Plato's Reply to Lysias: Republic 1 and 2 and Agaisnt Eratosthenes

179PLATO’S REPLY TO LYSIAS

American Journal of Philology 125 (2004) 179–208 © 2004 by The Johns Hopkins University Press

PLATO’S REPLY TO LYSIAS: REPUBLIC 1 AND 2AND AGAINST ERATOSTHENES

JACOB HOWLAND

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Abstract. In his courtroom speech Against Eratosthenes, Lysias calls for revengeagainst the murderers of his brother Polemarchus. In Plato’s Republic, however,Socrates convinces Polemarchus, in the presence of Lysias, that harming enemiesis unjust. Socrates’ argument focuses on certain problems and assumptions thatturn out to be key features of Lysias’ indictment of Eratosthenes. I argue thatSocrates’ conversation with Polemarchus is on one level a Platonic reply toAgainst Eratosthenes and that Plato’s implicit criticisms of Lysias in the Republicharmonize with the picture of Lysias that he inscribes explicitly in the Phaedrus.

PLATO’S REPUBLIC DEPICTS A CONVERSATION that takes place at thehome of Polemarchus, who is present along with his father Cephalus andhis brothers Lysias and Euthydemus. The guests include Plato’s brothersGlaucon and Adeimantus, the rhetorician Thrasymachus, Cleitophon,Niceratus (son of the general Nicias), Charmantides, and Socrates. Whilethe dramatic date of the conversation cannot be precisely determined, itmust in any case be prior to the end of the Peloponnesian War.1 In theaftermath of the war, the Athenians suffered under the brutal regime ofthe Thirty, a group of oligarchs backed by the victorious Spartans. Duringtheir eight-month rule in 404–3, the Thirty, who executed some fifteenhundred Athenians, ruined the family of Cephalus and put to deathseveral of the men present in the Republic.2 In his courtroom speechAgainst Eratosthenes, Lysias details the murder of Polemarchus by theThirty and the confiscation of his family’s wealth, which had been ac-quired through the manufacture of arms. Plato’s Athenian readers weredoubtless well aware of these facts and of the oligarchy’s execution of

1 The issues are ably discussed in Nails 1998.2 On the numbers executed by the Thirty, see Krentz 1982, 79; Strauss 1986, 54–55;

Munn 2000, 231.

Sherry Massoni

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Niceratus and possibly also of Cleitophon.3 The effects of the Thirty werefelt for some time even after their forces were defeated in a battle in thePiraeus, the port of Athens and the setting of the Republic. In particular,Socrates was executed under the restored democracy—an action in largemeasure attributable to his association with men of tyrannical inclinationsuch as Alcibiades and Critias, the cousin of Plato’s mother and leader ofthe Thirty.4

The facts reviewed above make it clear that the inquiry into tyran-nical injustice that unfolds in the Republic is by no means an inconse-quential or abstract pursuit. Our knowledge of the eventual fate ofPolemarchus and the others gives the praise of injustice advanced byThrasymachus and Glaucon and excused by Adeimantus (Rep. 366c–d) acertain dark gravity. It is not clear, for example, whether Socrates con-vinced Glaucon to avoid the path of injustice or to what extent Plato’sbrother might have supported the Thirty—a regime in which his ownrelatives held great power.5 Plato furthermore seems to have written theRepublic not only with a view to historical events but also in a way thatcritically engages another important text. It is striking that Lysias, wholater made his name writing speeches for the law courts, remains silentthroughout a conversation devoted to the question of whether it is betterto be just or unjust. Yet, there is reason to believe that the argumentindirectly reflects Lysias’ influence. The fate of the family of Cephalus atthe hands of the Thirty becomes a matter of public record because of

3 On Niceratus, see Krentz 1982, 79–80; Munn 2000, 230–31 (cf. 211). On Cleitophon,see Rahe 1977, 198, who notes that, while his associates are either killed by the oligarchy orreemerge as democratic politicians, Cleitophon simply disappears from the historical nar-rative.

4 See Xenophon, Mem. 1.2.12 with the sources cited at Munn 2000, 425 n. 33. Plato’smaternal uncle Charmides, who also associated with Socrates, was one of the Ten whogoverned in the Piraeus under the Thirty (Krentz 1982, 92); Plato’s kinship with Critias andCharmides is charted at Welliver 1977, 51, following Davies 1971. By 400/399, Socrates’name “had been invoked often enough in connection with the enemies of democracy tocreate an ill-defined yet pervasive aura of sinister power about the man” (Munn 2000, 289).

5 According to Xenophon, Socrates cured Glaucon of his political ambition (Mem.3.6.1). Munn, however, speculates that Glaucon was among those who died at the side ofCritias when the forces of the Thirty were defeated in the battle of Munychia in the Piraeusand that Plato was inspired by his memory in composing the Republic. He observes that theroad along which Glaucon and Socrates are returning to Athens from the festal processionto the shrine of Bendis at the beginning of the Republic is “certainly . . . the same road thatsoaked up the blood of the seventy devotees of Critias” and that Glaucon is not mentionedat Ap. 34a, where Socrates notes the presence of both Plato and Adeimantus (2000, 239,416, n. 46).


Lysias’ speech Against Eratosthenes. In fashioning his indictment of Era-tosthenes, the member of the Thirty who arrested Polemarchus, Lysiasproduces a sketch of tyrannical injustice that is echoed in the emphasesof Thrasymachus, Glaucon, and Adeimantus in the Republic. In the courseof his speech, Lysias also insists on the widespread and traditional prin-ciple that harming enemies is a part of justice—a principle that formspart of Polemarchus’ initial definition of justice in book 1 of the Republicbut that is refuted by Socrates.6 Lysias’ speech was probably composedand delivered, however, sometime near the end of 403, which is by anyscholarly estimate many years before Plato wrote the Republic.7 Weshould therefore consider the possibility that the Republic is on one levelmeant to be a Platonic response to Against Eratosthenes.

The first three sections of this article make the case that Socrates’conversation with Polemarchus in the Republic critically targets AgainstEratosthenes. The fourth section spells out Plato’s reply to Lysias’ call forrevenge against Polemarchus’ murderers. The fifth and concluding sec-tion connects Plato’s implicit criticism of Lysias in the Republic with hisexplicit characterization of Lysias in the Phaedrus. The Phaedrus linksLysias with Thrasymachus in emphasizing both men’s ignorance of thenature of the soul and therefore of justice.8 While the Phaedrus signifi-cantly amplifies and extends Socrates’ remarks in book 5 of the Republicabout the passionate or erotic nature of philosophy, it also portraysLysias as unerotic and therefore unphilosophical. The Phaedrus thusharmonizes with the Republic in shedding light on what is, in Plato’sview, Lysias’ misunderstanding of the requirements of justice as well ashis inability to profit from a philosophical critique of harming enemies.

6 The assumption that harming enemies is just—and that it is furthermore an essen-tial part of helping friends—pervades Greek popular thought. See the citations collected inBlundell 1989, chap. 2, and Vlastos 1991, chap. 7.

7 Munn 2000, 280, suggests a later date of 401/400 for Against Eratosthenes; but cf.Krentz 1984, 24, n. 2. As Cooper notes (1997, xii), scholars who concern themselves with theorder of composition of the dialogues assume that Plato’s authorship began “sometimeafter 399 B.C.” Plato would have been about twenty-five years old in 403.

8 Neither practices the genuine art of rhetoric because both are ignorant of thenature of the soul: Phdr. 269d, 271a–c. Lysias is mentioned in connection with Thrasymachusalso at Phdr. 266c. Dover 1968, 52–53, suggests that Thrasymachus may be present at thehome of Polemarchus in the Republic because he was a friend of Lysias with a commoninterest in rhetoric. The suggestion is taken up by Nails, who notes that Lysias andThrasymachus are linked also in the Cleitophon (1998, 389). At Cleit. 406a, Socrates saysthat he has heard that Cleitophon, while conversing with Lysias, was criticizing Socratesand praising Thrasymachus.

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I. PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS

Before we turn to the texts, it will be helpful to set forth some of theassumptions of this inquiry with regard to Plato’s literary practices. APlatonic dialogue functions on multiple levels, so that a single textualdetail or motif, for instance, may carry more than one meaning and berelevant in more than one context.9 In particular, certain themes andarguments may be meaningfully explicated not only in terms of their rolewithin a dialogue as a more-or-less self-contained whole but also interms of their relevance to persons, historical events, and texts existingoutside of the dialogue.10 This is obviously true of dialogues that explic-itly discuss actual historical persons such as the Phaedrus (see below,section V). But because “nearly all his [Plato’s] named characters areknown to be based on real persons,”11 certain dialogues, or parts ofdialogues, may also contain implicit commentary on real persons. In thepresent instance, this means that Socrates’ conversation in the Republicwith the character Polemarchus may, among other things, constitute partof a meaningful critical response to events surrounding the death of thehistorical figure Polemarchus. The same is true of Plato’s inclusion of thecharacter Lysias in the Republic, which invites us to imagine that, yearsbefore he composed Against Eratosthenes, Lysias witnessed his brotherbecoming persuaded that harming enemies is unjust.

It will also be helpful to clarify what we need to presuppose aboutPlato’s knowledge of Against Eratosthenes. It is not necessary to assumethat Plato had actually read this speech and was responding to it in detailin the Republic. We need only assume that he knew about Lysias’ speechand was familiar with its main arguments. There are at least three goodreasons to suppose that this was indeed the case:

(1) In the Phaedrus, Plato puts in the mouth of Socrates an exten-sive criticism of a speech attributed to Lysias. This proves that he waseither intimately familiar with a minor composition by Lysias or knewhis style well enough to mimic it in a convincing manner.12 In either case,

9 See the conclusion of section II below for some examples. According toOlympiodorus, Plato “is elusive because it is possible to hear and understand his words inmany ways, both physically, and ethically, and theologically, and literally” (Westerink 1956,sec. 2.160–62).

10 See Blondell 2002, 6, with her remarks on “historical irony” and “emphasis” (32–34).11 Blondell 2002, 31.12 There is no scholarly unanimity on whether the speech attributed to Lysias in the

Phaedrus is a Platonic composition; see de Vries, 1969, 11–14; Rowe 1986, 142–43.


Plato was well acquainted with Lysias’ work and regarded him as a figureof sufficient importance to make his speech-writing a main theme of thePhaedrus.

(2) The trial of Eratosthenes was a politically significant event thatwas observed by other Greeks as well as by many Athenians. In thepolitical settlement of 403, the restored democracy extended amnesty toall but the highest magistrates. Even these, however, would be protectedagainst prosecution for past actions if they could pass the public processof euthuna, a giving of accounts before a jury.13 The trial for which Lysiascomposed Against Eratosthenes may have been a euthuna of this sort.14 Itwas in any case a public and well-publicized event: “many foreigners, aswell as many men from town,” Lysias tells the jury, “have come so as toknow what your judgment will be” (12.35). Plato might have been presentat the trial of Eratosthenes as an observer or, less likely, as a juror.15 Atall events, he would certainly have known about Lysias’ case againstEratosthenes, as he was sufficiently well acquainted with Polemarchus’household to adopt it as the dramatic setting of the Republic.16

13 On the provisions of the amnesty, see Loening 1987, 99–146, with Krentz 1982,102–4, and Ostwald 1986, 499.

14 Todd 1993, 113; Dover 1968, 44; Adams 1970, 43–44; Carey 1989, 2–3; Ostwald1986, 467–68, 511. The euthuna may have involved Pheidon, another member of the Thirty,as well as Eratosthenes (Murphy 1989, 40, n. 1); Lysias’ references to “the defendants”(12.2; cf. 12.87–91) may, on the other hand, be meant merely to emphasize the collectiveguilt of the Thirty (Usher 1999, 59). Some scholars believe that Against Eratosthenes wascomposed for a homicide trial (d¤kh fÒnou) separate from the euthuna; see Loening 1981,285–86, 292–93, with Usher 1999, 59, n. 17. In any case, 12.92 makes it clear that Lysiasaddresses a jury composed of erstwhile members of the Three Thousand—citizens who hadbeen selected by the Thirty to share in the government and who had remained in the city(toÁw §j êstevw)—and democrats, who had left Athens for the Piraeus or had sought refugein other cities during the oligarchy (toÁw §k Peirai«w). On the Three Thousand, whosemembership included Plato and Socrates, see Krentz 1982, 64–65; Munn 2000, 229.

15 In the fourth century, euthunai had 501 members; information for the fifth centuryis sparse (Ostwald 1986, 55). Figures for the number of jurors on a single panel at Athensrange from 200 to 6000, with more important cases tending to have larger juries: Harrison1998, II, 47; MacDowell 1978, 36–40.

16 While my argument does not depend upon the point, it is also likely that Platocould have obtained a written copy of Lysias’ speech. Lysias was apparently a well-knownspeechwriter even prior to the composition of Against Eratosthenes: at Phdr. 228a, Phaedruscalls Lysias “the cleverest of present writers,” and, as is clear from 257b, the dramatic dateof the Phaedrus is prior to Polemarchus’ death. Many of Lysias’ works were copied andcirculated (more than 400 speeches under the name of Lysias were in circulation in the firstcentury C.E., although many must not have been genuine [Adams 1970, 22–23]), and hismost important courtroom composition must have been among these. Against Eratosthenes

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(3) The trial of Eratosthenes would have had special personal sig-nificance for Plato. In the Seventh Letter Plato notes that some of theThirty were relatives and acquaintances of his (ofike›oi . . . ka‹ gn≈rimoi,324d), and he states that he was invited to play a role in their administra-tion when they came to power. He initially “turned his mind” (prose›xontÚn noËn) toward them with great interest and high hopes for a justregime but “withdrew” (§panÆgagon) in disgust when he observed theirunjust actions (Ep. 7.324d–25a). In particular, he was deeply distressedby their treatment of Socrates, whom they tried to involve in the murderof Leon of Salamis (cf. Ap. 32c–d), and by “other such [unholy deeds]that were not insignificant” (325a)—probably including the murder ofPolemarchus.17

Given that Plato addresses the subject of Lysias and his workexplicitly and at length in one of his dialogues (the Phaedrus), he maywell have done so implicitly in another. What evidence is there that hehas done so in the Republic? Several considerations are relevant in thisconnection. First, the portrait of the tyrannical man sketched by Thra-symachus, Glaucon, and Adeimantus in books 1 and 2 of the Republicclosely coincides with Lysias’ characterization of the Thirty in AgainstEratosthenes. Second, Lysias’ argument that the jury must take revengeagainst the Thirty represents a specific application of Polemarchus’ gen-eral claim that it is just to harm enemies. Socrates, however, persuadesPolemarchus to abandon his view and convinces him that harming en-emies is no part of justice (Rep. 331d–36a). This conclusion directlyopposes the guiding presupposition of Against Eratosthenes. What ismore, Socrates’ argument focuses on certain problems and assumptionsthat turn out to be key features of Lysias’ speech. It is in Socrates’philosophical conversion of Polemarchus, I wish to suggest, that we shallfind Plato’s critical response to Lysias.

launched Lysias’ career as a speechwriter (logogrãfow) for courtroom cases (Carey 1989,2–3; Adams 1970, 21), and it would have been in Lysias’ interest to make sure that thespeech was widely available to potential clients. Note that our text of Against Eratosthenesmay be “an improved version prepared for publication” (Krentz 1984, 23, n. 1).

17 Plato presents Polemarchus as a friend of his brothers and one of the companionsof Socrates, and it is likely that he spent time with Polemarchus in the company of Socrates.In the Phaedrus, Socrates expresses the hope that Lysias might “turn toward philosophylike his brother Polemarchus” (257b); in the Republic, it is Polemarchus who, accompaniedby Adeimantus, stops Socrates on his way back to town and insists that he stay in thePiraeus (327b–c). Cf. Lamb 1957, xi (who asserts that Polemarchus “definitely joinedthe Socratic circle”) and the diagram of intellectual and political associations at Dover1968, 52.


II. LYSIAS, THRASYMACHUS, AND PLATO’S BROTHERSON TYRANNICAL INJUSTICE

In the first part of Against Eratosthenes (12.4–19), Lysias narrates hisarrest and the arrest of Polemarchus, the confiscation of their property,his own escape, and Polemarchus’ murder and burial. In the course ofthis narrative and in the rest of his speech, Lysias describes the vilenature of Eratosthenes and the other members of the Thirty, and hecontrasts the base behavior of these men with the justice and goodcitizenship displayed by his own family. As it happens, Plato emphasizesthe same elements of the tyrannical character in the first two books ofthe Republic as Lysias does in Against Eratosthenes. There are of courseechoes of this common portrait of the tyrant in other texts, and Plato andLysias may have independently been drawing on the same set of conven-tions.18 Yet Polemarchus’ death at the hands of tyranny and Lysias’ pres-ence in the Republic open up the possibility that Plato’s portrait of thetyrant is meant to provoke thought not only about the fate of Polemarchusbut also about Lysias’ response to his brother’s murder. With this possi-bility in mind, it will be helpful to document the key points of resem-blance between the characterizations of tyrannical injustice in AgainstEratosthenes and the first two books of the Republic:

(1) Tyrants hide behind a mask of justice. When the Thirty came topower, Lysias writes, “they asserted that it was necessary to purge the cityof unjust men and to turn the rest of the citizens toward virtue andjustice, but although they said these sorts of things, they were so bold asnot to do them” (12.5).19 In confiscating the possessions of wealthy resi-dent aliens (m°toikoi) on the ground that the resident aliens held agrudge against the regime, the Thirty found a pretext for “appearing topunish, but in fact making money” (12.6). The Thirty furthermore con-trived to arrest two poor metics and eight rich ones “in order that, inregard to the rest [of the metics], they might have an excuse that thesethings had not been done for the sake of money” (12.7).20 According to

18 On the hypocrisy, greed, and impiety of the tyrant, see Xen. Hiero 2.17 and 4.7–11.Keeping in mind the distinction between the tyrant and the barbarian despot (on which seeArist. Pol. 1285a20–23), cf. Hdt. 3.80 along with Xen. Anab. 1.2.12, 19–20 (wherein it isrevealed that Cyrus, like the possessor of Gyges’ ring, sleeps with a married queen, takeswhatever he wishes through violence, and puts to death whomever he wants).

19 Cf. Plato, Ep. 7.324d: “I thought that they [the Thirty] would administer the city byleading it from an unjust life onto a just course.”

20 Xenophon concurs that the Thirty arrested the metics because they wanted theirmoney (Hell. 2.3.21; cf. the description of Critias at Mem. 1.2.12 as klept¤statow, “most

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Thrasymachus, all regimes set down laws for their own advantage yetdeclare that what they have set down is just for the ruled (Rep. 338e).Tyranny is nevertheless specifically characterized by “stealth” in thecommission of injustice (344a). Glaucon also focuses on the theme ofpracticing injustice while appearing to be just when he tells how Gyges’ancestor used a ring of invisibility to ascend to the rule of Lydia (359c–60b). His association of this deceptiveness with the “most perfect injus-tice” of Thrasymachus’ tyrant (344a) is an important extension of thelatter’s account. “Extreme injustice,” Glaucon informs us, “is to seem tobe just when one is not” (361a). The man of extreme injustice is theperfect tyrant: he does the greatest injustice yet “rules in the city becausehe seems to be just” (361a, 362b).

(2) Tyrants use public office to secure their private benefit. Lysiasnotes that the Thirty “made their households great by means of their[public] affairs” (12.93). Lysias and his relatives, in contrast, made theirconsiderable private resources available for the welfare of the Athe-nians. They paid for public choruses, contributed to special levies, ran-somed Athenians from enemies, and, in general, “performed every dutythat was imposed on us” (12.20). Thrasymachus emphasizes and expandsupon this distinction between unjust rulers and just citizens. Unjust rul-ers regard the ruled as sheep to be fattened and fleeced (Rep. 343b ff.).The unjust man uses public office to increase his private wealth, whereaswhen the just man assumes public office, “his private affairs suffer onaccount of neglect, while he gets no advantage from the public store onaccount of his justice” (343e). 21 In general, Thrasymachus says, one whowishes to learn “how much more to one’s private advantage injustice isthan justice” should look to the perfect injustice of tyranny, “which bothby stealth and by force takes away what belongs to others . . . not little bylittle, but all at once” (344a). So, too, Glaucon emphasizes that the per-fect tyrant uses his power to make contracts and partnerships with whom-ever he wants and “gains because he has no difficulty doing injustice”(362b).

thievish”). But Munn 2000, 229–30, argues against the charge of venality; cf. Krentz 1982,81, who notes that Lysias’ prior support for the democratic leader Thrasybulus (on whichsee below, section IV) might have been discovered by the Thirty.

21 The just man furthermore pays more in taxes and gets less in public distributionsthan the unjust man (Rep. 343d). In contracts, the unjust man ends up with more than thejust man; consider in this connection the outcome of Peison’s sworn agreement to spareLysias for a bribe of one talent (12.9–12, discussed below).


(3) Tyrants are motivated by extreme greed. This is a major theme ofLysias’ speech. “They [the Thirty] thought nothing of putting humanbeings to death but a great deal of getting hold of money” (12.7). Peison,the member of the Thirty who arrested Lysias, pledged to free him for abribe of one talent in silver. But Peison took all Lysias’ treasure in coinand silver cups—the total value of which was well over three talents—and left him nothing with which to pay for his escape from Athens (12.9–12). Later, while still in custody, Lysias persuaded Damnippus to try tobribe Theognis, another member of the Thirty, in the belief that “he[Theognis] would do anything if someone should give him money” (12.14).Lysias goes on to provide a long list of the things taken from his familyby the Thirty, including seven hundred shields, silver and gold, jewelry,furniture, clothing, and one hundred twenty slaves. So insatiable wastheir greed, however, that Melobius (yet another member of the Thirty)ripped a pair of gold earrings from the ears of Polemarchus’ wife.22 Forhis part, Thrasymachus emphasizes that greed is a primary motive forinjustice. His refusal to share his teaching with Socrates unless Socratesis willing to pay a fee (Rep. 337d) anticipates the specific examples hegives of unjust men (temple-robbers, kidnappers, housebreakers, swin-dlers, and thieves”: 344b), all of whom commit injustice for the sake ofmaterial advantage (cf. 343d–e). The tyrant, Thrasymachus makes clear,is driven by pleonej¤a, an overreaching desire to “have more” thanothers (344a). Greed also plays a central role in Glaucon’s account ofinjustice. The ancestor of Gyges is a grave robber. His first act of injusticeis the theft of a gold ring from the finger of a naked corpse (359d). Inrecounting the advantages of extreme injustice, moreover, the first thingGlaucon mentions is the liberty to take what one wants from the marketwithout fear (360b). He goes on to say that the perfect tyrant becomeswealthy because he claims more than his fair share (pleonekte›n, 362b).

(4) Tyrants have no fear of the gods. “Invoking utter destructionupon himself and his children,” Peison swore that he would save Lysiasin return for a talent of silver, but Lysias’ foreboding that he “treatsneither god nor men with proper respect” was confirmed when he brokehis oath (12.9–10).23 Later, Lysias tells us that the Thirty “seized men outof the temples, and violently put them to death . . . and did not allow them

22 As Wooten 1988 shows, Melobius’ seizure of the earrings is given special emphasisas it comes at the climax of a long and suspenseful rhetorical development. On therhetorical structure of this passage, cf. Usher 1999, 60.

23 Ostwald 1986, 100, defends this translation of oÎte yeoÁw oÎtÉ ényr≈pouw nom¤zei.

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to have the customary funeral rites, because they believed that theirruling power was more solid than the vengeance of the gods” (12.96).24 InGlaucon’s myth, Gyges’ ancestor descends into the earth and robs acorpse without apparent fear of divine retribution. Adeimantus followsGlaucon’s speech with an argument designed in part to show that fear ofthe gods is not an obstacle to intelligent men who wish to practice in-justice, for either the gods do not exist, or they can be bribed (365d–66a).

(5) Tyrants have no respect for the sanctity of burial or the bound-aries of private life. When Polemarchus was murdered, the Thirty did notpermit his funeral to be conducted in his house or in others belonging tohis family, nor did they provide a cloak for him (12.18). In these ways,they violated funerary custom, according to which one’s corpse is washed,dressed, and laid out for viewing in one’s house.25 Lysias states that theThirty deprived many of their victims of burial (12.21; cf. 12.96) and that,under their rule, it was dangerous to conduct funerals for the dead(12.88). The Thirty arrested Lysias in his home after driving out his guests(12.8).26 They also prevented the daughters of many men from beingmarried (12.21). Glaucon reiterates these themes. Gyges’ ancestor, as wehave just observed, is a corpse robber, nor does he hesitate, we may infer,to enter the private residence of the queen unlawfully in order to haveintercourse with her (Rep. 360a). In his list of the advantages of perfectinjustice, Glaucon includes the license “to go into houses and have inter-course with whomever one might want” and, later, the power to controlmarriages in the city (360c, 362b).

The close resemblance that we have just noted between the de-scriptions of the tyrannical character in Against Eratosthenes and theRepublic is not in itself enough to prove that Plato wrote with Lysias inmind. The parallels between these two texts do establish, however, thatwhen the Thirty came to power, the tyrannical injustice praised in theabstract by Thrasymachus and Glaucon became a concrete actuality and(at least from the point of view of Lysias) was realized in all of its

24 Temples and other sacred spaces (flerã) were legally acknowledged places ofrefuge for individuals who were being pursued. “To assassinate someone who had takenrefuge in a sanctuary was considered a heinous enough crime for the gods to inflict ascourge (a plague, for instance) on the whole city as punishment” (Zaidman and Pantel1992, 56).

25 Zaidman and Pantel 1992, 72; Burkert 1985, 192.26 Adams (1970, 67) notes that the arrest, while “a violation of the principle that a

man’s house is his sanctuary,” was nonetheless legal. But as Wooten (1988, 30–31) states, thearrest violated “the sacred Greek laws of hospitality.”


essential details.27 Our recognition of this fact reveals the poignancy ofPlato’s text and alerts us to the possibility that certain philosophicallyrelevant features of the Republic may on another level be intended toforeshadow dramatically—and literally to recall—the fate of Polemarchusand its political context. For example, Socrates’ descent to the Piraeuswith Glaucon and his failed attempt to return to town (prÚw tÚ êstu) atthe beginning of the Republic (327a–b) introduces the philosophicalimagery of ascent and descent that runs throughout the dialogue, but itshould probably also be understood in terms of the political geographyof Athens vs. Piraeus during the factional strife (stãsiw) after the end ofthe Peloponnesian War.28 So, too, the playful “arrest” and detention ofSocrates and Glaucon by Polemarchus and his companions (Rep. 327b–c) introduce the enduring problem of the relationship between philoso-phy and politics, but it also brings to mind the arrest of Polemarchus inthe street by Eratosthenes—a detail of which Lysias makes much be-cause it is his most vital piece of evidence (12.16, 26, 30).29

While the preceding reflections are necessarily speculative, ourpreliminary observations about Plato’s knowledge of Against Eratosthenesand its points of contact with his characterization of tyranny in theRepublic justify asking whether the conversation between Polemarchusand Socrates in book 1 of the Republic has a polemical subtext. For thisconversation appears to constitute a Platonic criticism of Lysias’ funda-mental assumptions in Against Eratosthenes as well as of his overheatedrhetoric and its consequences.

27 It is a separate issue whether Lysias is fair and accurate in his characterization ofthe Thirty and of Eratosthenes in particular. Cf. the debate between Krentz 1984 andSommerstein 1984.

28 See Lysias 12.92 with Munn 2000, 239–41, and n. 14, and cf. n. 5 above. AlthoughSocrates does not return to Athens that night, it is only his friendship for his youngercompanions that keeps him in the Piraeus. Perhaps this fact is meant to suggest that he ispolitically and philosophically at home neither under the oligarchy nor under the democ-racy (see below, section IV).

29 Further: the example of a man who lends weapons and then demands them backwhen he is mad (Rep. 331c–d) is a dialectical topos (Dissoi Logoi 3.4; Xen. Mem. 4.2.7); isit also an allusion to the arms manufacture in which the family of Cephalus made itsfortune, and perhaps specifically to the assistance that Lysias rendered to the democrats inexile by providing them with shields, mercenaries, and money (Krentz 1982, 73, 81)? IsSocrates’ seemingly superfluous mention of the proskefalãiou or “pillow” on whichCephalus was sitting (Rep. 328c) a delicate allusion not only to Cephalus’ imminent passingbeyond the threshold of old age (328e) but also to the proskefãlaion that the friends ofPolemarchus were obliged to provide for his funeral (12.18)?

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III. SOCRATES AND POLEMARCHUS, PLATO AND LYSIAS

At the end of Against Eratosthenes, Lysias reminds his hearers that theliving must speak on behalf of the dead (12.99–100). Lysias speaks forPolemarchus primarily in calling for vengeance against Eratosthenes andthe Thirty. These men, he asserts, could not pay the penalty for theirdeeds even if they were to die two deaths (12.37). Even if the jury wereto punish them unlawfully, even if they were to put their children todeath (cf. 12.36) and confiscate their property—even then, the punish-ment would be insufficient (12.82–84). Revenge, it seems, knows nobounds.

Plato, too, speaks for the dead—including Socrates as well asPolemarchus—in writing the Republic. He does so by creating the ap-pearance that the dead are speaking for themselves. What he puts in themouth of Polemarchus is the claim that it is just to help friends and harmenemies. Polemarchus’ fate underscores the dramatic appropriateness ofthis authorial decision: if the murdered Polemarchus could speak on thesubject of justice, Plato suggests, this is precisely what he would want tosay. Nor can we fail to be struck by the fact that this is precisely whatLysias does say. Indeed, that it is just to harm enemies (and that one owesit to friends who have been harmed to do so) is nothing less than thefundamental moral principle upon which he rests his case in AgainstEratosthenes. This becomes clear shortly after the end of his preliminarynarrative of events. In putting Eratosthenes on the dais for questioning,Lysias ignores the risk of pollution in addressing an unpurified murderer.“My view is this,” he explains, “I believe that to talk to another about thisman, if it is for his benefit, is unholy, but to talk to him, if it is for his harm,is pious and holy” (12.24).

Unlike Lysias, Plato does not let Polemarchus’ last word be one ofretribution. On the contrary, Socrates succeeds in convincing Polemarchusthat a just man would not harm anyone. By the end of their conversation,Polemarchus has become an eager advocate of this principle and is readyto join forces with Socrates to do battle on its behalf (335e).

What role might Polemarchus’ conversion play in a Platonic criti-cism of Against Eratosthenes? To answer this question, we must first askwhat we can learn about Polemarchus from his conversation with Socrates.No such conversation, of course, need ever have taken place outside ofthe pages of Plato. Assuming that Polemarchus initially believed that it isjust to harm one’s enemies, we do not know whether Socrates everactually tried to convince him that he was wrong, much less whether hewas successful—and, if he was, whether Polemarchus’ conversion was


permanent or only temporary. Nothing in the historical record shedslight on these questions. We do know, however, that Plato portraysPolemarchus as being open to philosophical arguments about justice. AtPhaedrus 257b, Plato furthermore contrasts Polemarchus, who has turnedtoward philosophy, with Lysias, who has not. In Against Eratosthenes,however, Lysias entirely obscures Polemarchus’ philosophical character.In particular, he gives no hint in speaking for Polemarchus that hisbrother would have been likely to entertain any argument against theproposition that justice demands revenge against Eratosthenes.

We are now prepared to understand why Plato makes Lysias anauditor of the conversation between Polemarchus and Socrates. Becausein dramatic time this conversation precedes Lysias’ composition of AgainstEratosthenes, Plato is able not only to imply that Lysias misrepresentsPolemarchus and distorts the proper claims of justice but also to shedlight on the roots of Lysias’ errors. Polemarchus’ abandonment of theview that harming enemies is just constitutes a dramatic demonstrationof his ability to listen to Socrates or of his openness to philosophy. Lysias,on the other hand, hears the entire conversation of the Republic, but hiscall for revenge in Against Eratosthenes proves that his ears remainclosed. Because he will not (or cannot) take to heart the arguments ofSocrates, he fails to do justice both to the memory of his brother and tothe cause of justice itself.30

IV. WHY NOT HARM ENEMIES?PLATO’S REPLY TO LYSIAS

One can easily sympathize with Lysias’ desire to avenge his brother’smurder. What, after all, is wrong with harming enemies? Socrates at-tempts to answer this question in book 1 of the Republic. Like Thra-symachus’ and Glaucon’s praise of tyranny, Socrates’ argument takes no

30 It is unclear whether Lysias’ silence in the Republic may also be significant.Teichmüller 1881 maintains that the silence of Lysias and Euthydemus indicates a certainintellectual tension (Spannung) between them and their brother Polemarchus, who inclinestoward Socrates. Teichmüller fancifully connects this claim, however, with the argumentthat the Euthydemus constitutes a Platonic criticism of the historical figure Lysias, who isallegedly present as a character in the dialogue under the pseudonym Dionysodorus (48,51–55). On the general question of silent auditors in Plato, cf. Blondell 2002, which arguesagainst reading Socrates’ silence in the Sophist and Statesman as tacitly critical of theStranger from Elea and cautions that “an unmarked silence is . . . most plausibly interpretedas acquiescent or respectful” (393).

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notice of particular historical circumstances and is presented in the gen-eral or abstract terms that are appropriate to philosophical disputation.As with these other dimensions of the Republic, however, Socrates’refutation of the principle that harming enemies is a part of justicebecomes both more concrete and more pointed when it is viewed in thelight of the tyranny of the Thirty and its aftermath.

When Cephalus hands down to Polemarchus the view that justice istelling the truth and giving back what one has taken from another,Polemarchus jokes that he is the heir of all that belongs to his father(Rep. 331d). This is a deft Platonic touch, as Polemarchus’ future wealthwill indeed turn out to be directly relevant to his experience of justiceand injustice—albeit not in the way that Cephalus envisions. WhileCephalus has argued that wealth helps a man to be just because itrelieves him of the necessity to cheat and lie against his will (331b), it isPolemarchus’ inheritance that makes him a victim of injustice.

In defending his father’s definition of justice, Polemarchus appealsto the authority of the poet Simonides, who claims that justice is givingeach what is owed (331e). Socrates wonders what this means. Polemarchusresponds by speaking of what is owed to friends, namely, “to do somegood, but nothing bad” (332a). Implicit in this claim is a distinctionbetween friends and enemies (ofl f¤loi and ofl ¶xyroi, those who are dearand those who are hated); an enemy, Polemarchus asserts, is owed “thevery thing that is also fitting: some harm” (332b). Socrates and Pole-marchus go on to agree that Simonides’ meaning is that justice is givingeach his due (tÚ pros∞kon •kãstƒ épodidÒnai, 332c). According toPolemarchus, benefit is what is due a friend and harm is what is due anenemy.

In the remainder of his conversation with Polemarchus, Socrates isconcerned to refute the claim that harm is what befits an enemy. Heproceeds by introducing a series of paradoxes and problems associatedwith Polemarchus’ understanding of justice. First, Socrates shows that inpeacetime, justice will be useful only for useless purposes (332e–33e);next, that justice must be a kind of deceit or thievery (333e–34b); then,that the distinction between friends and enemies is deeply problematic(334c–35a); finally, that to harm something is to make it worse, which isthe work of the unjust person (335a–35d). Each of these four stages ofthe argument is suited to the refutation of Lysias. Let us consider eachone in turn.

Polemarchus maintains that the just man will be most able to helpfriends and harm enemies “in making war and being an ally in battle”(332e). Socrates does not challenge this claim. Rather, he asks whether


the just man will not be useless for men who are not at war. Socratesseems interested in examining the nature of justice in a broader contextthan that of opposing armies; indeed, the subject of war does not comeup again in the course of his refutation of Polemarchus, except tangen-tially at 334a. Socrates perhaps takes his cue from Polemarchus’ ownchoice of words; what is at issue in the argument is not harming pol°mioi,enemies in war, but ¶xyroi, those who are perceived as hateful. (Thesecategories, we may note, become tragically confused in the context ofcivil war.) The distinction between friends and enemies, however, playsno further role in this stage of the argument.

For the use and acquisition of what, Socrates asks Polemarchus, isjustice useful in peacetime? Polemarchus answers “contracts” (jumbÒlaia),by which Socrates gets him to specify that he means “partnerships”(koinvnÆmata, “things held in common”: 333a). This is an importantpoint, because Socrates’ terminology suggests that justice might be mostuseful not simply in relation to specific sorts of business partnerships—which is the unpromising possibility that he and Polemarchus pursue—but rather in relation to koinvn¤a or partnership as such, and in particu-lar the political partnership or political community. While the lattersuggestion is never explicitly advanced, it is indirectly supported in sev-eral ways. To begin with, it is not refuted in the course of the argument.Socrates goes on to show that, in partnerships that require the exercise ofa certain sort of expertise (e.g., house-building, kithara-playing, or pur-chasing horses or ships), the just man will be useless in comparison withthe relevant expert when it comes to the specified activity. The just manwill thus be useful not in using equipment or treasure but in guarding orkeeping these things safe when they are not in use (333b–d).

Two things are noteworthy about this argument. First, it ignoresSocrates’ initial hint that the just man may be useful in acquiring partner-ships (cf. 333a). Surely a housebuilder who seeks funding will be morelikely to enter into a partnership with a wealthy man who is just thanwith one who is unjust. Second, it says nothing that would lead one toreject the intuitively attractive notion that the just man is especiallyuseful in acquiring and preserving koinvn¤a as such. In fact, this sugges-tion is dramatically borne out by the conclusion of the argument as awhole in which Polemarchus, having come round to Socrates’ point ofview, agrees that they will “share in battle as partners” in defending theircommon understanding of justice (koinª, koinvne›n: 335e). The supremelyunjust man is furthermore soon revealed to be a destroyer of koinvn¤a:according to his encomiast Thrasymachus, he aims to overturn the entirestructure of the political community, subverting “what is sacred and

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profane, private and public, not in little bits but all at once” (344a). Seenin the light of these passages, Socrates’ ability to draw even the initiallyhostile Thrasymachus into the emerging community of philosophicaldiscourse that forms over the course of the Republic (cf. 336b–d with450b and 498c–d) seems to furnish additional evidence of his justice.

As we have seen, the first stage of Socrates’ refutation of Pole-marchus abstracts from the difference between friends and enemies andfocuses on the usefulness of the just man in times of peace. It would seemthat harming enemies belongs, if anywhere, to war. What is more, Socratesimplies that the proper work of the just man during peacetime consists insafeguarding koinvn¤a. Lysias’ practice in Against Eratosthenes flies inthe face of both of these insights. His speech is presented in a court oflaw, the fundamental political institution for the achievement of justice.Lysias nevertheless urges the jury to do harm to Eratosthenes and, moregenerally, to the surviving members of the Thirty. He furthermore insistsupon the inadequacy of available legal remedies and even alludes inpassing to the possibility of punishing the Thirty in a manner that trans-gresses the bounds of law (paranÒmvw, 12.82). Nor does he explicitlyreject the latter option. Remarkably, he maintains instead that no pun-ishment, legal or extralegal, would be sufficient to expiate the crimes theThirty have committed (12.82–84). Lysias claims to be motivated byconcern for the welfare of the city as well as by private grievances (12.2),yet he is in effect urging his democratic compatriots (the men §k Peirai«wwhom he addresses directly at 12.95) to continue their war against theoligarchs.31 As one scholar has noted, the question he puts before Athe-nians in Against Eratosthenes is “whether to begin a policy of revengewhen the policy of forgiveness had brought rest after a long and bitterstruggle.”32 In sum, Socrates’ refutation of Polemarchus begins by sug-gesting that those who embrace the kinds of values expressed by Lysiasare unable to tell (or unwilling to acknowledge) the difference between

31 The main thesis of Murphy 1989 is that Lysias presents an inflammatory picture ofthe oligarchic type so as “to make traditional positive aspects of class superiority appearpolitically suspect” (41) and to encourage class prejudice. Lysias may even have gone so faras to urge preemptive vengeance for crimes that have not yet been committed; thus,Fogelmark 1979 reads 12.88 as suggesting that the jurors must protect themselves againstthe vengeance that the defendants would be likely to seek if they were released.

32 Adams 1970, 45. The restored democracy’s policy is visible in the terms of theamnesty, which included a provision to the effect that former members of the ThreeThousand would be well represented on the jury at the euthuna of the Thirty (Ostwald1986, 499).


war and peace as well as the proper employment of justice in thesecontexts.

The next stage of Socrates’ argument picks up on the notion thatthe just man is useful as a guardian of equipment or treasure. Socratesnow introduces the paradox that the clever (deinÒw) guardian is also aclever thief, from which he draws the conclusion that justice must be “acertain art of stealing, for the benefit, of course, of friends and the harmof enemies” (334b). Socrates supposes that Polemarchus learned thisfrom Homer whose Autolycus “surpassed all human beings in stealingand swearing oaths.” The just man is, in other words, a deceiver as well asa thief: he steals while pretending to guard. And since guarding implies adistinction between friends (partners) and enemies (would-be thieves),the just man turns out to be an enemy to those to whom he appears to bea friend.33

The latter reflections are also apposite to the case of Lysias. Lysiasbegins Against Eratosthenes by stating that, in the present trial, he doesnot have to follow the usual practice of explaining his enmity (tØn ¶xyran)toward the defendants. Rather, the burden is on them to explain theirenmity toward the city (12.2). By beginning with the unargued premisethat the defendants are enemies of the city, Lysias is able to make hisenmity toward them—which is admittedly partly private (12.2)—appearto be coincidental with his friendship for the city (cf. 12.50–51, 60, 99). Inseeing to the punishment of Eratosthenes, he implies, he is safeguardingthe welfare of Athens. But as we have seen, Lysias effectively uses thisjudicial proceeding as a weapon of factional strife.34 His claim of friend-ship for the city is hard to square with his attempt to enflame animositybetween its recently reunited halves, the democrats of the Piraeus andthe men of the town who had supported the oligarchy (on whom see n.14). For the “many men” who, Lysias warns, are currently attempting togive aid to those who “have destroyed” the city and who “will be able todestroy the city once again” (12.89) must belong to the latter party. In thelast analysis, then, Lysias is more of a friend to his family and to thePiraeus party than he is to the city as a whole. Because his vengeful

33 The second stage of the argument thus leads directly to the problem of theconfusion between seeming and being that is taken up in the third stage.

34 In this, he imitates those he calls enemies of the city. Even before the Thirtyreturned from exile in 404, the supporters of oligarchy “began to arrest, try, and execute themost outspoken of their opponents,” including the statesman Cleophon; democratic laws“now became the tools of partisans working to undermine popular government” (Munn2000, 207).

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partisanship is more likely to harm the political community than tobenefit it, he is an insincere guardian of the city’s well being.

In the third stage of the argument, Polemarchus admits his perplex-ity at Socrates’ conclusion that justice is an art of stealing, but he never-theless reiterates his opinion that justice is helping friends and harmingenemies. This allows Socrates to introduce two questions that have al-ready implicitly been raised: who is a friend and who is an enemy? Inparticular, are friends (or enemies) those who seem to be good (or bad),or those who are? Polemarchus states that men love those whom theybelieve to be good (xrhstoÊw) and hate those they believe to be bad(ponhroÊw), but he concedes that human beings make mistakes in thesejudgments (334c). If, as Polemarchus seems to assume, feelings of affec-tion and animosity determine friendship and enmity, and if it is just toharm the bad and unjust and to help the good and just, it follows that itwould be just for those who mistake seeming and being in this way toharm their friends (since they are in fact bad) and help their enemies(since they are in fact good). This is, however, the exact opposite ofSimonides’ meaning (334d–e). Polemarchus is thus led to reformulate hisdefinition of friends and enemies so as to take account of being inaddition to seeming: the friend will be one who seems to be, and is, good,and the enemy one who seems to be, and is, bad. Socrates concludes thisstage of the argument by suggesting a further correction to whichPolemarchus readily agrees: the good man will be a friend and the badman an enemy—regardless, he implies, whether they seem good or bad(334e–35a).

Lysias’ understanding of who is a friend and who is an enemy is ina crucial respect the same as that of his brother prior to Socratic refuta-tion. In Against Eratosthenes, Lysias begins with, and repeatedly returnsto, the anger that he and the members of the jury feel—or ought to feel—toward the defendants (12.2, 20, 30, 80, 90, 96). He makes clear that hehad good reasons for anger and therefore for enmity: “I make theseremarks not, indeed, because I lack private enmities (¶xyraw) and suffer-ings,” he tells the jury at 12.2, “but because there are for all of us a greatmany reasons to be angry (Ùrg¤zesyai) on behalf of our private concernsor those of the people (t«n dhmos¤vn).” Anger is also a sufficientjustification for punishment—all the more so, Lysias insists, in the presentcircumstances (12.20, 30–31; cf. 36). In sum, Lysias’ rhetorical strategy isto inflame the anger of the jury toward the defendants and to use thisanger as a reason for treating the defendants as enemies who ought to beharmed.


Not surprisingly, Lysias never raises the Socratic question of whetherthe object of one’s anger is necessarily an enemy or whether anger maysometimes be rooted in a confusion between seeming bad and being bad.Yet, the trial and death of Socrates poignantly illustrates the urgency ofjust these sorts of questions, especially for democrats bent on vengeancelike Lysias. Plato remarks that Socrates was convicted and executedunder the restored democracy “even though he refused to take part inthe unholy arrest of one of the friends of the men who were then inexile,” namely, the democratically elected general Leon of Salamis (Ep.7.325c). Why would this fact not have particularly impressed his accus-ers? Xenophon suggests an answer when he considers why Socrates wasaccused of corrupting the young. Socrates’ speeches, so it is alleged,“induced the young to despise the established regime and made themviolent”; more to the point, Critias and Alcibiades associated with Socrates,and “this pair did (§poihsãthn) the greatest evil to the city” (Mem.1.2.9,12). The use in this context of the dual form of the verb poie›n isnoteworthy, as it suggests that Critias and Alcibiades, apart from the factthat they were friends, were somehow also birds of a feather.35 “Critias,”Xenophon writes, “was the most thieving and violent and murderous ofall those in the oligarchy, and Alcibiades, for his part, was the mostlacking in self-control, the most hybristic, and the most violent of those inthe democracy” (Mem. 1.2.12). Both Critias and Alcibiades behaved inextreme ways that violated social norms. Both, in a word, were character-ized by paranomia, the transgression of general social codes of behaviorif not also of specific legal, political, or religious injunctions.36 Xenophonconfirms this point when he defends Socrates on the ground that, afterleaving him, Critias fell in with men “who practiced lawlessness (énom¤a)rather than justice” (Mem. 1.2.24). As for Alcibiades, it is a remarkablefact that the word paranomia is in the fifth century applied most fre-quently to him.37

While the behavior of some of those who associated with Socratesmade him seem to be an enemy of the democracy and perhaps also a

35 On the friendship of Alcibiades and Critias, see Ostwald 1986, 403, 464, 543.Critias made the motion for Alcibiades’ recall from exile in 409/408 (Munn 2000, 166).

36 For this understanding of paranomia, see Ostwald 1986, 111–29, esp. 113–16.37 Ostwald 1986, 116. It should also be noted that Alcibiades was not regarded as a

friend of the democracy. His vices made the many view him as an aspirant to tyranny, andafter his exile, he tried to help establish an oligarchy in Athens as a precondition for hisreturn (Thuc. 6.15.4, 8.47.2).

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friend of the Thirty, he was in fact neither of these things. Socrates felt astrong sense of duty to Athens and to his fellow citizens; as an opponentof ignorance and folly and a champion of justice, however, it was inevi-table that he would at some time fall afoul of the democracy as well asthe oligarchy.38 In the Apology, Socrates mentions two episodes that arerelevant in determining where his allegiances lay. The first was his unsuc-cessful attempt, as one of the prutãneiw of the Council who happened tobe serving as chairmen of the Assembly, to block the trial of the generalsat Arginusae as a group. The second was his later refusal, under theoligarchy, to comply with the request of the Thirty to arrest Leon. In thefirst instance, Socrates opposed the will of the people, with the result that“the orators were ready to indict me and arrest me” (Ap. 32b). In spite ofthe critical tone of this anecdote, Socrates’ opposition to the d∞mow fol-lowed not from any antipathy toward democracy per se but from hissense of lawfulness, for the basis of his objection was that the proposedaction was in violation of unwritten customs if not also of written stat-utes (paranÒmvw, 32b4; parå toÁw nÒmouw, 32b5).39 Socrates’ behavior inthe second instance was also dictated by his abhorrence of paranomia:his “whole care” was “to commit no unjust or impious deed.” “As strongas it was,” he explains, “that regime [the oligarchy of the Thirty] did notshock me into doing anything unjust ” (32d). Socrates was no friend ofthe Thirty insofar as they practiced injustice and impiety.40

Shortly after mentioning his family’s orderly behavior and goodcitizenship (12.20), Lysias alleges that Eratosthenes put Polemarchus todeath in order to satisfy his paranomia (12.23). The Thirty are enemiesessentially because they have no respect for nÒmow. Yet, Lysias himself

38 See Kraut 1984; Ober 1998, 166–89; Ober 2000.39 Munn 2000, 186, argues that Socrates’ opposition to the collective trial of the

generals in fact had no statutory basis.40 It is debatable whether Socrates’ abhorrence of paranomia allowed for any excep-

tion to the rule that one must at all times obey the existing laws of one’s polis (Crito 51b,51e–52a). Kraut 1984 notes that Socrates criticizes the order to arrest Leon not on thegrounds that it was illegal but that it was unjust. Socrates thus leaves the door open tojustified disobedience: “it is safe to generalize and say that according to the ApologySocrates will disobey any law or order of any government, if that law or order calls uponhim to perform an act he considers unjust” (22–23). Ober 2000 finds no need to make suchan assumption. He argues that the procedural focus of Athenian law meant that adherenceto the law did not conflict with Socrates’ freedom to philosophize and that Socrates was notbreaking the law when he refused to arrest Leon because “he did not accept that theancestral (fifth-century, democratic) Athenian lawcode had been nullified by the govern-ment of the Thirty” (548).


speaks in a way that tends to obscure this fundamental difference be-tween friends and enemies. Lysias’ prosecution of Eratosthenes was ap-parently unsuccessful, even though he did his best to feed the restoreddemocracy’s desire for revenge against the Thirty.41 In other hands, how-ever, this same thirst for vengeance ultimately did claim the life ofSocrates—a man whose consistent opposition to lawlessness and injus-tice under the oligarchy as well as the democracy brought him afoul ofmany of his fellow citizens. Because the longing for revenge against theoligarchs was indiscriminate as well as immoderate, it ended up wrong-ing a steadfast ally in the war against injustice and one whom Lysias andthe other democratic enemies of paranomia ought properly to haveregarded as a friend and a kinsman (cf. Rep. 328d).

In the final stage of his refutation of Polemarchus, Socrates arguesthat it is not the work of a just man to harm anyone. Polemarchus beginsby restating his view in the light of conclusions of the preceding stage ofthe argument: “bad men and enemies (toÊw ge ponhroÊw te ka‹ §xyroÊw)ought to be harmed” (335b). Under questioning, however, he admits thatdogs and horses that are harmed become worse with regard to theirspecific virtue or excellence (éretÆ), from which it seems to follow thatthe same holds true for human beings. Since justice is human virtue(ényrvpe¤a éretÆ), Polemarchus is forced to concede that human beingswho have been harmed necessarily become more unjust (335b–c). Whatis more, because just or good men cannot make others unjust or bad bythe exercise of justice or virtue, harming others must be the work of theunjust and bad man (335c–d).42

For Lysias, as for Polemarchus prior to Socrates’ refutation, harm-ing enemies is a basic way of helping friends. In Against Eratosthenes,Lysias asserts that the jurors owe it to friends of the city like Polemarchus(cf. 12.20) to exact revenge upon their enemies, and, in particular, to putthem to death (12.60, 99–100). Hence the Socratic principle that it isunjust to harm anyone challenges Lysias’ conception of what is owed to

41 On the probable acquittal of Eratosthenes, see Krentz 1984, 31–32; Ostwald 1986,468; Adams 1970, 21, 40; Sommerstein 1984, 372.

42 Socrates’ argument against harming anyone has been criticized as ambiguous(Pappas 1995, 36; cf. Cleit. 410b) but seems clear enough in its own terms (cf. Annas 1981,32). “Socrates says that to harm is to make a person or thing worse, with respect to his orits specific virtue. . . . Socrates’ view is perfectly consistent with stealing from or killing anenemy just so long as he is not made more unjust” (Bloom 1968, 325). Indeed, Socratesimplies that making war against enemies is sometimes necessary. Enemies of just menshould ideally be made more virtuous; failing that, they must be made weaker.

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friends as well as what is owed to enemies. In addition, Socrates’ conclu-sions about harming others are well illustrated by the contrast betweenhis behavior and Lysias’. Polemarchus was executed as an enemy of theThirty and Socrates as an enemy of the democracy, yet in the Republic,these two men are friends who become philosophical partners. Theyagree to do battle together on behalf of their new understanding ofjustice (335e), but their conception of justice entails that they will fightfor this understanding in a manner that harms no one. Socrates in factprovides a neat dramatic demonstration of what sort of “battle” thismight be. In fighting for his view of justice against that of Polemarchus,he manages to turn his interlocutor from an advocate into a critic ofrevenge. And as we noted earlier, Socrates does battle in such a way as toturn would-be enemies like Thrasymachus into friends and allies onbehalf of the truth. Socrates’ speech safeguards koinvn¤a, but the samecannot be said for the kind of speech on display in Against Eratosthenes.Lysias’ attempt to harm his enemies threatens to erode the fragile politi-cal friendship or concord of the Athenians.43 His thirst for vengeancealso confirms one of Socrates’ primary insights. While the whole courseof Socrates’ argument supports the conclusion that Lysias’ quest forrevenge is unjust, his behavior springs from the harmful injustice that hehimself suffered at the hands of the Thirty. Lysias thus furnishes livingproof that that harming human beings makes them worse with respect tohuman virtue.

Finally, keeping Lysias in mind as we read Socrates’ conversationwith Polemarchus helps us to understand the significance of severalseemingly minor textual details. The first is a Socratic comparison thatmight otherwise appear to be randomly chosen. In inquiring into Pole-marchus’ understanding of the work of (the art of) justice, Socrates asksabout the arts of medicine and cooking (Rep. 332c–d). This mention ofmedicine and cooking (t°xnh mageirikÆ) in connection with justice bringsto mind the Gorgias, in which Socrates establishes the following “geo-metrical” analogy: cookery (here, ÙcopoiikÆ) is to medicine as rhetoric isto justice (465b–c). Gymnastic and medicine, he explains, are arts thatcare for the body with an eye to what is best for it, while legislation andjustice care for the soul in a similar manner. Cookery and rhetoric, on theother hand, are subdivisions of the art of flattery (kolakeutikÆ), an artthat “gives no thought to the best but always hunts after folly anddeceives it by means of pleasure, so that it seems to be of the highest

43 On concord (ımÒnoia) as political friendship, see Rep. 351d and cf. Alc. I 126c.


value” (464d). Thus, “cookery impersonates medicine, and pretends toknow the best foods for bodies” (464d); the cook makes tasty food, whichboys and foolish men mistake for healthy food. It follows from Socrates’analogy that rhetoric impersonates justice, the art of “medicine” forsouls. The rhetorician is ignorant of justice—the art of caring for (un-healthy) souls44—but he hides his ignorance behind a veil of flattery.Because what he says gives pleasure to his auditors, he is able to trickfoolish men into believing that he knows what is just.

Socrates’ introduction of medicine and cookery into his refutationof Polemarchus will remind readers of the Gorgias that, while the justperson knows what is best for souls and uses this knowledge to makeothers better, some of those who are ignorant of justice possess an art ofspeaking (=htorikÆ) that allows them to conceal their ignorance.45 Lysias,as we have seen, is one of these people: he uses the rhetorical art tocreate the false impression that he knows what is just. And just as aflattering and unmedical cook leaves bodies in worse condition by givingthem pleasing but unhealthy food, Lysias leaves the souls of his auditorsin worse condition by gratifying their passions in an unhealthy way.Socrates confirms this point in the Phaedrus when he first observes thatLysias “feasts” men with his words (227b) and later pretends to beunable to resist the speech of Lysias that Phaedrus has with him—aspeech he calls a “drug” (fãrmakon, 230d).46

Socrates’ last words in his discussion with Polemarchus seem to bestill more pointedly directed at Lysias. The notion that it is just to helpfriends and harm enemies, he observes, belongs not to a wise man but tothe likes of Periander, Perdiccas, Xerxes, Ismenias the Theban, “or someother rich man who thinks he has great power” (336a). This list of namesmerits attention. Periander was a cruel and murderous tyrant of Corinth(see esp. Hdt. 3.50–53, 5.92), Perdiccas was the founder of the Temeniddynasty in Macedonia and a sometime enemy of Athens (Hdt. 8.137–39;Thuc. 1.57.2–5, 4.82.1), and Xerxes was the Persian emperor who tried tosubdue the Greek cities in the invasion of 480–479. Socrates thus suggests

44 Gymnastics aims at producing and maintaining healthy bodies, and medicine aimsat restoring health to sick bodies; we may infer that legislation aims at producing andmaintaining healthy souls, and justice aims at restoring health to sick souls.

45 In the Gorgias, as in the Republic, Plato indicates that Socrates is a just man. “Butanswer nobly,” Socrates at one point tells Polus, “submitting yourself to the argument as toa doctor” (Gorg. 475d).

46 On the analogy between medicine and rhetoric in the Phaedrus, see below,section V.

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that Polemarchus’ original definition of justice would appeal especiallyto tyrants and despots—a suggestion that is confirmed when Glauconstates that the man of perfect injustice “does good to friends and harm toenemies” (362c). Ismenias, the only one of the four who was not amonarch, was a Theban who took a bribe from the Persian emperorArtaxerxes to make war against the Spartans (Xenophon, Hell. 3.5.1; cf.Plato, Meno 90a, where Socrates remarks on Ismenias’ wealth). Socrates’final reference to “some other rich man who thinks he has great power”helps to explain his mention of Ismenias and allows us to see that hisemphasis has shifted from political power (as exemplified by Periander,Perdiccas, and Xerxes) to the presumption of power that accompaniesthe possession of wealth.

This is where Lysias comes in. For there is one more crucial point tobe made about Ismenias: he used his private funds to support the demo-cratic leader Thrasybulus when Thrasybulus’ forces marched from Thebesto take the fort at Phyle on the frontier of Attica in the winter of 404/403.47 The immediate significance of this fact is that Lysias also supportedThrasybulus’ war against the Thirty by providing him with mercenaries,money, and shields when he was at Phyle.48 Socrates’ reference to Ismeniasthus reminds us of at least one “other rich man who thinks he has greatpower” and who unwisely believes that harming enemies is a part ofjustice. That man is Lysias, who was very wealthy prior to the death ofPolemarchus and who apparently still had considerable assets even afterthe Thirty had confiscated his property.49

Of course, Lysias had more than one reason to suppose that he hadgreat power. In the Gorgias, Polus tells Socrates that orators have thepower of tyrants, in that “they put to death whomever they please, andconfiscate property, and throw out of the cities whomever they like”(466c). Lysias certainly attempts to assert this sort of power over Era-tosthenes. He thereby imitates the very sort of men he himself condemnsin Against Eratosthenes—men like Periander, Perdiccas, and Xerxes.

47 Justin 5.9.8. Cf. Krentz 1982, 70; Munn 2000, 235.48 Krentz 1982, 73, 81; cf. Dover 1968, 34.49 Dover 1968, 34.


V. LYSIAS IN THE PHAEDRUS AND THE REPUBLIC

If, as I have argued, the subtext of Republic 331d–36a is a Platonic replyto Against Eratosthenes, a rather unflattering portrait of Lysias emergesfrom the text. Lysias, Plato suggests, is unable to distinguish betweenenemies and friends, and his manner of speaking is more appropriate towar than to peace. More important, he is ignorant of the nature of justice,and he lacks self-knowledge. Lysias demands justice at the trial of Era-tosthenes, but his rhetoric is both unjust and productive of injustice.Because he is not open to philosophy, however, he cannot remedy thesedefects. Similarly, he misrepresents his philosophically inclined brotherwhen he speaks on his behalf in court.

The thesis I have defended in the present article is supported bythe fact that the latter, implicit criticisms of Lysias are consistent with thepicture of Lysias that Plato inscribes explicitly in the Phaedrus. ThePhaedrus presents Socrates’ attempt to disenchant a young man who isinitially completely under the spell of Lysias. Phaedrus opines that, atleast on the subject of the superiority of the non-lover to the lover, “noone could ever say other things in greater quantity or of greater value”than Lysias has written (Phdr. 235b). If Socrates can do so, Phaedruspromises, he will set up a statue of him at Olympia (236b). Socratesproceeds to make his own speech in praise of the non-lover, but hebreaks it off halfway through. While he evidently regrets what he hasalready said, he believes that he cannot leave before making expiationfor his offense against ÖErvw (242a–43b). After delivering a palinode inpraise of ÖErvw, Socrates utters a prayer that underscores Lysias’ uneroticnature: “If Phaedrus and I said anything harsh against you [ÖErvw] in theprevious speech, blame Lysias as the father of the speech, and make himcease from such speeches, and turn him toward philosophy just as hisbrother Polemarchus has been turned” (257b).50

In the second half of the Phaedrus, Socrates criticizes Lysias’ non-philosophical rhetoric. He asserts that neither Lysias nor Thrasymachus—who seem to have been friends with a shared interest in craftingspeeches—possesses the genuine art (t°xnh) of rhetoric (269d). Whereasthe art of justice is the analogue of medicine in the Gorgias, the art ofrhetoric is the analogue of medicine in the Phaedrus. Medicine and

50 The Phaedrus resembles the Republic in its abrupt shift from a perspective thatabstracts from ero\s to one that emphasizes the essentially erotic nature of philosophy. SeeHowland 1998.

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rhetoric follow the same path (trÒpow): while the former art is rooted inknowledge of the body and aims at producing health and strength, thelatter is rooted in knowledge of the soul and aims at producing convic-tion and virtue (270b). Lysias and Thrasymachus, however, do not writein such a way as to display knowledge of the soul, which entails knowl-edge of the nature of the whole (270c, 271a–c). The dialogue concludeswith Socrates exhorting Phaedrus to tell Lysias about their conversation(278b,e). Socrates holds out more hope for the philosophical conversionof the rhetorician Isocrates, however, because he has a better nature and“has been blended with a more noble character” than Lysias and because“there is a certain love of wisdom (filosof¤a) in the man’s mind”(279a–b).

According to the Phaedrus, Lysias makes speeches that appear tobe of great value, yet he has not acquired the knowledge of the soul andof the whole that is necessary to produce virtue. Lysias is unaware ofthese errors, and he lacks the knowledge of ignorance that makes onelong for wisdom in the first place (cf. Symposium 204a); this is whySocrates tells Phaedrus to relate their conversation to him. Socrates’comparison of Lysias with Isocrates implies, however, that there is littlechance Lysias will follow his brother Polemarchus in pursuing wisdom:his character is not particularly noble, and his intellect is not philosophical.

Socrates’ critical evaluation of Lysias’ character is supported by“Lysias’” composition on ero \s (see n.12), which Phaedrus reads aloud(Phdr. 230e–34c). Although the speech of the non-lover aims at winningthe erotic favors of an attractive boy, it is a curiously cool document. Asis clear from the tone and substance of his appeal to the boy, the non-lover evaluates erotic matters from the standpoint of a prudent eco-nomic calculus.51 His speech—which argues, in effect, that giving one’sfavors to a lover is a bad investment—is a quasi-legal indictment of the“sickness” of ero \s (Phdr. 231d) whose absurdity would be immediatelyobvious if it were ever actually uttered with the aim of seducing some-one.52 These dimensions of the speech of the non-lover underscore Lysias’double detachment from the give-and-take of philosophical dialogue.53

51 These dimensions of the speech are captured in Ferrari 1987, 91–93.52 Griswold 1986, 45–51. Griswold observes that Lysias’ speech is a “legal brief” that

could exist only in writing.53 Lysias never converses directly with Socrates in the Platonic dialogues: he is

mentioned in the Cleitophon as having listened to an unfavorable comparison of Socrateswith Thrasymachus, he is present in the Phaedrus only as a text, and he is silent in theRepublic.


Lysias, we are reminded, was a writer who (apparently with only oneexception) did not himself speak in the law court.54 His aim, moreover,was not wisdom but monetary gain.55

While the Phaedrus does not explicitly address the connectionbetween ero \s and justice, it does provide some basis for inference. IfLysias is ignorant of the nature of the soul, and if he is unmoved by theero \s that, according to Socrates, carries the soul up to the vision of thehyperuranian beings (including Justice and Moderation) of which it hasbut a dim recollection (Phdr. 247d, 250a), it follows that he will beignorant both of justice and of how to speak in such a way as to producejustice. This is the same criticism that is implicit in Socrates’ conversationwith Polemarchus in the Republic. And, if, as Socrates suggests in thePhaedrus, Lysias is neither philosophical nor inclined to become such, hewill be unlikely to benefit from a philosophical conversation about jus-tice. In spite of his exposure to Socratic conversation, his speeches willcontinue to reflect his ignorance about justice as well as the defects ofcharacter that are likely to accompany this ignorance. This, too, is whatPlato means to imply by making Lysias present, long before the compo-sition of Against Eratosthenes, at a discussion in which Socrates con-vinces Polemarchus that justice does not include harming enemies.

The Republic indirectly confirms the relationship implied in thePhaedrus between Lysias’ lack of ero\s and his injustice. Lysias’ apparentindifference to the conversation in the home of Polemarchus contrastssharply with the strong interest displayed by some of his companions.The Republic develops only because Polemarchus, Thrasymachus,Glaucon, and Adeimantus repeatedly push the conversation forward bychallenging Socrates.56 They do so because they are attracted to manythings—to the power and pleasure injustice seems to promise (Rep.357a–67e), to a life that is distinctively human (372d–e, 419a), to women

54 The prosecution of Eratosthenes is the only firmly attested case in which Lysiashimself spoke before the court (Todd 1993, 173). Lysias briefly enjoyed citizenship after therestoration of the democracy as the result of a proposal by Thrasybulus that was soonrescinded, and it is probably at this time that he delivered Against Eratosthenes (Ostwald1986, 504, n. 22; Lamb 1957, xiv). On the legal capacities of the metics, see MacDowell 1978,222–24; Todd 1993, 195–96.

55 Ferrari 1987, 228, observes that Lysias’ “is no free and living voice”; “his voice inthe city is heard purely for its results, the verdicts it can elicit—the bottom-line.” Cf. Phdr.264c–d with Burger 1980, 29, who notes that “the specific image for the written speech ofLysias is the tombstone of Midas the Phrygian, mythical model for the self-destructivecapacity of excessive love of gain.”

56 Cf. Clay 1988.

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(449a–50a), and finally to wisdom itself (450b, 506d). The Republic ulti-mately teaches that philosophy is the sole route to justice in the soul. Thisteaching is dramatically echoed by the behavior of Socrates’ compan-ions, without whose philosophical persistence the deep connection be-tween justice and the love of wisdom would never have come to light.Lysias, however, evidently lacks the ero \s that drives both the companionsof Socrates and the best souls in the Kallipolis toward wisdom. For thisreason, Socrates implies, he can neither know what justice is nor be trulyjust (cf. 506a with 619c–d).

As we have observed, Plato connects Lysias with Thrasymachus inseveral dialogues (see n. 8). It would be unjust to Thrasymachus, how-ever, to conclude without acknowledging that the Republic leaves uswith a better impression of him than his initial attack upon Socrateswould lead us to expect.57 As a professional teacher of rhetoric, Thra-symachus at first seems, like Lysias, to be most interested in makingmoney from the art of speaking (cf. Rep. 337d). Yet he actively partici-pates in the dialogue, and, for all his anti-Socratic bluster, he really listensto Socrates. To his credit, he does not slink off after the trouncing hesuffers in book 1, and he is ultimately drawn back into the conversa-tion—at one point encouraging Socrates to continue by reminding himthat the purpose of the gathering is not to acquire gold but to listen tolÒgoi (Rep. 450b). Thrasymachus’ desire to learn enables him, unlikeLysias, to reap a profit from the conversation quite different from theone he had initially envisioned. And like Polemarchus, he is arguablymade better by Socrates’ philosophical practice of justice. Socrates indi-cates as much when he gently admonishes Adeimantus in book 6: “Don’tset Thrasymachus and me at odds,” he tells him, “when we have justbecome friends, although we were not really enemies before” (498c–d).58,59

THE UNIVERSITY OF TULSA

e-mail: [email protected]

57 Cf. the sympathetic reading of White 1995, which presents Thrasymachus as “apenetrating critic of contemporary political affairs who is dismayed by the triumphs ofinjustice” (324).

58 But see Patterson 1987, who suggests that Socrates may simply have calmed “amore-or-less recalcitrant Thrasymachus” with “gentleness and gracious good will” (341–42).

59 I would like to thank Paul Rahe, Barbara Gold, and the anonymous referees ofAJP for their critical suggestions, which have greatly improved the present article. I wouldalso like to thank Debra Nails for sharing her knowledge of the people of Plato.


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Plato's Reply to Lysias: Republic 1 and 2 and Agaisnt Eratosthenes

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Transcript of Plato's Reply to Lysias: Republic 1 and 2 and Agaisnt Eratosthenes