Of Dark Clouds and Silver Linings: Effects of Exposure to Issue Versus Candidate Advertising on...

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2002 29: 295Communication ResearchEric W. Groenendyk and Nicholas A. Valentino

Persuasion , Information Retention, and Issue SalienceOf Dark Clouds and Silver Linings: Effects of Exposure to Issue Versus Candidate Advertising on

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COMMUNICATION RESEARCH • June 2002Groenendyk, Valentino • Exposure to Advertising

ERIC W. GROENENDYK1

NICHOLAS A. VALENTINO

Of Dark Clouds and Silver LiningsEffects of Exposure to Issue VersusCandidate Advertising on Persuasion,Information Retention, and Issue Salience

In this study, we examine the impact of sponsorship cues in issue versus candi-date advertising on perceived credibility, persuasion, information retention,and priming of message-relevant issues. Theories of persuasion and attitudechange suggest that citizens should react differently to the same messagewhen source cues are varied. In an experiment, adult participants saw eitheran actual ad sponsored by the Sierra Club, an edited version in which Al Gorewas depicted as the sponsor, or no ad at all. Although participants were slightlyless able to correctly identify the sponsor of the issue ad, the ad was seen asmore credible and persuasive than the candidate-sponsored version. Thoughboth were negative in tone, the issue ad did not depress participatory inten-tions as much as the candidate ad. Participants also retained more informa-tion from the issue appeal. Finally, the issue ad was a more powerful prime formessage-relevant performance criteria in evaluations of the target, George W.Bush. The implications of these findings for the ongoing debate on campaign-finance reform are discussed.

Campaign-finance reform has become a significant issue in recent elections.At the center of the debate is the expanding role of soft money and independ-ent expenditures. These are funds collected outside the regulatory reach ofthe Federal Election Commission (FEC) because they are not directly linkedto particular candidates (Johnson-Cartee & Copeland,1997).Although manyexperts and lay citizens believe that these expenditures corrupt our system,few understand the complexities of the campaign-finance-reform debate.Furthermore, scholars have not fully investigated the impact that reformsmight have on the character and quantity of campaign communication.

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Of the different avenues through which soft money and independent cam-paign expenditures enter the electoral process, “issue advocacy” advertisinghas attracted the most attention from politicians and the press. The SupremeCourt significantly constrained the reach of the Federal Elections CampaignAct (FECA) in Buckley v. Valeo (1976), stating that hard-money restrictionscould only be applied to appeals that expressly advocated the election ordefeat of particular candidates. The Court ruled that the First Amendmentrights of groups, including parties, were violated by the original language ofthe FECA. Therefore, individuals and interest groups were allowed to air anyappeal that did not specifically use the “magic words”: “vote for candidate X”or “do not vote for candidate X” (Rozell & Wilcox, 1999). In other words, theCourt made a narrow distinction based on the language of persuasive mes-sages, not on their intended or actual effects.

Though it took a few election cycles, interest groups learned to accommo-date this restriction, and the number of groups airing issue-advocacy ads hasincreased with each election cycle since 1980 (Magleby, 2001). Some havepointed out that the language restrictions were practically meaningless fromthe start because the vast majority of candidate spots do not use the magicwords (Krasno & Seltz, 2000). According to Beck, Taylor, Stanger, and Rivlin(1997), 31 advocacy groups, including the Republican and DemocraticNational Committees, spent between $135 million and $150 million on televi-sion advertising during the 1996 presidential-election cycle.

Several important concerns about issue advocacy have been raised inrecent years. First, Kathleen Hall Jamieson (2001) pointed out that these adshave the potential to drown out the voices of political candidates and could belegally restricted without infringing on the First Amendment because publicairways are a scarce resource. West (1997) concluded that “if monied inter-ests on either side of the political spectrum can secretly finance public edu-cation ads right before an election, it eviscerates federal disclosure rules”(p. 193). Since interest groups are unaccountable in the standard electoralsense, the concern about their ability to “hijack” the issue agenda of cam-paigns is warranted.

On the other hand, many might argue in principle that if issue ads wereused for their intended purpose—to raise the salience of pressing socialissues during campaigns—they would serve democracy rather than under-mine it. In fact, according to Magleby (2000), 66% of issue ads broadcast dur-ing the 2000 presidential primaries followed the spirit of Buckley v. Valeo byfocusing on election issues. This finding raises the possibility that some typesof issue ads play an important informational role in American politics.

A second valid concern about issue ads stems from their overwhelminglynegative tone. Issue-advocacy ads exhibit harsher and more frequent attacks

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than any other type of campaign communication, ostensibly because interestgroups are not as accountable as the candidates themselves (Beck et al.,1997). This quality of issue appeals might have undesirable depressiveeffects on citizens’ motivation to participate in elections, since exposure tonegative advertisements has been linked to demobilization (Ansolabehere,Iyengar, & Simon, 1999; Ansolabehere, Iyengar, Simon, & Valentino, 1994).Some, however, have argued that only particular types of “negativity,” espe-cially mudslinging and partisan attacks, are likely to demobilize voters(Kahn & Kenney,1999;Lawton & Freedman,2001). If citizens do not considernegative issue ads to be partisan mudslinging, they may not be as likely todemobilize.

Neither side of this debate can cite much evidence about the harmful orbeneficial effects of issue advertisements relative to standard candidateappeals. In fact, extant research finds no significant negative effects amongthose exposed to political action committee (PAC)–sponsored ads in terms ofcampaign awareness, campaign interest, knowledge, or likelihood of voting.On the contrary, Pfau, Park, Holbert, and Cho (2001) found that viewersof PAC ads expressed a slightly higher likelihood of voting than thoseexposed to candidate-sponsored contrast ads, party-sponsored ads, and evencandidate-sponsored positive ads, though these differences were not statisti-cally significant.

There are some theoretical reasons to expect that at least some issue adsmay be more persuasive, informative, and powerful in focusing attention onparticular issues in the campaign than similar appeals sponsored by candi-dates. In particular,we concern ourselves with the impact of sponsorship cuesin candidate versus issue ads on persuasion, information gain, and issuesalience.

Source Cues and the Effects of Issue Ads

Classic theories of persuasion and attitude change suggest that source infor-mation can powerfully condition the effects a message has on its audience.Early work summarized the basic elements of persuasion and attitudechange with the question “Who says what to whom with what effect?” (Smith,Lasswell, & Casey, 1946). Hovland’s message-learning approach explored thesource, message, and recipient variables that condition the size and directionof persuasion effects (Hovland, Janis, & Kelley, 1953). These researchers dis-covered that source-credibility cues are quite important in determining thesize of attitude change after exposure to a persuasive message (Hovland &Weiss, 1951). More specifically, certain underlying dimensions of credibility,such as trustworthiness and the self-interestedness or persuasive intent of

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the source, strongly moderate message effects (Hass & Grady,1975;Kiesler &Kiesler, 1964). Thus, Andreoli and Worchel (1978) found that newscasters aremore persuasive than candidates, especially when the message is deliveredvia a medium that makes source characteristics salient (i.e., television), pre-sumably because the audience assumes newscasters are not self-interestedor motivated to persuade. In addition, McCroskey and Jenson (1973) foundthat competence, character, sociability, composure, and extroversion all influ-enced source credibility in the news.

Sources arguing in favor of their own vested interests are less trustworthy,and therefore less persuasive, than those arguing against their self-interest(Walster, Aronson, & Abrahams, 1966). Salmon, Reid, Pokrywczynski, andWillet (1985) showed that when noncommercial sources appeared not to ben-efit from the advocacy, ads they sponsored were considered to be more trust-worthy.Furthermore,Petty and Cacioppo (1979) conclude that cues about thepersuasive intent of a source reduce attitude change by prompting the audi-ence to attend to and counter- argue the appeal.

Candidate-sponsored ads are, by definition, self-interested attempts to per-suade. The audience for a candidate appeal might rationally conclude that thecandidate’s position on a given issue is motivated by the desire to win office.Issue ads, on the other hand, do not usually make explicitly self-interestedrequests that would directly benefit the sponsoring group in terms of moneyor votes. Instead, they might ask the viewer to contact an elected official tovoice his or her opinion about a given issue. Moreover, issue ads are generallysponsored by interest groups with a much narrower agenda than that of anycandidate. These groups may also be seen as more competent than candi-dates on a particular issue because it is their sole focus. Therefore, interestgroups may be perceived as more credible when making claims pertaining totheir particular issue agendas.

Another approach to thinking about source effects is as information short-cuts. Lupia (1994), for example, found that source cues provide valuableinformation for citizens when they encounter a persuasive message about acomplicated issue. A well-known interest group, therefore, may provide citi-zens with a reliable shortcut to help them understand the informationembedded in the appeal. In fact, in as much as sponsor information does serveas a heuristic for understanding political appeals, the audience might beespecially sensitive to this type of information.

Sponsor cues in issue appeals may serve as particularly effective short-cuts because they usually have quite narrow issue agendas. Whereas candi-dates are usually forced to be “experts” at a wide variety of issues, interestgroups usually attempt to foster a strong reputation on a narrower range of

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social concerns. For example, a presidential candidate who takes a strongposition on women’s equality in the workplace must also establish positionson taxes,education, social welfare,and many other unrelated issues.The can-didate’s experience in some of these other areas may be more extensive thanin the area of gender discrimination, and other personal characteristics (e.g.,the candidate’s gender) might affect his or her credibility on this issue as well.The National Organization for Women, however, focuses heavily on this issueand may therefore be seen as more credible on it than would most candidates.

Finally, interest groups have another natural advantage over candidateswhen it comes to fostering credibility; they are groups. Because there is no sin-gle individual who would benefit, issue ads may appear less self-interested.Candidate appeals, because they are sponsored by individuals, lend them-selves to the interpretation that they are motivated by individual self-interest.The fact that a large, well-known group is making the issue appeal may sup-ply an additional reason for viewers to trust what is being said. In otherwords, interest group sponsors, especially when easily identified, may enjoyhigher levels of credibility in the public eye compared to candidates who sup-port the same issues.

Of course, our discussion to this point assumes the source of an issue ad iswell known and identifiable, which raises one of the growing concerns aboutmany issue advertisements. Jamieson (2000) found that only about half of alldiscussants could correctly identify the sponsors of issue ads immediatelyafter viewing them. Magleby’s (2001) research produced similar findings.Our study does not examine the class of issue ads designed to intentionallyobscure the source’s identity and therefore cannot speak confidently abouttheir effects. Instead, we will examine the impact of appeals by well-knowninterest groups and leave the impact of more obscure sponsorship cues tofuture studies. Of course, it is still important for us to test whetherwell-known sources are identified when present or whether viewers still mis-take these appeals for candidate spots.

Hypotheses

The previous discussion leads us to a series of hypotheses involving the rela-tive effects of issue versus candidate-sponsored political appeals. As we havesaid, we focus on well-known groups whose names might serve as importantcues to voters. If, even with such ads, viewers assume that any appeal attack-ing a given candidate must be sponsored by that candidate’s opponent, thenthere should be no difference in impact. Our first endeavor, then, is to deter-mine the degree of misidentification of issue ad versus candidate ad sponsors.

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To the extent that viewers can distinguish between sponsor types, we predictthat altering the sponsor of a given political appeal may produce differencesin credibility.

Our first hypothesis is that issue ads will be seen as more credible thancandidate-sponsored ads. This prediction follows from the assumption thatcandidates are generally viewed as being motivated primarily by electoralincentives,whereas interest groups are more likely to be seen as invested in aparticular issue.

Hypothesis 1:An interest group–sponsored appeal will be considered morecredible than an identical ad sponsored by a candidate.

If issue ads are seen as more credible, they may also be more persuasivethan candidate-sponsored ads. Persuasion can be measured in differentways. First, an issue ad may seem more convincing to the audience than theidentical ad when sponsored by a candidate.Second,different sponsors mightbe unequally effective in their shared implicit goal: to reduce support for thetarget candidate.

Hypothesis 2a:An interest group appeal will be perceived as more convinc-ing than an identical candidate-sponsored appeal.

Hypothesis 2b: An interest group appeal will be more effective than anidentical candidate-sponsored appeal in altering support for the targetcandidate.

We also suspect that issue appeals, though negative in tone, may not dis-courage participation as much as candidate-sponsored ads. This hypothesisis based on the notion that issue appeals will not be interpreted as partisanmudslinging but as sincere attempts to raise concern about a particularissue.Ads perceived as less partisan and more issue oriented have been foundto be less detrimental to electoral participation (Kahn & Kenney, 1999;Lawton & Freedman, 2001). If citizens consider issue advertisements to bemore credible, as a consequence of their “nonpolitical” sponsorship, then thedemobilizing effect of negativity may be mitigated. Therefore, we predict thatalthough both the candidate-sponsored and group-sponsored attack ads mayreduce viewers’ intentions to participate, the negative effect should be largestamong those who view candidate-sponsored appeals.

Hypothesis 3: A negative ad sponsored by an interest group will be lesslikely to discourage electoral participation than an identical ad spon-sored by a candidate.

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We also explore the impact of ad sponsorship on information retention anduse in candidate evaluation. If issue ads are intended to raise the salience ofparticular issues during campaigns, how successful are they in this regardcompared to candidate-sponsored ads? Here we invoke the concept of prim-ing: the tendency for those schemas recently or frequently activated in mem-ory to be most readily available for use in subsequent evaluations of relevantsocial objects (Wyer & Srull, 1980). These schemas can be thought of asknowledge structures that integrate and connect various aspects of a givensocial object (Fiske & Taylor,1991).Schemas are then arranged in associativenetworks in memory (Anderson, 1983), with some linked together moreclosely than others.

It is reasonable to expect that schemas involving well-known candidatesmay be wider and more elaborate,with a larger number of related nodes, thanthose involving even relatively well-known interest groups, about whichinformation is limited. Therefore, when a candidate is well known, such aswith most presidential hopefuls, a wider variety of schemas will be availablefor activation. Candidate appeals may therefore prime thoughts about otherissues, events, scandals, and so forth as a result of “spreading activation” thatis independent of the particular issue content of the message (Collins & Lof-tus, 1975).

On the other hand, because interest groups tend to be oriented toward oneparticular issue, the set of thoughts and feelings evoked by such a sponsor islikely to be narrow. Cognitive psychologists have demonstrated that a logicalorganizing theme will facilitate memory (Bransford & Franks, 1971;Bransford & Johnson, 1972; Fiske & Taylor 1991). Because most advocacygroups are synonymous with a particular issue, sponsorship by one of thesegroups provides such a theme.Therefore we expect that the issue-appeal mayfacilitate the retention of substantive information. A candidate-sponsoredappeal is likely to activate a wide range of thoughts related only tangentiallyto the ad’s specific message. This fact might depress information retentionamong those exposed to a candidate-sponsored appeal.

Hypothesis 4: Viewers of an ad sponsored by an interest group will exhibithigher substantive information retention than those exposed to anidentical candidate ad.

The narrow activation, and retention, of issue-relevant informationshould also boost the salience of the issue in subsequent evaluations of thetarget candidate. The more voters are exposed to an issue, the more perfor-mance on that issue impacts overall evaluations of that candidate (Iyengar &

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Kinder, 1987; Iyengar & Simon, 1993; Krosnick & Brannon, 1993; Krosnick &Kinder, 1990). Those exposed to the issue ad should put more weight on thisissue as a criterion for evaluating the target candidate. Those exposed to thecandidate appeal, even on the same topic, may not place as much weight onthat issue since other issues are likely to have been activated at the sametime, and/or the content of the message is ignored or dismissed as simply apartisan attack.

Hypothesis 5: An interest group–sponsored ad will be more effective thanan identical candidate-sponsored ad in priming relevant issuedimensions.

Method

Design and Procedures

To test our hypotheses, we designed an experiment to manipulate the spon-sorship cues in an actual political advertisement that ran during the 2000presidential election campaign. Experimental methods are optimal for ourpurposes because we hope to isolate the impact of exposure to specific adver-tising cues. Whereas previous studies have tested for differences in reactionsto broad categories of ads (Magleby, 2001; Pfau et al., 2001), our goal is tomake specific claims about the impact of sponsorship, independent of otheradvertising characteristics.

The design, containing three different conditions, was quite simple. Weemployed a widely broadcast Sierra Club ad shown on television during the2000 presidential election campaign. Why did we choose the Seirra Club?First, the group is concerned with a highly publicized set of issues aboutwhich voters hold a wide variety of views. According to research by theAnnenberg Public Policy Center, the environment was the second most com-mon topic of political ads in both the 1998 election cycle and 2000 primaries(Aday, 2000; Stanger & Rivlin, 1998).

Second, the environment is like many other political issues such as educa-tion, law enforcement, and social security in that most people would agreewith politicians on the goal but disagree on the means required to achieve it.Everyone wants clean air and water, but there is controversy over what con-stitutes good environmental policy.

Third, the group belongs to a class of high-profile organizations thathave been very active, well financed, and visible during recent elections. In1996, the group spent $7.5 million on television issue advocacy in supportof various political causes (West, 1997). In the 2000 election, the Sierra Club

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spent millions on issue advocacy (National Journal Group Inc., 2002). Withall this spending, the Sierra Club, along with National Environmental Trust,ranked among the top 10 interest-group spenders in the 2000 primaries(Falk, 2000).

A transcript of the ad used here is displayed in Table 1. We selected this adbecause it is a “typical” example of an issue appeal.First, it focuses on a famil-iar issue of national importance. Like most issue ads, it is negative in tone,attacking George Bush’s environmental record in Texas. It uses commonadvertising conventions, such as comments by the “average” citizen, toattempt to persuade the audience. The Sierra Club used this particular spotquite extensively, running it in many large battleground media markets dur-ing the general election of 2000.

Media-effects experiments can be criticized for their lack of general-izability precisely because they attempt to isolate specific characteristics inparticular messages and therefore do not present subjects with “natural”stimuli in realistic settings. Although we cannot make broad generalizationsabout the impact of all types of interest groups or the appeals they sponsor,we do feel the group and appeal on which we focus are typical of a large andimportant segment of the population of such phenomena. Furthermore, therealism of our experimental manipulation is enhanced because, as othershave reported, issue ads and candidate ads are quite similar to begin with(Krasno & Goldstein, 2001). Most important, we feel the sacrifice we make interms of the breadth of our inferences is fully compensated by our ability toisolate the moderating impact of ad sponsorship on persuasion, informationgain, and issue salience.

The Sierra Club ad was edited slightly to create the first of our treatmentconditions. The Sierra Club logo was removed from its position at the end ofthe ad and was inserted briefly at the beginning. In addition, the line “Spon-sored by the Sierra Club” was added in place of the logo at the end. The rest ofthe appeal, including the entire narrative and visual sequence, was left unal-tered from its original form. A second version of this ad was created by replac-ing the Sierra Club logo from the introduction of the spot with a Gore 2000campaign insignia. At the end, “Sponsored by Gore 2000” was substituted for“Sponsored by the Sierra Club.” Therefore, the two versions of the ad wereexactly the same except for the brief sponsorship cues at the beginning andend. This manipulation allows us to infer that any differences in attitude orbehavior between the two conditions are produced by sponsorship cues alone.

Subjects viewed a sequence of three ads, the first and third of which—Honda automobiles and Colgate toothpaste, respectively—were constantacross conditions. Each version of the political ad was inserted between the

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Table 1Ad Transcript

Audio Image Text on Screen

Ed: All of our lakes have water quality problems. Ed sits in a boat on a lake. Gore 2000 logo or Sierra Club logo (upper leftcorner). “Ed Parten Kingwood, Texas”

Voice Over: Texas leads the nation in the numberof factories violating clean water standards.

Footage of a lake filmed from apassing car.

“Texas leads in factories violating clean waterstandards—EPA Compliance Data”

Tamara: We’ve got too many children on breath-ing machines—too many people with asthma.

Tamara and another woman sitat dining room table. Fades toa girl on a breathing machine.

“Tamara Maschino, Seabrook Texas”

Voice Over: Texas has the most industrial air pol-lution in the nation.

A factory billows smoke. “Texas has the most industrial air pollution inthe nation.—EPA Latest Toxic Release In-ventory (1998)”

Tamara: We’re in a crisis situation. Tamara at dinning room table.Fades to dirty water flowingfrom a factory.

Ed: We’ve contacted George Bush’s Office and hehas the attitude that he’s not interested.

Ed sits in a boat on a lake.

Voice Over: Call George Bush. Tell him to opposelegislation in Congress that weakens penaltiesfor clean air and water violators—for our fami-lies, for our future.

Smoke stacks billow smoke.Fades to children walkingthrough a field of tall grass.

“Call George W. Bush at (512) 463-2000. Tellhim to oppose S. 1053 and H.R. 3570.” Paidfor by Gore 2000 or Paid for by the SierraClub

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other two. The third condition, a control group, was created by insertinganother product commercial (for the Yellow Pages) in place of the political ad.

We attempted to make the viewing conditions as natural as possible. Stu-dents were greeted in a waiting room and ushered into the lab. We randomlyassigned each group of respondents to one of our three conditions. Partici-pants sat in comfortable living-room-type seating facing a large television onwhich we played the video segments. We administered no pretest in order toavoid priming viewers’ political attitudes.Participants were asked not to talkduring the video segment. After viewing the video segment, all participantsfilled out a questionnaire involving a variety of subjects including the ad thatthey had seen. We asked respondents not to consult each other about thequestionnaire.Finally,participants were debriefed and excused from the lab.

Sample

The sample consists of 157 student volunteers from a large midwestern uni-versity. These students were solicited from introductory CommunicationsStudies courses, and they were offered extra credit for their participation.The median age of the sample is 20 years. The sample is 80.3% White, 3.8%Black, 11.5% Asian, 2.5% Hispanic, and 1.9% other. Women make up 68.8% ofthose sampled. In terms of partisanship, 40.1% are Democrats, 25.5% areRepublicans, and 34.4% identify themselves as Independent. Although oursample is not representative of the U.S.’s voting population in terms of educa-tion or age, it does contain wide variation on variables such as partisanshipand gender that are known to influence candidate choice. We find no theoreti-cal reason to believe that the effects demonstrated in this study would notoccur among a more representative sample.Still,we do not attempt to predictlevels of these dependent variables in the population at large.

Measures

The accuracy of sponsor identification is measured with a single multiple-choice item requesting that respondents circle the sponsor of the ad that theysaw from a list that includes a variety of candidates, parties, interest groups,and the option to answer “none of the above.” As an additional check on thesalience of the sponsoring information, we also asked respondents to ratehow important various issues are to Gore: “On a 7-point scale, rate the impor-tance of the environment/social security/abortion/gun control to Al Gore.”The second measures the perceived ideological positioning of the Sierra Club:“Here is a 7-point scale on which the political views that people might holdare arranged from extremely liberal to extremely conservative. Where would

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you place the Sierra Club on this scale?” The third measures the perceivedproximity of Gore and the Sierra Club: “On a scale of 1 to 7, 1 being not at allclose and 7 being extremely close, how closely would you rate the values andinterests of Al Gore with the values and interests of the Sierra Club?” Theseitems serve both as a manipulation check and to reinforce our inferencesabout whether subjects were aware of the source cues in the ad.

We measure credibility with a scale consisting of three separate items.Thethree items are all based on 7-point Likert-type scales. These three questionsare worded as follows: “If you saw a political ad, did you believe the state-ments that were made in that ad?” “If one of the ads that you saw was a politi-cal ad, how likely would you be to use the information provided by that ad tomake a decision?” “If one of the ads that you saw was a political ad, how likelydo you believe it is that the information provided by that ad was false or mis-leading?” These three items were found to be reliable (α = .78).

Persuasion is measured in two different ways.First we measured how con-vincing respondents felt the message was using two separate items. Oneasked, “Did you think (the political ad) was persuasive?” (1 = not at all persua-sive, 7 = extremely persuasive). The second asked, “Do you agree or disagreewith the message (of the political ad)?” (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = stronglyagree). These two items were highly correlated (Pearson’s r = .50), so we stan-dardized and summed them to form a self-reported persuasiveness scale run-ning from zero to two. Second, we measured persuasion as electoral supportfor George W. Bush with the following question: “If the election were heldtoday rather than last November, who would you be most likely to vote for?”(Bush, Gore, Nader, Other).

Information recall is measured using an additive index consisting of fiveitems. These include the following: “If you saw a political ad, how many billswere mentioned in that ad?” (correct answer was 2); “In 1998, where didTexas rank among the 50 states in terms of the amount of industrial air pollu-tion? (If 1st is the cleanest and 50th is the dirtiest,write the correct answer onthe line)” (correct answer was 50th); “If you saw a political ad, according tothat ad, which two environmental issues are specifically problematic inTexas? 1. Air Pollution, 2. Deforestation, 3. Water Quality, 4. Endangered spe-cies protection, 5. Farmland degradation” (correct answers were 1 and 3;respondent had to choose both to be coded “correct”); “If you saw a political ad,how did George W. Bush allegedly respond to constituents’ complaints aboutenvironmental problems in the state? 1. He sent them a letter. 2. He got legis-lation passed. 3. He increased penalties for violators. 4. He created a specialtask force to investigate complaints. 5. He showed no interest.” (correctanswer was 5); “If you saw a political ad in the segment that you just viewed,please circle the recommendation it gave. 1. Vote for Al Gore. 2. Vote for

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George W. Bush. 3. E-mail George W. Bush. 4. Call George W. Bush. 5. Write aletter to George W. Bush. 6. None of the Above” (correct answer was 5). Thesequestions were recoded as “correct” or “incorrect.” Because each questiondoes not solicit subjective answers, if no answer was given, it was coded as“incorrect.” The number of correct answers were added together and dividedby 5 to create the final information recall index.

Three candidate-issue performance items are used to test the priminghypothesis. Subjects were asked the following: “On this 7-point scale, pleaserate the environmental record of George W.Bush during his time as Governorof Texas”; “On this 7-point scale,please rate the education record of George W.Bush during his time as Governor of Texas”;and “On this 7-point scale,pleaserate the tax cutting record of George W. Bush during his time as Governor ofTexas.” Finally, participants rated their overall feelings toward Bush using astandard feeling thermometer scale running from 0 to 100 with 50 represent-ing neutral feelings toward the candidate.

Results

Before testing our hypotheses, it is necessary to make sure the randomizationprocedure was effective. Using chi-square tests, we find no significant depar-tures from randomness in terms of the distribution of gender, race, age, citi-zenship, political ideology, and party identification across the three condi-tions of the design at the p < .05 level. This and all other statistical tests aretwo-tailed. In addition, when asked to rate the Sierra Club on a 7-point scalefrom 1 (extremely liberal) to 7 (extremely conservative), the average ratingthat was given by the control group was 4.25. In other words, in the absence ofexposure to an appeal, the average respondent rated the group as moderate.This is important because it reinforces our confidence that our results are notlimited to ads sponsored by extreme ideological groups.

Our first test pertains to whether subjects exposed to an issue-advocacyad (sponsored by Sierra Club) are less likely to correctly identify the sponsorof the ad than those who view the candidate-sponsored version. Results froma t test reveal no significant differences in accuracy between the interestgroup and candidate versions of the ad. Moreover, as is shown in Table 2, onlyone of the respondents who viewed the issue-advocacy ad misidentified thesponsor to be Gore.

We also find that those who viewed the Gore-sponsored version rate theenvironment as more important to him than viewers of the Sierra Club ver-sion (t = 2.46, p < .01). The perceived importance to Gore of gun control, socialsecurity, and abortion are unaffected. Viewers of the Sierra Club ad also ratethe group as significantly more liberal than viewers of the candidate-

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Table 2Cross-Tabulations of Exposure Group With Recall of Ad Sponsor

Sponsor Recalled

Gore Bush Democratic Party Republican Party Sierra Club None of the Above Total

Exposure Group n % n % n % n % n % n % n %

Gore ad 40 80.0 3 6.0 6 12.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 2.0 50 100.0Sierra Club ad 1 1.8 8 14.0 4 7.0 0 0.0 38 66.7 6 10.5 57 100.0Control 3 6.0 0 0.0 3 6.0 1 2.0 1 2.0 42 84.0 50 100.0Total 44 28.0 11 7.0 13 8.3 1 0.6 39 24.8 49 31.2 157 100.0

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sponsored ad (t = 2.51, p < .01). Finally, viewers of the Sierra Club ad rateGore and the Sierra Club as being much more closely linked in terms of theirvalues and interests than viewers of the Gore candidate-sponsored ad (t =–5.61, p < .01).

In general, then, we find that a large segment of our sample is able to accu-rately identify the sponsor of each of these ads. These results indicate thatthe manipulation was successful; subjects were, on balance, able to distin-guish between the two versions of the ad. Furthermore, as a result of expo-sure to either sponsor, subjects are able to make logical inferences about thecandidate or group. They learn from the Sierra Club ad where the groupstands ideologically, while they learn from the Gore ad that the environmentis important to him.

According to the first hypothesis, subjects who view the issue-advocacyad should rate it as more credible than subjects who viewed the candidate-sponsored ad. Results strongly support this hypothesis. On a 7-point scale,the candidate-sponsored ad received a rating of 3.52, whereas the issue-advocacy version is rated at 4.16, an 18% difference that was statistically sig-nificant (t = –2.77, p < .01).

The second hypothesis focuses on the persuasive impact of the candidateversus issue appeal. Given that the issue ad was seen as more credible, wepredicted that subjects who viewed the issue appeal would think it was moreconvincing than those who saw the ad sponsored by Gore. This prediction isstrongly supported. Those who viewed the issue advocacy ad rate the ad asmore persuasive on the zero to two scale (M = 1.36, SD = .34) than those whoviewed the candidate-sponsored ad (M = 1.20, SD = .33). This 13% differenceis statistically significant (t = 2.58, p < .05).

The second test with regard to persuasion involves the impact of ad spon-sorship on support for the target candidate, George W. Bush. Figure 1 displays

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38%

26%29%

0%5%

10%15%20%25%30%35%40%45%50%

Candidate-SponsoredAd (n = 50)

Issue-Advocacy Ad (n = 57)

Control Group (n = 50)

Sup

port

for

Bus

h (%

)

Figure 1. The Persuasiveness of Candidate versus Issue Appeals



the percentage vote for Bush across the three cells of the design. In the con-trol group, Bush captures about 29% of the vote. In the Sierra Club ad, hissupport is slightly reduced,at 26%.Surprisingly,however, support for Bush isactually highest in the Al Gore ad condition,at 38%.None of these differencesis statistically significant in a logistic regression with dummy variables forthe two ad conditions. However, the comparison between the Sierra Club andGore versions of the ad suggest that the latter is quite uneffective.

The third hypothesis predicts that the issue-advocacy ad should have, ifanything, only a small demobilizing effect, because viewers should be lesslikely to consider the appeal an example of candidate mudslinging.Viewers ofthe candidate-sponsored ad are expected to be less motivated to participate.As predicted, on a 7-point scale virtually no difference is found between thelikelihood of voting among those who viewed the issue advocacy ad (M = 6.32,SD = 1.35) and those in the control group (M = 6.36, SD = 1.17), while themean turnout score in the candidate condition is about 7% lower (M = 5.94,SD = 2.00). Although none of these differences is statistically significant, thepattern is consistent with the basic hypothesis. The issue ad, though just asnegative, does not reduce the likelihood that viewers will commit to voting.

The fourth hypothesis predicts that the group-sponsored appeal will facil-itate information recall more than that of the candidate-sponsored ad. Thishypothesis is supported. The accuracy of information recall is 15% higher inthe Sierra Club condition (M = .69, SD = .23) than in the Gore condition (M =.60, SD = .19). This difference is statistically significant (t = 2.11, p < .05).

The fifth hypothesis states that the issue-advocacy ad will boost envi-ronmental concerns in evaluations of Bush more powerfully than will thecandidate-sponsored ad. This hypothesis is also strongly supported. Fig-ures 2a, 2b, and 2c display the results of three separate linear regressionanalyses, where George Bush’s overall rating as measured by the feelingthermometer serves as the dependent variable. Each panel compares theeffect of Bush’s performance on a given issue dimension as a predictor of hisoverall rating across the two advertising conditions. We expect that theimpact of Bush’s environmental performance as a criterion in his overallevaluation should be larger among those exposed to the Sierra Club ad com-pared to those exposed to the Gore ad. In other words, the slope of the line inFigure 2a corresponding to the Sierra Club condition should be steeper thanthat for the Gore ad. This is the case. The relationship is almost six timeslarger in the Sierra Club condition (13.30) than in the Gore condition (2.24).This difference is statistically significant (B = 11.06, p < .05). For results fromthe full regression analyses used to produce Figure 2, see the appendix.

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0

25

50

75

100

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Issue Performance

Glo

bal

Fee

ling

sT

ow

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sh

Gore Ad Sierra Club Ad

Figure 2a. The Impact of Environmental Performance on Evaluations of Bush

0

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Figure 2b. The Impact of Taxation Performance on Evaluations of Bush

0

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Issue Performance

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Figure 2c. The Impact of Education Performance on Evaluations of Bush



Also, we predicted that Bush’s performance along other issue dimensions,unrelated to the content of the ad, should not vary substantially across condi-tions. They do not. Figures 2b and 2c show that, for taxes and education,Bush’s performance is quite strongly related to his overall rating in eitherexperimental condition. These findings suggest that the interest-group spon-sor more strongly primed the issue considerations central to the appeal.

Summary

The primary objective of this study was to uncover the distinct effects, if any,that issue versus candidate ads may have on persuasion, information, andissue salience in the electorate. We investigated the impact of only onedimension here: ad sponsorship. We found that most viewers could identifythe sponsor of these ads, even when sponsorship cues were scarce. Further-more, they used the information in the appeal to make reasonable guessesabout the linkage between the issue and sponsor.

As we expected, the issue ad was seen as more credible than the candidate-sponsored version of the same appeal. It was also seen as more persuasiveand slightly, though not significantly, depressed support for the target candi-date compared to the Gore-sponsored version.

We also found that the Sierra Club appeal, though negative, did not dis-courage subjects from voting. The concern about the infusion of a largeamount of negative advertising into the campaign environment is basedmostly on previous findings for candidate appeals. Our findings are consis-tent with recent suggestions that “negativity” itself may be influenced by itscontext. Viewers of ads critiquing a candidate along an issue dimension,sponsored by a group known to be associated with that issue, may not beviewed as unfair partisan mudslinging. As a result, such appeals may be lesslikely to demobilize.

Furthermore, we found that those who saw the Sierra Club appeal weremuch more likely to remember the arguments and information contained inthe message. This finding is interesting in that it contradicts previous worksuggesting message retention does not vary as a function of source credibility(Hovland & Weiss, 1951; Petty & Cacioppo, 1979; Watts & Holt, 1979). Wespeculate that although previous experiments were able to hold engagementconstant, the candidate appeal may have been less engaging because theimplication of partisan mudslinging led viewers to tune out the message. TheSierra Club may not have conveyed the same tone, though its message wasidentical, and therefore may have been more engaging to viewers.

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Finally, issue ads may be better able to influence the set of criteria thatvoters use to evaluate candidates. The impact of Bush’s environmental per-formance as a criterion in his overall evaluation was quite small among thoseexposed to the Gore appeal. That impact was greatly enhanced among thosewho saw the Sierra Club version. Furthermore, the effect was quite narrow,leaving the impact of other issue-performance criteria such as taxes or educa-tion unchanged. These findings are consistent with recent work suggestingthat priming effects are enhanced when a message is delivered by a credible,trusted source (Miller & Krosnick, 2000).

Conclusions

Our findings are consistent and strong, leading us to conclude that citizensmay find at least some issue ads more credible than identical appeals spon-sored by candidates. Although Al Gore consistently aligned himself withenvironmental issues during his political career, participants in our studyviewed an environmental critique of George W. Bush as significantly morecredible when sponsored by the Sierra Club. This could either be because cer-tain groups are viewed as having more competence than candidates alongsome issue dimensions or because candidate appeals are viewed simply asself-interested demands for electoral support. Either way, it may be possiblefor interest groups to break through some of the public cynicism that sur-rounds modern political advertising.

These results suggest that some issue ads are less damaging than previ-ously feared. The fact that most members of the public see these ads asattempts to depress support for a targeted candidate (Magleby, 2000) maymute their persuasive effects. A recent study found that participants whowere advised to “beware of soft-money-sponsored issue ads,” were effectively“inoculated” against any politically pernicious consequences of exposure(Pfau et al., 2001).

The campaign finance reform proposals being considered would restrictinterest group advertising during the final weeks before an election. Thedebate about this element of the reform has, to this date, focused mostly onthe conflict between the free speech rights of interest groups versus the dis-torting influence they might have on electoral outcomes. The particular costsand benefits of issue-advocacy advertising as a means for informing the pub-lic have been largely neglected.

Although the results of this study would not lead us to claim that all issueads are helpful or harmful to our system, they do suggest some significant

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effects of exposure to these ads, including increased information retentionand issue salience. Of course, whether these effects prove beneficial enoughto mitigate the current level of concern about these ads is unclear. First, all ofthese effects are contingent upon the audience correctly identifying the spon-sor. By placing the sponsor logo at the beginning of the ad, we designed ourmanipulation to boost the likelihood that subjects would distinguish betweenthe two conditions. If prominent sponsorship information is not common,issue advertising may not be harmless. Therefore, our findings lead us to thesame normative suggestion as others have offered (West, 1997; Jamieson,2001): In order to inform and mobilize the electorate,or to raise the salience ofparticular issues in the electoral arena, the sponsors of issue appeals must beidentifiable.

Second, the informational benefits of these ads will only improve publicdecision making to the extent that the claims they make are truthful and theinformation they present is accurate. Universally accessible, accurate, andcredible political information is a valuable asset in any democracy (Althaus,1998;Bartels,1996;Delli Carpini & Keeter,1996).By providing more credibleinformation and inducing higher information recall than candidate-sponsoredads, issue-advocacy ads might play a positive role. If the information providedis false or misleading, however, issue ads would have the potential to under-mine political accountability, confuse voters, and ultimately damage thelegitimacy of elected officials. And it is important to recognize that the spon-sors of issue advertisements may have less to lose if they mislead viewersbecause they can remain relatively anonymous. If so, issue ads might pose anadditional threat to the quality of public deliberation. Content analyses suchas those by Magleby (2001), Krasno and Seltz (2000), and Beck et al. (1997)are vital in order to obtain a more complete understanding of the informationand persuasion attempts contained in these ads. In particular, it would beuseful to know whether the veracity of an appeal varies according to thefamiliarity of the ad’s sponsor.

Some caveats are warranted. A potential limitation of the current study isits reliance on a student sample. Factors that differentiate this sample fromthe population at large include age, socioeconomic status, and educationlevel. However, socioeconomic status is positively associated with politicalknowledge and participation.As a result,we might actually expect the effectsof these ads to be smaller in this sample than in one that was more represen-tative of the nation. In any case, future research should test these hypotheseson representative, adult samples in order to generalize these findings.

Further research must also expand the investigation to other interestgroups and other types of campaigns. The Sierra Club ad was chosen because

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it was deemed fairly typical of well-known groups with a favorable reputationamong a significant segment of the population and was considered to be polit-ically moderate by subjects who participated in this study. Given that sourcecharacteristics such as ideology can moderate the effects of political advertis-ing (Ansolabehere & Iyengar, 1995; Iyengar & Valentino, 2000), furtherresearch that varies the ideological position of the source is required.Anothervariable of interest is the ideological distance between the interest group andthe viewer. Appeals sponsored by disliked groups may be deemed even lesscredible than opposition candidates. Of course, interest groups probablyattempt to minimize this possibility by targeting their appeals to media mar-kets that contain a substantial number of sympathetic viewers. Research onissue-advertising effects in nonpresidential campaigns, in which candidateinformation is less prevalent, would also make for an interesting comparisonto the results presented here.

Moreover, the current study does not attempt to test the impact of issue-advocacy ads in which the sponsoring interest group, political action commit-tee, or party organization uses an unfamiliar name. Instead, the results aremost directly applicable to ads sponsored by popular, moderate, and fairlynoncontroversial groups. Any of these characteristics could alter the effectswe demonstrate by changing the inferences viewers make about the credibil-ity of the source. Nevertheless, the findings are important even if the resultsare restricted to this one class of issue ads, if for no other reason than thatsuch ads are fairly common.

Although concerns about the sheer volume of issue ads distorting thepolitical debate are valid, our results reveal a potential silver lining aroundthe dark cloud that others have noticed. If some issue ads are more credibleand informative than candidate ads, they may infuse the campaign withenergy that many think is on the wane. It is, therefore, essential that weunderstand the impact of this common form of political communicationbefore we alter the incentive structure connecting parties, candidates, andinterest groups in the campaign arena.The question for legislators is not onlyhow to reduce unfairness in the current system, but also how their reformsmight tip the balance of power between these competing factions to the detri-ment of citizens’ information levels and willingness to participate. A valuablecompromise in the debate over issue-advocacy ads might be to create specificrules regarding sponsor identification rather than outlawing them alto-gether. This solution might withstand constitutional challenges while pre-serving some of the potential benefits of issue advocacy discovered here.

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AppendixThe Priming Effects of Gore Versus Sierra Club–Sponsored Appeals, Across Issue Domain

Bush’s Record Bush’s Bush’sGeorge Bush Feeling on the Record on Record onThermometera Environment Cutting Taxes Education

Sierra Club ad –24.92** (11.87) 5.08 (18.90) –15.66 (16.07)Issue performance 2.24 (3.28) 9.37*** (3.17) 5.78* (3.01)Sierra Club xIssue Performance 11.06** (4.85) –2.90 (4.32) 4.21 (4.01)

Constant 35.95**** (8.86) 3.50 (13.39) 18.12 (12.72)

R2 .13 .12 .16N 105 105 105

Note. Entries are drawn from separate OLS regression analyses for each column. The Sierra Clubad is a dummy variable where the Gore ad is the excluded category. Issue performance, therefore, isthe impact of performance on each issue in the column head on Bush’s overall rating among thosewho saw the Gore version of the ad. The interaction term in the third row corresponds to differencebetween the effect of the issue in the Gore condition and that in the Sierra Club condition.a. Dependent Variable. *p < .10. **p < .05. ***p < .01. ****p < .001.

Note

1. The authors would like to thank Travis Dixon, Jermone Johnston, and KristenHarrison for helpful feedback at various stages of this project.

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