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‘Old’ Islamists and ‘New’ Radicals:Understanding the Politics of ReligiousRadicalisation in Pakistan and itsImplicationsSmruti S. PattanaikPublished online: 21 Jun 2011.

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Strategic AnalysisVol. 35, No. 4, July 2011, 581–594

‘Old’ Islamists and ‘New’ Radicals: Understanding the Politics ofReligious Radicalisation in Pakistan and its Implications

Smruti S. Pattanaik

Abstract: The new radicals in Pakistan have challenged the old Islamists asrepresented by the religious political parties on the nature of state and the means tocapture state power. These new radicals reject the ‘bottom up’ approach followed by thetraditional Islamic political parties and prefer a ‘top down’ approach. Their ideologi-cal inspiration and reference point is Afghanistan under Taliban. This paper exploresthe relationship between the state and Islamists historically and examines how the stateinitiated Islamisation, in the process giving birth to new radicals that cashed in on thestate’s failure and posed an ideological challenge to the Pakistani state.

Pakistan ka matlab kya? La illah ilallah(What is the meaning of Pakistan? There is no God other than Allah)

Introduction

Pakistan has witnessed a significant shift in the politics of religion. Islam, in theinitial years after the creation of Pakistan, was used to construct a national identity

and define the role of the state with regard to religion. However, the politics of religionhas now permeated to the societal level and is shaping the opinion of the masses.The religious political parties who portrayed themselves as the harbingers of Islamnow appear to have been sidelined. Radical groups that were previously associatedwith religious political parties have created a niche for themselves largely due to theirinvolvement in Afghanistan, Kashmir and in perpetuating sectarian politics in Pakistan.These new radicals are now attempting to define the nature of the state and societyaccording to their interpretation of Islam. In the past they had coerced the state toimplement Sharia in Swat, something the Islamic political parties had failed to achievein the more than six decades of their existence.

Over the last few years the radical groups have started questioning the legitimacyof Islamic political parties and their methods for bringing about an Islamic revolution.It appears that the old Islamists1 represented mainly by the Jamaat-e-Islami and theJamiat-ul-Ulama-i-Islam,2 the major political bodies of the Islamists in Pakistan, aregradually sliding into a political decline in terms of their influence and hold on thenew generation of Islamists. Both these political parties have been at the vanguardof the Islamic movement in Pakistan and have played a major role in determiningthe discourse on the place of religion in Pakistani polity and the means of creatingan Islamic state. They have also been hand in glove with the Pakistani political andmilitary establishment to implement Pakistan’s policy in Kashmir and Afghanistan.

Smruti S. Pattanaik is a Research Fellow at IDSA.

ISSN 0970-0161 print/ISSN 1754-0054 online© 2011 Institute for Defence Studies and AnalysesDOI: 10.1080/09700161.2011.576096http://www.informaworld.com

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These ‘old’ Islamists believe that the Westphalian state is an instrument ratherthan a hindrance for the achieving of their religio-political objectives. They have actedwithin the parameters of the state to consolidate the religious character of the ‘IslamicState’ of Pakistan.3 However, their success in the 2002 elections and subsequent elec-toral decline has given rise to a new breed of radicals who are seeking to occupy thepolitical space with their radical Islamic agenda. This new breed of Islamists initiallyfunctioned with the blessings of the religious political parties and the Pakistani estab-lishment. Currently though they have distanced themselves from the establishment,but links between their cadres remain. Political Islam has become more of a contestbetween the new radicals and the ‘old’ Islamists. This article will deal with how thePakistani state has negotiated with the Islamic political parties historically and the con-text of their rise. It will also analyse how the ‘old’ Islamists are being marginalised bythe new radical groups like the Pakistani Taliban and other smaller groups who arechallenging the Pakistani state. Finally it will discuss the possible implications of thesedevelopments on the politics of religion.

Mapping the geographical space and political identity of the ‘new’ radicals:

The fundamental distinction between the new radicals and old Islamists could be theirmethod and approach to politics and the state. The old Islamists, as has been men-tioned earlier, accepted democracy as an instrument for the establishment of an Islamicstate. To achieve this, the ‘politically progressive and socially conservative’4 religiousparties laid emphasis on preparing the people for an Islamic state. Others, however,felt that Islamic resurgence is urgent and necessary ‘in view of the sterility of theintellectual formulations of the traditional ulema class’.5 They formed alliances withsecular political parties to implement their political agenda even though their ‘rolein the democratisation movements (was) of theoretical significance’.6 In contrast, thenew Islamists believe in a top-down approach. To them, secular parties and democ-racy are anathemas. They view Western political institutions as a contradiction to theSharia based state. They believe in enforcing Islam from a position of strength. Unlikethe Islamic political parties they do not believe in negotiating with the state to imple-ment their agenda, rather they have forced the state to concede political space to themthrough the barrel of their gun. The new radicals do not engage themselves in theo-logical discourse like the Islamic political parties. They are against education for girlsand want to find an ‘al hall al Islami’ (Islamic solution) to problems of alienation,education, economic organisation and social justice.7 The radicals look to the ‘Islamicpast for inspiration and want to recover Islam’s original ethical, spiritual and esotericprinciples. However like traditionalists they do not want to reconstruct the esotericaspects of the past such as political institutions and legal framework’.8 The new rad-icals have their own Islamic agenda, which was earlier monopolised by old Islamists.A water-tight compartmentalisation between the ‘old’ and ‘new’ Islamist is impossibleas they often use each other to maximise their benefit vis-à-vis the state.9 However, theold Islamists have been enjoying the patronage of the Pakistani state from time to timeboth as a counter to political mobilisation along ethnic lines and as a foil to mainstreampolitical parties during military rule.10

Islamic political parties continue to maintain links with the new radicals, are rarelycritical of their activities, have argued against military action and favour a negotiatedsettlement with them.11 The JUI-F patronised the Pakistani Taliban during its rule from2002–2007 – having trained them earlier during the anti-Soviet jihad. Yet the fact thatthe JUI-F does not want to follow the Taliban policies is indicative of the dichotomy

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Pakistani villagers offer funeral prayers for victims of suicide attacks in Dera Ghazi Khan on Monday,4 April 2011. Twin suicide attacks killed more than 50 people and wounded over 100 others visitinga shrine on Sunday, 3 April 2011. (AP Photo/Saleem Raza).

in their relationship. The JI do not criticise suicide bombings even though some of theulema groups have been critical of them. The Islamic political parties have not onlybeen supportive of these new radicals to further their agenda of Islamisation but alsoout of fear that they may lose their relevance. Their support bases also overlap in thetribal areas even though they have ideological and theological differences. Since theseradical groups do not participate in the elections, they do not threaten the constituencyof the ‘old’ Islamists. Some of the new radicals have a transnational Islamic agendaand do not believe in the concept of nation state.

Compared to the ‘old’ Islamists, the ‘new’ radical groups, of late, have begun toperceive the Pakistani state under the current regime as an ‘enemy’ of Islam especiallyafter Pakistan joined the US led war on terror. The state has no intermediary to influ-ence them to join formal politics. In spite of the challenge, the Pakistani state has nothesitated to make use of the new radicals in its Afghan policy.

The new radicals can be grouped into three categories: the first is the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) which has direct linkages with the Taliban in Afghanistan andthe Al Qaeda. It has close links with the Sunni fundamentalist sectarian groups inPakistan and in the recent past has been involved in sectarian conflict. The TTP’s ideo-logical underpinning is Wahabism,12 the second category consists of sectarian groups –the Sunni and Shia as well as Deobandi and Barelvi. Groups like the Lashkar Islam(Deobandi) – which is also supported by the TTP – and Ansar ul Islam (Barelvi)are engaged in violence. In the third category, are the groups involved in jihad inKashmir and those who have a regional Islamic agenda. Domestically they are linkedto groups like the TTP and other Sunni sectarian groups who support their agenda. Thelinks between the Jammat ul Dawa (JuD, Ahle Hadith) and Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM)

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and Sunni sectarian groups are well known. However, they also have close linkageswith the Pakistani establishment and can be referred to as state actors. It needs to beemphasised here that religious radicalism is an offshoot of Pakistan’s long-term policytowards Islam and radical groups. The achievements of the Islamic political partiesremained limited as they attempted to arrive at a convergence of ideas by openingup to the Barelvis and Deobandis. The new radicals have no such pretensions. Theirideological benchmarks are the Taliban and Al Qaeda. According to Olivier Roy, thehistory of the Muslim world has no relevance for the ulemas, mullahs, their follow-ers and the Islamists in their conceptualisation of Islamic society and Islamic politicalimagination.13 The new radicals are a new generation of Islamists, who are extremelyviolent and want to enforce their ideology by capturing state power14 by the bulletrather than the ballot.

The globalisation of the economy helped the educated English-speaking elites who,due to their broad exposure, were able to secure employment. According to a studythere is envy and resentment against the elites who many youth believe have createdbarriers for the poor.15 The shortest way available for these poor youths to achieveempowerment is through the gun – a commodity that is easily available. More signif-icantly the spread of modern education produced Muslim intellectuals who reasserted‘the primacy of foundational texts, the Qur’an and sunna’16 and challenged the ulemaictradition that earlier had the monopoly over Islam and its interpretation. The waqf thatconstituted the economic backbone of ulema was gradually taken over by the state inorder to exercise control over them.17

The new radicals have a presence all over the country and are networked withother radical and sectarian groups. They can strike at will in Punjab and evenIslamabad – the heartland of Pakistan. For example the Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP)and Lashkar-e-Jhagvi (LeJ) have strong links in the Punjab and in lower Kurram. TheTehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariah-e-Mohammadi (TNSM), which fought for the implementa-tion of Sharia in Malakand is closely linked with the TTP. The JUI-F has a strongbase in North and South Wazirstan. However, it is fearful of losing its support basein the settled areas as the Taliban have expanded their base. In 2006 when the JUI-Fheld a convention and declared suicide bombing as being un-Islamic, its leader, FazlurRahman, was threatened in Dera Ismail Khan for his opposition to armed uprisingagainst the state. He declared that his ‘party believes in moderation’.18 Interestingly,in spite of these differences, the Taliban based in the Orakzai agency are using theJUI-F platform to promote the agenda of the SSP. It needs to be remembered that bothKurram and Orakzai have large Shia minority populations. The JI has a strong presencein upper and Lower Dir and has an affinity with the TTP.19 Similarly the SSP, LeJ, JeMhave fought alongside the Taliban and foreign fighters in the past.20

Democracy, power and the politics of religion in Pakistan

Understanding the phenomenon of religious radicalism requires a discussion on thenature of the state, its societal characteristics and its approach to religion and theinstitutionalisation of democracy. The post-colonial societies of South Asia inher-ited advanced political institutions as a superstructure but had predominantly tribal,caste and religious–societal substructures. The elites ruled the state by cooptionrather than through inclusive institutional arrangements like elections or delegationof power to the local authorities. Long years of military rule undermined democraticinstitution-building and arrested any expansion of the elite base. Within the institu-tional parameters and given the context of state formation, the political contest has

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always revolved around the ‘ideals of modernism and the conservative Islamic order inPakistani society’.21 Enormous time was spent in trying to determine as to who was thetrue inheritor of the state. This made ‘the definition of Pakistani conditional upon thatof Muslim’, which finally resulted in the adoption of 1973 Constitution that definedbelievers as those who acknowledge the finality of Mohammad’s prophethood.22

Though the goal of the Islamic state remains fundamental to ideological contestation,the Islamists and radicals differed in their methods for capturing state power. The dis-tinction between the new generation of radicals and the traditional Islamists howeverremains blurred.23 It is therefore not surprising, as a scholar has pointed out, that the‘Islamist movements themselves constantly oscillate between political activism andneo-fundamentalism’.24

Pakistan as a modern state based on the ideals of liberal democracy faced its firstchallenge from the Islamists when they succeeded in defining the identity of the state.The concept of an Islamic state as proposed by the traditionalists is not necessarilyincompatible with the modernist view of democracy except the territorial basis. In factthe tussle between the modernising elite and the religious parties resulted in the pas-sage of the objective resolution of the Constitution, which entrusted the sovereignty ofthe country to Allah and gave the state the power to ‘enable’ Muslims to order theirlife according to the teaching and requirement of Islam.25 The liberal elites and tra-ditional Islamists both perceived the Objective Resolution as an advantage from theirpoints of view. To quote Binder: ‘(T)he “ulema” desired to enshrine the principle ofthe supremacy of Sharia, while the politicians, perhaps most of them, found this prin-ciple acceptable so long as it was not clearly defined’.26 The elites wanted religion toremain in the realm of public policy rather than be the law. This dichotomy betweenthe fundamentalist view of Islam and the modern democratic state based on Westernideals provided space for the religious and the modernist elites to contest for politicaland ideological dominance. To quote Binder once again: ‘nowhere has the element ofdemocratic nationalism been so weak, the desire for an Islamic constitution so gen-erally admitted, and the cleavages between the Western educated and the “ulema” sowide’.27 Religious political parties like the Jamaat Islami made ‘religion available tothe state for political ends’.28 The modernising elites co-opted the religious elites forlegitimacy. While trying to use religion to satisfy their conservative ally they strugglednot to become the victim of their power pursuit.29 The state endeavoured to use religionas a nationalising glue and also to keep power in the hands of a few elite – mostly feu-dal. The state of Pakistan, a modern project, faltered due to its proclivity to use religion.A glaring example of this failure was the birth of Bangladesh. The failure of democ-racy and the confining of power in the hands of few raised several questions regardingthe state’s nomenclature as the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. Except for ‘Islamic val-ues’ the state symbolised everything – no equity, no justice or fair play, exploitation ofthe poor etc. There was a contest not just between the religious political parties and theulemas but also between these elements and the political elites who thought they had amonopoly over religion in view of their political power.

The use of religion for political purposes also gave rise to numerous interestgroups who tried to promote their particular interpretations of the religion. Accordingto an analyst: ‘new claimants to power and privilege came on the scene and relativestandings of various groups and classes were shaken’.30 These groups and classesinstead of expanding the elite base tried to appease the new claimants to power byimplementing some of their demands while retaining their hold on interpretation.Bhutto’s slogan of ‘Islam is our religion, socialism is our creed, and democracy is oursystem’, captured the imagination of the Pakistani masses. The slogan promised the

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right mixture of socialism and religion and equality in a highly segmented society. Therise of the petit bourgeoisie especially the salariat class31 empowered a section of thesociety that was sidelined by the dominant political class, which constituted mostlymigrants, bureaucrats and military officials. In this socio-political context the Islamistswere marginalised. They could not become part of the emerging elite, which to someextent enjoyed the fruits of power in terms of influence and economic empowerment.The religious political parties who mostly cashed in on this subaltern disillusionment,continued to sell them the idea of an egalitarian socio-economic order under Sharia.They also continued to argue for the need to capture state power in order to achievethis goal. The religious political parties also realised that they needed to demonstratetheir commitment to Sharia, and therefore did not hesitate to closely collaborate withthe military rulers on some issues. The military tried to use the religious politicalparties for their ends even if it meant the Islamisation of the state. The military felt thatby Islamising they would control both their direction and their politics. This becamemore evident during Zia’s presidency.32 Ideological consent became an important partof the consensus between the state and the Islamists, a tool of hegemony for the stateand an instrument for the Islamists to use as a bargaining chip. The proposed Islamicorder treated Islam as a monolith without considering its various forms, manifestationsand evolution.

By the end of the 1980s, the process of radicalisation was complete as a result ofZia’s Islamisation drive and the Afghan jihad. The religious political parties played animportant role in motivating and indoctrinating directionless youths and transformingthem into jihadis with a mission. The military channelled money and weapons to selectgroups identified by the religious political parties, thereby creating a system of patron-age. This also helped these religious political parties to retain their support base and forthe first time –like other political parties – to offer concrete benefits to their followers.The weapons gave these young radicals the currency of power and status, which theyhad never enjoyed before. With the passage of time these radicals expanded their ownsupport base and became independent, giving rise to multiple centres of power. Thewithdrawal of the Soviet Union and its later disintegration gave the subaltern Islamistsimmense confidence in their power. The Taliban’s capture of power in Afghanistan andimplementation of their version of the Sharia convinced the Pakistani radicals that atop-down approach was the right one for ushering in an Islamic revolution.

The new radicals are largely drawn from impoverished families unlike the religiouspolitical parties who have their support base among the petit bourgeoisie. That is whythe JI does not want any revolutionary change33 as it would put their economic interestsat risk. Compounding the problem of Islamisation, as an analyst pointed out, is the‘incremental sacrilisation’34 of the state, which has placed the religious political partiesin the forefront. The state of Pakistan attempted to control the process of Islamisationand assumed the role of a religious authority. For example the sighting of the moonat the beginning of the Ramadan was institutionalised as a part of the state’s activityand not that of the religious political entity. Similarly General Musharraf’s argumentof ‘enlightened moderation’ was primarily aimed at retaining the primacy of the stateand that of the political elite.

Failure of religious political parties and emergence of new radicals

The emergence of the ‘new’ radicals can be attributed to two factors – disillusionmentwith governance in general and patronage by religious political parties and the military

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elite. The elites – military, bureaucratic and traditional political leaders –perpetuateda system that was neither egalitarian nor popular to remain ensconced in power. Landremained in the hands of a few and the concept of the Islamic state remained a dream.35

The socio-economic condition of the masses remained unchanged and authoritarianregimes continued to marginalise them while co-opting the salariat class to perpetuatethemselves in power. The rural youths remained mostly unemployed and did not haveaccess to modern education. Second, the indoctrination of young minds to becomefoot soldiers of Islam with the illusionary dream of establishing a state based on Shariaadded to the strength of the radicals. The US, a one-time ally, became the new enemyof the radical protagonists and they found support among the Islamists and liberalsalike who opposed US intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq. The liberals sympathisedwith the radical Islamists in their fight against the US presence in Afghanistan whilethey were not supportive of Taliban rule in Pakistan.36 This indirectly helped the ‘new’radicals and justified violence for the radical elements. Commenting on the trend ofliberals supporting the Islamists, Hasan Askari Rizvi says that some of the so-calledliberals are products of Zia’s education system and are schooled in Islamism that sup-ports violence against the US troops in Afghanistan. The radicals offer the same logicwhile attacking the Pakistan army in the country.37

The question that arises here is: does the rise of the radical Islamists mean thatreligious political parties have ceased to be an effective political force for further-ing the Islamic agenda? Two of the prominent Islamic political parties – the Jamaatul Ulema Pakistan and Jamaat i Islami – have been prominent players in Pakistanipolitics and have pushed forward conservative agendas through the process of bargain-ing. To quote an analyst, conservative Islamic parties ‘assumed the mantle of Islamists,identifying the liberal interpreters of Islam as secularist and westernised.’38 By 1956,these religious political parties had realised that they could negotiate with the stateto implement their Islamic agenda.39 The Objective Resolution provided ample scopefor Islamisation as it required that no law repugnant to the Quran or Sunnah was tobe passed in Pakistan, making it mandatory for all the laws to pass this litmus test.The Pakistan movement had already mobilised the people on religious lines. Thereforeit was believed that a transition from being a state for Muslims to an Islamic statewould not be difficult. Although the religious parties could not catapult themselves topower, they succeeded in nudging the state to go for greater Islamisation. Some of thesuccesses of Islamic political parties are: forcing Ayub to declare Pakistan an IslamicRepublic through the first amendment to the 1962 Constitution; prodding Yahya Khanto adopt the Legal Framework Order with Islamic content, adherence to which wasbinding for all the parties who wanted to participate in the 1970 elections and theIslamists forced Bhutto – in spite of his overt disdain for the Islamist – to speak ofIslamic socialism and adopt the Musawat-i-Mohammad, ban drinking, horse racing,gambling and declare Ahamediyas to be non-Muslim. The state attempted to dominateIslamic discourse and in the process become a legitimate actor.40 In a nutshell in spiteof the fact that the religious political parties allowed the state to adopt a liberalisedversion of Islam, the masses did not find it appealing.

The state usurped the Islamic agenda while the religious political parties grap-pled with the contours of Islamisation and its interpretation. The state’s modernisationprogramme and flirtation with Islamic agenda as mentioned earlier at best remaineddichotomous, thereby creating dissension among the Islamists who accused the stateof being insincere about its commitment to the Islamic agenda. Various actions ofthe government exposed this duality as did the family ordinance of Ayub. Bhutto

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in spite of making Islam the state religion was not in favour of any Islamisation.To oppose Bhutto’s government even secular political parties spoke of the Nizam-i-Mustafa, which raised hopes of an imaginary Islamic state. Zia only cashed in on thisIslamic romanticism.

The state’s dabbling with religion, especially during Zia’s regime, created itsown dynamic. The result was the rise of sectarian groups that created divergencesfrom within. The Shia–Sunni violence, the Barelvi–Deobandi differences,41 can beattributed to the politicisation of religion in which the state emerged as a partisan actorrather than a neutral arbitrator. The preference given to Sunni Muslims became verymuch apparent. Religion was used to create a parallel system of education, parallelcourts and a parallel legal system. Provincial autonomy remains an issue in spite of the18th amendment, where the government tried to address this long pending debate. Thishas resulted in a centralised state with a projected common enemy i.e. India. Thoughthe state tried to control the madrassas and seminaries it allowed many of them to growbeyond its purview, especially the ones that were funded through private donations.The state’s endeavour to control and provide direction to the Islamic element also didnot succeed. By the late 1980s the new radicals had emerged with their own supportstructure.

The radicalisation of Pakistan, which one analyst has referred to as the ‘saudi-isation of Pakistani culture’42 has taken place within a social and political context.Though the state had earlier taken up the process of Islamisation to delegitimise theIslamic political parties but its commitment to Sharia remained, at best, superficial.In 1998 Nawaz Sharif tried to implement the Sharia through the 15th amendment tothe constitution, but failed as he did not have required strength in the senate to passthe bill. Socially the anti-Soviet jihad led to the politicisation of the masses that hadhitherto remained marginalised in the political system and had no relevance even inthe societal structure in terms of power, position and economic well being.43 The anti-Soviet jihad provided a false sense of déjà vu, which undermined the role of the Maliksand political agents who had traditionally been the only link between the state and thetribes. The mullahs whose primary duty was to pass judgements in accordance withthe Pushtunwalli code and were supported financially by the Pathan clans emerged asthe new centres of power, with financial resources provided by the ISI for distributionamong the anti-Soviet jihadis.44

Saudi aid to the Afghan jihad undoubtedly led to the growth of Wahabi Islam inthe region. The new radicals emboldened by Soviet withdrawal called for the imple-mentation of Sharia in Pakistan. For example the TNSM’s call in 1994 to implementSharia in Malakand and Tanzeem-i-Ittehad-i-Ulema-i-Qabail’s demand for its enforce-ment in Khyber. Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-fiqah Jafria (TNFJ), SSP, LeJ, Sipah-i-Mohammadall wanted to assert their version of Islam. The SSP was created by Maulana Haq NawazJhangvi, a member of the Jamaat ul Ulema with the blessing of the intelligence agencyto counter the Shias.45 In addition the jihadi groups’ engagement with jihad outside ofthe country fuelled religious extremism at home. For the first time, Pakistan witnessedthe growth of many splinter groups like a proverbial hydra, and all these added to theintensity of sectarian violence. As a result of radicalisation, observance of rituals andpublic display of religiosity have become common phenomena in Pakistan.46

The snapping of the ties between the state and the Islamists or at least theirirrelevance to the state in the current context placed the well armed radicals in a disad-vantageous position. For example, throughout the 1980s the Islamists remained centralto Pakistani strategy. It was only after 9/11 that the relationship between the state andthe radicals was ruptured.

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Two important spheres where the radicals have prevailed are over the US presencein Afghanistan and the issue of imposing Sharia. Both the issues were highlighted bythe conglomerate of the religious parties – the Mutahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA). TheMMA came to power riding high on its anti-US stance and the demand to imposeSharia. However, it failed on both counts. Notwithstanding the right noises it made onthe US presence in Afghanistan, it could not oppose General Musharraf as a petitionwas pending before the Supreme Court that threatened to revoke the equivalence of amadarssa degree to a graduate degree. Similarly the much ‘acclaimed’ Hasba (account-ability) Bill which was passed by 68 votes to 34 against did not get the approval of thepresident and later the Supreme Court rejected it, terming it ultra vires. This was a set-back for the MMA, which then confined itself to removing billboards that had picturesof women and also banned sporting events for women.

The Lal Masjid incident proved that the ‘new’ radicals could challenge the authorityof the state in a much more organised fashion. The religious political parties refusedto condemn the activities of these Islamists. As Abdul Rashid Ghazi, deputy clericof the Lal Masjid said: ‘Our struggle may be viewed as a natural alternative to thealmost complete failure of religious political parties and their approach’47. One of thedemands of the clerics of the red mosque was to declare Sharia as law in Pakistan andthey refused to compromise in spite of the intervention of the religious political parties.Similarly, the disillusionment with the JI led to the creation of Tehrik e Islami, someof whose members were involved in the bombing of the mosque in the GHQ and heldthe view that the Jamaat had not been able to implement its agenda for an Islamic stateand had deviated from it.48 The Jamaati-Islami is also wary of acting against some ofits cadres, fearing that it could lead to a larger debate on the party’s commitment to theestablishment of an Islamic state.49

Ideological contestation: Western vs. Islamic

The radicals as well as the Islamists have debated the idea of democracy and feel thatIslam is a preferable alternative, as equality and justice are important elements in aSharia based political system. Since the Sharia is considered to be a complete code oflife, the radicals feel answers to many of the problems faced by Muslims lie withinthe religion itself. The modern Westphalian state that came into existence with the endof colonialism also promoted individual freedom and secularism, which were consid-ered to be inconsistent with the principles of Sharia. The definition of ‘progressive’excluded many ideological groups from playing a meaningful role. As a result thereactionary movements that were anti-modern located themselves in opposition to theWestern liberal institutions.

The Islamists perceived democracy as unrepresentative of their ethos and culture.The state miscalculated the objectives of the Islamists and felt they could be easily sat-isfied with social and political policies couched in religious terms. The main grievanceof the Islamists in general has been that they are not integrated into the political sys-tem, which is dominated by the Westernised urban elite. Thus the demands of the newradicals can be understood not only from the point of view of ideology but also in thebroader context of the elite competition. Both the elites – Western educated as wellas the Islamist – wanted to further their individual political agendas (Western liberaldemocracy vs. Sharia), and had competing support structures (liberal vs. tradition-bound conservative constituencies). The two sets of elites struggled to capture statepower to perpetuate a system that strengthened their support base and their hold on the

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state, and to remodel it as per their ideological choice. The Islamist reaction in Pakistanwas more of a subaltern reaction to Western institutions and power structures that haveno space for marginal groups. The failure of the government to deliver socially, toensure access to education for all and its inability to provide equal economic opportu-nities impinged on its efforts to deal with radical Islamic elements comprehensively.These are some of the grievances on which they have built their support base apartfrom their ideological consensus.

The discourse of the Islamists is based on concepts, values (egalitarian society,delivery of justice, non-corrupt ruling class and rule by consensus), which the post-colonial state has denied to its masses. The Islamists by raising such issues, couched inreligious terms, have rendered it a populist meaning (in subaltern lexicon), thereby cre-ating a new dynamic between the state and hitherto marginalised citizens. As pointedout by a scholar: ‘even where Islamism has failed to bring about regime change it hasnevertheless affected state-society relations by changing the cultural reference pointsof the society, and thereby forcing change in the nature of the relations between thetwo’50. Islamists have subtly altered society–state relations in Pakistan. Earlier Islamicpolitical parties cultivated young people and socialised them into a protest culture thatmany a time turned violent and pressurised the state into accommodation.

The Pakistani state managed its relations with society through various intermedi-aries. This is especially true in the case of tribal areas – where the state exists notionallyrather than as a substantive presence – and has ruled through its proxies. Similarly thesystem of dispensation of justice has been costly and time consuming. In contrast tothe regular courts the qazi courts have dispensed speedy justice delivered within dayswithout much cost. The state has used the landed aristocracy as the interface betweenthe state and the society. The landed elites have formed the backbone of the state thatwas yet to entrench itself in rural areas as an embodiment of authority. From the outsetthe state was caught between the ‘British structure of authority and the Islamic tide thathad risen in opposition to it’.51

The leadership of the political parties and their leaders has remained in the hands offew families, mostly feudals and businessmen. The relationship between the ruler andthe ruled replicated the relationship that exists between a feudal and his haris (landlesslabourers). In contrast, Islamic political parties have structures that encourage the riseof leaders from the lower strata of the society. Land reform still remains a problem. Inrural Sindh, Balochistan and southern Punjab, huge landholdings continue to exist.52

Support for Taliban in Swat has come from landless labourers and the economicspoils of political dominance have been distributed among the foot soldiers. ‘They wereencouraged to cut down the orchard trees and sell the wood for their own profit . . .

or they were told to pay rent to the Taliban instead of their now absentee bosses’.53

Therefore apart from enforcing their vision of Islam, the radicals are taking advan-tage of the socio-economic cleavages to enlarge their support base against a perceivedunequal state.

Whither Pakistan

The state of Pakistan really does not exist in large parts of its geographical space, andthis is most prominent in the FATA region. There could be two reasons for this lack ofstate penetration: first the feudal nature of the society where the patron–client system

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is well entrenched. Second, the long period of military rule has struck at the very rootof political aspirations.

The erosion of the state can also be attributed to the political elites proclivityto use Islam to entrench themselves in power as religion has emerged as a tool forlegitimacy.54 The state’s silence on some fatwas, Hudood, Qiyas, blasphemy laws etc.has severely curtailed individual liberty and has emboldened the radicals. The statehas emerged as an equal partner in this crime. The state’s inability is demonstrated byits recent reaction to many incidents, including attacks on Ahmediyas, attacks on sufishrines, and the recent killings of the Punjab governor Salman Taseer and MinorityAffairs Minister Shahbaz Bhatti. It needs to be mentioned that the Pakistan Army andintelligence have been targeted earlier. The reactions of the political parties and thegovernment show how the state is slowly losing the battle to the radicals. The Islamicpolitical parties may not have adequate numbers but they have successfully blocked thestate’s attempt to revise either the blasphemy law or the Hudood law.

The radical Islamist groups have shunned elections, unlike the religious politicalparties. Though divided, they possess the wherewithal to challenge the state. This isevident from the numerous cases of sectarian conflict and the rising incidence of attackson the security forces in Pakistan. Moreover, TTP is increasingly asserting itself as awell-knit group wedded to the idea of Islamic rule in Pakistan. Though its popularsupport base remains limited – and most of it is based on coercion – it has enoughfoot-soldiers (evident from the rising number of willing suicide bombers) to engagethe Pakistani army. This phenomenon reveals a deep socio-political malaise. The newradicals, who at one point in time were part of Pakistan’s foreign policy strategy, havenow emerged as a challenge to the state itself. It is difficult for the state to bring aboutany major policy shift and roll back this tide. The problem is compounded by thefact that civil society in Pakistan has not condemned the radicals and their agenda.Moreover, Islamabad still hopes it can use some of these radical groups as instrumentsof its regional policy, and therefore it is unlikely to take any steps towards the completeelimination of these groups. The view that radicalism can be localised in the frontierregion does not seem plausible at the moment; these groups have developed stronglinks with other radicals within the country that provide them with the logistical andsupport network to carry forward their activities.55 The military’s tactic of ‘discreditingits extremist partners internally’56 has also backfired as many of these militant groupsperceive the military to be an ally of the US and therefore their enemy.

In this context, the rise of radical Islamist groups in Pakistan would have severalimplications for India. It is likely to have a spill-over effect on India if Pakistan fails tocontain this menace. As of now, the expanding geographical dispersal of the radicalshas emerged as a major threat to the Pakistani state. Though Talibanisation is an out-come of the state’s approach to religious radicalisation over the years, how it handlesthis issue would give an indication of what it portends for its future. The Pakistanistate has always engaged the Islamists in its various political projects – either forseeking legitimacy or wresting the initiative of Islamisation from the Islamic politi-cal parties. It engaged radicals to fight the Soviets in Afghanistan and in Kashmir andelsewhere. It encouraged radical Islamist groups like the Taliban to experiment withIslamic utopianism in Afghanistan. In spite of its commitment to the war on terror, thestate continues to support the radicals as a fall-back option in Afghanistan. In the past,the Pakistan army moved only to those areas where militant activities were too visibleto hide.57 The weakness of the Pakistan army according to Hasan Abbas is that it hasmany sympathisers – if not supporters – of the radicals within its ranks.58 Radicals

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would always have a limited appeal but their capacity to seize the state from within ismassive.59 Radicalism is not a Pashtun phenomenon anymore as has been argued bymany. Its rise is more about power and authority than religion. While it may not turnPakistan into a radical Islamic state, the real danger confronting the country today isthe possible division of society on sectarian lines. The casualty here will not be radicalIslam as a phenomenon but the people and the state.

Notes1. The term Islamist as used in this article is a generic reference to those people who argue for

an Islamic state. They are basically traditional conservative groups with a moderate approachtowards the state. Scholars like Olivier Roy speak of the ‘Islamic political imagination’ as for-warded by the ulemas, salafists and Islamists. Though he categories these groups into three,I have refrained from categorisation and have used as a generic conceptual definition of theterm Islamic. See Olivier Roy, The Failure of Political Islam, I.B. Tauris, London, 1994, p. 12.In his recent book entitled Globalised Islam: Search for a New Ummah, Hurst and Co, London,2004, Roy has referred to global Islamists as the post-Islamists. Classification like traditional-conservative and neo-traditional are also used for the radicals. Clinton Bennett divides theminto traditionalists (Deobandhis), neotraditionalists (Maududi), radical jihadist (Islamic jihad).See Clinton Bennett, Muslims and Modernity: An Introduction to the Issues and Debates,Continuum, London, 2005, pp. 18–20. Also Basheer M. Nafi’s description of ‘traditional’,which is similar to the term ‘old’ Islamist as used in this article. See Basheer M. Nafi, TheRise of Islamic Reformist Thought and its Challenge to Traditional Islam, pp. 29–30 and 47–53and also the chapter by Abdelwahab El-Affendi, ‘On the State, Democracy and Pluralism’, inSaha Taji-Farouki and Basheer M. Nafi (eds.), Islamic Thought in the Twentieth Century, I.B.Tauris, London, 2004, pp. 172–191.

2. There are other religious political parties (such as Jamiat Ulema-i-Pakistan, JUI [Samiul Haq],Sunni Tehrik etc) that also have their influence in Pakistani politics. Similarly some of thenew Islamists such as Hafiz Gul Bahadur belonging to Pakistani Taliban did facilitate the 2008elections to National Assembly, however, they are rather known for their rejection of the existingpolitical system.

3. The Machi Goth Ijtema in which JI decided to enter electoral politics, some people left theJamaat and formed Tanzeem Islami. Similarly in 1995 Tehrik-e-Islami was formed when someof the JI followers felt the JI was deviating from its stated goal.

4. See W.C. Smith, Modern Islam in India, Muhammad Ashraf, Lahore,1969, p. 339.5. This is mainly a Jamaat Islami view. See Ibrahim M. Abu Rashid, ‘Islamic Resurgence’,

Institute for Policy Studies, Islamabad, 1995, p. 6.6. S.V.R. Nasr, ‘Democracy and Islamic Revivalism’, Political Science Quarterly, 110 (2),

Summer 1995, p. 2677. Ibrahim M Abu Rashid, note 5, p. 148. Clinton Bennett, note 1, p. 209. According to Joshua T. White, Islamic political parties engage in vigilante activities like the

new radicals and formal politics like other political parties. This in the post 9/11 Pakistan hasled to the blurring of the line that should demarcate the realm of formal politics from anti-stateviolence. Refer to Joshua T. White, ‘Vigilante Islamism in Pakistan: Religious Party Responsesto the Lal Masjid Crisis’, Current Trend in Islamist Ideology, 7 (51), Hudson Institute, 2008.

10. Farzana Shaikh, Making Sense of Pakistan, Foundation Books, Delhi, 2009, p. 65.11. In 2006, the JUI had negotiated the Miramshah peace deal.12. They have destroyed a Buddhist statue in Swat valley in November 2007 and do not allow any

reverence to the Sufis and their Mazars.13. Olivier Roy, note 1, p. 2014. Sayyid Qutub rejected democracy and politics, calling for a truly Islamic society and deferring

politics until a vanguard community is established. In the 1970s groups like Islamic Jihad andal-Jama ‘a al-Islamiya in Egypt rejected democracy. See Abdelwahab El-Affendi, note 1, p. 181

15. Moeed Yusuf, ‘Prospects of Youth Radicalisation in Pakistan’, Brookings, Analysis Paper No.14, October 2008, p. 7.

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16. Basheer M. Nafi and Suha Taji Farouki ‘Introduction’, note 1, p. 10. In the context ofPakistan, Zia made Pakistan studies and Islamic studies compulsory, which contributed to theIslamisation of the present generation. The social science text book taught in regular schoolslead to Islamisation of mind. See Yvette Claire Rosser, Islamisation of Pakistani social ScienceTextbooks, Rupa, New Delhi, 2003.

17. For example the Pakistan Waqf Property Ordinance of 1961 enabled the administrator to takethem over, and later waqf boards were nationalised and the government introduced zakat.This affected donations to shrines. See Jamal Malik, Colonisation of Islam: Dissolution ofTraditional Institutions in Pakistan, University Press Limited, Dhaka, 1999, p. 60–61.

18. Ismail Khan, ‘Politically Savvy’, Herald, September 2007.19. JI supposedly runs 30 FM radio channels to preach jihad in Kashmir. In lower Dir the HuM,

JuD, JeM, Harkatul Ansar, and Hizbul Mujaheedin have their recruitment offices. See IntikhabAmir, ‘Flashpoint Frontier’, Herald, June 2006, p. 65

20. Zahir Shah Sherzai, ‘The Past is Another Region’, Herald, December 2007.21. Mohammad A. Qadeer, Pakistan: Social and Cultural Transformations in a Muslim Nation,

Abingdon: Routledge, 2006, p. 24.22. Farzana Shaikh, note 10, pp. 61–62.23. For example, The JI in Pakistan is now trying to join the bandwagon of the radicals by criticising

US presence and trying to distance itself from the present government. Some of its cadres havejoined the radicals in Wazirstan and have questioned JI policy but the party has not been ableto take action against them. See Idrees Bakhtiar and Umer Farooq, ‘Between the State and“Jihad” ’, Herald, June 2010, p. 58.

24. Olivier Roy, note 1, p. 2425. See the text of Objective Resolution cited in Leonard Binder, Politics of Religion in Pakistan,

University of California Press, Los Angeles,1961, p. 14326. Ibid., p. 144. The meaning of Islam in the Objective Resolution was defined by some members

of Constituent Assembly as ‘based on God-consciousness’, some law makers felt that it affirmedthe need to keep religion as a moral force joined to politics, Liaquat Ali Khan explained it as‘democracy in the Islamic sense’ and the ulemas felt that the recognition of God’s sovereigntyand acceptance of His law means a commitment on the part of politicians to give effect toSharia. Jamaat defined it as a victory for the Islamic state. See pp. 145–148.

27. Leonard Binder, note 25, p. 628. S.V.R. Nasr, note 6, p. 26929. For example the Board of Talimaat-i-Islamia Recommendation on Objective Resolution was

sidelined when the government started playing one group of the Ulema against the other.30. Mohammad A. Qadeer, note 21, p. 2831. Hamza Alavi, who introduced this concept, has defined Salariat as a class of people who were

in government jobs, petty bourgeoisie, etc.32. For details, refer to the author’s previous article on ‘Islam and the ideology of Pakistan’,

Strategic Analysis, 22 (9), December 1998, pp. 1273–1295.33. S.V.R. Nasr, The Islamic Leviathan: Islam and Making of State power, Oxford University Press,

Karachi, 2001, p. 1534. S.V.R. Nasr, ‘Islamic Opposition in the Political Process: Lessons from Pakistan’, in John L.

Esposito (ed.), Political Islam: Revolution, Radicalism or Reform, Lynne Rienner, Boulder,1997, p. 141.

35. The land reforms Act of 1977 restricted individual holdings to 100 acres of irrigated and 200acre non-irrigated lands. Religious courts created by Zia gave a verdict that land reform isunislamic. Subsequently, peasants were forced to give up lands acquired under land reforms inNWFP, Punjab and Sindh. See I. A. Rehman, ‘Time for Land reform in Pakistan’, Dawn, 26June 2008.

36. In the context of Pakistan Zia made Pakistan studies and Islamic studies compulsory that con-tributed to the Islamisation of present generation’s. The social science text book taught inregular schools lead to Islamisation of mind. See Yvette Claire Rosser, Islamisation of Pakistanisocial Science Textbooks, Rupa, New Delhi, 2003.

37. Interview with Hasan Askari Rizvi, 8 August 2010 in Lahore. Also see Tahmina Rashid,‘Radicalisation of Civil Society: A Case Study of Pakistan’, in Smruti S. Pattanaik (ed.), SouthAsia: Envisioning a Regional Future, IDSA-Pentagon, Delhi, 2011, pp. 155–163.

38. Mohammad A. Qadeer, note 21, p. 163

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39. For example the Jamaat position was that it prevented the establishment of a secular constitutionand considered it to be practical wisdom to move towards the ultimate goal of an Islamic state.See Kalim Bahadur, The Jama’at-i-Islami of Pakistan: Political Thought and Political Action,Chetna Publishers, Delhi,1977, p. 84

40. S.V.R. Nasr, no.33, p. 17. Also see Mohmmad Waseem, ‘Origins and Growth patterns of IslamicOrganisations in Pakistan’ in Satu P. Limaye, Mohan Malik and Robert Wirsing (eds.), ReligiousRadicalism and Security in South Asia, Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, Honolulu,2004, p. 22.

41. For details see Ashok K. Behuria, ‘Sects within Sect: The Case of Deoband-Barelvi Encounterin Pakistan’, Strategic Analysis, 32 (1), 2008, pp. 57–80

42. Pervez Hoodbhoy, ‘The Saudi-isation of a once-vibrant Pakistani Culture’, at http://www.sacw.net/article495.html (accessed January 2009).

43. For a discussion on this see Feroz Ahmed, ‘Pakistan: Ethnic Fragmentation of NationalIntegration?’ Pakistan Development Review, 35(4), Part II, Winter 1996, pp. 639–640.Also see Aqueel Yousufzai, Talibanisation (Urdu), Nigareshat Publisher, Lahore, 2009,pp. 98–99. Cited in Shamshad Ahmed Khan, Strategic Analysis, 34(1), January 2010,pp. 124–125.

44. To understand the relationship between Mullah and Malik see Sana Haroon, ‘Frontier of Faith:Islam in the Indo-Afghan Borderland’, Hurst and Co., London 2007, pp. 69–73.

45. Frederic Grare, Reforming the Intelligence Agency in Pakistan’s Transitional Democracy,Carnegie Endowment, 2009, p. 26

46. See Mohammad A. Qadeer, note 21, pp. 175–17647. Abdullah M. Adnan, ‘Curbing Pakistan’s Rising militancy’, at http://www.commonground

news.org/article.php?id=22445&lan=en&sid=1&sp=0, (accessed on 24 November 2010).48. ‘Rising Rebels’, Herald, June 2010, p. 5549. It needs to be mentioned that radical groups like JeM, Sipah-i-Sahaba, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi have

suffered a split and more radical factions have broken away. The JUI-F, for example, defacedbillboards that had pictures of women, closed music shops and tried to pass the Hasba bill toappease the radical elements within the party. The JI, especially its student organisation, hasbeen involved in Islamic activism supported by the JI.

50. S.V.R. Nasr, note 33, p. 1451. Ibid., p. 4652. For the landlords’ connection to the ruling class see, Feroz Ahmed, ‘Pakistan: Ethnic

Fragmentation of National Integration?’ Pakistan Development Review, 35(4), Part II, Winter1996, p. 641.

53. Jane Perlez and Pir Zubair Shah, ‘Taliban Exploits the Class Rifts in Pakistan’, New York Times(Asia Pacific), 16 April 2009, at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/17/world/asia/17pstan.html?_r=1&hp.

54. It is important to mention here that in the 1990s the Army was ‘less concerned with limit-ing Islamism and more with constricting democratic parties’ and was not comfortable withPML-N rise as a centre right party would take the Islamist from the monopolised control of theArmy. See S.V.R.Nasr, ‘Military Rule, Islamism and Democracy in Pakistan’, The Middle EastJournal, 58 (2), Spring 2004, p. 199

55. This is evident from the attack on Marriott in Islamabad, attack on Federal Investigative Agencyin Lahore, police training institute in Mianwali, attack on ISI and GHQ in Rawalpindi etc.

56. Moeed Yusuf, note 15, p. 1157. M. Illyas Khan, ‘Back to the Drawing Room’, Herald, February, 2006, p. 6058. Hasan Abbas, Pakistan’s Drift Towards Extremism, M.E. Sharpe, New York, 2005, p. 24059. A survey conducted by the CRSS reflects how the people of FATA view some of the issues raised

by the radicals: 86 per cent of the population interviewed did not support the blowing up of CDshops, 95 per cent supported girls’ education, around 92 per cent of the people thought that theTaliban and Fazlullah do not support true Islam, 91 per cent thought the Taliban’s way was thewrong way. However, 67 per cent thought that Sharia would ensure justice and 77 per cent saidthat they do not welcome the Pakistan army. See http://crss.pk/Fata/FATA_Survey_Aug2008.ppt (accessed on 20 September 2008).

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