Sociology: A reply to Gianluca

Social Science Information52(3) 394–408

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Rational choice theory, the logic of explanation, middle-range theories and Analytical Sociology: A reply to Gianluca Manzo and Petri Ylikoski

Karl-Dieter OppDepartment of Sociology, University of Leipzig

The first part of my response to the two discussants of my article addresses Gianluca Manzo’s critique. Manzo focuses on rational choice theory (RCT) in general. This may interest more readers than the more specific subject of Analytical Sociology. Therefore, I start with my response to Manzo, and then move on to address Ylikoski’s critique of my paper.

I. Reply to Gianluca Manzo

The ‘narrow’ and the ‘wide’ version – an untenable distinction?

In distinguishing a narrow and a wide version of rational choice theory, I did not want to characterize disciplines, and I did not do this in the paper that first suggested this distinc-tion (Opp, 1999) either. I characterized two sets of theoretical assumptions (see the sum-mary in Opp, 1999: 174, Table 1). To be sure, I think that most often one finds advocates of the assumptions of the narrow version in neo-classical economics. But I agree with Manzo that there are at the same time many authors in economics and game theory whose work includes assumptions of the wide version (Manzo mentions the work of K Binmore, H Gintis and I Gilboa). However, the models of these authors are not com-pletely in line with the assumptions of the wide version, as I show below. There are thus often mixed versions, which I also mention in my article (Opp, 1999: 192). So I do not see that my distinction between the two versions of RCT is problematic. Being aware that there are different versions (including mixed versions) is important, among other things, to judge whether the critique of ‘the’ theory of rational action holds in general or for only certain versions of RCT.

Corresponding author:Karl-Dieter Opp, Professor Emeritus, Department of Sociology, University of Leipzig, Sulkyweg 22, 22159 Hamburg, Germany. Email: [email protected]

488475 SSI52310.1177/0539018413488475Social Science InformationOpp2013

Theory and methods/Théorie et méthodes

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The wide version, neo-classical economics and the consistency of preferences

In this section I discuss the extent to which a neo-classical version of RCT is similar to the wide version and to what extent the former is preferable to the latter.

Consistency of preferences as scope condition of a neo-classical model. Manzo reviews some recent work by Binmore, Gintis and Gilboa, arguing that the wide version is more generally accepted than some sociologists think. If that is correct, this is, in my opinion, good news: a good model is increasingly adopted.

However, there are differences between the version these authors advocate and the wide version. Manzo notes that ‘the conceptual core of neo-classical rational choice theory only and entirely relies on the assumption of preference consistency’. ‘Consistency’ (or, equivalently, rationality) means that preferences are complete, transitive and inde-pendent of irrelevant alternatives (Gintis, 2009: 4–6).1 This implies, as Manzo correctly argues, that there are no constraints on the kinds of preferences. So people may have altruistic preferences and a preference to conform to norms. But the restriction is on the relationships between preferences. Consistency is a scope condition under which the neo-classical version of RCT is supposed to hold true. Thus, if this model is applied in a rigorous way, the first step must be to determine empirically whether preferences are consistent. If they are not, the model cannot be applied.

Although Gintis seems to assume that preferences are always consistent, research shows that at least sometimes preferences are not consistent. Thus, one difference between the neo-classical version (as advocated, for example, by the three authors men-tioned before) and the wide version is that the range of application of the wide version is less restricted: consistency of preferences need not be given.

The wide version and consistency of preferences. It could be argued that the absence of the consistency requirement from the wide version is a serious flaw. As a matter of fact, most sociological rational choice theorists do not share the consistency restriction. In empiri-cal research – as, for example, in the experiments or surveys on the dictator and ultima-tum game – the assumption of the consistency of preferences is not made. At least it is never tested for fulfillment.

Is this a flaw? In applying RCT to real situations, it is relevant what the preferences and beliefs in this situation are. For example, in explaining when people vote, one will measure empirically, among other things, voters’ efficacy beliefs, their public goods preferences and the internalized norm that one has an obligation to vote. Whether a pub-lic goods preference (for example, for more environmental protection) is consistent with all other preferences will not be relevant for the explanation of the voting act. This is at least the implicit assumption of rational choice theorists who have conducted empirical research to test hypotheses about voting. I am not aware of any study that tests, among other things, the consistency of preferences or even mentions this assumption. I think that a wide version should look at the specific preferences and beliefs that determine an actor’s behavior in a specific situation. In other words, consistency of preferences is not a requirement for applying the wide version of RCT.

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Utility maximization as a substantive proposition in the wide version. Another difference between the neo-classical version and the wide version is that utility maximization is a substantive hypothesis in the wide version. It is first assumed that individuals have goals or, equivalently, preferences. Second, individuals’ perceived constraints (i.e. beliefs) determine behavior. These variables are conditions for acting in order to achieve the actors’ goals. Utility maximization says that individuals behave in such a way as to make the best of their situation, i.e. to try to achieve the highest possible satisfaction in the sense that they reach their goal as far as possible, given the con-straints. The chapters on utility, marginal utility, budget constraints, indifference curves, etc., in economic textbooks clearly show that utility maximization is a separate hypothesis. If only goals exist (whether they are consistent or not) nothing can be said about utility maximization. This can only be achieved if action is performed in order to reach goals. Just knowing what goals exist does not say anything about the actions that are performed.

This can be clearly shown by applying value expectancy theory (the name for subjec-tive expected utility theory in social psychology). For each perceived behavioral alterna-tive an equation is formulated. In each equation, product terms for each perceived behavioral consequence, which the actors associate with performing the respective behavior, are listed. Each product term consists of the utility (or preference) and the expectancy (subjective probability or, equivalently, belief) that the consequence occurs when the action is performed. These products are summed up for each behavioral alter-native. This sum is the total net utility (the subjective expected utility) of a behavioral alternative. So far the variables are utilities and beliefs. They are summed up for each behavioral alternative. Nothing is said so far about utility maximization. This is a sepa-rate hypothesis: it assumes that the behavioral alternative with the highest subjective expected utility is chosen. In other words, the assumption is that individuals choose the behavioral alternative that they think leads to the best overall outcome. This is a testable proposition and may be false. Accordingly, many empirical studies, especially in social psychology, test value expectancy theory. Thus, utility maximization (or a form of opti-mization in value expectancy theory) is a substantive proposition, logically independent of assumptions about preferences or beliefs. I return later to the claim that utility maxi-mization can be derived from statements about goals below.

Formalization. Manzo emphasizes the importance of formalization. As far as value expectancy theory is concerned, the behavioral equations can be written in symbolic form and can be reformulated in various ways (see e.g. already Riker & Ordeshook, 1973). There exists thus a formalization by applying simple algebra. The formulation can be extended by looking at marginal utilities or probabilities. In this case, calculus could be applied (see again Riker & Ordeshook, 1973). Therefore, Manzo’s argument that the adoption of a wide version leads to a loss of mathematical rigor is not acceptable.

Even if Manzo is correct that the formalization of the wide version is so far unsatisfac-tory, the question arises of what a theoretical model should accomplish: is the major goal to have a nicely formalized model, or does the priority lie in ‘descriptively correct’ (as Manzo puts it) propositions that have (not yet) been formalized in a satisfactory way?

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The major aim of the social sciences is to provide correct explanations of empirical phe-nomena. If there is a choice between wrong theories that are formalized on the one hand, and correct theories that are not formalized on the other, I would clearly prefer the ‘descriptively correct’ alternative. Thus, an argument saying that a theory is inferior or should be eliminated only because it has not (yet) been formalized is unacceptable.

Manzo praises the formalization of the neo-classical version. However, this formali-zation is very simple, only a few elementary rules of formal logic are applied. In addi-tion, the formalization is not necessary, it is just a shortcut of a verbal description. Comparing the application of simple algebra in value expectancy theory I do not see the great superiority of the Binmore/Gintis/Gilboa formalization.

Is utility maximization a logical implication of the consistency of preferences?. To answer this question I look in more detail at the formulation in Gintis (2009:1–29ff.). Gintis intro-duces the relation ≥ between preferences. x ≥ y means that x is weakly preferred to y. ‘Weakly preferred’ means that a person either likes x better than y or is indifferent, i.e. x is at least as good as y. Gintis writes:

When the preference relation ≥ is complete, transitive, and independent of irrelevant alternatives, we term it consistent. If ≥ is a consistent preference relation, then there will always exist a preference function such that the individual behaves as if maximizing this preference function. (Gintis, 2009: 6; emphasis added in the second sentence)

Thus, if preferences are consistent, the individual behaves ‘as if’ he or she maximizes utility. The decisive question is what ‘as if’ means. Manzo interprets it as a logical deduc-tion. In other words, if preferences are consistent, then this implies logically that indi-viduals who have these preferences maximize utility. However, Gintis does not show how the statement that individuals maximize utility can logically be derived from the assumption that preferences are consistent. What exactly does the deductive argument look like, and what are the logical rules that are applied? We do not know.

That there is such a logical implication is intuitively highly implausible. Why should a set of ordered preferences of actors imply logically that they maximize their utility? As was said before, maximization means that a behavior is chosen that entails a relatively high satisfaction. But if only goals exist – whatever their relation to each other is – there is not yet any action that is performed. It is thus possible that preferences are consistent, but that actors choose actions that do not entail the best possible satisfaction of their goals.

But even if it could be shown that utility maximization can be deduced from the con-sistency assumption, something must be wrong with the assumptions from which such an unacceptable conclusion follows. Utility maximization is a separate substantive hypothesis and is not implied by consistent preferences.

The restriction of neo-classical economics to certain types of action. Manzo adds another limitation to the consistency conception: the neo-classical model only works in certain situations that are called ‘routine choice’ (see Manzo’s account, 2013). This is a serious flaw in the possibilities to apply the theory, i.e. a lack of informative content. This is not given in the wide version.


The problem of revealed preferences in the neo-classical model. The most dramatic differ-ence between the neo-classical and the wide version is that the consistency conception is based on the revealed preference approach. Advocates of this approach do not regard preferences as psychic phenomena that are to be measured. Preferences are ‘revealed’ by the choices. In other words, they are simply assumed. For example, if a person buys com-modity A and not B, it is assumed that he or she prefers A to B. In what way does behav-ior ‘reveal’ a preference? Is there an empirical relation between the preference and the behavior? In this case, a preference and a behavior are different phenomena. If there is such an empirical relation, it can (and should) empirically be tested. However, since the neo-classical version does not consider psychic phenomena, such a test is impossible. Is there a logical relation between preference and behavior in the sense that a statement about preferences can be logically derived from a statement about behavior? If this is asserted, one would like to see the deductive argument. But such an argument does not exist, and it is difficult to see how such a derivation could be accomplished. So it is sim-ply not clear in what sense a behavior ‘reveals’ a preference.

If the only evidence for a preference is the respective behavior, then RCT is indeed circular: the postulated preferences cannot any longer be determined independently of the behavior. We can thus, for example, not know whether a given behavior such as spending money for a charitable organization is due to an altruistic motivation, due to the goal to gain status in the community, or due to following a norm that spending for a cer-tain kind of organization is a duty. In explaining protests, for example, one cannot ascer-tain to what extent participation is caused by selective incentives (such as social pressure), by an internalized norm to participate, or by a (false) belief that one could make a differ-ence. The critique that RCT is circular is perfectly correct for this approach but clearly not for the wide version. This version lays a strong emphasis on ascertaining empirically what the motivations and beliefs are that determined a behavior. In addition, an advocate of the wide version would claim that it is of interest to know what kinds of preferences are determinants of a behavior.

It seems that some scholars go even further: they do not assume the existence of pref-erences at all, they do not deal with them any more. For example, Gintis (2009: 6) writes that his BPC (beliefs, preferences and constraints) model is based on the work of Paul Samuelson, which ‘removed the hedonistic assumptions of utility maximization’. Preferences are thus not addressed at all. As Binmore puts it:

Modern decision theory succeeds in accommodating the infinite variety of the human race within a single theory simply by denying itself the luxury of speculating about what is going on inside someone’s head. Instead, it pays attention only to what people do. (2009: 8)

This is similar to (or identical with) the doctrine of behaviorism in psychology in which internal states are not addressed. This school is at present mainly of historical interest, and has few adherents in sociology either.

‘Paternalism’ in the wide version. Manzo mentions the debates around the ‘new paternal-ism’, which are, in his opinion, difficult to reconcile with a wide version. Recently, this approach has been elaborated in Thaler and Sunstein’s book Nudge (2009). I am not

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aware of any book that better illustrates the fruitfulness of the wide version. To ‘nudge’ means to provide small and subtle incentives to change behavior in a ‘paternalistic’ way. Thus, the wide array of incentives that we find in social life are taken into account. This is completely in line with the wide version. The book explores numerous very specific preferences and beliefs that govern behavior. These incentives are often found in inge-nious ways. My favorite example is from the men’s rooms at Schiphol Airport in Amster-dam (Thaler & Sunstein, 2009: 4). What can be done to reduce the spillage of men’s urination? An ingenious device reduced the spillage by 80%: the authorities ‘etched the image of a black housefly into each urinal … If men see a target, attention and therefore accuracy are much increased.’ The black housefly is one of the subtle incentives that govern everyday behavior. It has empirically been determined to what extent such a device works. This is reminiscent of the work of learning theorists, who also determine empirically which items are rewards for animals.

The program of empirical theory comparison

I suggest as an addition to the program of Analytical Sociology the program of empirical theory comparison (see Opp, 2013b, this issue). Manzo rejects this program, arguing that it cannot be carried out without a formal definition of subjective utility maximization. This makes the program ‘impossible to operationalize’.

I strongly disagree with this argument. Comparing empirical theories means that compet-ing explanations are tested for a specific explanatory problem. Assume a theoretical model, based on the theory of collective action, has been specified that is supposed to explain when individuals protest. There is an extensive literature in which such hypotheses are tested (recently see Brandstätter & Opp, 2013; Opp & Brandstätter, 2010, both with further refer-ences). For example, the collective action model, based on RCT, supposes, among other things, that public goods preferences (i.e. political discontent), weighted by the belief that an individual can contribute to realizing these preferences, affect protest participation. Furthermore, it is hypothesized that positive incentives from the social environment (such as social approval for participation) and an internalized protest norm are factors that explain protest. Social psychologists argue that personality characteristics are missing in such a model so that the model is mis-specified. Surveys were conducted in which the variables of both sets of theoretical propositions were measured. Multivariate statistical analyses were used to examine the impact of the different variables. In order to test competing theories it must be clear what the variables are and how they are related to each other. Formalization is not a necessary requirement for this. The formalization (if value expectancy theory is applied) is sufficient to conduct comparative empirical theory testing.

Can utility maximization be tested directly? I refer to economics textbooks that show in detail what the implications of the assumption of utility maximization are. The wide ver-sion proceeds in a similar way. In applying the model, the researcher tries to find out what the incentives might be in a situation when a behavior is to be explained. These hypotheses are then tested. This is still better than postulating utility maximization for logical reasons in the neo-classical model, as Manzo argues.


However, one might imagine in-depth interviews of individuals about what has moti-vated them to perform a certain behavior. Perhaps one could elicit statements referring to what extent a decision has made the individuals better off or whether in the decision situ-ation another behavior might have been ‘better’. This design would make a falsification of the utility maximization hypothesis possible. I am not aware whether rational choice theorists ever proceeded in this way and whether there are discussions of this procedure. This would be an interesting topic for further research.

Theoretical alternatives to the wide and narrow version

Manzo grants that the neo-classical model can only be applied in a certain class of situa-tions. This implies that the respective phenomena cannot be explained. To illustrate, if we dispose of a theory that can explain embezzlement, one cannot apply it to explain theft. Why not apply the wide version in such situations? Manzo suggests a better alter-native: he briefly sketches ‘four action-oriented approaches’ that he wishes to use when the consistency conception does not work. These approaches are Raymond Boudon’s theory of ordinary rationality, Peter Hedström’s desires/beliefs/opportunities (DBO) theory, the dual-process approach, and the ‘fast-and-frugal heuristic’ research program, based on the work of Gerd Gigerenzer. I offer some brief comments on each of these approaches.

Boudon’s theory of ordinary rationality. Manzo asserts that a major difference between Boudon’s model and the wide version is that ‘the principle of utility maximization com-pletely disappears’. Manzo is correct in that, to my knowledge, Boudon never mentions this principle. However, it goes without saying that he implicitly applies it. Boudon’s major proposition is that actors choose a behavior if they have good reasons for doing so. For example, if a person goes to the polls, he or she does it because there are good rea-sons for it. Why does the person not choose the action for which there are no good rea-sons? For example, why does the person not refrain from voting? Apparently, because voting makes the person better off than refraining from voting. If there are good reasons for voting, then the person reaches his or her goals to a higher extent than if the person stays home. Thus, utility maximization is implicitly assumed.

If this is denied: what else should motivate the person to vote? This is the principal problem of approaches that do not make the assumption of utility maximization: if there are several goals (or if a behavior has advantages or disadvantages), what motivates a person to choose one and not the other behavioral alternative?

Manzo further argues that Boudon’s actors are not ‘computational devices operating over probability distributions’. I strongly disagree with this claim. Again, this is never said explicitly by Boudon, but it is implicitly assumed. If a person acts on good reasons, this person will certainly think about alternatives to the behavior he or she has finally chosen. Since individuals are uncertain about many behavioral consequences, there will be guesses as to what is more or less probable. Except when actors behave spontane-ously, ‘probability distributions’ are not involved in making a decision, at least not explicitly. But they were certainly involved when the person first decided to perform a behavior, which is then repeated without factoring in the respective situations.

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Another special feature of Boudon’s theory is that it is based on the actors’ ‘reasons’, as Manzo argues. At first sight this seems to imply that no utility is implied. But if the theory is analyzed more carefully and compared to the wide version, it is evident that this version also implies that actors act on good reasons. Only the terminology is not used. For example, assume a person votes mainly because he or she wants to avoid negative sanctions from important others for not voting. This is a behavioral consequence of par-ticipating in an election. One could express the same assertion by saying that the voter had a good reason to vote, namely to avoid negative sanctions. Before a general claim is made about the difference between theories, one must analyze the meanings of the terms of the theory. Often different terms have the same meaning. This analysis has not been carried out by Manzo.

I will not go into further detail here. In contrast to Manzo, my thesis is that Boudon’s theory is equivalent to a wide version of RCT. I have shown this in detail in another paper (Opp, 2013a, forthcoming; the interested reader may obtain a copy by email).

The desires/beliefs/opportunities (DBO) theory. I have argued in my article that DBO the-ory is equivalent to a wide version of RCT. I do not want to repeat my analysis here. Manzo does not show that this analysis is flawed. In regard to the hypothesis of utility maximization let me repeat only this: the same holds as for Boudon’s theory – the hypothesis is not mentioned, but it is implicitly assumed. Take the example of Mr Smith who takes an umbrella. The goal is not to get wet. Apparently, taking an umbrella realizes his goals better than getting wet. This is a clear application of the utility maximization hypothesis. Furthermore, I showed in my article that the variables of DBO theory and the wide version are identical. None of this has been challenged in Manzo’s article.

The dual-process and the ‘fast-and-frugal heuristic’ research program. These approaches are not theories with clearly specified dependent and independent variables. They are a loose collection of numerous propositions. The overview of Kahneman (2011) that Manzo mentions is a good example. The same holds for the writings of the Gigerenzer group. The question that Manzo did not answer but that should be answered is which of these hypotheses are really the alternatives to the neo-classical model or the wide version?

Should analytical sociology apply to neo-classical economics?

My article is concerned with strengths and weaknesses of Analytical Sociology (AS). Manzo decided to focus on my defense of rational choice theory (RCT) (see note 1 in Manzo, 2013). However, his discussion is highly relevant for AS as well. Granting that DBO theory is equivalent to the wide version of RCT, the implication is that Manzo’s critique of RCT holds for DBO theory as well. The implicit practical implication of Manzo’s plea to reinstate neo-classical economics (as far as it goes) is, thus, to abandon DBO theory and instead use the narrow RCT version. Since I do not think that Manzo’s arguments in favor of the neo-classical rational choice model are acceptable, it seems useful that AS further applies DBO theory and, thus, the wide version of RCT.


Conclusion I

The preceding discussion shows that there are clear differences between the neo-classi-cal version of RCT and the wide version. Furthermore, I have tried to show that the neo-classical version, as outlined by Manzo, is heavily flawed and by no means a candidate for a sociological rational choice approach. Furthermore, the alternatives Manzo men-tions are certainly not clearly superior informative theories to the wide version of RCT.2

II. Reply to Petri Ylikoski

Ylikoski's reply to my article begins with a false assertion that I want to correct right at the beginning in order to avoid misunderstandings: he wants to show, in contrast to my defense of the Hempel–Oppenheim scheme (HO-scheme) ‘why mechanism-based rea-soning is important in the social sciences’. Let me make it clear that I do not deny this. As I have emphasized in my article and elsewhere, I fully support the usefulness of mechanism-based explanations – who does not? However, I do not think, as I argued (see also below), that these explanations contradict the HO-scheme. Let me re-emphasize too that I am not an opponent of Analytical Sociology (AS). I only criticize some claims the adherents of AS make. These claims are superfluous and should be given up. This would strengthen the research program of AS.

What is wrong with the Hempel–Oppenheim explanation when it is applied in social science explanations?

Let me illustrate the Hempel–Oppenheim scheme (HO-scheme) in social science expla-nations with an example. This is the best way to show that it cannot be dispensed when specific phenomena in the social sciences are explained. I take the example from Hedström’s book (2005: 39) in which he illustrates DBO theory. It is observed that Mr Smith (S) brought an umbrella today. This is to be explained (it is the explanandum). Why did S do this? One possible way to answer this question is to observe what hap-pened before the action and then assert that these events are the causes. For example, assume S ate a steak the other day. Is this the cause? We would spontaneously say ‘no’. But why? Intuition? Plausibility? Introspection? These are not convincing answers – everybody may provide different hypotheses without disposing of a way to assess their validity. Hedström applies a theory, namely DBO theory saying that in general desires (D), beliefs (B) and behavioral opportunities (O) determine behavior (see the more pre-cise formulation in Hedström’s book and the problems, as described in Opp, 2013b). This theory thus asserts that it is not the steak that caused the action. The theory suggests looking at the specific Ds, Bs and Os that existed before S brought the umbrella. These specific factors – the initial conditions – are the causes for the behavior. The argument thus is:

Theory: If there are desires D and existing beliefs B that performing an action A achieves the desires D, and if there are opportunities O to perform A, then A is performed.

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Initial conditions: Mr Smith believes (B) that bringing an umbrella (A) avoids getting wet (D) and he has an umbrella at home (O).

Explanandum: Mr Smith brings an umbrella.

Note that this is a deductive argument. Note further that, in order to be adequate (or acceptable), the deductive (explanatory) argument needs to fulfill certain requirements. For example, each statement in the explanation needs to be empirically correct, the law must have empirical content, and the deduction must be logically valid.

I have argued in my article that this procedure is useful in social science explanations of specific events (i.e. of singular statements describing these events). There are other meanings of ‘explanation’, as Ylikoski writes. For example, assume you read the follow-ing sentence: ‘Let me “explain” to you what the meaning of “explanation” is’. In this sentence, the word ‘explain’ means ‘clarify’. I am not concerned with the other mean-ings. My major point is this: If a scholar wants to explain specific phenomena in the social sciences (such as the rise of the crime rate in a community or the foundation of the European Union), it is useful to apply laws. The main reason is that the laws give infor-mation about the causes of the phenomenon to be explained. Second, although the scheme is deficient (which I do not, of course, deny, as Ylikoski seems to assume), there is no clear alternative procedure. Third, scholars, and in particular proponents of Analytical Sociology, actually apply the scheme (which I demonstrated with the example of vacancy chains and of Mr Smith). This fact in particular convincingly demonstrates the fruitfulness of the HO-scheme. Fourth, I argue that social science disposes of rela-tively good theories that can be applied.

These arguments in favor of applying the HO-scheme are clearly formulated. This makes it easy for a critic to attack them. For example, the critic could outline a clear alternative to the HO-scheme or he could show that scholars actually do not apply the scheme. However, Ylikoski did not address my arguments in any detail. To illustrate, Ylikoski reviews at length the various problems of the HO-scheme, and argues that I ‘completely ignore’ this debate. He is right, if he means that I did not see any reason to review or discuss the debate in detail. My major defense of the scheme is that social scientists and especially proponents of AS apply it, and that there is no better alternative. Most disappointing is that Ylikoski does not say a word about what exactly the better alternative procedure is. Outlining this alternative would be the most convincing critique of the scheme. To be sure, Ylikoski alludes to previous publications, which I know, but no clear alternative is found there either. What is wrong with my examples that demon-strate the actual application of the HO-scheme in AS? Or are the explanatory arguments in AS false?

It is argued by advocates of AS that mechanism-based explanations are an alternative to the HO-scheme. Ylikoski also argues that the ‘covering-law theory is abandoned and replaced with a more plausible mechanism-based account’ in AS. I discussed at length in my article and elsewhere that a good mechanism-based explanation is an explanation that applies laws, i.e. that applies the HO-scheme. Ylikoski does not discuss the argu-ments I provided. A mechanism that outlines specific causal processes is ad hoc if no laws are applied. If that is incorrect, why did Ylikoski not show it?


After all the devastating critique of the HO-scheme, the following assertion is more than stunning: ‘Opp’s implicit assumption seems to be that the main point of the mecha-nism-based account of explanation is to deny that explanations are deductive arguments and that generalizations have a role in the justification of causal claims. This is a misun-derstanding: the mechanisms-based approach is not based on a negation of covering-law theory, but rather on a set of positive ideas about explanation.’ These ‘positive ideas’ are probably explanations with mechanisms. The previous citation suggests that good mech-anism-based explanations conform to the HO-scheme – which is the argument I make in my article. This is really confusing.

Did I misunderstand proponents of AS? Hedström and Ylikoski (2010: 55) write that a mechanism-based explanation is not ‘wedded to the idea that an explanation is a deduc-tive argument’. However, Hedström notes in his book (2005: 30): ‘a mechanism-based explanation … can be characterized as a theoretical deductive argument’ (see note 6 in Opp, 2013b). The most recent programmatic statement contradicts the claim in Hedström’s book. I discussed in my article the former, more recent, claim, which I think is legitimate.

Ylikoski addresses the question of what properties a law should have. Although ‘causal generalizations’ are used (and should be used?) in explanations, according to Ylikoski, they are of a special kind: they ‘are not universal generalizations about the constant conjunctions of events assumed by Opp, but more like domain-restricted invari-ances’. Ylikoski refers here to the ideas of Woodward (2003) about invariances: ‘Invariances usually hold only for a limited range of possible interventions (and changes in background factors); they can refer to particular objects, places and times, and they might have exceptions. In short, they might hold only in a certain domain and collapse outside of it.’ If ‘invariances’ refer to ‘particular objects, places and times’, they are sin-gular statements, like ‘in 2003, the crime rate is higher in the US than in Switzerland’. An invariance can thus be any statement, a singular statement or a law. Incidentally, according to Woodward an ‘invariant’ relationship is given if there is some ‘causal or nomological’ relationship between variables (Woodward, 2000: 205).

If the ‘generalizations’, according to Ylikoski, include singular statements, there is no way of establishing causality. (Incidentally, it is more than odd to denote a specific sin-gular statement as a generalization. Why is such a definition useful?) Take the sentence: ‘Mr Smith smokes; some years later he gets cancer, gets divorced and buys a computer’. Did Mr Smith’s smoking cause his cancer, his divorce and the purchase of a computer? How can causality be established? To be sure, Ylikoski grants that a ‘[s]ingular causal claim can only be justified by a generalization if that generalization is itself causal’. This is certainly correct. In other words, in order to make specific causal claims as in our example, a general statement is to be used. This is exactly my argument (and in line with the HO-scheme). So what exactly are Ylikoski’s objections?

Woodward’s criterion of manipulation does not help as an alternative to the HO-scheme either. Assume we take measures that prompt Mr Smith to begin smoking. We thus introduce a manipulation. Now assume we observe that after the manipulation Mr Smith gets cancer, gets divorced and buys a computer. Apparently, the manipulation does not help to determine what the causal effects were. Is buying a computer a causal effect of smoking? Clearly, we need a law to establish causality.

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Ylikoski’s conclusion is: ‘he [Opp] assumes that the mechanistic approach amounts to a denial of the HO theory. As I have suggested above, this is not the main point. The goal is to replace the HO theory, not just deny it. There is no reason to repeat what has been said elsewhere …’. However, ‘elsewhere’ there is no outline of a clear alternative! So my major argument that there is no superior alternative to the HO-scheme in social science explanations has not been addressed.

Let me conclude. The major problem of Ylikoski’s critique is that he does not address in any detail my arguments, and that he does not clearly specify an alternative to the HO-scheme. In regard to my misunderstandings, I anticipated that such an argument would be made. I have therefore provided extensive quotations for the theses I criticize, and so I am pretty sure that there is no misunderstanding.

Rational choice theory

There is an extensive literature addressing problems of rational choice theory (RCT). There is further a large body of literature in which proponents of RCT respond to their critics. It goes without saying that a qualified critique of RCT should not only repeat well-known arguments but also address counter-arguments by rational choice theorists. Unfortunately, Ylikoski mainly repeats what has been said before and what has been discussed in detail by proponents of RCT, but he does not address the counter-arguments. For example, an old and wrong critique is circularity. I mention my detailed discussion of this argument (Opp, 1999), which Ylikoski does not mention. Another critique is the ‘instrumentalism’ of RCT, meaning that rational choice theorists are not interested in the truth of their theory. One of the main proponents is Milton Friedman. This methodologi-cal stance is widely discussed, and is by no means generally accepted. Again, why does Ylikoski not discuss the arguments against instrumentalism in detail? The kind of cri-tique provided by Ylikoski is best illustrated by the following quotation, which refers to the wide version of RCT:

This approach to explanation seems arbitrary and it does not allow for a sensible way of dealing with unrealistic assumptions. For realists about explanation, the key issue is whether explanation gets the crucial causal dependencies right. It is not enough that the model ‘saves the phenomena’, it should represent the essential features of the actual causal process responsible for the observed phenomenon (Hedström & Ylikoski, 2010, 2011). For this reason the ‘as if’ attitude displayed so often by rational choice theorists is not acceptable. (Ylikoski, 2013: 388, emphasis added)

The italics that I added show the problematic claims: does arbitrary mean ‘wrong’? What is meant by a sensible way of dealing with ‘unrealistic assumptions’? There is a long discussion about ‘unrealistic assumptions’ that shows that they need not be made (see also Opp, 2013b). A major advantage of the wide version of RCT and any empirical theory is that in explanations of real phenomena assumptions must be realistic. As was said before, the laws, initial conditions and explanandum must be true. What is meant by essential features of actual causal processes? Is it meant that the causal processes are described accurately or that the factors that have the strongest impact should be


discovered? Who disagrees with that? The citation refers to the wide version, but the final sentence apparently refers to a narrow version. It is a characteristic feature of the wide version that it is realistic and does not engage in any as-if arguments.

The discussion of ‘model building’ is extremely unclear. Mentioning computer simu-lation in a positive way does not fit into Ylikoski’s condemnation of the rational choice approach: agent-based modeling (a primary research agenda of AS), in particular, is a perfect application of RCT. Only a superficial look at major work in simulations, such as the models by Schelling and Axelrod, indicates that they are based on – sometimes very simple – rational choice assumptions.

Sometimes Ylikoski claims the obvious, e.g.: ‘Ultimately the theoretical assumptions should be both empirically valid and compatible with the results of other disciplines.’ Indeed, who would not agree to this? Is this an objection against the arguments of my article?

Ylikoski’s assertions about the achievements of RCT are simply wrong. For example, there is a long discussion of explaining unintentional social processes (beginning with Adam Smith’s famous example of the butcher who is not interested in the welfare of his customers but nevertheless contributes to increasing the welfare of the community). There are also numerous analyses comparing rational choice hypotheses with alternative hypotheses (see e.g. discussions about the different approaches to explaining crime in criminology). The work by rational choice theorists on economic history (such as the writings of Douglass North) are pertinent here as well as providing examples for the wide range of other applications of RCT.

After the devastating critique of RCT, the following assertions are surprising: ‘Analytical sociologists have not rejected rational choice theory … but what has been suggested is the reinterpretation of its place in sociological theory. The advantage of the assumptions of the rational choice theory is that they can be used for modeling social processes … these benefits of rational choice theory can be enjoyed without assuming that it has a foundational role in the social sciences or that rational choice theory is the only legitimate framework for modeling social phenomena.’ After reading Ylikoski’s critique of RCT, one would eliminate RCT immediately from the social sciences. How can a bad theory like RCT be fruitfully used in modeling social processes? Then sud-denly it is said that AS does not reject RCT. So it seems that Ylikoski accepts my analysis that DBO theory is equivalent to RCT?

Some clarification of what is meant by a ‘foundational role’. Proponents of RCT argue that the theory should be applied as long as there is no superior one. As my discus-sion of theories of the middle range shows, there is no way I would claim that only RCT should be applied in social science explanations. This would be pure dogmatism.

Theory comparison and middle-range theories

I have outlined in detail various weaknesses of middle-range theories (MRTs), but also some strengths. My suggestion is to utilize the strengths and weaknesses of MRTs and of RCT. This can be done by carrying out a program of comparative theory tests (for details see Opp, 2013b). What could be wrong with this program? Ylikoski's general assertion is that ‘most of the points Opp makes against middle-range theories are based on misun-derstanding’. I would expect Ylikoski to specify what exactly these misunderstandings

Opp 407

are and what the correct understanding of AS’s position is. For example, do the weak-nesses of MRTs I specified not exist? Ylikoski raises only the following issues.

‘Contrary to what Opp … claims, [proponents of AS] do not subscribe to everything ever called middle-range theory, nor do they assume that these theories are limited to specific subject matter, as he also suggests.’ If AS applies only to certain kinds of MRTs, it would be useful to specify what they are. This is done neither in the AS literature nor by Ylikoski.

Do proponents of AS not assume that MRTs refer to ‘specific subject matters’? Would this imply that theories explaining crime, revolutions, divorce, protest, economic growth or occupational choice are not MRTs? Are only social psychological theories such as dissonance theory or the Fishbein–Ajzen theory regarded as middle-range theories? Typically, when sociologists such as Robert K Merton speak of ‘middle-range’ theories, they have in mind theories that explain specific classes of phenomena. If proponents of AS want to redefine the concept of MRT, this should be done explicitly, and there should be reasons for such a redefinition.

According to Ylikoski, MRTs are about ‘mechanism schemes’. This is wrong (see Opp, 2013b): many MRTs are macro theories that do not specify mechanisms.

Does sociology need general theories? Ylikoski argues: ‘sociology does not need a foundational theory of action’. The answer to the question is thus ‘no’. There are several arguments that strongly suggest the use of general theories. I discuss these arguments in my article. I do not want to repeat them here. If Ylikoski thinks that general theories are superfluous, why does he not discuss these arguments?

Ylikoski argues that ‘the idea of unified foundational theory should be treated with great suspicion’. In other words, Ylikoski is very skeptical about the prospect of finding a perfect general theory. What enables Ylikoski to predict the future of theory building in the social sciences? Should a personal, intuitive feeling of pessimism be sufficient to prevent trying to find better and general theories? How does Ylikoski know that there will not be a sociological Einstein?

A final note: I write that the HO-scheme is not a theory, which Ylikoski denies. The answer depends on what is understood by ‘theory’. I refer to the concept in the social sciences (and in AS), where theory is a set of general empirical statements claiming that an explanandum occurs under certain conditions. DBO theory thus is a theory. Clearly, the HO scheme is not a theory in this sense. If theory is understood as something ‘about the nature of explanation’, it may be called a theory.

Conclusion II

I have very carefully formulated various arguments in my article and discussed certain claims from proponents of AS step by step. This makes it easy for a critic to find prob-lems. I find it disappointing that Ylikoski does not argue point by point. For example, what is wrong with my examples showing that AS actually uses the HO-scheme? What exactly is the alternative procedure? What about the deficiencies of MRTs – which one of the various problems I listed is wrong? Instead of a clear detailed discussion, Ylikoski engages in broad brushstrokes. I do not think that any of my detailed arguments has been refuted. I therefore conclude that Analytical Sociologists should give up the claims that I


criticize in my article and should add programs of empirical theory comparison to their research agenda. All this would not harm the research program of AS. On the contrary, the program would be made stronger.

Notes

1. Incidentally, these properties of preferences make sure that a utility function (or, equivalently, a preference function) can be formulated (see also below the quotation from Gintis, 2009) and that cyclic preferences are excluded. I do not undertake to explain this; instead the reader is invited to refer to a textbook in economics or decision theory.

2. Only briefly do I mention another assertion by Manzo: the wide version is not ‘original’. To be sure, the wide version consists of the same basic principles as the narrow version. In this sense, it is obviously not original. Originality could consist of detecting kinds of preferences and constraints that determine the behavior that is to be explained. Even if Manzo is right: so what? Most important is that the wide version provides fruitful explanations.

References

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Sociology 36: 49–67.Kahneman D (2011) Thinking. Fast and Slow. London: Allen Lane.Manzo G (2013) Is rational choice theory still a rational choice of theory? Social Science

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(and Boudon’s) critique of rational choice theory and its ability to explain norm emergence. In: Manzo G (ed.) Paradoxes, Mechanisms, Consequences: Essays in honor of Mohamed Cherkaoui. Oxford: Bardwell Press.

Opp K-D (2013b) What is Analytical Sociology? Strengths and weaknesses of a new sociological research program. Social Science Information 52(3): 329–3600.

Opp K-D, Brandstätter H (2010) Political protest and personality traits: A neglected link. Mobilization 15: 323–346.

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Sociology: A reply to Gianluca

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