Political Legitimacy under Epistemic Constraints: Why Public Reasons Matter
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1 Political Legitimacy under Epistemic Constraints: Why Public Reasons Matter Forthcoming in NOMOS issue on Political Legitimacy, 2018 (Melissa Schwartzberg, ed.) Fabienne Peter 1 Department of Philosophy, University of Warwick [email protected] 1 I am most grateful for the detailed and insightful written comments on a previous version of this paper that I have received from Jennifer Rubinstein and Micah Schwartzman. I have also greatly benefitted from the comments of other participants at the Nomos conference at the March 2017 Central APA meeting in Kansas City and from the comments I have received on previous versions of this paper, including at the workshop on Factual Disagreements and Political Legitimacy at the University of Copenhagen, the New Directions in Public Reason conference at the University of Birmingham, the Pavia graduate conference in political philosophy, the workshop on Religion and Public Justification at University College London, the Philosophy, Politics, and Economics conference in honour of Luc Bovens at LSE, and at research seminars at the University of Leiden, the ANU, and the University of Melbourne. I particularly want to thank Ian Carter, Emanuela Ceva, Tony Coady, David Estlund, James Fleming, Gerald Gaus, Dan Halliday, Klemens Kappel, Jack Knight, Cécile Laborde, Christian List, Steve Macedo, Jonathan Quong, Kristen Rundle, Debra Satz, Melissa Schwartzberg, Kai Spiekermann, Steve Wall, Han van Wietmarschen, Jo Wolff, Andrew Valls, Daniel Viehoff, and Alex Voorhoeve, among many others.
Transcript of Political Legitimacy under Epistemic Constraints: Why Public Reasons Matter
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PoliticalLegitimacyunderEpistemicConstraints:WhyPublicReasonsMatter
ForthcominginNOMOSissueonPoliticalLegitimacy,2018(Melissa
Schwartzberg,ed.)
FabiennePeter1
DepartmentofPhilosophy,UniversityofWarwick
1Iammostgratefulforthedetailedandinsightfulwrittencommentsona
previousversionofthispaperthatIhavereceivedfromJenniferRubinsteinand
MicahSchwartzman.Ihavealsogreatlybenefittedfromthecommentsofother
participantsattheNomosconferenceattheMarch2017CentralAPAmeetingin
KansasCityandfromthecommentsIhavereceivedonpreviousversionsofthis
paper,includingattheworkshoponFactualDisagreementsandPolitical
LegitimacyattheUniversityofCopenhagen,theNewDirectionsinPublicReason
conferenceattheUniversityofBirmingham,thePaviagraduateconferencein
politicalphilosophy,theworkshoponReligionandPublicJustificationat
UniversityCollegeLondon,thePhilosophy,Politics,andEconomicsconferencein
honourofLucBovensatLSE,andatresearchseminarsattheUniversityof
Leiden,theANU,andtheUniversityofMelbourne.Iparticularlywanttothank
IanCarter,EmanuelaCeva,TonyCoady,DavidEstlund,JamesFleming,Gerald
Gaus,DanHalliday,KlemensKappel,JackKnight,CécileLaborde,ChristianList,
SteveMacedo,JonathanQuong,KristenRundle,DebraSatz,Melissa
Schwartzberg,KaiSpiekermann,SteveWall,HanvanWietmarschen,JoWolff,
AndrewValls,DanielViehoff,andAlexVoorhoeve,amongmanyothers.
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Abstract
Myaiminthispaperistoprovideanepistemologicalargumentforwhypublic
reasonsmatterforpoliticallegitimacy.Akeyfeatureofthepublicreason
conceptionoflegitimacyisthatpoliticaldecisionsmustbejustifiedtothe
citizens.Criticsofthepublicreasonconception,bycontrast,arguethatpolitical
legitimacydependsonjustificationsimpliciter.Anotherwaytoputthepointis
thatthecriticsofthepublicreasonconceptiontakethejustificationofpolitical
decisionstobebasedonreasonsthatareagreement-independent.Icallsuch
reasonsobjectivereasons.Publicreasonsare,however,agreement-dependent.
Thedebatebetweendefendersandcriticsofapublicreasonconceptionof
politicallegitimacyfocusesonwhetherobjectivereasonsorpublicreasonsare
therightbasisforthejustificationofpoliticaldecisions.Mydefenseofthepublic
reasonconceptionwillgranttoitscriticsthatthereareobjectivereasonsand
allowthatsuchreasonscanaffectthelegitimacyofpoliticaldecisions.ButIwill
show,focusingonepistemicconstraintsonthejustificationofpoliticaldecisions,
thatitdoesnotfollowthatthejustificationofthosedecisionsisnecessarily
agreement-independent.Intheepistemiccircumstancesthataretypicalof
politicallife,publicreasonswillberequiredforthejustificationofpolitical
decisions.
I.Introduction
Politicaldecisionsregulatemanyaspectsofourlives.Forexample,theymight
concernthelegalpermissibilityofabortions,influencetheextentofincomeand
wealthinequalities,ordeterminemembershipininternationalorglobal
institutions.Suchpoliticaldecisionsarelegitimateifeitherthedecisions
themselves,orthepoliticalinstitutionsthroughwhichtheyweremade,are
justified.22Theconceptofpoliticallegitimacyhasbeenunderstoodinmanydifferentways,
ofcourse.InPeter(2010)Igiveanoverview.Tosidesteppossiblecontroversies
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Whatdoesthejustificationofpoliticaldecisions,whetheritissubstantiveor
procedural,demand?Philosophersgenerallyunderstandjustificationintermsof
reasons.Abeliefisjustifiediftherearetherearesufficientordecisivereasons
thatsupportthatbelief.Anactionisjustifiediftherearesufficientordecisive
reasonsthatsupportthataction.Onthisview,whichIwilladopthere,apolitical
decisionisjustifiediftherearesufficientordecisivereasonsinsupportofit.But
whatsortofreasonscanjustifypoliticaldecisions?
Inpoliticallife,weoftendisagreeabouttheanswertothatquestion.Sometimes,
thesedisagreementshavetheiroriginprimarilyindivergentmoralorreligious
beliefs.Wemightdisagree,forexample,abouttheextenttowhichthe
governmentshouldprotectindividuallibertyrelativetoothervaluesandthus
disagreeaboutthelegitimateextentofgovernmentinterferencewithindividual
choices.Otherdisagreementshavetheiroriginsprimarilyindivergentbeliefs
aboutnon-moralfacts.Examplesincludedisagreementsaboutclimatechange
policiesthatderivefromconflictingassessmentsoftheeffectivenessofcarbon
onthisissue,Itakeanecumenicalapproachandunderstandpoliticallegitimacy
inrelationtothejustificationofpoliticaldecisions.Inaddition,Idonot,forthe
mostpart,distinguishbetweensubstantiveandproceduralconceptionsof
politicallegitimacy.Asubstantiveconceptiontargetsthejustificationofpolitical
decisionsdirectly;aproceduralconceptiontargetsthejustificationofdecision-
makinginstitutions.IthusintendtocoverbothwhenIspeakofthejustification
ofpoliticaldecisions.
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taxationordisagreementsaboutthedesirabilityofaminimumwagepolicythat
arebasedinconflictingassessmentsabouttheeffectsofsuchpolicieson
unemployment.Thesedisagreements,too,mightyieldincompatibleassessments
ofwhetheragovernmentpolicyisjustified.
Thisfactofdisagreementaboutthejustificationofpoliticaldecisionsneedstobe
distinguishedfromthenormativequestionofwhatgroundsthejustificationof
politicaldecisions.Itisthisnormativequestion,aquestionaboutthesortof
reasonsthathavethepowertojustifypoliticaldecisions,thatisattheheartof
thedebateonpublicreasonandthatIwanttofocusoninthispaper.
AccordingtodefendersofaPublicReasonConceptionofpoliticallegitimacy,the
reasonsthatcanjustifypoliticaldecisionsarethosethatallcanacceptorthatno
onecanreasonablyreject,undersomesuitablequalificationofwhatcountsasan
agreementorasareasonablerejection.3Onthisconception,atleastsome(but
typicallynotall)ofourdisagreementsarenormativelysignificantinthesense
thattheyhavethepowertounderminethejustificationofpoliticaldecisions.
JohnRawls(1993,1995),forexample,tooksomemoralandreligiousreasonsto
besubjecttonormativelysignificantdisagreementsandarguedthatthose
reasonscannotjustifypoliticaldecisions.Becausethereasonsthatareinthe
justifyingsetarethosethatarenotsubjecttoanormativelysignificant
3Notethatmyfocusinthispaperisonconceptionsoflegitimacy,noton
conceptionsofjustice.Itisnotanaimofthispapertodefendapublicreason
conceptionofjustice.
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disagreement,Iwanttocharacterizethereasonsthatcanjustifypolitical
decisionsonthePublicReasonConceptionasagreement-dependent.
Ontheopposingconceptionofpoliticallegitimacy,whichIcalltheObjective
ReasonConception,thejustificationofpoliticaldecisionsisagreement-
independent.Accordingtodefendersofthisconception,normativepractical
reasonsare,oraregivenby,objectivefacts,andwhetherpoliticaldecisionsare
justifieddependsonhowwelltheyaresupportedbythosereasons(e.g.Raz
1984;Enoch2014;Enoch2015).Itisanimplicationofthisviewthatour
disagreementsarenotnormativelysignificant;disagreementsdonotimpacton
practicaljustificationand,asaresult,donotimpactonthejustificationof
politicaldecisions.
Arelatedwayofunderstandingthecontrastisthis.AccordingtothePublic
ReasonConceptionofpoliticallegitimacy,politicaldecisionsmustbejustifiedto
thecitizens.Disagreementsarenormativelysignificantwhentheyimplyafailure
tojustifyaparticulardecisiontothecitizens.AccordingtotheObjectiveReason
Conception,bycontrast,practicaljustification,ingeneral,isnotjustificationto,
butjustificationsimpliciter.Whetherapoliticaldecisionisjustifieddependson
objectivereasons,notonwhetherthereissomesortofagreement.
MyaiminthispaperistoargueagainsttheObjectiveReasonConceptionof
politicallegitimacyand,inthisway,providesupportfortheclaimthatpublic
reasonsmatterforpoliticallegitimacy.Mystarting-point,however,istogrant
thatthereareobjectivereasonsandtoallowthattheycanaffectthejustification
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ofpoliticaldecisions.Iwillshowthatgrantingthispremisetothedefendersof
theObjectiveReasonConceptiondoesnotentailthatthejustificationofpolitical
decisionsisnecessarilyintermsofthoseobjectivereasons.Agreementcanstill
matter.
ThemainproblemwiththeObjectiveReasonConceptionofpoliticallegitimacy
arisesfromitsstanceondisagreements.Accordingtothisconception,asI
mentioned,disagreementsdonotaffectthejustificationofpoliticaldecisions;
disagreementsarenormativelyneutral.DisagreementssuchastheonesI
describedatthebeginningaretheresultofmistakenbeliefsaboutreason-
relevantfacts–normativeornon-normative–andsuchmistakes,itisthought,
donotunderminethejustificationofpoliticaldecisions.Iwillarguethat
defendersofaPublicReasonConceptionofpoliticallegitimacyarerightto
emphasizethatnotalldisagreementsaremeremistakes;somedisagreements
havenormativeimplications.Whentheydo,politicallegitimacydependson
overcomingthosedisagreements.
Ofcourse,adefenderofaPublicReasonConceptiondoesnotneedtoclaim–and
typicallydoesnotclaimthatalldisagreementsunderminepoliticallegitimacy.
Somedisagreementsarenotnormativelysignificantbecausetheyaretheresult
ofmistakesoranunwillingnesstoconsiderrelevantevidenceorarguments,etc.
Asuccessfuldefenseoftheclaimthatpublicreasonsmatterforpolitical
legitimacyneedstoanswerthequestionofwhichdisagreementsarenormatively
significant.IwillsayalotmorebelowonwhatImeanbynormativelysignificant
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disagreements.Forthetimebeing,letmejustnotethatIproposetoanswerthis
questionnotonthebasisofsomemoralorpoliticalvalues,ashasbeencommon
intheliteratureonpublicreason(e.g.Larmore2008;Quong2011).Instead,I
willstartfromtheepistemologyofpracticalreasoning.Iwillprovideanaccount
ofpracticalreasoningthatiscompatiblewiththeObjectiveReasonConception
andthusrefrainfromloadingthediceagainstthatconceptionfromthestart.I
willthenusethisaccounttoidentifyacategoryofnormativelysignificant
disagreements,however,andshowhowsuchdisagreementsaffectpractical
justification,atleastinthecontextofpoliticallegitimacy.Thiswillallowmeto
pinpointwheretheObjectiveReasonConceptiongoeswrongandtobuildmy
argumentforthesignificanceofpublicreasonsforpoliticallegitimacy.
Thepaperisorganizedasfollows.Iwillstartwithamoreexactportrayalofwhat
isatstakeinthedebatebetweendefendersoftheObjectiveReasonConception
anddefendersofthePublicReasonConception(sectionII).Iwillthenintroduce
myaccountoftheepistemologyofpracticalreasoningandpresentafirst
argumentagainsttheObjectiveReasonConception–theargumentfrom
permissiblepracticalreasoning(III).InsectionIV,Ideveloptheideaof
normativelysignificantdisagreementsandshowhowitfiguresinasecond
argumentagainsttheObjectiveReasonView.InsectionV,Iwillpresentmythird
andfinalargumentagainsttheObjectiveReasonView.Thisargument
demonstratesthatpublicreasonsmatterforpoliticallegitimacy,atleastunder
someepistemiccircumstances.Iwillendthepaperwithabriefdiscussionof
someobjectionsthatonemightraiseagainsttheviewIdefendinthispaper
(sectionVI).
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II.TwoConceptionsofPoliticalLegitimacy
ItistimetocharacterizetheObjectiveReasonConceptionofpoliticallegitimacy
withgreaterprecision.Iunderstanditascommittedtothefollowingtwoclaims.
Thefirstclaimisthis:
OR:Therearenormativepracticalreasonsthatare,oraregivenby,
attitude-independentfacts;theyareobjectivereasons.
ToacceptORistoacceptthatatleastsomenormativepracticalreasonshave
theirsourceofnormativityinattitude-independentfacts.Suchreasonsdonot
derivefrombeliefswehaveaboutwhatisdesirable,forexample,orfromwhat
wehappentodesire.
TherearetwowaysinwhichonecanspelloutOR.Thestrongversionsaysthat
allnormativepracticalreasonsarereasonsgivenbyattitude-independentfacts.
Manyhaveendorsedthisclaim–ithasbecomeaverypopularviewinrecent
metanormativetheory(e.g.Parfit2011;Scanlon2014;amongothers).ORcan
alsobeinterpretedmoreweakly,however.Onthisinterpretation,theclaimis
onlythatsomenormativepracticalreasons(butnotnecessarilyall)areobjective
reasons.IaccepttheweakinterpretationofORanditisanupshotofthe
argumentIpresentinthispaperisthatweshouldrejectthestrong
interpretation,atleastforthepoliticalcontext.4
4Ifoneunderstandsobjectivereasonsasasubsetofallnormativepractical
reasons,oneiscommittedtoahybridviewofpracticalnormativity.Suchviews
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Whilethefirstclaimisaclaimaboutnormativepracticalreasons,thesecond
claimisaclaimabouthowthesereasonsbearonthejustificationofpolitical
decisions.
ORJ:thejustificationofpoliticaldecisionsisnecessarilyintermsof
objectivereasons.
ORJstatesthattheonlyreasonsthatmatterforpoliticallegitimacyarethose
givenbyattitude-independentfacts.5
JosephRazandDavidEnochareamongthephilosopherswhohavemost
prominentlyadvocatedversionsoftheObjectiveReasonConception.TheNormal
JustificationThesisthatisatthecoreoftheconceptionofpoliticallegitimacy
thatRazadvocatesstatesthatthelegitimacyofpoliticaldecisionsdependson
whetherthosedecisionsallowthecitizenstobetterconformtothereasonsthat
applytothemanyway,independentlyofthedecisionsofthepoliticalauthority
arefarlesspopularthanthemonistviews.Chang(2013)defendsahybridview.I
defendahybridviewofthegroundsofpoliticallegitimacyinPeter(2017).
5IfthestrongversionofORweretrue,ORJwoulddirectlyfalloutofthat–ifall
normativepracticalreasonsareobjective,therearenootherreasonsthatcould
playaroleinthejustificationofpoliticaldecisions.ButORJcanbemade
compatiblewiththeweakversionofORaswellandthecombinedclaimisthat
eveniftherearenormativepracticalreasonsthatarenotobjectivereasons,only
objectivereasonscanjustifypoliticaldecisions.Anadditionalargumentwould
benecessarytoshowwhyonlythosereasonscanjustifypoliticaldecisions.
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(Raz1984).Thereasonsinquestionarefact-givenreasons;theyarenotreasons
thatcitizensagreeonorendorse.Enoch,similarly,drawsadistinctionbetween
thefactsthatarereason-givingandpeople’sbeliefsaboutthosefacts.Heargues
thatdefendersofaPublicReasonConceptionarewrongtofocusonpeople’s
perspectives;whatjustifiespoliticaldecisionsisnotwhatpeoplebelieveabout
thosedecisions,butwhetherornotthefactssupportthosedecisions(Enoch
2015:130f).
MymaintargetinthispaperisORJ,theclaimthatpoliticaljustificationis
necessarilyintermsofobjectivereasons.Asmentionedabove,Igrantthatthere
areobjectivereasonsandIaccepttheweakversionofOR.ButIwillarguethat
objectivereasonsarenottheonlyreasonsthatcanjustifypoliticaldecisions.
MyargumentagainstORJhingesontheroleofpracticalreasoninginpolitical
decision-makingandinpoliticaljustification.Practicalreasoningisreasoning
aboutwhatweshoulddoandpoliticaldecision-makingreliesonit.Ourpractical
reasoning,ingeneral,isnotdeterminedbythefacts,however,butbyour
perspectiveonthefacts.Asaresult,whatwehaveobjectivereasontodoand
whatwebelieveweshoulddomightcomeapart.
Thefollowingexampleillustratesthepoint.Supposeyouconsiderofferingyour
friendadrink.Youbelieve–andhaveeveryreasontobelieve–thattheglassin
frontofyoucontainsgin.Youdecidethatyoushouldofferyourfriendthedrink.
Unfortunatelyforyouandyourfriend,theglassdoesnotcontaingin.Itcontains
petrol.Ifallnormativepracticalreasonsaregivenbyattitude-independentfacts,
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asthestrongversionofORclaims,thenyouhavenonormativereasontooffer
yourfriendthedrink.Ifonlyreasonsgivenbyattitude-independentfacts
determinepracticaljustification,thenyouarenotjustifiedinofferingyourfriend
thedrink.Yet,thereseemstobenothingwrongwithyourreasoning.Whenwe
reasonpractically,wenecessarilyreasononthebasisofwhatwebelieveabout
thepracticalcircumstanceswefindourselvesin.
EvendefendersofthestrongversionofORacceptthatthisisafeatureofour
practicalreasoning,ofcourse.Theydealwiththeissueinthefollowingway.In
additiontoobjectivereasons,therearesubjective,orapparent(Parfit2011),
reasons.Subjectivereasonsreflectourperspectiveonthesituation–asgivenby
ourbeliefsand/orourevidence.Andasthegin/petrolexampleshows,whatwe
haveobjectivereasontodoandwhatwehavesubjectivereasontodocancome
apart.
DefendersofthestrongversionofORinterpretsubjectivepracticalreasonsin
relationtoourbeliefsand/orourevidence.6Thosewhorejectthestrongversion
ofOR–eitherinfavorofahybridvieworbecausetheyrejectORaltogether–
6Thisisaveryloosecharacterization,compatiblewithboththeunderstanding
thatasubjectivereasonisabeliefthatonehasanobjectivereasonandwiththe
counterfactualunderstandingthatasubjectivereasonisabeliefthat,iftrue,
wouldbeanobjectivereason.SeeWhiting(2014)onthistopic.
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oftencharacterizesubjectivereasonsinotherways.7Althoughthisisan
importanttopic,Icannotfullydiscussithere.Itisalsosomewhattangentialto
theargumentIdevelopinthispaper,asmyargumentdoesnotdependona
particularcharacterizationofsubjectivereasons.Forthepurposesofthispaper,
Ishalldefinesubjectivepracticalreasonsasreasonsthatareorinvolvebeliefs
abouttherelevantpracticalcircumstances.Thisisafairlyloosecharacterization
thatleavesopenanumberofquestions–whethertherelevantbeliefsneedtobe
justifiedornot;what,ifanything,justifiesthosebeliefs,etc.
Whatinterestsmehereaboveallisthequestionofwhatsortofreasonscan
groundpoliticalgroundpracticaljustificationinthecontextofpolitical
legitimacy–objectivereasonsorsubjectivereasons?Considerthefollowing
examplefromthepoliticalcontext.SupposethereisapolicyAwhichwould
increasethehealthstatusofthepoor,andwhichshouldbeimplementedforthat
reason.AdefenderoftheObjectiveReasonConceptionwouldarguethata
politicaldecisiontoimplementpolicyAisjustifiedonthebasisofthefact-given
reasonthatitincreasesthehealthstatusofthepoor.Butinourpractical
reasoningaboutwhetherornotweshouldimplementpolicyA,wemightform
divergentbeliefsabouttheempiricalfacts–whetherornotpolicyAdoes,infact,
increasethehealthstatusofthepoor–andaboutthenormativefacts–whether
thefactthatapolicyincreasesthehealthstatusofthepoorisareasonto
7Theydefinesubjectivereasonsasdependentonattitudessuchasdesires,for
example,oronproceduralfactorssuchasendorsement.
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implementit.Fromtheperspectiveofoursubjectivereasons,thecasefor
implementingpolicyAmightnotbeclear-cut.
Dosubjectivereasonsplayaroleinthejustificationofpoliticaldecisions?
DefendersofthePublicReasonConceptionofpoliticallegitimacyanswer
positively.Differentinterpretationsofthisviewworkwithdifferent
interpretationsofsubjectivereasons.Whattheyallhaveincommon,however,is
theclaimthatpoliticaldecisionsmustbejustifiedonthebasisofsubjective
reasons–whethertheyaresubstantivereasonsorproceduralreasons.8Inmy
understanding,thePublicReasonConceptionisthuscommittedtothefollowing
claim:
PRJ:Thejustificationofpoliticaldecisionsisnecessarilyintermsofan
agreementgroundedinsubjectivereasons.
Ofcourse,PRJshouldnotbeunderstoodsoastoentailthattherelevant
agreementthatcanjustifyapoliticaldecisionmustincludeanypossiblesetof
subjectivereasons.DefendersofaPublicReasonConceptiontypicallyallowfor
somerestrictionsintheadmissibleset.Someinterprettherelevantrestrictionin
termsofreasonableness,whichisarestrictiononpublicdeliberation(Quong
8Tokeepthepresentationsimple,Iwillmainlyfocusonasubstantive
interpretationofpublicreasons,eventhoughthisisnotactuallythe
interpretationthatIbelieveweshouldadopt(seePeter2013).Iwillcomeback
tothisissueinthelastsectionofthispaper.
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2011).Inthisinterpretation,subjectivereasonsthatdonotmeetthe
reasonablenesstest,howeveritisspecified,donotunderminethejustificationof
politicaldecisions.Onlydisagreementsthatsurvivethereasonablenesstestcan
underminethejustificationofpoliticaldecisions.Othersformulatethe
restrictionintermsofindividualdeliberation.Gaus,forexample,arguesthat
onlygoodreasoninggivesrisetowhatIcallsubjectivereasonshere(Gaus,2011:
246).
NotealsothatmycharacterizationofthePublicReasonConceptiondoesnot
distinguishbetweentheso-calledconsensusaccountsandconvergenceaccounts.
Accordingtoconsensusaccounts,agreement-basedjustificationofpolitical
decisionsisintermsofasinglesharedsetofreasons.Accordingtoconvergence
accounts,itissufficientthatanagreementthatisrelevantforthejustificationof
politicaldecisionsobtainsatthelevelofthedecisionsthemselves,itdoesnot
havetoobtainatthelevelofthereasonsthatjustifyaparticulardecision.Such
anagreementmightthusbesupportedbydiversereasons.Mycharacterization
doesnotdistinguishbetweenthetwoaccountsbecauseitleavesopenwhat
exactlytherelationshipisbetweenagreementandthereasonsthatjustifya
politicaldecision.9
9Foradiscussionofthetwoaccounts,seeVallier(2011).Arelatedwaytoput
thepointisthatmycharacterizationofthePublicReasonConceptionleaves
openwhethertheaggregationofindividualjudgmentsaboutwhichpolitical
decisionisjustifiedshouldbepremise-basedorconclusion-based(Bovensand
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Whateveronemightwanttosayaboutwhichsubjectivereasonsarerelevantfor
thejustificationofpoliticaldecisions,theimportantpointtonoteisthatitiswith
regardtothenormativesignificanceofsubjectivereasonsthatthePublicReason
ConceptionandtheObjectiveReasonConceptioncomeapart.Defendersofthe
ObjectiveReasonConceptionrejectthenormativesignificanceofsubjective
reasons.Theydrawadistinctionbetweenpracticalreasoningandpractical
justificationandmaintainthatevenifpracticalreasoningisintermsof
subjectivereasons,practicaljustificationisstillnecessarilyintermsofobjective
reasons.
Wecanmakeprogressinthisdebateifweexaminetheepistemologyofpractical
reasoning,orsoIwillargueinthispaper.Evenifwegrantthatthereare
objectivereasonsandthattheysometimesmatterforthejustificationofpolitical
decisions,theepistemiccircumstancesthatcharacterizethepoliticaljustification
areoftensuchthatwelackagoodgriponwhattheyare.Andwhenobjective
reasonsareepistemicallyoutofreach,theyarenotavailableforthejustification
ofpoliticaldecisions.Ifthereisanyjustificationforpoliticaldecisionsinthose
circumstances,thisjustificationwilldependonwhatisaccessibleinvalid
practicalreasoningand,therefore,onsubjectivereasons.ORJshouldthusbe
rejectedandbereplacedbyaconceptionofwhatisrequiredforthejustification
Rabinowicz2003;List2006).Accordingtotheconsensusconception,itisthe
former;accordingtotheconvergenceconception,itisthelatter.
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ofpoliticaldecisionsthatrecognizesthatsubjectivereasonsplayanimportant
roleinpoliticaljustification,atleastinsome–epistemic–circumstances.10
III.EpistemicConstraintsonPracticalReasoning
WhatdoImeanbypracticalreasoning?Letmestartwithacommentonthe
contrastwiththeoreticalreasoning.Theoreticalreasoninganswersaquestion
aboutwhatshouldbebelieved.Practicalreasoning,bycontrast,answersa
questionaboutwhatshouldbedone.Butitwouldbewrongtothinkthatthereis
nooverlapbetweentheoreticalandpracticalreasoning.Practicalreasoning
dependsonourbeliefsaboutnon-normativefactsand,ifoneacceptsatleasta
weakversionofOR,asIdo,italsodependsonourbeliefsinrelationto
normativefacts–factsthatareorgiverisetonormativepracticalreasons.
Becauseofthatfact-dependence,wecanaskabouttheepistemicconstraintsthat
applytopracticalreasoning.
Somehaveargued,buildingonTimothyWilliamson’sworkontheknowledge
normforassertion(2000),thattherelevantconstraintisknowledge.The
knowledgenormforassertionisthis:
KA:Itispermissibleforyoutoassertthatpiffyouknowthatp.
Forexample,supposealosttouristasksyouaboutthewaytohishotel.Itis
permissibleforyoutoassert“thehotelisjustdowntheroad”if(andonlyif)you
10AsIwillexplainbelow,IwillnotdefendPRJ,butaweakerprincipleinstead.
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knowthatthehotelisjustdowntheroad,butnotifyoudonotandjustwantto
beseenasfriendly.Williamsonexplainsthat“…assertingthatPwithoutknowing
thatPisdoingsomethingwithouthavingtheauthoritytodoit,likegiving
someoneacommandwithouthavingtheauthoritytodoso”(2000:257).11
Assertionsare,ofcourse,atypeofactionsandsomehavethusgeneralized
Williamson’saccounttoreasonsforactionandtopracticalreasoning.12Applied
topracticalreasoning,ourtopichere,theKnowledgeNormsaysthis:
KPr:Youruseofpasapremiseinpracticalreasoningispermissibleiff
youknowthatp.
Wecanapplytheknowledgenormbothtoordinarypracticalreasoningandto
normativepracticalreasoning.Usingtheexamplefromaboveagainthe
knowledgenormsaysthatyourreasoningthatapolicyAshouldbeimplemented
becauseitincreasesthehealthstatusofthepoorisapermissibleinstanceof
practicalreasoningjustincaseyouknowthatthepolicyincreasesthehealth
11Williamsonoriginallyonlyformulatedthenecessityclaim:itispermissiblefor
youtoassertthatponlyifyouknowthatp.Thetendencyhassincebeentofocus
onthedefenseofthestronger,biconditional,claimKA,whichcombinesthe
necessityclaimwithasufficiencyclaim:knowingthatpissufficientfor
permissiblyassertingthatp.
12SeeBrown(2008);StanleyandHawthorne(2008);Gerken(2011),among
others.
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statusofthepoor(non-normative)andthatitdoessoisareasontoimplement
thepolicy(normative).13
IstheKnowledgeNormaplausiblerestrictiononpracticalreasoning?Thereare
twomainobjectionsthataimtoshowthatitisnot.14Thefirstisthatthereare
manycasesinwhichknowledgeofpdoesnotseemnecessaryforpermissible
practicalreasoninginp-relatedcontexts.Thesecondisthattherearecasesin
whichknowledgedoesnotappeartobesufficient.AlthoughIfindboth
objectionsconvincingandrelevanttothetopicunderdiscussion,Iwillonlybe
abletofocusonthenecessityobjectionhere.Inthefinalsectionofthispaper,I
willbrieflytouchonthesufficiencyobjectionaswell,however.
Thegin/petrolcaseImentionedearliercanservetoillustratethenecessity
objection.Supposeyouarejustifiedtobelievethattheglasscontainsgin,not
petrol–alltheotherglassesonthetablecontaingin,youhavehadadrink
yourselfearlierfromthistable,youhaveseenawaiterfilltheglasseswitha
bottleofgininhishand,etc.Itseemspermissibleforyouinthiscasetousethe
premise“thisisgin”whendeliberatingaboutwhethertoofferyourfriendthe
drink.Asithappens,theglasscontainspetrol,afactyoudonotknow.Sothe
knowledgenormisviolated,buttheredoesnotseemtobeanythingwrongwith
yourpracticalreasoning.Wewillalsoacceptyourexcusethatyoudidnotknow
13Inwhatfollows,Iwillusethefeasibilityexamplemorethannormative
examples,asitissimpler.
14Seee.g.Lackey(2007)andBrown(2008).
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thisfactyouwhenitturnsoutthatyouractionmadeyourfriendveryill.This
exampleseemstoshowthatitcanbeappropriatetoinvokepinyourp-
dependentpracticalreasoningandchoice,evenifpisfalse.Knowledge,whichI
amassumingisfactive,isthusnotnecessary.
Therightresponsetothenecessityobjectionistoweakentheknowledgenorm
andreplaceknowledgebyjustifiedbelief.15TheJustificationNormfor
permissiblepracticalreasoningsaysthis:
JPr:Youruseofpasapremiseinpracticalreasoningispermissibleiffyou
arejustifiedtobelievethatp.
Inthegin/petrolcase,JPrsaysthatifyouarejustifiedtobelievethattheglass
containsgin,thenyouruseofthatpremiseinpracticalreasoningaboutwhether
toofferyourfriendthedrinkispermissible;knowledgeisnotrequired.Inthe
politicalcase,JPrsaysthatifyouarejustifiedtobelievethatapolicyisfeasible,
forexample,thenyouruseofthatpremiseinpracticalreasoningaboutwhich
policyoptionstoconsiderispermissible;knowledgeisnotrequired.
IfthiscorrectandweshouldreplaceKPrbyJPr,wecanusethistoformulatea
firstargumentagainsttheObjectiveReasonConceptionofpoliticallegitimacy.
Theargumentgoeslikethis.TheObjectiveReasonConceptionisonlyplausibleif
practicalreasoningisplausiblyrestrictedbyKPr,atleastinthenormative
context.Thisissobecauseofthefacticityofknowledge.Toseethis,assumep
referstoafactthatgivesrisetoanobjectivereason.Onlyifyouknowthatpdo
15SeealsoLackey(2007)andWedgwood(2008).
20
objectivereason(givenbyp)andsubjectivereason–thereasonthatdetermines
yourpracticalreasoning,givenbyyourbeliefthatp–necessarilycoincide.But
wesawthatKprisnotplausibleandthatwethuscannotassumethatobjective
reasonsandsubjectivereasonsnecessarilycoincide.Themoreplausiblenorm,
JPr,impliesthatknowledgeisnotnecessaryforpermissiblepracticalreasoning.
Thismeansthattheremightbeagapbetweenwhatyoupermissiblyreasonyou
shoulddoandwhatyoushoulddointheobjectivereasonsense.
Ah,youmightsay,butthisargumentisflawed.JPronlyshowsthatpermissible
practicalreasoningdependsonsubjectivereasons,notthatpracticaljustification
does.ButtheObjectiveReasonConceptionisonlyconcernedwithpractical
justification,notwithpermissiblepracticalreasoning.Thewholepointofthe
gin/petrolcaseistoshowthatImightbepermissiblyreasoningthatthisisgin
and,onthatbasis,decidetoofferthedrinktomyfriend.ButtosaythatIam
reasoningpermissiblyisonlytosaythatwhatIamdoingisrational,thatIcanbe
excusedformyaction,andsoon.ItisnottosaythatIamjustifiedindoingsoin
thefull-bloodedsense–thatIhaveanormativereasontodoso.Evenifwe
acceptthatpracticalreasoningisnecessarilyintermsofsubjectivereasons,we
donothavetoacceptthatsubjectivereasonscarryanyindependentnormativity.
Andyouarerightofcourse;theargumentIhavepresentedisflawedinthisway.
AsuccessfulargumentagainsttheObjectiveReasonConceptionneedstoshow
thatsubjectivereasonsnotonlydeterminepermissiblepracticalreasoning,but
thattheycanhavenormativeimportintheirownrightandthatORJisthusfalse.
MynextargumentagainstORJisanargumentfromdisagreement.
21
IV.NormativelySignificantDisagreements
Characterizedquitegenerally,disagreementsinvolveattitudesthatarenotonly
incompatiblebutthatcannotbejointlyheld(Dreier2009).Disagreements
betweendoxasticattitudesareacaseinpoint.Ifyouexpressabeliefthatp(e.g.
thepolicyisfeasible)andIexpressabeliefthatnot-p(thepolicyisnotfeasible),
wehaveadisagreementasthetwoattitudescannotbejointlyheld:thepolicyis
eitherfeasibleoritisnot.
Buttherearealsonon-doxasticdisagreements.Aninterestingcaseis
disagreementabouttaste.Canwehavedisagreementsabouttaste?Sayyou
maintain“haggisistasty”andImaintain“haggisisnottasty”.Clearly,thetwo
attitudesareincompatible.Buttheredoesnotseemtobeanythingparticularly
problematicaboutthat.Itcertainlydoesnotfollowthatoneofushasmadea
mistake.Sowhilethetwoattitudesareincompatible,itappearsthattheycanbe
jointlyheld–bydifferentindividuals,atleast.Ifthatistherelevanttest,wedo
nothaveadisagreement.Butifweapplyamoredemandingtestandspecifythat
therelevantattitudesthatconstituteadisagreementareattitudesthatone
individualcouldnotjointlyhold,thenwehaveadisagreementabouttaste.16
16Conflictingperceptionsofcolorgiverisetoarelatedexample,takenfroma
recentinternethype.Individually,wecannotbothholdthataparticulardress
lookswhite/goldandthatitlooksblue/black.Butdifferentindividualsmight
wellseecolordifferently.Onthemoredemandingtest,iftwoindividualsseethe
22
Thetopicofthispaperispracticaldisagreements–disagreementsaboutwhat
weshoulddo.Practicaldisagreementscanresultfromattitudessuchasdesires,
intentionstoact,beliefsrelatingtopracticalreasonsetc.Iftherelevantattitudes
aredesires,thepracticaldisagreementmightlooklikeadisagreementabout
tastes–ifthereisadisagreementatall,itisfaultlessandtypically
unproblematic.Butthereclearlyareconstellationsofpracticalattitudesthat
constituteadisagreement.Considerthefollowingattitudes.Youhold“weshould
dox”;Iholdthat“weshoulddonot-x”.Ourincompatibleattitudesmaystillbe
faultless,i.e.notinvolveamistakeoneithersidebutsimplyarisefromdifferent
desires.Butitisaclearcaseofapracticaldisagreementasourincompatible
attitudestowardswhatweshouldtodocannotbejointlyrealizedandhence
jointlyheldbyus.
Giventhatwecanhavepracticaldisagreements,thereisafurtherdistinction
thatisrelevantformypurposeshere,thedistinctionbetweenfact-dependent
andfact-independentdisagreements.Inadoxasticdisagreement,the
disagreementisaboutwhichpropositionismadetruebythefacts:isthepolicy
feasibleornot?Suchadisagreementisobviouslyafact-dependentdisagreement.
Inadisagreementabouttaste,ifitoccursatall,thereisprobablynofactofthe
matter.Ifthereisnot,thenitisnotafact-dependentdisagreement.Practical
disagreementscanbeofeitherkind.Iwillfocushereonfact-dependentpractical
dressashavingadifferentcolor,theyhaveadisagreementaboutcolor.Onthe
lessdemandingtest,theydonothaveadisagreement.
23
disagreementsandtherelevantfactsmightbeeithernon-normativeor
normative.17Tousemypoliticalexampleagain,youandImightdisagreeabout
whetherornotpolicyAincreasesthehealthstatusofthepoorand/orabout
whetherornotthefactthatAincreasesthehealthstatusofthepoorjustifies
implementingA.
Returningnowtopracticalreasoning,acceptingJPrhasthefollowing
implication:permissiblepracticalreasoningmayresultinfact-dependent
disagreements.ThisisanimportantdifferencebetweenKPrandJPr.If
knowledgesetstheconstraintforpermissiblepracticalreasoning,thenwe
cannothavedisagreementsthatarecompatiblewithpermissiblepractical
17Onemightobjectatthisstagethatthismoveimpliesthatmyargumentonly
worksforthoseinterpretationsofthePublicReasonConceptionthat
accommodatefact-dependentnormativedisagreements.IunderstandGaus’
interpretationofthePublicReasonConceptionthatheputsforwardinTheOrder
ofPublicReason,forexample,tobeintermsofdisagreementsthatarenotfact-
dependent.AccordingtoGaus(2011),anormativeorderisjustifiedifitis
supportedbyeveryone’spreferences,suitablyunderstood,forrulesofsocial
morality.ButthosewhodefendaversionofthePublicReasonConceptionofthis
kindcouldacceptahypotheticalversionoftheargumentthatIintendtopresent:
ORJisfalseevenifoneacceptstheweakversionofOR.Thishypotheticalversion
leavesopenwhetheroneshouldacceptORorwhetheroneshouldconstrue
normativepracticalreasonsinthepoliticalcontextondifferentpremises
altogether.
24
reasoning.Ifwefindourselvesinadisagreementaboutp,atleastoneofuswill
havereasonedimpermissibly.ButifJPristhecorrectnormforpermissible
practicalreasoning,thenitispossiblethatoneofuspermissiblyconcludesthatp
andtheotherpermissiblyconcludesthatnot-p.18Supposewebothagreethat
policyAismoredesirablethanpolicyB.But,tousemynon-normativeexample
again,supposethatwhileyoujustifiablybelievethatAisfeasible,Ijustifiably
believethatitisnotfeasible.Wethenfindourselvesinadisagreementabout
whethertochooseAorBthatresultsfromourpermissiblereasoning.
Iwanttoclaimthatfact-dependentpracticaldisagreementsthatresultfrom
permissiblereasoningarenormativelysignificant,atleastinthecontextthatis
thefocusofmypaperhere–thejustificationofpoliticaldecisions.Theyare
normativelysignificantinthesensethattheyhaveimplicationsforpractical
justification.Toseetheplausibilityofthis,considerthecontrastbetweena
disagreementthatresultsfromimpermissiblereasoningandonethatresults
frompermissiblereasoning.IfIhavesimplynotbotheredtotakeintoaccount
evidenceforthefeasibilityofAalthoughitwouldhavebeeneasyformetoso,for
example,thenourdisagreementisofadifferentkindthanifmyreasoningin
favorofBispermissible.IfIamtoblame,epistemicallyspeaking,formyfalse
beliefthatAisnotfeasible,thenitdoesnotfollowfromourdisagreementthat
choosingAisnotjustified.ChoosingAmightstillbejustified,evenifIbelieve
18Thisholdsatleastaslongasepistemicjustificationisnon-factive;see
Littlejohn(2012)foranopposingview.
25
thatweshouldchooseB.Butifneitherofusisreasoningimpermissibly,the
situationisdifferent.
Practicaldisagreementsthatresultfrompermissiblereasoningcanaffect
justificationinthefollowingway.IfyoujustifiablybelievepandIjustifiably
believenot-p,ap-dependentpolicychoiceiseithernotjustifiedtomeoritisnot
justifiedtoyou.Inthepolicyexample,ifyoupermissiblyreasonthatAisfeasible
andthatweoughtthustodoAandIpermissiblythatAisnotfeasibleandthat
wethusoughttochooseB,choosingAisnotjustifiedtomeandchoosingBisnot
justifiedtoyou.Thesamelineofthoughtcanalsobedevelopedfor
disagreementsthatinvolvenormativebeliefs.
WecanusethispointtoformulateasecondargumentagainsttheObjective
ReasonConceptionofpoliticallegitimacy–theargumentfromnormatively
significantdisagreements.RecallthatORJsaysthatthejustificationofpolitical
decisionsnecessarilydependsonobjectivereasons.Thisimpliesthat
disagreementsaboutnormativepracticalreasonsarenormativelyinsignificant.
ButIhavejustshownthatdisagreementsaboutwhichobjectivereasonsapply
thatresultfromourpermissiblepracticalreasoningcanunderminepractical
justification,includingthejustificationofpoliticaldecisions.Suchdisagreements
arethusnormativelysignificantandsubjectivereasonsmayaffectwhatcounts
asajustifieddecision.Therefore,ORJisfalse.
Ah,youmightsaynow,butthisargumentisflawedtoo.ToshowthatORJisfalse,
Iwouldhavetoshowthatobjectivereasonsarenotnecessaryforthe
26
justificationofpoliticaldecisions.ButIhavenotyetshownthat.Ihaveonly
shownthattheremightbeagapbetweenjustificationsimpliciterand
justificationto–justificationintermsofobjectivereasonsandjustificationin
termsofsubjectivereasons.
Andyouarerightagain.MybeliefthatAisnotfeasiblemightbemistaken,
whereasyoucorrectlyholdthatAisfeasible.ChoosingAmightthenstillbe
justified,evenifitisnotjustifiedtome.ThatisallthatORJclaims.Ihavethusnot
yetshownthatORJisfalse,letalonethatweshouldadoptsomeversionofthe
PublicReasonConceptionofpoliticallegitimacy.
WhilemoreworkisneededtoshowthatORJisfalse,thesecondargument
establishessomething.Itcannotestablishthatobjectivereasonsarenot
necessaryforthejustificationofpoliticaldecisions,butitdoesshowthatthe
justificationofpoliticaldecisionsmaybeepistemicallyunderdeterminedwhen
permissiblepracticalreasoningleadstodisagreementsaboutwhichpolicy
shouldbechosenandneithersidecanjustifiablyclaimtheepistemichigh-
ground.Ifnobodyknows–inafactivesense–thereason-relevantfacts,thenORJ
doesnothaveagriponthejustificationproblem.Permissiblepracticalreasoning
mayleadtoagapbetweenobjectiveandsubjectivereasonsandthisgapimplies
thatpracticaljustificationintermsofobjectivereasonsisepistemically
underdetermined.Thisdoesnotyetshowthatagreementatthelevelof
subjectivereasonsisrequiredforthejustificationofpoliticaldecisions,asthe
PublicReasonConceptionclaims,butitdoesshowthatdisagreementsthatresult
frompermissiblepracticalreasoningcanunderminetheapplicabilityofORJ.
27
V.PoliticalLegitimacyandDisagreements
ToshowthatORJisfalse,Ihavetoshowthatobjectivereasonsarenotnecessary
forthejustificationofpoliticaldecisions,atleastinsomecontexts.Iwilldosoby
showingthatthereareepistemiccircumstancesinwhichthejustificationof
politicaldecisionsrequiresanagreementinvolvingsubjectivereasons.Iwillnot,
however,argueforthePublicReasonConceptionofpoliticallegitimacyasitis
normallyunderstood.
RecallthatIcharacterizedthisconceptioninthefollowingway:
PRJ:Thejustificationofpoliticaldecisionsisnecessarilyintermsofan
agreementgroundedinsubjectivereasons.
WhatIwilldefendinthissectionisaweakerversionofthisconception.The
weakerconceptiondoesnotclaimthatpoliticallegitimacyalwaysrequiresan
agreementinvolvingsubjectivereasons.Itonlyclaimsthatanagreement
involvingsubjectivereasonsissometimesnecessaryforpoliticallegitimacy,the
ideabeingthatisnecessarywhenthejustificationofpoliticaldecisionsinterms
ofobjectivereasonsfailsbecauseofepistemiclimitations.Specifically,whatIwill
defendisthefollowingclaim:
PRJ*:Insomeepistemiccontexts,thejustificationofpoliticaldecisionsis
necessarilyintermsofanagreementgroundedinsubjectivereasons.
28
ToshowthatORJ,theclaimthatpoliticaljustificationisnecessarilyintermsof
objectivereasons,isfalseandthatPRJ*iscorrect,Ineedtomakeastrongercase
thanIhavesofarforthenormativesignificanceofagreement-basedjustification
ofpoliticaldecisions.Asastart,consideragainthenon-normativeexamplethatI
havealreadyusedafewtimes.Youjustifiablybelievep–thatpolicyAisfeasible
–andpermissiblysupportpolicyAonthatbasis.Ijustifiablybelievenot-pand
permissiblysupportpolicyBonthatbasis.SupposethatpistrueandAisthe
correctchoice.Forthetimebeing,assumethatyoudonotknowthat,however.19
WhataretheimplicationsofthiscaseforthepoliticallegitimacyofchoosingA?
First,notethatfindingourselvesinsuchadisagreementdoesnotimplythat
choosingAcannotbejustifiedtome.HowcanIpermissiblyreasonthatchoosing
Aisjustified?Afterall,Ijustsaidthatthedisagreementwefindourselvesinis
normativelysignificantinthesensethatitresultsfromthepermissible
reasoningofeachofus.True.Butthatwasourseparatereasoning.After
establishingthedisagreement,wemightturntocollectivedeliberationtotryand
resolveit.Iseetwomainwaysthismighthappen(theremightbeothers).20First,
19Youmightobjectthatifyouhaveajustifiedbeliefthatpandpistrue,youhave
knowledge.ButjustthinkofGettier-styleexamples.Pmightbetrueeventhough
thereasonsforwhichyouhappentobelievephavenothingtodowiththefacts
thatmakeptrue,soyoudonotknowp.
20Arelatedquestion,onethatIcannotaddresshere,iswhetherwemighthave
reasonstoadjustourbeliefsinresponsetothefactofdisagreement.Aversionof
29
youmighttestifythatpandthismightgivemeepistemicreasontoadjustmy
beliefthatpinresponsetoyourtestimony.Suchreasonscouldincludethatyou
haveareputationformakingreliablejudgmentsintheparea,thatyouareina
moreprivilegedepistemicpositionwithregardtopthanIam,orthatthe
methodsthatyouusedtoformyourbeliefthatparegenerallytrustworthy,etc.
IfIhavesuchepistemicreasonstoacceptyourtestimony,thenIcannot
justifiablyholdontomyoriginalbelief.Imighthavesufficientreasontocome
aroundandformabeliefthatp.
Alternatively,choosingAmaybecomejustifiedtomeifyoucanexplaintome
whyp.Forexample,youmightbeabletoshowmeevidencethatdemonstrates
conclusivelythatp.Again,iftheforceofepistemicreasonsisonyourside,you
maybeabletochangemypermissiblereasoning,inwhichcaseIcannot
justifiablysticktomyoriginalbeliefthatnot-p.
WhileitisthuspossiblethatA–thecorrectchoice,Ihaveassumed–canbe
justifiedtome,itmightnotbepossibletodoso.Theproblemarisesbecause
justifiablybelieving–orevenknowing–thatpneitherentailsbeingagood
testifiernorthatoneisabletoexplainwhyp.Whetheroneisagoodtestifier
dependsonarangeoffactorsthatareonlyindirectly,ornotall,relatedtop.And
“whyp”isadifferentpropositionthan“p”.Sononeofyourreasonsforbelieving
thisquestionisthefocusoftheliteratureontheepistemologyofdisagreement.I
havediscussedtheimplicationsoftheepistemologyofdisagreementforpolitical
legitimacyelsewhere,inPeter(2013and2016).
30
thatp(orevenknowingthatp)maybereasonsthatyoucouldmobiliseto
explaintome“whyp”.
Ifneitherconditionismet,thenIhavenowayofformingajustifiedbeliefthatp
andhencetoconcludethatweshouldchooseA.Soourdisagreementthatresults
frompermissiblereasoningpersistsand,Iwanttoclaim,remainsnormatively
significant.Ihaveassumedthatweareinasymmetricalepistemicsituation–we
havebothreasonedpermissiblyandalthoughyourbeliefthatAisfeasible
happenstobecorrectandmybeliefthatAisnotfeasibleisnotcorrect,youdo
notknowthatandyouhavenotbeenabletogivemegoodepistemicreasonsfor
believingotherwise.Giventhatwebothlackaccesstotherelevantfacts,thereis
noepistemicbasisforprivilegingyourbeliefanddismissingmineandthusfor
insistingthatchoosingAisjustified.Underthosecircumstances,thefactthatAis
notjustifiedtomeunderminesthepoliticallegitimacyofchoosingA.
Brieflyconsiderwhathappensifwemodifytheexampleandassumethatyoudo
notonlyhaveajustifiedbeliefthatp,butyouknowthatp.IntheexampleIhave
beenusing,supposeyouknowthatAisfeasible.Isthatsufficientforthe
legitimacyofapoliticaldecisioninfavorofA?AlthoughIcannotfullyargueit
here,Iaminclinedtosaythat,atleastinapoliticalcontext,knowledgewithout
anabilitytotestifyortoexplainisnotsufficientforpracticaljustification.
Thispointisbasedonthesufficiencyobjectiontotheknowledgenormof
practicalreasoningthatImentionedearlier.Thisobjectionsaysthatsometimes
evenknowledge-leveljustificationisnotsufficientforpermissiblepractical
31
reasoning(e.g.Brown2008).Theobjectioncanbeillustratedwiththefollowing
example.Supposeasurgeonhasbeeninformedbyherextremelycompetentand
reliableteamthatthetumorsheisabouttoremoveisintheleftkidney.Onthe
basisofthistestimonybyherteam,thesurgeonknowsthatthetumorisinthe
leftkidney.Butwewouldprobablyconsiderherirresponsible–engagingin
impermissiblepracticalreasoning–ifshedidnotdouble-checktheevidence
herselfbeforeoperating.
Similarcircumstancesregularlyobtaininthepoliticalcontextandwhatcreates
theextrapressureonjustificationistheinter-personalconstellation.Consider
thehealthexampleagainandsupposethatyouknow,notonlythatpolicyAwill
increasethehealthstatusofthepoor,butalsothatthisempiricalfactfavors
implementingthepolicy.SupposethatIjustifiablybelievethatitwillnot
increasethehealthstatusofthepoororthat,whileitdoes,thisisnotareasonto
implementit(becauseofcountervailingreasons,forexamplethatthepolicyis
tooexpensive).Iwanttoclaim,deployingthesufficiencyobjection,thatformeto
berequiredtodefertoyourclaimthatweshouldimplementA,itisnotenough
thatyouknowwhatyoudoaboutA.Additionalconditionshavetobemet,
minimallyconditionsrelatingtoyourabilitytotestifyortoexplaintomethatthe
policyhastheempiricaland/ornormativepropertiesthatyouclaim.
Thissketchofanargumentwillnotconvincethehard-nosedobjectivistabout
normativereasons.Hewilldenythesufficiencyobjectionandinsistthat
knowledgeoftheobjectivereasonsthatapplyissufficientforpractical
32
justification,includingthejustificationofpoliticaldecisions.Sothisisalooseend
Icannotargumentativelytieuphere.
LetmebracketthisissueandcontinuewiththeassumptionImadeabove,that
justificationintermsofobjectivereasonsisnotepistemicallyaccessibletoeither
ofus:neitherofushasknowledge-leveljustificationforthebeliefsthatdriveour
practicaldisagreement.Thisassumptionechoestheepistemicskepticismthat
Rawlsexpressedinhisessayon“TheIndependenceofMoralTheory”(1974).I
agreewithRawlsthatourknowledgeofnormativefactsisnotasrobustasour
knowledgeofnon-normativefacts.Withscience,wehaveafairlyreliable,though
ofcoursenotinfallible,routetofactualknowledge.Inthecontextofnormative
claims,welackasimilarlyreliablemethodology.Especiallyifoneendorsessome
versionofnon-naturalism,therethusremainsanepistemologicalchallenge(e.g.
Mackie1977):howdowegainknowledgeofnormativefacts?Theproposalsthat
defendersofORhaveofferedforhowtodealwiththeepistemologicalchallenge
remaincontroversial.21Inaddition,inpolicy-evaluationsthatusuallydependon
acomplexmixofnormativeandnon-normativeassessments,knowledgealso
veryquicklycomesunderpressure.Ithusdonotthinkthatatheoryofpractical
justificationthatissuitableforthepoliticalcontextcanbeplausiblyrestrictedto
instanceswhereweknowalltherelevantfacts,normativeandnon-normative.
21Aprominentsuggestioninthisregardisthattheepistemologicalchallengecan
bemetviaareflectiveequilibriumapproach.Ibelievethatthisstrategyfailsfor
reasonssimilartothosearticulatedbyKellyandMcGrath(2010).
33
MythirdandfinalargumentagainsttheObjectiveReasonConceptionofpolitical
legitimacyisthusthis.Ifjustificationintermsofobjectivereasonsisnot
epistemicallyaccessible,thenwhatwecanjustifytoeachotherisallthe
justificationwecanget.Underthoseepistemiccircumstances,ifthereistobe
anyjustificationforpoliticaldecisions,ithastobejustificationinthesenseof
justificationto,notofjustificationsimpliciter.Disagreementsthatresultfrom
permissiblepracticalreasoningcanunderminepoliticallegitimacy.Viceversa,a
politicaldecisionisonlylegitimate,inthoseepistemiccircumstances,ifthe
decisioncanbejustifiedtoeachofus.Inthosecircumstances,agreement-based
justificationhastotheplaceofjustificationintermsofobjectivereasons.
Letmeillustratethepointoncegainintermsofmyexampleofadisagreement
aboutnon-normativefacts.ForAtobethelegitimatechoiceunderthe
circumstancesIhaveassumed,choosingAmustbejustifiabletome.Ifour
normativelysignificantdisagreementpersistsandAcannotbejustifiedtome,
thenchoosingAisnotlegitimate.Viceversa,ifchoosingBcannotbejustifiedto
you,thenchoosingBisnotlegitimateunderthecircumstancesIhaveassumed.
Theonlypolicychoicesthatarelegitimateunderthosecircumstancesarethose
thatcanbejustifiedtobothofus,i.e.thosethataresupportedbyanagreement
groundedinsubjectivereasons.
Granted,thechoiceswemakeinthisfashionmaynotbejustifiedintermsof
objectivereasons,weretheyaccessible.Butthereisnootherrouteto
justificationthanvia(someaccountof)subjectivereasons.Underthose
epistemiccircumstances,ORJisthusfalseandPRJ*iscorrect.
34
VI.Objections
LetmeendthispaperbybrieflyconsideringsomeobjectionstotheargumentI
havepresented.
Afirstobjectionispolitical.Onemightobjectthataconceptionofpolitical
legitimacythatrequiresagreementistoodemanding.Suchaconditionof
politicallegitimacywillidentifymostpolicy-choicesasillegitimate,asindeedit
didinmyexampleofachoicebetweenpolicyAandB.Inreply,Iwanttosay
somethingabouthowIunderstandtheneedtoreachagreementthrough
permissiblepracticalreasoning.Myexamplesthroughouthavehighlightedthe
substantivelevel–whichpolicyshouldwechoose?Ididthistokeepthings
simple.Idonotmeantoimplythatpoliticallegitimacyalwaysrequires
agreementatthesubstantivelevel.Isharetheworryarticulatedintheobjection
thatthiswouldresultinanoverlyminimalsetofjustifiedpolicies.The
agreementrequiredbyPRJ*,bytheweakversionofthePublicReason
ConceptionthatIendorse,maybeattheprocedurallevel.Anagreementatthe
procedurallevelisanagreementabouthowweshouldmakedecisionsabout
controversialpolicychoices.Inmanydemocraticsocieties,forexample,theview
thatdemocraticprocedureshelpresolvecontroversialpolicyissuesisstillvery
widelyheld.NothinginwhatIhavesaidaboveprecludesdevelopingthePublic
ReasonConceptionofpoliticallegitimacyinsuchaproceduraldirection.My
argumentcanthussupporttheclaimthatinthefaceofnormativelysignificant
35
disagreementsaboutpolicyissues,politicallegitimacyrequiresademocratic
decision.22
ThesecondobjectionIwanttoconsiderisconceptual.Onemightobjectthatthe
epistemologyofpracticalreasoningisthewrongstarting-pointforadefenseofa
PublicReasonConceptionbecausethejustificationofpoliticaldecisions–
whethersubstantiveorprocedural–isapracticalproblem,notatheoretical
problem.Theproblemiswhatwehavereasontodo,notwhatwehavereasonto
believe.Inreply,note,first,thatthemainfocusoftheepistemologyofpractical
reasoningisnotonwhatoneshouldbelieve.Instead,itisonwhatappropriate
practicalreasoningrequires.Andthethoughtisthatappropriatepractical
reasoningcannotignorethequestionofwhatoneshouldbelieveabout
alternativecoursesofaction.
Thereare,ofcourse,practicalcontextswherewhatoneshouldbelieveislargely
irrelevant.Forexample,whenyouaredeliberatingaboutwhichicecreamflavor
tobuy,whatyoushouldbelieveaboutthoseflavorsisprobablynotvery
important.Whatmattersiswhichflavoryoulikebest.Iamhappytograntthat
evensomepoliticaldecisionsmaybeofthiskind.Butmostofourpolitical
decisions,andmanyofourprivatedecisions,arenotofthiskind,orsoIwantto
claim.Whenyouaredeliberatingaboutwhichcharitytogiveto,whatyoushould
believeaboutthosecharitiesisrelevant.Yourdeliberationiscriticizableifyou
22InPeter(2009)Idefendaproceduralinterpretationofpublicreasonandin
Peter(2013)Iprovideanegativeepistemicargumentfordemocracy.
36
relyonbeliefsyoushouldnothold.Likewise,yourargumentthatweshouldnot
choosepolicyAbecauseAisnotfeasibleisnotdefensibleifyoushouldbelieve
thatAisfeasible.And,finally,yourargumentthatweshouldnotchoosepolicyA
becausethehealthstatusofthepoorisnotapoliticalconcernisnotdefensibleif
youshouldbelievethatthehealthstatusofthepoorisapoliticalconcern.
Athirdobjectiongrantsthattheepistemologyofpracticalreasoningisrelevant
forthejustificationofpoliticaldecisions,buthighlightsthatphilosophersarejust
aslikelytodisagreeaboutthecorrectepistemologicaltheoryastheyareabout
thecorrectmoralorpoliticaldefenseofaPublicReasonConceptionofpolitical
legitimacy.Myapproachthusdoesnotofferprogress.Myargumentisindeed
vulnerabletothisobjectionbecauseIhavemadecontroversialclaimsaboutthe
epistemologyofpracticalreasoning.Ihaveclaimed,forexample,thatthe
appropriatenormforpracticalreasoningisjustifiedbelief,notknowledge.Ifthis
premiseisfalse,myargumentisunsound.
Inreplytothisobjection,letmeemphasizethatmyaiminthispaperhasbeen
somewhatnarrowerthantheobjectionassumes.Myaimhasbeentoshowthat
evenifoneacceptsthatthereareobjectivereasonsandthattheymatterforthe
justificationofpoliticallegitimacy,itdoesnotfollowthattheyaretheonly
reasonsthatmatter.Itdoesnotfollowbecausepoliticaljustificationoftenfaces
significantepistemicconstraintsandtheseconstraintscanimplythatno
justificationintermsofobjectivereasonsisavailable.Theonlyjustificationthat
isavailableinthosecircumstancesisajustificationbasedonpublicreasons.
Someepistemologiesofpracticalreasoning–stronglyexternalistones–will
37
indeedbeincompatiblewiththislineofargument.Butitisatleastconceivable
thatepistemologiesotherthantheoneIhaveadoptedinthispaperwillsupport
anargumentroughlyalongthoselines.Andthatwillbesufficientformymain
claimtogothrough.Inaddition,exploringtheepistemologicalassumptions
supportingdifferentconceptionsofpoliticallegitimacyis,Ibelieve,illuminating
initsownright.
AfinalobjectiontotheviewthatIhavedevelopedinthispaperconcernsits
implicationsfortheObjectiveReasonConception.AdefenderofanObjective
ReasonConceptioncangrantmyargumentbutmaintainthataweakerversionof
ORJcanstillbeupheld.Ihavearguedthatweshouldrejectthefollowingclaim:
ORJ:thejustificationofpoliticaldecisionsisnecessarilyintermsof
objectivereasons.
TheobjectionstatesthatonecouldweakenORJinanalogytohowIhave
weakenedthePublicReasonConception.TheweakerversionofORJ,callitORJ*,
statesthis:
ORJ*:Insomeepistemiccontexts,thejustificationofpoliticaldecisionsis
necessarilyintermsofobjectivereasons.
IagreethatmyargumentiscompatiblewithORJ*.Whatismore,Iwouldwantto
endorseORJ*.Ifwehavesufficientlyrobustknowledgeofwhatpoliticaldecision
isobjectivelycorrect,Iagreethatpoliticallegitimacyisunderminedifthewrong
38
decisionismade.Toseetheplausibilityofthis,supposeapoliticalregimemakes
decisionsthatareobviouslymorallyimpermissible.Forexample,supposea
regimeissueslawsthatviolateessentialhumanrightsofsomeminorities
withoutanyredeemingjustification.Suchdecisionsdo,Iwanttomaintain,lack
legitimacybecausetheydisregardmoralknowledgethatissufficientlyrobust.
WhileIacceptORJ*,itisimportanttorecognizethelimitationsofbuildinga
conceptionofpoliticallegitimacyonORJ*.Myargumentinthispaperis
motivatedbythequestionofwhatlegitimacyrequireswhenwelacksufficiently
robustknowledgeofwhatthecorrectpoliticaldecisionis.Ibelievethistobethe
normalcaseinpolitics.IhavenodisagreementwithadefenderofanObjective
ReasonConceptionwhoacceptsthatiftheepistemiccircumstanceslimitreliance
onobjectivereasons,politicallegitimacywillrequirethatpoliticaldecisionsare
justifiedintermsofpublicreasons.Mydisagreementisprimarilywiththose
defendersofanObjectiveReasonConceptionwhosubscribetoORJ(thestrong
version)andwhothusclaimthatpublicreasonsareirrelevantforthe
justificationofpoliticaldecisions.AndIalsowanttopressupononalldefenders
ofanObjectiveReasonConceptionthatthequestionofwhatlegitimacyrequires
whenepistemiccircumstanceslimitrelianceonobjectivereasonsisinneedofan
answer.
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