Legitimacy in International Society

The Versailles Settlement: The Making of an Illegitimate Order?

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LegitimacyinInternationalSocietyIanClark

Printpublicationdate:2007PrintISBN-13:9780199219193PublishedtoOxfordScholarshipOnline:January2008DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199219193.001.0001

TheVersaillesSettlement:TheMakingofanIllegitimateOrder?

IanClark(ContributorWebpage)

DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199219193.003.0007

AbstractandKeywords

ThischapterdiscussestheVersaillesSettlementafterWorldWarI.TheVersaillesistaintedwithinauguratingorderconsideredtobeillegitimate.Itstressedtheconditionsofrightfulmembershipofinternationalsociety,butinsuchawaythatthisdomestictestundermineditssimultaneousattempttointegratethevanquishedstatesintothenewsystem.Asfarasitstreatmentoftheinternationaldimensionsoflegitimacywasconcerned,Versaillesfacedproblemsinfindinganyeffectiveconsensus,arounditstreatmentofGermanyspecifically,andintheproceduralaspectsofthetreatynegotiationsmoregenerally.Thesefeaturescompoundedtheunderlyingproblemsthatalreadyawaitedthepeacemakers.Thewarhadbeenofsuchmagnitude—affectingsomanylivesdirectly,creatingbothdomesticandinternationaldivisions,andengenderinginsatiableexpectationsofthepeace—thatthepeacemakerswereallbutimpotenttodealsensiblywithitsconsequences.Thiswasnotasettlementinwhichthepeacemakerscarelesslylettheopportunityforconsensus–buildingslipthroughtheirfingers:thebasic


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problemofVersailleswasthatnosuchconsensuscouldpossiblybefound.

Keywords:treaties,legitimacy,internationalsettlements,internationalrelations,consensus,WorldWarI

PresentingthetextoftheVersaillesTreatytotheGermanplenipotentiarieson7May1919,FrenchPrimeMinister,Clemenceau,madethefollowingemotional,andhighlyrevealing,remarks.‘IamcompelledtoaddthatthisSecondPeaceofVersailles…hasbeentoodearlyboughtbythepeoplesrepresentedhere’,herecalled,‘forusnottobeunanimouslyresolvedtosecurebyeverymeansinourpowerallthelegitimatesatisfactionswhichareourdue’(Hankey1963:153).TheFrenchleaderencapsulatedinthesewordstheburdensthatweigheduponthepeace:theheavysacrificesofthewar;thepopulardimensionsofthenewnationalistwarfare,andtheexpectationstowhichtheyhadled;thearduoussearchforagreementaboutthecontentsofthepeace;andthestrongsenseonthepartofthevictorsthatwhatwasbeingaskedofGermanywastheveryleastthatwasacceptable.Fewtreatieshavebeensovoluminouslydiscussed,andwithsuchpassion,bysubsequentgenerationsofhistorians.Strikingly,thethemeoflegitimacyiscentraltotheirdebates.

IfViennaenjoysiconicstatusastheframerofalegitimateorder,itisVersaillesaboveallthatistaintedwithinauguratinganorderconsideredtobehighlyunstable,becauseillegitimate.Itsfailuresarethoughttobemultiple.Morethananytreatysofar,itstressedtheconditionsofrightfulmembershipofinternationalsociety,butinsuchawaythatthisdomestictestundermineditssimultaneousattempttointegratethevanquishedstatesintothenewsystem.Asfarasitstreatmentoftheinternationaldimensionsoflegitimacywasconcerned,Versaillesfacedproblemsinfindinganyeffectiveconsensus,arounditstreatmentofGermanyspecifically,andintheproceduralaspectsofthetreatynegotiationsmoregenerally.Thesefeaturescompoundedtheunderlyingproblemsthatalreadyawaitedthepeacemakers,astheClemenceauquotemakesclear.Thewarhadbeenofsuchmagnitude—affectingsomanylivesdirectly,creatingbothdomesticandinternationaldivisions,andengenderinginsatiableexpectationsofthepeace—thatthepeacemakerswereallbutimpotenttodealsensiblywithitsconsequences.Thiswasnotasettlementinwhichthepeacemakerscarelesslylettheopportunityforconsensus‐buildingslipthroughtheir(p.110) fingers:thebasicproblemofVersailleswasthatnosuchconsensuscouldpossiblybefound.Wemustdistinguish,however,betweenaconsensusaroundprinciplesoflegitimacy,andtheseparatesearchtosecurelegitimationforwhatwastobedoneintheirname.

THESETTLEMENTANDITSCONTEXTSomedoubtthatVersaillesdeservestobecalledasettlementatall.Solittlediditdotoresolvetheinternationalproblemsoftheperiod,itmightbetterbeconsideredameretruceinanongoingtwentyorthirtyyears'war(Bell1986).Itslegacy‘wasneitherpeacenorsettlement’(Jacobson1998:451).Thiswasnotaconsequencesimplyofitsfailuretodealwithexistinginternationaldisputesandbalancesofpower.Morefundamentally,whatwasleftunresolvedwasthelegitimacyofdominantdomesticconstitutionalforms,anditwasaroundthisissuethattheepochalwarofthetwentiethcenturywastorageuntil1990.


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ThemostcommonverdictuponVersaillesisthatthesettlementwasthevictimoftheincompatiblevictors'objectives,andhenceofthenecessarycompromisestowhichnegotiationswereboundtolead.Differentattitudestowardsthewarfromitsoutsetwerecarriedoverintothepreparationsforthepeace.Indicatively,theUnitedStateshadbeenatsomepainstodistanceitselffromotherAlliedwaraims(andsecretagreements)bybecomingabelligerentasan‘associate’only,notasan‘ally’(Schulzinger1994:82).SincethewarwasamorelimitedonefortheUnitedStates,Americanentryintothewarheraldedtheprospectofamoremoderatepeacethananythatcouldhavebeenagreedbythepreviouslyexistingcoalitionofpowers(Stevenson1998:137–8).

Thisdiversityofopinionhadsomehowtobereconciledwiththesimultaneousaspiration,ifnotuniversallyshared,foramore‘integrated’conceptionofinternationalsociety.UndertheVersaillesproposals,particularlywiththeinceptionoftheLeague,the‘societyofstateswastoremainassuch’,Armstrongcontends.However,‘thelimitedassociationoftheWestphalianconceptionwastoevolvetowardsmuchclosercommunity,sharingvalues,standards,practices,andinstitutionsaswellasinterests’(Armstrong1993:161).Innosmallmeasure,suchaconceptionarosefromUSPresidentWoodrowWilson'sownbeliefthatinternationalsocietyhadnotyetbeenfullyrealized,asitstilllackedaneffectivelegalbasis.Itwasthetaskofthepeacemakerstointroducethisruleoflaw,andtocreatetherebyaneffectiveinternationalsociety,inplaceofthedeficientapparatusthathadsofarexisted.Inparticular,theincorporationofcertainkeyvalueswasnecessary,inWilson'smind,‘becausetheywerejust,notbecausetherewasaconsensusontheiracceptability’(Osiander1994:266).Inthisrespect,Wilsonappealedtoputativeabstractandabsolutevaluesthatstoodapartfromconsensualstatepractice.Hedidso,nonetheless,infullexpectationthatsucha‘processofconsensualempowerment’,ifendorsed,(p.111) wouldinturnresultintheacceptanceofhiskeyprinciplesintostatepractice,andpermittheencouragementofnewformsofstateconduct.

Versaillesoffersthatrareopportunityforbringingthetheoreticaldiscussionoflegitimacy,anditspracticalapplicationinthesphereofpolitics,intodirectcorrespondencewitheachother.ThisopportunityiscreatedinthepersonofnoneotherthanWeberwho,aswehaveseen,representsakeyperspectiveontheimportanceoflegitimacy.WeberwasapersonalparticipantintheGermanpeacedelegation,aroleonlyrecentlyrecovered(Mommsen1998:539).Tellingly,Weberfoundhimselfrangedonthatwingofthedelegationthateventuallyarguedforrejectionofthepeacetermsofferedbythevictorpowers,ashefeltthattoomanyintolerableconcessionshadbeenmade(Mommsen1998:540–1).Aboveall,Weber's‘perception’ofthematterisdoublyinterestingforthisdiscussion,exactlybecauseheviewedthesituationintermsofthecriticallinkagebetweenthe‘legitimacy’oftheinternationalconditionsofthepeace,andtheimpactthiswouldhaveuponthedomesticlegitimacyofthenewWeimarregime.Inhisestimation,‘acceptanceofthetreatywouldhavedevastatingeffectsonthedomesticsituationandwouldseverelyburdenthenewdemocraticorder’(Mommsen1998:546).Sincethefosteringofsuchanorder,bothinGermanyandelsewhere,wasanimportantcomponentoftheWilsonianproject,weareledtoconfrontthisdualfaceoflegitimacyinourassessmentofthispeace.TheUnitedStatesandBritainsawtheprocessofthegradual


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accommodationofGermany(intowhatwouldthenbecomeanincreasinglylegitimateinternationalorder)tobeconditionalonGermandomesticchange,whereasWeber'sanxietywasthatthetreaty'sinternationaltermswouldthemselvesprecludetheachievementofsuchinternalchange.TheinterplaybetweentheinternationalanddomesticfacetsoflegitimacyisthuscentraltothedilemmafacedatVersailles,andtellsusmuchaboutthenatureofitsfailure.

TheParisconference—fromwhichfinallyemergedtheVersaillesTreatywithGermany,andthefourotherindividualpeacetreaties—wasunquestionablythelargestandmostcomplexsuchgatheringinhumanhistory.ItsagendawasmuchmorethanapurelyEuropeanone.IttookplaceafterasuspensionofhostilitieshadalreadybeenagreedbytheArmisticeof11November1918.Therewereprecedentsforsuchsuspensionbeforeapeaceconferencewassummoned,butequallytherehadbeenpreviouspeacenegotiationsenteredintowhilethefightingwasstillongoing(Marston1944:13).

InadditiontoitsincorporationoftheCovenantoftheLeague,Versaillesprovidedfortheterritorial,military,economic,andcolonialsettlements.GermanylosttheprovincesofAlsaceandLorraineand,overall,some13percentofitspre‐1914territory.Restrictionswereimposeduponitsarmy(anupperlimitof100,000,andthesetobeprofessional,notconscript),aswellasonitsnavy.Someeconomicissuesweredealtwithbymeansoftemporaryexpedients—suchasadministrationoftheSaar—butmostcontentiouslywasthisdonebythefutureeffortsoftheReparationsCommissiontowhichtheproblemofdeterminingasumforreparationswaspassed.Finally,Germanywas(p.112) strippedofitsformerextra‐Europeancolonies,tobehandedoverasmandatestotheadministrativeoversightoftheLeagueMandatesCommission,butindailypracticetotheholdersofthisnewcolonialresponsibility(Sharp1991).

Beneaththeseformalprovisionsofthetreatyistherichveinofsupportingprincipleonwhichitwaspurportedlytobebased,andherethehistorianofinternationallegitimacyisfacedwithasubstantiallylargerarchiveofsourcematerialthanistypicallyavailable.ItisthisWilsonianrhetoric,sharedornotinvaryingdegreesbyotherparticipants,thatsetsthetonefortheanalysisoflegitimacyinthisparticularsettlement.

AtthecentreofWilson'svisionwastobefound‘theprincipleofpublicright’(Holsti1991:177).Ifsuchcouldbearticulated,theninternationalsocietywouldbegroundedonasharedvaluesystemthatwoulditselfmakepossibleadialogueaboutlegitimacy.Inconjunctionwiththis,theveryconceptofinternationalsocietywasnowbroadenedouttoprovidetherequisiteunderpinningforthenewnormativearchitectureitwastobear.Itwastobeunderstoodasaninternationalsocietyofpeoples,notsimplyofstates.Thefutureorderwastobebasednotjustontheactsofgovernments,butupon‘thewill,thegoodwill—ofthepeople’,ofwhomgovernmentsweresimplytheservants(Baker1923:vol.1,103).Itwasthepeoplewhowouldhavetobesatisfiedwiththepeacearrangementsmadeontheirbehalf,andonlyintheirsatisfactioncouldthedurabilityoftheorderbeguaranteed.Itfollowedequallythatinternationalsocietymustgenuinelyrepresentthewishesofthepeople,andthisdemandedtheadoptionofdemocraticinstitutions,bothdomesticallyandinternationally.Consentlayattheheartofthewhole


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enterprise(Baker1923:vol.1,11;Keylor1998:475).TheLeaguenotonlydependedforitsefficacyuponaworldwidedemocraticrevolution,butwouldservealsotobringoneabout(Ikenberry2001:127).Democraticvalueswere,after1919,tobecometheequivalentof‘thecoinoftherealm’(Mayall2000:64).

Thereremainedonefinaldesideratum.Forpublicopiniontobeeffectiveasadeterrent,peoplemusthavefullinformationabouttheinternationaldeedsoftheirgovernments.Thismanifesteditselfinthedemandforopenagainstsecretdiplomacy.Onlythuscouldthemoralforceofmankindbebroughttobear.Theactualnegotiationofthepeacesettlementwastoprovidethefirsttestofthisnewaccountability.Sadlyforitssupporters,Wilsonandhiscolleaguesdisplayedalarmingtendenciestowardsrecidivismwhenfacedwithharddecisions.Thechoicebetweentheoldandthenewdiplomacywasmadeinfavouroftheformer,accordingtothethenUSSecretaryofState,RobertLansing,and‘secrecywasadopted’instead(Lansing1921:241).Inthisview,theconferencewastaintedfromitsoutsetbythe‘extraordinarysecrecyandarrogationofpowerbytheCouncilofFour’,which‘excitedastonishmentandcomplaint’(Lansing1921:218).Thiswasbadenough,butdoublysowhencompoundedbythehighstandardsithadpubliclysetforitself,andtheburdenofexpectationtowhichthesehadgivenrise.ThiswasthebackgroundtothepracticeoflegitimacyatVersailles.

(p.113) THEHISTORICALVERDICTSHistoricaljudgementsuponVersailleshavetendedtoconcentrateexplicitlyonthenotionoflegitimacy.Thisisscarcelysurprising,sincePresidentWilsonpersonallydidsomuchtoplacethisstampuponthetreaty,therebytomarkitshistoricaldeparturefrom—ashesawit—theunfortunateprecedentsofthepast.Thesehadbeenpreoccupiedwithspoils,andwiththebalanceofpower.Asaresult,theyhaddispensedvictors'justice,whichhadservedonlytoperpetuatethedeformationsoftheinternationalpoliticalsystem.Theopportunitypresenteditselfnow,incontrast,forreconstitutingtheinternationalorderuponarealprincipleofjustice.‘AnevidentprinciplerunsthroughthewholeprogrammeIhaveoutlined’,heenunciatedinhisFourteenPoints.‘Itistheprincipleofjusticetoallpeoples’(Baker1923:vol.3,45).TheimportationintotheinterstatediscourseoflegitimacyofthisnormativeprincipleofjusticewasthehallmarkofWilson'smodusoperandi(Lentin1985:5;Holsti1991:185).Wilsonself‐consciouslyproceededonthebasisofthedomesticanalogy,andhisself‐assignedtaskwasnoneotherthantheobliterationofanydistinctionbetweentherealsocietyofindividualswithinthestateandtherudimentarysocietythatwastheinternational.Aninternationalsocietycouldbetrulyformedonlybyestablishingwithinittheruleoflaw,rootedinasharedconceptofjustice.Hispoliticalquest,asstatedinhisMountVernonaddressof4July1918,wasthereforetoreplicatebythe‘consentofallnations’whatwereessentially‘thesameprinciplesofhonorandofrespectforthecommonlawofcivilizedsocietythatgoverntheindividualcitizenofallmodernstatesintheirrelationswithoneanother’(Baker1923:vol.3,46).Thisishowheconceivedofthecreationof‘astableandlegitimatepostwarorder’(Ikenberry2001:160).Itis,ofcourse,thegreatparadoxoftheVersaillessettlementthatapeacesopainstakinglybasedonexplicitprinciplesoflegitimacyshouldhaveresultedinanordersopoorlylegitimatedasapoliticalcondition.Seldomisthererecognizedtobe


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suchawidegulfbetweenaspirationandactualattainment.Butwhatexactlywasthenatureofthisfailure?

ItmaybehelpfulatthispointtoreturntotheconceptintroducedinthecontextoftheViennasettlementof1815:thenotionofajustequilibrium.WasthekeydefectofVersaillesitsviolationofitsowndeclaredprincipleofjustice,orwasitinsteaditsadherencetojusticetotheconsequentneglectoftheactualbalanceofpower?Orwasitinsteaditsfailuretocombinethesetwoelementsinsomeeffectiveway?ThisissueispromptedbyKissinger'sownanalysisofthepeace:itsshortcomings,hefeltsure,were‘structural’.TheViennaorderhadbeensostablebecauseitwassupportedbythreepillars:‘apeaceofconciliationwithFrance,abalanceofpower;andasharedsenseoflegitimacy’(Kissinger1995:242).Versaillesregrettably‘fulfillednoneoftheseconditions’(1995:242).Othershaveexplainedthemattersomewhatdifferently.Osiander,forexample,islessconcernedwiththefailuretorestoreabalanceofpower.(p.114) Theproblemlayelsewhereintheinabilitytogenerateaneffectiveinternationalconsensus(Osiander1994:329).Butwhatwasthereasonforthis?Wasit,asKissingerthought,thelackofasharedsenseoflegitimacythatmadethereachingofaconsensusimpossible,or—asOsianderwouldhaveit—thefailuretoestablishconsensusthatrenderedagreedprinciplesoflegitimacyunattainable?

Holstiputsyetanotherglossonit,andframeshisexplanationintermsofWilson'sabandonmentofakeyfeatureofhisownnotionofproceduraljustice:

Bylate1918he[Wilson]hadalsoabandonedoneofhiscriticalmoralmaxims:peacemustbebasedonjustice.Inpractice,thismeantthatthepeacewouldhavetobenegotiatedbetweenallthebelligerents;itmustbeapeacebetweenequals…Theprocedurewascommonlyrecognizedasafundamentalrequirementforestablishinglegitimacytoapeacesettlementandforassimilatingthedefeatedpower(s)intothepostwarorder.(Holsti1991:197–8)

Inthisversion,theillegitimacyoftheorderwasafunction,notsomuchofthesubstantiveharshnessofthepeacealone,butoftheproceduresfollowedinitsmaking,andparticularlyofGermany'sexclusionfromthatprocess.

Finally,thereisthewidelyheldjudgementthatVersailleswasthevictimoftoomanycompromises.ThethemeofcompromiseisprominentinallaccountsofVersailles.Thisderived,inturn,fromincompatiblewaraimsattheoutset,andfromthe‘complicationofcoalitionwarfare’(Boemeke,Feldman,andGlaser1998:16).Thereweretwotypesofcompromisethatweretoprovedamagingtothesustainabilityofthetreaty.Thefirstwasthecompromisebetweenprincipleandexecution.Inpractice,thosegreatWilsonianprinciplesintendedtosubverttraditionalEuropeanstatecraftwerefoundtohaveadaptedpartsofthattraditiontotheirnewpurpose(Soutou2001:306–7).AccordingtoLloydGeorge,theBritishPrimeMinister,Wilsonhadtolearnsomeprettyhardlessons,aboveallthat‘thechronictroublesofEuropecouldnotbesettledbyhangingrounditsneckthephylacteriesofabstractjustice’(George1938:238).Secondly,thereweretobecompromisesbetweenthevariousclashingprinciplesthemselves—how,forexample,the


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newappealstoself‐determinationweretobereconciledwiththeotherbuttressesoforder.Thegreatbetrayal,forsome,wastobefoundintheelevationofjusticeasthesupremeprincipletowhichthesecuringofpoliticalequilibriumwastobesacrificed(Osiander1994:329).Thesecompromises,asSoutoupowerfullysuggests,lentthetreatysystemadynamicquality,andanunusualdegreeof‘suppleness’,inthelongerterm(Soutou2001:312).Thismaywellhavebeenso.Butpossiblythisveryflexibilitywasitsownundoing;itcouldbendinsomanydirectionsthatthepractitionersthemselvesbecamedisorientedbytheintricacyoftheirownartifice.Forallthesereasons,thepracticeoflegitimacyatVersaillesprovedanespeciallycomplexandonerousundertaking.Itwasnotthatitwaswantingforprinciples,butthepoliticsoflegitimationofthesettlementprovedexceptionallyrecalcitrant.

(p.115) LEGITIMACYATVERSAILLES

RightfulMembership

TheVersaillessettlementtookyetastagefurthertheideaofinternationalsociety'sresponsibilityforitsowncomposition,andthetutelagethatwasanecessaryadjunctofthatrole.Theactofadmissionintointernationalsocietywasnottobeunderstoodasunconditional:stateshadtoconformtocertainnormstoaccomplishthisriteofpassage.Thismuchwasscarcelynew,andhadbecomemorefirmlyentrenchedinthelastthirdofthenineteenthcentury,aftertheCongressofBerlinof1878,especiallywithregardtotreatmentofethnicminorities(Soutou2001:308–9).Minoritieshadalreadybeenaccorded,bytheseinternationalinstruments,certainbasicreligiousfreedomsasamatterofdomesticconstitutionalpracticeofthestatesconcerned.However,in1919,thecomminglingofthiswiththenewWilsonianrhetoricraisedtheconsciousnessaboutissuesofmembershiptoevenhigherlevels.Itwasalsomoreexplicitinrelatingthisissue,notsimplytodomesticstability,buttointernationalpeaceaswell.ThusKrasnerobservesthatthe1919arrangementswere‘explicitlydesignedtoalterthedomesticpoliticalarrangementsofthenewstates’,giventheWilsonianthinkingabout‘therelationshipamongtherightsofminorities,nationalself‐determination,democracy,andinternationalpeace’(Krasner2001:39).

ThisgreaterpreoccupationwithrightfulmembershiphadimplicationsforGermany,andgenerallyfor‘theassimilationofthedefeatedpower(s)intotheinternationalsociety’(Holsti1991:199).In1815,themattercouldbeconstruedsimplyasthereadmissionofFranceintothediplomaticconcertofthepowers.Mattersweremuchmorecomplexin1919,andthiswasparticularlysowithregardtothenatureoftheinternationalsocietyintowhichGermanynowsoughtre‐entry.Itwasnolongertobeconsideredsimplyaclubofgreatpowers.Itwas,inWilsonianterms,tobeasocietyofpeoplewhoboreresponsibilityforthegoodbehaviouroftheirrespectivegovernments.Admissiontothissocietysetahigherthreshold,andthiswastheobstaclethatGermanynowconfronted.ItwascaughtalsointhepincermovementbetweenthealternativemeansforsecuringfutureGermancompliance.Forsomeobservers,Germanywouldbesubjecttothenewinternationalnormsandinstitutionsunderconstructionin1919,andwouldbeexternallyconstrainedinthisway.Forothers,theessentialconstraintwouldbeinternal,andresult


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fromdomestictransformationswithinGermany.Unhappily,theseconsiderationsoperatedintandeminwaystoprescribeaperiodofprobationforGermany,untilsuchtimethattheexternalconstraintsweresufficientlydevelopedandrobust,oruntilsuchtimethattheevidencesofinternalpoliticalchangehadbecomecompelling.Germanywasnottobepermanentlycastadriftfrominternationalsociety,butwasrequiredtowaitpatientlyonthewingsuntilitscredentialscouldagainbeaccepted.Theexternalconstraintscouldbemodified(p.116) when‘theGermanshadbeendisciplinedanddemocratized’,andsooncemore‘becomeapartofthesystem’(Martel1998:615).Thismadeperfectsense,aslongastheexternalconstraintsdidnotthemselvesvitiatethedemocratictransformationsawaitedinside.

ItisnotpossiblefullytoappreciatetheVersaillesarchitecturewithoutaclearfocusonthiscardinalprincipleofdemocracyasaproperconcernofinternationalsociety.ThisunderpinnedalltheaspirationsfortheLeague,butleftitsimprintalsoontheapplicationoftheprincipleof‘self‐determination’.ItwastobethekeyrationaleforthetreatmentofGermany.Intheseways,itpervadesthesettlementasawhole.NorwasthisattitudeconfinednarrowlytotheWilsoniancamp.Itwasappealedtoequallybytheotherpeacemakers,whenevertheyhadgoodreasontodoso.Wecannote,forinstance,theinsistenceonthisrequirementintheofficialFrenchblueprintfortheLeagueofNations.‘[N]onationscanbeadmittedtotheLeague’,itstipulated,‘otherthanthosewhichareconstitutedasStatesandprovidedwithrepresentativeinstitutionssuchaswillpermittheirbeingthemselvesconsideredresponsiblefortheactsoftheirownGovernments’(Baker1923:vol.3,153).Despitethelogicofcollectivesecuritypointingtowardsuniversalinclusiveness,itisapparentthattheinsistenceupondemocraticinstitutionswasdeployedinsteadasaprincipleofinternationalexclusion.The‘processofconsensualempowerment’wasthuscomingtobefocusedexplicitlyuponthisdefinitionofrightfulmembership,exactlyattheverymomentwhentheconstitutionalstrugglebetweendifferentstateformsandideologies(liberaldemocratic,communist,andfascist)wasmovingtowardsitsbloodyclimax(Bobbitt2002:608).

Democracy,inturn,wasboththelogicalprecondition,andthenecessaryvindication,oftheprincipleofself‐determination—thatothermomentouslegitimatingprinciplethatplayedsuchapowerfuldiscursiverolewithintheframeworkofthesettlement.HenryKissinger(1977:145),typically,hasdescribednationalself‐determinationas‘thelegitimizingprincipleofthenewinternationalorder’after1919.Itbecameinternationalsociety's‘newmasterprinciple’(Osiander1994:255),andoperatedassuchinthespecificsensethatitprovided‘theacceptedcriterionformembershipofthesystem’,therebyleavingalastingimpressiononthefuturedevelopmentofinternationalsociety(Osiander1994:318).Andyetthisprinciplecamelatetotheprominencethatitwaseventuallytoenjoy.Significantly,itwasnotlistedamongstWilson'sFourteenPoints,makingitsappearancethreedayslater(Keylor1998:475).Moreover,itcouldneverbemorethanageneralguide,ratherthanasetofspecificprescriptions.Consequently,fewotherprinciplesweretorevealsuchagapbetweenitsapparentuniversalism—evenifWilsondidnotconsideritinthisway—anditslimiteddeliveryontheground.


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Itsinherentproblemwasthat,onceenunciated,itsoundedlikeanabsoluteprinciple.Inpractice,itwasdifficulttoimplementconsistently,becauseitthreatenedotherpriorities.Wilson'ssecretaryofstateLansingwashighlysuspiciousoftheprinciple.‘Itisanevilthing’,hedeclaimed,‘topermitthe(p.117) principleof“self‐determination”tocontinuetohavetheapparentsanctionofthenationswhenithasbeeninfactthoroughlydiscredited’(Lansing1921:104).Thiswasonthegroundsthatitwaseitherintractableinitself,orpronetobepushedasidebymorepowerfulconsiderations.Wilson,itissaid,gaveupontheprinciple‘whenevercompetingprinciplesorinterestsclaimedahigherpriority’(Keylor1998:493).Itwasalsosoonabundantlyclearthatself‐determinationforsomewouldcreatenationalminoritiesofothers,andtherewasnointentonWilson'sparttopursueself‐determinationtoanykindoflogicalconclusion.Instead,theresultingproblemofminoritieshadtobedealtwithasamatterofcivilrights(Preece1998:71).NoryetwasitanypartofWilson'sprogrammetoapplytheprincipleoutsideofthenewstatesinsouth‐eastEurope:thiswasnodoctrinefordismantlingthegreatEuropeanempiresthatbestrodetheremainderoftheglobe.

Allsuchcriticismscanreadilybemade.Self‐determination,forallthat,wasregularlyappealedtoasalegitimatingprincipletothwartthespoilsofwar.Italyisagoodexample,withreferencetoitslogofterritorialdemandsagainsttheformerAustro‐Hungarianempire.Thesewereadvancedonanumberofdistinctgrounds:thesanctityoftreaties,andwhathadbeenpromisedbytheAlliesintheLondonTreaty;Italy'sneedsforrationalborders,onbotheconomicandsecuritygrounds;accesstoseaportstoservicethehinterland;andthefuturestabilityoftheItaliangovernment,claimedtodependonsatisfactionofthesedemands.Suchpressurescamestarklyupagainstarivalsetofvalues:theWilsonianinsistenceonthenew,asopposedtotheold,diplomacyandthediscreditintowhichsecrettreatieslikeLondonhadfallen;theprincipleofself‐determinationwhichItalianexpansionwouldviolateonethnicandlinguisticgrounds;andaboveallthenotionthatforself‐determinationtohaveany‘normativepull’,itwouldhavetobeappliedconsistentlyasbetweenvictorsandvanquished.Itcouldhavenomoralforceifdeparturesfromitwereseentobemotivatedsimplybythewishtopunishthedefeatedstatesortorewardthevictors(Osiander1994:289).

Thisthenencapsulatedthetitanicclashbetweenrivalsetsofnormativeprinciples,withimmenseconsequencesforthefuture.InWilson'smind,theissuewasveryclear,asheexplainedwhenapplyingpressureonItalytoabandonitsclaimtotheportofFiume.TheArmisticewithGermanyhadalreadyexpressedthebasicprinciplesofthepeace,andonthesethesettlementwithGermanywasinprocessofformulation.TherecouldnotthenbeapeacewithAustriathatwasfoundedonadifferentsetofprinciples.Inshort,theremustbeconsistencynotonlywithinaspecifictreaty,butacrossthetreatysystemasawhole.‘WecannotaskthegreatbulkofpowerstoproposeandeffectpeacewithAustria’,Wilsondeclaredinapublicstatementof23April1919,‘…onprinciplesofanotherkind’(Baker1923:vol.3,287–8).ThisreflectedtheadvicealreadytenderedtohimbyanumberofUSexperts,concernedastheywereabouttheglaringcontradictionthatwouldemergeiftheLeagueweretobeseenas‘acoalitiontomaintainanunjustsettlement’.(p.118) Thiswouldunderminetheintegrityofthenewworldorder,and


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saddletheLeague‘withtheacceptanceofthedoctrinesofTalleyrandandMetternich’(Baker1923:vol.3,279).TheappealtoItalyissuedbyBritain'serstwhilePrimeMinisterandcurrentForeignSecretary,A.J.Balfour,wasanevenmoresubtleblend.Fiume,tobesure,wasnotapartoftheLondonTreaty,butforhimthatwasnotthecentralissueinanycase:

ItisforItaly,andnotfortheothersignatoriesofthePactofLondon,tosaywhethershewillgainmoreinpower,wealthandhonourbystrictlyadheringtothatpartofthePactofLondonwhichisinherfavour,thanbyacceptingmodificationsinitwhichwouldbringitintocloserharmonywiththeprincipleswhicharegoverningtheterritorialdecisionsoftheAlliesinotherpartsofEurope.(Memorandum,24April1919;Baker1923:vol.3,285)

Thisappealwentbeyondthematteroflegality,andrestedbothontheconsistencyofthetreatyframeworkasawhole,andthebenefitsthatwouldaccruetoall,includingItaly,fromaconsensualstanceupontheirapplication.WhatItalywasbeingaskedtodowastoconformtothecodecontainedintheArmisticedocument,asthiswasalsothebasisofexpectationamongstthedefeated.TheinvitationtoItalywastobringitsfutureborderswithintheboundsofthisconsensus.Itwasinsuchapoliticalconditionthatlegitimacywouldbefound,notinadherencetolegalnicetiesalone.

Whatallthisamplyrevealedwasthatlegitimacyrequiredmorethantheapplicationofanyoneprincipleinisolation.Legitimacyresidednotinrigidadherence,say,totheideaofnationalself‐determination,letalonetothetermsofthewar'ssecrettreaties.Itwasultimatelyderivativefromthewidergoalsofinternationalsociety,andwastobediscoveredinabroadreconciliationwiththem.Self‐determinationcouldbeadvancedtocurbterritorialdemandsthatwouldgeneratefutureinstability.Inturn,itwasitselftobetemperedbynotionsoforderandstability,understoodastheavoidanceofdisruptiveconflictsbetweenstates.Thishadmuchtodowiththeotherunspokenvaluesofinternationalsociety.Legitimacyprinciplesunderwroteaconceptionofinternationalorder,andthisofnecessitysettheboundstotheimplementationofself‐determination(Preece1998:89,94).WilsonhadexpressedthiscandidlyinaspeechtoCongress,longbeforethewarhadcometoanend.Hecommittedhimselftothesatisfactionofall‘welldefined’nationalaspirations,butwiththeimportantqualificationthatthisshouldbedone‘withoutintroducingneworperpetuatingoldelementsofdiscordandantagonismthatwouldbelikelyintimetobreakthepeaceofEuropeandconsequentlytheworld’(Keylor1998:475).Nationalself‐determinationcouldberegardedasalegitimatingprinciplewithininternationalsocietyonlyinsofarasitwasnotitselfdisruptiveoftheorderonwhichthatinternationalsocietyrested.Boththeprincipleanditsqualificationhaveresoundedininternationalsocietyeversince.

Thecorollaryofself‐determinationwastobeprotectionforminorityrights.Thiswasintendedtoaddress‘theshortcomingsofnationalself‐determination’,(p.119)paradoxicallyattheverysamemomentastheParispeacemakers‘firsthaileditasthenewprincipleoflegitimacyininternationalsociety’(Preece1998:94).Inthesamespirit,Wighthadacknowledgedtheminorities'treatiestobetheinevitableadjunctofnational


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self‐determinationand,assuch,‘anotableattempttorefinethenewprincipleoflegitimacyandtocontrolitsoperation’(Wight1972:14).Thisrefinementbuiltonexistingpractice,butextendeditbeyondreligiousprotectiontoincludesomemeasuresoflinguisticandculturalprotectionaswell(Preece1998:72).Whatwascriticalabouttheseinstrumentswas,however,thefactthattheyrepresentedaformof‘conditionalrecognition’forthenewstatesofsouth‐eastEurope.Theconditionresidedintheclearimpositiononthesestatesof‘certainprinciplesofgovernment’which,inturn,derivedfrom‘fundamentalprinciplestowhichallcivilizedstatesconformed’(Temperley1924:vol.V,116).Asaprincipleoflegitimacy,thisinsistenceuponprotectionofminoritiesalsohadtheeffectofaggravatingtheissueoftherelativestatusofthebigandsmallpowers,andpresenteditselfasoneofdoublestandards.AdraftclauseintheCovenantoftheLeaguehadrequiredallmemberstosignuptoreligioustoleration,butthishadbeenrejected.Accordingly,ithasbeensuggested,‘thequestioncouldbeaskedwhyanobligationwhichtheGreatPowersrefusedtoundertakethemselvesshouldbeimposeduponothers’(Temperley1924:vol.V,129).Inthesameway,itwasobjectedthatcivilizedbehaviourdidnot,apparently,extendtoacceptanceofracialequality,sinceeffortstoincludeastatementtothiseffectwerealsodefeated(A.Williams1998:262).Wilsonhimselfplayedadecisiveroleinthisregard,andforpurelytacticalpoliticalreasons.‘Wilsonknewthatanyreferencetoracialequalitywouldalienatekeypoliticiansonthewestcoast’,isonecomment,‘andheneededtheirvotestogettheLeaguethroughCongress’(Macmillan2001:329).

Thepracticeoflegitimacylookedforaccommodationbetweenoftencompetingnorms,ofwhichself‐determinationwasamongstthemostprominent.Ifthissearchwasoftenwayward,itnonethelessmanagedtoestablishanewpriorityforscrutinyoftheorganizationalprincipleswithinthememberstates.States,infuture,wouldbesocializedintoacceptanceofthisorderbythepowerofinternationalsocietytobestow,orwithhold,membership.

AnImmoderatePeace?TheTreatmentofGermany

ToWilson,justicedictatedmoderationinthetreatmentofGermany.‘Wemustnotgiveourenemiesevenanimpressionofinjustice’,WilsonexhortedinMarch1919,andthismeant‘moderationandequity’(Mantoux1964:24).Butifthiswasanappealtonaturaljustice,itwasphrasedalsointhepragmaticlanguageofconsequentialism:tobehaveotherwisewastosowtheseedsoffutureconflict.Inhisdemandsforamoderatepeace,Wilsonthusfluctuatedbetweentheargumentthatthiswastobedonebecauseitwasjust,andthesomewhatdifferentargumentthatitwasdesirabletoavoidfuturedisruptionto(p.120) theinternationalsystem,andfutureentanglementsfortheUnitedStates.‘Desstipulationsexcessives’,hewarnedon27March1919,‘jetteraientungermecertaindeguerre’(Mantoux1955:vol.1,41).Theproblem,asitbecameclear,wasthatGermanperceptionsofwhatwasacceptable,andtheperceptionsofthevariousvictorpowers,werenotnecessarilythesame.Clemenceauwasfullyalerttothispotentialdisparity.‘Ilnefautpas—ditlePrésidentWilson—donnerauxAllemandslesentimentd'uneinjustice’.Clemenceaudidnotdissentfromsuchacourse.Hisconcernwasrather,asheputitinMarch1919,that‘cequenoustrouveronsjusteici,danscettechambre,


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neserapasnécessairementacceptécommetelparlesAllemands’(Mantoux1955:vol.1,43).Inshort,therewasaproblemwithWilson'sattemptedapplicationofjustice,asifitweresomeobjectivestandard.Legitimacy—onwhichthereceptionofthesettlementwoulddepend—was,instead,amatterofpoliticalperception.

TheissuecametobeencapsulatedintheGermanresentmentagainsttheso‐called‘war‐guiltclause’.LloydGeorgeblufflydismissedallsuchcomplaints,andsoughttomollifyhisreadersbyremindingthemthat,atthetimeofthesigning,theprevailingtemperregardedthepeaceastoolenient,nottooharsh(George1938:vol.1,92–3).Andyettheassignmentofguiltrankledbothatthetime,andsince,asitappearedtoviolateacardinalprincipleoncesetoutinthewritingsofGrotius.Hehadremindedhisseventeenth‐centuryreadersthat‘itisnotcustomaryforthepartiestoarriveatpeacebyaconfessionofwrong’,andhethoughtitwisethat‘intreatiesthatinterpretationshouldbeassumedwhichputsthepartiesasfaraspossibleonanequalitywithregardtothejusticeofthewar’(Grotius1918:809).ThenotionofthepeaceasaDiktatgrewalsofromtheperception,currentatthetime,thattheAllieswereinapositiontomakeunconditionaldemandsofGermany.USanalystshadconcluded,asearlyasthebeginningof1918,thattheyhadthe‘powertocompelGermany'sassentatthepeaceconference’(Baker1923:vol.3,40).Theproblemforthelegitimationofanyorderthatwascompelledwastwofold.IfonedangerwasthatGermanywouldnotbereconciledtoit,theotherwasthatitmightalsoprovetooharshtoopinionelsewhere,especiallyinBritain.‘Whatchancediditstandofdurability’,Lentinreflectsrhetorically,‘ifthevictorsthemselvescouldnotstomachit?’(Lentin1985:134–5).

WhatissostrikingaboutVersaillesisthetensionbetweentwooperativeframeworksoflegitimacy:restrictivemembershipandinclusiveconsensus.Ifitis,inKissingerianterms,thesinequanonofalegitimateorderthataformergreatpower,defeatedinwar,bespeedilyreintegratedintointernationalsociety,thenthestatedreasonforthisnothappeninginGermany'scasewastobethatcountry'sfailuretomeettheprevalenttestforrightfulmembership.Theprinciplesoflegitimacywereclearenough.WhatwaslackingatVersailleswasanyavailablestrategyoflegitimationthatcouldreconcilematterswhenthosetwoprinciplesfoundthemselvespressinginoppositedirections.Intheremainderofthissection,thetreatmentofGermanycanbeconsideredasapackageofinterconnectedissues:itsincorporationintointernationalsociety;the(p.121)consistencybetweentheArmisticeprinciplesandthefinalformofthepeace;andthesubstantivecontentofthepeaceitself.Ineachoftheseareas,wecanseeademonstrablelinkagebetweeninternationaltreatmentandtheconditionsforfullmembership.

WecantakethematterofpossiblemembershipoftheLeagueassymbolicofGermany'swiderstandingwithininternationalsociety,althoughobviouslythetwoarenotidentical.Germanyexistedasalegalentity,andtherewasnoquestionaboutitsrecognitionassuchininternationallaw.That,however,wasnotincompatiblewiththebestowalof‘second‐class’citizenship,asfarasenjoymentofthefullbenefitsofinternationalsocietywasconcerned.Therewascertainlyawidespreadfeelingin1919that,ceterisparibus,GermanmembershipoftheLeaguewastobepreferredtoitsexclusion.Thisderivedin


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partfromtheverylogicofcollectivesecuritywhichfunctionedbestontheassumptionofthreatsfromwithin,toberesistedbythewholecommunity,asopposedtothreatsfromwithout,whichmerelyinvitedreinventionofalliancesandotherformsofbalancingbehaviour.Thematter,ofcourse,wentbeyondthisformallogicalone.Putbluntly,LloydGeorge'sargumentwasthatitwasbetter‘toseetheGermansintheLeagueofNationsratherthanoutside’,becausethatway‘wewouldhavegreatercontroloverthem’(Mantoux1964:2).Butotherthingswerenotequal,andClemenceauinparticularwasadamantlyopposedtoGermanmembership.TheGermandelegationprotested,ifnottothefactoftheirexclusion,thenatleasttothelackofspecificityabouttheconditionstobemetfortheireventualinclusion(Baker1923:vol.3,506;Mantoux1955:vol.2,21).Theresponsetothiswasfairlycategorical.ThedraftCovenantwasexplicitthattheLeaguewasopento‘touteslesnationsquisegouvernentvraimentelles‐mêmesselonunrégimedémocratique’(Mantoux1955:vol.2,21).Hence,andlogicallyenough,assoonasGermanytookondemocraticconstitutionalformunderWeimar,itsrepresentativescouldthenmakethecaseforitsimmediateadmission(Schwabe1998:42–3).

AsecondissuewastheconformityofthefinalpeacetotheagreedgoverningprinciplesassetoutintheArmistice.ByOctober1918,theUnitedStatesofferedGermanythebestprospectsforareasonablepeacesettlement,andthatwaswhythedémarchehadbeenmadeintheGermannoteof4October(Marston1944:13).TheFourteenPointswereunderstoodtoindicatethenatureofthepeacetobeexpected.FromtheUSpointofview,thestatementofthesePointshadbeendirectedeverybitasmuchtotheotherAlliesastoGermany.‘ThewholepurposeoftheAmericaninsistenceontheFourteenPoints’,itisrecalled,‘wastotiethehandsoftheEuropeanAlliesinthefinalpeacenegotiationsandforcethemtoacceptamoderatepeace’(Goemans2000:307–8).Morespecifically,theFourteenPointswereregardedbytheAmericansasadeviceforsecuringtheabrogationofthevariouscommitmentsenteredintobythewartimetreaties—allofwhichmanifestlyviolatedWilsoniantenetsforaproperlyconductedsettlement(Temperley1920:vol.I,274).Aboveall,whattheFourteenPointshadmandatedwasapeace‘withoutvictorsand(p.122) vanquished’(Lentin1985:3).Therewere,however,tobetwoobstaclestotherealizationofsuchanoutcome.First,bytheirverynature,theFourteenPointswerestatementsofgeneral,andsomewhatvague,principle(Temperley1920:vol.I,275).Theyallowedsubstantiallatitudeformanoeuvre.Second,notalltheAlliesfeltequallyboundbytheseundertakings,asWilson'scloseadviser,ColonelHouse,waslatertorecall:‘theweekfollowingHouse'sarrivalinPariswasmarkedbyasteadyeffortontheirparttoevadeanyrecognitionoftheFourteenPointsasthebasisforthepeace’(House1926:164).

Nevertheless,GermannegotiatorsenteredintoarmisticediscussionsinthefirmbeliefthattheFourteenPointsconstitutedthelegalbasisofthefuturepeace(Mommsen1998:536).ThisappearedtobespecificallyconfirmedintheLansingnoteof5November1918(Schwabe1998:41–2).ItwastothisinterpretationthatHousefeltsodeeplycommitted.Hemaintainedthatthepre‐Armisticeagreement‘setforthingeneralprincipletheconditionswithwhichtheultimatepeacemustcomply’and,aboveall,thisgaveGermanythe‘righttoapeacesettlementbasedupontheFourteenPoints’(House1926:156,


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152).TheexchangeofArmisticenotesof11NovemberincludedHouse'sspecificintentthattheGermandelegateswouldtakepartinthepeaceconference(Bobbitt2002:573–4).Therehad,inthemeantime,beenissuedsomereservationsaboutthemeaningoftheFourteenPointsonthepartoftheAllies,andthesehadbeensetdowninamemorandumofreservationof4November(Marston1944:31).Intriguingly,HousehadnotseenfittocommunicatethecontentofthisexplanatorynotetotheGermannegotiators,despitetheimportantglossthatitplacedupontheFourteenPointsasthebasisofthepeace(Marston1944:25–6).GeneralSmutswaslatertowritetoWilsonon30May1919,pointingoutthattheAlliescouldnotaffordtofollowtheGermanexampleinitstreatmentof‘scrapsofpaper’,andtheywouldbeheldaccountableiftheydid.Accordingly,heenjoinedWilsonthat‘weareboundtomakeapeacewithinthefourcornersofyourPointsandPrinciples’(Baker1923:vol.3,466).Butexpectationsanddevelopmentsonthegroundhad,inthemeantime,movedinremorselesslyopposeddirections.TheArmisticehadfosteredasetofillusionswhereby‘theGermansawaitedatreatyofequalswhileinParistheAllieswroteapeaceofvictors’(Marks2002:83).

ItisonthesegroundsthatthecaseforaDiktatisgenerallymounted(Holsti1991:199).Lansingbitterlyregrettedthecoursethatwasfollowedatthetime,andcontributedfurthertothecriticalmoodthatsurroundedit.Becauseoftheprocedureadopted—andinparticulartheabsenceofanynegotiationwiththeGermandelegation—hewastoconcludeinhismemoirthat‘itwasevidentthatitwastobea“dictatedpeace”andnota“negotiatedpeace”’(Lansing1921:238).Versailleshasthusbeencreditedwiththeunusualdistinctionofbeing‘thefirstEuropeanmultilateralwarsettlementthatwasnotnegotiatedbetweenallthebelligerents’(Holsti1991:199).SocontroversialhadthesettlementbecomeamongsttheAllies,thattheyfearedaGermancontributionmightdestroyitaltogether.Inshort,toretaintheminimalconsensusamongstthevictors(p.123) alone,anypretenceatreachingaconsensustoincludethevanquishedhadtobesacrificed(Osiander1994:282).

Theissueofhowimmoderatethepeacewasarosefinallyinthecontextofitssubstance.Therecanbenoobjectiveorabsolutemeasureofthis.Itwasthepsychologicalexpectationsoftheparticipantsthatwereimportant,andthesewerefeddirectlybytheproceduraldimensionsjustdiscussed.TheFourteenPointshadexplicitlyencouragedtheexpectationofamoderatepeacebetweenequals.Itwasagainstthisstandardalonethatthefinalcontentcouldfindanyrealisticmeasure.ThenotionthatVersailleswasfinallytoemergeasa‘harsh’peacehasmanyelementstoit.ThreeaspectsarethoughttohaveledtothegreatestdegreeofGermandisaffection.First,therewastheobjectiontothenon‐applicationoftheprincipleofself‐determinationtoGermans,bothinthetransferofGermannationalstonewstates,andinthepreclusionofanyunificationbetweenGermanyandAustria.Second,therewasArticle231on‘warguilt’.Therearemanyironiesaboutthedraftinghistoryofthisclause.Asisnowwidelyaccepted,theintentionoftheAmericandrafterswastousetheacceptanceofmoralguiltasadeviceformoderatingtheeconomicdemandsimposedthroughreparations.Paradoxically,however,sinceGermanswerenotreconciledtotheimplicationsoftheclause,itevokedamoregeneralobjectiontoreparations,andtotheimaginedinequityofthepeaceasawhole(Keylor


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1998:501).Thethirdcriticalissuewas,ofcourse,thatofreparationsitself.Thisisnottheplacetorehearsethatdebate.Therelevantpointforthepresentdiscussionissimplytheextenttowhichthesubstantiveissueofreparationscauseddisharmonyonaccountofitsperceivedbreachofexistingundertakings.Wilsonhadbeenquiteclearinhisobjectivethat,financially,thiswasnottobeapunitivepeace.Nosooner,however,didthevariousdelegationsbegintoarriveinParisthanriftsdevelopedbetweentheAmericans,ontheonehand,andLloydGeorgeandtheEmpirerepresentatives(especiallyBillyHughesofAustralia),ontheother.TheAmericansfirmlybelievedthat‘warcostsandindemnity’hadalreadybeenruledoutbytheLansingnoteonwhichtheArmisticehadbeennegotiated(Lentin1985:36).Othersnowmountedacampaigntofindwaystorulethembackin,lestanyassessmentsolelyintermsofdirectwardamagewouldconfinereparationstoFranceandBelgium.Evidently,thesensethatareopeningofthescopeofreparationswasinequitablewasnotaGermanperceptionalone.BritishdelegatesreportedabouttheconferenceinJanuarythat‘Wilsonbecomesquitefuriouswhenanyonementionstheword“indemnity”tohimandsayshewillhearofnothingofthekind’(Headlam‐Morley1972:6).Hewasinfacttohearmuchmoreofthiskind.

TheFormatoftheNegotiations

WehavealreadyconsideredsomeproceduralaspectsofthetreatmentofGermany.Proceduralissuesemergedmoregenerallyaboutwhetherornotthissettlement—ashadothersinthepast—wastohaveatwo‐stageformat.(p.124) Therewasalsotheequallysensitivequestionofthescopeofrepresentationwithinthecoredecision‐makingstructuresoftheconference.Thistouchedonrelationsamongstthevictorpowers,aswellasupontherelationshipbetweenthegreatandthesmall.Inalltheseareas,importantargumentsweretoariseaboutwhatwastocountasanappropriateconsensus,sufficientlybroadtogivethesettlementsomebasisinlegitimacy.Equally,inallthoseareas,therewastobeamanifestdisparitybetweenthestatedprinciplesuponwhichtheproceduresweretobebasedandthoseactuallyputintopractice.Theconferencegenerateditsownorganizationalmomentumastherecalcitrantpracticalitiesofthepeacemakingbegantotakeoverfromdeclaredvalues(Elcock1972).

Wecanbeginwiththe‘phases’ofthesettlement.Thisisavexedissueintheliteraturewhichcontinuestopaintaconfusingpicture.Itiscertainlythecasethattherehadbeenpastprecedentsforasequenceofseparatestages.First,termswouldbereachedbetweenthebelligerentsthemselves(includingthelosingparty).Subsequently,amoregeneralcongresswouldbeheldtoratifythesettlement,andtodecideonissuesofconcerntothiswiderconstituencyofstates.SuchwasbroadlythesequencepreviouslypursuedattheendoftheNapoleonicWar,allowingfortheslightuntidinesscausedbythehundreddays,andtheresultingneedforasecondParisTreaty.Intheoriginalscheme,theParisTreatynegotiatedthetermsforFrance,andtheCongressofViennathenelaboratedthemoregeneralconstitutionalordertobeimplemented.Thiswasalso,iflessformally,theschemeenactedatUtrecht.ThemodeltypifyingEuropeannineteenth‐centurystatecraftwasthat‘apeacenegotiateddirectlybetweentheparticipantsinawarultimatelyhadtoobtaintheapprovaloftheEuropeancommunityofstates’,andadherencetothisprocedurewasconsideredvital‘forestablishinglegitimacytoapeace


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settlement’(Holsti1991:197–8).

Bothatthetime,andsince,Versailleshadbeendiscussedaspossiblyentailingtwodistinctstages,butthereismarkedconfusionastowhatthesestagesweretobe,andsomepresentationsofthemdonotconformtoHolsti'smodel(e.g.Marks2002:84).Thenomenclaturethatpervadesthehistoriesoftheconferencedistinguishesbetweenapreliminaryandafinaltreaty.ItalsomakesexplicitreferencetoanInter‐AlliedConference.Sowhatpreciselywastheintentionofthepeacemakersinthisregard,andhowdidtheactualpracticeunfold?

Inmuchofthediscussionatthetime,thefirstphasewasnotatalltobeasdescribedabove.ThisbecomesapparentinWilson'sseemingrejectionofanInter‐AlliedConferenceasthefirststage,insteadofholdingameetingbetweenallbelligerents.AccordingtotheBritishPrimeMinister,Wilsonwas‘entirelyopposed’toanInter‐AlliedConference,sincehefearedthe‘generalPeaceConferencewouldbeashamifdefiniteconclusionsweresimplyarrivedatbeforehand,andthesepresentedtoGermany’(Hankey1963:17).Interestingly,bothFrenchandAmericanparticipantswerelatertoregretthelossoftimebetweenthearmisticeandtheconveninginParis,andruedthata‘preliminary’(p.125)peacehadnotimmediatelybeenstruckintheinterim(Tardieu1921:104;House1926:211–12).Butgiventheirrespectivepositions,theywereobviouslynotlamentingthefailuretoreachthesamekindofpreliminarypeace.WasGermanparticipationtobeallowedatthisstage?ThisisnotwhattheFrenchhadinmind.Thehistorianoftheconferenceproceduresdrawsattentiontothe‘confusion’thatreignedinthisrespect.Initially,duringNovember1918,itremainedunclearastowhethertheremightbeaconferencewhosetaskwastoreacha‘preliminary’peacewithGermany,whichwouldthenberatifiedbyauniversalCongress.AftertheLondonmeetings,therewasevidentlyachangeofcourse.Thereafter,inDecember,‘allpreparationwasfora“conference”ofAlliedandAssociatedPowersonly’(Marston1944:28).TheideaofapreliminarymeetinginvolvingGermany—whichWilsonhadchampionedagainstarestrictiveInter‐AlliedConference—haddisappearedfromtheagenda.Iftherewasnowtobeapreliminarymeeting,itwasafterallforthevictorsalone.Intheevent,thispreliminarymeetingturnedoutalsotobethefinalone.

ThisresultedbecausethemeetingoftheAlliesbecamesodifficultandprotracted(Marston1944:40–1).Inpartalso,theideaofatwo‐stagetreatyprocesscametobeviewedasincreasinglyunattractivetotheUnitedStates,givenitscomplexratificationproceduresandWilson'sworriesabouttheSenate:twotreaties,onepreliminaryandonefinal,wouldpossiblyentailrunningthatgauntlettwice(Temperley1920:vol.I,261).TherewasalsothematteroftheprioritythatWilsonattachedtotheCovenant,asweshallseeshortly,andthisfurthercomplicatedtheissue,ashewasreluctanttoaddressthepeacewithGermanyoutsidetheframeworkoftheLeague.Whatfinallyeventuateddidsoasmuchbycontingencyandpoliticalcalculationasoutofanyconsistentpurpose.Thepreliminaryagreementwas‘soprecarious’,Bobbittpointsout,thattheGermanswereexcludedfromit.Instead,thisthen‘metamorphosedintoafinalsettlementdrivenbyAlliedfearthattheirdomesticpublicshadlostpatience’(Bobbitt2002:574).


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Theothersignificantaspectofconferenceprocedurewasthecompositionofitskeyorganizationalstructures.Aswiththephasesofthetreaty,decisionsaboutorganizationalstructuresalsosuccumbedtoaprocessofpoliticalevolution.Indeed,afterthecommencementoftheconference,participantsreportedonageneralsenseofdriftandlackofdirection(Headlam‐Morley1972:4).Inthis,asinsomuchelse,theacceptabilityofwhatwastobedonecouldnotbutbeinfluencedbytheexpectationsthattheAllieshadthemselvesengendered.Theyweretobejudged,notbyabsolutestandards,butbythosetheyhadfirmlydecreedthemselves.

ItistruethatatthemomenttheconferencefirstconvenedinJanuary,verylittlehadbeenalreadysettled(Marston1944:53).Therewere,however,threestrongindicatorsoflikelydirections.OnewasthePreliminaryFrenchplanofprocedurefortheconference,circulatedinNovember1918.ThisenvisagedthatWilson'sarrivalinPariswould‘enablethefourGreatPowerstoagree(p.126) amongthemselvesupontheconditionsofthepeace’which,asitstatedunreservedly,couldthenbe‘imposedseverallyontheenemywithoutdiscussionwithhim’(Baker1923:vol.3,56).Initially,aswehaveseen,Wilsonhaddistinctqualmsaboutsuchabluntinstrument.ThesecondwastheTardieuPlanwhichdistinguishedbetweenthosepowerswith‘general’interests(thatwouldattendallsessions)andthosewith‘specific’interests(toattendbyinvitationonly)(Tardieu1921:98;Marston1944:57).ThethirdindicatorwastheprocedurealreadyadoptedwithregardtotheArmistice.Keydecisionsaboutitscontentweretaken,notbythecompleteWarCouncil,butbyamoreinformalcoteriewithinit(House1926:98).ItwasduringthenegotiationoftheArmisticethat‘theexistenceofaninnercabinetbecameadefinitefeatureoftheorganization’(Marston1944:14–15).Theprecedentwasimportant,giventheinterestingcontinuityofpersonnel.Hankey,whoservedassecretarytotheBritishWarCabinet,andalsototheSupremeWarCouncil,wentontobecomealsothesecretaryoftheinnercabinetthatemergedatVersailles(Marston1944:1).

Subsequentevents,inthatlight,possessedanairofinevitability.Forthefirsttwomonths,great‐powerdirectionoftheconferencewasconductedthroughthemediumoftheCouncilofTen(Marston1944:96).Thereafter,asfrom24March1919,itrelapsedintotheconfinesoftheCouncilofFour(Hankey1963:96,103).Ifthiswasintendedtospeedupthesluggishpaceofprogress,thenearlyreportsweresceptical(Headlam‐Morley1972:57).

Tosaythatthisconcentrationintoasmallcircleofdecision-makingresultedfromevolutionisnottoimplythatitcouldhaveturnedoutotherwise.Therewasapowerfullogicbehindthisfromtheoutset.Clemenceauhadmadeclearthatthewinningalliancewouldcarryitsworkacrossfromthewarintothepeace,withno‘separationinthepeaceofthefourpowerswhichhavebattledsidebyside’(Lansing1921:77).PresidentWilson,forallhiscommitmenttoajustpeace,justlyarrivedat,didnotdisagree.Therewerecertainbasicrulesofpoliticsthatcouldnotbebreachedeveninthepursuitoftheloftiestideals,andthesedemandedthatthegreatvictorpowershavethefinalsayonthekeydecisions,asheconfirmedinaspeechon31May1919:


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Andbackofthatliesthisfundamentallyimportantfactthatwhenthedecisionsaremade,thealliedandassociatedpowersguaranteetomaintainthem.Itisperfectlyevident,uponamoment'sreflection,thatthechiefburdenoftheirmaintenancewillfalluponthegreaterpowers.Thechiefburdenofthewarfelluponthegreaterpowers,andifithadnotbeenfortheiraction,theirmilitaryaction,wewouldnotbeheretosettlethesequestions.And,therefore,wemustnotcloseoureyestothefactthatinthelastanalysisthemilitaryandnavalstrengthofthegreatpowerswillbethefinalguaranteeofthepeaceoftheworld.(Temperley1924:vol.V,130)

Thegreatpowershadearnedtheirrighttobrokerthesettlementbothbytheirroleinthewar,andalsobytheresponsibilitythattheynowboreforthemaintenanceofthepeace.

(p.127) TheAbsenceofConsensusItwasnotonlyuponsuchproceduralmattersthattheVersaillesconsensusremainedprecarious.Thiswenttotheheartalsoofmanysubstantiveissues,andabovealltotheverycompositionofajustpeace.Theattainmentofconsensusthusrequiredthestrikingofcompromisesoverfundamentals,notovermereincidentals.Withoutdoubt,thisdidmuchtodamagetheintegrityandconsistencyoftheenterpriseasawhole.

Thisisbestdemonstratedintheirdifferingconceptionsofajustorder,inthedifferingprioritieswhichresultedfromthem,andintheirbasicallyirreconcilableaccountsofthepurposesoftheLeague.Allcouldconsenttothegeneralityofajustpeace,butthismeantdifferentthingstotheparticipants.AsClemenceauoncepointedlyremarked,hesharedwithLloydGeorgethegoalofa‘durableandconsequentlyjustpeace’,butdissentedfromhisconclusionthatthisentailed‘moderateterritorialconditions’,inordertoavoid‘aprofoundfeelingofresentmentafterthepeace’(Baker1923:vol.3,249–50).HiscomplaintwasthatLloydGeorgehadalreadyachievedallhisglobalgoalsforBritain,andhisdemandforjusticeboileddowntomakingconcessionsatothers'expense,especiallyoverFrenchsecurity.

ThisincompatibilitywasunderscoredbythecontrastingFrenchandAmericanattitudestothechronologicalsequencethatwastoprevailasbetweenthepeaceproperwithGermanyandtheconstructionofthewiderinternationalorder.ThepreliminaryFrenchplanofprocedureofNovember1918hadsetoutitsprioritiesunambiguously,envisagingtheworkoftheconferenceintwophases:‘thesettlementofthewar’andthe‘organizationoftheSocietyofNations’.‘Theexaminationofthesecondquestion’,itbluntlyrecommended,‘nodoubtcallsforthesettlementofthefirst’(Baker1923:vol.3,59;Marston1944:53).Wilsonwouldhavenoneofthis.TheearlydiscussionsofthisissuebetweenWilsonandClemenceau‘indicatedhowfarapartweretheirideas’.Wilson'sresolvebyearlyDecemberwastomaketheLeague‘thecentreofthewholeprogramme’,andtolet‘everythingrevolvearoundthat’(House1926:263).IffortheFrenchtheconstructionofanewinternationalordercouldawaittheresolutionoftheGermanproblem,andthesatisfactionofFrenchsecurity,forWilsonthisseparationdidnotexist:itwasthenewinternationalorderthatwouldresolveeverythingelse.The


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Leaguewould‘lockEuropeanstatesintoanewtypeoforder’,andwasinthatsense‘thekeytotheentiresettlement’(Ikenberry2001:139).

ThisgapspilledoverintotherivalconceptionsoftheLeague.WilsonwassufficientlyrealistictoappreciatethatthecommunityoftheLeaguewouldtaketimetodevelopandgrow:itcouldnotbelegislatedintobeing(Ikenberry2001:146).TheFrenchapproachedthematterinalessleisurelyframeofmind:timewasnotontheirside.OnlyifFrenchsecurityhadbeenguaranteedalreadycouldtheLeaguebereliedupontoplayitssubsidiaryroleofpreservingthose(p.128) arrangements:itwasnosubstituteforthem.InpressingtheFrenchdemandforamilitaryfrontierontheRhine(whichtheUnitedStatesandBritainwere,intheevent,toreject),MarshalFochhadcommentedthat,inthefullnessoftime,‘thedevelopmentofcivilization’andthe‘moralsenseofnations’mightcurbwarsofconquest.Inthemeantime,heprotested,‘itisnecessarythatthissocietyshouldreceive,atonce,asufficientlysecurebasisandanespecialstrengththatwillensureitsdevelopment’(Baker1923:vol.3,228).

InKissingerianterms,iftheVersaillesorderprovedillegitimate,itwasnotbecauseGermanywastheonlygreatpowertobeleftdissatisfied.BolshevikRussiawaspositivelyexcludedfromthepeace.ItwasreportedattheoutsetthatWilson‘hadnotshownanykeennessontheideathatRussiashouldberepresentedattheConference’(George1938:189).InthishewassupportedbytheBritishdelegation.TheclearestreasonwhyRussiashouldbecastasidecame,assooften,fromClemenceau.HedeclaredhisintentiontoresistRussianrepresentation‘withthegreatestenergy’,onthegroundsthatRussiahad‘betrayedtheAlliedcause’.Moreover,hewasadamant,‘thepeacewhichwastobesettleddidnotconcernher’(George1938:320).Thisisthepointexactly.Ifitdidnotconcernher,Russiacouldhavenointerestinitspreservation,andtothatextentitexercisedno‘normativepull’overherfutureconduct.FrancewaseventuallytocometowishthatthepeacehadconcernedRussiamore,butbythenitwastoolate.Whatwasevenworsefortherestrictedconsensusthatbecamethepeacewasnotjustthenon‐incorporationofGermanyandRussia,butitsfinalabandonmentbytheUnitedStatesaswell.

CONCLUSIONInshort,firstthingsmustcomefirst,butevidentlytheprincipalgreatpowerssharednocommonvisiononthatorderofpriority,eitherinimportanceorintime.ThiswastheheavyburdenthatthepeacemakingatVersailleshadtocarryuponitsshoulders,andwhichsetthelimitstoanypossibilitiesforagreement.Intheexistingaccounts,Versaillesestablishedanillegitimateorder,eitherbecauseitfailedtoincorporateGermany,orbecausetherewasanevenwiderlackofconsensusamongstthegreatpowersasawhole.Bothareinasensetrue,butonlyapartofthetruth.Theydonotfullyexplainthenatureoftheproblem.Fromanotherangle,itwasthewiderlackofconsensusabouttheshapeofadesirableinternationalorderthatprecludedGermany'sintegrationintoit.Andfromayetdeeperperspectivestill,viewsoftheinternationalorderhadbeensoprofoundlyshakenbythewelterofrevolutionary,andconflicting,ideasastobeunabletosettleuponanyoneconsistentversionforthewhole.


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Inthesevariousways,thetragedyofVersailleswasitsinabilitytotranslateprinciplesoflegitimacyintoeffectivepoliticallegitimation.Therewascertainlynoabruptabandonmentoftheinternationalsocietalproject.Ifanything,thereversewasthecase,namelythatthisprojectwaspushedtoofarandtooquickly.Takeninconjunctionwiththeimmensedislocationsofthewar,the(p.129) consequencewasthattherequiredpoliticalaccommodationsbetweencompetingnormscouldnotbefound.Ifthepracticeoflegitimacyisunderstoodas‘aprocessofconsensualempowerment’,thenitwasinternationalsocietyasawholethatwasdebilitatedbythisfailure,andforwhichitwaseventuallytopayaveryhighpriceindeed.

Versailleshadgonetogreatlengthstointegrateitsconceptsofrightfulmembershipwithitsvisionforrightfulconduct.Evenso,thiswastobetakenyetastagefurtherintheideasthatwereincirculationatthecloseoftheSecondWorldWar.Inthefinalstageofthishistoricalsurvey,wemustconsidertheelementsoflegitimacyastheyappearedtothepeacemakersin1944–5.(p.130)

Legitimacy in International Society

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