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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT Appellate Case: 16 – 14969 FF TITLE 440: CIVIL RIGHTS, OTHER CIVIL _______________________________________________________________________________________________ IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS DIVISION OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS TRUMBULL COUNTY, OHIO CASE NO. 08 DR 00213 , CASE NO. 09 DV 00028 , CASE NO. 09 DR 00392 _______________________________________________________________ IN THE COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN AND MARION COUNTY, FLORIDA CASE NO: 2016-DR-3626-FJ _____________________________________________________________ Christopher Edward Hallett Plaintiff - Appellant VS State of Ohio, Et al Defendants - Appellees ____________________________________________________________ RE: FEDERAL CASE: 5:16-CV-238-OC-32-TJC-PRL ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA, OCALA DIVISION ____________________________________________ PRACTITIONERS JUDICIAL REPORT BY CHRISTOPHER EDWARD HALLETT (LIC. NO. 443079) _______________________________ 16062 SW 34 CT RD, Ocala, Florida, 34473, Ph. (352)470-8460 [email protected]

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

Appellate Case: 16 – 14969 FF

TITLE 440: CIVIL RIGHTS, OTHER CIVIL _______________________________________________________________________________________________

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS

DIVISION OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS TRUMBULL COUNTY, OHIO

CASE NO. 08 DR 00213, CASE NO. 09 DV 00028, CASE NO. 09 DR 00392 _______________________________________________________________

IN THE COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

IN AND MARION COUNTY, FLORIDA

CASE NO: 2016-DR-3626-FJ _____________________________________________________________

Christopher Edward Hallett

Plaintiff - Appellant VS

State of Ohio, Et al Defendants - Appellees

____________________________________________________________

RE: FEDERAL CASE: 5:16-CV-238-OC-32-TJC-PRL

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA, OCALA DIVISION

____________________________________________

PRACTITIONERS JUDICIAL REPORT BY

CHRISTOPHER EDWARD HALLETT (LIC. NO. 443079)

_______________________________

16062 SW 34 CT RD, Ocala, Florida, 34473, Ph. (352)470-8460 [email protected]

In The

One Hundred-Fifteenth Congress Of The

United States of America

UNDER:

28 U.S. Code §§§ 2201, 2202, 2415

IN THE MATTER OF:

Christopher Edward Hallett VS State of Ohio, Et al ____________________________________________________________

TITLE 440: CIVIL RIGHTS, OTHER CIVIL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

APPELLATE NO: 16-14969 ____________________________________________________

ARTICLE 1, SECTION 9, CLAUSE 8

(A.K.A. THE EMOLUMENTS CLAUSE) Non est arctius vinculum inter hominess quam jusjurandum

______________________________________

PRACTITIONERS JUDICIAL REPORT PREPARED BY:

CHRISTOPHER EDWARD HALLETT Fiduciary Lic. No. 443079

_______________________________

Christopher E. Hallett 16062 SW 34 CT RD Ocala, Florida, 34473 (352) 470-8460 [email protected]

I

PREFACE The following report is presented for review in good faith as a “Friend of the

Court” under License Number (443079) as a Fiduciary Practitioner consisting of

9,301 words and 39 pages. (not including Dicta and Appendix sources) My license

holds, and is subject to, the “High Standards” consistent with other Fiduciary

Practices of Care, Sense of Fair Play, and Equal Protections under the Law. My

work as presented to this court, in efforts to, “Assist the Case Presentations” in

working with the Plaintiffs in these matters, toward Protecting the Integrity of

these Proceedings, the Court, and these Plaintiffs in congruence. A task not

undertaken lightly as the very course of multiple lives will be forever altered,

therefore the utmost care must remain as the “Standards of Practice” to insure the

continuation, and Protection, of THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED

STATES be interpreted as intended by the 56 men who constructed it. [see

“Statement of Claim” filed March, 2016]

What may seem rudimentary to so many when in consideration of “Basic

Equal Protections” and “Basic Due Process” as related to this Practice; are luxuries

it has never been afforded. The fact it has become arrogant and hostile is a “Side

Effect” of this type of exile. It is for this reason my personal choice of profession

was outside of this area of service for years. That was until I received the knock on

my door which forever changed the course of my life, and forced me into action

for no other purpose than “Self Preservation” in my own case.

Like so many before me I had, for the longest time, given up and decided not

to care. I then remembered this: But when a long train of abuses and usurpations,

pursuing invariably the same Object evinces a design to reduce them under

absolute Despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such

Government, and to provide new Guards for their future security.

II

NOTICE OF APPEARANCE

On March 13, 2017 POTUS issued a lawful EO 13781. As a Licensed

Fiduciary Practitioner, and established Friend of the Court under that License,

citing Qui Tam Provision 31 U.S. Code, § 3730(b),(c), I am following it in a

continued effort to expose these continued assaults upon the court by frauds upon

the court and Prosecutorial Misconduct/s. [see “Serving the Court”, pg 12]

III

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Content Page

Table of Authorities …..……………………………………………………….. V

The Declaration of Independence ………………………………………….…. VI

Personal Cases ………………………………………………………………… XII

Cases Studied (cited in various works) ……………………………………… XIII

Return to Parliamentary Practices ……………………………………………….. 1

The Negative Nexus ……………………………………………………………. 3

Blacks Law Text referenced …………………………………………………….. 3

Amicus Curiae Brief (Hallett v Ohio, Et al) Quotes ……………………………. 4

Yale Law Journal “Scamming, The Misunderstood Confidence Man” Quotes … 6

Defining the Practice of Law as a Business of Law ……………………………… 7

Democracy in America (1840) Quote ……………………………………….. 7

Article 1, Section 9, Clause 8 …..…….………………………………………….. 8

Devil’s Advocate Viewpoint …………………………………………………… 10

SIDE EFFECT BENEFIT TO THE STATES ……………………………….. 11

SERVING THE COURT ……………………………………………………… 12

Hallett v Ohio, Et al …………………………………………………………… 14

Altenhofen v Texas, Et al …………………………………………….………… 16

Malmstrom v Utah, Et al ………………………………………………..………. 17

Conclusions …………………………………………………………………….. 19

Practitioners Affidavit ……..…………………………………………………… 22

Judicial Dicta (lined pages provided for convenience) …………………………. 23

.

IV

APPENDIX

Content Tab

Department of Justice Letter …………………………………………………. 1

George Washington’s First Inaugural speech ……………………………………. 2

Criminal Law 2.0 (Hon. Alex Kozinski) ……………………..………………….. 3

Yale Law Journal “Scamming, The Misunderstood Confidence Man” ………..… 4

Social Security Entitlement Map of Title IV (4) funding incentives ……………. 5

Office of Child Support Enforcement (2016 Preliminary Report) ……………. 6

Federalist Paper 43 ……………………………………………………………… 7

Amicus Curiae Brief (Hallett v Ohio, Et al) ……………………………………. 8

Judicial Accountability Report (John Gentry CPA. Lic. No. 27062) ……………. 9

Notice of Limited Appearance ..………………………………………………… 10

Statement of Claim ……………………………………………………………… 11

.

V

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Black’s Law Dictionary, Tenth Edition, pages of text referenced in this Brief Best interest of the child (1876) ………………………………………..… pg 191

Best-interest-of-the-child-doctrine (1954) ……………………………..… pg 191

Breach of Loyalty (16c) ………………………………………………..… pg 226

Breach of Statutory Duty (1844) ………………………………………..…. pg 226

Confidence (14c) …………………………………………………………… pg 361

Confidence Game (1856) …………………………………………………… pg 361

Confidence Trick ……..…………………………………………………… pg 361

Confidence Man (1849) …………………………………………………… pg 361

Constitutional-Doubt Canon ………………………………………………. pg 377

Constitutional-fact Doctrine (1937) ……………..………………………… pg 377

Crimen Falsi (17c) …………………………………………………………. pg 454

Dereliction of Duty ……………………………………………………….. pg 537

Derelict-official act (1912) ………………………………………………… pg 537

Falsus in uno Doctrine (1956) ……………………………………………. pg 720

Fruit of the Poisonous Tree Doctrine (1979) ………………………………. pg 784

Fruits of a crime (1854) …………………………………………………… pg 785

Agency Jurisdiction ……………………………………………………….. pg 980

Legal Monopoly (18c) …………………………………………………….. pg 1160

Monopoly (16c) ……………………………………….…………………… pg 1160

Bilateral Monopoly (1906) …………………………………………..…… pg 1160

Monopoly Leveraging (1982) ……………………………………………... pg 1160

Monopoly Power (1954) ………………………………………………..… pg 1160

Parental-preference doctrine (1974) ……………………………………... pg 1298

.

VI

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS

Amendment I

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.

Amendment VII

In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.

Amendment IX

The enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.

Amendment XI [referenced in context to Fiduciary Duty]

The Eleventh Amendment does not protect state officials from claims for prospective relief when it is alleged that state officials acted in violation of federal law, nor does it usurp the Fourteenth Amendment Rights retained by the People. Tolman v. Finneran, 171 F. Supp. 2d 31 (D. Mass. 2001)

Amendment XIV

The 14th Amendment to the Constitution was ratified on July 9, 1868, and

granted citizenship to all persons born or naturalized in the United States, which included former slaves recently freed. In addition, it forbids states from denying any person "life, liberty or property, without due process of law" or to "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONAL ARTICLES / CLAUSES Article four (4), Section four (4) Article one (1), Section nine (9), Clause eight (8)

VII

Declaration of Independence

IN CONGRESS, July 4, 1776. The unanimous Declaration of the thirteen united States of America, When in the Course of human events, it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve the political bands which have connected them with another, and to assume among the powers of the earth, the separate and equal station to which the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God entitle them, a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel them to the separation. We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.— � That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed,— � That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness. Prudence, indeed, will dictate that Governments long established should not be changed for light and transient causes; and accordingly all experience hath shewn, that mankind are more disposed to suffer, while evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing the forms to which they are accustomed. But when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same Object evinces a design to reduce them under absolute Despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such Government, and to provide new Guards for their future security.— � Such has been the patient sufferance of these Colonies; and such is now the necessity which constrains them to alter their former Systems of Government. The history of the present King of Great Britain is a history of repeated injuries and usurpations, all having in direct object the establishment of an absolute Tyranny over these States. To prove this, let Facts be submitted to a candid world.

He has refused his Assent to Laws, the most wholesome and necessary for the public good. He has forbidden his Governors to pass Laws of immediate and

VIII

pressing importance, unless suspended in their operation till his Assent should be obtained; and when so suspended, he has utterly neglected to attend to them. He has refused to pass other Laws for the accommodation of large districts of people, unless those people would relinquish the right of Representation in the Legislature, a right inestimable to them and formidable to tyrants only. He has called together legislative bodies at places unusual, uncomfortable, and distant from the depository of their public Records, for the sole purpose of fatiguing them into compliance with his measures. He has dissolved Representative Houses repeatedly, for opposing with manly firmness his invasions on the rights of the people. He has refused for a long time, after such dissolutions, to cause others to be elected; whereby the Legislative powers, incapable of Annihilation, have returned to the People at large for their exercise; the State remaining in the mean time exposed to all the dangers of invasion from without, and convulsions within. He has endeavored to prevent the population of these States; for that purpose obstructing the Laws for Naturalization of Foreigners; refusing to pass others to encourage their migrations hither, and raising the conditions of new Appropriations of Lands. He has obstructed the Administration of Justice, by refusing his Assent to Laws for establishing Judiciary powers. He has made Judges dependent on his Will alone, for the tenure of their offices, and the amount and payment of their salaries. He has erected a multitude of New Offices, and sent hither swarms of Officers to harrass our people, and eat out their substance. He has kept among us, in times of peace, Standing Armies without the Consent of our legislatures.

IX

He has affected to render the Military independent of and superior to the Civil power. He has combined with others to subject us to a jurisdiction foreign to our constitution, and unacknowledged by our laws; giving his Assent to their Acts of pretended Legislation: For Quartering large bodies of armed troops among us: For protecting them, by a mock Trial, from punishment for any Murders which they should commit on the Inhabitants of these States: For cutting off our Trade with all parts of the world: For imposing Taxes on us without our Consent: For depriving us in many cases, of the benefits of Trial by Jury: For transporting us beyond Seas to be tried for pretended offences For abolishing the free System of English Laws in a neighbouring Province, establishing therein an Arbitrary government, and enlarging its Boundaries so as to render it at once an example and fit instrument for introducing the same absolute rule into these Colonies: For taking away our Charters, abolishing our most valuable Laws, and altering fundamentally the Forms of our Governments: For suspending our own Legislatures, and declaring themselves invested with power to legislate for us in all cases whatsoever. He has abdicated Government here, by declaring us out of his Protection and waging War against us. He has plundered our seas, ravaged our Coasts, burnt our towns, and destroyed the lives of our people. He is at this time transporting large Armies of foreign Mercenaries to compleat the works of death, desolation and tyranny, already begun with circumstances of Cruelty & perfidy scarcely paralleled in the most barbarous ages, and totally unworthy of the Head of a civilized nation. He has constrained our fellow Citizens taken Captive on the high Seas to bear Arms against their Country, to become the executioners of

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their friends and Brethren, or to fall themselves by their Hands. He has excited domestic insurrections amongst us, and has endeavoured to bring on the inhabitants of our frontiers, the merciless Indian Savages, whose known rule of warfare, is an undistinguished destruction of all ages, sexes and conditions.

In every stage of these Oppressions We have Petitioned for Redress in the most humble terms: Our repeated Petitions have been answered only by repeated injury. A Prince whose character is thus marked by every act which may define a Tyrant, is unfit to be the ruler of a free people. Nor have We been wanting in attentions to our Brittish brethren. We have warned them from time to time of attempts by their legislature to extend an unwarrantable jurisdiction over us. We have reminded them of the circumstances of our emigration and settlement here. We have appealed to their native justice and magnanimity, and we have conjured them by the ties of our common kindred to disavow these usurpations, which, would inevitably interrupt our connections and correspondence. They too have been deaf to the voice of justice and of consanguinity. We must, therefore, acquiesce in the necessity, which denounces our Separation, and hold them, as we hold the rest of mankind, Enemies in War, in Peace Friends. We, therefore, the Representatives of the united States of America, in General Congress, Assembled, appealing to the Supreme Judge of the world for the rectitude of our intentions, do, in the Name, and by Authority of the good People of these Colonies, solemnly publish and declare, That these United Colonies are, and of Right ought to be Free and Independent States; that they are Absolved from all Allegiance to the British Crown, and that all political connection between them and the State of Great Britain, is and ought to be totally dissolved; and that as Free and Independent States, they have full Power to levy War, conclude Peace, contract Alliances, establish Commerce, and to do all other Acts and Things which Independent States may of right do. And for the support of this Declaration, with a firm reliance on the protection of divine Providence, we mutually pledge to each other our Lives, our Fortunes and our sacred Honor. [The 56 signatures on the Declaration were arranged in six columns:] [Column 1] Georgia: Button Gwinnett Lyman Hall George Walton

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[Column 2] North Carolina: William Hooper Joseph Hewes John Penn South Carolina: Edward Rutledge Thomas Heyward, Jr. Thomas Lynch, Jr. Arthur Middleton [Column 3] Massachusetts: John Hancock Maryland: Samuel Chase William Paca Thomas Stone Charles Carroll of Carrollton Virginia: George Wythe Richard Henry Lee Thomas Jefferson Benjamin Harrison Thomas Nelson, Jr. Francis Lightfoot Lee Carter Braxton [Column 4] Pennsylvania: Robert Morris Benjamin Rush Benjamin Franklin John Morton George Clymer James Smith George Taylor James Wilson George Ross Delaware: Caesar Rodney George Read Thomas McKean [Column 5] New York: William Floyd Philip Livingston Francis Lewis Lewis Morris New Jersey: Richard Stockton John Witherspoon Francis Hopkinson John Hart Abraham Clark [Column 6] New Hampshire: Josiah Bartlett William Whipple Massachusetts: Samuel Adams John Adams Robert Treat Paine Elbridge Gerry Rhode Island: Stephen Hopkins William Ellery Connecticut: Roger Sherman Samuel Huntington William Williams Oliver Wolcott New Hampshire: Matthew Thornton

XII

ACTS OF CONGRESS Fair Debt Collections Act Freedom of Information Act Bradley Amendment Violence Against Women Act Title IV of the Social Security Act EXECUTIVE ORDERS 13781 13520 STATE CONGRESSIONAL ACTS Best Interest Doctrine PERSONAL RELATED CASES BY STATE STATE OF OHIO IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS, DIVISION OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS, TRUMBULL COUNTY, OHIO CASE NO. 08 DR 00213 CASE NO. 09 DV 00028 CASE NO. 09 DR 00392 STATE OF FLORIDA IN THE COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, IN AND MARION COUNTY, FLORIDA Case Number: 2016-DR-3626-FJ

XIII

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA, OCALA DIVISION FEDERAL CASE: 5:16-CV-238-OC-32-TJC-PRL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS, FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT Appellate Case: 16 – 14969 FF CASES STUDIED (CITED IN VARIOUS WORKS) Hardwick V. Vreeken, (2017)

Guaranty Trust Co. v. York (1945)

BRADY v. MARYLAND 373 U.S. 83 (1963)

U.S. V American Telephone & Telegraph, (D.D.C. 1982)

United States v. Microsoft Corporation 253 F. 3d 34 (D.C. Cir 2001)

Tolman v. Finneran, 171 F. Supp. 2d 31 (D. Mass. 2001)

Wyatt v. Cole 504 U.S. 158 (1992)

Ulrich v. Butler No. 09-7660

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803)

Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980)

Mitchum v. Foster, 407 US 225 - Supreme Court (1972)

Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 155-56, 52 L. Ed. 714, 28 S. Ct. 441 (1908)

Warnock v. Pecos County, 88 F.3d 341 (5th Cir. 07/08/1996)

Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 664, 39 L. Ed. 2d 662, 94 S. Ct. 1347 (1974)

Davis v. Wechsler, 263 US 22, 24 (1923)

Brennan v. Stewart, 834 F.2d 1248, 1252 (5th Cir. 1988)

Wilkinson v. Torres, 610 F .3d 546, 554 (9th Cir. 2010)

Jeffers v. Gomez, 267 F.3d 895, 905-06 (9th Cir.2001)

Porter v. Osborne, 546 F.3d 1131, 1137 (9th Cir.2008)

XIV

Jenkins v. McKeithern 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969)

Haines v. Kerner, 92 S. Ct. 747 (1969)

Picking v. Pennsylvania R. Co. 151 F.2d 240

Sherar v. Cullen, 481 F 945

Miller vs. U.S. , 230 F. 486,489

Sperry v. State of Florida ex re. The Florida Bar, (1963)

Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957)

Gould v. Artisoft, Inc.,1 F.3d 544, 548 (7th Cir. 1993)

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US 436, 491

Sims V. Aherns, 271 s.w. 720 (1925)

Heckler v. Community Health Services of Crawford Cty., Inc., 467 US 51 - Supreme Court (1984)

Sampson v. Murray 415 U.S. 61, 88 (1974)

Meyer v. Nebraska 262 U.S. 390, 399, 401 (1923)

Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356 (1990)

Schumacher v. Schumacher, 627 N.W.2d 725, 729 (2001)

ServiceMaster of St. Cloud v. GAB Business Servs., Inc., 544 N.W.2d 302, 306 (1996)

Zirinsky v. Sheehan, 413 F.2d 481 (8th Cir. 1969)

Stuempges v. Parke, Davis & Co., 297 N.W.2d 252, 255 (Minn. 1980)

Stepnes v. Ritschel, 663 F.3d 952, 963 (8th Cir. 2011)

Cavanaugh v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 941 F.Supp. 872, 879 (D. Minn. 1996)

1

RETURN TO PARLIAMENTARY PRACTICES

1) The People of the United States “Brexit’d” from Parliamentary Practices of

Law some two-hundred forty (240) years ago. Yet we have seem to come “Full

Circle” within our Judiciary, and returned to these same “Practices and Suffrages”

from which the Constitution was written to prevent. It does not matter what the

Law intends, if no one is “Practicing the Law” as it was written and intended; or

even worse, intentionally misrepresenting the Law based on the agenda of the ones

who stand to benefit from it. [Social Control vs. Domestic Tranquility]

Those who cannot remember the mistakes of the past are condemned

to repeat it. ~ George Santayana

Quoted from THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENCE

Such has been the patient sufferance of these Colonies; and such is now the necessity which constrains them to alter their former Systems of Government. The history of the present King of Great Britain is a history of repeated injuries and usurpations, all having in direct object the establishment of an absolute Tyranny over these States. To prove this, let Facts be submitted to a candid world.

2) This can be evidenced based on my case work in the Federal Article III

Courts as it relates to the lower State Equity Courts. In State Equity Court

Proceedings, decisions are made and the documents are prepared “before” entering

into the Court Room. The “Hearings” are merely to present the “Appearance of

Due Process” as a means of “Creating Billable Hours”. Not actual Due Process

itself as in most of these State cases, unbeknownst to at least one party as that party

has been either betrayed by counsel, or is unrepresented by counsel. It is this

problem that generated the “Dear Colleague Letter” from the U.S. Department of

Justice on which much of my work is based. Upon closer review of the cases cited

2

within the Letter, I soon came to realize this problem in these lower state Equity

Courts was an “Epidemic” caused by the Practices to which I am referring.

Confirmation of this is can be found at the top of the Letter as it reads as follows:

U.S. Department of Justice Civil Rights Division Office for Access to Justice

When I read the bold underlined office title, I knew I was neither crazy nor was I

alone in this situation. I also knew my gut was right about challenging this by

calling it what it is. “A MONOPOLY”; as there is only one organization to get a

referral in the event of a problem.

3) These lawyers working in lower state Equity Courts have managed to

institute Rules and Policies inconsistent with “Equal Protections” required by the

Fourteenth Amendment converting the “Judiciary Scale” into a “Hammer”. Rules

such as misapplications of the state’s “Best Interest Doctrine” which lawyers use in

these Equity Courts to thumb their noses at the Fourteenth Amendment, and the

Due Process Clause contained therein. Intentional misapplications of the “Bradley

Amendment”, intentional misapplications of the “Violence Against Women Act”

used to promoted more conflicts which equates to “Billable Hours”, and the never

ending cycle of these case begins. [see The Negative Nexus on page 3]

4) The party retaining the ability, financial resources, to fight becomes the

“Target” of the lawyers who know and understand the “Process” is constructed in

such a manner to paint that party into a corner and bleed every penny possible from

that party. In many of these cases these lawyers are guilty of “Barratry &

Treason upon the Court” due to these Practices. [cited within the Kozinski

Journal] A read of Mitchum v. Foster, 407 US 225 - Supreme Court (1972), and

Hardwick V. Vreeken, (2017), brings multiple similarities into “Plain View”.

3

THE “NEGATIVE NEXUS”

Negatio destruit negationem, et ambae faciunt affirmationem Negatio duplex est affirmatio

Article IV (4), Section IV (4), 29 U.S. Code § 1109

Article I (1), Section IX (9), Clause VIII (8), 28 U.S. Code § 1927 __________________________________________________________________ 5) The following is what has transpired in the lower Family Court in this case

through these “Defective Practices” which establish this “Negative Nexus”.

[A significant portion of evidence and testimony corrupted / tainted, and not based in truth or on fact/s. ie: having to attempt to prove a non-existent piece of evidence or face contempt charges.]

[Negative Nexus] [(-1 x -1) = 1] What the parties see = What the court sees __________________________________________________________________ 6) These Rules and Policies are clearly exploited for the Financial Gains of the

Practitioners operating within these proceedings. The U.S. Code calls them “Unjust

Enrichments”, Black’s Law calls them fruits of a crime (1854), The Constitution

calls them “Emoluments”. These Emoluments are clearly designed to provide

“Motivating Factors” to insure Practitioner Compliance while also insuring their

silence, or even motivating them to commit Perjury which taints the entire

proceeding as “Poisoned Fruit”. Reference to the afore mentioned is clearly

defined within the Preferred Black’s Law Text of this court as follows:

Black’s Law Dictionary, Tenth Edition, pages of text referenced Best interest of the child (1876) ………………………………………..… pg 191

Best-interest-of-the-child-doctrine (1954) ……………………………..… pg 191

Breach of Loyalty (16c) ………………………………………………..… pg 226

Breach of Statutory Duty (1844) ………………………………………..…. pg 226

Confidence (14c) …………………………………………………………… pg 361

4

Confidence Game (1856) …………………………………………………… pg 361

Confidence Trick ……..…………………………………………………… pg 361

Confidence Man (1849) …………………………………………………… pg 361

Constitutional-Doubt Canon ………………………………………………. pg 377

Constitutional-fact Doctrine (1937) ……………..………………………… pg 377

Crimen Falsi (17c) …………………………………………………………. pg 454

Dereliction of Duty ……………………………………………………….. pg 537

Derelict-official act (1912) ………………………………………………… pg 537

Falsus in uno Doctrine (1956) ……………………………………………. pg 720

Fruit of the Poisonous Tree Doctrine (1979) ………………………………. pg 784

Fruits of a crime (1854) …………………………………………………… pg 785

Agency Jurisdiction ……………………………………………………….. pg 980

Legal Monopoly (18c) …………………………………………………….. pg 1160

Monopoly (16c) …………………………………….…………………… pg 1160

Bilateral Monopoly (1906) …………………………………………..…… pg 1160

Monopoly Leveraging (1982) ……………………………………………... pg 1160

Monopoly Power (1954) ………………………………………………..… pg 1160

Parental-preference doctrine (1974) ……………………………………... pg 1298

.

7) It appears the most perplexing question from the Court’s vantage point is:

How did we regress back to this point, and why are so many judges under siege

over the past 30 or so years? I believe the answer rests within the question in

context of the current “BAR Monopoly”, and its obvious hostility to preserve itself

at all costs. Without the ability to pose arguments that thwart this type of “Skillful

Activity”; the Integrity of the Court, and the trust in the Court by the People

becomes suspect resulting in the multiple actions against judges you are now

5

seeing within the Courts. [from page 12, para’s 10, 11 of my amicus curiae brief,

Hallett v Ohio, Et al, 16-14969]

10) As stated throughout these proceedings; the necessity to pay due

respect to the “Living Law Concept” in which the Constitution can be readily available should the need arise is a “Hallmark Concept” on which THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA stands. It is also why “We The People” expect and demand “Professional Ethical Standards” be maintained at all times. When those “Standards” are called into question; it is for “The People” to decide what those rules should look like. In this case, adding a “Licensure Requirement” to the Rules of the Court which defines where “Judicial Advocates Stand” has become necessary. When Advocates’ allegiances’ become “Suspect” based on “Core Concepts of Law”; this becomes a concern of consequence in and of itself. The relative “Subject Matter of Consequence” becomes secondary with respect to facts and evidence.

11) There is a reason that “Legal” is only a “Department” in my world of

business. I do understand the fact it is all this Monopoly does, but when it became “Self Aware” it was time to “Pull the Plug” as mandated by The Declaration of Independence. The current thinking in that the only people “Qualified” are Monopoly Members is “Ludicrous”, even borderline “Insane”. In a limited Government, the government does not have the authority tell me what my “Rights” are per their interpretations; I tell the Government what my “Rights” are per my interpretations. The courts job is to “Oversee Due Process” as I address “My Jury” to maintain that “I Remain Respectful and Professional” at all times.

8) In summation of these cases; the fact that people have been taken down the

wrong path is no fault of their own. It is also no fault of the court, and why I

continue my work knowing the potential for the Monopoly to retaliate against me

at any given moment. I am fully aware of the inherent dangers of “Whistle

Blowing” activities. Which leads me to why I chose the following quotation from

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the cited Yale Law Journal when constructing the “estoppel of No Confidence”

document:

Confidence men are not "crooks" in the ordinary sense of the word. They are suave, slick and capable. Their depredations are very much on the genteel side. Because of their high intelligence, their solid organization, the widespread convenience of the law, and the fact that the victim [sometimes] must admit criminal intentions if he wishes to prosecute, society has been neither willing nor able to avenge itself affectively [sic].8 (Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Braucher and Orbach: Scamming: The Misunderstood Confidence Man (2015))

9) Now that we have established the crime scene; the best most readily

deployable remedy is to alter the lower Family Courts from an Equity Court into

an Article III Court subject to Constitutional Equal Protections under the Law

preventing continued abuses and usurpations of the Constitution. I also believe this

will ultimately give those judges some much needed elbow room to adjudicate

clearly and conclusively. In combination with the “Restructuring Licensure

Proposal”, these activities can be dealt with as is with every other Practice.

10) The mere fact this has been allowed to escalate to this level is demonstrative

proof of this assertion. Keeping in mind my career choice before this mess was

Corporate Auto and Truck Parts, sidelining in Real Estate Sales. Trust and believe

I had no desire to jump into this “swamp”. I was drug into it against my will, but

now that I am here I fully intend to finish the work I started. Not to be

remembered, but in the hopes that one day I can forget, and potentially be

forgotten so that I may live out what time I do have in peace. If not? Then so be it.

Better me than my children to spite my alienation from them due to this very

problem.

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DEFINING THE PRACTICE OF LAW AS A BUSINESS OF LAW

11) In defining what a “Fiduciary Practitioner” is, we must first define the Job

Description. To demonstrate to the court the importance of this, seemingly

rudimentary principle, and how it potentially is negatively affecting the integrity of

the court from a different vantage point; the following definition of Fiduciary Duty

has traditionally been the “Standard of Practice”:

Fiduciary Duty: is a legal duty to act solely in another party's interests. Parties owing this duty are called fiduciaries. The individuals to whom they owe a duty are called principals. Fiduciaries may not profit from their relationship with their principals unless they have the principals' express informed consent. They also have a duty to avoid any conflicts of interest between themselves and their principals or between their principals and the fiduciaries' other clients. A fiduciary duty is the strictest duty of care recognized by the US legal system. The following two (2) quotations which reflect most on my work; the first one

demonstrates the solution; the second one demonstrates the problem.

Quoted from: THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENCE

“Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed, that whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and institute new Government, laying its Foundation on such Principles, and organizing its Powers in such Form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.”

Quoted from: Democracy in America (1840)

"Lawyers in the United States form a power that... envelops society as a whole, penetrates into each of the classes that compose it, works in secret, acts constantly on it without its knowing, and in the end models it to its own desires." ~ Alexis de Tocqueville

8

12) Though the Supreme Court has determined the “Practice of Law” can not be

licensed, the time to define “The Business of Law” is long overdue. In short, if one

chooses to act on behalf of another for profit? The Highest Fiduciary Standards

must be applied in such a manner as to be clearly enforceable in providing equal

protections against these misconducts through an available “Tort Claim

Mechanism” consistent with all other areas of “Practice” therefore affording Due

Process, and to hold them accountable.

Which brings me to the application of:

ARTICLE 1, SECTION 9, CLAUSE 8

(A.K.A. THE EMOLUMENTS CLAUSE)

Non est arctius vinculum inter hominess quam jusjurandum

13) The Fore Fathers knew that “Absolute Power corrupts Absolutely” during

the construction of the Constitution and wrote language against the high power

European bankers and lawyers of the time period as its original 13th Amendment

read as follows…

“If any citizen of the United States shall accept, claim, receive, or retain, any title of nobility or honor, or shall, office or emolument of any kind whatever, from any emperor, king, prince, or foreign power, such person shall cease to be a citizen of the United States, and shall be incapable of holding any office of trust or profit under them, or either of them.”

14) During the war of 1812 when the Capitol Records building was burned;

those high powered European Bankers and Lawyers illegally rewrote this

Amendment, and its language, to read as it currently does about Slavery absent the

language of Bankers and Lawyers enabling them to do exactly what they have

done to the People in these cases over time.

9

15) Dating as far back as the beginning people have remained suspicious of

these Bankers and Lawyers so this concept is not new. My case work demonstrates

evidence this Amendment should be re-ratified as it was intended to restore Public

Trust in government and the Court. People have always felt strongly that those

who articulate law should not be the same as those whom we trust to interpret the

law. This current concept, absent that language, negates the true intention of the

“People Governing Themselves” and allows to much room for corruption, misuse

of power, and perversion of Public Offices against the People as seen in the

following case assessments.

16) In context of my work; the BAR itself is the “Foreign Power” currently

holding a monopoly over the Court to achieve its goal of “Social Control” in

Conflict of Interest to the Court’s cited charter to “Insure Domestic Tranquility”.

Since 1789 this court has remained “Honorable and Strong” as a result of its

independence from the other two (2) branches of Government. It is for this reason I

believe my work is necessary to allow this court to continue its established

mandate to Interpret the Constitution in good faith; uninhibited by issues such as

“Practitioner Misconduct”.

17) Though these misconducts are rarely discovered in context, countless

numbers of Americans have fallen victim to them with no means to seek relief or

remedy as this practice remains “Undefined” by the People, therefore it is a

“Foreign Power” holding “Titles of Nobility” subject to Constitutional Article 1,

Section 9, Clause 8. I refer to this in tangent on pages 6 and 7 of my Notice of

Limited Appearance (see Appendix) citing the potential Conflicts of Interest, and

potential for encroachments on the Separation of Powers.

10

DEVILS ADVOCATE VIEWPOINT

18) Looking at this from the Practitioners view point; as this “Practice” remains

undefined, the inherent risks and benefits become clear.

1. Good Actors often falling victim to the actions of more experienced

“Bad Actors” placing them in various precarious circumstances that

can force their cooperation, or face retaliation without any Due

Process Protections enjoyed by other Practices.

2. “One School of Thought” limiting them from certain actions, even on

behalf of a client.

3. Extreme limitations on areas of Law open to Interpretation.

4. The potential for multiple forms of losses based on items 1, 2, and 3.

5. Not every issue is one of a “Constitutional Question” as much as the

potential for need to litigate highly specialized fields unknown by this

current Monopoly.

a. Science and Technology

b. Commerce and contracts outside of the scope of knowledge within any Specialized Business.

c. Areas of Law yet to be discovered because of the current

Monopoly’s own “Short Sightedness” and desire for “Social Control”.

19) What the Monopoly gives up by this redefinition pales by comparison to the

potential benefits to them as “Individual Practitioners” if People, and Companies,

have multiple options from which to choose, and the simple assurance the person

they are paying for “Legal Services” is “Legally Bound” to their interests,

consistent with every “Fiduciary Practice” across the board.

11

20) Practitioners also gain a “Stability in Standing” by this redefinition.

Practitioners will be more in control of their own Practices without the BAR

looking over their shoulders constantly. They can be more mobile outside of the

courtroom to network and establish “Specialties of Legal Practice” either as a firm,

or as an individual, without any limitations or encroachments provided they remain

“Loyal to Their Clients’ Interests”, and follow the Rules of the Court.

21) The task of weeding out the “Bad Actors” is monumental one in and of

itself. The court’s time is a precious commodity that should not be squandered in

such a manner. We the People are very capable of governing ourselves. This

includes devising reasonable, yet merciful means, to deal with “Bad Actors” as

their punishment/s will be commensurate with their crime/s.

§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§

SIDE EFFECT BENEFIT TO THE STATES

22) States will gain access to a new revenue stream they have never seen, or

enjoyed, before. The economics of this I will leave to your interpretations, but

history has already provided the answer.

§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§

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SERVING THE COURT

23) As everyone who has served this country can agree, Service to Country is an

honor unique to each beholder, but this is the job which chose me. My service may

be defined as “Unconventional”, nevertheless it is the task for which my service

can best be defined as the times themselves are just as “Unconventional” by

comparison to our nation’s history.

24) My most frequently asked question is: What does “Serving the Court” mean,

and why is that so important? Based on my experiences, the fact this question is

even asked, let alone it being the most frequently asked concerns me greatly. My

most commonly pondered thought in reference to the answer is this question: Why

must I be presented in such a negative context, having to defend myself against a

Government I have sworn an oath to uphold? This is not what the Fore Fathers

intended when they attempted to define a Government that would promote

“Domestic Tranquility”.

25) The unfortunate answer is that “The Practice of Law” has constructed itself

to reflect this negative positioning as a means to protect itself against the People.

As a citizen who is supposed to enjoy Equal Protections under the Law; I must

proceed through this complex, almost undecipherable process, in attempt to ask for

Rights and Protections that are already mine. I can not even wrap my head around

that concept having read and studied the Constitution along with my attempts to

apply myself as a “Friend of the Court”; not a “Hostile Person” to be treated as I

have been for the last 28 years of my life for only doing my best to stay out of

trouble, and work within the limitations of the Law. It has turned a simple “One

case divorce” into a “Multi-tier Case Process” which is completely unreasonable

and undecipherable to the average person for the purpose of “Creating Billable

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Hours” for themselves, “Fruits of a crime”, “Unjust Enrichments”, or

“Emoluments”. The terms are interchangeable, but the end result is the same. Our

Courts, by this practice, have reverted back to a system which “FORCES” people

to “Pay for their own Demise”. Not my definition of an “Honorable Practice”.

26) I will outline how “The Multi-tier Process” works in context of each of the

two (2) cases in which I assisted those Plaintiffs with their Case Presentations to

their various courts starting with my personal case making three (3) cases in total.

Please take notice of the fact we are doing our very best, in good faith, to hold the

judges harmless, no matter the circumstances presented. Our premise is simple. We

collectively maintain; had the courts been given “ALL” of the correct information

at the time of those proceedings, the outcomes would have looked very different

than they currently do as a result of the “Defective Practices” cited within the

“Complaint Briefs”.

27) Knowing it is only a matter of time before one (1) of these cases goes before

a jury; or as the lawyers put it, 12 people not smart enough to get out of jury duty

since that is how they feel about them, keep in mind these are the same people that

stood on the other side of my “Parts Counter” for decades. These people don’t care

about these lawyers and their precious “Practice”. They know only the damage

these “Practitioners” have done to someone close to them, and it is not going to

take me very long to convince these same people of the “Defects” within these

“Practices”. Practices necessitating this “Monopoly Breakup” to Protect the

Integrity of Our Courts and that of Good Judges.

“ALL”… of “Our Courts” and “Good Judges”.

The following represents “My Service to the Court”, and “My Country”.

14

Hallett v Ohio, Et al, 16-14969 (ongoing)

28) As my case was a “Dry Run” at this, I knew I would be in this for the long

haul. Based on my previous 27 years, at that time, of “No Joy” with anything

related to court proceedings; I knew I was going to have to take on the beast itself

to get to the end. That being said, I soon realized I had a rare and unique

opportunity to define my own Service to my Country using my Fiduciary License.

As I patiently watched from the darkness of my home, that has become my prison,

in anticipation of what results the 2016 POTUS Election would yield, I studied the

cited information in the “Table of Authorities” of this report profusely day and

night as by this time my case had gone to Appeal.

29) The tiers of this case are as follows:

Tier 1 The original Divorce case of which I was declared Custodial Parent

Tier 2 The false Domestic Violence case used against me in Tier 3

Tier 3 The second Divorce case constructed to thwart my efforts in Tier 1

Tier 4 The Interstate Child Support case resulting from Tier 3

Tier 5 The Monopoly Challenge currently before the U.S. 11th Dist. Court of Appeals as a result of Tiers 1 through 4

30) The case is currently before the Eleventh District Court of Appeals as a

“Monopoly Challenge”, and SCOTUS “Rule 6, Arguments Pro Hac Vice”

challenge in congruence under the same preface. To add insult to injury; The US

Government became a Defendant by happenstance in this case, and was never

assigned counsel before it went to Appeal. An error I made an earnest effort to

forgive by Motioning the Court of Appeals to join cases 16-14969 and 16-15336

with cooperation from opposing counsel.

15

31) Case 16-15336 was ultimately dismissed due to the missed appointment of

counsel through the District Court, and the obvious arguments presented outside of

Appellate Rules. So much the court had no choice but to recognize those

arguments should have taken place in the District Court. The case is a “Train

Wreck” full of errors which resulted from the simple fact; I was never allowed my

day in court, and have yet to have my day in court which supports the Monopoly

arguments and dangers we still face.

32) I therefore did the next best thing. I continued my studies, and happened

across the two (2) people I would ultimately end up standing with in court to

present my argument as their case circumstances were not dissimilar from mine in

that the actors who inflicted harm were Officers of the Court. A precarious

predicament as it turns out since no “Monopoly Member” will work on these cases.

So for lack of a better expression, I have had to prosecute the Prosecutors to

establish the need for my work which the Monopoly refuses to practice in order to

maintain its control over the Courts. Quite the conundrum at best considering I

started from less than zero without cause.

33) Knowing now that the “Exculpatory Evidence” in my case has been hidden

in Judge Rintalla’s private cabinet for lord knows how long; I have moved the

State of Ohio to begin Articles of Impeachment against her for her actions

combined with the Financial Emoluments discovered within the course of my

investigation into her activities. (Special Project Judges Divorce) for openers. I’m

not the threat to the court as I have been previously portrayed; I’m just an old dog,

with an even older trick who knows a “Snake-Oil Salesmen” when he sees one.

The real threat to the court is what you just read in this paragraph as it relates to

this case. Enough said.

16

Altenhofen v Texas, Et al (2017)

34) Of all the case work I have assisted with, this case saddens me the most as I

have heard the audio recordings in this case. After listening to them my resolve to

seek Justice in this case became overwhelming strong to me as a father of 5, and

grandfather of 3. The voices still haunt me as we try to proceed to the next tier of

his case while the question of: How did this get suppressed in an Article III Court

of Law? The “Skein” of the attached Title IV Map has me convinced. Enough said.

35) The three (3) tiers of this case are as follows:

Tier 1 was the false allegations of the Criminal Matter. (now cleared)

Tier 2 The Family Law Matter which resulted in the false allegations, and is currently underway in the lower court.

Tier 3 §1985 & §1986 has yet to be filed, but is a work in progress. 36) This was a case of “Unfinished Business”, or a “Silver Bullet”, in which the

Plaintiff was falsely charged with a crime he did not commit. (just like me by the

way) The obvious motivations in the lower state court were consistent with the

information provided above. The Federal Case was filed on April 19, 2017, and

Reasonable Doubt resulting in the “Termination” of the removed Criminal Case,

clearing the Plaintiff’s good name, was handed down on May 3, 2017.

37) Though the §1983 complaint was ultimately dismissed, the resulting good

that came from it in the short run of returning my friend to his rightful position of

“Good Standing” was reward enough for me. Personally; I consider it a “Victory”

for him, and look forward to the day we can pick up where we left off and protect

his son once and for all. [Le salut du peuple est la supreme loi] I will continue to

stand with my friend until justice has been fully achieved in his cases, and Equal

Protections under the Law therein ultimately preserved.

17

Malmstrom v Utah, Et al (2017)

38) Here was a case which bared tangent relevance to my own, in that this case

boils down to upholding a standing order, Equal Protections Violations, and

fighting for exculpatory evidence contained within various State Departments

which would ultimately clear this young man’s name. As this case evolved; the

interest of the lower court ultimately became the same as the Plaintiffs in this case.

39) The three (3) tiers of this case are as follows:

Tier 1 The current lower court case consisting of multiple “Defective Practices”

Tier 2 The arising of the Appellate case resulting from tier 1 (a win as of August 1, 2017)

Tier 3 The Federal Case filed to seek relief / remedy from the activities of tier 1

40) The assailment methods employed by taking advantage of a lesser

experienced Commissioner did get discovered as exactly what we called them in

the Complaint Brief. Lawyers conspiring together to commit multiple forms of

“Fraud upon the Court” for financial gains, and an attempt to steal the house the

Plaintiffs live in out from under them. Not a smart idea as my license is based on

Real Estate Sales, and other transfers of Real Property. Those kinds of frauds I can

spot from miles away. I have seen this process before, and know exactly how it

works. (a continuing education class for law enforcement may be in order on this

topic)

41) This case was one that did carry a uniqueness I did not expect. The skill and

arguments employed by counsel in the lower court were crafted in such a manner

as to distract mom by trying to use her son against her, and hold mom in contempt

for not being able to produce documents that do not exist. This was when I

devised the simple explanation of “The Negative Nexus”. I later found myself

18

finishing the formula in combination with a carefully crafted Memorandum in

response to the lower Appeals Court’s Sua Sponte Motion. Having studied higher

math I was able to employ a seldom used calculus formula which proves a negative

by establishing a contrary positive to ultimately thwart counsel’s skillful efforts by

his own admission. (Noted by his response to that same Sua Sponte Motion) This is

one example of many I have discovered through the course of my work in the

Courts. It is also confirmation of the inherent dangers we face against this “Hostile

Monopoly” which continue their attacks on the “Integrity of the Courts”, the

“Honorable Decisions” contained therein, and the need for Properly Skilled

Practitioners who require “Stability in Standing” next to their clients.

42) August 1, 2017, was the real tipping point of the scale in favor of the

Plaintiffs when the State of Utah Court of Appeals handed down the decision in

concurrence with the above mentioned Memorandum. The actions of attempting to

amend a two year old “Decree of Divorce” fall outside of State Rule 4 of Appellate

Procedure. [see Federalist Paper 43]

43) In preponderance of evidence the application of the falsus in uno Doctrine,

Fruit of the Poisonous Tree Doctrine, the Constitutional-fact Doctrine, the

Constitutional Doubt Canon; combined with the cited case precedents, become

means by which the Federal Court can adjudicate in favor of these Plaintiffs. [Lex

punit mendaciam]

19

CONCLUSIONS

44) Upon review of the information contained within this Report; the three (3)

cases cited based on my Professional Assessments as a Licensed Fiduciary.

Conduct within these cases, in totality, clearly rises to the level of “Prosecutorial

Misconduct”. It is these misconducts to which I have been referring; as a “Friend

of the Court” in “Good Faith”, and continued effort to “Protect the Honor and

Integrity” of the Court, Honorable Judges, and even Honorable actions of the

Practitioners who risk retaliation against in their efforts to do the same.

45) This Report confirms the findings of the attached Judicial Accountability

Report compiled by John Gentry (CPA) which establishes a finding of Low

Judicial Misconducts. Giving the judges the benefit of the doubt in that they are

not responsible for the actions within these cases; and the parties litigating Pro per

or Pro se are not responsible for the cited misconducts, there is only one other

party left in the room with knowledge to construct such misconducts. The Lawyers

who repetitively argue “He who represents himself has a fool for a client”; I rebut

with a quote from my Grandfather. “If you want a job done right? Take the time to

learn the task properly, and do it yourself.” He was a successful business man,

taught in a highly respected University, sat of the Board of a local bank, and died a

millionaire. Another one of my favorite quotes he always said was, “A fool and

their money will soon be parted.”

46) These cases re-establish the necessity of Article 1, Section 9, Clause 8, as a

“Check and Balance” intended by the Fore Fathers to assist the People in weeding

out “Bad Actors” in Government. They also confirm the unfortunate Conflicts of

Interest between “Social Control” verses “Domestic Tranquility” articulated within

the Constitution’s Preamble, and referenced in my amicus curiae brief (page 13,

20

para 12) to THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES. I am a “Registered

Independent” as I believe both parties are “Right” and “Wrong” by design to

intentionally to promote “Social Unrest” enabling their agenda to attempt “Social

Deconstruction” through “Media Weapons of Mass Distraction”. Enough Said.

47) It also establishes validity to one missing key element yet to be presented.

Out of all the crimes that could potentially be committed by anyone; the only

punishment articulated by the Fore Fathers within the Constitution itself was the

punishment for acts of “Betrayal” to the Constitution, and to the People of The

United States itself. The punishment to which I am referring is “Loss of

Citizenship and / or Exile”. That being said; the burden of deciding whether these

acts are consistent with the acts described within the Constitutions original

Thirteenth (13th) Amendment rise to that level will be left for the requested jury in

this case to ponder. This also explains what I meant on page one (1) about

“Coming Full Circle within our Courts”, and returning to the “Parliamentary

Practices of Law” we Declared Independence from in 1776.

48) At this point a quotation from our first President of The United States,

George Washington, seems appropriate. He also seemed to agree about the dangers

of Political Parties and the threats they could pose left un-checked.

By the article establishing the Executive Department, it is made the duty of the President "to recommend to your consideration, such measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient." The circumstances under which I now meet you, will acquit me from entering into that subject, farther than to refer to the Great Constitutional Charter under which you are assembled; and which, in defining your powers, designates the objects to which your attention is to be given. It will be more consistent with those circumstances, and

21

far more congenial with the feelings which actuate me, to substitute, in place of a recommendation of particular measures, the tribute that is due to the talents, the rectitude, and the patriotism which adorn the characters selected to devise and adopt them. In these honorable qualifications, I behold the surest pledges, that as on one side, no local prejudices, or attachments; no separate views, nor party animosities, will misdirect the comprehensive and equal eye which ought to watch over this great assemblage of communities and interests: so, on another, that the foundations of our National policy will be laid in the pure and immutable principles of private morality; and the pre-eminence of a free Government, be exemplified by all the attributes which can win the affections of its Citizens, and command the respect of the world.

49) It is only with a sense of “Historical Irony”; We The People fighting these

cases in “State Equity Courts”, boil down to the same problems our Fore Father’s

faced in 1776: Maledicta expositio quae corrumpit textum

“Defective Parliamentary Practices of Law for Profit”

Lex punit mendaciam

50) These cases are merely a drop in the bucket when considering the dangers of

a Monopoly over the court. The Practice has become “The Unopposed Dictator” to

the court in spite of the cited Constitutional Protections. Therefore these cases also

cross an unexpected threshold of “Equal Protections” to include “Equal

Prosecutions” of the actors who commit these acts of Betrayal to their clients, this

court, and the Constitution in totality. Nec curia deficeret in justitia exhibenda

Respectfully Submitted

_________________________________ Christopher E. Hallett (Lic. No. 443079)

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PRACTITIONER AFFIDAVIT (Christopher E. Hallett Lic. No. 443079)

Practitioner Christopher E. Hallett hereby swears under oath, statements made in this documentation are, to the best of my knowledge and belief, to be the truth and understand the penalties for knowingly making false statements could include fines and/or imprisonment. DATE: _______________ __________________________________ Christopher E. Hallett State of ____________, County of ____________________

Sworn to or affirmed and signed before me on this date: ___________________

By: (Notary Public) __________________________________

My commission expires: _________________

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Christopher E Hallett, certify service of this document to all Appellees via US Mail.

1) State of Ohio, Mike DeWine, 30 East Broad St, 14th Floor, Columbus, Oh, 43215

2) Elizabeth Tosh, 4301 West Boy Scout Blvd, Suite 400, Tampa, Fl, 33607

(counsel for Elise Burkey)

3) Gary Rich, 342 Mahoning Ave, Warren, 44483

4) Benjamin Joltin, 106 South Broad St, Canfield, Oh, 44406

5) Christina Burnham Hallett, 1750 Manhattan Ave, Youngstown, Oh, 44509

Christopher E. Hallett, 16062 SW 34 CT RD, Ocala, Fl, 34473, Phone (352) 470-8460 email: [email protected]

FIDUCIARY PRACTITIONERS REPORT CASE ASSESSMENTS BASED ON: _______________________________

ARTICLE 1, SECTION 9, CLAUSE 8

(A.K.A. THE EMOLUMENTS CLAUSE) Non est arctius vinculum inter hominess quam jusjurandum

_______________________________

PREPARED BY CHRISTOPHER EDWARD HALLETT

(LIC. NO. 443079) ____________________________________

APPENDIX

Content Tab

Department of Justice Letter …………………………………………………. 1

George Washington’s First Inaugural Speech ……………………………………. 2

Criminal Law 2.0 (Hon. Alex Kozinski) ……………………..………………….. 3

Yale Law Journal “Scamming, The Misunderstood Confidence Man” ………..… 4

Social Security Entitlement Map of Title IV (4) funding incentives ……………. 5

Office of Child Support Enforcement (2016 Preliminary Report) ……………. 6

Federalist Paper 43 ……………………………………………………………… 7

Amicus Curiae Brief (Hallett v Ohio, Et al) ……………………………………. 8

Judicial Accountability Report (John Gentry CPA. Lic. No. 27062) ……………. 9

Notice of Limited Appearance ..………………………………………………… 10

Statement of Claim ……………………………………………………………… 11

.

TAB 1

Washington, D.C. 20530

March 14, 2016 Dear Colleagues:

In December of last year, the Department of Justice brought together judges, court

administrators, advocates, prosecutors, and defense attorneys to participate in a working session on “Poverty and the Criminal Justice System: The Effect and Fairness of Fees and Fines.” The Department’s working session was followed the next day by a meeting at the White House on “A Cycle of Incarceration: Prison, Debt and Bail Practices.” These extraordinary convenings raised many critical issues, and highlighted several promising ideas and strategies for reform.

At the end of the meetings, the Department pledged to continue working with the diverse

communities represented to help address the complex challenges the assessment and enforcement of fines and fees pose. We are pleased to announce today several initiatives that will help stakeholders make the changes needed to guarantee equal justice under law to everyone, regardless of their financial circumstances.

• The Department’s Bureau of Justice Assistance will be awarding $2.5 million in

competitive grants to state, local, or tribal jurisdictions, who together with community partners, want to test strategies to restructure the assessment and enforcement of fines and fees through the Price of Justice: Rethinking the Consequences of Justice Fines and Fees grant program. Four grants of $500,000 will be awarded to agencies and their collaborative partners to develop strategies that promote appropriate justice system responses, including reducing unnecessary confinement for individuals who are unable to pay fines and fees. An additional grant of $500,000 will be awarded to a technical assistance provider. For agencies interested in applying for this funding opportunity, BJA will host an informational webinar on March 28, 2016, at 11:30 a.m. to describe the background, key concepts, and requirements of the solicitation. To register, please follow this link.

• The Bureau of Justice Assistance plans to provide resources to support the new National Task Force on Fines, Fees, and Bail Practices, led by the Conference of Chief Justices and the Conference of State Court Administrators. The Task Force, which will also be funded by the State Justice Institute, will be comprised of

U.S. Department of Justice Office of Justice Programs Civil Rights Division Office for Access to Justice

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Washington, D.C. 20530

March 14, 2016

Dear Colleague:

The Department of Justice (“the Department”) is committed to assisting state and local

courts in their efforts to ensure equal justice and due process for all those who come before them. In December 2015, the Department convened a diverse group of stakeholders—judges, court administrators, lawmakers, prosecutors, defense attorneys, advocates, and impacted individuals—to discuss the assessment and enforcement of fines and fees in state and local courts. While the convening made plain that unlawful and harmful practices exist in certain jurisdictions throughout the country, it also highlighted a number of reform efforts underway by state leaders, judicial officers, and advocates, and underscored the commitment of all the participants to continue addressing these critical issues. At the meeting, participants and Department officials also discussed ways in which the Department could assist courts in their efforts to make needed changes. Among other recommendations, participants called on the Department to provide greater clarity to state and local courts regarding their legal obligations with respect to fines and fees and to share best practices. Accordingly, this letter is intended to address some of the most common practices that run afoul of the United States Constitution and/or other federal laws and to assist court leadership in ensuring that courts at every level of the justice system operate fairly and lawfully, as well as to suggest alternative practices that can address legitimate public safety needs while also protecting the rights of participants in the justice system.

Recent years have seen increased attention on the illegal enforcement of fines and fees in

certain jurisdictions around the country—often with respect to individuals accused of misdemeanors, quasi-criminal ordinance violations, or civil infractions.1 Typically, courts do not sentence defendants to incarceration in these cases; monetary fines are the norm. Yet the harm 1 See, e.g., Civil Rights Division, U.S. Department of Justice, Investigation of the Ferguson Police Department (Mar. 4, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/ferguson_findings_3-4-15.pdf (finding that the Ferguson, Missouri, municipal court routinely deprived people of their constitutional rights to due process and equal protection and other federal protections); Brennan Center for Justice, Criminal Justice Debt: A Barrier to Reentry (2010), available at http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/Fees%20and%20Fines%20FINAL.pdf (reporting on fine and fee practices in fifteen states); American Civil Liberties Union, In for a Penny: The Rise of America’s New Debtors’ Prisons (2010), available at https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/InForAPenny_web.pdf (discussing practices in Louisiana, Michigan, Ohio, Georgia, and Washington state).

U.S. Department of Justice Civil Rights Division

Office for Access to Justice

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caused by unlawful practices in these jurisdictions can be profound. Individuals may confront escalating debt; face repeated, unnecessary incarceration for nonpayment despite posing no danger to the community2; lose their jobs; and become trapped in cycles of poverty that can be nearly impossible to escape.3 Furthermore, in addition to being unlawful, to the extent that these practices are geared not toward addressing public safety, but rather toward raising revenue, they can cast doubt on the impartiality of the tribunal and erode trust between local governments and their constituents.4

To help judicial actors protect individuals’ rights and avoid unnecessary harm, we discuss

below a set of basic constitutional principles relevant to the enforcement of fines and fees. These principles, grounded in the rights to due process and equal protection, require the following:

(1) Courts must not incarcerate a person for nonpayment of fines or fees without first

conducting an indigency determination and establishing that the failure to pay was willful;

(2) Courts must consider alternatives to incarceration for indigent defendants unable to pay fines and fees;

(3) Courts must not condition access to a judicial hearing on the prepayment of fines or

fees;

(4) Courts must provide meaningful notice and, in appropriate cases, counsel, when enforcing fines and fees;

(5) Courts must not use arrest warrants or license suspensions as a means of coercing the payment of court debt when individuals have not been afforded constitutionally adequate procedural protections;

(6) Courts must not employ bail or bond practices that cause indigent defendants to remain incarcerated solely because they cannot afford to pay for their release; and

(7) Courts must safeguard against unconstitutional practices by court staff and private contractors.

In court systems receiving federal funds, these practices may also violate Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d, when they unnecessarily impose disparate harm on the basis of race or national origin.

2 Nothing in this letter is intended to suggest that courts may not preventively detain a defendant pretrial in order to secure the safety of the public or appearance of the defendant. 3 See Council of Economic Advisers, Issue Brief, Fines, Fees, and Bail: Payments in the Criminal Justice System that Disproportionately Impact the Poor, at 1 (Dec. 2015), available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/page/files/1215_cea_fine_fee_bail_issue_brief.pdf (describing the disproportionate impact on the poor of fixed monetary penalties, which “can lead to high levels of debt and even incarceration for failure to fulfil a payment” and create “barriers to successful re-entry after an offense”). 4 See Conference of State Court Administrators, 2011-2012 Policy Paper, Courts Are Not Revenue Centers (2012), available at https://csgjusticecenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/2011-12-COSCA-report.pdf.

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As court leaders, your guidance on these issues is critical. We urge you to review court

rules and procedures within your jurisdiction to ensure that they comply with due process, equal protection, and sound public policy. We also encourage you to forward a copy of this letter to every judge in your jurisdiction; to provide appropriate training for judges in the areas discussed below; and to develop resources, such as bench books, to assist judges in performing their duties lawfully and effectively. We also hope that you will work with the Justice Department, going forward, to continue to develop and share solutions for implementing and adhering to these principles.

1. Courts must not incarcerate a person for nonpayment of fines or fees without first conducting an indigency determination and establishing that the failure to pay was willful. The due process and equal protection principles of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibit

“punishing a person for his poverty.” Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 671 (1983). Accordingly, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the government may not incarcerate an individual solely because of inability to pay a fine or fee. In Bearden, the Court prohibited the incarceration of indigent probationers for failing to pay a fine because “[t]o do otherwise would deprive the probationer of his conditional freedom simply because, through no fault of his own, he cannot pay the fine. Such a deprivation would be contrary to the fundamental fairness required by the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. at 672-73; see also Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 398 (1971) (holding that state could not convert defendant’s unpaid fine for a fine-only offense to incarceration because that would subject him “to imprisonment solely because of his indigency”); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 241-42 (1970) (holding that an indigent defendant could not be imprisoned longer than the statutory maximum for failing to pay his fine). The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed this principle in Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507 (2011), holding that a court violates due process when it finds a parent in civil contempt and jails the parent for failure to pay child support, without first inquiring into the parent’s ability to pay. Id. at 2518-19.

To comply with this constitutional guarantee, state and local courts must inquire as to a

person’s ability to pay prior to imposing incarceration for nonpayment. Courts have an affirmative duty to conduct these inquiries and should do so sua sponte. Bearden, 461 U.S. at 671. Further, a court’s obligation to conduct indigency inquiries endures throughout the life of a case. See id. at 662-63. A probationer may lose her job or suddenly require expensive medical care, leaving her in precarious financial circumstances. For that reason, a missed payment cannot itself be sufficient to trigger a person’s arrest or detention unless the court first inquires anew into the reasons for the person’s non-payment and determines that it was willful. In addition, to minimize these problems, courts should inquire into ability to pay at sentencing, when contemplating the assessment of fines and fees, rather than waiting until a person fails to pay.

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Under Bearden, standards for indigency inquiries must ensure fair and accurate assessments of defendants’ ability to pay. Due process requires that such standards include both notice to the defendant that ability to pay is a critical issue, and a meaningful opportunity for the defendant to be heard on the question of his or her financial circumstances. See Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2519-20 (requiring courts to follow these specific procedures, and others, to prevent unrepresented parties from being jailed because of financial incapacity). Jurisdictions may benefit from creating statutory presumptions of indigency for certain classes of defendants—for example, those eligible for public benefits, living below a certain income level, or serving a term of confinement. See, e.g., R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-20-10 (listing conditions considered “prima facie evidence of the defendant’s indigency and limited ability to pay,” including but not limited to “[q]ualification for and/or receipt of” public assistance, disability insurance, and food stamps).

2. Courts must consider alternatives to incarceration for indigent defendants unable to pay fines and fees. When individuals of limited means cannot satisfy their financial obligations, Bearden

requires consideration of “alternatives to imprisonment.” 461 U.S. at 672. These alternatives may include extending the time for payment, reducing the debt, requiring the defendant to attend traffic or public safety classes, or imposing community service. See id. Recognizing this constitutional imperative, some jurisdictions have codified alternatives to incarceration in state law. See, e.g., Ga. Code Ann. § 42-8-102(f)(4)(A) (2015) (providing that for “failure to report to probation or failure to pay fines, statutory surcharges, or probation supervision fees, the court shall consider the use of alternatives to confinement, including community service”); see also Tate, 401 U.S. at 400 n.5 (discussing effectiveness of fine payment plans and citing examples from several states). In some cases, it will be immediately apparent that a person is not and will not likely become able to pay a monetary fine. Therefore, courts should consider providing alternatives to indigent defendants not only after a failure to pay, but also in lieu of imposing financial obligations in the first place.

Neither community service programs nor payment plans, however, should become a

means to impose greater penalties on the poor by, for example, imposing onerous user fees or interest. With respect to community service programs, court officials should consider delineating clear and consistent standards that allow individuals adequate time to complete the service and avoid creating unreasonable conflicts with individuals’ work and family obligations. In imposing payment plans, courts should consider assessing the defendant’s financial resources to determine a reasonable periodic payment, and should consider including a mechanism for defendants to seek a reduction in their monthly obligation if their financial circumstances change.

3. Courts must not condition access to a judicial hearing on prepayment of fines or fees. State and local courts deprive indigent defendants of due process and equal protection if

they condition access to the courts on payment of fines or fees. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 374 (1971) (holding that due process bars states from conditioning access to

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compulsory judicial process on the payment of court fees by those unable to pay); see also Tucker v. City of Montgomery Bd. of Comm’rs, 410 F. Supp. 494, 502 (M.D. Ala. 1976) (holding that the conditioning of an appeal on payment of a bond violates indigent prisoners’ equal protection rights and “‘has no place in our heritage of Equal Justice Under Law’” (citing Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252, 258 (1959)).5

This unconstitutional practice is often framed as a routine administrative matter. For

example, a motorist who is arrested for driving with a suspended license may be told that the penalty for the citation is $300 and that a court date will be scheduled only upon the completion of a $300 payment (sometimes referred to as a prehearing “bond” or “bail” payment). Courts most commonly impose these prepayment requirements on defendants who have failed to appear, depriving those defendants of the opportunity to establish good cause for missing court. Regardless of the charge, these requirements can have the effect of denying access to justice to the poor.

4. Courts must provide meaningful notice and, in appropriate cases, counsel, when enforcing fines and fees. “An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is

to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.” Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314-15 (1950); see also Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2519 (discussing the importance of notice in proceedings to enforce a child support order). Thus, constitutionally adequate notice must be provided for even the most minor cases. Courts should ensure that citations and summonses adequately inform individuals of the precise charges against them, the amount owed or other possible penalties, the date of their court hearing, the availability of alternate means of payment, the rules and procedures of court, their rights as a litigant, or whether in-person appearance is required at all. Gaps in this vital information can make it difficult, if not impossible, for defendants to fairly and expeditiously resolve their cases. And inadequate notice can have a cascading effect, resulting in the defendant’s failure to appear and leading to the imposition of significant penalties in violation of the defendant’s due process rights.

Further, courts must ensure defendants’ right to counsel in appropriate cases when

enforcing fines and fees. Failing to appear or to pay outstanding fines or fees can result in incarceration, whether through the pursuit of criminal charges or criminal contempt, the imposition of a sentence that had been suspended, or the pursuit of civil contempt proceedings. The Sixth Amendment requires that a defendant be provided the right to counsel in any criminal proceeding resulting in incarceration, see Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373 (1979); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972), and indeed forbids imposition of a suspended jail sentence on a probationer who was not afforded a right to counsel when originally convicted and sentenced,

5 The Supreme Court reaffirmed this principle in Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1981), when it prohibited conditioning indigent persons’ access to blood tests in adversarial paternity actions on payment of a fee, and in M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 107 (1996), when it prohibited charging filing fees to indigent persons seeking to appeal from proceedings terminating their parental rights.

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see Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 662 (2002). Under the Fourteenth Amendment, defendants likewise may be entitled to counsel in civil contempt proceedings for failure to pay fines or fees. See Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2518-19 (holding that, although there is no automatic right to counsel in civil contempt proceedings for nonpayment of child support, due process is violated when neither counsel nor adequate alternative procedural safeguards are provided to prevent incarceration for inability to pay).6

5. Courts must not use arrest warrants or license suspensions as a means of coercing the payment of court debt when individuals have not been afforded constitutionally adequate procedural protections. The use of arrest warrants as a means of debt collection, rather than in response to public

safety needs, creates unnecessary risk that individuals’ constitutional rights will be violated. Warrants must not be issued for failure to pay without providing adequate notice to a defendant, a hearing where the defendant’s ability to pay is assessed, and other basic procedural protections. See Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2519; Bearden, 461 U.S. at 671-72; Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314-15. When people are arrested and detained on these warrants, the result is an unconstitutional deprivation of liberty. Rather than arrest and incarceration, courts should consider less harmful and less costly means of collecting justifiable debts, including civil debt collection.7

In many jurisdictions, courts are also authorized—and in some cases required—to initiate

the suspension of a defendant’s driver’s license to compel the payment of outstanding court debts. If a defendant’s driver’s license is suspended because of failure to pay a fine, such a suspension may be unlawful if the defendant was deprived of his due process right to establish inability to pay. See Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971) (holding that driver’s licenses “may become essential in the pursuit of a livelihood” and thus “are not to be taken away without that procedural due process required by the Fourteenth Amendment”); cf. Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 113-14 (1977) (upholding revocation of driver’s license after conviction based in part on the due process provided in the underlying criminal proceedings); Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 13-17 (1979) (upholding suspension of driver’s license after arrest for driving under the influence and refusal to take a breath-analysis test, because suspension “substantially served” the government’s interest in public safety and was based on “objective facts either within the personal knowledge of an impartial government official or readily ascertainable by him,” making the risk of erroneous deprivation low). Accordingly, automatic license suspensions premised on determinations that fail to comport with Bearden and its progeny may violate due process.

6 Turner’s ruling that the right to counsel is not automatic was limited to contempt proceedings arising from failure to pay child support to a custodial parent who is unrepresented by counsel. See 131 S. Ct. at 2512, 2519. The Court explained that recognizing such an automatic right in that context “could create an asymmetry of representation.” Id. at 2519. The Court distinguished those circumstances from civil contempt proceedings to recover funds due to the government, which “more closely resemble debt-collection proceedings” in which “[t]he government is likely to have counsel or some other competent representative.” Id. at 2520. 7 Researchers have questioned whether the use of police and jail resources to coerce the payment of court debts is cost-effective. See, e.g., Katherine Beckett & Alexes Harris, On Cash and Conviction: Monetary Sanctions as Misguided Policy, 10 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 505, 527-28 (2011). This strategy may also undermine public safety by diverting police resources and stimulating public distrust of law enforcement.

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Even where such suspensions are lawful, they nonetheless raise significant public policy concerns. Research has consistently found that having a valid driver’s license can be crucial to individuals’ ability to maintain a job, pursue educational opportunities, and care for families.8 At the same time, suspending defendants’ licenses decreases the likelihood that defendants will resolve pending cases and outstanding court debts, both by jeopardizing their employment and by making it more difficult to travel to court, and results in more unlicensed driving. For these reasons, where they have discretion to do so, state and local courts are encouraged to avoid suspending driver’s licenses as a debt collection tool, reserving suspension for cases in which it would increase public safety.9

6. Courts must not employ bail or bond practices that cause indigent defendants to remain incarcerated solely because they cannot afford to pay for their release. When indigent defendants are arrested for failure to make payments they cannot afford,

they can be subjected to another independent violation of their rights: prolonged detention due to unlawful bail or bond practices. Bail that is set without regard to defendants’ financial capacity can result in the incarceration of individuals not because they pose a threat to public safety or a flight risk, but rather because they cannot afford the assigned bail amount.

As the Department of Justice set forth in detail in a federal court brief last year, and as

courts have long recognized, any bail practices that result in incarceration based on poverty violate the Fourteenth Amendment. See Statement of Interest of the United States, Varden v. City of Clanton, No. 2:15-cv-34-MHT-WC, at 8 (M.D. Ala., Feb. 13, 2015) (citing Bearden, 461 U.S. at 671; Tate, 401 U.S. at 398; Williams, 399 U.S. at 240-41).10 Systems that rely primarily on secured monetary bonds without adequate consideration of defendants’ financial means tend to result in the incarceration of poor defendants who pose no threat to public safety solely because they cannot afford to pay.11 To better protect constitutional rights while ensuring defendants’ appearance in court and the safety of the community, courts should consider transitioning from a system based on secured monetary bail alone to one grounded in objective risk assessments by pretrial experts. See, e.g., D.C. Code § 23-1321 (2014); Colo. Rev. Stat. 16-

8 See, e.g., Robert Cervero, et al., Transportation as a Stimulus of Welfare-to-Work: Private versus Public Mobility, 22 J. PLAN. EDUC. & RES. 50 (2002); Alan M. Voorhees, et al., Motor Vehicles Affordability and Fairness Task Force: Final Report, at xii (2006), available at http://www.state.nj.us/mvc/pdf/About/AFTF_final_02.pdf (a study of suspended drivers in New Jersey, which found that 42% of people lost their jobs as a result of the driver’s license suspension, that 45% of those could not find another job, and that this had the greatest impact on seniors and low-income individuals). 9 See Am. Ass’n of Motor Veh. Adm’rs, Best Practices Guide to Reducing Suspended Drivers, at 3 (2013), available at http://www.aamva.org/WorkArea/linkit.aspx?LinkIdentifier=id&ItemID=3723&libID=3709 (recommending that “legislatures repeal state laws requiring the suspension of driving privileges for non-highway safety related violations” and citing research supporting view that fewer driver suspensions for non-compliance with court requirements would increase public safety). 10 The United States’ Statement of Interest in Varden is available at http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/pressreleases/attachments/2015/02/13/varden statement_ of_interest.pdf. 11 See supra Statement of the United States, Varden, at 11 (citing Timothy R. Schnacke, U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Corrections, FUNDAMENTALS OF BAIL: A RESOURCE GUIDE FOR PRETRIAL PRACTITIONERS AND

A FRAMEWORK FOR AMERICAN PRETRIAL REFORM, at 2 (2014), available at http://nicic.gov/library/028360).

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4-104 (2014); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 431.066 (2015); N.J. S. 946/A1910 (enacted 2015); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (permitting pretrial detention in the federal system when no conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the defendant and safety of the community, but cautioning that “[t]he judicial officer may not impose a financial condition that results in the pretrial detention of the person”).

7. Courts must safeguard against unconstitutional practices by court staff and private contractors. In many courts, especially those adjudicating strictly minor or local offenses, the judge or

magistrate may preside for only a few hours or days per week, while most of the business of the court is conducted by clerks or probation officers outside of court sessions. As a result, clerks and other court staff are sometimes tasked with conducting indigency inquiries, determining bond amounts, issuing arrest warrants, and other critical functions—often with only perfunctory review by a judicial officer, or no review at all. Without adequate judicial oversight, there is no reliable means of ensuring that these tasks are performed consistent with due process and equal protection. Regardless of the size of the docket or the limited hours of the court, judges must ensure that the law is followed and preserve “both the appearance and reality of fairness, generating the feeling, so important to a popular government, that justice has been done.” Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also American Bar Association, MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 2, Rules 2.2, 2.5, 2.12.

Additional due process concerns arise when these designees have a direct pecuniary

interest in the management or outcome of a case—for example, when a jurisdiction employs private, for-profit companies to supervise probationers. In many such jurisdictions, probation companies are authorized not only to collect court fines, but also to impose an array of discretionary surcharges (such as supervision fees, late fees, drug testing fees, etc.) to be paid to the company itself rather than to the court. Thus, the probation company that decides what services or sanctions to impose stands to profit from those very decisions. The Supreme Court has “always been sensitive to the possibility that important actors in the criminal justice system may be influenced by factors that threaten to compromise the performance of their duty.” Young v. U.S. ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 810 (1987). It has expressly prohibited arrangements in which the judge might have a pecuniary interest, direct or indirect, in the outcome of a case. See Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927) (invalidating conviction on the basis of $12 fee paid to the mayor only upon conviction in mayor’s court); Ward v. Village of Monroeville, Ohio, 409 U.S. 57, 61-62 (1972) (extending reasoning of Tumey to cases in which the judge has a clear but not direct interest). It has applied the same reasoning to prosecutors, holding that the appointment of a private prosecutor with a pecuniary interest in the outcome of a case constitutes fundamental error because it “undermines confidence in the integrity of the criminal proceeding.” Young, 481 U.S. at 811-14. The appointment of a private probation company with a pecuniary interest in the outcome of its cases raises similarly fundamental concerns about fairness and due process.

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The Department of Justice has a strong interest in ensuring that state and local courts provide every individual with the basic protections guaranteed by the Constitution and other federal laws, regardless of his or her financial means. We are eager to build on the December 2015 convening about these issues by supporting your efforts at the state and local levels, and we look forward to working collaboratively with all stakeholders to ensure that every part of our justice system provides equal justice and due process.

Sincerely, Vanita Gupta Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General Civil Rights Division Lisa Foster Director Office for Access to Justice

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First Inaugural Address George Washington

April 30, 1789

Fellow Citizens of the Senate and the House of Representatives:

Among the vicissitudes incident to life, no event could have filled me with greater anxieties than that of which the notification was transmitted by your order, and received on the fourteenth day of the present month. On the one hand, I was summoned by my Country, whose voice I can never hear but with veneration and love, from a retreat which I had chosen with the fondest predilection, and, in my flattering hopes, with an immutable decision, as the asylum of my declining years: a retreat which was rendered every day more necessary as well as more dear to me, by the addition of habit to inclination, and of frequent interruptions in my health to the gradual waste committed on it by time. On the other hand, the magnitude and difficulty of the trust to which the voice of my Country called me, being sufficient to awaken in the wisest and most experienced of her citizens, a distrustful scrutiny into his qualification, could not but overwhelm with dispondence, one, who, inheriting inferior endowments from nature and unpractised in the duties of civil administration, ought to be peculiarly conscious of his own deficencies. In this conflict of emotions, all I dare aver, is, that it has been my faithful study to collect my duty from a just appreciation of every circumstance, by which it might be affected. All I dare hope, is, that, if in executing this task I have been too much swayed by a grateful remembrance of former instances, or by an affectionate sensibility to this transcendent proof, of the confidence of my fellow-citizens; and have thence too little consulted my incapacity as well as disinclination for the weighty and untried cares before me; my error will be palliated by the motives which misled me, and its consequences be judged by my Country, with some share of the partiality in which they originated.

Such being the impressions under which I have, in obedience to the public summons, repaired to the present station; it would be peculiarly improper to omit in this first official Act, my fervent supplications to that Almighty Being who rules over the Universe, who presides in the Councils of Nations, and whose providential aids can supply every human defect, that his benediction may consecrate to the liberties and happiness of the People of the United States, a Government instituted by themselves for these essential purposes: and may enable every instrument employed in its administration to execute with success, the functions allotted to his charge. In tendering this homage to the Great Author of every public and private good, I assure myself that it expresses your sentiments not less than my own; nor those of my fellow-citizens at large, less than either. No People can be bound to acknowledge and adore the invisible hand, which conducts the Affairs of men more than the People of the United States. Every step, by which they have advanced to the character of an independent nation, seems to have been distinguished by some token of providential agency. And in the important revolution just accomplished in the system of their United Government, the tranquil deliberations and voluntary consent of so many distinct communities, from which the event has resulted, cannot be compared with the means by which most Governments have been established, without some return of pious gratitude along with an humble anticipation of the future blessings which the past seem to presage. These reflections, arising out of the present crisis, have forced themselves too strongly on my mind to be

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suppressed. You will join with me I trust in thinking, that there are none under the influence of which, the proceedings of a new and free Government can more auspiciously commence.

By the article establishing the Executive Department, it is made the duty of the President "to recommend to your consideration, such measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient." The circumstances under which I now meet you, will acquit me from entering into that subject, farther than to refer to the Great Constitutional Charter under which you are assembled; and which, in defining your powers, designates the objects to which your attention is to be given. It will be more consistent with those circumstances, and far more congenial with the feelings which actuate me, to substitute, in place of a recommendation of particular measures, the tribute that is due to the talents, the rectitude, and the patriotism which adorn the characters selected to devise and adopt them. In these honorable qualifications, I behold the surest pledges, that as on one side, no local prejudices, or attachments; no seperate views, nor party animosities, will misdirect the comprehensive and equal eye which ought to watch over this great assemblage of communities and interests: so, on another, that the foundations of our National policy will be laid in the pure and immutable principles of private morality; and the pre-eminence of a free Government, be exemplified by all the attributes which can win the affections of its Citizens, and command the respect of the world.

I dwell on this prospect with every satisfaction which an ardent love for my Country can inspire: since there is no truth more thoroughly established, than that there exists in the oeconomy and course of nature, an indissoluble union between virtue and happiness, between duty and advantage, between the genuine maxims of an honest and magnanimous policy, and the solid rewards of public prosperity and felicity: Since we ought to be no less persuaded that the propitious smiles of Heaven, can never be expected on a nation that disregards the eternal rules of order and right, which Heaven itself has ordained: And since the preservation of the sacred fire of liberty, and the destiny of the Republican model of Government, are justly considered as deeply, perhaps as finally staked, on the experiment entrusted to the hands of the American people.

Besides the ordinary objects submitted to your care, it will remain with your judgment to decide, how far an exercise of the occasional power delegated by the Fifth article of the Constitution is rendered expedient at the present juncture by the nature of objections which have been urged against the System, or by the degree of inquietude which has given birth to them. Instead of undertaking particular recommendations on this subject, in which I could be guided by no lights derived from official opportunities, I shall again give way to my entire confidence in your discernment and pursuit of the public good: For I assure myself that whilst you carefully avoid every alteration which might endanger the benefits of an United and effective Government, or which ought to await the future lessons of experience; a reverence for the characteristic rights of freemen, and a regard for the public harmony, will sufficiently influence your deliberations on the question how far the former can be more impregnably fortified, or the latter be safely and advantageously promoted.

To the preceeding observations I have one to add, which will be most properly addressed to the House of Representatives. It concerns myself, and will therefore be as brief as possible. When I was first honoured with a call into the Service of my Country, then on the eve of an arduous

3  

struggle for its liberties, the light in which I contemplated my duty required that I should renounce every pecuniary compensation. From this resolution I have in no instance departed. And being still under the impressions which produced it, I must decline as inapplicable to myself, any share in the personal emoluments, which may be indispensably included in a permanent provision for the Executive Department; and must accordingly pray that the pecuniary estimates for the Station in which I am placed, may, during my continuance in it, be limited to such actual expenditures as the public good may be thought to require.

Having thus imparted to you my sentiments, as they have been awakened by the occasion which brings us together, I shall take my present leave; but not without resorting once more to the benign parent of the human race, in humble supplication that since he has been pleased to favour the American people, with opportunities for deliberating in perfect tranquility, and dispositions for deciding with unparellelled unanimity on a form of Government, for the security of their Union, and the advancement of their happiness; so his divine blessing may be equally conspicuous in the enlarged views, the temperate consultations, and the wise measures on which the success of this Government must depend.

 

TAB 3

PREFACE

CRIMINAL LAW 2.0

HON. ALEX KOZINSKI1

I

Although we pretend otherwise, much of what we do in the law is guesswork. Forexample, we like to boast that our criminal justice system is heavily tilted in favor ofcriminal defendants because we’d rather that ten guilty men go free than an innocentman be convicted.2 There is reason to doubt it, because very few criminal defendantsactually go free after trial.3 Does this mean that many guilty men are never chargedbecause the prosecution is daunted by its heavy burden of proof? Or is it becausejurors almost always start with a strong presumption that someone wouldn’t becharged with a crime unless the police and the prosecutor were firmly convinced ofhis guilt? We tell ourselves and the public that it’s the former and not the latter, butwe have no way of knowing. They say that any prosecutor worth his salt can get agrand jury to indict a ham sandwich. It may be that a decent prosecutor could get apetit jury to convict a eunuch of rape.

The “ten guilty men” aphorism is just one of many tropes we assimilate longbefore we become lawyers. How many of us, the author included, were inspired to goto law school after watching Juror #8 turn his colleagues around by sheer force ofreason and careful dissection of the evidence?4 “If that’s what the law’s about, then Iwant to be a lawyer!” I thought to myself. But is it? We know very little about this becausevery few judges, lawyers and law professors have spent significant time as jurors.5 Infact, much of the so-called wisdom that has been handed down to us about theworkings of the legal system, and the criminal process in particular, has been underminedby experience, legal scholarship and common sense. Here are just a few examples:

1. Eyewitnesses are highly reliable. This belief is so much part of our culture thatone often hears talk of a “mere” circumstantial case as contrasted to a solid casebased on eyewitness testimony. In fact, research shows that eyewitness identificationsare highly unreliable,6 especially where the witness and the perpetrator are ofdifferent races.7 Eyewitness reliability is further compromised when the identificationoccurs under the stress of a violent crime, an accident or catastrophic event—which

1. The author is a judge on the Ninth Circuit. He wishes to acknowledge the extraordinary helpprovided by his law clerk, Joanna Zhang. © 2015, Alex Kozinski.

2. Actually, as Sasha Volokh points out, the number of guilty men we are willing to free to save aninnocent one is somewhat indeterminate. See Alexander “Sasha” Volokh, n Guilty Men, 146 U. PA. L. REV.173, 187-92 (1997).

3. According to the most recent United States Attorneys’ Annual Statistical Report, out of the 3424federal criminal cases that went to trial in 2013, only 228, or about 6.7 percent, resulted in acquittals. SeeDep’t of Justice, U.S. Attorneys’ Annual Statistical Report: Fiscal Year 2013, at 51-56, Tables 2 & 2A(Sept. 22, 2014), available at http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/usao/legacy/2014/09/22/13statrpt.pdf.

4. 12 ANGRY MEN (United Artists 1956).5. I’ve done it twice, and I can’t say I know much more about the process. One case was so clear-cut

that only one verdict was possible. The other one was closer and resulted in a hung jury, but doubtlesswould have resulted in a swift conviction but for my participation.

6. See Roger B. Handberg, Expert Testimony on Eyewitness Identification: A New Pair of Glasses forthe Jury, 32 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1013, 1018-22 (1995).

7. See John P. Rutledge, They All Look Alike: The Inaccuracy of Cross-Racial Identifications, 28 AM. J.CRIM. L. 207, 211-15 (2001).

44 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC (2015) iii

pretty much covers all situations where identity is in dispute at trial.8 In fact,mistaken eyewitness testimony was a factor in more than a third of wrongfulconviction cases.9 Yet, courts have been slow in allowing defendants to present expertevidence on the fallibility of eyewitnesses; many courts still don’t allow it.10 Few, ifany, courts instruct juries on the pitfalls of eyewitness identification or caution themto be skeptical of eyewitness testimony.

2. Fingerprint evidence is foolproof. Not so. Identifying prints that are taken bypolice using fingerprinting equipment and proper technique may be a relativelysimple process,11 but latent prints left in the field are often smudged and incomplete,and the identification process becomes more art than science. When tested by rigorousscientific methods, fingerprint examiners turn out to have a significant error rate.12

Perhaps the best-known example of such an error occurred in 2004 when the FBIannounced that a latent print found on a plastic bag near a Madrid terrorist bombingwas “a 100 percent match” to Oregon attorney Brandon Mayfield.13 The FBI eventu-ally conceded error when Spanish investigators linked the print to someone else.

3. Other types of forensic evidence are scientifically proven and thereforeinfallible. With the exception of DNA evidence (which has its own issues), what goesfor fingerprints goes double and triple for other types of forensic evidence:

Spectrographic voice identification error rates are as high as 63%, depending on thetype of voice sample tested. Handwriting error rates average around 40% and

8. See Thomas Dillickrath, Expert Testimony on Eyewitness Identification: Admissibility and Alterna-tives, 55 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1059, 1063-64 (2001).

9. See The National Registry of Exonerations, % Exonerations by Contributing Factor (last visitedApr. 7, 2015), http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/ExonerationsContribFactorsByCrime.aspx (mistaken eyewitness identifications were a contributing factor in 34 percent of all exonerationsrecorded in the database).

10. The Seventh and Eleventh Circuits have “consistently looked unfavorably upon such testimony,”United States v. Smith, 122 F.3d 1355, 1357 (11th Cir. 1997), with the Eleventh Circuit going as far as tohold that eyewitness expert testimony is per se inadmissible. See United States v. Holloway, 971 F.2d675, 679 (11th Cir. 1992); United States v. Hall, 165 F.3d 1095, 1104 (7th Cir. 1999) (noting apresumption against admission of eyewitness expert testimony). The Second Circuit takes a similarlyskeptical approach, holding that eyewitness expert testimony likely usurps the jury’s role of determiningwitness credibility. See United States v. Lumpkin, 192 F.3d 280, 289 (2d Cir. 1999). The Third and SixthCircuits, by contrast, have welcomed the admission of eyewitness expert testimony. See United States v.Smith, 736 F.2d 1103, 1107 (6th Cir. 1984); United States v. Stevens, 935 F.2d 1380, 1397-98 (3d Cir.1991); see also United States v. Hines, 55 F. Supp. 2d 62, 72 (D. Mass. 1999) (“[w]hile jurors may wellbe confident that they can draw the appropriate inferences about eyewitness identification directly fromtheir life experiences, their confidence may be misplaced, especially where cross-racial identification isconcerned”). And don’t even get me started on the state courts—they’re all over the place.

11. Then, again, maybe not. When the FBI Special Agent came around to take fingerprints for mybackground check, he brought a fingerprint kit and 10 cards, all of which he insisted on filling—about120 prints in all. “Why so many?” I asked. “Because sometimes they don’t come out so clear so we liketo make backups.” He carefully rolled his ten dozen prints and left . . . then came back a week later with10 more cards: None of the first set were any good. True story.

12. “[F]orensic fingerprint identification almost never deals in whole fingerprints. Rather, techniciansuse ‘latent’ fingerprints—invisible impressions that they ‘develop’ using a powder or a chemicaldeveloping agent. Latent prints are usually fragmentary, blurred, overlapping, and otherwise distorted.The challenge is to match the latent print to a pristine inked (or, these days, optically scanned) print takenunder ideal conditions at the police station.” Simon Cole, The Myth of Fingerprints: A Forensic ScienceStands Trial, 10 LINGUA FRANCA, no. 8, 2000; see Simon A. Cole, More Than Zero: Accounting for Errorin Latent Fingerprint Identification, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 985, 994-1029 (2005); Michael J. Saks& Jonathan J. Koehler, The Coming Paradigm Shift in Forensic Identification Science, 309 SCI. 892, 895(2005); Andy Newman, Fingerprinting’s Reliability Draws Growing Court Challenges, N.Y. TIMES (Apr.7, 2001), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/04/07/us/fingerprinting-s-reliability-draws-growing-court-challenges.html. In United States v. Llera Piaza, 188 F. Supp. 2d 549, 564 (E.D. Pa. 2002), for example,Judge Louis Pollack rejected fingerprint identification expert testimony after concluding that the field offingerprint identification has failed to systematically test its underlying assumptions and claims of expertise.

13. Saks & Koehler, supra n.12, at 894.

44 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC (2015)iv

sometimes approach 100%. False-positive error rates for bite marks run as high as64%. Those for microscopic hair comparisons are about 12% (using results ofmitochondrial DNA testing as the criterion).14

Other fields of forensic expertise, long accepted by the courts as largely infallible,such as bloodstain pattern identification, foot and tire print identification and ballis-tics have been the subject of considerable doubt.15 Judge Nancy Gertner, for example,has expressed skepticism about admitting expert testimony on handwriting,16 ca-nines,17 ballistics18 and arson.19 She has lamented that while “the Daubert-Kumhostandard [for admitting expert witness testimony] does not require the illusoryperfection of a television show (CSI, this wasn’t), when liberty hangs in the balance—and, in the case of the defendants facing the death penalty, life itself—the standardsshould be higher . . . than [those that] have been imposed across the country.”20

Some fields of forensic expertise are built on nothing but guesswork and falsecommon sense.21 Many defendants have been convicted and spent countless years inprison based on evidence by arson experts who were later shown to be little betterthan witch doctors.22 Cameron Todd Willingham may have lost his life over it.23

14. Id. at 895 (internal citations omitted); see United States v. Starzecpyzel, 880 F. Supp. 1027, 1038(S.D.N.Y. 1995) (McKenna, J.) (“the testimony at the Daubert hearing firmly established that forensicdocument examination, despite the existence of a certification program, professional journals and othertrappings of science, cannot, after Daubert, be regarded as scientific . . . knowledge”) (internal quotationmarks omitted); see also Radley Balko, How the Flawed “Science” of Bite Mark Analysis Has SentInnocent People to Prison, WASH. POST (Feb. 13, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/wp/2015/02/13/how-the-flawed-science-of-bite-mark-analysis-has-sent-innocent-people-to-jail/ (4-part se-ries criticizing the failure of courts to accept the consensus in the scientific community that “bite markmatching isn’t reliable and has no scientific foundation for its underlying premises, and that until andunless further testing indicates otherwise, it shouldn’t be used in the courtroom”).

15. See TERRY LABER ET AL., NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, FINAL REPORT, RELIABILITY ASSESSMENT OF

CURRENT METHODS IN BLOODSTAIN PATTERN ANALYSIS (2014), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/247180.pdf; Yaron Shor & Sarena Weisner, A Survey on the Conclusions Drawn on the SameFootwear Marks Obtained in Actual Cases by Several Experts Throughout the World, 44 J. FORENSIC SCI.380, 383 (1999); COMMITTEE ON IDENTIFYING THE NEEDS OF THE FORENSIC SCIENCES COMMUNITY, STRENGTHEN-ING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL 154-55 (2009),available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/228091.pdf (noting the unknown, and yet to besufficiently tested, reliability of ballistics analysis).

16. Hines, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 69-71 (ruling that a handwriting expert may not give an ultimateconclusion on the author of a robbery note, and remarking that “[t]here is no academic field known ashandwriting analysis,” as “[t]his is a ‘field’ that has little efficacy outside of a courtroom”).

17. United States v. Hebshie, 754 F. Supp. 2d 89, 119 (D. Mass. 2010) (“There are no peer reviewedstandardized methods of training detective dogs; their reliability is in fact highly variable”) (citing MichaelE. Kurz et al., Effect of Background Interference on Accelerant by Canines, 41 J. FORENSIC SCI. 868 (1996)).

18. United States v. Green, 405 F. Supp. 2d 104, 107-08 (D. Mass. 2005) (finding “serious deficien-cies” in the ballistics expert’s proffered testimony, including the expert’s failure to “cite any reliablereport describing his error rates, that of his laboratory, or indeed, that of the field”).

19. Hebshie, 754 F. Supp. at 114-15 (summarizing recent “public and professional literature reflect-[ing] increasing scrutiny of arson evidence by experts in both the scientific and legal fields as well as bythe public at large,” and expressing concerns about arson expert testimony rooted in “bad science” and“unreliable methodologies”).

20. Green, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 109.21. “[S]ubjective, pattern-based forensic techniques—like hair and bite-mark comparisons” leave

much room for error. See Spencer S. Hsu, FBI Admits Flaws in Hair Analysis Over Decades, WASH. POST

(Apr. 18, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/crime/fbi-overstated-forensic-hair-matches-in-nearly-all-criminal-trials-for-decades/2015/04/18/39c8d8c6-e515-11e4-b510-962fcfabc310_story.html; Roger Ko-ppl, CSI for Real: How to Improve Forensic Science, REASON FOUND., Dec. 2007, at 3-18 (detailinginadequacies in the practice of forensic science).

22. See Paul Bieber, Anatomy of a Wrongful Arson Conviction, THE ARSON PROJECT, http://thearsonproject.org/charm/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/wrongful_convictions.pdf (since 1989, 29 exonerations have in-volved arson convictions).

23. See Robert Tanner, Science Casts Doubt on Arson Convictions, WASH. POST (Dec. 9, 2006),http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/12/09/AR2006120900357.html; David Grann,

44 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC (2015) v

4. DNA evidence is infallible. This is true to a point. DNA comparison, whenproperly conducted by an honest, trained professional will invariably reach thecorrect result. But the integrity of the result depends on a variety of factors that are,unfortunately, not nearly so foolproof: the evidence must be gathered and preservedso as to avoid contamination; the testing itself must be conducted so that the twosamples being compared do not contaminate each other; the examiner must becompetent and honest.24 As numerous scandals involving DNA testing labs haveshown,25 these conditions cannot be taken for granted, and DNA evidence is only asgood as the weakest link in the chain.

5. Human memories are reliable. Much of what we do in the courtroom relies onhuman memory. When a witness is asked to testify about past events, the accuracy ofhis account depends not only on his initial perception, but on the way the memoriesare recorded, stored and retrieved. For a very long time, it was believed that storedmemories were much like video tape or film—an accurate copy of real-word experi-ence that might fade with the passage of time or other factors, but could not bedistorted or embellished.

Science now tells us that this view of human memory is fundamentally flawed. Themind not only distorts and embellishes memories, but a variety of external factors canaffect how memories are retrieved and described. In an early study by cognitivepsychologist Elizabeth Loftus, people were shown videos of car accidents and thenquestioned about what they saw.26 The group asked how fast the cars were goingwhen they “smashed” into each other estimated 6.5 mph faster than the group askedhow fast the cars were going when they “hit” each other.27 A week later, almost athird of those who were asked about the “smash” recalled seeing broken glass, eventhough there was none.28

Trial by Fire, NEW YORKER (Sept. 7, 2009), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2009/09/07/trial-by-fire.24. The DNA scandals continue to this day. See Jaxon Van Derbeken, DNA Lab Irregularities May

Endanger Hundreds of SFPD Cases, SF GATE (Mar. 28, 2015), http://www.sfgate.com/crime/article/DNA-lab-irregularities-may-endanger-hundreds-of-6165643.php (noting that the San Francisco Police Depart-ment is facing accusations that its DNA crime lab technicians have been “fill[ing] in the gaps ofpoor-quality, incomplete genetic evidence” and passing them off as “definitive test results to the state’soffender tracking database, something that would not have been allowed with the original, lower-qualityDNA evidence”); see also Kimberly C. Boies, Misuse of DNA Evidence is Not Always a “HarmlessError”: DNA Evidence, Prosecutorial Misconduct, and Wrongful Conviction, 17 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV.403, 414-16 (2011); Paul C. Giannelli, Wrongful Convictions and Forensic Science: The Need to RegulateCrime Labs, 86 N.C. L. REV. 172-95 (2007).

25. See Stuart Taylor Jr., Opening Argument–Innocents in Prison, NAT’L J. (Aug. 4, 2007), http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/opening-argument-innocents-in-prison-20070804; Mark Hansen, Crime LabsUnder the Microscope After a String of Shoddy, Suspect and Fraudulent Results, ABA J. (Sep. 1, 2013),http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/crime_labs_under_the_microscope_after_a_string_of_shoddy_suspect_and_fraudu/; Adam Liptak & Ralph Blumenthal, New Doubt Cast on Testing in HoustonPolice Crime Lab, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 5, 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/08/05/us/new-doubt-cast-on-testing-in-houston-police-crime-lab.html; Belinda Luscombe, When The Evidence Lies, TIME MAG. (May13, 2001), http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,109625,00.html.

26. See Elizabeth F. Loftus & John C. Palmer, Reconstruction of Automobile Destruction: An Exampleof the Interaction Between Language and Memory, 13 J. VERBAL LEARNING & VERBAL BEHAV. 585-89(1974), available at https://webfiles.uci.edu/eloftus/LoftusPalmer74.pdf.

27. Id. at 586, Table 1.28. Id. at 587, Table 2. Professor Loftus has shown it is even possible to manufacture false memories.

See, e.g., Elizabeth F. Loftus & Jacqueline E. Pickrell, The Formation of False Memories, 25 PSYCHIATRIC

ANNALS 720-25 (1995), https://webfiles.uci.edu/eloftus/Loftus_Pickrell_PA_95.pdf. For example, shegave students each a packet describing three real childhood memories and a false one, and told thestudents that all four memories were real and took place with a close family member. In follow-upinterviews asking the students to describe their memories, 7 of 24 students remembered the false event intheir packet and some added their own details to that false memory. Id. at 722. Loftus was also able toconvince participants in another experiment that they’d experienced traumatic events that never hap-

44 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC (2015)vi

This finding has troubling implications for criminal trials where witnesses arequestioned long and hard by police and prosecutors before the defense gets to doso—if ever. There is thus plenty of opportunity to shape and augment a witness’smemory to bring it into line with the prosecutor’s theory of what happened. Yet withrare exceptions, courts do not permit expert testimony on human memory.29 Forexample, the district judge in the Scooter Libby case denied a defense motion for amemory expert, even though the key issue at trial was whose recollection of a4-year-old telephone conversation should be believed.30 At least one member of thejury that convicted Libby lamented the lack of expert testimony on the subject.31 Anda key witness in that case recently suggested in her memoirs that her memory mayhave been distorted by the prosecutor’s crafty questioning.32

Given the malleability of human memory, it should come as no surprise that manywrongful convictions have been the result of faulty witness memories, often manipu-lated by the police or the prosecution.33

6. Confessions are infallible because innocent people never confess. We nowknow that this is not true. Innocent people do confess with surprising regularity.Harsh interrogation tactics, a variant of Stockholm syndrome, the desire to end theordeal, emotional and financial exhaustion, family considerations and the youth orfeeble-mindedness of the suspect can result in remarkably detailed confessions thatare later shown to be utterly false.34

pened, such as witnessing drug busts and breaking windows with their hands. See Elizabeth F. Loftus,Illusions of Memory, 142 PROCEEDINGS OF THE AM. PHIL. SOC., 60-73 (1998). Judge Mark Bennett providesa comprehensive overview of the existing cognitive psychological research on memory. See Mark W.Bennett, Unspringing The Witness Memory and Demeanor Trap: What Every Judge And Juror Needs toKnow About Cognitive Psychology And Witness Credibility, AM. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015), availableat http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id�2581650.

29. See, e.g., United States v. Affleck, 776 F.2d 1451, 1458 (10th Cir. 1985) (“Specialized testimonyexplaining memory . . . is improper. The average person is able to understand that people forget; thus, afaulty memory is a matter for cross-examination.”). Testimony on memory has been admitted in limitedcircumstances, such as in cases involving mistaken eyewitness identifications, see supra n.10, andrepressed memory caused by stress or trauma, see Isely v. Capuchin Province, 877 F. Supp. 1055, 1064,1066 (E.D. Mich. 1995) (admitting expert testimony on “repressed memory, its validity and reliability,and whether or not [the plaintiff] has, in fact, experienced repressed memory and/or post-traumatic stressdisorder”).

30. United States v. Libby, 461 F. Supp. 2d 3, 16 (D.D.C. 2006).31. See Peter Berkowitz, The False Evidence Against Scooter Libby, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 6, 2015),

http://www.wsj.com/articles/the-false-evidence-against-scooter-libby-1428365673.32. See JUDITH MILLER, THE STORY: A REPORTER’S JOURNEY (2015); see infra n.113.33. See infra nn.51-52 and accompanying text (discussing how a 12-year-old boy accused the wrong

man of a murder after the police fed the boy details of the crime); The National Registry of Exonerations,George Franklin, https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid�3221(George Franklin was convicted on the basis of his daughter’s testimony—20 years after the crime tookplace—that she had seen him commit the murder. He was released after it was revealed that the daughterhad recalled the memory through hypnosis.); Jim Dwyer, Witness Accounts in Midtown Hammer AttackShow the Power of False Memory, N.Y. TIMES (May 14, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/15/nyregion/witness-accounts-in-midtown-hammer-attack-show-the-power-of-false-memory.html?_r�0.

34. One such instance took place in Lake County, Illinois, where local police interrogated Juan RiveraJr. for 4 straight days until he suffered a psychological breakdown and confessed to sexually assaultingand killing a young girl. Rivera spent 20 years in prison until DNA evidence exonerated him in 2012. SeeDan Hinkel, Wrongful Convictions: Exonerated Inmate Wins Early Round In Suit Against Lake CountyOfficials, CHI. TRIB. (Oct. 14, 2013), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2013-10-14/news/ct-met-juan-rivera-lawsuit-win-20131013_1_wrongful-convictions-dna-evidence-dna-exonerations; see also Brandon L. Gar-rett, The Substance of False Confessions, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1051, 1052-57 (2010); Jed S. Rakoff, WhyInnocent People Plead Guilty, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS (Nov. 20, 2014), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2014/nov/20/why-innocent-people-plead-guilty/ (citing criminologists’ estimation that between2 and 8 percent of convicted felons are innocent people who pleaded guilty, and noting that “young,unintelligent, or risk-averse defendants will often provide false confessions just because they cannot ‘takethe heat’ of an interrogation”); Adam Cohen, Why Innocent Men Make False Confessions, TIME MAG.

44 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC (2015) vii

7. Juries follow instructions. This is a presumption—actually more of a guess—that we’ve elevated to a rule of law.35 It is, of course, necessary that we do so becauseit links the jury’s fact-finding process to the law. In fact, however, we know very littleabout what juries actually do when they decide cases.36 Do they consider theinstructions at all? Do they consider all of the instructions or focus on only some? Dothey understand the instructions or are they confused? We don’t really know. We getoccasional glimpses into the operations of juries when they send out questions orsomeone discloses juror misconduct, and even then the information we get is limited.But we have no convincing reason to believe that jury instructions in fact constrainjury behavior in all or even most cases.37 And, because the information we get frominside the jury room is so limited and sporadic, experience does little to improve ourknowledge. Looking at 100 black boxes is no more informative than looking at one.

8. Prosecutors play fair. The Supreme Court has told us in no uncertain terms thata prosecutor’s duty is to do justice, not merely to obtain a conviction.38 It has alsolaid down some specific rules about how prosecutors, and the people who work forthem, must behave—principal among them that the prosecution turn over to thedefense exculpatory evidence in the possession of the prosecution and the police.39

There is reason to doubt that prosecutors comply with these obligations fully. TheU.S. Justice Department, for example, takes the position that exculpatory evidencemust be produced only if it is material.40 This puts prosecutors in the position ofdeciding whether tidbits that could be helpful to the defense are significant enoughthat a reviewing court will find it to be material, which runs contrary to thephilosophy of the Brady/Giglio line of cases and increases the risk that highlyexculpatory evidence will be suppressed. Beyond that, we have what I have describedelsewhere as an “epidemic of Brady violations abroad in the land,”41 a phrase that hascaused much controversy but brought about little change in the way prosecutors

(Feb. 11, 2013), http://ideas.time.com/2013/02/11/why-innocent-men-make-false-confessions/; ShankarVedantam, Confessions Not Always Clad in Iron, WASH. POST (Oct. 1, 2007), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/09/30/AR2007093001326.html.

35. See Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225, 234 (2000) (“A jury is presumed to follow its instruc-tions.”); Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 211 (1987).

36. See David Alan Sklansky, Evidentiary Instructions and the Jury as Other, 65 STAN. L. REV. 407(2013).

37. See id.; Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring) (“Thenaive assumption that prejudicial effects can be overcome by instructions to the jury . . . , all practicinglawyers know to be unmitigated fiction.”).

38. See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (“The United States Attorney is therepresentative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to governimpartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminalprosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.”).

39. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (“suppression by the prosecution of evidencefavorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt orto punishment”); United States v. Giglio, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972) (the Brady rule includes evidence thatcould be used to impeach a witness); see also Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437-38 (1995) (extendingthe state’s obligation under Brady to evidence in the possession of the police).

40. See, e.g., United States Attorneys’ Manual, Chapter 9-5.000, ISSUES RELATED TO TRIALS AND OTHER

COURT PROCEEDINGS, http://www.justice.gov/usam/usam-9-5000-issues-related-trials-and-other-court-proceedings.

41. United States v. Olsen, 737 F.3d 625, 626 (9th Cir. 2013) (Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial ofrehearing en banc); see People v. Velasco-Palacios, F068833, 2015 WL 782632 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 24,2015) (noting that a prosecutor inserted a false confession into the transcript of the defendant’s policeinterrogation); Denis Slattery, Exclusive: Bronx Prosecutor Bashed and Barred from Courtroom forMisconduct, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Apr. 4, 2014), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/bronx/bronx-prosecutor-barred-courtroom-article-1.1746238 (noting that a Bronx prosecutor failed to present evidencethat would have freed a man held at Rikers Island on bogus rape charges).

44 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC (2015)viii

operate in the United States.42

9. The prosecution is at a substantial disadvantage because it must prove itscase beyond a reasonable doubt. Juries are routinely instructed that the defendant ispresumed innocent and the prosecution must prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,but we don’t really know whether either of these instructions has an effect on theaverage juror. Do jurors understand the concept of a presumption? If so, do theyunderstand how a presumption is supposed to operate? Do they assume that thepresumption remains in place until it is overcome by persuasive evidence or do theybelieve it disappears as soon as any actual evidence is presented? We don’t really know.

Nor do we know whether juries really draw a distinction between proof by apreponderance, proof by clear and convincing evidence and proof beyond a reason-able doubt. These levels of proof, which lawyers and judges assume to be hermeti-cally sealed categories, may mean nothing at all in the jury room. My own experienceas a juror certainly did nothing to convince me that my fellow jurors understood andappreciated the difference. The issue, rather, seemed to be quite simply: Am Iconvinced that the defendant is guilty?

Even more troubling are doubts raised by psychological research showing that“whoever makes the first assertion about something has a large advantage overeveryone who denies it later.”43 The tendency is more pronounced for older peoplethan for younger ones, and increases the longer the time-lapse between assertion anddenial. So is it better to stand mute rather than deny an accusation? Apparently not,because “when accusations or assertions are met with silence, they are more likely tofeel true.”44

To the extent this psychological research is applicable to trials, it tends to refute thenotion that the prosecution pulls the heavy oar in criminal cases. We believe that itdoes because we assume juries go about deciding cases by accurately rememberingall the testimony and weighing each piece of evidence in a linear fashion, selectingwhich to believe based on assessment of its credibility or plausibility. The reality maybe quite different. It may be that jurors start forming a mental picture of the events inquestion as soon as they first hear about them from the prosecution witnesses.Later-introduced evidence, even if pointing in the opposite direction, may not becapable of fundamentally altering that picture and may, in fact, reinforce it.45 And theeffect may be worse the longer the prosecution’s case lasts and, thus, the longer ittakes to bring the contrary evidence before the jury. Trials in general, and longer trials

42. See CENTER FOR PROSECUTOR INTEGRITY, AN EPIDEMIC OF PROSECUTOR MISCONDUCT, WHITE PAPER (Dec.2013), available at http://www.prosecutorintegrity.org/wp-content/uploads/EpidemicofProsecutor-Misconduct.pdf.

43. Shankar Vedantam, Persistence of Myths Could Alter Public Policy Approach, WASH. POST (Sept. 4,2007), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/09/03/AR2007090300933.html (dis-cussing the results of a 2007 study by psychologist Norbert Schwarz); see Norbert Schwarz et al.,Metacognitive Experiences and the Intricacies of Setting People Straight: Implications for Debiasing andPublic Information Campaigns, 39 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 127, 152 (2007) (“[o]nce astatement is accepted as true, people are likely to attribute it to a credible source—which, ironically, mayoften be the source that attempted to discredit it—lending the statement additional credibility whenconveyed to others”) (citation omitted).

44. Vedantam, supra n.43 (quoting the statement of Peter Kim, an organizational psychologist whopublished a study in the Journal of Applied Psychology); see Donald L. Ferrin et al., Silence SpeaksVolumes: The Effectiveness of Reticence in Comparison to Apology and Denial for Responding toIntegrity- and Competence-Based Trust Violations, 92(4) J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 893-908 (2007).

45. See Norbert Schwarz et al., Metacognitive Experiences and the Intricacies of Setting PeopleStraight: Implications for Debiasing and Public Information Campaigns, 39 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL

SOC. PSYCHOL. 127, 152 (2007); Eliot G. Disner, Some Thoughts About Opening Statements: AnotherOpening, Another Show, PRAC. LITIGATOR, Jan. 2004, at 61 (“there is substantial evidence that juriesnormally make up their minds long before closing argument”).

44 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC (2015) ix

in particular, may be heavily loaded in favor of whichever party gets to present itscase first—the prosecution in a criminal case and the plaintiff in a civil case. If this isso, it substantially undermines the notion that we seldom convict an innocent manbecause guilt must be proven to a sufficient certainty. It may well be that, contrary toinstructions, and contrary to their own best intentions, jurors are persuaded ofwhatever version of events is first presented to them and change their minds only ifthey are given very strong reasons to the contrary.

10. Police are objective in their investigations. In many ways, this is the bedrockassumption of our criminal justice process. Police investigators have vast discretionabout what leads to pursue, which witnesses to interview, what forensic tests toconduct and countless other aspects of the investigation. Police also have a uniqueopportunity to manufacture or destroy evidence,46 influence witnesses, extract confes-sions47 and otherwise direct the investigation so as to stack the deck against peoplethey believe should be convicted.48 And not just small-town police in Podunk orTimbuktu. Just the other day, “[t]he Justice Department and FBI [] formally acknowl-edged that nearly every examiner in an elite FBI forensic unit gave flawed testimonyin almost all [of the 268] trials in which they offered evidence against criminaldefendants over more than a two-decade period before 2000.”49 Do they offer a classat Quantico called “Fudging Your Results To Get A Conviction” or “Lying On TheStand 101”? How can you trust the professionalism and objectivity of police any-where after an admission like that?

There are countless documented cases where innocent people have spent decadesbehind bars because the police manipulated or concealed evidence, but two exampleswill suffice:

46. One example is the case of Mark Prentice, who pleaded guilty to assault and robbery only after aNew York State Police trooper, David Harding, reported that he had found fingerprints matching Prenticein the victim’s house. A subsequent investigation revealed that New York State Police troopers, includingHarding, had falsified fingerprint evidence in at least 30 cases, and Harding admitted to planting evidencein Prentice’s case. Prentice was acquitted after spending six years in prison. Harding was then sentencedto 4.5 years in prison for fabricating evidence. See The National Registry of Exonerations, Mark Prentice,https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid�4540. In addition to the casesrecorded by the National Registry of Exonerations, researchers became aware of more than 1,100 cases inwhich convictions were overturned due to just 13 police corruption scandals, the majority of whichinvolved planting drugs or guns on innocent individuals. See Chris Seward, Researchers: More than2,000 False Convictions in Past 23 Years, NBC NEWS (May 21, 2012), http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/05/21/11756575-researchers-more-than-2000-false-convictions-in-past-23-years?lite; Sean Gar-diner, Brooklyn District Attorney Kenneth Thompson Takes on Wrongful Convictions, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 8,2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/brooklyn-district-attorney-kenneth-thompson-takes-on-wrongful-convictions-1407547937 (Brooklyn DA Kenneth Thompson’s conviction integrity unit has ordered thereview of more than 100 prior convictions, 70 of which involved accusations that former BrooklynDetective Louis Scarcella coerced confessions and tampered with witness statements).

47. See supra n.34 (discussing Rivera’s coerced confession at the hands of the Lake County police);Spencer Ackerman, “I Sat In That Place for Three Days, Man”: Chicagoans Detail Abusive ConfinementInside Police “Black Site”, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 27, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/feb/27/chicago-abusive-confinment-homan-square (four African-Americans describe being detained for sev-eral days inside a police warehouse, where they were “shackled and interrogated,” denied access tocounsel and forbidden from notifying anyone of their whereabouts); see also Miriam S. Gohara, A LieFor a Lie: False Confessions and the Case for Reconsidering the Legality of Deceptive InterrogationTechniques, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 791, 794-95 (2006); Laure Magid, Deceptive Police InterrogationTechniques: How Far is Too Far?, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1168, 1168 (2001).

48. 92 percent of arrest warrants obtained by the Ferguson, Missouri Police Department were issuedagainst African Americans, who as a group were 68 percent less likely than others to have their chargesdismissed. See UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE-CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION, INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGU-SON POLICE DEPARTMENT, (Mar. 4, 2015), available at http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson_police_department_report.pdf.

49. See Hsu, supra n.21.

44 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC (2015)x

In 2013, Debra Milke was released after 23 years on Arizona’s death row basedentirely on a supposed oral confession she had made to one Detective Saldate whowas much later shown to be a serial liar.50 And then there is the case of RickyJackson, who spent 39 years behind bars based entirely on the eyewitness identifica-tion of a 12-year-old boy who saw the crime from a distance and failed to pickJackson out of a lineup.51 At that point, “the officers began to feed him information:the number of assailants, the weapon used, the make and model of the getaway car.”52

39 years!For some victims of police misconduct, exoneration comes too late: Mark Collin

Sodersten died in prison while maintaining his innocence.53 After his death, aCalifornia appellate court determined that Sodersten had been denied a fair trialbecause police had failed to turn over exculpatory witness tapes.54 It posthumouslyset aside the conviction, which no doubt reduced Sodersten’s time in purgatory.

11. Guilty pleas are conclusive proof of guilt. Many people, including judges,take comfort in knowing that an overwhelming number of criminal cases are resolvedby guilty plea rather than trial.55 Whatever imperfections there may be in the trial andcriminal charging process, they believe, are washed away by the fact that thedefendant ultimately consents to a conviction. But this fails to take into accountthe trend of bringing multiple counts for a single incident—thereby vastly increasingthe risk of a life-shattering sentence in case of conviction56—as well as the creativityof prosecutors in hatching up criminal cases where no crime exists57 and theovercriminalization of virtually every aspect of American life.58 It also ignores that

50. Michael Keifer, Debra Milke Murder Charges Dismissed, AZ CENT. (Dec. 11, 2014), http://www.azcentral.com/story/news/local/phoenix/2014/12/11/%20milke-double-jeopardy-appeals/20253845/.

51. Radley Balko, This Week in Innocence: Ricky Jackson to be Released Tomorrow After 39 Years inPrison, WASH. POST (Nov. 20, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/wp/2014/11/20/this-week-in-innocence-ricky-jackson-to-be-released-tomorrow-after-39-years-in-prison/. Jackson was exoner-ated thanks to the dedicated efforts of the Ohio Innocence Project. See Ohio Innocence Project,University of Cincinnati College of Law, http://www.law.uc.edu/oip.

52. Exonerated Man Who Spent 39 Years in Prison Meets Accuser, CBS NEWS VIDEO (Jan. 5, 2015),http://www.cbsnews.com/videos/exonerated-man-who-spent-39-years-in-prison-meets-accuser/.

53. Laura Ernde, Accused Murderer Cleared Seven Months After Prison Death, DAILY J. (Jan. 18, 2007).54. In re Sodersten, 53 Cal. Rptr. 3d 572 (Ct. App. 2007).55. Judge Morris Hoffman, for example, cites to the fact that “almost all criminal defendants plead

guilty” as support for the proposition that “the actual rate of wrongful convictions in the United States isvanishingly small.” See Morris B. Hoffman, The “Innocence” Myth, WALL ST. J., Apr. 26, 2007, at A19.But see Rakoff, supra n.34 (strongly objecting to the tendency to equate guilty pleas with actual guilt,noting that the current “prosecutor-dictated plea bargain system, by creating such inordinate pressures toenter into plea bargains, appears to have led a significant number of defendants to plead guilty to crimesthey never actually committed”). As to the meaning of a 1 percent error rate, see infra pp. xiv-xv.

56. H. Mitchell Caldwell, Coercive Plea Bargaining: The Unrecognized Scourge of the Justice System,61 CATH. U. L. REV. 63, 72-74 (2011).

57. See, e.g., Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 706 (2005) (reversing ArthurAndersen’s conviction of obstruction of justice under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1512(b)(2)(A) and (B), where the juryinstructions, consistent with the government’s reading of the vaguely-worded statute, had all but erased aculpability requirement); United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 442, 448 (2d Cir. 2014) (pointing out“the doctrinal novelty of [the government’s] recent insider trading prosecutions” and reversing withprejudice two hedge fund managers’ convictions for securities fraud because the government “presentedno evidence that [the managers] knew that they were trading on information obtained from insiders inviolation of those insiders’ fiduciary duties”); United States v. Goyal, 629 F.3d 912, 921 (2010) (reversinga chief financial officer’s convictions of 15 counts of securities fraud and making false statements where“the government’s case suffered from a total failure of proof”) (internal quotation marks omitted); id. at922 (Kozinski, C.J., concurring) (“[Goyal] is just one of a string of recent cases in which courts havefound that federal prosecutors overreached by trying to stretch criminal law beyond its proper bounds.This is not the way criminal law is supposed to work.”) (citations omitted).

58. Justice Scalia criticized the overcriminalization of federal law in his dissent from denial ofcertiorari in Sorich v. United States, 555 U.S. 1204 (2009), a case in which the Seventh Circuit affirmed

44 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC (2015) xi

many defendants cannot, as a practical matter, tell their side of the story at trialbecause they fear being impeached with prior convictions or other misconduct.59

And, of course, if the trial process is perceived as highly uncertain, or even stacked infavor of the prosecution, the incentive to plead guilty to some charge that will allowthe defendant to salvage a portion of his life, becomes immense.60 If the prosecutionoffers a take-it-or-leave-it plea bargain before disclosing exculpatory evidence, thedefendant may cave to the pressure, throwing away a good chance of an acquittal.

12. Long sentences deter crime. In the United States, we have over 2.2 millionpeople behind bars.61 Our rate of approximately 716 prisoners per 100,000 people isthe highest in the world, over 5 times higher than that of other industrialized nationslike Canada, England, Germany and Australia.62 Sentences for individual crimes arealso far longer than in other developed countries. For example, an individual con-victed of burglary in the United States serves an average of 16 months in prison,compared with 5 months in Canada and 7 months in England.63 And the averageprison sentence for assault in the United States is 60 months, compared to under 20months in England, Australia and Finland.64

Incarceration is an immensely expensive enterprise. It is expensive for the taxpay-ers, as the average cost of housing a single prisoner for one year is approximately$30,000.65 A 20-year sentence runs into something like $600,000 in prison costsalone. Long sentences are also immensely hard on prisoners and cruel to their

Chicago city employees’ convictions under the honest services mail fraud statute. The statute criminalizesthe use of the mail or wire services to carry out a “scheme . . . to deprive another of the intangible right ofhonest services.” 18 U.S.C. § 1346. In urging the Court to construe the statute more narrowly, JusticeScalia pointed out that the mail fraud statute “has been invoked to impose criminal penalties upon astaggeringly broad swath of behavior, including misconduct not only by public officials and employeesbut also by private employees and corporate fiduciaries”—for example, the convictions of “a localhousing official who failed to disclose a conflict of interest,” “students who schemed with their professorsto turn in plagiarized work” and “lawyers who made side-payments to insurance adjusters in exchange forthe expedited processing of their clients’ pending claims.” Sorich, 555 U.S. at 1204 (Scalia, J., dissentingfrom denial of certiorari) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Harvey A. Silverglate, Three Felonies aDay: How the Feds Target the Innocent (2009) (illustrating the shady practices prosecutors have used inorder to convict individuals under vaguely worded federal statutes for conduct no rational person wouldview as criminal); Alex Kozinski & Misha Tseytlin, You’re (Probably) a Federal Criminal, in IN THE

NAME OF JUSTICE 43-56 (Timothy Lynch ed., Cato Institute 2009); Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Ham SandwichNation: Due Process When Everything Is a Crime, 113 COLUM. L. REV. Sidebar 102 (2013); George F.Will, When Everything Is a Crime, Wash. Post (Apr. 8, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/when-everything-is-a-crime/2015/04/08/1929ab88-dd43-11e4-be40-566e2653afe5_story.html.

59. Tracey L. Meares, Rewards for Good Behavior: Influencing Prosecutorial Discretion and Conductwith Financial Incentives, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 851, 863 (1995).

60. See John H. Blume & Rebecca K. Helm, The Unexonerated: Factually Innocent Defendants WhoPlead Guilty, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 157 (2014); Bennett L. Gershman, Threats and Bullying by Prosecu-tors, 46 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 327 (2014); see also infra n.73.

61. Roy Walmsley, World Prison Populations List (10th ed., Oct. 2013), INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR

PRISON STUDIES 3, http://www.prisonstudies.org/sites/prisonstudies.org/files/resources/downloads/wppl_10.pdf (estimating there are 2,239,751 individuals, including pre-trial detainees, in American penal institutions).

62. Id. (Canada’s rate is 118 per 100,000; England’s is 148 per 100,000; Germany’s is 79 per 100,000;and Australia’s is 130 per 100,000).

63. See Adam Liptak, U.S. Prison Population Dwarfs That of Other Nations, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 23,2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/23/world/americas/23iht-23prison.12253738.html?pagewanted�all&_r�0.

64. FINDING DIRECTION: EXPANDING CRIMINAL JUSTICE OPTIONS BY CONSIDERING POLICIES OF OTHER NA-TIONS, JUST. POL’Y INST. 2 (Apr. 2011), http://www.justicepolicy.org/uploads/justicepolicy/documents/sentencing.pdf.

65. See NATHAN JAMES, THE BUREAU OF PRISONS (BOP): OPERATIONS AND BUDGET, CONG. RES. SERV. 14(Mar. 4, 2014), available at http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42486.pdf; Christian Henrichson & Ruth Dela-ney, What Incarceration Costs Taxpayers, VERA INST. OF JUST. CENTER ON SENT’G AND CORRECTIONS (Feb.19, 2012), http://www.vera.org/pubs/special/price-prisons-what-incarceration-costs-taxpayers (“total per-inmate cost averaged $31,286” in 2011).

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families, as it’s usually very difficult for a prisoner to re-integrate into his family andcommunity after very long prison sentences.66

We are committed to a system of harsh sentencing because we believe that longsentences deter crime and, in any event, incapacitate criminals from victimizing thegeneral population while they are in prison. And, indeed, the United States isenjoying an all-time low in violent crime rates, which would seem to support thisintuition.67 But crime rates have been dropping steadily since the 1990s, and notmerely in the United States but throughout the industrialized world.68 Our intuitionabout harsh sentences deterring crime may thus be misguided.69 We may be spendingscarce taxpayer dollars maintaining the largest prison population in the industrializedworld, shattering countless lives and families, for no good reason. As with much elsein the law, the connection between punishment and deterrence remains mysterious.70

We make our decisions based on faith.

II

What I have listed above are some of the reasons to doubt that our criminal justicesystem is fundamentally just.71 This is not meant to be an exhaustive list, nor is itclear that all of these uncertainties would, on closer examination, be resolved againstthe current system. But there are enough doubts on a broad range of subjects touchingintimately on the integrity of the system that we should be concerned. The NationalRegistry of Exonerations has recorded 1576 exonerations in the United States since1989.72 The year 2014 alone saw a record high of 125 exonerations, up from 91 the

66. See generally Jalila Jefferson-Bullock, The Time is Ripe to Include Considerations of the Effects onFamilies and Communities of Excessively Long Sentences, 83 UMKC L. REV. 73 (2014).

67. See Uniform Crime Reports: Crime in the United States 2013, FBI, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2013/crime-in-the-u.s.-2013/violent-crime/violent-crime-topic-page/violentcrimemain_final (ex-plaining that an estimated 1.16 million violent crimes occurred in the U.S., which is 12.3 percent belowthe 2009 level and 14.5 percent below the 2004 level).

68. See Where Have All the Burglars Gone?, THE ECONOMIST (July 20, 2013), http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21582041-rich-world-seeing-less-and-less-crime-even-face-high-unemployment-and-economic; see alsoInimai M. Chettiar, The Many Causes of America’s Decline in Crime, THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 11, 2015),http://www.theatlantic.com/features/archive/2015/02/the-many-causes-of-americas-decline-in-crime/385364/.

69. Nor does putting more people behind bars necessarily lead to less crime. A recent report by theBrennan Center reveals that “incarceration has been decreasing[ly effective] as a crime fighting tacticsince at least 1980,” as increased incarceration has had “no observable effect” on the nationwide declinein violent crimes in the 1990s and 2000s. See DR. OLIVER ROEDER ET AL., WHAT CAUSED THE CRIME

DECLINE?, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUST., 22-23 (Feb. 12, 2015), available at https://www.brennancenter.org/publication/what-caused-crime-decline. A recent study points to “prosecutors—more than cops, judges, orlegislators—as the principal drivers of the increase in the prison population,” explaining that “[t]he realchange is in the chances that a felony arrest by the police turns into a felony case brought byprosecutors.” See Jeffrey Toobin, The Milwaukee Experiment: What Can One Prosecutor Do About TheMass Incarceration of African-Americans?, THE NEW YORKER (May 11, 2015), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/05/11/the-milwaukee-experiment.

70. Compare VALERIE WRIGHT, DETERRENCE IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE: EVALUATING CERTAINTY VERSUS SEVER-ITY OF PUNISHMENT, THE SENT’G PROJECT 6-8 (2010), available at http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/deterrence%20briefing%20.pdf (compiling several studies that conclude that longer sentences don’t leadto lower recidivism rates, and can even lead to higher rates), with FRANCESCO DRAGO ET AL., THE

DETERRENT EFFECTS OF PRISON: EVIDENCE FROM A NATURAL EXPERIMENT, THE INST. FOR THE STUDY OF LAB. 2(Jul. 2007), available at http://ftp.iza.org/dp2912.pdf (finding that in some cases, a longer sentence canreduce recidivism by 1.24 percent). According to Judge Rakoff, this uncertainty should not stop thejudiciary from speaking out against the “evil” of mass incarceration. Jed S. Rakoff, Mass Incarceration:The Silence of the Judges, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (May 21, 2015), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2015/may/21/mass-incarceration-silence-judges.

71. There are similar reasons to doubt that our civil justice system is fundamentally just, but that’s atopic for another day.

72. The National Registry of Exonerations, http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/

44 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC (2015) xiii

year before, and there is reason to believe the trend will continue.73 Certainly thesignificant number of inmates freed in recent years as the result of various innocenceprojects and especially as a result of DNA testing in cases where the convictions wereobtained in the pre-DNA era, should cause us to question whether the current systemis performing as effectively as we’ve been led to believe. It’s no answer to say thatthe exonerees make up only a minuscule portion of those convicted. For everyexonerated convict, there may be dozens who are innocent but cannot prove it.

We can be reasonably confident that the system reaches the correct result in mostcases, but that is not the test. Rather, we must start by asking how confident we arethat every one of the 2.2 million people in prisons and jails across the country are infact guilty. And if we can’t be sure, then what is an acceptable error rate? How manyinnocent lives and families are we willing to sacrifice in order to have a workablecriminal justice system? If we put the acceptable error rate at 5 percent, this wouldmean something like 110,000 innocent people incarcerated across the country. A 1percent error rate would mean 22,000 innocent people—more or less the populationof Nogales, Arizona—wrongly imprisoned. These numbers may seem tolerable un-less, of course, you, your friend or loved one draws the short straw.

Do we know how these numbers compare to the actual error rate? We have noidea. What we have is faith that our system works very well and the errors, when theyare revealed, are rare exceptions.74 Much hinges on retaining this belief: our selfimage as Americans; the pride of countless judges and lawyers; the idea that we livein a just society; confidence in the power of reason and logic; the certainty that noneof us or our loved ones will face the unimaginable nightmare of unjust imprisonment

detaillist.aspx (last visited Apr. 7, 2015). Of these exonerated individuals, 112 were sentenced to death,and 265 spent more than 20 years behind bars. The average time spent in prison was 9 years, with 40percent imprisoned for more than 10 years. 80 percent were convicted by juries, 7 percent by judges and12 percent pleaded guilty. 25 percent were exonerated at least in part by DNA evidence. The followingfactors contributed to their exonerations: mistaken witness identification (34% of exonerations); perjuryor false accusation (55%); false confession (13%), defective or misleading forensic evidence (22%) andofficial misconduct (46%). Cases often involve more than one of these factors. See The National Registryof Exonerations, % Exonerations by Contributing Factor (last visited Apr. 7, 2015), http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/ExonerationsContribFactorsByCrime.aspx.

73. 47 of the 125 exonerations in 2014 involved defendants who had pleaded guilty. See University ofMichigan, The National Registry of Exonerations, Exonerations in 2014, 3 (Jan. 27, 2015), https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Documents/Exonerations_in_2014_report.pdf. The exonerations weremostly concentrated in California, Texas, New York and Illinois. According to an in-depth study by SAN

FRANCISCO magazine, between 1989 and 2004, more than 200 California inmates were freed after courtsfound they were wrongfully convicted. See Nina Martin, Innocence Lost, S.F. (Nov. 2004),http://deathpenalty.org/downloads/SFMag.pdf.

Their stories are the stuff of nightmares. Take, for example, Gloria Killian, a 30-something former lawstudent who had signed up to do freelance detective work for a coin shop owner. One day, an elderly coincollector was robbed and killed, and someone called the Sacramento police accusing “a law studentnamed Gloria” of being involved. Nothing came of this accusation until a year later, when a repeat felonnamed Gary Masse was convicted of the murder and sentenced to life without parole. He named Killianas his accomplice and claimed she masterminded the robbery. The accusation stuck, and Killian wasconvicted of conspiracy and murder, and sentenced to 32 years to life. Masse got his sentence reduced to25 years. Over a decade later, a new investigation uncovered evidence that Masse had entered into anagreement with prosecutors to testify against Killian in exchange for leniency—a fact never disclosed tothe defense. The investigation also turned up a letter Masse sent to the DA soon after Killian wassentenced, in which he wrote, “I lied my ass off for you people.” A panel of our court reversed Killian’sconviction in 2002, at which point she had already lost 16 years of her life to prison. See Killian v. Poole,282 F.3d 1204 (9th Cir. 2002). The prosecutor walked away with an admonishment from the CaliforniaState Bar. See Martin, supra, at 10-11.

74. Judge Hoffman cautions against the assumption that “our criminal justice system [is] so dismalthat a rightful conviction seems the exception and not the rule,” urging that we “look not only at thenumber of wrongfully convicted defendants, but also at the number of rightly convicted ones.” SeeHoffman, supra n.55.

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or execution; belief in the incomparable integrity and accuracy of our system ofjustice; faith that we have transcended medieval methods of conviction and punish-ment so that only those who are guilty are punished, and their punishment is humaneand proportionate. There are, we are convinced, no Edmond Danteses and no Chateaud’Ifs in America today.

But what do we really know? We must reject out of hand the idea that the numberof actual exonerations represents all of those who have been wrongly convicted.Convicted prisoners wishing to gain release on grounds of innocence face formidablehurdles.75 To begin with, they are in prison and thus unable to pursue leads the policemight have missed; they have to rely on someone on the outside to do it, and that’soften difficult or impossible to accomplish. A prisoner’s access even to his counsel isseverely restricted once he’s incarcerated. A loyal friend or relative might do it, butfriends and even relatives often abandon defendants who are convicted, no matterhow much they may protest their innocence. A few prisoners may obtain the help ofan innocence project, but the work is labor-intensive, resources are scarce andmanpower is limited, so innocence projects engage in triage, focusing on the mostpromising cases.76 Of course, it’s often difficult to tell whether a case is promisinguntil you look closely at it, so a promising case can easily be overlooked.

But the biggest problem is that new evidence is hard—and often impossible—tofind. If it’s a physical crime, police secure the crime scene and seize anything thatlooks like it could be relevant. The chance of going back years later and picking upnew clues is vanishingly small. The trick then is to get whatever evidence the policehave, assuming they didn’t destroy it or release it once it was clear that it wouldn’t beused at trial. If the crime is non-physical, such as fraud, child pornography orcomputer hacking, the police seize all the relevant computers, hard drives and paperrecords (including any exculpatory evidence the suspect may have there) and maywell discard them after the conviction becomes final. For a brief period, DNAevidence helped exculpate defendants who were convicted in the pre-DNA era,77 butDNA often cannot help identify the true perpetrator because no sample of DNA wasfound or collected from the crime scene.78 A prisoner has to be exceedingly lucky to

75. See Brandon L. Garrett, Claiming Innocence, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1629, 1670-84 (2008).76. See Steven A. Krieger, Why Our Justice System Convicts Innocent People, and the Challenges

Faced by Innocence Projects Trying to Exonerate Them, 14 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 333, 367-77 (2011) (theaverage innocence project receives about 600 requests per year, but only has the bandwidth to effectivelyinvestigate around 100 cases per year).

77. Often over the dogged opposition of prosecutors who have no wish to have a victory snatchedaway. Take, for example, Ken Anderson, the Texas district attorney who succeeded in putting MichaelMorton in prison for murder. See infra nn.80-82 and accompanying text. Morton was released aftertwenty-five years based on DNA test results linking the crime to another man, as well as exculpatoryevidence that Anderson had withheld during trial. For six years, Anderson’s successor, John Bradley,fought Morton’s repeated requests for DNA testing, explaining that “[o]nce a prosecutor has a case inwhich he or someone else has achieved a conviction where a body of people have been convinced beyondreasonable doubt someone is guilty and then sentenced them, the presumption becomes that that is ajustified verdict that the prosecutor must defend.” See Brandi Grissom, A Tough Prosecutor Finds HisCertitude Shaken by a Prisoner’s Exoneration, THE TEX. TRIB. (Nov. 18, 2011), http://www.texastribune.org/library/multimedia/john-bradley-texas-prosecutor-asserts-change-of-heart/.

The prosecutors in Anthony Ray Hinton’s case took the same approach as Bradley: “Despite pleas byMr. Hinton’s lawyers, who cited conclusions by newly enlisted specialists, the state refused for years toreconsider the evidence” that eventually led to his release after 30 years on death row. See Alan Blinder,Alabama Man Freed After Decades On Death Row, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 3, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/04/us/anthony-ray-hinton-alabama-prison-freed-murder.html?mwrsm�Email&_r�1; see infra n.167.

78. See Richard A. Rosen, Innocence and Death, 82 N.C. L. REV. 61, 73 (2003) (“[F]or everydefendant who is exonerated because of DNA evidence, there have been certainly hundreds, maybethousands, who have been convicted of crimes on virtually identical evidence,” yet “[f]or these thousandsof defendants . . . there was no physical evidence that could have been subjected to scientific scrutiny.”).

44 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC (2015) xv

collect enough evidence to prove his innocence; most cannot hope to meet thatstandard. I think it’s fair to assume—though there is no way of knowing—that thenumber of exculpations in recent years understates the actual number of innocentprisoners by an order, and probably two orders, of magnitude.79

Wrongful convictions are not merely unjust to the prisoner and his family, theyoften result in another injustice or series of injustices: When an innocent man isconvicted, a guilty man is left free and emboldened to victimize others. The MichaelMorton case provides a good example.80 Morton was convicted in 1987 for the 1986beating murder of his wife. Twenty-five years later he was exonerated when DNAevidence pointed to another man, Mark Norwood, who was eventually convicted ofkilling Mrs. Morton. However, Norwood has now been charged with the similarbeating-death of another woman, Debra Baker; that murder was committed a yearafter Morton was convicted of his wife’s murder.81 Norwood is awaiting trial for theBaker murder.82 Had police continued to investigate the Morton murder instead ofshutting down the investigation once they decided that Michael Morton was theculprit, Debra Baker might still be alive.

There’s another question the answer to which we must be reasonably confident: Ofthose that are guilty, can we be sure that substantial numbers are not spending farmore time behind bars than is justified? The question of how much time prisonersspend behind bars is no less important than that of whether only the guilty are beinglocked up. The ability to pick up the threads of one’s life after three to five years inprison is quite different than after fifteen, twenty or twenty-five years. Aside from thebrutalizing and often dehumanizing effect of long-term imprisonment,83 an inmatewho is released after a lengthy prison term simply does not return to the same worldhe left behind: Children grow up; spouses find other partners; friends and acquain-tances forget; job prospects disappear; life and work skills deteriorate.84 Shortersentences also reduce the consequences of wrongful convictions. While no timebehind bars can be justified for someone who is innocent,85 we must be especiallycareful before imposing life-altering sentences.

By any measure, the United States leads the world in incarceration. In absoluteterms, it has more prisoners than any other country. With just 5 percent of the world’s

79. See Samuel R. Gross et al., Rate of False Conviction of Criminal Defendants Who Are Sentencedto Death, 111 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCIS. 7230, 7230 (2014), http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4034186/ (acknowledging that “the great majority of innocent defendants remain undetected,” andconservatively estimating that at least 4.1 percent of those on death row are innocent).

80. See supra n.77; Innocence Project, Michael Morton, http://www.innocenceproject.org/cases-false-imprisonment/michael-morton.

81. Morton was convicted and sentenced to life in prison in February 1987, and Baker was murderedin January 1988. See Brandi Grissom, Mark Norwood Indicted in Second Austin Murder, THE TEX. TRIB.(Nov. 9, 2012), http://www.texastribune.org/2012/11/09/mark-norwood-faces-grand-jury-second-austin-murder/.

82. See Claire Osborn & Jazmine Ulloa, Mark Norwood, Sentenced to Life for Morton Murder, PleadsNot Guilty in Second Case, STATESMAN (Jan. 9, 2014), http://www.statesman.com/news/news/local/mark-norwood-sentenced-to-life-for-morton-murder-p/nchx2/; Jazmine Ulloa, Judge Delays Trial in the 1988Killing of Debra Baker, STATESMAN (Jan. 12, 2015), http://www.statesman.com/news/news/crime-law/judge-delays-trial-in-the-1988-killing-of-debra-ba/njmTY/.

83. See Jefferson-Bullock, supra n.66, at 100-05.84. See Craig Haney, The Psychological Impact of Incarcertation: Implications for Postprison Adjust-

ment, in PRISONERS ONCE REMOVED 46-48 (Jeremy Travis & Michelle Waul eds., The Urb. Inst. Press2003).

85. Jails, which primarily house the legally innocent, treat their inmates no better than prisons do, andhave their own share of horror stories. See Ryan Cooper, How Your Local Jail Became Hell: AnInvestigation, THE WEEK (Mar. 31, 2015), http://theweek.com/articles/540725/how-local-jail-became-hell-investigation.

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population, we have almost a quarter of the world’s prisoners.86 China, with nearly 20percent of the world’s population, has 16 percent of the world’s prisoners.87 Incarcera-tion rates were not always this high in the United States. For the first three-quarters ofthe twentieth century, the rate was well under 250 per 100,000.88 Then, startingaround 1980, incarceration rates started rising sharply with the advent of the war ondrugs, mandatory minimum sentences and three-strikes laws.89

The difference in incarceration rates cannot be explained by higher crime rates inthe United States. Crime rates here are roughly equivalent to Canada and in manycategories lower than other countries.90 And the crime rate has been dropping in theUnited States, as in many other industrialized nations.91 Yet, U.S. sentences arevastly, shockingly longer than just about anywhere else in the world.92

There are reasons to doubt whether the length of prison sentences in this country isjust. Although elected officials, regardless of party affiliation and political leaning,seem to favor Draconian sentences, and the public seems to support them in theabstract, it’s unclear how much popular support they enjoy when applied to indi-vidual defendants. U.S. District Judge James Gwin of Ohio reported on an informalstudy he conducted involving 22 jury trials.93 He asked the jurors who had convictedthe defendant to write down what each thought was the appropriate sentence. JudgeGwin found that the jurors’ recommended sentences were significantly lower thanthose recommended by the Sentencing Guidelines: “In several cases, the recom-mended median Guidelines range was more than 10 times greater than the medianjurors’ recommendation. Averaged over more than 20 cases, jurors recommendedsentences that were 37% of the minimum Guidelines recommended sentences and22% of the median Guidelines recommended sentences.”94

Whether we are incarcerating the right people and for an appropriate length of timeare important questions to which we do not have very good answers. We are taughtearly in our schooling that the criminal justice system is tilted heavily in favor ofdefendants, resolving all doubts in their favor. Movies and television reinforce thisidea with countless stories of dedicated police and prosecutors bringing guilty peopleto justice,95 or of acquittals of the innocent because of the efforts of a dedicatedlawyer or investigator.96 Our educational system spends little time pondering the fate

86. Liptak, supra n.63.87. Walmsley, supra n.61.88. See JUSTICE POLICY INSTITUTE, THE PUNISHING DECADE: PRISON AND JAIL ESTIMATES AT THE MILLENNIUM

4 (2000), available at http://www.justicepolicy.org/images/upload/00-05_rep_punishingdecade_ac.pdf(charting incarceration rates from 1900 onwards).

89. Id. Some states, like Maine and Minnesota, have stayed at the pre-1980s levels. Others, like Texasand Louisiana, have around 1000 inmates per 100,000 of population—which means that one out of every100 people in those states are prisoners. See Liptak, supra n.63. Are people in Texas and Louisiana reallythree times worse than those in Maine and Minnesota?

90. See Jan van Dijk, John van Kesteren & Paul Smit, CRIMINAL VICTIMISATION IN INTERNATIONAL

PERSPECTIVE 43 (2007), http://www.unicri.it/services/library_documentation/publications/icvs/publications/ICVS2004_05report.pdf (ranking the top 15 countries by victimization rates, with Canada and the UnitedStates coming in 12th and 13th, respectively).

91. The Curious Case of the Fall in Crime, ECONOMIST (July 20, 2013), http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21582004-crime-plunging-rich-world-keep-it-down-governments-should-focus-prevention-not.

92. FINDING DIRECTION: EXPANDING CRIMINAL JUSTICE OPTIONS BY CONSIDERING POLICIES OF OTHER NA-TIONS, supra n.64.

93. James S. Gwin, Juror Sentiment on Just Punishment: Do the Federal Sentencing Guidelines ReflectCommunity Values?, 4 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 173 (2010).

94. Id. at 187-88.95. See, e.g., JFK (Warner Bros. 1991); Law & Order: Special Victims Unit (NBCUniversal Television

Distribution 1999-2015).96. See, e.g., CONVICTION (Fox Searchlight Pictures 2010); JUST CAUSE (Warner Bros. 1995); MY

COUSIN VINNY (Twentieth Century Fox 1992); TO KILL A MOCKINGBIRD (Universal Pictures 1962).

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of those unjustly convicted or those wasting their lives behind bars because of apunishment that far outstrips whatever evil they were convicted of committing. NoDumas, Hugo or Zola has risen among us to foment public sympathy to the plight ofthe unjustly imprisoned.

III

Lawyers and judges are inculcated with the notion that the system works well andthere is nothing to worry about. And perhaps it’s true. But there are far too manyuncertainties for us to be complacent. Criminal trials as we know them weredeveloped centuries ago at a time when life and technology were very different.The process has remained essentially unchanged since time out of mind. While wehave much experience with the process, we know very little about how well it works.We tell ourselves that the system works, and we really believe it, but this is largelybased on faith. When all is said and done, we have only a guess.

Below I offer some suggestions on how the system might be improved andvalidated. I do not suggest how these changes are to be implemented: Some mayrequire legislation; others a change in judicial practices; still others constitutionalamendments. Nor do I insist that all my suggestions be implemented immediately.Some may deserve closer attention, and some should be delayed while others areaccelerated. There may well be good reasons that my suggestions are unworkable,and perhaps others will come up with better ones. If my proposals raise controversyand opposition, leading to a spirited debate, I will have achieved my purpose.97

A. Juries

Juries matter. They obviously matter in the relatively few cases that are actuallytried to them, but they also matter in the multitude of cases that are pled or settled. Tothe extent the jury is viewed as an unpredictable, erratic force, it increases theuncertainty of the outcome and thus considerably raises the stakes for the parties,especially criminal defendants. If a prosecutor can make a credible case that a jurymight return a verdict calling for life without parole, he is very likely to extract a pleadeal involving a “mere” 15- or 20-year sentence.

Most judges, especially trial judges, express satisfaction with the operation of thejury system. I’ve heard judges say that they seldom or never think juries reach thewrong outcome. I am skeptical of such claims. To begin with, judges don’t know anybetter than anyone else what is the correct verdict in a case. The most they can say isthat they would have reached the same verdict as the jury.98 But judges are notusually called upon to make findings when they are presiding over a jury trial; theirfunction is to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to support a guiltyverdict, a process which presupposes that the prosecution’s witnesses are believed bythe trier of fact. This is a very different and much less rigorous process than figuringout who’s lying and who’s telling the truth, and I doubt that judges routinely gothrough that process in parallel with the jury. I certainly don’t.

Actual observation of behavior in the jury room is rare, but it does exist. Ascameras have become smaller and less obtrusive over the last quarter century, we’ve

97. “When critics disagree, the artist is in accord with himself.” Oscar Wilde, THE PICTURE OF DORIAN

GRAY, Preface (1891).98. In fact, judges are far more likely to acquit than juries. See Andrew D. Leipold, Why Are Federal

Judges So Acquittal Prone?, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 151, 151 (2005) (“Statistically, federal judges aresignificantly more likely to acquit than a jury is—over a recent 14 year period, for example, the jury trialconviction rate was 84%, while the bench conviction rate was a mere 55%.”).

44 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC (2015)xviii

had several instances where we have been able to observe jury-room behavior.99 Theresults are not particularly reassuring.

There is at least one case of documented jury nullification, with every jurorexpressing the belief that the defendant was guilty yet acquitting him nevertheless.100

In another case, jurors misconstrued the judge’s denial of their request for a certaintranscript to mean that they were not entitled to any transcripts from the trial.101 Andin a high profile murder trial, one juror experienced aggressive pushback for express-ing skepticism of the defendant’s guilt because the medical examiner had switchedher diagnosis from accidental drug overdose to homicide only after listening to a taperecording where the defendant said “I got away with it.”102 The juror asked the judge(unsuccessfully) to excuse her from the jury because she was uncomfortable withbeing pressured, and eventually voted with the majority to convict the defendantwhile protesting that she was doing so in a “bullied manner.” Worse still, indeliberations after the penalty phase of the trial, a different juror expressed acomplete change of heart from the jury’s guilty verdict the day before, emphaticallymaintaining that she never believed the defendant committed one of the two murdersof which he was convicted. In short, “[e]ven with the camera rolling, jurors compro-mised on verdicts, allowed personality conflicts to interfere with the deliberations,and oversimplified the judge’s instructions.”103

Anecdotal accounts tend to support this view. I always debrief my jurors after theyreturn a verdict (I’ve never had a hung jury) and try to get them to talk about whathappened in the jury room. Some of the comments seem entirely rational, but muchof what jurors describe looks like a fun-house mirror reflection of Twelve Angry Men.There was one case I remember where the jury acquitted despite what I thought wasan iron-clad prosecution case. I was a bit shocked and entirely puzzled about whathad happened. When I debriefed the jury, I got somewhat muted responses from mostof the jurors but one gentleman, who turned out to be the foreman, had very strongviews. He thought the government was wasting taxpayer money in prosecuting thisdefendant who had been caught red-handed with a suitcase full of some 10,000Ecstasy pills just imported from Europe. The foreman was a large man and quitevociferous—almost belligerent—about it. Of course, during voir dire I had asked theusual questions about whether any of the panel members had philosophical objectionsto our drug laws, and he had answered in the negative. The reality was different; hehad strong objections to the war on drugs and managed to pull the jury with him.

That one strong personality can dominate the jury room is consistent with my ownexperience. I’ve sat on two (state) juries. One of the cases was not close by any

99. TV cameras have entered the jury room on at least three occasions. First, in 1986, PBS aired abroadcast showing footage of deliberations in a Wisconsin criminal trial. Inside the Jury Room (PBSFrontline television broadcast 1986). Then, in 1997, CBS aired a 2-hour documentary consisting offootage of jury deliberations in four Arizona trials. Enter the Jury Room (CBS Reports televisionbroadcast 1997). Most recently, in 2004, ABC aired a 7-part TV series following six homicide cases fromthe pretrial stage to the jury deliberations and final verdict. In the Jury Room (ABC television broadcast2004).

100. The jurors in the Wisconsin trial all acknowledged early in the deliberations that they believed thedefendant was guilty, but concluded that the only way they could achieve a just result was to ignore thelaw. See Inside the Jury Room (PBS Frontline television broadcast 1986); Margaret E. Guthrie, FilmTakes an Inside Look at Deliberations of Jurors, NAT’L L.J. (Apr. 14, 1986).

101. See Enter the Jury Room (CBS Reports television broadcast 1997); David Schneider, JuryDeliberations and the Need for Jury Reform: An Outsider’s View, 36 JUDGES’ J. 23, 31, 53 (1997).

102. In the Jury Room (ABC television broadcast 2004) (following the deliberations in State of Ohio v.Mark Ducic). The foreman, for example, accused the juror of “fighting logic.”

103. Diane E. Courselle, Struggling With Deliberative Secrecy, Jury Independence, and Jury Reform,57 S.C. L. REV. 203, 229 (2005) (discussing the jury deliberations in the ABC In the Jury Room series).

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measure, but the other one hinged on the testimony of a single witness, as there wasno physical evidence whatsoever. The police had not even managed to recover a largebag of coins that the accusing witness claimed he had handed over to the defendantduring a store holdup, even though the defendant was apprehended within 20 minutesof the robbery, just a couple of blocks away. Having been elected foreman, I spokeafter every one of my fellow jurors had expressed the view that the defendant wasguilty. I reminded my colleagues of the prosecution’s heavy burden of proof andquestioned whether the complaining witness’s identification could be trusted giventhe missing coins. If the defendant was, in fact, the perpetrator, he couldn’t havespent a bag of assorted coins in the time it took to apprehend him, and he couldn’teasily have hidden it when he saw the police approaching. And wouldn’t he havegotten much farther from the scene of the crime if he were carrying a bag of stolencoins? One by one, all but one of the other jurors switched their votes to acquit. Theone exception proved impossible to budge so we eventually asked the judge todeclare a mistrial, which he did.

The simple truth is that our confidence in juries rests largely on faith, and ourprocesses are not designed to help us improve the functioning of the jury becausethere is no systematic feedback mechanism to help us figure out what works and whatdoesn’t. I’ve recently suggested that we introduce cameras into the jury room,104 andI will not rehash the arguments I’ve advanced in support. Suffice to say that viewingwhat juries do in actual cases will give us a much better understanding of jurybehavior and provide valuable information for different techniques in presentingevidence, instructing juries and jury management. Seeing what juries do in actualcases can also ameliorate or eliminate the endless speculation about which trial errorsare harmless and which are prejudicial. Why shoot in the dark when a man’s libertyor life is at stake? The same is true where there is a claim of improper juror conduct.In such circumstances, the trial judge will hear conflicting accounts about whathappened in the jury room. Wouldn’t it be better to see and hear what actuallytranspired?

Videos of jury deliberations could be sealed and preserved for viewing by research-ers only after the case is final. Or they could be made available to the trial judge and areviewing court as needed to resolve questions involving the jury’s conduct. Or theycould be made available to the lawyers immediately after the verdict. Disclosurecould be implemented incrementally over time and rolled back if the process is foundto interfere with the jury’s function. But we need to get a close look as to what’sgoing on in the jury room before we can even begin the process of meaningfulreform.

In the meantime—or in addition—I offer the following suggestions for reform:1. Give jurors a written copy of the jury instructions. Jury instructions are often

lengthy and difficult to follow. Jurors are expected to absorb them by listening, whichis probably the worst way to learn new and complex subject matter.105 Many judgestry to ameliorate this problem by sending a copy of the instructions into the jury roomwhen the panel retires to deliberate, but some judges refuse to do so. It should bereversible error for a judge to fail to send a full set of jury instructions with the jurywhen it retires to deliberate. Pre-instructing the jury on key concepts and giving themthose instructions in writing is also a good idea.

2. Allow jurors to take notes during trial and provide them with a full trial

104. See Alex Kozinski & John Major, Why Putting Cameras in the Jury Room Is Not as Crazy as YouThink, DUKE JUDICATURE (forthcoming 2015).

105. See Michael A. Cohen et al., Auditory Recognition Memory Is Inferior to Visual RecognitionMemory, 106 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCIS. 6008, 6008 (Apr. 7, 2009).

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transcript. Most judges now allow note-taking and provide writing materials for the juryto use, but a minority refuse to do so. This should be reversible error. Consulting notesduring deliberations is immensely useful when the jurors’ memories differ as to what awitness has said. Forcing jurors to rely on their recollections alone exacerbates the distortingmemory effects discussed above. In fact, I would go a step farther and give jurors transcriptsof the proceedings to consult during deliberations. This was not possible when transcriptshad to be transcribed laboriously by hand. But real-time transcripts are now pretty muchstandard and available for the judge and lawyers to consult while the trial is going on. I cansee no justification for keeping jurors in the dark.

3. Allow jurors to discuss the case while the trial is ongoing. Most jury trialsnow start with a stern admonition that jurors not discuss the case until they are sentout to deliberate. It’s unclear why we do this except that we’ve always done it thatway.106 When I served as a juror, this restriction seemed unnatural and counter-productive. My guess is that it exacerbates the distorting effects of memory. Allowingjurors to discuss what they’ve heard could give them a chance to express doubts andto remind each other of the need to keep an open mind.

4. Allow jurors to ask questions during the trial. I’ve been doing this for someyears in civil cases and it seems to work well. I ask jurors to put any questions inwriting and hand them up to me. I then share these questions with the lawyers and letone or both use them during their examinations. Other techniques are possible,including having jurors pose questions to the witnesses directly and letting thelawyers follow up in light of the answers.

5. Tell jurors up-front what’s at stake in the case. In most jurisdictions, jurors innon-capital cases are not told what the likely punishment will be if the defendant isconvicted. In fact, we tell jurors not to consider punishment in deciding guilt. I don’tunderstand why this is appropriate. In making most life decisions, we consider theconsequences in determining how much effort to put into deciding and the degree ofconfidence we must feel before we go forward. Whether to get married or have arisky operation obviously requires a greater psychological commitment than choosingbetween Starbucks and Peets. Jurors should be told the gravity of the decision theyare making so they can take it into account in deciding whether to convict or acquit.As representatives of the community where the defendant committed his crime, thejury should be allowed to make the judgment of whether the punishment is too severeto permit a conviction. Having to confront the jury with the severity of the punish-ment they are seeking to extract may well deter prosecutors from using overchargingas a bargaining tool.

6. Give jurors a say in sentencing. Except for capital cases, we have turned oursentencing process over entirely to experts and professionals. We have mandatoryminimums, sentencing guidelines, probation officers and judges at all levels involvedin the decision, but we studiously ignore the views of the very people who heard theevidence and are given the responsibility to determine guilt or innocence whilereflecting the values of the community in which the offense occurred. This is asystem only a lawyer could love. Jurors should be instructed on the range ofpunishments authorized by law and, if they find the defendant guilty, entrusted toweigh in on the appropriate sentence within that range. And I would make that theabsolute upper limit of what punishment the judges actually impose, overriding anysentencing guidelines, mandatory minimums or their own considered judgment.

106. See David A. Anderson, Let Jurors Talk: Authorizing Pre-Deliberation Discussion of the Evi-dence During Trial, 174 MIL. L. REV. 92, 94-95, 121-24 (2002) (chronicling the history of the prohibitionagainst pre-deliberation discussion and concluding that the rule doesn’t make sense and should beabolished).

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B. Prosecutors

Prosecutors hold tremendous power, more than anyone other than jurors, and oftenmuch more than jurors because most cases don’t go to trial. Prosecutors and theirinvestigators have unparalleled access to the evidence, both inculpatory and exculpa-tory, and while they are required to provide exculpatory evidence to the defenseunder Brady, Giglio, and Kyles v. Whitley, it is very difficult for the defense to findout whether the prosecution is complying with this obligation.

Prosecutors also have tremendous control over witnesses: They can offerincentives—often highly compelling incentives—for suspects to testify. This includesproviding sweetheart plea deals to alleged co-conspirators and engineering jail-houseencounters between the defendant and known informants. Sometimes they feedsnitches non-public information about the crime so that the statements they attributeto the defendant will sound authentic.107 And, of course, prosecutors can pile oncharges so as to make it exceedingly risky for a defendant to go to trial. There arecountless ways in which prosecutors can prejudice the fact-finding process andundermine a defendant’s right to a fair trial.108

This, of course, is not their job. Rather, as the Supreme Court has held, “[Aprosecutor] is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the twofoldaim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. He may prosecute withearnestness and vigor—indeed, he should do so. But, while he may strike hard blows,he is not at liberty to strike foul ones.”109 All prosecutors purport to operate just thisway and I believe that most do. My direct experience is largely with federalprosecutors and, with a few exceptions, I have found them to be fair-minded,forthright and highly conscientious.110 But there are disturbing indications that anon-trivial number of prosecutors—and sometimes entire prosecutorial offices—engage in misconduct that seriously undermines the fairness of criminal trials. Themisconduct ranges from misleading the jury,111 to outright lying in court112 and tacitly

107. Recently, California Superior Court Judge Thomas Goethals removed the Orange County DA’soffice from a high profile murder case after the prosecutors had shown a “chronic failure” to comply withorders to turn over evidence with respect to how defendant Scott Dekraai was assigned a cell next to aprolific jailhouse informant as part of a larger scheme to extract false confessions. People v. Dekraai,Supplemental Ruling 12ZF0128 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Mar. 12, 2015), http://big.assets.huffingtonpost.com/SUPPLEMENTALRULINGDekraai03122015.pdf; see Paloma Esquivel, D.A. Ran Illegal Snitch Operation inO.C. Jail, Attorneys Say, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 27, 2014), http://articles.latimes.com/2014/feb/27/local/la-me-ln-jailhouse-informant-operation-20140227.

Indeed, last year, it was revealed that “two of the most prolific jailhouse informants in Orange and LosAngeles counties, Raymond Cuevas and Jose Paredes[, had] befriended suspects in jail and collectedinformation in more than 30 criminal cases” in exchange for over $150,000 from local law enforcementauthorities. See Tony Saavedra, Money, Cable TV, Food Delivery: How Mexican Mafia Snitches LivedLike Kings Behind Bars, O.C. REG. (Nov. 23, 2014), http://www.ocregister.com/articles/cuevas-643108-paredes-informants.html; see also REPORT OF THE 1989-90 LOS ANGELES COUNTY GRAND JURY: INVESTIGA-TION OF THE INVOLVEMENT OF JAIL HOUSE INFORMANTS IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IN LOS ANGELES

COUNTY 28, available at http://perma.cc/S2MB-LTEV (“Copies of arrest reports, case files, and photo-graphs of victims are shown to informants.”); Tracey Kaplan, Santa Clara County: Ex-Jailer SaysPlanting Informants Was Routine, SANTA CRUZ SENTINEL (Mar. 1, 2015), http://www.santacruzsentinel.com/general-news/20150301/santa-clara-county-ex-jailer-says-planting-informants-was-routine.

108. See, e.g., Peder B. Hong, Summation at the Border: Serious Misconduct in Final Argument inCriminal Trials, 20 HAMLINE L. REV. 43, 45-55 (1996) (outlining 19 forms of serious misconduct).

109. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).110. I was less impressed with the prosecutor in one of the two cases where I participated as a juror. I

thought he engaged in unfair tactics that I would not have allowed, had I been the judge.111. See, e.g., United States v. Kojayan, 8 F.3d 1315, 1322 (9th Cir. 1993) (AUSA strongly implied that a

participant in the crime had not entered into a cooperation agreement, knowing full well that he had).112. See, e.g., Sidney Powell, Federal Judge Blasts Yet Another Federal Prosecutor for Lying to the

Court, OBSERVER (Dec. 9, 2014), http://observer.com/2014/12/federal-judge-blasts-yet-another-federal-

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acquiescing or actively participating in the presentation of false evidence by police.113

Prosecutorial misconduct is a particularly difficult problem to deal with because somuch of what prosecutors do is secret. If a prosecutor fails to disclose exculpatoryevidence to the defense, who is to know? Or if a prosecutor delays disclosure ofevidence helpful to the defense until the defendant has accepted an unfavorable pleabargain, no one will be the wiser. Or if prosecutors rely on the testimony of cops theyknow to be liars, or if they acquiesce in a police scheme to create inculpatoryevidence, it will take an extraordinary degree of luck and persistence to discoverit—and in most cases it will never be discovered.

There are distressingly many cases where such misconduct has been docu-mented,114 but I will mention just three to illustrate the point. The first is UnitedStates v. Stevens,115 the prosecution of Ted Stevens, the longest serving RepublicanSenator in history. Senator Stevens was charged with corruption for accepting theservices of a building contractor and paying him far below market price—essentiallya bribe. The government’s case hinged on the testimony of the contractor, but thegovernment failed to disclose the initial statement the contractor made to the FBI thathe was probably overpaid for the services. The government also failed to disclose thatthe contractor was under investigation for unrelated crimes and thus had good reasonto curry favor with the authorities.116

Stevens was convicted just a week before he stood for re-election and in the wakeof the conviction, he was narrowly defeated, changing the balance of power in theSenate.117 The government’s perfidy came to light when a brave FBI agent by thename of Chad Joy blew the whistle on the government’s knowing concealment ofexculpatory evidence. Did the government react in horror at having been caught with

prosecutor-for-lying-to-the-court/ (AUSA in United States v. Seggerman, No. 10-cr-948 (S.D.N.Y.) was“lambasted” by Judge Kevin Duffy for being caught in “a flat out lie”—namely, by telling the court thatpress releases were not issued when they indeed had been).

113. See, e.g., Gathers v. United States, Nos. 09-CO-422, 11-CO-1676, 11-CO-1677, 12-CO-1411,12-CO-1412, at 17-18 (D.C. Ct. App. Oct. 23, 2014), http://www.dccourts.gov/internet/documents/09-CO-422.pdf (granting a new trial because the government presented “plainly false evidence highly prejudicialto the outcome” and “knew or should have known of the falsity, however belatedly this falsity may havecome to the forefront”).

114. See The Open File Blog, http://www.prosecutorialaccountability.com/ (chronicling nationwideinstances of prosecutorial misconduct); Registry Database, CENTER FOR PROSECUTOR INTEGRITY, http://www.prosecutorintegrity.org/registry/database/. The former governor of Illinois just pardoned a prisoner whohad served 22 years because the prosecution was tainted with numerous flaws, including prosecutorialmisconduct. See Nicholas Schmidle, Freedom for Tyrone Hood, THE NEW YORKER (Jan. 13, 2015),http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/freedom-tyrone-hood.

115. No. 08-cr-231 (EGS), 2009 WL 6525926 (D.D.C. Apr. 7, 2009).116. The whole sordid episode, as well as several others, are detailed in Sidney Powell’s powerful

book, Licensed to Lie. See SIDNEY POWELL, LICENSED TO LIE 190-201 (2014).117. This wasn’t the only prosecution that has had profound effects on American politics. “A

revelation in journalist Judith Miller’s new memoir, ‘The Story: A Reporter’s Journey,’ exposes unscrupu-lous conduct by Special Counsel Patrick J. Fitzgerald in the 2007 trial of I. Lewis ‘Scooter’ Libby.”Berkowitz, supra n.31. According to Berkowitz, “It is painful to contemplate how many lives—Americanand Iraqi—might have been spared had Mr. Libby, the foremost champion within the White House in2003 of stabilizing Iraq through counterinsurgency operations, not been sidelined and eventually forcedto resign because of Mr. Fitzgerald’s multiyear investigation and relentless federal prosecution.” Id.

Overly aggressive prosecution also wrecked the political career of longtime Iowa state legislator HenryRayhons. The Attorney General of Iowa charged 78-year-old Rayhons with rape for having sex with hisown wife, who was afflicted with Alzheimer’s. By the time the jury acquitted Rayhons, he had withdrawnfrom the re-election race for a seat he had held for 18 years. See Eugene Volokh, 78-Year-Old IowaEx-Legislator Acquitted of Having Nonconsensual Sex with His Wife, Who was Suffering from Alzhei-mer’s, WASH. POST (Apr. 23, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/04/23/78-year-old-iowa-ex-legislator-acquitted-of-having-nonconsensual-sex-with-his-wife-who-was-suffering-from-alzheimers.

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its hands in the cookie jar? Did Justice Department lawyers rend their garments andplace ashes on their head to mourn this violation of their most fundamental duty ofcandor and fairness? No way, no how. Instead, the government argued strenuouslythat its ill-gotten conviction should stand because boys will be boys and the evidencewasn’t material to the case anyway.118

It was only the extraordinary persistence and the courageous intervention of DistrictJudge Emmet Sullivan, who made it clear that he was going to dismiss the Stevens case andthen ordered an investigation of the government’s misconduct119 that forced the JusticeDepartment to admit its malfeasance—what else could it do?—and move to vacate theformer senator’s conviction. Instead of contrition, what we have seen is Justice Departmentofficials of the highest rank suffering torn glenoid labrums from furiously patting them-selves on the back for having “done the right thing.”120

The second case comes from my own experience. The defendant was Debra Milke,

118. See POWELL, supra n.116, at 210 (Judge Emmet Sullivan observed: “Not only did the governmentseek to keep [Chad Joy’s] complaint a secret, but the government claimed that the allegations had nothingto do with the verdict and no relevancy to the defense; that the allegations could be addressed by theOffice of Professional Responsibility’s investigation; and that any misconduct had already been addressedand remedied during the trial”). Lack of materiality is the Justice Department’s standard defense when itis caught committing a Brady violation. See DOJ Defends FBI Deputy Director Andrew WeissmannAgainst Serious Ethics Charges Pending in NY, SEEKING JUST. (Apr. 26, 2013), http://seeking-justice.org/doj-defends-fbi-deputy-director-andrew-weissmann-against-serious-ethics-charges-pending-in-ny/ (the “en-tire . . . defense [was based on] the claim that the Rules of Professional Conduct require prosecutors todisclose to the defense team only information that is both favorable and material”) (emphasis and internalquotation marks omitted). Just as they did in Stevens, the prosecutors refused to acknowledge that theyhad a duty to turn over exculpatory evidence in United States v. Brown, C.R. No. H-03-363, 2010 WL3359471 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 2010), affirmed by 650 F.3d 581 (5th Cir. 2011). In Brown, the governmentsecured a paper-thin conviction against a Merrill Lynch executive for perjury and obstruction of justicefor his grand jury testimony regarding the company’s involvement in a Nigerian barge transaction—allthe while suppressing evidence showing that the executive had testified truthfully. See POWELL, supran.116, at 376-77.

119. See Henry F. Schuelke III, Special Counsel, Report to Hon. Emmet G. Sullivan of InvestigationConducted Pursuant to the Court’s Order, dated Apr. 7, 2009, In re Special Proceedings, No. 1:09-mc-00198-EGS (D.D.C. Mar. 15, 2012), available at http://legaltimes.typepad.com/files/Stevens_report.pdf.

120. It’s not clear that the Justice Department learned much from the Stevens debacle, as it refused toadmit that the exculpatory evidence it suppressed in the Stevens case was material to two otherprosecutions that stemmed from the same investigation and involved overlapping issues and witnesses.See United States v. Kohring, 637 F.3d 895 (9th Cir. 2010); United States v. Kott, 423 Fed. App’x 736(9th Cir. 2011); see also POWELL, supra n.116, at 231. Holding that the prosecution had yet again violatedBrady by failing to disclose the very evidence deemed material in the Stevens case, a panel of my courtvacated both defendants’ convictions and remanded for a new trial. Judge Betty Fletcher lambasted theprosecution’s “flagrant, willful bad-faith misbehavior” as “an affront to the integrity of our system ofjustice” and found “[t]he prosecution’s refusal to accept responsibility for its misconduct [] deeplytroubling and indicat[ive] that a stronger remedy is necessary to impress upon it the reprehensible natureof its acts and omissions.” Kohring, 637 F.3d at 914 (Fletcher, J., concurring in part and dissenting inpart); see Kott, 423 Fed. App’x at 738 (Fletcher, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Despitetheir assurances that they take this matter seriously, the government attorneys have attempted to minimizethe extent and seriousness of the prosecutorial misconduct and even assert that Kott received a fairtrial . . . . The government’s stance on appeal leads me to conclude that it still has failed to fully grasp theegregiousness of its misconduct, as well as the importance of its constitutionally imposed discoveryobligations.”).

A similar case was recently repeated from Cuyahoga County, Ohio. Cuyahoga Common Pleas JudgeNancy Russo ruled that three men who had spent almost 20 years in prison for a 1995 murder should bereleased pending a new trial, explaining: “A review of the evidence firmly supports the conclusion that[former Cuyahoga County prosecutor] Carmen Marino maliciously inserted himself into a criminalproceeding, and that he also sought to suppress evidence from the defendants, that he concealed publicrecords from the citizenry, and that he subverted the process of justice, thereby violating each of thedefendants’ individual rights to a fair trial.” See OH: The Long Shadow of Misconduct in CuyahogaCounty, The Open File Blog (Apr. 17, 2015), http://www.prosecutorialaccountability.com/oh-the-long-shadow-of-misconduct-in-cuyahoga-county/. The current Cuyahoga County chief prosecutor respondedthat Marino had done nothing wrong. Id.

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who spent 23 years on Arizona’s death row after a conviction and sentence obtainedin 1990 based on an oral confession she supposedly made to Phoenix police detectiveArmando Saldate Jr. as a result of a 20-minute interrogation.121 No one was present inthe room with Milke except Saldate, who refused to record the session, despite hissupervisor’s admonition that he do so.122 When the session ended, Saldate came outwith nothing in writing—not even a Miranda waiver—and claimed Milke hadconfessed; Milke immediately and steadfastly denied it. The jury believed Saldate,but what the prosecution failed to disclose is that Saldate had a long and documentedhistory of lying in court; he also had a serious disciplinary infraction bearing on hiscredibility: He had sought to extort sex from a lone female motorist and then liedabout it when she reported the incident.123 It is not difficult to imagine that a jury mayhave been skeptical of Saldate’s testimony that Milke confessed, had it known abouthis track record. But the Maricopa County District Attorney’s office did not disclosethis information, although it was party to many of the proceedings where Saldate hadbeen found to be a liar.

The evidence remained hidden for two decades until an unusually dedicated teamof lawyers and investigators124 spent hundreds of hours digging through all of thecriminal prosecutions in Maricopa County during the era when Saldate had been aninvestigator. It winnowed down those cases and focused on those where Saldateprovided evidence.125 And the state doggedly refused to turn over Saldate’s disciplin-ary record until forced to disgorge it by an order of the district judge who consideredMilke’s federal habeas petition.

After we vacated the conviction and gave Arizona a chance to re-try Milke, theArizona Court of Appeals barred any re-trial in an opinion so scathing it made theNew York Times.126 The Court of Appeals described the “long course of Brady/Giglio violations in this case” as a “flagrant denial of due process” and “a severe stainon the Arizona justice system”—one that it hoped would “remain unique in thehistory of Arizona law.”127 The Arizona Supreme Court recently denied the state’spetition for review,128 so the Court of Appeals decision stands. Maricopa CountyAttorney Bill Montgomery lamented that “[t]he denial of [the] petition for review is adark day for Arizona’s criminal justice system.”129

121. See Michael Keifer, supra n.50.122. See Milke v. Ryan, 711 F.3d 998, 1002 (9th Cir. 2013).123. See id. at 1007.124. This team included Milke’s attorney Anders Rosenquist, investigator Kirk Fowler and a dozen

Arizona State University law students. See Steve Krafft, Debra Milke Case: Researchers DiscoveredDetective’s History of Misconduct, FOX 10 NEWS (Sept. 21, 2013), http://www.fox10phoenix.com/story/23447616/2013/09/16/debra-milke-case-research-team-discovered-detectives-misconduct.

125. This gargantuan effort is related in detail in our opinion. See Milke, 711 F.3d at 1018.126. See Arizona: No Retrial for Woman Freed from Death Row, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 11, 2014),

http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/12/us/arizona-no-retrial-for-woman-freed-from-death-row.html?_r�1.127. Milke v. Mroz, 339 P.3d 659, 665-66, 668 (Ariz. App. Ct. 2014). See Jonathan Abel, Buoying

Brady’s Burden, DAILY J. (Mar. 19, 2015) (critiquing the prosecutorial misconduct in Milke’s case as “asymptom of a much larger problem,” particularly with respect to prosecutors’ reluctance to discloseBrady evidence concerning police misconduct).

128. Milke v. Mroz, CV-15-0016-PR (Mar. 17, 2015), available at https://perma.cc/QJE7-3FTN?type�pdf.129. News Release: County Attorney Comments on Arizona Supreme Court Ruling in State v. Milke

(Mar. 17, 2015), http://www.maricopacountyattorney.org/newsroom/news-releases/2015/2015-03-17-County-Attorney-Comments-on-ASC-Ruling-in-State-v-Milke.html. Montgomery also had unkind thingsto say about our opinion, but we can live with that; life tenure is a wonderful thing.

Less than a month later, Montgomery filed a motion to depublish the Court of Appeals’ decision barringre-trial, which the Arizona Supreme Court denied. Milke v. Mroz, CV-15-0016-PR (Apr. 21, 2015),available at http://www.azcourts.gov/Portals/21/MinutesCurrent/Mot_042115.pdf. Motions to depublishopinions that disclose prosecutorial misconduct, or at least to modify them to delete the name of theoffending prosecutor, are common. See, e.g., infra n.193 (discussing the government’s motion in United

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The third case is unfolding as I write these words. It involves the prosecution inOrange County of Scott Dekraai, who was convicted of having shot several people ata hair salon and is facing a capital penalty-phase trial. The prosecution presentedevidence from a jailhouse informant, Fernando Perez, whom Dekraai had purportedlyconfessed to. It turns out that Perez was a serial informant who had presented similarconfessions.130 Defense counsel challenged the informant, and Superior Court JudgeThomas Goethals ordered the prosecution to produce evidence bearing on thisclaim.131 He eventually found that the Orange County District Attorney’s office hadengaged in a “chronic failure” to disclose exculpatory evidence pertaining to ascheme run in conjunction with jailers to place jailhouse snitches known to be liarsnear suspects they wished to incriminate, effectively manufacturing false confes-sions.132 The judge then took the drastic step of disqualifying the Orange CountyDistrict Attorney’s office from further participation in the case.133 But this resultcame only after public defender Scott Sanders “wasted two years uncovering govern-ment misconduct, time that he could have spent preparing Dekraai’s defense againstthe death penalty.”134 Pulling an elephant’s teeth is surely easier than extractingexculpatory evidence from an unwilling prosecution team.

These cases are hardly unique or isolated. But they illustrate that three ingredientsmust be present before we can be sure that the prosecution has met its Bradyobligations under the law applicable in most jurisdictions. First, you must have ahighly committed defense lawyer with significant resources at his disposal. Second,you must have a judge who cares and who has the gumption to hold the prosecutor’sfeet to the fire when a credible claim of misconduct has been presented. And, third,you need a great deal of luck, or the truth may never come out. The misconductuncovered in the Milke and Dekraai cases seems to implicate many other cases wherecriminal defendants are spending decades in prison. We can only speculate how manyothers are wasting their lives behind bars because they lacked the right lawyer or theright judge or the luck needed to uncover prosecutorial misconduct.

While most prosecutors are fair and honest, a legal environment that toleratessharp prosecutorial practices gives important and undeserved career advantages toprosecutors who are willing to step over the line, tempting others to do the same.Having strict rules that prosecutors must follow will thus not merely avoid the risk ofletting a guilty man free to commit other crimes while an innocent one languishes hislife away, it will also preserve the integrity of the prosecutorial process by shieldingprincipled prosecutors from unfair competition from their less principled colleagues.

Here are some potential reforms that would help achieve these goals:1. Require open file discovery. If the prosecution has evidence bearing on the

crime with which a defendant is being charged, it must promptly turn it over to the

States v. Kojayan).130. See Paloma Esquivel, Seal Beach Shooting Case Casts Spotlight on Jailhouse Informants, L.A.

TIMES (Apr. 20, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/local/la-me-oc-informant-20140421-story.html#page�1.131. This courage did not go unpunished. Since February 2014, around the time that Judge Goethals

began looking into prosecutors’ mishandling of informant-related evidence, the Orange County DA’soffice has asked to disqualify him from 57 other criminal cases. See Christopher Goffard, O.C.Prosecutors Steering Cases Away from Judge Thomas Goethals, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 13, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/local/orangecounty/la-me-jailhouse-snitch-20150314-story.html.

132. People v. Dekraai, Supplemental Ruling 12ZF0128 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Mar. 12, 2015), available athttp://big.assets.huffingtonpost.com/SUPPLEMENTALRULINGDekraai03122015.pdf.

133. See supra n.7; Christopher Goffard, Orange County D.A. Is Removed from Scott Dekraai MurderTrial, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 12, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/local/orangecounty/la-me-jailhouse-snitch-20150313-story.html. The California Attorney General’s Office has since appealed Judge Goethals’s ruling,and I, of course, express no view as to how the case should be decided.

134. Goffard, supra n.133.

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defense. North Carolina adopted such a rule by statute after Alan Gell was convictedof murder and sentenced to death, even though the prosecution had statements of 17witnesses who reported to have seen the victim alive after Gell was incarcerated—evidence that the prosecution failed to disclose until long after trial.135 Three yearsafter its passage, the law forced disclosure of evidence that eventually exoneratedthree Duke lacrosse players who were falsely accused of rape—and led to the defeat,disbarment and criminal contempt conviction of Durham District Attorney MikeNifong.136 Prosecutors were none too happy with the law and tried hard to roll it backin 2007 and again in 2012, but the result was an even stronger law that applies notonly to prosecutors but to police and forensic experts, as well it should.137

A far weaker law was proposed by several U.S. Senators following the disgracefulprosecutorial conduct during the Stevens case. The law would require prosecutors todisclose all information “that may reasonably appear to be favorable to the defen-dant.”138 Despite support from both Democrats and Republicans, the bill has made noprogress toward passage because of steadfast opposition from the U.S. Department ofJustice.139 In his 2012 Preface to these pages,140 Attorney General Eric Holder voiceda strong commitment to ensuring compliance with Brady and related discoveryobligations, but all of the measures he mentions leave prosecutors in charge ofdeciding what evidence will be material to the defense—something they cannotpossibly do, because they do not know all the potential avenues a defense lawyer maypursue, and because it’s not in their hearts to look for ways to help the other side. Ifthe Department of Justice wants to show its commitment to justice, it should drop itsopposition to the Fairness in Disclosure of Evidence Act and help get it passed into law.

2. Adopt standardized, rigorous procedures for dealing with the government’sdisclosure obligations. For reasons already explained, enforcing the government’sobligations is critical to achieving a level playing field in criminal cases. But policingthis conduct is exceedingly difficult for the simple reason that “Brady violations . . .almost always defy detection. The cops know it. The prosecutors know it. Thedefense and the defendant have no idea whether Brady material exists.”141 Open filediscovery would go a long way toward ameliorating the problem, but not far enough.The prosecutor’s file will generally contain what the police and investigators considerto be inculpatory evidence; a great deal might be left out that is unhelpful to the

135. See EVIDENCEPROFBLOG, Open And Shut: North Carolina Strengthens Its Open Discovery Law(June 3, 2011), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/evidenceprof/2011/06/back-in-2004-north-carolina-governor-mike-easley-signed-a-bill-into-law-that-required-prosecutors-to-share-their-files.html.

136. See Duke Lacrosse Prosecutor Disbarred, CNN (June 17, 2007), http://www.cnn.com/2007/LAW/06/16/duke.lacrosse/; THE ASSOCIATED PRESS, Day in Jail for Ex-Duke Prosecutor, N.Y. Times (Sept. 1,2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/01/us/01nifong.html?_r�0&gwh�D729031CB5109A29647D63F43549BEA4&gwt�pay.

137. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-903(a)(1) (2011), available at http://www.ncleg.net/Sessions/2011/Bills/House/PDF/H408v2.pdf (“Upon motion of the defendant, the court must order: The State to makeavailable to the defendant the complete files of all law enforcement agencies, investigatory agencies, andprosecutors’ offices involved in the investigation of the crimes committed or the prosecution of thedefendant.”); EVIDENCEPROFBLOG, supra n.135.

138. Fairness in Disclosure of Evidence Act of 2012, S. 2197, 112th Cong. (2012), available athttps://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/s2197/text.

139. See Video Recording: Ensuring that Federal Prosecutors Meet Discovery Obligations: Hearing onS. 2197 Before the S. Judiciary Comm., 112th Cong. (2012) (on file with S. Judiciary Comm.) (statementof James M. Cole, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice opposing the bill: “[I]n reacting to theStevens case, we must not let ourselves forget . . . true improvements to discovery practices will comefrom prosecutors and agents . . . [i]n other words, new rules are unnecessary.”).

140. Eric Holder Jr., Preface, In the Digital Age, Ensuring that the Department Does Justice iii, 41GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. (2012).

141. Scott H. Greenfield, The Flood Gates Myth, SIMPLE JUSTICE (Feb. 16, 2015), http://blog.simplejustice.us/2015/02/16/the-flood-gates-myth/.

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prosecution. Yet the government’s disclosure obligation extends to information that isin the hands of investigators and places an affirmative obligation on prosecutors tobecome aware of exculpatory evidence that is held by others acting on the govern-ment’s behalf.142 Ensuring that the government complies with this obligation can’t beleft up to individual prosecutors. Rather, prosecutorial offices must establish firmpolicies to ensure compliance.

This does happen from time to time. For example, in 1990, Chief Assistant UnitedStates Attorney Mary Jo White of the Eastern District of New York, Chief of theCriminal Division Bill Muller and Chief of the Narcotics Unit David Shapiro, amongothers, issued a detailed, thoughtful 27-page memorandum analyzing the govern-ment’s disclosure obligation at the time and recommending procedures to be followedwhen dealing with informants and other government witnesses.143 One of thoserecommendations was that the office maintain, and provide to the defense, “informa-tion about every case in which an informant has testified as an informant or adefendant, including the district or state in which the proceedings took place, thedocket numbers and transcripts, where possible . . . and statements by a judge referringto a witness’s truthfulness and any allegations of double dealing or other misconduct.”144

The memo contained other similarly enlightened recommendations, disclosing afirm commitment to complying with the spirit, not merely the letter, of Brady and itsprogeny. Some years later, in 1999, a similar set of procedures was adopted by theUnited States Attorney’s Office in the Northern District of California in a manualdrafted by one of the authors of the EDNY memo who had moved there and served ashead of the Criminal Division.145 But, according to a lawyer who left the office in2002, the manual was disregarded by the new U.S. Attorney.

Compliance with the government’s disclosure obligations cannot be left to thepolitical vagaries of 93 U.S. Attorneys’ offices and the countless District Attorneys’offices across the country. Instead, the U.S. Justice Department and the justicedepartment of every state must ensure compliance by setting standards and meaning-fully disciplining prosecutors who willfully fail to comply. If they will not do it ontheir own, Congress and the state legislatures must prod them into it by adopting suchstandards by legislation.

3. Adopt standardized, rigorous procedures for eyewitness identification. NorthCarolina leads the way, once again, with the Eyewitness Identification Reform Act,146

which does just that. It provides in relevant part that lineups “shall be conducted byan independent administrator”; “[i]ndividuals or photos shall be presented to wit-nesses sequentially, with each individual or photo presented to the witness sepa-rately”; the eyewitness must be instructed that he “should not feel compelled to makean identification”; “at least five fillers shall be included in a [photo or live] lineup, inaddition to the suspect”; and live identification procedures must be recorded onvideo.147 This law, too, came as a result of a huge miscarriage of justice whenJennifer Thompson-Cannino mistakenly identified Ronald Cotton as her rapist.148 He

142. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995).143. See MARY JO WHITE ET AL., BRADY/GIGLIO DISCLOSURES (Oct. 30, 1990) (unpublished internal

memorandum, on file with author).144. Id. at 2.145. See AUSA Manual for the Northern District of California (unpublished internal manual, on file

with author).146. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-284.52 (2012), http://law.justia.com/codes/north-carolina/2012/chapter-

15a/article-14a/section-15a-284.52.147. Id.148. See Innocence Project, Ronald Cotton, http://www.innocenceproject.org/cases-false-imprisonment/

ronald-cotton. The case and the reform that it triggered were featured on a 60 Minutes episode titled

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spent 11 years in prison before he was exonerated by DNA evidence.149 The casesinvolving mistaken eyewitness identification are legion.150

4. Video record all suspect interrogations.151 The surprising frequency of falseconfessions should make us deeply skeptical of any interrogation we cannot viewfrom beginning to end. Suspects are frequently isolated and pressured in obvious andsubtle ways, and when the process ends we often have very different accounts ofwhat happened inside the interrogation room.152 In those circumstances, whom arewe to believe? Most of the time, the judge and juries believe the police. There mayhave been a time when we had to rely on such second-hand reports, but technologyhas now made this unnecessary: Video recording equipment is dirt cheap, and storagespace for the resulting files is endless. No court should ever admit a confession unlessthe prosecution presents a video of the entire interrogation process from beginning toend.153

It appears that change is underway. Just last year, the Justice Department reversedits century-old prohibition against recording interrogations and adopted a policy“establish[ing] a presumption that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), theDrug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms,and Explosives (ATF), and the United States Marshals Service (USMS) will electroni-cally record statements made by individuals in their custody.”154

“Eyewitness: How Accurate is Visual Memory?” See EVIDENCEPROFBLOG, Can I Get A(n Eye) Witness: 60Minutes Story Exposes Problems with Eyewitness IDs (Mar. 9, 2009), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/evidenceprof/2009/03/those-of-you-wh.html.

149. See Innocence Project, supra n.148.150. For example, in Gantt v. Roe, 389 F.3d 908, 914 n.8 (9th Cir. 2004), the police first showed an

eyewitness a picture of a car owned by an initial suspect named Wilson, which the witness identified asthe car he had seen the morning of the crime. The police then showed the witness a six-photo lineupincluding Wilson’s photo, and “sure enough, [the witness] selected Wilson as someone who ‘looked likethe pedestrian he had seen,’” even though Wilson was eventually shown to have zero connection to thecrime. Id.; see also Newsome v. McCabe, 256 F.3d 747, 749 (7th Cir. 2001) (there was ample evidencethat police officers had “encouraged two witnesses to select [the defendant, who was exonerated after 15years in prison,] from a lineup . . . yet withheld from the prosecutors information about their coaching ofthe witnesses and the fact that these witnesses earlier selected pictures from a book of mug shots that didnot contain [the defendant]’s photo”).

151. In fact, why don’t police officers wear body cameras at all times? It would protect the suspect andthe police officer. See Steve Tuttle, Cambridge University Study Shows On-Officer Video ReducesUse-of-Force Incidents by 59 percent, TASER Int’l (Apr. 8, 2013), https://s3.amazonaws.com/uploads.hipchat.com/33/3817/rc4wgppgd39lrns/130408%20Rialto%20AXON%20Flex%20Cambridge%20Study.pdf (the use of “officer worn cameras reduced the rate of use-of-force incidents by 59 percent” and“utilization of cameras led to an 87.5 percent reduction in complaints” by citizens against police officers);see also U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, IMPLEMENTING A BODY-WORN CAMERA PROGRAM: RECOMMENDATIONS

AND LESSONS LEARNED (2014), available at http://www.policeforum.org/assets/docs/Free_Online_Documents/Technology/implementing%20a%20body-worn%20camera%20program.pdf.

152. See, e.g., Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992 (9th Cir. 2004) (the defendant claimed his confessionwas coerced, while the detectives argued otherwise); Milke, 711 F.3d at 1002 (Detective Saldate claimedthat Milke confessed to the murder during her interrogation, while Milke maintained that Saldate ignoredher request for a lawyer and “embellished and twisted [her] statements to make it sound like she had confessed”).In both these cases, we lacked access to a video or audio recording to ascertain what really happened.

153. This practice has been adopted in England, Ireland and Australia, where the general rule is that allinterrogations—and not just confessions—must be recorded on audio or video. However, Australia is theonly country that explicitly provides that the consequence for failing to record is inadmissibility of thecontents of the interrogation. See TOM SULLIVAN, COMPENDIUM: ELECTRONIC RECORDING OF CUSTODIAL

INTERROGATIONS, National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, July 11, 2014, available at http://www.nacdl.org/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id�33287&libID�33256. In addition, a number of states,including Alaska, Arkansas, Minnesota, Montana and New Jersey, require all interrogations to berecorded and consider compliance with that requirement a factor in determining whether a statementmade in an interrogation is admissible. See id.

154. See James M. Cole, Memorandum, POLICY CONCERNING ELECTRONIC RECORDING OF STATEMENTS,May 12, 2014, https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1165422/doj-interrogation-

44 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC (2015) xxix

5. Impose strict limits on the use of jailhouse informants. In response to adevastating report on jailhouse informants issued by the Los Angeles County grandjury in 1990, the county adopted procedures that required the approval of a commit-tee before informants could be used.155 The use of informants consequently plum-meted.156 Even still, the practice of using jailhouse informants as a means ofdetecting and perhaps manufacturing incriminatory evidence has continued in Califor-nia.157 Serial informants are exceedingly dangerous because they have strong incen-tives to lie or embellish, they have learned to be persuasive to juries and there is noway to verify whether what they say is true.158 A man jailed on suspicion of a crimeshould not be subjected to the risk that someone with whom he is forced to sharespace will try for a get-out-of-jail-free card by manufacturing a confession.

6. Adopt rigorous, uniform procedures for certifying expert witnesses andpreserving the integrity of the testing process. There is an effort underway to dothis at the federal level. A 30-member commission headed by the Justice Departmentand comprised of forensic scientists, researchers, prosecutors, defense attorneys andjudges was founded two years ago with the goal of “improv[ing] the overall reliabil-ity of forensic evidence after instances of shoddy scientific analysis by federal, stateand local police labs helped convict suspects.”159

However, the Justice Department recently made the unilateral decision that “thesubject of pre-trial forensic discovery—i.e., the extent to which information regard-ing forensic science experts and their data, opinions, methodologies, etc., should bedisclosed before they testify in court—is beyond the ‘scope’ of the Commission’sbusiness and therefore cannot properly be the subject of Commission reports ordiscussions in any respect.”160 This prompted the resignation of commission memberJudge Rakoff, who criticized the decision as “a major mistake that is likely tosignificantly erode the effectiveness of the Commission” and a reflection of “adetermination by the Department of Justice to place strategic advantage over a searchfor the truth.”161 He elaborated: “A primary way in which forensic science interactswith the courtroom is through discovery, for if an adversary does not know inadvance sufficient information about the forensic expert and the methodological andevidentiary bases for that expert’s opinions, the testimony of the expert is nothingmore than trial by ambush.”162

Judge Rakoff’s noisy resignation had its desired effect: Two days later, the JusticeDepartment reversed its decision to bar the commission from considering issues

memo.txt; Michael S. Schmidt, In Policy Change, Justice Dept. to Require Recording of Interrogations,N.Y. TIMES (May 22, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/23/us/politics/justice-dept-to-reverse-ban-on-recording-interrogations.html?_r�0.

155. See Henry Weinstein, Use of Jailhouse Testimony is Uneven in State, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 21, 2006),http://articles.latimes.com/2006/sep/21/local/me-jailhouse21.

156. Id.157. See supra n.107.158. See Russell D. Covey, Abolishing Jailhouse Snitch Testimony, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1375,

1376-1409 (2014).159. See Tim Cushing, Judge Resigns from Forensic Science Committee, Calls Out DOJ’s “Trial By

Ambush” Tactics, TECHDIRT (Feb. 5, 2015), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20150202/11152629883/judge-resigns-forensic-science-committee-calls-out-dojs-trial-ambush-tactics.shtml; Spencer S. Hsu, U.S. ToCommit Scientists and New Commission To Fix Forensic Science, WASH. POST (Feb. 15, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/crime/us-to-commit-scientists-and-new-commission-to-fix-forensic-science/2013/02/15/e11c31f8-77b3-11e2-8f84-3e4b513b1a13_story.html.

160. See Full Text: Judge’s Protest Resignation Letter, WASH. POST (Jan. 29, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/full-text-judges-protest-resignation-letter/2015/01/29/41659da6-a7e1-11e4-a2b2-776095f393b2_story.html.

161. Id.162. Id.

44 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC (2015)xxx

related to pre-trial forensic discovery.163 Judge Rakoff subsequently returned to thecommission, which is now in the process of preparing recommendations for theAttorney General. But why should the Justice Department have to be buffaloed intodoing the right thing?

7. Keep adding conviction integrity units. We know that there are innocent peoplelanguishing in prison, but figuring out who they are is very difficult—more so if theprosecution, which has control of whatever evidence there is, is fighting you tooth and nail.That turns out to be a common response from prosecutors confronted with evidence thatthey may have obtained a wrongful conviction. A separate unit within the prosecutor’soffice, with access to all the available evidence, and with no track record to defend, may bethe best chance we have of identifying wrongfully convicted prisoners. More than a dozensuch offices have been established across the country164 and more are being added.165 Thistrend needs to continue and escalate. Better yet, there might be a federal agency toinvestigate the problem of questionable state convictions. This would reduce the bias thatone state agency might have in favor of another.

In addition, state and federal law ought to be revised to give convicted defendantsfull access to DNA and other evidence in the possession of the prosecution. We haverepeatedly witnessed the appalling spectacle of innocent defendants spending manyyears fighting to obtain the evidence that would eventually exonerate them. MichaelMorton spent six additional years in prison because District Attorney John Bradleyworked very hard to block Morton’s requests for DNA testing.166 And Anthony RayHinton spent more than fifteen years in prison fighting for the right to test evidencethat eventually set him free.167 Bruce Godschalk lost seven years168; Frank Lee Smithdied in prison waiting for DNA testing that eventually proved his innocence.169

163. See Spencer S. Hsu, Judge Rakoff Returns to Forensic Panel After Justice Department Backs OffDecision, WASH. POST (Jan. 30, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/crime/in-reversal-doj-lets-forensic-panel-suggest-trial-rule-changes-after-us-judge-protests/2015/01/30/2f031d9e-a89c-11e4-a2b2-776095f393b2_story.html.

164. Various District Attorneys’ offices in 12 states, as well as the U.S. Attorney’s Office in Washing-ton, D.C., have established conviction integrity units for the purpose of identifying and investigatingwrongful conviction claims, often in collaboration with local innocence projects. See Center for Prosecu-tor Integrity, CONVICTION INTEGRITY UNITS, http://www.prosecutorintegrity.org/ (last visited Mar. 18,2015); CENTER FOR PROSECUTOR INTEGRITY, CONVICTION INTEGRITY UNITS: VANGUARD OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE

REFORM 9 (Dec. 2014), available at http://www.prosecutorintegrity.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/Conviction-Integrity-Units.pdf (noting that these conviction integrity units have produced a total of 61exonerations, with 33 attributed to the unit in Dallas, Texas); Gardiner, supra n.46 (Brooklyn DA KennethThompson overhauled the office’s conviction integrity unit and, in a mere 7 months, has ordered 7 murderconvictions overturned).

165. See, e.g., Marisa Gerber, L.A. County D.A. to Create Unit to Review Wrongful-Conviction Claims,L.A. TIMES (Apr. 22, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-conviction-review-unit-20150422-story.html#page�1; Jim Forsyth, Bexar DA Establishes “Conviction Integrity Unit”, WOAI LOCAL

NEWS (Feb. 25, 2015), http://www.woai.com/articles/woai-local-news-sponsored-by-five-119078/bexar-da-establishes-conviction-integrity-unit-13288998/.

166. See Brandi Grissom, supra n.77. In the words of the Houston Chronicle, “The fall of JohnBradley was swift and severe and justified.” Lisa Falkenberg, Tossed from Office, Ex-Williamson DALands Job in Sunny Palau, HOUSTON CHRON. (July 1, 2014), http://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/columnists/falkenberg/article/Falkenberg-5594473.php. Bradley lost the Republican primary for William-son County District Attorney in 2012, a post he had held for a decade.

167. Just recruiting the panel of experts, including a former F.B.I. official, to review the forensicevidence took Hinton and his lawyers almost a decade. See Alan Blinder, supra n.77; Anthony Ray HintonIs Free After 30 Years Wrongfully On Death Row, EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE (Apr. 3, 2015), http://www.eji.org/node/1064.

168. See Sara Rimer, DNA Testing in Rape Cases Frees Prisoner After 15 Years, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 15, 2002),http://www.nytimes.com/2002/02/15/us/dna-testing-in-rape-cases-frees-prisoner-after-15-years.html.

169. See The National Registry of Exonerations, Frank Lee Smith, https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid�3644. Smith was exonerated on the basis of DNA testingresults 11 months after his death in 2000 and 14 years after his conviction. He had requested DNA testing

44 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC (2015) xxxi

There is no justification for withholding evidence that might set an innocent manfree from unjust imprisonment. Whatever impediments have been interposed toprevent access to such evidence to convicted defendants and those working on theirbehalf ought to be summarily removed by legislation giving them full and swiftaccess to all evidence in possession of the government. Most states now have lawsallowing post-conviction access to DNA testing, but many are restrictive in practice—for example, denying requests from inmates who originally confessed to the crime orimposing a deadline of one year after conviction to file a request.170 Nebraska’sstatute, however, serves as a good example to emulate. It provides:

[A] person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a court may, at any time afterconviction, file a motion, with or without supporting affidavits, in the court thatentered the judgement requesting forensic DNA testing of any biological material that:(a) Is related to the investigation or prosecution that resulted in such judgment;(b) Is in the actual or constructive possession or control of the state or is in thepossession or control of others under circumstances likely to safeguard the integrityof the biological material’s original physical composition; and(c) Was not previously subjected to DNA testing or can be subjected to retestingwith more current DNA techniques that provide a reasonable likelihood of moreaccurate and probative results.171

The statute further provides that DNA tests must be performed in a nationally accreditedlaboratory, that the county attorney must submit an inventory to the defense and to the courtof all evidence secured by the state in connection with the case.172

8. Establish independent Prosecutorial Integrity Units. In my experience, theU.S. Justice Department’s Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) seems to viewits mission as cleaning up the reputation of prosecutors who have gotten themselvesinto trouble. In United States v. Kojayan,173 we found that Assistant United StatesAttorney Jeffrey Sinek had misled the district court and the jury. The district judge,who had trusted the AUSA, was so taken aback with the revelation that he barredfurther re-prosecution of the defendants as a sanction for the government’s miscon-duct.174 OPR investigated and gave the AUSA a clean bill of health. And no JusticeDepartment lawyer has yet been sanctioned for the Stevens prosecution despite theclear evidence of willful misconduct.175 Prosecutors need to know that someone iswatching over their shoulders—someone who doesn’t share their values and eatlunch in the same cafeteria. Move OPR to the Department of Agriculture, andinstitute similar independent offices in the 50 states.

to no avail for 2 years.170. See Sue Russell, The Right and Privilege of Post-Conviction DNA Testing, PACIFIC STANDARD (Oct.

4, 2012), http://www.psmag.com/politics-and-law/the-right-and-privilege-of-post-conviction-dna-testing-47781; Innocence Project, ACCESS TO POST-CONVICTION DNA TESTING (Oct. 10, 2014), http://www.innocenceproject.org/free-innocent/improve-the-law/fact-sheets/access-to-post-conviction-dna-testing.

171. See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-4120.172. Id.173. 8 F.3d 1315, 1322 (9th Cir. 1993).174. Order on Motion for Acquittal, No. 2:91-cr-00622-ER-2, Dkt. 111 (Mar. 9, 1994) (granting the

motion to dismiss the indictment with prejudice).175. The Justice Department did give two of its prosecutors, Joseph Bottini and James Goeke, slaps on

the wrists, but the Merit Systems Protection Board recently overturned even these mild sanctions on thebasis that the Justice Department violated its own procedures for investigating alleged misconduct. SeeLisa Rein, Review Board Clears U.S. Prosecutors Accused of Botching Sen. Ted Stevens’s CorruptionTrial, WASH. POST (Jan. 14, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/federal-eye/wp/2015/01/14/panel-clears-u-s-prosecutors-accused-of-botching-sen-ted-stevenss-corruption-trial/. A bungled attempt at sanc-tions strikes me as worse than no sanctions at all. What does that say about the sincerity and competenceof the Justice Department’s efforts? They can topple a senator and jail Martha Stewart, but they can’teven spank their own misbehaving lawyers?

44 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC (2015)xxxii

C. Judges

Judges, especially trial judges, can do a great deal to ensure that prosecutorscomply with their constitutional obligations, that only reliable evidence is presentedto juries, that juries are properly instructed and that the trial is generally fair. Therehas been an avalanche of exonerations in recent years, many of them of people whospent half a lifetime or more behind bars,176 and in every one of those cases there wassome sort of proceeding—usually a trial, sometimes a plea—where a judge let aninnocent man be convicted and sent him to prison or death row. When such cases arereported, the trial judge is always given a pass, as if he were merely a bystander whowatched helplessly while an innocent man had his life ripped away from him. I don’tbuy it. Any judge that inexperienced or incompetent has no business presiding overanything more significant than small claims court. In criminal cases, judges have anaffirmative duty to ensure fairness and justice, because they are the only ones whocan force prosecutors and their investigators and experts to comply with due process.

Other than being vigilant, compassionate and even-handed, there are specificmeasures trial judges can take to ensure fairness in criminal proceedings and avoidthe conviction of innocents.

1. Enter Brady compliance orders in every criminal case. The Brady rule is inmany ways the ultimate guarantor of fairness in our criminal justice system. This isbecause police have unparalleled access to the evidence in criminal cases—bothinculpatory and exculpatory. Once a crime is reported and police are on the scene,they can secure the area and prevent anyone from touching anything until they aredone. They have control of what evidence is sent out for forensic testing; they talk towitnesses and get their impression before anyone else does. Police and prosecutors,working together, can lean on witnesses by threatening prosecution or offeringleniency. If there is evidence helpful to the defense, it will generally wind up in thepossession of the police; if witnesses have made helpful statements in their initialcontact with investigators (as happened in the Stevens case) that information will bein the sole possession of the prosecution. A defense investigator or lawyer plowingover the same territory after the police have done their job will generally find thescene denuded of clues and witnesses who are skittish and laconic.

Brady and its progeny therefore impose important obligations on prosecutors,obligations that are too frequently ignored. In case after case where an innocentperson is exonerated after many years in prison, it turns out that the prosecutionfailed to disclose or actively concealed exculpatory evidence. But Brady is notself-enforcing; failure to comply with Brady does not expose the prosecutor to anypersonal risk.177 When Judge Sullivan discovered that the prosecutors in the Stevenscase had obtained their conviction after failing to disclose exculpatory evidence, heappointed a special counsel, DC attorney Henry Schuelke III, to independentlyinvestigate the prosecutors’ conduct.178 Schuelke determined that the lawyers hadcommitted willful Brady violations but that the court lacked the power to sanction thewrongdoers because they had not violated any court-imposed obligations.179

The solution to this problem is for judges to routinely enter Brady complianceorders, and many judges do so already. Such orders vary somewhat from judge to

176. See The National Registry of Exonerations, supra n.72 and accompanying.177. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430, 431 n.34 (1976) (prosecutors are absolutely immune

for “activities [that are] intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process,” includingthe willful suppression of exculpatory evidence).

178. See Henry F. Schuelke III, Special Counsel, Report to Hon. Emmet G. Sullivan of InvestigationConducted Pursuant to the Court’s Order, supra n.119.

179. See id.

44 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC (2015) xxxiii

judge, but typically require the government to turn over, when received, documentsand objects, reports of examinations and tests, expert witness opinions and allrelevant material required by Brady and Giglio.180 Entering such an order holdsprosecutors personally responsible to the court and will doubtless result in far greatercompliance.

2. Engage in a Brady colloquy. This procedure was proposed by Professor JasonKreag in an article published last year in the Stanford Law Review Online,181 and itstrikes me as a good idea. The details are outlined in Professor Kreag’s article but thegeneral idea is that, during pretrial hearings and before a defendant enters a guiltyplea, the trial judge would have a conversation with the prosecutor on the record,asking him such questions as, “Have you reviewed your file . . . to determine if [it]include[s] information that is favorable to the defense?” and “Have you identifiedinformation that is favorable to the defense, but nonetheless elected not to disclose[it] because you believe that the defense is already aware of the information or theinformation is not material?”182 There is nothing like having to face a judge on therecord to impress upon lawyers the need to scrupulously comply with their profes-sional obligations. But the questions must be sufficiently specific and detailed toavoid the mantra, “We’re aware of our Brady obligations and we’ve met them.”

3. Adopt local rules that require the government to comply with its discoveryobligations without the need for motions by the defense. The prosecution need notpresent Brady evidence unless the defense asks for it, usually by motion.183 Thisseems sort of silly because the defense obviously wants whatever exculpatory evi-dence the prosecution might have. Surprisingly, few courts have rules that obviate theneed for criminal discovery motions.184 I’m aware of only a dozen or so federalcourts that have local rules either stating that the defense doesn’t need to make aformal discovery motion, or requiring the government to disclose Brady/Gigliomaterial within a specific time frame, without mentioning a defense motion.185

An example of such a rule is Eastern District of Washington Local Criminal Rule16(a), which was adopted just last year. The rule requires the government to makeavailable within 14 days of arraignment: (1) all of the defendant’s oral and written

180. These orders are routine among all the district judges in the Eastern District of Washington. See,e.g., Judge Justin Quackenbush, Scheduling Order at 1, No. 2:15-CR-0025-JLQ (E.D. Wa. Mar. 23, 2015)(“the United States shall forthwith provide, when received, all relevant material required by Brady and byGiglio”) (citations omitted); Judge Edward Shea, Case Management Order at 4, No. 4:14-CR-6053-EFS(E.D. Wa. Feb. 13, 2015) (“The Court further presumes a request for discovery and disclosure underFederal Rules of Evidence 404(b), 608(b), and 609, Brady, Giglio, United States v. Henthorn, 931 F.2d 29(9th Cir. 1991), and their progeny.”) (citations omitted).

181. Jason Kreag, The Brady Colloquy, 67 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 47 (2014).182. Id. at 50.183. See Bennett L. Gershman, Litigating Brady v. Maryland: Games Prosecutors Play, 57 CASE W.

RES. L. REV. 531, 534 (2007), available at http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article�1535&context�lawfaculty (“Prosecutorial disclosure of Brady evidence is not automatic. Prosecutors aretypically required to provide Brady evidence only upon a request.”); FED. JUDICIAL CTR., TREATMENT OF

BRADY V. MARYLAND MATERIAL IN UNITED STATES DISTRICT AND STATE COURTS’ RULES, ORDERS, AND POLICIES

14 (2007), available at https://bulk.resource.org/courts.gov/fjc/bradyma2.pdf.184. See LAURAL HOOPER ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., A SUMMARY OF RESPONSES TO A NATIONAL SURVEY OF

RULE 16 OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND DISCLOSURE PRACTICES IN CRIMINAL CASES:FINAL REPORT TO THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL RULES (2011), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Publications/Rule16Rep.pdf.

185. Courts that require the government to provide criminal discovery without a motion include theDistrict of Hawaii, District of Kansas, District of New Hampshire, District of New Mexico, WesternDistrict of Texas, Eastern District of Washington and Eastern District of Wisconsin. Courts that imply asmuch include the Middle District of Alabama, Southern District of Alabama, Northern District ofCalifornia, District of Massachusetts, Northern District of New York and the District of Vermont. See id.at 18.

44 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC (2015)xxxiv

statements, the defendant’s prior record, documents and objects and expert witnessopinions that are in the government’s “possession, custody or control or which maybecome known . . . through due diligence”; (2) information from an “electroniceavesdrop, wiretap or any other interception,” as well as “the authorization for andinformation gathered from” a tracking device or video/audio recording used duringinvestigations; (3) “search warrants and supporting affidavits”; (4) information regard-ing whether physical evidence intended to be offered in the government’s case-in-chief was seized without a warrant; and (5) photographs used in any photo lineup, aswell as information obtained from any other identification technique.186 Rule 16(a)(6)is a catchall clause that requires the government to “[a]dvise the defendant’s attorneyof evidence favorable to the defendant and material to the defendant’s guilt orpunishment to which defendant is entitled pursuant to Brady and United States v.Agurs.”187 I have no idea why this isn’t part of the Federal Rules of CriminalProcedure, but it should be.

4. Condition the admission of expert evidence in criminal cases on the presen-tation of a proper Daubert showing. As Judge Nancy Gertner has pointed out onnumerous occasions,188 courts in criminal cases routinely admit expert evidencelacking the proper foundations and sometimes amounting to little more than guess-work. Few defense lawyers challenge the reliability of expert evidence because fewtrial judges grant requests for Daubert hearings.189 And appellate courts affirm suchdenials under a very generous abuse of discretion standard.190 With the mountingnumber of wrongful convictions based on faulty expert evidence in such diverseareas as arson and shaken baby syndrome, courts must be far more rigorous inenforcing Daubert before allowing experts to testify in criminal trials. Failure to holda Daubert hearing where the reliability of expert evidence has been credibly chal-lenged should be considered an error of law, as should the refusal to allow a defensememory expert where the case turns on conflicting recollections of past events.191

5. When prosecutors misbehave, don’t keep it a secret. Defense lawyers whoare found to have been ineffective regularly find their names plastered into judicialopinions, yet judges seem strangely reluctant to name names when it comes tomisbehaving prosecutors.192 Indeed, judges seem reluctant to even suspect prosecu-tors of improper behavior, as if they were somehow beyond suspicion. For example,the district judge in the Kojayan case, discussed above, could have obviated theappeal and the entire sordid episode by forcing the Assistant U.S. Attorney to answera simple question: “Did Nourian have a plea agreement with the government?”Defense counsel urged the judge to ask the question but to no avail. It was not untilthe oral argument before our court that the AUSA was compelled to disclose that fact:

186. U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Washington, Local Crim. R. 16(a), available athttp://www.waed.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/Local_Criminal_Rules-20150303_0.pdf.

187. Id. (citations omitted).188. See, e.g., Nancy Gertner, Judges Need to Set a Higher Standard for Forensic Evidence, N.Y.

TIMES (Mar. 30, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2015/03/30/robert-durst-handwriting-and-judging-forensic-science/judges-need-to-set-a-higher-standard-for-forensic-evidence; Nancy Gertner, Com-mentary on the Need for a Research Culture in the Forensic Sciences, 58 UCLA L. REV. 789, 793 (2011).

189. See David E. Bernstein, The Misbegotten Judicial Resistance to the Daubert Revolution, 89NOTRE DAME L. REV. 27, 50-66 (2013). Moreover, “[s]tatistics substantiate the ubiquity of defense failureto initiate Daubert challenges, confirming the rarity in the trial courts of any defense challenge to aprosecutor’s proffered expert testimony.” See also Peter J. Neufeld, The (Near) Irrelevance of Daubert toCriminal Justice and Some Suggestions for Reform, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 107, 110 (2005).

190. See, e.g., Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 141 (1997).191. See supra pp. vi-vii and accompanying footnotes.192. See Adam M. Gershowitz, Prosecutorial Shaming: Naming Attorneys to Reduce Prosecutorial

Misconduct, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1059, 1069-71 & n.21 (2009).

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[Q]: Was there a cooperation agreement?AUSA: Well, your honor, that is not something that’s in the record.[Q]: I understand. Was there a cooperation agreement?AUSA: There was an agreement with the Southern District of New York and[Nourian], yes.193

Naming names and taking prosecutors to task for misbehavior can have magicalqualities in assuring compliance with constitutional rights. In Baca v. Adams,194 apanel of our court dealt with a case where both the California trial court and theCalifornia Court of Appeal concluded that a prosecutor lied on the stand, butnonetheless deemed the error harmless. During our questioning, we asked the DeputyAttorney General arguing the case whether the lying prosecutor and another untruth-ful witness had been prosecuted for perjury or otherwise sanctioned. The answer, ofcourse, was that they had not been. We then suggested that, in resolving the case, wewould write an opinion naming those who had misbehaved and the failure of the stateauthorities to take any actions against them. The video of that oral argument made itsway to the blogosphere and has been viewed over 24,000 times.195

Not surprisingly, three weeks afterwards, the California Attorney General wroteconfessing error and requesting that we remand to the district court with instructionsthat it grant a conditional writ of habeas corpus.196 The incident, by the way,illustrates the importance of providing video access to court proceedings. It is fareasier to hide an injustice from public scrutiny if only the judge and a few lawyersknow about it.

Judges who see bad behavior by those appearing before them, especially prosecu-tors who wield great power and have greater ethical responsibilities, must hold suchmisconduct up to the light of public scrutiny. Some of us regularly encourageprosecutors to speak to their supervisors, even the United States Attorney, to ensurethat inappropriate conduct comes to their attention, with excellent results.197 If judgeshave reason to believe that witnesses, especially police officers or governmentinformants, testify falsely, they must refer the matter for prosecution. If they becomeaware of widespread misconduct in the investigation and prosecution of criminalcases, a referral to the U.S. Department of Justice for a civil rights violation mightwell be appropriate.198

193. United States v. Kojayan, 8 F.3d 1315, 1320 (9th Cir. 1993). The Justice Department reacted withtypical insouciance: It filed a motion to depublish the opinion or, in the alternative, to amend the opinionto remove the AUSA’s name. USA’s Motion for Depublication, or in the Alternative, Modification ofOpinion w/Declaration of AUSA Sinek, No. 95-50875, Dkt. 51 (Sept. 24, 1993); see supra n.129.

194. No. 13-56132, 2015 WL 412835, at *1 (9th Cir. Jan. 30, 2015).195. See 13-56132 Johnny Baca v. Derral Adams, YOUTUBE (Jan. 8, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/

watch?v�2sCUrhgXjH4.196. Appellee’s Unopposed Motion for Summary Reversal and Remand to the District Court to

Conditionally Grant the Writ, Baca v. Adams (Jan. 29, 2015) (No. 13-56132, Dkt. 33).197. A memorable example is United States v. Maloney, 755 F.3d 1044 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc). The

AUSA had sandbagged the defense at trial by making for the first time a factual assertion not in the recordin his rebuttal during closing argument. At oral argument, I asked the AUSA to go back and show thevideo of the oral argument to the U.S. Attorney and “see whether this [conduct] is something [she]want[s] to be teaching [her] line attorneys.” 11-50311 United States v. Maloney, YOUTUBE (Sept. 19,2013), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v�HgafGnA4Eow, at 59:00. A little over two weeks later, wereceived a letter from Laura Duffy, the U.S. Attorney herself, admitting that the AUSA had actedimproperly and promising to “use the video of the argument as a training tool to reinforce the principlethat all Assistant U.S. Attorneys must be aware of the rules pertaining to closing argument and must makeevery effort to stay well within these rules.” Motion to Summarily Reverse the Conviction, Vacate theSentence and Remand to the District Court, United States v. Maloney (Oct. 7, 2013) (No. 11-50311, Dkt.52-1). Bravo Ms. Duffy!

198. But not always successful. In our opinion vacating Milke’s conviction, we made an express referral of thematter to the Justice Department based on what appeared to us to be knowing and repeated use of perjured

44 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC (2015)xxxvi

D. Miscellaneous

On March 8, 2015, A.M. “Marty” Stroud III, a Shreveport lawyer and former stateprosecutor, published a remarkable piece in the Shreveport Times reflecting on thecase of Glenn Ford, who spent 30 years on death row after being convicted of murderand sentenced to death in 1984.199 Ford was released after the state disclosedevidence proving his innocence. Stroud offered a public apology for his conduct inthe case. It is well worth reading in full, but here is the gist of it:

At the time this case was tried there was evidence that would have cleared GlennFord. The easy and convenient argument is that the prosecutors did not know ofsuch evidence, thus they were absolved of any responsibility for the wrongfulconviction.

I can take no comfort in such an argument . . . . Had I been more inquisitive,perhaps the evidence would have come to light years ago . . . . My mindset waswrong and blinded me to my purpose of seeking justice, rather than obtaining aconviction of a person who I believed to be guilty. I did not hide evidence, I simplydid not seriously consider that sufficient information may have been out there thatcould have led to a different conclusion. And that omission is on me.

I did not question the unfairness of Mr. Ford having appointed counsel who hadnever tried a criminal jury case much less a capital one. It never concerned me thatthe defense had insufficient funds to hire experts . . . .

The jury was all white, Mr. Ford was African-American. Potential African-American jurors were struck with little thought about potential discrimination . . . . Ialso participated in placing before the jury dubious testimony from a forensicpathologist that the shooter had to be left handed . . . . All too late, I learned that thetestimony was pure junk science at its evil worst.

In 1984, I was 33 years old. I was arrogant, judgmental, narcissistic and very fullof myself. I was not as interested in justice as I was in winning. To borrow a phrasefrom Al Pacino in the movie “And Justice for All,” “Winning became everything.”200

What is remarkable about Stroud’s statement is not that he gained a conviction anddeath sentence for a man that turned out to be innocent. Or that that man spent threedecades caged like an animal. That kind of thing is all too common. Nor is thereanything unusual about the confluence of errors that led to the wrongful conviction—failure to uncover exculpatory evidence, inexperienced defense lawyers, race-basedjury selection, junk science, and a judge who passively watched the parade and sat onhis thumbs. The same goes for a prosecutorial attitude of God-like omniscience andunwillingness to entertain the possibility that the wrong man is being prosecuted.These things happen all the time in case, after case, after case.

What is unusual—unique really—is Stroud’s willingness to accept personal respon-sibility for the calamity he helped inflict on Glenn Ford and his family—his willing-

testimony by Detective Saldate in a large number of criminal prosecutions. Milke, 711 F.3d at 1019-20. The JusticeDepartment declined to investigate the matter, yet evidence that Milke’s case was not an isolated incident wasreadily available. For example, in a recent letter to the editor complaining about Milke’s release, a colleague ofSaldate’s in the 1980s stated: “I am painfully aware that Detective Armando Saldate and his now deceased partnerwere notorious for bending the rules, especially when it came to suspect interviews. Other homicide detectivesattempted to make supervisors aware of these serious issues. They were met with disdain and angrily told that ifthey couldn’t be a team player, they could find another place to work. Nothing else was said for fear of retaliation,and no corrective steps were taken.” See Antonio Morales Jr., Op-ed, Milke Doesn’t Deserve Her Freedom, AZCENTRAL (Mar. 20, 2015), http://www.azcentral.com/story/opinion/letters/2015/03/19/milke-deserve-freedom/25057361/. If evidence of such widespread misconduct in the highest level of a metropolitan police department isunworthy of even an investigation by the U.S. Justice Department, one must wonder what is.

199. A.M. “Marty” Stroud III, RE: “State Should Give Ford Real Justice”, SHREVEPORT TIMES, Mar. 8,2015, at 6D, http://www.shreveporttimes.com/story/opinion/readers/2015/03/20/lead-prosecutor-offers-apology-in-the-case-of-exonerated-death-row-inmate-glenn-ford/25049063/.

200. Id.

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ness to embrace this as his personal failure, not just an unfortunate failure of thesystem. Most prosecutorial attitudes run the gamut from “that’s why they put eraserson pencils” to “they must be guilty of something.” Everyone else in the system,starting with trial judges, absolves himself of personal responsibility when a heinousfailure occurs. We could do with a lot less of that.

In a sense, however, the system is responsible because it places a great deal ofpower and responsibility in young, ambitious lawyers, like Stroud, who have everyincentive to close their eyes to the possibility of innocence, to testilying by police, tobogus experts and to suggestive eyewitness identification procedures. A prosecutorcertainly does not help advance his career by providing to the defense evidence thathis star witness made a statement directly contrary to his testimony before the policestarted leaning on him—as happened in the shameful prosecution and wrongfulconviction of Senator Stevens. Faced with a remote possibility of being found out,and the likelihood that nothing bad will happen even if they are, many prosecutorswill turn a blind eye or worse. And that’s how miscarriages of justice happen.

Some of the suggestions above will help ameliorate the problem, but there aresome other reforms that require either legislation, a ruling by the Supreme Court,action by parties not involved in the criminal justice process or a constitutionalamendment. These may be more difficult to achieve, but here they are nonetheless:

1. Abandon judicial elections. Professor Monroe Freedman made the case for theunconstitutionality of elected state judges in his succinct monograph, The Unconstitu-tionality of Electing State Judges.201 He relied on the separate opinions of JusticesO’Connor and Ginsburg in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White,202 citing JusticeO’Connor’s opinion for “studies showing that judges who face elections are far morelikely to override jury sentences of life without parole and impose the death pen-alty.”203 The difficulty confronting any judge who faces an election is compoundedby the well-known practice of prosecutors enlisting one of their own to oppose ajudge that they consider to be pro-defense.204 And in at least 19 states, lawyers mayalso “paper” or “affidavit” a judge by filing a peremptory challenge to disqualify ajudge they deem “prejudiced” against their interests, without having to submit anyexplanation or proof of prejudice.205 This tactic can be used en masse to effectivelypreclude a judge from hearing any criminal cases, and is precisely what appears to behappening to the judge in Orange County who removed the District Attorney’s officefrom a high-profile case because of repeated instances of misconduct.206 While many,

201. Monroe H. Freedman, The Unconstitutionality of Electing State Judges, 26 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS

217 (2013).202. 536 U.S. 765 (2002).203. Freedman, supra n.201, at 218.204. See Jennifer Emily, Dallas DA Accused of Pushing Prosecutors to Run Against Judges, THE

DALLAS MORNING NEWS (Oct. 7, 2013), http://www.dallasnews.com/news/politics/local-politics/20131006-da-accused-of-pushing-prosecutors-to-run-against-incumbent-judges.ece (six prosecutors from the DallasCounty DA’s office were running for state district judge benches, five of whom were challengingincumbent Democratic judges).

205. See Michelle Quinn, District Attorney’s Boycott of a Judge Raises Issues, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 20,2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/21/us/21sfcourt.html?pagewanted�all&_r�0 (Santa Clara CountyDA disqualified one judge from 100 cases as retaliation for the judge freeing a child molester after thedeputy DA provided false testimony and withheld exculpatory evidence); Maureen Cavanaugh & PatFinn, San Diego’s Great Judge Boycott, KPBS (Feb. 22, 2010) http://www.kpbs.org/news/2010/feb/22/san-diegos-great-judge-boycott/ (discussing the boycott of certain judges by the San Diego County DA’soffice after those judges had either made rulings against the prosecution or criticized prosecutors forfailing to disclose exculpatory evidence).

206. Prosecutors from the Orange County DA’s office made blanket disqualification requests againstJudge Thomas Goethals in his other criminal cases as soon as he began probing into the misuse ofjailhouse informants in the Dekkrai murder trial. See supra n.131; Eric Hartley, Prosecutors Avoiding

44 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC (2015)xxxviii

perhaps, most judges resist the pressure and remain impartial, the fact that they mayhave to face the voters with the combined might of the prosecution and police groupsaligned against them no doubt causes some judges to rule for the prosecution in caseswhere they would otherwise have ruled for the defense.207

2. Abrogate absolute prosecutorial immunity. In Imbler v. Pachtman,208 adivided Supreme Court held that prosecutors are absolutely immune from damagesliability for misconduct they commit when performing the traditional activities of aprosecutor. Imbler was not a constitutional ruling; the Court was interpreting 42U.S.C. § 1983. And it was certainly not a result compelled by the language of thestatute; section 1983 says nothing about immunity. Rather, Imbler reflected a purepolicy judgment that prosecutors needed complete freedom from liability in order toproperly discharge their functions. Writing for himself and two others, Justice Whitewould have adopted a more limited immunity rule that would have held prosecutorsliable for certain kinds of deliberate misconduct such as willfully failing to discloseBrady and Giglio evidence.209

Under Imbler, prosecutors cannot be held liable, no matter how badly theymisbehave, for actions such as withholding exculpatory evidence, introducing fabri-cated evidence, knowingly presenting perjured testimony and bringing charges forwhich there is no credible evidence. All are immune from liability. A defense lawyerwho did any such things (or their equivalents) would soon find himself disbarred andplaying house with Bubba. The Imbler majority seemed reassured by the possibilitythat rogue prosecutors will be subject to other constraints:

We emphasize that the immunity of prosecutors from liability in suits under [§] 1983 doesnot leave the public powerless to deter misconduct or to punish that which occurs. ThisCourt has never suggested that the policy considerations which compel civil immunity forcertain governmental officials also place them beyond the reach of the criminal law . . . .Moreover, a prosecutor stands perhaps unique, among officials whose acts could deprivepersons of constitutional rights, in his amenability to professional discipline by an associa-tion of his peers. These checks undermine the argument that the imposition of civilliability is the only way to insure that prosecutors are mindful of the constitutional rights ofpersons accused of crime.210

This argument was dubious in 1976 and is absurd today. Who exactly is going toprosecute prosecutors? Despite numerous cases where prosecutors have committed willfulmisconduct, costing innocent defendants decades of their lives, I am aware of only two whohave been criminally prosecuted for it; they spent a total of six days behind bars.211

Judge They Say Is Biased, O.C. REG. (June 13, 2014), http://www.ocregister.com/articles/prosecutors-618207-goethals-judge.html?page�1. The Orange County Bar Association took notice and passed Resolution15R-01, titled “Independence of the Judiciary,” in which it stated that it “publicly disapproves of the useof tactics which are, or have the appearance of being, punitive and retaliatory towards any sitting judge,”and that “the excessive use of [the affidavit procedure] against a particular judge can be . . . inappropriate. . . and could be construed as an attempt to intimidate not just that judge, but the entire judiciary, whowill and must remain independent.” See Orange Cnty. Bar Ass’n, Resolution 15R-01: Independence of theJudiciary (Mar. 27, 2015), http://www.ocbar.org/Portals/0/pdf/press_releases/2015/2015_03_30_OCBA_ResolutionR15-01.pdf.

207. See supra n.129 (again, life tenure is a wonderful thing).208. 424 U.S. 409, 430, 431 n.34 (1976).209. Id. at 438-45 (White, J., concurring). In fact, on May 1, 2015, the Supreme Court of Canada

reversed course and embraced a similar rule. See Henry v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [2015]S.C.C. 24 (Can.) (government may be sued when prosecutors intentionally withhold evidence favorableto the defense).

210. Id. at 428-29.211. Texas district attorney Ken Anderson, see supra n.77, went to jail for five days (serving only half

of his 10-day sentence) for hiding evidence that put Michael Morton in prison for a quarter of a century.And he got even that much because he was found in contempt of a Brady compliance order entered by the

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There have been a few instances of professional discipline against prosecutors,though even that has been much less than against similarly-situated private law-yers.212 By and large, however, professional organizations are exceedingly reluctantto impose sanctions on prosecutors for misconduct in carrying out their professionalresponsibilities.213 Sidney Powell’s book, Licensed to Lie, illustrates exhaustively thefutility of getting bar disciplinary boards to impose professional discipline formisconduct committed in the course of criminal prosecutions.214

Despite this dismal track record refuting the bland assurances of the Imbler majority thatprosecutors will be subject to other forms of control, even if damages lawsuits are notavailable, the Court has reaffirmed Imbler on numerous occasions. Most recently, in itsunanimous opinion in Van de Kamp v. Goldstein,215 the Court denied compensation to thepetitioner, Thomas Goldstein, who had spent 24 years in prison based on the testimony ofnotorious jailhouse snitch Edward Fink. Prosecutors used Fink as a utility infielder innumerous cases, and he somehow always managed to testify that the defendant hadconfessed.216 Unmoved, the Court held the prosecutors and their supervisors were allprotected by absolute immunity and Mr. Goldstein can pound sand.217

What kind of signal does this send to young prosecutors who are out to make aname for themselves? I think it signals that they can be as reckless and self-serving asthey want, and if they get caught, nothing bad will happen to them. Imbler and Van deKamp should be overruled. It makes no sense to give police, who often have to act inhigh pressure situations where their lives may be in danger, only qualified immu-nity218 while giving prosecutors absolute immunity. It is a disparity that can only be

trial judge in that case. See Texas Prosecutor to Serve 10 Days for Innocent Man’s 25-Year Imprisonment,THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 8, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/08/texas-prosecutor-ken-anderson-michael-morton-trial. None of the prosecutors who concealed evidence in the Stevens criminalcase were prosecuted, and the two who were initially disciplined by the DOJ got their sanctionsoverturned by the Merit Systems Protection Board. See supra n.175. Mike Nifong, the district attorneywho committed widespread misconduct when prosecuting the Duke Lacrosse players, was convicted ofcriminal contempt but sentenced to just one day in jail. See supra n.136. The list of prosecutors who havecommitted misconduct causing serious, lasting harm to innocent people and who have not themselvesbeen criminally prosecuted is very long indeed. I am aware of no prosecutors, other than Ken Andersonand Mike Nifong, who have been convicted of prosecutorial misconduct.

212. For example, Trinidad County, Colorado District Attorney Frank Ruybalid pleaded guilty to overa dozen instances of professional misconduct and had his law license suspended for six months, but thatsuspension was immediately suspended, even though “private attorneys ‘have received sanctions moresevere than a six-month stayed suspension’ for conduct similar to Ruybalid’s.” See Alan Prendergast,Frank Ruybalid, Trinidad District Attorney, Cops a Plea, Admits Misconduct, WESTWORD (Jan. 29, 2015),http://www.westword.com/news/frank-ruybalid-trinidad-district-attorney-cops-a-plea-admits-misconduct-6282816 (quoting the settlement agreement).

213. Nor have courts been eager to uphold sanctions imposed by professional organizations. See, e.g.,In re Kline, No. 13-BG-851, at 2-3 (D.C. Ct. App. Apr. 9, 2015), available at http://www.dccourts.gov/internet/documents/13-BG-851.pdf (despite finding that “Bar Counsel proved by clear and convincingevidence that [the prosecutor] intentionally failed to disclose information in violation of [a D.C. Rule ofProfessional Conduct prohibiting prosecutors from intentionally withholding exculpatory evidence fromthe defense in a criminal case], the panel concluded that “given the confusion regarding the correctinterpretation of a prosecutor’s obligations under the rule, sanctioning [the prosecutor] would beunwarranted”). One can hope that prosecutors in the District of Columbia will no longer be confused as totheir disclosure obligations after In re Kline.

214. See POWELL, supra n.116, at 397-401.215. 555 U.S. 335 (2009).216. Id. at 339.217. Id. at 349 (“[W]here a § 1983 plaintiff claims that a prosecutor’s management of a trial-related

information system is responsible for a constitutional error at his or her particular trial, the prosecutorresponsible for the system enjoys absolute immunity just as would the prosecutor who handled theparticular trial itself.”).

218. See, e.g., Messerschmidt v. Millender, 132 S. Ct. 1235 (2012); see also Devereaux v. Abbey, 263F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (police have only qualified immunity for allegedly fabricating

44 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC (2015)xl

explained by the fact that prosecutors and judges are all part of the legal professionand it’s natural enough to empathize with people who are just like you.219 If theSupreme Court won’t overrule Imbler and Van de Kamp, Congress is free to do it byamending 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

3. Repeal AEDPA § 2254(d). Prior to AEDPA taking effect in 1996, the federalcourts provided a final safeguard for the relatively rare but compelling cases wherethe state courts had allowed a miscarriage of justice to occur. One of the better-known examples of this is the case of Ron Williamson, who in 1994 was just 5 daysaway from being executed for a murder of which he was eventually cleared by DNAevidence. He was saved when U.S. District Judge Frank Seay entered a stay ofexecution that began a process culminating in Williamson’s exoneration. The case isdescribed in depth in John Grisham’s non-fiction book, The Innocent Man.220

The federal court safety-value was abruptly dismantled in 1996 when Congresspassed and President Clinton signed the Antiterrorism and Effective Death PenaltyAct. Hidden in its interstices was a provision that has pretty much shut out the federalcourts from granting habeas relief in most cases, even when they believe that anegregious miscarriage of justice has occurred.221

We now regularly have to stand by in impotent silence, even though it may appearto us that an innocent person has been convicted.222 Not even the Supreme Court mayact on what it believes is a constitutional violation if the issue is raised in a habeaspetition as opposed to on direct appeal.223 There are countless examples of this, but

evidence in a criminal case); Gantt v. City of Los Angeles, 717 F.3d 702 (9th Cir. 2013) (same).219. Though it raises other questions, it’s also worth taking another look at absolute judicial immunity.

See Timothy M. Stengel, Absolute Judicial Immunity Makes Absolutely No Sense: An Argument for anException to Judicial Immunity, 84 TEMP. L. REV. 1071 (2012) (arguing that absolute judicial immunityshould be removed in cases where malice or corruption is substantiated).

220. See JOHN GRISHAM, THE INNOCENT MAN: MURDER AND INJUSTICE IN A SMALL TOWN (2006).221. Namely, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) provides that a writ of habeas corpus shall not be granted unless the

adjudication of the claim on the merits in state court “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, orinvolved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the SupremeCourt of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determinationof the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.”

222. See, e.g., Murdoch v. Castro, 609 F.3d 983 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (theplurality applied AEDPA deference and denied habeas relief to a petitioner who had steadfastly main-tained his innocence and had “strong proof” that he was in fact innocent). It’s no surprise that courts have“performed miserably in ferreting out the innocent.” See Adam Liptak, Study of Wrongful ConvictionsRaises Questions Beyond DNA, N.Y. TIMES (July 23, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/23/us/23bar.html?_r�1&&gwh�D810E36AF10FBA1A836653D78673C1C8&gwt�pay. Not only did the SupremeCourt decline to hear the appeals of 30 of 31 prisoners who were later exonerated by DNA evidence, butit ruled against the prisoner in the one appeal it did hear. See Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108COLUM. L. REV. 55, 95 (2008).

223. Compare Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 148-49 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring) (“In my view,this is a case in which Congress’ instruction to defer to the reasonable conclusions of state-court judgesmakes a critical difference. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Were I a California state judge, I would likelyhold that Payton’s penalty-phase proceedings violated the Eighth Amendment . . . . Nonetheless, incircumstances like the present, a federal judge must leave in place a state-court decision unless thefederal judge believes it is ‘contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly establishedFederal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.’ § 2254(d)(1) . . . . I cannot saythat the California Supreme Court decision fails this deferential test.”), and Sessoms v. Grounds, 776 F.3d615, 631 (9th Cir. 2015) (Kozinski, C.J., reluctantly dissenting) (“But what we must decide is not whatSessoms meant or the officers understood, but whether it was unreasonable for the state courts toconclude that a reasonable officer would have been perplexed as to whether Sessoms was asking for anattorney . . . . I am dismayed that Sessoms’s fate—whether he will spend his remaining days in prison,half a century or more caged like an animal—turns on such esoterica. But that’s the standard we arebound to apply, even if we are convinced that the habeas petitioner’s constitutional rights wereviolated.”), with Hinton v. Alabama, 134 S. Ct. 1081, 1083 (2014) (per curiam) (vacating the state court’sjudgment on direct appeal upon concluding that Anthony Ray Hinton’s trial attorney “rendered constitution-

44 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC (2015) xli

perhaps the best illustration is Cavazos v. Smith,224 the case involving a grandmotherwho had spent 10 years in prison for the alleged shaking death of her infantgrandson—a conviction secured by since-discredited junk science. My court freedSmith, but the Supreme Court summarily reversed (over Justice Ginsburg’s impas-sioned dissent) based on AEDPA.225

AEDPA is a cruel, unjust and unnecessary law that effectively removes federaljudges as safeguards against miscarriages of justice. It has resulted and continues toresult in much human suffering. It should be repealed.226

4. Treat prosecutorial misconduct as a civil rights violation. The U.S. JusticeDepartment seems ready enough to pursue charges of civil rights violations in caseswhere police have engaged in physical violence,227 but far more reluctant to pursuemisbehaving prosecutors.228 But prosecutors can wreck and take lives just like police,and their actions are often far more premeditated than those of officers who mayover-react to a belligerent suspect. And when a prosecutorial office uses known liarsas jailhouse snitches, or presents evidence from cops they know are prone to fabricateevidence or conduct suggestive lineups or eyewitness identifications, they are commit-ting civil rights violations with dire consequences for their victims. It is preciselysuch alternative enforcement mechanisms that the Supreme Court hypothesized inImbler in deciding to give prosecutors absolute immunity.229 One can only hope thatthe U.S. Department of Justice will reconsider what appears to be its policy againstinvestigating prosecutorial misconduct in criminal cases as potential civil rights violations.

5. Give criminal defendants the choice of a jury or bench trial. Under currentlaw, either the defendant or the prosecution can insist on trying the case before ajury.230 Conventional wisdom is that defendants prefer juries because it only takesone juror to hang, but experienced defense lawyers know that some kinds of casescan best be tried before a judge—particularly where a defendant wishes to testify but

ally deficient performance,” see supra n.77.224. 132 S. Ct. 2 (2011).225. Citing 2254(d), the Supreme Court explained: “Doubts about whether Smith is in fact guilty are

understandable. But it is not the job of this Court, and was not that of the Ninth Circuit, to decide whetherthe State’s theory was correct. The jury decided that question, and its decision is supported by therecord.” 132 S. Ct. at 7.

226. In last year’s Preface, Shon Hopwood details other ill effects of AEDPA’s heartless regime. ShonHopwood, Preface, Failing to Fix Sentencing Mistakes: How the System of Mass Incarceration May HaveHardened the Hearts of the Federal Judiciary, 43 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. (2014).

227. For example, the Justice Department brought civil rights charges against the four LAPD officersinvolved in the brutal beating of Rodney King. See James H. Andrews, US Justice is on Trial in RodneyKing Case, CHRISTIAN SCI. Monitor (Mar. 15, 1993), http://www.csmonitor.com/1993/0315/15121.html.And while it ultimately decided not to prosecute police officer Darren Wilson for the shooting death ofMichael Brown, the Justice Department conducted an extensive investigation which culminated in a86-page report. See UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE-CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

REPORT REGARDING THE CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION INTO THE SHOOTING DEATH OF MICHAEL BROWN BY FERGUSON,MISSOURI POLICE OFFICER DARREN WILSON (Mar. 4, 2015), available at http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/documents/national/department-of-justice-report-on-the-michael-brown-shooting/1436/.

228. See supra n.198 (discussing the Justice Department’s decision not to investigate the prosecutors’misconduct in Milke).

229. See Imbler, 424 U.S. at 428 (“This Court has never suggested that the policy considerationswhich compel civil immunity for certain governmental officials also place them beyond the reach of thecriminal law. Even judges, cloaked with absolute civil immunity for centuries, could be punishedcriminally for willful deprivations of constitutional rights . . . .”).

230. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 23(a) (“If the defendant is entitled to a jury trial, the trial must be by juryunless: (1) the defendant waives a jury trial in writing; (2) the government consents; and (3) the courtapproves.”).

44 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC (2015)xlii

fears impeachment with prior misdeeds.231 The prosecution has many institutionaladvantages, not the least being that they get to go first and thus have their theory ofthe case laid out before the defendant can present any evidence at all.232 I would thinkit fair to let the defendant get the choice of judge or jury. Because the government hasno constitutional right to a jury, but the defendant does, there should be no constitu-tional impediment to such a rule.233

And while I’m at it, I’d amend Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a) (and its stateanalogues) to preclude impeachment of a criminal defendant testifying on his ownbehalf with evidence of his past criminal convictions.234 Too many defendants are putto the grim choice of either telling their side of the story and having the jury hear oftheir prior misdeeds, or standing mute and seeming to acquiesce in the prosecution’scase.235 If the defendant lies, a skilled prosecutor will trip him up on cross; there is noneed to paint him as a monster before the jury.236

6. Conduct in depth studies of exonerations. The recent spate of exonerations,especially those obtained by DNA evidence, gives us a window as to what can gowrong in our criminal justice system. It is an important database that ought to makeus doubt the supposed infallibility of our criminal justice process. But it can also be arich source of useful information about why criminal prosecutions go wrong, whypolice focus on a single innocent suspect, why prosecutors pursue cases withoutasking hard questions about whether the defendant is truly guilty and why judges andjuries are so badly misled in so many cases. This should not be a matter left toacademia, although much good work is done there now. Far better, though, if thefederal government devoted, say, the cost of one aircraft carrier to analyze and dissectthese cases and try to figure out what went wrong and what we can do better in thefuture. Thus far, the government has only made such an inquiry into a handful ofcases.237 This effort needs to be expended on a much larger scale, because even asingle wrongful conviction is one too many.

231. See Gordon Van Kessel, Adversary Excesses in the American Criminal Trial, 67 NOTRE DAME L.REV. 403, 482 (1992) (many defendants do not testify because “[t]he threat of felony convictionimpeachment can be a powerful deterrent to taking the witness stand”).

232. See supra n.43 and accompanying text (discussing the advantage of going first).233. See Adam H. Kurland, Providing a Federal Criminal Defendant with a Unilateral Right to a

Bench Trial: A Renewed Call to Amend Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 23(a), 26 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.309 (1993) (fleshing out the arguments in favor of giving the defendant a unilateral right to choosebetween a bench or jury trial).

234. See Fed. R. Evid. 609(a)(1)(B) (evidence of a criminal conviction for purposes of attacking awitness’s character for truthfulness “must be admitted in a criminal case in which the witness is adefendant, if the probative value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to that defendant”).

235. See Roselle L. Wissler & Michael J. Saks, On the Inefficacy of Limiting Instructions: When JurorsUse Prior Conviction Evidence to Decide Guilt, 9 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 37, 47 (1985) (“[T]he presentationof the defendant’s criminal record [under Rule 609] does not affect the defendant’s credibility, but doesincrease the likelihood of conviction, and the judge’s limiting instructions do not appear to correct thaterror. People’s decision processes do not employ the prior-conviction evidence in the way the law wishesthem to use it. From a legal policy viewpoint, the risk of prejudice to the defense is greater than theunrealized potential benefit to the prosecution.”).

236. Rape shield laws and Federal Rule of Evidence 412 are based on similar policy considerations.See 124 Cong. Rec. 36,256 (1978) (statement of Sen. Biden) (“The enactment of [the Privacy Protectionfor Rape Victims Act of 1978, of which Federal Rule of Evidence 412 was the centerpiece,] will eliminatethe traditional defense strategy . . . of placing the victim and her reputation on trial in lieu of thedefendant [and] end the practice . . . wherein rape victims are bullied and cross-examined about theirprior sexual experiences[, making] the trial almost as degrading as the rape itself.”).

237. The National Institute of Justice recently sponsored in-depth analyses on three high-profile legalmistakes in an effort to “tease out the sequence of factors that might have contributed to a mistake and,perhaps, lead to a more accident-proof legal system”; the study found that “[t]here was no single badactor,” with most cases involving “a series of small slip-ups that cascaded into an important mistake.” See

44 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC (2015) xliii

7. Repeal three felonies a day for three years.238 Professor Tim Wu of ColumbiaLaw School recounted a “darkly humorous game” played by Assistant U.S. Attorneysin the Southern District of New York:

[S]omeone would name a random celebrity—say, Mother Theresa or John Lennon.It would then be up to the junior prosecutors to figure out a plausible crime forwhich to indict him or her. The crimes were not usually rape, murder, or othercrimes you’d see on Law & Order but rather the incredibly broad yet obscurecrimes that populate the U.S. Code like a kind of jurisprudential minefield: Crimeslike “false statements” (a felony, up to five years), “obstructing the mails” (fiveyears), or “false pretenses on the high seas” (also five years). The trick and skill layin finding the more obscure offenses that fit the character of the celebrity and carriedthe toughest sentences.239

A big reason prosecutors have so much leverage in plea negotiations is that there aremany laws written in vague and sweeping language, inviting prosecutorial adventur-ism.240 It is thus difficult for individuals charged with a crime to know how to defendthemselves and to gauge the likelihood of being acquitted.

Even if ultimately vindicated, the process of being charged itself takes a massivetoll. Arthur Andersen, guilty of no crime according to the Supreme Court, neverthe-less was put out of business, leaving its 85,000 employees world-wide withoutjobs.241 Senator Stevens lost his Senate seat even though his prosecution was riddledwith misconduct and the Justice Department eventually dismissed all charges. Thelist of lives and businesses ruined by baseless prosecutions is long.242 And, in thewords of George Will, “as the mens rea requirement withers when the quantity andcomplexity of laws increase, the doctrine of ignorantia legis neminem excusat—ignorance of the law does not excuse—becomes problematic. The regulatory state isrendering unrealistic the presumption that a responsible citizen should be presumedto have knowledge of the law.”243 Repealing a thousand vague and over-reachinglaws and replacing them with laws that are cast narrowly to punish morally reprehen-sible conduct and give fair notice as to what is criminal may not solve the problemaltogether, but it would be a good start.

CONCLUSION

‘Nuff said.

Douglas Starr, A New Way to Reform the Judicial System, The NEW YORKER (Mar. 31, 2015), http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-root-of-the-problem.

238. Harvey Silverglate estimates that a typical American commits three felonies a day due tooverbroad laws. Silverglate, supra n.58; see Kozinski & Tseytlin, supra n.58, at 44�45 (“[M]ostAmericans are criminals and don’t know it, or suspect they are but believe they’ll never get prosecuted.”).

239. Tim Wu, American Lawbreaking, SLATE (Oct. 14, 2007), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/features/2007/american_lawbreaking/introduction.html.

240. See supra n.57 (discussing examples).241. See Andersen Died in Vain, CHI. TRIB. (Mar. 14, 2012), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-

03-14/opinion/ct-edit-andersen-20120314_1_andersen-s-professional-standards-group-andersen-case-founder-arthur-andersen.

242. See, e.g., Goyal, 629 F.3d at 922 (Kozinski, C.J., concurring) (“This case . . . has no doubtdevastated the defendant’s personal and professional life.”); POWELL, supra n.116, at 52 (“Jim Brown[,see supra n.118,] was devastated. His entire life and that of his family had been turned upside down. Nowhe was facing prison time. He was in shock.”).

243. Will, supra n.58 (citing Michael Anthony Cottone, Rethinking Presumed Knowledge of the Law inthe Regulatory Age, 82 TENN. L. REV. 137 (2014)).

44 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC (2015)xliv

TAB 4

Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities

Volume 27 | Issue 2 Article 2

2015

Scamming: The Misunderstood Confidence ManJean BraucherUniversity of Arizona, James E. Rogers College of Law

Barak OrbachUniversity of Arizona, James E. Rogers College of Law

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh

Part of the History Commons, and the Law Commons

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in YaleJournal of Law & the Humanities by an authorized administrator of Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository. For more information, pleasecontact [email protected].

Recommended CitationBraucher, Jean and Orbach, Barak (2015) "Scamming: The Misunderstood Confidence Man," Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities:Vol. 27: Iss. 2, Article 2.Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol27/iss2/2

Scamming: The MisunderstoodConfidence Man

Jean Braucher*

Barak Orbach**

"Swindling is not a crime known to our law."-Chase v. Whitlock (1842)'

"The origin of the diddle is referrable to the infancy of the HumanRace. Perhaps the first diddler was Adam."

-Edgar Allan Poe (1843)2

"One of the indigenous characters who has figured long in ourjournals, courts, and cities is the Confidence Man."

-Boston Daily Evening Transcript (1857)3

I. INTRODUCTION

Scamming-also known as the confidence game, diddling, conning, andswindling-loosely refers to schemes where the confidence man (the "conman") persuades the victim (the "mark") to trust him with her money

* The late Roger C. Henderson Professor of Law, the University of Arizona, James E. Rogers Collegeof Law.** Professor of Law and Director of the Business Law Program, the University of Arizona, James E.Rogers College of Law. Jean Braucher passed away on November 25, 2014 before this Article wascompleted. She hoped to publish the paper in the Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities. In thisinstance, all mistakes are indeed mine. The credit goes to my co-author.

1. Chase v. Whitlock, 3 Hill 139, 139 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1842).2. Edgar Allan Poe, Diddling: Considered as One of the Exact Sciences, in 4 THE COMPLETE

WORKS OF EDGAR ALLAN POE 267 (1867) [hereinafter Poe, Diddling].3. Knick, Literary, BOSTON DAILY EvE. TRANSCRIPT, Apr. 10, 1857, at 2 (reviewing Herman

Melville's The Confidence-Man: His Masquerade (1857)).

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using persuasion tricks that may include false or misleading promises. Thegame has evolved considerably over time and continues through good andbad times on both a small and large scale. The confidence game has manyforms and variants. Familiar examples include telemarketing frauds,fraudulent charities, pyramid and Ponzi schemes, work-from-homeschemes, quack medicines, home repair scams, and Nigerian scams. Asthe examples illustrate, scams often, though not always, exploit the marks'unrealistic hopes for profit, cure, and inexpensive quality.' The concept ofscamming cannot be precisely defined and outlawed. It is essentially aform of opportunism, "self-interest seeking with guile."5 The voluntaryparticipation of the victims and the challenges associated with identifyingscamming often result in skepticism toward the plausibility of scams anddemands that individuals would be responsible for the choices they make.6

Scamming, however, is a common, persistent, and costly humanactivity.7 In his seminal 1940 book, The Big Con, David Maurer explainedthe uniqueness of confidence games as crimes:

Although the confidence man is sometimes classed withprofessional thieves, pickpockets, and gamblers, he is really not athief at all because he does no actual stealing. The trusting victimliterally thrusts a fat bank roll into his hands. It is a point of pridewith him that he does not have to steal.

Confidence men are not "crooks" in the ordinary sense of theword. They are suave, slick and capable. Their depredations arevery much on the genteel side. Because of their high intelligence,their solid organization, the widespread convenience of the law,and the fact that the victim [sometimes] must admit criminalintentions if he wishes to prosecute, society has been neitherwilling nor able to avenge itself affectively [sic].8

This Article traces the intellectual origins of the confidence game. Westudy how the game was introduced to the public and explain some of itscomplexities.

In early July 1849, the New York Herald, then the most profitable andmost widely circulated newspaper in the United States, 9 published in itsPolice Intelligence column a series of four unsigned short reports about

4. See Keyes Winter, Fools and Their Money, HARPER'S MONTHLY MAG., Aug. 1, 1927, at 361.

5. OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKET AND HIERARCHIES 26 (1975).

6. See Barak Orbach, A State of Inaction: Regulatory Preferences, Rent, and Income Inequality,16 THEORETICAL INQ. 45 (2015).

7. See TAMAR FRANKEL, TRUST AND HONESTY (2006); ARTHUR ALLEN LEFF, SWINDLING ANDSELLING (1976); DAVID MAURER, THE BIG CON 313 (1940) ("Confidence games are cyclical

phenomena. They appear, rise to a peak of effectiveness, then drop into obscurity. But they have yet todisappear altogether.")

8. Id. at 1-2.9. See The Progress ofJournalism, N.Y. HERALD, Aug. 2, 1849, at 2 (bragging that "the Herald,

with an aggregate circulation of fifty-five thousand, stands at a point far beyond that of any othernewspaper. . . in this country or Europe.")

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the arrest of a swindler, purportedly known as the "Confidence Man."10

With the exception of one piece, the articles were published in the internalpages of the paper. The Herald also published a provocative editorialabout the Confidence Man, comparing him to the "real" (or "true")confidence men-Wall Street "financiers."" The swindler, SamuelThompson, was a "graduate of the college at Sing Sing" 2 and used ahighly distilled version of an old trick: he expressly asked his victims toplace confidence in him by lending him money or a watch. The Herald didnot treat the story an important one. During July 1849, the Heraldallocated considerably more space to reports about a few other swindlers,the whereabouts of Father Mathew,'3 and general matters, such as politicaland foreign affairs, the cholera outbreak in New York, the movements ofmajor steamboats, and theater reviews. The articles about the ConfidenceMan, however, drew considerable attention4 had an immediate impact onjournalism, literature, law, and culture." The Herald redefined swindlingand introduced the modern analysis of scamming. The Herald is creditedfor coining the term "confidence man" and the original report about thearrest of Thompson is still frequently cited.16

The popular account of the term "confidence man," however, istoo

10. Arrest of the Confidence Man, N.Y. HERALD, July 8, 1849, at 2 [hereinafter Arrest]; TheConfidence Man, N.Y. HERALD, July 9, 1849, at 2 [hereinafter Confidence 1]; The Confidence Man,N.Y. HERALD, July 10, 1849, at I [hereinafter Confidence 2]; Incident ofthe "Confidence Man," N.Y.HERALD, July 14, 1849, at 2 [hereinafter Incident].

11. "The Confidence Man" on a Large Scale, N.Y. HERALD, July 11, 1849, at 2 [hereinafterLarge Scale].

12. Arrest,supra note 10.13. Theobald Mathew (1790-1856), known as Father Mathew, was an influential temperance

reformer. He happened to visit New York in July 1849. See MARY FRANCIS CLARE, THE LIFE OFFATHER MATHEW 199-206 (1872) (describing the visit and the Herald's coverage).

14. See, e.g., The Confidence Man, ALEXANDRIA GAZETTE, July 16, 1849, at I (describing theConfidence Man as a news item that shares with Father Mathew, Captain McCerren [a prominentswindler], and the cholera, the public attention.")

15. See Johannes Dietrich Bergmann, The Original Confidence Man, 21 AM. Q. 560 (1969);Robert E. Mensel, "A Diddle At Brobdingnag": Confidence and Caveat Emptor During the MarketRevolution, 38 U. MEM. L. REV. 97 (2007-2008); Paul Smith, The Confidence-Man and the LiteraryWorld ofNew York, 16 NINETEENTH-CENTURY FICTION 329 (1962).

16. The arrest report states that the swindler "was recognized as an old offender by the name ofWin. Thompson." Arrest, supra note 10. Subsequent reports clarified that Thompson used manynames. We discuss his name in Part II.E. There are numerous contemporary sources that reference thisreport. See LARA LANGER COHEN, THE FABRICATION OF AMERICAN LITERATURE 170 (2012) ("Theterm 'confidence man' was originally coined by the New York Herald to describe an ingratiatinggentleman named William Thompson."); STEVE FRASER, EVERY MAN A SPECULATOR: A HISTORY OFWALL STREET IN AMERICAN LIFE 30 (2006) ("In July 1849, the New York Herald published anextraordinary article about the arrest of a local confidence man."); KAREN HALTTUNEN, CONFIDENCEMEN AND PAINTED WOMEN: A STUDY OF MIDDLE-CLASS CULTURE IN AMERICA, 1830-1870, at 6(1982) ("The term confidence man was probably first coined by the New York press in 1849 duringcoverage of the arrest of a swindler named William Thompson."); David Samuels, The ConfidenceMan, NEW YORKER, Apr. 26, 1999, at 150, 152 ("The Term 'confidence man' was purportedlyinvented by the New York Herald in 1849 to describe the activities of a petty grafter named WilliamThompson."); AMY READING, THE MARK INSIDE 25 (2012) ("It was a reporter at the Herald whocoined the name 'Confidence Man."'); H. BARBARA WEINBERG, AMERICAN STORIES: PAINTINGS OFEVERYDAY LIFE, 1765-1915, at 60 (2009) ("The term 'confidence man' was coined in 1849 todescribe the exploits of William Thompson.").

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simplistic. It is unclear why Thompson's story was so influential leavingus with the phrases "confidence game," "confidence man" and "con man."

Thompson did not contribute to his trade any new scheme nor did he

develop one.17 We show that he was a clumsy burglar and unsophisticated

swindler. Many, however, mistakenly interpreted Thompson's lack of

sophistication and boldness as genius. We argue that the popularity of the

story demonstrates and emphasizes a broad misunderstanding of the

complexity of scamming.We utilize the story of the Confidence Man in its historical context to

explain the nature of scams as the exploitation of predictable imperfect

decisions. We specifically focus on bounded rationality and other human

imperfections of both scammers and their victims, as well as the ways

scammers utilize time, information, and institutional complexity toadvance their schemes. First, our study illustrates an obvious point-individual scammers and victims are imperfect humans. The literaturesometimes offers depictions of hyper-calculated scammers and rationalconsumers. Such images cannot guide good policies. Second, we describe

the use of time in scams. Scammers often use time to sort the populationand trap vulnerable individuals. Common instruments used for this

purpose are the utilization of (1) actual or perceived time pressure, (2)uncertainty due to changes of circumstances (such as booms, busts, andvolatile conditions), and (3) cognitive impairments resulting from aging.

Third, we discuss common effects of complexity of scams on their legal

analysis. Fourth, we show that the intuitive legal requirements for

knowledge and intent to establish liability for scams are sometimes too

broad and result in poor laws and policies. Finally, we explain how scamsmay be integrated into industry standards.

Our study is fundamentally an inquiry into the abuse of trust for profit.Successful scammers-individual or institutional ones-are opportunistic

and take advantage of circumstances where the legal system does not offer

protection to trusting individuals, is vague about liability for abuse oftrust, or is not precise enough to detect abuse of trust. We explain some of

the reasons for the tendency to focus on crude scams and neglect nuanced

ones.Nobel Laureates George Akerlof and Robert Shiller observed that

"[e]conomists have a particular interpretation of the meaning of the termconfidence[, which] is nothing more ... than a prediction."'8 Theyrecognized, however, that the term has "additional shades" that include

"trust" and "full belief' and argued that "[e]conomists have only partlycaptured" those meanings.19 As a result, the common economic premise is

17. Cf READING, supra note 17, at 24, 26 ("Confidence artistry began one day in May 1849[with] a well-dressed young man named ... William Thompson.... [Thompson] conceived an entireindustry.").

18. GEORGE A. AKERLOF & ROBERT J. SHILLER, ANIMAL SPIRITS 12 (2009).

19. Id.

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that "confidence is rational: people use the information at hand to makerational predictions; they then make a rational decision based on thoserational predictions." Our normative argument is that economists are notalone and that the interpretation of confidence as a prediction is rathercommon. The misguided attribution of sophistication to the originalconfidence man illustrates the point. We discuss several othermisconceptions that follow the discounting of abuse of trust.

II. CREATING THE CONFIDENCE MAN

A. Introducing the Confidence Man to the Public

1. The Branding of an Uninspiring Swindler

Among thieves, Samuel Thompson was regarded a clumsy criminal.Many professional criminals were unwilling to work with him.20 Hestarted his criminal career in New York, where he engaged in "pocketpicking and small burglaries, but prov[ed] more audacious than adroit."21

In 1841, he and his brother were caught robbing a lace store and were sentto prison for two and a half years.22 Upon his release, Thompson moved toPhiladelphia, where the "High Constable Jim Young, [the] common patronof all nefarious genius," assigned him to work with an "old gang ofEnglish thieves."23 Thompson, however, did not "meet the expectations"of the gang and "was regularly cast out, as dangerous [for] his clumsiness,to the more proficient."24 Failing to enter the crime circle in Philadelphia,Thompson "sought a lower order of acquaintances" and pursued moremodest types of property crimes. At some point, he decided to tryswindling.25 For some time, he engaged both in swindling and"traditional" property crimes but discovered that he was more successfulin swindling. As a swindler, Thompson operated in Several large citiesand returned to New York City in late 1848. He understood the elementsof swindling but was much less sophisticated than many of hiscontemporaries. Rather than creating an impression of confidence,Thompson expressly asked for confidence. His technique utilized

20. See, e.g., The "Confidence" Man, NAT'L POLICE GAZETTE, July 28, 1849, at 2; TheConfidence Man and His Crimes, NAT'L POLICE GAZETTE, Aug. 18, 1849, at 2.

21. The "Confidence" Man, NAT'L POLICE GAzETTE, July 28, 1849, at 2.22. Id.23. Id. James Young was a robber and a thief, who became the High Constable in Philadelphia

Police, guarded by the mayor and a few local judges. He used his position to patronize crime until hisexposure by the National Police Gazette. See The Philadelphia Police, NAT'L POLICE GAZETTE, Nov.4, 1848, at 2; More Developments of Police Rascality, NAT'L POLICE GAZETTE, Nov. 18, 1848, at 4;Astounding Developments, NAT'L POLICE GAZETTE, Mar. 10, 1849, at 2; A Free Press: The New YorkPolice Gazette and Judge Parsons ofPhiladelphia, BOSTON HERALD, Mar. 19, 1849, at 3; Response ofthe Press, NAT'L POLICE GAZETTE, Mar. 29, 1849, at 3; Recovery of the Jewels, NAT'L POLICEGAZETTE, Apr. 14, 1849, at 2; Tribute from Abroad, NAT'L POLICE GAZETTE, June 23, 1849, at 2

24. The "Confidence" Man, NAT'L POLICE GAZETTE, July 28, 1849, at 2.25. Id.

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confidence without any meaningful scheme: Thompson approached hisvictims-strangers-on the street, disarmed them with a friendly chat,sometimes led them to believe that they knew him in the past, and thenasked them to place confidence in him and express their trust by lendinghim a watch or money.26 Other swindlers were using much moresophisticated forms of the game for larger scores.27

In December 1848, the New York Evening Post reported about an"accomplished swindler" who used Thompson's modus operandi:

AN ACCOMPLISHED SWINDLER recently called upon a worthyBaptist clergyman in Division Street, and after expressing hisregard and proffering any amount of pecuniary assistance whichmight be desired by the pastor, he remarked that few personswould have so much confidence in a stranger as to make such anoffer. "You," said [the swindler] to the pastor, "would not placesuch confidence in me." The pastor thought he would, and to proveit placed $30 in the stranger's hands, but his confidence met asorry return. The benevolent strangers, as if overpowered with hisemotions, stepped to the door, remarked that the pastor would hearfrom him again and vanished. He has not been heard from since.28

On Saturday, July 7, 1849, Thompson was arrested in New York.29 Oneof his victims-Hugh McDonald--recognized him on the street and calledthe police.30 The next day, the Herald published a short report announcingthe arrest of "the man ... known as the 'Confidence Man.'31 The reportbriefly summarizes Thompson's signature method that explains thesobriquet:

[H]e would go up to a perfect stranger in the street, and being aman of genteel appearance, would easily command an interview.Upon this interview he would say, after some little conversation,"have you confidence in me to trust your watch until to-morrow?"[T]he stranger. . . supposing him to be some old acquaintance, notat the moment to be recollected, allows him to take the watch, thusplacing "confidence" in the honesty of a stranger who walks offlaughing.32

The report also offers details about Hugh McDonald, the mark whoidentified Thompson. He lived on Madison Street (the lower east side ofManhattan) and gave Thompson a gold lever watch valued at $110 (about

26. See By the Pilot Line, PHIL. INQ., July 11, 1849, at 2; Trial of the Confidence Man, N.Y.HERALD, Oct. 9, 1849, at 1; The Case ofthe Confidence Man, N.Y. HERALD, Oct. 10, 1849, at 4.

27. See, e.g., LIFE AND ADVENTURES OF THE ACCOMPLISHED FORGER AND SWINDLER, COLONELMONROE EDWARDS (1848) (author unknown).

28. City Intelligence, N.Y. EVENING POST, Dec. 7, 1848, at 2.

29. See Smith v. People, I Parker Cr. Cas. 317, 317 (N.Y. 1851) (describing the arrest).

30. Arrest, supra note 10.

31. Id.32. Id.

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$3,100 adjusted to 2015 values).33 the arrest report describes Thompson asan "old offender" and notes that he had operated in the city for a fewmonths prior to his arrest. It concludes by inviting people to seeThompson in the city jail: "It will be well for all those persons who havebeen defrauded by the 'Confidence Man' to call at the [city jail, the]Tombs, and take a view of him." 34 A distinctive quality of the arrest reportis the elegant presentation of Thompson in a sketch. We discuss thesignificance of this quality later.

On Monday, July 9, 1849, the Herald reported that Thompson wasknown to use also the aliases Samuel Williams and Samuel Thomas. Onhis arrest, the police found in his possession another gold watch that wasbelieved to be stolen.35 That day (just one day after the publication of thearrest report), according to the Herald, "in consequence of the publicitygiven in the daily journals respecting. . . the arrest of the 'confidenceman' quite a numerous attendance was brought to the police office, whowere all anxious to witness a man who could so far humbug any sensibleman to trust him with a gold watch, under the pretense of establishing'confidence."' 36 The Herald's reference to "daily journals" meant theHerald itself. Other newspapers started reporting about the ConfidenceMan only on Tuesday, July 10th.3 7 Yet, the call for victims to comeforward was productive. Two additional individuals identified Thompsonas the person who duped them using the method described in the Herald.38

The New York Tribune, the Herald's primary competitor, did not report onthe arrest. Rather, at the end of a condensed report of the police activitiesduring July 9th, the Tribune noted that Hugh McDonald and twoadditional individuals "appeared at the Tombs and identified Thompsonalias Williams as being the individual that had by his winning mannerobtained their watches and money."39

On July 11, the Philadelphia Inquirer published a lengthy report aboutthe Confidence Man written by its New York correspondent.40 TheInquirer's correspondent summarized his visit at the Tombs:

[T]he celebrated "Confidence Man". . . made himself so notoriousby his successful swindling during the last eighteen months or twoyears... . As soon as it was announced that the "Confidence Man"was in durance vile, it was requested by the authorities that all who

33. Id.34. Id.35. Confidence 1, supra note 10.36. Confidence 2, supra note 10.37. See, e.g., Arrest ofthe Confidence Man, TRENTON STATE GAZETTE, July 10, 1849, at 1; The

Last Device of a Swindler, PUB. LEDGER, Jul. 12, 1849, at 2; The Last Device of a Swindler, SUN(BALTIMORE), July 13, 1849, at 1; The Last Device ofa Swindler, NEW ORLEANS DAILY PICAYUNE,Jul. 20, 1849, at 1.

38. Confidence 2, supra note 10; By the Pilot Line, supra note 28.39. Law Courts, N.Y. TRIB., July 10, 1849, at 3.40. By the Pilot Line, supra note 28.

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had been duped by him should visit the Tombs, recognize him, andmake their complaints. The result is that [the] building has beencrowded ever since, by a group of victims to confidence, and sogreat is the rush, that it is difficult matter for the magistrate to giveattention to the complaints. Indeed the scene ... [is] somewhat ...ridiculous."4 1

The Inquirer also quotes several individuals who identified Thompsonat the Tombs and described his use of confidence. The article concludesstating that there were "complaints against [Thompson] already sufficientto send him to Sing Sing for one hundred and fifty years or more."42

On Saturday, July 14th, the Herald published a forth article offeringmore details about the "notorious individual ... extensively known as the'Confidence Man."'43 Thompson, we learn, operated in Boston,Philadelphia, and New York City for two or three years before his arrestduring which he found many men "ready to place confidence in him.""The article explains that the "rogues" used the term "putting them tosleep" to describe the "confidence process" because the victims were tooashamed to report about the swindle and preferred to absorb the losses.The article explains that, through his "persuasive powers," the ConfidenceMan had the ability to influence "sensible men" to act like fools and givetheir money and valuables to a stranger. He disarmed his victims withfriendly conversations and then asked them to place confidence in him bylending him money or a watch implying that their decision reflected onpersonal morality in some way. The article emphasizes that theConfidence Man "obtain[ed] money by the confidence process" that otherswindlers used though he was particularly effective.45 It criticizes thepolice for having "quite a laugh over the cunning maneuver[s] of theConfidence Man."46

2. The Editorial: Large-Scale Confidence Men

Three days after the publication of the arrest report, on Wednesday, July11th, the Herald published an editorial, entitled "The Confidence Man " ona Large Scale.47 Like the articles, the editorial was unsigned. However,Lewis Gaylord Clark, the highly regarded editor of the literary magazineKnickerbocker "suspected" that the author was Dr. James AlexanderHouston, a celebrated reporter and one of the principal editors of theHerald. 48

41. Id.42. Id.43. Incident, supra note 10.

44. Id.45. Id.46. Id.47. Large Scale, supra note 11.48. Editor's Table, 34 KNICKERBOCKER 257, 279 (Sept. 1849). See also infra note 73 and

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The editorial opens by suggesting that its author had nothing to do withthe Confidence Man articles: "During the last week or ten days, the publichave been entertained by the police reporters with several amusingdescriptions of the transactions of a certain financial genius, who rejoicesin the soubriquet of the 'Confidence Man.' 49 The introduction of theConfidence Man to the public, however, was an accomplishment of theHerald and was about 72-hour old. The depiction of the press coverage issimilar the Herald's reference to "the publicity given in the daily journalsrespecting ... the arrest of the 'confidence man."'50 The editorial thoughrecognizes that the "Confidence Man" is "euphonious and winningdesignation."

The editorial is a satire that further develops the concept of "confidenceman." It explains that the Confidence Man, a "certain financial genius,"disarmed his victims by his appearance, tricked them with "moralsuasion,"51 and vanished with grin. Yet, despite his "genius, address, tact,and skill" he was arrested. By contrast, "true" and "real" confidence men,those who operate on a large scale-Wall Street financiers-livecomfortably in palaces and keep scamming the public:

His genius has been employed on a small scale in Broadway.Theirs has been employed in Wall Street. That's all the difference.He has obtained half a dozen watches. They have pocketed half amillion of dollars. He is a swindler. They are exemplars of honesty.He is a rogue. They are financiers. He is collared by the police.They are cherished by society. He eats the fare of a prison. Theyenjoy the luxuries of a palace. .. . Long life to the real "ConfidenceMan!"--the "Confidence Man" of Wall street-the "ConfidenceMan" of the palace up town-the "Confidence Man" who battensand fattens on the plunder coming from the poor man and the manof moderate means! As for the "Confidence Man" of "the Tombs,"he is a cheat, a humbug, a delusion, a sham, a mockery! Let himrot!52

What was the failure of the Confidence Man? "He struck too low!" 53 Heshould have breached fiduciary duties and caused others to do so, ratherthan swindling "perfect strangers":

He should have issued a flaming prospectus of another grandscheme of internal improvement. He should have entered his ownname as a stockholder, to the amount of one hundred thousanddollars. He should have called to his aid a few chosen associates.

accompanying text.49. Large Scale, supra note 11.50. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.51. Houston, a critique of religious institutions, compared the effectiveness of the Confidence

Man to that of Father Mathew who visited New York City that week. See supra note 13 andaccompanying text.

52. Large Scale, supra note 11.53. Id.

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He should have quietly got rid his stock; but on the faith of it get acontrolling share in the management of the concern. He shouldhave got all the contracts on his own terms. He should haveinvolved the company in debt, by a corrupt and profligateexpenditure of the capital subscribed in good faith by poor menand men of moderate means. He should have negotiated a loan,and taken it himself, at his own rates. He should have securedhimself by the capital of the concern. He should have run thecompany into all sorts of difficulty. He should have depreciated thestock by every means in his power. He should have brought thestockholders to bankruptcy. He should have sold out the wholeconcern, and got all into his own hands in payment of his "bonds."He should have drawn, during all the time occupied by this processof "confidence," a munificent salary; and, choosing the proper,appropriate, exact nick of time, he should have retired to a life ofvirtuous ease, the possessor of a clear conscience, and one millionof dollars!54

3. The Birth of the Confidence Man

The Herald's articles were exceptionally effective. While Thompsonwas waiting for his trial, his new public identity became a commoncurrency. He enjoyed the publicity and started presenting himself as the"Confidence Man."55 On July 23, 1849, about two weeks after thepublication of the arrest report, William E. Burton's Chambers StreetTheatre launched a new farce entitled The Confidence Man. (See Figure1.) Critics praised the show that was inspired by the story of theConfidence Man.56 The Herald declared that "[t]his little farce, thoughwritten in such a short time, and got up in such a short notice, is one of thefunniest things of the season."57 By the end of July, the National PoliceGazette started using the phrase "confidence game" to describe theswindles of the Confidence Man.58 This phrase became a term of art aswell.

Shortly after his publicized arrest, Thompson attempted to buy hisrelease on bail. His unsuccessful scheme exposed corruption at the DistrictAttorney's office and further implicated Thompson in the court of publicopinion.59 Held in the Tombs, waiting to be tried for "charges of felony of

54. Id.55. See, e.g., The Case of the Confidence Man, supra note 26 (referring to a letter from

Thompson, which he signed as the "Confidence Man.").56. See Bergmann, supra note 16, at 567-68.

57. Burton's Theatre, N.Y. HERALD, Aug. 1, 1849, at 1.

58. See The "Confidence" Man, NAT'L POLICE GAZETrE, July 28, 1849, at 2.

59. On August 9, 1849, the judge who was involved in the case, together with two police officers,published in several daily newspapers a statement arguing that the District Attorney, exercising

"illegal and dishonorable conduct," endorsed the "notorious 'Confidence Man' No. I" and the two areallies. See The Administration ofJustice, N.Y. HERALD, Aug. 10, 1849, at 2. See The "Confidence"Man, NAT'L POLICE GAZETrE, July 28, 1849, at 2.

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a serious character,"60 Thompson persuaded one of the prison guards toserve as his "secret agent" and deliver him funds and valuables to"purchase ... bail and to corrupt the authorities."' Being able to pay,Thompson bribed some of the prison guards "to regard him as a man to berespected."62 He further "gained the confidence of. . . the AssistantDistrict Attorney, and induced him to get up on a Sunday morning and godown to the Tombs to let him out on straw bail [and] he even won theconfidence of... the District Attorney himself and induced him not onlyto believe all that he said, but to endorse it for truth, and to direct itspublication in the public print."6 He also arranged for one of hisassociates to pay the bail and have him released.64 During the bail hearing,on July 29, Thompson unwisely talked about a burglary in Philadelphiathat he committed disclosing his source of funding and accomplices. Thus,upon release on bail he was immediately rearrested and the DistrictAttorney faced harsh public criticism. 65 Summarizing the incident, theHerald insisted that Thompson was a "modem genius of persuasion,though the Herald recognized that Thompson returned to jail because heplaced "too much confidence in persons who professed to be his friends[and swindled him]." 66 The Herald also recognized that Thompson'sunsuccessful attempt to buy his release on bail caused him "infinite harmin the eyes of the public, going to show conclusively that he was afraid tomeet the charges standing against him." 67 The District Attorney, whosereputation was questioned for the events, later prosecuted Thompson andhad incentives to appear tough.

During the summer of 1849, New York newspapers publishedcommentaries exploring the meaning of the concept "confidence man." InAugust 1849, the National Police Gazette described the contrast betweenThompson's new public identity as an accomplished thief and a "supremeswindler" and his actual profile of a fool:

The Confidence Man is fulfilling a greater destiny than even he, inthe vastness of his self-complacency ever expected for himself.Previous of his recent incarceration[,] .. . he was satisfied to beregarded among his associates, as an adroit thief, and supremeswindler, but now he claims to be considered as a great man in theeyes of the world ....

For all [he accomplished], the Confidence Man has a right to

60. Corruption ofAuthority, NAT'L POLICE GAZETTE, Aug. 4, 1849, at 2.

61. Id.62. Id.63. The Confidence Man and His Crimes, NAT'L POLICE GAZETTE, Aug. 18, 1849, at 2.

64. Id.; see also Smith v. People, I Parker Cr. Cas. 317 (N.Y. 1851) (discussing the legality of thebail); Confidence Business, NAT'L POLICE GAZETTE, Aug. 11, 1849, at 2 (reporting about the bailhearing); The Confidence Man, SPECTATOR, Aug. 9, 1849, at I (reporting about the bail hearing).

65. Confidence Men Bailed, N.Y. HERALD, July 30, 1849, at 2.66. Confidence Man, N.Y. HERALD, Aug. 3. 1849, at 3.67. Id.

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consider himself "some," and were it not for the drawback ofreputation derived from the overthrow of fools, we should regardhim as "some," too. But the Confidence Man is a fool like thosewhom he has been playing with, and like all fools, is destined to bestrangled by his own folly.... He will be well known by [the] title[Confidence Man].68

On August 18, the Literary World reprinted an editorial from theMerchants ' Ledger assessing the effectiveness of confidence games.69 Thecomments preceding the reprint described the Confidence Man as "thenew species of the Jeremy Diddler [and] a subject of police fingering,[who was] . . . impressed into the service of Burton's Comicalities in

Chambers Street."7 0 The Ledger editorial observes that, in every socialcircle, confidence men, such as the "confidence man of politics" and"confidence man of merchandise," are rather common.71 It then arguesthat

"[i]t is a good thing, and speaks well for human nature, that, ... inspite of all the hardening of civilization and all the warning ofnewspapers, men can be swindled. The man who is always on hisguard, always proof against appeal, who cannot be beguiled intothe weakness of pity by any story-is far gone, ... toward beinghimself a hardened villain." 72

In a similar spirit, a month later, Lewis Gaylord Clark, the editor of theliterary magazine Knickerbocker wrote:

One of the good effects resulting from the arrest of the'Confidence Man' was an article in the 'Herald' daily journal,from the pen, we suspect of Dr. Houston, the accomplishedcongressional reporter, upon 'The Confidence-Man of Society.' Itwas a masterly, trenchant satire, as true as it was keen; but for itslength, and for the fact that it has already been widely circulated,we should have transferred it entire to these pages.73

Thompson's trial was held on October 8 and 9, 1849, three months afterhis arrest.74 The prosecution based its case on the testimony of HughMcDonald, the victim who led to Thompson's arrest. McDonald told thejury that Thompson actually "snatched" his watch leaving him"thunderstruck" and not understanding how "a man who was so much myfriend ... [would] steal my watch."75 He also told the jury about anattempt to bribe him not to testify against Thompson.76 The defense tried

68. The Confidence Man and His Crimes, supra note 59.

69. What Is TalkedAbout, LIT. WORLD, Aug. 18, 1849, at 132, 133.

70. Id. For Jeremy Diddler, see infra notes 106-110 and accompanying text; and infra Part I.F.

71. Id.72. Id.73. Editor's Table, 34 KNICKERBOCKER 257, 279 (1849).74. Trial ofthe Confidence Man, supra note 26; The Case ofthe Confidence Man, supra note 26.

75. Trial ofthe Confidence Man, supra note 26.

76. The Case ofthe Confidence Man, supra note 26.

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to establish the argument that no theft was committed because there wasconsent to give the watch.77 One of Thompson's associates testified that,immediately after Thompson swindled McDonald, he warned McDonaldabout the swindle and advised him to follow Thompson but his advice wasrudely rejected.78 The witness did not have much credibility and probablyeven harmed Thompson since he mentioned that Thompson swindled himthe first time they met and then asked for feedback.79 The jury delivered aguilty verdict from their seats.80 Thompson was sentenced for two yearsand six months in prison.

4. Was Thompson a Notorious Scammer Prior to His Arrest?

Thompson had misleading appearance and certain persuasion skills. Heprobably obtained watches and money from people who did not comeforward and from people in New York and other cities. Overall, however,there were only "six complaints [that Thompson] obtain[ed] money andwatches, by false pretense, from different individuals in [New YorkCity]." 8 He was indicted for two counts of alleged grand larceny inconnection of two incidents of obtaining gold watches through his swindlebut was tried only for swindling the individual who led to his arrest.82 Forthe nineteenth century, Thompson was an unsuccessful small-time streetswindler who did not accomplish much other than publicity. Thechronology below his rise to stardom.

By and large, Thompson has mostly been understood as some kind of a"genius operator." In his classic article, The Original Confidence Man,Johannes Bergmann explained that "[w]hat is noteworthy aboutThompson's swindle is not just his rather astonishing ability to condenseall the steps of the usual confidence game into a brief exchange but alsothat his game provides a strikingly clear illustration of just what aconfidence game is." 8 3 While Thompson's story is illustrative, it isimportant to recognize that his skills as a swindler were limited and, infact, journalists in several newspapers used his limitations to developsocial critique.

Together, the Herald's articles present a sophisticated analysis ofscamming: First, the articles conceptualize the confidence game andintroduce a new term-"confidence man." Second, the articles illustratethat the confidence game erodes trust in society because the victims areshamed as fools and the villain is admired. Third, the articles stress the

77. Id.78. Id.79. Id.80. Id.81. Confidence Men Bailed, N.Y. HERALD, July 30, 1849, at 2.82. The Confidence Man, N.Y. HERALD, Aug. 9, 1849, at 1.83. Bergmann, supra note 15, at 562.

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tension created in modem society where people often trust "strangers."Fourth, the articles emphasize that both scammers and their victims mayact like fools. Fifth, the articles, primarily the editorial, criticize the waysociety perceives and treats scammers. Sixth, the articles reflect the viewthat, in addition to the benefit of their scores, swindlers enjoy the harmthey impose on their marks.

B. Meaning and Context

Three core aspects in the story of the Confidence Man cannot beproperly appreciated outside their historical context: (1) concerns andanxieties regarding strangers, (2) economic circumstances that influencedperceptions and decisionmaking during the first half of the nineteenthcentury, and (3) the use of sketches during the era.

1. The Confidence Man as Stranger

The Confidence Man was arrested during an era of concerns andanxieties regarding interactions with strangers.84 Social and technologicalchanges situated many individuals as inexperienced in their environmentscompared to others, leaving them vulnerable to scams. Specifically, peoplein rural areas were "strangers" in the city and "strangers" visitedcommunities that were not familiar with confidence games.

An example for a typical swindle that fed the fears of strangers is thestory of Hagerstown, Maryland. In July 1817, while an economicdepression was burdening the country, a swindler named Jonathan Parkscame to Hagerstown and "completely enlisted the confidence of some of[the] citizens," for talking effectively "against drunkenness, profaneswearing, Sabbath breaking, etc."85 Then, "[a]fter enlisting the confidence

and good wishes of many of [the town's] citizens,. .. he commenced theexhibition of an optical show, by which he ... amassed a considerablesum of money, [as] many persons contributed liberally under theimpression that he was really ... an honest man-laboring for the good ofhis fellow men."86 William D. Bell, the editor of the local paper, theHagers Town [sic] Torch Light and Public Advertiser, tried to track downParks by asking "every editor in the United States" to print ads calling forinformation about Parks and demanding Parks to turn himself in. (SeeFigure 2.) Since Parks did not turn himself in, Bell distributed a warningthat numerous newspapers printed, describing the events in Hagerstownand informing the public that any person "who reposes confidence in

84. See HALTTUNEN, supra note 16 (studying the concerns regarding confidence men and painted

women).

85. The quotes are taken from a warning, entitled "To the People of the United States. Beware of

a Swindler!!!," which numerous newspapers published in February and March 1818. The warningdescribes the events of July 1817.

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[Parks would] find that such restraint is but [a] feeble barrier against theduplicity of an accomplished swindler."8 7 Park's swindle and its depictionby the local newspaper were quite common and illustrate that Thompson'suse of confidence was neither innovative nor impressive.

The frequent reports about unfortunate interactions with strangersinspired a new writing genre in the early nineteenth century. The press andindependent authors emphasized and amplified the concerns, through"advice" for inexperienced individuals, mostly those who moved to thecity.88 For example, newspapers and periodicals frequently printed theessay How to be Rich, advising: "Trust no man upon appearances-theyare deceptive ... . Beware of a gaudy exterior. Rogues usually dress well.The rich are plain men.... Trust no stranger.... No, is a very usefulword-be not afraid to use it."89 William Alcott's exceptionally popularYoung Man's Guide included a chapter, entitled How to Know With Whomto Deal.90 The chapter attempts to reconcile two "common-life""maxims": "Use every precaution with a stranger, that you would wishyou had done, should he turn out to be a villain," and "Treat every man asan honest man, until he proves to be otherwise."91 Alcott advised theinexperienced man that it "will be your wisdom ... to be cautious of ...those who are very talkative, and who, in dealing with you, endeavor todraw off your attention from the point in hand by incoherent or randomexpressions."92 Edward Martin's 1868 The Secrets of the Great City is "asimple narration of actual facts. It is designed to warn the thousands whovisit the city [the "strangers"] against the dangers and pitfalls into whichtheir curiosity or vice may lead them, and it is hoped that those who readthe book will heed its warnings."93 The book describes common swindles.John Todd's The Young Man spells out the concerns: "The moment theinexperienced youth sets his foot on the side-walk of the city, he is markedand watched by eyes that he never dreamed of." 9 4 In the same spirit, WaltWhitman in an essay for Life Illustrated advised inexperienced individualshow to cope with urban swindlers and observed that "[e]very great city isa sort of countryman-trap." 95

In her study of the genre, cultural historian Karen Halttunen explainsthat "[d]uring the first half of the nineteenth century, unprecedentednumbers of young men were leaving their rural homes and families to seekwork in the booming cities of industrializing America."9 6 Social change,

87. Id.88. Id.89. How to Be Rich, NEW ENG. FARMER, Oct. 23, 1829, at 112 (anonymous author).90. WILLIAM A. ALCOTT, THE YOUNG MAN'S GUIDE 133 (20th ed. 1849).91. Id.92. Id. at 134.93. EDWARD WINSLOW MARTIN, THE SECRETS OF THE GREAT CITY 15-16 (1868).94. JOHN TODD, THE YOUNG MAN: HINTS ADDRESSED TO THE YOUNG MEN 122 (1845).95. Walt Whitman, Advice to Strangers, LIFE ILLUSTRATED, Aug. 23, 1856, at 133.96. HALTFUNEN, supra note 16, at 1.

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Halttunen shows, alarmed "middle-class moralists" and triggered massiveamounts of writing about "manners, morals, personal appearance, [and]mental development."97 During that era, the confidence game was "asymbolic expression of deep[] fears about the direction of AmericanSociety."98

It was the prominence of these fears that contributed to the interest inthe Confidence Man.99 The Herald emphasized the Confidence Man'sability to engage "perfect strangers" and make them believe that the hewas "some old acquaintance, not at the moment to be recollected."00 Thistalent epitomized the fear of strangers.

2. Confidence in Booms, Busts, and Volatile Times

The era of the Confidence Man was challenging for most people in theUnited States. During the first half of the nineteenth century, the U.S.economy underwent twelve recessions, including two depressions.'0 Suchnegative economic conditions considerably impact the lives ofindividuals,102 though the effects are sometimes underappreciated.103

Stripped of wealth, assets, and economic opportunities, manycontemporaries of the Confidence Man had to find new ways to make endsmeet. One consequence of the needed adjustments was social mobility thatturned many into "strangers" in new environments. Another consequenceof the frequent booms, busts, and volatile economic conditions was thedegradation of decision-making capacity resulting from exposure to new

97. Id.98. Id. at 10.99. See Samuels, supra note 16, at 153 ("The widespread fear of impostors was . . . a symptom of

deeper anxieties, provoked by America's unrivalled social mobility.").100. Arrest, supra note 10.

101. The National Bureau of Economic Research's (NBER) chronology of business cyclesprovides the following recessions: (1) 1802-1804, (2) 1807-1810 (depression), (3) 1812 (two quarters),(4) 1815-1821 (depression), (5) 1822-1823, (6) 1825-1826, (7) 1828-1829, (8) 1833-1834, (9) 1836-1838, (10) 1839-1843, (11) 1845-1846, and (12) 1847-1848. The available data for this period,including the economic indicators used to establish this chronology, is limited. Several studies suggestthat the periods of decline in trade and economic activity were shorter. However, this debate is mostlyabout the details. See, e.g., Joseph H. Davis, An Improved Annual Chronology of U.S. Business Cycles

since the 1790s, 66 J. ECON. HIST. 103, 106 (2006); see also OT7o C. LIGHTNER, THE HISTORY OF

BUSINESS DEPRESSIONS (1922) (describing six "business depressions" and recognizing threeadditional "minor depressions.").

102. See, e.g., Anne Case et al., The Lasting Impact of Childhood Health and Circumstance, 24 J.HEALTH ECON. 365 (2005); Philip Oreopoulos, The Short- and Long-Term Career Effects ofGraduating in a Recession, 4 AM. ECON. J.: APPLIED ECON. 1 (2012) (finding that the cost of

recessions for new graduates is substantial and unequal across graduates); Gerard J. van den Berg et

al., Economic Conditions Early in Life and Individual Mortality, 96 AM. ECON. REV. 290 (2006)(finding a significant negative effect of recessions in early life on mortality rates).

103. A series of influential papers by Christopher Ruhm documents that recessions are "good foryour health." See Christopher J. Ruhm, Are Recessions Good for Your Health?, 115 Q. J. ECON. 617

(2000); Christopher J. Ruhm, Good Times Make You Sick, 22 J. HEALTH ECON. 637 (2003);Christopher J. Ruhm, Healthy Living in Hard Times, 24 J. HEALTH ECON. 341 (2005). The findings ofthese papers and their progeny are frequently interpreted by scholars as resulting from the betteropportunities to exercise and maintain a healthy diet that a person has while unemployed.

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circumstances and uncertainty.104 The situations of strangers inenvironments where people tend to make mistakes created scammingopportunities.

The adverse effects of economic conditions on the quality of decision-making capacity partially explains why swindlers, like the Thompson,often succeed in manipulating relatively sensible individuals.

3. The Conceptualization of Crime

The Herald used the exploits of an actual swindler to conceptualize"confidence men." Such conceptualization was not entirely innovative.Sketches were very popular during the nineteenth century.10 During the1840s (and probably also before), a few sketches of swindlers had impacton popular culture. Jeremy Diddler, Peter Funk, and David Hines are themost known predecessors of Thompson, though not the only ones.

"Jeremy Diddler," the protagonist of a popular 1803 farce,06 became aterm used for swindlers. It inspired Edgar Allan Poe's 1843 essay,Diddling: Considered as One of the Exact Sciences ("Diddling"), whichpopularized the character and its use as a metaphor.10 7 Indeed, the LiteraryWorld described the Confidence Man as a "new species of the JeremyDiddler." 08 Poe argued that Diddler "gave name to the most important ofthe Exact Sciences."09 However, it was Poe's essay that turned Diddlerand diddling into common currencies used in everyday language."l0 Asexplained below, the Herald's editorial clearly builds on Poe's Diddling.

"Peter Funk" was a fictional character whose name meant a mockauctioneer-a person who inflates auction prices.I" The scheme was verycommon during the nineteenth century.12 Asa Greene is credited forcreating the character for his 1834 satire, The Perils of Pearl Street."3

However, a 1848 sketch of Walt Whitman, Peter Funk, Esq., appears to

104. Nicholas Bloom, Fluctuations in Uncertainty, 28 J. ECON. PERSP. 153 (2014); (Nearly)Nothing to Fear but Fear Itself, ECONOMIST, Jan. 29, 2009, at 84. See generally DANIEL KAHNEMAN,THINKING, FAST AND SLOw (2011) (discussing decision-making under uncertainty).

105. For sketches during the nineteenth century, see DANA BRAND, THE SPECTATOR AND THEClTY IN NtNETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICAN LITERATURE (1991); KRISTIE HAMILTON, AMERICA'SSKETCHBOOK: THE CULTURAL LIFE OF A NINETEENTH-CENTURY LITERARY GENRE (1998); andThomas H. Pauly, The Literary Sketch in Nineteenth-Century America, 17 TEX. STUD. LIT &LANGUAGE 489 (1975).

106. JAMES KENNEY, RAISING THE WIND (1803).107. See POE, supra note 2; Burton R. Pollin, Poe's "Diddling ": The Source of the Title and Tale,

2 S. LITERARY J. 106 (1969); infra Part II.E.108. What Is Talked About, supra note 69, and accompanying text.109. POE, supra note 2, at 267.110. Pollin, supra note 107.111. Louise Pound, "Peter Funk:" The Pedigree of Westernism, 4 AM. SPEECH 183 (1929).112. See, e.g., Harry Branco, Peter Funk's Revenge, 27 KNICKERBOCKER 58 (1846); Mock

Auctions and Inventions, SCI. AM., Aug. 16, 1951, at 381 (explaining the nature of "Peter Funkshops"); Peter Funk's Little Game, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 14, 1872, at 4; see also MARTIN, supra note 93, at540-43.

113. ASA GREENE, THE PERILS OF PEARL STREET 50-54 (1834) (describing Peter Funk).

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suggest that Greene used an already existing term whose sources wereunknown.1 14 Whitman, a contemporary of Greene, opens the sketchwriting that "Funk, like all other illustrious personages who have becomeso well known,. . . was born and brought up no one knows where."'15 Heconcludes by expressing skepticism of the validity of the speculationsregarding his origins.'16 Peter Funks dominated the auction scene in NewYork City during the era of the Confidence Man.' 17

Finally, Dr. David Theodosius Hines, also known as Colonel DorsetHamilton or simply the "notorious Dr. Hines," was a colorful swindler,who operated between 1831 and 1864, primarily in the South."8 Hineswas born (apparently in 1810) to a "highly respectable family" in SouthCarolina that was "most popular and prosperous" in his childhood but lostits fortune.119 He used numerous aliases and was known as a "bigamist,'nigger thief,' swindler, and a confidence man." 20 Hines loved publicity,often provided information to newspaper editors, and occasionally alsogave public lectures. He "pursued his villainous career with morepersistency than success"'21 and enjoyed a certain degree of stardom even

among law enforcement officers. His "rascally propensities in the way ofswindling unwary tradesmen and abusing the confidence of unsuspectingfemales" were widely known and fascinated the public.122 In August 1840,he was arrested in Louisiana, convicted for slave stealing, and sentencedto fourteen years in prison.123 In July 1852, Louisiana Governor JosephMarshall Walker pardoned him.124 Shortly before his 1940 arrest andimmediately after his release, Hines published autobiographies written asletters from prison to the Herald publisher, James Gordon Bennett.12 5 By1849, when the Confidence Man was arrested, the 1840 autobiography

114. Walt Whitman, Peter Funk, Esq., NEW ORLEANS DAILY CRESCENT, March 13, 1848, at 1.

115. Id.116. Id.117. See, e.g., New York in Slices: The Mock Auctions, N.Y. TRIB., Aug. 10, 1848, at 1 ("Let all

strangers remember, once and for all, that there is establishment in the City where real watches and

valuable jewelry are sold at auction."). The article was part of a series of articles about schemes in thecity, later published in GEORGE G. FOSTER, NEW YORK IN SLICES: BY AN EXPERIENCED CARVER 33

(1849).118. See A Proclamation, CHARLESTON CITY GAZETTE, May 19, 1831, at I (declaring a $300

reward for the apprehension and delivery of Hines); David T. Hines, CHARLESTON COURIER, Nov. 18,

1939, at 2 (reporting about the apprehension of Hines); Incidents in the Life of David Hines, CAMDENJ., June 20, 1840, at 2 (providing the known biography of Hines); Doctor David Theodosius Hines,NEW ORLEANS DAILY PICAYUNE, Sept. 1, 1840, at 2;

119. DAVID T. HINES, THE LIFE, ADVENTURES & OPINIONS OF DAVID THEO. HINES (1840) 21-22

[hereinafter LIFE, ADVENTURES & OPINIONS].

120. Dr. Hines, Alias Col. Hamilton, Turned Up, LOUISVILLE DAILY COURIER, June 13, 1859, at

1.121. Dr. Hines, Alias Col. Hamilton, Turned Up, supra note 120.

122. Dr. Hines "Turned Up"Again, BATON ROUGE DAILY ADVOCATE, June 14, 1859, at 2.

123. Dr. Hines, PHIL. INQ., June. 22, 1840, at 2 (summarizing the reports about Hines arrest);Doctor David Theodosius Hines, supra note 118 (referring to the sentencing).

124. The Celebrated Dr. Hines, BATON-ROUGE GAZETTE, Feb. 21, 1852, at 2.

125. LIFE, ADVENTURES & OPINIONS, supra note 119; DAVID T. HINES, LIFE AND ADVENTURES

OF DR. DAVID T. HINES (1852) [hereinafter LIFE AND ADVENTURES].

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was well known, especially to people close to Bennett. The book recountsthe rise to greatness of a swindler. Being famous, Hines writes: "I supposemy life, or a part of it, is published by this time. I know it will sell likemint juleps."l26 The publication of his letters in the Herald would "honor[Bennett's] disinterestedness."2 7 Hines even brags that "even the widecirculation of the Herald will not place my narrative within the reach ofevery city and hamlet which witnessed my performance."1 2 8 He claimsthat "[t]he spirit of prophecy is upon" him and that, taking into account thedirection of society, the value of his skills is on the rise: "If there ever wasan era especially favorable to the exercise of my peculiar talents, it isthis." 29 His prophecy depicts a decaying society. He "take[s] it forgranted[] that, before many days, the laws will give [a person] a carteblanche to blow on whom [he] please[s],... and afford [him] an equalprivilege of showing how excellently [he] can write ... the signatures of[his] neighbors."130 The book reads like a clever satire and some havequestioned whether Hines himself wrote it. It is undisputed though that thebook established Hines's image as a notorious swindler. It was aneffective platform for using the story of a swindler to deliver ideas andopinions to the public.

Hines's career after 1852 is somewhat related to our analysis. Uponrelease from prison, Hines told journalists that "in his youthful years hehad erred,"131 but he returned to swindling quickly.132 His 1852autobiography rationalizes his choices and conduct. It even argues thatHines had a passionate affaire with Ellen Jewett,133 the New Yorkprostitute whose murder and murder trial shook the nation in 1836.134Hines dismisses accusations against the alleged murderer, RichardRobertson, writing that "Robertson was tried for the deed, but my mindpointed to a person in New York, more popular in life than Robertson."'3

Bennett played a key role in the coverage of the murder trial. A fewmonths after his release from prison, in November 1852, Hines wasconvicted of stealing mail and was sentenced to six months imprisonmentwith hard labor and required to pay a $100 fine and prosecution costs.Unable to pay the fine and costs, he remained in prison for another two

126. Id. at 193.127. Id. at 193-94.128. Id. at 194.129. LIFE, ADVENTURES & OPINIONS, supra note 125, at 19.130. Id.at20.131. The Celebrated Dr. Hines, supra note 124.132. Mr. David T. Hines and His Old Pranks, RICHMOND ENQUIRER, Apr. 7, 1852, at 6; Dr.

Hines, WOODVILLE REPUBLICAN, May 27, I852, at 1.133. LIFE AND ADVENTURES, supra note 125, at 47-50.134. See SKETCH OF THE LIFE OF Miss ELLEN JEWETr (1836); PATRICIA CLINE COHEN, THE

MURDER OF HELEN JEWETT (2006). Cohen does not mention Hines in her otherwise excellent book.135. LIFE AND ADVENTURES, supra note 125, at 50.

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months until President Franklin Pierce pardoned him.136 He continuedcommitting petty crimes, going in and out of prison until his death in1864.

C. Dr. James Alexander Houston

1. The Biography of a Forgotten Genius

In his article, The Original Confidence Man, Johannes Bergmanninterpreted the Knickerbocker's reference to "Dr. Houston." He wrote:"George Houston was a close associate of James Gordon Bennett from thefounding of the Herald until Houston's death in 1849, some time after thesatire was published." 37 This is the most elaborate discussion of theperson behind the Confidence Man that we could locate. It is rather partialand imprecise. We now correct the record.

James Alexander Houston was born in Ireland in 1819, immigrated toAmerica in 1839, and died in 1849. (See Figure 3.) He gained thereputation of a "celebrity" reporter for his work as the first SenateReporter.138 When Houston died on September 17, 1849, he was known as"one of the principal contributors of the columns of the New YorkHerald."1 39 The Herald's obituary stated that "[flor talent and ability,either as reporter or editor, [Dr. Houston] had few equals and no superior."140

Houston died unexpectedly shortly before Tompson's trial. The directcause of death was "hamorrhagia from the lungs,"l41 a term that was usedto describe any form of bleeding into the lungs that could arise frommyriad causes. He was not a healthy person and apparently suffered fromdepression. Physicians used terms like "nervous," "excitable, "irritable,"and "depression" to describe his mental health. 142

Thompson was a close friend of the Herald's publisher, James GordonBennett, whom he met shortly after his arrival in America.143 Houston'seditorials and articles for the Herald were unsigned, but he also served asthe editor of the New York Lancet, which he founded with Bennett, servedas a congressional reporter for the Washington Union, wrote satiricalcolumns and commentaries for the abolitionist newspaper the NationalEra, published and edited the United States Reporter, and occasionally

136. U.S. Marshal-Release of "Dr." Hines, CHARLESTON COURIER, July 15, 1853, at 2.

137. Bergmann, supra note 15, at 566.138. Dr. Houston 's Senate Reports, SUN (BALTIMORE), Dec. 17, 1847, at 2.

139. Death of Dr. James A. Houston, 41 BOSTON MED. & SURG. J. 162 (1849).

140. Death ofDr. Houston, N.Y. HERALD, Sept. 18, 1849, at 2.

141. Harmorrhagia from the Lungs, supra note 146.

142. Death of Dr. Houston, supra note 140; Hcemorrhagia from the Lungs, Id. at 315-16.

143. See, e.g., James Smith the Younger, New York Letter, NEW ERA, June 17, 1847, at I (writingabout Bennett).

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wrote letters to the editors of leading newspapers and periodicals.144Houston was a prolific and passionate intellectual and was admired by hispeers, as well as in literary and medical circles.

Upon his death, the New York Press Club adopted a special resolutionpraising Houston for being a leader in the profession.145 The BostonMedical and Surgical Journal, the predecessor of the New EnglandJournal of Medicine, published a lengthy obituary and a detailed report ofhis post-mortem examination.'46 The Knickerbocker's editor, LewisGaylord Clark, wrote in his Editor's Table:

We deeply regret to record the death of Dr. Houston, theaccomplished congressional reporter, and late one of the assistanteditors of the 'Herald' daily journal. It seems but yesterday that hewas sitting by our side in the sanctum. He was a gentleman ofeducation and refinement, and of rare talents .. . [H]is reputation iswithout stain. He will be widely lamented.147

The National Era wrote that Dr. Houston "was well known throughoutthe United States as an accomplished reporter, and his contributions to thepress indicated a mind of rich endowments, capable of signalachievements in literature, had his time been less occupied with his dutiesas a professional reporter."l48 Many other daily newspapers publishedshort obituaries describing Houston as "the famous reporter and one of theprincipal editors of the Herald." 49

Houston was thus an exceptionally gifted individual, a celebratedreporter and a senior editor at the Herald when the articles about theConfidence Man were published. His columns for the National Era,published under the pseudonym "John Smith the Younger," illustrate someof his talents. Houston wrote for the National Era satirical columns,typically organized in series, as well as commentaries. His favorite themeswere politics, sketches of political characters, social decay, morality,journalism, and literature. His most popular series of sketches, Portraitsfor the People, was "very extensively read, and much admired."50 Thesesketches conceptualized political characters through satirical stories. Forexample, he described the "extraordinary operations" of the "Man whoPulls the Ropes," who "makes his influence felt," "rewards disloyalty withgifts, clothing falsehood with honor and dignity; and, .. . comes upon the

144. See, e.g., James A. Houston, Dr. Castle's Case of Epilepsy, 37 BOSTON MED. & SURG. J. 279(1847).

145. James Alexander Houston, supra note 139, at 149; Monument to the Memory of the Late Dr.James A. Houston, BOSTON HERALD, Oct. 9, 1849, at 4 (providing the language of the resolution).

146. Death of Dr. James A. Houston, supra note 139; A. C. Castle, Hamorrhagia from the Lungs:Treatment, Death, and Post-Mortem Examination in the Case of the Late Dr. James E. Houston, 41BOSTON MED. & SURG. J. 314 (1849).

147. Editor's Table, 34 KNICKERBOCKER 355, 364 (1849).148. Dr. Houston, NATIONAL ERA, Oct., 4, 1849, at 2.

149. See, e.g., City Intelligence, BROOKLYN DAILY EAGLE, Sept. 18, 1848, at 1.150. Dr. Houston, supra note 148.

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poor official like an armed man."'15 The conceptualization of theConfidence Man in its style and language is remarkably similar toHouston's sketches.

Some of the images, metaphors, and ideas that Houston used for hiscriticism of social decay also appeared in the Herald's editorial about theConfidence Man.152 He portrayed bankers as "operators," described the"palaces" they lived in with their wives and daughters, and criticized theirmorality.153 His fictional banker, Christian Shylock, was a confidence manand offered "[t]he security of the word of an honest man" when he took aloan, but was unwilling to accept such a security when he was asked toextend a loan.154 Reading Houston's columns in the National Era leaveslittle doubt that he also wrote the Herald's editorial. ConsideringHouston's broad recognition, the Knickerbocker's editor probably knew,not merely "suspected," that the author of "The Confidence-Man ofSociety" was Dr. Houston.155

Houston also frequently wrote book reviews for the National Era. InMay 1847, the New Era published a lengthy and positive review ofOmoo,15 6 Herman Melville's second book. Additionally, Houston in hiscolumn, Literary Gossip, wrote that the book had "met with a very rapidsuccess." 57 He praised the book, although commented that "it is not equal

to Typee," Melville's first book, and added that, in his opinion, Melvillestood "in the very first rank of American writers . . . [and] writes

powerfully and well."'58 Much of the research about the "originalconfidence man" focused on the inspiration of Melville's novel TheConfidence-Man: His Masquerade.159 These studies find great similaritybetween the story of the Confidence Man and a character in Melville'sbook. They also show that Melville was in New York City "during theentire episode of the 'Confidence Man' affair" 60 and argue that he musthave been aware of Thompson's story. All these conclusions are wellestablished. Houston's book review, however, received no attention.161 Itis quite clear that, during the summer of 1849 while Melville was in NewYork, people in literary circles paid attention to the coverage of the

151. James Smith the Younger, The "Man Who Pulls the Ropes," NEw ERA, Feb. 25, 1847, at 1.

152. See supra Section II.A.2.153. See, e.g., James Smith the Younger, The Financial Circles, NEW ERA, Sept. 20, 1847, at 3;

James Smith the Younger, Rambling Epistles From New York, NATIONAL ERA, Oct. 12, 1848, at 1.

154. The Financial Circles, id.155. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. For Clark and his influence, see T. B. Thorpe,

Lewis Gaylord Clark, HARPER'S NEW MONTHLY MAG., Mar. 1874, at 587.

156. Adventures in the South See, NEW ERA, May 27, 1849, at 2.

157. John Smith the Younger, Literary Gossip, NEw ERA, May 27, 1849, at 3.158. John Smith the Younger, Literary Gossip, NEW ERA, May 27, 1849, at 3.159. See, e.g., Bergmann, supra note 15; Michael S. Reynolds, The Prototype for Melville's

Confidence-Man, 86 PMLA 1009 (1971); Smith, supra note 15.160. Reynolds, supra note 156, at 1010.161. See, e.g., ROBERT K. WALLACE, DOUGLASS AND MELVILLE: ANCHORED TOGETHER IN

NEIGHBORLY STYLE 69 (2005) (noting that Houston's review was overlooked by Melville scholars).

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Confidence Man. It is also quite clear that the story of the Confidence Manwas rather known for another decade or so. Melville was undoubtedlyaware of Houston's book review. We submit that, like other people inliterary circles, Melville knew or at least suspected that Houston was theauthor of "The Confidence-Man ofSociety."

We could not locate conclusive evidence showing that Houston wrotethe Herald articles or that one person wrote all the articles. Our inquiry,however, leads to the conclusion that Houston wrote the editorial andprobably wrote the other articles. Specifically, the conceptualization of theConfidence Man in the arrest report appears like one of Houston'ssketches.

2. Potentially Relevant Anecdotes

Houston was an extraordinary person in many ways. We provide threeadditional anecdotes related to his life and personality to demonstrate hiscapacity and possible thinking about scamming.

An Alleged Impostor. In 1894, the Phonographic Magazine published ashort biography of Houston stating that Houston was "a student ofmedicine at Glasgow University, Scotland, and ... graduated therefromwith the degree of Doctor of Medicine." 62 Yet, though he used the title,Houston was not a doctor. The members of the medical establishment inNew York accused Houston of being a "quack and impostor,"63 namely,some kind of a "confidence man." In July 1842, the Recording Secretaryof the Medical Society of New York certified Houston as a practicingphysician, relying on documents that Houston showed him. Members ofthe Society publicly attacked the "pretender" and argued that hiscredentials were nothing more than "certain tickets of attendance onLectures, delivered in the University of Glasgow."M Houston attacked theestablishment in the press taking advantage of his access to the Herald, themost influential New York newspaper. Ultimately, however, he had toacknowledge that he did not hold any diploma.'65 Members of the MedicalSociety pointed out that Houston kept using the "honorable title" eventhough he was compelled to admit that he merely held a certificateobtained by showing dubious credentials.

Although many physicians considered Houston an impostor, he waswell regarded by others.166 In 1842, when he and Bennett founded the NewYork Lancet, the Boston Medical and Surgical Journal, the first and mostestablished medical journal in the United States, reported favorably about

162. James Alexander Houston, supra note 139, at 147.

163. The New York Lancet and Its Editor, N.Y. DAILY TRIB., Sept. 12, 1842, at 1. The Tribunewas the Herald's primary rival and its report emphasizes, possibly with some exaggeration, Houston'sflaws.

164. Id.165. Id.166. See, e.g., Death ofDr. James A. Houston, supra note 139.

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its new competitor and wrote that Houston "certainly gives abundantevidence of an active mind, and we doubt not that time will show him tobe a bright star in the western medical hemisphere."16 7

A Recognized Leading Reporter. Houston learned stenography from hisfather.168 After joining the Herald, he conceived the idea of using his skillto report Congressional debates.169 In 1846, with the encouragement ofBennett, he moved to Washington, where he started reporting for theWashington Union. He quickly proved himself and was regarded as "thebest stenographic reporter in the United States[,] one of the best in theworld."170 In February 1847, Houston offended several Congressmen byreporting that they regularly used the exclamation "bah!" in debates.171 Hewas accused of publishing a "false and scandalous report of theproceedings of this House" and a few Representatives called to bar himfrom reporting such proceedings.172 Houston published an apology, notingthat in "using the exclamation 'Bah!' [he] sought to express, with muchaccuracy as possible, the 'expressions of dissatisfactions' which . .. werevery frequently heard in the House." 73 He "humbly" stated though that"sometimes [it is] difficult to catch the precise form of the exclamationsoccasionally heard in the House."l74 His humor and professionalismpersuaded the majority in the House to vote against the allegations againsthim. A few weeks later, Houston was appointed to serve as the officialreporter to the U.S. Senate and, for this purpose, he founded the UnitedStates Reporter.175 In this position, Houston "stood at the head of hisprofession."76 The reporting from the Senate turned out to be toodemanding for one individual. In 1848, Houston returned to New York.

Advertising Quack. Several quack medicine makers used Houston'sname to promote their products. It is difficult to believe that Dr. Houstonwas willing to associate his name with these confidence men. Yet,considering his contribution to the understanding of con men, the use ofhis name by con men to promote their game is somewhat interesting.These three anecdotes do not link Houston directly to the story of theConfidence Man. However, they reflect on his credibility and possibly histhinking about scamming.

167. New York Lancet, 25 BOSTON MED. & SURG. 418 (1842).168. James Alexander Houston, supra note 139, at 151.

169. Dr. Houston, supra note 148.

170. James Alexander Houston, supra note 139, at 150-51.

171. James A. Houston, The Union Congressional Reports, WASH. UNION, Feb. 8, 1847, at 2;

Congressional, WASH. UNION, Feb. 10, 1847, at 1.

172. CONG. GLOBE, 29th Cong., 2d Session 359-60 (1847).173. Houston, supra note 168.

174. Id.175. JAMES L. HARRISON, 100 GPO YEARS, 1861-1961 13 (2010).

176. Death ofDr. James A. Houston, supra note 139.

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D. Thompson, the Original Confidence Man

Little is known about Samuel Thompson, the original Confidence Man.The literature typically depicts him as a skillful swindler. Thompson,however, was an unsuccessful burglar and a small-time swindler.

Born in 1821, supposedly to a family of "the highest respectability," 7 7

Samuel Thompson was "a good-looking man, of affable and gentlemanlybearing ... who would nowhere be taken for a rogue by the commonobserver."78 He used many aliases-William Thompson, SamuelThompson, James Thompson, Samuel Thomas, Samuel Powel, SamuelWilliams, Williams Evans, Samuel Willis, William Davis, and WilliamBrown.179 In the literature he mostly appears as "William Thompson," thename used in the Herald's arrest report.80 He was tried and imprisoned as"Samuel Thompson,"'8' but the authorities could never verify his birthname.182 Thompson was "five feet seven inches high, well made, withdark hair, gray eyes, large mouth, good teeth, broad face, strong squarechin, and dark complexion."'83 The National Police Gazette reported that,to his neighbors in New York City, Thompson was known as "a highlyrespectable man." 84 He was married, lived with his wife and allegedly"was a constant visitor at church, own[ed] a house in the upper part of thecity, pa[id] taxes, [and] ... performed jury duty."'85 This report is notentirely consistent with the record. Thompson clearly had a misleadingphysical appearance but he was not established in New York as arespectable person. He was indeed married and lived with his wife, but hewas mostly known as an unsuccessful burglar. He did not live in NewYork City between his arrest in 1841 and late 1848, operated and lived indowntown New York, and interacted with small-time crooks. The pressand the authorities could never confirm his real name. It is hard to believethat such a person, or his family, were particularly "respectable" in NewYork.

177. Death of the Original Confidence Man, N.Y. TRIB., Oct. 30, 1856, at 7; see also The"Confidence " Man, NAT'L POLICE GAZETTE, July 28, 1849, at 2 (referring to Thompson's age); Deathofthe Original Confidence Man, FRANK LESLIE'S ILLUSTRATED NEWSPAPER, Nov. 15, 1856, at 368(noting that the Confidence Man was "most respectably connected"); The Original ConfidenceMan-Subject to the Blues, N.Y. HERALD, Sept. 11, 1856, at 8 (referring to Thompson's age).

178. Nelson Sizer, L. N. Folwer's Visit to the Tombs, 11 AM. PHRENOLOGICAL J. & MISCELLANY316,317 (1849).

179. See, e.g., City News, SPECTATOR, Aug. 8, 1849, at 1; The Confidence Man and His Crimes,supra note 63; The "Confidence" Man, supra note 177; The Original Confidence Man in Town,ALBANY EVE. J., Apr. 28, 1855, at 2.

180. Arrest ofthe Confidence Man, N.Y. HERALD, July 8, 1849, at 2.

181. See, e.g., Smith v. People, I Parker Cr. Cas. 317 (N.Y. 1851) (discussing Thompson'sindictment, sentencing, and bail); Corruption ofAuthorities, NAT'L POLICE GAZETTE, Aug. 2, 1849, at2. Court of General Sessions, N.Y. HERALD, Oct. 9, 1849, at 1; Court of General Sessions, N.Y.HERALD, Oct. 10, 1849.

182. More About the Confidence Man, ALBANY EVE. J., Mar. 19, 1852, at 2.183. The "Confidence" Man, supra note 177.184. The Confidence Man and His Crimes, supra note 63.185. Id.

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In September 1849, a month before Thompson's trial, Lorenzo NilesFowler, a leading phrenologist, examined Thompson in prison.186 NelsonSizer, one of Fowler's associates, wrote a report about this examinationthat the American Phrenological Journal & Miscellany published. Sizer'sreport describes Thompson as the "celebrated Confidence Man."' 7

Thompson's phrenological evaluation was as follows:

He is a very independent man-relies on himself-is bold andcourageous-not timid, but venturesome. He is a lady's [sic] man,and can insinuate himself into their good graces, or gain theconfidence of any person, by his urbanity of manners and oilytongue. He has a restless love of variety and novelty, and atraveling, wandering disposition. He is not cruel or revengeful. Hehas much caution, tact, management, and power to conceal; cansuit himself to circumstances; is capable to plan and carry outschemes; is seldom at a loss for means to accomplish ends; isartful, plausible, and insinuating. He has a strong desire to makemoney, and will plan and speculate to get it. He knows who totake, and how to take them. He reads men intuitively, judges ofcharacter very closely, and is able to use them to his ownadvantage. He has fine conversational power-can talk withremarkable ease and pertinency. Conscience does not trouble himmuch-can justify himself in his motives and actions. Great tactand self-confidence are strong features of his mind, and a tendencyto licentiousness a besetting sin.'88

Phrenology, once considered a science, assumed that a person'spersonality traits could be read from bumps and fissures in the skull.Fowler's report though not scientific is consistent with other reports aboutThompson's confident conduct. Thompson was released from prison inJuly 1852 and returned to the confidence game and property crimes.189 Hislast arrest was in April 1855 in Albany.190 In court, "he appeared verymuch affected and shed ... tears of sorrow. He protested against havingintended to commit any crime."'9' "Respectable physicians" testified thatThompson was sick and partially insane, suffering from "depression of thespirits, and that he had on several occasions attempted to commitsuicide." 92 He was convicted and sentenced for two years in stateprison.'93 A few weeks after his conviction, October 1856, Thompson died

186. See Sizer, supra note 178, at 317.187. Id. at 316.188. Id. at 317.189. The Confidence Man, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 1852, at 3 (reporting about the release of the

Confidence Man).190. The Original Confidence Man in Town, supra note 179; The Original Confidence Man in

Quod, N.Y. EVE. POST, Apr. 30, 1855, at 1.191. The Original Confidence Man in Town, id.192. The Original Confidence Man-Subject to the Blues, supra note 177.

193. Id.

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in prison.194

E. Poe's Scientific Scammer

Literary circles identified the Confidence Man as a "new species of theJeremy Diddler,"s95 the protagonist of James Kenney's popular 1803 farce,Raising the Wind, that Edgar Allan Poe developed in his essay,Diddling.196 Thompson's publicized traits, such as grin, audacity,nonchalance, and originality, were characteristics that Poe described inDiddling.

Poe explored the traits of Jeremy Diddler through the descriptions ofcommon scams. The popularity of the character of Jeremy Diddlercontributed to the perception of scammers and confidence men in thenineteenth century.

Diddling opens with a reference to "two Jeremys": Jeremy Benthamwho "wrote a Jeremiad about usury ... and was a great man in a smallway" and Jeremy Diddle who was "a great man ... in the very greatest ofways."l97 Bentham's controversial book, Defence of Usury, was apowerful attack on usury laws published in four editions between 1787and 1818.198 The concept of usury, in Bentham's thinking, was anapplication of his "principle of utility."l99 For Poe, usury symbolizedfinancial exploitation though he tried to distinguish between diddlers andbankers. Poe argued that diddlers operate only on a small scale: "Should[the diddler] ever be tempted into magnificent speculation, he then, atonce, loses his distinctive features, and becomes what we term 'financier.'This latter word conveys the diddling idea in every respect except that ofmagnitude. A diddler may thus be regarded as a banker."200 Poe, therefore,believed that the scale merely defines the species of the scammer.

Poe's biography is relevant to the understanding of his portrayal ofscamming. Poe lived in the shadow of debts, often fleeing collectors.201

His professional skills and choices mostly worsened his financialproblems. Poe dedicated his life to literary writing and wrote nonfictionworks, such as Diddling, only to supplement his income from poetry. Heconsidered these works "literary commodities."20 2 Diddling was written

194. Death ofthe Original Confidence Man, N.Y. TRIB., Oct. 30, 1856, at 7.195. Supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text.

196. Poe, Raising the Wind, supra note 2; Burton R. Pollin, Poe's "Diddling": The Source of theTitle and Tale, 2 S. LITERARY J. 106 (1969).

197. POE, supra note 2, at 267.198. JEREMY BENTHAM, DEFENCEOF USURY (4th ed. 1818).199. JEREMY BENTHAM, INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 1-2

(1789); JEREMY BENTHAM, THE RATIONALE OF REWARD (1825).200. POE, supra note 2, at 268.201. ARTHUR HOBSON QUINN, EDGAR ALLAN POE: A CRITICAL BIOGRAPHY, 97-117 (1997);

Terence Whalen, Edgar Allan Poe and the Horrid Laws ofPolitical Economy, 44 AM. Q. 381(1992).202. Whalen, supra note 201, at 384; Terence Whalen, Poe's "Diddling" and the Depression:

Notes on the Sources ofSwindling, 23 STUD. AM. FICTION 197 (1995).

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for fee as an "urban guide" of the kind that was rather popular in the1840s..203 Poe was quite influenced by the Panic of 1837, which was oneof the worst financial crises in the history of the United States andfollowed the implosion of a speculative lending bubble.204 In December1842, shortly before publishing Diddling, Poe filed for bankruptcy. In hisera, lenders and creditors were perceived as scammers.

Perhaps because of the comparison to lending, perhaps because thewriting of Diddling was a financial compromise in Poe's mind, or perhapsfor both reasons (or others), Poe identified only calculated scammers whoutilize information and analysis for their schemes. Poe did not considerother types of scammers. Diddling, according to Poe, is a "compound, ofwhich the ingredients are minuteness, interest, perseverance, ingenuity,audacity, nonchalance, originality, impertinence, and grin."205

(a) Minuteness. The "diddler is minute. His operations are upon a smallscale [as already discussed]."206

(b) Interest. The "diddler is guided by self-interest."207

(c) Perseverance. The "diddler perseveres. He is not readilydiscouraged. Should even the banks break, he cares nothing about it."208

(d) Ingenuity. The "diddler is ingenious. He has constructiveness large.He understands plot." 20 9

(e) Audacity. The "diddler is audacious. He is a bold man."210

(f Nonchalance. The "diddler is nonchalant. He is not at all nervous. Henever had any nerves. He is never seduced into a flurry.... He is cool-cool as a cucumber."211

(g) Originality. The "diddler is original-conscientiously so. Histhoughts are his own.. . . A stale trick is his aversion. He would return apurse. . . upon discovering that he had obtained it by an unoriginaldiddle."212

(h) Impertinence. The "diddler is impertinent. He swaggers .... He

sneers in your face . . . . He eats your dinner, he drinks your wine, he

borrows your money, he pulls your nose, he kicks your poodle, and hekisses your wife." 213

(i) Grin. The "true diddler winds up all with a grin. But this nobody seesbut himself. He grins when his daily work is done.... This is no

203. See supra notes 84-98 and accompanying text.

204. See REGINALD C. MCGRANE, THE PANIC OF 1837 (1924); Samuel Rezneck, The Social

History ofan American Depression, 1837-1843,40 AM. HIST. REv. 662 (1935).205. POE, supra note 2, at 268.206. Id.207. Id.208. Id.209. Id.210. Id.211. Id.at268-69.212. Id. at 269.213. Id.

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hypothesis. It is a matter of course.... [A] diddle would be no diddlewithout a grin." 214

Diddling offers eleven sketches of urban swindlers to illustrate theseingredients. The technique supposedly suggests that, because scam storiesdemonstrate certain patterns of scammers, all scammers follow suchpatterns. Poe's anecdotes, however, do not support his characterization ofscammers. Specifically, Poe's sketches describe scams that were verycommon in the first half of the nineteenth century. They even imply thatdiddlers have modus operandi. The most distinctive characteristic ofscams is their lack of originality: most scammers follow specific patternsand fail to change their methods. In the same spirit, Poe's assumptionsregarding the mental state of scammers were too strong. Only a class ofscammers consciously enjoy the game. The others often believe in theirown game. Poe undoubtedly believed that scammers burdened society andtried to characterize their patterns, but he conflated his aversion ofscammers with realistic scams. If we accept his depiction of scammers ashyper-calculated creatures, very few "true diddlers" would ever beidentified, brought to justice, and convicted. Most scammers and scamsare much less conspicuous than those Poe described.

Properly understood, Diddling is a collection of sketches whose writingwas heavily influenced by three factors: (1) economic circumstances thataffected the author and his era, (2) the author's beliefs, and (3) theauthor's premise that humans (scammers) can be hyper-calculated. Similarbiases also appear in the literature that discount the plausibility of scams.

III.THE ELEMENTS OF SCAMS

Our inquiry into the introduction of the confidence man shows how themechanisms of scamming may be misunderstood. We utilize this study toemphasize several key elements of scams.

A. Scammers and Fools

Scamming-the exploitation of trust for profit-is possible becausemany types of mistakes and imperfect decisions are predictable. There willalways be people who will entrust their gold watches to scammers, investin pyramid schemes, purchase quack medicines, take subprime mortgages,pay upfront fees to "Spanish Prisoner" and Nigerian scammers, and losemoney in other confidence games. Scammers capitalize on such mistakes.The targeting of mistakes, in turn, often complicates the design of counterlegal strategies.

In the past, there were doubts regarding the ability of marketparticipants to profitably exploit consumers' mistakes and imperfect

214. Id.

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decisions.215 Modem economics, however, rejects this skepticism, whichprimarily serves anti-regulation sentiments.216 Vast literature explains anddocuments how suboptimal decisions of consumers can and are used forprofit.2

17 The story of the Confidence Man demonstrates how even a

clumsy scammer may succeed with simple tricks. Thompson had certainskills but he gained from the poor decision-making capacity of his marks.

Our analysis also emphasizes the imperfect nature of scammers. Thedepictions of scammers hyper-calculated creatures are not realistic.Although scammers can cause harm and distress to their victims, theyoften harm themselves. Scammers often stick to identifiable modioperandi, adopt unsustainable schemes, brag about their accomplishments,and take other actions that assist law enforcers.

Consider the Ladies' Deposit Company ("LDC"), a pyramid schemethat Sarah E. Howe operated in Boston between 1876 and 1880.218

Studying LDC in 1881, the Atlantic Monthly maintained that "not everyswindle . . . deserves a chronicle [but] the Ladies' Deposit possesse[d]almost every feature of interest which can characterize a fraud: it wassuccessful on a large scale; it chose its victims in an original way; it wasmanaged with much adroitness in many of its details; and yet in the total itwas one of the most barefaced and preposterous cheats that ever presumedupon the credulity of an intelligent people."219 Mrs. Howe practicallyoperated a private bank, which she marketed as "a charitable institution forsingle ladies, old and young."220 She received deposits that were no "lessthan two hundred dollars [and no] more than one thousand [dollars]" andguaranteed its investors "interest at the rate of $8.00 on a hundred per

215. See generally Herbert Hovenkamp, Rationality in Law & Economics, 60 GEO. WASH. L.REV. 293 (1992) (describing the doubts in the traditional law and economics literature). See also LynnA. Stout, The Investor Confidence Game, 68 BROOKLYN L. REV. 407 (2002) (criticizing the rationalexpectations model in securities law); Ernest J. Weinrib, Legal Formalism: On the Immanent

Rationality of Law, 97 YALE L.J. 949 (1988) (attempting to defend formalism by challenging theargument that law is political).

216. See generally Orbach, supra note 6.

217. See, e.g., BLAIR STEWART, AN ANALYSIS OF SPECULATIVE TRADING IN GRAIN FUTURES(1949); Rajesh K. Aggarwal & Guojun Wu, Stock Market Manipulations, 79 J. BUS. 1915 (2006);Oren Bar-Gill, SEDUCTION BY CONTRACT: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PSYCHOLOGY IN CONSUMERMARKETS (2012); Markus K. Brunnermeier & Lasse Heje Pedersen, Predatory Trading, 60 J. FIN.1825 (2005); John Y. Campbell, Household Finance, 61 J. FIN. 1553 (2006); Stephano DellaVigna,Psychology and Economics: Evidence from the Field, 47 J. ECON. LIT. 315 (2009); Xavier Gabaix &David Laibson, Shrouded Attributes, Consumer Myopia, and Information Suppression in Competitive

Markets, 121 Q. J. ECON. 505 (2006); Robert A. Jarrow, Market Manipulation, Bubbles, Corners, andShort-Squeezes, 27 J. FIN. QUANTITATIVE ANAL. 311 (1992); Ginger Zhe Jin & Phillip Leslie, TheEffect of Information on Product Quality: Evidence from Restaurant Hygiene Grade Cards, 118 Q. J.ECON. 409 (2003); Christopher Mayer et al., The Rise in Mortgage Defaults, 23 J. ECON. PERSP. 27(2009); Ran Spiegler, The Market for Quacks, 73 REV. ECON. STUD. 1113 (2006).

218. See Henry A. Clapp, Sympathetic Banking, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, July 1881, at 121; M. A.Dodge, The Gentlemen's Contribution to the Ladies'Deposit, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, July 1881, at 111;A South-Sea Bubble in Boston, HARPER'S WEEKLY, Nov. 6, 1880, at 770.

219. Clapp, supra note 222, at 121-22.220. Id. at 123.

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month [to be] paid every three months in advance."221 LDC inevitablycollapsed, leaving its investors with considerable losses. An inquiry intoMrs. Howe's past discovered that before LDC, her behavior was known tobe "queer," taking "extraordinary shapes," causing some to believe thatshe was "an insane person."222 She was a confidence woman with manyfaces. Among other things, Howe did business as a fortune-teller, "femalephysician," and clairvoyant.223 Still before LDC, her interactions with thelegal system included several convictions for "a very elaborate set offrauds."224 All of the reported frauds were confidence games. In October1880, Mrs. Howe was arrested and was sentenced to five years in prison.Upon her release, she set up a new pyramid scheme that did not lastlong.2 25 She was arrested again and was sentenced for another three yearsin prison.226 Several commentators pointed out that Mrs. Howe waspunished despite her troubled personality, but a good number of"gentlemen" were aware of her enterprises, benefitted from them, andwere not held accountable for facilitating or accommodating herscheme.227 In retrospect, Mrs. Howe's scheme appears quite implausiblebut so do all Ponzi schemes and policies of financial institutions that feedfinancial bubbles.228

Consider now the caveat emptor rule. Caveat emptor may apply insituations where one transacting party consciously profits frominformation that other transacting parties do not have. The rule appeared inthe sixteenth century but acquired its defined meaning only during thenineteenth century.229 In his classic study of the doctrine, WaltonHamilton observed that in the nineteenth century "judges discover[ed] thatcaveat emptor sharpened wits, taught self-reliance, made a man-aneconomic man-out of the buyer, and served well its two masters,business and justice."230 The rule, therefore, reflects a belief that peoplehave the ability to cope with scammers. For example, in Laidlaw v.Organ,231 the parties entered into an agreement for future delivery oftobacco. The agreement price reflected material information that wasknown to the defendant (the buyer) but not to the plaintiff (the seller):Britain was about to lift the embargo on Southern U.S. ports that had kept

221. Id.222. Id. at 130.223. Id. at 131.224. Id.225. See Mrs. Howe a Fugitive, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 1887, at 1; Mrs. Howe's "Bank" Again,

N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 1887, at4.226. Death of "Woman's Bank" Mrs. Howe, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Jan. 21, 1892, at 1.227. See Clapp, supra note 218; Dodge, supra note 218.228. See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT: FINANCIAL

REPORT ON THE NATIONAL COMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS INTHE UNITED STATES (2011).

229. Walton H. Hamilton, The Ancient Maxim Caveat Emptor, 40 YALE L.J. 1133 (1930).230. Id. at 1186.231. 15 U.S. 178 (1817).

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tobacco prices down. Was the defendant a scammer? Introducing thecaveat emptor rule, Chief Justice Marshall held that the defendant "wasnot bound to communicate" the private information he possessed.232 Thelogic, the Chief Justice explained, is that "[i]t would be difficult tocircumscribe the contrary doctrine within proper limits, where the meansof intelligence are equally accessible to both parties."233

A contemporary example of exploitation of human limitations for profitis the common practice, used in many industries, of obscuring the true ofcost of a service with add-on pricing schemes.234 For example, airlines useseveral sets of add-on fees-for early boarding, premium seating,baggage, ticket changes, unaccompanied minors, in-flight food, andInternet services-to conceal the true price and to erode consumers'ability to shop for the lowest total fare.235 Similarly, hotels and resortsconceal their costs by hiding many fees.23 6 In the financial sector, thephenomenon of concealing the true price is common and add-on pricing isa common practice.237 For example, between 2012 and 2015, several largefinancial institutions paid collectively over two billion dollars insettlements to resolve allegations regarding the legality of the sales ofcredit card add-on products.238 The practice involved pressuring customersinto buying additional products when they activated the cards or otherwisecommunicated with the companies over the phone.

Another example from the financial sector is "swipe fees" (also knownas "merchant discount fees"), payments that vendors make for each creditor debit card transaction.239 These fees are nontransparent to consumers

232. Id. at 178.233. Id.234. Seeee Gabaix & Laibson, supra note 217; Scott McCartney, Find the Hidden Fees in This

Picture, WALL ST. J., March 13, 2014, at DI.235. See Transparency of Airline Ancillary Fees and Other Consumer Protection Issues, 79 Fed.

Reg. 57489 (Sept. 25, 2014) (proposed rule); Daniel Michaels, Extra Airline Fees: A Growth Market,WALL ST. J., May, 31, 2011, at B3; Christine Negroni, Cashing In Before Taking Off, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.28, 2012, at B8; Jad Mouawad, The Frills Are Few, The Fees Are Not, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2013, atBl.

236. See, e.g., Jad McCartney, Payingfor the Pool: Hotels Are Piling On Fees, WALL ST. J., June,2009, at DI.

237. See, e.g., Vickie Elmer, A Hidden Fee Is Set to Rise, N.Y. TIMES, March 4, 2012, at RE4;Laura Stover, Uncovering the Hidden Fees in Retirement Plans, WALL ST. J., Feb. 25, 2013, at R5.

See also Maria Armental, Former ConvergEx Executive Charged, WALL ST. J., Aug. 8, 2014

(reporting on a scheme involving hidden fees).238. See Matthias Rieker et al., Capital One Dealt Fine to Pitch to Customers, WALL ST. J., July

19, 2012 at Cl ($210 million settlement); Andrew R. Johnson & Andrea Tadena, Discover to MakeRefunds to Settle Probe of Credit-Protection Products, WALL ST. J., Sept. 22, 2012, at B2 ($214

million settlement); Alan Ziebl & Robin Sidel, AmEx to Pay $76 Million in Card Add-On' Settlement,WALL ST. J., Dec. 26, 2013, at C3; Alan Ziebl, BofA Settles Card Probe for $772 million, WALL ST. J.,Apr. 10, 2014, at C3; AnnaMaria Andriotis & Christina Rexrode, Citigroup Settles Over Card FeesFor $770 Million, WALL ST. J., July 22, 2015, at C2. See also Robin Sidel & Alan Zibel, RegulatorsScrutinize Auto Lenders, WALL ST. J., May 3,2013, at Al.

239. See United States v. Am. Exp. Co., No. 10-CV-4496 NGG RER, 2015 WL 728563(E.D.N.Y. Feb. 19, 2015).

239. United States v. Am. Exp. Co., No. 10-CV-4496 NGG RER, 2015 WL 728563 (E.D.N.Y.Feb. 19, 2015).

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who choose the form of payment and can be quite considerable. AmericanExpress, MasterCard, and Visa used to maintain rules that concealed theirswipe fees and prohibited merchants from encouraging consumers to uselower-cost payment methods when making purchases. Specifically, therules prohibited merchants from offering discounts or other incentives toconsumers in order to encourage them to choose less-costly paymentmethods. Visa and MasterCard even colluded to fix their swipe fees.240

Add-on pricing schemes, swipe fees, and other strategies that obscurethe actual price demonstrate how businesses can utilize boundedrationality for profit. Consumers often know that there is a differencebetween the stated price and actual cost, but it is difficult for them toevaluate the difference. The more bounded rational they are, the more theydiscount that difference. These strategies profoundly differ from the goldwatch scam of the original confidence man and other types of crudescams. Strategies that obscure prices are often pricing methods oflegitimate businesses and presented as ordinary measures of third-degreeprice discrimination,2 41 which may even constitute the industry standard.Further, explicit consumer preferences often contribute to the developmentof such schemes. This may happen, for example, when the schemeresponds to the demand to unbundle the components of a product orservice. The economics of unbundled products, however, is often toocomplex for many consumers.242

B. Time

Nineteenth-century swindlers took advantage of social changes,primarily the transition of people from the country to the city.24 3

Scammers often use time to trap people in situations where they are likelyto make mistakes.244 Common examples of such schemes include (1)actual and perceived need to make an immediate decision (time pressure),(2) changes in society and the economy that require people to makeadjustments,2 45 and (3) aging that impairs cognitive capacities.246

240. In re Payment Card Interchange Fee and Merchant Discount Antitrust Litigation, 986F.Supp.2d 207 (E.D. N.Y. 2013); Shelly Banjo, Wal-Mart Accuses Visa of Charging High 'SwipeFees', WALL ST. J., March 28, 2014, at B3.

240. United States v. Am. Exp. Co., No. 10-CV-4496 NGG RER, 2015 WL 728563 (E.D.N.Y.Feb. 19, 2015).

241. "Third-degree price discrimination" means charging different rates to different consumergroups. Such pricing can enhance welfare.

242. See, e.g., Gabaix & Laibson, supra note 217; Neil Irwin, If Cable TV Charged Like theAirline, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2015.

243. See supra notes 84-98 and accompanying text.244. See Clayton Marsh, Stealing Time: Poe's Confidence Men and the "Rush of the Age," 77

AM. LIT. 259 (2005); POE, supra note 2, at 271-72 (describing a scam utilizing time pressure).245. See supra Part II.B.2; In Poe's work, Diddling was a metaphor describing problems

associated with urbanizing society and an emerging capitalistic economy. See Pollin, supra note 107.It was a repeat theme in his writing. See Marsh, supra note 247.

246. See, e.g., Sumit Agarwal et al., The Age of Reason: Financial Decisions Over the Life Cycleand Inplications for Regulation, 2009 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIvITY 51 (2009).

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One of the often-overlooked elements in the sketch of the ConfidenceMan is the symbolic function of watches.247 In the mid-nineteenth century,clocks and watches, representing improvements in time measuringtechnologies, were a source of anxiety for many people. In his influentialbook American Nervousness, the neurologist George Beard explained theanxiety:

The perfection of clocks and the invention of watches havesomething to do with modem nervousness, since they compel us tobe on time, and excite the habit of looking to see the exactmoment, so as not to be late for trains or appointments.

A nervous man cannot take out his watch and look at it when thetime for an appointment or train is near, without affecting hispulse, and the affect on that pulse . . . [is] correlated to a loss to thenervous system.248

From the perspective of the swindler, this nervousness is an opportunity.Several practices of credit card companies that were legal before the

enactment of the Credit CARD Act illustrate the contemporary use of timein scams:249 retroactive increases of interest rates and fees applicable tooutstanding balances, unilateral changes of the terms governing therepayment of outstanding balances, double-cycle billing,25 0 and others.The add-on practices of the credit card companies, used after theenactment of the Credit CARD Act, also trapped customers in situations ofpressure, when they activated cards or were communicating with afinancial institution.251

C. Scale, Complexity, and Confidence

Poe distinguished between small-scale scamming conducted by diddlersand large-scale scamming conducted by "financiers."2 52 Houston used thisdistinction in his editorial, The Confidence Man on a Large Scale.2 53 Theeditorial criticizes society for its fascination with individual swindlers andoversight of institutional scammers.

The perception that the scale of scammers is adversely related to theirlegal risk is common but not entirely precise. Scale, as Bernard Madoff

247. See Marsh, supra note 244.248. GEORGE M. BEARD, AMERICAN NERVOUSNESS: ITS CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 103-04

(1881).249. The Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-

24, 123 Stat. 1734.250. Double-cycle billing occurs when a cardholder with no previous balance does not pay the

entire balance of a new purchase by the payment due date, then-on the next periodic billingstatement-the issuer computes interest on the original balance of the purchase. For example if thecardholder makes a $1000 purchase and pays off $950 in the first month, under double-cycle billing,she would be charged interest on the $1000 in the next month.

251. See supra note 238 and accompanying text.252. See supra note 200 and accompanying text.

253. See supra Part fl.A.2.

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learned, may also influence punishment considerations.254 The perceptionsupposedly suggests that business size may offer strengths that couldinfluence the application of law. While it is uncontroversial that wealthand capital influence law,255 very often scale and complexity are conflated.

Small-scale scams, such as those of the Confidence Man, tend to becrude and unsophisticated, whereas large-scale scams are sometimesnuanced and integrated in lawful business operation. The complexity oflarge-scale schemes makes the proof of their illegality considerablycostlier than that of small-scale scams.

To illustrate, consider scams in commodities markets.256 I Commoditiesmarkets, financial institutions, such as JPMorgan and Goldman Sachs,used to act in several capacities: they stored, traded in, and distributedcommodities, as well as traded in future markets of these commodities. Afinancial institution that acquired enough warehouses could have thecapacity to manipulate prices in several markets. After the GreatRecession, this was a common phenomenon.25 7 The analysis of thepractice, however, turned out to be complicated because most activitieswere lawful. By comparison, it is much simpler to analyze the gold-watchscam of the original confidence man and, equally important, to explain itto a jury.

Scale also emphasizes the most complicated element of confidence: thepotential opportunism created in any fiduciary relationship, namely, theagency problem. The classic confidence man is a stranger, but a person orinstitution may also take advantage of confidence that is established in arelationship or created by some duty. In theory, fiduciary duties intend toprotect people from such scams, but those duties are known as "the mostelusive concepts in Anglo-American law." 258 The actual application offiduciary duties, especially under Delaware law, 2 59 creates opportunitiesfor scamming where a sensible person should have expectations to haveconfidence in an agent.260 There is no need for scale to have this elementof confidence: every agent can betray the confidence of her principal.

254. See Amir Efrati & Robert Frank, 'Evil' Madoff Gets 150 Years in Epic Fraud, WALL ST. J.,June 30, 2009, at Al.

255. See, e.g., Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009); Citizens United v. Fed.Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); Barak Orbach, Invisible Lawmaking, 79 U. CHI. L. REV.DIALOGUE 1 (2012).

256. For early reports of the schemes see Tatyana Shumsky & Andrea Hotter, Wall Street Eyed inMetal Squeeze, WALL ST. J., June 17, 2011, at Cl; and Pratima Desai et al., Goldman's New MoneyMachine: Warehouses, REUTERS (July 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/07/29/us-lIme-warehousing-idUSTRE76R3YZ20110729.

257. See Wall Street Bank Involvement with Physical Commodities: Hearings Before thePermanent Subcomm. of the Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 113th Cong. (2014).

258. Deborah A. Demott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 DUKEL.J. 879, 879 (1988); Austin W. Scott, The Fiduciary Principle, 37 CAL. L. REV. 539 (1949).

259. See, e.g., In re Citigroup Inc. Shareholder Derivative Litigation, 964 A.2d 106 (2009)(holding that Citigroup directors did not breach their fiduciary duties during the housing bubble).

260. See PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW (Andrew S. Gold & Paul B. Millereds., 2014).

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However, scale obscures the duties and provides greater scammingopportunities.

D. Intent, Knowledge and Industry Standards

The Confidence Man allegedly left the scene "laughing." Edgar AllanPoe believed that a "true diddler winds up all with a grin." 2 6 1 He believedthat scammers were hyper-calculated, interested in the game itself andwould "return a purse ... upon discovering that [it was] obtained ... byan unoriginal diddle."262 The "grin" element-or more precisely,knowledge-is critical for legal purposes because scamming is not anoffense of strict liability. 2 63 To prove unlawful scamming, plaintiffs

typically must show that the defendant possessed a certain degree ofknowledge. This burden, in turn, is often satisfied with express boldness ofscammers, whose scams are straightforward, such as that of the originalconfidence man. The "boldness" is perceived as knowledge. But not allscammers are obvious and transparent. It could be difficult to satisfy theknowledge requirement when the scams are even slightly complex. Forexample, in United States v. Newman,264 the Second Circuit reshaped thelaw of insider trading, holding that to sustain an insider trading convictionagainst a tippee, the government must prove that the tippee knew that acompany insider had disclosed confidential information and did so inexchange for a personal benefit in violation of a fiduciary duty. Thus,Newman effectively shields tippees who receive confidential informationfrom a third party rather than from the insider directly. This rulingprotects a tippee who is comfortable with the information but not fullyaware of the insider's benefit.265 Such interpretations of "knowledge" (or"grin") requirements make it quite difficult to hold scammers liable, evenwhen the scam is rather plain.

Thus, the "grin" requirement practically serves scammers. In reality,scammers pursue profit opportunities and their precise understanding oftheir schemes is not always clear. Often, the confirmation bias and andother cognitive biases cause confidence men to believe in their own gamesand act without conscious intent to engage in a "scam."266 For example,during the housing bubble of the 2000s, all major U.S. financialinstitutions operated in mortgage markets securitizing, selling, andmarketing risky mortgages.267 In the aftermath of the crisis, it was quite

261. POE, supra note 2, at 269.

262. Id.263. See, e.g., Belmont v. MB Inv. Partners, Inc., 708 F.3d 470 (3d Cir. 2013); United States v.

Philip Morris USA Inc., 566 F.3d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 2009).264. United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014).

265. See Christopher M. Matthews, Ruling Puts Dent in Insider Probes, WALL ST. J., DEC. 11,2014, at Al; James Stewart, Delving Into Morass ofInsider Trading, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, at BI.

266. See generally Raymond Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many

Guises, 2 REv. GEN. PSYCH. 175 (1998) (explaining the confirmation bias).

267. See FIN CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, supra note 232.

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difficult to prove that their directors and officers were aware of theimplications of those risky mortgages.268 The effect of knowledge andintent requirements is sometimes willful blindness.269

To illustrate the impact of complexity on the inference of knowledge,consider first Mrs. Howe, the mastermind and chief operator of theLadies' Deposit Company. Howe, as mentioned, was a confidence womanwith a troubled personality. Promising a return of 8% per month, Howeprobably did not understand the implausibility of her own scheme. Shewas tried and convicted for her actions, but it is hard to argue that her planwas rational. By contrast, the "gentlemen" who benefited from LDC andwere never investigated for their actions were probably much morerational and informed. Stated differently, Howe was assumed to beinformed because of the boldness of her scam although there are goodreasons to question her rationality.

Consider now bread pricing at the turn of the nineteenth century.270

During much of the nineteenth century, Americans bought a 16-ounce loafof bread for 50. At the end of the century, costs of inputs went up. Bakerscould raise the price of a loaf by 10, the smallest denomination of thecurrency, and face public outrage for a price increase of 20%. Instead,they took a more moderate approach and started selling smaller loaves,without disclosing the exact size of the loaf. The public felt deceived uponlearning about the "short-weight bread."27 1 (See Figure 4.) Localitiesacted to address this perceived scam.2 7 2 Many bakers, however, consideredthe short-weight bread merely as an adjustment to the changing inputcosts, not a scam. In the words of the president of the Chicago baker tradeassociation:

We don't want to deceive the people, and we don't. We don't sell apound of bread. We sell a 5 cents worth of bread, and we give asgood quality as we can and as much of it as we can for 5 cents.People don't buy bread by weight. They buy it by 5 centsworth.... [I]f a sixteen ounce standard is fixed by law, up goes theprice to 6 cents, and the people won't stand for it.273

It may be that bakers believed that the sale of short-weight bread was areasonable quantity adjustment, not a deception. Considering the public

268. See, e.g., In re Citigroup Inc. S'holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106 (Del. Ch. 2009)(absolving the board of Citigroup of liability for its failure to identify red flags). Cf In re CitigroupInc. Sec. Litig., 753 F. Supp. 2d 206 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); In re Citigroup Inc. Sec. Litig., 965 F. Supp. 2d369 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (imposing liability on Citigroup for marketing financial products intending tobenefit from the recession).

269. Under Delaware law, firms must install reasonable risk management systems but "directorliability based on the duty of oversight is possibly the most difficult theory in corporation law uponwhich a plaintiff might hope to win ajudgment." Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 125.

270. See BARAK ORBACH, REGULATION: WHY AND HOW THE STATE REGULATES, 740-45 (2012).271. Id.272. See, e.g., Schmidinger v. Chicago, 226 U.S. 578 (1913).273. 16 Ounces, 6 Cents; Say City Bakers, CHI. DAILY TRIBUNE, Dec. I1, 1907, at 9.

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beliefs and views at the time-that 50 buys a 16-ounce loaf of bread-theshort-weight bread was a scam. Bakers, including the Chicago baker tradeassociation, also actively opposed laws requiring them to disclose the sizeof each loaf, sell standardized loaves to simplify pricing, keep scalesavailable to their customers, and abide by other regulatory measuresintended to resolve the informational problem.274 For all practicalpurposes, the intent of those bakers, their understanding of their actions,and "grin" do not change the substance of the scheme: bakers throughoutthe United States were deceiving customers.

The debate over the short-weight bread was in essence a controversyover industry standards. The 16-ounce loaf of bread for 5 was anequilibrium standard that the industry sought to change. The change of thereference price was complicated: because the smallest denomination of thecurrency was I cent, bakers could not raise the price of a 16-ounce loaf ofbread by less than 20%. The industry, therefore, tried to secure for itsmembers the flexibility of adjusting the size of the loaves. The newstandard, however, created scam opportunities. Under such conditions,when the industry standards allow sellers to conceal information fromconsumers or to provide them with confusing information, thencompliance with the standards may not satisfy legal requirements forintent to scam or knowledge of scamming. Yet, consumers were scammed.

The determination that industry standards intend to benefit the trade byobscuring prices and costs tends to be rather challenging. Thisphenomenon, however, is rather common.275 One example of thephenomenon that was already discussed is add-on pricing schemes.276

Another example is the packaging of a product to make the consumerbelieve that she receives more than she actually does.277 The practice hasseveral names and is similar to the short-weight bread. Federal and statelaws use the term "nonfunctional slack fill" to outlaw the practice.278 Theterm intends to describe nonfunctional or empty space that creates anillusion about the actual volume of a product that a package contains. In

274. Schmidinger, 226 U.S. 578.275. See, Gabaix & Laibson, supra notes 234-242 and accompanying text; Douglas W. Allen &

Yoram Barzel, The Evolution of Criminal Law and Police During the Pre-Modern Era, 27 J. L. ECON.

& ORG. 540 (2009).276. Id.277. See Henry Gilgoff, FDA's Fight Against Slack Fill, L.A. TIMES, June 21, 1973, at K18;

Gerald Gold, FDA's New Target: Air in Food Packages, N.Y. TIMES, July 14,1973, at 21; Sarena Ng,'Desheeting' Shrinks Rolls, Plumps Margins, WALL ST. J., July 25, 2013, at Bl; Paul Ziobro, SamePackage, Same Price, Less Product, WALL ST. J., June 12, 2015, at BI.

278. The Fair Packaging and Labeling Act, Pub. L. No. 89-755, 80 Stat. 1296 (1966) authorizedthe Secretary of Health and Human Services to promulgate rules regulating package size, statements

concerning sale prices, and non-functional slack fill. See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. § 100.100 (prohibiting the useof "misleading containers"). See also Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 12606 (defining "slack fill" as "thedifference between the actual capacity of a container and the volume of product contained therein.");

Waldman v. New Chapter, Inc., 714 F.Supp.2d 398 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (discussing the legality of thepractice in New York); Hendricks v. StarKist Co., 30 F.Supp.3d 917 (N.D.CA. 2014) (discussing thelegality of the practice in California).

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the personal care industry, it is called "desheeting"-reducing the numberof sheets of toilet paper or tissues in a package without a correspondingreduction in the retail price.279 In the food industry it is called "weightout." 2 80 Yet, in lawsuits against manufacturers that use the practice,consumers refer to it as "fraud" and other similar terms. Practically, for thereasons discussed above, it is often difficult to prove "nonfunctional slackfill" when the industry standard of packaging changes.281

IV. CONCLUSION

The 1849 intersection of the lives of two young men resulted in theintroduction of the term "confidence man" and the concept of scam as"confidence game." In July 1849, Alexander James Houston wrote for theNew York Herald about the arrest of the "Confidence Man," anunimpressive swindler whose name was apparently Samuel Thompson.Houston did not sign his articles, yet newspapers around the countryreprinted them. Two months later, Houston died at age 30. Thompson diedin 1856 at age 35, a few months before Herman Melville released hisnovel The Confidence-Man: His Masquerade, which was inspired byHouston's reports. Numerous books and articles cite the Herald's articlesabout the Confidence Man, often crediting the Herald for coining the term"confidence man" to describe Thompson. We argue that Houston wrotethe story of Thompson as a sketch intending to illustrate introducedconcept he had in mind. We also argue that the perception of Thompson asa talented scammer reflects broad misunderstanding of the elements ofscams.

Scams, or confidence games, are schemes in which one party acquiresand abuses the trust of another party. The original confidence manacquired the "confidence" of strangers, making them feel that it wasimproper not to trust people like him. In the modem economy, thefunctioning of many institutions rests on some trust. However, when oneperson trusts another and subsequently feels deceived it is often unclearthat illegal scamming occurred. In many settings, it is difficult todistinguish between permissible conduct and impermissible scamming.Yet, we argue that a nuanced understanding of the nature of confidencegames could considerably contribute to policies intending to reduce thesocial costs of scamming.

279. Ng, supra note 277.280. Id.281. See, e.g., J. H. Chaloud, Product Weight and Fill Control, 19 Bus. LAWYER 177 (1963).

2015] 287

39

Braucher and Orbach: Scamming: The Misunderstood Confidence Man

Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2015

Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities

BURTON'S THEATRE.Dress Circle and Parquette, 50 cents; Family Circle or

Second Tier, 25 cents.

T HIS (Monday) (EVENING), July 23d, will be playedthe Comedietta, calledFAINT HEART NEVER WON FAIR LADY.

King Charles II. . Miss J Hill I Roy Comes . . . ClarkeDuchess Torrenuevada .... . . Miss Wallack

To be followed by the new Farce ofTHE CONFIDENCE MAN.

Brass.... .. Brougham I Mr Polyanthos Poodle . BurtonElisa ...................... Miss Hill

To conclude with the favorite Burlesque, calledDON GIOVANNI.

Don Giovanni. . Miss Taylor I Loprello ........ . J DannDonna Anna.. . .... .. .. . Miss Brougham

Special Notice-Alteration of time-Curtain will risein future at a Ito 8 o'clock-Doors open at 4 past 7.-Checks not transferable. No orders admitted.

Strangers and visitors are informed that Tickets forthis Theatre are to be obtained at all the principal Hotels:

Figure 1. The Burton's Theatre Introducing the Confidence Man, NEWYORK EVENING POST (New York, July 23, 1849) (also pubished in otherNew York daily papers).

288 [Vol. 27:2

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Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 27 [2015], Iss. 2, Art. 2

http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol27/iss2/2

Braucher & Orbach

Mr. Jonathan Parks,WHO tarried some time in this place,

in July last, disturbing moral tacts andexhibiting an optical show, is requested toinform me of his place of residence, and-so-forth, on or before the first of Februarynext ; otherwise I shell be under the ne-cissity of disclosing some circumstancesof the utmost importance to him, and notaltogether unimportant to the public.

W. D. BELL.Hagers Town, Md. Jan. 5.

Figure 2. HAGERS TOWN TORCH LIGHT AND PUBLIC ADVERTISER(Hagerstown, Md., Jan. 6, 1818) (also published in many other dailynewspapers around the country).

JAMES ALEXANDER HOUSTON.

Figure 3. James Alexander Houston, PHONOGRAPHIC MAG. 150(Cincinnati, Ohio, May 15, 1894).

2015] 289

41

Braucher and Orbach: Scamming: The Misunderstood Confidence Man

Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2015

Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities

Figure 4. Short-Weight Bread, SAN FRANCISCO CALL (San Francisco,Cal., Aug. 13, 1910).

ts ri,

[Vol. 27:2290

42

Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 27 [2015], Iss. 2, Art. 2

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TAB 5

TAB 6

1

FY 2016 CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT PRELIMINARY REPORT

Office of Child Support Enforcement

PRELIMINARY REPORT FY 2016

2

3

Appendix Table of Contents

Appendix Section

Program Overview

Table P-1 Financial Overview for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years 6

Table P-2 Statistical Overview for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years 7

Table P-3 Program Trends for Three Consecutive Fiscal Years 8

Program Collections

Table P-4 Total Distributed Collections for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years 9

Table P-5 Cumulative Total Distributed Collections Fiscal Years 1976 - 2016 10

Table P-6 Distributed Current Assistance Collections for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years 11

Table P-7 Distributed Former Assistance Collections for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years 12

Table P-8 Distributed Medicaid Never Assistance Collections for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years 13

Table P-9 Distributed Never Assistance Collections for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years 14

Table P-10 Distributed TANF/Foster Care Collections for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years 15

Table P-11 Distributed TANF Collections for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years 16

Table P-12 Distributed Foster Care Collections for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years 17

Table P-13 Distributed Non-TANF Collections for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years 18

Federal and State Share of Collections

Table P-14 Federal Share of TANF/Foster Care Collections for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years 19

Table P-15 State Share of TANF/Foster Care Collections for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years 20

Undistributed Collections (UDC)

Table P-16 Net Undistributed Collections for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years 21

Table P-17 Percent of Undistributed Collections (UDC) for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years 22

Table P-18 UDC Pending Distribution by Category, FY 2016 23

Table P-19 UDC Unresolved Distribution by Category, FY 2016 24

Table P-20 Net UDC by Age, FY 2016 25

Other Collections

Table P-21 Collections Forwarded to Non-IV-D Cases for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years 26

Table P-22 Collections Sent to Other States, FY 2016 27

Table P-23 Current Assistance Collections Sent To Other States for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years 28

Table P-24 Former Assistance Collections Sent To Other States for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years 29

Table P-25 Medicaid Never Assistance Collections Sent To Other States for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years 30

Table P-26 Never Assistance Collections Sent To Other States for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years 31

Table P-27 Collections Sent to Other Countries for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years 32

Table P-28 Total Collections Received from Wage Withholding for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years 33

Table P-29 Total Collections Received by Method of Collection, FY 2016 34

Table P-30 Total Collections Passed Through for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years 35

Payments to Families

Table P-31 Payments to Families or Foster Care for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years 36

Table P-32 Current TANF/Foster Care Assistance Payments to Families for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years 37

Interstate Activity

Table P-33 Interstate Collections Forwarded to Other States for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years 38

Table P-34 Interstate Cases Sent to Another State for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years 39

Table P-35 Interstate Cases Received From Another State for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years 40

Cost-Effectiveness

Table P-36 Cost-Effectiveness Ratio for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years 41

Incentives

Table P-37 Incentive Payment Estimates for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years 42

Table P-38 Incentive Payment Actuals for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years 43

Table P-39 Incentive Performance Measures, FY 2016 44

Medical Support

Table P-40 Distributed as Medical Support Payments for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years 45

Table P-41 Health Insurance Provided as Ordered for Two Consecutive Fiscal Years 46

Table P-42 Percent of Cases with Orders (Minus Arrears Only Cases) in which Medical Support is Ordered and Ordered and Provided for Two Consecutive Fiscal Years

47

Program Expenditures

Table P-43 Total Administrative Expenditures for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years 48

Table P-44 Federal Share of Administrative Expenditures for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years 49

Table P-45 State Share of Administrative Expenditures for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years 50

Table P-46 Administrative Expenditures Using Funds Received as Incentive Payments for Four Quarters, FY 2016 51

Table P-47 Non-IV-D Costs for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years 52

Functional Costs

Table P-48 ADP Expenditures for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years 53

4

FY 2016 CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT PRELIMINARY REPORT

Appendix Section

Fees

Table P-49 Fees Charged by OCSE, FY 2016 54

Table P-50 Fees and Costs Recovered in Excess of Fees for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years 55

Table P-51 Fees Retained by Other States for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years 56

Cases and Caseloads

Table P-52 Total Caseload for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years 57

Table P-53 Cases Open at the End of the Fiscal Year for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years 58

Table P-54 Cases for Which the State Has No Jurisdiction for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years 59

Table P-55 Total Caseload by Current Assistance for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years 60

Table P-56 Total Caseload by Former Assistance for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years 61

Table P-57 Total Caseload by Never Assistance for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years 62

Table P-58 Medicaid-Only Cases Open at the End of the Fiscal Year for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years 63

Table P-59 State-Tribal Cases Initiated in This State Open at the End of the Fiscal Year for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years 64

Table P-60 State-Tribal Cases Received From a Tribal IV-D Program Open at the End of the Fiscal Year for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years

65

Table P-61 International Cases Initiated in This State Open at the End of the Fiscal Year for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years 66

Table P-62 International Cases Received From Another Country Open at the End of the Fiscal Year for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years

67

Table P-63 Cases With Medical Coverage Received from Any Source for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years 68

Orders Established

Table P-64 Total Cases with Support Orders Established for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years 69

Table P-65 Cases with Orders Established by Current, Former, and Never Assistance, FY 2016 70

Table P-66 Medicaid-Only Cases With Orders Established Open at the End of the Fiscal Year for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years 71

Table P-67 State-Tribal IV-D Cases With Support Orders Established Initiated in This State for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years 72

Table P-68 State-Tribal IV-D Cases With Support Orders Established Received From a Tribe for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years 73

Table P-69 International Cases With Support Orders Established Initiated in This State for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years 74

Table P-70 International Cases With Support Orders Established Received From Another Country for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years

75

Paternities

Table P-71 Total Number of Paternities Established or Acknowledged for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years 76

Table P-72 Paternity Establishment for Two Consecutive Fiscal Years 77

Services Provided

Table P-73 TANF Cases Closed Where a Child Support Payment Was Received for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years 78

Table P-74 Number of Support Orders Established During the Fiscal Year for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years 79

Table P-75 Number of Cases in Which a Collection Was Made on an Obligation for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years 80

Table P-76 Cases Sent to Another State for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years 81

Table P-77 Cases Received from Another State for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years 82

Services Required

Table P-78 Cases Requiring Services to Establish a Support Order for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years 83

Table P-79 Children Requiring Paternity Determination Services for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years 84

Staff

Table P-80 Total Full-Time Equivalent Staff for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years 85

Table P-81 Full-Time Equivalent Staff by State and Local, Cooperative Agreement, and Privatized IV-D Offices for Two Consecutive Fiscal Years

86

Table P-82 Costs and Staff Associated with the Office of Child Support Enforcement for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years 87

Current Support

Table P-83 Amount of Current Support Due for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years 88

Table P-84 Amount of Support Distributed as Current Support for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years 89

Arrears

Table P-85 Total Amount of Arrearages Due for All Fiscal Years for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years 90

Table P-86 Total Amount of Support Distributed as Arrears for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years 91

Table P-87 Cases with Arrears Due for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years 92

Table P-88 Cases Paying Towards Arrears for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years 93

Table P-89 Certified Federal Offset Caseload and Arrearage Amount Totals, 2016 94

Non-Cooperation and Good Cause

Table P-90 Cases Open with a Determination of Non-Cooperation for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years 95

Table P-91 Cases Open with Good Cause Determinations for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years 96

Children

Table P-92 Children with Paternity Resolved for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years 97

5

Appendix Section

Table P-93 Total Number of Children in IV-D Cases for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years 98

Table P-94 Number of Children Determined Eligible For Medicaid for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years 99

Table P-95 Number of Children Determined Eligible For Medicaid Covered by Private Health Insurance for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years

100

Federal Parent Locator Service

Table P-96 Tax Offset and Administrative Offset Programs (TANF and Non-TANF Combined), 2016 101

Table P-97 Federal Parent Locator Service (FPLS), FY 2016 102

Table P-98 Federal Parent Locator Service (FPLS), 2016 103

Table P-99 Federal Parent Locator Service (FPLS) National Directory of New Hires (NDNH), FY 2016 104

Table P-100 Federal Parent Locator Service (FPLS) Number of Cases in the FCR, FY 2016 105

Table P-101 Federal Parent Locator Service (FPLS) Number of Unique Persons in the FCR by Participant Type, FY 2016 106

Table P-102 Federal Parent Locator Service (FPLS) Number of Unique Persons (NCPs and PFs) in the FCR Matched by Participant Type, FY 2016

107

Table P-103 Federal Parent Locator Service (FPLS) Net Collections - Federal Offset Program, 2016 108

Table P-104 Federal Parent Locator Service (FPLS) Number of Offsets - Federal Offset Program, 2016 109

Table P-105 Federal Parent Locator Service (FPLS) Number of Unique Persons With Known and Unknown SSN Located through the FPLS, FY 2016

110

Table P-106 Federal Parent Locator Service (FPLS) Number of Unique Persons With Unknown SSN Located through the FPLS, FY 2016

111

Glossary 112

Appendix - Incentive Formulas and Forms 119

6

FY 2016 CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT PRELIMINARY REPORT

Program Overview

Table P-1 Financial Overview for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years

2012 2013 2014 2015 2016DISTRIBUTED COLLECTIONS $27,719,045,787 $28,006,600,190 $28,199,056,113 $28,559,134,175 $28,834,212,099

Current Assistance IV-A and IV-E $960,541,144 $908,280,972 $846,853,251 $808,350,174 $771,390,007

Former Assistance IV-A and IV-E $8,888,602,104 $8,772,460,744 $8,819,373,154 $8,958,517,382 $8,867,831,169

Medicaid Never Assistance $6,111,179,415 $6,944,526,335 $7,072,012,564 $7,367,706,101 $7,903,952,045

Never Assistance $11,758,723,124 $11,381,332,139 $11,460,817,144 $11,424,560,518 $11,291,038,878

BY DISTRIBUTION METHOD TOTALS

Payments to Families or Foster Care 6 $25,565,885,575 $25,950,247,514 $26,210,942,807 $26,591,803,103 $26,879,612,362

Total Medical Support 6 $418,513,672 $464,021,868 $482,509,967 $510,885,574 $540,206,041

Total Passed Through $122,204,707 $122,895,682 $118,136,280 $111,925,881 $105,130,710

Total Fees Withheld by State 7 $48,842,013 $51,148,037 $52,156,148 $52,979,465 $53,443,370

Total Assistance Reimbursement 1 $1,563,599,820 $1,418,287,089 $1,335,310,911 $1,291,540,152 $1,255,819,616

State Share $687,137,518 $626,957,254 $591,842,017 $574,241,665 $558,722,603

Federal Share $876,462,302 $791,329,835 $743,468,894 $717,298,487 $697,097,013

BY ASSISTANCE CLASSIFICATION

Current Assistance Collections 2 $960,541,144 $908,280,972 $846,853,251 $808,350,174 $771,390,007

Passed Through $120,499,898 $121,315,978 $116,795,342 $109,688,151 $102,779,141

Assistance Reimbursement $645,853,818 $596,905,851 $561,382,869 $539,759,675 $511,980,470

Medical Support 6 $30,615,959 $34,607,529 $14,666,596 $8,179,123 $7,144,039

Payment to Families or Foster Care 6 $163,571,469 $155,451,614 $154,008,444 $150,723,225 $149,486,357

Former Assistance Collections 3 $8,888,602,104 $8,772,460,744 $8,819,373,154 $8,958,517,382 $8,867,831,169

Passed Through $1,704,809 $1,579,704 $1,340,938 $2,237,730 $2,351,569

Assistance Reimbursement $917,746,002 $821,381,238 $773,928,042 $751,780,477 $743,839,146

Medical Support 6 $124,142,248 $131,841,651 $140,320,739 $146,366,246 $147,138,522

Payment to Families or Foster Care 6 $7,845,009,045 $7,817,658,151 $7,903,783,435 $8,058,132,929 $7,974,501,932

Medicaid Never Assistance Collections 4 $6,111,179,415 $6,944,526,335 $7,072,012,564 $7,367,706,101 $7,903,952,045

Medical Support $160,343,526 $187,684,853 $210,442,466 $235,260,111 $259,649,834

Payment to Families or Foster Care $5,933,994,380 $6,738,138,868 $6,842,130,283 $7,112,356,507 $7,623,246,515

Fees Withheld by State 7 $16,841,509 $18,702,614 $19,439,815 $20,089,483 $21,055,696

Never Assistance Collections 5 $11,758,723,124 $11,381,332,139 $11,460,817,144 $11,424,560,518 $11,291,038,878

Medical Support 6 $103,411,939 $109,887,835 $117,080,166 $121,080,094 $126,273,646

Payment to Families or Foster Care 6 $11,623,310,681 $11,238,998,881 $11,311,020,645 $11,270,590,442 $11,132,377,558

Fees Withheld by State 7 $32,000,504 $32,445,423 $32,716,333 $32,889,982 $32,387,674

ESTIMATED INCENTIVE PAYMENTS $450,383,057 $448,373,000 $533,833,251 $481,344,222 $480,173,272

TOTAL ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENDITURES $5,661,227,597 $5,588,313,627 $5,689,759,314 $5,748,694,920 $5,727,999,685

Federal Share $3,406,838,525 $3,343,841,573 $3,445,693,992 $3,474,050,434 $3,444,303,931

State Share $2,254,389,072 $2,244,472,054 $2,244,065,322 $2,274,644,486 $2,283,695,754

COST EFFECTIVENESS RATIO $5.19 $5.31 $5.25 $5.26 $5.33

Source: Forms OCSE-34A & OCSE-396A. Beginning fiscal year 2015, forms OCSE-34 & OCSE-396.

1 Total Assistance Reimbursement equals collections that will be divided between the State and Federal governments to reimburse their respective shares of either Title IV-A (TANF) payments or Title IV-E (Foster Care) maintenance payments. Form OCSE-34A - Part 1, line 7b, column G. Beginning fiscal year 2015, form OCSE-34 - Part 1, line 7b, column G.

2 Current Assistance Collections are those made on behalf of families currently receiving Title IV-A (TANF) or Title IV-E (Foster Care) assistance.

3 Former Assistance Collections are those made on behalf of families formerly receiving Title IV-A (TANF) or Title IV-E (Foster Care) assistance.

4 Medicaid Never Assistance Collections are those received and distributed on behalf of children who are receiving Child Support Enforcement services under Title IV-D of the Social Security Act, and who are either currently receiving or who have formerly received Medicaid payments under Title XIX of the Social Security Act, but who were not currently receiving and who have never formerly received assistance under either Title IV-A (TANF or AFDC) or Title IV-E (Foster Care) of the Social Security Act.

5 Never Assistance Collections are those made on behalf of families never receiving public assistance under TANF or Foster Care.

6 Alabama data adjusted based on revised data submitted after the final deadline for FY 2012.

7 North Carolina data adjusted for this report, based on revised data submitted after the final deadline for FY 2016.

7

Table P-2 Statistical Overview for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years

2012 2013 2014 2015 2016TOTAL IV-D CASELOAD 1 15,747,140 15,588,775 15,123,628 14,744,538 14,522,408

Current Assistance 1,886,135 1,792,757 1,693,601 1,550,234 1,415,414

Former Assistance 6,821,018 6,739,567 6,423,040 6,304,838 6,179,967

Never Assistance 7,039,987 7,056,451 7,006,987 6,889,466 6,927,027

CASES OPEN (line 1) 15,713,245 15,553,544 15,088,924 14,712,978 14,499,150

Current Assistance 1,878,516 1,784,642 1,685,413 1,543,063 1,408,649

Former Assistance 6,805,161 6,723,282 6,407,556 6,290,203 6,168,832

Never Assistance 7,029,568 7,045,620 6,995,955 6,879,712 6,921,669

CASES WITH NO JURISDICTION (line 3) 33,895 35,231 34,704 31,560 23,258

Current Assistance 7,619 8,115 8,188 7,171 6,765

Former Assistance 15,857 16,285 15,484 14,635 11,135

Never Assistance 10,419 10,831 11,032 9,754 5,358

NUMBER OF CHILDREN 17,156,552 16,899,994 16,337,739 15,898,934 15,562,306

TOTAL CASES WITH COLLECTIONS 9,215,021 NA 4 9,047,839 9,028,701 9,015,064

Current Assistance 659,678 NA 4 558,457 522,220 491,912

Former Assistance 3,934,848 NA 4 3,791,715 3,790,011 3,752,268

Never Assistance 4,620,495 NA 4 4,697,667 4,716,470 4,770,884

PERCENTAGE OF CASES WITH COLLECTIONS 58.6 NA 4 60.0 61.4 62.2

Current Assistance 35.1 NA 4 33.1 33.8 34.9

Former Assistance 57.8 NA 4 59.2 60.3 60.8

Never Assistance 65.7 NA 4 67.1 68.6 68.9

TOTAL CASES WITH ORDERS ESTABLISHED 12,872,311 12,920,344 12,779,273 12,613,822 12,537,234

Current Assistance 1,151,098 1,111,534 1,080,118 998,712 926,468

Former Assistance 5,958,088 5,941,891 5,751,474 5,688,342 5,624,280

Never Assistance 5,763,125 5,866,919 5,947,681 5,926,768 5,986,486

PERCENTAGE OF CASES WITH ORDERS ESTABLISHED 81.9 83.1 84.7 85.7 86.5

Current Assistance 61.3 62.3 64.1 64.7 65.8

Former Assistance 87.6 88.4 89.8 90.4 91.2

Never Assistance 82.0 83.3 85.0 86.1 86.5

PERCENTAGE OF CASES WITH COLLECTIONS TO CASES WITH ORDERS 71.6 NA 4 70.8 71.6 71.9

Current Assistance 57.3 NA 4 51.7 52.3 53.1

Former Assistance 66.0 NA 4 65.9 66.6 66.7

Never Assistance 80.2 NA 4 79.0 79.6 79.7

TOTAL PATERNITIES ESTABLISHED OR ACKNOWLEDGED 1,658,287 1,594,664 1,541,637 1,484,477 1,478,743

IV-D Paternities Established or Acknowledged 2 588,079 525,655 464,480 412,254 406,044

In-Hospital and Other Paternities Acknowledged 3 1,070,208 1,069,009 1,077,157 1,072,223 1,072,699

TOTAL SUPPORT ORDERS ESTABLISHED 1,204,644 1,142,204 1,068,725 1,016,267 981,028

Current Assistance 210,235 195,334 182,071 171,115 158,629

Former Assistance 366,467 343,216 312,232 294,260 276,660

Never Assistance 627,942 603,654 574,422 550,892 545,739

FULL-TIME EQUIVALENT STAFF 54,569 54,040 53,645 53,422 52,505

Source: Form OCSE-157.

1 Total IV-D Caseload combines lines 1 (cases open) and 3 (cases with no jurisdiction) of the OCSE-157 report.

2 Paternities Established or Acknowledged for the current year are reported on line 16 of the OCSE-157 report.

3 In-Hospital and Other Paternities Acknowledged are reported on line 10 of the OCSE-157 report and include an unknown number of acknowledgements for children in the IV-D caseload.

4 National data not available due to a reporting problem in two states. See table P-75 for data by state.

8

FY 2016 CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT PRELIMINARY REPORT

Table P-3 Program Trends for Three Consecutive Fiscal Years

Percent Change

2013 - 2014

Percent Change

2014 - 2015

Percent Change

2015 - 2016

2013 2014 2015 2016

DISTRIBUTED COLLECTIONS $28,006,600,190 $28,199,056,113 0.7% $28,559,134,175 1.3% $28,834,212,099 1.0%

Current Assistance IV-A and IV-E $908,280,972 $846,853,251 -6.8% $808,350,174 -4.5% $771,390,007 -4.6%

Former Assistance IV-A and IV-E $8,772,460,744 $8,819,373,154 0.5% $8,958,517,382 1.6% $8,867,831,169 -1.0%

Medicaid Never Assistance 1 $6,944,526,335 $7,072,012,564 1.8% $7,367,706,101 4.2% $7,903,952,045 7.3%

Never Assistance $11,381,332,139 $11,460,817,144 0.7% $11,424,560,518 -0.3% $11,291,038,878 -1.2%

TOTAL PAYMENTS TO FAMILIES 2 , 6 $26,537,165,064 $26,811,589,054 1.0% $27,214,614,558 1.5% $27,524,949,113 1.1%

TOTAL ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENDITURES

$5,588,313,627 $5,689,759,314 1.8% $5,748,694,920 1.0% $5,727,999,685 -0.4%

ADP Expenditures $648,107,150 $701,725,334 8.3% $689,020,850 -1.8% $709,418,407 3.0%

TOTAL IV-D CASELOAD 15,588,775 15,123,628 -3.0% 14,744,538 -2.5% 14,522,408 -1.5%

Current Assistance 1,792,757 1,693,601 -5.5% 1,550,234 -8.5% 1,415,414 -8.7%

Former Assistance 6,739,567 6,423,040 -4.7% 6,304,838 -1.8% 6,179,967 -2.0%

Never Assistance 7,056,451 7,006,987 -0.7% 6,889,466 -1.7% 6,927,027 0.5%

CASES WITH ORDERS ESTABLISHED 12,920,344 12,779,273 -1.1% 12,613,822 -1.3% 12,537,234 -0.6%

TOTAL CASES FOR WHICH A COLLECTION WAS MADE

NA 5 9,047,839 NA 5 9,028,701 -0.2% 9,015,064 -0.2%

Current Assistance NA 5 558,457 NA 5 522,220 -6.5% 491,912 -5.8%

Former Assistance NA 5 3,791,715 NA 5 3,790,011 0.0% 3,752,268 -1.0%

Never Assistance NA 5 4,697,667 NA 5 4,716,470 0.4% 4,770,884 1.2%

NUMBER OF CHILDREN 16,899,994 16,337,739 -3.3% 15,898,934 -2.7% 15,562,306 -2.1%

TOTAL PATERNITIES ESTABLISHED OR ACKNOWLEDGED

1,594,664 1,541,637 -3.3% 1,484,477 -3.7% 1,478,743 -0.4%

Paternities Established or Acknowledged 3

525,655 464,480 -11.6% 412,254 -11.2% 406,044 -1.5%

State In-Hospital and Other Paternities Acknowledged 4

1,069,009 1,077,157 0.8% 1,072,223 -0.5% 1,072,699 0

TOTAL SUPPORT ORDERS ESTABLISHED

1,142,204 1,068,725 -6.4% 1,016,267 -4.9% 981,028 -3.5%

Current Assistance 195,334 182,071 -6.8% 171,115 -6.0% 158,629 -7.3%

Former Assistance 343,216 312,232 -9.0% 294,260 -5.8% 276,660 -6.0%

Never Assistance 603,654 574,422 -4.8% 550,892 -4.1% 545,739 -0.9%

FULL-TIME EQUIVALENT STAFF 54,040 53,645 -0.7% 53,422 -0.4% 52,505 -1.7%

Source: Financial and Statistical data as reported by the States.

1 Medicaid Never Assistance collections are those made on behalf of children who are receiving Child Support Enforcement services under Title IV-D of the Social Security Act, and who are either currently receiving or who have formerly received Medicaid payments under Title XIX of the Social Security Act, but who are not currently receiving and who have never formerly received assistance under either Title IV-A (TANF or AFDC) or Title IV-E (Foster Care) of the Social Security Act.

2 Includes payments to families or foster care, medical support, and pass-through.

3 Paternities Established or Acknowledged for the current year are reported on line 16.

4 In-Hospital and other Paternity Acknowledgements are reported on line 10 of the OCSE-157 report and include an unknown number of acknowledgements for children in the IV-D caseload.

5 National data not available due to a reporting problem in two states. See table P-75 for data by state.

9

Program Collections

Table P-4 Total Distributed Collections for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years

STATES 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016ALABAMA $290,572,812 $292,851,132 $305,979,180 $320,480,355 $325,009,128

ALASKA 99,583,102 96,778,053 96,470,329 99,574,780 99,600,932

ARIZONA 323,093,647 322,560,931 317,199,298 313,943,546 312,073,959

ARKANSAS 219,645,476 227,060,980 230,001,139 234,810,293 231,187,031

CALIFORNIA 2,208,751,449 2,205,953,985 2,208,197,922 2,247,498,866 2,311,471,682

COLORADO 293,245,061 300,914,154 309,678,517 318,996,217 321,101,279

CONNECTICUT 245,369,851 242,343,350 239,004,703 242,487,423 245,530,131

DELAWARE 74,451,056 74,899,868 73,903,748 75,417,449 75,986,354

DIST. OF COL. 50,365,472 48,140,992 47,357,275 47,343,430 47,110,099

FLORIDA 1,466,273,345 1,488,746,417 1,450,639,777 1,443,751,002 1,477,346,218

GEORGIA 647,282,139 646,823,263 658,549,802 678,646,491 690,988,211

GUAM 13,534,698 11,689,948 12,185,681 10,748,158 9,763,397

HAWAII 96,191,283 96,165,788 97,700,940 98,888,615 99,425,230

IDAHO 151,981,715 159,592,372 161,391,527 169,281,382 171,537,029

ILLINOIS 802,971,010 805,882,656 805,081,568 807,772,022 811,743,030

INDIANA 580,545,272 568,000,950 556,624,325 553,887,280 549,292,842

IOWA 313,319,066 311,829,311 308,319,557 307,628,096 307,779,154

KANSAS 189,363,684 188,717,689 182,077,612 182,652,580 187,350,486

KENTUCKY 389,349,338 381,686,118 381,682,114 383,607,980 379,507,355

LOUISIANA 380,063,605 388,552,815 394,004,210 406,865,602 397,885,269

MAINE 99,657,835 98,477,135 96,570,225 98,680,730 100,753,458

MARYLAND 514,934,157 518,529,331 527,997,612 533,041,437 534,748,108

MASSACHUSETTS 604,380,725 612,779,716 619,591,585 626,665,708 634,750,462

MICHIGAN 1,320,275,023 1,296,510,912 1,314,094,928 1,324,213,639 1,328,650,378

MINNESOTA 582,324,840 584,830,863 584,663,171 583,371,957 575,056,824

MISSISSIPPI 299,798,756 302,481,524 309,697,386 322,142,959 328,139,566

MISSOURI 573,548,550 571,368,166 575,683,350 596,717,964 596,454,203

MONTANA 59,935,863 60,812,705 61,057,236 62,718,670 60,586,661

NEBRASKA 200,318,373 203,717,713 205,231,434 206,767,027 206,148,541

NEVADA 171,931,117 175,388,845 175,807,832 179,728,430 183,853,843

NEW HAMPSHIRE 83,176,973 82,463,070 81,882,654 78,122,974 76,548,067

NEW JERSEY 1,131,352,192 1,140,851,723 1,146,736,488 1,154,241,606 1,154,277,540

NEW MEXICO 112,170,094 114,839,125 118,649,455 121,805,960 121,491,197

NEW YORK 1,703,265,881 1,694,254,663 1,697,340,934 1,701,208,206 1,750,878,995

NORTH CAROLINA 662,096,486 663,887,308 655,469,608 661,805,785 663,210,244

NORTH DAKOTA 89,592,169 92,256,930 95,110,175 96,939,840 96,264,449

OHIO 1,697,143,384 1,704,229,238 1,680,821,856 1,662,243,146 1,651,453,068

OKLAHOMA 315,117,057 329,779,861 338,582,208 348,822,105 342,044,816

OREGON 349,474,272 353,042,802 357,382,407 354,419,271 359,706,112

PENNSYLVANIA 1,320,237,119 1,300,546,352 1,263,370,002 1,247,383,434 1,240,481,754

PUERTO RICO 336,840,678 332,069,166 334,919,932 328,304,424 336,108,619

RHODE ISLAND 66,339,200 69,200,964 71,235,761 73,768,669 74,327,824

SOUTH CAROLINA 255,318,273 242,271,997 259,070,133 276,692,044 287,578,479

SOUTH DAKOTA 86,280,610 88,856,419 90,759,898 92,266,271 91,900,750

TENNESSEE 555,988,101 580,403,541 593,728,173 601,662,972 604,695,788

TEXAS 3,320,420,591 3,541,224,895 3,706,766,136 3,869,737,092 3,975,425,586

UTAH 194,717,309 200,149,786 205,110,708 208,930,091 212,273,414

VERMONT 45,987,161 45,014,073 45,135,618 44,091,884 43,660,064

VIRGIN ISLANDS 8,186,414 7,928,193 7,300,367 6,698,268 6,913,628

VIRGINIA 606,627,426 606,514,260 611,649,574 610,461,256 607,383,240

WASHINGTON 644,113,060 651,731,719 641,623,544 637,489,204 640,491,685

WEST VIRGINIA 195,410,794 196,524,715 195,985,384 199,206,476 188,496,816

WISCONSIN 611,876,491 620,140,452 628,435,812 639,018,256 645,190,808

WYOMING 64,255,732 64,331,256 65,545,303 65,484,853 62,578,296

TOTALS $27,719,045,787 $28,006,600,190 $28,199,056,113 $28,559,134,175 $28,834,212,099

Source: Form OCSE-34A - Part 1, line 8, column G. Beginning fiscal year 2015, form OCSE-34 - Part 1, line 8, column G.

10

FY 2016 CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT PRELIMINARY REPORT

Table P-5 Cumulative Total Distributed Collections Fiscal Years 1976 - 2016

FISCAL YEAR Total Distributed Collections

Cumulative Total Distributed

Collections

Difference Between Years

Percent Change

1976 $692,549,785 NA NA NA

1977 863,704,311 $1,556,254,096 $171,154,526 24.7%

1978 1,047,981,403 2,604,235,499 184,277,092 21.3

1979 1,333,259,009 3,937,494,508 285,277,606 27.2

1980 1,477,699,706 5,415,194,214 144,440,697 10.8

1981 1,628,927,417 7,044,121,631 151,227,711 10.2

1982 1,770,378,096 8,814,499,727 141,450,679 8.7

1983 2,024,183,962 10,838,683,689 253,805,866 14.3

1984 2,378,087,644 13,216,771,333 353,903,682 17.5

1985 2,693,528,089 15,910,299,422 315,440,445 13.3

1986 3,244,595,476 19,154,894,898 551,067,387 20.5

1987 3,917,497,904 23,072,392,802 672,902,428 20.7

1988 4,613,439,769 27,685,832,571 695,941,865 17.8

1989 5,249,751,330 32,935,583,901 636,311,561 13.8

1990 6,010,124,882 38,945,708,783 760,373,552 14.5

1991 6,885,618,975 45,831,327,758 875,494,093 14.6

1992 7,964,521,800 53,795,849,558 1,078,902,825 15.7

1993 8,908,123,099 62,703,972,657 943,601,299 11.8

1994 9,850,200,000 72,554,172,657 942,076,901 10.6

1995 10,827,167,179 83,381,339,836 976,967,179 9.9

1996 12,019,789,424 95,401,129,260 1,192,622,245 11.0

1997 13,363,971,702 108,765,100,962 1,344,182,278 11.2

1998 14,347,706,681 123,112,807,643 983,734,979 7.4

1999 15,901,201,077 139,014,008,720 1,553,494,396 10.8

2000 17,854,271,522 156,868,280,242 1,953,070,445 12.3

2001 18,957,597,108 175,825,877,350 1,103,325,586 6.2

2002 20,136,867,071 195,962,744,421 1,179,269,963 6.2

2003 21,176,389,882 217,139,134,303 1,039,522,811 5.2

2004 21,861,258,876 239,000,393,179 684,868,994 3.2

2005 23,005,880,131 262,006,273,310 1,144,621,255 5.2

2006 23,933,384,257 285,939,657,567 927,504,126 4.0

2007 24,854,768,488 310,794,426,055 921,384,231 3.8

2008 26,560,705,860 337,355,131,915 1,705,937,372 6.9

2009 26,385,592,827 363,740,724,742 -175,113,033 -0.7

2010 26,555,741,023 390,296,465,765 170,148,196 0.6

2011 27,296,685,029 417,593,150,794 740,944,006 2.8

2012 27,719,045,787 445,312,196,581 422,360,758 1.5

2013 28,006,600,190 473,318,796,771 287,554,403 1.0

2014 28,199,056,113 501,517,852,884 192,455,923 0.7

2015 28,559,134,175 530,076,987,059 360,078,062 1.3

2016 28,834,212,099 558,911,199,158 275,077,924 1.0

Source: Financial Collection Forms.

NA - Not Available.

11

Table P-6 Distributed Current Assistance Collections for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years 1

STATES 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016ALABAMA $6,840,660 $6,102,788 $5,347,168 $4,628,888 $4,116,704

ALASKA 4,246,875 3,796,162 3,639,307 3,793,433 3,857,714

ARIZONA 3,764,921 3,756,261 2,836,405 1,633,168 1,303,185

ARKANSAS 3,549,774 3,469,790 3,020,439 2,964,655 2,532,949

CALIFORNIA 290,480,413 273,816,940 266,006,534 265,537,985 259,719,078

COLORADO 11,017,392 10,569,818 11,113,943 11,059,877 10,361,034

CONNECTICUT 15,623,931 15,075,756 15,148,827 15,128,581 15,877,077

DELAWARE 3,433,789 3,329,950 2,546,646 2,342,289 2,602,597

DIST. OF COL. 6,154,838 5,852,171 5,455,049 5,081,585 4,995,253

FLORIDA 22,985,475 26,695,894 24,114,143 22,631,088 21,292,634

GEORGIA 10,735,226 9,818,415 9,403,786 9,190,643 9,339,292

GUAM 1,922,075 1,197,843 1,118,439 979,587 763,544

HAWAII 4,647,700 4,731,335 4,536,374 4,638,191 4,451,881

IDAHO 1,883,750 1,860,457 1,722,203 1,745,808 1,873,415

ILLINOIS 14,184,363 14,712,376 15,202,010 15,170,300 13,009,078

INDIANA 4,630,234 3,803,980 3,343,655 3,334,728 3,133,951

IOWA 8,800,649 7,795,304 6,847,759 6,213,530 5,792,097

KANSAS 7,850,220 5,882,735 4,618,291 4,103,550 3,879,490

KENTUCKY 20,917,911 21,116,033 22,402,574 21,634,588 20,419,273

LOUISIANA 6,440,059 5,129,736 4,167,535 3,921,329 3,568,041

MAINE 12,390,547 8,441,906 6,783,422 5,757,995 4,921,413

MARYLAND 12,916,722 12,216,919 12,902,938 12,717,271 12,064,137

MASSACHUSETTS 28,416,515 27,101,710 24,368,278 20,438,613 17,980,695

MICHIGAN 23,471,147 18,164,631 14,242,917 12,378,089 10,286,547

MINNESOTA 12,634,621 11,744,702 10,810,689 11,019,061 16,322,793

MISSISSIPPI 3,721,683 2,973,786 2,646,645 2,350,270 2,152,918

MISSOURI 17,433,668 15,492,237 12,212,205 11,693,867 7,297,538

MONTANA 2,230,673 1,895,695 1,944,020 1,977,947 2,071,186

NEBRASKA 4,043,463 3,680,231 3,422,734 3,452,277 3,442,652

NEVADA 3,619,015 3,402,845 3,591,570 3,301,741 3,124,385

NEW HAMPSHIRE 3,229,200 2,689,673 2,289,250 2,047,569 1,768,053

NEW JERSEY 26,132,298 24,050,684 21,980,164 20,437,334 16,126,611

NEW MEXICO 4,589,787 3,782,359 3,441,595 3,144,178 3,018,504

NEW YORK 59,396,163 57,164,634 55,461,062 56,514,179 57,558,036

NORTH CAROLINA 10,673,186 10,140,247 9,494,542 9,406,645 8,879,833

NORTH DAKOTA 1,768,866 1,429,997 1,525,815 1,443,517 1,306,821

OHIO 54,464,004 54,412,707 34,484,084 30,072,643 30,952,894

OKLAHOMA 5,015,585 4,981,568 4,942,833 5,144,472 4,926,389

OREGON 21,526,107 23,526,215 24,265,800 19,640,523 17,953,809

PENNSYLVANIA 39,764,013 36,586,437 33,197,433 32,305,116 30,614,777

PUERTO RICO 2,397,431 2,254,841 2,335,667 2,686,676 2,837,378

RHODE ISLAND 3,004,178 2,999,835 2,961,561 2,755,394 2,399,118

SOUTH CAROLINA 12,659,807 10,895,763 11,184,552 11,822,525 11,816,080

SOUTH DAKOTA 1,951,853 2,053,994 2,019,900 2,029,608 2,083,844

TENNESSEE 45,696,331 45,735,672 45,197,758 40,713,267 36,636,359

TEXAS 10,583,046 9,175,351 7,399,697 5,578,483 4,680,590

UTAH 5,084,393 4,461,104 4,381,077 4,197,503 4,355,987

VERMONT 2,534,757 2,479,231 2,350,446 2,129,576 2,343,052

VIRGIN ISLANDS 92,653 83,375 92,588 87,545 89,590

VIRGINIA 21,026,110 19,373,584 17,609,481 16,562,068 14,898,385

WASHINGTON 28,992,170 26,037,214 22,113,358 18,239,875 17,877,847

WEST VIRGINIA 6,640,019 6,398,490 6,110,826 5,541,109 4,805,761

WISCONSIN 21,601,947 23,176,083 25,755,873 24,284,401 20,250,422

WYOMING 728,931 763,508 741,384 745,034 657,316

TOTALS $960,541,144 $908,280,972 $846,853,251 $808,350,174 $771,390,007

Source: Form OCSE-34A - Part 1, line 8, columns (A+B). Beginning fiscal year 2015, form OCSE-34 - Part 1, line 8, columns (A+B).

1 Current Assistance includes collections for families currently receiving IV-A TANF or IV-E Foster Care collections.

12

FY 2016 CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT PRELIMINARY REPORT

Table P-7 Distributed Former Assistance Collections for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years 1

STATES 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016ALABAMA $108,659,914 $108,980,588 $114,475,312 $120,273,126 $121,472,377

ALASKA 39,588,339 36,541,891 35,367,040 35,887,397 35,960,626

ARIZONA 174,405,008 169,662,570 163,140,464 158,107,206 152,065,270

ARKANSAS 65,138,950 64,410,975 62,945,123 63,102,085 60,401,283

CALIFORNIA 1,027,084,815 1,026,815,364 1,025,813,555 1,054,811,527 1,102,740,250

COLORADO 101,184,837 98,902,833 96,841,318 96,707,212 95,553,711

CONNECTICUT 136,202,115 132,460,067 129,239,392 131,505,461 134,322,882

DELAWARE 23,750,254 23,346,521 13,395,695 15,749,608 15,981,994

DIST. OF COL. 21,327,074 20,372,791 20,146,548 20,752,340 20,862,826

FLORIDA 543,258,991 626,242,093 725,134,425 855,531,131 820,075,618

GEORGIA 291,084,488 276,899,089 274,628,537 275,349,318 272,048,927

GUAM 3,231,405 2,598,334 2,483,583 2,126,376 1,796,666

HAWAII 42,850,354 41,726,060 42,581,170 43,039,007 42,735,949

IDAHO 22,998,924 22,449,650 20,184,173 19,480,349 18,259,830

ILLINOIS 222,811,819 212,877,367 203,653,025 187,818,552 186,139,305

INDIANA 225,146,806 211,920,454 198,842,068 190,552,791 179,933,108

IOWA 134,280,541 130,391,638 126,067,101 123,089,779 119,811,363

KANSAS 100,771,547 98,130,312 92,791,615 90,560,265 91,062,886

KENTUCKY 151,876,288 139,805,313 133,424,720 133,588,891 130,728,322

LOUISIANA 138,597,605 132,543,637 126,584,545 124,556,932 115,736,419

MAINE 51,954,753 54,754,015 53,813,537 55,611,126 56,650,743

MARYLAND 90,657,459 89,929,215 90,841,275 92,019,475 93,901,379

MASSACHUSETTS 212,662,657 209,209,318 210,356,578 211,835,051 211,980,303

MICHIGAN 419,861,926 398,730,403 385,342,809 382,216,664 380,739,033

MINNESOTA 238,832,104 230,526,170 224,048,958 219,395,509 207,431,458

MISSISSIPPI 76,533,160 74,079,482 73,264,420 73,412,976 72,568,465

MISSOURI 238,421,693 233,008,990 230,852,151 236,947,887 237,109,295

MONTANA 24,894,237 24,282,177 23,167,557 23,388,948 21,258,959

NEBRASKA 83,549,566 82,953,666 82,769,721 81,718,420 80,142,027

NEVADA 41,785,318 42,458,420 42,817,430 44,941,875 47,265,069

NEW HAMPSHIRE 35,054,602 34,106,485 33,552,499 31,241,211 30,510,022

NEW JERSEY 263,117,505 255,882,575 249,962,509 250,582,389 251,571,919

NEW MEXICO 56,797,330 58,877,727 61,005,659 62,347,684 60,820,460

NEW YORK 395,548,832 374,831,139 365,372,096 359,645,067 366,186,076

NORTH CAROLINA 2 259,700,951 246,502,927 230,908,287 222,876,697 214,791,667

NORTH DAKOTA 29,573,792 29,276,889 27,989,822 26,867,149 25,099,267

OHIO 446,580,619 440,544,876 434,351,290 427,750,672 424,419,262

OKLAHOMA 95,821,506 93,978,933 89,398,033 87,187,676 80,774,896

OREGON 102,032,261 106,885,696 114,913,046 117,472,050 116,643,075

PENNSYLVANIA 286,761,185 269,896,076 251,322,206 242,555,941 237,447,387

PUERTO RICO 13,411,800 13,231,746 13,947,288 13,815,824 15,279,715

RHODE ISLAND 37,070,031 37,072,119 36,771,917 37,290,872 37,415,937

SOUTH CAROLINA 112,793,225 110,864,101 116,685,092 124,974,500 127,558,081

SOUTH DAKOTA 41,485,580 41,793,917 42,320,556 42,038,025 41,669,495

TENNESSEE 126,080,889 128,372,843 238,764,651 281,001,931 288,945,926

TEXAS 775,337,438 767,546,945 750,256,150 733,608,896 698,558,477

UTAH 70,228,146 68,596,346 67,547,019 65,869,064 63,925,799

VERMONT 23,357,184 22,288,742 22,327,069 21,495,230 20,872,516

VIRGIN ISLANDS 1,172,570 1,154,612 1,067,114 972,039 1,096,528

VIRGINIA 184,934,978 184,328,548 187,178,113 187,440,693 186,187,660

WASHINGTON 259,095,355 259,725,472 254,174,745 251,802,500 250,188,444

WEST VIRGINIA 76,318,843 74,518,593 73,076,033 72,417,660 67,689,571

WISCONSIN 129,218,432 122,892,890 120,030,358 122,548,321 123,959,522

WYOMING 13,706,103 12,281,144 11,437,757 10,638,007 9,483,124

TOTALS $8,888,602,104 $8,772,460,744 $8,819,373,154 $8,958,517,382 $8,867,831,169

Source: Form OCSE-34A - Part 1, line 8, columns (C+D). Beginning fiscal year 2015, form OCSE-34 - Part 1, line 8, columns (C+D).

1 Former Assistance includes collections for families formerly receiving IV-A TANF or IV-E Foster Care Assistance.

2 North Carolina data adjusted for this report, based on revised data submitted after the final deadline for FY 2016.

13

Table P-8 Distributed Medicaid Never Assistance Collections for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years 1

STATES 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016ALABAMA 0 $1,747 $887 $817 $816

ALASKA 152,720 227,721 198,682 183,895 166,216

ARIZONA 17,234,674 20,668,795 24,872,531 27,936,880 27,303,722

ARKANSAS 116,496,152 124,824,673 130,364,548 133,867,372 132,675,747

CALIFORNIA 77,789,659 80,520,542 86,681,089 82,308,958 62,147,627

COLORADO 2,708,231 2,194,634 1,660,437 1,401,058 1,213,463

CONNECTICUT 52,726,051 55,805,666 57,980,537 59,317,374 57,349,964

DELAWARE 14,092,003 14,277,458 19,545,014 23,748,613 27,080,716

DIST. OF COL. 9,901,659 10,100,482 10,562,601 10,944,516 11,244,861

FLORIDA 619,285,645 680,657,220 521,126,048 393,643,246 452,349,523

GEORGIA 165,630,934 179,241,488 195,216,994 222,606,092 244,100,913

GUAM 0 0 0 0 0

HAWAII 2,835,187 3,106,066 3,037,990 3,044,352 2,873,047

IDAHO 56,826,236 65,539,545 73,250,646 82,485,745 86,295,954

ILLINOIS 235,718,840 250,118,047 250,791,292 242,858,609 245,965,592

INDIANA 158,945,932 161,226,903 199,653,766 233,934,892 246,113,235

IOWA 105,574,676 108,346,944 110,413,352 115,624,257 120,316,528

KANSAS 58,363,547 62,543,629 63,871,189 67,769,526 70,489,719

KENTUCKY 78,517,610 99,417,128 110,636,840 107,844,945 102,003,396

LOUISIANA 158,262,441 170,102,027 182,637,284 203,098,041 204,112,950

MAINE 10,516,326 12,863,121 14,372,906 15,175,583 15,561,502

MARYLAND 0 0 0 0 59,962,925

MASSACHUSETTS 14,283,126 14,897,938 15,317,089 15,919,521 16,486,442

MICHIGAN 403,342,574 423,538,598 445,893,312 474,474,858 493,562,154

MINNESOTA 163,408,348 179,573,293 190,112,529 192,651,297 188,437,172

MISSISSIPPI 5,418,193 72,669,375 76,101,997 73,236,886 69,331,854

MISSOURI 190,953,733 196,134,188 200,450,537 200,271,913 189,715,656

MONTANA 5,126,180 5,418,781 5,701,736 5,625,854 5,567,239

NEBRASKA 76,698,607 81,598,308 84,596,418 87,825,341 89,658,831

NEVADA 41,881,411 44,164,038 44,364,946 42,820,718 40,483,401

NEW HAMPSHIRE 20,292,640 21,861,943 23,336,135 23,551,280 23,834,467

NEW JERSEY 10,153,887 12,077,119 13,439,736 13,491,973 13,138,938

NEW MEXICO 17,799,063 19,087,635 19,571,254 18,578,311 17,304,122

NEW YORK 124,787,934 413,194,112 465,859,220 501,191,130 546,284,214

NORTH CAROLINA 2 237,053,226 253,690,775 264,845,550 279,086,478 288,185,976

NORTH DAKOTA 37,018,066 39,100,049 40,324,830 39,556,808 36,408,244

OHIO 328,203,940 346,719,066 343,878,069 376,310,304 485,710,091

OKLAHOMA 156,118,365 173,181,415 187,658,597 199,834,555 202,211,689

OREGON 43,704,404 44,465,029 45,065,774 41,767,766 41,523,765

PENNSYLVANIA 246,327,944 243,973,176 327,950,535 376,604,312 411,535,779

PUERTO RICO 0 0 0 0 0

RHODE ISLAND 11,602,200 13,017,102 14,426,963 16,144,576 16,582,948

SOUTH CAROLINA 43,135,731 44,783,218 47,538,834 49,579,713 46,844,398

SOUTH DAKOTA 23,734,359 24,098,808 24,038,518 26,435,335 26,992,177

TENNESSEE 215,982,595 237,825,745 146,047,849 111,534,806 106,957,132

TEXAS 1,058,957,697 1,215,537,522 1,360,341,098 1,526,943,493 1,650,309,895

UTAH 60,098,045 65,297,297 72,156,465 79,480,965 84,806,494

VERMONT 2,297,155 2,345,925 2,149,311 1,979,143 1,780,342

VIRGIN ISLANDS 17,923 8,182 14,689 14,059 15,135

VIRGINIA 121,179,802 126,207,737 117,622,336 113,677,231 78,832,127

WASHINGTON 93,087,534 99,566,296 -6,543 1,863 110,501,089

WEST VIRGINIA 63,293,527 63,656,274 64,821,649 70,981,901 66,645,843

WISCONSIN 335,596,342 347,647,173 355,420,210 364,860,825 370,802,146

WYOMING 18,046,341 17,406,382 16,098,288 15,478,115 14,173,869

TOTALS $6,111,179,415 $6,944,526,335 $7,072,012,564 $7,367,706,101 $7,903,952,045

Source: Form OCSE-34A - Part 1, line 8, column E. Beginning fiscal year 2015, form OCSE-34 - Part 1, line 8, column E.

1 Medicaid Never Assistance Collections are those received and distributed on behalf of children who are receiving Child Support Enforcement services under Title IV-D of the Social Security Act, and who are either currently receiving or who have formerly received Medicaid payments under Title XIX of the Social Security Act, but who are not currently receiving and who have never formerly received assistance under either Title IV-A (TANF or AFDC) or Title IV-E (Foster Care) of the Social Security Act.

2 North Carolina data adjusted for this report, based on revised data submitted after the final deadline for FY 2016.

14

FY 2016 CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT PRELIMINARY REPORT

Table P-9 Distributed Never Assistance Collections for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years 1

STATES 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016ALABAMA $175,072,238 $177,766,009 $186,155,813 $195,577,524 $199,419,231

ALASKA 55,595,168 56,212,279 57,265,300 59,710,055 59,616,376

ARIZONA 127,689,044 128,473,305 126,349,898 126,266,292 131,401,782

ARKANSAS 34,460,600 34,355,542 33,671,029 34,876,181 35,577,052

CALIFORNIA 813,396,562 824,801,139 829,696,744 844,840,396 886,864,727

COLORADO 178,334,601 189,246,869 200,062,819 209,828,070 213,973,071

CONNECTICUT 40,817,754 39,001,861 36,635,947 36,536,007 37,980,208

DELAWARE 33,175,010 33,945,939 38,416,393 33,576,939 30,321,047

DIST. OF COL. 12,981,901 11,815,548 11,193,077 10,564,989 10,007,159

FLORIDA 280,743,234 155,151,210 180,265,161 171,945,537 183,628,443

GEORGIA 179,831,491 180,864,271 179,300,485 171,500,438 165,499,079

GUAM 8,381,218 7,893,771 8,583,659 7,642,195 7,203,187

HAWAII 45,858,042 46,602,327 47,545,406 48,167,065 49,364,353

IDAHO 70,272,805 69,742,720 66,234,505 65,569,480 65,107,830

ILLINOIS 330,255,988 328,174,866 335,435,241 361,924,561 366,629,055

INDIANA 191,822,300 191,049,613 154,784,836 126,064,869 120,112,548

IOWA 64,663,200 65,295,425 64,991,345 62,700,530 61,859,166

KANSAS 22,378,370 22,161,013 20,796,517 20,219,239 21,918,391

KENTUCKY 138,037,529 121,347,644 115,217,980 120,539,556 126,356,364

LOUISIANA 76,763,500 80,777,415 80,614,846 75,289,300 74,467,859

MAINE 24,796,209 22,418,093 21,600,360 22,136,026 23,619,800

MARYLAND 411,359,976 416,383,197 424,253,399 428,304,691 368,819,667

MASSACHUSETTS 349,018,427 361,570,750 369,549,640 378,472,523 388,303,022

MICHIGAN 473,599,376 456,077,280 468,615,890 455,144,028 444,062,644

MINNESOTA 167,449,767 162,986,698 159,690,995 160,306,090 162,865,401

MISSISSIPPI 214,125,720 152,758,881 157,684,324 173,142,827 184,086,329

MISSOURI 126,739,456 126,732,751 132,168,457 147,804,297 162,331,714

MONTANA 27,684,773 29,216,052 30,243,923 31,725,921 31,689,277

NEBRASKA 36,026,737 35,485,508 34,442,561 33,770,989 32,905,031

NEVADA 84,645,373 85,363,542 85,033,886 88,664,096 92,980,988

NEW HAMPSHIRE 24,600,531 23,804,969 22,704,770 21,282,914 20,435,525

NEW JERSEY 831,948,502 848,841,345 861,354,079 869,729,910 873,440,072

NEW MEXICO 32,983,914 33,091,404 34,630,947 37,735,787 40,348,111

NEW YORK 1,123,532,952 849,064,778 810,648,556 783,857,830 780,850,669

NORTH CAROLINA 2 154,669,123 153,553,359 150,221,229 150,435,965 151,352,768

NORTH DAKOTA 21,231,445 22,449,995 25,269,708 29,072,366 33,450,117

OHIO 867,894,821 862,552,589 868,108,413 828,109,527 710,370,821

OKLAHOMA 58,161,601 57,637,945 56,582,745 56,655,402 54,131,842

OREGON 182,211,500 178,165,862 173,137,787 175,538,932 183,585,463

PENNSYLVANIA 747,383,977 750,090,663 650,899,828 595,918,065 560,883,811

PUERTO RICO 321,031,447 316,582,579 318,636,977 311,801,924 317,991,526

RHODE ISLAND 14,662,791 16,111,908 17,075,320 17,577,827 17,929,821

SOUTH CAROLINA 86,729,510 75,728,915 83,661,655 90,315,306 101,359,920

SOUTH DAKOTA 19,108,818 20,909,700 22,380,924 21,763,303 21,155,234

TENNESSEE 168,228,286 168,469,281 163,717,915 168,412,968 172,156,371

TEXAS 1,475,542,410 1,548,965,077 1,588,769,191 1,603,606,220 1,621,876,624

UTAH 59,306,725 61,795,039 61,026,147 59,382,559 59,185,134

VERMONT 17,798,065 17,900,175 18,308,792 18,487,935 18,664,154

VIRGIN ISLANDS 6,903,268 6,682,024 6,125,976 5,624,625 5,712,375

VIRGINIA 279,486,536 276,604,391 289,239,644 292,781,264 327,465,068

WASHINGTON 262,938,001 266,402,737 365,341,984 367,444,966 261,924,305

WEST VIRGINIA 49,158,405 51,951,358 51,976,876 50,265,806 49,355,641

WISCONSIN 125,459,770 126,424,306 127,229,371 127,324,709 130,178,718

WYOMING 31,774,357 33,880,222 37,267,874 38,623,697 38,263,987

TOTALS $11,758,723,124 $11,381,332,139 $11,460,817,144 $11,424,560,518 $11,291,038,878

Source: Form OCSE-34A - Part 1, line 8, column F. Beginning fiscal year 2015, form OCSE-34 - Part 1, line 8, column F.

1 Never Assistance collections are those made on behalf of families never receiving public assistance under TANF or Foster Care.

2 North Carolina data adjusted for this report, based on revised data submitted after the final deadline for FY 2016.

15

Table P-10 Distributed TANF/Foster Care Collections for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years

STATES 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016ALABAMA $15,568,150 $13,515,514 $12,791,915 $11,866,629 $11,026,090

ALASKA 11,786,275 10,428,524 9,981,834 11,047,815 11,180,573

ARIZONA 18,727,437 16,750,587 15,307,387 12,806,086 11,150,590

ARKANSAS 7,061,701 6,726,524 6,172,080 5,862,510 5,352,344

CALIFORNIA 506,613,808 472,023,646 453,892,193 454,792,804 448,537,956

COLORADO 16,299,537 15,393,057 15,928,868 15,847,128 14,783,293

CONNECTICUT 37,697,324 34,686,835 34,146,422 34,395,970 36,025,546

DELAWARE 6,313,376 5,931,493 4,512,922 4,231,441 4,729,990

DIST. OF COL. 8,339,533 7,730,565 7,252,459 6,974,125 6,721,929

FLORIDA 48,127,759 51,625,012 40,344,926 39,239,021 37,288,460

GEORGIA 30,544,816 22,496,495 21,052,048 20,118,024 19,702,156

GUAM 2,356,164 1,342,105 1,105,506 1,023,652 811,630

HAWAII 9,838,520 9,327,594 9,033,958 9,229,365 9,068,979

IDAHO 3,665,241 3,468,442 3,110,251 3,085,253 2,953,547

ILLINOIS 35,259,473 33,803,469 34,095,865 32,939,150 30,258,669

INDIANA 20,009,491 17,275,807 16,109,889 15,167,190 14,120,063

IOWA 25,866,288 23,569,742 21,229,130 19,960,437 18,531,928

KANSAS 21,152,369 17,869,895 14,987,265 13,920,809 13,244,257

KENTUCKY 38,391,345 36,941,945 38,799,617 37,970,475 37,277,146

LOUISIANA 14,964,531 11,758,915 10,212,887 9,643,273 8,808,209

MAINE 23,097,001 19,997,352 17,416,436 16,579,471 15,851,212

MARYLAND 24,105,460 22,136,555 22,976,936 22,101,929 22,290,841

MASSACHUSETTS 47,639,168 44,843,861 42,008,726 38,364,936 35,130,651

MICHIGAN 84,871,785 68,426,558 55,819,387 47,401,715 43,809,101

MINNESOTA 30,705,932 27,757,459 25,670,143 24,254,359 27,038,836

MISSISSIPPI 7,539,630 6,124,271 5,638,843 4,946,270 4,699,471

MISSOURI 41,778,124 37,268,827 32,745,956 32,616,068 28,101,045

MONTANA 4,355,143 3,905,198 3,736,529 3,888,836 3,649,012

NEBRASKA 8,181,490 7,221,179 6,773,762 6,655,579 6,477,800

NEVADA 10,028,095 9,358,205 9,330,736 9,138,524 9,390,207

NEW HAMPSHIRE 6,489,604 5,414,590 4,875,853 4,156,340 3,921,106

NEW JERSEY 48,029,878 43,632,848 41,247,354 40,058,979 36,410,605

NEW MEXICO 10,350,647 9,208,798 8,343,301 8,023,383 7,672,625

NEW YORK 111,766,812 104,239,280 102,756,284 102,005,984 103,639,023

NORTH CAROLINA 22,311,981 20,639,840 19,284,490 18,536,328 17,736,743

NORTH DAKOTA 5,095,608 4,533,548 4,178,048 3,910,527 3,611,794

OHIO 96,676,507 90,134,488 69,076,506 62,761,071 64,039,831

OKLAHOMA 17,367,340 16,617,706 15,362,128 15,063,510 14,542,366

OREGON 34,388,971 34,686,282 35,372,565 31,007,182 32,174,686

PENNSYLVANIA 58,811,974 53,674,185 48,469,550 46,857,369 45,062,388

PUERTO RICO 3,351,381 3,128,299 3,261,380 3,439,385 3,926,895

RHODE ISLAND 5,362,028 5,172,897 5,093,951 4,810,255 4,490,799

SOUTH CAROLINA 18,089,081 14,909,617 14,856,848 15,693,164 15,606,778

SOUTH DAKOTA 3,514,532 3,635,631 3,560,396 3,714,730 3,624,628

TENNESSEE 58,563,461 57,480,388 61,004,709 56,637,363 53,731,899

TEXAS 51,469,057 46,424,005 42,006,809 37,829,097 34,495,654

UTAH 11,032,603 9,147,593 8,704,038 7,982,027 8,039,147

VERMONT 2,944,861 2,772,326 2,718,636 2,510,255 2,676,000

VIRGIN ISLANDS 152,632 137,975 178,635 146,691 154,540

VIRGINIA 46,240,507 43,673,804 42,157,051 41,151,884 39,312,034

WASHINGTON 65,279,263 60,349,881 54,318,075 48,477,946 48,344,271

WEST VIRGINIA 9,090,963 8,653,385 8,330,527 8,018,937 7,397,210

WISCONSIN 29,033,501 29,794,371 31,629,207 29,466,851 24,969,223

WYOMING 1,988,988 1,894,842 1,810,076 1,802,549 1,637,377

TOTALS $1,878,287,146 $1,729,662,210 $1,620,781,293 $1,560,130,651 $1,515,229,153

Source: Form OCSE-34A - Part 1, line 8, columns (A+B) + line 7b, columns (C+D). Beginning fiscal year 2015, form OCSE-34 - Part 1, line 8, columns (A+B) + line 7b, columns (C+D).

16

FY 2016 CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT PRELIMINARY REPORT

Table P-11 Distributed TANF Collections for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years

STATES 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016ALABAMA $14,995,165 $12,896,061 $12,256,097 $11,242,482 $10,223,560

ALASKA 10,504,464 9,417,814 8,877,029 9,593,913 9,671,629

ARIZONA 18,685,547 16,753,521 15,294,047 12,797,791 11,141,471

ARKANSAS 6,524,076 6,163,917 5,577,091 5,134,188 4,639,451

CALIFORNIA 488,385,362 456,454,525 440,071,328 441,147,325 434,742,483

COLORADO 15,080,518 14,237,546 14,846,355 14,729,466 13,717,469

CONNECTICUT 36,789,364 33,898,469 33,250,657 33,515,818 35,128,183

DELAWARE 5,971,863 5,604,048 4,291,679 4,010,686 4,519,617

DIST. OF COL. 8,236,514 7,637,339 7,137,173 6,860,197 6,614,682

FLORIDA 47,498,121 50,687,665 39,709,775 38,864,506 36,958,780

GEORGIA 29,064,964 21,164,460 19,119,058 17,230,443 16,171,322

GUAM 2,356,164 1,342,105 1,105,506 1,023,652 811,630

HAWAII 9,312,999 8,830,933 8,527,372 8,776,098 8,512,654

IDAHO 3,487,677 3,233,837 2,888,752 2,893,372 2,763,585

ILLINOIS 32,590,507 31,007,794 31,487,806 30,045,283 27,252,842

INDIANA 19,560,489 16,897,344 15,769,116 14,818,380 13,841,989

IOWA 25,115,285 22,928,888 20,705,287 19,422,757 18,073,893

KANSAS 19,580,878 16,208,794 13,498,807 12,385,987 11,641,380

KENTUCKY 36,743,483 35,406,828 37,087,628 36,244,071 35,423,152

LOUISIANA 13,812,055 10,808,032 9,182,241 8,780,545 7,971,599

MAINE 22,569,507 19,550,077 16,977,329 16,212,083 15,533,882

MARYLAND 23,384,077 21,290,167 22,139,571 21,357,334 21,679,386

MASSACHUSETTS 47,294,369 44,548,472 41,766,641 38,190,558 34,993,304

MICHIGAN 81,934,217 65,559,226 53,405,267 44,979,180 41,584,894

MINNESOTA 29,792,334 26,984,905 24,996,234 23,513,820 26,216,868

MISSISSIPPI 7,218,582 5,861,344 5,366,196 4,668,541 4,397,694

MISSOURI 38,171,482 33,462,159 30,461,941 30,109,496 25,341,486

MONTANA 4,223,355 3,707,317 3,585,986 3,742,158 3,548,793

NEBRASKA 7,460,708 6,552,380 6,191,790 5,930,775 5,799,191

NEVADA 10,005,870 9,340,532 9,324,745 9,111,265 9,371,087

NEW HAMPSHIRE 6,334,973 5,247,579 4,751,307 4,048,813 3,824,921

NEW JERSEY 46,591,344 42,280,551 39,714,100 38,291,097 34,398,560

NEW MEXICO 10,341,143 9,204,723 8,333,941 8,016,265 7,671,777

NEW YORK 108,586,158 101,350,086 100,243,977 99,689,644 101,140,935

NORTH CAROLINA 20,597,795 18,959,347 17,652,572 16,659,306 15,912,358

NORTH DAKOTA 4,346,754 3,879,451 3,448,939 3,129,825 2,914,482

OHIO 95,342,142 88,915,233 67,801,557 61,164,980 62,428,741

OKLAHOMA 14,205,384 13,289,015 11,835,133 11,223,738 10,724,777

OREGON 31,459,339 32,675,175 33,358,134 29,822,922 31,041,272

PENNSYLVANIA 50,583,205 46,294,919 42,017,733 39,938,265 37,836,558

PUERTO RICO 3,212,080 2,982,848 3,134,186 3,272,958 3,713,022

RHODE ISLAND 5,311,103 5,133,414 5,089,683 4,773,934 4,450,365

SOUTH CAROLINA 17,120,629 14,028,616 13,806,536 14,702,863 14,561,484

SOUTH DAKOTA 3,320,034 3,427,183 3,334,128 3,491,738 3,374,175

TENNESSEE 56,582,604 55,350,729 58,395,116 53,934,017 50,793,467

TEXAS 49,297,197 44,670,197 40,313,437 36,239,909 33,036,128

UTAH 10,294,925 8,475,948 7,914,738 7,149,454 7,220,024

VERMONT 2,879,949 2,735,737 2,688,975 2,479,178 2,638,302

VIRGIN ISLANDS 152,632 137,975 178,635 146,691 154,540

VIRGINIA 44,374,301 42,020,827 40,415,007 39,355,744 37,433,169

WASHINGTON 64,988,602 60,115,132 54,096,366 48,274,460 48,137,774

WEST VIRGINIA 8,902,134 8,489,361 8,073,411 7,642,067 7,079,477

WISCONSIN 26,919,208 27,617,788 29,406,523 27,148,083 22,433,190

WYOMING 1,714,168 1,616,891 1,528,019 1,433,372 1,261,867

TOTALS $1,799,807,799 $1,657,335,224 $1,552,430,657 $1,489,361,493 $1,442,469,321

Source: Form OCSE-34A - Part 1, line 8, column A + line 7b, column C. Beginning fiscal year 2015, form OCSE-34 - Part 1, line 8, column A + line 7b, column C.

17

Table P-12 Distributed Foster Care Collections for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years

STATES 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016ALABAMA $572,985 $619,453 $535,818 $624,147 $802,530

ALASKA 1,281,811 1,010,710 1,104,805 1,453,902 1,508,944

ARIZONA 41,890 -2,934 13,340 8,295 9,119

ARKANSAS 537,625 562,607 594,989 728,322 712,893

CALIFORNIA 18,228,446 15,569,121 13,820,865 13,645,479 13,795,473

COLORADO 1,219,019 1,155,511 1,082,513 1,117,662 1,065,824

CONNECTICUT 907,960 788,366 895,765 880,152 897,363

DELAWARE 341,513 327,445 221,243 220,755 210,373

DIST. OF COL. 103,019 93,226 115,286 113,928 107,247

FLORIDA 629,638 937,347 635,151 374,515 329,680

GEORGIA 1,479,852 1,332,035 1,932,990 2,887,581 3,530,834

GUAM 0 0 0 0 0

HAWAII 525,521 496,661 506,586 453,267 556,325

IDAHO 177,564 234,605 221,499 191,881 189,962

ILLINOIS 2,668,966 2,795,675 2,608,059 2,893,867 3,005,827

INDIANA 449,002 378,463 340,773 348,810 278,074

IOWA 751,003 640,854 523,843 537,680 458,035

KANSAS 1,571,491 1,661,101 1,488,458 1,534,822 1,602,877

KENTUCKY 1,647,862 1,535,117 1,711,989 1,726,404 1,853,994

LOUISIANA 1,152,476 950,883 1,030,646 862,728 836,610

MAINE 527,494 447,275 439,107 367,388 317,330

MARYLAND 721,383 846,388 837,365 744,595 611,455

MASSACHUSETTS 344,799 295,389 242,085 174,378 137,347

MICHIGAN 2,937,568 2,867,332 2,414,120 2,422,535 2,224,207

MINNESOTA 913,598 772,554 673,909 740,539 821,968

MISSISSIPPI 321,048 262,927 272,647 277,729 301,777

MISSOURI 3,606,642 3,806,668 2,284,015 2,506,572 2,759,559

MONTANA 131,788 197,881 150,543 146,678 100,219

NEBRASKA 720,782 668,799 581,972 724,804 678,609

NEVADA 22,225 17,673 5,991 27,259 19,120

NEW HAMPSHIRE 154,631 167,011 124,546 107,527 96,185

NEW JERSEY 1,438,534 1,352,297 1,533,254 1,767,882 2,012,045

NEW MEXICO 9,504 4,075 9,360 7,118 848

NEW YORK 3,180,654 2,889,194 2,512,307 2,316,340 2,498,088

NORTH CAROLINA 1,714,186 1,680,493 1,631,918 1,877,022 1,824,385

NORTH DAKOTA 748,854 654,097 729,109 780,702 697,312

OHIO 1,334,365 1,219,255 1,274,949 1,596,091 1,611,090

OKLAHOMA 3,161,956 3,328,691 3,526,995 3,839,772 3,817,589

OREGON 2,929,632 2,011,107 2,014,431 1,184,260 1,133,414

PENNSYLVANIA 8,228,769 7,379,266 6,451,817 6,919,104 7,225,830

PUERTO RICO 139,301 145,451 127,194 166,427 213,873

RHODE ISLAND 50,925 39,483 4,268 36,321 40,434

SOUTH CAROLINA 968,452 881,001 1,050,312 990,301 1,045,294

SOUTH DAKOTA 194,498 208,448 226,268 222,992 250,453

TENNESSEE 1,980,857 2,129,659 2,609,593 2,703,346 2,938,432

TEXAS 2,171,860 1,753,808 1,693,372 1,589,188 1,459,526

UTAH 737,678 671,645 789,300 832,573 819,123

VERMONT 64,912 36,589 29,661 31,077 37,698

VIRGIN ISLANDS 0 0 0 0 0

VIRGINIA 1,866,206 1,652,977 1,742,044 1,796,140 1,878,865

WASHINGTON 290,661 234,749 221,709 203,486 206,497

WEST VIRGINIA 188,829 164,024 257,116 376,870 317,733

WISCONSIN 2,114,293 2,176,583 2,222,684 2,318,768 2,536,033

WYOMING 274,820 277,951 282,057 369,177 375,510

TOTALS $78,479,347 $72,326,986 $68,350,636 $70,769,158 $72,759,832

Source: Form OCSE-34A - Part 1, line 8, column B + line 7b, column D. Beginning fiscal year 2015, form OCSE-34 - Part 1, line 8, column B + line 7b, column D.

18

FY 2016 CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT PRELIMINARY REPORT

Table P-13 Distributed Non-TANF Collections for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years

STATES 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016ALABAMA $275,004,662 $279,335,618 $293,187,265 $308,613,726 $313,983,038

ALASKA 87,796,827 86,349,529 86,488,495 88,526,965 88,420,359

ARIZONA 304,366,210 305,810,344 301,891,911 301,137,460 300,923,369

ARKANSAS 212,583,775 220,334,456 223,829,059 228,947,783 225,834,687

CALIFORNIA 1,702,137,641 1,733,930,339 1,754,305,729 1,792,706,062 1,862,933,726

COLORADO 276,945,524 285,521,097 293,749,649 303,149,089 306,317,986

CONNECTICUT 207,672,527 207,656,515 204,858,281 208,091,453 209,504,585

DELAWARE 68,137,680 68,968,375 69,390,826 71,186,008 71,256,364

DIST. OF COL. 42,025,939 40,410,427 40,104,816 40,369,305 40,388,170

FLORIDA 1,418,145,586 1,437,121,405 1,410,294,851 1,404,511,981 1,440,057,758

GEORGIA 616,737,323 624,326,768 637,497,754 658,528,467 671,286,055

GUAM 11,178,534 10,347,843 11,080,175 9,724,506 8,951,767

HAWAII 86,352,763 86,838,194 88,666,982 89,659,250 90,356,251

IDAHO 148,316,474 156,123,930 158,281,276 166,196,129 168,583,482

ILLINOIS 767,497,337 771,942,980 770,820,539 774,576,807 781,210,908

INDIANA 560,535,781 550,725,143 540,514,436 538,720,090 535,172,779

IOWA 287,452,778 288,259,569 287,090,427 287,667,659 289,247,226

KANSAS 168,211,315 170,847,794 167,090,347 168,731,771 174,106,229

KENTUCKY 350,957,993 344,744,173 342,882,497 345,637,505 342,230,209

LOUISIANA 365,099,074 376,793,900 383,791,323 397,222,329 389,077,060

MAINE 76,522,865 78,459,202 79,137,676 82,091,249 84,895,017

MARYLAND 490,828,697 496,392,776 505,020,676 510,939,508 512,457,267

MASSACHUSETTS 556,734,864 567,930,097 577,572,478 588,292,806 599,612,656

MICHIGAN 1,235,401,982 1,228,084,094 1,258,275,541 1,276,811,922 1,284,841,277

MINNESOTA 551,618,908 557,073,404 558,993,028 559,117,598 548,017,988

MISSISSIPPI 292,259,126 296,357,253 304,058,543 317,196,689 323,440,095

MISSOURI 531,770,426 534,099,339 542,937,394 564,101,896 568,353,158

MONTANA 55,580,720 56,907,507 57,320,707 58,829,834 56,937,649

NEBRASKA 192,136,883 196,496,534 198,457,672 200,111,448 199,670,741

NEVADA 161,903,022 166,030,640 166,477,096 170,589,906 174,463,636

NEW HAMPSHIRE 76,687,369 77,048,480 77,006,801 73,966,634 72,626,961

NEW JERSEY 1,083,322,314 1,097,218,875 1,105,489,134 1,114,182,627 1,117,866,935

NEW MEXICO 101,819,447 105,630,327 110,306,154 113,782,577 113,818,572

NEW YORK 1,591,499,069 1,590,015,383 1,594,584,650 1,599,202,222 1,647,239,972

NORTH CAROLINA 1 639,784,505 643,247,468 636,185,118 643,269,457 645,473,501

NORTH DAKOTA 84,496,561 87,723,382 90,932,127 93,029,313 92,652,655

OHIO 1,600,466,877 1,614,094,750 1,611,745,350 1,599,482,075 1,587,413,237

OKLAHOMA 297,749,717 313,162,155 323,220,080 333,758,595 327,502,450

OREGON 315,072,739 318,375,237 322,024,910 323,435,637 327,529,184

PENNSYLVANIA 1,261,425,145 1,246,872,167 1,214,900,452 1,200,526,065 1,195,419,366

PUERTO RICO 333,489,297 328,940,867 331,658,552 324,865,039 332,181,724

RHODE ISLAND 60,977,172 64,028,067 66,141,810 68,958,414 69,837,025

SOUTH CAROLINA 237,229,192 227,362,380 244,213,285 260,998,880 271,971,701

SOUTH DAKOTA 82,766,078 85,220,788 87,199,502 88,551,541 88,276,122

TENNESSEE 497,787,595 523,412,661 533,893,418 545,619,586 551,562,654

TEXAS 3,268,951,534 3,494,800,890 3,664,759,327 3,831,907,995 3,940,929,932

UTAH 183,684,706 191,002,193 196,406,670 200,948,064 204,234,267

VERMONT 43,042,300 42,241,747 42,416,982 41,581,629 40,984,064

VIRGIN ISLANDS 8,033,782 7,790,218 7,121,732 6,551,577 6,759,088

VIRGINIA 560,386,919 562,840,456 569,492,523 569,309,372 568,071,206

WASHINGTON 578,833,797 591,381,838 587,305,469 589,011,258 592,147,414

WEST VIRGINIA 186,319,831 187,871,330 187,654,857 191,187,539 181,099,606

WISCONSIN 581,047,906 588,420,958 594,472,303 606,970,193 617,561,330

WYOMING 62,266,744 62,436,414 63,735,227 63,682,304 60,940,919

TOTALS $25,839,053,832 $26,275,358,276 $26,576,933,882 $26,996,765,794 $27,316,631,377

Source: Form OCSE-34A - Part 1, line 7c, columns (C+D) + line 7d, columns (C+D) + line 8, columns (E+F). Beginning fiscal year 2015, form OCSE-34 - Part 1, line 7c, columns (C+D) + line 7d, columns (C+D) + line 8, columns (E+F).

Note: Non-TANF collections include Former Assistance TANF collections and Foster Care collections.

1 North Carolina data adjusted for this report, based on revised data submitted after the final deadline for FY 2016.

19

Federal and State Share of Collections

Table P-14 Federal Share of TANF/Foster Care Collections for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years

STATES 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016ALABAMA $8,853,606 $7,563,259 $7,211,881 $6,845,805 $6,626,014

ALASKA 5,649,541 5,028,701 4,814,116 5,322,202 5,355,267

ARIZONA 11,573,951 10,034,360 9,450,958 8,444,755 7,383,102

ARKANSAS 4,411,288 4,151,571 3,845,245 3,668,329 3,371,037

CALIFORNIA 209,551,527 193,679,206 183,073,904 182,484,913 179,111,915

COLORADO 7,898,065 7,488,118 7,757,896 7,875,718 7,300,486

CONNECTICUT 15,757,301 14,245,312 13,969,367 14,219,712 15,138,999

DELAWARE 2,211,369 2,089,598 2,235,230 2,046,930 2,388,749

DIST. OF COL. 2,870,331 2,602,374 2,376,318 2,225,744 2,228,765

FLORIDA 23,752,928 26,659,330 20,713,876 21,027,406 20,063,424

GEORGIA 17,887,906 12,439,365 11,804,683 11,710,075 11,635,952

GUAM 781,239 378,685 249,039 249,063 191,787

HAWAII 4,186,979 4,036,166 3,911,331 4,085,471 4,182,109

IDAHO 2,331,019 2,136,935 1,958,641 1,976,362 1,896,735

ILLINOIS 15,239,436 14,275,167 14,344,801 14,017,142 12,961,007

INDIANA 12,733,647 11,066,155 10,345,535 9,703,223 9,017,655

IOWA 15,058,047 13,476,616 11,814,278 10,676,008 9,733,525

KANSAS 11,414,218 9,676,723 8,161,630 7,598,306 7,141,778

KENTUCKY 26,665,541 25,024,085 25,815,383 25,307,280 24,976,064

LOUISIANA 8,380,345 6,536,030 5,666,465 5,467,289 5,020,856

MAINE 12,022,194 10,638,709 9,220,011 9,007,815 8,849,706

MARYLAND 11,549,117 10,550,630 10,863,535 10,506,151 10,666,783

MASSACHUSETTS 21,152,006 19,852,962 18,624,725 17,150,032 15,797,009

MICHIGAN 52,072,008 42,140,924 34,125,952 28,501,097 26,567,317

MINNESOTA 13,851,245 12,514,462 11,626,778 10,877,614 10,735,999

MISSISSIPPI 4,988,200 4,057,150 3,678,851 3,239,448 3,101,531

MISSOURI 25,434,199 21,967,245 19,535,120 19,904,130 17,406,656

MONTANA 2,650,569 2,380,814 2,237,688 2,344,490 2,170,183

NEBRASKA 3,580,802 3,093,127 2,898,255 2,689,365 2,515,827

NEVADA 5,419,094 5,372,144 5,615,653 5,649,485 5,878,416

NEW HAMPSHIRE 3,138,961 2,615,298 2,361,096 1,998,335 1,878,228

NEW JERSEY 19,839,563 17,947,401 17,156,064 16,911,771 15,815,902

NEW MEXICO 5,676,544 5,109,195 4,627,112 4,526,522 4,386,672

NEW YORK 41,730,597 38,738,373 38,152,237 37,683,519 38,237,561

NORTH CAROLINA 13,641,624 12,573,039 11,766,908 11,103,797 10,613,519

NORTH DAKOTA 2,564,182 2,202,385 1,889,927 1,744,252 1,606,725

OHIO 48,015,970 40,516,262 38,820,766 38,128,014 38,854,470

OKLAHOMA 10,635,657 10,230,532 9,433,013 8,960,944 8,440,606

OREGON 16,361,557 15,476,360 16,320,932 14,139,010 14,754,513

PENNSYLVANIA 21,032,133 17,659,900 15,633,554 14,571,853 14,100,491

PUERTO RICO 1,084,111 1,151,343 1,224,856 1,226,582 1,395,808

RHODE ISLAND 2,307,606 2,186,876 2,087,248 1,994,729 1,921,992

SOUTH CAROLINA 7,375,823 5,572,857 5,568,251 6,028,033 6,275,576

SOUTH DAKOTA 2,007,091 1,961,622 1,844,640 1,855,907 1,827,542

TENNESSEE 17,398,850 16,025,140 18,343,964 17,646,167 17,815,383

TEXAS 27,791,407 25,541,158 23,119,284 20,840,648 18,773,598

UTAH 7,196,679 5,807,204 5,597,802 5,126,662 5,127,597

VERMONT 1,502,342 1,368,037 1,307,638 1,207,775 1,203,306

VIRGIN ISLANDS 69,973 69,236 90,611 73,881 70,556

VIRGINIA 18,777,271 17,767,706 17,414,127 17,151,574 16,603,309

WASHINGTON 31,784,569 29,317,887 26,384,525 23,735,702 23,595,886

WEST VIRGINIA 3,799,824 3,642,884 3,481,150 3,602,759 3,455,379

WISCONSIN 11,921,088 11,870,132 12,120,850 11,415,572 10,181,538

WYOMING 881,162 823,085 775,194 803,119 746,203

TOTALS $876,462,302 $791,329,835 $743,468,894 $717,298,487 $697,097,013

Source: Form OCSE-34A - Part 1, line 10a, column G + line 10b, column G. Beginning fiscal year 2015, form OCSE-34 - Part 1, line 10a, column G + line 10b, column G.

20

FY 2016 CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT PRELIMINARY REPORT

Table P-15 State Share of TANF/Foster Care Collections for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years

STATES 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016ALABAMA $4,048,764 $3,473,163 $3,375,144 $3,077,091 $2,857,334

ALASKA 5,649,531 5,028,694 4,814,111 5,322,197 5,355,263

ARIZONA 5,623,600 5,243,291 4,606,693 3,890,558 3,329,469

ARKANSAS 1,827,274 1,764,877 1,640,128 1,507,078 1,444,730

CALIFORNIA 209,551,522 193,679,200 183,073,896 182,484,905 179,111,905

COLORADO 7,898,057 7,488,110 7,757,890 7,563,843 7,093,219

CONNECTICUT 15,757,291 14,245,304 13,969,360 14,219,707 15,138,991

DELAWARE 1,870,906 1,663,946 1,806,044 1,769,832 1,967,896

DIST. OF COL. 2,870,322 2,602,366 2,376,311 2,225,737 2,228,755

FLORIDA 18,632,740 19,241,720 14,519,798 14,182,586 13,006,337

GEORGIA 9,149,437 6,534,651 6,100,191 5,783,312 5,589,735

GUAM 781,236 309,832 203,759 203,777 156,917

HAWAII 4,107,353 3,746,645 3,632,218 3,736,605 3,565,406

IDAHO 988,102 872,832 775,362 778,148 765,723

ILLINOIS 15,239,431 14,275,162 14,344,795 13,597,403 12,507,664

INDIANA 6,283,150 5,411,148 5,114,021 4,883,703 4,522,370

IOWA 9,745,193 9,138,948 8,579,784 8,546,187 7,992,798

KANSAS 8,642,396 7,447,189 6,179,663 5,819,151 5,620,512

KENTUCKY 10,796,582 10,445,913 11,153,516 10,876,994 10,541,664

LOUISIANA 5,337,686 4,136,785 3,625,865 3,343,814 3,049,965

MAINE 6,979,218 6,364,179 5,759,699 5,549,093 5,271,417

MARYLAND 11,549,113 10,550,623 10,863,527 10,506,141 10,666,776

MASSACHUSETTS 21,152,001 19,852,955 18,624,715 17,150,026 15,796,999

MICHIGAN 26,657,972 21,333,881 17,330,551 14,985,473 13,931,642

MINNESOTA 13,851,237 12,514,455 11,626,770 10,877,604 10,735,992

MISSISSIPPI 1,736,252 1,468,043 1,357,223 1,163,173 1,080,121

MISSOURI 14,651,219 13,827,513 11,957,902 11,465,657 10,100,702

MONTANA 1,358,766 1,226,477 1,135,881 1,213,158 1,156,278

NEBRASKA 2,741,237 2,454,083 2,396,326 2,359,189 2,401,738

NEVADA 4,223,422 3,620,396 3,283,954 3,128,462 3,175,049

NEW HAMPSHIRE 3,138,957 2,615,292 2,361,089 1,998,329 1,878,223

NEW JERSEY 19,839,555 17,947,394 17,156,059 16,911,762 15,815,894

NEW MEXICO 2,507,632 2,287,931 2,059,463 1,972,436 1,847,053

NEW YORK 41,730,589 38,738,368 38,152,229 37,683,513 38,237,551

NORTH CAROLINA 7,255,475 6,619,512 6,121,370 5,750,781 5,409,305

NORTH DAKOTA 2,064,307 2,011,097 1,889,918 1,744,246 1,606,712

OHIO 26,833,554 23,208,589 22,779,942 22,740,460 23,342,534

OKLAHOMA 6,013,777 5,754,673 5,301,462 5,422,595 5,398,719

OREGON 9,646,323 9,309,612 9,527,870 7,932,503 8,163,337

PENNSYLVANIA 17,159,501 14,874,918 13,577,125 13,548,281 13,010,626

PUERTO RICO 1,084,100 954,235 1,013,097 1,009,757 1,142,025

RHODE ISLAND 2,119,881 2,079,362 2,078,088 1,994,720 1,889,970

SOUTH CAROLINA 3,125,064 2,339,761 2,322,141 2,505,422 2,553,315

SOUTH DAKOTA 1,387,274 1,529,435 1,600,712 1,738,024 1,713,522

TENNESSEE 8,820,032 8,207,644 9,752,170 9,505,959 9,571,829

TEXAS 19,943,748 17,529,934 16,272,921 15,060,556 14,087,592

UTAH 2,940,917 2,535,280 2,360,403 2,139,018 2,172,513

VERMONT 1,106,797 1,073,142 1,065,141 1,028,430 1,029,171

VIRGIN ISLANDS 69,970 56,645 74,133 60,449 57,731

VIRGINIA 18,777,265 17,767,696 17,414,119 17,151,568 16,603,300

WASHINGTON 31,784,560 29,317,879 26,384,519 23,707,233 23,595,879

WEST VIRGINIA 1,432,650 1,413,869 1,415,671 1,446,657 1,382,734

WISCONSIN 7,773,426 7,999,526 8,402,093 8,175,250 7,303,503

WYOMING 881,154 823,079 775,185 803,112 746,198

TOTALS $687,137,518 $626,957,254 $591,842,017 $574,241,665 $558,722,603

Source: Form OCSE-34A - Part 1, line 7b, column G - (lines 10a, column G + 10b, column G). Beginning fiscal year 2015, form OCSE-34 - Part 1, line 7b, column G - (lines 10a, column G + 10b, column G).

21

Undistributed Collections (UDC)

Table P-16 Net Undistributed Collections for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years

STATES 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016ALABAMA $17,438,864 $19,844,242 $19,343,408 $21,976,354 $22,032,600

ALASKA 2,780,920 2,798,828 2,535,115 2,313,371 1,883,779

ARIZONA 8,961,832 10,477,634 11,099,312 10,311,999 12,821,926

ARKANSAS 3,375,524 3,633,310 3,330,643 2,811,924 2,226,484

CALIFORNIA 60,676,619 68,629,309 73,788,762 58,520,909 59,448,701

COLORADO 2,470,081 2,617,554 3,309,056 2,489,455 2,908,699

CONNECTICUT 3,410,308 3,309,153 2,811,640 2,769,124 2,561,276

DELAWARE 3,933,269 3,483,551 4,031,610 3,920,689 3,425,549

DIST. OF COL. 1,182,767 1,056,426 1,027,886 1,290,069 1,386,857

FLORIDA 127,403,427 67,600,928 63,115,343 63,100,217 53,400,479

GEORGIA 6,069,089 6,406,322 5,185,262 4,781,186 4,548,580

GUAM 5,290,200 4,975,511 4,961,499 4,810,286 5,057,801

HAWAII 7,415,357 7,942,685 8,665,164 8,644,010 8,899,667

IDAHO 1,368,354 2,142,748 3,227,770 2,673,274 3,097,263

ILLINOIS 16,365,684 14,666,877 15,505,276 15,518,419 17,416,436

INDIANA 9,972,614 9,967,364 9,212,071 9,857,749 9,206,755

IOWA 4,333,011 4,797,250 5,033,607 5,184,511 5,809,831

KANSAS 2,713,126 2,923,563 2,636,546 2,245,764 1,417,745

KENTUCKY 7,280,418 9,229,512 9,667,688 10,702,280 9,801,398

LOUISIANA 3,510,596 4,302,507 4,332,663 4,771,262 4,536,121

MAINE 1,623,037 1,861,263 1,923,865 1,865,339 1,742,533

MARYLAND 7,611,291 7,693,816 7,629,817 7,851,196 12,434,672

MASSACHUSETTS 11,052,829 13,331,433 12,417,720 12,798,184 11,582,537

MICHIGAN 16,993,438 13,669,019 27,493,393 27,160,882 27,868,684

MINNESOTA 8,033,000 8,355,882 8,683,779 7,983,923 8,167,178

MISSISSIPPI 16,328,821 16,764,756 16,282,737 14,307,530 13,620,837

MISSOURI 12,012,647 12,846,758 12,743,567 12,344,200 13,755,082

MONTANA 417,821 377,705 256,029 259,042 245,554

NEBRASKA 2,574,302 2,878,293 2,989,888 3,175,559 3,636,838

NEVADA 2,590,458 2,661,006 2,465,703 2,357,705 2,119,035

NEW HAMPSHIRE 970,899 957,122 1,148,662 1,151,769 1,296,125

NEW JERSEY 22,235,276 27,295,781 25,236,868 23,531,925 25,333,571

NEW MEXICO 3,023,162 3,471,670 3,723,063 3,509,735 3,308,759

NEW YORK 74,621,756 69,896,887 66,889,744 66,599,715 58,903,277

NORTH CAROLINA 17,125,947 17,530,440 16,470,956 15,385,870 16,651,444

NORTH DAKOTA 3,585,037 3,952,008 4,333,262 4,705,146 5,269,542

OHIO 28,634,705 32,041,640 27,172,788 28,043,564 31,000,866

OKLAHOMA 7,287,656 10,741,643 8,025,717 6,533,067 7,539,211

OREGON 2,869,718 3,279,422 3,321,074 6,053,658 6,004,480

PENNSYLVANIA 7,495,817 7,245,317 6,646,762 5,828,783 5,938,208

PUERTO RICO 10,076,607 9,776,623 10,350,885 10,879,513 10,130,421

RHODE ISLAND 2,071,445 1,284,559 955,088 1,111,339 1,257,209

SOUTH CAROLINA 7,121,961 7,251,309 7,426,822 8,609,610 12,469,640

SOUTH DAKOTA 1,120,049 1,423,557 1,461,627 1,558,990 1,916,471

TENNESSEE 18,891,931 22,862,724 19,809,355 17,906,355 18,879,173

TEXAS 24,959,046 18,833,939 21,339,194 35,619,042 10,327,630

UTAH 3,064,251 3,639,607 4,047,032 3,778,583 4,249,245

VERMONT 1,157,582 1,557,638 1,543,308 1,461,364 1,402,060

VIRGIN ISLANDS 772,991 668,942 595,258 608,373 709,836

VIRGINIA 6,265,634 7,350,391 8,440,820 8,250,431 8,065,253

WASHINGTON 4,707,658 4,933,066 6,150,141 8,561,837 5,933,375

WEST VIRGINIA 7,594,042 6,490,358 5,628,097 6,306,119 6,094,210

WISCONSIN 8,590,783 9,860,978 9,066,800 8,949,075 9,857,263

WYOMING 1,339,050 1,409,837 1,429,334 1,186,977 1,130,375

TOTALS $640,772,707 $605,000,663 $606,919,476 $604,927,252 $580,728,541

Source: Form OCSE-34A - Part 1, line 9b, column G (4th quarter). Beginning fiscal year 2015, form OCSE-34 - Part 1, line 9b, column G (4th quarter).

22

FY 2016 CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT PRELIMINARY REPORT

Table P-17 Percent of Undistributed Collections (UDC) for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years

STATES 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016ALABAMA 5.66% 6.28% 5.95% 6.41% 6.35%

ALASKA 2.72 2.81 2.56 2.27 1.86

ARIZONA 2.70 3.15 3.38 3.18 3.95

ARKANSAS 1.51 1.57 1.43 1.18 0.95

CALIFORNIA 2.67 3.02 3.23 2.54 2.51

COLORADO 0.84 0.86 1.06 0.77 0.90

CONNECTICUT 1.37 1.34 1.16 1.13 1.03

DELAWARE 5.02 4.44 5.17 4.94 4.31

DIST. OF COL. 2.29 2.15 2.12 2.65 2.86

FLORIDA 7.99 4.34 4.17 4.19 3.49

GEORGIA 0.93 0.98 0.78 0.70 0.65

GUAM 28.10 29.86 28.93 30.92 34.13

HAWAII 7.16 7.63 8.15 8.04 8.22

IDAHO 0.89 1.32 1.96 1.55 1.77

ILLINOIS 2.00 1.78 1.91 1.88 2.10

INDIANA 1.69 1.72 1.63 1.75 1.65

IOWA 1.36 1.52 1.61 1.66 1.85

KANSAS 1.41 1.53 1.43 1.21 0.75

KENTUCKY 1.84 2.36 2.47 2.71 2.52

LOUISIANA 0.92 1.10 1.09 1.16 1.13

MAINE 1.60 1.85 1.95 1.86 1.70

MARYLAND 1.46 1.46 1.42 1.45 2.27

MASSACHUSETTS 1.80 2.13 1.97 2.00 1.79

MICHIGAN 1.27 1.04 2.05 2.01 2.05

MINNESOTA 1.36 1.41 1.46 1.35 1.40

MISSISSIPPI 5.16 5.25 5.01 4.25 3.98

MISSOURI 2.05 2.20 2.17 2.03 2.25

MONTANA 0.69 0.62 0.42 0.41 0.40

NEBRASKA 1.27 1.39 1.44 1.51 1.73

NEVADA 1.48 1.49 1.38 1.29 1.14

NEW HAMPSHIRE 1.15 1.15 1.38 1.45 1.67

NEW JERSEY 1.93 2.34 2.15 2.00 2.15

NEW MEXICO 2.62 2.93 3.04 2.80 2.65

NEW YORK 4.20 3.96 3.79 3.77 3.25

NORTH CAROLINA 2.52 2.57 2.45 2.27 2.45

NORTH DAKOTA 3.85 4.11 4.36 4.63 5.19

OHIO 1.66 1.85 1.59 1.66 1.84

OKLAHOMA 2.26 3.15 2.32 1.84 2.15

OREGON 0.81 0.92 0.94 1.67 1.64

PENNSYLVANIA 0.56 0.55 0.52 0.47 0.48

PUERTO RICO 2.90 2.86 3.00 3.21 2.93

RHODE ISLAND 3.02 1.82 1.32 1.48 1.66

SOUTH CAROLINA 2.71 2.90 2.78 3.02 4.16

SOUTH DAKOTA 1.28 1.58 1.58 1.66 2.04

TENNESSEE 3.27 3.79 3.28 2.88 3.03

TEXAS 0.75 0.53 0.59 0.91 0.26

UTAH 1.55 1.79 1.94 1.78 1.96

VERMONT 2.46 3.34 3.30 3.21 3.11

VIRGIN ISLANDS 8.63 7.78 7.54 8.33 9.31

VIRGINIA 1.02 1.20 1.36 1.33 1.31

WASHINGTON 0.73 0.75 0.96 1.32 0.92

WEST VIRGINIA 3.74 3.20 2.79 3.07 3.13

WISCONSIN 1.38 1.56 1.43 1.38 1.50

WYOMING 2.04 2.14 2.15 1.78 1.77

TOTALS 2.26% 2.11% 2.11% 2.07% 1.97%

Source: Form OCSE-34A - Part 1. Beginning fiscal year 2015, form OCSE-34 - Part 1.

Formula: Net UDC, 4th quarter/(Balance remaining undistributed at end of quarter, Qtr1 + collections received + net adjustments) - (collections forwarded to non-IV-D cases + collections sent to other States + collections sent to other countries); line 9b, 4th quarter/(line 1 1st qtr + line 2 + line 3) - (lines 4a + 4b + 4c).

23

Table P-18 UDC Pending Distribution by Category, FY 2016 1

STATES Net UDC Collections

Totals

Collections Received Within

the Past Two Business Days

Collections from Tax Offsets Being Held

for Up to Six Months

Collections Received and

Being Held for Future Support

Collections Being Held

Pending the Resolution of

Legal Disputes

Collections Being Held Pending

Transfer to Other States or Federal

AgencyALABAMA $22,032,600 $7,754,467 $2,025,843 $4,401,238 $946,696 $76,772

ALASKA 1,883,779 0 636,724 861,246 0 0

ARIZONA 12,821,926 0 2,658,570 2,625,734 707,982 840

ARKANSAS 2,226,484 7,862 1,081,492 12,485 41,099 0

CALIFORNIA 59,448,701 8,584,298 8,488,423 1,696,710 66,378 29,071,916

COLORADO 2,908,699 750,874 1,498,070 6,977 0 0

CONNECTICUT 2,561,276 0 777,607 1,057,710 321,680 0

DELAWARE 3,425,549 0 243,728 1,318,219 50,336 14,920

DIST. OF COL. 1,386,857 0 255,707 32,764 17,737 0

FLORIDA 53,400,479 6,014,658 3,338,185 4,696,269 10,277,280 0

GEORGIA 4,548,580 0 2,352,798 420 0 0

GUAM 5,057,801 0 28,303 261,257 290 0

HAWAII 8,899,667 222,370 1,518,224 2,063,779 1,140,007 0

IDAHO 3,097,263 37,060 693,837 1,986,747 0 0

ILLINOIS 2 17,416,436 0 0 0 0 0

INDIANA 9,206,755 55,791 2,399,951 1,666,558 505,980 107,177

IOWA 5,809,831 0 799,415 82,046 3,969,121 0

KANSAS 1,417,745 32,662 104,161 55,643 4,741 0

KENTUCKY 9,801,398 16,990 2,232,869 4,324,833 350 0

LOUISIANA 4,536,121 0 2,786,858 18,389 676,687 0

MAINE 1,742,533 0 529,080 312,481 111,513 104

MARYLAND 12,434,672 333 1,412,186 2,711,628 2,216 1,604,469

MASSACHUSETTS 11,582,537 0 1,131,561 5,783,113 2,836,964 0

MICHIGAN 27,868,684 1,188,732 6,240,902 14,308,040 797,242 867,456

MINNESOTA 8,167,178 27,241 2,148,475 4,576,178 1,159,068 67,926

MISSISSIPPI 13,620,837 1,639,490 1,508,842 8,926,025 54,120 16,463

MISSOURI 13,755,082 1,828,433 2,429,402 8,625,532 373,176 0

MONTANA 245,554 33,783 0 78,345 23,337 0

NEBRASKA 3,636,838 57,643 958,996 603,129 252,876 579

NEVADA 2,119,035 107,137 1,247,710 15,858 151,426 18,017

NEW HAMPSHIRE 1,296,125 0 450,630 332,908 167 107,956

NEW JERSEY 25,333,571 0 2,481,899 16,224,878 4,715,739 186,514

NEW MEXICO 3,308,759 0 594,723 1,060,700 615,841 0

NEW YORK 58,903,277 12,375,311 747,882 24,873,844 605,922 4,432,772

NORTH CAROLINA 16,651,444 0 2,127,492 8,167,859 183,038 303,771

NORTH DAKOTA 5,269,542 0 277,149 2,132,442 0 135,103

OHIO 31,000,866 6,856,459 6,243,775 162,205 6,400,822 3,596,335

OKLAHOMA 7,539,211 0 3,025,134 1,497,946 131,544 0

OREGON 6,004,480 57,113 3,206,408 1,204,272 648,584 0

PENNSYLVANIA 5,938,208 0 2,223,643 1,165,286 945,303 410,604

PUERTO RICO 10,130,421 0 2,398,651 934,495 394,207 0

RHODE ISLAND 1,257,209 0 95,523 18,329 305,516 -15,186

SOUTH CAROLINA 12,469,640 1,141,398 841,576 63,468 148,888 9,703

SOUTH DAKOTA 1,916,471 1,302,292 271,836 269,483 0 13,007

TENNESSEE 18,879,173 0 9,343,612 4,378,942 9,269 1,193,432

TEXAS 10,327,630 3,384 1,572,259 92,485 5,768,371 312,331

UTAH 4,249,245 862,086 1,716,847 1,219,043 249,423 0

VERMONT 1,402,060 169,126 182,791 462,728 44,509 7,828

VIRGIN ISLANDS 2 709,836 0 0 0 0 0

VIRGINIA 8,065,253 1,029,471 3,030,477 2,614,961 28,730 0

WASHINGTON 5,933,375 0 277,317 2,396,905 0 0

WEST VIRGINIA 6,094,210 18,641 549,442 4,595,044 771,275 0

WISCONSIN 9,857,263 35,941 2,150,499 6,935,610 0 0

WYOMING 1,130,375 101,313 575,314 8,347 4,645 133,751

TOTALS $580,728,541 $52,312,359 $95,912,798 $153,921,533 $46,460,095 $42,674,560

Source: Form OCSE-34, Part 1 and Part 2. Beginning fiscal year 2015, form OCSE-34, Part 1 and Part 2, Line 9b

line 1 line 3 line 4 line 5 line 6 line 7

Formula: OCSE-34, Part 1, Line 9b/OCSE-34, Part 2 by categories & ages

1 All data are for the 4th quarter.

2 Ilinois and Virgin Islands did not submit their 4th quarter itemized undistributed collections report for fiscal year 2016.

24

FY 2016 CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT PRELIMINARY REPORT

Table P-19 UDC Unresolved Distribution by Category, FY 2016 1

STATES Net UDC Collections Totals

Unidentified Collections

Collections Being Held

Pending the Locations of the

CP or NCP

Collections Disbursed but Uncashed and

Stale-Dated

Collections with Inaccurate

or Missing Information

Other Collections Remaining

Undistributed

ALABAMA $22,032,600 $73,248 $922,027 $0 $5,504,048 $328,261

ALASKA 1,883,779 646 85,449 0 208,429 91,285

ARIZONA 12,821,926 136,945 298,914 3,965,926 1,251,659 1,175,356

ARKANSAS 2,226,484 37,709 36,231 103,827 0 905,779

CALIFORNIA 59,448,701 21,385 1,318,283 741,681 443,164 9,016,463

COLORADO 2,908,699 0 132,791 60,431 0 459,556

CONNECTICUT 2,561,276 84,780 298,499 0 8,541 12,459

DELAWARE 3,425,549 83,699 99,379 430,682 694,984 489,602

DIST. OF COL. 1,386,857 50,911 467,288 224,059 165,609 172,782

FLORIDA 53,400,479 1,676,333 1,467,526 11,377 18,358,347 7,560,504

GEORGIA 4,548,580 0 22,169 9,729 0 2,163,464

GUAM 5,057,801 609,205 177,351 3,335,538 419,749 226,108

HAWAII 8,899,667 186,970 1,520,069 0 2,192,676 55,572

IDAHO 3,097,263 5,436 280,568 0 86,316 7,299

ILLINOIS 2 17,416,436 0 0 0 0 0

INDIANA 9,206,755 11,925 153,680 76,813 3,695,226 533,654

IOWA 5,809,831 17,244 422,125 0 -36,752 556,632

KANSAS 1,417,745 10,385 251,841 53,954 96,286 808,072

KENTUCKY 9,801,398 71,243 234,186 86,659 832,500 2,001,768

LOUISIANA 4,536,121 126,377 383,956 0 338,953 204,901

MAINE 1,742,533 109,276 226,099 275,212 94,605 84,163

MARYLAND 12,434,672 5,487 979,245 247,023 260,593 5,211,492

MASSACHUSETTS 11,582,537 73,240 223,660 162,015 709,237 662,747

MICHIGAN 27,868,684 331,500 1,472,237 768,403 1,724,831 169,341

MINNESOTA 8,167,178 13,103 62,520 0 95,045 17,622

MISSISSIPPI 13,620,837 156,743 61,192 77,936 310,755 869,271

MISSOURI 13,755,082 32,764 108,209 47,698 152,254 157,614

MONTANA 245,554 547 2,707 984 12,440 93,411

NEBRASKA 3,636,838 0 238,108 0 52,253 1,473,254

NEVADA 2,119,035 2,762 50,935 240,813 149,412 134,965

NEW HAMPSHIRE 1,296,125 38,586 40,971 178,312 146,591 4

NEW JERSEY 25,333,571 153,289 324,985 48,234 331,374 866,659

NEW MEXICO 3,308,759 295,840 129,331 79,729 195,337 337,258

NEW YORK 58,903,277 5,012,562 5,888,062 0 0 4,966,922

NORTH CAROLINA 16,651,444 132,826 1,301,895 0 1,450,755 2,983,808

NORTH DAKOTA 5,269,542 1,655 52,118 0 2,642,307 28,768

OHIO 31,000,866 2,050,304 2,255,588 241,140 556,368 2,637,870

OKLAHOMA 7,539,211 306 20,856 298,075 224,498 2,340,852

OREGON 6,004,480 988 386,849 24,446 315 475,505

PENNSYLVANIA 5,938,208 71,196 239,645 455,941 396,956 29,634

PUERTO RICO 10,130,421 645,223 246,252 5,256,187 204,970 50,436

RHODE ISLAND 1,257,209 33,955 647,046 29,410 142,616 0

SOUTH CAROLINA 12,469,640 7,995 949,325 4,167,499 703,859 4,435,929

SOUTH DAKOTA 1,916,471 2,601 38,217 18,608 0 427

TENNESSEE 18,879,173 1,700,305 2,179,109 74,504 0 0

TEXAS 10,327,630 532,392 1,285,881 0 58,337 702,190

UTAH 4,249,245 990 11,887 11,100 131,844 46,025

VERMONT 1,402,060 49,832 8,691 544 0 476,011

VIRGIN ISLANDS 2 709,836 0 0 0 0 0

VIRGINIA 8,065,253 10,453 130,255 0 1,030 1,219,876

WASHINGTON 5,933,375 109,250 316,235 595,968 27,116 2,210,584

WEST VIRGINIA 6,094,210 9,993 60,403 72,934 0 16,478

WISCONSIN 9,857,263 94,176 440,758 0 48,247 152,032

WYOMING 1,130,375 0 69,335 0 21,767 215,903

TOTALS $580,728,541 $14,884,580 $29,020,938 $22,473,391 $45,105,447 $59,836,568

Source: Form OCSE-34, Part 1 and Part 2. Beginning fiscal year 2015, form OCSE-34, Part 1 and Part 2, Line 9b

line 1 line 9 line 10 line 11 line 12 line 13

Formula: OCSE-34, Part 1, Line 9b/OCSE-34, Part 2 by categories & ages

1 All data are for the 4th quarter.

2 Ilinois and Virgin Islands did not submit their 4th quarter itemized undistributed collections report for fiscal year 2016.

25

FY 2016 CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT PRELIMINARY REPORT

Table P-20 Net UDC by Age, FY 2016 1

STATES Net UDC Collections

Up to 2 Business Days of Receipt

More Than 2 Days but Not More Than 30 Days

More Than 30 Days but Not More Than 6 Months

More Than 6 Months but Not More Than 1 Year

More Than 1 Year but Not More Than 3 Years

More Than 3 Years but Not More Than 5 Years

More Than 5 Years

ALABAMA $22,032,600 $8,457,180 $2,558,479 $3,983,065 $417,359 $878,499 $612,730 $5,125,288

ALASKA 1,883,779 421,438 486,440 769,771 122,559 83,571 0 0

ARIZONA 12,821,926 812,973 2,517,291 4,587,268 1,011,586 1,706,785 806,117 1,379,906

ARKANSAS 2,226,484 73,251 214,459 1,443,026 263,312 25,605 59,426 147,405

CALIFORNIA 59,448,701 12,458,906 27,478,867 12,299,869 2,071,367 2,676,480 887,979 1,575,233

COLORADO 2,908,699 713,561 275,225 1,696,801 127,839 75,401 13,687 6,185

CONNECTICUT 2,561,276 466,744 505,116 1,287,026 60,985 119,966 55,138 66,301

DELAWARE 3,425,549 177,744 921,489 1,310,986 328,718 571,621 63,890 51,101

DIST. OF COL. 1,386,857 37,552 111,534 389,146 91,856 223,056 102,639 431,074

FLORIDA 53,400,479 10,856,950 14,859,554 15,274,403 10,151,954 1,319,758 364,378 573,482

GEORGIA 4,548,580 18,587 281,599 4,177,072 44,170 9,012 8,823 9,317

GUAM 5,057,801 28,604 135,470 368,934 162,508 332,727 237,011 3,792,547

HAWAII 8,899,667 222,370 1,292,352 2,671,464 266,671 600,670 507,173 3,338,967

IDAHO 3,097,263 313,031 1,919,441 746,007 58,422 34,613 15,011 10,738

ILLINOIS 2 17,416,436 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

INDIANA 9,206,755 814,255 3,685,333 3,634,867 510,057 384,079 87,878 90,286

IOWA 5,809,831 0 379,886 1,021,333 358,681 1,236,374 924,114 1,889,443

KANSAS 1,417,745 875,658 102,448 182,676 137,372 95,765 22,113 1,713

KENTUCKY 9,801,398 1,367,760 2,925,774 4,225,400 693,766 453,642 123,780 11,276

LOUISIANA 4,536,121 42,777 464,984 3,266,149 392,554 276,583 56,881 36,193

MAINE 1,742,533 69,167 247,525 719,542 45,955 100,830 102,166 457,348

MARYLAND 12,434,672 5,670,568 2,308,605 2,727,426 598,260 846,931 126,539 156,343

MASSACHUSETTS 11,582,537 1,810,602 5,007,386 3,225,084 962,103 434,324 113,930 29,108

MICHIGAN 27,868,684 3,644,972 13,225,524 7,509,608 920,585 1,259,431 638,016 670,548

MINNESOTA 8,167,178 1,366,606 3,524,751 3,117,404 72,534 72,223 13,659 1

MISSISSIPPI 13,620,837 2,477,561 3,931,718 4,928,906 768,725 959,616 554,311 0

MISSOURI 13,755,082 1,935,288 8,633,878 2,823,399 181,152 154,916 14,979 11,470

MONTANA 245,554 58,091 114,846 64,593 5,432 2,423 0 169

NEBRASKA 3,636,838 198,704 168,364 1,234,434 278,239 830,846 147,797 778,454

NEVADA 2,119,035 110,770 262,082 1,362,742 91,098 252,103 22,945 17,295

NEW HAMPSHIRE 1,296,125 109,082 252,933 584,678 74,226 175,256 17,520 82,430

NEW JERSEY 25,333,571 3,580,947 9,223,470 10,534,552 1,248,860 666,066 56,643 23,033

NEW MEXICO 3,308,759 251,577 992,288 1,192,279 270,178 242,609 68,068 291,760

NEW YORK 58,903,277 7,926,749 25,310,315 4,123,222 1,500,957 3,043,276 1,640,698 15,358,060

NORTH CAROLINA 16,651,444 1,378,154 5,429,402 5,267,969 2,322,445 1,126,243 427,918 699,313

NORTH DAKOTA 5,269,542 2,506,421 1,677,515 552,933 94,366 106,505 102,841 228,961

OHIO 31,000,866 7,325,317 5,045,809 9,252,438 2,144,150 2,212,421 925,434 4,095,297

OKLAHOMA 7,539,211 1,334,193 1,133,463 3,441,114 241,191 1,387,546 1,704 0

OREGON 6,004,480 702,686 1,077,204 3,593,375 142,497 251,882 56,073 180,763

PENNSYLVANIA 5,938,208 623,591 1,395,046 2,637,652 168,391 408,919 216,526 488,083

PUERTO RICO 10,130,421 113,319 269,253 2,610,680 355,904 1,021,598 797,972 4,961,695

RHODE ISLAND 1,257,209 20,135 226,852 377,464 102,879 225,646 30,472 273,761

SOUTH CAROLINA 12,469,640 1,183,958 1,527,831 1,487,945 798,770 2,495,551 1,203,515 3,772,070

SOUTH DAKOTA 1,916,471 645,355 718,746 467,434 53,322 29,397 2,217 0

TENNESSEE 18,879,173 3,561,949 3,460,900 3,481,381 3,283,673 3,516,837 579,392 995,041

TEXAS 10,327,630 1,724,314 2,385,698 2,213,508 1,267,423 2,037,906 530,959 167,822

UTAH 4,249,245 862,086 1,340,396 1,958,720 48,079 30,930 9,034 0

VERMONT 1,402,060 169,126 352,221 419,633 153,781 164,013 123,612 19,674

VIRGIN ISLANDS 2 709,836 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

VIRGINIA 8,065,253 1,179,115 2,918,020 3,659,199 209,399 94,128 5,162 230

WASHINGTON 5,933,375 1,127,344 2,329,972 1,633,034 526,132 315,474 538 881

WEST VIRGINIA 6,094,210 18,641 4,967,634 827,595 131,115 69,113 39,180 40,932

WISCONSIN 9,857,263 2,184,886 4,832,738 2,503,402 148,397 157,798 24,221 5,821

WYOMING 1,130,375 121,982 424,171 502,844 20,825 9,900 1,572 49,081

TOTALS $580,728,541 $94,152,597 $175,832,297 $154,371,452 $36,502,779 $35,806,864 $13,544,381 $52,391,899

Source: Form OCSE-34, Part 1 and Part 2. Beginning fiscal year 2015, form OCSE-34, Part 1 and Part 2, Line 9b

line 1 line 14 line 15 line 16 line 17 line 18 line 19 line 20

Formula: OCSE-34, Part 1, Line 9b/OCSE-34, Part 2 by categories & ages

1 All data are for the 4th quarter.

2 Ilinois and Virgin Islands did not submit their 4th quarter itemized undistributed collections report for fiscal year 2016.

26

FY 2016 CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT PRELIMINARY REPORT

Other Collections

Table P-21 Collections Forwarded to Non-IV-D Cases for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years

STATES 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016ALABAMA $165,447,044 $165,309,963 $162,761,291 $161,519,150 $157,689,647

ALASKA 388,721 527,445 508,131 538,429 485,341

ARIZONA 342,902,181 354,679,459 358,443,098 357,408,332 354,887,252

ARKANSAS 49,716,800 49,202,241 47,354,957 45,702,751 43,372,970

CALIFORNIA 207,045,347 215,012,642 218,133,016 217,074,916 208,989,606

COLORADO 83,275,582 88,203,044 94,789,672 102,219,308 108,398,764

CONNECTICUT 41,206,412 41,481,010 40,418,623 39,931,063 39,047,550

DELAWARE 8,523,441 8,039,875 7,119,197 6,759,562 6,385,646

DIST. OF COL. 2,992,073 2,815,031 2,604,921 2,364,403 2,283,698

FLORIDA 248,327,686 254,111,847 260,152,590 265,523,409 281,902,499

GEORGIA 34,772,420 36,100,574 36,445,086 36,232,667 35,893,265

GUAM 176,938 147,632 128,441 120,533 101,714

HAWAII 10,304,466 10,095,500 9,878,408 9,761,305 9,319,589

IDAHO 2,328,562 2,071,486 1,762,342 1,434,991 1,356,293

ILLINOIS 516,423,381 533,754,652 539,943,327 546,575,905 555,853,636

INDIANA 211,362,301 209,073,699 207,994,700 208,443,383 208,765,404

IOWA 70,974,484 72,117,218 71,365,462 71,316,888 71,189,152

KANSAS 132,866,431 134,953,938 137,882,022 139,112,149 136,484,311

KENTUCKY 30,874,333 30,252,007 29,129,642 27,373,224 25,735,810

LOUISIANA 3,213,117 3,690,358 4,083,676 4,450,999 4,435,387

MAINE 2,047,145 2,041,335 1,898,311 1,606,133 1,284,035

MARYLAND 9,948,342 9,662,710 10,085,027 9,950,679 9,686,431

MASSACHUSETTS 9,199,432 9,109,944 8,651,276 8,314,112 8,104,272

MICHIGAN 73,018,614 76,830,844 53,406,331 54,994,559 59,775,637

MINNESOTA 5,571,526 5,639,864 5,944,768 6,122,249 5,784,396

MISSISSIPPI 2,572,672 2,378,084 2,377,882 2,395,530 2,399,582

MISSOURI 70,300,827 70,440,196 68,450,892 67,779,051 67,754,572

MONTANA 816,476 698,806 655,808 554,903 477,100

NEBRASKA 26,640,023 26,476,683 25,648,028 25,192,215 24,482,953

NEVADA 246,933 333,616 155,882 143,374 150,293

NEW HAMPSHIRE 206,134 271,283 317,252 381,424 416,535

NEW JERSEY 85,945,286 90,672,135 94,526,109 95,277,633 96,359,888

NEW MEXICO 2,045,782 1,991,129 1,966,825 1,766,685 1,694,574

NEW YORK 948,370 1,366,353 916,979 2,404,362 2,428,304

NORTH CAROLINA 31,439,140 29,944,655 28,336,210 27,038,094 26,386,940

NORTH DAKOTA 24,619,660 25,707,577 25,885,260 26,261,659 27,124,778

OHIO 124,461,010 119,605,698 116,040,471 115,447,883 115,520,539

OKLAHOMA 14,074,661 14,195,153 13,758,580 13,042,668 11,863,203

OREGON 4,706 2,382 4,198 5,366 2,166

PENNSYLVANIA 92,710,579 98,364,051 97,403,414 98,469,076 99,530,913

PUERTO RICO 11,114,732 10,919,916 9,901,559 8,962,649 8,167,103

RHODE ISLAND 14,054,055 14,488,677 14,192,723 13,595,421 13,558,921

SOUTH CAROLINA 0 0 0 0 0

SOUTH DAKOTA 2,307,633 2,243,498 2,140,355 1,884,760 1,716,246

TENNESSEE 37,474,190 38,112,636 39,178,980 35,488,708 35,449,729

TEXAS 766,386,721 749,410,352 722,670,903 690,447,344 657,873,813

UTAH 64,616 20,901 7,196 3,180 3,445

VERMONT 4,059,887 3,891,287 3,969,245 3,737,443 3,434,834

VIRGIN ISLANDS 164,555 133,137 126,646 172,660 152,887

VIRGINIA 25,053,857 25,217,739 24,519,603 23,405,953 22,855,428

WASHINGTON 2,402,169 2,447,323 2,422,567 2,427,504 2,184,742

WEST VIRGINIA 2,815,277 3,011,179 2,929,767 2,970,976 3,224,679

WISCONSIN 278,279,839 278,939,799 275,558,515 274,066,999 272,972,776

WYOMING 11,266,450 11,464,520 11,617,545 11,541,469 10,738,004

TOTALS $3,895,383,019 $3,937,673,083 $3,896,563,709 $3,869,716,088 $3,846,137,252

Source: Form OCSE-34A - Part 1, line 4a, column G. Beginning fiscal year 2015, form OCSE-34 - Part 1, line 4a, column G.

Note: These data are not reflected in distributed collections shown elsewhere in this report.

27

Table P-22 Collections Sent to Other States, FY 2016

STATES Total Current Assistance Former Assistance Medicaid Never Assistance

Never Assistance

ALABAMA $27,645,191 $1,204,469 $2,147,503 $9,277 $24,283,942

ALASKA 12,297,653 1,051,624 2,982,154 598,757 7,665,118

ARIZONA 34,689,578 5,560,872 6,789,779 5,761,447 16,577,480

ARKANSAS 19,834,618 2,785,288 2,339 4,723,671 12,323,320

CALIFORNIA 93,843,134 5,598,488 13,615,829 12,947,213 61,681,604

COLORADO 34,443,288 4,154,095 4,979,042 9,520 25,300,631

CONNECTICUT 16,762,448 67,183 3,439,939 1,168,316 12,087,010

DELAWARE 6,935,877 631 397,826 124,959 6,412,461

DIST. OF COL. 6,714,914 683,343 258,988 0 5,772,583

FLORIDA 122,973,818 7,724,379 33,198,502 18,399,413 63,651,524

GEORGIA 71,521,832 6,766,547 16,014,061 12,685,097 36,056,127

GUAM 814,021 19,872 271,451 0 522,698

HAWAII 6,581,009 581,395 1,004,115 657,661 4,337,838

IDAHO 11,807,587 997,757 3,502,014 239,629 7,068,187

ILLINOIS 59,747,590 8,485,614 5,604,484 8,310,277 37,347,215

INDIANA 36,047,951 20,679 6,419,466 3,375,318 26,232,488

IOWA 16,086,399 2,535,031 2,559,391 4,386,967 6,605,010

KANSAS 16,831,941 3,469,842 2,565,961 7,750,526 3,045,612

KENTUCKY 19,532,577 1,624,472 3,381,065 4,420,562 10,106,478

LOUISIANA 27,191,294 3,228,922 426,896 6,268,371 17,267,105

MAINE 4,867,547 312,023 52,344 866,055 3,637,125

MARYLAND 43,177,846 1,641,809 1,746,186 2,507,114 37,282,737

MASSACHUSETTS 25,829,366 730,475 8,622,814 670,696 15,805,381

MICHIGAN 29,978,722 27,524 5,673,645 3,693,211 20,584,342

MINNESOTA 19,326,288 870,495 5,673,584 5,847,106 6,935,103

MISSISSIPPI 15,351,710 2,263,494 426,749 92,232 12,569,235

MISSOURI 30,554,018 0 14,695,053 2,911,957 12,947,008

MONTANA 8,904,905 315,110 806,938 199,198 7,583,659

NEBRASKA 11,193,931 145,831 2,720,000 1,813,473 6,514,627

NEVADA 28,884,086 8,196,246 4,219,056 0 16,468,784

NEW HAMPSHIRE 5,454,598 898,015 780,383 989,928 2,786,272

NEW JERSEY 50,682,504 9,973 6,174,940 148,891 44,348,700

NEW MEXICO 10,045,038 1,149,027 0 617,621 8,278,390

NEW YORK 115,174,736 17,116,683 1,159,922 777 96,897,354

NORTH CAROLINA 44,816,324 5,406,979 162,756 7,839,267 31,407,322

NORTH DAKOTA 8,724,209 1,562,819 1,042,081 1,126,615 4,992,694

OHIO 40,867,667 27,401 5,790,224 3,661,144 31,388,898

OKLAHOMA 23,333,810 7,491,012 3,329,720 1,080,429 11,432,649

OREGON 25,033,051 8,929,649 1,158,171 3,659,108 11,286,123

PENNSYLVANIA 47,123,461 2,176,133 5,321,410 2,023,739 37,602,179

PUERTO RICO 21,672,824 6,214,476 493,050 0 14,965,298

RHODE ISLAND 4,516,632 760,780 1,008,225 682,980 2,064,647

SOUTH CAROLINA 12,024,099 1,838,718 147,779 56,585 9,981,017

SOUTH DAKOTA 7,193,393 854,697 2,844,041 85,703 3,408,952

TENNESSEE 38,622,281 -2,529 5,595,983 1,431,964 31,596,863

TEXAS 125,555,677 3,674,994 34,133,535 20,603,836 67,143,312

UTAH 13,446,279 523,264 2,487,092 1,675,089 8,760,834

VERMONT 2,263,028 207,591 399,998 0 1,655,439

VIRGIN ISLANDS 1,288,217 94,772 70,024 312,936 810,485

VIRGINIA 52,640,981 5,090,000 213,171 0 47,337,810

WASHINGTON 40,669,115 6,356,389 5,857,403 3,917,970 24,537,353

WEST VIRGINIA 10,794,732 839,214 1,364,806 1,755,918 6,834,794

WISCONSIN 19,103,249 3,082,542 2,105,820 5,717,314 8,197,573

WYOMING 6,999,993 844,348 13,096 1,335,009 4,807,540

TOTALS $1,588,417,037 $146,210,457 $235,850,804 $169,160,846 $1,037,194,930

Source: Form OCSE-34 - Part 1, line 4b.

28

FY 2016 CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT PRELIMINARY REPORT

Table P-23 Current Assistance Collections Sent To Other States for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years

STATES 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016ALABAMA $1,716,961 $1,592,527 $1,459,756 $1,375,492 $1,204,469

ALASKA 3,702,899 1,093,250 1,025,252 1,115,789 1,051,624

ARIZONA 6,551,108 6,525,184 6,125,706 5,854,674 5,560,872

ARKANSAS 3,866,332 3,552,143 3,253,198 2,973,537 2,785,288

CALIFORNIA 7,650,697 6,690,348 6,143,485 5,889,745 5,598,488

COLORADO 4,999,284 4,774,954 4,559,553 4,201,970 4,154,095

CONNECTICUT 78,576 77,108 56,034 55,001 67,183

DELAWARE 3,553 6,704 416 0 631

DIST. OF COL. 669,337 653,033 714,492 703,272 683,343

FLORIDA 9,184,830 6,231,439 7,068,393 7,591,410 7,724,379

GEORGIA 6,600,003 6,528,927 6,587,968 6,748,879 6,766,547

GUAM 16,611 13,697 14,195 12,494 19,872

HAWAII 563,199 514,795 480,289 554,839 581,395

IDAHO 1,532,698 1,237,463 1,122,767 993,629 997,757

ILLINOIS 9,703,351 8,912,267 8,856,635 8,591,279 8,485,614

INDIANA 34,365 23,409 22,088 17,551 20,679

IOWA 2,884,217 2,796,212 2,655,143 2,593,238 2,535,031

KANSAS 4,507,633 4,170,808 3,734,552 3,399,275 3,469,842

KENTUCKY 2,632,794 2,085,986 1,658,948 1,665,138 1,624,472

LOUISIANA 4,097,203 3,794,060 3,607,580 3,500,366 3,228,922

MAINE 813,935 822,374 577,892 359,266 312,023

MARYLAND 2,388,771 2,177,420 2,037,202 1,808,666 1,641,809

MASSACHUSETTS 1,219,543 1,156,059 1,023,440 843,127 730,475

MICHIGAN 47,509 37,509 43,660 36,780 27,524

MINNESOTA 981,516 931,642 846,131 844,194 870,495

MISSISSIPPI 2,474,138 2,416,018 2,269,267 2,207,841 2,263,494

MISSOURI 0 0 0 0 0

MONTANA 454,835 361,609 313,704 333,303 315,110

NEBRASKA 356,661 271,750 183,300 145,995 145,831

NEVADA 8,429,072 8,414,117 8,221,364 8,401,778 8,196,246

NEW HAMPSHIRE 913,894 925,777 871,755 871,747 898,015

NEW JERSEY 12,665 22,831 26,622 14,492 9,973

NEW MEXICO 1,595,114 1,482,871 1,404,229 1,246,904 1,149,027

NEW YORK 18,543,720 17,270,210 16,444,651 16,144,370 17,116,683

NORTH CAROLINA 5,500,286 5,593,488 5,321,793 5,301,168 5,406,979

NORTH DAKOTA 1,533,130 1,542,574 1,661,052 1,704,079 1,562,819

OHIO 31,366 19,801 24,207 26,644 27,401

OKLAHOMA 9,458,237 8,878,551 8,333,676 8,125,547 7,491,012

OREGON 9,830,295 9,230,145 8,897,474 8,916,902 8,929,649

PENNSYLVANIA 599,306 1,069,442 1,588,026 1,888,727 2,176,133

PUERTO RICO 5,945,967 6,618,985 6,155,908 5,930,692 6,214,476

RHODE ISLAND 658,314 605,931 656,538 712,190 760,780

SOUTH CAROLINA 1,592,130 1,604,110 1,651,035 1,701,508 1,838,718

SOUTH DAKOTA 1,073,209 1,084,758 975,010 924,831 854,697

TENNESSEE -8,757 713 -4,605 105 -2,529

TEXAS 6,763,930 5,360,317 4,609,540 3,832,775 3,674,994

UTAH 715,751 701,773 532,145 568,608 523,264

VERMONT 271,529 231,106 242,369 211,327 207,591

VIRGIN ISLANDS 114,981 125,453 101,122 94,175 94,772

VIRGINIA 6,420,335 6,010,392 5,593,831 5,282,901 5,090,000

WASHINGTON 6,711,542 6,707,195 6,469,225 6,322,062 6,356,389

WEST VIRGINIA 1,167,201 1,187,043 1,036,423 973,907 839,214

WISCONSIN 2,870,157 2,940,094 2,860,750 2,907,797 3,082,542

WYOMING 1,125,227 1,081,947 1,029,385 931,019 844,348

TOTALS $171,601,160 $158,158,319 $151,144,571 $147,453,005 $146,210,457

Source: Form OCSE-34A - Part 1, line 4b, columns (A+B). Beginning fiscal year 2015, form OCSE-34 - Part 1, line 4b, columns (A+B).

29

Table P-24 Former Assistance Collections Sent To Other States for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years

STATES 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016ALABAMA $2,017,200 $2,054,172 $2,032,129 $2,068,416 $2,147,503

ALASKA 2,744,425 3,181,211 2,918,400 3,306,007 2,982,154

ARIZONA 6,838,160 7,199,313 7,099,305 6,925,102 6,789,779

ARKANSAS 0 517 0 7,060 2,339

CALIFORNIA 7,814,577 9,376,937 10,967,781 12,462,310 13,615,829

COLORADO 5,376,324 5,377,414 5,244,026 5,195,997 4,979,042

CONNECTICUT 3,943,668 3,956,378 3,714,879 3,668,227 3,439,939

DELAWARE 768,107 764,458 309,113 354,683 397,826

DIST. OF COL. 284,135 244,618 275,871 257,896 258,988

FLORIDA 10,882,138 12,359,914 22,164,895 32,226,756 33,198,502

GEORGIA 13,744,069 14,354,990 14,497,536 15,366,929 16,014,061

GUAM 387,509 284,278 301,895 265,969 271,451

HAWAII 965,186 883,737 964,016 998,272 1,004,115

IDAHO 2,936,973 3,296,778 3,239,991 3,519,496 3,502,014

ILLINOIS 3,645,302 4,365,358 5,046,619 5,493,045 5,604,484

INDIANA 6,493,016 7,582,840 7,293,163 6,583,907 6,419,466

IOWA 2,752,038 2,742,170 2,659,677 2,639,660 2,559,391

KANSAS 2,439,421 2,401,735 2,261,443 2,317,134 2,565,961

KENTUCKY 2,698,330 3,042,204 3,432,755 3,338,725 3,381,065

LOUISIANA 372,684 425,852 446,593 504,692 426,896

MAINE 437,310 361,985 142,427 78,792 52,344

MARYLAND 1,630,329 1,668,167 1,705,379 1,797,880 1,746,186

MASSACHUSETTS 9,139,973 8,933,464 8,855,119 8,755,098 8,622,814

MICHIGAN 6,371,905 6,079,690 5,872,573 6,149,047 5,673,645

MINNESOTA 6,252,380 6,009,105 5,839,889 5,972,608 5,673,584

MISSISSIPPI 399,825 439,384 407,329 409,366 426,749

MISSOURI 13,156,921 13,515,107 13,308,034 14,042,324 14,695,053

MONTANA 1,035,523 933,150 886,944 888,304 806,938

NEBRASKA 2,914,729 2,846,745 2,791,961 2,742,003 2,720,000

NEVADA 3,535,269 3,590,202 3,735,377 4,004,502 4,219,056

NEW HAMPSHIRE 592,479 597,095 673,384 764,939 780,383

NEW JERSEY 6,270,855 6,160,556 5,974,025 6,010,355 6,174,940

NEW MEXICO 0 0 0 0 0

NEW YORK 2,193,207 1,833,717 1,545,713 1,341,875 1,159,922

NORTH CAROLINA 192,410 155,553 121,370 125,876 162,756

NORTH DAKOTA 1,233,945 1,222,159 1,226,535 1,160,069 1,042,081

OHIO 5,873,656 5,840,289 5,922,481 5,982,310 5,790,224

OKLAHOMA 3,881,092 3,795,241 3,712,693 3,505,232 3,329,720

OREGON 1,588,674 1,325,553 1,277,079 1,303,941 1,158,171

PENNSYLVANIA 5,627,927 5,263,304 4,925,645 4,931,297 5,321,410

PUERTO RICO 427,806 435,269 397,481 412,116 493,050

RHODE ISLAND 1,108,528 1,003,961 1,080,311 1,033,810 1,008,225

SOUTH CAROLINA 136,060 105,247 123,574 134,670 147,779

SOUTH DAKOTA 3,042,117 3,236,830 3,050,711 2,988,162 2,844,041

TENNESSEE 3,791,365 3,971,778 4,366,391 5,070,310 5,595,983

TEXAS 27,628,865 32,260,355 33,125,133 34,195,687 34,133,535

UTAH 2,035,490 2,114,280 2,386,676 2,392,430 2,487,092

VERMONT 468,251 466,438 530,035 489,110 399,998

VIRGIN ISLANDS 58,080 57,728 47,855 48,993 70,024

VIRGINIA 164,150 201,480 227,065 185,276 213,171

WASHINGTON 5,871,861 5,858,332 5,499,558 5,727,447 5,857,403

WEST VIRGINIA 2,035,394 1,811,794 1,697,374 1,496,175 1,364,806

WISCONSIN 2,488,468 2,361,839 2,244,959 2,240,414 2,105,820

WYOMING 32,744 35,215 33,812 31,765 13,096

TOTALS $198,720,850 $208,385,886 $218,604,979 $233,912,466 $235,850,804

Source: Form OCSE-34A - Part 1, line 4b, columns (C+D). Beginning fiscal year 2015, form OCSE-34 - Part 1, line 4b, columns (C+D).

30

FY 2016 CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT PRELIMINARY REPORT

Table P-25 Medicaid Never Assistance Collections Sent To Other States for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years

STATES 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016ALABAMA 0 $895 $6,433 $7,715 $9,277

ALASKA 280,603 368,441 377,253 513,348 598,757

ARIZONA 5,093,584 5,651,065 5,800,001 5,795,140 5,761,447

ARKANSAS 4,132,641 4,492,442 4,746,519 4,692,532 4,723,671

CALIFORNIA 12,548,097 14,622,581 12,798,033 13,251,357 12,947,213

COLORADO 20,828 6,816 1,288 5,477 9,520

CONNECTICUT 1,126,622 1,173,165 1,215,313 1,185,483 1,168,316

DELAWARE 64,415 68,536 84,645 81,476 124,959

DIST. OF COL. 1,687 1,235 0 0 0

FLORIDA 14,674,082 18,685,969 17,757,922 16,528,093 18,399,413

GEORGIA 8,103,770 9,605,809 10,517,732 11,807,792 12,685,097

GUAM 0 0 0 0 0

HAWAII 564,354 736,723 638,780 689,983 657,661

IDAHO 912,924 556,951 219,400 291,565 239,629

ILLINOIS 5,851,189 7,045,255 7,444,324 7,924,409 8,310,277

INDIANA 1,693,966 1,806,725 2,388,500 2,969,168 3,375,318

IOWA 3,753,922 4,153,422 4,334,071 4,326,751 4,386,967

KANSAS 3,318,121 4,686,904 5,181,638 6,278,184 7,750,526

KENTUCKY 20,593 2,162,904 4,424,656 4,451,717 4,420,562

LOUISIANA 5,263,891 5,879,961 6,348,412 6,543,268 6,268,371

MAINE 459,666 471,758 600,021 736,734 866,055

MARYLAND 0 0 0 0 2,507,114

MASSACHUSETTS 614,224 636,237 644,857 658,320 670,696

MICHIGAN 3,078,964 3,215,339 3,356,983 3,640,577 3,693,211

MINNESOTA 4,482,270 4,954,830 5,290,658 5,662,286 5,847,106

MISSISSIPPI 20,639 96,380 103,566 99,865 92,232

MISSOURI 2,120,753 2,230,110 2,358,313 2,664,525 2,911,957

MONTANA 120,096 144,456 145,746 162,975 199,198

NEBRASKA 1,810,883 1,758,728 1,746,903 1,785,455 1,813,473

NEVADA 0 0 0 0 0

NEW HAMPSHIRE 908,862 860,144 873,381 935,567 989,928

NEW JERSEY 29,720 43,138 58,268 82,930 148,891

NEW MEXICO 235,170 338,531 286,764 441,243 617,621

NEW YORK 10,558 10,203 954 13,012 777

NORTH CAROLINA 6,900,552 7,715,783 7,975,717 7,976,923 7,839,267

NORTH DAKOTA 926,044 974,996 1,086,271 1,116,996 1,126,615

OHIO 486,036 544,211 455,677 1,560,119 3,661,144

OKLAHOMA 647,536 819,040 868,380 934,172 1,080,429

OREGON 3,543,632 3,876,104 3,993,119 3,741,251 3,659,108

PENNSYLVANIA 693,115 881,689 1,187,153 1,590,073 2,023,739

PUERTO RICO 0 0 0 0 0

RHODE ISLAND 488,885 607,447 577,530 617,919 682,980

SOUTH CAROLINA 56,761 37,971 44,322 54,289 56,585

SOUTH DAKOTA 94,484 75,577 105,568 102,776 85,703

TENNESSEE 1,335,990 1,589,629 1,254,421 1,246,992 1,431,964

TEXAS 20,058,930 21,078,272 19,840,963 21,057,748 20,603,836

UTAH 1,986,089 2,091,928 1,742,553 1,770,084 1,675,089

VERMONT 31,693 25,308 0 0 0

VIRGIN ISLANDS 391,364 385,732 312,570 311,309 312,936

VIRGINIA 0 0 0 0 0

WASHINGTON 3,270,503 3,532,240 3,696,975 3,791,312 3,917,970

WEST VIRGINIA 1,637,219 1,704,249 1,804,588 1,861,327 1,755,918

WISCONSIN 3,988,049 4,463,295 5,150,137 5,487,911 5,717,314

WYOMING 1,551,255 1,684,748 1,589,932 1,536,106 1,335,009

TOTALS $129,405,231 $148,553,872 $151,437,210 $158,984,254 $169,160,846

Source: Form OCSE-34A - Part 1, line 4b, column E. Beginning fiscal year 2015, form OCSE-34 - Part 1, line 4b, column E.

31

Table P-26 Never Assistance Collections Sent To Other States for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years

STATES 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016ALABAMA $22,178,541 $22,565,090 $23,009,710 $23,748,323 $24,283,942

ALASKA 5,827,837 7,242,140 7,166,047 7,729,855 7,665,118

ARIZONA 18,481,222 18,976,712 18,017,063 17,280,198 16,577,480

ARKANSAS 11,523,154 12,123,438 12,074,412 12,423,350 12,323,320

CALIFORNIA 65,144,035 62,733,855 62,938,470 61,777,659 61,681,604

COLORADO 22,752,031 23,572,986 24,096,987 24,722,914 25,300,631

CONNECTICUT 11,920,707 12,093,978 11,610,172 11,754,344 12,087,010

DELAWARE 6,529,652 6,180,231 6,433,214 6,191,325 6,412,461

DIST. OF COL. 5,598,899 5,600,284 5,757,398 5,813,234 5,772,583

FLORIDA 77,012,997 74,765,764 72,050,013 64,913,243 63,651,524

GEORGIA 39,623,567 38,818,221 37,241,021 36,556,149 36,056,127

GUAM 632,301 553,272 614,895 554,587 522,698

HAWAII 4,085,456 4,103,688 4,345,650 4,432,528 4,337,838

IDAHO 6,146,914 6,691,780 6,814,863 6,823,267 7,068,187

ILLINOIS 44,623,290 43,862,571 42,313,012 40,093,048 37,347,215

INDIANA 26,639,521 25,239,825 25,153,855 25,999,664 26,232,488

IOWA 6,386,353 6,244,593 6,267,798 6,549,735 6,605,010

KANSAS 7,190,155 5,440,408 4,444,853 3,655,837 3,045,612

KENTUCKY 13,373,671 11,394,731 9,777,968 10,193,581 10,106,478

LOUISIANA 18,252,011 17,878,944 17,815,415 17,910,194 17,267,105

MAINE 3,010,033 2,928,345 3,451,056 3,782,228 3,637,125

MARYLAND 36,509,003 37,926,242 38,575,291 39,031,600 37,282,737

MASSACHUSETTS 15,010,081 15,451,893 15,570,266 15,661,950 15,805,381

MICHIGAN 21,479,150 20,939,146 20,132,478 20,456,233 20,584,342

MINNESOTA 7,750,275 7,442,387 7,011,846 6,877,236 6,935,103

MISSISSIPPI 11,253,813 11,366,469 11,253,065 12,244,591 12,569,235

MISSOURI 12,792,622 12,706,108 12,292,225 12,710,410 12,947,008

MONTANA 7,229,176 7,393,030 7,438,551 7,588,680 7,583,659

NEBRASKA 6,736,955 6,707,893 6,590,256 6,363,362 6,514,627

NEVADA 16,981,144 16,325,947 15,853,203 15,787,635 16,468,784

NEW HAMPSHIRE 3,260,225 3,056,785 3,102,273 3,003,790 2,786,272

NEW JERSEY 45,060,152 45,307,920 44,034,334 44,383,009 44,348,700

NEW MEXICO 7,422,912 8,240,312 8,392,235 8,786,571 8,278,390

NEW YORK 97,920,704 97,487,493 96,050,999 96,178,924 96,897,354

NORTH CAROLINA 33,862,488 33,074,859 31,602,180 31,451,846 31,407,322

NORTH DAKOTA 3,780,887 4,143,447 4,524,796 4,944,105 4,992,694

OHIO 33,738,278 33,851,945 33,988,040 33,445,930 31,388,898

OKLAHOMA 11,112,855 11,460,399 11,704,728 11,828,425 11,432,649

OREGON 10,319,685 10,138,710 10,139,957 10,505,697 11,286,123

PENNSYLVANIA 42,278,505 40,024,306 38,058,104 37,762,427 37,602,179

PUERTO RICO 14,650,741 14,742,160 13,970,408 13,743,827 14,965,298

RHODE ISLAND 2,197,509 2,201,305 2,079,880 2,166,201 2,064,647

SOUTH CAROLINA 8,738,961 8,384,484 8,788,652 9,716,856 9,981,017

SOUTH DAKOTA 3,322,925 3,184,679 3,464,059 3,379,296 3,408,952

TENNESSEE 31,323,079 31,836,892 31,934,069 31,364,564 31,596,863

TEXAS 70,061,610 67,496,887 69,258,785 67,475,381 67,143,312

UTAH 7,612,353 7,505,199 8,031,270 8,485,993 8,760,834

VERMONT 1,684,776 1,606,665 1,624,491 1,676,379 1,655,439

VIRGIN ISLANDS 1,072,981 1,010,744 780,525 697,624 810,485

VIRGINIA 49,488,243 49,897,077 49,944,826 48,966,792 47,337,810

WASHINGTON 23,057,590 23,064,838 23,029,771 23,760,032 24,537,353

WEST VIRGINIA 7,740,789 7,507,049 7,044,611 6,846,940 6,834,794

WISCONSIN 8,970,499 8,789,325 8,582,639 8,474,793 8,197,573

WYOMING 4,895,940 5,010,259 5,145,199 5,114,157 4,807,540

TOTALS $1,076,249,253 $1,064,293,710 $1,051,387,884 $1,043,786,519 $1,037,194,930

Source: Form OCSE-34A - Part 1, line 4b, column F. Beginning fiscal year 2015, form OCSE-34 - Part 1, line 4b, column F.

32

FY 2016 CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT PRELIMINARY REPORT

Table P-27 Collections Sent to Other Countries for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years

STATES 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016ALABAMA $250,224 $245,970 $224,973 $239,206 $208,013

ALASKA 88,059 166,508 172,659 182,384 160,715

ARIZONA 517,337 420,618 305,203 322,915 305,399

ARKANSAS 117,509 108,659 104,299 111,191 137,600

CALIFORNIA 2,519,311 2,525,238 2,843,320 2,828,457 2,941,894

COLORADO 495,751 531,723 560,559 620,735 557,033

CONNECTICUT 351,102 370,570 368,238 429,444 315,652

DELAWARE 0 0 0 0 0

DIST. OF COL. 12,614 11,122 11,920 14,870 28,039

FLORIDA 2,219,543 2,124,307 2,122,003 2,443,658 2,225,761

GEORGIA 944,148 984,443 985,244 1,036,782 1,023,203

GUAM 0 0 0 0 0

HAWAII 35,499 45,281 44,092 55,321 50,817

IDAHO 115,658 133,229 123,679 141,533 135,102

ILLINOIS 885,158 650,701 323,380 1,253,918 1,523,086

INDIANA 0 0 0 0 0

IOWA 107,632 115,043 146,549 140,423 140,970

KANSAS 197,629 208,897 225,349 179,732 167,451

KENTUCKY 289,292 324,801 288,052 322,956 322,232

LOUISIANA 263,755 298,675 291,254 263,211 253,910

MAINE 151,727 135,502 147,740 138,108 131,538

MARYLAND 0 0 0 0 0

MASSACHUSETTS 365,196 567,761 626,501 581,792 453,002

MICHIGAN 1,003,071 1,033,723 1,047,260 1,007,743 1,066,002

MINNESOTA 345,432 333,788 319,456 299,656 316,975

MISSISSIPPI 81,478 81,883 117,213 56,031 68,446

MISSOURI 275,975 226,420 270,467 240,283 241,949

MONTANA 92,536 131,377 102,166 122,031 108,011

NEBRASKA 0 0 68,863 86,829 68,548

NEVADA 363,901 378,600 365,156 409,287 478,298

NEW HAMPSHIRE 0 0 0 0 0

NEW JERSEY 0 0 0 0 0

NEW MEXICO 0 0 0 0 0

NEW YORK 2,165,910 2,098,645 2,788,416 2,871,757 2,744,711

NORTH CAROLINA 575,832 654,462 656,365 597,579 572,229

NORTH DAKOTA 64,907 72,221 50,688 52,838 63,111

OHIO 0 0 0 0 0

OKLAHOMA 289,022 303,051 341,563 373,132 336,175

OREGON 0 0 0 0 0

PENNSYLVANIA 671,606 695,656 683,524 663,434 637,600

PUERTO RICO 7,500 12,094 0 0 0

RHODE ISLAND 63,803 59,688 79,843 80,662 75,505

SOUTH CAROLINA 0 0 0 0 0

SOUTH DAKOTA 0 0 0 0 8,572

TENNESSEE 282,553 284,686 249,593 315,491 266,765

TEXAS 3,565,655 3,422,284 3,577,925 3,362,864 3,327,241

UTAH 158,392 161,395 175,458 139,630 126,813

VERMONT 0 0 0 0 0

VIRGIN ISLANDS 0 0 0 0 0

VIRGINIA 0 0 0 0 0

WASHINGTON 1,391,372 1,338,556 1,278,592 1,264,974 1,154,486

WEST VIRGINIA 31,534 32,041 56,124 93,171 75,490

WISCONSIN 0 0 0 0 0

WYOMING 55,784 71,625 86,439 71,880 51,303

TOTALS $21,413,407 $21,361,243 $22,230,125 $23,415,908 $22,869,647

Source: Form OCSE-34A - Part 1, line 4c, column G. Beginning fiscal year 2015, form OCSE-34 - Part 1, line 4c, column G.

33

Table P-28 Total Collections Received from Wage Withholding for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years 1

STATES 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016ALABAMA $371,325,158 $385,640,347 $392,018,953 $402,414,955 $405,019,149

ALASKA 56,589,941 56,736,842 56,849,088 56,380,558 54,460,837

ARIZONA 499,383,491 513,758,065 512,404,974 511,746,462 504,090,613

ARKANSAS 208,904,767 216,808,619 220,975,885 224,357,602 220,771,599

CALIFORNIA 1,676,163,847 1,743,865,924 1,776,452,102 1,807,458,438 1,841,739,689

COLORADO 267,263,123 283,873,904 302,741,284 317,672,657 324,258,157

CONNECTICUT 190,169,946 192,712,595 192,103,350 194,743,406 195,948,165

DELAWARE 59,955,924 61,103,227 59,545,143 59,385,272 58,792,041

DIST. OF COL. 43,481,910 41,903,923 41,772,024 41,595,611 40,751,121

FLORIDA 1,215,978,604 1,231,705,822 1,279,576,327 1,282,830,789 1,320,753,354

GEORGIA 458,367,707 479,885,057 493,236,919 511,590,254 527,412,401

GUAM 7,582,768 7,912,302 7,852,967 7,592,579 7,092,298

HAWAII 82,772,515 84,762,523 86,715,155 87,985,559 88,750,844

IDAHO 97,333,696 103,792,831 105,821,933 107,472,774 108,749,305

ILLINOIS 1,096,912,757 1,124,896,787 1,145,378,034 1,190,514,292 1,209,924,478

INDIANA 622,020,954 624,593,346 628,559,122 632,980,468 632,401,741

IOWA 309,783,860 315,730,697 315,746,833 316,782,470 316,849,499

KANSAS 270,016,642 277,666,232 279,090,197 282,893,670 286,566,477

KENTUCKY 261,375,259 263,577,547 269,116,257 275,242,206 272,832,072

LOUISIANA 274,269,780 289,378,191 295,334,941 303,440,573 294,695,686

MAINE 67,919,010 65,990,502 64,032,963 65,299,401 66,719,097

MARYLAND 384,437,129 399,715,067 411,325,809 419,174,007 424,091,472

MASSACHUSETTS 423,761,753 443,238,261 448,730,162 456,062,286 460,835,329

MICHIGAN 1,021,997,476 1,044,277,021 1,050,986,982 1,071,412,346 1,082,491,596

MINNESOTA 436,371,886 444,848,770 448,602,554 449,482,443 443,811,745

MISSISSIPPI 239,104,408 253,707,603 261,064,773 268,823,309 269,699,360

MISSOURI 423,229,258 449,690,015 458,205,512 481,039,418 486,015,242

MONTANA 45,411,981 46,547,191 47,168,454 48,330,849 46,991,452

NEBRASKA 166,515,955 171,939,946 173,058,496 173,580,617 173,063,069

NEVADA 124,565,727 131,800,759 134,896,140 136,830,448 138,407,033

NEW HAMPSHIRE 61,068,874 61,428,898 61,677,044 60,113,482 58,639,829

NEW JERSEY 833,275,351 864,757,919 881,050,514 896,815,964 895,555,742

NEW MEXICO 76,692,908 82,366,805 87,505,928 89,650,148 89,123,236

NEW YORK 1,272,553,115 1,282,690,969 1,310,738,091 1,323,760,691 1,353,103,214

NORTH CAROLINA 468,898,730 479,571,252 482,486,280 490,523,621 493,914,794

NORTH DAKOTA 85,430,246 88,987,658 91,891,687 93,551,745 93,150,209

OHIO 1,378,366,300 1,407,037,188 1,412,609,219 1,422,371,762 1,421,335,439

OKLAHOMA 239,762,103 251,664,413 258,613,155 263,788,647 259,125,756

OREGON 238,998,504 247,759,752 252,878,754 257,374,805 258,986,163

PENNSYLVANIA 1,056,633,758 1,067,806,613 1,060,967,712 1,054,942,335 1,048,641,279

PUERTO RICO 163,800,280 168,129,083 170,663,756 169,207,932 169,416,262

RHODE ISLAND 56,887,444 60,209,714 61,910,871 63,035,708 63,907,329

SOUTH CAROLINA 145,868,861 149,252,428 167,719,342 182,916,877 188,675,919

SOUTH DAKOTA 61,373,774 63,841,546 64,989,027 65,736,906 65,413,658

TENNESSEE 426,778,648 452,046,987 453,354,110 433,648,616 440,439,769

TEXAS 3,049,093,009 3,216,569,407 3,344,010,345 3,428,567,479 3,414,889,981

UTAH 145,944,384 153,337,866 158,494,713 163,189,700 166,948,934

VERMONT 36,781,221 36,877,452 37,239,414 35,758,520 35,132,222

VIRGIN ISLANDS 6,486,419 5,522,985 5,405,436 4,815,386 4,797,812

VIRGINIA 435,198,524 444,531,199 451,035,135 451,499,600 454,211,373

WASHINGTON 426,132,192 444,636,506 449,101,787 453,028,604 452,648,037

WEST VIRGINIA 148,383,574 142,743,864 143,940,332 146,282,104 137,978,927

WISCONSIN 644,846,281 657,868,009 667,684,211 683,252,045 691,244,113

WYOMING 51,275,700 52,334,106 53,894,707 53,389,877 49,565,821

TOTALS $22,913,497,432 $23,634,032,535 $24,089,224,903 $24,472,338,273 $24,610,830,739

Source: Form OCSE-34A - Part 1, line 2e. Beginning fiscal year 2015, OCSE-34 - Part 1, line 2e.

1 Income Withholding includes collections received from IV-D and non-IV-D child support cases processed through the State Disbursement Unit.

34

FY 2016 CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT PRELIMINARY REPORT

Table P-29 Total Collections Received by Method of Collection, FY 2016

STATES Offset of Offset of Offset of AEI and Other Income Other States Other Total Collections Federal Tax

RefundState Tax Refunds

Unemployment Compensation

Payments

Sources 1 Withholdings 2 Countries Received

ALABAMA $26,141,757 $1,480,527 $576,490 $57,626,400 $405,019,149 $19,784,431 $125,160 $510,753,914

ALASKA 7,315,596 0 2,028,543 38,225,675 54,460,837 10,024,600 59,798 112,115,049

ARIZONA 27,406,646 3,541,517 2,861,673 144,659,825 504,090,613 22,019,698 0 704,579,972

ARKANSAS 18,377,459 1,811,952 2,153,221 36,169,884 220,771,599 16,499,521 14,385 295,798,021

CALIFORNIA 147,517,370 36,557,944 40,275,775 454,630,316 1,841,739,689 96,719,226 733,787 2,618,174,107

COLORADO 22,695,378 2,953,785 4,620,471 85,305,178 324,258,157 29,884,654 78,444 469,796,067

CONNECTICUT 20,064,444 5,540,338 7,479,880 45,315,598 195,948,165 27,760,632 0 302,109,057

DELAWARE 5,435,339 510,138 1,143,676 12,117,298 58,792,041 10,829,192 0 88,827,684

DIST. OF COL. 3,629,596 908,188 244,268 5,990,761 40,751,121 4,672,099 37,505 56,233,538

FLORIDA 102,479,927 0 6,056,671 310,222,289 1,320,753,354 135,562,212 0 1,875,074,453

GEORGIA 44,561,876 4,333,044 5,530,492 135,389,840 527,412,401 81,966,252 0 799,193,905

GUAM 500,763 1,031,952 0 938,588 7,092,298 1,317,997 0 10,881,598

HAWAII 9,644,397 2,099,224 1,391,112 15,243,594 88,750,844 4,043,190 18,034 121,190,395

IDAHO 11,644,418 2,867,341 1,455,016 32,529,296 108,749,305 29,271,933 105,895 186,623,204

ILLINOIS 51,804,968 4,231,840 21,206,551 119,521,315 1,209,924,478 25,488,732 0 1,432,177,884

INDIANA 44,055,587 5,997,919 6,774,084 78,368,282 632,401,741 25,920,882 0 793,518,495

IOWA 19,155,587 3,163,987 7,596,441 33,623,402 316,849,499 15,252,093 179,986 395,820,995

KANSAS 20,735,625 3,807,663 2,480,105 24,618,688 286,566,477 2,943,481 43,604 341,195,643

KENTUCKY 34,757,324 2,969,099 4,340,420 87,239,331 272,832,072 22,186,633 67,941 424,392,820

LOUISIANA 36,978,469 1,637,263 3,412,547 70,029,454 294,695,686 23,260,941 3,713 430,018,073

MAINE 8,638,607 1,320,612 1,569,226 17,411,362 66,719,097 11,078,872 176,751 106,914,527

MARYLAND 25,191,501 5,574,006 8,585,018 87,307,042 424,091,472 40,340,803 0 591,089,842

MASSACHUSETTS 22,498,541 5,049,315 18,108,075 143,582,160 460,835,329 17,772,641 174,412 668,020,473

MICHIGAN 64,188,274 7,659,406 21,881,701 202,534,951 1,082,491,596 38,600,332 320,589 1,417,676,849

MINNESOTA 24,415,457 9,952,791 14,660,045 68,918,610 443,811,745 38,668,491 256,529 600,683,668

MISSISSIPPI 39,866,363 68,747 3,355,006 51,764,690 269,699,360 27,485,635 23,695 392,263,496

MISSOURI 42,199,448 2,692,709 4,516,184 110,921,763 486,015,242 50,085,062 136,042 696,566,450

MONTANA 4,758,183 999,121 1,231,646 9,635,028 46,991,452 6,913,893 88,137 70,617,460

NEBRASKA 9,869,589 3,022,867 1,152,018 40,402,286 173,063,069 14,588,422 0 242,098,251

NEVADA 15,191,856 0 2,253,603 35,871,544 138,407,033 21,109,300 59,422 212,892,758

NEW HAMPSHIRE 5,763,195 0 156,325 11,328,478 58,639,829 7,400,790 0 83,288,617

NEW JERSEY 42,810,377 6,437,428 33,813,004 273,698,137 895,555,742 50,950,613 0 1,303,265,301

NEW MEXICO 12,932,995 2,173,698 2,247,160 23,856,546 89,123,236 7,146,807 0 137,480,442

NEW YORK 52,068,614 21,981,133 31,842,260 370,130,493 1,353,103,214 35,805,401 457,218 1,865,388,333

NORTH CAROLINA 36,990,381 3,585,804 1,377,216 133,188,649 493,914,794 67,605,973 145,673 736,808,490

NORTH DAKOTA 5,273,507 301,875 1,651,346 24,002,502 93,150,209 8,304,503 58,198 132,742,140

OHIO 84,192,933 9,315,746 20,659,768 222,467,383 1,421,335,439 52,897,559 0 1,810,868,828

OKLAHOMA 35,395,494 3,762,176 6,719,693 52,417,664 259,125,756 21,402,936 36,887 378,860,606

OREGON 22,646,773 3,422,106 4,961,508 69,949,294 258,986,163 24,764,355 22,579 384,752,778

PENNSYLVANIA 35,401,653 1,969,244 29,046,794 200,329,306 1,048,641,279 70,693,413 175,273 1,386,256,962

PUERTO RICO 25,965,991 5,088,706 321,551 154,923,948 169,416,262 9,537,193 1,560 365,255,211

RHODE ISLAND 4,929,811 875,643 1,596,006 17,161,744 63,907,329 6,048,764 5,825 94,525,122

SOUTH CAROLINA 18,631,634 5,188,864 1,015,875 86,137,134 188,675,919 1,393,116 0 301,042,542

SOUTH DAKOTA 7,253,878 0 475,251 20,870,655 65,413,658 7,610,169 71,909 101,695,520

TENNESSEE 57,291,084 0 3,172,553 142,272,050 440,439,769 43,452,570 41,265 686,669,291

TEXAS 251,977,367 0 73,688,020 921,163,035 3,414,889,981 75,489,355 225,925 4,737,433,683

UTAH 13,006,675 1,352,644 2,457,522 28,756,237 166,948,934 13,732,591 76,053 226,330,656

VERMONT 2,693,852 600,647 728,922 5,930,292 35,132,222 4,530,300 0 49,616,235

VIRGIN ISLANDS 449,319 405,478 12,953 1,837,744 4,797,812 952,889 0 8,456,195

VIRGINIA 41,923,863 3,500,830 5,979,743 110,031,996 454,211,373 66,162,166 0 681,809,971

WASHINGTON 37,577,070 0 12,945,546 133,449,182 452,648,037 44,373,241 1,004,622 681,997,698

WEST VIRGINIA 14,333,902 1,581,397 5,196,562 29,304,260 137,978,927 13,959,215 25,545 202,379,808

WISCONSIN 39,509,403 13,497,452 10,030,399 156,194,130 691,244,113 28,088,832 0 938,564,329

WYOMING 5,325,589 0 1,792,756 14,880,512 49,565,821 9,260,141 15,199 80,840,018

TOTALS $1,766,065,705 $206,824,166 $450,828,691 $5,760,395,821 $24,610,830,739 $1,543,614,742 $5,067,560 $34,343,627,424

Source: Form OCSE-34 - Part 1,

line 2a line 2b line 2c line 2d & 2h line 2e line 2f line 2g line 2

1 Includes administrative enforcement and other sources.

2 Income withholding includes collections received from IV-D and non-IV-D child support cases processed through the State Disbursement Unit. Total collections received as reported on this table exceed the distributed amounts reported elsewhere.

35

Table P-30 Total Collections Passed Through for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years

STATES 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016ALABAMA 0 0 0 0 0

ALASKA 0 0 0 0 0

ARIZONA 0 0 0 0 0

ARKANSAS 0 0 0 0 0

CALIFORNIA 27,685,966 26,815,191 26,284,602 25,722,636 24,735,676

COLORADO 0 0 0 0 0

CONNECTICUT 1,394,108 1,297,449 1,289,143 1,327,513 1,389,805

DELAWARE 1,310,535 1,777,809 222,502 200,836 213,250

DIST. OF COL. 1,595,736 1,587,841 1,552,916 1,520,382 1,498,980

FLORIDA 0 0 0 0 0

GEORGIA 0 0 0 0 0

GUAM 0 0 0 0 0

HAWAII 0 0 0 0 0

IDAHO 0 0 0 0 0

ILLINOIS 1,750,992 1,999,952 2,108,736 2,014,221 1,606,431

INDIANA 0 0 0 0 0

IOWA 0 0 0 0 0

KANSAS 0 0 0 0 0

KENTUCKY 0 0 0 0 0

LOUISIANA 0 0 0 0 0

MAINE 1,507,917 987,870 782,637 671,631 571,235

MARYLAND 0 0 0 0 0

MASSACHUSETTS 3,852,000 3,785,151 3,398,460 2,844,233 2,437,427

MICHIGAN 3,389 341 300 -666 -155

MINNESOTA 0 0 0 0 2,151,300

MISSISSIPPI 0 0 0 0 0

MISSOURI 0 0 0 0 0

MONTANA 0 0 0 0 0

NEBRASKA 0 0 0 0 0

NEVADA 0 0 0 0 0

NEW HAMPSHIRE 0 0 0 0 0

NEW JERSEY 6,076,844 5,688,910 5,179,935 4,538,020 3,560,750

NEW MEXICO 1,031,872 847,966 714,681 651,440 618,112

NEW YORK 22,243,461 21,445,028 21,254,050 21,444,839 21,437,209

NORTH CAROLINA 0 0 0 0 0

NORTH DAKOTA 0 0 0 0 0

OHIO 0 0 0 0 0

OKLAHOMA 0 0 0 0 0

OREGON 2,849,836 2,840,551 2,770,867 2,172,755 1,870,067

PENNSYLVANIA 10,929,764 12,849,813 12,090,268 11,493,073 10,798,914

PUERTO RICO 245,365 258,357 279,045 294,417 286,242

RHODE ISLAND 434,864 439,934 443,739 409,599 333,067

SOUTH CAROLINA 0 0 0 0 0

SOUTH DAKOTA 0 0 0 0 0

TENNESSEE 20,778,376 21,899,072 21,294,347 19,667,682 17,231,083

TEXAS 1,699,242 1,448,754 1,159,939 781,470 619,557

UTAH -1,392 0 0 0 0

VERMONT 0 0 0 0 0

VIRGIN ISLANDS 0 0 0 0 0

VIRGINIA 6,087,301 5,678,145 5,165,515 4,824,310 4,331,410

WASHINGTON 1,800 1,684 2 -4 33

WEST VIRGINIA 2,769,102 2,680,543 2,501,149 2,231,631 1,988,909

WISCONSIN 7,957,629 8,565,321 9,643,447 9,115,863 7,451,408

WYOMING 0 0 0 0 0

TOTALS $122,204,707 $122,895,682 $118,136,280 $111,925,881 $105,130,710

Source: Form OCSE-34A - Part 1, line 7a, column G. Beginning fiscal year 2015, form OCSE-34 - Part 1, line 7a, column G.

36

FY 2016 CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT PRELIMINARY REPORT

Payments to Families

Table P-31 Payments to Families or Foster Care for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years

STATES 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016ALABAMA 1 $275,522,106 $279,948,504 $293,564,969 $308,657,746 $313,894,256

ALASKA 88,270,884 86,700,157 86,828,182 88,884,758 88,866,355

ARIZONA 303,580,278 304,859,258 300,680,969 299,201,531 298,950,624

ARKANSAS 212,721,101 220,308,039 223,650,764 228,752,620 225,378,740

CALIFORNIA 1,757,135,583 1,786,063,308 1,809,941,112 1,850,780,905 1,922,352,888

COLORADO 276,531,725 284,972,361 293,155,071 302,515,665 305,650,974

CONNECTICUT 209,617,008 209,429,840 206,323,819 209,913,787 212,330,508

DELAWARE 68,706,217 68,995,310 69,092,688 70,900,856 70,920,893

DIST. OF COL. 42,380,431 40,755,834 40,413,737 40,730,415 40,518,393

FLORIDA 1,423,707,278 1,442,535,380 1,414,865,253 1,407,886,245 1,443,517,205

GEORGIA 618,809,072 626,357,539 639,141,352 659,568,185 672,131,894

GUAM 11,917,052 10,967,164 11,692,769 10,258,855 9,395,774

HAWAII 87,154,776 87,507,525 89,199,980 90,170,110 90,901,052

IDAHO 148,464,218 156,452,849 158,492,749 166,395,742 168,698,769

ILLINOIS 770,201,010 774,765,226 773,717,753 777,572,544 784,084,314

INDIANA 560,998,820 551,045,965 540,781,903 538,936,937 535,463,408

IOWA 282,216,008 281,286,779 278,809,764 278,108,078 278,672,094

KANSAS 166,792,241 169,176,404 165,906,863 167,857,407 173,267,704

KENTUCKY 349,013,757 343,527,251 342,005,123 344,826,087 341,486,939

LOUISIANA 364,291,430 375,348,982 381,930,317 395,038,794 386,797,953

MAINE 78,527,086 79,736,405 80,143,939 82,789,581 85,384,467

MARYLAND 490,391,020 495,965,264 504,823,034 510,539,004 511,885,113

MASSACHUSETTS 557,689,742 568,702,391 578,364,482 588,864,469 600,102,272

MICHIGAN 1,175,099,807 1,167,229,863 1,193,702,180 1,206,965,247 1,211,040,534

MINNESOTA 528,081,667 532,452,736 534,554,559 535,956,765 527,255,457

MISSISSIPPI 292,685,607 296,476,132 304,119,476 317,146,048 323,314,027

MISSOURI 532,968,501 534,998,280 543,580,585 564,760,226 568,336,529

MONTANA 55,796,146 57,085,170 57,578,532 59,055,897 57,141,278

NEBRASKA 191,625,429 195,476,542 196,988,316 198,523,532 197,832,408

NEVADA 159,772,958 163,662,028 164,078,773 168,105,381 171,819,338

NEW HAMPSHIRE 76,532,585 76,861,359 76,768,824 73,728,332 72,413,025

NEW JERSEY 1,085,367,874 1,099,009,156 1,106,926,597 1,115,523,122 1,118,706,303

NEW MEXICO 102,717,130 106,304,139 110,907,932 114,358,974 114,254,149

NEW YORK 1,581,740,304 1,579,517,099 1,583,178,855 1,589,388,937 1,634,189,909

NORTH CAROLINA 638,474,144 641,870,462 634,716,771 641,973,883 644,119,757

NORTH DAKOTA 84,525,699 87,584,926 90,859,126 93,005,972 92,620,480

OHIO 1,577,464,464 1,585,162,858 1,577,340,128 1,562,144,730 1,547,389,508

OKLAHOMA 294,684,783 309,049,693 317,804,319 327,421,316 321,149,816

OREGON 310,436,533 313,347,990 315,565,837 316,646,892 322,520,272

PENNSYLVANIA 1,264,303,551 1,248,680,526 1,215,878,484 1,201,229,488 1,195,993,876

PUERTO RICO 334,419,365 329,695,941 332,390,988 325,767,854 333,275,221

RHODE ISLAND 55,442,195 57,924,121 59,330,760 61,608,128 62,697,061

SOUTH CAROLINA 244,503,766 234,044,748 250,915,787 267,880,665 278,487,470

SOUTH DAKOTA 82,763,800 85,236,933 87,201,048 88,537,520 88,205,820

TENNESSEE 506,000,078 531,236,206 541,337,910 552,031,309 557,430,716

TEXAS 3,061,988,449 3,257,399,631 3,402,381,572 3,541,850,031 3,627,836,065

UTAH 183,738,878 190,924,079 196,198,343 200,711,700 204,029,353

VERMONT 43,293,656 42,498,339 42,686,858 41,798,783 41,356,472

VIRGIN ISLANDS 7,997,136 7,755,450 7,091,571 6,522,992 6,744,475

VIRGINIA 560,802,753 563,107,920 569,467,938 569,174,627 567,712,032

WASHINGTON 578,427,282 590,746,177 586,412,215 587,550,774 590,705,152

WEST VIRGINIA 186,654,167 187,904,472 187,954,822 191,324,501 180,727,480

WISCONSIN 561,229,070 569,643,504 576,173,047 588,741,241 599,214,433

WYOMING 61,708,955 61,953,299 63,324,062 63,217,915 60,441,357

TOTALS $25,565,885,575 $25,950,247,514 $26,210,942,807 $26,591,803,103 $26,879,612,362

Source: Form OCSE-34A - Part 1, line 7d, column G. Beginning fiscal year 2015, form OCSE-34 - Part 1, line 7d, column G.

1 Alabama data adjusted based on revised data submitted after the final deadline for FY 2012.

37

Table P-32 Current TANF/Foster Care Assistance Payments to Families for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years

STATES 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016ALABAMA 1 $2,658,209 $2,478,497 $2,209,236 $1,949,282 $1,660,041

ALASKA 487,203 371,129 353,607 403,416 470,043

ARIZONA 1,495,118 1,446,997 1,227,320 461,479 433,791

ARKANSAS 821,380 807,578 680,680 682,434 534,314

CALIFORNIA 59,743,232 57,755,400 61,358,783 63,977,257 65,458,467

COLORADO 503,282 416,202 413,082 407,284 388,443

CONNECTICUT 4,637,152 4,747,790 4,762,568 4,531,612 4,318,053

DELAWARE 920,561 399,530 248,459 213,305 159,161

DIST. OF COL. 804,522 754,676 777,407 838,524 623,159

FLORIDA 5,741,332 5,721,290 5,107,742 4,024,536 4,208,754

GEORGIA 3,495,242 3,506,651 3,133,108 2,606,497 2,464,034

GUAM 793,689 653,588 651,631 564,014 458,248

HAWAII 1,467,021 1,434,096 1,376,268 1,300,844 1,239,782

IDAHO 345,075 458,580 375,901 330,497 291,084

ILLINOIS 2,797,742 2,923,563 3,000,400 3,094,575 2,971,899

INDIANA 990,658 797,308 649,624 580,177 580,038

IOWA 782,804 664,171 561,074 459,175 538,730

KANSAS 846,185 596,623 534,054 422,943 403,866

KENTUCKY 882,734 1,441,095 1,808,683 1,773,111 1,746,066

LOUISIANA 1,236,505 1,072,419 911,082 817,968 721,618

MAINE 2,586,552 1,995,093 1,640,619 1,344,935 1,158,289

MARYLAND 997,940 1,020,934 1,234,221 1,075,589 935,509

MASSACHUSETTS 1,476,653 1,343,169 1,359,287 1,212,323 1,095,361

MICHIGAN 2,855,711 2,271,786 2,217,143 1,963,236 1,624,744

MINNESOTA 2,543,938 2,313,345 2,062,559 2,202,474 3,034,691

MISSISSIPPI 812,308 596,774 599,185 542,434 514,360

MISSOURI 1,590,309 1,357,647 1,145,138 1,190,210 578,469

MONTANA 343,322 295,724 360,715 330,081 320,987

NEBRASKA 1,772,328 1,590,728 1,394,892 1,522,412 1,493,188

NEVADA 355,665 331,961 401,532 339,951 316,941

NEW HAMPSHIRE 207,930 180,471 150,930 156,188 161,627

NEW JERSEY 2,272,971 2,046,296 1,752,568 1,693,185 1,216,099

NEW MEXICO 1,120,161 950,241 922,356 858,974 808,296

NEW YORK 5,666,860 4,902,098 4,781,874 4,820,366 5,445,518

NORTH CAROLINA 1,412,389 1,446,442 1,394,355 1,677,430 1,712,723

NORTH DAKOTA 461,579 316,838 396,850 418,026 395,786

OHIO 1,074,290 958,015 1,115,382 895,529 754,933

OKLAHOMA 671,451 570,019 569,531 617,197 635,006

OREGON 4,624,413 5,941,476 5,609,624 5,897,337 6,718,233

PENNSYLVANIA 9,378,474 8,026,762 7,006,170 6,989,096 6,886,538

PUERTO RICO 937,805 764,364 744,382 908,629 1,102,820

RHODE ISLAND 138,258 107,662 127,767 93,725 94,309

SOUTH CAROLINA 7,588,194 6,996,999 6,966,456 7,159,709 6,777,887

SOUTH DAKOTA 118,959 144,381 113,797 119,857 81,038

TENNESSEE 11,173,679 10,820,357 10,419,025 9,206,299 8,502,171

TEXAS 981,083 957,807 663,922 536,067 489,413

UTAH 895,082 802,347 742,660 714,319 736,781

VERMONT 335,068 331,047 345,814 273,935 443,523

VIRGIN ISLANDS 12,441 12,094 13,726 12,361 25,807

VIRGINIA 2,598,520 2,459,342 2,163,112 2,024,366 1,773,946

WASHINGTON 1,690,202 1,692,887 1,532,789 1,017,138 1,137,513

WEST VIRGINIA 1,076,203 906,633 923,081 728,499 563,138

WISCONSIN 2,125,269 2,305,616 2,738,491 2,548,268 2,137,546

WYOMING 225,816 247,076 257,782 194,150 143,576

TOTALS $163,571,469 $155,451,614 $154,008,444 $150,723,225 $149,486,357

Source: Form OCSE-34A - Part 1, line 7d, columns (A+B). Beginning fiscal year 2015, form OCSE-34 - Part 1, line 7d, columns (A+B).

1 Alabama data adjusted based on revised data submitted after the final deadline for FY 2012.

38

FY 2016 CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT PRELIMINARY REPORT

Interstate Activity

Table P-33 Interstate Collections Forwarded to Other States for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years

STATES 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016ALABAMA $25,912,702 $26,212,684 $26,508,028 $27,199,946 $27,645,191

ALASKA 12,555,764 11,885,042 11,486,952 12,664,999 12,297,653

ARIZONA 36,964,074 38,352,274 37,042,075 35,855,114 34,689,578

ARKANSAS 19,522,127 20,168,540 20,074,129 20,096,479 19,834,618

CALIFORNIA 93,157,406 93,423,721 92,847,769 93,381,071 93,843,134

COLORADO 33,148,467 33,732,170 33,901,854 34,126,358 34,443,288

CONNECTICUT 17,069,573 17,300,629 16,596,398 16,663,055 16,762,448

DELAWARE 7,365,727 7,019,929 6,827,388 6,627,484 6,935,877

DIST. OF COL. 6,554,058 6,499,170 6,747,761 6,774,402 6,714,914

FLORIDA 111,754,047 112,043,086 119,041,223 121,259,502 122,973,818

GEORGIA 68,071,409 69,307,947 68,844,257 70,479,749 71,521,832

GUAM 1,036,421 851,247 930,985 833,050 814,021

HAWAII 6,178,195 6,238,943 6,428,735 6,675,622 6,581,009

IDAHO 11,529,509 11,782,972 11,397,021 11,627,957 11,807,587

ILLINOIS 63,823,132 64,185,451 63,660,590 62,101,781 59,747,590

INDIANA 34,860,868 34,652,799 34,857,606 35,570,290 36,047,951

IOWA 15,776,530 15,936,397 15,916,689 16,109,384 16,086,399

KANSAS 17,455,330 16,699,855 15,622,486 15,650,430 16,831,941

KENTUCKY 18,725,388 18,685,825 19,294,327 19,649,161 19,532,577

LOUISIANA 27,985,789 27,978,817 28,218,000 28,458,520 27,191,294

MAINE 4,720,944 4,584,462 4,771,396 4,957,020 4,867,547

MARYLAND 40,528,103 41,771,829 42,317,872 42,638,146 43,177,846

MASSACHUSETTS 25,983,821 26,177,653 26,093,682 25,918,495 25,829,366

MICHIGAN 30,977,528 30,271,684 29,405,694 30,282,637 29,978,722

MINNESOTA 19,466,441 19,337,964 18,988,524 19,356,324 19,326,288

MISSISSIPPI 14,148,415 14,318,251 14,033,227 14,961,663 15,351,710

MISSOURI 28,070,296 28,451,325 27,958,572 29,417,259 30,554,018

MONTANA 8,839,630 8,832,245 8,784,945 8,973,262 8,904,905

NEBRASKA 11,819,228 11,585,116 11,312,420 11,036,815 11,193,931

NEVADA 28,945,485 28,330,266 27,809,944 28,193,915 28,884,086

NEW HAMPSHIRE 5,675,460 5,439,801 5,520,793 5,576,043 5,454,598

NEW JERSEY 51,373,392 51,534,445 50,093,249 50,490,786 50,682,504

NEW MEXICO 9,253,196 10,061,714 10,083,228 10,474,718 10,045,038

NEW YORK 118,668,189 116,601,623 114,042,317 113,678,181 115,174,736

NORTH CAROLINA 46,455,736 46,539,683 45,021,060 44,855,813 44,816,324

NORTH DAKOTA 7,474,006 7,883,176 8,498,654 8,925,249 8,724,209

OHIO 40,129,336 40,256,246 40,390,405 41,015,003 40,867,667

OKLAHOMA 25,099,720 24,953,231 24,619,477 24,393,376 23,333,810

OREGON 25,282,286 24,570,512 24,307,629 24,467,791 25,033,051

PENNSYLVANIA 49,198,853 47,238,741 45,758,928 46,172,524 47,123,461

PUERTO RICO 21,024,514 21,796,414 20,523,797 20,086,635 21,672,824

RHODE ISLAND 4,453,236 4,418,644 4,394,259 4,530,120 4,516,632

SOUTH CAROLINA 10,523,912 10,131,812 10,607,583 11,607,323 12,024,099

SOUTH DAKOTA 7,532,735 7,581,844 7,595,348 7,395,065 7,193,393

TENNESSEE 36,441,677 37,399,012 37,550,276 37,681,971 38,622,281

TEXAS 124,513,335 126,195,831 126,834,421 126,561,591 125,555,677

UTAH 12,349,683 12,413,180 12,692,644 13,217,115 13,446,279

VERMONT 2,456,249 2,329,517 2,396,895 2,376,816 2,263,028

VIRGIN ISLANDS 1,637,406 1,579,657 1,242,072 1,152,101 1,288,217

VIRGINIA 56,072,728 56,108,949 55,765,722 54,434,969 52,640,981

WASHINGTON 38,911,496 39,162,605 38,695,529 39,600,853 40,669,115

WEST VIRGINIA 12,580,603 12,210,135 11,582,996 11,178,349 10,794,732

WISCONSIN 18,317,173 18,554,553 18,838,485 19,110,915 19,103,249

WYOMING 7,605,166 7,812,169 7,798,328 7,613,047 6,999,993

TOTALS $1,575,976,494 $1,579,391,787 $1,572,574,644 $1,584,136,244 $1,588,417,037

Source: Form OCSE-34A - Part 1, line 4b, column G. Beginning fiscal year 2015, form OCSE-34 - Part 1, line 4b, column G.

39

Table P-34 Interstate Cases Sent to Another State for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years

STATES 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016ALABAMA 19,671 19,437 19,198 18,781 18,777

ALASKA 8,111 7,984 7,828 7,262 7,015

ARIZONA 12,273 12,832 13,085 13,099 13,274

ARKANSAS 10,962 10,920 10,557 9,733 9,220

CALIFORNIA 62,030 62,213 61,020 59,914 59,442

COLORADO 16,065 16,211 16,204 16,007 15,590

CONNECTICUT 16,372 16,955 16,818 17,291 17,450

DELAWARE 3,355 3,452 9,600 9,428 9,414

DIST. OF COL. 5,197 5,578 6,113 5,882 5,758

FLORIDA 90,867 79,506 60,703 58,367 63,916

GEORGIA 44,622 43,262 42,977 40,707 40,676

GUAM 637 596 582 558 551

HAWAII 7,284 6,927 6,461 6,344 5,895

IDAHO 17,142 16,932 17,397 17,828 17,641

ILLINOIS 14,407 14,225 13,887 14,060 14,193

INDIANA 18,495 18,265 17,852 17,148 16,639

IOWA 18,994 18,549 31,025 18,101 17,830

KANSAS 16,135 15,737 15,085 14,739 14,133

KENTUCKY 20,161 19,792 18,569 17,348 16,724

LOUISIANA 14,338 14,403 14,205 14,180 13,873

MAINE 6,903 6,879 7,202 7,007 6,858

MARYLAND 16,037 16,908 16,941 16,798 16,456

MASSACHUSETTS 11,175 11,689 11,123 10,821 10,174

MICHIGAN 33,251 33,874 33,430 31,050 30,847

MINNESOTA 26,039 25,962 24,749 23,110 22,050

MISSISSIPPI 7,374 7,339 7,152 7,424 7,045

MISSOURI 33,170 32,865 32,707 32,182 31,096

MONTANA 5,479 5,439 5,373 5,315 5,126

NEBRASKA 8,859 8,908 8,759 8,783 8,546

NEVADA 15,938 16,929 16,737 16,058 15,832

NEW HAMPSHIRE 5,986 5,941 5,642 5,109 4,825

NEW JERSEY 31,437 30,784 28,744 26,732 25,523

NEW MEXICO 3,342 3,400 3,465 3,544 3,426

NEW YORK 55,403 58,144 62,603 64,268 64,980

NORTH CAROLINA 38,722 38,766 38,722 37,037 35,981

NORTH DAKOTA 5,564 5,442 5,428 5,307 5,002

OHIO 38,766 37,481 35,833 34,589 33,219

OKLAHOMA 12,288 12,659 12,946 12,936 12,589

OREGON 16,873 16,235 15,616 15,150 14,729

PENNSYLVANIA 40,110 39,420 38,601 37,870 36,441

PUERTO RICO 8,643 8,240 6,343 5,860 5,374

RHODE ISLAND 5,534 5,564 5,716 4,966 4,698

SOUTH CAROLINA 6,948 6,932 15,065 14,275 14,070

SOUTH DAKOTA 4,548 4,579 4,560 4,372 4,496

TENNESSEE 28,292 24,542 24,374 25,158 24,770

TEXAS 43,451 44,529 44,280 45,133 45,058

UTAH 8,412 8,238 7,779 7,406 6,888

VERMONT 2,286 2,274 2,236 2,217 2,156

VIRGIN ISLANDS 1,307 1,388 1,406 1,421 1,427

VIRGINIA 46,439 46,691 45,417 43,385 42,058

WASHINGTON 36,941 36,484 34,943 33,954 33,123

WEST VIRGINIA 10,525 10,647 10,672 10,116 9,528

WISCONSIN 18,298 18,223 18,443 18,202 17,928

WYOMING 5,908 5,616 5,471 5,073 4,962

TOTALS 1,057,366 1,042,787 1,037,644 999,405 985,292

Source: Form OCSE-157, line 1a.

40

FY 2016 CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT PRELIMINARY REPORT

Table P-35 Interstate Cases Received From Another State for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years

STATES 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016ALABAMA 23,623 23,220 22,670 21,812 21,632

ALASKA 5,524 5,429 5,166 4,940 4,800

ARIZONA 23,414 22,802 21,708 20,117 19,951

ARKANSAS 11,121 10,964 10,629 10,234 9,942

CALIFORNIA 51,381 48,906 47,322 46,265 45,800

COLORADO 16,384 16,336 16,096 16,129 16,065

CONNECTICUT 9,794 9,854 9,058 8,827 8,583

DELAWARE 4,465 4,502 5,744 5,922 5,868

DIST. OF COL. 6,901 6,884 6,858 6,548 6,094

FLORIDA 67,538 72,485 68,500 60,614 59,255

GEORGIA 35,963 35,092 35,372 35,718 36,747

GUAM 444 428 427 441 413

HAWAII 7,291 6,260 5,928 5,896 5,861

IDAHO 7,891 7,641 7,361 7,161 6,896

ILLINOIS 41,436 41,129 40,341 39,118 39,855

INDIANA 19,374 18,944 18,967 18,639 18,319

IOWA 9,689 9,895 9,770 9,639 9,594

KANSAS 10,732 11,234 12,194 12,237 12,220

KENTUCKY 14,033 13,855 13,476 13,653 13,738

LOUISIANA 20,029 20,327 20,735 20,973 20,711

MAINE 3,152 3,097 3,052 2,902 2,806

MARYLAND 16,960 17,021 16,741 16,640 16,634

MASSACHUSETTS 13,771 13,189 12,731 11,988 11,615

MICHIGAN 32,097 32,028 32,030 25,906 25,311

MINNESOTA 9,827 9,708 9,491 9,222 9,095

MISSISSIPPI 16,125 16,107 15,933 15,791 14,730

MISSOURI 20,042 20,673 20,669 19,946 19,679

MONTANA 5,295 5,192 5,060 4,996 4,871

NEBRASKA 6,932 6,704 6,435 6,130 6,128

NEVADA 15,027 14,818 14,318 13,932 13,637

NEW HAMPSHIRE 2,913 2,942 3,013 3,104 3,081

NEW JERSEY 23,004 21,970 20,803 19,872 19,203

NEW MEXICO 7,023 7,015 7,120 6,932 6,968

NEW YORK 50,804 50,713 51,518 50,616 50,713

NORTH CAROLINA 28,117 27,569 26,983 26,378 25,899

NORTH DAKOTA 3,172 3,329 3,535 3,544 3,519

OHIO 28,927 28,609 27,678 26,877 26,369

OKLAHOMA 15,795 15,911 15,846 15,789 14,738

OREGON 19,444 19,425 18,699 17,942 17,375

PENNSYLVANIA 20,823 21,015 21,186 21,121 20,749

PUERTO RICO 21,676 19,898 20,218 20,564 18,728

RHODE ISLAND 2,671 2,609 2,591 2,535 2,494

SOUTH CAROLINA 22,221 22,225 23,183 22,158 22,212

SOUTH DAKOTA 3,717 3,802 3,766 3,709 3,627

TENNESSEE 24,405 21,519 21,292 20,560 21,109

TEXAS 68,094 68,562 68,381 68,052 66,445

UTAH 6,222 6,313 6,278 6,239 6,141

VERMONT 1,181 1,121 1,061 1,002 964

VIRGIN ISLANDS 1,344 1,331 1,355 1,357 1,362

VIRGINIA 24,169 23,792 23,457 23,213 22,727

WASHINGTON 21,894 21,685 21,597 21,273 20,987

WEST VIRGINIA 7,578 7,387 7,169 6,907 6,596

WISCONSIN 11,969 11,531 11,281 10,870 10,712

WYOMING 3,419 3,349 3,226 3,172 3,030

TOTALS 946,837 938,346 926,018 896,122 882,598

Source: Form OCSE-157, line 1b.

41

Cost-Effectiveness

Table P-36 Cost-Effectiveness Ratio for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years

STATES 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016ALABAMA $4.83 $5.31 $4.85 $5.17 $6.54

ALASKA 3.99 3.63 3.82 4.02 4.10

ARIZONA 5.90 6.15 5.87 5.35 4.98

ARKANSAS 4.72 4.51 4.50 4.94 4.87

CALIFORNIA 2.47 2.54 2.43 2.51 2.51

COLORADO 4.20 4.28 4.90 4.83 4.59

CONNECTICUT 3.77 3.56 3.33 3.22 3.13

DELAWARE 1.73 1.67 2.03 1.89 2.28

DIST. OF COL. 1.89 1.84 1.99 2.07 2.00

FLORIDA 5.88 6.33 5.75 5.89 6.15

GEORGIA 6.83 6.47 7.65 8.37 7.61

GUAM 2.68 2.27 2.02 1.74 1.46

HAWAII 5.39 5.84 5.42 4.93 4.92

IDAHO 7.17 7.66 7.28 7.78 7.03

ILLINOIS 4.41 4.61 4.61 4.68 4.75

INDIANA 6.26 6.46 5.69 5.56 5.88

IOWA 5.91 5.91 5.58 5.71 5.73

KANSAS 3.76 4.12 5.89 5.80 5.69

KENTUCKY 5.88 6.85 6.45 6.33 6.32

LOUISIANA 5.21 5.47 5.44 5.51 5.56

MAINE 3.71 3.76 3.59 3.50 3.46

MARYLAND 4.18 4.65 4.21 4.54 4.65

MASSACHUSETTS 5.90 5.64 5.40 5.40 6.03

MICHIGAN 5.96 5.98 6.26 5.75 6.74

MINNESOTA 3.50 3.66 3.58 3.55 3.31

MISSISSIPPI 10.26 9.98 9.62 7.94 9.36

MISSOURI 7.43 7.42 7.73 8.33 8.76

MONTANA 4.60 4.51 4.40 4.48 4.24

NEBRASKA 5.80 5.43 5.37 5.97 5.97

NEVADA 4.05 3.90 4.00 4.13 3.83

NEW HAMPSHIRE 4.63 4.79 3.97 3.46 3.86

NEW JERSEY 4.27 4.28 4.25 4.45 4.20

NEW MEXICO 3.02 3.04 3.37 3.14 3.26

NEW YORK 4.90 4.90 5.10 4.75 5.15

NORTH CAROLINA 4.63 5.16 4.98 5.07 4.89

NORTH DAKOTA 6.63 6.38 6.37 6.20 6.15

OHIO 7.31 7.45 7.34 6.31 8.25

OKLAHOMA 4.53 4.81 4.81 5.07 4.89

OREGON 5.48 5.41 5.18 4.50 3.44

PENNSYLVANIA 5.76 5.45 5.48 5.10 5.43

PUERTO RICO 10.05 8.48 9.72 9.75 10.55

RHODE ISLAND 4.94 5.44 5.55 5.86 5.38

SOUTH CAROLINA 4.66 6.04 4.53 5.62 4.62

SOUTH DAKOTA 12.05 11.57 11.08 10.78 10.69

TENNESSEE 7.20 7.86 7.74 7.99 7.00

TEXAS 11.11 11.61 11.34 12.26 11.21

UTAH 6.37 6.05 6.47 6.53 6.40

VERMONT 3.50 3.27 3.04 3.06 2.89

VIRGIN ISLANDS 1.71 1.31 1.14 1.14 1.82

VIRGINIA 7.02 6.52 6.59 6.42 6.21

WASHINGTON 5.05 4.97 4.56 4.54 4.27

WEST VIRGINIA 4.99 5.01 5.03 5.29 4.86

WISCONSIN 6.64 6.54 6.46 6.76 8.43

WYOMING 7.79 8.79 8.20 7.22 7.48

TOTALS $5.19 $5.31 $5.25 $5.26 $5.33

Source: Form OCSE-34A - Part 1, lines 4b, 4c, 8, 11, column G / OCSE-396A, line 7, columns (A+C) - line 1c, columns (A+C). Beginning fiscal year 2015, form OCSE-34 - Part 1, lines 4b, 4c, 8, 11, column G / OCSE-396, line 7, columns (A+C) - line 1c, columns (A+C).

42

FY 2016 CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT PRELIMINARY REPORT

Incentives

Table P-37 Incentive Payment Estimates for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years

STATES 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016ALABAMA $4,000,000 $3,750,000 $3,000,000 $4,000,000 $3,000,000

ALASKA 1,800,000 1,778,400 1,800,000 1,750,000 1,600,000

ARIZONA 5,167,212 6,500,000 6,500,000 6,375,000 6,312,500

ARKANSAS 4,588,160 4,725,000 4,520,483 4,780,905 4,200,000

CALIFORNIA 39,068,249 38,918,752 40,516,249 40,619,000 40,752,750

COLORADO 5,000,000 5,000,000 5,000,000 5,000,000 5,000,000

CONNECTICUT 4,400,000 4,400,000 4,400,000 4,400,000 4,400,000

DELAWARE 1,200,000 1,200,000 1,200,000 900,000 1,200,000

DIST. OF COL. 0 0 0 0 0

FLORIDA 31,532,650 28,176,947 33,864,413 34,351,682 34,069,913

GEORGIA 0 0 24,000,000 15,000,000 9,000,000

GUAM 140,000 140,000 170,000 200,000 130,000

HAWAII 1,600,000 1,575,000 1,600,000 1,600,000 1,200,000

IDAHO 2,776,962 2,818,608 2,791,860 2,922,492 3,087,744

ILLINOIS 14,032,200 14,671,300 14,838,500 15,157,700 15,278,700

INDIANA 10,585,917 9,856,480 9,814,400 9,734,398 9,812,769

IOWA 7,500,000 7,000,000 7,500,000 7,000,000 3,500,000

KANSAS 3,500,000 3,500,000 3,625,000 4,000,000 4,000,000

KENTUCKY 7,400,000 7,400,000 7,400,000 7,400,000 7,100,000

LOUISIANA 6,637,798 6,657,848 6,657,848 6,657,848 6,657,848

MAINE 1,000,000 1,250,000 1,250,000 1,500,000 2,000,000

MARYLAND 9,275,000 8,150,000 7,000,000 7,000,000 7,000,000

MASSACHUSETTS 8,000,000 8,000,000 8,000,000 8,000,000 8,000,000

MICHIGAN 25,200,000 24,200,000 68,749,768 25,200,000 25,800,000

MINNESOTA 12,000,000 12,000,000 12,000,000 12,000,000 12,000,000

MISSISSIPPI 2,800,000 2,800,000 2,800,000 2,100,000 3,500,000

MISSOURI 10,000,000 10,173,402 16,226,147 10,000,000 7,500,000

MONTANA 976,000 976,000 1,100,000 1,100,000 1,100,000

NEBRASKA 2,750,000 2,750,000 2,750,000 2,750,000 2,750,000

NEVADA 0 500,000 0 0 0

NEW HAMPSHIRE 1,100,000 1,200,000 1,200,000 1,200,000 1,200,000

NEW JERSEY 15,456,000 15,456,000 15,456,000 15,456,000 15,456,000

NEW MEXICO 2,158,786 2,425,750 2,600,000 2,550,000 2,400,000

NEW YORK 26,000,000 26,000,000 26,000,000 27,143,000 30,884,000

NORTH CAROLINA 11,994,366 10,528,626 11,200,000 11,200,000 11,200,000

NORTH DAKOTA 1,391,249 1,414,783 1,429,480 1,458,068 1,998,256

OHIO 28,000,000 28,000,000 28,000,000 21,500,000 28,000,000

OKLAHOMA 5,788,242 5,788,192 5,788,192 5,788,192 5,788,192

OREGON 5,319,250 4,400,000 4,263,000 4,126,000 4,144,500

PENNSYLVANIA 21,441,680 21,441,680 21,441,680 21,441,680 21,441,680

PUERTO RICO 345,700 0 0 0 0

RHODE ISLAND 1,200,000 1,200,000 1,200,000 1,200,000 1,275,000

SOUTH CAROLINA 1,800,000 1,800,000 1,800,000 1,800,000 1,350,000

SOUTH DAKOTA 1,850,000 1,840,000 1,780,000 1,820,000 1,840,000

TENNESSEE 0 0 0 6,800,000 8,000,000

TEXAS 60,300,000 65,400,000 69,700,000 72,000,000 72,000,000

UTAH 2,950,000 2,750,000 2,800,000 2,800,000 2,800,000

VERMONT 948,636 915,232 915,232 1,552,259 877,258

VIRGIN ISLANDS 60,000 45,000 60,000 60,000 69,019

VIRGINIA 10,000,000 10,000,000 10,000,000 10,000,000 10,000,000

WASHINGTON 12,949,000 12,500,000 12,724,999 13,549,998 12,757,143

WEST VIRGINIA 3,600,000 3,600,000 3,600,000 3,600,000 3,600,000

WISCONSIN 12,000,000 12,000,000 12,000,000 12,000,000 12,340,000

WYOMING 800,000 800,000 800,000 800,000 800,000

TOTALS $450,383,057 $448,373,000 $533,833,251 $481,344,222 $480,173,272

Source: Financial Management.

43

Table P-38 Incentive Payment Actuals for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years

STATES 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016ALABAMA $4,871,944 $4,918,992 $5,073,485 NA NA

ALASKA 1,826,958 1,698,442 1,672,831 NA NA

ARIZONA 6,525,506 6,492,350 6,411,658 NA NA

ARKANSAS 5,059,203 5,198,113 5,289,441 NA NA

CALIFORNIA 39,127,999 39,674,949 39,179,540 NA NA

COLORADO 5,220,102 5,221,997 5,429,055 NA NA

CONNECTICUT 5,036,213 4,971,790 4,951,145 NA NA

DELAWARE 1,044,842 698,219 1,102,609 NA NA

DIST. OF COL. 825,692 785,473 796,137 NA NA

FLORIDA 30,799,537 33,761,849 33,348,543 NA NA

GEORGIA 14,413,518 14,219,789 14,567,320 NA NA

GUAM 217,656 171,537 174,665 NA NA

HAWAII 1,668,529 1,645,667 1,703,429 NA NA

IDAHO 2,922,490 3,087,743 3,173,710 NA NA

ILLINOIS 15,303,263 15,519,422 15,539,014 NA NA

INDIANA 12,029,683 11,703,845 11,988,929 NA NA

IOWA 7,259,884 7,188,739 7,146,346 NA NA

KANSAS 4,220,577 4,233,376 4,248,291 NA NA

KENTUCKY 7,725,746 7,650,751 7,812,092 NA NA

LOUISIANA 8,215,297 8,266,422 8,521,502 NA NA

MAINE 1,986,385 1,957,750 1,938,765 NA NA

MARYLAND 7,639,258 7,787,591 7,868,161 NA NA

MASSACHUSETTS 10,739,027 10,654,424 10,799,704 NA NA

MICHIGAN 25,737,546 25,182,209 25,997,666 NA NA

MINNESOTA 11,973,855 11,930,935 12,091,125 NA NA

MISSISSIPPI 3,109,359 4,937,967 5,220,059 NA NA

MISSOURI 12,362,937 12,164,754 12,264,987 NA NA

MONTANA 1,204,876 1,188,263 1,161,432 NA NA

NEBRASKA 4,651,764 4,678,506 4,781,811 NA NA

NEVADA 3,327,077 3,312,952 3,428,160 NA NA

NEW HAMPSHIRE 1,746,292 1,714,791 1,663,075 NA NA

NEW JERSEY 16,731,904 16,717,042 16,993,268 NA NA

NEW MEXICO 2,186,086 2,218,029 2,294,613 NA NA

NEW YORK 28,166,791 30,570,278 31,820,270 NA NA

NORTH CAROLINA 14,433,752 14,649,269 14,249,571 NA NA

NORTH DAKOTA 2,114,035 2,133,416 2,183,732 NA NA

OHIO 30,801,273 30,774,036 30,382,296 NA NA

OKLAHOMA 6,887,385 7,199,342 7,422,212 NA NA

OREGON 6,347,464 6,329,050 6,581,218 NA NA

PENNSYLVANIA 25,888,140 24,985,769 25,442,927 NA NA

PUERTO RICO 1,963,529 4,188,488 4,233,288 NA NA

RHODE ISLAND 1,336,480 1,395,806 1,457,967 NA NA

SOUTH CAROLINA 4,617,146 4,442,194 4,955,440 NA NA

SOUTH DAKOTA 2,003,265 2,020,715 2,048,600 NA NA

TENNESSEE 10,969,986 11,576,248 12,325,769 NA NA

TEXAS 63,942,535 67,585,826 71,428,780 NA NA

UTAH 4,091,934 4,155,630 4,324,273 NA NA

VERMONT 892,365 839,285 850,695 NA NA

VIRGIN ISLANDS 0 79,158 48,007 NA NA

VIRGINIA 11,818,417 11,673,481 11,725,733 NA NA

WASHINGTON 12,810,940 12,551,989 11,237,494 NA NA

WEST VIRGINIA 4,193,130 4,216,108 4,199,799 NA NA

WISCONSIN 13,703,514 13,815,598 14,189,557 NA NA

WYOMING 1,306,914 1,263,636 1,259,804 NA NA

TOTALS $526,000,000 $538,000,000 $547,000,000 NA NA

Source: Financial Management.

NA - Not Available.

44

FY 2016 CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT PRELIMINARY REPORT

Table P-39 Incentive Performance Measures, FY 2016

STATES IV-D PEP Statewide PEP Percent of Cases with Orders

Percent of Current

Collections

Percent of Arrearage Cases

Cost Effectiveness

RatioALABAMA 96.70 87.55 54.01 60.55 $6.54

ALASKA 105.20 92.84 56.59 65.68 4.10

ARIZONA 145.06 87.81 57.29 56.28 4.98

ARKANSAS 100.89 91.34 63.95 69.40 4.87

CALIFORNIA 98.61 90.35 66.98 66.72 2.51

COLORADO 104.98 88.63 64.27 68.94 4.59

CONNECTICUT 96.40 91.13 61.60 61.16 3.13

DELAWARE 79.46 75.32 60.10 54.77 2.28

DIST. OF COL. 90.01 73.28 61.62 56.84 2.00

FLORIDA 91.32 82.90 63.25 70.23 6.15

GEORGIA 93.92 89.36 61.26 65.56 7.61

GUAM 90.78 75.14 62.02 55.45 1.46

HAWAII 96.20 76.12 62.65 44.76 4.92

IDAHO 98.71 87.88 64.41 58.57 7.03

ILLINOIS 83.18 82.65 62.72 62.39 4.75

INDIANA 105.39 93.61 65.31 73.26 5.88

IOWA 97.30 91.74 73.57 70.33 5.73

KANSAS 92.78 86.00 55.45 58.77 5.69

KENTUCKY 96.93 90.11 58.40 61.51 6.32

LOUISIANA 94.13 86.79 53.31 53.31 5.56

MAINE 103.93 95.08 62.33 65.25 3.46

MARYLAND 89.96 84.85 68.96 70.41 4.65

MASSACHUSETTS 90.69 87.35 71.34 63.07 6.03

MICHIGAN 97.52 81.52 71.25 64.52 6.74

MINNESOTA 100.77 88.91 74.29 72.36 3.31

MISSISSIPPI 96.54 76.79 53.57 58.11 9.36

MISSOURI 90.21 91.08 60.28 61.12 8.76

MONTANA 106.31 88.77 63.11 64.92 4.24

NEBRASKA 95.75 86.35 71.54 69.49 5.97

NEVADA 126.44 86.47 64.06 64.62 3.83

NEW HAMPSHIRE 106.87 81.32 66.11 63.11 3.86

NEW JERSEY 99.91 85.42 67.25 65.36 4.20

NEW MEXICO 97.47 83.67 54.72 64.85 3.26

NEW YORK 92.06 85.58 65.96 58.12 5.15

NORTH CAROLINA 99.91 85.74 68.05 67.28 4.89

NORTH DAKOTA 106.12 93.16 72.77 65.10 6.15

OHIO 93.46 90.07 69.44 67.00 8.25

OKLAHOMA 112.36 81.89 54.27 60.76 4.89

OREGON 98.68 86.51 62.59 60.54 3.44

PENNSYLVANIA 95.65 90.76 84.34 84.51 5.43

PUERTO RICO 87.51 86.01 55.24 44.30 10.55

RHODE ISLAND 93.25 78.84 61.72 55.42 5.38

SOUTH CAROLINA 80.27 81.14 54.88 62.26 4.62

SOUTH DAKOTA 110.58 92.11 65.94 63.80 10.69

TENNESSEE 92.05 83.99 56.60 63.98 7.00

TEXAS 93.87 83.13 64.32 63.06 11.21

UTAH 101.56 86.72 71.67 64.50 6.40

VERMONT 108.95 90.06 74.23 75.56 2.89

VIRGIN ISLANDS 67.43 69.73 53.33 46.67 1.82

VIRGINIA 96.49 88.84 64.57 65.76 6.21

WASHINGTON 99.16 93.35 66.30 61.87 4.27

WEST VIRGINIA 100.56 91.66 66.98 61.48 4.86

WISCONSIN 104.84 87.18 74.48 69.05 8.43

WYOMING 122.10 93.48 66.19 70.58 7.48

AVERAGES 101.74 94.02 86.47 65.41 64.40 $5.33

Source: Forms OCSE-157, OCSE-34 - Part 1, and OCSE-396.

The formula for calculating each of the measures can be found in the appendix.

FY 2016 data reliability information not available at the time of publication.

45

Medical Support

Table P-40 Distributed as Medical Support Payments for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years

STATES 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016ALABAMA 1 $826,060 $526,865 $458,791 $492,090 $204,090

ALASKA 13,146 20,501 13,920 45,623 24,047

ARIZONA 1,663,700 1,788,634 1,815,893 1,764,196 1,749,069

ARKANSAS 450,490 473,218 523,044 557,111 614,218

CALIFORNIA 2,034,449 2,181,748 2,258,245 2,475,134 2,611,046

COLORADO 9,568 11,980 8,621 7,858 7,124

CONNECTICUT 2,406,593 2,683,619 3,011,046 2,368,736 1,108,514

DELAWARE 73,810 94,117 78,738 59,069 62,493

DIST. OF COL. 648,652 592,577 637,993 641,152 635,206

FLORIDA 180,399 309,987 540,850 654,765 759,252

GEORGIA 634,440 647,878 638,370 674,450 687,433

GUAM 55,171 34,267 40,114 36,463 18,919

HAWAII 494,641 631,482 711,376 652,848 530,576

IDAHO 198,376 129,756 164,775 131,130 175,802

ILLINOIS 540,141 567,149 565,483 570,712 583,614

INDIANA 529,655 477,682 382,866 363,417 289,409

IOWA 5,375,073 6,998,002 8,186,538 9,365,176 10,442,737

KANSAS 2,514,829 2,417,373 1,829,456 1,377,716 1,320,492

KENTUCKY 1,461,896 1,279,627 1,295,221 1,184,371 1,099,056

LOUISIANA 613,225 1,036,887 1,249,850 1,409,348 1,413,188

MAINE 621,420 585,111 494,447 487,483 497,662

MARYLAND 379,982 389,064 365,291 398,466 478,156

MASSACHUSETTS 534,976 586,257 579,203 656,948 616,755

MICHIGAN 66,441,847 65,805,903 68,935,945 73,762,488 77,111,040

MINNESOTA 25,190,666 25,953,042 25,435,924 24,230,809 22,751,749

MISSISSIPPI 388,697 480,199 541,836 594,290 643,887

MISSOURI 494,631 575,128 609,743 587,951 610,316

MONTANA 130,382 120,244 105,135 105,125 118,922

NEBRASKA 1,765,616 2,079,642 2,325,942 2,563,300 2,761,835

NEVADA 1,885,527 2,095,372 2,181,846 2,177,011 2,309,906

NEW HAMPSHIRE 168,636 173,307 194,583 206,882 186,471

NEW JERSEY 228,356 258,862 317,833 356,931 378,691

NEW MEXICO 236,916 289,894 340,267 296,588 385,211

NEW YORK 12,021,721 11,973,202 12,769,256 11,186,255 14,968,986

NORTH CAROLINA 213,396 230,284 218,398 261,754 305,719

NORTH DAKOTA 171,707 188,011 196,310 169,313 156,608

OHIO 44,829,396 55,341,529 41,881,020 39,229,942 41,866,556

OKLAHOMA 2,409,373 3,291,842 4,519,035 5,430,556 5,457,955

OREGON 9,423,188 11,289,655 12,422,549 12,756,412 11,617,812

PENNSYLVANIA 3,333,973 3,056,689 2,851,474 3,243,671 3,318,372

PUERTO RICO 7,737 9,290 11,946 5,814 9,323

RHODE ISLAND 6,034,654 6,570,671 7,295,926 7,761,493 7,485,734

SOUTH CAROLINA 2 0 0 0 0 0

SOUTH DAKOTA 122,445 128,429 113,498 134,820 153,866

TENNESSEE 1,307,183 1,310,648 1,265,659 1,089,476 939,917

TEXAS 196,392,888 225,958,902 249,883,842 276,681,859 299,149,139

UTAH 253,896 266,482 317,070 288,837 266,422

VERMONT 84,366 74,555 75,981 56,896 71,115

VIRGIN ISLANDS 248 0 453 30 502

VIRGINIA 6,722 13,295 8,317 6,942 5,908

WASHINGTON 628,552 850,294 960,083 1,024,050 1,127,727

WEST VIRGINIA 755,051 882,947 632,592 600,928 942,314

WISCONSIN 20,797,035 19,818,046 19,840,756 19,303,490 18,790,461

WYOMING 528,175 471,723 406,617 397,399 384,719

TOTALS $418,513,672 $464,021,868 $482,509,967 $510,885,574 $540,206,041

Source: Form OCSE-34A - Part 1, line 7c, column G. Beginning fiscal year 2015, form OCSE-34 - Part 1, line 7c, column G.

1 Alabama data adjusted based on revised data submitted after the final deadline for FY 2012.

2 South Carolina does not currently distinguish the type of payment going to the family and so includes medical support payments to families in their reporting of "Payments to Families or Foster Care" rather than separately as "Distributed as Medical Support Payments", which is the data source of this table.

46

FY 2016 CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT PRELIMINARY REPORT

Table P-41 Health Insurance Provided as Ordered for Two Consecutive Fiscal Years

Cases in which Health Insurance is Ordered

Cases in which Health Insurance is Provided as Ordered

Percent of Health Insurance Provided as Ordered

STATES 2015 2016 2015 2016 2015 2016ALABAMA 56,032 53,433 8,359 8,183 14.9% 15.3%

ALASKA 26,456 25,363 14,347 13,943 54.2% 55.0%

ARIZONA 30,622 28,269 22,891 21,229 74.8% 75.1%

ARKANSAS 59,784 58,599 17,294 15,649 28.9% 26.7%

CALIFORNIA 797,565 781,832 191,691 188,475 24.0% 24.1%

COLORADO 84,243 84,196 30,512 31,355 36.2% 37.2%

CONNECTICUT 99,400 93,308 16,568 14,670 16.7% 15.7%

DELAWARE 35,454 35,598 10,639 10,303 30.0% 28.9%

DIST. OF COL. 8,325 8,036 3,027 2,897 36.4% 36.1%

FLORIDA 266,377 254,493 42,302 40,603 15.9% 16.0%

GEORGIA 187,601 193,889 135,980 139,136 72.5% 71.8%

GUAM 1,281 1,199 607 546 47.4% 45.5%

HAWAII 29,903 28,172 10,742 10,312 35.9% 36.6%

IDAHO 69,750 69,791 8,960 8,116 12.8% 11.6%

ILLINOIS 144,653 156,757 32,279 33,778 22.3% 21.5%

INDIANA 162,854 161,388 29,916 33,964 18.4% 21.0%

IOWA 69,525 68,761 20,357 18,870 29.3% 27.4%

KANSAS 54,342 56,606 8,775 8,277 16.1% 14.6%

KENTUCKY 156,037 148,210 47,894 25,323 30.7% 17.1%

LOUISIANA 188,980 184,790 59,735 60,798 31.6% 32.9%

MAINE 7,049 5,637 903 718 12.8% 12.7%

MARYLAND 100,334 97,372 28,290 26,746 28.2% 27.5%

MASSACHUSETTS 107,987 104,671 39,312 40,430 36.4% 38.6%

MICHIGAN 428,026 412,666 156,730 149,523 36.6% 36.2%

MINNESOTA 60,060 57,039 35,514 33,919 59.1% 59.5%

MISSISSIPPI 31,367 32,583 19,198 18,161 61.2% 55.7%

MISSOURI 200,022 195,532 47,623 50,531 23.8% 25.8%

MONTANA 21,913 21,609 10,797 10,438 49.3% 48.3%

NEBRASKA 52,222 50,023 26,691 25,903 51.1% 51.8%

NEVADA 65,090 64,936 18,792 19,265 28.9% 29.7%

NEW HAMPSHIRE 18,948 19,611 2,592 2,185 13.7% 11.1%

NEW JERSEY 168,391 165,219 40,135 48,797 23.8% 29.5%

NEW MEXICO 34,096 33,778 8,695 8,008 25.5% 23.7%

NEW YORK 473,020 463,376 NA NA NA NA

NORTH CAROLINA 233,463 230,376 199,753 194,968 85.6% 84.6%

NORTH DAKOTA 24,677 23,837 9,814 9,631 39.8% 40.4%

OHIO 253,032 240,897 162,698 157,098 64.3% 65.2%

OKLAHOMA 77,807 75,307 27,672 28,120 35.6% 37.3%

OREGON 96,034 89,840 31,160 29,996 32.4% 33.4%

PENNSYLVANIA 265,278 260,237 114,424 113,662 43.1% 43.7%

PUERTO RICO 2,578 3,098 424 425 16.4% 13.7%

RHODE ISLAND 19,915 19,298 17,382 17,034 87.3% 88.3%

SOUTH CAROLINA 17,228 15,504 1,365 1,101 7.9% 7.1%

SOUTH DAKOTA 23,215 23,901 9,974 10,247 43.0% 42.9%

TENNESSEE 192,841 189,934 30,206 30,806 15.7% 16.2%

TEXAS 878,499 896,023 343,416 341,081 39.1% 38.1%

UTAH 59,327 59,366 29,210 29,486 49.2% 49.7%

VERMONT 10,913 10,122 9,922 8,268 90.9% 81.7%

VIRGIN ISLANDS 2,178 2,002 670 641 30.8% 32.0%

VIRGINIA 175,933 173,625 43,429 43,466 24.7% 25.0%

WASHINGTON 160,673 154,988 50,110 48,334 31.2% 31.2%

WEST VIRGINIA 61,071 57,453 10,377 9,787 17.0% 17.0%

WISCONSIN 224,730 221,768 60,549 64,033 26.9% 28.9%

WYOMING 15,142 14,958 4,532 3,554 29.9% 23.8%

TOTALS 7,092,243 6,979,276 2,305,234 2,262,789 32.5% 32.4%

Source: Form OCSE-157, lines 22 & 23, column A.

NA - Not Available.

47

FY 2016 CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT PRELIMINARY REPORT

Table P-42 Percent of Cases with Orders (Minus Arrears Only Cases) in which Medical Support is Ordered and Ordered and Provided for Two Consecutive Fiscal Years

STATES Cases Open in

which Medical Support Ordered in 2015

Cases Open in

which Medical Support Ordered in 2016

Cases Open in

which Medical Support Ordered

and Provided In 2015

Cases Open in

which Medical Support Ordered

and Provided In 2016

Cases Open with

Support Orders

Established In 2015

Cases Open with

Support Orders

Established In 2016

Arrears-Only IV-D

Cases With Orders

Established In 2015

Arrears-Only IV-D

Cases With Orders

Established In 2016

% of Cases in

Which Medical Support Ordered in 2015

% of Cases in

Which Medical Support Ordered in 2016

% of Cases in

Which Medical Support Ordered

and Provided in 2015

% of Cases in

Which Medical Support Ordered

and Provided in 2016

ALABAMA 108,598 108,032 73,610 73,590 189,533 189,238 69,356 70,180 90.4% 90.7% 61.3% 61.8%

ALASKA 26,486 25,390 14,783 14,358 44,834 43,312 16,810 16,687 94.5% 95.4% 52.8% 53.9%

ARIZONA 93,410 89,195 33,516 31,336 153,407 149,709 42,438 42,931 84.2% 83.5% 30.2% 29.3%

ARKANSAS 60,616 59,397 48,111 41,948 98,048 95,678 23,971 23,958 81.8% 82.8% 64.9% 58.5%

CALIFORNIA 798,321 782,624 404,240 363,320 1,106,842 1,097,510 256,200 262,530 93.8% 93.7% 47.5% 43.5%

COLORADO 84,243 84,196 36,729 37,619 134,484 133,305 38,720 37,861 88.0% 88.2% 38.4% 39.4%

CONNECTICUT 99,795 93,696 19,568 16,208 157,101 151,734 48,845 49,575 92.2% 91.7% 18.1% 15.9%

DELAWARE 35,469 35,611 10,674 10,337 58,210 58,544 15,242 16,038 82.5% 83.8% 24.8% 24.3%

DIST. OF COL. 14,585 14,076 7,254 7,081 35,197 34,649 9,668 9,443 57.1% 55.8% 28.4% 28.1%

FLORIDA 267,983 256,414 43,590 42,124 538,755 544,505 99,718 102,798 61.0% 58.1% 9.9% 9.5%

GEORGIA 205,101 208,117 148,425 149,061 361,555 367,392 84,010 85,811 73.9% 73.9% 53.5% 52.9%

GUAM 1,304 1,219 620 557 5,160 5,000 1,407 1,469 34.7% 34.5% 16.5% 15.8%

HAWAII 31,691 30,198 12,646 12,889 59,298 58,018 19,978 20,068 80.6% 79.6% 32.2% 34.0%

IDAHO 69,883 69,931 23,096 21,646 103,623 104,461 27,918 28,350 92.3% 91.9% 30.5% 28.4%

ILLINOIS 144,955 157,338 34,834 36,982 392,348 393,055 97,447 116,198 49.2% 56.8% 11.8% 13.4%

INDIANA 163,576 162,005 30,466 34,476 260,369 255,349 70,204 70,767 86.0% 87.8% 16.0% 18.7%

IOWA 97,818 96,929 41,803 40,144 154,602 153,986 44,965 45,052 89.2% 89.0% 38.1% 36.9%

KANSAS 76,898 79,014 12,885 12,158 117,647 121,337 30,484 30,799 88.2% 87.3% 14.8% 13.4%

KENTUCKY 159,511 154,752 47,899 25,563 249,517 244,631 61,153 61,922 84.7% 84.7% 25.4% 14.0%

LOUISIANA 193,859 189,970 61,752 62,854 247,488 246,383 41,378 44,166 94.1% 93.9% 30.0% 31.1%

MAINE 32,407 28,130 4,157 3,453 51,645 47,017 17,825 17,742 95.8% 96.1% 12.3% 11.8%

MARYLAND 100,578 97,654 29,902 27,753 175,516 172,625 39,092 38,798 73.7% 73.0% 21.9% 20.7%

MASSACHUSETTS 108,383 105,047 39,389 40,514 197,332 189,347 42,337 38,635 69.9% 69.7% 25.4% 26.9%

MICHIGAN 474,869 459,901 335,423 328,489 683,193 689,925 158,625 193,157 90.5% 92.6% 63.9% 66.1%

MINNESOTA 129,859 127,754 62,175 58,360 202,050 197,799 31,795 28,275 76.3% 75.4% 36.5% 34.4%

MISSISSIPPI 87,694 86,857 15,244 14,512 223,313 224,009 24,234 26,503 44.0% 44.0% 7.7% 7.3%

MISSOURI 207,613 203,183 62,779 69,857 310,499 303,143 79,322 79,061 89.8% 90.7% 27.2% 31.2%

MONTANA 22,229 21,922 11,804 11,359 31,933 31,466 8,168 8,151 93.5% 94.0% 49.7% 48.7%

NEBRASKA 56,850 54,833 30,375 29,769 93,605 93,839 18,708 19,461 75.9% 73.7% 40.6% 40.0%

NEVADA 65,470 65,312 21,489 21,860 81,898 81,682 11,566 11,730 93.1% 93.4% 30.6% 31.3%

NEW HAMPSHIRE 22,445 22,857 3,246 2,471 30,756 31,315 6,956 7,208 94.3% 94.8% 13.6% 10.3%

NEW JERSEY 168,476 165,307 40,302 48,956 289,594 284,895 24,235 21,694 63.5% 62.8% 15.2% 18.6%

NEW MEXICO 34,131 33,804 10,743 9,522 51,734 52,289 12,045 12,842 86.0% 85.7% 27.1% 24.1%

NEW YORK 491,239 481,252 158,061 152,461 740,120 732,610 105,314 107,332 77.4% 77.0% 24.9% 24.4%

NORTH CAROLINA 234,843 231,840 197,012 190,858 352,497 349,511 75,418 76,867 84.8% 85.0% 71.1% 70.0%

NORTH DAKOTA 24,993 24,135 13,450 12,913 34,020 33,359 8,790 8,913 99.1% 98.7% 53.3% 52.8%

OHIO 494,516 487,064 183,562 177,196 765,790 757,204 172,367 176,788 83.3% 83.9% 30.9% 30.5%

OKLAHOMA 121,016 121,149 45,241 46,954 171,780 166,459 42,286 36,905 93.5% 93.5% 34.9% 36.2%

OREGON 100,496 93,440 41,435 38,326 170,282 162,437 58,296 58,851 89.7% 90.2% 37.0% 37.0%

PENNSYLVANIA 287,434 280,740 266,593 261,910 356,096 345,295 44,688 43,805 92.3% 93.1% 85.6% 86.9%

PUERTO RICO 43,681 48,412 2,155 2,624 188,643 188,746 43,589 45,545 30.1% 33.8% 1.5% 1.8%

RHODE ISLAND 37,562 34,830 35,628 33,040 39,991 39,713 10,696 11,304 128.2% 122.6% 121.6% 116.3%

SOUTH CAROLINA 80,102 81,634 1,486 1,231 155,793 157,783 47,823 48,757 74.2% 74.9% 1.4% 1.1%

SOUTH DAKOTA 23,996 24,727 11,199 11,571 35,481 37,146 9,424 10,331 92.1% 92.2% 43.0% 43.2%

TENNESSEE 197,509 193,804 35,285 35,649 308,419 307,937 82,494 86,203 87.4% 87.4% 15.6% 16.1%

TEXAS 899,024 914,235 589,476 593,865 1,257,571 1,287,064 287,160 301,445 92.6% 92.8% 60.7% 60.3%

UTAH 65,631 65,441 35,725 36,273 81,225 80,371 11,939 11,482 94.7% 95.0% 51.6% 52.7%

VERMONT 12,023 11,183 10,081 8,126 15,196 14,176 2,534 2,444 95.0% 95.3% 79.6% 69.3%

VIRGIN ISLANDS 2,320 2,154 755 737 6,301 6,233 2,398 2,397 59.4% 56.2% 19.3% 19.2%

VIRGINIA 176,343 174,046 44,570 44,630 275,856 269,547 83,226 82,878 91.5% 93.2% 23.1% 23.9%

WASHINGTON 178,017 172,472 35,940 34,485 313,675 307,951 121,323 121,323 92.5% 92.4% 18.7% 18.5%

WEST VIRGINIA 72,725 68,034 14,105 12,898 111,189 105,874 24,127 24,890 83.5% 84.0% 16.2% 15.9%

WISCONSIN 247,035 246,340 81,211 83,404 316,467 314,870 64,282 63,574 98.0% 98.0% 32.2% 33.2%

WYOMING 15,319 15,113 5,678 4,705 26,344 25,801 9,132 8,864 89.0% 89.2% 33.0% 27.8%

TOTALS 8,050,930 7,942,710 3,582,177 3,484,982 12,613,822 12,537,234 2,882,126 2,970,758 82.7% 83.0% 36.8% 36.4%

Source: Form OCSE-157, Line 21 Line 21a Line 2 Line 2e Lines 21 / (2 - 2e) Lines 21a / (2 - 2e)

1 Arrears only cases are subtracted from the number of cases with an order before percentages are determined.

48

FY 2016 CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT PRELIMINARY REPORT

Program Expenditures

Table P-43 Total Administrative Expenditures for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years

STATES 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016ALABAMA $66,341,149 $60,715,726 $69,479,648 $68,028,161 $54,622,440

ALASKA 28,139,702 29,984,746 28,319,454 27,979,050 28,469,500

ARIZONA 62,405,289 59,856,703 61,825,190 66,527,241 70,433,259

ARKANSAS 51,255,627 55,459,523 56,162,597 52,188,024 52,038,013

CALIFORNIA 932,703,797 907,740,837 947,255,569 932,640,548 959,561,224

COLORADO 77,828,008 78,270,047 70,237,361 73,242,148 77,609,371

CONNECTICUT 69,637,919 73,001,269 76,970,571 80,492,792 83,991,576

DELAWARE 47,356,832 48,985,649 39,803,937 43,502,079 36,379,543

DIST. OF COL. 30,144,474 29,747,076 27,211,035 26,103,264 26,922,390

FLORIDA 270,554,944 254,970,362 275,445,976 268,319,854 262,748,339

GEORGIA 104,846,968 110,837,451 95,246,123 89,665,255 100,354,743

GUAM 5,445,764 5,537,542 6,506,557 6,662,458 7,248,163

HAWAII 19,048,930 17,566,175 19,226,710 22,016,084 20,923,360

IDAHO 22,825,157 22,393,178 23,772,198 23,265,609 26,106,230

ILLINOIS 199,084,450 190,625,633 190,437,383 187,964,021 185,389,115

INDIANA 98,517,321 93,506,857 104,278,768 106,390,307 99,710,354

IOWA 55,759,654 55,527,785 58,223,180 56,732,798 56,638,705

KANSAS 55,383,143 51,133,958 34,844,763 35,437,126 37,073,632

KENTUCKY 69,559,996 58,627,582 62,408,040 63,894,424 63,275,004

LOUISIANA 78,441,279 76,231,995 77,663,427 79,074,716 76,452,691

MAINE 28,152,182 27,441,852 28,304,417 29,685,926 30,461,656

MARYLAND 132,918,332 120,620,933 135,350,144 126,898,831 124,411,727

MASSACHUSETTS 106,995,484 113,306,715 119,593,686 120,870,421 109,706,665

MICHIGAN 227,004,454 222,163,243 214,754,170 235,775,892 201,816,738

MINNESOTA 172,249,159 165,207,638 168,584,177 169,889,162 179,890,312

MISSISSIPPI 30,621,901 31,770,619 33,662,083 42,481,442 36,721,993

MISSOURI 81,276,606 81,135,427 78,344,839 75,358,920 71,822,094

MONTANA 14,965,112 15,469,434 15,898,675 16,029,621 16,424,900

NEBRASKA 36,665,117 39,742,372 40,475,691 36,587,514 36,565,543

NEVADA 49,896,313 52,495,745 51,204,955 50,652,267 55,943,912

NEW HAMPSHIRE 19,204,227 18,333,059 22,035,312 24,207,281 21,229,515

NEW JERSEY 277,488,617 279,470,406 282,897,887 271,694,567 287,577,035

NEW MEXICO 40,813,099 42,487,221 38,435,723 42,606,768 41,365,384

NEW YORK 371,975,259 370,326,444 355,585,322 382,599,551 363,159,144

NORTH CAROLINA 153,143,868 137,990,207 140,921,757 139,664,016 145,032,655

NORTH DAKOTA 14,927,364 16,028,086 16,631,456 17,451,505 17,524,879

OHIO 237,619,155 234,292,673 234,616,041 269,844,104 205,082,217

OKLAHOMA 75,262,245 73,964,610 75,613,357 73,830,396 74,813,465

OREGON 68,432,876 69,804,890 73,668,716 84,223,538 111,965,838

PENNSYLVANIA 237,917,566 247,505,973 238,993,053 253,846,698 237,432,990

PUERTO RICO 35,631,052 41,719,672 36,574,275 35,734,082 33,899,170

RHODE ISLAND 14,338,247 13,552,879 13,649,046 13,369,013 14,657,843

SOUTH CAROLINA 57,056,971 41,793,873 59,475,170 51,344,075 64,845,216

SOUTH DAKOTA 7,787,780 8,337,718 8,876,969 9,244,116 9,268,495

TENNESSEE 82,279,486 78,618,805 81,550,816 80,102,865 91,996,627

TEXAS 312,592,587 317,608,342 339,879,453 327,359,648 367,222,671

UTAH 32,538,056 35,190,565 33,712,399 34,035,330 35,314,986

VERMONT 13,826,843 14,467,565 15,619,254 15,191,527 15,910,005

VIRGIN ISLANDS 5,742,341 7,262,211 7,477,045 6,878,265 4,517,888

VIRGINIA 94,477,219 101,795,738 101,484,324 103,740,384 106,446,176

WASHINGTON 135,600,312 139,344,541 149,593,236 149,585,390 159,695,662

WEST VIRGINIA 41,677,147 41,658,006 41,290,944 39,806,629 41,033,423

WISCONSIN 95,638,999 98,464,911 100,726,694 97,837,562 78,983,171

WYOMING 9,231,218 8,221,160 8,959,741 10,141,655 9,312,038

TOTALS $5,661,227,597 $5,588,313,627 $5,689,759,314 $5,748,694,920 $5,727,999,685

Source: Form OCSE-396A, line 7, columns (A+C). Beginning fiscal year 2015, form OCSE-396, line 7, columns (A+C).

49

Table P-44 Federal Share of Administrative Expenditures for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years

STATES 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016ALABAMA $41,145,158 $37,432,376 $43,216,570 $42,258,587 $33,410,809

ALASKA 17,398,460 18,601,931 17,502,841 17,377,174 17,733,871

ARIZONA 37,479,038 35,461,792 33,334,346 42,534,411 39,476,809

ARKANSAS 27,530,762 34,550,886 34,083,796 30,977,810 30,753,324

CALIFORNIA 589,799,461 573,422,580 598,393,669 588,734,225 606,413,591

COLORADO 47,868,200 48,195,589 42,911,389 44,893,300 47,639,010

CONNECTICUT 43,057,028 45,276,837 47,896,577 50,221,242 52,530,440

DELAWARE 30,652,808 31,726,151 25,675,729 28,075,263 23,111,517

DIST. OF COL. 19,889,560 19,127,350 17,868,607 16,887,850 17,319,487

FLORIDA 156,892,932 147,840,021 159,927,688 156,410,689 150,927,764

GEORGIA 55,696,342 55,887,887 59,092,590 58,883,383 65,413,461

GUAM 3,501,257 3,439,143 4,142,374 4,354,972 4,782,834

HAWAII 11,977,757 11,340,394 12,354,540 14,408,275 12,893,472

IDAHO 13,198,437 12,930,987 13,847,023 13,426,459 15,192,200

ILLINOIS 121,873,566 109,813,900 115,950,436 114,157,509 112,312,803

INDIANA 60,093,965 56,333,278 63,327,518 64,950,071 59,784,386

IOWA 31,125,370 31,764,336 34,269,297 33,186,647 32,398,544

KANSAS 34,241,513 30,821,798 20,605,042 20,748,505 23,808,597

KENTUCKY 37,563,897 35,031,572 36,090,316 36,991,394 35,584,249

LOUISIANA 46,769,722 42,907,563 45,835,765 46,997,473 45,123,514

MAINE 16,178,126 15,830,282 16,996,173 17,682,384 18,594,509

MARYLAND 79,189,345 76,879,432 83,675,650 80,828,489 78,660,426

MASSACHUSETTS 59,908,467 65,850,161 69,422,217 70,003,562 63,446,404

MICHIGAN 134,049,496 129,721,363 125,080,445 138,331,830 115,446,587

MINNESOTA 105,702,605 101,178,063 103,362,813 104,252,432 110,747,462

MISSISSIPPI 20,210,457 20,968,609 22,216,976 28,037,754 13,509,769

MISSOURI 46,503,496 40,789,098 43,994,914 40,035,297 37,457,202

MONTANA 9,757,753 9,421,386 9,616,068 9,713,458 10,073,890

NEBRASKA 16,245,452 22,985,004 21,848,373 19,326,310 20,107,082

NEVADA 31,170,867 33,195,011 32,775,070 31,620,302 34,821,971

NEW HAMPSHIRE 12,026,029 11,008,891 12,812,952 14,133,978 12,979,964

NEW JERSEY 175,914,954 176,079,129 181,244,442 170,944,853 184,391,384

NEW MEXICO 26,936,644 28,041,567 25,367,577 27,917,857 26,317,599

NEW YORK 230,695,053 218,025,628 214,782,220 231,107,760 217,327,183

NORTH CAROLINA 86,089,574 88,150,401 86,164,233 83,873,142 87,372,279

NORTH DAKOTA 9,075,570 9,717,468 10,087,632 10,469,276 10,608,902

OHIO 138,454,287 139,084,993 137,728,352 160,043,530 116,872,930

OKLAHOMA 45,852,842 44,564,209 45,631,212 43,704,459 44,478,228

OREGON 40,931,011 41,890,053 45,293,088 51,394,408 70,660,734

PENNSYLVANIA 143,655,453 149,189,616 143,099,858 153,779,531 143,168,124

PUERTO RICO 21,937,094 27,534,983 24,139,021 23,243,774 21,385,442

RHODE ISLAND 8,671,243 8,152,902 8,216,180 8,031,550 8,766,675

SOUTH CAROLINA 37,148,270 27,056,744 38,565,553 33,361,558 42,123,608

SOUTH DAKOTA 3,933,536 4,187,583 4,907,534 4,787,476 4,784,665

TENNESSEE 54,304,462 51,888,411 53,823,540 52,867,893 60,717,775

TEXAS 164,023,386 165,177,276 176,723,517 166,285,572 193,705,963

UTAH 20,801,252 20,783,641 20,410,795 21,768,997 22,443,291

VERMONT 8,535,726 9,025,225 9,720,547 9,438,246 10,017,895

VIRGIN ISLANDS 3,789,947 4,793,059 4,934,850 4,539,655 2,981,805

VIRGINIA 55,340,574 58,028,470 59,339,716 60,566,527 62,833,715

WASHINGTON 81,485,291 84,109,304 90,234,036 89,684,357 96,926,435

WEST VIRGINIA 25,130,917 25,118,283 24,876,023 23,896,375 24,706,058

WISCONSIN 59,703,492 48,082,991 66,362,873 55,209,112 43,111,347

WYOMING 5,730,621 5,425,966 5,913,429 6,693,491 6,145,946

TOTALS $3,406,838,525 $3,343,841,573 $3,445,693,992 $3,474,050,434 $3,444,303,931

Source: Form OCSE-396A, line 7, columns (B+D). Beginning fiscal year 2015, form OCSE-396, line 7, columns (B+D).

50

FY 2016 CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT PRELIMINARY REPORT

Table P-45 State Share of Administrative Expenditures for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years

STATES 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016ALABAMA $25,195,991 $23,283,350 $26,263,078 $25,769,574 $21,211,631

ALASKA 10,741,242 11,382,815 10,816,613 10,601,876 10,735,629

ARIZONA 24,926,251 24,394,911 28,490,844 23,992,830 30,956,450

ARKANSAS 23,724,865 20,908,637 22,078,801 21,210,214 21,284,689

CALIFORNIA 342,904,336 334,318,257 348,861,900 343,906,323 353,147,633

COLORADO 29,959,808 30,074,458 27,325,972 28,348,848 29,970,361

CONNECTICUT 26,580,891 27,724,432 29,073,994 30,271,550 31,461,136

DELAWARE 16,704,024 17,259,498 14,128,208 15,426,816 13,268,026

DIST. OF COL. 10,254,914 10,619,726 9,342,428 9,215,414 9,602,903

FLORIDA 113,662,012 107,130,341 115,518,288 111,909,165 111,820,575

GEORGIA 49,150,626 54,949,564 36,153,533 30,781,872 34,941,282

GUAM 1,944,507 2,098,399 2,364,183 2,307,486 2,465,329

HAWAII 7,071,173 6,225,781 6,872,170 7,607,809 8,029,888

IDAHO 9,626,720 9,462,191 9,925,175 9,839,150 10,914,030

ILLINOIS 77,210,884 80,811,733 74,486,947 73,806,512 73,076,312

INDIANA 38,423,356 37,173,579 40,951,250 41,440,236 39,925,968

IOWA 24,634,284 23,763,449 23,953,883 23,546,151 24,240,161

KANSAS 21,141,630 20,312,160 14,239,721 14,688,621 13,265,035

KENTUCKY 31,996,099 23,596,010 26,317,724 26,903,030 27,690,755

LOUISIANA 31,671,557 33,324,432 31,827,662 32,077,243 31,329,177

MAINE 11,974,056 11,611,570 11,308,244 12,003,542 11,867,147

MARYLAND 53,728,987 43,741,501 51,674,494 46,070,342 45,751,301

MASSACHUSETTS 47,087,017 47,456,554 50,171,469 50,866,859 46,260,261

MICHIGAN 92,954,958 92,441,880 89,673,725 97,444,062 86,370,151

MINNESOTA 66,546,554 64,029,575 65,221,364 65,636,730 69,142,850

MISSISSIPPI 10,411,444 10,802,010 11,445,107 14,443,688 23,212,224

MISSOURI 34,773,110 40,346,329 34,349,925 35,323,623 34,364,892

MONTANA 5,207,359 6,048,048 6,282,607 6,316,163 6,351,010

NEBRASKA 20,419,665 16,757,368 18,627,318 17,261,204 16,458,461

NEVADA 18,725,446 19,300,734 18,429,885 19,031,965 21,121,941

NEW HAMPSHIRE 7,178,198 7,324,168 9,222,360 10,073,303 8,249,551

NEW JERSEY 101,573,663 103,391,277 101,653,445 100,749,714 103,185,651

NEW MEXICO 13,876,455 14,445,654 13,068,146 14,688,911 15,047,785

NEW YORK 141,280,206 152,300,816 140,803,102 151,491,791 145,831,961

NORTH CAROLINA 67,054,294 49,839,806 54,757,524 55,790,874 57,660,376

NORTH DAKOTA 5,851,794 6,310,618 6,543,824 6,982,229 6,915,977

OHIO 99,164,868 95,207,680 96,887,689 109,800,574 88,209,287

OKLAHOMA 29,409,403 29,400,401 29,982,145 30,125,937 30,335,237

OREGON 27,501,865 27,914,837 28,375,628 32,829,130 41,305,104

PENNSYLVANIA 94,262,113 98,316,357 95,893,195 100,067,167 94,264,866

PUERTO RICO 13,693,958 14,184,689 12,435,254 12,490,308 12,513,728

RHODE ISLAND 5,667,004 5,399,977 5,432,866 5,337,463 5,891,168

SOUTH CAROLINA 19,908,701 14,737,129 20,909,617 17,982,517 22,721,608

SOUTH DAKOTA 3,854,244 4,150,135 3,969,435 4,456,640 4,483,830

TENNESSEE 27,975,024 26,730,394 27,727,276 27,234,972 31,278,852

TEXAS 148,569,201 152,431,066 163,155,936 161,074,076 173,516,708

UTAH 11,736,804 14,406,924 13,301,604 12,266,333 12,871,695

VERMONT 5,291,117 5,442,340 5,898,707 5,753,281 5,892,110

VIRGIN ISLANDS 1,952,394 2,469,152 2,542,195 2,338,610 1,536,083

VIRGINIA 39,136,645 43,767,268 42,144,608 43,173,857 43,612,461

WASHINGTON 54,115,021 55,235,237 59,359,200 59,901,033 62,769,227

WEST VIRGINIA 16,546,230 16,539,723 16,414,921 15,910,254 16,327,365

WISCONSIN 35,935,507 50,381,920 34,363,821 42,628,450 35,871,824

WYOMING 3,500,597 2,795,194 3,046,312 3,448,164 3,166,092

TOTALS $2,254,389,072 $2,244,472,054 $2,244,065,322 $2,274,644,486 $2,283,695,754

Source: Form OCSE-396A, line 7, columns (A+C) - line 7, columns (B+D). Beginning fiscal year 2015, form OCSE-396, line 7, columns (A+C) - line 7, columns (B+D).

51

Table P-46 Administrative Expenditures Using Funds Received as Incentive Payments for Four Quarters, FY 2016

STATES Total First Quarter Second Quarter Third Quarter Fourth QuarterALABAMA $4,000,000 $1,000,000 $1,000,000 $1,000,000 $1,000,000

ALASKA 1,600,000 400,000 400,000 400,000 400,000

ARIZONA 10,619,911 3,590,674 3,899,950 1,554,287 1,575,000

ARKANSAS 5,442,071 1,673,113 1,200,000 768,958 1,800,000

CALIFORNIA 40,752,750 10,137,500 10,137,500 10,137,500 10,340,250

COLORADO 5,429,055 1,250,000 1,250,000 1,679,055 1,250,000

CONNECTICUT 4,400,000 1,100,000 1,100,000 1,100,000 1,100,000

DELAWARE 1,362,093 345,650 312,085 355,618 348,740

DIST. OF COL. 680,745 153,969 181,184 151,035 194,557

FLORIDA 34,069,913 8,473,762 8,473,762 7,349,453 9,772,936

GEORGIA 514,641 42,190 78,160 278,278 116,013

GUAM 1,443 675 0 768 0

HAWAII 1,387,795 335,291 247,073 547,150 258,281

IDAHO 3,087,744 771,936 771,936 771,936 771,936

ILLINOIS 15,218,200 3,789,425 3,789,425 3,819,675 3,819,675

INDIANA 9,127,949 1,963,047 1,636,992 3,538,182 1,989,728

IOWA 7,550,000 1,750,000 2,200,000 1,500,000 2,100,000

KANSAS 1,000,000 1,000,000 700,000 -700,000 0

KENTUCKY 9,359,473 1,991,041 3,458,715 2,162,489 1,747,228

LOUISIANA 8,083,730 0 7,924,872 60,109 98,749

MAINE 2,288,154 139,257 606,604 777,067 765,226

MARYLAND 5,089,164 994,143 2,136,543 1,160,678 797,800

MASSACHUSETTS 13,575,747 3,105,959 2,502,911 4,147,366 3,819,511

MICHIGAN 26,597,666 3,462,500 9,737,500 10,160,166 3,237,500

MINNESOTA 12,091,125 3,000,000 3,000,000 3,091,125 3,000,000

MISSISSIPPI 12,656,075 0 0 4,199,700 8,456,375

MISSOURI 15,068,756 4,525,170 5,080,249 5,405,371 57,966

MONTANA 1,161,432 276,000 275,000 335,432 275,000

NEBRASKA 6,100,268 1,325,000 2,407,059 732,197 1,636,012

NEVADA 3,183,352 1,424,765 703,499 553,550 501,538

NEW HAMPSHIRE 1,562,624 392,682 387,846 378,877 403,219

NEW JERSEY 8,196,150 836,114 1,996,315 2,748,099 2,615,622

NEW MEXICO 1,490,237 5,149 3,275 1,478,594 3,219

NEW YORK 17,307,849 2,394,041 2,403,650 10,088,986 2,421,172

NORTH CAROLINA 12,520,040 2,463,452 3,526,614 2,343,518 4,186,456

NORTH DAKOTA 1,450,790 393,367 390,176 349,494 317,753

OHIO 28,459,949 6,468,636 6,643,088 7,863,429 7,484,796

OKLAHOMA 7,422,212 1,447,048 1,447,048 3,081,068 1,447,048

OREGON 4,901,412 800,979 1,360,859 1,663,056 1,076,518

PENNSYLVANIA 7,530,298 892,181 2,672,312 2,205,424 1,760,381

PUERTO RICO 1,496,984 595,321 77,465 697,598 126,600

RHODE ISLAND 1,375,000 325,000 350,000 350,000 350,000

SOUTH CAROLINA 1,021,565 175,946 173,891 311,097 360,631

SOUTH DAKOTA 2,019,005 490,640 482,102 475,602 570,661

TENNESSEE 0 0 0 0 0

TEXAS 71,975,979 15,500,000 19,728,780 18,524,622 18,222,577

UTAH 1,310,000 0 0 0 1,310,000

VERMONT 731,378 209,821 101,915 209,821 209,821

VIRGIN ISLANDS 0 0 0 0 0

VIRGINIA 11,243,573 2,954,107 2,430,421 2,486,689 3,372,356

WASHINGTON 11,800,000 3,425,000 3,110,714 1,654,762 3,609,524

WEST VIRGINIA 3,600,000 900,000 900,000 900,000 900,000

WISCONSIN 13,662,948 12,809,011 21,648 48,245 784,044

WYOMING 0 0 0 0 0

TOTALS $472,577,245 $111,499,562 $123,419,138 $124,896,126 $112,762,419

Source: Form OCSE-396A, line 1a, column A. Beginning fiscal year 2015, form OCSE-396, line 1a, column A.

52

FY 2016 CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT PRELIMINARY REPORT

Table P-47 Non-IV-D Costs for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years

STATES 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016ALABAMA $725,962 $627,761 $833,673 $704,906 $646,583

ALASKA 0 0 0 0 0

ARIZONA 1,315,842 1,115,907 1,400,988 1,081,966 689,622

ARKANSAS 610,520 596,498 569,941 513,324 440,818

CALIFORNIA 541,945 429,092 430,501 441,477 429,659

COLORADO 0 0 0 0 0

CONNECTICUT 0 0 137,633 0 0

DELAWARE 49,132 47,170 43,903 37,318 35,434

DIST. OF COL. 0 0 0 0 0

FLORIDA 1,973,621 1,889,833 2,013,030 1,989,757 2,271,524

GEORGIA 0 0 0 0 0

GUAM 3,550 2,197 2,077 1,740 691

HAWAII 57,390 10,870 9,036 599,442 -641,481

IDAHO 0 0 0 0 0

ILLINOIS 2,288,327 1,904,808 1,858,922 1,665,479 1,742,503

INDIANA 284,359 252,384 254,674 353,291 182,373

IOWA 45,412 53,235 54,824 52,640 50,517

KANSAS 301,730 1,248,520 1,221,556 1,197,595 1,142,160

KENTUCKY 138,194 94,830 168,555 166,061 115,393

LOUISIANA 12,455 14,418 14,141 14,951 15,296

MAINE 7,735 6,703 7,129 7,636 -60,707

MARYLAND 0 16,014 32,321 37,264 31,330

MASSACHUSETTS 10,162 7,745 8,861 6,682 6,221

MICHIGAN 0 0 0 0 0

MINNESOTA 0 0 0 0 0

MISSISSIPPI 0 0 0 0 0

MISSOURI 272,286 254,672 170,064 157,132 179,593

MONTANA 0 0 0 0 0

NEBRASKA 112,855 121,710 114,484 106,190 116,079

NEVADA 175,173 182,585 155,679 199,032 201,784

NEW HAMPSHIRE 0 0 0 0 0

NEW JERSEY 488,355 764,727 996,162 878,302 937,467

NEW MEXICO 621,080 1,410,778 221,832 432,061 975,641

NEW YORK 0 0 0 0 0

NORTH CAROLINA 130,268 124,773 125,645 126,374 132,556

NORTH DAKOTA 270,089 330,252 351,550 361,329 432,799

OHIO 0 0 0 0 0

OKLAHOMA 91,402 128,544 100,943 76,317 76,360

OREGON 0 0 0 0 0

PENNSYLVANIA 0 105,029 95,937 134,405 93,359

PUERTO RICO 0 0 0 0 0

RHODE ISLAND 0 0 0 0 0

SOUTH CAROLINA 0 0 1,860 0 0

SOUTH DAKOTA 0 0 0 0 0

TENNESSEE 0 0 0 0 0

TEXAS 2,162,818 1,454,984 1,492,304 1,151,948 1,002,862

UTAH 902 603 516 20 19

VERMONT 0 0 0 0 0

VIRGIN ISLANDS 0 0 0 0 0

VIRGINIA 108,794 130,764 141,352 147,598 110,953

WASHINGTON 0 0 0 0 0

WEST VIRGINIA 0 0 0 0 0

WISCONSIN 691,657 756,390 555,439 471,290 156,266

WYOMING 0 0 0 0 0

TOTALS $13,492,015 $14,083,796 $13,585,532 $13,113,527 $11,513,674

Source: Form OCSE-396A, line 1c, columns (A+C). Beginning fiscal year 2015, form OCSE-396, line 1c, columns (A+C).

53

Functional Costs

Table P-48 ADP Expenditures for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years

STATES 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016ALABAMA $9,525,263 $8,986,006 $10,473,425 $9,824,546 $8,147,644

ALASKA 1,134,544 3,037,897 2,394,367 2,270,606 3,794,230

ARIZONA 7,456,638 7,092,148 7,291,578 8,714,546 11,023,190

ARKANSAS 9,293,556 11,203,151 10,200,443 10,308,923 10,269,544

CALIFORNIA 95,025,168 80,110,302 83,567,438 88,280,395 88,292,843

COLORADO 2,737,076 6,791,438 137,953 1,019,173 4,804,716

CONNECTICUT 2,961,906 2,831,411 3,009,341 3,938,668 4,210,190

DELAWARE 22,037,938 26,986,854 13,188,758 14,930,771 8,552,813

DIST. OF COL. 3,846,149 3,986,155 3,486,827 2,919,787 3,898,630

FLORIDA 45,936,239 25,930,618 25,827,578 26,489,066 24,720,160

GEORGIA 15,683,575 17,079,941 16,565,000 15,067,848 20,216,555

GUAM 1,252,540 1,275,000 1,506,277 2,007,569 2,283,032

HAWAII 2,997,911 2,106,951 1,536,501 5,568,639 3,781,251

IDAHO 4,089,132 4,704,875 5,190,937 5,290,227 7,897,201

ILLINOIS 21,486,713 19,172,843 19,536,416 18,385,009 16,820,629

INDIANA 17,716,052 17,628,293 17,071,529 16,289,720 13,804,114

IOWA 4,610,366 4,618,786 4,445,847 4,607,777 4,461,235

KANSAS 9,732,830 10,475,621 9,863,909 10,081,396 6,980,754

KENTUCKY 16,587,115 7,286,214 8,934,597 8,342,827 8,229,959

LOUISIANA 8,842,983 8,728,104 12,481,471 6,550,467 6,408,388

MAINE 1,155,898 1,347,560 998,315 1,323,433 1,881,536

MARYLAND 28,496,545 16,449,544 30,803,629 21,494,882 20,250,318

MASSACHUSETTS 16,698,627 35,773,751 43,451,912 46,168,184 37,343,115

MICHIGAN 28,195,306 26,645,589 32,920,263 30,300,208 21,088,920

MINNESOTA 29,747,334 25,687,801 27,397,068 25,152,790 29,135,256

MISSISSIPPI 2,028,403 1,881,171 1,509,903 967,868 971,710

MISSOURI 7,152,789 6,365,375 6,564,988 6,430,376 6,979,705

MONTANA 2,247,255 2,852,894 2,370,667 2,349,582 2,516,379

NEBRASKA -1,193,240 4,783,326 2,051,775 3,349,443 4,828,601

NEVADA 3,490,372 4,712,549 7,910,039 7,247,174 7,069,436

NEW HAMPSHIRE 667,595 749,515 2,751,793 4,902,644 1,745,650

NEW JERSEY 19,066,093 17,292,674 23,221,534 17,990,284 19,761,515

NEW MEXICO 7,408,378 8,900,136 3,360,183 5,207,022 3,307,282

NEW YORK 9,626,055 13,045,428 4,115,661 9,107,513 9,246,693

NORTH CAROLINA 6,006,027 6,230,722 5,686,829 4,561,388 5,458,182

NORTH DAKOTA 2,463,938 2,749,878 2,662,766 2,855,988 2,725,294

OHIO 15,022,535 12,233,624 22,163,008 27,156,709 17,465,834

OKLAHOMA 2,904,204 3,205,603 2,771,538 3,152,153 2,911,780

OREGON 2,829,087 3,469,649 4,212,384 10,066,384 42,244,589

PENNSYLVANIA 37,992,644 43,687,286 32,700,084 31,782,383 21,944,132

PUERTO RICO 9,100,977 7,115,823 6,568,145 6,791,443 6,186,435

RHODE ISLAND 470,753 311,322 362,041 539,814 1,304,871

SOUTH CAROLINA 19,752,008 5,390,819 19,982,084 7,521,675 20,943,577

SOUTH DAKOTA 658,535 994,835 1,028,637 1,175,708 1,061,591

TENNESSEE 10,572,327 10,329,419 9,934,450 8,430,950 7,286,963

TEXAS 68,163,097 74,628,246 103,311,017 100,010,322 113,066,384

UTAH 7,102,426 7,864,116 7,581,703 8,066,284 8,778,151

VERMONT 1,443,680 1,505,092 1,865,688 1,438,800 987,824

VIRGIN ISLANDS 1,946,131 2,499,635 1,819,578 1,438,504 1,022,461

VIRGINIA 6,665,208 5,607,749 7,209,128 6,020,255 6,039,104

WASHINGTON 9,995,027 10,246,853 10,346,667 9,323,798 7,966,230

WEST VIRGINIA 2,880,175 2,854,920 2,667,201 2,932,590 2,906,054

WISCONSIN 9,880,980 10,236,244 12,195,831 12,345,465 13,805,292

WYOMING 1,193,345 425,394 518,633 530,874 590,465

TOTALS $674,784,208 $648,107,150 $701,725,334 $689,020,850 $709,418,407

Source: Form OCSE-396A, lines 4, 5, and 6, columns (A+C). Beginning fiscal year 2015, form OCSE-396, lines 4, 5, and 6, columns (A+C).

OCSE-396A, lines 4, 5, and 6 gives the automated data processing expenditures eligible for FFP at the 66 percent rate.

54

FY 2016 CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT PRELIMINARY REPORT

Fees

Table P-49 Fees Charged by OCSE, FY 2016

STATES FPLS Fees CSENet Fees Pre-Offset Notices FeesALABAMA $125,492 $60,968 $0

ALASKA 25,780 12,524 0

ARIZONA 107,176 52,068 60,535

ARKANSAS 64,928 31,544 0

CALIFORNIA 769,348 373,776 0

COLORADO 81,268 39,484 0

CONNECTICUT 108,812 52,864 0

DELAWARE 42,056 20,432 0

DIST. OF COL. 28,600 13,896 0

FLORIDA 460,980 223,960 49,175

GEORGIA 215,860 104,872 111,014

GUAM 3,732 1,812 2,106

HAWAII 45,900 22,300 3,998

IDAHO 66,412 32,268 6,771

ILLINOIS 274,884 133,548 0

INDIANA 179,888 87,396 16,520

IOWA 100,360 48,760 11,650

KANSAS 72,344 35,148 7,552

KENTUCKY 163,940 79,648 0

LOUISIANA 162,164 78,784 0

MAINE 35,204 17,104 0

MARYLAND 127,048 61,724 0

MASSACHUSETTS 137,484 66,796 0

MICHIGAN 539,336 262,028 45,153

MINNESOTA 133,544 64,880 0

MISSISSIPPI 182,556 88,692 0

MISSOURI 195,708 95,080 51,540

MONTANA 21,672 10,528 12,072

NEBRASKA 58,680 28,508 0

NEVADA 58,044 28,200 8,081

NEW HAMPSHIRE 19,292 9,372 12,148

NEW JERSEY 207,188 100,660 109,479

NEW MEXICO 37,480 18,212 24,961

NEW YORK 500,936 243,372 0

NORTH CAROLINA 233,936 113,656 0

NORTH DAKOTA 21,892 10,636 0

OHIO 514,168 249,800 45,895

OKLAHOMA 110,052 53,468 82,510

OREGON 126,108 61,268 0

PENNSYLVANIA 234,908 114,128 23,140

PUERTO RICO 128,412 62,388 0

RHODE ISLAND 31,568 15,336 0

SOUTH CAROLINA 120,972 58,772 0

SOUTH DAKOTA 25,016 12,156 3,014

TENNESSEE 231,176 112,316 0

TEXAS 722,168 350,856 76,290

UTAH 46,876 22,772 0

VERMONT 10,720 5,208 1,598

VIRGIN ISLANDS 5,236 2,544 239

VIRGINIA 182,480 88,656 111,268

WASHINGTON 195,824 95,140 21,195

WEST VIRGINIA 68,900 33,472 0

WISCONSIN 197,408 95,908 0

WYOMING 18,124 8,804 0

TOTALS $8,580,040 $4,168,492 $897,904

Source: Form OCSE-396A. Beginning fiscal year 2015, form OCSE-396,

line 10 line 11 line 12

55

Table P-50 Fees and Costs Recovered in Excess of Fees for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years

STATES 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016ALABAMA $1,654,079 $4,625,168 $1,966,532 $1,859,277 $1,757,363

ALASKA 304,022 301,453 346,953 313,734 338,985

ARIZONA 4,666,570 5,369,870 5,198,619 5,326,823 5,542,080

ARKANSAS 9,908,452 9,901,590 9,625,985 9,534,814 9,617,901

CALIFORNIA 4,043,221 4,032,267 4,004,598 3,990,421 4,015,296

COLORADO 1,704,333 1,428,705 1,462,077 1,439,156 1,476,320

CONNECTICUT 572,669 570,852 569,896 570,664 550,145

DELAWARE 122,568 122,007 101,940 114,044 117,691

DIST. OF COL. 187,749 589,565 173,943 172,450 169,816

FLORIDA 6,851,410 7,052,103 7,893,928 7,915,750 7,786,956

GEORGIA 6,054,010 7,375,429 8,834,421 9,640,426 8,961,747

GUAM 46,850 44,775 46,200 0 0

HAWAII 249,805 245,832 247,426 245,491 247,010

IDAHO 2,026,962 2,380,242 2,055,036 2,102,207 2,047,154

ILLINOIS 2,172,000 2,201,450 2,232,525 2,246,225 2,249,075

INDIANA 6,057,500 5,925,981 5,121,537 5,846,785 5,492,530

IOWA 982,838 984,952 986,276 1,024,832 1,066,763

KANSAS 3,278,983 3,196,903 3,057,632 3,050,345 3,072,668

KENTUCKY 1,421,931 1,425,502 1,422,124 1,422,759 1,409,095

LOUISIANA 1,687,982 1,742,906 1,735,162 1,791,081 1,765,355

MAINE 363,168 943,547 906,815 903,736 913,400

MARYLAND 3,742,989 4,777,177 3,462,143 3,558,482 3,633,632

MASSACHUSETTS 0 0 2,246,076 1,161,737 1,151,028

MICHIGAN 5,437,573 5,722,679 4,858,890 4,977,409 4,787,726

MINNESOTA 7,120,614 7,857,816 7,680,886 8,183,431 8,396,156

MISSISSIPPI 5,693,473 5,259,299 5,208,976 5,520,881 5,411,742

MISSOURI 2,123,521 2,133,633 1,933,091 2,412,318 2,132,591

MONTANA 279,834 282,931 296,750 302,979 294,605

NEBRASKA 613,008 621,986 630,515 639,496 645,392

NEVADA 1,285,348 1,305,470 1,369,877 1,432,780 1,441,786

NEW HAMPSHIRE 198,738 198,998 198,014 194,087 194,575

NEW JERSEY 2,692,859 2,711,079 2,699,508 2,715,444 2,699,158

NEW MEXICO 565,463 548,673 527,908 889,419 638,770

NEW YORK 4,369,388 6,881,225 1,378,638 4,063,471 4,203,476

NORTH CAROLINA 2,950,851 3,047,066 3,047,771 3,183,106 3,208,103

NORTH DAKOTA 671,300 375,657 369,429 357,265 366,298

OHIO 36,823,478 35,204,904 38,347,147 -1,941,837 78,790,893

OKLAHOMA 1,630,383 1,612,589 1,713,484 1,764,396 2,024,070

OREGON 1,136,520 844,311 842,328 846,290 821,740

PENNSYLVANIA 4,316,998 4,257,547 4,172,411 4,129,487 4,049,222

PUERTO RICO 2,090,550 2,025,338 2,022,692 1,954,587 1,953,576

RHODE ISLAND 22,338 10,015 29,711 129,323 331,267

SOUTH CAROLINA 479,497 474,436 429,984 465,833 276,110

SOUTH DAKOTA 481,648 482,628 493,098 485,978 474,158

TENNESSEE 1,766,525 1,825,962 1,872,490 1,829,099 1,836,363

TEXAS 16,346,860 16,834,535 15,197,083 16,642,910 16,460,053

UTAH 3,263,694 3,352,992 3,419,844 3,449,478 3,597,107

VERMONT 97,248 91,246 69,200 174,587 94,854

VIRGIN ISLANDS 90,367 174,579 171,549 145,523 149,769

VIRGINIA 3,107,342 3,136,526 3,126,596 3,063,239 3,024,716

WASHINGTON 1,820,733 1,870,334 1,822,909 1,770,060 1,745,238

WEST VIRGINIA 273,344 291,643 291,303 276,538 272,489

WISCONSIN 15,369,538 15,671,872 16,213,145 16,496,548 14,884,795

WYOMING 537,976 541,732 514,821 514,748 494,732

TOTALS $181,757,100 $190,887,977 $184,647,892 $151,300,112 $229,083,540

Source: Form OCSE-396A, line 2a, columns (A+C). Beginning fiscal year 2015, form OCSE-396, line 2a, columns (A+C).

56

FY 2016 CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT PRELIMINARY REPORT

Table P-51 Fees Retained by Other States for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years

STATES 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016ALABAMA $12,382 $12,642 $11,031 $8,305 $11,462

ALASKA 11,143 11,762 9,395 8,291 8,312

ARIZONA 15,270 16,765 18,792 19,359 19,036

ARKANSAS 3,795 3,101 2,121 1,622 1,566

CALIFORNIA 88,722 95,386 97,200 98,185 75,152

COLORADO 18,229 31,764 29,335 29,717 29,788

CONNECTICUT 23,988 24,393 25,871 3,807 3,699

DELAWARE 3,307 2,987 2,260 2,587 3,200

DIST. OF COL. 0 0 0 0 0

FLORIDA 51,217 50,695 44,906 40,947 42,465

GEORGIA 33,000 31,659 31,628 32,074 30,590

GUAM 0 0 0 0 0

HAWAII 1,935 1,782 386 1,715 1,272

IDAHO 51,712 57,223 59,410 70,173 78,474

ILLINOIS 0 0 0 0 0

INDIANA 17,558 18,252 17,143 31,871 16,401

IOWA 17,533 14,921 12,961 13,909 11,111

KANSAS 20,981 21,481 24,836 19,815 18,231

KENTUCKY 0 0 0 0 0

LOUISIANA 19,126 21,655 21,388 407 26,173

MAINE 2,722 3,104 3,148 3,327 3,194

MARYLAND 0 0 0 0 0

MASSACHUSETTS 3,900 4,393 3,952 3,975 3,775

MICHIGAN 31,837 28,864 27,152 25,824 26,630

MINNESOTA 14,741 13,832 12,442 12,565 11,351

MISSISSIPPI 31,648 33,084 32,847 35,432 34,268

MISSOURI 212,567 193,514 181,235 184,877 178,377

MONTANA 6,992 6,629 9,006 8,425 7,912

NEBRASKA 14,896 14,136 12,693 20,482 12,105

NEVADA 21,481 22,074 22,936 21,759 22,508

NEW HAMPSHIRE 0 -2,278 12 0 0

NEW JERSEY 27,760 27,200 26,688 24,611 24,769

NEW MEXICO 4,684 5,046 3,975 3,669 3,880

NEW YORK 0 0 0 0 0

NORTH CAROLINA 32,681 20,170 17,974 16,304 18,668

NORTH DAKOTA 6,555 3,125 6,035 6,080 4,909

OHIO 29,267 23,961 21,207 21,073 17,672

OKLAHOMA 49,983 42,698 39,482 36,160 32,167

OREGON 13,400 13,185 12,402 12,660 11,558

PENNSYLVANIA 0 0 0 0 0

PUERTO RICO 237,845 0 0 0 0

RHODE ISLAND 385 550 192 219 135

SOUTH CAROLINA 0 0 0 0 0

SOUTH DAKOTA 7,453 5,336 5,198 4,420 4,294

TENNESSEE 0 27,008 34,530 36,871 18,606

TEXAS 111,555 118,806 113,293 107,734 100,471

UTAH 5,642 5,037 5,121 4,665 4,313

VERMONT 0 0 0 0 0

VIRGIN ISLANDS 0 0 0 0 0

VIRGINIA 18,836 17,897 18,314 20,068 19,265

WASHINGTON 27,036 28,192 36,465 39,165 37,179

WEST VIRGINIA 2,876 2,578 2,168 2,297 2,322

WISCONSIN 15,458 10,330 18,342 12,739 17,328

WYOMING 17,858 17,616 16,379 15,206 15,298

TOTALS $1,339,956 $1,102,555 $1,091,851 $1,063,391 $1,009,886

Source: Form OCSE-34A - Part 1, line 11. Beginning fiscal year 2015, form OCSE-34 - Part 1, line 11.

57

Cases and Caseloads

Table P-52 Total Caseload for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years

STATES 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016ALABAMA 232,788 229,281 226,745 218,827 216,144

ALASKA 47,844 48,222 49,047 49,023 46,650

ARIZONA 192,318 189,223 184,223 178,113 173,601

ARKANSAS 119,558 117,987 112,983 108,338 104,747

CALIFORNIA 1,332,942 1,290,703 1,257,649 1,237,983 1,214,962

COLORADO 152,190 153,171 153,950 151,637 150,409

CONNECTICUT 202,736 206,221 196,304 181,990 167,150

DELAWARE 77,495 79,901 79,936 82,532 77,759

DIST. OF COL. 50,273 51,166 51,222 49,342 47,282

FLORIDA 942,504 854,923 694,456 650,421 656,869

GEORGIA 394,909 388,767 396,791 403,563 411,331

GUAM 6,452 6,600 6,714 6,805 6,654

HAWAII 86,136 84,494 79,980 79,158 76,266

IDAHO 119,418 118,318 122,685 121,335 120,743

ILLINOIS 496,314 496,906 481,331 480,209 475,614

INDIANA 336,696 300,196 287,436 279,327 272,789

IOWA 179,290 177,900 175,078 170,817 167,846

KANSAS 132,519 132,594 140,023 134,216 141,105

KENTUCKY 299,818 298,928 288,370 275,012 271,525

LOUISIANA 301,703 308,573 305,864 291,391 283,871

MAINE 64,560 63,455 59,638 54,132 49,450

MARYLAND 220,575 217,259 214,415 207,591 203,452

MASSACHUSETTS 242,531 241,759 237,212 230,376 216,952

MICHIGAN 1,005,639 996,380 954,770 842,771 846,347

MINNESOTA 245,782 245,991 238,379 230,420 225,386

MISSISSIPPI 326,752 339,689 306,876 300,922 291,717

MISSOURI 359,994 363,366 355,157 344,300 332,822

MONTANA 40,019 39,987 39,068 37,321 37,344

NEBRASKA 108,005 107,409 107,078 108,443 108,674

NEVADA 103,109 102,135 97,437 94,112 94,458

NEW HAMPSHIRE 34,587 34,834 35,124 38,115 38,510

NEW JERSEY 389,665 378,013 363,950 347,538 333,636

NEW MEXICO 66,554 66,539 69,815 67,681 62,497

NEW YORK 930,517 918,192 903,606 896,898 856,179

NORTH CAROLINA 431,576 426,062 415,282 411,215 407,651

NORTH DAKOTA 40,591 39,964 39,118 38,133 37,380

OHIO 925,740 899,150 873,517 856,136 840,689

OKLAHOMA 202,313 205,416 207,434 208,086 203,269

OREGON 229,449 241,155 232,162 204,366 188,432

PENNSYLVANIA 421,344 414,282 405,107 395,952 380,451

PUERTO RICO 232,629 227,874 227,082 226,147 219,449

RHODE ISLAND 58,034 57,909 57,316 52,402 50,402

SOUTH CAROLINA 219,308 224,944 200,444 190,138 194,451

SOUTH DAKOTA 46,735 47,840 47,577 47,222 46,947

TENNESSEE 421,195 401,681 380,648 369,641 366,715

TEXAS 1,345,121 1,421,410 1,462,517 1,516,674 1,548,574

UTAH 87,750 88,672 90,172 92,601 92,683

VERMONT 19,930 18,772 17,823 16,867 15,744

VIRGIN ISLANDS 1 8,916 9,232 9,212 9,086 8,952

VIRGINIA 332,928 329,903 312,281 306,776 303,413

WASHINGTON 366,135 365,609 343,717 336,712 329,878

WEST VIRGINIA 125,120 126,595 132,258 122,332 115,523

WISCONSIN 357,070 361,223 365,667 363,184 361,221

WYOMING 33,064 32,000 30,982 30,209 29,843

TOTALS 15,747,140 15,588,775 15,123,628 14,744,538 14,522,408

Source: Form OCSE-157, lines 1 and 3, column A.

1 Virgin Islands data were unreliable for line 1 in FY 2012 and FY 2014. Line 3 data are not subject to data reliability audits.

FY 2015 and FY 2016 data reliability information not available at the time of publication.

58

FY 2016 CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT PRELIMINARY REPORT

Table P-53 Cases Open at the End of the Fiscal Year for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years

STATES 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016ALABAMA 232,788 229,281 226,745 218,827 216,144

ALASKA 47,844 48,222 49,047 49,023 46,650

ARIZONA 189,181 185,979 181,008 174,932 170,491

ARKANSAS 119,558 117,987 112,983 108,338 104,747

CALIFORNIA 1,332,680 1,290,377 1,257,376 1,237,737 1,214,712

COLORADO 152,185 153,165 153,945 151,634 150,405

CONNECTICUT 201,858 205,298 195,366 181,198 166,495

DELAWARE 77,495 79,901 79,936 82,497 77,728

DIST. OF COL. 50,273 51,166 51,222 49,342 47,282

FLORIDA 942,313 854,777 694,366 650,352 656,801

GEORGIA 394,809 388,649 396,640 403,410 411,151

GUAM 6,452 6,600 6,714 6,805 6,654

HAWAII 86,080 84,435 79,936 79,114 76,222

IDAHO 118,492 117,076 120,869 119,477 118,870

ILLINOIS 495,966 496,546 480,974 480,137 475,543

INDIANA 336,696 300,196 287,436 279,327 272,789

IOWA 179,290 177,900 175,078 170,817 167,846

KANSAS 132,490 132,569 139,995 134,195 141,082

KENTUCKY 299,785 298,883 288,331 274,976 271,491

LOUISIANA 301,703 308,573 305,864 291,391 283,871

MAINE 64,560 63,455 59,638 54,132 49,450

MARYLAND 220,575 217,259 214,415 207,591 203,452

MASSACHUSETTS 242,207 241,445 236,966 230,131 216,777

MICHIGAN 1,005,595 996,341 954,698 842,709 846,279

MINNESOTA 244,015 243,995 236,059 227,783 222,472

MISSISSIPPI 326,752 339,689 306,876 300,922 291,717

MISSOURI 359,987 363,356 355,150 344,291 332,815

MONTANA 37,892 37,879 37,065 35,652 35,446

NEBRASKA 108,005 107,409 107,078 108,443 108,674

NEVADA 103,109 102,135 97,437 94,112 94,458

NEW HAMPSHIRE 34,585 34,832 35,122 38,113 38,509

NEW JERSEY 389,429 377,783 363,803 347,424 333,535

NEW MEXICO 58,985 59,744 63,243 61,501 62,497

NEW YORK 930,336 918,027 903,450 896,713 856,038

NORTH CAROLINA 431,576 426,062 415,282 411,215 407,651

NORTH DAKOTA 38,655 38,091 37,409 36,456 35,807

OHIO 925,695 899,109 873,450 856,107 840,653

OKLAHOMA 202,313 205,416 207,434 208,086 203,269

OREGON 228,052 238,587 230,226 203,488 187,756

PENNSYLVANIA 421,328 414,272 405,097 395,940 380,439

PUERTO RICO 232,629 227,870 227,082 226,147 219,449

RHODE ISLAND 57,863 57,660 57,211 52,335 50,369

SOUTH CAROLINA 219,308 224,944 200,444 190,138 194,451

SOUTH DAKOTA 37,397 38,117 37,704 38,458 40,326

TENNESSEE 421,195 401,681 380,648 369,641 366,632

TEXAS 1,344,895 1,421,193 1,462,351 1,516,487 1,548,329

UTAH 87,624 88,649 90,159 92,593 92,678

VERMONT 19,924 18,767 17,821 16,864 15,740

VIRGIN ISLANDS 1 8,902 9,217 9,197 9,073 8,939

VIRGINIA 332,928 329,903 312,281 306,776 303,413

WASHINGTON 366,135 365,609 343,717 336,712 329,878

WEST VIRGINIA 125,109 126,576 132,238 122,317 115,509

WISCONSIN 357,029 361,180 365,631 363,152 361,169

WYOMING 30,718 29,712 28,711 27,947 27,600

TOTALS 15,713,245 15,553,544 15,088,924 14,712,978 14,499,150

Source: Form OCSE-157, line 1.

1 Virgin Islands data were unreliable for line 1 in FY 2012 and FY 2014.

FY 2015 and FY 2016 data reliability information not available at the time of publication.

59

Table P-54 Cases for Which the State Has No Jurisdiction for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years

STATES 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016ALABAMA 0 0 0 0 0

ALASKA 0 0 0 0 0

ARIZONA 3,137 3,244 3,215 3,181 3,110

ARKANSAS 0 0 0 0 0

CALIFORNIA 262 326 273 246 250

COLORADO 5 6 5 3 4

CONNECTICUT 878 923 938 792 655

DELAWARE 0 0 0 35 31

DIST. OF COL. 0 0 0 0 0

FLORIDA 191 146 90 69 68

GEORGIA 100 118 151 153 180

GUAM 0 0 0 0 0

HAWAII 56 59 44 44 44

IDAHO 926 1,242 1,816 1,858 1,873

ILLINOIS 348 360 357 72 71

INDIANA 0 0 0 0 0

IOWA 0 0 0 0 0

KANSAS 29 25 28 21 23

KENTUCKY 33 45 39 36 34

LOUISIANA 0 0 0 0 0

MAINE 0 0 0 0 0

MARYLAND 0 0 0 0 0

MASSACHUSETTS 324 314 246 245 175

MICHIGAN 44 39 72 62 68

MINNESOTA 1,767 1,996 2,320 2,637 2,914

MISSISSIPPI 0 0 0 0 0

MISSOURI 7 10 7 9 7

MONTANA 2,127 2,108 2,003 1,669 1,898

NEBRASKA 0 0 0 0 0

NEVADA 0 0 0 0 0

NEW HAMPSHIRE 2 2 2 2 1

NEW JERSEY 236 230 147 114 101

NEW MEXICO 7,569 6,795 6,572 6,180 0

NEW YORK 181 165 156 185 141

NORTH CAROLINA 0 0 0 0 0

NORTH DAKOTA 1,936 1,873 1,709 1,677 1,573

OHIO 45 41 67 29 36

OKLAHOMA 0 0 0 0 0

OREGON 1,397 2,568 1,936 878 676

PENNSYLVANIA 16 10 10 12 12

PUERTO RICO 0 4 0 0 0

RHODE ISLAND 171 249 105 67 33

SOUTH CAROLINA 0 0 0 0 0

SOUTH DAKOTA 9,338 9,723 9,873 8,764 6,621

TENNESSEE 0 0 0 0 83

TEXAS 226 217 166 187 245

UTAH 126 23 13 8 5

VERMONT 6 5 2 3 4

VIRGIN ISLANDS 14 15 15 13 13

VIRGINIA 0 0 0 0 0

WASHINGTON 0 0 0 0 0

WEST VIRGINIA 11 19 20 15 14

WISCONSIN 41 43 36 32 52

WYOMING 2,346 2,288 2,271 2,262 2,243

TOTALS 33,895 35,231 34,704 31,560 23,258

Source: Form OCSE-157, line 3.

FY 2015 and FY 2016 data reliability information not available at the time of publication.

60

FY 2016 CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT PRELIMINARY REPORT

Table P-55 Total Caseload by Current Assistance for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years

STATES 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016ALABAMA 27,340 24,268 21,251 17,732 15,789

ALASKA 5,426 5,536 5,860 6,462 5,008

ARIZONA 19,185 16,119 13,344 10,939 9,639

ARKANSAS 11,593 10,646 9,289 7,892 7,109

CALIFORNIA 368,764 343,514 350,579 327,971 297,057

COLORADO 16,482 17,024 16,811 15,764 15,659

CONNECTICUT 18,791 19,033 18,717 16,174 14,531

DELAWARE 9,069 8,674 7,351 8,722 6,957

DIST. OF COL. 14,709 14,712 15,116 13,311 12,467

FLORIDA 77,737 73,477 53,019 46,817 43,783

GEORGIA 22,320 21,349 20,993 21,550 21,421

GUAM 577 437 448 391 338

HAWAII 14,838 13,836 13,330 12,890 11,879

IDAHO 3,639 3,527 3,530 3,580 3,595

ILLINOIS 79,216 79,514 77,063 68,052 56,297

INDIANA 14,059 12,194 10,611 9,629 9,057

IOWA 18,911 18,089 16,494 15,195 15,019

KANSAS 17,307 15,112 14,319 13,038 12,166

KENTUCKY 41,115 41,450 38,769 35,263 36,303

LOUISIANA 25,954 23,054 22,039 20,633 20,586

MAINE 8,643 7,212 5,717 4,840 4,017

MARYLAND 22,247 20,368 21,079 19,345 16,694

MASSACHUSETTS 41,032 37,254 31,260 27,112 23,099

MICHIGAN 69,233 52,554 62,615 51,252 39,464

MINNESOTA 26,269 25,394 25,063 25,537 26,574

MISSISSIPPI 17,638 16,006 13,534 11,915 10,523

MISSOURI 45,147 43,888 34,498 30,784 21,451

MONTANA 4,532 5,078 4,911 4,631 5,235

NEBRASKA 7,095 6,878 6,834 6,650 6,760

NEVADA 7,782 7,784 8,462 6,616 7,736

NEW HAMPSHIRE 4,038 3,772 3,598 3,685 3,473

NEW JERSEY 48,664 43,874 40,371 33,285 25,902

NEW MEXICO 9,798 8,060 8,549 7,048 6,989

NEW YORK 152,899 149,961 139,831 136,203 129,063

NORTH CAROLINA 34,388 33,877 29,204 28,967 27,713

NORTH DAKOTA 3,111 2,937 3,102 3,022 3,100

OHIO 103,910 99,265 93,500 90,538 87,081

OKLAHOMA 20,002 19,332 19,680 19,170 18,434

OREGON 38,773 45,590 46,420 27,382 20,825

PENNSYLVANIA 52,359 55,637 53,850 50,677 44,715

PUERTO RICO 29,469 26,363 25,918 27,034 25,139

RHODE ISLAND 7,131 6,820 6,066 5,392 4,469

SOUTH CAROLINA 27,278 25,979 23,492 22,689 21,848

SOUTH DAKOTA 7,258 7,176 6,922 7,062 8,023

TENNESSEE 77,943 72,147 64,955 55,322 50,663

TEXAS 62,083 56,577 49,527 46,624 43,440

UTAH 7,027 6,700 6,415 6,498 6,793

VERMONT 3,778 3,723 3,343 2,927 2,707

VIRGIN ISLANDS 882 973 983 886 810

VIRGINIA 43,964 42,686 37,886 36,300 34,208

WASHINGTON 45,238 44,872 36,742 33,369 31,520

WEST VIRGINIA 11,954 12,308 12,162 11,734 11,676

WISCONSIN 35,369 37,975 36,010 31,292 28,120

WYOMING 2,169 2,172 2,169 2,441 2,490

TOTALS 1,886,135 1,792,757 1,693,601 1,550,234 1,415,414

Source: Form OCSE-157, lines 1 and 3, column B.

61

Table P-56 Total Caseload by Former Assistance for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years

STATES 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016ALABAMA 108,507 107,468 107,464 104,032 102,367

ALASKA 23,150 23,238 23,270 22,899 23,035

ARIZONA 112,223 111,306 107,758 103,625 98,925

ARKANSAS 44,616 43,372 41,482 39,496 37,503

CALIFORNIA 658,081 652,414 623,998 634,257 647,448

COLORADO 74,138 72,430 71,808 69,719 67,478

CONNECTICUT 99,402 105,960 96,506 100,755 95,819

DELAWARE 30,586 31,668 19,613 20,086 21,652

DIST. OF COL. 21,892 23,005 22,774 23,655 23,162

FLORIDA 383,164 347,976 262,602 239,513 236,099

GEORGIA 177,328 174,606 172,912 172,099 172,866

GUAM 2,916 3,046 3,081 3,168 3,135

HAWAII 43,832 43,238 40,674 40,502 39,304

IDAHO 33,475 30,822 30,772 29,768 29,028

ILLINOIS 194,031 191,074 181,830 187,591 191,000

INDIANA 154,561 137,486 128,167 121,074 115,040

IOWA 97,418 97,263 96,973 95,061 91,165

KANSAS 68,336 68,291 71,172 69,218 70,328

KENTUCKY 135,549 135,180 132,268 126,723 122,941

LOUISIANA 127,937 127,798 123,464 115,745 109,573

MAINE 34,689 35,319 35,337 33,799 32,506

MARYLAND 92,703 92,745 91,330 87,718 86,869

MASSACHUSETTS 119,648 122,195 123,264 121,075 112,769

MICHIGAN 482,255 489,594 437,033 373,706 373,365

MINNESOTA 127,223 125,622 121,452 116,019 110,375

MISSISSIPPI 106,468 109,704 101,508 97,916 88,115

MISSOURI 199,059 202,622 204,999 201,517 201,897

MONTANA 22,725 21,437 20,525 19,058 18,266

NEBRASKA 56,203 55,307 55,274 55,265 54,586

NEVADA 36,858 36,609 36,749 37,296 37,387

NEW HAMPSHIRE 17,722 17,913 17,831 19,344 19,105

NEW JERSEY 165,230 165,015 159,709 155,302 151,448

NEW MEXICO 29,784 30,973 32,276 32,023 30,300

NEW YORK 388,631 377,945 369,988 366,941 347,230

NORTH CAROLINA 204,591 196,744 189,664 182,687 175,172

NORTH DAKOTA 20,065 19,442 18,784 18,521 18,104

OHIO 438,165 424,459 412,897 402,103 392,867

OKLAHOMA 67,917 66,240 63,735 61,826 56,225

OREGON 92,595 96,931 73,684 122,702 114,070

PENNSYLVANIA 158,253 149,936 145,568 142,635 136,739

PUERTO RICO 17,997 18,760 19,400 19,278 21,798

RHODE ISLAND 31,085 30,563 31,196 30,369 29,993

SOUTH CAROLINA 116,280 119,588 106,386 101,917 103,857

SOUTH DAKOTA 16,519 17,142 16,891 16,269 16,828

TENNESSEE 186,450 184,107 185,802 189,675 191,424

TEXAS 423,233 432,827 429,088 427,577 419,466

UTAH 38,065 37,338 36,715 35,803 34,683

VERMONT 10,496 9,747 9,356 8,899 8,119

VIRGIN ISLANDS 2,669 2,832 2,864 2,924 2,967

VIRGINIA 151,625 150,481 143,085 139,798 138,414

WASHINGTON 191,922 191,106 188,634 185,438 181,087

WEST VIRGINIA 56,033 56,335 56,897 53,798 51,351

WISCONSIN 116,975 115,533 118,235 118,981 117,412

WYOMING 9,743 8,815 8,296 7,673 7,305

TOTALS 6,821,018 6,739,567 6,423,040 6,304,838 6,179,967

Source: Form OCSE-157, lines 1 and 3, column C.

62

FY 2016 CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT PRELIMINARY REPORT

Table P-57 Total Caseload by Never Assistance for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years

STATES 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016ALABAMA 96,941 97,545 98,030 97,063 97,988

ALASKA 19,268 19,448 19,917 19,662 18,607

ARIZONA 60,910 61,798 63,121 63,549 65,037

ARKANSAS 63,349 63,969 62,212 60,950 60,135

CALIFORNIA 306,097 294,775 283,072 275,755 270,457

COLORADO 61,570 63,717 65,331 66,154 67,272

CONNECTICUT 84,543 81,228 81,081 65,061 56,800

DELAWARE 37,840 39,559 52,972 53,724 49,150

DIST. OF COL. 13,672 13,449 13,332 12,376 11,653

FLORIDA 481,603 433,470 378,835 364,091 376,987

GEORGIA 195,261 192,812 202,886 209,914 217,044

GUAM 2,959 3,117 3,185 3,246 3,181

HAWAII 27,466 27,420 25,976 25,766 25,083

IDAHO 82,304 83,969 88,383 87,987 88,120

ILLINOIS 223,067 226,318 222,438 224,566 228,317

INDIANA 168,076 150,516 148,658 148,624 148,692

IOWA 62,961 62,548 61,611 60,561 61,662

KANSAS 46,876 49,191 54,532 51,960 58,611

KENTUCKY 123,154 122,298 117,333 113,026 112,281

LOUISIANA 147,812 157,721 160,361 155,013 153,712

MAINE 21,228 20,924 18,584 15,493 12,927

MARYLAND 105,625 104,146 102,006 100,528 99,889

MASSACHUSETTS 81,851 82,310 82,688 82,189 81,084

MICHIGAN 454,151 454,232 455,122 417,813 433,518

MINNESOTA 92,290 94,975 91,864 88,864 88,437

MISSISSIPPI 202,646 213,979 191,834 191,091 193,079

MISSOURI 115,788 116,856 115,660 111,999 109,474

MONTANA 12,762 13,472 13,632 13,632 13,843

NEBRASKA 44,707 45,224 44,970 46,528 47,328

NEVADA 58,469 57,742 52,226 50,200 49,335

NEW HAMPSHIRE 12,827 13,149 13,695 15,086 15,932

NEW JERSEY 175,771 169,124 163,870 158,951 156,286

NEW MEXICO 26,972 27,506 28,990 28,610 25,208

NEW YORK 388,987 390,286 393,787 393,754 379,886

NORTH CAROLINA 192,597 195,441 196,414 199,561 204,766

NORTH DAKOTA 17,415 17,585 17,232 16,590 16,176

OHIO 383,665 375,426 367,120 363,495 360,741

OKLAHOMA 114,394 119,844 124,019 127,090 128,610

OREGON 98,081 98,634 112,058 54,282 53,537

PENNSYLVANIA 210,732 208,709 205,689 202,640 198,997

PUERTO RICO 185,163 182,751 181,764 179,835 172,512

RHODE ISLAND 19,818 20,526 20,054 16,641 15,940

SOUTH CAROLINA 75,750 79,377 70,566 65,532 68,746

SOUTH DAKOTA 22,958 23,522 23,764 23,891 22,096

TENNESSEE 156,802 145,427 129,891 124,644 124,628

TEXAS 859,805 932,006 983,902 1,042,473 1,085,668

UTAH 42,658 44,634 47,042 50,300 51,207

VERMONT 5,656 5,302 5,124 5,041 4,918

VIRGIN ISLANDS 5,365 5,427 5,365 5,276 5,175

VIRGINIA 137,339 136,736 131,310 130,678 130,791

WASHINGTON 128,975 129,631 118,341 117,905 117,271

WEST VIRGINIA 57,133 57,952 63,199 56,800 52,496

WISCONSIN 204,726 207,715 211,422 212,911 215,689

WYOMING 21,152 21,013 20,517 20,095 20,048

TOTALS 7,039,987 7,056,451 7,006,987 6,889,466 6,927,027

Source: Form OCSE-157, lines 1 and 3, column D.

63

Table P-58 Medicaid-Only Cases Open at the End of the Fiscal Year for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years

STATES 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016ALABAMA 31,453 29,916 39,702 40,450 40,358

ALASKA 320 309 495 354 33

ARIZONA 5,128 4,974 4,750 4,509 4,324

ARKANSAS 32,442 33,235 32,950 32,594 28,431

CALIFORNIA 29,460 0 28,205 22,685 15,904

COLORADO 4,602 4,532 288 391 386

CONNECTICUT 29,963 32,214 25,919 5,157 2,392

DELAWARE 18,419 19,016 16,936 25,186 15,922

DIST. OF COL. 790 863 795 660 578

FLORIDA 139,494 129,796 105,635 113,572 130,395

GEORGIA 81,236 77,925 83,095 83,623 86,017

GUAM 0 0 0 0 0

HAWAII 6,251 5,985 4,701 4,023 3,532

IDAHO 43,508 45,883 51,262 49,796 49,547

ILLINOIS 51,362 56,227 55,270 56,429 62,456

INDIANA 999 5,490 9,280 12,847 16,826

IOWA 20,393 20,069 18,135 19,460 23,069

KANSAS 21,990 24,067 28,269 23,449 25,122

KENTUCKY 53,166 52,387 42,858 35,639 37,051

LOUISIANA 116,688 124,368 129,042 128,431 118,599

MAINE 9,631 9,365 6,956 3,872 1,529

MARYLAND 11,905 12,072 12,300 12,145 11,633

MASSACHUSETTS 1,951 1,528 0 0 0

MICHIGAN 163,243 168,195 165,448 158,843 158,935

MINNESOTA 35,099 37,129 30,000 23,315 21,977

MISSISSIPPI 12,443 13,468 10,777 6,914 4,762

MISSOURI 25,344 24,846 15,789 2,293 931

MONTANA 1,200 1,757 1,742 1,449 1,582

NEBRASKA 15,022 15,058 15,923 17,122 17,780

NEVADA 7,209 7,747 2,257 705 645

NEW HAMPSHIRE 3,754 3,980 4,601 5,954 6,757

NEW JERSEY 5,537 5,721 2,576 2,045 1,889

NEW MEXICO 7,041 7,270 7,321 5,984 5,642

NEW YORK 48,904 50,630 45,783 39,395 29,264

NORTH CAROLINA 87,680 91,359 91,219 81,956 87,134

NORTH DAKOTA 5,476 5,250 1,719 540 537

OHIO 120,968 116,070 92,571 96,454 87,417

OKLAHOMA 42,904 57,655 64,511 64,738 67,368

OREGON 37,651 46,527 54,230 7,071 6,040

PENNSYLVANIA 900 1,272 1,391 1,407 1,399

PUERTO RICO 334 363 347 451 462

RHODE ISLAND 11,543 12,022 11,852 8,623 8,048

SOUTH CAROLINA 33,724 36,907 28,432 21,978 19,864

SOUTH DAKOTA 8,204 7,734 7,851 8,110 8,387

TENNESSEE 53,180 50,150 39,712 34,352 31,246

TEXAS 330,956 364,659 421,087 437,649 455,222

UTAH 13,556 14,483 15,940 18,388 18,426

VERMONT 292 93 0 0 0

VIRGIN ISLANDS 230 245 247 249 247

VIRGINIA 29,984 31,831 1,963 1,916 1,699

WASHINGTON 39,957 38,299 27,535 29,146 28,810

WEST VIRGINIA 18,025 17,876 23,902 19,901 16,367

WISCONSIN 71,026 70,985 69,916 72,766 72,298

WYOMING 5,959 5,530 4,854 4,719 4,551

TOTALS 1,948,496 1,995,332 1,958,339 1,849,705 1,839,790

Source: Form OCSE-157, line 1c.

64

FY 2016 CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT PRELIMINARY REPORT

Table P-59 State-Tribal Cases Initiated in This State Open at the End of the Fiscal Year for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years

STATES 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016ALABAMA 0 0 0 0 0

ALASKA 11 14 14 14 12

ARIZONA 0 1 2 1 3

ARKANSAS 1 2 1 1 1

CALIFORNIA 0 30 43 54 62

COLORADO 8 0 0 0 0

CONNECTICUT 0 0 1 7 8

DELAWARE 0 0 0 6 14

DIST. OF COL. 0 0 0 0 0

FLORIDA 0 2 2 3 5

GEORGIA 2 1 2 1 2

GUAM 0 0 0 0 0

HAWAII 2 1 1 1 1

IDAHO 262 290 302 306 314

ILLINOIS 1 2 0 0 0

INDIANA 0 0 0 0 0

IOWA 16 24 34 90 154

KANSAS 1 6 24 49 67

KENTUCKY 0 0 0 0 0

LOUISIANA 0 0 0 0 0

MAINE 0 12 12 12 13

MARYLAND 0 0 0 0 0

MASSACHUSETTS 0 0 0 0 0

MICHIGAN 45 66 64 55 52

MINNESOTA 279 220 227 207 226

MISSISSIPPI 0 0 0 0 0

MISSOURI 2 2 8 4 3

MONTANA 105 178 374 694 731

NEBRASKA 97 109 134 161 163

NEVADA 6 7 10 11 10

NEW HAMPSHIRE 0 0 0 0 0

NEW JERSEY 0 0 0 0 0

NEW MEXICO 0 0 0 0 0

NEW YORK 1,482 1,463 0 0 0

NORTH CAROLINA 0 0 0 23 29

NORTH DAKOTA 124 118 111 89 80

OHIO 15 12 13 33 40

OKLAHOMA 261 291 333 298 303

OREGON 253 264 301 308 312

PENNSYLVANIA 7 5 6 4 7

PUERTO RICO 0 0 0 0 0

RHODE ISLAND 0 0 0 0 0

SOUTH CAROLINA 0 0 0 0 0

SOUTH DAKOTA 1 9 8 204 391

TENNESSEE 0 0 0 0 1

TEXAS 1 3 1 1 1

UTAH 5 6 9 6 5

VERMONT 0 0 0 0 0

VIRGIN ISLANDS 1 0 0 1 1

VIRGINIA 0 0 0 0 0

WASHINGTON 1,934 1,934 2,177 2,143 1,944

WEST VIRGINIA 0 0 0 0 0

WISCONSIN 17 18 24 29 34

WYOMING 50 49 33 37 36

TOTALS 4,989 5,139 4,271 4,853 5,025

Source: Form OCSE-157, line 1d.

65

Table P-60 State-Tribal Cases Received From a Tribal IV-D Program Open at the End of the Fiscal Year for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years

STATES 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016ALABAMA 0 0 0 0 0

ALASKA 326 400 450 489 506

ARIZONA 0 1 1 2 2

ARKANSAS 2 3 3 1 3

CALIFORNIA 0 9 11 9 12

COLORADO 0 0 0 0 0

CONNECTICUT 0 0 0 1 2

DELAWARE 0 0 0 0 0

DIST. OF COL. 0 0 0 0 0

FLORIDA 1 1 3 2 4

GEORGIA 1 2 5 5 5

GUAM 1 0 0 0 0

HAWAII 1 0 1 3 4

IDAHO 7 7 4 7 5

ILLINOIS 2 3 5 5 3

INDIANA 0 0 0 0 0

IOWA 4 5 7 7 10

KANSAS 0 2 1 0 1

KENTUCKY 0 0 0 0 0

LOUISIANA 0 0 0 0 0

MAINE 0 10 10 9 9

MARYLAND 0 0 0 0 0

MASSACHUSETTS 0 0 0 0 0

MICHIGAN 12 15 17 7 7

MINNESOTA 5 10 11 11 11

MISSISSIPPI 0 0 0 0 0

MISSOURI 1 2 2 3 3

MONTANA 16 14 31 44 42

NEBRASKA 6 3 6 3 6

NEVADA 2 4 4 5 6

NEW HAMPSHIRE 0 0 0 0 0

NEW JERSEY 0 0 0 0 0

NEW MEXICO 79 81 81 367 0

NEW YORK 1 1 0 0 0

NORTH CAROLINA 0 0 0 3 3

NORTH DAKOTA 4 3 9 12 10

OHIO 16 10 10 13 14

OKLAHOMA 2 2 4 9 9

OREGON 45 55 68 7 15

PENNSYLVANIA 2 2 2 3 5

PUERTO RICO 0 0 0 0 0

RHODE ISLAND 0 0 1 1 1

SOUTH CAROLINA 0 0 0 0 0

SOUTH DAKOTA 13 22 32 5 9

TENNESSEE 0 0 0 0 2

TEXAS 2 2 2 2 1

UTAH 7 5 5 6 6

VERMONT 0 0 0 0 0

VIRGIN ISLANDS 0 0 0 0 0

VIRGINIA 0 0 0 0 0

WASHINGTON 2,790 2,687 2,849 3,093 3,406

WEST VIRGINIA 0 0 0 0 0

WISCONSIN 0 0 0 1 1

WYOMING 2 2 3 3 4

TOTALS 3,350 3,363 3,638 4,138 4,127

Source: Form OCSE-157, line 1e.

66

FY 2016 CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT PRELIMINARY REPORT

Table P-61 International Cases Initiated in This State Open at the End of the Fiscal Year for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years

STATES 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016ALABAMA 18 20 15 14 16

ALASKA 51 50 50 0 45

ARIZONA 27 24 29 26 27

ARKANSAS 17 9 9 9 6

CALIFORNIA 342 370 384 398 331

COLORADO 41 46 52 45 40

CONNECTICUT 50 48 45 44 53

DELAWARE 0 0 8 16 24

DIST. OF COL. 4 4 4 4 4

FLORIDA 409 316 223 231 264

GEORGIA 85 75 73 68 71

GUAM 0 0 0 0 0

HAWAII 25 19 19 19 16

IDAHO 51 48 49 46 40

ILLINOIS 5 12 19 95 95

INDIANA 0 0 0 0 0

IOWA 39 37 38 32 38

KANSAS 16 15 16 17 18

KENTUCKY 24 31 29 28 27

LOUISIANA 11 10 9 6 9

MAINE 182 155 149 150 149

MARYLAND 0 0 0 0 0

MASSACHUSETTS 66 69 61 64 65

MICHIGAN 59 61 248 221 222

MINNESOTA 181 175 178 178 173

MISSISSIPPI 0 0 0 0 0

MISSOURI 27 31 35 41 44

MONTANA 49 49 47 45 44

NEBRASKA 8 7 4 8 10

NEVADA 68 72 60 58 58

NEW HAMPSHIRE 19 24 18 13 16

NEW JERSEY 134 136 136 144 160

NEW MEXICO 7 6 5 5 6

NEW YORK 1,231 959 921 874 925

NORTH CAROLINA 66 63 64 68 58

NORTH DAKOTA 24 16 13 10 9

OHIO 186 169 162 154 134

OKLAHOMA 22 25 26 24 22

OREGON 14 18 61 63 55

PENNSYLVANIA 118 129 133 116 118

PUERTO RICO 57 54 51 48 45

RHODE ISLAND 11 12 13 10 10

SOUTH CAROLINA 1 1 3 3 3

SOUTH DAKOTA 20 19 15 17 19

TENNESSEE 22 18 17 19 22

TEXAS 83 94 104 110 109

UTAH 71 72 60 59 49

VERMONT 0 0 0 0 0

VIRGIN ISLANDS 7 3 0 0 1

VIRGINIA 137 144 127 129 121

WASHINGTON 404 383 357 352 340

WEST VIRGINIA 10 7 8 8 10

WISCONSIN 74 68 70 64 54

WYOMING 9 15 15 10 11

TOTALS 4,582 4,188 4,232 4,163 4,186

Source: Form OCSE-157, line 1f.

67

Table P-62 International Cases Received From Another Country Open at the End of the Fiscal Year for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years

STATES 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016ALABAMA 120 114 117 116 109

ALASKA 35 32 35 0 35

ARIZONA 237 215 220 201 208

ARKANSAS 49 44 45 44 45

CALIFORNIA 381 393 419 434 424

COLORADO 141 145 154 153 148

CONNECTICUT 133 133 129 120 115

DELAWARE 0 0 26 27 28

DIST. OF COL. 19 19 20 21 18

FLORIDA 859 969 928 843 816

GEORGIA 316 323 333 333 323

GUAM 1 1 1 0 0

HAWAII 84 92 94 96 95

IDAHO 40 37 36 41 39

ILLINOIS 95 296 587 591 597

INDIANA 0 0 0 0 0

IOWA 41 43 46 40 38

KANSAS 62 62 70 61 55

KENTUCKY 93 94 104 102 99

LOUISIANA 125 131 135 137 132

MAINE 63 55 53 57 61

MARYLAND 0 0 0 0 0

MASSACHUSETTS 137 156 151 140 126

MICHIGAN 162 155 410 367 371

MINNESOTA 98 103 101 102 102

MISSISSIPPI 0 0 0 0 0

MISSOURI 110 113 116 118 109

MONTANA 29 26 25 23 18

NEBRASKA 38 45 44 36 36

NEVADA 111 111 110 115 120

NEW HAMPSHIRE 4 5 7 6 12

NEW JERSEY 187 215 221 222 209

NEW MEXICO 42 44 46 48 45

NEW YORK 1,352 1,255 1,347 1,306 1,435

NORTH CAROLINA 230 241 241 239 233

NORTH DAKOTA 12 9 9 10 19

OHIO 212 198 195 188 187

OKLAHOMA 97 99 109 112 102

OREGON 42 44 92 95 100

PENNSYLVANIA 194 177 175 183 175

PUERTO RICO 4 4 4 4 4

RHODE ISLAND 18 19 19 19 21

SOUTH CAROLINA 125 117 127 143 147

SOUTH DAKOTA 14 17 14 15 14

TENNESSEE 137 115 107 108 36

TEXAS 1,216 1,292 1,254 1,241 1,241

UTAH 43 40 48 44 40

VERMONT 0 0 0 0 0

VIRGIN ISLANDS 1 0 0 0 0

VIRGINIA 241 236 245 247 249

WASHINGTON 319 328 325 328 302

WEST VIRGINIA 33 32 30 30 32

WISCONSIN 69 68 67 57 60

WYOMING 15 15 16 14 13

TOTALS 8,186 8,477 9,207 8,977 8,943

Source: Form OCSE-157, line 1g.

68

FY 2016 CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT PRELIMINARY REPORT

Table P-63 Cases With Medical Coverage Received from Any Source for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years

STATES 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016ALABAMA 223,232 216,891 238,574 238,676 235,841

ALASKA 22,659 24,277 25,723 25,810 24,957

ARIZONA 40,840 41,362 42,098 40,328 35,474

ARKANSAS 81,367 81,070 75,648 70,713 66,554

CALIFORNIA 907,520 864,054 791,605 710,431 624,904

COLORADO 97,558 97,480 78,324 79,983 83,105

CONNECTICUT 131,496 132,762 122,231 96,306 35,325

DELAWARE 45,499 46,412 49,174 52,627 47,524

DIST. OF COL. 31,087 32,429 32,615 32,842 31,430

FLORIDA 12,269 436,663 338,601 279,631 291,219

GEORGIA 277,068 271,303 283,485 285,868 291,259

GUAM 741 794 773 728 670

HAWAII 28,663 28,026 22,634 21,255 19,365

IDAHO 65,365 67,532 71,334 69,668 68,255

ILLINOIS 45,954 49,609 44,497 47,959 50,235

INDIANA 205,693 204,153 203,780 203,814 202,471

IOWA 114,797 114,651 112,096 109,910 109,722

KANSAS 90,819 89,949 92,222 83,727 68,410

KENTUCKY 73,066 71,894 75,461 73,671 36,364

LOUISIANA 246,436 252,050 250,810 237,794 227,456

MAINE 24,273 24,399 10,837 7,991 6,366

MARYLAND 0 0 0 0 0

MASSACHUSETTS 83,326 82,385 65,373 68,790 62,008

MICHIGAN 605,820 585,787 606,277 560,335 548,236

MINNESOTA 82,495 82,145 79,248 74,020 69,746

MISSISSIPPI 0 0 0 0 0

MISSOURI 77,000 78,330 78,074 78,321 88,840

MONTANA 19,847 20,597 19,202 17,218 16,674

NEBRASKA 37,347 36,096 34,470 35,395 35,167

NEVADA 36,436 37,416 30,173 29,548 30,377

NEW HAMPSHIRE 17,183 17,041 21,966 16,598 15,076

NEW JERSEY 119,389 113,643 108,321 92,559 91,767

NEW MEXICO 31,298 41,219 42,078 25,372 23,350

NEW YORK 509,256 206,719 356,162 343,661 321,266

NORTH CAROLINA 320,129 315,773 303,494 301,412 296,300

NORTH DAKOTA 24,183 24,379 21,811 20,497 19,962

OHIO 629,051 603,072 571,952 531,761 498,534

OKLAHOMA 35,770 39,609 42,302 44,013 44,833

OREGON 102,405 115,346 106,567 91,410 76,389

PENNSYLVANIA 351,183 345,147 338,885 333,862 323,337

PUERTO RICO 5 9 8 21 43

RHODE ISLAND 43,620 43,601 45,316 41,539 39,495

SOUTH CAROLINA 117,371 126,895 110,732 29,572 20,436

SOUTH DAKOTA 26,508 26,750 26,724 27,625 29,241

TENNESSEE 283,446 298,074 273,735 261,938 258,694

TEXAS 922,755 976,389 994,148 1,004,557 1,009,835

UTAH 38,107 38,624 39,832 42,004 42,797

VERMONT 1,884 1,904 1,883 1,870 1,859

VIRGIN ISLANDS 154 141 167 128 134

VIRGINIA 31,748 30,298 24,498 2 24,144

WASHINGTON 18,183 17,995 13,313 14,418 13,913

WEST VIRGINIA 66,184 65,196 71,237 65,374 57,345

WISCONSIN 216,048 215,454 212,182 212,591 210,994

WYOMING 2,154 2,047 1,793 1,725 1,475

TOTALS 7,616,687 7,735,841 7,604,445 7,137,868 6,829,173

Source: Form OCSE-157, line 35.

69

FY 2016 CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT PRELIMINARY REPORT

Orders Established

Table P-64 Total Cases with Support Orders Established for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years

STATES 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016ALABAMA 192,898 192,902 193,020 189,533 189,238

ALASKA 43,190 44,409 44,716 44,834 43,312

ARIZONA 160,645 158,768 157,085 153,407 149,709

ARKANSAS 103,084 102,354 100,883 98,048 95,678

CALIFORNIA 1,171,159 1,148,813 1,121,654 1,106,842 1,097,510

COLORADO 132,129 133,116 134,613 134,484 133,305

CONNECTICUT 151,785 157,850 158,503 157,101 151,734

DELAWARE 51,633 53,485 56,372 58,210 58,544

DIST. OF COL. 34,620 34,594 34,973 35,197 34,649

FLORIDA 694,485 686,065 564,925 538,755 544,505

GEORGIA 341,850 338,255 354,427 361,555 367,392

GUAM 5,033 5,181 5,159 5,160 5,000

HAWAII 58,436 59,629 59,112 59,298 58,018

IDAHO 103,340 100,948 102,272 103,623 104,461

ILLINOIS 401,835 406,771 392,400 392,348 393,055

INDIANA 272,720 268,679 265,350 260,369 255,349

IOWA 157,528 157,256 156,872 154,602 153,986

KANSAS 109,829 111,040 115,448 117,647 121,337

KENTUCKY 266,027 265,494 259,797 249,517 244,631

LOUISIANA 234,386 240,214 245,192 247,488 246,383

MAINE 57,569 57,347 56,290 51,645 47,017

MARYLAND 183,977 184,811 182,702 175,516 172,625

MASSACHUSETTS 202,358 204,432 203,268 197,332 189,347

MICHIGAN 774,463 770,849 760,284 683,193 689,925

MINNESOTA 211,170 211,321 207,737 202,050 197,799

MISSISSIPPI 201,742 209,149 221,754 223,313 224,009

MISSOURI 310,765 312,204 313,087 310,499 303,143

MONTANA 33,645 33,459 33,053 31,933 31,466

NEBRASKA 92,675 92,960 93,080 93,605 93,839

NEVADA 84,157 84,688 83,255 81,898 81,682

NEW HAMPSHIRE 29,877 29,965 30,015 30,756 31,315

NEW JERSEY 299,238 296,607 294,156 289,594 284,895

NEW MEXICO 48,190 50,092 51,236 51,734 52,289

NEW YORK 746,297 741,412 741,996 740,120 732,610

NORTH CAROLINA 357,591 358,405 356,544 352,497 349,511

NORTH DAKOTA 34,460 34,753 34,883 34,020 33,359

OHIO 788,208 782,092 771,610 765,790 757,204

OKLAHOMA 158,615 164,931 169,167 171,780 166,459

OREGON 174,713 176,786 176,970 170,282 162,437

PENNSYLVANIA 378,749 371,933 363,730 356,096 345,295

PUERTO RICO 1 185,329 185,200 187,365 188,643 188,746

RHODE ISLAND 38,816 39,582 40,797 39,991 39,713

SOUTH CAROLINA 157,062 158,591 159,138 155,793 157,783

SOUTH DAKOTA 34,630 35,469 35,177 35,481 37,146

TENNESSEE 315,432 308,849 309,978 308,419 307,937

TEXAS 1,110,564 1,172,083 1,217,245 1,257,571 1,287,064

UTAH 78,498 80,348 80,558 81,225 80,371

VERMONT 17,666 16,658 15,949 15,196 14,176

VIRGIN ISLANDS 1, 2 5,950 6,169 6,293 6,301 6,233

VIRGINIA 293,238 294,162 280,273 275,856 269,547

WASHINGTON 331,263 333,262 318,442 313,675 307,951

WEST VIRGINIA 110,456 112,869 115,298 111,189 105,874

WISCONSIN 309,784 315,478 318,011 316,467 314,870

WYOMING 28,552 27,605 27,159 26,344 25,801

TOTALS 12,872,311 12,920,344 12,779,273 12,613,822 12,537,234

Source: Form OCSE-157, line 2.

1 Puerto Rico and Virgin Islands data were unreliable for line 2 in FY 2012.

2 Virgin Islands data were unreliable for line 2 for FY 2014.

FY 2016 data reliability information not available at the time of publication.

70

FY 2016 CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT PRELIMINARY REPORT

Table P-65 Cases with Orders Established by Current, Former, and Never Assistance, FY 2016

STATES Total Current Assistance Former Assistance Never AssistanceALABAMA 189,238 7,176 94,462 87,600

ALASKA 43,312 3,413 22,093 17,806

ARIZONA 149,709 5,215 88,549 55,945

ARKANSAS 95,678 3,957 35,626 56,095

CALIFORNIA 1,097,510 226,685 619,397 251,428

COLORADO 133,305 9,007 62,781 61,517

CONNECTICUT 151,734 9,454 89,987 52,293

DELAWARE 58,544 4,130 19,117 35,297

DIST. OF COL. 34,649 6,353 18,236 10,060

FLORIDA 544,505 22,453 215,059 306,993

GEORGIA 367,392 13,988 161,354 192,050

GUAM 5,000 177 2,110 2,713

HAWAII 58,018 6,153 31,203 20,662

IDAHO 104,461 2,885 26,030 75,546

ILLINOIS 393,055 22,645 166,574 203,836

INDIANA 255,349 5,200 110,689 139,460

IOWA 153,986 10,104 86,798 57,084

KANSAS 121,337 8,971 64,391 47,975

KENTUCKY 244,631 25,170 117,464 101,997

LOUISIANA 246,383 13,300 99,762 133,321

MAINE 47,017 3,060 31,564 12,393

MARYLAND 172,625 10,018 74,333 88,274

MASSACHUSETTS 189,347 13,356 100,786 75,205

MICHIGAN 689,925 31,222 331,174 327,529

MINNESOTA 197,799 16,229 102,290 79,280

MISSISSIPPI 224,009 5,772 75,792 142,445

MISSOURI 303,143 15,575 185,164 102,404

MONTANA 31,466 2,513 16,264 12,689

NEBRASKA 93,839 4,248 50,053 39,538

NEVADA 81,682 3,328 32,343 46,011

NEW HAMPSHIRE 31,315 2,048 16,939 12,328

NEW JERSEY 284,895 14,065 130,602 140,228

NEW MEXICO 52,289 3,464 26,952 21,873

NEW YORK 732,610 93,719 310,588 328,303

NORTH CAROLINA 349,511 17,075 160,487 171,949

NORTH DAKOTA 33,359 2,084 16,191 15,084

OHIO 757,204 54,219 366,132 336,853

OKLAHOMA 166,459 12,677 50,777 103,005

OREGON 162,437 10,939 101,239 50,259

PENNSYLVANIA 345,295 30,232 127,983 187,080

PUERTO RICO 188,746 16,838 21,537 150,371

RHODE ISLAND 39,713 2,307 24,279 13,127

SOUTH CAROLINA 157,783 10,596 90,744 56,443

SOUTH DAKOTA 37,146 4,330 12,994 19,822

TENNESSEE 307,937 31,942 166,978 109,017

TEXAS 1,287,064 22,984 364,234 899,846

UTAH 80,371 4,822 31,303 44,246

VERMONT 14,176 1,913 7,504 4,759

VIRGIN ISLANDS 6,233 321 1,453 4,459

VIRGINIA 269,547 23,318 126,797 119,432

WASHINGTON 307,951 23,485 173,159 111,307

WEST VIRGINIA 105,874 7,994 49,026 48,854

WISCONSIN 314,870 21,372 109,363 184,135

WYOMING 25,801 1,967 5,574 18,260

TOTALS 12,537,234 926,468 5,624,280 5,986,486

Source: Form OCSE-157, line 2, columns a, b, c, and d.

71

FY 2016 CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT PRELIMINARY REPORT

Table P-66 Medicaid-Only Cases With Orders Established Open at the End of the Fiscal Year for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years

STATES 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016ALABAMA 26,861 25,928 33,508 34,559 34,334

ALASKA 92 92 113 154 11

ARIZONA 4,564 4,509 4,360 4,121 3,960

ARKANSAS 27,164 28,218 29,336 29,563 25,826

CALIFORNIA 27,605 25,773 26,555 21,353 15,183

COLORADO 3,827 3,855 260 306 303

CONNECTICUT 16,952 19,486 18,127 4,650 2,293

DELAWARE 8,267 8,638 9,422 13,770 10,321

DIST. OF COL. 427 423 417 417 391

FLORIDA 83,846 82,425 72,594 79,617 92,783

GEORGIA 62,626 64,841 68,214 70,223 70,631

GUAM 0 0 0 0 0

HAWAII 10,214 10,333 7,829 7,071 6,204

IDAHO 34,279 35,536 39,104 39,627 40,245

ILLINOIS 41,594 44,273 43,230 42,990 46,997

INDIANA 249 3,599 7,113 10,393 14,192

IOWA 15,579 15,795 14,985 16,675 19,061

KANSAS 15,588 17,507 19,783 19,576 21,757

KENTUCKY 45,428 45,133 39,738 34,041 34,060

LOUISIANA 76,317 81,917 88,882 94,280 93,663

MAINE 6,756 6,852 6,331 3,708 1,433

MARYLAND 5,550 5,791 6,139 6,218 6,114

MASSACHUSETTS 1,507 1,281 0 0 0

MICHIGAN 92,885 97,519 99,529 100,046 101,492

MINNESOTA 26,163 28,080 23,987 19,440 18,157

MISSISSIPPI 4,825 5,098 5,747 4,697 3,603

MISSOURI 20,619 19,819 13,680 2,104 880

MONTANA 950 1,321 1,474 1,286 1,366

NEBRASKA 11,226 11,319 11,998 12,497 12,947

NEVADA 4,192 4,611 1,860 627 623

NEW HAMPSHIRE 3,038 3,166 3,415 3,614 4,273

NEW JERSEY 2,381 2,555 1,278 1,137 1,117

NEW MEXICO 5,731 5,986 5,972 5,557 5,349

NEW YORK 34,506 36,964 35,448 31,300 23,660

NORTH CAROLINA 64,193 69,766 73,549 66,882 69,807

NORTH DAKOTA 4,260 4,230 1,507 458 453

OHIO 110,902 110,574 89,592 94,762 86,451

OKLAHOMA 28,490 40,689 46,767 48,367 49,712

OREGON 23,381 27,204 36,404 6,274 5,595

PENNSYLVANIA 565 914 1,068 1,102 1,174

PUERTO RICO 218 273 271 379 400

RHODE ISLAND 5,933 6,456 7,343 6,549 6,351

SOUTH CAROLINA 16,785 17,337 17,808 16,947 15,736

SOUTH DAKOTA 7,100 6,843 6,910 7,120 7,456

TENNESSEE 33,034 32,020 32,649 30,577 28,585

TEXAS 247,852 274,681 322,608 331,903 348,791

UTAH 10,574 11,691 12,605 13,760 14,032

VERMONT 278 85 0 0 0

VIRGIN ISLANDS 209 213 215 213 211

VIRGINIA 26,367 28,468 1,843 1,715 1,581

WASHINGTON 32,979 32,973 25,760 27,532 27,292

WEST VIRGINIA 15,466 15,816 18,783 18,621 16,244

WISCONSIN 55,201 56,088 54,704 56,553 55,357

WYOMING 5,515 5,139 4,675 4,523 4,350

TOTALS 1,411,110 1,490,103 1,495,489 1,449,854 1,452,807

Source: Form OCSE-157, line 2d.

72

FY 2016 CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT PRELIMINARY REPORT

Table P-67 State-Tribal IV-D Cases With Support Orders Established Initiated in This State for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years

STATES 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016ALABAMA NA 0 0 0 0

ALASKA 11 14 14 14 12

ARIZONA 0 1 2 1 3

ARKANSAS 1 2 1 1 1

CALIFORNIA 0 30 42 52 62

COLORADO 7 0 0 0 0

CONNECTICUT 0 0 1 7 8

DELAWARE 0 0 0 1 1

DIST. OF COL. 0 0 0 0 0

FLORIDA 0 2 1 2 4

GEORGIA 2 1 2 1 2

GUAM 0 0 0 0 0

HAWAII 2 1 1 1 1

IDAHO 252 260 273 265 270

ILLINOIS 1 2 0 0 0

INDIANA 0 0 0 0 0

IOWA 9 10 16 51 97

KANSAS 1 6 23 47 64

KENTUCKY 0 0 0 0 0

LOUISIANA 0 0 0 0 0

MAINE 0 11 11 10 11

MARYLAND 0 0 0 0 0

MASSACHUSETTS 0 0 0 0 0

MICHIGAN 43 64 63 55 51

MINNESOTA 254 191 193 168 199

MISSISSIPPI 0 0 0 0 0

MISSOURI 2 2 8 4 3

MONTANA 88 133 234 419 434

NEBRASKA 61 68 93 109 119

NEVADA 5 7 10 11 10

NEW HAMPSHIRE 0 0 0 0 0

NEW JERSEY 0 0 0 0 0

NEW MEXICO 0 0 0 0 5,664

NEW YORK 1,339 1,197 0 0 0

NORTH CAROLINA 0 0 0 17 22

NORTH DAKOTA 120 118 104 84 75

OHIO 14 12 12 32 39

OKLAHOMA 220 241 291 260 273

OREGON 223 250 291 302 307

PENNSYLVANIA 5 5 6 3 6

PUERTO RICO 0 0 0 0 0

RHODE ISLAND 0 0 0 0 0

SOUTH CAROLINA 0 0 0 0 0

SOUTH DAKOTA 11 18 27 183 300

TENNESSEE 0 0 0 0 1

TEXAS 0 1 0 0 0

UTAH 2 4 6 3 4

VERMONT 0 0 0 0 0

VIRGIN ISLANDS 0 0 0 1 1

VIRGINIA 0 0 0 0 0

WASHINGTON 1,549 1,588 1,762 1,772 1,689

WEST VIRGINIA 0 0 0 0 0

WISCONSIN 16 17 24 29 34

WYOMING 48 46 32 35 35

TOTALS 4,286 4,302 3,543 3,940 9,802

Source: Form OCSE-157, line 2f.

NA - Not Available.

73

Table P-68 State-Tribal IV-D Cases With Support Orders Established Received From a Tribe for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years

STATES 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016ALABAMA 0 0 0 0 0

ALASKA 294 375 437 470 497

ARIZONA 0 0 0 0 1

ARKANSAS 1 3 3 1 3

CALIFORNIA 0 8 11 9 10

COLORADO 0 0 0 0 0

CONNECTICUT 0 0 0 1 2

DELAWARE 0 0 0 0 0

DIST. OF COL. 0 0 0 0 0

FLORIDA 0 1 2 2 4

GEORGIA 1 1 4 4 4

GUAM 0 0 0 0 0

HAWAII 0 0 1 3 3

IDAHO 7 7 4 7 5

ILLINOIS 1 1 4 4 3

INDIANA 0 0 0 0 0

IOWA 3 4 5 6 9

KANSAS 0 2 1 0 1

KENTUCKY 0 0 0 0 0

LOUISIANA 0 0 0 0 0

MAINE 0 10 10 9 9

MARYLAND 0 0 0 0 0

MASSACHUSETTS 0 0 0 0 0

MICHIGAN 12 14 16 7 7

MINNESOTA 5 7 10 10 11

MISSISSIPPI 0 0 0 0 0

MISSOURI 1 2 2 3 3

MONTANA 15 14 28 42 38

NEBRASKA 5 3 6 3 5

NEVADA 2 4 4 5 6

NEW HAMPSHIRE 0 0 0 0 0

NEW JERSEY 0 0 0 0 0

NEW MEXICO 58 59 45 253 0

NEW YORK 1 1 0 0 0

NORTH CAROLINA 0 0 0 3 3

NORTH DAKOTA 4 3 6 10 9

OHIO 15 10 10 13 13

OKLAHOMA 2 2 4 8 9

OREGON 44 54 64 6 12

PENNSYLVANIA 2 2 2 3 5

PUERTO RICO 0 0 0 0 0

RHODE ISLAND 0 0 1 1 1

SOUTH CAROLINA 0 0 0 0 0

SOUTH DAKOTA 13 28 36 4 8

TENNESSEE 0 0 0 0 2

TEXAS 2 1 1 2 1

UTAH 6 5 5 6 6

VERMONT 0 0 0 0 0

VIRGIN ISLANDS 0 0 0 0 0

VIRGINIA 0 0 0 0 0

WASHINGTON 2,453 2,526 2,684 2,904 3,176

WEST VIRGINIA 0 0 0 0 0

WISCONSIN 0 0 0 1 1

WYOMING 2 2 2 3 3

TOTALS 2,949 3,149 3,408 3,803 3,870

Source: Form OCSE-157, line 2g.

74

FY 2016 CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT PRELIMINARY REPORT

Table P-69 International Cases With Support Orders Established Initiated in This State for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years

STATES 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016ALABAMA 9 11 10 12 11

ALASKA 45 46 46 43 45

ARIZONA 23 20 25 21 23

ARKANSAS 13 7 6 7 5

CALIFORNIA 304 331 341 352 289

COLORADO 34 37 44 38 35

CONNECTICUT 42 40 41 43 49

DELAWARE 0 0 5 8 10

DIST. OF COL. 3 3 3 3 3

FLORIDA 264 239 163 170 198

GEORGIA 53 46 51 50 54

GUAM 0 0 0 0 0

HAWAII 20 16 16 16 15

IDAHO 46 45 44 45 38

ILLINOIS 5 7 16 70 67

INDIANA 0 0 0 0 0

IOWA 25 21 25 21 27

KANSAS 15 14 15 16 17

KENTUCKY 20 25 27 25 25

LOUISIANA 8 8 7 5 7

MAINE 176 147 143 143 140

MARYLAND 0 0 0 0 0

MASSACHUSETTS 44 49 47 50 54

MICHIGAN 34 35 198 177 174

MINNESOTA 141 137 139 141 140

MISSISSIPPI 0 0 0 0 0

MISSOURI 26 30 33 39 43

MONTANA 40 43 44 42 41

NEBRASKA 6 6 4 6 8

NEVADA 50 49 41 43 44

NEW HAMPSHIRE 13 19 14 12 14

NEW JERSEY 97 99 107 106 118

NEW MEXICO 6 6 5 5 0

NEW YORK 692 503 529 513 607

NORTH CAROLINA 48 51 50 52 48

NORTH DAKOTA 24 16 13 10 9

OHIO 173 156 150 144 131

OKLAHOMA 17 18 17 17 20

OREGON 12 15 55 57 51

PENNSYLVANIA 88 98 106 92 97

PUERTO RICO 27 28 28 29 29

RHODE ISLAND 5 4 5 6 6

SOUTH CAROLINA 1 0 3 3 3

SOUTH DAKOTA 18 16 14 16 19

TENNESSEE 15 14 14 16 20

TEXAS 69 77 82 80 92

UTAH 43 44 44 43 37

VERMONT 0 0 0 0 0

VIRGIN ISLANDS 3 0 0 0 0

VIRGINIA 103 116 106 99 94

WASHINGTON 342 321 306 312 307

WEST VIRGINIA 9 6 8 8 9

WISCONSIN 58 60 58 54 45

WYOMING 6 11 13 8 6

TOTALS 3,315 3,090 3,261 3,268 3,324

Source: Form OCSE-157, line 2h.

75

Table P-70 International Cases With Support Orders Established Received From Another Country for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years

STATES 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016ALABAMA 107 101 106 107 103

ALASKA 35 31 35 36 33

ARIZONA 194 183 188 174 171

ARKANSAS 43 42 41 43 42

CALIFORNIA 315 339 351 388 385

COLORADO 130 131 141 147 135

CONNECTICUT 117 115 119 111 106

DELAWARE 0 0 25 25 26

DIST. OF COL. 14 14 16 14 15

FLORIDA 765 848 821 752 734

GEORGIA 284 290 306 316 300

GUAM 1 1 1 0 0

HAWAII 44 45 49 52 53

IDAHO 38 36 34 37 37

ILLINOIS 79 255 496 517 525

INDIANA 0 0 0 0 0

IOWA 19 21 22 18 22

KANSAS 58 55 58 56 51

KENTUCKY 89 90 97 96 97

LOUISIANA 105 106 120 116 115

MAINE 57 49 47 54 54

MARYLAND 0 0 0 0 0

MASSACHUSETTS 108 133 132 124 117

MICHIGAN 139 135 355 310 304

MINNESOTA 86 86 85 88 87

MISSISSIPPI 0 0 0 0 0

MISSOURI 102 108 111 112 102

MONTANA 27 25 24 23 18

NEBRASKA 32 35 33 30 31

NEVADA 106 109 105 111 116

NEW HAMPSHIRE 4 5 7 5 4

NEW JERSEY 152 181 190 202 191

NEW MEXICO 34 36 34 37 0

NEW YORK 1,187 1,087 1,149 1,110 1,227

NORTH CAROLINA 172 190 192 176 183

NORTH DAKOTA 12 9 9 10 18

OHIO 193 180 176 166 159

OKLAHOMA 85 91 98 102 93

OREGON 40 40 90 93 96

PENNSYLVANIA 171 164 155 156 156

PUERTO RICO 4 4 4 4 4

RHODE ISLAND 13 14 15 17 18

SOUTH CAROLINA 84 89 94 99 105

SOUTH DAKOTA 12 14 13 14 13

TENNESSEE 105 98 92 92 31

TEXAS 847 911 925 901 930

UTAH 39 36 40 37 35

VERMONT 0 0 0 0 0

VIRGIN ISLANDS 1 0 0 0 0

VIRGINIA 224 218 235 226 230

WASHINGTON 306 311 314 319 292

WEST VIRGINIA 33 32 29 30 31

WISCONSIN 56 58 56 51 51

WYOMING 14 14 14 14 11

TOTALS 6,882 7,165 7,849 7,718 7,657

Source: Form OCSE-157, line 2i.

76

FY 2016 CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT PRELIMINARY REPORT

Paternities

Table P-71 Total Number of Paternities Established or Acknowledged for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years

STATES 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016ALABAMA 6,379 6,544 6,114 5,854 5,918

ALASKA 3,988 3,897 3,890 3,775 3,755

ARIZONA 54,955 49,607 61,421 46,617 47,656

ARKANSAS 13,924 13,078 12,503 12,595 11,896

CALIFORNIA 204,788 197,092 191,033 191,101 186,631

COLORADO 13,120 13,031 12,815 13,194 13,260

CONNECTICUT 24,596 23,657 22,017 20,453 18,467

DELAWARE 6,981 7,673 2,443 2,289 1,854

DIST. OF COL. 7,757 7,934 7,477 7,657 6,971

FLORIDA 93,457 93,425 94,457 92,229 96,019

GEORGIA 45,660 44,267 44,536 42,384 44,991

GUAM 924 839 840 790 778

HAWAII 10,796 10,307 10,126 9,434 9,235

IDAHO 9,976 9,898 10,114 8,976 9,024

ILLINOIS 60,704 61,760 59,810 58,335 56,279

INDIANA 8,766 7,781 6,317 5,164 5,272

IOWA 10,955 11,772 12,756 12,418 12,533

KANSAS 23,856 22,168 20,188 20,855 22,474

KENTUCKY 9,700 9,396 8,428 7,686 8,351

LOUISIANA 5,777 5,531 5,182 4,701 4,202

MAINE 5,390 6,218 4,928 4,806 4,230

MARYLAND 29,273 7,498 6,646 6,169 5,251

MASSACHUSETTS 21,619 20,903 20,876 19,786 19,301

MICHIGAN 49,171 51,137 52,308 54,685 48,866

MINNESOTA 32,949 32,739 26,192 24,000 23,611

MISSISSIPPI 37,852 26,412 22,377 21,432 15,854

MISSOURI 35,372 33,465 32,257 32,053 29,315

MONTANA 4,595 4,454 4,350 4,115 4,249

NEBRASKA 9,216 9,263 9,315 9,787 9,616

NEVADA 2,791 2,740 1,970 1,946 1,739

NEW HAMPSHIRE 1,126 1,106 905 982 954

NEW JERSEY 36,878 36,751 36,913 36,618 35,764

NEW MEXICO 4,891 4,173 4,522 3,781 3,690

NEW YORK 129,505 127,676 110,786 99,346 114,911

NORTH CAROLINA 77,437 59,312 56,629 57,027 64,502

NORTH DAKOTA 5,576 6,033 6,377 5,803 5,810

OHIO 57,046 56,161 55,863 53,170 53,955

OKLAHOMA 19,985 19,779 19,692 19,405 19,663

OREGON 15,965 16,297 16,823 15,473 15,200

PENNSYLVANIA 68,524 64,186 63,680 64,175 62,135

PUERTO RICO 167 23,820 22,878 21,854 19,824

RHODE ISLAND 2,790 2,334 1,772 1,410 1,134

SOUTH CAROLINA 26,751 24,716 24,787 22,981 21,539

SOUTH DAKOTA 4,156 4,036 4,050 4,027 3,938

TENNESSEE 71,145 65,103 56,264 51,812 50,394

TEXAS 169,480 172,861 173,973 172,260 168,419

UTAH 9,811 10,140 9,337 9,996 9,991

VERMONT 1,164 1,080 936 789 726

VIRGIN ISLANDS 313 276 158 77 68

VIRGINIA 37,030 31,633 30,924 30,531 30,145

WASHINGTON 35,280 35,156 33,726 30,634 32,732

WEST VIRGINIA 9,720 9,700 9,485 9,483 8,287

WISCONSIN 25,967 25,609 25,109 25,252 24,893

WYOMING 2,293 2,240 2,362 2,305 2,471

TOTALS 1,658,287 1,594,664 1,541,637 1,484,477 1,478,743

Source: Form OCSE-157, lines 10 and 16, column A.

77

FY 2016 CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT PRELIMINARY REPORT

Table P-72 Paternity Establishment for Two Consecutive Fiscal Years

STATES IV-D PEP Children

in IV-D Cases Open

as of the End of the Preceding Fiscal Year Who Were Born Out-

of-Wedlock In 2015

IV-D PEP Children

in IV-D Cases Open

as of the End of the Preceding Fiscal Year Who Were Born Out-

of-Wedlock In 2016

IV-D PEP Children in IV-D

Cases Open During or at

the End of the Fiscal Year

with Paternity Established or

Acknowledged In 2015

IV-D PEP Children in IV-D Cases

Open During or at the End of the Fiscal

Year with Paternity

Established or Acknowledged

In 2016

Statewide PEP

Children in the State

Born Out-of-Wedlock During the Preceding Fiscal Year

In 2015

Statewide PEP

Children in the State

Born Out-of-Wedlock During the Preceding Fiscal Year

In 2016

Statewide PEP Children in the State

with Paternity Established or

Acknowledged During the

Fiscal Year In 2015

Statewide PEP Children in the State

with Paternity Established or

Acknowledged During the

Fiscal Year In 2016

ALABAMA 135,923 131,641 129,380 127,296 24,715 25,230 0 0

ALASKA 22,906 22,716 21,451 20,960 4,016 3,963 4,270 4,169

ARIZONA 124,756 118,250 174,139 171,537 38,770 38,350 0 0

ARKANSAS 83,276 79,884 82,942 80,595 16,297 16,821 0 0

CALIFORNIA 953,820 935,236 972,791 951,437 195,076 189,265 191,101 186,631

COLORADO 92,346 91,086 85,659 85,803 13,652 13,865 14,593 14,555

CONNECTICUT 135,515 126,315 127,981 121,773 13,633 13,670 13,935 13,128

DELAWARE 68,421 70,576 56,767 56,078 0 0 0 0

DIST. OF COL. 42,061 40,574 28,942 28,265 6,219 6,247 5,598 5,623

FLORIDA 476,224 457,278 400,453 415,092 103,404 105,457 94,151 96,303

GEORGIA 377,502 383,142 389,304 397,415 60,040 59,715 54,159 56,086

GUAM 7,692 7,870 7,093 7,144 2,121 2,030 0 0

HAWAII 51,927 50,546 47,952 47,121 7,069 6,792 6,683 6,534

IDAHO 82,710 81,922 80,650 80,869 6,188 6,224 4,178 4,347

ILLINOIS 384,566 381,710 310,097 308,733 61,964 62,679 56,070 52,136

INDIANA 205,275 199,766 214,334 210,526 0 0 0 0

IOWA 109,357 106,934 106,537 106,367 13,992 14,059 13,715 13,680

KANSAS 100,845 96,842 98,351 102,536 14,268 14,530 13,322 13,481

KENTUCKY 190,554 181,211 179,983 175,640 22,524 22,071 0 0

LOUISIANA 254,223 237,280 232,129 223,358 32,647 33,145 0 0

MAINE 48,718 45,357 50,111 47,138 4,770 4,994 0 0

MARYLAND 166,087 164,248 164,265 161,648 27,783 28,217 25,272 25,384

MASSACHUSETTS 159,661 155,555 151,758 146,599 22,936 22,573 20,984 20,472

MICHIGAN 502,434 494,881 453,547 461,796 48,138 47,766 47,401 46,582

MINNESOTA 180,564 173,986 178,755 175,334 22,564 22,203 0 0

MISSISSIPPI 298,172 282,085 279,787 272,327 0 0 0 0

MISSOURI 294,544 289,759 282,411 277,868 30,902 30,772 28,774 27,759

MONTANA 25,511 24,871 26,753 26,441 4,381 4,368 3,456 3,527

NEBRASKA 77,113 78,454 77,030 77,325 8,754 8,968 8,696 8,587

NEVADA 67,637 64,948 80,258 82,122 15,682 16,161 0 0

NEW HAMPSHIRE 25,879 27,360 27,933 29,239 4,270 4,317 4,177 4,123

NEW JERSEY 200,193 186,888 190,730 179,689 35,422 34,922 35,612 34,891

NEW MEXICO 65,788 65,192 64,584 63,540 0 0 0 0

NEW YORK 598,071 589,583 516,057 496,339 93,510 92,754 87,369 85,385

NORTH CAROLINA 303,932 300,849 301,443 300,565 49,772 49,672 0 0

NORTH DAKOTA 29,155 28,350 30,420 30,085 4,116 4,064 0 0

OHIO 584,979 571,237 568,787 556,847 60,350 60,365 54,764 56,416

OKLAHOMA 154,976 155,292 133,214 131,437 17,734 17,540 19,256 19,708

OREGON 0 0 54,793 51,855 16,430 16,343 16,207 16,127

PENNSYLVANIA 295,077 294,685 316,569 314,470 58,350 58,191 58,127 55,659

PUERTO RICO 51,299 50,655 50,525 48,102 24,147 22,513 21,759 19,702

RHODE ISLAND 49,076 44,617 45,316 41,607 0 0 0 0

SOUTH CAROLINA 208,584 198,239 194,547 191,727 25,941 26,218 23,796 21,044

SOUTH DAKOTA 26,732 27,950 29,666 30,907 4,641 4,614 0 0

TENNESSEE 299,730 287,571 290,412 279,510 36,500 37,591 35,199 34,602

TEXAS 1,128,209 1,173,608 957,716 995,318 173,808 171,462 164,550 160,959

UTAH 58,128 59,291 62,075 64,721 9,708 9,786 10,298 9,939

VERMONT 13,039 12,431 13,820 13,544 591 512 0 0

VIRGIN ISLANDS 3,482 3,192 2,302 2,151 1,006 921 720 621

VIRGINIA 202,928 199,716 199,007 195,068 33,613 35,399 36,968 34,157

WASHINGTON 206,516 200,617 203,777 198,932 28,296 28,292 0 0

WEST VIRGINIA 76,235 69,789 76,894 70,179 9,295 9,017 8,696 7,759

WISCONSIN 270,133 274,934 283,344 288,237 0 0 0 0

WYOMING 15,907 15,734 19,326 19,211 2,324 2,390 2,367 2,532

TOTALS 10,588,388 10,412,703 10,124,867 10,040,423 1,512,329 1,507,018 1,186,223 1,162,608

Source: Form OCSE-157, line 5a line 6 line 8a line 9

78

FY 2016 CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT PRELIMINARY REPORT

Services Provided

Table P-73 TANF Cases Closed Where a Child Support Payment Was Received for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years

STATES 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016ALABAMA 1,692 1,695 1,474 1,286 1,048

ALASKA 1,407 1,440 1,417 1,151 1,046

ARIZONA 1,658 1,632 1,220 938 720

ARKANSAS 1,722 1,623 1,382 1,286 1,050

CALIFORNIA 10,178 11,291 11,710 17,391 21,196

COLORADO 3,938 3,627 3,874 3,742 3,777

CONNECTICUT 2,661 2,513 2,554 271 2,893

DELAWARE 293 411 551 317 462

DIST. OF COL. 526 691 464 733 539

FLORIDA 2,785 2,014 8,076 7,548 6,688

GEORGIA 4,655 4,237 3,533 3,411 3,108

GUAM 0 0 0 0 0

HAWAII 1,985 2,252 2,641 1,639 1,494

IDAHO 435 428 354 318 297

ILLINOIS 3,526 3,515 3,561 6,339 4,186

INDIANA 2,276 159 154 109 707

IOWA 4,063 3,919 3,449 2,855 2,529

KANSAS 2,830 2,162 1,573 1,355 1,339

KENTUCKY 842 450 1,749 262 1,004

LOUISIANA 2,335 1,148 900 770 726

MAINE 2,587 1,751 1,301 1,135 1,014

MARYLAND 4,923 4,748 4,962 4,719 4,269

MASSACHUSETTS 6,327 6,697 7,173 6,396 5,543

MICHIGAN 364 1,070 6,892 6,121 5,116

MINNESOTA 9,401 9,077 8,741 7,840 6,930

MISSISSIPPI 14,717 12,220 10,481 8,062 6,570

MISSOURI 6,119 5,650 4,893 4,492 4,155

MONTANA 1,560 1,162 1,067 942 1,142

NEBRASKA 2,196 1,831 2,283 1,554 1,587

NEVADA 1,428 1,398 1,616 1,642 1,485

NEW HAMPSHIRE 1,802 1,245 1,069 812 687

NEW JERSEY 4,505 4,263 4,193 4,332 3,648

NEW MEXICO 1,624 1,402 1,249 1,170 967

NEW YORK 11,531 9,521 9,945 9,697 9,986

NORTH CAROLINA 317 252 307 1,398 1,330

NORTH DAKOTA 2,754 2,946 3,178 916 293

OHIO 874 869 836 568 513

OKLAHOMA 1,676 1,621 1,456 1,579 1,556

OREGON 13,539 7,269 2,253 3,054 3,442

PENNSYLVANIA 10,744 8,706 8,127 7,890 7,732

PUERTO RICO 587 568 564 402 519

RHODE ISLAND 2,603 2,503 2,560 2,449 2,306

SOUTH CAROLINA 26 16 4 7 9

SOUTH DAKOTA 1,380 1,241 1,287 1,310 1,320

TENNESSEE 31,884 34,291 23,337 14,127 11,675

TEXAS 3,873 3,641 3,046 3,531 3,499

UTAH 1 1 1 1,067 1,043

VERMONT 1,020 1,219 1,448 1,084 1,133

VIRGIN ISLANDS 337 80 68 61 60

VIRGINIA 11,325 9,991 11,078 8,957 7,300

WASHINGTON 13,291 11,951 10,653 8,552 7,723

WEST VIRGINIA 2,962 2,923 2,609 2,331 1,896

WISCONSIN 8,897 8,590 10,517 10,181 7,915

WYOMING 112 122 169 151 132

TOTALS 227,093 206,042 199,999 180,250 169,304

Source: Form OCSE-157, line 14.

79

Table P-74 Number of Support Orders Established During the Fiscal Year for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years

STATES 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016ALABAMA 20,063 19,481 18,513 18,956 19,140

ALASKA 2,369 2,956 2,334 2,357 2,264

ARIZONA 4,821 4,750 4,940 3,989 4,371

ARKANSAS 6,404 5,627 5,334 4,500 4,188

CALIFORNIA 99,399 91,656 81,434 86,936 82,147

COLORADO 9,404 8,274 7,523 7,593 6,819

CONNECTICUT 7,081 7,518 7,401 7,110 5,945

DELAWARE 3,378 3,337 1,349 1,190 921

DIST. OF COL. 1,744 1,946 2,039 2,159 1,688

FLORIDA 60,076 26,648 25,192 29,118 29,937

GEORGIA 28,602 25,879 23,711 22,024 20,495

GUAM 1,132 1,089 970 774 566

HAWAII 4,017 3,748 3,545 3,029 2,048

IDAHO 6,871 5,860 6,021 6,560 6,683

ILLINOIS 47,081 45,026 41,742 37,235 42,056

INDIANA 43,951 60,879 52,349 53,493 47,171

IOWA 8,408 8,343 8,555 7,353 7,925

KANSAS 13,340 11,356 9,158 10,948 9,638

KENTUCKY 29,430 27,892 24,941 20,745 15,328

LOUISIANA 18,977 18,984 17,586 15,765 14,129

MAINE 2,193 2,099 1,719 923 788

MARYLAND 16,942 16,816 14,881 13,275 12,513

MASSACHUSETTS 33,257 32,134 30,773 27,657 27,098

MICHIGAN 52,561 54,227 55,972 57,349 56,551

MINNESOTA 16,573 15,759 14,844 13,044 12,726

MISSISSIPPI 21,923 18,521 19,993 19,565 17,727

MISSOURI 17,449 14,883 15,376 14,752 12,452

MONTANA 2,509 2,220 2,263 2,014 2,161

NEBRASKA 9,685 9,233 8,778 8,774 8,492

NEVADA 5,431 5,448 4,247 3,822 3,838

NEW HAMPSHIRE 2,861 2,915 2,904 2,735 3,404

NEW JERSEY 10,647 9,805 9,232 9,218 8,510

NEW MEXICO 6,059 5,292 4,980 4,547 4,276

NEW YORK 45,334 47,406 48,530 44,876 45,191

NORTH CAROLINA 38,102 36,609 32,681 30,323 30,075

NORTH DAKOTA 2,710 2,766 2,437 2,111 2,064

OHIO 48,225 43,852 41,245 37,903 34,561

OKLAHOMA 15,954 14,899 14,076 13,723 12,884

OREGON 9,045 9,153 8,013 6,535 5,216

PENNSYLVANIA 40,636 38,209 35,745 35,023 34,308

PUERTO RICO 4,485 4,416 4,307 4,134 3,766

RHODE ISLAND 3,602 3,435 3,170 2,312 1,893

SOUTH CAROLINA 15,783 13,886 16,351 14,179 13,737

SOUTH DAKOTA 2,621 2,484 2,325 2,299 2,487

TENNESSEE 109,074 105,587 99,650 90,033 86,488

TEXAS 129,155 127,068 118,437 110,291 117,962

UTAH 6,771 6,643 5,317 5,919 5,165

VERMONT 7,051 7,186 6,651 6,314 5,700

VIRGIN ISLANDS 277 224 232 235 211

VIRGINIA 21,984 21,460 18,812 15,938 15,364

WASHINGTON 37,439 34,944 28,933 25,705 24,694

WEST VIRGINIA 10,192 9,977 9,583 9,331 7,218

WISCONSIN 39,990 40,057 39,635 38,411 36,988

WYOMING 1,576 1,342 1,996 1,163 1,061

TOTALS 1,204,644 1,142,204 1,068,725 1,016,267 981,028

Source: Form OCSE-157, line 17.

80

FY 2016 CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT PRELIMINARY REPORT

Table P-75 Number of Cases in Which a Collection Was Made on an Obligation for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years

STATES 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016ALABAMA 131,609 133,087 134,972 137,798 138,317

ALASKA 33,338 34,072 33,835 33,638 33,249

ARIZONA 109,586 109,293 107,299 105,276 104,223

ARKANSAS 83,908 84,333 83,648 82,806 80,991

CALIFORNIA 729,045 721,533 713,098 711,114 716,474

COLORADO 113,862 114,182 116,136 116,098 115,289

CONNECTICUT 90,423 89,103 88,700 88,529 89,605

DELAWARE 29,133 29,213 29,610 30,082 30,320

DIST. OF COL. 20,086 19,913 20,141 19,908 19,745

FLORIDA 631,056 NA 1 476,152 471,818 466,165

GEORGIA 248,496 246,288 245,356 246,698 248,036

GUAM 4,128 3,739 3,723 3,471 3,239

HAWAII 25,361 25,086 24,947 25,196 24,180

IDAHO 62,693 63,539 63,121 64,032 64,366

ILLINOIS 253,667 250,486 251,400 249,145 256,293

INDIANA 199,676 198,854 196,859 194,758 193,912

IOWA 140,146 NA 1 136,694 134,569 132,837

KANSAS 82,435 82,403 78,721 79,337 80,776

KENTUCKY 166,566 165,507 166,822 165,559 162,918

LOUISIANA 140,020 138,882 137,351 138,623 136,050

MAINE 35,852 35,359 35,391 35,517 35,234

MARYLAND 154,377 153,429 153,194 149,882 148,057

MASSACHUSETTS 137,031 137,467 138,932 137,870 136,441

MICHIGAN 438,950 435,520 435,002 429,696 446,279

MINNESOTA 161,404 161,222 160,546 157,961 153,994

MISSISSIPPI 148,923 149,197 150,762 153,619 156,440

MISSOURI 221,236 220,404 221,425 222,393 218,858

MONTANA 27,054 26,915 26,502 26,538 25,442

NEBRASKA 73,745 74,009 74,023 74,603 74,213

NEVADA 64,835 65,005 64,634 64,577 65,155

NEW HAMPSHIRE 24,776 24,256 24,052 22,601 22,392

NEW JERSEY 230,577 227,500 228,136 226,223 224,647

NEW MEXICO 36,549 37,679 38,140 38,702 38,612

NEW YORK 475,673 469,569 461,172 459,619 456,729

NORTH CAROLINA 283,011 282,047 277,615 276,695 274,274

NORTH DAKOTA 26,099 26,079 25,997 25,915 25,364

OHIO 560,727 564,209 564,241 563,837 556,088

OKLAHOMA 119,607 122,750 125,606 129,142 128,230

OREGON 117,634 115,767 115,005 114,351 112,863

PENNSYLVANIA 335,262 314,971 304,386 297,063 291,571

PUERTO RICO 120,301 117,933 116,647 112,513 112,770

RHODE ISLAND 23,046 23,699 24,293 24,163 23,486

SOUTH CAROLINA 104,049 101,021 105,914 109,299 110,536

SOUTH DAKOTA 29,127 29,593 29,876 30,060 29,909

TENNESSEE 217,462 223,310 224,944 227,015 227,279

TEXAS 876,172 903,598 938,018 946,748 960,422

UTAH 62,184 62,657 62,331 62,229 61,581

VERMONT 14,278 13,881 13,514 13,084 12,698

VIRGIN ISLANDS 4,868 3,560 3,283 3,175 3,205

VIRGINIA 224,046 224,820 224,212 225,356 223,976

WASHINGTON 249,498 249,641 245,379 244,299 240,293

WEST VIRGINIA 72,723 73,183 74,068 73,180 70,314

WISCONSIN 223,589 225,621 227,294 227,919 227,240

WYOMING 25,122 24,890 24,720 24,402 23,487

TOTALS 9,215,021 NA 1 9,047,839 9,028,701 9,015,064

Source: Form OCSE-157, line 18.

1 NA - data not available due to a reporting problem in two states.

81

Table P-76 Cases Sent to Another State for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years

STATES 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016ALABAMA 2,121 2,117 2,133 2,174 1,972

ALASKA 1,955 1,816 1,476 887 1,417

ARIZONA 13,248 13,411 13,655 13,939 14,195

ARKANSAS 1,742 1,667 1,506 995 975

CALIFORNIA 13,283 12,756 10,969 9,738 9,303

COLORADO 5,030 4,780 4,673 4,590 4,163

CONNECTICUT 901 1,019 1,080 1,124 1,463

DELAWARE 441 401 1,215 1,486 1,615

DIST. OF COL. 259 1,685 408 579 536

FLORIDA 8,546 1,520 13,558 15,724 16,255

GEORGIA 10,083 9,127 7,630 6,557 7,117

GUAM 86 72 62 59 62

HAWAII 316 253 242 187 258

IDAHO 4,408 3,846 4,114 4,359 3,850

ILLINOIS 2,297 2,017 1,857 1,860 1,837

INDIANA 3,549 3,472 3,069 2,552 2,452

IOWA 1,561 1,319 1,391 1,375 1,421

KANSAS 2,390 2,086 613 1,318 1,519

KENTUCKY 3,469 3,236 2,828 2,617 3,112

LOUISIANA 2,415 2,411 2,032 2,157 1,893

MAINE 1,281 1,595 1,869 1,314 1,136

MARYLAND 2,410 2,332 2,407 2,501 1,976

MASSACHUSETTS 2,989 2,782 2,468 1,910 1,651

MICHIGAN 7,556 8,471 7,123 6,641 6,004

MINNESOTA 2,441 2,380 1,789 1,348 1,624

MISSISSIPPI 4,964 4,537 3,970 5,885 3,433

MISSOURI 9,383 8,538 8,665 7,894 6,937

MONTANA 924 1,075 1,078 1,142 902

NEBRASKA 1,841 1,830 1,695 1,818 1,457

NEVADA 6,181 5,033 5,082 5,704 6,773

NEW HAMPSHIRE 989 839 863 790 780

NEW JERSEY 5,372 4,631 4,141 4,000 3,738

NEW MEXICO 651 551 577 548 505

NEW YORK 4,582 6,833 9,109 7,567 7,179

NORTH CAROLINA 8,437 8,249 7,419 6,642 6,966

NORTH DAKOTA 1,015 1,094 1,036 1,030 1,082

OHIO 6,766 5,694 5,491 5,319 4,980

OKLAHOMA 2,887 2,867 2,858 2,758 2,797

OREGON 3,500 3,263 2,915 2,669 2,627

PENNSYLVANIA 6,910 6,403 6,263 6,231 5,904

PUERTO RICO 687 1,244 1,474 1,301 1,655

RHODE ISLAND 2,053 2,118 1,923 1,222 1,116

SOUTH CAROLINA 38 21 18 23 8

SOUTH DAKOTA 1,356 1,331 1,310 1,263 1,432

TENNESSEE 8,690 8,113 8,042 7,461 6,922

TEXAS 7,376 7,331 6,605 6,171 6,577

UTAH 3,935 3,667 3,311 2,862 2,498

VERMONT 1,013 1,092 1,120 1,070 989

VIRGIN ISLANDS 8 3 7 0 6

VIRGINIA 10,974 11,147 10,413 8,289 8,247

WASHINGTON 8,326 7,870 7,130 6,741 6,433

WEST VIRGINIA 2,991 2,802 3,224 2,537 1,953

WISCONSIN 18,516 17,116 17,757 17,750 17,770

WYOMING 1,999 1,670 1,696 1,424 1,389

TOTALS 227,141 213,533 215,359 206,102 200,861

Source: Form OCSE-157, line 19.

82

FY 2016 CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT PRELIMINARY REPORT

Table P-77 Cases Received from Another State for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years

STATES 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016ALABAMA 3,420 3,298 3,350 3,181 3,176

ALASKA 1,997 1,790 1,505 1,305 1,314

ARIZONA 4,161 3,203 3,076 2,901 3,249

ARKANSAS 2,739 2,474 2,202 2,084 2,063

CALIFORNIA 10,734 10,334 9,429 8,777 9,117

COLORADO 3,546 3,440 3,197 3,267 3,317

CONNECTICUT 491 420 402 480 455

DELAWARE 597 585 980 851 758

DIST. OF COL. 866 769 1,066 740 761

FLORIDA 14,086 14,546 13,257 11,534 10,571

GEORGIA 7,335 6,614 6,545 6,235 5,893

GUAM 73 74 65 71 63

HAWAII 839 839 799 675 720

IDAHO 1,797 1,682 1,418 1,454 1,293

ILLINOIS 6,729 6,196 5,582 4,921 4,814

INDIANA 2,703 2,413 2,305 2,054 2,215

IOWA 2,069 1,900 1,712 1,666 1,596

KANSAS 2,911 2,503 2,410 2,259 2,019

KENTUCKY 2,513 2,245 2,249 2,263 3,142

LOUISIANA 3,542 3,296 3,009 2,758 2,611

MAINE 350 545 577 449 455

MARYLAND 2,734 2,438 2,213 2,427 2,007

MASSACHUSETTS 1,347 1,364 1,333 1,171 1,191

MICHIGAN 5,332 5,432 4,743 4,402 3,914

MINNESOTA 1,872 1,750 1,686 1,661 1,595

MISSISSIPPI 2,541 2,364 2,195 2,237 1,877

MISSOURI 3,928 3,792 3,402 3,095 3,170

MONTANA 1,038 1,011 894 883 819

NEBRASKA 1,702 1,499 1,416 1,267 1,296

NEVADA 4,185 4,111 3,686 3,181 3,029

NEW HAMPSHIRE 554 666 746 496 680

NEW JERSEY 3,111 2,816 2,883 2,788 2,617

NEW MEXICO 1,323 1,148 1,094 852 930

NEW YORK 719 641 528 755 783

NORTH CAROLINA 6,327 7,499 7,539 8,157 7,224

NORTH DAKOTA 804 877 924 863 862

OHIO 4,976 4,561 4,435 4,067 4,005

OKLAHOMA 3,085 2,871 2,691 2,536 2,237

OREGON 4,339 4,132 3,622 3,378 3,024

PENNSYLVANIA 5,823 4,786 4,676 4,544 4,478

PUERTO RICO 2,896 2,107 3,247 3,684 3,766

RHODE ISLAND 458 393 483 410 420

SOUTH CAROLINA 3,261 2,730 3,155 2,985 2,934

SOUTH DAKOTA 853 923 822 841 800

TENNESSEE 5,521 5,245 5,649 5,467 5,977

TEXAS 13,425 12,961 12,193 11,592 11,761

UTAH 2,449 2,323 2,250 2,093 2,213

VERMONT 663 634 687 579 573

VIRGIN ISLANDS 82 51 55 118 124

VIRGINIA 4,822 4,988 4,545 4,215 4,030

WASHINGTON 5,419 4,888 4,806 4,702 4,643

WEST VIRGINIA 1,916 1,726 1,780 1,587 1,485

WISCONSIN 3,242 3,192 3,374 3,718 4,213

WYOMING 728 721 678 764 808

TOTALS 174,973 165,806 159,565 151,440 149,087

Source: Form OCSE-157, line 20.

83

Services Required

Table P-78 Cases Requiring Services to Establish a Support Order for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years

STATES 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016ALABAMA 39,134 35,684 33,083 28,719 26,727

ALASKA 4,682 3,815 4,340 4,210 3,348

ARIZONA 14,446 14,231 13,555 12,151 12,105

ARKANSAS 16,423 15,599 12,011 10,248 8,955

CALIFORNIA 198,161 176,860 169,160 162,162 147,047

COLORADO 12,584 12,707 12,653 11,454 11,563

CONNECTICUT 34,263 31,766 26,216 17,425 10,114

DELAWARE 25,862 26,416 11,580 11,069 7,534

DIST. OF COL. 15,232 16,184 15,907 13,841 12,258

FLORIDA 241,399 167,763 128,275 116,693 108,642

GEORGIA 48,137 50,394 42,203 41,855 43,759

GUAM 1,458 1,485 1,621 1,718 1,719

HAWAII 36,231 35,806 32,289 31,889 31,511

IDAHO 15,260 16,115 18,972 16,214 14,395

ILLINOIS 87,907 83,831 83,126 82,944 82,074

INDIANA 71,645 35,039 24,308 20,848 19,176

IOWA 6,291 5,127 4,672 4,675 3,647

KANSAS 30,757 30,081 36,874 29,593 36,535

KENTUCKY 33,758 33,389 28,534 25,459 26,860

LOUISIANA 66,696 67,620 59,999 43,358 37,084

MAINE 5,694 5,143 2,312 1,639 1,654

MARYLAND 40,227 35,523 34,515 34,092 32,758

MASSACHUSETTS 39,849 37,013 33,698 32,799 27,430

MICHIGAN 129,425 126,555 188,073 154,595 163,310

MINNESOTA 32,845 32,674 28,322 25,733 24,683

MISSISSIPPI 117,796 123,377 84,046 76,726 66,770

MISSOURI 27,671 25,159 23,422 19,041 16,724

MONTANA 4,247 4,420 4,012 3,719 3,980

NEBRASKA 18,332 17,222 16,580 17,510 17,631

NEVADA 18,956 17,443 14,183 12,213 12,778

NEW HAMPSHIRE 4,708 4,867 5,107 7,357 7,194

NEW JERSEY 89,326 80,454 68,994 57,344 48,191

NEW MEXICO 10,795 9,652 12,007 9,767 10,208

NEW YORK 155,252 153,595 151,128 150,123 70,051

NORTH CAROLINA 73,658 67,357 58,498 58,537 57,958

NORTH DAKOTA 3,228 2,843 2,278 2,191 2,042

OHIO 140,579 119,678 104,154 92,175 85,062

OKLAHOMA 43,496 40,271 38,105 36,100 36,568

OREGON 55,767 64,882 56,447 35,543 26,967

PENNSYLVANIA 53,969 52,622 51,403 49,192 43,139

PUERTO RICO 47,300 42,615 39,665 37,179 30,703

RHODE ISLAND 10,298 9,741 8,615 6,167 5,198

SOUTH CAROLINA 75,667 81,388 54,661 47,628 51,690

SOUTH DAKOTA 3,004 2,870 2,792 3,240 3,655

TENNESSEE 105,763 92,831 70,670 61,222 58,695

TEXAS 202,686 211,396 202,760 210,785 204,516

UTAH 9,044 7,862 9,323 9,886 11,218

VERMONT 2,258 2,109 1,872 1,668 1,572

VIRGIN ISLANDS 4,704 4,772 4,754 4,716 4,780

VIRGINIA 33,290 29,368 26,748 25,503 25,978

WASHINGTON 34,872 32,347 25,275 23,037 21,927

WEST VIRGINIA 14,762 13,892 17,157 11,591 9,673

WISCONSIN 23,005 23,044 24,914 23,980 22,987

WYOMING 1,149 1,156 884 974 1,070

TOTALS 2,633,948 2,436,053 2,226,752 2,030,497 1,853,813

Source: Form OCSE-157, line 12.

84

FY 2016 CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT PRELIMINARY REPORT

Table P-79 Children Requiring Paternity Determination Services for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years

STATES 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016ALABAMA 18,443 15,355 13,170 11,483 10,040

ALASKA 1,728 1,764 2,018 1,928 1,513

ARIZONA 18,349 17,023 13,665 12,408 11,548

ARKANSAS 11,198 10,345 8,123 6,884 5,611

CALIFORNIA 101,371 87,108 78,722 74,630 67,840

COLORADO 6,827 6,493 6,386 5,427 5,113

CONNECTICUT 16,545 16,646 12,357 7,452 4,847

DELAWARE 20,093 20,761 16,547 16,734 11,776

DIST. OF COL. 13,573 14,686 14,284 12,825 11,875

FLORIDA 50,333 64,128 56,536 29,985 29,540

GEORGIA 55,238 46,994 46,739 46,140 50,351

GUAM 793 865 976 1,025 1,018

HAWAII 3,291 3,341 3,526 3,444 3,316

IDAHO 8,393 8,805 9,732 8,461 7,875

ILLINOIS 78,907 86,370 88,472 71,631 58,496

INDIANA 25,126 10,701 7,681 7,031 6,207

IOWA 25,592 25,299 15,357 23,273 22,236

KANSAS 11,267 11,617 13,940 9,884 12,614

KENTUCKY 24,035 23,778 19,859 17,422 16,779

LOUISIANA 37,617 35,326 28,511 19,540 16,948

MAINE 1,598 1,958 1,424 1,236 1,195

MARYLAND 20,952 18,747 18,088 17,371 17,253

MASSACHUSETTS 14,538 12,462 10,596 10,290 9,379

MICHIGAN 51,351 53,364 43,923 38,744 37,598

MINNESOTA 17,529 17,094 15,076 14,002 13,606

MISSISSIPPI 41,797 45,946 38,693 22,626 18,881

MISSOURI 26,711 25,044 23,488 19,002 17,400

MONTANA 2,066 2,097 1,780 1,709 1,895

NEBRASKA 8,624 7,639 7,286 7,382 7,541

NEVADA 13,106 11,564 10,144 8,567 8,783

NEW HAMPSHIRE 1,745 1,829 1,741 1,441 1,178

NEW JERSEY 60,846 55,978 48,133 40,357 34,230

NEW MEXICO 8,967 8,229 10,097 7,775 8,066

NEW YORK 108,777 99,511 86,074 82,179 63,279

NORTH CAROLINA 33,962 29,558 25,331 24,942 23,943

NORTH DAKOTA 1,979 1,611 1,202 994 967

OHIO 57,970 47,391 41,351 36,117 33,313

OKLAHOMA 21,870 20,214 19,062 17,621 17,571

OREGON 10,850 14,640 11,291 6,246 4,338

PENNSYLVANIA 20,029 20,405 18,925 18,123 15,970

PUERTO RICO 230 184 139 136 98

RHODE ISLAND 7,237 6,858 6,039 4,419 3,693

SOUTH CAROLINA 34,527 35,293 23,867 19,593 19,774

SOUTH DAKOTA 2,017 1,848 1,675 1,943 2,322

TENNESSEE 36,623 35,574 29,702 25,708 24,662

TEXAS 174,373 177,166 167,916 173,204 166,143

UTAH 4,808 4,228 4,408 4,591 4,806

VERMONT 1,186 1,144 933 818 821

VIRGIN ISLANDS 1,828 1,789 1,632 1,480 1,317

VIRGINIA 18,107 16,378 14,513 14,379 14,770

WASHINGTON 20,330 18,467 14,136 13,261 12,673

WEST VIRGINIA 5,806 5,377 6,870 4,659 3,760

WISCONSIN 21,556 20,037 20,266 19,615 20,208

WYOMING 856 773 409 494 571

TOTALS 1,383,470 1,327,802 1,182,811 1,048,631 967,547

Source: Form OCSE-157, line 13.

85

Staff

Table P-80 Total Full-Time Equivalent Staff for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years 1

STATES 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016ALABAMA 704 682 743 722 699

ALASKA 246 246 246 249 209

ARIZONA 747 790 762 762 732

ARKANSAS 745 729 715 725 660

CALIFORNIA 8,280 8,116 8,033 7,870 7,638

COLORADO 700 699 701 718 721

CONNECTICUT 425 438 459 462 432

DELAWARE 193 195 196 199 196

DIST. OF COL. 239 239 239 249 249

FLORIDA 2,996 3,092 3,027 3,014 2,942

GEORGIA 1,266 1,233 1,096 1,087 1,068

GUAM 57 57 62 56 59

HAWAII 172 185 182 174 177

IDAHO 130 133 133 135 136

ILLINOIS 1,360 1,287 1,204 1,126 1,197

INDIANA 1,066 1,125 1,130 1,102 1,101

IOWA 518 509 511 505 510

KANSAS 562 427 428 437 423

KENTUCKY 799 826 847 838 848

LOUISIANA 784 767 765 764 751

MAINE 306 313 308 303 295

MARYLAND 1,118 1,005 985 1,047 994

MASSACHUSETTS 739 731 719 643 636

MICHIGAN 2,136 2,148 2,153 2,171 2,172

MINNESOTA 1,469 1,395 1,484 1,483 1,525

MISSISSIPPI 625 529 491 515 485

MISSOURI 1,184 1,206 1,104 1,071 1,020

MONTANA 164 164 164 164 157

NEBRASKA 386 385 392 384 377

NEVADA 429 438 413 428 427

NEW HAMPSHIRE 174 161 157 145 148

NEW JERSEY 2,025 2,019 1,980 1,977 1,985

NEW MEXICO 383 353 332 350 325

NEW YORK 2,743 2,691 2,657 2,614 2,496

NORTH CAROLINA 1,530 1,534 1,543 1,546 1,551

NORTH DAKOTA 163 160 158 158 161

OHIO 3,572 3,583 3,556 3,561 3,637

OKLAHOMA 901 894 875 944 799

OREGON 708 705 707 727 730

PENNSYLVANIA 2,586 2,615 2,718 2,674 2,556

PUERTO RICO 623 534 520 496 474

RHODE ISLAND 67 70 69 69 70

SOUTH CAROLINA 236 237 307 309 318

SOUTH DAKOTA 107 107 107 105 104

TENNESSEE 913 920 923 970 1,000

TEXAS 2,691 2,711 2,693 2,739 2,714

UTAH 407 384 387 374 388

VERMONT 112 116 115 110 110

VIRGIN ISLANDS 54 54 53 48 44

VIRGINIA 1,066 1,063 1,054 1,056 1,020

WASHINGTON 1,264 1,343 1,305 1,337 1,348

WEST VIRGINIA 527 518 505 501 482

WISCONSIN 989 998 1,057 1,032 1,038

WYOMING 183 181 175 177 171

TOTALS 54,569 54,040 53,645 53,422 52,505

Source: Form OCSE-157, lines 30 + 31 + 32.

1 Employed as of September 30th of the respective fiscal year.

86

FY 2016 CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT PRELIMINARY REPORT

Table P-81 Full-Time Equivalent Staff by State and Local, Cooperative Agreement, and Privatized IV-D Offices for Two Consecutive Fiscal Years 1

STATES Total Full-Time

Equivalent Staff In 2015

Total Full-Time

Equivalent Staff in 2016

State and Local IV-D Offices In

2015

State and Local IV-D Offices in

2016

Under Contract,

Interagency, or

Cooperative Agreement

In 2015

Under Contract,

Interagency, or

Cooperative Agreement

In 2016

Privatized IV-D Offices

In 2015

Privatized IV-D

Offices In 2016

ALABAMA 722 699 531 501 167 169 24 29

ALASKA 249 209 230 203 19 6 0 0

ARIZONA 762 732 653 629 109 103 0 0

ARKANSAS 725 660 725 660 0 0 0 0

CALIFORNIA 7,870 7,638 7,124 6,983 746 655 0 0

COLORADO 718 721 629 636 28 24 61 61

CONNECTICUT 462 432 162 135 300 297 0 0

DELAWARE 199 196 182 179 17 17 0 0

DIST. OF COL. 249 249 214 214 35 35 0 0

FLORIDA 3,014 2,942 2,204 2,162 407 346 403 434

GEORGIA 1,087 1,068 919 890 168 178 0 0

GUAM 56 59 56 59 0 0 0 0

HAWAII 174 177 174 177 0 0 0 0

IDAHO 135 136 135 136 0 0 0 0

ILLINOIS 1,126 1,197 817 787 309 410 0 0

INDIANA 1,102 1,101 195 178 907 923 0 0

IOWA 505 510 440 442 65 68 0 0

KANSAS 437 423 25 34 100 74 312 315

KENTUCKY 838 848 158 129 680 719 0 0

LOUISIANA 764 751 386 382 374 369 4 0

MAINE 303 295 242 235 61 60 0 0

MARYLAND 1,047 994 650 633 289 268 108 93

MASSACHUSETTS 643 636 555 547 88 89 0 0

MICHIGAN 2,171 2,172 183 180 1,988 1,992 0 0

MINNESOTA 1,483 1,525 1,171 1,173 312 352 0 0

MISSISSIPPI 515 485 368 363 87 61 60 61

MISSOURI 1,071 1,020 660 624 283 275 128 121

MONTANA 164 157 164 157 0 0 0 0

NEBRASKA 384 377 98 92 181 102 105 183

NEVADA 428 427 113 109 315 318 0 0

NEW HAMPSHIRE 145 148 130 133 15 15 0 0

NEW JERSEY 1,977 1,985 548 539 1,429 1,446 0 0

NEW MEXICO 350 325 350 325 0 0 0 0

NEW YORK 2,614 2,496 2,006 1,873 608 623 0 0

NORTH CAROLINA 1,546 1,551 1,326 1,343 82 84 138 124

NORTH DAKOTA 158 161 158 161 0 0 0 0

OHIO 3,561 3,637 2,549 2,538 1,012 1,099 0 0

OKLAHOMA 944 799 518 465 399 314 27 20

OREGON 727 730 593 593 134 137 0 0

PENNSYLVANIA 2,674 2,556 92 91 2,582 2,465 0 0

PUERTO RICO 496 474 496 474 0 0 0 0

RHODE ISLAND 69 70 69 70 0 0 0 0

SOUTH CAROLINA 309 318 287 251 22 67 0 0

SOUTH DAKOTA 105 104 93 93 12 11 0 0

TENNESSEE 970 1,000 141 141 428 450 401 409

TEXAS 2,739 2,714 2,653 2,627 86 87 0 0

UTAH 374 388 319 330 55 58 0 0

VERMONT 110 110 110 110 0 0 0 0

VIRGIN ISLANDS 48 44 46 43 2 1 0 0

VIRGINIA 1,056 1,020 928 907 50 36 78 77

WASHINGTON 1,337 1,348 1,056 1,078 281 270 0 0

WEST VIRGINIA 501 482 417 447 31 35 53 0

WISCONSIN 1,032 1,038 798 801 234 237 0 0

WYOMING 177 171 57 54 66 62 54 55

TOTALS 53,422 52,505 35,903 35,116 15,563 15,407 1,956 1,982

Source: Form OCSE-157, lines 30, 31, and 32.

1 Employed as of September 30th of the respective fiscal year.

87

Table P-82 Costs and Staff Associated with the Office of Child Support Enforcement for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years

EXPENSES

2012 2013 2014 2015 2016TRAINING AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE COSTS

Personnel Costs and Benefits $3,840,525 $3,887,407 $3,624,059 $2,976,396 $3,768,669

Travel and Transportation 486,561 315,630 314,817 366,629 339,079

Printing 169 NA NA NA NA

Other Services 10,030,119 7,531,509 8,747,891 6,622,212 5,698,565

Supplies/Equipment 78,968 64,105 143,741 88,989 99,734

TOTAL TRAINING AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE COSTS

$14,436,342 $11,798,651 $12,830,508 $10,054,226 $9,906,046

FPLS COSTS

Personnel Costs and Benefits $4,288,384 $4,493,648 $4,322,578 $4,449,389 $5,157,529

Travel and Transportation 14,284 10,541 12,981 14,882 10,395

Printing NA 90,000 134,145 90,000 130,925

Other Services 41,690,425 42,636,092 41,210,319 42,851,395 42,789,742

Supplies/Equipment 43,251 23,887 80,825 18,808 4,338

TOTAL FPLS COSTS $46,036,344 $47,254,168 $45,760,848 $47,424,474 $48,092,929

GRAND TOTAL $60,472,686 $59,052,819 $58,591,356 $57,478,700 $57,998,975

TOTAL FEDERAL STAFF 173 160 153 150 155

Source: OCSE, Office of the Commissioner.

Note: 1% of the appropriations is for use by the Secretary, either directly or through grants, contracts, or interagency agreements for technical assistance to states, providing training of state and Federal staff, and other related activities that would improve the programs.

2% of the appropriations is used specifically for the Federal Parent Locator Service (FPLS).

NA - Not Available.

88

FY 2016 CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT PRELIMINARY REPORT

Current Support

Table P-83 Amount of Current Support Due for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years

STATES 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016ALABAMA $420,246,094 $431,286,947 $440,511,511 $445,680,038 $450,509,999

ALASKA 108,621,352 112,343,485 113,939,368 113,751,701 113,078,327

ARIZONA 414,874,207 402,671,342 392,717,955 380,131,890 367,993,023

ARKANSAS 265,816,491 273,885,649 280,123,316 279,095,003 278,569,232

CALIFORNIA 2,343,209,865 2,321,340,977 2,275,353,768 2,256,241,546 2,315,420,697

COLORADO 369,119,659 379,454,739 386,294,106 392,393,404 397,962,746

CONNECTICUT 308,030,240 302,495,688 296,292,703 23,618,220 284,503,096

DELAWARE 101,629,405 102,253,165 101,736,743 102,382,213 101,448,264

DIST. OF COL. 65,362,934 63,273,002 61,981,461 61,170,793 60,791,396

FLORIDA 2,193,591,448 2,087,249,201 1,905,604,399 1,782,242,434 1,781,640,902

GEORGIA 839,490,358 867,182,573 889,103,611 909,197,952 928,673,389

GUAM 11,734,783 11,825,194 11,939,023 11,689,321 11,182,554

HAWAII 115,508,264 118,360,866 119,907,147 119,366,015 118,759,286

IDAHO 196,690,802 201,011,809 205,576,709 209,963,801 210,032,158

ILLINOIS 937,652,192 936,142,433 925,926,920 917,097,565 915,335,204

INDIANA 717,881,297 665,250,290 647,612,266 630,647,415 621,751,731

IOWA 335,445,047 332,686,473 331,210,724 330,336,037 333,135,118

KANSAS 235,870,822 241,091,849 241,741,978 241,979,211 241,591,163

KENTUCKY 500,936,200 501,853,293 500,657,020 494,389,821 484,268,770

LOUISIANA 499,293,747 516,267,132 534,836,351 556,984,624 567,814,634

MAINE 116,237,883 113,454,174 111,432,796 112,660,960 109,853,079

MARYLAND 640,765,468 642,082,514 641,862,295 642,841,671 642,895,644

MASSACHUSETTS 714,498,229 727,798,179 731,445,393 725,403,990 731,060,537

MICHIGAN 1,457,039,401 1,430,429,570 1,429,082,992 1,398,046,000 1,391,033,529

MINNESOTA 639,787,122 638,492,534 631,166,535 618,447,004 604,410,322

MISSISSIPPI 410,050,556 424,870,425 441,197,644 456,428,240 462,529,730

MISSOURI 762,665,459 764,248,586 768,069,237 765,207,616 755,472,954

MONTANA 76,121,727 77,567,751 78,642,528 78,761,647 77,543,982

NEBRASKA 233,543,441 236,360,914 236,705,603 236,285,159 235,482,090

NEVADA 251,739,754 245,796,621 239,550,719 232,430,884 229,018,171

NEW HAMPSHIRE 101,268,408 100,149,677 99,371,025 94,378,642 91,305,473

NEW JERSEY 1,496,550,303 1,511,805,071 1,507,631,021 1,488,715,531 1,469,806,558

NEW MEXICO 143,935,859 149,897,498 154,530,910 156,833,992 157,484,962

NEW YORK 2,054,101,322 2,071,620,808 2,053,785,213 2,053,410,525 2,075,155,225

NORTH CAROLINA 827,094,356 820,148,696 812,582,244 801,315,571 786,906,243

NORTH DAKOTA 97,570,081 102,479,909 107,838,996 111,363,799 112,289,681

OHIO 1,971,697,107 1,958,623,701 1,933,667,766 1,906,727,719 1,871,657,010

OKLAHOMA 412,721,769 434,491,457 453,521,747 465,183,030 466,743,276

OREGON 448,276,682 447,850,304 445,157,908 441,308,571 432,535,492

PENNSYLVANIA 1,345,102,053 1,331,552,102 1,299,221,067 1,276,829,487 1,264,018,711

PUERTO RICO 1 502,385,903 501,650,634 506,296,901 513,321,710 503,357,199

RHODE ISLAND 87,889,971 92,135,972 93,209,051 94,229,237 93,995,666

SOUTH CAROLINA 351,671,329 349,829,639 353,261,197 359,329,479 367,377,091

SOUTH DAKOTA 101,355,120 105,117,602 107,695,035 110,643,329 114,478,844

TENNESSEE 772,694,767 775,266,817 771,280,616 769,510,841 766,362,400

TEXAS 3,846,510,486 4,116,826,985 4,349,043,196 4,548,414,750 4,711,945,709

UTAH 253,572,410 261,674,838 266,052,316 269,379,015 241,570,253

VERMONT 53,807,143 52,265,980 50,683,716 48,942,356 47,617,675

VIRGIN ISLANDS 1 12,969,605 12,227,398 11,022,566 10,635,934 10,078,380

VIRGINIA 736,005,908 738,831,657 735,252,445 727,827,984 721,447,956

WASHINGTON 776,231,839 778,071,058 769,068,868 754,514,072 742,098,928

WEST VIRGINIA 228,738,291 230,342,162 231,701,564 230,639,068 217,655,038

WISCONSIN 676,872,586 680,552,713 684,428,515 688,914,076 695,949,777

WYOMING 74,697,641 76,588,846 76,821,822 76,774,904 76,068,603

TOTALS $33,657,175,186 $33,869,028,899 $33,845,348,526 $33,524,015,797 $33,861,667,877

Source: Form OCSE-157, line 24.

1 Puerto Rico and Virgin Islands data were unreliable for line 24 in FY 2012.

FY 2016 data reliability information not available at the time of publication.

89

Table P-84 Amount of Support Distributed as Current Support for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years

STATES 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016ALABAMA $215,531,499 $223,712,394 $230,891,752 $238,049,607 $243,335,481

ALASKA 64,742,570 66,449,261 65,900,513 65,228,109 63,991,468

ARIZONA 216,909,559 217,922,300 214,687,819 212,270,050 210,841,346

ARKANSAS 166,934,678 173,082,263 175,804,761 179,469,493 178,136,904

CALIFORNIA 1,438,080,708 1,470,304,708 1,477,121,954 1,500,902,042 1,550,864,094

COLORADO 231,591,458 239,265,105 245,661,571 252,817,772 255,751,867

CONNECTICUT 178,048,928 176,369,584 172,632,865 14,417,342 175,245,506

DELAWARE 60,655,340 60,784,564 59,187,644 60,466,461 60,975,420

DIST. OF COL. 39,830,473 38,483,362 38,136,494 37,900,027 37,458,093

FLORIDA 1,118,238,314 1,118,865,334 1,111,952,253 1,114,462,872 1,126,854,941

GEORGIA 517,698,276 533,182,641 541,423,133 557,216,090 568,892,515

GUAM 7,442,615 7,611,474 7,739,363 7,519,652 6,935,587

HAWAII 72,390,720 73,064,628 73,951,315 74,025,391 74,397,435

IDAHO 117,974,404 124,108,503 128,100,118 132,549,753 135,282,073

ILLINOIS 554,489,447 567,713,395 564,430,924 570,994,378 574,060,442

INDIANA 435,920,546 414,445,878 409,714,221 408,532,961 406,047,926

IOWA 244,208,770 246,060,741 244,764,743 245,319,858 245,097,804

KANSAS 132,018,629 134,513,416 130,648,492 131,706,313 133,970,994

KENTUCKY 288,840,409 286,680,990 286,485,187 287,838,271 282,827,486

LOUISIANA 284,286,313 295,986,657 301,884,992 309,465,376 302,678,343

MAINE 68,694,771 66,842,895 65,595,017 67,443,376 68,468,724

MARYLAND 420,868,095 428,801,907 434,871,459 440,686,530 443,370,149

MASSACHUSETTS 493,094,264 503,346,756 507,878,021 513,314,604 521,531,153

MICHIGAN 960,503,292 960,498,456 984,145,194 986,558,929 991,171,708

MINNESOTA 456,419,353 458,513,405 457,350,803 454,133,194 448,998,463

MISSISSIPPI 224,773,639 231,800,309 234,868,545 242,882,202 247,779,897

MISSOURI 437,515,090 441,018,657 445,063,102 455,336,852 455,386,823

MONTANA 48,008,547 49,154,744 49,369,751 50,014,261 48,939,350

NEBRASKA 163,363,451 166,992,177 168,104,648 168,589,319 168,472,769

NEVADA 139,952,817 142,824,479 142,641,681 144,344,727 146,715,899

NEW HAMPSHIRE 63,661,328 63,687,911 63,394,886 62,000,468 60,361,354

NEW JERSEY 973,812,941 985,769,753 986,189,815 988,761,088 988,481,741

NEW MEXICO 77,953,286 81,268,660 84,232,463 86,129,201 86,168,605

NEW YORK 1,365,981,519 1,357,854,734 1,349,354,900 1,350,243,710 1,368,739,975

NORTH CAROLINA 541,477,967 542,488,097 534,701,205 537,033,672 535,504,671

NORTH DAKOTA 73,266,692 76,186,870 80,000,982 82,495,635 81,709,837

OHIO 1,312,208,448 1,319,175,249 1,314,703,751 1,315,298,696 1,299,641,578

OKLAHOMA 229,410,350 239,464,320 248,763,569 255,891,350 253,293,829

OREGON 266,952,007 269,991,800 269,575,186 270,658,678 270,707,032

PENNSYLVANIA 1,129,550,270 1,113,515,477 1,085,346,157 1,073,581,424 1,066,082,484

PUERTO RICO 280,051,124 280,710,173 282,476,723 277,922,933 278,039,983

RHODE ISLAND 52,409,024 54,899,866 56,202,248 57,750,411 58,013,927

SOUTH CAROLINA 183,580,881 179,793,707 186,551,108 196,537,693 201,625,921

SOUTH DAKOTA 70,249,558 72,911,941 74,255,991 75,201,410 75,481,945

TENNESSEE 424,878,005 431,935,521 438,725,553 442,081,935 433,761,765

TEXAS 2,499,464,658 2,692,956,128 2,827,202,159 2,956,536,407 3,030,561,878

UTAH 155,792,315 162,186,332 166,476,115 170,426,802 173,142,442

VERMONT 37,193,208 36,503,333 35,911,275 35,586,242 35,348,472

VIRGIN ISLANDS 7,149,245 6,623,103 6,295,840 5,483,493 5,374,643

VIRGINIA 466,756,950 468,076,886 470,438,749 468,121,461 465,819,365

WASHINGTON 500,877,017 503,160,944 496,764,760 494,570,381 491,991,078

WEST VIRGINIA 150,256,241 152,379,786 151,560,813 153,759,630 145,786,636

WISCONSIN 484,542,803 493,427,235 499,679,512 510,857,086 518,320,930

WYOMING 50,445,332 51,478,616 52,170,807 52,358,537 50,347,022

TOTALS $21,196,948,144 $21,554,847,425 $21,731,982,902 $21,843,744,155 $22,148,787,773

Source: Form OCSE-157, line 25.

FY 2015 and FY 2016 data reliability information not available at the time of publication.

90

FY 2016 CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT PRELIMINARY REPORT

Arrears

Table P-85 Total Amount of Arrearages Due for All Fiscal Years for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years

STATES 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016ALABAMA $2,999,513,024 $3,143,992,093 $3,283,950,826 $3,335,452,829 $3,434,017,688

ALASKA 578,024,832 589,487,005 602,946,217 605,661,346 607,456,421

ARIZONA 1,742,245,152 1,737,681,855 1,748,250,078 1,748,640,365 1,725,191,931

ARKANSAS 626,335,143 639,642,983 642,993,568 632,678,342 631,560,170

CALIFORNIA 18,272,121,258 17,993,433,994 17,582,554,660 17,421,546,182 17,471,156,608

COLORADO 1,117,311,210 1,153,093,946 1,172,179,194 1,176,711,492 1,183,245,064

CONNECTICUT 1,570,937,903 1,589,423,758 1,600,961,701 1,599,674,823 1,594,867,756

DELAWARE 289,191,325 299,459,668 336,813,775 347,813,868 333,318,032

DIST. OF COL. 264,587,126 257,173,458 252,505,029 250,321,099 249,139,332

FLORIDA 7,729,826,696 7,407,508,809 5,223,605,838 5,719,171,960 5,636,606,603

GEORGIA 2,054,710,265 2,111,869,574 2,190,039,137 2,295,826,214 2,425,031,385

GUAM 65,096,617 64,220,205 64,005,940 63,879,371 66,548,394

HAWAII 461,554,736 472,853,625 476,461,802 484,114,954 484,229,199

IDAHO 477,582,633 487,413,516 515,113,650 530,623,249 542,879,608

ILLINOIS 3,109,739,898 3,169,545,609 3,028,350,646 3,077,642,622 3,114,376,537

INDIANA 2,337,138,592 2,299,410,218 2,276,975,382 2,242,192,953 2,207,705,273

IOWA 881,532,086 866,030,708 859,332,589 850,413,565 844,813,545

KANSAS 632,360,013 669,234,974 720,841,546 767,729,849 802,596,796

KENTUCKY 1,377,941,569 1,408,994,918 1,426,425,223 1,428,839,423 1,436,012,218

LOUISIANA 1,314,000,324 1,387,509,057 1,484,710,708 1,591,759,069 1,707,870,692

MAINE 466,488,976 472,751,065 477,055,860 472,316,202 467,035,088

MARYLAND 1,312,588,211 1,315,928,301 1,325,483,207 1,290,250,222 1,297,559,268

MASSACHUSETTS 2,510,867,016 2,540,123,358 2,550,963,496 2,372,806,619 2,232,032,509

MICHIGAN 8,759,016,619 8,406,415,371 7,569,669,156 6,343,499,740 5,947,072,245

MINNESOTA 1,693,674,894 1,699,078,433 1,657,299,203 1,604,933,629 1,548,536,125

MISSISSIPPI 1,065,895,139 1,179,220,845 1,263,947,894 1,325,482,290 1,379,302,396

MISSOURI 2,075,215,631 2,132,071,701 2,179,157,174 2,199,633,444 2,194,364,735

MONTANA 142,649,446 146,274,186 148,744,144 147,945,696 147,309,572

NEBRASKA 647,145,943 668,166,534 682,542,643 698,779,500 713,890,734

NEVADA 727,244,840 709,761,831 697,467,912 686,257,774 653,673,697

NEW HAMPSHIRE 206,842,340 211,128,496 216,096,103 225,049,159 231,296,460

NEW JERSEY 2,881,096,009 2,996,291,962 3,057,262,397 3,097,912,609 3,123,202,161

NEW MEXICO 679,566,560 712,014,475 736,374,203 758,444,869 776,172,178

NEW YORK 6,375,563,969 6,550,551,832 6,723,316,187 6,892,992,498 7,001,274,537

NORTH CAROLINA 1,826,067,204 1,851,326,860 1,797,718,361 1,830,797,220 1,789,772,302

NORTH DAKOTA 188,068,492 191,664,331 197,430,026 201,943,975 206,161,950

OHIO 4,665,968,280 4,762,770,056 4,833,973,218 4,849,083,755 4,876,911,477

OKLAHOMA 1,974,426,621 2,080,092,682 2,168,614,637 2,257,063,421 2,159,645,564

OREGON 1,178,794,278 1,202,954,761 1,230,475,862 1,247,642,159 1,259,507,799

PENNSYLVANIA 984,030,380 951,567,199 919,880,247 884,113,803 857,069,154

PUERTO RICO 1,168,843,858 1,243,546,963 1,330,288,929 1,414,050,023 1,532,607,458

RHODE ISLAND 221,151,048 234,842,340 249,006,818 258,919,140 271,154,360

SOUTH CAROLINA 1,425,979,051 1,495,142,586 1,559,930,588 1,551,376,489 1,571,522,367

SOUTH DAKOTA 147,533,455 156,461,413 164,330,082 174,879,652 194,108,892

TENNESSEE 2,807,302,734 2,877,863,938 2,964,900,128 3,067,393,429 3,150,490,129

TEXAS 12,184,536,533 13,122,638,056 14,032,601,608 14,995,391,826 15,844,922,985

UTAH 368,088,678 381,757,720 398,179,970 412,293,559 409,266,462

VERMONT 98,131,227 100,000,840 95,436,664 92,989,077 90,304,152

VIRGIN ISLANDS 53,725,697 54,876,479 55,192,846 56,986,000 18,474,577

VIRGINIA 2,275,440,366 2,322,951,157 2,363,816,318 2,400,926,293 2,435,392,985

WASHINGTON 1,927,981,276 1,956,920,252 1,976,802,221 1,975,924,043 1,961,742,234

WEST VIRGINIA 759,485,480 768,488,015 783,693,318 778,786,934 776,393,107

WISCONSIN 2,693,198,310 2,739,958,510 2,728,338,710 2,646,141,246 2,581,786,701

WYOMING 164,610,621 165,757,490 164,687,651 160,639,016 162,121,597

TOTALS $114,558,969,584 $116,149,340,011 $114,789,695,290 $115,544,338,886 $116,360,701,209

Source: Form OCSE-157, line 26.

91

Table P-86 Total Amount of Support Distributed as Arrears for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years

STATES 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016ALABAMA $111,528,670 $108,559,479 $111,552,996 $122,784,073 $121,268,129

ALASKA 39,235,491 37,137,706 37,098,192 41,152,927 42,005,615

ARIZONA 103,320,668 101,160,793 97,915,902 96,250,882 94,571,021

ARKANSAS 64,096,448 65,923,659 65,762,709 66,842,292 64,976,273

CALIFORNIA 861,117,887 834,489,423 829,735,103 837,118,054 852,618,496

COLORADO 84,169,231 85,019,985 86,997,710 89,170,813 88,691,291

CONNECTICUT 79,158,797 78,174,715 77,700,342 5,284,667 83,285,784

DELAWARE 22,219,117 22,651,946 19,689,263 19,741,427 20,541,146

DIST. OF COL. 14,715,838 13,624,479 13,550,161 13,608,381 13,936,022

FLORIDA 440,565,321 444,169,292 418,888,317 406,463,771 429,300,778

GEORGIA 175,940,822 162,256,019 163,108,463 169,220,865 171,198,796

GUAM 6,038,982 3,798,903 3,984,362 3,370,868 3,027,403

HAWAII 26,602,422 26,084,433 26,973,233 28,192,680 28,342,623

IDAHO 43,547,957 45,225,542 42,381,419 45,921,313 45,610,862

ILLINOIS 270,527,994 264,822,810 267,198,579 262,880,108 261,855,680

INDIANA 168,575,392 175,008,512 168,864,996 168,887,118 167,256,284

IOWA 81,948,636 78,766,305 76,658,153 75,389,029 76,926,393

KANSAS 59,711,806 58,511,035 55,674,159 56,734,600 58,747,231

KENTUCKY 117,543,691 114,113,683 114,460,435 116,183,044 109,687,151

LOUISIANA 115,135,520 112,679,923 112,497,436 118,393,730 114,768,402

MAINE 33,138,070 33,424,389 33,291,984 33,704,426 34,271,774

MARYLAND 123,533,479 120,289,399 123,690,955 123,078,636 122,290,300

MASSACHUSETTS 131,516,216 131,076,715 132,090,560 133,912,881 133,401,484

MICHIGAN 390,564,721 366,518,047 346,497,699 344,328,596 340,493,362

MINNESOTA 137,255,869 137,193,263 137,868,361 139,901,665 136,451,860

MISSISSIPPI 92,316,340 87,858,460 92,430,588 95,653,113 98,595,204

MISSOURI 225,623,356 213,752,914 228,710,685 231,421,529 229,002,699

MONTANA 17,154,280 17,041,152 16,734,856 17,914,897 16,626,663

NEBRASKA 50,831,830 50,034,949 50,339,739 50,066,617 48,869,803

NEVADA 46,719,665 47,257,580 46,958,983 49,036,974 50,321,385

NEW HAMPSHIRE 22,228,842 21,376,183 21,223,307 20,049,735 20,162,465

NEW JERSEY 199,771,496 197,868,789 203,141,443 206,935,510 207,022,076

NEW MEXICO 39,049,383 39,218,992 40,021,052 41,493,714 41,085,664

NEW YORK 455,483,464 455,037,139 457,132,363 475,674,773 496,950,938

NORTH CAROLINA 159,565,630 159,122,704 158,291,926 162,135,067 164,356,602

NORTH DAKOTA 21,226,106 21,596,060 21,231,590 20,741,230 20,849,119

OHIO 362,225,666 359,351,885 363,773,167 365,583,226 370,062,999

OKLAHOMA 111,715,397 115,587,894 114,101,323 115,910,655 112,211,599

OREGON 90,071,459 89,487,293 93,561,459 89,679,453 94,403,948

PENNSYLVANIA 192,895,102 184,523,521 178,863,813 176,791,734 174,466,063

PUERTO RICO 69,732,274 65,459,615 67,268,205 64,470,748 72,315,119

RHODE ISLAND 17,355,129 17,583,608 18,288,411 19,344,018 19,597,684

SOUTH CAROLINA 83,197,904 80,088,675 84,984,645 92,232,538 92,011,096

SOUTH DAKOTA 18,851,183 18,877,911 19,392,065 20,121,250 19,991,336

TENNESSEE 176,746,698 178,732,866 188,895,440 190,006,235 194,427,235

TEXAS 900,700,701 930,457,600 961,236,981 994,266,664 1,024,058,399

UTAH 47,317,633 47,117,309 47,664,977 47,684,145 48,398,666

VERMONT 10,982,516 10,793,058 11,517,765 10,932,458 10,697,535

VIRGIN ISLANDS 2,488,159 2,594,364 2,214,291 2,281,833 2,631,570

VIRGINIA 175,472,478 175,307,834 177,376,015 177,936,611 176,348,783

WASHINGTON 168,344,622 173,394,829 169,450,438 167,921,516 173,796,535

WEST VIRGINIA 53,650,804 54,669,504 53,918,017 55,494,737 52,233,433

WISCONSIN 139,899,860 139,327,222 141,548,799 141,216,113 139,685,476

WYOMING 19,166,593 18,306,500 18,475,436 18,407,082 17,151,770

TOTALS $7,672,493,615 $7,592,506,865 $7,612,879,268 $7,639,921,021 $7,803,856,024

Source: Form OCSE-157, line 27.

92

FY 2016 CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT PRELIMINARY REPORT

Table P-87 Cases with Arrears Due for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years

STATES 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016ALABAMA 186,050 188,115 188,369 188,697 185,745

ALASKA 41,199 42,433 42,370 42,686 42,896

ARIZONA 153,975 149,984 146,104 142,241 137,501

ARKANSAS 106,151 105,847 104,149 101,577 98,345

CALIFORNIA 958,614 925,177 900,432 883,955 880,141

COLORADO 135,051 136,300 135,805 134,885 132,368

CONNECTICUT 127,371 127,775 128,195 127,579 127,496

DELAWARE 41,639 42,630 45,071 44,060 44,281

DIST. OF COL. 29,766 29,103 28,448 28,185 27,886

FLORIDA 658,789 647,311 642,581 534,923 515,878

GEORGIA 308,027 306,733 309,372 310,149 311,551

GUAM 4,662 4,534 4,515 4,365 4,245

HAWAII 48,176 48,793 48,917 48,145 47,566

IDAHO 83,872 83,525 83,464 84,037 83,642

ILLINOIS 340,370 338,503 334,379 318,329 314,349

INDIANA 258,426 252,769 245,568 239,121 233,432

IOWA 139,262 136,530 136,092 134,674 133,237

KANSAS 108,547 109,771 107,281 109,159 108,655

KENTUCKY 224,066 224,550 222,686 217,516 211,844

LOUISIANA 185,950 188,175 189,959 193,864 196,593

MAINE 50,600 49,955 49,352 46,892 45,313

MARYLAND 189,578 177,967 174,123 169,842 163,695

MASSACHUSETTS 180,509 181,885 180,658 176,150 168,461

MICHIGAN 611,602 608,251 564,672 562,419 554,108

MINNESOTA 192,134 193,059 191,267 186,000 179,267

MISSISSIPPI 187,486 187,526 194,006 199,973 203,430

MISSOURI 282,972 281,555 281,107 277,756 270,403

MONTANA 34,297 34,444 34,197 33,725 33,144

NEBRASKA 77,642 77,853 77,284 77,626 77,114

NEVADA 91,377 90,073 88,272 85,945 84,826

NEW HAMPSHIRE 29,727 29,448 29,357 28,286 28,189

NEW JERSEY 288,136 285,045 281,214 276,818 273,135

NEW MEXICO 47,148 47,940 48,904 49,349 49,461

NEW YORK 620,646 616,554 611,325 606,251 601,440

NORTH CAROLINA 331,724 331,177 327,470 323,409 318,247

NORTH DAKOTA 29,307 29,806 29,821 29,870 29,469

OHIO 660,278 657,091 648,625 635,602 624,976

OKLAHOMA 164,326 167,984 172,232 175,140 176,415

OREGON 163,644 161,735 159,785 157,605 153,138

PENNSYLVANIA 310,905 302,108 292,082 283,124 274,727

PUERTO RICO 1 162,167 163,027 164,341 166,984 168,639

RHODE ISLAND 33,755 34,707 35,730 35,938 35,567

SOUTH CAROLINA 147,576 146,827 149,401 150,804 147,890

SOUTH DAKOTA 34,430 35,004 35,371 35,353 36,280

TENNESSEE 283,949 285,588 282,647 281,591 281,005

TEXAS 1,006,568 1,050,863 1,084,478 1,113,027 1,142,508

UTAH 79,363 78,009 76,908 76,185 75,197

VERMONT 16,269 16,046 15,655 14,886 14,038

VIRGIN ISLANDS 1, 2 6,116 6,082 5,601 5,447 5,329

VIRGINIA 289,660 289,042 285,641 278,692 272,733

WASHINGTON 322,206 326,033 323,999 321,395 316,989

WEST VIRGINIA 94,502 95,080 96,391 96,168 90,901

WISCONSIN 274,289 272,375 270,115 265,593 259,628

WYOMING 28,630 29,128 28,467 27,796 27,011

TOTALS 11,463,481 11,427,825 11,334,255 11,139,788 11,020,324

Source: Form OCSE-157, line 28.

1 Puerto Rico and Virgin Islands data were unreliable for line 28 in FY 2012.

2 Virgin Islands data were unreliable for line 28 in FY 2013 and FY 2014.

FY 2015 and FY 2016 data reliability information not available at the time of publication.

93

FY 2016 CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT PRELIMINARY REPORT

Table P-88 Cases Paying Towards Arrears for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years

STATES 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016ALABAMA 106,093 106,806 108,930 112,204 112,467

ALASKA 28,308 28,240 28,077 28,618 28,174

ARIZONA 83,860 83,113 80,569 78,549 77,388

ARKANSAS 70,756 71,051 70,743 70,123 68,254

CALIFORNIA 608,876 601,978 592,634 585,138 587,258

COLORADO 94,103 95,258 94,760 94,630 91,258

CONNECTICUT 75,767 75,485 75,659 76,254 77,974

DELAWARE 23,252 23,797 25,013 23,618 24,252

DIST. OF COL. 15,460 15,313 15,695 15,564 15,850

FLORIDA 393,371 385,605 376,531 360,304 362,290

GEORGIA 204,664 202,046 201,695 203,870 204,259

GUAM 3,292 2,838 2,813 2,559 2,354

HAWAII 21,692 21,703 21,415 21,986 21,292

IDAHO 49,317 49,319 48,332 49,331 48,991

ILLINOIS 205,668 202,638 201,843 198,946 196,118

INDIANA 174,889 174,892 172,659 171,807 171,016

IOWA 98,210 97,468 96,752 95,605 93,708

KANSAS 68,528 68,734 64,515 63,406 63,858

KENTUCKY 133,081 132,338 132,746 132,437 130,308

LOUISIANA 108,474 107,707 105,659 107,738 104,805

MAINE 28,957 29,132 29,263 29,884 29,567

MARYLAND 121,425 120,389 120,659 118,226 115,255

MASSACHUSETTS 107,978 108,788 108,563 107,791 106,251

MICHIGAN 355,258 354,900 341,274 345,326 357,485

MINNESOTA 135,518 136,072 135,784 134,131 129,721

MISSISSIPPI 111,614 110,485 110,777 115,377 118,214

MISSOURI 167,961 166,756 167,211 169,094 165,260

MONTANA 22,835 22,704 22,446 22,605 21,516

NEBRASKA 53,642 53,548 53,403 54,197 53,583

NEVADA 52,202 52,740 53,022 53,485 54,817

NEW HAMPSHIRE 19,299 18,773 18,803 18,213 17,790

NEW JERSEY 179,182 177,961 177,765 177,678 178,527

NEW MEXICO 31,244 31,538 31,828 32,289 32,073

NEW YORK 356,277 351,019 346,720 350,906 349,554

NORTH CAROLINA 214,660 216,226 214,220 215,296 214,124

NORTH DAKOTA 20,128 20,320 19,815 19,678 19,185

OHIO 421,201 421,777 422,374 423,566 418,711

OKLAHOMA 100,402 103,794 105,552 108,270 107,196

OREGON 94,074 92,585 92,071 92,723 92,712

PENNSYLVANIA 259,257 252,181 243,949 237,634 232,184

PUERTO RICO 76,757 76,281 76,266 72,683 74,714

RHODE ISLAND 19,150 19,445 20,035 20,277 19,710

SOUTH CAROLINA 78,755 77,063 87,418 91,109 92,073

SOUTH DAKOTA 22,824 23,230 23,250 23,606 23,147

TENNESSEE 164,525 169,060 173,539 175,329 179,780

TEXAS 656,988 678,604 698,558 710,714 720,474

UTAH 49,173 49,880 49,370 49,334 48,499

VERMONT 11,385 11,184 11,216 10,927 10,607

VIRGIN ISLANDS 1 2,822 2,698 2,485 2,461 2,487

VIRGINIA 179,859 177,695 177,785 180,388 179,353

WASHINGTON 194,576 197,794 195,750 198,102 196,106

WEST VIRGINIA 57,916 58,243 58,405 58,441 55,890

WISCONSIN 175,615 177,460 178,334 179,632 179,275

WYOMING 20,437 20,260 20,142 19,972 19,065

TOTALS 7,131,557 7,126,914 7,105,092 7,112,031 7,096,779

Source: Form OCSE-157, line 29.

1 Virgin Islands data were unreliable for line 29 in FY 2012.

FY 2015 and FY 2016 data reliability information not available at the time of publication.

94

FY 2016 CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT PRELIMINARY REPORT

Table P-89 Certified Federal Offset Caseload and Arrearage Amount Totals, 2016 1

STATES TANF Cases TANF Arrearage Non-TANF Cases

Non-TANF Arrearage

Total Cases Total Arrearage

ALABAMA 43,681 $455,290,856 100,324 $2,880,996,571 144,005 $3,336,287,427

ALASKA 16,336 229,570,762 18,492 364,791,645 34,828 594,362,407

ARIZONA 39,185 1,635,620,493 55,501 1,376,513,940 94,686 3,012,134,433

ARKANSAS 14,395 40,824,457 45,957 527,139,369 60,352 567,963,826

CALIFORNIA 343,176 7,328,630,681 410,537 10,375,318,577 753,713 17,703,949,258

COLORADO 29,697 160,810,376 67,849 839,027,133 97,546 999,837,509

CONNECTICUT 48,004 642,293,568 57,913 970,992,740 105,917 1,613,286,308

DELAWARE 10,190 56,089,511 19,490 254,976,694 29,680 311,066,205

DIST. OF COL. 11,123 71,026,623 13,401 178,404,373 24,524 249,430,996

FLORIDA 64,184 374,052,087 342,742 5,855,656,594 406,926 6,229,708,681

GEORGIA 43,774 294,941,996 148,429 2,102,467,269 192,203 2,397,409,265

GUAM 656 12,154,618 2,548 44,314,014 3,204 56,468,632

HAWAII 17,250 170,540,185 23,255 303,305,621 40,505 473,845,806

IDAHO 10,060 43,902,029 33,974 474,682,868 44,034 518,584,897

ILLINOIS 68,647 488,948,930 174,591 2,794,788,499 243,238 3,283,737,429

INDIANA 41,651 279,353,555 122,085 1,874,014,164 163,736 2,153,367,719

IOWA 37,319 298,033,174 51,884 641,568,298 89,203 939,601,472

KANSAS 34,383 261,150,778 53,985 598,816,087 88,368 859,966,865

KENTUCKY 60,102 466,066,433 77,588 856,979,273 137,690 1,323,045,706

LOUISIANA 23,130 132,035,371 107,484 1,506,491,436 130,614 1,638,526,807

MAINE 18,714 223,326,320 19,861 243,030,194 38,575 466,356,514

MARYLAND 34,729 252,533,162 84,406 1,326,995,460 119,135 1,579,528,622

MASSACHUSETTS 44,259 502,227,316 75,104 1,649,813,310 119,363 2,152,040,626

MICHIGAN 112,189 1,655,980,558 232,794 3,986,241,037 344,983 5,642,221,595

MINNESOTA 45,603 310,120,971 76,710 1,158,700,779 122,313 1,468,821,750

MISSISSIPPI 17,663 49,489,430 94,386 1,102,189,253 112,049 1,151,678,683

MISSOURI 66,338 415,148,585 122,798 1,745,984,314 189,136 2,161,132,899

MONTANA 6,699 32,374,288 11,140 100,987,643 17,839 133,361,931

NEBRASKA 21,842 216,329,233 33,901 523,083,028 55,743 739,412,261

NEVADA 20,025 110,434,989 35,366 508,849,893 55,391 619,284,882

NEW HAMPSHIRE 7,263 41,790,295 14,110 164,078,711 21,373 205,869,006

NEW JERSEY 64,315 535,126,456 123,178 2,512,277,440 187,493 3,047,403,896

NEW MEXICO 14,449 111,361,044 28,279 291,950,849 42,728 403,311,893

NEW YORK 117,063 1,332,087,975 178,845 3,807,173,181 295,908 5,139,261,156

NORTH CAROLINA 37,339 148,202,564 109,950 1,178,905,460 147,289 1,327,108,024

NORTH DAKOTA 6,341 42,582,332 13,999 178,217,402 20,340 220,799,734

OHIO 143,113 1,047,460,054 268,617 3,633,940,327 411,730 4,681,400,381

OKLAHOMA 34,705 310,603,727 91,883 1,646,460,598 126,588 1,957,064,325

OREGON 60,178 603,231,089 69,593 857,374,072 129,771 1,460,605,161

PENNSYLVANIA 40,227 174,916,156 86,179 737,871,463 126,406 912,787,619

PUERTO RICO 13,126 69,535,806 92,428 986,956,125 105,554 1,056,491,931

RHODE ISLAND 7,201 47,646,940 11,094 139,350,590 18,295 186,997,530

SOUTH CAROLINA 35,909 180,979,672 76,131 1,047,095,823 112,040 1,228,075,495

SOUTH DAKOTA 7,866 43,047,739 15,849 174,912,170 23,715 217,959,909

TENNESSEE 79,999 603,414,666 143,986 2,370,262,906 223,985 2,973,677,572

TEXAS 164,666 1,878,506,266 677,009 13,942,954,143 841,675 15,821,460,409

UTAH 10,846 47,610,817 28,240 343,285,324 39,086 390,896,141

VERMONT 2,570 12,500,772 6,095 74,309,208 8,665 86,809,980

VIRGIN ISLANDS 557 4,408,162 2,307 36,631,296 2,864 41,039,458

VIRGINIA 66,158 485,914,100 108,211 1,838,307,468 174,369 2,324,221,568

WASHINGTON 86,275 594,218,734 116,213 1,428,300,582 202,488 2,022,519,316

WEST VIRGINIA 21,024 81,216,206 41,235 574,541,171 62,259 655,757,377

WISCONSIN 40,423 410,046,406 101,799 2,104,511,635 142,222 2,514,558,041

WYOMING 4,391 22,532,509 10,038 131,740,154 14,429 154,272,663

TOTALS 2,411,008 $26,038,241,822 5,129,763 $87,368,528,174 7,540,771 $113,406,769,996

Source: Federal Parent Locator Service (FPLS); data as of September 29, 2016.

1 Processing Year, the calendar year the collections actually took place.

95

Non-Cooperation and Good Cause

Table P-90 Cases Open with a Determination of Non-Cooperation for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years

STATES 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016ALABAMA 2,701 2,494 2,225 1,875 1,700

ALASKA 307 302 301 317 288

ARIZONA 655 294 180 148 1,221

ARKANSAS 1,011 931 825 641 496

CALIFORNIA 20,008 20,497 21,913 21,781 18,924

COLORADO 821 1,074 1,080 955 1,033

CONNECTICUT 111 112 93 77 64

DELAWARE 545 5,380 519 807 813

DIST. OF COL. 9,081 8,646 9,244 9,038 9,278

FLORIDA 0 0 0 0 0

GEORGIA 558 415 280 317 330

GUAM 230 225 219 221 213

HAWAII 553 479 433 444 425

IDAHO 90 97 123 85 98

ILLINOIS 10,854 13,666 11,416 16,876 12,742

INDIANA 285 462 224 321 301

IOWA 413 474 464 444 453

KANSAS 503 390 356 359 300

KENTUCKY 2,205 1,929 1,994 1,798 1,969

LOUISIANA 2,070 1,528 1,368 1,185 1,215

MAINE 6 34 13 3 0

MARYLAND 292 260 269 290 263

MASSACHUSETTS 625 584 375 333 250

MICHIGAN 2,630 2,651 851 748 334

MINNESOTA 2,445 2,137 1,933 1,945 1,928

MISSISSIPPI 11,008 16,786 12,716 12,267 9,970

MISSOURI 226 181 127 91 42

MONTANA 1,122 1,565 1,771 1,613 1,634

NEBRASKA 1,790 1,696 1,760 2,314 2,245

NEVADA 5,309 5,424 4,172 3,941 3,890

NEW HAMPSHIRE 159 143 125 116 118

NEW JERSEY 754 967 873 629 530

NEW MEXICO 2,004 1,171 1,917 1,386 1,381

NEW YORK 2,303 2,526 2,853 3,464 3,762

NORTH CAROLINA 473 551 412 638 538

NORTH DAKOTA 1,240 1,004 623 316 279

OHIO 2,771 2,419 2,206 2,018 1,792

OKLAHOMA 2,437 2,361 2,519 2,465 2,445

OREGON 990 1,122 1,235 1,007 860

PENNSYLVANIA 15,207 17,419 16,414 15,886 13,818

PUERTO RICO 599 468 392 383 320

RHODE ISLAND 228 179 156 200 180

SOUTH CAROLINA 0 0 0 0 0

SOUTH DAKOTA 157 170 179 210 264

TENNESSEE 5,822 4,178 3,675 2,890 2,343

TEXAS 7,328 5,195 3,996 3,132 3,338

UTAH 14,897 16,509 17,929 19,251 21,390

VERMONT 142 139 146 99 105

VIRGIN ISLANDS 25 51 42 33 32

VIRGINIA 1,412 1,463 1,195 1,168 1,048

WASHINGTON 4,020 4,035 3,285 2,967 2,656

WEST VIRGINIA 284 223 146 148 104

WISCONSIN 684 778 693 515 411

WYOMING 48 57 52 35 33

TOTALS 142,438 153,841 138,307 140,190 130,166

Source: Form OCSE-157, line 37.

96

FY 2016 CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT PRELIMINARY REPORT

Table P-91 Cases Open with Good Cause Determinations for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years

STATES 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016ALABAMA 35 42 49 40 37

ALASKA 62 68 83 105 88

ARIZONA 40 22 19 19 21

ARKANSAS 44 54 48 49 44

CALIFORNIA 1,670 1,739 1,615 1,144 1,039

COLORADO 3 2 2 1 1

CONNECTICUT 360 364 353 343 303

DELAWARE 1 26 11 13 11

DIST. OF COL. 24 22 25 26 22

FLORIDA 3 0 457 199 148

GEORGIA 0 0 0 8 3

GUAM 1 2 2 1 1

HAWAII 1 0 1 0 1

IDAHO 19 23 32 32 28

ILLINOIS 0 0 0 0 0

INDIANA 8 4 2 1 1

IOWA 6 4 6 3 3

KANSAS 55 30 36 22 17

KENTUCKY 68 99 167 157 40

LOUISIANA 39 35 34 33 31

MAINE 44 36 23 22 35

MARYLAND 15 11 8 6 4

MASSACHUSETTS 455 322 568 433 466

MICHIGAN 564 388 454 182 192

MINNESOTA 133 160 137 165 153

MISSISSIPPI 9 8 4 5 3

MISSOURI 986 1,090 1,208 1,322 1,482

MONTANA 40 46 12 17 32

NEBRASKA 77 86 92 95 109

NEVADA 280 254 117 118 130

NEW HAMPSHIRE 5 2 2 1 1

NEW JERSEY 1,040 886 878 753 540

NEW MEXICO 4 0 0 1 0

NEW YORK 1,106 1,192 1,314 1,342 1,508

NORTH CAROLINA 35 29 27 22 24

NORTH DAKOTA 0 0 0 0 0

OHIO 128 114 105 89 88

OKLAHOMA 38 37 31 44 60

OREGON 717 266 456 155 97

PENNSYLVANIA 14 11 18 21 20

PUERTO RICO 0 0 0 0 0

RHODE ISLAND 287 279 252 258 249

SOUTH CAROLINA 146 143 105 72 81

SOUTH DAKOTA 11 14 12 11 10

TENNESSEE 556 599 405 241 182

TEXAS 277 231 238 213 230

UTAH 29 31 38 35 47

VERMONT 40 63 61 57 60

VIRGIN ISLANDS 0 0 0 0 0

VIRGINIA 198 208 193 165 159

WASHINGTON 117 156 155 169 154

WEST VIRGINIA 41 38 27 34 34

WISCONSIN 48 41 58 57 51

WYOMING 0 0 0 0 0

TOTALS 9,879 9,277 9,940 8,301 8,040

Source: Form OCSE-157, line 38.

97

Children

Table P-92 Children with Paternity Resolved for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years 1

STATES 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016ALABAMA 202,813 201,927 200,421 194,323 190,146

ALASKA 45,281 44,875 45,333 44,450 42,199

ARIZONA 183,832 177,515 170,838 161,959 154,842

ARKANSAS 119,226 118,508 115,199 111,339 108,024

CALIFORNIA 1,323,091 1,279,499 1,245,386 1,222,546 1,194,310

COLORADO 147,483 147,541 147,658 146,004 144,863

CONNECTICUT 170,265 171,166 167,278 157,286 142,978

DELAWARE 61,997 62,981 68,435 70,863 69,002

DIST. OF COL. 33,870 33,763 34,279 33,863 32,752

FLORIDA 875,860 803,647 638,617 610,374 612,121

GEORGIA 495,525 496,318 508,284 517,581 526,214

GUAM 10,167 10,319 10,336 10,433 10,142

HAWAII 47,408 45,623 48,541 48,822 47,608

IDAHO 145,073 144,621 148,030 147,867 148,065

ILLINOIS 433,233 429,607 414,959 403,785 400,188

INDIANA 330,739 299,038 283,545 271,590 262,228

IOWA 152,705 151,113 148,600 144,716 142,477

KANSAS 132,233 130,368 133,030 128,218 133,909

KENTUCKY 279,018 276,619 266,927 253,232 246,984

LOUISIANA 282,237 291,260 291,090 274,861 266,035

MAINE 49,744 50,197 48,441 45,035 41,491

MARYLAND 209,765 208,283 205,890 202,718 197,006

MASSACHUSETTS 217,440 216,392 209,995 203,261 192,088

MICHIGAN 886,557 872,576 873,599 815,251 628,559

MINNESOTA 251,757 252,651 245,952 236,343 231,633

MISSISSIPPI 367,915 379,682 338,187 337,019 322,520

MISSOURI 449,307 448,526 445,082 436,533 423,425

MONTANA 39,718 39,630 38,769 37,421 36,870

NEBRASKA 145,732 146,300 146,536 147,779 147,987

NEVADA 106,700 106,424 100,677 97,308 96,755

NEW HAMPSHIRE 36,578 36,558 36,621 39,169 39,319

NEW JERSEY 459,558 451,507 442,766 430,540 419,308

NEW MEXICO 77,800 79,493 82,288 82,417 83,389

NEW YORK 873,286 856,654 847,264 833,780 792,178

NORTH CAROLINA 414,916 400,392 392,953 385,493 378,796

NORTH DAKOTA 46,593 46,681 45,964 44,529 43,549

OHIO 872,427 847,816 821,399 800,961 778,076

OKLAHOMA 200,813 204,059 205,818 205,879 206,265

OREGON 83,587 98,363 99,935 91,808 86,611

PENNSYLVANIA 448,466 439,596 430,523 421,556 408,605

PUERTO RICO 230,557 224,089 215,857 208,901 197,047

RHODE ISLAND 54,039 53,959 53,779 49,382 47,246

SOUTH CAROLINA 253,312 251,360 233,141 222,928 227,569

SOUTH DAKOTA 37,721 38,204 38,080 38,806 39,709

TENNESSEE 413,679 394,143 372,187 358,115 349,066

TEXAS 1,083,597 1,148,680 1,188,281 1,231,589 1,263,570

UTAH 108,238 110,098 112,034 115,694 115,544

VERMONT 21,826 20,481 18,892 18,035 17,303

VIRGIN ISLANDS 5,297 5,505 5,276 5,045 4,715

VIRGINIA 303,533 301,172 280,180 273,379 267,490

WASHINGTON 337,165 334,417 306,834 296,174 286,919

WEST VIRGINIA 116,702 117,166 121,500 112,315 104,889

WISCONSIN 346,592 350,795 354,619 354,589 352,632

WYOMING 22,463 22,264 25,404 24,961 24,722

TOTALS 15,045,436 14,870,421 14,471,509 14,158,825 13,727,938

Source: Form OCSE-157, line 7.

1 Includes all children born within a marriage, legitimized by marriage or adoption, and children with paternity established or acknowledged.

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FY 2016 CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT PRELIMINARY REPORT

Table P-93 Total Number of Children in IV-D Cases for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years

STATES 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016ALABAMA 217,650 212,618 208,207 199,755 194,701

ALASKA 47,009 46,639 47,351 46,378 43,712

ARIZONA 200,014 192,548 182,920 172,779 164,677

ARKANSAS 131,297 130,008 124,162 118,495 114,043

CALIFORNIA 1,427,617 1,369,906 1,327,392 1,300,157 1,265,153

COLORADO 157,521 157,122 157,126 154,426 152,919

CONNECTICUT 186,810 187,812 179,635 164,738 147,825

DELAWARE 82,090 83,742 84,871 87,119 80,538

DIST. OF COL. 46,291 47,362 47,420 45,495 43,544

FLORIDA 1,004,525 901,890 715,755 667,152 669,861

GEORGIA 529,258 521,367 533,252 542,222 553,455

GUAM 11,013 11,225 11,347 11,508 11,232

HAWAII 83,454 81,088 75,847 73,318 69,337

IDAHO 153,466 153,426 157,762 156,328 155,940

ILLINOIS 513,855 517,603 504,979 508,241 488,288

INDIANA 356,481 310,170 291,598 278,973 268,747

IOWA 178,335 176,438 172,979 168,009 164,737

KANSAS 143,889 142,361 147,381 138,443 146,900

KENTUCKY 304,358 301,446 287,707 271,662 265,366

LOUISIANA 320,015 326,651 319,628 298,454 286,573

MAINE 88,611 86,855 81,734 73,828 67,255

MARYLAND 231,215 227,442 224,339 220,367 214,511

MASSACHUSETTS 236,881 233,786 227,137 220,152 207,874

MICHIGAN 964,608 952,805 955,532 881,557 881,343

MINNESOTA 269,680 270,383 261,628 250,210 245,095

MISSISSIPPI 412,071 428,104 378,437 370,473 354,840

MISSOURI 476,876 479,477 469,255 456,080 441,300

MONTANA 41,795 41,741 40,564 39,138 38,771

NEBRASKA 154,480 154,007 153,896 155,245 155,522

NEVADA 119,613 117,806 110,651 105,747 105,395

NEW HAMPSHIRE 38,313 38,374 38,345 41,271 41,506

NEW JERSEY 522,802 509,877 493,396 473,528 456,279

NEW MEXICO 87,111 88,082 92,815 90,566 91,828

NEW YORK 977,564 951,744 929,653 911,570 852,562

NORTH CAROLINA 448,823 440,604 426,112 418,908 413,936

NORTH DAKOTA 48,327 48,064 46,934 45,318 44,275

OHIO 934,471 898,501 865,594 839,537 813,463

OKLAHOMA 222,683 224,273 224,880 223,500 223,836

OREGON 232,552 242,971 233,329 205,544 187,199

PENNSYLVANIA 563,376 554,189 541,120 529,302 509,296

PUERTO RICO 230,787 224,271 215,993 209,031 197,145

RHODE ISLAND 61,734 61,227 60,242 54,192 51,240

SOUTH CAROLINA 289,465 297,523 265,671 249,907 254,491

SOUTH DAKOTA 40,426 40,774 40,485 41,137 42,501

TENNESSEE 450,313 429,723 401,891 383,824 373,762

TEXAS 1,577,492 1,653,072 1,689,695 1,742,807 1,773,253

UTAH 113,022 114,312 116,433 120,278 120,337

VERMONT 23,057 21,644 19,855 18,884 18,151

VIRGIN ISLANDS 7,979 8,040 7,738 7,296 6,782

VIRGINIA 321,672 317,601 294,743 287,806 282,305

WASHINGTON 359,738 354,798 323,039 311,531 301,786

WEST VIRGINIA 122,525 122,550 128,374 116,942 108,642

WISCONSIN 368,209 370,897 374,961 374,304 372,936

WYOMING 23,333 23,055 25,949 25,502 25,341

TOTALS 17,156,552 16,899,994 16,337,739 15,898,934 15,562,306

Source: Form OCSE-157, line 4.

99

Table P-94 Number of Children Determined Eligible For Medicaid for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years

STATES 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016ALABAMA 115,718 107,195 129,647 126,113 121,992

ALASKA 6,467 6,474 6,846 6,168 6,042

ARIZONA 23,485 24,448 28,271 25,265 23,275

ARKANSAS 78,104 78,524 74,610 69,561 54,800

CALIFORNIA 552,508 516,968 545,096 516,559 440,969

COLORADO 77,422 77,867 1,409 1,910 2,701

CONNECTICUT 123,873 124,074 103,134 14,712 6,460

DELAWARE 42,185 43,796 37,419 52,790 36,786

DIST. OF COL. 29,528 30,289 31,568 27,386 26,717

FLORIDA 294,120 290,202 214,689 192,697 186,367

GEORGIA 287,344 273,287 296,535 306,549 309,637

GUAM 0 0 0 0 0

HAWAII 0 0 0 0 0

IDAHO 62,287 68,421 76,181 75,147 74,457

ILLINOIS 315,449 324,611 311,463 305,141 291,916

INDIANA 1,363 8,026 13,608 18,746 25,224

IOWA 118,864 118,531 115,430 114,727 116,372

KANSAS 75,303 73,668 80,321 61,996 47,682

KENTUCKY 177,607 175,659 146,172 118,658 120,703

LOUISIANA 255,804 260,875 259,656 248,559 223,935

MAINE 34,298 34,520 15,529 11,432 9,192

MARYLAND 0 0 0 0 0

MASSACHUSETTS 61,180 53,860 52,536 56,672 42,651

MICHIGAN 494,678 474,341 539,419 495,667 477,932

MINNESOTA 144,545 146,085 126,542 100,413 89,866

MISSISSIPPI 0 0 0 0 0

MISSOURI 154,853 151,189 102,940 22,276 16,039

MONTANA 13,175 14,313 12,447 9,880 9,388

NEBRASKA 84,018 83,295 82,686 83,490 82,332

NEVADA 55,732 56,437 60,194 58,471 56,817

NEW HAMPSHIRE 18,020 18,340 18,767 21,985 23,596

NEW JERSEY 69,186 65,773 51,768 42,423 34,131

NEW MEXICO 36,553 35,989 35,200 27,006 24,634

NEW YORK 333,098 334,282 309,016 290,567 260,202

NORTH CAROLINA 323,191 320,098 306,705 302,642 295,442

NORTH DAKOTA 8,073 7,939 2,346 558 539

OHIO 521,800 495,712 442,641 411,316 372,563

OKLAHOMA 97,921 122,110 131,825 129,705 131,465

OREGON 126,838 156,359 158,954 154,266 148,950

PENNSYLVANIA 271,636 294,639 296,050 297,849 291,498

PUERTO RICO 41 52 51 69 98

RHODE ISLAND 42,716 42,971 44,619 40,176 38,105

SOUTH CAROLINA 167,310 184,525 169,158 25,195 28,469

SOUTH DAKOTA 21,441 21,008 20,819 21,873 23,187

TENNESSEE 319,919 306,942 291,231 279,480 272,545

TEXAS 749,285 780,466 856,770 838,090 826,567

UTAH 53,919 54,236 56,676 60,134 60,149

VERMONT 0 0 0 0 0

VIRGIN ISLANDS 2 3 2 2 2

VIRGINIA 188,039 183,745 156,895 17 155,651

WASHINGTON 195,557 193,518 151,144 155,549 150,111

WEST VIRGINIA 67,742 67,019 75,070 67,195 60,034

WISCONSIN 180,433 179,224 174,468 172,952 167,720

WYOMING 7,421 6,761 6,685 6,383 5,767

TOTALS 7,480,051 7,488,666 7,221,208 6,466,417 6,271,677

Source: Form OCSE-157, line 33.

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Table P-95 Number of Children Determined Eligible For Medicaid Covered by Private Health Insurance for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years

STATES 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016ALABAMA 14,208 15,565 22,093 20,354 20,479

ALASKA 284 282 282 222 222

ARIZONA 3,022 3,246 4,274 4,135 4,135

ARKANSAS 13,778 14,391 13,610 12,374 8,871

CALIFORNIA 61,191 56,872 60,807 53,930 44,359

COLORADO 1,312 1,084 12 20 14

CONNECTICUT 12,482 12,275 10,279 1,744 701

DELAWARE 6,525 6,928 3,676 5,237 3,758

DIST. OF COL. 2,239 2,352 2,487 2,081 2,243

FLORIDA 15 4 12,186 13,678 14,916

GEORGIA 44,896 45,646 50,627 53,930 54,591

GUAM 0 0 0 0 0

HAWAII 4,196 4,242 3,545 3,438 2,960

IDAHO 15,279 15,682 16,665 16,881 16,056

ILLINOIS 36,347 38,118 32,776 33,855 34,350

INDIANA 3 101 187 284 456

IOWA 32,821 32,166 31,261 31,727 31,193

KANSAS 7,912 7,096 6,976 5,496 3,490

KENTUCKY 44,239 42,464 38,175 32,093 19,392

LOUISIANA 43,615 45,084 46,694 47,779 48,317

MAINE 3,606 3,560 1,338 834 541

MARYLAND 0 0 0 0 0

MASSACHUSETTS 4,937 3,956 4,042 4,734 3,600

MICHIGAN 71,395 65,135 76,796 73,856 67,168

MINNESOTA 17,943 17,753 15,318 11,776 10,449

MISSISSIPPI 0 0 0 0 0

MISSOURI 27,583 26,697 18,685 3,518 2,532

MONTANA 1,482 1,791 1,585 1,432 1,370

NEBRASKA 21,006 19,372 17,813 17,885 16,904

NEVADA 6,203 6,507 8,526 9,263 9,038

NEW HAMPSHIRE 1,142 1,782 1,686 1,747 1,877

NEW JERSEY 2,819 2,776 2,153 1,835 2,091

NEW MEXICO 7,352 7,917 7,255 5,836 4,894

NEW YORK 46,961 33,703 33,901 32,379 27,385

NORTH CAROLINA 43,215 42,994 42,208 41,825 37,520

NORTH DAKOTA 2,127 2,113 594 85 76

OHIO 107,231 100,225 86,434 79,912 71,273

OKLAHOMA 13,280 18,726 20,893 20,976 20,655

OREGON 5,696 7,039 8,412 9,787 11,089

PENNSYLVANIA 77,630 78,488 180,877 187,627 187,208

PUERTO RICO 0 0 0 0 0

RHODE ISLAND 8,499 8,378 8,690 6,757 6,429

SOUTH CAROLINA 3,102 2,897 2,750 458 436

SOUTH DAKOTA 4,124 3,997 4,463 4,664 4,526

TENNESSEE 30,195 30,054 30,640 24,356 30,857

TEXAS 128,335 133,939 140,991 129,347 119,714

UTAH 15,756 15,898 17,321 19,015 19,458

VERMONT 1,634 1,427 1,257 1,165 0

VIRGIN ISLANDS 0 0 0 0 0

VIRGINIA 31,371 29,905 24,117 2 23,742

WASHINGTON 25,112 24,881 18,237 19,665 18,971

WEST VIRGINIA 7,508 7,518 8,655 8,579 7,186

WISCONSIN 38,666 37,108 34,848 35,091 33,813

WYOMING 1,332 1,184 1,255 962 754

TOTALS 1,101,606 1,081,318 1,178,352 1,094,626 1,052,059

Source: Form OCSE-157, line 34.

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Federal Parent Locator Service

Table P-96 Tax Offset and Administrative Offset Programs (TANF and Non-TANF Combined), 2016 1

Tax Offset Program Administrative Offset Program

STATES Offsets Amounts Offsets AmountsALABAMA 20,900 $30,920,611 691 $223,598

ALASKA 5,093 7,521,303 156 91,135

ARIZONA 17,745 29,513,176 435 339,814

ARKANSAS 13,032 18,114,546 260 139,041

CALIFORNIA 115,089 159,143,237 3,275 1,233,293

COLORADO 16,975 22,668,585 277 130,230

CONNECTICUT 16,171 21,369,780 340 137,277

DELAWARE 4,628 5,651,790 24 23,660

DIST. OF COL. 3,269 3,764,265 275 73,332

FLORIDA 77,944 112,128,423 408 402,860

GEORGIA 33,634 47,302,742 0 0

GUAM 287 477,493 20 11,402

HAWAII 6,930 9,035,536 154 44,814

IDAHO 8,861 12,920,097 122 91,911

ILLINOIS 40,073 54,117,614 857 408,143

INDIANA 34,436 46,214,296 267 209,934

IOWA 16,065 19,696,011 167 153,653

KANSAS 16,281 22,401,753 183 117,431

KENTUCKY 28,528 36,335,367 355 140,062

LOUISIANA 23,806 39,375,143 333 119,235

MAINE 6,794 9,163,405 134 47,882

MARYLAND 19,385 25,917,253 631 292,750

MASSACHUSETTS 19,437 23,702,401 333 110,104

MICHIGAN 57,299 69,319,008 1 75

MINNESOTA 21,935 26,470,786 0 0

MISSISSIPPI 26,609 39,754,310 171 125,208

MISSOURI 33,622 44,824,635 594 277,190

MONTANA 4,089 4,974,933 75 51,386

NEBRASKA 8,884 10,704,352 204 134,505

NEVADA 11,082 15,932,450 160 105,823

NEW HAMPSHIRE 4,498 5,825,499 22 47,884

NEW JERSEY 33,050 46,146,613 904 383,603

NEW MEXICO 8,409 13,188,002 309 153,587

NEW YORK 46,908 58,469,441 0 0

NORTH CAROLINA 32,285 38,514,543 0 0

NORTH DAKOTA 3,933 5,943,388 127 69,457

OHIO 77,043 100,379,309 1 35

OKLAHOMA 25,374 38,138,302 494 249,691

OREGON 17,994 24,694,732 264 178,922

PENNSYLVANIA 31,820 36,146,087 0 0

PUERTO RICO 13,569 26,730,128 519 239,361

RHODE ISLAND 3,811 4,532,403 42 11,821

SOUTH CAROLINA 16,857 19,835,358 234 89,494

SOUTH DAKOTA 5,359 7,324,642 33 6,576

TENNESSEE 42,128 55,825,353 540 192,229

TEXAS 171,179 264,066,586 4 478

UTAH 9,508 13,852,744 44 27,314

VERMONT 2,496 3,041,590 26 8,281

VIRGIN ISLANDS 319 498,941 14 13,649

VIRGINIA 34,032 41,419,743 200 51,709

WASHINGTON 34,886 41,777,774 527 397,098

WEST VIRGINIA 12,097 14,755,734 90 69,464

WISCONSIN 31,783 43,374,214 1 49

WYOMING 3,731 5,278,033 49 13,715

TOTALS 1,371,952 $1,879,194,462 15,346 $7,440,161

Source: Federal Parent Locator Service (FPLS)

1 Processing Year, the calendar year the collections actually took place.

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FY 2016 CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT PRELIMINARY REPORT

Table P-97 Federal Parent Locator Service (FPLS), FY 2016

NATIONAL FPLS STATISTICS - National Directory Of New Hires (NDNH) 10/1/2015 - 9/30/2016Total Number of Records Posted by Data Type 1 741,686,791

New Hire (NH) 65,627,116

Quarterly Wage (QW) 651,776,242

Unemployment Insurance (UI) 24,283,433

NATIONAL FPLS STATISTICS - Federal Case Registry (FCR)

Total Number of Cases in the FCR (As of End of the FY) 19,157,292

IV-D Cases 15,117,920

Non IV-D Cases 4,039,372

Total Number of Unique Persons in the FCR by Participant Type (As of End of the FY) 2 45,433,725

NonCustodial Parents (NCP) 12,605,967

Putative Fathers (PF) 764,749

Custodial Parties (CP) 13,639,076

Children (CH) 21,016,161

Total Number of Unique Persons (NCPs and PFs) Matched by Data Type 3 8,021,475

New Hire (NH) 3,934,392

Quarterly Wage (QW) 7,759,145

Unemployment Insurance (UI) 1,527,630

NATIONAL FPLS STATISTICS - Multistate Financial Institution Data Match (MSFIDM)

Number of Obligors with Account Matches (Average of Four Quarters for the FY) 4 2,174,107

Number of Account Matches Returned (Average of Four Quarters for the FY) 4 5,288,152

Number of Multistate Financial Institutions (MSFIs) 3,829

NATIONAL FPLS STATISTICS - CSENet 5

Valid Transactions 9,549,013

Exchange Agreements (As of End of the FY) 17,032

Source: Federal Parent Locator Service (FPLS)

1 The Total Number of Records Posted to the NDNH includes records submitted by both states and federal agencies. Therefore, the national totals are higher than the totals reported in the state-by-state report because that report does not include any records posted by federal agencies.

2 The Total Number of Unique Persons in the FCR is derived by unduplicating SSNs across all participant types. The figures for the individual participant types are unduplicated within that category but not between them--i.e., an individual may appear in more than one category, but is only counted once within that category and only once in the total. As a result, the counts for the individual participant types may not add up to the Total Number of Unique Persons in the FCR. In addition, an individual can be a child support case participant in more than one state but is only counted once in the nationwide total.

3 The Total Number of Unique Persons (NCPs and PFs) Matched is derived by unduplicating SSNs located across all data types (NH, QW, UI). The figure is unduplicated within each data type but not between them--i.e., an individual may appear in more than one category but is only counted once in that category and once in the total. As a result, the individual NH, QW, and UI counts may not add up to the Total Number of Unique Persons Matched.

4 The MSFIDM match is performed quarterly. If an obligor has an account open over two quarters, the match would be duplicated each quarter. To compensate for this, the average of the four quarters during the fiscal year was used. Since an obligor can have more than one account, there are always more accounts than obligors located.

5 States use the Child Support Enforcement Network (CSENet) to communicate case data and requests to other states automated systems in order to process interstate cases more effectively. A valid transaction involves the complete process of one state initiating and forwarding a request, and the appropriate state receiving this request. An Exchange agreement allows one state to forward a request to another state using CSENet. The total number of exchange agreements that an individual state has reflects the number of other states that it can send requests to. The national total is the sum of exchange agreements in all states.

103

Table P-98 Federal Parent Locator Service (FPLS), 2016 1

NATIONAL FPLS STATISTICS - FEDERAL OFFSET PROGRAMTotal Net Collections and Percent of Total $1,886,634,623

Offset 2 $1,879,194,462 99.6%

Administrative Offset 2 $7,440,161 0.4%

TANF 3 $329,782,864 17.5%

Non-TANF 3 $1,556,851,759 82.5%

Total Number of Offsets and Percent of Total 1,387,298

Tax Offset 2 1,371,952 98.9%

Administrative Offset 2 15,346 1.1%

TANF 3 304,926 22.0%

Non-TANF 3 1,082,372 78.0%

Total Certified Caseload and Percent of Total (As of End of the Year) 1 7,643,863

TANF Cases 4 2,431,978 31.8%

Non-TANF Cases 4 5,211,885 68.2%

Total Certified Arrearages and Percent of Total (As of End of the Year) 1 $114,830,813,408

TANF $26,013,909,338 22.7%

Non-TANF $88,816,904,070 77.3%

Source: Federal Parent Locator Service (FPLS)

1 Processing Year, the calendar year the collections actually took place.

2 Tax Offsets are based on intercepts of Federal Tax Refunds, while Administrative Offsets are based on intercepts of certain federal payments such as vendor and miscellaneous payments (that is, expense reimbursement payments and travel payments) and federal retirement payments. The tax and administrative figures add up to the Total figures and include both TANF and Non-TANF.

3 The TANF and Non-TANF figures add up to the Total figures and include both Tax and Administrative Offsets.

4 A certified case may be representative of an individual debt or an accumulation of TANF or Non-TANF debts. The criteria for certification of a debt for Federal Income Tax Refund Offset are as follows:

In TANF or Title IV-E foster care cases: the amount of past-due support must be at least $150.

In Non-TANF or Medicaid-only cases: the amount of past-due support must be at least $500.

The criterion for certification of a debt for Administrative Offset is the amount of past-due support must be at least $25.

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FY 2016 CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT PRELIMINARY REPORT

Table P-99 Federal Parent Locator Service (FPLS) National Directory of New Hires (NDNH), FY 2016

Number of Records Posted by Data Type

STATES Total New Hire Quarterly Wage Unemployment Insurance

ALABAMA 9,616,454 946,400 8,435,443 234,611

ALASKA 1,741,329 78,149 1,550,665 112,515

ARIZONA 14,297,322 2,074,441 11,894,820 328,061

ARKANSAS 6,226,851 814,147 5,291,120 121,584

CALIFORNIA 83,085,806 6,110,332 73,735,137 3,240,337

COLORADO 14,455,029 2,160,322 12,012,246 282,461

CONNECTICUT 7,810,624 490,052 7,012,073 308,499

DELAWARE 1,343,132 337,942 979,879 25,311

DIST. OF COL. 2,521,810 154,392 2,299,492 67,926

FLORIDA 41,012,899 4,118,079 36,624,530 270,290

GEORGIA 18,752,437 2,572,903 15,743,359 436,175

GUAM 1 10,067 10,067 0 0

HAWAII 2,992,700 168,618 2,753,280 70,802

IDAHO 3,186,801 276,337 2,848,140 62,324

ILLINOIS 35,054,916 1,891,182 32,154,372 1,009,362

INDIANA 14,351,755 1,715,547 12,318,730 317,478

IOWA 7,667,218 504,385 6,926,949 235,884

KANSAS 6,990,686 619,091 6,280,201 91,394

KENTUCKY 9,318,422 728,850 8,325,872 263,700

LOUISIANA 9,347,765 741,542 8,470,585 135,638

MAINE 3,033,493 252,889 2,711,196 69,408

MARYLAND 12,365,938 1,199,212 10,997,052 169,674

MASSACHUSETTS 19,209,244 1,847,062 16,931,402 430,780

MICHIGAN 22,473,965 2,125,574 19,850,131 498,260

MINNESOTA 15,543,332 2,446,996 12,714,915 381,421

MISSISSIPPI 5,476,529 424,975 4,923,405 128,149

MISSOURI 13,914,387 1,186,738 12,330,228 397,421

MONTANA 2,284,714 147,225 2,076,781 60,708

NEBRASKA 4,952,714 569,668 4,310,627 72,419

NEVADA 6,192,104 464,838 5,564,931 162,335

NEW HAMPSHIRE 3,711,195 256,906 3,398,147 56,142

NEW JERSEY 20,148,392 1,559,621 16,933,206 1,655,565

NEW MEXICO 3,880,352 325,679 3,462,766 91,907

NEW YORK 44,985,389 2,386,370 41,161,261 1,437,758

NORTH CAROLINA 21,661,869 1,888,368 19,501,840 271,661

NORTH DAKOTA 2,275,828 182,757 1,999,977 93,094

OHIO 27,073,446 2,668,425 23,735,646 669,375

OKLAHOMA 8,002,884 699,307 7,090,103 213,474

OREGON 7,522,488 185,394 7,023,419 313,675

PENNSYLVANIA 33,795,006 2,887,540 25,283,309 5,624,157

PUERTO RICO 3,321,550 90,708 3,064,452 166,390

RHODE ISLAND 2,394,250 172,131 2,131,127 90,992

SOUTH CAROLINA 9,852,154 835,935 8,877,635 138,584

SOUTH DAKOTA 2,145,000 243,134 1,880,298 21,568

TENNESSEE 15,330,074 1,973,978 13,080,941 275,155

TEXAS 59,339,175 5,365,611 52,395,989 1,577,575

UTAH 7,058,149 961,889 5,977,762 118,498

VERMONT 1,449,628 98,065 1,304,002 47,561

VIRGIN ISLANDS 138,781 3,946 121,607 13,228

VIRGINIA 18,308,783 1,805,905 16,295,438 207,440

WASHINGTON 6,021,972 1,380,649 4,112,842 528,481

WEST VIRGINIA 3,595,609 208,346 3,224,050 163,213

WISCONSIN 14,646,699 1,474,100 12,677,288 495,311

WYOMING 1,433,446 113,594 1,292,150 27,702

TOTALS 2 713,322,562 64,946,313 624,092,816 24,283,433

Source: Federal Parent Locator Service (FPLS), National Directory of New Hire (NDNH)

1 Guam does not report Quarterly Wage or Unemployment Insurance to NDNH.

2 These totals reflect what is reported from state agencies and do not include any reporting by federal agencies. Therefore, the state totals are lower than what is reported at national level.

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FY 2016 CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT PRELIMINARY REPORT

Table P-100 Federal Parent Locator Service (FPLS) Number of Cases in the FCR, FY 2016

Reporting Period ( as of 9/30/2016 )

STATES Total IV-D Cases NON-IV-D CasesALABAMA 257,357 230,270 27,087

ALASKA 70,048 47,512 22,536

ARIZONA 294,612 189,489 105,123

ARKANSAS 132,390 103,429 28,961

CALIFORNIA 1,403,801 1,188,290 215,511

COLORADO 245,728 152,264 93,464

CONNECTICUT 172,612 168,980 3,632

DELAWARE 82,857 79,083 3,774

DIST. OF COL. 54,186 49,001 5,185

FLORIDA 1,166,859 675,545 491,314

GEORGIA 488,471 471,478 16,993

GUAM 6,775 6,633 142

HAWAII 175,581 135,471 40,110

IDAHO 161,426 123,559 37,867

ILLINOIS 1,008,791 494,223 514,568

INDIANA 445,279 281,249 164,030

IOWA 246,177 169,598 76,579

KANSAS 224,636 139,360 85,276

KENTUCKY 303,916 289,292 14,624

LOUISIANA 300,238 298,474 1,764

MAINE 60,388 49,436 10,952

MARYLAND 322,437 316,165 6,272

MASSACHUSETTS 238,029 216,909 21,120

MICHIGAN 937,620 858,739 78,881

MINNESOTA 282,749 228,871 53,878

MISSISSIPPI 329,559 319,188 10,371

MISSOURI 811,290 338,697 472,593

MONTANA 62,418 39,569 22,849

NEBRASKA 151,749 108,027 43,722

NEVADA 162,921 126,003 36,918

NEW HAMPSHIRE 108,326 41,564 66,762

NEW JERSEY 339,337 333,309 6,028

NEW MEXICO 68,277 67,804 473

NEW YORK 1,080,799 882,945 197,854

NORTH CAROLINA 564,504 510,526 53,978

NORTH DAKOTA 54,694 39,771 14,923

OHIO 934,515 886,457 48,058

OKLAHOMA 371,558 209,074 162,484

OREGON 227,751 197,413 30,338

PENNSYLVANIA 393,001 380,109 12,892

PUERTO RICO 229,233 221,434 7,799

RHODE ISLAND 57,757 51,405 6,352

SOUTH CAROLINA 190,422 190,403 19

SOUTH DAKOTA 71,669 55,251 16,418

TENNESSEE 422,416 364,418 57,998

TEXAS 1,721,659 1,538,448 183,211

UTAH 172,358 92,831 79,527

VERMONT 32,024 17,646 14,378

VIRGIN ISLANDS 8,934 8,843 91

VIRGINIA 489,854 303,205 186,649

WASHINGTON 334,833 329,953 4,880

WEST VIRGINIA 136,103 115,572 20,531

WISCONSIN 472,059 348,683 123,376

WYOMING 74,309 36,052 38,257

TOTALS 19,157,292 15,117,920 4,039,372

Source: Federal Parent Locator Service (FPLS)

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FY 2016 CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT PRELIMINARY REPORT

Table P-101 Federal Parent Locator Service (FPLS) Number of Unique Persons in the FCR by Participant Type, FY 2016

Reporting Period ( as of 9/30/2016 )

STATES Total Unique Persons 1

Noncustodial Parents

Putative Fathers 2 Custodial Parties Children

ALABAMA 680,648 147,848 54,383 203,151 309,315

ALASKA 190,516 55,070 942 53,762 93,477

ARIZONA 914,629 241,632 12,063 254,194 428,175

ARKANSAS 387,473 103,772 4,736 109,570 177,901

CALIFORNIA 3,624,915 1,098,612 4,262 1,149,894 1,439,898

COLORADO 669,284 194,382 NA 194,548 295,925

CONNECTICUT 466,222 124,228 4,884 140,275 222,734

DELAWARE 219,067 56,787 6,229 63,760 103,612

DIST. OF COL. 148,640 38,519 5,604 42,883 67,138

FLORIDA 2,939,422 845,894 18,753 878,522 1,289,493

GEORGIA 1,305,878 381,408 NA 382,204 570,069

GUAM 22,584 4,669 1,239 6,004 11,074

HAWAII 378,659 118,674 NA 120,838 175,127

IDAHO 427,380 120,355 3,868 124,084 211,442

ILLINOIS 2,210,353 640,432 25,285 678,597 983,138

INDIANA 1,238,244 352,783 NA 359,013 575,163

IOWA 590,202 164,401 13,238 179,436 268,191

KANSAS 580,615 179,994 1,695 173,624 246,403

KENTUCKY 768,870 227,353 NA 224,407 345,624

LOUISIANA 809,325 219,045 809 235,805 369,023

MAINE 177,402 48,322 804 51,834 82,597

MARYLAND 857,682 232,498 NA 254,576 405,937

MASSACHUSETTS 707,030 189,345 10,459 207,711 318,306

MICHIGAN 2,374,029 640,898 41,400 714,580 1,185,370

MINNESOTA 688,229 214,983 NA 217,339 279,450

MISSISSIPPI 811,831 204,353 29,888 235,416 384,987

MISSOURI 1,878,161 611,450 13,860 621,537 769,397

MONTANA 165,378 49,906 1,781 50,539 70,095

NEBRASKA 427,507 120,364 NA 113,614 214,499

NEVADA 433,412 112,068 31,693 134,909 174,821

NEW HAMPSHIRE 238,997 68,064 1,864 69,340 109,912

NEW JERSEY 961,570 254,441 17,616 277,854 443,702

NEW MEXICO 214,334 53,226 5,255 60,229 100,106

NEW YORK 2,680,409 700,414 113,215 785,788 1,215,060

NORTH CAROLINA 1,427,817 397,140 29,274 435,208 628,086

NORTH DAKOTA 138,980 40,884 1,469 41,251 66,548

OHIO 2,261,175 646,132 20,696 684,939 1,016,779

OKLAHOMA 1,020,235 301,322 580 313,707 491,723

OREGON 632,757 180,293 4,225 184,110 299,174

PENNSYLVANIA 1,160,986 326,409 9,999 339,165 504,398

PUERTO RICO 619,522 173,927 2,709 197,143 255,417

RHODE ISLAND 162,691 39,577 6,962 48,046 74,430

SOUTH CAROLINA 546,224 153,245 NA 156,262 246,905

SOUTH DAKOTA 173,035 46,462 9,170 52,792 72,852

TENNESSEE 1,140,586 288,337 51,261 327,251 528,541

TEXAS 4,989,641 1,241,110 170,548 1,398,914 2,408,015

UTAH 459,762 127,400 2,663 131,001 220,986

VERMONT 86,335 25,578 2 25,492 39,583

VIRGIN ISLANDS 21,146 4,090 2,932 7,330 7,348

VIRGINIA 1,191,036 340,410 14,319 353,411 537,696

WASHINGTON 837,941 218,612 15,606 253,447 388,466

WEST VIRGINIA 338,208 108,436 2,258 107,212 130,474

WISCONSIN 1,089,915 318,995 11,690 351,307 502,552

WYOMING 172,923 58,864 NA 54,994 68,403

TOTALS 45,433,725 12,605,967 764,749 13,639,076 21,016,161

Source: Federal Parent Locator Service (FPLS), Federal Case Registry (FCR)

1 The Total Unique Persons in the FCR is derived by unduplicating SSNs across all participant types. The figures for the individual participant types are unduplicated within that category but not between them --i.e., an individual may appear in more than one category, but is only counted once within that category and only once in the total. As a result, the counts for the individual participant types may not add up to the Total Unique Persons in the FCR. In addition, an individual can be a child support case participant in more than one state; in these situations they are counted in the total for each individual state in which they are a participant but are only counted once in nationwide total. As a result, the individual state totals add up to more than the nationwide total.

2 Some states code their Putative Fathers as NCPs when submitting them to the FCR. For those states Putative Fathers are included in the NCP figure instead of the PF figure, which is NA.

107

Table P-102 Federal Parent Locator Service (FPLS) Number of Unique Persons (NCPs and PFs) in the FCR Matched by Participant Type, FY 2016

Reporting Period ( 10/1/2015 - 9/30/2016 )

STATES Unique NCPs and PFs Matched 1

New Hire Quarterly Wage Unemployment Insurance

ALABAMA 122,297 52,962 116,500 18,393

ALASKA 12,502 6,287 10,134 1,595

ARIZONA 57,234 33,766 42,942 7,520

ARKANSAS 36,126 22,053 25,688 4,139

CALIFORNIA 665,006 272,886 632,882 142,771

COLORADO 47,386 29,902 31,720 4,837

CONNECTICUT 49,191 26,934 36,642 5,610

DELAWARE 24,647 13,109 18,732 4,290

DIST. OF COL. 24,510 9,269 23,190 3,683

FLORIDA 191,943 109,998 135,480 21,295

GEORGIA 115,559 65,769 78,994 8,829

GUAM 1,908 821 1,493 110

HAWAII 23,904 9,245 20,450 2,291

IDAHO 34,140 16,805 26,368 4,658

ILLINOIS 121,727 73,529 85,579 12,777

INDIANA 175,752 88,945 168,886 24,326

IOWA 46,296 26,305 34,243 4,849

KANSAS 87,784 26,316 85,980 13,340

KENTUCKY 69,868 44,388 43,913 5,046

LOUISIANA 71,256 46,884 48,303 8,823

MAINE 12,511 6,715 9,693 1,460

MARYLAND 148,661 39,044 144,573 8,332

MASSACHUSETTS 127,120 49,801 120,730 18,677

MICHIGAN 133,909 78,849 92,086 12,471

MINNESOTA 53,458 29,275 38,836 5,530

MISSISSIPPI 102,609 57,518 82,611 12,262

MISSOURI 188,796 54,220 184,831 9,535

MONTANA 12,263 6,564 9,333 1,642

NEBRASKA 30,938 16,614 23,224 3,024

NEVADA 54,787 25,701 44,022 7,449

NEW HAMPSHIRE 15,119 7,823 11,876 1,490

NEW JERSEY 90,880 46,043 68,429 13,136

NEW MEXICO 67,326 24,465 64,858 9,117

NEW YORK 176,689 92,987 134,943 22,889

NORTH CAROLINA 131,327 72,789 93,463 12,235

NORTH DAKOTA 11,846 6,241 9,197 1,137

OHIO 495,715 258,011 480,322 78,945

OKLAHOMA 132,868 35,309 129,668 18,616

OREGON 103,625 27,824 98,912 20,379

PENNSYLVANIA 296,881 109,427 277,517 111,553

PUERTO RICO 56,546 26,539 51,941 7,861

RHODE ISLAND 16,135 7,294 13,633 1,944

SOUTH CAROLINA 58,485 35,955 39,683 5,264

SOUTH DAKOTA 14,961 7,333 11,969 1,442

TENNESSEE 99,713 64,709 62,635 6,948

TEXAS 393,437 219,181 267,313 30,222

UTAH 33,801 22,869 21,454 3,889

VERMONT 5,434 2,545 4,336 483

VIRGIN ISLANDS 1,877 817 1,762 212

VIRGINIA 171,092 72,799 165,977 16,846

WASHINGTON 69,736 32,084 54,911 7,943

WEST VIRGINIA 70,418 22,270 68,695 14,653

WISCONSIN 161,661 69,405 140,299 28,360

WYOMING 21,549 6,743 21,066 3,927

TOTALS 2 5,541,209 2,611,936 4,712,917 799,055

Source: Federal Parent Locator Service (FPLS), Federal Case Registry (FCR)

1 The Unique NCPs and PFs Matched is derived by unduplicating SSNs located across all data types (NH, QW, and UI). The figure is unduplicated within each data type but not between them--i.e., an individual may appear in more than one category but is only counted once in that category and once in the Unique Persons Matched column. As a result, the individual NH, QW, and UI counts may not add up to the Unique Persons Matched figure.

2 These totals are summations of the individual state totals. Since an individual may be involved in child support cases in more than one state, there may be duplicates between the states. Therefore, these totals are higher than the unduplicated totals that are reported at the national level.

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FY 2016 CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT PRELIMINARY REPORT

Table P-103 Federal Parent Locator Service (FPLS) Net Collections - Federal Offset Program, 2016 1

Reporting Period ( 1/1/2016 - 12/31/2016 )

STATES Total Tax Offsets 2 Administrative Offsets 2

TANF 3 Non-TANF 3

ALABAMA $31,144,209 $30,920,611 $223,598 $3,804,951 $27,339,258

ALASKA 7,612,439 7,521,303 91,135 2,414,315 5,198,123

ARIZONA 29,852,989 29,513,176 339,814 6,849,339 23,003,650

ARKANSAS 18,253,587 18,114,546 139,041 1,067,882 17,185,705

CALIFORNIA 160,376,530 159,143,237 1,233,293 71,733,465 88,643,065

COLORADO 22,798,815 22,668,585 130,230 3,933,125 18,865,690

CONNECTICUT 21,507,056 21,369,780 137,277 9,253,387 12,253,669

DELAWARE 5,675,450 5,651,790 23,660 962,292 4,713,158

DIST. OF COL. 3,837,597 3,764,265 73,332 1,311,198 2,526,399

FLORIDA 112,531,283 112,128,423 402,860 5,110,147 107,421,136

GEORGIA 47,302,742 47,302,742 0 4,586,599 42,716,144

GUAM 488,896 477,493 11,402 53,608 435,288

HAWAII 9,080,350 9,035,536 44,814 3,415,200 5,665,150

IDAHO 13,012,008 12,920,097 91,911 1,123,175 11,888,833

ILLINOIS 54,525,757 54,117,614 408,143 6,430,004 48,095,754

INDIANA 46,424,230 46,214,296 209,934 4,162,589 42,261,641

IOWA 19,849,663 19,696,011 153,653 5,439,518 14,410,145

KANSAS 22,519,184 22,401,753 117,431 5,622,980 16,896,204

KENTUCKY 36,475,428 36,335,367 140,062 10,262,395 26,213,034

LOUISIANA 39,494,378 39,375,143 119,235 2,631,124 36,863,254

MAINE 9,211,287 9,163,405 47,882 4,177,418 5,033,869

MARYLAND 26,210,002 25,917,253 292,750 3,664,635 22,545,367

MASSACHUSETTS 23,812,505 23,702,401 110,104 6,249,193 17,563,312

MICHIGAN 69,319,083 69,319,008 75 8,416,922 60,902,162

MINNESOTA 26,470,786 26,470,786 0 6,058,766 20,412,020

MISSISSIPPI 39,879,518 39,754,310 125,208 987,325 38,892,193

MISSOURI 45,101,826 44,824,635 277,190 8,470,265 36,631,561

MONTANA 5,026,319 4,974,933 51,386 961,041 4,065,279

NEBRASKA 10,838,857 10,704,352 134,505 2,306,706 8,532,151

NEVADA 16,038,273 15,932,450 105,823 2,786,715 13,251,558

NEW HAMPSHIRE 5,873,383 5,825,499 47,884 1,047,879 4,825,503

NEW JERSEY 46,530,215 46,146,613 383,603 8,984,811 37,545,404

NEW MEXICO 13,341,589 13,188,002 153,587 2,249,968 11,091,621

NEW YORK 58,469,441 58,469,441 0 16,291,034 42,178,408

NORTH CAROLINA 38,514,543 38,514,543 0 4,109,193 34,405,350

NORTH DAKOTA 6,012,845 5,943,388 69,457 832,869 5,179,977

OHIO 100,379,344 100,379,309 35 16,535,922 83,843,423

OKLAHOMA 38,387,993 38,138,302 249,691 4,984,329 33,403,664

OREGON 24,873,654 24,694,732 178,922 7,688,790 17,184,864

PENNSYLVANIA 36,146,087 36,146,087 0 9,725,914 26,420,172

PUERTO RICO 26,969,488 26,730,128 239,361 1,383,245 25,586,244

RHODE ISLAND 4,544,223 4,532,403 11,821 936,794 3,607,429

SOUTH CAROLINA 19,924,852 19,835,358 89,494 3,487,417 16,437,435

SOUTH DAKOTA 7,331,218 7,324,642 6,576 1,193,882 6,137,335

TENNESSEE 56,017,582 55,825,353 192,229 10,687,233 45,330,349

TEXAS 264,067,064 264,066,586 478 12,763,006 251,304,058

UTAH 13,880,058 13,852,744 27,314 2,050,014 11,830,043

VERMONT 3,049,871 3,041,590 8,281 473,556 2,576,315

VIRGIN ISLANDS 512,590 498,941 13,649 39,239 473,351

VIRGINIA 41,471,451 41,419,743 51,709 9,813,131 31,658,320

WASHINGTON 42,174,872 41,777,774 397,098 12,524,793 29,650,079

WEST VIRGINIA 14,825,198 14,755,734 69,464 2,040,538 12,784,660

WISCONSIN 43,374,263 43,374,214 49 5,025,254 38,349,009

WYOMING 5,291,748 5,278,033 13,715 667,772 4,623,976

TOTALS $1,886,634,623 $1,879,194,462 $7,440,161 $329,782,864 $1,556,851,759

Source: Federal Parent Locator Service (FPLS)

1 Processing Year, the calendar year the collections actually took place.

2 Tax Offsets are based on intercepts of Federal Tax Refunds, while Administrative Offsets are based on intercepts of certain federal payments such as vendor and miscellaneous payments (i.e., expense reimbursement payments and travel payments) and federal retirement payments. The Tax and Administrative figures add up to the total figures and include both TANF and Non-TANF.

3 The TANF and Non-TANF figures add up to the total and include both Tax and Administrative Offsets.

109

Table P-104 Federal Parent Locator Service (FPLS) Number of Offsets - Federal Offset Program, 2016 1

Reporting Period ( 1/1/2016 - 12/31/2016 )

STATES Total Tax Offsets 2 Administrative TANF 3 Non-TANF 3

Offsets 2

ALABAMA 21,591 20,900 691 3,325 18,266

ALASKA 5,249 5,093 156 1,980 3,269

ARIZONA 18,180 17,745 435 4,570 13,610

ARKANSAS 13,292 13,032 260 1,328 11,964

CALIFORNIA 118,364 115,089 3,275 56,549 61,815

COLORADO 17,252 16,975 277 3,720 13,532

CONNECTICUT 16,511 16,171 340 7,488 9,023

DELAWARE 4,652 4,628 24 960 3,692

DIST. OF COL. 3,544 3,269 275 1,629 1,915

FLORIDA 78,352 77,944 408 5,193 73,159

GEORGIA 33,634 33,634 0 4,272 29,362

GUAM 307 287 20 44 263

HAWAII 7,084 6,930 154 2,809 4,275

IDAHO 8,983 8,861 122 1,046 7,937

ILLINOIS 40,930 40,073 857 7,101 33,829

INDIANA 34,703 34,436 267 4,143 30,560

IOWA 16,232 16,065 167 5,389 10,843

KANSAS 16,464 16,281 183 4,974 11,490

KENTUCKY 28,883 28,528 355 9,395 19,488

LOUISIANA 24,139 23,806 333 2,075 22,064

MAINE 6,928 6,794 134 3,249 3,679

MARYLAND 20,016 19,385 631 3,645 16,371

MASSACHUSETTS 19,770 19,437 333 6,247 13,523

MICHIGAN 57,300 57,299 1 9,688 47,612

MINNESOTA 21,935 21,935 0 6,446 15,489

MISSISSIPPI 26,780 26,609 171 1,225 25,555

MISSOURI 34,216 33,622 594 8,596 25,620

MONTANA 4,164 4,089 75 1,045 3,119

NEBRASKA 9,088 8,884 204 2,605 6,483

NEVADA 11,242 11,082 160 2,315 8,927

NEW HAMPSHIRE 4,520 4,498 22 1,111 3,409

NEW JERSEY 33,954 33,050 904 7,820 26,134

NEW MEXICO 8,718 8,409 309 1,707 7,011

NEW YORK 46,908 46,908 0 15,930 30,978

NORTH CAROLINA 32,285 32,285 0 4,682 27,603

NORTH DAKOTA 4,060 3,933 127 701 3,359

OHIO 77,044 77,043 1 16,754 60,290

OKLAHOMA 25,868 25,374 494 4,267 21,601

OREGON 18,258 17,994 264 5,914 12,344

PENNSYLVANIA 31,820 31,820 0 10,030 21,790

PUERTO RICO 14,088 13,569 519 842 13,246

RHODE ISLAND 3,853 3,811 42 1,083 2,770

SOUTH CAROLINA 17,091 16,857 234 3,818 13,273

SOUTH DAKOTA 5,392 5,359 33 1,037 4,355

TENNESSEE 42,668 42,128 540 10,484 32,184

TEXAS 171,183 171,179 4 12,256 158,927

UTAH 9,552 9,508 44 1,746 7,806

VERMONT 2,522 2,496 26 510 2,012

VIRGIN ISLANDS 333 319 14 40 293

VIRGINIA 34,232 34,032 200 10,483 23,749

WASHINGTON 35,413 34,886 527 12,829 22,584

WEST VIRGINIA 12,187 12,097 90 2,449 9,738

WISCONSIN 31,784 31,783 1 4,651 27,133

WYOMING 3,780 3,731 49 731 3,049

TOTALS 1,387,298 1,371,952 15,346 304,926 1,082,372

Source: Federal Parent Locator Service (FPLS)

1 Processing Year, the calendar year the collections actually took place.

2 Tax Offsets are based on intercepts of Federal Tax Refunds, while Administrative Offsets are based on intercepts of certain federal payments such as vendor and miscellaneous payments (i.e., expense reimbursement payments and travel payments) and federal retirement payments. The Tax and Administrative figures add up to the total figures and include both TANF and Non-TANF.

3 The TANF and Non-TANF figures add up to the total and include both Tax and Administrative Offsets.

110

FY 2016 CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT PRELIMINARY REPORT

Table P-105 Federal Parent Locator Service (FPLS) Number of Unique Persons With Known and Unknown SSN Located through the FPLS, FY 2016 1

Reporting Period ( 10/1/2015 - 9/30/2016 )

STATESALABAMA

Unique NCPs and PFs Matched 2

127,126

ALASKA 28,048

ARIZONA 134,648

ARKANSAS 60,963

CALIFORNIA 944,324

COLORADO 93,792

CONNECTICUT 108,810

DELAWARE 29,850

DIST. OF COL. 25,274

FLORIDA 458,654

GEORGIA 116,230

GUAM 1,956

HAWAII 37,966

IDAHO 69,333

ILLINOIS 139,336

INDIANA 210,956

IOWA 104,121

KANSAS 94,686

KENTUCKY 71,665

LOUISIANA 148,431

MAINE 23,941

MARYLAND 165,255

MASSACHUSETTS 130,323

MICHIGAN 226,206

MINNESOTA 113,845

MISSISSIPPI 170,049

MISSOURI 244,783

MONTANA 22,906

NEBRASKA 64,527

NEVADA 74,255

NEW HAMPSHIRE 20,608

NEW JERSEY 134,394

NEW MEXICO 87,248

NEW YORK 304,584

NORTH CAROLINA 165,695

NORTH DAKOTA 21,800

OHIO 667,104

OKLAHOMA 171,045

OREGON 152,331

PENNSYLVANIA 352,470

PUERTO RICO 62,081

RHODE ISLAND 20,516

SOUTH CAROLINA 72,882

SOUTH DAKOTA 21,396

TENNESSEE 114,627

TEXAS 514,321

UTAH 82,343

VERMONT 5,495

VIRGIN ISLANDS 3,378

VIRGINIA 185,834

WASHINGTON 80,228

WEST VIRGINIA 90,518

WISCONSIN 231,528

WYOMING 25,402

TOTALS 3 7,830,087

Source: Federal Parent Locator Service (FPLS)

1 FPLS locate sources include: Department of Defense, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Internal Revenue Service, Social Security Administration, Department of Veterans Affairs, National Directory of New Hires, and National Security Agency.

2 The Unique NonCustodial Parents (NCPs) and Putative Fathers (PFs) Matched is derived by unduplicating SSNs located across all locate sources.

3 The report total is the sum of the individual state totals. Since an individual may be involved in child support cases in more than one state, there may be duplicates between the states.

111

Table P-106 Federal Parent Locator Service (FPLS) Number of Unique Persons With Unknown SSN 1 Located through the FPLS, FY 2016 2

Reporting Period ( 10/1/2015 - 9/30/2016 )

STATES Unique NCPs and PFs Matched 3

ALABAMA 109

ALASKA 174

ARIZONA 2,509

ARKANSAS 755

CALIFORNIA 17,819

COLORADO 1,646

CONNECTICUT 2,290

DELAWARE 812

DIST. OF COL. 144

FLORIDA 43,389

GEORGIA 10

GUAM 5

HAWAII 2,540

IDAHO 609

ILLINOIS 6,975

INDIANA 5,263

IOWA 2,182

KANSAS 193

KENTUCKY 100

LOUISIANA 1,933

MAINE 464

MARYLAND 2,165

MASSACHUSETTS 70

MICHIGAN 4,212

MINNESOTA 4,371

MISSISSIPPI 5,866

MISSOURI 1,080

MONTANA 286

NEBRASKA 451

NEVADA 1,340

NEW HAMPSHIRE 539

NEW JERSEY 1,255

NEW MEXICO 2,555

NEW YORK 18,516

NORTH CAROLINA 1,056

NORTH DAKOTA 148

OHIO 12,724

OKLAHOMA 3,540

OREGON 8,909

PENNSYLVANIA 3,293

PUERTO RICO 78

RHODE ISLAND 395

SOUTH CAROLINA 2,871

SOUTH DAKOTA 342

TENNESSEE 1,609

TEXAS 6,022

UTAH 1,092

VERMONT 5

VIRGIN ISLANDS 63

VIRGINIA 1,051

WASHINGTON 360

WEST VIRGINIA 901

WISCONSIN 3,085

WYOMING 163

TOTALS 4 180,334

Source: Federal Parent Locator Service (FPLS)

1 These counts include NonCustodial Parents (NCPs) and Putative Fathers (PFs) submitted to the FPLS for locate purposes with no known SSN. FPLS was able to identify the correct SSN using other demographic information, and then locate these individuals through the FPLS data source.

2 FPLS locate sources include: DOD, FBI, IRS, SSA, VA, NDNH, and NSA.

3 The Unique NonCustodial Parents (NCPs) and Putative Fathers (PFs) Matched is derived by unduplicating SSNs located across all locate sources.

4 The report total is the sum of the individual state totals. Since an individual may be involved in child support cases in more than one state, there may be duplicates between the states.

112

FY 2016 CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT PRELIMINARY REPORT

Glossary

Financial and Statistical Terms

Program Collections

Table P-4 - Total Distributed Collections (Form OCSE-34A - Part 1, line 8, column G. Beginning fiscal year 2015, form OCSE-34 - Part 1, line 8, column G)

Total amount of collections distributed during the year on behalf of both TANF (Temporary Assistance for Needy Families) and non-TANF families. Total collections are calculated as the sums of Current IV-A and IV-E Assistance, Former IV-A and IV-E Assistance, Medicaid Never Assistance, and Other Never Assistance.

Table P-8 - Distributed Medicaid Never Assistance Collections (Form OCSE-34A - Part 1, line 8, column E. Beginning fiscal year 2015, form OCSE-34 - Part 1, line 8, column E)

The amount of collections received and distributed on behalf of children who are receiving Child Support Enforcement services under Title IV-D of the Social Security Act, and who are either currently receiving or who have formerly received Medicaid payments under Title XIX of the Act, but who are not currently receiving and who have never formerly received assistance under either Title IV-A (TANF or AFDC) or Title IV-E (Foster Care) of the Act.

Table P-10 - Distributed TANF/Foster Care Collections (Form OCSE-34A - Part 1, line 8, col-umns (A+B) + line 7b, columns (C+D). Beginning fiscal year 2015, form OCSE-34 - Part 1, line 8, columns (A+B) + line 7b, columns (C+D))

The portion of total collections received on behalf of families receiving assistance under the TANF program plus children placed in foster care facilities. These collections are divided between the State and Federal governments to reimburse their respective shares of either Title IV-A assistance payments or Title IV-E Fos-ter Care maintenance payments.

Table P-13 - Distributed Non-TANF Collections (Form OCSE-34A - Part 1, line 7c, columns (C+D) + line 7d, columns (C+D) + line 8, columns (E+F). Beginning fiscal year 2015, form OCSE-34 - Part 1, line 7c, columns (C+D) + line 7d, columns (C+D) + line 8, columns (E+F))

The portion of total collections received on behalf of families not receiving assistance under the TANF/Foster Care programs and distributed to those families during the year.

Federal and State Share of Collections

Table P-14 - Federal Share of TANF/Foster Care Collections (Form OCSE-34A - Part 1, line 10a, column G + line 10b, column G. Beginning fiscal year 2015, form OCSE-34 - Part 1, line 10a, column G + line 10b, column G)

The portion of child support collections used to reimburse the Federal government for its share of past assistance payments under Title IV-E and IV-A of the Social Security Act.

Table P-15 - State Share of TANF/Foster Care Collections (Form OCSE-34A - Part 1, line 7b, column G - (lines 10a, column G + 10b, column G). Beginning fiscal year 2015, form OCSE-34 - Part 1, line 7b, column G - (lines 10a, column G + 10b, column G)

113

The portion of child support collections used to reimburse the state government for its share of past assistance payments under Title IV-E and IV-A of the Social Security Act.

Undistributed Collections

Table P-16 - Net Undistributed Collections (Form OCSE-34A - Part 1, line 9b, column G (4th quarter). Beginning fiscal year 2015, form OCSE-34 - Part 1, line 9b, column G (4th quarter))

The amount of collections that remains available for distribution in a future quarter.

Other Collections

Table P-21 - Collections Forwarded to Non-IV-D Cases (Form OCSE-34A - Part 1, line 4a, column G. Beginning fiscal year 2015, form OCSE-34 - Part 1, line 4a, column G)

Those collections received through income withholding and processed through the State Disbursement Unit on behalf of Non-IV-D cases that were forwarded to the custodial parent during the quarter.

Payments to Families

Table P-31 – Payments to Families or Foster Care (Form OCSE-34A - Part 1, line 7d, column G. Beginning fiscal year 2015, form OCSE-34 - Part 1, line 7d, column G)

The total collections that are distributed either to the family or to the foster care agency to be used on the child’s behalf.

Table P-32 – Current TANF/Foster Care Assistance Payments to Families (OCSE-34A - Part 1, line 7d, columns (A+B). Beginning fiscal year 2015, form OCSE-34 - Part 1, line 7d, columns (A+B))

The total amount of collections that are distributed either to the family or to the foster care agency to be used on the child’s behalf.

Interstate Activity

Table P-33 - Interstate Collections Forwarded to Other States (OCSE-34A - Part 1, line 4b, col-umn G. Beginning fiscal year 2015, form OCSE-34 - Part 1, line 4b, column G)

Amounts received in response to a request for assistance from another state and forwarded during the quarter to that state for distribution, including interstate cases and Administrative Enforcement in Interstate (AEI) col-

lections.

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FY 2016 CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT PRELIMINARY REPORT

Cost-Effectiveness

Table P-36 – Cost Effectiveness Ratio (OCSE-34A - Part 1, lines 4b, 4c, 8, 11, column G / OCSE-396A, line 7, columns (A+C) - line 1c, columns (A+C). Beginning fiscal year 2015, form OCSE-34 - Part 1, lines 4b, 4c, 8, 11, column G / OCSE-396, line 7, columns (A+C) - line 1c, columns (A+C).)

The total of collections forwarded to other states, plus total collections distributed, plus fees retained by other states, divided by total current quarter claims and total prior quarter adjustments minus Non-IV-D cost.

Incentives

Tables P-37 and P-38 - Incentive Payment Estimates and Actuals (Financial Management)

The amount of money states earn for running an efficient child support program. This amount is estimated prior to the start of the fiscal year and is reported by the state on a quarterly basis. Actual incentive amounts are computed after the end of the fiscal year and appropriate adjustments are made in state grant awards.

Medical Support

Table P-40 - Distributed as Medical Support Payments for Five Consecutive Fiscal Years (Form OCSE-34A - Part 1, line 7c, column G. Beginning fiscal year 2015, form OCSE-34, Part 1, line 7c, col-umn G)

The portion of any collection that corresponds to any amount specifically designated in a support order for medical support. To the extent that medical support has been assigned to the state, medical support collec-tions must be forwarded to the Medicaid agency for distribution in accordance with current regulations un-der Title XIX of the Social Security Act (Medicaid). Otherwise, the amount must be forwarded to the family.

Program Expenditures

Table P-43 – Total Administrative Expenditures (Form OCSE-396A line 7, columns (A+C). Begin-ning fiscal year 2015, form OCSE-396, line 7, columns (A+C))

Total amount of expenditures eligible for Federal funding that is claimed by the state during the year for the administration of the Child Support Enforcement program. Including all amounts claimed during the year, whether expended during the current or a previous fiscal year. The amounts being reported have been reduced by the amount of program income (fees and costs recovered in excess of fees and interest earned and other program income) received by the states.

Table P-44 - Federal Share of Administrative Expenditures (Form OCSE-396A line 7, columns (B+D). Beginning fiscal year 2015, form OCSE-396, line 7, columns (B+D))

Net Federal Share of current quarter claims plus prior quarter adjustments.

Table P-45 - State Share of Administrative Expenditures (Form OCSE-396A line 7, columns (A+C) - line 7, columns (B+D). Beginning fiscal year 2015, form OCSE-396, line 7, columns (A+C) - line 7, columns (B+D))

Total State share of current quarter expenditures plus prior quarter adjustments minus federal FPLS fees.

Table P-47 - Non-IV-D Costs (Form OCSE-396A line 1c, columns (A+C). Beginning fiscal year 2015,

115

form OCSE-396, line 1c, columns (A+C))

The amount of administrative expenditures attributable to the collecting, entering, maintaining, and process-ing information relative to non-IV-D child support cases in the state case registry and to the processing of non-IV-D child support collections through the State Disbursement Unit. Non-IV-D cases are those for which there is no assignment of support rights to the state or where the State has not received an application for Title IV-D services.

Functional Costs

Table P-48 - ADP Expenditures (Form OCSE-396A lines 4, 5, and 6, columns (A+C). Beginning fiscal year 2015, form OCSE-396, lines 4, 5, and 6, columns (A+C))

Expenditures made in accordance with the terms of an approved ADP for the planning, design, development, implementation, enhancement, or operation of an automated Statewide Child Support Enforcement System (CSES).

Cases and Caseloads

Table P-52 - Total Caseload (Form OCSE-157, lines 1 and 3, column A)

The number of IV-D cases open on the last day of the fiscal year, including the number of open cases at the end of the fiscal year as a result of requests for assistance received from other states.

Table P-54 - Cases for Which the State Has No Jurisdiction (Form OCSE-157, line 3)

Open cases on the last day of the fiscal year over which the state has no jurisdiction. This includes cases that involve an individual over whom the IV-D agency has no civil jurisdiction available to pursue or effectuate any child support actions.

Orders Established

Table P-64 - Total Cases with Support Orders Established (Form OCSE-157, line 2)

The number of IV-D cases open on the last day of the fiscal year that have support orders established. Includes cases with orders entered prior to the case becoming an IV-D case, as well as cases with orders established by the IV-D agency. Judgments for arrears, regardless of whether there is a payment schedule or an order for ongoing support, are also included.

Paternities

Table P-71 - Total Number of Paternities Established or Acknowledged (Form OCSE-157, lines 10 and 16, column A)

The number of children born out-of-wedlock in the reporting state for which paternity has been acknowledged during the fiscal year. Include children with paternity acknowledged through the state’s voluntary in hospital acknowledgment program and other acknowledgment processes. Also reported is the number of children in cases in the IV-D caseload for whom paternity was established or acknowledged during the fiscal year.

Table P-72 - Paternity Establishment for Two Consecutive Fiscal Years (Form OCSE-157, lines 5a, 6, 8a, and 9)

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FY 2016 CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT PRELIMINARY REPORT

The number of children in the IV-D caseload in cases open at the end of the current fiscal year who were born out-of-wedlock. Also the number of children born out of wedlock in the IV-D caseload in cases open at the end of the fiscal year who have paternity established or acknowledged.

The total number of children who were born out-of-wedlock in the state during the fiscal year. Also in-cluded is the number of minor children who were born out-of-wedlock in the state for whom paternity has been established or acknowledged during the fiscal year.

Services Provided

Table P-73 – TANF Cases Closed Where a Child Support Payment was Received (Form OCSE-157, line 14)

Includes all cases terminated from TANF during the fiscal year in which there was any child support collec-tion in the month of termination.

Table P-74 - Number of Support Orders Established During the Fiscal Year (Form OCSE-157, line 17)

The number of cases in which support orders were established by the IV-D agency during the fiscal year. Includes support orders established for medical support or health insurance.

Table P-75 - Number of Cases in Which a Collection Was Made on an Obligation (Form OCSE-157, line 18)

The number of cases for which one or more collections were made during the fiscal year. Included are cases where no support order is established but a voluntary payment was made.

Table P-76 - Cases Sent to Another State (Form OCSE-157, line 19)

The number of interstate cases the reporting state sent to other states during the fiscal year. Includes cases submitted for location, establishment of paternity or support order, enforcement of support, or any other IV-D activity.

Table P-77 - Cases Received from Another State (Form OCSE-157, line 20)

The number of interstate cases received from another state during the fiscal year.

117

Services Required

Table P-78 - Cases Requiring Services to Establish a Support Order (Form OCSE-157, line 12)

Total number of IV-D cases open at the end of the fiscal year that need services to establish a support order.

Table P-79 - Children Requiring Paternity Determination Services (Form OCSE-157, line 13)

The number of children in cases that are open at the end of the fiscal year who required paternity establish-ment. This includes all children whose paternity has not been established and children in the process of hav-ing paternity established. If there is more than one putative father for a child, this child is only counted once.

Staff

Table P-81 – Full-Time Equivalent Staff by State and Local, Cooperative Agreements, and Privatized IV-D Offices (Form OCSE-157, lines 30, 31, and 32)

The total number of FTE staff employed by the state and local IV-D agencies.

The total number of FTE staff employed by an agency (public or private) working under a cooperative agree-ment with the IV-D agency.

The total number of FTE staff employed by privatized IV-D agencies.

Current Support

Table P-83 - Amount of Current Support Due (Form OCSE-157, line 24)

The total amount of current support by current, former and never assistance for the fiscal year for all IV-D cases includes total voluntary collections.

Table P-84 - Amount of Support Distributed as Current Support (Form OCSE-157, line 25)

The total amount of support distributed as current support during the fiscal year for all IV-D cases. Voluntary payments are considered current support and should be included even though there is no order to require payment.

Arrears

Table P-85 – Total Amount of Arrearages Due for all Fiscal Years (Form OCSE-157, line 26)

The total amount of arrears due and unpaid as of the end of the fiscal year for all fiscal years, including the fiscal year covered by the report. Interest and penalties on arrearages may be included.

Table P-86 - Total Amount of Support Distributed as Arrears (Form OCSE-157, line 27)

The total amount of support distributed this fiscal year as arrearages. This amount includes judgments ordered and paid this fiscal year for prior year support.

Tables P-87 and P-88 - Cases with Arrears Due and Cases Paying Towards Arrears (Form OCSE-157, lines 28 and 29)

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FY 2016 CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT PRELIMINARY REPORT

The number of cases with arrears due during the fiscal year, including cases closed during the fiscal year with arrearages.

The number of cases in which there was at least one payment toward arrears during the fiscal year and the total number of IV-D cases in which payments of past-due child support were received during the fiscal year. Part or all of the payments were distributed to the family to which the past-due child support was owed.

Non-Cooperation and Good Cause

Table P-90 - Cases Open with a Determination of Non-Cooperation (Form OCSE-157, line 37)

The number of IV-D TANF cases open at the end of the fiscal year in which a determination was made that the custodial parent refused to cooperate with state agencies in identifying and locating the noncustodial parent.

Table P-91 - Cases Open with Good Cause Determinations (Form OCSE-157, line 38)

The number of cases open during the fiscal year in which it was determined by the state that the custo-dial parent has a good cause for refusing to cooperate with state agencies in identifying and locating the noncustodial parent.

Children

Table P-92 - Children with Paternity Resolved (Form OCSE-157, line 7)

The number of children in the IV-D caseload open at the end of the fiscal year with paternity resolved. In-clude all children born within a marriage, legitimized by marriage or adoption and children with paternity.

Table P-93 - Total Number of Children in IV-D Cases (Form OCSE-157, line 4)

The number of children in the IV-D caseload in cases open at the end of the fiscal year. This includes those

children who are under age 18.

119

Appendix - Incentive Formulas and Forms

CSPIA INCENTIVE MEASURE FORMULAS

INCENTIVE MEASURE FORM AND LINE NUMBERS

PATERNITY ESTABLISHMENT PERCENTAGE (PEP): IV-D

Number of Children in the Caseloadin the FY or as of the End of the FYWho Were Born Out-of-Wedlock

with Paternity Established or AcknowledgedNumber of Children in the Caseloadas of the End of the Preceding FYWho Were Born Out-of-Wedlock

OCSE-157, Line 6OCSE-157, Line 5a

PATERNITY ESTABLISHMENT PERCENTAGE (PEP): STATEWIDE

Number of Minor Children in the StateBorn Out-of-Wedlock with

Paternity Established or Acknowledged During the FYNumber of Children in the State

Born Out-of-WedlockDuring the Preceding FY

OCSE-157, Line 9OCSE-157, Line 8a

SUPPORT ORDER ESTABLISHMENT

Number of IV-D Cases with Support OrdersNumber of IV-D Cases

OCSE-157, Line 2OCSE-157, Line 1

CURRENT COLLECTIONS

Amount Collected for Current Support in IV-D CasesAmount Owed for Current Support in IV-D Cases

OCSE-157, Line 25OCSE-157, Line 24

ARREARAGE COLLECTIONS

Number of IV-D Cases Paying Toward ArrearsNumber of IV-D Cases with Arrears Due

OCSE-157, Line 29OCSE-157, Line 28

COST-EFFECTIVENESS

Total IV-D Dollars CollectedTotal IV-D Dollars Expended

OCSE-34, Lines 4b+ 4c + 8+ 11 ofcolumn (G)

OCSE-396, Line 7 columns (A) + (C) less Line 1(c) columns (A) + (C)

STATE COLLECTION BASE

2 times (Current Assistance + Former AssistanceCollections + Medicaid Assistance)

+ Never Assistance Collections+ Fees Retained by Other States

OCSE-34:2 times ((Line 4b,columns A+B+C+D+E)

+ (Line 8, columns A+B+C+D+E))+ Line 4b, column F + Line 8, column F

+ Lines 4c + 11 of column G

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FY 2016 CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT PRELIMINARY REPORT

How an Incentive Payment is Determined

Because of the complexity of the incentives formula set forth in section 458 of the Social Security Act, we have included an example of how the system would work in a particular year for State A. Let’s make the following assumptions regarding State A (See Table A):

• State A’s paternity performance level is 93 percent, making its applicable percentage 100 percent (see Table C)

• State A’s order establishment performance level is 74 percent, making its applicable percentage 88 percent (see Table C)

• State A’s current support collections performance level is 59 percent, making its applicable percentage 69 percent (see Table D)

• State A’s arrearage support collections performance level is 60 percent, making its applicable percentage 70 percent (see Table D)

• State A’s cost-effectiveness ratio is $4.40, making its applicable percentage 80 percent (see Table E)

• State A’s collections base is $50 million (determined by 2 times the collections for Current Assistance, Former Assistance, and Medicaid Never Assistance plus Never Assistance collections and fees retained by other states)

• The maximum incentive for State A is:

ɻ $50 million collections base for paternity ($50 mil. times 1.00), plus

ɻ $44 million collections base for orders ($50 mil. times 0.88), plus

ɻ $34.5 million collections base for current collections ($50 mil. times 0.69), plus

ɻ $26.25 million collections base for arrearage collections ($50 mil. times 0.751 times 0.70) plus

ɻ $30.0 million collections base for cost-effectiveness ($50 million times 0.751 times 0.80) equals

ɻ Resulting in a maximum incentive base amount of $184.75 million for State A.

1 Because the measure has less weight.

121

Table A

MeasureState A’s

Performance Level

Applicable Percentage based on

PerformanceWeight

State A’s Collection Base (assumed to be $50,000,000)

Paternity Establishment 93% 100% 1.00 $50,000,000Order Establishment 74% 88% 1.00 $44,000,000Current Collections 59% 69% 1.00 $34,500,000Arrearage Collections 60% 70% .75 $26,250,000Cost-Effectiveness $4.40 80% .75 $30,000,000

State A’s Maximum Incentive Base Amount $184,750,000

We must now make some assumptions regarding the other States. Let’s assume that there are only two other States in our country--and the maximum incentive base amount is $84 million for State B and $50 million for State C, making the total maximum incentive base amount $318.75 million for all three States (See Table B).

• We must now determine what is State A’s share of the $318.75 million. It is 58 percent ($184.75 divided by $318.75).

122

FY 2016 CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT PRELIMINARY REPORT

Table B

StateMaximum

Incentive Base Amounts

State’s Share of $318,750,000

Incentive Payment Pool $461,000,000

A $184,750,000 0.58 $267,199,216B $84,000,000 0.26 $121,487,059C $50,000,000 0.16 $72,313,725

Totals $318,750,000 1.00 $461,000,000

• Let us assume it is FY 2003, so the incentive payment pool for the FY is $461 million (see Table F).

• Since State A’s share is 0.58, this state has earned 58 percent of the $461 million incentive payment pool that Congress is allowing, or $267.2 million ($461 mil. x 0.58) incentive payment for this particular fiscal year.

123

Table C2

If the Paternity Establishment or Support Order Performance Level Is:

But Less Than:

The Applicable Percentage Is:

But Less Than:

The Applicable Percentage Is:At Least: At Least:

80% 100% 64% 65% 74%79% 80% 98% 63% 64% 73%78% 79% 96% 62% 63% 72%77% 78% 94% 61% 62% 71%76% 77% 92% 60% 61% 70%75% 76% 90% 59% 60% 69%74% 75% 88% 58% 59% 68%73% 74% 86% 57% 58% 67%72% 73% 84% 56% 57% 66%71% 72% 82% 55% 56% 65%70% 71% 80% 54% 55% 64%69% 70% 79% 53% 54% 63%68% 69% 78% 52% 53% 62%67% 68% 77% 51% 52% 61%66% 67% 76% 50% 51% 60%65% 66% 75% 0% 50% 0%

2 Use this table to determine the maximum incentive levels for the paternity establishment and support order performance measures.

124

FY 2016 CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT PRELIMINARY REPORT

Table D3

If the Current Collections or Arrearage Collections Performance Level Is:

At Least: But Less Than:

The Applicable Percentage Is: At Least: But Less

Than:The Applicable Percentage Is:

80% 100% 59% 60% 69%79% 80% 98% 58% 59% 68%78% 79% 96% 57% 58% 67%77% 78% 94% 56% 57% 66%76% 77% 92% 55% 56% 65%75% 76% 90% 54% 55% 64%74% 75% 88% 53% 54% 63%73% 74% 86% 52% 53% 62%72% 73% 84% 51% 52% 61%71% 72% 82% 50% 51% 60%70% 71% 80% 49% 50% 59%69% 70% 79% 48% 49% 58%68% 69% 78% 47% 48% 57%67% 68% 77% 46% 47% 56%66% 67% 76% 45% 46% 55%65% 66% 75% 44% 45% 54%64% 65% 74% 43% 44% 53%63% 64% 73% 42% 43% 52%62% 63% 72% 41% 42% 51%61% 62% 71% 40% 41% 50%60% 61% 70% 0% 40% 0%

3 Use this table to determine the maximum incentive levels for the current and arrearage support collections performance measures.

125

Table E4

If the Cost-Effectiveness Performance Level Is:

At Least: But Less Than: The Applicable Percentage Is:

5.00 100%4.50 4.99 90%4.00 4.50 80%3.50 4.00 70%3.00 3.50 60%2.50 3.00 50%2.00 2.50 40%0.00 2.00 0%

4 Use this table to determine the maximum incentive level for the cost-effectiveness performance measure.

126

FY 2016 CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT PRELIMINARY REPORT

Table F

Incentive Pool Payment, FYs 2001-2015

The incentive payment pool is:

• $429,000,000 for fiscal year 2001

• $450,000,000 for fiscal year 2002

• $461,000,000 for fiscal year 2003

• $454,000,000 for fiscal year 2004

• $446,000,000 for fiscal year 2005

• $458,000,000 for fiscal year 2006

• $471,000,000 for fiscal year 2007

• $483,000,000 for fiscal year 2008

• $504,000,000 for fiscal year 2009

• $504,000,000 for fiscal year 2010

• $513,000,000 for fiscal year 2011

• $526,000,000 for fiscal year 2012

• $538,000,000 for fiscal year 2013

• $547,000,000 for fiscal year 2014

• $556,000,000 for fiscal year 2015

The incentive payment pool after FY 2008 is the amount of the incentive payment pool for the preceding FY, multiplied by the percentage by which the Consumer Price Index (CPI) for that preceding FY exceeds the CPI for the second preceding FY.

The CPI for a FY is the average of the CPI for the 12 month period ending on Sept. 30 of the FY. The CPI means the last CPI for all-urban consumers published by the United States Department of Labor. The NOT seasonally adjusted CPI numbers are used.

The percentage increase between the preceding FY (FY 2008) and second preceding FY (FY 2007) is about 4.44%. So, $483 million (the FY 2008 incentive pool amount) plus 4.44% equals about $504 million (the FY 2009 incentive pool amount).

127

128

FY 2016 CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT PRELIMINARY REPORT

129

130

FY 2016 CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT PRELIMINARY REPORT

131

132

FY 2016 CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT PRELIMINARY REPORT

133

134

FY 2016 CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT PRELIMINARY REPORT

TAB 7

The Federalist Papers: No. 43

The Same Subject Continued (The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered)

For the Independent Journal.

MADISON

To the People of the State of New York:

''In a confederacy founded on republican principles, and composed of republican members, the superintending government ought clearly to possess authority to defend the system against aristocratic or monarchial innovations. The more intimate the nature of such a union may be, the greater interest have the members in the political institutions of each other; and the greater right to insist that the forms of government under which the compact was entered into should be SUBSTANTIALLY maintained. But a right implies a remedy; and where else could the remedy be deposited, than where it is deposited by the Constitution? Governments of dissimilar principles and forms have been found less adapted to a federal coalition of any sort, than those of a kindred nature. "As the confederate republic of Germany,'' says Montesquieu, "consists of free cities and petty states, subject to different princes, experience shows us that it is more imperfect than that of Holland and Switzerland. '' "Greece was undone,'' he adds, "as soon as the king of Macedon obtained a seat among the Amphictyons.'' In the latter case, no doubt, the disproportionate force, as well as the monarchical form, of the new confederate, had its share of influence on the events. It may possibly be asked, what need there could be of such a precaution, and whether it may not become a pretext for alterations in the State governments, without the concurrence of the States themselves.

These questions admit of ready answers. If the interposition of the general government should not be needed, the provision for such an event will be a harmless superfluity only in the Constitution. But who can say what experiments may be produced by the caprice of particular States, by the ambition of enterprising leaders, or by the intrigues and influence of foreign powers? To the second question it may be answered, that if the general government should interpose by virtue of this constitutional authority, it will be, of course, bound to pursue the authority. But the authority extends no further than to a GUARANTY of a republican form of government, which supposes a pre-existing government of the form which is to be guaranteed. As long, therefore, as the existing republican forms are continued by the States, they are guaranteed by the federal Constitution. Whenever the States may choose to substitute other republican forms, they have a right to do so, and to claim the federal guaranty for the latter. The only restriction imposed on them is, that they shall not exchange republican for antirepublican Constitutions; a restriction which, it is presumed, will hardly be considered as a grievance.

 

TAB 8

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

Appellate Case: 16 – 14969 FF

TITLE 440: CIVIL RIGHTS, OTHER CIVIL _______________________________________________________________________________________________

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS

DIVISION OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS TRUMBULL COUNTY, OHIO

CASE NO. 08 DR 00213, CASE NO. 09 DV 00028, CASE NO. 09 DR 00392 _______________________________________________________________

IN THE COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

IN AND MARION COUNTY, FLORIDA

CASE NO: 2016-DR-3626-FJ _____________________________________________________________

Christopher Edward Hallett

Plaintiff - Appellant VS

State of Ohio, Et al Defendants - Appellees

____________________________________________________________

RE: FEDERAL CASE: 5:16-CV-238-OC-32-TJC-PRL

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA, OCALA DIVISION

____________________________________________

AMICUS / REPLY BRIEF CHRISTOPHER EDWARD HALLETT

_______________________________

16062 SW 34 CT RD, Ocala, Florida, 34473, Ph.(352) 470-8460 [email protected]

In The

One Hundred-Fifteenth Congress Of The

United States of America

CITIZEN PETITION U.S. Code › Title 15 › Chapter 53 › Subchapter I › § 2620 (a)

IN THE MATTERS OF:

Christopher Edward Hallett VS State of Ohio, Et al

____________________________________________________________

TITLE 440: CIVIL RIGHTS, OTHER CIVIL

RE: FEDERAL CASE: 5:16-CV-238-OC-32-TJC-PRL

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA, OCALA DIVISION

____________________________________________________

THE HONORABLE TIMOTHY J CORRIGAN MAGISTRATE JUDGE PHILLIP R. LAMMENS ____________________________________________

AMICUS BRIEF CHRISTOPHER EDWARD HALLETT

_______________________________

Christopher E. Hallett 16062 SW 34 CT RD Ocala, Florida, 34473 (352) 470-8460 [email protected]

i

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PERSONS AND CORPORATE DISCLOURE STATEMENT (CIP)

Christopher E Hallett . vs. State of Ohio, Et al Appeal No. 16-14969 - FF 11th Cir. R. 26-1(a) requires the Appellant or Petitioner to file a Certificate of Interested Persons and Corporate Disclosure Statement (CIP) within 14 days after the date the case or appeal is docketed in this court, and include a CIP within every motion, petition, brief, answer, response, and reply filed. No Corporation/s involved containing a “ticker” ID therefore “nothing to declare”. Priority one: the two minor children subject to this case and under my protection Amber Elizabeth Hallett Steven Jeffrey Hallett Persons addressed January 4, 2016 in attempt to effect relief / remedy to no avail before filing this Federal Case: (service of January 10, 2016 available upon request) President of The United States, Donald J. Trump Vice President of The United States, Mike Pence The Supreme Court of The United States Senate Majority Leader, Mitch McConnell (Kentucky) Speaker of The House of Representatives, Paul Ryan (Wisconsin) US Senator Marco Rubio (Florida) US Senator Bill Nelson (Florida) US Attorney General Jeff Sessions Attorney Gary Rich Attorney Elise Burkey Attorney Ben Joltin Attorney Debra Smith Christina Hallett Captain Bradley Blackburn (Youngstown Ohio Police Dept.) Governor John Kasich (Ohio)

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Attorney General Mike DeWine (Ohio) Governor Rick Scott (Florida) Attorney General Pamela Bondi (Florida) Judge Pamela Rintalla (Trumbull County Ohio Court of Common Pleas) Presiding Judge Timothy J Corrigan Magistrate Judge Phillip Lammens Judge Ann Melissa Craggs (Marion County Florida) Trumbull County Child Support Persons who have responded to the January 4, 2016, letter / notice resulting in filing this case on March 23, 2016, with US District Court Middle District of Florida with continued denials of service (generic Dear Friend letters), or bait and switch of language notices: Nita Matter (response dated January 29, 2016, Manager Customer Service Call

Center Ohio Dept of Job and Family services under direction of Attorney General Mike DeWine’s Office stating no remedy available and implying by referral this matter IS of “Judicial Jurisdiction”)

Sharon Gadson (Trumbull County Child Support Case Manager / Judges

Assistant to Judge Pamela Rintalla, bait and switch meaning give us more money)

Governor Rick Scott Response dated January 19, 2016, stating this matter IS

of “Judicial Jurisdiction” Senator Bill Nelson (Florida) Response dated February 3, 2016, stating this

matter IS of “Judicial Jurisdiction” Attorney General Pamela Bondi Response dated March 11, 2016, citing

denial of AG jurisdiction implying by referral this IS a matter of “Judicial Jurisdiction”

Ms. P Jones Response dated May 10, 2016, Office of Child Support

Enforcement Administration Customer Service Branch, Washington D.C., under delegation of Vice President Joe Biden and in receipt of my correspondence addressed to him personally, stating this IS a matter of “Judicial Jurisdiction”

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Trumbull County CSEA No name, notice dated June 8, 2016, that Appellee

State of Ohio is attempting to change the rules, during court proceedings mandating my “Motion of No Confidence” in Judge Lammens, allowing them to do exactly what I accused them of doing illegally to remove culpability of wrong-doing. Changing the rules during a trial, as I received Judges orders in the mail July 8, 2016, is not legal

Department of Justice Response of July 6, 2016, declaring this matter IS

under “Judicial Jurisdiction” warranting this appeal. Senator Marco Rubio (Florida) Letter dated August 18, 2016 directly

addressing the Middle District Case number by “Good Faith Referral” to the Florida BAR implies “Judicial Jurisdiction” in direct contradiction to the current order of record by said court.

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NOTICE OF UPDATE OF CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PERSONS

Be advised as of this notice, being within compliance FRAP rules; the need

to update this list post the 2016 Presidential election has become necessary as the

Donald J. Trump Administration transitioned power per traditional standards.

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STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT

This case is unique in that it allows the court to address a long standing, yet

seemingly overlooked, problem. Inadequate Counsel and its current understood

definition are incomplete in that the current Legal Monopoly (18c) has too much to

gain by continuing to do so. Breach of Statutory Duty (1844), Per Citizen Petitions

U.S. Code › Title 15 › Chapter 53 › Subchapter I › § 2620 (a), should this Congress

wish to hear Oral Arguments on this issue upon review of this brief, I would be

honored to accommodate such a request.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Certificate of Interested Parties .…………………………..…………….………. i

Notice of Updated Certificate of Interested Persons ………………………. iv

Statement Regarding Oral Arguments …………….………………………..…… v

Table of Contents ……………………..…….…………………….…………… vi

Table of Authorities ………………………………..…….………………… vii

Cases …………………………………………………………………………… ix

Statement of Jurisdiction ……………………………………………………...….. 1

Statement of the case ……………………………………………………..……. 2

Article 4, Section 4 of the Constitution …………………………………….. 2

Fiduciary Duty ………………………………………………………………….. 2

Libel ………………………………………………………………………………. 2

Legal Monopoly (18c) Conflict of Interest …………………………………. 3

Statement of the issues / facts …………………………………………………... 4

Case Argument Summary ……………………………………………………… 7

Oral Arguments / Citations of Authority …………………..…….……………… 8

Emoluments Amendment Language …………………………………...…… 9

Domestic Tranquility (Preamble) …………………………………………….. 10

Non-Licensed Practitioners …………………………………………………… 10

SCOTUS Rule 6, Arguments Pro Hac Vice, Challenge ……………………….. 11

Declaration for No Confidence Vote ……………………………………….. 14

Memorandum of Legal Authority …………………………………………….. 15

Affidavit of Affirmation ………………………………………………………… 15

Conclusion Statement of Requested Relief ……..……………….…….….…… 16

Certificate of Compliance ……………………………………………..……… 17

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Certificate of Service …………………………………………………………. 18

Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, Reduced Punishment Letter 3/14/16

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES / CASE CITATIONS

U.S. CODES

Citizen Petitions - U.S. Code › Title 15 › Chapter 53 › Subchapter I › § 2620 (a) Breach of Trust / Fiduciary Duty - U.S. Code › Title 29 › Chapter 18 › Subchapter I › Subtitle B › Part 4 › § 1109 Libel - U.S. Code › Title 28 › Part VI › Chapter 181 › § 4101 Monopolies - U.S. Code › Title 15 › Chapter 1 › § 2 Counsel’s liability for excessive costs / Vexatious Litigation - U.S. Code › Title 28 › Part V › Chapter 123 › § 1927 Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act, 15 U.S.C. § 16(b)-(h) Criminal Frauds U.S. Code, Title 18, Part I, Chapter 47, § 1001, § 1031, § 1038 (a) Criminal Violation (1), (b) Civil Action Judiciary and Judicial Procedure U.S. Code › Title 28 Qui Tam Provision U.S. Code › Title 31 › Chapter 37 › Subchapter III › §3730 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

Local Rules 3.04 (a), (b) ……………………………………………………….. 1 Local Rule5 4.05 (b), (1)(2)(3)(4)(5) …………………………………………….. 8 . ACTS OF CONGRESS Plain Writing Act of (2010) …………………………………………………… 6 Fair Debt Collections Act (1978) ………………………………………………. 16 .

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EXECUTIVE ORDERS 13563, 12866, 12988 …………………………………………………………… 6 Black’s Law Dictionary, Tenth Edition, pages of text referenced in this Brief Breach of Loyalty (16c) ………………………………………………..… pg 226 Breach of Statutory Duty (1844) ………………………………………..…. pg 226 Legal Monopoly (18c) ..…………………………………………………... pg 1160 .

UNITED STATES CONSTITUIONAL REFERENCES

Title of Nobility Clause is a provision in Article I, Section 9, Clause 8 ……..……. 2

Article IV, Section (4) of the Constitution ……..…………...………………..….... 2

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UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS IN QUESTION

Amendment I

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.

Amendment VII

In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.

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Amendment IX

The enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.

Amendment XI

[referenced in context to Fiduciary Duty ( pg 9)]

The Eleventh Amendment does not protect state officials from claims for prospective relief when it is alleged that state officials acted in violation of federal law. Tolman v. Finneran, 171 F. Supp. 2d 31 (D. Mass. 2001)

Amendment XIV

The 14th Amendment to the Constitution was ratified on July 9, 1868, and

granted citizenship to all persons born or naturalized in the United States, which included former slaves recently freed. In addition, it forbids states from denying any person "life, liberty or property, without due process of law" or to "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” CASES Tolman v. Finneran, 171 F. Supp. 2d 31 (D. Mass. 2001) ……………………. ix Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957) …………………….……………………. 1 Gould v. Artisoft, inc. 1 F.3d 544, 548.(1993) ………………………………. 1 Hardwick V. Vreeken, (2017) ......................................................................... 2, 8 Warnock v. Pecos County, 88 F.3d 341 (5th Cir. 07/08/1996) ……….…….. 3 Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980) …………………………. 3 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803) ………………………………………… 11 .

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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

Enclosed within this Amicus / Reply Brief is information not in

dispute; instead documented through established Practices and Procedures of

Law, and in compliance of local rules 3.04 (a) (b), as such, Federal Court

retains Subject Matter / Prosecutorial Jurisdiction. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S.

41 (1957); Gould v. Artisoft, Inc.,1 F.3d 544, 548 (7th Cir. 1993). Rather, a

complaint should be construed broadly and liberally in conformity with the

mandate in Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(f).

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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The “Emoluments Clause” of the Constitution does not provide

immunity for Officials of Government lying within their “Official Capacity”

now confirmed under Hardwick V. Vreeken, (2017). The clause was in fact

written as a “Check and Balance Mechanism” to remove “Bad Actors” in

government who through their Offices of Authority, under their color of

authority, abuse that authority and inflict harm upon the citizens under

Constitutional Protections. This establishes a “Fiduciary Duty of Service”

under Article Four (4), Section Four (4) of the Constitution.

That standing Definition is as follows:

Fiduciary Duty: is a legal duty to act solely in another party's interests. Parties owing this duty are called fiduciaries. The individuals to whom they owe a duty are called principals. Fiduciaries may not profit from their relationship with their principals unless they have the principals' express informed consent. They also have a duty to avoid any conflicts of interest between themselves and their principals or between their principals and the fiduciaries' other clients. A fiduciary duty is the strictest duty of care recognized by the US legal system.

The following Breaches in Fiduciary Duty have resulted in Libelous

entries into my Public Record File, the commission of Fraud/s upon me as a

citizen of Florida, the Court, and THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED

STATES.

Libel: A published false statement that is damaging to a person's reputation; a written defamation.

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What you are about to read is the monopolized version of “Social

Control” which is in direct Conflict of Interest of the Constitutions intention

of “Domestic Tranquility”. Are these Fraud/s Civil or Criminal? As my

Constitutional Right to Due Process remains circumvented to date, I say we

find out by way of a Grand Jury trial as demanded and in compliance of

Federal Rules of Procedure. Warnock v. Pecos County, 88 F.3d 341 (5th Cir.

07/08/1996), The Eleventh Amendment does not protect state officials from

claims for prospective relief when it is alleged that state officials acted in

violation of federal law.

The intention of this case is for the Grand Jury to decide who the “Bad

Actors” are, and to what level does their involvement arise given the current

status of events; being a “Preponderance of the Evidence”, or “Beyond

Reasonable Doubt”. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980), was

a case decided by the United States Supreme Court, in which the court held

that a municipality has no immunity from liability under Section

1983 flowing from its constitutional violations and may not assert the good

faith of its officers as a defense to such liability.

Here is what we have already established as fact in this case:

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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES/FACTS

1. Those who cannot remember the mistakes of the past are

condemned to repeat it. ~ George Santayana

2. Common knowledge dictates that all “Professional Practitioners”

must be registered with a licensure under the appropriate state

bureau, and that license must be maintained to the state and or

Federal Standards which apply to that particular field of practice.

3. Any and every action/s taken in any court relies on a “Good Faith

Standing” and “Trust” in that those action/s are “True and Valid".

Any and every action taken by law enforcement relies on "Ethics"

and "Public Trust", while "Protecting the Innocent" as their most

significant "Fundamental Duty".

4. Knowing and understanding the establishment of a “Fiduciary /

Principle” Relationship; Judicial Advocates are NOT currently held

to this same High Standard of Practice as other professionals in our

respective fields. In addition, the practice in question does so under

a “Color of Authority”.

5. My Liberty Interests have been infringed by Case Steering Tactics

which include the selective admission of and selective exclusion of

relevant evidence and testimony in which the context of the

proceeding is altered to Prejudice the Court against me, and pays no

respect to validity or consequence.

6. I was never arrested and or arraigned for any crime/s.

7. I have been threatened by my former counsel Elise Burkey to be

prosecuted for sending a “Letter of Inquiry” to her office.

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8. Courts of Equity have been perverted from their intended purpose to

enforce equality into being used to force Financial Gains.

(undisputed allegation)

9. We are under a Legal Monopoly (18c) in which its allegiances have

become suspect to its Constitutional Role in Government.

10. The use of the Subject Matter Jurisdictional Threshold, in this

context, “IS” an artificial construct as the Constitution, nor the

Amendments, assert any such language in reference to Due Process.

This threshold is clearly a way to manipulate the inclusion of fact/s

without respect to validity or consequence.

11. Judges are now forced to practice law from the bench removing the

“Blindfold of Justice”. Often times in an effort to bring “Balance” to

the “Scales of Justice”.

12. This Monopoly has betrayed its Trust Relationship to the People of

the United States by failing to assign them counsel in this case

affording them Due Process.

13. As this Monopoly has failed; therefore it is no longer qualified as a

“Credible Source” for continued Exclusivity over Judicial

Advocacy, Placement of Judges, and Prosecutorial Discretion.

14. My level of education and Licensure as a Fiduciary Practitioner

affords me the ability to articulate Breach of Fiduciary Duty

circumstances.

15. The Facts and Mechanisms used in this case remain undisputed with

only one party, out of six (6), able to secure counsel.

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16. It is easy to repeat the same process incorrectly while thinking the

process is correct. We can see this based on recent electoral events

in that the country is looking for new ways to “Balance itself”

through use of the Ballot Box.

17. In retrospect it could be argued I have Provided a Service to the

Court and the Government of the United States. My efforts in

advocating for that Trust, and to remind the court of its placement as

the “Fulcrum Point” in the “Scales of Justice” necessitating this

Monopoly Breakup to allow that scale to function properly based on

the First Amendment Priority of the Right to be heard.

18. I have paid my $400.00 to the Federal Court, demanded a jury trial,

which was denied in spite of payment, and my $505.00 to the

Appeals Court to proceed with services. This does not include other

costs in other courts / lawyers I have incurred along the way as this

case has progressed.

19. I have always been more than happy to pay for “Professional”,

“Ethical”, “Honorable”, “Legal Representation”. What I received

for my payment was “Contempt”, “Disrespect”, “Arrogance”, and

“Dishonorable Services”. Since when did the court get to decide

which rules of established procedure it is going to follow? My

research indicates dictation of “Legal Procedures” is one of the

“Tasks” of this Congress as per U.S.C. Title 28, Judiciary and

Judicial Procedure? (see Plain Writing Act of 2010, also E.O.’s

13563, 12866, 12988) With this fact I am extremely disappointed, to

the point of utterly disheartened. We can, and will, do better than

this.

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CASE SUMMARY

The following Breaches of Loyalty / Trust specifically ignoring the

High Standards of Professional Practice, under a color of authority which

resulted in continuing harm, in this case. Documents submitted do indicate

they were created as a result of Direct United States Congressional Action

under Title IV of the Social Security Act to which these “Bad Actors”

continue to financially benefit. Local rules 4.05, 4.09 (a),

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ORAL ARGUMENTS / CITATIONS OF AUTHORITY

1) Based on these undeniable facts and evidence; this court has the

Statutory Duty under local rule 4.05 (b)(1)(2)(3)(4)(5) to issue a TRO in my

favor, and appoint a Grand Jury to exercise its Right of Prosecutorial

Discretion. This is NOT a question of, “Did this happen?” this is a question

of; “What do we “DO” about this?” The following Judicial citation best

expresses how we should be handling this issue…

Hardwick V. Vreeken Case: 15-55563, 01/03/2017, ID: 10251467, DktEntry: 46-1, Page 13 of 20 No official with an IQ greater than room temperature in Alaska could claim that he or she did not know that the conduct at the center of this case violated both state and federal law. The social workers in this case are alleged to have knowingly and maliciously violated the law in their attempt to sever Preslie’s protected relationship with her mother. Perjury is a crime under both federal and California state law, as is the knowing submission of false evidence to a court. 18 U.S.C. § 1621; Cal. Penal Code § 118. Both crimes make no distinction between criminal and civil proceedings. This malicious criminal behavior is hardly conduct for which qualified immunity is either justified or appropriate. 2) The Fore Fathers knew that “Absolute Power corrupts Absolutely” and

wrote language against the high power European bankers and lawyers of the

time period in order to insure any power granted could not be abused or

misinterpreted without consequences to the abuser/s. That Prosecutorial

Language per the Constitutions original 13th Amendment reads as follows…

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“If any citizen of the United States shall accept, claim, receive, or retain, any title of nobility or honor, or shall, office or emolument of any kind whatever, from any emperor, king, prince, or foreign power, such person shall cease to be a citizen of the United States, and shall be incapable of holding any office of trust or profit under them, or either of them.”

3) This language is the Prosecutorial Language granting authority to

remove “Oath Takers” who violate their oaths of office. The fifty-six (56)

men who frame worked the Constitution had the foresight to add this “Check

and Balance” as a means to limit government to respect the “Rule of Law”,

and prevent the Constitution from being used to “Rule by Law”. The history

of this language indicates it has already been ratified in the original Thirteen

(13) States; therefore the only dispute is its “lack of reference” in the current

“Print Copy” used by Government and the current Legal Monopoly (18c).

4) The need to remove the “Hostile Elements” from the current Monopoly

which currently uses the “Judiciary Scale” as a “Hammer” is ridiculously

obvious. What you’re attempting, with the proposed action against me

without cause, is nothing short of “Government Sanctioned Slavery”. A

color of authority NOT granted to this, or any other court or House of Honor

subject to Constitutional Limitations of Law.

5) The current known “Defects in the Practice of law” center around a

“Monopolized Interpretation of Law” in Conflict of Interest with

Constitutional Mandates. That Conflict of Interest being the current version of

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“Social Control” verses the written Mandate of “Domestic Tranquility”.

Which leads me to my final thought in reference to that end…

We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. 6) As a Licensed Fiduciary Practitioner entrusted to complete

transactions of Lands and other Personal Properties associated with these

transactions which forever change the course of People’s lives; it is my belief

I can also be trusted to handle my own affairs using these same principles and

practices in court. This also calls Supreme Court Rule 6, Argument Pro Hac

Vice (2013), into question as this rule is clearly designated to limit the First

Amendment Right to speak and be heard by the current Legal Monopoly (18).

7) In a House of Honor we have “High Standards” to uphold. I full well

intend to insist those “High Standards” be maintained at all times, and the

“Appropriate Respects” be adhered to when mandated. I will NOT consent

to any sub-standards of practice; down-to and including “Non Licensed

Practitioners”, or “Political Correctness”. BAR cards do not qualify as they

are not registered with the appropriate “Bureau of Licensure” for

examination or clarification. These sub-standards are beneath me and my

“High Standards of Professional Ethical Business Practices” and I will no

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longer be subject to them in this, or any other, court proceeding. If this is too

“vague” for anyone, see fiduciary duty definition for clarification.

8) The United States Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division,

Office for Access to Justice, issued the attached nine (9) page letter (and

cover letter) dated March 14, 2016, cautioning judicial members and private

contractors of potential “Trespasses of Law” by listed conduct on page 2.

Based on this letter which clearly classifies these actions as Vexatious

Litigation; we can now conclude through these abusive litigation processes to

unjustly use Prosecutorial Discretion under the lesser Preponderance of

Evidence standard for the purposes of Financial Gains under Title IV of the

Social Security Act.

9) It is my firm belief based on the Defensive Posture the courts have

taken against both Constitutional Mandates, and me as a Litigant, that Subject

Matter related to the outcome of ordering Judgment in my case has the

potential to affect the Court clearly clouding its ability to remain impartial as

outlined in the Canons which govern it. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137

(1803), The Supreme Court upheld there can be no “Rule of Law” in the

absence of “Remedy of Law”. This includes SCOTUS Pro Hac Vice Rule 6.

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10) As stated throughout these proceedings the necessity to pay due respect

to the “Living Law Concept” in which the Constitution can be readily

available should the need arise is a “Hallmark Concept” on which THE

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA stands. It is also why “We The People”

expect and demand “Professional Ethical Standards” be maintained at all

times. When those “Standards” are called into question; it is for “The People”

to decide what those rules should look like. In this case, adding a “Licensure

Requirement” to the Rules of the Court which defines where “Judicial

Advocates Stand” has become necessary. When Advocates’ allegiances’

become “Suspect” based on “Core Concepts of Law”; this becomes a

concern of consequence in and of itself. The relative “Subject Matter of

Consequence” becomes secondary with respect to facts and evidence.

11) There is a reason that “Legal” is only a “Department” in my world of

business. I do understand the fact it is all this Monopoly does, but when it

became “Self Aware” it was time to “Pull the Plug” as mandated by The

Declaration of Independence. The current thinking in that the only people

“Qualified” are Monopoly Members is “Ludicrous”, even borderline

“Insane”. In a limited Government, the government does not have the

authority tell me what my “Rights” are per their interpretations; I tell the

Government what my “Rights” are per my interpretations. The courts job is to

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“Oversee Due Process” as I address “My Jury” to maintain that “I Remain

Respectful and Professional” at all times. No more. No less.

12) As it is now clear as to the “Conflict of Interest” between “Social

Control” verses “Domestic Tranquility” as written and mandated, the

addition of a “Licensure Requirement” in which the “Judicial Advocates’

Allegiances’” are clearly defined per the “Rule of Law”. These current

undecipherable legal processes create more questions than they afford

answers, pay almost zero respect to Constitutional Mandates, and seem to

result in greater conflicts than when the process started. Since we made the

mistake of paying them to build this “House of Cards” as a “Monopoly”, we

must pay them again to “Tear it down” and rebuild it correctly as a “TEAM”.

A “Monopoly” works “in purpose” toward an “Agenda”; in this case “Social

Control”. A “TEAM” works “in concert” to achieve a “Common Goal”; in

this case “Domestic Tranquility”.

13) As for the matter of current Federal Cases, those issues were in a state

of “Default Summary Judgment” as of May 30, 2016, indicated and invoiced.

The only current issue is the courts’ lack of ordering enforcement of its own

rules. This being brought to light, I now bring forth the following Declaration.

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DECLARATION FOR A VOTE OF NO CONFIDENCE

14) Herein and by full “Authority in Standing” as the only “Advocate for

the People” in this matter to make this “Formal Declaration” within this

ONE-HUNDRED AND FIFTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE UNITED

STATES OF AMERICA; through proceedings and evidence, bring forth the

current “Legal Monopoly (18c)” has become hostile to its intended purpose,

and Breached its “Statutory Duty” to this “Republic”. A redefinition and

replacement of this entity has become necessary to insure the continuation of

this “Republic”, THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, and

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES remains intact.

15) Therefore I, Christopher Edward Hallett, born United States Citizen,

current resident of the State of Florida, County of Marion, and City of Ocala,

hereby exercise my “Full Legal Authority” and move for a “Vote of No

Confidence” against the current “Practice of Law, Legal Monopoly (18c)”,

also known as the “BAR”, under Article four (4) Section four (4) of the

Constitution. (see “Estoppel by Conduct” for details on the “Redefinition in

Relationship of, The Practice of Law to the People”)

Signed: _______________________________ Date: ______________ Christopher Edward Hallett (Dad)

~ Make America Great Again ~

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MEMORANDUM OF LEGAL AUTHORITY

I Christopher E Hallett as Plaintiff / Appellant, a legal Citizen of the State of Florida, The United States, and father of the children related to this case, Per Local Rules 3.04 (a),(b), and Qui Tam Provision of the U.S. Code, Title 31, Chapter 37, Subchapter III, §3730(b), (c), hear by assert my full Standing and Authority in this Congress to make this full claim, and delegation of authority to effect Relief / Remedy in this case.

Signed: _____________________________ Date: _____________ Christopher E. Hallett (Dad)

AFFIDAVIT OF AFFIRMATION

I Christopher E Hallett hereby certify by signature of this document, recognizing penalty of perjury, that all statements and claims made herein are truthful to the fullest extent of my knowledge of this matter.

Signed: _________________________________ Christopher E. Hallett (Dad)

State of ____________, County of _________________

Sworn to or affirmed and signed before me on this date: _________________

By: (Notary Public) __________________________________

My commission expires: _________________

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CONCLUSION STATEMENT OF REQUESTED RELIEF / REMEDY

(Reiterated) Put simply; any necessary orders that will enable me to

execute all of the “Terms and Conditions” associated with the submitted

“Invoice” in this matter. Said Invoice is consistent with original relief /

remedy requested in January of 2016, submitted timely per the language of

the “Fair Debt Collections Act”. Due date established May 30, 2016, served

via Certified US Mail as of August 23, 2016, and finally sent for Collections

on November 17, 2016 (per Personal Self Defense Policy) in response to

provocative action taken by Appellee State of Ohio Child Support

Enforcement officer Sharon Gadson. (Named as the acting agent in this suit

filing dated May 26, 2016) I have contracted “Brian Bogart” of Access

Collections located in Tampa Florida to conclude this element of this case

and insure all transfers are handled properly.

Brian Bogart, President Access Collections, LLC 10006 Cross Creek Blvd. Tampa Florida 33647-2595 Phone: 813-369-5300 ext. 101 Fax: 813-369-5333 Email: BBogart @ AccessCollectionAgency.com

Signed: _______________________________ Date: ______________ Christopher Edward Hallett (Dad)

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CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

This is to certify that this brief complies with Federal Rule of

Procedure. This brief is submitted in 14-point Times New Roman font, and it

contains 4,930 words.

Signed: _______________________________ Date: ______________ Christopher Edward Hallett (Dad)

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Christopher E Hallett, certify service of this document to all Appellees via US Mail in compliance with FRAP 25 (b) through (d).

1) State of Ohio, Mike DeWine, 30 East Broad St, 14th Floor, Columbus, Oh, 43215

2) Elizabeth Tosh, 4301 West Boy Scout Blvd, Suite 400, Tampa, Fl, 33607 (counsel for Elise Burkey)

3) Gary Rich, 342 Mahoning Ave, Warren, Oh, 44483 4) Benjamin Joltin, 106 South Broad St, Canfield, Oh, 44406 5) Christina Burnham Hallett, 1750 Manhattan Ave, Youngstown, Oh,

44509

Christopher E. Hallett, 16062 SW 34 CT RD, Ocala, Fl, 34473, Phone (352) 470-8460 email: [email protected]

Signed: _______________________________ Date: ______________ Christopher Edward Hallett (Dad)

TAB 9

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Auditor’s Compilation Report

REPORT OF INDEPENDENT CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANT

QUALIFIED OPINION

To whom it may concern;

I have compiled the Case Disposition Rates of eighteen (18) separate state judicial oversight boards, committees, etc. for the periods 2013 through 2016. The underlying state reports are the responsibility of the respective State’s oversight boards. My responsibility was to compile and express an opinion on the respective dismissal rates of these states. I have not audited or reviewed the supporting data and accompanying reports and, accordingly do not express an opinion, or provide any assurance about whether state Annual Reports are free of material misstatement.

Each reporting agency is responsible for the preparation and fair presentation of their Annual Reports in accordance with the statutes and reporting guidelines of their respective state. Each state report is available for public viewing on each State’s respective oversight board’s website. A listing of those website is included below.

Overview of the Analysis

The overall average dismissal rate of complaints filed against judges is ninety-five and one-half percent (95.5%) across eighteen (18) states. The highest dismissal rate is ninety-nine and one-half percent (99.5%) in Connecticut.

In my opinion, the Annual Report for Kentucky’s Judicial Conduct Commission is representative of; the types of complaints received, types of complainants, and types of proceedings, that resulted in complaints against Judges across all states. Typically, across all states, a larger percentage of complaints that are filed, are complaints arising out of Domestic Relations cases, and are filed by litigants, who are all non-legal professionals. Review of multiple state Annual Reports suggests that most of the complaints are filed due to “Legal Error” and complain that judges are not following the law.

The following table is a summary of complaints disposed annually and dismissal rates of total complaints disposed. In my opinion, this table is representative of the case dismissal rates of the respective state judicial oversight agency.

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The following table lists states whose Annual Reports were either not available for public viewing or could not be located on the state agency’s website.

Qualification

Reporting and classification of dismissal rates is not consistent between states. The reporting periods are slightly different from state to state, as are the classification of dismissals. Some states have information available for multiple periods while one state only has information available for one year.1 For the state with only one year

                                                            1 For states whose annual report includes a table with multiple period statistics, a single annual report is included as an exhibit.  For states that do not include a table reporting on multiple periods, excerpts have been included from several years of pertinent data for verification purposes, for each year reported, a single cover page has been included to segregate annual reports attached to this compilation report.   

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of statistics available, I have assumed that single period is a representative sample, as it is consistent with other reporting states.

Where complaints were dismissed for reasons of; judge’s resignation, vacancy of office, term expiration, retirement, and similar reasons for dismissal, those dispositions are included as part of the dismissal rate.

Considering these facts, this opinion is “qualified” with a reasonable error rate of plus or minus one to three percent in the calculation of the Average Dismissal Rate.

Observations

Review of the Complaints where disciplinary action was initiated by the various oversight boards, shows that primarily the only complaints acted upon, are complaints filed by legal professionals (other judges and legal professionals) and the state agencies tasked with providing oversight of judges do not provide Equal Protection for the general public, and or, non-legal professionals.

Generally, Annual Reports for most states are easily located on their respective websites. However, some state Annual Reports are difficult to locate and other states do not report case dispositions. For example, the Annual Reports for Texas are not readily apparent on the website but can be located by typing “Annual Reports” into the site’s search tool.

While dismissal rates are easily decipherable in many state Annual Reports, some state Annual Reports require careful review of the language and data to identify dismissal rates, and some reports appear to be intentionally misleading.

Other states like Arizona have changed the format of their report, making analysis of dismissal rates much less obvious to the general public. The Arizona Annual Report for 2013 was very simple to review and the dismissal rate for that year was easily calculated, but after the report format was changed in 2014, the dismissal rate became much less obvious, which may be especially true concerning the general public.

Of particular note, regarding historical reporting of the various agencies was the following excerpt from the New York 2014 Annual Report as follows:

The number of complaints received annually by the Commission in the past 10 years has substantially increased compared to the first two decades of the Commission’s existence.

Judicial Oversight Agencies National Center for State Courts http://www.ncsc.org/Topics/Judicial‐Officers/Ethics/State‐Links.aspx 

Alabama Judicial Inquiry Commission http://judicial.alabama.gov/JIC/JIC.cfm Arizona Commission on Judicial Conduct http://www.azcourts.gov/azcjc/Annual-Reports/2010-2019 California Commission on Judicial Performance https://cjp.ca.gov/annual_reports/ Colorado Commission of Judicial Discipline http://www.coloradojudicialdiscipline.com/Annual_reports.html Connecticut Judicial Review Council http://www.ct.gov/jrc/cwp/view.asp?a=3020&q=394914&jrcNav=| Florida Judicial Qualifications Commission http://www.floridajqc.com/ Georgia Judicial Qualifications Commission http://www.gajqc.com/annual_reports.cfm Kentucky Judicial Conduct Commission http://courts.ky.gov/commissionscommittees/JCC/Pages/publicinformation.aspx Maryland Commission on Judicial Disabilities http://www.courts.state.md.us/cjd/annualreport.html Michigan Judicial Tenure Commission http://jtc.courts.mi.gov/annual_report/index.php New Mexico Judicial Standards Commission https://www.nmjsc.org/resources/annual-reports/ New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct http://cjc.ny.gov/Publications/AnnualReports.htm North Carolina Judicial Standards Commission http://www.nccourts.org/Courts/CRS/Councils/JudicialStandards/

Judicial Oversight Agencies (Cont.) South Carolina Commission on Judicial Conduct http://m.sccourts.org/discCounsel/commissionJC.cfm Tennessee Board of Judicial Conduct https://www.tncourts.gov/board-of-judicial-conduct Texas State Commission on Judicial Conduct http://www.scjc.texas.gov/about/annual-reports.aspx Utah Judicial Conduct Commission http://jcc.utah.gov/reports/index.html Washington Commission on Judicial Conduct  

 

 

2013 2014 2015 2016

Dismissal 

Rate

Total Complaints 204         

Dismissals 190          Average

Dismissal Rate 93.14% 93.14%

Total Complaints 341       412         354          358         

Dismissals 311       399         342          343          Average

Dismissal Rate 91.20% 96.84% 96.61% 95.81% 95.12%

Total Complaints 1,181   1,174      1,231      1,210     

Dismissals 1,151   1,149      1,190      1,165      Average

Dismissal Rate 97.46% 97.87% 96.67% 96.28% 97.07%

Total Complaints 189       172         175         

Dismissals 182       168         167          Average

Dismissal Rate 96.30% 97.67% 95.43% 96.47%

Total Complaints 134       171         93           

Dismissals 132       171         93            Average

Dismissal Rate 98.51% 100.00% 100.00% 99.50%

Total Complaints 625       680         771         

Dismissals 548       610         570          Average

Dismissal Rate 87.68% 89.71% 73.93% 83.77%

Total Complaints 451       412        

Dismissals 444       410         Average

Dismissal Rate 98.45% 99.51% 98.98%

Total Complaints 234       192         266          208         

Dismissals 231       187         252          200          Average

Dismissal Rate 98.72% 97.40% 94.74% 96.15% 96.75%

Total Complaints 139       137         158          201         

Dismissals 135       134         151          193          Average

Dismissal Rate 97.12% 97.81% 95.57% 96.02% 96.63%

Alabama

Arizona

California

Colorado

Connecticut

Florida

Georgia

Kentucky

Maryland

2013 2014 2015 2016

Dismissal 

Rate

Total Complaints 595       568         512          587         

Dismissals 570          Average

Dismissal Rate 97.10% 97.10%

Total Complaints 184       188         189         

Dismissals 162       173         167          Average

Dismissal Rate 88.04% 92.02% 88.36% 89.47%

Total Complaints 1,770   1,767      1,959      1,944     

Dismissals 1,748   1,733      1,949      1,925      Average

Dismissal Rate 98.76% 98.08% 99.49% 99.02% 98.84%

Total Complaints 264       228         238          256         

Dismissals 253       215         225          240          Average

Dismissal Rate 95.83% 94.30% 94.54% 93.75% 94.60%

Total Complaints 298       293         302          290         

Dismissals 282       274         286          275          Average

Dismissal Rate 94.63% 93.52% 94.70% 94.83% 94.42%

Total Complaints 350       411         404          381         

Dismissals 335       396         391          362          Average

Dismissal Rate 95.71% 96.35% 96.78% 95.01% 95.96%

Total Complaints 1,109   1,080      1,242      1,049     

Dismissals 1,072   1,018      1,151      983          Average

Dismissal Rate 96.66% 94.26% 92.67% 93.71% 94.33%

Total Complaints 81         67           69            79           

Dismissals 78         65           69            79            Average

Dismissal Rate 96.30% 97.01% 100.00% 100.00% 98.33%

Total Complaints 319       335         310         

Dismissals 313       330         305          Average

Dismissal Rate 98.12% 98.51% 98.39% 98.34%

South Carolina

Tennessee

Texas

Utah

Washington

Michigan

New Mexico

New York

North Carolina

Home Appellate Courts Law Library Administrative Office of Courts

Appellate Home Supreme Court Civil Appeals Criminal Appeals Reporter of Decisions State Law Librarian Marshal

Judicial InquiryCommission Members

Chairman

  Billy C. BedsoleAttorneyMobile

First Vice Chairman

  David ScottScott Land Company, Inc.Opelika

Second Vice Chairman

  Randall L. ColePresiding Judge, 9th JudicialCircuitFort Payne

Members

  Craig PittmanJudge, Court of Civil AppealsMontgomery

  Dr. David ThrasherPhysicianMontgomery

  Ralph MaloneMasada Resource GroupHuntsville

  Augusta DowdAttorneyBirmingham

  Kim J. ChaneyDistrict Judge, Cullman CountyCullman

  David KimberleyCircuit Judge, 16th JudicialCircuitGadsden

Staff

Appellate Courts Judicial Inquiry Commmission

Judicial Inquiry CommmissionThe Alabama Supreme Court formulated, established, and, on December 15, 1975, adopted the AlabamaCanons of Judicial Ethics “as a code for judges and a declaration of that which the people of the State ofAlabama have a right to expect of them.” Preamble, Alabama Canons of Judicial Ethics.

Alabama, like each of the 49 other states and the District of Columbia, has a judicial-conduct system thatis the primary means by which ethical standards for and other conduct of judges are regulated. Thesejudicial-conduct systems were instituted to ensure the integrity, independence, and impartiality of judgesand the judicial system by

enforcing standards of judicial conduct on and off the bench;

assisting the judiciary in maintaining the necessary balance between independence andaccountability;

providing an accessible forum for citizens’ complaints against judges;

creating a greater public awareness of what constitutes proper and improper judicial conduct; and

protecting judges from false, unfounded, and inaccurate accusations.

Alabama’s judicial-conduct system was established, in 1973, by the overwhelming support of the citizensof Alabama when, by nearly a two-to-one vote, Alabama adopted Amendment No. 328 to the AlabamaConstitution (now §§ 139-162, Ala. Const. 1901 (Off. Recomp.)). Alabama’s two-tier judicial-conductsystem consists of the Judicial Inquiry Commission and the Court of the Judiciary. §§ 156 & 157, Ala. Const.1901 (Off. Recomp.). The Judicial Inquiry Commission is convened permanently as an independent agencywithin the judicial branch of government with authority to

initiate or receive complaints filed by any aggrieved person concerning any alleged violation by ajudge of the Alabama Canons of Judicial Ethics, misconduct in judicial office, failure to performjudicial duties, or inability to perform judicial duties because of a physical or mental disability;

conduct confidential investigations of allegations asserted in complaints filed with it;

file charges in the Court of the Judiciary upon the finding by a majority of the Judicial InquiryCommission that a reasonable basis exists to charge an Alabama judge with a violation of the Canonsof Judicial Ethics, misconduct in office, failure to perform judicial duties, or inability to performjudicial duties because of a physical or mental disability; and

prosecute charges the Commission files in the Court of the Judiciary (which, by rule of the Court ofthe Judiciary, the Commission is required to prove by clear and convincing evidence) and defend anyappeal to the Alabama Supreme Court from the decision of the Court of Judiciary.

The Commission does not adjudicate complaints. The Commission does not hold formal hearings, and itcannot impose discipline on judges. When it proceeds with a preliminary investigation, it acts not as aprosecutor to prove a case, but as an impartial investigator, sensitive to the rights of the judge, thecomplainant, and the public. Every investigation affords the judge opportunities to respond to theallegations and to present argument and evidence, as the judge deems appropriate.

The Commission does not act as an appellate court. It cannot reverse, vacate, or otherwise modify anyjudicial decision. It does not review allegations of legal error or of abuse of judicial discretion, absentevidence of intentionally or consistently ignoring the law, evidence of abuse of judicial power, or otherevidence of bad faith.

Article VI, § 156(b), of the Alabama Constitution, mandates that all proceedings of the Judicial InquiryCommission shall be confidential except the fact that a complaint has been filed with the Court of theJudiciary. This mandate for confidentiality during an investigation exists in the judicial-conduct systems in

Alabama Unified Judicial System -- judicial.alabama.gov http://judicial.alabama.gov/JIC/JIC.cfm

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  Jenny GarrettExecutive DirectorMontgomery

  Chandra BrownAssistant Executive DirectorMontgomery

  Rosa H. DavisCounselMontgomery

Contact InformationJudicial InquiryCommission

401 Adams AvenueP.0. Box 303400Montgomery, AL36130-3400

Phone (334) 242-4089Fax (334) [email protected]

all states. Alabama’s confidentiality has been further defined by the Alabama Supreme Court in the Rulesof Procedure of the Judicial Inquiry Commission. Although the Judicial Inquiry Commission and its staffmaintain strict confidentiality, the Commission has no authority to limit the speech of complainants,witnesses, or any judge involved in any complaint or investigation.

Pursuant to Article VI, § 156(c), the Alabama Supreme Court has adopted rules governing the procedures ofthe Judicial Inquiry Commission. Some key provisions include the following: Any complaint filed must beverified by the complainant (Rule 6.A); upon opening a confidential investigation, the Commission mustserve upon the judge the complaint and a notice setting forth the nature of the allegations beinginvestigated (Rule 6.C); every six weeks, the Commission must serve upon the judge any materialscollected during the investigation (Rule 6.D); the Commission must serve upon the judge any subpoena,which is issued by the Commission, prior to or simultaneously with service of the subpoena on the personor entity being subpoenaed (Rule 7.C); and the confidentiality exception set out above (Rule 5.A). Inaddition, Rule 18 gives the Commission discretion to render advisory opinions relating to judicial ethics tojudges upon request. (The Commission has issued 930 advisory opinions as of October 5, 2016.)

Pursuant to Article VI, § 156(a), the Judicial Inquiry Commission consists of nine members: a judge of anintermediate appellate court, appointed by the Alabama Supreme Court; three persons who are notlawyers or judges and a district judge, appointed by the Governor and subject to confirmation by theAlabama Senate; two circuit judges, appointed by the Alabama Circuit Judges’ Association; and twomembers of the Alabama State Bar, appointed by the Commissioners of the Alabama State Bar. Thus, sevencommissioners are appointed by elected Alabama officials, with four of those commissioners also beingconfirmed by the Alabama Senate. The composition of the Judicial Inquiry Commission and the mechanismof appointment of its members by various public, elected officials and entities are very similar to all but afew of the 51 judicial-conduct systems in the United States.

During fiscal year 2016, the Judicial Inquiry Commission received 204 complaints against Alabama judges.In addition, during fiscal year 2016:

152 complaints were dismissed, without investigation, each dismissal based on one or more of thefollowing findings by the Commission: The allegations did not present an ethical violation; theallegations did not present a reasonable basis on which to charge; and/or the allegations werebeyond the Commission’s jurisdiction because, in effect, they presented legal issues not implicatingethical misconduct.

38 complaints were investigated by the Commission, and the Commission subsequently dismissedthose complaints or filed charges in the Court of the Judiciary. 17 complaints were carried over tofiscal year 2017.

The Commission met with two judges about complaints filed against those judges, and theCommission subsequently dismissed those complaints.

The Commission filed charges in the Court of the Judiciary against five judges. The Court publiclycensured one judge; suspended two judges for 180 days without pay; and ordered one judge toimmediately retire and never again seek judicial office. The Court also suspended a judge withoutpay for the remainder of his term.

In the 42 years since its inception in 1973, the Commission has filed 48 complaints prior to fiscal year 2017.

JIC Opinions are available on the Alabama State Bar website (JIC Opinions)

Canons of Judicial Ethics

Rules of Procedure of Judicial Inquiry Commission

Court of the Judiciary

Alabama.gov | Alabama DirectoryCopyright © 2016 by Alabama Judicial System | 300 Dexter Avenue | Montgomery, Alabama 36104

Technical comments: Webmaster

Alabama Unified Judicial System -- judicial.alabama.gov http://judicial.alabama.gov/JIC/JIC.cfm

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Annual Case Report

Annual Case Report01/01/2013 through 12/31/2013

Description 2013

Cases filed 344Cases dismissed

Standard dismissals 295Dismissals with comment

Advisory Letters 17Warning Letters 4Other 0

Informal sanctions (imposed by commission) Reprimand 9Reprimand with conditions 0

Formal sanctions (recommended to court) Censure 0Suspension 0Removal 0Retirement 0Other 0

Consolidated cases 0Unresolved cases 3

NoteThis report shows the disposition of the complaints filedwith the commission during the period indicated above. Itis not final until all complaints are resolved.

Arizona Commission on Judicial Conduct Annual Report for Calendar Year 2014

February 2015

Introduction

This is the Arizona Commission on Judicial Conduct’s Annual Report highlighting its activities during calendar year 2014.

Purpose of the Commission Arizona judges and other judicial officers are required to comply with the Arizona Code of Judicial Conduct. The Arizona Commission on Judicial Conduct is the agency that reviews complaints that a judge or other judicial officer has violated one or more of the provisions of the Code or otherwise engaged in judicial misconduct that warrants judicial discipline. All complaints are first analyzed and investigated, as necessary, by commission staff. The commission reviews the results of staff investigations to determine if a judge has violated any rule of judicial conduct and, if so, whether he or she should be disciplined for misconduct. The commission may issue a public reprimand for low level judicial misconduct unless a formal hearing is requested by the judge. More serious sanctions such as censure, suspension, or removal, must be approved by the Arizona Supreme Court.

History of the Commission The Arizona Commission on Judicial Conduct was created in 1970 when voters approved Article 6.1 of the state constitution. The new article, which was subse-quently amended in 1988, established the commission as an independent state agency responsible for investigating complaints against justices and judges on the supreme court, court of appeals, superior court, and justice and municipal courts. The commission’s jurisdiction extends to court commissioners, pro tem judges, and hearing officers serving any of these courts.

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conclusions of law and a recommendation with the Arizona Supreme Court as to whether the formal charges should be dismissed or a sanction imposed for a violation of one or more of the judicial conduct rules judges must comply with. The final decision as to the dismissal of the charges or the imposition of discipline is up to the Arizona Supreme Court. It is possible that following the filing of formal charges a judge will agree to stipulate to facts that demonstrate the judge violated one or more judicial conduct rules and to a sanction for the stipulated violations. Stipulations must be approved by both the hearing panel and the Arizona Supreme Court for the agreed-upon sanction to resolve the formal proceeding. It is important to point out that complainants are not parties to any proceeding initiated by the commission. It is possible a complainant could be asked for additional information during the course of an investigation or be called as a witness in a formal proceeding against a judge, but the actual parties are the commission and the judge. The judge is entitled to be represented by counsel of his or her choice. Both parties have discovery rights similar to that which is allowed pre-trial in a civil lawsuit in superior court, and both parties can subpoena witnesses to testify at a hearing conducted by the hearing panel.

Calendar Year 2014 Activities

The principal mission of the commission is to fairly and efficiently review, investigate, and resolve complaints about the conduct of judges. The commission received 413 complaints in 2014. As of January 1, 2015, the commission had resolved most of those complaints. The balance remain under review. The following data summarizes the disposition of the complaints resolved in 2014.

a. Dispositions

i. Public Discipline

Unless a judge requests a hearing to contest the charges, the commission can issue a public reprimand for one or more violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct or other applicable ethics standards. Reprimands are the lowest level of public sanction and serve to disapprove of inappropriate conduct that does not warrant the filing of formal charges against the judge.

Upon the filing of formal charges against a judge, a commission hearing panel can recommend and the Supreme Court can impose the sanctions of censure, suspension, or removal.

Three judges were publicly disciplined in 2014. The details of each case can be found at the following location on the Internet:

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http://www.azcourts.gov/azcjc/PublicDecisions/2014.aspx

2014 Public Discipline

Judge Scott F. Sulley, a justice of the peace, was removed from office by the Arizona Supreme Court for numerous rule violations associated with his failure to effectively oversee the proper operation of his court, imposing improper restrictions on his staff and failing to ensure they were properly trained, maintaining a hostile work environment, making discriminatory comments, and lack of proper demeanor in court proceedings (Case No. 2014-114).

Judge Anne Fisher Segal, a justice of the peace, was censured for various rule violations in connection with her bid to be reelected (Case No. 2014-219).

Judge Anne Fisher Segal, a justice of the peace, was reprimanded for various rule violations in connection with her bid to be reelected (Case No. 2014-206).

Judge Maria Lorona, a justice of the peace, was reprimanded for failing to resign from a leadership role in a nonprofit organization that provided services to the court in which she served (Case No. 2014-096).

ii. Advisory and Warning Letters

The commission may determine that a judge has not engaged in judicial misconduct, but should be encouraged to avoid similar complaints in the future in an advisory or warning letter. Advisory and warning letters are used to bring issues and rules to the attention of judges. Hopefully, the judge in question will take the advice or warning and make appropriate corrections on a going forward basis. Repeating conduct for which a judge previously received one or more advisory or warning letters could lead to a public reprimand or the filing of formal charges. The commission expects judges to self-correct problematic conduct.

The commission issued five advisory letters and five warnings in 2014. Advisory letters are issued when a judge’s conduct does not technically violate the rules, but the commission believes the judge would benefit from advice in a particular area. A warning letter advises the judge of an evaluated concern that, absent correction on a going forward basis, could lead to judicial discipline.

2014 Advisory Letters

A justice of the peace was advised that any time the judge proposed to amend an order due to a prior oversight or otherwise, the judge should provide the parties with notice and an opportunity to be heard (Case No. 2014-084).

A pro tem superior court judge was advised to be aware of adverse appearances if the judge is simultaneously serving as a judge and also representing litigants in the same court in which the judge serves (Case No. 2014-088).

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A justice of the peace was advised that the judge should not automatically recuse from a case because someone has filed a complaint about the judge’s handling of the case with the commission. The judge was encouraged to review Formal Advisory Ethics Opinion 98-02 (Disqualification Considerations When Complaints Are Filed Against Judges) (Case No. 2014-122).

A municipal court magistrate was urged to carefully review the requirements of Rules 1.2, 2.2, and 2.6, including the duty to be impartial and appear to be impartial and the right of all parties to be heard. The judge was also advised to review the hearsay exceptions in the Rules of Evidence (Case No. 2014-234).

A justice of the peace was advised that the judge should not automatically recuse from a case because someone has filed a complaint about the judge’s handling of the case with the commission. The judge was encouraged to review Formal Advisory Ethics Opinion 98-02 (Disqualification Considerations When Complaints Are Filed Against Judges) (Case No. 2014-279).

2014 Warnings

A justice of the peace was warned about the impropriety of discussing a case with defense counsel outside the presence of the plaintiff and then taking action on that discussion (Case No. 2014-030).

A justice of the peace was warned about failing to live up to a commitment the judge made to the commission and about encouraging contact with the judge via the judge’s website that could lead to solicitations for legal advice and improper ex parte communications (Case No. 2014-055).

A superior court judge was warned against the use of humor that detracts from the decorum of court proceedings and can lead to the perception of impropriety, if not also a violation of Rule 2.8 (Case No. 2014-214).

A justice of the peace was warned concerning the use of an improper photo of the judge on the bench in election campaign material (Case No. 2014-282).

A superior court judge was advised to read Formal Advisory Ethics Opinion 06-02 (Prompt Disposition of Judicial Matters) and warned to implement appropriate procedures to prevent unreasonable delay in rulings in the future (Case No. 2014-290).

iii. Dismissals

Most complaints are dismissed as the facts do not support the allegations or the alleged misconduct does not constitute unethical conduct. For example, many complaints allege the judge was biased in favor of a litigant and prejudiced against the adverse party. The evidence supporting the claims of bias is one or more

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unfavorable rulings. Unfavorable rulings do not constitute, in and of themselves, evidence of unethical bias or prejudice. A party dissatisfied with a judge’s ruling must appeal to bring alleged legal error to the appropriate appellate court for possible reversal of the adverse ruling. Complaints based on alleged legal errors are routinely dismissed. The commission does not have jurisdiction to review the legal sufficiency of judicial rulings.

The disposition of all complaints filed with the commission since 2006 are

posted to the commission’s website (www.azcourts.gov/azcjc). The names of the complainants and the judges (and other identifying information) is redacted from dismissed complaints. The names of the complainants and judges are disclosed if the commission has issued a public reprimand or if the Arizona Supreme Court has issued a ruling in a judicial discipline case. b. Rule Revisions

The commission submitted two rule change petitions to the Arizona Supreme Court in November 2013. One set of rule changes can be characterized as technical in nature. These proposed changes clarify ambiguities and modernize the commission’s rules. The second set of rule changes proposed the reestablishment of the private admonition as the first level of judicial discipline. Currently, the first level of discipline is a public reprimand. The commission was of the view that a public reprimand was too harsh a sanction for minor violations. Of course, if a judge received a private admonition for a minor violation and then violated the same rule again, applying the concept of progressive discipline would likely lead to a more serious, public, sanction for the second such violation.

By order dated September 3, 2014, the Supreme Court approved the proposed technical changes to the commission’s rules, to be effective January 1, 2015. The Supreme Court separately denied the petition to reestablish the private admonition as the first level of judicial discipline. A public reprimand remains the first level of discipline in Arizona though it should be noted that not every violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct will result in the imposition of discipline. As the Scope Section of the Code states, “It is not intended, however, that every transgression will result in the imposition of discipline. Whether discipline should be imposed should be determined through a reasonable and reasoned application of the rules and should depend upon factors such as the seriousness of the transgression, the facts and circumstances that existed at the time of the transgression, the extent of any pattern of improper activity, whether there have been previous violations, and the effect of the improper activity upon the judicial system or others.”

c. Outreach

Members of the commission and staff take part in education programs to inform judges and court staff about its procedures and practices and to educate them about the Arizona Code of Judicial Conduct and the Arizona Code of Conduct for

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Arizona Commission on Judicial Conduct Annual Report for Calendar Year 2015

February 2016

Introduction

This is the Arizona Commission on Judicial Conduct’s Annual Report highlighting its activities during calendar year 2015.

Purpose of the Commission Arizona judges and other judicial officers are required to comply with the Arizona Code of Judicial Conduct. The Arizona Commission on Judicial Conduct is the agency that reviews complaints that a judge or other judicial officer has violated one or more of the provisions of the Code or otherwise engaged in judicial misconduct that warrants judicial discipline. All complaints are first analyzed and investigated, as necessary, by commission staff. The commission reviews the results of staff investigations to determine if a judge has violated any rule of judicial conduct and, if so, whether he or she should be disciplined for misconduct. The commission may issue a public reprimand for low level judicial misconduct unless a formal hearing is requested by the judge. More serious sanctions such as censure, suspension, or removal, must be approved by the Arizona Supreme Court.

History of the Commission The Arizona Commission on Judicial Conduct was created in 1970 when voters approved Article 6.1 of the state constitution. The new article, which was subse-quently amended in 1988, established the commission as an independent state agency responsible for investigating complaints against justices and judges on the supreme court, court of appeals, superior court, and justice and municipal courts. The commission’s jurisdiction extends to court commissioners, pro tem judges, and hearing officers serving any of these courts.

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who served on the investigative panel) will file written findings of fact and conclusions of law and a recommendation with the Arizona Supreme Court as to whether the formal charges should be dismissed or a sanction imposed for a violation of one or more of the judicial conduct rules judges must comply with. The final decision as to the dismissal of the charges or the imposition of discipline is up to the Arizona Supreme Court. It is possible that following the filing of formal charges a judge will agree to stipulate to facts that demonstrate the judge violated one or more judicial conduct rules and to a sanction for the stipulated violations. Stipulations must be approved by both the hearing panel and the Arizona Supreme Court for the agreed-upon sanction to resolve the formal proceeding. It is important to point out that complainants are not parties to any proceeding initiated by the commission. It is possible a complainant could be asked for additional information during the course of an investigation or be called as a witness in a formal proceeding against a judge, but the actual parties are the commission and the judge. The judge is entitled to be represented by counsel of his or her choice. Both parties have discovery rights similar to that which is allowed pre-trial in a civil lawsuit in superior court, and both parties can subpoena witnesses to testify at a hearing conducted by the hearing panel.

Calendar Year 2015 Activities

The principal mission of the commission is to fairly and efficiently review, investigate, and resolve complaints about the conduct of judges. The commission docketed 354 complaints in 2015, a decrease of 59 complaints from 2014. As of January 1, 2016, the commission had resolved most of those complaints. The balance remain under review. The following chart shows the trend of complaints about Arizona judges since 2003:

338 309 334 320 324 334 353 362 314 362 344413

354

Complaints

CJC Complaints2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

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The following data summarizes the disposition of the complaints resolved in 2015.

a. Dispositions

i. Public Discipline

Unless a judge requests a hearing to contest the charges, the commission can issue a public reprimand for one or more violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct or other applicable ethics standards. Reprimands are the lowest level of public sanction and serve to disapprove of inappropriate conduct that does not warrant the filing of formal charges against the judge.

Upon the filing of formal charges against a judge, a commission hearing panel can recommend and the Supreme Court can impose the sanctions of censure, suspension, or removal.

Twelve judges were publicly disciplined in 2015 (Seven 2014 cases were closed in 2015, but are reported on the commission’s website as 2014 cases). The details of each case can be found at the following locations on the Internet:

http://www.azcourts.gov/azcjc/Public-Decisions/2014

http://www.azcourts.gov/azcjc/Public-Decisions/2015

2015 Public Discipline

2015 Suspensions (1)

Flagstaff Justice of the Peace Howard Grodman was suspended from serving as a judge without pay for ninety days by the Arizona Supreme Court in Case No. 2014-216. Judge Grodman was found to have engaged in judicial misconduct during his primary election campaign in 2014. Judge Grodman’s misconduct included improperly using his court-provided email account; improperly using robed photographs as part of his political campaign; improperly campaigning during court hours; improperly campaigning during official court events; improperly posting campaign signs at a United States Post Office in violation of federal law; using “crude, offensive and disparaging language directed at his campaign opponent”; improperly endeavoring to obtain campaign endorsements; improperly retaliating against his campaign opponent; and failing to be candid and honest with the commission.

2015 Censures (1)

Superior/Kearny Justice of the Peace Larry A. Bravo was censured by the Arizona Supreme Court in Case No. 14-373. Judge Bravo was found to have violated a number of provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct in connection

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with his participation in court proceedings involving a person with whom he had an undisclosed financial relationship.

2015 Public Reprimands (10)

Pima County Pro Tem Justice of the Peace Adam W. Watters was publicly reprimanded in Case No. 14-165. The commission found that then Pro Tem Judge Watters appeared in a photograph on his law firm’s website in a judicial robe and advertised himself on the website as an active part-time pro tem judge in the Arizona court system. These instances were an abuse of the prestige of the judicial office to advance his own personal and/or economic interests in violation of Rule 1.3.

Eloy Municipal Court Magistrate Clifford G. Wilson was publicly reprimanded in Case No. 14-331. The commission found that Magistrate Wilson violated Rules 1.2 and 2.11(A) by failing to disqualify from hearing a criminal damage trial when he was the agent of the property management company that managed the property claimed to have been damaged. Notwithstanding his knowledge of the situation, Magistrate Wilson nevertheless ordered the defendant to pay $120 in restitution to the property management company. Page Justice of the Peace Donald G. Roberts was publicly reprimanded in Case No. 14-394. The commission found that Judge Roberts violated Rules 1.2 and 2.8(B) by making unwelcomed verbal comments to two detention officers and having unwelcomed physical contact with one of those detention officers. The commission indicated that allegations of a similar nature in the future may lead to formal disciplinary proceedings. Aqua Fria Justice of the Peace Joe “Pep” Guzman was publicly reprimanded in Case No. 14-398. The commission found that Judge Guzman had delayed three rulings past 60 days notwithstanding his periodic certification that he had no pending or undetermined cause for more than 60 days. One ruling was unreasonably delayed for over three months. The commission found the foregoing conduct violated Rule 1.1, which requires a judge to comply with the law, including the Code; Rule 1.2, which requires a judge to act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary; and Rule 2.5 which requires a judge to perform his judicial and administrative duties competently, diligently, and promptly. Cochise County Superior Court Judge Charles A. Irwin was publicly reprimanded in Case No. 14-400. The commission found that Judge Irwin’s ex parte communications with the Attorney General’s Office and the insertion of himself into the appellate process of a criminal case violated Rules 1.2, 1.3, 2.2, and 2.9 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.

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Maricopa County Superior Court Judge Jeanne M. Garcia was publicly reprimanded in Case No. 2015-062. The commission found that Judge Garcia had engaged in improper ex parte communication with a Department of Child Safety case worker in a family law case in violation of Rule 2.9(A) and had also engaged in an improper independent investigation in the case in violation of Rule 2.9(C). North Valley Justice of the Peace Gerald A. Williams was publicly reprimanded in Case No. 2015-085. The commission found that Judge Williams engaged in improper demeanor during a judgment debtor’s examination in violation of Rule 2.8(B). The judge was advised he should be fully aware, having been publicly reprimanded for similar misconduct in 2006, that any future complaint of a similar nature may lead to the filing of formal charges against him and the imposition of more serious discipline, including censure, suspension, or removal.

Maricopa County Pro Tem Justice of the Peace David H. Fletcher was publicly reprimanded in Case No. 2015-125. The commission found that Judge Fletcher’s tone during an eviction proceeding was not “patient, dignified, and courteous” in violation of Rule 2.8(B). It also found that the judge failed to afford either party a fair opportunity to be heard in violation of Rule 2.6(A), and demonstrated a lack of knowledge of the law by simultaneously entering a judgment for the defendant, but dismissing the case without prejudice, in violation of Rules 1.1 and 2.2.

West McDowell Justice of the Peace Rachel Torres Carrillo was publicly reprimanded in Case No. 15-189. The commission found that Judge Carrillo had violated a number of provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct in the conduct of a landlord/tenant eviction proceeding. She entered a judgment for rent when the tenant never received a notice of past due rent and the issue of past due rent was never addressed at the hearing. She failed to afford the tenant the right to present her defenses to the material and irreparable breach allegations and summarily found the tenant guilty of unlawful detainer based on unsworn avowals.

Maricopa County Superior Court Commissioner Julie P. Newell was publicly reprimanded in Case No. 2015-192. The commission found that Commissioner Newell had violated Rule 2.8(B) of the Code of Judicial Conduct by not being patient, dignified, and courteous with an attorney and others in a proceeding pending before her. While Commissioner Newell had previously been publicly reprimanded for similar misconduct in 2013, the commission determined that this matter should be resolved by the issuance of another public reprimand rather than the institution of formal proceedings in light of the fact that the commissioner had resigned from all judicial offices.

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ii. Advisory and Warning Letters

The commission may determine that a judge has not engaged in judicial misconduct, but should be encouraged to avoid similar complaints in the future in an advisory or warning letter. Advisory and warning letters are used to bring issues and rules to the attention of judges. Hopefully, the judge in question will take the advice or warning and make appropriate corrections on a going forward basis. Repeating conduct for which a judge previously received one or more advisory or warning letters could lead to a public reprimand or the filing of formal charges. The commission expects judges to self-correct problematic conduct.

The commission issued twenty-four (24) advisory letters and eleven (11) warnings in 2015. This was a significant increase in both types of cautions from 2014 when the commission issued five (5) advisories and five (5) warnings. Advisory letters are issued when a judge’s conduct does not technically violate the rules, but the commission believes the judge would benefit from advice in a particular area. A warning letter advises the judge of an evaluated concern that, absent correction on a going forward basis, could lead to judicial discipline.

2015 Warnings (11)

A justice of the peace was urged to familiarize himself with the appropriate legal standards utilized in protective order proceedings, particularly the definition of harassment in A.R.S. §12-1809, so that he applied the correct standard in the future (Case No. 2014-399).

A justice of the peace was urged to turn off or mute his cell phone during future court proceedings. The commission indicated that all cell phones should be turned off or muted during court proceedings to maintain proper decorum (Case No. 2015-044).

A superior court judge was urged to familiarize himself with the specific time lines for ruling required by Rule 32.6(c), Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, and to remain proactive and diligent in managing his calendar. In addition, the judge was reminded that the mere filing of a judicial conduct complaint was not grounds for disqualification and was encouraged to review Formal Advisory Ethics Opinion 98-02 (Disqualification Considerations when Complaints are Filed Against Judges) (Case No. 2015-063).

A justice of the peace distributed a proposed court policy to contract vendors and others that was interpreted by some recipients as a veiled threat that they would lose their contracts if they exercised their free speech and political process rights to disagree with the proposed policy. The commission suggested that the better practice would have been to only distribute the proposed policy to other judges in the court. Broader circulation of a proposed policy could occur

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if a majority of the judges in the consolidated court approved it for external comment or as official court policy (Case No. 2015-070).

A Part B judge (Retired Judge Available for Assignment) was warned that it was inconsistent with Rule 1.3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct (A judge shall not abuse the prestige of judicial office to advance the personal or economic interests of the judge) to use a photograph depicting him in a judicial robe in an advertisement for his mediation services. Considering all the facts and circumstances of the case, the commission determined that the violation did not warrant formal discipline (Case No. 2015-073).

A justice of the peace was reminded that he needed to ensure that his former law firm’s website did not give the appearance or leave the impression that he still practiced law with the firm, including, but not limited to, eliminating any reference to the judge as a member of the firm and removing his name from the firm name (Case No. 2015-118).

A pro tem justice of the peace was warned that the use of her Administrative Office of the Courts (AOC) e-mail account to send political campaign messages was inconsistent with Rules 3.1(E) and 4.1(A)(8) of the Code of Judicial Conduct and did not promote public confidence in the judiciary as required by Rule 1.2. Based on the judge’s lack of a disciplinary history, the commission determined that a warning would suffice to ensure her compliance with the rules in the future (Case No. 2015-144).

A municipal court magistrate was warned that the use of his government e-mail account to send political campaign messages was inconsistent with Rule 3.1(E) of the Code of Judicial Conduct and did not promote public confidence in the judiciary as required by Rule 1.2. Based on the judge’s lack of a disciplinary history, the commission determined that a warning would suffice to ensure his compliance with the rules in the future (Case No. 2015-145).

A justice of the peace was warned that the use of his Administrative Office of the Courts (AOC) e-mail account to send political campaign messages was inconsistent with Rules 3.1(E) and 4.1(A)(8) of the Code of Judicial Conduct and did not promote public confidence in the judiciary as required by Rule 1.2. Based on the judge’s lack of a disciplinary history, the commission determined that a warning would suffice to ensure his compliance with the rules in the future (Case No. 2015-147).

A superior court judge was urged to continue to improve his calendaring system to avoid any delayed rulings in the future and also urged to familiarize himself with the notice requirements under the Arizona Rules for Family Law Procedure as well as the service requirements that are triggered when one

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party seeks to hold another party in contempt of court for failing to comply with prior court orders (Case No. 2015-182).

A superior court commissioner was reminded of his obligations under Rules 1.1 and 2.2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct to comply with, uphold, and apply the law and urged him to become fully familiar with the requirements of Arizona’s Address Confidentiality Program (Case No. 15-214).

2015 Advisory Letters (24)

A number of advisories dealt with more than one judicial ethics issue.

Nine advisories requested, in part, that the judge endeavor to familiarize him or herself with or to follow the law. For example, in Case No. 15-099 a superior court judge received a private advisory letter concerning the judge’s decision to seal pleadings without making the findings required by a local court rule. The judge was encouraged to become familiar with the requirements of the rule and specified balancing test before sealing or redacting court files or records.

Seven advisories urged, in part, that the judge address issues concerning delay in ruling. For example, in Case No. 15-024 a superior court judge received a private advisory letter urging the judge to be ever vigilant in seeking to avoid delayed rulings.

Three advisories addressed, in part, issues concerning the judge’s demeanor or decorum in his or her courtroom.

Two advisories, in part, reminded the judge not to conduct an independent investigation of the facts of a case.

Five other advisories dealt with single issues, including the proper use of judicial titles and robes in election campaigns, reminding a judge not to discuss pending court cases in a public venue, ensuring the right of parties to be heard, promoting public confidence in the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary, and avoiding the abuse of the prestige of judicial office to advance the personal or economic interests of the judge or others, or allow others to do so.

Two advisories suggested best practices to the judge in a particular area.

iii. Dismissals

Most complaints are dismissed as the facts do not support the allegations or the alleged misconduct does not constitute unethical conduct. For example, many complaints allege the judge was biased in favor of a litigant and prejudiced against the adverse party. The evidence supporting the claims of bias and/or prejudice is one or more unfavorable rulings. Unfavorable rulings do not constitute, in and of themselves, evidence of unethical bias or prejudice. A party dissatisfied with a judge’s ruling must appeal to bring alleged legal error to the appropriate appellate court for possible reversal of the adverse ruling. Complaints based on alleged legal errors are

11

routinely dismissed. The commission does not have jurisdiction to review the legal sufficiency of judicial rulings.

The disposition of all complaints filed with the commission since 2006 are

posted to the commission’s website (www.azcourts.gov/azcjc). The names of the complainants and the judges (and other identifying information) is redacted from dismissed complaints. The names of the complainants and judges are disclosed if the commission has issued a public reprimand or if the Arizona Supreme Court has issued a ruling in a judicial discipline case.

b. Rule Revisions

The commission supported amendments of Supreme Court Rules 46(c) and (d) proposed by the Arizona Supreme Court Attorney Regulation Advisory Committee (Rules Petition R-15-0041). The proposed amendments seek to clarify the jurisdiction of the State Bar of Arizona and the Commission on Judicial Conduct over lawyers seeking to become judges, lawyers who are judges, and lawyers following their removal, resignation or retirement as judges. The rules petition is pending at this time and be found on the Internet at http://www.azcourts.gov/Rules-Forum/aft/558.

c. Outreach

Members of the commission and staff take part in education programs to inform judges and court staff about its procedures and practices and to educate them about the Arizona Code of Judicial Conduct and the Arizona Code of Conduct for Judicial Employees. A sampling of the programs commission members and staff participated in during 2015 include:

Limited Jurisdiction New Judges Orientation General Jurisdiction New Judges Orientation Maricopa County Justice of the Peace Training Maricopa County Justice Court Small Claims and Traffic Hearing Officer Training Administrative Office of the Courts (AOC) Judicial Staff Training Supreme Court and Court of Appeals Law Clerk Training Ethics Presentations at the Annual Arizona Judicial Conference Arizona Justice of the Peace Association Conference Governor’s Office of Highway Safety DUI Traffic Conference

Four members of the commission, its executive director, and the chair of the 2015 Arizona Supreme Court Judicial Ethics Advisory Committee, attended the 24th National College on Judicial Conduct and Ethics, sponsored by the National Center for State Courts, in Chicago, Illinois in late October 2015 to ensure currency in judicial ethics committee and commission activities nationally.

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Arizona Commission on Judicial Conduct Annual Report for Calendar Year 2016

February 2017

Introduction

This is the Arizona Commission on Judicial Conduct’s Annual Report highlighting its activities during calendar year 2016.

Purpose of the Commission Arizona judges and other judicial officers are required to comply with the Arizona Code of Judicial Conduct. The Arizona Commission on Judicial Conduct is the agency that reviews complaints that a judge or other judicial officer has violated one or more of the provisions of the Code or otherwise engaged in judicial misconduct that warrants judicial discipline. All complaints are first analyzed and investigated, as necessary, by commission staff. The commission reviews the results of staff investigations to determine if a judge has violated any rule of judicial conduct and, if so, whether he or she should be disciplined for misconduct. The commission may issue a public reprimand for low level judicial misconduct unless a formal hearing is requested by the judge. More serious sanctions such as censure, suspension, or removal, must be approved by the Arizona Supreme Court.

History of the Commission The Arizona Commission on Judicial Conduct was created in 1970 when voters approved Article 6.1 of the state constitution. The new article, which was subse-quently amended in 1988, established the commission as an independent state agency responsible for investigating complaints against justices and judges on the supreme court, court of appeals, superior court, and justice and municipal courts. The commission’s jurisdiction extends to court commissioners, pro tem judges, and hearing officers serving any of these courts.

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remaining eight members of the commission, excluding the three members who served on the investigative panel) will file written findings of fact and conclusions of law and a recommendation with the Arizona Supreme Court as to whether the formal charges should be dismissed or a sanction imposed for a violation of one or more of the judicial conduct rules judges must comply with. The final decision as to the dismissal of the charges or the imposition of public discipline is up to the Arizona Supreme Court. It is possible that following the filing of formal charges a judge will agree to stipulate to facts that demonstrate the judge violated one or more judicial conduct rules and to a sanction for the stipulated violations. Stipulations must be approved by both the hearing panel and the Arizona Supreme Court for the agreed-upon sanction to resolve the formal proceeding. It is important to point out that complainants are not parties to any proceeding initiated by the commission. It is possible a complainant could be asked for additional information during the course of an investigation or be called as a witness in a formal proceeding against a judge, but the actual parties are the commission and the judge. The judge is entitled to be represented by counsel of his or her choice. Both parties have discovery rights similar to that which is allowed pre-trial in a civil lawsuit in superior court, and both parties can subpoena witnesses to testify at a hearing conducted by the hearing panel.

Calendar Year 2016 Activities

The principal mission of the commission is to fairly and efficiently review, investigate, and resolve complaints about the conduct of judges. The commission docketed 358 complaints in 2016, a slight increase of 4 complaints from the number filed in 2015 (354). As of January 1, 2017, the commission had resolved most of those complaints. The balance remain under review. The following chart shows the trend of complaints about Arizona judges over the ten year period 2007-2016:

324 334 353 362314

362 344413

354 358

Complaints

CJC Complaints Over Ten Year Period2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

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The following data summarizes the disposition of the complaints resolved in 2016.

a. Dispositions

i. Public Discipline

Unless a judge requests a hearing to contest the charges, the commission can issue a public reprimand for one or more violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct or other applicable ethics standards. Reprimands are the lowest level of public sanction and serve to disapprove of inappropriate conduct that does not warrant the filing of formal charges against the judge.

Upon the filing of formal charges against a judge, a commission hearing panel can recommend and the Supreme Court can impose the sanctions of censure, suspension, or removal.

Five judges were publicly disciplined in 2016 (One 2015 case was closed in 2016, but is reported on the commission’s website as a 2015 case). Twelve judges were publicly disciplined in 2015. The details of the five cases can be found at the following locations on the Internet:

http://www.azcourts.gov/azcjc/Public-Decisions/2015

http://www.azcourts.gov/azcjc/Public-Decisions/2016

2016 Public Discipline

Public Reprimands (5)

Pima County Justice of the Peace Jose Luis Castillo was publicly reprimanded in Case No. 15-267 for violating Rules 1.2 and 2.8(B) by failing to be patient, dignified, and courteous to an attorney who appeared before him.

Yavapai County Superior Court Judge Celé Hancock was publicly reprimanded in Case Nos. 16-004 and 16-036 for violating Rules 1.2 and 2.8(B) by failing to be patient, dignified, and courteous to litigants in two separate family law cases. El Mirage Municipal Court Pro Tem Judge Timothy Forshey was publicly reprimanded in Case No. 16-011 for violating Rules 2.6(A) and 2.8(B) for failing to accord a litigant the right to be heard according to law and for failing to be patient, dignified, and courteous to a litigant in a civil traffic ticket case. El Mirage Municipal Court Pro Tem Judge Timothy Forshey was publicly reprimanded in Case No. 16-160 for violating Rules 1.2, 2.2, 2.6(A), and 2.8(B)

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for failing to accord a litigant the right to be heard according to law, for failing to be fair and impartial, and for failing to be patient, dignified, and courteous to the litigant in a civil injunction against harassment proceeding. Apache County Justice of the Peace Jay Yellowhorse was publicly reprimanded in Case No. 16-167 for violating Rules 1.2, 1.3, 2.10(A), and 2.11. Judge Yellowhorse briefly participated in a case involving members of his family and spoke to the adverse party in a public setting about the merits of his family’s claim while the case was pending in court.

ii. Advisory and Warning Letters

The commission may determine that a judge has not engaged in judicial misconduct or has engaged in misconduct that does not warrant public discipline. A judge may nevertheless benefit from cautionary advice to avoid potentially problematic behavior. Advisory and warning letters are used to bring issues and rules to the attention of judges. Hopefully, a judge receiving an advisory or warning will make appropriate corrections on a going forward basis. Repeating conduct for which a judge previously received one or more advisory or warning letters could lead to a public reprimand or the filing of formal charges. The commission expects judges to self-correct problematic conduct.

The commission issued twenty (20) advisory letters in 2016 (as compared to twenty-four (24) in 2015). The commission issued ten (10) warnings in 2016 (as compared to eleven (11) warnings in 2015). The commission issued five (5) advisories and five (5) warnings in 2014. Advisory letters are issued when a judge’s conduct does not technically violate the rules, but the commission believes the judge would benefit from ethics advice in a particular area. A warning letter advises the judge of a concern that, absent correction on a going forward basis, could lead to judicial discipline.

Warnings (10)

A municipal court judge was determined to have engaged in improper ex parte communication, independently investigated a case, and failed to afford a party the right to be heard. Noting that the Scope Section of the Arizona Code of Judicial Conduct provides that not every transgression of the rules warrants the imposition of discipline, the commission warned the judge to refrain from engaging in the indicated conduct in the future.

A justice of the peace was reminded of his obligations under Rule 2.6(A) to afford litigants the right to be heard according law. He was also reminded to review Rule 2.9(A)(3), authorizing judges to consult with other judges in carrying out their adjudicative responsibilities, and Rule 2.16, the duty to cooperate with the commission in the investigation of complaints.

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A superior court judge was determined to have improperly spoken to a prosecutor regarding his performance during the pendency of a case. The judge was warned to refrain from engaging in such communication and of the far-reaching consequences of discussing trial performance with lawyers depending on the status of the case.

A justice of the peace was reminded that it was his duty to promptly remove his name from his former firm’s website upon the assumption of judicial office and that he improperly failed to do so for an extended period of time. The judge was advised that he had the personal and ongoing duty to comply with the Code of Judicial Conduct at all times as a full-time judge.

A justice of the peace was determined to have directly solicited funds for an organization, which conduct was improper under Rules 1.3 and 3.7(A). The judge was warned to avoid the complained of conduct in the future.

A superior court judge was determined to have worn a button supporting a political candidate on one occasion, which was improper under Rule 4.1(A)(3). The judge was urged to avoid publicly endorsing or opposing another candidate for any public office.

A justice of the peace was urged to ensure any personal fiduciary duties complied with Rule 3.8 and did not give the appearance of impropriety under Rule 1.2.

A justice of the peace was determined to have had inappropriate interaction with a member of court staff. The judge was reminded of his obligation pursuant to Rule 2.8(B) to be patient, dignified and courteous with court staff.

A justice of the peace was reminded to promptly update biographical information so as not to create an appearance of impropriety in violation of Rule 1.2 (Promoting Confidence in the Judiciary).

A small claims hearing officer was warned to refrain from making comments that gave the appearance that he had prejudged a case so as not to violate Rule 1.2 (Promoting Confidence in the Judiciary) and Rule 2.2 (Impartiality and Fairness).

Advisory Letters (20)

A justice of the peace was advised to avoid referencing his judicial position in any promotional material used in an authorized private business activity and to disclose pertinent information about his business ownership to litigants who may come before him on cases involving issues similar to his businesses. This matter involved two related complaints.

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A justice of the peace was advised to refrain from making comments that could be perceived as favoring one party and encouraged the judge to conduct proceedings in a more formal fashion so as to promote confidence in and the impartiality and fairness of the judiciary.

A justice of the peace was advised of his obligations under Rule 2.8(B) to be patient, dignified, and courteous to judicial employees.

A superior court judge was advised to more fully review case files before issuing orders so as not to violate Rule 2.6 (Ensuring the Right to be Heard).

The commission suggested that a municipal court judge re-evaluate how the court’s practice of delaying civil traffic cases was reflected on the court’s case docket available to the public.

A pro tem justice of the peace was reminded to ensure all applicable response times expired prior to issuing a ruling so as not to violate Rule 2.6 (Ensuring the Right to Be Heard). A justice of the peace was encouraged to implement and/or enhance her case tracking system for matters taken under advisement.

A superior court judge was reminded of the need to rule promptly and of the need to implement measures to track pending matters and deadlines. A pro tem municipal court judge was reminded that the use of a cell phone during a hearing can give appearance of impropriety. A superior court commissioner was encouraged to thoroughly review her cases to avoid conflicts of interest warranting recusal. A superior court judge was reminded to refrain from making comments that could give the appearance that the judge had prejudged a case. A justice of the peace was reminded to avoid using language that some may find offensive so as not to violate Rules 1.2 or 2.8(B). The judge was also reminded that he was not required to recuse himself from a case merely because a litigant had filed a complaint against him with the commission. A superior court commissioner was advised to ensure that lawyers were not appointed as counsel in cases in which they had previously served as public officers.

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A justice of the peace and small claims hearing officer were reminded that they needed to clarify the status of business entities involved in litigation and that if an individual appeared on behalf of a business entity the individual had the legal capacity to do so in order to avoid violation of Rule 1.1 (Compliance with the Law). A superior court commissioner was reminded to ensure that all response times had elapsed before issuing a ruling so as not to violate Rules 1.1 (Compliance with the Law) and 2.6(A)(Ensuring the Right to Be Heard). A justice of the peace was reminded that when managing a high volume calendar with tight time constraints, it was important not to give litigants the impression that their matter would not be fully heard, thereby avoiding a violation of Rule 2.5(A) (Competence, Diligence, and Cooperation). A superior court judge was advised to thoroughly familiarize himself with the applicable family law rules so as not to violate Rule 1.1 (Compliance with the Law). A justice of the peace was advised to thoroughly familiarize himself with the applicable rules of criminal procedure so as not to violate Rule 1.1 (Compliance with the Law) and to refrain from viewing social media postings that could lead to inadvertent ex parte communication and/or acquisition of factual information outside of the record so as not to violate Rule 2.9 (Ex Parte Communications). A pro tem superior court judge was reminded of the appropriate parameters for taking judicial notice so as not to violate Rules 1.1 (Compliance with the Law), 2.5(A) (Competence, Diligence, and Cooperation), and 2.6(A) (Ensuring the Right to Be Heard).

iii. Dismissals

Most complaints are dismissed as the facts do not support the allegations or the alleged misconduct does not constitute unethical conduct. For example, many complaints allege the judge was biased in favor of a litigant and prejudiced against the adverse party. The evidence supporting the claims of bias and/or prejudice is one or more unfavorable rulings. Unfavorable rulings do not constitute, in and of themselves, evidence of unethical bias or prejudice. A party dissatisfied with a judge’s ruling must appeal to bring alleged legal error to the appropriate appellate court for possible reversal of the adverse ruling. Complaints based on alleged legal errors are routinely dismissed. The commission does not have jurisdiction to review the legal sufficiency of judicial rulings.

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The disposition of all complaints filed with the commission since 2006 are posted to the commission’s website (www.azcourts.gov/azcjc). The names of the complainants and the judges (and other identifying information) is redacted from dismissed complaints. The names of the complainants and judges are disclosed if the commission has issued a public reprimand or if the Arizona Supreme Court has issued a ruling in a judicial discipline case.

b. Rule Revisions

The commission supported proposed amendments of Supreme Court Rules 46(c) and (d) proposed by the Arizona Supreme Court Attorney Regulation Advisory Committee (Rules Petition R-15-0041). The proposed amendments sought to clarify the jurisdiction of the State Bar of Arizona and the Commission on Judicial Conduct over lawyers seeking to become judges, lawyers who are judges, and lawyers following their removal, resignation or retirement as judges. The Arizona Supreme Court approved only part of the recommended language in a subsequent order concerning the petition. The Court added the following language to Supreme Court Rule 46(d): “The State Bar and Commission on Judicial Conduct have concurrent jurisdiction over judges for misconduct as lawyers before becoming judicial officers.”

c. Outreach

Members of the commission and staff take part in education programs to inform judges and court staff about its procedures and practices and to educate them about the Arizona Code of Judicial Conduct and the Arizona Code of Conduct for Judicial Employees. A sampling of the programs commission members and staff participated in during 2016 include:

Limited Jurisdiction New Judges Orientation General Jurisdiction New Judges Orientation Maricopa County Justice of the Peace Training Maricopa County Justice Court Small Claims and Traffic Hearing Officer Training Arizona Magistrates Annual Conference Administrative Office of the Courts (AOC) Judicial Staff Training Supreme Court and Court of Appeals Law Clerk Training Ethics Presentations at the Annual Arizona Judicial Conference Arizona Justice of the Peace Association Annual Conference Pima County Justice Court Training for Pro Tem Justices of the Peace and Hearing Officers

Commission Membership

The commission is comprised of eleven members (six judges, two attorneys, and three public members):

State of California

CommiSSion on JudiCial PerformanCe

2016 annual rePort

455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 14400 San Francisco, California 94102

(415) 557-1200 http://cjp.ca.gov

2016 Annual ReportPage 14

10-year Summary of CommiSSion aCtivity

iii.aCtive and former JudgeS—2016 StatiStiCS

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

1,077 909 1,161 1,176 1,158 1,143 1,209 1,212 1,245 1,234

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Staff Inquiries55

(5%)70

(8%)102(9%)

101(9%)

95(8%)

72(6%)

53(4%)

84(7%)

69(6%)

85(7%)

Preliminary Investigations54

(5%)42

(5%)63

(5%)101(9%)

77(7%)

80(7%)

102(8%)

101(8%)

83(7%)

76(6%)

Formal Proceedings Instituted

1(<1%)

2(<1%)

1(<1%)

2(<1%)

1(<1%)

2(<1%)

0(0%)

2(<1%)

3(<1%)

1(<1%)

diSPoSition of CommiSSion CaSeS

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Total Dispositions 1,058 892 1,115 1,133 1,138 1,152 1,181 1,174 1,231 1,210

Closed After Initial Review975(92%)

805(90%)

1,007(90%)

988(87%)

995(87%)

1,000(87%)

1,061(90%)

1,039(89%)

1,103(90%)

1,079(89%)

Closed Without Discipline After Investigation

45(4%)

48(5%)

74(7%)

96(8%)

99(9%)

106(9%)

88(8%)

90(8%)

86(7%)

81(7%)

Advisory Letter20

(2%)18

(2%)25

(2%)31

(3%)26

(2%)30

(3%)21

(2%)29

(2%)26

(2%)26

(2%)

Private Admonishment9

(<1%)7

(<1%)3

(<1%)8

(<1%)10

(<1%)6

(<1%)7

(<1%)9

(<1%)11

(<1%)11

(<1%)

Public Admonishment5

(<1%)7

(<1%)2

(<1%)4

(<1%)5

(<1%)5

(<1%)1

(<1%)3

(<1%)2

(<1%)6

(<1%)

Public Censure1

(<1%)0

(0%)1

(<1%)3

(<1%)1

(<1%)1

(<1%)1

(<1%)2

(<1%)2

(<1%)1

(<1%)

Removal2

(<1%)2

(<1%)0

(0%)0

(0%)0

(0%)1

(<1%)0

(0%)0

(0%)0

(0%)1

(<1%)

Judge Retired or Resigned with Proceedings Pending

1(<1%)

5(<1%)

3(<1%)

3(<1%)

2(<1%)

3(<1%)

2(<1%)

2(<1%)

1(<1%)

5(<1%)

CommiSSion inveStigationS CommenCed

new ComPlaintS ConSidered by CommiSSion

2016 Annual Report Page 9

iii.aCtive and former JudgeS

2016 StatiStiCS

ComPlaintS reCeived and inveStigated

In 2016, there were 1,842 judgeships within the commission’s jurisdiction. In addition to jurisdiction over active judges, the commission has authority to impose certain discipline upon former judges for conduct while they were active judges.

The commission’s jurisdiction also includes California’s 251 commissioners and referees. The commission’s handling of complaints involving commissioners and referees is discussed in Section V.

JudiCial PoSitionS As of December 31, 2016

Supreme Court .............................................7Courts of Appeal ...................................... 105Superior Courts ......................................1,730Total ................................................ 1,842

New Complaints

In 2016, the commission considered 1,234 new complaints about active and former California judges. The 1,234 complaints named a total of 1,443 judges (894 different judges).

2016 CaSeload—JudgeS

Cases Pending 1/1/16 .................................112New Complaints Considered .................1,234Cases Concluded ................................... 1,210Cases Pending 12/31/16 .............................122

Discrepancies in totals are due to consolidated complaints/dispositions.

In 2016, the commission considered 96 complaints about subordinate judicial officers. These cases are discussed in Section V.

The commission office also received 454 complaints in 2016 concerning individuals and matters that did not come under the commission’s jurisdiction: federal judges, former judges for matters outside the commission’s jurisdiction, judges pro tem (temporary judges), workers’ compensation judges, other government officials and miscellaneous individuals. Commission staff responded to each of these complaints and, when appropriate, made referrals.

Staff Inquiries and Preliminary Investigations

In 2016, the commission ordered 85 staff inquiries and 76 preliminary investigations.

inveStigationS CommenCed in 2016

Staff Inquiries .............................................85Preliminary Investigations ..........................76

Formal Proceedings

At the beginning of 2016, there were three formal proceedings pending before the commission: Inquiry Concerning Judge Valeriano Saucedo, No. 194; Inquiry Concerning Judge John A. Trice, No. 196; Inquiry Concerning Judge Edmund W. Clarke, Jr., No. 197. In the Saucedo matter, the commission issued a decision in December 2015, but the time for the judge to file a petition for review in the California Supreme Court had not expired by the end of 2015.1 The judge filed a petition for review in March 2016, which was denied by the Supreme Court in May 2016. The Trice matter was concluded in 2016. The commission issued a decision in the Clarke matter in September 2016. The judge submitted a peti-tion for review of the commission’s determination

1 The Saucedo matter was not final at the end of 2015; it was not included in the complaint disposition statistics for 2015. It is included in the 2016 statistics.

2016 Annual Report

in December 2016, which was pending before the Supreme Court at the end of the year.2

During 2016, the commission instituted formal proceedings in one matter (Inquiry Concerning Judge Gary G. Kreep, No. 198), which remained pending before the commission.

formal ProCeedingS

Pending 1/1/16 ............................................... 3Commenced in 2016 ..................................... 1Concluded in 2016 ........................................ 2Pending 12/31/16 ........................................... 2

deferral of inveStigation

As discussed on page 5, the commission may defer an investigation under certain circumstances. At the beginning of 2016, 10 pending matters had been deferred. The commission ordered 9 matters deferred during 2016. Four matters were returned to the commission’s active calendar and were consid-ered and concluded by the commission in 2016. Four matters were returned to the active calendar and remained pending before the commission at the end of 2016. Eleven matters remained deferred at the end of the year.

deferred inveStigationS

Pending 1/1/16 ............................................. 10Investigations deferred in 2016 .....................9Deferred investigations returned to active calendar and concluded in 2016 .............. 4Investigations returned to the active calendar and pending 12/31/16 .................4Deferred investigations pending 12/31/16 ................................................... 11

Discrepancies in totals are due to consolidated complaints/dispositions.

ComPlaint diSPoSitionS

The following case disposition statistics are based on cases completed by the commission in 2016, regardless of when the complaints were received.3 In 2016, the commission concluded a total of 1,210 cases. The average time period from the filing of a complaint to the disposition was 3.30 months. A chart of Complaint Dispositions of all cases completed by the commission in 2016 is included on page 12.

tyPe of Court CaSe underlying ComPlaintS ConCluded in 2016

Criminal ....................................................42%General Civil .............................................20%Family Law .................................................18%Small Claims/Traffic ....................................6%All Others ..................................................10%

4% of the complaints did not arise out of court cases. These complaints concerned off-bench con-duct, such as the handling of court administration and political activity.

2 The Clarke matter is not included in the complaint disposition statistics for 2016.3 Staff inquiries and preliminary investigations in the cases closed in 2016 may have commenced in prior

years. Cases or portions of cases pending at the end of 2016 are not included in complaint disposition statistics.

iii.aCtive and former JudgeS—2016 StatiStiCS

Page 10

reaSonS inveStigationS were deferred in 2016

Deferred pending resolution of underlying case ........................................ 4Deferred pending appeal or other review .... 2Deferred pending civil, criminal or administrative investigation or proceeding ... 0Deferred pending rule 112 monitoring ........ 2 Deferred pending mentoring ....................... 1

2016 Annual Report

iii.aCtive and former JudgeS—2016 StatiStiCS

Closed with Discipline

In 2016, the commission removed one judge, publicly censured one judge and imposed six public admonishments. The commission also issued 11 private admonishments and 26 advisory letters. Each of these cases is summarized in Section IV.

A chart of the Types of Conduct Resulting in Discipline in 2016 appears on page 13. The types of conduct are listed in order of prevalence. The numbers on the chart indicate the number of times each type of conduct resulted in discipline. A single act of misconduct was counted once and assigned to the category most descriptive of the wrongdoing. If multiple types of misconduct were involved in a single case, each different type of conduct was counted and assigned to the appropriate category. However, if the same type of conduct occurred on multiple occasions in a single case, the conduct was counted only once.

Resignations and Retirements

The California Constitution authorizes the commission to continue proceedings after a judge retires or resigns and, if warranted, to impose discipline upon the former judge. When a judge resigns or retires during proceedings, the commission determines whether to continue or close the case and, if the case is closed, whether to refer the matter to another entity such as the State Bar. In 2016, the commission closed five matters without discipline when the judge resigned or retired with an investigation pending.

10-year Summary of CommiSSion aCtivity

A chart summarizing statistics on commission activities over the past 10 years appears on page 14.

Closed Without Discipline

In 2016, after obtaining the information neces-sary to evaluate the complaints, the commission determined that there was not a sufficient showing of misconduct in 1,079 of the complaints. In other words, there was an absence of facts which, if true and not otherwise explained, might constitute misconduct. A substantial percentage alleged legal error not involving misconduct or expressed dissat-isfaction with a judge’s decision. The commission closed these complaints without staff inquiry or preliminary investigation.

Following staff inquiry or preliminary invest-igation, the commission closed another 81 matters without discipline. In these cases, investigation showed that the allegations were unfounded or unprovable, or the judge gave an adequate explan-ation of the situation.

In closing one matter, a preliminary investiga-tion involving Judge Aaron Persky of the Santa Clara County Superior Court, the commission issued an explanatory statement pursuant to California Constitution, article VI, section 18(k), because of the widespread public attention the matter had received. A copy of the explanatory statement is included as Appendix 4.

SourCe of ComPlaintS ConCluded in 2016

Litigant/Family/Friend ............................ 88%Attorney ................................................... 3%Judge/Court Staff ...................................... 2%All Other Complainants .......................... 5% (including members of the public)Source Other Than Complaint ................ 2% (includes anonymous letters, news reports)

Page 11

2016 Annual Report

iii.aCtive and former JudgeS—2016 StatiStiCS

2016ComPlaint diSPoSitionS

2016 ComPlaint diSPoSitionS

1,210

CloSed after initial

review 1,079

diSPoSition following Staff inquiry or

Preliminary inveStigation 131

CloSed without diSCiPline

81

diSCiPline iSSued 45

CloSed following Judge’S reSignation

or retirement 5

adviSory letter 26

Private admoniShment

11

PubliC diSCiPline

8

PubliC admoniShment

6

PubliC CenSure 1

removal from offiCe

1

Page 12

2016 Annual Report Page 13

The types of conduct are listed in order of prevalence. The numbers indicate the number of times each type of conduct resulted in discipline. A single act of misconduct was counted once and assigned to the category most descriptive of the misconduct. If multiple types of misconduct were involved in a single case, each different type of conduct was counted and assigned to the appropriate category. However, if the same type of conduct occurred on multiple occasions in a single case, it was counted only once.

iii.aCtive and former JudgeS—2016 StatiStiCS

tyPeS of ConduCt reSulting in diSCiPline in 2016*

* See “Closed with Discipline” at page 11 of text.

Bias or appearance of Bias not DirecteD towarD a

particular class

(includes embroilment, prejudgment, favoritism)

[10]

Disqualification/Disclosure/ post-Disqualification conDuct

[10]

ex parte communications

[10]

failure to ensure rights

[8]

Demeanor/Decorum

[7]

Decisional Delay, false salary affiDavits

[6]on-Bench aBuse of authority in performance of JuDicial Duties

[6]

miscellaneous off-Bench conDuct

[4]

aBuse of contempt/sanctions

[3]adminiStrative malfeaSanCe

(includes conflicts between judges, failure to supervise staff, delay in responding to complaints about commis-

sioners)

[3]

off-Bench aBuse of office/misuse of court information

[3]

improper political activities

[2]nonperformance of JuDicial functions/

attenDance/sleeping

[2]

gifts/loans/favors/ticket fixing

[1]

improper Business, financial or fiDuciary activities

[1]

misuse of court

resources

[1]

1

Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline Annual Report for 2015

Background and Jurisdiction Formed in 1967 by the amendment to the Colorado Constitution that established a merit system for the appointment of judges, the Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline (Commission) monitors the judiciary’s compliance with the Canons in the Colorado Code of Judicial Conduct (Canons or Code). Originally, the Commission was named the Commission on Judicial Qualifications. The Commission is responsible for disciplinary proceedings to enforce Article VI, § 23(3)(d) of the Colorado Constitution, which provides that a justice or judge of any court of record may be disciplined or removed from office for misconduct, or may be retired for a disability that interferes with the performance of his or her duties. Colorado Rules of Judicial Discipline (Colo. RJD) govern the Commission’s disciplinary proceedings. The Code and Colo. RJD are published in “Court Rules, Book 1” of Colorado Revised Statutes. Colo. Const. Art. VI, § 23(3)(e) and Colo. RJD 35 provide for privately administered discipline, such as letters of admonition, reprimand, or censure, and for diversion programs, including training or docket management reports, that are designed to improve the conduct of the judge. The Commission may commence formal proceedings to address misconduct for which privately administered discipline would be inappropriate or inadequate. In formal proceedings, Colo. RJD 36 authorizes the Supreme Court to apply the sanctions of removal, retirement, public reprimand, or public censure or to retire a judge based on a permanent disability. A portion of the annual attorney registration fees paid to the Supreme Court by each Colorado lawyer and judge provides funding for the Commission’s operations. For a fuller understanding of the scope of the Commission’s disciplinary authority, it is important to note the following: • The Commission’s jurisdiction is limited to disciplinary matters concerning judges of

the county courts (exclusive of Denver County Court), district courts, Denver Probate Court, Denver Juvenile Court, and Colorado Court of Appeals, along with justices of the Colorado Supreme Court and senior judges (retired judges who serve during vacations or illnesses and assist with busy dockets). Excluded from this jurisdiction are magistrates, municipal judges, and administrative law judges (ALJs).

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another judicial position. The Commission’s proceedings, including its consideration of potential disciplinary measures, remain confidential, as required by the Constitution. In addition, Colo. RJD 6.5(f) authorizes the Commission or a judge to request the Supreme Court to authorize the release of information about a disciplinary proceeding if the allegations of misconduct “have become generally known to the public and, in the interest of justice, should be publicly disclosed.” Colo. RJD 6.5(i) authorizes the publication in this annual report of a summary of proceedings that resulted in a private disposition or a public sanction. If information is requested by Judicial Performance and the Commission determines, in its discretion, that such disclosure is consistent with the Commission’s constitutional mandate, it may provide information about a judge’s conduct on the condition that Judicial Performance may not publicly disclose such information without independent verification. Review of Complaints in 2015 Types of Complaints The Executive Director and the Commission’s administrative assistant manage the intake of complaints and requests for information. When appropriate, callers are redirected to Judicial Performance, Attorney Regulation, or, if a municipal judge is involved, the city or town where the judge presides. The Commission also responds to inquiries from the judiciary regarding the provisions of the Code. During 2015, the Commission received 175 written complaints. This is fewer than the average of 181 complaints received annually in the preceding seven years. Beginning in September 2014, the Commission began receiving complaints by email; 59 of the 175 complaints in 2015 were filed by email. The Commission launched its website in 2010. The website provides essential information to the public, including an explanation of the Commission’s procedures; a downloadable complaint form; frequently asked questions; recent annual reports; and links to the Colorado Constitution, Code, and Colo. RJD. The website has significantly increased the transparency of the Commission’s authority and proceedings. The public’s contact with the Commission in 2015 included approximately 1,800 web hits and 289 phone inquiries. Phone inquiries have declined substantially from the roughly 700 to 800 calls received before the website was established.

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In 2015, complaints were lodged against judges in each of the state’s 22 judicial districts. Two complaints were filed against judges of the Court of Appeals and none were filed against a justice of the Supreme Court. Of the 175 complaints received in 2015, 79 arose in the criminal law docket, many of which were filed by inmates in county jails or the Colorado Department of Corrections. A total of 49 complaints involved litigation in the general civil docket, of which three were in small claims court and five were filed by inmates as habeas corpus petitions or claims against Department of Corrections personnel. Other complaints included five in traffic cases, 49 in domestic relations cases, nine in juvenile court matters, and eight in probate matters. Several complaints pertained to issues involving more than one category of litigation or more than one type of court. In addition to complaints from litigants, many of whom had appeared in court pro se, six were filed by attorneys; nine were filed by relatives, friends, or court observers; two were filed by judges (including a judge’s self-report of the judge’s own behavior that involved potential grounds for misconduct); and one was initiated by the Commission. The frequency of various grounds alleged in the 175 complaints is summarized below. Some complaints involved multiple grounds. • administrative issues with colleagues and staff: 1 • appearance of impropriety: 1 • bias or prejudice: 29 • courtroom demeanor/intemperance: 12 • disputed rulings/appellate issues

appointment, inadequacy or misconduct of counsel: 8 bonds, sentencing, restitution, probation, unlawful detainer: 10 civil protection orders: 7 collections: 5 competency/mental health: 4 contempt proceedings: 1 foreclosures: none habeas corpus petitions: 5 jurors: selection/service/misconduct: 1 juvenile—dependency & neglect, child placement: 9 landlord/tenant: 2 parenting plans: 12 permanent orders and post decree motions: 3 probate—estates, guardians, conservators: 8 procedural or constitutional rules: 18

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relevance/admissibility of evidence: 6 service of process: 1 sovereign citizen claims: 1 statutory or case law issues: 1

• disability/ADA: 1 • ex parte communications: 4 • failure to manage the docket diligently, including lengthy delays in issuing rulings: 27 • prejudicial relationships with attorneys or litigants: 1 • recusal procedures: 7 • allegations directed at the conduct of officials other than state judges:

attorneys, district attorneys, public defenders, ALJs, or magistrates: 8 law enforcement or Department of Corrections staff: 2

The dispositions authorized by Colo. RJD 16 and 35 are described in “Complaints and Disciplinary Proceedings—Consideration and Decision,” above. Most incidents of misconduct are addressed by private disciplinary letters or diversion plans. The Executive Director dismissed 153 complaints under Colo. RJD 13(b) during the preliminary evaluation phase. While the Commission is provided with copies of the Executive Director’s dismissal letters for discussion at its next meeting, it also receives requests for reconsideration of dismissal from complainants. Four such requests were evaluated and the dismissals affirmed. Through its December 2015 meeting, the Commission had considered 19 complaints, including complaints carried over from 2014. After further investigation, the Commission dismissed 14 of these 19 complaints because they did not include evidence of misconduct that would satisfy the preponderance of the evidence standard in Colo. RJD 16(c), or they involved issues under the jurisdiction of the appellate courts. Examples of complaints that are usually dismissed include a judge’s candor about the credibility of a witness; a brief instance of intemperance in stressful circumstances without evidence of a pattern of willful or persistent misconduct; errors by court staff where there is no reasonable basis to attribute them to the judge; emotionally charged hearings involving parenting issues; insisting on deadlines for efficient case management; and reasonable measures to control the actions and demeanor of attorneys and litigants, including pro se parties.

erating with Attorney Regulation or law enforcement, or respond-ing to requests from the Supreme Court or judicial nominatingcommissions concerning the disciplinary record, if any, of a judgewho is under consideration for another judicial position. It is im -portant to note that the Commission’s proceedings, including itsconsideration of potential disciplinary measures, remain confiden-tial, as required by the Constitution.

In addition, Colo. RJD 6.5(f ) authorizes the Commission or ajudge to request the Supreme Court to authorize the release ofinformation about a disciplinary proceeding if the allegations ofmisconduct “have become generally known to the public and that,in the interest of justice should be disclosed.” Colo. RJD 6.5(i)authorizes the publication in this annual report of a summary ofproceedings that result in a private disposition or a public sanction.If information is requested by Judicial Performance and the Com-mission determines, in its discretion, that such disclosure is consis-tent with the Commission’s constitutional mandate, it may provideinformation about a judge’s conduct on the condition that JudicialPerformance may not publicly disclose such information withoutindependent verification.

Review of Complaints in 2014Types of Complaints

The Executive Director and the Commission’s administrativeassistant manage the intake of complaints and requests for infor-mation. When appropriate, callers are redirected to Judicial Per-formance, Attorney Regulation, or, if a municipal judge is involved,the city or town where the judge presides. The Commission alsoresponds to inquiries from the judiciary regarding the provisionsof the Code.

During 2014, the Commission received 172 written complaints.This is fewer than the average of 189 complaints received annuallyin the preceding seven years. Beginning in September 2014, theCommission began receiving complaints by e-mail; 11 of the 172complaints were filed by e-mail.

The Commission launched its website in 2010. The websiteprovides essential information to the public, including an explana-tion of the Commission’s procedures; a downloadable complaintform; frequently asked questions; recent annual reports; and linksto the Colorado Constitution, Code, and Colo. RJD. The websitehas significantly increased the transparency of the Commission’sauthority and proceedings. The public’s contact with the Commis-sion in 2014 included approximately 1,700 Web hits and 425phone inquiries, compared with approximately 700 to 800 phoneinquiries in the years prior to establishing the website.

Complaints were lodged against judges in twenty of the state’stwenty-two judicial districts. Four complaints were filed againstjudges of the Court of Appeals and one against a justice of theSupreme Court. Of the 172 complaints received in 2014, 87 arosein the criminal law docket, of which 63 were filed by inmates inColorado correctional facilities. A total of 42 complaints involvedlitigation in the general civil docket, of which 5 were in smallclaims court and 3 were filed by inmates as habeas corpus petitionsor claims against Department of Corrections personnel. Othercomplaints included 3 in traffic cases, 46 in domestic relationscases, 3 in juvenile court matters, and 8 in probate matters. Severalcomplaints concerned issues involving more than one category oflitigation.

In addition to complaints from litigants, many of whom hadappeared in court pro se, one complaint was filed by the Office ofthe State Court Administrator (SCAO) based on reports fromcourt staff; 6 by attorneys; one by a district attorney; and 8 by rela-tives, friends, or court observers.

The frequency of various grounds alleged in the 172 complaintsis summarized below. Some complaints alleged multiple grounds.

• Administrative issues with colleagues and staff.................... 1• Appearance of impropriety ................................................. 1• Bias or prejudice............................................................... 47• Courtroom demeanor/intemperance................................. 14• Disputed rulings/appellate issues

Appointment or inadequacy of counsel........................... 10

Bonds, sentencing, restitution, probation, unlawful detainer ............................................................. 9

Civil protection orders ..................................................... 5

Collections ...................................................................... 3

Competency/mental health.............................................. 9

Contempt proceedings..................................................... 4

Foreclosures..................................................................... 1

Habeas corpus petitions...................................................... 3

Jurors—selection/service/misconduct ............................... 2

Juvenile—dependency and neglect, child placement.......... 3

Landlord/tenant .............................................................. 3

Parenting plans .............................................................. 14

Permanent orders............................................................. 3

Probate—estates, guardians, conservators.......................... 8

Procedural or constitutional rules.................................... 21

Relevance/admissibility of evidence.................................. 6

Statutory or case law issues............................................... 4• Disability/ADA................................................................. 3• Docket management/speedy trial...................................... 24• Ex parte communications ................................................... 6• Prejudicial relationships with attorneys or litigants .............. 1• Recusal .............................................................................. 8• Allegations directed at the conduct of officials other than

state judges

Attorneys, DAs, public defenders, ALJs, or magistrates ..... 3

Court staff ....................................................................... 3

Medical or mental health witnesses ................................ 11

Most incidents of misconduct are addressed by private discipli-nary letters. (See examples in the dispositions described in “Con-sideration and Decision” above.)

In 2014, the Executive Director dismissed 159 of the 172 com-plaints during the preliminary evaluation phase. Through itsNovember 2014 meeting, the Commission had considered 15complaints, including 5 carried over from 2013. After furtherinvestigation, the Commission dismissed 9 of these 15 complaintsas unfounded or involving issues under the jurisdiction of theappellate courts. The Commission applied private disciplinarymeasures concerning two complaints and completed formal pro-ceedings concerning a complaint continued from 2013. Two of thedismissals were accompanied by expressions of concern, underColo. RJD 35(a), to improve the judge’s future compliance with theCanons.

In addition, the Commission ordered a diversion programrequiring quarterly docket reports to improve a judge’s diligence incase management. Another pending complaint was addressed by

COLORADO COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE

30 The Colorado Lawyer | June 2015 | Vol. 44, No. 6

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misconduct “have become generally known to the public and that, in the interests of justice, the nature of the disciplinary proceedings should be disclosed.” If information is requested by Judicial Performance and the Commission determines, in its discretion, that such disclosure is consistent with the Commission’s constitutional mandate, it may provide information about a judge’s conduct on the condition that Judicial Performance may not publicly disclose such information without independent verification. Review of Complaints in 2013 Types of Complaints The Executive Director and the Commission’s administrative assistant manage the intake of complaints and requests for information. When appropriate, callers are redirected to Judicial Performance, Attorney Regulation, or, if a municipal judge is involved, the city or town where the judge presides. The Commission also responds to inquiries from the judiciary regarding the provisions of the Code. During 2013, the Commission received 189 written complaints. The Commission received 211 complaints in 2007, 217 in 2008, 190 in 2009, 170 in 2010, 181 in 2011, and 169 in 2012. In 2013, the Commission received approximately 370 telephone inquiries and written requests from potential complainants who were seeking information or who requested a copy of the complaint form. This compares with 675 inquiries in 2009, 560 in 2010, 400 in 2011, and 393 in 2012. The Commission attributes the decline in telephone inquiries to the launching of its website in March 2010, which provides essential information to the public, including an explanation of the Commission’s procedures; a downloadable complaint form; frequently asked questions; recent annual reports; and links to the Colorado Constitution, Code, and Colo. RJD. In 2010, the website registered approximately 100 hits per month, 165 per month in 2011, 180 per month in 2012, and 190 per month in 2013. The complaints received in 2013 addressed the conduct of judges of the District Court, Probate Court, Juvenile Court, or County Court in 21 of the state’s 22 judicial districts. Six complaints were lodged against judges of the Court of Appeals and one against the Supreme Court.

9

Of the 189 complaints in 2013, 79 arose in the criminal law docket, of which 49 were filed by inmates in Colorado correctional facilities. A total of 55 complaints involved litigation in the general civil docket, of which six were in small claims court and eight were filed by inmates as habeas corpus petitions or claims against Department of Corrections personnel. Other complaints included three in traffic cases, 35 in domestic relations cases, seven in juvenile court matters, and four in probate matters. Several complaints involved issues involving more than one category of litigation. In addition to complaints from litigants, many of whom had appeared in court pro se, three complaints were filed by the Office of the State Court Administrator (“SCAO”) based on reports from court staff; one by an attorney; two by district attorneys; and one by parents of a litigant. One complaint was initiated by the Commission on its own motion and one was filed by a judge regarding the judge’s own conduct. Other complaints were filed by family, friends, the media, or courtroom observers. The frequency of various grounds alleged in the 189 complaints is summarized below. Some complaints alleged multiple grounds. • Administrative issues with colleagues and staff: 2 • Appearance of impropriety: 1 • Bias or prejudice: 34 • Courtroom demeanor/intemperance: 3 • Disputed rulings/appellate issues

Appointment or inadequacy of counsel: 13 Bonds, sentencing, restitution, probation: 32 Civil protection orders: 6 Collections: 7 Competency evaluations: 2 Foreclosures: 3 Habeas corpus petitions: 5 Juror selection/misconduct: 1 Juvenile – dependency & neglect, child placement: 7 Landlord/tenant: 6 Parenting plans: 21 Permanent orders: 4 Plea agreements: 3 Probate – estates, guardians, conservators: 4 Procedural rules: 26 Relevance/admissibility of evidence: 39 Statutory or case law issues: 2

10

• Docket management/delays in disposition: 18 • Ex parte communications: 4

• Extrajudicial activities: 1 • Financial, personal or family interests: 2 • Improper public or cyber statements: 1 • Inappropriate personal relationships with staff: 1 • Incompetence: 3 • Personal use of court resources: 1 • Prejudicial relationships with attorneys or litigants: 1 • Recusal : 8 • Allegations directed at the conduct of officials other than state judges:

Attorneys, DAs, public defenders, ALJs, or magistrates: 3 Court staff: 2 Police, sheriff, jail: 1 Staff of Department of Corrections: 3

Most incidents of misconduct are addressed by private disciplinary letters that include the dispositions described in Complaints and Disciplinary Proceedings above. In 2013, the Executive Director dismissed 170 of the 189 complaints during the screening process. Through its November 2013 meeting, the Commission had considered 22 complaints, including three carried over from 2012. After further investigation, the Commission dismissed 12 of these 22 complaints as unfounded or involving issues under the jurisdiction of the appellate courts. Three of the dismissals were accompanied by expressions of concern, under Colo. RJD 35(a), to improve the judge’s future compliance with the Canons. In addition, the Commission ordered a diversion program to improve a judge’s docket management. Another complaint was terminated by the judge’s retirement, while subject to a docket management diversion program, because of a chronic medical condition that had adversely affected the judge’s ability to perform judicial duties. The Commission applied private disciplinary measures concerning two complaints and commenced formal proceedings regarding one complaint. Five complaints were carried over to 2014 for further evaluation. The disciplinary measures applied by the Commission in 2013 contrasted with corrective action taken in one case in 2007, four in 2008, three in 2009, seven in 2010, ten in 2011, and four in 2012. There were no judges who declined to stand for retention

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VII.

STATISTICAL REPORT OF ACTIVITIES

July 1, 2013 to June 30, 2014

A. Conduct Complaints

1. Number of conduct complaints pending at beginning of period . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

2. Number of conduct complaints received during period. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .150

3. Number of conduct complaints considered during period. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .178

4. Number of conduct complaints disposed of during period. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171

5. Number of conduct complaints pending at end of period. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

6. Disposition of conduct complaints:

a. Dismissed after investigation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144

b. Dismissed as being barred by statute of limitation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .27

c. Dismissed due to death of respondent. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .0

d. Withdrawal of complaint by complainant. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .0

e. Private admonishment after investigation. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0

f. Exonerated after public hearing. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .0

g. Public censure ordered after public hearing. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0

h. Suspension less than one year ordered after public hearing. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0

i. Recommendation of suspension of more than one year after public hearing . . . . . . . 0

j. Recommendation of removal after public hearing. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .0

k. Dismissed due to resignation of respondent.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .0

7. Total conduct dispositions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171

B. Disability Retirement

1. Number of cases pending at beginning of period. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .0

8

The staff of the Council consists of Sharon Dexler, full-time Administrative Assistant, and

Dennis J. O’Connor, part-time Executive Director.

When the services of an investigator are required, they are contracted out.

The Council regularly meets at its office on the third Wednesday of each month (subject to change due

to conflicts). During this reporting period, the Council held eleven regular meetings, no probable cause

hearings and no public hearings.

VII.

STATISTICAL REPORT OF ACTIVITIES

July 1, 2014 to June 30, 2015

A. Conduct Complaints

1. Number of conduct complaints pending at beginning of period .............................................. 7

2. Number of conduct complaints received during period .............................................. …….120

3. Number of conduct complaints considered during period .................................................... 127

4. Number of conduct complaints disposed of during period..................................................... 93

5. Number of conduct complaints pending at end of period ...................................................... 34

6. Number of complainants ......................................................................................................... 74

a. Number who filed a single complaint ....................................................................... 52

b. Number who filed multiple complaints ..................................................................... 22

1) Number who filed 2 complaints ........................................................................... 14

2) Number who filed 3 complaints ............................................................................. 4

3) Number who filed 5 complaints ............................................................................. 1

4) Number who filed 7 complaints ............................................................................. 2

5) Number who filed 9 complaints ............................................................................. 1

Percentage of total complainants who filed multiple complaints .......................... 29%

Percentage of total complaints filed by multiple complainants (68 complaints from

multiple filers divided into 120 complaints filed in 2014-2015) ........................... 56%

7. Disposition of conduct complaints:

a. Dismissed after investigation .................................................................................... 71

b. Dismissed as being barred by statute of limitations .................................................. 22

c. Dismissed due to death of respondent ......................................................................... 0

d. Withdrawal of complaint by complainant ................................................................... 0

e. Number of Probable Cause Hearings .......................................................................... 0

f. Private admonishment after investigation ................................................................... 0

g. Number of Public Hearings ......................................................................................... 0

2013 Annual Report

- 11 -

On May 21, 2013, Judge Bob Smith, Probate Court of Hart County, received a reprimand

for engaging in inappropriate campaign activities on behalf of his son, who was a candidate for

another judicial office in Hart County.

Confidential Disciplinary Matters:

The Commission also issued confidential discipline in three matters: two letters of

admonition and one private reprimand. The conduct which resulted in a letter of admonition

involved a part-time Municipal judge who issued a warrant in a case and then, after meeting with

the defendant in his capacity as an attorney, he ordered the matter transferred to State Court and

made an entry of appearance as counsel of record for the same defendant. The second letter of

admonition involved a judicial candidate who was accused of causing signs of her opponent to

be removed from private property during a contested judicial race. The Commission also issued

a private reprimand involving a judge who improperly used his judicial status in an attempt to

detain a citizen he believed was committing a traffic violation.

B. COMPLAINT INFORMATION

The Commission receives a significant number of complaints each year alleging various

types of judicial misconduct. Set out below are some key statistics about those complaints.

Judicial Complaints FY2013

Number of Complaints Filed 451

Number of Complaints Rejected: No Merit or Lack of Jurisdiction 334

Number of Complaints Docketed 51

Number of Complaints Investigated but not Docketed 66

The numbers above reflect complaints received and processed in FY2013. This data does not reflect complaints which

have not been processed or acted upon.

In the 2015-2016 fiscal year, the Commission considered 249 complaints. The Commission concluded 208 complaints, thirteen of which resulted in imposed sanctions: Four Private Admonitions One Private Reprimand

1. October 9, 2015 - Violations of Canons 1 and 3B(4).

Two Public Reprimands 1. Judge Kenneth L. Easterling - Violation of Canon 3B(4). 2. Judge Sheila A. Collins - The Commission initiated formal proceedings

against Judge Collins on January 11, 2016. Following a hearing, held on April 19, 2016, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Final Order was entered on April 21, 2016, publicly reprimanding Judge Collins for violations of Canons 2A and 3B(4).

Three Suspensions

1. Judge Cathy E. Prewitt - 7-Day Agreed Order of Suspension, without pay, for violations of Canons 1, 2A, 3B(2),(7).

2. Judge Sam Potter - 30-Day Agreed Order of Suspension, without pay, for violations of Canons 1, 2A, 3B(2),(4),(7),(8) and 4A(3).

3. Judge Steven D. Combs - The Commission initiated formal proceedings against Judge Combs on April 27, 2015. Following a hearing, held on September 21, 2015, Judge Combs entered into a 6-month Agreed Order of Suspension, without pay, for multiple violations of Canons 1, 2A, 2D, 3B(2),(4),(8), 3E(1), 4A(1),(2),(3), and 5A(1)(c).

Temporary Suspension

Judge Olu A. Stevens - The Commission initiated formal proceedings against Judge Stevens on February 18, 2016. On April 18, 2016, Judge Stevens entered into an Agreed Order of Temporary Suspension, with pay, pending final adjudication. The tempo-rary suspension remained in effect at the end of the fiscal year.

Temporary Retirement

Judge Lisa O. Bushelman - Order of Temporary Retirement issued May 2, 2016; effective May 3, 2016 to September 1, 2016. The temporary retirement remained in effect at the end of the fiscal year.

Forty-one complaints were pending at the end of the fiscal year. Twenty-six were received prior to the end of the fiscal year but too late to be considered in the 2015-2016 fiscal year. Fifteen were carried over after initial consideration.

Judicial Conduct Commission

P.O. Box 4266

Frankfort, KY 40604-4266

Phone: 502-564-1231

Fax: 502-564-1233

Fiscal Year 2015-2016

Commission Members Stephen D. Wolnitzek, Chair Covington Judge Janet L. Stumbo Prestonsburg Judge Eddy Coleman Pikeville Judge David P. Bowles Louisville Joseph D. Adams Bardstown Michael T. Noftsger Somerset

Alternate Members

R. Kent Westberry Louisville Judge Jeff S. Taylor Owensboro Judge Mitch Perry Louisville Judge Karen A. Thomas Newport

Commission Staff

Ms. Jimmy Shaffer Executive Secretary J. Rachel Noyes

Executive Assistant

Judicial Conduct Commission Annual Report

Complaints:

18 - Number of complaints pending

final consideration at the beginning

of the fiscal year

26 - Number of complaints pending

initial consideration at the beginning

of the fiscal year

205 - Number of new complaints

received during the fiscal year

15 - Number of complaints pending

final consideration at the end of the

fiscal year

26 - Number of complaints pending

initial consideration at the end of

the fiscal year

208 - Number of complaints dis-

posed of during the fiscal year

Judicial Conduct Complaints:

0.00%

5.00%

10.00%

15.00%

20.00%

25.00%

30.00%

35.00%

Page 2 Fiscal Year 2015-2016

Jurisdiction:

Judicial positions in the Commonwealth of Kentucky within the jurisdiction of the Commission: 7-Supreme Court, 14-Court of Appeals, 95-Circuit Court, 51-Family Court, 116-District Court, 60-Trial Commissioner, 120-Master Commissioner, and 18-Domestic Relations Commissioner. Additionally, the Commission has jurisdiction over attorneys who have filed as candidates for judicial office.

Number of Complaints by Judicial Position:

What Types of Proceedings Resulted in Complaints?

0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140

Social Media

Political Activity/Campaign Conduct

Other

Legal Error

Judicial Temperament

Ex Parte Communication

Delay

Conflict of Interest/Failure to Recuse

Bias/Discrimination/Prejudice

0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140

Other

Media

Litigant

Judge

Inmate

Family Member

Attorney

Anonymous

Page 3

Who Filed Complaints?

Fiscal Year 2015-2016

What were the Allegations?

Complainant Representation in Court:

55.87% were represented by counsel

16.90% unknown (unspecified in the complaint)

15.96% appeared pro se

10.33% not applicable (non-litigation)

0.94% were represented by counsel, then appeared pro se

Page 4 Fiscal Year 2015-2016

About the Judicial Conduct Commission

The mission of the Kentucky Judicial Conduct Commission is to protect the public, to en-courage judges, commissioners and candidates for judicial office to maintain high stand-ards of conduct, and to promote public confidence in the integrity, independence, com-petence, and impartiality of the judiciary.

The Commission accomplishes this mission through its investigation of complaints of ju-

dicial misconduct, wrongdoing or disability. In cases where judges, commissioners and

candidates for judicial office are found to have engaged in misconduct or to be incapaci-

tated, the Kentucky Constitution authorizes the Commission to take appropriate discipli-

nary action, including issuing admonitions, reprimands, censures, suspensions, or remov-

al from office.

http://courts.ky.gov/commissionscommittees/JCC/Pages/default.aspx

0

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10-Year Complaint History

In the 2014-2015 fiscal year , the Commission considered 284 complaints. The Commission concluded 266 complaints, fourteen of which resulted in imposed sanctions: Seven Private Admonitions

Four Private Reprimands 1. July 23, 2014 - Violation of Canon 5A(1)(d), which prohibits a candidate for judicial

office from making a contribution to a political candidate. 2. August 15, 2014 - Violation of Canon 5A(1)(b), which prohibits a candidate for judicial

office from acting as a leader in a political organization. 3. December 5, 2014 - Violation of Canon 2D, which prohibits a judge from conveying

the impression that others are in a special position to influence the judge; violations of Canon 4A(1), which prohibits a judge from participating in activities which cast reasonable doubt on the judge’s ability to act impartially; and violation of 5A(1)(c), which prohibits a judge from publicly endorsing a candidate for public office.

4. April 2, 2015 - Violation of Canon 2D, which prohibits a judge from conveying the impression that others are in a special position to influence the judge and Canon 5A(1)(c), which prohibits a judge from publicly endorsing a candidate for public office.

Two Public Reprimands

1. Judicial Candidate Dana M. Cohen - Violations of Canon 5A(1)(c), which prohibits a candidate for judicial office from publicly endorsing a candidate for public office and Canon 5A(1)(d), which prohibits a candidate for judicial office from making a contribution to a political candidate.

2. Judge Sandra L. McLaughlin - Violation of Canon 3B(4), which requires a judge to be dignified and courteous to litigants and Canon 3B(5), which prohibits words or con-duct manifesting bias or prejudice.

One 15-day Suspension

1. The Commission initiated formal proceedings against Judge Gregory T. Popovich on February 19, 2015. Following a hearing, held on May 28, 2015, Findings of Fact, Con-clusions of Law and Final Order were entered on June 18, 2015, which ordered a 15-day suspension for violations of Canons 1, 2A, 2D, 3A, 3B(2),(4) and SCR 4.020(1)(b)(i).

The Commission initiated formal proceedings against Judge Steven D. Combs on April 27,2015. An Order of Temporary Suspension from Duties Pending Final Adjudi-cation was entered following a temporary suspension hearing held on June 16, 2015. The temporary suspension remained in effect at the end of the fiscal year. Forty-four complaints were pending at the end of the fis-cal year, twenty-six of which were received prior to the end of the fiscal year but too late to be considered in the 2014-2015 fiscal year, and eighteen of which were carried over after initial consideration.

Judicial Conduct Commission

P.O. Box 4266

Frankfort, KY 40604-4266

Phone: 502-564-1231

Fax: 502-564-1233

Fiscal Year 2014-2015

Commission Members

Stephen D. Wolnitzek, Chair Covington Judge Janet L. Stumbo Prestonsburg Judge Eddy Coleman Pikeville Judge David P. Bowles Louisville Diane E. Logsdon Elizabethtown Joyce King Jennings Louisville

Alternate Members

J. David Boswell Paducah Judge Laurance B. VanMeter Lexington Judge Jeffrey M. Walson Winchester Judge Karen A. Thomas Newport

Commission Staff

Ms. Jimmy Shaffer Executive Secretary J. Rachel Noyes

Executive Assistant

Judicial Conduct Commission Annual Report

Complaints:

29 - Number of complaints pending

at the beginning of the fiscal year

281 - Number of complaints re-

ceived during the fiscal year

266- Number of complaints dis-

posed of during the fiscal year

18 - Number of complaints pending

final consideration at the end of the

fiscal year

26 - Number of complaints pending

initial consideration at the end of

the fiscal year

Judicial Conduct Complaints:

Page 2 Fiscal Year 2014-2015

Jurisdiction:

There are 367 judicial positions in the Commonwealth of Kentucky within the jurisdiction of the Commission. Addition-ally, the Commission has jurisdiction over attorneys who have filed as candidates for judicial office.

Number of Complaints by Judicial Position:

33

.10

%

23

.24

%

15

.49

%

12

.68

%

5.9

9%

2.8

2%

2.4

6%

2.1

1%

1.4

1%

0.3

5%

0.3

5%

CR

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What Types of Proceedings Resulted in Complaints?

11

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52

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Page 3

Who Filed Complaints?

Fiscal Year 2014-2015

Complainant

Representation

in Court:

43.31% were represented

by counsel

22.54% appeared pro se

19.37% not applicable

(non-litigation)

13.38% unknown

1.41% were represented

by counsel, then ap-

peared pro se

What were the Allegations?

12

3

56

27

15

15

14

13

6 4 4 4 2 1

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Page 4 Fiscal Year 2014-2015

2014-2015 Presentations:

District Judges College - “When Trouble Comes: How to Avoid It and How to Respond to It” present-

ed by Judge David Bowles and Ms. Jimmy Shaffer, on September 15, 2014.

Presentation of the Kentucky Pretrial System to the Cook County, IL trial judges in Chicago by Judge

David Bowles on June 10-11, 2015.

About the Judicial Conduct Commission

The mission of the Kentucky Judicial Conduct Commission is to protect the public, to encourage judges, commissioners and candidates for judicial office to maintain high standards of conduct, and to promote public confidence in the integrity, independence, competence, and impartiality of the judiciary.

The Commission accomplishes this mission through its investigation of complaints of judicial

misconduct, wrongdoing or disability. In cases where judges, commissioners and candidates for

judicial office are found to have engaged in misconduct or to be incapacitated, the Kentucky

Constitution authorizes the Commission to take appropriate disciplinary action, including issu-

ing admonitions, reprimands, censures, suspensions, or removal from office.

http://courts.ky.gov/commissionscommittees/JCC

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

FY

14

-15

FY

13-

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FY

12-

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FY

11-

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10

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FY

09

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FY

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FY

07-

08

FY

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FY

05-

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FY

04

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Co

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ar

Fiscal Year

10-Year Complaint History

Judicial Conduct Commission

P.O. Box 4266

Frankfort, KY 40604-4266

Phone: 502-564-1231

Fax: 502-564-1233

Fiscal Year 2013-2014

Commission Members

Stephen D. Wolnitzek, Chair Covington Judge Janet L. Stumbo Prestonsburg Judge Eddy Coleman Pikeville Judge David P. Bowles Louisville Diane E. Logsdon Elizabethtown Joyce King Jennings Louisville

Alternate Members

J. David Boswell Paducah Judge Laurance B. VanMeter Lexington Judge Jeffrey M. Walson Winchester Judge Susan M. Johnson Paintsville

Commission Staff

Ms. Jimmy Shaffer Executive Secretary J. Rachel Noyes

Executive Assistant

Judicial Conduct Commission Annual Report

Complaints:

28 - Number of complaints

pending at the beginning of

the fiscal year

193 - Number of complaints

received during the fiscal year

192 - Number of complaints

disposed of during the fiscal

year

29 - Number of complaints

pending at the end of the

fiscal year

Supreme Court

Justices - 7

Court of Appeals Judges - 14

Circuit Court Judges - 95

Family Court Judges - 51

District Judges -116

Trial Commissioners - 60

Master Commissioners -

116

Domestic Relations Commissioners - 24

Kentucky Judicial Positions

There are 367 judicial positions in the Commonwealth of Kentucky within the jurisdiction of the Commission. Additionally, the Commission has jurisdiction over attorneys who have filed as candidates for judicial office. Of 193 total complaints filed for fiscal year 2013-2014, 81 complaints were filed against circuit court judges of general jurisdiction, 51 were filed against circuit family court judges, 50 were filed against district court judges, and 17 were filed against judicial candidates.

In the 2013-2014 fiscal year , the Commission considered 209 complaints—193 new complaints and 28 complaints carried over from the 2012-2013 fiscal year. The Commission con-cluded 192 complaints, five of which resulted in imposed sanctions: Two Private Admonitions

1. Violation of Canon 4C(3)(b)(i) and (iv) for using the prestige of the judicial office for the solicita-tion of donations for a charitable organization.

2. Violation of Canon 3B(5) for making a statement during a court proceeding which could be per-ceived as gender bias.

Two Public Reprimands (Judge Martin McDonald and

Judge Frank A. Fletcher) One 30-day Suspension (Judge Rebecca S. Ward) Twenty-nine complaints were pending at the end of the fiscal year, eighteen of which were received prior to the end of the fiscal year but too late to be considered before the first meet-ing in the new fiscal year and eleven of which were carried after initial consideration.

Jurisdiction:

Judicial Conduct Complaints:

Page 2 Fiscal Year 2013-2014

Percentages of Complaints by Judicial Position:

What Types of Proceedings Resulted in Complaints?

Page 3

Who Filed Complaints?

Fiscal Year 2013-2014

Complainant

Representation

in Court:

50.24% were represented

by counsel

1.90% were represented

by counsel, then ap-

peared pro se

24.17% appeared pro se

7.58% unknown

16.11% not applicable

(non-litigation)

What were the Allegations?

Page 4 Fiscal Year 2012-2013

2013-2014 Presentations:

University of Louisville Brandeis Inns of Court - Presentation on judicial elections, given by Mr.

Stephen Wolnitzek, on October 29,2013.

District Bar - Presentation on general Commission procedures and statistics given by Judge Janet

Stumbo, in Ashland, on September 16, 2013, and in Prestonsburg, on November 21, 2013.

Circuit Judges College - “When Trouble Comes: How to Avoid It and How to Respond to It” presented

by Judge Eddy Coleman, Justice Michele Keller, Mr. Stephen Wolnitzek, and Ms. Jimmy Shaffer, on No-

vember 20, 2013.

Louisville Bar Association - “Recusing and Reporting Judges: The Legal, Ethical & Practical” pre-

sented by Judge David Bowles, with co-presenter J. Vincent Aprile II, on March 5, 2014.

0

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FY

12-1

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FY

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FY

10-1

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FY

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FY

08

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FY

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08

FY

06

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FY

05-

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Fiscal Year

10-Year Complaint History

About the Judicial Conduct Commission

The mission of the Kentucky Judicial Conduct Commission is to protect the public, to encourage judges, commissioners and candidates for judicial office to maintain high standards of conduct, and to promote public confidence in the integrity, independence, competence, and impartiality of the judiciary.

The Commission accomplishes this mission through its investigation of complaints of judicial

misconduct, wrongdoing or disability. In cases where judges, commissioners and candidates for

judicial office are found to have engaged in misconduct or to be incapacitated, the Kentucky

Constitution authorizes the Commission to take appropriate disciplinary action, including issu-

ing admonitions, reprimands, censures, suspensions, or removal from office.

http://courts.ky.gov/commissionscommittees/JCC

In the 2012-2013 fiscal year , the Commission considered 262

complaints—233 new complaints and 29 complaints carried

over from the 2011-2012 fiscal year.

The Commission concluded 234 complaints, three of which

resulted in imposed sanctions:

Two Private Reprimands:

The judge exerted the influence of the judge’s

office in regard to the employment of certain

individuals.

In a confidential juvenile matter pending before

the judge, the judge contacted a third party not

involved in the case about a matter related to

the case.

One Public Reprimand (Judge Timothy A. Langford)

Twenty-eight complaints were pending at the end of the

fiscal year. Twenty-one complaints were received prior to

the end of the fiscal year but too late to be considered before

the first meeting in the new fiscal year.

Judicial Conduct Complaints:

Jurisdiction:

There are 367 judicial positions in the Commonwealth of Kentucky within the jurisdiction of the Commission. Of 233 total complaints filed for fiscal year 2012/2013, 95 complaints were filed against circuit court judges of general jurisdiction, 60 were filed against circuit family court judges, and 52 were filed against district court judges.

Judicial Conduct Commission

P.O. Box 4266

Frankfort, KY 40604-4266

Phone: 502-564-1231

Fax: 502-564-1233

Fiscal Year 2012-2013

Commission Members

Stephen D. Wolnitzek, Chair Covington Judge Janet L. Stumbo Prestonsburg Judge Eddy Coleman Pikeville Judge Susan M. Johnson Paintsville Diane E. Logsdon Elizabethtown Joyce King Jennings Louisville

Alternate Members

J. David Boswell Paducah Judge Laurance B. VanMeter Lexington Judge Linda Rae Bramlage Burlington Judge David P. Bowles Louisville

Commission Staff

Ms. Jimmy Shaffer Executive Secretary J. Rachel Noyes

Executive Assistant

Judicial Conduct Commission Annual Report

Complaints:

29 - Number of complaints

pending at the beginning of

the fiscal year

233 - Number of complaints

received during the fiscal

year

234 - Number of complaints

disposed of during the fiscal

year

28 - Number of complaints

pending at the end of the

fiscal year

Supreme Court

Justices - 7

Court of Appeals Judges - 14

Circuit Court Judges - 95

Family Court Judges - 51

District Judges -116

Trial Commissioners - 60

Master Commissioners -

116

Domestic Relations Commissioners - 24

Kentucky Judicial Positions

Page 2 Fiscal Year 2012-2013

What Types of Proceedings Resulted in Complaints?

Percentages of Complaints by Judicial Position:

Page 3

Who is Filing Complaints?

Fiscal Year 2012-2013

Complainant

Representation

in Court:

55.90% were represented

by counsel

3.06% were represented

by counsel, then ap-

peared pro se

23.14% appeared pro se

14.85% unknown

(unspecified in com-

plaint)

3.06% not applicable

(non-litigation)

What are the Allegations?

About the Judicial Conduct Commission

The mission of the Kentucky Judicial Conduct Commission is to protect the public, to encourage judges, commissioners and candidates for judicial office to maintain high standards of conduct, and to promote public confidence in the integrity, independence, competence, and impartiality of the judiciary.

The Commission accomplishes this mission through its investigation of com-

plaints of judicial misconduct, wrongdoing or disability. In cases where

judges, commissioners and candidates for judicial office are found to have

engaged in misconduct or to be incapacitated, the Kentucky Constitution

authorizes the Commission to take appropriate disciplinary action, including

issuing admonitions, reprimands, censures, suspensions, or removal from of-

fice.

http://courts.ky.gov/commissionscommittees/JCC

0

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3

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Fiscal Year

10-Year Complaint History

Page 4 Fiscal Year 2012-2013

Attorney Members:

Aileen E. Oliver, EsquireJoseph A. Stevens, Esquire

Public Members:

Dr. Brian H. AvinDr. Kevin DanielsDoreen Rexroad

STAFF:

Investigative Counsel: Steven P. Lemmey, EsquireAssistant Investigative Counsel: Elissa E. Goldfarb, EsquireExecutive Secretary: Gary J. Kolb, EsquireAdministrative Assistant: Lisa R. Zinkand

VII. MEETINGS.

The Commission Members held 12 regularly scheduled Meetings in FY 2013.

The Board Members held 12 regularly scheduled Meetings in FY 2013.

VIII. SUMMARY OF COMMISSION ACTIVITY IN FY 2013

During Fiscal Year 2013 (July 1, 2012 through June 30, 2013), theCommission opened files for 139 written complaints.

Thirteen complaints were filed by attorneys, 2 by judges, 13 by inmates,and 2 were initiated by Investigative Counsel on his own initiative, pursuant toMaryland Rule 16-805(d). The remaining 109 were filed by members of thegeneral public.

Complaints against Circuit Court Judges totaled 80; 52 complaints weremade against District Court Judges; 2 complaints were filed against a Court ofSpecial Appeals Judge; 1 complaint was filed against a Court of Appeals Judge;and 4 complaints were filed against Orphans’ Court Judges.

The types of cases involved include family law matters (divorce, alimonycustody, visitation, etc.) that prompted 30 complaints, criminal cases thatprompted 32 complaints, and 69 complaints arose from other civil cases. Eightcomplaints failed to fit in any of those categories.

7

In addition, the Commission authorized the filing of charges against aDistrict Court Judge regarding the Judge’s handling of numerous direct contemptcases. The Judge and the Commission entered into an Agreement for Disciplineby Consent (“Agreement”) and a Stipulation of Facts and Conclusions of Law,whereby the Judge admitted to the conduct alleged in the charges and agreedthat specific Rules of the Maryland Code of Judicial Conduct had been violated bythe Judge. The Judge consented to a suspension without pay for five (5) workdays, and to an overall suspension of ninety (90) days with the remaining eighty-five (85) days being stayed based upon the Judge’s successful completion of atwo (2)-year period of probation with the Commission. The Court of Appeals ofMaryland entered a Consent Order approving the Agreement, making theAgreement public, and suspending the Judge without pay for five (5) work days.

Also, the Commission issued a Private Reprimand to a District Court Judge. The Commission concluded, based upon stipulated facts, that the Judge violatedthe Maryland Code of Judicial Conduct by making inappropriate and demeaningcomments to a female attorney in the courtroom.

The Commission authorized the filing of charges against a District CourtJudge regarding alleged disrespectful, rude, and demeaning comments to litigantsduring a hearing. Prior to any further proceedings before the Commission, theJudge informed the Governor that he did not want to be reappointed and retiredat the completion of his term.

Further, the Commission entered into two Deferred Discipline Agreementswith Orphans’ Court Judges from two different counties regarding their handlingof estate cases and their need for a reviewer to provide helpful assistance to theJudges.

The Commission issued seven (7) dismissals with a warning involving: twoOrphans’ Court Judges signing an affidavit providing character evidence in a civilcase, without a subpoena; Circuit Court Judge failing to disclose, during thecourse of a trial, that the Judge may have known or should have realized thatJudge might know a particular witness in the case; District Court Judge makingan inappropriate comment to a defendant during a hearing; Circuit Court Judgehandling a case in which Judge appears to favor an unrepresented defendant by,among other things, sustaining objections that were not made by the defendantsand not treating counsel with appropriate patience, dignity, and courtesy; CircuitCourt Judge making a racially offensive term that may appear to those in thecourtroom that the Judge was not impartial, even though Judge did not intend tooffend anyone or appear biased; and District Court Judge presiding over case inwhich one of the parties was the Judge’s client when the Judge was in privatepractice and such party regularly appears before that District Court.

Forty-seven cases remained open at the end of Fiscal Year 2013.

8

State of Michigan

Judicial Tenure Commission

Annual Report 2016

Judicial Tenure Commission

Cadillac Place

3034 W. Grand Blvd.

Suite 8-450

Detroit, Michigan 48202

(313) 875-5110

jtc.courts.mi.gov

6

III. 2016 STATISTICS

A. Complaints Received and Investigated

1

n 2016, the Commission received 751 requests that "Request for Investigation" forms be

mailed to individuals. This number does not include downloads from the Commission

website. There were 561 Requests for Investigation filed in 2016.

2016 CASELOAD

Cases Pending on 1/1/2016 81

New Grievances Considered 561

Cases Concluded in 2016 587

Cases Pending on 12/31/2016 55

Grievances Received, 2007-2016

The grievances set forth a wide array of allegations. A substantial percentage alleged legal

error not involving misconduct or expressed dissatisfaction with a judge’s discretionary handling of

judicial duties.

1 The statistics as to filed cases, resolved cases, and other figures may not match as the Commission often addresses

multiple submissions regarding a judge in one formal complaint, admonishment, or caution, or may address several

disciplinary issues in one filing. In addition, based on the confidentiality restrictions relating to the Commission’s

investigations, some information relating to cases may not be disclosed.

587 588

540

638

546 560 595

568

512

561

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13

20

14

20

15

20

16

I

7

The Commission also received grievances concerning individuals and matters that did not

come under the Commission’s jurisdiction: federal judges, former judges, workers’ compensation

judges, other government officials and miscellaneous individuals. Commission staff responded to

each of these complaints and, when appropriate, the Commission made referrals.

B. Complaint Dispositions

In 2016, the Commission disposed of 587 cases.

1. Closed without Action

In 570 of the 587 cases closed in 2016, there was not sufficient evidence of misconduct after

the information necessary to evaluate the complaint was obtained and reviewed. In other words, the

allegations in these cases were unfounded, or unprovable, or the judge gave an adequate explanation

of the situation, or the Commission lacked jurisdiction.

2. Closed with Action2

In 2016, the Commission issued seven letters of admonishment and one caution. There was

one consent suspension, one voluntary resignation, two voluntary retirements, and the Commission

dismissed one pending formal complaint. These dispositions are summarized in Section IV.

The Commission did not issue any formal complaints in 2016.

Grievances Disposed of, 2007-20163

2 The number of cases closed without action plus the number of actions does not equal 587, because some actions

involved more than one grievance, and two matters ended when judges passed away. 3 The disposition statistics are based on cases completed each year, regardless of when the complaints were received.

570 516 545

600 554 558

611 595

493

587

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

900

1000

20

07

20

08

20

09

20

10

20

11

20

12

20

13

20

14

20

15

20

16

9

C. Analysis of Grievances Considered in 2016

The requests for investigation received and resolved by the Commission derived from the

following sources, covered the following subject matters, were lodged against the following types of

judges, and were resolved as follows. The totals may not equal 561 received or 587 closed, as listed

above, because some grievances cover more than one judge and many contain more than one type of

alleged misconduct.

1. Sources of Grievances

Litigants (including prisoners) filed the majority of requests for investigation, constituting

nearly 90% of the total filings.

Civil Litigants, 369

Prisoners, 144

Non-Litigants, 7

Attorneys, 20

Other Judges, 3

Judicial Tenure Commission, 4

Friends or family of litigant, 33

Court personnel, 1

State Court Administrator, 3

10

2. Subject Matters of Grievances

Sixty-nine percent of matters complained of in the Requests for Investigation sought to have

the Commission review the merits of the underlying case. However, the Commission has no

jurisdiction to act as an appellate body, so unless there was evidence of judicial misconduct, those

matters were ultimately dismissed.

Review Legal Ruling 69%

Prejudice/Partiality 14%

Demeanor 4%

Delay 1%

Other 12%

11

3. Nature of Underlying Litigation

Criminal cases, domestic relations matters, and general civil cases continue to be the most

common types of cases to produce grievances against the judge. Those cases combined make up

close to 80% of the filings with the Commission. Probate cases make up another 8% of the

submissions, and the rest of the filings are spread among the other categories.

Appeal 0.85%

Juvenile 0.51%

Landlord/Tenant 3.06% Mental Commitment

0.51%

Post-Conviction 0.17%

Domestic Relations 20.03%

Criminal 43.46%

Traffic 1.19%

No litigation 1.70%

General Civil 15.79%

Small Claims 1.87% Probate

8.15%

PPO 2.21%

Other 0.51%

20

B. Budget

The Commission’s budget is included in the budget of the Supreme Court. For the 2016

fiscal year (October 1, 2015–September 30, 2016), the Commission spent $1,122,759, which was

$7560 (less than .7%) over its $1,115,200 budget. The Commission works to keep its expenditures

to a minimum.

F:\Annual Report 2016.docx

Salaries and Wages 534,338

Longevity - 2,488

Insurance - 93,965

Retirement and FICA 299,872

CSS&M - 74,198

Travel - 16,322

Building Occupancy 101,576

Expenditures 10/1/2015-9/30/2016

NORTH CAROLINA JUDICIAL STANDARDS COMMISSION

IMPARTIALITY INDEPENDENCE INTEGRITY

Post Office Box 1122 Raleigh, North Carolina 27602 Tel.: (919) 831-3630 Fax: (919) 831-3637

ANNUAL

REPORT

2016

HON. WANDA G. BRYANT CHAIR CAROLYN A. DUBAY EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

Annual Report 2016 | 7

Judges, justices, commissioners and deputy commissioners may also seek private, confidential informal advisory opinions from the Commission’s Executive Director and Commission Counsel, although such opinions are not binding on the Commission. Each year, Commission staff responds to between 200 and 300 requests for informal ethics advice. The Commission Chair and staff also take part in educational programs for judges, attorneys and other interested parties relating to the North Carolina Code of Judicial Conduct and the work of the Commission.

2016 WORKLOAD STATISTICS

Review and Investigation of Complaints As set forth in Table 1, there were 290 matters pending or opened in 2016. This number includes 39 matters that remained open as of December 31, 2015 and 251 new complaints received between January 1, 2016 and December 31, 2016. Of the 39 matters that were pending at the start of 2016, 26 complaints were awaiting initial review by the Commission, 10 complaints were under formal investigation, 2 complaints were under preliminary investigation, and 1 matter was awaiting a disciplinary recommendation hearing. During the course of 2016, 256 files were closed, leaving 34 matters pending as of December 31, 2016. A summary of the inquiries pending, opened and closed in 2016 is provided in Table 1.

TABLE 1: 2016 WORKLOAD SUMMARY

2016 Total Workload 290

Pending Files as of January 1, 2016 39 New Files Opened in 2016 251 Files Closed in 2016 256 Open Files as of December 31, 2016 34

The 256 files that were closed in 2016 were disposed of in various ways, as set forth in Table 2. There were two cases that resulted in disciplinary hearings and recommendations of discipline to the North Carolina Supreme Court. The North Carolina Supreme Court adopted the Commission’s recommendation and issued a public reprimand in In re Mack, __ N.C. __, __ S.E.2d __ (2016) (the opinion is available on the Commission’s website). The second recommendation to the North Carolina Supreme Court remained pending as of December 31, 2016. An opinion in that case is expected in 2017.

TABLE 2: 2016 DISPOSITION SUMMARY

Total Complaints Considered in 2016 256

Dismissed After Initial Review 212 Dismissed After Preliminary Investigation 24 Dismissed After Formal Investigation 8 Dismissed with Letter of Caution 10 Discipline Recommended to the Supreme Court 2

Annual Report 2016 | 8

As discussed previously, the Commission will dismiss complaints after initial review if the complaint fails to raise issues that may be appropriately addressed by the Commission. In 2016, the Commission dismissed 212 out of 256 complaints it considered after initial review and without investigation. Of the remaining cases, the Commission ordered 31 preliminary investigations and 15 formal investigations. By the percentages, and as set forth in Table 3, 83% of the complaints considered in 2016 were dismissed after initial review, 9% were dismissed after preliminary investigation, 3% were dismissed after formal investigation, 4% were dismissed with a private letter of caution, and 1% of the complaints proceeded to a disciplinary hearing and recommendation to the Supreme Court.

TABLE 3: 2016 DISPOSITION SUMMARY BY PERCENTAGE

Nature of Complaints Considered by the Commission Written complaints are received from citizens (most of whom are involved in criminal or civil proceedings before the judge in question), attorneys, judges (either as self-reports or reports from other judges), and occasionally anonymous complainants. The Commission will also at times open an inquiry on its own motion on the discovery of potential misconduct (such as through reports in the media). Table 4 identifies the various sources of complaints considered by the Commission in 2016.

83%

9%

3% 4%1%

83% Dismissed After Initial Review

9% Dismissed After PreliminaryInvestigation

3% Dismissed After Formal Investigation

4% Dismissed with Letter of Caution

1% Discipline Recommended to theSupreme Court

Annual Report 2016 | 9

TABLE 4: SOURCE OF COMPLAINTS

* “Non-Litigant Citizen” includes family and friends of litigants and other participants in the proceeding, such as witnesses. “Other” includes judges, court personnel, self-reporting by judges and other miscellaneous sources.

With respect to the type of judge subject to a complaint in 2016, most complaints were directed at either Superior Court or District Court judges and arose from courtroom proceedings. Overall, the 251 new complaints received in 2016 named 292 judges, justices or Industrial Commissioners/Deputy Commissioners. As set forth in Table 5, the Commission considered 176 complaints against District Court judges, 100 complaints against Superior Court judges, 7 complaints against Court of Appeals judges, 2 complaints against Supreme Court justices, 3 complaints against Deputy Commissioners of the Industrial Commission, and 1 complaint against a Commissioner of the Industrial Commission.

TABLE 5: CATEGORIES OF RESPONDENT JUDGES AND COMMISSIONERS

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

Annual Report 2016 | 10

The complaints considered in 2016 alleged various forms of judicial misconduct. By far, the most common complaint was that a trial judge or Industrial Commission deputy commissioner committed some form of legal error in rendering a decision in a case. General allegations of bias or the denial of a fair hearing were also common complaints. The data below indicates the number of times a particular allegation appeared in a complaint in 2016 (note that a single complaint may raise multiple allegations):

TABLE 6: TYPES OF ALLEGATIONS OF JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT

Five Year Trends in Workload Over the last five years, the Commission’s workload has remained fairly consistent, although 2016 did experience an increase in the number of complaints received from the previous year. As indicated on Table 7, the number of charges filed, hearings conducted and recommendations for public discipline has also remained fairly consistent since the Commission’s authority to issue a public reprimand was revoked in 2013. Because the Commission no longer has this authority, there has been a relative increase in the number of statements of charges filed since 2013 as this is the only authorized procedure for public discipline of a judicial officer subject to the Code of Judicial Conduct.

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

200

Annual Report 2016 | 11

TABLE 6: FIVE YEAR TRENDS

2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 Average

Complaints Pending at Year Start 39 50 28 57 41 43

New Complaints Filed 251 227 250 235 312 255

Complaints Pending at Year End 34 39 50 28 57 41.6

Dismissed Without Formal Investigation 236 217 204 239 260 231.2

Formal Investigations Ordered 15 16 29 25 30 23

Dismissed After Formal Investigation 8 12 14 17 20 14.2

Private Letters of Caution Issued 10 7 7 8 14 9.2

Public Reprimands by Commission* N/A N/A N/A 1 2 N/A

Statements of Charges Issued 2 3 3 1 0 1.8

Charges Withdrawn or Dismissed 0 1 1 1 0 0.6

Disciplinary Hearings 2 2 2 0 0 1.2

Recommendations for Public Discipline 2 1 1 0 0 0.8

*The Commission’s statutory authority to issue public reprimands was revoked in 2013.

FY 2015 AnnuAl RepoRt

13

ComplAints, Dispositions & peRFoRmAnCe

JulY 1, 2014–June 30, 2015

stA

tist

iCs

§

COMPLAINTS RECEIVED

In FY 2015 the Commission received 233 written complaints, which is the second highest number ever received in the Commission’s history. The aggregate is comprised of 180 veri-

fied complaints (includes Commission-initiated and reopened inquiries) and 53 unverified complaints.

10-YEAR HISTORY OF WRITTEN COMPLAINTS

The Commission has an established pre-screening process for telephonic and in-person com-plaints. Staff members make every effort to discuss callers’ situations in detail as appropriate. Staff informs callers about the limited scope of the Commission’s jurisdiction under state law. Complaint forms are mailed to all callers who request them. Since 2001 complaint forms and detailed filing instructions have also been available to download from the Commission’s website.

SOURCES OF VERIFIED COMPLAINTS

Of the 180 verified complaints filed with the Commission, most were filed by litigants. The dis-tribution of the sources of written, verified complaints was the following: 86 by litigants or their family/friends, 25 by criminal defendants or their family/friends, 5 by citizens, 0 by public offi-cials, 11 by lawyers, 10 by judges, 1 by police, 0 by news media, 16 by prisoners, 4 by witnesses, and 2 by others. Additionally, 20 complaints were initiated by the Commission on its own motion. The chart on the following page illustrates these figures.

14

JUDGES REVIEWED

JUDICIAL BRANCH VERIFIED COMPLAINTS CASELOAD %Supreme Court 1 0.6%

Court of Appeals 1 0.6%District Court 114 63.3%

Metropolitan Court 7 3.9%Magistrate Court 38 21.1%Municipal Court 8 4.4%Probate Court 0 0.0%

Not a Judge 11 6.1%

CASE DISPOSITIONS

Inquiries Pending at Beginning of FY15 (July 1, 2014) 49New Written/Verified Complaints and Inquiries in FY15 180Inquiries Concluded in FY15 (189)Inquiries Pending at End of FY15 (June 30, 2015) 40

COMPLAINT SOURCES

15

HISTORICAL CASES FILED IN THE SUPREME COURT

From July 1, 1968 through June 30, 2015, the Commission filed 156 petitions for discipline and/or tem-porary suspension in the New Mexico Supreme Court involving 118 judges. By their nature, these cases involve the most serious questions of judicial misconduct or disability, thereby requiring the Commission to recommend sanctions, discipline, and/or immediate temporary suspension to the State’s highest court. Of the judicial branches concerned, the Commission’s petitions to the Supreme Court involved the follow-ing levels of the State Judiciary in order of the most filings: municipal courts, magistrate courts, district courts, probate courts, metropolitan court, Court of Appeals and Supreme Court.

The chart on the following page illustrates the historical distribution of cases filed in the Supreme Court since 1968.

Of the 189 cases disposed in FY 2015, the Commission concluded 8 cases (involving 5 judges) through for-mal proceedings (after charges filed, stipulations, trials and/or Supreme Court proceedings) and issued 19 informal letters of caution to 17 individuals. 77 cases were dismissed as appellate, 24 cases because they concerned individuals beyond the Commission’s jurisdiction, and 52 cases as unsubstantiated. In 9 cases involving 7 judges, the judges were referred for informal remedial measures, which may have included mentorship, education, counseling, and/or other assistance. No cases were closed because the judges died, resigned, or were not re-elected, and no matters were closed due to ongoing collateral proceedings, subject to being reopened at a later date. The graph below illustrates the FY 2015 case dispositions.

38

FY 2015 Final Approved Budget $ 858,300.00

Total FY 2015 Expenditures $ (855,534.63)

FY 2015 Reversion to General Fund (2,765.37)

Total Expenditures and Reversion $ (858,300.00)

Note: Reversion represents 0.003% of the Commission’s total General Fund appropriation.

AGENCY 10-YEAR GENERAL FUND FUNDING PROFILE

FisCAl YeAR

FunDing expenDituRes ReveRsion FRom geneRAl FunD

ReveRsion

FRom Cost

ReimbuRsements

ReveRsion As % oF FunDing

2006 650,816.00 650,253.11 0.00 $562.89 0.087%

2007 688,853.00 688,812.57 40.43 $0.00 0.006%

2008 819,548.00 803,295.93 0.00 $16,252.07 1.983%

2009 842,973.00 832,600.37 6,799.01 $3,573.62 1.231%

2010 780,002.40 749,752.96 22,047.04 $8,202.40 3.878%

2011 731,300.00 717,230.17 14,069.83 $0.00 1.924%

2012 706,900.00 705,230.69 1,669.31 0.00 0.236%

2013 742,900.00 742,838.03 61.97 0.00 0.008%

2014 839,987.00 836,659.33 3,327.67 0.00 0.396%

2015 858,300.00 855,534.63 2,765.37 0.00 0.322%

FY 2015 GENERAL FUND APPROPRIATION COMPARED TO GENERAL FUND EXPENDITURES

14

HisToRiCAL CAsEs FiLED in sUPREmE CoURT

From 1968 through June 30, 2014, the Commission filed 161 petitions for discipline and/or temporary suspension in the New Mexico Supreme Court involving 111 judges. By their nature, these cases involve the most serious questions of judicial misconduct or disability, thereby requiring the Commission to rec-ommend sanctions, discipline, and/or immediate temporary suspension to the State’s highest court. Of the judicial branches concerned, the Commission’s petitions to the Supreme Court involved the following levels of the State Judiciary in order of the most filings: municipal courts, magistrate courts, district courts, probate courts, metropolitan court, Court of Appeals and Supreme Court.

The chart on the following page illustrates the historical distribution of cases filed in the Supreme Court since 1968.

Of the 188 cases disposed in FY 2014, the Commission concluded 15 cases (involving 8 judges) through formal proceedings (after charges filed, stipulations, trials and/or Supreme Court proceedings) and issued 21 informal letters of caution. 75 cases were dismissed as appellate, 7 cases because they concerned in-dividuals beyond the Commission’s jurisdiction, and 59 cases as unsubstantiated. In 5 cases involving 3 judges, the judges were referred for informal remedial measures, which may have included mentorship, education, counseling, and/or other assistance. 2 cases were closed because the judges died, resigned, or were not re-elected, and 4 matters were closed due to ongoing collateral proceedings, subject to being reopened at a later date. The graph below illustrates the FY 2014 case dispositions.

15

PUBLiC CAsEs DisPosED BY TERminATion oF JUDiCiAL oFFiCEIn FY 2014, 8 cases concerning 5 judges were disposed after termination of judicial office in public proceed-ings before the Supreme Court. Since its inception, the Commission has disposed of 174 cases concerning 81 judges after termination of judicial office. These cases include involuntary or stipulated permanent removal, retirement, or resignation from office after the Commission had issued formal charges and then filed and requested action by the Supreme Court. Following is a ten-year history of cases disposed:

HisToRiCAL CAsEs FiLED in THE sUPREmE CoURT

16

HisToRiCAL inFoRmAL CAsE DisPosiTions

Short of proceeding formally on a case not warranting dismissal, the Commission may dispose of a matter informally. Informal dispositions are not filed with the Supreme Court and remain confidential pursuant to Article VI, §32 of the New Mexico Constitution. Allegations disposed of informally were found to merit notice to the judge, but due to their nature, the judge’s experience and disciplinary history, or a number of other factors, the Commission determined that an informal disposition was appropriate to address the issues in question. With informal dispositions, there are no findings of misconduct.

Informal dispositions include issuing private letters of caution, referring the judge for mentorship, or enter-ing into a stipulation agreement concerning the conduct in question. Since its formation in 1968 through June 30, 2014, the Commission has informally disposed of 358 case files. The following tables illustrate the distribution of the informal cautionary letter and mentorship dispositions. A brief discussion concerning confidential stipulation agreements follows thereafter.

CAUTIONARY LETTERS (266 CASES)

Judicial Branch Involved Number of Case Files

Percent of All Cautions

Supreme Court 1 0.4%Court of Appeals 2 0.8%

District Court 73 27.4%Metropolitan Court 28 10.5%Magistrate Court 97 36.5%Municipal Court 62 23.3%

Probate Court 3 1.1%

MENTORSHIPS (83 CASES)

Judicial Branch Involved Number of Case Files

Percent of All Mentorships

Supreme Court 0 0.0%Court of Appeals 0 0.0%

District Court 10 12.1%Metropolitan Court 2 2.4%Magistrate Court 38 45.8%Municipal Court 31 37.3%

Probate Court 2 2.4%

17

CONFIDENTIAL STIPULATIONS

In addition to private letters of caution and referrals to the mentor program, the Commission may infor-mally dispose of cases through confidential stipulations with judges. Stipulations typically require judges to retire, resign, or cease improper conduct. In FY 2014, 1 case was disposed through confidential stipula-tion. Historically, the Commission has disposed of 9 cases through informal stipulation.

HisToRiCAL GRAPHiCAL sUmmARY oF inFoRmAL CAsE DisPosiTions

15

PUBLiC CAsEs DisPosED BY TERminATion oF JUDiCiAL oFFiCEIn FY 2013, 14 cases concerning 8 judges were disposed after termination of judicial office in public pro-ceedings before the Supreme Court. Since its inception, the Commission has disposed of 166 cases con-cerning 76 judges after termination of judicial office. These cases include involuntary or stipulated perma-nent removal, retirement, or resignation from office after the Commission had issued formal charges and then filed and requested action by the Supreme Court. Following is a ten-year history of cases disposed:

17

CONFIDENTIAL STIPULATIONS (8 CASES)

In addition to private letters of caution and referrals to the mentor program, the Commission may infor-mally dispose of cases through confidential stipulations with judges. Stipulations typically require judges to retire, resign, or cease improper conduct. In FY 2013, 0 cases were disposed through confidential stipu-lation. Historically, the Commission has disposed of 8 cases through informal stipulation.

HisToRiCAL GRAPHiCAL sUmmARY oF inFoRmAL CAsE DisPosiTions

19

F o R m A L P R o C E E D i n G s

In FY 2013, the Commission concluded 11 cases by formal proceedings before the Commission and/or the New Mexico Supreme Court. Below are summaries of all formal proceedings with events occurring in and/or which were completed in FY 2013, including but not limited to the 11 in FY 2013:

Matter of Hon. John L. SanchezMora County Magistrate CourtJSC Inquiry Nos. 2009-070, 2009-098, 2010-024 & 2010-076 Supreme Court Docket No. 32,903

The Commission initiated matters pursuant to the Notices of Formal Proceedings and Answers filed in each inquiry number. In Inquiry Number 2009-070, the Notice of Formal Proceedings was filed on August 25, 2010 and Judge Sanchez (Respondent) filed his Answer on September 13, 2010. In consolidated Inquiry Numbers 2009-098 & 2010-024, the Notice of Formal Proceedings was filed on August 25, 2010 and the Respondent’s Answer was filed on September 13, 2010. In Inquiry Number 2010-076, the Notice of Formal Proceedings was filed on September 3, 2010 and the Respondent’s Answer was filed on September 22, 2010.

On March 14, 2011, the Commission and Judge Sanchez entered into an Amended Stipulation Agreement and Consent to Discipline. Judge Sanchez admitted the following:

1. Judge Sanchez failed to recuse himself prior to making rulings in a criminal case with his nephew, Daryl Sanchez, in State v. Daryl Sanchez, MR-37-2009-0110. Judge Sanchez arraigned his nephew in the case. Judge Sanchez set conditions of release of an unsecured appearance bond. Respondent altered the standard conditions of release and ordered that this nephew be allowed to leave the county of Mora during the pendency of his case.

2. Judge Sanchez ordered and signed an order appointing the Public Defender to represent his nephew in State v. Daryl Sanchez, MR-37-2009-0110, even though his nephew was not indigent and did not qualify for Public Defender representation based on income.

3. Judge Sanchez’s admitted conduct set forth violated the Canons of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Judge Sanchez agreed that his admitted conduct as set forth constituted willful misconduct in office and provided sufficient basis for the New Mexico Supreme Court to impose discipline against Judge Sanchez pursuant to Article VI, §32 of the New Mexico Constitution.

4. Judge Sanchez agreed to accept the following formal discipline from the Supreme Court:

A. Twelve-Month Supervised Probation and Formal Mentorship. The Commission shall recommend the probation supervisor/mentor, for consideration and appointment by the Supreme Court. The probation supervisor/mentor shall report on the progress and outcome of the mentorship to the Supreme Court and the Commission.

B. Complete a Course from the National Judicial College. Respondent shall attend all sections and complete a course from the National Judicial College recommended by the Commission and approved by the Supreme Court. Respondent shll not teach any portion of the approved course from the National Judicial College. Respondent shall pay all costs, including travel and tuition associated with attendance and completion of the course.

NEW YORK STATE

COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL CONDUCT

ANNUAL REPORT

2017

INTRODUCTION TO THE 2017 ANNUAL REPORT

INTRODUCTION TO THE 2017 ANNUAL REPORT

The New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct is the independent agency designated by the State Constitution to review complaints of misconduct against judges and justices of the State Unified Court System and, where appropriate, render public disciplinary determinations of admonition, censure or removal from office. There are approximately 3,350 judicial positions in the system filled by approximately 3,150 individuals, in that some town or village justices serve in more than one town or village court. The Commission’s objective is to enforce high standards of conduct for judges, who must be free to act independently, on the merits and in good faith, but also must be held accountable should they commit misconduct. The text of the Rules Governing Judicial Conduct, promulgated by the Chief Administrator of the Courts on approval of the Court of Appeals, is annexed. The number of complaints received annually by the Commission in the past 10 years has substantially increased compared to the first three decades of the Commission’s existence. Since 2007, the Commission has averaged 1,856 new complaints per year, 447 preliminary inquiries and 197 investigations. Last year, 1,944 new complaints were received, the third highest total ever. Every complaint was reviewed by investigative and legal staff, and a report was prepared for each complaint. All such complaints and reports were reviewed by the entire Commission, which then voted on which complaints merited opening full scale investigations. As to these new complaints, there were 420 preliminary reviews and inquiries and 177 investigations. This report covers Commission activity in the year 2016.

COMPLAINTS, INQUIRIES & INVESTIGATIONS IN THE LAST TEN YEARS

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

1978 ~ 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

641

1711

19231855

2025

1818 1785 1770 1767

1959 1944

413 354471 439 464 460 477 499 469

420

170 192262 257 225 172 182 177 145 179 177

New Complaints (Left) Preliminary Inquiries (Center) Investigations (Right)

______________________________________________________________________________________________ 2017 ANNUAL REPORT ♦ PAGE 1

ACTION TAKEN IN 2016

ACTION TAKEN IN 2016

Following are summaries of the Commission’s actions in 2016, including accounts of all public determinations, summaries of non-public dispositions, and various numerical breakdowns of complaints, investigations and other dispositions.

COMPLAINTS RECEIVED The Commission received 1,944 new complaints in 2016. All complaints are summarized and analyzed by staff and reviewed by the Commission, which votes whether to investigate. New complaints dismissed upon initial review are those that the Commission deems to be clearly without merit, not alleging misconduct or outside its jurisdiction, including complaints against non-judges, federal judges, administrative law judges, judicial hearing officers, referees and New York City Housing Court judges. Absent any underlying misconduct, such as demonstrated prejudice, conflict of interest or flagrant disregard of fundamental rights, the Commission does not investigate complaints concerning disputed judicial rulings or decisions. The Commission is not an appellate court and cannot intervene in a pending case, or reverse or remand trial court decisions. A breakdown of the sources of complaints received by the Commission in 2016 appears in the following chart.

PRELIMINARY INQUIRIES AND INVESTIGATIONS

The Commission’s Operating Procedures and Rules authorize “preliminary analysis and clarification” and “preliminary fact-finding activities” by staff upon receipt of new complaints, to aid the Commission in determining whether an investigation is warranted. In 2016, staff conducted 420 such preliminary inquiries, requiring such steps as interviewing the attorneys involved, analyzing court files and reviewing trial transcripts.

Commission (68)Lawyer (98)

Judge (10)

Audit and Control (7)

Civil Litigant (763)Criminal Defendant

(843)

Citizen (94)

Anonymous (26)

Other Professional (31)Other (4)

COMPLAINT SOURCES IN 2016

______________________________________________________________________________________________ 2017 ANNUAL REPORT ♦ PAGE 2

ACTION TAKEN IN 2016

In 177 matters, the Commission authorized full-fledged investigations. Depending on the nature of the complaint, an investigation may entail interviewing witnesses, subpoenaing witnesses to testify and produce documents, assembling and analyzing various court, financial or other records, making court observations, and writing to or taking testimony from the judge. During 2016, in addition to the 177 new investigations, there were 175 investigations pending from the previous year. The Commission disposed of the combined total of 352 investigations as follows:

• 91 complaints were dismissed outright.

• 30 complaints involving 23 different judges were dismissed with letters of dismissal and caution.

• 19 complaints involving 15 different judges were closed upon the judge’s resignation, three becoming public by stipulation and 12 that were not public.

• 16 complaints involving 12 different judges were closed upon vacancy of office due to reasons other than resignation, such as the expiration of the judge’s term.

• 19 complaints involving 13 different judges resulted in formal charges being authorized.

• 177 investigations were pending as of December 31, 2016.

FORMAL WRITTEN COMPLAINTS As of January 1, 2016, there were pending Formal Written Complaints in 28 matters involving eight judges. In 2016, Formal Written Complaints were authorized in 19 additional matters involving 13 judges. Of the combined total of 47 matters involving 21 different judges, the Commission acted as follows:

• 17 matters involving eight different judges resulted in formal discipline (admonition, censure or removal).

• Two matters involving two different judges were closed upon the judges’ resignation from office and became public by stipulation.

• 12 matters involving two judges were closed upon vacancy of office due to reasons other than resignation, such as the expiration of the judge’s term.

• 16 matters involving nine different judges were pending as of December 31, 2016.

______________________________________________________________________________________________ 2017 ANNUAL REPORT ♦ PAGE 3

INTRODUCTION TO THE 2016 ANNUAL REPORT

INTRODUCTION TO THE 2016 ANNUAL REPORT

The New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct is the independent agency designated by the State Constitution to review complaints of misconduct against judges and justices of the State Unified Court System and, where appropriate, render public disciplinary determinations of admonition, censure or removal from office. There are approximately 3,350 judicial positions in the system filled by approximately 3,150 individuals, in that some town or village justices serve in more than one town or village court. The Commission’s objective is to enforce high standards of conduct for judges, who must be free to act independently, on the merits and in good faith, but also must be held accountable should they commit misconduct. The text of the Rules Governing Judicial Conduct, promulgated by the Chief Administrator of the Courts on approval of the Court of Appeals, is annexed. The number of complaints received annually by the Commission in the past 10 years has substantially increased compared to the first two decades of the Commission’s existence. Since 2006, the Commission has averaged 1,811 new complaints per year, 442 preliminary inquiries and 206 investigations. Last year, 1,959 new complaints were received, the second highest total ever. Every complaint was reviewed by investigative and legal staff, and a report was prepared for each complaint. All such complaints and reports were reviewed by the entire Commission, which then voted on which complaints merited opening full scale investigations. As to these new complaints, there were 469 preliminary reviews and inquiries and 179 investigations. This report covers Commission activity in the year 2015.

COMPLAINTS, INQUIRIES & INVESTIGATIONS IN THE LAST TEN YEARS

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

1978 ~ 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

641

1500

1711

19231855

2025

1818 17851770 1767

1959

375 413 354471 439 464 460 477 499 469

170 267 192262 257 225

172 182 177 145 179

New Complaints (Left) Preliminary Inquiries (Center) Investigations (Right)

_____________________________________________________________________________________

2016 ANNUAL REPORT ♦ PAGE 1

ACTION TAKEN IN 2015

ACTION TAKEN IN 2015

Following are summaries of the Commission’s actions in 2015, including accounts of all public determinations, summaries of non-public decisions, and various numerical breakdowns of complaints, investigations and other dispositions.

COMPLAINTS RECEIVED

The Commission received 1,959 new complaints in 2015. All complaints are summarized and analyzed by staff and reviewed by the Commission, which votes whether to investigate. New complaints dismissed upon initial review are those that the Commission deems to be clearly without merit, not alleging misconduct or outside its jurisdiction, including complaints against non-judges, federal judges, administrative law judges, judicial hearing officers, referees and New York City Housing Court judges. Absent any underlying misconduct, such as demonstrated prejudice, conflict of interest or flagrant disregard of fundamental rights, the Commission does not investigate complaints concerning disputed judicial rulings or decisions. The Commission is not an appellate court and cannot intervene in a pending case, or reverse or remand trial court decisions. A breakdown of the sources of complaints received by the Commission in 2015 appears in the following chart.

PRELIMINARY INQUIRIES AND INVESTIGATIONS

The Commission’s Operating Procedures and Rules authorize “preliminary analysis and clarification” and “preliminary fact-finding activities” by staff upon receipt of new complaints, to aid the Commission in determining whether an investigation is warranted. In 2015, staff conducted 469 such preliminary inquiries, requiring such steps as interviewing the attorneys involved, analyzing court files and reviewing trial transcripts.

Commission (76)

Lawyer (79)

Judge (23)

Audit and Control (13)

Civil Litigant (801)

Criminal Defendant (836)

Citizen (81)

Anonymous (32)

Other Professional (15)

Other (3)

COMPLAINT SOURCES IN 2015

_____________________________________________________________________________________ 2016 ANNUAL REPORT ♦ PAGE 2

ACTION TAKEN IN 2015

In 179 matters, the Commission authorized full-fledged investigations. Depending on the nature of the complaint, an investigation may entail interviewing witnesses, subpoenaing witnesses to testify and produce documents, assembling and analyzing various court, financial or other records, making court observations, and writing to or taking testimony from the judge. During 2015, in addition to the 179 new investigations, there were 138 investigations pending from the previous year. The Commission disposed of the combined total of 317 investigations as follows:

• 80 complaints were dismissed outright.

• 23 complaints involving 22 different judges were dismissed with letters of dismissal and caution.

• 20 complaints involving 16 different judges were closed upon the judge’s resignation, five becoming public by stipulation and 11 that were not public.

• Nine complaints involving seven different judges were closed upon vacancy of office due to reasons other than resignation, such as the expiration of the judge’s term.

• 10 complaints involving six different judges resulted in formal charges being authorized.

• 175 investigations were pending as of December 31, 2015.

FORMAL WRITTEN COMPLAINTS

As of January 1, 2015, there were pending Formal Written Complaints in 33 matters involving 16 judges. In 2015, Formal Written Complaints were authorized in 10 additional matters involving six judges (as to two of whom a Formal Written Complaint was already pending). Of the combined total of 43 matters involving 20 different judges, the Commission acted as follows:

• 12 matters involving nine different judges resulted in formal discipline (admonition or censure).

• One matter involving one judge resulted in a letter of caution after formal disciplinary proceedings that resulted in a finding of misconduct.

• Two matters involving two different judges were closed upon the judges’ resignation from office and became public by stipulation.

• 28 matters involving eight different judges were pending as of December 31, 2015.

_____________________________________________________________________________________

2016 ANNUAL REPORT ♦ PAGE 3

INTRODUCTION TO THE 2015 ANNUAL REPORT ___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

INTRODUCTION TO THE 2015 ANNUAL REPORT

The New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct is the independent agency designated by the State Constitution to review complaints of misconduct against judges and justices of the State Unified Court System and, where appropriate, render public disciplinary determinations of admonition, censure or removal from office. There are approximately 3,300 judges and justices in the system. The Commission’s objective is to enforce high standards of conduct for judges, who must be free to act independently, on the merits and in good faith, but also must be held accountable should they commit misconduct. The text of the Rules Governing Judicial Conduct, promulgated by the Chief Administrator of the Courts on approval of the Court of Appeals, is annexed. The number of complaints received annually by the Commission in the past 10 years has substantially increased compared to the first two decades of the Commission’s existence. Since 2005, the Commission has averaged 1,770 new complaints per year, 430 preliminary inquiries and 215 investigations. Last year, 1,767 new complaints were received. Every complaint was reviewed by investigative and legal staff, and a report was prepared for each complaint. All such complaints and reports were reviewed by the entire Commission, which then voted on which complaints merited opening full scale investigations. As to these new complaints, there were 499 preliminary reviews and inquiries and 145 investigations. This report covers Commission activity in the year 2014.

COMPLAINTS, INQUIRIES & INVESTIGATIONS IN THE LAST TEN YEARS

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

1978 ~ 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

641

1565 1500

1711

19231855

2025

18181785 1770 1767

366 375 413 354471 439 464 460 477 499

170 260 267 192 262 257 225172 182 177 145

New Complaints (Left) Preliminary Inquiries (Center) Investigations (Right)

_____________________________________________________________________________________ 2015 ANNUAL REPORT ♦ PAGE 1

ACTION TAKEN IN 2014 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

ACTION TAKEN IN 2014

Following are summaries of the Commission’s actions in 2014, including accounts of all public determinations, summaries of non-public decisions, and various numerical breakdowns of complaints, investigations and other dispositions.

COMPLAINTS RECEIVED

The Commission received 1,767 new complaints in 2014. All complaints are summarized and analyzed by staff and reviewed by the Commission, which votes whether to investigate. New complaints dismissed upon initial review are those that the Commission deems to be clearly without merit, not alleging misconduct or outside its jurisdiction, including complaints against non-judges, federal judges, administrative law judges, judicial hearing officers, referees and New York City Housing Court judges. Absent any underlying misconduct, such as demonstrated prejudice, conflict of interest or flagrant disregard of fundamental rights, the Commission does not investigate complaints concerning disputed judicial rulings or decisions. The Commission is not an appellate court and cannot intervene in a pending case, or reverse or remand trial court decisions. A breakdown of the sources of complaints received by the Commission in 2014 appears in the following chart.

PRELIMINARY INQUIRIES AND INVESTIGATIONS

The Commission’s Operating Procedures and Rules authorize “preliminary analysis and clarification” and “preliminary fact-finding activities” by staff upon receipt of new complaints, to aid the Commission in determining whether an investigation is warranted. In 2014, staff conducted 499 such preliminary inquiries, requiring such steps as interviewing the attorneys involved, analyzing court files and reviewing trial transcripts.

Commission (63)

Lawyer (52)Judge (11)

Audit and Control (15)

Civil Litigant (718)

Criminal Defendant (805)

Citizen (58)

Anonymous (27)

Other Professional (15)

Other (3)

COMPLAINT SOURCES IN 2014

_____________________________________________________________________________________ 2015 ANNUAL REPORT ♦ PAGE 2

ACTION TAKEN IN 2014 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

In 145 matters, the Commission authorized full-fledged investigations. Depending on the nature of the complaint, an investigation may entail interviewing witnesses, subpoenaing witnesses to testify and produce documents, assembling and analyzing various court, financial or other records, making court observations, and writing to or taking testimony from the judge. During 2014, in addition to the 145 new investigations, there were 185 investigations pending from the previous year. The Commission disposed of the combined total of 330 investigations as follows:

• 101 complaints were dismissed outright.

• 28 complaints involving 23 different judges were dismissed with letters of dismissal and caution.

• 18 complaints involving 14 different judges were closed upon the judge’s resignation, four becoming public by stipulation and 10 that were not public.

• 11 complaints involving 9 different judges were closed upon vacancy of office due to reasons other than resignation, such as the expiration of the judge’s term.

• 34 complaints involving 18 different judges resulted in formal charges being authorized.

• 138 investigations were pending as of December 31, 2014.

FORMAL WRITTEN COMPLAINTS

As of January 1, 2014, there were pending Formal Written Complaints in 16 matters involving 10 judges. In 2014, Formal Written Complaints were authorized in 34 additional matters involving 18 judges (as to one of whom a Formal Written Complaint was already pending). Of the combined total of 50 matters involving 27 different judges, the Commission acted as follows:

• Seven matters involving five different judges resulted in formal discipline (admonition or censure).

• Nine matters involving five different judges were closed upon the judge’s resignation from office, three becoming public by stipulation and two that were not public.

• One matter involving one judge was closed due to the expiration of the judge’s term.

• 33 matters involving 16 different judges were pending as of December 31, 2014.

_____________________________________________________________________________________ 2015 ANNUAL REPORT ♦ PAGE 3

INTRODUCTION TO THE 2014 ANNUAL REPORT

INTRODUCTION TO THE 2014 ANNUAL REPORT

The New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct is the independent agency designated by the State Constitution to review complaints of misconduct against judges and justices of the State Unified Court System and, where appropriate, render public disciplinary determinations of admonition, censure or removal from office. There are approximately 3,300 judges and justices in the system. The Commission’s objective is to enforce high standards of conduct for judges, who must be free to act independently, on the merits and in good faith, but also must be held accountable should they commit misconduct. The text of the Rules Governing Judicial Conduct, promulgated by the Chief Administrator of the Courts on approval of the Court of Appeals, is annexed. The number of complaints received annually by the Commission in the past 10 years has substantially increased compared to the first two decades of the Commission’s existence. Since 2004, the Commission has averaged 1,750 new complaints per year, 424 preliminary inquiries and 224 investigations. Last year, 1,770 new complaints were received. Every complaint was reviewed by investigative and legal staff, and a report was prepared for each complaint. All such complaints and reports were reviewed by the entire Commission, which then voted on which complaints merited opening full-scale investigations. As to these new complaints, there were 477 preliminary reviews and inquiries and 177 investigations. This report covers Commission activity in the year 2013.

COMPLAINTS, INQUIRIES & INVESTIGATIONS IN THE LAST TEN YEARS

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

1978 ~ 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

641

1546 15651500

1711

1923 1855

2025

1818 1785 1770

415 366 375 413 354471 439 464 460 477

170 255 260 267192

262 257 225 172 182 177

New Complaints (Left) Preliminary Inquiries (Center) Investigations (Right)

_____________________________________________________________________________________ 2014 ANNUAL REPORT ♦ PAGE 1

ACTION TAKEN IN 2013

ACTION TAKEN IN 2013

Following are summaries of the Commission’s actions in 2013, including accounts of all public determinations, summaries of non-public decisions, and various numerical breakdowns of complaints, investigations and other dispositions.

COMPLAINTS RECEIVED

The Commission received 1,770 new complaints in 2013. All complaints are summarized and analyzed by staff and reviewed by the Commission, which votes whether to investigate. New complaints dismissed upon initial review are those that the Commission deems to be clearly without merit, not alleging misconduct or outside its jurisdiction, including complaints against non-judges, federal judges, administrative law judges, judicial hearing officers, referees and New York City Housing Court judges. Absent any underlying misconduct, such as demonstrated prejudice, conflict of interest or flagrant disregard of fundamental rights, the Commission does not investigate complaints concerning disputed judicial rulings or decisions. The Commission is not an appellate court and cannot intervene in a pending case, or reverse or remand trial court decisions. A breakdown of the sources of complaints received by the Commission in 2013 appears in the following chart.

PRELIMINARY INQUIRIES AND INVESTIGATIONS

The Commission’s Operating Procedures and Rules authorize “preliminary analysis and clarification” and “preliminary fact-finding activities” by staff upon receipt of new complaints, to aid the Commission in determining whether an investigation is warranted. In 2013, staff conducted 477 such preliminary inquiries, requiring such steps as interviewing the attorneys involved, analyzing court files and reviewing trial transcripts.

Commission (68)Lawyer (49)

Judge (17)

Audit and Control (23)

Civil Litigant (792)

Criminal Defendant (722)

Citizen (57)

Anonymous (23)

Other Professional (13)Other (6)

COMPLAINT SOURCES IN 2013

_____________________________________________________________________________________ 2014 ANNUAL REPORT ♦ PAGE 2

ACTION TAKEN IN 2013

In 177 matters, the Commission authorized full-fledged investigations. Depending on the nature of the complaint, an investigation may entail interviewing witnesses, subpoenaing witnesses to testify and produce documents, assembling and analyzing various court, financial or other records, making court observations, and writing to or taking testimony from the judge. During 2013, in addition to the 177 new investigations, there were 183 investigations pending from the previous year. The Commission disposed of the combined total of 360 investigations as follows:

• 113 complaints were dismissed outright.

• 17 complaints involving 17 different judges were dismissed with letters of dismissal and caution.

• 12 complaints involving 8 different judges were closed upon the judge’s resignation.

• 11 complaints involving 10 different judges were closed upon vacancy of office due to reasons other than resignation, such as the expiration of the judge’s term.

• 22 complaints involving 17 different judges resulted in formal charges being authorized.

• 185 investigations were pending as of December 31, 2013.

FORMAL WRITTEN COMPLAINTS

As of January 1, 2013, there were pending Formal Written Complaints in 23 matters involving 14 different judges. In 2013, Formal Written Complaints were authorized in 22 additional matters involving 17 different judges. Of the combined total of 45 matters involving 31 judges, the Commission acted as follows:

• 16 matters involving 12 different judges resulted in formal discipline (admonition, censure or removal from office).

• One matter involving one judge resulted in a letter of caution after formal disciplinary proceedings that resulted in a finding of misconduct.

• Eight matters involving five different judges were closed upon the judge’s resignation from office, all five resignations becoming public by stipulation.

• Three matters involving two different judges were closed due to the expiration of the judge’s term.

• In one matter involving one judge, the Formal Written Complaint was withdrawn and the complaint was dismissed.

• 16 matters involving 10 different judges were pending as of December 31, 2013.

_____________________________________________________________________________________ 2014 ANNUAL REPORT ♦ PAGE 3

ACTION TAKEN IN 2013

TABLE 3: COUNTY COURT JUDGES – 127, FULL-TIME, ALL LAWYERS*

Complaints Received 203 Complaints Investigated 8 Judges Cautioned After Investigation 1 Formal Written Complaints Authorized 1 Judges Cautioned After Formal Complaint 0 Judges Publicly Disciplined 0 Judges Vacating Office by Public Stipulation 0 Formal Complaints Dismissed or Closed 0

* Includes seven who also serve as Surrogates, five who also serve as Family Court judges, and 37 who also serve as both Surrogates and Family Court judges.

TABLE 4: FAMILY COURT JUDGES – 127, FULL-TIME, ALL LAWYERS

Complaints Received 174 Complaints Investigated 11 Judges Cautioned After Investigation 0 Formal Written Complaints Authorized 0 Judges Cautioned After Formal Complaint 0 Judges Publicly Disciplined 0 Judges Vacating Office by Public Stipulation 0 Formal Complaints Dismissed or Closed 0

TABLE 5: SURROGATES – 76, FULL-TIME, ALL LAWYERS

Complaints Received 30 Complaints Investigated 6 Judges Cautioned After Investigation 0 Formal Written Complaints Authorized 0 Judges Cautioned After Formal Complaint 0 Judges Publicly Disciplined 1 Judges Vacating Office by Public Stipulation 0 Formal Complaints Dismissed or Closed 0

_____________________________________________________________________________________ 2014 ANNUAL REPORT ♦ PAGE 5

ANNUAL REPORT OF JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE IN SOUTH CAROLINA 2015 - 2016

COMPLAINTS PENDING & RECEIVED: Complaints Pending June 30, 2015 27

Complaints Received July 1, 2015 – June 30, 2016 294 Total Complaints Pending and Received 321

DISPOSITION OF COMPLAINTS: Dismissed: By Disciplinary Counsel after initial review (no jurisdiction) 172 By Disciplinary Counsel after investigation (lack of evidence) 24 By Investigative Panel 79

By Supreme Court 0 Total Dismissed (275)

Not Dismissed: Referral to Another Agency 0 Closed but not Dismissed 1 Closed due to Death 1

Deferred Discipline Agreement 0 Letter of Caution 13 Confidential Admonition 0 Public Reprimand 0 Suspension 0 Removal from Office 0

Total Not Dismissed (15) Total Complaints Resolved (290)

Total Complaints Pending as of June 30, 2016 31

400 330 333 350 317

f Cases

299 293 305 342 283 285 294

300 316 334 283 298 289 302 290

250 294

Number o Received

200 Resolved

150 Pending

100 62 53 36 36 28 27 31 50 27 24

0 07-08 08-09 09-10 10-11 11-12 12-13 13-14 14-15 15-16

Fiscal Year

ANNUAL REPORT OF JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE IN SOUTH CAROLINA 2014 - 2015

COMPLAINTS PENDING & RECEIVED:

Complaints Pending June 30, 2014 Complaints Received July 1, 2014 – June 30, 2015

Total Complaints Pending and Received

24 305

329

DISPOSITION OF COMPLAINTS:

Dismissed: By Disciplinary Counsel after initial review (no jurisdiction) By Disciplinary Counsel after investigation (lack of evidence)

By Investigative Panel By Supreme Court

Total Dismissed

19327 66

0 (286)

Not Dismissed: Referral to Another Agency Closed but not Dismissed Closed due to Death

Deferred Discipline Agreement Letter of Caution Confidential Admonition Public Reprimand Suspension

Removal from Office Total Not Dismissed

Total Complaints Concluded Total Complaints Pending as of June 30, 2015

0 0 0 0

13 1 2 0 0

(16) (302)

27

JUDICIAL POSITION*:

Circuit Court Judge 85 Magistrate 78 Family Court Judge 57 Probate Court Judge 30 Municipal Court Judge 25 Master/Referee 13 Unknown 7 Administrative Law Judge** 5 Appellate Court Judge 1 Judicial Candidate 0

*These figures represent the number of complaints filed against each type of judge. **By statute enacted in 2014, discipline of administrative law judges was changed from the State Ethics Commission to the Commission on Judicial Conduct.

ANNUAL REPORT OF JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE IN SOUTH CAROLINA 2013 - 2014

COMPLAINTS PENDING & RECEIVED:

Complaints Pending June 30, 2013 Complaints Received July 1, 2013 – June 30, 2014

Total Complaints Pending and Received

28 289

317

DISPOSITION OF COMPLAINTS:

Dismissed: By Disciplinary Counsel after initial review (no jurisdiction) By Disciplinary Counsel after investigation (lack of evidence)

By Investigative Panel By Supreme Court

Total Dismissed

19327 54

0 (274)

Not Dismissed: Referral to Another Agency Closed but not Dismissed Closed due to Death

Deferred Disciplinary Agreement Letter of Caution Admonition Public Reprimand Suspension

Removal from Office Total Not Dismissed

Total Complaints Concluded Total Complaints Pending as of June 30, 2014

0 0 0 0

14 4 1 0 0

(19) (293)

24

JUDICIAL POSITION*:

Magistrate 94 Circuit Court 75 Family Court 56 Probate Court 26 Municipal Court 19 Master/Referee 10 Appellate Court 7 Judicial Candidate 1 Unidentified 1

*These figures represent the number of complaints filed against each type of judge.

ANNUAL REPORT OF JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE IN SOUTH CAROLINA 2012 - 2013

COMPLAINTS PENDING & RECEIVED:

Complaints Pending June 30, 2012 Complaints Received July 1, 2012 – June 30, 2013

Total Complaints Pending and Received

27 299

326

DISPOSITION OF COMPLAINTS:

Dismissed: By Disciplinary Counsel after initial review (no jurisdiction) By Disciplinary Counsel after investigation (lack of evidence)

By Investigative Panel By Supreme Court

Total Dismissed

18821 73

0 (282)

Not Dismissed: Referral to Another Agency Closed but not Dismissed Closed due to Death

Deferred Disciplinary Agreement Letter of Caution Admonition Public Reprimand Suspension Removal from Office

Total Not Dismissed Total Complaints Concluded

Total Complaints Pending as of June 30, 2013

0 0 0 0 9 1 6 0 0

(16) (298)

28

JUDICIAL POSITION*:

Magistrate 93 Circuit Court 70 Family Court 64 Municipal Court 35 Probate Court 24 Master/Referee 11 Appellate Court 2 Judicial Candidate 0

*These figures represent the number of complaints filed against each type of judge.

SOURCE OF COMPLAINT:

Litigant 85.95% Family/Friend of Litigant 5.35% Citizen (not involved in case) 1.67% Disciplinary Counsel 1.00% Family/Friend of Victim 1.00% Another Judge 1.00% Law Enforcement 1.00% Self-Report 1.00% Attorney 1.00% Employee <1.00% Litigation Witness <1.00% Public Official/Agency <1.00%

CASE TYPE:

Criminal 40.54% Domestic 21.28% General Civil 19.59% Probate 8.11% Not Case Related 4.05% Post-Conviction Relief 2.70% Debt Collection/Foreclosure 2.36% Employment <1.00% Personal Injury <1.00% Real Estate <1.00%

ALLEGED MISCONDUCT:

Fairness/Bias/Prejudice 76.47% Temperament 7.35% Diligence 5.51% Disqualification/Recusal/Conflict 5.15% Criminal Conduct 1.84% Civility 1.84% Political Activity/Campaign <1.00% Probate Conduct <1.00% Trust Account Conduct <1.00% Supervision/Employee Relations <1.00%

STATE COMMISSION

ON JUDICIAL CONDUCT

ANNUAL REPORT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2016

Table 1: Commission Activity

Cases Pending (Beginning FY/Ending FY)

Cases Filed

Total Number of Cases Disposed

% of Cases Disposed

Average Age of Cases Disposed

SCJC Actions (total)

Cases Disposed through:

Criminal Conviction

Review Tribunal Order

Voluntarily Agreement to Resign in Lieu of Disciplinary Action

Disciplinary Actions:

Public Censure

Public Censure and Order of Additional Education

Public Reprimand

Public Warning

Public Admonition

Public Sanction and Order of Additional Education

Private Reprimand

Private Warning

Private Admonition

Private Sanction and Order of Additional Education

Public Order of Additional Education

Private Order of Additional Education

Interim Actions:

Order of Suspension [15(a)]

Recommendation of Suspension to Supreme Court [15(b)]

Cases in Formal Proceedings

Amicus Referral

Dismissals

Request for Reconsideration Received

Reconsideration Granted

Reconsideration Denied

Pending

Cases Appealed to Special Court of Review

Informal Hearing Set

Public Statements Issued

2013

566/586

1130

1109

98.14%

6.5 Months

42

0

0

5

0

0

0

1

0

0

6

5

6

0

6

7

0

0

0

1072

76

1

71

8

6

9

0

6

0

14

1

22

56

2

70

1018

0

0

0

3

5

0

15

12

4

3

3

1

2

9

0

0

6

0

0

63

6.3 Months

94.82%

1080

1139

586/646

2014

0

19

meetingmeeting

(Incl. October)

0

3

23

2

28

983

0

0

1

2

2

0

18

4

5

2

14

0

0

10

0

0

11

0

0

69

5.9 Months

1049

1191

465/479

88.08%

2016

0

15

5

3

51

0

54

1151

0

0

0

5

0

0

13

5

1

9

16

7

1

25

0

0

14

0

0

96

6.9 Months

116.51%

1242

2015

1068

646/465

15

Creation and Authority of the Judicial Conduct Commission

Although it existed previously as a legislatively created body, Utah’s Judicial Conduct Commission (JCC) was constitutionally established in 1984. Constitution of Utah, Article VIII, Section 13. The constitution authorizes the Legislature to statutorily establish the composition and procedures of the JCC. Those provisions are found in Utah Code Ann., Title 78A, Chapter 11. The JCC is empowered to investigate and conduct confidential hearings regarding complaints against state, county and municipal judges throughout the state. The JCC may recommend the reprimand, censure, suspension, removal, or involuntary retirement of a judge for any of the following reasons:

action which constitutes willful misconduct in office;

final conviction of a crime punishable as a felony under state or federal law;

willful and persistent failure to perform judicial duties;

disability that seriously interferes with the performance of judicial duties; or

conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice which brings a judicial office into disrepute.

Prior to the implementation of any such JCC recommendation, the Utah Supreme Court reviews the JCC’s proceedings as to both law and fact. The Supreme Court then issues an order implementing, rejecting, or modifying the JCC’s recommendation.

Number of Complaints Received in FY 2016

Of the 85 complaints received in FY 2016, 79 have been resolved and 6 are still pending.

Complaints Received in FY 2016

Judge Type Number of Judges

Number of Complaints Received

Number of Judges

Named in Complaints

Supreme Court

5 1 1

Court of Appeals

7 0 0

District 72 51 42

Juvenile 30 10 6

Justice Court

98 21 16

Pro Tempore

60 2 1

Active Senior

39 0 0

Total 311 85 66

Confidentiality of JCC Records and Proceedings

Except in certain limited circumstances specified by statute, all complaints, papers and testimony received or maintained by the JCC, and the record of any confidential hearings conducted by the JCC, are confidential, and cannot be disclosed.

2540 Washington Blvd., Suite 703 Ogden, Utah 84401

Telephone: (801) 626-3369 www.jcc.utah.gov

UTAH JUDICIAL CONDUCT COMMISSION ANNUAL REPORT

FY 2016

Sanctions and Other Resolutions

Sanctions Implemented by the Utah Supreme Court There were no public sanctions implemented by the Utah Supreme Court during FY 2016.

Dismissals with Warnings Issued by the Judicial Conduct Commission

There were no dismissals with warnings issued by the Judicial Conduct Commission during FY 2016.

Administrative Affairs

Meetings The JCC meets as needed on the third Tuesday of each month at the Utah Law & Justice Center in Salt Lake City. The JCC met seven times during FY 2016.

Administrative Rules The JCC’s administrative rules are available on-line at www.rules.utah.gov.

JCC Commissioners Robert Behunin James Jardine Rep. Brian King, Chair Tami King Sen. Karen Mayne Rep. Kraig Powell Lois Richins, Vice-Chair Hon. Stephen Roth Hon. Todd Shaughnessy Sen. Stephen Urquhart Terry Welch Public member Robert Behunin resigned during FY 2016 due to continually increasing responsibilities at Utah State University where he serves as Vice-President for Commercialization and Regional Development. Public member Lois Richins completed her eight years of JCC eligibility at the conclusion of FY 2016.

Website The JCC’s website, www.jcc.utah.gov, contains in-depth information, links to related sites, annual reports, copies of public discipline documents, and downloadable complaint forms.

JCC Statutes The statutes governing the JCC are located in Utah Code Ann., Title 78A, Chapter 11.

Budget Most of the JCC’s budget is appropriated annually by the Legislature. For FY 2016, the legislative appropriation was $251,800. The JCC had non-lapsing savings from FY 2015 in the amount of $3,507, and the Division of Finance provided a one-time contribution of $25,000, resulting in total available funds in the amount of $280,307. JCC expenses for FY 2016 were $256,432, leaving a balance of $23,875.

JCC Staff Colin Winchester, Executive Director Aimee Thoman, Investigative Counsel Sara Sherman, Office Technician

UTAH JUDICIAL CONDUCT COMMISSION – COMPLAINT RESOLUTION PROCESS

INITIAL SCREENING

PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION

FULL INVESTIGATION

FORMAL PROCEEDINGS

SUPREME COURT

Executive Director reviews each “complaint” to determine whether it is a complaint within the JCC’s jurisdiction.

Staff returns non-JCC complaints (i.e., complaints against bar members or court employees) to complainant with appropriate instructions. For JCC complaints, staff prepares electronic and hard-copy files, sends acknowledgment letter to complainant, and returns

hard-copy file to Executive Director. Executive Director assigns investigator. Note: Anonymous complaints are submitted directly to JCC members, who review and discuss the complaint and vote to either take no action or to have

staff conduct a preliminary investigation.

Investigator conducts preliminary investigation, writes preliminary investigation report, and recommends whether to dismiss or to proceed to

full investigation as to some or all allegations. Executive Director reviews preliminary investigation report and recommendation, and may revise either. Staff distributes preliminary investigation report and

recommendation, along with pertinent materials, to JCC members. JCC meets, reviews and discusses preliminary investigation report and recommendation, and votes to dismiss, to have staff conduct additional preliminary investigation, or to proceed to full

investigation as to some or all allegations.

Staff provides judge with copy of complaint and other pertinent materials and asks judge to respond in writing to identified allegations.

Investigator conducts additional investigation, if necessary, as to issues raised in judge’s response. Investigator may write supplemental investigation report and may make recommendation whether to dismiss or to proceed to formal proceedings. Staff distributes judge’s

response and any supplemental investigation report and recommendation, along with pertinent materials, to JCC members. JCC meets, reviews and discusses judge’s response and any supplemental investigation report and recommendation, and votes to dismiss, to have staff

conduct additional investigation, or to proceed to formal proceedings as to some or all allegations.

Staff prepares formal complaint and serves same upon judge via certified mail. Judge may file written

response. Matter may be resolved by dismissal, stipulated resolution or confidential hearing. A stipulated resolution may recommend: Reprimand Censure Suspension

Removal from Office Involuntary Retirement After a confidential hearing, the JCC may dismiss the matter or may recommend: Reprimand Censure Suspension Removal from Office Involuntary Retirement

Staff files JCC’s findings of fact, recommendation and other statutorily required materials with Supreme Court.

JCC’s recommendation becomes public upon filing. All other materials become public only upon Supreme Court order. Supreme Court reviews JCC’s proceedings as to both law and fact, and implements, modifies or rejects JCC’s recommendation.

Note: JCC dismissals are not reviewed by the Supreme Court.

Creation and Authority of the Judicial Conduct Commission

Although it existed previously as a legislatively created body, Utah’s Judicial Conduct Commission (JCC) was constitutionally established in 1984. Constitution of Utah, Article VIII, Section 13. The constitution authorizes the Legislature to statutorily establish the composition and procedures of the JCC. Those provisions are found in Utah Code Ann., Title 78A, Chapter 11. The JCC is empowered to investigate and conduct confidential hearings regarding complaints against state, county and municipal judges throughout the state. The JCC may recommend the reprimand, censure, suspension, removal, or involuntary retirement of a judge for any of the following reasons:

action which constitutes willful misconduct in office;

final conviction of a crime punishable as a felony under state or federal law;

willful and persistent failure to perform judicial duties;

disability that seriously interferes with the performance of judicial duties; or

conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice which brings a judicial office into disrepute.

Prior to the implementation of any such JCC recommendation, the Utah Supreme Court reviews the JCC’s proceedings as to both law and fact. The Supreme Court then issues an order implementing, rejecting, or modifying the JCC’s recommendation.

Number of Complaints Received in FY 2015

Of the 70 complaints received in FY 2015, 69 have been resolved and 1 is still pending.

Complaints Received in FY 2015

Judge Type Number of Judges

Number of Complaints Received

Number of Judges

Named in Complaints

Supreme Court

5 0 0

Court of Appeals

7 1 3

District 71 39 30

Juvenile 30 6 6

Justice Court

98 17 14

Pro Tempore

67 7 7

Active Senior

66 0 0

Total 344 70 60

Confidentiality of JCC Records and Proceedings

Except in certain limited circumstances specified by statute, all complaints, papers and testimony received or maintained by the JCC, and the record of any confidential hearings conducted by the JCC, are confidential, and cannot be disclosed.

2540 Washington Blvd., Suite 703 Ogden, Utah 84401

Telephone: (801) 626-3369 www.jcc.utah.gov

UTAH JUDICIAL CONDUCT COMMISSION ANNUAL REPORT

FY 2015

Sanctions and Other Resolutions

Sanctions Implemented by the Utah Supreme Court There were no public sanctions implemented by the Utah Supreme Court during FY 2015.

Dismissals with Warnings Issued by the Judicial Conduct Commission

Dismissal with a Warning. On September 16, 2014, the JCC dismissed a complaint filed against a justice court judge who had acted impatiently toward an individual who interrupted court proceedings. The JCC found that the judge’s actions violated Rule 2.8(B), which requires judges to act with patience, dignity and courtesy. However, the JCC also found that the misconduct was troubling but relatively minor misbehavior for which no public sanction was warranted. Dismissal with a Warning. On November 18, 2014, the JCC dismissed a self-reported complaint against a justice court judge who, while wearing a judicial robe, participated in the ALS ice-bucket challenge and challenged other judges and court administrators to participate. The judge posted a video of his participation and challenges online, but immediately removed the video when he became aware of the violation. The JCC found that the judge’s actions violated Rule 3.7(A), which prohibits judges from engaging in many fund-raising activities. However, the JCC also found that the misconduct was troubling but relatively minor misbehavior for which no public sanction was warranted.

Dismissal with a Warning. On January 20, 2015, the JCC dismissed a complaint filed against a relatively new district court judge who had engaged in a few minor ex parte communications about a pending civil case. The JCC found that the judge’s actions violated Rule 2.9(A), which prohibits most ex parte communications. However, the JCC also found that the misconduct was troubling but relatively minor misbehavior for which no public sanction was warranted. Dismissal with a Warning. On March 17, 2015, the JCC dismissed a self-reported complaint against a new district court judge who had, during the judicial appointment process, publicly endorsed a candidate for public office. The JCC found that the judge’s actions violated Rule 4.1(A), which prohibits judges and judicial candidates from participating in many political activities. However, the JCC also found that the misconduct was troubling but relatively minor misbehavior for which no public sanction was warranted.

.

Administrative Affairs

Meetings The JCC meets as needed on the third Tuesday of each month at the Utah Law & Justice Center in Salt Lake City. The JCC met 8 times during FY 2015.

Administrative Rules The JCC’s administrative rules are available on-line at www.rules.utah.gov.

JCC Commissioners Robert Behunin James Jardine Rep. Brian King, Chair Tami King Sen. Karen Mayne Rep. Kraig Powell Lois Richins Hon. Stephen Roth Hon. Todd Shaughnessy Sen. Stephen Urquhart, Vice-Chair Terry Welch Judge Deno Himonas, who had served on the JCC since 2012, became a member of the Utah Supreme Court in February 2015. In March 2015, Judge Todd Shaughnessy was appointed to fill the vacancy.

JCC Staff Colin Winchester, Executive Director Aimee Thoman, Investigative Counsel Sara Sherman, Office Technician

Website The JCC’s website, www.jcc.utah.gov, contains in-depth information, links to related sites, annual reports, copies of public discipline documents, and downloadable complaint forms.

JCC Statutes The statutes governing the JCC are located in Utah Code Ann., Title 78A, Chapter 11.

Budget Most of the JCC’s budget is appropriated annually by the Legislature. For FY 2015, the legislative appropriation was $244,119. JCC expenses for FY 2015 were $240,613, leaving a balance of $3,506.

UTAH JUDICIAL CONDUCT COMMISSION – COMPLAINT RESOLUTION PROCESS

INITIAL SCREENING

PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION

FULL INVESTIGATION

FORMAL PROCEEDINGS

SUPREME COURT

Executive Director reviews each “complaint” to determine whether it is a complaint within the JCC’s jurisdiction.

Staff returns non-JCC complaints (i.e., complaints against bar members or court employees) to complainant with appropriate instructions. For JCC complaints, staff prepares electronic and hard-copy files, sends acknowledgment letter to complainant, and returns

hard-copy file to Executive Director. Executive Director assigns investigator. Note: Anonymous complaints are submitted directly to JCC members, who review and discuss the complaint and vote to either take no action or to have

staff conduct a preliminary investigation.

Investigator conducts preliminary investigation, writes preliminary investigation report, and recommends whether to dismiss or to proceed to

full investigation as to some or all allegations. Executive Director reviews preliminary investigation report and recommendation, and may revise either. Staff distributes preliminary investigation report and

recommendation, along with pertinent materials, to JCC members. JCC meets, reviews and discusses preliminary investigation report and recommendation, and votes to dismiss, to have staff conduct additional preliminary investigation, or to proceed to full

investigation as to some or all allegations.

Staff provides judge with copy of complaint and other pertinent materials and asks judge to respond in writing to identified allegations.

Investigator conducts additional investigation, if necessary, as to issues raised in judge’s response. Investigator may write supplemental investigation report and may make recommendation whether to dismiss or to proceed to formal proceedings. Staff distributes judge’s

response and any supplemental investigation report and recommendation, along with pertinent materials, to JCC members. JCC meets, reviews and discusses judge’s response and any supplemental investigation report and recommendation, and votes to dismiss, to have staff

conduct additional investigation, or to proceed to formal proceedings as to some or all allegations.

Staff prepares formal complaint and serves same upon judge via certified mail. Judge may file written

response. Matter may be resolved by dismissal, stipulated resolution or confidential hearing. A stipulated resolution may recommend: Reprimand Censure Suspension

Removal from Office Involuntary Retirement After a confidential hearing, the JCC may dismiss the matter or may recommend: Reprimand Censure Suspension Removal from Office Involuntary Retirement

Staff files JCC’s findings of fact, recommendation and other statutorily required materials with Supreme Court.

JCC’s recommendation becomes public upon filing. All other materials become public only upon Supreme Court order. Supreme Court reviews JCC’s proceedings as to both law and fact, and implements, modifies or rejects JCC’s recommendation.

Note: JCC dismissals are not reviewed by the Supreme Court.

Creation and Authority of the Judicial Conduct Commission

Although it existed previously as a legislatively created body, Utah’s Judicial Conduct Commission (JCC) was constitutionally established in 1984. Constitution of Utah, Article VIII, Section 13. The constitution authorizes the Legislature to statutorily establish the composition and procedures of the JCC. Those provisions are found in Utah Code Ann., Title 78A, Chapter 11. The JCC is empowered to investigate and conduct confidential hearings regarding complaints against state, county and municipal judges throughout the state. The JCC may recommend the reprimand, censure, suspension, removal, or involuntary retirement of a judge for any of the following reasons:

action which constitutes willful misconduct in office;

final conviction of a crime punishable as a felony under state or federal law;

willful and persistent failure to perform judicial duties;

disability that seriously interferes with the performance of judicial duties; or

conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice which brings a judicial office into disrepute.

Prior to the implementation of any such JCC recommendation, the Utah Supreme Court reviews the JCC’s proceedings as to both law and fact. The Supreme Court then issues an order implementing, rejecting, or modifying the JCC’s recommendation.

Number of Complaints Received in FY 2014

Of the 74 complaints received in FY 2014, 67 have been resolved and 7 are still pending.

Complaints Received in FY 2014

Judge Type Number of Judges

Number of Complaints Received

Number of Judges

Named in Complaints

Supreme Court

5 1 5

Court of Appeals

7 1 1

District 72 42 32

Juvenile 30 9 8

Justice Court

98 20 17

Pro Tempore

63 1 1

Active Senior

35 0 0

Total 310 74 64

Confidentiality of JCC Records and Proceedings

Except in certain limited circumstances specified by statute, all complaints, papers and testimony received or maintained by the JCC, and the record of any confidential hearings conducted by the JCC, are confidential, and cannot be disclosed.

2540 Washington Blvd., Suite 703 Ogden, Utah 84401

Telephone: (801) 626-3369 Facsimile: (801) 626-3390

www.jcc.utah.gov

UTAH JUDICIAL CONDUCT COMMISSION ANNUAL REPORT

FY 2014

Sanctions and Other Resolutions

Sanctions Implemented by the Utah Supreme Court Censure. On October 11, 2013, the Utah Supreme Court censured former Salt Lake City Justice Court Judge Virginia Ward. Judge Ward had pleaded guilty to possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, a second degree felony. She resigned her judicial office before entering her plea. As provided in Constitution of Utah, Article VIII, Section 13, final conviction of a felony is grounds for judicial discipline. Reprimand. On April 22, 2014, the Utah Supreme Court reprimanded Second District Juvenile Court Judge J. Mark Andrus. During an adoption hearing, Judge Andrus became frustrated. He repeatedly raised his voice and interrupted the child’s grandfather. The judge’s actions violated Code of Judicial Conduct Rule 2.8(B), which requires judges to be patient, dignified and courteous to persons with whom they deal in an official capacity.

Dismissals with Warnings Issued by the Judicial Conduct Commission Dismissal with a Warning. On November 5, 2013, the JCC dismissed a complaint filed against a district court judge who included comments in the certification of a motion to disqualify. The JCC found that the misconduct was troubling but relatively minor misbehavior for which no public sanction was warranted. Dismissals with Warnings. In March 2012, the JCC issued two dismissals with warnings, both arising from the same complaint, to a justice court judge who had engaged in ex parte communications. The JCC found that the misconducts were troubling but relatively minor misbehavior for which no public sanction was warranted. The complainant requested that the investigations be re-opened, and the JCC granted that request. After a criminal trial against the judge resulted in acquittal, and after additional investigation and consideration, the JCC determined that the original dismissals with warnings were appropriate.

Administrative Affairs

Meetings The JCC meets as needed on the third Tuesday of each month at the Utah Law & Justice Center in Salt Lake City. The JCC met 11 times during FY 2014.

Administrative Rules The JCC’s administrative rules are available on-line at www.rules.utah.gov.

JCC Commissioners Robert Behunin Elaine Englehardt, Chair Hon. Deno Himonas James Jardine Rep. Brian King, Vice-Chair Sen. Karen Mayne Rep. Kraig Powell Lois Richins Hon. Stephen Roth Sen. Stephen Urquhart Terry Welch In April 2014, Hon. Stephen Roth was appointed to fill a vacancy created by Hon. Carolyn McHugh’s confirmation to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals.

JCC Staff Colin Winchester, Executive Director Susan Hunt, Investigative Counsel Madison Howard, Office Technician

Website The JCC’s website, www.jcc.utah.gov, contains in-depth information, links to related sites, annual reports, copies of public discipline documents, and downloadable complaint forms.

JCC Statutes The statutes governing the JCC are located in Utah Code Ann., Title 78A, Chapter 11.

Budget Most of the JCC’s budget is appropriated annually by the Legislature. For FY 2014, the legislative appropriation was $240,400. The JCC contributed $200 in savings from FY 2013, and the Legislature authorized an additional $300 to cover the cost of increased 401(k) contributions. JCC expenses for FY 2014 were $242,992 (an over-expenditure of $2,092).

UTAH JUDICIAL CONDUCT COMMISSION – COMPLAINT RESOLUTION PROCESS

INITIAL SCREENING

PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION

FULL INVESTIGATION

FORMAL PROCEEDINGS

SUPREME COURT

Executive Director reviews each “complaint” to determine whether it is a complaint within the JCC’s jurisdiction.

Staff returns non-JCC complaints (i.e., complaints against bar members or court employees) to complainant with appropriate instructions. For JCC complaints, staff prepares electronic and hard-copy files, sends acknowledgment letter to

complainant, and returns hard-copy file to Executive Director. Executive Director assigns investigator. Note: Information received in any form other than a written complaint is submitted directly to JCC members, who review and

discuss the information and vote to either take no action or to have staff conduct a preliminary investigation.

Investigator conducts preliminary investigation, writes preliminary investigation report, and recommends whether to

dismiss or to proceed to full investigation as to some or all allegations. Executive Director reviews preliminary investigation report and recommendation, and may revise either. Staff distributes preliminary investigation

report and recommendation, along with pertinent materials, to JCC members. JCC meets, reviews and discusses preliminary investigation report and recommendation, and votes to dismiss, to have staff conduct additional preliminary investigation,

or to proceed to full investigation as to some or all allegations.

Staff provides judge with pertinent materials and asks judge to respond in writing to identified allegations.

Investigator conducts additional investigation, if necessary, as to issues raised in judge’s response. Investigator may write supplemental investigation report and may make recommendation whether to dismiss or to proceed to formal proceedings. Staff distributes judge’s

response and any supplemental investigation report and recommendation, along with pertinent materials, to JCC members. JCC meets, reviews and discusses judge’s response and any supplemental investigation report and recommendation, and votes to dismiss, to have staff

conduct additional investigation, or to proceed to formal proceedings as to some or all allegations.

Staff prepares formal complaint and serves same upon judge via certified mail.

Judge may file written response. Matter may be resolved by dismissal, stipulated resolution or confidential hearing. A stipulated resolution may recommend: Reprimand Censure

Suspension Removal from Office Involuntary Retirement After a confidential hearing, the JCC may dismiss the matter or may recommend: Reprimand Censure Suspension Removal from Office

Involuntary Retirement

Staff files JCC’s recommendation and statutorily required materials with Supreme Court.

JCC’s recommendation becomes public upon filing. All other materials become public only upon Supreme Court order. Supreme Court reviews JCC’s proceedings as to both law and fact, and implements, modifies or rejects JCC’s

recommendation. Note: JCC dismissals are not reviewed by the Supreme Court.

Creation and Authority of the Judicial Conduct Commission

Although it existed previously as a legislatively created body, Utah’s Judicial Conduct Commission (JCC) was constitutionally established in 1984. Constitution of Utah, Article VIII, Section 13. The constitution authorizes the Legislature to statutorily establish the composition and procedures of the JCC. Those provisions are found in Utah Code Ann., Title 78A, Chapter 11. The JCC is empowered to investigate and conduct confidential hearings regarding complaints against state, county and municipal judges throughout the state. The JCC may recommend the reprimand, censure, suspension, removal, or involuntary retirement of a judge for any of the following reasons:

action which constitutes willful misconduct in office;

final conviction of a crime punishable as a felony under state or federal law;

willful and persistent failure to perform judicial duties;

disability that seriously interferes with the performance of judicial duties; or

conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice which brings a judicial office into disrepute.

Prior to the implementation of any such JCC recommendation, the Utah Supreme Court reviews the JCC’s proceedings as to both law and fact. The Supreme Court then issues an order implementing, rejecting, or modifying the JCC’s recommendation.

Number of Complaints Received in FY 2013

Of the 86 complaints received in FY 2013, 81 have been resolved and 5 are still pending.

Complaints Received in FY 2013

Judge Type Number of Judges

Number of Complaints Received

Number of Judges

Named in Complaints

Supreme Court

5 0 0

Court of Appeals

7 1 3

District 71 51 39

Juvenile 29 7 5

Justice Court

98 22 17

Pro Tempore

74 3 3

Active Senior

29 2 2

Total 313 86 69

Confidentiality of JCC Records and Proceedings

Except in certain limited circumstances specified by statute, all complaints, papers and testimony received or maintained by the JCC, and the record of any confidential hearings conducted by the JCC, are confidential, and cannot be disclosed.

2540 Washington Blvd., Suite 703 Ogden, Utah 84401

Telephone: (801) 626-3369 Facsimile: (801) 626-3390

www.jcc.utah.gov

UTAH JUDICIAL CONDUCT COMMISSION ANNUAL REPORT

FY 2013

Sanctions and Other Resolutions

Resolutions Determined by the Utah Supreme Court Reprimand. On August 22, 2012, the Utah Supreme Court reprimanded retired Woods Cross City Justice Court Judge Robert Peters. Judge Peters initiated and considered an ex parte communication with a person who was on probation, and then revoked that person’s probation without following the statutorily mandated procedures. The judge’s actions violated: Code of Judicial Conduct Rule 1.2, which requires judges to avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety; Code of Judicial Conduct Rule 2.2, which requires judges to apply the law; and Code of Judicial Conduct Rule 2.9(A), which forbids ex parte communications about pending matters. Dismissal. On September 28, 2012, the Utah Supreme Court rejected the JCC’s recommended reprimand of West Valley City Justice Court Judge Keith Stoney. The JCC had recommended that the judge be reprimanded for issuing a $10,000 cash only bench warrant in response to a woman’s inappropriate behavior toward court clerks. The Supreme Court determined that there was insufficient evidence upon which to base a finding that Judge Stoney had violated the Code of Judicial Conduct. Reprimand. On March 26, 2013, the Utah Supreme Court reprimanded Kanab City Justice Court Judge Gary Johnson. After hearing a small claims trial but before issuing his decision, Judge Johnson first engaged in an ex parte communication with the defendant, and then engaged in an ex parte communication with the plaintiff. The judge’s actions violated Code of Judicial Conduct Rule 2.9(A), which forbids ex parte communications about pending matters.

Resolutions Determined by the Utah Supreme Court Censure. On May 21, 2013, the Utah Supreme Court censured Box Elder County Justice Court Judge Kevin Christensen. Judge Christensen was concurrently employed by the county justice court and three municipal justice courts. From 2009 through 2011, Judge Christensen received combined salaries from the four courts that exceeded the salary limits imposed by the Legislature. The judge’s conduct violated Code of Judicial Conduct Rule 1.1, which requires judges to comply with the law. The Court also ordered Judge Christensen to repay the excess salary amounts he had received.

Resolution Obtained by the Judicial Conduct Commission Retirement. On September 11, 2012, the Judicial Conduct Commission agreed to dismiss any and all pending complaints against West Valley City and Saratoga Springs Justice Court Judge Keith Stoney. Judge Stoney agreed to retire from both courts on December 31, 2012, and agreed not to seek or accept future appointment to any judicial office in the State of Utah.

Administrative Affairs

Meetings The JCC meets as needed on the third Tuesday of each month at the Utah Law & Justice Center in Salt Lake City. The JCC met ten times during FY 2013.

Administrative Rules The JCC’s administrative rules are available on-line at www.rules.utah.gov.

JCC Commissioners Robert Behunin Elaine Englehardt, Chair Hon. Deno Himonas James Jardine Rep. Brian King, Vice-Chair Sen. Karen Mayne Hon. Carolyn McHugh Rep. Kraig Powell Lois Richins Sen. Stephen Urquhart Terry Welch During FY 2013, JCC Commissioner Constance Lundberg resigned due to health reasons. Her contribution to the JCC and the citizens of Utah is greatly appreciated.

JCC Staff Colin Winchester, Executive Director Susan Hunt, Investigative Counsel Madison Howard, Office Technician

Website The JCC’s website, www.jcc.utah.gov, contains in-depth information, links to related sites, annual reports, copies of public discipline documents, and a downloadable complaint form.

JCC Statutes The statutes governing the JCC are located in Utah Code Ann., Title 78A, Chapter 11.

Budget Most of the JCC’s budget is appropriated annually by the Legislature. Additional funding comes from agency savings in prior years. For FY 2013, the legislative appropriation was $206,600; expenses totaled $235,589. In order to balance its budget for FY 2013, the JCC was required to use $28,989 from prior years’ savings. Effective July 1, 2013, the Legislature increased the JCC’s annual appropriation by $25,000 per year. Without that increase, the JCC would not have sufficient funds to operate in FY 2014 and beyond.

UTAH JUDICIAL CONDUCT COMMISSION – COMPLAINT RESOLUTION PROCESS

INITIAL SCREENING

PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION

FULL INVESTIGATION

FORMAL PROCEEDINGS

SUPREME COURT

Executive Director reviews each “complaint” to determine whether it is a complaint within the JCC’s jurisdiction.

Staff returns non-JCC complaints (i.e., complaints against bar members or court employees) to complainant with appropriate instructions. For JCC complaints, staff prepares electronic and hard-copy files, sends acknowledgment letter to

complainant, and returns hard-copy file to Executive Director. Executive Director assigns investigator. Note: Information received in any form other than a written complaint is submitted directly to JCC members, who review and

discuss the information and vote to either take no action or to have staff conduct a preliminary investigation.

Investigator conducts preliminary investigation, writes preliminary investigation report, and recommends whether to

dismiss or to proceed to full investigation as to some or all allegations. Executive Director reviews preliminary investigation report and recommendation, and may revise either. Staff distributes preliminary investigation

report and recommendation, along with pertinent materials, to JCC members. JCC meets, reviews and discusses preliminary investigation report and recommendation, and votes to dismiss, to have staff conduct additional preliminary investigation,

or to proceed to full investigation as to some or all allegations.

Staff provides judge with pertinent materials and asks judge to respond in writing to identified allegations.

Investigator conducts additional investigation, if necessary, as to issues raised in judge’s response. Investigator may write supplemental investigation report and may make recommendation whether to dismiss or to proceed to formal proceedings. Staff distributes judge’s

response and any supplemental investigation report and recommendation, along with pertinent materials, to JCC members. JCC meets, reviews and discusses judge’s response and any supplemental investigation report and recommendation, and votes to dismiss, to have staff

conduct additional investigation, or to proceed to formal proceedings as to some or all allegations.

Staff prepares formal complaint and serves same upon judge via certified mail.

Judge may file written response. Matter may be resolved by dismissal, stipulated resolution or confidential hearing. A stipulated resolution may recommend: Reprimand Censure

Suspension Removal from Office Involuntary Retirement After a confidential hearing, the JCC may dismiss the matter or may recommend: Reprimand Censure Suspension Removal from Office

Involuntary Retirement

Staff files JCC’s recommendation and statutorily required materials with Supreme Court.

JCC’s recommendation becomes public upon filing. All other materials become public only upon Supreme Court order. Supreme Court reviews JCC’s proceedings as to both law and fact, and implements, modifies or rejects JCC’s

recommendation. Note: JCC dismissals are not reviewed by the Supreme Court.

State of WashingtonCommission on Judicial Conduct

2015Annual Report

Commission Activity

Page 12

COMPLAINTS

MatterspendingonJanuary1,2015 98Complaintsreceivedduringperiod 261Requeststoreopencomplaints 32

TOTAL COMPLAINTS 391

DISPOSITIONS

DISMISSALSComplaintwithdrawn 6Insufficientevidencetoproceed 17LeftofficeunrelatedtoCJCaction 3LegalissuesoverwhichCJChasnojurisdiction 61Nobasistoreopen 31Noviolationfound 62Unsubstantiated 125

SUSTAINMENTSAdmonishment 1Censure 3*Reprimand 1

TOTAL COMPLAINTS DISPOSED 310

MATTERSPENDINGonDecember31,2015 81

INQUIRIES**

Totalinquiriesfiled 457

IV. COMMISSION ACTIVITY

1. Docket: Dismissal vs. Sustainment

*Duetomultiplecomplaintsagainstthesamejudicialofficer,asingledispositionmaydisposeofseveralcases.In 2015forexample,threecasesweredisposedofwiththecensureoftwojudicialofficers.

**InquiriesarerecordedwhenindividualscontacttheCommissionaboutfilingacomplaint.

Commission Activity

Page 13

2. Dispositions: Dismissal vs. Sustainment

DISPOSITIONS 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

DISMISSALComplaintwithdrawn 3 5 2 1 6Insufficientevidencetoproceed 28 20 18 22 17Lackofjurisdiction 1 2 2LeftofficeduetoCJCinanunrelatedmatter 1 3LeftofficeunrelatedtoCJCaction 19 2 1LegalissuesoverwhichCJChasnojurisdiction 93 95 106 107 61Nobasistoreopen 23 38 28 25 31Noviolationfound 67 79 53 62 62Unsubstantiated 116 159 101 110 125

SUSTAINMENTAdmonishment 1 6* 4 1Reprimand 2 2* 1Censure 2* 1 3*

TOTAL DISPOSITIONS 353 400 319 335 310

Admonishment 1 6* 4 1Reprimand 2 2* 1Censure 2* 1 3*

TOTAL PUBLIC DISPOSITIONS 3 4 6 5 5

3. Dispositions: Public

PUBLIC DISPOSITIONS 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

*Duetomultiplecomplaintsagainstthesamejudicialofficer,asingledispositionmaydisposeofseveralcases.In 2015forexample,threecasesweredisposedofwiththecensureoftwojudicialofficers.

Commission Activity

Page 15

CJCComplaintsfiledbyCourtLevelofJudicialOfficers

1981 - 2015

Source of CJC Complaints1981 - 2015

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

3000

3500

4000

4500

5000

5500

6000

6500

7000

Superior Court 4,669 

(58%)

District Court 2,245 (28%)

Municipal Court 806 (10%)

Court of Appeals 127 (2%)

SupremeCourt120 (1%)

MultipleCourts101 (1%)

Other26 

(<1%)

TAB 10

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NORTHERN UTAH

_______________________________________________________________________________________________

PARKER MALMSTROM CRYSTAL MALMSTROM CASE NO: 1:17 – CV - 00080

PLAINTIFFS

V JUDGE: EVELYN FURST

STATE OF UTAH, ET AL DEFENDANTS

Title 440 Civil Rights, Other Civil ___________________________________________________________

NOTICE OF LIMITED APPEARANCE AS AN EXPERT WITNESS _____________________________________________________________________

INTRODUCTION

1) Citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(c), Christopher Edward Hallett, comes before this

court in Limited Appearance, with permission from these Plaintiffs, under

Fiduciary License Number 443079 with 28 years of practical experience arguing

these issues in multiple states, and courts, as the “Official Author” of the following

documentation in effort to Protect this Courts’ Integrity, that of Honorable Judges

while in performance of their Duties, and these Plaintiffs:

A) “The Negative Nexus” (and applications to this case’ Core Subject Matters of consequence) B) “amicus curiae brief” published in Hallett v Ohio case no: 16-14969 “Monopolized Practice Challenge” currently before the ELEVENTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS, ATLANTA GA, and also to THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, in concert with & reference to:

2

1) CPA John Gentry Lic no. 27062 with his “Auditors Report”

2) US Dept. Of Justice, Civil Rights Division, Office for Access to Justice, 2 pg Cover Letter and 9 pg Letter dated March 14, 2016, (attached therein) to Judicial Members and Private Contractors referencing several DOJ Investigations in which peoples’ Constitutional Rights are repetitively ignored in context of outstanding court fines and fees.

C) “estoppel of No Confidence” as “Co-Author” in concert with Plaintiff Crystal Malmstrom based on the following cited Yale Law Journal, and personal research through the Blacks Law Dictionary as well as the above cited information contained therein. [see Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c)]

Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Braucher and Orbach: Scamming: The Misunderstood Confidence Man (2015)

2) Opinion: based on research and Practical Application/s through the courts in effort to “Protect the Courts’ Integrity” from the following known defined terms contained within the recognized text of the Blacks Law Dictionary, 10th Edition.

Constitutional-doubt Canon

Derelict-official act (1912)

Dereliction of Duty

Confidence Game (1856)

Confidence Man (1849)

Confidence (14c)

Confidence Trickery

Breach of Statutory Duty (1844)

[see amicus curiae brief pg 12, para. 10]

When Advocates’ allegiances’ become “Suspect” based on “Core Concepts of Law”; this becomes a concern of consequence in and of itself. The relative “Subject Matter of Consequence” becomes secondary with respect to facts and evidence.

3

THE “NEGATIVE NEXUS” 3) The establishment of a “Negative Nexus” is as simple as demonstration

through the use of basic algebra one (1), Orders of Operations. What the court sees

as a “Positive Product” of the equation, or positive one (1), is no longer established

using “Good Faith” positive factors on the left hand side of the Equal Sign (=).

Here is the simple explanation for the court and / or jury to interpret.

4) What people perceive as “Ethical Behaviors” or “Honorable Practices”

when entering a courtroom with counsel, or “Positive Nexus”.

[All evidence and testimony being based on truthful, tangible, fact/s, and evidence.]

[Positive Nexus] [(1 x 1) = 1] (Honorable Justice) What the parties see = What the court sees

__________________________________________________________________

5) The following is what has transpired in the lower Family Court in this case

through these “Defective Practices” which establish this “Negative Nexus”.

[A significant portion of evidence and testimony corrupted / tainted, and not based in truth or on fact/s. ie: having to attempt to prove a non-existent piece of evidence or face contempt charges.]

[Negative Nexus] [(-1 x -1) = 1] What the parties see = What the court sees __________________________________________________________________ 6) Through “Manipulation” of the “Practice of Law” the outcome is still

viewed by the court as a “Positive Value”, but established based on “Negative

Factors”. [see 29 U.S. Code § 1109, 28 U.S.C. § 1927]

4

7) Example of Negative Factors in context of this case: (applied by Christopher E Hallett – in context as shown above)

A) [- witness tampering as outlined within the Complaint Brief] X [- Defective Practices] see 18 USC § 1510, §1512 and § 1513 adjudication

B) [- Plaintiff being forced to produce a non-existent tax document or face contempt charge/s] see Owen v. City of Independence, (1980) X [- Defective Practices] adjudication C) [- cited hearing under Judicial estoppel] see Fed. R. Civ. P 8(c) X [- Defective Practices] adjudication D) [-Jill Coils’ clear efforts to sever Moms’ relationship with the children] X [- Defective Practices] see Hardwick V. Vreeken, (2017) adjudication 8) When judges (Presiding Authorities) partake in these “Confidence Games

(1856)” and “Confidence Trickery”, either knowingly or unknowingly, these issues

become more serious as the “Negative Factors” intensify which promotes

“Escalation within the Negative Nexus” in these cases. As my 28 years of

experience and practical application through multiple courts have demonstrated;

this “Escalation” is the goal of this Monopoly as they use their practice to subdue

people through “Vexatious Litigation Tactics” for the sole purpose of “Unjust

Enrichments”. Under “Derelict-Official Act (1912)” language, said judges, and / or

lawyers, should be instantly removed from the bench and / or Practice. Dismissed

from service under “Dereliction of Duty” also citing “Breach of Statutory Duty

5

(1844)” as the clarity of the “Constitutional-doubt Canon” comes into “Plain

View” through orders which pay more attention to “Rules” than “What the Law

Requires” to “Protect the People” under those cited rules. The fact that judges are

contained within this nexus; they sometimes get caught in the crossfire of these

Defective Practices which justifies the need to sever the connections between the

Monopoly and the Courts to Protect the Integrity of the Courts. It is for this

purpose the Fore Fathers wrote Article 1, Section 9, Clause 8, to be used in concert

with the language of the “Missing 13th Amendment” cited as follows: [see cited

amicus curiae brief, top of pg 9]

“If any citizen of the United States shall accept, claim, receive, or retain, any title of nobility or honor, or shall, office or emolument of any kind whatever, from any emperor, king, prince, or foreign power, such person shall cease to be a citizen of the United States, and shall be incapable of holding any office of trust or profit under them, or either of them.”

Opinion: Said “Foreign Power” in context of this report being the BAR itself as it has clearly become “destructive” to its intended purpose of relationship with the People of The United States, and therefore should be abolished as written in The Declaration of Independence, and to Protect the Courts’ Integrity. Language cited as follows:

“Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed, that whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and institute new Government, laying its Foundation on such Principles, and organizing its Powers in such Form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.”

6

9) My Practical Experiences conclude it is no coincidence the current Legal

Monopoly (BAR) refuses to Practice this law as it was intended, so said Legal

Monopoly can attempt to illegally seize power and control over the courts for the

purposes of invoking their “Social Control” over the Constitutional Language of

“Domestic Tranquility” as stated clearly within my “amicus curiae brief” on page

13, paragraph 12. The cited “Conflict of Interest” is also sufficient cause in this

case to demand the implementation of jury proceedings as written in the “Due

Process Clause”, and Seventh Amendment, of the Constitution.

10) The following quote from my “Petition for Writ of Mandamus” filed

August 4, 2016 within my personal case clearly applies in context of this case:

A) I, as the payer and father, did not consent to the assimilation and usage by the State of Ohio, nearly 80% of the funds dedicated to support my children. As I have already pointed out through previous Statements Governor Kasich relabeled Child Support in Ohio as income in order to be able to legally assimilate these funds for state government use in balancing “his” budget. Common knowledge dictates this improper appropriation of funds is illegal which makes this action “Taxation by Intimidation” which causes family hardships and is criminal in the eyes of the People.

B) The fact the “vague” term of “Other” is used to disguise and conceal these deceptions establishes “Destructive” intentions to the Rights of the individual so the State of Ohio may appear “Benevolent” to a larger majority for personal gains in the forms of “Votes to remain in office”, “Campaign Contributions”, and “Attorney’s Fees” (Special Project Judges Divorce). The motivation is to maintain control of a “Self Serving Government” and “Shame or Intimidate” any who oppose them through a “Manipulation of the Judiciary” by method of a language only its association members speak; leaving me defenseless to live in fear under a “Substandard State of Political Correctness” without “Real Access” to “Due Process” and “Honorable Justice”. Continuing to allow these destructive methods and,

7

misuse of “Due Process” against the People, is Dishonorable to this Judiciary and the People to whom it serves. These Advocates also establish a “Cost of Justice” where none is written or even implied under Constitutional Law thus creating a “Negative Bias” as to ability to pay for “Real Access to Due Process” leaving people no choice and subject to their “Deceptive Unethical Practices” and “Merciless Judgments”.

C) The Constitution, Bill of Rights, and the Declaration of Independence dictate the Government be comprised of three branches of equal power and authority. The Bar Association and it’s members have NO real power of authority granted to them by the people, yet they have managed to infiltrate every branch of Government instituting “Rules” and “Policies” outside of the public’s control. In that “Privatization” and “Membership Only” status they have utilized the dead Latin language as a means of communication and insure our continued dependence justifying their continued “need”.

D) Until now the need to question this relationship of “Trust” and “Ethics” between this association and the People was not necessary. Since this new issue of “Entitlements / Emoluments” has arisen under current circumstances of using my children against me for the financial gains of the Government, and intimidation to comply against my will. This, clearly arrogant, “private entity” HAS “assumed power” over all three branches of Government. Our three branch system has become “One single entity” speaking a different language than the people it governs in contradiction to the intent of the “Fore Fathers” to insure the “People Govern Themselves” on Principles most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness. Latin legal gibberish aside, this is it and we all know it.

~ End Quote~

11) Lincoln Prop. Co. v. Roche (2005), posed the cited question:

Whether a limited partnership's citizenship for diversity subject-matter jurisdiction purposes is determined not by the citizenship of its partners, but by whether its business activities establish a "very close nexus" with the state.

Opinion in context: [in this case; BAR card holders in relationship to the court/s, and their influences over the court/s]

8

Said Court concluded:

The Supreme Court will likely not use Lincoln Prop. Co. v. Roche to announce a new, nexus-based test for determining the citizenship of a limited partnership—as both parties agree, such a test has no precedential, statutory, or constitutional basis. However, the Court will have to clarify the proper scope of a federal court's diversity jurisdiction inquiry. The real question may be whether the Court can decide the case in a way that will avoid similar disputes in the future. Thus, if the Supreme Court finds for Lincoln, can it do so in a way that will keep purely local, state-law disputes out of federal court in the future? Similarly, will a victory for Roche encourage future diversity parties to wastefully litigate jurisdictional questions to the hilt? In that sense, the real import of the case will be in how the court decides, and not simply what it decides.

Opinion in context: [Which by simple inspection; would be creating a “Negative Bias” against these Plaintiffs in favor of the known “Court / BAR Nexus” over the individuals in this case.] 12) In the interest of full disclosure, and full transparency, I feel compelled to

come forward and advise the court of my position as “Co-Author” of the

“Complaint Brief” filed at the inception of this case in concert with Crystal

Malmstrom on behalf of Plaintiff Parker Malmstrom. This young man got caught

in the crossfire of a judicial issue on which he had no standing or ability to defend

himself. As a Licensed Fiduciary Expert; knowing Parker Malmstrom has become

susceptible to these cited “Defective Practices”, and lacks the necessary knowledge

and experience to defend himself, I take the stand in concert with his mother on his

behalf, to seek justice in this case as mandated by Law.

9

CONCLUSION

13) My work is not based on revenge or malice in any form, but instead toward

the implementation of a “Tort Mechanism” which will afford “Appropriate Due

Processes” when these types of “Defective Practices” are discovered. Such a

mechanism will equalize this Practice to any other “Licensed Practices” while in

the performance of their duties / work in practice. (Doctors, Brokers and Realtors,

Contractors, etc.) This effort; in good faith to the court, “Has” become necessary

to Preserve the Courts’ Integrity, that of Honorable Judges, and Due Process as we

know it. It is also consistent with the Intentions of multiple Constitutional

Mandates of “Equal Protections under the Law”, and “Right to Due Process under

the Law”. The time has come to define with which party Practitioners must remain

Loyal to in context of court proceedings.

Respectfully Submitted:

/S/ Christopher E. Hallett Christopher E. Hallett (Fiduciary Lic. No. 443079)

Christopher E. Hallett 16062 SW 34 CT RD Ocala, Florida, 34473 Ph. (352) 470-8460 [email protected]

TAB 11

Page 1 of 5

Statement of Claim: Libel Definition A published false statement that is damaging to a person's reputation; a written defamation. Fiduciary Duty

Definition

A fiduciary duty is a legal duty to act solely in another party's interests. Parties owing this duty are called fiduciaries. The

individuals to whom they owe a duty are called principals. Fiduciaries may not profit from their relationship with their principals

unless they have the principals' express informed consent. They also have a duty to avoid any conflicts of interest between

themselves and their principals or between their principals and the fiduciaries' other clients. A fiduciary duty is the strictest duty

of care recognized by the US legal system. Requested actions of these proceedings subject to this case beginning with but not limited to:

1. Cease and desist all Civil / Criminal cases, matters, and actions in the State of Ohio naming me (Christopher E. Hallett) as Defendant/Respondent to the case, matter, or action.

a) Any and All collection procedures against me, Christopher E. Hallett known or unknown. b) The re-labeling of case number 2009 DV 00028 to 2009 CD 00028 as NO VIOLENCE was

ever found to have occurred and this current label IS “Libelous” in nature. 2. Clear concise resolution with “Actionable Documentation” submitted to me, at my contact

information listed above in regard to the letter dated March 13, 2016 in reference to item (1,b) stated above. (copy of letter enclosed)

3. Dereliction of Fiduciary Duty as outlined in the Job Description of said position and corresponding actions of this collaboration against me personally in the establishment of these “FALSE CHARGES / ALLEGATIONS” and subsequent “FALSE DEBT” against:

a) Gary Rich esq, Elise Burkey esq, Benjamin Joltin esq, Pamela Rintala esq, and Christina M. Burnham – Spaite – Albritton – Hallett

4. RETURN MY CHILDREN, AMBER E. HALLETT AND STEVEN J. HALLETT, TO ME (CHRISTOPHER E. HALLETT) IN OCALA FLORIDA NOW!

5. Full and Complete refunds from the State of Ohio, the persons named in item (3a), and any subsequent damages awarded by the jury convened for these proceedings. Beginning with but not limited to; lost wages incurred over the entire time period starting date February 11, 2009 as this was the date of the original “False Allegations” and “Libelous” filing of case 2009 DV 00028 at the rate of $70,000.00 per year earnings lost during this time period.

Page 2 of 5 Though my license is currently in escrow, I am licensed by the State of Ohio to perform as a “Licensed Fiduciary”. Having successfully completed the required education and passing the state exam (first attempt), I AM more qualified to act in this capacity than ANY lay person. Therefore I hold a credential attorneys do not as outlined in the ORC (Ohio Revised Code). From this point on I shall be referred to as “The Licensed Professional” NOT a lay person in this articulation. Also my interpretations are held to the “Higher Standard of Practice” and adherence to the “Code of Ethical Practice” than a simple attorney/lay person recognized by ALL government entities including the court.

Duties The attorney general has three primary duties:

responsible for legal business of Ohio state government and its departments, boards and agencies and for the collection of debts owed to the state

enforcement authority in consumer protection, charitable solicitation, antitrust actions and organized crime

coordinate with local law enforcement agencies at their request and provide criminal justice support services

In the evidence packet I submitted with complaint dated January 4, 2016. The United States Department of Justice has referred this matter to its “Criminal Division” which only confirms “Evidentiary Cause for Action” by your office. According to your web site information, bullet two refers to Consumer Protections, Antitrust Actions, and Organized Crime as falling under your direct jurisdiction. However:

1. My children are still in Ohio 2. No refund/s processed to me yet (collection proceedings in progress) 3. No Transfer of Jurisdiction to Florida! (Make this happen!)

The actionable requests I have submitted are, in fact, reasonable based on facts already presented and in evidence.

1. Release “MY” documents and complete case file/s to me as requested 2. The Domestic Violence issue persists which IS interfering with my ability to work which further

contributes to the monthly damage increases imposed on me. I have had face to face meetings with the different departments here in Ocala Florida.

1. Child Support enforcement (they’re waiting on the interstate transfer from Ohio) 2. Sheriff Chris Blair (see report in evidence packet) 3. Local FBI Office Ocala (see letter of direction from Madam Loretta Lynch)

Case number in place 2014-4095-DR-FJ, with the appropriate persons named in the appropriate order, and we are still waiting on movement from Ohio.

Page 3 of 5 Known facts already in evidence:

1. I posses the legal definition of “Standing” to pursue this action. 2. Ohio has kidnapped my children during “VISITATION” and called it legal, which is illegal

under the UCCJA/UCCJEA of 1997. 3. The court and lawyers in question have “Disqualified” Ohio from further participation, by way

of, establishment of “Equitable Interest” in the outcome of this case, violations of the codes of “Ethical Practice”, “Fiduciary Duty”, and other violations of law and breaches in Civil Procedure I have already outlined in my original complaint dated January 4, 2016.

4. As a result of this documented illegal activity; a very substantial “FALSE DEBT” against me has been created out of thin air.

These facts have imposed a 7 year and counting obvious “Sentence” on me “WITHOUT CAUSE” forcing multiple occurrences of Extreme Duress and Compensatory Damages due to the interference with my ability to work. This is UNACCEPTABLE and will NOT be allowed to continue. Any action/s taken by the State of Ohio or any officials thereof, other than those I have reasonably requested, will be regarded as a potential threat and retaliatory, action/s which will be referred to my attorney here in Florida. I am not going to be bullied into submission through Malicious Prosecution, Creation of False Debt, or any of this illegal activity. I am a business professional with almost 20 years of experience being the boss, with access to billions of dollars in personnel, fleet resources, and inventory for some of the largest corporations in the world at the touch of a button. So having been in your position; I would be seeing the necessity in filing the conspiracy charges, and/or any other action/s you feel are in order, against the people perpetrating these felonies against me and the Ohio voters and call it a day. This experience also tells me Pam Rintala more than likely knew exactly what was going on in “her house”. Special Project Judges Divorce. (see first docket entry in case 2009 DR 392) I have many documented conversations with attorney Burkey, as well as letters directly to Judge Rintalla personally, in which I tried to inquire as to the nature of this entry and was told “I don’t know” by attorney Burkey, and got no response from the court. A few months later there is a “fund” established for attorney’s fees that did not exist before my many inquiries. If the established “fund” was to accommodate attorney’s fees in the beginning; Why is there further mention of attorney’s fees later in the Docket and proceedings? As a registered voter; I’m left wondering how this “one judge” was able to institute policy, allocate funds, bypass / circumvent voters and the State Senate including any associated budget committees by this single action without cause. Unless other information and action/s is needed or requested (see enclosures of said conversations and letters) I’ll leave this information to you for proper handling. Acknowledgement of requested action:

1. Accounting Statement, though not completely detailed, of payments received and processed through Ohio Department of Job and Family Services post marked to me March 10, 2016.

Page 4 of 5 The following Constitutional Amendments represent the establishment for basis of infringements of my Civil Rights and Liberties guaranteed me as a citizen of the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA under its protections.

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS

Amendment I Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to

assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.

Amendment VII In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the

United States, than according to the rules of the common law.

Amendment IX The enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights shall not be construed to deny

or disparage others retained by the people.

Amendment XIV The 14th Amendment to the Constitution was ratified on July 9, 1868, and granted citizenship to “all

persons born or naturalized in the United States,” which included former slaves recently freed. In addition, it forbids states from denying any person "life, liberty or property, without due

process of law" or to "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”

Page 5 of 5

Previous related cases establishing validity to this claim

The Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Parents have a fundamental

liberty interest under the XIV Amendment to the U.S. Constitution in the care, custody and control of their children. Meyer v. Nebraska 262 U.S. 390, 399, 401 (1923). This fundamental right includes a fundamental constitutionally protected liberty interest in ongoing “companionship and society” with the child, and this includes protection of the relationship between the parent and child even if the child is in state custody.

Supreme Court Ruling [miller vs. U.S. , 230 F. 486,489] the claim and exercise of a

Constitutional Right cannot be converted into a crime.

Supreme Court Ruling [There can be no sanction or penalty imposed upon one because of this exercise of Constitutional Rights. [Sherar v. Cullen, 481 F 945]

The assertion of Federal Rights, when plainly and reasonably made, is not to be

defeated under the name of local practice. [Davis v. Wechsler, 263 US 22, 24.]

Pro se pleadings are to be considered without regard to technicality. Pro se litigants pleadings are not to be held to the same high standards of perfection as lawyers. Jenkins v. McKeithern 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969), Picking v. Pennsylvania R. Co. 151 F.2d 240, and Haines v. Kerner, 92 S. Ct. 747 (1969).

Where proceeding is administrative in nature, non-lawyers are authorized to provide

representation. Sperry v. State of Florida ex re. The Florida Bar, 373 U.S. 379, 83 S. Ct. 1322, 10 L.Ed. 2d 428 (1963).

The Eleventh Amendment does not protect state officials from claims for prospective

relief when it is alleged that state officials acted in violation of federal law. Warnock v. Pecos County, 88 F.3d 341 (5th Cir. 07/08/1996), Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 155-56, 52 L. Ed. 714, 28 S. Ct. 441 (1908); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 664, 39 L. Ed. 2d 662, 94 S. Ct. 1347 (1974); Brennan v. Stewart, 834 F.2d 1248, 1252 (5th Cir. 1988).

Federal Law and Supreme Court Cases apply to State Court Cases. Howlett v. Rose,

496 U.S. 356 (1990).

Supreme Court Ruling [miller vs. U.S. , 230 F. 486,489] the claim and exercise of a Constitutional Right cannot be converted into a crime.”

Supreme Court Ruling [There can be no sanction or penalty imposed upon one

because of this exercise of Constitutional Rights. [Sherar v. Cullen, 481 F 945]

Supreme Court Ruling The assertion of federal rights, when plainly and reasonably made, is not to be defeated under the name of local practice. [Davis v. Wechsler, 263 US 22, 24.]

Provided is the list of people carbon copied of my original complaint and evidence packets to the DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE dated January 4, 2016. DOJ ID NUMBER 3195334 is currently an ongoing investigation through the departments’ Criminal Division. Note: Christina Burnham-Hallett: is subject to the case and will be notified via court order Attorney Burkey: requested in writing no further contact. Notification will take place via court order Judge Pam Rintalla: is subject to this case and will be notified via court order Attorney Gary Rich: is subject to the case and will be notified via court order Attorney Ben Joltin: is subject to the case and will be notified via court order Cc: Sharon Gadson (Trumbull County Child Support), Attorney Debra Smith (Guardian Ad Litem), Captain Bradley Blackburn (Youngstown PD), Vice President Joe Biden, US Attorney General Loretta Lynch, Governor John Kasich (OH), Governor Rick Scott (FL), Attorney General Pam Bondi (FL), US Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (KY), US Senator Bill Nelson (FL)

CHRISTOPHER EDWARD HALLETT

16062 SW 34 CT RD

OCALA, FL, 34473

(352) 470-8460