 135 feet fromwing tip to wing tip, be 205 feet longand 53 feet high or higher at the tail.20

Plans for the runway showed a strip23,000-feet long—over four miles.Perhaps survey stakes went into theground, but GE never built it. The A E Cdecided in December 1958 that neitherthe NRTS nor any other AEC installa-tion would be used for an A N Pf l i g h ttest site. Despite the millions invested inthe hangar building and its shielded con-trol room, the wasted money was “morethan outweighed by the potential risksinvolved.” The AEC told the Air Forcethat nuclear test flights would have tooriginate from an island or coastal sta-tion and fly only over the ocean.2 1

Still, in 1960 the Air Force was confi-dent that the hangar would be used fora prototype aircraft. It could be ground-tested in Idaho before it was hauledoverland to a coastal base for flighttests. In Evendale, GE mocked up acompartment for a five-person bombercrew: commander, nuclear engineer,bombardier-navigator, defense director,and co-pilot. Located far forward in theairplane as distant as possible from thereactor, the shielded cabin contained akitchen, work room, and sleeping quar-ters so detailed that they included aventilated drawer for stuffing dirtyunderwear. Dietitians planned a nutri-tious five-day menu down to the peachpie for the fifth-day dessert.22


1 2 5

Above. Design of crew

compartment for airplane

took place in Evendale.

Sleeping, storage, and relief

facilities are integrated in a

36-sq.-ft. space. Two full-size

beds permit simultaneous

sleeping of two crewmen.

Clothing and personal articles

are stored in individual

lockers above the bed. Right

are containers for soiled

clothing. The pull-out electric

incinerator toilet is at the

lower right and the second

bed, a pull-out berth, is at the

lower left.From Nuclear Flight edited by Lt. Colonel Kenneth F. Gantz

The Idaho hangar reflected equal atten-tion to detail. The shielded locomotivewould tow the airplane inside on thef o u r-rail track. Using remote controlsfrom a bunker next door, operatorswould draw the plane abreast of a cou-pling station similar to the one at the testpad. The crew would slip from the cock-pit through a hatch shielded with leadbricks and descend to the basementb e l o w. They would make their waythrough a maze of tunnels to a changingroom, shed their contaminated clothing,s h o w e r, and submit to medical examina-tions and mission debriefings.E v e n t u a l l y, they would emerge in thecontrol room. Back on the hangar floor,remote manipulations would lower theentire power plant to the floor of a plat-form elevator and it too would go below,its first stop before remote transportto the Hot Shop. Ashielded win-dow gave visual access into theh a n g a r, and a side door lead-ing to the control room wasprotected against accidentalexplosions or criticalities by a“shadow shield,” a concretebarrier four feet thick intendedto block gamma radiation frompassing into the control room hall-w a y.2 3

In January 1961 John F. Kennedybecame president. Eisenhower alreadyhad suggested that either the direct orindirect approach to the airplane becanceled, greatly alarming the ANPcorner of the “military-industrial com-plex.” He never said which approach,and everyone expected Kennedy tomake the choice.24

It had been fifteen years since the endof World War II, and as the LexingtonReport had predicted, $1 billion hadbeen spent on the project. But the air-plane had not materialized. Supporterssaid reactor experiments were “on thethreshold” of significant new progress;all the program needed was “less thanone-fifth of one billion dollars” and aplane could fly in 1963. At the sametime, the range and accuracy of guidedmissiles had greatly improved. 25

The JCAE still felt the sting of Sputnik,the Soviet Union’s successfulSeptember 1957 launch of the firstsatellite to circle the globe. Putting anatomic plane into the air before the

Soviets could do so offered great psy-chological appeal. The JCAE was underno illusion that the promised 1963 air-plane would be combat worthy. Itwould be a slow-flying subsonic show-piece with no function but to be thefirst.26

But the old coalition of doubters hadheard such promises before, and theyhad the ear of the new president.Besides, Kennedy had ideas of his own.Eisenhower’s years of budget cuttinghad eroded conventional defense capa-bility to the point that the Army hadonly eleven combat-ready divisions, ashortage of ammunition, and low airliftcapacity. In order to provide tactical airsupport for the Army, the Air Forceadmitted it would have to borrow ord-nance from the Navy. Kennedy wantedmore flexibility to take the initiative,realizing that a Third World existed,where the struggle against communismrequired political and economic initia-tives. The nation needed a capacity tomake limited responses—more missile-firing Polaris submarines, more

Minuteman rockets, more guerrilla-warfare capability—not just a

massive atomic arsenal.27

On March 28, 1961, Kennedycanceled the entire airplaneproject, saying, “the possibility

of a militarily useful aircraft inthe foreseeable future is still very

remote...” He also canceled theArmy’s Nike-Zeus anti-missile missileand the Air Force’s B-70 bomber, bothunproven technologies.28

Kennedy made the cancellation effec-tive instantly. Stunned, southeast Idahoflooded Senator Henry Dworshak withtelegrams. Idaho Governor RobertSmylie wrote directly to PresidentKennedy, warning him that the loss ofANP’s 500 jobs would be a blow toIdaho of “disastrous proportions” and


1 2 6

asked for some replacement researchthat would keep the jobs in Idaho.29

At TAN, the Idaho Falls Post-Registerreported, employees were “thunder-struck.” One of them was Jay Kunze,an ANP physicist and engineer.30

There were employee meetings, and theword got out immediately. I wasshocked. I had started with GE in 1959and had a new baby and a new house.Now I was out of a job! I was scaredstiff. But GE had a history of never lay -ing off an engineer. The company keptabout a hundred of us in Idaho...andsent others to San Jose or GE facilitieselsewhere.

Eventually, we got into space electricpower and worked on a thermionicreactor, in which the fuel elements werethermionic cells. The fuel gave off elec -trons to supply heat. Then Phillipsexperimented with the “710,” a high-temperature reactor for rocket propul -sion. The concept never went intooperation.

Later, we investigated another conceptfor NASA rocket propulsion. This wasfor a manned mission to Mars. NASAhoped that a one-year mission to Marsusing chemical fuel could be reduced tothree months on nuclear fuel. It was acavity reactor, a sphere about twelveinches in diameter. In the center wasthe fuel, uranium hexafluoride, whichabove room temperature, is a gas.Hydrogen would flow around the chainreaction in the fuel, heat up to tempera -tures up to 20,000 degrees F. and exitthrough a small nozzle, providingthrust.31

Thus, some replacement research cameto Idaho. The new work made some useof TAN’s empire of buildings. Thehangar had never been used. The gov-ernment had poured over $41 millioninto the Idaho ANP buildings and facili-ties through 1961. NASA put on holdits plans for a manned mission to Mars,so the Cavity Reactor and the otherspace-related reactors were shut downin the early 1970s. The vacant TANfacilities went up for rent, a testimonialthat the NRTS, no matter how brilliantits scientists and engineers, could notcontrol its destiny when the politicalwinds of Washington blew across thedesert.32


Above. Gas-core nuclear rocket concept. Uranium-

235 gas is in the center like a bubble. Hydrogen

flows around the uranium, heats up, and exits the

core through a small opening, providing thrust.

1 2 7

INEEL 71-3705

C H A P T E R F O U R T E E N

1 2 8

IM A G I N I N G T H E WO R S TThe reactor must also function during startup and shutdown or load change and

must be able to scram safely under a variety of postulated malfunctions.

—Nucleonics, 1960—

It isn’t clear justwhen the word “excursion” migratedinto the daily vocabulary of nuclear sci-entists. Among non-nuclear people, theword evokes picnics in the park andleisurely drives in the country. Reactorscientists appropriated the word todescribe a potentially deadly hazard.

Among the early preoccupations ofN RTS scientists was to imagine whatkinds of accidents might endanger peo-ple—and then to minimize the chancesof accidents. If power plants were togenerate electricity, they would mostlikely be located near populated areas.For the sake of the population and thefuture of the nuclear power industryboth, the plants had to operate safely.

An excursion is a sudden increase in thepower level of a reactor. All of the reac-tor’s accessories—the vessel that con-tains the fuel, the pumps that circulatethe coolant, the control rods and themachines that move them in and out—are designed with an expectation thatthe reactor will not run hotter than acertain temperature. Removing heat isthe single most important way to keepthe reactor safe. It is possible for the

accessories to be working well, butsomething within the core of the reac-tor—a badly-made fuel element, per-haps, or impurities in the coolant—canaffect the rate at which the uraniumatoms are fissioning. Instead of splittingat a certain rate per second, the atomssplit at twice that rate, or four times. Ifunchecked, such an “excursion” couldoverwhelm the heat-removing appara-tus, melt the fuel, inspire chemicalexplosions, and cause a release of fis-sion products into the environment.

In the 1950s, imagined accident scenar-ios opened up questions for which scien-tists had few answers. Does a risingtemperature encourage or discourage thechain reaction? What happens while thefuel is heating up? Will the reaction con-tinue? At what point will it stop? If theautomatic controls or human operatorsfail to scram an excursioning reactor,what is the worst that can happen? Suchquestions pointed the way to formulatingmany parts of the overall safety researchprograms supported by the A E C .

The Nautilus prototype and the MTRused water for cooling. In both casesthe water was pressurized to prevent thewater from boiling in the core or turn-ing to steam. The conventional wisdomwas that steam bubbles would somehowaffect the behavior of neutrons andcause the reactor to behave erratically,possibly overheating.

Samuel Untermyer, a scientist atArgonne National Laboratory, thoughtotherwise. Based on his observation ofan accidental withdrawal of a controlrod at a zero-power reactor in Chicago,he thought that if water bubbled orsteamed in an overheating reactor core,the chain reaction would merely slowdown until it died all by itself.

BORAX-I, the “runaway” reactor.

Argonne National Laboratory-West 201-709

Argonne-West. EBR-II containment dome is to the right of the Fuel Cycle Facility.

Middle Butte is on horizon.Argonne National Laboratory-West 103-Z5868

Automatic scrams or human judgmentwould not have to intervene. The morebubbles—or voids—the slower thereaction. The only way to prove it,however, was to try it. He set aboutdesigning a suitable test reactor.

Untermyer obtained the support ofWalter Zinn and the AEC, and they setup an experiment in Idaho. The two ofthem didn’t realize it at the time, buttheir innovative and unprecedentedBoiling Water Reactor Experiment(BORAX) began an epoch spanningmore than three decades in whichthe nuclear power industry allover the world—and later thespace program—obtained manyof its important safety answersfrom the NRTS. Only at theN RTS were scientists free to doexperiments in which explosionsor meltdowns might confirm orcontradict their predictions.1

News reporters liked to callBORAX-I the “runaway reactor. ”Construction began with a simplehole in the ground about a halfmile from the EBR. The reactorsat inside a shielding tank ten feetin diameter and open to the skylike a small swimming pool. T h etank was partly above ground, soa hill of earth ten feet thick wasmounded up against it for moreshielding. Asmall platform over theearth gave access to the top of the tank.By May 1953 water and reactor were inthe tank ready to go.2

Untermyer and his colleagues conductedover two hundred experiments in thenext fourteen months. Positioned insidea control trailer a short distance from the

r e a c t o r, he would pull the control rodout of the reactor core, for example, andthe water would bubble and hiss, spitscalding water 150 feet above the tank.Then the reactor would shut itself down,the gush diminish, and the water growcalm. Tourists passing by on Highway20/26 reported seeing a geyser like OldFaithful erupting on the Arco Desert.The team tried endless variations, diff e r-ent types of fuel elements and diff e r e n ttypes of “errors.” With each series ofexperiments, they gradually increasedthe power level of the reactor.3

The results proved Untermyer correct. Inevery case, the chain reaction stoppedbefore the aluminum fuel plates becamehot enough to melt. It appeared that boil-ing water reactors might therefore be“inherently” safe; that is, safe because of

the way nature took its course, notbecause automatic controls, machinery,and human judgment operated perfectlyone hundred percent of the time. Zinnthought the commercial possibility ofboiling water reactors should bee x p l o r e d .4

It was wise, Untermyer thought, tomake the point that a boiling waterreactor could be pushed too far. Heacquired the permissions needed to runa final test provoking the completedestruction of the reactor. He and Zinn

calculated how much radioac-tivity might be released intothe atmosphere and consultedwith IDO health physicists andthe meteorologists at the U.S.Weather Bureau’s NRTS sta-tion. Zinn justified the experi-ment to AEC Headquarters:“The worst situation imagin-able is one in which the imme-diate BORAX site would haveto be inactivated for someweeks while decontaminationis performed,” he wrote. Butunless scientists began toquantify the impacts of acci-dents, nuclear hazards wouldremain a topic for speculation,not knowledge.5

On the day scheduled, July 21,1954, the wind was blowing in

the wrong direction, so the meteorolo-gist aborted the test. Official guestswent away disappointed. The next day,amidst talk of using dynamite to simu-late a visually satisfying event in casethe reactor fizzled, the BORAX teamwelcomed the visitors again and posi-tioned them at an observation post.Physicist Harold Lichtenberger was at


1 3 0

BORAX-I “geyser” during another experiment.


the controls. Highway patrol officersstood by to close Highway 20/26 ifneeded. As the test time drew near, dri-vers warmed up the emergency evacua-tion buses. By 7:50 a.m. the breeze wasright, as all could see by looking at thesmoke bombs ringing the area.

Worried that the excursion rod mightstick and so ruin the show for the visi -tors, the crew decided to “give it every -thing” they had when ejecting theexcursion rod by remote control fromthe control trailer.

Almost instantly, the reactor blew upwith the force of three or four sticks ofdynamite, tossing debris and an inkyblack column of smoke more than ahundred feet above the desert brush.

“Harold, you’d better stick the rodsback in,” Zinn shouted. “I don’t think itwill do any good,” Lichtenbergerreplied, “There’s one flying through theair!” Zinn was surprised. Previousexcursion clouds had been silverywhite, evidence of discharged steamand water. This dark cloud, with almostvertical sides, indicated a far different,more powerful reaction. “Within thecolumn, and along its edges, andfalling away from the edges” Zinn sawa “large quantity of debris,” includinga large sheet of plywood that sailed offacross the desert like a giant playingcard.

The reactor was totally destroyed.Within the control trailer Zinn detecteda slight tremor, while most observers inthe open felt a small shock wave.6

Geiger counters squawked and everyonetook cover. The fallout cloud went southand then drifted back over the NRT S ,diluted enough not to be dangerous, butconcentrated enough to be measured.Zinn might have preferred that a steamexplosion had not destroyed the reactor,but the explosion was deliberate, and itidentified what later became known asthe “threshold eff e c t . ”

A rgonne salvaged the BORAX-I controlequipment and buried the rest where itl a y. The team moved a short distancefrom the scene and built a new reactorcalled BORAX-II, twice the size ofBORAX-I and dignified within a prefab-ricated metal building. They conductedhundreds more experiments, modifyingthe reactor core several times andrenaming it upon each major change toBORAX-III, -IV, and -V. With each test,the experimenters understood more thanbefore about the safety parameters foroperating a boiling water reactor.

Argonne’s ultimate goal was to evolvea reactor useful for electrical genera-tion. Having proved that the reactorwas stable during tests, the BORAXteam looked around for a wet-steamturbine generator. For once, the pile ofold Naval Proving Ground junk provedwanting, and they scrounged an aban-doned plant from an old sawmill nearAlbuquerque, New Mexico. “Here wewere,” recalled Ray Haroldsen,Argonne electrical engineer, “[at] theforefront of knowledge, trying to getthe old 1925 turbine going.”7

But they managed. Soon they wereready for the next major proof of prin-ciple. After President Eisenhower’s“Atoms for Peace” speech, the United

Nations sponsored the firstInternational Conference on AtomicEnergy at Geneva, Switzerland, in1955. It was an exciting moment fornuclear scientists because for the firsttime since the war, some of the secrecysurrounding nuclear knowledge wasbeing lifted, and scientists, who beforethe war had recognized no national bor-ders in scientific colloquy, could oncemore exchange information and show-case their achievements and ideas.8

Argonne scientists prepared fifty-onetechnical papers for presentation at theconference. They also decided that thiswas a suitable moment to demonstratefor the first time in the history of theworld that nuclear power could providereal electricity to a real town. With thecooperation of Utah Power and Light(UP&L), they hauled a transformer on aflatbed truck to BORAX-III andpatched the system into Arco. RayHaroldsen said:

It was [trouble with] a transmissionline that caused the lighting of Arco tobe delayed about two days. We also lostabout as much sleep. Engineers blewout several lines before successfullylighting the town. Those two sleeplessdays are something we will alwaysremember.9

The little boiling water reactor madeelectrical contact with Arco (and theN RTS Central Facilities Area) onS u n d a y, July 17, 1955, running forsomething over an hour around mid-night. Most citizens were tucked in forthe night and none the wiser. A rg o n n ehad invited several international visitorsto witness the entire procedure. Somewatched as a switch broke UP&L’s con-

C H A P T E R 1 4 • I M A G I N I N G T H E W O R S T

1 3 1

nection to Arco while others had a bird’seye view from the butte overlooking thetown. Film crews recorded everything.

Argonne kept the news from Arco for aweek while Walter Zinn and the rest ofArgonne’s Geneva delegation preparedto make a splash in Geneva. On themorning of August 12, seventy-two del-egates saw the fifteen-minute film while

Argonne sent Arco a dispatch, hopingthe citizens heard the news before therest of the world. The same film playedat 2 p.m. in Arco, the screening adver-tised by word of mouth and a car with aloudspeaker. Two hundred peopleshowed up and promised to keep thesecret until after the story was officiallyreleased a few hours later. Back inGeneva the international witnesses wereon hand in the post-film buzz to affirmthe credibility of the story. The SovietUnion, undoubtedly feeling upstaged,asserted that it hadn’t happened. ButArco believed it, delighted.10

The BORAX tests continued through1964. BORAX-V demonstrated thesafety aspects of reheating steam gener-ated by boiling water (superheatedsteam), potentially an improvement inthe efficient generation of electricity.Argonne went on to design, build, andimprove the country’s first boilingwater power plant, the ExperimentalBoiling Water Reactor (EBWR), at theArgonne Lab in Illinois. The plant ran

from 1956 to 1967, gradually increas-ing its power level and reliability to thepoint where it supplied electricity forthe entire Argonne Lab. By 1958, exec-utives from General Electric weretelling Senator Dworshak that boilingwater reactors would be competitivewith new fossil fuel plants by 1970.11

The BORAX series demonstrated to theAEC that the deliberate inducement ofpower excursions and the deliberatechoking of coolant could be testedunder controlled conditions without dis-aster and would provide useful safetyinformation. Soon the AEC approvedprograms for pressurized water reactorsand breeder reactors, and a parade ofsafety test reactors followed BORAX tothe NRTS.12

By 1953, AEC Headquarters itself waspreparing for the review and licensingactivities that a commercial industrywould eventually require. It created anAdvisory Committee on ReactorSafeguards (ACRS). The AEC andindustry both were represented on thisbody, which concerned itself with thelocation of reactors, their operationalsafety, radioactive fallout, and othersafety issues. Dr. Doan became a mem-ber of this committee.13


1 3 2

Above. Clarence W. Byrne, local agent for Utah

Power and Light Company at the Arco substation

switch on July 17, 1955. Left. The view from the

butte above Arco the same night.

INEEL 55-2349

INEEL 55-2351

In January 1955 the AEC began aPower Demonstration Reactor Program,inviting private utility companies toown, build, and operate prototypepower reactors. The AEC would subsi-dize the costs in various ways and lendthe necessary uranium fuel. The pro-gram accelerated the need for safetyinformation because these reactorswould be located near cities such asChicago, Detroit, and Boston.14

The AEC also realized that the newindustry would require an expansion inthe ranks of nuclear physicists, engi-neers, and chemists. It desired toencourage students to undertake careersin nuclear specialties. Graduate studentswould need to acquire experience withnuclear reactors. That meant puttingreactors on university campuses. TheAerojet-General Corporation alreadyhad designed a compact, university-affordable low-power reactor of a sortcalled a “swimming pool” reactorbecause it was moderated and shieldedwithin a pool of water. But the AEChad a question: how could the place-ment of nuclear reactors in the heart ofuniversity campuses be made safe?

A group of people at the NRTS wasready to assist the AEC. One of itsmembers was Warren Nyer, who laterrecalled:

The AEC wanted to get the universi -ties of the country involved. But allseasoned Ph.D.s were concerned withthe conditions under which grad stu -dents could be safely permitted to usethis new tool. Questions were beingraised about supervision, inhere n tdesign, constraints, and the like. Sothe AEC said, “What will we do with

all these graduate students muckinga round the reactors that are going tobe placed on the campuses?” We hadto make sure they could handle thesethings safely.

Dr. Doan, Bion Philipson, AllanJohnson, and I went to Chicago to meetwith Walter Zinn and a representativefrom AEC Headquarters to discuss thepossibility of Phillips undertaking aproject...[We discussed the BORAXexperiments] and Argonne promised itssupport.

We got a letter shortly thereafter givingus the go-ahead and allocating thefunds. The AEC was in effect asking,“What are the limits?...How much reac -tivity can we allow student reactors tohave?...How safe can swimming poolreactors be made and still let manypeople have free access to it?” We wereto explore the limits of the reactor’s

behavior, and it was expected that wewould test the reactors to destruction.


1 3 3

Above. Graduate student prepares experiment at

University of Missouri Research Reactor. Below. The

Peach Bottom power plant in Pennsylvania, part of

the Power Demonstration Reactor Program. The

reactor was housed in a containment building, and

the plant was located distant from heavily populated

areas.

Courtesy of University of Missouri


The following June [1955], eight ornine months later, we had our firstreactor going critical. And that’s howthe SPERT program got started. Ofcourse, it broadened to consider safetylimits for other types of reactors, too.The SPERT program led to the LOFT(Loss of Fluid Test) program and theSTEP (Safety Test EngineeringProgram).15

S P E RT stood for Special PowerExcursion Reactor Test. T h eIDO located the test complexabout sixteen miles from theeastern NRTS boundary in aspot where dominant windscould help disperse falloutclouds during destructive tests.The SPERT complex embell-ished the architectural vocabu-lary of earthen shields, controlbunkers, and buried reactor pitsinitiated by BORAX. The localnewspapers cultivated a color-ful vocabulary of their own asthey reported on “blowup tests”and “mad reactors” that were“allowed to run wild.”1 6

Phillips ran the SPERT pro-gram through 1970, developingreactors in a series that grewpast SPERT-I to the more com-plex SPERT-II, -III, and -IV.Experiments regularly pushedreactors far beyond normalsafety limits in order to discov-er what the normal safety lim-its were. The first SPERT-I(plate-type) core was sent deliberatelyto its destruction in November of 1962,followed by a new core and moretests.17

Instrumentation engineers, centered inthe Instrumentation Lab at Central,found opportunities to be brilliant asthey fashioned instruments and datarecorders advancing the art of reportingthe precise sequence of events andimpact of a power excursion. Some ofthe first experiments in each of theSPERTs tested freshly invented resis-tance thermometers and techniques forcalibrating them. Engineer Glen Bright,for example, invented a camera that

could photograph events occurringinside an exceedingly hot fuel rod andsee the actual onset of boiling betweenthe fuel plates.18

Analysts pored over the images and thedata, assessing their meaning andimport, extracting information. Whencomputers arrived, the analysts madethe most of them. They sent theirreports and recommendations to theACRS and AEC, which were responsi-

ble for establishing licensingrequirements not only forcampus reactors, but all othercommercial water-moderatedreactors in the country.Physicists working for utilitycompanies likewise examinedthe reports and consideredwhether their clients shouldchoose boiling water, pressur-ized water, or some otherreactor concept for power pro-duction. In fact, safety infor-mation was availableworld-wide, much of it pre-sented at Atoms for Peaceconferences in Geneva.19

The Detroit Edison Company,one of four utility companiesto propose a project for theAEC’s Power DemonstrationReactor Program, was theonly one to select Zinn’sbreeder concept, cooled withliquid metal. Walker Cisler,the president of DetroitEdison, had embraced the ele-

gant promise of the breeder to trans-form scarce uranium-235 into anon-issue. He prepared to build nearDetroit a plant to be called the EnricoFermi Atomic Power Plant. It took sev-


1 3 4

Twin pools of the SPERT-IV reactor facility, under

construction in 1961. The men on the bridge stand

over the reactor pool. The other pool was used

mainly to store fuel, but added to the general

flexibility of operations.

INEEL 61-6873

eral years to develop because the liq-uid-metal coolant and the fast-neutronhabit of breeders were in scientific ter-ritory entirely different from waterreactors, and they required safety-test-ing all their own.20

Cisler had followed the progress of theEBR-I. Early in 1953, technicians at theEBR-I removed samples of the U-238blanket around the core and shippedthem to Argonne’s chemical engineer-ing laboratory in Chicago. Thechemists found what they werelooking for: plutonium. Theword went quickly to AECHeadquarters. Gordon Dean,one of the commissioners, rec-ognized a momentous achieve-ment in nuclear history andannounced to the world, “Thereactor is...burning up uraniumand, in the process, it is chang-ing non-fissionable uraniuminto fissionable plutonium at arate that is at least equal to therate at which U-235 is beingconsumed.”21

Argonne had proved the prin-ciple. Zinn presented a long-range development plan to theAEC, convinced that in thelong run, breeder reactorswere the only type that wouldcompete successfully againstfossil fuel plants. He proposedthat Argonne build a prototypebreeder reactor in Idaho.Unlike EBR-I, this one wouldhave a significant power productioncapacity and be built to safety-test full-size commercial hardware. Since pluto-nium was to become fuel, theaccessories to the reactor would include

a plant for recycling the spent fuel andrecovering the plutonium economically.Experimental Breeder Reactor-II (EBR-II) would be a compact industrial plant:generating electricity and recycling itsown fuel. The idea was still in therealm of experimentation. To consum-mate the vision, the project would haveto solve one problem after another,safety and otherwise. Zinn and theAEC—and Detroit Edison—felt theproblems were well worth solving.

To facilitate the design of EBR-II (andFermi), A rgonne turned EBR-I to thetask of exploring excursions and ther e a c t o r’s inherent shut-down potential. Itappeared that under certain conditions,the reactivity in the core increased whentemperatures went up. This was undesir-able. Zinn wanted to push EBR-I fuel toa temperature of 500 degrees C. to see ifit would lose reactivity. To get the fuelthat hot, he had to take the drastic stepof shutting off the flow of coolant. He

also purposely disconnectedthe safety mechanisms thatwould automatically scramthe reactor before it reachedhis test temperature. Heknew that this could cause ameltdown if a scram wasn’ttimed perfectly and informedthe AEC accordingly.2 2

On November 29, 1955, theEBR-I reactor was ready forthe test. The plan was toscram the reactor when thepower level reached 1,500kilowatts or when the dou-bling of the fission rateoccurred at a one-secondinterval. When this momentarrived, an assistant misun-derstood the operator’sinstruction and scrammedthe reactor with a slow-moving control rod, not theindicated faster one. Theoperator quickly reachedover and pushed the properbutton, but the lapse had

cost two seconds. Fifteen minutes later,radioactivity within the control roomset off the alarms and everyone evacu-ated the building. Half of the football-sized core had melted. Unlike BORAX,


1 3 5

The core of EBR-I was about the size of a football.

The 1955 incident melted about half of it.

Argonne National Laboratory-East 103-237

the event produced no sound, no steam,no smoke, no explosion. Zinn reportedthe incident to the AEC the next day.Zinn the scientist absorbed what therewas to learn and saw an opportunity—perhaps making lemonade out of alemon—to learn how to handle a dam-aged core safely and efficiently.23

The episode, while being the first unin-tended meltdown in American nuclearh i s t o r y, possibly would have acquired thepatina of “one of those things” that hap-pens in the course ofe x p e r i m e n t a t i o n ,except that A E CHeadquarters decidednot to inform thepublic. The newsleaked out in A p r i l1956, covered by thenuclear and nationalpresses. The editor ofN u c l e o n i c s w a r n e dthe AEC that nuclearaccidents were publicbusiness. In wordsthat would later seemprophetic, he said,“Apart from the bade ffect that secrecywould have on atti-tudes toward nuclears a f e t y, such with-holding of news is wrong in principle. Itis beyond the authority of AEC to with-hold information not affecting the nation-al security. And because AEC operates inso much secrecy, public confidence in itwill surely be undermined.”2 4

Lost to public notice was the discoveryof how the meltdown had occurred andwhy higher heat in the reactor had pro-duced a positive temperature coeff i c i e n t .

A rg o n n e ’s Idaho team extracted the corefrom the reactor, built a shielded coff i nfor it, and shipped it to Chicago. T h eanalysts found that in the extraordinaryheat, the fuel elements had bowed andexpanded, bringing too many uraniumatoms too close to one another. The heathad been greater on one side of the ele-ments than the other, and since the fuelwas clamped at both ends, it bent towardthe higher heat, a simple mechanicalevent. In the future, this could be easilyp r e v e n t e d .2 5

EBR-I received a new core in 1957employing zirconium spacers and otherfeatures to hold the fuel rigid. EBR-I

continued to serve for experiments. In1962 Argonne installed what would beEBR-I’s last core, this one with plutoni-um fuel. Experiments continued untilArgonne shut down the reactor in 1964,ready to move on with EBR-II, the nextevolutionary step in the march towardcommercial-sized fast breeders.26

To further understand the behavior offast neutrons during an excursion—andwhile fuel was melting—Argonne builtTREAT, the Transient Reactor Test

Facility, “transient”being a term similarto “excursion,” indi-cating very tempo-rary bursts ofpower. The reactorwould test candidatefuels for EBR-II aswell. Because thetransient tempera-tures would beextremely high,TREAT’s specialfuel was made byembedding and bak-ing highly enricheduranium in graphite.When the tempera-ture of fast-movingneutrons was madeto spike, the

graphite acted as a heat sink, protectingthe fuel. Slots through the core provid-ed an opening for a camera to recordthe events taking place in the test holeduring the excursion.27

TREAT’s early experiments deliberate-ly melted fuel elements and assembliesto learn more about how fast-reactorcores would behave during a meltdown.As testing progressed, Argonne evolved


1 3 6

Operator demonstrates insertion of fuel element in

ZPPR (Zero Power Physics Reactor), housed at

Argonne-West. Physicists could mock up various

arrangements of fuel and control elements and test

them at low power. The reactor was made critical by

moving one half of the reactor closer to the other.

INEEL 69-4254

fuels and cladding materials that couldsurvive higher and higher temperaturesbefore they failed. For example, oneearly test series subjected EBR-II fuelto pulses of higher and higher tempera-tures. Thermocouples welded onto thecladding measured surface tempera-tures. At 970 degrees C., there was littledamage. At 1,000 degrees, the claddingfailed and molten uranium was ejectedforcefully enough to damage nearbyfuel elements. The tests showed that thecladding close to the base would failfirst. The next test series did the melt-downs in a stagnant pool of sodium andthen in an environment of flowing sodi-um. The design of fuel elements, thenfuel assemblies, then entire reactorcores grew ever more sophisticated.28

The research going into the design ofEBR-II required several support build-ings. The IDO opened up a new area forA rgonne at the NRTS. Still interested inreducing the travel time from the IdahoFalls airport, A rgonne chose to buildEBR-II and “Arg o n n e - West” as close tothe eastern boundary of the NRTS aspossible. After 1955, new facilities wentup regularly, including the A rgonne FastSource Reactor, a small low-power (onekilowatt) research reactor used forphysics studies and to improve instru-mentation and detection methods towardthe design of EBR-II—and all fast-neu-tron reactors elsewhere.2 9

EBR-II went critical for the first time inNovember 1963. The reactor buildingincluded a feature new at the NRTS: acontainment shell. The silver dome wasmade of inch-thick steel; inside, entryinto the reactor room was via a set ofairlock doors, a design borrowed fromthe Navy, to keep the room air-tight.

The reactor, the coolant pumps, and theheat exchanger all operated inside atank filled with 86,000 gallons of liquidsodium (not the alloy NaK). The sec-ondary sodium loop transferred enoughheat to a steam generator to produce thedesign level of 62.5 megawatts of elec-tricity. To prevent accidents derivingfrom sodium/water contact, the build-ing contained no circulating water.30

Next door to EBR-II, Argonne built theFuel Cycle Facility (FCF), a speciallaboratory where scientists were imag-ining the best: a fully integrated powerplant combining electrical generationwith a small factory right on thepremises to make new fuel elementsout of the unfissioned uranium and the

new plutonium from the reactor. Thespent fuel would have to cool for onlytwo weeks—not three or four monthslike MTR fuel. A pyrometallurgicprocess—melting and refining thefuel—would separate the good metalfrom the fission products. Instead ofbeing shipped elsewhere to be fabricat-ed into new fuel elements, fabricationtoo would be done on-site, eliminatingtransport costs. The radioactive wastewould amount to tiny volumes com-pared to the liquid wastes being storedin the Chem Plant tanks. It would all besafe, reliable, clean, and in the end,cheaper than mining and hauling coalday after day and decade after decade.


1 3 7

Floor plan for the Fuel Cycle Facility. Spent fuel came from EBR-II next door for on-site disassembly and

recycling. The rectangular section was a hot cell with air atmosphere; the doughnut shaped section, argon gas.

Workers could move around the work stations to complete the sequence of tasks required to disassemble fuel

elements, heat the fuel in a refining furnace, separate uranium from waste products, and reassemble new fuel

elements.

Argonne National Laboratory-West

C H A P T E R F I F T E E N

1 3 8

TH E S L-1 REA CT O RThat experience eclipses all of the other experiences I had up there.

—Dr. George Voelz, NRTS Medical Director—

In the arctic tundra, a treeless plain north of the coniferforests of Canada and Alaska, plant liferelies on shallow bogs and a few inchesof top soil. Below, the soil is frozen allyear long, permanently unresponsive tothe spring thaw. Vast acreages of thetundra allow practically no life at all,the ground a dark and flinty mat ofstones.

This was the setting thatthe U.S. A r m ydescribed to theA rgonne Lab as thedestination for asmall nuclear powerplant. The Army hadin mind the DistantEarly Warning sys-tem, the DEW L i n e .Beginning in 1953,dozens of mannedradar stations ringedthe Arctic Circle, onconstant watch for aSoviet air invasion. T h eArmy regularly shipped dieselfuel to each station for heat and electrici-t y. This was costly and sometimes haz-ardous in such remote areas, and the

Army hoped to replace the diesel supplyline with nuclear power.

The vision was to package a powerplant in three or four pieces, fit theminto cargo planes or trucks, and havesoldiers assemble them in a few hours.Easy to operate, a plant would run atleast three years on one fuel loading.The plant need generate only a thou-

sand kilowatts, andwhen the mission

ended, the crewcould pack it upagain and shipit elsewhere.Would Argonnedesign a proto-type?1

Applying its BORAX experience,Argonne developed the project using aboiling water reactor concept. Thevirtue of the system was that steamfrom the boiling water powered the tur-bine directly, eliminating the weight andcomplexity of a secondary loop andheat exchanger equipment.2

With tundra permafrost conditions inmind, the Army wanted to test not onlythe reactor, but its building as well. T h eprototype, assigned to Idaho, was readyto build in 1957. The building shellwas a circular steel tank, a silo-likecylinder forty-eight feet high and aboutthirty-eight feet in diameter. It sat ondummy piers arranged in a circle. Inthe arctic the piers would hold the bot-tom of the silo two feet above the per-mafrost and leave airspace between the

floor and the ground.This would preventtransferring heat tothe permafrost.Despite its armoredappearance, the silowas not intended asa containment struc-ture. Both the NRT Sand potential arctic

destinations were sufficiently remote,and the power level of the reactor

Cutaway of SL-1 reactor and the control building.

Reactor floor is above shielding gravel. Fan floor is

above reactor floor.

INEEL 60-3227

Pressure vessel for Stationary Low-Power Reactor has been placed during construction. Steel plate is

going up around the reactor building. Circa 1958.Argonne National Laboratory-West 103-4055

s u fficiently low, that the AEC deemedsuch a feature unnecessary.3

Inside, the plant was arranged like athree-layer cake. In the bottom third,native stone and gravel shielded thepressure vessel containing the reactor.The middle third was the operatinglevel, giving the crew access to the topof the reactor, the turbine generator, andcontrol rod machinery. On top, a “fanfloor” attic contained equipment to con-dense and cool the recirculating water.A weather-protected stairway snaked upthe side of the cylinder to connect theadjacent control building to the operat-ing floor level.4

After Argonne handed over the finishedplant to the Army’s operating contrac-tor, Combustion Engineering (CE), theArmy named the reactor StationaryLow-Power Reactor Number One, orSL-1. This name distinguished the reac-tor from a whole family of other smallreactors that the Army already had built

or was planning. Reactors were to be“stationary,” “portable,” or “mobile,”depending on the intended field appli-cation, and rated for “low,” “medium,”or “high” power.5

The IDO opened up an Army ReactorExperimental Area (AREA) about ahalf mile north of State Highway 20and ten miles east of Central Facilities.

The SL-1 was the first of three antici-pated Army experiments at the NRTS.The other two were intended to perfecta “mobile” reactor so miniaturized thatit would fit on a truck and move when-ever a field station moved. As of 1958all the reactors built in the UnitedStates had been cooled with water orliquid metal. But gas was a coolant pos-sibility and the Army chose to exploreit for mobile reactors. Ultimately, theArmy hoped ordinary air could be used,further simplifying the power plant andeliminating more weight. The Armycontracted Aerojet General Corporationto design a Gas Cooled ReactorExperiment (GCRE) and do for the gas-cooled concept what BORAX, SPERT,and TREAT had done for the other con-cepts: determine its safe operating para-meters and select the best fuel. Thatdone, the Army would use the remote-ness of the NRTS to field-test a proto-type for the Mobile Low-PowerReactor, or ML-1.6

The IDO reserved sites for the threereactors at half mile intervals along anaccess road it named Fillmore Avenue.The GCRE, a water-moderated reactorsituated in a “swimming pool” pitbelow the floor, went critical in 1959,and the ML-1 was expected to arrivesometime in 1961.7


1 4 0

Above. Cadremen at SL-1 control panel. Left.

Operators make adjustments in GCRE reactor pit.INEEL 63-4454

INEEL 59-4018

The Army planned to train its futureDEW Line crews at the SL-1, so CEran the reactor with a military crew.The Army and the Air Force senttrainees; the Navy, interested in thepotential of the SL-1 for Navy mis-sions, sent Seabees. The mixed“cadres” trained together and rotated toIdaho after several months of instruc-tion at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, where theArmy operated its prototype StationaryMedium-Power (SM-1) reactor eigh-teen miles from the White House.

The SL-1 went critical for the first timeon August 11, 1958, and produced itsfirst electricity two months later onOctober 24. Thereafter, the rhythm ofwork involved running the reactor forperiods ranging between one and sixweeks and then shutting down for train-ing in maintenance and repair or toinstall improvements. The first cadrehad been trained, tested, and certifiedby May 1959, and many others fol-lowed. CE’s Christmas routine was toshut down the reactor, celebrate theholiday, and then do annual mainte-nance tasks before the next start-up.8

Accordingly, on December 23, 1960,CE shut down the reactor. Crewsreturned on December 27, reporting towork in three shifts around the clock.Start-up was scheduled for January 4,1961. The men calibrated instrumentsand attended to the valves, pipes, andpump that circulated coolant waterthrough the reactor. To do part of thiswork, they lowered the water level inthe reactor about two feet.

The last task was to insert forty-fournew cobalt flux wires into the core forlater mapping of the reactor’s neutronflux. The January 3 day shift insertedthe flux wires. To gain access to thereactor core, they had moved out of theway several large concrete shieldingblocks that ringed the top of the reactor.Then they disconnected the control rodsfrom their drive mechanisms, these alsobeing in the way. It would fall to the 4p.m. shift to reconnect the control rodsto the drive mechanism.9

In miserably cold weather—the temper-ature was headed for seventeen degreesbelow zero that night—the three-mancrew arrived from Idaho Falls and setto work, the only workers at the SL-1area. As usual for night shifts, noguards were posted at the entry gate,which the day-shift cadremen hadlocked behind them as they left.

Reconnecting the drive mechanismsinvolved several steps, one of whichwas to lift the control rod—manually—about three inches out of the reactor. Atthe top of the control rod was a smallball. A “gripper” from the drive mecha-nism latched onto this ball, completingthe connection between the rod and therest of the mechanism and its motor.

C H A P T E R 1 5 • T H E S L- 1 R E A CT O R

1 4 1

Above. Enclosed stairway

from SL-1 support building to

operating floor of reactor silo.

Left. The control rod drive

mechanism. Note cruciform

shape of control rod (bottom

of drawing).

INEEL 58-2001

INEEL 61-203

The control rods were not cylindricalin shape, as the name “rod” mighti m p l y. Rather they were cruciform,with four narrow fin-like projectionsthat moved up and down the length ofthe core in narrow sheaths. The fuelzone was nearly twenty-eight incheslong. Moving the rods three inches wassafe and not enough to invite a chainr e a c t i o n .1 0

In recent weeks, the control rods hadseemed to stick slightly, perhapsbecause other items in the reactor corehad bowed, invading clearance spacesand putting pressure on the sheath,crowding the slender fins of the controlrods. The three men, wearing their graycoveralls, were in the silo at 9 p.m.,two of them directly over or very closeto the top of the reactor, working withthe central control rod. At 9:01 some-thing happened, the reactor went“prompt critical” and blew up.

When the reactor went critical, itreleased so much heat energy in fourmilliseconds that it flashed the watersurrounding the fuel to steam. Thesteam, being of lower density than liq-uid water and thus a less effective mod-erator, quenched the nuclear reaction.The decay heat built up rapidly. Withno system operating to remove the heat,twenty percent of the fuel melted. Thesteam forced upwards the seven-footcolumn of still-liquid water above it.The water rushed through the two feetof air space. It slammed against the lidof the pressure vessel at a velocity of160 feet per second and 10,000 poundsper square inch exactly as if it were apiston—a water hammer. The entirevessel jumped nine feet into the air, hit

the ceiling, and thumped back intoplace, shearing all of its connections tothe piping and instrumentation systems.Iron pellets packed near the reactor asthermal insulation and radiation shield-ing scattered all over the floor. Thewater hammer expelled the control-rodshield plugs, water, fragments of fuel,fission products, and other metal fromthe top of the reactor, leaving openholes. The violence of the explosionkilled all three of the men.11

Two of them died instantly, one thrownsideways against a shielding block andthe other straight upwards, where oneof the shield plugs pinned his body tothe ceiling. The head wounds of thethird were fatal, but his pulse continuedfor another two hours. The blast blewshards of radioactive metal into theirbodies, making them a danger to thosewho soon would try to rescue andrecover them.12

It would take nearly two years of tena-cious inquiry to make plain what hadhappened in two seconds, and the longprocess of discovery began immediately.

At 9:01 p.m., the heat-sensitive firealarm above the SL-1 reactor radiosone long and two shorts—the code forthe SL-1 complex—at the security cen-ter and the three NRTS fire stations.Accident response procedures com-mence. A security force notifies theduty officer and sets off for SL-1. Thefiremen at Central, the closest to theArmy complex, grab a card detailingthe potential hazards at SL-1 andreview it as the fire engine rolls. Theduty officer tunes in to their conversa-tion. Nine minutes later, they arrive atthe locked gate. Equipped with keys, adetail covered by prior planning, thefiremen unlock the gate. They observeno fires, no apparent disturbance, and


1 4 2

Scene at control station set up near junction of

Highway 20 and Fillmore Avenue.

INEEL 61-4

no one about in the freezing cold. Theynote a slight trail of steam coming fromthe reactor building, a typical sight inthe cold.13

The firemen enter the control buildingcarrying radiation detection instruments.They walk down the central corridor,calling, inspecting each room. In one,they see three lunch pails on a table.Finding nothing amiss, they movetoward the door at the bottom of thecovered stairway. The radiation indicatormoves sharply. They withdraw.

By 9:17 p.m., an HP from the MTRarrives and, together with a fireman,approaches the stairs. Each wears aScott Air-Pak, a 40-pound tank of airharnessed and buckled onto the backwith a hose to a face mask. It pumps airto the face, so that if the mask leaks, airis expelled, protecting the wearer fromdangerous gas or contaminated dust. Asthe rescuers start up the stairs, thedetectors read 25 R/hr; they withdraw.By now, the security detail has deter-mined that the men are nowhere else atthe NRTS. Other searchers find no onein the SL-1 support buildings. Thegrowing crowd of rescuers is forced toconclude that three cadremen are some-where inside the very quiet reactorbuilding.

In a few minutes, two more HPs arrive,dressed in fully protective clothing andequipped with Jordan Redectors, aninstrument able to detect gamma radia-tion up to 500 R/hr. One of themascends the stairs with two of the fire-men, a constant eye on the Jordan. A tthe top of the stairs, they discern damageinside, no men. The indicator needlepegs. The HP orders all to withdraw.

Meanwhile, in accordance with theemergency plan, CE and IDO authori-ties had been notified. Around 9:20p.m., John Horan, the IDO director ofHealth and Safety, answers the tele-phone at home and then tells his wife,“There’s been an accident.” He leavesfor his Idaho Falls office where he hasradio communication with the entireSite. As he passes the security desk, theguard tells him three people are miss-ing, but there is no fire.

Horan declares a “Class 1” emergency,meaning the incident is restricted to onelocation. IDO personnel in Idaho Fallsspeed to the site—the IDO duty officer,environmental HPs, the medical direc-tor and his assistant, others. The newsgoes to AEC Headquarters. The weath-er station reports the direction of thewind. The Radiological Assistance Plangoes into effect, activating the HPs inother complexes for response. The firedepartment sets up an operations trailer

at the intersection of Highway 20 andFillmore Avenue. Security forces pre-pare to block Highway 20 traffic, ifnecessary.14

The environmental HPs take detectorsinto the desert beyond the SL-1, look-ing for radioactivity on the sagebrushthat might have come from a cloud inthe light breeze. Others head forHighway 20 and collect samples there.Horan orders an aircraft and asks theaerial-monitoring team to stand by.Then he thinks better of an idea to sendthem on a night monitoring expedition.Heretofore, they had not practiced low-level night flights. They will fly at 6:30a.m. Meanwhile the ground surveyorsconclude that the public—and they—can travel safely on Highway 20.15


1 4 3

HPs check Highway 20 for contamination on the

morning after the accident.

INEEL 61-9

Around 10:30 p.m., the CE supervisorand HP arrive at SL-1, equip them-selves, and enter the reactor buildingto look for the men. They find onebadly mutilated and clearly dead, andthey observe a small movement bya n o t h e r.

They withdraw, formulate a plan, andenter once more, this time with twoother military men and an IDO HP.Radiation is estimated at up to 1,000R/hr, lethal. The HPs will allow no oneinside the building for longer than oneminute, and they use stopwatches totime the rescuers and order them outwhen the minute is up. The five menrush up the stairway with a stretcher.They skid and slip on the water and themarble-like pellets littering the floor.Face masks fog up. Two men collectthe man for whom they have somehope of survival while the others try,but fail, to locate the third man.

The rescuers place the man in a couriervehicle and drive toward the intersec-tion with Highway 20. On the way,they meet an ambulance and transferhim. As they reach the intersection, theNRTS night nurse, Hazel Leisen,arrives in her car and enters the ambu-lance, hearing what proves to be theman’s last breath. She applies an oxy-gen resuscitator to no avail. Around11:00 p.m. the assistant medical direc-tor, Dr. John Spickard, pronounces theman dead.16

The accident was unprecedented. Thesewere the first reactor casualties in thefourteen-year history of the AEC.Emergency planning had not accountedfor an event quite like this one. Allthose involved in the recovery, there-fore, now confronted situations andmade decisions unlike any they hadfaced before.

One of the first was made by Dr.George Voelz, the medical director,who arrived a few minutes after hisassistant and considered what should bedone with the body. The dispensary atCentral was completely unsuited forreceiving a contaminated body. Thesmall facility had been designed for theliving; it consisted of one shower headinstalled under the dispensary’s base-ment stairway. It was useless for thissituation. Dr. Voelz recalled:

Because his level of radiation was sohigh, we had no place to put him. Weleft him in the ambulance until wecould figure out what we were going todo next. The ambulance was sitting outin the desert, amongst the sagebrush.We decided the first thing we would dowas see how much radioactive materialwe could remove by taking off theclothing. We wanted to get this donebefore the morning traffic came ontothe Site. It was about four o’clock inthe morning when we decided to try totake the clothing off under the lights ofa couple of automobiles. Because theradiation levels were 500 rads perhour, we decided to work outside at 20below zero in anti-C [anti-contamina -tion] coveralls...

With the moisture [released in theexplosion] and the cold temperatures,the [clothes] were just one solid chunkof ice, having sat out there most of thenight. The health physicists had givenus about a minute’s working time [toremove his coveralls]. But we hadanticipated this, and had some prettyheavy-duty tools that we could use onthese coveralls... They had a stopwatchon us, and we got the job done. Iremember we went a few seconds over.I think it was a minute and seventeenseconds.

That gives you an idea of how you haveto improvise when you get into accidentscenarios. We were able to get theclothing off, and we put him back in theambulance...17

Removing the clothes didn’t help.Radiation levels remained as before.They wrapped the body in blankets anddraped lead aprons to protect the dri-ver’s seat in the ambulance. Around6:30 a.m., the ambulance drove to theChem Plant and into a large enclosedreceiving bay. Near it a decontamina-tion room lined with stainless steelserved as a mortuary. Dr. Voelz had thebody submerged in alcohol and ice topreserve it until he could develop aplan.

Because the reactor had not been oper-ating, early speculation was that achemical explosion had caused theaccident. But of this no one could becertain. Radiation fields were extremelyhigh within the silo. If the explosionhadn’t killed the three men, the radia-tion would have.18


1 4 4

In the daylight of January 4, Horandeliberately slowed the pace of recov-ery operations. The victims werebeyond saving, and it was now impera-tive to prevent further injuries. AllanJohnson told Horan, “John, I’m settingup a special account for the SL-1.Don’t hold back on anything youneed...it will be covered.” They decidedto document pictorially everything theycould about the accident and the subse-quent proceedings.19

We wanted the nation and the world tolearn what our experience was. It wasunique, and we wanted to make surethat people knew our successes and ourfailures. That is why three movies wereproduced. For the first one of the basicaccident, we took all the people that

were involved in the initial response,and they played in the movie the rolethat they actually did that night. Thatwas part of our effort to be as factualas we could and not have some actordo it.20

AEC Headquarters appointed an inves-tigating committee and a technicaladvisory committee. Most of themarrived on January 4, ready to begin.The JCAE sent one of its staff to pro-vide it with independent information assoon as possible. The national presssent reporters. AEC Headquarters staffarrived, and other AEC labs sent spe-cialists as well. Later, the investigatingcommittee complimented the IDO onits management of the crisis, but saidalso that the rapid arrival of so manyoutsiders, including themselves, hadbeen a disservice to the IDO and thecontractors as they undertook therecovery.21

IDO’s immediate priorities were todetermine what threat the accidentposed to public health, retrieve the othertwo men, and discover if the reactorwas stable or not. The airplane pilotsreported that the roof of the reactor wasintact, undamaged. A cloud of radioac-tive iodine-131 had drifted south towardAtomic City, but its dispersion and mix-ing with air had reduced its concenta-tion well below any health concerns.Ground surveys found that the onlyplace needing to be quarantined was theimmediate SL-1 yard, where the rescueattempt had tracked some contamina-tion. Beyond that, amounts above back-ground levels were negligible.22

A squad of six volunteers, all cadremen,spent January 4 rehearsing a plan toretrieve the body of the second man intwo-man relays. Someone else ran intothe silo to grab the logbook and a neu-tron detector. Crews decontaminated theambulance. The medical staff set up atemporary decontamination center at theGCRE building just up the road fromSL-1. The men who had retrieved thefirst body had not waited for specialgloves; they—and in particular theirhands—had to be washed clean of cont-amination, a process involving water,potassium permanganate, and plenty ofscrubbing. All who had been involvedreceived medical check-ups. The med-ical staff found no radiation injuries andhospitalized no one.2 3

That night, the cadremen retrieved theirsecond comrade. The film and radiationfoils in his dosimeter badge had beenblown away by the explosion. In lieu ofthose items, radiochemists examinedthe gold buckle of one victim’s watch-


1 4 5

A crew prepares to collect a water sample from

within the SL-1 reactor building.

INEEL 61-1221

band and a tiny screw in a pocket ciga-rette lighter. They found radioactivegold-198 and copper-64. Only neutroncapture could have created such iso-topes. Then they identified other fissionproducts and several isotopes of urani-um in the debris that had come out of

the reactor building with the men. Allof this evidence proved that the reactorhad gone critical.24

The third man finally was found. Hisposition directly above the reactor pre-sented a new hazard. Aside from theobvious difficulty of working in a highradiation field at an awkward location,physicists feared that if pieces of debrisnear him fell onto or into the reactorthrough the open shield-plug holes, thedisturbance might start a chain reaction.A photographer suited up and enteredthe room for one minute, taking asmany photographs as possible. With thehelp of the photos, a plan took shapefor the retrieval. Army volunteers froma special Chemical Radiological Unit atDugway Proving Ground wanted thepractical experience offered by thechallenge of removing the body. Thetwenty-four enlisted men and five offi-cers perfected a plan and rehearsedtheir moves on a full-scale mock-up of

the SL-1 erected at Central. Theyrigged a special net on the boom of acrane and positioned it to prevent thebody or anything else falling onto thereactor. Metal workers shielded thecrane operator’s cab. On January 9,eight men, paired in two-man relayslimited to sixty-five seconds inside thebuilding, recovered the body and low-ered it to the ground.25

The body joined the other two at theChem Plant. A team of health physicsspecialists and a forensic pathologistfrom Los Alamos conducted autopsies,improvising with long-handled instru-ments and other procedures to keepthemselves safe. They hoped that them e n ’s injuries might contribute someinsight into where they had been at themoment of the accident and what mighthave caused it. Most urg e n t l y, they man-aged to reduce the radiation fields ema-nating from each body to between oneand ten percent of the original levels.2 6

The subject of burial already had beenquietly controversial within the topranks of IDO and AEC management.A.R. Luedecke, AEC general manager,had proposed that the men be buriedtogether somewhere on the NRTS siteand a monument erected in their memo-ry. Johnson and other IDO officialsobjected strenuously, feeling that themen’s families deserved the right toconduct funeral rites of their ownchoosing and as naturally as possible.Their view prevailed. The IDO ordered


1 4 6

Above. Recovery crews practiced at a mock-up, seen

here under construction, at Central Facilities Area.

Left. Crew from Dugway Proving Ground. INEEL 61-674

INEEL61-685

three standard metal caskets from IdahoFalls and had them delivered to one ofthe NRTS shops. Craftsmen lined themwith lead. Extra lead wrap shieldedbody parts still heavily contaminated.Aside from protecting people whowould handle the caskets, the casketshad to meet radiological shipping stan-dards set by the Interstate CommerceCommission. Preparations complete,the respective military services tookpossession of thebodies and flewthem to the destina-tions requested bythe families. Ahealth physicistaccompanied eachto provide any nec-essary advice andconsultation.27

The retrieval of thethird body endedwhat came to beknown as PhaseOne of the SL-1r e c o v e r y. PhaseTwo lasted fromJanuary 10 through late April, the time ittook for CE to be certain that the reactorwas stable. No one entered the silo dur-ing those months. Operators dangledremotely controlled closed-circuit televi-sion and other equipment inside thereactor from the boom of a crane. CEfinally concluded that the core no longercontained any moderating water and thatthe reactor could not go critical again.

That done, it was time to clean up thesite and see if the reactor core couldreveal the cause of the accident. A f t e rPresident Kennedy canceled the nuclearairplane project in March, GE had people

available and offered to clean up thebuilding, decontaminate the site, andinvestigate. GE physicist Jay Kunze saidlater that the GE scientists considered theSL-1 job to be a choice assignment.BORAX and SPERT had failed to blowup. SL-1 should have been inherentlysafe. What had gone wrong? They wel-comed a chance to solve the puzzle. Butthe cleanup had to come first. Kunzec o n t i n u e d :

When IDO first asked GE if it could usethe Hot Shop to analyze the reactor, GEsaid, “It’s not available.” But after thecancellation, the word was, “The HotShop is available!” GE had about fivehundred people at the Site, eighty per -cent of whom were due to be terminat -ed, most of those to be transferred toother GE sites as a result of the cancel -lation of the Aircraft NuclearPropulsion Project. All of the profes -

sionals managed to find jobs with thisproject.

The SL-1 was a mess. It hadn’t beencleaned up at all. To clean it up, peoplehad to make short trips inside and dolimited tasks within a couple of minutesand then get out. Even though you suit -ed up, those couple of minutes wouldexpose you to your quarterly dose ofradiation, and you couldn’t go back in

for three months ordo any other workthat could potentiallyexpose you. Hundredsof people at GE,including those aboutto be transferred andmany workers fromother locations at theSite [and fromDugway], volunteeredto take their quarterlyradiation dose doingclean-up at the reac -tor. For many clean-up tasks, that was theonly way of handlingit. I don’t remember

anyone being particularly fearful of therisk.28

The time keepers were the HPs, whostood half-way down the stairway andbanged on metal when someone’svacuum-cleaning stint was over. ByNovember, the passage of time andremoval of debris had reduced radiationlevels. It was time to remove the reac-tor. Anticipating that the forty-miletruck ride to the TAN Hot Shop mightdisturb some of the evidence, the GEteam went underneath the reactor anddrilled several holes in the bottom ofthe pressure vessel. Through a special


1 4 7

The stretcher rig. Crews practiced before the rig was

inserted into the reactor building to collect the body

of the third man.

INEEL 61-667

tube, they inserted a camera and tookpictures inside the core.

The GE team had for months beenexamining debris fragments and otherrecovered reactor parts in an attempt toacquire as much information as possi-ble before having to take the drasticaction of cutting the pipes connectingthe vessel to the rest of the plant’sequipment. Kunze recalled:

Our main concern was how to cut thoselarge pipes so that a crane could lift thevessel up thirteen feet and then out andonto a truck. At first we envisioned nomethod except to use manpower in theform of many welders with their pipe-cutting torches, taking turns cutting asmuch pipe as possible before receivingtheir allowable maximum radiationdose.

But we continued to play around withbasic physics ideas—and came acro s sthe idea that the water, ejected upwardby the nuclear steam explosion, hadt r a n s f e rred its momentum to the vessel,p e rhaps sufficiently to cause the vesselto break the pipes and be lifted. Our cal -culations indicated that the vessel mayhave risen enough to hit the ceilingimmediately following the brief nuclearexcursion. So we took a close look at thefan floor, that is, the ceiling of the re a c -tor room, and saw that certain smalldents matched up with the head of thevessel. Now we saw that there was noneed to worry about how to cut thepipes. Much personnel risk and engi -neering frustration had been eliminated,all the result of the nature of this stillsomewhat mysterious accident.

We examined the recovered central con -trol rod, plug, and housing mechanismcarefully in the Hot Shop. The assemblyhad been recovered essentially with therod in the “down” position. However,upon disassembly, scratch marks on therod extension and the inside of theguide tube clearly showed that theguide tube had collapsed, the result ofthe 10,000-pound water hammer pres -sure, and had seized the rod extensionat the 26 1/4 inch withdrawn position.

Subsequently, as the unit hit the ceiling,the extension rod was forced back downto nearly the zero withdrawn position.29

Scratch marks had been made on theway back down, confirming that the rodoriginally had been withdrawn 26 1/4inches. That the rod had been with-drawn and then jammed back downinto the reactor to its “safe” positionafter hitting the ceiling was a bizarrecoincidence. One finding had led to


1 4 8

Schematic of SL-1 reactor.

another, and the team gradually recreat-ed the mysterious two seconds. Themechanical and material evidence,combined with the nuclear and chemi-cal evidence, forced them to believethat the central control rod had beenwithdrawn very rapidly. They built amock-up of the reactor vessel withidentically sheathed and weighted con-trol rods. In King Arthur fashion, menof lesser, similar, and greater strengthas the crew tried to lift the rod. Mostmanaged with little difficulty. The sci-entists questioned the cadremen: “Didyou know that the reactor would gocritical if the central control rod wereremoved?” Answer: “Of course! Weoften talked about what we would do ifwe were at a radar station and theRussians came. We’d yank it out.”30

On November 29, a large crane liftedthe reactor vessel out of the silo andonto a truck for the trip to the Hot Shopthe next day. Once it was inside thehuge remotely-operated laboratory, thescientists re-photographed the core andplugged the holes. They filled the ves-sel with water and confirmed that thereactor was quite subcritical; it hadgiven its one burst in the accident andthat was all. Then they examined everyinch of the vessel. They were particu-larly grateful that the flux wires hadbeen freshly installed, for they por-trayed the neutron flux uncompromisedby previous history.31

Thus the core and the mangled piecesof metal surrendered their story. In July1962, the GE investigators publishedtheir final report, observing that manualwithdrawal of the central control rodcould explain the accident: “No othermeans of withdrawing the rod has beenfound to be in accordance with the evi-dence.”32


1 4 9

C H A P T E R S I X T E E N

1 5 0

TH E AFT E R M A T HThe development of atomic energy will of a certainty continue to achieve for mankind’s benefitnew goals that now challenge the imagination... Distressing as this tragic occurrence surelymust be, it is to be observed that it came under such circumstances of time and place as to

make certain the prevention of a disaster that could be much worse... It [is] progress that should be generally recognized and accepted with fortitude...

—Editor, Idaho Daily Statesman, January 6, 1961—

Editorial comment inIdaho and other newspapers categorizedthe SL-1 accident as a regrettablemishap, an inevitable occurrence if soci-ety were to accruethe benefits of anew technology. Afew by-linedreporters tendedtoward emotionalmetaphors, onecharacterizing thereactor as a “mon-ster” that had “bro-ken loose for only amoment anddestroyed three ofits keepers.” Butsuch excess was theexception. Someeditors followed theemotional lead ofsoutheast Idaho cit-izens. Wrote one,“The fact that citizens of Arco and othercommunities in that area of Idaho aresleeping undisturbed by worry over suchaccidents is a comfort to the rest of us.”1

Boise’s Idaho Daily Statesman men-tioned other “atomic mishaps” at theNRTS—the EBR-I meltdown, anunplanned 1958 excursion in theHTRE-1, and a criticality at the ChemPlant in October 1959—and marked

this as the first to cause loss of life.Later the Statesman instructed the read-er on the distinction between nuclearand chemical blasts and described themechanism of an excursion, or “run-away,” and the role of control rods in

controlling a chainreaction.2

Newspapers fol-lowed the story forabout two weeksand then the arti-cles trailed off .Reporters describedthe Army missionfor the “new style”r e a c t o r, the locationand extent of theradiation hazard,public safety, andthe unfoldingunderstanding thatthe accident was anuclear excursion.As the bodies were

identified and recovered, the reportersdescribed the unique interment plansfor the victims.3

Dose reconstruction project in 1991 identified

probable path of I-131 plume released by SL-1

accident.

DOE/ID 12119 Vol. 1

Removal of the SL-1 core from the reactor building.INEEL 61-6829

In Washington, D.C., commentatorswondered about long-term repercus-sions on the AEC’s atomic power pro-gram. The AEC and the JCAE were inthe midst of deciding how close to met-ropolitan areas nuclear reactors couldbe situated. GE and Westinghousespokesmen worried that the accidentmight set back public acceptance ofnuclear reactors for years. 4

In this connection, Walter Reuther,president of the United Auto Workers(UAW) and the Industrial UnionDepartment of the AFL-CIO, was quickto exploit the accident. The UAW wasin court—by now the case had gone to

the U.S. Supreme Court—challengingthe AEC’s recent decision permittingthe Fermi fast-breeder reactor to locatenear Detroit. It was not safe, the unionclaimed. The union had a list of fortypurported reactor accidents that demon-strated why the Fermi reactor was amistake. Reuther said the SL-1 accidentconfirmed the validity of the union’sposition, pointing out that Fermi wasthree hundred times larger than theSL–1. “It is clear from Tuesday night’saccident that thousands of peoplewould have been overexposed to radia-tion if the SL-1 reactor had been builtnear populated areas.” Ultimately, theunion failed to stop the Fermi plant.Some answered Reuther by noting thatthe SL-1 evidence refuted his argumentbecause even without an engineeredcontainment structure, radioactivity hadremained mostly within the building.5

In Idaho Falls, the Oil, Chemical, andAtomic Workers International UnionLocal 2-652, expressed more credible

complaints in a letter to Senator HenryDworshak. To the concern that the reac-tor had been permitted to operatedespite sticking control rods, the unionadded a list of items that patently hadnot been considered in emergencyplans—the inadequate dispensary, thelack of proper lead caskets, the non-existent shift disaster teams, and instru-ments unable to read high radiationfields. Further, health physicists hadbeen called from all over the Site, leav-ing their own areas vulnerable. Theautopsy physicians, said the unions,received enough exposure to makethem less available for future emergen-cies. People who had responded earlyand received heavy radiation exposureswere, in general, less available or morevulnerable in the event of any futureemergency. The union asked for aCongressional investigation, that work-ers be compensated for over-exposuresresulting in loss of pay, and for a publicairing of all the facts.6


1 5 2

INEEL 61-1699

Ambulance used at SL-1 was decontaminated at the

Chem Plant and returned to service.

The AEC defended itself, tellingDworshak that the public had receivedall available information, excepting med-ical, about the event. It agreed that theaccident had exposed weaknesses in itse m e rgency plans, but that the IDO hadexecuted the plans that were in place.7

The JCAE scheduled hearingsfor June 12-15 on the broadersubject of Radiation Safetyand Regulation and invitedAEC testimony on the acci-dent. AEC commissionerRobert Wilson said that reactordesign would henceforth notallow a reactor to go criticalupon the motion of only onecontrol rod. He blamed thecontractor for allowing operat-ing decisions by unqualifiedpersonnel. The AEC, he said,should assign independentgroups to do periodicappraisals of every AEC orlicensed reactor. The discus-sion averted a Congressionalinvestigation specifically onthe SL-1. The JCAE apparent-ly was satisfied with thereports of the SL-1Investigating Board, which byJune was wrapping up itswork.8

The board had listened toscores of witnesses. With noevidence that the cadre’sactions had caused the acci-dent, the board absolved it ofresponsibility. The board saidthat an “unusual movement of the cen-tral control rod” was more plausible asthe cause of the accident than otherhypotheses. Then the board pried open

the layers of administration surroundingthe reactor, and here it spoke assertive-ly, sparing no one a share of blame.

Combustion Engineering had permittedsubstandard conditions to develop inthe reactor, the board said, yet contin-

ued to operate. The responsibility forsafety appraisals belonged to the IDOand AEC Headquarters, but the criti-cism was broad:

There appears to have been some lackof clear definition of assignments, with -

in the AEC, of responsibilityfor insuring continuing reactorsafety appraisals and inspec -tions... It is conceivable thatclearer definition of theseaspects of AEC staff responsi -bilities might also have pre -vented the SL-1 accident.9

Early in December 1961, A l l a nJohnson ended his nearly eight-year career as IDO manager. Hesaid it was for personal reasons,a desire to return to private life.Around the Site, however, peo-ple wondered if the AEC hadforced the resignation as a wayto signify that blame had settledsomewhere and a price paid.1 0

The AEC called for changeelsewhere as well. Immediatelyafter the accident, it surveyedall the nation’s licensed reac-tors, then numbering forty-seven. Licensees were askedfor information on shut-downprocedures and control compo-nents. The AEC modified someof the licenses, limiting certainoperating parameters. The AECordered its own reactor man-agers to review shut-downmargins and to assure that con-

trol systems operated fully withindesign specifications. Maintenance andoperation were to take place only underfully qualified supervisors.

C H A P T E R 1 6 • T H E A F T E R M A T H

1 5 3

A mockup of the SL-1 reactor top. Analysts tried to

determine where the three cadremen were standing

at the moment of the accident.

INEEL 61-947

For low-power critical facilities, includ-ing the ones at the NRTS, the AECordered that all operating and shut-down procedures be written in detail.Joe Hensheid, supervisor of the ETRCritical Facility, recalled:11

The SL-1 accident was a big watershedpoint. Up until then, our detailed proce -dures weren’t much, but we were able toget a lot done in a short amount of time.After SL-1, the reactor [I worked with]was shut down, and we had many, many

reviews of procedures. Some reactors atthe Site went two years before startingup again. There were committees, andeveryone was reviewing procedures anddeveloping formalized sign-offs. Itturned into a totally new way of doingbusiness with reactors. Procedural doc -uments that originally had been twopages long were expanded into thickbooks, and all activity became rigidlyprescribed...those years of committeemeetings with no experiments were hardon everyone.12

The accident inspired the AEC’sAdvisory Committee on ReactorSafeguards (ACRS) to continue itsstrong interest in learning more aboutthe type of destructive accident repre-sented by the SL-1. The SPERT pro-gram particularly received strongsupport. The ACRS was looking towardthe future when power reactors wouldcontain far more fuel and a biggerinventory of fission products than theSL-1. It requested that safetyresearchers look for a way to buildlarge reactors so that a neutron distur-bance or excursion in one region of fuelcould not propagate to the rest of it. Insuch an event, the ACRS hoped that“destruction of more than a small partof the reactor is demonstrably impossible.”13

The SL-1 disaster had no apparentimpact on the A r m y ’s plans for smallnuclear power plants. In the immediateaftermath of the accident, it ordered itsPortable Medium-Power reactor, operat-ing on the Greenland ice cap, to shutdown pending a review of its controlrods and operating procedures. T h eArmy continued its experiments inIdaho. Work at the GCRE had producedthe data for a pin-type fuel design forthe A r m y ’s “mobile” prototype. Am o n t hafter the accident, Aerojet-General inD o w n e y, California, loaded the proto-type ML-1 onto an Army semi-trailerand hauled it to Idaho for field testing.1 4

The little reactor went critical for thefirst time later in 1961 and ran as apower plant for the first time onSeptember 21, 1962, making history asthe smallest nuclear power plant onrecord to produce electricity. It reachedfull-power operation on February 28,


1 5 4

INEEL 62-6216

INEEL 63-1666

Left. ML-1 Test Building at Army Reactor Area-IV.

Power conversion component faces the door. Top of

circular reactor component is behind it. Below.

Aerial view of ML-1 test area. Control trailer is in

lower center behind shielding berm. Reactor was in

Test Building in upper center of view.

1963, and this first run continued untilMarch 4, 1963. Despite these bench-marks, the ML-1 proved disappointing,typically operating only a few days orhours before shutting down because ofleaks, failed welds, and other problems.After its four-day March 1963 run, forinstance, the crew found that thecoolant, nitrogen gas, had been leakinginto the moderator water. By the timeof its final shut-down on May 29, 1964,the ML-1 had accumulated only 664hours of operation.15

At the end, Aerojet disassembled theML-1 reactor at the TAN Hot Shop todiscover the reason for its last failure.Temperatures over 1,200°F had corrod-ed the steel pipes containing the gas.The ML-1 concept was too advancedfor the materials available.

That finding came in 1965. The escalat-ing war in Vietnam forced the Army toevaluate its spending and research pri-orities. The Army’s prototype reactorsin Greenland and elsewhere had acquit-ted themselves well, and it appearedthat the life-time cost of a nuclearpower plant was lower than that of aconventional plant. But the initial costwas far higher. As it set war-time bud-gets, the Army opted for low first-costalternatives. Economists suggested thatthis was false economy, but the Armycanceled its program in 1965 and neverrestored it. The reactor skid, control rodshields, and other ML-1 parts ended upin the NRTS Burial Ground.16

The remains of the SL-1 building didnot go to the Burial Ground. After aban-doning early thoughts of restoring thebuilding, GE concluded that hauling thecontaminated debris to the Burial

Ground, a distance of sixteen miles andpartly on Highway 20/26 would subjectlaborers to too much avoidable risk.Instead, it built two large pits and atrench about 1,600 feet away from theSL-1 compound. The walls of the silo,the power conversion and fan-floorequipment, the shielding gravel, and thecontaminated soil that had been gatheredduring the clean-up all went into thepits. Three feet of clean earth shieldedthe material. An exclusion fence withhazard warnings went up around thearea, the only monument to the reactor.1 7

The IDO completed its film, whichincluded the reenacted crisis response,an animated segment explaining thewater hammer, and lessons learnedabout emergency planning. Plannersand operators at other AEC labs andcommercial nuclear power plants usedit as a training device for years after theaccident. Manufacturers of detectioninstruments increased the upper limit to1,000 R/hr. Makers of respirators


1 5 5

Right. Foundation piers and gravel were all that

remained by 1962. Debris went to a special SL-1

burial ground. Below. Dismantling the SL-1

foundation piers required the use of shaped charges.

Here crew wires caps to charges.

INEEL67-2587

INEEL 62-1710

learned that their equipment had towork in sub-zero temperatures. TheIDO continued to concern itself withemergency planning, developing tech-niques and equipment to reduce person-nel exposures and save equipmentlosses in accident responses. 18

In connection with its continued workon emergency planning, the NRTSbecame identified as the majorsource—only source, in fact—of expe-rience with the execu-tion of emergencyplans. C. Wayne Bills,one of the IDO man-agers of the recovery,said later:

I averaged a call amonth on SL-1 for overtwenty years. Nuclearaccidents are rare!Years later, after theaccident at Three MileIsland, they quicklylooked for decontami -nation, photography,dosimetry, environmen -tal monitoring, andother techniques fromthe SL-1 accident and reactor safetyprogram to apply to their recovery.19

Twenty-two of the people who hadresponded to the SL-1 alarm receivedradiation exposures in the range of threeto 27 Roentgens total body exposure.Three of them received more than 25 R.The exposure guide that had been set upby IDO’s prior emergency plan allowedrescue personnel a 100 R dose to save alife and 25 R to save valuable property.2 0

In March 1962 the AEC awardedCertificates for Heroism and otherrecognitions to thirty-two SL-1 partici-pants at a ceremony at the Idaho FallsHigh School Little Theater. Amongthem were the military men, the nurseHazel Leisen, doctors Voelz andSpickard, and the many others fromIDO, Phillips, and other contractorswho had performed “special acts of ser-vice” or attempted a rescue at great riskto themselves.21

To the surprise of GE andWestinghouse, the accident failed tohave an immediate impact on the pub-l i c ’s acceptance of nuclear power.H o w e v e r, the accident’s long-termimpact on the progress of the industrymight be measured by the frequencywith which it appeared in nuclear-protest literature, a genre that flour-

ished in the 1970s and 1980s. Severalbooks listed nuclear accidents, near-accidents, and mishaps, describingthem in language aimed to outrage orfrighten the reader. The accounts ofSL-1 were often inaccurate, andauthors sometimes gave more-trivialevents equal weight. The accidentbecame part of a litany of eventsemployed in these attempts to erodepubic confidence in the safety ofnuclear power.2 2

For the NRTS peopleinvolved, the experi-ences of the crisis andthe recovery were thekind that permanentlyetched themselves inthe memory. Nearly athousand people wereinvolved in the crisisand clean-up. Peopleat the periphery ofevents heard storiesand retold them. Overthe years, the storiesgave the SL-1 acci-dent a quality of leg-end, and theseco-exist with thou-

sands of facts describing the event, theresults of the investigation, and the sci-entific analysis.

Much of the legend grew up around thequestion of cause that the investigationcould not answer: did one of thecadremen deliberately withdraw thecontrol rod, and if so, why? Or did thecontrol rod stick, causing over-exertionand a sudden release? All of the scienceat the NRTS was unequal to this mostperplexing question.


1 5 6

The SL-1 complex in 1962. The dirt road leads to

the SL-1 burial ground.

INEEL 62-3983


1 5 7

INEEL 81-3966

A 1961 photograph of the damaged top of the SL-1

reactor vessel was reused in 1981 to convey a safety

message.

C H A P T E R S E V E N T E E N

1 5 8

SC I E N C E I N T H E DE S E R TThe promise and prospects of nuclear energy were high and the problems were few.

We were the good guys.

—William Ginkel—

Hugo N. Eskildsonreplaced Allan Johnson as the IDO man-a g e r, but after a troubled term lastingonly two years, he left the NRTS. T h einterlude had been uncomfortable forother IDO administrators and the busi-ness leaders of the town, who realizedhow important their mutual regard hadbecome. The IDO wanted to preserve thesupport it enjoyed from the community,and the business leaders wanted to pre-serve an environment in which that sup-port would continue. As Allan Johnsonpointed out when he resigned, the NRT Shad grown on his watch from 1,400 to4,000 employees. The number of reactorshad risen from seven to thirty. The NRT Swas fulfilling its promise as a propellantfor regional economic growth.1

The AEC elevated Eskildson’s deputy,William Ginkel, as acting manager inSeptember 1963, making it permanent inApril 1964. Ginkel was the first of themanagers not to share the military back-ground of his predecessors. He hadworked as a civilian at Oak Ridge from1944 through 1950, first for contractorTennessee Eastman and then for theAEC, involved with the chemical aspectsof keeping track of uranium. His degrees

at the University of Rochester includedchemical engineering and businessadministration. With the opening of theN RTS, he saw an opportunity for promo-tion and a chance to join an emerg i n gengineering outfit. After a successfulIDO interview, he wondered how hemight persuade his southern-born wife tolove the West. Used to lush vegetation,

she had her doubts about the desert. Hesent her photographs of the lovely gar-dens around Idaho Falls’Tautphaus Parkand the Latter Day Saints temple. Desert

or no, Idaho offered them both—andothers who had lived behind the securitygates of a government town—the wel-come prospect of living a more civilianlife in a traditional American neighbor-hood. After a series of promotions, atfirst in work related to the Chem Plant,and a short hiatus at Knolls A t o m i cPower Laboratory in Schenectady,Ginkel reached the upper tier of IDOm a n a g e m e n t .2

Just as Ginkel moved into the manag-er’s office, Dr. Richard Doan, agedsixty-five, retired from Phillips and theNRTS. Doan’s unembroidered approachto work lasted through his final day onthe job. “He spent his last day as if itwere any other day—no round of good-byes, he just worked until five o’clockand walked out,” wrote one of his col-leagues. Doan’s retirement proved notto be very thorough. He had been amember of the AEC’s AdvisoryCommittee on Reactor Safeguards sinceits inception, and he continued to serveon this committee and as an advisor tothe licensing staff for the AEC.3

Ginkel took office as reactor researchwas in full flourish everywhere at theSite. The success of the original fourprojects had led to second and third

William Ginkel


The Advanced Test Reactor Critical Facility reactor and bridge with instrument panels in backgroundINEEL 6-5979

generations of the concepts they repre-sented. In late 1963, construction crewswere back in force, the annual payrollwas high and growing, and new initia-tives were evident everywhere. Evenspace-age projects had arrived at theNRTS. Nationally, nuclear power plantswere about to move into the commer-cial market, and the demand for safetytesting, NRTS-style, was growing. Nomatter where he looked around thedesert, Ginkel could observe an impres-sive array of activity.

At the Test Reactor Area, the Navy wasemerging as Phillips’ major customer,and a third big testing reactor was onthe way. The Navy’s nuclear fuels weregetting more complex, and the Navywanted a test reactor with more preci-sion than the ETR. It wanted to testfull-scale fuel elements, which weregetting larger and thicker, not just sam-ples. Also, it wanted faster results,

which meant having space in the reac-tor to run several tests at the same timeand expose them to a very high flux ofneutrons. ETR flux was too low and itstest loops were too small.4

Besides that, the normal way of operat-ing the MTR and ETR created prob-lems. Typically, control rods moved upor down during operation to regulatethe power level of the reactor. But if atest sample several inches long was inthe reactor parallel to a control rod, theneutron exposure to the top and bottomhalves of the sample would not be thesame for the duration of the test. In theMTR the variation could amount tothirty percent; in the ETR, ten percent.The Navy wanted to reduce the per-centage even more. Its planned experi-ments required perfect symmetry—oras close to perfect as possible—alongthe entire length of a test sample.

In the late 1950s, the AEC and theNavy invited a number of companies tomake proposals for an advanced testreactor that would serve not only theNavy but the AEC’s other test needs formany years to come. Despite studyperiods of up to three years, none ofseveral responses met the Navy’sdemanding requirements within a rea-sonable cost or time. It appeared thatthe aluminum-clad/enriched-uraniumreactor concept might have reached itslimit of performance.5

The Navy asked Phillips to take twomonths to review previous proposalsand come up, if possible, with a con-ceptual design. This challenge handedNRTS people a chance to prove theycould still produce brilliant ideas. Oneof them, Deslonde deBoisblanc, a sci-

entist with no doctorate in physics butwho nonetheless had a feel for the wayneutrons behave, created an elegantdesign for the reactor core in 1959. Thedesign, named Advanced Test Reactor(ATR), first of all solved the symmetryproblem. DeBoisblanc described theATR’s new way of controlling thepower level.

I tried to avoid a common problemencountered in most other test reactors,where the control elements move up ordown. In the ATR, the larger range ofcontrol is accomplished by rotating six -teen beryllium cylinders with hafniumshells that cover 120° of the outer sur -face. (Hafnium is a strong neutronabsorber.) The cylinders are situatedaround the core. When rotated singly orin groups, the hafnium moves closer orfarther from the core, thereby control -ling reactivity without disturbing thevertical power profile.

The design also included small neutron-absorbing control rods. Unlike controlrods in earlier reactors, these were notmoved slowly up or down during reac-tor operations to effect their control, buteither fully inserted or fully removed.

Another ground-breaking—and aesthet-ically satisfying—innovation in theATR was how it wrapped the reactor’sfuel around the samples in serpentinefashion, more than doubling the neu-tron flux (available in the ETR) to thesample. As deBoisblanc relates, it wasduring the long drive home from theSite that the “Aha!” moment occurred.

As was the custom, I was driving ByronLeonard, our consultant fromInternuclear Company, to his hotel in


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Deslonde deBoisblancINEEL Cultural Resources

Idaho Falls. It was one of those linger -ing twilight evenings, still quite light.On that straight stretch of Highway 20across the desert, with its sage brushand the frequent lava flow patches,there wasn’t much to distract us.

I started to describe a novel way tolook at the problem before us. I thoughtof breeder reactors, where the effort isto minimize the leakage of neutrons. Itried to think how we might make theneutrons leak in the direction of thesample, where we wanted to maximizethe number of neutrons absorbed intothe Navy’s samples.

If we placed water between the ATRfuel and the sample, the fast neutronswould “leak” into the water and collidewith hydrogen. This would slow themdown and they would pile up to createa high slow-neutron flux. This is the so-called “flux trap,” which I didn’tinvent.

I reached over across the front seat ofthe car and with my finger drew fourcircles for test loops, and then a snake-like fuel line partially around eachloop. Immediately, I saw that we couldplace another loop at the very centerbecause the four arcs that surrounded

the center loop were almost as effectiveas a circle. It soon became obvious thatby placing a beryllium reflector proper -ly we could gain four more attractiveloop locations.

The more we looked at that strangearrangement, the better it looked.Possible new locations for control ele -ments became apparent. Byron was soexcited he volunteered to lay out theconfiguration. He didn’t get much sleepthat night, but what he produced wasremarkable. His plan view showed thatthe entire serpentine fuel arrangementcould be produced with only one type offuel element. The number of test loopsgrew from the original four to nine.6

The next several days brought the usualquestions from devil’s advocates. Asalways with a “rich” design, each nega-tive, when resolved, revealed new capa-bility. They sensed they had a winner.“We quickly loaded the ETR CriticalFacility,” said deBoisblanc, “to modelthe serpentine geometry. The stunningsuccess of that program is another storyin itself. The mockup was really theclincher.”7

Arranging the core into multiple differ-ent flux-trap regions—in which thepower level could be different in eachsimultaneously—was something thatdeBoisblanc did invent. Satisfied, theAEC and the Navy selected the ATRcloverleaf design. Native ingenuity atthe NRTS had influenced the destiny ofthe lab one more time.8

Now the ATR was under constructionjust two hundred yards away from theMTR. At the groundbreaking in 1961,Governor Smylie had said that the $40

C H A P T E R 1 7 • S C I E N C E I N T H E D E S E R T

1 6 1

This schematic drawing of the ATR core in cross section shows the arrangement of the nine test holes, the

serpentine arrangement of the fuel assemblies, and the sixteen control cylinders. Note the hafnium lining on

the cylinders. The hafnium-lined portion of the cylinder could be turned toward or away from the test hole,

depending on the desired neutron flux.

million project was the largest con-struction project in the history of Idaho,eclipsing the Mountain Home Air Base,which had cost over $30 million. Witha capability of operating at 250megawatts, the ATR would be thelargest test reactor in the world. If pro-jections held, it would begin operatingin 1965.9

The MTR was still working, havingsurpassed 11,500 experiments. At theSecond Geneva Conference on thePeaceful Uses of Atomic Energy in1958, Phillips announced that the MTRhad run on plutonium-239 fuel at apower level of thirty megawatts forseveral months, adding more luster toits reputation. As the first water-moder-ated reactor to do this, the reactor con-firmed that plutonium could be areliable and controllable fuel for powerreactors. It was another first-in-the-world for the MTR. 10

The ETR had been in service since1957. The ETR’s on-stream time waslower than the MTR’s, mainly becausethe elaborate experiments took moretime to set up. Competition for its ser-vice was heavy, especially with thespace program considering nuclearapplications.11

Other TRA facilities were equally busy.The early zero-power reactors hadgiven way to more advanced models.The Gamma Facility had irradiated itsfirst 100,000 samples and wasapproaching 200,000. The neutron

physics program continued its explo-ration of neutron interactions with mat-ter. The work most immediately servedreactor designers, but also moved 20thcentury physics along in its progresstoward understanding the atomic nucle-us and ever smaller particles of matter.12

The NRTS had long ago burst the seamsof its Naval Proving Ground inheritanceat Central Facilities. The growing safetyand materials testing programs neededsupport labs and office space. About

$1 million worth of new space had beenbuilt in 1962, and more was on the way.The sponsors of MTR and ETR reactorexperiments had to design the experi-ments, but they needed NRTS welders,pipe fitters, carpenters, mechanics,heavy equipment operators, and otherspecialists to build them. New and larg e rcraft shops were popping up. W h e n e v e ra project or program vacated a building,someone else usually was waiting in thewings, seeking relief from crowded con-ditions elsewhere.1 3


1 6 2

INEEL 68-4967

Photo and schematic of ATR showing basements

below operating floor.

One project that shut down in 1963 wasthe Organic Moderated ReactorExperiment (OMRE). The art ofdiphenyl isomers had advanced sinceA rg o n n e ’s tar-making days, and thislow-cost experiment ($1.8 million) hadused something called Santowax-R asthe coolant. The reactor operated for sixyears, proved itself with a succession ofd i fferent cores, and served its purpose.The advantage of the waxy substancewas that it liquefied at high temperaturesbut didn’t corrode metal as water did. It

could operate at low pressures, signifi-cantly reducing the risk of leaking.1 4

A California company, AtomicsInternational (AI), had proposed andco-financed OMRE, the first such part-nership between the AEC and the pri-vate sector at the NRTS. The HPs oftenrecalled the California roots of the reac-tor because some of the process gaugeswere located outside the building. Toexamine them on a typical Idaho winterday required bundling up for the cold.15

The AEC decided to refine the OMREconcept and scale it up. TheExperimental Organic Cooled Reactor(EOCR) went up next door, equippedwith special testing loops and other

advanced features. By December 1962,the facility was nearly complete. Thenthe AEC canceled the program, decid-ing the concept could not improve onthe performance of breeder or water-cooled reactors. The EOCR was neverloaded with fuel and never went criti-cal. The building was recycled for stor-age and office space until the 1980sbrought another recycle as a trainingcenter for the Site’s security forces. 16

Nevertheless, the concept had onechance elsewhere in the United States.The town of Piqua, Ohio, had respond-ed to AEC’s Power DemonstrationReactor Program and applied for a pro-ject. Its 11.4-megawatt reactor had beenmodeled after the OMRE and went crit-ical in 1963. The town had to shut itdown three years later when wax builtup in the reactor core, making it hard tomaintain and operate. Irradiation hadchanged some of the wax, which melt-ed at higher temperatures. 17

INEEL 80-50INEEL 78-1697


1 6 3

Left. EOCR reactor facility in 1978. Below left. OMRE

as it looked in 1978 prior to demolition. This was

the first demolition as part of the official

decontamination and decommissioning (D&D)

program initiated by EG&G Idaho. Scientists

researched D&D methods, tools, and procedures.

Below right. OMRE area in 1980 after D&D.INEEL 78-3866

At Test Area North, things were hap-pening at the old ANP facilities. A newseries of reactors was going critical—and destructive tests taking place asscheduled. The National Aeronauticsand Space Administration (NASA) wassending satellites into orbit and imagin-ing future space exploration. It wantedto know if nuclear reactors might pro-duce electricity for heat and experi-ments on space missions. Solar cellsand chemical batteries were useful forshort missions, but for longer ventures,these methods were either too low-power or too heavy. Reactors mightoptimize long life and light weight. Itsdevelopment program was calledSystems for Nuclear Auxiliary Power,SNAP.18

NASAplanned to launch its first reac-tor into space in 1965 with an Atlas-Agena rocket. But first, it had toconsider the consequences of potentialaccidents. A rocket might fail, forexample, and the payload—reactorincluded—plunge into the ocean.NASAasked Phillips, which was con-ducting a safety program called SafetyTest Engineering Program (STEP), totest a mock-up of the reactor, namedSNAP-10A, and determine the radia-

tion levels that might be released insuch an accident. The NRTS had simu-lated submarines in the ocean, so it wasno problem simulating a rocket crash inthe ocean. The action on April 1, 1964,was at TAN. Richard Meservey, incharge of instrumentation, recalled:19

They took an old A N P double-wide railc a r, put a huge tank on it and filled itwith water. The tank had a plexiglasssleeve in the center to exclude water.The reactor was placed in the center ofthat plexiglass sleeve. When they wereready to run the test, they used explo -sives to drive the plexiglass sleeve awayso water could rush in on the re a c t o r.That simulated crashing into the ocean.

My job was to measure the temperatureof the fireball if one should occur. I hada little hoghouse, a triangular structureset up at the ANP coupling station nearthe test. We had to worry about neu -trons coming out and destroying theinstruments, so we set up paraffin andcadmium shielding to thermalize theneutrons, and lead to stop the gammaradiation.

A fireball did develop and blew thereactor all over the area. We used afront surface mirror so that the directradiation would not destroy theinfrared temperature detectors. Thedetectors “looked” at the fireball viathe mirror from behind the shielding.We knew we’d lose all the thermocou -ples in the fireball, so we used an opti -cal pyrometer to measure the heat. Itworked well.20

The program tested three SNAP reac-tors to destruction. HPs went on theroad once more, tracing small puffs ofradioactive iodine. Photographers cap-tured the most informative views of the


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INEEL 64-3600 INEEL 64-3605 INEEL 64-3606

INEEL 63-5838

Left. The ANP’s shielded locomotive was recycled for

use with SNAP transient experiments at TAN. Below.

SNAPTRAN-3 destructive experiment, April 1, 1964.

explosions. Safety engineers imaginedwhat else could go wrong—an acciden-tal criticality on the way to the launchpad, for example. Then they engineeredways to prevent such an occurrence,such as shipping the fuel in small sepa-rate packages. The tests proved that thereactor would destroy itself, not contin-ue to operate and build up a high inven-tory of radioactive fission products if itfell into the water.21

Reactor work, perhaps less photogenicthan the destructive tests at TAN, wasunderway at every other corner of theSite. The Army was trying to perfectits small mobile reactor, the ML-1,hoping to conduct a continuous 500-hour run in thespring of 1964. A tthe NRF, the Navywas building theS5G natural circula-tion reactor proto-type and enlarg i n gthe Expended CoreF a c i l i t y. The SPERTand T R E AT i n v e s t i-gations continued tounravel the myster-ies of fuel behaviorunder abnormal con-d i t i o n s .

At A rg o n n e - We s t ,the first-generationbreeder reactor wasgiving way to thesecond, the EBR-II.The venerable EBR-I ended its usefullife in December 1963. It had run onfour different fuel loadings since 1951.The first had bred new fuel at a scantratio of 1.01, just barely replacing thefissioned fuel. The crew had mastered

the handling of NaK coolant, learnedfrom the 1955 meltdown what hadcaused instability in the fuel, and final-ly proved that plutonium fuel,although it had a low melting pointand deformed under stress, could bemanaged in a breeder reactor as wellas uranium. In fact, the breeding ratioimproved to 1.27. And the locallymade electromagnetic pump workedthrough all four core loadings, trouble-f r e e .2 2

Now EBR-II was moving the breederconcept forward, scaling up twentytimes larger than EBR-I. After its firstcriticality in November 1963, itadvanced to the next milestones.

August 1964 saw the turbo-generatingequipment produce electricity, at first insmall amounts, then up to 62.5megawatts. The reactor supplied all thepower needs of Argonne-West withenough to spare for part of the demandelsewhere on the NRTS electrical grid. 23

Argonne scientists were attempting afar more daring goal with EBR-II thanmerely producing electricity. The ideawas to produce it efficiently. In additionto recycling its own fuel on the premis-es, Argonne also envisioned fuel thatwould “burn up,” i.e., fission, a highpercentage of its uranium fuel before itgot so clogged up with fission productsthat it could no longer sustain a chain

reaction. Unlikemost other reactorfuels, EBR-II fuelwas made of puremetal, not oxides.The fuel elementswere pin-shaped,thirteen and a halfinches long and of asmaller diameterthan an ordinarypencil. The standardfuel was mostly ura-nium, enriched to 67percent U-235, butalloyed with a fewother metals. A stan-dard fuel subassem-bly took 91 pins,which werearranged in a hexag-

onal pattern in the reactor. Aside fromits excellent heat-transfer properties andsuperior breeding qualities, the metalfuel made it feasible to melt, refine, andfabricate new fuel elements just downthe hall—literally.24


1 6 5

EBR-II turbine generator.


In September 1964, the EBR-II reactoroperators removed spent fuel pins fromthe reactor—now containing fissionproducts and uranium. About one per-cent of the fuel had burned up. Afterletting it cool for two weeks, they sentit through the FCF, the special argon-atmosphere recycling facility attachedto the reactor building. (Argon gas wasused to prevent sodium fires that werepossible in ordinary air.) At a series ofwork stations arranged around the largecircular cell, technicians removed spac-er wires and chopped the pins into con-venient sizes. Safe behind shieldingwindows, they manipulated their toolsand ran the small furnace, heating themetal to 1,400°C and refining it.Finally, they vacuum-cast new pins inVycor glass molds. The fission productwaste ended up in a crucible as a blobvaguely resembling a skull, which iswhat they were called. New fuel pins,however, were ready for a trial run inthe reactor.25

The pins performed well, as expected.EBR-II proved the principle. It contin-ued running with recycled fuel from1964 to 1969. By 1969, A rg o n n ewould raise the burn-up rate to 1.8 per-cent. During those years, there hadbeen no shipping costs. No transitrisks. No wasting of good enricheduranium. No storing of spent fuelunder water for months and months.No liquid wastes that might leak. Justblobs of hazardous waste to manage.For those who worried about terroristsstealing plutonium, the set-up off e r e dlittle opportunity.2 6

Of all of the reactor research done thusfar by the AEC, EBR-II and its fuelrecycling operation was the closest

thing to a perpetual energy machinethat had been invented. The politicaloutlook for Argonne’s breeder researchlooked as promising as the scientific.When the AEC abandoned the organic-cooled concept in 1962, it elevated thebreeder concept at the same time. TheFederal Power Commission (FPC) esti-mated that American energy consump-tion would double by 1990. It figuredthat the nation’s fossil fuel supplieswould be depleted within two hundredyears. The FPC believed nuclear energycould—and should—displace fossilfuels and supply as much as two-thirdsof the country’s electricity by the year2000. Under this scenario, the AECaccelerated its work on breeder reac-tors. The success of EBR-II was only a

beginning. The concept still had a longway to go before it could safely scaleup to a size competitive with fossil fuelpower plants.27

Thus, the AEC had authorized Argonneto design a third-generation testingbreeder reactor in Idaho. The Fast-Reactor Test Facility (FARET) would


1 6 6

Argonne National Laboratory-West H5673

Argonne National Laboratory-West G5264

Right. Inside the FCF’s argon atmosphere hot cell.

Note manipulators at right. Below. The view in the

working corridor outside the hot cell windows.

take the concept well beyond EBR-IIand the only other operating breederreactor in the country, the Fermi plantin Detroit. It appeared, although it wasnot yet certain, that funding would beapproved and that Argonne-West mightsee FARET under construction in1965.28

Not all nuclear research at the NRT Swas conducted at reactors.Environmental and health studies con-tinued, and in 1963 the IDO went intothe dairy farm business. Partly becauseof the growing frequency of destructivetests at the NRTS, each of whichreleased small amounts of radioiodine-131, the IDO Health and Safety Divisionwanted to get a firm handle on theimpact of these releases. If a large acci-dental release occurred—and one hadoccurred in England in 1957 because ofa fire at Wi n d s c a l e ’s reprocessingplant—the IDO wanted to be ready withbetter emergency plans, not only for Site

employees but also for downwind resi-dents beyond the NRTS. To do thatrequired a method of predicting how theiodine would behave. In addition, theinformation might improve the reactorsiting criteria used at the NRT S .2 9

The pathway of I-131 from the air tograss to cows to milk and to humanshad been generally understood since the1950s. But local doses could be calcu-lated only if local transfer patterns wereknown. Previous studies elsewhere hadtaken place mostly in laboratories. Noone had tested how iodine actuallybehaved in a natural environment.30

The IDO knew there was nothing like afield study to answer questions and cre-ate predictive models. What amount ofan I-131 release would deposit on thegrass? After a cow ate the grass, howmuch radioiodine would go to its thy-roid, through its body, or to its milk?After conducting a feasibility experi-

ment on a field of crested wheatgrassnear the southern edge of the Site, theIDO requested funds for a multi-yearprogram.

In setting up the Experimental DairyFarm, the scientists called upon localcounty agents and others to help themdecide how much acreage would sup-port how many cows, what kind of veg-etation was typical on nearby ranches,and the details of cow management.Montana State University lent Herefordcows for the testing season. Because ofthis, John Horan observed later, “Wehad some of the best pedigreed animalsin the world.”31

The dairy farm project, managed byClyde Hawley, used twenty-seven acresof flat ground about seven miles north-east of the Chem Plant—easy to get toand easy to cultivate. He set up a gridof detection instruments, dotting thepasture in regular lines and rows. Pressreleases went out, describing the pur-pose of the project and seeking bidsfrom local farmers to care for the farmand six cows, irrigate the pasture, andkeep milking records.32

The program was called CERT(Controlled Environmental RadioiodineTests) and would involve many experi-ments over several years. Typically themanager ran tests at different times ofthe year. When ready for a given test,he would order iodine-131 generatorsfrom Oak Ridge and set them up at theupwind edge of the pasture and trigger


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Inside the barn at the Experimental Dairy Farm.INEEL 69-5648

the release. Some iodine accumulatedon the pasture grass. Cows ate thegrass. Someone milked the cows.Technicians took samples of air, grass,and milk at suitably timed intervals,taking into account the eight-day half-life of the iodine. The IDO medicaldirector, Dr. George Voelz, was a pro-ject advisor and recalled some of theearly discussions.

We got to thinking about it. “Why don’twe take it one step further? We’ll get afew of us to volunteer to drink the milk,and we’ll take the final step into thehuman.” Clyde came to me to discussit. The amounts were quite small, and Ididn’t see any problem. Ultimately hegot six people to volunteer, all peopleworking with him.

My concern was with the handling ofthe milk—bacteriological contamina -tion. [The fact was,] we weren’t set upas a milk supplier. He arranged to get alittle home pasteurizer. In reality, weprobably spent more time, at least asmuch time, talking about the bacteriol -ogy as we did the radiation.33

The proposal went to the IDO counsel.John Horan recalled discussing theimplications of the Nuremberg Code.Nazi doctors had been convicted forcrimes against humanity for humanexperimentation. In 1946 a code of con-duct had been developed to guidehuman medical studies involving anelement of risk. The key tenet was that“voluntary consent is essential.” Anapproval and a sample consent formcame from AEC Headquarters. Itexcluded Phillips or other contractoremployees from participating because

the AEC felt that the contracts providedinsufficient liability protection to thegovernment in case of a future claim.34

The experiments completed the last linkin the iodine chain, imitating an acci-dental release. At first, the IDO volun-teers simply sat in the field during therelease and breathed. In later tests, afterthe cows had eaten contaminated grass,the people drank small quantities ofmilk. Subsequent counts, made possiblebecause highly sensitive equipment wasavailable to detect the small traces,identified how much iodine went to thethyroid and how much was excreted.35

The CERT program continued until1977 in a series of twenty-nine experi-ments, although only a few early onesinvolved the human consumption ofmilk. Most of the tests aimed to discov-er how seasonal conditions or differentgrasses affected the behavior of theiodine. Taken as a whole, they demon-strated that iodine uptake was a func-tion of vegetation type, climate, and thetime of year. The measurements made itpossible to predict from known releaseshow much iodine would make itthrough the consumption chain tohuman bodies.


1 6 8

Layout of first CERT experimental area.

IDO-12035

The project expanded to include a labo-ratory in which to isolate variables thatcouldn’t be controlled in the field andto help refine predictive models. Thefindings brought practical realism toemergency planning and reactor sitingat the NRTS. But the impact of thework went much farther. CERT find-ings helped persuade the AEC to reducethe amount of radioiodine that a com-

mercial light-water reactor would beallowed to discharge. The new stan-dard—a maximum of five milliremannual total body exposure—was onethousandth of the standard in effectbefore the CERT experiments.36

Over at the Chem Plant, the demand forrecovered enriched U-235 had beenslow for the last few years. After 1959,Hanford no longer sent highly enrichedslugs to Idaho. From January 1960through December 1963, the plant wason-line for a total of only twelvemonths. Runs were a month here, twomonths there. Likewise, the amounts ofuranium were small, coming mostlyfrom the MTR and ETR. The SL-1 fuelpassed through the plant in 1962. Aftereach run, the liquid waste went, asusual, to the big storage tanks.37

Then in 1963 things changed dramati-cally. The Waste Calcining Facility(WCF) went on line and revolutionizedthe management of radioactive liquidwaste. Ever since the late 1940s, AEC

chemists had been discussing what todo with the useless acidic by-productsof uranium recovery. Pouring it in end-less rows of tanks was obviously not agood idea. Acid corroded tanks—mostlikely within fifty years—and the longhalf-lives that made the waste such ahazard needed to be isolated from theenvironment for centuries, perhaps mil-lennia. Chemists therefore talked of“ultimate” disposal and regarded tankstorage as an “interim” step along theway.38

Chemists at various AEC labs came upwith ideas on how to remove waterfrom the waste and reduce it to a solid.The AEC decided to try only one of theideas, a fluidized-bed calcinationprocess, and build it at the Chem Plant.The development program began in1955, as scientists at Argonne NationalLaboratory tested the method in small-scale models. The process not onlysolidified the waste, but the productwas granular, free-flowing, and easilyhandled by pneumatic transport tech-niques. Phillips engineers starteddesigning the plant in 1956.39

To design the plant, the engineers hadto know which radioactive elementsvolatilized and which remained solid.Argonne identified what became of thedifferent chemicals in the waste whenheated to various temperatures. By1957 Phillips had enough data to designa demonstration plant. The next yearthe Fluor Corporation started building


1 6 9

Above. Construction workers lower the calciner vessel

into the calciner cell through a hatch. Left. Two of

t h ree surplus Navy gun barrels are shown in place

during construction of the Waste Calcining Facility.

INEEL 60-2485

INEEL 59-925

the facility just east of the Chem Plant’smain process building and south of thestorage tanks.40

The most common construction scenewas the placing of concrete for thickshielding walls around the processcells—all of which were below grade.The engineers could not avoid locatingthree “hot” pipes directly beneath anaccess corridor where people would beworking. At least one pipe would con-tain calcine—highly radioactive—on itsway to a storage bin. So they made

shielding tunnels out of Navy gunbarrels, another successful

scrounge courtesy of the oldProving Ground.41

Learning to operate thefluidized bed requiredconsiderable experimen-

tation, much of whichwas conducted at the

Chemical Engineering Lab atCentral Facilities. In 1961

Phillips began two years of “cold”operations, running simulated wastethrough the plant. The trials illuminateddeficiencies in the equipment or theprocess, all of which the engineers hadto adjust. At the same time, the safetyteams imagined how malfunctions orhuman failures might put people injeopardy. For example, what wouldhappen if the plant had to shut downwith calcine still sitting in the calcinervessel? Would decay heat cause thevessel to overheat? Answers to ques-tions like this produced more engi-neered adjustments, moreinstrumentation, redundant equipment,and refinement of operatingprocedures.42


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A t o m i c E n e r g y M e r i t B a d g e

The 1960s expansion of nuclear power led the Boy Scouts of America to intro-duce the “Atomic Energy Merit Badge” to acquaint scouts with a nuclear ener-gy career. This was the 104th merit badge in the series of Boy Scout badges,

approved in 1963. Members of the American Nuclear Society expected to assistwhen scout troops asked for help.

The badge was a symbol of the lithium atom on a yellow background enclosed ina green circle.

To earn the badge, the scout had to discuss the meaning of terms such asalpha particle, curie, fallout, dosimeter, neutron activation, andRoentgen. He also had to select five scientists from a list of tenand explain their discoveries.

Required projects included making three-dimensionalmodels of isotopes, explaining the difference betweenatomic weight and atomic number, and drawing the stan-dard radiation hazard symbol.

A choice of optional projects might involve the scout in mak-ing and using a Geiger counter, building a model of a nuclearreactor, visiting a medical office using X-rays, making a cloud cham-ber, visiting an industrial plant where radioisotopes were being used, or compar-ing the progress of irradiated seeds next to non-irradiated seeds by growing bothto maturity and noting any differences.

The AEC sent Idaho Senator Len Jordan two hundred booklets about the badge todistribute to his Boy Scout and Explorer Scout constituents.43

Now it was two days before Christmasin 1963. The years of preliminariesfinally were coming to an end.Someone turned certain valves, and thehot waste from one of the Chem Planttanks flowed into the building as a liq-uid and left as a solid. The magic wasin the calciner—a cylindrical vesselfour feet in diameter. It began by plac-ing a bed of grainy material resemblingsand (dolomite) at the bottom of thevessel. A NaK heat source placed with-in the bed of sand heated it to 400°CThen hot air flowed into the bedthrough fourteen holes at the bottom ofthe vessel, placing the grains inmotion, or “fluidizing” them, like pop-corn being air-popped in a theaterl o b b y. Liquid waste, containing mostlyaluminum nitrate, entered the vessel asa fine mist. In the hot environment,nature took its course. The watervaporized. Nitrate salts decomposed tonitrogen oxides and metal oxides. T h esolids adhered to the starter grainstumbling around in the vessel. As theprocess continued, the solids knockedagainst each other, causing small parti-cles to flake off and form new startergrains for the liquid feed, which kepton coming.

As the solid—called alumina—accumu-lated, it left the calciner vessel throughan overflow pipe. Pneumatic processestook over and moved it through a pipe(the Navy gun barrel) and on to storagebins east of the building. The watervapor and other off-gases left the vesselby another route, were treated, washed,and filtered and then exited the stack.One of the fission products in thewaste, ruthenium-106, formed a volatile

oxide that could not be allowed to goup the stack. The off-gas was routedinto vessels containing silica gel, whichabsorbed the ruthenium-106.44

The calcine went to one of the bins in a“bin set,” a group of four to seven tall,vertical steel bins nested together insidea thick reinforced concrete vault, inturn surrounded by earth and gravelshielding. The bins stood mostly abovegrade level, so the whole affair resem-bled a barren hill. Cooling air circulatedpast the bins, carrying off the heat ofradioactive decay. Atop each hill weresmall shelters, called doghouses, for fil-ters and the fans used to pull the airfrom within the bin set and send it up asmall stack.45


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Above. One of seven “bins” is lowered into a bin set under construction. Bins will receive calcine and were

built to last 500 years. Below. Waste Calcining Facility in 1972 showing location of the first three bin sets.

INEEL 72-4571

INEEL 71-0848

Operators referred to each run as a“campaign.” The first one lasted untilOctober 1964. Two 300,000-gallontanks and part of a third were emptiedbefore the campaign was forced to stop.In an excess of success, the campaignhad filled up all the available calcinebins. Half a million gallons of liquidhad been transformed into 7,500 bulkcubic feet of solid—a reduction in vol-ume better than 9 to 1. The WCF hadexceeded its design rate of 60 gallonsan hour. None of the feed lines pluggedup. Remote lubricating systems workedso well that no spares had to be put intoservice. The alumina traveled withoutincident from the calciner to the storagebins, despite several bends in the pipe.The gases leaving the stack includedsome strontium-90 and ruthenium-106,but the levels were below guidelinelimits. New bin sets wentunder construction, designedto last at least five hundredyears and made so the cal-cine could be retrieved atany time in the future.46

Analysts who had predictedsuch matters as particle sizeand other properties of thealumina were gratified to findthat performance matchedprediction. The author of onereport on the campaign cred-ited these excellent results tothe ten cold runs of the previ-ous two years. All therehearsing had made for askillful and resourcefulc r e w.4 7

Of all the innovations that streamed outof the NRTS, waste calcining turned outto be one of the most under- e x p l o i t e doutside of Idaho and the most profound-ly valuable within Idaho. Neither BillGinkel nor anyone else could know it atthe time, but the dry calcine tuckedaway in the bins would prove to be thesafest, most environmentally reliable ofall the methods then in use at any A E Cfacility for holding highly radioactivewaste. The calcine could be retrievedfrom the bins if its constituents wereever desired for re-use. Or it could betransformed to a more inert ceramic orglass form for its “ultimate” disposal. A tHanford and Savannah River, wheremuch larger volumes of waste accumu-lated, the practice was to put the waste,neutralized with sodium hydroxide incarbon steel tanks. This caused solids to

settle into a radioactive sludge in thebottom of the tank—a sticky goo. Itcould not be re-dissolved in nitric acidwithout destroying the carbon-steel con-tainer as well. Nor could it be calcined.Several of the tanks leaked. Many ChemPlant scientists thought they had demon-strated a better mousetrap—a way tostore very hazardous radioactive wastefor centuries without threatening theenvironment—but the technology didn’ttransfer to other AEC facilities.4 8

The calciner, the breeder/fuel recycleexperiments, the artful ATR, the reactorsafety studies—all of the NRTS pro-grams were at the leading edge of ahopeful new age of security and energyabundance. The NRTS was a uniqueplace where opportunity was grantedequally to all of the workers—meteo-

rologists, health physicists,welders, chemists, electri-cians, instrument-makers,mechanics, laborers, physi-cists, engineers, managers,carpenters—to exercise dailytheir gifts of curiosity, imagi-nation, and ingenuity. Thefounders had created in thedesert a safe environment inwhich to experiment, to“prove the principle” andthen to move engineeringprogress even farther. Thelaboratory was sanctioned bythe nation and treasured byits neighbors. But the charac-ter of the national nuclearenterprise—and the Idahoneighborhood—was about tochange. So would the NRTS.


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Graphic representation of underground facility for

storage of calcined wastes in granular form.

INEEL 66-6863


1 7 3

T h e B u s R i d e

Hundreds of Site buses have traveledthe roads of southeast Idaho carry-ing thousands of employees safely

to and from work. Accidents were rare,but memories are abundant.

For 22 of the 34 years that I worked at theSite, I commuted a hundred miles a day toand from the Site on government buses, atotal of over a half million miles. In theearly days, the old Brill buses were ro u g hriding, had straight-back seats, no airconditioning, and poor heaters. Theirgasoline engines were very prone tob reakdowns, especially in the middle ofthe desert on a hot summer afternoon orduring an icy blizzard .

Joe W. Henscheid

I was one of those who played bridge inthe back of the buses. We called it “busbridge,” because the rules were a littledifferent. The bus ride only lasted anhour, so you had to bid to the ultimate.

In those days, around 1961, womencouldn’t wear slacks to work. We had towear dresses and heels, no matter whatthe weather. During a terrible blizzard,an accident ahead stranded the bus cara -van about halfway between Central andIdaho Falls. The bus driver kept theengine running to keep the bus warm, butit was a long time before another buscame along, and finally it ran out of gas.As the bus got colder, they put the womenin the aisle seats, which were warmerthan the ones by the window.

The men could get off the bus, turn theirbacks, and relieve themselves, but the

women were handicapped by high heelsand bare legs in trying to get out into thewind and the snow. Mostly, we never did,so there was a lot of discomfort. I thinkwe finally got home around 2 a.m.

After this episode, Phillips relented someon the dress code. Whenever the tempera -t u re got below zero, we could wear slacks.

Myrna Perry

We had a blizzard warning and theweather was getting worse and worse. Atthe time, I was at the Site. [The roads toIdaho Falls and Blackfoot closed.] Nowthe only way to go was to head for MudLake and the Interstate. So we convoyedand headed to town.

But a truck got stalled on the on-ramp tothe Interstate, so the convoy had to headback to Central. On the way, the convoypicked up cars of people that had beencoming from Salmon. They crawled intothe line-up of buses and went back withus, feeling safer with a lot of company.

One bus stopped in Mud Lake and filledup with beer (although management didn’tknow this until weeks later). Gradually wemade it to Central where Riley Foote, themanager of the cafeteria, caught up withus. I asked Riley to get out the steaks. Hedid, and we fed everyone who was there ,even people who didn’t belong to the Site.I washed dishes. People slept all over theplace or played cards all night long.

For days after this, I got calls from peo -ple who normally worked at the Site andwho hadn’t got caught in the storm. Theysaid how sorry they were that theymissed the party.

Chuck Rice

Above (top to bottom) White Bus, Brill Bus,

Carpenter Bus, Gillig Bus, Crown Bus, Current

Bus - MCI

C H A P T E R E I G H T E E N

1 7 4

TH E SH A W EF F E CT. . .It appears also that [long-term changes at the NRTS] will be influenced by technology trends,

national policy, and other factors largely outside the control or option of the immediatecommunity or the State itself.

—William Ginkel, 1967—

The ATR start-upgroup was having a bad day, and it wasn’t the first one. It was preparing tobring the reactor critical for the firsttime. As the operators rotated the con-trol cylinders, they saw that the count-rate recorders were not behavingaccording to prediction. It could mean adelay like an earlier one when the stain-less-steel coolant pipe had been acci-dentally over-pressurized. Some of thepipe, thirty-six inches indiameter, had bulged anddeformed. The pipe wasruined. Replacing it hadcost millions of dollarsand a year of time.1

In the face of this newtrouble, the team shutdown the reactor,opened the pressure ves-sel, removed the fuel,and inspected. T h e ysoon discovered that thedrive mechanisms forthe sixteen controlcylinders would notrotate on command.Each of the drive units had been

installed backwards. The problem tookless time and money to fix than the ear-lier problem, and in an earlier day,might have been considered just one ofthe routine bugs that accompany anycomplex new project.

This time, the ATR start-up problemsand parts failures came under the closescrutiny of Milton Shaw, since late1964 the director of AEC-Headquarters’Division of Reactor Development andTechnology. He sent investigators to

discover the management failures thatmust have caused the mishap, anintense process that further postponedthe start-up.2

As a former aide to Admiral Rickover,Shaw had been exposed to the safetyphilosophy of the Nuclear Navy. Aswholeheartedly as Rickover, hebelieved in accident prevention viaexcellence, quality control, and redun-dancy. He once said of himself, “Mywife jokes that when I build a dog

house, it’ll withstand aseismic event.”Although such featureshad not been absentfrom NRTS safety phi-losophy, the principlesof Site remoteness andgeographical separationof reactors had beenmajor guarantors of pub-lic safety. It was likelythat if Shaw chose toassert his convictions,the shift in emphasiswould change the com-fortable old way ofdoing things at theNRTS.3Aerial view of TRA looking south. The large ATR

building is at right of photo. Its associated cooling

towers are below it and farther to the right.

INEEL 68-3496

Loss of Fluid Test Facility tunnel entranceINEEL 79-5542

A forceful and skillful manager, Shawalso practiced his mentor’s “abrasiveinterface” style of dealing with people,making no virtue of tact even on cere-monial occasions. The president of anIDO contractor, Chuck Rice, recalledone such occasion:

After I had been elected president ofNuclear [Aerojet Nuclear], we had abig dinner for key managers in thecompany at the Stardust Motel. MiltonShaw was there, Bill Ginkel, many fromAerojet, all the way down to branchmanagers. Shaw got up and did hisRickover-type tirade on all that thesepeople in the room had done wrong.They were lousy managers, had poorcontrol, and so on.

When it was my turn to speak, I got upand listed the outstanding accomplish -ments of the group and complimentedthem on the work they had done so well.

As I walked out after dinner,deBoisblanc came up and said, “I real -ly appreciated the comments. You’ll befired, but it was nice to hear it.”

The next day there was a meeting onwhether to fire Rice or not. Shaw said,“Find out the reason for his speech.Then we’ll decide.” Someone called meand I said, “Shaw works at Headquar -ters, I work here. If we are to do well,I’ve got to invite the people who workh e re to join my part y.” I kept my job.4

L a t e r, Rice and Shaw developed awarmer relationship. But Shaw’s obser-vation of the ATR troubles reinforced hisview that a quality assurance approachto reactor operations—even test reactors

like the ATR—was the only correctapproach. Parts and systems must meetstandards, and management must assurethe standards be observed. The AT Rproblems had made a strong impressionon him. Years later, he still referred tothem when discussing the quality issuewith the JCAE.5

As Shaw considered the state of theAEC’s national reactor program, he feltthere was duplication of effort and poorcoordination among the labs. Keymembers of the AEC commission andthe JCAE supported him in this view.Shaw felt that the situation justifiedreform, redirection, and tight control.His introduction to the ATR gave himno reason to exempt the NRTS or itscontractors from this overall appraisal.Shaw’s new broom began the sweep,and the dust-up generated discord andanxiety, program changes, and person-nel dislocations. Some misunderstand-ings lasted for years. 6

Phillips’ five-year operating contract,which the AEC had renewed regularlysince Phillips began at the Site in 1951,was scheduled to conclude in 1966. InMarch of 1965 the AEC announced anew approach to selecting the next con-tractor. The AEC wanted contractorsthat intended to invest in the nuclearindustry. While Phillips had a laudablerecord—and in fact would continue tomanage reactor safety research—Phillips’ only involvement in the indus-try, aside from uranium mining, hadbeen at the NRTS. The company wasinclined more to research, not engineer-ing. It had no other nuclear involve-ment.7


1 7 6

Above. Logo for Aerojet Nuclear Corporation. Middle.

Logo for Idaho Nuclear Corporation. Below. Logo for

Allied Chemical.

By June 1965, thirty companies saidthey were interested in the $29 millioncontract. The Idaho Falls newspaperkept track of the “titan firms” visitingthe Site. Ginkel and his staff rented theElks Club for briefings and conductedSite tours for the visitors. Up for newmanagement were all three materialstesting reactors (MTR, ETR, ATR),their supporting engineering groups andzero-power reactors, the Chem Plant,the Hot Shop and other TAN facilities,most of the site-wide craft and otherservices—and 1,800 people rangingfrom bus drivers to scientists. The deal,as usual, would be cost plus fixed fee.8

The AEC liked the Aerojet GeneralCorporation. The company, which hadbeen founded in 1942 to design andbuild rocket engines, had managed aproject for the AEC and NASA i nNevada called NERVA, a joint effort todevelop a nuclear-powered rocket. T h eAEC liked A e r o j e t ’s “disciplinedapproach to engineering and quality,which Aerojet...had developed in itsSpace Program operations.” Aerojet alsohad the right kind of ambitions. It want-ed to become a major nuclear player andhad entered the field of commercial gas-cooled reactors. Managing the NRT Swould give its people the experience andcompetencies necessary to make thegrade. A e r o j e t ’s proposal was managedby Allan C. Johnson, who, after his post-SL-1 departure from the NRTS, hadlanded on his feet at Aerojet. As assis-tant to A e r o j e t ’s chairman, he and J.Bion Philipson, an NRTS pioneer thenalso with Aerojet, led the company tothe winner’s box.9

There was a catch. Aerojet had littleexperience in chemistry, an unaccept-able weakness considering the impor-tance of the Chem Plant. The AECsuggested a shot-gun marriage betweenAerojet and one of the other bidders,Allied Chemical. The two companiesadjusted their bids and created IdahoNuclear Corporation (INC), with anunderstanding that Allied expertisewould manage the Chem Plant. Alliedheld a minority interest in the company(Phillips continued to manage the STEPprogram as an independent contractor).Dr. Charles H. Trent from Aerojetbecame president and Bion Philipsonhis deputy. The new regime began onJuly 1, 1966.10

The change jolted Phillips employees,some of whom had been part of thePhillips family for most of their careers.“Suddenly, we were like an arm graftedonto a new body,” observed one ofthem. Gradually, they adapted, althoughAerojet never re-created the Phillips’style of benign paternalism. The FrankPhillips Men’s Club and the JanePhillips Sorority disappeared.11

Shaw soon felt compelled by the rapidonset of the commercial power industryto reorganize the safety test program(STEP) for water-moderated reactors.The STEP program had progressed farbeyond the NASAtests studying theimpact of ocean crashes on reactorslaunched into space. The program nowinvolved two main branches. One wasto continue exploring reactor excur-sions. The SPERT IV facility would besupplanted by a much larger and moresophisticated reactor called the PowerBurst Facility (PBF). It would subject

test fuel to transient bursts of energy farsurpassing the capability of any previ-ous reactors.

The second branch opened up research onan altogether new realm of possible acci-dents. In 1963 the New Jersey CentralPower and Light Company said it wouldbuild a 515-megawatt nuclear powerplant because this was cheaper than allthe other options, including coal. GeneralElectric would build the plant for a fixedprice and hand it over to the utility tooperate. This “turnkey” contract—andothers that followed—signaled that GEand its chief competitor, We s t i n g h o u s e ,were ready to go commercial. The twocompanies scaled up the power plants tohigher and higher power levels, eachaiming to become market leader. Wi t h i nanother two years, they were designing

C H A P T E R 1 8 • T H E S H A W E F F E C T . . .

1 7 7

INEEL 72-2662

Loading fuel into PBF reactor, 1972.


1 7 8

1,000-megawatt reactors, far exceedingany previous AEC demonstration pro-jects. The fierce competitive struggle ledthe two companies to sell reactors asloss-leader products. The true profitabili-ty or economic superiority of nuclearover fossil fuel plants was—at least atthat time—debatable.1 2

The huge plants presented new safetyproblems. The AEC’s Division ofNuclear Safety, which performedlicensing and safety reviews of pro-posed plants, had thus far dealt withplants of much lower power. Even so,the AEC had not permitted them tolocate near highly populated areas.Additionally, the reactor buildings had

to be built so that if an accidentoccurred, the fission products—shouldthey escape the cladding and the reactorpressure vessel—would not passbeyond a third barrier called a contain-ment vessel. Typically, containmentvessels were dome-shaped and con-structed to withstand the pressures thatmight result from a steam explosion.

In the new plants, the reactor core con-tained tons of fuel. Analysts imaginedthe consequences if the coolant somehowfailed to carry away the heat of fission-ing. Suppose a pipe leaked or broke? T h eS P E RT tests had proven that such a situ-ation would easily put a stop to the chainreaction: the loss of pressure wouldallow the water to turn to steam; thelower density of steam would fail tomoderate the neutrons; and the nuclearreaction would stop. But the radioactivedecay of the fission products inside thefuel elements would continue to produceheat and continue to need cooling. Eventhough the decay heat was a small per-cent of the heat of a fissioning reactor, itwas enough to melt the fuel and cladmetal, leading to potentially violentinteractions with water or air.

Clearly, more was at stake in a largecommercial reactor. If something hap-pened to the coolant flow, an emer-gency back-up system had to sendwater to the core and carry heat away.It was chiefly a matter of engineering,not physics.

Scientists at Brookhaven NationalLaboratory attempted to define whatmight be at stake. They imagined theworst case loss-of-coolant accident(LOCA) in a reactor located very near alarge city. They elaborated it with the

worst possible weather conditions.Then they calculated the consequencesif the fuel melted. They speculated thatit would drop to the bottom of the pres-sure vessel, melt through it, fall to theconcrete floor and basements beneaththe power plant, burn through the con-crete, and proceed through the earth “toChina,” or at least in the direction ofChina, until the fuel cooled naturally.Worse, steam pressure might rupturethe containment vessel and send fissionproducts into the atmosphere whicheverway the wind was blowing. Havingbreached their triple containment, thefission products would be an immediatehazard in the air and could eventuallycontaminate soil and water supplies.13

New Jersey Central and other licenseapplicants were proposing a variety ofback-up cooling systems that would pre-vent fuel from ever getting hot enoughto head for China. The trouble was thatthese had not been proven to work.None of the safety testing at theN RTS—or anywhere else—had tested al a rge-reactor LOCA, the ChinaSyndrome, or how the many variables inl a rge-scale reactor systems would inter-act. Consequently, AEC regulators had ahost of new technical questions. T h ePhillips engineers had anticipated manyof the questions and were ready with aplan. In 1963 Phillips began a $19.4 mil-lion program to build a special reactor toexplore LOCAs. The main idea was toload up the reactor and the containmentbuilding with instrumentation, operatethe reactor, and then withhold thecoolant to “see what happens.”1 4

The Loss-of-Fluid Test (LOFT) reactorwas to be a 50-megawatt reactor withfuel elements clad in stainless steel and

Cutaway illustration of the PBF reactor.

surrounded by a containment vessel.Phillips placed the domed structurenext to the old hangar building at TAN,finding the old four-track railroad andother ANP facilities very adaptable to anew mission. The shielded controlbuilding next to the hangar became theLOFT control room. Phillips hauled outthe old shielded locomotive, intendingto move the reactor from the contain-ment building to the Hot Shop fordetailed examination after the experi-ment. Kaiser Engineers broke groundfor the project on October 14, 1964, ahappy ceremony that brought the vice-chairman of the JCAE, Chet Holifield,to Idaho to make the featured speech.15

The LOFT experiment was fairly sim-ple. It would be a small version of alarge reactor, the containment vessel anintegral part of the test. The cooling-system components would come “offthe shelf” from the commercial vendorswho sold to General Electric and

Westinghouse, not from the fabricationshops at the NRTS where parts were sooften given individual attention, notmass produced. In a series of non-nuclear experiments, the operatorswould first test the performance of thecomponents—the emergency sprays,pressure suppression devices, and otheremergency equipment that would sup-posedly come into play if the regularcoolant pipe broke. They would alsofind out how much pressure the con-tainment vessel could endure.16

After those tests, the grand finale wouldbe the NRTS specialty—a test todestruction. Operators would “break”an 18-inch coolant pipe, delay theinsertion of the control rods, cut off thecooling water, and decline to spraywater onto the core. They could studythe melting fuel, perhaps learn some-thing useful about the dynamics of theprocess. The instrumentation wouldkeep track of the fission products, mea-

suring what fraction of the total mightreach the atmosphere. They expected tolearn enough about LOCAs to definemore precisely the sequence of eventsand the exact nature of the hazards. Thedata would be extrapolated to larger-scale reactors. The test was expected totake place in the winter of 1968.17

The LOFT project hit a snag immedi-ately. The new commercial reactorsproposed to use zircaloy claddinginstead of stainless steel. In 1965,therefore, Phillips changed the LOFTreactor design for zircaloy-clad fuel.This affected the parameters for thesafe operation of the LOFT reactor, sothe safety studies had to be redone.These changes delayed the project.Back in Washington, the regulatorswere trying to cope with license appli-cations. They wondered whether theproposed tests, being performed on asmall reactor, would actually tell themanything relevant about large reactors.Some of the AEC staff doubted that themethods for analyzing the core melt orthe water interaction with meltingzircaloy were sophisticated enough toproduce meaningful data. Nor werethey sure that the containment vesselwould withstand the gas pressures gen-erated during the meltdown.18

Milton Shaw wondered if the LOFTproject would fall prey to the samekinds of problems as the ATR. He sawthe possibility that unreliable parts orequipment might interfere with good


1 7 9

INEEL 67-2104

Governor Don Samuelson (center) visits LOFT site in

1967. Bill Ginkel on left, Joe P. Lyon of INC on right.

test results. What was the point of anexperiment if it used the wrong parts,the wrong materials, and met the wrongspecifications? Results could never beduplicated. The project was about tenpercent complete, and the reactor’seighty-ton pressure vessel had beenfabricated. Nevertheless, Shaw stoppedthe work to “regroup and do the jobright.” Quality assurance hit the LOFTproject. The experiment was going tobecome much more complex.19

But not immediately. Forward motionon LOFT stalled while contendingforces within AEC Headquarters settledtheir differences—sometimes at aleisurely pace. The issue of power plantsiting had divided the regulatory anddevelopment arms of the AEC. Withtheir low confidence in the utilities’proposals for untested backup safetysystems, the regulators were reluctantto allow power plants close to cities,the load centers. On the developmentside, Shaw, the commissioners, and theJCAE resisted imposing excessive orunnecessary costs on utility companies.The grip of nuclear power on economicviability was too tenuous, and they didn’t want the fledgling industry tofalter because of unnecessary costs.

Related to the siting issue, a diff e r e n c eof opinion emerged on how to—orwhether to—research the ChinaSyndrome. One view was that the A E Cshould confront it directly: test it, under-stand it, characterize it, and learn how tomake it inherently impossible. This hadbeen one purpose of the original testplan for the LOFT experiment. T h eother view was that this was costly andu n n e c e s s a r y. The China Syndromeshould simply be prevented. Emerg e n c y

core cooling system (ECCS) engineeringshould be so foolproof that nuclear fuelwould never have a chance to melt. Ifanything was to be researched, it shouldbe these engineering preventatives.2 0

Shaw felt that standards and criteria,combined with experience and goodengineering judgment would protectpublic safety. He sided with those whofelt it was possible to prevent accidentsby building reliable back-up systems—defense-in-depth. Understanding themoment-by-moment progress of anaccident that would never happen was awaste of money.

As the 1960s wore on, the debate con-tinued. The regulatory staff had noindependent control of a research bud-get, so their needs for research resultson LOCAs went unmet. Staff commit-tees formed, talked, and dissolved. Atthe same time, applications kept com-ing in for review; the regulators neededthe results of LOFT-type experimentsand they didn’t have them.

For LOFT the upshot of all the talk wasa loss of support for the original experi-ments. Those advocating research onthe mechanism of the China Syndromeultimately were disappointed. Asidefrom Shaw’s determination to makeLOFT a showcase for new qualityassurance procedures, the project drift-ed. People were laid off. Work stopped,started, stopped. Funds were held backor stinted, even though they had beenappropriated.

The AEC desired to see improvedaccountability in management, so in1969 Phillips joined Aerojet and Alliedas a minority partner in the operating

contract. As Bill Ginkel said at thetime, the AEC was looking for “upgrad-ed engineering, standards, codes andguides, documentation, plant reliability,and quality level of performance.”Absorbing Phillips into the corporationwas intended to strengthen overall man-agement of NRTS programs. Aerojetcontinued as the majority partner.21

Personnel layoffs soon followed andcontinued into 1971. Idaho scientistswrote angry letters to the Idaho con-gressional delegation, blaming LOFTproblems on poor policy direction andbungled management from Washington.Some people thought Shaw was rob-bing LOFT funds to support his greaterinterest in breeder reactor development.Aerojet hired new people for the LOFTproject at the same time it was lettinggo of Idaho people. “The deterioratingsituation at the NRTS...continues toworsen,” wrote one employee toSenator Len Jordan. In a departure fromprevious custom, the new LOFT workcenter—174 employees—was movedfrom the Site to the Rogers Hotel inIdaho Falls, which contributed furtherto resentment and misunderstanding. 22

A belief arose that the Shaw/Aerojetmanagers were autocratic and vindic-tive, eliminating people who dissentedfrom the official point of view. ThePost-Register called for the congres-sional delegation to rescue the NRTSfrom the poor AEC management thatwas causing both the layoffs and “sci-entific disillusionment” at the Site.Governor Cecil Andrus made a similarappeal. “We can ill afford the loss,” hewrote of the layoffs. 23


1 8 0

Aerojet president Chuck Rice tried toexplain the general upheaval in moraleand the impact of Shaw’s new proce-dures to Idaho congressman OrvalHansen:

In the past, reactor and enviro n m e n t a lsafety was derived from experiencede x p e rts working together as a looselyknit team, each member of which expect -ed the remaining members to performthe appropriate functions at the appro -priate time without clear cut lines ofresponsibility and delegated authorities.In response to AEC desires and dire c -

tives, this informal system has, in a period of less than one year, beenreplaced by a highly formalized systemthat places primary reliance onu n s w e rving adherence to a set of inter -locking pro c e d u res and re s p o n s i b i l i t i e sthat have been subjected to multiplereviews by boards of specialists. Thewriting of pro c u rement specificationshas become a job for the skilled engi -neer rather than the purchasing agent.C a refully documented engineering stud -ies have replaced the quick fix by themaintenance man.2 4

Meanwhile, the STEP program opera-tors had managed to carry out usefulwork in spite of difficulties. Theydeveloped computer models predictingthe behavior of coolant in a LOCA.Among other experimental devices,they built a simulated reactor calledSemiscale to help understand howcoolant water would behave as itdepressurized after a pipe broke. Thisprocess was called a “blowdown.”Blowdown tests and computer analysisof the simulated accidents led to com-puter programs, called codes, capableof predicting the performance of back-up cooling systems during a blowdown.The codes originated at the NRTS withthe help of the INEL SupercomputingCenter (ISC), which was built in 1968.25


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INEEL 69-6280

INEEL 68-3179

Above. Semiscale was a simulated reactor.

Instrumentation leads leave head of the core. Left.

Semiscale blowdown test, 1968, simulated a break

in a coolant pipe.

The Semiscale heat source was electri-cal but created the same high tempera-tures as a reactor. Between November1970 and March 1971, a series of testsdemonstrated—unexpectedly—thatafter certain accidents, steam pressurein the coolant pipes prevented anyemergency water at all from gainingaccess to the core. If this was a pictureof what might happen in a large reactor,the problem was serious indeed. Themargins of safety that had previouslybeen assumed for commercial emer-gency core cooling systems would haveto be revised downward.26

The findings provoked the AEC to holdhearings on the matter. Semiscale scien-tists from Idaho traveled to Washingtonto explain their findings before peoplewho were reluctant to believe that theSemiscale results could be extrapolatedto large reactors. Nevertheless, Idahoresearch was solid and persuasive. TheAEC adopted a set of requirementsmore conservative than had been thecase before. They were “Interim”Acceptance Criteria, a set of safetyrequirements that a utility company hadto meet in order to obtain a licensefrom the AEC. The Criteria went intoeffect immediately, without the custom-ary time elapsing for further comment.NRTS work thus had an impact onsafety requirements for commercialreactors.27

Milton Shaw finally decided how hewanted to redirect the LOFT program.The AEC regulators needed to examineplans for emergency cooling systems,predict their performance in an acci-dent, and then decide whether or not toapprove the plans. With such complexsystems as a nuclear reactor, they were

using computer models. Therefore, thetesting program at the LOFT reactor inIdaho should verify the accuracy of thecodes. With reliable codes, the regula-tors could confidently evaluate pro-posed power plant design proposals.28

For the LOFT team, it was like startingo v e r. Reorienting the project took timeand required more money. The reactorneeded more elaborate piping and instru-mentation—all quality assured. The pro-ject slipped its schedule repeatedly. T h ecompletion date moved out to 1971,then 1972, 1973, and beyond. Phillips,and then Aerojet, could not get fabrica-tors to supply the major primary pumpand heat exchangers on schedule. T h estandards were set so high that vendorsrefused to bid on the secondary coolantpump. Code specifications for pipingand steam generators changed, and thiscaused more delays. Construction haltedcompletely from May 1968 to October1 9 7 0 .2 9

For all of the delays, Shaw had blamedPhillips. Idaho scientists resented thisunfairness. Shaw himself had authoredthe delay. The quality-oriented delayswere particularly irritating. Why shouldstandards that would protect the crewof a submarine apply to short-termexperiments in a remote, isolateddesert? But the conditions of work atthe NRTS had changed. Scientistsbegan to realize that the early tradi-tions were giving way. The outcome ofthe LOFT struggles showed that theywere losing their early freedom todefine their own research problems.3 0

In 1971 when it was time for the IDO tonegotiate a new operating contract,Aerojet took over completely, subcon-tracting with Allied to run the ChemPlant and assuming the STEP p r o g r a mfrom Phillips. The name changed from


1 8 2

An artist’s view of LOFT circa 1964 shows reactor

inside domed containment building.

INEEL 64-6461

INC to ANC—Aerojet NuclearCorporation. Phillips, co-inventor of thew o r l d ’s only reactor testing station, was,with little ceremony, gone for good. Itsearlier ambitions regarding nuclear ener-gy had abated; changes in the NRT Sprograms and the environment in whichit now operated gave it little furtherstake in testing nuclear reactors.3 1

In 1972, Science magazine charted theLOFT-centered erosion of affectionbetween the NRTS and AECHeadquarters. The author, RobertGillette, described with dismay howNRTS scientists met him secretly one

night on a back street in Idaho Fallsand then drove to one of their homes.“That men nationally recognized intheir profession felt they had to do thisshows how far relations between theAEC and Idaho have deteriorated,” hewrote. But the new Aerojet manager,Charles Leeper, supported Shaw. “Thehighly creative days and the permissivetimes are behind us,” he said, “and thedemands now are for a hard bittenreduction to economical practices.”32

Although work protocols, managementp h i l o s o p h y, and the burden of paper-work had changed, it was still possible

to do good work at the NRTS. Betterdays were ahead for LOFT.

After the troubled start-up of the AT R ,the reactor went on to perform superbly,like a theatrical play after a poor dressrehearsal. In August 1969, the operatorsran it for the first time at its full powerlevel of 250 megawatts. The designersoriginally expected to run the ATR twen-ty-one days before having to shut downand reload new fuel. In practice, theyran in thirty-four day cycles and longer.In the next ten years, the ATR regularlyset new performance records, running at98.2 percent operating efficiency andon-line eighty percent of the year. T h i swas a superior accomplishment becausethe ATR was so complex a machine thatany of four hundred different reactor andexperimental systems could fail and shutdown the reactor. Breaking performancerecords meant that a team was sharp,diligent, and skillful.3 3

The Shaw effect was not limited to thetotal reorientation of the LOFT p r o g r a mand the imposition of a new style ofmanagement and procurement. It alsoplayed out in the theater of operations atA rg o n n e - West. Shaw had a strong com-mitment to the future of the breederr e a c t o r. But it turned out that he did nothave a strong commitment to A rg o n n e -West. When this became apparent to theeastern Idaho supporters of the NRTS, aboost machine went into high gear.


1 8 3

ATR technicians check the fit of a dummy fuel

element in the reactor core (before ATR became

operational). The curved pipes are for instrument

leads and reactor coolant. The vertical pipes provide

paths for experiments into the core area.INEEL 67-5184

C H A P T E R N I N E T E E N

1 8 4

. . .A N D T H E ID A H O BO OS TThere can be a great future for the state in atomic energy development.

—Idaho Governor Don Samuelson, 1967—

Milton Shaw andthe AEC canceled A rg o n n e ’s FA R E Tr e a c t o r. Never mind that Congress hadauthorized the funds. Times hadchanged. Old breeder plans were not theright breeder plans. Atoms for peace hadbecome a fact. Between1965 and 1970, utilitycompanies in the UnitedStates ordered a hundrednuclear power plants—allof them moderated andcooled by water. Shawand the others felt that thetorch had passed to indus-t r y, and water- m o d e r a t e dreactors should no longerrequire federally subsi-dized research.1

The national coal lobbyhad objected for yearsthat Congress subsidizednuclear power. Congresswas unfair, it said, to dis-place coal plants by financing theresearch that would make commercialnuclear power possible. The lobby hadprotested the AEC’s reactor demonstra-tion program. It objected to federalinsurance subsidies for utility compa-nies in the event of a nuclear accident.2

The AEC and the JCAE were in a posi-tion, therefore, in 1964 to make a con-cession to the coal industry while at thesame time advancing to the next level ofthe nuclear future, which was to bringliquid-metal-cooled fast-breeder reactorsto the commercial market. It could con-clude research on water-cooled concepts.

Ideas about the world’s reserves of ura-nium were still driving reactor develop-ment ideas. The global wave of newnuclear power plants would consumemore and more uranium, probablydepleting it if the demand for energycontinued to grow. Water-moderatedreactors used uranium extremely ineff i-

c i e n t l y. Of the uraniumin a reactor core, a typi-cal commercial reactorburned about one per-cent, perhaps a littlemore. The rest of theuranium—the unfis-sioned U-235 and the U-238—could be recycledat great expense or dis-carded as a contaminatedwaste. A b r e e d e r, on theother hand, could pro-duce something valu-a b l e — p l u t o n i u mfuel—out of U-238 andthus convert it into ane n e rgy source. T h ebreeder could use nearly

a l l of the uranium. Besides, breedershad the potential of burning up a higherpercentage of the fuel to begin with.3

Therefore, Shaw and the AEC shiftedtheir resources to the breeder. GlennSeaborg, a Nobel laureate chemist who

Glenn Seaborg holding the first tiny sample of the

fissionable form of the nuclear fuel plutonium-239.

This sample is now at the Smithsonian Institution in

Washington, D.C.


Nuclear energy exhibit attracts Idaho Falls visitors in 1969.Idaho State Historical Society MS326

as part of the Manhattan Project hadmade the world’s first plutonium,became chairman of the AEC in 1961.Seaborg was completely committed tothe “plutonium economy” of the breed-er reactor. He told President Kennedyin 1962 that the way for the UnitedStates to maintain nuclear reactor tech-nological preeminence in the world wasto perfect the breeder reactor as a safeand commercially viable source ofenergy. He even suggested that plutoni-um would eventually replace gold asthe standard of the monetary system.4

Washington politics favored the AEC’snew focus on the breeder. But manysafety and engineering questions stillremained to be solved if breeder reac-tors were to scale-up to commercialproportions. Physics and chemistryquestions remained. As a more distantachievement, therefore, the breeder rep-resented less of a threat to the coalindustry and their opposition evaporat-ed. The breeder research programwould take many more years.5

Shaw spent 1965 considering how bestto redirect the A E C ’s breeder programand then decided, with AEC approval, tomanage it directly from his own off i c e .This arrangement was a departure fromthe A E C ’s more typical assignment ofcontractor management to its fieldo ffices. Shaw’s critics, among themAlbert Crewe, the director of A rg o n n eNational Laboratory, publicly challengedS h a w ’s “cult of perfection” in experi-mental work. If research methods livedwith the safety requirements for nuclearsubmarines, he said, so little would beaccomplished that Europe would takethe lead in breeder technology.6

Shaw felt that the breeder programneeded a large test reactor. Goals fortesting fuel and components had to beaggressive if the breeder was to make itto the commercial market. The FARETreactor was too small, the Argonne pro-gram too unambitious. Instead, hechose Hanford to design a new reactor,named the Fast-Flux Test Facility(FFTF). The open conflict betweenShaw and Crewe didn’t help Argonne.In view of Crewe’s public antipathy forShaw, the new reactor wasn’t going toArgonne. Still, even if Hanforddesigned it, Argonne assumed the FFTFcould still be built in Idaho.7

The technical issue appeared to be thetype of fuel planned for each reactor.Argonne’s efforts with EBR-II fuel todate had been to improve uranium-


1 8 6

Above. Original exterior of TREAT reactor building.

Below. Perspective drawing of the TREAT reactor.


Argonne National Laboratory-West Report ANL-6034

plutonium fuel so that it could operatein a reactor at higher and higher tem-peratures without melting the fuel orcladding. The economics of a commer-cial reactor would require an operatingtemperature of about 1,200°F, a targetthat Argonne had not yet reached.Shaw and others felt that fuel made ofoxides or carbides of uranium and plu-tonium and cladding of zirconium andtitanium alloys held more promise forhigher operating temperatures. In thislarger scheme of research, Shaw want-ed the EBR-II to shift its programemphasis and become a materials test-ing reactor for these new fuel concepts.The new FFTF would have test loopsin which fuel elements six inches indiameter and three to four feet longcould be irradiated in an environmentproducing more neutron flux than eventhe ATR was capable.8

Shaw opened a Liquid Metal FastBreeder Reactor (LMFBR) office atA rg o n n e ’s Chicago and Idaho locationsand staffed them with people whoreported directly to him. The atmospherewas not cordial. Shaw’s people demand-ed copies of all trip reports, conferencereports, and program documents con-taining conclusions and recommenda-tions. He laid his quality template on allplanning documents: objectives, criteria,standards, alternatives, priorities, ratio-nale, and more. He told Crewe that heexpected A rgonne to “serve as an exten-sion” of the LMFBR office. He rejectedinitiatives from the field. Ahistorian ofthe A rgonne lab described A rg o n n e ’snew role as “captive handmaiden” ofS h a w ’s office, its autonomy gone.9

In Idaho Falls, business leaders respond-ed swiftly to Idaho’s loss of the FA R E T

r e a c t o r. By this time, they were well-practiced observers and promoters of theN RTS. The spirit of the “party plan” wasstill intact. The team now included theIdaho governor’s office and the Idahocongressional delegation. The new editorof the Idaho Falls P o s t - R e g i s t e r, RobbB r a d y, forged an important link betweenthe NRTS and the public. These groupseyed the flow of money and ideas inWashington, D.C. They kept a tally ofprojects gained and lost, proposed andcanceled. They watched the NRT Semployment and budget statistics likehawks. All understood that competitionfor federal research funds was a growingfact of life.

Information flowed freely among theplayers, and they followed up in careful-ly orchestrated moves. The newspaperkept readers informed, and Brady’sthoughtful editorials were so well con-sidered that they circulated inWashington, D.C. Political party aff i l i a-tion made no apparent difference in who

spoke with whom. In April 1964, forexample, Republican Governor RobertSmylie sent a telegram to each memberof the delegation, at the time consistingof two Democrats and twoR e p u b l i c a n s :1 0

U rge you support AEC project 630-Afor A rco, Idaho AEC installation. Nowb e f o re JCAE. Efforts currently exert e dto assign same to Hanford. If shifted,will have detrimental effect in easternI d a h o .11

The effort succeeded, and the 630-Areactor experiment went to TAN. Theproject, intended to advance a nuclear-powered civilian maritime fleet, was ofmodest budgetary impact, but it helpedpreserve the NRTS as an importantAEC facility. Better that Idaho get thework than Hanford.

While Hanford designed the FFTF, theIdaho boost machine worked on anotherproject. In 1965, the AEC asked theNational Academy of Sciences (NAS) toselect a location for a proposed NationalAccelerator Laboratory, a $348 millionparticle accelerator known as the“Bevatron.” Editor Brady thought it wasa long shot for Idaho, given the absenceof a nuclear physics program at IdahoState University (ISU) in Pocatello.1 2

Nevertheless, Governor Smylie wasgame. He established a special IdahoAccelerator Committee, on which menfrom the business community and fromGinkel’s office all helped to coordinatethe promotion. Headed by FredRooney, an executive with the FMCCorporation in east Idaho, the commit-tee included Brady and a professionalpublicist named Don Watson. The com-

C H A P T E R 1 9 • . . . A N D T H E I D A H O B O OS T

1 8 7

Governor Robert Smylie

Idaho State Historical Society 103-C5413

mittee decided early that if Idaho didn’tmake it through the “first turnstyle”—over a hundred applicants from forty-three states were competing—Idahocould fall back to a regional dealinvolving Utah, Montana, Nevada, andOregon. Politicaltrading would bepossible, Rooneytold Smylie. In themeantime, Bradywould make a dis-creet contact withAEC commissionerJames Ramey, andanother committeemember wouldcontact GlennSeaborg.13

Watson developedthe “livability” sec-tions of the propos-al and orchestratedthe reception of theNAS fact-findingteam when it visited the Site. “Vo l u n t a r yturnover of scientific personnel at theN RTS is low almost to the point ofbeing non-existent,” said the proposal.Along with the technical data on the costof electrical power at the NRTS wentstatistics on the below-national-averagehigh school drop-out rate in Idaho Falls.Idaho slipped through the first turnstyle,but it was crowded: eighty-four otherproposals also made the cut.1 4

The NAS committee did not favor Idaho.The NRTS was not near the right kind ofu n i v e r s i t y. Although ISU was geographi-cally near, the Idaho legislature had donelittle to support the AEC through highereducation. Only in 1965 had it made itsfirst significant gesture by authorizing a

training program at ISU for health physi-cists. This situation in no way lent Idahoany status in academic circles concernedwith high-energy physics. Smylie regret-ted Idaho’s neglect.1 5

Amonth after that disappointment,Smylie dissolved his old NuclearRadiation Hazards Safety Committee andcreated a Committee on Nuclear Scienceand Industry to take its place. The state’sinterest in the NRTS shifted firmly fromthe Health Department to the Departmentof Commerce and Development. T h eeleven volunteer members were to advisehim, Commerce and Development per-sonnel, and the legislature on all matters“pertaining to nuclear energy and the uti-lization of same in the State of Idaho.”Among other forces, Idaho was compet-ing with Hanford’s home state ofWashington, which called itself “the

Nuclear Progress State,” had funded apromotional office, and was distributingfull-color brochures toutingWa s h i n g t o n ’s “Total NuclearE n v i r o n m e n t . ”1 6

Smylie appointedbusiness promotersand members ofBill Ginkel’s staffto the committee.Evidence of thestate’s new enthu-siasm for nuclearindustry appearedimmediately. A1966 analysis ofthe state’s industri-al opportunitiesidentified atomicenergy as one ofthe state’s promis-ing growth indus-tries, NTRS’s “600engineers” a valu-able asset. The

committee recommended that the Idaholegislature create an office similar toWashington State’s, run by a state com-mission. The cause would be helped,too, if Idaho could express its positiveinterest in atomic energy by regulatingradioactive materials in the state, anactivity then managed by the AEC.17

Among its first acts, the Governor’scommittee decided that Idaho shouldfight to have the FFTF built in Idaho.Feelings ran high because many viewedthe cancellation of FARET as a politicalact, not solely a technical one. TheNRTS was the obvious place to build it.Breeder technology had been born,proven, matured, and safety-tested atthe NRTS. Where else was there a bet-


1 8 8

Teamwork inside the NRTS duplicated the outside

teamwork among NRTS supporters. Here, technicians

work over the core of EBR-I.


ter team or better facilities? To dupli-cate these elsewhere would waste theAEC’s investment at Idaho.18

The strategy was to combat“Washington State/AEC power withIdaho/Illinois power.” Robb Brady, thechairman, reviewed with the congres-sional delegation the poor state of thecurrent NRTS win/loss record. As of1966, cancellations had included thearmy program, the merchant shipproject, a lithium-cooled reactor, theorganic-cooled program, andFARET. It was time for a win. Asfor the rules of the campaign, parti-san politics were out. The gist ofBrady’s analysis, paralleled byGinkel’s, was that the NRTS neededa “new platform” if the NRTS wasto enjoy long-term stability free ofwide swings in employment levels.It seemed that the most promisingnew missions were the FFTF andnuclear applications for the spaceprogram.19

In January 1967, the AEC, follow-ing Shaw’s recommendation, sitedthe FFTF at Hanford. The justifica-tion—that there was a strong over-lap from design to construction—rang hollow in Idaho. Reactordesigns from all over the countryhad been built successfully in Idaho foryears. Idaho’s new governor, DonSamuelson, sent a “strenuous protest”to Seaborg. Editorial opinion in IdahoFalls was harsh. Congressman JamesMcClure demanded explanations. Butthe Idaho/Illinois axis could not undothe decision.20

The Idaho Legislature, then in session,took the loss into account as it consid-

ered the idea of a state promotionaloffice. Samuelson threw his whole-hearted support behind the idea. Thelegislature created the Idaho NuclearEnergy Commission (INEC) and fund-ed a director and small office for it.Idaho had in the past created commis-sions to promote potatoes, beans,wheat, and peas. The hallowed traditionnow embraced nuclear energy.

INEC was to advance the nuclear possi-bilities in the state by stimulating theinterest of industry, agriculture, andeducation. Commercial developments,aside from diversifying Idaho’s econo-my, would augment and support theNRTS base. INEC would advise thegovernor, report progress, and adminis-ter grants.22

Ginkel welcomed the INEC andencouraged the board to direct theirenergies “around and beyond theNRTS,” not solely at the NRTS itself.He had observed traditional Idahoindustries fail to exploit good nuclearopportunities. No one in the Idaho tim-ber industry, for example, had answeredan AEC invitation to develop an irradi-ated, plastic-impregnated wood prod-

uct. Idaho also had not bid on achance to test whether irradiatingmeat could preserve it withoutrefrigeration. After all, Ginkelsaid, the Army had first irradiat-ed beef in the MTR canals.23

Samuelson appointed the fivecommissioners, two from IdahoFalls, two from Pocatello, onefrom Boise. The chairman,Steele Barnett, was an executivewith the Boise CascadeCorporation, headquartered inBoise. The legislation dictatedthat INEC be bi-partisan, withno more than three membersfrom one party. The administra-tor of the state’s radiation con-trol office was an ex officiom e m b e r, preserving a connec-tion to the regulatory and healthinterests of the state.2 4

The enabling legislation gave INEC ano fficial start date of July 1, 1967, but thecommissioners met early and laid plans.They felt that hiring a “top-notch” exec-utive secretary was crucial, and theyfound him at the Naval ReactorsF a c i l i t y. Gene Rutledge, a We s t i n g h o u s echemist then working at a non-chemistpost, took the job. He had come yearsearlier from South Carolina to work onthe N a u t i l u s prototype. “I’d just like to


1 8 9

be a salesman,” he said as he began withINEC. He had his chance and hegrabbed it with both hands.2 5

Hired on August 1, he was ready with a21-point program six days later. Thefirst thing was to survey Idaho andidentify the ways that atomic energyand radiation could enhance existingindustries: agriculture, timber andforestry, mining. Idaho should ally withother western states in promotingnuclear industries in the PacificNorthwest. Beyond that there was awhole frontier of industrial possibility:irradiation might give cotton fabricqualities of permanent press, irradiationcould improve vulcanized rubber.Public education was important. Aboveall, the NRTS must be preserved and

given new missions. Idaho must neverallow the AEC to abandon it.26

Rutledge hit the deck running and neverstopped. He had the governor proclaimthe 25th anniversary of the first Chicagopile. Exhibits entitled “This A t o m i cWorld” began appearing at state fairsacross the state, often promoted by thecurrent Miss Idaho. As o p h i s t i c a t e dexhibit called the Nuclear Energ yMuseum appeared for a week at theIdaho Falls High School in August 1969.Rutledge arranged a symposium in thetown of Salmon, Idaho, to discuss thefuture of the thorium market, thoriumbeing a potential breeder-related fuelfound in Idaho. Anuclear exhibitappeared in the Idaho Statehouse, takingits place next to the familiar exhibits cel-ebrating Idaho mining and farming.Boise Cascade conducted seminars onthe potential of irradiation in the timberi n d u s t r y. INEC sponsored a televisionshow each week entitled “Idaho and the

Atom” to showcase ideas and guestspeakers. Rutledge even arranged foreminent scientist Dr. Willard F. Libby toaccept a title as “science advisor” toGovernor Samuelson, further embroider-ing Idaho’s image as a science-friendlys t a t e .2 7

Rutledge specialized in the sponsorshipof multiple high-profile activities. Hediscovered that the AEC had a portablecesium food irradiator on tour in thePacific Northwest. Soon, news releasespoured out of the Governor’s office, theTwin Falls County Republican CentralCommittee, and INEC. Robert Erkins,the owner and manager of the SnakeRiver Trout Farm near Buhl, Idaho, waspersuaded to host the irradiator at histrout farm for one week in April 1968.The public was warmly invited. TheTwin Falls newspaper, the Times-News,gave front page coverage to the storyfor two days and also published photos.Governor Samuelson, Lt. Gov. JackMurphy, and Secretary of State PeteCenarussa all left Boise to have a lookat the irradiator—and be photographedwhile doing so. 28

The legislature continued to supportINEC’s recommendations. Idahobecame an “agreement state,” takingover from the AEC the task of issuinglicenses for the use of medical andindustrial radioactive materials. Thework cost the state money and gave itno advantage other than giving the restof the world the impression that Idahowelcomed nuclear industry. The day ofthe signing ceremony, August 14, 1968,was well publicized, and two AECcommissioners flew in for the event.29


1 9 0

Gene Rutledge, second from left, poses with

Governor Don Samuelson, third from left, and the

members of the INEC Commission

1967 INEC Annual Report

Rutledge, INEC, and its allies quicklyforged an elaborate network of institu-tional connections. The legislature washelpful by appropriating funds to theBoard of Education so INEC couldmake nuclear research grants. It enteredinto a Western Interstate NuclearCompact. The Compact was a regionalversion of INEC, promoting nucleartechnology in the West and facilitatingmutual interests in power plant siting,mutual aid in case of a nuclear trans-port accident, and waste disposal.Rutledge was Idaho’s representative.Several western universities formed anassociation to encourage the assignmentof their students and faculty to theAEC’s western labs. The WesternGovernors Association created nuclearissue committees, and Samuelsonjoined them. In Idaho Falls, theChamber of Commerce maintained anactive atomic energy committee andkept in touch with the Eastern IdahoNuclear Industrial Council (EINIC), agroup that formed in 1969 to fosternuclear spin-off industries. NRTS sci-entists had formed a chapter of theAmerican Nuclear Society, and theirexpertise was always available. 30

The nuclear boost machine was fullycharged. It had a proactive governor, asupportive congressional delegation, afriendly legislature, a state commission,energetic staff, regional ties within thestate and in the West, educationalresources, and a nuclear-friendly popu-lace. One of the most important goalsof the entire apparatus was to supportand protect the interests of the NRTS.

In 1968 the AEC announced that itwould decommission the MTR in early1970. By that time, the ATR would befully functioning, and between the ATRand the ETR, the MTR would have nofurther mission. All of the MTR’s neu-tron beam research would end.Alarmed, INEC formed a study com-mittee to consider this and adviseSamuelson. The problem was serious,but it handed INEC a tremendousopportunity. All of INEC’s promotionspaled in comparison to what soonbecame its single biggest goal: to savethe MTR.31


1 9 1

Idaho State Historical Society MS 326

Nuclear energy exhibit at Idaho Falls High

School in 1969.

C H A P T E R T W E N T Y

1 9 2

A QU E S T I O N O F MI SS I O NIdaho has established beyond question its attitude and posture

toward the atomic energy industry.

—Idaho Department of Commerce—

The White Housestaff had wired up the sound system. Atechnician from one of the nationalradio stations tampered with it and acci-dentally cut the signal from the micro-phone to the loudspeakers. ThePresident of the United States, LyndonB. Johnson, had just begun to address ahuge audience, and no one could hearhim. Bill Ginkel, sitting on the platformwith other dignitaries and acting as themaster of ceremonies, saw the strickenfaces of his staff as they looked to himto do something. He fervently wishedhe could, as the president’s displeasurewas quite apparent.1

The platform was adjacent to theTechnical Services Building at Central,facing Lincoln Boulevard and a crowdof more than 12,000 people. It wasAugust 26, 1966. Less than twentyyears after the invention of the NRTS,one of its giant achievements was onthis day being designated as aRegistered National Historic Landmark.EBR-I had been decommissioned onlytwo years previously, and now it was inthe national pantheon along with ValleyForge, Hoover Dam, and the site inChicago where the world’s first self-

sustained nuclear reaction had takenplace. The matter of the speaker wire,the only flaw in the highly orchestratedevent, was soon corrected.2

N RTS supporters had grasped the visitas a superior opportunity to show off theN RTS. The arrangements committeeextended well beyond the IDO. T h eEastern Idaho Chamber of Commerceand the bank presidents from the sur-rounding towns lent their resources to

the elaborate occasion. Volunteers of theEastern Idaho Labor and Trades Councilbuilt the speaker’s stand. The membersof the American Nuclear Society and thetop administrative tier of the IDO haddiscreetly suggested that the presidentuse the occasion to make a major policyaddress on nuclear energ y. To their dis-appointment, Johnson was not inclined.He did, however, affirm his faith in thepotential of nuclear energy for thefuture: “What happened here merelyraised the curtain on a promising dramain our long journey to a better life.”3

Still, he was the first president to visitthe NRTS, and honoring the EBR-I wasa worthy reason. AEC Chairman GlennSeaborg dedicated the plaque at EBR-I,and on dignitary platform were LadyBird Johnson, four AEC commission-ers, Admiral Rickover, GovernorSmylie, and congressional representa-tives as well. 4

Behind the public facade, other agendaswere at work. Ginkel had a chance todiscuss the AEC budget with the presi-dent, and the IDO had a chance to givethe AEC commissioners a very goodimpression of the NRTS. Milton Shaw’ss t a ff held a round of business meetingsand could see how far the NRTS had pro-

President Lyndon Johnson and Dr. Glenn Seaborg

attend the designation of EBR-I as a National Historic

Landmark.

Argonne National Laboratory-East 1534

President Johnson affixes landmark plaque inside EBR-I.Argonne National Laboratory-West 1519

gressed on Shaw’s quality initiative—perhaps more than other AEC labs. Later,the AEC awarded Ginkel a DistinguishedService Award, and Ginkel credited therecognition partly to the exposurebrought by the president’s visit. In thecircle of towns surrounding the NRT S ,the event affirmed the value of the NRT Smission to the nation and placed it undera warm and welcome spotlight.5

The potential demise of the MTR was anentirely different propositionthan the end of EBR-I. A l lagreed that the EBR-I had ful-filled its useful life, but therewas no such consensus regard-ing the MTR. Some of theHPs thought the machine was“decrepit,” too aged and bat-tered to protect its operatorsfrom radiation hazards.C e r t a i n l y, the large test loopsof the ETR and ATR attestedto its obsolescence in theNuclear Navy program. Butthe MTR had beam holes. T h eETR and ATR did not. Noother reactor west of theMississippi River had this fea-ture, and if the MTR shutdown, it would foreclose awhole class of research potential inIdaho, and indeed anywhere else in thewestern United States. At least, that washow NRTS supporters saw it.

So the MTR had to be saved. INEC’sfirst salvo was a round of appeals to theAEC to change its mind. Samuelson,ten other western governors, the con-gressional delegation, and INEC allfailed to get the AEC to reconsider.Samuelson offered state funds to helpretain the MTR.6

Wilfrid E. Johnson, one of the AECcommissioners, came to Idaho Fallsand explained the AEC position to theRotary Club:

We are having extreme difficulty thesedays in obtaining funding for many ofour programs and I can give no assur -ance or even encouragement at thispoint in time that we will be able tokeep the MTR operating.7

The next phase of the campaign sawRutledge collecting testimonials andideas from MTR scientists and theregion’s universities about how theMTR might be reborn. A vision tookshape, and in no time, INEC encapsu-lated it in a brochure: “MTR, Today anIrradiation Facility, Tomorrow...WesternBeam Research Reactor, The Hub forNeutron Research in the Western

United States.” The beam hole featureof the MTR had been underexploited,said the brochure, compared to the in-pile materials testing function of thereactor. Universities and industries ofthe West might now use the reactor forbasic, applied, and developmentalresearch. The tradition of the MTR atthe frontier of knowledge could contin-ue to benefit western states.8

The entire Idaho nuclear networkembraced the We s t e r nBeam Research Reactor(WBRR). The governorwent on television express-ing the state’s support.Editorials and news articlesexplained the idea to thepublic. NRTS scientistswarned that without theMTR, its team of fiftyskilled scientists wouldbreak up and perhaps belost to Idaho. INEC satu-rated the service club cir-cuit with the MTRmessage. More letters wentfrom the congressional del-egation to the AEC admin-i s t r a t o r, the commissioners,and the White House. In its

1969 session, the Idaho legislatureraised its level of appropriations forn u c l e a r-oriented research to $200,000,hoping it would help retain the MTR.The lieutenant governor led a delega-tion to Washington, D.C., for an audi-ence with the JCAE. Remarkscelebrating the MTR and its potentialas the WBRR went into theC o n g ressional Record .9


1 9 4

The view toward the core of the MTR through a

beam hole.

INEEL 4383

Behind the scenes, GovernorSamuelson asked Bill Ginkel to lay onthe mantle, as it were, of the MTR’sproposed new persona. Change itsname from MTR to WBRR, he urged.Make it more open to university usersand eliminate security clearances.Establish a users group to evaluateresearch proposals. Create an office tohelp coordinate university activities.Provide temporary housing forresearchers at the NRTS.10

If Ginkel was inclined to followSamuelson’s recommendations, hefound no soft spot at AECHeadquarters, which mustered not theslightest enthusiasm. The highly secre-tive business of the Nuclear Navyoccupied the ETR and the ATR, and theMTR could not easily be isolated fromthe rest of the complex. The no-non-sense, PERT-charting engineers inWashington were trying to streamline,redirect all available resources to thebreeder program, and compete forfunds. INEC was asking the AEC tosubsidize the MTR for a very unrelatedmission at a cost approaching $5 mil-lion a year.

Obviously, INEC needed big money butcouldn’t seem to raise it. TheCommission succeeded in persuadingthe AEC to postpone the MTR decom-mission date to June 1970. But thecampaign wore on through 1970 andinto 1971, with more of the sameresults. Rutledge kept the issue at thehighest possible profile with an endlessstream of letters and appeals. He lookedeverywhere for investors, nurturedleads, and came up empty every time.Representatives of GE inspected the

MTR, but later concluded that the com-bined capacity of other reactors, publicand private, could meet market demandfor irradiation. Glenn Seaborg told UtahSenator Wallace Bennett that educationwas the only justification for preservingthe MTR, and other education prioritiesexisted elsewhere.11

The AEC, therefore, turned down a pro-posal from twenty-five western univer-sities asking the AEC to operate thereactor. The universities offered nofunds, although private industriespledged over $400,000 in business tomake industrial isotopes. The AECrejected commercial involvement with-out the concurrent sponsorship of apublic agency such as the NationalScience Foundation (NSF). SoRutledge followed that path, and theNSF promised to look into it.12

Before the NSF made its report, theMTR ran its last experiment. Aftermonths of preparation, the team loadedthe reactor with plutonium fuel. Theynamed the core “Phoenix” after the leg-endary bird that had lived five hundredyears, burned itself to ashes, and thenrose to live again. The reactor demon-strated that plutonium fuel could becontrolled safely in a water-moderatedreactor. The long-envisioned nuclearfuel cycle, beginning with the creationof fissile material in a breeder reactor,could be closed. Mission accom-plished, the AEC shut down the reactoron April 23, 1970.13

INEC doggedly trudged on. A few daysafter the shut-down, Idaho newspapershappened to carry a story from theIdaho Fish and Game Department.Among the 250,000 pheasants shotduring the 1969 hunting season, a fewhad more mercury in their blood thanwas safe for human consumption. Statebiologists suspected that the birds hadeaten grain contaminated with a fungi-cide containing mercury. How wide-spread was the problem? Would theDepartment have to cancel the pheasanthunt for 1970?

Rutledge saw a perfect chance todemonstrate why the MTR could not beallowed to fade away. The MTR couldirradiate pheasant samples. If mercurywas present, neutrons would transformit to a radioactive isotope, which couldquickly be identified and measured.Once more, he tripped all the wires inINEC’s network. A flurry of calls, let-ters, proposals, and conferences ensued.Dr. Libby got involved. The StateBoard of Education came up with funds

C H A P T E R 2 0 • A Q U E S T I O N O F M I SS I O N

1 9 5

Governor Don SamuelsonIdaho State Historical Society 66-132.1

“to the absolute limit of our fiscal capa-bilities.”14

The IDO cooperated. Aerojet, the MTRcontractor, brought the reactor criticalone more time for forty-eight hours inAugust 1970. Governor Samuelsonwent to observe. The scientists loadedthe old machine with a thousand sam-ples of pheasant, fish, grasses, mutton,beef, and pork from all around thestate. The publicity was good. Theresults were good. The Fish and GameDepartment decided the mercury prob-lem had been localized and temporary.The pheasant season opened on sched-ule that fall.15

At last, the AEC offered GovernorSamuelson a chance to rent the MTR for$1 a year. If Idaho didn’t want it, theAEC would establish a minimumacceptable bid and sell the MTR to thehighest commercial bidder. The termswere difficult. MTR use had to be

restricted to educational, research, andgovernment functions. Idaho had to paythe MTR contractor full costs (whichranged in the multi-millions) and theAEC would contribute nothing.1 6

Dr. Libby urged the governor to takethe deal, but Rutledge and the INECboard knew that without commercialbusiness, the state and the universitiescould not develop an income streamfast enough to make the MTR a goingconcern. Even maintaining it in a stand-by condition would quickly drain Idahoresources. The state was hardlywealthy; in 1970, its population basewas only about 713,000 people.17

The last, faint hope for the MTR dis-solved when the NSF said that reactorsat “eastern facilities” were sufficient forany likely demand. Nuclear research inenvironmental matters, crime abate-ment, cancer, and biology was notexpected to exceed their capabilities, so

the MTR was surplus even for non-government research.18

The fight was over. The MTR teambroke up. Dr. Robert Brugger eventual-ly left Idaho to run the nuclear physicsprogram at the University of Missouri,which possessed one of the swimmingpool reactors that had inspired theSPERT program. Others remained atthe NRTS, but they had to “redirect”themselves to other work.

The failure to keep the MTR alive wasnot a failure of heart or drive. Theeffort to save it was a creative foray toretain a research mission that had madethe NRTS worthy of the name “nationallaboratory,” even if the Site did notpossess the name. Money didn’t materi-alize, partly because demand was nolonger growing as it had earlier; exist-ing capacity elsewhere was sufficient.The message from GE had made thisclear. National nuclear reactor researchwas beginning to decline, and the lossof the MTR was an early sign of it.Possibly, there was the political realitythat the national power base for basicresearch was vested at the universitiesof Chicago, California, Princeton, andothers. Funds for a new western uni-versity research center would havereduced these universities’ slices of thebudgetary pie. The NRTS, lacking astrong champion within the AEC, waspoorly equipped to compete with thepolitical delegations of Illinois and


1 9 6

After the MTR was decommissioned, its floor space

was available for other uses. This 1982 view shows

a mockup of the CPP New Waste Calcining Facility.INEEL 82-1776

California. The NRTS was not aweapons production center, nor was itassociated with a major science univer-sity. One participant at the time, C.Wayne Bills, reflected later that theNRTS had an image as merely a serviceoutfit for the Navy or Argonne. Itsunique pool of brilliant scientists andengineers was easily fended off. “Ilearned how much energy could bewasted by not knowing the problem,”he said of the great “charge” to save theMTR.19

New reactor projects had become veryscarce at the NRTS. By 1972, most ofthe reactors that were going to be builtat the NRTS had been built or wereunder construction (a reactor calledNRAD went critical at Argonne-West inOctober 1977, but it was a commercialTriga reactor, not a new reactor type).After PBF and LOFT (and the Triga),the only reactors that would attain firstcriticality after 1970, there were nomore. The NRTS mission to test reac-tors had been accomplished. In all, theNRTS had been home to fifty two reac-tors. All but two of them went critical.(See Appendix B.) The NRTS fledg-lings—the Nuclear Navy and thenuclear power industry—had becomegiants making their own way in theworld. Both of the major commercialreactor concepts, pressurized water andboiling water, had been proven inIdaho. After 1970, the thrust of NRTSnuclear research increasingly was con-servative: to enhance proven concepts.The ETR and the ATR were at the ser-vice of the Navy; and the safety testingprogram at LOFT and PBF supportedthe Nuclear Regulatory Commissionand the nuclear power industry.20

During the height of the MTR cam-paign, another plutonium fire rippedthrough Rocky Flats. The fire occurredon May 11, 1969, and resulted in moredamage than from any previous RockyFlats fire. In June, the New York Timesran a story on the fire and mentionedthat the debris—ton after ton of con-crete blocks, metal shielding material,rubber, piping, coveralls—would go tothe NRTS to be buried. A customer ofRobert Erkins’trout farm clipped thestory and sent it to Erkins, wondering ifthe plutonium might somehow contami-nate the fish. Erkins was alarmed. Thepure spring water supplying his busi-ness came from the aquifer systemunderlying the NRTS. He visualizedplutonium seeping from the burialtrenches into the soil, finding a paththrough six hundred feet of the fissuredrock below, and leaching into the flow-


1 9 7

INEEL2522

Above. Part of the sea of barrels from Rocky Flats.

Below. An illustration depicts the subsurface

beneath the NTRS Burial Ground.

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

ing waters of the aquifer. If plutoniumcontaminated the aquifer, or if the restof the world thought that it had, hisbusiness could be finished. 21

He sent off a letter to GovernorSamuelson. He questioned Bill Ginkel,who wrote a response intended to r e a s s u r e :

We have zealously guarded the waterresources at the NRTS by an extensiveenvironmental research and monitoringprogram which has extended over twodecades. We have never found any evi -dence of movement of the plutonium orother wastes through the soil at anylocation in the burial ground. Becauseof the desert conditions, the soil doesnot contain sufficient moisture to pro -vide transport for this material.Moreover, the plutonium is in an essen -tially insoluble form... Tracer studieshave demonstrated that the water underthe south-central part of the Site ismoving at the rate of 10 to 20 feet perday. At this rate, the water currentlyunder the southern boundary of the Sitecan be expected to reach the ThousandSprings area on the Snake River afterthe year 2070.22

Ginkel also said that if signs of migra-tion ever were found, the waste was notbeyond recovery or countermeasures.He reminded Erkins that plutonium wasabout thirty times more valuable thangold, and that all reasonable effortswere made to recover it before thewaste went to Idaho. In newspapers,Ginkel was quoted as saying, “We havesubstantial technical experience.There’s no real or potential basis foralarm—ever.” Erkins was not reas-sured. He sent letters to newspaper edi-

tors all over the state, who obliginglypublished or quoted from them. TheSouth Idaho Press said Idahoans“should be alarmed generally,” andquoted Robert Lee, the director of theIdaho Water Resources Board, whosaid, “If the aquifer became radioactive,we would be wiped out.” The editorcalled for the creation of a “nationaldump” at some barren place where thewaste could never cause harm to any-one and quoted Erkins:

Basic common sense would tell anyonethat you do not store your garbage overyour water supply regardless of thetype of garbage. How then can we con -tinue to permit disposal of radioactivematerial over the source of one of theworld’s great spring water systems?23

Erkins kindled doubts elsewhere in theagricultural community of south Idaho,most of which relied on the aquifer orthe Snake River into which it flowed.Samuelson attempted to get the facts,but found that federal agencies seemedto have differing assessments of NRTSwaste burial practices. In addition, hisown state employees were issuing con-tradictory statements, fueling morepress coverage.24

“This confusion is not leading us any-where,” decided Samuelson. He put astop to ad hoc staff comments to thepress and created a State Task Force to“thoroughly examine, through a coordi-nated approach, any possible atomicpollution to the aquifer and then recom-mend a course of action.” The commit-tee consisted of the director of thehealth department, the state reclamationengineer, the director of the WaterResources Board, Gene Rutledge, and a

representative from the IdahoReclamation Association. Bill Ginkeland John Horan immediately invitedthe task force to have a look around.25

The public outcry reached Idaho sena-tor Frank Church. He decided to coor-dinate resources on a federal level. Heasked the USGS, the U.S. Public HealthService, the Federal Water PollutionControl Administration (FWPCA), andthe Bureau of Sport Fisheries andWildlife to conduct a joint study inde-pendently of the AEC to assess thelong-term implications of NRTS burialpractices. His news release said thatChurch had acted after NRTS officialshad “acknowledged publicly” thatradioactive wastes from both the NRTSand Rocky Flats were being buriedabove the aquifer. The practice hadbeen known to the state for years, butthis fact did not become part of thepublic discussion on the issue.26


1 9 8

Senator Frank ChurchBoise State University Library POR-105 D

Church discovered that the AEC had in1966 requested a National Academy ofSciences (NAS) committee to surveyradioactive waste research and develop-ment at the AEC’s four major plantsstoring such waste. The resulting reportpointed out that each facility had differ-ent standards and used different defini-tions for low-, intermediate-, andhigh-level wastes. The AEC’s 1948decision to let each lab handle waste itsown way had become a chicken comehome to roost. The NAS authors feltthat each site was in a poor geological

location. They suggested that the AECstart over and put its waste-generatingplants in areas selected for geologicalsuitability. Although the NAS commit-tee had visited neither Hanford norNRTS before making its report, it chal-lenged the NRTS judgment that haz-ardous amounts of radioactivity wouldnot reach the aquifer. Later, the com-mittee examined both sites andinformed the AEC that neither was cre-ating a hazard. The AEC had not pub-lished the report.27

Senator Church demanded that the A E Crelease what he called the “suppressed”report. When he obtained a copy, hepublished it in the C o n g re s s i o n a lR e c o rd. Glenn Seaborg, AEC chairman,said the report had gone “beyond its pur-pose” and delved unbidden into opera-tional issues. This explanation, whichcould have been interpreted as a politeway of saying its authors were ill-informed, seemed suspect to the public.After all, it appeared to them that theN RTS had “secretly” been burying plu-tonium-laced waste. Part of the Idahopublic began to think that the AEC andthe IDO were not to be trusted. T h e s edoubts planted the seeds of a new citizencoalition, and it would evolve as aprotest network, not a support group.2 8

At their October meeting, GovernorSamuelson’s task force staff faced apredicament. The staff had no means—no funds or qualified analysts—to makean independent assessment of NRTSwaste management practices. The onlyavailable information was in the handsof the people who said there was noproblem—the AEC and the USGS. Ifthere were a hazard, the staff presumedthe AEC would not release any infor-mation to substantiate it. Nevertheless,they accepted Ginkel’s invitation tovisit the Site. They would collect whatinformation they could and letSamuelson know if the problem wasserious or not. Gene Rutledge requestedthat the IDO articulate and make publiclong-term plans for wastemanagement.29


1 9 9

Damaged waste barrels retrieved in the 1970s were

sometimes placed in “overpack” bar rels.INEEL 75-3513

The issue continued to bubble. TheState Board of Health, whose memberswent on the NRTS tour with the TaskForce as they looked over the BurialGround, the SL-1 burial plot, and theinjection wells, decided they saw nocurrent dangers, but asked the AEC tostop burying waste in the desert. Dr.Theos J. Thompson, an AEC commis-sioner visiting Idaho in November todedicate Argonne’s new Zero PowerPhysics Reactor, asserted that contami-nation from buried solid wastes wouldnever reach the aquifer. To questionsabout the practice of injecting low-levelradioactive liquids into the aquifer, hesaid “regardless of how it sounds,”these planned releases would notendanger people. He described the tinyamount of radioactivity in the releasesin relation to the tremendous dilutingpower of the aquifer. He had no objec-tion to Idaho monitoring the NRTS, butobserved that it would duplicate per-sonnel and equipment already on thejob.30

On the first day of 1970, PresidentRichard Nixon signed the NationalEnvironmental Policy Act (NEPA).NEPA was a triumph of the growingenvironmental movement. It had beeninspired partly by frightening examplesof air and water pollution so seriousthat they threatened public health.Therefore, the national press was inter-ested in discovering further examples.Later in January, ABC Network Newssent a reporter to Idaho Falls to preparea story on the aquifer for a weekly pro-gram called “First Tuesday.”31

Radioactivity was in other news. AnAEC scientist named Arthur Tamplinfrom the Lawrence RadiationLaboratory in California went publicwith his view that the AEC’s radiationexposure standards should be tightenedby a factor of ten. He represented oneof two general views about the hazardof radiation. One opinion was thatexposure to radiation was a natural phe-nomenon, and that a very low annualdose was a normal risk of living.Tamplin held the opposing view, thatany amount of radiation, no matter howsmall, is deleterious to human life.32

These concerns about the hazards ofradioactivity helped focus a lively pub-lic interest on the NRTS. SenatorChurch’s four federal agencies weighedin with their combined report. “We findno problems that have occurred andthat none are likely,” they said.

Nevertheless, they recommended waysto improve NRTS practices, such asincreasing the soil barrier above andbelow the pits and trenches in theBurial Ground, better control of snowmelt, and more study of the basalt andalluvial layers beneath the BurialGround. In addition to monitoring soiland water to confirm the absence ofcontamination, monitoring also shouldpositively affirm that radioactivity hadnot migrated beyond the burial area. Itsuggested that waste with plutoniumand americium (long-lived transuranicelements) should be stored so that itcould be removed if necessary.33


2 0 0

INEEL 77-2632

Environmental monitoring technician collects soil

samples from beneath a storage trench. He holds

radiation detector in his right hand.

Governor Samuelson’s Task Forcewrapped up its own work a few monthslater. It, too, found “no evidence of anypresent hazard.” Nor was any hazardlikely in the future. The AEC had writ-ten the Task Force to say that the AECwould start removing the TRU waste inthe Burial Ground before the end of thedecade, reiterating a statement thatGlenn Seaborg had made earlier toSenator Frank Church. With that kindof schedule, the problem obviouslywould disappear. The Task Force alsothought it was time the Idaho gover-nor’s office establish a formal liaisonwith the NRTS and hire qualifiedexperts to maintain a continuing checkon NRTS waste management.34

AEC Headquarters also had beenreceiving public complaints from sever-al other parts of the country regardingthe waste management practices atsome of its other facilities. It created anew division called the Office of Waste

Management and Transportation andannounced that it had chosen a saltmine in Lyons, Kansas, for an evalua-tion as an underground repository forRocky Flats and other radioactivewaste. The AEC expected to start ship-ping wastes to Kansas around 1975.Undoubtedly, this expectation underlayAEC intentions to begin removingburied waste from Idaho. Further, AECHeadquarters began the long-deferredtask of developing a set of policies,standards, and criteria that would applyuniformly to waste management prac-tices at all of its laboratories.35

In response to the new attention beingfocused on waste, Ginkel’s staff beganconsidering the implications for its ownwaste management practices. “We wantsome new thinking on the BurialGround,” was the message to GeorgeWehmann, director of IDO’S Office ofWaste Management. Furthermore, theAEC in March of 1970 directed that

TRU waste be segregated from otherkinds of nuclear waste and also bestored so that it could be retrieved at alater date.3 6

Wehmann looked at various problems.Part of the Burial Ground area had lavarock fairly close to the surface, makingit unsuitable for pit and trench burial.He concluded that if this area were cov-ered with asphalt paving, it could beused for above-ground storage, and thisplan eventually went into effect as away of making economical use ofBurial Ground space.37

On the recommendation of John Horan,the IDO had told Rocky Flats in the fallof 1969 that it could no longer expectto deliver waste for burial during thewinter and spring months (due to floodhazards and the reassessment of prac-tices then underway). After the AEC’sMarch 1970 directive, there would beno more subsurface Rocky Flats burialsat all. The Rocky Flats barrels andboxes went to asphalt pads built adja-cent to the old Burial Ground, wherethe barrels were stacked on their sidesto prevent water from pooling on thetops.38

One day, someone noticed water leak-ing from a few of the barrels. Wehmannrecalled:

This was happening despite the asser -tions of Rocky Flats that they weresending only solids in these barrels. Iwent to Rocky Flats and we had a don -


2 0 1

A 1970 view of the Burial Ground shows the

Transuranic Storage Area in the foreground, a new

destination for Rocky Flats transuranic waste.INEEL 70-5212

nybrook. They said there couldn’t bewater in the barrels. I watched them fillthe barrels with waste encased andsealed in plastic bags and then seal thebarrels. Then we looked at the drums[barrels] in the storage yard. We foundclear liquid on top of the drums. Well,they weren’t tending to details. The bar -rels were standing up in the rain. Theywere using sponge gaskets to seal thebarrel lids, and these weren’t alwayssealed perfectly. In those cases, theseals acted like a syphon, sucking waterinto the barrel.39

So Rocky Flats changed its ways, dis-continued outdoor storage, and repack-aged nearly 2,000 barrels. It soonimproved the plastic liner inside thebarrel, improved the sealant, and substi-tuted a better seal on the barrel itself.

The IDO also had to consider theAEC’s decision to retrieve Rocky Flatswaste barrels that had been buriedbetween 1954 and 1970. Exhumingwhat had not been intended for retrievalpresented a number of questions.Retrieving stacked-up barrels probablywould be easy. But the practice ofdumping Rocky Flats barrels fromtruck beds into the pits, while it hadkept costs down and reduced radiationexposure to workers, also dented anddamaged the barrels. The soil most inti-mate with these barrels may haveadsorbed flecks of radioactivity.Exposing soil to the drying winds ofthe desert could produce dust. If it con-tained plutonium, the dust was a poten-

tial health hazard. Then there was theold problem of not being sure whatRocky Flats had actually sent to theBurial Ground. Its industrial garbageand fire debris may have included labo-ratory solvents like carbon tetrachlorideand trichloroethylene or other low-levelradioactive items. These needed duerespect if they were to be disturbed.Mixed wastes were a complication;workers had to be defended from twokinds of hazards: radioactive materialsand hazardous chemicals. Techniquesfor handling one might be unsuited tohandling the other.

Retrieval thus required practicalresearch. Could older barrels be safelyretrieved and, if so, at what cost? Asusual, the only way to find out was tobegin the job, first by removing andexamining a few barrels of several dif-ferent vintages, and then by proceedingwith a practical plan. By 1978, over20,000 barrels had been removed frombelow the ground and stacked onasphalt pads. Not unexpectedly, the bar-rels that had been damaged during thedays of random dumping were not aseasily dealt with as the others. To pro-tect workers from wind and weatherduring retrieval operations, the workarea was sheltered within a temporaryair-supported “building” that lookedfrom the outside like a very large pil-low. Made of fabric, it was anchored tothe ground and kept inflated by a con-stant flow of air pumped into the build-


2 0 2

INEEL77-1262

Above. Air-supported building inflates after being

moved to new work location. Left. Barrel retrieval

takes place in pits 11 and 12 inside air-supported

building in 1977.

INEEL74-2808

ing. When a new work area opened, thebuilding was moved to the new spot.Most of the 20,000 barrels had beenburied relatively recently or in the veryearly days of by-hand stacking.40

The IDO prepared itself for the daywhen the AEC designated some otherlocation outside of Idaho as the finalresting place for the Rocky Flats barrelsand crates. New standards for the barrelsindicated they should have a life oftwenty years. Monitoring of the environ-ment increased around the area;enhanced soil compaction methods wentinto use; and new techniques made moree fficient use of limited space.4 0

O b v i o u s l y, the name Burial Ground nolonger was appropriate, even though thelow-level radioactive waste (non-transuranic) from the NRTS would con-tinue to be buried there. Wehmann had itchanged in 1970 to Radioactive Wa s t eManagement Complex. The NRTS had anew mission: waste retrieval.


2 0 3

Above. An aerial view of the RWMC in 1976, facing

west. Three air support buildings indicate locations

of work areas. Below. The “Three Cell Personnel

Entry” was used to control contamination levels on

workers’ clothing as they exited work areas during

the Early Waste Retrieval Project of 1976.

INEEL 76-1380

INEEL 76-2954

C H A P T E R T W E N T Y - O N E

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BY TH E EN D O F T H I S DE C A D E[There is] the likelihood of the AEC almost surreptitiously permitting Idaho’s NRTS burial

ground to evolve into one of the nation’s large de facto burial grounds...

—Cecil Andrus—

Cecil D. Andrus,elected governor of Idaho in 1970, hada nuclear vision for the development ofsoutheast Idaho. The growing season ofthis high-elevation part of the statemight be extended by irradiating seedsto cause their early germination. Then anuclear reactor somewhere in the regioncould lend its heat to irrigation waterfor the seeds, further extending thegrowing season. The agricultural baseof the region could diversify, no longerlimited to potatoes and a short list ofother crops. The reactor’s abundantelectricity would short-circuit any fur-ther debate about damming Idaho riversfor more hydroelectric power, an issuegrowing ever more controversial. Thereactor also would complement theresearch and development activity at theNRTS, further diversifying the econo-my.1

There was more. Nuclear reactors mightpower an electrolytic process makinghydrogen fuel from water. Hydrogenwas non-toxic and upon combustionproduced only water as waste.Hydrogen-powered aircraft could carryIdaho agricultural abundance to Asia.

The whole scheme invited new indus-tries, expanded the economic base, andresolved potential energy shortages.2

The vision required research. Did irra-diation really cause seeds to germinateearly? Would there be any undesirable

side effects to using reactor coolingwater for irrigation? Where mightnuclear power plants best be located?

How long would it take to develop eco-nomic hydrogen fuel? Andrus posedthese questions to professors at theUniversity of Idaho (U of I). Soon studyproposals were under way, with titlessuch as “A Conceptual Study of aNuclear Energy Park for the State ofIdaho,” and “Agrocargo HydrogenStudy.” Perhaps the NRTS couldbecome the center for research applyingatomic age energy to agriculture notonly in the United States but the rest ofthe world as well. 3

The governor’s enthusiasm for a nuclear-based future in southeast Idaho encour-aged the INEC board and helped it focusits research grants. A n d r u s ’s staffresearched additional questions, such aswhether the Environmental ProtectionAgency (EPA) had established minimumstandards on plutonium in the soil.4

Bill Ginkel cooperated. By July 1,1973, U of I professors were ready tostart an experiment just outside theperimeter fence of the Chem Plant.They would use thermally warm waterfrom the plant’s operations to irrigatecertain forest trees and ornamentalplants to test how far the growing sea-son could be extended.5

Governor Cecil D. Andrus

Boise State University Library 3502A10

Researchers from University of Idaho examine young trees grown using

thermally warm Chem Plant water.INEEL 74-3023

He and Andrus also arranged the closerrelationship that Samuelson’s TaskForce had recommended between theirtwo offices. From then on, the twooffices defended each other from sur-prises, sent advance copies of pressreleases, and cultivated mutual under-standing. The agenda of Idaho Fallsbusiness leaders to preserve the publicimage of the NRTS was now also thegovernor’s agenda.

Andrus had a plan to bulwark shakypublic confidence in the NRTS. Heasked Dixy Lee Ray, the Chair of theAEC after September 1972, to financean independent surveillance system sothat the State of Idaho could monitorthe NRTS for any radioactive contami-nation emanating from the Site. TheState could cross-match its data withthe AEC’s regular environmental moni-toring reports. She thought it was agood idea, but felt that Congress wasunlikely to appropriate the funds.6

Then Andrus’s early nuclear visionbegan to fade. Events in 1973 and 1974beyond Idaho helped deflect his energyfrom nuclear economics to nuclear poli-tics. First, Andrus—and the rest of theworld—learned that a Hanford wastestorage tank containing highly radioac-tive waste was leaking. This wasn’t thefirst tank to leak—Hanford tanks hadbeen leaking since 1958—but this leakhad gone unnoticed for several weeks.What kind of stewardship was that?Could it happen at the NRTS? TheIdaho public wasn’t sure.

Next, Idaho’s radiation control officer,Michael Christie, found an article in theWashington Post reporting that the AECwas considering the NRTS, along with

Hanford and Nevada, as a “dump for A-wastes.” He had sat on Samuelson’sTask Force, and this news hinted thatthe AEC might reverse previous assur-ances that, because of its location overthe Snake River Plain Aquifer, Idahowould not become a waste repository.Christie told Andrus, “It is imperativethat this type of consideration by theAEC be stopped.” It was news thatAndrus felt should have come fromGinkel but hadn’t.7

Andrus, together with Senator FrankChurch, wrote Commissioner Dixy LeeRay that they had understood that Idahowas not to be used as a repository forwastes. They wanted her assurance “inwriting” that except for fuels to bereprocessed and calcined, the NRTSwould not receive wastes from anyplace that hadn’t previously sentwastes. She must state, they said, thatthe NRTS was not being considered asan interim or permanent storage site forlong-lived wastes in any form. Finally,she must tell them that the AEC wasusing “all efforts” to develop a nationalwaste repository so that long-livedradioactive wastes currently in Idahocould begin to leave the NRTS by “theend of this decade.” 8

Her reply was disappointing. She gaveno satisfaction on the first point. TheAEC had to make the best use of all itsfacilities. Any waste going to Idahowould be handled safely. Previous AECorders that the NRTS exhume andrepackage plutonium-contaminatedwastes would continue. Nor did shemake any promise on the second point.She left it open that Idaho might beconsidered for interim—but not long-term—storage of long-lived nuclear

waste. On the last item, however, shewas definite. The schedule for Idaho’splutonium-contaminated waste “recog-nizes our commitment to be ready tostart moving this waste from that siteby the end of this decade.”9

Bill Ginkel retired as manager of theNRTS in September 1973. R. GlennBradley took his place. Andrus’s firstofficial encounter with him was far dif-ferent than his first with Ginkel. Ginkelhad made the first move, facilitating theclearance needed for Andrus to accessall NRTS facilities. Now Andrus putBradley on notice that his office was tostay in “direct contact with my staff”concerning any unusual increases in thewaste entering Idaho for interim stor-age. He told Bradley that manyIdahoans feared the AEC would “makeIdaho the nation’s de facto repositoryfor atomic wastes of all varieties.” The


2 0 6

R. Glenn Bradley


two grew to understand each other’spolitical constituencies—Andrus hadthe Idaho electorate and Bradley hadAEC Headquarters—and worked outamiable protocols.10

Meanwhile, publications with a nation-al readership—Smithsonian, ReadersDigest, and US News and World

Report—were publishing articles withtitles such as “Rising Dangers ofAtomic Wastes” and “NuclearTerrorism: A Threat to the Future?”Some scientists imagined disaster sce-narios involving terrorists, the theft ofplutonium, and the making of bombs.Many journalists no longer differentiat-ed between waste and spent fuel. It was

all waste, and wherever it went was a“dump.”11

Andrus fought hard to distance theNRTS from this kind of backgroundnoise. He started by trying to distancethe NRTS from Hanford’s problems,which Dixy Lee Ray had characterizedas “not only regrettable, but disgrace-ful.” Andrus decided to lead a presstour of the RWMC, the Chem Plant,and their associated laboratories inDecember 1973. Bradley collaborated.Both hoped the tour would “amelioratesuspicion within the ranks of the unin-formed media concerning the treatmentof wastes at the NRTS.” Theypromised reporters that the trip wouldnot be an IDO “sales job.” All ques-tions would be answered. Andrus read-ied himself to identify the ChemPlant’s calcining program as a keypoint of difference between Hanfordand the NRTS. Here was commendableevidence that the NRTS employed“better techniques than Hanford.”Reporters would also see the areaswhere boxes and barrels had beenburied and lost their integrity, andwhere “at the most, plutonium hasmigrated only 6” into the groundunderneath.”12

The press tour went well, and the majorIdaho papers featured the story withinthe next few days. With the pressinformed and the AEC promising thatthe NRTS would not evolve into a per-manent waste depository, Andrus hopedthe issue had been settled.

C H A P T E R 2 1 • B Y T H E E N D O F T H I S D E C A D E

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Governor Andrus at RWMC.Boise State University Library ISS-100

Then Bradley told him that TRU wastefrom the A rgonne Laboratory inIllinois was headed for Idaho. A n d r u stold Bradley he suspected the A E Ccapable of letting the NRTS graduallyevolve into a large burial ground bysending one small shipment of wasteafter another and calling it “interim.”In the eyes of the press particularly,this shipment was going to look likeanother step in the wrong direction.1 3

Bradley reminded him that the ship-ment was consistent with Dixy LeeR a y ’s earlier letter and did not contra-dict any of the assurances she hadmade. It was, on the other hand, quitepossible that the NRTS might qualifyas the best site for an interim storagefacility that would reprocess andrepackage not only the TRU waste

already at the NRTS, but also fromother sources. After all, in dealing withthe waste already present, the NRT Swas acquiring a unique expertise inthat field. He expected research anddevelopment funding towards that endto bring $1.1 million into Idaho in F Y 1 9 7 5 .1 4

But an “interim” storage plan thatmight last thirty to fifty years lookedtoo much like “de facto permanent” toAndrus. Despite the view held byA n d r u s ’s office, in southeast Idaho,and among others that the NRTS waspracticing the best safety methods inhandling all of its waste, and that nei-ther public health nor the Snake RiverPlain Aquifer was in jeopardy, theState of Idaho embarked on a missionthat would dominate its relationshipwith the NRTS for the rest of the cen-tury: to make the AEC remove buriedRocky Flats waste from Idaho.1 5

The mission effectively dissolvedA n d r u s ’s thoughts of a nuclear- b a s e deconomic renaissance in southeastIdaho, although he continued to supportnew initiatives for the NRTS. It inter-fered with the boost machine campaignsfor expansion of the NRTS and lent an“us against the world” patina to the feel-ings of east Idaho residents. The highpublic profile of the issue eventuallygave the NRTS an image, at least inmore distant parts of the state, as a placeof great danger and risk. Grass-rootspolitical movements found a target forenvironmental and anti-proliferationp r o t e s t s .

The first skirmish in the campaign toremove waste began with an AEC pro-posal to build an above-ground vaultfor the storage of spent fuel from com-mercial power plants. The candidatesites were Hanford, Nevada, and Idaho.The AEC released a draft EIS (environ-mental impact statement), numberedWASH-1539 for its origin at AECHeadquarters, in September 1974 andsolicited comments for a hearing inNovember.

Andrus swiftly named a Blue RibbonStudy Commission, raising an aware-ness of the issue all over Idaho, andcharged it with reviewing the draft andmaking recommendations. TheCommission absorbed public attentioninstead of Andrus, who was running forre-election as governor. The president ofIdaho State University, William E.Davis, was the chairman. Other mem-bers included Cyril Slansky from theSite’s Chem Plant, Al Wilson of INEC,Kent Just of the Idaho Falls Chamber ofCommerce, and representatives of orga-


2 0 8

The December 1973 press tour took the governor

(foreground) and reporters to the Chem Plant.

Boise State University Library

nized labor, the East Idaho NuclearIndustry Council (EINIC), the IdahoFarm Bureau, a newspaper editor fromBurley, executives from Idaho PowerCompany and Boise Cascade, and oth-ers. Mike Christie, the state’s radiationexpert, was an ad hoc member.16

Frank K. Pittman, head of AECHeadquarters’ Division of WasteManagement and Transportation, metwith the Commission during its Octobermeeting to discuss the proposal. But itwas the removal of existing waste thatwas on the minds of the Commission,and Pittman discussed it freely:

Pittman: ...it is logical to storetransuranic waste here because of thetechnical know-how.

Wilson: As far as Idaho, we have beengiven the feeling that the Governor andSenator Church feel that transuranicwaste presently stored in Idaho willstart to be moved by the end of thedecade.

Pittman: [An AEC] letter to SenatorChurch indicated that material buriedin Idaho would start to be moved out—but it is not feasible. Is your worryabout material buried prior to the pre -sent material? If we dig up old materi -al, an environmental impact study willhave to be made to see if it could betaken out safely.

Wilson: The Governor’s and SenatorChurch’s concern is based on the loca -tion of our aquifer. The concern cer -tainly includes people other than IdahoFalls and Arco.17

The Commission drafted and adoptedan interim report and decided to put itbefore the public in a series of six pub-lic hearings around the state. Variousinterest groups began to take positionson both sides regarding the storagevault proposal. The unions were for it,environmentalists were not, potatogrowers and water users opposed it, theIdaho Falls City Council favored it.18

In its final report, the Commission’sfirst comment was to affirm its beliefthat present waste management prac-tices at the Site were ostensibly safeand responsible; they posed no threat tothe environment. After that, the recom-mendations were of a sufficientlyinnocuous nature that a majority couldagree. The Commission declined toendorse the expansion of the NRTS forstoring commercial spent fuel becausethe draft EIS was “inadequate.” It sug-gested that commercial spent fuel


2 0 9

INEEL 91-35-8-1

In 1975, the Site was designated as a National

Environmental Research Park (NERP). All lands

within the Site boundaries are a protected outdoor

laboratory where scientists from the Department of

Energy, other federal and state agencies, universities

and private research foundations conduct ecological

studies. The Idaho NERP, covering some 570,000

acres, is the largest undisturbed area of sagebrush

vegetation in the Intermountain West. The NERP has

a large number of paleontological, historic, and

prehistoric archaeological sites. It also has over 400

species of plants and a wide variety of animal life.

Common reptiles, fish, raptors, and over 40 mammal

species, including elk, deer, moose and, most

noticeably, pronghorn antelope, can be found here.

should remain where it was until itcould go directly to a permanent reposi-tory or to an interim site closer to afinal repository. The Commission thenembraced Governor Andrus’s missionand asked the AEC to give its “firmcommitment” and a schedule forremoving buried TRU waste from theNRTS. It requested that the AECfinance an independent environmentalmonitoring capability for Idaho.Finally, almost as an afterthought, theCommission said it favored “a strongnuclear program” in Idaho as a matterof policy, provided it maintained a highlevel of environmental quality.19

At the hearing on November 12, 1974,the constituent member organizationsof the Blue Ribbon Commission cameout squarely for or against the proposal.Andrus himself endorsed the findingsof the Blue Ribbon Commission. He re-stated the AEC end-of-decade commit-

ment and demanded the AEC set aschedule. Kent Just, speaking for theIdaho Falls Chamber of Commerce,said he did not fully understand whywaste management practices hadchanged from burial to above-groundstorage. “I am not certain if it was sole-ly through public pressure or in con-junction with new techniques,” saidJust. “We are not absolutely sure theburial was a mistake...” If Just expectedto receive clarification on this pointfrom either the IDO or the AEC, heapparently didn’t receive any.20

After the hearing, Andrus conferredwith Glenn Bradley. He assuredBradley that his testimony had not pre-cluded receipt of Rocky Flats waste forinterim storage. His position was stillconsistent with the view that the NRTSnot receive TRU waste from newsources. Nor was he critical of currentwaste practices. But, “you and AEC-

DC should recognize the wisdom ofremoving TRU waste at the end of thisdecade.” And if you don’t intend to, hewrote, “notify me in writing as soon aspossible.”21

The rising tide of public doubt compro-mised the whole-hearted support ofSenator James McClure for the WASH-1539 proposal, eroding his power toboost the project. Then serving his sec-ond term, he demanded publicly thatthe AEC investigate reports that “hugequantities” of highly radioactive wasteshad been buried in cardboard cartons.“If there is even a ‘minimal danger’ ofcontamination of the Snake RiverAquifer,” he said, “then that is morethan the people of Idaho should beexpected to live with.” A subsequentPost-Register editorial accused him oftaking “potshots” threatening Idaho’schances of bringing in a project worth$3 billion in the next twenty-five years.Later, McClure mended his own bridgeto Idaho Falls and endorsed the WASH-1539 proposal—but only if all thewaste was above ground, constantlymonitored, dry, and interim. And, headded, the material buried in the earlyyears should be removed. 22


2 1 0

RWMC activities in 1997 included waste storage,

waste evaluation, environmental monitoring, waste

repackaging, and waste management research and

development.INEEL 97-620-1-9

Kent Just thought that Andrus perhapshad used the Blue Ribbon Commissionto deflect pressure from himself duringthe election campaign. He deeplyregretted that Andrus’s position had notechnical basis. Equally, he was dis-mayed that the IDO had chosen toemphasize the dollar value of the pro-ject in Idaho instead of its technical orscientific merits.23

In the next few years, Andrus over-looked no opportunity to remind theIDO and its Washington counterpartsthat they had committed to start remov-ing radioactive wastes from Idaho by theend of the 1970s. His staff scrutinizedevery AEC and IDO message, pressrelease, and report for evidence of anagency careless of its commitments.2 4

In the end, the AEC did not go forwardwith the WASH-1539 proposal, for rea-sons other than the events in Idaho. Still,the IDO took several steps to redeemitself in the eyes of a doubting Idahopublic. It held an open house and invitedvisitors to examine the waste retrievalf a c i l i t y. Among its usual annual outputof public relations pamphlets andbrochures, the IDO produced one specif-ically about the RWMC for the firsttime. It reached out to groups such asthe League of Women Voters, which hadopposed any expansion of waste man-agement facilities. Andrus hinted toBradley that he should venture onto theturf of the potato growers and otherN RTS opponents. It was the same sortof work that IDO managers had doneever since 1949 when Bill Johnstonbegan with the Kiwanis and Rotary clubcircuit, but Andrus thought the relevantcircuit had grown far larger; he worriedthat Bradley didn’t venture far enough.2 5

The RWMC pamphlet told the publicthat “a number of years will be neces-sary to retrieve, treat, and repackagethese wastes.” The idea of digging upthe old Burial Ground had become awell-articulated IDO practice and policy.

The evolution of this policy seemedlaced with irony. No investigations hadsaid that NRTS waste practices hadposed any risk to the Snake River PlainA q u i f e r. The IDO had not acknowledgedthe old practices as a miscalculation ofrisks, nor had it qualified or quantifiedthe nature of future risks. Governors’committees and IDO citizen advisorycommittees since the early 1950s hadnot raised doubts about the safety of Sitepractices. Kent Just had hinted that thenew AEC/IDO policy was a capitulationto public sentiment. If so, it was a trib-ute to A n d r u s ’s effectiveness. The tasksof retrieving, processing, and movingTRU waste continued to be goals of theAEC, the IDO, and the State of Idahofor the rest of the century—andb e y o n d .2 6


2 1 1

C H A P T E R T W E N T Y - T W O

2 1 2

JU M P I N G T H E FE N C EIt was an opportunity to step outside the Site boundaries...

—Jay Kunze—

With the MTR outof business after 1970, the physicists whoh a d n ’t left Idaho were available for otherwork. Fortunately, this surplus of NRT Stalent dovetailed with national events thato ffered new opportunities. In 1971 notlong after an electrical “brownout” in theeastern states, President Richard Nixonwarned Congress that the country shouldnot take its energy supply for granted. Hesuggested that a new government depart-ment unify the country’s energy develop-ment programs. But the price of energ ywas sufficiently low that Congress didlittle at the time.1

H o w e v e r, the NRTS and the A E C ’sother national laboratory facilitiesbegan to expand their research to non-nuclear energy sources. East Idahobusiness leaders were exploring everyavenue they could to diversify andbuild new programs at the NRTS, sothis was a welcome development. T h eemployment numbers at the Site wereabout 5,600, having fallen from a peakemployment of 6,145 in mid-1965.The Eastern Idaho Nuclear IndustrialCouncil published a brochure entitledPotentially Available Facilities, whichidentified 223,000 square feet of space

available in twenty vacant NRT Sbuildings. Diversification was highlyd e s i r a b l e .2

The IDO contractor, Aerojet Nuclear,was wide open to new possibilities. Itcreated an office to pursue researchwork in alternative energy sources suchas solar, geothermal, wind, and tidalenergy. Physicist Jay Kunze headed theoffice and began looking around. 3

Kunze learned of the geothermal watersthat flowed from artesian wells in theRaft River Valley in Idaho, about 150miles southwest of Idaho Falls and nearthe Utah border. A number of years pre-v i o u s l y, some farmers had drilled irriga-tion wells and to their surprise broughtup boiling water. The remote valley hada population of a few hundred souls andreceived its electricity from theBonneville Power Administration (BPA )through the Raft River Rural ElectricalCooperative. The co-op manager, EdwinS c h l e n d e r, inspired by the national dis-cussion about potential energy shortages,wondered if the hot water below the val-ley might produce electricity at a pricecompetitive with that of the BPA. Hehired a geologist to investigate theresource and applied for a water rightfrom the Idaho Department of Wa t e rResources (IDWR). Several neighboringlandowners prepared to protest the appli-cation because the water table in the val-ley had been declining over the yearsand they feared new wells would worsenthe situation.4

Kunze and his boss, Dr. RobertBrugger, drove down the highway oneday in 1972 toward Malta, Idaho, tovisit the cooperative. The Raft River isa north-flowing tributary to the Snake

Well drilling at Raft River.

INEEL 77-9183

The Raft River Pilot Plant at night.INEEL 74-3023

River, rising in the Raft RiverMountains that stride the Idaho/Utahborder. Beneath the valley surface, geo-logical features such as faults intersect-ing each other at depths of severalthousand feet provide heat and path-ways to subterranean water reservoirs.Conditions such as these are commonelsewhere in Idaho and other westernstates. Kunze recalled the trip.

Bob and I went to visit Ed Schlender. Ifelt a little uneasy going down therewith the message, “Hello, we’re fromthe government; we’re here to helpyou.” But the manager took to us, andwe took to him. We developed a friendlyrelationship and started to put togethera project. We worked with the IdahoDepartment of Water Resources, thepublic power agencies, and the BPA.The Raft River people gave us a lot ofsupport, moral and otherwise. It was anopportunity to step outside the Siteboundaries and attempt to develop aresource that would benefit Idaho. 5

A research proposal took shape. Kunzeworked with the Raft River neighborsand collaborated with the IDWR. Hehired Clay Nichols, a geologic engi-neer with a specialty in geothermalg e o l o g y, who had done his doctoraldissertation at the University ofOklahoma on geothermal systems andwas then teaching at Boise StateU n i v e r s i t y. They went to Wa s h i n g t o n ,D.C., in August 1973, seeking federalgrant support. The objective was todrill wells deep into the fractured rock,bring up water at a temperature of3 0 0 ° F, install turbine/generator equip-ment using a working fluid other thanw a t e r, and generate electricity. T h eengineering challenge was to make the

system work economically. The waterwas 50°F cooler than what then wasunderstood to be economic. As a non-nuclear project and one that wouldtake place off-Site, the project was asignificant departure from the NRT St r a d i t i o n .6

Support rolled in from the usual net-work, aided by an apparent energy cri-sis. In the fall of 1973, the petroleumexporting countries of the Middle Eastembargoed the shipment of crude oil tothe United States. The energy shortagesthat followed were the worst the coun-try had experienced since World War IIand lent an air of urgency to the questfor alternative energy supplies.Congress was quite willing to financeresearch that might produce greaternational energy independence.Governor Cecil Andrus eagerly promot-ed the project. Idaho senator FrankChurch was at the peak of his politicalpower. He was chair of the InteriorCommittee’s Subcommittee on Waterand Power and, along with IdahoSenator James McClure, in a good posi-tion to help the project.7

Church, whose mother lived in a Boiseneighborhood heated by geothermalwater, had said, “Oh, we can’t let thismoney go to Los Alamos!” Idaho mus-cled out other contenders, includingother national AEC facilities, for someof the millions available for geothermalfunding. The project began in 1974with a plan to build, operate, and test afive-megawatt pilot plant. The geother-mal water would exchange its heat toisobutane, which would drive the tur-bine. If successful, the project mighthave broader application elsewhere inthe West.8

The program quickly attracted workersfrom various disciplines. Scientists con-verged in the Raft River Valley like asurgical team over a critical patient.Chemists analyzed the water.Radiologists determined its radioactivequalities. Geophysicists tried to under-stand the fractured rock below the sur-face. Seismic experts set up earthquakerecorders. Hydrologists monitored theeffect of hot water withdrawals on thecool groundwater system. Biologistsidentified the plant and animal speciesin the area, making a baseline for futurecomparisons. The old, old question ofthe right valve for a new job requiredengineers to invent a method to shut offthe flow of boiling water originating ata thousand feet below the earth’s sur-face. Metallurgists put samples of car-bon steel and other metals into a loopof hot water to figure out corrosionrates. Computer programmers simulat-ed the entire pilot plant system to aidwith predictions. Even the technologyof the fluidized bed moved to RaftRiver, as chemical engineers tried tokeep the hot water from depositingchemical crud in heat exchanger tubes.9

The team set up side experiments.Could better drill bits do the job? Theytried new ideas. What kind of pipeinsulation would best prevent heat loss?They buried some pipe and comparedthe results with spray-on insulation. Ifgeothermal water were used for irriga-tion, would salts build up in the soilover time? Someone staked out plotsfor trees, wheat, oats, potatoes, andbeets. How about warm water beingused for fish culture? Up went race-ways and a fish pond for shrimp, perch,catfish, and tilapia. What went oninside a geothermal well? Special elec-


2 1 4

tronic instruments were snaked downthe wells on cables. In short, the stan-dard NRTS multi-disciplinary attack ona problem had a thorough workout.

The environmental monitoring studiesat Raft River called for scientists andengineers in new specialties. Much ofthe talent was youthful, and several of

the geothermal recruits were youngwomen who were riding the crest ofenthusiasm brought about by the envi-ronmental movement—and the crest ofconfidence brought about by thew o m e n ’s movement. Kunze hiredSusan Stiger, a civil engineer with anacademic focus on the environmentand hydrogeology, to create the envi-ronmental program at Raft River. A tthe time, no models existed for com-prehensive characterization of environ-mental features and their interactions.Once more, NRTS energy research was“all new” for a new generation.1 0

Old trailers served as field offices andcrew quarters at Raft River. Monitoringthe performance of wells and fluidssometimes required 24-hour-a-day oper-ation. No one seemed to mind. Kunzerecalled another woman he hired:

We needed a geologist to examine cut -tings while the well was being drilled.Someone referred me to a lady geolo -gist named Susan Prestwich who livedin Idaho Falls. She had “sat wells” forher family business in Utah. I thought,“Drilling crews are known to be rough -necks. I can’t send a woman out thereall night to work that well!” But Italked to her, and she said, “Don’tworry, I can handle those guys.”11

And she did. Prestwich was the firstfemale drilling engineer (and geologist)ever hired at the Site. As it had been forhundreds of NRTS male scientists andengineers before her, the chance of dis-covering something new was motiveenough to endure an all-nighter. Shecontinued with Aerojet and EG&G, thenew Site contractor in 1976. Her careereventually took her to the Departmentof Energy in Washington. Stiger contin-ued her career with BechtelCorporation, returning to the Site in1999 to manage the entire environmen-tal management program when Bechtelbecame the contractor.

Kunze and Roger Stoker, the chiefgeologist for the geothermal project,extended the reach of the project toBoise. Geothermal wells drilled in the1890s had heated homes in the city’sWarm Springs neighborhood fordecades, but the question was whethergeothermal water might be found else-where on the Boise Front faultline. Ateam including Clay Nichols and RoyMink from Boise State Universityselected a site for a test well on Boise

C H A P T E R 2 2 • J U M P I N G T H E F E N C E

2 1 5

Above. Inside a geothermally heated greenhouse near

Raft River test facility. Left. Raft River Pilot Plant.

INEEL 79-10129

INEEL 81-4752

City-owned land. The well produced165°F water at a depth of about a thou-sand feet. A second well on Bureau ofLand Management property nearbylikewise found hot water, althoughslightly deeper. The wells were turnedover to the city and the state, whichdeveloped systems to heat commercialand state office buildings in and neardowntown Boise.12

The Raft River Pilot Plant started up inOctober 1981 and then ran briefly in1982. Power from the plant went out onthe regional electrical grid. It provedthat the binary cycle using isobutanecould work. For a number of reasons,including the depth of the wells, thesystem could not compete with the eco-nomics of hydropower production inthe Pacific Northwest (where the costsof building public power dams are notcharged to customers), but in someparts of the world, the system couldcompete with coal-burning plants thatrequired special pollution controls.13

The project ended abruptly in the firsthalf of 1982. After the election ofRepublican Ronald Reagan in 1980, theproject (among many others) became asymbol of the Democratic party’s sup-posed inclination to finance programsmore properly in the domain of privateenterprise. In addition, the energy sup-ply crisis clearly had ended. Fundingfor geothermal research was drasticallyreduced. Frank Church was defeated inthe 1980 election, and Raft River lostits most influential supporter.14

The IDO informed IDWR that no furtherfunding was available for the project.Neither it nor Raft River Rural Electricpursued a water right, and the informal

agreement between IDO and IDWRended. The Pacific Northwest hadentered a period of energy surplus, andneither Idaho Power Company nor BPAdesired to buy power from Raft River.The IDO eventually asked the GeneralServices Administration to sell the pro-ject, which was done officially onFebruary 8, 1984. Hydra-Co Enterprisesacquired the Raft River property andmoved the pilot plant to Nevada.1 5

Other alternative energy programssprouted at the NRTS in the 1970s. Sitescientists found themselves involved inindustrial energy conservation, the pro-duction of alcohol fuel, and solar energyresearch. They tested batteries for elec-tric vehicles, developed glass and alu-minum recovery systems for solid wasteprograms, and examined the energypotential in biomass production. TheSite became the nation’s lead laboratoryfor a hydropower program in which thegovernment loaned funds to utilities andmunicipalities for small innovativehydropower systems. As a result of thisprogram, Idaho Falls installed a low-head bulb-turbine system in the SnakeRiver to increase its municipal electricalsupply. Many of these programsinvolved commercial clients other thanthe federal government.16

The impact of the new programs helpedincrease employment levels at the Site,although the major nuclear activities atA rgonne, the Naval Reactors Facility,the Test Reactor Area, the Chem Plant,and the LOFT facilities continued as themajor NRTS missions. Maintaining astable but growing employment base atthe NRTS was important to the econom-ic vitality of southeast Idaho. All of thenational laboratories were diversifying


2 1 6

Non-nuclear research at the NRTS included vortex

studies. Large commercial airlines flew through

plumes of smoke while cameras recorded the

disturbance.

INEEL 70-829

INEEL 70-824

their missions, so an entrepreneurialapproach to competition had to be addedto traditional political approaches.

In this connection, a feeling had arisenover the years amongst Site scientistsand administrators, members of EINIC,and others that the NRTS had gone farbeyond the proof-testing of nuclear reac-tor concepts. Its nuclear safety engineer-ing research had become a nationalforce; its research in neutron physics, ofglobal importance. The NRTS was aleader in radiation and environmentalprotection and advanced computer mod-eling. It was a world-class innovator ininstrumentation and, despite MiltonS h a w ’s shift of breeder work toHanford, in the field of breeder reactors.N o w, because of the environmentalmonitoring and waste managementresearch at the old Burial Ground, theSite was becoming a leader in the tech-nologies of waste management andr e t r i e v a l .

In short, by the early 1970s the Site hadgrown out of its role as a “testing sta-tion.” It was truly a “laboratory. ”Furthermore, it was long past due forN RTS scientists to push back when peo-ple from Headquarters or other A E C“laboratories” slighted their importancefrom time to time. For example, in annu-al reports, the AEC didn’t identify theN RTS as a laboratory and had no partic-ular category to define the “thing” thatwas the NRTS. Obviously the NRT Sneeded a new name. The internal org a n i-zation of the AEC had always made ithard to compete for funds and attentionduring a Cold War when militaryresearch and weapons production—andthe labs that served those needs direct-ly—had such strong champions.1 7

Around 1974, NRTS supporters askedIdaho congressman Orval Hansen totake the lead in getting the AEC com-missioners to designate the NRTS as a“national laboratory,” a mission heundertook enthusiastically. Elected in1968, Hansen had gained a seat on theJCAE in 1971. Dixy Lee Ray becamethe chair of the AEC in 1972, appointedby President Nixon. She made internalreforms of the AEC that made herunpopular with senior members of theJCAE, entrenched interests at the AEC,and the commercial nuclear industry—atrio whose close relationship had some-times had been referred to as an “irontriangle.” Hansen described the name-change mission.

I went directly to Dixy Lee Ray, chair -man of the AEC. I proposed that inaddition to being designated as a labo -ratory that the new name include“Idaho” and that it should be known asa “national” laboratory to give it sta -


2 1 7

Orval HansenCourtesy of Orval Hansen

Below. Advanced battery technology developed at

INEL was used in a cooperative research project with

the United States Advanced Battery Consortium.

INEEL 84-464-2-8

tus similar to other national laborato -ries. I firmly believe that Dixy’s positiveresponse was due, in large part, to herdesire to do a personal favor to me. Ihad given her total support on theJCAE at a time when some other mem -bers of the committee resisted changesshe was making in the AEC includingthose affecting Milt Shaw. She wasgrateful for my support and we devel -oped a warm and close relationship.She knew that the requested namechange would help me politically.

There was resistance to the requestedname change. The national laborato -ries were a kind of club. There was lit -tle enthusiasm for the apparentelevation of a more narrowly special -ized installation to national laboratorystatus. I believe that the resistanceinfluenced the name finally selected. Isuggested that it be the Idaho NationalEnergy Laboratory which would bemore descriptive of its mission. I don’twant to leave the impression that poli -tics played the dominant role in thename change. I believe that we had astrong case to make.18

Although Hansen didn’t feel that “engi-neering,” the adjective finally selectedto describe the laboratory, adequatelyreflected the kind of research, testing,and development of advanced technolo-gies being done in Idaho, he hadachieved his main goal: status for theSite as a national laboratory and a namethat identified it with its state.

In August 1974, preparations wereunderway in Idaho to celebrate thetenth anniversary of EBR-II. The planwas to use this occasion, to take placeat Argonne West, to announce the new

name. Hansen invited Vice PresidentGerald Ford to do the honor. Fordagreed to come to Idaho, but in earlyAugust it became clear that PresidentNixon had been involved in a criminalcover-up and that his resignation wasimminent. Ford canceled his trip toIdaho, but AEC Commissioner WilliamAnders, a former Apollo astronaut, dig-nified the speakers’dais and pro-nounced that the NRTS would beknown thereafter as the Idaho NationalEngineering Laboratory (INEL).19

Later in the year other name changesoccurred in Washington, D.C. ByOctober 1974 the Arab oil embargo hadlifted, the crisis in the presidency hadpassed, and Congress was ready toreform the AEC, separating its develop-mental and regulatory functions into twoagencies. The Energy Reorg a n i z a t i o nAct of 1974 abolished the AEC and dis-

tributed its developmental functions tothe Energy Research and DevelopmentAdministration (ERDA). The bill trans-ferred to ERDAseveral energy programsformerly in the Department of Interior(coal, mining) and the EnvironmentalProtection Agency (automotive sys-tems). The regulatory and licensingfunction went to a new agency called theNuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).

The new agencies went into effect inJanuary 1975. Jimmy Carter becamepresident in 1976. That winter, a short-age of natural gas in the New Englandstates helped shape Carter’s view thatconservation must become a major ele-ment in a national energy plan. Carterpromoted further reorganization aimingfor a more comprehensive planningapproach. Congress created theDepartment of Energy (DOE) in 1977.James Schlesinger, who earlier had


2 1 8

AEC Commissioner William Anders announces that the NRTS will be renamed

the Idaho National Engineering Laborator y. EBR-II is in the background.

Argonne National Laboratory-West S5843

been an AEC commissioner, becamethe first Secretary of Energy and amember of the president’s cabinet.20

With these changes, the nation’s nuclearenterprise had effectively been shiftedfrom the custody of a powerful congres-sional committee to the executivebranch. The route to political influencebecame far more diffuse than it hadbeen. Presidential politics became atleast as important as congressional poli-tics, and this contributed further to thedecline in nuclear research alreadyunderway. For example, one of Carter’sgoals was to eliminate the country’sdependence on nuclear energy by theyear 2000. Schlesinger organized DOEnot by types of fuel (nuclear, fossil,geothermal), but by different processesalong a continuum from researchthrough development to commercializa-tion. The organizational chart changedfrequently during the 1980s, but the oldsheltered autonomy, such as it was, ofthe AEC/JCAE system was gone forgood.21

The forces that had changed the nuclearoutlook at the national level had gath-ered their strength from the local politi-cal dynamics of the nation’s fifty states.Idaho citizens had no commercialpower plant upon which to focus theirconcern about environmental degrada-tion, their fear of nuclear accidents, ortheir protests to the Cold War armsrace. But they did have the INEL.

Leadership at the Idaho governor’so ffice, the IDO, and IDO’s prime con-tractor all changed about the same time.Carter drafted Cecil Andrus, who hadwon his second term as governor in

1974, as Secretary of the Interior. Lt.Governor John Evans moved into theg o v e r n o r’s chair in 1977 and then wonhis own election as governor in 1978.Charles E. Williams, previously thedeputy manager at the Nevada Test Site,succeeded Glenn Bradley as IDO manag-er in 1976. Aerojet lost its bid to extendits operating contract in 1976, and thenew prime contractor was EG&G Idaho.

Evans continued the Andrus campaignto remove nuclear waste from Idaho. Athis first opportunity, a public hearing onwaste management, he reminded ERDAof its obligations to Idaho. Evans want-ed an action schedule and “I respectful-ly request that this commitment be putin writing.” The Idaho Potato Growersand Shippers and many others com-mended Evans for his stand. The gener-al sentiment was that the sooner thewaste was removed from above theaquifer, the better.22

DOE canceled its plans to develop arepository in Kansas, setting back anyplans it may have had to remove wastefrom Idaho during the 1970s. Evansresponded by turning to the nationalwaste management picture, investingconsiderable energy in the NuclearPower Subcommittee of the NationalGovernors Association. The best hopefor Idaho to see the last of the waste wasto assure that national policy created abetter place for it. He felt that Idaho hadlittle legal means of preventing DOEfrom sending new wastes to Idaho in theinterim. But, he said, “I would use thepowers of this office to protest in thestrongest possible manner. I think thatkind of public pressure would stop it.”2 3


2 1 9

Charles E. WilliamsINEEL Cultural Resources

In November 1979 the INEL monitor-ing program found a trace of tritium ina water sample taken from the aquifernear the southern INEL boundary. Thepress covered this news, and explainedthat it had come from the Chem Plantinjection well. The news provoked apublic reaction similar to the earlier oneabout the TRU buried at the Site, andagain Senator Frank Church called foran investigation.24

By this time, grass roots environmentaland peace movements in Idaho had gath-ered momentum and were strong enoughto help build the “public pressure”Evans had invited. The IdahoConservation League had organized in1973 and its membership grew quicklythroughout the 1970s. Its agenda wasbroadly aimed at several issues, includ-ing wilderness preservation and energ yconservation. In response to the newsabout the injection well, a group of envi-ronmentalists and pacifists in Boiseo rganized the Snake River Alliance towork for the closure of the well and anend to the practice of waste injection.The group quickly recruited members,particularly in the Twin Falls area wherecitizens felt themselves potentially in thedirect path of the hazard. Aside from itsobjection to the well, the Snake RiverAlliance evinced a mistrust of the DOEand a concern that nuclear fuels could bedirected toward weapons production.Other groups such as the GroundwaterAlliance based in Ketchum, Idaho, alsoo rganized and found common causewith the Snake River Alliance.

These groups held meetings, publishednewsletters, appeared at hearings,scraped together funds, and learned tomake the most of NEPA-mandated pub-

lic hearings and other opportunities toget their messages to the press, the pub-lic, and the politicians.

For the first time since 1949, the finelymeshed network of interests protectingand nurturing the INEL was forced tocontend with an antagonistic networkfighting for different goals. The gover-nor’s office, while not a completedropout from the old network, had toacknowledge the new network and theelectorate it represented.

The public was alarmed at INEL’s overtand deliberate introduction of a radioac-tive substance directly into the aquifer.How could this be safe? Evans read theirletters and realized that the State had toprovide a counterweight to the public’sfaltering confidence in the INEL. Oncemore, a governor of Idaho created a spe-cial task force of distinguished authori-ties to investigate the situation at INELand make recommendations. Once morethe IDO conducted tours and answeredquestions. The IDO reminded the groupthat it had been sending quarterly andannual monitoring reports to the gover-nor and Idaho’s health officers for years.The practice was no secret. Monitoringwould continue. Site drinking water wassafe. Chem Plant improvements alreadyhad reduced the amount of tritium enter-ing the waste stream. The State was wel-come to take its own samples.2 5

The task force traveled around the stateand heard public comments. In the end,it concluded that “no immediate healthhazard exists, and it seems unlikely thata long-term hazard is posed by currentdisposal practices.” It complimentedthe INEL for its “forthright and help-ful” assistance and noted no evidence

of a cover-up. The INEL had beencleared once more of taking undue riskswith public safety. Nevertheless, thecommittee recommended that the prac-tice of discharging radioactive liquidwastes through the injection well to theaquifer be discontinued in favor ofsome other alternative that wouldsomehow prove to be “more accept-able.” Public perceptions were impor-tant, it said.26

The task force advised the governor todo everything possible to prevent thislow-level waste from entering thea q u i f e r. Idaho should improve its inde-pendent monitoring capability, it said,repeating a suggestion made to A n d r u sby a previous committee.2 7

The next three years saw the campaignto plug the injection well unfold at sev-eral venues. The IDO hired the FluorCorporation to analyze how the ChemPlant operations might be engineered toend the injection of tritium-contaminatedw a t e r. The governor gave the Fluorstudy time to mature and in the mean-time protested DOE waste shipmentsinto Idaho. He redoubled his efforts toaccelerate the moment when a nationalstorage facility would relieve the state.By this time, DOE had settled on a loca-tion in New Mexico for a Wa s t eIsolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), a projectreplacing the salt mine in Kansas as apotential repository for TRU waste. Adate for moving any waste from Idahohad moved into the mid-1980s.

The Snake River Alliance and its asso-ciates kept the waste issue alive in theirnewsletters and meetings. In September1980 they held a protest rally nearEBR-I, calling for an end to the injec-


2 2 0

tion well, an end to shipments fromRocky Flats, and an end to breederreactors in general. Environmentaldegradation and the production ofweapons were two faces of the sameissue. Sam Day, the editor of theProgressive and the featured speaker,observed that the breeder reactor,because of its ability to make plutoni-um, “probably represents the greatestdanger beyond nuclear war itself to thefuture and welfare of humankind.”Another speaker asserted that the INELwas “the home and playground” for theU.S. breeder reactor program. The busi-ness community in Idaho Falls felt thatsuch comments were “absurd.” 28

As the governor’s office waited for theIDO to act on an alternative to the injec-tion well, the relationshipbetween the two offices dete-riorated. Idaho wanted morethan just to look over anI N E L lab technician’s shoul-der while collecting a watersample. It wanted to examineengineering drawings andspecifications, to be notifiedprior to certain constructionprojects, to be sent an inven-tory of every air pollutionemission source at the Site,and more. But the IDO man-ager had conveyed to Evanshis view that activity withinthe boundaries of the Site was“none of the state’s business.”The editor of the P o s t -R e g i s t e r called for an end tothe “spitting match” betweenthe two offices so they couldsolve the problem together.2 9

Although the Fluor Report had beencompleted in 1980, the IDO managedto delay for nearly three years a deci-sion on the injection well. The gover-nor’s staff characterized the IDO as“stubborn.” In May 1983 CharlesWilliams left the IDO, and DOEappointed Troy Wade to take his place.At last, things began to move faster andwith more amity.30

On February 9, 1984, Governor JohnEvans stood near the Chem Plant in hisovercoat against the chill weather anddiverted a stream of waste water into anevaporation pond. The four-acre pondwas sixteen feet deep, its bottom allow-ing the percolation of water into thesoil. Radionuclides would interact withthe soil and become trapped just below

the pond. The tritium would evaporateinto the air with the water. IDO said theproject had cost $800,000.31

Possibly for the first time, an Idahogovernor had been the ceremonial fig-urehead to dedicate a new project at theSite. The environmental networkregarded the closing of the well as avictory for the citizens of Idaho, appar-ently not concerned with the fact thatthe tritium would henceforth dilute andundergo radioactive decay in the airinstead of underground.

Behind the scenes, the governor hadalso won another kind of victory. Hehad signed a Working Agreement withthe IDO. It allowed the governor’semployees to accompany INEL moni-

toring technicians on the job.Idaho could split water sam-ples with IDO and perform itsown independent analysis. TheIDO and the governor reaf-firmed their promises not tosurprise each other in public.Any press releases about envi-ronmental releases or prob-lems would come after bothparties had reviewed andsigned off on them. The gover-nor’s office was now in a posi-tion to monitor the Site. TheState of Idaho finally hadarrived inside the INELfence.32


2 2 1

DOE-IDOmanager Troy Wade (left) and

Governor John Evans open the new

evaporation pond at the Chem Plant on

February 9, 1984.INEEL 84-0091-3-9

C H A P T E R T W E N T Y - T H R E E

2 2 2

TH E EN D O W M E N T O F URA N I U MThe growth in the world’s inventory of plutonium can be brought to a halt and then reversed.

—Till, Chang, and Hannum, 1997—

As Site employeesbegan to get used to their new name in1974, the national reactor safety testingprogram, which included LOFT, PBF,Semiscale, and other INEL projects,finally emerged from the policy chaosof the previous ten years. Early in herterm as AEC chair, DixyLee Ray had created anew Division of ReactorSafety Research in theAEC. She removed safe-ty research from the con-trol of Milton Shaw.Shaw then left the AEC.Around the Site (and atother AEC facilities),this development pro-duced either generalrejoicing or, amongthose who had admiredhis tenacity and hard-nosed managementapproach, a sense ofregret.1

Allocations for safety researchimproved immediately, and the LOFTprogram picked up steam. During thelean years, the Phillips and Aerojetteams had barely kept the project grind-ing forward. Once it became clear that

the mission of the reactor wouldinclude repeated LOCA experiments,the designers had to re-engineer a com-plex water-management system and aspecial holding tank (the blowdownvessel) so that the reactor could “lose”its cooling water without flooding thereactor chamber or causing other dam-age to the test facility. Solving this

problem had created extra costs. Whenrigorous specifications resulted in nobids from vendors for main coolantpumps and valves, LOFT project engi-neers scrounged these items from NS

Savannah, the nation’s first and onlynuclear-powered merchant ship.Launched in 1961, it had been decom-missioned and was about to bescrapped. Other LOFT parts came fromas far away as a United States Air Forcebase in Vietnam. Site craft shops pro-ceeded to modify and polish the hand-me-downs for the LOFT plant.2

Another implication ofrepeated experimentswas that the reactormight require detailedexamination after eachtest. This could be donein the TAN Hot Shop.The engineers decidedto recycle the sameequipment and use thesame method that theANP had used to moveits reactor experimentsback and forth. Thefour-rail track and theshielded locomotive

were pressed once more into service. Ifthe reactor was to leave the contain-ment building, the building would needa very large, very heavy door. Beforeeach test the door would have to bewell-sealed to retain potential contami-nation inside the building. The 200-tondoor had been installed in November

LOFT reactor being moved into containment vessel.

INEEL 73-3710

The LOFT door is moved into place.INEEL 70-4141

1970. As it turned out, operators did notremove the reactor after the testsbecause of the complexity of auxiliarypiping and other systems around thereactor. But they did open the doorbetween tests to facilitate preparationsfor the next test.3

LOFT engineers—the ones at theRogers Hotel—had created computermodels predicting how different typesof emergency core cool-ing systems would sup-posedly perform if areactor lost its coolant.Some systems pumpednew cooling water intothe core; others injectedcooling water from pres-surized tanks. The pur-pose of the LOFTexperiments was to pro-vide empirical valida-tion—or not—for thetheory behind the com-puter models.4

The first nuclear test onDecember 10, 1978, imi-tated a “double-ended guillotine break,”where the coolant flooded from bothends of a broken pipe. This was pre-sumed to be among the worst kinds ofaccidents. The computer model had pre-dicted that the fuel temperature couldrise to 1,350°F and that the emerg e n c ysystem would restore cooling waterwithin 90 seconds. The computer provedto be conservative. The coolant wasrestored within 44 seconds, and themaximum temperature of the fuel rose toabout 1,000°F. More tests were plannedto imitate other accidents, but the assess-ment of what kinds of breaks to test wasabout to change.5

On March 28, 1979, at the Three MileIsland 2 (TMI) nuclear power plant nearH a r r i s b u rg, Pennsylvania, the mainpumps circulating the secondary coolantstopped running. This prevented heatremoval from the primary cooling sys-tem. The turbine shut down, and thereactor likewise. Decay heat continued toheat the water near the core. This causeda pressure surge and forced open a pres-sure relief valve. Emergency pumps

began to restore circulation. As pressuresubsided, the pressure relief valve shouldhave closed, but it stayed open.

The operators didn’t know, couldn’tsee, and hadn’t been trained to imaginethat the valve was open. Because ofother events and faulty indicators, theybelieved too much water was enteringthe vessel and shut down the emer-gency pumps. They started, thenstopped the primary coolant circulatingpumps. Water pressure fell, and some

of the water in the pressure vesselflashed to steam. One thing after anoth-er went wrong with instruments, equip-ment, computers, and human judgment.During the next sixteen hours, a third ofthe core melted, although no one knewwhat this fraction was until much later.The hot core material did not meltthrough the reactor vessel, let alonedown to China. About twenty curies ofradioiodine were released to the

environment.6

In the immediate effortto understand the condi-tion of the reactor,inspectors from theNRC arrived fromWashington, D.C., andconcluded that the zir-conium-clad metal wasinteracting chemicallywith the hot steam tocreate hydrogen gas.They feared that a bub-ble of the gas couldinterfere with the flowof cooling waterthrough the core.

Analysts speculated that a large gasbubble could explode and blow openthe containment shell.7

Urgent questions about the hydrogencame to INEL scientists. Within twen-ty-four hours, they had modified thepiping at the Semiscale facility to rep-resent the situation at TMI and deliv-ered reassuring information about thehydrogen bubble. Fear of an explosionlifted. President Carter visited the TMIplant for a briefing on the condition ofthe facility, a gesture that soothed thecountry and calmed Harrisburg citizens.A support team flew from INEL to


2 2 4

Three Mile Island Nuclear Station in 1979.

INEEL 79-9362

Pennsylvania and became part of theeffort to secure the plant in a cold shut-down position.8

But the hard-slogging work of investi-gation was just beginning. How couldthe place be cleaned up enough to startanalyzing what had taken place insidethe reactor? What exactly had happenedto the fuel elements inside the reactorvessel? Where had all the fission prod-ucts gone after the fuel-rod claddinghad burst or melted?

The PBF reactor at INEL had beendesigned to continue the tradition ofS P E RT in testing the performance offuel elements during transients, or sud-den bursts of power and heat. But itcould handle a far larger repertoire ofsimulated accident scenarios than couldS P E RT. By this time, the many varietiesof imagined accidents had acquiredhighly specific names and acronyms:reactivity-initiated accidents (RIA),p o w e r-cooling-mismatch (PCM) acci-dents, anticipated transients withoutscram (ATWS), loss-of-coolant acci-dents (LOCA), and severe fuel damage(SFD) accidents. During each accidentsimulation, sophisticated instrumentsrecorded temperatures of fuel, ofcladding, of coolant; the building pres-sure inside the fuel rods; the change inshape of fuel rods during the event.Monitors detected and timed the precisemovement of fission products as theyescaped from a fuel rod whose claddinghad failed. As usual, PBF tests tookplace only after a computer program hadpredicted the results of the test. Constantrefinement—and post-test examinationof melted and mangled fuel rods in a hotcell—brought predictions and actualresults into closer and closer agreement.9

Now the TMI operators wanted to knowthe shape and condition of the fuelinside their damaged pressure vessel.After the PBF had run simulations of theTMI accident, INEL scientists took thetest bundle, still in its container vessel,to A rg o n n e - We s t ’s Neutron Radiography(NRAD) reactor and made neutron radi-ographs of the core. The images showeda combination of melted fuel and a massof rubble collapsed at the bottom.Beverly Cook was one of the INELengineers to take the news to T M I .

We made slides of the images for a pre -sentation to the people in Pennsylvaniaand flew out there. They still had notseen the inside of the TMI vessel. Usingthe PBF simulation, we told them whattheir core would look like. We showedthem zones of melted fuel and how theywould lay over rubble at the bottom.They didn’t believe it. They couldn’tbelieve that so much of their core hadmelted. But we knew that the uraniumoxide in the fuel had interacted withother metals and caused more meltingthan they thought.

Later, when the TMI core was openedup for the remote insertion of cameras,we watched the procedure as it unfold -ed on a videotape. The camera went infrom the top and was gradually sentfurther and further into the vessel. Noone had edited the remarks of the cam -era operators as they were doing this,and we heard them say in amazement,“Where’s the core?” and otherdeletable expletives. They weren’t find -ing anything at all at the top of the ves -sel, just foot after foot of empty space.When they finally got a look at it, thecore lay pretty much exactly as we hadpredicted.10

The connection between INEL and TMIcontinued in many forms. INEL teamsdeveloped training and emergencyresponse techniques for TMI accidentscenarios, many of which had beenlearned because of the post-TMI inves-tigation and the Semiscale tests. Later,INEL scientists helped evaluate the con-dition of the TMI fuel. INEL transporta-tion managers arranged the highlycomplicated task of packaging the fueland other core debris for a trip to Idahofor further examination and temporarystorage.11

The purpose in bringing the fuel to theI N E L was to determine what had takenplace in the core during the accident.What was below the rubble bed and itssolidified sublayer? INEL s p e c i a l i s t sdesigned and built a 20,000-pound “corebore” machine in the thirty months afterthe accident and took it to TMI. A d a p t e dfrom a commercial drilling machine, ithad to fit through an air lock and operater e m o t e l y. The drill bits bit throughceramic and metal to reach the interiorof the reactor vessel. After a hole wasdrilled, a remotely operated televisioncamera inspected the interior of the core.With these techniques the scientistsmapped the core, learned where the fis-sion products were located, and devel-oped a plan to ship the materials safelyto Idaho for further examination andtemporary storage. The last shipment ofTMI debris arrived in Idaho in 1990 andthe fuel examination program continuedfor several years.1 2

After this real accident, which hadinvolved a “small” leak caused by thestuck pressure-relief valve, the focus ofLOFT and Semiscale experiments shift-ed to investigating small leaks and a

C H A P T E R 2 3 • T H E E N D O W M E N T O F U R A N I U M

2 2 5

variety of operational transients andaccident scenarios associated withthem. Whereas PBF had focused onfuel behavior during the accident,LOFT tests focused on the coolingwater. By December 1980, LOFT man-agers had designed a series of tests tosimulate the TMI accident and verifypredictive computer codes. Taken as awhole, these tests persuaded formerdoubters that INEL safety test resultscould be scaled to commercial-sizedpower plants. One of the tests success-fully duplicated an incident that hadoccurred at an Arkansas power plant. 13

The INELtest programs attracted world-wide interest. At first financed by theNRC, sponsorship shifted to the interna-tional Organization of EconomicCooperation and Development inJanuary 1983, which contributed to a$93 million test program that continuedfrom 1983 to 1986. The nuclear testsconcluded in July 1985 with a deliberatemelting of the LOFT r e a c t o r’s test-fuelbundle, somewhat fulfilling LOFT’soriginal destiny as a “meltdown” reactor.One purpose of the test, aside from com-paring actual results with the predictedresults, was to trace the path of fissionproducts released in the melt. The resultssuggested that a failure of the contain-ment vessel was not likely to createnearly the radioactive exposures to thepublic as the most extreme, but theoreti-cal, scenarios had imagined.1 4

Because of the PBF, LOFT, Semiscale,and other safety testing facilities—aTwo-Phase Flow Loop, for example,which examined in minute detail therelationships between steam and waterduring an accident—the INEL hadacquired a global reputation as the best

technical source of data about thebehavior of pressurized-water nuclearpower plants during an accident. TheINEL found that its advanced computercodes, simulators, instrumentation labs,damage analysis capabilities, risk eval-uation techniques, and training methodscontinued to be in demand.15

Since the very beginning of the com-mercial nuclear power industry, theengineers and scientists at the INELhad been among the strong proponentsof the idea that the nation’s nuclearpower plants must operate with animpeccable safety record. They had feltthat their work could make importantcontributions to the safe design andoperation of these plants. At times, theyhad met with resistance in Washingtonalong the way by those who felt thatcommercial plants already had adequatesafety designs. In the end, the nuclearreactor safety codes designed andproved at INEL, known by such namesas RELAP5, TRAC-BD1, and FRAP-CON, were in widespread use by thenuclear industry that initially had beenso skeptical.16

By the time LOFT ran its simulation ofthe TMI accident in 1985, the course ofnuclear research at the Site was rapidlydiminishing. The SPERT series ofexperiments had ended in 1970, andPBF went on standby status in 1985. Atthe Test Reactor Area, the ETR joinedthe MTR in retirement in 1981, leavingonly the ATR to serve the Navy fuelexamination and materials testing pro-grams. Computer power had displacedmany types of experiments formerlyaccomplished with the help of low-power and test reactors. 17

The only corner at INEL engaged in thedevelopment of new reactor conceptswas Argonne-West. Ronald Reagan’selection in 1980 brought fresh politicalsupport for the nation’s nuclear enter-prise, despite a wave of doubt arisingfrom many citizens after the TMI acci-dent. Reagan supported the continuedcommercial development of nuclearpower. He wanted the breeder reactor tomove toward its destiny as a safe, eco-nomically viable solution to energyshortages. At Hanford, the FFTF wentcritical for the first time in 1980 andreached full power in 1982. Supportingit, EBR-II had earlier been transformedinto a materials testing reactor, irradiat-ing candidate fuels and doing relatedsafety testing.

Reagan urged Congress to continue tosupport the construction of a larg edemonstration plant at Clinch River,Tennessee. This project was to befinanced by the joint effort of DOE andcontributions from more than sevenhundred utility companies. The projectwould finally, it was hoped, demon-strate the commercial feasibility andsafety of the Liquid Metal Fast BreederReactor (LMFBR). In its beginning,the concept promised to breed plutoni-um fuel at a rate to double the initialfuel loading in eight to ten years ofo p e r a t i o n .1 8

The impact of Ronald Reagan’s presi-dency was felt in a number of otherways at the Site. In 1983 Reagan under-took the Strategic Defense Initiative(SDI), a research and development pro-gram to devise a defense against inter-continental ballistic missiles. More thanthe breeder program, the SDI off e r e dopportunities to expand the INEL. T h e


2 2 6

Idaho nuclear boosters went to work,crippled as they were by a governor dis-tracted by an injection well and the“green” protest network. Now that fundswere flowing for defense projects, sup-porters hoped that INEL expertise couldattract some of it. Although they hadtried and failed some years earlier toland the (Clinch River) breeder in Idaho,this time they had some success.1 9

Idaho’s major asset in Washington wasnow Senator James McClure. With thehelp of his advocacy, DOE selected theINEL as the site of a New ProductionReactor (NPR) to manufacture tritiumreplenishment for the warheads onPershing II, Trident, and Cruise mis-siles. A spokesperson for the SnakeRiver Alliance asserted that “the peoplecan stop it” and promised to be vocal

about the difference between past INELactivities and this kind of weaponswork. The Idaho Conservation Leagueposition was, “We are, in general,opposed to expansion of all nuclear-related activity at the INEL Site...” Sitepersonnel, on the other hand, beganpreparing for the new reactor.20

DOE next selected INEL as the site fora Special Isotope Separations (SIS)plant to make plutonium for weapons.Not a reactor, the $500 million projectwould import plutonium from Hanford,use lasers to vaporize it and removeimpurities, and then send it to RockyFlats for fabrication. By-productswould remain in Idaho. The project wasto be located at the Chem Plant, andsoon employees began the complexwork of developing this project.21

In October 1983, 240 United StatesMarines had been killed in Lebanon bya terrorist car-bomb. Shocked by thevulnerability of the troops, Congressinsisted on a general upgrade in readi-ness and security against anti-terroristactivity both inside and outside thenation. At INEL, the security force dou-bled in 1984 and the IDO took deliveryof two helicopters by December 1984.Four new guard posts went up aroundthe Site, and DOE attempted to restrictcommercial air traffic from flying overthe Site. Helicopter surveillance patrolsbegan in 1985.22

E v e n t u a l l y, the major nuclear defenseactivities planned for the INEL, theNew Production Reactor and the


2 2 7

Not everyone agreed that the Special Isotope

Separation project was right for the INEL.INEEL 88-121-1-18

INEEL 88-121-1-30

Special Isotope Separations facility,were canceled by DOE, but notbecause of Idaho protests. Secretary ofE n e rgy James Watkins asked Congressin 1990 to cancel the SIS plant becauseweapons needs could be met withexisting plutonium resources. In facthis predecessor, John S. Herrington,had once declared that the nation was“awash in plutonium.” The SovietUnion was coming apart, futureweapons needs were revised, and ageneral downsizing of the weaponscomplex began. The New ProductionReactor faded, as Watkins looked intothe possibility that a linear acceleratorcould produce tritium.2 3

Only one major defense project materi-alized in Idaho, and it had more to dowith conventional than nuclear defense.Still, it was as secret as any traditionalnuclear weapon. When IDO managerTroy Wade announced it in 1983, hecould only describe what it was not: nota reactor, not related to nuclear fusion,and not a space-related project. He saidit didn’t involve weapons or radioactivehazards.24

But the project did involve uranium.And it was intended for non-peacefulpurposes, if not directly as a weapon.The project went under construction inthe fall of 1983. The United StatesArmy had secretly developed an armorpackage using depleted uranium for itsM1-A1 Abrams Main Battle Tank. TheEast Idaho Nuclear Industrial Councilhad been trying to market the emptyhangar building at TAN for years, andthe building at last found a customer.Its expansive clear space was roomyenough to hide an 82,000-square-footbuilding three stories high from the

eyes of satellites passing overhead. Thebuilding—and the remoteness ofIdaho—were ideal for the secret manu-facturing project.25

The junk that had accumulated in theh a n g a r-as-storage-closet over the yearswas moved out of the way, and the IDOhired Exxon Nuclear Idaho Company toset up shop. Fresh barbed wire went uparound the area, and signs went up inthe cafeteria warning workers not to dis-cuss classified information. The hangardoors were welded shut. The A N P ’sn e v e r-used coupling station and hatchaccess to the basement remained in itsoriginal place, encompassed as part of astairway landing and part of a fewo ffices. Because its purpose was secret,Site workers and the press called itProject X. Its official name—SpecificManufacturing Capability (SMC)—gavelittle away. In 1985 Exxon produced thefirst production prototype and by 1988regular shipments headed for Lima,Ohio, where the material was fitted ontothe tanks. The project employed five

hundred people, most of whom managedto do their jobs without knowing howtheir product was to be used.2 6

In 1990 the Army announced to thepublic and to its employees what was


2 2 8

INEEL 91-0116-2-28

Above. Support buildings for Project X went up

around the TAN Hangar. Below. An employee

appreciation day held in 1991 at SMC gave

employees an opportunity to see the M1-A1 Abrams

tank in action.

INEEL 93-293-17-3

being made. Soon after, the tanksreceived their first combat experiencein the 1991 Persian Gulf War, wherethey withstood direct hits from enemyfire. The Army decided to produce1,150 M1-A2 tanks by retrofitting olderM1 tanks. The armor production work,with a reduced work force, was expect-ed to keep the hangar occupied until atleast the year 2003. The formulas andproduction processes remained secret,and the Army merely conceded that thearmor was denser than lead.27

INEL’s move to defense programsproved to be a mixed blessing for rela-tions between INEL and the State ofIdaho. On the one hand, the new pro-jects boosted employment and budgetsat the INEL and, by extension of theeconomic multiplier, the entire econo-my of southeast Idaho. On the otherhand, the defense build-up aroused thegreater energies of pacifists and envi-ronmentalists, who mounted vigorousprotests across the state. These placedthe governor’s office in a predicament.John Evans’ staff, for example, debatedthe political hazards involved should heconsummate a deal with the IDO: Youshut down the Chem Plant injectionwell, and the governor will support thenew defense projects.28

More was new at the Chem Plant inthe early 1980s than Governor Evans’sevaporation pond. A second generationof process facilities was replacing thewell-used originals. Beginning in themid-1970s, new construction had beena constant activity at the Chem Plant.Construction trailers, warehouses, tem-porary contractor office buildings, andlaydown yards cluttered up the com-p l e x .

The old Waste Calcining Facility hadworn out. Small scratches and pits onthe metal surfaces of vessels and pipesattracted deposits of radionuclides thatwere hard, if not impossible, toremove. Hazards to the maintenanceand repair crews were increasing at thesame time that exposure standardswere becoming more stringent. T h edesigners had not anticipated thatwaste feed containing fluorides wouldpass through the pipes and vessels inthe plant, but these and other exoticchemicals had helped to age it.2 9

DOE selected the Ralph M. ParsonsCompany as concept designer of a newcalcining facility. It was to meet fourmain goals: be safer for workers, raisethe process capacity from 1,800 gallonsto 3,000 gallons a day, handle thechemistry of future wastes, and dis-charge even less radioactivity into theatmosphere. Every feature of the plantwas up for improvement—the heatingsystem, the handling of ruthenium,even the shape of the calciner vessel.Federal rules that had followed fromenvironmental protection laws nowrequired that future decontaminationand final decommissioning be consid-ered in the design.30

The new calciner started hot operationsin 1982. In some ways, its design was atribute to the original plant. It was in asingle building with the process cellsbelow grade. Shielded equipment cubi-cles next to the cells housed high-main-tenance items—although this time theyhad air locks. Back-up equipment wasinstalled from the start so that a failurewould not have to shut down a cam-paign. More chores could be doneremotely, so there were more shielded

glass viewing windows and manipula-tors. Old annoyances such as awkwardlifting lugs on heavy objects were elim-inated.31

The makeover of the Chem Plantincluded a better air filtration system, anew Remote Analytical Laboratory, andother upgrades. New locker rooms anda cafeteria replaced their worn-out orig-inals. The uranium reprocessing plantitself was rebuilt in stages beginning in1979. This time, new fuel storagebasins were located adjacent to theprocess building so fuel could moveunderwater directly to the dissolvers.The arrangement eliminated the tediousloading and unloading of casks for anoverland journey of one-third of a mile.The huge pools had 2,600 fuel storagepositions. The process cells could dis-solve modern fuel elements usinghydrofluoric acid. The method had beeninvented at INEL, so the process wasnamed “Fluorinel.” The $200 millionplant featured remote- and computer-controlled management of the process.Despite its great cost, the plant wasexpected to recover enough uraniumand other commercial by-products infive years to pay back the cost—andcontinue efficiently for decades tocome.32

Beyond the INEL, most of the AEC’sold demonstration power plants hadlong since come to the end of theiroperational life. Their nuclear fuel,some of which had been exotic orunusual, needed to be removed. If theunfissioned U-235 could not be recov-ered, it needed secure storage some-where. The AEC assigned some of it toIdaho, handing the Chem Plant a newmission: storing the fuel. Some of it,


2 2 9


2 3 0

The INEL work in reactor safety wasa complex and detailed interactionbetween the familiar procedures of

scientific inquiry: making predictionsand then verifying them with empiricaltests. Each test confirmed the predic-tion or helped to refine the next itera-tion. Computers made itpossible to model systems withhuge numbers of variables. Thesafety tests at the INELinvolved several interrelatedprograms, among which were:

A D V A N C E D C O D E D E V E LO P M E N T

Predicted the thermal hydraulicbehavior of coolant in the pri-mary coolant system based onnew models. The modelsresulted from small-scaleexperiments, carefully instru-mented to obtain accurate data.The models were incorporated in anoverall code called RELAP.

F U E L B E H A V I O R P R O G RA M

Tested the performance of fuel pins inconditions of normal and transient con-ditions. Tests were done in the MTR,ETR, and ATR. The work included thecreation and experimental confirmationof a Fuel Rod Analysis Program(FRAP) using the Power Burst Facility.

F U L L- L E N G T H E M E R G E N C Y C O R E

H E A T I N G T E S T S ( F L E C H T )Using twelve-foot non-nuclear bundlesof fuel rods, tests determined the effec-tiveness of emergency core coolingsystems in pressurized-water reactors.

F I SS I O N P R O D U C T B E H A V I O R

E X P E R I M E N T S

Small-scale tests helped assess theaccuracy of computer models describ-ing the release of fission products andwhere they went after a loss-of-coolantaccident (LOCA).

C O N T A I N M E N T A N A LY S I S P R O G RA M

Experiments were performed at SandiaNational Laboratory and in Idaho;additional analytical work was done atthe INEL.

E M E R G E N C Y C O R E C O O L I N G

S Y S T E M S A N A LY S I S

Combination of experimentaland analytical work that evaluat-ed and predicted how productsmade by various manufacturerswould actually perform. Resultsof Semiscale and LOFT e x p e r i-ments were part of this program.

S E M I S C A L E

Experiments tested and verifiedcomputer models of LOCAs. Inthe event of a leak in a primary

coolant system, water pressure wouldfall, a process called “blowdown.”Semiscale studied this thermal-hydraulic phenomenon in detail.

LO F T I N T E G RA L T E S T P R O G RA M

An experimental reactor providedempirical data supporting behavior pre-dictions for pressurized-water reactorsunder LOCAconditions. The programevaluated engineered safety featuresand assessed the margins of safety intheir performance.

R e a c t o r S a f e t y T e s t i n g

Developed at INEL, RELAP5 is a program that

gives over 50,000 computational instructions to a

large computer. It calculates overall nuclear

power plant system responses to accident

situations such as the one at Three Mile Island.

INEEL 82-4005

like the special graphite fuel used inrocket propulsion experiments inNevada, could not be stored in waterdue to undesirable chemical reactions.

So dry storage cells were added to theChem Plant landscape. Fuel from PeachBottom Atomic Power Station,Pennsylvania, and Ft. St. Vrain NuclearGenerating Station, Colorado, eventual-ly arrived in Idaho for safekeeping.

Meanwhile, the power of anti-nuclearprotests (overshadowed, some histori-ans think, by the management mistakesof the electric utility industry) wasderailing the progress for uranium thatscientists and policy-makers had takenfor granted since the 1950s. Scientistshad expected, first, that breeders wouldeventually replace water-moderatedreactors because only breeders fulfilledthe endowment of all uranium, not just

the tiny percent of U-235 in the naturalmetal, as a benefit to human society.Water-moderated reactors had been eas-ier to develop, but they wasted urani-um. Second, the nuclear industry wouldreprocess spent fuel in commercialplants similar to the Chem Plant. Spentfuel would not be stored indefinitely asa waste, but recycled to conserve theresource. Third, the disposition ofradioactive waste would in due courseyield to both scientific and politicalsolutions.33

President Carter and many of his staffbelieved that civilian nuclear energyoffered opportunities for the illicitassembly of nuclear weapons. A LosAlamos physicist named TheodoreTaylor contended that it would be easyto divert nuclear materials from com-mercial operations and make bombs. Asa nuclear weapons insider since theManhattan Project, Taylor’s credibilitywas regarded as excellent by many, andhe described his fears in forums such asthe New Yorker magazine. At the sametime, the number of nations in theworld which had developed sufficientexpertise to conduct nuclear weaponstests grew to include India, which deto-nated a nuclear device in May 1974.Brazil and Pakistan seemed to be nextin line; West Germany was about tosend Brazil both a fuel enrichmentplant and a fuel reprocessing plant.34


2 3 1

Above. Peach Bottom fuel elements, consisting of

uranium and thorium carbides clad in graphite,

before they were loaded into the reactor. The reactor

went critical on March 3, 1966, with 682 elements

loaded in the core. Left. The New Waste Calcining

Facility calciner vessel.

AEC-67-7886

INEEL 81-3072

Carter decided to eliminate as manyopportunities for the “proliferation” ofnuclear weapons as possible. He perma-nently canceled construction of a com-mercial fuel reprocessing plant atBarnwell, South Carolina. Henceforth,spent fuel had to be stored in heavilyshielded facilities at power plants orelsewhere. Hoping to enlist the rest ofthe international nuclear community inthe cause, Carter then supported anInternational Nuclear Fuel CycleEvaluation (INFCE), a technical studyof the characteristics—including theirpotential attraction for illicit diver-sion—of reactor fuels in use around theworld. Carter opposed the Clinch Riverbreeder demonstration, althoughCongress continued to fund it. RonaldReagan defeated Carter and threw hissupport behind Clinch River, but thegovernment’s investment in the projectwas rising at an unacceptable rate.Congress ended the project in 1983.35

With reprocessing activities canceleddue to fears of proliferation, ClinchRiver canceled because of spiralingcosts, and anxiety about radioactivewaste generating political protests allover the country, the old template forthe progress of uranium was renderedcompletely obsolete.

Still, the situation offered someone anopportunity to be brilliant. The death ofClinch River, the fuel for which was tobe a uranium oxide, opened the door toa new way of thinking about breeders.At Argonne, physicist Charles Till tookcharge of Argonne’s nuclear reactorprogram in 1980. Earlier, he had direct-ed the technical work of one ofINFCE’s working groups. Up untilnow, the evolution of reactors had

flowed more or less from the revela-tions of science. Society and the envi-ronment had been forced to adaptaccordingly. Perhaps it was time that areactor design meet the specificationsof society.36

That was Till’s insight. As he comparedClinch River’s oxide fuel to othertypes, its many disadvantages becamestartlingly clear. For one thing, the fuelwould have to be reprocessed usingtechnology that would purify the pluto-nium, an imagined opportunity fordiversion. Till returned to the idea of ametal fuel along the lines that the EBR-II team had been developing—andrecycling on-site—before Milton Shawhad truncated its progress. The oldEBR-II fuel was uranium, substantiallyenriched, but uranium only. A new fuelshould contain a mix of uranium andplutonium because the fissile materialcreated in the reactor would includeplutonium, and the plutonium—in

metal form—should be part of the recy-cling process. Till said later,

Metal fuel had a number of advantages.It was cheap, easy to make. The LMFBRfuel was expensive and it needed a hugeexpensive facility for re p rocessing thatmight be economic if it could serve fiftybig reactors, but the problem was get -ting from the first to the fiftieth.


2 3 2

Above. Well-guarded bunker at the Chem Plant

(CPP-651) stores uranium. Below. Operating floor of

EBR-II reactor (inside the dome).

Argonne National Laboratory-West CC5262

INEEL 98-0537

We needed a different kind of reprocess -ing. It should be cheap, be part of thereactor plant and be as easy to dealwith as routine maintenance. Just turnthe fuel around. A couple of the oldpyroprocessing people at Argonne Eastsaid, “We think we can make electrore -fining work.” They were the bestchemists in the world in that field, forthey had worked with it before. Theyhad the expertise to recognize that thismight be possible.37

So Till and his colleagues developed anew reactor concept. At the time, theArgonne Lab was, like the INEL andother national labs, considering whatnew initiatives were available in theworld of the mid-1980s. Argonne’sBoard of Governors was asking for pro-posals. Till prepared one. But first, hemade a pilgrimage to visit Hans Bethe.Bethe had been the head of theoreticalphysics at Los Alamos during theManhattan Project and was revered asone of the giants of 20th-centuryphysics. Till called on him at CornellUniversity and described the physics ofthe new reactor concept.

We packed up and I took the leadingperson in each technical field with me.We crowded into his small office, andeach man gave him a one-hour brief -ing. As he understood a point, he wouldsay, “Yes, yes, yes,” indicating that youshould move along.

At the end he said, “All the pieces fit.What do you want me to do?”

Bethe’s affirmation that the reactor wassensible, simple, and likely to work wasall that Till wanted. Bethe had a reputa-tion as someone who never sugar-coat-

ed his opinions, and he stated his opin-ion of Till’s reactor in letters to thePresident’s science advisor, the chair-man of the Senate Energy Committee,and Idaho’s Senator James McClure.The support of each of these individu-als was necessary to start the project.McClure needed assurance that in sup-porting a project of obvious benefit tohis home state, he would be on solidtechnical ground. Support for the pro-ject followed soon after the letters.38

Till drove to the Board of Governor’smeeting to make his proposal. On thew a y, he realized that he had not giventhe reactor a name. He decided onIntegral Fast Reactor (IFR). It was asomewhat opaque name that declined touse the baggage-laden word “breeder”but highlighted the integration of thereactor with on-site fuel recycling. T h u sprepared, Till began by listing the speci-fications that the world of the 1980sseemed to be asking of a nuclear reactor.

World population was growing, he said.Demand for electricity would continueto grow. It was important to conserveall energy resources. It was importantto limit greenhouse gases and preventrapid global climate change. Asian andother economies desired a growingshare of the world’s energy resources ifthey were to meet rising expectationsfor a better material life. At the sametime, fear of plutonium diversion wascurbing nuclear development. Water-moderated reactors were producing plu-tonium as a waste in their spent fuel,and this material was piling up.Isolating it for centuries was a tremen-dous expense, and in the United States,at least, the political system had thusfar failed to decide where to store it.

And finally, after the TMI accident, thepublic was losing its faith in the safetyof nuclear energy.39

Taking all that into account, a newreactor should be inherently safe, burnup plutonium in a manner discouragingdiversion, and not generate large vol-umes of long-lasting waste. The IFRmet these conditions, and EBR-II inIdaho could prove it.

Argonne committed to the project,DOE agreed to fund it, and Till had hischarter. Engineers began to modifyEBR-II, the fuel recycling facility, andTREAT for their new mission. No onehad made even small experimentalquantities of metal fuels for at least fif-teen years, but Leon Walters, the headof EBR-II metallurgy, knew how it wasdone. Within a few months, he had fab-ricated the fuel elements, and the oldroutine of carrying out nuclear experi-ments to prove a principle began oncemore at the INEL.40


2 3 3


Dr. Charles Till

C H A P T E R T W E N T Y - F O U R

2 3 4

TH E URA N I U M TRA I L FA D E SWe are eliminating programs that are no longer needed, such as nuclear

power research and development. (Applause.)

—President Bill Clinton, State of the Union Address, 1993—

The techniciansloaded EBR-II with the new IFR fuelpins. Made of plutonium, uranium, andzirconium, the fuel pins conducted heatwell, a virtue that helped to keep thetemperature of the fuel low.Furthermore, the first test assemblieshad achieved a nineteen to twenty per-cent burnup rate, which was far betterthan what Charles Till considered nec-essary for commercial feasibility.Commercial water-moderat-ed reactors were still averag-ing only three to four percentburnup. If the rest of the IFRtests went as well as the fuelburnup demonstration, theIFR might change the worldof nuclear energy rather dra-matically. 1

This April day in 1986 wasthe moment to prove that anuclear reactor could be safebecause of the natural lawsof physics, not because ofcomplex, highly engineeredemergency systems and consistenthuman performance. The reactor sat inEBR-II’s tank of liquid sodium coolant,ready for the test. For over twenty

years, this solid little sodium-cooledreactor had run safely and reliably, con-tributing electricity steadily to the Site.The coolant, which had a poor reputa-tion among some engineers because itreacts with water and air, in fact con-ducted heat (very well) and operated atatmospheric pressure. The piping wasnever subjected to the stresses intro-duced to a system when water circulat-ed under high pressure. In practicalexperience, the sodium coolant hadproved to be a non-problem. Sodium

had the additional benefit of not causingcorrosion or the crud that went with it.2

The designers of the IFR fuel felt that itssafety reliability rested on the fact thathot metal expands. If the pencil-thin fuelpins overheated, the metal would swelland the plutonium and uranium atomswould move farther apart from oneanother and lose reactivity. If the coolantfailed to circulate for some reason, thechain reaction should shut down beforethe fuel could melt, all without any help

from scram buttons or con-trol rods.

At least, that was the prin-ciple to be proved. As inthe exciting days of the1950s, Argonne invited dis-tinguished visitors from allover the world—utilityexecutives, scientists, andrepresentatives of govern-ments—to witness whatthey hoped would be a his-toric day. The plan was tosimulate a complete electri-cal blackout occurring

while the reactor operated at full power.They would initiate two types of acci-dents that day. In the first, the pumpswould “fail” to move the coolant, pre-


Visitors at EBR-II during the first test on April 3,

1986, watch gauges that show the coolant

temperature rise—and fall—after the coolant pump

“failed.”

Space was available at the Irradiated Fuel Storage Facility for additional fuel from Ft. St. Vrain reactor.

Distances and dividers were arranged to prevent accidental criticalities.INEEL 74-110

saging the accident at Chernobyl laterthat month; and in the second, the heatexchange between the reactor core andthe electrical generator would cease, ashad happened at TMI.

As the experiment began the reactor wasat full power. The pumps then shutdown. Till and the others eyed thegauges. The temperature in the reactorshot straight up, “not a pretty sight toanyone who’s had anything to do with ar e a c t o r,” observed Till later. But the tem-perature spiked quickly, and within afew minutes the reactor’s power droppedto zero. The temperature returned to nor-mal. The IFR operators, meanwhile,stood back, their hands in the air, so tospeak, disengaged from the controls.Neither they nor an emergency corecooling system had been necessary forthe reactor to recover safely all byi t s e l f .3

“It worked on the blackboard, it workedin computer simulations, and the engi-neers were willing to bet their lives thatit would work in practice,” wrote anadmiring reporter of the demonstration.The implications for a commercial reac-tor were good: an IFR would need lessreliance on emergency power and corecooling accessories, reducing the capitalcost of the plant. Afew environmentalo rganizations took notice of the IFR. Aspokeswoman for the Audubon Societysaid that she supported the developmentof solar energy as the best way to savethe planet from fossil fuel heat contami-nation, but she also favored testing“these so-called idiot-proof reactors.”4

The Argonne team now could move onto prove the next principle: that the IFRcould solve the nuclear waste problem.

Like all other reactor fuels, the IFR fuelgenerated fission and activation prod-ucts, the latter of which included pluto-nium, americium, and the otherlong-lived TRU elements. These ele-ments required isolation from the envi-ronment for centuries, and these werethe ones to be recycled as IFR fuel. Bycontrast, the most dangerously ener-getic fission products would decay toharmless levels within a few hundredyears.

Recycling was to be done within thesame doughnut-shaped arg o n - a t m o s-phere cell next door to EBR-II whereA rgonne had re-cast uranium metalfuel in the 1960s. The recipe beganwith chopping up the fuel and dissolv-ing it in a solution of cadmium andmolten salt. Upon applying an electriccurrent through the material, the pluto-nium and uranium (and other TRU ele-ments and some fission products)accumulated on collector electrodes.The rest of the fission products

remained in the cadmium and salt.Thus separated, the uranium and pluto-nium could be recast into new fuel pinsand sent back to the reactor to generatemore electricity. The rest was waste,


2 3 6

Above. Using a glovebox, a technician perf o rms a quality

assurance check on a new IFR fuel pin. Below. The

exterior shape of the Fuel Cycle Facility reflects the

c i rcular arc h i t e c t u re of the arg o n - a t m o s p h e re laboratory.


Argonne National Laboratory-West Q12088

but it lacked the great volumes of cont-aminated water and long-half-lifechemicals typical of Chem Plant recov-ery processes.

The recycling of plutonium promisedto assuage fears about terrorist diver-sion. Because the plutonium wasmixed up with other TRU elements andfission products, it was dirty, impure,and highly radioactive, not the kind of“weapons grade” material required formaking bombs. If someone managed tosteal it, the would-be bomb-makerwould have to refine it in a facilitysimilar to the Chem Plant. Terrorists orrogue states wouldhave a hard timehiding one of those.

A rgonne proceeded.Additional prepara-tions and safetystudies wererequired beforelaunching the finalexperiments. W h e nall was ready, EBR-II would need toburn IFR fuel in thereactor for twoyears or so, recyclethe spent fuel intonew fuel pins, andthen burn the newfuel for another twoyears. This would“close the loop” and demonstrate thecontinued reliability of the reactoroperating on its new recycled fuelwhile producing electricity at the samet i m e .

Three weeks after the IFR fuel hadpassed its test so well, an accidentoccurred at the Chernobyl reactor in theUSSR, overshadowing the good news.Far worse than the TMI accident, steamand fuel vapor explosions blew the topoff the reactor and released into theatmosphere great quantities of radioac-tivity, more than that released in thebombing of Hiroshima. Opponents ofnuclear power felt confirmed in theirobjections to any and all nuclear reac-tors, even the IFR. To the shelves ofnuclear literature were added bookswith titles such as as Final Warning:The Legacy of Chernobyl.5

I n i t i a l l y, the stark contrast between thesafe and harmless shutdown of EBR-IIand the dramatic events at Chernobyl—each initiated by the same turning off ofthe coolant pumps—worked to theadvantage of the IFR, but as the decadeended, the political environment inWashington, D.C., became more hostileto the IFR. Many of the nuclear oppo-nents from the Carter years still wieldedinfluence at policy-making levels.Consumer advocates like Ralph Nadercalled for the government to give upnuclear research altogether and concen-trate on renewable energy alternatives.By the time Bill Clinton won election

as president in1992, the weightof political senti-ment continued tobe unfavorable fornuclear power. Infact, in his firstState of the Unionaddress, he toldCongress that hefelt nuclear powerresearch was nolonger needed.6

To nuclear oppo-nents, the IFRlooked like anyother dangerousp l u t o n i u m - b r e e d-ing reactor. T h eprogram was can-

celed in 1994, despite the best efforts ofthe Idaho congressional delegation tokeep the project funded. A rgonne shutdown EBR-II for the last time onSeptember 30, 1994. It had not had itschance to demonstrate the full fuelcycle. After a technically sensationalthirty-year run, the reactor was grounded

C H A P T E R 2 4 • T H E U R A N I U M T R A I L F A D E S

2 3 7

The Integral Fast Reactor concept. Fuel makes

electricity and when spent, goes next door to be

recycled as new fuel pins.


for political reasons before it couldprove its most important principle.7

Like a spool that had tumbled to theground and unwound its thread, INELresearch on new reactor concepts rolledto a stop. Many INEL scientists hadinvested their careers and their patrio-tism on the proposition that the UnitedStates should become and remain theworld leader in nuclear technology. Itappeared to them that such leadershipwas now likely to pass to Japan orsome other nation. It was a moment ofprofound and, for some, bitter regret.

The Cold War, one of the igniters ofpatriotism, was a spool that had cometo the end of its thread as well.Perestroika and Glasnost changed theUSSR. Lithuania declared itself inde-pendent of the Soviet “union.” TheUSSR collapsed. The Berlin Wall camedown. In November 1990 PresidentGeorge Bush said the Cold War wasover. American defense spendingdeclined, and the U.S. Navy scaledback its nuclear fleet. With this, theNavy’s training needs diminished andthe Navy started to close some of itstraining facilities.8

At the INEL, the Navy shut down itsreactors and the research and trainingprograms associated with them. It hadshut down the S1W prototype onOctober 17, 1989, before the Cold Wa rhad ended, citing the prototype’s ageand the high cost of its continued opera-tion. Its last core had operated for twen-ty-two years, the longest of any nuclearreactor core in the world at that time.The A 1 W prototype ran until January1994, and S5G until May 1995. The reg-ular arrival and departure of trainees

ended. Only the Expended Core Facilityremained. Despite a diminished fleetcomplement, the Navy planned to con-tinue shipping reactor cores to Idaho.9

Thus the number of reactors actuallyoperating at the INEL went down tothree. The ATR and the ATRC (its low-power auxiliary) remained operating asan essential part of the Navy’s fuelexamination and materials testing pro-gram. Indeed, the Navy was the ATR’sbiggest customer, although the reactorcontinued to manufacture isotopes ofinterest to medical and industrial mar-kets. At Argonne-West, the low-powerNRAD reactor operated from time totime as a tool for neutron radiography,a method of taking pictures of radioac-tive materials by directing a stream ofneutrons at the subject. NRAD hadtaken the pictures of the TMI fuel-fail-ure simulations. The TREAT reactorwas in standby at Argonne, but withoutan assignment. The uranium trail was

carrying the merest trickle of freshreactor fuel into Idaho. 10

H o w e v e r, DOE still needed to shipRocky Flats TRU waste and spent reactorfuel to INEL for storage. The Idaho gov-e r n o r, on the other hand, did not supportthese missions. In stark contrast to its tol-erance of INEL’s earlier nuclear missions,the governor’s office now wrestled withDOE to keep these forms of uranium andplutonium from entering the state.Although the IDO played a role in thestruggles, the decisions about INEL m i s-sions in the scheme of things came pri-marily from DOE in Washington, D.C.

The wrestling match had begun notlong after Cecil D. Andrus becameIdaho governor for his third term in


2 3 8

Boise State University Library ISS 102

Admiral Bruce DeMars (left) and Governor Cecil

Andrus discuss naval nuclear propulsion in the S5G

prototype.

1986. He had returned to the state afterserving the Carter administration andtook office after John Evans completedhis second term. Andrus knew that thedecade of the 1970s had passed withoutDOE removing any buried waste fromthe INEL. But he could also see thatduring the 1980s, DOE had prepared adeep underground salt cavern nearCarlsbad, New Mexico, to isolate andstore the waste. In 1988 the WasteIsolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) seemednearly ready to open. 11

In September 1988 Andrus and DonOfte, who had followed Troy Wade asIDO manager in 1987, went to NewMexico for a first-hand look at theWIPP. While there, Andrus was unableto extract from DOE officials an open-ing date for the plant. New Mexicoopponents were promoting delay, andAndrus feared that the decade of the1980s also would pass without anywaste leaving Idaho. Meanwhile,Rocky Flats continued sending waste tothe INEL. For Andrus, the predicamentwith the INEL had not changed. As hehad observed more than once, the INELwas of enormous importance to theIdaho economy. It seemed that the onlyway to ensure public confidence in theINEL was to protect its environmentalintegrity and restore the Site’s credibili-ty with the public. That meant remov-ing any reasonable possibility that theaquifer could become contaminatedbecause of buried radioactive waste.12

Andrus contemplated what strategies asmall state like Idaho might use to mus-cle the federal government into openingWIPP and proceeding with the removalof waste from Idaho. One idea was toshine a very bright light on the problem

and make it pertinent to the nationalgovernment and other states as well. Ashe wrote later, he had learned from hisexperience as a cabinet secretary that“the government in our nation’s capitolreacts only to crises.” He set out to cre-ate one.13

On October 20, 1988, after DOE off i-cially postponed the opening of W I P P,Andrus ordered the Idaho State Police tostop at the border any railcars bringingshipments from Rocky Flats to INEL.The order stranded a boxcar that hadcome as far as Blackfoot but had notcompleted its journey to the INEL. DOEhonored the closure and turned away ashipment from Illinois before it had achance to reach a roadblock at the Idahob o r d e r. CBS television invited the gov-ernor to appear on its morning news pro-gram. On October 23, a Sunday, theNew York Ti m e s published a photographof an Idaho state trooper, his arms fold-ed across his chest and eyes shaded bythe visor of his hat, standing in front ofhis patrol car guarding the boxcar.Andrus had his bright light. “They have

broken their word too many times,”Andrus said of DOE’s failure to openW I P P. “They cannot give us a date.”DOE turned the Blackfoot car aroundand sent it back to Rocky Flats.14

The governor’s actions did not openW I P P, but it shut off the flow ofRocky Flats waste to the INEL. Itmight also have shut off shipments ofTMI fuel to Idaho, but Ofte persuadedAndrus not to:

Not long after Rocky Flats shut down, Idiscussed with [Andrus] and his staff allof the materials coming to the INEL.The TMI fuel was controversial, andA n d rus wanted to stop that, too. Iexplained how we had been tasked toanalyze the TMI accident because wew e re the uniquely qualified facility in thec o u n t ry with the capability to do it. Wehad cooperative agreements with theGermans and the Japanese, and this was


2 3 9

Shoshone-Bannock tribal police block train

shipment of Naval spent fuel.

Idaho State Journal

a nationally and internationally impor -tant project. He agreed to let it enter thestate, and we shook hands. He told mel a t e r, he re g retted it, but he said hew o u l d n ’t go back on his word .1 5

As it happened, DOE shut down produc-tion at Rocky Flats temporarily inDecember 1989 to deal with safety andmanagement problems at the site, inter-rupting the production of waste that oth-erwise would have gone to Idaho. In1991, after reassessing military require-ments in the post-Cold War world, DOEdecided that its arsenals no longer need-ed fresh nuclear warheads, and DOEstopped making plutonium weaponsparts at the plant.1 6

The concept of “waste dump” took on anew meaning when Andrus learned in1990 that INEL planned to accept forstorage at the Chem Plant spentgraphite fuel from the Public ServiceCompany of Colorado, which wasdecommissioning its Fort St. Vrainreactor in Platteville. The fuel belongedto DOE, which had a contract with theutility company to store the fuel after ithad been used up. DOE had built theIrradiated Fuel Storage Facility at theChem Plant in 1975. It already storedfuel from Fort St. Vrain that had beenshipped many years previously. Thesenext shipments would send the balanceof the fuel and fill hundreds of remain-ing vacant storage cells.

Andrus saw this move as new evidenceof DOE’s intention to convert INEL’s“superb laboratory” into a “de factowaste dump.” He once again threatenedto mobilize the state police to stop ship-ments at the Idaho border. T h eShoshone-Bannock Tribe supported him,

attempting to forbid shipments on thestretch of interstate highway crossing itsreservation on the way to INEL.1 7

Much of the subsequent struggle tookplace in the courts. A long series oflegal filings ensued and kept the IDOlegal staff and the governor ’s attorneysbusy for the next several years. Withthe help of temporary injunctions,Idaho managed to prevent the fuel fromentering the state until September of1991, when the 9th Circuit Court ofAppeals in San Francisco sided withColorado and DOE. Andrus’s roadblockwas ruled unconstitutional.

Idaho responded with another wave oflitigation. During a short interlude in thefall of 1991 in which no judicial injunc-tion prohibited fuel shipments, at leasttwo Colorado shipments made it into theChem Plant. Another injunction soonfollowed, and those shipments proved tobe the last. The Colorado utility decidednot to await the final outcome of the

legal battles, which it feared could takeyears. It wanted to remodel Fort St.Vrain as a gas-fired power plant andproceeded to erect a spent-fuel storagebuilding next door to the reactor.1 8

In April 1992 DOE announced that itwould no longer reprocess any spentnuclear fuel at the Chem Plant. Thecountry’s need for enriched uraniumwas much reduced, it said. Since July1988 the Chem Plant had processed nofuel while its underground pipes hadbeen upgraded (placed in double con-duit as extra protection against leaks),and now the shutdown was to be per-manent. The Chem Plant would storespent Navy fuel instead of reprocessingit. The question of how long the fuelwould be stored was unclear. At thedirection of Congress, DOE was con-


2 4 0

Barrels of Rocky Flats waste stand in a certification

staging area ready to go to the Waste Isolation Pilot

Plant in 1989.

INEEL89-631-1-8

sidering a site at Yucca Mountain,Nevada, as a potential place to storespent reactor fuel. But the technical andultimate political viability of this ideawas far from certain.19

This turn of events brought Navy fuelinto the continuing swarm of litigation,court orders, and political spotlights.Previously, Andrus had not sought tointerfere with Navy fuel shipments intoIdaho, partly because he considered theNavy’s business a matter of nationalsecurity and partly because the fuel hadtraditionally been reprocessed at theChem Plant. However, he saw storagewithout reprocessing as an entirely newkind of mission. He soon concludedthat the Navy saw Idaho as a weakstate, a remote place where it could“dump” its spent nuclear fuel. He want-ed such activity placed under the scruti-ny of the nation’s environmental laws.20

Meanwhile, the IDO had embarked onthe preparation of an EnvironmentalImpact Statement (EIS) on waste man-agement at the INEL, a study thatwould include waste burial practicesand environmental restoration at theSite. (DOE Headquarters was to do aparallel study on its national wastemanagement program.) Upon a findingby the U.S. District judge that DOE’Snational program for the disposition ofits spent fuel also should be subject toan EIS, DOE decided to add this item,national in scope, to the EIS alreadyunderway. Later, the study alsoembraced the Navy’s spent fuel.21

The expensive project placed the bur-den of effort on the IDO staff in IdahoFalls to prepare and coordinate a docu-ment affecting Navy and DOE spent

nuclear fuel operations across the entirenational DOE complex—as well as avery large percentage of the work doneat the INEL. It was a huge undertaking.The forces in conflict—the state ofIdaho, the U.S. Navy, and DOE—nowrelied on an EIS to fulfill their conflict-ing hopes. The Navy wanted to send itsfuel to Idaho. Idaho wanted a scientificdocument to demonstrate that storingTRU waste and spent fuel above theaquifer was environmentally unaccept-able. DOE wanted to manage its nation-al responsibilities and use its resourcesat the INEL in the most optimal way,hopefully welcomed by its host state.

The nation’s environmental laws, whichhad been conferring on the states newpowers of participation, intervention,and comment on federal activities eversince the beginning of the environmentalmovement, had given Idaho standing todiscuss and influence the Site’s internala ffairs. In the old debate between theSite and Idaho about states’rights, theenvironmental movement had swung thependulum decidedly in favor of Idaho. 2 2


2 4 1

The Fluorinel and Storage Facility at the Chem Plant

in 1985. Fuel stored at the Chem Plant’s 1950s-built

storage basin was to move into this new facility.

INEEL 85-267-1-8

The court had told the Navy that whilethe EIS was being prepared, it couldnot ship its fuel into the Site. The Navyneeded to defuel its ships, wished tosend the fuel to Idaho, and didn’t wantto wait for the years it might takebefore a final EIS was published. TheNavy decided to negotiate withGovernor Andrus, hoping to ease thecourt’s injunction before the EIS wascompleted. Soon the Secretary of theNavy himself, John H. Dalton, wastrading letters with Andrus about whatthey might agree upon.

Andrus had a list of items to place onthe negotiation table. The Snake RiverAlliance had recently brought toAndrus’s attention a technical studythat had questioned the reliability of theChem Plant’s 1950s-built storage basin(Building CPP-603) in an earthquake.Therefore, Andrus insisted that spentfuel being stored in this building bemoved to safer quarters. In general,spent fuel should be stored above-ground and dry, not below ground inpools of water. Also, DOE should speedup the calcining of sodium-bearing liq-uid waste sitting in the aging storagetanks at the Chem Plant. Aside from thefreedom to ship reactor cores to Idaho,the Navy wanted Andrus to help per-suade the environmental community toaccept whatever agreement they made.“Let’s all be heroes,” wrote Dalton.23

When the discussions were over, theNavy was allowed to ship nineteen (ofsixty-four) containers of fuel to Idaho,plus any others certified to be neededfor national security. DOE agreed toaccelerate the items on Idaho’s worklist and to make grants supporting thediversification of the economy in east-ern Idaho. The IDO staff, alreadyembarked on its massive EIS, wasgiven milestone dates and had to com-plete the study on an aggressivelyaccelerated schedule. The Navy andDOE agreed not to appeal the judge’sinjunction on further shipments or hisdecision requiring DOE to examine theagency’s spent nuclear fuel program inan EIS. With Idaho’s assent, the judgeamended the order and allowed thenineteen shipments.24

When DOE published for public reviewand comment the Draft EIS in June1994, the governor’s office was nothappy with the document. It was notcomprehensive, said Idaho, and it failedto evaluate the cumulative impacts of

waste storage or to consider alterna-tives; its proposed action program wasvague. In November, the Navy asked ifIdaho would allow eight more contain-ers. Andrus refused.25

But Andrus was about to leave the IdahoStatehouse, and the Navy’s request fellinto the lap of Phil Batt, the new gover-n o r. Batt allowed the additional contain-ers. He told protesting Idaho citizens hewas convinced that a court or Congresswould decide that the Navy shipmentswere a matter of national security.2 6

The Final EIS was published in A p r i l1995 and its subsequent Record ofDecision in June. The Record ofDecision identified which of the alterna-tives developed in the EIS that DOEintended to implement. It indicated thatthe INEL could receive nearly 2,000shipments of (Navy and other) spentnuclear fuel and additional shipments ofTRU waste, but mentioned no require-ment that the material ever leave Idaho.Batt decided to try to fulfill Idaho’s long-


2 4 2

At 7:00 a.m. on April 27, 1999, the first truckload of

transuranic waste leaves the Radioactive Waste

Management Complex for WIPP. Buildings in

background store waste above ground.INEEL99-237-1-27

time mission: to obtain from DOE awritten schedule for removing waste—and now spent fuel—from the state. T h ecitizens of Idaho had to be assured thatI N E L would not threaten the SnakeRiver Plain Aquifer by transforming theSite into a “dump” for nuclear waste.2 7

The new governor and his staff still feltthat eventually the court would forceIdaho to allow Navy fuel into theINEL. The question was whether Idahomight obtain any concessions fromDOE or the Navy. The Navy was run-ning out of options to hold nuclear fuelat its shipyards, threatening its ability todefuel ships and support the fleet, andthe conflict was inhibiting DOE fromcarrying out its missions at the INEL.All parties chose to negotiate.28

DOE representatives began makingtrips to neutral ground, cities likeChicago or Minneapolis, to meet theirNavy and Idaho counterparts. They metin a law office or hotel rooms; some-times the principals holed up together,

sending their aides and lawyers outsideto await developments. After one suchsession lasting several hours, one ofthem stepped outside and said, “Wehave a deal.” The terms were refinedthroughout September, and an agree-ment was signed on October 16, 1995.29

The Idaho Settlement Agreement was adetailed import/export list itemizingwhat could enter the state and what mustleave and by when. With many interimmilestones—including shipments ofRocky Flats waste to WIPP—the fulfill-ment of the Settlement was set for 2035.The stored fuel and TRU waste wouldall be gone. Penalties for DOE failurewould cost it $60,000 a day after 2035.At last, Idaho had it “in writing.”3 0

After Batt signed the Agreement, thosewho opposed it attempted but failed torecall him from office. Opponents thengathered enough signatures to place onthe ballot an initiative, PropositionThree, to nullify the Agreement andrequire voter approval for the receipt of

radioactive waste. After a spirited cam-paign in which “Stop the Shipments”battled “Get the Waste Out,” Idaho vot-ers soundly rejected the proposition andsupported Batt’s action by a margin ofnearly two to one. 31

Throughout the Idaho campaign to openW I P P and to fend off the entry of addi-tional waste and spent nuclear fuel forlong-term storage in Idaho, the role ofscience, technical analysis, and riskassessment had been relatively minor.The heart of the problem had been oneof public perception. Settling it—andrestoring the credibility of the INEL a san environmentally sound neighbor—hadrequired political risk and eventually acareful collaboration—a partnership—between the IDO managers and the gov-e r n o r’s office. As of 1999, it seemed as ifthey may have succeeded. The DOE (andthe Navy) were meeting their SettlementAgreement milestones. W I P P opened in1999, and the first barrels of TRU wasteleft Idaho.

But a major question about the Siteremained: With the United States nolonger testing reactor concepts on thedesert and the storage of spent fuel amission with no long-term future, whatexactly was the mission of the Site intothe 21st century?


2 4 3

Former governors Cecil Andrus and Phil Batt stand

behind Governor Dirk Kempthorne during

ceremonies celebrating the first shipment of Rocky

Flats waste to leave the Site.

INEEL 99-237-1-15

C H A P T E R T W E N T Y - F I V E

2 4 4

MI SS I O N: FU T U R EOpportunity knocks for future engineers.

—Editorial headline, iNews—

Dirk Kempthornefelt that INEL’s future rested on theenvironment. As a United States sena-tor from Idaho in 1993 he proposedthat INEL change its name again byadding to it the word “environmental.”He said, “the plain fact is that the INELis now, will be, and must always be,known as an environmental lab. INELshould be recognized as the leader insolving tough environmental prob-lems.” But it took time for the name-change proposal to become off i c i a l .Until 1997, the name continued asINEL, but then Site letterhead changedto Idaho National Engineering andEnvironmental Laboratory(INEEL), and the new logoassumed the environmentalcolors of green and tan.1

And indeed, the mission ofthe INEEL into the 21st century wasgoing to involve—at the very least—agreat variety of interaction with theenvironment. The industrial and nuclearhistory of the Site had left its mark onthe desert, and the time had arrived toremediate or remove what DOE choseto call the environmental “legacy” ofthe Cold War. Although the struggle

between Idaho governors and DOE overthe storage of TRU waste and spentnuclear fuel had captured most of theheadlines in Idaho after 1988, muchelse had been afoot at the laboratory inthe last two decades of the 20thcentury.2

Not long after President George Bushappointed Admiral James Watkins assecretary of DOE in 1989, Watkins saidhe felt that “protecting the environ-ment...is not at all inconsistent withadvancing both energy security and

national security needs.” DOE fundscommitted to environmental cleanupbegan to rise. By January 1992, some ofthat funding was reflected in anemployment level at the INEL of12,700 people. In 1992 DOE’s environ-mental restoration and waste manage-ment budget request increased bytwenty-five percent. By 1995, sixty per-

cent of the INEL budget was directed towaste management, cleaning up, dis-mantling obsolete buildings, and decon-tamination.3

Watkins appointed Augustine Pitrolo tosucceed Don Ofte, who became eligibleto retire from federal service and did soin 1989. In June 1989, the FederalBureau of Investigation had raided theRocky Flats plant in Colorado, suspect-ing that its managers had engaged incriminal negligence of national environ-mental laws. Reacting to this—and towhat he regarded as the managerial“mess” of DOE’s organizational struc-ture—Watkins felt that DOE’s fieldoffices had to surrender a great deal of

policy-making autonomy in theinterest of more centralizedcontrol and implementa-tion from Headquarters.Organizational chartschanged, and once more

an ex-Navy nuclear engineer attemptedto impact the work and the culture ofDOE and its labs. 4

Pitrolo’s responsibility was to assurethat the INEL was in compliance withenvironmental regulations and to helpWatkins achieve a disciplined responseto DOE Headquarters initiatives. He set

Laser research at the INEEL Research Center.INEEL 92-0067-4-1

in motion the analysis and proceduresthat would result in the 1994 consolida-tion of five major Site operating con-tracts under one contractor, LockheedMartin Idaho Technologies Company.Henceforth, DOE announced, everyincumbent contractor could assume thatthe next complex-wide contract wouldbe competitive. New evaluation andselection criteria were expected to holddown costs and improve performanceon well-defined tasks.5

Environmental compliance tasks werestructured by a variety of laws pertain-ing to the removal of hazardouswastes. The INEL had been designatedas a Superfund site under theComprehensive EnvironmentalResponse, Compensation, andLiability Act (CERCLA). This andseveral other laws required that landsand waters contaminated by hazardous

substances be invento-ried, evaluated, andremediated. T h eE n v i r o n m e n t a lProtection A g e n c y,DOE, and the IdahoDepartment of Healthand Welfare mutuallyagreed in 1991 towork as partners inexecuting a consentorder spelling out howeach problem area atI N E L would be priori-tized and remediated.6


2 4 6

L e a r n i n g t o L o v e D & D

Fred Tingey said to me, “I have a favor to ask of you. We’re in the process ofstarting up a D and D program at the Site. It’ll be the first new program thatEG&G has started and not inherited from the previous contractor. We’d like it

to look good, get it organized well and done right. I’d like you to set it up.”

As he told me all this, my mind was racing a hundred miles an hour. I’d neverheard of D and D and I didn’t know what it meant. Finally I said, “Fred, I’mreally embarrassed. You keep talking about D and D, and I’m not sure what thatmeans.”

He said, “Oh! Well, it’s decontamination and decommissioning. It’s in the wastemanagement program.” I just about died. In those days, waste managementmeant garbage. I had seen pictures of trucks hauling stuff and dumping it in apit. How do you explain to your family—your parents especially—that they’veinvested all this money to get you trained as a scientist, and now I was going toleave the high-tech world of lasers and start dumping stuff in pits! I felt horrible.

By the time I got the program set up and operating, it was one of the more interest-ing things I’d ever done. There was lots of boom-boom stuff, and we had researchm o n e y. It was fun figuring out how to decontaminate something. We looked atbiodecontamination of soil and all kinds of explosive dismantlement techniques fors t r u c t u r e s .

When you got done with a job, it was verysatisfying to walk away and see green grassgrowing there: a site returned to its naturalconditions. Or we made a building usefulfor someone who needed a facility, and weprovided it at a fraction of what it wouldcost to build new. I stayed fifteen years.

Richard Meservey

Not everything from historic programs was

dismantled. In 1988, Big Mama hauled the two HTR

experiments from the Aircraft Nuclear Propulsion

program at Test Area North to a visitor center at the

site of EBR-I.INEL88-0590-22-9

The laws laid a grid of regulatorycompliance vocabulary over the entireSite. The familiar old names—CentralFacilities Area, Test Reactor Area, Te s tArea North—took on additional labelsas “Waste Area Groups (WA G s ) . ”There are 10 WAGs at the INEL.Individual remediation targets withinthe WAGs became “Operable Units(OUs).” The CERCLA work was,h o w e v e r, heavily laced with check-points and consultations among thethree agencies. The burden of intera-gency communication and public hear-ings sometimes seemed to the workersto exceed the actual workof removing and treatingthe hazardous materials.WAG 10 included thedesert land beyond thefences of the Site’s ninemain activity complexes.In WAG 10, DOE combedthe desert for—andfound—unexploded ord-nance and chunks of T N Tfrom Naval ProvingGround detonation testsand bombing practice.

When seen through a C E R C L A lens, the Siteseemed to be a collectionof wastewater ponds,sewage lagoons, burn pits,tank sites, spill sites, wasteinjection wells, leachfields, landfills, evapora-tion ponds, contaminatedbuildings, and once-leakypipes. Traces of the industrial andradioactive materials that had been theingredients of daily work for so manyyears had settled in patches of soil, on

concrete walls, in lab drains and ventsand sumps.

But a CERCLA lens was a feeble tool.When seen through the lens of science,the Site was something else entirely:the impact of human activity on thedesert environment opened up a brandnew laboratory. The theme of “wastemanagement” became a new platformfrom which to leap into new frontiersof knowledge. Waste was an environ-mental problem all over the world, andthe INEEL would, as Kempthorne hadsaid, “lead.” Scores of biologists,

chemists, metallurgists, engineers, andthe other specialists focused on thehome ground.

I r o n i c a l l y, the laboratory building towhich many of these scientists report-ed for work was located in Idaho Falls,not out on the desert. The INELResearch Center (IRC) had been agrowing part of the research and engi-neering mission since 1983. Idaho sen-ator James McClure, who had beenresponsible for securing the funds forthe lab from Congress, dedicated it inApril 1984. Like so many other leaps

into the future taken bySite employees, the IRCmaterialized because of astrategic assessment ofthe future that hit theb u l l ’s eye. Dennis Keiserwas director of researchand development and vicepresident of EG&G, theI D O ’s prime contractor inthe early 1980s. Keisers a i d :

The major drive for thel a b o r a t o ry was the needto support the nuclearreactor safety pro g r a m .We needed to developdiagnostic and instru m e n -tation devices for LOFT,P B F, and other safety testreactors. At first, weplanned to build the labout on the desert, bute n e rgy conservation was

a major issue at the time, and trans -p o rtation was cheaper in town.7

C H A P T E R 2 5 • M I SS I O N : F U T U R E

2 4 7

Box of waste is burned at the Waste Experimental

Reduction Facility.

INEEL 84-621-1-10

He found a thirty-five-acre farm at thenorth edge of Idaho Falls owned by anolder couple whose children wished torelieve their parents of the rigors offarm management. EG&G bought theproperty and became the proud ownerof a barn, farmhouse, and potato cellar.The first structure to go up on theproperty was a fuel alcohol plant,which sat on a concrete pad. A t r a i l e rcontaining the plant controls wasparked nearby. Soon came anotherbuilding. Keiser continued:

As we designed the laboratory, wethought twenty to twenty-five yearsinto the future. We made an aggre s s i v epush for new re s e a rch programs andwe were very successful. The firstmajor program, which was for theB u reau of Mines, proved to be the seedthat took off in many other dire c t i o n sstill working today. The Bureau wasi n t e rested in the biological pro c e s s i n gof ores, and the nation’s earliest workin this field began here. Microbes liveoff of the sulphur in some ores and

p roduce sulfuricacid, which dis -solves the metaland makes it pos -sible to selectivelyremove the metal.The technique isp a rticularly effec -tive with coppero re s .


2 4 8

The first structure on the IRC prop-erty was the fuel alcohol plant.During the Carter administration,

DOE was promoting alternativeenergy sources such as making fuelalcohol from grain. This idea quick-ly caught the attention of farmerswho hoped that making their ownfuel might reduce their operatingcosts.

But a lot of scam artists picked up onthe idea as well, and they started sell-ing alcohol plants to farmers at aprice around $50,000. These, ofcourse, didn’t work. Farmers begancomplaining to DOE or asking forh e l p .

So DOE decided to build a referencestandard plant here in Idaho Falls.The idea was for us to identify thekinds of operating criteria that thebuyer of a plant should look for inmaking a purchase. For example, oneof the criteria had to do with howmany gallons of alcohol per hour theplant should produce, and anotherrelated to the number of hours perday that the plant could reasonablyoperate.

After we built and operated the plantaccording to the reference criteria, wefound that a plant that would actuallywork had to cost around $1 million.And the operator had to be prettysophisticated. The operation was, infact, a chemical processing plant, andyou couldn’t allow contamination to

a ffect the fermentation and distillationprocesses. If you did, productivitywent way down, and the economicsof it became marginal at best.

In the end, not a lot of fuel alcoholplants were built, partly because wemanaged to educate a lot of farmersabout what it would really take to runone profitably. Senator Frank Churchhad been a big supporter of the fuelalcohol program. After he was defeat-ed [1980], James McClure becameI d a h o ’s senior senator. He favoredother research directions, and thealcohol plant went the way of the RaftRiver geothermal project. Eventually,the plant was dismantled and shippedto the Tennessee Valley A u t h o r i t y.

Because of the fuel alcohol plant,though, the INEL hired its first bio-chemist and microbiologist. Weacquired acapability inthese fields thatwe hadn’t hadbefore, andthese continuedto grow andevolve.

Tony Allen

T h e Fi r s t I R C B u i l d i n g

INEEL 81-3504

The fuel alcohol plant

at the INEL Research

Center.

The Bureau also was looking for a sub-stitute for chromium in metal alloys.The United States depended on othercountries for chromium, but this was astrategic metal, and the Bureau did notwish to rely on South Africa or Russiafor supplies. IRC scientists succeededin developing new alloys, and this workled to the development of super-plasticalloy systems and better magnets nowused in computers.

In connection with alloys, the Bureaualso had a welding program. One of thecriteria for any new alloy was whetheror not it was weldable. So the IRC didwelding research. Eventually, this workevolved toward the development ofautomatic—robotic—welding, in whicha system monitors the welding processusing complex interactions of comput-ers, mathematics, and electronics.Without the decades of accumulatedexperience in hot cell work, this inno-vation might not have come about.Those successes attracted the attentionof the Department of Defense, whichcame to the IRC with a number of clas-sified projects. IRC work includedmembrane research, where the chal-lenge was to separate hazardous ionsfrom liquid solutions. This, too, contin-ued as a major research activity.

It turned out that our vision was a goodone. We deliberately went in new direc -tions that were uncharted by otherDOE labs. We identified new areaswhere we thought American researchand development would enter. We hadlittle competition, and we continued tobuild on new knowledge and apply it inmany different directions.

We did have to rename the lab, though.One day Troy Wade, the IDO manager,and I were showing Governor Andrusthrough the lab. At the time, the lab wasnamed the Idaho Laboratory Facility.Andrus asked us if the lab was ownedby DOE or whether it was a privatefacility. We realized immediately that wehad to put “INEL” in the name. 8

With laboratories for geophysics, chem-istry, microbiology, and other sciences,the IRC was well-equipped to add theenvironmental cleanup mission to itsmany others. Cleanup technologies hadto be safe for workers and be economi-cal, which usually meant reducing thevolume of the waste. Technologies test-ed and proven at the INEL were expect-ed to benefit the rest of the globe, notjust Idaho and the INEL.

For example, IRC scientists built ontheir mining microbiology experienceand pioneered biodecontamination.While studying how microbes in thedesert soil affect the stability of buriedconcrete, scientists discovered amicrobe that might strip radioactivecontamination from concrete floors,walls, and ceilings. After conductingexperiments in the basement of EBR-I,IRC scientists perfected a means ofapplying the microbe so it would stickto a wall. They came up with a gelmade of cellulose, elemental sulfur, andthe microbes. The microbe metabolizes


2 4 9

INEEL facilities in Idaho Falls in 1999 included, from

top, DOE-ID South, Engineering Research Office

Building (EROB), Willow Creek Building (WCB), the

INEEL Research Center (IRC) and Technical Support

Buildings A and B (TSA and TSB).INEEL 91-181-2-10

INEEL 96-667-3-5

INEEL 83-275-1-11

INEEL 97-438-1-5

INEEL 89-290-1-9

the sulfur, creating sulfuric acid. Theacid etches the concrete surface andloosens the top millimeters of the con-crete. After a few months, a humancomes along, vacuums the degradedconcrete, and disposes of it. Themethod was safer than dressing up ateam of people in anti-contaminationgear to chip concrete. Besides, someradiation fields are too high to allowthis, or contamination resides in areashard to reach. The method was betterthan demolishing a whole building andtreating the entire volume of rubble as aradioactive waste. As of 1999, the “eatand be merry” microbes were on theirway to the United Kingdom to provethat they could clean up the concretewalls of the Windscale Pile 1 reactor inSellafield.9

Other IRC researchers built upon thecapabilities acquired during the RaftRiver geothermal project. They invent-ed a “rapid geophysical surveyor,”capable of “seeing” several feet beneaththe surface of the old Burial Groundand differentiating the closely-spacedpits and trenches from one another.This tool was also taken to the BighornBattlefield in Montana to help findremains of twenty-eight soldiers whohad perished, historians believed, some-where in Deep Ravine. A private com-pany in Idaho Falls went into businessto market the surveyor. The gadget thenserved at a long list of Superfund sitesand other DOE facilities requiringdetailed characterization prior tocleanup.10

In short, the IRC labs tackled everyaspect of waste management. Scientistsmonitored and characterized waste,counted it, moved it, prevented it,reduced it, analyzed it, modeled it.They treated, burned, biomassed, shred-ded, buried, and exhumed waste. Someof it they exploded, pumped, shrunk,calcined, or vitrified. Each activity wasan opportunity for research, experi-ment, and a comparison of alternatives.And always, the cleanup of the Site wasa route to new ideas, new customers,and new contracts. Every innovationwas potentially a bridge to new oppor-tunity.

In 1995, after DOE Headquarters con-vened a task force to consider thefuture of the national laboratory system,the group, chaired by Robert Galvin,recommended among other things thatDOE more carefully coordinate andfocus the work of all of its labs. It sug-gested that DOE identify “lead labora-tories” whose responsibility it would beto take a broad national view of a spe-cific problem, assess or characterize it,and coordinate an overall strategy thatwould exploit the strengths of all DOEresources in solving it most efficiently.DOE followed this recommendation.Designation as a “lead lab,” naturally,brought with it a certain prestige. Thesystem attempted to end duplicativeand inappropriate competition amongthe national labs. While the systemimplied some reduction in autonomyfor each lab in defining its mission, italso granted new opportunities for asingle lab to have an impact on anational problem or mission.11


2 5 0

Above. Concrete-eating microbe gel has removed as

much as twelve millimeters of concrete per year in

laboratory conditions. Below. Operator uses rapid

geophysical surveyor at Bighorn Battlefield in

Montana.

INEEL 99-233-1-25

INEEL 95-234-1-15

Thus, it was a moment of pride at theINEL when DOE named it as its LeadLaboratory for EnvironmentalManagement in 1994. Lead labs alsowere expected to be “test beds” for theimproved methods and techniques thatwould tackle an environmental clean-upproblem. The many enterprises of theresourceful teams of people at the IRCat its desert “test bed” had helped toshape the future of the INEL.12

The nuclear legacy of the Site off e r e dpaths to new missions v i a “ t e c h n o l o g yt r a n s f e r,” a DOE program Pitrolo inau-gurated in the early 1990s. The philos-ophy behind this program was toexploit the expertise acquired atnuclear laboratories as a benefit tosociety through private industry. T h u sthe “core competencies” acquired overthe years were another bridge to newmissions. For example, by buildingreactors with control rods able to scrama reactor in a microsecond, the engi-neers at the Site knew how to make aheavy object move very fast. The chal-lenge of technology transfer in thiscase, is to adapt this know-how toother industries that needed to moveheavy objects very fast.1 3

Evidence that the INEEL had capabili-ties valued by private industry accumu-lated in the form of a growing list ofCooperative Research andDevelopment Agreements (CRADAs).These were partnerships in which pri-vate companies invested in an IRCresearch program aimed at perfecting aproduct for commercial application. By1999 INEEL had 105 CRADAs to itscredit. IRC scientists regularly won“R&D-100” awards presented by R&DMagazine, which recognized each yearonly a hundred research and develop-ment innovations in the country.

Nuclear research at the INEEL contin-ued to be a presence amidst the ever-evolving continuum of ideas movingfrom some stage of theory to engi-neered hardware. Several dozen nuclearscientists worked in various laborato-ries around the Site. Considering thepossibility that global warming (caused

by the emissions of fossil fuel powerplants) or other events might reawakenthe nation’s interest in nuclear power,some of these scientists continued toadvance the case for socially responsi-ble nuclear power plants. The IFR mayhave been ahead of the political andsocial market, but the notions that areactor should—and could—be inher-ently safe, resist plutonium diversion,


2 5 1

Above. To learn how water flows through zones of

fractured rock, INEEL did a field study of a fracture at

Hell's Half Acre, a lava field west of Idaho Falls.

Sensors record water dripping from an artificial pond

through a fracture in an overhang. Right. INEEL

cleaned up waste left by activities at the Naval

Proving Ground. Soil contaminated with TNT was

collected, mixed with acetone to dissolve the TNT,

and the mixture composted. The process avoided

accidental detonation and fugitive dust problems.

Here, material goes into composter.INEEL 99-0293-1-24

and minimize waste now were drivingreactor research. Scientists consideredconcepts for gas-cooled or liquid-lead-cooled reactors and studied new ideason corrosion-resistant materials andcladding that might allow higher tem-peratures and more-economical opera-tion. Other analysts continued thetradition of reactor safety work for theNuclear Regulatory Commission:updating safety codes for commercialreactors, improving the human interfacewith reactor control systems, analyzingsteady-state and transient thermo-hydraulic phenomena in reactors.14

In 1997 DOE Headquarters established aNuclear Energy Research Initiative(NERI), a program that invited scientistsand engineers from all over the DOEcomplex to collaborate with each other,private companies, and universities.They were to propose their best ideas fornuclear research and request funds tocarry it out. Three hundred bids entered

the first round, forty were funded, andfive of these went to the INEEL. T h escale of the program was modest com-pared to the earlier thrusts to create anuclear navy and a nuclear power indus-t r y, but it invited new concepts andproof-of-principle opportunities.

At Argonne-West, scientists likewisecontinued to promote the philosophybehind the IFR, if not the IFR itself. Inthe aftermath of the EBR-II shutdown,something had to be done with the IFRfuel that had been tested. It had beendesigned for burnup and recycling, notstorage or chemical reprocessing.Argonne took five percent of the IFRfuel, developed a way of stabilizing itusing an electro-metallurgical treat-ment, and proposed to apply the treat-ment to the rest of the fuel. Beyondtheir own “waste” fuel, Argonne scien-tists felt that an industry-wide concen-tration on the “tail end” of the fuelcycle was long past due, and they

intended to promote it as importantwork that needed to be done well.15

At the Chem Plant, which changed itsname in 1999 to Idaho NuclearTechnology and Engineering Center(INTEC), the mission continued tofocus on the technologies of receivingand storing spent fuel or calcining thewaste still remaining at the plant. Thereprocessing facilities, in which somuch had been invested, remained onstandby in case a new mission for themshould emerge. Because the ChemPlant engineers, scientists, and man-agers had acquitted themselves so wellin their handling of high-level radioac-tive wastes, hazards and problems inIdaho were much less urgent than theywere at other DOE reprocessing facili-ties. Money to deal with urgent prob-lems went elsewhere in the DOEsystem, a fact that sometimes seemed toold Chem Plant employees an ironicreward for good behavior.16


2 5 2

Don Ofte Augustine Pitrolo John Wilcynski

INEEL 87-0623-1-11 INEEL 90-1-53-4 INEEL 91-328-4

With INEEL work roughly dividedinto sixty percent for waste cleanupand forty percent for other researchmissions, John Wilcynski, IDO manag-er from 1994-1999, summarized thepath forward with the words, “Finishthe sixty and grow the forty.” T h ecleanup would eventually get done andthe mission disappear. Dismantledbuildings particularly symbolized thistrend. By September 1999, the INEELhad cleaned up scores of sites anddemolished 215 buildings or struc-tures, and the next to go was theExperimental Organic Cooled Reactor,which had run out of scrounge value.After the Special Response Te a mappropriated the building in 1984 as atraining center, security forces prac-ticed hostage rescues and anti-terror-ism tactics. Now the old building wassurplus even for that mission.1 7

The research and development businesswould, on the other hand, have to grow.Whether it would grow absolutely oronly as the larger portion of a shrinkingwhole was the question. AlthoughINEEL would always rely on its workforce to grasp opportunities to be bril-liant, Wilcynski continued to refine theterms by which the INEEL related tothe many potential allies among itsIdaho neighbors.

The INEEL had, for example, recog-nized the Shoshone-Bannock tribe as asovereign tribal nation. By virtue of apact made with the tribe in 1992, INEELprovided training and equipment so thetribe would have an independent envi-ronmental monitoring capability. It alsoagreed to protect Native American arti-facts on Site grounds. Wilcynski contin-ued to consult with the tribe on mattersof mutual importance.1 8

Don Ofte had worked with theUniversity of Idaho and the Idaho StateUniversity to improve higher educationopportunities in nuclear engineering atthose schools. The U of I opened a doc-toral program in nuclear engineering,the first established in the United Statessince 1965. Ofte made the laboratoriesof the IRC available to graduate stu-dents. ISU initiated an independentenvironmental monitoring program, away of validating Site data. Wilcynskiadvanced INEEL ties to higher educa-tion as he prepared the bid specifica-tions for a new Site operating contractin 1999. The winner was a consortiumof interests led by Bechtel BWXT ofIdaho that included the InlandNorthwest Research Alliance, a groupof seven universities including the U of I and ISU.19

DOE established a policy of supportinga Citizens Advisory Committee at eachof its field facilities. This group of citi-zen volunteers from across the state anda variety of professions reviewed wastemanagement and other issues as a con-structive path to greater public knowl-edge and information about INEELoperations. Wilcynski welcomed this


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First convened in 1994 the INEEL Citizens Advisory

Board is an independent panel of fifteen Idaho

citizens. The board provides consensus advice to

IDO and its regulators, and contributes in-depth

public involvement for many IDO decisions.

group when it convened for the firsttime in 1994 and continued to receiveits advice.20

The IDO continued to enjoy the supportof its irrepressible eastern Idaho sup-porters, which never had abandoned theSite. Nuclear protesters had scorned theIdaho Falls Chamber of Commerce as ajobs-are-our-only-concern outfit, butthe Chamber had in fact not ignored thefindings of science in its reaction toevents affecting the Site. In looking fora stable regional economy, traditionalSite supporters were aided by newinstitutions, notably the Eastern IdahoRegional Development Alliance.Organized to distribute DOE SettlementAgreement grants intended to promoteregional economic diversification, theAlliance hoped to retool part of the Siteas a spaceport for launching rocketsand space-travel vehicles.21

Another new organization, Coalition21, worked to revitalize the nuclearresearch mission of the Site. The non-profit group attracted Site retirees, ISUfaculty members, business owners, andothers who believed that nuclear tech-nology had much to offer the nationand the world in the 21st century. Thegroup had supported the SettlementAgreement and helped defendGovernor Batt against PropositionThree in 1996. Coalition 21, whosemotto was “supporting tomorrow’stechnologies with facts, not with fears,”advocated continued research on theIFR and other technologies promotingsafe nuclear reactors and innovativesolutions to the management of spentfuel.22

The Snake River Alliance, continued asan INEEL “watchdog group.” Newsreporters faithfully consulted its repre-sentatives in order to balance waste-related news stories. In 1999 theAlliance (among others) opposedINEEL’s proposed Advanced MixedWaste Treatment Project, a facilityintended to treat certain Rocky Flatswaste to prepare it for shipment toWIPP. A feature of the SettlementAgreement, the facility had the supportof the governor’s office, which wasthen staffed with a nineteen-memberINEEL Oversight Office monitoringwaste management.23

In 1999 a member of the generationthat had arrived at the Site in the envi-ronmentally exuberant 1970s becamethe new and first woman IDO manager.Beverly A. Cook, metallurgical engi-neer, joined the INEL in 1975 withAerojet Nuclear. She spent her firstdays on the job behind the glass shield-

ing window of a hot cell, where she hadsome lessons to learn.

The technicians were prone to makingeach new engineer open a tool box andremove its contents using the remotemanipulators—a procedure that tookme, an amateur, all day. They taught methe concept of a “non-recoverable situ -ation” in a hot cell, that is, a situationthat cannot be fixed, like dropping apiece of radioactive material on thefloor where it cannot be reachedremotely. It was a valuable lesson:Analyze all of the job to completionbefore beginning, and do it right thefirst time.24


2 5 4

Secretary of Energy Bill Richardson addresses the

crowd attending the INEEL 50th anniversar y

celebration.

INEEL 99-0409-3-13

After fifteen years at the Site, Cook’scareer took her away from Idaho to theDefense Nuclear Facilities Safety Boardand then to DOE’s Office of NuclearEnergy in Washington, D.C. When shereturned, appointed by Secretary ofEnergy Bill Richardson in 1999, shecontinued to believe that science andsolid engineering techniques can andshould be behind decisions that “do itright the first time.” Aware that thenuclear skills like those possessed byher hot cell mentors were the kernel ofthe Site’s present and future missions,she observed in an interview that“everything we do here at the INEELcan be tied to the historic expertise wedeveloped.” But her charter fromRichardson also expressed the ideals ofthe Galvin task force: the talents atINEEL were to be applied not only atthe home lab but at other places aroundthe DOE complex. Corporate resourceshad to solve corporate challenges. Withfifteen years of Site experience, she waswell aware of its reservoir of talent.25

At INEEL’s fiftieth anniversary cere-monies in the summer of 1999,Secretary Richardson named theINEEL, along with Argonne NationalLaboratory, as a DOE Nuclear ReactorTechnology Lead Laboratory. DOEcould see that the totality of nuclearexpertise in the nation had been shrink-ing. Nuclear experts were retiring andnot being replaced. Yet nuclear energyprovided twenty percent of the nation’selectricity and larger percentages inother countries. Nuclear safety andnuclear power were not local issues, asthe Chernobyl accident made clear. Thenuclear safety record in the UnitedStates—and the confidence to keepreactors running after the TMI acci-dent—had depended in large part onthe experiments and computer work ofhundreds of Site scientists. Now DOEHeadquarters needed an in-house con-sultant, as it were, to identify existingexpertise, articulate nuclear researchneeds, and otherwise help the nationregroup and formulate energy technolo-gy strategies for the future.

INEEL—or rather, the people of theINEEL—had been moving the frontiersof knowledge and engineering forwardfor fifty years. The human potential tocreate ingenious experiments and pickat the edge of knowledge was still aforce. The discipline of science—tomake a prediction, design a test, carry itout, observe carefully, refine the nextprediction—offered the same promiseof discovery to a new generation as ithad in the halcyon days of nuclear reac-tor research.

It is altogether possible, even probable,that in 2049, a new generation ofretirees will recall their careers aroundthe turn of the century and tell theirgrandchildren, “It was exciting then. Itwas all new.”


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Beverly A. CookINEEL 99-0365-1-15A


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A P P E N D I X A

I N E E L M a n a g e r s a n d C o n t ra c t o r s

DOE-ID Managers

Leonard E. “Bill” Johnston 4 / 4 9 - 4 / 5 4Allan C. Johnson 4 / 54 - 1 2 / 6 1Hugo N. Eskildson 1 / 6 2 - 1 1 / 6 3William L. Ginkel (Acting) 1 1 / 6 3 - 3 / 6 4William L. Ginkel 3 / 64 - 9 / 7 3R. Glenn Bradley 9 / 73 - 3 / 7 6Charles E. Williams 5 / 7 6 - 6 / 8 3Troy E. Wade 7 / 8 3 - 6 / 8 7Don Ofte 6 / 8 7 - 1 2 / 8 9Phil Hamric (Acting) 1 / 9 0 - 4 / 9 0Augustine Pitrolo 4 / 9 0 - 2 / 9 4John Wilcynski (Acting) 2 / 9 4 - 1 0 / 9 4John Wilcynski 1 0 / 9 4 - 2 / 9 9 Warren E. Bergholz, Jr. (Acting) 2 / 9 9 - 5 / 9 9 Beverly A. Cook 5 / 9 9 -


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Prime Operating Site Contractors

1 9 5 0 - 1 9 6 6 Phillips Petroleum Company

1 9 6 6 - 1 9 7 2 Idaho Nuclear Corporation (Allied Chemical Corporation, Aerojet General

Corporation, and Phillips Petroleum Company)

1 9 72 - 1 9 7 6 Aerojet Nuclear Corporation

1 9 7 6 - 1 9 9 4 EG&G Idaho

1 9 9 4 - 1 9 9 9 Lockheed Martin Idaho Technologies Company

1 9 9 9 - Bechtel BWXT Idaho, LLC


1 9 4 9 - University of Chicago

Idaho Chemical Processing Plant (Idaho Nuclear Technology and Engineering Center)

1 9 5 0 - 1 9 5 3 American Cyanamid Company

1 9 5 3 - 1 9 6 6 Phillips Petroleum Company

1 9 6 6 - 1 9 7 1 Idaho Nuclear Corporation

1 9 7 1 2 - 1 9 7 9 Allied Chemical Corporation

1 9 7 9 - 1 9 8 4 Exxon Nuclear Idaho Company

1 9 84 - 1 9 9 4 Westinghouse Idaho Nuclear Company



Specific Manufacturing Capability

1 9 8 3 - 1 9 8 6 Exxon Nuclear Idaho Company

1 9 8 6 - 1 9 9 1 Rockwell INEL

1 9 9 1 - 1 9 9 4 Babcock & Wilcox Idaho Inc.



Naval Reactors Facility

1 9 5 0 - 1 9 9 9 Westinghouse Electric Corporation

1 9 9 9 - Bechtel Bettis, Inc.

A P P E N D I X B

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After the first reactor at the National Reactor Testing Station(Experimental Breeder Reactor-I) went critical in 1951, scientists built and operated dozens more reactors in the next fivedecades. Since the 1970s, it has become accepted that 52 reactors operated at the Site.

But counting reactors at a reactor research facility is not as straightforward as it might seem, nor is accumulating vital statis-tics about each reactor. While considering the reactors that operated on the Idaho desert, the following thoughts might bekept in mind.

First, scientists in different programs did not seem to follow the same rules when it came to naming reactors. For example,the Aircraft Nuclear Propulsion (ANP) program modified the core of the reactor it called HTRE-1 and named it HTRE-2.These were subsequently known as two reactors. In another program, experimenters changed the core of the OrganicModerated Reactor more than once, but the reactor retained the same name and was counted as one reactor. When theExperimental Breeder Reactor-II operated as a prototype of the Integral Fast Reactor, the name did not change. Thus, any listof reactors very definitely understates and under-represents the actual complexity of reactor development at the Site.

Second, the list-maker must decide what to commemorate in a list of reactors. Should reactors that never went critical begiven a place? If so, the list will include the Experimental Organic Cooled Reactor. No uranium fuel ever was loaded into thereactor and it never operated or went critical before the program was canceled. It was “a reactor,” but never “an operatingreactor.” This was true as well for the Experimental Beryllium Oxide Reactor.

This list does not include simulated reactors such as Semiscale, which was part of the reactor safety testing program. Theomission of facilities like this is another way in which a list can understate the variety and complexity of the INEEL’snuclear reactor history.

Finally, not all the information one might desire about the history of a reactor is easily found. For example, one goal for thislist was to identify the day, month, and year of initial criticality for each reactor—and the date of its final shutdown. But theINEEL Technical Library’s vast collection of archived reports did not yield this information for each reactor. Some reportwriters were content to report that a reactor went critical “in the summer of” a certain year and leave it at that. The samewriters may have considered other milestones, such as its first operation at “full power,” to be more meaningful in theprogress of their particular reactor.

This alphabetical list of reactors contains the names of 52 reactors (the fifty that operated and the two that did not) as theyhave been known traditionally, their acronyms, selected milestone dates, and descriptive information about each reactor. Allreferences to megawatts are “thermal” megawatts. Readers who examine this list are invited to contribute additional mile-stone dates and other vital statistics about the reactors so that future lists might be made more complete and more accurate.

F i f t y Y e a r s o f R e a c t o r s a t t h e I N E E L

1. Advanced Reactivity Measurement Facility No. 1 ARMF-I 10-10-60 1974The ARMF-I, a reactor located in a small pool in a building east of the MTR in the Test Reactor Area, was used to determine the nuclear characteristics of reactor fuels and other materials subject to testing in the MTR. Together with the MTR, the reactor helped improve the performance, reliability, and quality of reactor core components. Until the next generation reactor, the ARMF-II, this was considered the most sensitive device for reactivity determinations then in existence.

2. Advanced Reactivity Measurement Facility No. 2 ARMF-II 12-14-62The ARMF-II was built in the opposite end of the tank occupied by ARMF-I. It had a “readout” system which automatically recorded measurements on IBM data cards. This refinement over the ARMF-I meant that operators could process data quickly in electronic computers. Designers of the ARMF-II benefitted from previous experience with the ARMF-I and the Reactivity Measurement Facility (described below).

3. Advanced Test Reactor ATR 7-2-67 ContinuingLocated at the Test Reactor Area, the ATR, which continued to operate in 2000, is a materials testing reactor. It simulates the environment within a power reactor for the purpose of studying the effect of radiation on steel, zirconium, and other materials.

The ATR produces an extremely high neutron flux up to 1 x 1025 neutrons per square centimeters per second. Target materials are exposed to the neutron flux for selected periods of time to test their durability within an environment of high temperature, high pressure, and high gamma radiation fields. Data that normally would require years to gather from ordinary reactors can be obtained in weeks or months in the ATR.

The ATR can operate at a power level of 250 megawatts. Its unique four-lobed design can deliver a wide range of power levels to nine main test spaces, or loops. Each loop has its own distinct environment apart from that of the main reactor core. Therefore, nine major experiments can take place simultaneously.Additional smaller test spaces surrounding the loops allow for additional tests.

In addition to materials testing, the ATR has made radioisotopes used in medicine, industry, and research.

4. Advanced Test Reactor Critical Facility ATRC 5-19-64 ContinuingThe ATRC performs functions for the ATR similar to those of the ARMF reactors in relation to the MTR. It was a valuable auxiliary tool in operation long before the ATR startup. It verified for reactor designers thee ffectiveness of control mechanisms and physicists predictions of power distribution in the large core of the AT R .

Low-power testing in the ATRC conserved valuable time so that the large ATR could irradiate experiments at highpower levels. The ATRC is also used to verify the safety of a proposed experiment before it is placed in the AT R .

5. Argonne Fast Source Reactor AFSR 10-29-59 Late 70sThe Argonne Fast Source Reactor was a tool used to calibrate instruments and to study fast reactor physics, augmenting the Zero Power Plutonium Reactor research program. Located at Argonne-West, this low-power reactor—designed to operate at a power of only one kilowatt—contributed to an improvement in the techniques and instruments used to measure experimental data.

6. Boiling Water Reactor Experiment No. 1 BORAX-I 1953 July 1954BORAX-I was a pioneer reactor that tested the safety and operating parameters of reactors which used boiling water as a moderator and coolant. In this reactor type, water is allowed to boil in the core. Saturated steam drives the turbines and generates power.

BORAX-I, like the later BORAX experiments, was located just north of EBR-I. It demonstrated that the boilingwater moderated reactor concept was feasible for power reactors. Its design capacity was 1.4 megawatts. Operators destroyed it in July 1954 in a deliberately planned “destructive test,” the purpose of which was to subject it to extreme operating conditions and learn more about the limits of its safe operation.


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Reactor Last Day of

Name Acronym S t a r t u p Operation

7. Boiling Water Reactor Experiment No. 2 BORAX-II 10-19-54 March 1955BORAX-II continued the testing program for boiling water reactors, this time at a power level capacity of 6 megawatts. Tests used fuels with varying enrichments of uranium-235.

8. Boiling Water Reactor Experiment No. 3 BORAX-III 6-9-55 1956The operating capacity of BORAX-III was 15 megawatts. The reactor was connected to a 2000-kilowatt turbine/generator set so that engineers could generate electricity, the ultimate objective of the reactor test program. On the night of July 17, 1955, the reactor produced sufficient power to light the city of Arco (500 kilowatts), the BORAX test facility (500 kilowatts), and part of the Central Facilities Area at the NRTS (1000 kilowatts).

9. Boiling Water Reactor Experiment No. 4 BORAX-IV 12-3-56 June 1958BORAX-IV, with a power level of 20 megawatts, tested fuel elements made from mixed oxides (ceramics) of uranium and thorium. These materials had a high capacity to operate in the extreme heat of a reactor before they failed.

The ceramic core demonstrated that a reactor loaded with this fuel could operate safely and feasibly. The fuel could operate in higher temperatures, was less reactive with the water coolant in case the cladding ruptured, was cheaper to manufacture, and burned a larger percentage of the fuel before loosing its reactivity. The reactorproduced measurable quantities of the artificial thorium-derived fuel, uranium-233. One series of BORAX-IVtests involved operating the reactor with experimentally defective fuel elements in the core.

10. Boiling Water Reactor Experiment No. 5 BORAX-V 2-9-62 S e p t e m b e rBORAX-V could operate at a power level of 40 megawatts. This flexible reactor advanced the boiling water 1 9 6 4reactor concept by testing the safety and economic feasibility of an integral, nuclear superheat system. On October 10, 1963, it produced superheated (dry) steam entirely by nuclear means for the first time. The reactordemonstrated that improved efficiency from manufactured steam is obtainable by incorporating as a design feature a number of superheated fuel assemblies in the reactor core lattice.

11. Cavity Reactor Critical Experiment CRCE 5-17-67 Early 1970sLocated at TAN, CRCE was an outgrowth of a program begun by NASAin the 1960s to investigate thepropulsion of space rockets by nuclear power, offering the possibility of much greater thrust per pound of propellant than chemical rockets. The concept for the cavity reactor core was that the uranium would be in avapor, or gaseous, state. Hydrogen propellant flowing around it would theoretically attain much higher temperatures—up to 10,000° F—than in conventional solid core rockets. The experiments at TAN used simulatedhydrogen propellant and produced data on the reactor physics feasibility of a gaseous core being able to go critical.

The core was uranium hexafluoride (UF6); the experiments were all done at the relatively low temperature

of about 200° F. In the proposed ultimate application, the ball of uranium gas would be held in place by the hydrogen flowing around it, something like a ping-pong ball suspended in a stream of air. Uranium core temperatures as high as 100,000° F were considered possible.

12. Coupled Fast Reactivity Measurement Facility CFRMF 1968 1991When the ARMF-II reactor was modified in 1968, it was given a new name, the CFRMF.A section of the core was modified to produce a region of high-energy neutron flux useful in comparing calculated and observed results. This tool provided physics information about the behavior of fast (ie, unmoderated) neutrons. Physicists studied differential cross sections and tested calculational methods. The CFRMF contributed to the development of fast neutron reactors.

13. Critical Experiment Tank CET 1958 1961The CET reactor produced a source of neutrons used to calibrate various types of neutron sensors and chambers.Part of the Aircraft Nuclear Propulsion program and located at Test Area North (TAN), the CETwas a low-powerreactor (one of three in the A N P program) originally designed to mock-up the HTRE-I and HTRE-II reactors. Later, fuel test bundles intended for testing in HTRE-II were first evaluated for reactivity characteristics in the CET.

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Reactor Last Day of


14. Engineering Test Reactor ETR 9-19-57 December When the Engineering Test Reactor started up at the TRAin 1957, it was the largest and most advanced 1981materials test reactor in the world. The 175-megawatt reactor provided larger test spaces than the older MTR and provided a more intense neutron flux. The ETR evaluated fuel, coolant, and moderator materials under environments similar to those of power reactors.

In 1972 the ETR was modified by the addition of a Sodium Loop Safety Facility into the reactor core. With this, the reactor played a new role supporting DOE’s breeder reactor safety program. ETR test programs related to the core design and operation of breeder reactors. As testing progressed, the reactor was again modified with a new top closure accommodating the irradiation loop. Other additions included a helium coolant system and sodium-handling system. The ETR was the first complete reactor facility to be deactivated and documented immediately after shutdown.

15. Engineering Test Reactor Critical Facility ETRC 5-20-57 1982ETRC was a full-scale, low-power nuclear facsimile of the ETR, similar in function to the ARMF and ATRC. It was used to determine in advance the nuclear characteristics of experiments planned for irradiation in ETR and the power distribution effects for a given ETR fuel and experiment loading. Since no two ETR loadings were identical, the ETRC allowed operators to predict the ETR’s nuclear environment when completed experiments were removed or new ones added.

This information was necessary to calculate the experiment irradiation and determine core life, control rod withdrawal sequences, reactivity worths, and core safety requirements.

Proposed fuel and experiment loadings were first mocked up in ETRC and manipulated until a desired power distribution throughout the core was attained, satisfying pertinent safety requirements. The ETRC’slow-power tests allowed the ETR to operate without interruption, saving time and money.

16. Experimental Beryllium Oxide Reactor EBOR Never operatedModifications of a former ANPbuilding at TAN, the Shield Test Pool Facility, began in May 1963 to house the Experimental Beryllium Oxide Reactor (EBOR). The objective of the reactor was to develop beryllium oxide as a neutron moderator in high-temperature, gas-cooled reactors. The project was canceled in 1966 before construction was complete.

Among the reasons for the cancellation was the encouraging progress achieved, concurrent with EBOR construction, in developing graphite as a moderator. This reduced the importance of developing beryllium oxide as an alternate.

17. Experimental Breeder Reactor No. I EBR-I 8-24-51 12-30-63EBR-I, the first reactor built at INEEL, began operation in 1951. The reactor produced the first usable electricity from nuclear heat on December 20, 1951. It achieved full-power operation the next day. In 1953, the reactor confirmed that a nuclear reactor designed to operate in the high-energy neutron range is capable of creating more fuel than its operation consumes (“breeding”).

The reactor, which used enriched uranium as fuel, was unmoderated. It used sodium-potassium alloy (NaK) ascoolant. Ablanket of uranium-238 around the core provided the “fertile” material in which breeding took place.The liquid-metal coolant permitted the neutron energies to be kept high, thus promoting fissionable-material breeding. The coolant also enabled high-temperature and low-pressure operation, both conducive to efficient power production.

President Lyndon B. Johnson dedicated EBR-I as a National Historic Landmark on August 26, 1966. It was subsequently opened to the public for visits and tours.

18. Experimental Breeder Reactor No. II EBR-II 9-30-61 9-30-94Part of the continuing investigation of fast neutron breeding reactors, the EBR-II, located at Argonne-West inside a containment shell, was built to demonstrate the feasibility of on-site fuel reprocessing as an adjunct


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Reactor Last Day of


Experimental Breeder Reactor No. II (continued)to a liquid metal-cooled fast-breeder-reactor power plant. These objectives were met within the first few years of its operation.

By September 1969, EBR-II operated at a capacity of 62.5 megawatts and supplied electricity to A rg o n n e - West and the power grid at the Site until its shutdown in 1994. The reactor operated submerged in a tank of liquid sodium coolant. During recycle experiments between 1964-1969, spent fuel was sent by automated handling methods to the Fuel Cycle Facility adjacent to the reactor building, treated by pyrometallurgical techniques, and the useful fissile metal refabricated into new fuel pins.

EBR-II also was used to irradiate reactor fuel and structural material samples, testing their durability in breeder-reactor environments. This information helped improve fuel and material performance for future breeder reactors.

19. Experimental Organic Cooled Reactor EOCR Never operatedBecause the OMRE (see below) was built as a minimum-cost facility ($1,800,000) to test the feasibility of the organic-cooled reactor concept, it lacked test loops needed to investigate various organic coolants and experimental fuel elements. The EOCR was intended to extend and advance the OMRE studies.

During the final stages of its construction, EOCR was placed in standby status in December 1962 when the AEC decided that the organic-cooled concept would not significantly improve nuclear power plant performance over what other reactor concepts already had achieved. The building, located east of the Central Facilities Area, was recycled for other (non-nuclear) uses.

20. Fast Spectrum Refractory Metals Reactor 710 March 1962 1968This low-power critical facility operated at TAN to collect data for a proposed fast-spectrum refractory-metal reactor concept called the 710 Reactor. The concept involved using metals such as tungsten and tantalum in a compact, very high-temperature reactor for generating power in space.

21. Gas Cooled Reactor Experiment GCRE 2-23-60 4-6-61Built at the Army Reactor Experimental Area, later called the Army Reactor Area (ARA), the GCRE was a w a t e r-moderated, nitrogen (gas)-cooled, direct- and closed-cycle reactor. It generated 2,200 kilowatts of heat, but no electricity. The U.S. Army wanted to develop a mobile nuclear power plant, and the GCRE was the first phase of the program, proving the principle of this reactor concept. The reactor provided engineering and nuclear data for improved components. The GCRE was also used to train military and civilian personnel in the operation and maintenance of gas-cooled reactor systems.

22. Heat Transfer Experiment No. 1 HTRE-1 11-4-55 1956Test Area North was opened in 1952 for the Aircraft Nuclear Propulsion program, which operated during the 1950s to develop for the U.S. Air Force a nuclear-powered jet airplane using direct-cycle heat transfer engineering. The program involved ground tests only, but proved the principle of nuclear-powered turbojet engine operation with a full-power test in January 1956, with Heat Transfer Reactor Experiment No. 1 (HTRE-I),which produced 20 megawatts of heat energy on a test stand at TAN’s Initial Engine Test Facility. The water-moderated reactor used enriched uranium fuel clad in nickel-chromium.

23. Heat Transfer Experiment No. 2 HTRE-2 July 1957 3-28-61In order to irradiate fuel elements that were too large to fit in the MTR for materials tests, the ANP program (End of ANPdrilled a hexagonal hole in the center of HTRE-1 and renamed it HTRE-2, converting it to a materials test program)reactor and subjecting test fuels to environments reaching 2,800° F. The ANP materials test program advanced the technology of high-heat ceramic reactor fuels.

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24. Heat Transfer Experiment No. 3 HTRE-3 1958 December After substantial testing and experimentation, this new experiment arranged the reactor, engine, 1960shielding, and heat transfer systems in a horizontal configuration anticipating final design in an airframe.

President John F. Kennedy canceled the ANPprogram on March 28, 1961. Work on the project came to an abrupt and permanent end on that date. The two HTRE experiments were moved to the site of EBR-I, where they are on display at the visitors center.(See Heat Transfer Experiment No. 1)

25. High Temperature Marine Propulsion Reactor 630-A 1962 1964The 630-Areactor, a low-power critical experiment, was operated at TAN to explore the feasibility of an air-cooled, water-moderated system for nuclear-powered merchant ships. Further development was discontinued in December 1964 when decisions were made to lower the priority of the entire nuclear power merchant ship program.

26. Hot Critical Experiment HOTCE 1958 3-28-61HOTCE was an elevated-temperature critical experiment designed to obtain information on temperature (End of ANPcoefficients of solid-moderated reactors, to develop a theory consistent with this information, and to develop program)measurement techniques for high-temperature reactors. A part of the ANPprogram, it operated in the Critical Experiment cell of the Low Power Test Facility at TAN. HOTCE was one of three low-power reactors supporting the ANP program, along with the Shield Test Pool Facility Reactor (see below) and the Critical Experiment Tank (CET). The ANP program ended in 1961.

27. Large Ship Reactor A A1W-A 10-21-58 1-26-9428. Large Ship Reactor B A1W-B July 1959 1987

The A1W (aircraft carrier, first prototype, Westinghouse) plant consisted of a pair of prototype reactors for USS Enterprise, a U.S. Navy nuclear-powered aircraft carrier. Located at the Naval Reactors Facility,the two pressurized-water reactors (designated A and B) were built within a portion of a steel hull. The plant simulated Enterprise’s engine room. All components could withstand seagoing use.

The A1W plant was the first in which two reactors powered one ship propeller shaft through a single-geared turbine propulsion unit. As the Navy program evolved, new reactor cores and equipment replaced many of the original components. The Navy trained naval personnel at the A1Wplant and continued a test program to improve and further develop operating flexibility.

29. Lost of Fluid Test Facility LOFT 1973 7-9-85The LOFTreactor, located at TAN within a containment building, was a centerpiece in the safety testing program for commercial power reactors. The reactor was a scale-model version of a commercial pressurized-water power plant built chiefly to explore the effects of loss-of-coolant accidents (LOCAs).

Thirty-eight nuclear power tests were conducted on various accident scenarios, including the real accident at Three Mile Island, between 1978 and 1985. Among other goals, the program investigated the capability of e m e rgency core cooling systems to prevent core damage during a LOCA. Experiments at LOFT simulated small-,medium-, and large-break LOCAs, sometimes complicated with other events such as “loss of offsite power.”

LOFT was inactivated in 1986, following completion of the LP-FP-2 experiment, the most significant severe-fuel-damage test ever conducted in a nuclear reactor. This test, which involved the heating and melting of a 100-rod experimental fuel bundle, provided information on the release and transport of fission products that could occur during an actual commercial reactor accident where core damage occurs.

30. Materials Test Reactor MTR 3-31-52 4-23-70The MTR was the original reactor at the Test Reactor Area and the second reactor operated at the NRTS. Fueled with enriched uranium fuel, water-cooled and -moderated, the reactor was a key part of the Atomic Energy Commission’s post-war reactor development program. It supplied a high neutron flux in support of a reactor development program subjecting potential reactor fuels and structural materials to irradiation. In


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Materials Test Reactor (continued)addition, its “beam holes” made it possible to perform cross-section and other physics research.

The high-flux radiation fields available in this reactor made it possible to accelerate the screening of potential reactor materials. In its early years, the MTR contributed to the design of pressurized water, organic-moderated, liquid-metal-cooled, and other reactors. Successful operation of the MTR itself was a great experiment resulting in a family of plate-type reactors. The reactor operated at a power level of 30 megawatts until September 1955 when thermal output was increased to 40 megawatts.

The MTR logged more than 125,000 operating hours and more than 19,000 neutron irradiations. During August 1958, the MTR became the first reactor to operate using plutonium-239 as fuel at power levels up to 30 megawatts. The demonstration showed that a plutonium-fueled reactor could be controlled satisfactorily.

The materials testing workload of the MTR was taken over by the new and larger Advanced Test Reactor.

31. Mobile Low-Power Reactor No. 1 ML-1 3-30-61 5-29-64Following the operation of the GCRE, the ML-1 was the next major step toward the development of a mobile low-power power plant for the U.S. Army. The entire ML-1 plant was designed to be transported either by standard cargo transport planes or standard Army low-bed trailers in separate packages weighing less than 40 tons each.

The reactor was operated remotely at the ARA-IVarea from a control cab at a distance of approximately 500 feet. It could be moved after a 36-hour shutdown. The reactor was designed for ease of operation and maintenance by enlisted technicians at remote installations, for reliable and continuous operation under extreme climatic conditions, and for the rigors of shipment and handling under adverse conditions.

The ML-1 shut down for the last time after operating for a total of 664 hours. Before the ML-1 had reached all of its performance goals, the Army phased out its reactor development program around 1965.

32. Natural Circulation Reactor S5G 9-12-65 5-1-95The S5G (submarine reactor, 5th prototype, General Electric) was the prototype of a pressurized-water reactor for USS Narwhal. Located at the Naval Reactors Facility, it was capable of operating in either a forced or natural circulation flow mode. In the natural mode, cooling water flowed through the reactor by thermal circulation, not by pumps. Use of natural circulation reduced the noise level in the submarine.

To prove that the design concept would work in an operating ship at sea, the prototype was built in a submarine hull section capable of simulating the rolling motion of a ship at sea. The S5G continued to operateas part of the Navy’s nuclear training program until that program was reduced after the end of the Cold War.

33. Neutron Radiography Facility NRAD ContinuingThe NRAD, located in the Hot Fuel Examination Facility at Argonne-West, is a nondestructive examination tool. Using two collimated neutron beams produced by a 250-kilowatt reactor, NRAD produces neutron radiographs showing the internal condition of highly irradiated test specimens without physically cutting into the specimen. The reactor also has been used as a neutron source for isotope production, activation analysis, and the evaluation of radiation effects on materials.

34. Nuclear Effects Reactor FRAN 8-28-68 June 1970The Nuclear Effects Reactor (FRAN) was a small-pulsed reactor, capable of supplying bursts of high-intensity fast neutrons and gamma radiation. FRAN was transferred to the NRTS in mid-1967 from the Nevada Test Site, where it had been operated by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.

Located in the ARAbuilding formerly occupied by the ML-1 reactor, FRAN was used for a short time to test the performance of new detection instruments then being developed for reactor control purposes. The reactor was moved back to DOE’s Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in June 1970.

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35. Organic Moderated Reactor Experiment OMRE 9-17-57 April 1963OMRE demonstrated the technical and economic feasibility of using a liquid hydrocarbon as both coolant and moderator, a reactor concept developed and partially financed by Atomics International. Located a few miles east of the Central Facilities Area, the reactor operated with a succession of cores. The waxy coolant was considered promising because it liquified at high temperatures but didn’t corrode metal like water did. Also, it operated at low pressures, significantly reducing the risk of leaking. A scaled-up reactor, the Experimental Organic Cooled Reactor, was built next door in anticipation of further development of the concept.

36. Power Burst Facility PBF 9-22-72 1985Located southeast of the Test Reactor Area, the PBF was part of the reactor safety testing program. It was designed to simulate various kinds of imagined accidents caused by sudden increases in the operating level of a reactor. The PBF was the only reactor in the world that could perform rapid power changes (bursts) within milliseconds. It performed severe-fuel-rod-burst tests and also simulated loss-of-coolant accidents within a special assembly that fit inside the main reactor core.

The initial mission for PBF was to test light water reactor fuel rods under representative accident conditions. Data from these tests were used to develop and validate fuel behavior computer codes for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

After its test program ended in 1985, the PBF reactor was considered for use in defense-related programs or for use in a brain cancer treatment program called Boron Neutron Capture Therapy (BNCT). The BNCTprogram would have treated patients with glioblastoma multiforme—a form of brain cancer. However,neither of these missions materialized.

37. Reactivity Measurement Facility RMF 2-11-54 4-10-62R M F, a detector reactor that measured reactivity changes in materials irradiated in the MTR or ETR, was operatedfor more than eight years. The RMF was used to assay new and spent fuel elements and to assist in experiment scheduling by evaluating reactivity losses and flux depression caused by in-pile apparatus.

38. Shield Test Pool Facility SUSIE 1961The SUSIE reactor was used for bulk shielding experiments that were performed in support of the ANPShielding Experimentation Program. The reactor, situated in a water-filled pool at TAN, could be operated safely, was adaptable to many forms of nuclear research, and was easy to operate at minimum cost. After the ANPprogram was discontinued in 1961, SUSIE continued in use by other programs at the NRTS.

39. Special Power Excursion Reactor Test No. I SPERT-I 6-11-55 1964SPERT-I was the first in a series of four safety-testing reactors designed to study the behavior of reactors when their power level changed rapidly. Power runaways were produced deliberately by moving the control rods. The variables in the thousands of SPERT studies included fuel plate design, core configuration, coolant flow, temperature, pressure, reflectors, moderators, and void and temperature coefficients.

All operations were conducted from a control building located a half mile from the reactors, situated a few miles east of the Central Facilities Area. SPERT-I was an open-tank, light-water-moderated and reflected reactor,originally using 92 percent enriched uranium fuel. The reactor tank, about 4 feet in diameter and 14 feet high, was filled with water to a level about 2 feet above the core.

In general, SPERT-I tests demonstrated the damage-resistant capabilities of low-enrichment (4 percent enricheduranium-235) uranium-oxide fuel pins similar to those used in water-cooled reactors powering large central stations.

40. Special Power Excursion Reactor Test No. II SPERT-II 3-11-60 October 1964 This facility consisted of a closed pressurized water reactor with coolant flow systems designed for operation with either light or heavy water. The pressure vessel was 24 1/2 feet high by 10 feet inside diameter. Tests with heavy water (deuterium, an isotope of hydrogen) were desired because heavy water reactors were of growing


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Special Power Excursion Reactor Test No. II (continued)importance in Canada, Europe, and the United States. Also, heavy water tests allowed for the verification of various types of physics calculations on the effects of neutron lifetime on power excursions.

41. Special Power Excursion Reactor Test No. III SPERT-III 12-19-58 June 1968SPERT-III was considered the most versatile facility yet developed for studying the inherent safety characteristics of nuclear reactors. This reactor (which was planned as the third in the series of SPERTreactors, but was built second) provided the widest practical range of control over three variables: temperature, pressure, and coolant flow. The reactor sat in a pressurized vessel similar to those used in commercial power production. Water could flow through the vessel at rate up to 20,000 gallons per minute, temperatures up to 650° F, and pressures up to 2,500 pounds per square inch.

42. Special Power Excursion Reactor Test No. IV SPERT-IV 7-24-62 August 1970SPERT-IV was an open-tank, twin-pool facility that permitted detailed studies of reactor stability as affected by varying conditions including forced coolant flow, variable height of water above the core, hydrostatic head, and other hydrodynamic effects. The reactor, water-moderated and -reflected, used highly enriched, aluminum alloyed, plate-type fuel elements.

The SPERT-IV facility was modified by the installation of a Capsule Driver Core (CDC), which permitted fuel samples to be inserted into a test hole in the center of the reactor core, where it could be subjected to short-period excursions without damaging the “driver” fuel in the rest of the core. The CDC work on fuel-destructive mechanisms continued until the Power Burst Facility replaced it.

43. Spherical Cavity Reactor Critical Experiment SCRCE November 1973SCRCE was the final experiment in reactor physics work for the NASA-sponsored program to determine 1972the feasibility of a reactor going critical with a gaseous core of uranium. Previous work had been done with a cylindrical configuration because of its ease of construction. The spherical configuration was the culmination of the project, allowing for a comparison between theory and experimental results. The spherical shape was considered a more likely geometry for the ultimate application in a rocket to Mars.

44. Stationary Low-Power Reactor (Earlier name - A rgonne Low Power Reactor) SL-1, ALPR 8-11-58 1-3-61The SL-1 reactor, originally named Argonne Low Power Reactor (ALPR), was designed for the U.S. Army as a prototype of a low-power, boiling-water reactor plant to be used in geographically remote locations. The SL-1 was accidentally destroyed and three men killed on January 3, 1961.

45. Submarine Thermal Reactor S1W, STR 3-30-53 10-17-89With the S1W, also known as the Submarine Thermal Reactor (STR), the United States’nuclear navy was born.The purpose of a nuclear-powered submarine was to transform submarines into “true submersibles,” vesselsthat could remain underwater powered by a fuel which did not require oxygen.

The S1W (submarine, first prototype, Westinghouse) nuclear power plant was the first prototype built at the Naval Reactors Facility. Cooled and moderated by pressurized water, the reactor and its associated propulsion equipment were installed inside two hull sections duplicating the size and specifications of USS Nautilus, under constructionat the same time in Connecticut. To facilitate shielding research, the hull sections were placed in a tank of water.

After startup, the S1Waccomplished a simulated voyage nonstop from Newfoundland to Ireland, “submerged” and at full power most of the way during the 96 hour test. The simulation proved the principle and the feasibility of atomic ship propulsion long before USS Nautilus set out to sea. Later, the S1W tested advanced design equipment and operated as part of the Navy’s personnel training program.

46. Systems for Nuclear Auxiliary Power (SNAP) 10A Transient No. 1 S N A P T R A N - 1 Early 1960sThe SNAPTRAN program extended the SPERT reactor safety testing program to aerospace applications. Three test series, involving three reactors, investigated the behavior of SNAP10A/2 fuel under large-transient,

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Systems for Nuclear Auxiliary Power (SNAP) 10A Transient No. 1 (continued)power-excursion conditions. SNAPTRAN-1, located at Test Area North, was subjected to non-destructive tests in conditions approaching but not resulting in damage to the zirconium-hydride-uranium fuel.

47. Systems for Nuclear Auxiliary Power (SNAP) 10A Transient No. 3 S N A P T R A N - 3 4-1-64 4-1-64SNAPTRAN-3 was the first of two destructive tests on a version of the small space reactor (SNAP10A/2) designed to supply auxiliary power in space. The test, conducted at TAN’s Initial Engineering Test Facility on April 1, 1964, simulated the accidental fall of a reactor into water or wet earth such as could occur during assembly, transport, or a launch abort. The test demonstrated that the reactor would destroy itself immediately instead of building up a high inventory of radioactive fission products.

48. Systems for Nuclear Auxiliary Power (SNAP) 10A Transient No. 2 S N A P T R A N - 2 1965 January 11, This test version of the small space reactor, SNAP 10A/2, was intentionally destroyed on January 11, 1966. 1966It provided information on the dynamic response, fuel behavior, and inherent shutdown mechanisms of these reactors in an open air environment. In normal operation, the control drums of the SNAP10A/2 were rotated to obtain criticality after the reactor had been placed in orbit. In case of a launch abort, however, impact on the earth might cause the drums to rotate inward, go critical, conceivably destroy itself, and release fission products to the surrounding environment. The test data contributed to an understanding of reactor disassembly upon impact and methods for assessing or predicting the radiological consequences.

49. Thermal Reactor Idaho Test Station THRITS 1964THRITS was a low-power reactor located at TAN. Its nuclear core was arranged in two halves of a vertical, Split-Table aluminum, honeycomb-like matrix. The reactor could not be operated until the two halves were brought Reactortogether to form the critical fuel mass. Operators mocked up reactor design concepts for thermal and fast-neutron reactor systems to obtain basic physics and design data for such concepts.

50. Transient Reactor Test Facility TREAT 2-23-59 April 1994Part of the safety program for fast breeder reactors, TREAT was a uranium-oxide-fueled, graphite-moderated, air-cooled reactor designed to produce short, controlled bursts of nuclear energy. Located at Argonne-West, its purpose was to simulate accident conditions leading to fuel damage, including melting or even vaporization of test specimens, while leaving the reactor’s “driver” fuel undamaged. Early studies determined the effect of extreme energy pulses on prototype fuel pins designed for EBR-II. TREAT tests provided data on fuel-cladding damage, fuel motion, coolant-channel blockages, molten-fuel/coolant interactions, and potential explosive forces during an accident. The data helped refine computer simulations of reactor accidents, and, ultimately, design reactors with greater inherent safety.

51. Zero Power Physics Reactor (Earlier name - Zero Power Plutonium Reactor) ZPPR 4-18-69 April 1992ZPPR, a low-power critical facility located at Argonne-West, provided reactor physics data for any type of Standbyfast neutron spectrum reactor, from tiny space-power reactors to large commercial breeder reactors. The (full-size) reactor core configuration to be studied was mocked up in two halves, the fuel loaded into a honeycomb lattice in each of the separated halves. Extrapolation from the zero-power measurements to full-power conditions was readily achievable. Upon moving the two lattice together, ZPPR was brought to a low power, critical state by control rods. Heat removal was by air flow over the fuel elements.

52. Zero Power Reactor No. 3 ZPR-III October 1955 N o v e m b e rThis was a low-power split-table reactor that achieved criticality by bringing two halves of a fuel configuration 1970t o g e t h e r. Alow-power reactor, ZPR-III was used to determine the accuracy of predicted critical mass geometries and critical measurements in connection with various loadings for makeup of fast-reactor core designs. The cores of EBR-II, Fermi, Rapsodie, and SEFOR reactors were originally mocked up in this facility.

Experimental critical assembly results in this field were almost completely lacking before this reactor started up.The reactor was placed on standby in 1970 and later went on display in the EBR-I Visitor Center.


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A P P E N D I X C

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RunNumber Fuel Process Period

1 Hanford C and J slugs 2-53 to 8-53

2 MTR, LITR, NRX, ORNLshielding 10-53 to 12-53

Cold test EBR-I Core 1 7-54 to 7-54

3 EBR-I Core 1, NPCold Run, MTR, LITR,

BORAX, BORAX scrap, Hanford C and J slugs 7-54 to 2-55

P ro c e s s i n g R u n s , I d a h o C h e m i c a l P r o ce s s i n g P l a n t

Between 1953 and 1988 the Chem Plantrecovered from spent reactor fuel 31,432 kilograms of uranium containing uranium-235. At times, the plant also recovered radioactive lanthanum (RaLa), neptunium, andradioactive krypton and xenon for use by private industry or other nuclear facilities.

Among the more frequent sources of fuel were the MTR, ETR, ATR, and STR(S1W), ZPR-III, EBR-I, and EBR-II—all NRTS/INEL/INEEL reactors. In addi-tion, the plant processed SL-1 fuel, SNAPTRAN debris, and fuel from OMRE,BORAX, and SPERT reactors, and other test materials. The largest single sourceof reprocessed fuel was from naval nuclear propulsion reactors: prototype reactors,submarines, cruisers, and other vessels

Other sources included SRP (Savannah River Plant), Hanford, LITR (LowIntensity Test Reactor, Oak Ridge), SIR (Submarine Intermediate Reactor), OWR(Omega West Reactor, Los Alamos), GETR (General Electric Test Reactor), LPTR(Livermore Pool-type Reactor), BGRR (Brookhaven Graphite Research Reactor),ASTR (Aerospace Systems Test Reactor), JRR (Japanese Research Reactor), NRX(Nuclear Engine Reactor Experiment, Jackass Flats, Nevada), SER (SandiaEngineering Reactor), KUR (Kyoto University Reactor), STIR (Shielding TestsIrradiation Reactor), ORR (Oak Ridge Research Reactor), JANUS (BiologicalResearch Reactor, Argonne National Laboratory), BMI Reactor (Battelle MemorialInstitute of Columbus, Ohio) ML-1 (Mobile Low-Power Reactor), SFR(Segmented Fast Reactor), and many other university and research reactors.


4 Hanford J slugs, MTR, BORAX bulk shielding,

BORAX, LITR 3-55 to 7-55

Cold tests Cold test SRPreject slugs 9-55 to 11-55

5 Hanford J and C slugs, Chem Dev Test SRP

reject slugs 12-55 to 3-56

6 MTR, LITR, BORAX, CP-3, CR 3-56 to 5-56

7 Hanford C and J slugs, CR, MTR, BORAX,

LITR, ANL plates, LM slugs, STR, RaLa MTR 5-56 to 3-57

CPM cold start with LM slugs 8-57 to 9-57

8 LM slugs, RaLa MTR 10-57 to 12-57

9 STR 12-57 to 1-58

10 Hanford C slugs, RaLa MTR, SRP LM slugs 1-58 to 2-58

11 SRP LM slugs, SRP Tube, MTR, RaLa MTR,

Chalk River, SRP Tube 5-58 to 11-58

12 SRP slug, SRP Tube, NRX, RaLa MTR 12-58 to 4-59

13 SRP Tube, SRPslug, SRP Tube ends, Chalk River 4-59 to 8-59

14 SIR, OMRE, BMI, RaLa MTR 7-59 to 12-59

15 MTR, RaLa MTR, ETR, LITR, Convair (ASTR),

Hanford C, J, and KW slugs, SRPLM slugs 12-59 to 2-60

16 SIR, RaLa MTR 2-60 to 3-60

17 STR, RaLa MTR 3-60 to 4-60

18 ETR 1-61 to 2-61

19 MTR, ETR, BORAX IV, RaLa MTR, Hanford C and J

slugs, LITR, Chalk River, CP-5, LPTR, GTR (Convair),

OWR, SL-1 scrap 12-61 to 2-62

SL-1 10-62 to 10-62

20 MTR, ETR, RaLa MTR, SPERT, GETR, BRR, SL-1,

BNL, LITR, CP-5, LPTR, GTR (Convair), OWR, WTR,

BORAX III, SUSIE, Hanford AEC, Hanford Rey, NRU 6-63 to 9-63


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21 BGRR, NRX, McMasters, NRU, NRL, SWE, IRL,

University of Michigan—FNR, GTR, MTR, OWR,

LPTR, LITR, UF, ETR, CP-5, STR, SPERT, NASA 6-64 to 12-64

Cold Zr, unirradiated Zr scrap, PWR Core I Seed I,

Zr, EBR-I Core 3 codissolution, EBR-I Core 3,

SNAPTRAN 2/10A-3 core debris 1-65

22 VBWR, Atomics International UO2SO

44-65 to 6-65

23 Cold from ATR, MTR, ETR, and SPERT; MTR, ETR,

LITR, LPTR, OWR, SPERT, GTR, ASTR, GETR,

EBR-II Vycor glass, EBR-I Mark 2, plastic-coated

Al fuel plates 12-65 to 1-66

24 JRR-2 Core 1, NRX, NRU, BGRR, EBR-II Vycor glass,

JRR-2 Cores 2 and 3 3-67 to 9-67

25 MTR, WSU, ETR, LITR, LPTR, OWR, GTR, CP-5,

SER, IRL, GETR, NRL, graphite leaching, Zr, EBR-II

Vycor glass 4-68 to 6-68

26 Zr, MTR, ETR, GETR, Korean, SER, LITR, AFNETR,

JRR-2, KUR, LPTR, OWR, ATR, SPERT, ZPR-III,

SNAPTRAN 2/10-2 debris 8-69 to 10-69

ETR types 1-70 to 4-70

27 Zr, JRR-2 (6 batches), EBR-II scrap, WADCO 2-71 to 7-71

28 Zr, ETR, custom miscellaneous 6-72 to 9-72

29 EBR-II, EBR-II slurry and denitrator product 1-73 to 5-73

30 Zr, GETR, ATR, MTR, MTR 20%, TRAscrap, JRR, ETR,

CP-5, OWR, JMTR, Juggernaut, KUR, UM, SER, LPTR,

EBR-II Vycor glass, G.G.A. Thermionic, ETRC plates,

University of Wyoming UO2SO

4, Atomics International fission

disc, HTRE scrap, Walter Reed Army Hospital, Nuclear

Test Gauge/Split Table Reactor, HTGR secondary burner

ash leaching, BMLfission disc 2-74 to 5-74

31 EBR-II, APPR cold fuel scrap 2-75 to 5-75

32 Zr, PWR 5-76 to 9-76

33 Godiva reactor fuel, HTRE, ATR, MTR, LPT, ETR,

GETR 3-77 to 6-77

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34 EBR-II, OMRE, SPERT, ORNL-17-1, BMI,

Kinglet, Sandia (Godiva reactors), PBF metallurgical samples 8-77 to 9-77

35 Zr, custom 7-78 to 3-79

36 Zr, Rocky Flats U3O

8, GETR, OWR, STIR,

LPTR, UCLA-MTR, ATR, ETR, ATR-XA 9-80 to 3-81

37 EBR-II, Los Alamos metal fuel scrap, Rocky Flats

U3O

8, Rover cold 8-81 to 11-81

38 ETR, BSR, ATR, OWR, ORR, HFR-PETTEN,

SAPHIR, GETR, FRG, FRJ/FRM, SFR, UO2SO

49-82 to 11-82

39 Rover, Sandia, Rocky Flats, cold FLUORINEL,

FLUORINEL Phase 1 cold run 4-83 to 6-84

40 ITAL, FRG, DR-3, UCLA, MURR, OWR, HFBR,

LPTR, TR-1, ATR, BSR, ORR, HMI, Triton, FRJ-2,

HRF, BR-2, ORPHEE, ASTRA, SRF, R-2, JUNTA,

McMaster, JRR-2, JMTR, JANUS, SR, UCSB

UO2SO

4, FLUORINELPhase II cold run,

FLUORINEL pilot plant 8-85 to 1-86

41 FLUORINEL 10-86 to 10-87

42 FLUORINEL, EBR-II Vycor glass, BYU UO2SO

4,

EBR-II fuel scrap, ANL-E fuel scrap 12-87 to 7-88

Sources:

M.D. Staiger, Calcine Waste Storage at the Idaho Nuclear Technology and Engineering Center,

Report No. INEEL/EXT-98-00455 (Idaho Falls: Lockheed Martin, June 1999), Appendix pp. A-163

to A-168.

Dieter Knecht, et al., “Historical Fuel Reprocessing and HLW Management in Idaho,” Radwaste

Magazine (May 1997).

Leroy Lewis, Science and Engineering Fellow, Bechtel BWXT Idaho, contributed corrections to the

lists published in the above two documents.


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C r i t i c a l i t y A c c i d e n t s , I d a h o C h e m i c a l P r o ce s s i n g P l a n t

A criticality accident is an unintendedamassing of a fissionable material (like uranium) which results in the fissioning ofthe material in a chain reaction. In such an event, fission products such as heat,gamma radiation, neutrons, gases, and other emissions are released by the nuclearreaction.

The designers of chemical processing, fuel fabrication, and other plants that han-dle fissionable material employ a variety of strategies to avoid accidental amass-ing of enough material to initiate a chain reaction. The examples below refer touranium, but similar principles would apply to the management of any other fis-sionable material:

• Geometric control: the dimensions of the containers and conveyors of uraniummake it impossible to reach a critical mass. At the Chem Plant, for example,certain dissolver vessels and storage vessels were no more than five inches indiameter. Spacing of vessels was also important, with two feet between vesselsrequired to prevent a criticality.

• Concentration control: Where chemical processes involve evaporation or pre-cipitation reactions which could result in the concentration of the uranium, ves-sels and containers are sized to prevent accidental accumulations of a criticalmass. Appropriate dilution may also be used to keep the solution concentrationbelow a minimum value to prevent criticalities.

• Mass control: In handling enriched uranium, the quantity that can be handled atany one time is limited to a specified, known-to-be-safe number of grams ofmaterial.

• Administrative control: Operational procedures may require two or more peo-ple to approve if a particular procedure could lead to a loss of control. Check-off points, guide limits, process alarm systems, color-coding of certain valvehandles, key-only procedures, personnel training, and other controls accompanynon-routine and many routine procedures.

1. Criticality Accident of October 16, 1959

A bank of storage cylinders containing a uranium solution was air-sparged (airwas bubbled violently into the solution to mix it). The cylinders were geometrical-ly safe, but the sparging initiated a siphon that transferred 200 liters of the solu-tion to a 5,000-gallon tank containing about 600 liters of water. The resultingcriticality lasted about twenty minutes.

No workers were exposed to gamma or neutron radiation, as the criticalityoccurred in a cell below ground when no one was in the vicinity. Airborne activityspread through the plant through vent lines and drain connections, triggeringalarms and an evacuation. Two people who evacuated received significant betadoses (with no detectable medical consequences) as they passed areas whereradioactive gas was being released into the room from floor drains.

The incident resulted in the placement of new valves, restrictions on air-flow lineswhen sparging, installation of water traps, and other measures before the plantrestarted.

2. Criticality Accident of January 25, 1961

About 40 liters of uranyl nitrate solution (200 grams of uranium per liter) wasforced upward from a 5-inch-diameter section of an evaporator into a 24-inch-diameter vapor disengagement cylinder, well above normal solution level.Analysts later assumed that air entered associated lines while operators wereattempting to clear a plugged line and improve a pump. When the air bubblereached the evaporator, solution was expelled from the lower section, and amomentary criticality occurred in the upper section. Radiation triggered alarms,but no personnel received more than 100 mrem exposure. Concrete shieldingwalls surrounded the location of the criticality; the vent system prevented airborneactivity from entering work areas; and equipment design prevented a persistentexcursion. No equipment was damaged.

Management thereafter restricted the use of air pressure to move liquids and clearlines. A borated steel grid was installed in the disengagement cylinder. Boron is anuclear “poison” that absorbs neutrons, helping prevent criticalities.

3. Criticality Accident of October 17, 1978

During the first solvent extraction cycle in the recovery of uranium from spentfuel, the uranium was extracted from the dissolution solution and then scrubbed,stripped, and washed in various process columns to separate the uranium from fis-sion products. The criticality occurred in the scrub column (a long narrow, verticaltank). Water had leaked into the tank where the scrub chemical, aluminum nitrate,had been made up, and reduced the aluminum nitrate concentration. But this was


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not known to operators because an alarm had not been repaired and was inopera-ble. Also, operators had not sampled the scrub solution to determine whether thealuminum nitrate was above the required concentration. As a result, the solutionwas too dilute to force the uranium into the organic phase and instead extractedsmall amounts of it out on the organic phase into the aqueous phase and accumu-lated it into the large-diameter disengaging head.

Over a period of a month, uranium continued to accumulate until it reached a con-centration in the aqueous phase high enough to achieve criticality. It accumulatedin a large-diameter part of the column designed to separate the organic phase fromthe aqueous phase. The criticality reaction continued for about a half an hourbefore the operators responded to the slight pressure build-up and took steps toterminate the reaction.

The criticality occurred in a well-shielded location inside a process cell and result-ed in insignificant radiation exposures to personnel or damage to equipment.

The operation and management failures associated with this criticality led to a sig-nificant reassessment and evaluation of Chem Plant operations. A Plant ProtectionSystem (which consisted of a variety of changes in procedures, operating limits,sampling protocols, specifications, warning systems regarding analytical samples,and others) was installed to preclude this type of accident from happening again.

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A P P E N D I X E

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R & D 1 0 0 A w a r d s

Cryogenic ZAWCAD • 1999

Research Team: Dennis Bingham, RussellFerguson, Gary Palmer, Douglas Stacey, RichardSwainston, Carl A. Dunn, Gerald Decker

Description: Cryogenic ZAWCAD is a remark-able, patented cutting and cleaning tool that willmake many industrial processes safer and moreenvironmentally friendly by performing haz -ardous and non-hazardous cleaning and cuttingoperations while minimizing secondary waste.This unique system uses as its cutting/cleaningmedium a harmless atmospheric gas that dissi-pates after use. As a result, there is no secondarywastestream and no cross contamination. Yet, itcan cut with the precision of the most advancedcutting tool and clean or abrade surfaces withfiner control, more aggressiveness, and greaterefficiency than other cleaning technologies—allwithout creating a secondary waste to clean-up,dispose of or treat.

Cryogenic ZAWCAD is a highly controllablet e c h n o l o g y, adjustable for temperature, speed, anda g g r e s s i v e n e s s .

Tractrix Valve • 1999

Research Team: John Wordin, Pio Park

Description: The Tractrix Valve is a revolution-ary, self-sealing valve that doesn’t leak anddoesn't wear out. Based on a geometric shapecalled a “tractrix curve,” this innovative, plug-type valve wears less than competing plug andball valves and seals tighter the more it wears—essentially “wearing in” each time it is openedand closed. It requires up to 90% less torque toactuate and can be made of any constructionmaterial for the most severe or simple applica-tions. This cost-competitive new valve repre-sents a leap in technology that could makecommon plug and ball valves obsolete for manyapplications—particularly those that are environ-mentally sensitive.

High Void-Fraction MultiphaseFlowmeter • 1999

Research Team: James Fincke, Darrell Kruse,Daniel J. Householder, Bulent Turan, DoyleGould, Charles Ronnenkamp

D e s c r i p t i o n : The INEELHigh Vo i d - F r a c t i o nMultiphase Flowmeter solves one of the naturalgas industry’s most difficult measurement prob-lems: cost-effective measurement of “wet gas”(mixed-phase flows of ≤5% liquid by volume).This innovative flowmeter represents a majoreconomic breakthrough that can impact over300,000 natural gas wells in the U.S. alone. Ito ffers extraordinary size and cost savings overexisting technology, and is the only device to pro-vide real-time wet-gas measurement at the well-head. It brings better fiscal management toproducers, maximizing gas recovery. Its compactsize will simplify facilities design, and its lowcost will reduce capital investment and total gasproduction costs. Most importantly, the INEELFlowmeter gives producers a reliable, economicalmeans of managing natural gas reservoirs for thefirst time, conserving a precious natural resource.

Maverick Tank InspectionRobot • 1999

Research Team: Thor Zollinger, Kerry Klingler,Charles B. Isom, Kerry Trahan, Scott Bauer,Don Hartsell

Description: The Maverick is a submersible,robot-based system that offers safe, practical, andc o s t - e ffective inspection of in-service, above-ground storage tanks (AST). This patented tech-nology provides direct and indirect cost savingsof 75% or greater over traditional manual inspec-tion methods, reduces the inspection process fromfour weeks (or more) to a few days, eliminatesworker exposure to hazardous conditions, andenables tank owners to continue using their tanksduring inspections, saving them tens of thousandsof dollars in previously “lost” revenue. Maverick

also is the only robotic inspection system certi-fied for use in hazardous and potentially explo-sive fuel environments (Class I, Division 1,Group D) such as gasoline and other fuel oils.

The robot’s payload includes a multi-channelultrasonic sensor system to map and correlatemetal thickness data, an onboard video systemto provide a detailed view of the tank bottom,and position-tracking sensors so techniciansknow the exact location of the Maverick, andany problem spots, at all times.

Supercritical Fluid Slashing System • 1999

Research Team: Mark Argyle and Alan Propp

Description: Before threads can be woven intofabric, they must be “sized,” a process that addsa strengthening and smoothing coating to thethread. The INEELSupercritical Fluid SlashingSystem (SFSS) is a cheaper, faster, smaller, andmore environmentally correct method for coat-ing threads with size, one that replaces cen-turies-old technology. The INEELmethodtransports the size (starch or polyvinyl alcohol)in a very high-pressure “supercritical fluid” thathas properties of both a fluid and a gas.Individual threads pass through pressure gradi-ent tubes, where the supercritical sizing mixtureis forced into the threads. The efficient methodreduces the amount of water, starch, andpolyvinyl alcohol that textile manufacturers dis-pose of. The SFSS specifically addresses anindustry “wish list” to provide uniform coating,reduce yarn hairiness, reduce the amount of siz-ing material, eliminate standing baths, and mini-mize drying. Because it significantly increasessizing efficiency, the SFSS can double produc-tion throughput for improved profitability.

Electro-Optic High-Voltage Sensor • 1998

Research Team: Thomas M. Crawford, James R.Davidson, Gary D. Seifert

D e s c r i p t i o n : The Electro-optic High-voltageSensor (EHVS) is a safe, small, non-electricaloptical sensor that uses photons instead of elec-trons to measure high voltages on power lines.The most unique aspect of this technology is thatthe sensor does not have to be in electrical con-tact to effect a measurement, but simply withinthe conductor’s electronic field, a key advantageover the large transformers conventionally usedfor voltage measurement at power distributionsites. The EHVS device offers substantialimprovement over potential transformers in cost,ease of installation, range of response to voltagefluctuations, and richness of applications.

Rapid Solidification Process Tooling • 1998

Research Team: Kevin McHugh

D e s c r i p t i o n : Rapid Solidification Process (RSP)Tooling technology is a fast, low-cost alternativeto conventional fabrication of precision toolingused in the manufacture of nearly all mass pro-duced products, from cell phones to automobiles.This new, molten metal spray-forming technologypromises to reduce the cost and lead time for pro-ducing tooling by a factor of 5 to 10, substantiallyshortening the time it takes industry to get prod-ucts to market. Unlike other alternative toolingapproaches, RSPTooling technology makes itpossible to create tooling from hard tool steels atthe rate of 2,000 lb/hr or more, suitable for thel a rgest auto industry tooling requirements.

Malt-Based Antimicrobial • 1998

Research Team: Karen B. Barrett

Description: The Malt-Based Antimicrobial is anaturally occurring biopesticide derived frommalted cereal grains. Developed as an environ-mentally sound solution to agricultural crop pro-tection, this product represents a majorbreakthrough in pesticide research. It offers anextraordinary taxonomic range—unrivaled bychemical fungicides, is easily and inexpensivelyproduced, has an excellent shelf life; and can beused to protect crops in the field, in storage, andduring transport. Most importantly, this new

biopesticide is harmless to people, animals, andthe environment; and is derived from a plentifulrenewable resource: common cereal grain.

Nanocrystalline Composite CoerciveMagnet Powder • 1997

Research Team: J.D. Branagan, J.A. Hyde, C.H.Sellers, K.W. Dennis, M.J. Kramer, R. W.McCallum

Joint entry: Ames Laboratory, Dr. R. WilliamMcCalum

D e s c r i p t i o n : The development and application ofa new alloying approach in rare earth-based per-manent magnet systems resulted in the develop-ment of advanced alloys with a nanocrystallinecomposite microstructure. Atomization process-ing of these new alloys resulted in significantimprovements in hard magnetic properties andprocessability over previous alloys, allowing thepossibility of near term, high volume, low costproduction of atomization materials.

Advanced Tensiometer • 1997

Research Team: Joel M. Hubbell, James B.Sission

Description: The Advanced Tensiometer is aninstrument that measures how tightly water isheld to soil in the unsaturated zone, a region thatextends from the earth’s surface to the aquifer.The Advanced Tensiometer’s breakthroughdesign helps investigators determine the direc-tion and rate of water movement at depths andwith accuracies not possible before, ushering ina new era for monitoring waste disposal sites,safeguarding drinking water supplies, and con-trolling agricultural irrigation systems.

Gamma Neutron Assay System •1995

Research Team: R. Aryaeinejad, J.D. Cole, R.C.Greenwood

D e s c r i p t i o n : The Gamma Neutron Assay System( G N AT) is a new, nonintrusive, and uniquepatented technique of identifying fissile materialsand their isotopic ratios in bulk quantities and in afield environment. It resolved, for the first time,problems of assaying and tracking special nuclearmaterial (SNM) not previously possible, whichare important in arms control, nonproliferation,and nuclear weapons dismantlement.

Biocube Aerobic Biofilter—A Biofilterfor Treatment of Toxic Gases andVapors • 1993

Research Team: W.A. Apel, F.S. Colwell, A.S.Espinosa, E.G. Johnson, B.D. Lee, M.R. Wiebe,W.D. Kant, P. Melick, B. Singleton

Joint entry: EG&G Roston, W.D. Kant

Description: The Biocube™ Aerobic Biofilter isa landmark product that ushers in a new era fordegradation of toxic vapors and gases. It isnovel, effective, and economical vs. convention-al technologies, and is the first modular andmobile biofilter.

Portable Isotopic-Neutron SourceChemical Assay System • 1992

Research Team: A.J. Caffrey, J.D. Cole, L.Forman, R.J. Gehrke, R.C. Greenwood, K.M.Krebs, M.H. Putnam

Description: The Portable Isotopic-neutronsource (PINS)-based non-destructive assay sys -tem distinguishes chemical weapons (e.g., nervegas) from high-explosive munitions for treatyverification.

Pulsed Extraction Secondary IonMass Spectrometer • 1992

Research Team: D. Applehans, D.A. Dahl, J.E.Delmore

Description: This is a new type of SecondaryIon Mass Spectrometer using a patented sec-ondary ion Pulsed Extraction technique that pre-vents sample charging and allows the positiveand negative ion spectra to be collected simulta-neously, making possible analyses that previous-ly could not be performed.

Sulfur Poisoning Resistant andRegenerable HydrogenationCatalysts • 1990

Research Team: Randy B. Wright

D e s c r i p t i o n : This entry is a new, unique, andadvanced method for the preparation of highlyactive, sulfur poisoning resistant and repeatedlyregenerable hydrogenation catalysts. This methodutilizes the controlled manipulation of chemicallyinduced surface segregation processes in conjunc-tion with intermetallic compounds and binaryalloys to design and synthesize a wide range of


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A P P E N D I X E

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active catalysts. As specially applied to nickel-based intermetallic compounds, this approach pro-vides a technique by which highly activehydrogenation catalysts can be prepared andregenerated by elevated temperature oxidation/reduction treatment of the starting material.

FiberOptic Moire InterferometrySystem • 1990

Research Team: V. Deason, M.B. Ward

D e s c r i p t i o n : The FiberOptic MoireInterferometry System, Model FMI 1700, is amajor advance in an important new technique—d i ffraction moire interferometry. Diff r a c t i o nmoire is used for the study and measurement ofdistortion, stress, and fracture. The FMI wasdeveloped at the INELin response to seriousfailings to the existing diffraction moire systems.The FMI utilizes advanced optical fiber compo-nents in a compact portable unit to replace anoptical table full of standard optical devices.These fiber optic components are in all casess m a l l e r, lighter, and more stable than the discretecomponents normally used. At the same time, theFMI greatly simplifies the experimental process,which until now has been complicated andtedious using conventional equipment.

D i ffraction Moire Interferometry, for which theFMI was developed, allows the researcher tomake highly accurate (better than one Micronresolution) measurements of deformation. T h i sdeformation could be the result of stresses on as h i p ’s hull, an airplane’s frame, bridge, piping ina nuclear plant, or other critical area.Understanding the relationship between stress,deformation, and such factors as aging, load, cor-rosion, and material properties is crucial toreducing the heavy burden on the economy andsociety of structural failures (estimated at tens tohundreds of billions of dollars annually, plusextensive loss of life and productivity).

D i ffraction moire measures deformation in aspecimen by creating full two-dimensional mapsof the corresponding deformation in a diff r a c t i o ngrating bonded or marked on the surface of thes p e c i m e n .

Finnigan MAK Gas MassSpectrometer Model 271/251 • 1990

Research Team: R. Rankin, K.W. Guardapee,L.L. Dickerson

Joint entry: Finnigan MAT Corporation

D e s c r i p t i o n : The 271/251 gas mass spectrometerdefined the state-of-the-art in instrumentation forthe analysis of noble gases in the environment.The unique aspect of this instrument is that itcombines two diverse gas analysis functions,usually requiring separate instruments, into a sin-gle entity. The instrument performs both gascomposition and gas isotope ratio analyses. Inaddition, typical isotopic precision capabilitieswith gas mass spectrometers were on the order of0.03%. This product has been able to exceedthese values by more than an order of magnitude(0.001%), thereby significantly extending thestate-of-the-art in high precision gas isotopicanalysis. Highly precise measurement of the con-centrations of the gas isotopes in the atmosphereis indispensable to environmental studies involv-ing nuclear facilities. This work has been recog-nized internationally; instruments based on thesedesigns are now in use in Europe and A s i a .

Simion PC/PS2 4.0 • 1989

Research Team: D.A. Dahl, J.E. Delmore, A.D.Applehans

D e s c r i p t i o n : SIMION PC/PS2 4.0 is a personalcomputer program for designing and analyzingc h a rged particle (ions and electrons) lenses, iontransport systems, and all types of mass spectrom-eters and surface probes that utilize charged parti-cles. The program, which became available inJune, 1988, has exclusive capabilities that signifi-cantly expand the number and types of problemsthat can be addressed, problems that heretoforewere impossible to model with existing programs.

Neutral Molecular Beam SurfaceProbe • 1988

Research Team: J.E. Delmore, A.D. Apprelhans,and D.A. Dahl

D e s c r i p t i o n : This device produces a well focusedbeam of high energy neutral sulfur hexafluoridemolecules at energies ranging from 3 to 23 keVthat can be transported many meters under vacu-um while retaining sharp focusing, to probe the

few molecular layers of a sample’s surface. T h eprimary function of the Neutral Molecular BeamSurface Probe is the analysis of surfaces of non-electrical-conducting materials. Asimilar tech-nique has been used with charged atomic particlebeams for many years to analyze surfaces of elec-trically conducting materials, although the tech-nique is applied with great difficulty to insulatingmaterials. Other techniques, notably fast neutralatom beams (FAB sources) have been used withsome success, but the nature of their productionprecludes sharp focusing. In addition, the FA Bsource must be mounted quite close to the speci-men, and that constrains the secondary ion sourcedesign. The new Neutral Beam is much easier touse, allows much sharper focus, and increasessensitivity about 1000 fold over systems usingc h a rged particle beams on insulating specimens.

Biodegradation System for Toxic Organic Waste Processing • 1988

Research Team: J.H. Wolfram, R.D. Rogers

D e s c r i p t i o n : Disposing of hazardous waste is ahigh-priority item for every organization that pro-duces it. Virtually every hospital, research univer-s i t y, and biotechnology company in the U.S.produces small quantities of hazardous wastes ofo rganic compounds (e.g., toluene, xylene, andpseudocumene). The first two of these com-pounds are on the EPApriority pollutant list. Amixture of these compounds is know as liquidscintillation cocktail when the mixture also con-tains radioactive materials. The BiodegradationSystem presented here introduces organisms tothe cocktail that detoxify it at very high levels ofe ff i c i e n c y. The system includes a bioreactor(where living cells “feed” on the toxic materialsand produce carbon dioxide), accessory hardware,and a supply of the detoxifying microorg a n i s m s .Once installed, the system will continually bio-process an inflow of the cocktail, rendering it safefor conventional disposal through the sewer sys-tem if the radioactivity is within prescribed limits,or as low-level radioactive waste otherwise. T h i seliminates the high cost of packing and transport-ing the mixed waste to the very few authorizeddisposal sites. Sanctioned methods for handlingthe waste at present are incineration and long-term storage. Converting the waste at the siteeliminates dependence on these methods and thecost associated with them.

Improved Iron-Based Alloys fromNoble Gas Doping • 1988

Research Team: John E. Flinn

D e s c r i p t i o n : The primary function of this productis to strengthen alloys for high-temperature appli-cations. Noble gas atoms (e.g., those of helium ora rgon), when entrapped during the processing ofiron-base powders, stabilize the microstructureand strengthen the alloy produced. The alloyingaddition forms numerous small and very stableclusters with vacancies (missing atom sites) dur-ing rapid cooling. The formation of the clusters isdue to the high binding energy between the noblegas atoms and the vacancies that are created byhigh temperature exposure (i.e., heat treating).Because they retard microstructure coarsening, theclusters allow fine microstructures to be retainedduring exposure to high temperatures. Clusterpresence provides a form of solid solution anddispersion strengthening. The strengthening is fur-ther enhanced during aging heat treatmentsbecause the clusters provide nucleation, or pre-ferred, sites for the formation of precipitates suchas carbides. The fine dispersion of a large numberof precipitates significantly improves the strengthof the alloy. This process is applicable to all iron-base alloys, particularly to stainless steels.

Oxynitride Braze Method for JoiningSilicon Nitride Ceramics • 1988

Research Team: R.M. Neilson, D.N. Coon, S.T.Scheutz, R.L. Tallman

D e s c r i p t i o n : Structural ceramics are potentialsubstitutes for strategic and/or critical materials.H o w e v e r, many potential structural ceramicapplications require components that are too intri-cate or too large to be fabricated with existingtechniques. The invention is a method for joiningsilicon nitride ceramics to produce large partsand/or parts that have complex geometries inwhich the high-temperature mechanical propertiesof the joined part are comparable to that of theoriginal ceramic components. For certain applica-tions (e.g., aerospace, engines, chemical process-ing) ceramic parts, and complex shapes arepreferred to metals. Reasons include: increasedservice operating temperatures, greater strengthand increased corrosion resistance at the highertemperatures, greater thermodynamic eff i c i e n c yin energy conversion devices, lower density and,

therefore, lower inertia, lower cost of raw materi-als, and conservation of possibly strategic and/orcritical materials in some applications. Structuralceramics are, however, difficult to form in eitherl a rger size parts or in complex geometriesbecause the forming process usually requiressome combination of high temperature and highpressure. Some method of joining the ceramicswhile maintaining the structural integrity andthermodynamic qualities of the ceramic is neededto produce the larger and/or more complex shapesrequired in many applications. The oxynitridebraze method for joining silicon nitride ceramicspresented here has been demonstrated to be ane ffective joining technique using either a hot iso-static press or a graphite resistance furnace withsmall nitrogen overpressure. In this process,oxynitride glass brazes are used to join siliconnitride ceramics. The glass uses are comparablein composition to the grain boundary phase pre-sent in the ceramic pieces that results from thedensification process used to consolidate the sili-con nitride powders.

Die-Target for DynamicConsolidation of Powders • 1987

Research Team: John E. Flinn, Gary E. Korth

D e s c r i p t i o n : Die Ta rget for DynamicConsolidation of Powders is a new and improvedmethod of consolidating metal monoliths fromrapidly solidified powders (RSP). The Die-Ta rg e tcontrols dynamic stress waves produced by deto-nation of explosive charges to consolidate RSPalloys. With each detonation, the Die-Ta rget pro-duced four fully consolidated, fully dense, crack-free monoliths for test specimens. This processdoes not produce high generalized temperaturesin the powders, which could seriously alter themicrostructure and desirable properties for theR S P. Monoliths produced by the dynamic consol-idation of RSPalloys (e.g., stainless steel) haveimproved mechanical properties, improved corro-sion resistance, chemical homogeneity, extendedsolubility limits, very fine microstructures, anddesirable metastable phases. At present, the pri-mary use of the Die-Ta rget is as a research tool.H o w e v e r, the theory and principles underlyingthe design hold promise for industrial and com-mercial applications of the DIE-Ta rget whereadvanced materials that are harder and strongerare needed.

Vision System for High LuminosityProcesses • 1986

Research Team: Jon Bolstad, M.B. Ward, C.L.Shull

D e s c r i p t i o n : This system produces high-qualityvideo imagery of industrial or experimentalprocesses which are normally obscured by highluminosity of an electric arc, a plasma, or a com-bustion flame. It has particular application inelectric arc welding where detailed vision of thewelding pool, electrode, and liquid/solid interfaceis required. The welding site is illuminated bypulsed laser light transported to the welding torchby one or more optical fibers. The sensor assem-bly incorporates objective optics, a laser line fil-t e r, a microchannel plate image intensifier tube,and a CCD video camera. The intensifier tube isshuttered electronically in synchronism with theflash from the laser source, which occurs onlyonce per video frame (or some multiple thereof).The shuttering interval (about 100 nanoseconds)is very small in comparison with the 33 millisec-ond integration time of a standard video camera.The welding arc light is almost totally eliminatedfrom the video picture. Visibility through the arcis regained, and extreme variation in brightnessacross the picture is removed. The video imageryis much superior to standard video for interpreta-tion by eye and by electronic image processinge q u i p m e n t .


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A B B R EV I A T I O N S

IHS Idaho Historical Society

BSU Boise State University LibrarySpecial Collections

HREX Human Radiation Experiments,Internet site:http://tis.eh.doe.gov/ohre/

C H A P T E R O N E

Epigraph: Susan M. Stacy, Conversations, ACompanion Book to Idaho Public Television’sProceeding On Through a Beautiful Country(Boise: Idaho Public Television, 1990), 47.

1. Mike Atwood, interview with author,January 22, 1999, recounted his story asretold in this chapter.

2. “Fourteen Stockmen Testify at AEC LandHearing,” Post-Register, May 3, 1950, 2.

3. See Dr. Bill Hackett, et al, GeohydrologicStory of the Eastern Snake River Plain andthe Idaho National Engineering Laboratory(Idaho Falls: Idaho Operations Office,1986), 11.

4. (Lava tubes) Hackett, Snake River Plain , 11;(date) personal communication from Dr.Richard P. Smith to Julie Braun, INEEL,March 9, 1999. Lava flows at Craters of theMoon National Monument west of theINEELmay be only 2,000 years old.

5. Mike Atwood, January 22, 1999.

6. E.S. Lohse, “Aviator’s Cave,” IdahoArcheologist 12 (Fall 1989): 23.

7. Susanne J. Miller, Idaho NationalEngineering Laboratory Management Planfor Cultural Resources (Final Draft) (IdahoFalls: Lockheed Idaho TechnologiesCompany Report DOE/ID-10361, Revision1, 1995), 2-17.

8. Lohse, “Aviator’s Cave,” 23-28.

9. Miller, Cultural Resources Plan, pp. 2-18 to2-21.

10. (Homesteading) Miller, Cultural ResourcesPlan, pp. 2-21 to 2-22; (quotation) HughLovin, “Footnote to History: `The ReservoirWould Not Hold Water,’” Idaho Yesterdays(Spring 1980): 14.

11. (Traditional routes) to Clayton Marler fromDiana Yupe, Tribal Cultural ResourcesCoordinator, Shoshone-Bannock Tribes,June 21, 1999, copy at Cultural ResourcesOffice, INEEL.

C H A P T E R T W O

Epigraph: Kay Lambson, interview with author,February 9, 1999.

1. Wyle Laboratories, Interim OrdnanceCleanup Program Record Search Report,hereafter, Scientech Report (Norco,California: Scientific Services and SystemsGroup, 1993), Reference 2, “History of theNaval Ordnance Plant, Pocatello, Idaho,” p.1. This report reprints documents found inNaval Historical Center and other archives.See also Arrowrock Group, The NationalEnvironmental and Engineering Laboratory:A Historical Context and Assessment,(hereafter Context Report) INEEL/EXT-97-01021, Revision 2 (Idaho Falls: INEEL,1997), 29-30; and United States, Buildingthe Navy’s Bases in World War II: History ofthe Bureau of Yards and Docks and the CivilEngineer Corps, 1940-1946,Vol. 1(Washington D.C.: Government PrintingOffice, 1947), 1-13.

2. Context Report, 29-30.

3. Context Report, 30.

4. Scientech Report, Reference 2, pp. 4 -5.

5. Context Report, 30.

6. Context Report, 31. The letters on theconcrete were still visible in 1999.

7. Margaret and Orville Larsen, interview withauthor, March 19, 1999; Scientech Report, p.3-2 (road names).

8. Kay Lambson, Gloria Lambson, interviewswith author, February 9, 1999; and Scientech

Report Reference 1, “Register of PertinentInformation,” p. 2.

9. Scientech Report, Reference 2, p. 22;Reference 85, p. 135; and map of NavalProving Ground, p. 2-8. See also 1951INEEL photo no. 02974; map U.S. NavalProving Ground.

10. Stan Coloff, “The High and Dry Navy:World War II,” Philtron (October 1965): 3,reprinted as “WWII: The Arco NavalProving Ground” in INEL News (May1989): 18; Scientech Report, p. 3-2 (roadnames), Reference 2, p. 5 (Scoville). Extantbuildings from the Naval Proving Groundera in 1999 included the commandingofficer’s house (CFA-607), the Marinebarracks (CFA-606), the pumphouse (CFA-642), a brick-veneer cottage (CFA-613), anda wood frame cottage (CFA-603). Three ofthe magazines were still in use: CFA-635and -637 stored hazardous materials; andCFA-638 was used as a DosimetryCalculation Laboratory.

11. Coloff, 3.

12. Gloria Lambson, February 9, 1999.

13. Gloria Lambson, February 9, 1999;Scientech Report, Reference 1, p. 6 (buoyrepair).

14. Kay Lambson, Gloria Lambson, February 9,1999.

15. Scientech Report, p. 2-6, 2-9, 2-10, 6-1.

16. One designated area was about five milesnorthwest of the INEEL’s Radioactive WasteManagement Complex; the other centeredon what is today’s U.S. Highway 20between East Butte and the site of EBR-II.See Scientech Report, Reference 96, p. 2-74, 6-7.

17. (Quote, air-gap) to Captain M.A. Sawyerfrom Captain Walter E. Brown, August 11,1944, in Scientech Report, p. 2-23 to 2-25.

18. Scientech Report, p. 2-22, 2-29, 2-35 to 2-38.

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N o t e s

19. Scientech Report, p. 6-7, References 76-80,82.

20. Scientech Report, p. 2-31.

21. Scientech Report, Reference 92.

22. Scientech Report, Reference 67, p. 7;Reference 88.

23. Depleted uranium was a byproduct ofuranium enrichment plants at Oak Ridge,Tennessee. It contained less than the naturalamount of the isotope of uranium-235. T h ematerial has several uses. In breeder reactors,it can be bred into Plutonium-239 and thenfissioned. It is used in armor-piercing shells,in tank armor, and for counterbalances onaircraft control surfaces. For Elsie, Marsh seeScientech Report, p. 2-72.

C H A P T E R T H R E E

1. Edward R. Landa and Terry B. Councell,“Leaching of Uranium from Glass andCeramic Foodware and Decorative Items,”Health Physics 63 (No. 3, September 1992):343.

2. Raymond W.Taylor and Samuel W.Taylor,Uranium Fever; or No Talk Under $1Million (New York: Macmillan, 1970), 79.

3. In some reactors, such as the fast-fissioningEBR-II, some U-238 atoms will fission.

4. Norman Polmar and Thomas B. Allen,Rickover, Controversy and Genius, ABiography (New York: Simon and Schuster,1982), 118-120. Enrico Fermi observeduranium fission in a 1934 experiment. Hethought the fission products were newelements and did not recognize them askrypton and barium. Four years later,Austrian physicist Lise Meitner realized thatthe uranium atom had actually split apart.

5. William Benton, The Annals of America,Volume 15 (Chicago: The EncyclopediaBritannica, Inc., 1968), 601-602.

6. Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986), 427;Stephane Groueff, Manhattan Project: TheUntold Story of the Making of the AtomicBomb (New York: Little, Brown, and Co.,Bantam, 1967), 55-56; Taylor, UraniumFever, 81; Polmar and Allen, Rickover, 120.The first two of these sources and RichardG. Hewlett and Oscar E. Anderson, Jr., TheNew World, 1939-1946 (Philadelphia:Pennsylvania State University Press, 1962)are histories of the Manhattan Project.

7. Rhodes, Atomic Bomb, 711, 740. Estimateson TNT yield equivalent differ. Rhodes’source was the Committee for theCompilaton of Materials on Damage Causedby the Atomic Bombs in Hiroshima andNagasaki, p. 21, in Hiroshima and Nagasaki(Basic Books, 1977, 1981).

8. Jack M. Holl, Argonne National Laboratory,1946-1996 (Urbana: University of IllinoisPress, 1997), 40.

9. See Holl, Argonne, 62.

10. (Groves approval) Holl, Argonne, 40. For anaccount of the early deliberations of theAEC, see Richard G. Hewlett and FrancisDuncan, Atomic Shield, 1947/1952(University Park: Pennsylvania StateUniversity Press, 1969).

11. Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (Public Law 79-585).

12. For a history of early corporate interest innuclear energy, see Mark Hertsgaard,Nuclear, Inc., The Men and Money BehindNuclear Energy (New York: PantheonBooks, 1983).

13. See Hewlett, Atomic Shield; Herbert York,The Advisors, Oppenheimer, Teller, and theSuperbomb (San Francisco: W.H. Freemanand Company, 1976); and Herbert York,Race to Oblivion (New York: Simon andSchuster, 1970).

14. David Lilienthal, Atomic Energy,A NewStart (New York: Harper and Row, 1980), 1.

15. John Tierney, “Take the A-Plane: The $1Billion Nuclear Bird that Never Flew,”Science 82 (Jan/Feb 1982): 47; Henry W.Lambright, Shooting Down the NuclearAirplane (Syracuse, NY: Inter-UniversityCase Program No. 104, 1967), 3; Susan M.Stacy, Idaho National EngineeringLaboratory: Test Area North, Hangar 629,Historic American Engineering Record ID-32-A (Idaho Falls: Lockheed Martin IdahoCorporation, 1994), 10.

16. Susan M. Stacy, Idaho National EngineeringLaboratory, Army Reactor ExperimentalArea, Historical American EngineeringRecord ID-33-D (Idaho Falls: LockheedMartin Idaho Corporation, 1998), 5.

17. Hewlett, Atomic Shield, 196, 202-204. In1948 the AEC research laboratories wereArgonne, Chicago; Oak Ridge, Tennessee;Brookhaven, New York; and the newKnolles laboratory in Schenectady. The LosAlamos Science Laboratory in New Mexicofocused on weapons research. The Radiation

Laboratory at Berkeley, California, did notcarry the title of “national laboratory.” OtherAEC production centers made plutoniumand other weapons materials.

18. Pike quoted by Kevin Richert in “OriginalAEC Site Spawned Eastern Idaho’s `GoldRush,’” (Idaho Falls) Post-Register, May 15,1994, H-20; (Hafstad) Hewlett, AtomicShield, 210.

19. Hewlett, Atomic Shield, 196, 206.

20. Hewlett, Atomic Shield, 210.

21. Smith, Hinchman & Grylls, Survey on FortPeck, Montana, and Pocatello, Idaho, Sites(Detroit: Smith, Hinchman & Grylls, March1949), 1, 41 (fog).


23. Robert Smylie, interview with author, July8, 1998, Boise; “Idaho Termed Top Favoritefor Plant Site,” (Idaho Falls) Post-Register,March 16, 1949, 1.

24. “Arco Area to Get West Atomic Plant,”Post-Register, March 22, 1949, 1. See alsoletter to Mike Mansfield from DavidLilienthal, March 29, 1949, IHS AR 2/22,Papers of Governor C.A. Robins, Box 1,Series 1, File: Arco Atomic EnergyPlant/part 1; (hearings) Hewlett, AtomicShield, 211.

25. “Station Manager Named,” Post-Register,April 4, 1949, 1.

C H A P T E R F O U R

1. “Who cares for letterheads?” ArcoAdvertiser, April 29, 1949, 1; “Arco ChiefWonders if Neighbor is Lacking in BrotherlyLove,” Idaho Daily Statesman, April 29,1949; “Idaho Falls Pulls Back on Publicityas Atomic Capital,” Post-Register, April 26,1949.

2. “Station Manager Named,” Post-Register,April 4, 1949, 1.

3. Because of the Navy’s resistance to givingup the proving ground, the AEC discussedother locations for the MTR, EBR, andNavy reactors as late as mid-July; Hewlett,Atomic Shield, 218.

4. Jacqui Johnston Batie, interviews withauthor on October 14, 1998, and March 14,1999; Bill Ginkel, interviews with author onOctober 13, 1998, and February 3, 1999;and undated news clipping supplied byJacqui Batie, “Leonard E. Johnston, AECChief Here Takes New Job, Reports Say.”


2 8 2

See Groueff, Manhattan Project, 381, forgaseous diffusion plant.

5. “Details Revealed for Plan to Build WestAtomic Field Station,” Post-Register, March8, 1949, 1; “Arco Site Named for AtomicPlant,” Arco Advertiser, March 25, 1949, 1;and “Leonard E. Johnston, AEC Chief HereTakes New Job, Reports Say,” (see note no.4 above).

6. “A Village Wakes Up,” Life (May 9, 1949):98-101; “Arco Site Named for AtomicPlant,” Arco Advertiser, March 25, 1949, 1.See also Vardis Fisher, ed. The IdahoEncyclopedia (Caldwell, Idaho: CaxtonPrinters, 1938) entry for Arco.

7. “Village Alert to Problems” and “NewBusiness Firms Move In,” Arco Advertiser,1; to Chet Moulton from Governor Robins,April 14, 1949, IHS AR2/22, Box 1, Series1, File: Arco Atomic Energy Plant, part 1;and Federal Housing Administration, “APreliminary Plan and Program for Arco,Idaho,” 1949, in AR2/22, File: Arco AtomicEnergy Plant, part 3.

8. (Quote) to Robins from Cy Davis, IdahoFalls Chamber of Commerce, March 28,1949, IHS AR2/22, Box 1, Series 1, File:Arco Atomic Energy Plant, part 1.

9. (Quote) Robins from Cy Davis, March 28,1949, cited in note above; to Robins fromJoe Call, Idaho Falls Chamber ofCommerce, March 28, 1949, IHS AR2/22,Box 1, Series 1, File: Arco Atomic EnergyPlant, part 1. The towns were Island Park,Warm River, Ashton, St. Anthony, Rexburg,and Arco.

10. “Mayors Form Committee to Cooperate withAtomic Project,” Arco Advertiser, April 8,1949, 1.

11. Telegram to Robins from John Sanborn,April 12, 1949, IHS AR2/22, Box 1, Series1, File: Arco Atomic Energy Plant, part 1.

12. “Who Cares for Letterheads?” ArcoAdvertiser, April 29, 1949, 1.

13. Robb Brady, interview with author, August27, 1998.

14. Robb Brady, August 27, 1998.

15. “Blackfoot eyes Possibility of AtomicFuture,” Post-Register, April 3, 1949, 5. Seealso Ben Plastino, Coming of Age: IdahoFalls and the Idaho National EngineeringLaboratory (Idaho Falls: Margaret A.Plastino, 1998), 7-8.

16. Marvin Walker, interview with author,March 15, 1999. Walker, Johnston’s driverand document courier, heard Johnstonremark several times that the NOPwouldhave been an ideal set-up for the AEC head-quarters, except for the lack of commitmentfrom Pocatello. See also Plastino, Coming ofAge, 17.

17. AEC news release, May 18, 1949, IHSAR2/22 Box 1, Series 1, File: AtomicEnergy Plant, part 1.

18. David Lilienthal, The Atomic Energy Years,1945-1950, The Journals of David E.Lilienthal, Volume II (New York: Harper andRow, 1964), 513-514.

19. “Purpose of Arco Site Explained,” ArcoAdvertiser, August 5, 1949, 1.

20. Jacqui Batie, Marvin Walker, and John Ray,interviews with author, March 14 and 15,1999.

21. “Problems Mount as City Squares Off to BigJob,” Post-Register, May 22, 1949, 4.

22. R.L. Polk and Co., Polk’s Idaho Falls CityDirectory (Omaha: R.L. Polk, 1952), 13.

C H A P T E R F I V E

Epigraph: Bill Johnston to C.A. Robins, July 13,1949. See note no. 1 below.

1. “AEC Offices in New Location,” ArcoAdvertiser, July 22, 1949, 1; letter to C.A.Robins from Bill (L.E.) Johnston, July 13,1949, IHS AR 2/22, Box 1, Series 1, File:Arco Atomic Energy Plant, part 2; (bubblerumor) Hewlett, Atomic Shield, 219.

2. Hewlett, Atomic Shield, 218-219.

3. Holl, Argonne, 87.

4. “Gradual Expansion of Arco Plant Plannedby AEC,” Arco Advertiser, September 30,1949, 1.

5. Marvin Walker, interview with author,March 15, 1999; Hewlett, Atomic Shield,495; William Ginkel, interview with author,February 3, 1999.

6. Jack M. Holl, “The National Reactor TestingStation: The Atomic Energy Commission inIdaho, 1949-1962,” Pacific NorthwestQuarterly (Volume 85, No. 1, January1994): 18.

7. John Horan, interview with author, July 29,1997.

8. “Exploratory Surveys Start at Atomic Site,”A rco A d v e rt i s e r, July 1, 1949, 1.


10. John Horan, July 29, 1997.

11. Smith, Hinchman & Grylls, Survey, 54, 70,80. Harold T. Stearns and J. StewartWilliams, consulting geologists, weresubcontracted by Smith, Hinchman & Gryllsto summarize their understanding of theaquifer. See “Geological and HydrologicFeatures of the Pocatello Site, Idaho,” in theSurvey.

12. “Gradual Expansion of Arco Plant Plannedby AEC,” Arco Advertiser, September 30,1949, 1; Hewlett, Atomic Shield, 211;“Testing Proves Ample Supply,” ArcoAdvertiser, August 19, 1949, 1.

13. Marvin Walker, March 15, 1999.

14. Hewlett, Atomic Shield, 218-220. For ahistory of the hydrogen bomb, see RichardRhodes, Dark Sun, The Making of theHydrogen Bomb (New York: Simon andSchuster, 1995).

15. “Gradual Expansion of Arco Plant Plannedby AEC,” Arco Advertiser, September 30,1949, 1.

16. Rick Bolton, “USGS technician RodgerJensen reflects on 30 years in the sagebrush”INEL News (May 19, 1992); “A VillageWakes Up,” Life (May 9, 1949): 101;(Johnston quote) “Purpose of Arco SiteExplained,” Arco Advertiser, August 5,1949, 1.

17. “AEC Given Custody of Naval ProvingGround,” Arco Advertiser, December 9,1949, 1.

18. Hewlett, Atomic Shield, 495; “Fresh WaterTest Well Contract Bid” and “Batch PlantEquipment Moved to Atomic Site,” ArcoAdvertiser, October 7, 1949, 1.

19. Deslonde deBoisblanc, interview withauthor, January 16, 1999.

20. Marvin Walker, March 15, 1999.

21. To Robins from Johnston, August 24, 1949,and September 9, 1949; to Johnston fromRobins, September 2, 1949; all in IHSAR2/22, Box 1, Series 1, Arco AE Plant—1949, part 1.

22. To James Reid, Idaho Bureau of Highways,from J. Bion Philipson, November 22, 1949,IHS AR2/22, Box 1, Series 1, File: ArcoAtomic Energy Plant 1949, part 1.

23. (Robins quotation) to Johnston from Robins,November 30, 1949, IHS AR2/22, Box 1,

N O T E S

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Series 1, File: Arco Atomic Energy Plant,1949, part 1; also see letter to J. BionPhilipson from James Reid, November 30,1949, IHS AR2/22, Box 1, Series 1, File:Arco Atomic Energy Plant 1949, part 1.

24. “Dworshak and Welker in Blackfoot Today,Discussion on Highway 20 Construction;Irate as Johnson Bypasses the Meeting,”Blackfoot Daily Bulletin, September 12,1952.

25. “Groups Ready Dedication of Idaho Falls-Arco Highway,” Post-Register, September21, 1951; “Deal Dedicates New Arco, IdahoFalls Highway,” Post-Register, October 8,1951.

26. (Quotation) Lou Haller, “Johnston ExplainsAEC Position on the Road, Rich Sets 1954-’55 As Completion Date; Senator DworshakHas Asked Federal Aid,” Blackfoot DailyBulletin, September 23, 1952; “Dworshakand Welker in Blackfoot Today; Discussionon Highway 20 Construction; Irate asJohnston By-passes the Meeting,” BlackfootDaily Bulletin, September 12, 1952;Plastino, page 13.

27. “State Engineer Says Highway 26 ServingAEC from Blackfoot Should Be Given FirstPriority,” Blackfoot Daily Bulletin,November 21, 1952; “Sen. DworshakReports AEC and Bureau of Public RoadsHave Assured Construction Money Aid,”Post-Register, December 22, 1952.

28. “Sen. Dworshak Reports AEC and Bureauof Public Roads Have Assured ConstructionMoney Aid,” Post-Register, December 22,1952; “Crews Start Plotting AEC-RexburgRoad,” Salt Lake Tribune, January 27, 1952.

29. (Bus fare) William Ginkel, interview withauthor, February 3, 1999.

30. To Alton B. Jones, State Superintendent ofSchools, from George Green, Superintendentof Schools for Bannock County, April 26,1949, IHS AR2/22, Box 1, Series 1, File:Arco Atomic Energy Plant, part 1. See alsoHoll, The National Reactor Testing Station;Robb Brady, interview with author, August27, 1998.

31. “L.E. Johnston Explains Purpose andDevelopment of Reactor Plant,” ArcoAdvertiser, December 9, 1949, 1.

C H A P T E R S I X

Epigraph: The occasion for the song was anAEC announcement that Oak Ridge would notbe involved further in reactor development, butthat such work would be centralized at Argonne.See Hewlett, Atomic Shield, 126.

1. Kirby Whitham, interview with author,October 14, 1998. The test was conducted inthe EBR-I reactor. An organic compound isone which contains carbon.

2. William Ginkel, interview with author,February 3, 1999.

3. Holl, Argonne, 68-69.

4. In reactor technology, neutrons with energiesabove 100,000 electron volts are called fastneutrons. EBR-I neutrons moved with twomillion electron volts of energy.

5. For a general overview of fast reactors seeAlan M. Jacobs, et al, Basic Principles ofNuclear Science and Reactors (D. VanNostrand Company: Princeton, 1960), 171-175.

6. “New Pump to Aid AEC At Idaho FallsPlants,” Salt Lake Tribune, April 14, 1952.Engineers also installed more conventionalpumps in each of the main cooling systems.


8. Kirby Whitham, October 14, 1998.

9. “Dr. Walter Zinn Recalls Early Days,” IdahoNational Engineering Laboratory EBR-IReview, 1. This undated reprint with noother publication data is a collection ofstories about EBR-I printed some time afterDecember 13, 1971, possibly by the INELemployee newspaper. Copy found in BechtelCultural Resources departmental files atINEEL. Hereafter, EBR-I Review.

10. John H. Buck and Carl F. Leyse, MaterialsTesting Reactor Project Handbook, ReportNo. TID-7001 (Lemont, Illinois: ArgonneNational Laboratory and Oak RidgeNational Laboratory, 1951), 356. For a briefdescription of nuclear physics research at theMTR, see NRTS, 1965 Thumbnail Sketch,16-17. Beam experiments did extend outsidethe MTR building, but not to distances of aquarter of a mile.

11. Buck and Lehse, MTR Handbook, 29.

12. For general history of MTR development,see Buck and Lehse, MTR Handbook, 34-43.

13. Donald J. Hughes. The Neutron Story(Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday Anchor

Books, 1959), 41; Buck and Leyse, MTRHandbook, 29.

14. Buck and Lehse, MTR Handbook, 37;Hewlett, Atomic Shield, 126, 419.

15. Hewlett, Atomic Shield, 186-188.

16. (Groundbreaking) Buck and Lehse, MTRHandbook, 43; (siting) John Horan, July 29,1997.


18. (Quotation in previous paragraph andextended quote) John W. Simpson, NuclearPower from Underseas to Outer Space (LaGrange Park, Illinois: American NuclearSociety, 1995), 22 and 26-27, respectively.

19. Simpson, Nuclear Power, 27; (MTRcontribution to STR) 1965 ThumbnailSketch, 13.

20. Accounts of Rickover and the Nuclear Navyinclude Richard Hewlett and Francis Duncan,Nuclear Navy 1946-1962 ( C h i c a g o :University of Chicago Press, 1974); Polmarand Allen, op cit.

21. (Rickover quote) Ronald Schiller,“Submarines in the Desert,” ColliersMagazine (February 5, 1954): 90. Polmarand Allen, Rickover, 149. The original nameof the Idaho reactor was Mark I; theNautilus reactor, Mark II. Rickover referredto the development shortcut as “Mark Iequals Mark II.”

22. Simpson, Nuclear Power, 43.

23. (McGaraghan’s Sea) Schiller, Colliers, 88;(backscatter) Dr. John Taylor,communication with author, August 6, 1999.Taylor was responsible for the backscatterresearch.

24. The Bluejackets Manual, 19th edition(Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press,1973), 153.

25. Simpson, Nuclear Power, 27, 224-337.


C H A P T E R S E V E N

Epigraph: Marion Thomas, “Recollections andReflections,” Idaho American Nuclear SocietyNewsletter (June 1989), 5.

1. Deslonde R. deBoisblanc, Idaho ANSNewsletter, 5-6. This issue contained severaltributes to Dr. Doan by former associates.

2. Fred McMillan, interview with author,February 2, 1999.


2 8 4

3. deBoisblanc, ANS Newsletter,June 1989.

4. (Architects) Fred McMillan, February 2,1999; (welcome) see for example “Two JoinPhillips Petroleum Staff,” Post-Register,August 1, 1951, 3.

5. “Atom Pioneer Directs Phillips ProjectHere,” Post-Register, August 19, 1951. Seealso Virginia Doan Fanger, ANS Newsletter,June 1989.

6. Stephane Groueff, Manhattan Project, 80.

7. deBoisblanc, Idaho ANS Newsletter, June1989; Richard Austin Smith, “PhillipsPetroleum—Youngest of the Giants,”Fortune (August 1954): 72; and PhillipsPetroleum Company, Phillips, The First 66Years (Bartlesville, Oklahoma: PhillipsPetroleum Company, 1983), 86, 125-140.

8. Warren Nyer, Idaho ANS Newsletter, June1989, 7-9.

9. Ibid.

10. (Pappy) John Byrom, interview with author,August 25, 1999; deBoisblanc, MilesLeverett, Warren Nyer, ANS Newsletter,June 1989, 6-9.

11. Phillips, The First 66 Years, 86, 125-140.

12. The study is described by W. Singlevich, etal, Natural Radioactive Materials in theArco Reactor Test Site, Report No. HW-21221 (cover title: Ecological andRadiological Studies of the Arco ReactorTest Site (Richland: General ElectricNucleonics Division, Hanford Works, 1951),1-49. See also “AEC Sets RadioactivityStudy at Idaho Site; College Gets Contract,”Post-Register, June 19, 1950, 3.

13. John Horan, in an interview with author,indicated that Health and Safety Divisionpersonnel in particular made use of thereport: Singlevich, et al, Natural RadioactiveMaterials in the Arco Reactor Test Site,Report No. HW-21221. See note 12 for fullcitation.

14. (Nevada test site) Hewlett, Atomic Shield,535; (malfunctioning, 10 mr/hr on truck)Phillips Petroleum Company, Survey of Fall-out of Radioactive Material in South andSouth-East Idaho Following the Las Vegas,Nevada Tests of October and November,1951, Report IDO 12000 HPO (Idaho Falls:Site Survey Section of the Health PhysicsDivision, NRTS, 1952), 11, 8; (truck,rainstorm explanation) John Horan, “Draft

of Interview” with John K. Harrop andJoseph J. Shonka in Idaho Falls, Summer1994, 2.

15. See for example, “Press Release, May 18,1961: Annual Summary of EnvironmentalMonitoring Data for 1960,” in records ofSenator Henry Dworshak, IHS, Ms. 84, Box122 B, File: AEC-Id-Press Releases.

16. “AEC to Employ Top Safeguards Here,”Post-Register, May 11, 1950, 15.

17. Henry Peterson, interview with author,February 22, 1999; (NCRPstandards)Elizabeth S. Rolph, Nuclear Power and thePublic Safety (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heathand Co., 1979), 108; John Horan, interviewwith Baldwin and Bacchus, 1994. Anexposure of 50 milirems per day was anallowable exposure, but alarms sounded at80 percent of that value.

18. “AEC Sets Radioactivity Study at IdahoSite; College Gets Contract,” Post-Register,June 19, 1950, 3; “Experts Test WeatherData,” Post-Register, May 14, 1950, 14.

19. Idaho Department of Labor, First BiennialReport of the Department of Labor, August15, 1949—December 31, 1950, 1.

20. To Governor Robins from W.L. Robison,March 22, 1950, IHS AR2/22, Box 1, File:Arco Atomic Energy Plant-1950, part II. Seealso “AEC to Organize Medical Program,”Post-Register, June 21, 1950, 9.

21. (Accident rates) First Biennial Report, 25;(ceremony) Idaho Department of Labor,Third Biennial Report of the Department ofLabor, October 31, 1952 to October 1954,29.

22. “Committee to Advise AEC on Health inArea,” Arco Advertiser, March 19, 1954, 3;“Idaho Board Approves AEC HealthSafeguards, Arco Advertiser, March 26,1954, 1; “State Committee Ends Meeting atAEC Plant,” Arco Advertiser, July 22, 1955,7.

23. (Hospitals) Ninth Semiannual Report of theAEC, January 1951, 31; (Idaho hospitals)Dr. Lawrence Knight, interview with author,April 20, 1999; “Mountain States TumorInstitute,” supplement in Idaho Statesman,May 11, 1997, 2. St. Lukes Hospital inBoise organized an isotope laboratory in1957 and began cobalt cancer therapy in1960. (Shoes) Department of Health,Radiation Health Section, “Program for theRegulation and Control of the Use ofRadiation in the State of Idaho, 1968,” 5,

IHS, Samuelson Papers, Box 50, File:Governor Samuelson Nuclear—Misc.

24. “Minutes of the Idaho State Board of Health,April 21-22, 1958; August 4-5, 1958,”Minute Book at Idaho State Department ofHealth and Welfare, Director’s Office,Boise, Idaho, p. 58 and 63, respectively.Among early industrial users of radioactivematerials was the agricultural industry,which used tracers to help identify theuptake of pesticides or fertilizers in plants.

25. “Program for Regulation and Control...1968,” 5.

26. See, for example, letter to Smylie from LyallJohnson, Acting Director of the Division ofMaterials Licensing, AEC-DC, May 13,1964, in IHS AR2/23, Box 17, File: AtomicEnergy.

27. To Governor Smylie from Terrell Carver,August 9, 1963, IHS, Smylie Papers, Box20, File: Health Department, 1963. See alsoMinutes of the Board of Health, July 30-31,1964, p. 241. The IDO/Phillipsrepresentatives were C. Wayne Bills, J.Weaver McCaslin, and Tabb O’Brien;“Minutes of the Governor’s Committee onthe Use of Atomic Energy and RadiationHazards, February 19, 1964,” held at theoffice of the Department of Labor, Boise. InIHS, Smylie Papers, Box 21, File: LaborDepartment 1962-1964.

28. To Clinton P. Anderson from T.O. Carver,February 18, 1959; IHS, Mss 84, Box 104,File: Legislative AEC Misc. 1959.

29. “Statement by the Honorable Robert E.Smylie, Governor of the State of Idaho, tothe Natural Resources Subcommittee of theCommittee on Government Operations,”presented at a hearing held November 22,1963, Seattle, Washington, IHS, AR2/23,Box 25, File: Len Jordan 1962-64. For areview of Idaho/AEC relations regardinghousing, grazing, law enforcement, andother matters, see Jack M. Holl, “The NRTS:The AEC in Idaho,” 85 Pacific NorthwestQuarterly (January 1994): 15-24.

C H A P T E R E I G H T

Epigraph: Idaho Department of Labor, 2ndBiennial Report, 21. Thanks to Warren Nyer,from whom I first heard the term “reactor zoo.”

1. Hewlett, Atomic Shield, 497. See also, Holl,Argonne National Laboratory, 1946-1996,99. Holl reports the shortage as 12.5kilograms of uranium-235, this being the

N O T E S

2 8 5

amount over Zinn’s original estimate of 40kilograms exclusive of the fuel in the extrafuel rods.

2. Kirby Whitham, communication to author,July 9, 1999. According to Whitham, the re-manufactured rods were .010 inches largerin diameter.

3. Hewlett, Atomic Shield, 497-98. Thesignificance of the names on the wall isuncertain. According to Richard Lindsay ofArgonne-West, not all of the crew memberswere present during the chalk ceremony; afew added their names later but others didnot. The sensibilities of the era were suchthat the women who ran the EBR officewere not included. In 1995 the names of thewomen were placed on a plaque andinstalled in the EBR-I building, but thenames of missing men have not been soidentified. See IDO News Release, March20, 1995, and “Better late than never forEBR-I women,” Post-Register, March 24,1995.

4. “Reactor Staff Weary, Happy” and“Materials Testing Reactor AchievesOperation Stage Here,” Post-Register, April4, 1952, 1; and Fred McMillan, interviewwith author, February 2, 1999.

5. (Squirrels) Jack Clark, interview withauthor, July 16, 1998; (Doan) John Byrom,August 25, 1998. “Scram” was a slang wordmeaning, “let’s get out of here.” Its use as aterm for emergency reactor shutdownsoriginated with CP-1, the first reactor. Forsafety backup, a man was stationed near arope restraining a control rod. Should othercontrols fail, he was to cut the rope, lettingthe rod fall into place. Someone devised anacronym “Safety Control Rod Ax Man.”Another acronym, according to Polmar inRickover, p. 151, was “Super-CriticalReactor Ax Man.”

6. John Byrom, August 25, 1998; PhillipsPetroleum Company, The Materials TestingReactor,A Light Water Moderated Reactor(Geneva, Switzerland: InternationalConference on Peaceful Uses of AtomicEnergy, 1955) “Research Reactors,” p. 352.See also Buck and Leyse, MTR Handbook,352.

7. Buck and Leyse, MTR Handbook, 29-30.

8. John Byrom, interviews with author, August25, 1998, and March 26, 1999. See also E.Fast, J.P. Byrom, and J.W. McCaslin, ASurvey of the Materials Testing ReactorShield, Report No. (IDO-16073) (Idaho

Falls: Phillips Petroleum Co., n.d.) and BlawKnox Construction Company, BarytesAggregate Concrete Applied to ReactorShielding, Report No. IDO-24003 (IdahoFalls: Blaw Knox Chemical Plant Division,1952).

9. John Byrom, personal communication toauthor, October 29, 1998.

10. Fred McMillan, interview with author,February 2, 1999.

11. John Taylor, personal communication toauthor, August 6, 1999.

12. Fred McMillan, February 2, 1999.



15. Schiller, Colliers, 91.

16. Polmar and Allen, Rickover, 151-152.

17. Polmar and Allen, Rickover, 152.

18. Simpson, Nuclear Power, 55-56.


20. The original telegram is located in a NavalReactors Facility historical scrapbook, 1958.


22. By the time the Navy laid the keel for USSEnterprise on February 4, 1958, it hadlaunched or laid the keel for the submarinesNautilus, Skate, Seawolf, Swordfish, Sargo,Seadragon, and Triton; and the cruiser USSLong Beach.

C H A P T E R N I N E

1. “Industrial Radioactive Waste Disposal,”Hearings before the Special Subcommitteeon Radiation of the JCAE 86th Cong, 1stsession, Volume 1, January 28, 29, and 30;February 2 and 3, 1959 (Wash, D.C.: GPO,1959). Hereafter, Radioactive WasteHearings.

2. (Quotation) Rafe Gibbs, “The World’sHottest Garbage,” Popular Mechanics (April1955): 124-125; (Argonne) Holl, Argonne,57-58.


4. B.C. Anderson, et al., A History of theRadioactive Waste Management Complex atthe Idaho National Engineering Laboratory(Idaho Falls: IDO Nuclear Fuel CycleDivision, 1979), 1. Hereafter, History of theRWMC.

5. Anderson, History of the RWMC, 2; (precip-itation) 1971 Thumbnail Sketch, 3.

6. Anderson, History of the RWMC , p. 4, 16.

7. Henry Peterson, interview with author,February 3, 1999.

8. Henry Peterson, February 3, 1999; (diapers)Ronald Schiller, Colliers, 90; (sanitary pads)Beverly Cook, interview with author,September 7, 1999.

9. Edgar Juell, A Short History of the ExpendedCore Facility, 1953 to June 1990 (IdahoFalls: Naval Reactors Facility ExpendedCore Facility, no date), 1.

10. (General procedures, liquids) Anderson,History of the RWMC , 16; (irradiated metalparts) Doan remarks in Radioactive WasteHearing, 601.

11. (Native grasses) Byrom, personal communi -cation; (practices) Anderson, History of theRWMC, 16. In current practice, cardboardboxes are no longer used. Waste is packagedin wooden boxes or metal drums, each linedwith plastic.

12. For Rocky Flats history, seewww.indra.com/rfcab/ FAQ.html#4.

13. Anderson, History of the RWMC, 19. TheRocky Flats area was later expanded toeleven square miles. Source:www.cdphe.state.co.us, April 26, 1999.

14. (Nevada/Idaho) Anderson, History of theRWMC, 19.

15. John Horan, interview with author, January15, 1999.

16. John Horan, January 15, 1999. See alsoAnderson, History of the RWMC , 21.

17. Radioactive Waste Hearing, 582-583.

18. Anderson, History of the RWMC , 21-22.Also, see photo 58-1450. See “AlphaDecay” in John F. Hogerton, The AtomicEnergy Deskbook (New York: ReinholdPublishing Corp., 1963), 21. Plutonium ishighly ionizing and presents a hazard tohuman health when it is inhaled or ingested.

19. Clyde Hammond, interview with author,October 15, 1998. According to D.H. Card,Waste Management Program History ofBuried Transuranic Waste at INEL, (IdahoFalls: EG&G Report No. WMP77-3, 1977),9, Gulf Atomic sent 190 drums and 22 boxesof waste to the NRTS in 1962. Some drumswere centered in boxes, and the boxes filledwith concrete for shielding. These weighedbetween 12,000 to 14,000 pounds each.


2 8 6

20. Cass Peterson, “Rocky Flats: Risks Amid aMetropolis,” Washington Post, December12, 1988, 1.

21. Anderson, History of the RWMC, 22.

22. Clyde Hammond, October 15, 1998.

23. (Backfill) John Commander, personal com-munication to author, June 29, 1999; (strike)Anderson, History of the RWMC, 31; (effi-ciency) George Wehmann, interview withauthor, September 29, 1999.

24. Anderson, History of the RWMC, 28.According to EG&G, Waste ManagementProgram, History of Buried TransuranicWaste at INEL, (Idaho Falls: EG&G ReportNo. WMP77-3, 1977), p. 8, waste arrivingat this time included contaminated materialsfrom other governmental experimental sitesaround the nation.

25. (Upper limits, flooding, guidelines, InterimBurial Ground) Anderson, History of theRWMC, 19, 33, 30, 27.

26. Anderson, History of the RWMC, 30; (quota-tion) Radioactive Waste Hearing, 584.

27. Anderson, History of the RWMC, 35.

28. Formal definitions of “high-level,” “low-level,” TRU, spent fuel, and other categoriesof radioactive waste have changed over timeand have become more complex; recent def-initions are found in the Energy Policy Actof 1992, Title 10 of the Code of FederalRegulations (CFR), Part 60 and in DOEOrder 5820.2A. At the INEEL, high-levelwaste refers to the solid and liquid wastesresulting from chemical separations done atthe Idaho Chemical Processing Plant. TRUwaste contains alpha-emitting transuranicelements (like plutonium-contaminatedwaste from Rocky Flats) with half-lives of20 years or more and concentrated at 100nanocuries per gram of waste or more. Low-level waste, typically disposed or stored atthe Burial Ground, in general contains lowerconcentrations of radionuclides per gram ofwaste than high-level and TRU waste. SeeDOE, Linking Legacies Report No.DOE/EM-0319 (Washington, D.C.: DOEOffice of Environmental Management,1997), pp. 31-70.

29. (Handbook) Radioactive Waste Hearing,581. For the general AEC philosophy onconcentrating and reducing volumes ofwaste, see remarks by Dr. Abel Wolman inthe hearing on p. 8-10.

30. Radioactive Waste Hearing, 581, 589.

31. Radioactive Waste Hearing, 581.

32. Whether to measure the concentration of acontaminant at the point of discharge or atthe point of its use downstream later becamethe subject of regulatory definition.

33. Bruce Schmalz, interview with author,February 1, 1999. See also RadioactiveWaste Hearing, 589.

34. John Horan, “Draft of Interview, Mr. JohnHoran” with John K. Harrop and Joseph J.Shonka, Summer 1994, p. 4.

35. Radioactive Waste Hearing, 602.

36. John Byrom, personal communication toauthor.

37. Arrowrock Group, Context Plan, 146.

38. (Pellets) Leroy Lewis personal communica-tion to author.

39. See INEELphotos 56-3201, -3203, -3205, -3206, -3207, and -3208.

40. INEL, Idaho National EngineeringLaboratory Historical Dose Evaluation,Volume 1, Report No. DOE/ID-12119(Idaho Falls: IDO, 1991), pp. iii, v-vii, 6-8.Later DOE expenditures on the removal ofwaste from below ground were justified onthe basis that these pathways should not everfind a human population at any time in thelong-range future.

C H A P T E R T E N


2. Bettis Plant, Expended Core Facility,Maintenance and Operations Guide(Pittsburgh: Westinghouse, 1958), 3.Hereafter, ECF Guide.

3. ECF Guide, v. The ECF was designed by theAEC’s Bettis Atomic Power Laboratory,managed by Westinghouse. Arthur G.McKee & Co. was architect/engineer; andPaul Hardeman, Inc., general contractor.

4. ECF Guide, 14. Later equipment allowed forthe unloading of a cask without having toplunge the cask into the water.

5. Edgar L. Juell, A Short History of theExpended Core Facility, (Idaho Falls: NavalReactors Facility, 1990), 9-11 (excerpt p.10).

6. Juell, A Short History of ECF, 12.

7. (Three cores) ECF Guide, 15; (MTRirradiated fuel) Juell, A Short History ofECF, 9.

8. Juell, A Short History of ECF, 13.

9. (Early training) “Crews Train in Idaho forA-Submarine,” Idaho State Journal,February 22, 1953. Thanks to Kenhi Drewesand Hal Paige, interviews with author,February 4, 1999, for discussions of trainingprogram.

10. Polmar and Allen, Rickover, 297-301.

11. (Rickover quote) Polmar and Allen,Rickover, 302; (cross-training) KenhiDrewes and Hal Paige, February 4, 1999.

12. Ronald Schiller, “Submarines in the Desert,”Colliers (February 5, 1954): 91.

13. Kenhi Drewes, Hal Paige, February 4, 1999;(cooling pond) Mary Freund, interview withauthor, February 2, 1999.

14. On aircraft carriers, cargo such as tanks oflubricating oil could be located to offershielding opportunities around shipboardreactors. USS Enterprise was launched onSeptember 24, 1960.

15. Clay Condit, interview with author, August25, 1999.

16. To Governor from Henry Dworshak, April 8,1961, IHS Mss 84, Box 122 B, File: AEC-Idaho Plant; to Robb Brady from HenryDworshak, April 8, 1961, IHS, Mss 84, Box122 B, File: AEC—Idaho Plant.

17. (Criticality date) Naval Reactors Facilitypamphlet, no date, no page numbers. Formore on the U.S. Navy’s quest for silentsubmarines and the compromises madeamong silence, depth, and speed, see Tyler,Running Critical, The Silent War, Rickover,and General Dynamics (New York: Harperand Row, 1986). See Tom Clancy, The Huntfor Red October (Annapolis, Md.: NavalInstitute Press, 1984) for a fictionalizedaccount of the competition between the twosuperpowers; and “Submarines, Secrets, andSpies,” a NOVA television programproduced by the Documentary Guild forWGBH/Boston with Sveriges Television,copyright 1999.

18. Elizabeth S. Rolph, Nuclear Power and thePublic Safety, 24-26.

19. (Sidebar) U.S. DOE and U.S. Department ofDefense, The United States NavalPropulsion Program (Washington, D.C.:GPO), 19.

20. Rolph, Nuclear Power and the PublicSafety, 26.

21. Clay Condit, August 25, 1999.

N O T E S

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22. (Steno) Mary Freund; (preparations) HenryPeterson, February 3, 1999; (legend) HalPaige, February 4, 1999.

C H A P T E R E L EV E N

1. Don Reid, in undated transcript of tapedinterview named “Don Reid’s Early CPPHistory, Cassette Tape # 1,” p. 9-10. Asecond tape was named “Cassette Tape # 2.”No copies of the tape were found, nor thename of the interviewer.Transcript suppliedto author by Jeff Bryant of INTEC (ChemPlant).

2. Don Reid, Cassette Tape # 1, 14, 16.

3. (AEC plans) Don Reid, Cassette Tape # 1,14-17. In a bomb detonation, tritiumundergoes a fusion reaction with deuterium,producing a generous supply of neutronswhich in turn promote the fissioning ofplutonium atoms.

4. TWX from C. Vanden Bulck, Oak RidgeNational Laboratory, to R. Cook, USAEC,Washington, D.C., August 31, 1953, HREXDoc. No. 0709671.

5 . Richard Rhodes, The Making of the A t o m i cB o m b (New York: Simon and Schuster,1986), 574. See also “Human Studies ProjectTeam Fact Sheet, Bayo Canyon/The RaLaProgram,” January 10, 1994, HREX Doc. No.0701316, p. 1.

6. To R. Cook, Washington, D.C., from C.Vanden Bulck, acting manager ORNL,August 31, 1953, HREX Doc. no. 0709671.See also John Horan, Summer 1994interview by John K. Harrop and Joseph J.Shonka, pp. 1-2. Iodine is taken up by thehuman thyroid gland.

7. General Manager’s Diary entry for April 18,1950, HREX Doc. No. 0723885; to CarrollWilson, General Manager, AEC, fromGeorge Brown, Director of Engineering,AEC, April 25, 1950, HREX Doc. No.0720687; to George Brown from RayKnapp, May 3, 1950, HREX Doc. No.0720685.

8. The hexone process was called REDOX; thetributyl phosphate process, PUREX. In thehistory of the Chem Plant, there were threeaccidental criticalities.

9. Succeeding operators were PhillipsPetroleum Company, 1953-1966; IdahoNuclear Corporation, 1966-1971; AlliedChemical, 1971-1979; Exxon NuclearCorporation, 1979-1984; Westinghouse

Idaho Nuclear Corporation, 1984-1994;Lockheed Martin Idaho Corporation, 1994-1999. The Bechtel Corporation assumedresponsibility in 1999.

10. Don Reid, Cassette Tape # 2, 6-9.

11. Mark L. Sutton, “ICPP Historical Data,”September 8, 1988, 1. Copy supplied toauthor by Jeff Bryant. This also is source forsidebar, p. 98, “Memories of an OperatorHelper at the Chem Plant.”

12. R.B. Lemon and D.G. Reid, “ExperienceWith a Direct Maintenance RadiochemicalProcessing Plant,” Proceedings of theInternational Conference on the PeacefulUses of Atomic Energy Volume 9 (Geneva:United Nations, 1956), 536.

13. Don Reid, Cassette Tape No. 2, 15. See also“Uranium Production—ICPPProcessingRuns,” Revised 10-1-75, MPH, an ICPPhistory of production runs; and “AECChemical Processing Plant Begins Operationat Arco Site,” Idaho State Journal, March15, 1953.

14. Reid, Cassette Tape # 2, 11.

15. Reid, Cassette Tape # 2, 12-14.

16. For a more detailed description of theICPP’s modified PUREX process, seeBrewer F. Boardman, The ICPP (AFactsheet) (Idaho Falls: Idaho OperationsOffice, 1957). For a general description ofthe plant and its operations, see R.B. Lemonand D.G. Reid, “Experience With DirectMaintenance Plant,” 532-545.

17. L.A. Decker, “Significant Accomplishmentsin the History of the ICPP,” paper presentedat the 1972 National Meeting of theAmerican Chemical Society, San Francisco,California, September 1, 1976, p. 5. In 1969Idaho Nuclear Corporation designed adenitration facility to convert the liquid intoUO

3, a granular solid, for which, see N.J.

Rigstad, “ICPPEnvironmental ImpactStatement,” 1973, a draft manuscriptsupplied to author by Jeff Bryant, p. 17. Thechange was stimulated by more stringentpackaging and shipping requirements.

18. Dieter Knecht, et al, “Historical FuelReprocessing and HLW Management inIdaho,” Radwaste Magazine (May 1997):40. See also Richard K. Lester and David J.Rose, “The Nuclear Wastes at West Valley,New York, Technology Review (May 1977):20-21, for discussion of neutralization ofacid wastes and its cost; (quotatation) JohnB. Huff, Furnace Separations for

Radioactive Liquid Wastes Report No. PTR-241 (Idaho Falls: 1957, PPCo.), 8.

19. See Cyril M. Slansky and John A. McBride,“The Case for Small Reprocessing Plants,Nucleonics (September 1962): 43-56.

20. Knecht, “Historical Fuel Reprocessing,” 40.The ratio of ten gallons of fission product toone million gallons of stored waste wasnoted in a letter from John B. Huff to HenryDworshak, August 18, 1958, IHS, Ms. 84,Box 83, File: AEC-Idaho Plant. GenevaConference ICPP Report, p. 534, says low-activity waste was “discharged directly tothe ground.” Boron is a neutron “poison,” amaterial that absorbs neutrons and helpsprevent accidental criticalities.

21. N.J. Rigstad, “ICPP EIS,” 1973, p. 7,manuscript provided to author by JeffBryant. For a summary of how processchemistry progressed, see Dieter A. Knecht,“Historical Fuel Reprocessing,” 35-47.Between 1953 and 1988, the Chem Plantrecovered 31,432 kilograms of U-235.

22. Don Reid, Cassette Tape # 2, 17-18. Seealso Rigstad, 12. The fuel cutting facilitywas at CPP-603, the Fuel Storage Facility. Ithad to be modified to receive and unloadfuel arriving in 75-ton casks, heavier thanearlier casks.

23. (Dates of RaLa program) U.S. DOE, INELHistorical Dose Evaluation Report No.DOE/ID-12119 (Idaho Falls: DOE/IDO,1991), Vol. 1, p. A-26. The program wasunder design and cold testing from March1954 to November 1956. For a descriptionof the RaLa cell, see Cyril M. Slansky andJohn A. McBride, “The Case for SmallReprocessing Plants,” Nucleonics(September 1962): 44-45; (Operating prac-tices) E.R. Ebersole, “RaLa MonitoringExperience” in A Compendium ofInformation for Use in Controlling RadiationEmergencies, delivered at a Conference inIdaho Falls on February 23, 1958, HREXDoc. No. 704450; (procedures in early yearsof RaLa runs prior to addition of filtrationequipment) John Horan, interview withHarrop and Shonka, Summer 1994, pp. 2, 4-6; (iodine retention), Phillips PetroleumCompany, Idaho Chemical Processing Plant(Idaho Falls: PPCo, n.d., but circa 1965), 33.

24. John Byrom, note to author, June 24, 1999.See also Horan, interview with Harrop andShonka, Summer 1994, pp. 4-5; and Horan,interview with Baldwin and Bacchus, HREXDoc. No. 0726467, pp. 26-27.


2 8 8

25. John Horan, interview with Burton Baldwinand Thomas Baccus, August 18, 1994, p. 5-6, “redacted version” in HREX Doc. No.0726467.

26. John R. Horan, Annual Progress Report,Health and Safety Division, 1962 , ReportNo. IDO-12033, p. 43, HREX Doc. No.702992.

27. INELHistorical Dose Evaluation, iii.

C H A P T E R T W E LV E

1. “Johnson Leaves Position as Idaho AECManager, Arco Advertiser, April 30, 1954, 4.Also, Jacqui Johnston Batie and WilliamGinkel, interviews with author, October 14,1998, and February 3, 1999, respectively.

2. (Consolidation) “AEC Contractors StudyMerger Move,” “Phillips Plans AECMerger,” “Phillips Ends Merger Soon,”Post-Register, August 24, August 27, andOctober 8, 1953, respectively; (employeeattitudes) Bernice Paige, April 8, 1999.

3. Eisenhower’s policy domination is a centraltheme of Richard G. Hewlett and Jack M.Holl in Atoms for Peace and War 1953-1961(Berkeley: University of California Press,1989), xxi; (defense spending) Harry S.Truman, Memoirs, Years of Trial and Hope,Volume 2 (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubledayand Co., 1956), 306-312; (quotation) DwightDavid Eisenhower, Mandate for Change,1953-1956 (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubledayand Co., 1965), 452; (massive retaliation)Chester J. Pach, Jr., and Elmo Richardson,The Presidency of Dwight David Eisenhower(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas,1991), 76-81. The Army’s share of thebudget shrank from 33 percent to 25 percent,and the Air Force’s grew from 39 percent to47 percent.

4 . (Scare the country, Atoms for Peacequotations, Operation Candor) Herbert S.Parmet, Eisenhower and the A m e r i c a nC ru s a d e s (New York: Macmillan Company,1972), 386; (national objectives) U.S. A E C ,Major Activities in the Atomic Energ yP rograms, January—June 1953 U.S. A t o m i cE n e rgy Commission ( Washington, D.C.: U.S.AEC, 1953), 18.

5. (Quotation) Hewlett, New World, 5.

6. Public Law 83-703 was adopted by theSecond Session of the 83rd Congress andbecame effective August 30, 1954.

7. J.W. Henscheid, interview with author,December 10, 1998.

8. J.R. Huffman, MTR Technical QuarterlyReport, Second Quarter 1954, Report No.IDO-16191 (Idaho Falls: PPCo, 1954), 17;and Huffman, MTR Technical QuarterlyReport, Third Quarter 1954, Report No.IDO-209, 12.

9. Deslonde deBoisblanc, interview withauthor, January 16, 1999.

10. R.L. Heath, Scintillation Spectrometry,Gamma-Ray Spectrum Catalogue, 2ndedition, Report No. IDO-16880-1 (IdahoFalls: PPCo, 1964). Report number for thefirst edition was IDO-16408. According toD.R. deBoisblanc, Heath “pushed theresolution by more than a factor of sixteenusing lithium-drifted germanium and silicon,plus low noise amplifiers employing liquidnitrogen-cooled field effect transistors. Healso introduced the use of digital computersto reduce the data.”

11. 1965 Thumbnail Sketch (Idaho Falls: IdahoOperations Office, 1965), 17; deBoisblanc,July 14, 1999.

12. (Hydraulic rabbit) US AEC, Major Activitiesin the Atomic Energy Program July—December 1953. (Washington, D.C.: USAEC, January 1954), 25; (Argonne loop)L.W. Fromm, Design Evaluation of In-Reactor Tube for Argonne Water Loop atMTR, Report No. ANL-5403 (Lemont,Illinois: Argonne National Laboratory,1955), 5.

13. W.E. Nyer, et al. Proposal for a ReactivityMeasurement Facility at the MTR, ReportNo. IDO-16108 (Idaho Falls: PPCo, 1953),6-8.

14. J.W. Henscheid, personal communication toauthor, December 10, 1998.

15. J.R. Huffman, MTR Technical BranchQuarterly Report for First Quarter 1955 ,Report No. IDO-16229 (Idaho Falls: PPCo,1955), 24.

16. Pamphlet, Gamma Irradiation Facility, AFact Sheet, no author, p. 3-5, found attachedto 1957 Thumbnail Sketch.

17. Walter C. Sparks, interview published inSusan M. Stacy, ed., Conversations, ACompanion Book to Idaho PublicTelevision’s “Proceeding On Through ABeautiful Country) (Boise: IdahoEducational Public BroadcastingFoundation, 1990), 266-267.

18. Walter C. Sparks, interview with author,May 13, 1999.

19. Sparks, May 13, 1999; George A. Freund,Suitability of Potato Products Prepared fromIrradiated and Chemically InhibitedPotatoes and Freund, Current Status andPotential of Irradiation to Prevent PotatoSprouting, Reports No. IDO-10042 andIDO-11300-Addendum, respectively, both(Idaho Falls: Western Nuclear Corporationin cooperation with Engineering Committee,Potato Processors of Idaho, February 1965);and “Commercial Interest IncreasingRapidly in Food Irradiation, Nucleonics(December 1963): 23.

20. (40 megawatts) IDO-16254, 6; (questions)see series of Phillips Technical Branchquarterly reports for 1955 through 1957.

21. W.P. Connor, MTR Technical BranchQuarterly Report, Report No. IDO-16297(Idaho Falls: PPCo, 1956), 5.

22. “Test Reactors—The Larger View,”Nucleonics (March 1957): 55.

23. Philip D. Bush, “ETR: More Space forRadiation Tests,” Nucleonics (March 1957):41-42. The extra depth required for thecontrol rods meant that a portion of thefoundation had to be blasted through lavarock. See also R.M. Jones, An EngineeringTest Reactor for the MTR Site (APreliminary Study), Report No. IDO-16197(Idaho Falls: PPCo, 1954), 7.

24. 1965 Thumbnail Sketch, 14; J.W. Henscheid,December 10, 1999. For more informationon the ETR, see “ETR: More Space forRadiation Tests,” Nucleonics (March 1957):41-56.

C H A P T E R T H I R T E E N

1. Horan, Baldwin and Baccus 1994 interview,HREX Doc. No. 0726467. Bracketed insertswithin quotation are from INELHistoricalDose Evaluation,Volume 2, pp. A-180 to A-182.

2. (Johnston announcement) “AEC to AddAircraft Unit Here,” Post-Register, July 29,1952, 1; See “AEC Announces PreliminaryPlans for Airplane Reactor Will be ReadyAround November 15,” Arco Advertiser,November 7, 1952, 1; “AEC Sets January 30as Bid Opening Date for $6,000,000Facilities at Aircraft Reactor Site,” Post-Register (assumed), January 3, 1953, 1;“Utah Construction Low Bidder on AECAircraft Reactor,” Arco Advertiser, February

N O T E S

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20, 1953; “Contact Let for AEC AircraftPropulsion Reactor,” Arco Advertiser, March27, 1953, 1; “AEC Announced Bids for theConstruction of an Access Road to thePrototype Aircraft Propulsion Reactor,”Post-Register, August 31, 1952.

3. “Allan C. Johnson Gets Idaho AEC Post;Bowden Goes to FOA,” Post-Register, May13, 1954, 1; “Allan Johnson Named NewAEC Manager, Arco Advertiser, May 14,1954, 1.

4. William Ginkel, February 3, 1999. Fordetailed history of Aircraft NuclearPropulsion Program, see Susan M. Stacy,Historical American Engineering Record,Idaho National Engineering Laboratory,Test Area North, Hangar 629, HAER NO.ID-32-A(Idaho Falls: LMITCO, 1995).

5. Hewlett, Atomic Shield, 71-74, 106.

6. John Tierney, “Take the A-Plane: The $1Billion Nuclear Bird that Never Flew,”Science 82 (January/February 1982): 49;also Henry W. Lambright, Shooting Downthe Nuclear Airplane (Syracuse, N.Y.: Inter-University Case Program, No. 104, 1967), 5.

7. To Senator William F. Knowland fromHenry Dworshak, November 24, 1956; IHSDworshak Papers, Box 59, File: Legis AECMiscellaneous.

8. Among the public relations documentsproduced by General Electric in 1959 wasIdaho Test Station, Idaho Falls, Idaho, apamphlet describing GE’s activitiesconcerning the ANP program. It includesexplanations and diagrams explaining thedirect cycle concept. Copy in DworshakPapers, Box 112 File: AEC Idaho Plant.Pratt and Whitney contracted to develop theindirect cycle, but got a late start due tocontract disputes.

9. Carl Gamertsfelder, “Oral History of HealthPhysicist Carl C. Gamertsfelder,” January19, 1995, Report No. DOE/EH-467 HumanRadiation Studies: Remembering the EarlyYears.

10. (ANPmanagement structure) KennethGantz, ed., Nuclear Flight (New York:Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1960); John Horan,interview with author, July 14, 1998.

11. General Electric, Nuclear Power PlantTesting in the IET, Report No. APEX-131(Cincinnati: Aircraft Nuclear PropulsionProgram, Aircraft Gas Turbine Division,May 1953), 5.

12. For description of HTREs, see G. Thornton,A.J. Rothstein, and D.H. Culver, ed.Comprehensive Technical Report, GeneralElectric Direct-Air-Cycle Aircraft NuclearPropulsion Program, Program Summaryand References, Report No. APEX-901(Cincinatti: GE ANP Department, AtomicProducts Division, 1962),

19. See also news release, “General ElectricANPDepartment Completes Testing of HeatTransfer Experiment No. 3,” issued by AECIDO, January 27, 1961, Dworshak Papers,Box 122-B, File: Atomic EnergyCommission, Idaho Press Releases.

13. General Electric, ANPP EngineeringProgram Progress Report No. 18, ReportNo. APEX-18 (Cincinatti: GE ANP, 1955),7; APEX-901, 37; Tierney, “Take the A-Plane,” 50.

14. (Shield weight) Tierney, “Take the A-Plane,”50; APEX-18, 195.

15. Gamertsfelder, “Oral History,” Report No.DOE/EH-0467.

16. Comptroller General of the United States,Review of Manned Aircraft NuclearPropulsion Program, Atomic EnergyCommission and Department of Defense,Report to the Congress of the United States(Washington, D.C.: General AccountingOffice, 1963), 138. Congress authorizedconstruction of the FET(hangar), supportbuildings, and a runway in July 1955.Detailed design commenced in March 1956,and groundbreaking occurred in September1957. The facility was ready in July 1959.Hereafter, Comptroller General.

17. Richard Meservey, interview with author,October 12, 1998.

18. AEC/IDO news release, “General ElectricANPDepartment Completes Testing of HeatTransfer Experiment No. 3,” January 27,1961, IHS, Dworshak Papers, Box 122-B,File: Atomic Energy Commission, IdahoPress Releases. See also “HTRE - 3Completes 120 Hours of Operation,” GENews, Idaho Test Station, Aircraft NuclearPropulsion Department (April 1, 1960): 1.Issue found in IHS, Dworshak Papers, Box112, File: AEC Idaho Plant; and APEX-901,p. 50, 57.

19. John Horan, interview with Baldwin andBaccus, HREX Doc. No. 0726467, p. 7. Seealso Gamertsfelder, DOE/EH-0467.

20. APEX-18, 196.

21. (Runway) “Proposed ANPRunway Area,”Drawing No. 7-ANP-001-2 2/2, and “ANPRunway Profile,” 7-ANP-001-3, shown toauthor by Bud White, INEL; copiesavailable at Record Storage Center, CentralFacilities Area, INEEL; (quote), ComptrollerGeneral, 39, 52.

22. Gantz, Nuclear Flight, 175, 178.

23. D.J. Blevins, et al. Flight Engine TestFacility Design Criteria, Report No. APEX-225 (Idaho: GE ANPDepartment Idaho TestStation, 1955), 15-21.

24. See samples of mail to Henry Dworshak:telegram from Robb Brady, Idaho FallsPost-Register, January 29, 1961; letter from(Idaho State Senator) C.A. Bottolfsen,March 2, 1961; IHS Dworshak Papers, Box122-B, File: AEC Idaho Plant.

25. David F. Shaw, “General Manager’s Report”and “GE Ready to Perform FirstExperimental Flight in 1963,”A i rc r a f tNuclear Propulsion Department News(March 31, 1961): 1.

26. Letter to Bottolfsen from Henry Dworshak,March 7, 1961; dayletter to J. Robb Bradyfrom Henry Dworshak, March 8, 1961; IHSDworshak Papers, Box 122-B File: AtomicEnergy Commission Idaho Plant.

27. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A ThousandDays, John F. Kennedy in the White House(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), 300-301,307. See also Herbert York, Race toOblivion (New York: Simon and Schuster,1970), 29.

28. “Kennedy Asks $2 Billion DefenseInsurance Hike,” and “A-Plane Work HaltAsked by JFK in Defense Message,” IdahoDaily Statesman, March 29, 1961, p. 1, 6respectively.

29. To President John F. Kennedy fromGovernor Robert E. Smylie, March 29,1961; IHS Dworshak Papers, Box 122-B,File: Atomic Energy Commission IdahoPlant.

30. “Kennedy Wants A-Plane Junked, New GEEffort,” Post-Register, March 28, 1961, 1.

31. Jay Kunze, interview with author, February5, 1999.

32. (Expense) Comptroller General, 113; “ANPTermination Leaves Vast Facilities, BigTechnical Legacy,” Nucleonics (August1961): 26-27. See also letter from John W.Morfitt, Manager, ANPD, to HenryDworshak, September 26, 1961; both in


2 9 0

Dworshak Papers, Box 122 B, File: AECIdaho Plant.

C H A P T E R F O U R T E E N

Epigraph: “Transient Studies,” Nucleonics (June1960): 115.

1. Plastino, Coming of Age, 64; Holl, Argonne,118. The acronym comes from the lettersBOiling water Re Actor eXperiment.

2. Holl, Argonne, 118; Andrew W. Kramer,Understanding the Nuclear Reactor(Barrington, Illinois: Technical PublishingCo., 1970), 37, 70.

3. J.R. Dietrich and D.C. Laymans, Transientand Steady State Characteristics of aBoiling Reactor: The Borax Experiments,1953, Report No. ANL-5211, February1954; Holl, Argonne, 118; Plastino, Comingof Age, quoting Ray Haroldsen, 64.



6. Holl, Argonne, 120; (talk of dynamite),Clyde Hammond, interview with author,October 15, 1998.

7. Plastino, Coming of Age, quoting Haroldsen,64.

8. For account of 1955 Geneva Conference, seeLaura Fermi, Atoms for the World: UnitedStates Participation in the Conference on thePeaceful Uses of Atomic Energy (Chicago:University of Chicago Press, 1974).

9. Plastino, Coming of Age, 64-65. Theaddition of the generating equipment earnedBORAX-II its new designation as BORAX-III. BORAX-IV was BORAX-III with a newcore made of a fuel containing ThoriumOxide and Uranium Oxide.

10. “Arco First City in United States Lighted byAtomic Power,” Arco Advertiser, August 12,1955, 1; “Arco Gets Premier Showing ofAEC Film, Arco Advertiser, August 19,1955, 1; Plastino, Coming of Age, 65.

11. (Borax tests) Argonne National Laboratory,Annual Report for 1959 , ANLReport No.ANL-6125 (Chicago: ANL, 1959), 94. Seealso J.O. Roberts, “Selected OperatingExperience of Commission PowerReactors,” a paper presented to theAmerican Institute of Electrical Engineers,June 18, 1961, in IHS, Ms 84, Box 122 B,File: AEC-Press Releases; (EBWR) Holl,Argonne, 150; Robert L. Loftness, NuclearPower Plants: Design, Operating

Experience, and Economics, (Princeton,N.J.: Van Nostrand (Nuclear Science Series),1964), 167-213; to Senator Dworshak fromFrancis K. McCune, GE, September 25,1958; IHS, Ms 84, Box 104, File:Legislative AEC Misc 1959.

12. Reactor safety programs also took place atother national labs; ie, Kinetic Energy WaterBoilers (KEWB) were safety tested at LosAlamos.

13. Richard L. Doan, “Two Decades of ReactorSafety Evaluation,” Memorial Lecture inhonor of Dr. C. Rogers McCulloughprepared for Winter Meeting of theAmerican Nuclear Society,Washington,D.C., November 15-18, 1970, p. 3. Forgeneral histories of reactor safety, seeGeorge T. Mazuzan and J. Samuel Walker,Controlling the Atom (Berkeley: Universityof California Press, 1984) and J. SamuelWalker, Containing the Atom (Berkeley:University of California Press, 1992).

14. Jack M. Holl, et al., United States CivilianNuclear Power Policy, 1954-1984: AHistory (Washington, D.C., U.S. DOE,1985), 4.

15. Warren Nyer, interview with author,February 1, 1999.

16. (Location) T.R. Wilson An EngineeringDescription of the SPERT-1 ReactorFacility, Report No. IDO 16318 (IdahoFalls: ANL, 1957), 8. (vocabulary) to GlennSeaborg from Senator Dworshak, November16, 1961, IHS MS 84, Box 122 B, File:AEC-Idaho Plant.

17. “SPERT-2 Features Versatility,” Nucleonics(June 1960): 120; pamphlet, “Special PowerExcursion Reactor Tests” (Idaho Falls:Phillips Petroleum Company, n.d.), 18.

18. Nyer, February 1, 1999.

19. “Special Power Excursion Reactor Tests,”(Idaho Falls: Phillips Petroleum Company.n.d.); Warren Nyer, February 1, 1999.

20. Detroit Edison led a consortium of utilitycompanies called the Power ReactorDevelopment Company.


22. J.O. Roberts, “Selected OperatingExperience,” 37.


24. “AEC Tells How Reactor Failed,” BusinessWeek (April 14, 1956): 34; Jerome D. Luntz,“Nuclear Accidents Are Everybody’sBusiness, Nucleonics (May 1956): 39.

2 5 . A rgonne National Laboratory, Annual Reportfor 1957, Report No. ANL-5870 (Chicago:ANL, 1958), 83.

26. Loftness, Nuclear Power Plants, 339; ANL-West, EBR-II since 1964 (Idaho Falls: ANL-W, 1983).

27. For design and other details, see GeorgeFreund, et al, Design Summary Report onthe Transient Reactor Test Facility, TREAT,Report No. ANL-6034 (Chicago: ANL,1960).

28. ANL, Annual Report 1959, 102; Edmund S.Sowa, “First TREAT Results—MeltdownTests of EBR-II Fuel,” Nucleonics (June1960): 122-124.

29. These were the Argonne Fast SourceReactor (AFSR) and Zero-Power ReactorThree (ZPR-III). ZPR-I and -II were notlocated at the NRTS.

30. “About the Idaho Division...” (Idaho Falls:Argonne Idaho Facilities, 1964), Fact SheetEBR-II, page 1-2. The approach to design-level power production was gradual, attainedon September 25, 1969.

C H A P T E R F I FT E E N

Epigraph: Interview of George Voelz,“Remembering the Early Years,” Report No.DOE/EM 0454, November 29, 1994, HREXDoc. No. 0727845.

1. Lawrence H. Suid, The Army’s NuclearPower Program, The Evolution of a SupportAgency (New York: Glenwood Press, 1990),p. 3-8, 82. For technical detail on the SL-1reactor and artist’s renderings of DEWLinepackages, barge-mounted reactors, and otherapplications, see “Army Reactor Program,”Nucleonics (February 1969): 53-54 andinsert. See also ANL Annual Report 1958,Report No. ANL-5980 (Lemont, Illinois:ANL, 1959), 53-55.

2. For a history of the Army Reactor Programat the NRTS, see Susan M. Stacy, HistoricalAmerican Engineering Record, IdahoNational Engineering Laboratory, ArmyReactor Experimental Area, HAER No. ID-33-D.

3. Suid, Army’s Nuclear Program, 83.

4. See “Description of ALPR,” Nucleonics(February 1958), and pull-out sectionfollowing p. 54.

5. Argonne had named the reactor “ArgonneLow Power Reactor,” or ALPR.

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6. The GCRE was the eighth reactor typedeveloped by the AEC Nuclear Reactordevelopment program, selected for bothmilitary and civilian potential. The name ofthe AREAreactor complex was changedlater to ARA(Army Reactor Area) and stilllater to ARA(Auxiliary Reactor Area). U.S.AEC press release, June 6, 1956; IHSDworshak Papers, Mss 84, Box 55, File:AEC—Idaho Plant.

7. Norman Engineering Co., Master Plan Studyfor the Army Reactor Experimental Area,Report No. IDO-24033 (Idaho Falls:Norman Engineering, 1959), Section II (no p.n.).

8. R.T. Canfield, SL-1 Annual OperatingReport, February 1959-February 1960,Report No. IDO 19012 or CEND-82 (IdahoFalls: Combustion Engineering, 1960), 7.SL-1 was the first power plant reactor in thecountry to use aluminum-clad fuel elements,which heretofore had been used only in testreactors like the MTR. A new alloyovercame the low melting point ofaluminum, and after SL-1, aluminum alloyswere used widely. See Suid, Army’s NuclearProgram, 83.

9. “SL-1 Explosion Kills 3; Cause andSignificance Unclear,” Nucleonics (February1961): 17.

10. See drawing in Nucleonics, (February 1969):54 ff. The fuel zone was 27.8 inches long.

11. (Water hammer) General Electric, FinalReport of SL-1 Recovery Operation (IdahoFalls: GE Report No. IDO-19311, 1962), p.I-6.

12. Staff of the JCAE, “Summary of the SL-1Reactor Incident at the National ReactorTesting Station in Idaho on January 3,1961,” January 10, 1961, IHS, DworshakPapers, Box 122 B, File: AEC Id PressReleases. Other details of the accident werereported in Nucleonics (February 1961): 17-23; and in a series of press releases from theIdaho Operations Office after the accident,copies in Dworshak papers.

13. “Sequence of Events Related to the SL-1Accident at the National Reactor TestingStation, Idaho, on January 3, 1961.” HREXdocument #0715561. No author or date. Thisreport was an appendix to an unidentifiedAEC document. See also Nucleonics(February 1961); and “Detailed EventsChain at SL-1 Reactor Told,” Post-Register,January 12, 1961.

14. A Class II event would impact otherfacilities on the site; a Class III, territorybeyond the boundaries of the Site. A roadblock was not required. C. Wayne Billsrecalled that the HPs may have stopped oneor two autos in order to determine whethertheir tires had picked up any contamination.

15. SL-1 Report Task Force, IDO Report on theNuclear Incident at the SL-1 Reactor onJanuary 3, 1961, at the National ReactorTesting Station, Report No. IDO-19302(Idaho Falls: Idaho Operations Office,1962), 54.

16. “Big Hazard at Idaho Atom Site? TrafficAccidents, Says Nurse,” Post-Register,February 23, 1961.

17. Dr. George Voelz, “Remembering the EarlyYears,” Oral History Interview, November29, 1994, HREX Doc. No. 0727845.

18. The men were Specialist 5 John A. Byrnes,27, U.S. Army; Specialist 4 Richard L.McKinley, 22, U.S. Army; and ConstructionElectrician Richard C. Legg, 26, U.S. Navy.Byrnes had been certified at SL-1 inFebruary 1960; Legg, in September 1960.McKinley was a trainee.


20. Horan, July 16, 1998.

21. “Findings of the Board of Investigation,”Nuclear News (July 1961): 15.

22. INELHistoric Dose Evaluation, Volume 2,p. A-83 to A-85. See also Volume I map,p.27.

23. (Squad rescue) Staff of the JCAE,“Summary of the SL-1 Reactor Incident,” 2-3; (GCRE decontamination, logbook,neutron detector) film “The SL-1 Accident,”(Idaho Falls: Idaho Operations Office).

24. The General Manager’s Board ofInvestigation, Report on the SL-1 Incident,January 3, 1961, Press Release No. 61-24(SL-1), (Idaho Falls: Idaho OperationsOffice, June 11, 1961), 31.

25. (Team recovery) IDO Press release, January9, 1961, Dworshak Papers, box 122 B;(Dugway, mockup, procedures) film “TheSL-1 Accident.”

26. George Voelz, M.D., November 29, 1994;John Horan and Wayne Bills, “What HaveWe Learned? Health Physics at SL-1,”Nucleonics (December 1961): 48.

2 7 . (Luedecke proposal) John Horan, July 16,1998; (caskets) “Blast Vi c t i m ’s [sic] Rites

Await AEC Action,” Salt Lake Tr i b u n e,January 17, 1961; (lead wrap) C. Wa y n eBills, February 3, 1999; “Military GetsBodies of NRTS Victims,” P o s t - R e g i s t e r,January 23, 1961; “Atom Victim is Buried inLead Vault,” Utica Observ e r- D i s p a t c h,January 25, 1961; “ACatastrophe New toMan,” New York Herald Tr i b u n e, January 29,1961. The AEC required that the cemeteriesaccepting the caskets must have perpetualcare, that the graves not be disturbed withoutAEC permission, and that the graves beshielded with concrete and dirt.

28. Jay Kunze, February 5, 1999. The AECcontracted General Electric to disassembleand analyze the reactor on May 5, 1961;(Dugway) C.W. Bills, personalcommunication, June 25, 1999.

29. Kunze, February 5 and July 6, 1999.

30. Kunze, February 5, 1999.

31. (Crane) Wayne Bills, interview with author,February 3, 1999; (vessel in transit) GeneralElectric, Final Report of SL-1 p. II-37, II-39.See also “SL-1 Reactor Core Trucked to HotCell for Study,” Arco Advertiser, December8, 1961, 3.

32. General Electric Final Report, ii.

C H A P T E R S I X T E E N

1. (Monster quote) Robert F. Alkire,“‘Monsters’Huddle in Weird Stillness,”Associated Press story published in SaltLake Tribune, January 8, 1961, and as“Moon-like Eastern Idaho Desert Scene ofNuclear ‘Monster’ Runaway,” in IdahoDaily Statesman, same date, 5; (sleepingquote) “A-Reactors Won’t Blow Us Up,”The Deseret News and Telegram, January 6,1961.

2. (Mishaps) “NRTS Marks First Fatal AtomicMishap,” Idaho Daily Statesman, January 5,1961; (instructed) Frank Carey, “ChemicalExplosion in Nuclear Reactor PotentiallyMore Perilous than A-`Blast,’ Idaho DailyStatesman, January 5, 1961.

3. The IDO compiled 154 press clippings fromaround the country in a document “The SL-1Accident, Press Clippings.” A copy is extantat the IDO public information office inIdaho Falls, Idaho.

4. (Siting) John W. Finney, “Blast Stresses A-Question,” Salt Lake Tribune, January 5,1961; (set back) “What Happened in


2 9 2

Nuclear Blast,” Business Week, January 7,1961.

5. (Reuther quote) “Press Release fromIndustrial Union Department of AFL-CIO,January 5, 1961, at IHS, Ms 84, Box 122 B,File: “AEC-Idaho Plant;” (defeat) “AMonthAfter the Idaho Accident,” Oak Ridger,February 6, 1961.

The forty-item list included incidents suchas the MTR fuel rod with a pin-hole leak(described in Chapter 12) and similar eventsthat had occurred in other AEC facilitiesacross the country. The information wasavailable for review in unclassified AECliterature.

6. To Senator Henry Dworshak from Donald E.Seifert and George Dragich, May 11, 1061,in IHS, Mss 84, Box 122 B, File: AEC-Idaho Plant.

7. To Senator Dworshak from John T. Conway,June 20, 1961, IHS, Mss 84, Box 122 B,File: AEC Miscellaneous.

8. (Wilson) To Senator Dworshak from John T.Conway, acting executive director of JCAE,June 1, 1961, in IHS, Mss 84, Box 122 B,File: AEC-Idaho Plant.

9. Atomic Energy Commission InvestigationBoard, SL-1 Accident (Washington, D.C.:Joint Committee Print, U.S. GovernmentPrinting Office, 1961), ix.

10. “Johnson Resigns at AEC,” ArcoAdvertiser,” December 8, 1961, 1; JohnHoran, C. Wayne Bills interviews withauthor, July 16, 1998, and February 2, 1999,respectively.

11. To Ramey from A.R. Luedecke, January 12,1961, in IHS, Mss 84, Box 122 B, File:AEC-Idaho Press Releases; “AEC SurveysSafety of Licensed Reactors,” Post-Register,January 13, 1961; “Safety Survey Launchedfor all Reactors Licensed by AEC,” IdahoDaily Statesman, January 13, 1961; “AECAsks U. Bolster Reactor Safety,” Salt LakeTribune, January 13, 1961.

12. J.W. Henscheid, interview with author,December 10, 1998.

13. David Okrent, On the History of theEvolution of Light Water Reactor Safety inthe United States (Los Angeles: Universityof Los Angeles, 1978), pp. 6-102 to 6-106.Okrent reproduces a letter from the ACRS toA.R. Luedecke, December 31, 1962.

14. (Greenland) To Ramey from Luedecke,January 12, 1961, op cit.; (ML-1)

AEC/Idaho Operations press release,February 11, 1961, IHS, Dworshak Papers,Box 122 B, File “AEC—Press Releases.”Also, Hogerton, Atomic Energy Desk Book,33. The Army operated SM-1 at FortBelvoir; SM-1Aat Fort Greeley, Alaska;PM-2Aat Camp Century, Greenland; PM-1at Sundance Air Force Base, Wyoming; PM-3Aat McMurdo Sound, Antarctica; PL-3 atByrd Station; and Sturgis, a barge.

15. (Power dates) Suid, Army’s NuclearProgram, 91.

16. T.L. Murphy, Final Disassembly andExamination of the ML-1 Reactor Core,IDO-171-90, (Idaho Falls: PPCo, 1966),110-111; “Economic Military Power Arrives,But Pentagon Hesitates,” Nucleonics (April1960): 27; Suid, Army’s Military Reactors,92-93. See also Stacy, Army ReactorExperimental Area, HAER No. ID-33-D.

17. The SL-1 Burial Ground was regraded andrecontoured in 1997 after a 1996 “Record ofDecision” signed by the Department ofEnergy, the Environmental ProtectionAgency, and the State of Idaho. The newnatural-material “cap” was to improve theisolation of hazardous materials fromhumans and the surrounding environment.Erik Simpson, “Agencies agree to capreactor burial grounds,” INELNews(February 6, 1996): 7.

18. “Reactor Safety: Accident Control Study,”Nucleonics (April 1964): 28. See John R.Horan and C. Wayne Bills, “What Have WeLearned? Health Physics at SL-1,”Nucleonics (December 1961): 48; Voelz,November 29, 1994. The film, “The SL-1Accident,” produced by Idaho OperationsOffice circa 1962, was in three parts, Phase1, 2, and 3. All were converted to videoformat.

19. C. Wayne Bills, personal communication toauthor, June 25, 1999.

20. (Exposures) IDO Report on the NuclearIncident at the SL-1, 27; John R. Horan andC. Wayne Bills, “What Have We Learned?Health Physics at SL-1,” Nucleonics(December 1961): 43.

21. “Rescue, Control Crews Honored forService After SL-1 Blast,” Post-Register,March 6, 1962, 12; “AEC HonorsParticipants in SL-1 Reactor Emergency,”March 6, 1962, IDO Press Release, IHS, MS84, Box 124, File: AEC Idaho Plant.

22. See for example Harvey Wasserman andNormon Solomon, Killing Our Own, TheDisaster of America’s Experience withAtomic Radiation (New York: DelacortePress, 1982); John Fuller, We Almost LostDetroit (New York: Reader’s Digest Press,1975); John May, The Greenpeace Book ofthe Nuclear Age (New York: PantheonBooks, 1989); Leslie J. Freeman, NuclearWitnesses: Insiders Speak Out (New York:W.W. Norton and Co., 1981).

C H A P T E R S E V E N T E E N

Epigraph: William Ginkel, EG&G Bulletin, July19, 1985, 1.

1. “Johnson Resigns at AEC,” Arco Advertiser,December 8, 1961, 1; C. Wayne Bills, inter-view with author, February 3, 1999.

2. William Ginkel, interview with author,October 13, 1998.

3. Warren Nyer, “Recollections andReflections,” Idaho ANS Newsletter (June1989): 9.

4. The following quotations and informationregarding the ATR not otherwise noted arefrom Deslonde deBoisblanc, interviews andpersonal communications with author,August-September 1999.

5. D.R. deBoisblanc, The Advanced TestReactor—ATR—Final Conceptual Design,Report No. IDO-16667 (Idaho Falls:Phillips, 1960), 11-13; and DeslondedeBoisblanc, personal communications.

6. Deslonde deBoisblanc, personalcommunications to author, August 23 andSeptember 2, 1999.

7. Deslonde deBoisblanc, communication toauthor, August 23, 1999.

8. For additional information on the ATR, seeD.R. deBoisblanc et al, The Advanced TestReactor—ATR Final Conceptual Design,Report No. IDO-16667 (Idaho Falls: PPCo,1960). See pamphlet, Advanced Test Reactor(Idaho Falls: Idaho Nuclear Corporation, nodate) for addition description of the reactor.

9. “Idaho Rites Start Record Atom Job,” Post-Register, no date, p. 1, 12, clipping in IHS,Ms. 84, Box 124, File: AEC-Idaho Plant,1961.

10. Letter to Senator Dworshak from RichardDonovan, November 7, 1961, IHS, Ms. 84,Box 122 B, File: AEC Miscellaneous;(Geneva) IDO Press Release, September 11,1958, at IHS, Ms. 84, Box 83, File: AEC-

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Idaho Plant; R.L. Doan, “MTR-ETROperating Experience,” Nuclear Science andEngineering (January 1962): 23-24, 26;Idaho Operations Office, 1965 ThumbnailSketch (Idaho Falls: Idaho OperationsOffice, 1965), 15.

11. R.L. Doan, “MTR-ETR OperatingExperience,” 24.

12. 1965 Thumbnail Sketch, 16-18.

13. “Bid opening for AEC Tech ServicesCenter,” Arco Advertiser, June 5, 1962.

14. J.O. Roberts, “Selected OperatingExperience of Commission PowerReactors,” 32 (full citation in Chapter 14).

15. November 1958 Thumbnail Sketch, 23;(gauges) Jack Clark, interview with author,July 16, 1998.

16. For more on OMRE and EOCR, seeArrowrock Group, Context History, 85-88.

17. (Melting point) C. Wayne Bills,communication to author, circa August 20,1999. Piqua was one of the “Second Round”of demonstrations initiated by AECinvitation in September 1955. See Holl,Anders, and Buck, Civilian Nuclear PowerPolicy, 5; Controlled Nuclear ChainReaction: The First 50 Years (La GrangePark, Illinois: American Nuclear Society,1992), 41; and numerous editions ofThumbnail Sketch.

1 8 . William R. Corliss. S N A P Nuclear SpaceR e a c t o r s ( Washington, D.C.: U.S. A E CDivision of Technical Information, 1966), 11 .

19. July 1971 Thumbnail Sketch , 34.

20. Richard Meservey, interview with author,October 12, 1998. See also letter to J.W.McCaslin from G.L. Cordes, January 20,1965, “Monthly Report of TAN-SPERT HPSection for December 1965,” HREX Doc.No. 0721415.

21. “Idaho’s Atom Mission in Space,” Post-Register, April 14, 1965, 4; Corliss, SNAPNuclear Space Reactors, 35-38. 1965Thumbnail Sketch, 32. See also AEC/IDnews release No. 63-11, “AEC SchedulesDeliberate Reactor Destructive Test forNovember,” September 17, 1963, HREXDocument No. 721416. See also JohnHoran, “Memo to File,” January 14, 1966,HREX Document No. 727305. The testswere named SNAPTRAN (SNAP Transient).

22. R. (Dick) Smith, “The Breeder ReactorConcept,” Idaho National Engineering

Laboratory EBR-1 Review (cited in ChapterSix notes.)

23. “EBR-II Fact Sheet,” copy found in IHS,Ms. 400, Box 43, File: Legislative JCAE—20th Anniversary.

24. EBR-II since 1964, 24. The first loading offuel was enriched to 48 percent U-235.

25. For more detailed description, see EBR-IISince 1964, 67-70.

26. (Burnup rate), EBR-II since 1964, 26.Burnup rate reached 2.6 percent in 1975.

27. Holl, Anders, and Buck, Civilian NuclearPower Policy, 10.

28. Holl, Argonne, 230; “AEC Kills Argonne’sFARET in favor of Fast Flux Test Facility,”Nucleonics Week, December 2, 1965.

29. J. Newell Stannard, Radioactivity andHealth, A History, Report No.DOE/RL01830-T59 (Hanford: PacificNorthwest Laboratory, 1988), 1299; C.A.Hawley, et al, Controlled EnvironmentalRadioiodine Tests, National Reactor TestingStation, Report No. IDO-12035 (Idaho Falls:IDO, 1964), 1; John Horan, interview withauthor, January 15, 1999.

30. Clyde Hawley, interview with author,September 22, 1999.

3 1 . John Horan, July 14, 1998; Hawley,C o n t rolled Environmental RadioiodineTe s t s, 2.

32. (Location), C.A. Hawley, ed., ControlledEnvironmental Radioiodine Tests at theNational Reactor Testing Station 1965Progress Report, Report No. IDO-12047(Idaho Falls: IDO, 3; (grid) D.F. Bunch,Controlled Environmental Radioiodine TestsProgress Report Number Two, Report No.IDO-12053 (Idaho Falls: IDO), 3; (bids)IDO News Releases, April 21, 1966; April25, 1967; May 6, 1967; April 2, 1970; April13, 1970; in BSU, Ms. 6, Box 155, File 1.

33. George Voelz, “Remembering the EarlyYears,” HREX Doc. No. 0727845. Othersources indicate that from six to ten peoplewere involved in the experiments. See U.S.DOE, Human Radiation Experiments: TheDepartment of Energy Roadmap to the Storyand the Records, Report no. DOE/EH-0445(Washington, D.C.: DOE, 1995), 239.

34. In a 1994 interview with researchersinvestigating human radiation experiments,John Horan expressed his belief that theNRTS might have been the only AEClaboratory to follow the protocol of

obtaining approval of the AEC anddeveloping consent forms. See transcript ofinterview by Baldwin and Baccus, HREXDoc. No. 0726467, p. 16. For a summary ofCERT test dates, see INEL Historical DoseEvaluation, Volume 2 (Idaho Falls: IdahoOperations Office Report No. DOE/ID12119, 1991), page A-72 through A-77. Acopy of the Nuremburg Code was found atwww.geneletter.org/0197/nuremburg.htm.

35. (Sensitive counters) Hawley, ControlledEnvironmental Radioiodine Tests, 14; for anaccount of personal experiences, see IdahoPress Tribune, January 19, 1987.

36. Stannard, Radioactivity and Health, AHistory, 1,300, 1,302; (laboratoryexperiments) J.D. Zimbrick and P.G.Voilleque, Controlled EnvironmentalRadioiodine Tests at the National ReactorTesting Station Progress Report NumberFour, Report No. IDO-12065 (Idaho Falls:IDO, 1969), 2.

37. “Uranium Production—ICPPProcessingRuns,” Revised 10-1-75, M.P.H., and “CPP601 Processing History,” both provided byJeff Bryant of INTEC (ICPP).

38. See W.S. Ginnell, J.J. Martin, and L.P.Hatch, “Ultimate Disposal of RadioactiveWastes,” Nucleonics (December, 1954): 14-18; “Outlook for Waste Disposal,”Nucleonics (November 1957): 155-164; TheWaste Calcining Facility at the IdahoChemical Processing Plant, pamphlet, nodate, no author, p. 2; Joseph A. Lieberman,“Treatment and Disposal of Fuel-Reprocessing Waste,” Nucleonics (February1958): 86; and J.I. Stevens, et al,Preliminary Process Criteria and Designsfor Waste Calcining Facilities at the IdahoChemical Processing Plant, Report No.PTR-177 (Idaho Falls: PPCo, 1957), 5.

39. See C.E. Stevenson, et al, Waste Calcinationand Fission Product Recovery Facilities—ICPP, A Conceptual Design, Report PTR-106 (Idaho Falls: PPCo, 1956); and D.R.Evans, Pilot Plant Studies with a Six-InchDiameter Fluidized Bed Calciner , ReportNo. IDO-14539 (Idaho Falls: PPCo), 2.

40. Argonne National Laboratory, AnnualReports for 1955 (p. 21-23), 1956 (p. 65),1957 (p. 95-97). See also C.E. Stevenson, etal, Waste Calcination and Fission ProductRecovery Facilities—ICPP,A ConceptualDesign, Report PTR-106 (Idaho Falls:PPCo, 1956); and D.R. Evans, Pilot PlantStudies with a Six-Inch Diameter Fluidized


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Bed Calciner, Report No. IDO-14539 (IdahoFalls: PPCo, 1961) ). Studies of the two-footmodel are reported in B.P. Brown, E.S.Grimmett, and J.A. Buckham, Developmentof a Fluidized Bed Calcination Process forAluminum Nitrate Wastes in a Two-FootSquare Pilot Plant Calciner, Part 1,Equipment Development in Initial ProcessStudies, Report No. IDO-14586 (Idaho Falls:PPCo).

41. See INEELphotos NRTS-59-709 andNRTS-59-925. For a history of the oldWaste Calcining Facility, see Susan M.Stacy, Idaho National Engineering andEnvironmental Laboratory, Old WasteCalcining Facility HAER No. ID-33-C ,Report No. INEEL-97-01370 (Idaho Falls:LMITCO, 1997).

42. L.T. Lakey, et al, Development of FluidizedBed Calcination of Aluminum Nitrate Wastesin the Waste Calcining Facility, Report No.IDO-14608 (Idaho Falls: PPCo, 1965), pp. ii-5.

43. (Merit badge sidebar) “Boy Scouts AtomicEnergy Merit Badge,” Nuclear News(August 1963): 34; to Len Jordan fromRobert L. Shannon, March 14, 1966, BSU,Ms. 6, Box 148, File 1.

44. D.R. Evans, Pilot Plant Studies, 3. See alsoRobert D. Thompson, Ruthenium Behaviorduring Fluidized Bed Calcination ofRadioactive Waste Solutions: ProblemReview and Program Suggestions, ReportNo. PTR-743 (Idaho Falls: PPCo, 1965).The calciner’s first waste feed came fromaluminum-clad fuel. With the aluminumnitrate from the waste stream and aluminumnitrate from the process, most of the nitratesalt being processed was aluminum nitrate.Calcining turned this into aluminum oxide,which is known as the mineral alumina. Thecalcined product of zirconium-clad fuel iszirconia.

45. Stacy, Old Waste Calcining Facility HAERNo. ID-33-C.

46. (500 years) Allied Chemical, The WasteCalcining Facility, Idaho ChemicalProcessing Plant (Idaho Falls: IdahoChemical Programs, circa 1974), 13.Towards the end of life for the WCF, thebends in the pipe did become a concern. Theabrasion of the calcine particles eroded ahole in an elbow of the transport line; LeroyLewis, personal communication to author,August 31, 1999.

47. R.E. Commander, et al, Operation of theWaste Calcining Facility with HighlyRadioactive Aqueous Waste, Report No.IDO-14662 (Idaho Falls: PPCo, 1966), 1-4;and L.T. Lakey, Fluidized Bed Calcination,iii. Lakey, IDO-14608 contains a summaryof test-runs.

48. Richard K. Lester and David J. Rose, “TheNuclear Wastes at West Valley, New York,”Technology Review (May 1977): 20-23.

C H A P T E R E I G H T E E N

Epigraph: William Ginkel, Remarks at Chamberof Commerce Breakfast Meeting, WestbankMotel, Id Falls, May 16, 1967, p. 2. Copyprovided by Bill Ginkel.

1. J.W. Henscheid, interview with author,December 10, 1998. See also Nuclear News(October 1969): 17, which described afailure of the primary coolant heatexchangers early in the hydraulic testingprogram (1965) from excessive tubevibrations and which had to be rebuilt.

2. J.W. Henscheid, December 10, 1998.

3. (Shaw quotation) William Lanouette,“Dream Machine,” Atlantic Monthly (April1983): 45. For a summary of safetyphilosophy, see Elizabeth Rolfe, NuclearPower and the Public Safety .

4. Chuck Rice, interview with author, October15, 1998.

5. Joint Committee on Atomic Energy,Hearings on AEC Authorizing Legislation,Fiscal Year 1968 (Washington: GovernmentPrinting Office, 1967), 762.

6. (Shaw views) Robert Gillette, “NuclearSafety (I): The Roots of Dissent”, Science(September 1, 1972): 774-776.

7. “Martin, U.S. Rubber to Run Hanford ‘200Area,’Build Isotope Plant; Diversification atNRTS,” Nucleonics (March 1965): 21; “ANew Contractor to Manage NRTS in placeof Phillips,” Nuclear Industry (February1965): 12.

8. (Thirty companies) “NRTS Breakup: AECSeeks New Contractor,” Nucleonics (June1965): 27; “AEC Invites Proposals forOperation of Certain Facilities at IdahoSite,” May 3, 1965, BSU Ms. 6, Box 141,Folder 10; (titan firms) “Titan Firms to seekIdaho AEC Contract,” Post-Register, circaMay 9, 1965, in BSU Ms. 6, Box 141,Folder 10; “General Atomics Here to StudyContract,” Post-Register, undated clipping,

BSU Ms. 6, Box 141, Folder 9; Bill Ginkel,“Welcome. The NRTS—What It Is andWhat It Does...,” remarks at “Pre-ProposalInformation Meeting,” Elks Club, May 20,1965.

9. (AEC liked Aerojet) Aerojet NuclearCompany, A Historical Brief of the LOFTReactor at the Idaho National EngineeringLaboratory Report No. ERDA/IDO CI-1275(Idaho Falls: ANC, 1975), 14; (Aerojetinvestments) Robert Gillette, “NuclearSafety (II): The Years of Delay,” sidebar“The Fall of Phillips Nuclear,” Science(September 8, 1972): 868; “AerojetCommemorates 25th Anniversary March20,” Idaho Nuclear News (March 1967): 1;(Johnson) to Jordan from Allan C. Johnson,February 22, 1966, BSU Ms. 6, Box 148,Folder 1. Aerojet was a subsidiary of theGeneral Tire Company; Charles Rice,interview with author, October 15, 1998.

10. IDO news release, “Idaho Nuclear AssumesMajor Operating Role at NRTS in Idaho,”July 1, 1966, BSU Ms. 6, Box 147, Folder36; (shot-gun marriage) Charles Rice,October 15, 1998.

11. (Quotation) Robert Gillette, “The Fall ofPhillips Nuclear” sidebar, Science(September 8, 1972): 868.

12. For discussions of the “Bandwagon Market”that began with the Oyster Creek project, seeRichard Rhodes, Nuclear Renewal (NewYork: Viking, 1993); Elizabeth Rolfe,Nuclear Power and Public Safety ; J. SamuelWalker, Containing the Atom.

13. The Brookhaven Study was WASH-740, areport originally prepared in 1957, when theJCAE was preparing the Price-Anderson Actand contemplating the monetary value ofsevere accidents.

14. Aerojet Nuclear Company, AHistorical Briefof the LOFT P ro j e c t, 1.

15. Aerojet Nuclear Company, AHistorical Briefof the LOFT R e a c t o r, 1.

16. Roger Anders, unrevised preliminaryunpublished manuscript, “Safety Research:An Impossible Task,” copy supplied to Stacyby author, p. 48.

17. Walker, Containing the Atom, 147.

18. (Zircaloy) Aerojet Nuclear Company, AHistorical Brief of the LOFTProject, 2; (gaspressure) Anders, “Safety Research,” 6.

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19. (Regroup quotation) JCAE, Hearings onAEC Authorizing Legislation, Fiscal Year1968, 761.

20. Samuel J. Wa l k e r, Containing the A t o m, 144.For a review of Advisory Committee onReactor Safety views on China Syndrome,see David Okrent, On the History of theEvolution of Light Water Reactor Safety inthe United States (Los Angeles: Okrent, circa1978), p. 2-173 ff .

21. (Quotation) Bill Ginkel, “Presentation, toConsolidation Study Group,” March 11,1969; Gillette, “The Fall of PhillipsNuclear,” Science, p. 868.

22. (Breeder) Robert Gillette, “Nuclear Safety(III): Critics Charge Conflicts of Interest,”Science, (September 15, 1972): 970;(quotation) to Jordan from T.G. Taxelius,September 18, 1970, BSU, Ms. 6, Box 174,File 31; to Edward J. Bauser from DonaldKull, November 17, 1970, BSU Ms. 6, Box174, File 31.

23. Robert Gillette, “Nuclear Safety (I): TheRoots of Dissent,” Science (September 1,1972): 773; (Post-Register quotation) “TheLayoff and Our Deeper Throes,” editorial,Post-Register, circa 1970, p. 4, undatednews clipping in IHS Ms. 400, Box 16, File9/I Atomic Energy Commission; (Andrusquotation) to Jordan from Andrus,November 2, 1971, BSU Ms. 6, Box 181,File 11.

24. To Orval Hansen from Chuck Rice, Sept 22,1970, IHS, Ms. 400, Box 16, File 9/I AEC.

25. Walker, Containing the Atom, 177. U.S.DOE, Comprehensive Facility and Land UsePlan, INEL, Report No. DOE/ID-10514(Idaho Falls: IDO, 1995), 185.

26. Gillette, “Nuclear Safety (III): CriticsCharge Conflicts of Interest,” Science, 974.

27. Rolfe, Nuclear Power and the Public Safety,93. See also letter to Robert Hollingsworthfrom Orval Hansen, Nov 19, 1971, IHS Ms.400, Box 16,21, File: Dept Atomic EnergyCommission. The Union of ConcernedScientists attacked the Interim Criteria andthe Semiscale tests that supported thembecause they were not conservative enough.

28. Aerojet Nuclear Company, A HistoricalBrief of the LOFT Reactor, 4.

29. (No fabricators) Gillette, “Nuclear Safety(II): The Years of Delay, Science, 870;Aerojet Nuclear Company, A HistoricalBrief of the LOFT Reactor, 5; to John

Hough, governor’s office, from NolanHancock, Oil, Chem and Atomic WorkersInternational Union, Dec 30, 1971, BSU Ms.141-3, Box 91, File 6.

30. (Blame Phillips) Gillette, “Nuclear Safety(II): The Years of Delay,” 869; (earlyresearch independence) Rolph, NuclearPower and the Public Safety , 68.

31.(Stake) Bill Ginkel, personal communicationto author, July 13, 1999; (name change)Gillette, “The Fall of Phillips Nuclear,” 868.

32. (Gillette quotation) “Nuclear Safety (I): TheRoots of Dissent,” Science, p. 773; (Leeperquotation), same article, p. 774. In additionto the four-part series published in Scienceon September 1, 8, 15, and 22, 1972, Gillettewrote “Nuclear Reactor Safety: At the AECthe Way of the Dissenter is Hard,” whichappeared in Science (May 5, 1972):492-498,and discusses the hearing underway at thetime on LOCAs and ECCS.

33. EG&G, Five Year Report, 76/81 (IdahoFalls: EG&G, 1982), 14; EG&G NewsRelease, “New ATR Operation RecordEstablished,” December 23, 1981.

C H A P T E R N I N ET E E N

Epigraph: “Governor, Commission Size AtomGoals,” Post-Register, September 20, 1967.

1. (FARET canceled) “AEC Kills Argonne’sFARET in favor of Fast Flux Test Facility,”Nucleonics Week (December 2, 1965).

2. Holl, Anders, Buck, Civilian Nuclear Policy,6. The Price-Anderson amendment to theAtomic Energy Act capped the coverage fora nuclear accident at $560 million. Thegovernment supplied $500 million of theinsurance at a nominal cost, while privatecompanies supplied the remaining $60million at standard rates.

3. See EBR-II Since 1984, p. 26-29 foroperating data on EBR-II reactor. Accordingto Richard Lindsay, a water cooled reactorcan make plutonium, but not with enoughefficiency to make recycling economic formore than about one recycle.

4. William Lanouette, “Dream Machine,”Atlantic Monthly (April 1983): 45.

5. There were several types of breeders. Usingcombinations of uranium and thorium, theconcepts had in common the conversion ofotherwise useless metals into newfissionable fuel. See Lanouette, “DreamMachine,” 36.



8. “AEC Reports on Current Fast ReactorTechnology,” Nucleonics (April 1966): 19.


10. (Brady editorials), Orval Hansen, interviewwith author, July 1, 1998.

11. Telegram to Frank Church, Len B. Jordan,and Ralph Harding from Governor RobertSmylie, April 16, 1964, IHS, Ms. AR2/23,Box 17, File: Atomic Energy 63-64.

12. IDO news release, September 15, 1965,BSU, Ms. 6, Box 141, File 9; (long shot)“The Research Yeast,” editorial, Post-Register (May 9, 1965), 4.

13. To Governor Smylie from N.K. Sowards,Asst. Mgr, Aerojet, June 7, 1965; and toGovernor Smylie from Fred Rooney, May25, 1965, IHS, Papers of Gov. Samuelson,Box 50, File: Nuclear File from Smylie,1965.

14. Robb Brady, “The Research Yeast,” Post-Register, May 9, 1965, 4; “Additional NRTSSiting Information for the 200 BevatronAccelerator,” June 11, 1965, and letter toW.L. Robison from Senator Leonard Jordan,August 5, 1965, in BSU Ms. 6, Box 141,File 10; IDO Press Release, September 15,1965, and letter to Idaho AcceleratorCommittee from F.S. Rooney, September 20,1965, in BSU Ms. 6, Box 141, File 9; AECPress Release, March 22, 1966, in BSU Ms.6, Box 148, File 1.

15. Robb Brady, “Idaho’s Post-AcceleratorBriefing,” Post-Register, March 23, 1966, 4;letter to Frederick Seitz from EmanualPiore, March 23, 1966, in BSU Ms. 6, Box148, File 1.

16. Executive Order, Nuclear Science andIndustry Advisory Committee, April 27,1966, in Idaho State Library GovernmentDocuments (the list of appointees includedF.H. Anderson, NRTS, and Wayne Bills,AEC); Pamphlet “Nuclear Energy inWashington State—The Nuclear ProgressState,” Office of Nuclear EnergyDevelopment, no date, in IHS, SamuelsonPapers, Box 50, File: Nuclear—Miscellaneous, 1960s.

17. Industrial Development Division of theDepartment of Commerce, Idaho IndustrialOpportunities (Boise: Department ofCommerce, 1966), 4; “Legislature StudiesIdaho’s New Atomic Mission,” Post-


2 9 6

Register, January 26, 1967, 16. See alsoDepartment of Commerce, An ActionProgram for Industrial Progress in Idaho(Boise: Dept of Commerce, 1968).

18. To Jordan from R.R. Smith, July 1, 1966,BSU Ms. 6, Box 147, Folder 136.

19. To Smylie from Lloyd Howe, July 8, 1966,IHS, Samuelson Papers, Box 13, File:Commerce and Development—NuclearAdvisory Committee; (new platformquotation) to Jordan from Robb Brady, April26 and July 14, 1966, BSU, Ms. 6, Box 147,Folder 36; and R.R. Smith to Jordan, July 1,1966, op cit.; to Jordan from Brady, June 3,1966, BSU Ms. 6, Box 148, Folder 1.

20. To Chet Holifield from Glenn Seaborg,January 23, 1967, BSU Ms. 6, Box 154,Folder 30; (strenuous protest) to Seaborgfrom McClure, February 2, 1967; “IdahoLoses Another Atomic Race,” editorial,Post-Register, January 25, 1967, 4.

21. Idaho Code 39-3004 established the IdahoNuclear Energy Commission, created byS.B. 115, 39th Session, Idaho Legislature(1967).

22. INEC, Annual Report of the Idaho NuclearEnergy Commission, Report No. 3, 1969(Boise: INEC, 1969), 1.

23. Bill Ginkel, “Remarks at Chamber ofCommerce Breakfast Meeting,” WestbankMotel, Idaho Falls, May 16, 1967, p. 3.

24. Other members were Donald McKay,Wallace C. Burns, Perry Nelson, Albert E.Wilson, see INEC Annual Report NumberTwo, 1968.

25. J. Shifferdecker, “Idaho Nuclear PanelDirected by Chemist,” Idaho DailyStatesman, August 6, 1967.

26. To Jordan from Steele Barnett, June 1, 1967,BSU, Ms. 6, Box 154, Folder 28.

27. (Photograph) “This Atomic World,”Blackfoot News, September 12, 1968, 3.Promotional activities of INEC are found inINEC Annual Reports from 1967 through1975.

2 8 . “Atomic Food Unit to be Shown,” Ti m e s -N e w s, April 18-19, 1968, 3; “Peaceful Use ofNuclear Power to be Shown in Buhl,” Ti m e s -N e w s, April 22, 1968, 1; “Gov. SamuelsonSlates Buhl Visit to AEC Irradiator,” B u h lH e r a l d, April 25, 1968, 1; photograph, Ti m e s -N e w s, April 26-27, 1968, 3.

29. “Bill may be Significant in Efforts toDevelop Atomic Energy Uses,” Post-

Register, February 4, 1968; “AEC ApprovesPact with Idaho,” NRTS News (August1968): 1; “Idaho to Become Atom‘Agreement’State,” Post-Register (August11, 1968), 10.

30. (Research grants) INEC Report No. 3;(compact) “Western Interstate NuclearBoard Annual Report, 1969-1970,” in BSUMs. 6, Box 174, Folder 31; “An ActAuthorizing entry of the State into theWestern Interstate Nuclear Compact” and“An Act Appropriating Moneys from theGeneral Fund to the INEC for...paying theState’s share of expenses to the WesternInterstate Nuclear Compact,” in BSU Ms. 6,Box 167, Folder 8; to John Conway, JCAE,from R.E. Hollingsworth, GM AEC, April26, 1968, BSU Ms. 6, Box 162, Folder 4.

31. To INEC from MTR Study Committee,March 3, 1968, in IHS, Samuelson Papers,Box 23, File: State AEC/Nuclear EnergyCommission; to Glenn Seaborg fromSamuelson, April 19, 1968; to Steele Barnettfrom Seaborg, April 8, 1968, in IHS,Samuelson papers, Box 50, File: Nuclear1968.

C H A P T E R T W E N T Y

Epigraph: “Nuclear Industry Potential inExpanding Idaho,” Idaho Department ofCommerce.

1. Ben Plastino, Coming of Age, 46; BillGinkel, interview with author, October 13,1998.

2. Robb Brady, “12,000 Hear LBJ at Site,”Post-Register, August 26, 1966, 1.

3. (Policy address) John Horan, interview withauthor, October 14, 1998; (quotation) RobbBrady, “12,000 Hear LBJ at Site,” Post-Register, August 26, 1966, 1.

4. Through November 1999, President LyndonJohnson was the only president of theUnited States to visit the Site.

5. Commemorative booklet produced byNRTS, “President’s Visit, August 26, 1966,”copy found at IHS; Bill Ginkel, interviewwith author, October 13, 1998.

6. “Governors Back Idaho Reactor,” Post-Register, May 17, 1968; “Idaho Views FundUse for Reactor, Post-Register, June 7,1968.

7. “Remarks by Wilfrid E. Johnson, US AECCommissioner, August 15, 1968, Rotary

Club,” IHS, Samuelson Papers, Box 50,File: Nuclear 1968.

8. Pamphlet “MTR, Today an IrradiationFacility, Tomorrow...Western BeamResearch Reactor, The Hub for NeutronResearch in the Western United States,”inBSU Ms. 6, Box 167, Folder 10.

9. See “In preparation for KIFI Channel 8program in Idaho Falls, November 8, 1968,”IHS, Samuelson Papers, Box 23, File: StateAEC/Nuclear Energy Commission; “NuclearCouncil Advances Member Drive; MTRRole Scoped,” Post-Register, December 8,1968, 12; to Dr. Lee Dubridge from OrvalHansen, January 27, 1969, IHS, Ms. 400,Box 1, File: 9/I/A/5 Atomic Energy; toJordan from Samuelson, April 9, 1969, BSUMs. 6, Box 167, Folder 11; to Chet Holifieldfrom Orval Hansen, May 3, 1969, BSU Ms.6, Box 167, Folder 10; CongressionalRecord (Volume 115, No. 73, Tuesday May6, 1969):E 3666-7.

10. To Ginkel from Samuelson, December 26,1968, IHS Samuelson Papers, Box 23, File:State AEC/Nuclear Energy Commission.

11. To Frank Church from Robert D. O’Neill,AEC, September 15, 1969, BSU FrankChurch Papers, Series 3.2.1, Box 3, Folder1; to Wallace F. Bennett from Seaborg, May20, 1969, BSU Ms. 6, Box 167, Folder 10.

12. “AProposal to Sustain the MTR as theWBRR for a Two-Year Period,” in BSU Ms.6, Box 167, Folder 10; “AEC DeniesUniversities’Bid for Arco MaterialsReactor,” Idaho Statesman, October 11,1969; (commercial business) to WilliamGinkel from Joseph Rosenbuerg, January 27,1970, BSU Ms. 6, Box 174, Folder 32; toJordan from Rutledge, February 10, 1970,BSU Ms. 6, Box 174, Folder 32.

13. To Jordan from Robert O’Neill, AECCongressional Relations, April 27, 1870,BSU Ms. 6, Box 174, Folder 32.

14. To Rutledge from Donald F. Kline,Executive Director for Higher Education,May 28, 1970, BSU, Ms. 6, Box 174, Folder32. See also “Application for Funding for aProposed Study of Mercury Poisoning inIdaho,” May 28, 1970, and relateddocuments in same folder.

15. (August critical) to Edward Bauser fromR.E. Hollingsworth, August 27, 1970, IHSMs. 400, Box 43, File: JCAE-MTR;“Governor Sees MTR Still Displays Class,”Post-Register, August 25, 1970, 2.

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2 9 7

16. To Samuelson from Hollingsworth, August19, 1970, BSU Ms. 6, Box 174, Folder 32.

17. To James Schlesinger from Donald J.Mackay, March 28, 1972, BSU Ms. 141-3,Box 91, Folder 7. The Post-Registerspeculated that the AEC refused to help withthe MTR because it was protecting GeneralElectric, which it had encouraged to build atest reactor at Vallecitos, California, toproduce radioisotopes for private industry.See R.C. Russell, “`Chess Game’ContinuesOver Future of MTR,” Post-Register,September 13, 1970, 16; (population)Cartography Students, University of Idaho,The Compact Atlas of Idaho (Moscow,Idaho: Cart-O-Graphics Laboratory, 1938,61.

18. To Hansen from Edward E. David, Jr.,February 18, 1972, IHS, Ms. 400, Box 34,File: AEC-General.

19. C. Wayne Bills, personal communication toauthor,September 2, 1999.

20. (NRAD reactor) Richard Lindsay, personalcommunication.

21. 21. Peter H. Metzger, The AtomicEstablishment (New York: Simon andSchuster, 1972), 150; Lawrence E. Davies,“Fire Cleanup Keeps Plutonium Plant Busy”New York Times, June 17, 1969, 10.

22. Bill Ginkel to Robert Erkins, Sept. 12, 1969,IHS, Ms. 400, Box 16, File: Atomic Energy.

23. (Ginkel quote, previous paragraph)“Radioactive Wastes Disposal NotHazardous, AEC Claims,” Post-Register,September 11, 1969; (Lee) “ThoroughInvestigation Needed,” September 15, 1969,and “National Atomic Dump,” circaOctober, 1969, p. 4, both from South IdahoPress.

24. To Doug Bean from Ginkel, Oct. 21, 1968,IHS, Samuelson Papers, Box 50, File:Nuclear-1968; “Official Thinks AEC Tries toAvert Contaminating Ground Water” and“AEC Wastes Miss Goals Set by Idaho,”Idaho Daily Statesman, September 12, 1969.

25. To T.O. Carver from Samuelson, October21, 1969, IHS Ms. 400, Box 16, File:Atomic Energy.

26. News release, September 12, 1969, BSUFrank Church, Series 3.2.1, Box 2, Folder12.

27. Bob Smith, “AEC Scored on StoringWaste,” (possibly from New York Times)

March 7, 1970; “Burial Hazards Denied bythe AEC,” Post-Register, March 16, 1970, 1.Both items found in IHS, Samuelson Papers,Box 50, File: Nuclear 1970.

28. Bill Ginkel sent the report to Samuelson’sTask Force as well as a more current update.See National Academy of Science,“Radioactive Waste Management: AnInterim Report of the Subcommittee onRadioactive Waste Management” February17, 1970, and “Geological Aspects ofRadioactive Waste Disposal,” 1966, referredto in letter from Ginkel to Samuelson,March 17, 1970, IHS Samuelson Papers,Box 3, File: Health: General. See also TheAtomic Establishment, p. 151-154.

29. “Meeting of the Governor’sTask ForceCommittee for Investigation of PossibleAtomic Pollution to the Snake RiverAquifer,” Boise, October 29, 1969, IHSSamuelson Papers, Box 50, File: Nuclear1969.

30. “AEC, State Scan Waste Disposal,” Post-Register, November 1969 (copy in clippingfile IHS, Samuelson Papers, Box 50 inpamphlet file); “Why Idaho Haste on WasteStudy?” Times-News, September 30, 1969;“AEC Commissioner Backs Idaho AECOfficials, Idaho Nuclear on Issues,” Post-Register, November 25, 1969.

31. Unsigned memo regarding Howard Tucknervisit to Idaho Falls, January 21, 1970, IHSSamuelson Papers, Box 50, File: Nuclear-1970.

32. “AEC Scientist Raps Safety Standards,”Idaho State Journal, January 13, 1970.

33. U.S. Department of Health, “Public HealthAspects of the NRTS Radioactive BurialGrounds,” copy in Congressional Record,March 6, 1970, p. S 3142.

34. To Samuelson from Terrell Carver,November 12, 1970; “Minutes of Meeting ofGovernor’s Task Force on Disposal ofRadioactive Wastes in Idaho,” October 17(or Oct. 27, record is ambiguous), 1970, inIHS Samuelson Papers, Box 50, File:Nuclear-1970; (within the decade) to FrankChurch from Glenn Seaborg, June 9, 1970.

35. (Salt mine) to Orval Hansen from John A.Erlewine, June 19, 1970; and AEC PressRelease, June 17, 1970, IHS, Ms. 400Hansen, Box 16, File: Atomic EnergyCommission; (uniform AEC policies)Anderson, History of the RWMC, 36.

36. (New thinking) George Wehmann, interviewwith author, September 29, 1999; (AECdirective) Anderson, History of the RWMC,42. The directive was Immediate ActionDirective (IAD) No. 0511-21, “PolicyStatement Regarding Solid Waste Burial.”

37. This area eventually became known as PadA, the only asphalt pad used for above-ground storage within the boundaries of theoriginal 88-acre Burial Ground.

38. (Winter/spring moratorium) Anderson,History of the RWMC , p. 37-38. AfterJanuary 6, 1970, Rocky Flats waste was nolonger buried, but stored above the ground.

39. Note: George Wehmann, September 29,1999.

40. the IDO conducetd several studies of thefeasibility and economics of barrel retrieval.See Anderson, History of the RWMC, 54-60;(air support buildings) John Commander,interview with author, July 14, 1998.

41. Technical Site Information, 1993,Radioactive Waste Management Complex, p. 13.

C H A P T E R T W E N T Y O N E

1. To Syd Duncombe, University of Idaho,from Cecil Andrus, July 7, 1972, in BSUMs. 141-3, Box 91, File 7.

2. BSU Ms. 141-3, Box 92, File 2 containsmarked and highlighted articles on thepotentials of hydrogen fuel including“Hydrogen and Other Synthetic Fuels, ASummary of the Work of the Synthetic FuelsPanel,” prepared for the Federal Council onScience and Technology; “When HydrogenBecome’s the World’s Chief Fuel,” BusinessWeek (September 23, 1972): 98; LawrenceLessing, “The Coming Hydrogen Economy,”Fortune (November 1972): 138-145.

3. C.C. Warnick, W.P. Barnes, E.L.Michaelson, et al, A Conceptual Study of aNuclear Energy Park for the State of Idaho(Moscow: University of Idaho, November1972); “$150,000 U.S. Revenue Earmarkedfor NRTS,” newsclip with no date or namein BSU Ms. 141-3, Box 91, File 2(Agrocarbon Hydrogen Study).

4. To Cecil Andrus from Gene Rutledge,February 22, 1073; to Andrus from Alfred T.Whatley,Western Interstate Nuclear Board;both in BUS Ms. 141-3, Box 91, File 8.

5. Drs. John Howe and Maynard Fosberg, AStudy of the Unitization of Water from a


2 9 8

Nuclear Reactor to Grow Trees andOrnamentals (Moscow: University of Idaho,1973.) The water was non-radioactivecooling water from the Chem Plantcondenser.

6. To Dixy Lee Ray from Cecil Andrus, July31, 1973; to Andrus from Ray, September 6,1973; BSU Ms. 141-1, Box 62, File 14.

7. To Governor Andrus (and others) fromMichael Christie, August 28, 1973, BSU Ms.141-3, Box 91, File 8; “AEC Eyes NevadaSite as Dump for A-Wastes,” WashingtonPost, August 28, 1973.

8. To Dixy Lee Ray from Frank Church andCecil Andrus, October 9, 1973, BSU Ms.141-3, Box 9, File 8.

9. To Governor Andrus from Dixy Lee Ray,November 5, 1973, BSU Ms. 141-3, Box 91,File 8.

10. To Glenn Bradley from Cecil Andrus,October 5, 1973, BSU Ms. 141-1, Box 62,File 14.

11. “Rising Dangers of Atomic Wastes,” USNews and World Report (September 10,1973): 30-32; Dennis Farney, “TheAwesome Problem of Nuclear Wastes,”Smithsonian (April 1974) and in ReadersDigest (August 1974): 83-87; TheodoreTaylor and Douglas Colligan, “NuclearTerrorism: A Threat to the Future?” ScienceDigest (August 1974): 12-16 ff.

12. To D.T. Neill and C.M. Rice, EINIC,December 19, 1973, BSU Ms. 141-3, Box91, Folder 8; to editors and bureau chiefsfrom “Chris,” December 4, 1973, BSU Ms.141-3, Box 91, File 8; to the governor fromChris on “Atomic wastes and the tour you’releading,” no date, BSU Ms. 141-3, Box 91,Folder 16.

13. To Andrus from Bradley, March 13, 1974,and to Bradley from Andrus, March 20,1974, BSU Ms. 141-3, Box 91, File 9.

14. To Cecil Andrus from Glenn Bradley, April22, 1974, BUS Ms. 141-3, Box 91, Folder12.

15. To Chris Carlson from Ralph Brown, March26, 1974; to Brown from Carlson, April 2,1974, in BSU Ms. 141-3, Box 91, Folder 9.

16. To department heads from Cecil Andrus,September 25, 1974; mailgram to Dixy LeeRay from Andrus, September 25, 1974, BSUMs. 141-3, Box 91, Folder 9; to Andrusfrom Kent Just, February 6, 1975, BSU Ms.141-3, Box 91, Folder 13.

17. Transcript of October 7, 1974, meeting ofBlue Ribbon Committee, p. 9, BSU Ms.141-3, Box 91.

18. BSU Ms. 141-3, Box 108, Folder 18,contains the letters and comments that camefrom the hearings and other sources. Seealso William E. Davis, “Presentation toPanel on Disposal of High Level NuclearWastes” at Conference on States’Role inRadioactive Material Management, LasVegas, December 11, 1974, BSU Ms. 141-3,Box 91, Folder 10.

19. “Governor’s Blue Ribbon Committee onAtomic Wastes—Report,” November 6,1974.

20. Transcript of hearing on WASH-1539 onNovember 12, 1974, pp. 161, 190, 193, 197,BSU Ms. 141-3, Box 91, Folder 10;“Andrus Expounds View on INEL WasteIssue,” Post-Register, December 15, 1974,D-1.

21. To Bradley from Andrus, December 18,1974, BSU Ms. 141-3, Box 91, Folder 12.

22. “McClure Asks AEC to Investigate Fast,”Idaho Statesman, November 16, 1974; BenPlastino, “McClure’s Attacks Hurt INEL$3Billion chance,” Post-Register, November20, 1974, 8; “McClure Endorses INELWaste Storage Proposal,” Post-Register,December 22, 1974.

23. ToAndrus from Kent Just, February 6, 1975,BSU Ms. 141-3, Box 91, Folder 13.

24. See for example, to James Liverman,ERDA, from Andrus, October 8, 1976, andto Charles Williams from Andrus, October20, 1976, in BSU Ms. 141-3, Box 109,Folder 14.

25. Pamphlet “Waste Management at theINEL—1973 Data,” in BSU Ms. 141-3, Box91, Folder 14; to Bradley from Andrus, April29, 1975; to Andrus from Bradley, June 19,1975; to Governor from Chris Carlson, July3, 1975; BSU Ms. 141-3, Box 91, Folder 14for first two; Folder 13 for last item.

26. ToAndrus from Bradley, January 16, 1975,BSU Ms. 141-3, Box 91, Folder 14;(quotation from pamphlet) “WasteManagement at the INEL—1973 Data.”

C H A P T E R T W E N T Y T W O

1. Terrence R. Fehner and Jack M. Holl,Department of Energy 1977-1994, ASummary History (Washington, D.C.: U.S.Department of Energy, 1994), 4.

2. Dr. E. Fast, compiler, Potentially AvailableFacilities at the National Reactor TestingStation (Idaho Falls: Eastern Idaho NuclearIndustrial Council, February 1970), 14.

3. Jay Kunze, interview with author, February5, 1999; Clay Nichols, interview withauthor, August 28, 1998.

4. J.F. Kunze, et al, A Low TemperatureDemonstration Geothermal Power Plant inthe Raft River Valley, Report No. ANCR-1138 (Idaho Falls: Aerojet NuclearCompany, 1974), 1; Idaho Water ResourcesDepartment, Permit Application 43-7032,September 1, 1971.

5. Jay Kunze, February 5, 1999. Brugger leftthe NRTS in 1974.

6. “Co-op Calls on A.E.C. to Build 2Geothermal Pilot Plants in Idaho,” New YorkTimes, August 12, 1973, 13; (50 degrees toocool) S.G. Spencer et al, DraftEnvironmental Report, Raft River ThermalLoop Facility (Idaho Falls: no publisher, nodate), section 4, no page no.

7. Jay Kunze, February 5, 1999.

8. (Church’s mother) Jay Kunze, February 5,1999; Jay Kunze, Idaho GeothermalDevelopment Projects Annual Report for1976 (Idaho Falls: EG&G, Raft River RuralElectrical Cooperative, State of Idaho,1976), no page no.

9. Jay Kunze, Idaho Geothermal DevelopmentProjects Annual Report for 1976;(computers) J.F. Whitbeck and R.R. Stiger,“5 MW(e) Raft River Pilot PlantDescription,” Geothermal ResourcesCouncil Bulletin (February 1982): 13.

10. Susan Prestwich, interview with author,August 25, 1999; Susan Stiger, interview witha u t h o r, August 30, 1999.

11. Jay Kunze, February 5, 1999.

12. Jay Kunze, personal communication,September 6, 1999. Mink later becamedirector of the University of Idaho’s WaterResource Research Institute. Kunze’sgeothermal team recommended that thewater be reinjected into the aquifer, but thisstep and its expense were not undertaken.The IDWR later imposed restrictions on theuse of the system in order to minimizeaquifer level reductions.

13. Jay Kunze, September 6, 1999.

14. (1982 operation) Terry Smith, “Raft RiverEmployees generate energies as plant’spower surges again” INELNews (April 20,

N O T E S

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1982): 4; (funding) Susan Prestwich, August26, 1999.

15. (End of DOE interest, sale to GSA) toKenneth Dunn from R.E. Wood, March 21,1983, Idaho Water Resources Department,Boise (IDWR), Idaho, Permit ApplicationFile No. 43-7133; (energy surplus) MikeHill, “ Firm Still Plans Raft RiverGeothermal Plant,” Burley South IdahoPress, September 6, 1985, 1; (Hydra-Co) toKenneth E. Lindebak from Norm Young,February 9, 1984, IDWR File “Hydra-CoEnterprises, Inc., 43-GR-6; (Nevada) to JohnD. Carlson from Beverley Sastri, September3, 1985, IDWR File 43-GR-6.

16. EG&G, 5 Year Report, 76/81 (Idaho Falls:EG&G, 1982), 23; pamphlet Idaho NationalEngineering Laboratory (Idaho Falls:EG&G, 1986), 25.

17. Orval Hansen, interview with author, July 1,1998. See Atomic Energy Commission, AECAnnual Financial Report, 1961 , p. 16,partial copy found in IHS, Dworshak Papers,Box 122-B, File: AEC Idaho Plant. Thanksto insight of C. Wayne Bills on lack ofchampions in Washington.

18. Orval Hansen, September 8, 1999.

19. “Ceremony to observe EBR-II 10thBirthday,” Post-Register, August 11, 1974,1; “Reactor Testing Site to bear Idahoname,” Post-Register, August 14, 1974, 1;“Hansen explains purpose of change inname,” Post-Register, August 15, 1974, A-8.

20. Fehner and Holl, A Summary History, 17-22.

21. Fehner and Holl, A Summary History, 22,130-140.

22. (Quotation) “Testimony of Governor John V.Evans before the ERDAHearing Board onERDA-1536,” Rodeway Inn, Boise, February3, 1977, IHS, AR2/27, Series 1, Box 2, 1977-ERDA. To Evans from Meldon B. A n d e r s o n ,E x e c . M g r. Idaho Growers Shippers A s s n ,February 14, 1977, ibid.

23. “Evans: No More Waste in Idaho Dumps,”Lewiston Morning Tribune, October 30,1979, 3-D.

24. To Frank Church from John Deutsch,November 30, 1979, IHS AR2/27 Box 35,File: Gov.’s Radioactive Waste Task Force.

25. To Robert de Berard, December 7, 1979, IHSEvans, Series III, Box 6, File: Energy 1979.This file also contains letters from citizensconcerned about the safety of the aquifer;Radioactive Waste Task Force, “Report to the

G o v e r n o r,” December 13, 1979, p. 1, 42, IHSEvans, Box 35, File: Governor’s RadioactiveTask Force.

26. To Frank Church from John Deutsch,undersecretary of DOE, November 30, 1979,IHS Ar2/27 Box 35, File: Governor’sRadioactive Waste Task Force; “Snake RiverPlain Aquifer Problem,” presentation packet,December 4, 1979, IHS Evans, Box 20, nofile.

27. Report, page 7; “INEL RadioactiveMaterials Discharge Monitoring Proposal,”IHS Evans, Box 35, File: Gov.’s RadioactiveWaste Task Force. Logo, etc:www.state.id.us/deqinel/agreement.htm

28. Bob Roos, “Rally Speakers Criticize INELWeapons Role,” Post-Register, September15, 1980, A-2; “Anti-nuclear groups rally atEBR-I site,” Arco Advertiser, September 18,1980; (absurd) “Anti-nuclear groupsunrealistic, idealistic, Creek says,” Post-Register, September 16, 1980.

29. “Working Agreement between State of Idahoand US DOE Concerning EnvironmentalMonitoring at the INEL.” Draft of January7, 1980, IHS, Evans, Box 20, no file. Restaff work, see for example, memo to Evansfrom Pat Costello, February 1, 1980, reNaval Storage and Shipment of Waste, IHS,Evans, Box 21, no file; (state’s business)“Appendix C, INEL’s Disposal Wells,”Idaho Department of Water Resources, June30, 1980, IHS Evans, Box 35, no file;(friction) speech by John Evans at IdahoFalls, August 27, 1980, IHS Evans Box 11,no file; (spitting) “INEL Waste DisposalSolution first takes halt to bickering,” Post-Register, December 7, 1980, A-4.

30. (Stubborn) “Draft Plan Paper re InjectionWell,” circa April 1981, no author, IHS,Evans, Box 3, no file.

31. IDO News release, February 9, 1984, in IHSEvans Papers, Box 3, no file.

32. “Working Agreement between the State ofIdaho and US ERDAconcerningenvironmental monitoring at the INEL”(ERDARef. No. EY-77-A-07-1662), April14, 1977, IHS Evans Box 20, no file.

C H A P T E R T W E N T Y T H R E E

1. Rolfe, Nuclear Power and the Public Safety,153.

2. (LOFT allocations) Rolfe, Nuclear Powerand the Public Safety, 93; (extra plumbing)

John Commander, interview with author,July 14, 1998; (Savannah) John F. Hogerton,The Atomic Energy Deskbook (New York:Reinhold Publishing Corporation, 1963),490; Robert Gillette, “Nuclear Safety (II):The Years of Delay,” Science (September 8,1972): 870; (scrounge) Jason Bohne, “Hedoes what’s needed to get the job done,”(Lockheed Martin Idaho TechnologiesCompany) STAR (August 18, 1998): 3.

3. Draft EIS Loss of Fluid Test Facility, ReportNo. WASH-1517 (Idaho Falls: NRTS, 1972),5; “Door Shut Weighing 200 Tons,” IdahoStatesman, November 16, 1970.

4. Draft EIS Loss of Fluid Test Facility, 12-13.

5. Samuel McCracken, The War Against theAtom (New York: Basic Books, 1982), 21.

6. For accounts of the TMI accident, seePresident’s Commission on the Accident atThree Mile Island (“KememyCommission”), October 1979. Also, NuclearRegulatory Commission, Report No.NUREG-0600 Investigation into the March28, 1979, TMI Accident by the Office ofInspection and Enforcement; RichardRhodes, Nuclear Renewal (New York:Penguin Books, 1993), 80-83; PublicBroadcasting System, Meltdown at TMI,American Experience television program,1999.

7. Three Mile Island Fact Sheet , NuclearRegulatory Commission web site:www.nrc.gov.

8. EG&G, 5 Year Report, 76/81 (Idaho Falls:EG&G, 1982), 11. See also PublicBroadcasting System, Meltdown at TMI,American Experience television program,1999.

9. Pamphlet, Power Burst Facility (Idaho Falls:EG&G Idaho, no date, but circa 1976), 1.

10. Beverly Cook, interview with author,January 11, 2000.

11. Al Anselmo, interview with author, October14, 1998; D.R. Dierks, “TMI-2 VesselIntegrity Program,” Mechanics of Materials,found at www.et.anl.gov/mt/mtMM-LWR.html on November 16, 1999; newsrelease 99-56, “NRC Issues License to DOEfor Storage of TMI-2 Fuel in Idaho,” March19, 1999, found at www.nrc.OPA/gmo/nrar-cy/99-56.htm, on same date.

12. Note was in Joyce Lowman’s files. No date.No author, no source. (Dates of transport)“NRC Issues License to DOE for Storage ofTMI-2 Fuel in Idaho,” March 19, 1999,


3 0 0

News Release 99-56, found atwww.nrc.gov/OPA/gmo/nrarcy/99-56.htm onNovember 1, 1999.

13. Rita Scott, “LOFTtests ‘close’to predic-tions,” INEL News, August 18, 1981.

14. “International Agreement signed for safetytests at LOFT facility in Idaho,” ArcoAdvertiser, March 24, 1983, 7A.

15. Pamphlet, Idaho National EngineeringLaboratory (Idaho Falls: EG&G, circa1987), 6-8.

16. EG&G pamphlet Idaho NationalEngineering Laboratory, 10.

17. The Power Burst Facility was placed instandby status in 1985. Seewww.inel.gov/about/facts/PBFWROC_fact_sheet2.html.

18. William Lanouette, “Dream Machine,”“Dream Machine,” Atlantic Monthly (April1983): 45, 47.

19. “Idaho Considered as Site for AtomicTesting Plant,” clipping probably IdahoStatesman, November 12, 1971, in IHS Ms.400, Box 117, File: Legislation-Nuclear; toRobert Hollingsworth from Cecil Andrus,September 30, 1971, BSU Ms. 141-3, Box91, File 6.

20. Ken Retallic, “Idaho Lands Top Slot onNPR List,” Post-Register, August 10, 1983,A-3; Bruce Botka, “Three States Runningfor New Production Reactor,” Los AngelesTimes, April 1, 1984, Part 1; Rod Gramer,“New INELchief assures Evans of lab’ssafety,” Idaho Statesman, August 12, 1983.

21. IDO, Executive Summary of the Draft EIS,Special Isotope Separation Project (IdahoFalls: INELReport No. DOE/EIS-0136), p.S-4 to S-6; Kevin Richert, “DOE AnnouncesINELas Preferred SIS Site,” Idaho StateJournal, August 13, 1986; telephone notesof conference between Troy Wade and JohnEvans, August 14, 1986, IHS, Evans, Box21, no file.

22. Notes of meeting between Troy Wade andJohn Evans, July 3, 1984, IHS Evans papers,Box 3, no file.

23. (End of NPR and SIS) Fehner and Holl, ASummary History, 69; (awash) KeithSchneider, “Nuclear Arms and New JobsClash in Idaho,” New York Times, March 27,1988, A1, A28.

24. Bob Roos, “Project at INELStill Secret,”Post-Register, June 30, 1983.

25. Dr. E. Fast, compiler, Potentially AvailableFacilities at the National Reactor TestingStation (Idaho Falls: Eastern Idaho NuclearIndustrial Council, February 1970), 14;Kevin Richert, “Rockwell planning exitfrom INEL,” Post-Register, July 13, 1990,B-1.

26. Kevin Richert, “New Life for SMC,” Post-Register, August 2, 1991, B-1; “INELpro-duces armor for new tanks,” IdahoStatesman, March 25, 1990, 3-C; (satellites)Dan Egan, “Armor Shield for Tanks Made inTest Area North Hangar, Post-Register, May15, 1994, H-12. (coupling station) Eric Yde,interview with author, November 2, 1999.

27. Dan Egan, “Armor Shield for Tanks Made inTest Area North Hangar,” Post-Register,May 15, 1994, H-12. Managers subsequentto Exxon were Rockwell-INEL, 1986-1991;Babcock and Wilcox Idaho, 1992-1994;Lockheed Idaho Technologies Company,1994-1999, Bechtel B&W Idaho, 1999-.

28. (Mixed reactions) see for example,“Idahoans Divided on nuclear arms pro-jects,” Idaho Statesman, Jun 17, 1989, 4 A;“At odds over SIS,” Idaho Statesman, June18, 1989, 1 F; (staff deliberations) “DRAFTPlan Paper re Injection Well,” n.d., but circa1981, IHS, AR2/26, Box 20, no file, andmemo to Bob Lenaghen from Pat Costello re“INELmatters—political perspective, April30, 1981, IHS, AR2/26, Box 40, no file.

29. Allied Chemical, The Waste CalciningFacility, Idaho Chemical Processing Plant(Idaho Falls: Allied Chemical Corporation,1974), 16.

30. Allied Chemical, The Waste CalciningFacility, 16-18.

31. R.R. Smith, Design Criteria for New WasteCalcine Facility, Report ACI-164 (IdahoFalls: Allied Chemical Corporation, 1974),1-5. See p. 99 for criteria under Chapter 10,Code of Federal Regulations, Part 50,Appendix F[2] for decommissioning criteria.

32. Pamphlet, FDF [Fluorinel DissolutionProcess] Facts (Idaho Falls: WestinghouseIdaho Nuclear Company, 1986).

33. (Management mistakes) Richard Rhodes,Nuclear Renewal (New York: Whittle Bookswith Viking, 1993).

34. (Taylor) John McPhee, “The Curve ofBinding Energy,” New Yorker, December 3,10, and 17, 1973 (these articles were pub-lished in book form by Farrar, Straus andGiroux, New York, 1974, using the same

title); (nuclear devices) Colin Norman,“Toward a Non-Nuclear Future in a NuclearWorld” Technology Review (Oct/Nov 1976):8-9.

35. (INFCE) Charles Till, interview with author,July 16, 1999; (Carter) William Lanouette,“Dream Machine,” Atlantic Monthly (April1983): 47-49.

36. Charles Till, July 16, 1998.

37. Charles Till, July 16, 1998.

38. Charles Till, personal communication toauthor, October 13, 1999.

39. C.E. Till, Y.I. Chang, and W.H. Hannum,“The Integral Fast Reactor—An Overview,”in The Technology of the Integral FastReactor and its Associated Fuel Cycle , aspecial issue of Progress in Nuclear Energy(Volume 31, Number 1/2, 1997): 4.


C H A P T E R T W E N T Y F O U R


2. In thirty years of operation, the coolant hadnever needed to be replaced. According toJ.P. Ackerman, et al, in “Treatment ofWastes in the IFR Fuel Cycle,” Progress inNuclear Energy, vol 31, No. 1/2, p. 143, inpressurized-water reactors, control ofreactivity is aided by adjusting theconcentration of neutron-absorbing borondissolved in the coolant by “feeding” and“bleeding” as required. The sodium lost tothe EBR system was caused by the residualfilm on discharged fuel elements orcomponents removed from the reactor tankfor repair.


4. Holl, Argonne, 448; J.I. Sackett, “Operatingand Test Experience with EBR-II, the IFRPrototype,” Progress in Nuclear Energy(Volume 31, No. 1/2, 1997): 111.

5. For a description of the accident and itseffects, see Yuri M. Shcherbak, “Ten Yearsof the Chernobyl Era,” Scientific American(April 1996), andwww.uilondon.org/cherntim.htm. Chernobylleterature includes Robert Gale, FinalWarning: The Legacy of Chernobyl (NewYork: Warner Books, 1988); 1st VintageBooks, Chernobyl: The End of the NuclearDream (New York: Vintage, 1987); DeanIng, The Chernobyl Syndrome (New York:Baen, 1988).

N O T E S

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6. The State of the Union address, deliveredFebruary 17, 1993, may be found atwww.pub.whitehouse.gov/uri-res/12R?urn:pdr://oma.eop.gov.us/1993/2/17/3.text.1

7. (Cancellation) Holl, Argonne, 453-458;(Idaho efforts) see the following from theIdaho Statesman: “Andrus, Craig to testifyfor INELproject,” April 28, 1993, 5C; CarolBradley, “Crapo asks to fund more work onreactor,” June 10, 1993, 1C; “Clinton budgethits INEL,” February 8, 1994, 1A; “Crapofears White House wants to kill INELproject,” April 10, 1994, 2C; “House billthreatens 900 jobs at INEL,” June 17, 1994;“900 may lose jobs in project shutdown,”August 5, 1994, 1C; “INELprojectshutdown called fight over nucleartechnology, not money,” August 6, 1994, 3C.

8. (Bush) Fehner and Holl, A SummaryHistory, 68. On May 10, 1992, DOESecretary James Watkins told the SenateArmed Services Committee that for the firsttime since 1945, the U.S. was not buildingany nuclear weapons, p. 128, A SummaryHistory.

9. (Age and cost of S1W) “Historic Reactor toshut down,” Idaho Statesman, July 24,1988), 3 C; (S1Wcore life) NRF, NavalReactors Facility (Idaho Falls:Westinghouse, 1998), n.p. See also “Navywill shut down facility at INEL,” IdahoStatesman, September 8, 1993, 1C.

10. (ATR and ATRC) Ray Furstenau, interviewwith author, November 15, 1999.

11. Pamphlet, WIPP Safe and Ready to Go Now,BSU Ms. 140.2, Box 4, File 19: WIPP1993.

12. (Environmental integrity) Cecil Andrus,“Remarks to DOE Defense Nuclear FacilityPanel, Committee on Armed Services,” May9, 1989, BSU, Ms. 141, Box 258, File: 44.

13. Cecil Andrus, Politics Western Style (Seattle:Sasquatch Books, 1998), 201; “Andrus tohalt N-waste shipment if storage sitedelayed,” Idaho Statesman, July 17, 1988,,3C.

14. Nancy Reid, “Andrus bans bringing N-wasteto Idaho,” Idaho Statesman, October 20,1988, 1A; “Radioactive waste leavesBlackfoot,” Idaho Statesman, October 23,1988, 1C; (photo, Argonne shipment) FoxButterfield, “Idaho Firm on Barring AtomicWaste,” New York Times, October 23, 1988,32 L.

15. Don Ofte, interview with author, November19, 1999.

16. “Safety concerns halt Rocky Flats plutoniumproduction,” Idaho Statesman, December 2,1989, 2C. See also “FBI scours Rocky Flatsplant for environmental violations,” IdahoStatesman, June 7, 1989, 1A, reporting theFBI raid which led to management changes,and environmental and safety investigations.

17. To Andrus from James Watkins, March 18,1991, BSU, Ms. 140.2, Box 4, File 3;Stephen Stuebner, “Nuclear waste plan setsoff political chain reaction,” IdahoStatesman, February 8, 1991, 1C; StephenStuebner, “Tribes ban waste shipments toINEL,” Idaho Statesman, February 7, 1991,1C.

18. (Pitrolo) “Colorado nuclear waste heads toIdaho, Idaho Statesman, October 5, 1991,1A. (Ft. St. Vrain) Dan Popkey, “Coloradonuclear reactor wants out of the business,”Idaho Statesman, June 3, 1991; (shipments)“Tribes threaten suit to avert wasteshipment,” Idaho Statesman, October 11,1991, 1C; “Indians block nuclear wasteshipment,” Idaho Statesman, October 17,1991, 1C; Renee Villeneuve, “Judge Haltsnuclear waste at the border,” IdahoStatesman, November 2, 1991, 1A.

19. “INELfaces elimination of nuclear fuelwork,” Idaho Statesman, April 30, 1992, 1C;“Job losses stun crew at plant,” IdahoStatesman, May 2, 1992; (Yucca Mountain)pamphlet Viability Assessment of aRepository at Yucca Mountain, DOE Officeof Civilian Radioactive Waste Management,n.d., but circa 1998.

20. Cecil D. Andrus, interview with author,November 11, 1999; Andrus, Cecil, PoliticsWestern Style, pp. 191-207; letter to BruceDeMars from Andrus, July 16, 1993, in BSUMs. 140.2, Box 4, Folder 4: 1992-1994.

21. “Public Service Co. of Colorado vs. Cecil D.Andrus,” Civ. Nos 91-0035-S-HLR and 91-0054-S-HLR, US District Court Idaho, June28, 1993, p. 1,510; Andrew Garber, “Judgeblocks nuke waste,” Idaho Statesman, June29, 1993, 1A; Andrew Garber, “Nuclearwaste headed for Idaho turned back,” IdahoStatesman, June 30, 1993, 1A.

22. (Congress declines) “Navy’s end run aroundINELban tackled for now,” IdahoStatesman, July 23, 1993, 1A.

23. (Heroes) to Andrus from John H. Dalton,Secy of Navy, July 29, 1993, BSU Ms.

140.2 Box 4, File 4; (CPP-603) “Safety ofINEL facility questioned in report,” IdahoStatesman, June 9, 1993, 3C, and AndrewGarber, “Andrus fumes after learning aboutmishandling of INEL nuclear waste,” IdahoStatesman, June 26, 1993, 1C; (agreement)Charles Etlinger, “Andrus agrees to let nukewaste flow again,” Idaho Statesman, August10, 1993, 1A.

24. Press release from Office of GovernorAndrus, August 9, 1993, BSU Ms. 140.2Box 4, File 2; to Hazel O’Leary and John H.Dalton from Cecil Andrus, August 9, 1993,BSU Ms. 140.2, Box 4, File 4; “Courtapproves Andrus’deal with Navy on wasteshipments,” Idaho Statesman, September 22,1993, 2C.

25. “State of Idaho Comments on ProgrammaticSpent Nuclear Fuel Management and INELEnvironmental Restoration and WasteManagement EIS,” September 27, 1994,page 1, BSU Ms 140.2, Box 4, File 10. Seealso “Task force will assess eastern Idahonuclear waste storage, governor declares,”Idaho Statesman, July 8, 1994, 4C; “Andrusfaults nuclear waste study,” IdahoStatesman, August 26, 1994, 5C; “Andrussays INELstudy doesn’t meet expectations,”Idaho Statesman, October 2, 1994, 9B;(eight containers) to Steven S. Honigmanfrom Clive Strong, November 2, 1994, BSUMs. 140.2, Box 4, File 4.

26. Governor Phil Batt, “Statement prepared fora joint meeting of the Idaho State SenateResources and Environment Committee andthe Idaho State House of RepresentativesEnvironment Affairs Committee, February13, 1996, p. 5.

27. Governor Phil Batt, “Statement,” February13, 1996, p. 7.

28. Phil Batt, The Compleat Phil Batt, 42; (finalEIS) memo to Interested Citizens from JeffSchrade, “Idaho’s Nuclear Timeline,”December 3, 1998, p. 4; (Navy options)Steven Honigman, “Why It is Essential toResume Shipments of Naval Spent Fuel toIdaho in June to Avoid Threatening NationalSecurity,” March 17, 1995, BSU Ms 140.2,Box 4, File 9

29. Jeff Schrade, interview with author,December 14, 1998; Schrade, “Idaho’sNuclear Timeline,” December 3, 1998, p. 5.

30. Settlement Agreement among the State ofIdaho, the Department of Energy, and theDepartment of the Navy, October 16, 1995,to resolve all issues in the actions Public


3 0 2

Service Company of Colorado v. Batt, No.CV-91-0035-S-EJL(D.Id) and United Statesv. Batt, No. CV-91-0065-S-EJL (D.Id). Copywas found at www.inel.gov/environmental/summary.html in November 1999.

31. The vote was NO, 62.5 percent; YES, 37.5percent.

C H A P T E R T W E N T Y F I V E

1. Press release, “Kempthorne Proposes INELName Change,” July 7, 1993, copy sent toauthor by Office of Governor DirkKempthorne, Boise Statehouse.

2. See U.S. DOE Office of EnvironmentalManagement, Linking Legacies, Connectingthe Cold War Nuclear Weapons ProductionProcesses To Their EnvironmentalConsequences, Report No. DOE/EM-0319(Washington, D.C., Office of EnvironmentalManagement, 1997).

3. (Quotation) Fehner and Holl, A SummaryHistory, 53; (1992 employment) “Moore:INELwill lose jobs,” Idaho Statesman,January 23, 1992, 1C; (budget increase)“INEL’s cleanup budget may get boost,”Idaho Statesman, January 31, 1992, 4C.

4. (Ofte retirement) Don Ofte, interview withauthor, November 19, 1999; (quotation)Fehner and Holl, A Summary History, 54;Pitrolo, November 15, 1999; (FBI raid) “FBIscours Rocky Flats plant for environmentalviolations,” Idaho Statesman, June 7, 1989;(culture) Augustine Pitrolo, interview withauthor, November 15, 1999, and A SummaryHistory, 74.

5. (Pitrolo) Augustine Pitrolo, interview withauthor, November 15, 1999; (contracts) JohnH. Cushman, Jr., “Department of Energyofficials declare competition will be the rulein future nuclear site management,” IdahoStatesman, July 7, 1994, 3C.

6. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,Region 10; The State of Idaho, Departmentof Health and Welfare; and the U.S.Department of Energy, Federal FacilityAgreement and Consent Order in the Matterof the US Department of Energy IdahoNational Engineering Laboratory (“INEL”) ,Administrative Docket No: 1088-06-29-120.

7. This and subsequent information aboutestablishment of IRC and its programs fromDennis Keiser, interview with author,November 18, 1999.

8. DOE eventually purchased the IRC land andbuildings from EG&G.

9. INEEL News, “Microbes doing biomasscleanup at UK reactor shutdown,”www.INEL.gov/cgi-bin/newsdesk,September 1999.

10. INEEL, pamphlet Innovation 1997 (IdahoFalls: IDO, 1997), pp. 10-12.

11. Secretary of Energy Advisory Board Ta s kForce on Alternative Futures for theDepartment of Energy National Laboratories,“Alternative Futures for the Department ofE n e rgy Laboratories,” (Washington D.C.:Department of Energ y, 1995), Section B:Recommendations. Copy (no page numbers)found at www. d o e . g o v / n e w s / d o c s /g a l v i n / V 1 d . h t m .

12. DOE subsequently designated INEL/INEELas lead laboratory for fusion safety research,national mixed waste focus area, systemsengineering, and spent fuel.

13. Ray Barnes, interview with author, August26, 1998.

14. (Reactor concepts) Davy Petty, interviewwith author, November 19, 1999; (nuclearresearch) Jim Werner, interview with author,November 19, 1999.

15. Paul Pugmire, interview with author,November 17, 1999.

16. Leroy Lewis, interview with author, variousdates, 1999.

17. IDO news release, “INEELDemolishesfacility using explosive charges,” September18, 1999.

18. “DOE wants tribes in on waste decisions,”Idaho Statesman, December 4, 1991, 3C;“Shoshone-Bannocks sign pact with DOE,”Idaho Statesman, Oct 4, 1992, 7C.

19. The other universities included Boise StateUniversity, Montana State University,University of Montana, Utah StateUniversity, and Washington State University.The U of I and ISU created a further R&Dalliance in June of 1999. See IDO pressreleases “INEELForms Alliances with ISU,U of I,” June 21, 1999, and “Bechtel B&WIdaho Awarded INEELContract,” June 2,1999.

20. “Help INELboost citizen involvement,”Idaho Statesman, December 8, 1993, 13A.

21. See Eye on Idaho Commerce, IdahoBusiness Briefs, at www.idoc.state.id.us/eye-oncommerce/Idahobusbriefs.html, n.d.

22. Pamphlet, Join Coalition 21, n.d.

23. INEEL, FINAL EIS for Advanced MixedWaste Treatment Facility (Idaho Falls:INEEL, 1999); Beatrice Brailsford, “Fix theINEEL’s worst problems first,” Post-Register (Opinion), October 3, 1999. Seealso Web site for Snake River Alliance,http://coehp.idbsu.edu/GLOBE-ID/sra.html.

24. Beverly A. Cook, personal communicationto author, January 11, 2000.

25. (Quotation) Beverly Cook, interview withauthor, September 7, 1999.

N O T E S

3 0 3


3 0 4

630-A High Temperature Marine Propulsion Reactor710 Fast Spectrum Refractory Metals Reactor

A1W Aircraft carrier, first prototype, Westinghouse(Also known as the Large Ship Reactor A and B)

A/E architect/engineeringACRS Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards

AEC Atomic Energy CommissionAFSR Argonne Fast Source Reactor

AI Atomics InternationalANC Aerojet Nuclear CorporationANP Aircraft Nuclear PropulsionARA Army Reactor Area, (Later Auxiliary Reactor Area)

AREA Army Reactor Experimental AreaARMF Advanced Reactivity Measurement Facility

ATR Advanced Test ReactorATRC Advanced Test Reactor Critical FacilityATWS Anticipated Transients Without Scrams

BORAX Boiling Water Reactor ExperimentBPA Bonneville Power Administration

CE Combustion EngineeringCERCLA Comprehensive Environmental Response,

Compensation, and Liability ActCERT Controlled Environmental Radioiodine Tests

CET Critical Experiment TankCFA Central Facilities Area

CFRMF Coupled Fast Reactivity Measurement FacilityCP-1 Chicago Pile Number OneCPP Chemical Processing Plant

CRADA Cooperative Research and Development AgreementCRCE Cavity Reactor Critical ExperimentDEW Distant Early Warning SystemDoD Department of DefenseDOE Department of Energy

DOE-ID Department of Energy-Idaho Operations Office

EBR Experimental Breeder ReactorEBOR Experimental Beryllium Oxide ReactorEBWR Experimental Boiling Water ReactorECCS Emergency Core Cooling System

ECF Expended Core FacilityEINIC East Idaho Nuclear Industry Council

EIS Environmental Impact StatementEOCR Experimental Organic Cooled Reactor

EPA Environmental Protection AgencyERDA Energy Research and Development AdministrationEROB Engineering Research Office Building

ETR Engineering Test ReactorETRC Engineering Test Reactor Critical Facility

FARET Fast Reactor Test FacilityFCF Fuel Cycle FacilityFET Flight Engine Test

FFTF Fast-Flux Test FacilityFLECHT Full-length Emergency Core Heating Tests

FPC Federal Power CommissionFRAN Nuclear Effects ReactorFRAP Fuel Rod Analysis Program

FWPCA Federal Water Pollution Control AdministrationGCRE Gas Cooled Reactor Experiment

GE General ElectricHOTCE Hot Critical Experiment

HP health physicistHTRE Heat Transfer Reactor Experiment

ICPP Idaho Chemical Processing PlantIDO Idaho Operations Office

IDWR Idaho Department of Water ResourcesIET Initial Engine TestIFR Integral Fast ReactorINC Idaho Nuclear Corporation

INEC Idaho Nuclear Energy Commission

3 0 5

A c ro n y m s

INEL Idaho National Engineering LaboratoryINEEL Idaho National Engineering and Environmental

LaboratoryINFCE International Nuclear Fuel Cycle EvaluationINTEC Idaho Nuclear Technology and Engineering

CenterIRC INEEL Research CenterISC INEEL Supercomputing CenterISU Idaho State University

JCAE Joint Committee on Atomic EnergyKAPL Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory

LMFBR Liquid Metal Fast Breeder ReactorLOCA Loss-of-Coolant AccidentLOFT Loss of Fluid Test

MIT Massachusetts Institute of TechnologyML-1 Mobile Low-Power ReactorMTR Materials Testing ReactorNaK eutectic alloy of sodium (Na) potassium (K)NAS National Academy of Science

NASA National Aeronautic and Space AdministrationNEPA National Environmental Policy ActNERI National Energy Research InitiativeNERP National Environmental Research Park

NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric AdministrationNPG Naval Proving GroundNPR New Production Reactor

NRAD Neutron Radiography FacilityNRC Nuclear Regulatory CommissionNRF Naval Reactors Facility

NRTS National Reactor Testing StationNSF National Science Foundation

NWCF New Waste Calcining FacilityOAC operating area confinement

OMRE Organic Moderated Reactor ExperimentOU operable unit

PBF Power Burst FacilityRAF Remote Analytical FacilityRaLa radioactive lanthanumRIA reactivity-initiated accidents

REM roentgen equivalent manRMF Reactivity Measurement Facility

RWMC Radioactive Waste Management Complex

S5G submarine reactor, 5th prototype, General Electric(Also known as the Natural Circulation Reactor)

SCRCE Spherical Cavity Reactor Critical ExperimentSDI Strategic Defense InitiativeSIS Special Isotope Separations

SL-1 Stationary Low-Power ReactorSM-1 Stationary Medium-Power ReactorSMC Specific Manufacturing Capability

SNAP Systems for Nuclear Auxiliary PowerSPERT Special Power Excursion Reactor Test

STEP Safety Test Engineering ProgramSTR Submarine Thermal Reactor

(Also known as S1W or, Submarine reactor, 1st prototype, Westinghouse)

STR Split Table ReactorSUSIE Shield Test Pool Facility

TAN Test Area NorthTHRITS Thermal Idaho Reactor Test Station

TMI Three Mile IslandTRA Test Reactor Area

TSA/B Technical Support BuildingTREAT Transient Reactor Test

TRU transuranicU of I University of IdahoUAW United Auto Workers

UP&L Utah Power and LightUSGS United States Geological SurveyUSSR Union of Soviet Socialist RepublicsWAG Waste Area Group

WBRR Western Beam Research ReactorWCB Willow Creek BuildingWCF Waste Calcining Facility

WERF Waste Experimental Reduction FacilityWIPP Waste Isolation Pilot PlantWOW Woman Ordnance Worker

ZPR Zero Power ReactorZPPR Zero Power Physics Reactor

(Previously known as the Zero Power Plutonium Reactor)


3 0 6

Activation product

Upon bombardment with neutrons, somematerials absorb neutrons into theirnuclei, forming new and usually radioac-tive isotopes.

Alpha particle

A positively charged nuclear particleidentical with the nucleus of a heliumatom. It consists of two protons and twoneutrons. Alpha particles can be stoppedby a sheet of paper.

Anti-Cs

Slang speech meaning “anti-contamina-tion,” referring to special clothing wornby people requiring protection from radi-ation.

Atom

The smallest particle of an element thatcan exist either alone or in combinationwith other elements. Atoms are made upof electrons, neutrons, and protons.

Atomic energy

Energy that can be liberated by changesin the nucleus of an atom, such as by fis-sion or fusion. Contemporary scientistsprefer to use the term “nuclear energy.”

Atomic number

A characteristic of an element, the num-ber of protons in the nucleus.

Aquifer

A water-bearing stratum of permeablerock, sand, or gravel.

Background radiation

The radiation in an ambient environment.It includes cosmic rays from outer space,radon gas, and other forms of radiationfrom natural sources (such as granite) andhuman-made sources (dental X-rays, fall-out from nuclear explosions).

Beta particle

An electron or positron ejected from thenucleus of an atom during radioactivedecay. The mass of an electron is equal to1/1837 that of a proton. It can be stoppedby an inch of wood or a thin sheet of alu-minum.

Bin set

A cluster of storage containers at theIdaho Nuclear Technology EngineeringCenter built to store solid calcine waste.The waste is highly radioactive, and thebin sets are heavily shielded.

Blowdown

A term used to describe sudden depres-surization upon the breaking of a pipecarrying pressurized water.

Boiling water reactor

A nuclear reactor concept in which thecoolant, water, is permitted to boil as itabsorbs the heat of the nuclear reaction.The resultant steam drives a turbine andgenerates electricity.

Breeder reactor

A nuclear reactor concept in which theoperation produces a net increase in fis-sionable material. That is, more fission-able material is produced than isconsumed.

Calcine

As a noun, the dry solid (grainy or granu-lar) product of a chemical process remov-ing liquids from a solution. As a verb, theheating of a material at a high tempera-ture to drive off volatile materials.

Cerenkov radiation

A blue-white light produced whengamma rays hit electrons in water. Theenergy of the gamma rays is sufficientlygreat that the electrons move through thewater faster than light moves throughwater.

Cesium-137

A radioactive isotope of the elementcesium, which emits gamma radiation. Itis an important fission product.

3 0 7

G l o ss a r y

Chain reaction

A self-sustaining sequence of eventsoccurring when a neutron splits a fission-able atom (of uranium, for example) andreleases sufficient neutrons to cause otheratoms to split in the same way.

China Syndrome

A figure of speech referring to a theoreti-cal melting of nuclear reactor fuel whichwould occur upon a loss of coolant to thefuel. The fuel would melt, penetrate thereactor vessel, drop to the concrete floorof the building, and reach the soil below.The phrase comes from the expression“dig a hole all the way to China,” a fanta-sy of (American) children who believeChina to be on the opposite side of theglobe from their own playground.

Chicago Pile-1

The name of the first nuclear reactor togo critical, so called because graphiteblocks were piled upon each other to con-struct the reactor.

Cladding

The outer layer of metal over the fission-able material in a nuclear fuel element,typically aluminum or zirconium.Cladding promotes the transfer of heatfrom the fuel to the coolant and containsfission products and activation productswithin the fuel element.

Cold run

A test of a chemical process and equip-ment using non-radioactive materials.

Cold shutdown

A reactor condition in which the coolanttemperature has been reduced to 200° For below, the pressure has been reducedto atmospheric pressure, and the chainreaction has stopped.

Cold War

A conflict over ideological differencesbetween the United States and the SovietUnion and their respective allies lastingfrom the late 1940s until early in the1990s. It was carried on by means otherthan sustained or direct military action.

Containment building

A safety feature of most commercialnuclear reactor power plants. The airtightbuilding, typically engineered to containgases and pressures that might bereleased in an accident, houses the reac-tor, pressurizer, coolant pumps, and otherequipment.

Control rod

A device within a nuclear reactor made ofmaterials which absorb neutrons. Controlrods help dampen or permit the reactor’schain reaction.

Contamination, radioactive

Unintentional or undesirable contact of aperson, object, or material with radioac-tive substances.

Control room

The operating center of a nuclear reactorfrom which the reactor is operated andmonitored.

Coolant

In a nuclear reactor, a gas or fluid (suchas water or liquid metal) sent past thefuel elements to collect and carry awaythe heat generated by the nuclear reac-tion.

Core

That part of the nuclear reactor consistingof the fuel and control elements, thecoolant, and the vessel containing these.

Criticality

The point at which a nuclear reactor is justcapable of sustaining a chain reaction.

Critical mass

The minimum amount of nuclear fuelnecessary to sustain a chain reaction.

Curie

A measure of radioactivity, a curie is thatquantity of material that decays at a rateof 3.7x1010 disintegrations per second.

D&D

An abbreviation for “decontaminationand decommissioning,” particularly of abuilding or structure that once housedactive nuclear activities and may havebeen contaminated in the process.Historic uses of the term may also havereferred to “dismantling” or “demolish-ing.”

Decontaminate

A process removing radioactive materialsfrom a person, place, or object.

Decay

The spontaneous ejection of particles byradioactive materials. Synonym forradioactive disintegration.

Depleted uranium

Uranium that, through the process ofenrichment, has been stripped of most ofthe uranium-235 it once contained. It hasmore uranium-238 than natural uranium,but is referred to as “depleted.”

Dose

A specific amount of ionizing radiation or atoxic substance absorbed by a living being.


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Dosimeter

A device such as a film badge which canbe worn by a person (or placed some-where in the environment) and is used tomeasure the radiation dose received overa period of time.

Electron

An elementary particle consisting of acharge of negative energy. Electrons aresaid to circle the nucleus of an atom.

Emergency Core Cooling System

An emergency backup system designedto inject cooling water into the core of areactor in the event that the normal cool-ing system fails. This safety requirementis intended to prevent the overheating ofthe fuel and subsequent melting.

Enriched uranium

Uranium which has been modified fromits natural state to contain a higher con-centration of the isotope uranium-235than natural uranium.

Excursion

A term used to describe an unexpected oraccidental increase in the power level ofa nuclear reaction.

Fallout

Radioactive particles and gases resultingfrom a nuclear explosion which graduallydescend to earth.

Film badge

A piece of masked photographic filmworn by nuclear workers. The film isdarkened by radiation and can be ana-lyzed to indicate how much exposure thefilm and the badge wearer received overa period of time.

Fission

The splitting of an atomic nucleus result-ing in the creation of lighter elements,heat, free neutrons, and other particles.

Fission product

Any of several lighter elements or parti-cles created by the nuclear fission of aheavy element such as uranium.

Flux

The flow or stream of neutrons emanat-ing from nuclear fission.

Fossil fuels

Coal, oil, and natural gas are referred toas “fossil” fuels because they are theremains of plants and animals that livedon earth millions of years ago.

Fuel cycle

The life cycle of a fuel including thecomplete sequence of steps beginningwith mining and refining an ore and end-ing with the disposition of the wasteproducts after the fuel has been benefi-cially used.

Fuel reprocessing

A chemical process, usually involvingseveral steps, that recovers uranium-235and other fissionable products from spentfuel.

Fuel assembly

An arrangement of nuclear fuel and itscladding material into a particular formand shape for use in a nuclear reactor.Fuel may be assembled in plates, rods ofvarious diameters, or other shapes.

Fusion

The union of atomic nuclei to form heav-ier nuclei resulting in the release of enor-mous quantities of energy. The processusually requires conditions of extremeheat and pressure.

Gamma radiation

High-energy, high penetrating electro-magnetic radiation emitted in the radioac-tive decay of many radionuclides. Theyare similar to X-rays.

Geiger counter

An instrument used to detect and measurebeta and gamma radiation.

Half-life

The time it takes for one-half of anygiven number of unstable atoms to decay(disintegrate). Half-life is unaffected bytemperature, pressure, or chemical condi-tions surrounding the substance.

Hot cell

A specialized shielded laboratory inwhich radioactive materials may be han-dled with the aid of remotely operatedmanipulators. The walls and windows ofthe laboratory are made of materialsdesigned to protect workers from gammaand other radiation.

Hot run

An operational (or test) run of a chemicalprocess and equipment using radioactivematerials.

Hot settlement Pond

An outdoor basin, usually lined at thebottom with clay, in which liquids con-taining radioactive particles are sent toevaporate. Solids settle to the bottom,where they are adsorbed onto the clay.

G L O S S A R Y

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Interim storage

A concept in the management of nuclearwaste in which the waste is moved to anintermediary location between its point oforigin and its “final” or ultimate storagelocation.

Iodine-131

Also called radioiodine or radioactiveiodine, an isotope of the element iodine,which has a half-life of about eight days.This (and other iodine isotopes) arereleased when the cladding surroundingspent fuel is dissolved or breached.

Ion exchange

A chemical process in which a substancedissolved in water is exchanged withanother.

Ionization chamber

A device used to measure radioactivity.

Irradiate

To expose a substance to ionizing radia-tion in a nuclear reactor. The substance soexposed may be referred to as the target.

Isotope

Any of two or more species of atoms of achemical element distinguished by differ-ent quantities of neutrons in their nuclei.For example, hydrogen has three iso-topes: protium (one proton), deuterium(two protons), and tritium (three protons).

Linear accelerator

Adevice in which charged particles arespeeded up in a straight line by successiveimpulses from a series of electric fields.

Manhattan EngineerDistrict/Manhattan Project

Created by President Roosevelt in 1939, theManhattan Engineer District of the U.S.Army Corps of Engineers was commis-sioned to build an atomic bomb. The eff o r twas referred to as the Manhattan Project.

Maximum permissible dose

A regulatory limit on the radiation expo-sure that a nuclear worker or a memberof the general public may legally receivedue to radioactive releases from a nuclearpower plant or other nuclear activity.

Megawatt

A measure of electrical power equal toone million watts.

Meltdown

The accidental melting of nuclear reactorfuel caused by a failure of the coolant tocarry away heat.

Millirem

A unit of radiation equal to one thou-sandth of a “rem.” See rem.

Microcurie

A measure of radioactivity equal to onemillionth of a curie.

Mixed waste

Waste that contains both chemically haz-ardous and radioactive waste.

Moderator

A material used in a nuclear reactor toreduce the natural speed of neutronsejected from fissioning atoms. Typicalmoderators are water or graphite.

Natural uranium

Uranium that has not been through anenrichment process to separate its urani-um-235 isotopes. It is made of uranium-238 (99.3 percent) and uranium-235 (0.7percent).

Neutron

An uncharged particle, a part of an atom-ic nucleus, having a mass nearly equal tothat of a proton. One or more neutronsare present in every known elementexcept hydrogen.

Noble gases

Elemental gases which do not generallycombine chemically with other materials.They are helium, neon, argon, krypton,xenon, and radon.

Nuclear power plant

An electrical generating facility usingnuclear fuel.

Nuclear energy

Energy released in a nuclear fission orfusion reaction.

Nuclear reactor

A complex device designed to contain acontrolled nuclear fission chain reaction.A reactor may function for testing andexperimentation (Materials Test Reactor),for the generation of electricity (any com-mercial nuclear power plant), for the pro-duction of weapons-related materialssuch as tritium or plutonium (N Reactorat Hanford), as a breeder of nuclear fuel(Experimental Breeder Reactor), forpropulsion (Submarine Thermal Reactor),or as a combination of these functions.


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Nuclear waste

A general term including high-level,transuranic, low-level, mixed low-level,and byproduct material. Each of theseterms is further defined for regulatorypurposes.

Nucleus

Center of an atom consisting of a clusterof neutrons and protons. It contains near-ly all of the mass of the atom.

Plutonium

A metallic element most typically createdby irradiating uranium in nuclear reactors(although small amounts have been foundin nature). The fissionable isotope pluto-nium-239 can be used as reactor fuel.

Pressurized water reactor

A reactor concept in which water is usedto cool the reactor core. It is pressurizedto prevent it from boiling. Heat is trans-ferred from a “primary” coolant pipe to a“secondary” pipe.

Primary loop

A closed system of piping through whichcoolant flows past the nuclear fuel in areactor.

Prompt critical

Astate of criticality derived from the factthat a small percentage of neutrons in achain reaction are not emitted as soon asthe atom splits, but are “delayed” for aslong as a few minutes. “Prompt” neutronsare emitted immediately upon fission. If areactor goes “prompt critical,” it indicatesthat reactivity has increased to the pointthat prompt neutrons alone are suff i c i e n tto maintain the chain reaction. Rapid mul-tiplication of neutrons can occur after thispoint. In the SL-1 reactor accident, the

rapid withdrawal of the control rod is pre-sumed to have brought about a state ofprompt criticality, in which the chain reac-tion did not require the emission of the“delayed” neutrons to begin or continue.

Proton

An elementary atomic particle that isidentical with the nucleus of a hydrogenatom. Along with neutrons, it is a con-stituent of all other atomic nuclei.

PUREX

An acronym for plutonium-uraniumextraction, the name of a chemicalprocess used to reprocess spent nuclearfuel and irradiated targets.

R&D 100 Award

Research and development awards pre-sented by R&D Magazine. Only one hun-dred R&D innovations are recognized inthe country each year.

Radiation

E n e rgy transferred through space or someother media in the form of particles orwaves. If the particles or waves are capableof breaking up atoms or molecules, then theradiation is said to be ionizing radiation.

R

An abbreviation meaning “roentgen.”One roentgen (R) measures the power ofgamma or X-rays to produce ionization(ie, strip an electron from an otherwisestable atom) in one gram of air.

Radioactive waste

By-products of nuclear processes whichare radioactive and have no useful recy-clable purpose.

Radioactivity

The spontaneous emission of particles orwaves from the nucleus of an atom. Theemissions may include alpha and betaparticles, and gamma rays.

Radionuclide

A radioactive species of an atom. Forexample, strontium-90 is a radionuclide(also called a radioisotope) of strontium.

RaLa

An abbreviation for RadioactiveLanthanum, one of the fission products ofa nuclear reaction. It was useful to scien-tists developing a plutonium bomb.

Reactor vessel

A cylindrical steel container enclosing thefuel elements, control elements, coolantpiping, and other structures that supportthe core of a nuclear reactor.

Reflector

Part of the structure of some nuclearreactors designed to reflect neutrons backtoward the core of the reactor.

Rem (or REM)

An abbreviation meaning “roentgenequivalent man,” a measure of theamount of exposure (dose) of radiationthat takes into account the biologicaleffectiveness of the exposure on the par-ticular organ exposed.

Retention basin

An outdoor basin (of any of severaldesigns) in which liquid solutions aredeposited and held pending evaporationor the precipitation of solids.

G L O S S A R Y

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Roentgen

An international unit of measurement ofgamma or X- radiation. See “R” above.

Secondary loop

In a reactor coolant system, heat carriedaway from the reactor core in a “prima-ry” system is transferred to a secondloop. Water in the second loop does notbecome radioactive and its steam is usedto spin turbines for electrical generation.

Semiscale

The informal name of a scale model of anuclear reactor operated as part of theNuclear Reactor Safety Test EngineeringProgram at the NRTS/INEL. Instead ofusing nuclear fuel, the “core” simulatedthe heat of a nuclear reaction by electricalmeans. The device was used to study thebehavior of water and steam in accidentsinvolving the loss of coolant caused by abroken pipe.

Scram

A sudden shutting down of a nuclearreactor, usually by dropping safety rods,when a predetermined neutron flux orother dangerous condition occurs.

Shielding

Material such as lead, concrete, water,paraffin, and other materials used to pre-vent the escape of radiation into theambient or working environment of peo-ple and equipment.

Spent nuclear fuel

Nuclear fuel containing fission and acti-vation products that can no longer eco-nomically sustain a chain reaction and iswithdrawn from a reactor.

Spent fuel storage basin

A pool or pit made of reinforced concretecontaining water and used to store spentnuclear fuel. The water acts as a shieldpreventing radiation from harming work-ers near the pool.

Transuranic waste (TRU)

Waste materials contaminated with human-made elements heavier than uranium, suchas plutonium. Also called TRU (transuran-ic waste). This term also implies a regula-tory definition in which the waste containssubstances with a half-life over twentyyears in concentrations of more than oneten-millionth of a curie per gram of waste.

Triga

The brand name of a small, low-powerreactor manufactured by General Atomicsfor use in universities and laboratories.The reactor was in a small pool of waterused as both coolant and moderator.Similar reactors are often called “triga-type” reactors.

Tritium

An isotope of hydrogen containing threeprotons. Tritium gas is produced in nuclearreactors and used to boost the explosivepower of most modern nuclear weapons. Itis also a constituent of irradiated waterassociated with reactor operations.

Uranium-235

A fissionable isotope of the metallic ele-ment, uranium. In nature, only 0.7 per-cent of all uranium mined from theground consists of this isotope.

Uranium-238

The most common isotope of uranium. Itdoes not generally fission, but can be irra-diated in a reactor and transformed to anisotope of plutonium which does fission.

Uranium oxide

A metallic compound of uranium andoxygen, a useful form of uranium for useas nuclear fuel because it has a highermelting point than metallic uranium andcan survive the high temperatures insidea reactor more readily. However, its heattransfer properties are not as efficient asthose of metallic uranium.

Water-moderated reactor

A reactor concept which is designed sothat water slows down the speed of neu-trons ejected from fissioning atoms.Includes boiling water and pressurizedwater reactor concepts.

Warm run

The operation of a chemical processusing materials that are slightly radioac-tive. A “warm” run is contrasted with“cold” or “hot” runs.

Waste storage tank

A holding tank for liquid or gaseouswastes which may or may not be radioac-tive.

Zirconium

A metallic element highly resistant to cor-rosion and used to make cladding fornuclear fuel elements. It is sometimesalloyed in small amounts in the fuel itself.

Zero power

Also called “low power,” a mode of oper-ating a reactor so that it maintains a chainreaction at extremely low power levels. Itproduces very little heat. Zero power reac-tors are used as sensitive laboratory toolsto pre-test experimental loadings of testreactors and for other analytical purposes.


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The following referencesinclude significant works on the history of theAtomic Energy Commission, the Departmentof Energ y, and the Nuclear RegulatoryCommission. Also listed are selected techni-cal reports on specific projects or programsconducted at the NRTS/INEL/ INEEL a n dother sources of project information. Foradditional sources, see endnote citations.

B O O K S A N D R E P O R TS

Aerojet Nuclear Company. A Historical Brief ofthe LOFT Reactor at the Idaho NationalEngineering Laboratory. Report No.ERDA/IDO CI-1275. Idaho Falls: ANC, 1975.

Allardice, Corbin, and Edward R. Trapnell. TheFirst Reactor. Washington, D.C.: U.S. AtomicEnergy Commission Division of TechnicalInformation, no date.

Allied Chemical. The Waste Calcining Facility,Idaho Chemical Processing Plant. Idaho Falls:Idaho Chemical Programs, no date, but circa1 9 7 4 .

Anderson, B.C., et al. A History of theRadioactive Waste Management Complex atthe Idaho National Engineering Laboratory.Idaho Falls: IDO Nuclear Fuel Cycle Division,1979.

Andrus, Cecil D. Politics Western Style. Seattle:Sasquatch Books, 1998.

Argonne National Laboratory-West. EBR-II since1964. Idaho Falls: ANL-W, 1983.

Arrowrock Group, The National Environmentaland Engineering Laboratory: A HistoricalContext and Assessment. INEEL/EXT-97-01021, Revision 2. Idaho Falls: INEEL, 1997.

Batt, Phil. The Compleat Phil Batt . Meridian,Idaho: Phil Batt, 1999.

Bettis Plant. Expended Core Facility,Maintenance and Operations Guide.Pittsburgh: Westinghouse, 1958.

Blair, Jr., Clay. The Atomic Submarine andAdmiral Rickover. New York: Henry Holt andCo., 1954.

Boardman, Brewer F. The ICPP(A Factsheet).Idaho Falls: Idaho Operations Office, 1957.

Buck, John H., and Carl F. Leyse, MaterialsTesting Reactor Project Handbook. Report No.TID-7001. Lemont, Illinois: Argonne NationalLaboratory and Oak Ridge NationalLaboratory, 1951.

Canfield, R.T. SL-1 Annual Operating Report,February 1959-February 1960. Report No.IDO 19012 or CEND-82. Idaho Falls:Combustion Engineering, 1960.

Card, D.H. Waste Management Program Historyof Buried Transuranic Waste at INEL. IdahoFalls: EG&G Report No. WMP77-3, 1977.

Commander, R.E., et al. Operation of the WasteCalcining Facility with Highly RadioactiveAqueous Waste. Report No. IDO-14662. IdahoFalls: Phillips Petroleum Company, 1966.

Corliss, William R. SNAPNuclear SpaceReactors.Washington, D.C.: U.S. AECDivision of Technical Information, 1966.

“Industrial Radioactive Waste Disposal,”Hearings before the Special Subcommittee onRadiation of the JCAE 86th Cong., 1st session,Volume 1, January 28, 29, and 30; February 2and 3, 1959 (Wash, D.C.: GPO, 1959).

deBoisblanc, D.R. The Advanced Test Reactor—ATR—Final Conceptual Design. Report No.IDO-16667. Idaho Falls: Phillips, 1960.

Doan, Richard. Atomic Energy in Retrospect andProspect. Report IDO-16088. Idaho Falls:Phillips Petroleum Company, 1953.

EG&G. Five Year Report, 76/81. Idaho Falls:EG&G, 1982.

EG&G. Idaho National Engineering Laboratory.Pamphlet. Idaho Falls: EG&G, 1986.

EG&G. Power Burst Facility. Idaho Falls:EG&G Idaho, no date, but circa 1976.

Eisenhower, Dwight David. Mandate forChange, 1953-1956. Garden City, N.Y.:Doubleday and Co., 1965.

Fast, E., compiler. Potentially AvailableFacilities at the National Reactor TestingStation. Idaho Falls: Eastern Idaho NuclearIndustrial Council, February 1970.

Fehner,Terrence R., and Jack M. Holl.Department of Energy 1977-1994, A SummaryHistory.Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department ofEnergy, 1994.

Fermi, Laura. Atoms for the World: United StatesParticipation in the Conference on thePeaceful Uses of Atomic Energy. Chicago:University of Chicago Press, 1974.

Freund, George A. Suitability of Potato ProductsPrepared from Irradiated and ChemicallyInhibited Potatoes. Report No. IDO-10042.Idaho Falls: Western Nuclear Corporation incooperation with Engineering Committee,Potato Processors of Idaho, February 1965.

Freund, George A. Current Status and Potentialof Irradiation to Prevent Potato Sprouting.Report No. IDO-11300-Addendum. IdahoFalls: Western Nuclear Corporation in coopera-tion with Engineering Committee, PotatoProcessors of Idaho, February 1965.

Gantz, Kenneth, ed. Nuclear Flight. New York:Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1960.

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S e l e c t e d B i b l i o g r a p h y

General Electric. Final Report of SL-1 RecoveryOperation. Idaho Falls: GE Report No. IDO-19311, 1962.

Gerber, Michele Stenehjem. On the Home Front,The Cold War Legacy of the Hanford NuclearSite. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press,1992.

Groueff, Stephane. Manhattan Project: TheUntold Story of the Making of the AtomicBomb. New York: Little, Brown, and Co.,Bantam, 1967.

Haber, Heinz. The Walt Disney Story of OurFriend the Atom. New York: Simon andSchuster, 1956.

Hackett, William, Jack Pelton, and ChuckBrockway. Geohydrologic Story of the EasternSnake River Plain and the Idaho NationalEngineering Laboratory. Idaho Falls: IdahoOperations Office, 1986.

Hawley, C.A., et al. Controlled EnvironmentalRadioiodine Tests, National Reactor TestingStation. Report No. IDO-12035. Idaho Falls:IDO, 1964.

Hertsgaard, Mark. Nuclear, Inc., The Men andMoney Behind Nuclear Energy. New York:Pantheon Books, 1983.

Hewlett, Richard G., and Francis Duncan.Atomic Shield, 1947/1952. University Park:Pennsylvania State University Press, 1969.

Hewlett, Richard G., and Jack M. Holl. Atomsfor Peace and War 1953-1961. Berkeley:University of California Press, 1989.

Hewlett, Richard G., and Oscar E. Anderson, Jr.The New World, 1939-1946. Philadelphia:Pennsylvania State University Press, 1962.

Hewlett, Richard, and Francis Duncan. NuclearNavy 1946-1962. Chicago: University ofChicago Press, 1974.

Hogerton, Atomic Energy Desk Book . New York:Reinhold Publishing Corporation, 1963.

Holl, Jack M. Argonne National Laboratory,1946-1996. Urbana: University of IllinoisPress, 1997.

Holl, Jack M., Roger Anders, and Alice L. Buck.United States Civilian Nuclear Power Policy,

1954-1984: A History. Washington, D.C., U.S.Department of Energy, 1985.

Hughes, Donald J. The Neutron Story. GardenCity, N.Y.: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1959.

Idaho National Engineering Laboratory. IdahoNational Engineering Laboratory HistoricalDose Evaluation, Volumes 1 and 2, Report No.DOE/ID-12119. Idaho Falls: IDO, 1991.

Idaho Operations Office. “The SL-1 Accident,Press Clippings.” Idaho Falls: IDO, no date,but circa 1961.

Jacobs, Alan M., et al. Basic Principles ofNuclear Science and Reactors. D. VanNostrand Company: Princeton, 1960.

Juell, Edgar. A Short History of the ExpendedCore Facility, 1953 to June 1990. Idaho Falls:Naval Reactors Facility Expended CoreFacility, no date.

Kunze, J.F., et al. A Low TemperatureDemonstration Geothermal Power Plant in theRaft River Valley. Report No. ANCR-1138.Idaho Falls: Aerojet Nuclear Company, 1974.

Kunze, J.F. Idaho Geothermal DevelopmentProjects Annual Report for 1976. Idaho Falls:EG&G, Raft River Rural ElectricalCooperative, State of Idaho, 1976.

Lakey, L.T., et al. Development of Fluidized BedCalcination of Aluminum Nitrate Wastes in theWaste Calcining Facility. Report No. IDO-14608. Idaho Falls: Phillips PetroleumCompany, 1965.

Lambright, Henry W. Shooting Down theNuclear Airplane. Syracuse, NY: Inter-University Case Program No. 104, 1967.

Kramer, Andrew W. Understanding the NuclearReactor. Barrington, Illinois: TechnicalPublishing Co., 1970.

Lemon, R.B., and D.G. Reid. “Experience Witha Direct Maintenance RadiochemicalProcessing Plant.” Proceedings of theInternational Conference on the Peaceful Usesof Atomic Energy, Volume 9. Geneva: UnitedNations, 1956,

Lilienthal, David. Atomic Energy, A New Start.New York: Harper and Row, 1980.

Lilienthal, David. The Atomic Energy Years,1945-1950, The Journals of David E.Lilienthal, Volume II. New York: Harper andRow, 1964.

Loftness, Robert L. Nuclear Power Plants:Design, Operating Experience, andEconomics. Princeton, J.J.: Van Nostrand(Nuclear Science Series), 1964.

McCracken, Samuel. The War Against the Atom.New York: Basic Books, 1982.

McPhee, John. “The Curve of Binding Energy.”New Yorker (December 3, 10, and 17, 1973).

Mazuzan, George T., and J. Samuel Walker.Controlling the Atom. Berkeley: University ofCalifornia Press, 1984.

Miller, Susanne J. Idaho National EngineeringLaboratory Management Plan for CulturalResources (Final Draft). Report DOE/ID-10361. Idaho Falls: Lockheed IdahoTechnologies Company, Revision 1, 1995.

Naval Reactors Facility. Naval ReactorsFacility. Idaho Falls: Westinghouse, 1998.

Norman Engineering Co. Master Plan Study forthe Army Reactor Experimental Area. ReportNo. IDO-24033. Idaho Falls: NormanEngineering, 1959.

Nyer,W.E., et al. Proposal for a ReactivityMeasurement Facility at the MTR. Report No.IDO-16108. Idaho Falls: Phillips PetroleumCompany, 1953.

Okrent, David. On the History of the Evolutionof Light Water Reactor Safety in the UnitedStates. Los Angeles: University of LosAngeles, 1978.

Pach, Chester J., Jr., and Elmo Richardson. ThePresidency of Dwight David Eisenhower.Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1991.

Parmet, Herbert S. Eisenhower and theAmerican Crusades. New York: MacmillanCompany, 1972.

Plastino, Ben. Coming of Age: Idaho Falls andthe Idaho National Engineering Laboratory.Idaho Falls: Margaret A. Plastino, 1998.

Polmar, Norman, and Thomas B. Allen.Rickover, Controversy and Genius, A


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Biography. New York: Simon and Schuster,1982.

Rhodes, Richard, Dark Sun, The Making of theHydrogen Bomb. New York: Simon andSchuster, 1995.

Rhodes, Richard. The Making of the AtomicBomb. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986.

Rhodes, Richard. Nuclear Renewal. New York:Viking, 1993.

Rolph, Elizabeth S. Nuclear Power and thePublic Safety. Lexington, Massachusetts: D.C.Heath and Co., 1979.

Schlesinger, Jr., Arthur M. A Thousand Days,John F. Kennedy in the White House. Boston:Houghton Mifflin, 1965.

Simpson, John W. Nuclear Power fromUnderseas to Outer Space. La Grange Park,Illinois: American Nuclear Society, 1995.

SL-1 Report Task Force. IDO Report on theNuclear Incident at the SL-1 Reactor onJanuary 3, 1961, at the National ReactorTesting Station. Report No. IDO-19302. IdahoFalls: Idaho Operations Office, 1962.

Smith, Hinchman & Grylls. Survey on FortPeck, Montana, and Pocatello, Idaho, Sites.Detroit: Smith, Hinchman & Grylls, March1949.

Singlevich, W., et al. Natural RadioactiveMaterials in the Arco Reactor Test Site. ReportNo. HW-21221. (Cover title: Ecological andRadiological Studies of the Arco Reactor TestSite). Richland: General Electric NucleonicsDivision, Hanford Works, 1951.

Stacy, Susan M. Idaho National EngineeringLaboratory, Army Reactor Experimental Area,Historical American Engineering Record ID-33-D. Idaho Falls: Lockheed Martin IdahoCorporation, 1998.

Stacy, Susan M. Idaho National EngineeringLaboratory: Test Area North, Hangar 629,Historic American Engineering Record ID-32-A. Idaho Falls: Lockheed Martin IdahoCorporation, 1994.

Stacy, Susan M. Idaho National Engineeringand Environmental Laboratory, Old WasteCalcining Facility HAER No. ID-33-C . Report

No. INEEL-97-01370. Idaho Falls: LockheedMartin Idaho Corporation, 1997.

Staff of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.“Summary of the SL-1 Reactor Incident at theNational Reactor Testing Station in Idaho onJanuary 3, 1961,” January 10, 1961.

Stannard, J. Newell. Radioactivity and Health, AHistory. Report No. DOE/RL01830-T59.Hanford: Pacific Northwest Laboratory, 1988.

Stevenson, C.E., et al. Waste Calcination andFission Product Recovery Facilities—ICPP, AConceptual Design. Report PTR-106. IdahoFalls: Phillips Petroleum Company, 1956.

Suid, Lawrence H. The Army’s Nuclear PowerProgram, The Evolution of a Support Agency.New York: Glenwood Press, 1990.

Taylor, Raymond W., and Samuel W. Taylor.Uranium Fever; or No Talk Under $1 Million .New York: Macmillan, 1970.

Thornton, G., A.J. Rothstein, and D.H. Culver,ed. Comprehensive Technical Report, GeneralElectric Direct-Air-Cycle Aircraft NuclearPropulsion Program, Program Summary andReferences. Report No. APEX-901.Cincinnati: GE ANPDepartment, AtomicProducts Division, 1962.

Truman, Harry S. Memoirs, Years of Trial andHope, Volume 2. Garden City, N.Y.:Doubleday and Co., 1956.

Tyler, Patrick. Running Critical, The Silent War,Rickover, and General Dynamics. New York:Harper and Row, 1986.

United States. Atomic Energy CommissionInvestigation Board. SL-1 Accident.Washington, D.C.: Joint Committee [onAtomic Energy] Print, U.S. GovernmentPrinting Office, 1961.

United States. Comptroller General of theUnited States. Review of Manned AircraftNuclear Propulsion Program, Atomic EnergyCommission and Department of Defense,Report to the Congress of the United States.Washington, D.C.: General Accounting Office,1963.

United States. Department of Energy. Office ofEnvironmental Management. LinkingLegacies, Connecting the Cold War NuclearWeapons Production Processes To TheirEnvironmental Consequences. Report No.DOE/EM-0319. Washington, D.C., Office ofEnvironmental Management, 1997.

United States. Department of Energy andDepartment of Defense. The United StatesNaval Propulsion Program. Washington, D.C.:Government Printing Office, no date.

Walker, J. Samuel. Containing the Atom.Berkeley: University of California Press,1992.

The Waste Calcining Facility at the IdahoChemical Processing Plant. Pamphlet. IdahoFalls: no author, no date.

Wyle Laboratories. Interim Ordnance CleanupProgram Record Search Report. Norco,California: Scientific Services and SystemsGroup, 1993.

Weart, Stephen. Nuclear Fear,A History ofImages. Cambridge, Massachusetts: HarvardUniversity Press, 1988.

York, Herbert. The Advisors, Oppenheimer,Teller, and the Superbomb. San Francisco:W.H. Freeman and Company, 1976.

York, Herbert. Race to Oblivion. New York:Simon and Schuster, 1970.

A R T I C L E S A N D P A P E R S

Anders, Roger. “Safety Research: An ImpossibleTask.” Preliminary draft of unpublished manu-script, copy supplied to author by Anders.

Coloff, Stan. “The High and Dry Navy: WorldWar II,” Philtron (October 1965): 3, reprintedas “WWII: The Arco Naval Proving Ground”in INEL News (May 1989): 18.

Decker, L.A. “Significant Accomplishments inthe History of the ICPP,” paper presented atthe 1972 National Meeting of the AmericanChemical Society, San Francisco, California,September 1, 1976.

Doan, Richard L. “MTR-ETR OperatingExperience.” Nuclear Science andEngineering. (January 1962): 23.

S E L E CT E D B I B L I O G RA P H Y

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Doan, Richard L. “Two Decades of ReactorSafety Evaluation,” Memorial Lecture inhonor of Dr. C. Rogers McCullough preparedfor Winter Meeting of the American NuclearSociety,Washington, D.C., November 15-18,1970.

Gillette, Robert. “Nuclear Safety (I): The Rootsof Dissent.” Science (September 1, 1972):774-776.

Gillette, Robert. “Nuclear Safety (II): The Yearsof Delay” and “The Fall of Phillips Nuclear.”Science (September 8, 1972): 868.

Gillette, Robert. “Nuclear Safety (III): CriticsCharge Conflicts of Interest.” Science(September 15, 1972): 970.

Holl, Jack M. “The National Reactor TestingStation: The Atomic Energy Commission inIdaho, 1949-1962.” Pacific NorthwestQuarterly (Volume 85, No. 1, January 1994):18.

Jordan, W.H. “Radiation from a Reactor.”Scientific American (October 1951): 54.

Knecht, Dieter, et al. “Historical FuelReprocessing and HLW Management inIdaho,” Radwaste Magazine (May 1997): 40.

Landa, Edward R., and Terry B. Councell.“Leaching of Uranium from Glass andCeramic Foodware and Decorative Items,”Health Physics 63 (No. 3, September 1992):343.

Lanouette, William. “Dream Machine.” AtlanticMonthly (April 1983): 45.

Lester, Richard K., and David J. Rose. “TheNuclear Wastes at West Valley, New York.Technology Review (May 1977): 20.

Lohse, E.S. “Aviator’s Cave.” IdahoArcheologist 12 (Fall 1989): 23-28.

Peterson, Cass. “Rocky Flats: Risks Amid aMetropolis.” Washington Post (December 12,1988): 1.

Phillips Petroleum Company, The MaterialsTesting Reactor, A Light Water ModeratedReactor (Geneva, Switzerland: InternationalConference on Peaceful Uses of AtomicEnergy, 1955) “Research Reactors,” p. 352.

Roberts. J.O. “Selected Operating Experience ofCommission Power Reactors,” a paper pre-sented to the American Institute of ElectricalEngineers, June 18, 1961.

Schiller, Ronald. “Submarines in the Desert.”Colliers Magazine (February 5, 1954).

Slansky, Cyril M., and John A. McBride. “TheCase for Small Reprocessing Plants.Nucleonics (September 1962): 43-56.

Tierney, John. “Take the A-Plane: The $1 BillionNuclear Bird that Never Flew,” Science 82(Jan/Feb 1982): 47.

Till, C.E., Y.I. Chang, and W.H. Hannum, “TheIntegral Fast Reactor—An Overview.” TheTechnology of the Integral Fast Reactor andits Associated Fuel Cycle, a special issue ofProgress in Nuclear Energy (Volume 31,Number 1/2, 1997): 4.

N E W S PA P E R A N D M A G AZ I N E S O U R C E S

Arco AdvertiserBlackfoot Daily BulletinIdaho Daily Statesman and Idaho Statesman

(Boise) INELNewsNuclear NewsNucleonicsPhiltron Post-Register (Idaho Falls) Salt Lake TribuneThumbnail SketchTimes-News (Twin Falls)

M A N U S C R I P T S A N D A R C H I V A L C O L L E CT I O N S

Idaho Historical Society Library and Archives:Senator Henry DworshakCongressman Orval HansenGovernor C.A. RobinsGovernor Len JordanGovernor Robert SmylieGovernor Don SamuelsonGovernor John Evans

Boise State University Special CollectionsLibrary:Senator Frank ChurchSenator Len JordanGovernor Cecil Andrus


3 1 6

50 year celebration, 254, 255A 1 W, 90-91, 238, 267ABC Network News, 200Abelson, Philip, 22Aberdeen, Idaho, 11 3above-ground storage, 210activation product, 23, 80advanced battery technology, 217Advanced Core Development, 230Advanced Mixed Waste Treatment Project, 254Advanced Reactivity Measurement Facility No. 1

(ARMF-1), 262Advanced Reactivity Measurement Facility No. 2 10,

1 5 4 - 1 5 5Advanced Test Reactor, 172, 177, 187, 191; design of,

160-162; post-MTR, 194, 195, 197; start-up, 174,176, 179, 183

Advanced Test Reactor Critical Facility (ATRC), 159AEC Headquarters. S e e Atomic Energy CommissionAerojet General Corporation, 140, 177

Space Program, 177Aerojet Nuclear Corporation, 196, 222; as A E C

c o n t r a c t o r, 180, 182-183, 212, 219; Chuck Rice, 176;geothermal project, 212, 215

Aircraft Nuclear Propulsion (ANP) program: 25,Assembly and Maintenance building, 123; beginningat NRTS, 116-120; cancellation, 126-127, 147; reuseof facilities, 164, 179, 222, 228; Test Area North, 120,125; tests, 120-124, 246

Airborne Security Program, 2Alaska, 138Albuquerque, New Mexico, 131alcohol fuel, 216Allegheney County Airport, 51Allen, To n y, 248Allied Chemical Company, 175, 177, 180, 182alpha particle, 20, 79, 170American West, 7, 30American Cyanamid, 98, 101, 106American Nuclear Society, 102, 170, 191-92Anders, William, 218Anderson, Clinton P., 63Anderson, William, 72Andrus, Cecil D., 220, 249; Blue Ribbon Committee, 208,

2 1 0 - 2 11; geothermal project, 214; LOFT l a y o ffs, 180;nuclear development in Idaho, 204-206, 219; wasteremoval from Idaho, 206-208

Anselmo, Al, 35anti contamination clothing (anti-C’s), 75, 89, 144Anticipated transients without scrams (ATWS), 225anti-proliferation, 208A q u i f e r, Snake River Plain: environmental monitoring,

82; liquid waste discharge, 83; James McClurestatement, 210; water supply for NRTS, 40; andN RTS Burial Ground (waste), 76, 206, 81; riskinvestigation, 211; Rocky Flats TRU waste, 208, 197-200; tritium, 220Arab oil embargo, 218

architect/engineering (A/E) firm, 46-47A rco A d v e rt i s e r, 16, 28Arco Desert, 7, 130Arco High School, 30Arco, Idaho, 36, 46, 150, 209; lit by nuclear power, 131-

132; near Naval Proving Ground, 10, 11, 12, 16;roads to, 41, 43, 120; hopes for NRTS headquartersc i t y, 30-34

Arco substation, 132Arctic, 26Arctic Circle, 138a rgon gas, 166A rgonne Fast Source Reactor (AFSR), 137A rgonne National Laboratory (“Argonne”), 36, 74, 109,

197, 208; BORAX safety test program, 128, 130-133,138; breeder reactor program, FA R E T and FFTF, 166,186-187; chemical processing, 51, 169; diphenylexperiment, 44, 49, 50, 163; Experimental BreederReactor I, 46-48, 64, 71; EBR-I accident, 135-136;field office relationships, 46, 106; Fuel Cycle Facility,137; Integral Fast Reactor, 233; MTR, 66, 111 ;o rganization of, 23; SL-1 reactor (ALPR), 138, 140;USS Nautilus reactor design, 52; ZPPR, 200

A rgonne National Laboratory-West, 129, 216, 226; EBR-II, 165-167, 218; IFR, 232, 252; lit up Arco, 131-132;and Milton Shaw, 183; NRAD, 197, 225; T R E AT,1 3 6 - 1 3 7

A r m y. S e e United States A r m yArmy Reactor Experimental Area (AREA), 140Asia, 204arrowheads, 5Atlantic Ocean, 71-72; coast, 8.Atlas-Agena rocket, 164Atomic City, Idaho, 46, 58, 145Atomic City, the (Idaho Falls), 28atomic arsenal, 126atom(ic) bomb, 14, 22, 25-26, 101atomic energy: development of, 150,184, 188, 190-192;

merit badge, 170; Navy propulsion, 86; proof ofprinciple, 66. See also nuclear power

Atomic Energy Act of 1946, 24-25, 108Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 108Atomic Energy Commission (AEC, AEC Headquarters):

and A N P program, 11 8 - 119, 125; becomesERDA/DOE, 218-219; breeder program, 184-189;chemical reprocessing, 94-98, 101, 103, 169, 172;civilian power industry, 72, 92, 108, 132-136, 163;

contract relationships, 46, 51, 53-54, 174-177, 180;decides on headquarters city, 28, 30-35, 36, 42;decides on Idaho site, 2, 15, 26-27, 42; and MTR, 50,111, 114, 194-196; NRTS name change, 217-218;N RTS reactors, 114 (ETR), 161 (ATR), 163 and 166(OMRE), 192 (EBR-I), 200 (ZPPR); organization of,24-25; organizes NRTS, 38-39, 40-44; radiationexposure standards, 59, 61, 83, 168 (CERT), 200;radioactive waste disposal/burial, 74, 79, 81-82, 198-203, 204, 207-212; safety programs, 128-130,178, 180-183, 222; SL-1, 140, 143-146, 152-156; andState of Idaho, 61-63; weapons and weapons tests, 58-59, 78-79. Mentioned, 21, 47, 56, 62, 71, 109, 158,190, 206

Atomic Energy Commission offices: AdvisoryCommittee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS), 26, 39,50, 132, 134, 154, 158; Chicago Field Office, 46,106, 187; Cincinnati Field Office, 124; Division ofNuclear Safety, 178; Division of Reactor Devel-opment, 27, 109; Division of Reactor Developmentand Technology, 174; Division of Reactor SafetyResearch, 222; Division of Waste Management andTransportation, 201, 209; Pittsburgh Field Office, 46,106; Schenectady Field Office, 30

Atomic Energy Merit Badge, 170Atomic Energy Plant Committee, 31atomic number, 79, 170atomic piles, 23atomic power, 66atomic waste, 207atomic weight, 18, 20, 170Atomics International (AI), 163atom(s), 24, 76, 108, 136, 170; irradiation, 69-70, 96;

structure of, 18, 20; uranium, in chain reactions, 21,23, 47, 50, 68, 128

Atoms for Peace, 108, 131, 134, 184Atwood, Mike, 2, 4-5, 7Avonlea, 7Av i a t o r’s Cave, 5, 7B-17 Flying Fortresses, 13B-24 Liberator, 13B-70 Bomber, 126Babcock & Wilcox Idaho Inc., B a c h e r, Robert F., 25B a n g, 21Bannock (Tribe), 3, 6-7Barnett, Steele, 189Barnwell, South Carolina, 232Bartlesville, Oklahoma, 54-57Batt, Phil, 254Beam Research Reactor, 194Beard, Vi c t o r, 116, 123

3 1 7

I n d e x

Bear Lake, 6Bechtel Company, 40, 48, 51Bechtel Corporation, 98, 215Bechtel Bettis, Inc., Bechtel BWXTIdaho, LLC, 253Becquerel, Henri, 18Beetle, the, 124Belgian Congo, 18Bennett, Wallace, 195B e rgholz, Jr., Warren E., Berlin, 22Berlin Wall, 2Bethe, Hans, 233Bettis Atomic Power Laboratory, 51-53Bevatron, 187-188Bighorn Battlefield, 250Big Lost River, 6, 39, 48Big Mamma, 246Big Southern Butte, 4,17, 98Bills, C. Wayne, 156, 197Bingham County, 42bin set, 170-172biodecontamination, 245, 249Bitteroot mountains, 6Blackfoot, Idaho, 7, 58, 173; hopes for NRTS headquarters

c i t y, 28, 32-34; roads to, 12, 39, 41-43, 48, 60 Blackfoot asylum, 32Blackfoot Chamber of Commerce, 33Blackfoot legislator, 28Blue Book, 11 0Blue Ribbon Study Commission, 208-211blowdown, 181, 222, 230Bohemia, 18Boiling Water Reactor Experiments (BORAX-I to -V),

128, 130-135, 140; in re SL-1, 138, 147Boise Cascade Corporation, 189-190, 209Boise Front fautline, 215Boise, Idaho: fallout on truck, 58-56; geothermal

resource, 214-216; in re Idaho governor, 30, 32, 43;INEC representative, 189; NRF detonation, 15; SnakeRiver Alliance, 220. Mentioned, 60, 61, 150, 189,190, 220

Boise State University, 214-215B o n n e r, John, 27Bonneville County, 33, 41-42Bonneville Hotel, 57Bonneville Power Administration (B PA) ,3 8 ,2 1 2 , 214, 216Boston, 133Bottolfson, Clarence A . , 3 2Bottolfson, Elizabeth, 32Boy Scouts of America, 170Boyson, Bigelow, 38B r a d l e y, R. Glenn, 206, 208, 210-211, 219B r a d y, Robb, 187-189Brazil, 231Bright, Glen, 134Brookhaven National Laboratory, 178Brown, Wa l t e r, 16B r u g g e r, Robert, 11 0 - 111, 196, 212, 214Buhl, Idaho, 190Bureau of Land Management, 40, 216Bureau of Mines, 248Bureau of Public Roads, 42

Bureau of Reclamation, 63Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife, 198Bureau of the Budget, 11 8Burial Ground, 155, 198-203, 211, 217B u r l e y, Idaho, 40, 209bus ride stories, 173Bush, George, 244Butte County, 30, 42Byrom, John, 66-67, 84, 105Byrne, Clarence W., 132C-54 aircraft, 120calcine, 169-172, 207, 250, 252California, 163, 196-197, 200Canada, 113, 138Carey Act of 1894, 7Carter Administration, 248C a r t e r, Jimmy, 218-219, 224, 231-231C a r v e r, Dr. Terrell O., 62-63casks, 229C Cell, 100Cenarussa, Pete, 190Centerline Road, 11Central Facilities Area (CFA, Central): EBR-I ceremony,

192; helicopter base, 2, 4; in re location of otherfacilities, 48, 51, 76, 120, 140; landfill (non-radioactive), 84-85; lit by BORAX-III, 131; origin,41, 42; reuse of NPG facilities, 101, 162; servicesmentioned, 57, 101, 109, 134, 142, 144, 170, 173; SL-1, 146

Central Power and Light Company, 177C e r e n k o v, P.A., 73Cerenkov radiation, 69, 73, 108Certificates for Heroism, 156Cesium, 190C FA-609, 41chain reaction: in bombs, 96; first experiment, 22-23; and

loss-of-coolant accident, 178; in named reactors, 128-130 (BORAX), 47 (EBR-I), 165 (EBR-II), 50 (MTR);process of, 21, 64, 68; and SL-1, 142, 150

Chemical Engineering Lab, 170Chernobyl, 255Chicago, Illinois: locale of Met Lab, A rgonne National

L a b o r a t o r y, 44, 52, 56, 64, 128, 135, 136, 187; site offirst reactor, 22-23, 192; and siting of EBR-I, 24.Mentioned, 35, 133, 196

Chicago Pile Number One (CP-1), 22, 190China Syndrome, 178, 180Christie, Michael, 206, 209Church, Frank, 220, 248; letter from Dixy Lee Ray, 206,

209;Raft River geothermal, 214, 216; Rocky Flatswaste burial, 198-201

C i s l e r, Wa l k e r, 134-135C i t i z e n ’s Advisory Committee, 253c i t i z e n ’s advisory committees, 211Clark, D. Worth, 27Clinch River, Tennessee, 226-227, 232Clinton Laboratory, 49-50Coalition 21, 254Connecticut, 52cold run, 94Cold Wa r, 24, 91, 122, 217, 219; beginning of, 25; end of,

2; environmental legacy, 244Colorado, 18, 244

Columbia University, 21Combustion Engineering (CE), 140-141, 143-144, 147,

1 5 3Comprehensive Environmental Response, C o m p e n s a t i o n

and Liability Act (CERCLA), 246-247Compton, Dr. Arthur Holly, 56Committee on Nuclear Science and Industry, 188Congressional Record, 194, 199Congressional investigation, 152-153Connecticut, 52Controlled Environmental Radioiodine Tests (CERT ) ,

1 6 7 - 1 6 9Cook, Beverly A., 224, 254, 255Cooperative Research and Development A g r e e m e n t

(CRADA), 251Containment Analysis Program, 230Corcoran, Thomas, 27Cornell University, 233Crewe, Albert, 186-187Critical Experiment Tank (CET), critical mass, 94, 97c r i t i c a l i t y, 64, 165curie(s), 60, 170Curie, Marie, 18Czechoslovakian mines, 22D&D, 163, 246Dann, Emma, 2Davis, William, E., 208D a y, Sam, 221D Cell, 100Dean, Gordon, 135deBoisblanc, Deslonde, 54, 106, 109, 160-161, 176d e c a y, radioactive, 49, 60, 109, 195, 96-97; explanation of,

76; fission product, 112, 123; heat of, 103, 171, 178,224; and liquid waste, 83-84, 221; RaLa, 96-97

D e n v e r, Colorado, 78-79Department of Defense, 249Department of Energy (DOE), 209, 215, 221, 246, 249;

Airborne Security Program, 2, 227; breeder reactorprograms, 226, 233; consent order, 246; creation of,218-219; national initiatives, 220, 244, 248, 250-251;weapons programs, 227-228

Department of Energ y, Idaho Operations Office. S e eIdaho Operations Off i c e .

Department of Interior, 218Desert Side-notched, 7Detroit, 27, 133-134, 152, 167Detroit (consultants), 27, 30-31, 39-41Detroit Edison Company, 134-135D E W Line, 138, 141Distant Early Warning System (DEW), 138, 141Doan, Richard: career and background, 54, 56-57, 158; and

nuclear safety, 66, 69, 132-133; Phillips consolidation,106; at waste disposal hearing, 74, 82

d o s i m e t e r, 145, 170D o w n e y, California, 154dry storage, 231Dubois, Idaho, 58, 61Dugway Proving Ground Chemical Radiological Unit,

1 4 6 - 1 4 7Duluth, Minnesota, 106Duquesne Light Company, 72Durham, Carl T., 79


3 1 8

Dworshak, Henry, 119, 126, 132, 152-153Eagle Rock, 7Early Waste Retrieval Project, 203East Butte, 4, 15Eastern Idaho Chamber of Commerce, 192Eastern Idaho Labor and Trades Council, 192Eastern Idaho Regional Development Alliance, 254East Idaho Nuclear Industry Council (EINIC), 191, 209,

212, 217, 228East Monument Road, 11EG&G Idaho, 163, 215, 219, 246-248Einstein, Albert, 22E i s e n h o w e r, Dwight D., 106-108, 118, 126, 131electron(s), 18, 20, 73, 127Elks Club (Idaho Falls), 177e m e rgency core cooling system (ECCS), 180, 224, 230Encyclopedia Britannica, 18e n e rgy conservation, 216E n e rgy Reorganization Act of 1974, 218E n e rgy Research and Development A d m i n i s t r a t i o n

(ERDA), 218-219Engineering Research Office Building (EROB), 249Engineering Test Reactor (ETR), 162, 169, 177, 197, 230;

compared to ATR, 160; development of, 11 4 - 115; andend of MTR, 191, 194-195; retired, 226

Engineering Test Reactor Critical Facility (ETRC), 11 5 ,154, 161

Engine Room Number Three, 91England, 167Enrico Fermi Atomic Power Plant (Fermi plant),

134-135, 167E n t e r p r i s e, 73, 91Environmental Impact Statement (EIS), 208, 209environmental monitoring, 82, 210, 217, 220Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), 204, 218environmental protection, 217environmental restoration, 244Erkins, Robert, 190, 197-198Eskildson, Hugo N., 158Europe, 21-22, 186Evans, John, 219, 220-221, 229Evendale, Ohio, 120, 125evaporation ponds, 221excursion (nuclear), 150; defined, 68, 128; planned tests,

128, 131, 134-136; SL-1, 148, 154Expended Core Facility (ECF), 86-89, 165; ECF

Engineering, 88Experimental Beryllium Oxide Reactor (EBOR), Experimental Boiling Water Reactor (EBWR), 132Experimental Breeder Reactor-I (EBR-I), 50, 58, 75, 249;

and plutonium, 135, 136; design and build decisions,37-38, 45-48; first criticality, 64-66, 71; fuelmeltdown, 135-136, 150; in re location of otherfacilities, 17, 76, 130, 221, 246; National HistoricLandmark, 192-194; retired, 165

Experimental Breeder Reactor-II (EBR-II), 129, 218;design and build decisions, 135-137, 165-167, 186;fuel recycling, 165-166; and IFR, 232-237; supportsF F T F, 186-187, 226; retired, 237, 252

Experimental Dairy Farm, 15, 167Experimental Organic Cooled Reactor (EOCR), 163, 253Exxon Nuclear Idaho Company, 228Fairchild Engine and Airplane Corporation, 25

fallout, 170.Farnsworth Electric Company, 88Farragut Avenue, 11Farragut Naval Training Center, 8Fast-Flux Test Facility (FFTF), 186-189, 226Fast Reactor Test Facility (FARET), 166-167, 184,

1 8 6 - 1 8 9Fast Spectrum Refractory Metals Reactor (710), Fat Man, 23Federal Bureau of Investigation, 244Federal Housing Administration, 31Federal Power Commission (FPC), 166Federal Primary Aid System, 41Federal Water Pollution Control A d m i n i s t r a t i o n

(FWPCA), 198Fermi, Enrico, 21-23Fermi reactor, 152F.H. McGraw Company, 51Fiesta Ware, 18Fillmore Avenue, 140, 142-143First Tu e s d a y, 200fission(s), 49, 66, 135; defined, 20-22; heat of, 51, 121,

178; of uranium, 23-24, 47, 94, 128, 165fission product(s), 49, 123, 165; behavior during accident,

128, 165, 178-179, 225-226, 230; and MTR fuel, 49-51, 69, 84, 109, 112; RaLa, 96, 98; waste and wastestorage, 80, 103, 171; separation from spent fuel, 137,166; and SL-1, 146, 154

Flight Engine Test (FET) facility, 122Fluor Corporation, 51, 169, 220-221Fluor Report, 220Fluorinel process, 229flux wire, 69, 141, 149FMC Corporation, 187Foote, Riley, 173Ford, Gerald, 218Fort Belvoir, Vi rginia, 141Fort Hall, Idaho, 6Fort Hall Indian Reservation, 7Foster Wheeler Company, 98-99Frank Phillips Men’s Club, 57, 177Ft. Peck Dam, 28Ft. Peck, Montana, 27, 34Ft. St. Vrain, 231, 235, 240fuel, fossil, 132, 135, 166, 178, 184-186, 219fuel, chemical (re)processing of, 69, 94-104, 169, 229,

2 3 1 - 2 3 3fuel cycle, 195, 252fuel, graphite, 231fuel(s), nuclear: A N P program, 25, 11 5 - 116, 121-123;

assembly(ies), 78, 109, 111, 136, 161; ATR, 160-161,174, 183; breeding potential, 24, 111, 135, 165;commercial use, 108, 133; EBR-I, 23, 46-47, 64, 135-138; EBR-II, 165-166; enriched uranium, 23, 24, 46-47, 49-51, 64, 96, 113, 121; ETR, 11 4 - 115, 160; green,69, 96, 104; Hanford slug, 93, 99, 102, 169; IFR, 186-187, 232; irradiated, 82, 89, 96, 112, 226; irradiationsource, 69, 70, 11 2 - 113, 190; LOFT, 178-179; MTR,49-51, 67-70, 109, 11 2 - 116, 162, 195; MTR fuelreprocessing, 94-97, 103-104; naval vessels, 22, 70, 86-88, 91, 160, 226; plutonium, 162, 165, 184, 186, 195;recycling, 135-137, 165-166; safety testing, 116, 128-137, 177-179, 230, 252; SL-1 and Army programs, 25-

26, 138, 142, 154, 169; space applications, 127, 231;TMI, 224-226. Mentioned, 130, 134, 179, 219, 220.See also Fuel, spent nuclear

fuel, spent nuclear: commercial reactors, 229, 231-232;IFR, 233, 252; MTR, 50, 69, 84, 96-98, 112; Navy, 70,88-89; shipment of, from Hanford, 58; Shippingport,89; storage of, 99, 208, 229, 231-232, 235, 244; aswaste, 207-209, 229, 252. See also Fort St. Vrain; fuel,chemical (re)processing of; fuel, nuclear, irradiationsource; fuel, nuclear, recycling; RaLa;

Fuel Alcohol Plant, 248Fuel Behavior Program, 230Fuel Cycle Facility (FCF), 129, 137, 166Fuel Element Burn Tests, 11 6Fuel Rod Analysis Program (FRAP), 230Fuel Storage Building, 99Full-Length Emergency Core Heating Tests (FLECHT),

2 3 0Galvin, Robert, 250Galvin Task Force, 255G a m e r t s f e l d e r, Carl, 121Gamma Facility, 11 2 - 113, 162G a r d n e r, J.S., 28Gas Cooled Reactor Experiment (GCRE), 140, 145, 154,gas-core nuclear rocket concept, 127Gaseous Diffusion Plant, 24, 30Geiger counter, 131, 170General Electric Corporation, 51, 91, 114, 132, 177, 179;

contractor for direct-cycle airplane engine, 11 9 - 1 2 5 ,127; MTR retirement, 195-196; SL-1 accident, 147-149, 152, 155-156;

General Services Administration, 216Geneva, Switzerland, 108, 131-132, 134, 162geothermal programs, 212, 214-215, 219G e r m a n y, 21-22Gibson, Pat, 13Gillette, Robert, 183Ginkel, William L., 172, 176, 177, 179, 192; appointed

IDO manager, 158-160; Distinguished Service Aw a r d ,194; cooperation with State of Idaho, 187-189, 195,199, 204-206; quoted, 158, 174, 180, 198; wastemanagement, 198-199, 201

GM meters, 68Golden, Colorado, 78G o o d a l e ’s Cutoff, 7g o rge hook device, 7G o v e r n o r’s Committee on the Use of Atomic Energy and

Radiation Hazards, 62Great Basin, 6Greenland, 56, 154-155G r o b e rg, Delbert, 31Groton, Connecticut, 86g r o u n d w a t e r, 214Groundwater Alliance, 220Groves, Leslie, 22-24Gunn, Ross, 22Guam, 8Hafstad, Lawrence R., 27, 36half-life, radioactive, 79, 96, 169; calculating waste

d i s c h a rges, 83-84; explained, 76; radioiodine, 98, 168;Russell Heath studies, 109-11 0

Hammond, Clyde, 74, 80Handbook 52, 83

I N D E X

3 1 9

Hanford Engineering Works (Hanford site), Hanford,Washington, 30-31, 35, 86, 199, 208; concrete batchplant, 40-41; FFTF, 186-189, 226; in re Idaho ChemPlant, 99, 103; plutonium manufacture, 19, 23, 56,227; potential RaLa site, 96, 98; RadiologicalSciences Department, 58; waste management, 74,172, 206-207. See also Fuel, nuclear, Hanford slugs

Hansen, Orval, 181, 186, 217, 218Haroldson, Ray, 131H a r r i s b u rg, Pennsylvania, 224Hawaii, 8, 11 2H a w l e y, Clyde, 167health physicist (HP), 81, 109, 163, 172, 188; destructive

tests, 116, 123, 130; nature of work, 59, 66, 74-75, 77-78, 164, 194; quoted, 77 (Henry Peterson), 84, 105(John Byrom), 121-122 (Carl Gamertsfelder); SL-1accident, 143-144, 146-147, 152

Heath, Russell, 105, 109-11 0Heat Transfer Reactor Experiments (No. 1, 2, 3), 11 7 ,

121-123, 150, 246Henscheid, Joe W., 112, 154, 173H e l l ’s Half Acre, 251Herrington, John, 228H i t l e r, Adolph, 22Highway 20, 73, 140, 142-144, 161Highway 20/26, 130-131, 155High Temperature Marine Propulsion Reactor

(630-A), 187Holden, Bill, 29, 31, 33Holifield, Chet, 79, 179Homer Laughlin Company, 18Hoover Dam, 192H o s t e t t e r, G. M., 60-61Horan, John, 84, 116, 198, 201; CERTtests, 167-168;

testimony before JCAE on waste management, 74,79, 82-83; and A N P program, 123-124; SL-1, 143,1 4 5

hot cell, 166, 249, 254-255Hot Cell Building, 111Hot Critical Experiment (HOTCE), hot run, 98, 101-103 Hot Shop (Test Area North), 177, 187; A N P program use

of, 121, 122, 126; LOFTuse of, 179, 222; SL-1 useof, 147-149; ML-1 use of, 155. See also Test A r e aN o r t h .

H u ffman, John, 36human experimentation. S e e Controlled Environmental

Radioiodine Te s t s .Hydra-Co Enterprises, 216Idaho, East, 16, 187, 204, 212, 229Idaho, siting of federal and nuclear facilities: Bevatron

(National Accelerator Laboratory), 187-188;BORAX, 130; A N P, 118, 120-121, 126-127; A r m yreactor programs and SL-1, 138, 154; Chem Plant,96-97; EBR-I, first nuclear electric generation, 64-66; EBR-II, 135; FFTF, 186; MTR, 50, 108; NRT S ,4, 17, 27, 44, 54-56; Nautilus and Navy programs,52-53, 86-90, 92; Navy Proving Ground andordnance tests, 8-11, 16

Idaho, State of, departments: Aeronautics, 31; Board ofEducation, 191, 195; Board of Health, 61-62, 188,200; Commerce and Development, 188, 192; Fishand Game, 195-196; Health, 59, 61-62, 188; Health

and Welfare, 245; Highway, 32, 48; INEELOversight, 254; Labor, 60-64; Reclamation Engineer,61; Water Resources (IDWR), 198, 212, 214, 216

Idaho, State of, Governors: advocate state’s rights, 61-63,206; change in 1977-1978, 219; and monitoringI N E L waste, 58, 200, 206, 220-221; and roads, 41-43; and Rocky Flats waste, 208-211; Statehouseexhibit, 190; support A N P, 126; support MTR, 194-196; visit from David Lilienthal, 34. See also n a m e sof Idaho governors

Idaho, State of, locale: ATR biggest project, 162;business sign, 73; fallout, 58-59; in name of INEL,217-218; potatoes, 113. See also Idaho Falls; SnakeRiver Plain A q u i f e r

Idaho, State of, “public,” reactions to: Reagan militarybuildup, 229; SL-1, 150; waste management, 198-201, 207-211, 220-221, 244

Idaho Accelerator Committee, 187“Idaho and the Atom” television program, 190Idaho Chemical Processing Plant (ICPP, CPP, Chem

Plant): Andrus tour of, 207-208; contractors, 106,177, 182; history, operations, 58, 94-105; injectionwell, 220-221; fuel processing, 69-70, 88, 94-105;siting and construction, 38, 40, 51, 118; SL-1m o r t u a r y, 144, 146-147; warm water experiment,204-205; waste calcining, 169-172, 196, 229,231;waste storage, 82-83, 137, 252. Mentioned, 4,85, 158, 167, 216, 227, 232

Idaho Congressional delegation, 42, 59, 180, 189, 191, 194

Idaho Conservation League, 220, 227Idaho Daily Statesman (Boise), 150Idaho Environmental Advisory Committee, 61Idaho Falls, Idaho: air monitoring, 58; becomes NRT S

headquarters site, 28-35; business, civic leadersa c t i v i t y, 119-120, 158, 185, 186-191, 206, 212, 221;impact of NRTS on, 56-57, 66, 216; locale ofN RT S / I N E L facilities, 180, 247-248; low-head bulbturbine, 216; road to Site, 33, 39, 41-43, 60, 137,160-161, 173. Mentioned, 7, 53, 183, 194, 200, 215,250, 251

Idaho Falls Chamber of Commerce, 27, 28, 57, 191;Blue Ribbon Committee, 208, 210; campaign forheadquarters city, 31-34, 36

Idaho Falls City Council, 209Idaho Falls High School, 190-191Idaho Falls Little T h e a t e r, 156Idaho Falls Rotary Club, 194Idaho Farm Bureau, 209Idaho Legislature, 60, 62, 188-191, 194Idaho National Engineering and Environmental

Laboratory (INEEL), 244, 251-255. See also I d a h oNational Engineering Laboratory; National ReactorTesting Station

I N E E LC i t i z e n ’s Advisory Board, 253I N E L / I N E E L Research Center, 245, 247-251, 253I N E L / I N E E L Supercomputing Center, 181Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL):

description, 2; designated National EnvironmentalResearch Park, 209; name changes, 217-218, 244;t a rget of protesters, 219-220; injection well, 220-221;Superfund Site, 246-247. See also National ReactorTesting Station; Idaho National Engineering and

Environmental LaboratoryIdaho Nuclear Corporation (INC), 176, 177, 179-183Idaho Nuclear Energy Commission (INEC), 189-191,

194-196, 204, 208Idaho Nuclear Technology and Engineering Center, 252.

S e e Idaho Chemical Processing PlantIdaho Operations Office (of the AEC, DOE) (IDO,

DOE/ID): 192, 196, 216, 227; and CERT, 167-169;and contractors, 106, 176, 182, 219, 228, 247, 253;environmental monitoring, 58-63, 105, 130, 219;location of, 28-36; opens new facilities, 120, 134,140; organizes NRTS, 40-43, 44, 46, 48; SL-1accident response, 143-147, 153, 155-156; wastemanagement, 76, 78-85, 199-20, 210-211, 220-221,229. See also names of managers

Idaho Operations Office, departments and off i c e r s :Engineering and Construction, 74; Health and Safety,48, 60, 74, 83, 116, 123, 143, 167; Wa s t eManagement, 201

Idaho Potato Growers and Shippers, 219Idaho Power Company, 38, 209, 216Idaho Reclamation Association, 198Idaho Settlement Agreement, 254Idaho State Encyclopedia, 30Idaho State Hospital South, 32(Idaho) State Task Force (of Gov. Samuelson), 198-201,

2 0 6Idaho State University (ISU, Idaho State College), 32,

58, 187-88, 208Illinois, 132, 189, 196, 208Imperial Roman Villa, 18India, 231Indiana, 54Indians, 7Initial Engine Test (IET), 120injection well(s), 200, 220-221Inland Northwest Research Alliance, 253Integral Fast Reactor (IFR), 233, 251-252, 254Interim Acceptance Criteria, 182interim storage, 169, 208Internuclear Company, 160International Conference on Atomic Energ y, 131International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation

(INFCE), 232International Organization of Economic Cooperation and

Development, 226Interstate Commerce Commission, 147iodine. S e e radioactive iodine.ionization chamber, 59Ireland, 72irradiated fuel. S e e fuel(s), nuclear irradiated uranium. S e e fuel(s), nuclearirradiated waste, 78irradiation, neutron: of diphenyl, 44, 49, 163; in MTR,

49, 67-71, 110, 11 2 - 115, 191, 194-195; non-irradiation of mercury, 123; of wax in Piqua reactor,163; of seeds, 170, 204; of SL-1 items, 145-146; ofwood products, 189-190; of Idaho pheasants, 195-1 9 6

irradiation, gamma, 73, 11 2 - 113, 190isotope(s). S e e fuel(s), nuclear; names of elementsJ-4 engine, 120Japan, 8, 15, 113; Hiroshima, 23; Nagasaki, 23


3 2 0

Johnson, Allan C., 118, 133, 145-146, 153, 158, 177Johnson, Lady Bird, 192Johnson, Lyndon B., 192-193Johnson, Wilfrid E., 194Johnston atoll, 8Johnston, Leonard E. “Bill:” career at NRTS, 27, 74, 106,

11 6 - 118; background and personality, 28-30, 34-35;o rganizes NRTS, 32, 36-46, 56, 61, 211. Mentioned,66, 211

Joint Committee on Atomic Energy (JCAE), 63, 108, 11 9 ,194; and A N P program, 11 8 - 119, 126;created/abolished, 25, 218-219; hearings, 27, 187, 74,79-80, 82-83, 153; response to SL-1, 145, 152-153;and Shaw, 176, 180, 184. See also names ofcommittee members

Jones, R.M. “Murph”, 94Jordan, Len B., 62, 170, 180Jordan Redectors, 143Just, Kent, 208, 210-211Kaiser Engineers, 114, 179K a i s e r- Wilhelm-Institut, 22Kansas, 219-220Keirn, Donald J., 25, 120K e i s e r, Dennis, 247-248Kempthorne, Dirk, 244, 247K e n n e d y, John F., 126, 147, 186Ketchum, Idaho, 220Kiwanis Club, 57, 211Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory (KAPL), 30, 51,

99, 158Korean Wa r, 40, 51, 97-98Kunze, Jay, 127, 147-148, 212, 214-215Kwajalein, 8Lake Pend Orielle, 8Lambson, Kay, 8L a rge Ship Reactor A( A 1 W-A). S e e A 1 WL a rge Ship Reactor B (A1W-B). S e e A 1 WLarsen, Margaret, 12Larsen, John, 12Larson, Archie, 100Latter Day Saints, 158lava (rock) formations: in Burial Ground, 74-76, 201; at

Chem Plant blast site, 40; in Snake River Canyon, 58;in Snake River Plain, 4-5, 10, 36, 36, 41, 161

Lawrence Radiation Laboratories, California, 200League of Women Voters, 211Lebanon, 2, 227LCell, 104-105Lee, Robert, 198L e e p e r, Charles, 183Leisen, Hazel, 144, 156Lemhi mountains, 6Leonard, Byron, 160Leverett, Mike, 96Lexington Project, 118, 126L i b b y, Willard F., 190, 195-196L i c h t e n b e rg e r, Harold, 130-131Lilienthal, David, 25, 27, 34, 41, 96Lima, Ohio, 228Lincoln Boulevard, 11, 116, 120, 192Liquid Metal Fast Breeder Reactor (LMFBR), 187. S e e

also A rgonne National Laboratory, breeder reactor;Atomic Energy Commission Breeder Program; Clinch

River; Department of Energ y, breeder program;Experimental Breeder Reactor-I and -II; fuel(s),n u c l e a r, breeding potential; Integral Fast Reactor;

Little Boy, 23Lockheed Martin Idaho Technologies Company, 246Los Alamos, New Mexico (Los Alamos National

Laboratory), 23, 40, 96-98, 146, 214, 231, 233loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA), 178, 181-182, 222, 225,

2 3 0Loss of Fluid Test (LOFT), facility, 4, 175, 216, 247;

program to 1974, 134, 177-183, 197, 230; and T h r e eMile Island tests, 222-224, 226

Lost River Desert, 7Lost River ranges, 6Lost Rivers Transportation Company, 106Luedecke, A.R., 146Lyon, Joe P., 179Lyons, Kansas, 201M1-A1 Abrams Main Battle Tank, 28-229Ml-1 Test Area (ARA-IV), 154, 165M a c k a y, Idaho, 10, 12Malta, Idaho, 212Manhattan District, 18, 22-23, 30, 56, 11 8Manhattan Project, 28, 39, 56, 74; as career background,

30, 186, 231, 233; purpose of, 22-23Mars, 127Marshall Islands, 8Marvel, Winfield, 28, 30-31Mass Detonation Area, 15, 16Massachusetts, 11 9Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), 13, 11 8Materials Testing Reactor (MTR): campaign to prevent

decommissioning of, 191, 194-197, 212; contractors,53-58, 177; design, construction of, 42, 48-51, 66-69,84; fuel reprocessing, 94-96, 98, 103, 137, 169; fuelas gamma source, 11 2 - 113, 116, 189; physicsresearch, 108-11 2 , 11 3 - 115; operations, 66, 68-71, 77-78, 86-89, 160, 162, 230; plutonium fuel, 162; RaLa,96-98, 104; siting of, 38-40; and “tarpaper palace,”57. Mentioned, 122, 128, 143, 161, 226

McClure, James, 189, 210, 214, 227, 233, 247-248 McDermott, E.F., 29, 31McGaraghan, Jack, 52M c G a r a g h a n ’s Sea, 52McMillian, Fred, 66meltdown, 165, 226m e r c u r y, 123, 195M e s e r v e y, Richard, 123, 164, 246M e t a l l u rgical Laboratory, 22-23, 56Middle Butte, 4, 15, 129Middle East, 214M i d w a y, Idaho, 14, 46Midway atoll, 8Mink, Dr. Roy, 215Minuteman rocket, 126Mississippi River, 194M i s s o u r i, 8, 9Mobile Low-Power Reactor No. 1 (ML-1), 140,

154-155, 165Monsanto, 94Montana, 5-6, 27-28, 34, 188Montana State University, 167, 171Morrison-Knudsen Company, 8, 10

Moulton, Chet, 31Mountain Home Air Base, 162Mud Lake, Idaho, 43, 105, 120-121, 173 M u r p h y, Lt. Governor Jack, 190M u r r a y, Thomas, 71NaK (alloy of sodium [Na] potassium [K]), 48, 84, 85,

137, 171Naples, Italy, 18N a rw h a l, 92National Academy of Science (NAS), 187-188, 199National Aeronautic and Space Administration (NASA),

127, 164, 177National Bureau of Standards, 83National Accelerator Laboratory, 187National Center for Disease Control, 85National Committee on Radiation Protection, 59National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 200, 220National Environmental Research Park (NERP), 209National Oceanic and Atmospheric A d m i n i s t r a t i o n

(NOAA), 39National Reactor Testing Station (NRTS): Army Reactor

Experimental Area, 140; Av i a t o r’s cave at, 5-7;background radiation, 58-60; Burial Ground, 74-82,85, 88, 155, 197-203; change initiated by Shaw, 174-187; construction safety, 60-61; contractors, 54-58,158, 176-177, 180-181, 182-183; creation ando rganization, 26-28, 35, 36-43, 106;description/remoteness of, 2-5, 174; expansion of, in1950s, 108-115, 162; first three reactor projects(EBR-I, MTR, S1W), 44-53, 64-73; mercury, use of,123; name changes, 217-218, 244; non-nuclearresearch, 212, 216; President Lyndon Johnson visits,192-194; programs circa 1963, 159-173; radiations a f e t y, 89, 167-169; Radioactive Waste ManagementComplex, 203, 206-211; reactor safety testing, 128-137, 164-165, 177-183; security of, 2, 227; siting ofheadquarters city, 29-34; SL-1 accident, 142-149,154-157; and State of Idaho, 60-63, 187-191, 194-203, 204-212; Test Area North, 116-120, 125, 127;waste management, 74-85, 102, 197-203, 206-211 .Mentioned: 22, 64, 86, 93, 102, 138, 142. See alsonames of contractors, reactors, facilities, andprograms; Idaho National Engineering Laboratory;Idaho National Engineering and EnvironmentalL a b o r a t o r y

National Science Foundation (NSF), 195-196Native American artifacts, 5-7, 253Natural Circulation Reactor (S5G), 165N a u t i l u s (prototype), 4, 70, 71-72, 128. See also Nautilus

(submarine); Submarine Thermal ReactorN a u t i l u s (submarine), 51-53, 72, 86, 88-89, 189. See also

Nautilus (prototype)Naval Ordnance Plant, 8, 13, 32, 34-35Naval Ordnance Test Facility, 17Naval Proving Ground (NPG): family life, 11-12, 38;

ordnance research, 13-17; purpose and description of,1 0 - 11, 39, 91; T N T cleanup, 247, 251; use offacilities, materiel, by NRTS, 41, 59-60, 101, 109,131, 162, 170-171

Naval Reactors Facility (NRF), 4, 84, 90-91, 93, 116, 165,189, 216

N a v y. S e e United States NavyN E RVA, 177

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Neutron Radiography Reactor (NRAD), 197, 225neutron(s): defined, 20, 47, 60; demand for, 11 3 - 114, 194;

in Hanford reactors, 96; in reactors, 44, 78; physics,1 0 9 - 111; in uranium, 18, 21-24. See also neutron flux;irradiation, neutron; half-life; fuel(s), nuclear;excursion; names of reactors

neutron flux, in reactors: ATR, 160-161; ETR, 11 4 - 11 5 ;EBR-I (the “fast flux” reactor), 47-48; FFTF, 187;Hanford, 96; HTRE-2 reactor, 122; MTR (the “highflux” reactor), 49-50, 68-69, 70, 109-111, 11 3 - 11 4 ;SL-1, 149. See also Experimental Breeder Reactor- I ;Materials Testing Reactor; neutron(s)

Nevada, State of, 188, 206, 208, 216Nevada Test Site, 58, 79, 219New England states, 218New Jersey, 17New Jersey Central Power and Light, 177-178New Mexico, 19, 220New Production Reactor (NPR), 227-228New Waste Calcining Facility (NWCF), 196, 231New York, 30, 35, 51, 99, 107, 11 8New Yo r k e r magazine, 231New York Ti m e s, 197Nichols, Clay, 214-215Nike-Zeus missile, 126Nixon, Richard, 200, 212, 217Nobel laureate, 21, 56, 184Nooter Engineering Works, 94North Pole, 72Novia Scotia, 72NS Savannah, 222nuclear airplane, 116-127. See also Aircraft Nuclear

Propulsion ProgramNuclear Effects Reactor (FRAN), nuclear energ y, 25-26, 166; promotion of, in Idaho, 170,

185, 188, 189, 191, 192; released in chain reaction, 21Nuclear Energy Museum, 190Nuclear Energy Park, 204Nuclear Energy Research Initiative (NERI), 252nuclear flight. S e e Aircraft Nuclear Propulsion Program;

nuclear airplaneNuclear Navy, 51, 72, 86, 174, 186, 197, 238, 252;

Expended Core Facility, 86-89; and MTR, 194-195;training, 89-93. See also names of reactors; fuel(s),n u c l e a r, naval vessels; Rickover, Hyman

nuclear power plant: army mobile, 25-26, 138, 154-155;commercial industry, 106, 160, 177, 180, 184, 197,251-252; commercial safety, 128, 156, 226, 131, 169,179, 186; potential in Idaho, 197, 204; in surfacevessels, 90, 187. See also fuel(s), safety testing

Nuclear Power Subcommittee of the National GovernorsAssociation, 219

nuclear propulsion. S e e Aircraft Nuclear PropulsionProgram; Nuclear Navy

Nuclear Radiation Hazards Safety Committee, 188Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), 197, 218, 224,

226, 252nuclear research, 197, 196-197; needed after World War 2,

26, 44, 106; post-1990, 251, 254. See also C E RT;fuel(s), nuclear, safety testing; names of reactors

nuclear rocket program, 124nuclear terrorism, 207nuclear waste. S e e radioactive waste

nuclear weapons, 74, 78N u c l e o n i c s magazine, 128, 136nucleus, 20, 50, 100N u r e m b e rg Code, 168N y e r, Warren, 133Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Tennessee, 44, 28-30, 81,

109, 158; A N P shielding research, 121; Chem Plantdevelopment, 94-99; gaseous diffusion and uraniumenrichment, 23-24; MTR development, 36, 49-50, 66,69; reactor at Geneva Conference, 108; shipments to,from NRTS, 35, 102, 167; training of NRT Semployees at, 54-56, 101-102

Odessa, Texas, 57Ofte, Don, 244, 252-253Oil, Chemical, and Atomic Workers International Union

Local 2-652, 152Old Faithful, 130Operable Units (OUs), 247Operating Area Confinement (OAC), 203Operation Wiener Roast, 11 6O p p e n h e i m e r, J. Robert, 11 8Oregon, 5, 188Oregon Trail, 7O rganic Moderated Reactor Experiment (OMRE), 163,

1 8 9Pacific fleet, 10Pacific Northwest, 190, 216Pacific Ocean, 72, 86; coast, 8; war in, 8Paige, Bernice, 102Paige, Hal, 90Pakistan, 231Palmyra atoll, 8Parsons, Ralph M. company, 229Pastore, John O., 82Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, 133, 231Pearl Harbor, 8Pennsylvania, 72, 89. 133, 225P e r r y, Myrna, 57, 173Pershing II missile, 227Persian Gulf Wa r, 229Peterson, Henry, 77Philipson, J. Bion, 41, 66, 133, 177Phillips, Frank, 57Phillips, Jane, Sorority, 57, 177Phillips Petroleum Company: ATR development, 160-

162; dress code for women, 173; employment safety,61, 63; LOFT, 178-200, 222; MTR set-up, research,66-69, 71, 84, 109-114, 162; as NRTS contractor, 54-58, 106, 176-177, 180, 182-183; Research Division,54, 56; rocket propulsion research, 127; SNAP-10A,164; SPERT, 133-134; Waste Calcining Facility, 169-170. Mentioned, 156, 168. See also Doan, Richard;MTR; fuel(s), nuclear; Safety Test EngineeringProgram (STEP)

Phillips P h i l t ro n magazine, 58, 63Phoenix, 195Pike, Sumner, 25-26Piqua, Ohio, 163Pit 9, 203Pitman, Frank K., 209Pitrolo, Augustine, 244, 251-252P i t t s b u rgh, Pennsylvania, 46, 51-53plutonium, 2, 204, 222; bred from uranium-238, 47, 135,

184-187, 221; half-life, 76; reactor fuel, 136-137, 166,195, 232-233; waste burial/retrieval of, at NRT S ,197-203, 208-211; in weapons, 19, 23, 24, 78-79, 96-97, 207, 227-228. See also fuel(s), nuclear; Hanford;Rocky Flats; TRU; waste

Pocatello, Idaho: and siting of NRTS headquarters, 32-34;Naval Ordnance Plant, 8-11, 15, 17. Mentioned, 3, 40,58, 187, 189

Pocatello Army Air Base, 13Pocatello Chamber of Commerce, 27Pocatello Rotary Club, 40Polaris submarines, 126Ponderosa Drive, Idaho Falls, 56Popular Mechanics magazine, 74Portable Medium-Power reactor, 154Portland Avenue, 11Portugal, 18P o s t - R e g i s t e r, 31, 35, 127, 180, 187, 210, 221Potato Processors of Idaho, 11 3p o w e r-cooling-mismatch (PCM), 225Power Demonstration Reactor Program, 133-134, 163Power Burst Facility (PBF), 177-178, 197, 222, 225-226,

2 4 7Pratt & W h i t n e y, 11 9Prestwich, Susan, 215Princeton University, 118, 196Process Makeup area, 100P ro g re s s i v e, 221projectile points, 5Project Elsie, 15Project Marsh, 15Project X, 228Proposition 3, 254Protection Technology Idaho, Inc., proton(s), 18-20, 76R&D magazine “R&D 100 Award, 251radiation, 49, 72, 82, 164; alpha, 59, 60, 79-80, 97;

background at NRTS (and fallout), 58-61, 109, 11 6 ;beta, 49, 59, 60, 69, 80, 97; detection, 58-59, 69, 105,75, 143, 200; gamma, 59-60, 69-70, 97; gamma,from reactor test operations, 121, 126, 143, 164;gamma, from waste and spent fuel, 80, 86; hazardsymbol, 74, 170; protection standards, 62, 105, 217;shielding, 53, 66-69, 170; used for materials testing,49, 70, 109. See also calcine; CERT; irradiation,gamma; irradiation, neutron; MTR; radiationd o s e / e x p o s u r e

radiation dose/exposure: to public, 60-61, 85, 200; in reSL-1, 143-144, 146-148, 152, 156; to workers, 57, 59,70, 78, 89, 97, 194, 200, 202

Radioactive Waste Management Complex (RWMC), 197,203, 207, 210-211

radioactivity: at Chem Plant, 100-102; discovery of, 18-20; Idaho State control of, 62, 190, 206; lessening of,due to passage of time, 69; preventing spread of, inwork areas, 74, 77, 89; in Raft River geothermalw a t e r, 214; released by NRTS experiments, 120, 130,135. See also half-life, radioactive; NaK; radiation;radioactive iodine; radioactive waste

radioactive iodine (radioiodine), 76, 164, 224; product offuel dissolution, 98, 104-105; released by SL-1accident, 145, 150; pathway to human thyroid, 167-169


3 2 2

radioactive waste, 74, 77, 137, 166, 217, 252; fromreprocessing spent fuel, 26, 51, 94, 98, 102-105, 172;liquid, 82-84, 103, 169, 200, 220; Snake RiverAquifer issue, 198-203, 206-211, 219-221; solid, atN RTS Burial Ground, 74-85, 197-203, 206, 219-220;as states rights issue, 62-63, 199. See also calcine;EBR-II; Fuel Cycle Facility; Hanford; IFR;Radioactive Waste Management Complex: RockyFlats Fuel Fabricating Facility; Waste Calcine Facility

Radioactive Waste Management Complex (RWMC), 197,203, 207, 210-211

Radiological Assistance Plan, 143radium, 18, 73Raft River Pilot Plant (geothermal energy project), 213,

215-216, 248, 250Raft River (area of Idaho), 212-215Raft River Rural Electrical Cooperative, 212, 216Rainbow Five, 8RaLa (radioactive lanthanum-140), 96-98, 101,104-105R a m e y, James, 188Rapid Geophysical Surveyor, 250R a y, Dixie Lee, 206-208, 217-218, 222reactivity-initiated accidents (RIA), 225Reactivity Measurement Facility (RMF), 111 - 11 2reactor concepts, 217, 232-233; boiling water, 128-132,

134, 138, 197; cavity (gas core), 127; gas cooled, 140,154-155, 177; lithium cooled, 189; organic cooled,163, 166, 189; pressurized water, 134, 197, 230; watercooled, 114, 163, 184; water moderated, 162, 177,184, 195, 231, 233. See also reactor(s); names ofr e a c t o r s

reactor cores. See names of reactors; (Naval ReactorsFacility) Expended Core Facility; fuel(s), nuclear

reactor vessel: EBR-I, 45; HTRE-3, 123; SL-1, 139-141,147, 149, 157

reactor(s): AEC siting policy for, 26-27; control rod, 160-161, 174, 251; coolant, 51, 53, 82, 92, 128; decline inresearch on, 196-197; first, 20-23; generatee l e c t r i c i t y, 66, 132; influence of MTR on design, 109;potential in Idaho, 204; purpose of early NRTS, 44-53; shielding studies, 53, 66-68, 70. See also names ofreactors; radiation; Idaho Chemical Processing Plant,fuel reprocessing; excursion (nuclear); fuel(s),nuclear; nuclear power plant; radioactivity; loss-of-coolant accident; Safety Test Engineering Program;S e m i s c a l e

reactor(s), breeder. See Experimental Breeder Reactor-I, -II; Liquid Metal Fast Breeder Reactor; Integral FastReactor; Clinch River

reactors(s), commercial. See nuclear power plants,commercial industry; names of reactors

reactor(s), prototype. See names of reactors (SubmarineThermal Reactor; A 1 W; S5G); United States A r m y ;Power Demonstration Reactor Program

reactor(s), zero- or low-power, 64, 111, 115, 128, 133, 137,177. See also Mobile Low-Power Reactor No. 1.

Reactor Test Facility, 48R e a d e r’s Digest, 207Reclamation Act of 1902, 7, 198Reagan, Ronald, 216, 226, 232Registered National Historic Landmark, 192Reid, Don, 94, 98-99, 104R E L A P, 226, 230

REMs (roentgen equivalent man), 60Remote Analytical Facility (RAF), 97R e u t h e r, Wa l t e r, 152R e x b u rg, Idaho, 43, 120Rice, Chuck, 173, 176, 181Richardson, Bill, 254-255R i c k o v e r, Hyman, 30, 94, 192; first criticality of S1W, 52,

69, 71-73; influence on Shaw, 174, 176; and Nautilusprogram, 51, 52; philosophy of training, 89-90, 92-93

Robins, C.A., 30-32, 34, 41-43, 60, 62Robinson, Clark, 13-14Robison, W.L., 60-61rocket propulsion, 127Rocky Flats Fuel Fabricating Facility, 221, 227, 244, 254;

waste shipment to NRTS, 78-82, 201-202, 210;plutonium fire of 1969, 197-198; retrieval of wastebarrels, 202-203

roentgen(s), 112, 156, 170Rogers Hotel, 34, 36, 38, 58, 60, 180, 224R o o n e y, Fred, 187-188Roosevelt, Franklin D., 22Rosegate, 7Rotary clubs, 34, 36, 40, 211Russia, 122, 249Rutledge, Gene, 189-191, 194-196, 198-199S 1 W. S e e Submarine Thermal Reactor.S5G, 91-92, 165, 238Safety Test Engineering Program (STEP), 134, 164, 177,

1 8 1 - 1 8 2Salmon, Idaho, 172, 190Salt Lake City, Utah, 53Sandia National Laboratory, 230San Jose, California, 127Samoa atoll, 8Samuelson, Don, 179, 184, 189; promotes nuclear energ y,

189-191; fights for MTR, 194-196; Task Force reinjection well, 198-199, 201, 206

Savannah River, South Carolina, 96, 103-104, 172S c h e n e c t a d y, 38, 158S c h l e n d e r, Edwin, 212, 214S c h l e s i n g e r, James, 218, 219Schmaltz, Bruce, 83S c h o o n o v e r, A.J., and Sons, 40S c i e n c e magazine, 183Scott A i r-Pak(s), 75, 143Scoville, John A., 11scram, 66, 128, 130, 135Seabees, 141S e a b o rg, Glenn, 184, 188, 189, 192, 195; and breeder

r e a c t o r, 184-186; and removal of waste from Idaho,201; and “suppressed” report, 199

S e a w o l f, 88Semiscale, 181-182, 222, 224Sellafield, UK, 250“710 reactor,” the, 127severe fuel damage (SFD), 225S h a w, Milton, 174, 192-194, 218, 222; and Phillips, 176-

177; and LOFT, 179-183; and breeder program, 184-187, 189, 217, 232

Sheehan, Gary, 22Shield Test Pool Facility (SUSIE), Shinkolobwe mine, 18, 22Shippingport Atomic Power Station, 72, 89

Shoshone-Bannock people, 3, 5-7Simpson, John, 51, 53, 71Site, the. See National Reactor Testing Station.Sixth Supplemental National defense Appropriation A c t

of 1942, 8SL-1. S e e Stationary Low-Power Reactor No. 1S l a n s k y, Cyril, 208Smithsonian Institution, 184Smithsonian magazine, 207Smylie, Robert, 62-63, 126, 161, 187-188, 192Snake River, 6, 33, 40, 58, 198, 212, 216Snake River Alliance, 220-221, 254Snake River Canyon, 58Snake River Plain, 4-6, 206, 208, 210-211Snake River Plain A q u i f e r. S e e A q u i f e r, Snake River

P l a i n .Snake River Trout Farm, 190SNAPTRAN, 164-165S o l b e rg, E.J., 30South Africa, 249South Carolina, 189South Dakota, 28South Idaho Pre s s, 198Soviet Union. See Union of Soviet Socialist RepublicsSpalding, Eliza, 7Space port, 254Sparks, Walter C., 11 3Special Isotope Separation (SIS), 227-228Special Power Excursion Reactor Tests No. 1-4 (SPERT- I

to -IV): evolution of program, 133-134, 154, 165,225-226; results of tests, 134, 147, 178. Mentioned,140, 196

Special Response Team, 2, 7, 227Specific Manufacturing Capability (SMC, Project X),

2 2 8 - 2 2 9spent nuclear fuel. S e e fuel, spent nuclearSpherical Cavity Reactor Critical Experiment, 127Spickard, John, 144, 156Sputnik, 126State Highways. See Highway 20; Highway 20/26State Hospital South, 32St. Louis, Missouri, 94Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), 226Stationary Low-Power Reactor No. 1 (SL-1), 177, 200;

history of, and accident, 138-149; impact of accident,1 5 0 - 1 5 7

Stationary Medium-Power Reactor No. 1, 141S t e i g e r, Susan, 215S t o k e r, Roger, 215Strauss, Lewis, 25, 27Submarine Thermal Reactor (S1W, STR), 4, 38-39, 84;

first criticality, 69-72; Nautilus prototype, 51-53;nuclear submarine training, 88-93

Subsurface Disposal Area, 77Sun Va l l e y, Idaho, 108Superbomb, 40Superfund Site, 246, 250Sutton, Mark L., 99-100Sutton, Tom, 29S e w i c k l y, Pennsylvania (coal), 11 3Sylvania Electric Products Company, 109Systems for Nuclear Auxiliary Power (SNAP), 164, 158Table Rock Mesa, Boise, 15

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Ta b e r, Idaho, 10Taconite contracting Corporation, 106Tamplin, A r t h u r, 200Tautphaus Park, 158Ta y l o r, Dr. John, 70TCell, 103Technical Services Building, 192Technical Support Building (TSAand TSB), 249Technology Transfer program, 251Tennessee Eastman, 158Tennessee Valley A u t h o r i t y, 248Terreton, Idaho, 43, 120Tarpaper Palace, 57Terteling Company, J.A. 10Test Area North (TAN), 177, 247; site of A N Pp r o g r a m ,

4, 120, 124-125; site of LOFTexperiments, 178-179;site of 630-A r e a c t o r, 187; site of SMC, Project X,228; site of SNAPexperiments, 164-165. See alsoHot Shop

Test Grid No. III, 11 6Test Reactor Area (TRA), 4, 162, 216, 226, 247; liquid

waste retention basin, 83, 84; radiation survey, 77;reactor operations, 108, 160, 162, 174. See alsonames of reactors

Third World, 126“This Atomic World” exhibit, Idaho Falls, 190Thomas, Marion E., 54Thompson, Theos J., 200Thousand Springs, Idaho, 58, 198Three Cell Personnel Entry, 203Three Mile Island (TMI), 156, 224-226, 230, 233, 255Charles Till, 232-234, 236Ti n g e y, Fred, 246T N T, 13-16, 23, 243, 251Transient Reactor Test (TREAT) Facility, 136, 140, 165,

186, 233transuranic (TRU) waste, 77, 208, 220, 244; definition of,

79-80; retrieval of, at Burial Ground/RWMC, 200-203, 208-211. See also Rocky Flats; plutonium;waste, nuclear

Transuranic Storage Area, 77Trent, Charles H., 177Trident, 227Triga, 197Trinity fireball, 19tritium, 96, 220-221, 227-228 Truman, Harry S., 25, 27, 40, 78, 106, 108Tuttle, A. R., 35Twin Falls County Republican Central Committee, 190Twin Falls, Idaho, 59, 190, 220Twin Falls Times News, 190Two-Phase Flow Loop, 226Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), 25, 108,

132, 138, 228; arms/technology race with U.S., 40,59, 91, 126

Union Pacific Railroad, 8, 10-11United Auto Workers (UAW), 152 United Kingdom, 250United Nations, 107-108, 131, 162United States, 108, 184, 186, 194, 214; arms/technology

race with USSR, 25, 40, 59, 91, 126; atomic bomb,22-23. See also Manhattan Project

United States Advanced Battery Consortium, 217

United States Air Force, 25-26, 108, 115, 118, 120-126,141, 222

United States Air Force, 108, 115, 141, 222; and nuclear-powered airplane engine, 25-26, 11 8 - 1 2 7

United States A r m y, 28, 40, 118, 126; Corps of Engineersassists NRTS, 39-40; detonation research at NPG, 13-14, 16; food irradiation, 112, 189; nuclear power plantprogram, 25, 138-142, 154-155, 165; Project X(Specific Manufacturing Capability), 228-229. Seealso Manhattan District

United States Congress, 227; pass A t o m i cE n e rgy/ERDA/DOE acts, 24-25, 108, 218; authorize(or not) projects at NRTS, 73, 184, 206, 214, 228,247; Clinch River project, 226, 232; InteriorCommittee, 241; response to 1970s energy crisis, 212,214. See also Joint Committee on Atomic Energy

United States Geological Survey, 40, 61; and NRT SBurial Ground, 74-76, 82-83, 198-199

United States Marines, 2, 12-13, 227United States Naval Research Laboratory, Wa s h i n g t o n ,

D.C., 21United States Navy: and AEC acquisition of proving

ground, 27, 35, 36, 38, 41; as customer for materialstesting reactors, 70-71, 115, 160-161, 194-195, 197,226, 238; Expended Core Facility, 86-89; NRT Straining school, 89-93, 238; operates Arco NavalProving Ground, 8-17, 39; operates prototypereactors, 51-53, 72, 112, 165, 238; pursues nuclearpropulsion, 21-23, 26, 44; reprocesses spent navalnuclear fuel, 104, 240; role in Idaho SettlementAgreement, 238, 241-243. Mentioned, 46, 77, 84,106, 126, 137, 141, 252. See also Naval ProvingGround; Rickover, Hyman; Watkins, James D.; namesof naval reactor prototypes (Submarine T h e r m a lR e a c t o r, A 1 W, S5G); Naval Reactors Facility; nuclearn a v y

United States Public Health Service, 198United States Soil Conservation Service, 40United States Supreme Court, 152United States Tr e a s u r y, 15United States Weather Bureau, 39-40, 60-61, 85, 123, 130University of Idaho (U of I), 113, 204-205, 253University of Chicago, 22, 56University of Missouri, 196University of Missouri Research Reactor, 133University of Oklahoma, 214University of Rochester, 158U n t e r m y e r, Samuel, 128, 130Uranium: decay products, 18, 20; depleted, 15, 18, 79,

228-229; discovery and use, 18-27, 184-187, 231;recovery of, from spent fuel, 94-105, 169-170, 229,232. Mentioned, 2, 56, 81, 146, 158. See also atomicbomb; fuel(s), nuclear; fuel, spent nuclear; half-life;names of reactors

US News and World Report, 207Utah, 53, 188, 195, 212, 214-215Utah Power and Light (UP&L), 38, 131-132Valley Forge, 192Van deGraff generators, 20Vietnam, 17, 155, 222Voelz, George, 138, 144, 156, 168Vycor glass molds, 166Wade, Troy E., 221, 228, 249

Wake atoll, 8Wa l k e r, Marvin, 40Walters, Leon, 233Ward, J. Carlton Jr., 25Warm Springs, Boise, 215WASH-1539, 208, 210-211Washington (state), 188-189Washington Post, 2 0 6waste, non-nuclear, 82, 84-85waste, nuclear. See radioactive waste Waste Area Groups (WAGs), 247Waste Calcining Facility, 169-172. See also c a l c i n i n gWaste Experimental Reduction Facility (WERF), 247, Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, 219-220, 254Waste Processing Building, 100. See also Idaho Chemical

Processing PlantWatkins, James D., 93Watson, Don, 187-188Waymack, William M., 25Wehmann, George, 201, 203We i n b e rg, Alvin, 50Weiner Roast No. 1, 11 6We i z s a c k e r, Von, 22West, the American, 158, 191, 194, 214West Germany, 231West Monument Road, 11Western Beam Research Reactor (WBRR), 194-195Western Governors Association, 191Western Interstate Nuclear Compact, 191Westinghouse Company, 189; contractor for Nautilus

nuclear power plant, 51-53, 69-72; developer ofcommercial power plants, 152, 156, 177, 179

White Horse Bar, 38Whitman, Narcissa, 7Wilcynski, John, 252-253Williams, Charles A. 219, 221Willow Creek Building (WCB), 249Wilson, Al, 208Wilson, Charles, 11 6Wilson, Robert, 153Windscale Pile No. 1 reactor, UK, 250Winsdcale Reprocessing Plant, UK, 167Wi s c o n s i n, 8Witham, Kirby, 48Woman Ordnance Worker (WOW), 11 - 1 2Working Agreement, 221World War II, 7-17. See also atomic bomb; Manhattan

P r o j e c tWyoming, 6Yellowstone National Park, 32-33Zaire, 18Zero Power Physics Reactor (ZPPR), 136, 200Zero Power Reactor No. 3 (ZPR-III), 162, 177Zinn, Wa l t e r, 44; and breeder reactor ideas, 23-24, 135-

136; and siting of facilities, 26, 36-38, 48, 50-51; andEBR-I, 40, 64-66, 135-136; and BORAX and SPERTprograms, 130-134

zirconium, 94, 99, 187, 224, 234Z i r c a l o y, 179


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Educated at Georgetown University andthe University of Pittsburgh, Susan M. Stacy became a resident of Boise, Idaho,in 1973, She became interested in historical research while serving the City ofBoise as director of the Boise City Planning Department from 1979 to 1986.She returned to school, obtained a Master of History at Boise State University,and began a career as a research historian and author. Proving the Principle isher fourth book, the others being When the River Rises, Flood Control on theBoise River, 1943-1985; Conversations, A Companion Book to Idaho PublicTelevision’s Proceeding On Through a Beautiful Country; and Legacy of Light,A History of the Idaho Power Company. In addition to writing full-lengthbooks, she does historical research for reports, biographies, photographicexhibits, National Register nominations, Historic American Engineering Recordand Historic American Building Survey reports, and other historical research forpublic, corporate, legal, and private clients.

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