ON THE RELATION BETWEEN REALITY AND PERCEPTION

BOGAZICI UNIVERSITY

ON THE RELATION BETWEENREALITY AND PERCEPTION

PHIL 499- INDEPENDENT STUDY PROJECT INSTRUCTEDBY LUCAS THORPE

BESTE YAMALIOĞLU09.06.2012

The Project tries to focus on the question that is it enough to perceive the world in order to establish an understanding of reality through using some excerpts from the science fiction movie The Matrix.

On The Relation Between Reality and Perception

There are some obvious common sensical beliefs on which

people based all their other beliefs and actions. The real,

corporate existence of the external world is one and probably

the most important of them. This belief is so important that it

makes the world reliable for people. These people who are sure

of the existence of the external world start to relate with the

world which we normally call as the life of people. Life does

not just mean the years a person lived but includes his/her all

relations to the external world. That is why being sure of the

existence of the world is so important. Actually, in ordinary

life, people do not even question its existence. They take it

as presupposed and then start to live with it. Still, there are

obvious facts and thought experiments that, from time to time,

should make us suspect the existence of the world. The evil

demon of Descartes, hallucinations, illusions, dreams and evil

scientists are some of them. It may be seen too radical to say

the existence of the world so let’s assume, for the time being,

that these facts and thought experiments overshadow the

certainty of the perception of the world. How can this be

possible and moreover how come we still believe the real,

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corporate external world in our lives will be the subject

matter of this paper.

I shall consider myself as having no hands or eyes, or

flesh, or blood or senses, but as having falsely believed that

I had all these things. (Descartes 2004, 3) This is, in

Descartes’ terms, what the evil demon makes us believe all

these years. All the external things are nothing but dreams the

evil demon makes us believe. Descartes uses this thought

experiment in order to justify the certainty of the existence

of the mind. On the other hand, he throws all the beliefs

concerning the external world into a hole which is full of

doubts. If a person shakes the grounds of his/her beliefs even

once as such, how can s/he will be sure of them again? Before

this, more importantly, we should ask can a person really throw

his/her beliefs about reality. If so, what kind of reasons can

justify such a big endeavor?

Most of the people agree that we get our basic beliefs

about reality from the perception of external world. So, in

ordinary life what perception suggests becomes our reality.

That is why we need to assume an external world and moreover we

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need to trust its existence. Otherwise, our beliefs about

reality will be damaged. Descartes’ first attempt to mistrust

his perceptions comes from this. He clearly said that we cannot

trust our senses through which we can perceive the external

world since they can deceive us. First example, he uses is

dreams. In dreams, we are experiencing the world as it is real

in such an extent that sometimes we even cry in our sleep. So,

what gives me the ability to distinguish dreams from real

experiences? Can it be the case that what we are experiencing

now as real is the dream and what we suppose as dream is the

real world.

For Descartes, the answer is the memory since in dreams

we have no link with past experiences. All we have is a

momentary experience which, most of the time, has no causal

link with past or future events. But, obviously Descartes is

mistaken. There is nothing in memory that is related with the

perception. So, even though memory can be a way to distinguish

dreams from real experiences we cannot say it is because of

perception. On the other hand, apparently we distinguish them.

Berkeley introduces a solution to this problem which is much

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more helpful than Descartes’. He argues that there are three

criteria that make genuine perceptions more intrinsically vivid

than non-genuine counterparts: vividness of perception, its

degree of independence from our will and its connectedness to

previous and future perceptions (Litch, 2002: 21). But all of

these are apparent in our dreams too. What is different is

that, as he suggested, no continuity of the dream perceptions

after we wake up. Moreover, our waking experiences do not

continue after we sleep. That means we can distinguish these

two because we wake up. In the movie The Matrix (Wachowski

1999), Morpheus asks Neo a question:

"Have you ever had a dream, Neo, that you were so sure was

real? What if you were unable to wake from that dream,

Neo? How would you know the difference between the dream

world and the real world? "

As Morpheus’ question suggests, the problem is not

solved with Berkeley’s solution. In a dream that you are unable

to wake up, we cannot talk about discontinuity. Dreams are not

the only problems with perception. That is why we need to

investigate other kinds of perceptions to find a definite

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solution. Illusions, hallucinations and simulated realities are

the subject matter of our discussion from now on. But first of

all, we need to have a better understanding of perception and

why it is sometimes problematical. First thing we can say about

perceptions is that they have an object whether mind-dependent

or mind-independent. We perceive something. Since we begin with

Descartes, let me first explain what he thought about

perception. Descartes introduces a theory of representative

perceptions. He thought that a genuine perception should be

caused by an external mind-independent object and should

accurately represent it (Litch, 2002: 19).Then we should say

many perceptions in The Matrix are not genuine since they are

not caused by an external mind-independent object. What gives

these perceptions is a manipulation in the characters’ minds in

Matrix. On the other hand, for Berkeley, there are no such

things as mind-independent objects in perception. To be is to

be perceived so objects are collections of perceptions (Litch,

2002: 25). This account makes the question about the knowledge

of external world irrelevant. That is because in order to

attain its knowledge, we only need to perceive it. So, in terms

of this account we should say that since Neo perceives the

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world, Matrix is real for him. In order to see whether there is

a problem on this account or not let me apply the three

criteria of Berkeley on Neo’s experience of perception. In the

film, Neo’s perceptions in the Matrix seems so vivid even to

the viewers. Actually, from our point of view it is much more

real than the world Morpheus presents as real since Matrix is

much more like our reality in appearance. What about the

independence of the perception in Matrix? In Neo’s point of

view, before he discovers that Matrix is a simulated reality

(which I will explain later) all his perceptions seem to arise

independently of his will. But, actually this is not the case.

His perceptions arose independently of his will but dependently

of another person’s will, I mean the creator of the Matrix. So,

we can say that what Neo has is a perceptual illusion created

by someone else, not a genuine perception. This also seems to

be the only valid reason according to which Neo changes his

beliefs about reality. What Neo realizes after taking the red

pill is that there is no such thing to perceive at all. That is

why he becomes able to stop the bullets through seeing the real

Matrix. So, this does not falsify my ideas about perception.

Contrary, this justifies it: Neo’s reality is based on what Neo

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believes as real in terms of perception. After he realized that

there is nothing to be perceived at all, he start to see the

process of simulation as a computer program not as vivid

perceptions. So, he starts not to believe the reality of them.

Now, let me introduce an important concept: illusions.

This and the following concept, hallucination, are important

since perception is defined as ‘openness to the world’. These

two concepts becomes an obstacle to define perception as this.

An illusion here may be defined, with A.D. Smith, as “any

perceptual situation in which a physical object is actually

perceived, but in which that object perceptually appears other

than it really is” (Smith 2002: 23) (Crane 2011). So in

illusion, our main concern is not whether the object exists or

not; but whether we can perceive it as it is or not. The

problem in the illusion theory is the following: if such kinds

of perceptions are possible, then how can we be sure that at

least some of our perceptions are genuine. It seems to me that

in illusions we implicitly assume that there is an objective,

mind independent way of perceiving objects. So that, we can say

some of our perceptions are illusions and some are genuine. If

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we do not make this assumption, all kinds of perceptions

including dreams, illusions or hallucinations will be justified

in terms of representing the reality. This also explains why

Neo start to believe Matrix is not real after learning that

Matrix is a computer-generated simulation. In a way, he learns

that his perceptions in Matrix are not genuine ones. After

realizing this, there is no way to believe for Neo that his

perceptions represent reality. That is to say, we need to add

some extra element in our relation between perception and

reality. We get our basic beliefs about reality from the

genuine perception of external world. That is why when we look

at the spoon in the water and perceive it as if it is broken;

we know that this is not the proper way of perception. That is

why we do not believe the spoon is really broken.

Still, the problem is not solved. How can we decide

whether our perceptions are genuine or not? Hallucinations are

other kinds of perceptions that make the problem even harder. A

hallucination in this sense is an experience which seems

exactly like a perception of a real, mind-independent object,

but where there is no mind-independent object of the relevant

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kind being perceived. (Crane 2011) From the subjective point of

view, they are indistinguishable from real perception

experiences. So, it seems that there is no reason for a subject

to take his/her hallucinations as real perception experiences.

The subject seems to see the objects. So, we cannot accept the

definition of genuine perception as the experience of mind-

independent objects around us since it can be easily imitated

by hallucinations

One way to deal with the problem of hallucination and

illusion is the sense-datum theory. Although there are some

problematic sides of it, it may still be an explanation to what

is happening in Matrix. Sense- data theory basically argues

that although we are presented with mind-independent objects,

we are not aware of them. Rather we are aware of the sense-

data. So, in illusions, for example, the property we are aware

is not in the mind-independent object but rather in the sense-

data that we are aware of. That means we still keep on assuming

the existence of mind-independent objects as they really are.

In Matrix, what is real is just the Matrix as a computer

program consists of all those zeros and ones. What the people

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of Matrix aware of are a world which is very like ours. So,

there is nothing unreal in the existence of computer program.

The perceptual illusion happens in the sense-data. This is, I

think, an easy way to think in terms of Matrix since it

explains how a person can be manipulated by a computer when the

reality stays as it is. Still, sense-data theory cannot be a

solution to the problem of hallucination since there is no

corresponding object that gives us the sense-data. The sense-

data that we are aware of in the case of hallucination is like

coming to be out of nothing.

What I try to say is the following: in order to explain

Matrix we need to give some role to the mind in perception.

This is because Matrix is a place in which the minds of the

people are manipulated. I think the body part of the subjects

is not important in this world. This is solely because if those

computers are so complex and sophisticated to create a

simulated world in which all sensations and perceptions are

imitated, then they can also give the subjects the sense of

having bodies. That is exactly the same with the thought

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experiment known as ‘The Brains in the Vat’1. (Putnam 1981)

That is why what idealists argue can give a chance both to the

existence of Matrix and The Brains in the Vat. What idealists

argue is that all objects and properties are mental or mind-

dependent. (Crane 2011) So, if you directly manipulate the

mind, you can also manipulate the perception of reality

accordingly. What can be problematic in the sense-data theory

to explain what is happening in Matrix is that it holds the

sense-data experience in a subjective level. However, in Matrix

a common-sense-data is the subject matter. The question is that

is it possible to experience a sense-data not in an individual

level but in a community level.

What we are talking up to now is taking us to the concept

of ‘simulated reality’. This is because Matrix is not an

ordinary perceptual illusion experience that we may experience

in our world. There is something different there. Simulated

reality is the skeptical hypothesis that reality could be

simulated- perhaps by computer simulation- to a degree

1 The person’s brain has been removed from the body and placed in a vat of nutrients which keeps the brain alive. The nevre endings have been connected to a super-scientific computer which causes the person whose brain it is to have the illusion that everything is perfectly normal (see Putnam, Hilary, Reason, Truth and History, pg. 5-14)

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indistinguishable from ‘true’ reality.2 In accordance with this

description, one can argue that the concept of common-sense-

data is possible in simulated realities. In these realities,

what really is the computer program (instead of the external

world) and what the subjects experience is a collective-sense-

data created by these programs. On the other hand, the response

given against the sense-data theory is still valid even in the

Matrix case. Why should we assume the experience of sense-data

rather than assuming the direct experience of the object? It

seems to me that the problem of hallucination, illusion or

simulation is much more possible in sense-data theory since it

explains our awareness of the object not directly but through

sense-data. If we accept the sense-data theory in explaining

the Matrix, we can conclude that the whole system breaks down

for Neo when he becomes aware of the object (in the movie it is

the computer program) not the sense-data. This means there is a

way to perceive the object directly rather than perceiving it

through sense-data. Moreover, this way is much more

enlightening to perceive the reality as in the Neo’s case. So,

the sense-data theory can easily lead us to deception.

2 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Simulated_reality13


The failure of sense-data theory does not change my

argument. I still think that the mind has an important role in

perceiving the reality. It is such a crucial role that it can

both manipulate the perception of reality and illuminate the

true nature of it. Both are visible in Neo’s case. Another

important account which gives an important role to the mind in

the perception of reality is Kant’s. For Kant, reality is not

‘out there’ so that we can perceive it. It is something

constructed by our minds (Litch, 2002: 31). He basically gives

two kinds of world: noumenal and phenomenal. Noumenal world is

the world of ‘things in itself’ and the phenomenal world is the

world of objects as revealed in experience (Litch, 2002: 30).

ince the objects for experience is in the phenomenal world, our

knowledge is limited with it. So, in Kant’s view we can be sure

that our perceptions accurately represent the objects in the

world. On the other hand, we have to be careful about the

objects since what are represented in our perceptions are not

the objects in themselves. In order to understand Kant’s

position, understanding internalism may be useful.

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In the internalist perspective as Putnam argues a

single world description cannot be given. So, unlike

externalism, internalism rejects one true description of the

world (Putnam 1981). Objects do exist within our conceptual

scheme and our conceptions are not value-free. They are shaped

in accordance with our culture, biology so and so forth. So,

our conceptions define some kind of objectivity for us. This is

the part of internalism which we may compare to Kant’s theory

of noumena and phenomena. We can only talk about the reality as

we experience it. Since we can never experience the noumenal

world, we can never describe the objects in themselves. I think

internalist perspective breaks down if we take The Matrix as a

thought experiment which is given as a counter-example. The

Matrix and generally the simulated realities, at first sight,

seems to be a perfect example to the internalist (but much more

Kantian) picture. We can see the Matrix (computer program) as

the noumenal world and the perceptual illusion that the

inhabitants of Matrix are exposed to as the phenomenal world.

The only thing that these subjects can experience or know is

the perceptual illusion the program gives them. They have no

accessing to the program (noumenal world). It seems to be such

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a good illustration to the internalist picture until Neo

reaches the knowledge of noumenal world. Of course, this is a

movie and anything may come true. But what the philosophers do

is not a different thing when they construct a thought

experiment to evaluate all possible situations. That is why I

do not see any absurdity in developing my arguments based on a

possible world created by a filmmaker. Back to the point, it is

not impossible to imagine a reality over and above all the

things we experience as real now (which is already accepted by

Kant). What is important in this picture is beyond a level from

what Kant says. It is possible to imagine accessing that

noumenal world. Up to this point, this seems as if the only way

to perceive the reality.

But of course, we do not have any red pills so how could

we reach that noumenal world. Even if we have one, the

internalist account has still some problems when it comes to

understand the reality on the basis of perception. If we accept

a reality over and above our experiences but say we have no

access to that reality, then we can never know whether we are

in a perceptual illusion or not. That is why, I think,

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internalism suggests that what is real is constructed in

accordance with our minds. Accepting this would be ignoring the

reality in order to find a secure base. A second case might be

denying the reality over and above our experiences and

constructing the understanding of reality solely on us. But,

this time, I think, the perceptual illusion appeared on an

individual level. Let me go back to the Matrix: take the movie

as representing two different worlds. The one is a simulated

world and the other is the real one. Most of the simulated

people in Matrix did not know about the other world so that

they can live in Matrix as if it is real. They believe it is

real. On the other hand Morpheus or Trinity did know the other

‘real’ world. So, what they believe as ‘real’ is very different

from others. Two different realities and two different kinds of

people believing two different realities… For the ones who

believe in the reality of Matrix, others are in perceptual

illusion. The same goes for the reverse situation. So, we can

still doubt from the understanding of reality on the basis of

perception of external world.

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A question should be arisen here: whether perception

(especially seeing, since most of the examples we gave are

related to seeing) entails believing? (Audi 2011) This is

important to ask in here because if perception really entails

believing then we have a very little chance to escape from

deception. It seems to me that in order to believe people need

more than just perceiving. Aristotle argued that perception is

passive. In part (but only in part) I agree with him. I think

there are two kinds of perceptions: conscious and unconscious

ones. The ones we pay attention, deliberately perceive are the

conscious ones. This is the basis of our beliefs. On the other

hand it is undeniable that we have a lot of other perceptions

which we do not pay much attention. These are the ones we

passively exposed. Of course, this passivity is not exactly

what Aristotle meant but still we can make a connection. These

are, in a sense, our potential perceptions. When they are

necessary we recall them by paying attention and accordingly

use them in order to believe. What I mentioned as genuine

perceptions are the ones which require consciousness in order

to lead a belief. That belief is, most of the time, the belief

of reality.

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The problem of hallucination and illusion is still not

solves though we apply the consciousness into the picture. That

is because in both cases we think we are conscious about what

we perceive. In simulated reality, the problem is even harder

since the aim includes the simulation of the conscious minds

too. That is why we need to give an account which

distinguishes these perceptual illusions from the genuine ones.

Disjunctivism tries to do exactly this. Disjunctivists maintain

that veridical perceptions and hallucinations are mental events

(or states) of different kinds. (Soteriou 2010) They are

perceived just like genuine perceptions but this is only the

appearance. So, they have something common with genuine

perceptions; they seem just like them. But, they are

fundamentally different. They are subjectively

indistinguishable from the veridical perceptions. The question

turns out to be the one that asks how genuine perceptions can

and a hallucination can be distinguished. There are some

suggestions to this question. One explanation depended on the

intentionality theory of perception. According to this theory,

our perceptual experiences are mental events (or states) with

intentional contents that represent the world as being a

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certain way (Soteriou 2010). So, this kind of account

necessarily assumes that there is a world which is perceived in

an objective way. So, the difference between genuine

perceptions and hallucinations is that genuine perceptions have

object-dependent intentional contents which are lack in

hallucinations. Since we accept that object-dependent

intentional content (coming from the mind-independent object)

as a general fact which belongs to all people who have genuine

perception, we can distinguish who is hallucinating and who

perceives in a genuine way. This account also explains what is

going on in Matrix. Since there is no mind-independent object,

there is no object-dependent intentional content. This leads a

collective deception and since everyone in the Matrix has the

same experience, there is no way to notice this deception

within the Matrix. This also explains Neo’s transformation in

the way of exploring what is real and what is not on the basis

of perception. He comes to the knowledge of he has no object-

dependent intentional content when he saw all those zeros and

ones after taking the red pill.

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Up to now I have talked mostly on the basis of what

philosophers argue and I try to focus on possible solutions in

accordance with their accounts. From now on, I want to give

some points which should be remembered while evaluating the

arguments mentioned above. One thing I have in mind is that

perception is not a one sided process. I am affected in

perception and also give direction to it as I stated earlier in

conscious and unconscious perceptions. So, I have some control

over it. That is why I can know I am not connected to a

machine. I can close my eyes whenever I want and that stops my

visual perception. In order to imitate this, the machine should

be much more sophisticated to understand and imitate my will

which seems impossible to me. Will is not a notion which can

only be imitated by sending some electrical stimulus to the

nerves. A computer does not expect me to close my eyes so it

cannot give that sense impression. We have the ability to

decide. How can a machine represent this? That explains Neo’s

transformation again. When he took that red pill, he in a sense

learned the control he has. He notices his will and the ability

to decide. He cannot be manipulated anymore.

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Of course, there are still some issues in which our minds

can be manipulated like what is done by advertisers or

politicians. They may create an illusionary democracy and make

us believe to it. But this is not the same thing as making me

believe that the sun is green. I will not believe that. Some

semantics games can be played in this process. They may raise

me in a society where I am taught of yellow as if it is green.

But this is just the matter of words not what they stand for.

Moreover, how is it going to give me the words that I decide to

use? Even I do not know what I will say next most of the time.

How can a computer guess what is happening in my mind? If these

are all about nerves and electric impulses than science can

explain them all. But it cannot. I even cannot explain what is

happening in my mind. Self-observation is not vulnerable to

socialization. That is why I can see how I got my beliefs. They

may be right or wrong like in Matrix. But I can still see how I

got them.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

Audi, Robert. Epistemology: A Contemporary Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge. New York: Routledge , 2011.

Crane, Tim. «The Problem of Perception.» The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Spring 2011. http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entries/perception-problem/ (03 2012 tarihinde erişilmiştir).

Descartes, Rene. Meditations on First Philosophy. 2004.

Irwin, William. Matrix ve Felsefe. İstanbul: Güncel Yayıncılık, 2003.

Litch, Mary M. Philosophy Through Film. New York: Routledge, 2002.

Putnam, Hilary. Reason,Truth and History. United States of America: Cambridge University Press, 1981.

Soteriou, Matthew. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Winter 2010. <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2010/entries/perception-disjunctive/> (March 2012 tarihinde erişilmiştir).

Wartenberg, Thomas E. Thinking on Screen: Film As Philosophy. New York: Routledge, 2007.

FILMOGRAPHY

The Matrix. Directed Andy&Lana Wachowski. 1999.

The Matrix Reloaded. Directed Andy&Lana Wachowski. 2003.

The Matrix Revolutions. Directed Andy&Lana Wachowski. 2003.

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ON THE RELATION BETWEEN REALITY AND PERCEPTION

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