Nepotism at Schools in Armenia: A Cultural Perspective

Nepotism at Schools in Armenia: A Cultural Perspective

Meri Avetisyan Network Fellow, Edmond J. Safra Center for Ethics

Varsenik Khachatryan

Edmond J. Safra Working Papers, No. 51 http://www.ethics.harvard.edu/lab

November 12, 2014

EDMOND J. SAFRA RESEARCH LAB, HARVARD UNIVERSITY • NEPOTISM AT SCHOOLS IN ARMENIA: A CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE • AVETISYAN & KHACHATRYAN • NOVEMBER 12, 2014

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About this Working Paper Series: In 2010, Lawrence Lessig launched the Edmond J. Safra Research Lab, a major initiative designed to address fundamental problems of ethics in a way that is of practical benefit to institutions of government and society around the world. As its first undertaking, The Edmond J. Safra Research Lab is tackling the problem of Institutional Corruption. On March 15, 2013, this Working Paper series was created to foster critical resistance and reflection on the subject of Institutional Corruption. http://www.ethics.harvard.edu/lab

Nepotism at Schools in Armenia: A Cultural Perspective By Meri Avetisyan and Varsenik Khachatryan

Edmond J. Safra Research Lab Working Papers, No. 51 Harvard University

124 Mount Auburn Street, Suite 520N, Cambridge, MA 02138

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported License.

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Edmond J. Safra Working Papers, No. 51


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Abstract

This paper discusses the issue of favorable treatment of fellow teachers’ children at

Armenian schools. It demonstrates that this behavior is a part of schools’

institutional culture, and is being accepted as a normative behavior. The paper

attempts to interpret this situation by using dominant value orientation in

Armenian society, explaining why the majority of participants conform to unwritten

rules of loyalty towards colleagues and criticize a few who attempt to break the

cycle of institutional corruption.

Keywords:

Corruption in education, nepotism, culture, colleague’s child, institutional

corruption


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Introduction

Corruption is a major problem for Armenia. It is present in many fields including

education. This problem was extensively discussed in many reports of both non-

governmental and governmental organizations. For instance, the Ombudsman of

the Republic of Armenia in his 2012 and 2013 annual reports specified that high

levels of corruption exist in the public education system of Armenia.1 In 2013,

Transparency International’s Global Corruption Barometer demonstrated that the

educational system of Armenia is perceived as corrupt or highly corrupt, scoring

3.7 on the 5 point scale.2 According to Policy Forum Armenia, corrupt acts in

Armenian schools include, but are not limited to, bribes for hiring teachers and

illegal fundraisings from pupils.3 Even the Minister of Education and Science of

Armenia, A. Ashotyan, acknowledged the existence of corruption—especially the

issue of “forced” donations, “forced” tutoring and other violations of professional

ethics at public schools.

Corruption in education is not a unique problem of Armenia: it is entrenched in

educational systems of many other countries and has been investigated by many

researchers. Researchers from post-Soviet countries Natalya Rumyantseva4 and

Elena Denisova-Schmidt5 discussed the issue of corruption in higher education

from different perspectives. However, their findings can also be extended to school

education. Rumyantseva made distinctions between different types of corruption in

higher education based on the level of involvement of students in it: in the first,

students are part of corrupt actions affecting their values and beliefs, and in the

second, students are not involved in corrupt actions, and are not even concerned

1 On the activities of the RA (Republic of Armenia) Human Rights Defender and on the violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the country during 2012, see “Annual Report on the Activities of the RA Human Rights Defender and on the Violations of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in the Country During 2012,” 2013, http://ombuds.am/en/library/library/page/101/type/3. On the same during 2013, see “Annual Report on the Activities of the RA Human Rights Defender and on the Violations of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in the Country During 2013,” 2014, http://ombuds.am/en. 2 Transparency International, “Global Corruption Barometer 2013,” 2013, 35, http://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/pub/global_corruption_barometer_2013. 3 Policy Forum Armenia, “Corruption in Armenia,” October 2013, http://www.pf-armenia.org/sites/default/files/documents/files/PFA_Corruption_Report.pdf. 4 Nataliya L. Rumyantseva, “Taxonomy of Corruption in Higher Education,” Peabody Journal of Education 80.1 (2005): 81‒92, http://www.transparency.az/transpfiles/15.pdf. 5 Elena Denisova-Schmidt, “Justification of Academic Corruption at Russian Universities: A Student Perspective,” Edmond J. Safra Research Lab Working Papers, No. 30, November 14, 2013, http://ssrn.com/abstract=2353513.


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with them.6 These categorizations well compliment the definition of corruption in

education suggested by Jacques Hallak and Muriel Poisson. They interpret

corruption in education as a “systematic misuse of public office for private benefit

whose impact is significant on access, quality or equity in education.”7 Discussing

the fact that corruption in education can occur at every level, David Chapman8

specified several forms of corruption (favoritism in procurement, personal

appointments, ghost teachers, private tutors) that manifest in education. Inge

Amundsen indicated favoritism is present within five forms of corruption and

mentioned nepotism as a sub-category of the former.9 According to this definition,

it is very common for people to have the tendency to favor family members, and

“anybody close and trusted.” Moreover, the authors considered that favoritism can

provide ample privileges, in a number of senses, for particular families and social

groups.10 Another researcher who looked at the system of networks and issues of

corruption in post-Soviet countries, Alena Ledeneva, defined favor as “an

ambivalent transaction of sharing, transferring, or redistributing (im)material

resources for (im)material gain, aimed at maintaining (or creating) social

relations.”11

As a part of favoritism, researchers also discuss nepotism. The latter is considered

as a “special form of favouritism, in which an office holder (ruler) prefers his

proper kinfolk and family members (wife, brothers and sisters, children, nephews,

cousins, in-laws etc.).”12 This issue is very common in education too. Indeed,

corruption in education is a disease, but its negative influence on school education

is doubled when it occurs at the classroom level and manifests in teacher-pupil

relations. Corrupt practices by teachers may include teacher absenteeism, illegal

6 Rumyantseva, “Taxonomy of Corruption in Higher Education,” 86. 7 Jacques Hallak and Muriel Poisson, “Ethics and Corruption in Education: Results from the Expert Workshop Held in Paris on 28-29 November 2001,” Forum of Education, No. 15, 2002, http://www.unesco.org/iiep/PDF/Forum15.pdf. 8 David Chapman, “Corruption and the Education Sector,” Management Systems International, November 2002, http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNACT874.pdf. 9 Inge Amundsen, “Corruption: Definition and Concepts,” Chr. Michelsen Institute: Developmental Studies and Human Rights, 2000,5, resources.transparency.bg/download.html?id=261. 10 Id.

11Alena Ledenevea, “Beyond Russia’s Economy of Favours: The Role of Ambivalence,” Center for European Politics, Security & Integration (CEPSI) Working Papers, No. 2013-04, 4, http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/1417510/. 12 Inge Amundsen, “Corruption: Definition and Concepts,” 6.


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private tutoring,13 becoming a ghost teacher, and influence peddling and

cheating.14

In the Armenian context, corruption in education—particularly corruption at

schools—has been more often discussed in the media and by national and

international organizations than by researchers. To our knowledge, only Kristine

Antonyan has recently conducted research on the issues of academic integrity, and

has revealed such violations of academic integrity as favoritism, making deals with

lecturers, cheating and plagiarism, etc.15 Different forms of corrupt behaviors

within schools in Armenia have been revealed and discussed in several reports on

education policies,16 but nepotism within school education has not.17

Interestingly, the data that we collected in the framework of our research project on

the integrity of school teachers in Armenia demonstrates that favoritism and

nepotism are present in schools. This research project aimed to reveal school

teachers’ perceptions and interpretations of professional integrity, and to

demonstrate the types of integrity violations that occur at public schools in

Armenia. Our explorative study started in the beginning of September 2013 and

lasted until December 2013. Using methods of purposive and convenience

sampling, we approached 225 in-service teachers from different regions of Armenia

and from Yerevan, the capital city. We used mainly two means of approaching

teachers: via school principals or vice principals and via personal contacts. None of

the interviews were conducted at the school where Varsenik Khachatryan currently

works, the “Tsakhunq Open School.”

13 This issue is also discussed in Mihaylo Milovanovitch, “Fighting Corruption in Education: A Call for Sector Integrity Standards,”Edmond J. Safra Research Lab Working Papers, No. 31, November 22, 2013. 14 Harry A. Patrinos and Ruth Kagia, “Maximizing the Performance of Education Systems: The Case of Teacher Absenteeism,” in J. Edgardo Campos and Sanjay Pradhan, eds., The Many Faces of Corruption: Tracking Vulnerabilities at the Sector Level, (World Bank, 2007), 69. 15 Kristine Antonyan, “Academic Integrity in Higher Education,” policy paper, in Armenian. http://www.osf.am/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/Kristine-Antoyan-policy-paper.pdf. 16 Turpanjian Center for Policy Analysis, American University of Armenia, “Access to School Education in Armenia: Exploratory Research,” supported by Open Society Foundations – Armenia, 2013, http://www.osf.am/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/Acccess-to-School-Education-Report_English.pdf. See also Serob Khachatryan, Silva Petrosyan, and Gayane Terzyan, “Assessment of Teacher Professional Development and Educational Content in the Context of General Education Eeforms in Armenia,” Barev Scientific Educational NGO, 2013, http://www.osf.am/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/FinalENGAssessmentPDEC.pdf. 17 Harutyun Aleksanyan, “Cases of Corruption and its Prevention in Armenia’s Education System,” Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), Regional Competence-Building for Think-Tanks in the South Caucasus and Central Asia, 2012 [2007].


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One of the authors met each participant in person, explaining the aim of the

research and providing written information about the research project. We asked

public school teachers to write a story from their or their colleague’s professional

experience when he/she had to violate “moral norms”18 and express their attitudes

towards the violation. Teachers were encouraged to share their thoughts about the

particular situation and what the final decision or action was in this case. Gathering

written cases, rather than interviews, was seen as a suitable method at that stage

of research, as in written stories participants were expected to include more

emotions and to give more detailed accounts, whereas during interviews they might

have felt intimidated to do so.19 In addition, it enabled participants to devote their

time to the task without any time pressure. Some respondents preferred not to

write by hand but rather type the document and return printed sheets to us.20

In the administration of this exploratory stage, we aimed to maximally secure the

anonymity of research participants. Thus, although we understand that information

such as the subject each participant taught might have added value, we ruled out

collecting such information to avoid the possibility of disclosing identities, and

concentrated only on gathering true, real-life cases. The only demographic

information we asked respondents to provide was their age and years of

experience. During meetings with potential participants, the voluntary nature of the

research was stressed and anonymity of participants was assured. Overall, 114

participants returned filled booklets, resulting in a return rate of 51%.

From the 114 written stories/cases, 11 were irrelevant to the aims and scope of

our research. Thus only 103 cases were analyzed. All the stories had been written

in the teachers’ mother tongue—Armenian. The length of the stories ranged from

50 words up to 1000 words. In 21 cases respondents spoke about favorable

treatment of their colleague’s child. Moreover, 13 cases out of these 21 described

grade fixing situations in which colleagues’ children were given higher marks than

they deserved or were allowed to cheat during exams. Another 8 cases are related 18 We intentionally didn’t use any provocative wording, such as “corruption” or “integrity violations,” to avoid refusals to participate in the research. 19 For more conceptual information on this form of data collection, see Maggi Savin-Baden and Claire Howell Major, Qualitative Research: The Essential Guide to Theory and Practice (Routledge, 2013). 20 For more detailed information on this data collection process see Meri Avetisyan and Mihaylo Milovanovitch, “Damned if You Do, And Damned if You Don’t: The Integrity, Attitudes and Difficult Choices of Teachers in Armenia,” work in progress. See also, Meri Avetisyan, “A Moral Dilemma (Magarich), Edmond J. Safra Research Lab blog post, December 20, 2013, http://ethics.harvard.edu/blog/moral-dilemma-magarich.


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to the indulgence of the violation of school rules by a colleague’s child. Although

participants recognize this situation as a violation of integrity and regret being

involved in such situations, the majority conform to the situation and present

themselves as victims of collegial loyalty and (informal) institutional culture. This

paper seeks to demonstrate that (favoritism) nepotism in the form of undeserved

advantages for colleagues’ children (or relatives), such as undeserved high grades

and the indulgence of rule-violating behaviour, has become a component of

institutional corruption in public schools in Armenia. The paper aims to explain this

situation by referring to the value orientation that currently exists in Armenian

society.

A Colleague’s Child and Institutional Corruption

Lawrence Lessig stated that “institutional corruption manifests where there is a

systematic and strategic influence which is legal, or even currently ethical, that

undermines the institution’s effectiveness by diverting it from its purpose,

weakening its ability to achieve its purpose, including, to the extent relevant to its

purpose, weakening either the public trust in the institution or the institution’s

inherent trustworthiness.”21

Content analysis of 13 cases from our data related to inflating the grades of fellow

teachers’ children highlight the interplay of this phenomenon with institutional

corruption.

The analysis of those 13 cases describing incidents of grade inflation forcolleagues’

children indicates that nepotism is a component of institutional culture in public

schools in Armenia. Although participants recognize this situation as a violation of

integrity and some regret being involved in such situations, the majority conforms

to the situation and present themselves as victims of collegial loyalty and

(informal) institutional culture. This is well illustrated by the following passage

from our data: “One of my students is a child of a fellow teacher. She is a good

student, but she is not good enough to get high enough grades. However, since she

is the child of a colleague, all of my fellow teachers were giving her better grades

21 Lawrence Lessig, “Foreward: ‘Institutional Corruption’ Defined,” Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics 41.3 (2013): 2-4.


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than she deserves. I did the same. I didn’t want to put my good relationship with

colleagues at risk.”22

This example demonstrates the existence of hidden peer pressure in the school

community. Although the respondent was not even asked to inflate the grades of

the student who is the child of a colleague, she feels obliged to follow her peers

and inflate the student’s grades as a favor to the student’s parent. The above-

mentioned quote further demonstrates that doing favors for colleagues is the part

of the institutional culture on which good relationships with colleagues are based.

Moreover, in 17 cases out of 21, respondents spoke about a fear of losing good

relationships with other teachers, which demonstrates that teachers adjust their

behavior to meet the expectations of the school community. This behavior might be

explained by teachers’ need to be accepted among colleagues.

Furthermore, another quote shows that respect among teachers is greatly based on

doing favors to each other: “My colleague’s granddaughter studied in the class

where I was the supervisor. She was quite inattentive and indifferent to learning

and missed classes very often. Her grandmother taught the same class and always

awarded high grades to her granddaughter, but ‘had awarded’ lower grades to

other students who did better and attended classes regularly. When I did not inflate

the grade of this student, her grandmother (my colleague) argued with me, calling

me an ill-mannered person who has no respect for senior colleagues. I was also

criticized for this approach by other colleagues who became aware of the

situation.”23

When some teachers try not to follow the institutional culture, they are accused of

being disrespectful towards fellow teachers, not only by the colleague whose

interests were involved, but also by others.

The attitude towards grade inflation incidents indicates that other colleagues

accept this behavior and expect that every teacher at the school would behave in

this way rather than try to respect professional integrity. In all but three responses

involving the issue of nepotism, respondents expressed no regret for what they

22 Interview Location A, N3. See also Avetisyan and Milovanovitch, “Damned If You Do, And Damned If You Don’t.” 23 Interview Location Y N20.


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have done and present this as an accepted practice, although they are aware that

this practice formally violates the integrity of the profession. The fact that the

practice of nepotism is perceived as acceptable is illustrated in the following

passage from our data: “In my extended professional experience there were many

cases when I have asked other teachers to mark higher grade to my relatives or I

have myself marked higher grades to children of our colleagues. This is life and you

should respect your colleagues.”24

Moreover, this behavior is presented as mutually beneficial—as a win-win strategy,

which can be inferred from the following statement from our data. “I thought to the

daughter of our school librarian. All the teachers and me too have marked her

higher grades than other pupils. And the librarian in her turn had supported us

during school events with organizational issues and any kind of support.”25

Trust is a vital feeling in workplace relationship, and fear of losing the relationship

makes teachers tolerate all hidden and obvious violations, pressures from their

fellow teachers. There is always a dilemma between resistance, refusing the

inclination to violate professional integrity, and the fear of losing good relations

with members of school community. Thus, it is not surprising that in our sample of

21cases related to the issue of a colleague’s child only 4 respondents attempted to

resist and challenge the rooted practice of nepotism towards colleagues’ children.

These respondents were quickly marginalized and labeled as “black sheep.” The

remaining participants accepted the situation as the “way of life,” and were “matter

of fact,”26 blaming culture and the unwritten rules of collegial loyalty.

Our data demonstrate that the respondents prioritized personal relationships

among members of their profession over professional ethics, and are ready to

ignore even the fact that this prioritizing may undermine the effectiveness of the

school’s education and weaken the public trust in schools. The fact that

participants are aware of the consequences of nepotism at schools can be inferred

from the following response. “In some cases you become a victim of the ‘relatives

in law – acquaintances – hail friends’ disruptive system. On one hand you

disappoint the student you are asked to help and create a fake future for him; on 24 Interview Location D N2. 25 Interview Location A N3. 26 Interview Location D N2.


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the other hand you also disappoint other students who believe in you and your

morals. I had acted in this way by inflating the grade I gave to my colleague’s

child’s exam paper.”27

The above-mentioned analysis demonstrates that nepotism, specifically the

phenomenon of grade inflation for fellow teachers’ children, is a component of the

informal systematic practices that make up the institutional culture of schools.

Although participants realize that this practice at least violates professional ethics,

it is so deeply rooted in institutional culture that conformity to this practice

became the norm and resistance to the practice is condemned as rule violating

behavior. Our data shows that participants understand that this practice threatens

the aims of the educational system and undermines the public trust, but they

continue to follow it, because it seems that they value personal relationships with

their colleagues more than professional integrity. This could be explained by value

orientation in Armenian society in general and the overall threshold of tolerance for

violating integrity norms.28

Value Orientation in Armenian Society and the Phenomenon of a Colleague’s Child

Culture, particularly value orientation in a particular culture, is a very important

factor for understanding informal practices, integrity violations and corrupt

behavior in any organization, including schools. Identifying several types of

corruption at the school level, Chapman emphasizes the role of culture and

differences in cultural perspectives.29 Cultural perceptions may be so different that

a type of behavior which might be considered as favoritism or nepotism in one

culture, in another might be regarded as providing family or friendship support.30

Looking at one of the types of social capital—the “institute of networks”—in

Armenian culture, Gayane Harutyunyan stated that in Armenian culture “institutes

27 Interview Location A N7. 28 Mihaylo Milovanovitch had introduced a concept about the range of tolerance for malpractice, which may be hard or soft depending on cultural and national differences in as well as the complexity of the education system. See Milovanovitch, “Fighting Corruption in Education.” 29 Chapman, “Corruption and the Education Sector.” 30 Mariam Orkodashvili,“Corruption in Higher Education: Causes, Consequences, Reforms, The Case of Georgia,”August 10, 2010, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1729903.


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of networks” are perceived as the best mechanism for solving problems at the

micro level. She emphasizes the fact that very often people in Armenia trust only

the relatives, family members, and friends who make up their network; they turn to

this network of people if they have a problem or need services, etc. As Harutyunyan

states, this increases risks of corruption through networks. Moreover, Harutyunyan

had shown that the “institute” of networks is present both on micro and macro

levels, for example, on the personal and organizational levels. The findings of this

research demonstrate that the reasons for such perceptions are a low level of trust

in public institutions and the supremacy of the role of family and relatives in

Armenian society.31 Harutyunyan’s research also revealed that people in Armenia

think that mutual help and support is the base of family, and that there is nothing

illegal in receiving help from family and relatives, despite of the type of help.32

This findings complement our data well: in all 17 cases of favorable treatment of

colleagues’ children, participants explain their behavior by loyalty and respect

towards colleagues. A typical example can be traced in the following statements

from our data. “Very often I had to be more indulgent towards a student—a

colleague’s child—than towards his classmate with similar indecent behavior. What

to do? There is no other way, she is your colleague.”33 Or: “I have been in such a

situation during an exam (9th grade), when one of our teachers asked me to pass

answers[for cheating] to her son. Another student noticed me passing him the

paper. I was in a stupid situation, as I felt as if I had been caught committing

robbery. After the exams I avoided meeting with students, but on the other hand I

couldn’t refuse my colleague.’’34

Moreover, the issues of trust, loyalty towards colleagues and mutual support is

heavily present in our data, which demonstrates that personal relationships,

respect, and loyalty toward colleagues have higher status in the hierarchy of values

than integrity, ethics, the aims and interests of the organization, and the society in

general. Our data demonstrates that even when teachers attempt to weigh the pros

31 Gayane Harutyunyan, “Institute of Networks as a Type of Social Capital in Armenian Society (“Tsanoti” instituty vorpes socialakan kapitali drsevorman dzev hay hasarakutyunum’’), Armenian Sociological Club, March 17, 2010, http://armsociology.com/?p=28 32 Id. 33 Interview Location Y N 3. 34 Interview Location Y N 16.


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and cons of their behavior when asked to inflate the grade of a colleagues’ child or

otherwise violate professional ethics by providing inappropriate help, personal

interests such as respect towards colleagues, mutual trust and support almost

always outweigh such values as integrity, public interest and trust. This is a clear

demonstration that the interests of the “network” are valued more highly than the

interests of the institution and the society in general.

The fact that personal interests have higher status in the value ranking in Armenia

is confirmed by recent research on beliefs and value orientation in Armenian

society. Based on Schwartz’s theory of value orientations and preferences, this

research demonstrates that,35 among values ranked by Schwartz’ Value Survey,

conservative values such as conformity and security, as well as benevolence,36 have

the highest rating.37 This predicts people’s behavioral preference to maintain

stability in personal relationships and refrain from actions that contradict social

expectations.38

Both the study on the “institute” of networks and value orientation emphasized the

lack of trust in public institutions in Armenia.39 The lack of trust makes people rely

on their own networks in different life situations, which creates a moral obligation

to pay back the “network” members by supporting them when they need support.

In our data we can see expressions such as “I have been asked by a colleague to

award a higher grade” or “I asked a colleague to award a higher grade.” These

expressions demonstrate that the specified behavior is systematic and mutual:

teachers both ask colleagues to inflate grades and themselves are asked to do the

same by their colleagues. Moreover, the data demonstrate that they accept this as

a normative rather than deviant behavior, because they present it as a “way of life,”

an already established order. 35 The Schwartz Value Survey consists of 57 values measuring 10 basic values. The values are presented in two lists. The first list includes 30 values that are formulated as nouns (concepts) showing an individual's desired goals. The values in the second list (27 items) are phrased as adjectives (qualities) that show desirable ways of acting. The 10 scales of values are the following: Self-Direction, Stimulation, Hedonism, Achievement, Power, Security, Conformity, Tradition, Benevolence, and Universalism. See Narine Khachatryan, Sona Manusyan, et al., Culture, Values, Beliefs: Behavior Guidelines in Changing Armenian Society (Academic Swiss Caucasus Net, 2014), 45, http://www.ascn.ch/en/research/Completed-Projects/Completed-Projects-Armenia.html. 36 Benevolence is the need for attachment with the primary group and manifests in actions intended to promote the well-being of others. 37 Khachatryan and Manusyan, et al., Culture, Values, Beliefs, 47. 38 Id., 47-48. 39 Id.


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Our data show that there is very little resistance to nepotism at schools. Moreover,

those who resist are condemned by the whole group and not only by a particular

teacher whose interests were not upheld. It seems that private interests of one

teacher are considered as the interests of the whole team of teachers at a

particular school. Therefore, the group puts moral pressure on those teachers who

do not want to follow unwritten rules of loyalty towards colleagues’ interests. Our

participants feared losing good relationships with colleagues if they attempted to

resist nepotism. This could also be explained by the lack of trust in public

institutions: teachers as the rest of the society probably do not trust public

institutions and authorities, including those in schools, thus they have to conform

to unwritten rules of the network and meet its expectations to be able to rely on it

when they themselves need help.

Overall, our findings indicate that culture and specifically the value orientation in a

particular culture in Armenia creates a fertile ground for nepotism to thrive in

schools. It does so by prioritizing the personal advantages of friends, colleagues

and family over social justice and professional ethics.

Conclusion

Grade fixing situations related to giving higher-than-deserved grades to colleagues’

children or helping them to cheat during exams are clear examples of nepotism—a

type of corruption—that is, violations of teachers’ professional integrity. Our data

demonstrate that this behavior is part of the institutional culture of schools, and is

being accepted as a normative behavior; the value orientation in Armenian society

explains why the majority of participants conform to unwritten rules of loyalty

towards colleagues and criticize those who attempt to resist this culture.

Research demonstrated that in Armenian society personal interests are prioritized

over such values as honesty, social justice, and professional ethics. People do not

trust public authorities and prefer to rely on their own networks in various

situations, and they tend to uphold the interests of the network at the expense of

public interests. In line with the findings of other researchers, our data

demonstrated that the majority of teachers consider giving higher than deserved

grades to colleagues’ children or helping them to cheat during exams as

acceptable behavior, a way of life. Those who engage in such activities are not


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condemned, but are considered trustworthy and respected colleagues. In contrast,

those who refuse to follow this path are labeled as disrespectful and untrustworthy,

and are quickly marginalized.

It seems that when a network is based in a public institution such as a school, it

tends to replace the aims and interests of the organization with those of the

network. Obviously, good marks and overall good results of the network members’

children are within the network’s interests and are more important for fellow

teachers than the primary goals of schools. Teachers are ready to pursue the

interests of their network members regardless of overall long- and short-term

negative consequences for a school and for society in general, such as undermining

students’ belief in social justice and weakening the public trust in schools.


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About the Authors

Meri Avetisyan is an Assistant Professor (currently on maternity leave) at the Chair

of Developmental and Applied Psychology of the Armenian State Pedagogical

University, in Yerevan, Armenia. Meri’s research interest in this subject originated

during her time as a school teacher, and consequently developed after she became

an Assistant Professor at the University.

Varsenik Khachatryan works as a school psychologist at “Tsakhunq Open School”

in a village in Armenia, and is interested in integrity issues in education.

Acknowledgments

The authors are grateful to Lab Fellow Mihaylo Milovanovitch for his invaluable

advice, comments, and feedback on the earlier version of this paper, and to Elena

Denisova-Schmidt for her comments on the first draft. First author Meri Avetisyan

would like to thank Network Fellow Aleksandr Khechumyan for endless discussions

and feedback during the process of researching and writing of this piece. She also

wants to acknowledge the enthusiastic efforts and help of her former student, Ani

Hovhannisyan, in collecting the data. Finally, it would have not been possible to

realize this idea and conduct the research without the support of the Edmond J.

Safra Center for Ethics Research Lab.


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Working Paper Series

Institutional Corruptions by Lawrence Lessig Edmond J. Safra Research Lab Working Papers, No. 1 Strengthening the Theory of Institutional Corruptions: Broadening, Clarifying, and Measuring by Donald W. Light Edmond J. Safra Research Lab Working Papers, No. 2 Influence Incognito by Brooke Williams Edmond J. Safra Research Lab Working Papers, No. 3 Professionalism and Moral Behavior: Does A Professional Self-Conception Make One More Unethical? by Maryam Kouchaki Edmond J. Safra Research Lab Working Papers, No. 4 Short-Termism At Its Worst: How Short-Termism Invites Corruption… and What to Do About It by Malcolm S. Salter Edmond J. Safra Research Lab Working Papers, No. 5 What Institutional Corruption Shares with Obscenity by Gregg Fields Edmond J. Safra Research Lab Working Papers, No. 6 Investment Consultants and Institutional Corruption by Jay Youngdahl Edmond J. Safra Research Lab Working Papers, No. 7 Does the Gender of Directors Matter? by Miriam Schwartz-Ziv Edmond J. Safra Research Lab Working Papers, No. 8 Finding Solutions to Institutional Corruption: Lessons from Cognitive Dissonance Theory by Lisa Cosgrove and Robert Whitaker Edmond J. Safra Research Lab Working Papers, No. 9


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Democracy in Poverty: A View From Below by Daniel M. Weeks Edmond J. Safra Research Lab Working Papers, No. 10 What’s the Big Deal?: The Ethics of Public-Private Partnerships Related to Food and Health by Jonathan H. Marks Edmond J. Safra Research Lab Working Papers, No. 11 Tax-Exempt Corruption:Exploring Elements of Institutional Corruption in Bond Finance by Zachary Fox Edmond J. Safra Research Lab Working Papers, No. 12 Second Thoughts on Second Opinions: Conflicted Advisors Reduce the Quality of Their Advice When They Know They Will be “Second-Guessed” by Sunita Sah and George Loewenstein Edmond J. Safra Research Lab Working Papers, No. 13 Culture Wars: Rate Manipulation, Institutional Corruption, and the Lost Underpinnings of Market Conduct Regulation by Justin O’Brien Edmond J. Safra Research Lab Working Papers, No. 14 Institutional Corruption and the Crisis of Liberal Democracy by William English Edmond J. Safra Research Lab Working Papers, No. 15 Two Concepts of Corruption by Dennis F. Thompson Edmond J. Safra Research Lab Working Papers, No. 16 Think Tanks’ Dirty Little Secret: Power, Public Policy, and Plagiarism by J.H. Snider Edmond J. Safra Research Lab Working Papers, No. 17 Rooting Out Institutional Corruption To Manage Inappropriate Off-Label Drug Use by Marc A. Rodwin Edmond J. Safra Research Lab Working Papers, No. 18 Divided Loyalties: Using Fiduciary Law to Show Institutional Corruption by Michael Pierce Edmond J. Safra Research Lab Working Papers, No. 19


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Political Finance in the United Kingdom by Timothy Winters Edmond J. Safra Research Lab Working Papers, No. 20 Blinding as a Solution to Institutional Corruption by Christopher Robertson Edmond J. Safra Research Lab Working Papers, No. 21 A Passport at Any Price? Citizenship by Investment through the Prism of Institutional Corruption by Laura Johnston Edmond J. Safra Research Lab Working Papers, No. 22 Independent Drug Testing to Ensure Drug Safety and Efficacy by Marc A. Rodwin Edmond J. Safra Research Lab Working Papers, No. 23 Brazil’s Case Against Private-Sponsored Events for Judges: A Not-yet-perfect Attempt at Fighting Institutional Corruption by José Vicente Santos de Mendonça Edmond J. Safra Research Lab Working Papers, No. 24 Institutional Corruption: A Fiduciary Theory by M.E. Newhouse Edmond J. Safra Research Lab Working Papers, No. 25 “You’re Not Just a Paid Monkey Reading Slides:” How Key Opinion Leaders Explain and Justify Their Work by Sergio Sismondo Edmond J. Safra Research Lab Working Papers, No. 26 The Power of Perception: Reconciling Competing Hypotheses about the Influence of NRA Money in Politics by Arjun Ponnambalam Edmond J. Safra Research Lab Working Papers, No. 27 Does Trust Matter? Corruption and Environmental Regulatory Policy in the United States by Oguzhan Dincer and Per Fredriksson Edmond J. Safra Research Lab Working Papers, No. 28 Singapore Sling: How Coercion May Cure the Hangover in Financial Benchmark Governance by Justin O’Brien Edmond J. Safra Research Lab Working Papers, No. 29


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Justification of Academic Corruption at Russian Universities: A Student Perspective by Elena Denisova-Schmidt Edmond J. Safra Research Lab Working Papers, No. 30 Fighting Corruption in Education: A Call for Sector Integrity Standards by Mihaylo Milovanovitch Edmond J. Safra Research Lab Working Papers, No. 31 Annals of Crony Capitalism: Revisiting the AIG Bailout by Malcolm S. Salter Edmond J. Safra Research Lab Working Papers, No. 32 From “Institutional” to “Structural” Corruption: Rethinking Accountability in a World of Public-Private Partnerships by Irma E. Sandoval-Ballesteros Edmond J. Safra Research Lab Working Papers, No. 33 The Open Government Index Initiative: A Colombian Tool for Preventing Institutional Corruption by Juan Pablo Remolina Edmond J. Safra Research Lab Working Papers, No. 34 Judicial Independence in Latin America and the (Conflicting) Influence of Cultural Norms by Roberto Laver Edmond J. Safra Research Lab Working Papers, No. 35 How to Mitigate Corruption in Emerging Markets: The Case of Russia by Stanislav Shekshnia, Alena V. Ledeneva and Elena Denisova-Schmidt Edmond J. Safra Research Lab Working Papers, No. 36 Interagency Information Sharing with Resource Competition by Laurence Tai Edmond J. Safra Research Lab Working Papers, No. 37 Banking Compliance and Dependence Corruption: Towards an Attachment Perspective by Kate Kenny Edmond J. Safra Research Lab Working Papers, No. 38 Institutional Integrity, Corruption, and Taxation by Gillian Brock Edmond J. Safra Research Lab Working Papers, No. 39


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Institutional Corruption: From Purpose to Function by Paul C. Taylor Edmond J. Safra Research Lab Working Papers, No. 40 Institutional Corruption as a Problem of Institutional Design: A General Framework by Gustavo H. Maultasch de Oliveira Edmond J. Safra Research Lab Working Papers, No. 41 Community Development Authorities: A Further Exploration of Institutional Corruption in Bond Finance by Mary M. Báthory Vidaver Edmond J. Safra Research Lab Working Papers, No. 42 Tackling Corruption in Political Party Financing: Lessons from Global Regulatory Practices by Chandrashekhar Krishnan Edmond J. Safra Research Lab Working Papers, No. 43 Trust and Institutional Corruption: The Case of Education in Tunisia by Mihaylo Milovanovitch Edmond J. Safra Research Lab Working Papers, No. 44 Systemic Corruption: Considering Culture in Second-Generation Reforms by Roberto Laver Edmond J. Safra Research Lab Working Papers, No. 45 Negotiation Games in the Fight against Corruption by Mariano Mosquera Edmond J. Safra Research Lab Working Papers, No. 46 Arms, Exports, Influence: Institutional Corruption in the German Arms Export Regime by Kathrin Strobel Edmond J. Safra Research Lab Working Papers, No. 47 Corruption Issues in State and Local Politics: Is Political Culture a Deep Determinant? by Oguzhan Dincer and Michael Johnston Edmond J. Safra Research Lab Working Papers, No. 48 Who Governs Global Affairs? The Role of Institutional Corruption in U.S. Foreign Policy by Simona Ross Edmond J. Safra Research Lab Working Papers, No. 49


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Crony Capitalism, American Style: What Are We Talking About? by Malcolm S. Salter Edmond J. Safra Research Lab Working Papers, No. 50 Nepotism at Schools in Armenia: A Cultural Perspective by Meri Avetisyan and Varsenik Khachatryan Edmond J. Safra Research Lab Working Papers, No. 51

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Marcia Angell Lisa Cosgrove Arthur Applbaum Oguzhan Dincer Marguerite Avery William English Mahzarin Banaji Gregg Fields Max Bazerman Paul Jorgensen Archon Fung Aaron Kesselheim David Korn Genevieve Pham-Kanter Nancy Rosenblum Marc Rodwin Malcolm Salter Susannah Rose Dennis Thompson

Nepotism at Schools in Armenia: A Cultural Perspective

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