Mutual Myopia: Individual and Dyadic Influences on Market Orientation

by

J. David Lichtenthal City University of New York

Gopalkrishnan R. Iyer Florida Atlantic University

ISBM Report 8-2003

Institute for the Study of Business Markets The Pennsylvania State University

402 Business Administration Building University Park, PA 16802-3004

(814) 863-2782 or (814) 863-0413 Fax

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Mutual Myopia: Individual and Dyadic Influences on Market Orientation

by

J. David Lichtenthal Professor of Marketing &

Editor, Journal of Business to Business Marketing & Senior Editor, Foundations Series in Business Marketing

Zicklin School of Business Baruch College

City University of New York 1 Baruch Way - B12 -240

New York, NY 10010 646-312-3281 (desk) 646-312-3271 (fax)

212-628-8370 (home)

and

Gopalkrishnan R. Iyer InternetCoast Institute Adams Professor of Industry Studies

Florida Atlantic University Department of Marketing

122 Business West Boca Raton, Florida 33431

561-691-8583 (office) 561-691-8535 (fax)

561-362-6535 (home) Acknowledgments: The authors appreciate the partial funding provided for this project by the Institute for the Study of Business Markets at Penn State as well as comments provided on earlier versions by Michele D. Bunn, University of Alabama and Thomas Tellefsen, College of Staten Island, CUNY.

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Mutual Myopia: Individual and Dyadic Influences on Market Orientation

ABSTRACT

Marketing myopia is a complex organizational condition that underlies both organizational

learning and market orientation. While considerable focus and attention has been directed to

developing a market-oriented learning organization, there has been less attention given to individual

actions and dyadic-level interactions that are the basis of organization-wide learning. We advance

the theory that myopia must be addressed at the pair-wise actor level within the organization to

concurrently reconcile the perspectives and beliefs held by the actors’ respective organizational

functions when formulating and executing marketing strategy. The consequence of overlooking bi-

functional dyadic interactions within the firm detracts from transmission of learning to systemic

levels and may be thought of as mutual myopia. Based on Martin Buber’s philosophy of dialogue,

we develop an approach to understand the individual and dyadic influences on the dynamics of

organizational myopia and the resulting links to organizational learning.

We expand the notion of myopia, clarify the definition of myopia, remold it in a business

context, identify the many intra-organizational and inter-personal factors that can create myopia

and delineate the negative consequences of myopia. We also draw on Buberian thought to provide

frameworks for understanding the processes that lead to myopia and for recommending remedies.

Keywords: Market orientation, organizational learning, myopia

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INTRODUCTION

The concept of a market orientation has been associated with a leap in customer value

(Kumar, Scheer and Kotler 2000); increased introductions of new need-satisfying products (Lukas

and Ferrell 2000); and one-to-one marketing and relationship building (Peppers, Rogers and Dorf

1999) among other positive impacts. A market orientation has also proved to be particularly useful

in understanding organizational influences on firm performance characteristics. Thus, companies

have wholeheartedly embraced the mantra of “we are market oriented” and implementation of the

concept has had far reaching implications that go well beyond establishing a closer relationship with

the customer (Shapiro 1988). Unfortunately, the question of how to incorporate a balanced market

orientation within the firm still remains to be answered.

A market orientation is one of many organizational-level constructs that have been

empirically linked to market and financial performance for large firms (Slater and Narver 2000;

Homburg and Pflesser 2000; Narver and Slater 1990); small firms (Pelham 2000) and turnaround of

company performance (Harker 1998). While useful, we know organizational-level phenomena are

often the sum of individual actions and dyadic interactions (Lichtenthal and Eyuboglu 1991). It is

people that make decisions, not organizations. Therefore, it has been suggested that implementation

of the marketing concept, must occur at the level of the individual employee (Allen, McQuarrie, and

Feldman 1998).

While it is readily appreciated that the emphasis on "market orientation" and "learning

organization" is important for a firm's responsiveness to customer needs and for creating and

sustaining competitive advantages, there is less attention on processes that would aid in building a

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market orientation and help create a learning-centered organization. This paper attempts to address

that lacuna by elaborating on fundamental processes that may detract from an organization's ability

to be more market orientated and balanced with dialogue-based learning.

Drawing upon sources from philosophy as well as from the conventional management and

marketing literatures, we present a framework that identifies distinct causes of the breakdown in

internal cohesion processes across divisions and the failure to achieve inter-functional coordination.

Both are critical in helping achieve market orientation and create the type of learning organization

best suited to maintain competitive advantage in dynamic environments. The framework advanced

analyzes the multiple detractions to a market-oriented learning organization and helps identify the

processes and practices that must be put in place to create a marketing orientation.

This paper makes several contributions to the literature. It expands the concept of myopia to

include a broader range of shortcomings in perceptions and behaviors within the firm. It then uses

this concept to examine how such limitations can inhibit meaningful dialogue within a firm and

thereby reduce the potential for organizational learning and establishment of market orientation

throughout the firm. Toward that end, this paper also introduces an analytical framework based on

the work of Martin Buber (1965, 1970). Buber’s typology of dialogue and recommendations for

improved communications provide a useful basis for developing a deeper understanding of myopia,

its essential nature and how it can be corrected. This in turn points to a number of areas for future

research and specific actions that can be taken by managers to improve communications thereby

strengthening the firm’s market orientation.

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MARKET ORIENTATION AND ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING

Recently, scholars and practitioners have emphatically focused on a clear orientation toward

the customer, and customer-driven processes within the organization. The emphasis has been on

the nature, antecedents, and consequences of a market orientation (Jaworski and Kohli 1993; Kohli

and Jaworski 1990; Narver and Slater 1990), the development of market-driven organizations (Day

1999, 1994a, 1990) and customer-focused strategies (Deshpande, Farley, and Webster 1993). It has

been argued that a market orientation significantly contributes to the development and sustenance of

core competencies and capabilities, which in turn translates into superior performance (Day 1994b;

Slater and Narver 1994).

Arguing that a market orientation by itself is not enough, Slater and Narver (1995)

emphasize the creation of a learning organization - an organization that learns "how to create

superior customer value in dynamic and turbulent markets" (p. 63). They argue that organizations

must emphasize not only the cultural elements of market orientation and entrepreneurship, but also

the climatic factors provided by an organic structure, facilitative leadership, and decentralized

strategic planning (Slater and Narver 1995). Positional advantage arises from the confluence of a

market orientation, entrepreneurship, innovativeness, and organizational learning and has a positive

effect on ROI, income, and stock price (Hult and Ketchen 2001).

Market orientation, in part, involves the translation of relevant signals from the environment

into appropriate responses by the firm. The extent to which such translation occurs through mere

adaptation or through a more fundamental questioning of long held assumptions, beliefs and models

depends on the form of learning itself (Argyris 1977, Slater and Narver 1995). Even if, for

argument's sake, it is accepted that the adaptation of the learning organization is fruitful for the long

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run, it could be asserted that learning itself is potentially myopic (Levinthal and March 1993).

While learning emphasizes exploration, it is also constrained by evaluation of the results of the

exploration in terms of the current knowledge base or experiences. This type of learning, transcends

and informs the ever-evolving definition of the term “marketing” (Lichtenthal and Beik 1984).

Furthermore, there has been an overemphasis on a macro-view of organizational learning and an

underemphasis on an inside-out view which recognizes that people are the main agents of learning

(Hurley 2002). Extending a customer orientation focus to the individual level worker (Kennedy,

Lassk and Goolsby 2002) is associated with the proper execution of an individual’s job.

Myopia Persists as a Dysfunctional Learning Problem: Concepts of market orientation and

learning appear to focus on the dynamics inherent in the environment and approaches to providing

customer value despite changes in the environment (Narver and Slater 1990; Slater and Narver

1995). These approaches and responses appear to mediate solutions to the problems that result from

marketing myopia. The overriding message is that firms must constantly reassess their

environments and, in so doing, redefine themselves.

One potential factor that can inhibit a firm’s ability to learn about its environment and

implement a market orientation is the shortsightedness of its managers. This issue was first

examined by Theodore in his seminal work “Marketing Myopia” (1960). Levitt (1960, 1975)

argued that most problems faced by businesses and industries were not so much due to

environmental change, but more due to the myopic stance of its decision makers. The term

"marketing myopia" was attributed to the failure of top management to conceptualize their business

beyond the narrow definitions and scope emerging from the product and production processes.

Levitt argued that pre-eminent focus ought be on the customer by providing customer-creating

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value satisfactions. The primary task faced by top management was to spread the importance of this

vision of a customer orientation throughout the organization.

In Levitt’s conception of myopia, problems faced by decision makers were less due to

changing environmental conditions than due to an unbalanced focus on the product or production

processes. By subscribing to various myths, organizations constrain their vision of the future.

Essentially, predictions of an ever-increasing market due to population growth, belief in the absence

of substitutes, faith in mass production processes, and an overwhelming focus on the product were

argued to be the main forces contributing to marketing myopia (Levitt 1960, 1975). To overcome

these biases emphasis was placed on the importance of the customer and Levitt outlined top

management’s vision as one of enabling a pro-active orientation toward creating value for the

customer.

Firm-environment interactions play an important moderating role (see Figure 1). Where both

components are dynamic, firms are less likely to succumb to myopic tendencies. Conversely, where

both elements are static or the environment is itself static, it may be argued that a myopic stance is

actually an asset. However, in a dynamic environment (where most if not all firms live

INSERT FIGURE ONE ABOUT HERE

in the long run), a firm with static tendencies will inevitably develop myopia and will suffer

associated adverse performance consequences. To escape myopia and its negative consequences

would require a firm to constantly adjust to its environment by successively refocusing (Ward

1967). The question remains, how to foster interactions between and among organizational actors

that are not laden with myopia.

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Frequent individual-level communications contribute to the development of shared mental

models (i.e., common ways of looking outward and inward), development of shared meanings and

understanding, common interpretation of organizational context and realities, and even common

ways of approaching and solving problems (Denzau and North 1994). One goal is to get

organizational actors to talk to each other differently. Weick (1979) suggests that an organization is

not just a body of thought, but a set of thinking practices as well. Organizations can be viewed as

entities built-up from interlocked behaviors between pairs of people. Whether actors are talking

about divestiture, new products, or incentive systems they are always taking elements and putting

them together in some combination. Sense-making occurs through various relational algorithms

which can be variations of the recipe: knowing, thinking, seeing, and saying. Weick also notes (in

Coutu 2003) that organizations can learn to be more mindful if leaders complement what they know

by staying in touch with complex realities of their firm. The development of routines and rules that

offer organizational structure, policies, and processes appear to be the building blocks toward

sustainable competitive advantage (Itami and Roehl 1987; Winter 1987). However, the

development of shared mental models contributes to the institutionalization of commonly held

beliefs and assumptions and can also be a limiting factor in overcoming myopia. Rationales exist

for resisting market orientation and sabotaging its implementation (Harris 2002).

The use of the term “myopia” is not a mere cliche. Rather, it is important to point out that

the denotation of “myopia” means considerably more than a simple connotation of

“shortsightedness.” Furthermore, myopia is often an acquired condition (Huxley 1942). There are

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many parallels to many similar symptoms in an organizational setting.1 Indeed, with so many eyes

, one might ask, why doesn’t an organization “see” ?

Organizations will not learn as effectively as they might until they recognize and confront

the implications of differing occupation-based cultures. For example, the three communities of

executives, engineers and operators often do not understand each other and they represent different

occupational cultures that often work at cross purposes hindering organizational learning (Schein

1996). It has long been argued that a single market manager must have a multi-functional attitude

(Cox 1956) and effective decision-making requires synthesizing various functional views (Felton

1959, Burnett 1966).

MARKETING MYOPIA REVISITED & REFINED

One article that almost all students of business are familiar with is "Marketing Myopia" by

Theodore Levitt which appeared in the Harvard Business Review (1960, 1975) more than forty

years ago. It remains a classic in business literature and is often quoted in marketing management

textbooks (Kotler 2003, Perrault and McCarthy 2002). Furthermore, Levitt is considered virtually

alone among the discipline’s intelligentsia as a voice and early apotheosis of the marketing concept

(Brown 1999).

1 Aristotle is considered the first to distinguish myopia, noting individuals squinted or closed their eyes to see (Borish 1970). The word “myopia” comes from the Greek words myein” (i.e., to close ) and opos (i.e., the eyes) (Webster 1959, p. 1619-1620). In opthamology, it is an optical state that: “reflects a condition of nearsightedness and . . . this is an apt description of the typical facial attitude of an uncorrected myope as...they attempt to obtain clear distance vision” (Curtin 1985, p.3). Visual symptoms include defective distance vision which is compensated by clear near vision (i.e., organizational actors understand their business function more than (another) “distant” one). The etiology of myopia is manifold (Cline, Hofstetter and Griffin 1985, p. 416 - 418) revealing other direct parallels for this optical state to organizational contexts. Fibrillar myopia - faulty development during early growth = business school training or first job assignment; adventitious myopia - comes from prolonged periods spent visualizing at a near point = sustained performance in a single job function; transitory myopia - caused by stress or trauma, appears then disappears = in time of business or role-position related crisis, organizational actors cope with primary function overemphasis.

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Multi-Functional View: Myopia emerges from excessive anchoring of an organizational

actor’s perspective in any business function. Articles subsequent to Levitt’s marketing myopia have

discussed variant forms including: research myopia (Andrus and Reinmuth 1979); product-present

focus myopia (Friedman 1980); planning myopia (Canton 1987); market research myopia (Crosier

1979); limited views on product development (Schmidt 1995, Clancy and Shulman 1993);

performance (i.e., financial) myopia (Inkpen 1996). These articles have also offered a philosophical

treatment of how to avoid or remedy similar symptoms such as tunnel vision (Mitroff and Mohrman

1987); and have expanded the definition of business and environment boundaries (Richard,

Womack, Allaway 1992).

Mutual Myopia Defined: For any given decision, instance, or interaction when the

perspectives and processes of two organizational actors (i.e., a dyad) from two functional areas,

overshadow the concurrent use of the orientations of both actors, they are in a state of mutual

myopia. This can be defined as the absence of an ability to translate one's primary business

function responsibility into bi-functional responsive problem-solving and decision-making. A dyad

acts myopically, when both actors simultaneously see the same problem or decision in a

shortsighted way. Organizational actors from any function, can see, think, and behave myopically

with members from any other function within the firm. When this manifests simultaneously

between two or more organizational actors from different functional areas, the individuals in this

dyad are engaged in mutual myopia.

Myopia has an inherent potential to manifest in a bi-directional manner when organizational

actors adhere too strongly to the practices of their primary functional view without allowing other

functional views to mediate ways of enacting their functional roles. Mutual myopia occurs when

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members of at least two departments (while interacting) cannot see past the orientation of their own

functions to include the consideration of the other’s function. In other words, actors in two or more

departments can be myopic simultaneously.2

Organizational actors from any function, can see, think and behave myopically with

members from any other function within the firm. Furthermore, when this happens simultaneously

between two or more organizational actors from different functional areas, we could say that such a

within-organization dyad is suffering from mutual myopia. Both sides of a dyad act myopically, as

they both simultaneously see the problem or decision they face in a reciprocal shortsighted way.

Reducing mutual myopia occurs through the concurrent melding of different orientations by

simultaneously using the perspectives of actors in various business functions (i.e., finance,

marketing, R&D, production and sales, etc.). A reduction in mutual myopia should follow which

will then generate better results on behalf of the organization. Therefore we propose:

P1: As mutual myopia increases,

P1a: organizational learning decreases, and

P1b: market orientation decreases.

2For example, if members in a financial function are overly cost conscious and cannot see the value of basic research from the R&D department to ultimately enhance the introduction of new products they are financially myopic. In parallel, when members of the R & D function cannot see that cost and revenue considerations that must be ultimately taken into account when doing basic research for introducing new products they are R & D myopic. Alternatively, when purchasing managers, see marketing's request for additional customer service resources as only an expense rather than an investment in customer satisfaction, buyer loyalty and goodwill, they are seeing myopically. In parallel, when marketing staff pursue meeting every customer need and satisfaction while failing to see purchasing’s healthy concern for incremental expense and ROI, they are seeing myopically. Common to both examples, is the simultaneous operation of individual myopias, hence, mutual myopia.

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CONCEPTUAL OVERVIEW

The focus on market orientation and organizational learning diverts attention from the more

immediate contexts of organizational goals, functional priorities, and intra-organizational learning

processes.3 Boundaries within the organization, especially in terms of distinct functions,

objectives, priorities, routines, and practices, must be given adequate attention in order to

understand the mechanisms by which myopia of the form described by Levitt and others can be

overcome.

It can be argued that, to a certain extent, Levitt foresaw the curing of myopia through a focus

on market orientation as well as learning. In Levitt's marketing myopia, there is: (1) the failure of

top management within the firm to focus on the market and customers and (2) shortsightedness that

leads to a concentration on limited functional aspects instead of on many varied functions and

processes that clearly contribute to creating customer value. Thus, the lack of an "outward

orientation”, i.e., a proper view toward the market, as well as an insufficient "inward focus," i.e.,

concentration on strategy, operational processes, and policies that contribute most to customer

value, are implied in Levitt's conception of myopia (see Figure 2). The cure for myopia, obviously

requires a two-pronged effort, one aimed at correctly interpreting the market and customer needs

and the other aimed inwardly at translating such needs into value-creating products and processes

across functions.

INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE

3 Narver and Slater (1990) also suggest that the process of framing and implementing marketing strategy must be guided by inter-functional coordination. However, the various functional goals themselves may be in conflict, suggesting: (i) that the domain of corporate strategy may be less influenced by customer-value creating strategies, and (ii) that the various inhibitions to learning may occur from the various functional departments themselves.

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As Kohli and Jaworski (1990) argued, market orientation is the implementation of the

marketing concept, through imbibing an external orientation that eliminates myopic vision toward

markets and consumers.4 At the same time, the focus is also on developing those competencies that

would enable the firm to deliver superior value to the customer far better than its competitors (Day

and Wensley 1983, 1988; Day 1994a; Prahalad and Hamel 1990). Absence of a sufficiently

outward orientation and a misplaced inward focus, generally work against the imperatives of

building a market orientation (Day 1990, 1994a; Kohli and Jaworski 1990; Jaworski and Kohli

1993; Narver and Slater 1990; Slater and Narver 1994, 1995) and result in the development of

inimitable "core competencies" (Barney 1986, 1991; Ghemawat 1986; Prahalad and Hamel 1990).

Nonetheless, the question of how a firm can implement a market orientation at the individual

dyadic level within the company, still begs for an answer. While prescriptions ranging from inter-

functional coordination (Narver and Slater 1990) to continuous learning (Day 1994b) are offered for

marketing myopia, these prescriptions fall short of addressing varieties of other myopic

perspectives. Furthermore, complicating a potentially “quick fix” cure is the reality that inhibitions

to change exist and are often entrenched. To elaborate, even an outward orientation may focus too

lightly on changing needs and / or a saturation of the market (Levitt 1960) or too much on current

markets as opposed to future ones (Hamel and Prahalad 1994).

4 By contrast, Narver and Slater (1990) view a marketing orientation as "the organization culture that effectively and efficiently creates the necessary behaviors for the creation of superior value" (p. 21). This conception of market orientation refers to the inculcation of an outward focus on creating superior customer value.

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DIAGNOSING AND OVERCOMING MUTUAL MYOPIA IN DYADIC INTERACTIONS

Myopia, it will be recalled, can come about from excessive anchoring of one's perspective in

any business function. Hence, organizational actors can be “human-resource” myopic, “R & D”

myopic and “accounting” myopic, to mention a few. Functional myopia can occur when

organizational actors adhere too strongly to the practices of their primary functional view without

allowing other functional views to moderate and mediate ways of enacting their role and conducting

the firm’s business. Furthermore, myopia has an inherent potential to manifest in a bidirectional

manner. When members of two departments (simultaneously) cannot see past the orientation of

their own individual functions to include the considerations of another function, mutual myopia

results.

Research has addressed the need to facilitate a marketing orientation across departmental

barriers on a pair-wise basis with marketing: R & D (Souder, 1980; Shanklin and Ryans, 1984;

Gupta et al., 1985, 1986; Wilson and Ghingold, 1987; Lucas and Bush, 1988); manufacturing and

quality control (Shapiro, 1977; Kohoutek, 1988; Cravens et al., 1988); or sales (Kotler 1977;

Nichols-Manning, 1978) as well as simultaneously across multi-functional departmental boundaries

(Maltz and Kohli 2000; Lichtenthal and Wilson 1992; Lim and Reid 1992; Masiello 1988; Canning

1988; Ruekert and Walker 1987; Wind 1981).

However, none have addressed a specific remedy for mutual myopia on an individual dyad

level.

Principles of dialogue as developed by Martin Buber (1965, 1970) can be used to understand the

factors that lead to mutual myopia within an organization. Analyzing different spheres of human

interaction, Buber conveyed how an individual’s perceptions about himself or herself, others, and

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the object of a conversation influence the structure and content of a dyadic interaction. Toward that

end, Buber developed a typology describing the effectiveness of interactions and prescriptions for

improving them.

Buber’s principles can be used to understand the dyadic interaction barriers that result in

inhibitions which, in turn, increase the likelihood of mutual myopia. His insights, when artfully

applied also offer ways of overcoming mutual myopia. This approach can foster the individual-

oriented dimension of organizational learning systems (Shirivasta 1983, Cantley and Sahal 1980).

By extension, two or more dissimilar business functions living together for mutual benefit ought to

be symbiotic (Varadarajan and Rajaratnam 1986).

Buber (1970) suggests that people like to be told there are “two worlds” and “two ways”

because dichotomous classifications are easier to cope with. Typically, one way is seen as common

and the other one is viewed as superior. However, the reality of any individual is, of course,

manifold, as are his or her associated current and potential attitudes.

Core Inhibitions That Produce Mutual Myopia. Buber (1970 )5 contrasts two broad ways in which

people approach relationships: "I-You" or "I-It.” The difference between these two is not the nature

of the person or object to which one is relating - - it is in the relationship itself6. Not every

relationship between persons is an “I-You” which is open and ideal. Nor is every relation with even

an animal or thing an “I-It” which is muted and closed. And, the “I” of the basic word pair “I-You”

5 This is the date of translation from the German by Maurice Friedman. Buber’s lectures and notes, the basis for the book, range in date from the 1920's and 1930's. Buber states in the preface that this volume clarifies and applies the dialogue principles set out in the earlier volume.

6 It will be shown shortly that the former reduces mutual myopic tendencies while the latter induces mutual myopic tendencies.

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is different from the “I” of “I-It.” As a result, there are five relationships that provide the context

for analyzing the core nature of myopic interactions between organizational actors (see Table 1).

INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE

These mind sets, are a way of viewing the root causes of functional myopia which can then lead to

mutual myopia. Furthermore, it can manifest from actors in any pair-wise set of business functions.

I - I. Some individuals have no consuming interest in anyone or anything other than

themselves. These people are not devoted to anything: not other people, possessions or projects.

People in an “I-I” relationship fail to recognize another person as another I (Buber 1970). This may

result in a form of within-function myopia for which its nuance can be elaborated as follows.

In the context of functional myopia, organizational actors may not see beyond their own

department’s function or their own position to allow for the concerns of those in other positions

even within their own departments. For example, consider a sales department with two types of

representatives - one handling small and medium accounts in a geographic territory (the territory

rep.) and the other handling larger key accounts (senior account rep.) in the same area. The territory

rep., having developed an account to the extent that it’s grown large, finds that account re-assigned

to the senior accounts representative. This territory rep fails to understand how a key accounts rep.

who lacks the years of contact with the client, can do a better job. Key accounts reps have specific

skills and experience to cater to the unique needs of large customers more efficiently and effectively

and the territory rep. perhaps, cannot see this.

On the other hand, the senior accounts rep. argues that certain territory accounts have

characteristics and potential to become key accounts in the future and that these accounts should be

handled by her from the start. In the development of the client from small to large, the very nature

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of the relationship and the specifics of the selling situation require that the territory rep. handle the

initial account development. Territory reps have specific skills and experience to cater to the

diverse needs of smaller customers more efficiently and effectively. The senior account

representative perhaps, cannot see this.

I - It. Some individuals take a keen interest in certain objects or people (more than they do

themselves) but they act without proper dedication or commitment. While they “take interest,” they

do not give of themselves (Buber 1970). In the context of functional myopia, these individuals may

be enamored with techniques and processes yet they may suffer from any of the various types of

myopias mentioned earlier. For example, an advertising executive coordinating with an advertising

agency may pay an inordinate amount of attention to the details of creative aspects of the campaign

and its execution, without an overt focus on whether the campaign meets the communication

objectives of the client firm being served. The art of their craft and nuances of such expression

supercedes overall results and even client objectives.

It-It and We-We. Some individuals devote less time and attention to developing their unique

selves. Instead, some interest or passion dominates their lives. In a manner of speaking, they do

not have any I at all. Theirs is a world of It-It or We-We. These are two ways of having essentially

no I at all (Buber 1970).

In the context of functional myopia, such organizational actors are likely not involved in

working with individuals in other departments or in people-oriented positions even within their own

departments. These individuals may work in relative seclusion, perhaps even sanctioned by their

firm. For example, R&D associates (highly talented researchers) and computer geniuses may be

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given “license” to operate outside organizational norms for reporting and interacting because their

idiosyncratic skills and expertise are needed for major technological advances or breakthroughs.

Us -Them. Some individuals always divide the world into two groups - - - us versus them.

For these people, almost every social problem can be analyzed through this seemingly pervasive

schism (Buber 1970, 1970). Within the field of marketing, a pair-wise departmental configuration

was and still remains one of the dominant approaches to implementing a marketing orientation

(Lichtenthal and Wilson 1992). A pervasive social dichotomization results in actors seeing their

own group or functional area as always the virtuous group and the other group or functional area

(the “them”) as heretical. Such a stance may ultimately foster mutual myopia.

In the context of functional myopia, organizational actors subscribing to the Us-Them world

view may attempt to have their functions, views, and approaches predominate during decision

making, especially when decisions involve other functions. Such actors may couch their views and

perspectives behind jargon and technical details that the other parties or groups would not be able to

understand. If both sides of a dyad act this way, of course, it heightens the probability of a mutually

myopic response, which, in turn, can result in dysfunction. For example, in the context of a

marketing and production dyad, each individual would not be able to understand the other’s vantage

point. The production person, due to her technical orientation, may resist making process changes

and argue against adding or enhancing the product based on market research with buyers. “Those

people in marketing just do not understand our product,” she may contend. On the other hand, a

marketing person, in his zeal to satisfy as many incremental segments as possible, may overlook the

production consequences and cost constraints. “Those people in production just do not get it. The

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buyer is our reason for living” the market analyst may argue in his fervor. Organizational actors see

themselves and their respective functions as an “Us” in conflict with a “Them.”

In the first five attitudes described above, there is no “You” portrayed in the dyads. In

contrast, the “I-You” described below, is more likely to foster a non-myopic response on the part of

organizational actors from different functions. During an episode of mutual myopia, both

organizational actors are likely acting with biases that result from one of the aforementioned five

states, regardless of their function. Indeed, there are the many ways of interacting without really

involving oneself or the other. More effective is dialogue that is found in an “I-You” relationships

described next. “I-You” encounters involve direct relationships (Buber 1970) which may relax

mutually myopic tendencies.

I - You. In the course of certain interactions between individuals there are, from time to

time, episodes without any mediating factors. Albeit briefly, nothing conceptual intervenes between

such individuals in an “I - You” encounter. Prior knowledge and imagination, purpose or

anticipation is temporarily suspended. Every means becomes an obstacle to the manifestation of a

direct encounter. It is difficult, if not impossible to persist in this direct relationship state. It

endures, but only in an alternation of actuality and latency (Buber 1970). This means that this state

is active then inactive. It never endures for long periods of time. I-You is about the hyphen and,

the moment there is speech, I-You may be gone. I- You is a relationship beyond speech, at the

moment of knowing (Buber1970).

In the context of mutual myopia, organizational actors would need to interact in a way that

temporarily suspends the use of stereotypes about other business functions, company policies, and

personalities involved. The tendency must be, from moment to moment, to consistently allow the

20

suspension of department and professional personal agendas so that a broader and more balanced

perspective is achieved. Individuals need to strain against parochial tendencies in the short-run to

attain more desirable collective organizational goals in the intermediate to long-run. Pressures that

mitigate against this broader perspective are inherent in any particular dyad. A relationship, to

overcome mutual myopia, must be one of openness, directness, reciprocity and presence7.

Organizational actors need to strain against tendencies that inhibit movement, from moment

to moment, and need to consciously work toward an “I-You” relationship which is inherently non-

myopic. Not unexpectedly, organizational actors who display negative emotions (e.g., antagonism,

hostility) are closer to attaining a direct relation than those who are devoid of emotion. In the

context of organizational meetings, argument and heated exchanges could be fostered and valued

for their positive impact. They could ostensibly increase the frequency and duration of direct

encounters in the long run. While dysfunctional conflict may have deleterious effects for strategy

and performance, healthy conflict has been found to improve both quality of strategy and

performance (Menon, Bharadwaj, and Howell 1996).

NEW PERSPECTIVES, ON OLD PROBLEMS, FOR BETTER SOLUTIONS

Buber (1965) offers principles for dialogue( i.e., realms of communication) that can increase

the likelihood of less mutually myopic “I-You” episodes from occurring. These guidelines, can

7 The absence (or presence) of mutual myopia likely remains independent of the inherent nature of the respective functions of the organizational actors interacting.

21

foster individual dyadic relationships based on true dialogue, thereby cultivating an environment

more amenable to advantageous, simultaneous multi-functional interactions and decision making.

Principles of Dialogue -> Realms of Interaction. According to Buber (1965), there is a

range of possible interactions that can result when two people relate with each other(see Table 2).

INSERT TABLE TWO ABOUT HERE

A monologue results when a person withdraws from accepting another person into her realm

and lets the other exist only as her own experience (Buber 1965). For example, an extremely strong

or autocratic leader may impose her own thoughts and experiences throughout the organization.

While this can be the case in small owner-managed businesses, even in a large organization, a

charismatic-domineering leader could sweep his or her organizational agenda and objectives by

implementing a one-sided policy setting process. If the leader's goals include fostering a customer-

centric organization, this may be less of a problem in creating a market-oriented organization.

However, more often than not, the charismatic leader's concern may be more performance-oriented,

and take little account of the organizational policies that would be most conducive to learning and

adaptation.

Next, there is monologue disguised as dialogue. In this realm, two or more people are really

speaking to themselves in circuitous ways and yet imagine they have engaged in an exchange that

approximates dialogue (Buber 1965). This form of dialogue has the appearance but not the essence

of dialogue. For example, participants in “forced” meetings as part of the organization’s policies

and processes have the semblance of a dialogue, but achieve no more than the perfunctory effect of

taking care of a routine chore. While organizations may entreat their employees to have weekly

22

meetings, often such meetings may be without any definite or pressing agendas and they serve

merely as forums for interactions that do not enable serious understanding or dialogue on

organizational issues and strategies. As a result, what could otherwise have been a forum for

breaking functional and ontological barriers simply emerges as a policy-guided activity.

Conversation is characterized by an absence of the need to communicate or learn something,

or influence someone. Instead, the sole desire is to have one's own self-reliance confirmed by

marking the impression that is made (Buber 1965). For example, there are various forums for

conversation in daily organizational life. They range from informal and chance meetings at the

water cooler, photocopy or fax machines, or the elevator to more formal newsletters, e-mails,

bulletin board postings, etc. However, in a vast majority of these instances, the communication

offered does not contribute to a rich learning experience. If anything, informal conversation may

devolve into gossip and idle chatter8 that detracts from the understanding that is needed to break

organizational barriers. At the same time, formal conversations (as well as newsletters, e-mails, and

postings), while carrying the semblance of communicating something useful or new, often do not

get the attention they demand, let alone the influence they would need to bring about some learning

or change.

Debate is when thoughts are expressed so they strike home in the sharpest way without

regard to persons present (Buber 1965). The sole purpose of debate is to influence the other on a

particular issue, policy or decision. For example, a new product market manager presents to the

Board of Directors, a proposal arguing for major financial resources to create a new division and

product line extension for the firm.

8 Not all chatter is idle. There can be some relationship building value.

23

Technical dialogue is focused primarily on subject matter without experiencing the other

person. It is prompted solely by the need for objective understanding (Buber 1965). These

interactions belong to the inalienable part of modern existence and in corporate settings, can either

foster or mitigate mutual myopia. Technical dialogue leads to increased mutual myopia when it is

employed to argue a funcitional perspective with the intent to persuade, but not convince, the other.

On the other hand, technical dialogue could serve to reduce mutual myopia if functional jargon is

clarified at the outset.

In contrast, there is genuine dialogue, whether spoken or silent, where each of the

participants really has in mind the other and turns to them with the intention of establishing a living

mutual relationship (Buber 1965) . This kind of dialogue is rare and difficult to sustain. The

communication can be spoken or silent, and during an interaction, a sense of reciprocity is

established, wherein one receives something that is transmitted and feels themselves approached for

an answer. Nothing needs to mediate between two people because they are bound up in relation to

the same center (Buber 1965). Movement into episodes of genuine interaction is a matter of the

“turning toward” the other and directing attention to them. This way, one pays focused attention to

another, albeit momentarily, instead of being directed to a multiplicity of points (Buber 1965). By

doing so, mutual myopia can be reduced and its consequences overcome. When organizational

actors more squarely face each other and the facts before them, conciliation occurs and they are

confronted by an inner demand to comprehend each other and recognize mutually beneficial

reasoning (“give and take”) occuring in the present. These approaches to dialogue can be

augmented creating greater synergy toward non- myopic interactions (see Table 2).

24

Facilitating Perspectives for Organizational Actors. There are three ways in which people

are able to perceive and be with another person (Buber 1965). Knowledge of these modalities will

provide organizational actors with the proper outlook necessary to help them understand how

myopic tendencies can be reduced during their interactions with each other and subsequently

overcome adverse learning consequences.

Observers are actors who are wholly intent on fixing the observed person in their mind, on

"noting" them. They “probe” and “write them up” with as many "traits" as possible. Next,

Onlookers take up a position that “allows” them to see the other person or object freely, “awaiting”

what will be presented. “Reading” past the text (spoken or written) of the other person, the

onlooker experiences the person who “says” or “writes” it, the person behind the words. In the case

of the onlooker, the other is more a “Thou”, and less an “It” (Buber 1965). The observer and

onlooker are similarly oriented, in that even though both experience the other as a sum of traits,

neither demands any action nor inflicts any requirements on each other. In effect, the other

organizational actor and his or her role can be comprehended more fully vis-a-vis the perceiver’s

function. Both observer and onlooker pause before reaching a conclusion or taking any action.

Each are able to see, hear and fully comprehend the other (Buber 1965).

In contrast, the optimal state in which a person is able to perceive is one in which he or she

is becoming aware (Buber 1965). It occurs when, in a receptive moment, a person "says

something" to someone, not necessarily through real speech, and establishes a vital connection (a

communication) with the essence of the other. There is no such thing as the self, only the self in

relationship, no isolate self. This occurrence of perception and connection manifests only from time

to time with any other person (Buber 1965). This state of awareness contributes to an environment

25

that fosters the frequency and degree of genuine dialogue and thus, results in the mitigation or

negation of mutual myopia and its deleterious consequences.

These realms of dialogue allow individuals to strain against the impulse to reduce the

multitude of possibilities for discussion to only two (i.e., only my function’s way or only yours).

The key then is to bring improved modalities for dialogue to all organizational actors and to every

business function.

AGGREGATING DYADIC INTERACTIONS TOWARDS A MARKET ORIENTATION

A hierarchy of learning must occur within any organization to effect correction of mutual

myopic tendencies which impair true learning (see Figure 3). For this to occur, integration of bases

for interactions that are void of mutual myopia must become the norm of daily organizational life.

INSERT FIGURE THREE ABOUT HERE

Individual Interactions. In the everyday organizational context, there are countless instances

of lateral and vertical communications and interactions. Since such interactions often occur across

functional boundaries, departmental units and business units, a variety of shared understandings on

pertinent organizational and strategic issues inevitably will develop. However, in the absence of

such cross-functional interactions, functional myopia can be deepened and will often contribute to

spirals of distrust between functions and/or units (Pfeiffer and Salancik 1978). Deliberate

individual interactions across functions and units are often fostered by meetings, tours, teams,

education and training, and sometimes even social events. All these processes contribute to

learning about the other, which is a more fundamental construct for the individual as opposed to the

abstraction involved in learning organizational strategy, policies, and processes from written memos

and handbooks. The individual’s tendency to evaluate (involving approval/disapproval) creates

26

barriers while listening and understanding creates gateways to communication (Rogers and

Roethlisberger 1991).

P2: Frequent and purposive genuine dialogue between individuals from different functions and business units contributes to greater understanding necessary for creating a learning organization.

Shared Mental Models. Arygis (1991, 1994) notes that success in the marketplace increasingly

depends on learning and even well-educated, high-powered people in an organization may not be

very good at it. For effective learning to occur, actors must reason productively, which can be

emotional and even painful at times. The questioning of someone else’s reasoning should not be

seen as a sign of mistrust but a valuable opportunity for learning. Professionals embody the

learning dilemma: they are enthusiastic about continuous improvement but are often an obstacle to

its success. Furthermore, rationales for sabotaging market orientation ought to be mitigated and

approaches for implementing sabotage of a market orientation ought to be defeated (Harris 2002).

Sources of underlying resistance likely need to be uncovered and addressed. Toward this end, it is

the process of learning (i.e., how something is learned) rather than what is learned, that fosters the

development of an organizational capability for sustaining an advantage in rapidly-changing

competitive conditions (Schendel 1996) while reducing mutual myopia. It appears, the greater the

level of genuine dialogue, the greater likelihood for shared mental frameworks between

organizational actors. This dynamic positively contributes to an environment where learning is

facilitated, likely reducing the frequency of mutual myopia. Therefore,

P3a: The development of “I -You” relationships facilitates the development of shared mental models.

P3b: The development of shared mental frameworks reduces myopia.

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P3c: Reduced mutual myopia increases organizational learning.

Organizational Routines, Codes and Rules. Majchrzak and Wang (1996) note organizations

must make responsibilities overlap, base rewards on unit performance, and redesign physical layout

and work procedures. Organizations must do more than reorganize to break a functionally myopic

mind set. Myopic eyes must be given plenty of practice in changing the focus from a near point to a

distant one (Huxley 1942). Non-myopic eyes in an organization should encourage employees, from

moment to moment, to have a multi-functional view in their daily deliberations with colleagues.

Organizational redesign efforts should focus on all employees’ needs for working well together.

Organizational culture must reward allocating time to activities that build and foster cross-

functional tolerance.

In effect, to overcome marketing myopia, Levitt (1960, 1975) called for the creation of a

specialized entrepreneurial organization, one that was led by an individual with a pulsating will to

succeed. Kahn and Mentzer (1998) note that interdepartmental integration of market orientation

should emphasize a collaboration component to achieve better performance. This presupposes

marketing’s (and other departments’) adoption of a collaborative perspective toward

interdepartmental integration. Organizations should use interaction as a tool to establish contact

and then let collaboration drive the integration process, instead of simply forcing interactions (i.e.

dictating a preconceived number of meetings or documented information exchanges).

Furthermore, organizations should enable the development of shared processes (some of which may

be affective or volitional) and resources with mutually consistent at goals. Transfer of best

practices must overcome internal stickiness for transfer to occur (Szulanski1996) and the positive

28

results are well documented. Developing and sustaining strategic flexibility has a positive influence

on a firm’s performance, even after a crisis (Grewal and Tansuhaj 2001).

P4: Organizational culture that embodies routines and practices which in turn fosters

episodes of cross-functional “I - You” relationships through genuine dialogue

contributes positively to the reduction of mutual myopia and enables a learning

organization.

Business Unit Strategy. At the same time, a significant inhibiting force to market orientation ---

whether couched in functional units, business units, or the entire organization --- is a singular lack

of vision, or in other words, myopia. Organizational myopia, enshrined in the mission statement,

corporate strategy, policies, and processes of the organization can only be a collective result of the

myopia of its decision-makers. Former organizational structures will continue to shape identity,

beliefs, and social ties of managers as the marketing charter moves from freshly created business

units to established ones (Houston, Walker, Hutt and Reingen 2001).

Organizational learning, memory, and climate can only be the collective representation of

the policies and processes adopted, shared, and instilled in each of its members. Hence, it is not the

organization, but the individual, that must be made the focus of analysis. Concentrating on

individual-level interactions, meanings, information-gathering, dissemination, and in fact, learning -

-- all contribute to the shaping of organizational codes and routines that enhance market orientation

and build a proactive organizational culture as well (Winter 1987). A repertoire of institutional

norms and rules for behavior must take into account individual-level interactions within

organizations.

P5: Organizations that practice ongoing learning processes through conscious development of shared meanings, policies and a supportive organizational culture are

29

better posed to enable more frequently occurring individual-level (I - You) interactions that are critical to reducing the probability of episodes of mutual myopia.

There is a need to create shared meaning behind operational strategy so that conversations are

aggregated at the institutional level. Only then will there be a viable marketing implementation

(Narver, Slater and Tietje 1998; Romer and Van Doren 1993). Individual and organizational

conversations are neither sequential nor independent of each other. Perhaps, the adaptation of a

Buberian approach holds promise for organizing conversations in the workplace to promote the

emergence of coherent patterns (Liedtka and Rosenbloom 1996).

Selected Implementation Issues: A Buberian-based approach to organizational learning by

modifying organizational dialogue dynamics will likely come about in an evolutionary manner.

One of Buber’s main premises is that “all life is in meeting.” This philosophical view was

developed with respect to all spheres of human interaction. Initially then, thought ought to be given

regarding how to specifically apply “principles of dialogue” within the learning organization.

Which function first? It is very likely that the probability of direct relations (i.e, the absence

of mutually myopic tendencies) does vary according to the nature of the functions of respective

organizational actors. If the various business functions are viewed as subcultures within an

organization, it is more likely that members of functions that are in close psychic proximity will be

able to achieve direct relations (i.e, R & D and manufacturing or accounting and finance).

Similarly, there is a greater likelihood of direct relations resulting, at least initially within functions.

This aspect represents a point of departure for overcoming mutual myopia .

P6a: The closer the intellectual ties among the members within a funcitional unit the higher the probability of reducing episodes of mutual myopia.

P6b: The closer the intellectual ties between the members of differing functional units the

higher the probability of reducing episodes of mutual myopia.

30

Market orientation vs. other functional orientations. Implicit in overcoming mutual myopia

is the recognition that no one function would be dominant, at least not for extended periods of time.

Marketing myopia, per se, was concerned with fostering an effective market orientation within the

firm. Mutual myopia overtly acknowledges that all functions must look at how they can behave

myopically and prevent this tendency with its associated adverse business consequences.

Furthermore, delineation is needed, between what constitutes functional myopia among

marketing sub-functions. For example, within advertising, Vaughn (1983) developed a code of

conduct for balancing interactions between “creatives” and “researchers.” Within marketing,

Lorge (1999) and Greenglass (1997) offered approaches for reducing tension and increasing

communication between marketing and sales personnel.

Fostering the learning of “principles of dialogue.” Buber’s framework is intended for all

human interaction regardless of social context. Therefore, the development of specific ways of

being and communicating that are applicable to corporate life, would be another step towards

enhancing the viability of this approach. For example, Rogers and Roethlisberger (1991, 1952)

state that true listening occurs when a person first restates what has been said by the other before

responding with his or her own views. To build more efficient teams and within-firm tolerance of

them, Chen, Chen, and Meidnl (1998) suggest that firms must encourage the tendencies of

individualists and collectivists towards cooperation. Contingent mechanisms between

organizational actors foster facilitation and conciliation in a more open climate as well.

MANAGERIAL IMPACT OF MUTUAL MYOPIA: INWARD FOCUS, OUTWARD

PERSPECTIVES, AND MARKETING PROCESSES

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The impact of a myopic tendency permeates within, across, and around organizational

dynamics. Subsequently, a broader range of myopias in organization visions of environment as

well as organizational processes and strategy can be detected. What follows is a delineation of the

impact of mutual myopia on organizational phenomena at a strategic level.

Inward Myopic Perspectives: These include the inability to overcome core rigidities in

organizational focus being enamored with “rote” techniques, the assumed coordination of cross-

functional collaboration, and the lack of a unified focus (see Figure 4).

INSERT FIGURE FOUR ABOUT HERE

Core Rigidities in Focus. Fundamental questions concerning the nature, scope, and definition of a

business must be clearly answered in a way that assumes future opportunities are not squandered.

The development of core competencies follows from conceptualizations that are neither too broad

nor too narrow (i.e., non-myopic). Overt concentration on specific, narrowly-defined competencies

could contribute to "core rigidities," i.e., the inability of the firm to foresee beyond its core

competencies (Hamel and Prahalad 1994; Leonard-Barton 1992). To ensure that there is a search

for, as well as development of newer competencies, mental models that challenge traditional

assumptions must be developed (Slater and Narver 1995). Organizational actors must look “outside

the box.”

Enamored With Techniques. Over utilizing of specific techniques and tools for decision making

while overlooking underlying problems and issues also contributes to a myopic understanding of the

tasks required for effective implementation of strategy. For example, Andrus and Reinmuth (1979)

define "research myopia" as the shortsightedness that comes about when market researchers have

more interest in analytic techniques than they do in the information needs of decision makers.

32

When analysts are enamored with tools and techniques, they lose sight of operational information

requirements of users.

Assumption of Cross-Functional Coordination. It can not be assumed that marketing’s emphasis on

customers will be synthesized by all functional areas. Functional myopia comes about because

organizational actors see the duties and consequences of their function clearly but are not able to get

a focus on the considerations of the other’s (i.e., more distant) function. The “big picture” remains

an elusive abstraction, if it in fact registers at all. This contributes to little, if any, cross-functional

coordination, unless organizations are adequately structured for this purpose, or relevant incentives

exist for enabling such coordination. For example, market orientation and interdepartmental

integration can positively influence product development performance (Kahn and Mentzer 1998,

Kahn 2001).

Lack of Integration Between Individuals Across Functions. It is assumed that market orientation

operates as an organization-wide value system that enables the development of norms which in turn,

lead to customer-sensitive functional strategies (Lichtenthal and Wilson 1992). In practice, market

orientation as a trans-functional perspective within a business, needs to become more viable. First,

it does not provide a clear set of operating tools and techniques that would guide interaction among

individuals from various functions from day-to-day. Second, given the ambiguity in its

interpretation, the degree of market orientation could differ without an adequate consensus. Third,

it is difficult to assess whether individual beliefs and behavior are in conformity with a particular

market orientation. While market orientation may serve as a “background gestalt” to organizational

strategy, its communication, diffusion and adoption within the organization is impeded due to

functional myopia as outlined above, and by the nature of its own abstract character. The lack of

33

unifying precepts which could convert everyday individual learning into organizational learning,

challenges the creation and delivery of superior customer value - a natural outgrowth of a

potentially effective marketing orientation.

Outward Myopic Perspectives: These include traditional assumptions regarding the nature and

growth of customer markets, assumptions regarding competition, and undue focus on currently

served markets (see Figure 4).

Nature and Growth of Customer Markets. Levitt (1960) argued that much of marketing myopia

was a direct consequence of various myths about the customer markets. For example, marketing

managers believed that the expansion and increasing affluence of the population would continually

revitalize demand and that resulting demand would be better satisfied through mass production

techniques. Such assumptions led to a myopic outlook on the external environment. Although

these assumptions have been challenged in recent times, there is little evidence to suggest that the

majority of marketers are informed by more than their own beliefs on the nature of markets and the

behavior of buyers.

Richard, Womack, and Allaway (1992) developed a classification scheme for myopia along

two dimensions: business definition (product or customer) and business environment perspective

(single or multi-industry perspective). Firms with the broadest perspective are innovative and

exemplify a customer definition/multi-industry perspective. The classic myopic firm is limited

along both dimensions, maintaining a single industry perspective in all of its decisions.

Assumption of Static Competition. Decisions makers may often believe that competitive activity is

stable and of limited impact. Friedman (1980) suggests myopia occurs when a firm persists in

being present-oriented. Firms that are not cognizant of the changes and threats the future may bring

34

may find their products in danger of early obsolescence. Thus, this form of myopia comes about

from ignoring the future or being unable to evaluate it properly. Time is viewed as an important

element in marketing strategy (Stalk 1988). Various processes that assure learning from the

competition, such as, bench marking, competitive intelligence, and imitation assume that the

competitors are static. Myopic views on competitive ability only ensure that the firm is, at best, one

step behind relevant competitors rather than one step ahead, anticipating future customer needs and

providing differential benefits for them.

"Tyranny of Served Markets." A strong external orientation may itself be problematic by

contributing to a specific and narrow focus on one's current markets and competitors as opposed to

those that are new, emerging, or broader (Hamel and Prahalad 1991). For example, Canton (1987)

defines "planning myopia" as a manufacturing firm’s fear-based tendency to overlook growth

opportunities in an unfamiliar services sector. Manufacturers who survive may be those who

realize that customer orientation goes beyond the creation of new products within a defined industry

to entry into any suitable product-market where a firm’s competencies can yield profit while

fulfilling customer needs.

Marketing Strategy Myopias: Processes of strategy formulation are fraught with various

potentially debilitating myopias: myopia of planning horizon, rationality, resource availability and

use, and learning (see Figure 4).

Scope of Planning Horizon. The forces that affect a business often shift and change and, in

hindsight allow the underlying assumptions of the past to become visualized and comprehended

(Mitroff and Mohrman 1987). Many of the assumptions in an industry are never fully or explicitly

articulated. They are implicit. To reduce tunnel vision, there must be a systematic analysis of all

35

the key assumptions upon which an industry and firm have been based and a series of far-reaching

organizational experiments directed at challenging those original assumptions. Indeed, in many

cases, assumptions can only be gleaned clearly in retrospect, when attempts are made to look back

for the purpose of learning how to avoid similar mistakes in the future. Some firms feel virtually

assured of immortality, or so it seems, unless environmental signals are massive, sustained, and

clearly undeniable. These often seemingly abrupt crises (Hwang and Lichtenthal 2000) are the

result of the cumulative effects of rampant unrestrained myopia.

Focus on current markets reveals a myopia of planning horizons, whereby decision-makers

are restricted by the time frame allotted to them for adequately dealing with the future. The focus

on performance cycles may be another area ripe for myopic tendencies. It is debatable whether

market orientation will have a direct and temporally-linked impact on performance (i.e., quarterly

deadlines) even though intuition suggests it might. Empirical evidence by Slater and Narver (1994)

points to a whole series of moderating links that exist between market orientation and performance.

Bounded Rationality. The idea that decision-makers can predict the future with one hundred

percent accuracy is unreal. Indeed, Simon (1957) had pointed to the fact that bounded rationality

(defined as serious limitations in language and neurophysiology) limits the decision-maker's

attempts to systematically plan and obtain optimal solutions. Extended further into the

organizational domain, the concept of bounded rationality contributes heavily to the failure of

contracts, market failures, and the increase in transaction costs (Williamson, Wachter and Harris

1975). Lacking a clear prognosis for the future, decision-makers resort to search, adaptation, and

satisficing (March and Simon 1958). Continuous adaptation, however, encourages dealing with the

future one step at a time and may not be free from the planning horizon myopia outlined earlier.

36

Approach to Resource Availability and Use. Prescriptive and normative theories on strategy,

market orientation and learning assume that once the organization realizes what is wrong, it could

easily obtain the resources to solve the problem. The question is never “how” but only “when”,

with the key issue being one of realizing (i) there is a problem, and (ii) that specific steps must be

taken to solve it. Even if one assumes a lack of resource constraints, there is no convincing

evidence that suggests resources will flow in the direction of priorities (though there is a plausible

reason to believe this is so), or that they will be applied in a way that will correct for myopia.

IMPACT ON ORGANIZATION - WIDE LEARNING

Various mutual myopias impair and impede organizational learning. While there are many,

spheres in which this can occur, four that are of strategic importance to most firms are: business

definition, planning horizon, irrationality , and impaired learning (Kotler 2003, Day 1995, 1994;

Porter 1980). The challenge at the organizational strategy level is to see the consequences, side

effects and potential cures (see Table 3). There needs to be a concerted effort made toward the

middle ground.

INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE

Business definition of a firm can be either too narrow or too broad. Perhaps even more harmful is a

business definition that is rigid and inflexible. Business definition needs to be somewhat pliable to

remain viable. The side effects of inappropriate business definition can include an inordinate focus

on current markets or products, or looking too far afield.

Planning horizon may be too short term and have an overly compartmentalized emphasis. When

planning becomes tactical rather than a circumspect strategic process, planning benefits are lost.

37

Irrationality can result in the failure to optimize viable possibilities. It can lead to poor predictions

and a tendency to pursue programmatic change without high-order, recurring re-evaluations.

Emotions must be tempered with responses grounded in reasoning.

Impaired learning manifests in many ways: urgency in decision resolutions; over emphasizing

success while under-analyzing failure; and inappropriate decisions in reference to time frames.

Reducing learning impairment tendencies requires company-wide emphasis on buyer needs (current

and future), as well as adapting, integrating and balancing what is learned from both failure and

success.

While much research has already been conducted on the antecedents and consequent

impacts of marketing orientation and learning organization, much work is needed to understand the

processes that hinder or facilitate the creation of a market-oriented firm and a learning organization.

The framework and discussions advanced in the previous sections take a step in this direction.

However, for a more thorough understanding of the various issues involved and for strategies that

could result in relevant managerial input, the following research directions may be pursued.

DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

The processes of interaction and understanding, while investigated in several research

streams and disciplines, are yet to be fully explored and understood in the contexts provided by

Buber (1965, 1970). While interactions are often facilitated within an organization through

meetings and other encounters, we know less about how to facilitate the types of interactions that

break down long-held belief structures and promote a conversation among equals. Instead of

reducing the impact of myths, stereotypes and misunderstandings about individuals, roles, positions

38

and processes, most meetings and encounters serve to enhance these. Future research should focus

on how genuine conversation could be fostered among individuals within organizations as well as

on the organizational pre-requisites for mitigating the impact of myopic visions.

While those in marketing do not need much convincing about the importance and role of

market orientation (this is, perhaps, part of our myopia), it is quite debatable if other business

disciplines share the same fervor and enthusiasm about the concept. Reduction in myopia or inter-

functional coordination (or even organization-wide learning) is less likely to occur in a situation

where other business disciplines see the organizational agenda and objectives tilted by a particular

business function. Research must identify ways in which the core elements of the marketing

concept and orientation could themselves be marketed through the organization. One approach

could be through a better focus on marketing metrics, which might explore how a market oriented

firm contributes directly to better performance results. Just as the concept of ROI is now no longer

restricted to the finance discipline alone, the concept of market orientation may be absorbed

organization-wide.

The process and impact of mutual myopia may not just be inter-disciplinary phenomena.

They may surface within the marketing discipline as well. Barriers to meanings and understanding

may exist in the interactions between the market research manager and the product manager, for

example, or between the sales manager and the advertising manager. The processes that create

shared understanding must start with the marketing function itself. Future research could address

the causes and extent to which barriers to shared meanings and understanding break down in multi-

function, multi-product, multi-location firms, while simultaneously uncovering the processes by

which a marketing-oriented culture emerges within the firm itself.

39

IN CONCLUSION

The marketing oriented firm need not be run by a marketing department or person.

Marketing departments are made up of individuals who are experts in techniques and concepts that

are subsequently applied to solving marketing related problems. This leads to a need for continuous

clarification of the marketing concept (Houston 1986; Greneveld. 1973). Aufreiter, George and

Lempres (1996) note that traditional approaches to marketing (i.e., brand management, marketing as

a staff function) leave a firm ill-equipped to handle the new marketing landscape. Functional and

brand silos must be replaced with an integrated approach.

Implementation of true marketing consciousness is not restricted to the marketing

department. In a sense, everyone in the organization must, from time to time be acting like a

marketer. Srivastava, Shervani and Fahey (1999) note that if marketing is to be the energizing

source that creates and excites buyers, it must infuse and integrate the activities that fall within the

organization’s core processes. Managers must understand the contribution of each core process, the

connections among them, and broad consequences they present for marketplace and financial

success. Organizations must facilitate an environment where there can be a “meeting of the minds”

for fostering true and balanced market orientation (Barabba 1995). While marketing is often

viewed as the function that manages connections between the organization and its buyers (Moorman

and Rust 1999) collaboration within the firm (i.e., across functional areas) must be as desirable as

collaboration across business lines (Liedtka 1996).

Collins and Porras (1996) state that the basic dynamic of visionary companies is the preservation of core values, while they progress towards an envisioned future. Having all organizational actors broaden their perspectives and strive toward a multi-functional, tolerant workplace should allow that vision to materialize and be sustained for many years to come.

40

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47

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on

shor

t-ter

m

inte

rpre

tatio

ns

Emph

asis

on

imm

edia

cy

Ove

r sam

plin

g of

su

cces

s an

d un

der

repr

esen

tatio

n of

failu

res

Prob

lem

s of

mai

ntai

ning

a

bala

nce

betw

een

expl

orat

ion

and

expl

oita

tion

give

s pr

imac

y to

or

gani

zatio

ns a

s pr

o-ac

tive

enac

tions

whi

le u

nder

-re

pres

entin

g or

gani

zatio

ns

as in

stitu

tiona

lized

ent

ities

Focu

s on

free

ent

ry /

exit

of e

ntre

pren

euria

l in

divi

dual

s an

d ca

pita

l Fo

cus

on s

elec

tive

pres

sure

s of

the

envi

ronm

ent

Lear

ning

from

a s

ucce

ss /

failu

re b

alan

ce

52

FI

GU

RE 1

: A

TYP

OLO

GY

OF

FIRM

-EN

VIRO

NM

ENT

MA

TCH

ING

EN

VIR

ON

ME

NT

FI

RM

STA

TIC

D

YN

AM

IC

I Firm

s in

Reg

ulat

ed In

dust

ries

; Fir

ms

with

Hig

h M

arke

t Pow

er in

Mat

ure

Indu

stri

es

II

Firm

s Suf

feri

ng F

rom

Myo

pia

S

TA

TIC

D

YN

AM

IC

IV

Ris

k-ta

king

, Ent

repr

eneu

rial

Fir

ms

III Mar

ket-

Res

pons

ive

Firm

s

53

Out

war

dO

rient

atio

n

Dya

dic

Myo

pia

Inw

ard

Focu

s

Proc

ess

Org

aniz

atio

nal

Myo

pia

Org

aniz

atio

nal

Lear

ning

Mar

ket

Orie

ntat

ion

Dyn

amic

s of M

yopi

a

Org

aniz

atio

nal C

ultu

re

Figu

re 2

Inte

grat

ive

Fram

ewor

k of

M

utua

l Myo

pia

and

Mar

ket O

rient

atio

n

54

FIGURE 3: SUMMING INDIVIDUAL INTERACTIONS & ENVISIONING MARKET

ORIENTED STRATEGY

INDIVIDUAL INTERACTIONS (Teams, Education & Training, Lateral & Vertical Communications, Expertise, Experiences)

SHARED MENTAL MODELS (Shared Meanings, Interpretation, and Memory)

ORGANIZATIONAL ROUTINES, CODES, AND RULES (Institutionalization Processes)

BUSINESS UNIT STRATEGY (Institutional Encoding of Action Plans)

CORPORATE STRATEGY AND VISION TOWARD MARKET ORIENTATION

55

FIGURE 4: THE VARIOUS MYOPIAS Myopias of Inward Customer Focus Myopias of Outward Orientation * Rigid Core Focus *Assumption of Unchanged needs/markets * Cross-Functional Concentration * Assumption of Static

Competition * Lack of Unifying Precepts * Tyranny of

Served Markets

Myopias of Strategy Formulation

* Myopia of Planning Horizon

* Myopia of Rationality

* Myopia of Resource Availability and Use