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Neoconservatives
An analysis of their journey from Cold War
inception through Wilsonian roots, to polemical
dogmatism and [perhaps] inevitable hubris
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C o n t e n t s
Abstr ac t I V
Pre f ace V
P a r t One Root s & Ech oe s o f t he Pa s t
Chapter I 0 7
Chapter I I 16
P a r t Two The End o f S t a t e s & Hub r i s
Chapter I I I 29
Bibl iogr aphy 42
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The historical task of neoconservatism would seem to be
this: to convert the Republican Party, and American
conservatism in general , against their respective wi l ls, into a
new kind of conservative polit ics suitable to governing a
modern democracy.
I r v i n g K r i s t o l . T h e N e o c o n s e r v a t i v e P e r s u a s i o n .
T h e N e o c o n R e a d e r . 2 0 0 4 . S t e l z e r . G r o v e P r e s s . N e w Y o r k .
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Abstract
This dissertation shal l , in the first instance, delineate the antecedents of
the neoconservative foreign policy outlook, in respect of any analogous
‘Wilsonian’ vision, from the period following the Cold War. As a
corollary what follows ameliorates the ideas and impacts that this small
but highly influential group of cold war l iberals had, and sti l l have, on
American foreign pol icy to the present day. Specifical ly where these ideas
came from and how they are pursued takes centre stage. In précis the
purpose of this treatise is to replace heat with l ight, and in -so-doing
separate the truths underlying some of the fears of neoconservatism and
neocons from the fantasies. The main tenets of the ‘Wilsonian’ foreign
policy direct ion are instantiated and measured against the key tenets of
neoconservative thought and foreign policy direction, accenting the ways
in which neoconservatives advocate a ‘dogmatic’ ‘Wilsonian’ vision for
foreign affairs . By this measure the neocon servative foreign policy
outlook can be understood in the l ight of ‘Wilsonian’ ideals and any
similarit ies explicated. In the second instance this essay examines who
won the Cold War and draws attention to the ways in which a
neoconservative vision for foreign affairs can be understood in the ‘post
9/11’ cl imate. The f inal part of this discussion posits that the domination
of states within international re lations is g iving way to the domination of
‘social movements’ . The impact of this seismic shift wil l , i n al l
l ikelihood, end with the neoconservatives engulfed in lugubrious hubris.
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Preface
Perhaps the hardest part of any discourse on the neoconservatives is
getting behind the prejudice implied in the word neoconserva tive and seeing
what these f igures rea lly thought and sa id. Neoconservatives are a diverse
group; often they shun their label on the grounds of i ts pejorative
connotat ions while others are amused, f lattered, or dismissive, depending
on the context. Although neoconservat ive is often deemed a pejorat ive term,
it can hardly be cast in poor l ight i f understood within the boundaries of
an accurate definition. Contrary to what the label implies, some
neoconservatives are l iberal on social issues and favour governmental
intervention in economic affai rs; others are socia l and cultura l
conservatives who are reluctant to interfere with markets. 1 Some
advocate an aggressively interventionist foreign pol icy, whereas others
urge caution and restraint in the use of American power. 2 The ties that
bind the two factions together, however, is their common identity as
activist intel lectuals, as well as a deep anti -Communist commitment. 3
Precise ly how, therefore, is neoconservatism defined? Journalists, and
now even presidentia l candidates, speak with an enviable c onfidence on
who or what is ‘neoconservative’ and seem to assume the meaning ful ly
revealed in the name. 4 This can be misleading.
Constructivist understanding posits that the neoconservative
‘movement’ was originally formed out of a broad collective coal i t ion of
anti -communist academics who dominated American l iberalism in the late
1940s through to the late 1970s.
1 Ehrma n . , Joh n , . 19 95 . Th e R i s e o f Ne o c o n s e r v a t i sm : I n t e l l e c t u a l s a n d Fo r e i g n A f f a i r s 1 94 5 -1 9 94 . v i i . Ya l e Un ive r s i t y P re s s . 2 i b id . 3 i b id . 4 K r i s t o l . I r v ing , . 2 00 4 . Th e Ne o c o n s e r v a t i v e P e r s u a t i o n . T he Neocon Re ad e r . p . 2 9 . Ed i t e d by S t e l z e r . Grove P re ss . New Yo rk .
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Neoconservatism in this guise can be understood as an intel lectual
undercurrent that surfaces only intermittently. It is not, as the
conspiratorial cr itics would have i t , a ‘movement’ . Neoconservatism is
that which the late historian of Jacksonian America, Marvin Meyers,
called a ‘persuasion’, one which manifests i tse lf over t ime, but erratical ly ,
and one whose meaning is g l impsed c learly only in retrospect . 5
Viewed thus, one can say that ‘ the historical task and poli t ical
purpose of neoconservatism would seem to be this: to convert the
Republican Party, and American conservatism in general , against their
respective wi l ls, into a new kind of conservative pol itics suitable to
governing a modern democracy’. 6 That this new conservatism is distinctly
American is beyond doubt.
Throughout the neoconservative history there has been a
consistent and subtle enunciat ion of their animosity towa rds communist
ideals. Indeed the neoconservatives maintained their hard -l ine anti -
Communism and gradually broke with what they viewed as a dangerous
turn to the left during the 1970s by l iberal ism and the Democratic party,
and regained their influence as part of President Ronald Reagan’s
conservative coali tion during the 1980s. 7 There is , however, a problem
for intel lectuals when they move beyond their cloistered arenas of
abstract ideas and operate in the real world of party pol itics, where
principle often must give way to compromise or expediency. A close
reading of that which prominent neocons have sa id leads to the
conclusion that the foreign pol icy they advocate , some of which was
adopted by the Bush administration in response to the attack on America
on September 11th 2001, is less radical , and certainly less novel, than is
widely thought.
5 op . c i t . K r i s t o l . Th e Ne o c o n s e r v a t i v e P e r s u a t i o n . p . 3 3 . 6 i b id . 7 op c i t . Eh rman . v i i i .
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Part One
Roots & Echoes of the Pas t
Chapter I
There is a necessary caveat bound with any discussion on the
development of neoconservatism. As David Brooks notes in an artic le for
the New York Times; ‘If you ever read a sentence that starts with
‘Neocons believe’ , there is a 99.44 per cent chance everything else in that
sen tence wil l be untrue.’ 8 Brooks is r ight. There is no such thing as a
neoconservative ‘movement’ , in the dict ionary sense of ‘ a group of peop le
working to advance a shared cause ’ 9 (a series of organized actions to advance
a shared cause). There is however, that which the acknowledged
godfather 1 0 of neoconservatism, Irving Kristol, terms ‘the
neoconservatism persuasion 1 1 ’ ; that which Joshua Muravchik terms ‘a
distinctive neoconservative sensibil ity 1 2 ’ ; and that which Norman
Podhoretz, in Commentary magazine used to develop and win adherents to
the foreign policy branch of neoconservatism - ‘a tendency 1 3 ’ . Podhoretz
prefers the description ‘tendency’, since as Ste lzer explains 1 4
neoconservatism ‘never had or aspired to the kind of centra l organization
character i stic of a movement’ . 1 5
8 B roo k s . Dav id , . 2 00 4 . Th e E ra o f D i s t o r t i o n . J anu a ry 6 t h 2 0 06 . New Yo rk T ime s . New Yo rk T ime s Co .
9 The Oxfo rd Eng l i sh D ic t io na ry . New Sh or t e r Ed i t io n . 1 99 3 . Ed . Le s l e y Br own . p . 6 2 3 . C l a re nd on P re s s Oxfo rd 1 0 op . c i t . K r i s t o l . Th e Ne o c o n s e r v a t i v e P e r s u a t i o n . p . 33 . 1 1 i b id . 1 2 Muravch i k . Jo shu a , . 20 0 4 . Th e Ne o c o n s e r v a t i v e Caba l . p . 25 4 . F rom Neo c o n s e r v a t i sm . Ed i t e d by S t e l z e r . At l a n t i c B oo ks Lo nd on . 1 3 Pod hore t z . Norman , . 1 99 6 . Neo c o n s e r v a t i sm : A Eu l o g y . C ommen t a r y . Marc h 1 99 6 . p . 20 . Ame r i c an J ew i sh Commit t e e . 1 4 S t e l z e r . I rw in , . 2 00 4 . Th e N e o c o n s e r v a t i v e P e r s u a t i o n . Th e N e o c o n R e ad e r . p . 4 . Gro ve P re s s . New York . 1 5 i b id . Pod ho re s t z . p . 20
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In part this disincl ination by a group that ‘share[s] views on many
subjects’ 1 6 to label neoconservatism a ‘movement’ stems from recognition
by the those in broad agreement with some of its principles that there are
non-trivial differences among them on important points of policy. 1 7 In
part , Stelzer posits, i t stems from the fact that many of the m have spent
their l ives rai l ing against a variety of self -sty led ‘movements’ – the peace
movement, the communist movement, the environmental movement, and
others that view with horror deviations from organizational orthodoxy by
their dues-paying members. 1 8 The intel lectuals known as ‘neocons’ ,
loosely defined, prize their individualism; they simply are not grouping
with others to form an ideological monolith. 1 9 As already noted,
neoconservatism is more a tendency than a movement. Kristol informs
the reader, in The Neoconservat ive Persuasion , that ‘there is no set of
neoconservative beliefs concerning foreign pol icy, only a set of att itudes
derived from historical experience’ . 2 0 The favourite text on which
neocons find their historical anlage is in the work s of Professor Leo
Strauss, particularly; On Thucydides’ War of the Peloponnesians and the
Athenians. 2 1 Recently the focus of media attention has been centered on
foreign policy , in respect to neoconservative American poli tics. This is
surprising since there is no set of neoconservative beliefs concerning
foreign policy, only a set of atti tudes derived from history – history as
far back as Herodotus himself envisages. Neoconservatism is associated
with periodicals such as Commentary and The Weekly Standard and foreign
policy initiatives of think tanks such as the American Enterprise Insti tute
(AEI) and the Project of the New American Century (PNAC).
1 6 The Econ omi s t . 2 00 4 . May 29 t h 20 0 4 . p . 2 5 . T he Eco nomi s t Newspa pe r L im i t ed . 1 7 op . c i t . S t e l z e r . 20 04 . T h e Ne o c o n R e ad e r . p . 4 . 1 8 i b id . 1 9 i b id . 2 0 op . c i t . K r i s t o l . Th e Ne o c o n s e r v a t i v e P e r s u a t i o n . p . 35 . 2 1 S t r au s s . Leo , . 1 96 4 . Th e C i t y an d Man . Es say en t i t l ed ; On Thu c y d i d e s ’ War o f t h e P e l o p o n n e s i an s an d t h e Ath e n i an s . p . 1 39 - 2 43 . T he U n i ve r s i t y o f Ch ic ago P re s s .
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None of which present a complete foreign policy outlook. Subtle
differences aside these atti tudes are encapsulated in the following theses
proposed by Kristol .
Firs t , pa tr iot i sm i s a natura l and hea l thy sent iment , and should be
encouraged by both pr iva te and publ ic inst i tu t ions ; second, wor ld
government i s a terr ib le idea s ince i t can lead to wor ld tyranny .
Internat iona l inst i tut ions tha t po int to an u l t imate wor ld government
should be regarded wi th the deepest susp ic ion; th ird , sta te smen should ,
above a l l , have the abi l i ty to d i s t ingui sh fr iends from enemies [not a s
easy a s the Cold War revea led] ; and f ina l ly , for a great power , the
‘nat iona l in teres t ’ i s not a geographica l term, except for fa i r ly prosa ic
matter s , inc lud ing [amongst others] t rade a nd environmenta l
regulat ion . 2 2
[My ad d i t io n s ]
In order to instantiate this for example a smal ler nat ion might
appropriate ly feel that its national interest begins and ends at i ts borders,
in short i t is internally focused, its foreign po l icy is almost always in
defense mode. A larger nat ion has more extensive interests and a larger
nation whose identity is ideological , l ike the Soviet Union of the Cold
War and United States of to -day, inevitably have ideological interests in
addit ion to more materia l concerns. Barring extraordinary events, the
United States wil l always feel obliged to defend, i f possible, a democratic
nation under attack from non-democratic forces, external or internal . 2 3
The thread that runs through this understanding of neoconservatism can
be seen as born from a ‘Wilsonian’ understanding of international
relat ions and foreign affairs.
2 2 op . c i t . K r i s t o l . Th e Ne o c o n s e r v a t i v e P e r s u a t i o n . p . 3 6 . 2 3 i b id .
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There is, therefore, an inherent sorrow within a thread of this na ture –
the difficult conundrum of what to leave out. The history of both
‘Wilsonian’ ideology and the neoconservative movement is together
broad and multifaceted. Space prohibits a full treat ise of ‘Wilsonian’
history but does faci l itate an historic treati se, in précis, as means of an
analge for neo-conservatism. A laconic summary of Wilson’s foreign
policy outlook coupled with the neoconservative response informs the
underpinnings of this argument. In order to understand these principles,
compromises and the legacy of intel lectual thought brought to bare on
neoconservatives a brief overview of the ‘Wilsonian’ vision for foreign
policy is prudent. The ‘Wilsonian’ vision for foreign policy outlook is the
outgrowth of President Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points†, which he
believed, that if implemented, would help create world peace. Wilson’s
speech of January 8 t h 1918, delivered to Congress, outl ining his fourt een
points for reconstructing a new Europe following World War I was
idealist ic in some respects, myopi c in others and successful in only a few.
While some of his points were specif ic, others were more general ,
including freedom of the seas, abol ishing secret treaties, disarmament,
restored sovereignty of some occupied lands, and the right of national
self-determination.
It is the general undertone and foreign policy vision of Wilson’s
speech that the neoconservative ‘movement’ adapted for their own
foreign pol icy ‘direct ion’. As such it is clear that the neoconservatives of
the 1970s and 1980s were st i l l r epresentative of the cold war l iberalism –
often called the vital centre – that echoed ‘Wilsonian’ ideals and
developed after World War II.
† Wil son ’ s Fou r t e e n P o i n t s a r e f u l l y d e t a i l ed in t he app end ix on the f i na l p age o f t h i s d i s se r t a t io n .
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These ideals were the anlage for the neoconservatives’ anti -Communism,
which were born from a belief in the superiori ty of American democratic
values. The three key principles analogous with both veins of thought are
self-determination, the advocacy of democracy and, crucial ly, anti -
isolationism in the sphere of intervention in the promotion of democracy
to create global stabil i ty and peace. The overriding concerns of
neoconservatives are characterized by benevolence and ideology, rather
than strict self -interest and fear. These stra ins of thought worked
together in the 1980s, when many neoconservatives held office under
President Regan, to re inforce the administration’s anti -Communist
outlook while a lso moving it toward a pol icy of actively assisting foreign
governments or groups trying to develop democratic insti tutions of their
own. 5 In this respect neoconservatives’ closely advocated the ‘Wilsonian’
vision for foreign affairs.
There is a common misconception surrounding the
neoconservative story – that they are too academic, often dismissed as
detached from realpol i t ik , perceived as hudibrast ic. Barnes wrote that :
[…] neo -cons defected f rom the Democra t ic par ty in droves in the la te
1970s and ear ly 1980s . Their chief gr ipe : Democrats were
accommodat ing in the f ace of Sov iet expansioni sm and suppor t ive of
soc ia l permiss iv ism. 2 4
Such simplistic and sweeping comments display a myopic view of the
circumstances under which neoconservatives spl intered from the
Democrat ic Party and the differences between related neoconse rvative
threads. Neoconservatives have within their number l ibera ls ,
conservatives, polit icians and l iterary intel lectuals.
2 4 Ba rn es . , F r ed , . 19 92 . Th e y ’ r e Ba ck ! New Re pu b l i c . Augu s t . Vo lume 3 . 1 9 92 . p . 12 . The Ne w Repub l i c .
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As a group its core successes and fai lures are not easi ly defined by dint
of its complex constituent structure. In the context of United States
foreign policy , neoconserva tism has a narrow and elegant clari ty . Its core
posits are based on interventionist hawkish views with an emphasis on
mili tary force, unilateral i f required, to replace autocratic regimes with
democratic ones. Although this view is at odds and competes with strict
l iberal international ism, rea lism and non -intervention, it remains true to
Wilson. Broadly sympathetic to Wilson’s idealist ic goals to spread
American principles of democracy, neoconservatives grew to reject the
notion of a re l iance on international organizations and treaties to
accomplish these objectives. Although John Lewis Gaddis, of Yale
University, be l ieves that President Bush’s foreign policy is a disastrous
deviation from the more multi lateral ist policy crafted by Franklin D.
Roosevelt, he has pointed out that many of the doctrines underlying the
current president’s policy have roots in America ’s his tory. 2 5
Early in the twentieth century, Theodore Roosevelt articulated a
policy that differs l i tt le from that of George W. Bush, with the exception
of Theodore Roosevelt’s concentration on the Western Hemisphere: 2 6
Chronic wrongdoing , or an impotence which resu l t s in a genera l
loosening of the t ie s of c iv i l i zed soc ie ty , may […] u l t imate ly requ ire
in tervent ion by some c iv i l i zed na t ion, and in the Weste rn Hemisphere
[…] may force the United S tate s , however re luctant ly […] to the
exerc i se of inte rnat iona l pol ice power ’ . 2 7
Neoconservatives have embraced the president who, in Ste lzer’s eyes,
urged Americans to speak softly and carry a big stick. 2 8
2 5 op . c i t . S t e l z e r . 2 00 4 . Th e Ne o c o n R e ad e r . p . 4 .
2 6 i b id . p . 9 . 2 7 c i t i ed by Gad d i s . Jo hn , Lew i s , . 20 04 . S u r p r i s e , S e c u r i t y an d t h e Ame r i c an Ex p e r i e n c e . p . 2 1 . Har va rd . 2 8 i b id S t e l z e r .
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In their essay, National Interes t and Global Responsibi l i t y , Kristol and Kagan
cite with particular approval Theodore Roosevelt’s statement, ‘
A na t ion’s f i r st duty i s wi thi n i t s borders , but i t i s not thereby
absolved from fac ing i t s du t ie s in the wor ld a s a whole ; and i f i t
refuses to do so , i t mere ly forfe i t s i t s r ight to struggle for a place
among the people tha t shape the dest iny of mank ind. 2 9
A decade after Roosevelt’ s statement, Wilson told the world that America
had occupied Cuba, ‘Not for annexation but to provide the helpless
colony with the opportunity for freedom’, 3 0 language similar to that used
by George W. Bush and Tony Blair many years later as one of the
justificat ions for unseating Saddam Hussein. Wilson is regarded as the
‘poster boy’ of modern neoconservatism for this very reason. Like to -
day’s neocons, Wilson sought to remake the world, or substantial
portions of i t , in America ’s democratic image. His cal l for ‘se lf -
determination’, a concept he never really defined, 3 1 is echoed in the Bush-
Blair ca l l for free elections that wil l al low Iraqis to determine their own
furture. 3 2
However, neoconservatism is Wilsonianism with a very big
difference. Wilson believed that his goal could be achieved by relying on
the persuasive powers of multi latera l insti tut ions such as the League of
Nations. Neocons disagree. This is perhaps the most palpable difference
between a ‘Wilsonian’ vision of foreign policy and that o f a
neoconservative vision. This break from Wilson can be seen as a
response to the fai lure of international organizations, specifical ly the
League of Nations, to deliver on their promise to regulate global stabi l ity
2 9 K r i s t o l a nd Kaga n . 2 00 4 . Nat i o n a l I n t e r e s t a n d G l o ba l R e s p o n s i b i l i t y . p .7 3 . Neo c o n s e r v a t i sm . Ed i t ed by S t e l z e r . At l a n t i c Boo k s Lo nd o n . 3 0 op . c i t . S t e l z e r . 20 04 . T h e Ne o c o n R e ad e r . p . 9 . 3 1 Macmi l l an . , Ma rga re t , . 20 0 3 . P e a c emak e r s : Th e P a r i s Con f e r e n c e o f 191 9 an d I t s A t t emp t s t o End War s . p .31 . Jo hn Mur ra y P re ss 3 2 i b id . S t e l z e r .
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and secure peace. The mistrust of international organizations and treaties
to del iver on their promises manifests itself in the neoconservative
rel iance on an increased emphasis on defense capabi l ity , a wi l l ingnes s to
challenge regimes deemed hosti le to the values and interests of the
United States, pressing for free -market polices abroad, and promoting
democracy and freedom.
Neocons would make democracy possible by deposing dictatorial
regimes that threaten American security and world order – using mili tary
force if al l else fai ls; they would follow regime change with nation -
building; and they would rely on varying ‘coalit ions of the wil l ing’, rather
than on the United Nations. The neocon position might be summed up as
[…] d iplomacy i f poss ib le , force i f necessary ; the UN if poss ible , ad
hoc coa l i t ions or uni la te ra l ac t ion i f necessary ; pre -emptive s tr ikes i f i t
i s reasonable to ant ic ipate host i le act ion on the par t of Amer ica ’ s
enemies . 3 3
Max Boot emphatically states that neocons are Wilsonian idealists. 3 4
Although, he attaches an important qualification; the ‘Wilsonian’ label, as
Boot understands, has been haphazardly affixed to anyone who bel ieves
that U.S. foreign policy should be guided by the promotion of American
ideals, not just the protect ion of narrowly defined economic interests, as
realpoli tikers believe. 3 5 However, Wilsonians’ are not al l al ike. Liberal
‘soft ’ Wilsonians’ , such as former U.S President Jimmy Carter and,
previously, U.S. President Woodrow Wilson himself, share a fai th that, as
aforementioned, multi lateral organizations should be the main venues
through which the United States promotes its ideals, and that
international law should be the United States’ main policy tool.
3 3 op . c i t . S t e l z e r . 20 04 . T h e Ne o c o n R e ad e r . p . 1 0 . 3 4 Boot . , Max , . 2 00 4 . Th ink A ga i n Ne o c o n s . p . 12 . Fo re i gn Po l i c y . J a nua ry 1 s t 2 0 04 . Fo re i g n Po l i c y . 3 5 i b id .
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Boot is almost unique in his interpretat ion that these so -called ‘soft’
neocons are wil l ing to use force onl y when the intervention is untainted
by any hint of nat ional interest . This is c learly myopic. For any
promotion of peace is necessari ly in the interest of international stabi l ity,
and by corollary, in the natural interest of the United States. Boot seems
to contradict himself when he states ‘that neocons have scant regard for
Wilson himself, whom they regard as hopelessly naïve’ . 3 6 Indeed, Boot
attempts to parry his own argument be citing the second strand in his
dichotomous explicat ion of neocons – his so-called ‘hard Wilsonians’ .
‘Hard Wilsonians’ , 3 7 place their fai th not in pieces of paper but in power,
specifical ly U.S. power. Their heroes are Theodore Roosevelt , Frankl in
Roosevelt, Harry Truman, and Ronald Reagan – al l U.S. presidents who
successful ly wielded power in the service of a higher purpose. When
these dichotomous strands are woven to -gether Boot recognizes the
solemn thread that in précis neocons believe that the United States
should use force when necessary to champion its ideals as well a s its
interest, not only out of sheer humanitarianism but a lso because the
spread of democracy improves U.S. security, whi le crimes against
humanity inevitably make the world a more dangerous place. 3 8
3 6 op . c i t . Bo ot . , Max , . p . 1 2 . 3 7 i b id . 3 8 i b id .
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C h a p t e r I I
Wrought w i th in the f ina l chapte r of the Co ld War , the pens of
ed i tor ia l i s t s dr ipped w i th the ant ic ipa t ion of a New World Order
proc la imed by the v i c tors in the West . Many thought that the new
wor ld order decreed by George Bush Snr . wa s the promise of 1945
fu l f i l l ed , a wor ld in which in te rna t iona l ins t i tu t ions , led by the
Uni ted Nat ions , guaranteed in te rna t iona l peace and secur i ty w i th the
ac t ive support of the wor ld ’ s ma jor powers . 3 9 Tha t wor ld order was a
ch imera .
Th i s New Wor ld o pt imism was misp laced a s the emerg ing wor ld
order took chimer ica l form. Th i s Chimera i s woven in to the Co ld War
na rra t ive in both the l i te ra ry and c la ss i ca l sense and can thus ly be
seen a s an an lage supported by an ama lgamat ion of the fac tors beh ind
the co l l apse of the Sov ie t Union. At th is ea r l y s tage l ibe ra l academic
op in ion was d iv ided on who or wha t the v ic tor of the Cold War was ,
in more recent t imes however , l ibe ra l academic rhe tor ic has e r red
towards the Uni ted S ta te s and neoconserva t ive e lement a s t he
a rche typa l hol low v ic tors .
Af te r the co l lapse of the Sov ie t Union weste rn thoughts of
mul t ipo la r i t y was the popula r c l iché tha t marked the uncer ta in ty in
which d i rec t ion inte rna t iona l re l a t ions wou ld u l t imate l y t rave l .
However , i f th i s c l iché were u sed to imply an h i s tor ica l ana logy w i th
the n ine teenth century i t i s h igh ly mis l ead ing , for the o ld order re s ted
on a ba l ance of f ive rough ly equa l g rea t powers whi l e to -day ’ s g rea t
powers a re fa r f rom equa l l y ba l anced. 4 0
3 9 S l a u g h t e r . , A n n e - M a r i e , . 1 9 9 7 . , S e p t e m b e r / O c t o b e r , . F o r e i g n A f f a i r s : T h e R e a l N e w W o r l d O r d e r . p . 1 8 3 . F o r e i g n A f f a i r s . 4 0 N y e . , J o s p e h , . 1 9 9 2 . , S p r i n g , . F o r e i g n A f f a i r s : W h a t N e w W o r l d O r d e r ? p . 8 6 . F o r e i g n A f f a i r s .
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The end of the Co ld War marks the most important h i s tor i ca l d iv ide
in ha l f a century , 4 1 indeed not s ince the Ides of March has academic
opin ion been so d iv ided on who or wha t u l t imate l y ‘won ’ a t the
end ing of an e ra . Was i t Russ i a [Rome] , the Uni ted S ta te s [ the
Repub l ic ] , o r was the v ic tor e l sewhere? The magn i tude of the Co ld
War’ s deve lopments has ushered in a w ide - rang ing deba te over the
reasons for i t s end – a deba te tha t i s l i ke l y to be a s prot rac ted ,
controvers i a l , and po l i t i ca l l y s i gn i f icant a s tha t over the Co ld War ’ s
or ig ins . 4 2 In the ea r ly 1990’ s , the emerg ing deba t e over why the Cold
War ended i s o f more than hi s tor i ca l in te res t : a t s take i s the
v ind ica t ion and leg i t imat ion of an ent i re world v iew and fore ign
po l i cy or ien ta t ion . 4 3 Neo-conserva t i sm, i t seems , was under the
spot l i gh t .
Th i s ent i re wor ld v i ew ; th i s n ew wor ld order a f te r the Cold War i s
su i gener i s , and academics began in the immedia te yea rs preced ing the
co l lapse of the Sov ie t Union to over ly const ra in the i r unders tand ing
by t ry ing to force i t in to the procrus tean bed of typica l metaphors
w i th the i r mechan ica l po la r i t ie s . 4 4 Undoubted ly , the u l t imate cause of
the Co ld War’ s outcome l i e s in the fa i lure of the Sov ie t sy s tem i t se l f .
At most , outs ide forces has tened and in tens i f ied the c r i s i s . 4 5 The
Uni ted S ta te s , in a ssess ing the re s t o f the wor ld ’ s impac t on Sov ie t
change , both fore ign pol i cy change and ideolog ica l change , has
formed a marked ly s impl i s t i c and se l f - se rv ing convent iona l w i sdom.
The ‘Reagan v ic tory schoo l ’ , th i s new ‘convent iona l w i sdom’ cente rs
on Pres ident Rona ld Reagan ’ s mi l i ta ry and ideol ogica l a sse r t iveness
dur ing the 1980 ’ s and represent neo -conserva t i sm in i t s base form.
4 1 D e u d n e y . , D a n i e l , . a n d I k e n b e r r y . , G . J o h n , . S u m m e r , 1 9 9 2 . , F o r e i g n P o l i c y : W h o w o n t h e C o l d W a r ? p . 1 2 3 . v o l . 8 7 . F o r e i g n P o l i c y . 4 2 i b i d . 4 3 i b i d . 4 4 o p . c i t . N y e . p . 8 8 . 4 5 o p . c i t . D e u d n e y a n d I k e n b e r r y .
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The Reagan victory school holds that it was precise ly this new
assertiveness by Reagan and his ‘Right’ , which played the lead role in the
collapse of Soviet communism and the taming of i ts foreign policy. 4 6 If
this conventional wisdom is to be believed then the Reagan
administration’s ideological counter -offensive and its mil i tary spending
and build-up hammered the final nail into the Soviet coffin which was a
system internally bankrupt and a lready in the ground.
Deudney and Ikenberry 4 7 argue that ideological warfare was such a key
front in the Cold War because the Soviet Union was, at i ts core, an
ideological creation. In this view, the Cold War was won by the West’s
uncompromising assertion of the superiority o f its values and i ts
complete denial of the moral legitimacy of the Soviet system during the
1980’s. It appears therefore, that Western mili tary strength ( its increased
spending on defense and arms build -up) could prevent defeat at the
hands of the Soviet Union, but only ideological breakthrough could
guarantee victory. 4 8
Perhaps the greatest anomaly of the Reagan victory school and the
surrounding neoconservative cohort was Reagan himself; for the ‘Reagan
Right’ foolishly ignored that Reagan’s stance on th e side of anti -
nuclearism was as strong as his convictions on anti -communism. It is
argued 4 9 that Reagan’s personal convictions on nuclear weapons were
profoundly at odds with the beliefs of most of his administration. Staffed
by hawks, Reagan’s administra tion faced a potential crisis in Soviet -
United States international relations along the nuclear cleavage.
4 6 o p . c i t . D e u d n e y a n d I k e n b e r r y . p . 1 2 4 . 4 7 i b i d . p . 1 3 3 4 8 i b i d . 4 9 s e e D e u d n e y . , D a n i e l , . a n d I k e n b e r r y . , G . J o h n , . S u m m e r , 1 9 9 2 . , F o r e i g n P o l i c y : W h o w o n t h e C o l d W a r ?
p . 1 2 6 . v o l . 8 7 . F o r e i g n P o l i c y .
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Relations between Reagan and Gorbachev were to become paramount for
the neoconservatives of the time and shape neoconservative thought and
‘policy ’ to the present day. November 1985 saw Gorbachev and Reagan at
the Geneva summit, where Reagan’s deep antipathy for nuclear weapons
were decisive in convincing Gorbachev that it was possible to work with
the West in halting the nuclear arms race. It can be argued that Reagan’s
anomalous anti -nuclearism prov ided the crucial signal to Gorbachev that
bold init iatives would be reciprocated rather than exploited. Reagan’s
anti -nuclearism was more important than his administration’s mili tary
build-up in catalyzing the end of the Cold War and setting in stone the
neoconservative fear of nuclear arms proliferation. 5 0
Neoconservatives freely admit that the greatest danger to the
United States to-day is the possibi l ity that some rouge state wil l develop
nuclear weapons and then share them with terrorist groups. Iran and
North Korea, Max Boot conceives are the two l ikeliest culprits. 5 1 Neither,
Boot expla ins, would be wil l ing to negotiate away its nuclear arsenal ; no
treaty would be any more trustworthy than the 1994 Agreed Framework
that North Korea violated; neocons believe that the only way to ensure
U.S. security is to topple the tyrannical regimes in Pyongyang and
Tehran. 5 2 This objective does not mean, however, that neocons are
advocating for pre -emptive war; they do not rule out force if necessary,
but their preferred solution is to use pol itical , diplomatic, economic, and
mili tary pressure, short of actual war to bring down these dictators – the
very same strategy the United States fol lowed with the Soviet Union
during the Cold War. 5 3
5 0 Deud ney . , Dan ie l , . an d Ik e nbe r ry . , G . Jo hn , . Summer , 1 99 2 . , Fore ign Po l i c y : Wh o won the Co ld War ? P . 1 2 7 -1 28 . vo l . 8 7 . Fo re ign Po l i c y . 5 1 op . c i t . Bo ot . , Max , . p . 1 2 . 5 2 i b id . 5 3 i b id .
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Several factors caught the neoconservatives off guard and increased their
convictions during the 1980s. First ly the rhetoric employed by the
Reagan administration added fuel the fire of a large peace movement in
the United States that spread across Western Europe in this period, a
movement that put significant pressure on Western governments to
pursue far-reaching arms control proposals. In this c l imate the tone and
posture of the rhetoric employed by the early Reagan administration was
becoming a significant poli tical l iabi l ity and a possible electoral
minefield. Economic factors played an increasin gly important role in the
Soviet-United States international relations. Secondly , powerful Western
interests that favoured East -West economic ties undercut the Reagan
administrations hard-l ine polic ies.
The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) develo ped a
natural gas pipeline, which l inked the Soviet Union to Western Europe,
demonstrating that economic interdependence and cooperation was on
the increase. 5 4 Thus the neoconservatives found themselves at the end of
the Cold War without an enemy. This vacuum was unexpected and the
neoconservative ‘movement’ was in danger of becoming resigned to the
annals of American history.
After their successes during Ronald Reagan’s first term, the
neoconservatives entered a period of increasing confusion. In a large
part , this was caused by an intel lectual fai lure. 5 5 Neoconservative’s
underestimated the abil i ty of the Soviet Union to destroy itself from the
inside out. The end of the cold war forced neoconservative foreign pol icy
writers to face a quest ion they had no t seen in forty years: what should
be the focus of American efforts abroad? 5 6
5 4 op . c i t . Deud ney a nd Iken be r ry . p . 1 30 . 5 5 op . c i t . Eh ram . p . 17 3 . 5 6 i b id . p . 18 1 .
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The debate revolved around the issue of whether the United States
should pursue a true/pure ‘W ilsonian’ foreign policy, dedicated to
spreading democracy throughout the world, or i f policy should be based
on the narrower foundation of national se lf -interest. This particular
discussion orig inated in 1986 with Tucker, a polemical neoconservative
essayists, reassertion of a point he had made in the 1960s, that Americans
believe that their purpose transcend mere survival and include a mission
to spread l iberty:
From the outse t of our exi stence a s a nat ion we have be l ieved tha t our
secur i ty and surv iva l are synonymous with the secur i ty and surv iva l of
f reedom in the wor ld . This i s why our reason of sta te has not only had
a d imension above and beyond a convent iona l reason of sta te , bu t has
been regula r ly seen as somehow qual i ta t ive ly d if ferent f rom i t . This i s
a lso why we have a lways be l ieved tha t what we do for ourse lves we d o
for other s a s wel l . 5 7
When this view is put forward i t is clear that as a result, Reagan’s
policies of seeking to extend freedom, as well as neoconservatism’s
‘Wilsonian’ impulse , were consistent with American customs.
Neoconservatives put this into pract ice in the 1980s and subsequently
benefited further from the decline of the Soviet Union and the spread of
democracy in the Third World, both of which appeared to reinforce
American interests at l i tt le cost. During Reagan’s successful 1980
campaign, he hired a Democratic party apostate as his foreign policy
advisor, Jeane Kirkpatrick, who later became U.S ambassador to the
United Nations.
5 7 Tucke r . , Ro be r t , . 19 90/ Ex emp l a r o r C ru s ad e r ? R e f l e c t i o n s o n Ame r i c a ’ s Ro l e . I n t h e Na t i o n a l I n t e r e s t : A Na t i o n a l I n t e r e s t R e ad e r . p . 69 . Un ive r s i t y P re s s o f Ame r i c a .
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Kirkpatrick represents a direct l ine of thought from ‘Wilsonian’ visions
of foreign policy to the polemical outpouring of the neoconservative
foreign policy posit ion towards communism. Known for her anti -
communist stance and her tolerance of right -wing dictatorships, she
argued that U.S pol icy should not aid the overthrow of right -wing
regimes if these were only to be replace d by even less democratic left -
wing regimes. This lucid and pragmatic position highlights the
commitment of the neoconservatives to continue the ‘Wilsonian’ spread
of stabi l ity and democracy. The very fact that this neoconservative
thinkers defected from the Democrat ic Party further legitimizes the claim
that the neoconservatives represent the thesis of ‘Wilsonian’ thought in
the latter parts of the Twentieth Century and the synthesis of ‘Wilsonian’
foreign policy vision in the Twenty -First Century.
In the 1980s this foreign policy direction took the form of the
Kirkpatrick Doctrine. In précis this doctrine presents an elegant and
arresting view of neoconservative ideals – i t attempted to just ify U.S
support for anti -Communist dictatorships in the Third Wor ld, in the
context of Cold War rivalries. The doctrines focal point was directed
towards the promulgation that pro -Soviet communist states were
tota l itarian regimes while pro -Western anti -Communist Third World
dictatorships were authoritarian ones. The dif ferences between the two
l ines of thought are more than semantic – even if they represent two
sides of the same coin. The neoconservatives claimed that total i tar ian
regimes were more stable than authoritarian regimes, and thus had a
greater propensity to influence neighbouring states – an influence, about
which the neoconservatives were extremely concerned.
The disparit ies amid authoritarian regimes and totali tarian regimes
were centered on the level of control of their subjects.
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Neoconservatives understood authoritar ian regimes as merely
trying to control and or punish their subjects’ behaviors, while
tota l itarian regimes sought a move beyond this. Totali tarian regimes
denied the citizens abil ity for self -determination by attempting to control
the though ts of their subjects’ through the use of propaganda, thought
reform (brainwashing ) , re-education and poli tical repressions based on
ideology. The neoconservatives feared a resurgence of tota l itarian
regimes akin to Stal in’s Soviet Union or Nazi Germany.
In order to safe guard against this resurgence, the Kirkpatrick
Doctrine, al lowed for the toleration of leaders such as Augusto Pinochet
in Chi le and Ferdinand Marcos in the Phi l ippines. As the 1980s began to
draw to a close the emergence of second -generation neoconservatives,
such as Ell iot Abrams (Assistant Secretary of State for Inter -American
Affairs) , pressed for a clear pol icy of supporting democracy against both
left-wing and right -wing dictators. This call prompted deep -seated debate
within the Reagan administration since support for Marcos continued
during the fraudulent Phil ippine election of February 7 t h 1986. Although
the U.S administration eventually opposed Marcos in the days that
followed, the turmoil in the Phil ippines grew, under widespread p opular
refusal to accept the electoral outcome. ‘Wilsonian’ ideals began to
surface in an immediately recognizable foreign policy direct ion when the
Reagan administration urged Marcos to accept defeat and leave the
country. Indeed Abrams supported the 1988 Chilean plebisci te that
resulted in the restoration of democratic rule and Pinochet’s eventual
removal from office. Through the National Endowment for Democracy
(NED), commonly know as Projec t Democracy , led by Carl Gershman, a
neoconservative businessman and President of the NED, funds were
directed to anti -Pinochet opposition in order to ensure a fair election.
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However, the ‘Wilsonian’ legacy that directed much of the
neoconservative thought can be equated to the Delphic Oracle . Like the
Delphic Oracle, the discourse that pursues neo -conservatism is
ambiguous in the perspicuity of its successes and fa i lures; this is most
evident from the theoretical and often tacit base on which the outcomes
of its foreign policy vision rests.
Parleying with the Soviet Union as i f the game of chess were the
modus operandi often presented unforeseen consequences. Arming the
Mujahadeen in Afghanistan is one example where American led
intervention, as a means of ending Communist rule later resurfaced to
harm the U.S.
In practical terms the neoconservatives sought to resist the
temptation to embark on a crusade for freedom, and instead advocated
building ‘a framework of stabi l ity and moderation within which
democratic insti tutions may take root and grow,’ 5 8 with the United States
acting as ‘a force for self -government simply by virtue of our example. ’ 5 9
Tucker’s argument represented the ethos of the majority of
neoconservatives. The spread of democracy abroad was of great benefit
to the United States but the neoconservatives were keen to avoid open-
ended crusades – a position that has since changed.
The end of ideological struggle for hegemonic dominance wrought
within the final chapter of the chapter of the Cold War saw second -
generation neoconservatives continually enuncia te an even more
explici tly ‘Wilsonian’ vision for foreign affairs in mimesis. Since the
terrorist attacks of 9/11† a third generation of neoconservative thought
has emerged.
5 8 op . c i t . Tuc ke r . p . 7 4 . 5 9 i b id . p . 75 .
† 9/ 11 re f e r s t o t he t h ree s imu l t ane ou s t e r ro r i s t a t t ac k s ag a in s t t he Wo r ld Trad e Cent re , The Pen t agon and Sh an ks v i l l e o n Sep t ember 1 1 th 2 00 1 in t he U n i t ed S t a t e
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This third generation of neoconservatives enjoyed a renaissance in the
post 9/11 climate. Their increasingly hard -l ine vision of foreign policy
direction and muscular stance towards external threat, in the Bush
administration appears to have found renewed purpose. Its ideological
shift of focus away from the threat of Communism to the threat of
[Islamic] terrorism has captured the mindset of the American people .
This ideologica l shift can be seen as, in one respect, a step away from the
‘Wilsonian’ legacy that used to run through the veins of
neoconservatives. U.S foreign pol icy is more active in preventing a states
self-determination i f it presents a potential risk to U.S interests or
security. However, the two remaining key ‘Wilsonian’ tenets of advocacy
of democracy and [military] intervention to promote democracy are at the
forefront of America’s War on Terror and i ts road-map to democratize the
world.
It is self evident from the current administrations act ions within
Iraq and Afghanistan, that the third generation of neoconservatives sti l l
holds a bel ief in the superiority of American democratic values. If the
post 9/11 neoconserva tive thought could be disti l led into singular canon
i t would be a mimesis of the ‘Bush Doctrine’ . The Bush Doctrine,
promulgated after September 11 t h , incorporates the concept that nations
harboring terrorists are themselves enemies of the United States.
Terrorism is perhaps the most important word in the world at this
moment in time. The ‘crusade’ against terrorism has seen the United
States with UN coalition forces wage an on -going mili tary campaign
against Afghanistan and the invasion and occupation of I raq. Polit ical
leaders from numerous countries declared support for the new U.S. ‘war
on terror’ and sought to re -classify their own enemies as terrorists.
Immediately the l ines separating the complex processes of regimes of
terror and fact ional terrorism as a mode of struggle became blurred.
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For instance following 9/11 Russia sought to cast Chechen rebels as
terrorist, and Georgia as a terrorist -harboring State, in order to
legit imate its use of violence in those two arenas. 6 0 Colombian army
officials quickly switched, within a few days of 9/11, from calling the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (The Fuerzas Armadas
Revolucionarias de Colombia – Ejército del Pueblo; FARC-EP) and the
National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional; ELN)
rebels ‘narcoguerrillas’ to calling them ‘narcoterrorists’. The war on
the al ’Qaeda network was justified by neoconservatives, through the
Bush Doctrine, in retal iation for the attacks of 9/11. However the enemy
of the U.S. mil itary campaign has not sole ly been the people responsible
for the September attacks but terrorism in general . Declaring a war on
‘ terrorism in general ’ , by dint of its magnitude, ref lects a dangerous
precedent since it does not seek to define that which is a terrorist .
Having the ‘ legitimacy’ to combat any enemy anywhere quickly becomes
an opiate for the State. It has polluted America ’s historical focus on the
doctrine of deterrence as a primary means of self -defence. While there
have been occasional pre -emptive strikes by American forces, unti l
recently pre-emptive strikes have not been the official American foreign
and mili tary policy. In this sense the neoconservatives won a significant
victory with the Bush Doctrine after September 11 t h . The Bush Doctrine,
which is l ikely to shape U.S. pol icy for decades to come, reflects the
reali t ies of American power as well as the aspirations of American
poli tical principles. Under this doctrine the neoconservatives have begun
to radically change U.S. foreign policy direction away from ‘Cl inton -era’
policies, especial ly in respect to the uses of U.S. power and military
force.
6 0 C ryan . , P h i l l ip . 2 00 1 . De f i n i n g T e r r o r i sm . Comp l e t e Co v e r a g e o f 9/ 11 an d t h e W ar o n A f g h an i s t an . Count e r Punch . No vembe r 29 , 20 01 . h t t p : / / www.count e rpunch .o rg/ c ry an 1 .h tm l 13 . 0 9 . 06 19 . 12
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The Bush Doctrine represents the realit ies of international pol it ics in the
post-cold-war, sole -superpower world. Further, the combination of two
factors, America's universal pol itica l principles and unprecedented global
power and influence, make the Bush Doctrine a whole greater than the
sum of i ts parts. 6 1
Thomas Donnelly, a resident fe l low at the American Enterprise
Inst itute (AEI), an influential [neo]conservative think -tank since the
Reagan era, argued in The Underpinnings of the Bush Doctr ine that
[ the] fundamenta l premise of the Bush Doctr ine is true : The United
Sta tes possesses the means - economic , mi l i t ary , d ip lomatic , to rea l i ze
i t s expans ive geopol i t ica l purposes . Fur ther , and espec ia l ly in l i ght of
the domest ic pol i t ica l r eact ion to the at tacks of September 11, the
v ic tory in Afghanis tan and the remarkable sk i l l demonstra ted by
Pres ident Bush in focus ing nat iona l a t tent ion , i t i s equa l ly t rue tha t
Amer icans possess the requi s i te pol i t ica l wi l lpower to pursue an
expans ive s tra tegy . 6 2
Any comprehensive U.S. ‘threat assessment’ would conclude that the
normal constraints of international pol itics; counterbalancing powers, no
longer immediately inhibit the exercise of American might. At the same
time, proliferat ion of weapons of mass des truction promises to upset the
normal rules of power among nation-states, devaluing the conventional
mili tary strength amassed by the United States. 6 3 This threats to poison
the general peace won by the victory in the cold war and complicate any
future great-power competit ion or challenge to the American -led
international order.
6 1 Donne l l y . , Thoma s , . 20 03 . Th e Und e r p i n n i n g s o f t h e Bu sh Do c t r i n e . Nat i o n a l S e c u r i t y Ou t l o ok . AEI Was h i ng t i on . Feb rua ry 1 s t , 2 0 03 . ae i . o rg/ pu b l i c a t ion s/ pubI D .158 4 5/ pub_ d e t a i l . a sp 13/ 0 9/ 06 1 9 . 4 7 6 2 i b id . 6 3 i b id .
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Small rogue states and violent, but nevertheless weak, international
movements l ike Islamic radicalism are coming to have a disproportionate
weight in global security calculat ions. 6 4 Moreover Islamism represents a
kind of ideologica l threat to the Western polit ical principles that made
the end of the Cold War against the Soviet Union also seem like the end
of history. The emphasis that neoconservatives place on ‘movements’ of
this kind is beginning to create a world i n which the largest threats to
America and ‘the West’ emanate not from within state boarders but from
without.
6 4 op . c i t . Don ne l l y .
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Part Two
The End of S ta te s & Hubr i s
Chapter I I I
In the aftermath of the Iraq War no inte llectual w as as vil i fied in either
the mainstream European media or the left -wing America media as Leo
Strauss. 6 5 Strauss was characterized as the force behind the war, the
behind-the-scenes intellectual el i t ist who preached the politics of power
and deception, and the philosopher-king of the neoconservative
movement. 6 6 Mary Wakefield, assistant editor as the Spectator , wrote in
January 2004, accusations that Tony Blair and Paul Wolfowitz had been
lying:
I am prepared to cons ider the possib i l i ty tha t Bla ir had a l tru i s t i c
motives [ for ly ing]… Perhaps, l ike Paul Wolfowi tz and other neo -
conserva t ives , he i s a d i sc ip le of the pol i t ica l phi losopher Leo St rauss .
Strauss was a champion of the ‘noble l ie ’ – the idea that i t i s
prac t ica l ly a duty to l ie to the masses because only a smal l e l i te i s
in te l lec tua l ly f i t to know the t ruth .
Pol i t ic i ans must concea l the ir v iews, sa id S tr auss , for two
reasons: to spare the people ’s fee l ings and to protect the e l i te f rom
poss ib le repr i sa ls . I t ’s a vers ion of the Moonie phi losophy of t ru th :
fa l sehood is OK as long as i t i s used to convert unbel i ever s to the
Unif icat ion Church. As Byron’s Don Juan puts i t : ‘And , af ter a l l wha t
is a l ie? ’Ti s bu t the tru th in masquerade ’ . 6 7
If this is the case then it is inherently diff icult to arrive at any verifiable
understanding of neoconservative thought.
6 5 We ins t e in . , Kenne th , . 2 0 04 . Ph i l o s o ph i c Ro o t s , Th e Ro l e o f L e o S t r au s s an d Th e War i n I r aq . Neocon se r va t i sm . p . 20 3 . Gr o ve P re s s . New Yor k . 6 6 i b id . 6 7 Wake f i e ld , . Ma ry , . 2 00 4 . J a nu ra ry 9 t h . p . 3 4 . Da i l y T e l e g r a p h . Te l eg ra ph Gr oup Ltd .
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Naturally , therefore, it is in the area of U.S. foreign policy that
Straussianism and Straussians have attracted the most attention of late.
Straussians came to hold signif icant roles in American foreign policy
during the Reagan administration, handling portfolios for public
diplomacy and human rights. 6 8 It is not difficult to understand the
influence that this people had in the previous Reagan administration and
the influence they continue to have in the current Bush administration,
largely by dint of their presence in every echelon. Professor Nathan
Tarcov of the pol itical science department of the University of Chicago
served on the policy planning staff of the Department of State, while
Carnes Lord, currently on the faculty of the Naval War College, was
director international communications and information pol icy for the
National Security Council . Charles Fairbanks, now on the faculty of the
Paul H. Nitze School for Advanced International Affairs at John Hopkins
University, served as Deputy Assistant Security of State for Human
Rights and Humanitarian Affairs; and Mark Bl itz, now Fletcher Jones
Professor of Poli tica l Phi losophy at Claremont McKenna Col lege, was
associate director of the U.S. Information Agency. 6 9 Through their
knowledge of how America was founded as a regime dedicated to l iberty
and inalienable rights, these Straussians and others were able to offer a
compel l ing and principled case for American anti -communism, which
explains why so many Straussian s served in the Reagan administrat ion –
more, even than serve President George W. Bush. 7 0 Given that there are
less neoconservatives in the White House under Bush Snr. than Reagan it
is perhaps surprising that neonconservatism has become very much the
topic of the day.
6 8 op . c i t . We in s t e i n . p . 2 0 5 . 6 9 i b id . 7 0 i b id .
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The reason for this is that these f igures proffer a louder rhetoric. The
neoconservative genus of late has frequently expressed admiration for the
‘big st ick’ interventionist foreign policy. In its narrow terms
neoconservatives view the world in 1939 terms, where the threat of
ideology seems more pressing the threat of any single State.
Neoconservatives compare the danger from adversaries as diverse as
Islamic extremism (dubbed Islamofasicism by many neoconservatives)
and China’s particular brand of Communism, so called the ‘China
Threat ’ . 7 1 Indeed the fact that the use of the term neoconservative has
rapidly risen since the 2003 Iraq War is ci ted by American conservatives
as proof that the term is largely irre levant in the long term. David
Horowitz, a purported leading neoconservative thinker, offered a crit ique
written in an Ita l ian newspaper:
Neo-conserva t i sm i s a te rm a lmost exc lusive ly used by the enemies of
America ’s l ibera t ion of I raq . There i s no ‘neo -conserva t ive ’ movement
in the Uni ted S ta tes . When there was one , i t was made up of former
Democra ts who embraced the we lfare sta te but supported Rona ld
Reagan’s Cold War pol ic ie s aga ins t the Soviet Bloc . Today neo -
conserva t i sm ident i f ie s t hose who be l ieve in an aggress ive pol icy
aga ins t rad ica l I s l am and the global terror is t s . 7 2
Whether or not the term is relevant can largely be seen as an exercise in
semantics since i t is their effect that is of most importance.
Neoconservative thinkers are eager to implement a particular type of
foreign policy. In the writings of Paul Wolfowitz, Norman Podhoretz,
Ell iott Abrams, Richard Perle, Jeane Kirkpatrick, Max Boot, Will iam
Kristol, Robert Kagan, Will iam Bennett , Peter Rodman, and others
influentia l in forging the polic ies doctrines of the Bush administration
7 1 Peop le Da i l y On l ine . h t t p : / / eng l i s h .peo p le . c om .cn/ 2 00 4 07/ 2 6/ eng 2 00 40 72 6_ 1 50 7 77 .h tm l 16 . 09 . 06 7 2 Horow i t z . , Da v id , . 2 00 4 . l a Repubb l i c a . A pr i l 0 6 t h . l a Re pubb l i c a P re s s .
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there are frequent references to the appeasement of Hitler at Munich in
1938, to which are compared the Cold War’s policies of détente and
containment (rather than roll -back) with the Soviet Union and the
People’s Republic of China.
The war that the Bush administration and the ‘coali t ion of the
wil l ing’ continue to fight in Iraq can be considered a fair test of the
practical validity of neoconservative thinking and principles. If the
quagmire in Iraq is successful in stabi l iz ing Iraq and the Middle East,
then the neoconservative ideas wil l have achieved victory. If, however,
the on-going conflict in Iraq further destabil izes the Middle East or leads
to a new regime that funnels oil reserves to terrorists and criminals then
the neoconservative ideals wil l have been dealt a fatal blow.
It is too early to say whether or not the situation in Iraq has
discredited the neoconservatives. The emerging media consensus that the
U.S. occupation has fizzled out is ludicrously premature. 7 3 There have
been many well publicized problems, such as terrorism, crime, and
electr icity shortages; a lot less -publicized progress is also evident – the
creation of a Governing Council , the election of ci ty councils and
mayors, the emergence of the freest poli tical parties and media in the
Arab world, the reconstruction of looted schools and government
buildings, and the establishment of a legal framework for a free
enterprise system. 7 4 Although currently the U.S. casualties are relat ively
low by the standards of guerri l la wars i f the occupation does t urn into a
fiasco, as numerous critics expect , the neoconservatives wil l be a
convenient scapegoat.
7 3 op . c i t . Bo ot . p . 5 1 7 4 i b id . p . 51
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To a large extent, Boot explains, this blame is unfair. Many of the early
problems of the occupation were due to the administrations fai lure to
commit sufficient resources to Iraq. Boot posits that
[…] thi s over s ight was large ly the fau l t of pol icy -makers , such as ,
Rumsfe ld , who remain skept ica l of nat ion bui ld ing. Neocons have been
pushing for a more v igorous na t ion -bu i ld ing ef for t in both Afghanis tan
and Iraq and for a concomitant expansion of the act ive -duty mi l i t ary to
prov ide the necessary troops . 7 5
This advice was largely unheeded by the Bush administration, and when
[…] The Whi te House f ina l ly rea l i zed i t neede d to spend more on
rebu i ld ing Ir aq and Afghanistan , Republ ican i sola t ioni s ts and f i sca l
conserva t ives in Congress ra ised obstac le s .
If neocons had been in control , they would have done far more , far
ear l ier , in both Afghanistan and Iraq , possib ly aver t in g some of the
post-war problems . 7 6
Whether or not this is true i t is doubtless the case that the
neoconservatives wi l l in al l l ikelihood be held responsible for the
outcome in both countries. The dramatic shift in international strategic
circumstances occasioned by the Soviet collapse requires a shift in the
manner in which this goal (peace in the Middle East) is pursued. In the
post Cold War era , the maintenance of a decent and hospitable
international order requires continued American leadership in r esist ing,
and where possible undermining rising dictators and hosti le ideologies; in
supporting American interests and l iberal democratic principles; and in
providing assistance to those struggling against the more extreme
manifestat ions of human evil . 7 7
7 5 i b id . p . 55 7 6 i b id . 7 7 K r i t s o l and Kag an . 20 00 . Nat i o n a l I n t e r e s t s a n d G l o ba l R e s p o n s i b i l t y . P r e s e n t Dan g e r s . I n t rod uc t io n . Encount e r Bo ok s .
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This does not mean that the U.S. must necessari ly root out evi l wherever
and whenever i t rears its head. Nor does it suggest that the U.S. must
embark on a crusade against every dictatorship. Clearly no doctrine of
foreign policy can do away with the need for judgment and prudence, for
weighing competing moral considerations. 7 8 No foreign policy doctrine
can provide precise and unvarying answers to the question of where,
when, and how the U.S. ought to intervene abroad.
I t i s easy to say that the United S tate s must have cr i te r ia for choos ing
when to inte rvene . But i t i s a good dea l harder to formulate those
cr i te r ia than s imply to say they must exi s t . 7 9
Henry Kissinger writes in Diplomacy 8 0 that what is most needed in
American foreign pol icy are ‘criteria for selectivi ty’ – however, he does
not venture to suggest exactly what those criteria might be. Determing
what is in America’s national interest is an art not a science; i t requires
not only the measurement of power but a lso an appreciat ion of bel iefs,
principles, and perceptions, which cannot be quantified. 8 1
That i s why we choose s ta tesmen, not mathemat ic ian s , to conduct
fore ign pol icy . Tha t is why we wi l l occasiona l ly have to inte rvene
abroad even when we cannot prove tha t a na rrow construed ‘v i ta l
in terest ’ of the United S tate s i s a s take . 8 2
It is worth pointing out, though, that a foreign policy premised on
American hegemony, and on the blending of principle with material
interest may in fact mean fewer, not more, overseas interventions than
under the ‘vita l interest ’ standard. 8 3
7 8 op . c i t . K r i t so l a nd Kagan . p . 3 . 7 9 i b id . 8 0 K i s s ing e r . 20 04 . D ip l om a c y . Ox ford U n i ve r s i t y P re ss 8 1 i b id . Kr i s t o l and Kaga n . 8 2 i b id . 8 3 i b id .
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Had the [first] Bush administration, for example, rea lized in the early
stages that there were no clear dist inction between American moral
concerns in Bosnia and America’s national inte rest there, the U.S., with
the enormous credibi l ity earned in the Gulf War, might have been able to
put a stop to Milosevic’s ambitions with a well -timed threat of punishing
mili tary action. 8 4 However the administration at the time placed Bosnia
outside the sphere of ‘vi tal ’ American interests, the resulting crisis
eventually required the deployment of thousands of troops on the
ground.
Kristol and Kagan write that the same could be said of American
interventions in Panama and the Gulf. A passive world -view encouraged
American leaders to ignore troubling developments that eventually
metastasized into full -blown threats to American security; Manuel
Noriega and Saddam Hussein were given reason to believe that the U.S.
did not consider i ts interests threatened by their behaviour, only to
discover that they had been misled. 8 5 Indeed in each case, a broader and
more forward-leaning conception of the national interest might have
made the later, large, and costly intervention unnecessary.
The question, then, is not whether the United States should
intervene everywhere or nowhere; the decision Americans need to make
is whether the Unites States should generally lean forward, as it were, or
si t-back. 8 6 A strategy aimed at preserving American hegemony should
embrace the former stance, being more rather less inclined to weigh in
when crisis erupt, and preferably before the erupt. 8 7
8 4 op . c i t . K r i s t o l a nd Kagan . p . 3 . 8 5 i b id . 8 6 i b id . 8 7 i b id .
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This is the standard of a global superpower that intends to shape the
international environment to i ts own advantage. By contrast, the vital
interest standard is that of a ‘normal ’ power that awaits a dramatic
challenge before i t rouses i tself into action. 8 8
Is the task, Kristol and Kagan posit, of maintaining American
primacy and making a consistent effort to shape the international
environment beyond the capacity of Americans? 8 9 Despite its degradation
in the past decade, for example, the United States sti l l wields the
strongest mil itary force in the world.
It has demonstra ted i ts prowess in war on severa l occasions s ince the
end of the Cold War – in Panama in 1989, in the Pers ian Gulf in 1991 ,
and most recent ly [be fore the second Gulf War ] in the a i r war over
Kosovo.
Those v ic tor ie s owed the ir success to a force bui l t in the Reagan year s .
This i s a legacy the Uni ted S ta tes has l ived off for over a decade , an
account i t has drawn too far down. 9 0
A strong America capable of projecting force quickly and with
devastating effect to important regions of the world would ma ke it less
l ikely that challengers to regional stabil ity would attempt to alter the
status quo in their favor. Kristol and Kagan explain that an America of
this nature may even deter such chal lengers from undertaking expensive
efforts to arm themselves in the first place. 9 1 While an America whose
wil l ingness to project force is in doubt, on the other hand, can only
encourage such challenges. To be sure, the United States cannot simply
wish hosti le regimes out of existence.
8 8 op . c i t . K r i s t o l a nd Kagan . p . 5 . 8 9 i b id . 9 0 i b id . p . 3 . 9 1 i b id .
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Iraq burns, Afghanistan boils, and a nuclear North Korea is free to test
its missi les with impunity. Iran, meanwhile, mockingly plays on both
chessboards simultaneously, refusing to give up its nuclear ambitions,
while employing i ts Hezbol lah surrogates to lure Israel into a new Middle
East war. Over the past year the l imits of American power has been
exposed. The opportunity to expand the Pax Americana is fraught with
danger and risk. If the neoconservative ‘doctrine’ , o n the back of the
Bush Doctrine is taken as a whole the image drawn is one of shadowy
figures quietly si tting in their ivy towers composing America’s future
while the Sword of Damocles gently sways over -head. When ‘movements’
begin to become a larger threa t than states the U.S. wi l l need to re ly on
increasingly tenuous historical precedents. These precedents rest upon
one of the few solid truths of social science, namely democracies rare ly
declare war on other democracies. One of the reasons it is so hard t o
imagine the European Union becoming a genuine competitor to the
United States is that there are no serious, direct transatlantic geopol itical
disputes.
Differences in the Middle East, for example, have no immediate
relat ionship to the power balance between Europe and America - nothing
today is analogous to the previous colonia l competition. 9 2 The prospects
for an expanded American -led l iberal international order are clouded by a
mili tary balance complicated by weapons proliferation. Nuclear weapons,
in particular , now pose a deterrent threat to the United States; hopes for
a stable and democratized Islamic world, for example, may be short - l ived
if Iran were to acquire such a capabil ity. This is the most urgent concern
to neoconservatives in the present da y.
9 2 Donne l l y . , Thoma s , . 20 03 . Th e Und e r p i n n i n g s o f t h e Bu sh Do c t r i n e . Nat i o n a l S e c u r i t y Ou t l o ok . AEI Was h i ng t i on . Feb rua ry 1 s t , 2 0 03 . ae i . o rg/ pu b l i c a t ion s/ pubI D .158 4 5/ pub_ d e t a i l . a sp 13/ 0 9/ 06 2 0 . 2 8
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Taken together, American principles, interests, and s ystemic
responsibil it ies argue strongly in favor of an active and expansive stance
of strategic primacy and a continued wil l ingness to employ mili tary
force. 9 3 Within that context, and given the ways in which nuclear weapons
and other weapons of mass destruction can distort normal calculations of
international power relat ionships, there is a compell ing need to hold
open the option of, and indeed, to build forces more capable of, pre -
emptive strike operations. This can be seen as the crysta l l ization of
policy direction for the third wave of neoconservatives as they enjoy their
current renaissance. However, the United States must take a wider view
of the traditional doctrine of ‘ imminent danger’ , considering how such
dangers might, not only threaten its direct interests, but i ts al l ies, the
l iberal international order, and the opportunities for greater freedom in
the world. 9 4 Yet there seems a l imit to the l ikelihood for an overly pre -
emptive or prevent ive use of American military power.
Despite the energetic rhetoric in the National Security Strategy,
the immediate test of the Bush Doctrine's emphasis on pre -emption is
not to be found in today's crises in North Korea. 9 5 Donnelly posits that
the cal l for pre -emption is firmly founded
Ye t i t takes l i t t le imagin at ion to dream up scenar ios that might ca l l for
preempt ive mi l i t ary ac t ion. Consider the choices for an Amer ican
pres ident i f a rad ica l r eg ime over threw, or s imply defeated a t the ba l lot
box , the Musharraf government in Paki s tan. Would neoconserva t ive
fears about Paki s tan' s nuc lear weapons const i tute an imminent danger?
What of a massing of Chinese forces across the Taiwan Stra i t , perhaps
preceded by an en larged ‘miss i le embargo ’ of the sor t a t tempted in
1996? These hypothet i ca l scenar ios suggest that the h e ightened
emphas is on preemption is not misp laced . 9 6
9 3 op . c i t . Don ne l l y 9 4 i b id . 9 5 i b id . 9 6 i b id .
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The neoconservatives are acutely aware that the preservation of Pax
Americana rests upon both actual mil itary strength and the perception of
strength. The variety of victories scored by U.S. forces since the end of
the cold war is testament to both the fut i l ity of directly challenging the
United States and the desire of its enemies to keep poking and prodding
to find a weakness in the American global order
Conv inc ing would -be great powers , rogue s ta tes , and ter ror i st s to
accept the l ibera l democrat ic order - and the cha l lenge to autocra t ic
forms of ru le tha t come wi th i t - require s not only an overwhelming
response when the peace i s broken, bu t a wi l l ingnes s to s tep in when
the danger i s imminent . The message of the Bush Doctr ine – ‘Don ' t
even think about i t ! ’ - res ts in par t on a logic of pre -empt ion tha t
under l ie s the logic of pr imacy . 9 7
The future of the state in international relations is difficult to e nvisage.
The Westphalian model, which is understood as the anlage of modern
state organization, has persisted for a long time but has frequently been
defeated; i t has been both enduring and fragi le. The seeds have been
sown for a future devoid of moral obl igat ion, a future where every state
is in constant fear of subjugation, not from one another but from hosti le
‘movements’ . This future is not far away. There is a tendency to assume
that power, l ike nature, abhors a vacuum - since the dawning of history
someone or some state is always been the hegemon, or bidding to become
it. 9 8 In the fifth century BCE Herodotus speaks of the constant change
in the hegemon from Cyrus the Great to Cambyses to Darius culminating
in Xerxes (483BCE). By 43BCE and the Ides of March Rome had had
many hegemon’s and fought many more would -be usurpers. This constant
change continues through the centuries unti l the present day.
9 7 op . c i t . Don ne l l y 9 8 Fe rguso n . , N ia l l . 2 00 4 . Ju l y/ Augus t . Fo r e i g n P o l i c y : A Wo r l d W i t h o u t P ow e r . p . 3 2 . Fore ig n Po l i c y .
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To-day the hegemon is the United States; a century ago it was the
United Kingdom - before that, it was France, Spain, Prussia and so on. 9 9
The world is currently unipolar, this is unlikely to last as power is not a
natural monopoly; the struggle for mastery is both perennial and
universal . 1 0 0 The unipolar i ty fol lowing the collapse of the Soviet Union
cannot last for much longer, for the simple reason that history despises a
hyperpower. 1 0 1 If history is r ight then there wil l be powers and
challengers that rise to conspire against the hegemon and bring
multipo lari ty back into the fold.
What i f the past were simply too different from the future and
could not make a prediction? What i f current academic thought is wrong?
What if the world is heading, not for another hegemon, but for a period
where there is no hegemon? What i f, instead of a balance of power, there
is an absence of power? 1 0 2 With the constant erosion of sovereignty and
rise of terrorist ‘movements’ i t is difficult to imagine ho w the concept of a
stat e might survive. Without this defining notion states would fai l to
dominate international relations – they would be replaced by fear and
dogmatism.
In order to bring about this apolar world Ferguson hypothesises the
worst-case scenario that;
U.S . neo-conserva t ive hubr is i s humbled in Iraq and tha t the Bush
admini s tra t ion’s projec t to democra t ize the Middle East a t gunpoint
ends in ignominious wi thdrawa l , go ing from empire to decoloniza t ion
in le ss than two year s . 1 0 3
9 9 i b id .
1 0 0 op . c i t . Fe rgu so n . p . 3 2 .
1 0 1 i b id . 8 3 i b id . p . 3 3 . 1 0 2 i b id . 1 0 3 op . c i t . p . 3 3 .
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If there is no aspir ing riva l powers that wish to shoulder the
responsibil ity of coping with Iraq and [conceivably] also Afghanistan, the
Balkans, Cuba, and Haiti – what would an apolar world look l ike?
There would be anarchy. Not since the ninth and tenth centuries
has a situation l ike this been known. The Roman Empire had crumbled;
the west was divided by re l igious dogmatism led by the pope and civil
unrest at the hands of the heirs of Charlemagne. With no guiding power
there would be a new Dark Ages. States would cease to function and wars
would break out where the U.S. had prevented them previously.
Meanwhile, l imited nuclear wars a long cleavages that were no longer
protected would devastate numerous regions - North and South Korea,
India and Pakistan would see their old rivals played out on a global scale .
States would persist in this world brief ly. In the f inal ity of the apolar
world there would be no states, no moral s and no security. Thomas
Hobbes would see the apolar world as his State of Nature come alive. In
constant fear of the unknown mankind would find more dangerous forces
than currently rival the superpowers – they would not benefit from any
protect ion, in th is g lobal void of power, against the bleak new world
disorder.
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Appe nd ix :
Wi ls on ’ s F our t ee n Po i n t s
I . Open c ove nan t s o f p eace , open ly a r r i ved a t , a f t e r wh i ch t he re sh a l l b e no p r iv a t e in t e r na t ion a l und e r s t and i ngs o f any k ind b u t d ip loma cy s ha l l p r oceed a l ways f r an k ly and i n t he pu b l i c v i ew .
I I . Abs o lu t e f r e ed om of na v i ga t io n up on the se a s , ou t s id e t e r r i t o r i a l w a t e r s , a l i ke in peace and i n war , ex cep t a s t he se a s may b e c lo s ed in who le o r in pa r t b y in t e r na t i ona l a c t ion fo r t he en forceme nt o f in t e rna t ion a l co vena n t s .
I I I . The r emo va l , so f a r a s p os s i b l e , o f a l l e co nomic ba r r i e r s and the e s t ab l i shment o f an equa l i t y o f t r ad e co nd i t i on s among a l l t he n a t io ns co nse n t in g t o t he peace a nd a s s oc i a t i ng t hem s e lve s f o r i t s ma in t en ance .
IV . Ad equa t e gua r a n t ee s g i ve n and t aken th a t na t i ona l a rmament s w i l l be r ed uced to t he lowes t po in t cons i s t en t w i th d ome s t i c s a f e t y .
V . A f r e e , ope n -m ind ed , a nd abs o lu t e l y impa r t i a l ad ju s tm ent o f a l l co lo n i a l c l a im s , b ased up on a s t r i c t ob se r va nce o f t he p r i n c ip l e t ha t i n d e t e rm i n i ng a l l such que s t io ns o f so ve re i gn t y t he in t e re s t s o f t he popu l a t io ns co nce r ned mus t have equa l we ig h t w i th t he equ i t ab l e c l a ims o f t he gove r nment whose t i t l e i s t o be d e t e rm i ne d .
VI . The ev acua t i on o f a l l Ru s s i an t e r r i t o r y a nd such a se t t l ement o f a l l que s t i on s a f f e c t i ng Rus s i a a s w i l l s e cu re t he be s t a nd f r ee s t coope r a t io n o f t he o the r n a t ion s o f t he wor ld i n ob t a in i ng fo r he r an unhampe red and unemba r r a s s ed oppor tun i t y f o r t he i nd ep end ent d e t e rm ina t ion o f he r own po l i t i c a l d eve lo pment a nd n a t io na l p o l i c y and a s su re he r o f a s i nce r e we lcome in t o t he so c i e t y o f f r e e na t i on s und e r i n s t i t u t io ns o f he r own choo s ing ; a nd , more t h an a we lcome , a s s i s t anc e a l s o o f e ve ry k ind t ha t she m ay n eed and may h e r se l f d e s i r e . Th e t r e a tment ac c ord ed Rus s i a by he r s i s t e r n a t ion s in t he months t o c ome w i l l be t he ac id t e s t o f t he i r go od w i l l , o f t he i r comp rehe ns io n o f he r need s a s d i s t i ngu i sh ed f rom the i r ow n in t e re s t s , and o f t he i r i n t e l l i g en t and un se l f i s h s ympathy .
VI I . Be lg ium , t he who le wor ld w i l l a g ree , mus t be ev acu a t ed and re s to red , w i t hou t any a t t empt t o l im i t t he s ov e re ign t y wh ic h s h e en j oy s in common w i th a l l o the r f r e e na t io ns . No o the r s i ng l e ac t w i l l s e r ve a s t h i s w i l l s e rve t o r e s to re c onf id e nce amo ng t he na t ion s in t he l aw s wh i ch t hey h ave t hemse l ve s se t and d e t e rm ine d fo r t he gov e rnme nt o f t he i r r e l a t io ns w i th o ne ano th e r . Wi thou t t h i s hea l in g ac t t he wh o le s t ruc tu r e and v a l id i t y o f in t e rna t ion a l l aw i s f o re ve r impa i r ed .
VI I I . A l l F re nch t e r r i t o ry sh o u ld be f r e ed and the i nv ad ed por t ion s r e s to r ed , and t he wr ong d o ne t o F rance by P ru ss i a i n 1 8 71 in t he mat t e r o f A l sace -L or ra i ne , wh i ch ha s un se t t l ed t h e peace o f t he wor ld fo r nea r l y f i f t y y ea r s , s hou ld be r i g h t ed , in o rd e r t h a t peace may o nce more be mad e secu r e in t he in t e re s t o f a l l .
IX . A re ad ju s tment o f t h e f r on t i e r s o f I t a l y s hou ld be e f f ec t ed a lon g c l e a r l y r e cog n iz ab le l ine s o f na t io na l i t y .
X . The peop le s o f Au s t r i a -H unga ry , whos e p l ace amo ng the na t i on s we w i s h t o see sa f egua rd ed and a s su red , shou ld be a cco rd ed the f r e e s t op por tu n i t y t o au to nomous d e ve lopment .
XI . Ruman ia , Se rb i a , and M ont eneg ro shou ld be ev acua t ed ; occup ied t e r r i t o r i e s r e s t o red ; Se r b i a acco rd ed f r ee and secu re a cc e ss t o t he se a ; and the r e l a t ion s o f t he se ve r a l B a l ka n s t a t e s t o one ano the r d e t e rm i ned by f r i e nd ly coun se l a lon g h i s t o r i c a l l y e s t ab l i shed l ine s o f a l l e g i ance and na t io na l i t y ; and i n t e r na t i ona l gua r an t ee s o f t he p o l i t i c a l a nd econom ic i nd epend en ce a nd t e r r i t o r i a l in t eg r i t y o f t he se ve ra l Ba lk a n s t a t e s s hou ld be en t e red in t o .
XI I . The Tu rk i s h p or t ion o f t he p re se n t Ot toman Empi re s hou ld b e a s su red a secu re so v e re i gn t y , bu t t he o the r n a t io na l i t i e s wh ich a re now und e r Tur k i sh ru l e s hou ld be a s su red an und ou bt e d secu r i t y o f l i f e and an ab so lu t e l y unmo le s t ed o ppo r tun i t y o f au ton omous d eve lo pment , and the Dard ane l l e s shou ld be pe rman ent l y op en ed a s a f r e e pa s sage t o t he sh ip s a nd commer ce o f a l l n a t ion s und e r in t e r na t ion a l gu a r an t ee s .
XI I I . An i nd epend e nt Po l i sh s t a t e shou ld be e rec t ed wh ich sh ou ld inc lud e t he t e r r i t o r i e s in hab i t ed by ind i spu t a b ly Po l i s h popu la t io ns , wh ic h sh ou ld be a s su red a f r e e and secu re acce ss t o t he se a , and whose po l i t i c a l a nd eco no mic i nd epend ence and t e r r i t o r i a l in t e g r i t y s hou ld be gua r an t eed by in t e r na t ion a l c ove na n t .
XIV. A gene r a l a s soc i a t ion o f na t ion s mus t be fo rmed und e r spec i f i c c ove nan t s fo r t h e pu rpo s e o f a f fo rd i ng mutua l gua ra n t ee s o f po l i t i c a l ind epe nd ence an d t e r r i t o r i a l in t eg r i t y t o g r e a t and sma l l s t a t e s a l i ke .
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D is se r t a t io n NeoCon s e r v a t i v e s 43
Word Count : 14 02 1 wo rd s a p prox . B ib l i og rap hy Aro n . , R , . 1 96 6 . , P e a c e an d Wa r : a Th e o r y o f I n t e r n a t i o n a l R e l a t i o n s . New York . D O U B L E D A Y . Ba r nes . , F red , . 19 9 2 . Th e y ’ r e Ba ck ! New Re pu b l i c . Augus t . Vo l ume 3 . 1 99 2 . The New Repu b l i c . Boot . , Max , . 2 00 4 . Th ink Aga i n Ne o c o n s . Fore ig n Po l i c y . J a n uary 1s t 20 04 . F ore ign P o l i c y . C ryan . , Ph i l l ip . 2 0 01 . De f i n i n g T e r r o r i sm . Comp l e t e Co v e r a g e o f 9/ 11 a n d t h e W ar o n A f g h an i s t an . Count e r Punch . Novemb er 29 , 20 0 1 . h t t p : / / www.count e rpunc h .o rg/ c rya n1 .h tm l Deud ney . , Dan ie l , . a nd Ikenb e r ry . , G . Joh n , . Summer , 19 9 2 . , Fo r e i g n P o l i c y : Who w on t h e Co l d War ? vo l . 87 . Fo re ign Po l i c y . Donne l l y . , Th omas , . 2 0 03 . Th e Und e r p i n n i n g s o f t h e Bu sh Do c t r i n e . Nat i o n a l S e c u r i t y Ou t l o ok . AEI Was h i ng t i on . Feb rua ry 1 s t , 2 0 03 . ae i . o rg/ pu b l i c a t ion s/ pubI D .158 4 5/ pub_ d e t a i l . a sp Ehrma n . , John , . 1 9 95 . Th e R i s e o f Ne o c o n s e r v a t i sm : I n t e l l e c t u a l s a n d Fo r e i g n A f f a i r s 19 4 5 - 19 9 4 . Ya l e Un ive r s i t y P re s s . Fe rgus on . , N i a l l . 2 0 04 . Ju l y/ Augus t . Fo r e i g n P o l i c y : A Wo r l d Wi t h o u t P ow e r . Fo re i gn Po l i c y . Gad d i s . J ohn , Lew i s , . 2 00 4 . S u rp r i s e , S e c u r i t y an d t h e Ame r i c a n Ex p e r i e n c e . Ha rv a rd . Good in . , Ro be r t E . , and P e t t i t . , Ph i l ip , . 20 0 3 . Con t empo r a r y P o l i t i c a l P h i l o s o ph y , A n An t h o l o g y . B l ac kwe l l . He ld . , Dav id , . 1 99 2 . , Demo c r a c y : F r om C i t y - s t a t e s t o a Co s ompo l i t a n O rd e r ? C i t i ed i n Po l i t i c a l S t u d i e s , 40 , S p e c i a l I s s u e , 19 92 , 1 0 - 39 . P o l i t i c a l S t ud ie s A ss oc i a t i on . Hobbe s . , Th oma s , . 1 95 7 , Le v i a t h an . Ox fo rd .
Horow i t z . , Dav id , . 20 04 . l a R epubb l i c a . A pr i l 0 6 t h . l a Repu bb l i c a P re ss . Keohane . , Robe r t O , . 1 98 4 . Af t e r H e g emon y : Co o p e r a t i o n an d D i s c o r d i n t h e Wo r l d P o l i t i c a l E c o n om y . P r inc e ton Un ive r s i t y P re s s Kras ne r , S t ephe n D . , 19 99 , S o v e r e i g n t y : Or g an i z e d Hy p o c r i s y , P r inc e ton Kr i s t o l . I r v i ng , . 20 0 4 . Th e N e o c o n s e r v a t i v e P e r s u a t i o n . The Neocon R ead e r . Ed i t ed b y S t e l z e r . Gr ove P re s s . New Yor k . Kr i t s o l a nd Kagan . 20 0 0 . N at i o n a l I n t e r e s t s a n d G l o ba l R e s p o n s i b i l t y . P r e s e n t Dan g e r s . In t rod uc t i on . Encount e r Bo ok s . Laws on , F red H . , 19 98 . Th e Anna l s o f t h e Ame r i c an Ac ad em y o f P o l i t i c a l a n d S o c i a l S c i e n c e . M i l l s Macmi l l a n . , Mar ga re t , . 20 03 . P e a c emak e r s : Th e P a r i s Con f e r e n c e o f 191 9 an d I t s A t t emp t s t o End War s . Joh n Mur ray P re s s Nye . , Jo s peh , . 19 92 . , S pr in g , . Fo r e i g n A f f a i r s : W ha t New Wo r l d Or d e r ? For e ig n Af f a i r s . Raw l i ns on . , Geo rge , . Hero d o t u s . Th e H i s t o r i e s . 1 99 8 . Eve rym an . S l aug h t e r . , Anne -Mar i e , . 19 9 7 . , Sep t embe r/ Octob e r , . Fo r e i g n A f f a i r s : Th e R e a l New Wo r l d Ord e r . Fore i gn Af f a i r s . S t e l z e r . 20 0 4 . Th e Ne o c o n R e ad e r . S t r au ss . L eo , . 1 96 4 . Th e C i t y an d Man . Es say e n t i t l ed ; On Thu c y d i d e s ’ War o f t h e P e l o p o n n e s i an s an d t h e Ath e n i an s . The Un ive r s i t y o f Ch icag o P re s s . Te sc hke . , Ben no , . 20 02 . , T h e o r i z i n g t h e We s t ph a l i a n S y s t em o f S t a t e s : I n t e r n a t i o n a l R e l a t i o n s f r om Abs o l u t i sm t o Cap i t a l s im . Eu ro pean Jou rna l o f I n t e rn a t i ona l Re l a t i on s . V o lume 8 ( 1 ) : S a ge Pub l i c a t i on s . Tucke r . , Robe r t , . 19 90/ Ex e mp l a r o r C ru s ad e r ? R e f l e c t i o n s o n Ame r i c a ’ s Ro l e . I n t h e Na t i o n a l I n t e r e s t : A Na t i o n a l I n t e r e s t R e ad e r . U n i ve r s i t y P re s s o f Am e r i c a . Wake f i e ld , . Mary , . 20 04 . J a nu ra ry 9 t h . D ai l y T e l e g r a ph . Te l eg rap h Grou p Ltd . We in s t e in . , Kenn e th , . 2 0 04 . Ph i l o s o ph i c Ro o t s , Th e Ro l e o f L e o S t r au s s an d Th e War i n I r aq . Neocon se r va t i sm . Gr ove P re s s . New Yor k . Whee le r . , N ic ho la s J . , 20 0 1 . I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s , V o l . 77 . N o . I . New York
Ca in M icha e l T ib e r iu s H aywa r d -Hughes
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Refe rence B l ac k ' s L aw D ic t i ona ry . 19 90 . 6 t h Ed i t i on . K luwe r Ac ad emi c Pub l i sh e r .
The Eco nomi s t . 2 00 4 . T he Ec onomi s t Newsp ape r L im i t ed .
The Oxfo rd Eng l i sh D ic t i on a ry . New Sh or t e r Ed i t i on . 1 99 3 . Ed . Le s l e y Br own . C la r end on P re s s Oxford . Peop le D a i l y O n l ine . h t t p : / / eng l i s h .peo p l e . com .cn/ 2 00 4 07 / 26/ eng 20 0 40 72 6_ 1 50 77 7 .h t m l Sec re t a ry Gene ra l ’ s A nnua l Repor t t o t he Gene r a l As se mbly , P re s s Re l e a se SG/ SM7 13 6 GA/ 95 9 6 . ht tp :/ / s rch I . un . o rg : 80
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