TheLondonSchoolofEconomicsandPoliticalScience

AnExplanatoryAccountofPracticalReasons

DerenCemHalilOlgun

AthesissubmittedtotheDepartmentofPhilosophy,LogicandScientificMethodoftheLondonSchoolofEconomicsandPoliticalScienceforthedegreeofDoctorofPhilosophy,December2017.

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Declaration

I certify that the thesis I havepresented for examination for thePhDdegreeof the London

School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than where I have

clearlyindicatedthatitistheworkofothers(inwhichcasetheextentofanyworkcarriedout

jointlybymeandanyotherpersonisclearlyidentifiedinit).

Thecopyrightofthisthesisrestswiththeauthor.Quotationfromitispermitted,providedthat

full acknowledgement ismade.This thesismaynotbe reproducedwithoutmypriorwritten

consent.

Iwarrantthatthisauthorisationdoesnot, tothebestofmybelief, infringetherightsofany

thirdparty.

Ideclarethatmythesiscontains91,596words(excludingbibliographyandappendices).

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Abstract

If I takemyumbrella,having seen that it’s rainingoutside,wemight say thatmy reason for

takingmyumbrellawasthatitwasraining.However,ifI’dbelievedthatitwasrainingwhenit

wasn’t,wemight say thatmy reason for takingmyumbrellawas that I believed that itwas

raining.Inthefirstcase,myreasonforactingseemstobeafeatureoftheworld,whilstinthe

seconditseemstobeafeatureofmypsychology.

Accordingtomosttheoriesofreasons,wearemistakenaboutwhatmyreasonforactingwas

inoneofthesecases.However,Iargue,thesetheoriesallentailseveralawkwardclaims.

I argue that there is a theory of reasons that can reconcile these two accounts ofwhatmy

reasonforactingwaswithoutentailingsuchawkwardclaims.Iarguethatwhatthefactthatit

israiningandthefactthatIbelievethatitisraininghaveincommonisthat,intheirrespective

cases, they each explainwhy itwas rational forme to takemy umbrella andwhy I took it.

Moregenerally,Iarguethatthereisatleastasenseinwhichallpracticalreasonsexplainwhy

itis,insomerespect,rationalfortheagenttodotheactionsforwhichtheyarereasons.

Themajorchallengeforthisaccount is theclaimthatonly featuresofanagent’spsychology

canexplainwhytheyactorwhyit isrationalforthemtoact. Iprovideaformalconstrualof

thischallengeandarguethatthefactthatitisrainingcanexplainwhyItakemyumbrellaand

whyitwasrationalformetodoso,byexplainingthefactthatIbelievedthatitwasraining.

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ContentsLISTOFTABLES 7

LISTOFFIGURES 8

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 9

INTRODUCTION 10

1 WHYDOWENEEDANEWTHEORYOFREASONS? 112 PLURALISMABOUTREASONS 113 EXPLANATORYRATIONALISM 124 MYTHEORYOFREASONS 155 THATWHICHIPASSOVERINSILENCE 156 ANOVERVIEWOFTHISDISCUSSION 16

CHAPTERSUMMARY 20

(I)ONTHEORIESOFREASONS 23

1 HOWMANYKINDSOFREASONARETHERE? 242 CLAIMSABOUTREASONS 333 CATEGORISINGTHEORIESOFREASONS 384 NORMATIVEANDMOTIVATINGREASONS 395 CONCLUSION 46

(II)REASONSTOACTTHATMAKEACTIONSWORTHDOING 47

1 SALLYANDTHENON-EXISTENTBEAR 472 HOWREASONEXPRESSIONSRELATE 503 FAVOURISMABOUTREASONSTOACT 514 THEPROBLEMSFORFAVOURISM 555 RESPONSESTOTHEPROBLEMSFORFAVOURISM 576 CONCLUSION 59

(III)ACTINGFORPSYCHOLOGICALREASONS 60

1 SOMEPRIMAFACIEREASONABLECLAIMS 602 PSYCHOLOGISMABOUTTHEREASONSFORWHICHWEACT 643 THEPROBLEMSFORPSYCHOLOGISM 654 RESPONSESTOTHEPROBLEMSFORPSYCHOLOGISM 675 CONCLUSION 68

(IV)ACTINGFORWHATYOUBELIEVE 69

1 SOMEPRIMAFACIEREASONABLECLAIMSABOUTREASONS 692 DELIBERATIVISMABOUTTHEREASONSFORWHICHWEACT 723 WHATSALLYANDEDMUNDTOOKTOFAVOURACTING 734 THEPROBLEMSFORDELIBERATIVISM 755 RESPONSESTOTHEPROBLEMSFORDELIBERATIVISM 776 CONCLUSION 79

(V)ONTHEPLURALITYOFREASONS 80

1 THESENSEOFANEXPRESSION 812 EXPANDINGTHECATEGORISATIONSCHEMA 813 FAVOURIST/DELIBERATIVIST(F/D)PLURALISM 83

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4 FAVOURIST/PSYCHOLOGIST(F/P)PLURALISM 855 WHYBEAPLURALIST? 876 PLURALISMISNOPANACEA 897 ACHALLENGEFORPLURALISM 928 CONCLUSION 93

(VI)ANEWFAMILYOFCLAIMSABOUTREASONS 94

1 PROTANTORATIONALACTION 942 EXPLANATORYRATIONALISM 973 APROBLEMFOREXPLANATORYRATIONALISM 984 ANOUTLINEOFWHATFOLLOWS 99

(VII)WENEEDTOTALKABOUTEXPLANATION 102

1 WHATDOIMEANBY‘EXPLAINS’? 1022 ONTOLOGICALASSUMPTIONS 1033 FULLEXPLANATIONANDPARTIALEXPLANATION 1044 OVERDETERMINATIONANDOVEREXPLANATION 1085 SUMMARY 110

(VIII)THEEXPLANATORYEXCLUSIONPROBLEM 111

1 ANOVERVIEW 1122 THEARGUMENTFROMFALSEBELIEF 1143 THEARGUMENTFROMIMPOTENTFACTS 1224 THEARGUMENTFORPREMISE1 1255 THEEXCLUSIONPRINCIPLE 1266 THEEXPLANATORYEXCLUSIONPROBLEMFOR(R1) 1287 CONCLUSION 128APPENDIX 129

(IX)OTHERUSESFORTHEEXPLANATORYEXCLUSIONPROBLEM 130

1 THEGENERALFORMOFTHEEXPLANATORYEXCLUSIONPROBLEM 1312 THEEXPLANATORYEXCLUSIONPROBLEMFOR(R2) 1323 THEEXPLANATORYEXCLUSIONPROBLEMFOR(R3) 1344 THEEXPLANATORYEXCLUSIONPROBLEMFOR(R4) 1365 THEARGUMENTFROMILLUSION 1396 CONCLUSION 140

(X)HOWNORMATIVEREASONSDON’TEXPLAIN 141

1 NORMATIVEREASONEXPLANATIONS 1422 THEORIESOFNORMATIVEREASONEXPLANATION 1433 ELLIPTICALTHEORIES 1444 DIRECTTHEORIES 1475 CONCLUSION 150APPENDIX 150

(XI)THEEXCLUSIONPRINCIPLEISFALSE 159

1 TWOCOUNTEREXAMPLESTOTHEEXCLUSIONPRINCIPLE 1592 WHYTHESEARECOUNTEREXAMPLESTOTHEEXCLUSIONPRINCIPLE 1623 WHAT’SWRONGWITHTHEEXCLUSIONPRINCIPLE 1644 WHEREDIDWEGOWRONG? 1665 WHICHEXPLANATIONAREDISTALEXPLANATIONSPARTOF? 1676 CONCLUSION 167

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(XII)EXPLAININGWHYWEACT 168

1 WHENNORMATIVEREASONSEXPLAIN 1692 IMPLICATIONSFOREXPLANATORYRATIONALISM 1713 IMPLICATIONSFORANTI-PSYCHOLOGICALTHEORIESOFREASONS 1724 CONCLUSION 173APPENDIX 173

(XIII)EXPLAININGWHYITISRATIONALTOACT 177

1 ANOTHERINDIRECTTHEORY 1772 ISEXPLANATIONTRANSITIVE?ANAPPARENTDILEMMA 1783 THEAPPARENTDILEMMAISNOTADILEMMA 1804 THECHALLENGE 1835 THEUNSUCCESSFULNATURALSTRATEGY 1836 THEMYSTERIOUSSTRATEGY 185

(XIV)THEMYSTERYRELATION 186

1 THEMYSTERYRELATIONANDJUSTIFIEDBELIEF 1872 THEMYSTERYRELATIONANDKNOWLEDGE 1893 THEMYSTERYRELATIONANDOPPORTUNITIESTOKNOW 1904 THEMYSTERYRELATIONANDACTINGFORAREASON 1925 ASUMMARYOFTHEEXAMPLES 1936 MYSTERYRELATIONSAREEXPLANATORYRELATIONS 1947 MYSTERYRELATIONSARETRANSITIVE 1968 CONCLUSION 200

(XV)MYSTERYRELATIONSANDWHYITISRATIONALTOACT 201

1 EXPLAININGWHYITISRATIONALTOACT 2022 ARELATIONINCOMMON 2033 WHENNON-PSYCHOLOGICALFACTSEXPLAINWHYITISRATIONAL 2094 CONCLUSION 211APPENDIX 211

(XVI)ANEWTHEORYOFREASONS 217

1 EXPLANATORYRATIONALISM:REVISITED 2182 SOLVINGTHEPROBLEMS 2213 NEWPLURALISM 2224 THECHALLENGEFORPLURALISM 2235 CONCLUSION 225APPENDIX 226

BIBLIOGRAPHY 232

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ListofTablesTableI-1:The‘standard’categorisationoftheoriesofreasons.................................................23

TableI-2:Reasonexpressionsandthekindsofreasontheypickout........................................32

TableI-3:Aprovisionalcategorisationschema..........................................................................33

TableI-4:Themainclaimsabouteachreasonexpression.........................................................36

TableI-5:Arevisedcategorisationschema................................................................................38

TableI-6:Prominenttheoriesofreasons,categorisedinmyproposedschema........................39

TableI-7:The‘assumedtheory’ofreasons................................................................................41

TableI-8:Theconventionalinterpretationoftheassumedtheory............................................43

TableII-1:Howproponentsoffavourismrespondtosomeproblemsforit..............................58

TableV-1:Acategorisationschemathataccommodatespluralisttheoriesofreasons.............82

TableV-2:The,univocal,'ReceivedView'representedinthenewschema...............................82

TableV-3:Anexamplepluralisttheory......................................................................................83

TableV-4:PureF/Dpluralism.....................................................................................................85

TableV-5:PureF/Ppluralism.....................................................................................................87

TableVI-1:ThewaysinwhichFevzi’sactionsare(oraren’t)rational........................................97

TableVI-2:Explanatoryrationalism............................................................................................97

TableXIV-1:Thecomponentfactsineachexample.................................................................197

TableXIV-2:Thetransitivityofthemysteryrelation................................................................197

TableXV-1:Asummaryofwhatexplainsandwhatdoesn'tineachcase................................211

TableXVI-1:Explanatoryrationalism........................................................................................218

TableXVI-2:Anapplicationofexplanatoryrationalism...........................................................221

TableXVI-3:NewPluralism.......................................................................................................223

TableXVI-4:Otherexamplesforexplanatoryrationalism........................................................226

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ListofFiguresFigureVIII-1:TheargumentforTheExplanatoryExclusionProblem.......................................114

FigureX-1:Ellipticaltheoriesofnormativereasonexplanation...............................................145

FigureX-2:Directtheoriesofnormativereasonexplanation...................................................147

FigureXI-1:TheHyperAcceleratedDragon..............................................................................161

FigureXII-1:Theindirecttheoryofnormativereasonexplanation..........................................169

FigureXII-2:Theindirecttheoryofbeliefexplanation.............................................................170

FigureXII-3:TheexplanationofwhyIcongratulatedmyfriend..............................................170

FigureXII-4:TheexplanationofwhySallyran..........................................................................171

FigureXII-5:TheexplanationofwhyEdmundskatedattheedgeofthelake.........................171

FigureXII-6:Explainingwhyweact..........................................................................................172

FigureXIII-1:Explainingwhyitisrationaltoact.......................................................................178

FigureXIII-2:Achainofexplanatoryrelationsthatarealltransitive.......................................183

FigureXIII-3:Achainofexplanatoryrelationsthatarenotalltransitive.................................183

FigureXV-1:Theexplanatoryrelationsintheawardcase.......................................................209

FigureXV-2:Theexplanatoryrelationsinthecarbonmonoxidecase......................................209

FigureXV-3:TheexplanatoryrelationsintheEvacase............................................................209

FigureXVI-1:Theexplanatoryrelationsinvolvedwhenitwasraining.....................................219

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AcknowledgementsThis thesis exists, in large part, because of the advice and support of my friends and

colleagues. I am grateful to all of them, but I would like to thank the following people, in

particular.

First, Iwould like to thankmyprimarysupervisor,ChristianList.Were itnot forhis rigorous

and precise feedback, thisworkwould have been far poorer, andwere it not for his open-

mindednessitwouldhavecertainlylackedwhateveritnowhasbywayoforiginality.Iwould

also like to thankmy secondary supervisor, RichardBradley, forhis astute criticisms, for his

encouragement, and for being so generous with his time. And I would like to thank my

examiners, Maria Alvarez and Jonathan Dancy, for their thoughtful engagement with this

thesis,andfortheirwordsofsupport.Havingspentsomuchtimethinkingabouttheirwork,it

wasanhonourtoheartheirthoughtsonmine.

I amenormously grateful toBryanRoberts for helpingme through several iterationsof The

ExplanatoryExclusionProblem.Withouthis guidancemyelaborationof thatproblemwould

havebeentwiceaslongandhalfasgood.IamalsogratefultoPeteFaulconbridgeandJames

Nguyen for their thoughtful responses to an early draft of chapters (XV) and (XIV); their

insights transformed my arguments. And I am grateful to Todd Karhu for his considered

engagementwithallofthemyriadproblemsIputtohim;hisinfluenceonthisthesisissubtle

butpervasive.

I would like to thank the donor who funded my scholarship, and who wished to remain

anonymous; their generositymade this work possible. I would also like to thank all ofmy

colleagues at the Office of Rail and Road, and Chris Hemsley in particular, for being so

supportiveandsoaccommodating.

IamluckytohaveenjoyedthefriendshipofmyfellowPhDstudents.Itwouldberemissofme

not to mention, in particular, and in addition to those already mentioned, Susanne Burri,

Goreti Faria, Johannes Himmelreich, Silvia Milano, Mantas Radzvilas and Nicolas Wüthrich.

Theircompanionshipthroughthepeaksandtroughsofthisworkwasinvaluable.

Finally,Ithankmypartner,AlexBobocica,whohasbeensupportive,patient,andconsiderate

throughout.Idon’tknowhowIwouldhavedonethiswithouther.

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IntroductionIf I takemyumbrella,having seen that it’s rainingoutside,wemight say thatmy reason for

taking my umbrella was that it was raining. However, if it hadn’t been raining, but I’d

mistakenlybelievedthat ithad,wemight insteadsaythatmyreasonfortakingmyumbrella

wasthatIbelievedthatitwasraining.

Inthefirstcase,myreasonforactingseemstobeafeatureoftheworld,whilstinthesecond

it seems to be a feature of my psychology. Can these two different accounts of what my

reasonforactingwasbereconciledwithinasingletheoryofwhat it istobeareason?Most

theorists thinknot;most theorists think that in oneor theother of these caseswe are just

wrongaboutwhatmyreasonforactingwas.

First,therearethosetheoristswhotakewhathappenswhenIammistakentobeindicativeof

whathappenswhenI’mnot.Theyinsistthat,irrespectiveofwhetherornotitwasraining,my

reason for taking my umbrella was that I believed that it was raining (and not that it was

raining).Theoristsofthissort,so-called‘psychologists’,suggestthatourreasonsforactingcan

onlybefeaturesofourpsychology.

Second, and in contrast, there are those theorists who take what happens when I’m not

mistaken to be indicative of what happens when I am. They insist that, in both cases (i.e.

regardlessofwhetherornotitwasraining),myreasonfortakingmyumbrellawasthatitwas

raining (and not that I believed that it was raining). These theorists, whom I call

‘deliberativists’,insistthattheconsiderationinlightofwhichanagentactsistheirreasonfor

acting.

Third,therearethosetheorists,whomIcall ‘favourists’,whodonotseektolearnsomething

fromonecaseabouttheother; instead,they insistthatourreasonsforactingmustcount in

favourofouractions.Likedeliberativists,favouristsarguethat,whenitwasraining,myreason

fortakingmyumbrellawasthatitwasraining.However,unlikedeliberativists,favouristsinsist

thatifItakemyumbrellabecauseofamistakenbeliefthatitisrainingthenIdon’ttakeitfora

reason.

Incontrasttoallofthesetheorists,Ithinkthatthetwodifferentaccountsofwhatmyreason

for takingmyumbrellawascanbe reconciledwithina single theoryof reasons. I argue that

whatthefactthat it israiningandthefactthat Ibelievethat it israininghave incommonis

that, in their respective cases, they each explain why it was rational for me to take my

umbrella and why I took it. I suggest that it is in virtue of standing in those explanatory

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relationstomyactionthatthosefactswere,intheirrespectivecases,myreasonfortakingmy

umbrella.Moregenerally,Iarguethatthereisaclearsenseofwhatitistobeareasonthereis

for one to act, or a reason one has to act, or a reason for acting, according towhich such

reasonsexplainwhyitis,inacertainsense,rationalfortheagenttodotheactionsforwhich

theyarereasons.Icallthisaccount‘explanatoryrationalism’.

1 Whydoweneedanewtheoryofreasons?

If there are already three, distinct, andpopular theories of the relation between an agent’s

reasonforactingandtheiraction,whygolookingforafourth?Whydoweneedanewtheory

ofreasons?

Weneedanewtheoryofreasonsbecausetheexistingtheoriesare,asJonathanDancyputsit,

‘awkwardinthesortofwaythatisusuallyduetobadtheory.AsAristotlesaid,theyleaveone

sayingthingsthatnobodywouldsayunlessdefendingatheory.’(2008a,267)Forinstance,itis

awkwardtosay,asthepsychologistmust,thatmyreasonfortakingmyumbrellacouldnever

bethatitwasraining.Anditisawkwardtosay,asthedeliberativistmust,thatIcouldtakemy

umbrellaforthereasonthatitwasraining,eventhoughitwasn’t.Anditislikewiseawkward

tosay,asthefavouristmust,thatalthoughItakemyumbrelladeliberately,purposefullyand

intentionally, I don’t take it for a reason. And indeed, as I will show, these theories are

awkwardinyetotherwaysstill.

IstresstheawkwardnessofthesetheoriesnotbecauseItakethattobethelastwordontheir

plausibility;clearly,onecouldjustacceptthisawkwardnessasapricethatisworthpayingfor

anotherwiseconvenientaccountofwhatit istobeareason.Myaimisrathertomakeclear

that foreachof thesetheories there isaprice thatmustbepaid,andthat thepriceofeach

theoryissufficienttomotivatethesearchforlesscostlyalternatives.AsMariaAlvarezputsit:

prima facieparadoxical claimsarenot, ‘adecisiveargumentagainst theviews thatgenerate

thembut[they]seemtofavourconsideringwhetherthereisaplausiblealternativeviewthat

doesnotcommitonetosuchclaims.’(2016b,11)Soisthere?

2 Pluralismaboutreasons

Well,hereisanalternativethatsometheoristsfavour:perhapstherearejustdifferentsenses

ofwhatitistobeareason.Forinstance,perhapsthereisasenseofwhatitistobeareasonin

whichreasonsarewhatpsychologismsaystheyare,andperhapsthereisadifferentsenseof

whatitistobeareasoninwhichreasonsarewhatfavourismsaystheyare.Accordingtosuch

an account, if I takemy umbrella because I mistakenly believe that it is raining, there is a

(psychologistic) sense inwhich I take it fora reasonanda (favourist) sense inwhich Idon’t;

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likewise (topickadifferentexpression), there isa sense inwhich Ihad a reason to takemy

umbrella and a sense in which I didn’t. According to this pluralist theory of reasons, the

awkwardness that univocal theories of reasons face is merely the result of conflating two

differentsensesofasingleexpression;pluralisttheoriesthuspurporttobeexactlythesortof

plausiblealternativethatwearelookingfor.Butarethey?

Well,IagreethatwhenImistakenlybelievethatitisrainingthereisasenseinwhichItakemy

umbrellaforareasonandasenseinwhichIdon’t;so,tothatextent,Iampersuadedthatour

eventualtheoryofreasonsoughttobepluralist.However,Iamnotpersuadedthatweshould

relyonpluralismasameansofavoidingtheproblemsthatunivocaltheoriesofreasonsface.In

particular, it is not at all clear tome thatwhenever a univocal theory ends up entailing an

awkwardclaimitisbecauseithasconflatedtwodifferentsensesofasingleexpression.And,in

the light of that scepticism, pluralism seems less like a way of avoiding awkwardness, and

morelikeacapitulationtoit.

3 Explanatoryrationalism

Wheredoesallthisleaveme?Itleavesmesearchingforaunivocalaccountofwhatitistobea

reasonthatdoesn’tforcemetosayawkwardthings(or,moremodestly,thatdoesn’tforceme

tosay thesameawkwardthingsas theseother theories).To thatend, Ipresentexplanatory

rationalism:

Reasonexpression Explanatoryrationalism

Foranyp,pisareasonforAtoφ… …ifandonlyifpexplainswhyitisprotantorationalforAtoφ.

Foranyp,pisareasonforA’sφing… …ifandonlyifpexplainswhyitisprotantorationalforAtoφandpmakesA’sφing,insomerespect,worthdoing.

Foranyp,pisareasonAhastoφ… …ifandonlyifpexplainswhyitisprotantorationalforAtoφ.

Foranyp,pisA’sreasonforφing… …ifandonlyifpexplainswhyitisprotantorationalforAtoφandexplains(intherightway)whyAφ’d.

Table1:Explanatoryrationalism1

I will eventually argue that explanatory rationalism avoids all the problems that face other

theories because it is able to reconcile the idea that agents always act for psychological

reasonswith the idea that theymay sometimes also act for non-psychological reasons. But

1Twopointsareworthnoting:First,IsaythatanactionisprotantorationalforAifandonlyifAtakesitto be, in some respect, worth doing. See §(VI)1 for further discussion. Second, the categorisationschemausedinTable1isunusualinsofarasitallowsforthepossibilityofdistinguishingbetweeneachof the expressions listed (it is conventional to take at least some of these expressions to be co-extensive).Idefendthisapproach,atlength,in§(I).

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beforeIreachthatconclusion,IaddresswhatItaketobethemajorproblemforexplanatory

rationalism.

3.1 Theproblemforexplanatoryrationalism

Explanatoryrationalismclaims,amongstotherthings,thatanagentactsforthereasonthatp

onlyifpexplainsbothwhytheyactedandwhyitwas(protanto)rationalforthemtosoact.

Thismeansthat ifexplanatoryrationalismistobeconsistentwiththeclaimthatwhenIsaw

that itwasrainingmyreasonfortakingmyumbrellawasthat itwasraining(asI intenditto

be), then itmust be possible for the fact that itwas raining to explainbothwhy I tookmy

umbrellaandwhyitwasrationalformetotakemyumbrella.

Thereis,however,awell-rehearsedargumentagainstthispossibility.Thisargumentsaysthat

facts about things that are external to an agent’smind (e.g. the fact that it is raining) can’t

explainwhytheydidsomethingorwhyitwasrationalforthemtodoit,sincewhatanagent

does,orwhatitisrationalforthemtodo,onlydependsontheirmind.

For instance,noticethatevenif it isn’training,so longas Ibelievethat it israiningIwillstill

takemy umbrella; and Iwill take itbecause I believe that it is raining. Further, notice that,

given that Ineed tobelieve that it is raining inorder to takemyumbrella,even if I takemy

umbrella when it is raining Imust still take it because I believe that it is raining. Thus, the

argumentgoes, if thefactthat Ibelievethat it israiningcanexplainwhyItookmyumbrella

whetherornotitisraining,thenthefactthatitisrainingdoesnorealworkinexplainingwhyI

tookmyumbrella,and,therefore,itdoesnotexplainwhyItookit.2

Thisargumentisaproblemforanytheorythatsaysthatanagent’sreasonforactingcouldbe

somethingotherthanafeatureoftheirpsychology(asexplanatoryrationalism,favourismand

deliberativismalldo), and is thusprobably themotivatingargument forpsychologismabout

agents’reasonsforacting.Thus,inordertosaveexplanatoryrationalism,Ineedtosayhowit

isthat(inspiteoftheargumentabove)thefactthat it israiningcanexplainbothwhyItook

myumbrella,andwhyitwasrationalformetotakeit.

3.2 Myresponsetotheproblem

My response to thisproblem is to say that the fact that it is rainingexplainswhy I tookmy

umbrellabyexplainingwhyIbelievedthatitwasraining,whichinturnexplainswhyItookmy

umbrella.Likewise,Isuggest,thefactthatitwasrainingexplainswhyitwasrationalformeto

takemyumbrellabyexplainingwhyIbelievedthatitwasraining,whichinturnexplainswhyit2This argument can likewise be applied to the explanation ofwhy itwas rational forme to takemyumbrella.

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was rational forme to takemyumbrella. I argue that themistake in theargumentabove is

thatitrejectsthepossibilityofsuchdistalexplanations.

Thisresponsereliesonthetransitivityoftheexplanatoryrelationsinvolved:iftheexplanatory

relationsbetweenthefactthatitwasraining,thefactthatIbelievedthatitwasraining,and

thefactthatItookmyumbrellaweren’ttransitive,thenthefactthatitwasrainingwouldnot

explainwhyItookit.

However,explanatory relationsarenotalways transitive.Forexample, if Imistake thespray

from a sprinkler for rain, then the fact that the sprinkler is spraying in front ofmywindow

explainswhy I believe that it is raining,which explainswhy it is rational forme to takemy

umbrella.But,thefactthatasprinklerissprayinginfrontofmywindowdoesnotexplainwhy

itisrationalformetotakemyumbrella,inspiteoftheexplanatorychainconnectingthetwo

facts.So,theexplanatoryrelationsinvolvedaren’ttransitivewithoneanother.

Whyisitthatthetransitivityofexplanationfailsinthiscase,butapparentlysucceedswhenI

actually see rain? That is, given that the fact that the sprinklerwas spraying in front ofmy

windowandthefactthatitwasrainingboth(intheirrespectivecases)explainwhyIbelieved

that it was raining, why is it that (as I have suggested) only the latter explains why it was

rationalformetotakemyumbrella?Itisbecause,Iwillargue,theexplanatoryrelationshipsin

thecaseofthelatter,unliketheformer,areallofacertain,transitivesort.Inparticular,Iargue

thatthereisamysterious,non-causalexplanatoryrelationthatobtains,interalia,betweenthe

factthatpandthefactthatanagentbelievesthatpwhenanagentknowsthatp.

Ithusarguethat,inthecasewhenIsawrain,thefactthatitwasrainingexplainswhyitwas

rational for me to take my umbrella because it ismysteriously related to the fact that I

believed that it was raining (which in turn explains why it was rational for me to take my

umbrella).AndIarguethat,conversely,inthecaseinwhichIwasmistaken,thefactthatthe

sprinklerwasspraying in frontofmywindowdoesnotexplainwhy itwasrational formeto

takemyumbrellabecauseit isnotmysteriouslyrelatedtothefactthatIbelievedthatitwas

raining(it ismerelycausallyrelatedto it). Moreover, Iargue, inbothofthesecasesthefact

that it appeared to me as though it was raining is mysteriously related to the fact that I

believedthat itwasraining,sothat inbothofthesecasesthefactthat itappearedtomeas

though itwas rainingexplainswhy itwas rational forme to takemyumbrella (and, indeed,

explainswhyItookit).

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4 Mytheoryofreasons

Thus, according to explanatory rationalism, when I saw that it was raining, my reasons for

takingmy umbrella include the fact that it was raining, the fact that it appeared tome as

thoughitwasraining,andthefactthatIbelievedthatitwasraining.Incontrast,whenImerely

sawthesprayofthesprinkler,myreasonsfortakingmyumbrelladonotincludethe‘fact’that

it was raining (not least because it wasn’t raining) nor do they include the fact that the

sprinklerwas spraying in front ofmywindow, but they nonetheless include the fact that it

appearedtomeasthoughitwasraining,andthefactthatIbelievedthatitwasraining.

Unlike anyother univocal theoryof reasons, explanatory rationalism is thus consistent both

with theclaimthatagentsalwaysact forpsychological reasonsandwith theclaimthat they

sometimesactfornon-psychologicalreasons.And,indeed,itispreciselythisthatmeansthat

explanatory rationalism avoids the particular awkward claims that other theories face, and

which,moregenerally,makesit immunetomanyofthechallengesonewouldnormally level

against such theories. Thus, I argue, explanatory rationalism is the best univocal theory of

reasons.

However, since, as I noted, I am persuaded that theremay be two distinct senses to each

reasonexpression,myowntheoryofreasonsiswhatIcall‘newpluralism’.Newpluralismsays

thatonesenseofeveryreasonexpression isexplanatoryrationalist,whiletheothersense is

favourist; and this allowsme to say that, for instance, when I takemy umbrella because I

mistakenlybelievethatitisraining,thereisasenseinwhichmyreasonfortakingmyumbrella

isthatIbelievethatitisraining,andthereisasenseinwhichItakemyumbrellafornoreason.

The virtue of new pluralism over existing pluralist theories is that it does not rely on the

plurality of senses to avoid the awkwardness that univocal theories face – explanatory

rationalismalreadyavoidsthatawkwardnessonitsown.

5 ThatwhichIpassoverinsilence

Thereare a few topics aboutwhich this discussionmakesno claim. The first of these is the

ontology of reasons. For themost part Iwill talk as though reasons are propositions, if not

facts,however, this ismostly for convenience.Whilst therehasbeensomedebatebetween

those who take reasons to be facts (or states of affairs) and those who take them to be

psychological states, I make no particular claim about that. My theory is not about what

reasonsare; it isabouttherelation inwhichreasonsstandtotheactionsforwhichtheyare

reasons.SinceItakereasonstostandinexplanatoryrelationstotheactionsforwhichtheyare

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reasons,ifyouacceptmyaccountthenitwillbe(atleastinpart)yourviewontheontologyof

explanantiathatdetermineswhattheontologyofreasonsis.AndaboutthatImakenoclaim.

This leadsmetothesecondtopicaboutwhich Imakenoclaim:whatthecorrectanalysisof

explanationis.WhilstIdiscussexplanationinsomedepth,Imakenoclaimsaboutthespecific

relationsthatunderpinexplanatoryrelations,andwhattheconditionsforthemare.However,

itmaybethatsomeofthepurportedinstancesofexplanationthatIciteareincompatiblewith

some accounts of explanation. To my knowledge, there are no instances of this kind that

wouldbeofseriousconcernformyargument,anditismybeliefthatanalternativeconstrual

of my argument could be made whatever one’s theory of explanation. However, I may be

wrong;theremaybeaccountsofexplanationthatareinconsistentwithwhatIwantfrommy

theoryofreasons,inwhichcase,sobeit.

Thirdly, I will also leave the question of whether or not desires are reasons well alone. Of

course,weregularlysaythingslike:‘myreasonforgoingtothegymisthatIwanttogetfit’;

and, ‘my reason for going to the shops is to buy eggs’. Whilst I think that explanatory

rationalismhassomething tosayabouthowwe interpret thesesentences, Iwon’tdiscuss it

here,andIwon’tmentionsuchsentencesfurther.

Finally, I will not discuss reasons for belief. Many hold that reasons for belief should be

analysableinthesamesortofwayaspracticalreasons,andthisisaviewthatIshare.Itwould

be tempting, then, to extend explanatory rationalism into an analysis of what it is to be a

reasontobelievesomething,and, indeed, Ithinkthatsuchanaccountcouldbe illuminating.

However,Idon’tdiscussthathere.

6 Anoverviewofthisdiscussion

The structureof thisdiscussion is as follows. In§(I), I setoutmyapproach to talkingabout

theoriesofreasons.InparticularIcategorisetheoriesofreasonsaccordingtotheclaimsthey

make about each of the following expressions: ‘the reasons there are for one to act’; ‘the

reasonsfororagainstacting’;‘thereasonsonehastoact’;and‘one’sreasonforacting’.Thisis

at odds with the prevailing tendency to sort reasons into ‘normative’ and ‘motivating’;

however, for reasons that I will make clear, I prefer to eschew that terminology in my

categorisationschema.

17

Thediscussionof§(I)highlightsthreeclaimsaboutreasonsthatareprobablythemostwidely

held(thoughnotnecessarilybythesametheorists).Theseare:

Favourism about reasons to act: For anyp, p is a reason forA toφ if and only ifpmakesA’sφing,insomerespect,worthdoing.

Psychologismaboutthereasonsforwhichweact:Foranyp,pisareasonforwhichAφ’difandonlyifpisafeatureofA’spsychologythatrationalisesφingandexplains(intherightway)whyAφ’d.

Deliberativismaboutthereasonsforwhichweact:Foranyp,pisareasonforwhichAφ’difandonlyifpisaconsiderationinlightofwhichAφs.

In§§(II), (III)and(IV), respectively, Ishowthateachof theseaccounts is inconsistentwitha

numberofprimafaciereasonableclaims.Theproblemssetout inthesechaptersaremostly

alternative construals of arguments that have already been made against each of these

accounts,andtheyformthebasisofmyclaimthatallexistingtheoriesofreasonsare,insome

sense,awkward.

In§(V),Iconsiderwhetherweshouldjustadoptpluralismasasolutiontotheawkwardnessof

univocal theories. Iconcludethatweshouldnot:pluralism,at leastoftheconventionalsort,

fallsshortofwhatweneedfromanewtheoryofreasons.

In §(VI), I set the agenda for the remainder of the discussion. I introduce explanatory

rationalism, and I giveanoverviewof themainproblem for it (highlighted in thediscussion

above),whichIcall‘TheExplanatoryExclusionProblem’.Iprovideanoutlineofmyapproach

todiscussing,and,ultimately,solvingthisproblem,whichisasfollows.

In §(VII), Imake some assumptions about the structural principles and logical properties of

explanation.Whilemydiscussionreliesoncharacterisingexplanationinthisway,Idonotthink

thateithermysolutiontoTheExplanatoryExclusionProblem,ormytheoryofreasonsmore

generally,dependsonexplanatoryrelationsbeingsocharacterisable.

In§(VIII),IusetheassumptionsoftheprecedingchaptertoprovideaformalconstrualofThe

ExplanatoryExclusionProblem. Inparticular, I showhow its conclusion (that factsabout the

worldexternaltoanagent’smindcannotexplaintheagent’sactions)canbearrivedat from

twoseeminglytrivialclaimsaboutwhatexplainsanagent’sactionwhentheyactinerrororin

ignorance,togetherwithfiveseeminglyplausibleprinciplesofexplanation.

In§(IX), IshowhowTheExplanatoryExclusionProblemcanalsobeusedtoarguethatfacts

abouttheworldexternaltoanagent’smindcannotexplainwhyitisrationalforthemtoact.

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In§(X),Iconsidertwopopularaccountsofhow,forinstance,thefactthatitisrainingexplains

whyItookmyumbrella.Thefirstoftheseaccountssaysthatitdoessoelliptically;thesecond

saysthatitdoessodirectly.Iarguethatbothoftheseaccountsareflawed.

In§§(XI)&(XII),IdevelopmyaccountofhowthefactthatitisrainingexplainswhyItookmy

umbrella;Isaythatitexplainsitindirectly.Myargumentproceedsintwostages.First,in§(XI),

IarguethatweshouldrejecttheconclusionofTheExplanatoryExclusionProblembecauseitis

based on a false principle of explanation, the exclusion principle. The exclusion principle

implies that only themostproximal explanations of some explananda explain it; but this is

mistaken – I argue thatmost of the explanationswe are interested in are, to some extent,

distalexplanations.Then, in§(XII), Ishowhowthat insighthelps informtheaccountofhow

thefactthatitisrainingcanexplainwhyItookmyumbrella.Specifically,Isuggestthatthefact

that it is raining is adistal explanation ofmy action; it explainswhy I tookmy umbrella by

explaining amore proximal explanation of why I tookmy umbrella (namely, the fact that I

believedthatitwasraining).

In§(XIII),Isuggestthatthesameaccountexplainshowitisthat,forinstance,thefactthatitis

rainingcanalsoexplainwhyitisrationalformetotakemyumbrella.Thatis,thefactthatitis

rainingexplainswhyIbelievethatitisraining,whichinturnexplainswhyitisrationalforme

totakemyumbrella.

However,Inote,thisdoesnotmeanthatifanagent’sbeliefexplainswhyitisrationalforthem

todosomeaction,thenanythingthatexplainswhytheyhavethatbeliefwillalsoexplainwhy

it is rational for them to do that action. That is, I note, not all explanatory relations are

transitive.Ithensetthestagefortheremainderofthediscussion,whichseekstoprovidean

accountofwhentheexplanatoryrelationsinvolvedare,andwhentheyaren’t,transitive.

Myaccountproceeds in twostages.First, in§(XIV), I introducethemystery relation. Iargue

thatthemysteryrelationisanon-causal,transitive,explanatoryrelationthatrelates:thebelief

thatptosomejustificationforitwhenthatbeliefisjustified;thebeliefthatptothefactthatp

whenthebeliefthatp isknowledgeable;ajustificationforthebeliefthatptothefactthatp

when that justification affords theopportunity for knowledge; and an action to somebelief

thatexplainswhythatactionisrationalwhenthatactionisdoneintentionally.Then,in§(XV),

Iarguethatthemysteryrelationistransitivewiththenon-causalexplanatoryrelationinvolved

inexplainingwhysomeactionisrational,whereasmerelycausalexplanatoryrelationsarenot.

Thisiswhyfactsthatmerelycausallyexplainourbeliefs(suchasthefactthatthesprinkleris

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sprayinginfrontofmywindow,orfactsthatdeviantlycauseourbeliefs)donotexplainwhyit

isrationalforustoact.

Finally, in §(XVI), I revisit explanatory rationalism. I show how it responds to the problems

faced by other theories. I suggest that it is to some extent immune from the conventional

proceduresforgeneratingproblemsfortheoriesofreasonsbecauseitisconsistentbothwith

the claim that agents always act for psychological reasons and with the claim that they

sometimes act for non-psychological reasons. In light of these arguments, I suggest that

explanatoryrationalismisthebestunivocalaccountofwhatitistobeareason.

Iconcludebyreturningtothe intuitionthat,whensomeoneactsona falsebelief, there isa

sense in which they act for a reason and a sense in which they don’t. Since I share this

intuition,Iadvocatenewpluralism,whichsaysthatexplanatoryrationalismtellsusonesense

ofwhatitistobeareason,whilstfavourismtellsustheother.Ishowthatnewpluralismdoes

notfacethesameweaknessesasotherformsofpluralismbecausewheneveranagentactsfor

areasoninthefavouristsense,theyalsoactforareasonintheexplanatoryrationalistsense.

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ChapterSummary(I)ONTHEORIESOFREASONS

InwhichIsayhowweshouldcategorisetheoriesofreasons.Iarguethat,ifourcategorisationschema is to capture at least themain theories of reasons, then it should by allow for thepossibility of asmany kinds of reason as there are reason expressions. I say that instead ofdistinguishing between psychological and anti-psychological theories we should categorisetheoriesofreasonsaccordingtowhattheysay,foreachreasonexpression,abouttherelationbetweenthereasonspickedoutbythatexpressionandtheactionsforwhichtheyarereasons.And I say thatweshouldeschewthe terminologyof ‘normative’and ‘motivating’ reasons inourcategorisationschemaandinourtheorising,because,astheyarestandardlydefined,theymakesubstantiveclaimsaboutwhat it is tobea reason that it isproperly thebusinessofatheoryofreasonstodetermine,andthat,moreover,thoseclaimssystematicallydisadvantage‘psychological’ theories of reasons. To frame the discussion of practical reasons in terms‘normative’and‘motivating’reasonsis,Isuggest,aTrojanhorsethatearnesttheorisingoughttoreject.

(II)REASONSTOACTTHATMAKEACTIONSWORTHDOING

Inwhich I showwhat it costs to think that if there is a reason todo someaction then thataction is, in somerespect,worthdoing. I showhow ‘favourismabout reasons toact’ (whichentails that reasons to act make actions worth doing) clashes with some prima faciereasonableclaimsaboutacaseinwhichsomeoneactsonafalsebelief.Isetoutwhichclaimsthe proponent of this view must choose between rejecting and I categorise the commonchoicesfromtheliterature.

(III)ACTINGFORPSYCHOLOGICALREASONS

In which I showwhat it costs to think that the reason for which an agent acts is always afeature of their psychology. I showhow ‘psychologism about the reasons forwhichwe act’clasheswithsomeprimafaciereasonableclaims.Inparticular,Ishowthatisinconsistentwiththeideathatweareoftenabletoactforreasonsthatmakeouractionsmorallyworthyand,moregenerally,worthdoing.

(IV)ACTINGFORWHATYOUBELIEVE

InwhichIshowwhatitcoststothinkthatareasonforwhichanagentactsisthecontentofthe belief they acted on. I show how ‘deliberativism about the reasons for which we act’clashes with some prima facie reasonable claims about the factivity of reasons, theexplanatorypowerof thereasons forwhichweact, thefactivityofexplanationandwhatanagent’s reasons for acting are inGettier cases. I set outwhich claims the proponent of thisviewmustchoosebetweenrejecting.

(V)ONTHEPLURALITYOFREASONS

InwhichIexplainwhatapluralisttheoryofreasonsisandwhy‘goingplural’isnotapanacea.Isuggestthatagivenreasonexpressioncouldhavemorethanonesense,andIshowhowwecanaccommodatetheoriesofreasonsthatacceptthatidea,i.e.pluralisttheoriesofreasons,inourcategorisationschema.Idiscusssomeexamplesofpluralisttheoriesfromtheliterature.Ishow how pluralist theories can solve some of the problems discussed in the previouschapters.Iexplainwhypluralismisnot,however,enough,andIsuggestthatourinvestigationshouldgobeyondfavourism,psychologismanddeliberativism.

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(VI)ANEWFAMILYOFCLAIMSABOUTREASONS

InwhichIsetoutanewfamilyofclaimsaboutreasons,andintroducethemajorchallengetoit. Idefine ‘pro tanto rational’actionsasactions thatanagent takes tobe, in somerespect,worthdoing. I set out a new family of claims about reasons, explanatory rationalism,whichsaysthatallpracticalreasonsexplainwhytheactionsforwhichtheyarereasonsareprotantorational.Iintroducethemajorchallengeforexplanatoryrationalism,TheExplanatoryExclusionProblem,whichargues thatonly featuresof an agent’s psychology couldexplaineitherwhythey do something or why it was rational for them to do it. I set out the program for theforthcomingchapters.

(VII)WENEEDTOTALKABOUTEXPLANATION

Inwhich Imake someassumptions aboutexplanation. I saywhat Imeanby ‘explains’ and IstatethatIwilltalkasthoughexplanandaarefactsandexplanantiaarepropositions(whetherornot theyare). I distinguish two sortsof explanatory relation, ‘fully explains’ and ‘partiallyexplains’,wherea fullexplanation issufficient for thetruthof the fact that itexplainsandapartial explanation is an element (or subset) of a full explanation, and I make someassumptions about the logical properties of these relations. Lastly, I say that some fact is‘overexplained’justincasetherearetwogenuinelydifferentfullexplanationsofthatfact.

(VIII)THEEXPLANATORYEXCLUSIONPROBLEM

InwhichIsetoutTheExplanatoryExclusionProblem,whichis, insomeformoranother,themotivatingargumentforpsychologistictheoriesofreasons.IprovideaformalconstrualoftheProblem, showing how it results from two seemingly trivial claims about what explains anagent’s action when they act from error and from ignorance together with five seeminglyplausibleprinciplesofexplanation.IshowhowtheProblemimpliesthatIdidnotcongratulatemyfriendbecauseshehadwonanaward,butonlybecauseIthoughtshehad.

(IX)OTHERUSESFORTHEEXPLANATORYEXCLUSIONPROBLEM

InwhichIshowhowTheExplanatoryExclusionProblemcanbeusedtoarriveatsomeotherconclusionsthatareinconvenientforexplanatoryrationalism.IsetoutthegeneralformoftheProblem,followedbythegeneralformoftheargumentforthefirstpremiseoftheProblem.IshowtheProblemcanbeusedtoarguethat the fact that I readthatmy friendhadwonanawarddoesnotexplainwhy Icongratulatedher,andthatneitherthatfact,northefactthatshehadwonanaward,canexplainwhyitwasprotantorationalformetocongratulateher.

(X)HOWNORMATIVEREASONSDON’TEXPLAIN

In which I reject two accounts of how normative reasons explain. I re-introduce talk ofnormativereasons,definingthemasthingsthatmakeactions,insomerespect,worthdoing.Iaskhowitisthatwemanagetoexplainouractionswhenwesaythatweactedbecauseofanormativereasontherewastoact;forinstance:howisitthatIexplainwhyItookmyumbrellawhen I say that I took it because it was raining? I suggest that the fact that it was rainingexplainswhyItookmyumbrellaeither‘elliptically’, ‘directly’or‘indirectly’. Inotethatwhichanswer one accepts will depend on one’s response to The Explanatory Exclusion Problem:elliptical theorists accept the conclusion of the Problem, direct theorists reject the firstpremise, and indirect theorists reject the second. I set out the problemswith elliptical anddirecttheories.

(XI)THEEXCLUSIONPRINCIPLEISFALSE

In which I show that the exclusion principle is false. I provide two counterexamples to theexclusion principle, one involving causal explanation and another involving non-causalexplanation. I suggest that they are counterexamples because in each case the purportedlyexcluded fact explains the explanandum by explaining something that, in turn, explains the

22

explanandum. I suggest that theproblemwith theexclusionprinciple is that itdiscriminatesagainst all but the most proximal explanations of any given explanandum, and that this isproblematic at leastpartlybecauseweare typically interested inmoredistal explanations. Iexplainwhereour reasoningwentwrongandwhich full explanationanapparentlyexcludedfactispartof.

(XII)EXPLAININGWHYWEACT

Inwhich I say how normative reasons (and the appearance of them) explainwhywe act. Isuggest that normative reasons explain an agent’s action by explaining their belief that, inturn,explainstheagent’saction.Isuggestthattheyexplainanagent’sbeliefbyexplainingtheappearanceofthemthat,inturn,explainstheagent’sbelief.Isetouttheimplicationsofthisviewforexplanatoryrationalismandforanti-psychologicaltheoriesofreasonsmoregenerally.

(XIII)EXPLAININGWHYITISRATIONALTOACT

InwhichIsaywhensomethingexplainswhyit’srationaltoact,andwhenitdoesn’t.Isuggestthat normative reasons or appearances explainwhy it is rational to act only if they explainthosebeliefsthatinturnexplainwhyitisrationaltoact.Inotethatitistemptingtoinferthatif an agent’s belief explains why it is rational for them to do some action then whateverexplainsthatbeliefalsoexplainswhyitisrationalforthemtodothataction.Ishowhowthatinference leads to an apparent dilemma for explanatory rationalism. I counsel against thatinference, by noting that different kinds of explanatory relationsmay not be transitivewitheachother. I thensetout the taskahead: showing that theexplanatory relationsconcernedaretransitivewhen,andonlywhen,explanatoryrationalismneedsthemtobe.

(XIV)THEMYSTERYRELATION

In which I introduce the mystery relation. I suggest that a mysterious, non-causal relationobtainsbetweenabeliefandthejustificationthatitisbasedonwhenthatbeliefisjustified.Iargue that the mystery relation must be non-causal, because, as deviant causal chainsdemonstrate, a merely causal relation between a belief and some justification for it is notsufficient for that belief to be justified. I suggest that this exact same mysterious relationrelates: the belief that p to the fact that p when the belief that p is knowledgeable; ajustification for the belief that p to the fact that p when that justification affords theopportunityforknowledge;andanactiontosomebeliefthatexplainswhyitisrationalwhenthatactionisdoneintentionally.Iargue,furthermore,thatthismysteryrelationisatransitive,explanatoryrelation.

(XV)MYSTERYRELATIONSANDWHYITISRATIONALTOACT

Inwhich I say thatmystery relations are transitivewith the explanatory relation involved inexplainingwhyitisrational.Ilabelthesortofexplanatoryrelationthatobtainsbetween(i)thefactthatIbelievethatitisrainingand(ii)thefactthatitisprotantorationalformetotakeanumbrella,the‘E’-relation’.IarguethatthemysteryrelationistransitivewiththeE’-relation.Ishowhowthisaccordswithourintuitionsinsomeoftheexamplesalreadyconsidered.

(XVI)ANEWTHEORYOFREASONS

InwhichIsetoutmytheoryofreasons.IdiscusswhatexplanatoryrationalismsaysabouttheapplicationofeachreasonexpressiontothecasewhereItakemyumbrellahavingseenthatitis raining. Ishowhowexplanatoryrationalismsolvestheproblemsfacedbyothertheories. Isuggest that the best theory of reasons is a pluralist theory of reason that combinesexplanatory rationalism and favourism; I call this theory ‘new pluralism’. I show howexplanatory rationalism enables new pluralism to meet the main challenge to pluralisttheories.

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(I)

OnTheoriesofReasons

InwhichIsayhowweshouldcategorisetheoriesofreasons.Iarguethat,ifourcategorisationschemaistocaptureatleastthemaintheoriesofreasons,thenit should by allow for the possibility of asmany kinds of reason as there arereasonexpressions. I say that insteadof distinguishingbetweenpsychologicaland anti-psychological theories we should categorise theories of reasonsaccording to what they say, for each reason expression, about the relationbetween the reasons picked out by that expression and the actions forwhichthey are reasons. And I say that we should eschew the terminology of‘normative’ and ‘motivating’ reasons in our categorisation schemaand in ourtheorising, because, as they are standardly defined, they make substantiveclaimsaboutwhatitistobeareasonthatitisproperlythebusinessofatheoryof reasons to determine, and that, moreover, those claims systematicallydisadvantage ‘psychological’ theories of reasons. To frame the discussion ofpracticalreasons interms‘normative’and‘motivating’reasons is, Isuggest,aTrojanhorsethatearnesttheorisingoughttoreject.

Within the domain of practical reasons, it is common to distinguish two kinds of reason:

normative and motivating. It is typical1to then categorise theories of reasons according to

whether or not they take reasons of each kind to be (exclusively) features of the agent’s

psychology.Ifwesaythatatheoryis‘psychological’withrespecttoagivenkindofreasonifit

says that a reason of that kind is always a feature of the agent’s psychology, and ‘anti-

psychological’ if it denies that view, we have the following, ‘standard’ categorisation of

theoriesofreasons:

Theory Normativereasons Motivatingreasons

‘TheReceivedView’2 Anti-psychological Psychological

‘Anti-psychologism’ Anti-psychological Anti-psychological

‘Extremepsychologism’3 Psychological Psychological

TableI-1:The‘standard’categorisationoftheoriesofreasons

Despite its ubiquity, this categorisation schema is, as I will argue, only useful within the

confinesofafairlynarrowtheoreticalframework.Inparticular,itisnotwellsuitedtothetask

(forwhichitmaywellnothavebeenintended)ofdistinguishingmanyofthemaintheoriesof1(E.g.Dancy2000;Sandis2013;O’Brien2015)2ThisviewisthetargetofDancy’scriticisminhisPracticalRealityand iswhatMitova(2015)callsthe‘Standard Story’. It is typically attributed to Smith (1987), however, in §(V) I will challenge thisattribution.3‘Extremepsychologism’isanamethatIhaveborrowedfromMitova(2015),whodefendsthatview.

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reasons fromoneanother,because: (i) itonlyallowsfor twokindsofpractical reason,while

someprominenttheoriesallowformore;(ii)thecategorisationoftheoriesintopsychological

and anti-psychological cannot discriminate between distinct anti-psychological theories; and

(iii) given the way that ‘normative’ and ‘motivating’ reasons are now standardly defined,

assuming that they are picked out by any given reason expression involves a theoretical

commitmentthatatleastsometheoriesofreasonswouldandshouldreject.

IncriticisingthiscategorisationschemaImeantocriticisenoworkinparticular.Itmaybethat

the schema, so represented, isa strawman in so farasnooneholds it in itsentirety (orat

leastnot for thepurposeofsortingdifferenttheoriesof reasons).Nonetheless, I take it that

everythingthatIcritiqueisheldbyatleastsome,andsomeofthatwhichIcritiqueisheldby

many–so,sincemydiscussionisoftheconstituentpartsoftheschema,whetherornotthe

complex isgenerallyendorsed isneitherherenor there. If it turnsout thateveryoneagrees

thatthestandardschemaisofnouseincategorisingdistincttheoriesofreasonsthenwhatthe

discussionthatfollowswillhavedoneisdemonstratewhythatisthecase,aswellasoffering

analternativethatisbettersuitedtothatend.

Tore-iterate,myaim,inwhatfollows,istodemonstratethatwhatIhavecalledthe‘standard’

schemaisnotwellsuitedtothetaskofdiscriminatingbetweendifferenttheoriesofreasons,

andtoproposeanalternatecategorisationschemathatisbettersuitedtothattask.

1 Howmanykindsofreasonarethere?

Ingeneral,ifweuseoneexpressiontorefertoonethingandadifferentexpressiontoreferto

somethingelse,wehaveaprima faciebasis for thinking that the twothingsareofdifferent

kinds.Ofcourse,itmayturnoutthattwodifferentexpressionsareusedtopickoutthesame

kindofthing(e.g.‘abachelor’and‘asingleman’),butbeforewedeterminewhatkindofthing

theypickout,adifferenceintheformofanytwoexpressionsgivesusaprimafaciebasisfor

thinkingthattheypickoutdifferentkindsofthing.

Conversely, ifweuse thesameexpression to refer to twodifferent things,wehaveaprima

faciebasisforthinkingthatthedifferentthingsareofacommonkind.Ofcourse,itmayturn

outthatthesameexpressioncanbeusedtopickoutdifferentkindsofthing(asinthecaseof

homonymslike‘abat’(ananimal)and‘abat’(anitemofsportsparaphernalia)),butbeforewe

determinethatthatisthecase,thesamenessoftheexpressiongivesusaprimafaciebasisfor

thinkingthatthethingsthatitpicksoutareallofacommonkind.

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So,whenwewanttoworkouthowmanykindsofreasonthereare,agoodwaytostartisto

lookatthedifferentexpressionsthatweusetopickoutthingsthatwecall‘reasons’.Hereare

whatIwilltaketobethemainones:

- Reasonstherearetoact;

- Reasonsforandreasonsagainstacting;

- Reasonsonehastoact;

- One’sreasonforacting;and

- Reasonswhy.

All of these expressions pick out reasons of one kind or another. Each expression has a

differentform,so,Isuggest,atleastbeforewedeterminewhatkindofreasontheyeachpick

out,wehaveaprimafaciebasisforthinkingthattheyeachpickoutdifferentkindsofreason.

Moreover,becausehomonymsaretheexception,nottherule,wehaveaprimafaciebasisfor

believingthattheyeachpickoutonlyonekindofreason.Ofcourse,furtheranalysismayyield

thefindingthatsomeoftheseexpressionspickoutthesamekindofreason,orthatsomepick

outmore thanonekindof reason,but thatshouldbeaconclusionofour theorising,notan

assumptionwithwhichwebegin.So,sincewehavefivedifferentreasonexpressions,wehave

a prima facie basis for thinking that there are five different kinds of reason – one

correspondingtoeachreasonexpression.

Someclarifications,fortheavoidanceofdoubt:firstly, Itaketwokindsofreason,kindAand

kindB,tobedifferentkindsofreasonifandonlyiftheconditionsforbeingareasonofkindA

differ from the conditions for being a reason of kind B. Secondly, saying that there are

differentkindsof reasondoesnotmeanthatoneandthesamethingcannotbeareasonof

each kind, but nor does it mean that they can. Rather, it is for your theory of reasons to

determinewhetherornotreasonsofonekindcanalsobereasonsofanotherkind;anditwill

dosobytellingyouwhattheconditionsforbeingareasonofeachofthosekindsare.Lastly,

tworeasonexpressionspickoutreasonsofthesamekindifandonlyiftheyareco-extensive.

1.1 Reasonexpressionsinthestandardschema

Thestandardschemaassumesthattherearejusttwokindsofreason–thisistheassumptionI

wish to criticise in this section. The standard schema also makes assumptions about the

conditions under which something is a reason of either kind, which further restricts its

usefulness,butIwillreturntothatissuein§4.

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Giventhateachreasonexpressionpicksoutreasonsofonekindoranother,inassumingthat

there are only two kinds of reason, the standard schemamust assume that several of the

reasonexpressionsconsideredpickout reasonsof thesamekind.Andthat is indeedso: the

standard schema typically assumes (either implicitly or explicitly) that the first three reason

expressions (‘reasons thereare toact’; ‘reasons for/against acting’; and ‘reasonsonehas to

act’)allpickoutreasonsofonekind,whilethelattertwoexpressions(‘one’sreasonforacting’

and‘reasonswhyoneacts’)pickoutreasonsoftheotherkind.

The standard schema may well be correct about the co-extensivity of some of these

expressions – but that is a conclusion to be argued for, it is not something to be assumed

beforeonehasbeguntheorisinginearnest.Onereasonnottomakethisassumptionfromthe

outsetisthatwehaveaprimafaciebasisforthinkingthatthedifferentexpressionsaren’tco-

extensive–namely,thefactthattheyaredifferentexpressions.

However,thedifferencesbetweentheexpressionsnotwithstanding,assumptionsoftheirco-

extensivitymightbetolerableiftheequivalencebetweenparticularexpressionswereobvious,

oratleastun-contentious–butthatiscertainlynotthecase.Indeed,asweshallsee,several

theoriesofreasonsalreadydistinguishbetweenexpressionsthatthestandardschematakesto

beco-extensive,andthosetheoriesconsequentlyescapecategorisationwithinthatschema.

I want to make the case for a categorisation schema that allows for the possibility of

distinguishingbetweeneachofthereasonexpressionsIlist.Ialsowanttomakeclearwherea

theoryofreasonsisrequiredtodrawadistinctionbetweendifferentexpressions.And,lastly,I

wanttosaywhichofthesereasonexpressionsweshouldandwhichweshouldnotincludein

our categorisation schema. The following sections discuss each expression, with a view to

achievingeachoftheseaims.

1.2 Reasonstherearetoact

Thereisareasonformetogoforaswim.ToavoidcontroversyIwon’tsaywhat it is–butI

takeittobeuncontroversialtosaythatif(andonlyif)thereisareasonformetoswimthen

something4is the reason that there is. I take it to be likewise uncontroversial to say that if

somethingisareasonthereisformetoswimthenitisareasonformetoswim.5

4Imakenoassumption(yet)abouttheontologyofthatsomething–itcouldbeafact,astateofaffairs,amentalstateorwhateveryoulike.5These remarks are obviously intended to generalise beyond me and my swimming. But, for theavoidanceofdoubt, I take thestatement that ‘something is reasonthere is forA toφ’ tobe logicallyequivalent to ‘that same thing is a reason forA toφ’ and ‘there is a reason forA toφ’. I take thedifference in the forms of words here to be so slight as to preclude effective distinction – so our

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Hereisaseemingly‘pre-theoretic’observationwecanmakeaboutthekindofreasonpicked

outbytheexpression‘thereasonstherearetoact’:somethingcanbeareasonforAtoφeven

ifAdoesnotφ.Forinstance,therecanbeareasonformetoswimevenifIdon’tswim.That

is,itdoesnotimpingeonthereason-hoodofareasontoactifonedoesnotdotheactionthat

itwasareasontodo.

Isuggestwesaythatifthereason-hoodofreasonsofacertainkindisnotdependentonthe

occurrence of the action for which they are a reason, then reasons of that kind are

‘independent’oftheactionsforwhichtheyarereasons.6Thus,reasonstoactareindependent

oftheactionsforwhichtheyarereasons.

1.3 Reasonsforandreasonsagainstacting

I’mdebatingwhetherornottoswim:therearereasonsforandreasonsagainstmyswimming7

–don’tworryaboutwhattheyare.Likereasonstherearetoact,reasonsfororagainstacting

are independent of the actions for which they are reasons: something can be a reason for

swimming(orareasonagainstswimming)evenifIdon’t(ordo)swim.

While they differ in their form, I have grouped ‘reasons for’ and ‘reasons against’ because

thereseemstobeaclearsenseinwhichtheirmeaningsareinter-related–theyareopposites.

Sowhateverwelearnaboutthekindofreasonpickedoutbyonewilltellussomethingabout

the kind picked out by the other. As is typical in the literature, I will mostly restrict my

discussiontothe‘reasonsfor’expression.

Aswenoted in §1.1, it is typically assumed that ‘reasons there are to act’ and ‘reasons for

acting’areco-extensiveexpressions(it isalsotypical toassumethat ‘reasonsnottoact’and

‘reasonsagainst acting’are likewiseco-extensive). I think this is amistake– I think that the

prepositionsmattertothemeaning,andthatthetwoexpressionspickoutdifferentkindsof

reason.However,Iamnotarguingforthisclaimatthisstage;fornow,Iamonlyarguingthat

ourcategorisationschemashouldallowforthepossibilityofdifferencebetweenthem.

Thatis,atthisstageIneitheracceptnordenythat‘reasonstherearetoact’and‘reasonsfor

acting’alwayspickoutthesamekindofreason:allthatIamsayingisthat,inspiteofthefact

thattheyarebothindependentoftheactionsforwhichtheyarereasons,thedifferenceinthe

categorisation schema need not distinguish between them. Nonetheless, I state these assumedequivalenceswithaviewtomakingmyassumptionsclear.6 This will contrast them with those kinds of reason (introduced in §1.5) whose reason-hood isdependentontheoccurrenceoftheactionforwhichtheyarereasons,whichIcall‘dependent’reasons.7Again, if thereare reasons for swimming thensomething isa reason for swimming,and if therearereasonsagainstswimmingthensomethingisareasonagainstswimming.Andagain,theseequivalencesgeneralisebeyondmeswimming.

28

form of these reason expressions gives a prima facie basis for thinking that they pick out

different kinds of reason.Moreover, since I eventuallywant to advocate a theory thatdoes

distinguish between the reasons picked out by these expressions, if my theory is to be

represented withinmy own categorisation schema, I had better allow for the possibility of

suchadistinction.

1.4 Reasonsonehastoact

Ihaveareasontoswim.Again,ItakeittobeuncontroversialtosaythatifIhaveareasonto

swimthensomethingisthereasonthatIhavetoswim.8And,likereasonsthereareformeto

swim(andreasonsforswimming),reasonsthatIhavetoswimareindependentoftheactions

forwhichtheyarereasons:onecanhaveareasontoswim(oreat,orgototheshops)without

doingso.

Aswe have seen, it is typical to take the expressions ‘the reasons one has to act’ and ‘the

reasons there are to act’ to be co-extensive. As it happens, I share this view, but we

nonetheless should not start with this assumption, much less incorporate it into our

categorisationschema,forthefollowingreasons:firstly,asI’vealreadystressed,thedifference

betweentheformsoftheexpressionsgivesusaprimafaciebasis forthinkingthattheypick

outdifferentkindsofreason,soit isodd, ifnotcounter-productive,tostart(asthestandard

categorisation schema does) by assuming that they don’t. Secondly, andmore importantly,

severalauthors(e.g.Hornsby2008;Schroeder2008;ComesañaandMcGrath2014)rejectthe

view that these expressions are co-extensive; and their theories consequently escape

categorisationwithinthestandardschema.Andthirdly,asweshallsee,assumingthatthereis

no distinction between the kinds of reasons picked out by these expressions conceals a

possiblesolutiontooneofthemainproblemsforthedominantaccountofthereasonsthere

aretoact.9

So,inspiteofthefactthatthekindsofreasonpickedoutbytheexpressions,‘reasonsonehas

toact’and‘reasonstherearetoact’,arebothindependentofthereasonsforwhichtheyare

actions,wenonethelesshavegoodgrounds forusingacategorisationschemathatallowsat

least for the possibility of distinguishing between the kinds of reason picked out by these

expressions.

8Thismakesnoassumptionabouttheontologyofthatthing(inparticular–sayingthatsomethingisthereason Ihavetoswimdoesnotassumethatthatthingneedbeafactratherthan,say,an intentionalobject).9Seethediscussionofthe‘TheRationalActionProblem’in§(II)4.1.

29

1.5 One’sreasonforacting

Ithinkabouthowswimmingwillimprovemymood,howIwillsleepbetterifIswim,andother

thingsbesidesand,aftersomedeliberation,Idecidetoswim.Iheadoffanddoit:Iswimfora

reason.Asever,Iwon’tsaywhatmyreasonforswimmingwas.10

Some, hopefully, un-contentious equivalences: I swam for a reason if and only if something

wasmyreasonforswimming,andsomethingwasmyreasonforswimming ifandonly if (i) I

swamforthatreasonand(ii)itwasthereasonforwhichIswam.11Thelatterremarkisperhaps

themostcontentious(buthopefullynotespeciallyso)oftheequivalencesIhavedrawn,inso

farasItake‘myreasonforswimming’tobeequivalentto‘thereasonforwhichIran’inspite

oftheobviousdifferenceintheformoftheseexpressions.Itiscertainlyinprinciplepossibleto

distinguishbetweenthem,however,IhaveelectednottoonthebasisthatIknowofnotheory

that does (so the equivalence is seemingly uncontentious) and so, for the sake of brevity, I

assumenodistinction fromtheoutset.Perhaps Iamnot followingmyown instruction–but

my assumption is at least plain, so that those who disagree with it may revisemy schema

knowingasmuch.

While the standard categorisation schema draws no distinction between the reason

expressions discussed in the previous three sections, it does, as I have noted, distinguish

betweenthosereasonexpressionsand‘theagent’sreasonforacting’.Now,whileIwantusto

abandon the standard categorisation schema, I agreewith its implicit verdict that there are

unequivocalgroundsfordifferentiatingthekindsofreasonpickedoutby‘thereasonforwhich

the agent acts’ from the kinds picked out by the expressions already considered, which go

beyondameredifferenceinform.12WhatdoItakethosegroundstobe?

Considerthis:somethingcannotbeone’sreasonforφingunlessoneφs.Thatis,Ican’tswim

for a reasonunless I swim, so something can’t be the reason forwhich I swamunless I did

indeedswim.Andthisistrueeveniftheactionisinthefuture:somethingmightnowbethe

reasonforwhichIwillswim,butitisonlysoifIdoindeedswim(ifIdon’tgoontoswimthenit

isn’t now the reason for which I will swim). So, unlike the reason expressions already

considered,thereason-hoodofthereasonspickedoutbythisexpressionarenotindependent

10In particular, the story of my deliberative process need lead us to no conclusions about what myreasonforswimmingwas.11Again, these remarks should generalise beyond me and my swimming, but, for the avoidance ofdoubt,Itakethestatementthat‘somethingwasA’sreasonforφing’tobelogicallyequivalentto‘thatsamethingisareasonforwhichAφ’d’and‘Aφ’dforareason’.12Icallthisits‘implicitverdict’onlybecausethestandardapproachdoesnotgenerallytakeadifferenceinformtobesufficientgroundsforallowingthepossibilityofadistinction–asthefailuretodistinguishbetweenthereasonexpressionsalreadyconsidereddemonstrates.

30

of theactions forwhichtheyarereasons–theyare, letussay, ‘dependent’onthem, inthe

sensethatthereason-hoodofsuchreasonsdependsontheoccurrenceoftheactionforwhich

itisareason.

So,thekindofreasonpickedoutbytheexpression‘thereasonsforwhichAφs’isdistinctfrom

the kind(s)13picked out by the reason expressions of the previous sections (because the

conditionsforbeingareasonoftheformerkinddifferfromtheconditionsforbeingareason

ofthelatterkind(s)).14Thismeansthatnotonlymustourcategorisationschemaallowforthe

possibilityofdistinguishingthissortofreasonfromthosealreadyconsidered,butanytheory

of reasons should alsomake clear that this expressiondoes pick out a reasonof adifferent

kind.

1.6 Reasonswhy

Therewas a reasonwhy I swam. Likemy reasons for swimming (or the reasons forwhich I

swam),thereasonswhyIswamaredependentonthatwhichtheyareareasonfor:ifthereisa

reasonwhyIswamthenImusthaveswum.

Aswehavenoted,thestandardschemadoesnotsystematicallydistinguishbetweenthekinds

of reasonpickedoutby ‘the reasonwhysomeoneacts’and ‘the reason forwhich theyact.’

Nonetheless,thedifferenceintheirformsstillgivesusaprimafaciebasisfordistinguishingthe

twoexpressions,and this isdespite the fact that theybothpickoutakindof reason that is

dependentonthatwhichitisareasonfor.Moreover,recentscholarshiphasforcefullymadea

case for distinguishing between the kinds of reason picked out by the two expressions that

goesbeyondthemeredifferenceintheirform.15

Firstly,wecanreadilyobservethat,inspiteoftheirbothbeingdependentreasons,something

canbeareasonwhyanagentactswithoutbeingtheirreasonforacting.Forexample,thefact

thatI’mchoppingonionsmaybeareasonwhyI’mcryingwithoutbeingmyreasonforcrying(I

amnotcryingforareason,thoughthereisareasonwhyIamcrying).Likewise,thefactthat

Anthony was given a posthypnotic suggestion might be a reason why he drinks vinegar,

withoutbeinghis reason fordrinking it, and that is soeven ifhedrinks it fora reason.One

13The parenthetical pluralisation is to note that these reason expressions may or may not pick outdifferentkindsofreason.14Weshouldnotethatthisisnottosaythatoneandthesamethingcannotbeareasonofeachkind(asIalreadyremarkedintheclarificationsattheendof§1.1);itisjusttonotethattheexpressionspickoutreasonsofdifferentkinds.Thatis,totheextentthatasinglereasoncanbepickedoutbytheexpression‘the reason for which they acted’ and, for instance, ‘a reason they had to act’ (and, at this stage, Iassume nothing about whether or not they can) it is because that which is picked out is both adependentandanindependentreason–itistwodifferentkindsofreason.15See,inparticular,Alvarez(2010)butalsoAudi(2001),Dancy(2000)andHieronymi(2011).

31

neednot,Ithink,acceptanyparticulartheoryofreasonsinordertoacceptthetruthofthese

claimsand,moreover,theirtruthalreadyprovidesabasisfordistinguishingbetweenthekinds

of reason picked out by the expressions ‘the reasons why one acted’ and ‘the reasons for

whichoneacted,’thatgoesbeyondameredifferenceinform.

Secondly,andmoregenerally,thekindofreasonpickedoutbythe‘reasonwhy’expressionis

different to thosepickedoutbyallof thereasonexpressionsalreadyconsideredbecause its

relata are different. While all the reasons picked out by the reason expressions already

considered relate toactions,a reasonwhy is related toa fact (orproposition). For instance,

compare the relata of these expressions: ‘my reason for swimming’; and ‘the reasonwhy I

swam’–whileswimmingisanaction,‘Iswam’isasentence.

Thedifference in relata is alsoof some relevance toour thirdobservation:because reasons

why relate to facts, the sorts of things they are reasons for need not be in anyway agent

involving.Forinstance,therearereasonswhytheEarthorbitstheSunandtherearereasons

whytheDawlishseawallcollapsedin2014.Neitheroftheseisanagent-involvingoccurrence;

theEarthandtheDawlishseawallaren’t/weren’tagentsandtheydidn’tdowhatthey‘did’for

reasons.

Ifwesaythatreasonsthatareessentiallyagent-involvingare‘practical’kindsofreasons,then

thekindofreasonspickedoutbythe‘reasonwhy’expressionisnotapracticalkindofreason.

This does not mean ‘reasons why’ never relate to agent-involving activities, that is, for

instance,itdoesnotmeanthattherecan’tbereasonswhyagentsdothings;itjustmeansthat

‘reasons why’ are not exclusively agent-involving (because they sometimes don’t involve

agents).

In contrast, there are no reasons for the Earth to orbit the Sun (or reasons for the Earth’s

orbitingtheSun,orreasonstheEarthhastoorbittheSun),andthereisnothingthatcouldbe

called‘theEarth’sreasonfororbitingtheSun’becausethekindsofreasonpickedoutbythese

expressionsarepractical;sotheydon’tapplytothingsthataren’tagents,liketheEarth.Unlike

the‘reasonwhy’expression,then,allthereasonexpressionsoftheprevioussectionspickout

practicalkindsofreason.16

So,thekindofreasonpickedoutbythe‘reasonwhy’expressionisdistinctfromthekindsof

reasonpickedoutbytheexpressionsalreadyconsidered(becauseithasdifferentrelataandit

isn’tpractical).This isn’t tosay thatsomething that isa reasonofapracticalkindcannever

16Ofcoursetheseremarksdonotamounttoaproofthatthekindsofreasonpickedoutbythepreviousexpressionsarepractical–butItakethattobeclearenoughthatwecanassumeitwithoutcontroversy.

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alsobeareasonwhysomeonedoessomething17;itisjusttoacknowledgethattheconditions

for being a practical reason differ from the conditions for being a reasonwhy. That is, the

conditionsforbeingareasonofthekindpickedoutbythe‘reasonwhy’expressiondifferfrom

theconditionsforbeingareasonofthekindpickedoutbyanyoftheotherexpressions;the

‘reasonwhy’expressionpicksoutadifferentkindofreasontothereasonexpressionsalready

considered.

1.7 Asummaryofreasonexpressions

Isaidthattwokindsofreasonaredifferentkindsofreason if,andonly if, theconditionsfor

beingareasonofonekinddifferfrombeingareasonoftheotherkind.18Thediscussionofthe

previoussectionshasestablishedthatthereareatleastthreekindsofreason:independent&

practical reasons; dependent & practical reasons; and independent & non-practical reasons

(seeTableI-2).

Reasonexpression Dependent/Independent Practical/Non-practical

Reasonstherearetoact Independent Practical

Reasonsforacting Independent Practical

Reasonsonehastoact Independent Practical

One’sreasonforacting Dependent Practical

Reasonswhy Dependent Non-practical

TableI-2:Reasonexpressionsandthekindsofreasontheypickout

In addition, I have argued that, in spite of the fact that the standard categorisation schema

ordinarilydrawsnodistinctionbetweenthereasonstherearetoact, reasonsforacting,and

thereasonsonehastoact(thatis,theexpressionsthatpickoutindependentkindsofreason)

oranagent’sreasonforactingandthereasonswhytheyact(thatis,theexpressionsthatpick

outdependentkindsofreason)weshouldnonethelessuseacategorisationschemathatallows

for thepossibilityofdistinguishingbetween them, in particular, so thatwe candiscriminate

betweenalreadyexistingtheories.19

17Indeed, it is common toassume that reasonsof thekindpickedoutby theexpression ‘theagent’sreason for acting’ are always reasonswhy the agent acts (see §(IV)1.2 for further discussion of thispoint).18Tostressapoint Ihavealreadymade:thisdefinition isnotmeanttoprecludethepossibilityofoneandthesamethingbeingareasonoftwodifferentkinds.19Myargumentswere,inbrief,thatthedifferenceinformprovidesaprimafaciebasisforbelievingthatthey pick out different kinds of reason, that some theories already distinguish between the reasons

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Thus,Iproposethefollowing,provisionalcategorisationschema:

Reasonsthereareto

act

Reasonsforacting

Reasonsonehasto

act

Reasonsforwhichoneacts

Reasonswhyoneacts

Theoryofreasons Claim… Claim… Claim… Claim… Claim…

TableI-3:Aprovisionalcategorisationschema

In the next section I will consider the character of the claims that differentiate theories of

reasons.Havingdoneso,Iwillsuggestarevisiontothisprovisionalschemathatomitsthenon-

practicalkindofreason,reasonswhy.

2 Claimsaboutreasons

WhatIhavecalledthe‘standardschema’categorisestheoriesonthebasisofwhetherornot

they take reasons of a given kind to be exclusively psychological. In doing so, however, this

schemaobscures themany differences betweendistinct anti-psychological theories. Indeed,

whatthestandardschemacalls‘anti-psychologism’isnotsomuchatheoryofreasonsasitisa

collectionofdifferenttheoriesofreasonsthat,despitesharingacommitmenttothefalsityof

thepsychologicalviewofanykindofreason,varyinmanyotherrespects.

For instance,differentversionsofanti-psychologismdisagreeonwhetherornotreasonscan

befalse,andwhetherornottheexistenceofareasondependsonanagent’sperspective–but

the standard schema is incapable of recognising such disagreement. That is, of course,

perfectly fine so long as one’s focus is on psychologism and its discontents, but it becomes

quite inappropriatewhen onewants to categorise theories of reasons from amore general

perspective.

Furthermore, although there are alternatives to the psychological vs. anti-psychological

categorisation that can differentiate between different forms of anti-psychologism, they, in

contrast,obscurethedifferencesbetweenpsychologicaltheoriesandthedifferentvariantsof

anti-psychologism.Forinstance,Turri(2009)categorisestheoriesofreasonsaccordingtotheir

ontology–separatingtheoriesthattakereasonstobefacts,fromthosethattakethemtobe

mental states and again from those that take them to be intentional objects (that is, the

contents of mental states). However, a strict 20 ontology-based categorisation is no less

therearetoactandthereasonsonehastoact,andthatIwishtodistinguishbetweenthereasonstherearetoactandreasonsforacting.20Isay‘strict’becausemanytake‘factualism’tobetheviewthatreasonsarefactsandthattheyarenotexclusively psychological (indeed, it’s common to use ‘factualism’ to name the view that reasons arefacts that favour actions that are consequently typically non-psychological). This, of course, is not a

34

problematic than the standard schema’s approach, because (as Alvarez (2016b, 3) notes) it

cannotdiscriminatebetweenapsychologicaltheorythatsaysthatreasonsareallfacts(about

anagent’smind)andananti-psychologicaltheorythatsimilarlysaysthatreasonsareallfacts

(aboutallkindsofthings),sinceboththeorieshaveacommon,factualistontology.21

Alternatively, Lord (2015), Alvarez (2016a) and Way and Whiting (2017) divide theories

accordingtowhetherornottheytaketheexistenceofagivenkindofreasontodependonan

agent’s perspective. However, the categorisation of theories into ‘perspectivist’ and

‘objectivist’similarlyfailstodistinguishperspectivistanti-psychologicaltheoriesfrom(equally

perspectivist)psychologicaltheories.

Onecould,perhaps,surmounttheseproblemsbycategorisingthedifferenttheoriesonseveral

or all of these aspects,22but I think that such a response would be to miss the point. The

problemwithalloftheseapproachesisnotthattheyeachonlycaptureoneaspectofvariation

betweentheories.Rather, Isuggest, it isthattheyputthecartbeforethehorseinthesense

that they classify theories of reasons according to their stance on a particular topic, rather

thanwhatdeterminesthatstance,whichis,Isuggest,whatthetheoryactuallyisabout.

Towit,theanswerstothequestionsofwhetherornotreasonsarepsychological,ofwhattheir

ontology is andofwhetherornot their existencedependsonanagent’sperspective are all

determined by the answer to this, more fundamental question: for a given kind of reason,

whatistherelationbetweenreasonsofthatkindandtheactionsforwhichtheyarereasons?

Letuscall this relation the ‘reason-relation’: if you think that the reason-relation foragiven

kindofreasonissuchthat itcanrelatenon-psychologicalthingstoactions,thenyourtheory

willcomeoutanti-psychologicalforthatkindofreason,orifyouthinkthatthereason-relation

for a given kind of reason is such that it is not a factive relation, then you will, perhaps,

conclude that reasons of that kind are not facts (perhaps they are intentional objects – but

thatwilldependonwhatyouthinkthereason-relationis…).Inthisway,whatatheorytakes

thereason-relationtobejustdeterminesitsanswertotheseotherquestions.

Thejobofatheoryofreasonsis,interalia,tosayhowmanykindsofreasonthereareandto

then explainwhat the reason-relation is for each kind of reason. The standard approach to

strictlyontologicalclassification–anontologicalclassificationisonethatclassifiestheoriesonthebasisoftheirontologyalone.21Thequestionofwhattheyarefactsaboutisnotanontologicalone,andsocannotfeatureinastrictlyontologicalclassification.22 For instance, one could differentiate between theories that are perspectivist & psychological;perspectivist&anti-psychological;andobjectivist&anti-psychological.

35

categorising theories puts the cart before the horse because rather than categorising them

accordingtotheirclaimsaboutthereason-relation(whichisthesubstanceofthetheories),it

categorisesthemaccordingtotheconsequencesoftheirclaimsaboutthereason-relation.Of

course,thismaywellbefineforthepurposestowhichthecategorisationishabituallyput(e.g.

discussing the merits of psychological vs. anti-psychological or perspectivist vs. objectivist

theories), but it is not fine for the purpose of actually categorising the different theories of

reasons.23To do that, we should put the horse before the cart and categorise theories of

reasonsaccordingtowhattheysayaboutthereason-relationforeachreasonexpression.

2.1 Familiesofclaims

Sowhatdotheysay?Foranygivenreasonexpression,mosttheoriesofreasonssubscribetoa

viewthatbelongs tooneof three families: ‘favourism’, ‘deliberativism’and ‘psychologism’.24

Thesethreefamiliesdonotexhausttheavailableclaimsaboutanygivenreasonexpression,25

however, they cover, between them, the vast majority of claims made about each reason

expression (both considered andde facto), and they are the focusofmydiscussion inwhat

follows.

Whatthemembersofeachofthesefamilieshaveincommonisaviewofwhatittakestobea

reasonofanygivenkind:claimsinthefavourismfamilyrequirethatareasonofanygivenkind

must make an action, in some respect, worth doing;26claims in the deliberativism family

requirethatareasonofanygivenkindmustbesomethingtheagenttooktomaketheiraction,

insomerespect,worthdoing;andclaimsinthepsychologismfamilyrequirethatareasonof

anygivenkindmustbeafeatureoftheagent’spsychologythatrationalisestheiraction.Table

I-4setsouttheclaimsforeachreasonexpressionineachfamily(atthisstageIwill leavethe

23Nor,indeed,isitfineforreallygettingtogripswitheverythingthatiswrongwithaparticulartheory–sinceitmeansconcentratingonjustoneaspectofthetheory.24Thename‘psychologism’ItakefromDancy(2000),theothersaremyowninvention.25A noteworthy omission is Kearns and Star’s (2008, 2009) account according to which reasons areevidencethatoneoughttoactinacertainway.26Ihavetakensomelibertiesinrepresentingaviewthatistypicallyrenderedas‘reasonscountinfavourofactions’as‘reasonsmakeactionsworthdoing’.Idosobecauseleavingwhatitisto‘countinfavour’ofanactionun-interpretedleavesthetheoryofreasonsunder-determined.Iwant‘favourism’toreflectthewidelyheldinterpretationofthe‘countinginfavourof’relationthattakesittoeitherbetherelationof‘making,insomerespect,worthdoing’oratleastentailingthattheactionis,insomerespect,worthdoing. I specify favourist claims in terms of ‘making, in some respect, worth doing’ rather than‘favouring’ because different interpretations of the ‘counting in favour of’ relation abound – forinstance,KearnsandStar(2008)interpretwhatitisto‘countinfavour’ofactingas‘beingevidencethatone ought to so act’, which is clearly different fromwhatmakes an action worth doing.MeanwhileMitova (2016) advocates an alternative, if unspecified, construal of what it is to ‘count in favour’ ofaction,thatiscertainlynottheideaof‘makingitworthdoing’.Ireturntothisin§4.3.

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right-hand-sideconditionsofeachaccountunexplained;theywillbeexplainedinsubsequent

chapters).

Family

Reasonexpression Favourism Deliberativism Psychologism

Foranyp,pisareasonforAtoφ…

…ifandonlyifpmakesA’sφing,insomerespect,

worthdoing.

…ifandonlyifAtakesptomakeA’sφing,insomerespect,worthdoing.

…ifandonlyifpisafeatureofA’spsychologythatrationalisesφing.

Foranyp,pisareasonforA’sφing…

…ifandonlyifpmakesA’sφing,insomerespect,

worthdoing.

…ifandonlyifAtakesptomakeA’sφing,insomerespect,worthdoing.

…ifandonlyifpisafeatureofA’spsychologythatrationalisesφing.

Foranyp,pisareasonAhastoφ…

…ifandonlyifpmakesA’sφing,insomerespect,

worthdoing.

…ifandonlyifAtakesptomakeA’sφing,insomerespect,worthdoing.

…ifandonlyifpisafeatureofA’spsychologythatrationalisesφing.

Foranyp,pisA’sreasonforφing…

…ifandonlyifpmakesA’sφing,allthings

considered,worthdoingandexplains(intheright

way)whyAφ’d.27

…ifandonlyifpisaconsiderationinlightof

whichAφs.

…ifandonlyifpisafeatureofA’spsychologythatrationalisesφing

andexplains(intherightway)whyAφ’d.

Foranyp,pisareasonwhyAφ’d…

…ifandonlyifpexplainswhyAφ’d.

…ifandonlyifpexplainswhyAφ’d.

…ifandonlyifpexplainswhyAφ’d.

TableI-4:Themainclaimsabouteachreasonexpression

Favourism, deliberativism and psychologism are, as I have said, families of claims about

reasons;theyarenottheoriesofreasons.Instead,atheoryofreasonscanbeconstructedby

selectingoneclaimfromoneofthethreefamiliesforeachreasonexpression.

Withineachfamilytheconditionsforbeing‘areasonthereistoact’;‘areasonforacting’and

‘areasononehastoact’arethesame28–soatheorythatholdsthesameviewforanytwoof

thoseexpressions(say,favourismaboutreasonstherearetoactandfavourismaboutreasons

onehas toact) takes themtopickout thesamekindof reason.But,of course, thepointof

separatingoutthedifferentreasonexpressions inourcategorisationschemaisthatatheory

neednotalwaysselectaclaimfromthesamefamilyforeachreasonexpression.Thatis,one

couldhold(assomedo)favourismaboutthereasonstherearetoactanddeliberativismabout

the reasonsonehas toact–and todoso is tosay that thoseexpressionspickoutdifferent

kindsofreason.

27It’sworthnoting that apartofwhat is implicitly required for somep thatmakesanagent’s actionworthdoingtoexplaintheiractionintherightwayisforittobeaconsiderationinlightofwhichtheyact.28Theydifferfor‘theagent’sreasonforacting’,aswenotedtheyshould,becausewealreadyknowthatthatexpressionpicksoutadifferentkindofreason.

37

2.2 Revisedcategorisationschema

Finally,note that inTable I-4 there isnodisagreementbetweendifferent familiesabout the

conditions for being a reasonwhy. As I have noted, what sets the ‘reasonwhy’ expression

apartfromtheotherreasonexpressionsconsideredisthatitdoesn’tpickoutapracticalkind

ofreason.Instead,astheclaimsinTableI-4makeclear:reasonswhyarejustexplanations(of

whysomeonedoessomething,ofwhysomethingisacertainway,ofwhysomethingoccurred,

etc.).29Theymaybecausalexplanations(suchasthereasonswhytheEarthorbitstheSunor

thereasonswhytheDawlishseawallcollapsed)buttheyequallymaynotbe:thereasonswhy

it iswrong to tortureanimals seeminglydonotcause it tobewrongand the reasonswhy a

footballplayerisoffsideseeminglydonotcausehertobeoffside–buttheyarereasonswhyit

iswrong or reasonswhy she is offside all the same. Simply put: something is a reasonwhy

someother thing is the case if andonly if it explains (causallyorotherwise)why thatother

thingisthecase.30

Ofcourse, there isscopefordisagreementaboutwhattheproperaccountofexplanation is,

and, acknowledging that,we could further analyse the ‘explains’ relation itself – thiswould

create the possibility of more discriminating categorisations. However, I do not think we

should seek to categorise theories of reasons on the basis of their preferred accounts of

explanation–thatisjustaseparatesubject.

Noneof this is to say thatexplanation isnot relevant to thediscussionofpractical reasons;

indeed,somedefendaccountsaccordingtowhichreason-relationsjustareaparticularsortof

explanatory relation.31Mypoint is only thatwe canomit the ‘reasonswhy’ expression from

our categorisation schema, since whatever dispute there is about it is properly a part of a

separatediscussion.32

29See,forinstance,Raz(2009)andAlvarez(2010)forthisview.30Onthisanalysis,‘pisareasonwhyq’and‘pexplainswhyq’and‘qbecausep’arelogicallyequivalent.31For instance, Broome (2006) argues that a reason to act is a reason why someone ought to dosomething(see§(II)3forfurtherdiscussionofthis).Andindeed,Iwilleventuallydefendtheviewthatpracticalreasonsareallreasonswhyanactionisprotantorational.32 As Raz notes: ‘Whatever one can say about [reasons why] is better explored when studyingexplanations,avoluminousphilosophicalsubject.’(2009,186)

38

Those remarkshavingbeenmade, the revised framework for the schema I amproposing is,

thus,asfollows:

Reasonstherearetoact

Reasonsforacting

Reasonsonehastoact

Reasonsforwhichoneacts

Theoryofreasons Claim… Claim… Claim… Claim…

TableI-5:Arevisedcategorisationschema

3 Categorisingtheoriesofreasons

Forthemathematicallyinclined:withinmycategorisationschema,atheoryofreasonscanbe

specifiedasa4-tuple,witheachmemberofthetuplebeingaclaimaboutareasonexpression

from a particular family, ordered as follows: ‘reasons there are to act’; ‘reasons for acting’;

‘reasonsonehastoact’;‘reasonsforwhichoneacts’.IfweletF,D,andPdenoteFavourism,

DeliberativismandPsychologismabouttherelevantreasonexpression,respectively,then,for

instance,wecanspecifysomedistincttheoriesofreasonsasfollows:(F,F,F,F);(P,P,P,P);(F,

F,D,D);(F,F,D,F).Bywayof interpretation:thefirstandsecondofthesetheoriesmakeno

distinction between any independent kinds of reason,while the third and fourth distinguish

between‘thereasonstherearetoact’and‘thereasonsonehastoact’.

Ihavesetoutthereasonexpressionsthataretobeincludedinourcategorisationschemaand

I have set out the main claims that different theories of reasons make about each reason

expression,aswellasa(formal)wayofdescribingtheoriesofreasonsintermsoftheseclaims.

Usingthisframework,inTableI-6,Icategorisedifferenttheoriesofreasons.

This categorisation is far fromexhaustive.33Moreover, the theories of someof the theorists

that I have grouped together differ in some of their intricacies; more discriminating

characterisations of the different families of claims could, perhaps, separate out those

intricacies–butthatlevelofdiscriminationdoesnotalterthemaincriticismsthatthetheories

are subject to.34Since I only need the categorisation to be fine-grained enough to sort

betweenwhatargumentsapply towhich theories, thiswilldo,and, inparticular, it supports

thatendfarbetterthanthestandardschema.

33Noteworthyomissions includeJohnBroomeandThomasScanlon,whomIstruggledtoplace. Ihavealso omitted Michael Smith from this categorization, whose work is typically associated with ‘TheReceivedView’, because, as Iwill argue in §(V)4.1, headvocates apluralist theoryof reasons,whichevadescategorisationwithinthisschema.34See§(II)3.3formoreonthis.

39

Theoriesofreasons 4-tupledescription

Reasonstherearetoact

Reasonsforacting

Reasonsonehastoact

Reasonsforwhichoneacts

‘TheReceivedView’ (F,F,F,P) Favourism Favourism Favourism Psychologism

Stout(2009),Alvarez(2010),Parfit(2011),Littlejohn(2012)

(F,F,F,F) Favourism Favourism Favourism Favourism

Dancy(2000,2014),Davis(2005),Sandis(2009)

(F,F,F,D) Favourism Favourism Favourism Deliberativism

Schroeder(2008),Comesaña&McGrath(2014)

(F,F,D,D) Favourism Favourism Deliberativism Deliberativism

Hornsby(2008) (F,F,D,D) Favourism Favourism Deliberativism Favourism

Turri(2009),Gibbons(2010),Mitova(2015)

(P,P,P,P) Psychologism Psychologism Psychologism Psychologism

TableI-6:Prominenttheoriesofreasons,categorisedinmyproposedschema

4 Normativeandmotivatingreasons

Theterminologyof‘normative’and‘motivating’reasonsiscommonthroughouttheliterature

onpracticalreasons,and,asIhavenoted,thestandardschematypicallycategorisestheories

accordingtowhat theysayabouteach.Wearenow inapositiontoseewhat iswrongwith

thisterminology.

As Iwill argue, commondefinitions of these terms covertly import a theory of reasons into

one’s categorisation schema that leaves little scope for disagreement. Indeed, I argue that,

from a rhetorical standpoint, we ought to see these definitions less as terminological

housekeepingandmoreasaTrojanhorseleftbytheanti-psychologistsforthepsychologists.

So, I suggest,whenworkingtowardsatheoryofreasons inearnest,weshouldabandonthis

terminology,atleastasitisstandardlydefined.

4.1 TerminologyorTrojanhorse?

The de facto distinction between normative (or justifying) reasons and motivating (or

explanatory)reasonsisprobablyasfollows:normativereasonsexplainwhyanagentoughtto

do something whereasmotivating reasons explainwhy they did it.While this distinction is

40

itself problematic, 35 my focus in this section is on the following, increasingly typical

characterisationsoftheseterms36:

- Foranyp,p is anormative reason forA toφ if andonly ifp counts in favourofA’sφing.

- Foranyp,pisA’smotivatingreasonforφingonlyifpissomethingAtooktocountinfavourofφing.37

Thesecharacterisationsare innocuousas theyare:onecandefineone’s termshoweverone

wishes.However,whatmakestheiruseintheorisingproblematicisthattheirdefinitionsaren’t

typicallyrestrictedtotheseinnocuousstatements,butalsoincludethefollowingclaims38:

- Foranyp,pisanormativereasonforAtoφifandonlyifpisareasonforAtoφ.

- Foranyp,pisanormativereasonforAtoφifandonlyifpisareasonforA’sφing.

- Foranyp,pisanormativereasonforAtoφifandonlyifpisareasonAhastoφ.

- Foranyp,p isA’smotivatingreasonforφing ifandonly ifp isa reasonforwhichAφ’d.

I call these latter remarks ‘claims’ because, by associating these terms also with reason

expressions, these additional remarks go beyond mere definitions and well into what it is

properlythebusinessofatheoryofreasonstodetermine.

35Forinstance:noteverythingthatexplainsanagent’sactionisthesortofthingwewouldwanttocalla‘motivatingreason’(seeAlvarez2010).36Forinstance:‘Mostcontemporaryphilosophersstartbydistinguishingtwotypesofreasonforaction:“normative” reasons– that is, reasonswhich,very roughly, favouror justifyanaction,as judgedbyawell-informed, impartial observer; and “motivating” reasons – which, again roughly, are reasons the“agent”(thatis,thepersonacting)takestofavourandjustifyheractionandthatguidesherinacting.’(Alvarez 2016a, 1) It’s worth noting that this is not howmotivating reasonswere always defined, inparticular,MichaelSmith(1987)hasquiteadifferentnotioninmind,asDarwall(2003)observes–see§(V)4forfurtherdiscussionofthispoint.37Note that this is only a necessary condition, not a sufficient one.As I havenoted, it is common toassume thatmotivating reasons (so defined) also explain an agent’s action – although not everyonetakesthatview(e.g.Davis2005).38Forinstance:‘Therearenormativereasons:reasonsthatthereareforpeopletoact–asitisoftenput,reasonsthat‘favour’doingsomething;andmotivatingreasons:reasonsforwhichanagentacts,thatis,thereasonsthatanagenttakes(perhapsrightly)tofavouractingasshedoesandforwhichsheacts.’(Alvarez2016b,4–5emphasisadded)Similarly: ‘Normative reasonsareconsiderationswhichcount infavourof,oragainst,anaction.Whatyououghttodoisdeterminedbyhowthenormativereasonsforandagainstactingweighup–roughly,yououghttodowhatthebalanceofsuchreasonssupports.Forinstance,ifthereisareasonforyoutotakeanumbrella[i.e.anormativereasontotakeanumbrella],andnostrongerreasonnottodoso,yououghttotakeanumbrella.Normativereasonscontrastwithmotivatingreasons–thereasonsforwhichyouact.Insomecases,thereasonsforwhichyouactare,orcorrespond to, reasons for acting. That is to say, in some cases, your motivating reasons are, orcorrespond to, normative reasons. For instance, that it is rainingmight speak in favour of taking anumbrellaandbethereasonforwhichyoudoso.’(WayandWhiting2017,2–3emphasisadded)

41

Inparticular,aswellasprecludingthepossibilityofdistinguishingbetweenthekindsofreason

pickedoutbytheexpressions‘thereasonstherearetoact’, ‘thereasonsforacting’and‘the

reasons one has to act’ (the issues with which I have already discussed at length), these

‘definitions’gosomewaytosettingoutwhatthereason-relationforeachreasonexpressionis,

whichistosaythattheygosomewaytosettingoutatheoryofreasons.That is,behindthe

standardschema’sseeminglyinnocuousdefinitionsof‘normative’and‘motivating’reasonsis

the‘assumedtheory’ofreasonssetoutinTableI-7.

Theproblemisthatifwestartourtheorisingwiththe‘assumedtheory’inmindthenallthatis

really left todebate is how to interpret the relationof ‘counting in favourof’,which, aswe

shall see, gives anti-psychological theories a significant advantage. And it is precisely this

advantagethatmakesmesuggestthatthisactofseemingterminologicalhousekeepingought

tobeseenasaTrojanhorse,asthenextsectiondiscusses.

Reasonexpression Theassumedtheory

Foranyp,pisareasonforAtoφ… …ifandonlyifpcountsinfavourofφing.

Foranyp,pisareasonforA’sφing… …ifandonlyifpcountsinfavourofφing.

Foranyp,pisareasonAhastoφ… …ifandonlyifpcountsinfavourofφing.

Foranyp,pisaA’sreasonforφing… …onlyifAtookptocountinfavourφing.39

TableI-7:The‘assumedtheory’ofreasons

4.2 WhyitisaTrojanhorse

Whenit israiningandIbelievethat it israining,what is it thatcounts infavouroftakingan

umbrella– is itthefactthat it israiningorthefactthat Ibelievethat it israining?Themost

naturalinterpretationseemstobethat,inordinarycircumstances,itisthefactthatitisraining

thatcountsinfavouroftakingmyumbrella,andnotthefactthatIbelievethatitisraining.

A classic40sort of example illustrates this well: suppose that Sam believes that the security

servicesare trying to readhermind. If itwere true that the security serviceswere trying to

readhermind,thenthefactthattheyweretryingtoreadhermindwouldcountinfavourof

herwearingafoilhat.41However,thefactthatshebelievesthatthesecurityservicesaretrying

39It’sworthnoting thatbecause thisdoesn’tprovidesufficientconditions forbeinganagent’s reasonforacting, theassumedtheory isnotacomplete theoryof reasons– there is,as Iwill laternote,stillsomeroomfordisagreement,albeitmodest.40Alvarez (2016b)attributesthisexampletoAnscombe(1957);Hyman(1999);Raz (1999b)andDancy(2000).41Because, inter alia, foil hats block the radiofrequency electromagnetic radiation that the securityservicesusetoreadminds(orwould,iftheydid).

42

toreadherminddoesnotfavourwearingafoilhat–itfavoursgoingtoseeadoctor.42What

thisexampleshowsisthatthecircumstancesinwhichapsychologicalfact‘countsinfavour’of

anactioninthesamewayasthe(non-psychological)factthatitisraining‘countsinfavour’of

takinganumbrella areunusual – it is typically featuresof theworld that count in favourof

doingthings,not featuresofourpsychology.That is, ifawell-informedobserverwereto list

thethingsthatcountinfavourorcountagainstsomeaction,theywouldrarelylistfactsabout

theagent’sbeliefsasthingsthatcountinfavour(oragainst)theiraction(howevermuchthose

factsarelikelytoaffectwhattheagentactuallydoes).

We can press the point about the interpretation of the ‘counting in favour of’ relation by

consideringwhatitisthatanagenttakestocountinfavouroftheiractions.43Seemingly,what

Samtakestocountinfavourofwearingafoilhatisthatthesecurityservicesaretryingtoread

hermind(andthis issoeveniftheyaren’t), incontrast,whatshetakestocountinfavourof

going to see the doctor is that she believes that the security services are trying to read her

mind.Samisdeliberatingbothaboutthewayshetakestheworldtobeandthefactthatshe

takes it to be that way. Again, what the story about Sam’s deliberation shows is the

unusualnessofdeliberatingaboutfeaturesofone’sownpsychology–wedon’tnormallytake

featuresofourpsychologytofavouragivencourseofaction–itisnormallyonlythecontents

ofourmentalstatesthatfeatureinourdeliberation.

This line of reasoning leads us rather quickly from ‘the assumed theory’ to the following

conclusions:firstly,sincethethingsthatcountinfavourofactions(andaretakentocountin

favourofactions)areusuallynotpsychological,alltheclaimsinthepsychologismfamilymust

befalse(sincetheyonlyallowforpsychologicalreasons).Sowhateverourtheoryofreasonsis,

itmustbeanti-psychologicalwithrespecttoeveryreasonexpression.

Secondly,sincesomethingonlycountsinfavourofanactioniftheactionis,insomerespect,

worthdoing(thefactthat it’srainingdoesn’tcount in favouroftakingmyumbrella if taking

myumbrella is, tonoextent,worthdoing (if I actuallywant togetwet, say)),andsince it is

seeminglyworthdoinginvirtueofthatwhichcountsinfavourofit,thenaturalinterpretation

ofwhatitisto‘countinfavourof’anactionseemstobethis:

42Because,inSam’scase,herbeliefthatthesecurityservicesaretryingtoreadhermindistheproductofadelusionaldisorder.43Notingthat(which,asTableI-7makesclear)beingsomethingthattheagenttakestocountinfavourofanactionisanecessaryconditiononbeingthereasonforwhichanagentdoesthataction.

43

- For any p, p counts in favour of A’s φing if and only if pmakes A’s φing, in somerespect,worthdoing.44

By now we should smell a rat; substituting the above, which I have suggested is the most

naturalinterpretationofthe‘countinginfavourof’relation,intoTableI-7,yieldsthefollowing

theory:

Reasonexpression Theassumedtheory–conventionallyinterpreted

Foranyp,pisareasonforAtoφ… …ifandonlyifpmakesA’sφing,insomerespect,worthdoing.

Foranyp,pisareasonforA’sφing… …ifandonlyifpmakesA’sφing,insomerespect,worthdoing.

Foranyp,pisareasonAhastoφ… …ifandonlyifpmakesA’sφing,insomerespect,worthdoing.

Foranyp,pisA’sreasonforφing… …onlyifAtookptomakeA’sφing,insomerespect,worthdoing.

TableI-8:Theconventionalinterpretationoftheassumedtheory

ThetheorysetoutinTableI-8shouldlookfamiliar;theclaimsofthere-interpretedassumed

theory for the first three reason expressions just are the claims of favourism about those

reasonexpressions.

So,myconcernisthis:theterminologyof‘normative’and‘motivating’reasonsamountstoa

Trojanhorsebecauseonceyouaccept it, themostnatural interpretationof the ‘counting in

favourof’relationthenfixesyourtheoryforthefirstthreereasonexpressions(thatis,itforces

you to accept favourism about those reason expressions). Having accepted the assumed

theoryallthatislefttodebateisthenwhethertoendorsefavourismordeliberativismabout

thereasonsforwhichweact(whicharebothconsistentwiththefinalrowofTableI-845).That

is,whatmakes the terminologyaTrojanhorse is that it forcesmanytheorists46toacceptan

account of the reason-relation for each reason expression that puts them at a systematic

disadvantage – the only way to advocate their theory is for them to adopt an unnatural

interpretationofwhatitisto‘countinfavourof’anaction.

4.3 TheTrojanhorserejected

TheTrojansoughttohaveleftthatdamnedhorsealone,andsotooshouldwe,ifwearetodo

our theorising inearnest.That is, rather thanaccommodatingdifferent theoriesbyadopting

44I say this without meaning to undermine the view that the relation of ‘counting in favour of’ issomehowprimitive. It is, Ithink,stillpossiblethatthefavouringrelationisthemorefundamentaloneevenifthisisthecase–see§(II)3.1forfurtherdiscussionofthispoint.45As fn.39records–thefinalrowomitsasufficientconditionforbeingareasonforwhichtheagentacts,sotheassumedtheoryfallsshortofafulltheoryofreasons.46Thatis,theoriesofreasonsotherthan(F,F,F,F)or(F,F,F,D).

44

anunnaturalinterpretationofwhatitisto‘countinfavourofanaction’,47thebestresponseis

torejectthehorsebyrefusingtoaccepttheassumedtheoryasthestartingpointoftheorising.

Andonceonedoesthat,theoft-repeatedargumentagainstpsychologistictheories48becomes

question-begging:itstartsoffbyassumingthetruthofaposition49thatpsychologistictheories

shouldreject.50

4.4 IsitaTrojanhorseorisitjustthetruth?

ButisitreallyaTrojanhorse?Isn’tcountinginfavourofactingjustwhatitistobeareason?

Thisis,afterall,awell-establishedview,broughttotheforeinthefollowingremarks:

Iwilltaketheideaofareasonasprimitive.Anyattempttoexplainwhatitistobeareasonforsomethingseemstometoleadbacktothesameidea:aconsiderationthatcountsinfavorofit. ‘Counts in favor how?’ onemight ask. ‘By providing a reason for it’ seems to be theonlyanswer.(Scanlon1998,17)

Ifweareaskedwhatreasonsare,itishardtogiveahelpfulanswer.Factsgiveusreasons,wemight say,when they count in favourof ourhaving somebelief ordesire, or acting in someway.But‘countsinfavourof’means‘isareasonfor’.Likesomeotherfundamentalconcepts,suchas thoseof reality,necessity, and time, the conceptof a reasoncannotbeexplained inotherterms.(Parfit2001,18)

The suggestion is that ‘being a reason for’ and ‘counting in favour of’ are interchangeable

expressions.Now,werethatviewimmediatelyobviousthenwhatIhavecalleda‘Trojanhorse’

would be less of a covert assault on psychologistic theories andmore just the inconvenient

truth for them. I don’t, however, think that this view is immediately obvious, particularly

becauseIthinkitisactuallyfalse.

WhileIagreewithScanlonandParfitthatwheneversomethingisareasonforactingitmust

countinfavourofsoacting,51IdisagreewiththeminsofarasIthinkthatitcountsinfavour

soactingasaconsequenceofitsbeingareasonforacting,andnotaconsequenceofitsbeing

areason.Inparticular,Idonotthinkitfollowsthatanythingthatcountsinfavourofanaction

isareasonfordoingit,northatallreasonscountinfavourofactions.52WhatIwanttoargue

47AccordingtowhichthefactthatSambelievesthatthesecurityservicesaretryingtoreadhermindcountsinfavourofwearingatinfoilhat.IthinkthatMitova(2016)prefersthatoption.48BywhichImeantheargumentsetoutin§4.2,whichonecouldputsuccinctlyasfollows:whatcountsinfavourofactionsisoftennotpsychological(asshownbySam’scase)andthatwhichcountsinfavourofanactionisareasontodoit,soreasonscanbethingsotherthanfeaturesofanagent’spsychology,sopsychologism(whichsaysthattheycan’t)isfalse.49I.e.thatsomethingisareasonjustincaseitcountsinfavourofanaction.50Thisis,Ithink,preciselyGibbons’s(2010,354)objectiontotheuseofthislineofreasoningagainsthis‘psychologistic’theory.51Andthatwheneversomethingisareasonagainstactingitmustcountagainstdoingit.52Thatis,whileIagreethatifp isareasonforφingthenpcountsinfavourofφing.Idon’tagreethattheright-to-leftreading(ifpcountsinfavourofφingthenpisareasonforφing)istrue,nordoIagreethatifpisareasonforAtoφthenpcountsinfavourofφing.

45

for now, however, is not the view that ‘being a reason’ and ‘counting in favour of’ aren’t

interchangeableexpressions–butjustthattheviewthattheyareisnotimmediatelyobvious.

Myargument is this: it seemsmore likely that themeaningof ‘counting in favourof’ comes

fromthefactthatsomethingisareasonforactingthanthatitisareasonforacting.

TheOxfordEnglishDictionarydefinesthe‘for’preposition(interalia)asfollows:

‘In defenceor support of; in favour of, on the sideof.Opposed to against.’ (‘For, Prep. andConj.’,n.d.,7aemphasisadded)

Seeminglyanythingthatisforsomething,inthissenseofthepreposition,countsinfavourof

it, invirtueof itsbeing for it (andnotnecessarilyanythingelseabout it).So, I suggest,what

makesa‘reasonforacting’countinfavourofanactionisthefactthatitisforthataction(as

opposedtoagainstit),andnotthefactthatitisareason.Thatis,myclaimisthatweshould

not necessarily analyse ‘being a reason’ as ‘counting in favour of’, ratherwe have stronger

reasonsforanalysing‘beingforsomething’as‘countinginfavourofit’.

This is made clearer by the fact that the ‘for’ preposition lends the meaning of ‘counts in

favour of’ to things other than reasons. For instance, I can say: ‘the factors for and against

acting’; ‘the things for and against acting’; ‘the considerations for and against acting’; ‘what

there is to be said for and against acting’.Wherever this ‘for’ appears,we can say that the

thingthatprecedes itcounts in favourof thatwhich it is for,but thatdoesn’t leadustosay

that what it is to be a ‘factor’, or a ‘thing’, or a ‘consideration’, or ‘something to be said’,

dependsoncountinginfavourofsomeactionindependentofitsbeingafactorfor,orathing

for,oraconsiderationfor,orsomethingtobesaidfordoinganaction.Likewise,Isuggest,the

factthatbeingareasonfordoingsomethingdependsoncountinginfavourofdoingit,should

notleadustoassumethatbeingareasondependsoncountinginfavourofdoingsomething–

insteadweshouldjustadmitthatwheneveranythingisforsomething,itcountsinfavourofit,

andjustbecauseitisforit.53

Tobeclear:myaimwiththeseremarksisnottoshowthatsomereasonsdon’tcountinfavour

ofacting.Myaimisjusttoshowthatitisnotaforegoneconclusionthatallreasonscountin

favour of actions, and it is certainly not something thatwe should assume at the outset of

theorising.One’stheorymightenduparguingthatthereason-relationsarebestunderstoodin

termsof the ‘counting in favourof’ relation (i.e. as favouristsdo)–but that is anargument

thatmustbemade,itisnotthedefaultposition.Thatis,weshouldnotstartoffourtheorising53Whatabouttheagent’sreasonforacting?Doesn’tthatthencountinfavouroftheiraction,sinceitisfor it? Idonot think itdoes, I suggest that thisuseof ‘for’appeals tooneof theprepositions (many)othermeanings;specifically‘ofpurposeordestination.’(‘For,Prep.andConj.’,n.d.,IV)Theassociationofthisexpressionwiththismeaningisdiscussedinmoredetailin§(II)1.2.

46

byassumingeitherthatsomethingisareasontoact,areasonforactingorareasononehasto

actjustincaseitcountsinfavourofacting,orthatareasonforwhichanagentactsisalways

somethingtheytaketocountinfavouroftheiraction.Tostartourtheorisinginthismanneris,

Isubmit,prejudicialtoourenquiry.Andthis,accordingly,iswhyIhaverejectedthestandard

schemaandwhyIeschewtheterminologyof‘normative’and‘motivating’reasons.

5 Conclusion

I have argued that the standard schema is ill-suited to the task of categorising different

theories of reasons and I have proposed an alternative categorisation. My alternative

categorisation distinguishes theories according towhat they say the reason-relation is for a

number of typical reason expressions and it eschews the language of ‘normative’ and

‘motivating’ reasons because those terms (as they are standardly defined) already involve

substantivetheoreticalcommitments.

In thenext three chapters I discuss themain critiquesofwhat are typically taken tobe the

strongest suits of each of the three families, namely (and I discuss them in this order):

favourism about reasons to act; psychologism about the reasons for which we act; and

deliberativism about the reasons for which we act. I set out a number of prima facie

reasonableclaimsandshowhoweachoftheseviewsmustrejectsomesubsetoftheseclaims.

47

(II)

Reasonstoactthatmakeactionsworthdoing

InwhichIshowwhatitcoststothinkthatifthereisareasontodosomeactionthenthatactionis,insomerespect,worthdoing.Ishowhow‘favourismaboutreasons to act’ (which entails that reasons to actmake actionsworth doing)clashes with some prima facie reasonable claims about a case in whichsomeoneactsonafalsebelief.IsetoutwhichclaimstheproponentofthisviewmustchoosebetweenrejectingandIcategorisethecommonchoicesfromtheliterature.

Whilewalkingthroughaforestthatsheknowstocontainbears,Sallyhearswhatsoundslikea

bearrunningtowardsher.1Sheruns, frantically, toanearbysafe-house. In fact,nobearwas

chasingher;itwasanoddrustlingofthetreesthatmadethenoise.DidSallyhaveareasonto

run?Ofcourse–shethoughtabearwaschasingher!Didsherunforareason?Surely!What

washerreasonforrunning?Shethoughtthatabearwaschasingher,orperhapsonemight

saythis:sheheardabear-likesound.

Thisseeminglystraightforwardstoryandthesetypicalintuitionsaboutit,createproblemsfor

whatIhavecalled‘favourismaboutreasonstoact’,accordingtowhichareasonforsomeone

todosomeactionisafactthatmakesit,insomerespect,worthdoing.

The purpose of this chapter is to set out a series of prima facie reasonable claims about

reasons2andtothenshowthat‘favourismaboutreasonstoact’mustrejectatleastsomeof

them.This isnotmeanttobeaconclusiveargumentagainstthisview–onlytoshowthat it

comesatthecostofrejectingsomeprimafaciereasonableclaims.

1 Sallyandthenon-existentbear

1.1 Reasonsandrationality

Given that she knew that safety was nearby, and given that she thought that a bear was

chasingher (addthatshewantsto live, ifyou like), itwasplainlyrational forSallytorun,as

Stoutnotes:

Whatcanbeacceptedwithoutmuchdifficultyisthatherhavingthatbeliefmakesherrunningawayrationally intelligible.Learningthatshethinksabear ischasingher Icanmakesenseofherrunningaway;Icanseethatherbehaviourisrational.(Stout2009,52)

1ThisexampleisadaptedfromStout(2009).2BasedbothonthisstoryaboutSallyandonmoregeneralintuitionsabouthow‘thereasonsthereareforanagenttoact’relateto‘thereasonstheyhavetoact’and‘thereasonsforwhichtheyact’.

48

SinceitwasplainlyrationalforSallytorun,let’ssayitplainly:

(F1) ItwasrationalforSallytorun.3

Now, IsaidthatSallyhadareasontorun,eventhoughnobearwaschasingher.Thisseems

likeanaturalthingtosay,butwhy?Ithinkthatitisbecause,asErrolLordobserves:

It’snaturaltothinkthatwheneverit’srationalformetoφ,Ihavereasonstoφ.(Lord2010,1)4

It’snaturaltosaythatshehasareasontorun,anditsoundsstrangetosaythatshedoesn’t

becausethefactthatitwasrationalforhertodoitsuggeststhatshehadareasontodoit.So,

hereisanotherprimafaciereasonableclaim:

(F2) IfitisrationalforAtoφthensomepwasareasonAhadtoφ.

1.2 Actingforareasonandactingintentionally

IsaidthatSallyranforareason.TodenythisandsaythatSallydidn’trunforareason,thatis,

thatshewasrunningfornoreason,seemstosuggestthatheractionwasunconsidered,that,

atbest,shewasrunningforthesakeofrunning,orrunningonawhim. Ifweweretosayto

someone that Sally ran for no reason, and then add that, by theway, she ran because she

thought a bearwas chasingher, itwould seem to cancel the sense inwhich she ran for no

reason:sheiscertainlynotrunningforthesakeofrunningifsheisrunningbecauseshethinks

thatabearischasingher.

Thepointisnotthatthereisnowayofmakingtheclaimthatsheranfornoreasonintelligible

–it’sjustthatsayingthatsheranfornoreasonandthatsheranbecauseshethoughtabear

was chasing her has an air of contradiction about it. And the reason it has an air of

contradiction about it is that saying that someone didn’t act for a reason implies that their

actionlackedsomesortofrational,intentional,deliberateness–itmakesitseemwhimsicalor

unconsidered,ifnotentirelyunintentional.AsDancynotes:

Intentional,deliberate,purposefulactionisalwaysdoneforareason.(Dancy2000,1)

Why does Dancy choose the particular string of adjectives (‘intentional, deliberate,

purposeful’)hedoes?Ithinkheistryingtoanticipateanobjectiontothesimplerclaimthatall

intentionalaction isdoneforareason. Inparticular:onemightsaythat if Icrossmy legs(to

useDancy’sexample),IactintentionallybutIdon’tactforareason–thesortofactsonedoes3Youcould,ofcourse,addindefeaters(shethoughtthebearwasbetweenherandthesafe-house;shethinksthatstayingstillisthebestwaytoavoidabearattack),butthatwouldbetochangemystory–therearenosuchdefeatershere;themostrationalthingforSallytodoisrun.4For similar remarks on the ‘naturalness’ of this claim, fromphilosopherswith different views aboutreasons seeUnger (1978, 200), Alvarez (2010, 13), Gibbons (2010, 337) and Comesaña andMcGrath(2014,61).

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on a whimmay be done for no reason, but they aren’t unintentional. Dancy, quite rightly,

doesn’twanttoustothinkofsuchactions(whichO’Shaughnessy(1980)calls‘sub-intentional’

actions), as actions that are done intentionally, purposefully anddeliberately.5It seems that

thereisaclearclassofwhatwemightcallsophisticatedlydeliberateactionsthatweassociate

withactingforareason.6Forthesakeofbrevity IwillshortenDancy’sstringofadjectivesto

justdeliberateactionandformulatethisprimafaciereasonableclaimasfollows:

(F3) IfAφsdeliberatelythenAφsforareason.

This view is shared by philosophers with a wide range of views onwhat reasons are,7and,

indeed,Meleremarksthat ‘theoverwhelmingmajorityofordinaryspeakersofEnglishasked

foragutreactionto[thisclaim]wouldfinditextremelyplausible.’(Mele2007,99)

DidSallyrundeliberately(intentionally,purposefully…)?Ofcourseshedid!Sherespondedto

the situation as she took it to be, she decided on the appropriate course of action and she

actedonthedecisionshe’dmade(albeithurriedly!).8Thuswecansay:

(F4) Sallyrandeliberately.

SothisiswhyitsoundsoddtosaytheSallydidn’trunforareason:itsuggeststhatshedidn’t

rundeliberately(intentionally,purposefully…)–whichsheplainlydid.

1.3 Sally’sreasonsforrunning

TheremarksImadeaboutSally’sreasonsforrunningbear(!)repeating,sinceItakethemto

beprimafaciereasonable.Firstly,Isaidthat:

(F5) Sally’sreasonforrunningwas,interalia,thatshebelievedabearwaschasingher.

5Mele (2007, 99) considers another would-be counterexample to claim that all intentional action isdoneforareason,whichDancy’swordingisseeminglyalsodesignedtoavoid.6It’sworthnoting that the senseof sophisticationhere is purely internal to the agent –whatmakessomethingcountas,inDancy’sterminology,anintentional,deliberateandpurposefulactionisallaboutthewaytheagentreasonedtheirwaytoit,andnothingtodowithitscorrespondencetotheexternalworld.7For instance, it’s worth noting that Maria Alvarez, who rejects (F3) nonetheless notes that ‘Thesuggestionthatsomeonewhoactedmotivatedbyafalsebeliefdoesnotact forareasonmightseemprimafaciewrong.’(2010,141)ThatisallthatIamsaying–thatitisprimafaciereasonabletosaythattheydoactforareason.(SeealsoAnscombe1957,9;Davidson2001c,83;Davis2005,68–69;Gibbons2010,357;Hieronymi2011,410–11)8Sally’s circumstancesareextremebut I don’t think it’sunreasonable to suggest that shedeliberatesaboutwhattodo.Shemightbetorn,forinstance,overwhetheritwouldbebetterto‘playdead’–cansheoutrunthebear?Onemightwell, Isubmit,deliberateevenwhenthestakesarehighandtime isshort – such deliberation need not take a long time, or even havemuch to it (themattermight bestraightforward)forone’sactiontobedeliberate.

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It flies in the faceofexperience todeny thatwemakesuchremarks,as, indeed, JosephRaz

notes:

There isnodenyingthatweuse locutionsoftheform‘hisreasonforφingwashisbeliefthatp’…(asin‘hisreasonfornotcomingwasthathethoughtyouwouldnotbehere’).(Raz1999b,18)

Ialsosaidthat:

(F6) Sally’sreasonforrunningwas,interalia,thatsheheardabear-likesound.

Thisseemstosuggestthatanappearanceorperceptualexperiencecouldbeanagent’sreason

for acting. I find it as natural to say this as saying that her reason for runningwas that she

believedthatabearwaschasingher,but it isperhapsworthnotingthatreasonsofthiskind

are less commonly discussed in the literature.9Nonetheless, I take this claim to be, equally,

primafaciereasonable.

2 Howreasonexpressionsrelate

In §(I)1, I discussed different reason expressions, but made no mention of the relations

betweenthem.Sohowaretheyrelated?HereiswhatGibbonssuggests:

Ifyougotothestoreformilk…youwillgothereforareason.Soyoumusthaveareason.Sotheremustbeareason.(Gibbons2010,343)

Gibbons’inferenceseemsnatural.Thatis,itseemsprimafaciereasonabletothinkthatifone

actsforareasononemusthavehadareasontoactandifonehadareasontoactthenthere

musthavebeenareasontoact,whichonehad.So:

(F7) IfAφsforareasonthentherewasareason,p,forAtoφ.

Denying thismeans, as Jennifer Hornsby notes (albeit, in the process of denying it), saying

thingslike:‘therewasnoreasontodowhathedid,eventhoughhediditforareason,’(2008,

249) which is, in her own words, ‘prima facie paradoxical.’ The denial of a prima facie

paradoxicalclaimis,itseemstome,atleastprimafaciereasonable.

IthinkthatGibbons’inferencepermitsofsomestrengthening:itisnotjustthatyougotothe

storeforareasonandyouhaveareasonandthereisareason,butthatyourreasonforgoing

there isareasonthatyouhavetogothereand isareasonthatthere is foryoutogothere.

9AlthoughDancyalludestothissortofreasonforactingwhenhenotesthatwhenEdmundstaysawayfromthemiddleofanicylakeafterhisfriendhadtoldhimthattheicewasthinthere,‘hisreasoncouldhavebeensimplythathisfriendhadwarnedhimoff.’(Dancy2014,88)KearnsandStar(2008)defend(at length)anaccountthatagreeswiththis intuitionandWhiting(2014)alsonotesthatweoftenciteperceptualexperiencesasreasons.Lord (2010,6) isalsoclear thatareasontobelievesomething isareasontodothatwhichthebeliefmakesrational–assumingthatexperiencescanbereasonsforbelief,hewouldseeminglyagreewith(F6).

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These strengthened claims provide us with the following, additional prima facie reasonable

claimsaboutreasons:

(F8) Foranyp,ifpwasareasonAhadtoφthenpwasareasonforAtoφ.10

(F9) Foranyp,ifAφsforthereasonthatpthenpwasareasonforAtoφ.11

Bothof these claimsareat leastprima facie reasonablebecausedenyingeitheramounts to

saying, implausibly,thatsomethingthatisareasonisn’tareason:denying(F8)meanssaying

thatanagenthasareasontoactthatisn’tareasontoact;anddenying(F9)meanssaying,as

Dancynotes,‘anagentcanactforareasonthatisnoreason.’(2000,3)

Indeed,Melefindsitsostrangetosaysuchthingsthathemakesitanexplicitconstraintona

satisfactorytheoryofreasonsthatitconcedethat:‘anythingthatisareasonisnotnoreason.’

(2007,95) Iamnotgoingas farasMele– Inotehis remarksonlytoshowthattheseclaims

enjoyconsiderableintuitiveplausibility,sotheyareatleastprimafaciereasonable,andthatif

atheoryrejectsthem,itisatsomecostthatitdoesso.

3 Favourismaboutreasonstoact

RecallthefollowingclaimaboutreasonsfromTableI-4:

Favourism about reasons to act: For anyp, p is a reason forA toφ if and only ifpmakesA’sφing,insomerespect,worthdoing.

ThisisnotthestandardwayofcharacterisingtheviewofthosetowhomIattributeit.12These

theoristsmoretypicallycharacterisetheirviewastheclaimthatareasontodosomeactionis

thatwhich‘countsinfavour’ofdoingit.

However,IcharacteriseitinthewaythatIdobecausetherearedifferencesofopinionabout

what it is to ‘count in favour’ofanaction,13sotheproblemsfor favourismaboutreasonsto

act(tobediscussed in§4)donotapplytoeveryonewhoholdstheviewthatreasonstoact

count in favour of actions. My aim in characterising the view in this way is thus to group

togetherthosetheorists(ofwhichtherearemany)whoaresusceptibletotheproblemsthat

10Alvarez (2016b, 11) provides a thorough defence of the intuitiveness of this claim. It is alsoworthnotingthatImakenoclaimaboutthetruthorfalsityoftheright-to-leftreadinghere.11Cf. Dancy’s (2000) normative constraint, which is aweaker version of this thesis. It says that if anagentactsforthereasonthatpthenpcouldhavebeenareasontherewasforthemtoact.12SeeTableI-6forthelistofthosetowhomIattributethisview.13For instance, Kearns and Star suggest that ‘a fact counts in favor ofφing just in case this fact isevidence that one ought to φ.’ (2008, 44) And Mitova (2016) also rejects the conventionalinterpretation,althoughsheleavestheworkofdevelopinganalternativeforanothertime.IalsothinkLord (2010) requires another interpretation of the ‘counting in favour of’ relation if he is to get hisdesiredresultthatthatwhichjustifiesabeliefalsocounts infavourofanactionthatthebeliefmakesrational.

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follow,acknowledgingthattherearesubtlevariationsbetweentheirtheories(moreonthisto

come).

InwhatfollowsIprovidesomecontextforhowIarriveatthecharacterisationthatIdo,aswell

assomeexplicationofwhatitisforanactiontobe,insomerespect,worthdoing.

3.1 ‘Countinginfavourof’

AsGjelsvik(2007)notes,therearedifferingwaysofconceivingofwhatitisto‘countinfavour

of’anactionthatarriveatseeminglythesameconclusionaboutwhenanactionisfavoured.

Tounderstandthefirstway,letusrevisitthefollowingremarks:

Iwilltaketheideaofareasonasprimitive.Anyattempttoexplainwhatitistobeareasonforsomethingseemstometoleadbacktothesameidea:aconsiderationthatcountsinfavorofit. ‘Counts in favor how?’ onemight ask. ‘By providing a reason for it’ seems to be theonlyanswer.(Scanlon1998,17)

Ifweareaskedwhatreasonsare,itishardtogiveahelpfulanswer.Factsgiveusreasons,wemight say,when they count in favourof ourhaving somebelief ordesire, or acting in someway.But‘countsinfavourof’means‘isareasonfor’.Likesomeotherfundamentalconcepts,suchas thoseof reality,necessity, and time, the conceptof a reasoncannotbeexplained inotherterms.(Parfit2001,18)

I firstdiscussedtheseremarks in§(I)4.4,whenIdrewattentiontothefactthatScanlonand

Parfit take the ‘counting in favour of’ relation and the ‘being a reason to’ relation to be

equivalent. This is something they have in common with, I think, everyone who endorses

favourism about reasons to act. But another observation that we can make about these

remarks, andonewhich, aswe shall see, separates Scanlon andParfit from someothers to

whom I attribute favourism about reasons to act, is that the former take the ‘counting in

favourof’relationtobeprimitive.Thisconstrual,(‘favouring’asaprimitiverelation)isthefirst

wayofconceivingofwhatitistocountinfavourofanaction.

ThemainalternativeisgivenitsclearestexpositionbyJohnBroome,whostatesthat‘tocount

infavourofφistoplayaparticularroleinanexplanationofwhyyououghttoφ’(2006,41).

JohnHyman(e.g.2015,133–34)alsoseemstobeclearabouttheexplanatorycharacterofthe

reason-relation,andwhilehelessdirectlyanalysesthe‘countinginfavourof’relationinthose

terms,Ithinkhispositionamountstothesame.

Others are less explicit, but, I think, more or less implicitly analyse favouring as such an

explanatoryrelation.Forinstance,someauthorscharacterise‘countinginfavourof’asmaking

good,orrightorvaluable:

Areasonforactionissomethingthatfavoursormakesvaluableanactionoftherelevantkind.(Everson2009,22emphasisadded)

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Ifapersonhasareasonforφingthenitfollowsthatthatpersonoughttoormay(ifonlyprotanto)φ.Thismightmeanthatthereasonfavoursφing,orrecommends,permits,warrants,ordemands, etc. φing. But the question arises why a reason for φing favours, warrants, ordemandsφing? I suggested that theanswer to thisquestion is thata reason forφingmakesφingrightorappropriate(sometimesmerelyprotantorightorappropriate).(Alvarez2010,12–13emphasisadded)

Whenwe think of such reasons, we think of features that speak in favour of the action (oragainst it)… theymake actions right or wrong, sensible or unwise. (Dancy 2000, 1 emphasisadded)

Ithinkthatitisnaturaltointerpretthe‘making’relationsinvokedhere(reasonsmakeactions

valuable, right, sensible…) as explanatory relations. I find it odd to think that some x could

makesomeyanFwithout(atleastpartly)explainingwhyitisanF,soIlikewisefinditoddto

think that some reason could make some action right or valuable without (at least partly)

explaining why it was right or valuable. Thus, I take accounts that say that reasons make

actions right, valuable or good to be, albeit implicitly, of the same explanatory view as

Broome.14Iftheyaren’tthenthereisperhapsathirdwayofarrivingatwhatisultimatelythe

sameconclusion.

Whatisthatconclusion?Ithinkwecanputit,15asIdidinhopefullyun-contentiously,thus:

- For any p, p counts in favour ofA’sφing if and only ifA’s φing is, in some respect,worthdoing.

Given the presumed equivalence of ‘being a reason to’ and ‘counting in favour of’ amongst

advocatesof favourismaboutreasonstoact,wethusarriveat theview,setoutabove, that

there isareasonforanagenttoφ if,andonly if,φing is, insomerespect, ‘worthdoing’ for

thatagent.Butwhatdoesitmeantobeforanacttobe,insomerespect,worthdoing?

3.2 Whatitisforanacttobe,insomerespect,worthdoing

I say ‘in some respect’worthdoing,because the fact that there is something that counts in

favour of doing an action does not mean that it is, all things considered worth doing. For

instance, although something counts in favour of having a doughnut every day (they taste

great!),sothatitis,insomerespect,worthdoing,itisprobablynotallthingsconsideredworth

doing(thecalories!).Insuchcaseswecansaythattheactionis,insomerespect,worthdoing,

butnotallthingsconsideredworthdoing.

14To the extent that ‘in virtue of’ relation is an explanatory relation, Raz (perhaps against his ownjudgment) is socategorisable, cf. ‘reasonsare facts invirtueofwhich thoseactionsaregood in somerespect.’(Raz1999a,22emphasisadded)15AsIdidin§(I)4.2.

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When is an act, in some respect, worth doing? It might be when it results in (or just is)

somethingthatis,insomerespect,good,right,valuable,ormerelydesired.16Forthepurposes

ofthisdiscussionwedon’tneedtodecidewhichofthoseitis–allweneednoteisthatanact

is,insomerespect,worthdoingif,asamatteroffact,itwouldresultinsomethingthatis,in

somerespect,good,right,valuable,desiredorwhathaveyou.

An important point to take from the last remark is this: whether or not an action is worth

doing(insomerespect,orallthingsconsidered)forsomeagentisanobjectivematteroffact

that is, inparticular, independentof theirperspective. Soanaction is stillworthdoing if an

agent is ignorantof the fact that it’sworthdoing. For instance: it’sworth taking a different

routehomeifthere’strafficonone’susualroute–andthat’sworthdoingevenifonethinks

one’s usual route is all clear (that it’s worth doing doesn’tmean that onewill do it, it just

meansthatifonedidit,some‘good’17wouldcomeofit).18Andanactionisn’tworthdoingjust

becauseyouthinkitis:youmightthrowawaysomemilkbecauseyouassume,falsely,thatit’s

goneoff–throwingawaythemilkisnotworthdoing,althoughyoumaythinkthatitis.Soit’s

theway theworld is thatmatters to whether or not some action is worth doing for some

agent,19notthewayshetakesittobe.

3.3 Favourismaboutreasonstoact

SofarI’vesaidthat,accordingtothisview,thereisareasontoactifandonlyifanactionis,in

somerespect,worthdoing,and I’veexplainedwhat it is foranactiontobeworthdoing.All

thoseauthors towhomIattribute favourismaboutreasonstoactwould, I think,agreewith

thoseremarks.

Wheremy characterisation of favourism about reasons to act strays into the contentious is

that it goesbeyond these remarks to claim that reasonsareactuallywhatmakes theaction

worthdoing.Thismaybeunpalatabletothosewhotakethe‘countsinfavourof’relationtobe

primitive. For those that do balk at it I am happy for them to shrug it off (along with my

16 Alvarez gives what she describes as a ‘rough’ characterisation, which, to my mind, is a neatrepresentationofmanyofthedifferentviews.Shenotesthatfortheretobeafactthatfavoursanagentdoing someaction that ‘requires theirhaving somemotivation thatwouldbe servedbyacting in theway favoured…Themotivationmaybesuch thingsasdesires,plans, long-standingprojectsorvalues.Anditmaybesomethingtheagentactuallyhas,orsomethingshewouldhaveifshereasonedproperlyfromhercurrentmotivations.’(Alvarez2016a,10)ThisiswhatImeanbysayingthatanactis‘favoured’ifitis,insomerespect,worthdoing.17Howeverwechoosetounderstand‘good’…18Cf.Inagameofchess,agoodmoveisagoodmoveregardlessofwhetherornotyou’vespottedit.19NotethataccordingtoBroome-typeconceptionsofthe‘countinginfavourof’relation,actsareworthdoingbecauseofthewaytheworldis.

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categorisationoftheirtheories),althoughthatmeansleavingunanalysedarelationthatsome

interpretdifferently.20

WhatreallymattersisthatallofthetheoriststowhomIattributefavourismaboutreasonsto

actarecommittedtothefollowingposition,which,asIwillshow,iswhatreallycreatestrouble

forthem:

(FAV) Foranyp,p isareasonforAtoφonly ifA’sφing, is insomerespect,worthdoing.

Thisisclearlylogicallyentailedbyfavourismaboutreasonstoact.Moreover,Ithinkallthose

towhomIattributefavourismaboutreasonstoactwhomightbalkatmycharacterisationofit

(suchasParfitandScanlon)wouldnonethelessagreewith(FAV).

Tobeclear:(FAV)isweakerthanfavourismaboutreasonstoact, inthesensethatthelatter

entailstheformer,buttheformerdoesnotentailthelatter.Mypointisjustthatthat(FAV)is

enoughtocreatetroubleforfavourismaboutreasonstoact.

4 Theproblemsforfavourism

Toseewhattheproblemsfor(FAV)are, let’sreturntoSallyandhernon-existentbear.Since

thereisn’tactuallyabearchasingher,exhypothesi,runningisn’tworthdoingforSally.There

isnothingtobegained(foranyone)fromSally’srunning. Indeed, it’spossiblethatshemight

fallandhurtherself,orattracttheattentionofactualbearsbyrunning.Sonotrunningisworth

doing,butrunningisreallytonoextentworthdoing.21Thus:

(F10) Sally’srunningwasnotatallworthdoing.

This observation, combinedwith theprima facie reasonable claims set out above, results in

three distinct problems for the favourist view: The Rational Action Problem; TheDeliberate

ActionProblem;andThePsychologicalReasonProblem(forFavourism).

4.1 TheRationalActionProblem

TheRationalActionProblemisthis:itisrationalforSallytorun,soshehasareasontorun,so

there is a reason for her to run, so her running is, in some respect, worth doing, but her

runningisinnorespectworthdoing!Explicitly,thefollowingclaimsaremutuallyinconsistent:

(F1) ItwasrationalforSallytorun.

20See§(I)fn.26fordifferentinterpretationsofthe‘countinginfavourof’relation.21Youcouldmakeastoryinwhichrunningwas,insomerespect,worthdoing,ifyouliked(Sallyneedstoloseafewpounds,say),butthat’snotmystory.InmystorySallystandstogainnothing,andpotentiallylosemuch,fromrunning(and,likewise,nothingofworthaccruestoanyoneelseifSallyruns).

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(F2) IfitisrationalforAtoφthensomepwasareasonAhadtoφ.

(F8) Foranyp,ifpwasareasonAhadtoφthenpwasareasonforAtoφ.

(FAV) Foranyp,p isareasonforAtoφonly ifA’sφing, is insomerespect,worthdoing.

(F10) Sally’srunningwasnotatallworthdoing.

4.2 TheDeliberateActionProblem

TheDeliberateActionProblemisthis:Sallyrandeliberately,sosheranforareason,sothere

wasareasonforhertorun,soherrunningis,insomerespect,worthdoing,butherrunningis

innorespectworthdoing!22Explicitly,thefollowingclaimsaremutuallyinconsistent:

(F4) Sallyrandeliberately.

(F3) IfAφsdeliberatelythenAφsforareason.

(F7) IfAφsforareasonthentherewasareason,p,forAtoφ.

(FAV) Foranyp,p isareasonforAtoφonly ifA’sφing, is insomerespect,worthdoing.

(F10) Sally’srunningwasnotatallworthdoing.

4.3 ThePsychologicalReasonProblem(forFavourism)

ThePsychologicalReasonProblem(forFavourism)isthis:Sally’sreasonforrunningwas,inter

alia,thatshebelievedthatabearwaschasingher,sothatwasareasonforhertorun,soher

runningwas, insomerespect,worthdoing,butherrunningwastonoextentworthdoing!23

Explicitly,thefollowingclaimsaremutuallyinconsistent:

(F5) Sally’sreasonforrunningwas,interalia,thatshebelievedabearwaschasingher.24

(F9) Foranyp,ifAφsforthereasonthatpthenpwasareasonforAtoφ.

(FAV) Foranyp,p isareasonforAtoφonly ifA’sφing, is insomerespect,worthdoing.

22AvariantofthisproblemisBroome’s(2013,71)‘quickobjection’tothethesisthatactingrationallyis‘respondingcorrectlytoreasons.’23It’sperhapsworthnotingthatthisisanargumentusedbythosewhoalreadyacceptfavourismaboutreasonstoacttoshowthatSally’sreasonforrunningcan’tbethatshebelievedthatabearwaschasingher (assetout in§(I)4.2).Mypoint is thatwhenwestartour investigationofwhat reasonsare fromprima facie reasonable claims about them, without assuming favourism about reasons to act, theargumentrunsintheotherdirection–againstfavourism.24RecallthatIassumethat:foranyp,A’sreasonforφingwasthatp ifandonlyifAφsforthereasonthatp(see§(I)1.5).

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(F10) Sally’srunningwasnotatallworthdoing.

4.4 TheExperientialReasonProblem(forFavourism)

TheExperientialReasonProblem(forFavourism) is this:Sally’s reason for runningwas, inter

alia,thatsheheardabear-likesound,sothatwasareasonforhertorun,soherrunningwas,

in some respect,worthdoing, buther runningwas tonoextentworthdoing! Explicitly, the

followingclaimsaremutuallyinconsistent:

(F6) Sally’sreasonforrunningwas,interalia,thatsheheardabear-likesound.

(F9) Foranyp,ifAφsforthereasonthatpthenpwasareasonforAtoφ.

(FAV) Foranyp,p isareasonforAtoφonly ifA’sφing, is insomerespect,worthdoing.

(F10) Sally’srunningwasnotatallworthdoing.

5 Responsestotheproblemsforfavourism

How can a proponent of favourism about reasons to act respond to these problems? The

optionsarelimited.Idon’tthinkonecouldtolerablyrejecteitherthatit’srationalforSallyto

run,orthatSallyrunsdeliberately–so(F1)and(F4)areoffthemenuofpotentialresponses.

Itmightbetemptingtothinkwecouldreject(F10)andkillthreeproblemswithonerejection.

Weshould resist thisurge– todoso isultimately just tochange thenotionof ‘beingworth

doing’inawaythatamountstonomorethanarejectionoffavourismaboutreasonstoactby

anothername.25

So,(F1),(F4)and(F10)areoffthemenu.Thisbringsmetotheconclusionofmyargument:if

youwanttopreserve(FAV)thenyouhavetorejectatleastoneoftheprimafaciereasonable

25Maybeyouwant tosay thatSally’sbelief thatabear ischasingher iswhat favoursheraction (VeliMitova(2015,2016)givesthisagoodgo).Well,wecouldseehowitcouldmakerunningworthdoing.If,forinstance,Sallyhasaparticularlyoddconstitutionsuchthatifshebelievesthatabearischasingherandshedoesn’trunthenshewillhaveaheartattackorsuffersomeotherunpleasantness.Then,inthatcase, her belief that a bear is chasing herwouldmake running (in some respect)worth doing.Why?Because,giventhatshebelievesthatabearischasingher,ifshedoesn’trunshe’llhaveaheartattack.But this isn’t the situation that Sally is in. Sally is like you or I – she hears what sounds like a bearrunning,knowssafetyisnearby,sosheruns.Perhapsyouwanttosaythatsomethingdoesfavourherrunning:thefactthattheremightbeabearnearby.Butthatfactdoesn’tmakerunningworthdoing–sincethereisn’tabearnearby.Thefactthatinclosepossibleworldsabearischasingherdoesnotmakeitworthrunninginthisactualworld.AsitstandsSallyhasnothingtogainandquiteabittolosefromrunning.Runningisnotworthdoingforher,althoughitisthemostrationalthingtodo–andgiventheconceptoffavouringthatweareworkingwith,thisjustmeansthatnothingfavoursheraction.

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claims fromeachof the followinggroups (andpossibly two fromgroup3– sinceoneof the

disjunctsisaconjunction),andacceptthecounterintuitiveconsequencesofdoingso26:

(F2) IfitisrationalforAtoφthensomepwasareasonAhadtoφ.

(F8) Foranyp,ifpwasareasonAhadtoφthenpwasareasonforAtoφ.

(F3) IfAφsdeliberatelythenAφsforareason.

(F7) IfAφsforareasonthentherewasareason,p,forAtoφ.

EITHER:

(F5) Sally’sreasonforrunningwas,interalia,thatshebelievedabearwaschasingher.And;

(F6) Sally’s reason for running was, inter alia, that she heard a bear-likesound.

OR:

(F9) Foranyp, ifAφs for thereasonthatp thenpwasa reason forA toφ.27

For reference, here is a very much non-exhaustive account of which of these prima facie

reasonableclaimssomedifferentproponentsoffavourismaboutreasonstoactreject(where:

û=rejects):

Group1 Group2 Group3

(F2) (F8) (F3) (F7) (F5)&(F6) (F9)

TheReceivedView û û û

Stout(2009),Alvarez(2010),Parfit(2011),Littlejohn(2012) û û û

Hornsby(2008)28 û û û

Schroeder(2008),Comesaña&McGrath(2014) û û û û

Dancy(2000,2014),Davis(2005),Sandis(2009) û û û û

TableII-1:Howproponentsoffavourismrespondtosomeproblemsforit

26Groups1,2and3consistoftheremainingpremisesofTheRationalActionProblem,TheDeliberateAction Problem, and The Psychological Reason Problem (for Favourism) & The Experiential ReasonProblem(forFavourism),respectively.27It’s worth noting that (F9) entails (F7) – so rejecting the former serves as a response to both TheDeliberateActionProblemandTheWrongReasonsProblem.28IthinkthatHornsby’s(2008)viewwithrespecttothetruthof(F9)haschanged.Inanearlierworkshestatesthat‘pmaybetheagent’sreason[foracting]evenwhenitisfalsethatp.’(2007,299)Ifpwerefalse it could not have been a reason for anyone to act because falsehoods don’t count in favour ofanything(thatisnottosaythatnegationsdon’tfavouranything–negationsarefactsthatfavoursomethings,butfalsehoodsaren’tfactsatall).Hornsby’searlierviewisthusmorecloselyalignedtotheviewsofSchroeder(2008)andComesaña&McGrath(2014).However inher laterworkshesuggeststhat ‘aconditionofφingforthereasonthatp,whenonebelievesthatp,isthatoneknowsthatp.’(2008,251)Ithinkher idea in this laterwork is thatonemayact fora reason though theremaybeno reason forwhichoneacts–thisissomethingthat,in§(I)1.5,Iassumedcouldnothappen.Totheextentthatthatisherview,itsnuancesarenotcapturedinmycategorisationschema.

Group1

Group2

Group3

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Ofcourse,manyoftheproponentsoffavourismaboutreasonstoacthavegoodargumentsas

to why it is acceptable to reject these prima facie reasonable claims. For instance, Alvarez

(2010,142)defendsherrejectionof(F3)bynotingthatwhenanagentactsonafalsebeliefwe

mightwellsaythattheyactfornoreason–someonewhoisrunningtocatchatrainmightsay,

on discovering that it has been cancelled, ‘You mean I ran all this way for no reason?’29

MeanwhileDancy(2000)suggeststhatwecanexplainawayexpressionslike‘Sally’sreasonfor

runningwasthatshebelievedthatabearwaschasingher’asactuallymeaning‘Sally’sreason

forrunningwasthatabearwaschasingher,asshebelieved’–wherethe‘asshebelieved’is

meant to be understood appositionally, in amanner that only qualifieswhat is said, rather

thanchangingthemeaningofit.

I amnot seeking to refute theseargumentshere.Mypoint is not that thesearguments are

wrong or that, more generally, there is no way tomake the rejection of these prima facie

reasonableclaimsintelligibleMypointisthatrejectingtheseprimafaciereasonableclaimsisa

stancethatdemandssomeexplanation–because,indoingsoyouarerejectingsomethingthat

onthefaceofitseemsreasonable.Sothatatleastcountsinfavouroflookingforatheorythat

doesn’tcommitonetosuchrejections.

6 Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter was to show the costs involved in accepting favourism about

reasons toact. Ihaveargued that ifonewants toaccept that view,onemust reject several

primafaciereasonableclaims.Thisisapricethatsomearehappytopay;Iwouldrathernot.

29Alvarezput thisparticular example tome in adiscussionof thispoint.Bywayof further response,Parfit(2001)andAlvarez(2010)wouldbothsuggestthatweshouldsaythatbothSallyandthepersonwhosetrainwascancelledrunforanapparentreasonbutnotagenuinereason.

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(III)

Actingforpsychologicalreasons

InwhichIshowwhatitcoststothinkthatthereasonforwhichanagentactsisalways a feature of their psychology. I show how ‘psychologism about thereasonsforwhichweact’clasheswithsomeprimafaciereasonableclaims. Inparticular,Ishowthatisinconsistentwiththeideathatweareoftenabletoactfor reasons thatmakeouractionsmorallyworthyand,moregenerally,worthdoing.

Myfriendhaswonamuch-covetedaward;IreadaboutitinanewspapersoIcallherupand

congratulateher. Itseemsnatural tosaythatmyreasonforcongratulatingherwasthatshe

hadwonanaward.Italso,Ithink,seemsnaturaltosaythatmyreasonforcongratulatingher

wasthatIreadthatshehadwonanaward.Anotherexample:ifJonathanseessomeonewhois

aloneandintrouble,hecould,undertherightcircumstances,helpherforthereasonthatshe

wasaloneandintrouble.1

Thesefairlyanodyneobservationscreatealotofdifficultyforpsychologismaboutthereasons

forwhichweact,whichsaysthatanagent’sreasonforactingcanonlyeverbeafeatureofher

psychology,andisprobablythedefactoaccountofwhatanagent’sreasonforactingis.

The purpose of this chapter is to set out a number of prima facie reasonable claims that

psychologism about the reasons for which we act must reject.2This is not meant to be a

conclusive argument against that view – it is only meant to show that accepting this view

comesatsomecost.

1 Someprimafaciereasonableclaims

1.1 Myreasonforcongratulatingmyfriend

I’ve already statedmy firstprima facie reasonable claim, but it’sworth re-iterating;when I

readinanewspaperofrecordthatmyfriendhadwonanawardandIconsequentlycallherup

tocongratulateher,itisnaturaltosaythat:

(P1) My reason for congratulatingmy friendwas, interalia, that shehadwonanaward.

Itis,Ithink,similarlynaturaltosaythat:

1ThisexampleisfromDancy(2000).2Astheformerchapterdidforfavourismaboutreasonstoact.

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(P2) Myreasonforcongratulatingmyfriendwas,interalia,thatIreadthatshehadwonanaward.

We should add to this observation two seemingly obvious remarks, whose importance will

becomeclear(ifitisnotalready)whenweconsidertheproblemsforpsychologismaboutthe

reasonsforwhichweact:

(P3) Thefactthatmyfriendhadwonanawardisnotafeatureofmypsychology.

(P4) The fact I read that my friend had won an award is not a feature of mypsychology.

1.2 Morallyworthyactions

SupposethatJonathanisonhiswaytotheofficewhenheencounterssomeonewhoisalone

andintrouble.Takingallmorallyrelevantfeaturesofthesituationintoaccount,withoutone

thoughttoomany,withoutanyundueconsiderationsoffurtheringhisownendsorotherless

upstandingconcerns,hedulycomestoheraid.Isubmittoyouthatwhathedoesisamorally

worthyact:

(P5) Jonathan’sactofhelpingthewomanismorallyworthy.

Whatdoesthemoralworthofhisaction,andactsingeneral,comedownto?Oneseemingly

relevantconsiderationisthis: ifJonathanhadhelpedheronlybecauseheknewthatshewas

veryrichandwouldrewardhimamplyfordoingso,themoralworthinessofhisactdissipates.

AsJuliaMarkovitsnotes,‘whenwedotherightthingbecauseithappenstosuitus,orhappens

tobe inour interest,ouractionhasnomoralworth.This is intuitive.Morallyworthyactions

mustbeperformedfortherightreasons.’3(2010,203)

So,wecandotherightthingwithoutdoingsomethingmorallyworthyifwedon’tdoitforthe

rightreasons.Andwhataretherightreasons?Theyaretheonesthatmaketheactionright:

Myactionismorallyworthyifandonlyif…IperformtheactionImorallyoughttoperform,forthereasons4whyitmorallyoughttobeperformed.(Markovits2010,205)

WhenIdothemorallyrightthing,becauseitistherightthingtodo,myreasonsarethefactsthatmakethatactionright.(GarrardandMcNaughton1998,53)

I take this tobean intuitiveview,and itprovidesuswith thebasis forournextprima facie

reasonableclaim:

3Markovits’ original says ‘the right (motivating) reasons’ – I omit the parenthetical terminologicalremark only because I am trying to avoid this terminology (see §(I)4). On her account ‘motivatingreasons’are‘thereasonsforwhichanagentacts’and‘normativereasons’are‘thereasonsforanagenttoact’.4HereMarkovits’originalreads‘the(normative)reasonswhy’–Iomitittheparentheticalterminology,again,toavoidterminologicalconfusion(seefn.3).

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(P6) A’sφingismorallyworthyonlyifAφsforareasonthatmakesφingright.5

So,whatJonathandoesismorallyworthyonlygiventhathedoesitforareasonthatmakesit

right.

1.3 Whatmakesitright?

SowhatmakesitrightforJonathantohelpher?Whyisitthathelpingheristherightthingto

do?AsDancynotes,‘itisbecausesheisintroublethatIoughttohelpher,notbecauseIthink

sheisintrouble.’(2000,52)

Dancy’spointisthatitistheobjectivefeaturesoftheworldthatdeterminewhetherornotan

actisthemorallyrightthingtodo,andnotfeaturesoftheagent’spsychology.Itisrightforme

torecyclebecauseitwillhelptheenvironment–andthatissoevenifIdon’tknowthatitwill

helptheenvironment.Likewise, it is right for Jonathantocometothewoman’saidbecause

sheisintrouble,andthatwouldbesoevenifhehadnoideathatshewasintrouble.6

Of course, sometimes features of our psychology might enter into the fray as moral

considerations: youmight say that regardlessofwhetherornot she is in trouble,given that

Jonathanthinkssheis,therightthingforhimtodoistotryandhelpher.Thatis,youmightsay

thatnothelpingsomeonewhoyoubelievetobeintroubleiswrong,regardlessofwhetheror

nottheyareintrouble.AndinthatcaseitisafeatureofJonathan’spsychologythatmakeshis

actionright.Onthisaccounthisactionisdoublyright:bothbecausehelpingherwillsaveher

fromtroubleandbecause,ifhedoesso,hewon’tbeneglectingsomeonehebelievestobein

trouble.

However, it’s also quite possible that Jonathan’s act is made right only by the objective

featuresofthesituation.Evenifyouthinkthatjustbelievingthatsheisintroublecouldmake

helpingher theright thingtodo (regardlessofwhetherornotshe’s introuble), it’spossible

thatgiventherestofwhathebelieves,believingthatsheisintroubledoesn’tmakeitrightfor

himtotrytohelpher,althoughthefactthatsheisintroublecontinuestodoso.Forinstance,

supposethatwhilehebelievesthatsheisintroublehealso(falsely)believesthatifhewereto

trytohelpheritwouldonlyworsenhersituation–inthatcasehisbeliefthatsheisintrouble

5This is entailed byMarkovits’ bi-conditional. I use the weaker claim because it is sufficient for mypurposes.6I’m not doing an analysis of what it is for an action to be ‘right’ and certainly not of what ‘ought’means.Evenifthereisanambiguitybetweenobjectiveandsubjective‘ought’claims,Ithinkthereisaclear and commonplace sense of ‘right’ actions that is independent of the agent’s perspective – andthat’sthesenseIamworkingwith–anditis,importantly,inthissenseofbeing‘right’thatIthink(P6)isanintuitiveclaim.Ifitweren’tthenitwould,forinstance,beunclearhowonecoulddotherightthingforthewrongreasons,orthewrongthingfortherightreasons.

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doesnotmakeitrightforhimtotrytohelpher(becausehethinksthatbyhelpingheritwould

make herworse off). However, since he could, in fact, help herwithoutworsening her lot,

helpingherisstill,insomeobvioussense,therightthingtodo.

WhileIdon’tsupposethatJonathanisinthesituationsodescribed(inparticular,hedoesthink

thathecouldimproveherlotbyhelpingher),sinceIwanttoremovecomplicatingfactors,I’m

going to suppose that Jonathan is ina situationsuch that it isonlyobjective featuresof the

circumstancethatmakehisactionright.Itakeitasagiventhatthatisatleastpossibleevenif

itisalsopossiblethatfeaturesofhispsychologycouldmakehisactionright.

To what end, all this convoluted reasoning? It is tomake several points: objective (that is,

worldly,notpsychological)featuresofasituationcanmakeanactionright;andwhilstfeatures

ofanagent’spsychologymayalsobeabletomakeanactionright, theydon’tneedto–the

reasonswhyit isrightforsomeagenttodosomeactioncouldhavenothingtodowiththeir

psychology,and I’msaying that that isactually thecase in theexampleof Jonathanand the

troubledwoman,asIconstructit.Thus,wecan,exhypothesi,makethefollowingprimafacie

reasonableclaim:

(P7) NofeaturesofJonathan’spsychologymakehelpingthewomanright.

1.4 Actingforreasonsthatmakeitworthacting

IfmyfriendwinsanawardandIcongratulateheritwillletherknowthatI’vethoughtofher

andampleasedforher–andshe’llgetsomejoyfromthat(andotherthingsbesides).Maybe

I’llalsogetsomejoyfromittoo.Inthesensediscussedin§(II)3.2,congratulatingmyfriendis

somethingthatis,forme,worthdoing.

Whatmakescongratulatingmy friendanact that is, forme,worthdoing? It seemsthat it is

things like this: the fact that she won an award, the fact that it would please her to be

congratulated(giventhatshehadthewontheaward),andsoon.Thatis,factsabouttheway

theworldismakemyactworthdoing(includingfactsaboutmyfriend’spsychology).EvenifI

didn’tknowthesethings,ifIhadnoideaaboutherhavingwontheaward,congratulatingher

wouldstillbeworthdoing–Ijustwouldn’tdoit.Solet’ssaythis:

(P8) Thefactthatmyfriendwonanawardmakescongratulatingherworthdoing.

Now,here’sarelevantprimafaciereasonableclaimaboutreasonsthatIwanttoputforward:

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(P9) Foranyp,ifpmakesA’sφingworthdoingthenAcouldφforthereasonthatp.7

A note on ‘could’: what is themodal concept we are working with here? I think there are

intuitivegrounds foraquite restrictiveone,however, all that I need for thepurposeof this

argument is logical possibility: that is, if p makes A’s φing worth doing then it is logically

possiblethatAcouldφforthereasonthatp.

Thisseems,tome,likeaclaimthatishardtodeny,butifyouneedsomepersuasionconsider

this:ifyouaren’tdoingsomethingforreasonsthatmakeitworthdoing,whatreasonsareyou

doingitfor?Thewrongones?It justseemsoddtometothinkthattherecouldbeanaction

that isworthdoingbutwhichonecouldneverdoforreasonsthatmakeitworthdoing.It is,

seemingly, onlywhen you do something for reasons that actuallymake itworth doing that

you,‘dotherightactionfortherightreason.’(Lord2008,2)Indeed,theveryideaofacting‘for

the right reasons’ seems to depend upon the logical possibility (and probably something

strongerthanthat)ofactingforreasonsthatmakeone’sactionworthdoing.Thefalsityof(P9)

would implythat therecouldbesomeactionsthatareworthdoingthatonecouldneverdo

‘fortherightreasons’.Iwouldsuggestthatthatis,atleast,aprimafacieimplausibleview,so

that(P9)is,atleast,primafaciereasonable.

2 Psychologismaboutthereasonsforwhichweact

RecallthefollowingclaimaboutreasonsfromTableI-4:

Psychologismaboutthereasonsforwhichweact:Foranyp,pisareasonforwhichAφ’difandonlyifpisafeatureofA’spsychologythatrationalisesφingandexplains(intherightway)whyAφ’d.

Davidson’s ‘Actions, Reasons andCauses’ (2001a) is probably theprogenitor of this view. In

addition,Ithinkthatthisclaim(orsomethingsufficientlysimilartoit)isalsoadvocatedbyTurri

(2009), Gibbons (2010) andMitova (2015, 2016) (although they don’t articulate it in these

terms). This claim is also perhaps most commonly associated with what I have called the

‘ReceivedView’(ofwhichtheformerarenotadvocates(seeTableI-6)).

7ThisiscloselyrelatedtoBernardWilliams’claimthat:‘Iftherearereasonsforaction,itmustbethatpeople sometimes act for those reasons, and if they do, their reasons must figure in some correctexplanationoftheiraction.’(Williams1981,102)(SeealsoDancy2000,101;Smith2004,175;Hornsby2007,301;Raz2009,194;Hieronymi2011,415;WayandWhiting2016,214).IusethisversionbecauseWilliams(andotherswhoexpressthisclaim)takefavourismaboutreasonstoact(seepreviouschapter)for granted – but someonewho rejects that view can satisfyWilliams’s claimwithout difficulty. (P9)entailsWilliams’ claim (given favourism about reasons to act), while providing a claim that onewhorejects the latterwill still alsohave to reject inorder toendorsepsychologismabout the reasons forwhichweact(see§3.2).

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Why would anyone hold this view? I think that most philosophers who endorse it do so

becausethey,eitherimplicitlyorexplicitly,thinkthatanagent’sreasonforactingmustmake

their action rational and that only features of an agent’s psychology canmake their actions

rational.However,thefocusofthisdiscussionisontheproblemsthatarisefrompsychologism

aboutthereasonsforwhichweact,soIleaveasidethereasonswhyonemightendorseitfora

laterdiscussion.8

ItispossiblethatsomeofthosetowhomIhaveattributedpsychologismaboutthereasonsfor

whichweact(seeTable I-6)mightbalkatmyexactwordingof it.9Nonetheless, I thinkallof

thosetheoristsshareacommitmenttothefollowing,whichisentailedbypsychologismabout

thereasonsforwhichweact,10andwhichiswhatreallycreatestroubleforit:

(PSY) Foranyp,ifAφsforthereasonthatpthenpisafeatureofA’spsychology.11

3 Theproblemsforpsychologism

I present three problems for (PSY): The Moral Worthiness Problem; The Right Reasons

Problem;andTheNon-PsychologicalReasonProblem.

3.1 TheMoralWorthinessProblem

The Moral Worthiness Problem is this: Jonathan’s act of helping the woman was morally

worthy,sohediditforreasonsthatmadeitright,sofeaturesofhispsychologymadeitright,

but no featuresof his psychologymade it right! Explicitly, the following claims aremutually

inconsistent:

(P5) Jonathan’sactofhelpingthewomanismorallyworthy.

(P6) A’sφingismorallyworthyonlyifAφsforareasonthatmakesφingright.

(PSY) Foranyp,ifAφsforthereasonthatpthenpisafeatureofA’spsychology.

(P7) NofeaturesofJonathan’spsychologymakehelpingthewomanright.

8In§(VIII),Iwilldiscuss,atlength,themotivatingargumentforpsychologism.9Inthesamewaythat,say,ScanlonandParfitmighthavebalkedatmycharacterisationoftheirviewsas‘favourismaboutreasonstoact’(see§(II)3.3).10Forthesakeofclarity:(PSY)isweakerthanpsychologismaboutthereasonsforwhichweact, inthesensethatthelatterentailstheformer,buttheformerdoesnotentailthelatter.Mypointisthat(PSY)iswhatcausespsychologismaboutthereasonsforwhichweacttofacetheproblemsitdoes.11Cf. ‘Psychologism… is the claim that the reasons for which we act are psychological states ofourselves.’(Dancy2000,98).

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3.2 TheRightReasonsProblem

The Right Reasons Problem is this: the fact that my friend has won an award makes

congratulating her worth doing, so it’s logically possible forme to congratulate her for the

reason that shehaswonanaward, so the fact thatmy friendhaswonanawardmustbea

featureofmypsychology,butitisn’t!Explicitly,thefollowingclaimsaremutuallyinconsistent:

(P8) Thefactthatmyfriendwonanawardmakescongratulatingherworthdoing.

(P9) Foranyp,ifpmakesA’sφingworthdoingthenAcouldφforthereasonthatp.

(PSY) Foranyp,ifAφsforthereasonthatpthenpisafeatureofA’spsychology.

(P3) Thefactthatmyfriendhadwonanawardisnotafeatureofmypsychology.

3.3 TheNon-PsychologicalReasonProblem

TheNon-Psychological Reason Problem is this:my reason for congratulatingmy friendwas,

interalia,thatshehadwonanaward,sothatmusthavebeenafeatureofmypsychology,but

itisn’t!Explicitly,thefollowingclaimsaremutuallyinconsistent:

(P1) My reason for congratulatingmy friendwas, interalia, that shehadwonanaward.

(PSY) Foranyp,ifAφsforthereasonthatpthenpisafeatureofA’spsychology.

(P3) Thefactthatmyfriendhadwonanawardisnotafeatureofmypsychology.

3.4 TheExperientialReasonProblem(forPsychologism)

TheExperientialReasonProblem(forPsychologism) is this:my reason forcongratulatingmy

friendwas, interalia, that Ireadthatshehadwonanawardinthenewspaper,sothatmust

havebeenafeatureofmypsychology,butitisn’t!Explicitly,thefollowingclaimsaremutually

inconsistent:

(P2) Myreasonforcongratulatingmyfriendwas,interalia,thatIreadthatshehadwonanaward.

(PSY) Foranyp,ifAφsforthereasonthatpthenpisafeatureofA’spsychology.

(P4) The fact I read that my friend had won an award is not a feature of mypsychology.

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4 Responsestotheproblemsforpsychologism

Whatcanaproponentofpsychologismaboutthereasonsforwhichweactdo?Itseemstome

thereislittletonochoiceinthematter.(P3)and(P4)areundeniable:ofcoursefactsaboutmy

friendorwhatI’vereadarenotfeaturesofmypsychology.

We constructed the Jonathan example so as to ensure the truth of (P7) (the claim that no

features of Jonathan’s psychology made his act right), so unless one wants to change the

conceptof ‘makingright’, toadifferentonetothatwhich Iamusing,onecannotreject(P7)

(and if onewere to change the concept, thatwouldobviously justbeanew (perhapsmore

solvable) problem, it would not be a solution to the problem I am posing). Similar remarks

countagainstrejecting(P8).

What about (P5) (the claim that Jonathan’s act ismorallyworthy)? Endorsing some formof

moralanti-realismcouldallowonetoclaimthatnoactsaremorallyworthy,sothatJonathan’s

actisn’teither,therebyrejecting(P5).Thisavoidshavingtoreject(P6),butonlybytrivialising

it – it is trueonlybecause theantecedent isnever satisfied– so I think that a strategy that

rejects(P5)isatleastasprimafacieimplausibleasjustrejecting(P6).

So, leaving aside the possibility of rejecting (P5), there are no choices for the proponent of

psychologismaboutthereasonsforwhichweact;theymustrejectallofthefollowingprima

faciereasonableclaims:

(P1) My reason for congratulatingmy friendwas, interalia, that shehadwonanaward.12

(P2) Myreasonforcongratulatingmyfriendwas,interalia,thatIreadthatshehadwonanaward.13

(P6) A’sφingismorallyworthyonlyifAφsforareasonthatmakesφingright.14

(P9) Foranyp,ifpmakesA’sφingworthdoingthenAcouldφforthereasonthatp.15

Of course, one can perhaps put forward good arguments as to why these claims are

nonethelessfalse,orwhyitisnonethelessacceptabletorejectthem.Forinstance,onemight

arguethat(P9)isfalse,byprovidingcasesinwhichoneseeminglycannotdosomeactionfora

12Rejecting(P1)solvesTheNon-PsychologicalReasonProblem.13Rejecting(P2)solvesTheExperientialReasonProblem(forPsychologism).14Rejecting(P6)solvesTheMoralWorthinessProblem.15Rejecting(P9)solvesTheRightReasonsProblem.

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reason that makes it worth doing.16 Alternatively, perhaps one could construct counter-

examplesto(P6).17

My point, again, is not that one cannot argue against these claims, or that the arguments

againsttheseclaimsarewrong,ratheritisjustthattheseclaimsareprimafaciereasonableso

thatrejectingthemisastancethatdemandssomeexplanation–youarerejectingsomething

thatonthefaceofitseemsreasonable.So,again,thatatleastcountsinfavouroflookingfora

theorythatdoesn’trejectsuchprimafaciereasonableclaims.

5 Conclusion

Aswith theprevious chapter’sdiscussionof favourismabout reasons toact, thepurposeof

thischapterwasnot toargueagainstpsychologismabout the reasons forwhichweact,but

onlytoshowthecostofacceptingit,whichisthatonemustreject(P1),(P6)and(P9),which

are,asIhaveargued,allprimafaciereasonable.

16Schroeder (2007, 33) gives the followingexample: The fact that there is a surprisepartywaiting athomeforhimmakesgoinghomeearlyworthdoingforNate.However,Natecannotgohomeearlyforthereasonthatthereisasurprisepartywaiting(becauseitwon’tbeasurprisepartyifheisawareofit,andhecan’tgohomeforthereasonthatthereisasurprisepartywaitingforhimifheisn’tawarethatthereis).17Forinstance,onemightthinkthatdiscoveringthecureforcancerexclusivelyforthereasonthatonewillbeadmired forhavingdoneso isnonethelessmorallyworthy. Iwoulddisagree,as, I think,manyotherswould.Ultimately, I think,whetherornotonerejects itdependsuponwhetherornotone isaconsequentialist about moral worthiness – noting that one can be a consequentialist about moralrightnesswithoutbeingaconsequentialistaboutmoralworthiness(cf.Mill:‘themotivehasnothingtodowiththemoralityoftheaction,thoughmuchwiththeworthoftheagent.’(1863,29)).

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(IV)

Actingforwhatyoubelieve

InwhichIshowwhatitcoststothinkthatareasonforwhichanagentacts isthe content of thebelief theyactedon. I showhow ‘deliberativismabout thereasons for which we act’ clashes with some prima facie reasonable claimsaboutthefactivityofreasons,theexplanatorypowerofthereasonsforwhichweact,thefactivityofexplanationandwhatanagent’sreasonsforactingareinGettiercases.Isetoutwhichclaimstheproponentofthisviewmustchoosebetweenrejecting.

Thereisanaccountofthereasonsforwhichanagentactsthataimstoreconciletheideathat

anagentwhoacts intentionally,deliberatelyandpurposefullyalsoactsforareasonwiththe

ideathatthereasonsforwhichtheyactareoftennotfeaturesoftheirpsychology.According

tothisaccount,whichiswhatIhavecalled‘deliberativismaboutthereasonsforwhichweact’,

theconsiderationsinlightofwhichanagentacts,whichiswhattheybelievedwhentheyacted

ontheirbelief,arethereasonsforwhichtheyact.

Theproblemsforthisview,asIshallshow,arisefromtheprimafaciereasonableclaimsthat

‘being a reason’ is a seemingly factive property, that one’s reasons for acting explain one’s

actions and that even when the considerations in light of which one acts are true, we are

sometimesreluctanttocallthemtheagent’sreasonsforacting.

1 Someprimafaciereasonableclaimsaboutreasons

1.1 Thefactivityofreasons

IfSally is runningbecauseshemistakenly thinks thatabear ischasingher,wedon’t tendto

say, ‘herreasonforrunning is thatabear ischasingher,eventhoughone isn’t’.Onereason

thatwedon’t tend to say it is, I submit, that theexpressionsoundsodd.1AsAlvarezputs it,

thereisan‘airofparadox’aboutit:

‘OthellokillsDesdemonaforthereasonthatDesdemonahasbeenunfaithfultohim,althoughshehasnotbeenunfaithfultohim’soundsonlymarginally lessparadoxicalthan‘OthellokillsDesdemonabecauseofthefactthatDesdemonahasbeenunfaithfultohim,althoughshehasnotbeenunfaithfultohim’.It isnotthatonecannotgivemeaningfulinterpretationstotheseexpressions: wemayhearthemasconveyingwhattheagenthim-orherselfwouldhavesaidifaskedabouttheirreason...Allthesame,thefactthattheseexpressionshaveanairofparadox

1Indeed,thisclaimwasmetwithlaughterwhenIputittoaseminaraudience.

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and require this special interpretation are arguably explained by the thought that both ‘thereasonthat’and‘thefactthat’arefactiveoperators.(Alvarez2016b,8)2

I thinkAlvarez’sreading iscorrect: it isnotthatwecan’t findanymeaning intheexpression

‘Sally’sreasonforrunningwasthatabearwaschasingher,eventhoughonewasn’t’–it’sthat

theexpressionsoundsodd,andwehavetore-interpretittomakesenseofit.Moreover,the

factthatwedon’tsaysuchthingsshouldtellussomethingabouttheapplicabilityoftheterm

tosuchcases.

Isuggest,therefore,thattheclaimthat‘…istheagent’sreasonforacting’isafactivepredicate

isprimafaciereasonable.Thus:

(D1) Foranyp,ifpwasA’sreasonforφingthenpisthecase.

1.2 Theexplanatorypowerofreasons

Wecanexplainanagent’sactionbygiving their reason foracting.Moreover, it is seemingly

naturaltothinkthatwhenwesoexplainanagent’saction, it istheagent’sreasonforacting

itself that explains their action. When I say that Sally’s reason for running was that she

believedthatabearwaschasingheritstronglyseemstosuggest(ifnotdirectlyimplies)that

Sallyranbecauseshebelievedthatabearwaschasingher.Likewise,ifIsaythatmyreasonfor

congratulatingmyfriendwasthatshehadwonanaward itsuggeststhat Icongratulatedmy

friendbecauseshehadwonanaward.

Theideathatanagent’sreasonforactingalwaysexplainstheiractionis,asLilianO’Briennotes

‘verywidelyshared’(2015,282).Forinstance:

Iactinlightofthosereasons.TheyarethereasonswhyIdowhatIdo.(Dancy2000,103)

Whenanagentactsfora(specific)reasonthatveryreasonisalsotheexplanation(oratleastpartoftheexplanation)ofwhyshedidwhatshedid.(Heuer2004,45)

Takingsomethingasone’sreason,inactingonit,istakingitasanexplanatoryreason.(Setiya2007,36)

A fairly standardway of linking reasons for action and explanations of action… is thatwhensomeoneactsforareasonthentheirreasonforactingthatwayexplainstheiractingthatway.(Stout2009,57emphasisadded)

When there is a reason for which an agent acted then that reason explains (features in anexplanationof)thataction.(Raz2011,14)

2For others who take such remarks to sound odd see Unger (1978, 208), Scanlon (2014, 36), Dancy(2008a,267)andComesaña&McGrath(2014,75)–the lattertwoareparticularlyworthnotingsincetheyadvanceadeliberativeaccountandnonethelessrecognizetheoddnessofsuchexpressions.

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I suggest that it is sowidelyheldpreciselybecause itmatchesour intuitions.Theclaim that

somethingwasone’sreasonforactingseemstobesubstitutablefortheclaimthatoneacted

becauseofit.Thus,wehavethesecond,primafaciereasonableclaimforthisdiscussion:

(D2) Foranyp,ifpwasA’sreasonforφingthenpexplainswhyAφ’d.

1.3 Thefactivityofexplanation

Consider the following statements: I took my umbrella because it was raining, although it

wasn’training.Thereasonwhythewindowbrokewasthatabrickstruck it,althoughabrick

didn’t strike it. That it’s unfair explainswhy it’swrong, although it’s not unfair. All of these

statementssoundstrangetothepointofunintelligibility.Whatmakesthemsoundstrangeis

thatexplanatoryrelations(whethercausalornon-causal)areseeminglyfactiverelations(and

that is sowhether theyarepickedoutby ‘because’, ‘explains’or ‘reasonwhy’)– something

cannotexplainunlessitistrue.

I take this to be such an obviously prima facie reasonable claim that I won’t defend its

intuitivenessfurther:

(D3) Foranyp,ifpexplainsanythingthenpisthecase.

1.4 Gettiercases

EdmundGettier(1963)introducedanow-familiarsortofcharactertoepistemology:someone

whohasajustified,truebeliefthatfallsshortofknowledge.Gettiercharactersarerelevantto

thisdiscussionbecause,whenanagent’s justifiedbelief is truebyhappyaccident,what the

agent believes (despite its truth) seemingly does not explain their action, as Hornsby

demonstrates:

Edmund…believesthattheiceinthemiddleofthepondisdangerouslythin,havingbeentoldsobyanormallyreliablefriend,and…accordinglykeepstotheedge.ButEdmund’sfrienddidn’twantEdmundtoskateinthemiddleofthepond(nevermindwhy),sothathehadtoldEdmundthat the ice therewasthindespitehavingnoviewaboutwhetherornot itactuallywasthin.Edmund,then,didnotkeeptotheedgebecausethe ice inthemiddlewasthin.Supposenowthat, as it happened, the ice in themiddle of the pondwas thin. Thismakes no difference.Edmundstilldidn’tkeepto theedgebecausethe icewas thin.The fact that the icewas thindoesnotexplainEdmund’sacting,eventhoughEdmunddidbelievethatitwasthin,andeventhough the fact that itwas thin actuallywas a reason for him to stay at the edge. (Hornsby2007,251emphasisadded)

I think Hornsby’s claim is intuitive: there is no sense in which Edmund’s action was the

consequenceoftheicebeingthin,and,indeed,theicecouldhavebeenthickinthemiddleof

the pond and Edmund would have stayed at the edge just the same. And given those

observations,itseemshardtoseehowitcouldbetruethatEdmundstayedattheedgeofthe

lakebecausetheicewasthin.So,Isuggestthatthefollowingclaimisprimafaciereasonable:

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(D4) The fact that the ice was thin does not explain why Edmund stayed by theedgeofthelake.

2 Deliberativismaboutthereasonsforwhichweact

RecallthefollowingclaimaboutreasonsfromTableI-4:

Deliberativismaboutthereasonsforwhichweact:Foranyp,pisareasonforwhichAφ’difandonlyifpisaconsiderationinlightofwhichAφs.

Whiledeliberativismaboutthereasonsforwhichweactischaracterisedbythisbi-conditional,

itmayhelpthereaderwhenwecometotheproblemswiththeaccountifweseparateoutthe

left-to-right and right-to-left readings (noting that the deliberative account is committed to

both).Thus:

(DEL1) Foranyp,ifpisaconsiderationinlightofwhichAφsthenpisA’sreasonforφing.

(DEL2) Foranyp,ifpisA’sreasonforφingthenpisaconsiderationinlightofwhichAφs.3

Itiseasyenoughtosaythatsomethingis‘aconsiderationinlightofwhichoneacts’,perhaps,

butwhat does itmean?4 JonathanDancy,who is probably the progenitor of contemporary

deliberativismaboutthereasonsforwhichweact,providesthefollowinginsight:

Thereasonsforwhichweactaretheconsiderations inthe lightofwhichwedowhatwedo.Thesearethefeatureswhichwetaketotellinfavourofsoacting;theywillfigureprominentlyinourdeliberation.(Dancy2006,123)

So, a condition on something’s being a consideration in light of which one acts is that one

should have taken it to ‘favour’ doing that action. Dancy, and other proponents of

deliberativism,understandthefavouringrelationintheconventionalwaythatIhavealready

discussed(see§(I)4.4and§(II)3.1)–as‘making,insomerespect,worthdoing’.So,acondition

onsomething’sbeingaconsiderationinlightofwhichoneactsisthatonemusttakethatthing

tomakeone’saction,insomerespect,worthdoing.

But this isnotall there is tobeingaconsideration in lightofwhichoneacts;onecouldtake

somethingtomakeanaction,insomerespect,worthdoingandactuallydothatactionwithout

thatthingbeingtheconsiderationinlightofwhichonedidit.Forinstance,Icouldtakethefact

that it’spleasantoutsidetomakegoingoutsideworthdoingand Icouldactuallygooutside,

3It’sworthnotingthatmanywhodonotsubscribetodeliberativismaboutthereasonsforwhichweactnonethelesstake(DEL2)tobetrue(e.g.Stout2009;Alvarez2010;Parfit2011;Hyman2015).4 These are what Scanlon (1998) calls ‘operative reasons’, what Olson and Svensson (2005) call‘deliberativereasons’andwhatDancy(2000)andSchroeder(2008)call‘motivatingreasons’.

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buttheconsiderationinlightofwhichIdosomightbe,say,thatIneedtogetlunch(Iwould

stillhavegoneoutsideiftheweatherhadbeendreadful).

Whatmakessomethingaconsiderationinlightofwhichoneactsisnotmerelythatonetakes

ittofavourone’saction,butthatoneactsonit.Whatthatmeansmaybealittleopaque,butI

thinkthatwecansay,bywayofexplication,thatoneactsonsomethingthatonetooktomake

one’sactionworthdoingifoneactsasaresultoftakingittomakeone’sactionworthdoing.5

Whatdoesthisallmean?Well,whenIseerainoutside,Ibelievethatit’srainingandIbelieve

thatmyumbrellawillkeepmedry.Ireasonthus:it’sraining,myumbrellawillkeepmedry,I

wanttostaydry(orjudgeitgoodorwhathaveyou),andsoIhadbettertakemyumbrella.I

taketheseconsiderationstofavourtakingmyumbrellaandItookmyumbrellaasaresultof

taking those considerations to favour doing so. It is these two conditions (taking some

considerationtofavouracting,andactingasaresultoftakingittofavourdoingso)thatmake

someconsiderationaconsiderationinlightofwhichanagentacts.Somuch,then,forwhatit

istobeaconsiderationinlightofwhichoneacts.

3 WhatSallyandEdmundtooktofavouracting

3.1 Sally’sconsiderations

WhatweretheconsiderationsinlightofwhichSallyran?Thatis,whatwasitthatshetookto

favour running (that is, to make running, in some respect, worth doing)?Well, Sally heard

something that sounded likeabear,andher thoughtprocess,albeitaquickone,musthave

beensomethinglike:‘Abear’scoming!Thesafe-houseisnearby–Icanmakeit. Ihadbetter

run!’ So, amongst the considerations that Sally took to favour runningwas that a bearwas

chasing her. Of course, a bearwasn’t chasing her, but that doesn’t prevent it from being a

considerationinlightofwhichsheacted,anymorethanthefactthatabearwasn’tchasingher

preventedherfrombelievingthatonewas.

Inorderforonetotakesomethingtofavoursomeaction,forittobeaconsiderationinlightof

which one acted, it is, as I have noted, enough that one believes it, believes that it favours

one’saction(inthesenseofmakingit,insomerespect,worthdoing)andactsonthosebeliefs.

Inparticular,itisnotnecessarythatoneknowit,oreventhatitbethecase,becausethebelief

operator,unlikeknowledge,isnotfactive.

5The natural interpretation of ‘as a result’ here is an explanatory one – but I want to avoid such acommitment since some (e.g. Dancy 2000) don’t think the ‘taking’ is explanatory, but is merely an‘enablingcondition’fortheaction.

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This is a noteworthy upshot of the deliberative account: an agent can act in light of a

considerationthatwasfalse.Andthis iswhatSallydoes:Sally takes thatabearwaschasing

hertofavourheraction,andactsinthelightofthatconsideration.

(D5) AconsiderationinlightofwhichSallyranwasthatabearwaschasingher.

Was the fact that shebelieved thatabearwaschasingheraconsideration in lightofwhich

Sallyran? Itwasnot.Sallydoesnotthinktoherself: ‘Hmmm, Ibelievethatabear ischasing

me.ThatIbelievethatabearischasingmemakesrunningworthdoing(regardlessofwhether

ornotabear ischasingme…),so Ihadbetterdo it.’ ItwouldbeoddforSally toreasonthis

way, because it’s only in unusual circumstances thatwe take considerations aboutour own

psychologytofavourouractions.

Theseremarksrelatetoremarksmadein§(I)4.2,thatareperhapsworthrevisiting.Recallthat

Sambelievesthatthesecurityservicesaretryingtoreadhermind.Shetakesthatthesecurity

servicesare trying to readhermind to favourwearinga foilhat (she takes it tobe, in some

respect,worth doing). However, knowing that she has a delusional disorder, she also takes

thatshebelievesthatthesecurityservicesaretryingtoreadhermindtofavourgoingtoseea

doctor.Samdeliberatesaboutthewayshetakestheworldtobeaswellasthewayshetakes

hermindtobe.

SallyisnotlikeSam–whenSallydecidestorunit’snotbecauseshehasdeliberatedabouther

ownpsychology–whatSallytakestofavourheractionisthewayworldis,accordingtoher.If

Sally thought thatmerely believing that a bearwas chasing herwouldmake runningworth

doingregardlessofwhetherornotabearwaschasingher,thenitcouldbeaconsiderationin

light of which she runs. But, ex hypothesi, that isn’t what Sally thinks, what Sally takes to

favourrunningisthatabearischasingher(eventhoughnobearisactuallychasingher)–Sally

is just mistaken about what makes running worth doing, because nothing makes it worth

doing.

ThepointisthatweshouldnotinferfromthefactthatSallyrunsbecauseshebelievesthata

bear is chasing her that what she deliberates about is her mental states rather than their

propositionalcontents.Inshort:

(D6) ThatshebelievedthatabearwaschasingherwasnotaconsiderationinlightofwhichSallyran.

WhataboutthefactthatSallyheardabear-likesound?Isthataconsiderationinlightofwhich

sheran?MaybeyouwanttosaythatSally’sreasoninggoeslikethis‘Thatsoundedlikeabear!

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Theremust be a bear coming! I had better run!’ Her reasoningmight go like that. But that

doesn’tmakehearingabear-likesoundsomethingshetooktofavourrunning.

Why not? Because she doesn’t think that hearing a bear-like sound makes running worth

doing.Sallydoesn’tthink:‘ifIhearabear-likesoundIshouldrun,regardlessofwhetherornot

a bear is chasing me.’ Hearing a bear-like sound is what makes her believe that a bear is

chasing her, but it’s that a bear is chasing her that she takes to favour running. That is, if

hearingabear-likesoundplaysanyroleinherdeliberationitisinhelpingherdecidewhatto

believe;butonceshehassettledonbelievingthatabearischasingheritiswhatshebelieves

thatshetakestofavourheraction,notwhatshetooktofavourbelievingit.So:

(D7) Thatsheheardabear-likesoundwasnotaconsiderationinlightofwhichSallyran.

3.2 Edmund’sconsiderations

WhatweretheconsiderationsinlightofwhichEdmundstayedbytheedgeofthepond?That

is,whatwasitthathetooktofavourstayingbytheedgeofthepondandonthebasisofwhich

hedidso?

Well,histhoughtprocessmighthavegone(ifsomewhatelaborately)likethis:‘Theiceisthinin

themiddle.IfIskatethereitmightcrack,Imightfallthrough.Thatwouldbedreadful,perhaps

fatal.I’dbetterjuststayattheside.’Assumingthatthis(orsomethinginitsvicinity)ishowhis

reasoning went, the things that Edmund took to favour his action, and which made the

difference towhat he did,were things like that the icewas thin, that skating on thin ice is

dangerousandsoon.Thus,wecansay:

(D8) AconsiderationinlightofwhichEdmundstayedbytheedgewasthattheicewasthin.

4 Theproblemsfordeliberativism

Theproblemsfordeliberativismaboutthereasonsforwhichweactwillnodoubtbeobvious

fromtheremarksoftheprevioussections.Nonetheless,itisworthbeingexplicitaboutthem.

What follows are four distinct problems for the deliberative account: The False Reasons

Problem; The Explanatory Reasons Problem; The Deliberative Gettier Problem; and The

PsychologicalReasonProblem(forDeliberativism).

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4.1 TheFalseReasonsProblem

TheFalseReasonsProblemisthis:Aconsiderationin lightofwhichSallyranwasthatabear

waschasingher,soitwasherreasonforrunning,soabearwaschasingher,butnobearwas

chasingher!Explicitly,thefollowingclaimsaremutuallyinconsistent:

(D5) AconsiderationinlightofwhichSallyranwasthatabearwaschasingher.

(DEL1) Foranyp,ifpisaconsiderationinlightofwhichAφsthenpisA’sreasonforφing.

(D1) Foranyp,ifpwasA’sreasonforφingthenpisthecase.

(D9) ItisnotthecasethatabearwaschasingSally.

4.2 TheExplanatoryReasonsProblem

TheExplanatoryReasonsProblemisthis:AconsiderationinlightofwhichSallyranwasthata

bearwaschasingher,so itwasherreasonforrunning,so itexplainswhysheran,soabear

was chasing her, but no bear was chasing her! Explicitly, the following claims aremutually

inconsistent:

(D5) AconsiderationinlightofwhichSallyranwasthatabearwaschasingher.

(DEL1) Foranyp,ifpisaconsiderationinlightofwhichAφsthenpisA’sreasonforφing.

(D2) Foranyp,ifpwasA’sreasonforφingthenpexplainswhyAφ’d.

(D3) Foranyp,ifpexplainsanythingthenpisthecase.

(D9) ItisnotthecasethatabearwaschasingSally.

4.3 TheDeliberativeGettierProblem

TheDeliberativeGettierProblem is this:Aconsideration in lightofwhichEdmundstayedby

theedgeofthepondwasthattheicewasthininthemiddle,sothatwashisreasonforstaying

bytheedge,soitexplainswhyhestayedbytheedge,butitdoesn’texplainwhyhestayedby

theedge!Explicitly,thefollowingclaimsaremutuallyinconsistent:

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(D8) AconsiderationinlightofwhichEdmundstayedbytheedgewasthattheicewasthin.

(DEL1) Foranyp,ifpisaconsiderationinlightofwhichAφsthenpisA’sreasonforφing.

(D2) Foranyp,ifpwasA’sreasonforφingthenpexplainswhyAφ’d.

(D4) The fact that the ice was thin does not explain why Edmund stayed by theedgeofthelake.

4.4 ThePsychologicalReasonProblem(forDeliberativism)

ThePsychologicalReasonProblem(forDeliberativism) is this:Sally’s reason for runningwas,

inter alia, that she believed a bearwas chasing her, so thatwas a consideration in light of

whichsheran,butitwasn’t!6Explicitly,thefollowingclaimsaremutuallyinconsistent:

(F5) Sally’sreasonforrunningwas,interalia,thatshebelievedabearwaschasingher.7

(DEL2) Foranyp,ifpisA’sreasonforφingthenpisaconsiderationinlightofwhichAφs.

(D6) ThatshebelievedthatabearwaschasingherwasnotaconsiderationinlightofwhichSallyran.

4.5 TheExperientialReasonProblem(forDeliberativism)

The Experiential Reason Problem (for Deliberativism) is this: Sally’s reason for runningwas,

interalia,thatsheheadabear-likesound,sothatwasaconsiderationinlightofwhichsheran,

butitwasn’t!Explicitly,thefollowingclaimsaremutuallyinconsistent:

(F6) Sally’sreasonforrunningwas,interalia,thatsheheardabear-likesound.

(DEL2) Foranyp,ifpisA’sreasonforφingthenpisaconsiderationinlightofwhichAφs.

(D7) Thatsheheardabear-likesoundwasnotaconsiderationinlightofwhichSallyran.

5 Responsestotheproblemsfordeliberativism

What can the proponent of this account do? Rejecting (D9) is not an option: a bearwasn’t

chasingSally–thatmuchweknowforsure.Rejectinganyof(D5),(D6),(D7)or(D8)(theclaims6Thisargument isoften (e.g.Dancy2000,124–25;Alvarez2016b,9)usedbyproponentsof (DEL2) toargueagainsttheideathatSally’sreasonforrunningwasthatshebelievedthatabearwaschasingher.My point is that it is prima facie reasonable to suggest that Sally’s reason for running was that shebelievedthatabearwaschasingher–soifone’stheoryofreasonscommitsyoutorejectingit,itisatsomecostthatitdoesso.7Thisisfrom§(II)1.3,wherewefirstconsideredthisexample.

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abouttheconsiderationsinlightofwhichSallyandEdmunddidordidnotact) isalsonotan

option–thetruthof(D5)to(D8)justfollowsfromwhatit istobeaconsiderationinlightof

whichoneacts(andtheconstructionoftheexamples).Ofcourseonecouldchangethenotion

of consideration that we are working with, but that would be to change the account, it

wouldn’tsolvetheproblemfordeliberativismaboutthereasonsforwhichweact.

So,theproponentofdeliberativismaboutthereasonsforwhichweactmustreject:

(F5) Sally’sreasonforrunningwas,interalia,thatshebelievedabearwaschasingher.8

(F6) Sally’sreasonforrunningwas,interalia,thatsheheardabear-likesound.9

(D1) Foranyp,ifpwasA’sreasonforφingthenpisthecase.10

And,EITHER:

(D3) Foranyp,ifpexplainsanythingthenpisthecase.11And;

(D4) The fact that the ice was thin does not explain why Edmund stayed by theedgeofthelake.12

OR:

(D2) Foranyp,ifpwasA’sreasonforφingthenpexplainswhyAφ’d.13

Asever,onecan,perhaps,constructcompellingargumentsastowhytheseclaimsare,inspite

of theirprima facie reasonableness, nonetheless false. For instance,Dancy(2000) suggested

thatrejecting(D3),andinsistingthatthereissuchathingasnon-factiveexplanation,mightbe

theappropriateresponsetoTheExplanatoryReasonsProblem.Thisviewhasprovedtobeless

than compelling; indeed, the claim that explanation could be non-factive is apparently so

unpalatableathesisthatevenDancyhasnowabandonedit,yieldingtowhathedescribesas‘a

barrageofcriticism’.14

Therejectionof(D2) isnowthemorefavouredapproachamongstdeliberativists.15Themain

strategy for doing so appears to be this: given that an agent’s reason for acting is an

intentional object (qua what the agent believes), it is not the sort of thing that can do

8Rejecting(F5)solvesThePsychologicalReasonProblem(forDeliberativism).9Rejecting(F6)solvesTheExperientialReasonProblem(forDeliberativism).10Rejecting(D1)solvesTheFalseReasonsProblem.11Rejecting(D3)solvesTheExplanatoryReasonsProblem.12Rejecting(D4)solvesTheDeliberativeGettierProblem.13Rejecting(D2)solvesbothTheExplanatoryReasonsProblemandTheDeliberativeGettierProblem.14SeeDancy(2014).Although,Comesaña&McGrath(2014)appeartohavepickedupthenon-factivebaton.15(E.g.Stoutland1998;Davis2003,2005;Sandis2013;Dancy2014)

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explaining, so (D2) can’tbe true. Theproblem, it seems tome, is that this lineof argument

reasons to its conclusion by taking (DEL1) as given, when that is precisely what is in

contention.16

Nonetheless,aswiththepreviousdiscussions,what isat issuehere isnotwhetherornotan

argumentcanbegiventhatmakesrejecting(D2)(and(F5),(F6)and(D1))tolerable,mypointis

just that it counts against deliberativism about the reasons for which we act that such an

argument needs to be given in the first place. If your theory has some counter-intuitive

consequencesitscounter-intuitivenessdoesn’tmakeitwrong,butitcertainlycountsagainstit

whencomparedtoamoreintuitivetheory.

6 Conclusion

This chapter has shown that the deliberative account must reject a number of prima facie

reasonable claims, as previous chapters did for favourism about reasons to act and

psychologismaboutthereasonsforwhichweact.Thenextchapterconsiderswhetherornot

thedifficulties facedby these threeaccountsshouldpersuadeus that thereare justseveral,

irreconcilableconceptsofreasonatplay.

16That is, it concludes thatanagent’s reason foractingcan’texplain theiractionbyassuming it isanintentionalobject,butthisbegsthequestion,whichis,inpart,aboutwhetherornottheagent’sreasonforactingisanintentionalobject.

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(V)

Onthepluralityofreasons

InwhichIexplainwhatapluralisttheoryofreasonsisandwhy‘goingplural’isnotapanacea.Isuggestthatagivenreasonexpressioncouldhavemorethanone sense, and I show how we can accommodate theories of reasons thatacceptthatidea,i.e.pluralisttheoriesofreasons,inourcategorisationschema.I discuss some examples of pluralist theories from the literature. I show howpluralist theories can solve some of the problems discussed in the previouschapters. I explainwhypluralism is not, however, enough, and I suggest thatourinvestigationshouldgobeyondfavourism,psychologismanddeliberativism.

Thepreviousthreechapterssetoutsomeofthemainproblemsforthemostpopularclaims

from each of the three families of claims about reasons. In doing so they painted a bleak

picture of contemporary theories of reasons; as Dancy notes (paraphrasing Aristotle) the

theories ‘leaveone saying things thatnobodywould sayunlessdefendinga theory.’ (2008a,

267)Sowhatistobedone?Onepossiblesolution,whichIwishtoconsidernowonlysothat

wemaysetitaside,istothinkthattherearedifferentsensesofagivenreasonexpression.

UpuntilnowallofthetheoriesIhaveconsideredhavebeenunivocal;thatis,theyhave(asI

noted in §(I)1) all assumed that a given reason expression always picks out reasons of the

same kind. Homonyms, I said, are the exception and not the rule. But what if reason

expressions are homonyms of some sort, picking out kinds of things that are confusingly

similar, but nonetheless distinct? Perhaps, that is, there is a sense inwhich Sally runs for a

reason and a sense inwhich shedoesn’t run for a reason (or runs for no reason). Similarly,

perhaps ifthere isnomilkathomebut Ibelievethatthere is,thenthere isasense inwhich

thereisnoreasonformetobuymilkandasenseinwhichthereisareasonformetobuymilk.

Perhaps, the same reason expression can have different senses; perhaps, that is, the same

reasonexpressioncanbeusedtopickoutdifferentkindsofreason.

A theory that admits that a single reason expression can have different senses is apluralist

theoryofreasons.Thepurposeofthischapteristoexplainwhatpluralisttheoriesofreasons

are,whyonewouldadoptpluralism,andtoshowthateven ifweadoptapluralisttheoryof

reasons, we should look for a new account of the reason-relation, beyond favourism,

deliberativismandpsychologism.

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1 Thesenseofanexpression

ForexpositionalpurposesIwanttostressthedistinctionswearenowworkingwith:thereare

(i) different reason expressions, (ii) different kinds of reason they pick out and, now (iii)

differentsensesofareasonexpression.

In§(I)1,Idiscussed,atlength,thepossibilitythatdifferentreasonexpressionsmightpickout

differentkindsofreason.However,Iassumedthateachreasonexpressionpicksoutonlyone

kind of reason.Now, I am allowing that the same reason expressionmay pick outdifferent

kindsof reason–and to theextent that it does,we can say that the reasonexpressionhas

differentsenses.Thatis,asinglereasonexpressionhasdifferentsensesifandonlyifitcanbe

usedtopickoutdifferentkindsofreason(andtwokindsofreasonaredifferentifandonlyif

theconditionsforbeingareasonofeachkinddiffer).

Afurther,important,clarificationistonotethatsayingthatareasonexpressionhasdifferent

sensesisnotthesameassayingthatitpicksouta‘disjunctive’kindofreason.If,forinstance,

‘areasonthereistoact’justpicksoutonekindofreason,whichhappenstobedisjunctive(in

thesensethattheconditionsforbeingareasonofthatkindaredisjunctive1),thentherecould

notbeasenseinwhichsomethingisandasenseinwhichitisn’tareasontoact–thereisjust

one sense of that reason expression, even though the conditions for its application are

disjunctive.Incontrastifasinglereasonexpressioncanbeusedtopickouttwodifferentkinds

ofreason,therearetwosensestothatexpression,andthis issoevenifbothofthekindsof

reasonpickedoutarenon-disjunctive.2

2 Expandingthecategorisationschema

Toaccountforthepossibilityofapluralityofsensesforanygivenreasonexpression,weneed

toexpandthecategorisationschemasetoutinTableI-3(and,indeed,expandingtheschema

inthiswaycanbeusedtofurtherexplicatewhatwemeanbytherebeingdifferentsenses).1I haven’t considered any disjunctive conditions for being a reason (I amnot convinced that anyoneholdswhatIwouldcalladisjunctivetheory).However,wewouldhaveadisjunctiveclaimaboutreasonstoact if,for instance,wesaid: ‘p isareasonforAtoφ ifandonlyifeitherpmakesA’sφing, insomerespect,worth doing or A takesp tomake A’s φing, in some respect,worth doing.’ Thiswould be adisjunctive, but nonetheless univocal, account of the expression ‘a reason there is to act’ (it isdisjunctivebetweenthefavouristanddeliberativistconditions).2Intheeventthatthisisnotclear,considerthefollowing:thereisasenseoftheword‘bat’accordingtowhichthatwhichahitterinabaseballgameusesisa‘bat’,andasenseinwhichitisn’ta‘bat’(it’snotawingedmammal). The expression ‘a bat’ has two senses, each picking out a non-disjunctive kind ofthing.Incontrast‘(sporting)bat∨(animal)bat’isadisjunctiveexpression(youcouldsaythatitpicksouta‘disjunctivekindofthing’ifyoubelieveindisjunctivekinds)thathasonlyonesense–it’snotthecasethatsomethingcouldbeboth‘(sporting)bat∨(animal)bat’andnot‘(sporting)bat∨(animal)bat’(thatis, if something is either a sportingbator ananimalbat then is a ‘(sporting)bat∨ (animal)bat’).Mypointisjustthatbeingdisjunctiveisunrelatedtohavingseveralsenses.

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TableV-1 isacategorisationschemathatallowsfortwosensesofagivenreasonexpression

andtherebyprovidesawaytorepresentbothunivocalandpluralist3theoriesofreasons.

Reasonexpression SenseA SenseB

Foranyp,pisareasonforAtoφ… Claim Claim

Foranyp,pisareasonforA’sφing… Claim Claim

Foranyp,pisareasonAhastoφ… Claim Claim

Foranyp,pisA’sreasonforφing… Claim Claim

TableV-1:Acategorisationschemathataccommodatespluralisttheoriesofreasons

Recall that a reason expression only picks out different kinds of reason if the conditions

betweendifferentsensesoftheexpressiondiffer(iftheydon’tthenthe‘different’sensesboth

pickoutthesamekindsofreason,inwhichcasethereisreallyonlyonesense).So,aunivocal

theory is represented inTableV-1byproviding the same conditionsunderboth senses. For

instance, the ‘Received View’, which is a univocal theory that is classified in the original

schemaas(F,F,F,P),wouldbeasfollowsinthisnewschema:

Reasonexpression SenseA SenseB

Reasonstherearetoact Favourism Favourism

Reasonsforacting Favourism Favourism

Reasonsonehastoact Favourism Favourism

Reasonsforwhichoneacts Psychologism Psychologism

TableV-2:The,univocal,'ReceivedView'representedinthenewschema

Thereisonlyonesensetoeachexpressioninthe‘ReceivedView’,hencetheclaimsabouteach

reasonundereach ‘sense’ in the categorisation schemaare the same.Wecanenrichour4-

tuple descriptions to represent the possibility of theories with multiple senses of a given

reasonexpressionbyintroducinga‘/’todenotealternatesenses.So:(F,F,F,P)≡(F/F,F/F,F/F,

P/P).

Now, in contrast to thisunivocal theory, apluralist theoryof reasons isany theory that, for

some reason expression, makes a different claim under each sense. Here is an example

pluralisttheoryrepresentedusingthisschema:

3Oratleast‘dual’sensetheories–Isupposeit’spossiblethatanexpressioncouldhavemorethantwosenses,butIdon’tconsiderthathere.

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Reasonexpression SenseA SenseB

Reasonstherearetoact Favourism Deliberativism

Reasonsforacting Favourism Favourism

Reasonsonehastoact Favourism Favourism

Reasonsforwhichoneacts Favourism Favourism

TableV-3:Anexamplepluralisttheory

The4-tupledescriptionofthistheoryis(F/D,F/F,F/F,F/F).Thisisnot,tomyknowledge,one

that anyone advocates – I use it only to indicate what a pluralist theory looks like in this

schema.Thistheoryispluralistwithrespecttoreasonstherearetoact;ittakes‘areasonthere

is to act’ to pick out either a fact that makes the act, in some respect, worth doing, or

somethingthattheagenttooktomaketheact,insomerespect,worthdoing.Butitisunivocal

withrespecttoalltheotherreasonexpressions.

InwhatfollowsIwanttobrieflyrepresent(whatItaketobe)thetwomain‘pluralist’theories

ofreasonsthathavebeenconsideredintheliteraturetodate.

3 Favourist/Deliberativist(F/D)pluralism

3.1 Objectiveandsubjectivereasons

AnincreasinglycommonresponsetocaseslikeSally’smistakeaboutthebearormyignorance

aboutmy lackofmilk is todistinguishbetweenobjectiveandsubjectivekindsofreason(e.g.

Stoutland2007;Schroeder2007;Markovits2011;Vogelstein2012;Whiting2014).Anobjective

reason issomethingthat (inmyparlance)makesone’saction, insomerespect,worthdoing,

whereasasubjectivereasonissomethingthat(again,inmyparlance)theagenttooktomake

theiraction,insomerespect,worthdoing.4

So, to give some examples, what Sally takes to make running worth doing (that a bear is

chasingher) isasubjective reason forher to runbutnotanobjective reason forher to run.

And, in contrast, the fact that I am out of milk is an objective reason for me to buymore

(because it makes it, in some respect, worth doing) but not a subjective reason (because I

believethatIhaveplenty–Idon’ttakeanythingtomakebuyingmilk,insomerespect,worth

doing).If,ontheotherhand,itisrainingandIbelievethatitisrainingthenthefactthatitis

raining is both an objective reason and a subjective reason for me to take my umbrella

4An alternative vernacular for the subjective/objective reasons distinction is talk of first-person andthird-personreasons(respectively).

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(becauseitbothmakestakinganumbrella,insomerespect,worthdoingandIbelievethatit

does).5

It should perhaps be clear that, given these definitions, an objective reason is the kind of

reason that favourists take reason expressions to pick out (i.e. the sort of thing thatmakes

actions, in some respect, worth doing), and a subjective reason is the kind of reason that

deliberativists take reason expressions to pick out (i.e. the sort of thing that agents take to

maketheiractions,insomerespect,worthdoing).

3.2 Apluralisttheory

Sofarthedistinctionbetweenobjectiveandsubjectivereasonsismerelyterminological.One

couldmakethisdistinctionandyetretainaunivocaltheoryofreasonsifoneweretosaythat

no single reason expression can be used to pick out either objective or subjective reasons.6

However, someexplicitly invoke thedistinctionbetweenobjectiveandsubjective reasonsso

as tooffer apluralist theoryof reasons. For instance,Vogelstein saysofParfit’s(2011)well-

known‘snake’example7:

Thereseemstobeasenseinwhichthereisareasonforyoutorunaway(sinceyoubelievethatrunningawaywillsaveyourlife),andasenseinwhichthereisnoreasonforyoutorunaway(sincenogoodwillcomeofit).Thatis,thereisasubjectivereason,butnoobjectivereason,foryoutorunaway.Likewise,thereisasenseinwhichthereisareasonforyoutostandstill(sinceitwillsaveyour life),andasense inwhichthere isnoreasonforyoutostandstill (sinceyoubelievenothingtosuggestthatanygoodwillcomeofit).Thatis,thereisanobjectivereason,butnosubjectivereason,foryoutostandstill.(Vogelstein2012,241)

Vogelsteinissayingisthattherearetwosensestobeingareasonthereistoact.Onesense,he

suggests,correspondstoobjectivereasons,theothercorrespondingtosubjectivereasons.So,

sincehethinksoneofthereasonexpressionshastwosenses,heisofferingwhatIhavecalled

a‘pluralist’theoryofreasons.Andaccordingtohispluralisttheoryofreasonsonesenseofthe

expression,‘areasonthereistoact’isfavouristandtheothersenseisdeliberativist.

5If one assumes that intentional objects are propositions and that true propositions are facts –otherwise the ontology of subjective and objective reasons is different, so one and the same thingcannotbebothanobjectiveandasubjectivereason.Thatbeingso,inthisexampleIwouldstillhaveanobjective and a subjective reason, they would just be different things on account of the ontologicaldifferencebetweenthesekindsofreason.6Forinstance,IthinkthatSchroeder(2008)invokestheobjectiveandsubjectivereasondistinctiononlytosaythattheexpression‘areasonthereistoact’picksoutobjectivereasons,whereastheexpression‘areasononehastoact’picksoutsubjectivereasons(thisis,Ithink,alsoDancy’s(2012)interpretationof Schroeder’s view), so his theory is not pluralist, it just distinguishes between the kinds of reasonpicked out by these expressions (which are normally taken to be co-extensive (see §(I)1)). For theclassificationofSchroeder’sviewseeTableI-6.7Here, for reference, is Vogelstein’s version of this example: ‘While walking in a desert, you haveangeredapoisonous snake. Youbelieve that runningawaywill save your life, andbelievenothing tosuggestotherwise.Asitturnsout,however,youmuststandstillinordertosaveyourlife,asthissnakewillattackmovingtargets.’(Vogelstein2012,241)

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Vogelstein is not alone. Although they don’t talk in terms of ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’

reasons,bothHyman(2011)andLocke(2015)offerapluralistaccountoftheexpression‘the

agent’sreasonforacting,’ofpreciselythiskind.Theybothhold(inmyparlance)thatthereisa

sense of ‘the agent’s reason for acting’ that picks out a consideration in light of which the

agentacted(that is,asubjective reasonthattheyactedon),andadifferentsensethatpicks

out a fact thatmakes their action,all things considered,worth doing, and explains it in the

rightway(that is,anobjectivereasonthatexplainstheiractionintherightway).8Thus,both

Hyman and Locke think that one of the senses of being a reason for which an agent acts

correspondstofavourismaboutthereasonsforwhichweactandanothersensecorresponds

todeliberativismaboutthereasonsforwhichweact.

Sotherearepluralisttheoriesthatmixfavourismanddeliberativism.Idon’twant(orneed)to

categorisethemall,so,forthesakeofargumentlet’sjustcharacteriseapluralisttheoryofthis

kindaspluralistabouteveryreasonexpression(i.e.(F/D,F/D,F/D,F/D)):9

Reasonexpression SenseA SenseB

Reasonstherearetoact Favourism Deliberativism

Reasonsforacting Favourism Deliberativism

Reasonsonehastoact Favourism Deliberativism

Reasonsforwhichoneacts Favourism Deliberativism

TableV-4:PureF/Dpluralism

4 Favourist/Psychologist(F/P)pluralism

Michael Smith (1987,1994) is typically taken toholdwhat Ihave called the ‘ReceivedView’

(see Table V-2), which is a combination of, inter alia, favourism about reasons to act and

psychologismaboutthereasonsforwhichweact.IthinkthatthisisamisreadingofSmith.In

what follows I want, briefly, to make the case that Smith argues for a pluralist theory of

reasons.

4.1 ThemisinterpretationofMichaelSmith

Firstly, although Smith’s definition of ‘normative reasons’ in these works is loose,10we can

plausibly treatwhat he refers to as ‘normative reasons’ aswhatwe have already called an

8Although it isperhapsworthnoting that theydiffer in theirviewsofwhat it takes forsucha fact toexplainanactionintherightway(Hymanthinksitisknowledge,Lockethinksitisanexplanatorychain).9Sometheoriesmaynotbepluralistabouteveryexpression,inthewaythatthisoneis–butthatisn’tveryimportanthere.10(SeeSmith1987,39)

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‘objective reason’ (that is, something thatmakes an action, in some respect, worth doing),

which is, you will recall, what favourists take reasons to be. Smith’s usage of the term

‘normativereason’isthusconsistentwithitscontemporaryusage.11

In contrast, Smith’s usage of the term ‘motivating reason’ is at odds with contemporary

usage.12 Smith argues thatmotivating reasons are all psychological states of the agent that

rationalise their action (that is,motivating reasons are the sorts of thing that psychologism

takesreasonstobe),andthisisbecausehedefinesmotivatingreasonssuchthat:

Thedistinctivefeatureofamotivatingreasontoφisthatinvirtueofhavingsuchareasonanagent is inastatethat ispotentiallyexplanatoryofhisφing. (Notethe‘potentially’.Anagentmay thereforehaveamotivating reason toφwithout that reason'sbeingoverriding.) (Smith1987,38emphasisinoriginal)

It is typical to interpret Smith’s remarks aboutmotivating reasons to be about ‘the agent’s

reason foracting’,andhence to takeSmith tobearguing foraunivocalpsychologismabout

theagent’sreasonforacting13–this,Ithink,isamistake.Forone,thefactthathetalksabout

motivating reasons being only potentially explanatory should already tell us that he isn’t

talkingabouttheagent’sreasonforacting–theagent’sreasonforactingissomethingthatis

generallytakentobe(andSmithcertainlytakesittobe)actuallyexplanatory(see§(IV)1.2).

Furthermore, thefact thatSmithtalksaboutmotivatingreasonstoφ shouldbe indicativeof

thefactthatthekindofreasonheistalkingaboutissuchthatreasonsofthatkindare(inthe

senseintroducedin§(I)1) independentoftheactionsforwhichtheyarereasons.Thatis,the

‘to’ prepositionmakes clear that something could be amotivating reason to do something

even ifonedoesnotdo it.Now,sinceweknow14that reasonsof thekindpickedoutbythe

expression‘theagent’sreasonforacting’,aredependentontheactionstheyarereasonsfor,15

whenSmithrefersto‘motivatingreasonstoφ’hecan’tbetalkingabouttheagent’sreasonfor

acting.

Thus, contrary to the typical interpretation,when Smith talks about ‘motivating reasons’ he

isn’tnecessarilytalkingaboutthosereasonspickedoutbytheexpression‘theagent’sreason

foracting’.So,whenhesaysthatmotivatingreasonsarefeaturesoftheagent’spsychology,he

islikewisenotnecessarilyadvocatingpsychologismaboutthereasonsforwhichweact.Ithink

thatinsayingwhathedoes,Smithisn’tmakingaclaimaboutanyparticularreasonexpression

–heisjustdefiningtheterm‘motivatingreason’.11See§(I)4.1foradiscussionofthecontemporaryusageof‘normative’and‘motivating’reasons.12ThisapointthatbothDarwall(2003,442–43)andSetiya(2007,30)make.13Whichis,indeed,whyheisassociatedwiththeReceivedView.14See§(I)1.5.15Inthesensethatitsreason-hooddependsontheoccurrenceoftheactionforwhichitisareason.

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TherightwaytounderstandSmith’susageoftheterms‘normative’and‘motivating’reasons

is, I suggest, as different senses of any given reason expression. For instance, I take such a

pluralistconceptiontobethemostnaturalwaytoconstruethefollowingremarks:

TheclaimthatAhasareasontoφisambiguous.ItmaybeaclaimaboutamotivatingreasonthatAhasoraclaimaboutanormativereasonthatAhas.(Smith1987,38emphasisinoriginal)

Smith is saying that theexpression ‘a reasonAhas toφ’ isambiguousbetween twosenses:

being a normative reason (which is the favourist kind of reason, on Smith’s definition) and

beingamotivatingreason(whichisapsychologistickindofreason,onSmith’sdefinition).That

is, Smith is recommending a pluralist account of that expression, and therefore, a pluralist

theoryofreasons.Moreover,Ithink,Smith’spluralismextendstoallthereasonexpressions.16

4.2 Anotherkindofpluralism

Thathavingbeensaid,Smith’sactualtheory is largely irrelevanttoourprimaryconcern.The

remarks above aremainly intendedas context (if somewhatpolemical); all thatweneed to

take from this discussion is that the materials for another pluralist theory of reasons are

alreadyoutthere–onewhichtakesallreasonexpressionstohavetwosenses,onefavourist

and the other psychologist (i.e. (F/P, F/P, F/P, F/P)).We can represent such a theory in our

revisedschemaasfollows:

Reasonexpression SenseA SenseB

Reasonstherearetoact Favourism Psychologism

Reasonsforacting Favourism Psychologism

Reasonsonehastoact Favourism Psychologism

Reasonsforwhichoneacts Favourism Psychologism

TableV-5:PureF/Ppluralism

5 Whybeapluralist?

Wehave considered twodistinctpluralist theoriesof reasons,which I have called ‘pureF/D

pluralism’and‘pureF/Ppluralism’.Butwhywouldyouwanttobeapluralistinthefirstplace?

16Considerhisuseof theexpression ‘theagent’snormative reason for acting.’ (Smith1994,131–32).Consider also the following: ‘The distinction is that between psychological states that teleologicallyexplain[i.e.motivatingreasons]andconsiderationsthatjustify[i.e.normativereasons].Theimportanceofmakingthisdistinctioninthiswaybecomesclearwhenweaskwhetherallactionsmustbedoneforreasons. For though this question gets answered resoundingly in the affirmative when reasons areunderstoodtobemotivatingreasons…thequestiongetsansweredjustasresoundinglyinthenegativewhenreasonsareunderstoodtobenormativereasons.’(Smith2004,174–75)

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5.1 Pluralismrespectsthe‘twosenses’intuition

Well,ifitstrikesyou(asitstrikesme)thatitistruethatthereisasenseinwhichSallyrunsfor

areasonandasenseinwhichshedoesn’t,orthatthereisasenseinwhichIhaveareasonto

buymilkandasenseinwhichIdon’t,thenyouhavealreadysetthestageforapluraltheoryof

reasons.Indeed,itseemstome,ifyouwantyourtheoryofreasonstorespectthis‘twosenses’

intuition (which you might, if it is an intuition you share) then you have to adopt a plural

theoryofreasons.

5.2 Pluralismmaysolvetheproblemsthatunivocaltheoriesface

Asecondappealing featureofpluralist theoriesof reasons is that they seemtoprovideone

withameansof solvingmanyof theproblems facedby theunivocalclaimsdiscussed in the

previouschapters.

Forinstance,considerTheDeliberateActionProblemdiscussedin§(II)4.2,whichconsistedof

thefollowingsetofmutuallyinconsistentclaims:

TheDeliberateActionProblem

(F4) Sallyrandeliberately.

(F3) IfAφsdeliberatelythenAφsforareason.

(F7) IfAφsforareasonthentherewasareason,p,forAtoφ.

(FAV) Foranyp,p isareasonforAtoφonly ifA’sφing, is insomerespect,worthdoing.

(F10) Sally’srunningwasnotatallworthdoing.

Accordingtoapluralisttheoryofreasons,thisproblemneedsre-formulatinginamannerthat

brings to lightwhich sense of each reason expression the claim is being made about. So,

denotingthedifferentsensesofeachreasonexpressionas‘reasonA’(favourist)and‘reasonB’,

(eitherdeliberativistorpsychologist –dependingonone’s theory),we can re-formulate this

problemasthefollowingsetofmutuallyinconsistentclaims:

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Are-formulationofTheDeliberateActionProblem17

(F4) Sallyrandeliberately.

(F3’) IfAφsdeliberatelythenAφsforareasonB.

(UNI) AφsforareasonBifandonlyifAφsforareasonA.

(F7’) IfAφsforareasonAthentherewasareasonA,p,forAtoφ.

(FAV’) Foranyp,p isareasonAforAtoφonlyifA’sφing,isinsomerespect,worthdoing.

(F10) Sally’srunningwasnotatallworthdoing.

By adding (UNI), this re-formulation makes a premise of the problem that is implicit in its

original formulation,explicit: that ‘the reason forwhichoneacts’ isaunivocalexpression.A

pluralisttheoryofreasonsthensolvesTheDeliberateActionProblembyrejecting(UNI),which

thusavoidstheneedtorejecttheotherprimafaciereasonableclaims.

And, indeed, pluralist theories of reasons can solve most of the problems considered in

previous chapters in a similarmanner. However, they don’t solve all of them, and pluralist

theoriesfacenewproblemsoftheirown,asthenextsectionswillshow.

6 Pluralismisnopanacea

SinceIsharethe‘twosenses’intuition,Ithinkthatoureventualtheoryofreasonsoughttobe

pluralist.However,asIwillargueinthissection,justadoptingapluralisttheoryofreasonsis

notenoughtosolvetheproblemsconsideredinthepreviouschapters.Firstly, ‘conventional’

pluralist theories (i.e. thosemade up of only favourist, psychologist or deliberativist claims)

cannotsolveallof theproblemsconsidered inpreviouschapters.Andsecondly, thepluralist

solutiontoanygivenproblemreliesontherebeinganimplicitunivocalityassumptioninthat

problem – but since it is not at all clear that all of the problems considered in previous

chapters implicitly include such an assumption, it is not at all clear that pluralism really

providesuswithasolution.

17Thisisonlymeanttobeanindicativeexampleofhowthepluralistmightrespond;inparticular,thereare other ways to formulate this problem that change which reason expression the univocalityassumption concerns. For example, compare (UNI) with (UNI*) in the following, alternative re-formulationofTheDeliberateActionProblem:

(F4) Sallyrandeliberately.(F3’) IfAφsdeliberatelythenAφsforareasonB(F7*) IfAφsforareasonBthentherewasareasonB,p,forAtoφ.(UNI*) Foranyp,pisareasonBforAtoφifandonlyifpisareasonAforAtoφ.(FAV’) Foranyp,pisareasonAforAtoφonlyifA’sφing,isinsomerespect,worthdoing.(F10) Sally’srunningwasnotatallworthdoing.

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6.1 Conventionalpluralismcannotsolvealltheproblems

There is a problem that a pluralist theory that only consists of favourist, psychologist or

deliberativist claims,18i.e. a conventional pluralist theory, cannot solve – The Experiential

ReasonsProblem.

Recallthatfavourism,psychologismanddeliberativismallfacesomeformofTheExperiential

ReasonsProblembecausenoneofthemarecompatiblewiththeprimafaciereasonableclaims

that(i)Sally’shearingabear-likesoundcouldbeherreasonforrunning;or(ii)thatmyreading

thatmyfriendhadwonawardcouldbemyreasonforcongratulatingher.Thatbeingso,any

conventionalpluralisttheorywillalsofaceTheExperientialReasonsProblem.

Furthermore,itisworthnotingthatsincebothfavourismanddeliberativismfacesomeformof

The Psychological Reasons Problem, any pluralist theory that only consists of favourist or

deliberativist claims (such as pure F/D pluralism), will also face The Psychological Reasons

Problem.

The point of these remarks is this: even if we adopt a (conventional) pluralist theory of

reasons,thatstillwillnothelpussolvealltheproblemsconsideredinthepreviouschapters.If

wearetodothat,weneedanewfamilyofclaimsaboutreasons.

6.2 Justbecauseyoucoulddoesn’tmeanyoucan

Secondly, we should be sceptical about the pluralist’s approach to solving the problems

considered; as Dancy puts it: ‘one cannot resolve philosophical puzzlement in this way by

multiplicationofsenses.’(2011,351)

OnewaytointerpretDancy’sremarkistheinsistencethatyoucan’tsolvetheseproblemsby

justpostulatingdifferentsensesthataren’tactually ‘there’.However,asDustinLockerightly

pointsout,thisisnotwhatthepluralistintends:

Iamnotsuggestingthatwecanresolvephilosophicalpuzzlementbymultiplicationofsenses.Rather, I am claiming that senses are alreadymultiple—the phrase ‘S’s reason [for acting]’alreadyhastwodistinctsenses.(Locke2015,218)

Tore-interpretLocke’sargumentinmyownterms:ifyouhavethe‘twosenses’intuitionit is

that intuition thatmakesyou think that reasonsareplural,which then forms thebasis fora

pluraltheoryofreasons.Thatis, it’snotthatyouaremultiplyingsensesinordertosolvethe

problems,it’sthat(atleastifyouhavethe‘twosenses’intuition)thesensesjustaremultiple,

andonceyouacknowledge that,manyof theproblems that aunivocal theory faces can fall

18Asopposedtotheclaimsofsomenewfamily,notyetconsidered.

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away. Ifthe‘twosenses’ intuitionisright,then,thepluralistcaninsistthatourphilosophical

puzzlement has arisen only because we haven’t recognised that the senses already are

multiple.

However, a more nuanced interpretation of Dancy’s objection is harder for the pluralist to

avoid.IthinkthatDancycanreasonablybeinterpretedashavingmeantthatevenifthesenses

aremultiple, the fact that invokingmultiple sensesof the relevant reasonexpressionscould

solvemanyoftheproblemsconsideredinthepreviouschaptersshouldnotmakeusthinkthat

theycanbesolvedthatway(i.e.thatthatisthecorrectsolutiontothem).

Itmightbethattheprimafaciereasonableclaimsinanygivenproblemarereallyrestrictedto

asinglesenseofthereasonexpressionsinvolved–inwhichcasetheassumptionofunivocality

doesnowork,andtheproblemreturns.That is, for instance,TheDeliberateActionProblem

mayactuallybelikethis:

Anotherre-formulationofTheDeliberateActionProblem

(F4) Sallyrandeliberately.

(F3*) IfAφsdeliberatelythenAφsforareasonA.

(UNI) AφsforareasonBifandonlyifAφsforareasonA.

(F7’) IfAφsforareasonAthentherewasareasonA,p,forAtoφ.

(FAV’) Foranyp,p isareasonAforAtoφonlyifA’sφing,isinsomerespect,worthdoing.

(F10) Sally’srunningwasnotatallworthdoing.

Inthisconstrual,becausealltheprimafaciereasonableclaimsareallaboutthesamesenseof

reason, ‘reasonA’, theunivocalityassumptiondoesnowork.So,apluralist theoryof reasons

wouldthusstillhavetofindsomeclaim,inadditionto(UNI),toreject–theproblemreturns.

Apluralistsolutiontoanygivenproblemreliesonthatproblembeingtheresultofaconflation

of different senses of the same reason expression – that is, it relies on a univocality

assumptionbeingapartofeveryproblem.Thedifficultyforpluralistsolutionstotheproblems

considered is that it seemsquiteplausible thatat leastsomeof theproblemsconsidereddo

notresultfromaconflationofsenses,and,inthatcasepluralismisnohelpinsolvingthem.

So,again,itseemsthatifwedowanttosolvealloftheproblemsconsideredintheprevious

chapters,weneedanewfamilyofclaimsaboutreasons.

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7 Achallengeforpluralism

It is generally19agreed that whenever we give an agent’s reason for acting we explain the

agent’s action in a way that makes them seem rational.20For instance, saying that Sally’s

reasonforrunningwasthatshebelievedthatabearwaschasingherexplainsthefactthatshe

raninawaythatmakesherseemrationalforrunning;and,likewise,sayingthatmyreasonfor

congratulatingmyfriendwasthatshehadwonanawardexplainswhyIcongratulatedherina

waythatmakesmeseemrationalforhavingdoneso.

Thisobservationisofsomerelevancetopluralismbecauseitisseeminglynotrestrictedtoany

particularsenseofthe ‘agent’sreasonforacting’expression.That is, itseemsasthough,we

mayaddafurtherprimafaciereasonableclaimtothosealreadyconsidered:

(S1) Whenever we give an agent’s reason for acting,whatever the sense of theexpression used, we explain their action in a way that makes them seemrational.

Whyisthisclaimproblematicforpluralism?Well,recallthefollowing:

(F5) Sally’sreasonforrunningwas,interalia,thatshebelievedabearwaschasingher.

(P1) My reason for congratulatingmy friendwas, interalia, that shehadwonanaward.

Only pure F/P pluralism21can accommodate the truth of both (F5) and (P1); it does so by

insisting that a different sense of the expression, ‘the agent’s reason for acting’, is being

invoked in each case (psychologistic in the former, favourist in the latter). This view is

problematicbecause, if itwere true, itwouldbehard toseewhyour respective reasons for

actingcanbothbecitedinanexplanationofouractionsthatmakesuseachseemrational.

Consider:accordingtopureF/Ppluralism,therelationsbetween(i)Sally’sbeliefandheraction

and (ii) the fact thatmy friend won an award andmy action are different. And yet, giving

eitherexplainsourrespectiveactions inawaythatmakesusseemrational.SothepureF/P

pluralist is seemingly forced to say that in spite of the reason-relations being different, by

incredible coincidence, both Sally’s andmy reason for acting end up standing in a common

relationtoourrespectiveactions–therelationinvirtueofwhichgivingtheagent’sreasonfor

actingexplainstheiraction inawaythatmakesthemseemrational.PureF/Ppluralismthus

19(E.g.Dancy2000,8;Stout2009,53;Gibbons2010,343;Broome2013,47)20This is not to assume that it is the agent’s reason thatdoes theexplaining: one canhold this viewwithoutholdingthatitistheagent’sreasonforactingthatexplainstheiraction,as,forinstance,Dancy(2014)does.21Orless‘pure’variantsofit,suchas:(F/F,F/F,F/F,F/P).

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facesanunenviabledilemma:eitheritacceptsthishighlyimplausiblecoincidence22oritrejects

thisnewprimafaciereasonableclaim.23

ThisisaparticularproblemforF/Ppluralism,butitisalsoaconstraintonanypluralisttheory

ofreasons.That is,anypluralisttheoryofreasonswillhavetoprovidesomeaccountofhow

(S1)couldbetrue,orsuffertheconsequencesofrejectingit. Iwillreturntothispoint inthe

finalchapter,whenIsetoutmyownpluralisttheoryofreasons.

8 Conclusion

Ihavesuggestedthatwhilethe‘twosenses’intuitionmightprovideuswithsomemotivation

foradoptingapluralisttheoryofreasons,wecannotrelyonpluralismtosolvetheproblems

considered in thepreviouschapters. Instead, Ihaveargued,weneedanewfamilyofclaims

aboutreasons.Theaimoftheremainingchaptersistoadvanceandthendefendsuchafamily.

22The‘highlyimplausibleco-incidence’beingthatgivingeithersenseoftheexpression,independently,explainstheagent’sactioninawaythatmakesthemseemrational.23I.e.(S1).

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(VI)

Anewfamilyofclaimsaboutreasons

InwhichIsetoutanewfamilyofclaimsaboutreasons,andintroducethemajorchallenge to it. I define ‘pro tanto rational’ actions as actions that an agenttakestobe,insomerespect,worthdoing.Isetoutanewfamilyofclaimsaboutreasons,explanatory rationalism,which says thatall practical reasonsexplainwhy theactions forwhich theyare reasonsarepro tanto rational. I introducethe major challenge for explanatory rationalism, The Explanatory ExclusionProblem, which argues that only features of an agent’s psychology couldexplaineitherwhytheydosomethingorwhyitwasrationalforthemtodoit.Isetouttheprogramfortheforthcomingchapters.

In§(I), Inotedthatmosttheoriesofreasonssubscribetoone,ifnotseveralofthefollowing

claims: favourism about reasons to act, psychologism about the reasons for which we act

and/or deliberativism about the reasons for which we act (see Table I-6). In §§(II)-(IV), I

showedthateachoftheseaccountsisinconsistentwithseveralprimafaciereasonableclaims.

In§(V),Iarguedthat,evenifthesensesofanygivenreasonexpressionareplural,pluralismis

nopanacea: that is,wecannot just relyonthepluralityofsensesas thewaytomakethose

prima facie reasonable claims consistent with our theory of reasons. In short, I argued, we

mustlookbeyondfavourism,psychologismanddeliberativism:weneedanewfamilyofclaims

aboutreasons.

In this chapter I introduce a new family of claims about reasons: explanatory rationalism.

According to explanatory rationalism, the fundamental reason-relation is that of explaining

whyanaction isprotanto rational;which is tosaythatallpractical reasonsexplainwhythe

actionsforwhichtheyarereasonsareprotantorational.Now,sinceexplanatoryrationalism

rejectsfavourismaboutreasonstoact,psychologismaboutthereasonsforwhichweactand

deliberativismaboutthereasonsforwhichweact, itcansolvealloftheproblemssetout in

§§(II)-(IV). My aim, in the chapters that follow, is to set out and defend explanatory

rationalism.

InthischapterIdefinewhatitisforanactiontobeprotantorational,Idescribeexplanatory

rationalismandIsetoutthechallengesforit.

1 Protantorationalaction

Fevzi iswaiting toboarda flight to Japan. It’searly sohehad tomisshismorning swim.He

looks forlornlyoutof thewindow, yearning to go swimming.He couldabandonhis trip and

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havehisswimbuthethinks itwouldbebetter tostayandboardthe flight.Nonetheless,he

stillthinksthatthereissomethingtobesaidforgoingswimming.WecansaythisaboutFevzi:

hethinksthatswimmingis,insomerespect,worthdoing,buthethinksthatboardingtheflight

isallthingsconsideredworthdoing.

Incontrast,Fevziseesnothingofworthinaimlesslywanderingaroundtheairport.Ifhewent

forawanderhe’dmisstheflightwithout,atleastbyhislights,anygoodcomingofit;hethinks

thatwanderingaimlesslyis,innorespect,worthdoing.

There are clear differences between these three actions (flying, swimming,wandering) that

are,Isubmit,ofrelevancetotheirrationalstanding.First,Iwillintroducesometerminologyto

characterisethosedifferencesandthenIwillarguethatwhatdifferentiatesthethreeactions

is relevant to their rational standing. In particular, I will suggest that even though it is not

rationalforFevzitogoswimming,itisnonethelessmorerationalforhimtogoswimmingthan

it is for him to wander aimlessly around the airport, and that we should have some

terminologythatreflectsthat.

1.1 Twokindsofrationalaction

TherationalthingforFevzitodoistoboardhisflight.Ifheweretogoswimmingwewouldsay

thatheactedirrationallysince,byhisownlights,itwasnotallthingsconsideredworthdoing.

Doingonethingwhenyoubelievesomethingelsetobeallthingsconsideredmoreworthdoing

isnotarationalthingtodo.

If we leave aside the question as to what makes an action worth doing,1I think we can

(hopefullyuncontroversially)characteriseafamiliarsenseofrationalactionasfollows:

Assumption It is rational forA toφ if and only if A takesφing to be, all thingsconsidered,worthdoing.2

This is an assumption, it is not a definition or an analysis of what it is for an action to be

rational,norisitaclaimaboutwhyanactionisrational(wewillcometothatshortly).Thisis

meanttobeafairlyblandassumptionaboutwhatobtainswhenitisrationalforsomeagentto

act; it leaves unspecified all of the details that would actually furnish us with a theory of

1Dependingonone’stheoryofrationalityor‘motivation’,sayingthatFevzitakesgettingontheplanetobe, insomerespect,worthdoingcouldbecashedoutbysayingthathebelievesthatbyboardingtheplanehewillgotoJapanandeitherthathewantstogotoJapanorthathejudgesthatgoingtoJapanwould be good, or right, or something of the sort. Nothing that I have to say ismeant to express acommitmenttoeitheroftheseviews.See§(II)3.2forrelatedcaveats.2For instance, this is, I think, in keeping with Parfit’s (2011, 34) characterisation of rational action.Comparealso:‘anagentisshowntobeactingrationallyif,aswemightputit,heisshowntobetryingtodowhatthereisgoodreasontodo,evenifasamatteroffactheisquitemistakenonthatfront.’(Dancy2004,33)

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rationality. I state it here only so that wemay better understand the concept of pro tanto

rationality,whichIwillintroduceforthwith.

What separatesFevzi’sboarding the flight frombothhisgoing swimmingandhiswandering

aimlesslyaroundtheairport isthat it isrationalforhimtodotheformer,butnotthe latter.

However it isnonetheless common todistinguishacts likeFevzi’sgoing swimming fromacts

likehiswanderingaimlessly,inspiteofthefactthattheyarebothirrational.Whileitwouldbe

plainly irrationalofFevzi todothe latter, ifheweretogoswimmingthatwouldbeatypical

exampleofanakraticaction,orso-called‘weaknessofwill’.

Isuggestthatwhatseparatesakraticactsfrom‘plainly’irrationalonesisofrelevancetotheir

rationalstanding.IfFevziweretogoswimmingthatwouldbemarkedlymorerationalthanif

heweretowanderaimlesslyaroundtheairport;thatis,therewouldbemarkedlymorebyway

ofrationalintelligibilityinhisactionifheswamthanifhewandered–andthatissoevenifwe

concedethatgoingswimmingisnonethelessnotarationalthingtodo.

Now,ifwhatseparatesakraticbehaviourfromwhatIhavecalled‘plainlyirrational’behaviour

is of relevance to the rational standing of those actions, then, I suggest, we need an

intermediateconceptofrationalitythatallowsustorecognisetheformerassomehowmore

rationalthantheother.Tothatend,letusdefine‘protantorationalactions’thus:

Definition It isprotantorational forA toφ ifandonly ifA takesφing tobe, insomerespect,worthdoing.3

This isadefinition,notaclaim.4Ihaveusedtheterm‘rational’because(forthereasons just

outlined)Ibelievethatanaction’sbeingprotantorationalisofsomerelevancetotheaction’s

rationalstanding(aprotantorationalaction,is,Isubmit,inafamiliarsenseofthewordmore

rationalthananactionthatisnotevenprotantorational).Ifthereaderbalksatterminology

that says that it is to any extent rational for Fevzi to go swimming, thenplease feel free to

substitute some less objectionable term in its place (mutatis mutandis throughout this

discussion).5

Lastly, inordertomakethedistinctionbetweenrationalactionandprotanto rationalaction

clear,Isuggestthatwecanrefertotheformerasallthingsconsideredrationalaction,noting3DanielWhiting (2014,5)uses the terminologyofpro tanto rationalactionequivalently.Parfit (2011,34)alsoindicatesthedistinctionIhavesuggestedwhenhedistinguishesbetweenactionsthatare‘lessthanfullyrational’andactionsthatare‘irrational’.4Thatis,Iamjustdefiningtheuseofthetechnical‘protantorational’predicatehere.5Ibelievethataprotanto rationalaction isanactionthatonSmith’s(1987)terminologytheagent ismotivatedtodo(note:thestateofbeingmotivatedisdefeasible,onSmith’saccount),soIcouldhavetalkedintermsof ‘motivation’.However, Ihaveavoidedtheterminologyof ‘motivation’as Ithinkthedangersofmisunderstandingareevenmorepronouncedthere.

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thatthisisthetypicalunderstandingof‘rational’action.So,forthesakeofclarity,hereishow

thetwoconceptsapplytoFevzi’spossibleactions:

Action Allthingsconsideredrational? Protantorational?

Boardinghisflight ü ü6

Goingswimming û ü

Wanderingaimlessly û û

TableVI-1:ThewaysinwhichFevzi’sactionsare(oraren’t)rational

Sayingthatgoingswimmingisprotantorationalwhereaswanderingaimlesslyisnotevenpro

tanto rationalallowsustorecognisethatthere isadifference intherationalstandingofthe

twoactionswithout impingingon the fact thatboarding the flight is theonly really rational

thingforFevzitodo.

2 ExplanatoryRationalism

ThefamilyofreasonclaimsIwanttointroducesaysthatreasonsofanykindexplainwhythe

actions for which they are reasons are pro tanto rational. Because this family of claims

emphasises theexplanatory characterof the reason-relation, andbecausea reasonexplains

why an action is rational, Iwill call this family of claims ‘explanatory rationalism’.Using the

schemadevelopedin§(I),wecanrepresentexplanatoryrationalismasfollows:

Reasonexpression Explanatoryrationalism

Foranyp,pisareasonforAtoφ… …ifandonlyifpexplainswhyitisprotantorationalforAtoφ.

Foranyp,pisareasonforA’sφing… …ifandonlyifpexplainswhyitisprotantorationalforAtoφandpmakesA’sφing,insomerespect,worthdoing.

Foranyp,pisareasonAhastoφ… …ifandonlyifpexplainswhyitisprotantorationalforAtoφ.

Foranyp,pisA’sreasonforφing… …ifandonlyifpexplainswhyitisprotantorationalforAtoφandexplains(intherightway)whyAφ’d.

TableVI-2:Explanatoryrationalism

According to explanatory rationalism, there are three kinds of reason: the expressions ‘a

reason forA toφ’ and ‘a reasonAhas toφ’pickoutonekind, theexpression ‘a reason for

φing’picksoutanother7and‘A’sreasonforφing’picksoutafinalkind.

6Anyall thingsconsideredrationalaction isautomaticallyaprotantorationalactionsince ifanagenttakes an action to beall things consideredworth doing they certainly take it to be, in some respect,worthdoing.

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InlaterchaptersIwillarguethatexplanatoryrationalismavoidsalloftheproblemssetoutin

§§(II)-(V) and that, indeed, explanatory rationalismcharacterises thede facto senseofeach

reasonexpression.However, in linewiththetwosenses intuition, Iwill suggest thatthere is

anothersensetoeachreasonexpression,whichisfavourist.Beforewegetthere,though,Iwill

need todemonstratehow it is that explanatory rationalism couldbe true in the faceof the

majorobjectiontoit,whichIwillcall‘TheExplanatoryExclusionProblem’.

3 Aproblemforexplanatoryrationalism

Recall the following example from § (III):My friend haswon amuch-coveted award; I read

aboutitinanewspapersoIcallheruptocongratulateher.Isuggestedthatitwasprimafacie

reasonabletoclaimthatmyreasonsforcongratulatingmyfriendwere,interalia,thatshewon

anawardandthatIreadthatshehadwonanawardinthenewspaper.

Now,according toexplanatory rationalism,anagent’s reason foractingbothexplainswhy it

wasprotantorationalforthemtodowhattheydidandexplainswhytheydidit.Therefore,if

explanatory rationalism is to be consistent with these prima facie reasonable claims about

whatmyreasonsforcongratulatingmyfriendwere(asIintendittobe),thefollowingmustbe

true:

(R1) Icongratulatedmyfriendbecauseshehadwonanaward.

(R2) IcongratulatedmyfriendbecauseIreadthatshehadwonanaward.

(R3) Itwaspro tanto rational forme to congratulatemy friend because she hadwonanaward.

(R4) ItwasprotantorationalformetocongratulatemyfriendbecauseIreadthatshehadwonanaward.

There isa familiarargumentagainstthe ideathat factsabouttheexternalworldcanexplain

whyweact(which(R1)supposes),whichproceeds,broadlyasfollows:if,forinstance,Ibelieve

thatitisrainingwhenitisn’t,Iwillstilltakemyumbrella–becauseIbelievethatitisraining.

However,giventhatIneedtobelievethatitisraininginordertotakemyumbrella8,theneven

ifItakemyumbrellawhenitisraining,ImuststilltakemyumbrellabecauseIbelievethatitis

raining.But,ifmybeliefthatitisrainingcanexplainmyactionwhetheritistrueorfalse,then

what explanatory work can the fact that it is raining do? None, the argument concludes –

whichmustmeanthatonlyfeaturesofanagent’spsychologycanexplaintheiractions–that

7As a result, something couldbe a reason for an agent toφwithoutbeing a reason for theirφing. Idiscussthispointfurtherin§(XVI)A.3.8AssumingIseenothingelseofworthintakingmyumbrella.

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is, (R1) is not literally true. The same argument applies to (R2), and, as I will show, can be

generalisedalsototheexplanationofwhyitis(protanto)rationalforanagenttoact;thatis,it

canbeusedtoshowthat(R3)and(R4)arealsofalse.

Thisargument,whichIcall‘TheExplanatoryExclusionProblem’,isthemotivatingargumentfor

psychologism(andpsychologismaboutthereasonsforwhichweact,inparticular)becauseit

insists that only features of an agent’s psychology can explain their actions, and therefore

(given that an agent’s reason for actingmust explain their action), that only features of an

agent’spsychologycouldbeamongsttheirreasonsforacting.

4 Anoutlineofwhatfollows

To the extent that the argument considered in the previous section is right, explanatory

rationalism cannot solve the problems considered in §§(II)-(IV) – indeed, to the extent that

that argument is right, explanatory rationalism just collapses into psychologism. The rest of

thisdiscussionisthus,forthemostpart,aresponsetotheargumentoftheprevioussection.

In §(VII), Imake some assumptions about the structural principles and logical properties of

explanatory relations, which I will use throughout my discussion. In §(VIII), I use this

framework to provide a formal construal of The Explanatory Exclusion Problem. In § (IX), I

show how the Problem also precludes perceptual experiences from explaining why we act,

thereby counting against (R2); and, further, how it applies to the explanation of why it is

rationaltoact,therebyalsocountingagainst(R3)and(R4).

Thede facto response toTheExplanatoryExclusionProblem is toaccept theconclusionand

say that thepurported explanans in (R1), i.e. the fact thatmy friend hadwon an award, is

merelyellipticalfortherealexplanans,whichisthefactthatIbelievedthatmyfriendhadwon

anaward.Becausethis isaclaimabouthowit isthatanormativereason9todosomeaction

could explain why someone does it, I call this ‘the elliptical theory of normative reason

explanation’.

An alternative and increasingly popular theory, which seeks to preserve the bona fide

explanatory role of normative reasons in action explanation, rejects the conclusion of The

ExplanatoryExclusionProblemandsaysthatthefactthatmyfriendwonanawardexplainsmy

actiondirectly.Thisisthedirecttheoryofnormativereasonexplanation.

In§(X), I setoutboth theellipticaland thedirect theoriesofnormative reasonexplanation,

andIarguethattheyareeachflawedinwaysthatshouldmakeuslookforanalternative.9Ire-habilitatethisterminologyin§(X)1,understandingnormativereasonsasthingsthatmakeactions,insomerespect,worthdoing;withoutassociatingthemwithanyparticularreasonexpression.

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In §§(XI) & (XII), I develop that alternative: the indirect theory of normative reason

explanation. This theory argues that a normative reason explains an agent’s action by

explainingthefeaturesoftheagent’spsychologythat,inturn,explaintheiraction.

My argument for the indirect theory proceeds in two stages: first, in §(XI), I argue thatwe

should reject the conclusion of The Explanatory Exclusion Problembecause it is based on a

false principle of explanation, which I call ‘the exclusion principle’. The exclusion principle

requires thatonly themostproximal explanationsof someexplananda explain it;but this is

mistaken – most of the explanations we are interested in are, to some extent, distal

explanations.

Then, in§(XII), I showhow that insighthelps inform theaccountofhownormative reasons

explain actions. I argue that normative reasons are distal explanations of our actions; they

explainthosefeaturesofourpsychologythat,inturn,explainouractions.Ithenshowhowthe

indirecttheorycanbeusedtoshowthatboth(R1)and(R2)aretrue.

In §(XIII), I suggest that the same reasoning accounts for the truth of (R3) and (R4). For

instance,IarguethatthefactthatIreadthatmyfriendhadwonanawardexplainswhyit is

protantorationalformetocongratulateherbecauseitexplainswhyIbelievedthatshehad

wonanaward,which, in turn,explainswhy itwaspro tanto rational forme tocongratulate

her.

However,Inote,thetransitivityofexplanationfailsonsomeoccasions,inparticularwhenthe

explanatory chain is adeviant causal chain. So,weneed someaccountofwhy it is that the

explanatorychainuptothefactthatitisprotantorationalforanagenttoactistransitiveifit

isn’tdeviant,butisn’ttransitiveifitisdeviant.In§§(XIV)&(XV),Iprovidesuchanaccount.

First, in §(XIV), I introduce themystery relation. I argue that themystery relation is a non-

causal,transitive,explanatoryrelationthatrelates:thebeliefthatptosomejustificationforit

when that belief is justified; the belief that p to the fact that p when the belief that p is

knowledgeable; a justification for the belief thatp to the fact thatpwhen that justification

affords theopportunity for knowledge; and an action to somebelief that explainswhy that

actionisprotantorationalwhenthatactionisdoneintentionally.

In §(XV), I argue that the mystery relation is transitive with the non-causal explanatory

relationinvolvedinexplainingwhysomeactionisrational,whereasmerelycausalrelationsare

not. This allowsme to distinguish between deviant cases (which lack the required chain of

mystery relations) and non-deviant cases (which don’t). This leads me to argue: (i) that

becauseIknowthatmyfriendhaswonanaward,thefactthatshehaswonanawardexplains

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whyitisprotantorationalformetocongratulateher(whichis(R3));and(ii)thatbecausemy

beliefthatshehadwonanawardisbasedonthefactthatIreadthatshehadwonanaward,

thefactthatIreadthatshehadwonanawardalsoexplainswhyitisprotantorationalforme

tocongratulateher(whichis(R4)).

Finally,in(XVI),Irevisitexplanatoryrationalismandshowhowitavoidstheproblemsfacedby

othertheories.Iconcludebysettingoutmypreferredtheoryofreasons,newpluralism,which

holds that explanatory rationalism tells us one sense of what it is to be a reason, whilst

favourismtellsustheother.Ithenshowhownewpluralismeasilyrespondstothechallenge

forpluralisttheoriesintroducedinthepreviouschapters.

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(VII)

Weneedtotalkaboutexplanation

In which Imake some assumptions about explanation. I say what Imean by‘explains’ and I state that I will talk as though explananda are facts andexplanantiaarepropositions(whetherornottheyare).Idistinguishtwosortsofexplanatory relation, ‘fully explains’ and ‘partially explains’, where a fullexplanation is sufficient for the truthof the fact that it explainsandapartialexplanation is an element (or subset) of a full explanation, and Imake someassumptions about the logical properties of these relations. Lastly, I say thatsome fact is ‘overexplained’ just in case thereare twogenuinelydifferent fullexplanationsofthatfact.

InthischapterImakesomeassumptionsaboutthestructuralprinciplesandlogicalproperties

of explanatory relations. This iswith a view to having a technical frameworkwithwhich to

moreformallycharacteriseTheExplanatoryExclusionProblem,whichwillbediscussedinthe

next chapter. While I think that the assumptions below are intuitive and hopefully

uncontroversial,1IthinkthatneitherthethrustofTheExplanatoryExclusionProblemnorthe

effectivenessofmysolutiontoitdependsonformalisingexplanatoryrelationsinthismanner.

1 WhatdoImeanby‘explains’?

HereiswhatBroomehastosayaboutthemanymeaningsof‘explains’:

‘Explain’incommonusagehasvarioussenses.Inoneofthem,Darwinexplainedwhyevolutionoccurs. In another, The Origin of Species explains why evolution occurs. In a third, naturalselectionexplainswhyitoccurs.(Broome2013,48)

I,likeBroome,wishtosticktohisthirdsenseof‘explains’inthisdiscussion.Thatis,whenItalk

ofsomethingexplainingsomethingelse,thatwhichexplainsismeanttobetheexplanansand

notadescriptionofitortheonewhodescribesit.Similarly,whenItalkofsomethingbeingan

explanation2ofsomethingelse,Imeantosaythatitisanexplanansofthatthing.3

This‘explains’relation,sounderstood,is,Isuggest,thesamerelationastheonepickedoutby

the‘because’or‘reasonwhy’expressions,soIshallhereaftertakethemtobeequivalent.

1ItakeseveraloftheseassumptionsfromBroome(2013).2That said, in § (X), when I come to talk of normative reason explanation, I will mean somethingdifferent(andmoreakintothesecondsense).3Kim suggests that theremay be a fourth kind of ‘explains’ relation: ‘The explanans relation relatespropositions or statements; the explanatory relation relates events or facts in the world. Theexplanatory relation is an objective relation among events that, as we might say, “ground” theexplanansrelation,andconstitutesits“objectivecorrelate.”’(Kim1988,226)The‘explains’relationsasIwilluseitisthuswhatKimcalls‘theexplanansrelation’,andnotablynottheobjectiverelationthathetakestounderpinit(whathecalls‘theexplanatoryrelation’).

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2 Ontologicalassumptions

2.1 Ontheontologyofexplananda

ThroughoutthisdiscussionIwillassume,purelyforexpositionalconvenience,thatexplananda

arefacts.Oneconsequenceofthisassumptionisthat,for instance,onecanexplainwhyit is

raining if it is raining, but one cannot explainwhy it is raining if it is not raining. A second

consequenceisthatwhenItalkofsomethingexplaining,forinstance,anactionorabeliefthis

isnotmeanttoimplyanythingabouttheontologyofthoseexplananda.

2.2 Ontheontologyofexplanantia

Throughout this discussion I will mostly treat explanantia as propositions (or sets of

propositions).4Importantly, I do not assume, in my exposition that explanantia are true

propositions: this is because I want to be able to recognise the possibility of non-factive

theorieswithinmydiscussion–althoughIwillultimatelydismissthem,becauseIdothinkthat

explanationisfactive.5

Explanatoryrationalismimpliesthatallpracticalreasonsstandinexplanatoryrelationstothe

rationalityoftheactionsforwhichtheyarereasons.Thus,whateversortofthingexplanantia

are,sotooarereasons.Thismeans,therefore,that Iwillbetreatingreasonsaspropositions

also.

However, although I will talk as though explanantia and reasons are propositions, I am not

arguing that theyare.My theory isneitheraboutwhatexplanantiaarenor is it aboutwhat

reasonsare; it isabouttherelation inwhichreasonsstandtotheactionsforwhichtheyare

reasons.So,ifyourpreferredtheoryofexplanationsaysthatmentalstatesorstatesofaffairs

canbeexplanantiathenitiscompatiblewithmytheorythatreasonscouldbementalstatesor

statesofaffairsalso;mypoint isnotthatreasonsarepropositions,mypoint isonlythat it is

the ontology of the relata of explanatory relations that determines the ontology of reasons

(becauseIthinkthereason-relationisultimatelyanexplanatoryrelation).6

4Again,whileImightoccasionallytalkabout(forinstance)beliefsexplainingthings,thatshouldnotbereadasimplyingthatitisthebelief(quamentalstate)doingtheexplaining,asopposedtothefactthattheagenthasthatbelief.5 Given the assumption that explanation is factive (i.e. all explanantia are true), and that truepropositions are facts, my treating explanantia as propositions, amounts to Broome’s (2013, 48)conventionoftreatingthemasfacts.6Thisisnotatrivialcaveat:somearestronglyoftheviewthatmentalstates,andnotfactsaboutthem,areanagent’sreasons(e.g.Turri2009),whilstothersareseeminglyoftheviewthatitisonlystatesofaffairs(andnotfacts)thathavethemetaphysical‘oomph’neededtoexplain(e.g.Dancy2000).

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3 Fullexplanationandpartialexplanation

SupposethatJoanne’sroofleaksandthatitrainedlastnightandthathercarpetisnowwet.7

When I say that Joanne’s carpet is wet because her roof leaks and she says that it is wet

becauseitrainedlastnight,althoughweeachcitedifferentfactsbywayofexplanationofwhy

thecarpetiswet, itseemsclearthat,asBroomeputsit, ‘ourexplanationsarenotrivals,and

wewould not feelwewere contradicting each other.’(2013, 49) Furthermore, althoughwe

eachsaythatthefactsweciteexplainwhythecarpetiswet,neitherfactiswhatwemightcall

‘thewholestory’ofwhythecarpetiswet.

It seems natural to think that the reason why the explanations that Joanne and I give are

neither rivalsnor, individually, thewholestoryofwhythecarpet iswet, isbecausetheyare

eachpartof,whatBroomecalls,‘onebigexplanation’–wherethatonebigexplanationisthe

whole story ofwhy the carpet iswet. Supplementing this idea, Broome suggests thatwhen

givinganexplanationwetypicallypick justsomepartofthisbigexplanationandthat ‘which

partwepickoutwilldependonourcontext:ourbackgroundknowledge,ourinterestsinthe

matterandsoon.’(2013,49)

I want to further regiment Broome’s suggestion. I suggest that we call this ‘one big

explanation’a ‘fullexplanation’,and theelements (or subsets)of it ‘partialexplanations’, so

that all explanatory relations are either full or partial. In the following sections I will make

some assumptions about the logical properties of the ‘fully explains’ and ‘partially explains’

relations.8

3.1 Fullexplanations

Wecouldthinkoffullexplanationsascomplexpropositionsorsetsofpropositions;foreaseof

expositionIwillusethelatter,without,indoingso,intendinganyclaimabouttheontologyof

explanantia.

What differentiates a full explanation from a partial explanation, I suggest, is that a full

explanation is sufficient for the truth of itsexplanandum, so that a set of propositions fully

explainssomefactonlyifitissufficientforthetruthofthatfact.Thatis:

7ThisisBroome’s(2013,48)example.8It is worth noting that Ruben (2004) makes much use of the distinction between full and partialexplanation, which is, in many respects, similar to mine (though I am perhaps more prescriptive).Schnieder (2011) draws the same distinction between what he calls ‘ complete’ and ‘incomplete’explanations. See also Raz’s (2009, 185–86) discussion of a ‘complete reason why’ for analogousremarks.

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Assumption Foranypropositionp,someset,Δ,fullyexplainsthefactthatponlyifΔentails9p.10

However, just entailing the truth of some proposition is obviously not sufficient for fully

explaining it (hencetheabove isnotabi-conditional).For instance, the fact that it is raining

entails the fact that it is raining, but the fact that it is raining does not explain (fully or

otherwise)thefactthatitisraining.

Tosubstantiatethispoint,wecanassumethatthe‘fullyexplains’relationis11:

- Irreflexive–Nothingfullyexplainsitself;

- Asymmetric–Ifpfullyexplainsqthenqdoesnotalsoexplainp;and

- Non-monotonic–IfΔisafullexplanationofthefactthatp,thenaddingsomearbitrarypropositiontoΔdoesnotentailthatthesetsocreatedisalsoafullexplanationofthefactthatp.

Whiletheargumentofsubsequentchaptersdoesnotdependonexplanatoryrelationshaving

theseproperties, ifat least someof themseemplausible then that shouldmake it clear the

extenttowhichmereentailment fallsshortofexplanation(asentailment isareflexive,non-

symmetric,monotonicrelation).

Assuming that full explanations are non-monotonic means that adding some arbitrary

propositionintowhatisalreadyafullexplanationofsomefactdoesnotgiveyouafurtherfull

explanation. I want to strengthen this assumption by requiring that full explanations never

containsuperfluousparts;thatis,asWedgwoodputsit:

Theexplanans…mustnotcontainanyirrelevantelementsthatcouldbestrippedawaywithoutmakingitanylesssufficienttoproducetheexplanandum.(Wedgwood2002,363)

Thisisastrengtheningofnon-monotonicitybecauseitrequiresnotjustthatyoucannotaddan

arbitrary proposition into a full explanation and still say that that enlarged set is a full

9Inwhatwaydoesasetofpropositionsthatfullyexplainssomeotherfact ‘entail’ it? Isuggestthat itlogically entails it, so that full explanations necessitate their explananda. This may mean that a fullexplanationofthefactthatpmay includefacts (suchas factsaboutphysical laws)thatareseeminglyextremelyperipheral (thoughnot irrelevant)tothequestion ‘why is it thecasethatp?’However, it isimportant tonotethat I’mnotsayingthateverything ina fullexplanation is thesortof thingthatwewouldsay‘explains’theexplanandum–soonecouldacceptthatsomefactisapartofafullexplanationwithoutacceptingthatitisthesortofthingthatwewouldsay‘explains’theiraction(thismightbewhatwewouldcallan‘enablingcondition’).Seefurtherremarksinthenextsection.10Cf.Schniedersaysthatacompleteexplanationisanexplanation‘whoseexplanansissufficientfortheexplanandum.’(2011,450)11Explanatory relations are commonly assumed to have these properties – see, for instance, Rosen’s(2010)remarksaboutexplanation(ingeneral)inhisdiscussionofgroundingexplanations.Althoughitisworth noting that there is some dissent on whether or not explanatory relations respect theseproperties(seee.g.Ruben2004).

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explanation, but that each element of the full explanation should be, in some sense,

‘necessary’ to it. This property is, in other areas, known as ‘minimality’.12I characterise it

formallyasfollows:

MINIMALITY Foranypropositionp,someset,Δ,fullyexplainsthefactthatponlyifthereisnoΓsuchthatΓfullyexplainsthefactthatpandΓisapropersubsetofΔ.13

Lastly,itisworthnotingthatwhileafullexplanationissufficientforitsexplanandum,atleast

somefullexplanationsarenotnecessaryfortheirexplananda.Forinstance,supposethatthe

factthatI’vejustbeentothegymtogetherwiththefactthatIamalwaystiredafterI’vebeen

to the gym fully explains why I’m tired. The fact that it fully explains my tiredness in this

instance clearlydoesnotmean thatwhenever I am tired it is because I’vebeen to thegym

etc.,whichistosaythatatleastsomefullexplanationsarenotnecessaryfortheirexplananda.

3.2 Partialexplanation

We can now define the concept of ‘partial explanation’ in terms of the concept of ‘full

explanation’,asfollows:anyelementofafullexplanationofsomefactisapartialexplanation

ofthatfact.Thatis:

Definition Foranypropositions,pandq,ppartiallyexplainsthefactthatqifandonlyifthereisaset,Δ,suchthatΔfullyexplainsthefactthatq,andpisanelementofΔ.

Forthesakeofcompleteness,itisworthnotingthatasetcanalsobeapartialexplanation(ifit

isasubsetofafullexplanation):

Definition Foranyproposition,p,andset,Γ,ΓpartiallyexplainsthefactthatpifandonlyifthereisaΔsuchthatΔfullyexplainsthefactthatpandΓisasubsetofΔ.

Somehouse-keeping:Firstly,justbecausesomeproposition(orset)isapartialexplanationof

somefact,weneednotsaythatitexplainsthatfact.Thatis,whilewemightsaythatthefact

thatJoannehadcarpetundertheholeinherroofisapartofthefullexplanationofwhyher

carpetiswet(it’sisanecessarypartofthesufficientcondition)wemightnotwanttosaythat

thatfactexplainswhyhercarpetiswet.LikeBroome,Isuggestthatwhatdetermineswhether

12See,for instance,Audi’s(2012b,699)characterisationofminimality inthecontextofgrounding.Myformalizationisatranspositionofhis.13 See, for instance, Raz’s (2009, 185–86) remarks about the importance of non-redundancy toexplanations.

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or notwe say that somepartial explanationexplains someother is amatter of background

knowledgeandotherfeaturesofthecontext.14

Secondly, however, I will assume that if something explains some fact then it is a partial

explanationofthatfact(notethisisnotmerelyrestrictedtowhatwesayexplainsthefact,but

whatactuallyexplainsit).AlthoughIstruggletoseehow,ifoneacceptsthebasicstructureof

fullandpartialexplanationsetouthere,onecoulddenythis,itisperhapsstillworthstressing:

Assumption Foranypropositions,pandq, ifpexplainsthefactthatq thenp isapartialexplanationofthefactthatq.

Thirdly,the‘partiallyexplains’relation,sounderstood,isacontingentrelation(unlikethe‘fully

explains’relation);thefactthatitrainedlastnightonlypartiallyexplainswhyJoanne’scarpet

is wet given other facts about the way the world is. However, even though that fact only

partially explains why the carpet is wet given other facts, the ‘partially explains’ relation is

nonethelessstillbetweenthatfactandthefactthatthecarpetiswet.

Fourthly,andmoretrivially,itfollowsfromtheabovethatallfullexplanationsarealsopartial

explanations(sinceanyfullexplanationisasubsetofafullexplanation).

Lastly,Iwillassume,forthesakeofcompleteness,thatthe‘partiallyexplains’relationis(like

the‘fullyexplains’relation),irreflexive,asymmetricandnon-monotonic.

3.3 Explainingwhythecarpetiswet

Returning to our example, then: the full explanation of the fact that Joanne’s carpet iswet

includes, interalia, factssuchasthefactthat itrainedlastnight,thefactthatherroof leaks

and the fact that there is carpet beneath her leaky roof. That full explanation entails that

Joanne’scarpetiswet.

Eachof themembersof that full explanation (i.e. the fact that it rained lastnight, etc.) is a

partial explanation of why Joanne’s carpet is wet. However, contextual and pragmatic

considerationswilldeterminewhetherornotwesay,ofanygivenpartialexplanation,thatit

explainswhyhercarpetiswet.15

14Thisisasuggestionaboutthepracticeofsayingthatonethingexplainsanother–Imakenocommentonwhetherornotallpartialexplanationsexplainactionsinsomenon-contextrelativesense.15Cf. ‘A partial explanation may be good relative to one set of circumstances, but bad relative toanother,inwhichinterests,beliefs,orwhateverdiffer.’(Ruben2004,22)

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4 Overdeterminationandoverexplanation

Havingthuscharacterisedfullandpartialexplanation,Inowwanttoofferacharacterisationof

overexplanation in terms of these concepts, as it is of some relevance to The Explanatory

ExclusionProblem.

4.1 Overdetermination

Somethingissaidtobeoverdeterminedifandonlyiftherearetwoseparatesetsofconditions

that are each individually sufficient for it to obtain and those conditions determine that it

obtain.16Differentkindsofdetermination relationyielddifferent sortsofoverdetermination.

Causal overdetermination (and whether or not it is possible) is probably the most hotly

debatedkindofoverdetermination–hereisarepresentativecharacterisation:

Suppose that a certain event, in virtue of its mental property, causes a physical event. Thecausal closureof thephysical domain says that thisphysical eventmust alsohaveaphysicalcause.Wemayassume that thisphysical cause, in virtueof itsphysical property, causes thephysical event… Could it be that the mental cause and the physical cause are each anindependent sufficient cause of the physical effect? The suggestion then is that the physicaleffect isoverdetermined.So if thephysical causehadn'toccurred, themental causeby itselfwouldhavecausedtheeffect.(Kim1993,280–81)

Theprincipleissomethinglikethis:somethingiscausallyoverdeterminedifyoucouldtakeone

of its causes away and it would still obtain (or occur, or exist or what have you). A classic

example: twovandalseach throw rocks that simultaneously strikeandbreakawindow.The

breaking of thewindow is seemingly causally overdetermined because either rock-throwing

wouldhavebeensufficienttobreakthewindow.It’sbeyondthescopeofthisdiscussiontoget

intowhatthatmeansforthecausalstatusofeitherrock-throwing.

4.2 Overexplanation

HereishowIproposetocharacteriseoverexplanation:

Definition For any propositionp, the fact thatp is overexplained if and only ifthereare(atleast)twogenuinelydifferentfullexplanationsofthefactthatp.

Is there a difference between overexplanation and overdetermination? If you are an

explanatory realist (so that explanatory relations 17 are underpinned by ontological

16I stress the latterconjunctas therebeingmerely twosetsofconditions thatentail somefact isnotsufficient for the fact to be over-determined (if it were then, arguably, everything would beoverdetermined, given the reflexivity of the entailment relation, and the claim that everything isdeterminedinsomemoremetaphysicallysignificantsensethanentailment).17OfthekindIhaveinmind(seefn.3ofthischapterforclarification).

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determinationrelations18)andyouholdthatexplanationsaregenuinelydifferentonly if they

are independent,19then youwill probably think that overdetermination andoverexplanation

arethesamething.

However,sinceIwanttoallowforthepossibilityofrejectingeitherexplanatoryrealismorthat

two explanations are genuinely different only if they are independent, I distinguish

overexplanation from overdetermination. Distinguishing them in this manner does not

preclude thepossibilityof therebeing the same; thatdependsonlyonhowonedefines the

definiensofoverexplanation.

Whatdoesitmeanfortwofullexplanationstobegenuinelydifferent?Isuggestitisthatthey

shouldexplaintheexplanandumindifferentways.Whycallthem‘genuinelydifferent’andnot

merely ‘different’explanations?Because Iwanttoallowforthepossibilitythatnon-identical

fullexplanations(i.e.‘different’)fullexplanationsmaynonethelessexplainsomeexplanandum

inthesameway(i.e.withoutbeing‘genuinelydifferent’).

4.3 Benignoverexplanation

It is widely believed that genuine causal overdetermination is rare (if it is even possible).20

Assuming that causal determination relations underpin causal explanatory relations, causal

overexplanationispresumablyequallyrare.

However,bonafidecasesofnon-causaloverexplanationabound.Forinstance,recallthatIsaid

thatswimmingwillbothhelpmesleepbetterand improvemymood.Swimming is then, for

me, in some respect, worth doing partly because it will help me sleep better and partly

because it will improve my mood. The explanatory relations involved here are, I suggest,

clearlynotcausal.

Nowconsiderthis:swimmingwouldstillbe, insomerespect,worthdoingevenif itwouldn’t

helpmesleepbetterbecauseitwouldstillimprovemymood.Conversely,ifitweren’tthecase

thatswimmingwouldimprovemymood,wecouldstillsaythatitwas,insomerespect,worth

doingbecauseitwouldhelpmesleepbetter.

18Cf.: ‘According to “explanatory realism,”when something is correctly invoked as an explanation ofanotherthing,theexplanatoryrelationmustbegroundedinsomeobjectiverelationofdependenceordeterminationholdingfortheexplanansandtheexplanandum.’(Kim1993,xii)19Thatis,inwhateversenseyoutakeanoverdeterminingcause/factortobeindependent.20Kim (1993, 280) describes the idea that there could be systematic causal overdetermination as‘absurd’.

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Incontrast,ifithadn’trainedlastnightthen,ceterisparibus,thefactthatJoanne’sroofleaks

wouldnotcontinuetopartiallyexplainthefactthathercarpetwaswet(hercarpetwouldnot

havebeenwet,ifherroofdidn’tleak).

Whatdifferentiates these twocases is seemingly this:while the fact that it rained lastnight

andthefactthatherroofleaksarepartofthesamefullexplanationofwhyhercarpetiswet,

the fact that swimmingwould helpme sleep better and the fact that itwould improvemy

moodarepartoftwogenuinelydifferentfullexplanationsofwhyswimmingwouldbe,insome

respect,worthdoing–theyexplaintheexplanandum indifferentways.Thus,sincethereare

twogenuinelydifferentfullexplanationsofwhyswimmingis,insomerespect,worthdoing,it

is overexplained. Whereas, in contrast, since there are not two genuinely different

explanationsofwhyJoanne’scarpetiswet,thefactthathercarpetiswetisnotoverexplained.

The characterisation of overexplanation hangs on what it is for two explanations to be

genuinelydifferent. I havegivenwhat I take tobeanunambiguousexamplehere,but Iwill

returntowhatmakesexplanationsgenuinelydifferentinthenextchapter(see§(VIII)3.2).

5 Summary

I have said that there are two kinds of explanatory relation: full and partial, and I’vemade

some assumptions about the logical properties of each. I then provided an analysis of

overexplanation in termsof fullexplanation. In thenextchapter Iwillput theseconcepts to

work in a characterisation of the main challenge to my theory: The Explanatory Exclusion

Problem.

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(VIII)

TheExplanatoryExclusionProblem

InwhichIsetoutTheExplanatoryExclusionProblem,whichis,insomeformoranother, the motivating argument for psychologistic theories of reasons. Iprovide a formal construal of the Problem, showing how it results from twoseemingly trivial claims aboutwhat explains an agent’s actionwhen they actfromerrorandfromignorancetogetherwithfiveseeminglyplausibleprinciplesofexplanation.IshowhowtheProblemimpliesthatIdidnotcongratulatemyfriendbecauseshehadwonanaward,butonlybecauseIthoughtshehad.

Myfriendhaswonamuch-covetedaward;IreadaboutitinanewspapersoIcallherupand

congratulate her. Did I congratulate her because she had won an award, or just because I

thoughtshehad?

There is a well-established response to this question that proceeds, broadly, along the

followinglines:ifshehadn’twonanawardbutIhadbelievedthatshehad,thenIwouldstill

havecongratulatedher,and Iwouldhavecongratulatedherbecause Ibelievedthatshehad

wonanaward.Conversely, if Ihadn’tbelievedthatshehadwontheawardtheneven ifshe

hadwonit Iwouldnothavecongratulatedher.So, if Ihadn’tbelievedthatshehadwonthe

award,thefactthatshehadwontheawardcouldnothaveexplainedwhyIcongratulatedher

(sinceIwouldn’thave).

So,itseemsasthoughwhatmatterstotheexplanationofwhyIcongratulatedmyfriendisthe

factthatIbelievedthatshehadwonanawardandnotthefactthatshehadwonanaward;

that is, I did not really congratulate my friend because she had won an award, but only

becauseIthoughtshehad.

Anargumentalongtheselinesiswhattypicallymotivatestheviewthatfactsabouttheworld

cannotexplainanagent’sactionand that, therefore,anagent’s reason foractingmustbea

featureoftheirpsychology.1Indeed,thislineofreasoningisthemotivatingargumentforwhat

Icalled‘psychologismaboutthereasonsforwhichweact’.2So,forthosewhowanttoreject

thatformofpsychologism(asIdo),thisargumentistheonetobeat.

InwhatfollowsIofferaformalconstrualoftheargumentasanargumentaboutwhatexplains

anagent’saction(i.e.asanargumentthatisonlyindirectlyaboutwhattheirreasonforacting

is).Iwillusetheconceptsintroducedinthepreviouschaptertoformallycharacterisethethree

1Sinceanagent’sreasonforactingalwaysexplainstheiraction(see§(IV)1.2).2SeeTableI-4.

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componentsofwhat Iwillcall ‘TheExplanatoryExclusionProblem’,whichare:theargument

fromfalsebelief3;theargumentfromimpotentfacts4;andaprincipleofexplanationthatIcall

‘the exclusion principle’5. In particular, on my construal, the conclusion of The Explanatory

ExclusionProblemcanbearrivedatfromtwoseeminglytrivialclaimsaboutwhatexplainsan

agent’s action when they act in error or ignorance, together with five seemingly plausible

principlesofexplanation.

MyintentinformalisingTheExplanatoryExclusionProblem isthree-fold:firstly,doingsowill

helpmedemonstrate,in§(IX),thattheProblemappliesalsotothefactsonwhichanagent’s

beliefsarebased6andtotheexplanationofwhyit isrationalforsomeonetodosomething.7

Secondly,formalisingtheProblemwillhelpmetodiscriminatemoreeasilybetweendifferent

responsestoit.And,thirdly,aformalconstrualallowsmetoidentifymorepreciselywhereThe

ExplanatoryExclusionProblemgoeswrong.

I should note that other construals of this argument are possible, andmine is by nomeans

definitive (though I hope it is illuminating). However, I do not think one can construe the

overallprobleminawaythatmakesitimmunetomyeventualresponse;thatis,Idonotthink

thatmyresponsetotheoverallproblemhangsonformalisingitinthewaythatIdo.

Lastly, we should also be clear that my discussion here is strictly about what explains an

agent’saction,andnotwhattheirreasonforactingis.TheExplanatoryExclusionProblemonly

bearsuponwhatanagent’sreasonforactingcouldbetotheextentthatweassumethatan

agent’s reason for acting always explains their action (although this is a widely held

assumption-see§(IV)1.2).

1 Anoverview

Recall that I said that if explanatory rationalism is to be consistent with the prima facie

reasonableclaimssetoutin§§(II)-(IV),thefollowingmustbetrue:

(R1) Icongratulatedmyfriendbecauseshehadwonanaward.

TheExplanatoryExclusionProblemprovidesthefollowingargumentagainstthisclaim:

3ThisisStout’s(1996,2009)nameforthisargument.4Stout(1996)discusseswhathecalls,‘TheArgumentfromtheImpotenceUnrepresentedFacts’;whilehisargument is in somerespects similar tomine, thepremisesandconclusionsofourargumentsaresufficientlydifferentastomakethemdifferentarguments.5This principle share’s some similarities with Kim’s principle of causal exclusion, but, as I shall note,differsfromitinparticularrespectsthatshallturnouttobecriticaltothisdiscussion.6Andnotmerelyfactsabouttheexternalworld.7Andnotmerelytotheexplanationofwhytheydoit.

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TheExplanatoryExclusionProblemfor(R1)

Premise1 ThereisafullexplanationofwhyIcongratulatedmyfriendsuchthatthe fact that she had won an award is neither a part of that fullexplanationnorisitpartofagenuinelydifferentexplanation.8

EXCLUSION For any propositions,pandq, if there is a full explanation ofwhyqsuchthatp isneitherapartofthatfullexplanationnor is itpartofagenuinelydifferentexplanation9,thenpdoesnotpartiallyexplainq.

Conclusion1 The fact that my friend had won an award does not explain why Icongratulatedher.

The focus of this chapter is on setting out the argument for Premise1 and for EXCLUSION. In

§(IX) I will show how, by altering Premise1, The Explanatory Exclusion Problem can also

provideargumentsagainst(R2),(R3)and(R4).

1.1 TheargumentforPremise1

Premise1, as I will demonstrate, follows from the conclusions of two other arguments: the

argumentfromfalsebeliefandtheargumentfromimpotentfacts.

TheconclusionoftheargumentfromfalsebeliefisthatwecangiveafullexplanationofwhyI

congratulatedmy friendwithoutmentioning the fact that shewonanaward; so longaswe

notethatIbelievedthatshehadwonanaward.Ishowhowthisconclusioncanbearrivedat

fromaseeminglytrivialclaimaboutwhatwouldhaveexplainedmyactionhadmybeliefbeen

falsetogetherwiththreeseeminglyplausibleprinciplesofexplanation.

Theconclusionoftheargumentfromimpotentfactsisthatthefactthatmyfriendhadwonan

awardisnotpartofagenuinelydifferentexplanationofwhyIcongratulatedherfromthefact

that I believed that she had. I show how this conclusion can be arrived inferred from (i) a

seemingly trivial claimaboutwhat theexplanatorypowerof the fact thatmy friendwonan

awardwouldhavebeenif Ihadn’tbelievedthatshehad;togetherwith(ii)anotherplausible

principleofexplanation.

Premise1canthenbeinferredfromtheconclusionsofthesetwoarguments.

1.2 TheargumentforEXCLUSION

TheargumentforEXCLUSIONismorestraightforward.Inshort: ifsomefactisnotpartofafull

explanation of some explanandum and it is not part of a genuinely different explanation of

8That is,agenuinelydifferentexplanationofwhy I congratulatedmy friend… Iomit thisqualificationthroughout,forbrevity.9That is, a genuinely different explanation ofwhyq…Again, I omit this qualification throughout, forbrevity.

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thatexplanandum,thenseemingly,bythelawoftheexcludedmiddle,itisnotpartofanyfull

explanationofthatexplanandum,whichmeansthatitdoesnotexplainit.

1.3 What’snext

InwhatfollowsIsetouttheargumentfromfalsebeliefandtheargumentfromimpotentfacts.

I then show the conclusions of these two arguments yield Premise1. I then set out the

argumentforEXCLUSION.IthenshowhowPremise1,togetherwithEXCLUSION,yieldsConclusion

1(whichisthedenialof(R1)).

Forreference,thefigurebelowprovidesanoverviewofthestructureofthisdiscussion.

FigureVIII-1:TheargumentforTheExplanatoryExclusionProblem

2 TheArgumentfromFalseBelief

Dancyprovidesaconcisesummaryoftheargumentfromfalsebelief,asitrealtestoanagent’s

reasonforacting:

[Consider]thecasewherethingsarenotastheagentconceivesthemtobe.Surely, insuchacase,wecannot say thathis reason foractingashedidwas thatp.Wehave to say thathisreason foractingwas thathebelieved thatp.Accepting this for thecasewhere the relevantbeliefisfalse,then,wemightstillhopethat‘thatp’canindeedbetheexplanationoftheactionwhereitisthecasethatp,butthatwhereitisnotthecasethatptheexplanationcanonlybe‘thathebelievedthatp’.But,asBernardWilliamsputsit,thetrue-falsedistinctionshouldnotbe allowed to affect the form of the relevant explanation. Supposing, therefore, that ourexplanation should take the same form whether it is or is not the case that p, and havingalreadyacceptedthatthecorrectexplanationincaseswhereitisnotthecasethatpis‘thathebelieved thatp’,wearedriven to say the samewhere the relevantbelief is true rather thanfalse.(Dancy2000,121)

AdaptingDancy’sargumenttomypresentconcernaboutwhatexplainsanagent’saction(and

notjusttheirreasonforacting),themainconclusionofthislineofreasoningseemstobethat

wecanalwaysexplainanagent’sactionintermsoftheirbeliefs,withoutreferencetothetruth

Premise1.AFACTIVITY

ENDURANCESUFFICIENCY

Premise1.B

DIFFERENCE

Premise1

Conclusion1 (§3)TheArgumentfromImpotentFacts

(§2)TheArgumentfrom

FalseBelief

EXCLUSION

(§§4-6)TheExplanatoryExclusionProblem

Conclusion1.A

Conclusion1.B

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orfalsityofthatbelief.Thisconclusionmayseemobvious,however,sincesomedenyit,10itis

worthbeingexplicitabouttheargumentforit.

In what follows I provide a formal construal of this argument. I take my construal to be

plausibleand, Ihope, informative;however,other construalsareavailable (e.g. Stout2009).

The conclusion of the argument from false belief, in the case of my friend’s award, is as

follows:

Conclusion1a There is a full explanation of why I congratulated my friend thatincludes the fact that I believed that shehadwonan awardbut notthefactthatshehadwonanaward.

ThisconclusionisthefirstpartoftheargumentforPremise1. In§3, Ipresenttheargument

fromimpotentfacts,whichisthesecondpartoftheargumentforPremise1.

2.1 Actingonfalsebeliefs

Theargument from falsebelief starts, predictably,withanobservationaboutwhathappens

whenanagentactsona falsebelief.Consider:even ifmybeliefhadbeenfalse, Iwouldstill

havecongratulatedmyfriend,andIwouldhavecongratulatedherbecauseIbelievedthatshe

hadwonanaward.11Now,tosaythatIwouldhavecongratulatedherbecauseIbelievedthat

shehadwonanawardistosaythattheformerpartiallyexplainsthelatter.

Moreover, I suggest, when I congratulate her because of my false belief that she won an

award, the fact that she did not win an award is not part of any explanation of why I

congratulatedher.12

Thismuchshouldbeundeniable.Thus:

Premise1a If,ceterisparibus,myfriendhadnotwonanaward(butIstillbelievedthat shehad13), then (i) the fact that Ibelieved that shehadwonanawardwouldhavepartiallyexplainedwhyIcongratulatedher;and(ii)the fact that she had not won an award would not have partiallyexplainedwhyIcongratulatedher.

2.2 TheFactivityPrinciple

Recallingthediscussionof§(IV)1.3,wherewenotedthatthefactivityofexplanationisaprima

faciereasonableandwidelyheldprincipleofexplanation,letusjustassumethefollowing:

10Seethediscussionofexclusivedisjunctivisttheoriesin§(X)A.4.11Compare:whydidSallyrun?Becauseshethoughtabearwaschasingher.12Perhaps, one could craft a weird example in which it was, but that is not my example. Likewise,compare:thefactthatabearwasn’tchasingSallydoesnotexplainwhysheran.Therelevanceofthisqualificationwillbecomeclearasthediscussionproceeds.13Thisremarkisparentheticalbecauseitisalreadyimpliedbytheceterisparibuscondition.

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FACTIVITY Foranypropositionspandq,ifppartiallyexplainsthefactthatqthenpisthecase.

ThismeansthatwhenSallyrunsbecauseshemistakenlybelievesthatabearischasingherthe

falseproposition that a bearwas chasingher doesnot explainwhy she ran. Likewise, ifmy

belief thatmy friendhadwonanawardhadbeen false, the falseproposition thatmy friend

hadwonanawardwouldnotexplainwhyIcongratulatedher.

2.3 Twomoreprinciplesofexplanation

Considerthefollowing,much-discussedremark:

Thedifferencebetweenfalseandtruebeliefsontheagent’spartcannotaltertheformoftheexplanationwhichwillbeappropriatetohisaction.(Williams1981,102)

Here iswhat I take to be an implication ofwhatWilliams is saying, inmy terminology: the

samefullexplanationofone’sactionisavailablewhetherone’sbeliefistrueorfalse.14While

thisclaimmayseemobvious,therearethosewhodenyit,andwhodosofordifferentreasons,

soitisworthconsideringitinmoredetail.

In what follows, I want to show how this claim can be motivated by two principles of

explanation, the endurance principle and the sufficiency principle, that are both general (i.e.

applybeyondtheexplanationofaction)andplausible.

2.3.1 TheEndurancePrinciple

Thefollowingremark,Isuggest,reliesontheenduranceprinciple:

Whenanagentactsonfalsebeliefs,wecannotexplaintheactionintermsofthefactsbutonlyintermsofthosebeliefs–thereisonlyaninternalistexplanationoftheiraction.Butevenwhenthebeliefsaretruethatsameinternalistexplanationworks.(Stout1996,24emphasisadded)

Stoutsuggests thatsincewecanexplainanagent’sactions in termsof the factsaboutwhat

theybelievedwhentheirbeliefwasfalse,wecanlikewiseexplaintheiractionintermsofthe

factsaboutwhattheybelievedwhentheirbeliefistrue.Inwhichcase,giventhefactthatSally

believedthatabearwaschasingher(partially)explainswhysheranwhenherbeliefwasfalse,

if,ceterisparibus,herbeliefhadbeentrue,thefactthatshebelievedthatabearwaschasing

herwouldstillhave(partially)explainedwhysheran.Butwhyshouldthisbethecase?Why

doesitfollowthatwhatexplainsinthefalsebeliefcasealsoexplainsinthetruebeliefcase?

Let’s startbynoticing this:whenSally runsbecause shemistakenly thought thatabearwas

chasingher,weknow, fromFACTIVITY, that the falseproposition thatabearwaschasingher

14Williams’sremark,Ithink,goesfurtherthanthis–Ithinkthat,giventhatexplanationisfactive,thereisareadingofhisremarkonwhichitjustistheconclusionoftheargumentfromfalsebelief.

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(i.e. the content of Sally’s belief) couldnot partially explainwhy Sally ran. Furthermore, the

factthatabearwasnotchasingSallyisalsonotpartofanyfullexplanationofwhysheran–

and,inparticular,itisnotpartofthesamefullexplanationasthefactthatshebelievedthata

bearwas chasing her.15So, there seems to be a clear sense inwhich, when Sally’s belief is

false, the proposition that a bear is chasing her is irrelevant to the explanation ofwhy she

ran.16

Nowconsiderwhatwouldhavehappenedif,ceterisparibus,Sally’sbeliefhadbeentruerather

thanfalse?Thiswouldhavehappened:apropositionthatwasirrelevanttotheexplanationof

heraction(i.e.thatabearwaschasingher)wouldhavegonefrombeingfalsetobeingtrue.

But why would that proposition’s suddenly becoming true affect the pre-existing partial

explanationrelationsif itwasirrelevanttothosepartialexplanationswhenitwasfalse?That

is,whywouldSally’sbeliefthatabearwaschasingherstopexplainingheractionjustbecause

afalsepropositionthatwasirrelevanttothatexplanationsuddenlybecametrue.17Seemingly,

itwouldnot.

To the extent that this line of reasoning is persuasive, I suggest that that is just because it

accords with a more general principle of explanation – namely that if, ceteris paribus, a

propositionthatisirrelevanttosomeexplanationofsomeexplanandum(i.e.neitheritnorits

negation is part of that full explanation of that explanandum) when it is false suddenly

becomes true, then that does not stop anything that partially explained that explanandum

when that proposition was false from continuing to explain it when it is true. That is, the

partialexplanationrelationsbetweenfactsendurewhenthetruth-valueofapropositionthat

isirrelevanttothemchanges.Thus:

15Again,onecouldcraftaweirdexampleinwhichitwas,butthatisnotmyexample.16This does notmean that the proposition is irrelevant in all senses of relevance – for instance, it iscertainly something she took to make running worth doing; the point is just that from a particularexplanatory perspective, it is seemingly irrelevant. It is also worth stressing this: just because theproposition thatabear ischasingher is irrelevantwhen it is false,doesnotmeanthat it is irrelevantwhen it is true – a proposition is irrelevant to some partial explanation of some fact only in someparticularinstanceandonlyinsofarasneitheritnoritsnegationarepartofthesamefullexplanationofthatfactasthatpartialexplanation.17Consider:evenifthefactthatabearwaschasingherisrelevanttotheexplanationofheractionwhentruethatdoesnotshowthatitsbecomingtruewoulddestroypre-existingpartialexplanationrelations,despiteitspriorirrelevance.

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ENDURANCE For any propositionsp, qand r, the following holds: Suppose thatqpartiallyexplainsthefactthatrwhenitisnotthecasethatp.Supposefurtherthatneitherpnornotpispartofthesameexplanationofrasq. Then, if, ceteris paribus, it were the case that p, q would stillpartiallyexplainthefactthatr.18

Althoughthisclaimislong-winded,Itaketheprincipletobeultimatelyintuitive.However, in

the event that it is not clear, the next section discusses some examples and a failed

counterexample.

2.3.2 Someexamplesoftheenduranceprinciple

ThereaderwhoisalreadycomfortablewithENDURANCEmayskiptheseexamples.

Example 1: An uncontroversial example: Suppose that a teacher is performing a science

experiment for her students, although one of the students, Nathan, is absent. She heats a

metalrodanditexpands.Thefactthattherodwasheatedpartiallyexplainswhyitexpanded,

and the false proposition thatNathan is present is irrelevant to that explanation of why it

expanded.19Moreover, ceteris paribus, had Nathan been present, the fact that the rodwas

heatedwouldstillpartiallyexplainwhyitexpanded.

Example 2:Of course,Nathan’sbeingpresent is rarely likely to feature inanexplanationof

whytherodexpanded,sohereisanotherexample,inwhichthepropositionthatisirrelevant

whenfalse,explainswhentrue.Considerthecaseinwhichswimmingwillhelpmesleepbetter

butwon’t improvemymood.Wealreadyestablished20that the fact thatswimmingwillhelp

me sleepbetterpartially explainswhy swimming is, forme, in some respect,worthdoing.21

Moreover, Isuggest,neitherthefalsepropositionthatswimmingwill improvemymood,nor

thefactthatitwon’timprovemymoodexplainwhyitis,insomerespect,worthdoing–sothe

propositionthatswimmingwill improvemymood is irrelevanttothefullexplanationofwhy

swimmingis,insomerespect,worthdoing.

However,if,ceterisparibus,swimmingwouldimprovemymoodthenitwouldpartiallyexplain

whyswimmingwas, insomerespect,worthdoing.But justbecause,onceitobtains,thefact

that swimmingwould improvemymoodstartsexplainingwhyswimmingwouldbe, in some

respect, worth doing, doesn’t mean that the fact that swimming will help me sleep better

18Moreformally:Foranypropositionsp,qandr,if,whenitisnotthecasethatp,qpartiallyexplainsthefact thatrthen,providedthatneitherpnornotp ispartof thesameexplanationofrasq, if,ceterisparibus,itwerethecasethatp,thenqwouldstillpartiallyexplainthefactthatr.19Neitheritnoritsnegationispartofthefullexplanation(ofwhichthefactthattherodwasheatedispart)ofwhytherodexpanded.20See§(VII)4.3.21GiventhatIwanttosleepbetter,orjudgeitgoodandwhathaveyou.

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stopsexplainingwhyitis,insomerespect,worthdoing.Allthathappensnowisthattheyboth

explain.

Example3:Awould-becounterexample:supposethatTomthrowsarockatawindowandit

breaks, while Susie stands and watches. The fact that Tom threw a rock at the window

(partially) explainswhy it broke. Seemingly, neither the false proposition that Susie threwa

rockatthewindownorthefactthatshedidn’tthrowarockexplainswhythewindowbroke:

thepropositionthatSusiethrewarockisirrelevanttothefullexplanationofwhythewindow

broke.

However,supposethatSusiehadthrownarock,andshehadthrownitbeforeTom,andher

rock had broken thewindow. Inwhich case Tom’s rock-throwingwould seemingly cease to

explainwhythewindowbroke(hisrockwouldhavesailedthroughtheemptyspacewherethe

windowusedtobe).So,contratheenduranceprinciple,whenanirrelevantpropositiongoes

fromtruetofalsethatcanstopsomethingfrompartiallyexplainingtheexplanandum.

This counterexample fails because it violates the ‘ceteris paribus’ condition in ENDURANCE. In

makingitthecasethatSusiethrewarockatthewindowanditbrokewearenotchangingthe

truth-valueofonly irrelevantpropositions,butof relevantpropositionsaswell.For instance,

the fact that the window was intact before Tom’s rock hit it is a part of the same full

explanationofwhythewindowbrokeasthefactthatTomthrewtherock.22Soofcoursethe

fact that Tom threw the rock stops explainingwhy thewindowbroke – by adding in Sally’s

rock-throwing we have taken away an element of the full explanation that Tom’s rock-

throwingwaspartof,soeverythinginitstopsexplaining.

Incontrast,supposewehonourthe ‘ceterisparibus’conditionandchangeonlythatwhich is

not part of the same full explanation of thewindow’s breaking as Tom’s rock throwing. So,

let’s suppose that Susie’s rock harmlessly bounces off the window. In this circumstance it

shouldstillbeclear(giventhatallotherthingsareequal)thatTom’srockbreaksthewindow

andTom’srock-throwingexplainswhythewindowbroke.ENDURANCEperseveres.

2.3.3 TheSufficiencyPrinciple

Now: another principle of explanation – the sufficiency principle. Recall that I interpreted

Williams’sremarkastheclaimthatthesamefullexplanationofanagent’sactionisavailable

whether their belief is true or false. We need more than just ENDURANCE to reach that

conclusion.

22It is anecessarypartof that full explanationbecause if thewindowhadn’tbeen intact, itwouldn’thavebeenbrokenbyTom’srock.

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Consider:thereisasetofpartialexplanationsofwhySallyran(whenherbeliefwasfalse)that

isafullexplanationofwhysheran.WhatENDURANCEtellsusisthatthatwhichpartiallyexplains

her actionwhen her belief is falsewould also partially explain if, ceteris paribus,her belief

were true. So, the same setofpartial explanations that fully explainedher actionwhenher

beliefwasfalsewouldstillbeasetofpartialexplanationsofheractionifherbeliefweretrue.

However,weneed toadd some further requirement to guarantee that that set is still a full

explanationwhenherbelief is true(asopposedtobeingmerelyasetofpartialexplanations

i.e.anincompletefullexplanation).Whatisthatrequirement?

Itisthis:whateversufficestoexplainanagent’sactionwhenanagent’sbeliefisfalselikewise

suffices to explain it when their belief is true. And, again, I suggest that this is just a

consequenceof an intuitively plausible, andmore general principleof explanation –namely

thatifsomesetofpartialexplanationssufficestoexplain(i.e.isafullexplanationof)somefact

in some situation, then whenever those partial explanations all explain that fact, they will

sufficetoexplainit.Thus:

SUFFICIENCY Foranypropositionq,andanyset,Δ, ifΔ isa fullexplanationof thefact thatq in somecircumstance, then, inanycircumstance inwhichall theelementsofΔpartiallyexplain the fact thatq,Δ fullyexplainsthefactthatq.23

2.3.4 CombiningtheEndurancePrincipleandtheSufficiencyPrinciple

Theenduranceprincipleandthesufficiencyprincipleprovideuswiththeconclusionthatthe

same full explanation of an agent’s action is available whether their belief is true or false.

How?Byensuringthat justchangingthetruth-valueofsomepropositionthat isoutsideofa

full explanation of some explanandum (i.e. which is irrelevant to the explanation of that

explanandum)cannotaffectwhetherornotthat fullexplanation isavailable.So, ifyouthink

thatneitherthepropositionthatabearischasingher,northefactthatabearisnotchasing

her, arepartsof the full explanationofwhySally ran (whenherbeliefwas false), then that

samefullexplanationwillbeavailable,ceterisparibus,regardlessofwhetherornotabear is

chasingher.24

23ThismayseemclosetoMINIMALITY,butitisaverydistinctclaim.However,theconjunctionofthetwoyieldswhatwemightcallcounterfactualminimality,whichcanbedefinedasfollows:

C-MINIMALITY Foranypropositionp,someset,Δ,fullyexplainsthefactthatponlyifthereisno Γ such that Γ is a proper subset of Δ and if, ceteris paribus, Δ had notexistedbutΓhad,thenΓwouldfullyexplainthefactthatp.

Isuspectthatan intuitivecommitmenttoC-MINIMALITY,resultingfroman implicitcommitmenttobothMINIMALITYandSUFFICIENCYasprinciplesofexplanation,helpsmotivatestheargumentfromfalsebelief.24Notethatnon-factivists(e.g.Dancy2000),whothinkthatexplanationcanbenon-factive,wouldsaythatthatabearischasingher(quathecontentofherbelief)ispartofthefullexplanationofwhySally

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This may seem elaborate, but distinguishing these two general explanatory principles is

essentialnotonlytodiscriminatingbetweendifferentrejectionsofTheExplanatoryExclusion

Problem,25butalsotoclearlydemonstratingwhyitiswrong.

2.4 Concludingtheargumentfromfalsebelief

Here,then,ismyconstrualoftheargumentfromfalsebelief:if,ceterisparibus,myfriendhad

notwonanawardthenthefactthatIbelievedthatshehadwonanawardwouldhavebeena

partofafullexplanationofwhyIcongratulatedher(fromPremise1a).However,neitherthe

fact that she had not won an award nor the false proposition that she had won an award

wouldhavebeenpartofthatexplanation(fromPremise1aandFACTIVITY).

Weshouldmaketwoobservationsfromtheseremarksaboutwhatwouldhavebeenthecase

if my belief had been false: firstly, there would have been a full explanation of why I

congratulatedmyfriendthatwouldhaveincludedthefactthatIbelievedthatshehadwonan

award but not the (false) proposition that she had won an award. Secondly, the (false)

propositionthatshehadwonanawardwouldhavebeenirrelevanttotheexplanationofmy

action.

From the secondobservation,wecan conclude (fromENDURANCE) thatwhateverwouldhave

partially explainedmyaction ifmybeliefhadbeen falsemust alsopartially explain itwhen,

ceterisparibus,mybeliefistrue.So,sincealltheelementsofwhatwouldhavefullyexplained

myactionhadmybeliefbeenfalsealso(partially)explainmyactionwhenmybeliefistrue,we

caninfer(fromSUFFICIENCY)thatthatsetofpartialexplanationsmustlikewisefullyexplainmy

actionwhenmybeliefistrue.

Now recall the first observation: had my belief been false there would have been a full

explanation of my action that included the fact that I believed that my friend had won an

awardbutnotthe(false)propositionthatshehadwonanaward.Butgiventhatthesamefull

explanationisavailablewhethermybeliefistrueorfalse,thatmustmeanthatevenwhenmy

beliefistrue,thereisafullexplanationofmyactionthatincludesthefactthatIbelievedthat

myfriendhadwonanawardbutnotthefactthatshehadwonanaward.

ran.This,however,wouldnotstopthemfromagreeingwiththeclaimthatthesamefullexplanationofSally’sactionisavailablewhetherherbelief istrueorfalse(indeed,thedesiretoagreewithWilliams’claimisapartofwhatpersuadesDancytoadoptnon-factivism).25In particular: those whom I call ‘exclusive disjunctivists’ (e.g. Collins 1997; Stoutland 1998) rejectENDURANCE,whereasthosewhomIcall ‘supplementarists’(possiblyAlvarez2010)rejectSUFFICIENCY.SeetheAppendixto§(X)forfurtherdiscussion.

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Formally:

TheArgumentFromFalseBelief

Premise1a If,ceterisparibus,myfriendhadnotwonanaward(butIstillbelievedthat she had), then (i) the fact that I believed that she hadwon anawardwouldhavepartiallyexplainedwhyIcongratulatedher;and(ii)the fact that she had not won an award would not have partiallyexplainedwhyIcongratulatedher.

FACTIVITY Foranypropositionspandq,ifppartiallyexplainsthefactthatqthenpisthecase.

ENDURANCE For any propositionsp, qand r, the following holds: Suppose thatqpartiallyexplainsthefactthatrwhenitisnotthecasethatp.Supposefurtherthatneitherpnornotpispartofthesameexplanationofrasq. Then, if, ceteris paribus, it were the case that p, q would stillpartiallyexplainthefactthatr.

SUFFICIENCY Foranypropositionq,andanyset,Δ, ifΔ isa fullexplanationof thefact thatq in somecircumstance, then, inanycircumstance inwhichall theelementsofΔpartiallyexplain the fact thatq,Δ fullyexplainsthefactthatq.

Conclusion1a There is a full explanation of why I congratulated my friend thatincludes the fact that I believed that shehadwonan awardbut notthefactthatshehadwonanaward.

Theconclusionof theargument from falsebeliefprovides the firstpartof theargument for

Premise1. The argument from impotent facts, which is the subject of the next section,

providesthesecondpartofthatargument.

3 TheArgumentfromImpotentFacts

Theargumentfromimpotentfacts is,mercifully,simpler. It is, insomesense,summarised in

thefollowingremark:

Whenevertheagentactsinlightofthefactthatp[i.e.becausep],theagentmusttakeitthatp, and I understand this sort of ‘taking it that’ as aweak formof belief… The psychologisedexplanationoftheactionistobeunderstoodasthesameexplanationasthenon-psychologisedone.(Dancy2000,126)

Dancymakes twokeyobservations: the first is that if theagent loses theirbelief thatp, the

possibilityofexplainingintermsofthefactthatpdisappears.Thesecondisthatthefactthatp

isnotpartofa(genuinely)differentexplanationoftheagent’sactionfromthefactthatthey

believedthatp.

TheargumentfromimpotentfactsshowshowDancy’sfirstobservation,togetherwithanother

generalprincipleofexplanation,entailshissecond.Appliedtothecaseofmyfriend’saward,it

runs as follows: the fact thatmy friendhadwon an awardwould not have explainedwhy I

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congratulatedherifIhadn’tbelievedthatshehadwonanaward(because, interalia,Iwould

nothavecongratulatedher).Thatbeingso,theexplanatorypowerofthefactthatmyfriend

hadwonanawarddependsonmybelievingthatshehad.Butonepropositioncannotbepart

of a genuinely different explanation from another if the explanatory power of the former

dependsonthetruthofthelatter.Therefore:

Conclusion1b The fact that my friend won an award is not part of a genuinelydifferent explanationofwhy I congratulatedher from the fact that Ibelievedthatshehadwonanaward.

Thefollowingsectionssetoutthisargumentinmoredetail.

3.1 Impotence

IfIhadn’tbelievedthatmyfriendhadwonanawardIwouldnothavecongratulatedher(I’m

notasarcasticsort26).So,intheeventthatmyfriendhadwonanawardandIhadnotbelieved

that she had, the fact that my friend had won an award would not explain why I had

congratulatedher.Thus:

Premise1b If,ceterisparibus,Ihadnotbelievedthatmyfriendhadwonanaward(thoughshehad27)thenthefactthatshehadwonanawardwouldnothavepartiallyexplainedwhyIcongratulatedher.

Thiscaseisclear:hadInotbelievedthatmyfriendhadwonanawardthenthefactthatshe

hadwonanawardwouldnothaveexplainedwhyIcongratulatedherbecauseIwouldn’thave

congratulatedher.However,evenifIhadcongratulatedher,itwouldnothavebeenbecause

shewonanaward (absentsomeweirdcircumstances).For instance, suppose that Ibelieved

thatshehadjustgotanewjob,Imighthavestillcongratulatedherthen,butevensoitwould

bewrongtosaythatIcongratulatedherbecauseshehadwonanaward.

Thepointisthat,intheabsenceofanyweirdness28,somethingthatonewouldordinarilytake

tomakeone’sactionworthdoingcouldnotexplainwhyonedid itunlessonebelievedit.As

othersnote:

26And, ex hypothesi, I didn’t take anything else tomake congratulating her, in some respect, worthdoing.27Thisremarkisparentheticalbecauseitisalreadyimpliedbytheceterisparibuscondition.28Hornsbygivesthefollowingexampleofsuchweirdness:‘ConsiderGeorgewhoisquiteignorantoftheconditionoftheice…ItmightbethatGeorgeissociable,andskatesattheedgebecausethatiswheretheotherskatersare;anditmightthenbetruethatheskatesattheedgebecausetheiceinthemiddleisthin(thereisatwo-stepexplanationofGeorgesskatingtherewhichadducesthethinnessoftheice).’(Hornsby 2007, 296) The point is that I’m not saying that a fact cannever explain an agent’s actionunlesstheagentbelievesit.WhatIamestablishingisthatineitheroftheexamplesgiven(andwearekept‘in’thoseexamplesbytheceterisparibusclauses)–itdoesnotexplainmyactionunlessIbelieveit.

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Afactcannotbeareasonthatexplainsone’sactionunlessthepersonisawareof it.(Alvarez2016a,30)

IfIactinthelightofthefactthatIammarried[i.e.becauseIammarried],ImustbelievethatIam.(Dancy2000,126)

So, the explanatory power of that which an agent believes typically depends upon their

believingit.

3.2 TheDifferencePrinciple

When is one proposition part of a genuinely different explanation fromanother? Recall the

caseof overexplanation considered in §(VII)4.3:we said that the fact that swimmingwould

improvemymoodandthefactthatswimmingwouldhelpmesleepbetterwereeachpartsof

genuinely different explanations of why swimming was, in some respect, worth doing. In

contrast,we said that the fact that Joanne’s roof leaks and the fact that it rained last night

werenotpartsofgenuinelydifferentexplanations.

Whydidwe reach these conclusions? Itwas because even if it stoppedbeing the case that

swimming would help me sleep better, the fact that it would improve my mood would

continue to explain why swimming was, in some respect, worth doing; and vice versa. In

contrast, if Joanne’s roof didn’t leak, then, ceteris paribus, the fact that it rained last night

wouldnotexplainwhyhercarpet iswet. Itwasbecauseof thisdifferencebetween the two

examples that we said the former involved genuinely different explanations, whereas the

latterdidnot.

Thepoint,Isuggest,isthis:apropositionisseeminglypartofagenuinelydifferentexplanation

fromsomeotherpropositiononlyifitsexplanatorypowerdoesnotdependonthetruthofthe

latter.Sothefactthatitrainedlastnightisnotpartofagenuinelydifferentexplanationofwhy

thecarpet iswetfromthefactthattheroof leaksbecause,ceterisparibus, if theroofdidn’t

leak then the fact that it rained lastnightwould stopexplainingwhy the carpetwaswet (it

wouldn’tbewetanymore).29Thus:

DIFFERENCE For any propositions p, q and r, p is part of a genuinely differentexplanationofthefactthatrfromqonlyif,ceterisparibus,hadpbeenthecaseandqnotbeenthecase,pwouldstillpartiallyexplainthefactthatr.

29Cf. ‘If the rationalizing explanation is dependenton thephysiological explanation in an appropriatesense(e.g.,bybeingreducibletoit),thenintruththereisonlyoneexplanationhere.’(Kim1989,80)

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The difference principle connects the property of being part of a genuinely different

explanationfromsomeotherpropositionwiththepropertyofbeinglogically independentof

thatotherthatproposition.30

3.3 Concludingtheargumentfromimpotentfacts

Here,then, iswhat Ihavecalled ‘theargumentfromimpotentfacts’: thefactthatmyfriend

hadwonanawardwouldnothaveexplainedwhyIcongratulatedherifIhadn’tbelievedthat

she had. That being so, since some proposition is part of a genuinely different explanation

fromsomeotheronlyifitsexplanatorypowerdoesnotdependonthetruthofthelatter,the

fact thatmy friendwon an award is not part of a genuinely different explanation of why I

congratulatedherfromthefactIbelievedthatshehadwonanaward.

Formally:

TheArgumentfromImpotentFacts

Premise1b If,ceterisparibus,Ihadnotbelievedthatmyfriendhadwonanaward(thoughshehad)thenthefactthatshehadwonanawardwouldnothavepartiallyexplainedwhyIcongratulatedher.

DIFFERENCE For any propositions p, q and r, p is part of a genuinely differentexplanationofthefactthatrfromqonlyif,ceterisparibus,hadpbeenthecaseandqnotbeenthecase,pwouldstillpartiallyexplainthefactthatr.

Conclusion1b The fact that my friend won an award is not part of a genuinelydifferent explanationofwhy I congratulatedher from the fact that Ibelievedthatshehadwonanaward.

4 TheargumentforPremise1

I said that Premise1 can be inferred from the conclusion of the argument from false belief

togetherwiththeconclusionoftheargumentfromimpotentfacts,here’show:Theargument

fromfalsebelieftellsusthatthereisafullexplanation,callit‘Δ*’,ofwhyIcongratulatedmy

friendthat includesthefactthat Ibelievedthatshehadwonanawardbutnotthefactthat

shehadwonanaward.Theargumentfromimpotentfactstellsusthatthefactthatmyfriend

wonanawardisnotpartofagenuinelydifferentexplanationofwhyIcongratulatedherfrom

thefactthatIbelievedthatshehadwonanaward.31

Now,sinceΔ*isafullexplanationofwhyIcongratulatedmyfriendthatincludesthefactthatI

believedthatshehadwonanaward, theargumentfromimpotent factsmeansthatthefact

30IntheAppendixto§(X)InotethatthosewhomIcall‘inclusivedisjunctivists’rejectthisprinciple.31Thismeans that, forany fullexplanation,Δ,ofwhy I congratulatedmy friend that includes the factthat I believed thatmy friend hadwon an award, there is no full explanation that is both genuinelydifferentfromΔandincludesthefactthatmyfriendwonanaward.

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thatmy friend won an award cannot be part of an explanation of why I congratulatedmy

friendthat isgenuinelydifferent fromΔ*.Therefore, there isa fullexplanation,Δ*,ofwhy I

congratulatedmyfriendsuchthatthefactthatmyfriendwonanawardisneitherapartofΔ*

norisitpartofafullexplanationthatisgenuinelydifferentfromΔ*.

Formally:

Conclusion1a There is a full explanation of why I congratulated my friend thatincludes the fact that I believed that shehadwonan awardbut notthefactthatshehadwonanaward.

Conclusion1b The fact that my friend won an award is not part of a genuinelydifferent explanationofwhy I congratulatedher from the fact that Ibelievedthatshehadwonanaward.

Premise1 ThereisafullexplanationofwhyIcongratulatedmyfriendsuchthatthe fact that she had won an award is neither a part of that fullexplanationnorisitpartofagenuinelydifferentexplanation.

TheformalargumentforPremise1issetoutinfullintheAppendixtothischapter.

5 TheExclusionPrinciple

Premise1 isthefirstpremiseofTheExplanatoryExclusionProblem.Thesecondpremise isa

finalprincipleofexplanation:theexclusionprinciple.Theexclusionprinciplesaysthatifsome

proposition is not part of a full explanation of some explanandum, and is not part of a

genuinely different explanation of that explanandum then it does not explain that

explanandum. In this section I set out the argument for the exclusion principle and, as an

aside,discussitsrelationtoKim’swell-knownprincipleofcausalexclusion.

5.1 Theargumentfortheexclusionprinciple

The reasoningbehind theexclusionprinciple is straightforward: if you say that youcan fully

explain some explanandum without mentioning p, then p can’t just be added to that full

explanation (because it would be superfluous – and MINIMALITY precludes superfluous

explanans),sopandthatfullexplanationcan’ttogetherbepartofthesamefullexplanation.

Moreover,ifp isalsonotpartofagenuinelydifferentfullexplanation,thenwearedrawnto

theconclusion that,by the lawofexcludedmiddle,p isnotapartofany fullexplanationof

thatexplanandum(sinceitisn’tpartofthesamefullexplanationandisn’tpartofagenuinely

different explanation). But if it isn’t part of any full explanation, then it isn’t a partial

explanation–whichmeans,asIsetoutinthepreviouschapter,itdoesnotexplain.

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Thus, if there isa fullexplanationof someexplanandum thatdoes includesome fact then if

that fact is not part of a genuinely different explanation of that explanandum, it does not

explainit.Or,inotherwords:

EXCLUSION For any propositions,pandq, if there is a full explanation ofwhyqsuchthatp isneitherapartofthatfullexplanationnor is itpartofagenuinelydifferentexplanation,thenpdoesnotpartiallyexplainq.

ThisisthesecondpremiseofTheExplanatoryExclusionProblem.

5.2 Theexclusionprincipleandtheprincipleofcausalexclusion

As an aside, before we conclude, it is worth noting that the exclusion principle is a close

relation of a principle that is central to the exclusion problem inmental causation, namely,

Kim’sprincipleofcausalexclusion:

Ifaneventehasasufficientcausecatt,noeventattdistinctfromccanbeacauseofe(unlessthisisagenuinecaseofcausaloverdetermination).(Kim2008,17)

ThereareseveralsimilaritiesbetweenKim’sprincipleandmine.32However,despitemyuseof

the‘exclusionprinciple’label,therearealsosomesignificantdifferences.

OnedifferencethatisparticularlyworthstressingisthatwhileKim’sprincipleisrestrictedonly

totheconsideration(orexclusion)ofsimultaneousevents,thereisnoanalogousrestrictionin

myexclusionprinciple.Thisdifference isparticularlyworthstressingbecause it is thereason

why my argument against the exclusion principle (see §(XI)) does not also apply to Kim’s

principleofcausalexclusion.

32 In particular, much of the conceptual apparatus of Kim’s principle of causal exclusion has anexplanatory analogue in the conceptual apparatus I have used. For instance, Kim’s (1993, 280)distinction between partial and sufficient causes, is, I suggest, the causal analogue ofmy distinctionbetweenpartialandfullexplanation.ItisthuspossibletotransposeKim’sprincipleintoanexplanatoryanalogueofit,usingthestructuralprinciplesofexplanationIhaveassumed(itisperhapsworthnotingherethatKim(1988,233)originallyformulatedhisprincipleastheprincipleofexplanatoryexclusion).Doingsorevealsboththerespectsinwhichmyexclusionprincipleissimilartohis,andthoseinwhichitisnot.

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6 TheExplanatoryExclusionProblemfor(R1)

Here, then, is the argument of The Explanatory Exclusion Problem against the claim that I

congratulatedmyfriendbecauseshewonanaward(i.e.against(R1)):

TheExplanatoryExclusionProblemfor(R1)

Premise1 ThereisafullexplanationofwhyIcongratulatedmyfriendsuchthatthe fact that she had won an award is neither a part of that fullexplanationnorisitpartofagenuinelydifferentexplanation.

EXCLUSION For any propositions,pandq, if there is a full explanation ofwhyqsuchthatp isneitherapartofthatfullexplanationnor is itpartofagenuinelydifferentexplanation,thenpdoesnotpartiallyexplainq.

Conclusion1 The fact that my friend had won an award does not explain why Icongratulatedher.

7 Conclusion

Ihavedemonstratedhowtwoseemingly trivialclaimsaboutwhatexplainsanagent’saction

whentheyactinerrorandinignorance,togetherwithfiveplausibleprinciplesofexplanation

can lead to the somewhat counterintuitive conclusion that I did not congratulatemy friend

becauseshehadwonanaward,butonlybecauseIthoughtshedid.

Indeed, as is presumably clear, this result should generalise beyond this example – The

ExplanatoryExclusionProblemisaproblemforanyonewhothinksthatfactsaboutthingsthat

areexternaltoourmindscanexplainwhywedothethingsthatwedo.So,forinstance,ifthe

Problemistobebelievedthenonenevertakesone’sumbrellabecauseit israining,butonly

becauseonebelievesthatit israining.Similarly,oneneverwaitstocrosstheroadbecausea

cariscoming,butonlybecauseonethinksacariscoming.

ThestandardresponsetoTheExplanatoryExclusionProblemistoaccepttheconclusionandto

insistthatwhenIsaythatIcongratulatedmyfriendbecauseshewonanaward,thepurported

explanansofthatexpression(thefactthatmyfriendhadwonanaward)ismerelyellipticalfor

therealexplanans,whichitconversationallyimplies(thatIkneworbelievedthathadshewon

anaward).Iwilldealwiththisresponse,andothercommonresponsesin§(X).Beforethen,in

thenextchapter,IwanttoshowhowTheExplanatoryExclusionProblemcanbeusedtocreate

furtherproblemsforexplanatoryrationalism.

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Appendix

A.1 TheargumentforPremise1

Forreference,hereistheargumentforPremise1,infull:

Premise1a If,ceterisparibus,myfriendhadnotwonanaward(butIstillbelievedthat she had), then (i) the fact that I believed that she hadwon anawardwouldhavepartiallyexplainedwhyIcongratulatedher;and(ii)the fact that she had not won an award would not have partiallyexplainedwhyIcongratulatedher.

FACTIVITY Foranypropositionspandq,ifppartiallyexplainsthefactthatqthenpisthecase.

ENDURANCE For any propositionsp, qand r, the following holds: Suppose thatqpartiallyexplainsthefactthatrwhenitisnotthecasethatp.Supposefurtherthatneitherpnornotpispartofthesameexplanationofrasq. Then, if, ceteris paribus, it were the case that p, q would stillpartiallyexplainthefactthatr.

SUFFICIENCY Foranypropositionq,andanyset,Δ, ifΔ isa fullexplanationof thefact thatq in somecircumstance, then, inanycircumstance inwhichall theelementsofΔpartiallyexplain the fact thatq,Δ fullyexplainsthefactthatq.

Premise1b If,ceterisparibus,Ihadnotbelievedthatmyfriendhadwonanaward(thoughshehad)thenthefactthatshehadwonanawardwouldnothavepartiallyexplainedwhyIcongratulatedher.

DIFFERENCE For any propositions p, q and r, p is part of a genuinely differentexplanationofthefactthatrfromqonlyif,ceterisparibus,hadpbeenthecaseandqnotbeenthecase,pwouldstillpartiallyexplainthefactthatr.

Premise1 ThereisafullexplanationofwhyIcongratulatedmyfriendsuchthatthe fact that she had won an award is neither a part of that fullexplanationnorisitpartofagenuinelydifferentexplanation.

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(IX)

OtherUsesforTheExplanatoryExclusionProblem

InwhichIshowhowTheExplanatoryExclusionProblemcanbeusedtoarriveatsomeotherconclusionsthatareinconvenientforexplanatoryrationalism.Isetout the general form of the Problem, followed by the general form of theargumentforthefirstpremiseoftheProblem.IshowtheProblemcanbeusedtoargue that the fact that I read thatmy friendhadwonanawarddoesnotexplainwhyIcongratulatedher,andthatneitherthatfact,northefactthatshehad won an award, can explain why it was pro tanto rational for me tocongratulateher.

Recall that in §(VI), I said that if explanatory rationalism is to be consistentwith theprima

faciereasonableclaimssetoutin§§(II)-(IV),thefollowingmustbetrue:

(R1) Icongratulatedmyfriendbecauseshehadwonanaward.

(R2) IcongratulatedmyfriendbecauseIreadthatshehadwonanaward

(R3) Itwaspro tanto rational forme to congratulatemy friend because she hadwonanaward.

(R4) ItwasprotantorationalformetocongratulatemyfriendbecauseIreadthatshehadwonanaward.

In the previous chapter I showed how The Explanatory Exclusion Problem provides an

argumentagainst(R1).ThepurposeofthischapteristoshowthatTheExplanatoryExclusion

Problem also provides an argument against (R2), (R3) and (R4), by using it to reach the

followingconclusions:

Conclusion2 ThefactthatIreadthatmyfriendhadwonanawarddoesnotexplainwhyIcongratulatedher.

Conclusion3 Thefactthatmyfriendwonanawarddoesnotexplainwhyitwasprotantorationalformetocongratulateher.

Conclusion4 ThefactthatIreadthatmyfriendhadwonanawarddoesnotexplainwhyitwasprotantorationalformetocongratulateher.

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1 ThegeneralformofTheExplanatoryExclusionProblem

ThegeneralformofTheExplanatoryExclusionProblemfortheclaimthatsomeproposition,x,

explainssomeproposition,z,isasfollows:

ThegeneralformofTheExplanatoryExclusionProblem

Premise# Thereisafullexplanationofwhyzsuchthatxisneitherapartofthatfullexplanationnorisitpartofagenuinelydifferentexplanation.

EXCLUSION For any propositions,pandq, if there is a full explanation ofwhyqsuchthatp isneitherapartofthatfullexplanationnor is itpartofagenuinelydifferentexplanation,thenpdoesnotpartiallyexplainq.

Conclusion# xdoesnotexplainwhyz.

TheExplanatoryExclusionProblemcanthusprovidetheargumentforConclusions2,3,and4,

ifweprovidetheappropriatespecificationof‘Premise#’.Howdowedoso?

1.1 ThegeneralformoftheargumentforPremise#

IntheargumentforPremise1ofthepreviouschapter,theonlypremisesthatwerespecificto

theexampleconsideredwerethese:

Premise1a If,ceterisparibus,myfriendhadnotwonanaward(butIstillbelievedthat she had), then (i) the fact that I believed that she hadwon anawardwouldhavepartiallyexplainedwhyIcongratulatedher;and(ii)the fact that she had not won an award would not have partiallyexplainedwhyIcongratulatedher.

Premise1b If,ceterisparibus,Ihadnotbelievedthatmyfriendhadwonanaward(thoughshehad)thenthefactthatshehadwonanawardwouldnothavepartiallyexplainedwhyIcongratulatedher.

Thegeneralformofthesepremisesis,fortheparticularpropositionsx,yandz,asfollows:

Premise#a If,ceterisparibus,xhadnotbeenthecase(butystillhad)then(i)thefactthatywouldhavepartiallyexplainedwhyz;and(ii)thefactthatnotxwouldnothavepartiallyexplainedwhyz.

Premise#b If, ceteris paribus,yhadnot been the case (but x still had) then thefactthatxwouldnothavepartiallyexplainedwhyz.

AlloftheotherpremisesintheargumentforPremise1were,youwillrecall,generalprinciples

ofexplanation.Asaresult,ifPremise#aandPremise#baretrueofx,yandz,thenPremise#

istrueofthemtoo(givenFACTIVITY,SUFFICIENCY,ENDURANCEandDIFFERENCE);andifPremise# is

trueofthemthenTheExplanatoryExclusionProblemimpliesthatxdoesnotexplainz.So,to

arrive at Conclusions 2, 3, and 4 we need only show that the appropriate specifications of

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Premise #a and Premise #b are true of those cases. I consider the argument for each

conclusioninturn.

2 TheExplanatoryExclusionProblemfor(R2)

Doesthefactthat I readthatmyfriendhadwonanawardexplainwhy Icongratulatedher?

The Explanatory Exclusion Problem for (R2) concludes that it does not. To reach that

conclusionweneedtoestablishthefollowing:

Premise2 ThereisafullexplanationofwhyIcongratulatedmyfriendsuchthatthefactthatIreadthatmyfriendhadwonanawardisneitherapartof that full explanation nor is it part of a genuinely differentexplanation.

Now, as discussed, in order to arrive at Premise2 we need only demonstrate that the

appropriatespecificationsofPremise#aandPremise#baretrue.That is thepurposeof the

followingsections.

2.1 TheargumentforPremise2a

Firstly, suppose that, ceteris paribus, I hadn’t read that she had won an award, but I still

believed that she had –maybe I saw her win it, or heard about it from another friend, or

maybe (incredibly) I acquired the belief as the result of a brain aneurism. In such a

circumstance,wouldIstillhavecongratulatedher?OfcourseIwould!Ithoughtthatshe’dan

award!And,Isubmit,IwouldhavecongratulatedherbecauseIbelievedthatshehadwonan

award.

Moreover, continuing to suppose that, ceteris paribus, I hadn’t read that she had won an

award(butnonethelessbelievedthatshehad),wouldthefactthatIhadn’treadthatshehad

won an award explainwhy I congratulated her? Surely not!Whywould it? This is a prosaic

case,notaweirdone.

Thus,combiningthesetwoinsights,wearriveatthefollowingspecificationofPremise#a:

Premise2a If,ceterisparibus,Ihadnotreadthatmyfriendhadwonanaward(butI still believed that shehad) then (i) the fact that Ibelieved that shehadwonanawardwouldhavepartiallyexplainedwhyIcongratulatedher; and (ii) the fact that I hadnot read that shehadwonanawardwouldnothavepartiallyexplainedwhyIcongratulatedher.

2.2 TheargumentforPremise2b

Nowconsider:if,ceterisparibus,IhadnotbelievedthatshehadwonanawardeventhoughI’d

read that she had in the newspaper (perhaps I’m sceptical of the mainstream media, or

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jealousymakesmewithhold),wouldIhavecongratulatedher?OfcourseIwouldn’t:aswe’ve

alreadyestablished.Ididn’tthinkthatshe’dwonanaward,soitwouldhavebeenoddofme

tocongratulateher (again, Ididn’t seeanythingelseofworth incongratulatingher,and I’m

notasarcasticsort).

But if Iwouldn’t have congratulated her then the fact that I had read that she hadwon an

award wouldn’t have explained why I congratulated her (since I wouldn’t have, and

explanandamustbethecase).Thus:

Premise2b If,ceterisparibus,Ihadnotbelievedthatmyfriendhadwonanaward(althoughIhadreadthatshehadwonanaward)thenthefactthat Ihad read that she had won an award would not have partiallyexplainedwhyIcongratulatedher(sinceIwouldn’thave).

2.3 TheargumentforPremise2

To run through theargument, for clarity:weknow, fromcondition (i)ofPremise2a, that if,

ceterisparibus,Ihadnotreadthatmyfriendhadwonanaward(buthadstillbelievedthatshe

had won an award) then there would have been a full explanation, call it ∆*, of why I

congratulated her that would have included the fact that I believed that she had won an

award.And,fromFACTIVITY,weknowthathadInotreadthatshehadwonanaward,the(false)

propositionthatIreadthatshehadwonanawardcouldnothavebeenapartof∆*.

Wealsoknow,fromcondition(ii)ofPremise2a,thatthefactthat Ididn’t readthatshehad

wonanawardwouldnothavebeenapartof∆*.So,since(hadInotreadthatshehadwonan

award) neither the (false) proposition that I read that she hadwon an awardnor its (true)

negationwouldhavebeenelementsof∆*,weknow,fromENDURANCE,thatalltheelementsin

∆*mustalsohaveexplainedwhyIcongratulatedmyfriendinthecaseinwhichIdidreadthat

shehadwonanaward.So,fromSUFFICIENCY,weknowthat∆*islikewiseafullexplanationof

whyIcongratulatedherwhenIdidreadthatshehadwonanaward.

Now,fromPremise2b,weknowthat if,ceterisparibus, Ihadn’tbelievedthatmyfriendhad

won an award then the fact that I had read that she had won an award would not have

explainedwhyIcongratulatedher(sinceIwouldn’thave).So,fromDIFFERENCE,weknowthat

the fact that I read that she had won an award cannot be part of a genuinely different

explanation of why I congratulated her from the fact that I believed that she had won an

award.Andsince∆* includes the fact that Ibelieved that shewonanaward, the fact that I

readthatshehadwonanawardcannotbepartofanexplanationofwhyIcongratulatedher

thatisgenuinelydifferentfrom∆*.Therefore:

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Premise2 ThereisafullexplanationofwhyIcongratulatedmyfriendsuchthatthefactthatIreadthatmyfriendhadwonanawardisneitherapartof that full explanation nor is it part of a genuinely differentexplanation.

2.4 TheExplanatoryExclusionProblemfor(R2)

So,theProblemfor(R2)isasfollows:

TheExplanatoryExclusionProblemfor(R2)

Premise2 ThereisafullexplanationofwhyIcongratulatedmyfriendsuchthatthefactthatIreadthatmyfriendhadwonanawardisneitherapartof that full explanation nor is it part of a genuinely differentexplanation.

EXCLUSION For any propositions,pandq, if there is a full explanation ofwhyqsuchthatp isneitherapartofthatfullexplanationnor is itpartofagenuinelydifferentexplanation,thenpdoesnotpartiallyexplainq.

Conclusion2 ThefactthatIreadthatmyfriendhadwonanawarddoesnotexplainwhyIcongratulatedher.

3 TheExplanatoryExclusionProblemfor(R3)

Does the fact thatmy friendwonan awardexplainwhy itwaspro tanto rational forme to

congratulateher?TheExplanatoryExclusionProblem for (R3) concludes that itdoesnot. To

reachthatconclusionweneedtoestablishthefollowing:

Premise3 There isa fullexplanationofwhy itwaspro tanto rational formetocongratulatemy friend such that the fact that shewon an award isneither a part of that full explanation nor is it part of a genuinelydifferentexplanation.

Inthefollowingsections IwilldemonstratethattheappropriatespecificationsofPremise#a

andPremise#baretrue.

3.1 TheargumentforPremise3a

If,ceterisparibus,myfriendhadnotwonanaward,butIstillbelievedthatshehad,wouldit

stillhavebeenpro tanto rational forme tocongratulateher? I suggest that itwould: inany

normalcircumstancesifyouthinkthatyourfriendhaswonanawardtherationalthingtodois

tocongratulateher–ifyoudidn’tthenyouwouldbeactingirrationally(unless,say,youwere

veryjealous,orknewthatshedoesn’tliketobecongratulated–butthat’snotmyexample).

Whydoesn’tthefalsityofmybeliefseemtomatter?Itisbecause,asWedgwoodnotes:

Whenweassessachoiceordecisionasrationalorirrational,weareassessingitonthebasisofitsrelationtotheagent’sbeliefs,desires,andothersuchmentalstates–notonthebasisofitsrelationtofactsabouttheexternalworldthatcouldvarywhilethosementalstatesremainedunchanged.(Wedgwood2002,350)

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Forinstance,wealreadyacknowledged(see§(II)1.1)thatitwasrationalforSallytorungiven

thatshebelievedthatabearwaschasingher1;furthermore,itwasrationalinspiteofthefact

thatnobearwaschasingher.Whatmatterstotheprotantorationalityofanactionis,asI’ve

suggested,thattheagenttakestheretobesomethingofworthindoingit–notthatitactually

is,insomerespect,worthdoing.

So,if,ceterisparibus,myfriendhadnotwonanaward,butIstillbelievedthatshehad,thenit

wouldhavebeenprotantorationalformetocongratulateher,andthatwouldhavebeen,in

part,becauseIbelievedthatshehadwonanaward.

Moreover, in this counterfactual case, the fact thatmy friendhadnotwonanawardwould

clearlynothaveexplainedwhyitwasprotantorationalformetocongratulateher.Again,the

caseis,exhypothesi,prosaicandnotweird.Thus:

Premise3a If,ceterisparibus,myfriendhadnotwonanaward(butIstillbelievedthat she had), then (i) the fact that I believed that she hadwon anawardwouldhavepartiallyexplainedwhyitwasprotantorationalformetocongratulateher;and(ii)thefactthatshedidnotwinanawardwould not have partially explainedwhy itwaspro tanto rational formetocongratulateher.

3.2 TheargumentforPremise3b

Nowconsider: if,ceterisparibus, Ihadnotbelievedthatshehadwonanawardeventhough

shehad,would itstillhavebeenprotantorational formetocongratulateher?Perhapsyou

thinkthattheanswerdependsonwhetherornotitwasrationalformenottobelievethatshe

hadwonanaward?Iwillreturntothequestionofwhetherornotthatmatters in§4.1,but

suppose,fornow,thatitwas.

IfIdidn’tbelievethatshehadwonanawardanddidn’ttakecongratulatinghertobe,inany

other respect,worth doing, then itwould not have been evenpro tanto rational forme to

congratulateher.Norational(non-sarcastic)person,withsuchbeliefsanddesires(etc.)would

congratulatetheirfriend.Thus:

Premise3b If,ceterisparibus,Ihadnotbelievedthatmyfriendhadwonanaward(thoughshehad)thenthefactthatshehadwonanawardwouldnothave partially explained why it was pro tanto rational for me tocongratulateher(sinceitwouldn’thavebeenprotantorationalformetocongratulateher).

1Ifyouareconcernedaboutwhetherornotherbeliefisrationalinthefirstplace,pleaseforestallthoseconcernsuntil§4.1.

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3.3 TheExplanatoryExclusionProblemfor(R3)

Trusting that the reasoning isnow familiar, Iwill spare the readerademonstrationofhow I

thinkwecanarriveatPremise3fromPremise3aandPremise3b.So,theProblemfor(R3)is

asfollows:

TheExplanatoryExclusionProblemfor(R3)

Premise3 There isa fullexplanationofwhy itwaspro tanto rational formetocongratulatemy friend such that the fact that shewon an award isneither a part of that full explanation nor is it part of a genuinelydifferentexplanation.

EXCLUSION For any propositions,pandq, if there is a full explanation ofwhyqsuchthatp isneitherapartofthatfullexplanationnor is itpartofagenuinelydifferentexplanation,thenpdoesnotpartiallyexplainq.

Conclusion3 Thefactthatmyfriendwonanawarddoesnotexplainwhyitwasprotantorationalformetocongratulateher.

4 TheExplanatoryExclusionProblemfor(R4)

Finally:doesthe fact that I readthatmyfriendhadwonanaward in thenewspaperexplain

whyitwasprotantorationalformetocongratulateher?TheExplanatoryExclusionProblem

for(R4)saysitdoesnot.Thisiswhatweneedtoshowtogetthere:

Premise4 There isa fullexplanationofwhy itwaspro tanto rational formetocongratulatemyfriendsuchthatthefactthatIreadthatshehadwonan award is neither a part of that full explanation nor is it part of agenuinelydifferentexplanation.

4.1 TheargumentforPremise4a

Suppose, as we did in §2.1, that ceteris paribus, I hadn’t read that my friend had won an

award,butIstillbelievedthatshe’dwonanaward.IfIhadn’treadthatshe’dwonanaward,

but,say,I’dseenherwinit,woulditstillhavebeenprotantorationalformetocongratulate

her?Ofcourseitwould.Likewise,ifI’dheardaboutherawardfroma(reliable)frienditwould

havebeenprotantorationalformetocongratulateher.ButwhatifIacquiredthebeliefasthe

result of brain aneurism?Would it still havebeenpro tanto rational forme to congratulate

her?Somethinkitwouldnot,forinstance:

Ifanagenthasirrationalbeliefs,thosebeliefsarenotabletomakerationalanyactionsdoneintheirlight.(Dancy2000,60)

ItwouldnotberationalforHollytoputonwinterclothesifherbeliefthatit issnowingweredue to crazed conviction, say, or wishful thinking. Irrationality cannot beget rationality! Asubject’s beliefs contribute tomaking it rational for her to act in certain ways only if thosebeliefsarethemselvesrational.(Whiting2014,4)

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If this is so, then it seems that the way that one acquires one’s beliefs is relevant to the

rationality of one’s actions; that is, we cannot so easily omit mention of them in the

explanationofwhyitisrationalforanagenttodosomeaction.

Insomerespect,Idisagree–Ithinkthatanirrationalbeliefcannonethelessexplainwhyitwas

pro tanto rational (but probably not all things considered rational) for someone to do

something,2asdoothers.3Nonetheless,evenifirrationalbeliefscan’texplainwhyactionsare

pro tanto rational, that does not mean that the experiences or appearances on which an

agent’sbeliefsarebasedarenecessarytoafullexplanationofwhyitisprotantorationalfor

thatagenttodosomeaction;itmeansonlythatthefactthattherelevantbeliefsoftheagent

arerational4isnecessarytoafullexplanation.

So, ifceterisparibus, Ihadn’treadthatmyfriendhadwonanaward,but Istillbelievedthat

she’dwonanawardandthatbeliefwas(still)rational,wouldithavebeenprotantorational

forme to congratulatemy friend?Of course!And itwouldhavebeenpro tanto rational, in

part,becauseIbelievedthatshehadwonanaward.

Moreover, the fact that I didnot read thatmy friend hadwon an award clearlywould not

explainwhyitwouldhavebeenprotantorationalformetocongratulateher.Thus:

2Anargument to thateffect: suppose thatBernardOrtcutt, spyextraordinaire, comes tobelieve thattheFBIhasdiscoveredthatheisaspyandhassentagentstoapprehendhim.Hisbeliefiswell-founded–FBIcounter-intelligenceexiststocapturespieslikehim;anormallyregularassethasgonemissing;andhe’sbeenrepeatedlytrailedbyablacksedanthisweek.Itis,Isubmit,protantorationalforBernardtogointohiding(sinceheisapatriot(soisn’tmindedtoturn),andhasnointerestinjailtime,itislikelyalsoall things considered rational). Now considerOrnard Bertcutt: Ornard has actually lived a ratherpedestrianlifebut,throughsomefreakco-incidence(apeculiarmentaldisorder,say),hismentalstatesareall identicaltoBernard’s–heisBernard’smentalduplicate.So,Ornard,likeBernard,believesthattheFBIisouttogethim.However,Ornard’sbeliefisnotonlyfalse,itisplainlynotrational.Nonetheless,it is, I submit, at least pro tanto rational for him to go into hiding. Some resistance to this view isunderstandable:tobelievethattheFBIischasingyouiscertainlyoutlandish,andOrnardonlybelievesitbecauseheiscrazy–sosurelygoingintohidingcan’tbeevenaprotantorationalthingforhimtodo?IfOrnard goes into hiding it’s because he’s not rational, it’s not the rational thing for him to do! Theproblem,however,withsayingthatitisn’tevenprotantorationalforOrnardtogointohidingisthatweareseemingly forcedtoquestionwhetherornot it isprotantorational forBernardtogo intohiding.Why?Becauseof thewidelyheldviewthatwhat it is rational foranagent todosuperveneson theirmentalstates(e.g.Broome2013,151),whichistosaythattherecanbenochangeinwhatitisrationalfor an agent to do without a change in their mind. Now, since Bernard and Ornard are mentalduplicates,giventhatwhatitisrationalforanagenttodosupervenesontheirmentalstates,therecanbenodifferencebetweenBernardandOrnard inwhat it is rational for them todo, since there isnodifferenceintheirbrainstates.3‘Givenmyirrationalbeliefthatsmokingwillprotectmyhealth,itwouldberationalformetosmoke.Given this hermit’s irrational belief that his life of self-inflicted pain would please God, he couldrationallylivesuchalife.’(Parfit2011,114)4Whateveryourpreferredstandardofrationalityforbeliefsis.

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Premise4a If,ceterisparibus,Ihadnotreadthatmyfriendhadwonanaward(butI still believed that she had won an award) then (i) the fact that Ibelieved that she hadwon an awardwould have partially explainedwhy itwasprotanto rational formetocongratulateher;and (ii) thefact that I hadnot read that shehadwonanawardwouldnothavepartiallyexplainedwhyitwasprotantorationalformetocongratulateher.

4.2 TheargumentforPremise4b

Finally:if,ceterisparibus,IhadnotbelievedthatshehadwonanawardeventhoughI’dread

thatshehad,wouldithavebeenprotantorationalformetocongratulateher?Again,perhaps

youthinkitdependsonwhetherornotitwasrationalformenottobelievethatshehadwon

anaward.Andperhaps, further, you insist thatgiven theceterisparibus clause it can’thave

beenrational.Well,Idisagree.

Supposing that pathological jealousymakesmewithhold. The all things considered rational

thingformetodoistoceasewithholding(andperhapsseektreatment).Then,onceI’vedone

that, itwouldbepro tantorational formetocongratulatemy friend.But,giventhat Idon’t

believethatshehaswonanaward(that is,before Iceasewithholding), Isuggest, itcan’tbe

protantorationalformetocongratulateher.Iseenothingofanyworthindoingso–andnot

becauseIdon’tlikeher,ordon’tcareaboutherfeelings–butbecauseIdon’tbelievethatshe

has won an award. To insist that it is even pro tanto rational for me to congratulate her,

despitethefactthatIdon’tbelievethatshehaswonanaward,istoinsistthatitisprotanto

rationalformetodosomethingthatItaketobe,innorespect,worthdoing.Idon’tseehow

thatcouldberational.

So,giventhatitwouldn’thavebeenprotantorationalformetocongratulateher,thefactthat

Ireadthatshehadwonanawardcouldnotexplainwhyitwouldhavebeenprotantorational

formetocongratulateher.Thus:

Premise4b If,ceterisparibus,Ihadnotbelievedthatmyfriendhadwonanaward(althoughIhadreadthatshehadwonanaward)thenthefactthat Ihad read that she had won an award would not have partiallyexplainedwhy I itwaspro tanto rational forme to congratulateher(sinceitwouldn’thavebeenprotantorationalformetocongratulateher).

4.3 TheExplanatoryExclusionProblemfor(R4)

Again, I will not spell out the reasoning from Premise 4a and Premise 4b to Premise4. So,

concluding,theProblemfor(R4)is:

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TheExplanatoryExclusionProblemfor(R4)

Premise4 There isa fullexplanationofwhy itwaspro tanto rational formetocongratulatemyfriendsuchthatthefactthatIreadthatshehadwonan award is neither a part of that full explanation nor is it part of agenuinelydifferentexplanation.

EXCLUSION For any propositions,pandq, if there is a full explanation ofwhyqsuchthatp isneitherapartofthatfullexplanationnor is itpartofagenuinelydifferentexplanation,thenpdoesnotpartiallyexplainq.

Conclusion4 ThefactthatIreadthatmyfriendhadwonanawarddoesnotexplainwhyitwasprotantorationalformetocongratulateher.

5 TheArgumentfromIllusion

Many have observed 5 a similarity between the problem that I have formalised as The

ExplanatoryExclusionProblemandtheargumentfromillusionintheliteratureonperception.

Totheextent thatweconceiveof theargument from illusionasaproblemfor the ideathat

the external world could explainwhywe believewhatwe believe then the argument from

illusion can be represented as an instance of The Explanatory Exclusion Problem, briefly, as

follows.

IseeatomatosoIbelievethatthereisatomatobeforeme.Ifnotomatohadbeenbeforeme,

butitstillappearedtomeasthoughonehad,thenthefactthatitappearedtomeasthougha

tomatowere therewouldpartiallyexplainwhy Ibelieved thata tomatowas there.And the

fact that there wasn’t a tomato wouldn’t. This provides the relevant specification of

Premise#a.

Andtheniftherehadbeenatomatobutithadn’tappearedtomeasthoughtherehad(blind

spotsinmyvision,say),thenIwouldn’thavebelievedthattherewasatomato,sothefactthat

therewasatomatowouldn’thaveexplainedwhy Ibelievedthattherewas (since Iwouldn’t

havebelievedthattherewas).ThisprovidesuswiththerelevantspecificationofPremise#b.

FromthesespecificationsofPremise#aandPremise#b,togetherwiththerelevantprinciples

of explanation,we can, in amanner that should now be familiar, arrive at The Explanatory

ExclusionProblem,andtheconsequentconclusionthatthefactthatthereisatomatobefore

doesnotexplainwhyIbelievethatthereis.

However,thereareotherversionsoftheargumentfromillusionaccordingtowhichitisnota

claim about what explains an agent’s beliefs. For instance, one interpretation of it is as a

problem for the idea that veridical perceptual experience provides a basis for knowledge.5(E.g.Stout1996;Dancy2000;Hornsby2008;Hyman2011;McDowell2013)

140

When the argument from illusion is conceived in that manner, it cannot be so simply

characterised as The Explanatory Exclusion Problem. Although, I submit, the problems are

nonethelessrelated.

6 Conclusion

I have now shown how The Explanatory Exclusion Problem can provide arguments against

(R1)-(R4).

Sinceexplanatory rationalismrequires the truthof (R1)-(R4) if it is tobeconsistentwith the

primafaciereasonableclaimssetoutinearlierchapters,Iwillneedtofindsomewaytoreject

the conclusions of The Explanatory Exclusion Problem. My solution will be to reject the

exclusionprinciple,which,Iwillargue,bymeansofseveralcounterexamples,isclearlyfalse.I

willargue, interalia,thatthefactthatmyfriendwonanawardexplainswhyIcongratulated

herbecauseitexplainswhyIbelievedthatshewonanaward,andtheexclusionprinciplefails

toprovideforthetransitivityofthatsortofexplanation.

Before then, however, I wish to consider the other, more commonplace responses to The

Explanatory Exclusion Problem, andwhat iswrongwith them. That is the focus of the next

chapter.

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(X)

Hownormativereasonsdon’texplain

InwhichIrejecttwoaccountsofhownormativereasonsexplain.Ire-introducetalkofnormativereasons,definingthemasthingsthatmakeactions, insomerespect, worth doing. I ask how it is that wemanage to explain our actionswhenwesaythatweactedbecauseofanormativereasontherewastoact;forinstance:howisitthatIexplainwhyItookmyumbrellawhenIsaythatItookitbecauseitwasraining?IsuggestthatthefactthatitwasrainingexplainswhyItookmyumbrellaeither ‘elliptically’, ‘directly’or ‘indirectly’. Inote thatwhichansweroneacceptswilldependonone’sresponsetoTheExplanatoryExclusionProblem: elliptical theorists accept the conclusion of the Problem, directtheorists reject the firstpremise,and indirect theorists reject thesecond. I setouttheproblemswithellipticalanddirecttheories.

Weoftenexplainwhywedosomethingbycitingsomefactthatcountedinfavourofdoingit:I

saythatItookmyumbrellabecauseitwasraining;Marshallsaysthatheisgoingtothestation

because his daughter is on the 7 o’clock train. How are we to make sense of these

commonplaceexplanations?

IfTheExplanatoryExclusionProblemistobebelieved,weshouldnotinterpretthemliterally.

That is, thepurported explanantia (i.e. thatwhich follows the ‘because’) in such statements

arenottheactualexplanantia;thefactthatitisrainingdoesnotreallyexplainwhyItookmy

umbrella.Instead,whateverexplanatorypowerthesestatementshaveisduetotherebeinga

short-hand;when I say that I tookmy umbrella because itwas raining, the fact that itwas

rainingismerelyellipticalforwhatreallydoestheexplaining,whichisthefactthatIbelieved

thatitwasraining,orthatIknewthatitwas.

Alternatively,onecouldrejecttheconclusionofTheExplanatoryExclusionProblem,andinsist

that these remarks are literally accurate; the fact that it is raining really does explainwhy I

tookmyumbrella.Therearetwowaysofdoingthis:eitherbyrejectingthefirstpremiseofthe

Problem,orthesecond.

Theoriesthatrejectthefirstpremisesaythatthecontributionofthefactthat it israiningto

theexplanationofwhyItookmyumbrellais,insomesense,independentfrom,orinaddition

totheexplanatorycontributionofthefactthatIbelievedthatitwasraining.Theyarguethat

the fact that it is raining explainsmy actiondirectly (that is, unmediated by features ofmy

psychology).Accordingtothemostpopulartheories,thedirectexplanatoryrelationbetween

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theworldandtheactionistheresultofthespecialconnectionbetweentheworldandactions

thatknowledgeengenders.

Incontrast, theoriesthatrejectthesecondpremiseacceptthattheexplanatorycontribution

ofthefactthatitwasrainingisnotinadditiontotheexplanationthatisalreadyprovidedby,

inter alia, the fact that I believe that it was raining. Thus they deny that the fact that it is

raining directly explains why I tookmy umbrella. However, they insist, the fact that it was

rainingdoesindirectlyexplainwhyItookmyumbrella,byexplainingwhyIbelievedthatitwas

raining.

Inshort:wewanttounderstandhowitisthatImanagetoexplainmyactionwhenIsay,‘Itook

myumbrellabecause itwas raining.’ There are threepossible accounts: the fact that itwas

rainingeitherexplainsmyactionelliptically,oritexplainsitdirectly,oritexplainsitindirectly.

Inwhat follows Iwill set out the problemswithelliptical anddirect theories,which are the

typicalresponsestothisproblem.InsubsequentchaptersIwilldefendmyownindirecttheory.

Before then it will helpme better characterise what is at stake in this discussion if we re-

introducetalkof‘normativereasons’;thatisthefocusofthefirstsection.

1 Normativereasonexplanations

1.1 Normativereasons

Iwanttore-habilitatetheterm‘normativereason’,whichIabandonedin§(I).Letusdefineit

asfollows:

Definition Foranyp,pisanormativereasonforAtoφifandonlyifpmakesA’sφing,insomerespect,worthdoing.1

Afewpoints,alreadydiscussedin§(I)4,areworthstressinghere:Firstly,whilethisdefinition

iscloselyalignedtotheconventionaldefinitionofnormativereasons, itdepartsfromit inso

farasIamnotsayinganythingabouthownormativereasons,sodefined,relatetoexpressions

like‘thereasonstherearetoact’or‘thereasonsforwhichanagentacted’–formypurposes

theterm‘normativereason’isstrictlyatermofartmeaninganythingthatmakesanaction,in

somerespect,worthdoing.

Secondly,Iwillassume,toavoidambiguity,that‘countinginfavourof’and‘making, insome

respect, worth doing’ are equivalent relations. This assumption has no bearing on the

argumentofthischapter.

1Note:thisdefinitionmakesnoexplicitassumptionsabouttheontologyof‘p’.

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Finally,itisworthrecallingthatthatwhichcountsinfavourofanaction(i.e.thatwhichmakes

it,insomerespect,worthdoing),istypicallynotafeatureoftheagent’spsychology,whichis

tosaythatnormativereasonsaretypicallynotfeaturesofanagent’spsychology.

1.2 Normativereasonexplanations

In§(VII)1,Inotedthattheword‘explains’and‘explanation’havedifferentmeanings.Ifwesay

thatthefact that it rained lastnight isanexplanationofwhyJoanne’scarpet iswet,weare

givingonesenseof‘explanation’,inwhichanexplanationisanexplanans.Thisisthesenseof

‘explanation’and‘explains’thatIhavefocussedoninpreviouschapters–itisthesensethatis

involvedintheconceptsoffullandpartialexplanation.

However,Isuggestthat‘Itookmyumbrellabecauseitwasraining’isanexplanationofwhyI

tookmyumbrellaindifferentsenseoftheword–thesentenceisanelucidationofwhyItook

my umbrella, it is not the explanans of why I took it. It is in that sense of the word

‘explanation’thatIsuggestthatwecallsentencesinwhichanormativereasonforanagentto

act appears in the position of an explanans of why they acted, 2 ‘normative reason

explanations’.

It is a fact that we often give normative reason explanations of our actions. I gave a few

examplesinmyopeningremarks,herearesomemore3:Sandraisgoingtotheshopsbecause

she is out ofmilk; I’m flying to Bodrumbecause that’swheremy father lives; TheresaMay

madeadealwiththeDUPin2017becausethatwastheonlywayforhertoformamajority

government.4In all of these examples, something that made the action, in some respect,

worthdoing(forthatagent),whichistosay,anormativereasonforthemtodoit,appearsto

explaintheiraction.And,indeed,whensuchexplanationsaregiven,youunderstandwhythe

actionwasdone–soanexplanationofsomesorthascertainlybeenprovided.

2 Theoriesofnormativereasonexplanation

IntheintroductiontothischapterIaskedhowitwasthatImanagedtoexplainmywhyItook

myumbrellawhen Isaidthat I tookmyumbrellabecause itwasraining.Theremarksof the

previous section should have made clear that this is a specific instance of a more general

2Thatis,sentenceslike‘Aφ’dbecausep’or‘thefactthatpexplainswhyAφ’d’wherethefactthatpisanormativereasonforAtoφ.3 For the following examples, assume that the relevant supporting conditions (desires, evaluativejudgements,evaluativefacts…)areinplacesuchthat:thefactthatSandraisoutofmilkisanormativereasonforhertogototheshops;thefactthatmyfatherlivesinBodrumisanormativereasonformeto go there; the fact thatmaking a dealwith theDUPwas the onlyway forMay to form amajoritygovernmentwasanormativereasonforhertodoso.4Ofcourse,thepurportedexplanantiaoftheseremarksare,atbest,partialexplanations.

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question: how do we manage to explain our actions when we give a normative reason

explanation of them? Answering this question is the job of what I will call a ‘theory of

normativereasonexplanation’.

Which theoryofnormative reasonexplanationoneholdsdependsonone’s response toThe

Explanatory Exclusion Problem: thosewho accept the conclusion of the Problem insist that

when we give a normative reason explanation it is not really the normative reason that

explainsouraction.Instead,theyargue,thenormativereasonisellipticalforthatwhichreally

doestheexplaining–whichistheagent’sawarenessof,orbeliefinthenormativereason.This

istheellipticaltheoryofnormativereasonexplanation.

ThosewhorejectthefirstpremiseoftheProbleminsistthat,whenwegiveanormativereason

explanation of an agent’s action, the normative reason explains the agent’s action directly;

that is, the explanatory relations involved are unmediated by features of an agent’s

psychology.Thesearedirecttheoriesofnormativereasonexplanation.

Finally,thosewhorejectthesecondpremiseoftheProblemaccepttheprimacyoffeaturesof

theagent’spsychologyinexplainingtheiraction,butnonethelessinsistthatnormativereasons

canexplainanagent’sactionindirectly,byexplainingthosefeaturesoftheagent’spsychology

thatexplaintheiraction.Theseareindirecttheoriesofnormativereasonexplanation.

The focusof thenext twosections isoncritiquingelliptical anddirect theoriesofnormative

reasonexplanation,respectively.Subsequentchaptersaredevotedtothedefenceofmyown

indirecttheoryofnormativereasonexplanation.

3 Ellipticaltheories

Elliptical theories5accept the conclusionof TheExplanatory ExclusionProblem; they suggest

thatwhenIsaythatItookmyumbrellabecauseitwasraining,thepurportedexplanans(the

fact that itwas raining) isnot theactual explanans.Nonetheless,when I say that I tookmy

umbrellabecauseitwasraining,youunderstandwhyItookit–thatis,inspiteoftheapparent

inaccuracyofwhatIsaid,youstillunderstoodwhyItookmyumbrella.Thequestionis:how?

Howdowemanage toexplainouractions if thepurportedexplanans inanormative reason

explanationisnottheactualexplanans?

The elliptical theorist’s response, is to say that, in a normative reason explanation, the

normativereasonisellipticalfortheactualexplanans,so,forinstance,whenIsaythatItook

myumbrellabecauseitwasraining,thefactthatitwasrainingisellipticalforsomefeatureof5The name for these theorieswas inspired byMaria Alvarez’s (2010, 180) related (but not identical)discussionofwhatshecalls‘Humeanexplanations.’

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mypsychology,which iswhat reallydoes theexplaining. That is,whenwegiveanormative

reason explanation, ‘we suppose that, properly understood, it should be seen as

enthymematic, i.e. asanacceptable shorthandversionof the full explanation.’ (Dancy2000,

121)

FigureX-1:Ellipticaltheoriesofnormativereasonexplanation

Althoughtheyarerarely6explicitlyadvocated,ellipticaltheoriesprovidewhatisprobablythe

defactoaccountofhowfactsabouttheworldexplainouractions.

3.1 Ellipticalforwhat?

What feature of our psychology is it that normative reasons aremeant to be elliptical for,

whenwegiveanormativereasonexplanation?Opinionsdiverge.OneviewisthatifIsaythatI

took my umbrella because it was raining the conversational implicature7is the fact that I

believedthatitwasraining,8anotherviewisthatitisthefactthatIactedforthereasonthatit

was raining,9andanother still is that it is the fact that I knew that itwas raining.10Of these

threeviewsonlythelatterisrobusttoaparticularsortofchallengeposedbyGettiercases,11

soIwillassumethattheconversationalimplicatureofsayingthatItookmyumbrellabecause

itwasrainingisthatIknewthatitisraining.

6Sandis(2013)and, Ithink,Dancy(2014)arerareexceptions.Sandis(2012,178fn.24)alsoattributesthisviewtoMichaelSmith.7Which,recall,iswhatreallyexplainswhyItookmyumbrella.8Thisisprobablythedefactoview,and,Ithink,isexplicitlythepositionofSandis(2013).9SeeDancy(2014).10Gibbons (2010,359) comes close toadvocating this view–although I thinkhis eventualposition iscloser to the indirect theory that I advocate in §(XII), since, on the same page, hemakes clear thatnormativereasonscanexplain.11Thechallenge is this: recall, from§(IV)1.4 thatwhenEdmundhadaGettierbelief (i.e. justifiedandtruebutnotknowledgeable)thattheicewasthinwecouldnotsaythathestayedattheedgebecausetheicewasthin.However,iftheconversationalimplicatureofsaying‘Hestayedattheedgebecausetheicewasthin’ismerelythathebelievedthattheicewasthin,thenthereisnoreasonwhyweshouldnotsayit–thisisthenaproblemforellipticaltheoriesthattakethepurportedexplananstobeellipticalforthefactthattheagentbelievedit.Incontrast,iftheconversationalimplicatureisthatheknewtheicewasthin,thenweshouldnotsaythathestayedattheedgebecausetheicewasthin,sincehedidnotknowit.Dancy’s(2014)account,accordingtowhichtheconversationalimplicatureisthathestayedattheedgeforthereasonthattheicewasthincouldaccountforthefactthatwedon’tsaythathestayedattheedgebecausetheicewasthinifhewerewillingtosaythatanagentonlyactsforthereasonthatpiftheyknowit;butheisn’t,soitcan’t.

Psychological

factimplies explainsNormativereason

Action

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3.2 Theproblemswithellipticaltheories

Elliptical theories claim that normative reason explanations provide some explanation of an

agent’sactiononlybecausetheyimplythattheagentknewthatnormativereason.Critically,

ellipticaltheoristsinsist,thenormativereasondoesnoexplanatoryworkofitsown.

I raise two related concerns with this view: first, it makes normative reasons explanatorily

inert,contrarytotheprevailingviewthattheyoughttohaveexplanatorypower;andsecond,

it renders ordinary language explanations of our actions thoroughly unsuited to the task to

whichwehabituallyputthem.

Onthefirst:the‘explanatoryconstraint’,sonamedbyJonathanDancy(2000),12andtowhich

many13subscribe, says that any theory of reasons must account for someone doing some

actionbecauseofanormativereasonthatthereisforthemtodoit.Thisconstraintseemslike

a modest one: assuming that normative reasons indeed have some normative import, the

explanatory constraint requires only that normative reasons havemore than just normative

significance.AsUlrikeHeuersuccinctlyputsit,thisrequirement,‘expressesnothingmorethan

theeverydayassumption thatwe sometimes…do somethingbecause it is rightor justified.’

(Heuer 2004, 47) Indeed, onemustwonderwhat the point of normativity is if we can’t do

thingsbecausetherearesuchnormativereasonsforustodothem(whyrecommendanaction

ifthatrecommendationcan’taffectwhetherornotyoudoit?).

Theproblemforellipticaltheoriesisthattheyclearlyfailtheexplanatoryconstraint.Theyhold

thatit isneverthenormativereasonpersethatexplainstheagent’saction,butonlywhatis

impliedbyit–therebyrenderingnormativereasonsexplanatorilyinert.14

The second problem: denying that normative reasons explain our actions contradicts our

habitualpatternsofspeech.Weroutinelycitenormativereasonsbywayofexplanationofour

actions and it does quite severe disservice to our ordinary language expressions to suppose

thatwhenIsay,‘Laurathrewawaythemilkbecauseithadgoneoff’therealexplanansisnot

what I say it is15but only what is implied by it. Ordinary language may be occasionally

imprecise or misleading, but to accept such ubiquitous misrepresentation as a part of our

everydayaccountsofactionsseemstobeahighpricetopay.Ithinkwecandobetter.12Dancy’sworkis,tomyknowledge,alsothefirstappearanceofthisargument.13(e.g.Dancy2000,101;Smith2004,175;Hornsby2007,301;Raz2009,194;Hieronymi2011,415)14ThisargumentissimilartoTheRightReasonsProblem(see§(III)3.2).However,whilethatargumentrequired that an agent should be able to do something for reasons that make it worth doing, thisargumentrequiresthatanagentshouldbeabletodosomethingbecauseofwhatmakesitworthdoing,indeed, they should be able to do it because it is worth doing. The problem for The ExplanatoryExclusionProblemisthatitisincompatiblewiththeideathatsuchfactscouldexplainanagent’saction.15Thatis,whatfollowsthe‘because’.

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4 Directtheories

The only way to satisfy the explanatory constraint and to accept the literal form of our

everydayexpressionsistoconcedethat(non-psychological)normativereasonscanexplainour

actions. Thismeans rejecting the conclusionof The Explanatory ExclusionProblem. The first

waytodothat,whichweconsidernow,istorejectthefirstpremise.

RecallthegeneralformofthefirstpremiseofTheExplanatoryExclusionProblem:

Premise# Thereisafullexplanationofwhyzsuchthatxisneitherapartofthatfullexplanationnorisitpartofagenuinelydifferentexplanation.

Now,asweestablished in§(VIII), it seemsas thoughwheneverwegiveanormative reason

explanation we can make a claim that fits the Premise # form about the explanatory

contributionofthenormativereasontotheexplanationoftheaction16;thatis,foranyaction

andanynormative reason todo thataction, there isalwaysa fullexplanationof thataction

such that that normative reason is neither a part of that full explanation nor is it part of a

genuinelydifferentfullexplanation.Directtheoriesdenythisclaim.

4.1 Hownormativereasonsdirectlyexplainactions

Directtheoriessaythatwhenanormativereasonexplainsanactionitaddssomethingtothe

explanationof that action that is independentof, and in addition to,what the fact that the

agentknewitprovides.

FigureX-2:Directtheoriesofnormativereasonexplanation

Buthoware factsabout theworld supposed todirectlyexplainouraction?Here isa typical

response:followingGilbertRyle(1949),onecanconceiveofknowledgeasacapacityorability.

Inparticular, one can conceiveof knowledgeas the capacity to respond to a fact about the

world,thatis,thecapacitytorespondtoanormativereason.

Thesuggestionisthat,whenanagentactsfromknowledge:

- ‘Thefactthatthingsactuallyarethewaytheybelievethemtobeweighswiththem’(Hornsby2008,254);or

- Thefactexertsarationalinfluenceontheagent’swill(McDowell2013);or

16There are, perhaps, exceptions in ‘weird’ cases, where the fact that p and the fact that the agentbelievesthatparebothnormativereasonsforthemtoφ(seeDancy2000,124)–butthesearepeculiarenoughthattheycanbeignored.

Normativereason explains

Action

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- Theagentisguidedbythefact(Hyman2015);or

- Theagentexhibitsarationalresponsetothefact.(Smith2004)

Thus, knowing some fact engenders a special, direct connectionbetween theagent and the

fact. When one knows something the fact itself guides one or impresses itself upon one’s

actionandtherebyaccountsforwhatonedoes:thatishownormativereasonsdirectlyexplain

anagent’saction.

Notalldirecttheoriesrelyonknowledgetoaccountforthedirectconnection,however.Some,

suchasDancy’s(2000)non-factivetheoryofnormativereasonexplanationdonotthinkthata

normative reasonneedevenbe true inorder toexplainanagent’s action, so longas itwas

believed.Moregenerally,evenamongstknowledge-baseddirecttheories, theprecisenature

of how the normative reason explains depends on the way in which one rejects the first

premise of The Explanatory Exclusion Problem. I consider the main ways of being a direct

theoristintheAppendixtothischapter.

4.2 Theproblemswithdirecttheories

4.2.1 What’sweirdaboutdirectnormativereasonexplanation

Howexactlydoes‘responding’toanormativereason,being‘guided’byoneor‘actinginlight

of it’ make that normative reason directly explanatory? The nature of the explanation that

knowledge is supposed toengender is thoroughlymysterious,andaccountsof itare replete

withmetaphorsbutthinondetail.Iftheconceptof‘respondingtothefact’isnotcausal(and

none seem to think it is), what exactly is the nature of the direct connection between the

agentandthefact,whentheyrespondtothefact,thatmakesthatfactexplaintheiraction?17

Now, if itwere self-evident that there is suchadirect connection then theuseofmetaphor

might well be unproblematic. For instance, we can say that maglev trains are ‘guided’ by

magnetswithoutneedingtobeliteralabouttherelationbetweenthemagnetsandthetrain

because it is seemingly clear that something themagnets are doing is directly affecting the

train. However, it is very much not clear that normative reasons are directly affecting my

action–soweneedanaccountofwhatisoccurringthatisnotcouchedinmetaphorsinorder

toconvinceusthatthenormativereasonreallyisdirectlyrelatedtotheaction.Iamconcerned

that no such account is available because there is no such direct relation. This is the first

problemfordirecttheories.

17Similar remarks can bemade for direct theories that aren’t knowledge-based, such as non-factivetheories.SeeremarksintheAppendixtothischapterforfurtherdetail.

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4.2.2 YoucannotcrediblyrejectPremise1

Nowforthesecondproblemfordirecttheories.In§§(VIII)2-4,Isetouttheargumentforthe

followingclaim:

Premise1 ThereisafullexplanationofwhyIcongratulatedmyfriendsuchthatthe fact that she had won an award is neither a part of that fullexplanationnorisitpartofagenuinelydifferentexplanation.

Directtheoriesrejectthisclaim,inthisinstance,andtheyrejectthatasimilarsortofclaimcan

bemadeforanynormativereasonthatpurportstoexplainanagent’saction.Theproblem,I

suggest,isthatthereisnocrediblewaytorejectPremise1.

First, recall that Premise1 followed from four principles of explanation together with the

followingtwoclaims:

Premise1a If,ceterisparibus,myfriendhadnotwonanaward(butIstillbelievedthat she had), then (i) the fact that I believed that she hadwon anawardwouldhavepartiallyexplainedwhyIcongratulatedher;and(ii)the fact that she had not won an award would not have partiallyexplainedwhyIcongratulatedher.

Premise1b If,ceterisparibus,Ihadnotbelievedthatmyfriendhadwonanaward(thoughshehad)thenthefactthatshehadwonanawardwouldnothavepartiallyexplainedwhyIcongratulatedher.

Assumingthattheseclaimsareuncontentious,18theonlyoptionsforonewhowantstoreject

Premise1aretorejectoneofFACTIVITY,ENDURANCE,SUFFICIENCY,orDIFFERENCE.

Ithinkthatthereisnounproblematicwayforadirecttheoristtorejectoneoftheseprinciples

of explanation. I provide a full account of my reasoning in the Appendix to this chapter,

however,bywayofoverviewhere:denyingFACTIVITYcomesatthecostofdenyingsomething

thatisseeminglyobviouslytrue(i.e.thatexplanationisfactive).DenyingDIFFERENCEmakesthe

concept of being a genuinely different explanation obscure, and relying on the denial of

difference to account for normative reason explanation results in an implausibly ubiquitous

levelofoverexplanation.Meanwhile,theoriesthatdenyENDURANCEseeminglystretchcredulity

by insisting that, in some cases, the mind plays no explanatory role in action. And lastly,

theories that deny SUFFICIENCY must insist that normative reasons are indispensable to the

explanationofanactioniftheyareknown–andthereisnogoodaccountofwhythatshould

bethecase.

18AndIknowofnoonewhowoulddenyeither.

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The upshot, I suggest, is that there is no credible way to reject the first premise of The

Explanatory Exclusion Problem for normative reason explanation, and therefore no credible

wayofbeingadirecttheorist.

5 Conclusion

IhavediscussedtwopossibleresponsestoTheExplanatoryExclusionProblemfornormative

reason explanation, elliptical theories and direct theories. I suggested that both of these

theoriesaredeeplyproblematic.

Ifnormativereasonsdon’texplainelliptically,anddon’texplaindirectly,then, Isuggest,they

must explain indirectly, that is, by explaining those features of the agent’s psychology that

explain their actions. In the next chapter I will provide the basis for my indirect theory by

showingthattheexclusionprincipleisfalse.Subsequentchapterswillthensetoutanddefend

myindirecttheory.

Appendix

A.1 Fourdirecttheoriesofnormativereasonexplanation

Direct theoriesofnormative reasonexplanation reject the idea that the firstpremiseofThe

Explanatory ExclusionProblem is always trueof normative reasons.Asnoted in §4.2.2, this

meansthatdirecttheoriesmustrejectoneofthefollowingprinciplesofexplanation:

FACTIVITY Foranypropositionspandq,ifppartiallyexplainsthefactthatqthenpisthecase.

DIFFERENCE For any propositions p, q and r, p is part of a genuinely differentexplanationofthefactthatrfromqonlyif,ceterisparibus,hadpbeenthecaseandqnotbeenthecase,pwouldstillpartiallyexplainthefactthatr.

ENDURANCE For any propositionsp, qand r, the following holds: Suppose thatqpartiallyexplainsthefactthatrwhenitisnotthecasethatp.Supposefurtherthatneitherpnornotpispartofthesameexplanationofrasq. Then, if, ceteris paribus, it were the case that p, q would stillpartiallyexplainthefactthatr.

SUFFICIENCY Foranypropositionq,andanyset,Δ, ifΔ isa fullexplanationof thefact thatq in somecircumstance, then, inanycircumstance inwhichall theelementsofΔpartiallyexplain the fact thatq,Δfullyexplainsthefactthatq.

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Since any direct theorymust reject one of these principles,we can categorise the different

directtheoriesaccordingtowhichoftheseprinciplestheyreject,asfollows19:

- Non-factivist: Theories that reject FACTIVITY and insist that when normative reasonsexplainanagent’sactiontheydosoquathecontentoftheagent’sbelief.

- Inclusive disjunctivist: Theories that reject DIFFERENCE and insist thatwhen normativereasons explain what an agent does they do so as part of an explanation that isgenuinelydifferentfromtheexplanationintermsoftheagent’spsychology.

- Exclusivedisjunctivist:Theories that rejectENDURANCEand insist thatwhennormativereasonsexplainwhatanagentdoestheydosoaspartofthefullexplanationinsteadofthefactsaboutwhatanagentbelieves.

- Supplementarist: Theories that reject SUFFICIENCY and insist that when a normativereasonexplainsanagent’s action theydo soaspartof the full explanation togetherwiththefactsaboutwhatanagentbelieves.

Inwhat follows Iwill setout theaccountofhownormativereasonsexplain ineachof these

strategies,followedbytheproblemstheyface.

A caveat regarding all these theories: they are all to a greater or lesser extent, ofmy own

construction. Most of the literature from which these theories are drawn is actually a

discussion of whether or not (and how) normative reasons can be the reason for which an

agentacts. I,however,amansweringasimplerquestion:cannormative reasonsexplainour

actions? The theories below have been inspired by responses to the former question, and

whileIsuggestthatcertainauthorsholdsomeformsofthetheoriesbelow,nothinginwhatI

say depends on these attributions being accurate. That is, so long as they are correct

characterisationsofpossibletheories,itisnotvitalthatthosetowhomIattributethemwould

agreewiththeattribution.

A.2 Non-factivisttheories

Non-factivist theories reject the factivity principle. According to non-factivist theories (e.g.

Dancy 2000; Comesaña andMcGrath 2014), saying that I tookmy umbrella because it was

raininghas theconversational implicaturethat itwasraining,butdoesnotentail that itwas

raining;indeed,theystress,thatimplicatureiscancellable.

19There isa fourthstrategythat Ihaven’tconsideredhere.Onecoulddifferentiatetheexplanantiaofnormative reasons and psychological facts (I believe that Stout (1996) adopts this strategy, but onecouldalsodevelopsuchastrategybasedonHornsby(2008)andMcDowell’s(2013)disjunctivismaboutacting)–andconsequentlyarguethatnormativereasonscanexplainsomethinganagentdoese.g.thefactthatthereisbeerinthefridgeexplainsthefactthatIgotbeer(Icouldn’thavedonesohadtherenot been beer there). I don’t consider this strategy here because I think it suffers all the failings ofellipticaltheorywithoutitssimplicity–wewanttobeabletogiveanormativereasonexplanationofthefactthatIwenttothefridge,notmerelythefactthatIgotbeer.

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These theories suggest thatwhenanormative reasonexplainsanagent’saction factsabout

whattheagentbelievesarereallysecondfiddleinexplanatorytermstothenormativereason:

theyactasmereenablingconditions forthenormativereason(quawhattheagentbelieves)

toexplainwhattheagentdoes.

The idea seems to be this: a normative reason cannot explain an agent’s action unless the

agentbelievesit20–sothefactthattheagentbelievesitmustatleastenabletheexplanation.

However, ‘there is a difference between a consideration that is a proper part of an

explanation,andaconsiderationthatisrequiredfortheexplanationtogothrough,butwhich

isnotitselfapartofthatexplanation.’(Dancy2000,127)

Accordingtothisstrategy,thefactsaboutwhattheagentbelievesdon’thavetheexplanatory

forcenecessarytoexplaintheagent’saction,onlythenormativereasondoes.Thatis,thefact

thatIbelievethatit israiningenablesthecontentsofmybelief,namely,thatit israining,to

explainwhyItookmyumbrella(andsotheyareindependentpartsofthesameexplanation–

althoughit’sthenormativereasonthatis, insomesense,themajorparty).Theysaythatwe

should understand expressions like ‘Sally ran because she thought a bear was chasing her’

appositionally,wherethereferencetoSally’sbelievingisaqualificationonthetruthvalueof

theexplanans,butnotapartoftheexplanansitself.21

Non-factivisttheoriescanthusacceptthatthesamefullexplanationisavailablewhetherthe

agent’sbeliefistrueorfalsebecausethetruthorfalsityofthecontentoftheagent’sbeliefhas

nobearingonwhetherornotitisinthatfullexplanation.

A.2.1 Theproblemfornon-factivisttheories

The first problem with non-factivist theories is that they are absurd. If we admit that

falsehoods can explain that seems to make the concept of explanation itself thoroughly

mysterious.Ifsomeonesaysthattheytooktheirumbrellabecauseitwasrainingeventhough

itwasn’t,IwouldnotthinktheywerecancellingaGriceanimplicature,Iwouldthinkthatthey

misspoke,becausewhattheysaidisjustplainlycontradictory.

Secondly,non-factivisttheoriesresttheirclaimtoplausibilityontheideathatbeliefsaremere

enablingconditions–theydon’thavetherequisiteexplanatoryforce inandofthemselves. I

amscepticalthattheperceivedexplanatoryweaknessof‘enablingconditions’isgenuineand

isn’tmerelyaconsequenceoftheirsalience inagivencontext.Were itmerelyaquestionof

saliencethentheexplanatorypoweroffactsabouttheagent’spsychologywouldberestored

20Recallthediscussionof§(VIII)3.1.21Dancyproposesthissortofreading:‘Sallyranbecauseabearwaschasingher,asshebelieved.’

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andwewouldagainhavetoquestionwhatnormativereasonsaddbywayofexplanation.But

evenputtingsuchscepticismaside,itis,asTurri(2009)notes,farfromclearthatfactsabout

what an agent believes are aptly categorised as enabling conditions.22And if they aren’t

enablingconditions,concernsaboutwhatnormativereasonsreallydobywayofexplanation

return.

Thirdly,non-factivist theories struggle toexplainwhy it is that,whenanagenthasaGettier

belief,wedon’tgiveanormativereasonexplanationof theiraction.23For instance,wedon’t

saythatEdmundstayedattheedgebecausetheicewasthinwhenhis justifiedbeliefthat it

wasthinisonlyaccidentallytrue–althoughthenon-factivistwouldinsistthatweshould.24

Fourthly, it isworth noting, from a rhetorical perspective, that even the progenitor of non-

factivisttheories,JonathanDancy,hassinceabandonedthem(seeDancy2014).

A.3 Inclusivedisjunctivisttheories

Inclusivedisjunctivist theories reject thedifferenceprinciple. Theyaccept that there is a full

explanationofwhy Icongratulatedmyfriendthatdoesnot includethefactthatshewonan

award. 25 Nonetheless, they say, there is a genuinely different explanation of why I

congratulatedmyfriendthatdoes includethefactthatshewonanaward.Theysuggestthat

even though the explanation in terms of normative reasons would not exist without the

explanationintermsofbeliefs,itisnonethelessgenuinelydifferentfromit.26

Whatwouldmakeyoubelieve this?Well,asalreadynoted,27therearestructural similarities

betweentheargument from illusion in the literatureonperceptionand theproblemfor the

22Turri(2009,505–6)arguesthatitisnormallyoddtoaskwhyanenablingconditionforanexplanationobtains,but that it isnotnormallyodd toaskwhyanagentbelievedwhat theybelieved– thereforefactsaboutwhatanagentbelievesaren’tenablingconditions.23Seefn.11.24See,forinstance,Dancy(2014,89)forthiscriticismofnon-factivisttheories.25This is what makes them inclusive disjunctivists as opposed to the exclusive disjunctivists, to beconsideredinthenextsection.Ihaveadoptedtheinclusivevs.exclusivedistinctionfromRuben(2008)andStout(2009);theysaythatinclusivedisjunctivistsacceptsomeroleforthehighestcommonfactor,while exclusive disjunctivists do not. Note Pautz (2010, 298–99) draws the same distinction betweendifferenttypesofdisjunctivism,buthecallsinclusivedisjunctivismthe‘overdeterminationversion’;andexclusivedisjunctivismand‘therestrictiveversion’.26This is, I think, the view that JohnHyman sets out: ‘If Jamesmerely believed that going to churchwouldpleasehismotherbutdidnotknowthatitwould,wecansaythathewenttochurchbecausehebelievedthat itwouldpleasehismother,butwecannotsaythathewenttochurchbecause itwouldpleasehismother.But ifheknewthat itwouldpleasehismother,wecansayeither thathewent tochurchbecauseheknewthat itwouldpleasehismotheror thathewent tochurchbecause itwouldpleasehismother.’(Hyman2011,366–67)27See§(IX)5.

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explanationofactionthatIhaveconstruedasTheExplanatoryExclusionProblem.28Onecould,

inspired by disjunctivist responses to the former, adopt a disjunctivist view of action

explanationasaresponsetothelatter.Theideaisthis:althoughitisalwaysexplanatory,the

highestcommonfactorofallactionexplanations(explanationintermsofthefactsaboutwhat

the agent believes) is not the limit of the resources available for action explanation29–

sometimeswe canalso explain an agent’s action directly, and differently, with a normative

reason.Sowhile theaction isalready fullyexplainedby factsaboutwhat theagentbelieves

(and relevant supplementary facts (e.g. facts about what they want, judge good etc.)) the

normativereasonaddsanother,additionalexplanationofit.

A.3.1 Theproblemsforinclusivedisjunctivisttheories

The first problem with inclusive disjunctivist theories is that, in rejecting the difference

principlewe are rejecting a seemingly plausible account of (at least part of) what it is that

makesexplanationsgenuinelydifferent.Asaresult,Ifind,webegintoloseourhandleonwhat

itisthatmakestheexplanationgenuinelydifferent.

Secondly,andrelatedly,it’snotatallclearwhatwouldbeinthefullexplanationoftheagent’s

actionthatincludesthenormativereason.GivenMINIMALITY,itcannotincludealltheelements

ofthefullexplanationthatincludesthebelief–soitmustbesomeothersetoffacts.Butwhat

other set of facts is also sufficient forme to congratulatemy friend andwhich explainsmy

doingsodirectly?Icannotthinkofany.

And lastly, and perhapsmost obviously, the inclusive disjunctivist accepts thatmy action is

overexplained,becausetherearetwogenuinelydifferentexplanationsofit.Thisisproblematic

because, asDancyputs it, ‘[it]wouldmean that there are somehow toomanyexplanations

around’(2000,171).30Andthisisnotabenigncaseofoverexplanation–it’snotatallclearthat

thefactthatIcongratulatemyfriendisexplainedintwodifferentways.

28Consider:Forperception,whenit,forinstance,appearsasthoughthereisatomatooneisalwaysineitheroneoftwostates:eitheroneisseeingatomatooritmerelyappearstooneasthoughthereisatomato.Thefactthatitappearsasthoughthereisatomatoisthehighestcommonfactorofthesetwostates.CompareHorsnby’s(2008)construalofaction:whenoneactsonthebeliefthatitisrainingoneisalways inoneof twostates–actingontheknowledgethat it is rainingormerelyactingonthebeliefthatitisraining.Actingonthebeliefthatitisrainingisseeminglythehighestcommonfactorofthesetwostates.29As McDowell puts it: ‘The point of the disjunctive approach is to reject a highest common factorconception,notinthesenseofdenyingthattherearecommonfeaturesbetweenthedisjuncts,butinthesenseofrefusingtorestrictourresourcesforrationalexplanationtothosethatareavailableforthe“worse”disjunct.’(McDowell2013,27)30Davis(2005)alsomakesthisargument.

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Theproblemisn’tjustconfinedtothiscaseeither.Whattheinclusivedisjunctivistrequiresis

thatwheneverwecangiveanormativereasonexplanationofanaction,theagent’sactionis

overexplained. But if this sort of overexplanation is meant to occur whenever we give a

normative reason explanation, then, given the ubiquity of such explanations, inclusive

disjunctivismseemstorequireareallyimplausibleincidenceofoverexplanation.

Maybe you want to insist that overexplanation should not trouble us as much as

overdetermination, because there aren’t independent determining factors, there are only

differentexplanatoryfactors.However,Ithinkthisresponseismoretroublethanit’sworth–

it’snotcleartomethatitmakesoverexplanationunproblematicand,asI’venoted,westartto

lose our grasp on what makes genuinely different explanations genuinely different if they

aren’t,insomesense,independentexplanations.

A.4 Exclusivedisjunctivisttheories

Exclusivedisjunctivisttheoriesrejecttheenduranceprinciple.Theyrejecttheideathat,whenI

congratulatemy friend, the fact that I believed that she hadwon an award explains why I

congratulatedher.Accordingtothisstrongersortofdisjunctivism(henceexclusiveratherthan

inclusive)eitheranagentactsbecausetheybelievetheworldtobeacertainwayortheyact

because the world is that way, but never both. On this account, when a normative reason

explainsanagent’sactionitdoessoinsteadofthefactsaboutwhatanagentbelieves.31

Why would you believe this? That is, why think that sometimes beliefs don’t explain?

Stoutlandmakesthefollowingargumentforthisview:

Ifsomeonegoestoaroombecauseameetingisbeingheldthere,thatisadequatejustificationforhereffort.Ifitturnsoutthatthemeetingisn'tthere,wehavetoreviseourjustification,andhenceourexplanation,andsayshewent to theroombecauseshebelieved themeetingwasthere.Herbeliefbecomesanexplanatory factor, that is tosay, just incaseshewasmistakenabout the situation originally appealed to as justification. This is the general case: beliefsbecomeexplanatoryfactorswhenagentsaremistakenaboutthesituationsoriginallytakentojustifythem.

Thesituation isanalogoustosomeone’s flippingaswitchto turnona light,without the lightgoingon.Inthiscasehetriedtoturnonthelight,justbecausehefailed,whichwouldnotbe

31 Both Collins (1997) and Stoutland (1998) adopt this response to the Problem. I may havemis-interpretedHyman’s (2011) view in fn.26, inwhich case I think this ishisposition. Sandis (2012,119)alsoattributesthisviewtoAlvarez(2010),thoughI’mnotconvinceditisherposition.Inparticular,Alvarez agrees that beliefs still explain in veridical cases (cf. ‘It is always possible (and sometimesnecessary, namely when the agent acted on a false belief) to give explanations in the psychologicalform.’ (Alvarez 2013, 149)). More generally, it’s not clear to me that Alvarez is responding to TheExplanatory Exclusion Problem as I have characterised it – her discussion focuses on the pragmaticconsiderationsthatdeterminewhetherornotonegivesanormativereasonexplanationoroneintermsof psychological facts. However, to the extent that she does respond to the redundancy objection, Ithinksheisbettercharacterisedasadoptingthesupplementaristtheory.

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true ifhesucceeded in turning itonwithoutdifficulty.Fromthe fact thatwhatsomeonedidwhenhe failed to turnona light is thathe tried, itdoesn't followthatwhathedidwhenhesucceeded also included trying. Analogously, given that what explains my going to a roomwhereIdonotfindmyfriendisthatIbelievedmyfriendwasthere,itdoesnotfollowthatwhatexplainsmygoing to the roomwhenmy friend is there isalso that Ibelieved shewas there.(Stoutland1998,61)

IthinkthatthemostcoherentreadingofStoutland’saccountisasarejectionoftheideathat

wheneveranagentacts, theyactonthewaytheytakethingstobe.That is:eitheranagent

actsonthewaytheytakethingstobeor,touseMcDowell’s(2013)phraseology,they‘actin

lightofthefacts’,butnotboth.32Iftheyactonthewaytheytakethingstobe,thenthefact

thattheytakethemtobethatwayexplainstheiraction,butiftheyactinlightofthefacts(i.e.

inlightofanormativereason),thenitisthefactsthatexplaintheiraction.Thatis,eitherfacts

aboutwhattheybelieveexplaintheiractionsornormativereasonsexplaintheiractions,but

notboth.

A.4.1 Theproblemsforexclusivedisjunctivisttheories

Firstly,byrejectingtheenduranceprincipletheexclusivedisjunctivistiscommittedtotheview

thatwhensomeirrelevantfalsepropositionbecomestrue,thatcandestroypre-existingpartial

explanationrelations.Forthereasonssetoutin(VIII)2.3.1,thatseemsimplausible.

However,even if it turnsout that theenduranceprinciple is false, theexclusivedisjunctivist

theoryisadifficultpositiontomaintainbecausethereiswidespreadsupportfortheviewthat

beliefsalwaysplaysomeroleinexplainingwhatanagentdoes.

Exclusivedisjunctivism insists that there is nohighest common factor that is relevant to the

explanation of action, whether one is right or mistaken. That is, it insists that there is no

significantcommonfactorbetweensomeonewhoactsonsomethingtheyknowtobethecase

andsomeonewhoactsonsomethingtheymerelybelieve.Ifindthisincredible.

32This reading has Stoutland endorsing (exclusive) disjunctivism about acting. This is different fromdisjunctivismaboutwhatexplainsanagent’saction,orwhattheirreasonforactingis.It’sworthnotingthatHornsby(2008)andMcDowell(2013)giveaconsiderablymorethoroughaccountofdisjunctivismaboutacting,buttheirsisofan inclusivekind–theyconcedethatwheneveranagentactstheyactontheway they take things tobe.Sowhile I takeStoutlandtobeadisjunctivistabout thesamething, Idon’t invoke them here since his disjunctivism is far stauncher. There is also an alternative reading(perhapstruertohisprecisestatements)onwhichStoutlandembracesanexclusivedisjunctivismaboutactionexplanation(i.e.anexclusiveversionofthedisjunctivismconsideredintheprevioussection).Allthat such a disjunctivism insists is that the facts aboutwhat an agent believes donot always explaintheiraction, it is silenton thequestionofwhetherornotanagentalwaysactson theway they takethingstobe.Thislattersortofdisjunctivismisweakerthantheformerinsofarasitisentailedbyit.Ifindthelattersortlesscoherentwithouttheformersinceitisnotcleartomehowonecouldactonthewayonetakes things tobewithout the fact thatone takes themtobe thatwayplayingsomerole inexplainingwhatonedoes;forthatreasonIdon’tconsideritfurther.

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Consider:when I believe that it’s raining I ameither in a situation inwhich I know that it’s

raining or I merely believe (i.e. without knowing) that it is raining. Given that I take my

umbrellawhicheverofthetwosituationsIamin,doesn’tthepossibilitythatthetwosituations

may be indistinguishable tome justmean that I act on theway I take things to be in both

situations?33AndgiventhatIactonthewayItakethingstobe,thefactthatItakethemtobe

that way must explain my action. I find positions that deny this reasoning impossible to

believe.

Moreover,Stoutland’ssupposedargumentbyanalogyisnotsomuchanargumentforhisview

as it ismerelytheapplicationof it toanotherarea. Itseemscleartome(andtoothers(e.g.

O’Shaughnessy 1973), that someone who goes to turn on a light tries to turn on the light

whetherornottheyendupdoingso.34Stoutland’srejectionofthatviewisjustthesamesort

of (exclusive)disjunctivismashis rejectionof theview thatonealwaysactson thewayone

takes things tobe.35Andonewho isnotpersuadedofhisview in the latter isunlikely tobe

persuadedbytheapplicationofitsomewhereelse.

Ofcourse,myincredulousstaremaydonothingtoaltertheopinionofsomeonewhobelieves

sucha theory;however, Idon’t think I amalone inmy incredulity. Surely thereare theories

thatareeasiertobelieve?

A.5 Supplementaristtheories

Finally,supplementariststrategiesrejectthesufficiencyprinciple.Theyarguethatjustbecause

factsaboutwhatanagentbelievesplaya role inexplaining theiraction thatdoesnotmean

that normative reasons are not needed for a full explanation of the agent’s action; indeed,

they argue, normative reasons are an independent (and necessary) part of the same

explanationasthefactsaboutwhatanagentbelieves.36

Supplementarist strategies differ from non-factive strategies in that they insist that the

normative reason can explain the agent’s action only if it is true; for instance, the

supplementaristmightinsist,thenormativereasononlyexplainsanagent’sactioniftheagent

knows it.What the supplementarist rejects is the idea that the same full explanation of an

33Thisisnotadenialofdisjunctivismtoutcourt–forinstance,aninclusivedisjunctivist(e.g.McDowell2013) can acknowledge that one always acts on theway one takes things to be; they just deny thatactingonthewayonetakesthingstoisallthatapersoneverdoes.34Comparethesecommonplaceexpressions:‘hetriedandfailed’;‘hetriedandsucceeded’–Stoutland’saccountmakestheformertrueofanyonewhotries,andmakesthelatteracontradiction.35Indeed,Dancy(2008b)discussesadisjunctivistaccountoftryingtoact.36As noted in fn. 31 to the extent that Alvarez (2010) gives a response to The Explanatory ExclusionProblem,Ithinkthismaybeherview.

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agent’s action is availablewhether or not the agent knowswhat theybelieve. Instead, they

say,thenormativereasonisanindispensablepartoftheexplanationwhen(andonlywhen)it

is known. Importantly, the supplementarist doesnot violateMINIMALITY because theydonot

thinkthatthesetthatomitsthenormativereasonisstillsufficienttoexplaintheagent’saction

whentheagentactsfromknowledgeofthenormativereason.37

A.5.1 Theproblemsforsupplementaristtheories

Thefirstproblemforsupplementaristtheoriesisthatinrejectingthesufficiencyprinciplethey

rejectaseeminglyplausibleprincipleofexplanation.Thatis,ifsomesetofpartialexplanations

is sufficient to explain some explanandum in one case, given that whenever those partial

explanationsallexplainanexplanandum theyaresufficient toentail it,whywould theyalso

notbesufficienttoexplainit?

However,even if therewereagoodargumentforrejectingthesufficiencyprinciple, it isnot

clearwhyitshouldbefalseinthiscase.Thatis:it’snotclearwhyknowinganormativereason

makes that normative reason an indispensable part of the full explanation of the agent’s

action. Given that what I believe doesn’t explain my action when I am mistaken, so an

explanation in termsofpsychological facts suffices,why is that explanation insufficient (and

thenormativereasonindispensable)whenmybeliefhappenstoknowledgeable?

I suppose the supplementarist theoristwill answer thisquestionby saying that it’s because,

whentheagentknowsthenormativereason,thenormativereasonis,itself,apartofthestory

ofwhytheyactedbecauseitguidesthemortheyrespondtoit.Whenanagentdoesn’tknow

thenormativereason,itdoesn’tguidethem,soitisn’tpartofthereasonwhytheyacted.Then

I fallback tomy first concern (see§4.2.1): I justdon’t knowwhat itmeans foranormative

reasontoguidesomeoneanduntilIdo,Ican’tseewhyIshouldacceptthatnormativereasons

areindispensabletoanexplanationonlyiftheyareknown.

37AlthoughtheydoviolateC-MINIMALITY(see§(VIII)fn.23).

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(XI)

TheExclusionPrincipleisFalse

In which I show that the exclusion principle is false. I provide twocounterexamples to the exclusion principle, one involving causal explanationand another involving non-causal explanation. I suggest that they arecounterexamples because in each case the purportedly excluded fact explainsthe explanandum by explaining something that, in turn, explains theexplanandum. Isuggestthattheproblemwiththeexclusionprinciple isthat itdiscriminates against all but the most proximal explanations of any givenexplanandum, and that this is problematic at least partly because we aretypically interested inmoredistal explanations. I explainwhereour reasoningwentwrongandwhichfullexplanationanapparentlyexcludedfactispartof.

InthepreviouschapterIarguedthatweshouldnotaccepttheconclusionofTheExplanatory

Exclusion Problem (at least as far as normative reason explanations are concerned). I also

arguedthatweshouldnotrejectthefirstpremiseoftheProblem.Ifweshouldnotacceptthe

conclusion and we should not reject the first premise, the only remaining response to the

Problemistorejectthesecondpremise,theexclusionprinciple.Thepurposeofthischapteris

to show that the exclusion principle is false and to explainwhy it is false. The next chapter

builds on these insights to provide the makings of an indirect theory of normative reason

explanation.

1 Twocounterexamplestotheexclusionprinciple

Recalltheexclusionprinciple:

EXCLUSION For any propositions,pandq, if there is a full explanation ofwhyqsuchthatp isneitherapartofthatfullexplanationnor is itpartofagenuinelydifferentexplanation,thenpdoesnotpartiallyexplainq.

In this section I want to discuss two counterexamples to EXCLUSION, one involving causal

explanationandtheothernon-causalexplanation.

1.1 Acausalcounterexample

JeancontractsHIVafterhavingbeentransfusedwith infectedblood. Itgoesundiagnosedfor

solongthat,tragically,hedevelopsAIDS.Thismuchseemsclear:JeandevelopedAIDS,inpart,

becausehewastransfusedwithHIV-infectedblood.Thatis:

(a) ThefactthatJeanwastransfusedwithHIV-infectedbloodpartiallyexplainswhyhedevelopedAIDS.

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However,wecanalsogive the followingexplanationofwhyhedevelopedAIDS:hehadHIV

and it went untreated. The fact that he had HIV and the fact that it went untreated are, I

suggest, parts of a single full explanation of why he developed AIDS. Is the fact that he

contractedHIV froman infectedblood transfusionapartof thatexplanation? I suggestnot:

thefactthathehadHIVisalreadyenough1forJeantodevelopAIDS,2sothefactthathewas

transfusedwithHIV-infectedbloodwouldbesuperfluous inanyfullexplanationthatalready

includedthefactthathehadHIV.3Thus,thereisafullexplanationofwhyhedevelopedAIDS

thatincludesthefactthathehadHIVbutdoesnotincludethefactthathewastransfusedwith

HIV-infectedblood.4

Moreover, the fact that Jean was transfused with HIV-infected blood only explains why he

developedAIDSgiven thathehadHIV.5So, fromDIFFERENCE, the fact thathewas transfused

with HIV-infected blood cannot be part of a genuinely different explanation of why he

developedAIDSfromthefactthathehadHIV.

So,itfollowsthat:

(b) ThereisafullexplanationofwhyJeandevelopedAIDSsuchthatthefactthathewas transfusedwithHIV-infectedblood isneitherapartof that fullexplanationnorisitpartofagenuinelydifferentexplanation.

Now notice that (b) is the antecedent condition of EXCLUSION while (a) is the denial of the

consequent condition. That is, the fact that Jean was transfused with HIV-infected blood

explainswhyhedevelopedAIDSinspiteofthefactthatthereisafullexplanationofwhyhe

developedAIDSthatitisneitherapartofandnorispartofagenuinelydifferentexplanation.

So,giventhat(a)and(b)aretrue,EXCLUSIONmustbefalse.

1Togetherwith the fact that itwentuntreatedand the fact thata sustained,untreatedHIV infectionleadstoAIDS,etc.2Wecanseethisbynotingthatafullexplanationofthissort(hehadHIV,itwentuntreated,untreatedinfectionsleadtoAIDS…)wouldhavebeenavailable,ceterisparibus,howeverhecontractedHIV.3AndMINIMALITYprecludesthepossibilityoffullexplanationshavingsuperfluouselements.4Wecanarriveatthisconclusionusingtheestablishedreasoningfrompreviouschapters,asfollows:if,ceterisparibus,JeanhadnotbeentransfusedwithHIV-infectedbloodbutstillhadHIV(nevermindhowhe contracted it), thenhewould still havedevelopedAIDS, and the fact thathehadHIVwouldhave(partially) explainedwhy he developed AIDS.Moreover, in this counterfactual circumstance, the factthathehadnotbeentransfusedwithHIV-infectedbloodwouldnothavebeenpartoftheexplanationofwhy he developed AIDS. This supplies us with the appropriate specification of Premise #a, which,together with FACTIVITY, ENDURANCE and SUFFICIENCY, leads us to the conclusion that there is a fullexplanationofwhyhedevelopedAIDSthatincludesthefactthathehadHIVbutdoesnotincludethefactthathewastransfusedwithHIVinfectedblood.5If,ceterisparibus,JeanhadnotcontractedHIVdespitehavingbeentransfusedwithHIV-infectedbloodthen he wouldn’t have developed AIDS, so the fact that he was transfused with HIV-infected bloodwouldnothaveexplainedwhyhedevelopedAIDS.ThissuppliesuswiththeappropriatespecificationofPremise#b.

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1.2 Anon-causalcounterexample

PerhapsyouagreethatEXCLUSIONisfalseforcausalexplanation,butyouinsistthatitistrueof

non-causalexplanation.Ifthatweretrue,andonemaintainedthatreasonexplanationisnon-

causal, then The Explanatory Exclusion Problem for normative reason explanation would

return.Thepurposeof this section is todemonstrate that EXCLUSION isequally false fornon-

causalexplanation.

Considerthefollowingchessopening:

FigureXI-1:TheHyperAcceleratedDragon

Thisgamehasjustbegun.White’skingandkingsiderookareintheirstartingpositions(e1and

h1,respectively).Itistypicalintheearlystagesofachessgameforaplayertoseektocastle.

Foraplayerplayingwhite,castlingonherking’ssidealwaysinvolvesmovingthekingfrome1

tog1,and(aspartofthesameturn)therookfromh1tof1.However,Whitecannotcastleon

herking’s sidebecauseof thebishop (on f1)between thekingand thekingside rook,which

obstructsthemove.Thatis:

(c) The fact that there isabishopbetween thekingand thekingside rookpartiallyexplainswhyWhitecannotcastleonherking’sside.

Itakeitthattheexplanatoryrelationshiphereisclearlynon-casual(oratleastnotcausalinthe

familiarsenseinwhichJean’sstoryisacausalstory).

Now,theWorldChessFederation’shandbookstatesthat:

Castling is prevented temporarily… if there is any piece between the king and the rookwithwhichcastlingistobeeffected.(FIDE,n.d.,3.8.2.2)

Thisfact(concerningtherulesofchess),togetherwiththefactthatthereisapiecebetween

White’skingandherkingsiderookfullyexplainswhyWhitecannotcastleonherking’sside.

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Butthatfullexplanationdoesnotincludethefactthatthereisabishopbetweenthekingand

thekingsiderook.6So,itseems,thereisafullexplanationofwhyWhitecannotcastleonher

king’ssidethatincludesthefactthatthereisapiecebetweenthekingandtherookbutdoes

notincludethefactthatthereisabishopbetweenherkingandking’ssiderook.7

Moreover, the fact that there is a bishopbetween the king and the rook only explainswhy

Whitecannotcastleifthereisapiecebetweenthekingandtherook.8Thatbeingsoweknow

(fromDIFFERENCE)thatthefactthatthereisabishopbetweenthekingandtherookisnotpart

ofagenuinelydifferentexplanationofwhyWhitecannotcastle fromthefactthatthere isa

piecebetweenthekingandtherook.

So,itfollowsthat:

(d) There is a full explanation of whyWhite cannot castle such that the fact thatthere is a piece between the king and the rook is neither a part of that fullexplanationnorisitpartofagenuinelydifferentexplanation.

Nownotice,again, that (d) is theantecedentconditionofEXCLUSIONwhile (c) is thedenialof

theconsequentcondition.So,giventhat (c)and (d)are true,andgiventhat theexplanatory

relationsinvolvedarenon-causal,EXCLUSIONmustbefalseofevennon-causalexplanation.

2 Whythesearecounterexamplestotheexclusionprinciple

Why are these cases counterexamples to the exclusion principle? Answering that question

meansanswering thequestionofhow the seeminglyexcluded factsnonethelessexplain the

explanandatheyareexcludedfrom.Myanswerisstraightforward:theyexplainbyexplaining

thosefactsthatinturnexplaintheexplananda.

6Again,thelatterisjustsuperfluoustothatfullexplanation,andMINIMALITYprecludessuchsuperfluity.7Again,wecouldarguetothisconclusionusingtheconventionalreasoning:If,ceterisparibus,therehadbeennobishopbetweentherookandthekingbuttherehadstillbeenapiecebetweenthekingandtherook(supposethattherewasaknightthereinstead),thenthefactthattherewasapiecebetweenthekingandtherookwouldstillhaveexplainedwhyWhitecouldnotcastle.Moreover,hadtherebeennobishopbetweenthekingandtherook,thefactthattherewasnobishopbetweenthekingandtherookwouldnothaveexplainedwhyWhitecouldnotcastle.ThisprovidesuswiththerelevantspecificationofPremise#a,so,fromFACTIVITY,ENDURANCEandSUFFICIENCYwecanconcludethatthereisafullexplanationofwhyWhitecannotcastlethat includesthefactthatthere isapiecebetweenthekingandtherookbutdoesnotincludethefactthatthereisabishopbetweenthekingandtherook.8Ifthebishophadn’tbeenapiece(perhapsoneisplayingachessvariantthatexcludesbishops,butforwhichtherulesareotherwisethesame), thenWhitewouldhavebeenabletocastle,sothefact thatthere isabishopbetween thekingand the rookwouldnothaveexplainedwhyWhitewouldn’thavebeenable to castle (sinceWhitewouldhavebeenable to castle). This is the relevant specificationofPremise#b.Consider:iftherehadbeenapennyontheboardbetweentherookandthekingwewouldnotsaythatWhitecannotcastle;however,inthechessvariantinwhichbishopsaren’tpieces,theyare,fromthegame’sperspective,nodifferentfrompennies–thatis,theyarejustirrelevant.

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2.1 Revisitingthecausalcounterexample

InthefirstcounterexampleIinsistedthatthefactthatJeanwastransfusedwithHIV-infected

bloodexplainswhyhedevelopedAIDS.Howdoesitdoso?Itdoessobyexplainingwhyhehas

HIV.

Of course, the fact that JeanhasHIV is themore immediateexplanationof the fact thathe

developedAIDS.And,ofcourse,thewayonecontractsHIVmakesnodifferencetowhetheror

notonedevelopsAIDSgiventhatonehasHIV. Ifyourquestionwerewhy,giventhathehad

HIV, did Jean develop AIDS, then the relevant explanation includes the fact that it went

untreated,andthefactsabouthowasustained,untreatedHIV infection leadstoAIDS–and

that explanation needmake nomention of howhe contractedHIV. But itwould be odd to

alwaystakethefactthathehadHIVasgiven!Andonceyoudon’ttakeitasagiven,apartof

theexplanationofhowhecametodevelopAIDSiswhyhehasHIVinthefirstplace.Andhe

hasHIVbecausehewastransfusedwithHIV-infectedblood.

Summarising:thefactthatJeanwastransfusedwithHIV-infectedbloodexplainsboththefact

thathehasHIVandthefactthathedevelopedAIDS,andthefactthathehasHIValsoexplains

thefactthathedevelopedAIDS.Symbolically:ppartiallyexplainsq,qpartiallyexplainsrandp

partially explains r. The question is:why doesp partially explain r? I think the simplest and

mostnaturalansweristhattheexplanatoryrelationsinvolvedaretransitive.

Giventhetransitivityofthe(partial)explanationrelationsinvolved,thefactthatpexplainsq

togetherwith the fact thatq explains r ensures thatp explains r. So, the fact that Jeanwas

transfusedwithHIV-infectedbloodexplainswhyhedevelopedAIDSbecause itexplains that

which explains why he developed AIDS and because of the transitivity of the explanatory

relationsinvolved.

2.2 Revisitingthenon-causalcounterexample

Whatof the chessexample?What is the relationshipbetween the fact that there is apiece

betweenthekingandthekingsiderookandthefactthatthereisabishopbetweentheking

andthekingsiderook?

Well,thefactthatthereisapiecebetweenthekingandthekingsiderookisanexistentialfact.

Andexistentialfactsareexplainedbytheirinstances:

‘Why is it that something is F? Because A is F. An existential quantification is explained byprovidinganinstance.’(Lewis1987,223)

‘Existentialquantificationsaretruebecauseoftheirtrueinstances.’(Schnieder2011,460)

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So,why is thereapiecebetween thekingand thekingside rook?Because there is abishop

between thekingand thekingside rook (andabishop isapiece…)– the fact that there isa

bishopbetweenthekingandthekingsiderookexplainswhythereisapiecebetweentheking

andthekingsiderook.

Summarising:thefactthatthereisabishopbetweenthekingandthekingsiderookexplains

bothwhythereisapiecebetweenthekingandthekingsiderookandwhyWhitecannotcastle

onherking’sside,andthe fact that there isapiecebetweenthekingandthekingsiderook

also explainswhyWhite cannot castle. Symbolically, again:p partially explainsq,q partially

explainsrandppartiallyexplainsr.And,again, Ithinkthemostnaturalexplanationofthese

facts is that theexplanatoryrelations involvedare transitive. That is:pexplainsrbecausep

explainsqandqexplainsr.

3 What’swrongwiththeexclusionprinciple

Having understood how the apparently excluded facts of these two counterexamples

nonetheless explain, we are now in position to see what was wrong with the exclusion

principle.

First, somebasic terminology: ifpexplainsq andq explains rand the explanatory relations

involvedare transitive thenwe can say thatp is adistal explanationof r,whileq is amore

proximal explanation of r. So, the suggestion of the previous sectionwas this: the fact that

Jean was transfused with HIV-infected blood and the fact that there is a bishop between

White’s king and her kingside rook are distal (partial) explanations of their respective

explananda.Whereas,bycomparison,thefactthatJeanhadHIVandthefactthatthere isa

piecebetweenthekingandthekingsiderookaremoreproximal(partial)explanationsoftheir

respectiveexplananda.Isuggestthattheproblemwiththeexclusionprinciple,andthereason

whyitiswrong,isthatitdeniestheexplanatorypowerofdistalexplanations.

Itwillalwaysbetrueofanydistal (partial)explanationofsomeexplanandum that there isa

full explanation of that explanandumofwhich it is not part.Moreover, a distal explanation

doesnotexplaintheexplananduminawaythatisgenuinelydifferentfromthemoreproximal

explanation. So itwill seemingly alwaysbe trueof anydistal explanation that there is a full

explanationof someexplanandum such that thatdistal explanation is not apartof that full

explanationnorisitpartofagenuinelydifferentfullexplanation.Thatis,adistalexplanation

ofsomeexplanandumwillalwayssatisfytheantecedentconditionofEXCLUSION.

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Thatbeing so, theonlyway topreserveEXCLUSION is todeny theexplanatory statusofdistal

explanations–but that it is a veryheavyprice topay. Itmeans insisting thatonly themost

proximateexplanationofsomeexplanandumexplainsit.Andthisisabsurd!

SupposewesaythatFranzdevelopedlungcancerbecausehesmoked.Thisexplanationis, in

some sense, an extremely distal explanation of why he developed lung cancer. A more

proximal explanation would be that he regularly inhaled carcinogens. A more proximal

explanationstillwouldbethefactthatcellsinhislungsmutated.9

Whateachofthesemoreproximalexplanationshaveincommonisthatafullexplanationof

the fact that Franz developed lung cancer can be given in terms of them which makes no

mentionof,norevenentails, themoredistalexplanation.For instance,giventhatFranzwas

inhalingthatmixofcarcinogens,itdoesn’tmatter(ceterisparibus)whetherhegotthemfrom

smokingorfrompassivesmoking.Likewise,giventhatthecellsinhislungsmutateditdoesn’t

matter(ceterisparibus)tohisdevelopinglungcancerwhetherthecellmutationwastheresult

of carcinogen inhalation or exposure to radiation. So, if the exclusion principle is to be

believed, we can’t even say that Franz developed cancer because he regularly inhaled

carcinogens. According to the exclusion principle, only themostproximal explanation of his

lungcancerexplainsit.Thisissurelyabsurd.10

The absurdity of the exclusion principle should be clear whenwe see that even an agent’s

beliefs can be excluded from the explanation of their actions. Suppose that, when I

congratulatemyfriend,Ibelievethatcongratulatingherwillmakeherhappyand,say,Idesire

tomakeherhappy(orwhathaveyou).GiventhatIbelievethatcongratulatingherwillmake

her happy, the explanation of why I believe it is excluded from the explanation of why I

9‘TheformationofcovalentbondsbetweenthecarcinogensandDNAproducingDNAadducts,andtheresulting permanentmutations in critical genes of somatic cells is themajor established pathway ofcancercausationbycigarettesmoke.’(Hecht2006,609)10Yablo(2008)makesananalogouscriticismofRussel’sremarksaboutcausation,whichfollow:

If the cause is a process involving change within itself, we shall require… causal relationsbetween its earlier and laterparts;moreover itwould seem thatonly the laterparts canberelevanttotheeffect…Thusweshallbeledtodiminishthedurationofthecausewithoutlimit,andhowevermuchwemaydiminish it, therewill still remainanearlierpart,whichmightbealteredwithoutalteringtheeffect,sothatthetruecause…willnothavebeenreached.(Russell1917,135)

Russellsuggeststhatonlythe‘laterpart’(i.e.themoreproximalpart)ofthecausecanbetakentobethe cause itself, since the ‘earlier part’ (i.e. the more distal part) of the cause can obtain withoutguaranteeingtheeffect,ifthelaterpartdoesnotobtain.Thisisthecausalanalogueof (whatItaketobe)theimplicationoftheexclusionprinciple.InresponsetoRussell’sthesisaboutwhatittakestobeacause,Yablonotesthat, ‘ifthis…weretrulydisqualifying…essentiallyeverythingwouldberobbedof itsintuitive causal powers.’ (2008, 298) My point is that the exclusion principle has exactly the sameimplicationforexplanation: if itweretruethenessentiallyeverythingwouldberobbedof its intuitiveexplanatorypower.

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congratulateher.That is, Idon’tneed tobelieve that shehaswonanaward tobelieve that

congratulatingherwillmakeherhappy,andif Idon’tbelievethatitwouldmakeherhappyI

wouldn’tcongratulateher,evenifIbelievedthatshehadwonanaward.ThefactthatIbelieve

that congratulating her would make her happy is a more proximal explanation of why I

congratulateher.ButitisabsurdtoinferfromthisthatthefactthatIbelievethatshehadwon

anawarddoesnotexplainwhyIcongratulatedher!

Theexclusionprincipleisadamagingexplanatoryprejudice–discriminatingagainstallbutthe

mostproximalexplanationsofanygivenexplanandumwillactuallyimpedeourabilitytooffer

the explanations that we ordinarily give, becausewe are typically interested inmore distal

explanationsofanygivenexplanandumthanthemostimmediatelyproximalexplanation.For

instance, if you’re looking toprevent lung cancer then itmatters that Franzdeveloped lung

cancerbecausehesmoked–knowingthatcellmutationexplainshiscancerdoesn’thelpyou

much.What’smostwrongwiththeexclusionprinciple,then,isthatitforcesustosaythatthe

explanationsweareinterestedinaren’treallyexplanations.11

4 Wheredidwegowrong?

Supposing you accept my reasoning, some questions still remain: if the fact that Jean was

transfusedwithHIV-infectedbloodexplainswhyhedevelopedAIDS then itmust bepart of

somefullexplanationofwhyhedevelopedAIDS.However,asestablishedin(b),thereisafull

explanation ofwhy he developed AIDS such that the fact that hewas transfusedwith HIV-

infected blood is neither a part of that explanation nor is it part of a genuinely different

explanation.Sohowcould itbepartofanyexplanation? Itwasexactlythis lineofreasoning

that,in§(VIII)5,ledustotheexclusionprinciple.Sincewehaveestablishedthattheexclusion

principleisfalse,weshouldseewhatwaswrongwiththisreasoning.

The mistake, I suggest, was the implicit assumption that if two full explanations of some

explanandum are not identical then they must be genuinely different explanations of that

explanandum.Thepointtorecogniseisthatfortwofullexplanationstobegenuinelydifferent

requiresmore than just non-identity, it requires,per the difference principle, some formof

independence.Thatis,theanswertothequestionofhowitcouldbepartofanyexplanationis

thattwofullexplanationscanbenon-identicalwithoutbeinggenuinelydifferent.Forinstance,

therearetwofullexplanationsofthefactthatJeandevelopedAIDSsuchthat,althoughthey

11Recallthatin§(VIII)5.2,InotedthatmyargumentagainsttheexclusionprincipleisnotanargumentagainstKim’sprincipleofcausalexclusion(inspiteoftheapparentsimilarityoftheirnamesandforms).This isbecause,asmayquitebeclear,Kim’sprincipledoesnotexcludedistalcausationsinceit isonlyrestrictedtotheexclusionofsimultaneouscauses.

167

arenotgenuinelydifferentexplanationsofwhyhedevelopedAIDS,theyarenonethelessnot

identical; and, in particular, the fact that he was transfused with HIV-infected blood is an

elementofoneandnottheother.

5 Whichexplanationaredistalexplanationspartof?

Anotherquestion:whichfullexplanationofwhyhedevelopedAIDSincludesthefactthatJean

was transfusedwith infectedblood?Weknow it cannotbe the same fullexplanationas the

onethatincludesthefactthathehadHIV,becausehowhecontractedHIVisredundantinthat

explanation.Sowhichfullexplanationisit?

Let‘[HIV]’standforthefactthatJeanhasHIVandlet‘Δ1’standforafullexplanationofwhy

JeandevelopedAIDSofwhich[HIV]isapart.Nowlet‘[Transfusion]’standforthefactthathe

hadaninfectedbloodtransfusionandlet‘Γ’standforafullexplanationof[HIV]thatincludes

[Transfusion].Finally, let ‘Δ2’standforthesetobtainedbysubstitutingΓfor[HIV] inΔ1.12My

suggestionisthis:Δ2isafullexplanationofwhyJeanhadAIDS.

That is, ifwesubstitute the fullexplanationofwhy JeanhadHIV,Γ, for the fact thathehad

HIV,[HIV], intothefullexplanationofwhyhedevelopedAIDS,Δ1,thatproducesanotherfull

explanation ofwhy he hadAIDS, Δ2.Now, Δ2 is clearly not identical to Δ1, but it is also not

genuinely different from it. Moreover, since [Transfusion] is included in Δ2, and Δ2 is a full

explanation of why he developed AIDS, [Transfusion] is a partial explanation of why Jean

developedAIDS.

To answer the question then, in ‘plain’ English: the fact that Jean had an infected blood

transfusionisapartofthefullexplanationofwhyhedevelopedAIDSthatisgotbysubstituting

thefullexplanationofwhyJeanhadHIVforthefactthathehadHIVintothemoreproximal

fullexplanationofwhyhedevelopedAIDS.

6 Conclusion

Ihavearguedthattheexclusionprincipleisfalseandthatseeminglyexcludedfactscanexplain

anexplanandumbyexplainingsomethingthat,inturn,explainsthatexplanandum.Inthenext

chapterIwillsetouttheprinciplesofmyindirecttheoryofnormativereasonexplanation.

12Thatis:Δ! = Γ ∪ Δ! ∖ 𝐻𝐼𝑉 .

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(XII)

Explainingwhyweact

In which I say how normative reasons (and the appearance of them) explainwhy we act. I suggest that normative reasons explain an agent’s action byexplaining theirbelief that, in turn,explains theagent’saction. I suggest thatthey explain an agent’s belief by explaining the appearance of them that, inturn, explains the agent’s belief. I set out the implications of this view forexplanatory rationalism and for anti-psychological theories of reasons moregenerally.

In lightof theremarksof thepreviouschapter,myproposedanswertothequestionofhow

normativereasonsexplainouractionsisperhapsclear:

Factsaboutanagent’s[normative]1reasonsexplainanagent’sactionswhenevertheyexplainwhy she has the (true) beliefs she has about her [normative] reasons, beliefs that in turnexplainheractions.(Smith1998,38)

This is the indirect theoryofnormativereasonexplanation.Accordingtothis theorythefact

that my friend won an award explains why I congratulated her because it explains why I

believedthatshehadwonanaward,which,inturn,explainswhyIcongratulatedher.

Theindirecttheoryofnormativereasonexplanationhasbeenvariouslyconsidered,endorsed

or rejected, by others, though mainly in passing.2 However, I do not think it has been

consideredasthoroughlyasitoughttohavebeen,because,Isuggest,itsimplicationsforwhat

anagent’sreasonforactingcouldbeareprofound(regardlessofwhetherornotoneaccepts

explanatoryrationalism).

Moreover, as I will show, the indirect theory applies equally well as an account of how

experiencesexplainactions–thatis,anexperienceexplainsanagent’sactionifitexplainsthe

beliefthatexplainstheagent’saction.

In thenextchapter Iwill considerwhat the indirect theoryshouldsayabouthownormative

reasonsandtheappearanceofthemexplainwhyitisrationaltoact.

1Theseare‘justifying’reasonsinSmith’soriginal–thesubstitutionImakeispurelyterminological.2See:Collins(1997,111),Smith(1998,38),Dancy(2000,109–101),Davis(2005,74–75),Saporiti(2007,306),Raz(2009,197)andGibbons(2010,359).DustinLocke(2015)givesamorethoroughtreatmentofatheoryofthiskind,however,Locke’streatmentdifferssignificantlyfrommine,particularlyinsofarasitisfocusedonwhatitisforsomethingtobeanagent’sreasonforacting.

169

1 Whennormativereasonsexplain

Theprinciplebehindthe indirecttheory isthatwhenanagentactsforareason‘there isthe

“proximal”explanationoftheaction,givenbyspecifyingthepsychologicalstateoftheagent.

Thenthereisthe“distal”explanationoftheaction,givenbyspecifyingwhatisresponsiblefor

theagentgetting into that state.’ (Dancy2000,109)For this tobea fruitfulaccountofhow

normativereasonsexplainactions, itmustbethecasethatanormativereasoncanbe‘what

gets’anagentintothestateofbelievingthatnormativereason.

FigureXII-1:Theindirecttheoryofnormativereasonexplanation

Buthowdoesafactabouttheworldexplainone’sbelief in it?Thatexplanatoryrelation is, I

suggest,alsoindirect.

1.1 Hownormativereasonsexplainbeliefsinthem

Why do I believe that the earth is spherical? Because it is spherical! That which I believe

explainswhyIbelieveit.Likewise:ifI’mbeingrainedon,andI’mjumpingtoavoidthepuddles

andIseeothersrushingforshelter,ifyouweretothenaskmewhyIbelieveit’srainingIwill

reply,incredulously,‘Becauseitisraining!’

HowcouldthefactthatitisrainingexplainwhyIbelievethatitisraining?Perhapsyouthink

alongthese lines: it’snotthefact that itwasrainingthatexplainswhy Ibelievedthat itwas

raining,itisonlythefactthatitappearedtomeasthoughitwasraining.Ifitweren’training

butitstillappearedtomeasthoughitwas,Iwouldstillhavebelievedthatitwas.Andsoon.

Thisview,asIarguedin§(IX)5,isjustanotherinstanceofTheExplanatoryExclusionProblem,

which the previous chapter discredited. In short: even though how things appear to be

intermediate between the world and our beliefs about it, that does not prevent the world

frombeingabletoexplainthosebeliefs.

Towit:thefactthatthingsappeartobeacertainwaymaybethemoreproximalexplanation

ofanagent’sbeliefthattheyarethatway.However,ifthingsactuallyarethatway,andthey

appear to be that way because they are that way, then, given the transitivity of the

explanatory relations involved, the fact that they are that way can explain why an agent

believesthemtobethatway.Thisis,Isuggest,anindirecttheoryofbeliefexplanation.

Psychologicalfactexplains explains

Normativereason

Action

170

FigureXII-2:Theindirecttheoryofbeliefexplanation

SupposethatIbelievedthatitwasrainingbecauseI lookedoutofthewindowandsawrain.

Whydiditappeartomeasthoughitwasraining?Well,inpart,becauseitwasraining.Thefact

thatitwasrainingexplainswhyIsawrainandthuswhyitappearedasthoughitwasraining,

which explains why I believed that it was raining. So, because the explanatory relations

involvedaretransitive,thefactthatitwasrainingexplainswhyIbelievedthatitwasraining.

Ifyoudoubtthattheexplanatoryrelationsinvolvedaretransitive,pleasesuspendyourdoubts

forthemoment:thisisasubjectIwilldiscussatlengthinsubsequentchapters.

Likewise,Ibelievedthatmyfriendhadwonanaward,inpart,becauseIreadthatshehadwon

anaward.AndIreadthatshehadwonanaward,inpart,becauseshehadwonanaward.3The

factthatshehadwonanawardexplainswhyIreadthatshehadwonanaward,whichexplains

whyIbelievedthatshehadwonanaward.Again,becausetheexplanatoryrelationsinvolved

aretransitive,wecansaythatthefactthatmyfriendwonanawardexplainswhy Ibelieved

thatshehadwonanaward.

So,thewaythatnormativereasonsexplainourbeliefsinthemisbyexplainingwhyitseemed

tousasthoughthosenormativereasonswerethecase.

1.2 Hownormativereasonsexplainactions

Whattheindirecttheoryofnormativereasonexplanationsuggestsisthis:Icongratulatedmy

friend,inpart,becauseIbelievedthatshehadwonanaward,andIbelievedthatshehadwon

anaward,inpart,becauseIreadthatshehadwonanaward,andIreadthatshehadwonan

award,inpart,becauseshewonanaward.So,becausetheexplanatoryrelationsinvolvedare

transitive,wecansaythatIcongratulatedmyfriend,inpart,becauseshewonanaward.

FigureXII-3:TheexplanationofwhyIcongratulatedmyfriend

3We could spell out the chain further: I read that she had won an award, in part, because thenewspaperprintedanarticleabout it,andtheyprintedanarticleabout it, inpart,becauseareporterwroteanarticleabout it,andtheywroteabout it, inpart,becausetheywitnessedherwintheawardandtheywitnessedherwinit,inpart,becauseshewonit.Thepointisthatgiventhetransitivityoftheexplanatoryrelationsinvolvedthereisnorequirementtospellouttheseintermediatesteps.

Howthingsappeartobeexplains explains

Theworld Belief

Ireadthatshehadwonan

award

Myfriendwonanaward

Ibelievedthathadshewonan

awardexplains

Icongratulated

herexplains explains

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1.3 Whennormativereasonsdon’texplain

Recallthatwedon’ttendtogivenormativereasonexplanationsininstancesoffalsebeliefsor

in Gettier cases – we say that, in those cases, the normative reason does not explain the

agent’s action. The indirect theoryofnormative reasonexplanation tellsuswhy:because in

both falsebelief casesandGettier cases, thenormative reasondoesnotexplain theagent’s

beliefinit.

First, a false belief case: when Sally ran because she (mistakenly) believed that a bear was

chasingher,wedon’tsaythatsheranbecauseabearwaschasingher.Whynot?Becausethe

proposition thatabearwas chasingher doesnotexplainwhy shebelieved that abearwas

chasingher.Clearenough.

FigureXII-4:TheexplanationofwhySallyran

Second,aGettiercase:recallthatEdmund’snormallyreliablefriendtoldhim,onawhim,that

theiceinthemiddleofthelakewasthin,althoughshehadnoideaabouttheactualstatusof

theice.AsaresultEdmundskatedbytheedgeofthelake;thatis,heskatedbytheedgeofthe

lake,inpart,becausehebelievedthattheiceinthemiddlewasthin.

Now, as it turns out, it actually was thin. However, as we have already acknowledged (see

§(IV)1.4),thefactthattheiceinthemiddleofthelakewasthindoesnotexplainwhyEdmund

skatedattheedge.Whynot?Wellaccordingtothe indirecttheorytit isbecause itdoesnot

explainwhyhebelieved that itwasthin;and itdoesnotexplainwhyhebelievedthat itwas

thinbecause itdoesnotexplainwhyhis friendtoldhimthatthe icewasthin (which iswhat

explainswhyhebelievedthatitwasthin).

FigureXII-5:TheexplanationofwhyEdmundskatedattheedgeofthelake

2 Implicationsforexplanatoryrationalism

Recall that explanatory rationalism requires that an agent’s reason for acting must both

explaintheiractionandexplainwhyitwasprotantorationalforthemtodoit.AsIsetoutin

Sheheardabear-likesound

AbearwaschasingSally

Shebelievedthatabearwaschasingherexplains

Sheranexplains

Edmund’sfriendtoldhimthattheicewasthin

Theiceinthemiddleofthelakewasthin

Hebelievedthattheicewasthinexplains

Heskatedattheedge

explains

172

§(VI),ifexplanatoryrationalismistobeconsistentwiththeprimafaciereasonableclaimsset

outin§§(II)-(IV),thefollowingmustbetrue:

(R1) Icongratulatedmyfriendbecauseshehadwonanaward.

(R2) IcongratulatedmyfriendbecauseIreadthatshehadwonanaward

(R3) Itwaspro tanto rational forme to congratulatemy friend because she had

wonanaward.

(R4) ItwasprotantorationalformetocongratulatemyfriendbecauseIreadthat

shehadwonanaward.

Thediscussionoftheprevioussectionhasdemonstratedhowitisthat(R1)and(R2)aretrue:

theexplanans ineachstatementexplainswhy I congratulatedmy friendbyexplainingwhy I

believedthatshehadwonanaward.

FigureXII-6:Explainingwhyweact

In the next chapter I will discuss (R3) and (R4), but before then I want to discuss the

implications of the indirect theory of normative reason explanation for anti-psychological

theoriesofreasonsmoregenerally.

3 Implicationsforanti-psychologicaltheoriesofreasons

RecallthatTheExplanatoryExclusionProblemwasthemotivatingargumentforpsychologism

aboutthereasonsforwhichweact.Thereasoningwentlikethis:anagent’sreasonforacting

must always explain their action (recall §(IV)1.2), however, only features of an agent’s

psychologycanexplaintheiractions(asperTheExplanatoryExclusionProblem),therefore,an

agent’sreasonforactingmustalwaysbeafeatureoftheirpsychology.

Thisargumentis,aswehavenoted,themajorargumentagainstanytheorythatsuggeststhat

reasonsaresometimesnotfeaturesofourpsychology.4Therejectionoftheexclusionprinciple

underminedthatargument,strengtheningthecaseforanti-psychologicaltheories.

Theindirecttheoryofnormativereasonexplanationnowprovidesuswithanaccountofwhyit

iswrong:normativereasonscanexplainactions,andtheydosobyexplainingthebeliefsthat

4Note: anti-psychological theoriesdon’t insist that reasonsarenever featuresofourpsychology, justthattheyatleastsometimesaren’t.

Howthingsappeartobeexplains explains

Normativereason Belief

explainsAction

173

explain our actions. This theory does not deny the primacy of the psychological, on which

psychologisminsists,butitnonethelessprovidesarolefortheworldinexplainingwhatagents

do. The indirect theory of normative reason explanation thus provides a response to

psychologismforallanti-psychologicaltheories,andnotmerelyexplanatoryrationalism.

4 Conclusion

One of the challenges I set myself was showing how it was that normative reasons could

explain an agent’s action. I take that challenge to have now beenmet. In particular, I have

arguedthat, regardlessofwhetherornotyouacceptexplanatoryrationalism(andtheother

arguments for it that follow), the indirect theory of normative reason explanation can still

provideyouwithanaccountofhowitisthatnormativereasonscanexplainouractions.

Thenextchapterdiscusseshowit isthatnormativereasons(andperceptualexperiencesand

thelike)canexplainwhyitisrationalforanagenttodosomething.Beforethatdiscussion,in

the Appendix to this chapter, I consider two potential objections to the indirect theory of

normativereasonexplanation.

Appendix

A.1 Objections

Objection1 Youhavesuggestedthatanormativereasonexplainsanagent’sactiononlyif

it explains a feature of their psychology that explains their action. However, here is a

counterexampletothatclaim:

Thatitisabouttorainmayexplainwhyeveryoneiscomingin.Istheirbeliefthatitisabouttoraintobeexplainedbyitsbeingabouttorain?Orisitrathertheblacknessofthecloudsandthesuddendrop in temperature? These are not themselves to be explained by its being about to rain. Thecloudsarenotblackbecauseitwillshortlyrain.(Dancy2000,112)

For expositional simplicity, let’s restrict Dancy’s example to claims about someone in

particular;callhim‘Jim’.ForJim,theargumentgoeslikethis:

(a) ThefactthatitisabouttorainisanormativereasonforJimtocomein;

(b) ThefactthatitisabouttorainexplainswhyJimiscomingin;and

(c) ThefactthatitisabouttoraindoesnotexplainwhyJimbelievesthatitisabouttorain.

174

If (a), (b) and (c) are all true then it is not true that, as I have argued, a normative reason

explainsanagent’sactiononlyif5itexplainsafeatureoftheirpsychologythatinturnexplains

theiraction.6

Response Iamhappytoagreethat(a)istrue,soImustrejecteither(b)or(c).Thereare

some7whoreject(b),onthegroundthatfactsaboutthefuturecan’texplainpresentactions.I

have some sympathy for that response; however, itmay not fare sowell with facts known

from inference, and may rely on a causal analysis of the explanatory relations involved.

Regardless, to mymind there is a more compelling response: I do not know how one can

consistentlymaintainboth(b)and(c).

TheonlyreasonthatDancygivesindefenceof(c)isthattheblacknessofthecloudsetc.isnot

explainedby the fact that it is raining.That is trueenough.But tomakethatargument is to

embracean indirect theoryofbeliefexplanation–namelythatsomefactpexplainsthefact

thatanagentbelievesthatponlyifitexplainssomefactthat,inturn,explainsthefactthatp.

Thatis,Dancypresupposestheindirecttheoryofbeliefexplanationinsuggestingthatthefact

thatitisabouttoraincan’texplainwhyJimbelievesthatitisabouttorainbecauseitdoesnot

explain the blackness of the clouds etc.My concern is that I don’t knowwhywe should be

indirecttheoristsaboutbeliefexplanationbutnotaboutactionexplanation.

Ofcourse,ifoneweretodeny(c),andinsistthatthefactthatitisabouttoraindoesexplain

why Jim believes that it is about to rain, then one might wonder what the explanatory

connection between those two facts is (given that it is unmediated by any perceptual

experience).However,Idon’tseehowonecanwonderthiswithoutlikewisewonderingwhat

theexplanatoryconnectionbetweenthefactthatitisabouttorainandthefactthatJimcame

inis.Mypointisthis:Idon’tseewhatbasisonecouldhaveforthinkingthatboth(b)and(c)

aretrue–eitheroneaccepts(b)and,forthesamereason,rejects(c);oroneaccepts(c)and,

forthesamereason,rejects(b).

So,ifthereisnoconsistentbasisforthetruthofboth(b)and(c),thenthisisnoobjectionto

theindirecttheoryofnormativereasonexplanation.

5Atleastinnon-weirdcases.6Anargumentofthiskindcanlikewisebemadeforfactsthatarebelievedonthebasisofinference(i.e.whereaperceptualexperiencethatexplainsone’sbeliefthatpisalsoseeminglyisnotexplainedbythefact that p). Alvin Goldman (1967) considered these sorts of examples in his causal theory ofknowledge,which is similar to the indirect theory in several respects.However,his response to themdiffersfrommine.7Forinstance:Davis(2003,456),Gibbons(2010,359)andLocke(2015,194).

175

Objection2 Evenifweacceptthisindirecttheoryofnormativereasonexplanation,itdoes

notguaranteethatyoucongratulatedyourfriendbecauseshewonanaward(i.e. itdoesnot

guaranteethetruthof(R1)).Whynot?Becauseonemaybescepticalastowhetherornotthe

factthatyourfriendwonanawardreallyexplainsthefactthatyoubelievedthatshehad.

Forinstance,supposethatyourfriend’sawardisparticularlyobscureandyoujusthappento

stumbleuponasmallarticleaboutitinanewspaperthatyouwouldn’tnormallyread.Under

these circumstances then (at least on, for instance, a difference-making account of

explanation)onemightsaythatthefactthatyourfriendwonanawarddoesnotreallyexplain

whyyoubelievedthatshehad,8anditconsequentlydoesnotexplainwhyyoucongratulated

her.Thus, in spiteofyour indirect theoryofnormative reasonexplanation, (R1)maystillbe

false.

Response Ihave three responses to thisobjection.First, I could justaccept that (R1) is

not truewhenmy discovering aboutmy friend’s award is so chancy. Theremight be other

examples (e.g. my friend wins a Nobel Prize), for which the explanatory connection is

sufficientlyrobusttocounterfactualsforthefactthatmyfriendwonanawardtocountasan

explanationofmyaction.Onestrategycouldthusbetojustrestrict(R1)toaclaimaboutsuch

cases.Therewouldbelittlelostformytheoryinmakingsucharestriction.

Mysecondresponse,however,istonotethatevenifmyfriend’sawardhadbeenobscure,and

I had only foundout about it because I stumbled upon an article about it in a newspaper I

wouldn’tnormallyread,Istillthinkthatthefactthatmyfriendwontheaward(partly)explains

whyIbelievedthatshedidand,therefore,whyIcongratulatedher.So,totheextentthatyour

account of explanation implies that it doesn’t, it is not really the sort of account that I am

anywayinclinedtoaccept.9

8Since there are very nearby possible worlds in which you don’t see the article, but in which shenonethelesswinstheaward.9Whatmaybeatworkhere isanexplanatoryanalogueofNedHall’s (2004)claimthat thereare twoconcepts of causation: productive and counterfactual dependence. I suggest that difference-makingaccountsofexplanationcanbeunderstoodasparticularkindofexplanatoryanalogueofcounterfactualdependenceconceptsofcausation(evenwithoutrestrictingthediscussiononlytocausalexplanation).Now,whilstIdon’twanttorejectdifference-makingaccountsofexplanation,IwouldsuggestthatthereisabonafidemannerofexplanationthatistheexplanatoryanalogueofHall’sproductivecausation.TherelevanceofthisobservationtothisdiscussionisthatHalldemonstratedthatonecanhaveproductivecausationwithoutcounterfactualdependence,andviceversa.Thus,mysuggestion(modestlymade)isthattheremaybetwodifferentconceptsofexplanationthatcanlikewisecomeapart.Thus,itmaybethateventhoughthefactthatmyfriendwonanawarddoesnotexplainwhyIbelievedthatshehadifwehaveinmindaparticularsortofcounterfactualdependenceconceptofexplanation(i.e.difference-making),itmaynonethelessstillexplainitifwehaveinmindtheproductiveconcept.

176

Mythirdresponse:inthechaptersthatfollowIarguethatifanagentknowsthatpthenthat

entailsthatthereisaparticularexplanatoryrelationbetweenthefactthatpandthefactthat

theybelievethatp. Ifyouacceptthis,thenyoumusteitherrejecttheclaimthatIknewthat

myfriendhadwonanawardoracceptthatthefactthatmyfriendhadwonanawardexplains

why Ibelievedthatshehad.10Since Ido thinkthat (even inthechancycase) Iknewthatmy

friendhadwonanaward,Iamalsoinclinedtothinkthatthefactthatshehadwonanaward

explains why I believed that she had, and, thereby, explains why I congratulated her.

However,if,inthechancycase,youdon’tthinkthatIknewthatmyfriendhadwonanaward,

then you could (aswedid for the first response) just restrict (R1) to a claim about cases in

whichIknewthatmyfriendwonanaward,withoutmuchlossformytheory.

10If you reject the claim about knowledge that I go on to make you are, of course, under no suchcompulsion.However,ifyourejectthisclaimthenyouwillperhapshavemoresignificantobjectionstomytheorythanjustthis.

177

(XIII)

Explainingwhyitisrationaltoact

Inwhich I saywhen something explainswhy it’s rational to act, andwhen itdoesn’t. I suggest that normative reasons or appearances explain why it isrational to act only if they explain those beliefs that in turn explainwhy it isrationaltoact.Inotethatitistemptingtoinferthatifanagent’sbeliefexplainswhyitisrationalforthemtodosomeactionthenwhateverexplainsthatbeliefalso explains why it is rational for them to do that action. I show how thatinference leads toanapparentdilemmaforexplanatory rationalism. I counselagainst that inference, by noting that different kinds of explanatory relationsmaynotbetransitivewitheachother. I thensetout thetaskahead:showingthat the explanatory relations concernedare transitivewhen, andonlywhen,explanatoryrationalismneedsthemtobe.

Thereisaseeminglyclearwayinwhichtheaccountofthepreviouschaptercouldalsobeused

asanaccountofhowitisthatnormativereasons(ortheappearanceofthem)explainwhyitis

rational foranagent toact:wecansay thatanormative reason (or theappearanceofone)

explainswhy it is rational for an agent to act if it explains the belief that explainswhy it is

rationalfortheagenttoact.

So,forinstance,whenIlookoutofthewindowandseerain,wecansaythatthefactthatitis

rainingexplainswhyitisrationalformetotakemyumbrellabecauseitexplainswhyIbelieved

that itwas raining.Thisproposalvindicatesexplanatory rationalism’sclaimthat thingsother

than features of an agent’s psychology could explain why it is rational for them to do

something.

However,asIwillargue,weshouldnotassumethatjustbecausesomefactexplainsanagent’s

beliefandtheirbeliefexplainswhyitisrationalforthemtodosomeaction,thatthatfactalso

explainswhyitisrationalforthemtodothataction.Thatis,Isuggest,thereareoccasionson

whichtheexplanatoryrelationsinvolvedaren’ttransitive.

In the next chapter I will provide an account of what separates those cases in which the

explanatoryrelationsinvolvedaretransitivefromthoseinwhichtheyaren’t.

1 Anotherindirecttheory

RecallthatIneedtodemonstratethefollowing:

(R3) Itwaspro tanto rational forme to congratulatemy friend because she had

wonanaward.

178

(R4) ItwasprotantorationalformetocongratulatemyfriendbecauseIreadthat

shehadwonanaward.

The question of how these claims could be true is an instance of amore general question,

namely:howisitthateithernormativereasons(quafactsabouttheworld)ortheappearance

ofthemcouldexplainwhyitis(protanto)rationalforanagenttoact?Myansweristhatthey

explainindirectly.

FigureXIII-1:Explainingwhyitisrationaltoact

The fact that it is raining explains why it appeared to me as though it was raining, which

explainswhyIbelievedthat itwasraining,whichexplainswhyitwasrationalformetotake

myumbrella.So,becausetheexplanatoryrelationsinvolvedaretransitive,thefactthatitwas

rainingexplainswhyitwasrationalformetotakemyumbrella.

Likewise, as we established in the previous chapter, the fact thatmy friendwon an award

explainswhy I read that shehadwonanaward,whichexplainswhy Ibelieved that shehad

wonanaward,whichexplainswhy itwasprotantorational formetocongratulateher.And

this is why (R3) and (R4) are true: we can say that it was pro tanto rational for me to

congratulatemyfriendbothbecauseshewonanawardandbecauseIreadthatshehadwon

anaward,andwecansaythatbecausetheexplanatoryrelationsinvolvedaretransitive.

2 Isexplanationtransitive?Anapparentdilemma

Ihavesaidthatnormativereasonsandhowthingsappeartobecanexplainwhyitisprotanto

rational foranagenttodosomeactiononly if,andbecause, theyexplainoneoftheagent’s

beliefs,which,inturn,explainswhyitisprotantorationalforthemtodothataction.

AsIhavenoted,thisindirectmannerofexplanationreliesonthetransitivityoftheexplanatory

relations involved. With that in mind, we might then reason from this observation to the

followingtheoryaboutwhatexplainswhyitisrationaltoact:

- TheNaïveTheory:ifthefactthatAbelievesthatpexplainswhyitisprotantorationalforA toφ thenwhateverexplainswhyAbelievesthatpalsoexplainswhyitwasprotantorationalforAtoφ.

Howthingsappeartobeexplains explains

Normativereason Belief

explains

Rationalityofaction

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Inwhat follows Iwillarguethat thenaïvetheory is false.Before Idoso,however, Iwant to

show how the naïve theory might seem to create a dilemma for explanatory rationalism,

irrespectiveofwhetheritistrueorfalse.

Recallwhatexplanatoryrationalismhastosayaboutthereasonsforwhichweact:

- Explanatoryrationalismaboutthereasonsforwhichweact:Foranyp,pisA’sreasonforφingifandonlyifpexplainswhyitisprotantorationalforAtoφandexplains(intherightway)whyAφ’d.

This,combinedwiththenaïvetheory,meansthatifAφsbecauseAbelievedthatpanditwas

protantorationalforAtoφbecauseAbelievedthatp,thenwhateverexplainswhyAbelieved

thatpisalsoA’sreasonforφing.

Butnoticethatsometimeswecanexplainwhysomeonebelievedsomethingbycitingthings

thatareplainlynotthereasonsforwhichtheyact,suchasbrainaneurismsorpsychosis.Were

thenaïvetheorytrue,then,theexplanatoryrationalistwouldbeforcedtoconcludethat,ifan

aneurismexplainswhyanagenthassomebelief,andtheyact rationallyon thatbelief, then

theirreasonforactingisthattheyhadabrainaneurism.Thisisanundesirableconclusion.1

Andyet, if thenaïve theory isn’t true, thenexplanation isnotagenerally transitive relation.

Butthe indirecttheoryofnormativereasonexplanation,and,moregenerally,myaccountof

why(R1)to(R4)aretrue,reliesonthetransitivityofexplanation.

Here, then, is the apparent dilemma: either (i) we accept the naïve theory, which means

rejectingexplanatory rationalismabout reasons forwhichweact;2or (ii)wereject thenaïve

theorybyrejectingthetransitivityofexplanation,whichmeansgivinguponthetruthof(R1)

to(R4).3Thenextsectionisdevotedtoarguingthatthisdilemmaisonlyapparentandthatthe

appearanceofadilemmais theresultofamistake–thesamemistakethat ledtothenaïve

theory.

1Ofcourse,thefactthatonehasabrainaneurismorpsychosiscouldbeareasonforwhichonedoessomething (e.g. goes to the doctor). However, if that brain aneurism just causes one to have anirrelevantbeliefthroughsomearationalprocess,wewouldtypicallynotwanttoconcludethatwhenanagentactsbecauseofthatbelief,theirreasonforactingisthattheyhadabrainaneurism.2Orsayingthatwhenabrainaneurismcausesmetobelievethatitisrainingthatmyreasonfortakingmy umbrella was that I had a brain aneurism. I take this to be worse than rejecting explanatoryrationalism.3 Which means, in turn, that explanatory rationalism reduces to psychologism. It reduces topsychologismbecause,ifexplanationcan’tbetransitive,thenonlyfeaturesofanagent’spsychologycanexplainwhytheyactorwhyitisrationalforthemtoact.

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3 Theapparentdilemmaisnotadilemma

Onesimple,butmistaken,waytoarriveatthedilemmaistothinkthatthereisonlyonekind

ofexplanatoryrelation.Werethattruethenanyinstanceofafailureoftransitivity(i.e.ifthe

naïvetheorywerefalse)wouldmeanthatexplanatoryrelationsarenottransitive.4However,

as the discussions of previous chapters have suggested, there is not just one kind of

explanatoryrelation.Wecanatleastdistinguishcausalfromnon-causalexplanatoryrelations,

andIsuggestthatthereareprobablystillmorefine-graineddistinctionsbetweenexplanatory

relationsthatthatdistinctionignores.

Amorenuancedbut,as Iwillargue,equallymistakenapproach is tomaintain thatalthough

there are different kinds of explanatory relation, if any explanatory relations are transitive

thentheyarealltransitivewitheachother.Isuggestthatit isthisfallaciousassumptionthat

ledtothenaïvetheory.

Myargument against this assumptionproceeds in two stages: firstly Iwill demonstrate that

someexplanatoryrelationsaretransitive;secondlyIwillgiveanexampleinwhichexplanatory

relationsarenot transitive.Together theseamount toacounterexample to theclaim that if

anyexplanatoryrelationsaretransitivethentheyallare.

3.1 Someexplanatoryrelationsaretransitive

Firstly,as§(XI)demonstrated,wehavegoodreasonstothinkthatsomeexplanatoryrelations

are transitive: if they weren’t then distal explanations of some explanandumwould never

reallybeexplanationsofthatexplanandum.5Since,inbothordinaryandscientificlife,weare

mostly interested in somewhat distal explanations, and since the explanations we normally

givearesomewhatdistal,ourordinaryandscientificexplanatorypracticeassumesthatatleast

someexplanatory relations are transitive. So, Iwill take it as a given that someexplanatory

relationsaretransitive,becausethatisthebestaccountofwhydistalexplanationsthatinvolve

suchrelationsexplain.

4Insofarasachainofexplanatoryrelationsdoesnotguaranteeanexplanatoryrelationlinkingthetwoexplanationsofthechain.5Ofcourse it’spossiblethatsomedistalexplanationsexplainforreasonsotherthanthetransitivityoftheexplanatoryrelationsinvolved.I’mnotsurewhatthosereasonscouldbe,butonemightbeabletoconstructexamples.Mypointisratherthatthetransitivityoftheexplanatoryrelationsinvolvedisreallythebestand simplestaccountofhowdistalexplanationsexplain,and it reallydoesexplainhow theyexplaininatleastsomecases.

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3.2 Notallexplanatoryrelationsaretransitivewitheachother

InthissectionIwillprovideanexampleinwhichthetransitivityofexplanationfails,andIwill

suggest that it is because the explanatory chain involves different kinds of explanatory

relationsthataren’ttransitivewitheachother.

3.2.1 Whenexplanationisn’ttransitive

RecallthatSallybelievedthatabearwaschasingherbecausesheheardabear-likenoise.Why

didshehearabear-likenoise?Becausethewindrustledthetreesinsuchandsuchaway.That

is,thenoisethatSallyheardhadnothingtodowithanybear,butitnonethelesssoundedvery

bear-like.

WehavealreadynotedthatitwasprotantorationalforSallytorunbecauseshebelievedthat

abearwaschasingher.Andwhatexplainsherbeliefthatabearwaschasingherwasthatshe

heard a bear-like noise (it appeared to her as though a bear was chasing her), and what

explains thatwas the fact that the trees rustled (in theway that they did). Thus, there is a

chainofexplanatoryrelationsfromthefactthatitwasprotantorationalforSallytoruntothe

fact that the trees rustled. But shouldwe say that itwaspro tanto rational for Sally to run

(evenpartly)becausethetreesrustled?

Idon’t thinkweshould. Itseemsasthougheven ifoneweretogivethissortofexplanation

one would then be forced to add that Sally believed that a bear was chasing her. And, I

suggest,thatisbecauseitisonlyreallythebeliefthatisdoingtheexplaining.6

However, if the fact that the trees rustled does not (even partially) explain why it was pro

tantorationalforSallytorun,7thentheexplanatoryrelationsinvolvedinthiscasemustnotbe

transitive.8

Perhapsyouobject:thisdoesnotviolatetransitivitybecausetheoddrustlingofthetreesdoes

not explainwhy she heard a bear-like sound.Of course, you say, it explainswhy she heard

something,butitdoesn’texplainwhythatsoundsoundedlikeabear.Whilethiswouldbeall

thebetterformeifIagreedwithit,unfortunatelyIdon’t:ofcourseotherfactorsmaydomore

toexplaintheparticularcharacterofthenoisemade,butthefactthatthetreesrustledinthat

wayis,Isuggest,apartoftheexplanationofwhysheheardabear-likenoise.

6IfyouworrythatthisistooclosetotheellipticalviewthatIrejected,notehowwearen’tforcedtoaddanythingaboutthebeliefwhenwesaythatItookmyumbrellabecauseitisraining.7Ofcourse,ifyourviewofexplanationisthatitispurelyarelationofcounterfactualdependence,thenitdoesexplainit.However,Ithinkthatisawrongaccountofexplanation(seemyresponsetoObjection2intheAppendixtothepreviouschapter).8Thisfollowsnecessarily.

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3.2.2 Whyexplanationwasn’ttransitive

The rustling in the treesexplained thenoise thatSallyheard, thenoiseexplainedherbelief,

and her belief explained why it was rational for her to run. However, I’ve suggested, the

explanatoryrelationshere9aren’talltransitivewitheachother.Whynot?Because,Isuggest,

theyaredifferentsortsofexplanatoryrelation.

Whatsortofexplanation istheexplanationofwhy itwasprotantorational forSallytorun?

Well, it isn’tcausal.Even ifweallowthatourbeliefscauseouractions, it’s stillnot thecase

that they cause it to be rational for us to act – anymore than the fact that a person is in

troublecauses it toberight tosavethem.Causation justseemstobethewrongconcept to

invoke when describing this sort of explanatory relation. That is, the explanatory relation

betweenmybeliefandtherationalityofmyactionisanon-causalexplanatoryrelation.

Incontrast,theonlysenseinwhichtherustlingofthetreesexplainswhySallyheardabear-

likesoundisacausalone;thatistheexplanatoryrelationhereisacausalexplanatoryrelation.

So, theexplanatory relationsbetween (i) the rustling treesand thenoiseSallyheardand (ii)

herbeliefandtherationalityofrunningareclearlyoftwodifferentkinds.AndIsuggestthat

thedifferentcharacteroftheexplanatoryrelationsinvolvediswhytheyaren’ttransitivewith

eachother.NotethatI’mnotsayingthatcausalexplanatoryrelationsarenevertransitivewith

non-causalexplanatoryrelations10–all Iamsayingisthattheseparticularsortsofcausaland

non-causalexplanatoryrelationsaren’ttransitive.

3.3 Theapparentdilemmaisn’tadilemma

Isaidthatthenaïvetheoryandtheapparentdilemmaitproduceswere(atbest)theresultof

the assumption that if anyexplanatory relations are transitive thenall explanatory relations

are transitive with each other. The argument of the previous two sections disproves that

assumption–whilesomekindsofexplanatoryrelationsaretransitive, itdoesnotfollowthat

differentkindsofexplanatoryrelationsaretransitivewitheachother.

Thus, there is no dilemma for explanatory rationalism because the naïve theory and the

consequent apparent dilemmawerebasedon themistaken assumption that all explanatory

relationsmustbetransitivewitheachother.

9That is:between (i) the treesand thenoise; (ii) thenoiseand thebelief; and (iii) thebeliefand therationalityofrunning.10That is, theremaybeother kindsof causal andnon-causal explanatory relations that are transitivewitheachother.

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However, explanatory rationalism is not out of difficulty yet, in the next section I will

discussion a new challenge posed by this response. Namely this: why should it be that the

explanatoryrelationsinvolvedaretransitivewheneverexplanatoryrationalismneedsthemto

be,andnotwhenitneedsthemnottobe?

4 Thechallenge

We are talking about three sets of explanatory relations: the relation from theworld to an

appearance, from an appearance to a belief, and then the relation of that belief to the

rationalityofanagent’saction.WhatIseemtobesayingabouttheseexplanatoryrelationsis

this:sometimestheyaretransitivewitheachother,andsometimestheyaren’t.Inparticular,I

amsaying that theexplanatory relations inFigureXIII-2are transitive,while theexplanatory

relationsinFigureXIII-3aren’t.

FigureXIII-2:Achainofexplanatoryrelationsthatarealltransitive

FigureXIII-3:Achainofexplanatoryrelationsthatarenotalltransitive

Isn’t this just ad-hoc? Why should we suppose that the relations are transitive when

explanatoryrationalismneedsthemtobe,butaren’twhen itneedsthemnottobe?That is

theremainingchallengeforexplanatoryrationalism.

I want to consider one response to this challenge that is natural, but won’t work, before

settingthestageformyownresponse.

5 Theunsuccessfulnaturalstrategy

A natural strategymight be to reason as follows: perhaps in the second case the failure of

transitivity is not in the explanatory relation per se, but in the putative explanans (i.e. the

rustlingofthetrees);it’sneitherthecontentofSally’sbeliefnorisitsomethingthatherbelief

was based on – it’s of no epistemic importance. And perhaps because it’s of no epistemic

importance, it’s just thewrong sort of thing to do the right sort of explaining. I could then

refinemy theory in away that excluded these sorts of (epistemically unimportant) putative

Ireadthatshehadwonan

awardnewspaper

Myfriendwonanaward

Ibelievedthatshewonan

awardexplains

Congratulatingherwasprotantorationalexplains explains

Sallyheardabear-likesound

Thetreesrustled

Shebelievedthatabearwaschasingherexplains

Runningwasprotantorational

explainsexplains

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explanans for some principled reason, and I could then insist that whatever met those

conditionsandexplainedmybelieftherebyalsoexplainedwhatthebeliefexplained.

There are twoproblemswith this strategy: firstly, it is not at all clear tome that one could

make such a restriction without it still being, in some respect, ad-hoc. Secondly, andmore

seriously,explanatoryrelationsmayfailtobetransitiveevenwhentheputativeexplanansisa

normativereason(i.e.therightsortofthing),asthenextexampledemonstrates.

5.1.1 Anotherexampleoffailureofexplanatorytransitivity

SupposethatIaminasealedroomthat,unbeknownsttome,isslowlybeingfilledwithcarbon

monoxide. Suppose further that, after a short while, the carbon monoxide causes me to

hallucinate,and,bysheerchance, Ihaveahallucinationofareliable friendbursting intothe

roomandwarningmethatitisfillingupwithcarbonmonoxide.Itisrationalformetoleave,11

andIdulydoso.12

The fact that the room was filled with carbon monoxide (partly) explains why I had the

hallucination.Ofcourse,itisonlyapartofthatexplanation–otherfactorsofmypsycheand

the likewilldomore toexplain the content ofmyhallucination,but the fact that therewas

carbonmonoxide in the room is, I suggest, a part of the full explanation ofwhy I had that

hallucination.

Moreover,thefactthatIhadthathallucinationexplainswhyIbelievedthattherewascarbon

monoxide in the room.And the fact that I believed that therewas carbonmonoxide in the

roomexplainswhyitwasprotantorationalformetoleave.

Again,wehaveanexplanatorychainconnectingthefact that therewascarbonmonoxide in

the roomwith the fact that itwaspro tanto rational formeto leave.Butdoes the fact that

therewascarbonmonoxideintheroomexplainwhyitwasprotantorationalformetoleave?

Idon’tthinkso.

It’stemptingtoputitlikethis:Iwasn’treallyawareofthatfact.Iamnotreallyrespondingto

the fact that there is carbonmonoxide in the roombecausemybelief is just truebyhappy

accident.That is,thatfact justseemstostand inthewrongsortofrelationtothefactthat I

believedthatitwasraining,i.e.itstandsinapurelycausalexplanatoryrelationtothatfact.11Assume,ifyoulike,thatIknowthatIamnotpronetohallucinations,andalsodon’tbelievethatthereisanythingthatmightmakebehallucinatenow.12Thanks for thisexampleareowedto JohnRoberts,whoput it tome inaseminar.This iswhatonemightcalla‘deviant’Gettiercase,involvingbothajustified,truebeliefthatfallsshortofknowledgeanda deviant causal chain linking the fact itself with the belief. This sort of case is a well-establishedproblem for Goldman’s (1967) causal theory of knowledge (see e.g. McDonnell 2015). I will discussdeviantcausalchainsingreaterdetailinthenextchapter.

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5.1.2 Thenaturalstrategyisunsuccessful

Nowwecanseewhythenaturalstrategyisunsuccessful:intheexamplejustconsidered,the

would-beexplanans is the right sortof thing– it isanormative reason, indeed, it isactually

whatIbelieve–andyettheexplanatoryrelationsinvolvedstillaren’ttransitive.So,asawayof

distinguishingbetweenthedifferentcases,thenaturalstrategyfails.That is, it’snotbecause

ofthenatureofthewould-beexplanansthattransitivityofexplanationfails.

The next section sketches out my strategy, which will be developed in detail in the next

chapter.

6 Themysteriousstrategy

Here is thechallenge: Ineedaprincipledaccountofwhy it is that theexplanatory relations

fromthebelievedfacttotherationalityoftheactionaretransitiveinthe‘award’casebutnot

ineitherthe‘Sally’caseorthe‘carbonmonoxide’case.Whatisthataccount?

I’vehintedatmyansweralready,andMcDowellexpressestheintuitionaboutwhatmarksout

the ‘award’ case from the others nicely thus: ‘we can say that the fact itself is exerting a

rational influenceontheagent’swill;wecansay that…theagent is respondingrationally to

thefactitself.’(2013,17)Now,in§(X)4.2.1,Ilamentedtheinscrutablymetaphoricalcharacter

ofthesesortsofremarks,so,whilsttheywilldoasanexpressionoftheintuition,Iwouldbe

fallingwellshortofmyownstandardifIleftitthere.

InthechaptersthatfollowIwanttogiveanon-metaphoricalcharacterisationofwhatitisthat

distinguishesthe‘award’casefromtheothers.Inparticular,Iwillargue,thereisamysterious,

transitive,non-causalexplanatoryrelationbetweenthefactthatmyfriendwonanawardand

thefactthatIbelievedthatshedidwhichislackingintheothercases.

Inthesubsequentchapter, Iwillargue,thismysteryrelationistransitivewiththenon-causal

explanatoryrelationthatobtainsbetweenthefactthatIbelievedthatmyfriendhadwonan

awardandthefactthatitwasprotantorationaltocongratulateher.

This argument provides a principled reason for saying why the explanatory relations are

transitive in the ‘award’ casebutnot in theothers:because, in the ‘award’ case there is an

explanatoryrelationbetweentheworldandmybeliefthatislackingintheothercases.

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(XIV)

TheMysteryRelation

In which I introduce the mystery relation. I suggest that a mysterious, non-causalrelationobtainsbetweenabeliefandthejustificationthatitisbasedonwhen that belief is justified. I argue that the mystery relation must be non-causal,because,asdeviantcausalchainsdemonstrate,amerelycausalrelationbetweenabeliefandsomejustificationfor it isnotsufficientforthatbelieftobejustified.Isuggestthatthisexactsamemysteriousrelationrelates:thebeliefthatptothefactthatpwhenthebeliefthatpisknowledgeable;ajustificationfor the belief that p to the fact that p when that justification affords theopportunityforknowledge;andanactiontosomebeliefthatexplainswhyitisrationalwhen thataction isdone intentionally. Iargue, furthermore, that thismysteryrelationisatransitive,explanatoryrelation.

Hereare somequestions:whatdistinguishesa justifiedbelief fromamerely justifiableone?

Whatseparatesaknowledgeablebelieffromabeliefthatoneholds,whenoneisinaposition

toknowit,withoutknowingit?Whatisthedifferencebetweenajustificationthataffordsthe

opportunity for knowledge from one that doesn’t? And, lastly,what distinguishes an action

doneintentionallyfromamerebodilymovement?

Idonotclaimtoknowtheanswertothesequestions.However,inwhatfollowsIwanttosee

what can be said without offering a theory of the difference between these cases. For

instance, the difference between a justified belief and a merely justifiable one is already

characterised in terms of the epistemic basing relation – the question is how that relation

shouldbeunderstood.Butevenwithoutansweringthatquestion,wecanstillsaysomethings

aboutthebasingrelation.Inparticular,itiswidelyagreedthattheproblemofdeviantcausal

chainsfrustratesapurelycausalanalysisofthebasingrelation,so,Isuggest,wecansuppose

that the basing relation is not merely causal. Which is to say, I suggest, that there is a

mysteriousnon-causalrelationbetweenabeliefandthatwhichitisbasedon,whenthatbelief

isjustified.

Isuggestthatthisexactsamemysteriousrelationrelates: thebeliefthatp tothefactthatp

whenthebeliefthatp isknowledgeable;ajustificationforthebeliefthatptothefactthatp

when that justification affords theopportunity for knowledge; and anaction to somebelief

when that action is done intentionally. I argue, furthermore, that thismystery relation is a

transitive,explanatoryrelation.

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Thischaracterisationofthemysteryrelationprovidesthebasisforthediscussionofthenext

chapter, inwhichIsaythatthemysteryrelationistransitivewiththenon-causalexplanatory

relation thatobtainsbetweenthe fact that Ibelievedthatmy friendhadwonanawardand

thefactthatitwasprotantorationaltocongratulateher.

Iofferthefollowinganalysismodestly.ThereisnosenseinwhichItakemyselftohavesolved

theproblemof deviant causal chains for the contexts considered. I alsodonot think I have

offeredmuchofananalysisofwhatdifferentiatesdeviantcasesfromnon-deviantcasesother

thansomethingdifferentiatesthem,andthatwhateveritmustbemustbeinsomesensenon-

causal,explanatoryandtransitive.Itaketheseobservationstoberelativelyanodyne,although

somemaydisagreewiththem.Myhopeisthateventheseblandobservationswillsufficefor

thepurposesofthenextchapter.

1 Themysteryrelationandjustifiedbelief

Thereisacommonlyrecogniseddistinctionbetweenajustifiedbeliefandamerelyjustifiable

belief.Hereisatypicalexample:

Ajustifiablebeliefisonethebelievercouldbecomejustifiedinbelievingifhejustputtogetherin the right way what he already believes. To illustrate, a woman might have adequateevidence for believing that her husband is unfaithful to her, but systematically ignore thatevidence.However,whenherfather,whomsheknowstobetotallyunreliableinsuchmattersandbiasedagainstherhusband,tellsherthatherhusbandisunfaithfultoher,shebelievesiton that basis. Then her belief that her husband is unfaithful is unjustified but justifiable.(PollockandCruz1999,79)

The woman in this example has some justification for believing that her spouse has been

unfaithful(wedon’tknowwhatit is),whichsheignores.Inspiteofignoringthejustifications

she has for believing it, she still ends up forming the belief that her husband has been

unfaithful,butbases iton the fact thather father toldher thatherhusbandwasunfaithful,

which is not a justification for believing it (because her father is known to be biased and

unreliable).

Herbeliefismerelyjustifiable,andnotjustified,becauseajustifiablebeliefisabeliefforwhich

one has some justification (which she does), but a justified belief is one that isbased on a

justificationonehasforit(whichhersisnot).

Asanaside:Iamstrayingintoepistemologyhere.Torestraintheboundsofmyassertions,let

mestatemyassumptionsplainly:all that ismeantbya ‘justification’here is something that

couldexplainwhyitisjustifiableforonetobelievethatpanduponwhichone’sbeliefthatp

couldbebased.WhatIamcalling‘justification’ismoretypicallycalleda‘reasonforbelief’in

the literature,but Iavoidthe‘reasons’terminologytoavoidconflatingthatwiththepresent

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discussion.1Moreover, I will take it as a given that appearances could be justifications for

belief.2

1.1 Theepistemicbasingrelation

Whatdoesitmeanforabelieftobebasedonsomejustificationforit?Thedefactoanalysisof

the‘basing’relationisacausalone.However,itiswidelyacknowledged(e.g.Korcz2015)that

thepossibilityofdeviantcausal chainsbetweenabeliefanda justification for it frustratesa

purelycausalanalysisofbasingbydemonstratingthatthefactthatajustificationforabelief

standsinacausalrelationtoitisnotenoughtoensurethatthebeliefisjustified.Typicallyone

hastoqualifyacausalanalysisbysayingthatthejustificationmustcausethebelief‘intheright

way’–butapurelycausalanalysisofwhatthis‘rightway’is,islacking.

Re-purposingtheexampleabove:supposethatEvaseesherhusbandkissinganotherwoman.

Supposethatthisisadequateevidenceofherhusband’sinfidelity(supplantmorecompelling

evidence ifyouaren’tconvinced).She ignorestheevidenceandcarriesonbelievingthather

husband is faithful.Her father isoutof thepicture this time,but suppose, instead, that the

stressofignoringwhatshehasseen(itisadifficultthingtoignore)causesabrainaneurism(in

spite of the fact that she does manage to ignore what she has seen) that, by incredible

coincidence,causeshertobelievethatherhusbandhasbeenunfaithfultoher.3Believingthat

herhusbandhasbeenunfaithfultoher,shesuesfordivorce.4

In this case her belief that her husband has been unfaithful is justifiable, and it is caused

(albeit,inaroundaboutway)bythejustificationshehasforbelievingit.Butitseemswrongto

sayeither thatherbeliefwasbasedon the justification thatshehad,or, indeed, that itwas

reallyajustifiedbelief.5

So, even if, as is popularly thought, ‘the basing relation is at least partly a causal relation,’

(PollockandCruz1999,79)theneedtostipulatenon-deviancyofthecausalchainprovidesat

1AlthoughIthinkananalogoustreatmentofreasonsforbeliefispossible,itisbeyondthescopeofthisdiscussiontoprovideone.2This will mean excluding the more extreme forms of internalism about epistemic justification (e.g.Davidson 2001d) but, adherents to that view are in the minority, as Littlejohn notes: ‘most statistinternalistsdefendtheviewthatexperiencesconstituteourreasonsforbelief.’(Forthcomming,4)3We could stress the independence of these events from Eva’s point of view: she has ignored theevidence,sowhenaskedwhyshebelievesthatherhusbandwascheatingonhershewon’tevencitethatfactthatshe’sseenhimkissinganotherwoman–perhapssheactuallymanagedtoforgetit.Whoknowswhatshewouldsay,theimportantpoint isthatshewouldn’tsaythatshesawhimkissingthatwoman.4Supposewhateveryouneedtosuppose inorder toensure that itwas rational forher todoso (thearationalityofthewaysheacquiredherbeliefnotwithstanding).5Thisexampleisstrongerthan,for instance,Plantinga’s(1993,69fn.8)classicexamplebecausewhatdoesthecausingisalsoajustificationforthebelief,whereasinPlantinga’scaseitisnot.

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leastprimafacieevidencethatthattherelationisnotmerelycasual.Moreover,intheabsence

ofacompelling,purelycausal,solutiontotheproblemofdeviantcausalchains,6Iwillassume

thatthereisnosuchsolution,andthatthebasingrelation,whateveritmaybe,isnotmerely

causal.7

Thus, ifabelief isbasedonsome justification for it (i.e. if it is justified) thenthere isanon-

causal relation (as well as, perhaps, a causal relation) between the belief and the

justification(s)itisbasedon–let’scallitthemysteryrelation.

At thispointweshoulddosomeontologicalhousekeeping.The relataof thebasing relation

areprobablynotfacts–theyare,perhaps,beliefs,experiencesoreventsorwhathaveyou.In

thesameveinIthinkthattherelataofthemysteryrelationproperarealsoprobablynotfacts.

However,itwillgreatlysimplifymyformalexposition,at,Ithink,nocosttomyargument,ifwe

treatthemasrelationsbetweenfacts.8

(M1) For any proposition,p, ifA has a justified belief thatp then the fact thatAbelievesthatpismysteriouslyrelatedtosomejustificationforit.

2 Themysteryrelationandknowledge

NowIwanttoconvinceyouthatthesamemysteriousrelationobtainsbetweenthefactthat

p9and the fact thatAbelieves thatpwhenanagent knows thatp.Why should youbelieve

this?

Firstconsiderthat,asinthecaseofthebasingrelation,thepossibilityofdeviantcausalchains

frustratesattemptstogiveapurelycausalanalysisoftherelationshipbetweenthefactthatp

andanagent’sbelief thatpwhen theyknowthatp. Inorder tomaintaina causal theoryof

knowledge,onemustinsistthatthefactcausesthebeliefintherightway.

6McCain (2012) offers a purely causal solution by, as Korcz (2015) puts it, ‘removing the chain’ anddenyingthatthebasingrelationistransitive.However, IshareKorcz’sconcernthatthistheoryfailstocapture pre-theoretical accounts ofwhat our beliefs are based on, so I don’t find it very compelling.Moregenerally,totheextentthatonetakescausalrelationstobetransitive,apurelycausalanalysisofdeviantcausalchainswillbeimpossible,assumingthatthesamecausalrelationobtainsbetweeneachlinkinthechain.7RecentsolutionstotheproblemofdeviantcausalchainsbyHyman(2015)andSosa(2015)supportmycontentionthatrelationsaffectedbythemarenotmerelycausal.Theyarguethatcausalrelationsarestill necessary for such relations, but that non-deviancy is only guaranteed by a further non-causalrelation:‘themanifestationofacompetence’.8Thereneedbenothingsignificantaboutthismove:iftherelataofgenuinebasingrelationsormysteryrelations are the truth-makers of propositions (e.g. Sally’s believing that a bear is chasing her to thepropositionthatshebelieves it), thenthebasingrelationsandmysteryrelations Imentionaremerelythecounterpartsofthegenuinerelationsinanontologyoffacts.9Again,someontologicalhousekeeping:properlyspeakingitisprobablythetruth-makerofthefactthatp,thatisrelatedtothebelief,butIamagaintransposingthistalktoanontologyoffactsforthesakeofsimplicity.

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Let’s revisit Eva’s case: Eva is in a position to know that her husband has been unfaithful10

becausesheiswatchinghimkissanotherwoman.Andhisdoingthatiswhatcauseshertosee

himdoingitwhichiswhatcauseshertoputtheeffortintoignoringitwhichiswhatcausesher

tohaveabrainaneurismwhichiswhatcauseshertobelievethathe’sbeenunfaithfultoher.

In this convolutedway, the fact that her husbandhasbeenunfaithful causesher tobelieve

that he has been unfaithful at a time when she is in a position to know that he has: she

believesitwithoutknowingit,eventhoughsheisinapositiontoknowitandeventhoughthe

factthathehadbeenunfaithfuliswhatcausedhertobelievethathehad.

Thus,giventhatacausalrelationbetweenthebeliefthatpandthefactthatpisnotsufficient

forthatbelieftobeknowledge(indeed,eveniftheagentisinapositiontoknowthatp)and

giventhatthe‘therightway’ofsomefact’scausingabeliefinitcannotbeanalysedinpurely

causal terms11we can say that if an agent knows thatp then there is a non-causal relation

betweentheirbeliefthatpandthefactthatp.

So,even if a causal relationbetween the fact thatp and thebelief thatp is required foran

agenttoknowthatp(anotinconsiderable‘if’),anon-causalrelationbetweenthefactandthe

beliefisstillalsorequiredfortheagenttoknowthatp.

Butwhysupposethatthisnon-causalrelationbetweenthefactandthebeliefisthesameas

the mystery relation that basing relations entail? Because, I suggest, the cases are directly

analogous:thedistinctionbetweenajustifiedbeliefandamerely justifiableoneisanalogous

to the distinction between knowing that p andmerely believing that p12when one is in a

positiontoknowthatp.

Indeed, theanalogousnessbetween the cases is already recognised in thediagnosisofboth

thesecasesascasesofdeviantcausalchains.Thesimplestexplanationofthisanalogyisthat

thenon-causalrelationthatislackinginthemerelycausalcasesineachisofacommonkind,

whichIhavecalledthe‘mysteryrelation’.Thus:

(M2) Foranyproposition,p,ifAknowsthatpthenthefactthatAbelievesthatpismysteriouslyrelatedtothefactthatp.

3 Themysteryrelationandopportunitiestoknow

NowIwanttoconvinceyouthat thesamemysteryrelationdistinguishesthose justifications

thataffordtheopportunityforknowledgefromthosethatdonot.

10Surely!11Whichweassumegiventhatsuchananalysisseemsisbothunavailableandanywayimplausible.12I.e.Believingwithoutknowingthatp

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We said that Evawas in aposition to know thatherhusbandwas cheatingonher. Sally, in

contrast, isnot inapositiontoknowthatabear ischasingher(not leastbecauseone isn’t).

Likewise(recallingtheexamplefromthepreviouschapter),whenIaminaroomthatisslowly

fillingwith carbonmonoxide, I amnot in aposition to know that the room is full of carbon

monoxide (therearenoalarms,novisiblewarningsetc.).WhatdifferentiatesEva fromSally

andIwithrespecttoourepistemicpositions?

Hereisawaytocharacterisethedifference:whileweallhaveajustificationforbelievingthat

p,onlyEvahasa justification thataffords theopportunity forknowledge.Characterisingour

question in these terms, and generalising it beyond these cases, we can ask: what

differentiates a justification for believing thatp that affords the opportunity for knowledge

from one that doesn’t? I think it is the mysterious relation that a knowledge-affording

justification stands in to the fact that p that separates it from a justification that does not

affordtheopportunityforknowledge.

Tostart,considertheseremarksbyMcDowell,inhisdiscussionofhowperceptualknowledge

ispossible(giventhepossibilityofillusion):

Supposesomeone ispresentedwithanappearance that it is raining. It seemsunproblematicthatifhisexperienceisinasuitablewaytheupshotofthefactthatitisraining,thenthefactitself can make it the case that he knows that it is raining. (McDowell 1982, 474 emphasisadded)

What is this suitable way? What is the relation between the ‘fact itself’ and the man’s

experiencethatmakesitpossibleforthefactto‘makeitthecasethattheheknowsthatitis

raining’?Well,itisn’tmerelycausal.

Suppose that another version ofme, call him ‘Twinny’, on some other very similarworld is

likewise in a room that is slowly filling with carbon monoxide. Twinny doesn’t have the

hallucination.However,hisfriendseesthecarbonmonoxidelevelsoftheroomonamonitor

(whichTwinnyhadnoaccessto),and,accordingly,burstsintotheroomtowarnhim.Twinny

leavestheroom,justasIdid.

Now,what Twinny and I experience is subjectively indistinguishable (ex hypothesi), and our

perceptual experiences justify each of our beliefs (we both know that we aren’t prone to

hallucinationsetc.).However,onlyTwinnyhadanexperiencethatcanaffordtheopportunity

forknowledge.13AndthatistheupshotofthefactthatthejustificationthatIhadforbelieving

thattheroomwasfullofcarbonmonoxidewascausedbythefactthattheroomwasfullof13OfcourseIcoulddothetests,gathertheevidenceandsoforth(assumingIlivedthatlong)andthenIwould be in a position to know that the roomwas full of carbonmonoxide – but there and then, incircumstancesastheywereoriginallydescribed,Iwouldnotbeinapositiontoknow.

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carbonmonoxidebya ‘deviant’causalchain–whereasthechain inTwinny’scasewas ‘non-

deviant’;thatis,itisonlyinTwinny’scasethathisexperienceisinasuitablewaytheupshotof

thefact.

Generalising:wecansaythatthefactthatp’shavingcausedajustificationforthebeliefthatp

doesnotensurethatthatjustificationisonethataffordsanopportunityforknowledge.So,I

suggest, theremustbeanon-causalrelation(aswellas,perhaps,acausalrelation)between

the fact that p and a justification for believing that p if that justification is to afford an

opportunityforknowingthatp.

What is that non-causal relation? My answer is presumably clear: it is the samemystery

relationasrelatesjustifiedbeliefstothefactstheyarebasedon,andknowledgetothatwhich

isknown.Inotherwords:

(M3) Foranypropositions,jandp,ifjaffordstheopportunityforknowledgethatpthenjismysteriouslyrelatedtothefactthatp.

4 Themysteryrelationandactingforareason

Finally,Iwanttoconvinceyouthatthesamemysteryrelationdistinguishesactionsdonefora

reasonfrommerebodilymovements.

Considerthefollowingexample:

A climbermightwant to rid himself of theweight and danger of holding anotherman on arope, andhemight know that by looseninghis holdon the ropehe could rid himself of theweightanddanger.Thisbeliefandwantmightsounnervehimas tocausehimto loosenhishold, and yet itmight be the case that he never chose to loosen his hold, nor did he do itintentionally.(Davidson2001b,79)

Inthisexamplethefactthattheclimberbelievesthat looseninghisgripwouldridhimselfof

danger (partially)explainswhy it ispro tanto rational for theclimber to loosenhisgrip,and

that belief also causes him to loosen his grip. However, he does not loosen his grip

intentionally. This example thus (famously) createsaproblem for apurely causal analysisof

what it is to act intentionally: although there is a causal chain between the belief and the

action,theagentdoesnotactintentionallybecausethecausalchainis‘deviant’.

Suppose that, had the climber acted on his beliefs and desires in the ‘non-deviant’way, he

wouldhaveactedintentionally.WecanthensaythatDavidson’sclimberwas inapositionto

dowhathedidintentionally,eventhoughhedidn’t.14Sowhatdifferentiatessomeonewhoφs

14Perhapsbeinginapositiontodosomethingintentionallyisjusthavinganintentiontodoit.Ileaveitforthereadertodecide.

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intentionally from someone (like the climber) who is in a position toφ intentionally, and,

indeed,φsbutdoesnotdosointentionally?

Thetraditional‘answer’tothisquestionistosaythatifanagentactsintentionallythen,inter

alia, a belief that explainswhy their action is rationalmust cause them todo it in the right

way.15So, again, assuming that this elusive ‘right way’ cannot be analysed in purely causal

terms,wecansaythatifanagentactsintentionallythenthereisanon-causalrelation(aswell

as, perhaps, a causal relation) between features of their psychology that explain why their

actionisrationalandtheiraction.16

Andagain,owingtotheanalogousnessofthiscasetotheothersalreadyconsidered,Isuggest

that thisnon-causal relation is the very samemystery relation thatwas requiredof justified

belief,ofknowledgeandofopportunityforknowledge-affordingjustifications.Thus:

(M4) IfAφsintentionallythen,forsomeproposition,p,thefactthatAbelievedthatpexplainswhyitwasprotantorationalforAtoφandismysteriouslyrelatedtothefactthatAφ’d.17

5 Asummaryoftheexamples

Ihavesuggested thatwhatdistinguishesdeviantcausal chains fromnon-deviantones in the

contexts considered is that, in the non-deviant cases, the relata are not merely causally

related.Inparticular,Ihaveargued,thesamenon-causal‘mystery’relationispresentineach

case,sothat:

(M1) For any proposition,p, ifA has a justified belief thatp then the fact thatAbelievesthatpismysteriouslyrelatedtosomejustificationforit.

(M2) Foranyproposition,p,ifAknowsthatpthenthefactthatAbelievesthatpismysteriouslyrelatedtothefactthatp.

(M3) Foranypropositions,jandp,ifjaffordstheopportunityforknowledgethatpthenjismysteriouslyrelatedtothefactthatp.

(M4) IfAφsintentionallythen,forsomeproposition,p,thefactthatAbelievedthatpexplainswhyitwasprotantorationalforAtoφandismysteriouslyrelatedtothefactthatAφ’d.

Asanaside:weshouldnotethatwhilemysteryrelationsarenon-causalrelations,theydonot

necessarily exclude causal relations. That is, for instance, it is quite possible that a justified

15Cf. ‘Anaction isperformedwitha certain intention if it is caused in the rightwaybyattitudesandbeliefsthatrationalizeit.’(Davidson2001c,87)16Notethatthisisanecessarybutnotsufficientcondition.17Thisformulationexcludes,forconvenience,instanceswhereanagentdoessomethingforitsownsake(e.g.IsangbecauseIfeltlikesinging).InadoptingthisformulationIamnotclaimingthatsuchactsarenotdoneintentionally,itisjustmoreconvenienttousethisformulation.

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beliefmaybebothcausallyandmysteriouslyrelatedtothejustificationitisbasedon.Indeed,

dependingonyourviews intheseareas itmightbethatacausalrelation isanecessary (but

notsufficient)conditionforthepresenceofamysteryrelation.

In the following sections I will argue further that the mystery relation is a transitive,

explanatoryrelation.

6 Mysteryrelationsareexplanatoryrelations

Now I want to convince you thatmystery relations are explanatory relations. Theymay be

other thingsalso,but Iaimtoconvinceyou that theyaredefinitelyexplanatory. Iwill argue

thatineachofthecasesofthemysteryrelationabovethereisanon-causalexplanationofthe

explanandumthatislackingwhenthemysteryrelationisabsent.

6.1 Explainingjustifiedbeliefs

Itisgenerallyacknowledgedthatthejustificationonwhichanagent’sbeliefisbasedexplains

whytheybelievedit(e.g.Harman1970).Whatsortofexplanationdoesitprovideuswith?

If we accept that the basing relation is partly a causal relation then, even though a causal

analysis is insufficient forestablishing it, it’s still possible that theexplanatory importof the

basing relation is merely causal. So, is the way that a justified belief is explained by the

justificationonwhichitisbasedmerelycausal?

The fact that Sally heard a bear-like sound headed her way (in a forest that she knew to

contain bears) is a justification for her to believe that a bear is chasing her.Moreover, her

beliefthatabearischasingherisbasedonthatjustificationforit.Sowecansay,aswehave

noted,thatSallybelievesthatabearischasingherpartlybecausesheheardabear-likesound.

Thatis:ajustificationforSallytobelievesomethingpartially18explainswhyshebelievedit.

Now notice that for Eva a justification for her to believe something also explains why she

believed it: shebelieves thatherhusbandhasbeenunfaithfulbecause itappearedtoheras

thoughhewaskissinganotherwoman(which,indeed,hewas).Thatis,forbothEvaandSallya

justification for their belief explains their belief. However, the sense of the explanation

providedby the justification inSally’s case seems tobe importantlydifferent to the sense it

providesinEva’scase–andthatdifferencecannotbecharacterisedincausalterms(becausea

causalrelationobtainsinbothcases).

18Otherpartsofthefullexplanationofherbeliefinclude,forinstance,thefactthatsheknewthewoodtocontainbears.

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So, there is a seemingly non-causal explanationof Sally’s belief that is lacking in Eva’s case,

which is to say that theexplanatory importof thebasing relation isnotmerelycausal (note

thatEva’sbeliefisnotbasedonanything,sothereisnosimilarnon-causalexplanationofit).

6.2 Explainingknowledgeablebeliefs

Anotherexample:supposethatEva’shusbandiskissingSean’swife.Seanalsoseesithappen,

butstraightforwardlyconcludesthathiswifehasbeenunfaithfultohim.Seanknowsthathis

wifehasbeenunfaithfulandhebelievesthathiswifehasbeenunfaithfulpartlybecauseshe

hasbeenunfaithful.

Now,it isalsotrueofEvathatshebelievesthatherhusbandhasbeenunfaithfulbecausehe

hasbeenunfaithful,eventhoughshedoesn’tknowthathehas–but,again likethe justified

belief case, the sense of the ‘because’ seems different. Even given that there is a causal

explanationinSean’scase,thefactthathiswifeischeatingonhimpartiallyexplainsthefact

thathebelievessheisinawaythatisnotmerelycausal,becauseitexplainsitinawaythatis

qualitativelydifferenttothemerelycausalexplanation(i.e.theEvacase).

6.3 Mysteriousrelationsarepartialexplanatoryrelations

Iwillsparethereaderarehearsalofthisreasoningfortheothercasesconsideredandcutto

the chase: wherever we compare a deviant causal case with a non-deviant case (in the

contextsconsidered),itseemsasthoughthereisanon-causalexplanatoryrelationinthenon-

deviantcasethat is lacking inthedeviantone. Indeed, itseemstomethat it ispreciselythe

differentcharacteroftheexplanatoryrelationsinvolvedinthenon-deviantcasethatallowsus,

inthesecontexts,todistinguishthenon-deviantexamplesfromthedeviantones.

So,sincethereappearstobeanon-causalexplanatoryrelationwhereverwehaveamystery

relation, and sincemystery relations, aswe have established, are non-causal, I suggest that

mysteryrelationsarenon-causal(partial)explanatoryrelations.

Thus,whatseparatesEvafromSeanisthefactthatthejustificationSeanhasforhisbeliefnon-

causally (aswellas,perhaps,causally)explainshisbelief,whereas, forEva itmerelycausally

explainsit.

Likewise,whatseparatesmeinmycarbonmonoxidefilledroomfromTwinnyisthatthefact

that the roomwas filled with carbonmonoxide non-causally (as well as, perhaps, causally)

explainswhy it appeared toTwinnyas thoughhis friendwaswarninghimabout the carbon

monoxide,whereasitonlycausallyexplainswhyitappearedtomethatway.Andsoon.

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7 Mysteryrelationsaretransitive

Finally, I want to convince you that mystery relations are transitive. I will show that the

conditionsfortransitivityaresatisfiedinalloftheaboveexamples,andIwillarguefurtherthat

the transitivity of the explanatory relations involved is the best explanation of why

knowledgeablebeliefsaremysteriouslyrelatedtothebelievedfacts.

7.1 Itistransitiveintheexamples

WhenIcongratulatedmyfriendIknewthatshehadwonanaward,sothefactthatIbelieved

thatshehadwonanawardwasmysteriouslyrelatedtothefactthatshehadwonanaward.

Moreover,Isuggest,sinceIcongratulatedherforareason,thefactthatIcongratulatedheris

mysteriouslyrelatedtothefactthatIbelievedthatshehadwonanaward.Canweconclude

that the fact that I congratulated her is mysteriously related to the fact that she won an

award?Ithinkwecan.

Consider:whenIsaythatIcongratulatedmyfriendbecauseshewonanawardithastheright

sortofexplanatorycharacter,thefactexplainsmyactionintherightway.Likewise,whenIsay

thatTwinnylefttheroombecauseitwasfullofcarbonmonoxidethattoohastherightsortof

explanatorycharacter.Andthat is, I suggestbecausethe fact that theroom is fullofcarbon

monoxide ismysteriously related to his belief, which, in turn, ismysteriously related to his

action.Thatis,Isuggestthatwecanconcludethatourrespectivenormativereasonstoactare

mysteriously related to our respective actions because there is a chain ofmystery relations

connectingthenormativereasontotheactionandthemysteryrelationistransitive.

Wecanseethatthesecaseshavetherightsortofexplanatorycharacterbycomparingthem

withacaseinwhichthenormativereasonfailstobemysteriouslyrelatedtomyaction:mein

myroomfullofcarbonmonoxide.InthiscasewhenwesaythatIlefttheroombecauseitwas

fullofcarbonmonoxidethatdoesnothavetherightsortofexplanatorycharacter.Ofcourse

thereisperhapsasenseinwhichitistrue(seeminglyastrictlycausalsense),butthatisnotthe

senseinwhichtheexpressionwouldbeconventionallyunderstood.Whatmarksoutthesense

in which the expression would be conventionally understood from this one is, as I have

suggested,thepresenceofthisnon-causalexplanatoryrelation;themysteryrelation.

Whyisthenormativereasonnotrelatedtomyactioninthecarbonmonoxidecasebutitisto

Twinny’saction?Because, I suggest, there isnota chainofmystery relationsconnectingmy

actiontothefactthattheroomisfullofcarbonmonoxide,whilethereisachainofmystery

relationsconnectingTwinny’sactiontothatfact.

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Moreover,whileIwillsparethereaderademonstration,Isuggestthatthesamereasoningcan

beappliedequallytoalltheothercases.

Forclaritywecansummarisethisasfollows.Firstly,somenotation:foreachcase,let‘f’stand

forthebelievedproposition;‘j’standforthejustificationthattheagenthasforbelievingit;‘b’

standforthefactthattheybelievedit;and‘a’standforwhattheagentdid.TableXIV-1sets

outthereferentsofthesesymbolsforeachcase.

Example f j b a

Awardcase Myfriendwonanaward

Ireadthatshehadwonanaward

Ibelievedthatshehadwonanaward

Icongratulatedher

CO19case Theroomwasfullofcarbonmonoxide

Itappearedtomeasthoughmyfriendwaswarningme

Ibelievedthattheroomwasfullofcarbonmonoxide

Ilefttheroom

Evacase Herhusbandwasunfaithfultoher

Itappearedtoherasthoughherhusbandwaskissinganother

woman

Shebelievedthatherhusbandwasunfaithful

Shesuedfordivorce

Climbercase Looseninghisgripwouldridhimof

danger

Itappearedtohimasthoughifheletgohewouldbefreedfromdanger20

Hebelievedthatlooseninghisgripwouldridhimof

danger

Heloosenedhisgrip

TableXIV-1:Thecomponentfactsineachexample

My suggestion is this: in any circumstance in which a chain of transitive mystery relations

would imply that the ends of the chain are mysteriously related, running through the

reasoningjustsetoutforeachoftheexamplesfindsthattheendsofthechainare,indeedso

related.Letting‘⇝’standforthemysteryrelation,TableXIV-2setsthisout.

ExamplesObservedrelations Shouldtheseobtain: Dotheyobtain

whentheyshould?f⇝j j⇝b b⇝a f⇝b? j⇝a? f⇝a?

Awardcase ü ü ü ü ü ü ü

COcase û ü ü û ü û ü

Evacase ü û ü û û û ü

Climbercase ü ü û ü ü û ü

TableXIV-2:Thetransitivityofthemysteryrelation

19CO=carbonmonoxide.20Youcouldsupplantsomethingmoreinterestinghereifyouliked–thisisjustmeanttobeindicative.

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Ofcourse,thefactthatthemysteryrelationhappenstobetransitiveintheseexamplesdoes

notamounttoproofthat it isalwaystransitive,but isat leastevidenceforthatclaim. Inthe

nextsectionIprovideadifferentdefenceoftheclaimthatmysteryrelationsaretransitive.

7.2 Knowledgeandknowledgeaffordingjustification

My second argument for the transitivity of mystery relations is that it provides the best

accountofwhyitisthatknowledgeablebeliefsaremysteriouslyrelatedtothebelievedfacts.

To start with, consider that, to the extent that knowledge entails justified belief, 21 a

knowledgeablebeliefmustbebasedonajustificationforit.Thatbeingso,itstrikesmethatif

a belief is knowledgeable it must be based on (and therefore mysteriously related to) a

justificationthatactuallyaffordstheopportunityforknowledge.22Ifthesetwoclaimsaretrue,

then,foranyp,ifAknowsthatp,thefactthatAbelievesthatpisbasedonsomejustification

thataffordstheopportunityforAtoknowthatp.

Summarising: for any p, a knowledgeable belief that p, being based on a justification that

affords the opportunity for knowledge that p, must therefore be mysteriously related to a

justificationforthebeliefthatpthatis,inturn,mysteriouslyrelatedtothefactthatp.Thatis,

touse thenotationof theprevious section, if theagentknows that f then: f ismysteriously

relatedtoj,jismysteriouslyrelatedtob,andfismysteriouslyrelatedtob.

So,ifanagentknowsthatpthentransitivityistrueofthemysteryrelationsbetweenthebelief

thatp,ajustificationonwhichitisbasedandthefactthatp.

21Which,pickingmybattles,Iwilltakeasagiven.22Lehrer’sgypsylawyercaseisacounterexampletothisclaim(oritwouldbeifitweretrue):

Alawyerisdefendingamanaccusedofcommittingeighthideousmurders…Thereisconclusiveevidence that the lawyer's client is guilty of the first sevenmurders. Everyone, including thelawyer,isconvincedthatthemaninquestionhascommittedalleightcrimes,thoughthemanhimself says he is innocent of all. However, the lawyer is a gypsywith absolute faith in thecards.Oneeveningheconsultsthecardsabouthiscase,andthecardstellhimthathisclientisinnocent of the eighth murder. He checks again, and the cards give the same answer. Hebecomesconvincedthathisclientisinnocentofoneoftheeightmurders.Asaresulthestudiesthe evidence with a different perspective as well as greater care, and he finds a verycomplicatedthoughcompletelyvalidlineofreasoningfromtheevidencetotheconclusionthathis client did not commit the eighth murder… This reasoning gives the lawyer knowledge.Thoughthereasoningdoesnotincreasehisconviction–hewasalreadycompletelyconvincedbythecards–itdoesgivehimknowledge.(Lehrer1971,311–12)

I shareGoldman’s intuition that, ‘To the extent that I clearly imagine that the lawyer fixes his beliefsolelyasaresultofthecards,itseemsintuitivelywrongtosaythatheknows—orhasajustifiedbelief—that his client is innocent.’ (2012, 36 n8) The lawyer is in a position to know it, and depending onwhetherornotonethinksthetarotcardscountasajustification,onemightevensayhehasajustifiedbelief–butIfinditstrangetosaythatheknowsitifthepresenceoftheonlyjustificationthataffordstheopportunityforknowledgeisneitherherenortherewithrespecttohisactuallyhavingthebelief.

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Dowehavereasontothinkthatthemysteryrelation is transitivewherever itappears?Well

wedon’thaveanyreasontodoubtit,buthereisanotherreasontothinkthatitmightbe:the

transitivity of the mystery explanation would explainwhy the belief that p is mysteriously

relatedtothefactthatpwhentheagentknowsthatp.

Althoughour intuition seems to suggest that a belief thatp is non-causally (if also causally)

explainedbythefactthatpifanagentknowsit,it’snotcleartomehowthefactthatpcould

directlyexplainanagent’sbeliefthatpinmuchthesamewayasitiswasnotcleartomehow

the fact thatp coulddirectly explainanagent’saction.23However,given thatourperceptual

experiences intermediate the explanatory relations between the world and beliefs the

transitivity of the relation that links them would ensure the connection that our intuitions

suggest between the belief and the fact itself. So, I suggest, the best explanation of why

knowledgeablebeliefsaremysteriouslyrelatedtothebelievedfactsisthatthereisatransitive

chainofmysteriousrelationsthatlinksthebelieftothefactsviathejustifications.24

7.3 Onwhomistheburdenofproof?

There areperhapsnumerouspoints in these arguments towhichone couldobject – but all

theywoulddoisunderminetheargumentsfortheclaimthatmysteryrelationsaretransitive,

theywouldnotunderminetheclaimitself.Whichleadsmetomyfinalpoint,indefenceofthe

assumption thatmystery relations are transitive: since I do not take it to be clear that the

burdenofproofissolelyonmetoprovethattheyare,itwouldneedafurtherargumentstillto

demonstrate that theyaren’t. Inparticular, sincemyview is thatourworkingassumptionof

anyparticularsortofexplanatoryrelationshouldbethatitistransitiveuntilprovenotherwise,

I take it that the burden of proof is actually upon thosewhowould deny that themystery

relationistransitive.

23Seemycriticismofdirecttheoriesofnormativereasonexplanationin§(X).24It’s worth noting that McDowell would reject this account. He notes that in the knowledge case‘appearancesareno longerconceivedas ingeneral interveningbetweentheexperiencingsubjectandtheworld.’ (1982,472)So forMcDowell it’snot true that the justification intermediatesbetweenthebeliefandthefactintheknowledgecase,ratherthefact’shaving‘madeitselfperceptuallymanifest’isenoughtodothejobonitsown.

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8 Conclusion

Ihaveforarguedthefollowingclaims:

(M1) For any proposition,p, ifA has a justified belief thatp then the fact thatAbelievesthatpismysteriouslyrelatedtosomejustificationforit.

(M2) Foranyproposition,p,ifAknowsthatpthenthefactthatAbelievesthatpismysteriouslyrelatedtothefactthatp.

(M3) Foranypropositions,jandp,ifjaffordstheopportunityforknowledgethatpthenjismysteriouslyrelatedtothefactthatp.

(M4) IfAφsintentionallythen,forsomeproposition,p,thefactthatAbelievedthatpexplainswhyitwasprotantorationalforAtoφandismysteriouslyrelatedtothefactthatAφ’d.

I have argued that themysterious relation in each case is the same relation, and that this

relationisanon-causal,transitive,explanatoryrelation.

I shouldnote: this isnota solution to theproblemofdeviantcausal chains foranyof these

cases.Itaketheinterestingquestionsforeachcasetobewhatthisexplanatoryrelationis,why

it obtains, andwhen itobtains: I have called this themystery relationpreciselybecause the

answerstothosequestions,theinterestingquestions,remainsshroudedinmystery.AllthatI

take myself to have done here is to offer some, hopefully, bland observations about this

relation.Nonetheless,Ihopethateventheseblandobservationswillbesufficienttomakemy

case.

In the next chapter I will argue that this relation is transitive with the explanatory relation

between,forinstance,thefactthatIbelievedthatmyfriendhadwonanawardandthefact

thatitwasprotantorationalformetocongratulateher.

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(XV)

Mysteryrelationsandwhyitisrationaltoact

InwhichIsaythatmysteryrelationsaretransitivewiththeexplanatoryrelationinvolvedinexplainingwhyit isrational. I labelthesortofexplanatoryrelationthatobtainsbetween(i)thefactthatIbelievethatitisrainingand(ii)thefactthatitisprotantorationalformetotakeanumbrella,the‘E’-relation’.Iarguethat the mystery relation is transitive with the E’-relation. I show how thisaccordswithourintuitionsinsomeoftheexamplesalreadyconsidered.

Iwanttosaythatthefactthatmyfriendwonanawardexplainswhyitwasrationalformeto

congratulateher.Ialsowanttosaythatthefactthatthetreesrustleddoesnotexplainwhyit

wasrationalforSallytorun.However,inbothcases,thereisachainofexplanatoryrelations

connectingthetwofacts.1So, if IamtosaywhatIwanttosay,asnotedin§(XIII)4, Ineeda

principled reason for saying that all the explanatory relations involved in the first case are

transitive,whiletheexplanatoryrelationsinvolvedinthesecondcasearenotalltransitive.In

thelastchapterIintroducedthemysteryrelationwithaviewtomakingthiscase.

Ihavealreadysuggestedthatthemerelycausalexplanatoryrelationbetweentherustlingof

thetreesandthefactthatSallyheardabear-likesoundisnottransitivewiththeexplanatory

relationbetweenthefactthatshebelievesthatabearischasingherandthefactthatitispro

tantorationalforhertorun.

Myargumentinthischapteristhis:themysteryrelationsbetweenthefactthatmyfriendhad

won an award and the fact that I believed that she hadare transitivewith the explanatory

relationbetweenthefactIbelievedthatshehadwonanawardandthefactthatitisprotanto

rationalformetocongratulateher.Iarguethatsomethingthatisnotafeatureofanagent’s

psychology(i.e.abeliefordesireorwhathaveyou)explainswhyitisrationalforthemtodo

some action only if it is mysteriously related to a feature of their psychology that, in turn,

explainswhyitisrationalforthemtodothataction.

Iputforwardthreeargumentsfortheclaimthatmysteryrelationsaretransitivewiththesort

ofexplanatoryrelationinvolvedin‘explainingwhyitisrational’:firstly,Iarguethattheyshare

many properties in common, and that the best explanation of why they share so many

1Thatis,thefactthatmyfriendwonanawardexplainswhyIreadthatshehadwonanaward,whichexplainswhy I believed that she hadwon an award,which explainswhy itwaspro tanto rational tocongratulateher.Likewise: thefact thatthetreesrustledexplainswhySallyheardabear-likenowise,whichexplainswhyshebelievedthatabearwaschasingher,whichexplainswhyrunningwasprotantorational.See§(XIII)4forrelateddiagrams.

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properties isthattheyarethesamesortoftransitive,explanatoryrelation.Secondly, Iargue

thatthebestanalysisofthissortofnon-causalrelation,grounding,takesittobeofasingular,

transitivesort.Thirdly, Iarguethatthis is thebestaccountofwhywemightsay, inordinary

language,that,forinstance,itisrationalformetotakemyumbrellabecauseitisraining.

1 Explainingwhyitisrationaltoact

1.1 TheE’-relation

ThefactthatIbelievethatitisrainingexplainswhyitisprotantorationalformetotakemy

umbrella. The fact that Sally believes that a bear is chasing her explainswhy it ispro tanto

rationalforhertorun.Eachofthesecasesinvolvesaparticularsortofexplanatoryrelation–

forexpositionalconvenienceitwillhelpifwenameit.Letussaythefollowing:

Definition For any proposition p, p is E’-related to the fact that it is pro tantorationalforAtoφ ifandonlyifpexplainswhyitisprotantorationalforAtoφ.

A clarification: theE’-relation isnot a relationbetween, say, the fact that I believe that it is

rainingandtheactoftakingmyumbrella.TheE’-relationrelatesthefactthatIbelievethatitis

rainingtothefactthatitisprotantorationalformetotakemyumbrella.TheE’-relationisjust

a particular sort of explanatory relation; it iswhatever sort of explanatory relation it is that

existsbetweenthosefacts.

1.2 WhatarethepropertiesoftheE’-relation?

WhatcanwesayabouttheE’-relation?First,aswehavealreadyobserved(see§(XIII)3.2.2),it

isanon-causalexplanatoryrelation.ThefactthatSallybelievesthatabearischasingherdoes

not cause it to bepro tanto rational for her to run, and you should accept that even if you

thinkitcauseshertorun.Causationjustseemstobethewrongwaytocharacterisethissortof

relation.So,theE’-relationisnon-causal.

Second,itisatransitivesortofexplanatoryrelation.Itseemsrighttosaythatifit’sprotanto

rational for me to get some exercise, then that fact (partly2) explains why it is pro tanto

rationalformetogoswimming.Nowsupposethatitisprotantorationalformetogetsome

exercise(partly)becauseIbelievethatexercisewillliftmyspirits.Insuchcircumstancesitalso

seemsrighttosaythatthefactthatIbelievethatexercisewill liftmyspirits(partly)explains

whyitisprotantorationalformetogoswimming.

2Togetherwith,perhaps,thefactthatIbelievethatgoingswimmingisgettingexercise,etc.

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Sowhat?Well,thefactthatIbelievethatexercisewillliftmyspirits,p,explainswhyitispro

tantorationalformetogetsomeexercise,q.Andthefactthatitisprotantorationalformeto

getsomeexercise(i.e.q)explainswhyit isprotantorationalformetoswim,r.Andthefact

thatIbelievethatexercisewillliftmyspirits(i.e.p)alsoexplainswhyitisprotantorationalfor

metoswim(i.e.r).Thus:pexplainsq,qexplainsrandpexplainsr;so,atleastinthisinstance,

theexplanatoryrelationsinvolvedsatisfytransitivity.

Now,Isubmit,suchexplanatoryrelationsmustalwaysbetransitive:ifitisrationalforAtoφ

andA believes thatψing is ameans toφing, then the fact that it is rational forA toφwill

explain why it is rational for A toψ. And whatever explains why it is rational for A toφ,

togetherwithA’sbeliefthatψingisameanstoφing,willlikewiseexplainwhyitisrationalfor

Atoψ.So,theexplanatoryrelationinvolvedinexplainingwhyit isrationaltodosomething,

i.e.theE’-relation,isatransitiverelation.

Third,totheextentthatontologicalpriorityisameaningfulconcept,thetruth-makersofthat

which explains why it is pro tanto rational to do some action are ontologicallyprior to the

rationality of actions. Consider: it’s possible that someone’s beliefs and desires/evaluative

judgements (delete or replace as appropriate)may never align in away that is sufficient to

make any action rational (perhaps theyhave veryodddesires, or normal desires, butweird

beliefs,ornormaldesiresandnormalbeliefsbut just live inadreadfully limitedworld)–the

factthatnoactionisrationaldoesnotimpingeontheirabilitytohavebeliefsanddesires.So

you can have beliefs and desires without there being any rational actions. However, the

propertyofbeingrationalcannotbeinstantiatedwithoutbeliefsanddesires.So,Isuggest,the

latterareontologicallypriortotheformer;whichistosaythattheE’-relationis(underpinned

by)arelationofontologicalpriority.

Fourth,andrelatedly,thissortofexplanatoryrelationentailsan‘invirtueof’claim.Thatis,if

thefactthatpexplainswhyitisrationalforAtoφ,thenweareseeminglyalwaysabletosay

thatitisrationalforAtoφinvirtueofthefactthatp.Forinstance,itisrationalforSallytorun

invirtueofthefactthatshebelievedthatabearischasingher.So,E’-relationsentail‘invirtue

of’claims.

2 Arelationincommon

I want to convince you that the mystery relation (a non-causal explanatory relation) is

transitivewiththeE’-relation(alsoanon-causalexplanatoryrelation).Thatis,Iwillarguethat:

(M5) Foranypropositions,p,q and r, ifp ismysteriously related toq andq is E’-relatedtorthenpisE’-relatedtor.

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Why should you believe this? Because, I argue, these relations are both the same sort of

transitive, non-causal explanatory relations. I put forward three arguments for this claim:

firstly, the pervasive similarities between the mystery relation and the E’-relation are best

explainedby thepresenceof a common relation. Secondly, thebest accountof explanatory

relationsofthissort,grounding,takesthemtobe(i)unitary(atleastuntilprovenotherwise)

and (ii) transitive. Thirdly, accepting (M5) gives us the best explanation of why, in ordinary

language,wemightsay,forinstance,thatitisrationalformetotakemyumbrellabecauseitis

raining.

Apointofclarification:Iamonlyarguingthattheseexplanatoryrelationsareofthesame,sort

(thatis,thattheybelongtothesamefamilyof(transitive)explanatoryrelations),becausethat

isenoughformyargumentfor(M5).Itisconsistentwiththisclaimtosupposethattheyarein

fact the same explanatory relation,3however, it is likewise consistent with this claim to

suppose that they aren’t. I take no particular stance onwhether or not they are the same

explanatoryrelationjustbecauseIdon’tneedtoformyargument.

2.1 Theserelationsaresimilarbecausetheyareofacommonkind

2.1.1 Thereareahostofsimilaritiesbetweentherelations

WhatarethesimilaritiesbetweenthemysteryrelationandtheE’-relation?Wehavealready

noted that they are bothnon-causal explanatory relations. Associatedwith their bothbeing

explanatory relations comes their both being asymmetric, irreflexive and non-monotonic.

Whatelse?

First, they are both transitive relations. In the previous chapter I demonstrated that the

mystery relation is transitive. In the previous section I demonstrated that the E’-relation is

transitive.

Second, they areboth relationsof ontological priority. I have alreadynoted that thatwhich

explainswhyanaction is rationalmustbeontologicallyprior totherationalityof theaction.

What of themystery relation? The examples in the previous chapter relate, variously: facts

abouttheworld(ortheagent’sperceptionofit)tofactsaboutwhattheagentbelieves;facts

abouttheworldto justificationsforbelief;andbeliefstoactions.Presumablyanyonewho is

notanidealistandfindssomemeaninginthenotionofontologicalprioritywillagreethatfacts

3Andthatmightevenbemoreparsimoniousthanthinkingthattheyaredifferentexplanatoryrelationsthatbelongtoasinglefamily.

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of the former kind are ontologically prior to the latter.4That is, presumably: the world is

ontologically prior to perceptual experiences of it, perceptual experiences are ontologically

priortobeliefs,andbeliefsareontologicallypriortoactions(Ihavealreadyarguedforthelast

claimintheprevioussection).Thesedon’tallneedtobetruetomakethecase,butIthinkthat

theyare.

Third, they both entail ‘in virtue of’ claims. Again, I have already noted that the E’-relation

relationalwaysentailsan‘invirtueofclaim’,andsotoodoesthemysteryrelation.Consider:it

seemsrighttosaythatSeanbelievesthathiswifehasbeenunfaithfultohim invirtueofthe

fact that shehasbeenunfaithful tohimand thatSallybelieves thatabear is chasingher in

virtueof thefactthatsheheardabear-likesound– incontrast itdoesnotseemrighttosay

thatEvabelievesthatherhusbandhasbeenunfaithfultoherinvirtueofthefactthatshesaw

himkissinganotherwoman.5

2.1.2 Theyaresimilarbecausetheyhavesomeexplanatoryrelationincommon

I think that the best explanation of these similarities is that the two relations both are the

samesortoftransitive,non-causal,explanatoryrelation.

Youmightobjecttothis.Perhapsyouarescepticaloftalkofontologicalpriority6or‘invirtue

of’7relations. In which case you will doubt that there is much in the way of similarity that

needs explaining. So be it. I, like many others,8increasingly take these to be meaningful

concepts, and I suggest that the fact that the same formofwords can be used in different

cases is, at least, aprima facie reason for thinking that there is a common relationatwork.

Since there is aprima facie reason for thinking that there is a common relation I, following

Audi,‘taketheburdenofprooftobeonthosewhothinktherearedifferentrelationsatwork

toshowwhy.’(P.Audi2012b,689)

Another objection: perhaps you say that these similarities, at best, characterise a genus of

non-causalexplanationofwhichthemysteryrelationandtheE’-relationaredifferentspecies–

theirmembershipof thegenusaccounts for their similarity,but theyare separatedby their

species-hood.Thatis,perhapsallofthesesimilaritiesderivefromtherebeingan‘E-relation’,

where an E-relation is a non-causal explanatory relation that is not transitive with other4And, I think, even some idealists can find ameaningful degreeof ontological priority of suitably re-describedfactsoftheformerkindoverfactsaboutbeliefs.5Nordoesitseemrighttosaythatshebelievesthatherhusbandhasbeenunfaithfultoherinvirtueofthefactthathehas;Eva’sbeliefisneitherknowledgeablenorjustified.6E.g.Hofweber(2009)7E.g. ‘We knowwe are in the realmofmurkymetaphysics by the presence of theweaselwords “invirtueof”.’(Oliver1996,48)8Seee.g.Rosen(2010),Fine(2012)andAudi(2012a).

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E-relations, even if it is transitivewith itself. Nothingwould then force us to conclude that

mysteryrelationsandtheE’-rationalrelationarethesamesortofE-relation,whichiswhatis

requiredforustoadmitthetruthof(M5).

Of course, this is possible, and, indeed, the different examples are not alike in all respects.

However,whatneedstobeshownisnotthattherearedifferencesbetweenthecasesgiven,

butthatwhatdifferentiatesthemissuchthattheycannotbethesamesortofE-relation.And,

again,Itaketheburdenofproofheretobeonthosewhothinkthattheyaren’t.

2.2 Thebestaccountofsuchrelationstakesthemtobeofonekind

There is a readily available analysis of the ontological underpinnings of these explanatory

relations according to which they are the same, transitive explanatory relation: namely,

grounding.

2.2.1 Whataregroundingrelations?

Grounding is the ‘in vogue’ relation in contemporary metaphysics. Here are a few

characteristicgroundingclaims9:

1.Mentalfactsobtaininvirtueofneurophysiologicalfacts;

2.Dispositionalpropertiesaregroundedincategoricalproperties;

3.Legalfactsaregroundedinnon-legal,e.g.social,facts;

4.Morallywrongactsarewronginvirtueofnon-moralfacts;

5.Normativefactsaregroundedinnaturalfacts.

(Correia2010,251)

Assuming that grounding is abona fide relation; here are some things that are taken to be

essentialtogrounding10:

− Itisanexplanatoryrelation;11

− Itisanotmerelycausalrelation12;

− Itistransitive;

9Note: the usefulness of grounding doesn’t hang on the truth of these claims but whether or notgroundingcanbeusedtocharacterisewhattheclaimsareclaimsabout.10Seee.g.Rosen(2010),Fine(2012)andAudi(2012a).11Asanaside:Weshouldnotethatonecouldquestionwhethergroundingrelationsarethenon-causalexplanatoryrelationsthemselvesortheontologicaldeterminationrelationsthatunderpinsthem.Thatquestionis,however,largelyorthogonaltoourdiscussion.12Thoughthereisnorequirementthatgroundingrelationsexcludecausalrelations.

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− ‘Thefactthatpisgroundedinthefactthatq’canbecharacterisedbylocutionslike‘pisthecaseinvirtueofq’;and

− Itisarelationofontologicalpriority.

Weshouldnoteanimportantdistinctionbetweenafullandapartialground.Hereisatypical

characterisation:

A is apartial ground forC ifA,on itsownorwith someother truths, is agroundofC. (Fine2012,50)

Now,althoughfullgroundsaretypicallytakentonecessitatethatwhichtheyground13,merely

partial grounds are not. For instance, the possibility of castling with one’s kingside rook is

partiallygrounded in the fact thatnopiecesobstruct themovebut that factalonedoesnot

guaranteethatonecancastlewithone’skingsiderook(forinstance,thekingmaybeincheck).

Andwhilefullgroundsmaynecessitatethatwhichtheyground,neitherfullnorpartialgrounds

needbenecessaryforthatwhichtheyground.Totakeastandardexample:thefactthatthis

ballisscarletfullygroundsthefactthatitisred,buttheformerisnotnecessaryforthelatter

(theballcouldbevermillionorruby).14

2.2.2 Theseexplanatoryrelationsaregroundingrelations

Grounding theoristsaimtoexplainwhyavarietyof relations inseeminglydifferentcontexts

exhibitthesamepropertiesbysuggestingthattheyallsharethecommon‘grounding’relation

(andthenprovidingananalysisofthatrelation).AsAudiremarks:

Such pervasive similarity among such diverse subject matters cries out for explanation. Iproposethatwhataccountsforthesimilarityissimplythatthereisasinglerelationatworkineachcase.(P.Audi2012b,689)

In§2.1.1, Iarguedthat themystery relationandtheE’-relationhaveahostofproperties in

common.Havingsetoutthepropertiesofgroundingrelationsabove,wecannowseethatthe

propertiesthattheserelationshaveincommonjustarethepropertiesofgroundingrelations.

Like grounding relations, these explanatory relations are non-causal, transitive, explanatory

relations; they can be characterised by locutions like ‘in virtue of’; they involve claims of

ontological priority; and they contribute to necessitating that towhich they relate although

theyneednotbenecessary for it toobtain.FollowingAudi’s logic, then, thebestaccountof

whytheserelationssharethosepropertiesisbecausethey,too,aregroundingrelations.

13Forexample, seeRosen (2010),Fine (2012)andAudi (2012b).There is somedissent fromthisview(forexample,seeChudnoff(2011)andLeuenberger(2014)).14The analogousness of the concepts of full and partial groundswith the concepts of full and partialexplanationinvokedthroughoutthisdiscussionispresumablyclear.

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Moreover, the distinction between full and partial grounds readily accommodates what we

earlierobservedaboutthestrictlypartialcontributionofthefactthatSallybelievesthatabear

ischasinghertotheexplanationofwhyitisrationalforhertorun:wecansaythatthepartial

explanation partially grounds that which it explains. It similarly provides us with a ready

characterisation of the strictly partial way inwhich the fact that it is raining explainswhy I

believethatitisrainingevenwhenIknowthatitisraining(foritdoesnotdosoonitsown):

againwecansaythattheformerfactpartiallygroundsthelatter.15

So here is another reason to believe (M5): there is awell-developed analysis of the sort of

explanations that both the E’-relation and mystery relations appear to exhibit, grounding,

whichtakesthemtobothbeacommon,non-causal, transitive,explanatoryrelation.That is,

thebestavailableaccountofthesortofexplanations involved intheE’-rationalandmystery

relationsentailsthetruthof(M5).

2.3 Theirtransitivitymakessenseofordinarylanguage

A final consideration in support of (M5) is that, provided that you agreewith (M1)-(M4), it

provides thebestaccountofordinary languageexpressions inwhichnon-psychological facts

aresaidtoexplainwhyitisrationaltodosomething.

Somethingswemightreadilysay:thefactthatSallyheardabear-likesound(inawoodthat

sheknewtocontainbears)atleastpartlyexplainswhyitwasrationalforhertorun.Thefact

that my friend won an award at least partially explains why it was rational for me to

congratulateher.Itwasrationalformetotakemyumbrellabecauseitwasraining.

Aswithnormativereasonexplanationsofaction,therearethreepossibleaccountsofwhatis

going on in these sorts of explanations: either the purported explanans explains the

explanandumelliptically,directlyorindirectly.Now,Isuggestthatthesameargumentsagainst

theelliptical anddirectaccountsofnormative reasonexplanationalsoapply to theelliptical

anddirect accountsof theexplanationofwhy it is rational (see§(X)). In contrast, provided

thatyouagreewithmyaccountofmysteryrelations,theclaimthattheyaretransitivewiththe

E’-relation (i.e. (M5)) furnishes us with an account of these explanations that is thoroughly

natural.

15Ourreadinessoftotalkintermsofgroundsforbelieforgroundsforactionis,perhaps,furthergristtothismill.

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3 Whennon-psychologicalfactsexplainwhyitisrational

Recall the challenge set out in §(XIII)4: I need a principled account of why it is that, for

instance, theexplanatoryrelations fromthebelieved fact to therationalityof theactionare

transitiveinthe‘award’casebutnotinthe‘carbonmonoxide’case.Whatisthataccount?

It is this: something that isn’tadirect featureofanagent’spsychologycanexplainwhy it is

rational for them to do some action only if it is mysteriously related to a feature of their

psychologythatexplainswhythatactionisrational.Inparticular,amerelycausalexplanatory

relationisnotsufficient.

3.1 Someexamples

Itwill helpmake theaccount clear ifwe revisit someof thedifferent cases considered.The

diagrams below set out three cases. I have labelled the explanatory relations as follows:

instancesofthemysteryrelationaremarked‘⇝’;instancesoftheE’-relationaremarked‘E’’;

andmerelycausalrelationsaremarked‘c’.

FigureXV-1:Theexplanatoryrelationsintheawardcase.

FigureXV-2:Theexplanatoryrelationsinthecarbonmonoxidecase

FigureXV-3:TheexplanatoryrelationsintheEvacase

Iwill run througheachof theseexamples in turn. In theawardcase (FigureXV-1) there isa

chainofnon-causalexplanatoryrelationsofacommonsortthat linksthefactthatmyfriend

won an award to the fact that it was pro tanto rational for me to congratulate her. In

particular:thefactthatmyfriendwonanawardismysteriouslyrelatedtothefactthatIread

Ireadthatshehadwonan

award

Myfriendwonanaward

Ibelievedthatshewonan

awardexplains

Congratulatingherwasprotantorationalexplains explains

⇝ ⇝ E’

Itappearedasthoughmyfriendwaswarningme

ofCO

TherewasCOintheroom

IbelievedthattherewasCOintheroomexplains

Leavingwasprotantorational

explainsexplains

⇝c E’

Itappearedtoherasthoughherhusbandwaskissinganotherwoman

Eva’shusbandwas

unfaithful

Shebelievedthather

husbandwasunfaithfulexplains

Divorcinghimwasprotanto

rationalexplainsexplains

E’⇝ c

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thatshehadwonanawardinthenewspaper,whichismysteriouslyrelatedtothefactthatI

believed that she had won an award, which is E’-related to the fact that it was pro tanto

rationalformetocongratulateher.

Now, since themystery relation is transitive, and transitivewith theE’-relation (from (M5)),

thatmeansthatthefactthatmyfriendwonanawardisE’-relatedtothefactthatitwaspro

tanto rational for me to congratulate her; that is: the fact that my friend won an award

explainswhyitwasprotantorationalformetocongratulateher.

Incontrast,inthecarbonmonoxidecase,thereisnochainofnon-causalexplanatoryrelations

linkingthefactthattherewascarbonmonoxideintheroomtothefactthatitwasprotanto

rational formeto leave it.Thefactthattherewascarbonmonoxide intheroomis(atbest)

merelycausallyrelatedtothefactthatitappearedtomeasthoughmyfriendwaswarningme

aboutthecarbonmonoxide.However,thefactthatitappearedtomeasthoughmyfriendwas

warningmeaboutthecarbonmonoxideismysteriouslyrelatedtothefactthatIbelievedthat

therewas(becauseIbasedmybeliefonthewaythingsappearedtobe),whichisE’-relatedto

thefactthatitwasprotantorationalformetoleave.So,again,giventhetransitivityofthese

relations,thefactthat itappearedtomeasthoughtherewascarbonmonoxideintheroom

doesexplainwhyitwasprotantorationalformetoleave.16

Finally,inEva’scase,thereislikewisenochainofnon-causalexplanatoryrelationslinkingthe

factthatherhusbandwasunfaithfultothefactthatitwasprotantorationalforhertodivorce

him.WhilethatfactismysteriouslyrelatedtothejustificationEvahasforbelievingit(i.e.that

it appeared toher as thoughhewas kissing anotherwoman), since that justification is only

merelycausallyrelatedtoherbelief, thenon-casualexplanatorychaindoesnotextendfrom

thefactintheworld,throughthejustification,totherationalityoftheaction.Thatis,neither

the fact that Eva’s husband was unfaithful to her, nor the fact that it appeared to her as

thoughhewaskissinganotherwomanexplainswhyitwasprotantorationalforhertodivorce

him.

16Itwillpresumablyalsobeclearhowthesamelineofreasoningshouldleadustotheconclusionthatthe rustling of the trees does not explain why it is (pro tanto) rational for Sally to run. That is, therustling of the trees is merely causally related to her hearing a bear-like sound, so the explanatorybetweenthetwofacts isnottransitivewiththeE’-relation,as itwouldneedtobe inordertoexplainwhyheractionwas(protanto)rational.

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Thetablebelowsummarisesthesecases:

Example Thebelievedfact/justificationforbelievingitExplainswhyitwasprotantorationaltoact?

Evacase

f Herhusbandwasunfaithfultoher û

jItappearedasthoughherhusbandwaskissing

anotherwoman û

COcasef Theroomwasfullofcarbonmonoxide û

j Itappearedasthoughmyfriendwaswarningme ü

Awardcase

f Myfriendwonanaward ü

j Ireadthatshehadwonanawardinthenewspaper ü

TableXV-1:Asummaryofwhatexplainsandwhatdoesn'tineachcase

4 Conclusion

Ihavearguedthatsomethingthatisnotadirectfeatureofanagent’spsychologycanexplain

why their action is pro tanto rational only if it is mysteriously related to a feature of their

psychologythat,inturn,explainswhytheiractionisprotantorational.Ihavearguedforthis

on the basis that themystery relation is transitivewith the E’-relation,whilemerely causal

relationsarenot.IconsidersomeobjectionstothisproposalintheAppendixtothischapter.

Thenext, and final, chapter combines the insightsof thisdiscussion to setoutmy theoryof

reasons.

Appendix

A.1 Objections

Objection1 Thechallengewasforyoutoshowwhyitwasthat(i)thefactthatyourfriend

wonanawardexplainedwhy itwasrational foryoutocongratulateher,despite (ii) the fact

thattheroomwasfullofcarbonmonoxidedidn’texplainwhyitwasrationalforyoutoleave.

Your‘answer’isthatitisamystery,butthat’snosortofanswer!Youarejustre-labellingthe

problemthatwasalreadydiagnosed.Whatprogresshasreallybeenmade?Don’twewantto

knowwhythisrelationshipispresentin(i)andnotin(ii)?

Response Well, here is some progress that has beenmade: we’ve identified that the

mysteryrelationispartofsomefamilyofexplanatoryrelations,wheremembersofthatfamily

havecertainproperties.Thatisatleastthestartingpointforasystematicinvestigationofwhy

therelationshipispresent.

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More generally, however, I amnot trying to answer the question ofwhy the relationship is

present.ThequestionIamtryingtoansweriswhytheexplanatorychainin(i)istransitiveand

whyitisn’tin(ii).Myansweristhatthereisachainof(mysterious)explanatoryrelationsin(i)

that there isn’t in (ii)and that thesemystery relationsare transitivewith theE’-relation (i.e.

(M5)).IfyouacceptthesetwoclaimsthatisenoughtoanswerthequestionthatIamtryingto

answer.

Thequestionastowhy there isamysteryrelationispresent in(i)but isn’t in(ii) isadeeper

(more distal) and perhaps more interesting question than the one I am answering. But

answering it is beyond the scope ofwhat I need to do tomakemy case. In identifying the

mystery relation as an explanatory relation, and showing that it is transitive with the

E’-relation,andshowingthatitobtainsin(i)butnotin(ii), Ihaveananswertothechallenge

posed,andIdon’tneedmorethanthat.

Objection2 If grounding-based formulationsofphysicalismare true, thenyouare forced

intotheabsurdconclusionthat,say, the fact thatSally’sbrain is instateBexplainswhy it is

rationalforhertorun.

Muchofyourargumentfor (M5)wasbasedontheclaimthatthebestexplanationofall the

grounding-likepropertiesthatthemysteryrelationandtheE’-relationsshareisthattheyboth

involveacommon,explanatory relation. Itwas for that reason thatyousuggested that they

weretransitive,so,yousuggest:

(a) Allexplanatoryrelationsthatexhibitgrounding-likepropertiesaretransitivewitheachother.

Grounding-based formulations of physicalism (e.g. Correia 2010; Kroedel and Schulz 2016)

holdthatallmental factsaregrounded inphysicalones.Now,grounding-basedformulations

of physicalism take the relation betweenmental and physical facts to exhibit exactly those

propertiesthatyousaidthattheE’-relationandmysteryrelationexhibit.17Thus:

(b) Allmental factsstand inaparticularexplanatory relation tosomephysical factsandthatexplanatoryrelationexhibitsgrounding-likeproperties.

Thus, from (a) and (b), togetherwith your claim that the E’-relation exhibits grounding-like

properties, we infer that the explanatory relation between the mental and the physical is

transitivewiththeE’-relation.

17Forinstance:Therelationisanon-causalexplanatoryrelation.Itcanbecharacterisedbythe‘invirtueof’locution.Etc.

213

So,somephysicalfact(e.g.thefactthatSally’sbrainisinstateB)non-causallyexplainsthefact

shebelievesthatitisrationalforhertorun.AndsincethatistransitivewiththeE’-relation,we

canconcludethatthefactthatSally’sbrainisinstateBexplainswhyitisprotantorationalfor

hertorun.Butthatisabsurd!

Response IagreethatitisabsurdtosaythatfactsaboutSally’sbrainstateexplainwhyit

wasprotantorationalforhertorun.So,topreservemytheoryinthefaceofthisconclusionI

mustrejecteither(a)or(b).18

Asitis,I’mnotconvincedthat(b)istrue–inparticular,it’snotcleartomethatfactsaboutan

agent’sbrainstateexplaintheirmentalstate.However,theclaimthatreductionrelationsare

explanatory relations is true in a number of popular construals of physicalism beyond just

grounding-basedformulations19–sorejectingitisnotwithoutitscosts.

Isthereawaytorendermytheoryconsistentwithsuchconstrualsofphysicalism,byrejecting

(a),thatdoesn’talsounderminemyargumentfor(M5)?Isuggestthatthereis.

Recall that inmyargument for (M5), I considered thepossibility that theE’-relationand the

mystery relation involve different species of a genus of non-causal explanatory relations, E-

relations,andthatitistheirbelongingtothatgenusthataccountsforthepropertiestheyhave

in common. The argumentwas that E’-relations andmystery relations need not involve the

samerelationtoexhibitthesameproperties–beingmembersofthesamefamilyissufficient.

MyresponsetothatpossibilitywasAudi’s:thattheburdenofproofisonthosewhotakethe

relationstobedifferenttoshowthattheyaredifferent.20

With respect tomystery relations, I can thinkofno compelling reasonas towhywe should

think that the sort of explanation involved is entirely different to the sort involved in the

E’-relation.However,unlikethemysteryrelation,totheextentthattherelationbetweenthe

mentalandthephysicalreally isanon-causalexplanatoryrelation(i.e.giventhatweassume

(b)),Ithinkthatwehavereasontothinkthatitdoesnotinvolvethesamesortofnon-causal

explanatoryrelationastheE’-relation.Thatis,Ithinkthatinthiscasewedohaveareasonfor

thinkingtheyinvolvedifferentsortsofexplanation,butinthecaseofthemysteryrelation,we

don’t.

Whatisthereasonwehave?Iarguethatthesortofexplanatoryrelationthatismeanttoexist

between the mental and the physical is not transitive with the sort of explanation the

18Atleastsolongasweassumethat,onanygrounding-basedversionofphysicalism,Sally’sbrainstateisthe‘ground’ofhermentalstate.19ThisiswhatCrane(2000)calls‘conceptualreduction’(asopposedto‘ontologicalreduction’).20Schaffer(2009,377)makessimilarremarks.

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E’-relation involves–andthatthis isareasonforthinkingthattheydonot involvethesame

relation.

Letusintroduceadistinction(whichismeanttobeintuitive,butwhichwillbesubstantiated

with examples) between two sorts of non-causal explanation: vertical and horizontal.21Say

thatverticalexplanatoryrelations,Ev-relations,areexplanatoryreductionrelations(ifthereare

suchthings), likethosebetweenthementalandthephysical.Saythathorizontalexplanatory

relations,Eh-relations,arelikethoseinvolvedinE’-relationsandmysteryrelations.WhatIwill

need to demonstrate is that horizontal explanatory relations are not transitivewith vertical

explanatoryrelations(i.e.that(a)isfalse).

Tostart:consider that the fact that this sliceofcake is thebiggestexplainswhy itwouldbe

impolitetotakeit.This,Isubmit,isahorizontalexplanatoryrelation–thefactthatthecakeis

biggestmakestaking it impolite inthesamewaythatabeliefthat it’scoldexplainswhyit is

rationaltoturnontheheating.

Nowgiventhatreduction isanexplanatoryrelation,asthe ‘conceptualreduction’physicalist

supposes, factsabout themicrophysicalpropertiesof the slice (and theother slices)explain

whyitisthelargestslice.Isuggestthatthisexplanatoryrelation,quareductionrelation,isthe

samesortofverticalexplanatoryrelation,i.e.theEv-relation,astherelationbetweenmental

andphysicalfacts.

But,Isuggest,itisoddtosaythatfactsaboutthemicrophysicalstructureofthesliceofcake

areapartoftheexplanationofwhyit’simpolitetotakeit.Thatis,wecannotinferfrom(i)the

fact that facts about the microphysical structure of the cake (partly) explain why it is the

largestslice;and(ii) thefactthatthefactthat it isthe largestslice(partly)explainswhy it is

impolite to take it; to (iii) the conclusion that facts about themicrophysical structureof the

cake(partly)explainwhyitisimpolitetotakeit.Inotherwords,thetransitivityofexplanation

breaksdown.Now,sincetheEh-relationisatransitiverelation,wehaveareasontothinkthat

theEv-relation is not transitivewith theEh-relation, so they aredistinct sortsof explanatory

relation.

This particular argument relies on the reduction of macro-physical to micro-physical facts

being relevantly analogous to the reduction of mental facts to physical ones. However, I

21Ihaveappropriatedandre-purposedthisterminologyfromJaegwonKim(2003).Kimtalksintermsof‘verticaldetermination’and‘horizontaldetermination’–whilstverticaldeterminationisclosetowhatIcharacterise as ‘vertical explanation’, Kim’s notionof horizontal determination is explicitly causal. ForthatreasonIdistinguishbetweenverticalexplanationandhorizontalexplanation.

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cannotseehowtransitivitywithEh-relationscouldfailfortheformer,(asIhavearguedthatit

does)butsucceedwiththelatter,soIhaveinferredthatitdoesn’t.22

In contrast, as I have argued above, the transition from amystery relation to anE’-relation

seeminglydoes involvea transitive formof explanation: the claimsweendupmaking ifwe

taketherelationtobetransitivethere(e.g.thefactthatitiscoldexplainswhyit’srationalfor

metoputtheheatingon)seemcommonplaceincomparisontothepreposterousnessofthe

claimswemakeifweassumethatverticalexplanationsarecontinuouswithhorizontalones.

MypointisjustthatwhileEv-relationsare‘transitivewith’eachother,theyarenot‘transitive

with’Eh-relations.

Thus,Ithinkthatthereisacrediblewayofrejecting(a)thatdoesnotunderminemyargument

for (M5), so that the proponent of grounding-based formulations of physicalism (and

conceptual reduction more generally) can accept my theory without arriving at the absurd

conclusion that Sally’s brain state explainswhy it is rational forher to run. Theonly cost to

such a physicalist is that they must admit that there are at least two kinds of grounding

relation that, despite sharing a host of properties, are not transitive with one another.

However,this isnotacost IneedpaysinceIanywaydon’tthinkthatreductionrelationsare

explanatory(thatis,mypreferredresponsetothisobjectionistoreject(b)).

Objection3 Deviantcausalchainsaffectmanyotheranalysesofcausation,forinstance:

Itwouldnotworktosaythattheheatoftheovencooksthechickenifandonlyiftheheatoftheovencausesthechickentobeinacookedstate.Theheatoftheovenmighttriggersomemicrowaveactivityelsewherewhichcausesthechickentobeinthatstate;inthiscasetheheatwouldnothavecookedthechicken.(Stout2010,161)

That being so, the mystery relation is presumably not only restricted to the cases you’ve

considered.Supposingthatthemysteryrelationdifferentiatesdeviantfromnon-deviantcases,

wemightsaythis:iftheovencooksthechickenthenthefactthattheovencookedthechicken

ismysteriouslyrelatedtothefactthatthechickenreachedacookedstate.

So,let’simagineatwicedeviantcarbonmonoxidecase.Insteadofcausingyoutohallucinate

in the ‘normal’way, thecarbonmonoxidecausesa creature in the roomtohallucinate that

youareattacking it, and,unbeknownst toyou, it injectsyouwithhallucinatoryvenom.That

thenmakesyouhallucinatethatyourfriendiswarningyouaboutthecarbonmonoxideandso

on.

22Indeed,thefactthatitisabsurdtoclaimthatthefactthatSally’sbrainisinstateBexplainswhyitispro tanto rational for her to run is clear evidence that the explanatory relations involved are nottransitive.

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In theoriginalexample thecarbonmonoxidemadeyouhallucinate inanon-deviantway. In

thisnewcaseitmadeyouhallucinateinadeviantway.Butifwhatdifferentiatesdeviantcases

fromnon-deviantonesisthemysteryrelation,thenthatmustmeantthat,inthenon-deviant

case,thefactthattherewascarbonmonoxideintheroom ismysteriouslyrelatedtothefact

that itappearedtoyouas thoughyour friendwaswarningyouabout thecarbonmonoxide.

That being so, given the transitivity of themystery relation, the fact that therewas carbon

monoxideintheroomoughttoexplainwhyitwasrationalforyoutoleaveit.

Response First,Ineverofferedthemysteryrelationasananalysisofwhatdifferentiates

deviantcausalchainsfromnon-deviantonesinanycontext.Itwasspecificallyrestrictedtothe

casesconsidered.

Second,Idonotthinkitshouldbeextendedtoothercases.Whatdistinguishesdeviantcausal

chainsfromnon-deviantonesismysteriousinthementalcasebecauseitinvolvesthemental

(or,at least, therepresentational). In thecaseofcookingthechicken,while Idon’thavethe

solutiontotheproblem,Idon’tthinkthereisthesamefundamentallymysteriousproblemat

work.Whatever themystery relation is, it is, I suggest, to do with the rational faculties of

agents,whereas,itseemstome,thequestionofdeviantcausalchainsinmerecausalcasesisa

merequestionofmechanism.

Perhaps you don’t find this response very compelling. I’m afraid I don’t have a more

compellingone;shouldthisprovetobeaninsuperabledifficultythenIshouldhavetolookfor

someotheranalysisastowhyfactsabouttheworldcanexplainwhyouractionsarerational.

However,Istruggletofindthisobjectioninsuperable.

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(XVI)

Anewtheoryofreasons

InwhichIsetoutmytheoryofreasons.Idiscusswhatexplanatoryrationalismsaysabout theapplicationofeachreasonexpressiontothecasewhere I takemyumbrellahavingseenthatitisraining.Ishowhowexplanatoryrationalismsolves theproblems facedbyother theories. I suggest that thebest theoryofreasons is a pluralist theory of reason that combines explanatory rationalismand favourism; I call this theory ‘new pluralism’. I show how explanatoryrationalism enables new pluralism to meet the main challenge to pluralisttheories.

In §(V), I argued that ifweare to solveall of theproblemsdiscussed in§§(II)-(VI) thenwe

needanewfamilyofclaimsaboutreasons.In§(VI),Isuggestedthatexplanatoryrationalism

was the new family of claims thatwe needed, however, I noted, The Explanatory Exclusion

Problempresentedasignificantchallengeforit.Theintermediatingchaptershavearguedthat

TheExplanatoryExclusionProblemisnottheproblemitseemstobe,andthatit istherefore

noobstacletoexplanatoryrationalism’ssolvingtheproblemsdiscussedin§§(II)-(V).

Now it is time to discuss howexplanatory rationalism solves theseproblems. The answer is

perhapsobvious:explanatoryrationalismsolvestheseproblemsbyrejectingthetroublesome

viewsthatgaverisetothem;thatis,explanatoryrationalismrejectsfavourism,psychologism

anddeliberativism.Moregenerally,explanatoryrationalismisnotsusceptibletosimilarsorts

ofproblemsbecauseitisconsistentbothwiththeideathatagentsalwaysactforpsychological

reasons, andwith the idea that they sometimes also act for normative reasons. Because of

this,Iargue,explanatoryrationalismisthebestunivocalaccountofwhatitistobeareason.

However,youwillrecallfrom§(V)thatIthinkthatourtheoryofreasonsoughttobepluralist

becauseIsharethetwosenses intuition.Tothatend, Ipresentnewpluralism: Isuggestthat

onesenseofwhatitistobeareasonisexplanatoryrationalistandtheothersenseisfavourist.

Thatismytheoryofreasons.

In what follows I revisit explanatory rationalism, and consider what it says about what my

reasonswerewhenIsawthatitwasraining,andconsequentlytookmyumbrella.Ithenshow

howexplanatory rationalismsolves theproblemsthataffectother theories.Finally, I setout

newpluralismandshowhowitaddressesthemainchallengetopluralisttheories.

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1 ExplanatoryRationalism:Revisited

Recallwhatexplanatoryrationalismhastosayabouteachreasonexpression:

Reasonexpression Explanatoryrationalism

Foranyp,pisareasonforAtoφ… …ifandonlyifpexplainswhyitisprotantorationalforAtoφ.

Foranyp,pisareasonforA’sφing… …ifandonlyifpexplainswhyitisprotantorationalforAtoφandpmakesA’sφing,insomerespect,worthdoing.

Foranyp,pisareasonAhastoφ… …ifandonlyifpexplainswhyitisprotantorationalforAtoφ.

Foranyp,pisA’sreasonforφing… …ifandonlyifpexplainswhyitisprotantorationalforAtoφandexplains(intherightway)whyAφ’d.

TableXVI-1:Explanatoryrationalism

Itmayhelpputthistheoryintocontextifweconsideranexample.Beforedoingso,however,

thereissomethingthatperhapsstillneedstobemadeexplicit:whatitmeanstoexplaininthe

rightwaywhysomeoneacted.ForthepurposeofthisdiscussionIwillassumethatifsomefact

ismysteriously relatedtothe fact that theagentdidwhat theydid, then itexplains it in the

rightway.Idiscussthisassumptionfurtherin§A.2oftheAppendixtothischapter.1

Thatclarificationhavingbeenmade,letusre-considerthefollowingexample:Ilookoutofthe

windowandseerain.Iknowthatit’sraining,soItakemyumbrellawhenIleavethehouse.

1.1 Theexplanatoryrelationsinvolved

What are the explanatory relations in this example? Well, the fact that it was raining is

mysteriously related to the fact that it appeared to me as though it was raining, which is

mysteriouslyrelatedtothefactthatIbelievedthatitwasraining,whichismysteriouslyrelated

to the fact that I tookmyumbrella. Furthermore, the fact that Ibelieved that itwas raining

explainswhyitwasprotantorationalformetotakemyumbrella.Diagrammatically:

1Asanaside:itisworthalsonotingthatthisassumptiondoesnotprecludethepossibilitythatacausalexplanatoryrelationisalsonecessaryforareasontoexplainanactionintherightway:inparticular,itmightbethat(atleastwhenitcomestoaction)acausalexplanatoryrelationbetweenareasonandanactionisanecessary(butnotsufficient)conditionforamysteryrelation.Inwhichcaseexplainingwhysomeonedidwhattheydid intherightway involvesbothacausalexplanatoryrelationandamysteryrelation.

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FigureXVI-1:Theexplanatoryrelationsinvolvedwhenitwasraining

So, given the transitivity of themystery relationwith the E’-relation, the following facts all

(partially)explainwhyitwasprotantorationalformetotakemyumbrella:thefactthatitwas

raining, the fact that itappeared tomeas though itwas rainingand the fact that Ibelieved

thatitwasraining.And,giventhetransitivityofthemysteryrelation,thesesamefactsareall

alsomysteriouslyrelatedtothefactthatItookmyumbrella.

1.2 ThereasonstherewereandthereasonsIhadtotakemyumbrella

Accordingtoexplanatoryrationalism,explainingwhyitisprotantorationalforsomeonetodo

someactionisbothnecessaryandsufficientforbeingareasonforthemtoactandforbeinga

reasonthattheyhavetoact.2So,thefactthatitwasraining,thefactthatitappearedtomeas

thoughitwasrainingandthefactthatIbelievedthatitwasrainingwereallreasonsformeto

takemyumbrellaandreasonsthatIhadtotakemyumbrella.

1.3 Thereasonsfortakingmyumbrella

Accordingtoexplanatoryrationalism,theconditionsforbeingareasonfor(oragainst)doing

something are different from the conditions for being a reason to (or not to) do it. In

particular,explanatoryrationalismmaintainsthatareasonfordoingsomethingmustbothbe

areasontodoitandmakeit,insomerespect,worthdoing.

Thefactthatitisrainingisareasonformetotakemyumbrellaanditmakestakingit,insome

respect,worth doing, so it is a reason formy takingmyumbrella.However, the fact that it

appearedtomeasthoughitwasraining,andthefactthatIbelievedthatitwasrainingdonot

make takingmyumbrella, in any respect,worthdoing,3so, despite being reasons forme to

takemyumbrella,theyaren’treasonsfortakingmyumbrella.

2Notethatsince,accordingtoexplanatoryrationalism,theconditionsforbeingareasonthereistoactarethesameasbeingareasonthatonehastoact,explanatoryrationalismtakesthesetwoexpressionstobecoextensive–thatis,topickoutthesamekindofreason.Thusexplanatoryrationalismentails(F8)(reasonsagentshavetoactareareasonsforthemtoact).3Recallthediscussionofthispointin§(I)4.2inparticular.

Itappearedtomeasthoughitwasraining

Itwasraining

Ibelievedthatitwasrainingexplains

Itookmyumbrella

explains explains

⇝ ⇝ ⇝

Itappearedtomeasthoughitwasraining

Itwasraining

Ibelievedthatitwasrainingexplains

Takingmyumbrellawasprotantorationalexplains explains

⇝ ⇝ E’

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Ifyouareconcernedthatitsoundsoddtosaythatsomethingisareasontodosomethingbut

notareasonfordoingit,pleaserefertothediscussionof§A.3oftheAppendixtothischapter.

1.4 Myreasonfortakingmyumbrella

Finally,explanatoryrationalismholdsthatthereasonforwhichanagentactsisanythingthat

bothexplainswhyitwasprotantorationalforthemtoact4andexplainswhytheyacted(inthe

rightway),whichistosaythatanyreasonforanagenttoactthatexplainswhytheyacted(in

therightway)istheirreasonforacting.5

Ihaveassumedthatthemysteryrelationissufficientforexplainingwhysomeoneactedinthe

rightway.Thismeansthatanyreasonforsomeagenttodosomeactionthatismysteriously

relatedtothefactthattheydiditisamongsttheirreasonsfordoingit.

Ihavenotedthatthefollowingfactswereallbothreasonsformetotakemyumbrellaandare

mysteriously related to the fact that I took it: the fact that it was raining, the fact that it

appearedtomeasthoughitwasraining,andthefactthatIbelievedthatitwasraining.Thus

thesewereallreasonsforwhichItookmyumbrella.

Ihavesaidthatthefactthat itwasrainingwasamongstmyreasonsfortakingmyumbrella.

Consider also that the fact that it was raining was a normative reason for me to take my

umbrella:so,Iactedforanormativereason.Sometheoristsholdthatoneactsforanormative

reasononly if one knows it (as I did in this case); in §A.5 of theAppendix to this chapter I

considerhowexplanatoryrationalismcouldexplainwhythatshouldbeso.

1.5 Asummary

TableXVI-2providesa summaryofwhatexplanatory realismhas to sayaboutwhich reason

expressionsapplytowhichfactinthisexample.

4Animplicationofthisformulationisthatanagentcoulddosomethingforareasonthatwasprotantobutnot all things considered rational for them todo. I discuss this implication further in §A.4of theAppendixtothischapter.5 It is worth noting that the formulation of explanatory rationalism thus entails the prima faciereasonableclaims(F7)and(F9)(theclaimsthatconnectactingforareasonwiththerebeingareasontoact)aswellas(D2)(theclaimthattheagent’sreasonforactingalwaysexplainstheiraction).

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Theputativereasons

Areasonformetotakemyumbrella

Areasonformy

takingmyumbrella

AreasonIhadtotake

myumbrella

AreasonforwhichItookmy

umbrella

Itwasraining ü ü ü ü

It appeared tome as thoughitwasraining ü û ü ü

Ibelievedthatitwasraining ü û ü ü

TableXVI-2:Anapplicationofexplanatoryrationalism

The facts considered above do not exhaust the reasons that there are in this example,6

howevertheyshouldhopefullybeindicativeofthesortsofclaimsthatexplanatoryrationalism

makes. For reference, I provide the same table for several of the examples considered in

previouschaptersin§A.1oftheAppendixtothischapter.

2 Solvingtheproblems

Explanatory rationalism solves the problems considered in §§(II)-(VI) by rejecting the

problematic theses that gave rise to them. That is, explanatory rationalism rejects all of the

followingclaims:

(FAV) Foranyp,p isareasonforAtoφonly ifA’sφing, is insomerespect,worthdoing.

(PSY) Foranyp,ifAφsforthereasonthatpthenpisafeatureofA’spsychology.

(DEL1) Foranyp,ifpisaconsiderationinlightofwhichAφsthenpisA’sreasonforφing.

(DEL2) Foranyp,ifpisA’sreasonforφingthenpisaconsiderationinlightofwhichAφs.

Manywill find explanatory rationalism’s rejectionof these viewsunpalatable. Indeed, itwill

seemtomanythatatleastsomeoftheseclaimsarethemselvesprimafaciereasonable.Ido

nottakethattobethecase–ratherIthinkthatanyresistancetorejectingtheseclaimscomes

fromone’stheoreticalcommitmenttothem,andnotfromtheirinherentplausibility.

Showing that explanatory rationalism can solve the problems considered in §§(II)-(VI) is, of

course,notademonstrationthatit isconsistentwithalloftheprimafaciereasonableclaims

set out in those chapters. Indeed, it is possible that there are otherprima facie reasonable

6Forinstance,thefactthatmyumbrellawouldkeepmedryisalsoareasonformetotakeit(giventhatIknowthatitwould),andareasonforwhichItookit.

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claimsouttherethat,whencombinedwiththosethatIhaveconsidered,createnewproblems

thatarespecifictoexplanatoryrationalism.

Against that possibility I have two responses: firstly, it is for the sceptic to generate such

claims,notformetoprovethatnoneexist(howcouldIprovethat?).Secondly,andperhaps

more compellingly, explanatory rationalism is to some extent inoculated from the

conventionalformoftheseproblemsbecauseitacknowledgesboththatagentsalwaysactfor

psychological reasons, and that agents also can, and often do, act for normative reasons.

Becauseitcanreconciletheseseeminglycompetingtheses, it is immunefromproblemsthat

arisefromdenyingeither,and,forthatreason, Isuggestthat it isthebestavailableunivocal

theoryofreasons.

3 Newpluralism

Explanatoryrationalismmaybethebestavailableunivocaltheoryofreasons,however,Ithink

that our theory of reasons ought to be pluralist. Recall that in §(V) I introduced the ‘two

senses’intuition:IsuggestedthatthereisasenseinwhichSallyranforareasonandasensein

whichshedidn’t;similarly,IsuggestedthatifIbelievethatthereismilkathomeeventhough

there isn’t, then there is a sense inwhich I don’t have a reason to buymilk and a sense in

which I do. In light of this observation I suggest thatwe should not stopwith the univocal

accountofreasonsprovidedbyexplanatoryrationalismonitsown;instead,weoughttoadopt

apluralisttheoryofreasons.

The sense in which Sally runs for a reason is the sense in which running intentionally,

deliberatelyandpurposefully is running fora reason. Likewise, the sense inwhich Ihaveno

reasontobuymilkisthesenseinwhich,ifitisnotrationalformetodosomething,Ihaveno

reasontodoit.OverthepreviouschaptersIhavearguedthatthebestwaytocharacterisethe

senseoftheseexpressionsforwhichtheseclaimsaretrueisexplanatoryrationalism.

Incontrast,thesenseinwhichSallydoesnotrunforareasonisthesenseinwhichthereisno

reasonforher torunbecausenogoodwillcomefromherrunning; it is innorespectworth

doing.Likewise,thesenseinwhichIhaveareasontobuymilkisthesenseinwhichonehasa

reasontodosomethingbecausedoingthatthing is, insomerespect,worthdoing.Thus,the

senseinwhichSallydoesnotrunforareason,andthesenseinwhichIhaveareasontobuy

milkischaracterisedbythefavouristfamilyofclaimsaboutreasons.

So,totheextentthatonesharesthe‘twosenses’ intuition, Isuggestthatthebesttheoryof

reasonstakesonesenseofeachreasonexpressiontobeexplanatoryrationalist,andtheother

sensetobefavourist.Thisisthenewpluralisttheoryofreasons.

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ReasonexpressionSenseA

(Explanatoryrationalism)

SenseB

(Favourism)

Foranyp,pisareasonforAtoφ…

…ifandonlyifpexplainswhyitisprotantorationalforAtoφ.

…ifandonlyifpmakesA’sφing,insomerespect,worthdoing.

Foranyp,pisareasonforA’sφing…

…ifandonlyifpexplainswhyitisprotantorationalforAtoφandpmakesA’sφing,insomerespect,worthdoing.

…ifandonlyifpmakesA’sφing,insomerespect,worthdoing.

Foranyp,pisareasonAhastoφ…

…ifandonlyifpexplainswhyitisprotantorationalforAtoφ.

…ifandonlyifpmakesA’sφing,insomerespect,worthdoing.

Foranyp,pisaA’sreasonforφing…

…ifandonlyifpexplainswhyitisprotantorationalforAtoφandexplains(intherightway)whyAφ’d.

…ifandonlyifpmakesA’sφing,allthingsconsidered,worthdoingandexplains(intherightway)whyAφ’d.

TableXVI-3:NewPluralism

While I think that new pluralism is the best way to capture our myriad intuitions about

reasons, I think that explanatory rationalism is the de facto sense of reason expressions in

ordinarylanguage.ItseemstometobemoreofastraintoinsistthatIhaveareasontobuy

milkevenifIbelievethatIhaveplenty,thantoinsistthatSallyhasareasontorunalthoughno

bearischasingher.Indeed,Ifeelmoreinclinedtoqualifytheformer–Imightsaythatthereis

asenseinwhichIhaveareasontobuymilk–andIamsoinclined,Ithink,becausethesensein

whichIhaveareasontobuymilkisnottheconventionalsenseofwhatitistohaveareason

(mutatismutandisforSally).7

4 Thechallengeforpluralism

Recallthefollowingprimafaciereasonableclaim:

(S1) Whenever we give an agent’s reason for acting,whatever the sense of the

expression used, we explain their action in a way that makes them seem

rational.

In §(V)7, I noted that (S1) creates a problem for pluralism. The problemwas as follows: a

theoryofreasonsthatispluralistwithrespecttothereasonsforwhichanagentacts,takesthe

‘agent’sreasonforacting’expressiontohavetwodifferentsenses.Inparticular,suchatheory

holds that the reason-relation for each sense (i.e. the relation between the action and the

7Ofcourse,thegreatvirtueofexplanatoryrationalismisthatthereareoccasionsonwhichsomethingisa reason that I have todo something inboth the favourist and theexplanatory rationalist sense. Forinstance,whenIknowthatitisraining,thefactthatitisrainingisareasonformetotakemyumbrellainboththefavouristandtheexplanatoryrationalistsense.

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reasoninvirtueofwhichitisareason)isdifferent.Thechallengeforpluralisttheoriesisthus

to explain how it is that, if the reason-relations are different for the different senses, it is

nonetheless thecase thatwhenwegiveanagent’s reason foracting,whatever the senseof

theexpressionused,weexplaintheiractioninawaythatmakesthemseemrational.Thatis,if

theexpression‘theagent’sreasonforacting’hastwodifferentsenses,howis(S1)true?

New pluralism’s answer to this question relies on the following observation: whenever an

agentactsforareasoninthefavouristsense,theyactforthesamereasonintheexplanatory

rationalistsense.Toseewhythisisso,recallwhatfavourismaboutthereasonsforwhichwe

actclaims:

- Favourismaboutthereasonsforwhichweact:Foranyp,p isaA’sreasonforφingifandonly ifpmakesA’sφing,all things considered,worthdoingandexplains (in therightway)whyAφ’d.8

Ifsomethingmakesanagent’sactionallthingsconsideredworthdoingthenitalsomakesitin

somerespectworthdoing,so it isanormativereasonforthemtodo it. Ihavesuggested, in

previouschapters,thatanormativereasontodosomeactionexplainswhattheagentdidin

therightwayonly if it ismysteriouslyrelatedtoabeliefthat, inturn,bothexplainswhythe

agent’s action is pro tanto rational and is mysteriously related to the fact that they

(intentionally)didit.Nowrecallthatabeliefthatexplainsbothwhyitisprotantorationalfor

some agent to do something and why they did it is the agent’s reason for acting in the

explanatoryrationalistsense.

Thus,anormativereason,p,istheagent’sreasonforactinginthefavouristsenseonlyifitis

mysteriouslyrelatedtothefactthattheagentbelievesthatp,wherethefactthattheagent

believes thatp is theagent’s reason foracting in theexplanatory rationalist sense.But, as I

haveargued,ifpismysteriouslyrelatedtothefactthattheagentbelievesthatp,andthefact

thattheagentbelievesthatp is, intheexplanatoryrationalistsense, their reasonforacting,

then the fact thatp isalso their reason foracting in theexplanatory rationalist sense.Thus,

wheneveranagentactsforareasoninthefavouristsense,theyactforthesamereasoninthe

explanatoryrationalistsense.

8Whilethisthesisisrarely, ifever,explicitlyadvocatedbyfavourists,Itakeittobeatleastimpliedbytheir views. For instance,many favouristshold thatanagentacts foranormative reasononly if theyknowit (seethediscussionsofboth§(X)4and§A.5oftheAppendixtothischapterforsomerelateddiscussionoftheseaccounts).Now,whetherornottheyacceptmyindirecttheoryofnormativereasonexplanation,suchfavouristsstillwanttoholdthatanormativereasonmustexplaintheagent’sactionintherightway if it istoexplaintheiraction–andthat isallthat isrequiredforthemtoagreewithmycharacterisation.

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And when an agent acts for a reason in the explanatory rationalist sense, their reason for

actingexplainsbothwhytheyactedandwhyitwasprotantorationalforthemtoact.Sothisis

whygivinganagent’sreasonforactingalwaysexplainstheiractioninawaythatmakesthem

seemrational (orat leastprotanto rational):becausetheirreasonforactingalwaysexplains

whytheydidwhattheydidandwhyitwas(atleastprotanto)rationalforthemtodoit.

Newpluralismthusmeetsthechallengethat(S1)createsforallpluralisttheoriesbyinsisting

that whenever something is an agent’s reason for acting, it is a reason for acting in the

explanatory rationalist sense, but sometimes it is also the agent’s reason for acting in the

favourist sense. New pluralism thus provides a plausible account of the truth of (S1)whilst

maintainingitspluralistcredentials.

5 Conclusion

Explanatory rationalism provides us with a univocal account of what it is to be a practical

reasonthatdoesnotsufferthefailingsofmostcontemporarytheoriesofreasons.Thegreat

virtueofexplanatoryrationalism is thusthat itdoesnotgenerallycompelus tomakeclaims

about reasons that are strange, counterintuitive or prima facie paradoxical, unlike most

contemporary theories of reasons. In this respect, it is, I suggest, superior to favourism,

deliberativism,andpsychologism.

Moreover, I have suggested that new pluralism, a theory that combines explanatory

rationalism and favourism, is the best theory of reasons; it combines all the virtues of

explanatoryrationalismwithawaytosatisfy the ‘twosenses’ intuition,and ithappilymeets

themajorchallengetopluralisttheories.

226

Appendix

A.1 Somemoreexamples

Forreference,TableXVI-4showswhatexplanatoryrationalismhastosayaboutwhichreason

expressions apply towhich facts/propositions in someof theexamples considered in earlier

chapters.

Example Theputativereasons AreasonforAtoφ

AreasonforA’sφing

AreasonAhadtoφ

A’sreasonforφing

Award

Myfriendwonanaward ü ü ü ü

Ireadthatshehadwonanawardinthenewspaper ü û ü ü

Ibelievedthatshehadwonanaward ü û ü ü

Sally

AbearwaschasingSally û û û û

Sheheardabear-likesound ü û ü ü

Shebelievedthatabearwaschasingher ü û ü ü

Eva

Herhusbandwasunfaithful û û û û

It appeared to her as thoughher husband was kissinganotherwoman

û û û û

She believed that he had beenunfaithful ü û ü ü

Climber

Loosening his grip would ridhimofdanger ü ü ü û

It appeared as thoughlooseninghisgripwouldridhimofdanger

ü û ü û

He believed that loosening hisgripwouldridhimofdanger ü û ü û

TableXVI-4:Otherexamplesforexplanatoryrationalism

A.2 Explainingintherightway

Throughoutthischapter,Iassumedthatifsomefactismysteriouslyrelatedtothefactthatthe

agentdidwhattheydid,thenitexplainsitintherightway.Thissectionprovidesmorecontext

tothatassumption.

227

Accordingtoexplanatoryrationalism,somethingisthereasonforwhichanagentdoessome

actiononlyifitisareasonforthemtodoit9anditexplainswhytheydiditintherightway.But

whatdoesitmeantosaythatitexplainsitintherightway?

Well,recallthecaseoftheclimberwhowassounnervedbyhisresolutiontodrophisfriend,

that he loosened his grip on his friend unintentionally (i.e. not for a reason).10According to

explanatoryrationalismtherewasareasonforhimtoloosenhisgrip,whichwas,interalia,the

factthathebelievedthatdoingsowouldridhimofdanger.11Moreover,giventhat itcauses

himtoloosenhisgrip,thereisperhapsa(causal)senseinwhichthefactthathebelievedthat

looseninghisgripwouldridhimofdangerexplainswhyheloosenedhisgrip.Thatbeingso,a

reasonforhimtoloosenhisgripexplainswhyheloosenedhisgrip,butitwasnonethelessnot

hisreasonforlooseninghisgrip.12Whynot?Becauseitdoesnotexplainwhyheloosenedhis

gripintherightway.13

Whatisthe‘rightway’ofexplaining?AsIsuggestedin§(XIV),therightwayofexplainingan

agent’sactionisnotmerelycausal.Toelaborate:whiletherightwaymightbepartlycausal(I

willtakenoviewonthat), it isnotmerelycausal.Inparticular,Ihavesuggestedthatifafact

explainswhyanagentactedintherightwaythenitismysteriouslyrelatedtothefactthatthe

agentactedastheydid.14

Whattheseremarksestablishisthatamysteryrelationbetweenareasonthereistoactand

thefactthattheagentactedastheydidisnecessaryforthereasontoexplaintheiractionin

the rightway. For the purpose of this discussion, I assumed that it is sufficient; so that if a

reasonthatanagenthastoactismysteriouslyrelatedtothefactthattheyactedastheydid,

then it is their reason for acting. This assumption does not have a significant impact onmy

argument;itjustmakestheexpositionlessinvolved.

9I.e.itexplainswhyitisprotantorationalforthemtodoit.10See§(XIV)4.11Itwasareasonforhimtoloosenhisgripbecauseitexplainswhyitwasprotantorationalforhimtoloosenhisgrip.12Thisisclearlyimpliedbythefactthathedoesnotloosenhisgripforareason.13Cf. ‘What distinguishes actionswhich are intentional from thosewhich are not? The answer that Ishall suggest is that they are the actions to which a certain sense of the question ‘Why?’ is givenapplication; the sense is of course that in which the answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting.’(Anscombe1957,§5)14Thatis,Ihavesuggestedthatthedifferencebetweenafactthatmerelycausallyexplainswhyanagentactedandonethatexplainswhytheyactedintherightway isthatitisonlyinthelattercasethatthefactismysteriouslyrelatedtothefactthattheagentdidwhattheydid.

228

A.3 Theproblemofreasonsforacting

Unlike any other theory of reasons (tomy knowledge) explanatory rationalismdistinguishes

betweenthekindofreasonpickedoutbytheexpressions‘areasontoact’and‘areasonfor

acting’.Itinsiststhatwhileareasontoactisjustanythingthatexplainswhyanagent’saction

isprotantorational,areasonforactingissomethingthatisbothareasontoactandcountsin

favouroftheagent’sdoingit.Aconsequenceofthisviewisthatsomethingcouldbeareason

foranagenttodosomeactionwithoutbeingareasonfortheirdoingit.

While thismay sound paradoxical, inwhat follows Iwill argue that this is actually the least

worstresponsetoaproblemthataffectsalltheoriesofreasons.

A.3.1 WhatreasontherewasforSallytorun

Totheextentthatweacceptthat it isprimafacie reasonabletoclaimthatSally’sreasonfor

runningisthatsheheardabear-likesound(i.e.(F6))andthatanagent’sreasonforactingmust

beareasontherewasforthemtosoact(i.e.(F9)), it followsthatthefactthatSallyhearda

bear-like sound (in a wood that she knew to contain bears) was a reason for her to run.

Indeed,itseemstome,ifyouhearsomethingthatsoundslikeabearinawoodthatyouknow

tocontainbears,thenthatisagoodreasonforyoutorun.Thus,Isuggest:

(R5) ThefactthatSallyheardabear-likesoundisareasonforhertorun.

A.3.2 Reasonstoactandreasonsforacting

AsIhavealreadynoted, itseemsreasonabletosaythat ifsomethingisareasontodosome

actionthenitisareasonfordoingit,thus:

(R6) Foranyp,ifpisareasonforAtoφthenpisareasonforA’sφing.

A.3.3 Reasonsforactingcountinfavourofactions

In§(I)1.3,Inotedthatallreasonsforactingcountinfavouroftheactionsforwhichtheyare

reasonsandthatallreasonsagainstsomeactioncountagainstdoingthataction.In§(I)4.4,I

argued further that a reason for some action counts in favour of that action in virtue of its

beingareasonforit;thatis,Iarguedthatthe‘for’prepositiononitsownisenoughtogiveit

thatmeaning.15Thus:

(R7) Foranyp,ifpisareasonforA’sφingthenpcountsinfavourofA’sφing.

15In§(I)4.4,Iarguedfurtherthatareasonforsomeactioncountsinfavourofthatactioninvirtueofitsbeing a reason for it; that is, I argued that the ‘for’ preposition on its own is enough to give it thatmeaning–Ileftitopenwhetherornotareasonforactingalsocountsinfavourofanactioninvirtueofitsbeingareason.Similarremarksapplytoreasonsagainstsomeaction.

229

A.3.4 Countinginfavourof

AsIhavealreadyargued,16themostnatural interpretationofwhatit istocountinfavourof

someactionistomakeit,insomerespect,worthdoing.17Thus:

(R8) For anyp, p counts in favour ofA’sφing if and only ifpmakes A’sφing, in

somerespect,worthdoing.

A.3.5 Whatmake’sSally’srunningworthdoing

As I established in §(II)4, Sally’s running is, in no respect,worth doing, so nothingmakes it

worthdoing.And,inparticular:

(R9) ThefactthatSallyheardabear-likesounddoesnotmakeherrunning,inany

respect,worthdoing.

A.3.6 TheReasonsforActingProblem

TheReasonsforActingProblemisthis:thefactthatSallyheardabear-likesoundisareason

forhertorun,soitisareasonforherrunning,soitcountsinfavourofherrunning,soitmakes

her running, in some respect, worth doing, but it doesn’tmake her running in any respect

worthdoing!Explicitly,thefollowingclaimsaremutuallyinconsistent:

(R5) ThefactthatSallyheardabear-likesoundisareasonforhertorun.

(R6) Foranyp,ifpisareasonforAtoφthenpisareasonforA’sφing.

(R7) Foranyp,ifpisareasonforA’sφingthenpcountsinfavourofA’sφing.

(R8) For anyp, p counts in favour ofA’sφing if and only ifpmakes A’sφing, in

somerespect,worthdoing.

(R9) ThefactthatSallyheardabear-likesounddoesnotmakeherrunning,inany

respect,worthdoing.

Thisisaproblemthatalltheoriesofreasonsface(notehowalloftheseclaimsareprimafacie

reasonable, although they are mutually inconsistent). The response of favourists and

deliberativiststothisproblemistoreject(R5).Psychologismaboutreasonsforactingrejects

(R7).18Kearns and Star (2008) interpret what it is to ‘count in favour of acting’ as ‘being

evidence thatoneought to soact,’ so theywouldpresumably reject (R8). I knowofnoone

16Recallthediscussionofthispointin§(I)4.2inparticular.17Where what it is for an action to be worth doing is to be determined, except for the claim thatwhetherornotsomeactionisworthdoingforsomeagentisindependentofantheircognitivestates.18Psychologistswouldprobablyalsoreject(R5).

230

who would reject (R9). For reasons that I have set out at various points over the previous

chapters,Idon’tfindanyoftheseoptionspalatable.

Incontrast,explanatoryrationalismrejects(R6).Itakethistobetheleastworstoftheoptions

available.Does it soundoddtosay thatsomethingcouldbea reasontoactwithoutbeinga

reasonforacting?Somewhat.However,Ithinkthattheoddnessofsayingthisdissipateswhen

particular examples are considered: it does not soundodd tome to say that the fact that I

believethatitisrainingisareasonformetotakeanumbrellabutnotareasonfortakingan

umbrella.

A.4 Actingprotantorationally

According toexplanatory rationalism, it ispossible thatanagentcoulddosomeaction fora

reasoneven though thatactionwasmerelypro tanto rational,andnotall thingsconsidered

rational. That is, explanatory rationalism suggests that evenwhen an agent does one thing,

despite judging somethingelse tobeall things consideredworthdoing instead, they still do

whattheydoforareason.Isthisright?

Well,considerthefollowingexample:

Amanwalkinginaparkstumblesonabranchinthepath.Thinkingthebranchmayendangerothers,hepicks itupandthrowsit inahedgebesidethepath.Onhiswayhomeitoccurstohim that the branch may be projecting from the hedge and so still be a threat to unwarywalkers. He gets off the tram he is on, returns to the park, and restores the branch to itsoriginalposition…It iseasyto imaginethatthemanwhoreturnedtotheparktorestorethebranchtoitsoriginalpositioninthepathrealizesthathisactionisnotsensible.Hehasamotiveformovingthestick,namely,thatitmayendangerapasser-by.Buthealsohasamotivefornotreturning,whichisthetimeandtroubleitcosts.Inhisownjudgement,thelatterconsiderationoutweighs the former; yet he acts on the former. In short, he goes against his own bestjudgement.(Davidson2004,172&174)

ThemaninDavidson’sexampledoesactforareason:hethinksthatthestickmayendangera

passer-by. It seemstomethat the fact that theaction is ‘less than fully rational’,19doesnot

impingeupon itshavingbeendone fora reason.20But thismeans thatweshouldbecareful

aboutsayingthatifoneactsforareasonthentheyactrationally.HereiswhatIsuggest:

- Anagentactsprotantorationallyifandonlyiftheirreasonfordoingitisaprotantoreasontodoit(i.e.somethingthatexplainswhytheiractionisprotantorational).

19TouseParfit’s(2011,34)term.20Othersarealsoofthisview,for instance: ‘Theincontinentmanholdsonecoursetobebetter(forareason)andyetdoessomethingelse(alsoforareason).’(Davidson2001b,34);‘Akrasia,orweaknessofthewill, occurswhen, in the face of conflicting reasons for and againstX-ing someonemakes an all-things-consideredjudgementthatheoughtnottoX,butX’sanywayanddoessoforareason,namely,for whatever the reason in favour of X-ing was (which was included in the basis of the all-things-consideredjudgement).’(Hurley1992,130)

231

- Anagentactsallthingsconsideredrationallyifandonlyiftheirreasonfordoingitisanallthingsconsideredreasontodoit(i.e.somethingthatexplainswhytheiractionisallthingsconsideredrational).

A.5 Actingforanormativereasonandknowledge

Several theorists hold that an agent acts for a normative reason only if they know it.21In

§(XIV)2, Iarguedthatamysteryrelationbetweenthe fact thatpandthe fact thatanagent

believesthatp isanecessaryconditionontheagent’sknowingthatp.Now,supposefurther

thatitisalsoasufficientcondition(i.e.ifthefactthatpismysteriouslyrelatedtothefactthat

anagentbelievesthatpthentheagentknowsthatp).

If that were true, then explanatory rationalism would provide us with an account ofwhy

knowinganormativereasonshouldbenecessaryforactingonit:becauseitisonlyifanagent

knowsanormative reason that it canmysteriously explain their action– and it is only their

reasonforactingifitmysteriouslyexplainstheiraction.Letmeelaborate.

Anormativereasontodosomeactionmustbemysteriouslyrelatedtotheagent’sbeliefinitif

it istoexplaineitherwhy itwasprotanto rational fortheagenttodothataction,or(inthe

right way) why they did it 22 ; that is, a normative reason to do some action must be

mysteriouslyrelatedtotheagent’sbeliefinitifitistobetheagent’sreasonforacting.Andif

wesupposethatthemysteryrelationissufficientforknowledge,thenanormativereasonwill

onlybemysteriouslyrelatedtoanagent’sbeliefinitiftheagentknowsthatnormativereason.

So this iswhyanagent canonly act for anormative reason if they know it: because if they

don’t know it then, interalia, itwon’texplainwhy theydid it in the rightway, and itwon’t

explainwhyitwasprotantorationalforthemtodoit.

21(E.g.Unger1978;Hyman1999,2015;Hornsby2008;McDowell2013)22Excludingweirdcases(e.g.whereanormativereasontodosomeactionalsohappenstobeafeatureoftheagent’spsychology,whichanywayexplainswhytheagent’sactionisprotantorational).

232

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