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Phronesis 59 (�0�4) 385-399

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Book NotesLate Antiquity

Peter AdamsonFakultät für Philosophie, Wissenschaftstheorie und ReligionswissenschaftLudwig-Maximilians-UniversitätGeschwister-Scholl-Platz 1, 80539 München. Germany

peter.adamson@lrz.uni-muenchen.de

Dominic O’Meara and Carlos Steel

In the previous installment of these Notes I discussed a Festschrift in honor of, and a collection of papers by, Jonathan Barnes. Now it is Dominic O’Meara’s turn. Sixteen of O’Meara’s articles, all in French and mostly on Neoplatonism (the first two are on Plato and Heraclitus), have been gathered for a book with a strong thematic unity.1 He returns repeatedly to the quintessentially Neoplatonic problem of how souls can rise from an initial state of ignorance, and ultimately to a state of understanding beyond knowledge itself. Drawing on Hadot’s insight that ancient philosophy was often a kind of ‘spiritual exer-cise’, O’M shows how the late ancient Platonists adopted the Parmenides idea of philosophy as a gymnastic exercise (31, 163). A notable example would be the aporiai collected and discussed by Damascius (200). Another path was pro-vided by Plato’s dialogues. A particularly interesting piece here discusses the role of the Philebus. It was placed at the end of the first cycle of dialogues in the late ancient curriculum because it deals with unity immanent in things, as opposed to the transcendent one at stake in the Parmenides, which ended the second cycle (121). O’M also discusses how Syrianus and other Platonists combined the metaphysics of Aristotle (whom they saw as ‘un Platonicien manqué’, 140) with their own metaphysics, for instance by grounding the unity of this science in the unity of intellect (176-7; see 183 for relevance to the

* Book Notes discusses books that are sent to the journal for review. These are Prof. Adamson’s last notes on Late Antiquity, and the Editors wish to express their gratitude to him for his contributions over the last nine years.

1 D. O’Meara, Sur les traces de l’Absolu. Études de philosophie antique. Paris: Cerf, 2013. Pp. 256. Paperback: €29. ISBN 9782204101370.

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principle of non-contradiction, and 88 for the related idea that intellect’s truth is ‘auto-vérifiante’). The highest principle, the ‘Absolute’ of the book’s title, is usually placed beyond human grasp unless it is reached through some sort of mystical union. On this point, O’M nicely suggests that Porphyry may have credited Plotinus with such an achievement as part of his polemic against Iamblichus over the latter’s alternative, theurgic route to the gods.

The O’Meara Festchrift is appropriately wide-ranging and multi-lingual, with papers in English, French, German and (in one case) Italian, on ancient philosophy and culture from Plato to ancient Christianity and Proclus.2 As often with a good Festschrift, there are interesting resonances between the papers. The central point made by Bene, that Plotinus’ ethics is inextricably bound up with his metaphysics, is not exactly revolutionary, but it is borne out in interesting detail by his observation that practical action has theoria at its core (147; like nature, one might add), and by Stern-Gillet’s piece which assesses Plotinus’ view on sacrificing one’s life. (At 188 she invokes meta-physical considerations to show that there can be no conflict between civic and purificatory virtue.) Plotinus’ stance on soul’s relation to practical action and to body is a kind of running theme, with a nice paper by Dillon on the mind-body relation. Equally interesting contributions were written by the two editors. Karfík explores the image of the council (ekklēsia) at Enneads 6.4.14, concluding that it represents ‘la présence d’un vestige de l’âme supérieure dans le corps vivant’ (91). Song argues convincingly that Porphyry went too far in saying that Plotinus was ‘ashamed’ to be in a body (Life of Plotinus 1-2). This was rather Porphyry’s own attitude, with the contrast indirectly proven by Plotinus’ failure to appear in the rather ascetic On Abstinence.3 Another useful paper on Porphyry, by Taormina, makes a strong case that Porphyry did not write a treatise called On What is Up to Us: rather, Stobaeus excerpts passages on this theme from what was probably a commentary on the Myth of Er. Ancient Christians are also well-represented in the volume. For me the standout piece here is Tornau’s study of Augustine on virtue, concentrating on Epistle 155. This makes for interesting reading alongside Männlein-Robert’s contribution, since the latter shows how Marinus presents Proclus as a paragon of specifically pagan happiness (254), while Tornau addresses the issue of whether pagans can be virtuous at all on Augustine’s view (225, 232).

2 F. Karfík and E. Song (eds.), Plato Revived: Essays on Ancient Platonism in Honour of Dominic J. O’Meara. Berlin: de Gruyter, 2013. Pp. 427. Hardback: $154. ISBN 9783110324402.

3 Here Song aptly cites G. Clark (112 n. 71); see Clark’s Body and Gender, Soul and Reason in Late Antiquity (Farnham, 2011), discussed in my 2012 Book Notes.

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Another well-deserved Festschrift is a weighty tome dedicated to Carlos Steel.4 It contains no fewer than 37 articles, a tribute to the breadth of Steel’s scholarship, which has ranged from ancient philosophy—including pioneering studies of later Neoplatonism and many editions and translations—to medi-eval philosophy.5 As the title of the volume indicates, the studies are bound together not just by their authors’ affection for Steel, but also by the theme of providence and freedom. Thus, restricting attention just to the sections of the book on ancient philosophy, there are papers on providence in Plato (Dudley), Plutarch and ps.-Plutarch (Algra and Opsomer), Plotinus (Chiaradonna), and Proclus (van den Berg, Layne). A similar range of figures are considered with respect to determinism and freedom or the ‘up to us’. Greek Patristic and Byzantine thought are also included, with four papers including stud-ies on Gregory of Nyssa (Moreschini) and John Italos (Trizio). Some papers concern ethical themes more broadly. Brisson returns to the much-discussed issue of evil in Plotinus, siding with those who see the root cause as lying in soul (something Brisson compares to the Greek concept of a ‘tragic fault’ as opposed to original sin, 186). Helmig and Vargas co-author a paper on the soul’s ascent in late Neoplatonism, linking the grades of virtue to grades of freedom that can be accessed through theurgy. (I like their remark, at 257, that from Iamblichus onwards philosophy is ‘enriched’ by theurgy, rather than seeing an opposition between the two.) Less prominent figures also receive coverage, as with Roskam’s look at Hermeias on the Socratic divine sign: since he ascribes a daimon to each human, Hermeias is required to give some account of what made Socrates’ case special (314) and thus argues that Socrates is, unlike most of us, aware of his daimon.

Plotinus and Porphyry

Speaking of signs, this year I received only one book on Plotinus, which may signify that scholars are shifting attention to less familiar figures of late antiq-uity. Raoul Mortley has produced a rather loosely structured monograph, more

4 P. d’Hoine and G. Van Riel (eds.), Fate, Providence and Moral Responsibility in Ancient, Medieval and Early Modern Thought. Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2014. Pp. 786. Hardback: €140. ISBN 9789058679703.

5 To pick out just one important publication for each period, see his The Changing Self: a Study of the Soul in Later Neoplatonism (Brussels, 1978) and Der Adler und die Nachteule: Thomas und Albert über die Möglichkeit der Metaphysik (Münster, 2001).

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a meditation on themes than a sustained argument.6 The reader is given fair warning of this approach (‘at times we wander with Plotinus’, 2). Perhaps the most prominently stressed thesis is that Plotinus has a broadly positive attitude towards this world. Although it is not really novel to point this out, or say that Plotinus thereby distances himself from the Gnostics (43, 127, 138), M has an innovative approach to the issue. He dwells on Plotinus’ remarks on the human face, suggesting that Plotinus recognizes the way that this part of the body can express individuality. This is more clever than convincing: the key text cited (Enn. 6.7.22, cited at 136) seems to me to say that whatever is valuable about the face derives from the soul and not the body. The passage merely confirms the unsurprising fact that, for Plotinus, body is worthless as such but receives order and beauty from higher, immaterial principles. There are certainly other rewarding points scattered throughout the book. For instance, while I do not normally find comparisons between Heidegger and Neoplatonists enlighten-ing, the invocation of the ‘ready to hand’ idea for the way soul relates to the intelligible strikes me as useful (57, 81). M also nicely develops Peter Brown’s thesis that chastity in antiquity was a path to self-sufficiency for women (65): Plotinus was a man, but abstained from sex for the same reason. M deals less effectively with other relevant secondary literature. Major recent studies of the self in antiquity by Gill and Sorabji go uncited, and when it comes to Plato the inadequate use of previous scholarship can be unintentionally comic (as at 51, where M remarks that ‘commentators’ seem to be ‘puzzled’ by the treatment of ignorance at Republic 478c—one of the most frequently discussed passages in all ancient philosophy—and cites only Crombie’s book from 1962). A firmer editorial hand would also have been useful in some places (for instance at 21-2 two consecutive paragraphs begin ‘Let us consider memory’ and ‘Let us deal with the question of memory’).

A much better book from the same press is a new monograph on Porphyry by Aaron P. Johnson.7 Although best-known among historians of philosophy for his editing of the Enneads and work on Aristotelian logic, Porphyry was in fact one of the most multi-dimensional authors of late antiquity. While this has been clear from other recent publications,8 J’s study substantially contributes to our sense of Porphyry’s overall intellectual project. The book foregrounds cultural studies, rather than philosophical analysis, but anyone with a philo-

6 R. Mortley, Plotinus, Self and World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013. Pp. 153. Hardback: $85. ISBN 9781107040243.

7 A. P. Johnson, Religion and Identity in Porphyry of Tyre: The Limits of Hellenism in Late Antiquity. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. Pp. 374. Hardback: £65. ISBN 9781107012738.

8 For instance, G. Karamanolis and A. Sheppard (eds.), Studies on Porphyry (London, 2007), discussed in my 2009 Book Notes.

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sophical interest in Porphyry should read it. This is especially true for the first half of the book, which shows how Porphyry ‘translated’ the texts and beliefs of Hellenic religion into doctrine fit for a philosophical elite. This insight allows J to resolve apparent tensions in the Porphyrian corpus. A particular strength of the volume is its extensive use of fragments, often speculating as to how the original texts may have been distorted by the authors who quote them, like Eusebius and Augustine (e.g. 97, 117, 130, 142-3, 168). Two helpful appendices on the fragments are also provided. The second half of the book interrogates the corpus to discover what Porphyry thought about concepts like ethnicity: the central question is, in a nutshell, whether this Hellenized Syrian thought of himself as ‘Greek’ (232). Offering a useful comparison with Maximus (also) of Tyre, J suggests that Porphyry took the ideal philosopher to transcend eth-nicity or nation, thus ‘decentering’ Greek culture. Here there is a connection to Porphyry’s Neoplatonic commitments: language, culture and religious prac-tices are tied to our bodily existence, which we should be trying to escape. Although the two halves of the book seem to me largely independent of one another (a slightly forced connection is suggested at 201), as a whole the vol-ume is one of the best things I have read on Porphyry.

Next we turn to Porphyry’s To Gaurus, a text on embryology. This work is transmitted in a Paris manuscript and known through borrowings and allu-sions in such authors as Iamblichus, Philoponus and Psellos. Although it is ascribed to Galen in the manuscript, it is now generally agreed to be the work of Porphyry. Under the leadership of Luc Brisson, a team at Paris has produced a new edition of and commentary on the text, with a facing-page French trans-lation and an English translation by Michael Chase.9 The volume was produced at the same time as James Wilberding’s translation and commentary,10 so it alludes to his study only occasionally (for some differences of opinion with Wilberding see e.g. Brisson at 118-19). The two books do not render each other redundant, though. The French publication offers not only a new Greek text by Tiziano Dorandi but also extensive discussion of the embryological tradition prior to Porphyry, with chapters on the Hippocratic corpus (Congourdeau), Plato (Brisson), Aristotle (Aubry), Stoicism (Collette-Dučić) and Plotinus (Brisson again).11

9 L. Brisson et al. (eds.), Porphyre: Sur la manière don’t l’embryon reçoit l’âme. Paris: J. Vrin, 2012. Pp. 384. Paperback: €30. ISBN 9782711624324.

10 J. Wilberding (trans.), Porphyry: To Gaurus on How Embryos are Ensouled, and On What is in Our Power (London, 2011), discussed in my 2011 Book Notes.

11 I briefly note two further volumes of translation. First, a French version of Aleander’s Mantissa on the soul: R. Dufour (trans.), Alexandre d’Aphrodise: De l’Âme II (Mantissa). Laval: Presses de l’Université Laval, 2013. Pp. 186. Paperback: $25. ISBN 9782763715032. This

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Porphyry also looms fairly large in Alastair Harden’s sourcebook of texts on attitudes towards animals in the ancient world.12 H provides not only selections from a wide range of ancient sources but a kind of running commentary that introduces each text. Although the book belongs to a series devoted to animal ethics, and alludes to ethics in its subtitle, H’s approach is not that of a histo-rian of philosophy. (He in fact voices the eternal suspicion of non-philosophers confronted with philosophy, calling Sorabji’s groundbreaking monograph on the subject ‘a rather cloistered study of what, at times, arguably comes down to minor points of language’, 5.)13 Thus, while the opening sections of the source-book draw mostly from philosophical works, culminating with Porphyry’s On Abstinence, the remainder provides sources on the ancient use of animals in such contexts as warfare, hunting and scientific experimentation. On the lat-ter topic it is a bit surprising to find no quotations from Galen, by far the most important ancient author for anatomical experimentation (he is however mentioned at 125). The book would probably be most useful for someone who wanted to teach a course on animals in antiquity, but it could also be good starting-point for researchers who are developing an interest in the topic.

Ancient Commentaries

The works of Proclus continue to appear in new English translations, with a fifth volume devoted to his all-important Timaeus commentary.14 This covers the three final ‘gifts of the demiurge’ to the cosmos, namely time, the heav-enly bodies and living things. Most eye-catching here is perhaps the account

is based on the edition of Sharples, who also translated the material into English: R. W. Sharples (trans.), Alexander of Aphrodisias: Supplement to On the Soul (London, 2004). Secondly, R. Hard (trans.), Epictetus: Discourses, Fragments, Handbook. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014. Pp. 400. Paperback: £9.99. ISBN 9780199595181. This includes an introduction by Hellenistic Philosophy Book Notes author Christopher Gill. As an afford-able version of Epictetus for use in teaching or general reading, this volume should sup-plant the revised version of the 1910 English translation of Epictetus’ works (published by Everyman in 1995), which already involved the same team of Hard and Gill.

12 A. Harden, Animals in the Classical World. Ethical Perspectives from Greek and Roman Texts. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013. Pp. 222, Hardback: £55. ISBN 9780230276611.

13 See R. Sorabji, Animal Minds and Human Morals: The Origins of the Western Debate (London, 1993).

14 D. Baltzly (ed. and trans.), Proclus: Commentary on Plato’s Timaeus. Vol. V. Book 4: Proclus on Time and the Stars. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013. Pp. 344. Hardback: £120. ISBN 9780521846585.

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of time, which takes its place alongside other key Neoplatonic treatments of the topic such as Enneads 3.7 and Simplicius’ Corollary on Time. Proclus rejects supervenience theories of time like Aristotle’s, and also Plotinus’ idea that time is brought about by soul. Since soul’s activities are governed by time, Time itself must be a superior principle (71), in fact an intellect (76). Although this section of the commentary is particularly interesting, one should not neglect Proclus’ treatment of the other topics, including technical issues in astronomy. Baltzly’s introduction, which is in general very helpful, has a particularly nice section on Proclus’ surprising denial of the procession of the equinoxes. Obviously not one of his better moments. But, as B points out, we can at least give him credit for acknowledging the issue—most other Platonists passed over it in silence—and for having a good methodological reason for his stance, namely the obser-vation’s incompatibility with the science of astrology (26-7).

Another English translation of Proclus, by Robert Lamberton, is devoted to the fifth and sixth of his essays on the Republic.15 As with previous volumes in the same series, which has included works by Iamblichus, we are also provided with a facing-page Greek text, which is basically Kroll’s edition. The fifth essay is not without interest, though in his brisk and useful introduction L admits that it is ‘one of [Proclus’] most pedestrian classroom performances’. The sixth essay, though, is a remarkable document, in which Proclus addresses some of the key questions concerning Plato’s banning of the poets. He discusses points that should be taken into account in any treatment of this issue, for instance the fact that Plato himself writes myths (77) and uses mimēsis (231). On the latter point, Proclus emphasizes that Plato often has his characters, even Socrates, endorse views Plato himself holds to be false (227). But Proclus takes the ban on Homer seriously. His fundamental explanation is that Homer is appropriate only for advanced readers, and not for the young, whose education is at stake in the relevant parts of the Republic (77-9). This connects to Proclus’ famous three-fold classification of poetry, with the highest being ‘divine’ and full of symbols (259-61).16 Apparently problematic texts in Homer, such as Zeus’ copulation with Hera, should be read allegorically and in light of Platonist metaphysical doctrine. But of course most readers are not capable of this, so they should not be exposed to such passages. L makes the nice point that for Proclus the less

15 R. Lamberton (trans.), Proclus the Successor on Poetics and the Homeric Poems: Essays 5 and 6 of his Commentary on the Republic of Plato. Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2012. Pp. 322. Paperback: $43.95. ISBN 9781589837119.

16 On which see A. D. Sheppard, Studies on the 5th and 6th Essays of Proclus’ Commentary on the Republic (Göttingen, 1980).

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capable readers would include contemporary Christians, who used Homer in their educational curriculum (xxviii).

Alan Bowen’s translation, with detailed (super-)commentary, of Simplicius’ commentary on Aristotle’s On the Heavens 2.10-12 will be of interest to scholars of ancient astronomy.17 But it does not make what B identifies as the mistake of some scholars (88) by seeing Simplicius primarily as a source of informa-tion on earlier thinkers. Instead, Simplicius’ digression at the end of the com-mentary on 2.12 shows him offering a creative interpretation of Aristotle and subsequent theories of the heavens. B shows that Simplicius finds himself in a dilemma, in that he agrees with his rival Philoponus that the heavenly spheres cannot be rotating around the midpoint of the cosmos as Aristotle claimed (28, 59). He instead accepts the more recent system of Ptolemy, eccentric spheres and all. Simplicius resolves the dilemma by depicting the mathemati-cal models of astronomers as mere hypotheses, which will be confirmed by the right physical theory. Aristotle has the wrong mathematical model, thanks to the inferior astronomy of his day, but his physical theory is the right one. B provides a rigorous and compelling reading of the text—one that shows how interesting it should be to historians of philosophy as well as historians of science.

Christianity and Islam

In my view the most important task facing historians of later ancient philoso-phy is the integration of Christian authors into the philosophical canon. A sig-nificant step in this direction is George Karamanolis’ volume in the ‘Ancient Philosophies’ series from Acumen.18 K’s book is an unabashed plea for taking the Christians seriously as philosophers—and he makes things harder for him-self by excluding the star example, Augustine, from the discussion. This is a sensible decision, as it allows K to focus on earlier Latin Fathers and the Greek tradition. The arrangement of the book is thematic, rather than chronological, with chapters on cosmogony, epistemology, free will, psychology and practical philosophy. This has the advantage of highlighting the philosophical contribu-tions of the Christian authors, which are set in context appropriately and often compared to developments in pagan authors. For instance, in the chapter on

17 A. C. Bowen, Simplicius on the Planets and Their Motions: In Defense of a Heresy. Leiden: Brill, 2013. Pp. 329. Hardback: €128. ISBN 9789004227088.

18 G. Karamanolis, The Philosophy of Early Christianity. Durham: Acumen, 2013. Pp. 317. Paperback: £17.99. ISBN 9781844655687.

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free will K not only highlights the importance of rivalry with Gnosticism but also draws parallels to Stoic ideas about autonomy (e.g. at 158) and Plato’s Myth of Er (168, 171). A downside of K’s approach is that the novice reader will prob-ably come away from the book without much sense of the individual think-ers, although this is to some extent ameliorated by brief information about the ‘protagonists’ in an appendix.19 The opening chapter is well worth reading as a sensible and balanced judgment about the sense in which these ancient Christians were philosophers. While attacking Hellenic philosophers, they often themselves insisted that Christianity is the ‘true philosophy’. And, as K acutely observes (54), they have a tendency to provide first and foremost ‘rational’ argument, only thereafter backing up their position with Scriptural authority.

Origen, the most philosophically and theologically daring of the Greek Church Fathers, is the topic of Mark Scott’s monograph focusing on the prob-lem of evil.20 After what may be an unnecessary amount of throat-clearing about the nature of theodicy in general, Scott proceeds to an in-depth study of Origen’s ideas about evil. He looks along the way at such issues the pre-eternity of souls, their different bodily fates, and the possibility of universal salvation. Although some of the book covers rather familiar ground (especially ch. 3), S’s approach is illuminating in its refusal to see philosophy and Christian theology as mutually exclusive paradigms for understanding Origen (42). He shows that the more often-discussed, and more ‘philosophical’ On Principles fits with Origen’s homilies and Scriptural commentaries. Origen’s cosmology is also shown to relate to his theology: the souls pre-exist in the divine Logos, and return to the Logos in the end (53, 132). S takes firm stands on several of the vexed issues in Origen scholarship. He follows Edwards in distinguish-ing Origen the theologian from Plotinus’ student of the same name (28), but disagrees with Edwards on the topic of bodily resurrection. S doesn’t provide much in the way of argument on that score, but is convincing in his defense of Origen’s commitment to universal salvation. On S’s reading, Origen believes that even the devil will be saved, but suggests this only tentatively to avoid giving readers the impression that one can get away with sin (137, 141, 146, 153).

The case for the philosophical importance of late ancient Christian liter-ature has no better argument than Augustine’s On the Trinity, a work insuf-ficiently admired by historians of philosophy, and more admired than read.

19 I take a thinker-by-thinker approach to the Christians in my forthcoming book The History of Philosophy without any Gaps: Philosophy in the Hellenistic and Roman Worlds (Oxford, 2015).

20 M. S. M. Scott, Journey Back to God: Origen on the Problem of Evil. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. Pp. 228. Hardback: $74. ISBN 9780199841141.

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A good collection of papers devoted to the text may help.21 To indulge in a false dichotomy, the volume gives equal weight to the ‘theological’ and ‘philosophi-cal’ sides of Augustine’s achievement. It opens with papers on Augustine’s attack on the Arians, with Edwards (31) and Boulnois (37, 42) considering how Augustine in this context rejected Ambrose’s claim that only the Son was made manifest in theophanies like Abraham’s vision of God, in order to maintain the equality of the Persons. Bochet (69, 81) further points out that such phe-nomena are not strictly identical with God anyway, but are rather created by the vis divina. Bochet also touches on a theme that runs through the book: Augustine’s response to the Platonists and other pagan philosophers. Tornau for instance contributes a fine discussion of the Neoplatonic background of Augustine’s epistemology, while Lössl looks at the role Porphyry may have played in conveying the theory of the ten categories to Augustine. In one of the most philosophically interesting papers, Erismann shows how sophisticated was Augustine’s use of categorial theory, exploring his handling of species as being literally divisible into individuals. As Erismann points out, the univer-sal thus becomes a kind of aggregate of these ‘parts’ (155). Other high-points of the volume include King’s look at Augustine’s theory of predication and MacDonald’s piece on the role of will in sense-perception. These contributions take the usual approach of sympathetically reconstructing Augustine’s posi-tion. Horn takes Augustine seriously as a philosopher in a rather different way, by posing a series of difficulties for his theory of self-knowledge—the excellent paper by Brittain that concludes the volume goes some way to answering these objections.

In her terrific book on Augustine’s moral psychology, Sarah Byers dem-onstrates Augustine’s sophisticated use of ideas from Stoicism as well as Platonism.22 Her monograph takes its start from a famous text at Confessions 8.11.26-7, where Augustine gives a vivid description of the inner battle he faced in his attempt to abandon his ‘old loves’ and devote himself to God. Through meticulous analysis of Augustine’s terminology, B shows that Augustine’s wicked desires are in effect described as Stoic motivating impressions (29-32). More generally, B gives us a very ‘intellectualist’ (my term, not hers) Augustine, who sees a wide range of psychological phenomena in terms of impressions with propositional content. Emotions, for instance, result from assent to such

21 E. Bermon and G. J. P. O’Daly (eds.), Le De Trinitate de Saint Augustine. Exégèse, logique et noétique. Paris: Instiute d’Études Augustiniennes, 2012. Pp. 372. Paperback: €33. ISBN 9782851212504.

22 S. C. Byers, Perception, Sensibility, and Moral Motivation in Augustine. A Stoic-Platonic Synthesis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013. Pp. 248. Hardback: $99. ISBN 9781107017948.

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impressions (pace Sorabji) (65), and Augustinian liberum arbitrium is defined by B as ‘the power to give or refuse assent to the sentential content of [an] impression’ (177). B shows how Augustine also adapts ideas from the Hellenic tradition concerning ‘preliminary passions’ and therapeutic strategies. Even grace is portrayed in a rather Stoicizing fashion: God helps us by ‘blowing’ a helpful impression into the mind (180). For all her attention to Augustine’s non-Christian sources, B is excellent on the Christian context of Augustinian pyschology. For instance she insightfully notes that his doctrine of original sin involves a critique of the Stoics (87). Throughout, she makes unusually extensive use of Augustine’s rhetorical works and sermons, which are for her a ‘hermeneutic key’ for texts like the Confessions (44). In all, B’s study is noth-ing short of a model for the integration of Augustine into the study of ancient philosophy.

At the core of Gaëlle Jeanmart’s monograph on lying is a contrast she draws between Plato and Augustine.23 Plato of course frequently has Socrates emphasize the need for interlocutors fearlessly to speak their opinion. J con-nects this to the Platonic project of perfecting the rational soul and overcom-ing the malign influence of desire, but also to his polemic against the sophists. As J shows, Augustine’s objections to lying are very different. He says that ‘every lie is a sin’, which contrasts sharply with Plato’s admission that a lie can be per-missible (even ‘noble’) if it nudges people towards virtue (99). In lying, we sin not just against others but against ourselves, because deliberately saying what one believes to be false is a manifestation of perverted will (110) and a viola-tion of the purpose of speech itself (124). Lying constitutes a turn away from God, whom Augustine of course identifies with Truth. Thus J goes so far as to say that, for Augustine, lying is not really about accuracy to the facts at all, but solely a matter of the orientation of the will (148). If that may be putting it a bit strongly, J seems to be on to a central insight here. She puts the point well by saying that the Greek pseudos had a double-sided meaning: falsehood and insincerity (118). Where Plato emphasized the first side, for Augustine lying has to do above all with the second. She is further able to connect the theme of lying to a wide range of topics in Augustine, from original sin and polemic against the Manicheans, to the political theory of the City of God. Finally, J explores Augustinian resonances in later authors, especially Rousseau and Kant.

It is still rare to see volumes devoted to both the pagan and Christian treat-ments of a particular philosophical issue. ‘Particular’ is an apposite term for an exception to this rule, a new collection of papers on individuality in late

23 G. Jeanmart, La mensonge et les vertus de la vérité. Une histoire. Turnhout: Brepols, 2012. Pp. 216. Paperback: €65. ISBN 9782503544946.

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antiquity edited by Alexis Torrance and Johannes Zachhuber.24 In fact the net is thrown even a bit wider than that, with Valentinian Gnostics covered in the first paper, a rather eccentric piece by Markschies. The editors have also broadened the scope by including a paper on antique astrology—an elegant overview by Edwards, with interesting material from Firmicus Maternus—and with the welcome inclusion of a piece by Brumberg-Chaumont on the philosophical implications of grammatical theories as concerns individual subjects. She makes the nice observation that, even if there are robust theo-ries of the metaphysics of individual things in late antiquity (like Porphyry’s bundle theory), the problem of individuation as such is more a medieval phe-nomenon (67-8). The same point is made by Zachhuber in his salutary review of the meaning of hypostasis in the Greek Fathers. They do not really ask the question ‘in what does uniqueness consist?’ (93). Rather hypostases were sim-ply postulated as the ‘existing instances of universal natures’ (102), something that caused major difficulties when the divine and human aspects of Christ were described as two hypostases that needed somehow to be brought into a unity.25 Erismann’s paper, again a highlight of the volume, looks at Philoponus’ understanding of the individual and makes a strong case that his handling of this issue in theological contexts echoes the doctrine already found in his philosophical commentaries (146, 156). This metaphysical side of the topic of individuals is the focus of Papadogiannakis’ discussion of resurrection in Christian authors, and of a typically fine piece by Chiaradonna which exposes a perhaps irresolvable conflict in Plotinus, between a radical picture of sen-sible ‘substances’ as nothing but collections of accidental qualities and a more traditional theory on which things do possess essential features (55, 59-60). The antique understanding of the individual has an ethical dimension as well, best brought out here by Torrance’s examination of Christian monastic figures, the ultimate solitary individuals. Their voluntary removal from society did not however undermine their status as ethical agents. To the contrary, as Evagrius put it, the monk is one who, ‘having been separated from all is also united to all’ (114).

Speaking of Evagrius, Augustine Casiday’s monograph on his theology does what its title promises: it is addressed to the theologian rather than the his-

24 A. Torrance and J. Zachhuber (eds), Individuality in Late Antiquity. Farnham: Ashgate, 2014. Pp. 193. Hardback: £60. ISBN 9781409440567.

25 It is worth mentioning here the appearance in paperback of Zachhuber’s important study Human Nature in Gregory of Nyssa: Philosophical Background and Theological Significance (Leiden, 2014).

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torian of philosophy.26 In fact C seems concerned to defend Evagrius from the charge of being too much of a philosopher. He was not engaged in ‘gratu-itous and intellectually obtuse philosophical speculation’ (149) and his use of Neoplatonic themes ‘does not . . . imply a negative valuation of his theology’ (226). Still, a broad-minded historian of philosophy will find points of inter-est here, such as the role of emotion in Evagrius’ life of prayer (163) and the identification of prayer as the highest function of the mind (nous, 137). Anyone with an interest in Evagrius can profit from C’s discussion of his works, which manages to be both a useful orientation and a contribution to debates within Evagrian studies.27 C argues against the notion that Evagrius was implicated in the first round of debates over the teachings of Origen. Here debate centers on the Kephalaia Gnostica, which survives in two versions. C argues that the second, more ‘Origenist’ version is further from what Evagrius actually wrote. It represents, rather, ‘evidence of what Evagrius’ works became in the hands of some admirers . . . who were subsequently condemned for their Origenistic views’ (71).28

Moving forward still later into the Greek tradition, we have from Börje Bydén and Katerina Ierodiakonou a collection of papers on Byzantine phi-losophy.29 This is a kind of sequel to an earlier book edited by Ierodiakonou.30 In the introduction to the new volume, she reflects on the reception of that earlier volume and the question of what we should understand by the phrase ‘Byzantine philosophy’. This field of research is not yet well explored, so it is natural that scholars are still testing its boundaries. Yet most of the contribu-tions here deal with topics that are in any case obviously ‘philosophical’: either the Byzantine reception of Aristotle or methodological reflections on philoso-phy itself. In the former category, the highlight is probably Golitsis on a poetic epilogue added by Pachymeres to his commentary on the Physics, which among

26 A. Casiday, Reconstructing the Theology of Evagrius Ponticus. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013. Pp. 267. Hardback: £60. ISBN 9780521896801.

27 See also Casiday’s Evagrius Ponticus (London, 2006).28 I briefly note another work on a Christian thinker of this period: R. A. Norris Jr., Gregory of

Nyssa: Homilies on the Song of Songs. Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2012. Pp. 517. Hardback: $79.95. ISBN 9781589831056. This has facing-page Greek text and English translation and an introduction that discusses Gregory’s approach to scripture. From the same press I also received a book on the late ancient poet Sedulius: C. P. E. Springer, Sedulius: The Paschal Song and Hymns. Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2013. Pp. 279. Hardback: $51.95; paperback: $36.95. ISBN 9781589837430.

29 B. Bydén and K. Ierodiakonou (eds.), The Many Faces of Byzantine Philosophy. Athens: Norwegian Institute at Athens: 2012. Pp. 243. Paperback: €15. ISBN 9788299912815.

30 K. Ierodiakonou (ed.), Byzantine Philosophy and its Ancient Sources (Oxford, 2002).

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other things praises Aristotle as being ‘in effect not a “pagan” thinker, because his knowledge surpassed that of the pagans’ (115). There is also a strong paper by Trizio on the reception of Eustratius’ Ethics commentary. Less persuasive is Arabatzis’ piece on Michael of Ephesus on Parts of Animals—a promising topic, but the chapter unconvincingly attempts to squeeze ideas about ‘inten-tionality’ out of Michael’s personification of plants and animals (61). Regarding methodology, one striking theme is the confluence of rhetoric and philosophy in Byzantine thinkers, especially Psellos, well discussed here by Papaioannou (who notes that Psellos actually envisioned a fusion of the two disciplines, call-ing it the summiktos epistēmē, 183), and by O’Meara. His piece also resonates nicely with Angelov’s treatment of Byzantine classifications of political phi-losophy. Broadest in scope is a rather polemical, but thought-provoking piece by Kadellis, who argues that we should take seriously contemporary accusa-tions of insincerity and unorthodoxy aimed at Byzantine philosophers. In all, the book adds considerable new weight to the case for taking this tradition as a whole more seriously, without even getting into the philosophically fascinat-ing aspects of Byzantine theology.31

Pagan, Christian and even Islamic philosophy features in a special issue of Horizons, a journal put out by Seoul National University.32 The nine papers, all in English, focus on the originally Platonic idea of a ‘world-maker’ or demiurge—the fruit of a colloquium on this topic held in Korea in 2011. (I leave it to you to devise your own joke about World Seoul.) In addition to a study on Plato’s Timaeus itself by the omnipresent O’Meara there are contribu-tions on everything from Middle Platonism (O’Brien, and Runia if you count Philo as a Middle Platonist—he points out that the Greek term kosmopoios, ‘world- making’, emerges only at about this time, 46) to Renaissance Platonism (Karfík). The theme allows the volume to take in both pagan thinkers and Christians, as well as the Platonism expressed by exponents of the branch of Shiite Islam known as the Ismailis (Nomoto). Certain themes arise in a wide variety of authors, for instance the question of whether the ‘world-maker’ must avail himself of pre-existing material. I didn’t find all the contributions equally convincing. For instance it seems to me that Shaw’s reading of Iamblichus goes too far in an anti-intellectualist direction, and that despite Shaw’s arguments Iamblichus does retain a kind of traditional ‘Platonic dualism’, albeit one that is qualified by his commitment to theurgy. But as a whole the collection certainly

31 As explored for instance in recent monographs by Torstein Theodor Tollefsen, such as his Activity and Participation in Late Antique and Early Christian Thought (Oxford, 2012), reviewed in last year’s Book Notes.

32 E. Song (ed.), Demiurge: The World-Maker in the Platonic Tradition = Horizons 31.1-2 (2012).

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shows that the world-maker idea was an important and lasting one, and one subject to many variations—an impression one might glean also from other recent publications devoted to the reception of the Timaeus.33

I close with a brief foray into the Islamic world, and Elvira Wakelnig’s excel-lent edition, translation and commentary of a ‘philosophy reader’ probably produced in the 11th century CE.34 As in the Latin tradition, philosophy in the Arabic was often transmitted in the form of such collections or compilations.35 The text in question here is particularly fascinating, not only because of the large number of sources used but also because some are otherwise unknown to us. Most famously, the reader contains unique materials from the Arabic translation of Plotinus, here called simply ‘the Greek Sage’. As W argues, the reader has been put together in an intelligent fashion, following a Neoplatonic structure of procession and return (8-9). Along the way it takes in extensive reflection on God, the soul, the human body (here drawing on the medical tradition) and ethics. W also makes a strong case that the reader should be situated within the orbit of the historian and Neoplatonist Miskawayh, who is the latest author used by the compiler. This is a book that will need to be con-sulted by anyone with an interest in Greek-Arabic philosophical transmission, or indeed philosophy in the formative period of the Islamic world, that is, up to the time of Miskawayh’s contemporary Avicenna.

33 For instance G. J. Reydams-Schils, Demiurge and Providence: Stoic and Platonist Readings of Plato’s Timaeus (Turnout, 1999) and papers in her edited collection Plato’s Timaeus as Cultural Icon (Notre Dame, 2002).

34 E. Wakelnig (ed. and trans.), A Philosophy Reader from the Circle of Miskawayh. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014. Pp. 517. Hardback: £80. ISBN 9780521193610.

35 For discussion of much later examples see G. Endress, ‘Philosophische Ein-Band-Bibiotheken aus Isfahan’, Oriens 36 (2001), 10-58.