Outside the Battlefield:

In-group Political Dynamics of Civil Conflict Negotiations and Settlements

Sema Hande Ogutcu-Fu, Ph.D.

Center on Democratic Performance

Binghamton University (SUNY)

hogutcu1@binghamton.edu

Published in Political Research Quarterly, 2016, 69(3): 403–417

Abstract

What increases warring parties’ ability to reach a negotiated settlement? In this study, I answer

this question by examining the political environment a government and rebel group leadership

internally encounter during a peace process. I disaggregate in-group dynamics of governments and

rebels into their respective political elements that either grant autonomy or create constraints for

resolution, namely, their constituencies and elites. I argue that willingness to end fighting does not

always translate into the ability to make concessions. While battlefield related indicators may

increase the likelihood of negotiations, it is internal cohesion that increases combatants’ credibility

as bargaining partners and improves the likelihood of settlement. To test these arguments, I

introduce original data on negotiations for internal conflict-dyad-years between 1980 and 2005.

Findings using two-stage censored probit models demonstrate that war-weariness increases

willingness for negotiations while internal consensus creates opportunity for settlement.

Keywords

civil conflict, negotiated settlement, negotiations, peace agreement, rebel group

1

Peace comes when you talk to the guy you most hate. And that's where the courage of a leader

comes, because when you sit down with your enemy, you as a leader must already have very

considerable confidence from your own constituency.

Desmond Tutu

The peace agreement between the African National Congress (ANC) and the last Apartheid

government of South Africa is considered one of the most successful for ending a protracted

conflict.1 As the above passage indicates, Mandela’s ability to achieve internal consensus among

the Black opposition was a defining factor in peacefully resolving the conflict. Although military

issues are at the forefront of conflict resolution research (Gent 2011; Mason et al. 1999), in-group

political support plays a pivotal role in successful settlement of civil conflict. Neither governments

nor rebel groups are unitary actors. In order to understand how civil conflict adversaries negotiate

a settlement, it is necessary to examine how they converge on a point acceptable to their internal

actors while trying to reconcile these preferences with their adversary.

In this paper, I argue that negotiations are more likely to settle civil conflicts if warring party

leadership have greater in-group cohesion and autonomy in decision-making. In-group cohesion

contributes to negotiation success in two major ways. First, internal cohesion is what gives both

sides’ leadership the opportunity to ratify the peace agreement without obstruction. Second,

leaders who can unite their in-group coalition can credibly signal their party’s compliance to the

agreement, mitigating commitment problems between their party and their opponent. I

disaggregate in-group dynamics of governments and rebels into their respective political actors

that alleviate or aggravate commitment problems during negotiations, namely, their constituencies

and institutional elites.

Conditions that impel combatants to initiate negotiations and conditions that facilitate

successful settlement are not always fully aligned (Findley 2013). While internal cohesion is

necessary for agreements to be ratified, it is not required for initiation of negotiations. Settlement

2

is when binding commitment takes place. Examining negotiation initiation as well as success, I

also argue that negotiations initiated only with short-term considerations such as war-weariness

are likely to break down in the absence of in-group political support. I use original data on civil

conflict negotiations for all internal conflict-dyad-years between 1980 and 2005 and employ a two-

stage analysis of negotiations to test these arguments.

This study contributes to the literature on civil conflict resolution on several fronts. First,

moving beyond the unitary actor assumption, I examine the mechanisms through which in-group

political dynamics affect major stages of a peace process. Second, emphasizing the dyadic nature

of peace agreements, I disaggregate all warring parties into their respective internal actors and

exhibit the pivotal role they play in demonstrating credible commitment to settlement. Finally, I

introduce an original universal dataset on civil conflict negotiations. In doing so, I study successful

negotiations along with the complete pool of negotiations, thereby looking at what makes certain

negotiations successful in settling conflict. Empirical findings demonstrate that while battlefield

weariness may impel negotiation initiation, internal consonance is the leading force behind

successful settlement. Therefore, the article also clarifies the mixed evidence regarding the

conditions that facilitate ripeness for resolution (Findley 2013; Hultquist 2013). Combatants can

initiate negotiations due to the pressure they face on the battlefield, yet negotiations will be

concluded when they reach internal consensus.

The article will proceed as follows. It begins by reviewing essential studies on negotiated

settlements and negotiators to situate the forthcoming argument. I then develop my theoretical

argument regarding the effect of internal political consensus on settlement and negotiation stages.

I describe my variables, the data collection process, and present my empirical findings. The article

is concluded with some theoretical and practical implications of the findings.

3

Negotiated Settlements and Negotiators’ Internal Dynamics: A Review

Negotiated settlements promise peaceful and institutionalized solutions to main causes of civil

conflict. Numerous studies emerged on the topic in recent years (Findley 2013; Hartzell and

Hoddie 2007; Walter 2002; Zartman 2003). One popular line of work on the subject explores

commitment problems among civil conflict combatants (Walter 2002). Following bargaining

models of war (Fearon 1995), proponents of this approach argue that commitment problems are

the most challenging hurdle combatants face while seeking to reach peaceful resolution. Strong

incentives exist for both parties to negotiate in bad faith and renege on their promise once their

adversary is weaker. Therefore, it is difficult for combatants to credibly convince one another that

their intentions of resolution are genuine (Walter 2002).

Various studies emphasize the role of third-party guarantors in helping combatants overcome

their commitment problems during the peace process (Fortna 2008; Stedman 1997; Walter 2002).

Others argue that the design of power-sharing agreements is pivotal in ameliorating commitment

problems (Hartzell and Hoddie 2007). While third-party enforcement or effective agreement

design may strengthen existing efforts for peace, it cannot transform warring parties’ decisions to

take the necessary steps towards peace. What ultimately minimizes commitment problems is

combatants’ perception of one another as credible negotiation partners (Pruitt 2005). In this paper,

I argue that negotiating parties can induce this perception by signaling their ability to deliver their

group’s political compliance to the agreement.

Another significant body of literature on negotiated settlements is framed around ripeness

theory (Pruitt 2005; Zartman 2003). Zartman (2003) argues that adversaries will settle when they

are in a “mutually hurting stalemate” that is costly for both parties— only then will they be “ripe

for resolution.” Previous attempts at operationalizing these concepts have been limited to

examining conditions that wear out belligerents in the battlefield. Ripeness embodies a time

4

component. Some scholars have therefore captured the notion using duration of conflict (Mason

et al. 1999). Other studies focus on “stalemates” and look at how distribution of power between

combatants affects civil war outcomes (Gent 2011; Hultquist 2013). Yet, the evidence on the

relationship between a stalemate and the likelihood of settlement is mixed. Findley (2013) finds

that power parity between the strongest armed group and the government positively affects the

first stage but negatively affects later stages of a peace process. Building on this premise, I use a

two-stage model to determine whether different factors influence negotiation initiation and

settlement stages differently.

While war-weariness is likely to induce a hurting stalemate and increase willingness to

negotiate, I argue that in-group politics are superior determinants of successful settlement. If the

internal environment does not produce opportunities for combatant leaders to settle, then,

willingness of either side’s leadership to settle is not sufficient for peace (Most and Starr 1989).

Putnam (1988) with his “two-level games” metaphor was the first to suggest that internal dynamics

of negotiating parties provide opportunities for or pose constraints on the negotiation process.

Although the relationship between two levels is examined with respect to international

negotiations, his analysis is fully applicable to civil conflict and peace processes (Urlacher 2011).

Earlier qualitative works on ethnic war, for example, disaggregate ethnic groups’ internal

dynamics and discuss their role in kindling conflict (Horowitz 1985; Kaufman 1996).

Yet, quantitative studies on civil conflict have largely focused on the internal dynamics of a

single combatant. On the state front, scholars have scrutinized the effect of governments’

institutional power on the conflict process. Previous studies show that the political strength and

stability of a government play a significant role in settlement (Urlacher 2011) or shortened duration

of civil conflict. On the rebel group front, collection of the Non-state Actors Dataset (henceforth

the NSA dataset) was essential in shedding light on armed organizations’ internal mechanisms

5

(Cunningham et al. 2013) and how these mechanisms affect duration and termination of conflict

(Cunningham et al. 2009). Another set of studies on internal dynamics of rebels examines how

fractionalization and organizational structure of rebel movements affect rebel violence on civilians

(K.Cunningham 2011; Staniland 2014; Weinstein 2007).

While these studies are important in understanding the inner workings of combatant states and

rebel groups, a dyadic approach is vital to the study of negotiated settlements (Cunningham et al.

2009). By the very definition and nature of the event, negotiated settlements cannot be understood

without taking into consideration the characteristics of all negotiating parties. This paper carries

the literature forward by examining how internal dynamics of both warring parties influence the

likelihood of negotiation initiation and settlement.

Theoretical Argument

A core question when studying negotiated settlements is how warring parties manage to arrive at

a common acceptable position. Settlement is an arduous process full of obstacles. An obstacle

often ignored, however, is the internal difficulty of arriving on a unified consensual decision to

settle. The widely utilized unitary actor assumption conveniently converges a group’s interests,

preferences, and ultimately, policy decisions, into one. The negotiating political units differ in

terms of size, complexity, and legitimacy. Yet, albeit in different manners, both the government

and the rebel group leadership seek to represent, at minimum, a group of key backers, and at

maximum, a substantial number of the population (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003). If a rebel group

was able to survive and challenge the government in significant ways, it was able to do so owing

to its civilian supporters and an effective organizational structure (Weinstein 2007). Regardless of

the asymmetry, both units can be disaggregated into their internal political actors that create

opportunities or constraints for them to negotiate a settlement.

6

In-group cohesion is central to reaching negotiation success in two fundamental ways. First,

in-group political dynamics determine how autonomous or constrained each side’s leadership is

during negotiations. Absence of internal cohesion constrains leaders as they seek approval from a

range of preferences within the group for agreement ratification. Second, in-group cohesion allows

leaders to credibly signal the ability to deliver their party’s political and military compliance to the

agreement. Negotiators have limited information regarding how committed their opponents are to

the peace process. If the leadership possesses internal cohesion in decision-making, they can

demonstrate to their negotiation partner that they can rally the necessary support for the agreement.

Moreover, leaders are beholden to their group’s actions. The potential for spoiler attacks takes

away from the credibility of the leaders’ commitment to settlement (Stedman 1997). Leaders

possessing internal cohesion can credibility display that they can deter potential spoilers within

their group (Kydd and Walter 2002). Thus, internal consensus contributes to peaceful resolution

not only by allowing the respective leader to act more autonomously during negotiations but also

by alleviating their opponent’s uncertainty regarding their commitment to settlement.

I disaggregate governments’ and rebel groups’ in-group coalitions into two salient political

elements that either expand or constrain their ability to settle: attitudes of constituency and elites.

A settlement agreeable to both sides will largely be determined by leaders’ ability to unify the

preferences of salient domestic actors that possess the capacity to block ratification. These actors

are internal veto points whose aggregated preferences are represented by the combatant leaders at

the negotiation table (Tsebelis 2002).2 Constituents and political institutions are building blocks

of combatant leaders’ consolidated power. Constituency support grants the government the

necessary votes to stay in power and allows the rebel group to access political and military

resources to survive. Additionally, institutionally powerful elites are by-products of the

organizational complexity that allows states and armed organizations to thrive. While legislatures

7

and governing councils are central to the decision-making process of states and armed groups, they

also lead to the emergence of potentially powerful opposition parties and high-rank commanders.

In line with the definition of a veto point, constituency and elite preferences can diverge from

the group’s position and restrict policy change that is settlement. Constituents and institutionally

powerful elites each have the power to derail the agreement by removing their support and

departing, politically or militarily, from the position of the leadership. They can support or block

ratification of the peace agreement at different points in the peace process. Moreover, these actors

can also mobilize to sustain or spoil the settlement, either preserving the credibility of their leader’s

commitment to peace, or rescinding it. Their political and military compliance to the agreement is

required for the settlement to be upheld.3

Consequently, not every initiated negotiation can succeed in settling the conflict. It is

necessary for combatant leadership to mobilize and represent a cohesive coalition to be able to

reach a final agreement. The two-stage model used in this paper allows for simultaneous analysis

of negotiation initiation and settlement stages and captures the interdependence between them,

identifying the internal factors that make certain negotiations succeed.

Internal Dynamics, War-weariness, and Negotiations

The barrier to initiating negotiations is low when compared to signing an agreement. As a

result, warring party leaders may initiate negotiations with various motivations. They may

negotiate in bad faith to take advantage of a ceasefire and replenish resources (Walter 2002;

Zartman 2003). They may also face significant international pressure to negotiate and seek to bring

voice their cause using the negotiation table. The streak of negotiations between Israel and Fatah

during 1990s possessed this international component (Darby 2001).

Warring party leaders can also initiate negotiations in good faith without being fully conscious

of internal opportunities and constraints. They can use the negotiation stage to test waters and

8

collect information on constituency and elite opinion regarding settlement. Governments can

conduct public opinion polls and hold meetings with opposition party leaders. Meanwhile, rebel

leadership embedded in the community can assess civilian support for settlement. Rebel

commanders’ independent actions can also signal future behavior. Based on this information

partially accessible to both parties through to media coverage, warring party leaders can choose to

proceed with negotiations or get back to the battlefield.

Thus, in addition to dyads that initiate negotiations in good faith and successfully conclude

them, dyads that fail to settle their conflict due internal constraints as well as dyads that do not

intend to settle can all initiate negotiations. Warring party leaders possess the internal consensus

necessary for settlement in only a portion of the initiated negotiations. For example, eight rounds

of negotiations were held in Northern Ireland since 1970s but it was the Good Friday Agreement

that received the required internal support in the following referendum and resolved the conflict

(Darby 2001). The saturated nature of the complete pool of negotiations leads to the following

hypotheses:

H1: Constituency support does not affect the likelihood of negotiations.

H2: Elite obstruction does not affect the likelihood of negotiations.

Warring parties agree to negotiate because they want “a way out” (Zartman 2003). War-

weariness, therefore, is an important catalyst for initiating negotiations. A prolonged conflict can

lead warring parties to start questioning their chances of victory and consider negotiating. As

conflict prolongs or combatants begin to reach a stalemate, their resources also depreciate.

Combatants hard pressed for resources could regard initiation of negotiations a viable option

(Zartman 2003). Furthermore, governments, as the party that will grant concessions, may want to

negotiate now rather than facing the possibility of dealing with stronger rebels later (Fearon 1995).

Rebels, on the other hand, would be willing to accept negotiations for access to political power

9

and representation. The weariness would translate into a willingness to retreat from the battlefield,

either temporarily or permanently. In many intractable civil conflicts that reached “a plateau”

(Zartman 2003) after several decades, like the conflict in Sri Lanka, negotiations took place. I

argue:

H3: As combatants’ war-weariness increases, the likelihood of negotiations also increases.

Constituencies and Negotiated Settlements

Negotiating with the opponent is a sensitive and controversial issue for the populaces on both

sides of the conflict. Engaging in dialogue with “the enemy” may pose significant political risks

for leaders. Maintenance of constituent support is essential for both sides. For the government, a

peace agreement with rebels necessitates significant domestic policy changes. Governments

require the support of a considerable portion of the population for their political survival as they

enact policy (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003). Executives need to make sure these potential policy

changes do not become a source of discontent and threaten the survival of their own rule and the

peace process.

Peace agreements are high-risk-high-reward undertakings. Executives confident about wide-

range public support can afford to focus on riskier endeavors such as settlements that can deliver

long-term positive results. Despite initial risks, if successful, executives are hailed as peacemakers.

A peace agreement is not ordinary policy and requires public endorsement efforts. Yet, a receptive

audience of constituents will make this leadership test easier.

Referenda and elections are commonly practiced ratification mechanisms for peace

agreements. In a post-settlement referendum, a popular government would have an easier time

getting their constituency to the voting booths in support of the peace agreement. Governments

enjoying wide support can also credibly signal their ability to deliver political compliance. This

will alleviate the rebel group’s concerns and contribute to negotiation success.

10

Recent Turkish electoral history demonstrates the significant role constituency-government

relationship can have on a peace process. The AKP (Justice and Development Party) was the first

government to engage in a peace process with the rebel group PKK (Kurdish Workers’ Party).

Until the AKP took office in 2002, Turkey had been ruled by a series of coalition governments—

no prior government enjoyed the level of constituency support the AKP possessed. Yet, while

electoral victories emboldened the AKP to initiate a peace process with the PKK in 2013, a decline

in AKP votes in 2015 elections lead to its breakdown. When the AKP failed to receive the

percentage of votes necessary for a majority government, they appealed to nationalist voters in the

early election. The peace process broke down when the AKP grew uncertain of their constituency

support and increasingly worried about political survival (Balta 2015). Building on this discussion,

I propose the following hypothesis:

H4: As constituency support for the government increases, the likelihood of a negotiated

settlement also increases.

A consenting coalition of followers is also critical for rebel group leaders negotiating a

settlement. Leadership of an armed organization is dependent on an ethno-religiously or

ideologically motivated community they seek to represent for recruitment, shelter, safe haven,

logistical support, and financial aid (Petersen 2006; Weinstein 2007). Rebel group leaders may

risk valuable support if there is significant opposition among their constituency towards settlement.

Support of base followers is also essential for the organization’s survival in the aftermath of

the settlement as armed opposition seeks to become a legal political party. Rebel groups can

survive and thrive as political parties if they can receive enough votes in post-settlement elections.

Rebel leaders who expect to receive popular support in post-settlement elections are more likely

to settle with the government (Heger 2015; Metternich 2011).

11

Moreover, rebel leaders who rely on a supportive population can credibly guarantee their

group’s compliance to the settlement. The government expects compliance from their adversary

at every stage of the peace process, from ceasefires to referendum, to the disarmament,

demobilization, and reintegration process. Mass base support signals organizational credibility,

alleviating the government’s concerns regarding group’s commitment to peace. The ability to unify

followers will translate into effective management or prevention of spoiler attacks originating from

either side. Returning to the introductory example, prior to post-conflict elections in South Africa,

an ANC leader was assassinated as part of a spoiler plan backed by members of the Conservative

Party. After the assassination, Mandela calmed nerves and prevented a potential riot. The spoiler

assassination, mostly thanks to Mandela’s ability to unite followers, accelerated the peace process

between actors instead of derailing it (Darby 2001). This brings the discussion to the following

hypothesis:

H5: As constituency support for the rebel group increases, the likelihood of a negotiated

settlement also increases.

Elites and Negotiated Settlements

Autonomy from in-group elite opposition is also a crucial condition for settlement. Both sides

may contain hawkish elites that criticize negotiating leaders for “selling out,” exposing weakness,

or granting legitimacy to the enemy. While peace is a public good on the part of constituents, elites

also seek to extract private goods from these arrangements in the form of political positions and

take into consideration their own advancement while evaluating the process (Bueno de Mesquita

et al. 2003). Therefore, constituencies and elites may hold different preferences regarding peace

and can impede peaceful resolution.

Autonomy from elite opposition would ideally mean cooperation or cooptation of elite support

for the peace process. However, opposition parties may take advantage of their ability to block

12

the progress of the process to deal a significant blow to the government with very little cost. If

opposition parties pose institutional constraints in the legislature, the peace agreement may never

be ratified. It would also be difficult for the government to make credible claims about ratification

if they face an institutionally strong opposition contesting the peace process.

In the Sri Lankan experience, for example, the discord between President Kumaratunga and

Prime Minister Wichremesinghe, members of different political parties, contributed to the

breakdown of the peace process with Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (Saravanamuttu 2009).

South African government, on the other hand, devised the practice of “sufficient consensus” while

negotiating with the ANC. Sufficient consensus required agreement of only two main political

parties in order to advance to the next stage—a practice that negotiating parties in Northern Ireland

also partially adopted (Darby 2001). Institutionally speaking, a weaker political opposition is more

advantageous for the government, giving them increased autonomy during the peace process. I

argue:

H6: As the strength of elite opposition in the legislature increases, the likelihood of a

negotiated settlement decreases.

Just as the political opposition to the government may contain adamant hawks, rebel groups

may have their extremist commanders who oppose dialogue. Negotiations may trigger a wide

range of disagreements among senior members. Firstly, settling means abandoning what has been

rebels’ way of life for years. Ambitions can generate problems regarding who should hold certain

positions after transition to civilian life. Ideological differences can break out as to what set of

gains and concessions should make up the group’s reservation point. Moreover, rebels are arguably

at a higher risk than the government in the post-settlement period due to the disarmament process.

While disagreements are to be expected, whether a commander would be able to act

independently amidst potential incongruence largely depends on the structure of the organization

13

(Weinstein 2007). In decentralized and loosely knit organizations, grievances may surface in the

form of extremist independent behavior. When the hierarchical chain of command is weak,

individual commanders are stronger. These commanders may possess the resources to mobilize a

sub-faction of soldiers. Threatened, the rebel group leader may feel compelled to respond to

internal divisions by conforming to extreme views. The group may walk away from the table or

move their reservation point to an extreme set of positions unpalatable to the government. Or,

extremist factions within the group can sabotage the peace process using spoiler attacks. Kydd and

Walter (2002) argue that it is not only the spoiler attack itself but also the division between

moderates and extremists that spoils peace. The government may lose trust in the leader’s ability

to contain extremist elements. These extremist factions may also split during negotiations,

resulting in the government’s loss of confidence in the process and in its capacity to end conflict

(Bapat 2005). The emergence of a splinter group, a renewed source of threat, is likely to force the

government to question the purpose of existing negotiations (Kydd and Walter 2002). As

organizational structure gets decentralized, the credibility of organization’s commitment to peace

disappears.

In contrast, a rebel group that has a strong hierarchical command structure can contain a

potentially unruly opposition and stick to a coherent set of positions during negotiations. All

affiliates answer to their superiors and this hierarchy deters commanders from acting

independently from the agreed position of the group. A strong chain of command embodies

discipline and contains punishment mechanisms in the face of subordination (Weinstein 2007). In

tightly-knit organizations, any concerns high-rank officials raise regarding the peace process are

discussed internally and the group’s negotiators consistently reflect the agreed position on the

negotiation table. This consistency emits credibility about the group’s stance regarding settlement

as well as the leader’s ability to suppress and alienate potential spoilers. The ANC, for example,

14

demonstrated credibility to the government not only in its ability to rally their constituency but

also in their consistently unified stance on the negotiation table (Darby 2001). I therefore

hypothesize:

H7: As the strength of elite opposition increases within the structure of the rebel group, the

likelihood of a negotiated settlement decreases.

Research Design

Data and Case Selection

The internal armed conflict cases are selected from Uppsala Conflict Data Program

(UCDP)/PRIO (Peace Research Institute Oslo) Armed Conflict Dataset (ACD). It defines internal

armed conflict as incidents of violence between states and armed groups that generate at least

twenty-five casualties in a given calendar year, over an incompatibility classified as control over

government and/or territory (Harbom et al. 2006). UCDP Dyadic Dataset (Harbom et al. 2008)

allocates the cases in the ACD dataset into dyad-years starting from 1946. In their Expanded

Uppsala/PRIO Non-state Actors (NSA) dataset, Cunningham et al. (2009) use this internal dyad-

conflict-year population and introduce original data on rebel groups’ various organizational

characteristics, from troop numbers to central command structure.4 The cases in this study are

taken from the NSA dataset (Cunningham et al. 2009). I analyze the period between 1980 and

2005, including both Cold War and post-Cold War cases.

The theoretical argument made regarding the internal dynamics of the government dictates the

presence of a legislative body. I therefore limit my sample to conflicts during which there was a

legislative body in the conflict state. Adversaries may negotiate and reach a settlement after

perpetrated violence stops or becomes sporadic. I have added to the dataset dyad-years during

which warring parties negotiated and/or settled, yet were not active in the battlefield.

15

Basic frequencies can provide some introductory information regarding the data. I analyze 209

dyads in total, and 57 out of the 84 dyads that initiated negotiations settled their conflict. Out of

129 conflicts, 39 have been settled. 71 conflict states had a legislative body and 31 of these states

reached a settlement with at least one rebel group.

Dependent Variables and Their Coding Procedures

I collected two sets of dependent variables. First, (y1) negotiation dependent variable is coded

as a binary variable with value 1 if negotiations were held regarding the resolution of conflict

between the government and the rebel group in a given year. Here, the unit of analysis is conflict-

dyad-year. Preparatory talks are included. When the political wing of a group negotiates with the

government, I also code them as 1. Moreover, secret negotiations revealed retrospectively, and

partially secret negotiations where details are not revealed are coded as 1.

The primary resources I used to collect the negotiation variable came from original news

articles and editorials in PAIS International (ProQuest), Lexis-Nexis, and Factiva Databases.

When conducting the content analysis, I entered in the search engine the names of the state and

the rebel group along with a date and keywords such as “negotiation,” “meeting,” “talk,” and

“agreement.” I read original documents of negotiations and peace agreements, collections

available in various online sources such as UCDP Peace Agreement Project (Hogbladh 2011) and

United States Institute of Peace (USIP 2013). I also used Civil War Mediation Dataset (Derouen

et al. 2011), UCDP Encyclopedia (UCDP 2013), and MAR Encyclopedia (MAR 2014) as

secondary sources.

The second dependent variable (y2), negotiated settlement is a binary variable with value 1 if,

in a given dyad-year, negotiations were successful in formalizing a peace agreement between

warring parties addressing some or all disputed incompatibilities, and the agreement lasted until

the end of that calendar year. The unit of analysis is conflict-dyad-year where negotiation has been

16

initiated. I heavily relied on the UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset and Project (Hogbladh 2011)

while coding this variable.

Using a two-stage censored probit model, I jointly estimate the likelihood of negotiations and

settlements, clustered by conflict-dyads.5 Settlements are “a sample that has been non-randomly

selected;” therefore, “none of the usual statistical techniques… produce reliable estimates” (Achen

1986, 97). Jointly estimating the two dependent variables will control for this non-randomness in

settlement observations.

Independent Variables

Vote share of the leading government party: A simple way of capturing the extent of popular

support for the government is to look at the percentage of votes the leading government party

received in the former election.6 The data for this and the next variable is taken from the Database

of Political Institutions (DPI) (Beck et al. 2001).

Seat share of opposition parties: For capturing the institutional strength of the political

opposition, I use the seat share of all opposition parties in the legislature. It is important to note

that seat shares and votes diverge significantly. Combination of variant electoral systems, electoral

formulas, political party systems, and political institutions result in large variation of outcomes in

the legislature. I have also filled in some missing observations in DPI’s government party vote and

opposition party seat variables using African Elections Database (Nunley 2012) and Election

Results Archive (Center on Democratic Performance 2014).

Rebel constituency support: In order to get an estimate for the level of rebel constituency

support, I use two indicators and create a composite variable. The first of these indicators is the

group’s mobilization capacity which measures the group’s ability to mobilize personnel, relative

to the government. The variable is from the NSA dataset (Cunningham et al. 2009, 2013). The

original measure contains “low,” “moderate,” and “high” mobilization levels. Following Wood

17

(2014), I collapse “moderate” and “high” to the value 1 due to the scarcity of observations

identified as “high.” While this is “a crude accounting of the popularity of the organization” (Wood

2014, 469), a few caveats call for an additional proxy. Recruitment can also be involuntary or

opportunistic (Weinstein 2007). Moreover, the fact that mobilization capacity was measured in

comparison to the government’s capacity does not yield a fully adequate measure.

In order to understand whether mobilization capacity reflects popular support or coercion, my

second proxy is a binary indicator of one-sided violence by the rebel group towards civilians.

Attacks on civilians are expected to reduce constituency support (Heger 2015). Obtaining the data

beginning with 1989 from UCDP’s one-sided violence dataset (Eck and Hultman 2007), I code

the variable as 0 for any rebel group that deliberately and directly killed 25 or more civilians for

two consecutive years within a given conflict period. To continue coding the indicator consistently

for the period before 1989, I turned to various sources such as Minorities at Risk Encyclopedia

(MAR 2014) and original news articles from PAIS International Database. Finally, I add these two

binary indicators to generate the constituent support variable. The resulting variable ranges from

0 to 2.

To assess the validity of this index measure, I obtain and report the results of a principal

component analysis on Table 1. Here, I investigate two dimensions of measure reliability. First, I

examine whether, out of alternative proxies of rebel constituency support, “mobilization” and

“absence of one-sided violence” variables capture significant amounts of variance in the “rebel

constituency support” concept. I would also like to observe whether these two variables are

interrelated as expected. Therefore, I include these two variables as the first two factors in the

principal component analysis. The remaining three binary variables included in the analysis are

“rebel territorial control,” “external state support,” and “lootable resources funding rebels.”7 These

variables are chosen as alternative proxies based on Weinstein’s (2007) dichotomy between

18

activist versus opportunistic rebellions where activist organizations need increased constituency

support. According to Kaiser’s rule, factors with eigenvalues greater than 1 are significant and

explain variability in the latent variable that is rebel constituency support (Jackson 1991). Based

on the results from the principal component analysis, “mobilization” and “absence of one-sided

violence” variables are interrelated and have significant explanatory power justifying their

simultaneous use as proxies.

[Table 1 about here]

Centralized rebel command: This variable captures the potential for elite opposition within

the rebel organization. It measures the extent to which there is a central chain of command structure

within the organization where the leadership exercises control over rebels’ “day-to-day activities”

(Cunningham et al. 2013, 523). The variable ranges from high (2) to moderate (1) to low (0). The

variable is from the NSA dataset (Cunningham et al. 2009).

Rebel group conflict duration: Following the previous literature on battlefield costs

(Cunningham et al. 2009; Mason et al. 1999), this variable and the next variable are going to be

used as indicators of war-weariness. The variable is a count of days that passed since the rebel

group began fighting the government. The variable’s ln transformation is taken. This variable and

the next variable are taken from the NSA dataset (Cunningham et al. 2009).

Power parity among combatants: Reaching a stalemate is another indicator of war-weariness

(Hultquist 2013; Zartman 2003). This variable captures the strength of rebel forces relative to the

government forces based on the size of the forces. The variable is binary and is coded as 1 if the

capability of the rebel group is at parity with that of the government (Cunningham et al. 2009).

19

Control variables

Mediation: A third party’s help may be important for negotiation initiation and success

(Derouen et al. 2011; Walter 2002). Mediation is coded as 1 if the dyad received any outside

assistance to conduct negotiations or to negotiate settlements in a given year. The variable is taken

from the Civil War Mediation Dataset (Derouen et al. 2011). Mediations should increase the

likelihood of negotiations to continue the following year. Therefore, I lag this variable by one year

when estimating negotiations.

Conflict intensity: It becomes difficult for parties’ leadership to justify resolution if there is

considerable number of casualties. Therefore, I expect conflict intensity to negatively influence

negotiation and settlement likelihood. Conflicts with less than 1000 battle-deaths per year are

coded as 1 and wars that reached 1000 battle-deaths are coded as 2. If negotiations are ongoing

and the dyad is not actively fighting, variable is coded as 0. The variable is taken from UCDP

Dyadic Dataset (Harbom et al. 2008).

Ethno-linguistic fractionalization (ELF) index: This index measures the probability that two

randomly selected individuals in a state belong to different ethnic groups. If a state is ethnically

diverse, the institutions may be more conducive to ethnic accommodation and conflict resolution

(Horowitz 1985). The data is taken from Fearon (2003).

Cold War dummy variable: The dissolution of Cold War era ideological alliances is likely to

increase the probability of civil peace agreements (Hartzell and Hoddie 2007). The variable takes

on the value of 1 for years between 1980 and 1989.

Number of other armed NSAs: This variable captures the number of other armed groups

fighting the government. Two-stage censored probit models require an exclusion restriction

variable for improved estimation. This variable is included in the estimation of the selection

equation but excluded from the estimation of outcome equation (Achen 1986). Presence of other

20

groups should have a negative effect on the initial process of arriving at the negotiation table,

where they may act as veto players (Cunningham 2006). Yet, as Nilsson (2008) shows, rebels

outside of the peace process should not have a discernable effect on the likelihood of settlement.

Therefore, I chose this variable as the exclusion restriction. The variable is taken from the NSA

dataset (Cunningham et al. 2009).

Empirical Findings

I estimate two sets of two-stage censored probit models for capturing the effects of constituency

support and elite obstruction. The second model contains variables capturing constituency support

or elite obstruction, while the first model also includes variables capturing war-weariness, namely

parity and conflict duration. In selection models, we assume that the errors from the selection

(negotiation) and outcome (negotiated settlement) estimation are correlated and the true value of

the Rho coefficient captures that correlation. When Rho is positive and significant, the null

hypothesis that negotiation and settlement are independent (ρ=0) can be confidently rejected

(Achen 1986). According to Ward tests, true values of the Rho coefficient are greater than 0 at the

0.1 significance level in the first model and at the 0.05 level in the remaining three models. These

findings regarding the Rho coefficient confirm that negotiated settlements estimated without

including the complete sample of negotiations are suffering from selection bias.

[Table 2 about here]

The Constituency Level

As demonstrated on Table 2, the effects of the two constituency level independent variables

on the likelihood of negotiated settlement (given negotiations) are both positive and statistically

significant. In accordance with Hypotheses 4 and 5, in models 1 and 2, governing party vote and

rebel constituency support variables both increase the likelihood of settlement (given negotiations)

at the 0.05 significance level. Using predicted probabilities obtained from model 2, Graph 1

21

demonstrates that one standard deviation of increase in the value of governing party votes, from

the mean value of 49 to 77, increases the predicted probability of negotiated settlements (given

negotiations) from 0.178 to 0.282. Similarly, increasing the ordinal value of rebel constituency

support from 1 to 2 increases the predicted probability of settlement from 0.18 to 0.28.

Constituency support for governments and rebels almost has the identical impact in increasing the

likelihood of settlement. This finding once more stresses the importance of examining parties

sitting on both sides of the negotiation table.

[Figure 1 about here]

In accordance with Hypothesis 1, the positive impact of government and rebel constituency

support on the likelihood of negotiations is not statistically significant. Although government and

rebel constituency support will encourage leaders to initiate negotiations, the positive impact is

going to be saturated by negotiation observations initiated in the absence of constituency support.

Conversely, both of the variables I use to capture war-weariness of combatants, group conflict

duration and power parity among combatants, increase the likelihood of negotiations. Confirming

Hypotheses 3, conflict duration and parity exert significant influence on the likelihood of

negotiations at the 0.05 and 0.01 significance level respectively. Conversely, conflict duration and

parity both impact the probability of settlement (given negotiations) negatively, the former at the

0.1 significance level. The finding makes intuitive sense since hostile feelings between warring

parties solidify as conflict wages on. Although parties may attempt negotiations as the pressure of

the battlefield takes its toll, in the absence of internal political opportunities, it becomes difficult

for warring parties to overcome their differences.

[Table 3 about here]

22

The Elite Level

For both warring parties, autonomy from elite obstruction increases the likelihood of

negotiations to successfully end in settlement. As demonstrated on Table 3, the share of opposition

party seats in legislature is negatively associated with the likelihood of negotiated settlement

(given negotiations). Consistent with Hypothesis 6, the association is statistically significant at the

0.01 significance level both in models 3 and 4. In accordance with Hypothesis 7, the effect of rebel

central command on the probability of negotiated settlement is positive and significant at the 0.01

level in model 3 and at the 0.05 level in model 4. As the organization’s central command structure

gets stronger, negotiation success becomes more likely.

Using predicted probabilities obtained from model 4, Figure 2 demonstrates graphed patterns

of the relationship between the level of elite obstruction and the likelihood of settlement (given

negotiations). As the strength of rebel central command structure decreases from moderate to low,

the predicted probability of negotiations ending with settlement decreases from 0.30 to 0.17. On

the other hand, one standard deviation of increase in the share of opposition seats in legislature

decreases the predicted probability of settlement from 0.31 to 0.18. As the significance levels and

the predicted probabilities indicate, both sides’ autonomy from in-group elite obstruction is

essential for negotiation success. Moreover, in both the constituency and the elite levels, one

warring parties’ internal cohesion is sufficient to increase the likelihood of settlement given

negotiations. The finding confirms that internal cohesion not only allows the negotiator to act more

autonomously but also signals their credibility to their opponent, alleviating commitment problems

among them.

[Figure 2 about here]

Consistent with Hypothesis 6, share of opposition party seats in legislature has no significant

impact on the likelihood of negotiations. Although significant opposition in the legislature will

23

have a deterrent effect on some negotiation initiation cases, not all dyads will be deterred.8 Yet,

diverging from the expectation in the same hypothesis, rebel central command structure is

positively associated with the likelihood of negotiations at the 0.1 significance level. While a

strong command structure facilitates elite compliance, it also provides battlefield advantages and

identifies a clear leadership for the government to initiate negotiations (Cunningham et al. 2009,

2013). Therefore, the positive effect strong central command has on the likelihood of negotiations

remains robust. In model 3, mirroring model 1 and in line with Hypothesis 7, conflict duration

and power parity robustly increase the likelihood of negotiations at the 0.05 and 0.01 significance

levels respectively. Yet, they are not sufficient for reaching settlement. Parity has a positive and

insignificant effect, while conflict duration has a negative and significant effect on the likelihood

of settlement.9

Control Variables

Across all models, mediation has a positive and significant effect on the likelihood of

settlements (given negotiations) and negotiations at the 0.01 significance level. Moreover,

intensity of conflict and on-going Cold War are negatively and significantly associated with the

likelihood of settlements and negotiations. ELF index demonstrates a positive and significant

effect on the probability of settlement. Finally, the exclusion restriction variable, number of other

armed groups, has a negative impact on the likelihood of negotiations, albeit insignificant. In brief,

all control variables exerted the expected effects on the dependent variables.

Conclusion

This study explored the role combatants’ internal political dynamics play in civil peace processes.

I argued that warring party leaders who have the consensual authority to engage in decision-

making on behalf of their respective groups not only face fewer constraints but also alleviate

commitment problems between their party and their opponent, increasing the likelihood of

24

settlement. Moreover, I proposed that while war-weariness is sufficient to impel combatants to

start negotiations, negotiations are unlikely to reach settlement in the absence of internal cohesion.

Two-stage censored probit models yield support for these arguments. Support of respective

constituencies and aversion from elite opposition proved to be significant factors for reaching

settlement. On the other hand, conflict duration and power parity among combatants increase

negotiation likelihood, yet do not exert the same effect on settlement. This finding as well as the

positive and significant value of the Rho coefficient demonstrated that ignoring the negotiation

process could lead to selection bias in the estimation of negotiated settlements. Peace agreements

take place in the political arena, making in-group political factors major determinants of successful

settlement. This study is the first quantitative work to examine states’ and rebel groups’ internal

political dynamics simultaneously while analyzing negotiation and settlement stages.

In obtaining these results, two novelties in data analysis were crucial. First, most quantitative

studies ignore the negotiation stage and focus on the outcome of civil conflict. The original

negotiation dataset introduced in this paper fills this gap in the quantitative conflict resolution

literature. Using the negotiation dataset, this paper studied findings obtained by simultaneously

examining negotiation initiation and success. While these are two essential stages of a peace

process, implementation stage after signing of the agreement also carries significant weight in

stabilizing peace. Given that this study found support for the argument that internal cohesion

increases parties’ credibility, future studies can investigate whether this positive effect is

permanent by examining settlement durability.

Second, when analyzing the bargaining process taking place between two parties, both parties

should attract equal attention in research. Discussions of conflict resolution that focus solely on

the state or the rebel group are likely to result in an incomplete analysis. In this regard, dyadic

datasets as well as data collection on armed groups are vital tools to advance research on civil

25

conflict resolution. More studies should explore various dimensions of rebel governance by

collecting information on rebel leadership and popular support on scales meaningful across

different organizations.

The findings have significant implications for mediators and practitioners of conflict

resolution. In search of the right time and environment to offer mediation, potential mediators can

benefit from monitoring the amount of in-group support combatant leaders enjoy. Election-based

indicators and news media can provide some necessary information regarding popular support for

both parties’ leadership. If a government has received wide-range support in a series of elections,

for example, beginning of the incumbency is a ripe moment to approach an executive about the

initiation of dialogue. Recognition that opportunities for conflict resolution originate within the

internal political networks of combatants will shift scholarly and diplomatic focus from the

battlefield to combatants’ respective political institutions and support mechanisms.

1 I use the terms “peace agreement,” “negotiated settlement,” and “negotiation success”

interchangeably. 2 They diverge from Cunningham’s (2006) veto players which are the individual negotiators. 3 As the in-group coalition supporting the peace process reaches substantial numbers, a spiral of

cooperation may trigger convergence in public and elite preferences (Kaufman 1996). Just as one of

these internal veto points can diverge in preferences and block the agreement, they can also initiate a

cooperative spiral. Yet, it is not possible to know whether the supportive coalition would be triggered

by constituency or elites, requiring the examination of both. 4 I use authors’ 2009 data where the unit of analysis is conflict-dyad-year. 5 Also called bivariate probit with sample selection or Heckprobit. 6 The leading government party is part of the government in cases of coalition. 7 The first two variables are taken from the NSA dataset (Cunningham 2009) and the third variable is

taken from Rustad and Binningsbo (2012). 8 As an alternative measure of elite opposition in legislature, I estimated model 4 using Henisz’s (2000)

measure of political constraints. The variable captures preference alignment across veto players. It has

a negative and significant effect on the likelihood of settlement and negotiations. A high value on the

Henisz’s index may mean that the government is constrained to the point of refraining from negotiation

initiation. All robustness checks are in the Online Appendix. 9 Robustness checks were ran with alternative operationalizations of settlement (coded 1 if the

agreement lasts until the end of the following year) and war-weariness variables (cumulative sum of

battle-related deaths). Findings remained unchanged. Variables included on Table 1 were also used as

alternative operationalizations of rebel constituency support. Findings from these robustness tests

showed that the operationalization used in the paper is the best alternative.

26

References

Achen, Christopher H. 1986. The Statistical Analysis of Quasi-experiments. Berkeley, CA: University

of California Press.

Balta, Evren. 2015. “How the Turkish elections changed the foreign policy of Turkey.” OpenDemocracy.

Available at: https://www.opendemocracy.net/evren-balta/how-turkish-elections-changed-foreign-

policy-of-turkey (Accessed 27 July 2015).

Bapat, Navin A. 2005. “Insurgency and the Opening of Peace Processes.” Journal of Peace Research

42(6): 699–717.

Beck, Thorsten, George Clarke, Alberto Groff, Philip Keefer, and Patrick Walsh. 2001. "New Tools in

Comparative Political Economy: The Database of Political Institutions." The World Bank Economic

Review 15(1):165–76.

Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, Alastair Smith, Randolph Siverson, and James Morrow. 2003. The Logic of

Political Survival. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Center on Democratic Performance. 2014. Election Results Archive. Binghamton University (SUNY).

Available at: http://cdp.binghamton.edu/era/index.html (Accessed April, 2014).

Cunningham David E. 2006. “Veto Players and Civil War Duration.” American Journal of Political

Science 50(4): 875–892.

Cunningham, David E, Kristian S Gleditsch and Idean Salehyan. 2009. “It Takes Two: A Dyadic

Analysis of Civil War Duration and Outcome.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 53(4): 570–597.

Cunningham, David E, Kristian S Gleditsch and Idean Salehyan. 2013. “Non-state actors in civil wars:

A new dataset.” Conflict Management and Peace Science 30(5): 516–531.

Darby, John. 2001. The Effects of Violence on Peace Processes. Washington, DC: United States Institute

of Peace Press.

DeRouen, Karl, Jacob Bercovitch and Paulina Pospieszna. 2011. “Introducing the Civil Wars Mediation

(CWM) dataset.” Journal of Peace Research 48(5): 663–672.

Eck, Kristine and Lisa Hultman. 2007. “Violence against Civilians in War.” Journal of Peace Research

44(2): 233-246.

Fearon, James D. 1995. "Rationalist explanations for war.” International Organization 49(3): 379-414.

Fearon, James D. 2003. "Ethnic structure and cultural diversity by country.” Journal of Economic

Growth 8(2): 195-222.

Findley, Michael G. 2013. Bargaining and the Interdependent Stages of Civil War Resolution. Journal

of Conflict Resolution 57(5): 905–932.

Fortna, Virginia Page. 2008. Does Peacekeeping Work?: Shaping Belligerents’ Choices After Civil War.

Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Gent, Stephen E. 2011. "Relative Rebel Strength and Power Sharing in Intrastate Conflicts."

International Interactions 37 (2):215–28.

Harbom, Lotta, Stina Hogbladh, and Peter Wallensteen. 2006. “Armed Conflict and Peace Agreements.”

Journal of Peace Research 43(5): 617–31.

Harbom Lotta, Erik Melander, and Peter Wallensteen. 2008. “Dyadic Dimensions of Armed Conflict,

1946--2007.” Journal of Peace Research 45(5): 697–710.

Hartzell, Caroline A. and Matthew Hoddie. 2007. Crafting Peace: Power-sharing Institutions and the

Negotiated Settlement of Civil Wars. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press.

27

Heger, Lindsay. 2015. "Votes and Violence: Pursuing terrorism while navigating politics." Journal of

Peace Research 52(1): 32-45.

Henisz, Witold J. 2000. "The Institutional Environment for Economic Growth." Economics and Politics

12(1): 1-31.

Horowitz, Donald L. 1985. Ethnic Groups in Conflict. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Högbladh, Stina. 2011. Peace agreements 1975-2011- Updating the UCDP Peace Agreement dataset. In

Pettersson T and Lotta T (eds.), States in Armed Conflict 2011. Uppsala University: Department of

Peace and Conflict Research Report 99.

Hultquist, Philip. 2013. “Power parity and peace? The role of relative power in civil war settlement.”

Journal of Peace Research 50(5): 623–634.

Jackson, Edward. 1991. A User's Guide To Principal Components. New York, NY: John Wiley & Sons.

Kaufman, Stuart. 1996. “Spiraling to Ethnic War.” International Security. 21(2):108-138.

Kydd, Andrew and Barbara F. Walter. 2002. "Sabotaging the Peace: The Politics of Extremist Violence."

International Organization 56(2):263–96.

Mason, T. David, Joseph Weingarten Jr., and Patrick J. Fett. 1999. “Win, Lose, or Draw: Predicting the

Outcome of Civil Wars.” Political Research Quarterly 52(2): 239–268.

Metternich, Nils W. 2011. “Expecting Elections, Interventions, Ethnic Support, and the Duration of Civil

Wars.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 55(6): 909-937.

Minorities at Risk Project. 2009. Minorities at Risk Encyclopedia. College Park, MD: Center for

International Development and Conflict Management. Available at:

http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/ (Accessed 1 November 2014).

Most, Benjamin A. and Harvey Starr. 1989. Inquiry, Logic, and International Politics. Columbia, SC:

University of South Carolina Press.

Nilsson, Desiree. 2008. “Partial Peace: Rebel Groups Inside and Outside of Civil War Settlements.”

Journal of Peace Research 45(4): 479–495.

Nunley, Albert. 2004. African Elections Database. Available at: http://africanelections.tripod.com

(Accessed 3 May 2014).

Petersen, Roger Dale. 2006. Resistance and Rebellion: Lessons from Eastern Europe. Cambridge, New

York: Cambridge University Press.

Putnam, Robert D. 1988. "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: the logic of two-level games."

International Organization 42 (03):427.

Pruitt, Dean. 2005. "Whither Ripeness Theory?" Working Paper #25. Fairfax, VA: Institute for Conflict

Analysis and Resolution, George Mason University.

Rustad, Siri and Helga M. Binningsbo. 2012. “A Price Worth Fighting for? Natural Resources and

Conflict Recurrence.” Journal of Peace Research 49(4): 531–46.

Saravanamuttu, Paikiasothy. 2006. “Democratization of the peace process: Sri Lanka.” In Democracy,

Conflict and Human Security: Further Reading. International Institute for Democracy and Electoral

Assistance.

Stedman, Stephen John. 1997. “Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes.” International Security 22(2): 5–

53.

Thyne, Clayton L. 2012. "Information, Commitment, and Intra-War Bargaining: The Effect of

Governmental Constraints on Civil War Duration." International Studies Quarterly 56 (2): 307–21.

28

Tutu, Desmond and Naomi Tutu. 2007. The Words of Desmond Tutu: Second Edition. New York:

Newmarket Press.

Tsebelis, George. 2002. Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work. Princeton University Press.

United States Institute of Peace. 2003. The Margarita S. Studemeister Digital Collections in International

Conflict Management. Available at: http://www.usip.org/category/publications/peace-agreements

(Accessed December 2012).

Uppsala Conflict Data Program. “UCDP Encyclopedia.” Uppsala University, Sweden. Available at:

www.ucdp.uu.se/database. (Accessed 1/2013-11/2014).

Urlacher, Brian R. 2011. "Political Constraints and Civil War Conflict Resolution." Civil Wars 13

(2):81–98.

Walter, Barbara F. 2002. Committing to Peace: The successful settlement of civil wars. Princeton, NJ:

Princeton University Press.

Weinstein, Jeremy M. 2007. Inside Rebellion: The politics of insurgent violence. Cambridge, New York:

Cambridge University Press.

Wood, Reed M. 2014. “Opportunities to kill or incentives for restraint? Rebel capabilities, the origins of

support, and civilian victimization in civil war.” Conflict Management and Peace

Science 31(5): 461–480.

Zartman, I. William. 2003. “The Timing of Peace Initiatives: Hurting stalemates and ripe moments.” In

Darby, J and MacGinty, R (eds.), Contemporary Peacemaking: Conflict, Violence, and Peace

Processes. Houndmills, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

29

Table 1

Principal Component Analysis for Potential Elements of Rebel Constituency Support

Factor Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative

1 1.25603 0.07169 0.2512 0.2512

2 1.18434 0.19025 0.2369 0.4881

3 0.99409 0.08016 0.1988 0.6869

4 0.91393 0.26232 0.1828 0.8697

5 0.65161 . 0.1303 1

30

Table 2

Two-stage Censored Probit Model of Civil Conflict Negotiation and Settlement:

The Constituency Level

Model 1 Model 2

Settlement Negotiation Settlement Negotiation

Governing party vote 0.012 0.002 0.012 0.001

(0.005)** (0.003) (0.005)** (0.002)

Rebel constituency support 0.371 0.155 0.358 0.169

(0.165)** (0.112) (0.176)** (0.108)

Conflict duration -0.230 0.100

(0.131)* (0.047)**

Combatants at parity -0.003 0.691

(0.485) (0.251)***

ELF index 1.472 -0.417 2.060 -0.241

(0.638)** (0.437) (0.619)*** (0.399)

Intensity of conflict -1.240 -0.288 -1.275 -0.212

(0.304)*** (0.140)** (0.275)*** (0.140)

Cold War -1.263 -0.960 -1.282 -0.790

(0.455)*** (0.172)*** (0.518)** (0.155)***

Mediation 1.012

(0.258)***

Mediation lagged t-1 1.696

(0.143)***

No. of other NSAs -0.089 -0.070

(0.078) (0.063)

Constant 0.056 -1.030 -2.435 -0.685

(1.201) (0.521)** (0.482)*** (0.359)*

Rho 0.63 0.50

(0.24)* (0.16)**

Log pseudo likelihood -549.50 -499.21

N 1,140 201 1,140 201

Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses.

*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%

31

Table 3

Two-stage Censored Probit Model of Civil Conflict Negotiation and Settlement:

The Elite Level

Model 3 Model 4

Settlement Negotiation Settlement Negotiation

Opposition seat share -1.583 0.003 -1.808 -0.021

(0.481)*** (0.348) (0.478)*** (0.306)

Rebel central command 0.465 0.227 0.470 0.196

(0.156)*** (0.122)* (0.205)** (0.105)*

Conflict duration -0.171 0.119

(0.099)* (0.048)**

Combatants at parity 0.315 0.774

(0.351) (0.196)***

ELF index 1.032 -0.783 1.775 -0.457

(0.570)* (0.385)** (0.571)*** (0.349)

Intensity of conflict -1.204 -0.300 -1.250 -0.225

(0.221)*** (0.126)** (0.210)*** (0.128)*

Cold War -1.642 -0.911 -1.679 -0.746

(0.450)*** (0.148)*** (0.506)*** (0.137)***

Mediation 0.800

(0.243)***

Mediation lagged t-1 1.750

(0.150)***

No. of other NSAs -0.075 -0.065

(0.074) (0.059)

Constant 0.923 -0.894 -0.892 -0.450

(0.971) (0.457)* (0.366)** (0.304)

Rho 0.64 0.42

(0.2)** (0.16)**

Log pseudo likelihood -632.97 -574.01

N 1,264 235 1,264 235

Note: *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%

32

Figure 1

Graphed here, based on Model 2, are the marginal effects of constituency level independent variables on the

predicted probability of negotiated settlement. 95 percent confidence intervals indicated. Other variables held at

their means and medians. Results obtained using Stata 12.

33

Figure 2

Graphed here, based on Model 4, are the marginal effects of elite level independent variables on the predicted

probability of negotiated settlement