Download - Political Legitimacy under Epistemic Constraints: Why Public Reasons Matter

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PoliticalLegitimacyunderEpistemicConstraints:WhyPublicReasonsMatter

ForthcominginNOMOSissueonPoliticalLegitimacy,2018(Melissa

Schwartzberg,ed.)

FabiennePeter1

DepartmentofPhilosophy,UniversityofWarwick

[email protected]

1Iammostgratefulforthedetailedandinsightfulwrittencommentsona

previousversionofthispaperthatIhavereceivedfromJenniferRubinsteinand

MicahSchwartzman.Ihavealsogreatlybenefittedfromthecommentsofother

participantsattheNomosconferenceattheMarch2017CentralAPAmeetingin

KansasCityandfromthecommentsIhavereceivedonpreviousversionsofthis

paper,includingattheworkshoponFactualDisagreementsandPolitical

LegitimacyattheUniversityofCopenhagen,theNewDirectionsinPublicReason

conferenceattheUniversityofBirmingham,thePaviagraduateconferencein

politicalphilosophy,theworkshoponReligionandPublicJustificationat

UniversityCollegeLondon,thePhilosophy,Politics,andEconomicsconferencein

honourofLucBovensatLSE,andatresearchseminarsattheUniversityof

Leiden,theANU,andtheUniversityofMelbourne.Iparticularlywanttothank

IanCarter,EmanuelaCeva,TonyCoady,DavidEstlund,JamesFleming,Gerald

Gaus,DanHalliday,KlemensKappel,JackKnight,CécileLaborde,ChristianList,

SteveMacedo,JonathanQuong,KristenRundle,DebraSatz,Melissa

Schwartzberg,KaiSpiekermann,SteveWall,HanvanWietmarschen,JoWolff,

AndrewValls,DanielViehoff,andAlexVoorhoeve,amongmanyothers.

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Abstract

Myaiminthispaperistoprovideanepistemologicalargumentforwhypublic

reasonsmatterforpoliticallegitimacy.Akeyfeatureofthepublicreason

conceptionoflegitimacyisthatpoliticaldecisionsmustbejustifiedtothe

citizens.Criticsofthepublicreasonconception,bycontrast,arguethatpolitical

legitimacydependsonjustificationsimpliciter.Anotherwaytoputthepointis

thatthecriticsofthepublicreasonconceptiontakethejustificationofpolitical

decisionstobebasedonreasonsthatareagreement-independent.Icallsuch

reasonsobjectivereasons.Publicreasonsare,however,agreement-dependent.

Thedebatebetweendefendersandcriticsofapublicreasonconceptionof

politicallegitimacyfocusesonwhetherobjectivereasonsorpublicreasonsare

therightbasisforthejustificationofpoliticaldecisions.Mydefenseofthepublic

reasonconceptionwillgranttoitscriticsthatthereareobjectivereasonsand

allowthatsuchreasonscanaffectthelegitimacyofpoliticaldecisions.ButIwill

show,focusingonepistemicconstraintsonthejustificationofpoliticaldecisions,

thatitdoesnotfollowthatthejustificationofthosedecisionsisnecessarily

agreement-independent.Intheepistemiccircumstancesthataretypicalof

politicallife,publicreasonswillberequiredforthejustificationofpolitical

decisions.

I.Introduction

Politicaldecisionsregulatemanyaspectsofourlives.Forexample,theymight

concernthelegalpermissibilityofabortions,influencetheextentofincomeand

wealthinequalities,ordeterminemembershipininternationalorglobal

institutions.Suchpoliticaldecisionsarelegitimateifeitherthedecisions

themselves,orthepoliticalinstitutionsthroughwhichtheyweremade,are

justified.22Theconceptofpoliticallegitimacyhasbeenunderstoodinmanydifferentways,

ofcourse.InPeter(2010)Igiveanoverview.Tosidesteppossiblecontroversies

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Whatdoesthejustificationofpoliticaldecisions,whetheritissubstantiveor

procedural,demand?Philosophersgenerallyunderstandjustificationintermsof

reasons.Abeliefisjustifiediftherearetherearesufficientordecisivereasons

thatsupportthatbelief.Anactionisjustifiediftherearesufficientordecisive

reasonsthatsupportthataction.Onthisview,whichIwilladopthere,apolitical

decisionisjustifiediftherearesufficientordecisivereasonsinsupportofit.But

whatsortofreasonscanjustifypoliticaldecisions?

Inpoliticallife,weoftendisagreeabouttheanswertothatquestion.Sometimes,

thesedisagreementshavetheiroriginprimarilyindivergentmoralorreligious

beliefs.Wemightdisagree,forexample,abouttheextenttowhichthe

governmentshouldprotectindividuallibertyrelativetoothervaluesandthus

disagreeaboutthelegitimateextentofgovernmentinterferencewithindividual

choices.Otherdisagreementshavetheiroriginsprimarilyindivergentbeliefs

aboutnon-moralfacts.Examplesincludedisagreementsaboutclimatechange

policiesthatderivefromconflictingassessmentsoftheeffectivenessofcarbon

onthisissue,Itakeanecumenicalapproachandunderstandpoliticallegitimacy

inrelationtothejustificationofpoliticaldecisions.Inaddition,Idonot,forthe

mostpart,distinguishbetweensubstantiveandproceduralconceptionsof

politicallegitimacy.Asubstantiveconceptiontargetsthejustificationofpolitical

decisionsdirectly;aproceduralconceptiontargetsthejustificationofdecision-

makinginstitutions.IthusintendtocoverbothwhenIspeakofthejustification

ofpoliticaldecisions.

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taxationordisagreementsaboutthedesirabilityofaminimumwagepolicythat

arebasedinconflictingassessmentsabouttheeffectsofsuchpolicieson

unemployment.Thesedisagreements,too,mightyieldincompatibleassessments

ofwhetheragovernmentpolicyisjustified.

Thisfactofdisagreementaboutthejustificationofpoliticaldecisionsneedstobe

distinguishedfromthenormativequestionofwhatgroundsthejustificationof

politicaldecisions.Itisthisnormativequestion,aquestionaboutthesortof

reasonsthathavethepowertojustifypoliticaldecisions,thatisattheheartof

thedebateonpublicreasonandthatIwanttofocusoninthispaper.

AccordingtodefendersofaPublicReasonConceptionofpoliticallegitimacy,the

reasonsthatcanjustifypoliticaldecisionsarethosethatallcanacceptorthatno

onecanreasonablyreject,undersomesuitablequalificationofwhatcountsasan

agreementorasareasonablerejection.3Onthisconception,atleastsome(but

typicallynotall)ofourdisagreementsarenormativelysignificantinthesense

thattheyhavethepowertounderminethejustificationofpoliticaldecisions.

JohnRawls(1993,1995),forexample,tooksomemoralandreligiousreasonsto

besubjecttonormativelysignificantdisagreementsandarguedthatthose

reasonscannotjustifypoliticaldecisions.Becausethereasonsthatareinthe

justifyingsetarethosethatarenotsubjecttoanormativelysignificant

3Notethatmyfocusinthispaperisonconceptionsoflegitimacy,noton

conceptionsofjustice.Itisnotanaimofthispapertodefendapublicreason

conceptionofjustice.

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disagreement,Iwanttocharacterizethereasonsthatcanjustifypolitical

decisionsonthePublicReasonConceptionasagreement-dependent.

Ontheopposingconceptionofpoliticallegitimacy,whichIcalltheObjective

ReasonConception,thejustificationofpoliticaldecisionsisagreement-

independent.Accordingtodefendersofthisconception,normativepractical

reasonsare,oraregivenby,objectivefacts,andwhetherpoliticaldecisionsare

justifieddependsonhowwelltheyaresupportedbythosereasons(e.g.Raz

1984;Enoch2014;Enoch2015).Itisanimplicationofthisviewthatour

disagreementsarenotnormativelysignificant;disagreementsdonotimpacton

practicaljustificationand,asaresult,donotimpactonthejustificationof

politicaldecisions.

Arelatedwayofunderstandingthecontrastisthis.AccordingtothePublic

ReasonConceptionofpoliticallegitimacy,politicaldecisionsmustbejustifiedto

thecitizens.Disagreementsarenormativelysignificantwhentheyimplyafailure

tojustifyaparticulardecisiontothecitizens.AccordingtotheObjectiveReason

Conception,bycontrast,practicaljustification,ingeneral,isnotjustificationto,

butjustificationsimpliciter.Whetherapoliticaldecisionisjustifieddependson

objectivereasons,notonwhetherthereissomesortofagreement.

MyaiminthispaperistoargueagainsttheObjectiveReasonConceptionof

politicallegitimacyand,inthisway,providesupportfortheclaimthatpublic

reasonsmatterforpoliticallegitimacy.Mystarting-point,however,istogrant

thatthereareobjectivereasonsandtoallowthattheycanaffectthejustification

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ofpoliticaldecisions.Iwillshowthatgrantingthispremisetothedefendersof

theObjectiveReasonConceptiondoesnotentailthatthejustificationofpolitical

decisionsisnecessarilyintermsofthoseobjectivereasons.Agreementcanstill

matter.

ThemainproblemwiththeObjectiveReasonConceptionofpoliticallegitimacy

arisesfromitsstanceondisagreements.Accordingtothisconception,asI

mentioned,disagreementsdonotaffectthejustificationofpoliticaldecisions;

disagreementsarenormativelyneutral.DisagreementssuchastheonesI

describedatthebeginningaretheresultofmistakenbeliefsaboutreason-

relevantfacts–normativeornon-normative–andsuchmistakes,itisthought,

donotunderminethejustificationofpoliticaldecisions.Iwillarguethat

defendersofaPublicReasonConceptionofpoliticallegitimacyarerightto

emphasizethatnotalldisagreementsaremeremistakes;somedisagreements

havenormativeimplications.Whentheydo,politicallegitimacydependson

overcomingthosedisagreements.

Ofcourse,adefenderofaPublicReasonConceptiondoesnotneedtoclaim–and

typicallydoesnotclaimthatalldisagreementsunderminepoliticallegitimacy.

Somedisagreementsarenotnormativelysignificantbecausetheyaretheresult

ofmistakesoranunwillingnesstoconsiderrelevantevidenceorarguments,etc.

Asuccessfuldefenseoftheclaimthatpublicreasonsmatterforpolitical

legitimacyneedstoanswerthequestionofwhichdisagreementsarenormatively

significant.IwillsayalotmorebelowonwhatImeanbynormativelysignificant

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disagreements.Forthetimebeing,letmejustnotethatIproposetoanswerthis

questionnotonthebasisofsomemoralorpoliticalvalues,ashasbeencommon

intheliteratureonpublicreason(e.g.Larmore2008;Quong2011).Instead,I

willstartfromtheepistemologyofpracticalreasoning.Iwillprovideanaccount

ofpracticalreasoningthatiscompatiblewiththeObjectiveReasonConception

andthusrefrainfromloadingthediceagainstthatconceptionfromthestart.I

willthenusethisaccounttoidentifyacategoryofnormativelysignificant

disagreements,however,andshowhowsuchdisagreementsaffectpractical

justification,atleastinthecontextofpoliticallegitimacy.Thiswillallowmeto

pinpointwheretheObjectiveReasonConceptiongoeswrongandtobuildmy

argumentforthesignificanceofpublicreasonsforpoliticallegitimacy.

Thepaperisorganizedasfollows.Iwillstartwithamoreexactportrayalofwhat

isatstakeinthedebatebetweendefendersoftheObjectiveReasonConception

anddefendersofthePublicReasonConception(sectionII).Iwillthenintroduce

myaccountoftheepistemologyofpracticalreasoningandpresentafirst

argumentagainsttheObjectiveReasonConception–theargumentfrom

permissiblepracticalreasoning(III).InsectionIV,Ideveloptheideaof

normativelysignificantdisagreementsandshowhowitfiguresinasecond

argumentagainsttheObjectiveReasonView.InsectionV,Iwillpresentmythird

andfinalargumentagainsttheObjectiveReasonView.Thisargument

demonstratesthatpublicreasonsmatterforpoliticallegitimacy,atleastunder

someepistemiccircumstances.Iwillendthepaperwithabriefdiscussionof

someobjectionsthatonemightraiseagainsttheviewIdefendinthispaper

(sectionVI).

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II.TwoConceptionsofPoliticalLegitimacy

ItistimetocharacterizetheObjectiveReasonConceptionofpoliticallegitimacy

withgreaterprecision.Iunderstanditascommittedtothefollowingtwoclaims.

Thefirstclaimisthis:

OR:Therearenormativepracticalreasonsthatare,oraregivenby,

attitude-independentfacts;theyareobjectivereasons.

ToacceptORistoacceptthatatleastsomenormativepracticalreasonshave

theirsourceofnormativityinattitude-independentfacts.Suchreasonsdonot

derivefrombeliefswehaveaboutwhatisdesirable,forexample,orfromwhat

wehappentodesire.

TherearetwowaysinwhichonecanspelloutOR.Thestrongversionsaysthat

allnormativepracticalreasonsarereasonsgivenbyattitude-independentfacts.

Manyhaveendorsedthisclaim–ithasbecomeaverypopularviewinrecent

metanormativetheory(e.g.Parfit2011;Scanlon2014;amongothers).ORcan

alsobeinterpretedmoreweakly,however.Onthisinterpretation,theclaimis

onlythatsomenormativepracticalreasons(butnotnecessarilyall)areobjective

reasons.IaccepttheweakinterpretationofORanditisanupshotofthe

argumentIpresentinthispaperisthatweshouldrejectthestrong

interpretation,atleastforthepoliticalcontext.4

4Ifoneunderstandsobjectivereasonsasasubsetofallnormativepractical

reasons,oneiscommittedtoahybridviewofpracticalnormativity.Suchviews

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Whilethefirstclaimisaclaimaboutnormativepracticalreasons,thesecond

claimisaclaimabouthowthesereasonsbearonthejustificationofpolitical

decisions.

ORJ:thejustificationofpoliticaldecisionsisnecessarilyintermsof

objectivereasons.

ORJstatesthattheonlyreasonsthatmatterforpoliticallegitimacyarethose

givenbyattitude-independentfacts.5

JosephRazandDavidEnochareamongthephilosopherswhohavemost

prominentlyadvocatedversionsoftheObjectiveReasonConception.TheNormal

JustificationThesisthatisatthecoreoftheconceptionofpoliticallegitimacy

thatRazadvocatesstatesthatthelegitimacyofpoliticaldecisionsdependson

whetherthosedecisionsallowthecitizenstobetterconformtothereasonsthat

applytothemanyway,independentlyofthedecisionsofthepoliticalauthority

arefarlesspopularthanthemonistviews.Chang(2013)defendsahybridview.I

defendahybridviewofthegroundsofpoliticallegitimacyinPeter(2017).

5IfthestrongversionofORweretrue,ORJwoulddirectlyfalloutofthat–ifall

normativepracticalreasonsareobjective,therearenootherreasonsthatcould

playaroleinthejustificationofpoliticaldecisions.ButORJcanbemade

compatiblewiththeweakversionofORaswellandthecombinedclaimisthat

eveniftherearenormativepracticalreasonsthatarenotobjectivereasons,only

objectivereasonscanjustifypoliticaldecisions.Anadditionalargumentwould

benecessarytoshowwhyonlythosereasonscanjustifypoliticaldecisions.

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(Raz1984).Thereasonsinquestionarefact-givenreasons;theyarenotreasons

thatcitizensagreeonorendorse.Enoch,similarly,drawsadistinctionbetween

thefactsthatarereason-givingandpeople’sbeliefsaboutthosefacts.Heargues

thatdefendersofaPublicReasonConceptionarewrongtofocusonpeople’s

perspectives;whatjustifiespoliticaldecisionsisnotwhatpeoplebelieveabout

thosedecisions,butwhetherornotthefactssupportthosedecisions(Enoch

2015:130f).

MymaintargetinthispaperisORJ,theclaimthatpoliticaljustificationis

necessarilyintermsofobjectivereasons.Asmentionedabove,Igrantthatthere

areobjectivereasonsandIaccepttheweakversionofOR.ButIwillarguethat

objectivereasonsarenottheonlyreasonsthatcanjustifypoliticaldecisions.

MyargumentagainstORJhingesontheroleofpracticalreasoninginpolitical

decision-makingandinpoliticaljustification.Practicalreasoningisreasoning

aboutwhatweshoulddoandpoliticaldecision-makingreliesonit.Ourpractical

reasoning,ingeneral,isnotdeterminedbythefacts,however,butbyour

perspectiveonthefacts.Asaresult,whatwehaveobjectivereasontodoand

whatwebelieveweshoulddomightcomeapart.

Thefollowingexampleillustratesthepoint.Supposeyouconsiderofferingyour

friendadrink.Youbelieve–andhaveeveryreasontobelieve–thattheglassin

frontofyoucontainsgin.Youdecidethatyoushouldofferyourfriendthedrink.

Unfortunatelyforyouandyourfriend,theglassdoesnotcontaingin.Itcontains

petrol.Ifallnormativepracticalreasonsaregivenbyattitude-independentfacts,

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asthestrongversionofORclaims,thenyouhavenonormativereasontooffer

yourfriendthedrink.Ifonlyreasonsgivenbyattitude-independentfacts

determinepracticaljustification,thenyouarenotjustifiedinofferingyourfriend

thedrink.Yet,thereseemstobenothingwrongwithyourreasoning.Whenwe

reasonpractically,wenecessarilyreasononthebasisofwhatwebelieveabout

thepracticalcircumstanceswefindourselvesin.

EvendefendersofthestrongversionofORacceptthatthisisafeatureofour

practicalreasoning,ofcourse.Theydealwiththeissueinthefollowingway.In

additiontoobjectivereasons,therearesubjective,orapparent(Parfit2011),

reasons.Subjectivereasonsreflectourperspectiveonthesituation–asgivenby

ourbeliefsand/orourevidence.Andasthegin/petrolexampleshows,whatwe

haveobjectivereasontodoandwhatwehavesubjectivereasontodocancome

apart.

DefendersofthestrongversionofORinterpretsubjectivepracticalreasonsin

relationtoourbeliefsand/orourevidence.6Thosewhorejectthestrongversion

ofOR–eitherinfavorofahybridvieworbecausetheyrejectORaltogether–

6Thisisaveryloosecharacterization,compatiblewithboththeunderstanding

thatasubjectivereasonisabeliefthatonehasanobjectivereasonandwiththe

counterfactualunderstandingthatasubjectivereasonisabeliefthat,iftrue,

wouldbeanobjectivereason.SeeWhiting(2014)onthistopic.

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oftencharacterizesubjectivereasonsinotherways.7Althoughthisisan

importanttopic,Icannotfullydiscussithere.Itisalsosomewhattangentialto

theargumentIdevelopinthispaper,asmyargumentdoesnotdependona

particularcharacterizationofsubjectivereasons.Forthepurposesofthispaper,

Ishalldefinesubjectivepracticalreasonsasreasonsthatareorinvolvebeliefs

abouttherelevantpracticalcircumstances.Thisisafairlyloosecharacterization

thatleavesopenanumberofquestions–whethertherelevantbeliefsneedtobe

justifiedornot;what,ifanything,justifiesthosebeliefs,etc.

Whatinterestsmehereaboveallisthequestionofwhatsortofreasonscan

groundpoliticalgroundpracticaljustificationinthecontextofpolitical

legitimacy–objectivereasonsorsubjectivereasons?Considerthefollowing

examplefromthepoliticalcontext.SupposethereisapolicyAwhichwould

increasethehealthstatusofthepoor,andwhichshouldbeimplementedforthat

reason.AdefenderoftheObjectiveReasonConceptionwouldarguethata

politicaldecisiontoimplementpolicyAisjustifiedonthebasisofthefact-given

reasonthatitincreasesthehealthstatusofthepoor.Butinourpractical

reasoningaboutwhetherornotweshouldimplementpolicyA,wemightform

divergentbeliefsabouttheempiricalfacts–whetherornotpolicyAdoes,infact,

increasethehealthstatusofthepoor–andaboutthenormativefacts–whether

thefactthatapolicyincreasesthehealthstatusofthepoorisareasonto

7Theydefinesubjectivereasonsasdependentonattitudessuchasdesires,for

example,oronproceduralfactorssuchasendorsement.

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implementit.Fromtheperspectiveofoursubjectivereasons,thecasefor

implementingpolicyAmightnotbeclear-cut.

Dosubjectivereasonsplayaroleinthejustificationofpoliticaldecisions?

DefendersofthePublicReasonConceptionofpoliticallegitimacyanswer

positively.Differentinterpretationsofthisviewworkwithdifferent

interpretationsofsubjectivereasons.Whattheyallhaveincommon,however,is

theclaimthatpoliticaldecisionsmustbejustifiedonthebasisofsubjective

reasons–whethertheyaresubstantivereasonsorproceduralreasons.8Inmy

understanding,thePublicReasonConceptionisthuscommittedtothefollowing

claim:

PRJ:Thejustificationofpoliticaldecisionsisnecessarilyintermsofan

agreementgroundedinsubjectivereasons.

Ofcourse,PRJshouldnotbeunderstoodsoastoentailthattherelevant

agreementthatcanjustifyapoliticaldecisionmustincludeanypossiblesetof

subjectivereasons.DefendersofaPublicReasonConceptiontypicallyallowfor

somerestrictionsintheadmissibleset.Someinterprettherelevantrestrictionin

termsofreasonableness,whichisarestrictiononpublicdeliberation(Quong

8Tokeepthepresentationsimple,Iwillmainlyfocusonasubstantive

interpretationofpublicreasons,eventhoughthisisnotactuallythe

interpretationthatIbelieveweshouldadopt(seePeter2013).Iwillcomeback

tothisissueinthelastsectionofthispaper.

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2011).Inthisinterpretation,subjectivereasonsthatdonotmeetthe

reasonablenesstest,howeveritisspecified,donotunderminethejustificationof

politicaldecisions.Onlydisagreementsthatsurvivethereasonablenesstestcan

underminethejustificationofpoliticaldecisions.Othersformulatethe

restrictionintermsofindividualdeliberation.Gaus,forexample,arguesthat

onlygoodreasoninggivesrisetowhatIcallsubjectivereasonshere(Gaus,2011:

246).

NotealsothatmycharacterizationofthePublicReasonConceptiondoesnot

distinguishbetweentheso-calledconsensusaccountsandconvergenceaccounts.

Accordingtoconsensusaccounts,agreement-basedjustificationofpolitical

decisionsisintermsofasinglesharedsetofreasons.Accordingtoconvergence

accounts,itissufficientthatanagreementthatisrelevantforthejustificationof

politicaldecisionsobtainsatthelevelofthedecisionsthemselves,itdoesnot

havetoobtainatthelevelofthereasonsthatjustifyaparticulardecision.Such

anagreementmightthusbesupportedbydiversereasons.Mycharacterization

doesnotdistinguishbetweenthetwoaccountsbecauseitleavesopenwhat

exactlytherelationshipisbetweenagreementandthereasonsthatjustifya

politicaldecision.9

9Foradiscussionofthetwoaccounts,seeVallier(2011).Arelatedwaytoput

thepointisthatmycharacterizationofthePublicReasonConceptionleaves

openwhethertheaggregationofindividualjudgmentsaboutwhichpolitical

decisionisjustifiedshouldbepremise-basedorconclusion-based(Bovensand

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Whateveronemightwanttosayaboutwhichsubjectivereasonsarerelevantfor

thejustificationofpoliticaldecisions,theimportantpointtonoteisthatitiswith

regardtothenormativesignificanceofsubjectivereasonsthatthePublicReason

ConceptionandtheObjectiveReasonConceptioncomeapart.Defendersofthe

ObjectiveReasonConceptionrejectthenormativesignificanceofsubjective

reasons.Theydrawadistinctionbetweenpracticalreasoningandpractical

justificationandmaintainthatevenifpracticalreasoningisintermsof

subjectivereasons,practicaljustificationisstillnecessarilyintermsofobjective

reasons.

Wecanmakeprogressinthisdebateifweexaminetheepistemologyofpractical

reasoning,orsoIwillargueinthispaper.Evenifwegrantthatthereare

objectivereasonsandthattheysometimesmatterforthejustificationofpolitical

decisions,theepistemiccircumstancesthatcharacterizethepoliticaljustification

areoftensuchthatwelackagoodgriponwhattheyare.Andwhenobjective

reasonsareepistemicallyoutofreach,theyarenotavailableforthejustification

ofpoliticaldecisions.Ifthereisanyjustificationforpoliticaldecisionsinthose

circumstances,thisjustificationwilldependonwhatisaccessibleinvalid

practicalreasoningand,therefore,onsubjectivereasons.ORJshouldthusbe

rejectedandbereplacedbyaconceptionofwhatisrequiredforthejustification

Rabinowicz2003;List2006).Accordingtotheconsensusconception,itisthe

former;accordingtotheconvergenceconception,itisthelatter.

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ofpoliticaldecisionsthatrecognizesthatsubjectivereasonsplayanimportant

roleinpoliticaljustification,atleastinsome–epistemic–circumstances.10

III.EpistemicConstraintsonPracticalReasoning

WhatdoImeanbypracticalreasoning?Letmestartwithacommentonthe

contrastwiththeoreticalreasoning.Theoreticalreasoninganswersaquestion

aboutwhatshouldbebelieved.Practicalreasoning,bycontrast,answersa

questionaboutwhatshouldbedone.Butitwouldbewrongtothinkthatthereis

nooverlapbetweentheoreticalandpracticalreasoning.Practicalreasoning

dependsonourbeliefsaboutnon-normativefactsand,ifoneacceptsatleasta

weakversionofOR,asIdo,italsodependsonourbeliefsinrelationto

normativefacts–factsthatareorgiverisetonormativepracticalreasons.

Becauseofthatfact-dependence,wecanaskabouttheepistemicconstraintsthat

applytopracticalreasoning.

Somehaveargued,buildingonTimothyWilliamson’sworkontheknowledge

normforassertion(2000),thattherelevantconstraintisknowledge.The

knowledgenormforassertionisthis:

KA:Itispermissibleforyoutoassertthatpiffyouknowthatp.

Forexample,supposealosttouristasksyouaboutthewaytohishotel.Itis

permissibleforyoutoassert“thehotelisjustdowntheroad”if(andonlyif)you

10AsIwillexplainbelow,IwillnotdefendPRJ,butaweakerprincipleinstead.

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knowthatthehotelisjustdowntheroad,butnotifyoudonotandjustwantto

beseenasfriendly.Williamsonexplainsthat“…assertingthatPwithoutknowing

thatPisdoingsomethingwithouthavingtheauthoritytodoit,likegiving

someoneacommandwithouthavingtheauthoritytodoso”(2000:257).11

Assertionsare,ofcourse,atypeofactionsandsomehavethusgeneralized

Williamson’saccounttoreasonsforactionandtopracticalreasoning.12Applied

topracticalreasoning,ourtopichere,theKnowledgeNormsaysthis:

KPr:Youruseofpasapremiseinpracticalreasoningispermissibleiff

youknowthatp.

Wecanapplytheknowledgenormbothtoordinarypracticalreasoningandto

normativepracticalreasoning.Usingtheexamplefromaboveagainthe

knowledgenormsaysthatyourreasoningthatapolicyAshouldbeimplemented

becauseitincreasesthehealthstatusofthepoorisapermissibleinstanceof

practicalreasoningjustincaseyouknowthatthepolicyincreasesthehealth

11Williamsonoriginallyonlyformulatedthenecessityclaim:itispermissiblefor

youtoassertthatponlyifyouknowthatp.Thetendencyhassincebeentofocus

onthedefenseofthestronger,biconditional,claimKA,whichcombinesthe

necessityclaimwithasufficiencyclaim:knowingthatpissufficientfor

permissiblyassertingthatp.

12SeeBrown(2008);StanleyandHawthorne(2008);Gerken(2011),among

others.

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statusofthepoor(non-normative)andthatitdoessoisareasontoimplement

thepolicy(normative).13

IstheKnowledgeNormaplausiblerestrictiononpracticalreasoning?Thereare

twomainobjectionsthataimtoshowthatitisnot.14Thefirstisthatthereare

manycasesinwhichknowledgeofpdoesnotseemnecessaryforpermissible

practicalreasoninginp-relatedcontexts.Thesecondisthattherearecasesin

whichknowledgedoesnotappeartobesufficient.AlthoughIfindboth

objectionsconvincingandrelevanttothetopicunderdiscussion,Iwillonlybe

abletofocusonthenecessityobjectionhere.Inthefinalsectionofthispaper,I

willbrieflytouchonthesufficiencyobjectionaswell,however.

Thegin/petrolcaseImentionedearliercanservetoillustratethenecessity

objection.Supposeyouarejustifiedtobelievethattheglasscontainsgin,not

petrol–alltheotherglassesonthetablecontaingin,youhavehadadrink

yourselfearlierfromthistable,youhaveseenawaiterfilltheglasseswitha

bottleofgininhishand,etc.Itseemspermissibleforyouinthiscasetousethe

premise“thisisgin”whendeliberatingaboutwhethertoofferyourfriendthe

drink.Asithappens,theglasscontainspetrol,afactyoudonotknow.Sothe

knowledgenormisviolated,buttheredoesnotseemtobeanythingwrongwith

yourpracticalreasoning.Wewillalsoacceptyourexcusethatyoudidnotknow

13Inwhatfollows,Iwillusethefeasibilityexamplemorethannormative

examples,asitissimpler.

14Seee.g.Lackey(2007)andBrown(2008).

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thisfactyouwhenitturnsoutthatyouractionmadeyourfriendveryill.This

exampleseemstoshowthatitcanbeappropriatetoinvokepinyourp-

dependentpracticalreasoningandchoice,evenifpisfalse.Knowledge,whichI

amassumingisfactive,isthusnotnecessary.

Therightresponsetothenecessityobjectionistoweakentheknowledgenorm

andreplaceknowledgebyjustifiedbelief.15TheJustificationNormfor

permissiblepracticalreasoningsaysthis:

JPr:Youruseofpasapremiseinpracticalreasoningispermissibleiffyou

arejustifiedtobelievethatp.

Inthegin/petrolcase,JPrsaysthatifyouarejustifiedtobelievethattheglass

containsgin,thenyouruseofthatpremiseinpracticalreasoningaboutwhether

toofferyourfriendthedrinkispermissible;knowledgeisnotrequired.Inthe

politicalcase,JPrsaysthatifyouarejustifiedtobelievethatapolicyisfeasible,

forexample,thenyouruseofthatpremiseinpracticalreasoningaboutwhich

policyoptionstoconsiderispermissible;knowledgeisnotrequired.

IfthiscorrectandweshouldreplaceKPrbyJPr,wecanusethistoformulatea

firstargumentagainsttheObjectiveReasonConceptionofpoliticallegitimacy.

Theargumentgoeslikethis.TheObjectiveReasonConceptionisonlyplausibleif

practicalreasoningisplausiblyrestrictedbyKPr,atleastinthenormative

context.Thisissobecauseofthefacticityofknowledge.Toseethis,assumep

referstoafactthatgivesrisetoanobjectivereason.Onlyifyouknowthatpdo

15SeealsoLackey(2007)andWedgwood(2008).

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objectivereason(givenbyp)andsubjectivereason–thereasonthatdetermines

yourpracticalreasoning,givenbyyourbeliefthatp–necessarilycoincide.But

wesawthatKprisnotplausibleandthatwethuscannotassumethatobjective

reasonsandsubjectivereasonsnecessarilycoincide.Themoreplausiblenorm,

JPr,impliesthatknowledgeisnotnecessaryforpermissiblepracticalreasoning.

Thismeansthattheremightbeagapbetweenwhatyoupermissiblyreasonyou

shoulddoandwhatyoushoulddointheobjectivereasonsense.

Ah,youmightsay,butthisargumentisflawed.JPronlyshowsthatpermissible

practicalreasoningdependsonsubjectivereasons,notthatpracticaljustification

does.ButtheObjectiveReasonConceptionisonlyconcernedwithpractical

justification,notwithpermissiblepracticalreasoning.Thewholepointofthe

gin/petrolcaseistoshowthatImightbepermissiblyreasoningthatthisisgin

and,onthatbasis,decidetoofferthedrinktomyfriend.ButtosaythatIam

reasoningpermissiblyisonlytosaythatwhatIamdoingisrational,thatIcanbe

excusedformyaction,andsoon.ItisnottosaythatIamjustifiedindoingsoin

thefull-bloodedsense–thatIhaveanormativereasontodoso.Evenifwe

acceptthatpracticalreasoningisnecessarilyintermsofsubjectivereasons,we

donothavetoacceptthatsubjectivereasonscarryanyindependentnormativity.

Andyouarerightofcourse;theargumentIhavepresentedisflawedinthisway.

AsuccessfulargumentagainsttheObjectiveReasonConceptionneedstoshow

thatsubjectivereasonsnotonlydeterminepermissiblepracticalreasoning,but

thattheycanhavenormativeimportintheirownrightandthatORJisthusfalse.

MynextargumentagainstORJisanargumentfromdisagreement.

21

IV.NormativelySignificantDisagreements

Characterizedquitegenerally,disagreementsinvolveattitudesthatarenotonly

incompatiblebutthatcannotbejointlyheld(Dreier2009).Disagreements

betweendoxasticattitudesareacaseinpoint.Ifyouexpressabeliefthatp(e.g.

thepolicyisfeasible)andIexpressabeliefthatnot-p(thepolicyisnotfeasible),

wehaveadisagreementasthetwoattitudescannotbejointlyheld:thepolicyis

eitherfeasibleoritisnot.

Buttherearealsonon-doxasticdisagreements.Aninterestingcaseis

disagreementabouttaste.Canwehavedisagreementsabouttaste?Sayyou

maintain“haggisistasty”andImaintain“haggisisnottasty”.Clearly,thetwo

attitudesareincompatible.Buttheredoesnotseemtobeanythingparticularly

problematicaboutthat.Itcertainlydoesnotfollowthatoneofushasmadea

mistake.Sowhilethetwoattitudesareincompatible,itappearsthattheycanbe

jointlyheld–bydifferentindividuals,atleast.Ifthatistherelevanttest,wedo

nothaveadisagreement.Butifweapplyamoredemandingtestandspecifythat

therelevantattitudesthatconstituteadisagreementareattitudesthatone

individualcouldnotjointlyhold,thenwehaveadisagreementabouttaste.16

16Conflictingperceptionsofcolorgiverisetoarelatedexample,takenfroma

recentinternethype.Individually,wecannotbothholdthataparticulardress

lookswhite/goldandthatitlooksblue/black.Butdifferentindividualsmight

wellseecolordifferently.Onthemoredemandingtest,iftwoindividualsseethe

22

Thetopicofthispaperispracticaldisagreements–disagreementsaboutwhat

weshoulddo.Practicaldisagreementscanresultfromattitudessuchasdesires,

intentionstoact,beliefsrelatingtopracticalreasonsetc.Iftherelevantattitudes

aredesires,thepracticaldisagreementmightlooklikeadisagreementabout

tastes–ifthereisadisagreementatall,itisfaultlessandtypically

unproblematic.Butthereclearlyareconstellationsofpracticalattitudesthat

constituteadisagreement.Considerthefollowingattitudes.Youhold“weshould

dox”;Iholdthat“weshoulddonot-x”.Ourincompatibleattitudesmaystillbe

faultless,i.e.notinvolveamistakeoneithersidebutsimplyarisefromdifferent

desires.Butitisaclearcaseofapracticaldisagreementasourincompatible

attitudestowardswhatweshouldtodocannotbejointlyrealizedandhence

jointlyheldbyus.

Giventhatwecanhavepracticaldisagreements,thereisafurtherdistinction

thatisrelevantformypurposeshere,thedistinctionbetweenfact-dependent

andfact-independentdisagreements.Inadoxasticdisagreement,the

disagreementisaboutwhichpropositionismadetruebythefacts:isthepolicy

feasibleornot?Suchadisagreementisobviouslyafact-dependentdisagreement.

Inadisagreementabouttaste,ifitoccursatall,thereisprobablynofactofthe

matter.Ifthereisnot,thenitisnotafact-dependentdisagreement.Practical

disagreementscanbeofeitherkind.Iwillfocushereonfact-dependentpractical

dressashavingadifferentcolor,theyhaveadisagreementaboutcolor.Onthe

lessdemandingtest,theydonothaveadisagreement.

23

disagreementsandtherelevantfactsmightbeeithernon-normativeor

normative.17Tousemypoliticalexampleagain,youandImightdisagreeabout

whetherornotpolicyAincreasesthehealthstatusofthepoorand/orabout

whetherornotthefactthatAincreasesthehealthstatusofthepoorjustifies

implementingA.

Returningnowtopracticalreasoning,acceptingJPrhasthefollowing

implication:permissiblepracticalreasoningmayresultinfact-dependent

disagreements.ThisisanimportantdifferencebetweenKPrandJPr.If

knowledgesetstheconstraintforpermissiblepracticalreasoning,thenwe

cannothavedisagreementsthatarecompatiblewithpermissiblepractical

17Onemightobjectatthisstagethatthismoveimpliesthatmyargumentonly

worksforthoseinterpretationsofthePublicReasonConceptionthat

accommodatefact-dependentnormativedisagreements.IunderstandGaus’

interpretationofthePublicReasonConceptionthatheputsforwardinTheOrder

ofPublicReason,forexample,tobeintermsofdisagreementsthatarenotfact-

dependent.AccordingtoGaus(2011),anormativeorderisjustifiedifitis

supportedbyeveryone’spreferences,suitablyunderstood,forrulesofsocial

morality.ButthosewhodefendaversionofthePublicReasonConceptionofthis

kindcouldacceptahypotheticalversionoftheargumentthatIintendtopresent:

ORJisfalseevenifoneacceptstheweakversionofOR.Thishypotheticalversion

leavesopenwhetheroneshouldacceptORorwhetheroneshouldconstrue

normativepracticalreasonsinthepoliticalcontextondifferentpremises

altogether.

24

reasoning.Ifwefindourselvesinadisagreementaboutp,atleastoneofuswill

havereasonedimpermissibly.ButifJPristhecorrectnormforpermissible

practicalreasoning,thenitispossiblethatoneofuspermissiblyconcludesthatp

andtheotherpermissiblyconcludesthatnot-p.18Supposewebothagreethat

policyAismoredesirablethanpolicyB.But,tousemynon-normativeexample

again,supposethatwhileyoujustifiablybelievethatAisfeasible,Ijustifiably

believethatitisnotfeasible.Wethenfindourselvesinadisagreementabout

whethertochooseAorBthatresultsfromourpermissiblereasoning.

Iwanttoclaimthatfact-dependentpracticaldisagreementsthatresultfrom

permissiblereasoningarenormativelysignificant,atleastinthecontextthatis

thefocusofmypaperhere–thejustificationofpoliticaldecisions.Theyare

normativelysignificantinthesensethattheyhaveimplicationsforpractical

justification.Toseetheplausibilityofthis,considerthecontrastbetweena

disagreementthatresultsfromimpermissiblereasoningandonethatresults

frompermissiblereasoning.IfIhavesimplynotbotheredtotakeintoaccount

evidenceforthefeasibilityofAalthoughitwouldhavebeeneasyformetoso,for

example,thenourdisagreementisofadifferentkindthanifmyreasoningin

favorofBispermissible.IfIamtoblame,epistemicallyspeaking,formyfalse

beliefthatAisnotfeasible,thenitdoesnotfollowfromourdisagreementthat

choosingAisnotjustified.ChoosingAmightstillbejustified,evenifIbelieve

18Thisholdsatleastaslongasepistemicjustificationisnon-factive;see

Littlejohn(2012)foranopposingview.

25

thatweshouldchooseB.Butifneitherofusisreasoningimpermissibly,the

situationisdifferent.

Practicaldisagreementsthatresultfrompermissiblereasoningcanaffect

justificationinthefollowingway.IfyoujustifiablybelievepandIjustifiably

believenot-p,ap-dependentpolicychoiceiseithernotjustifiedtomeoritisnot

justifiedtoyou.Inthepolicyexample,ifyoupermissiblyreasonthatAisfeasible

andthatweoughtthustodoAandIpermissiblythatAisnotfeasibleandthat

wethusoughttochooseB,choosingAisnotjustifiedtomeandchoosingBisnot

justifiedtoyou.Thesamelineofthoughtcanalsobedevelopedfor

disagreementsthatinvolvenormativebeliefs.

WecanusethispointtoformulateasecondargumentagainsttheObjective

ReasonConceptionofpoliticallegitimacy–theargumentfromnormatively

significantdisagreements.RecallthatORJsaysthatthejustificationofpolitical

decisionsnecessarilydependsonobjectivereasons.Thisimpliesthat

disagreementsaboutnormativepracticalreasonsarenormativelyinsignificant.

ButIhavejustshownthatdisagreementsaboutwhichobjectivereasonsapply

thatresultfromourpermissiblepracticalreasoningcanunderminepractical

justification,includingthejustificationofpoliticaldecisions.Suchdisagreements

arethusnormativelysignificantandsubjectivereasonsmayaffectwhatcounts

asajustifieddecision.Therefore,ORJisfalse.

Ah,youmightsaynow,butthisargumentisflawedtoo.ToshowthatORJisfalse,

Iwouldhavetoshowthatobjectivereasonsarenotnecessaryforthe

26

justificationofpoliticaldecisions.ButIhavenotyetshownthat.Ihaveonly

shownthattheremightbeagapbetweenjustificationsimpliciterand

justificationto–justificationintermsofobjectivereasonsandjustificationin

termsofsubjectivereasons.

Andyouarerightagain.MybeliefthatAisnotfeasiblemightbemistaken,

whereasyoucorrectlyholdthatAisfeasible.ChoosingAmightthenstillbe

justified,evenifitisnotjustifiedtome.ThatisallthatORJclaims.Ihavethusnot

yetshownthatORJisfalse,letalonethatweshouldadoptsomeversionofthe

PublicReasonConceptionofpoliticallegitimacy.

WhilemoreworkisneededtoshowthatORJisfalse,thesecondargument

establishessomething.Itcannotestablishthatobjectivereasonsarenot

necessaryforthejustificationofpoliticaldecisions,butitdoesshowthatthe

justificationofpoliticaldecisionsmaybeepistemicallyunderdeterminedwhen

permissiblepracticalreasoningleadstodisagreementsaboutwhichpolicy

shouldbechosenandneithersidecanjustifiablyclaimtheepistemichigh-

ground.Ifnobodyknows–inafactivesense–thereason-relevantfacts,thenORJ

doesnothaveagriponthejustificationproblem.Permissiblepracticalreasoning

mayleadtoagapbetweenobjectiveandsubjectivereasonsandthisgapimplies

thatpracticaljustificationintermsofobjectivereasonsisepistemically

underdetermined.Thisdoesnotyetshowthatagreementatthelevelof

subjectivereasonsisrequiredforthejustificationofpoliticaldecisions,asthe

PublicReasonConceptionclaims,butitdoesshowthatdisagreementsthatresult

frompermissiblepracticalreasoningcanunderminetheapplicabilityofORJ.

27

V.PoliticalLegitimacyandDisagreements

ToshowthatORJisfalse,Ihavetoshowthatobjectivereasonsarenotnecessary

forthejustificationofpoliticaldecisions,atleastinsomecontexts.Iwilldosoby

showingthatthereareepistemiccircumstancesinwhichthejustificationof

politicaldecisionsrequiresanagreementinvolvingsubjectivereasons.Iwillnot,

however,argueforthePublicReasonConceptionofpoliticallegitimacyasitis

normallyunderstood.

RecallthatIcharacterizedthisconceptioninthefollowingway:

PRJ:Thejustificationofpoliticaldecisionsisnecessarilyintermsofan

agreementgroundedinsubjectivereasons.

WhatIwilldefendinthissectionisaweakerversionofthisconception.The

weakerconceptiondoesnotclaimthatpoliticallegitimacyalwaysrequiresan

agreementinvolvingsubjectivereasons.Itonlyclaimsthatanagreement

involvingsubjectivereasonsissometimesnecessaryforpoliticallegitimacy,the

ideabeingthatisnecessarywhenthejustificationofpoliticaldecisionsinterms

ofobjectivereasonsfailsbecauseofepistemiclimitations.Specifically,whatIwill

defendisthefollowingclaim:

PRJ*:Insomeepistemiccontexts,thejustificationofpoliticaldecisionsis

necessarilyintermsofanagreementgroundedinsubjectivereasons.

28

ToshowthatORJ,theclaimthatpoliticaljustificationisnecessarilyintermsof

objectivereasons,isfalseandthatPRJ*iscorrect,Ineedtomakeastrongercase

thanIhavesofarforthenormativesignificanceofagreement-basedjustification

ofpoliticaldecisions.Asastart,consideragainthenon-normativeexamplethatI

havealreadyusedafewtimes.Youjustifiablybelievep–thatpolicyAisfeasible

–andpermissiblysupportpolicyAonthatbasis.Ijustifiablybelievenot-pand

permissiblysupportpolicyBonthatbasis.SupposethatpistrueandAisthe

correctchoice.Forthetimebeing,assumethatyoudonotknowthat,however.19

WhataretheimplicationsofthiscaseforthepoliticallegitimacyofchoosingA?

First,notethatfindingourselvesinsuchadisagreementdoesnotimplythat

choosingAcannotbejustifiedtome.HowcanIpermissiblyreasonthatchoosing

Aisjustified?Afterall,Ijustsaidthatthedisagreementwefindourselvesinis

normativelysignificantinthesensethatitresultsfromthepermissible

reasoningofeachofus.True.Butthatwasourseparatereasoning.After

establishingthedisagreement,wemightturntocollectivedeliberationtotryand

resolveit.Iseetwomainwaysthismighthappen(theremightbeothers).20First,

19Youmightobjectthatifyouhaveajustifiedbeliefthatpandpistrue,youhave

knowledge.ButjustthinkofGettier-styleexamples.Pmightbetrueeventhough

thereasonsforwhichyouhappentobelievephavenothingtodowiththefacts

thatmakeptrue,soyoudonotknowp.

20Arelatedquestion,onethatIcannotaddresshere,iswhetherwemighthave

reasonstoadjustourbeliefsinresponsetothefactofdisagreement.Aversionof

29

youmighttestifythatpandthismightgivemeepistemicreasontoadjustmy

beliefthatpinresponsetoyourtestimony.Suchreasonscouldincludethatyou

haveareputationformakingreliablejudgmentsintheparea,thatyouareina

moreprivilegedepistemicpositionwithregardtopthanIam,orthatthe

methodsthatyouusedtoformyourbeliefthatparegenerallytrustworthy,etc.

IfIhavesuchepistemicreasonstoacceptyourtestimony,thenIcannot

justifiablyholdontomyoriginalbelief.Imighthavesufficientreasontocome

aroundandformabeliefthatp.

Alternatively,choosingAmaybecomejustifiedtomeifyoucanexplaintome

whyp.Forexample,youmightbeabletoshowmeevidencethatdemonstrates

conclusivelythatp.Again,iftheforceofepistemicreasonsisonyourside,you

maybeabletochangemypermissiblereasoning,inwhichcaseIcannot

justifiablysticktomyoriginalbeliefthatnot-p.

WhileitisthuspossiblethatA–thecorrectchoice,Ihaveassumed–canbe

justifiedtome,itmightnotbepossibletodoso.Theproblemarisesbecause

justifiablybelieving–orevenknowing–thatpneitherentailsbeingagood

testifiernorthatoneisabletoexplainwhyp.Whetheroneisagoodtestifier

dependsonarangeoffactorsthatareonlyindirectly,ornotall,relatedtop.And

“whyp”isadifferentpropositionthan“p”.Sononeofyourreasonsforbelieving

thisquestionisthefocusoftheliteratureontheepistemologyofdisagreement.I

havediscussedtheimplicationsoftheepistemologyofdisagreementforpolitical

legitimacyelsewhere,inPeter(2013and2016).

30

thatp(orevenknowingthatp)maybereasonsthatyoucouldmobiliseto

explaintome“whyp”.

Ifneitherconditionismet,thenIhavenowayofformingajustifiedbeliefthatp

andhencetoconcludethatweshouldchooseA.Soourdisagreementthatresults

frompermissiblereasoningpersistsand,Iwanttoclaim,remainsnormatively

significant.Ihaveassumedthatweareinasymmetricalepistemicsituation–we

havebothreasonedpermissiblyandalthoughyourbeliefthatAisfeasible

happenstobecorrectandmybeliefthatAisnotfeasibleisnotcorrect,youdo

notknowthatandyouhavenotbeenabletogivemegoodepistemicreasonsfor

believingotherwise.Giventhatwebothlackaccesstotherelevantfacts,thereis

noepistemicbasisforprivilegingyourbeliefanddismissingmineandthusfor

insistingthatchoosingAisjustified.Underthosecircumstances,thefactthatAis

notjustifiedtomeunderminesthepoliticallegitimacyofchoosingA.

Brieflyconsiderwhathappensifwemodifytheexampleandassumethatyoudo

notonlyhaveajustifiedbeliefthatp,butyouknowthatp.IntheexampleIhave

beenusing,supposeyouknowthatAisfeasible.Isthatsufficientforthe

legitimacyofapoliticaldecisioninfavorofA?AlthoughIcannotfullyargueit

here,Iaminclinedtosaythat,atleastinapoliticalcontext,knowledgewithout

anabilitytotestifyortoexplainisnotsufficientforpracticaljustification.

Thispointisbasedonthesufficiencyobjectiontotheknowledgenormof

practicalreasoningthatImentionedearlier.Thisobjectionsaysthatsometimes

evenknowledge-leveljustificationisnotsufficientforpermissiblepractical

31

reasoning(e.g.Brown2008).Theobjectioncanbeillustratedwiththefollowing

example.Supposeasurgeonhasbeeninformedbyherextremelycompetentand

reliableteamthatthetumorsheisabouttoremoveisintheleftkidney.Onthe

basisofthistestimonybyherteam,thesurgeonknowsthatthetumorisinthe

leftkidney.Butwewouldprobablyconsiderherirresponsible–engagingin

impermissiblepracticalreasoning–ifshedidnotdouble-checktheevidence

herselfbeforeoperating.

Similarcircumstancesregularlyobtaininthepoliticalcontextandwhatcreates

theextrapressureonjustificationistheinter-personalconstellation.Consider

thehealthexampleagainandsupposethatyouknow,notonlythatpolicyAwill

increasethehealthstatusofthepoor,butalsothatthisempiricalfactfavors

implementingthepolicy.SupposethatIjustifiablybelievethatitwillnot

increasethehealthstatusofthepoororthat,whileitdoes,thisisnotareasonto

implementit(becauseofcountervailingreasons,forexamplethatthepolicyis

tooexpensive).Iwanttoclaim,deployingthesufficiencyobjection,thatformeto

berequiredtodefertoyourclaimthatweshouldimplementA,itisnotenough

thatyouknowwhatyoudoaboutA.Additionalconditionshavetobemet,

minimallyconditionsrelatingtoyourabilitytotestifyortoexplaintomethatthe

policyhastheempiricaland/ornormativepropertiesthatyouclaim.

Thissketchofanargumentwillnotconvincethehard-nosedobjectivistabout

normativereasons.Hewilldenythesufficiencyobjectionandinsistthat

knowledgeoftheobjectivereasonsthatapplyissufficientforpractical

32

justification,includingthejustificationofpoliticaldecisions.Sothisisalooseend

Icannotargumentativelytieuphere.

LetmebracketthisissueandcontinuewiththeassumptionImadeabove,that

justificationintermsofobjectivereasonsisnotepistemicallyaccessibletoeither

ofus:neitherofushasknowledge-leveljustificationforthebeliefsthatdriveour

practicaldisagreement.Thisassumptionechoestheepistemicskepticismthat

Rawlsexpressedinhisessayon“TheIndependenceofMoralTheory”(1974).I

agreewithRawlsthatourknowledgeofnormativefactsisnotasrobustasour

knowledgeofnon-normativefacts.Withscience,wehaveafairlyreliable,though

ofcoursenotinfallible,routetofactualknowledge.Inthecontextofnormative

claims,welackasimilarlyreliablemethodology.Especiallyifoneendorsessome

versionofnon-naturalism,therethusremainsanepistemologicalchallenge(e.g.

Mackie1977):howdowegainknowledgeofnormativefacts?Theproposalsthat

defendersofORhaveofferedforhowtodealwiththeepistemologicalchallenge

remaincontroversial.21Inaddition,inpolicy-evaluationsthatusuallydependon

acomplexmixofnormativeandnon-normativeassessments,knowledgealso

veryquicklycomesunderpressure.Ithusdonotthinkthatatheoryofpractical

justificationthatissuitableforthepoliticalcontextcanbeplausiblyrestrictedto

instanceswhereweknowalltherelevantfacts,normativeandnon-normative.

21Aprominentsuggestioninthisregardisthattheepistemologicalchallengecan

bemetviaareflectiveequilibriumapproach.Ibelievethatthisstrategyfailsfor

reasonssimilartothosearticulatedbyKellyandMcGrath(2010).

33

MythirdandfinalargumentagainsttheObjectiveReasonConceptionofpolitical

legitimacyisthusthis.Ifjustificationintermsofobjectivereasonsisnot

epistemicallyaccessible,thenwhatwecanjustifytoeachotherisallthe

justificationwecanget.Underthoseepistemiccircumstances,ifthereistobe

anyjustificationforpoliticaldecisions,ithastobejustificationinthesenseof

justificationto,notofjustificationsimpliciter.Disagreementsthatresultfrom

permissiblepracticalreasoningcanunderminepoliticallegitimacy.Viceversa,a

politicaldecisionisonlylegitimate,inthoseepistemiccircumstances,ifthe

decisioncanbejustifiedtoeachofus.Inthosecircumstances,agreement-based

justificationhastotheplaceofjustificationintermsofobjectivereasons.

Letmeillustratethepointoncegainintermsofmyexampleofadisagreement

aboutnon-normativefacts.ForAtobethelegitimatechoiceunderthe

circumstancesIhaveassumed,choosingAmustbejustifiabletome.Ifour

normativelysignificantdisagreementpersistsandAcannotbejustifiedtome,

thenchoosingAisnotlegitimate.Viceversa,ifchoosingBcannotbejustifiedto

you,thenchoosingBisnotlegitimateunderthecircumstancesIhaveassumed.

Theonlypolicychoicesthatarelegitimateunderthosecircumstancesarethose

thatcanbejustifiedtobothofus,i.e.thosethataresupportedbyanagreement

groundedinsubjectivereasons.

Granted,thechoiceswemakeinthisfashionmaynotbejustifiedintermsof

objectivereasons,weretheyaccessible.Butthereisnootherrouteto

justificationthanvia(someaccountof)subjectivereasons.Underthose

epistemiccircumstances,ORJisthusfalseandPRJ*iscorrect.

34

VI.Objections

LetmeendthispaperbybrieflyconsideringsomeobjectionstotheargumentI

havepresented.

Afirstobjectionispolitical.Onemightobjectthataconceptionofpolitical

legitimacythatrequiresagreementistoodemanding.Suchaconditionof

politicallegitimacywillidentifymostpolicy-choicesasillegitimate,asindeedit

didinmyexampleofachoicebetweenpolicyAandB.Inreply,Iwanttosay

somethingabouthowIunderstandtheneedtoreachagreementthrough

permissiblepracticalreasoning.Myexamplesthroughouthavehighlightedthe

substantivelevel–whichpolicyshouldwechoose?Ididthistokeepthings

simple.Idonotmeantoimplythatpoliticallegitimacyalwaysrequires

agreementatthesubstantivelevel.Isharetheworryarticulatedintheobjection

thatthiswouldresultinanoverlyminimalsetofjustifiedpolicies.The

agreementrequiredbyPRJ*,bytheweakversionofthePublicReason

ConceptionthatIendorse,maybeattheprocedurallevel.Anagreementatthe

procedurallevelisanagreementabouthowweshouldmakedecisionsabout

controversialpolicychoices.Inmanydemocraticsocieties,forexample,theview

thatdemocraticprocedureshelpresolvecontroversialpolicyissuesisstillvery

widelyheld.NothinginwhatIhavesaidaboveprecludesdevelopingthePublic

ReasonConceptionofpoliticallegitimacyinsuchaproceduraldirection.My

argumentcanthussupporttheclaimthatinthefaceofnormativelysignificant

35

disagreementsaboutpolicyissues,politicallegitimacyrequiresademocratic

decision.22

ThesecondobjectionIwanttoconsiderisconceptual.Onemightobjectthatthe

epistemologyofpracticalreasoningisthewrongstarting-pointforadefenseofa

PublicReasonConceptionbecausethejustificationofpoliticaldecisions–

whethersubstantiveorprocedural–isapracticalproblem,notatheoretical

problem.Theproblemiswhatwehavereasontodo,notwhatwehavereasonto

believe.Inreply,note,first,thatthemainfocusoftheepistemologyofpractical

reasoningisnotonwhatoneshouldbelieve.Instead,itisonwhatappropriate

practicalreasoningrequires.Andthethoughtisthatappropriatepractical

reasoningcannotignorethequestionofwhatoneshouldbelieveabout

alternativecoursesofaction.

Thereare,ofcourse,practicalcontextswherewhatoneshouldbelieveislargely

irrelevant.Forexample,whenyouaredeliberatingaboutwhichicecreamflavor

tobuy,whatyoushouldbelieveaboutthoseflavorsisprobablynotvery

important.Whatmattersiswhichflavoryoulikebest.Iamhappytograntthat

evensomepoliticaldecisionsmaybeofthiskind.Butmostofourpolitical

decisions,andmanyofourprivatedecisions,arenotofthiskind,orsoIwantto

claim.Whenyouaredeliberatingaboutwhichcharitytogiveto,whatyoushould

believeaboutthosecharitiesisrelevant.Yourdeliberationiscriticizableifyou

22InPeter(2009)Idefendaproceduralinterpretationofpublicreasonandin

Peter(2013)Iprovideanegativeepistemicargumentfordemocracy.

36

relyonbeliefsyoushouldnothold.Likewise,yourargumentthatweshouldnot

choosepolicyAbecauseAisnotfeasibleisnotdefensibleifyoushouldbelieve

thatAisfeasible.And,finally,yourargumentthatweshouldnotchoosepolicyA

becausethehealthstatusofthepoorisnotapoliticalconcernisnotdefensibleif

youshouldbelievethatthehealthstatusofthepoorisapoliticalconcern.

Athirdobjectiongrantsthattheepistemologyofpracticalreasoningisrelevant

forthejustificationofpoliticaldecisions,buthighlightsthatphilosophersarejust

aslikelytodisagreeaboutthecorrectepistemologicaltheoryastheyareabout

thecorrectmoralorpoliticaldefenseofaPublicReasonConceptionofpolitical

legitimacy.Myapproachthusdoesnotofferprogress.Myargumentisindeed

vulnerabletothisobjectionbecauseIhavemadecontroversialclaimsaboutthe

epistemologyofpracticalreasoning.Ihaveclaimed,forexample,thatthe

appropriatenormforpracticalreasoningisjustifiedbelief,notknowledge.Ifthis

premiseisfalse,myargumentisunsound.

Inreplytothisobjection,letmeemphasizethatmyaiminthispaperhasbeen

somewhatnarrowerthantheobjectionassumes.Myaimhasbeentoshowthat

evenifoneacceptsthatthereareobjectivereasonsandthattheymatterforthe

justificationofpoliticallegitimacy,itdoesnotfollowthattheyaretheonly

reasonsthatmatter.Itdoesnotfollowbecausepoliticaljustificationoftenfaces

significantepistemicconstraintsandtheseconstraintscanimplythatno

justificationintermsofobjectivereasonsisavailable.Theonlyjustificationthat

isavailableinthosecircumstancesisajustificationbasedonpublicreasons.

Someepistemologiesofpracticalreasoning–stronglyexternalistones–will

37

indeedbeincompatiblewiththislineofargument.Butitisatleastconceivable

thatepistemologiesotherthantheoneIhaveadoptedinthispaperwillsupport

anargumentroughlyalongthoselines.Andthatwillbesufficientformymain

claimtogothrough.Inaddition,exploringtheepistemologicalassumptions

supportingdifferentconceptionsofpoliticallegitimacyis,Ibelieve,illuminating

initsownright.

AfinalobjectiontotheviewthatIhavedevelopedinthispaperconcernsits

implicationsfortheObjectiveReasonConception.AdefenderofanObjective

ReasonConceptioncangrantmyargumentbutmaintainthataweakerversionof

ORJcanstillbeupheld.Ihavearguedthatweshouldrejectthefollowingclaim:

ORJ:thejustificationofpoliticaldecisionsisnecessarilyintermsof

objectivereasons.

TheobjectionstatesthatonecouldweakenORJinanalogytohowIhave

weakenedthePublicReasonConception.TheweakerversionofORJ,callitORJ*,

statesthis:

ORJ*:Insomeepistemiccontexts,thejustificationofpoliticaldecisionsis

necessarilyintermsofobjectivereasons.

IagreethatmyargumentiscompatiblewithORJ*.Whatismore,Iwouldwantto

endorseORJ*.Ifwehavesufficientlyrobustknowledgeofwhatpoliticaldecision

isobjectivelycorrect,Iagreethatpoliticallegitimacyisunderminedifthewrong

38

decisionismade.Toseetheplausibilityofthis,supposeapoliticalregimemakes

decisionsthatareobviouslymorallyimpermissible.Forexample,supposea

regimeissueslawsthatviolateessentialhumanrightsofsomeminorities

withoutanyredeemingjustification.Suchdecisionsdo,Iwanttomaintain,lack

legitimacybecausetheydisregardmoralknowledgethatissufficientlyrobust.

WhileIacceptORJ*,itisimportanttorecognizethelimitationsofbuildinga

conceptionofpoliticallegitimacyonORJ*.Myargumentinthispaperis

motivatedbythequestionofwhatlegitimacyrequireswhenwelacksufficiently

robustknowledgeofwhatthecorrectpoliticaldecisionis.Ibelievethistobethe

normalcaseinpolitics.IhavenodisagreementwithadefenderofanObjective

ReasonConceptionwhoacceptsthatiftheepistemiccircumstanceslimitreliance

onobjectivereasons,politicallegitimacywillrequirethatpoliticaldecisionsare

justifiedintermsofpublicreasons.Mydisagreementisprimarilywiththose

defendersofanObjectiveReasonConceptionwhosubscribetoORJ(thestrong

version)andwhothusclaimthatpublicreasonsareirrelevantforthe

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whenepistemiccircumstanceslimitrelianceonobjectivereasonsisinneedofan

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