Neoconservatives; an analysis of their journey from

Ca in M icha e l T ib e r iu s H aywa r d -Hughes

D is se r t a t io n NeoCon s e r v a t i v e s 1

Neoconservatives

An analysis of their journey from Cold War

inception through Wilsonian roots, to polemical

dogmatism and [perhaps] inevitable hubris



C o n t e n t s

Abstr ac t I V

Pre f ace V

P a r t One Root s & Ech oe s o f t he Pa s t

Chapter I 0 7

Chapter I I 16

P a r t Two The End o f S t a t e s & Hub r i s

Chapter I I I 29

Bibl iogr aphy 42



The historical task of neoconservatism would seem to be

this: to convert the Republican Party, and American

conservatism in general , against their respective wi l ls, into a

new kind of conservative polit ics suitable to governing a

modern democracy.

I r v i n g K r i s t o l . T h e N e o c o n s e r v a t i v e P e r s u a s i o n .

T h e N e o c o n R e a d e r . 2 0 0 4 . S t e l z e r . G r o v e P r e s s . N e w Y o r k .



Abstract

This dissertation shal l , in the first instance, delineate the antecedents of

the neoconservative foreign policy outlook, in respect of any analogous

‘Wilsonian’ vision, from the period following the Cold War. As a

corollary what follows ameliorates the ideas and impacts that this small

but highly influential group of cold war l iberals had, and sti l l have, on

American foreign pol icy to the present day. Specifical ly where these ideas

came from and how they are pursued takes centre stage. In précis the

purpose of this treatise is to replace heat with l ight, and in -so-doing

separate the truths underlying some of the fears of neoconservatism and

neocons from the fantasies. The main tenets of the ‘Wilsonian’ foreign

policy direct ion are instantiated and measured against the key tenets of

neoconservative thought and foreign policy direction, accenting the ways

in which neoconservatives advocate a ‘dogmatic’ ‘Wilsonian’ vision for

foreign affairs . By this measure the neocon servative foreign policy

outlook can be understood in the l ight of ‘Wilsonian’ ideals and any

similarit ies explicated. In the second instance this essay examines who

won the Cold War and draws attention to the ways in which a

neoconservative vision for foreign affairs can be understood in the ‘post

9/11’ cl imate. The f inal part of this discussion posits that the domination

of states within international re lations is g iving way to the domination of

‘social movements’ . The impact of this seismic shift wil l , i n al l

l ikelihood, end with the neoconservatives engulfed in lugubrious hubris.



Preface

Perhaps the hardest part of any discourse on the neoconservatives is

getting behind the prejudice implied in the word neoconserva tive and seeing

what these f igures rea lly thought and sa id. Neoconservatives are a diverse

group; often they shun their label on the grounds of i ts pejorative

connotat ions while others are amused, f lattered, or dismissive, depending

on the context. Although neoconservat ive is often deemed a pejorat ive term,

it can hardly be cast in poor l ight i f understood within the boundaries of

an accurate definition. Contrary to what the label implies, some

neoconservatives are l iberal on social issues and favour governmental

intervention in economic affai rs; others are socia l and cultura l

conservatives who are reluctant to interfere with markets. 1 Some

advocate an aggressively interventionist foreign pol icy, whereas others

urge caution and restraint in the use of American power. 2 The ties that

bind the two factions together, however, is their common identity as

activist intel lectuals, as well as a deep anti -Communist commitment. 3

Precise ly how, therefore, is neoconservatism defined? Journalists, and

now even presidentia l candidates, speak with an enviable c onfidence on

who or what is ‘neoconservative’ and seem to assume the meaning ful ly

revealed in the name. 4 This can be misleading.

Constructivist understanding posits that the neoconservative

‘movement’ was originally formed out of a broad collective coal i t ion of

anti -communist academics who dominated American l iberalism in the late

1940s through to the late 1970s.

1 Ehrma n . , Joh n , . 19 95 . Th e R i s e o f Ne o c o n s e r v a t i sm : I n t e l l e c t u a l s a n d Fo r e i g n A f f a i r s 1 94 5 -1 9 94 . v i i . Ya l e Un ive r s i t y P re s s . 2 i b id . 3 i b id . 4 K r i s t o l . I r v ing , . 2 00 4 . Th e Ne o c o n s e r v a t i v e P e r s u a t i o n . T he Neocon Re ad e r . p . 2 9 . Ed i t e d by S t e l z e r . Grove P re ss . New Yo rk .



Neoconservatism in this guise can be understood as an intel lectual

undercurrent that surfaces only intermittently. It is not, as the

conspiratorial cr itics would have i t , a ‘movement’ . Neoconservatism is

that which the late historian of Jacksonian America, Marvin Meyers,

called a ‘persuasion’, one which manifests i tse lf over t ime, but erratical ly ,

and one whose meaning is g l impsed c learly only in retrospect . 5

Viewed thus, one can say that ‘ the historical task and poli t ical

purpose of neoconservatism would seem to be this: to convert the

Republican Party, and American conservatism in general , against their

respective wi l ls, into a new kind of conservative pol itics suitable to

governing a modern democracy’. 6 That this new conservatism is distinctly

American is beyond doubt.

Throughout the neoconservative history there has been a

consistent and subtle enunciat ion of their animosity towa rds communist

ideals. Indeed the neoconservatives maintained their hard -l ine anti -

Communism and gradually broke with what they viewed as a dangerous

turn to the left during the 1970s by l iberal ism and the Democratic party,

and regained their influence as part of President Ronald Reagan’s

conservative coali tion during the 1980s. 7 There is , however, a problem

for intel lectuals when they move beyond their cloistered arenas of

abstract ideas and operate in the real world of party pol itics, where

principle often must give way to compromise or expediency. A close

reading of that which prominent neocons have sa id leads to the

conclusion that the foreign pol icy they advocate , some of which was

adopted by the Bush administration in response to the attack on America

on September 11th 2001, is less radical , and certainly less novel, than is

widely thought.

5 op . c i t . K r i s t o l . Th e Ne o c o n s e r v a t i v e P e r s u a t i o n . p . 3 3 . 6 i b id . 7 op c i t . Eh rman . v i i i .



Part One

Roots & Echoes of the Pas t

Chapter I

There is a necessary caveat bound with any discussion on the

development of neoconservatism. As David Brooks notes in an artic le for

the New York Times; ‘If you ever read a sentence that starts with

‘Neocons believe’ , there is a 99.44 per cent chance everything else in that

sen tence wil l be untrue.’ 8 Brooks is r ight. There is no such thing as a

neoconservative ‘movement’ , in the dict ionary sense of ‘ a group of peop le

working to advance a shared cause ’ 9 (a series of organized actions to advance

a shared cause). There is however, that which the acknowledged

godfather 1 0 of neoconservatism, Irving Kristol, terms ‘the

neoconservatism persuasion 1 1 ’ ; that which Joshua Muravchik terms ‘a

distinctive neoconservative sensibil ity 1 2 ’ ; and that which Norman

Podhoretz, in Commentary magazine used to develop and win adherents to

the foreign policy branch of neoconservatism - ‘a tendency 1 3 ’ . Podhoretz

prefers the description ‘tendency’, since as Ste lzer explains 1 4

neoconservatism ‘never had or aspired to the kind of centra l organization

character i stic of a movement’ . 1 5

8 B roo k s . Dav id , . 2 00 4 . Th e E ra o f D i s t o r t i o n . J anu a ry 6 t h 2 0 06 . New Yo rk T ime s . New Yo rk T ime s Co .

9 The Oxfo rd Eng l i sh D ic t io na ry . New Sh or t e r Ed i t io n . 1 99 3 . Ed . Le s l e y Br own . p . 6 2 3 . C l a re nd on P re s s Oxfo rd 1 0 op . c i t . K r i s t o l . Th e Ne o c o n s e r v a t i v e P e r s u a t i o n . p . 33 . 1 1 i b id . 1 2 Muravch i k . Jo shu a , . 20 0 4 . Th e Ne o c o n s e r v a t i v e Caba l . p . 25 4 . F rom Neo c o n s e r v a t i sm . Ed i t e d by S t e l z e r . At l a n t i c B oo ks Lo nd on . 1 3 Pod hore t z . Norman , . 1 99 6 . Neo c o n s e r v a t i sm : A Eu l o g y . C ommen t a r y . Marc h 1 99 6 . p . 20 . Ame r i c an J ew i sh Commit t e e . 1 4 S t e l z e r . I rw in , . 2 00 4 . Th e N e o c o n s e r v a t i v e P e r s u a t i o n . Th e N e o c o n R e ad e r . p . 4 . Gro ve P re s s . New York . 1 5 i b id . Pod ho re s t z . p . 20



In part this disincl ination by a group that ‘share[s] views on many

subjects’ 1 6 to label neoconservatism a ‘movement’ stems from recognition

by the those in broad agreement with some of its principles that there are

non-trivial differences among them on important points of policy. 1 7 In

part , Stelzer posits, i t stems from the fact that many of the m have spent

their l ives rai l ing against a variety of self -sty led ‘movements’ – the peace

movement, the communist movement, the environmental movement, and

others that view with horror deviations from organizational orthodoxy by

their dues-paying members. 1 8 The intel lectuals known as ‘neocons’ ,

loosely defined, prize their individualism; they simply are not grouping

with others to form an ideological monolith. 1 9 As already noted,

neoconservatism is more a tendency than a movement. Kristol informs

the reader, in The Neoconservat ive Persuasion , that ‘there is no set of

neoconservative beliefs concerning foreign pol icy, only a set of att itudes

derived from historical experience’ . 2 0 The favourite text on which

neocons find their historical anlage is in the work s of Professor Leo

Strauss, particularly; On Thucydides’ War of the Peloponnesians and the

Athenians. 2 1 Recently the focus of media attention has been centered on

foreign policy , in respect to neoconservative American poli tics. This is

surprising since there is no set of neoconservative beliefs concerning

foreign policy, only a set of atti tudes derived from history – history as

far back as Herodotus himself envisages. Neoconservatism is associated

with periodicals such as Commentary and The Weekly Standard and foreign

policy initiatives of think tanks such as the American Enterprise Insti tute

(AEI) and the Project of the New American Century (PNAC).

1 6 The Econ omi s t . 2 00 4 . May 29 t h 20 0 4 . p . 2 5 . T he Eco nomi s t Newspa pe r L im i t ed . 1 7 op . c i t . S t e l z e r . 20 04 . T h e Ne o c o n R e ad e r . p . 4 . 1 8 i b id . 1 9 i b id . 2 0 op . c i t . K r i s t o l . Th e Ne o c o n s e r v a t i v e P e r s u a t i o n . p . 35 . 2 1 S t r au s s . Leo , . 1 96 4 . Th e C i t y an d Man . Es say en t i t l ed ; On Thu c y d i d e s ’ War o f t h e P e l o p o n n e s i an s an d t h e Ath e n i an s . p . 1 39 - 2 43 . T he U n i ve r s i t y o f Ch ic ago P re s s .



None of which present a complete foreign policy outlook. Subtle

differences aside these atti tudes are encapsulated in the following theses

proposed by Kristol .

Firs t , pa tr iot i sm i s a natura l and hea l thy sent iment , and should be

encouraged by both pr iva te and publ ic inst i tu t ions ; second, wor ld

government i s a terr ib le idea s ince i t can lead to wor ld tyranny .

Internat iona l inst i tut ions tha t po int to an u l t imate wor ld government

should be regarded wi th the deepest susp ic ion; th ird , sta te smen should ,

above a l l , have the abi l i ty to d i s t ingui sh fr iends from enemies [not a s

easy a s the Cold War revea led] ; and f ina l ly , for a great power , the

‘nat iona l in teres t ’ i s not a geographica l term, except for fa i r ly prosa ic

matter s , inc lud ing [amongst others] t rade a nd environmenta l

regulat ion . 2 2

[My ad d i t io n s ]

In order to instantiate this for example a smal ler nat ion might

appropriate ly feel that its national interest begins and ends at i ts borders,

in short i t is internally focused, its foreign po l icy is almost always in

defense mode. A larger nat ion has more extensive interests and a larger

nation whose identity is ideological , l ike the Soviet Union of the Cold

War and United States of to -day, inevitably have ideological interests in

addit ion to more materia l concerns. Barring extraordinary events, the

United States wil l always feel obliged to defend, i f possible, a democratic

nation under attack from non-democratic forces, external or internal . 2 3

The thread that runs through this understanding of neoconservatism can

be seen as born from a ‘Wilsonian’ understanding of international

relat ions and foreign affairs.

2 2 op . c i t . K r i s t o l . Th e Ne o c o n s e r v a t i v e P e r s u a t i o n . p . 3 6 . 2 3 i b id .



There is, therefore, an inherent sorrow within a thread of this na ture –

the difficult conundrum of what to leave out. The history of both

‘Wilsonian’ ideology and the neoconservative movement is together

broad and multifaceted. Space prohibits a full treat ise of ‘Wilsonian’

history but does faci l itate an historic treati se, in précis, as means of an

analge for neo-conservatism. A laconic summary of Wilson’s foreign

policy outlook coupled with the neoconservative response informs the

underpinnings of this argument. In order to understand these principles,

compromises and the legacy of intel lectual thought brought to bare on

neoconservatives a brief overview of the ‘Wilsonian’ vision for foreign

policy is prudent. The ‘Wilsonian’ vision for foreign policy outlook is the

outgrowth of President Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points†, which he

believed, that if implemented, would help create world peace. Wilson’s

speech of January 8 t h 1918, delivered to Congress, outl ining his fourt een

points for reconstructing a new Europe following World War I was

idealist ic in some respects, myopi c in others and successful in only a few.

While some of his points were specif ic, others were more general ,

including freedom of the seas, abol ishing secret treaties, disarmament,

restored sovereignty of some occupied lands, and the right of national

self-determination.

It is the general undertone and foreign policy vision of Wilson’s

speech that the neoconservative ‘movement’ adapted for their own

foreign pol icy ‘direct ion’. As such it is clear that the neoconservatives of

the 1970s and 1980s were st i l l r epresentative of the cold war l iberalism –

often called the vital centre – that echoed ‘Wilsonian’ ideals and

developed after World War II.

† Wil son ’ s Fou r t e e n P o i n t s a r e f u l l y d e t a i l ed in t he app end ix on the f i na l p age o f t h i s d i s se r t a t io n .



These ideals were the anlage for the neoconservatives’ anti -Communism,

which were born from a belief in the superiori ty of American democratic

values. The three key principles analogous with both veins of thought are

self-determination, the advocacy of democracy and, crucial ly, anti -

isolationism in the sphere of intervention in the promotion of democracy

to create global stabil i ty and peace. The overriding concerns of

neoconservatives are characterized by benevolence and ideology, rather

than strict self -interest and fear. These stra ins of thought worked

together in the 1980s, when many neoconservatives held office under

President Regan, to re inforce the administration’s anti -Communist

outlook while a lso moving it toward a pol icy of actively assisting foreign

governments or groups trying to develop democratic insti tutions of their

own. 5 In this respect neoconservatives’ closely advocated the ‘Wilsonian’

vision for foreign affairs.

There is a common misconception surrounding the

neoconservative story – that they are too academic, often dismissed as

detached from realpol i t ik , perceived as hudibrast ic. Barnes wrote that :

[…] neo -cons defected f rom the Democra t ic par ty in droves in the la te

1970s and ear ly 1980s . Their chief gr ipe : Democrats were

accommodat ing in the f ace of Sov iet expansioni sm and suppor t ive of

soc ia l permiss iv ism. 2 4

Such simplistic and sweeping comments display a myopic view of the

circumstances under which neoconservatives spl intered from the

Democrat ic Party and the differences between related neoconse rvative

threads. Neoconservatives have within their number l ibera ls ,

conservatives, polit icians and l iterary intel lectuals.

2 4 Ba rn es . , F r ed , . 19 92 . Th e y ’ r e Ba ck ! New Re pu b l i c . Augu s t . Vo lume 3 . 1 9 92 . p . 12 . The Ne w Repub l i c .



As a group its core successes and fai lures are not easi ly defined by dint

of its complex constituent structure. In the context of United States

foreign policy , neoconserva tism has a narrow and elegant clari ty . Its core

posits are based on interventionist hawkish views with an emphasis on

mili tary force, unilateral i f required, to replace autocratic regimes with

democratic ones. Although this view is at odds and competes with strict

l iberal international ism, rea lism and non -intervention, it remains true to

Wilson. Broadly sympathetic to Wilson’s idealist ic goals to spread

American principles of democracy, neoconservatives grew to reject the

notion of a re l iance on international organizations and treaties to

accomplish these objectives. Although John Lewis Gaddis, of Yale

University, be l ieves that President Bush’s foreign policy is a disastrous

deviation from the more multi lateral ist policy crafted by Franklin D.

Roosevelt, he has pointed out that many of the doctrines underlying the

current president’s policy have roots in America ’s his tory. 2 5

Early in the twentieth century, Theodore Roosevelt articulated a

policy that differs l i tt le from that of George W. Bush, with the exception

of Theodore Roosevelt’s concentration on the Western Hemisphere: 2 6

Chronic wrongdoing , or an impotence which resu l t s in a genera l

loosening of the t ie s of c iv i l i zed soc ie ty , may […] u l t imate ly requ ire

in tervent ion by some c iv i l i zed na t ion, and in the Weste rn Hemisphere

[…] may force the United S tate s , however re luctant ly […] to the

exerc i se of inte rnat iona l pol ice power ’ . 2 7

Neoconservatives have embraced the president who, in Ste lzer’s eyes,

urged Americans to speak softly and carry a big stick. 2 8

2 5 op . c i t . S t e l z e r . 2 00 4 . Th e Ne o c o n R e ad e r . p . 4 .

2 6 i b id . p . 9 . 2 7 c i t i ed by Gad d i s . Jo hn , Lew i s , . 20 04 . S u r p r i s e , S e c u r i t y an d t h e Ame r i c an Ex p e r i e n c e . p . 2 1 . Har va rd . 2 8 i b id S t e l z e r .



In their essay, National Interes t and Global Responsibi l i t y , Kristol and Kagan

cite with particular approval Theodore Roosevelt’s statement, ‘

A na t ion’s f i r st duty i s wi thi n i t s borders , but i t i s not thereby

absolved from fac ing i t s du t ie s in the wor ld a s a whole ; and i f i t

refuses to do so , i t mere ly forfe i t s i t s r ight to struggle for a place

among the people tha t shape the dest iny of mank ind. 2 9

A decade after Roosevelt’ s statement, Wilson told the world that America

had occupied Cuba, ‘Not for annexation but to provide the helpless

colony with the opportunity for freedom’, 3 0 language similar to that used

by George W. Bush and Tony Blair many years later as one of the

justificat ions for unseating Saddam Hussein. Wilson is regarded as the

‘poster boy’ of modern neoconservatism for this very reason. Like to -

day’s neocons, Wilson sought to remake the world, or substantial

portions of i t , in America ’s democratic image. His cal l for ‘se lf -

determination’, a concept he never really defined, 3 1 is echoed in the Bush-

Blair ca l l for free elections that wil l al low Iraqis to determine their own

furture. 3 2

However, neoconservatism is Wilsonianism with a very big

difference. Wilson believed that his goal could be achieved by relying on

the persuasive powers of multi latera l insti tut ions such as the League of

Nations. Neocons disagree. This is perhaps the most palpable difference

between a ‘Wilsonian’ vision of foreign policy and that o f a

neoconservative vision. This break from Wilson can be seen as a

response to the fai lure of international organizations, specifical ly the

League of Nations, to deliver on their promise to regulate global stabi l ity

2 9 K r i s t o l a nd Kaga n . 2 00 4 . Nat i o n a l I n t e r e s t a n d G l o ba l R e s p o n s i b i l i t y . p .7 3 . Neo c o n s e r v a t i sm . Ed i t ed by S t e l z e r . At l a n t i c Boo k s Lo nd o n . 3 0 op . c i t . S t e l z e r . 20 04 . T h e Ne o c o n R e ad e r . p . 9 . 3 1 Macmi l l an . , Ma rga re t , . 20 0 3 . P e a c emak e r s : Th e P a r i s Con f e r e n c e o f 191 9 an d I t s A t t emp t s t o End War s . p .31 . Jo hn Mur ra y P re ss 3 2 i b id . S t e l z e r .



and secure peace. The mistrust of international organizations and treaties

to del iver on their promises manifests itself in the neoconservative

rel iance on an increased emphasis on defense capabi l ity , a wi l l ingnes s to

challenge regimes deemed hosti le to the values and interests of the

United States, pressing for free -market polices abroad, and promoting

democracy and freedom.

Neocons would make democracy possible by deposing dictatorial

regimes that threaten American security and world order – using mili tary

force if al l else fai ls; they would follow regime change with nation -

building; and they would rely on varying ‘coalit ions of the wil l ing’, rather

than on the United Nations. The neocon position might be summed up as

[…] d iplomacy i f poss ib le , force i f necessary ; the UN if poss ible , ad

hoc coa l i t ions or uni la te ra l ac t ion i f necessary ; pre -emptive s tr ikes i f i t

i s reasonable to ant ic ipate host i le act ion on the par t of Amer ica ’ s

enemies . 3 3

Max Boot emphatically states that neocons are Wilsonian idealists. 3 4

Although, he attaches an important qualification; the ‘Wilsonian’ label, as

Boot understands, has been haphazardly affixed to anyone who bel ieves

that U.S. foreign policy should be guided by the promotion of American

ideals, not just the protect ion of narrowly defined economic interests, as

realpoli tikers believe. 3 5 However, Wilsonians’ are not al l al ike. Liberal

‘soft ’ Wilsonians’ , such as former U.S President Jimmy Carter and,

previously, U.S. President Woodrow Wilson himself, share a fai th that, as

aforementioned, multi lateral organizations should be the main venues

through which the United States promotes its ideals, and that

international law should be the United States’ main policy tool.

3 3 op . c i t . S t e l z e r . 20 04 . T h e Ne o c o n R e ad e r . p . 1 0 . 3 4 Boot . , Max , . 2 00 4 . Th ink A ga i n Ne o c o n s . p . 12 . Fo re i gn Po l i c y . J a nua ry 1 s t 2 0 04 . Fo re i g n Po l i c y . 3 5 i b id .



Boot is almost unique in his interpretat ion that these so -called ‘soft’

neocons are wil l ing to use force onl y when the intervention is untainted

by any hint of nat ional interest . This is c learly myopic. For any

promotion of peace is necessari ly in the interest of international stabi l ity,

and by corollary, in the natural interest of the United States. Boot seems

to contradict himself when he states ‘that neocons have scant regard for

Wilson himself, whom they regard as hopelessly naïve’ . 3 6 Indeed, Boot

attempts to parry his own argument be citing the second strand in his

dichotomous explicat ion of neocons – his so-called ‘hard Wilsonians’ .

‘Hard Wilsonians’ , 3 7 place their fai th not in pieces of paper but in power,

specifical ly U.S. power. Their heroes are Theodore Roosevelt , Frankl in

Roosevelt, Harry Truman, and Ronald Reagan – al l U.S. presidents who

successful ly wielded power in the service of a higher purpose. When

these dichotomous strands are woven to -gether Boot recognizes the

solemn thread that in précis neocons believe that the United States

should use force when necessary to champion its ideals as well a s its

interest, not only out of sheer humanitarianism but a lso because the

spread of democracy improves U.S. security, whi le crimes against

humanity inevitably make the world a more dangerous place. 3 8

3 6 op . c i t . Bo ot . , Max , . p . 1 2 . 3 7 i b id . 3 8 i b id .



C h a p t e r I I

Wrought w i th in the f ina l chapte r of the Co ld War , the pens of

ed i tor ia l i s t s dr ipped w i th the ant ic ipa t ion of a New World Order

proc la imed by the v i c tors in the West . Many thought that the new

wor ld order decreed by George Bush Snr . wa s the promise of 1945

fu l f i l l ed , a wor ld in which in te rna t iona l ins t i tu t ions , led by the

Uni ted Nat ions , guaranteed in te rna t iona l peace and secur i ty w i th the

ac t ive support of the wor ld ’ s ma jor powers . 3 9 Tha t wor ld order was a

ch imera .

Th i s New Wor ld o pt imism was misp laced a s the emerg ing wor ld

order took chimer ica l form. Th i s Chimera i s woven in to the Co ld War

na rra t ive in both the l i te ra ry and c la ss i ca l sense and can thus ly be

seen a s an an lage supported by an ama lgamat ion of the fac tors beh ind

the co l l apse of the Sov ie t Union. At th is ea r l y s tage l ibe ra l academic

op in ion was d iv ided on who or wha t the v ic tor of the Cold War was ,

in more recent t imes however , l ibe ra l academic rhe tor ic has e r red

towards the Uni ted S ta te s and neoconserva t ive e lement a s t he

a rche typa l hol low v ic tors .

Af te r the co l lapse of the Sov ie t Union weste rn thoughts of

mul t ipo la r i t y was the popula r c l iché tha t marked the uncer ta in ty in

which d i rec t ion inte rna t iona l re l a t ions wou ld u l t imate l y t rave l .

However , i f th i s c l iché were u sed to imply an h i s tor ica l ana logy w i th

the n ine teenth century i t i s h igh ly mis l ead ing , for the o ld order re s ted

on a ba l ance of f ive rough ly equa l g rea t powers whi l e to -day ’ s g rea t

powers a re fa r f rom equa l l y ba l anced. 4 0

3 9 S l a u g h t e r . , A n n e - M a r i e , . 1 9 9 7 . , S e p t e m b e r / O c t o b e r , . F o r e i g n A f f a i r s : T h e R e a l N e w W o r l d O r d e r . p . 1 8 3 . F o r e i g n A f f a i r s . 4 0 N y e . , J o s p e h , . 1 9 9 2 . , S p r i n g , . F o r e i g n A f f a i r s : W h a t N e w W o r l d O r d e r ? p . 8 6 . F o r e i g n A f f a i r s .



The end of the Co ld War marks the most important h i s tor i ca l d iv ide

in ha l f a century , 4 1 indeed not s ince the Ides of March has academic

opin ion been so d iv ided on who or wha t u l t imate l y ‘won ’ a t the

end ing of an e ra . Was i t Russ i a [Rome] , the Uni ted S ta te s [ the

Repub l ic ] , o r was the v ic tor e l sewhere? The magn i tude of the Co ld

War’ s deve lopments has ushered in a w ide - rang ing deba te over the

reasons for i t s end – a deba te tha t i s l i ke l y to be a s prot rac ted ,

controvers i a l , and po l i t i ca l l y s i gn i f icant a s tha t over the Co ld War ’ s

or ig ins . 4 2 In the ea r ly 1990’ s , the emerg ing deba t e over why the Cold

War ended i s o f more than hi s tor i ca l in te res t : a t s take i s the

v ind ica t ion and leg i t imat ion of an ent i re world v iew and fore ign

po l i cy or ien ta t ion . 4 3 Neo-conserva t i sm, i t seems , was under the

spot l i gh t .

Th i s ent i re wor ld v i ew ; th i s n ew wor ld order a f te r the Cold War i s

su i gener i s , and academics began in the immedia te yea rs preced ing the

co l lapse of the Sov ie t Union to over ly const ra in the i r unders tand ing

by t ry ing to force i t in to the procrus tean bed of typica l metaphors

w i th the i r mechan ica l po la r i t ie s . 4 4 Undoubted ly , the u l t imate cause of

the Co ld War’ s outcome l i e s in the fa i lure of the Sov ie t sy s tem i t se l f .

At most , outs ide forces has tened and in tens i f ied the c r i s i s . 4 5 The

Uni ted S ta te s , in a ssess ing the re s t o f the wor ld ’ s impac t on Sov ie t

change , both fore ign pol i cy change and ideolog ica l change , has

formed a marked ly s impl i s t i c and se l f - se rv ing convent iona l w i sdom.

The ‘Reagan v ic tory schoo l ’ , th i s new ‘convent iona l w i sdom’ cente rs

on Pres ident Rona ld Reagan ’ s mi l i ta ry and ideol ogica l a sse r t iveness

dur ing the 1980 ’ s and represent neo -conserva t i sm in i t s base form.

4 1 D e u d n e y . , D a n i e l , . a n d I k e n b e r r y . , G . J o h n , . S u m m e r , 1 9 9 2 . , F o r e i g n P o l i c y : W h o w o n t h e C o l d W a r ? p . 1 2 3 . v o l . 8 7 . F o r e i g n P o l i c y . 4 2 i b i d . 4 3 i b i d . 4 4 o p . c i t . N y e . p . 8 8 . 4 5 o p . c i t . D e u d n e y a n d I k e n b e r r y .



The Reagan victory school holds that it was precise ly this new

assertiveness by Reagan and his ‘Right’ , which played the lead role in the

collapse of Soviet communism and the taming of i ts foreign policy. 4 6 If

this conventional wisdom is to be believed then the Reagan

administration’s ideological counter -offensive and its mil i tary spending

and build-up hammered the final nail into the Soviet coffin which was a

system internally bankrupt and a lready in the ground.

Deudney and Ikenberry 4 7 argue that ideological warfare was such a key

front in the Cold War because the Soviet Union was, at i ts core, an

ideological creation. In this view, the Cold War was won by the West’s

uncompromising assertion of the superiority o f its values and i ts

complete denial of the moral legitimacy of the Soviet system during the

1980’s. It appears therefore, that Western mili tary strength ( its increased

spending on defense and arms build -up) could prevent defeat at the

hands of the Soviet Union, but only ideological breakthrough could

guarantee victory. 4 8

Perhaps the greatest anomaly of the Reagan victory school and the

surrounding neoconservative cohort was Reagan himself; for the ‘Reagan

Right’ foolishly ignored that Reagan’s stance on th e side of anti -

nuclearism was as strong as his convictions on anti -communism. It is

argued 4 9 that Reagan’s personal convictions on nuclear weapons were

profoundly at odds with the beliefs of most of his administration. Staffed

by hawks, Reagan’s administra tion faced a potential crisis in Soviet -

United States international relations along the nuclear cleavage.

4 6 o p . c i t . D e u d n e y a n d I k e n b e r r y . p . 1 2 4 . 4 7 i b i d . p . 1 3 3 4 8 i b i d . 4 9 s e e D e u d n e y . , D a n i e l , . a n d I k e n b e r r y . , G . J o h n , . S u m m e r , 1 9 9 2 . , F o r e i g n P o l i c y : W h o w o n t h e C o l d W a r ?

p . 1 2 6 . v o l . 8 7 . F o r e i g n P o l i c y .



Relations between Reagan and Gorbachev were to become paramount for

the neoconservatives of the time and shape neoconservative thought and

‘policy ’ to the present day. November 1985 saw Gorbachev and Reagan at

the Geneva summit, where Reagan’s deep antipathy for nuclear weapons

were decisive in convincing Gorbachev that it was possible to work with

the West in halting the nuclear arms race. It can be argued that Reagan’s

anomalous anti -nuclearism prov ided the crucial signal to Gorbachev that

bold init iatives would be reciprocated rather than exploited. Reagan’s

anti -nuclearism was more important than his administration’s mili tary

build-up in catalyzing the end of the Cold War and setting in stone the

neoconservative fear of nuclear arms proliferation. 5 0

Neoconservatives freely admit that the greatest danger to the

United States to-day is the possibi l ity that some rouge state wil l develop

nuclear weapons and then share them with terrorist groups. Iran and

North Korea, Max Boot conceives are the two l ikeliest culprits. 5 1 Neither,

Boot expla ins, would be wil l ing to negotiate away its nuclear arsenal ; no

treaty would be any more trustworthy than the 1994 Agreed Framework

that North Korea violated; neocons believe that the only way to ensure

U.S. security is to topple the tyrannical regimes in Pyongyang and

Tehran. 5 2 This objective does not mean, however, that neocons are

advocating for pre -emptive war; they do not rule out force if necessary,

but their preferred solution is to use pol itical , diplomatic, economic, and

mili tary pressure, short of actual war to bring down these dictators – the

very same strategy the United States fol lowed with the Soviet Union

during the Cold War. 5 3

5 0 Deud ney . , Dan ie l , . an d Ik e nbe r ry . , G . Jo hn , . Summer , 1 99 2 . , Fore ign Po l i c y : Wh o won the Co ld War ? P . 1 2 7 -1 28 . vo l . 8 7 . Fo re ign Po l i c y . 5 1 op . c i t . Bo ot . , Max , . p . 1 2 . 5 2 i b id . 5 3 i b id .



Several factors caught the neoconservatives off guard and increased their

convictions during the 1980s. First ly the rhetoric employed by the

Reagan administration added fuel the fire of a large peace movement in

the United States that spread across Western Europe in this period, a

movement that put significant pressure on Western governments to

pursue far-reaching arms control proposals. In this c l imate the tone and

posture of the rhetoric employed by the early Reagan administration was

becoming a significant poli tical l iabi l ity and a possible electoral

minefield. Economic factors played an increasin gly important role in the

Soviet-United States international relations. Secondly , powerful Western

interests that favoured East -West economic ties undercut the Reagan

administrations hard-l ine polic ies.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) develo ped a

natural gas pipeline, which l inked the Soviet Union to Western Europe,

demonstrating that economic interdependence and cooperation was on

the increase. 5 4 Thus the neoconservatives found themselves at the end of

the Cold War without an enemy. This vacuum was unexpected and the

neoconservative ‘movement’ was in danger of becoming resigned to the

annals of American history.

After their successes during Ronald Reagan’s first term, the

neoconservatives entered a period of increasing confusion. In a large

part , this was caused by an intel lectual fai lure. 5 5 Neoconservative’s

underestimated the abil i ty of the Soviet Union to destroy itself from the

inside out. The end of the cold war forced neoconservative foreign pol icy

writers to face a quest ion they had no t seen in forty years: what should

be the focus of American efforts abroad? 5 6

5 4 op . c i t . Deud ney a nd Iken be r ry . p . 1 30 . 5 5 op . c i t . Eh ram . p . 17 3 . 5 6 i b id . p . 18 1 .



The debate revolved around the issue of whether the United States

should pursue a true/pure ‘W ilsonian’ foreign policy, dedicated to

spreading democracy throughout the world, or i f policy should be based

on the narrower foundation of national se lf -interest. This particular

discussion orig inated in 1986 with Tucker, a polemical neoconservative

essayists, reassertion of a point he had made in the 1960s, that Americans

believe that their purpose transcend mere survival and include a mission

to spread l iberty:

From the outse t of our exi stence a s a nat ion we have be l ieved tha t our

secur i ty and surv iva l are synonymous with the secur i ty and surv iva l of

f reedom in the wor ld . This i s why our reason of sta te has not only had

a d imension above and beyond a convent iona l reason of sta te , bu t has

been regula r ly seen as somehow qual i ta t ive ly d if ferent f rom i t . This i s

a lso why we have a lways be l ieved tha t what we do for ourse lves we d o

for other s a s wel l . 5 7

When this view is put forward i t is clear that as a result, Reagan’s

policies of seeking to extend freedom, as well as neoconservatism’s

‘Wilsonian’ impulse , were consistent with American customs.

Neoconservatives put this into pract ice in the 1980s and subsequently

benefited further from the decline of the Soviet Union and the spread of

democracy in the Third World, both of which appeared to reinforce

American interests at l i tt le cost. During Reagan’s successful 1980

campaign, he hired a Democratic party apostate as his foreign policy

advisor, Jeane Kirkpatrick, who later became U.S ambassador to the

United Nations.

5 7 Tucke r . , Ro be r t , . 19 90/ Ex emp l a r o r C ru s ad e r ? R e f l e c t i o n s o n Ame r i c a ’ s Ro l e . I n t h e Na t i o n a l I n t e r e s t : A Na t i o n a l I n t e r e s t R e ad e r . p . 69 . Un ive r s i t y P re s s o f Ame r i c a .



Kirkpatrick represents a direct l ine of thought from ‘Wilsonian’ visions

of foreign policy to the polemical outpouring of the neoconservative

foreign policy posit ion towards communism. Known for her anti -

communist stance and her tolerance of right -wing dictatorships, she

argued that U.S pol icy should not aid the overthrow of right -wing

regimes if these were only to be replace d by even less democratic left -

wing regimes. This lucid and pragmatic position highlights the

commitment of the neoconservatives to continue the ‘Wilsonian’ spread

of stabi l ity and democracy. The very fact that this neoconservative

thinkers defected from the Democrat ic Party further legitimizes the claim

that the neoconservatives represent the thesis of ‘Wilsonian’ thought in

the latter parts of the Twentieth Century and the synthesis of ‘Wilsonian’

foreign policy vision in the Twenty -First Century.

In the 1980s this foreign policy direction took the form of the

Kirkpatrick Doctrine. In précis this doctrine presents an elegant and

arresting view of neoconservative ideals – i t attempted to just ify U.S

support for anti -Communist dictatorships in the Third Wor ld, in the

context of Cold War rivalries. The doctrines focal point was directed

towards the promulgation that pro -Soviet communist states were

tota l itarian regimes while pro -Western anti -Communist Third World

dictatorships were authoritarian ones. The dif ferences between the two

l ines of thought are more than semantic – even if they represent two

sides of the same coin. The neoconservatives claimed that total i tar ian

regimes were more stable than authoritarian regimes, and thus had a

greater propensity to influence neighbouring states – an influence, about

which the neoconservatives were extremely concerned.

The disparit ies amid authoritarian regimes and totali tarian regimes

were centered on the level of control of their subjects.



Neoconservatives understood authoritar ian regimes as merely

trying to control and or punish their subjects’ behaviors, while

tota l itarian regimes sought a move beyond this. Totali tarian regimes

denied the citizens abil ity for self -determination by attempting to control

the though ts of their subjects’ through the use of propaganda, thought

reform (brainwashing ) , re-education and poli tical repressions based on

ideology. The neoconservatives feared a resurgence of tota l itarian

regimes akin to Stal in’s Soviet Union or Nazi Germany.

In order to safe guard against this resurgence, the Kirkpatrick

Doctrine, al lowed for the toleration of leaders such as Augusto Pinochet

in Chi le and Ferdinand Marcos in the Phi l ippines. As the 1980s began to

draw to a close the emergence of second -generation neoconservatives,

such as Ell iot Abrams (Assistant Secretary of State for Inter -American

Affairs) , pressed for a clear pol icy of supporting democracy against both

left-wing and right -wing dictators. This call prompted deep -seated debate

within the Reagan administration since support for Marcos continued

during the fraudulent Phil ippine election of February 7 t h 1986. Although

the U.S administration eventually opposed Marcos in the days that

followed, the turmoil in the Phil ippines grew, under widespread p opular

refusal to accept the electoral outcome. ‘Wilsonian’ ideals began to

surface in an immediately recognizable foreign policy direct ion when the

Reagan administration urged Marcos to accept defeat and leave the

country. Indeed Abrams supported the 1988 Chilean plebisci te that

resulted in the restoration of democratic rule and Pinochet’s eventual

removal from office. Through the National Endowment for Democracy

(NED), commonly know as Projec t Democracy , led by Carl Gershman, a

neoconservative businessman and President of the NED, funds were

directed to anti -Pinochet opposition in order to ensure a fair election.



However, the ‘Wilsonian’ legacy that directed much of the

neoconservative thought can be equated to the Delphic Oracle . Like the

Delphic Oracle, the discourse that pursues neo -conservatism is

ambiguous in the perspicuity of its successes and fa i lures; this is most

evident from the theoretical and often tacit base on which the outcomes

of its foreign policy vision rests.

Parleying with the Soviet Union as i f the game of chess were the

modus operandi often presented unforeseen consequences. Arming the

Mujahadeen in Afghanistan is one example where American led

intervention, as a means of ending Communist rule later resurfaced to

harm the U.S.

In practical terms the neoconservatives sought to resist the

temptation to embark on a crusade for freedom, and instead advocated

building ‘a framework of stabi l ity and moderation within which

democratic insti tutions may take root and grow,’ 5 8 with the United States

acting as ‘a force for self -government simply by virtue of our example. ’ 5 9

Tucker’s argument represented the ethos of the majority of

neoconservatives. The spread of democracy abroad was of great benefit

to the United States but the neoconservatives were keen to avoid open-

ended crusades – a position that has since changed.

The end of ideological struggle for hegemonic dominance wrought

within the final chapter of the chapter of the Cold War saw second -

generation neoconservatives continually enuncia te an even more

explici tly ‘Wilsonian’ vision for foreign affairs in mimesis. Since the

terrorist attacks of 9/11† a third generation of neoconservative thought

has emerged.

5 8 op . c i t . Tuc ke r . p . 7 4 . 5 9 i b id . p . 75 .

† 9/ 11 re f e r s t o t he t h ree s imu l t ane ou s t e r ro r i s t a t t ac k s ag a in s t t he Wo r ld Trad e Cent re , The Pen t agon and Sh an ks v i l l e o n Sep t ember 1 1 th 2 00 1 in t he U n i t ed S t a t e



This third generation of neoconservatives enjoyed a renaissance in the

post 9/11 climate. Their increasingly hard -l ine vision of foreign policy

direction and muscular stance towards external threat, in the Bush

administration appears to have found renewed purpose. Its ideological

shift of focus away from the threat of Communism to the threat of

[Islamic] terrorism has captured the mindset of the American people .

This ideologica l shift can be seen as, in one respect, a step away from the

‘Wilsonian’ legacy that used to run through the veins of

neoconservatives. U.S foreign pol icy is more active in preventing a states

self-determination i f it presents a potential risk to U.S interests or

security. However, the two remaining key ‘Wilsonian’ tenets of advocacy

of democracy and [military] intervention to promote democracy are at the

forefront of America’s War on Terror and i ts road-map to democratize the

world.

It is self evident from the current administrations act ions within

Iraq and Afghanistan, that the third generation of neoconservatives sti l l

holds a bel ief in the superiority of American democratic values. If the

post 9/11 neoconserva tive thought could be disti l led into singular canon

i t would be a mimesis of the ‘Bush Doctrine’ . The Bush Doctrine,

promulgated after September 11 t h , incorporates the concept that nations

harboring terrorists are themselves enemies of the United States.

Terrorism is perhaps the most important word in the world at this

moment in time. The ‘crusade’ against terrorism has seen the United

States with UN coalition forces wage an on -going mili tary campaign

against Afghanistan and the invasion and occupation of I raq. Polit ical

leaders from numerous countries declared support for the new U.S. ‘war

on terror’ and sought to re -classify their own enemies as terrorists.

Immediately the l ines separating the complex processes of regimes of

terror and fact ional terrorism as a mode of struggle became blurred.



For instance following 9/11 Russia sought to cast Chechen rebels as

terrorist, and Georgia as a terrorist -harboring State, in order to

legit imate its use of violence in those two arenas. 6 0 Colombian army

officials quickly switched, within a few days of 9/11, from calling the

Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (The Fuerzas Armadas

Revolucionarias de Colombia – Ejército del Pueblo; FARC-EP) and the

National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional; ELN)

rebels ‘narcoguerrillas’ to calling them ‘narcoterrorists’. The war on

the al ’Qaeda network was justified by neoconservatives, through the

Bush Doctrine, in retal iation for the attacks of 9/11. However the enemy

of the U.S. mil itary campaign has not sole ly been the people responsible

for the September attacks but terrorism in general . Declaring a war on

‘ terrorism in general ’ , by dint of its magnitude, ref lects a dangerous

precedent since it does not seek to define that which is a terrorist .

Having the ‘ legitimacy’ to combat any enemy anywhere quickly becomes

an opiate for the State. It has polluted America ’s historical focus on the

doctrine of deterrence as a primary means of self -defence. While there

have been occasional pre -emptive strikes by American forces, unti l

recently pre-emptive strikes have not been the official American foreign

and mili tary policy. In this sense the neoconservatives won a significant

victory with the Bush Doctrine after September 11 t h . The Bush Doctrine,

which is l ikely to shape U.S. pol icy for decades to come, reflects the

reali t ies of American power as well as the aspirations of American

poli tical principles. Under this doctrine the neoconservatives have begun

to radically change U.S. foreign policy direction away from ‘Cl inton -era’

policies, especial ly in respect to the uses of U.S. power and military

force.

6 0 C ryan . , P h i l l ip . 2 00 1 . De f i n i n g T e r r o r i sm . Comp l e t e Co v e r a g e o f 9/ 11 an d t h e W ar o n A f g h an i s t an . Count e r Punch . No vembe r 29 , 20 01 . h t t p : / / www.count e rpunch .o rg/ c ry an 1 .h tm l 13 . 0 9 . 06 19 . 12



The Bush Doctrine represents the realit ies of international pol it ics in the

post-cold-war, sole -superpower world. Further, the combination of two

factors, America's universal pol itica l principles and unprecedented global

power and influence, make the Bush Doctrine a whole greater than the

sum of i ts parts. 6 1

Thomas Donnelly, a resident fe l low at the American Enterprise

Inst itute (AEI), an influential [neo]conservative think -tank since the

Reagan era, argued in The Underpinnings of the Bush Doctr ine that

[ the] fundamenta l premise of the Bush Doctr ine is true : The United

Sta tes possesses the means - economic , mi l i t ary , d ip lomatic , to rea l i ze

i t s expans ive geopol i t ica l purposes . Fur ther , and espec ia l ly in l i ght of

the domest ic pol i t ica l r eact ion to the at tacks of September 11, the

v ic tory in Afghanis tan and the remarkable sk i l l demonstra ted by

Pres ident Bush in focus ing nat iona l a t tent ion , i t i s equa l ly t rue tha t

Amer icans possess the requi s i te pol i t ica l wi l lpower to pursue an

expans ive s tra tegy . 6 2

Any comprehensive U.S. ‘threat assessment’ would conclude that the

normal constraints of international pol itics; counterbalancing powers, no

longer immediately inhibit the exercise of American might. At the same

time, proliferat ion of weapons of mass des truction promises to upset the

normal rules of power among nation-states, devaluing the conventional

mili tary strength amassed by the United States. 6 3 This threats to poison

the general peace won by the victory in the cold war and complicate any

future great-power competit ion or challenge to the American -led

international order.

6 1 Donne l l y . , Thoma s , . 20 03 . Th e Und e r p i n n i n g s o f t h e Bu sh Do c t r i n e . Nat i o n a l S e c u r i t y Ou t l o ok . AEI Was h i ng t i on . Feb rua ry 1 s t , 2 0 03 . ae i . o rg/ pu b l i c a t ion s/ pubI D .158 4 5/ pub_ d e t a i l . a sp 13/ 0 9/ 06 1 9 . 4 7 6 2 i b id . 6 3 i b id .



Small rogue states and violent, but nevertheless weak, international

movements l ike Islamic radicalism are coming to have a disproportionate

weight in global security calculat ions. 6 4 Moreover Islamism represents a

kind of ideologica l threat to the Western polit ical principles that made

the end of the Cold War against the Soviet Union also seem like the end

of history. The emphasis that neoconservatives place on ‘movements’ of

this kind is beginning to create a world i n which the largest threats to

America and ‘the West’ emanate not from within state boarders but from

without.

6 4 op . c i t . Don ne l l y .



Part Two

The End of S ta te s & Hubr i s

Chapter I I I

In the aftermath of the Iraq War no inte llectual w as as vil i fied in either

the mainstream European media or the left -wing America media as Leo

Strauss. 6 5 Strauss was characterized as the force behind the war, the

behind-the-scenes intellectual el i t ist who preached the politics of power

and deception, and the philosopher-king of the neoconservative

movement. 6 6 Mary Wakefield, assistant editor as the Spectator , wrote in

January 2004, accusations that Tony Blair and Paul Wolfowitz had been

lying:

I am prepared to cons ider the possib i l i ty tha t Bla ir had a l tru i s t i c

motives [ for ly ing]… Perhaps, l ike Paul Wolfowi tz and other neo -

conserva t ives , he i s a d i sc ip le of the pol i t ica l phi losopher Leo St rauss .

Strauss was a champion of the ‘noble l ie ’ – the idea that i t i s

prac t ica l ly a duty to l ie to the masses because only a smal l e l i te i s

in te l lec tua l ly f i t to know the t ruth .

Pol i t ic i ans must concea l the ir v iews, sa id S tr auss , for two

reasons: to spare the people ’s fee l ings and to protect the e l i te f rom

poss ib le repr i sa ls . I t ’s a vers ion of the Moonie phi losophy of t ru th :

fa l sehood is OK as long as i t i s used to convert unbel i ever s to the

Unif icat ion Church. As Byron’s Don Juan puts i t : ‘And , af ter a l l wha t

is a l ie? ’Ti s bu t the tru th in masquerade ’ . 6 7

If this is the case then it is inherently diff icult to arrive at any verifiable

understanding of neoconservative thought.

6 5 We ins t e in . , Kenne th , . 2 0 04 . Ph i l o s o ph i c Ro o t s , Th e Ro l e o f L e o S t r au s s an d Th e War i n I r aq . Neocon se r va t i sm . p . 20 3 . Gr o ve P re s s . New Yor k . 6 6 i b id . 6 7 Wake f i e ld , . Ma ry , . 2 00 4 . J a nu ra ry 9 t h . p . 3 4 . Da i l y T e l e g r a p h . Te l eg ra ph Gr oup Ltd .



Naturally , therefore, it is in the area of U.S. foreign policy that

Straussianism and Straussians have attracted the most attention of late.

Straussians came to hold signif icant roles in American foreign policy

during the Reagan administration, handling portfolios for public

diplomacy and human rights. 6 8 It is not difficult to understand the

influence that this people had in the previous Reagan administration and

the influence they continue to have in the current Bush administration,

largely by dint of their presence in every echelon. Professor Nathan

Tarcov of the pol itical science department of the University of Chicago

served on the policy planning staff of the Department of State, while

Carnes Lord, currently on the faculty of the Naval War College, was

director international communications and information pol icy for the

National Security Council . Charles Fairbanks, now on the faculty of the

Paul H. Nitze School for Advanced International Affairs at John Hopkins

University, served as Deputy Assistant Security of State for Human

Rights and Humanitarian Affairs; and Mark Bl itz, now Fletcher Jones

Professor of Poli tica l Phi losophy at Claremont McKenna Col lege, was

associate director of the U.S. Information Agency. 6 9 Through their

knowledge of how America was founded as a regime dedicated to l iberty

and inalienable rights, these Straussians and others were able to offer a

compel l ing and principled case for American anti -communism, which

explains why so many Straussian s served in the Reagan administrat ion –

more, even than serve President George W. Bush. 7 0 Given that there are

less neoconservatives in the White House under Bush Snr. than Reagan it

is perhaps surprising that neonconservatism has become very much the

topic of the day.

6 8 op . c i t . We in s t e i n . p . 2 0 5 . 6 9 i b id . 7 0 i b id .



The reason for this is that these f igures proffer a louder rhetoric. The

neoconservative genus of late has frequently expressed admiration for the

‘big st ick’ interventionist foreign policy. In its narrow terms

neoconservatives view the world in 1939 terms, where the threat of

ideology seems more pressing the threat of any single State.

Neoconservatives compare the danger from adversaries as diverse as

Islamic extremism (dubbed Islamofasicism by many neoconservatives)

and China’s particular brand of Communism, so called the ‘China

Threat ’ . 7 1 Indeed the fact that the use of the term neoconservative has

rapidly risen since the 2003 Iraq War is ci ted by American conservatives

as proof that the term is largely irre levant in the long term. David

Horowitz, a purported leading neoconservative thinker, offered a crit ique

written in an Ita l ian newspaper:

Neo-conserva t i sm i s a te rm a lmost exc lusive ly used by the enemies of

America ’s l ibera t ion of I raq . There i s no ‘neo -conserva t ive ’ movement

in the Uni ted S ta tes . When there was one , i t was made up of former

Democra ts who embraced the we lfare sta te but supported Rona ld

Reagan’s Cold War pol ic ie s aga ins t the Soviet Bloc . Today neo -

conserva t i sm ident i f ie s t hose who be l ieve in an aggress ive pol icy

aga ins t rad ica l I s l am and the global terror is t s . 7 2

Whether or not the term is relevant can largely be seen as an exercise in

semantics since i t is their effect that is of most importance.

Neoconservative thinkers are eager to implement a particular type of

foreign policy. In the writings of Paul Wolfowitz, Norman Podhoretz,

Ell iott Abrams, Richard Perle, Jeane Kirkpatrick, Max Boot, Will iam

Kristol, Robert Kagan, Will iam Bennett , Peter Rodman, and others

influentia l in forging the polic ies doctrines of the Bush administration

7 1 Peop le Da i l y On l ine . h t t p : / / eng l i s h .peo p le . c om .cn/ 2 00 4 07/ 2 6/ eng 2 00 40 72 6_ 1 50 7 77 .h tm l 16 . 09 . 06 7 2 Horow i t z . , Da v id , . 2 00 4 . l a Repubb l i c a . A pr i l 0 6 t h . l a Re pubb l i c a P re s s .



there are frequent references to the appeasement of Hitler at Munich in

1938, to which are compared the Cold War’s policies of détente and

containment (rather than roll -back) with the Soviet Union and the

People’s Republic of China.

The war that the Bush administration and the ‘coali t ion of the

wil l ing’ continue to fight in Iraq can be considered a fair test of the

practical validity of neoconservative thinking and principles. If the

quagmire in Iraq is successful in stabi l iz ing Iraq and the Middle East,

then the neoconservative ideas wil l have achieved victory. If, however,

the on-going conflict in Iraq further destabil izes the Middle East or leads

to a new regime that funnels oil reserves to terrorists and criminals then

the neoconservative ideals wil l have been dealt a fatal blow.

It is too early to say whether or not the situation in Iraq has

discredited the neoconservatives. The emerging media consensus that the

U.S. occupation has fizzled out is ludicrously premature. 7 3 There have

been many well publicized problems, such as terrorism, crime, and

electr icity shortages; a lot less -publicized progress is also evident – the

creation of a Governing Council , the election of ci ty councils and

mayors, the emergence of the freest poli tical parties and media in the

Arab world, the reconstruction of looted schools and government

buildings, and the establishment of a legal framework for a free

enterprise system. 7 4 Although currently the U.S. casualties are relat ively

low by the standards of guerri l la wars i f the occupation does t urn into a

fiasco, as numerous critics expect , the neoconservatives wil l be a

convenient scapegoat.

7 3 op . c i t . Bo ot . p . 5 1 7 4 i b id . p . 51



To a large extent, Boot explains, this blame is unfair. Many of the early

problems of the occupation were due to the administrations fai lure to

commit sufficient resources to Iraq. Boot posits that

[…] thi s over s ight was large ly the fau l t of pol icy -makers , such as ,

Rumsfe ld , who remain skept ica l of nat ion bui ld ing. Neocons have been

pushing for a more v igorous na t ion -bu i ld ing ef for t in both Afghanis tan

and Iraq and for a concomitant expansion of the act ive -duty mi l i t ary to

prov ide the necessary troops . 7 5

This advice was largely unheeded by the Bush administration, and when

[…] The Whi te House f ina l ly rea l i zed i t neede d to spend more on

rebu i ld ing Ir aq and Afghanistan , Republ ican i sola t ioni s ts and f i sca l

conserva t ives in Congress ra ised obstac le s .

If neocons had been in control , they would have done far more , far

ear l ier , in both Afghanistan and Iraq , possib ly aver t in g some of the

post-war problems . 7 6

Whether or not this is true i t is doubtless the case that the

neoconservatives wi l l in al l l ikelihood be held responsible for the

outcome in both countries. The dramatic shift in international strategic

circumstances occasioned by the Soviet collapse requires a shift in the

manner in which this goal (peace in the Middle East) is pursued. In the

post Cold War era , the maintenance of a decent and hospitable

international order requires continued American leadership in r esist ing,

and where possible undermining rising dictators and hosti le ideologies; in

supporting American interests and l iberal democratic principles; and in

providing assistance to those struggling against the more extreme

manifestat ions of human evil . 7 7

7 5 i b id . p . 55 7 6 i b id . 7 7 K r i t s o l and Kag an . 20 00 . Nat i o n a l I n t e r e s t s a n d G l o ba l R e s p o n s i b i l t y . P r e s e n t Dan g e r s . I n t rod uc t io n . Encount e r Bo ok s .



This does not mean that the U.S. must necessari ly root out evi l wherever

and whenever i t rears its head. Nor does it suggest that the U.S. must

embark on a crusade against every dictatorship. Clearly no doctrine of

foreign policy can do away with the need for judgment and prudence, for

weighing competing moral considerations. 7 8 No foreign policy doctrine

can provide precise and unvarying answers to the question of where,

when, and how the U.S. ought to intervene abroad.

I t i s easy to say that the United S tate s must have cr i te r ia for choos ing

when to inte rvene . But i t i s a good dea l harder to formulate those

cr i te r ia than s imply to say they must exi s t . 7 9

Henry Kissinger writes in Diplomacy 8 0 that what is most needed in

American foreign pol icy are ‘criteria for selectivi ty’ – however, he does

not venture to suggest exactly what those criteria might be. Determing

what is in America’s national interest is an art not a science; i t requires

not only the measurement of power but a lso an appreciat ion of bel iefs,

principles, and perceptions, which cannot be quantified. 8 1

That i s why we choose s ta tesmen, not mathemat ic ian s , to conduct

fore ign pol icy . Tha t is why we wi l l occasiona l ly have to inte rvene

abroad even when we cannot prove tha t a na rrow construed ‘v i ta l

in terest ’ of the United S tate s i s a s take . 8 2

It is worth pointing out, though, that a foreign policy premised on

American hegemony, and on the blending of principle with material

interest may in fact mean fewer, not more, overseas interventions than

under the ‘vita l interest ’ standard. 8 3

7 8 op . c i t . K r i t so l a nd Kagan . p . 3 . 7 9 i b id . 8 0 K i s s ing e r . 20 04 . D ip l om a c y . Ox ford U n i ve r s i t y P re ss 8 1 i b id . Kr i s t o l and Kaga n . 8 2 i b id . 8 3 i b id .



Had the [first] Bush administration, for example, rea lized in the early

stages that there were no clear dist inction between American moral

concerns in Bosnia and America’s national inte rest there, the U.S., with

the enormous credibi l ity earned in the Gulf War, might have been able to

put a stop to Milosevic’s ambitions with a well -timed threat of punishing

mili tary action. 8 4 However the administration at the time placed Bosnia

outside the sphere of ‘vi tal ’ American interests, the resulting crisis

eventually required the deployment of thousands of troops on the

ground.

Kristol and Kagan write that the same could be said of American

interventions in Panama and the Gulf. A passive world -view encouraged

American leaders to ignore troubling developments that eventually

metastasized into full -blown threats to American security; Manuel

Noriega and Saddam Hussein were given reason to believe that the U.S.

did not consider i ts interests threatened by their behaviour, only to

discover that they had been misled. 8 5 Indeed in each case, a broader and

more forward-leaning conception of the national interest might have

made the later, large, and costly intervention unnecessary.

The question, then, is not whether the United States should

intervene everywhere or nowhere; the decision Americans need to make

is whether the Unites States should generally lean forward, as it were, or

si t-back. 8 6 A strategy aimed at preserving American hegemony should

embrace the former stance, being more rather less inclined to weigh in

when crisis erupt, and preferably before the erupt. 8 7

8 4 op . c i t . K r i s t o l a nd Kagan . p . 3 . 8 5 i b id . 8 6 i b id . 8 7 i b id .



This is the standard of a global superpower that intends to shape the

international environment to i ts own advantage. By contrast, the vital

interest standard is that of a ‘normal ’ power that awaits a dramatic

challenge before i t rouses i tself into action. 8 8

Is the task, Kristol and Kagan posit, of maintaining American

primacy and making a consistent effort to shape the international

environment beyond the capacity of Americans? 8 9 Despite its degradation

in the past decade, for example, the United States sti l l wields the

strongest mil itary force in the world.

It has demonstra ted i ts prowess in war on severa l occasions s ince the

end of the Cold War – in Panama in 1989, in the Pers ian Gulf in 1991 ,

and most recent ly [be fore the second Gulf War ] in the a i r war over

Kosovo.

Those v ic tor ie s owed the ir success to a force bui l t in the Reagan year s .

This i s a legacy the Uni ted S ta tes has l ived off for over a decade , an

account i t has drawn too far down. 9 0

A strong America capable of projecting force quickly and with

devastating effect to important regions of the world would ma ke it less

l ikely that challengers to regional stabil ity would attempt to alter the

status quo in their favor. Kristol and Kagan explain that an America of

this nature may even deter such chal lengers from undertaking expensive

efforts to arm themselves in the first place. 9 1 While an America whose

wil l ingness to project force is in doubt, on the other hand, can only

encourage such challenges. To be sure, the United States cannot simply

wish hosti le regimes out of existence.

8 8 op . c i t . K r i s t o l a nd Kagan . p . 5 . 8 9 i b id . 9 0 i b id . p . 3 . 9 1 i b id .



Iraq burns, Afghanistan boils, and a nuclear North Korea is free to test

its missi les with impunity. Iran, meanwhile, mockingly plays on both

chessboards simultaneously, refusing to give up its nuclear ambitions,

while employing i ts Hezbol lah surrogates to lure Israel into a new Middle

East war. Over the past year the l imits of American power has been

exposed. The opportunity to expand the Pax Americana is fraught with

danger and risk. If the neoconservative ‘doctrine’ , o n the back of the

Bush Doctrine is taken as a whole the image drawn is one of shadowy

figures quietly si tting in their ivy towers composing America’s future

while the Sword of Damocles gently sways over -head. When ‘movements’

begin to become a larger threa t than states the U.S. wi l l need to re ly on

increasingly tenuous historical precedents. These precedents rest upon

one of the few solid truths of social science, namely democracies rare ly

declare war on other democracies. One of the reasons it is so hard t o

imagine the European Union becoming a genuine competitor to the

United States is that there are no serious, direct transatlantic geopol itical

disputes.

Differences in the Middle East, for example, have no immediate

relat ionship to the power balance between Europe and America - nothing

today is analogous to the previous colonia l competition. 9 2 The prospects

for an expanded American -led l iberal international order are clouded by a

mili tary balance complicated by weapons proliferation. Nuclear weapons,

in particular , now pose a deterrent threat to the United States; hopes for

a stable and democratized Islamic world, for example, may be short - l ived

if Iran were to acquire such a capabil ity. This is the most urgent concern

to neoconservatives in the present da y.

9 2 Donne l l y . , Thoma s , . 20 03 . Th e Und e r p i n n i n g s o f t h e Bu sh Do c t r i n e . Nat i o n a l S e c u r i t y Ou t l o ok . AEI Was h i ng t i on . Feb rua ry 1 s t , 2 0 03 . ae i . o rg/ pu b l i c a t ion s/ pubI D .158 4 5/ pub_ d e t a i l . a sp 13/ 0 9/ 06 2 0 . 2 8



Taken together, American principles, interests, and s ystemic

responsibil it ies argue strongly in favor of an active and expansive stance

of strategic primacy and a continued wil l ingness to employ mili tary

force. 9 3 Within that context, and given the ways in which nuclear weapons

and other weapons of mass destruction can distort normal calculations of

international power relat ionships, there is a compell ing need to hold

open the option of, and indeed, to build forces more capable of, pre -

emptive strike operations. This can be seen as the crysta l l ization of

policy direction for the third wave of neoconservatives as they enjoy their

current renaissance. However, the United States must take a wider view

of the traditional doctrine of ‘ imminent danger’ , considering how such

dangers might, not only threaten its direct interests, but i ts al l ies, the

l iberal international order, and the opportunities for greater freedom in

the world. 9 4 Yet there seems a l imit to the l ikelihood for an overly pre -

emptive or prevent ive use of American military power.

Despite the energetic rhetoric in the National Security Strategy,

the immediate test of the Bush Doctrine's emphasis on pre -emption is

not to be found in today's crises in North Korea. 9 5 Donnelly posits that

the cal l for pre -emption is firmly founded

Ye t i t takes l i t t le imagin at ion to dream up scenar ios that might ca l l for

preempt ive mi l i t ary ac t ion. Consider the choices for an Amer ican

pres ident i f a rad ica l r eg ime over threw, or s imply defeated a t the ba l lot

box , the Musharraf government in Paki s tan. Would neoconserva t ive

fears about Paki s tan' s nuc lear weapons const i tute an imminent danger?

What of a massing of Chinese forces across the Taiwan Stra i t , perhaps

preceded by an en larged ‘miss i le embargo ’ of the sor t a t tempted in

1996? These hypothet i ca l scenar ios suggest that the h e ightened

emphas is on preemption is not misp laced . 9 6

9 3 op . c i t . Don ne l l y 9 4 i b id . 9 5 i b id . 9 6 i b id .



The neoconservatives are acutely aware that the preservation of Pax

Americana rests upon both actual mil itary strength and the perception of

strength. The variety of victories scored by U.S. forces since the end of

the cold war is testament to both the fut i l ity of directly challenging the

United States and the desire of its enemies to keep poking and prodding

to find a weakness in the American global order

Conv inc ing would -be great powers , rogue s ta tes , and ter ror i st s to

accept the l ibera l democrat ic order - and the cha l lenge to autocra t ic

forms of ru le tha t come wi th i t - require s not only an overwhelming

response when the peace i s broken, bu t a wi l l ingnes s to s tep in when

the danger i s imminent . The message of the Bush Doctr ine – ‘Don ' t

even think about i t ! ’ - res ts in par t on a logic of pre -empt ion tha t

under l ie s the logic of pr imacy . 9 7

The future of the state in international relations is difficult to e nvisage.

The Westphalian model, which is understood as the anlage of modern

state organization, has persisted for a long time but has frequently been

defeated; i t has been both enduring and fragi le. The seeds have been

sown for a future devoid of moral obl igat ion, a future where every state

is in constant fear of subjugation, not from one another but from hosti le

‘movements’ . This future is not far away. There is a tendency to assume

that power, l ike nature, abhors a vacuum - since the dawning of history

someone or some state is always been the hegemon, or bidding to become

it. 9 8 In the fifth century BCE Herodotus speaks of the constant change

in the hegemon from Cyrus the Great to Cambyses to Darius culminating

in Xerxes (483BCE). By 43BCE and the Ides of March Rome had had

many hegemon’s and fought many more would -be usurpers. This constant

change continues through the centuries unti l the present day.

9 7 op . c i t . Don ne l l y 9 8 Fe rguso n . , N ia l l . 2 00 4 . Ju l y/ Augus t . Fo r e i g n P o l i c y : A Wo r l d W i t h o u t P ow e r . p . 3 2 . Fore ig n Po l i c y .



To-day the hegemon is the United States; a century ago it was the

United Kingdom - before that, it was France, Spain, Prussia and so on. 9 9

The world is currently unipolar, this is unlikely to last as power is not a

natural monopoly; the struggle for mastery is both perennial and

universal . 1 0 0 The unipolar i ty fol lowing the collapse of the Soviet Union

cannot last for much longer, for the simple reason that history despises a

hyperpower. 1 0 1 If history is r ight then there wil l be powers and

challengers that rise to conspire against the hegemon and bring

multipo lari ty back into the fold.

What i f the past were simply too different from the future and

could not make a prediction? What i f current academic thought is wrong?

What if the world is heading, not for another hegemon, but for a period

where there is no hegemon? What i f, instead of a balance of power, there

is an absence of power? 1 0 2 With the constant erosion of sovereignty and

rise of terrorist ‘movements’ i t is difficult to imagine ho w the concept of a

stat e might survive. Without this defining notion states would fai l to

dominate international relations – they would be replaced by fear and

dogmatism.

In order to bring about this apolar world Ferguson hypothesises the

worst-case scenario that;

U.S . neo-conserva t ive hubr is i s humbled in Iraq and tha t the Bush

admini s tra t ion’s projec t to democra t ize the Middle East a t gunpoint

ends in ignominious wi thdrawa l , go ing from empire to decoloniza t ion

in le ss than two year s . 1 0 3

9 9 i b id .

1 0 0 op . c i t . Fe rgu so n . p . 3 2 .

1 0 1 i b id . 8 3 i b id . p . 3 3 . 1 0 2 i b id . 1 0 3 op . c i t . p . 3 3 .



If there is no aspir ing riva l powers that wish to shoulder the

responsibil ity of coping with Iraq and [conceivably] also Afghanistan, the

Balkans, Cuba, and Haiti – what would an apolar world look l ike?

There would be anarchy. Not since the ninth and tenth centuries

has a situation l ike this been known. The Roman Empire had crumbled;

the west was divided by re l igious dogmatism led by the pope and civil

unrest at the hands of the heirs of Charlemagne. With no guiding power

there would be a new Dark Ages. States would cease to function and wars

would break out where the U.S. had prevented them previously.

Meanwhile, l imited nuclear wars a long cleavages that were no longer

protected would devastate numerous regions - North and South Korea,

India and Pakistan would see their old rivals played out on a global scale .

States would persist in this world brief ly. In the f inal ity of the apolar

world there would be no states, no moral s and no security. Thomas

Hobbes would see the apolar world as his State of Nature come alive. In

constant fear of the unknown mankind would find more dangerous forces

than currently rival the superpowers – they would not benefit from any

protect ion, in th is g lobal void of power, against the bleak new world

disorder.



Appe nd ix :

Wi ls on ’ s F our t ee n Po i n t s

I . Open c ove nan t s o f p eace , open ly a r r i ved a t , a f t e r wh i ch t he re sh a l l b e no p r iv a t e in t e r na t ion a l und e r s t and i ngs o f any k ind b u t d ip loma cy s ha l l p r oceed a l ways f r an k ly and i n t he pu b l i c v i ew .

I I . Abs o lu t e f r e ed om of na v i ga t io n up on the se a s , ou t s id e t e r r i t o r i a l w a t e r s , a l i ke in peace and i n war , ex cep t a s t he se a s may b e c lo s ed in who le o r in pa r t b y in t e r na t i ona l a c t ion fo r t he en forceme nt o f in t e rna t ion a l co vena n t s .

I I I . The r emo va l , so f a r a s p os s i b l e , o f a l l e co nomic ba r r i e r s and the e s t ab l i shment o f an equa l i t y o f t r ad e co nd i t i on s among a l l t he n a t io ns co nse n t in g t o t he peace a nd a s s oc i a t i ng t hem s e lve s f o r i t s ma in t en ance .

IV . Ad equa t e gua r a n t ee s g i ve n and t aken th a t na t i ona l a rmament s w i l l be r ed uced to t he lowes t po in t cons i s t en t w i th d ome s t i c s a f e t y .

V . A f r e e , ope n -m ind ed , a nd abs o lu t e l y impa r t i a l ad ju s tm ent o f a l l co lo n i a l c l a im s , b ased up on a s t r i c t ob se r va nce o f t he p r i n c ip l e t ha t i n d e t e rm i n i ng a l l such que s t io ns o f so ve re i gn t y t he in t e re s t s o f t he popu l a t io ns co nce r ned mus t have equa l we ig h t w i th t he equ i t ab l e c l a ims o f t he gove r nment whose t i t l e i s t o be d e t e rm i ne d .

VI . The ev acua t i on o f a l l Ru s s i an t e r r i t o r y a nd such a se t t l ement o f a l l que s t i on s a f f e c t i ng Rus s i a a s w i l l s e cu re t he be s t a nd f r ee s t coope r a t io n o f t he o the r n a t ion s o f t he wor ld i n ob t a in i ng fo r he r an unhampe red and unemba r r a s s ed oppor tun i t y f o r t he i nd ep end ent d e t e rm ina t ion o f he r own po l i t i c a l d eve lo pment a nd n a t io na l p o l i c y and a s su re he r o f a s i nce r e we lcome in t o t he so c i e t y o f f r e e na t i on s und e r i n s t i t u t io ns o f he r own choo s ing ; a nd , more t h an a we lcome , a s s i s t anc e a l s o o f e ve ry k ind t ha t she m ay n eed and may h e r se l f d e s i r e . Th e t r e a tment ac c ord ed Rus s i a by he r s i s t e r n a t ion s in t he months t o c ome w i l l be t he ac id t e s t o f t he i r go od w i l l , o f t he i r comp rehe ns io n o f he r need s a s d i s t i ngu i sh ed f rom the i r ow n in t e re s t s , and o f t he i r i n t e l l i g en t and un se l f i s h s ympathy .

VI I . Be lg ium , t he who le wor ld w i l l a g ree , mus t be ev acu a t ed and re s to red , w i t hou t any a t t empt t o l im i t t he s ov e re ign t y wh ic h s h e en j oy s in common w i th a l l o the r f r e e na t io ns . No o the r s i ng l e ac t w i l l s e r ve a s t h i s w i l l s e rve t o r e s to re c onf id e nce amo ng t he na t ion s in t he l aw s wh i ch t hey h ave t hemse l ve s se t and d e t e rm ine d fo r t he gov e rnme nt o f t he i r r e l a t io ns w i th o ne ano th e r . Wi thou t t h i s hea l in g ac t t he wh o le s t ruc tu r e and v a l id i t y o f in t e rna t ion a l l aw i s f o re ve r impa i r ed .

VI I I . A l l F re nch t e r r i t o ry sh o u ld be f r e ed and the i nv ad ed por t ion s r e s to r ed , and t he wr ong d o ne t o F rance by P ru ss i a i n 1 8 71 in t he mat t e r o f A l sace -L or ra i ne , wh i ch ha s un se t t l ed t h e peace o f t he wor ld fo r nea r l y f i f t y y ea r s , s hou ld be r i g h t ed , in o rd e r t h a t peace may o nce more be mad e secu r e in t he in t e re s t o f a l l .

IX . A re ad ju s tment o f t h e f r on t i e r s o f I t a l y s hou ld be e f f ec t ed a lon g c l e a r l y r e cog n iz ab le l ine s o f na t io na l i t y .

X . The peop le s o f Au s t r i a -H unga ry , whos e p l ace amo ng the na t i on s we w i s h t o see sa f egua rd ed and a s su red , shou ld be a cco rd ed the f r e e s t op por tu n i t y t o au to nomous d e ve lopment .

XI . Ruman ia , Se rb i a , and M ont eneg ro shou ld be ev acua t ed ; occup ied t e r r i t o r i e s r e s t o red ; Se r b i a acco rd ed f r ee and secu re a cc e ss t o t he se a ; and the r e l a t ion s o f t he se ve r a l B a l ka n s t a t e s t o one ano the r d e t e rm i ned by f r i e nd ly coun se l a lon g h i s t o r i c a l l y e s t ab l i shed l ine s o f a l l e g i ance and na t io na l i t y ; and i n t e r na t i ona l gua r an t ee s o f t he p o l i t i c a l a nd econom ic i nd epend en ce a nd t e r r i t o r i a l in t eg r i t y o f t he se ve ra l Ba lk a n s t a t e s s hou ld be en t e red in t o .

XI I . The Tu rk i s h p or t ion o f t he p re se n t Ot toman Empi re s hou ld b e a s su red a secu re so v e re i gn t y , bu t t he o the r n a t io na l i t i e s wh ich a re now und e r Tur k i sh ru l e s hou ld be a s su red an und ou bt e d secu r i t y o f l i f e and an ab so lu t e l y unmo le s t ed o ppo r tun i t y o f au ton omous d eve lo pment , and the Dard ane l l e s shou ld be pe rman ent l y op en ed a s a f r e e pa s sage t o t he sh ip s a nd commer ce o f a l l n a t ion s und e r in t e r na t ion a l gu a r an t ee s .

XI I I . An i nd epend e nt Po l i sh s t a t e shou ld be e rec t ed wh ich sh ou ld inc lud e t he t e r r i t o r i e s in hab i t ed by ind i spu t a b ly Po l i s h popu la t io ns , wh ic h sh ou ld be a s su red a f r e e and secu re acce ss t o t he se a , and whose po l i t i c a l a nd eco no mic i nd epend ence and t e r r i t o r i a l in t e g r i t y s hou ld be gua r an t eed by in t e r na t ion a l c ove na n t .

XIV. A gene r a l a s soc i a t ion o f na t ion s mus t be fo rmed und e r spec i f i c c ove nan t s fo r t h e pu rpo s e o f a f fo rd i ng mutua l gua ra n t ee s o f po l i t i c a l ind epe nd ence an d t e r r i t o r i a l in t eg r i t y t o g r e a t and sma l l s t a t e s a l i ke .



Word Count : 14 02 1 wo rd s a p prox . B ib l i og rap hy Aro n . , R , . 1 96 6 . , P e a c e an d Wa r : a Th e o r y o f I n t e r n a t i o n a l R e l a t i o n s . New York . D O U B L E D A Y . Ba r nes . , F red , . 19 9 2 . Th e y ’ r e Ba ck ! New Re pu b l i c . Augus t . Vo l ume 3 . 1 99 2 . The New Repu b l i c . Boot . , Max , . 2 00 4 . Th ink Aga i n Ne o c o n s . Fore ig n Po l i c y . J a n uary 1s t 20 04 . F ore ign P o l i c y . C ryan . , Ph i l l ip . 2 0 01 . De f i n i n g T e r r o r i sm . Comp l e t e Co v e r a g e o f 9/ 11 a n d t h e W ar o n A f g h an i s t an . Count e r Punch . Novemb er 29 , 20 0 1 . h t t p : / / www.count e rpunc h .o rg/ c rya n1 .h tm l Deud ney . , Dan ie l , . a nd Ikenb e r ry . , G . Joh n , . Summer , 19 9 2 . , Fo r e i g n P o l i c y : Who w on t h e Co l d War ? vo l . 87 . Fo re ign Po l i c y . Donne l l y . , Th omas , . 2 0 03 . Th e Und e r p i n n i n g s o f t h e Bu sh Do c t r i n e . Nat i o n a l S e c u r i t y Ou t l o ok . AEI Was h i ng t i on . Feb rua ry 1 s t , 2 0 03 . ae i . o rg/ pu b l i c a t ion s/ pubI D .158 4 5/ pub_ d e t a i l . a sp Ehrma n . , John , . 1 9 95 . Th e R i s e o f Ne o c o n s e r v a t i sm : I n t e l l e c t u a l s a n d Fo r e i g n A f f a i r s 19 4 5 - 19 9 4 . Ya l e Un ive r s i t y P re s s . Fe rgus on . , N i a l l . 2 0 04 . Ju l y/ Augus t . Fo r e i g n P o l i c y : A Wo r l d Wi t h o u t P ow e r . Fo re i gn Po l i c y . Gad d i s . J ohn , Lew i s , . 2 00 4 . S u rp r i s e , S e c u r i t y an d t h e Ame r i c a n Ex p e r i e n c e . Ha rv a rd . Good in . , Ro be r t E . , and P e t t i t . , Ph i l ip , . 20 0 3 . Con t empo r a r y P o l i t i c a l P h i l o s o ph y , A n An t h o l o g y . B l ac kwe l l . He ld . , Dav id , . 1 99 2 . , Demo c r a c y : F r om C i t y - s t a t e s t o a Co s ompo l i t a n O rd e r ? C i t i ed i n Po l i t i c a l S t u d i e s , 40 , S p e c i a l I s s u e , 19 92 , 1 0 - 39 . P o l i t i c a l S t ud ie s A ss oc i a t i on . Hobbe s . , Th oma s , . 1 95 7 , Le v i a t h an . Ox fo rd .

Horow i t z . , Dav id , . 20 04 . l a R epubb l i c a . A pr i l 0 6 t h . l a Repu bb l i c a P re ss . Keohane . , Robe r t O , . 1 98 4 . Af t e r H e g emon y : Co o p e r a t i o n an d D i s c o r d i n t h e Wo r l d P o l i t i c a l E c o n om y . P r inc e ton Un ive r s i t y P re s s Kras ne r , S t ephe n D . , 19 99 , S o v e r e i g n t y : Or g an i z e d Hy p o c r i s y , P r inc e ton Kr i s t o l . I r v i ng , . 20 0 4 . Th e N e o c o n s e r v a t i v e P e r s u a t i o n . The Neocon R ead e r . Ed i t ed b y S t e l z e r . Gr ove P re s s . New Yor k . Kr i t s o l a nd Kagan . 20 0 0 . N at i o n a l I n t e r e s t s a n d G l o ba l R e s p o n s i b i l t y . P r e s e n t Dan g e r s . In t rod uc t i on . Encount e r Bo ok s . Laws on , F red H . , 19 98 . Th e Anna l s o f t h e Ame r i c an Ac ad em y o f P o l i t i c a l a n d S o c i a l S c i e n c e . M i l l s Macmi l l a n . , Mar ga re t , . 20 03 . P e a c emak e r s : Th e P a r i s Con f e r e n c e o f 191 9 an d I t s A t t emp t s t o End War s . Joh n Mur ray P re s s Nye . , Jo s peh , . 19 92 . , S pr in g , . Fo r e i g n A f f a i r s : W ha t New Wo r l d Or d e r ? For e ig n Af f a i r s . Raw l i ns on . , Geo rge , . Hero d o t u s . Th e H i s t o r i e s . 1 99 8 . Eve rym an . S l aug h t e r . , Anne -Mar i e , . 19 9 7 . , Sep t embe r/ Octob e r , . Fo r e i g n A f f a i r s : Th e R e a l New Wo r l d Ord e r . Fore i gn Af f a i r s . S t e l z e r . 20 0 4 . Th e Ne o c o n R e ad e r . S t r au ss . L eo , . 1 96 4 . Th e C i t y an d Man . Es say e n t i t l ed ; On Thu c y d i d e s ’ War o f t h e P e l o p o n n e s i an s an d t h e Ath e n i an s . The Un ive r s i t y o f Ch icag o P re s s . Te sc hke . , Ben no , . 20 02 . , T h e o r i z i n g t h e We s t ph a l i a n S y s t em o f S t a t e s : I n t e r n a t i o n a l R e l a t i o n s f r om Abs o l u t i sm t o Cap i t a l s im . Eu ro pean Jou rna l o f I n t e rn a t i ona l Re l a t i on s . V o lume 8 ( 1 ) : S a ge Pub l i c a t i on s . Tucke r . , Robe r t , . 19 90/ Ex e mp l a r o r C ru s ad e r ? R e f l e c t i o n s o n Ame r i c a ’ s Ro l e . I n t h e Na t i o n a l I n t e r e s t : A Na t i o n a l I n t e r e s t R e ad e r . U n i ve r s i t y P re s s o f Am e r i c a . Wake f i e ld , . Mary , . 20 04 . J a nu ra ry 9 t h . D ai l y T e l e g r a ph . Te l eg rap h Grou p Ltd . We in s t e in . , Kenn e th , . 2 0 04 . Ph i l o s o ph i c Ro o t s , Th e Ro l e o f L e o S t r au s s an d Th e War i n I r aq . Neocon se r va t i sm . Gr ove P re s s . New Yor k . Whee le r . , N ic ho la s J . , 20 0 1 . I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s , V o l . 77 . N o . I . New York



Refe rence B l ac k ' s L aw D ic t i ona ry . 19 90 . 6 t h Ed i t i on . K luwe r Ac ad emi c Pub l i sh e r .

The Eco nomi s t . 2 00 4 . T he Ec onomi s t Newsp ape r L im i t ed .

The Oxfo rd Eng l i sh D ic t i on a ry . New Sh or t e r Ed i t i on . 1 99 3 . Ed . Le s l e y Br own . C la r end on P re s s Oxford . Peop le D a i l y O n l ine . h t t p : / / eng l i s h .peo p l e . com .cn/ 2 00 4 07 / 26/ eng 20 0 40 72 6_ 1 50 77 7 .h t m l Sec re t a ry Gene ra l ’ s A nnua l Repor t t o t he Gene r a l As se mbly , P re s s Re l e a se SG/ SM7 13 6 GA/ 95 9 6 . ht tp :/ / s rch I . un . o rg : 80

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