Morality Within a Range of Possibilities: A Dialogue with Joel Robbins

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Within a Range of Possibilities: Morality and Ethics in Social LifeJarrett Zigon a

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ethnos, vol. 74:2, june 2009 (pp. 251–276)

Within a Range of Possibilities: Morality and Ethics in Social Life

Jarrett ZigonUniversity of Amsterdam, The Netherlands

abstract Despite its now common currency the anthropological concept of morality remains underdeveloped. One anthropologist who has made several important at-tempts to work out a more precise theoretical concept of morality is Joel Robbins. In his most recent contribution to this endeavor Robbins addresses the tension in anthropology between what he calls the morality of reproduction and the morality of freedom. In this article, I suggest an alternative solution to the problem of con-ceiving the distinction between a nonconsciously enacted morality and the conscious awareness of ethical dilemmas and moral questioning. I will support this distinction with ethnographic and life-historical material from my research on the moral lives of some Muscovites.

keywords Morality, ethics, range of possibilities, phenomenology, Russia

Inthelastdecadeorsoanthropologistshaveincreasinglyturnedtheirethnographicandanalyticgazeontheconceptofmorality(e.g.,Howell1997;Rydstrøm2003;Robbins2004).Itisaconcern,however,thatthe

anthropologicalstudyofmoralitiesstill lacksatheoreticalbasis(Faubion2001;Laidlaw2002).Forthemostpart,thesestudieshaveattemptedtoinfusetheiranalysiswithatheoreticalbasisbyborrowingheavilyfrommoralphilosophy.Isuggesttherearetwopredominantapproachestotheanthropologicalstudyoflocalmoralities:themoralreasoningandchoiceapproach(e.g.,Howell1997;Robbins2004),whichissignificantlyinfluencedbydeontology,andtheNeo-AristotelianandFoucauldianapproach(e.g.,Mahmood2005;Widlok2004),whichareformsofvirtuetheory.Whilebothapproachesofferinterestingstartingpointsforananthropologicalstudyofmoralities,neitherhaveyettobeformulatedspecificallyinanthropological

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terms.Therefore,amongthoseanthropologistswhohaveundertakenananthropologicalstudyoflocalmoralities,thereislittleagreementaboutwhatconstitutesthemoral,orhowweshouldgoaboutstudyingit.Inthisarticle,IaddressthislacunaandargueforananthropologicaltheoryofmoralitythatemphasizesaphenomenologicalfocusonwhatIcallmoralbreakdowns,whichisanexistentialstateinwhichadistinctionbetweenmoralityandethicsbecomespossible.Inordertomakethisargument,IfirstconsideranimportantarticlebyJoelRobbinsontheanthropologyofmoralitiesrecentlypublishedinthisjournal,inordertodiscusswhatIseeasthestrengthsandweaknessesofhistheory,afterwhich,inthesecondsection,Idelineatemyowntheoryofmoralbreakdownasawaytoaddressthesecritiques.Inthethirdandfourthsection,ethnographicmaterialfromcontemporaryMoscow,Russiawillshowhowthetheoryofmoralbreakdowncanhelpdisclosetheintricaciesofindividuals’morallives.

‘Between Reproduction and Freedom’Oneanthropologistwhohasmadeseveralimportantattemptstoworkout

amoreprecisetheoreticalconceptofmoralityisJoelRobbins.Inhismostrecentcontributiontothisendeavor,Robbinsaddressesthetensionseveralanthropologistshavefeltbetweenwhathecallsthemoralityofreproduc-tionandthemoralityoffreedom(2007).TheformernotionofmoralityischaracterizedingenerallyDurkheimiantermswheremoralityisessentiallyequatedwithsocialnormativity,stabilityandunquestionedreproductivity,whilethelatterisamoralityofchoice,change,andreflexivity.Robbinsarguesthatanthropologistsneednotgiveintothealluringtemptationofchoosingoneovertheother,butinsteadwouldbebetterservedwithfindingawaytomakeroomforbothnotionsinananthropologicaltheoryofmorality.

AlthoughIamsympatheticwiththeneedtomakeadistinctionbetweennonconsciouslyenactedmoralityandwhatIcallbelowtheconsciousprocessofethics,aswillbecomeclear,IamnotconvincedbythewayRobbinsat-temptstomakethisdistinction.FindinginspirationinbothDumont’stheoryofvaluesandWeber’sconceptionofsocietyasconsistingofcompetingvaluespheres,Robbinsarguesthatmoralitybecomesamoreworkableanthropo-logicalconceptwhensocietyisconceivedasconsistingofseveraldistinctandincompatiblemoral-valuespheres.Eachofthesespheresis‘governedbydifferentlaws,’andtherefore,rationallyconsistentwithinitsownculturaldomain(2007:298).Becauseofthislogicalandmoralconsistencyitisonlywhenindividualsorsocialgroupsfindthemselvesstuck,asitwere,between


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incompatiblemoral-valuespheresthatmoralitybecomesaproblem.MoralitywithinanyoneoftheseparticularspheresiswhatRobbinscallsamoralityofreproduction,whilemoralityattheconflictingpointsoftwoormoredif-ferentspheresisamoralityoffreedom(p.299).

ThestrengthofRobbins’viewisthatheprovidesawayinwhichwecanconceiveofthemorallivesofpeopleasencompassingbothanunquestion-edandnonconsciousaspect,aswellasaconsciousquestioningthatallowsforfreedomandchoice.WhatisparticularlyappealingaboutthisviewisthatRobbinsadoptsLaidlaw’sFoucaldiannotionoffreedominwhichitis‘constructedoutoftherolegiventochoiceinvariousculturesandinvariousdomainswithinspecificcultures’(p.295;seeLaidlaw2002).ThismovetakesusalongwayfromthemorecommonanthropologicalviewsofmoralityaseitherDurkheimiansocialnorm-following,ortoborrowfromMahmood’sdescriptionofanthropologicalusesoftheconceptofagency,asecular-liberaljudgment(2005).

ToagreatextentIagreewithRobbins’assessmentofthecurrentunder-developedstateoftheanthropologyofmoralities,andthepathhehashelpedtoestablishbymakingacleardistinctionbetweennonconsciouslyenactedmoralityandwhathecallsthemoralityoffreedom.Nevertheless,IhesitatetofollowRobbins’suggestionthatsocietyisconstitutedbyincompatiblemoral-valuespheres,forinmyviewitnotonlymissesoutonthecomplexsubtletiesofeverydaymorallife,butasatheoryseemstoremainincomplete.Beforeturningtoanalternativesolutiontotheproblemofconceivingofbothanonconsciouslyenactedmoralityandtheconsciousawarenessofethicaldilemmasandmoralquestioning,IwillbrieflyexplicateinmoredetailmyconcernswithRobbins’position.

What Do Spheres Do?Robbinssuccinctlyoutlineshistheoryinthefollowingway:

theunreflectivemomentsoflifedonot‘runonasaneventinnature,’butratherunfoldwithindomainsofcultureinwhichvaluehierarchiesarestablyorganizedandhencetherelationsbetweenvaluesarewellworkedout.Itiswherethisisnotthecase,whereconflictbetweenvaluesarises,thatamoralityoffreedomandchoicecomesintoplayandpeoplebecomeconsciouslyawareofchoosingtheirownfates.Anditisbecauseinsuchcasespeoplebecomeawareofchoosingbe-tweenvaluesthattheycometoseetheirdecision-makingprocessasoneengagedwithmoralissues(2007:300).


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Robbinsgoesontoexplainthatthistheoryallowsananthropologyofmo-ralitiestodescribeandaccountforbothamoralityofreproductionandamoralityoffreedom.Robbins’theory,despitehisinspirationfromWeberandDumont,basicallytakestheDurkheimianviewofsocietyasonecohe-rentsphereof‘overwhelming’moralforce(p.294),andsplitsitintoseveralcoherent,butincompatible,moral-valuespheres,withinwhich‘themoralcomponentofactionconsistsprimarilyofadherencetonormsunderstoodinbinding,Durkheimianfashion’(p.296).Therefore,Robbinshasessentiallyreproducedaquasi-Durkheimianviewofsociety,inwhichseveral,ratherthanonlyone,moral-valuespheresseeminglydeterminemoralaction.

Robbins’theoryofmoralityisworkedoutthroughanethnographicanalysisoftheUrapminofPapuaNewGuinea.AccordingtoRobbins,theUrapminhavebeenlivinginaperpetualmodeofmoralquestioningsincetheywereintroducedtoaformofPentecostalChristianitybecausetheintroductionofthisformofChristianitywasalsoanintroductionofanewandincompatiblemoral-valuesphere.AsRobbinsdescribesit,thismoralquestioningistheresultoftheconflictingmoral-valuespheresofthetraditionalUrapminsocialstructuredominatedbythevalueofrelationalism,andthenewcharismaticChristianityspheredominatedbythevalueofindividualism.BecausetheUrapminarestuckbetweenthesetwospheres,theyareleftinaperpetualstateofmoralquestioning.

Oneexampleofhowthisconflictbetweenparamountvaluesresultsinmoralquestioningcanbeseeninhowthewillisconceptualizedwithineachmoral-valuesphere.WithinthesphereofthetraditionalUrapminsocialstructure,Robbinstellsus,thewillholdsamorallyambiguousposition.Ontheonehand,awillfulpersoncanendangeralreadyexistingrelationshipsbywillfullybeginninganewrelationship,forexample,bygivingagifttosomeonewithwhomapreviousrelationshipdidnotexist.Ontheotherhand,apersonwhocanproperlybalancethiswillfulnessofcreatingnewrelationswiththelawsrequiringhimtomaintainalreadyexistingrelationswillbejudgedmorallysuccessfulfortheabilitytobothmaintainandexpandhissocialrelationships(pp.308–9).Thus,withintraditionalUrapminmoralitythewill,ifproperlyattuned,canenhanceone’smoralstanding.

ThisviewofthewillisincontrasttohowitisconceptualizedwithinthecharismaticChristianmoral-valuesphere.AccordingtoRobbins,withinthissphere‘allwillfulnessisdeemedimmoralinitseffectsontheself’(p.309).Thisissobecausewillfulnessisseenasoftenleadingtothesinofanger,whichinturnendangersthepossibilityofeternalsalvationforthatperson.Therefore,




thisviewofthemoraldangerofwillfulnessoftenleadsindividualUrapmintoabstainfromengaginginthekindsofrelationship-creatingactivitiesthatareimportanttotraditionalUrapminmorality.InRobbins’view,then,theincom-patibilitybetweentheparamountvaluesofrelationalismandindividualismwithintherespectivemoral-valuespheresnotonlycreatesacontradictorylogicofactionvis-à-visthewill,butalsoleavesUrapmininaconstantstateofmoraltormentintermsofhowtoresolvethiscontradiction.

Thisexampleraisesseveralquestions:isitinfactplausibletoconsidersocietyasmadeupofsuchmoral-valuespheres,inwhichitappearsthereisunquestionedmoralreproductionofasingleprimarymoral-value?Istherenoroomforpluralityornegotiationwithinthesemoral-valuespheres?Ordoesthisonlyhappenoutsidethespheres,oratpointsofconflictbetweenspheres?Intheexampleabove,itcertainlyseemsasthoughtheplaceofthewillwithinthetraditionalUrapminmoral-valuesphereissomewhatnego-tiable,andifthisisthecase,thenitwouldseemthatRobbins’moralityoffreedomwouldalsobeenactedwithinaparticularmoral-valuesphereduetothisnecessarynegotiation.Unfortunately,Robbinsdoesnotaddressthisandhowitmightaffecthisconceptionofparamountvalues.

Furthermore,thequestionshouldbeasked:howcananoutsideorabetweenspheresbeconceivedifsocietyasawholeismadeupofthem?Infact,Robbinsdoesnotprovideexamplesofothermoral-valuesphereswithinUrapminsocietybesidesthetwodiscussedabove.ThisleaveshistheoryopentothecritiquethathecharacterizestraditionalUrapminsocietyinanoverlyDurkheimianfashionconsistingofonlyonemoral-valuespheredominatedbyoneparamountvalue,which,inturn,isonlyshakenfromnonconsciousreproductionthroughculturalcontactandconversion.Leavingthisconcernaside,moreimportantlyforthepurposesofthisarticleisthateveniftradi-tionalUrapminsocietyhadonlyonemoral-valuesphere,therewouldstillbemomentsofmoralquestioningwithinthatsphere.ForasIhavejustsuggestedbasedontheexampleofthewillwithinthetraditionalUrapminmoral-valuesphere,itseemslikelythatamoralityoffreedomisalsopossiblewithinthisonesphereduetothenegotiationsnecessarybetweenlawfulnessandwill-fulness.Therefore,whileIamcertainthatRobbinshasaccuratelydescribedthemoralquestioningthathasarisenfortheUrapminintheircurrentsocialstate,thequestionsIhaveraisedheresuggestthathistheoreticalapproachmaynotaccuratelyrepresenttheintricatesubtleties, improvisations,andnegotiationsnecessaryinsuchafragmentedmoralworld.

Relatedtothispoint,onewondersifatheoryofmoral-valuespheres


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betterhelpsusunderstandanUrapmin’sexperienceofwhatismostlikelyattimesadreadful,moralquestioning?Unfortunately,theactuallife-experienceofstruggling-throughsuchmoraltormentisleftlargelyunaddressed,andthereforeoffers littletohelpusdescribeandunderstandthesituationalstruggles,stresses,andanxietyofrealpersonsmorallyquestioning.This,inturn,makesitdifficulttocomprehendtheprocessofenactingthefreedomofmoralquestioningattheconflictingpointsofmoral-valuespheres.Morespecifically,itisdifficulttocomprehendwhatitmightbeliketoexperiencetheshiftfromamodeofreproductiontoamodeoffreedom.Itwouldseemthatananthropologicaltheoryofmoralitiesneedstoaccountforthisshiftofmoralconsciousness.Robbins’theory,unfortunately,doesnotaccountforit,andinsteadonlyprovidesamechanismforconceivingofwhatmightinstigateashiftbetweenamoralityofreproductionandamoralityoffreedom.Itismycontentionthatsuchatheorycannotfullyaccountformoralitybecauseitleavesouttheactualexperienceoflivingamorallife.Socialexperientially,then,Robbins’theorydoesnotaccountforwhatRogerscalls‘theshadesofsimilarityanddifference’betweendifferingmoralitieswithinsocieties(2004:36),theexperienceoflivingwithboththemoralityofreproductionandthemoralityoffreedom,nordoesitdescribehowonecomestoenactthesemoralitiesintheshiftingmodesofreproductionandfreedom.

Ultimately,theseconcernsstemfromoneproblemraisedbyRobbins’theoryofmoral-valuespheres.Ifsocietyistobeunderstoodasconsistingofseveralcoherentbutincompatiblemoral-valuespheres,andmoralquestioningonlyoccursoutsideoratpointsofconflictofthesedifferentspheres,thenthereseemstobenothingtowhichpersonscanreferforguidanceintheresolutionoftheirmoraltorment.Themoralquestionarises due to the very factoftheincompatibilityofthetwoormoremoral-valuespheres.Becauseofthis,themoralvaluesofnoneofthespherescanprovidearesolutiontothemoralquestioningbecausetheycontradictandcanceloneanotherout.ThisisseenclearlyinRobbins’exampleoftheconflictingmoralvaluesofrelationalismandindividualismamongtheUrapmin.Havingfoundoneselfinthisstateofmoralquestioning,wherethereisnovaluereferenttohelpresolvethequestion,howdoesonereturntoanunreflectivestateofmoralreproduction?

Robbins’theoryseemstoprovideonlytwopossibleanswers,neitherofwhichseemsplausible.Thefirstisthatmoralquestioningcanonlybere-solvedbymeansofpower.ThisseemstobetheconclusionWebercametowithhisimageofvaluespheresaswarringgods,butitdoesnotappearto




bewhatRobbinsissuggesting.Unfortunately,hedoesnotprovideuswithawayforunderstandinghowaperson,groupofpersons,oranentiresocietycanresolveamoralconflict.BecauseofthisallthatremainsisthekindofWeberianpowerplaythatdoesnotrealisticallydescribethewayinwhichmosteverydaymoralquestionsareresolved.

Thesecondpossibleanswertohowoneresolvesmoralconflictsandreturnstoanunreflectivestateofmoralreproductionisthatonedoesnot.Instead,oneisstuck,perhapsforever,inthisstateofconstantmoralquestioning.Oneisperhapsleftwaitingforresolutionbymeansofpowerorinterven-tionfromanoutsider,whichisitselftheinfusionofanotherrelationshipofpower.Whateverthecasemaybe,thisperpetualstateofmoralquestioningappearstobeinfacthowRobbinsdescribesthecurrentstateoftheUrapmin(2007:310).WhilethismaybeapossiblewaytodescribeanentiresocietyasRobbinsismostlydoinginhisarticle,althoughIhavemydoubts,Idonotseehowthiscouldbeapossiblewayoflivingasociallifeforindividualpersons.Anditseemsthatanadequateanthropologicaltheoryofmoralitiesmustbeabletoaccountforboththemoralworldofasocietyaswellasthatoftheindividualswholiveinthatsociety.WhileRobbins’theorymaytosomeextenthelpusunderstandtheformer,itdoesnotthelatter.

Ascanbeseen,Robbinstheory,thoughimportantforsettingthesceneforwhatafutureanthropologyofmoralitiescouldlooklike,raisesmorequestionsthanitanswers.InthenextsectionIwillofferanalternativetheorythatissimilarlyconcernedwiththeshiftbetweenwhatRobbinscallsthemoralityofreproductionandthemoralityoffreedom,butonewhichIhopehelpsanswersomeofthequestionsIhaveraisedinthissection.Inparticular,thetheorythatIoffershowsthatbecausesocietyismuchmorecomplex,fragmented,interconnected,andnegotiablethanhowRobbinsportraysit,arangeofpossibilitiesalwaysexistsforpersonstoutilizeintheirattempttoovercomemoralquestioning.Thus,thetheoryIpresentinthenextsectionisnotaproceduraltheoryforguidingpersonsthroughmomentsofwhatIcallmoralbreakdown,butratherananalyticaltheorythatmakesmoreclearthecomplexityandsubtletyofmorallife.

Moral Breakdown and Ranges of PossibilitiesAnanthropologyofmoralitiesisbestbegunwithadistinctionbetween

moralityandethics(seeZigon2007,2008a).WhiletherearesomesimilaritiesbetweenthisdistinctionandRobbins’moralityofreproductionandmoralityoffreedom,thereareimportantdifferences.Itshouldalsobenotedthatothers


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suchasArthurKleinman(2006)andZygmuntBauman(1993)havealsomadethisdistinction,butinwaysquitedifferentfromhowIwilldoithere.Forexample,accordingtoKleinmanethicsis‘asetofmoralprinciplesthataspiretouniversalapplication,’whilemoralexperienceseemstobesomethinglikewhatwemightcalleverydayintersubjectivesociality(Kleinman2006:25–6).Aswillbeclear,thisisquitedifferentfromhowIconceiveofthedistinction.BeforeturningtohowIconceiveofethics,Iwillbeginwithmorality.Moralitycanbeconsideredasthreedifferent,butcertainlyinterrelated,aspectsthatarethemselvespluralistic:(1)theinstitutional;(2)thatofpublicdiscourse;and(3)embodieddispositions.Iwilltakeeachoftheseinturn.

Institutionscanbeverylooselydefinedasthoseformalandnon-formalsocialorganizationsandgroupsthatareapartofallsocietiesandthatwieldvaryingamountsofpoweroverindividualpersons(Foucault1990:141).Itcanbesaidthatallhumanpersonshaveatleastsomenominalcontactwithorparticipationinsomeoftheinstitutionsthatmakeuptheirrespectivesocieties.However,mosthumanpersonsareintimatelyentwinedwithintheoverlappingspheresofinfluenceofseveraldifferentinstitutionswithinandbeyondtheirownsociety.Lastly,itcanbesaidthatmost,ifnotall,institutionsproclaimthetruthortherightnessofaparticularmorality.Someexamplesofsuchinstitutionsaregovernments,organizedreligions,villageeldercouncils,theworkplace,andinternationalorganizationssuchastheunortheimf.

Partofwhatitistobeaninstitutionistoclaimthatitisthebearerandsecurerofthetruthorrightnessofaparticularkindofmorality.Andwhileinstitutionshavevaryinglevelsofpoweravailabletotheminordertopropa-gateandenforcetheirversionofmorality,itisgenerallyaformalprerequisiteofinteractingwiththeinstitutionthatone,atleastpublicly,adherestothismorality.Thus,forexample,theRussianOrthodoxChurchhasaparticularmoralviewonsexuality,whichispartoftheChurch’slargermoralsystem,anditisexpectedthatallOrthodoxliveaccordingtothismoraldoctrine.

AtthesametimeitisobviousthatnotallRussianOrthodox,orthoserelatedtoanyinstitutionforthatmatter,alwaysfollowtothelettertheclaimedmoralityoftheinstitution.Itisalsoobviousthatthosewhodonotfollowtheinstitutionalmoralityarenotalwayspunishedorreprimandedfornotdoingso.Infact,itmayoftentimesgounnoticed.Furthermore,itisclearthatallinstitutions,tosomeextent,consistofarangeofmoralpositionsthataredebatedandcontestedfromwithin.Despitethisinternaldebate,institu-tionsusuallyandforthemostpartpubliclyarticulateamoralityas thoughitwereinternallyunquestioned.Additionally,itisalsoclearthatallsocieties,




includingsmall-scalesocieties,aremadeupofapluralityofinstitutionalmoralities.Despitethesecontestationsandpluralitieswithininstitutionsandwithinsocieties,theinfluencesthatinstitutionalmoralitieshaveonindividualpersonsareclearlyrealandsubstantial.Forthisreasonitisnotuncommonthatwhenaskedwhatmoralityis,apersonwilloftengivesomeversionof,forexample,theTenCommandments,thelaw,societaltradition,orsomethingofthekind.Institutionalmorality,then,isasignificantlyinfluentialmoraldiscoursethatisoftentimessupportedbyveryrealexpressionsofpower,butwhich,neverthelessisnottotalizingandismoreakintoaverypersuasiverhetoricthanitistoatruth(Carrithers2005:434).

Closelyrelatedtoinstitutionalmorality,butyetnotquitethesame,iswhatIwillcallthepublicdiscourseofmorality.ThisdistinctionisverysimilartothedistinctionVoloshinovmadebetweenofficialideologyandbehavioralideology(2000),wheretheformeristhatwhichisupheldbyofficialandstateinstitutionsandthelatteristheresultoftheeverydaydialogicalinter-actionsbetweenpersons.Althoughthesetwokindsofideologies,liketheinstitutionalandpublicdiscourseofmorality,areseparateanddistinctfromoneanother,theyareinconstantdialoguewithoneanother.Thus,bothoftheideologiesaboutwhichVoloshinovspeaks,andthetwomoralitiesaboutwhichIamherespeaking(aswellasthethirdkindIwilldiscussnext),notonlysupportandauthorizeoneanother,butattimesalsoundermineandsubvertoneanother(Caton2006:51).Thepublicdiscourseofmorality,then,isallthosepublicarticulationsofmoralbeliefs,conceptions,andhopesthatarenotdirectlyarticulatedbyaninstitution.Someexamplesofthepublicdiscourseofmoralityarethemedia,protest,philosophicaldiscourse,everydayarticulatedbeliefs,opinions,andconceptions,moralexpressionsinthearts,literatureandstories,andfamilialteachings.

Asisclearfromsomeoftheseexamples,andasIhavealreadysaid,thepublicdiscourseofmoralitycanbeverycloselyrelatedtoinstitutionalmorality,butneednotbe.Yet,thetwotypesofmoralitiesarealwaysinadialogicalrelationshipwithoneanother.Thusforexample,certaintelevisionnewsnetworksmayarticulateamoraldiscoursethatisverysimilartothatoftheinstitutionalmoralityofthegovernment,butwhenthenetworkisnotitselfrunbythegovernment,itcannotbesaidthatitisitselfapartofthatinstitutionalmoralvoice.Thisissobecausegivenevenrelativeindependencefromtheinstitutionofthegovernment,thereisalwaysthepossibilityofdissentanddebatewithinthenetworkandbyspeakersonitsbroadcasts.

Becauseinthecontemporaryworldthemediahasbecomesoentwined


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withmanyinstitutions,perhapsitisbettertoconsidersomeotherexamplesofthepublicdiscourseofmoralitytoseehowitisadistinct,butyetadialo-gicallyinteracting,aspectofmoralityfrominstitutionalmorality.Take,forexample,people’severydayarticulationsoftheirmoralbeliefsandconceptions.Thesealsoofferanalternativemoralvoicetoinstitutionalmorality.AboveIsaidthatitisnotuncommonthatonewouldreference,forexample,theTenCommandmentsorthelawwhenaskedaboutmorality.InmyownresearchIhavefoundthistobecertainlytrue.Thisshowsthepervasiveinfluenceofinstitutionalmorality,butitisnottheendofthestory.Foronceonebeginstopressapersonabitmore,forexample, inthekindsofmoraldebatesthatariseonoccasionineverydaylifeorinthecontextofanthropologicalinterviewsandconversation,youoftenfindmoralarticulationsthatdiffer,sometimesradically,fromthedominantinstitutionalmoralitiesofasociety.SuchmoralarticulationsareapartofwhatIhavebeentryingtodescribeasthepublicdiscourseofmorality.

Theyarealso,Isuggest,anarticulation,orareflectedverbalizationofthethirdkindofmorality,thatis,moralityasembodieddispositions.ThisthirdkindofmoralitycanbedescribedaswhatMausscalledakindofhabitus,orunreflectiveandunreflexivedispositionsofeverydaysociallifeattainedoveralifetimeofwhathecalledsociallyperformedtechniques(1973).Moralityinthisthirdsense,unlikethewaymoralityissooftenconsideredasrule-followingorconsciousreflectiononaproblemordilemma,isnotthoughtoutbeforehand,norisitnoticedwhenitisperformed.Itissimplydone.Moralityasembodieddispositionsisone’severydaywayofbeingintheworld.

Itisbecauseallpersonsareabletoembodymoralityinthisunreflectiveandunreflexivewaythatmostpersonsmostofthetimeareabletoactinwaysthatare,forthemostpart,acceptabletoothersintheirsocialworldseeminglynaturally.Myownresearchinpost-SovietRussia,aplacewheremoralityisoftenquestionedbythegovernmentorRussianOrthodoxChurchorthemediaorpeopleintheirdailyconversations,foundthatdespitethiscacophonyofmoralquestioning,mostofmyinterlocutorsclaimthattheyandthosearoundthemareabletoactinwaysthataremorallyappropriatemostofthetimewithoutconsideringtheiractions.Isuggestthisholdstrueforallpersonsandthatitisthisabilitytobenonconsciouslymoralmostofthetimethatallowshumanstobesocialbeings.Thus,itisonlyoccasionallyineverydaylifethatoneactuallyhastostopandconsiderhowtoactorbemorallyappropriate.ThesemomentsarewhatIcallethics.

Iwillturntoethicsinamoment,butbrieflywanttoturnbacktoRobbins’




theoryinordertoconsideritinlightofwhatIhaveoutlinedsofaraboutthethreeaspectsofmorality.MoralityasI’vedescribedithereissimilartothemoralityofreproductionRobbinsdescribeswithinmoral-valuespheresinthatbothRobbinsandIagreethatmoralityisnonconsciouslyenacted.Thereisasignificantdifference,however,inhowweconceptualizeourrespectivenotionsofmorality.WhereasRobbinsconceivesofsocietyasconsistingofvariousmoral-valuesphereseachgovernedbyadominantandprimaryvalue,Iconceiveofmoralityasboundedneitherbysocialcontextnorsocieties.Inaglobalworldwemustbegintoconceiveofmoralitiesthathaveglobalreachandinfluence.Nevertheless,moralityisenactedverylocally.Butevenintheselocalenactments,moralityismulti-aspectualandpluralistic.IfRob-bins’moralactorisonewhononconsciouslyreproducesasinglemoralvaluewithinaparticularcontext,thenthemoralactorwithinthetheoryIamset-tingoutnonconsciouslyshiftsbetweenvariousaspectsofmorality,aswellasthepluralitiesthatconstitutetheseaspects,withinonecontext.Multipleandincompatiblemoralitiesarenotaproblemforpersonsinthetheoryofmoralbreakdown,becausethetheorytakesasitsstartingpointthatsuchmulti-aspectualpluralitycharacterizesthehumanandsocialcondition.Thiswillbecomeclearerintheethnographicsectionbelow.

AsIsaidabove,ethicsiswhatisdoneinthoseoccasionalmomentswhenonecallsintoquestionanyofthethreeaspectsofmorality.Ethicsisakindofstepping-awaytoquestionandworkonanyofthethreeaspectsofmorality.Indeed,ethicscanveryoftenquestionandworkonmorethanonemoralaspect,orallthree,atonetime.Instepping-awayinthisethicalmoment,apersonbecomesreflectiveandreflexiveabouthermoralworldandmoralpersonhoodandwhatshemustdo,sayorthinkinordertoappropriatelyreturntohernonconsciousmoralmodeofbeing.Whatmustbedoneisaprocessofworkingontheself,wherethepersonmustperformcertainpracticesonherselforwithotherpersonsinordertoconsciouslybeandactmoralinthesocialworld.Ethics,then,isaconsciousactingononeselfeitherinisolationorwithotherssoastomakeoneselfintoamoremorallyappropriateandacceptablesocialpersonnotonlyintheeyesofothersbutalsoforoneself.WhilethisviewofethicsisclearlyinfluencedbyFoucault’snotionofworkingontheself,IagreewithCritchley(2007:11)thatforFoucaultthisethicalprocessisaimedatself-masteryandauthenticity.Incontrasttothis,Iseetheethicalprocessofworkingontheselfasalwaysopen-endedandsituational,andthereforeasarecurringexistentialmomentthroughoutone’slifethatcanneverendinself-masteryorauthenticity.Forthisreason


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IrejecttheaimofFoucault’sethics,whileadoptinghisviewoftheethicalprocessasworkontheself.

ThisworkingononeselfinwhatIcalltheethicalmomentisbroughtaboutbyamoralbreakdownorwhatFoucaultcalledproblematization(2000).Thisoccurswhensomeeventorpersonintrudesintotheeverydaylifeofapersonandforceshertoconsciouslyreflectupontheappropriateethicalresponse.Onceonehasexperiencedthismoralbreakdown,sheworksonherselfbyutilizingcertainethicaltacticstonotonlyreturntotheunreflectiveandunreflexivedispositionofmorality,butinsodoing,tocreateanewmoraldispositionalperson.Thus,thismomentofethicsisacreativemoment,forbyperformingethics,personscreate,evenifeversoslightly,newmoralpersonhoodsandenactnewmoralworlds.

Thisethicalmomentisamomentinwhichthemultifariousaspectsoflocalmoralities,whichareallpartofthethreeaspectsofmoralityIdescribedabove,cometogethertoinformthewaysinwhichapersonworksonher-self.Isayinformbecausenoneoftheaspectsthatbelongtotheinstitutionalmoralities,thepublicdiscoursesofmorality,northeperson’sownembodieddispositionalmoralitydeterminehowthispersonwillworkonherselfinthisethicalmoment.Whileitmaybetruethatoneorseveraloftheseaspects,forexample,RussianOrthodoxmorality,themoralteachingsofone’sparents,orone’sownmoralexperiencesanddispositions,willoftentimesplayaverysignificantrole(sosignificantthatsomemightbetemptedtosayinsteadthatitortheyaredeterminant)intheworkingsoftheethicalmoment,neverthe-less,becausethisisamomentofconsciousreflectionanddialoguewithone’sownmoraldispositions,aswellaswiththeothertwoaspectsofmorality,itisalsoamomentoffreedom,creativity,andemergence.

Itisbecauseofthismoment,andthewayitfeedsbackintothesocialworld,thatnotonlyone’sownembodiedmoraldispositionschangethrough-outalifetime,butsotoodoesthepossibilityariseforshifts,alterations,andchangesintheinstitutionalandpublicdiscourseofmoralities.Forthisreason,Isuggestthatitisethicsandethicalpracticeswithinamoralbreakdownthatshoulddrawthemostattentionofanthropologistsofmoralities.Foritisbystudyingethicsandmoralbreakdownsthatwecanseetheintersectionofthevariousaspectsofmoralityinthedailylivesofindividualpersons,andseethemultifariouswaysinwhichhumanpersonsworkonthemselvesnotonlytoenact,butalsotoalterthemoralitiesoftheirsocialworlds.

Lastlyitisimportanttorecognizethatnotonlywithallthreeaspectsofmorality,butsotoowiththepracticeofethics,thereisalwaysarangeofpos-




sibilitiesthatdefinetherecognizableoptionsforwhatcountsaseithermoralityorethics.SimilartohowMacIntyre(1989,1991)hascharacterizedtraditionasconsistingofarecognizablerangeofdebateoveritskeyconcepts,ends,andpractices,sotoowithmoralityandethics.Itisthisrangeofpossibilitiesthatisaltered,evenifeversoslightly,bythecreativeandfreeprocessofethics.

WhatIcallethicsissimilartowhatRobbinscallsthemoralityoffreedominthatbothofuspositthisasconsciousmomentsoffreedomandchoice.Thedifference,however,isthatRobbinsseemstodescribethesemomentsasrelativelyrareandoccurringforthemostpartduetomajordisruptionstoasociety,suchasintimesofsocialchange,whileIsuggestthatethicsisaregularandnormalpartofsociallife.Ihavearguedthatmoralityisusuallyunquestioninglyenacted,nevertheless,ethicsisthenecessaryconsciousworkthatallowsforthecultivationofembodiedandnonconsciousmorality.Inotherwords,inorderfortheretobesuchamorality,ethicsmustberegularlyperformed.AsIarguedinthelastsection,itisnotclearhowandifapersonstuckinRobbins’moralityoffreedomcanreturntothemoralityofrepro-duction.Inthetheoryofmoralbreakdown,ontheotherhand,theethicalmomentofthebreakdownisdefinedbytheveryprocessofintentionallyworkingoneselfbackintononconsciousmorality.

InthissectionIhavelaidoutananthropologicaltheoryofmoralitythatdifferssignificantlyfromRobbins’theorydespitesomesimilarities.Thetwomostsignificantdifferencesareasfollows.Firstly,incontrasttoRobbins’viewthatsocietyconsistsofseparate,distinct,andcontextualizedmoral-valuesphereseachgovernedbyaprimaryvalue,Icontendthateverysocialcontexthasmulti-aspectualmoralitiesthatarethemselvespluralistic.Thatis,everysocialcontextallowsforarangeofpossiblemoralities.Therefore,withinanyparticularcontexteachpersonhasseveralmoralitiesavailableasameanstomorallylive-throughthatcontext.Secondly,incontrasttoRob-bins’moralityoffreedomthatonlycomesaboutduetoamajordisruptionineverydaylifeandpossiblyleavesapersonstuckinastateofperpetualmoraltorment,IcontendthatethicsisanormalandnecessarypartofeverydaylifebecauseitistheworkdonethatallowsformoralityasI’vedescribeditabove.Theseethicalmomentsofbreakdownoccurwhenforonereasonoranothertherangeofpossiblemoralitiesavailabledonotadequately‘fit’thecontext.Inthesebreakdownsashiftofconsciousnessoccursinwhichapersonorpersonsmustconsciouslyandcreativelyfindawaytobemoral.InthenextsectionIwillofferanethnographicexamplefrommyresearchinMoscowthatillustratesthisanthropologicaltheoryofmoralities.


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The Morality and Ethics of LyingAlthoughtosomeextentmoralquestioningcharacterizedmuchofthe

post-warperiodintheSovietUnion(e.g.,Binyon1983;Field1996;Yurchak2006),muchlikewiththeUrapmindescribedbyRobbins,majorsocialandculturalchangebroughtaboutbythefalloftheSovietUnionincreasedandmademorepublictheseexpressionsofmoraluncertainty.Thiscameaboutbecausebeginninginthelate-perestroikayearsandcontinuingthroughthe1990sintothe2000s,Russiaexperiencedasuddenexpansionoftherangeofpossibleinstitutionalandpublicdiscoursesofmoralities.NolongerdidtheCommunistPartyholdamonopolyonapubliclyallowablemorality.Thus,forexample,institutionsfromtheRussianOrthodoxChurchtoHariKrishnatoEvangelicalProtestants,fromtheYeltsinregimetotheWorldBanktofascistpoliticalmovementsallofferedthemselvesasprovidinganewinstitutionalmoralityforanewworld.Similarly,suchpublicdiscoursesofmoralitiesascapitalistmaterialismandworkethic,freedomofsexualityandpersonalexpression,thereturntoaristocraticvirtues,andawaveofnewmediaexpressingawidediversityofmoraldiscoursesallsuddenlybecameavailabletoRussians.ThissuddenandunexpectedexpansionoftherangeofmoralpossibilitiesledtowhatIcalledaboveamoralbreakdown,andthus,thepost-Sovietperiodhasalsobeencharacterizedbyapalpableconcernbyindividualstoethicallyworkonthemselves(Ries1997:119;Fitzpatrick2005).Asananthropologistinterestedinmorality,Ifoundthisaperfectopportunitytoresearchhowpersons’socialexperienceinformstheirmoralconceptionsanddispositions,andbeganlife-historicalresearchinMoscowin2002.Thisresearchfocusedprimarilyonfivepersonsandhowtheirlifehistoriesprovidedawaytounderstandtheprocessbywhichtheycametoconceiveandembodymoralityincertainways(Zigon2006,2008b).Intherestofthisarticle,Iwillshowhowratherthanconsideringtheworkplace,asRobbinsmight,asamoral-valuesphereprimarilygovernedbyonemoral-value,OlyaandLarisa,twoofthepeoplewithwhomIdidthisresearch,carryoverintheirembodieddispositionsseveralinfluencesfromavarietyoftheabove-mentionedinstitutionalandpublicdiscoursesofmoralitiesintothissocialarena.Indoingso,theyhaveavailabletothemarangeofmoralpossibilitiesforethicallyworkingthroughanybreakdownsthatmayoccurthere.

OlyaandLarisaarebestfriends.Theymetatuniversityin1995andhavebeenfriendseversince.Interestinglytheymaintaintheirfriendshipdespitesomeveryrealdifferences.WhileOlyaisadedicatedmemberofherRussianOrthodoxparish,attendingatleasttwoservicesaweekandsinginginthe




choir,Larisa,aftertryingforaboutayeartofindherfaith,nolongerconsidersherselfanOrthodoxChristian.WhenIfirstmetLarisainthefallof2002shewasinthemidstofthisstruggletobecomeOrthodoxandattendedchurchservicesabouttwiceamonthandthenoftenonlyoutofasenseofobligation.AlthoughLarisaconsideredherselfanOrthodoxbeliever,itwasastruggleforhertolivethekindoflifeshethinksabelieveroughttolive.ForthisreasonsheoftendeferredtoOlyaasthetruebelieverofthetwoandtheonewholivesatrulyChristianlife,andthusassheputsit,isabetterperson.There-fore,whilebothOlyaandLarisahavebeeninfluencedbyRussianOrthodoxinstitutionalmorality,OlyahasbeenmuchmoresothanLarisa.

Asa27-year-old,singlewomanlivinginMoscow,Larisaisperhapstheperfectimageoftheso-calledpost-Soviet,modernRussianwoman.Beingunmarried,economicallyself-sufficient,highlymotivated,andanavidshop-perforclothesandperfumeinmanyoftheforeignboutiquesinMoscow,Larisaepitomizesmanyofthepost-Sovietyouthwholivealifethatwasnotavailabletenyearsago.Andlikemanyotherpost-SovietwomenLarisahascometoconsiderhercareerapriorityinherlife,aswellasconsideringtheidealwomanacareer-orientedwoman(Kotovskaia&Shalygina1996:123).Thiswayofthinkingisradicallydifferentfromjustafewdecadesago,butassheputittome,‘Jarrett,IgrewupinRussianottheSovietUnion.’ItisalifesheknowstobedifferentnotonlyfromthatofthepastbutalsofrommanyofhercontemporariessuchasOlya.Wecansay,then,thatLarisahasbeensignificantlyinfluencedbythepublicmoraldiscoursesofconsumerismandcapitalism,andaswewillseebelow,hastoagreatextentcometoembodyinhermoralhabituswhatsheconsidersasignificantaspectofthelatter.

Olya,also27andunmarried,hasbeenaverystrongRussianOrthodoxbelieverandactivememberinherparishsinceshewassixteen.Otherthanherjob,mostofherdaysarefilledwithchurchactivities,suchaschoirprac-ticeorvolunteeringtocareforelderlymembersofthecommunity.WhenIfirstmetOlyashewasalanguageteacherataprivatehighschool,andsupplementedherincomewithprivatelessonsintheevening.Eventually,LarisahelpedOlyagetajobintheofficewheresheworks,sothatnowthesetwobestfriendsworktogethersocloselythattheirdesksfaceoneanother.MuchasOlyahadoncetriedtointroduceLarisatoanOrthodoxlife,nowLarisaishelpingOlyaorientherselftotheworldofbusinessandofficelife.WhatbecamecleartomeovertheyearsthatIhaveknownthemisthatbothhavesignificantlyinfluencedthemoralconceptionsofeachother.IntherestofthissectionIwillgivejustoneexampleofhowthisisso,andin


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doingsoofferitasanillustrationoftheanthropologicaltheoryofmoralitiesthatIsketchedabove.

Thisinterviewtookplaceoneeveninginthewinterof2005intheirofficeaftertheirco-workershadleftfortheday.Becauseeachofthemworkssuchlonghours,meetinghereatnineatnightwasthemostconvenienttimeandplaceforallofustocometogether.Italsoprovidedmewithanopportunitytoseetheirworkplaceandhowtheyinteractinthisspace.Aftermakingteawesattogetherattheirdesksandbeganourinterview.EventuallyIturnedtothetopicthatLarisahadfocusedoninmanyofourinterviewsandcon-versations,thatoflying.InparticularIwantedtoseehowOlyareactedtoLarisa’sclaimthatitisnecessarytolieintheworkplace.Surely,Ithought,OlyawoulddisagreewithLarisa,foritrunscountertoOlya’sstrictconcep-tionofwhatshecallsthemoralityofGod,whichisherownreflectivepublicdiscourseofherinterpretationofRussianOrthodoxinstitutionalmorality.Asbecomesclearinthefollowing,Iwasquitemistaken.

jarrett Larisahastoldmeaboutherdiscoveryoftheimportanceofwhatshe callsbluffingintheworkplace,whichismaybeanicewayofsaying thatyouhavetolieatworktobesuccessfulortomakeothersthink thatyouareperfect,Iwaswonderingwhatyou(Olya)thinkofthis?

olya Yes,Larisahassucceededinthis...

larisa (interjection)Itoldyou!

olya ...andshetriestoteachmetodoit.AndofcourseIappreciatethat shetries,andIseethatitisimportanttobesuccessfulhere.

jarrett Butthisdoesnotseemtomatchverywellwithyourreligiousbeliefs.

olya AndthatiswhyI’mnotverygoodatthis.SometimesIwilladmit rightawaythatImadeamistake...

larisa (interjection)Yes,andshelooksstupidwhenshedoesthis...

jarrett Soforyou[Larisa],forexample,itisoktolietoyourbossbecause youdon’tconsideritlyingtohimasapersonbuttohimasaboss?

larisa Yes,tolietohimislikelyingtoadoll,aworkingdoll.Butthesame boss,ifIgooutwithhim,forinstance,andheasksaboutsomething inhispersonallife,Iwouldneverlietohimbecauseheisanotherper- soninthisinstance,heisnotabossbutaperson...workisnotsepa- rate,itisapartoflife,butitisanunnaturalpartofyourlife...




jarrett Sobecauseyouconsiderworkanunnaturalpartoflife,somehowthe moralitythatyouliveaccordingtoinlifedoesn’tcounthere?

olya Yes,thatisright...

larisa Wellmaybenotmajorlies.ForinstanceIhavetheopportunityto, everydayIhavelargeamountsofmoneyinmyhandsandInever stealthisbecauseIthinkitisdishonest.Formethisisamajorlie. Butlies,forinstance,whentheyaskyouifyoudidsomethingand youdidn’tbutyousayyoudid,butthisisnotlyingthisisprotecting.

olya Preventingthemfrombeingworriedaboutnothing.

larisa (speaking to Olya)ItoldJarrettthatwhenyouarehonestatwork, forinstanceifD.(theboss)comesupandasksifyouhavedonethis, andyousayno,thenhebeginstoworry.

jarrett Soyou(Olya)agreewiththat?

olya Yes,absolutely.

jarrett SowhenyoutellthislietoD.itistoprotecthimortokeepthere- sponsibilityforyourself.

larisa Yes,andyouknow,maybelyingisanexaggeration.Atfirstyoushould trytogeneralizeasmuchaspossiblesothatyouranswerwillbein linewithrealitybutstillwillnotcausehimanyworries.Butifyou cannotdothis,thenyoushouldlie.

jarrett Isthisdifficultforyou(Olya)sinceyouseemtobestricteraboutthis?

olya I’mnotasgoodatthisasLarisa,butofcoursesometimesIwillsay thatIhavedonesomethingevenwhenIhaven’t,justsotheywon’t worry.ButmynatureisthatIcan’tinventtheseliesveryquicklyandI evengetconfusedsometimes,sowhenthishappensIcan’tgoagainst myself.

jarrett Thenitisjusteasiertotellthetruth?

olya Yes.

jarrett ButInoticedthatwhenIarrivedheretodayandyouhadtocomeget me,youhadtotellalittlelietothesecurityguard.

olya Ahyes... larisa (interjection)Whatdidyoutellhim?

olya ThesecurityguardaskedwhoyouwereandwhyIshouldlethimin,


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andItoldhimthatyouareourcolleagueandthatwehavetodo somework.

larisa Yousee,thisisaperfectexampleofwhatI’mtalkingabout.Itisto- tallyinnocent.Itleadstonothing,wellitleadsonlytogoodthings— thatyouwereletin.Andwhocareswhoyouare,youwillnotdestroy thisbuilding.

olya Youarenotaterrorist.

jarrett Iunderstandthatthisisokforyou[Larisa],butI’mabitmoresur- prisedwithOlya.Forexample,theBiblesaysdonotlie,thiscoversall situationsdoesn’tit?

olya Wellyes,butsometimesithappens.Lifedemandsit.

jarrett Soyouarewillingtogoagainstsomeofyourprincipleswhenneeded?

olya Yes,forexample,ifIdidn’tsaythisthenyouwouldstillbesitting downthere...

Hereweseehoweachoftheirownpublicdiscoursesofmoralities,thatis,thearticulationoftheiralreadyembodiedmoralities,bothoverlapanddivergeastheyexpressthepluralityoftherangeofpossiblewaysofbeingmoralintheirworkplace.Bothagreethatsometimeslyingatworkis,ifnotnecessary,thenconvenientbecauseithelpsalleviatepossibletension,wor-ries,andconcern.ButwhereasLarisarecognizesthisaspectofit,shetendstofocusmoreonhowlyingisawayofmaintainingresponsibilityforherselfandherownwork,aswellaspresentinganimageofcapabilityandsuccess.Assheputit,shedoesnotwanttolookstupidbybeingtoohonestaroundtheofficeassheaccusesOlyaofbeing.Olya,ontheotherhand,recognizesLarisa’sconcernsaboutresponsibilityandimage,buttendstofocusmoreonliesasameansofprotection.AsOlyasaidlaterintheinterview:‘IhavetriedtolearntosaythingsthatarenottruewhenIneedto,butIwouldnotcallthisalie,butprotection.Justsomephrasesthatprotectyoulikesomesafeclothes.’

Theprotectiveclothesofthelienotonlyprotecther,butalsoprotectherco-workers.First,bylearningtotellliesOlyaprotectsherbossesandothersintheofficefrombeingoverlyconcernedwithwhetherornottheworkwillbedoneontime,properly,andifshecanhandlethetask.Secondly,andrelatedtothefirst,Olyarealizesthatshecanprotectherselfbylying.Thatis,bynotcausingherco-workerstoquestionherabilitytodothework,Olyaisabletoprotectherselffrombeingconsideredapoorworker.This,however,is




somethingthatsheisstilllearningandhasnotmasteredasLarisahas.Wecansay,then,thatwhileLarisahasalreadyacquiredtheembodiedmoraldispositionoflyingintheworkplace,Olyaisstillethicallytrainingherselftoembodythisnewdisposition.Therefore,whileOlyaisethicallyworking-throughamoralbreakdownintheworkplace,Larisaisnot.

OlyaadmitsthatLarisaisbetteratlyingthansheis.Sheisbetterbecauseitispartofher‘nature.’AlthoughOlyadoesn’texplicitlysaythatthecapacitytoliewitheaseispartofLarisa’s‘nature,’shesuggeststhisbysayingthatherowndifficultywithlyingisduetoherown‘nature.’Inreferencingherown‘nature’aswhysheisunabletoliewithease,Olyaisindicatingherembodiedmoraldispositionthatshehascultivatedoveralifetimeandwhichisnowintheprocessofanethicaltransformationasshehasenteredanewarenaofsocialexperience.Becauseofher‘nature,’Olyasometimesgetsconfusedandcannotlieveryquickly.Herembodiedsensibilityfortruth-tellingreactsagainstthecultivationofseeminglyoppositedispositions.Inthesemomentsitismucheasierand‘natural’forOlyatosimplyspeakthetruthandriskworryingherco-worker,looking‘stupid,’andpotentiallyputtingherjobinjeopardy.Hersuccessinthisarenaandherabilitytoreturntoamorallycomfortableworldofunquestionedaction,theworldinwhichLarisaseemstobeabletolivebecauseofher‘nature,’dependsuponthesuccessofthisethicalworkonherselftocultivateanewmoraldisposition.

WhenIpointedout,however,howeasilyandsmoothlyshewasabletolietothesecurityguardwhenIarrived,Olyareliedonthecontingenciesoflifetoexplainheract.Sometimes‘lifedemandsit’shetoldme.Insuchmo-ments,asIobserved,OlyaisabletoeasilytellwhatLarisacallsaninnocentlieinordertomakethingsgosmoothly.Assheputit,IamnotaterroristsothereisnogoodreasonthatIcannotenterthebuilding.Suchaliewillnotharmanyone,Iamtold.ThesearethekindsofliesLarisabelievesarejustfinetotell, ifnotnecessary.Unliketheseinnocentlies,Larisaclaimsshewouldnevertellamajorliesuchasstealingmoneyfromtheproject’sbudget.Whilethisiswhatsheclaims,Idoknowthatshehasforgedseveraldocumentstocoverupherownaswellasherboss’errors.Therefore,notalltheliesaresoinnocent.

Bethatasitmay,sinceLarisabegancontrollingtheworkbudgetherolderbrotherhasbeenurginghertostealmoneyfromtheproject.Larisawillnotdothis.Notnecessarilybecauseitisdishonest,butprimarilybecauseitwouldriskherfutureintheworkworld.AsLarisaputitduringacasualconversationonthetopic, ‘mybrotherhasthisSovietmentalitythatbe-


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lievesheshouldgetasmuchashecanfromhisworkplacerightnow,whileI(Larisa)havethemoremodernmentalitythatbybeingagoodworkerIcaneventuallygetmorefrommyhardworkthanfromstealing.’Whetherornotthisdistinctionisoverlystereotypical,thefactremainsthatLarisadrawsanimportantlinebetweenwhatsheconsidersanappropriatelieornot,anddoessobycontrastingwhatIwouldcalltwoopposingpublicdiscoursesofmorality–theso-calledhoardingmoralityofsocialismandthe‘hard-worker’moralityofcapitalism.

ReturningtoOlya’sabilitytolieeasilytothesecurityguard,thequestionisbegged:ifOlyacansoeasilytellsuchalieinthesituationwiththesecurityguard,thenwhynotwithherboss?Perhapsbecause,despiteherdesiretobeconsideredagoodworker,shedoesnotconsidertheworkplacetobeonparwiththedemandsofreallife.Thisis,afterall,howLarisawouldputit.BothOlyaandLarisaagreethatworkisadifferentworld,adifferentgamethanreallife,andthusrequiresdifferentmoralsensibilities.Butthisdifferencedoesnot,asRobbinsmightsuggest,necessitatethatitisacompletelydifferentmoral-valuespherefromotherpartsoflife.Rather,itsimplyrequiresanembodiedshifttotheappropriatealreadycultivatedmoraldispositions.Thus,whilethisdifferencebetweenreallifeandworkallowsLarisatosoeasilylieintheofficebecauseshealreadyhascultivatedsuchdispositions,itisdifficultforOlyabecausesheisstillintheethicalprocessofsuchcultivation.

OnetacticthathelpsOlyacultivatethisnewmoralityisrelatingittoaspectsofheralreadyembodiedmorality.Thus,whileOlyarecognizesthatbyoccasionallylyingshemightbemoresuccessful,successdoesnotmattertohernearlyasmuchasitdoestoLarisa.UnlikeLarisa,thiscannotbethemotivationforOlyalying.Therefore,whileLarisatendstofocusonlyinginordertopreserveherimageandsenseofresponsibility,Olyaclaimsitisawayofprotectingothersfromworrying.Thus,whenOlyaliesatwork,itisforthesakeofprotectingherco-workersfromunnecessaryconcern.Itisanactforthesakeoftheother,whichdoesfitheralreadycultivatedmorality.

Butthismaynotalwaysbeenoughforhertogoagainsther‘nature’ofheralreadyembodiedmorality.Thus,attimesshebecomesconfusedandcannoteasilyorquicklylie.Ontheotherhand,whenconfrontedwiththepossibilitythatImightnotbeallowedintothebuilding,Olyawasabletoquicklyandeasilylietothesecurityguard.Butwhysoeasily?IhadcometotheirworkplacetomeetthembecauseOlyahadbeensobusyrecentlythatshewasunabletomeetwithmeanywhereelse.Thus,Iwastherebecauseshehadaskedmetocome.Shehadalsobeenputtingoffthemeetingfor




nearlyamonth.Olya,then,probablyfeltasenseofobligationtowardmeandwasunwillingtoletayoung,overlyzealoussecurityguardgetinthewayofusdoingwhatIhadcometodo.Olya,therefore,lied.Lifedemandedit.Interestingly,then,weseethatOlya’salreadyembodiedmoralityallowsforlyinginsomeinstancesevenoutsidetheworkplace.Wewillseebelowhowthismighthavecometobe.

Ifwork,accordingtoLarisa,isanunnaturalpartoflife,thenitsdemandsforlyingarelesspalpableforOlya.Shemaydosotoprotectherselffromthescornofherco-workersortoprotectthemfromunnecessaryworrying,butforOlyatheseconcernshavemoretodowiththereallife-likehumanrelationsbetweenherandherco-workers,thanwiththespaceofwork.Un-likeLarisa,Olyarecognizesthateveninthespaceofworksheisengagedinrealrelationswithotherpersons,andthusstruggleswiththequestionoftolieornot.ForLarisa,ontheotherhand,sheisnotengagedinhumanrelations,butratherinrelationswith‘workingdolls’or‘machines.’Dollsandmachinesdonotmeritmoralobligations,rathertheyaresimplypawnsinagame,thegoalofwhichistosuccessfullyaccomplishyourtasksandtolookgooddoingso.Larisa’sviewshowsthatwhatIcallmoralityneednotbemoralityinthetraditionalsenseofgoodandbadorrightandwrong.Rather,itmightbemoreappropriatetosaythatmoralitycanattimessimplybethewayinwhichpersonsandinstitutionsareabletoexistentiallybeinthesocialworldcomfortably.

Larisaisabletosupportthispositioninanumberofways.First,likeOlya,shealsoclaimstobelyingpartlytoprotectherco-workersfromunneces-saryworry.Butshealsoclaimsthatshedoesitbecausethesearetherulesofthegame.Shehaslearnedit,soshetoldmelaterinourconversation,frommen,theoneswhohaveestablishedtheserulesandcontrolthisunnaturalworld.Indeed,herbossD.,soLarisaclaimsandOlyaagrees,onlyworksashardashedoesinordertoprovethatheisrightaboutcertainthingshesaysanddoes.Inotherwords,heonlyworkshardinordertomaintainanimage.Thus,Larisaalsoliesbecausethisispartofthegame.Shefurtherrationalizesherlyingbyemphasizingthatthisissomethingsheonlydoesintheworkplace.Whileshemightlietoherbossatworkbecausethereheisa‘workingdoll,’whentheyseeeachotheroutsideofwork,whichdoeshappenonoccasion,Larisawillneverlietohim.Outsideofwork,outsideofthatparticulargame,D.isintersubjectivelytransformedfromabosstoaperson.Asaperson,Larisaisunable,sosheclaims,tolietohim.Thus,Larisadefendshermoralityoflyingattheworkplacebyclaimingthatshe


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issimplyactingaccordingtowhatsheseesasthealreadyestablishedpublicdiscourseofmoralityofthecapitalistworkplace.

Nevertheless,bothLarisaandOlya’sdistinctionbetweentheworkplaceandreallifebringstomindasimilardistinctionsocialscientistsobservedinthelate-Sovietperiod.Forexample,Kharkhordinhasclaimedthateverydaylifeinthelate-Sovietperiodwascharacterizedbydissimulationpracticesthatcametoconstitutethepublic/privatedivide(1999:270),andYurchakhasconvincinglyarguedthattheperformativeenactmentofofficialdiscourseandpracticeplayedasignificantroleintheeventualcollapseoftheSovietUnion(2006).Atfirstglanceitwouldappearthatsuchalegacyofdistinc-tionsmaysupportRobbins’theoryofdistinctmoral-valuespheres.Iwouldarguetothecontrary,however,that,ontheonehand,itrevealsthewaysinwhichpublicdiscoursesofmoralityfromthepastcontinueunrecognizedinthepresentasaspectsofindividual’sembodiedmoralities,aswellaslocalpublicinterpretationsofcapitalistmorality.Ontheotherhand,thislegacyshows,andasYurchak’sanalysisclearlyreveals,embodiedmoralitiesarecarriedacrossintodifferentsocialcontexts.Thus,justasYurchakshowshowtheembodiedmoralityofresponsibilitywascarriedbyhislate-Sovietinfor-mantsfromasocialcontextoffriendshipovertoacontextofaKomsomolmeetingsortheworkplace(2006:109),sotoo,asIhaveshownabove,Olya’salreadyembodiedmoralitysignificantlyinfluenceshowshebehavesinhernewworkplaceandthekindofethicalworkshedoesonherselfinordertofeelmoremorallycomfortableinthisnewcontext.

Some Closing Words

Herewehaveseenanexampleofthecomplexityofpeople’smorallives.Thisexampleillustrateshowwithinonesocialcontext,infactwithinasocialcontextthatRobbinsmightcallaspheregovernedbyoneprimarymoralvalue,therearecompetingandnegotiableconceptionsandactsofwhatcountsasmorality.Furthermore,thisexampleillustratesvariouspossibilitiesofallthree(institutional,publicdiscourses,andembodied)oftheaspectsofmoralitiesIoutlinedabove,aswellasethics.Additionally,asIarguedattheendofthelastsection,italsorevealsthewayinwhichmoralitiesfromthepastremaininfluentialinthepresent,evenifunrecognized.Thus,forexample,wehaveseenhowRussianOrthodoxinstitutionalmoralityinfluencesOlya,thedesiretoavoidthepublicmoraldiscourseofthesocialistworkinfluencesLarisa,evenifaspectsofsocialistmoralityremainunrecognizablyinfluential,andthepublicmoraldiscourseofthecapitalistworkinfluencesbothLarisaand




Olyatodifferingdegrees.WehavealsoseenhowOlyaethicallyworksonherselfintheconsciousattempttofullycultivateandembodythiscapitalistworkmorality.

Thisnotionofarangeofpossibilitiesbecomesevenmoreimportantforunderstandingpersons’moralliveswhenwerealizethatdespitewhatOlyaandLarisaclaiminthisinterview,thisisnottheendofthestory.ForIhaveobservedthembothlyingandheardstoriesthatsupporttheseobservationsthatfurthercomplicatetheissue.Larisahasliedinwaysthatsheclaimsweremorallyappropriateonnumerousoccasions,includingtomyself,outsideoftheworkplace.AndOlyaregularlyliestoherbrother,withapriest’sblessingIshouldadd,toprotecthimfromcommittingsuchsinsasstealingmoneyfromher,whichhehasdoneonseveraloccasions.Itisclearthattherangeofpossibilitiesthatconstitutethemoralityoflyingextendsbeyondthesocialcontextoftheworkplace,andfurthercomplicatesthetaskofattemptingtodrawmoralboundariesaroundcertainsocialcontexts.

ImaybeoversimplifyingRobbins’view,butitwouldseemthataccordingtohistheoryLarisaandOlya’sworkplace,andperhapsalloflaborandeco-nomy,wouldbeonesingularanddistinctmoral-valuesphereincompatiblewithanyother.Ifso,thenthisspherewouldbecharacterizedbyadominantvalueofperhaps‘truth-telling,’ormoreinterestingly,‘lying.’Butasisseenfromthisexample,thisisclearlynotthecase.Truth-tellingandlyingaresituationallynegotiated,questioned,andworked-throughindifferentwaysbydifferentpersonswithinandbeyondthissocialcontext.Thereisnodominantvaluethatpersonsfeelcompelledtofollow,butratherthereisarangeofpossibilitiesformorallyandethicallyacting.

Similarly,unlikewithRobbins’theorywherethedistinctmoral-valuespheresstandinsuchoppositiontooneanotherthatpersonsareseeminglyleftinastateofconstantmoralquestioningwhenstuckbetwixtandbetweenthem,thisexampleshowshowpersonscarrywiththemfromonecontexttoanotherthevariousmoraldispositionsandsensibilitiestheyhaveacquiredthroughoutalifetime.Findingoneselfinacontextofmoralbreakdownandquestioning,aswithOlyainthisexample,doesnotleaveherperpetuallyinmoraltorment,butinsteadprovidesanopportunityforhertoethicallyworkonherselftofindnewandcreativewaystofitheralreadyembodiedmoralityintothenewcontext,aswellashowtorecreatehermoralhabitussothatsheacquiresnewdispositionsandsensibilitiesadaptedtothenewworkplace.Itgoeswithoutsayingthatthesenewmoraldispositionsandsensibilitieswouldthenbeavailabletoherifandwhenneededinother,non-workplace,social


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contextsfornonconscioususe.Thatis,untilonceagainOlyafindsherselfinapositionofmoralbreakdownandmust,yetagain,alterhermoralwayofbeingintheworldthroughconsciousethicalwork.

ThereisnodoubtthatRobbinshascontributedsignificantlytotheanth-ropologyofmoralities,andinparticularforshowingonewaythatwecanconceiveofindividualandsocialmoralworldsasconsistingofbothanon-consciouslyenactedmoralityandconsciousattemptstobemoral,orwhatIcallethics.Inthisarticle,IhavetriedtopointoutwhatIseeassomeoftheshortcomingsofhistheory,andhaveofferedanalternativetheorythatIsuggestbettercapturesthecomplexityofsocialandmorallife.AlthoughhereIhavefocusedonhowthetheoryofmoralbreakdownisapplicabletoindividualpersonsinaspecificsocialcontext,Ihavearguedelsewherethatitcanalsohelpdescribeandexplicatelargersocietal-widemoralbreakdownsnotonlyinRussiabutelsewhereaswell(Zigon2007).Thisissobecauseasatheoryitdoesnotsimplydescribethemoralworldofindividualsorasociety,andassuchperhapsmayonlybepertinenttothepost-SovietRussiancontext,butinsteadoffersageneralframeworkforunderstandingtheprocessesbywhichmoralitymaybecomepossibleinthefirstplacewithinanysocietyasahumanwayofbeingintheworld.Becauseofthis,thetheoryofmoralbreakdowndoesnotnecessitateradicalculturalchangeforexplainingmoralquestioning,butinsteadrecognizesthatwhatIcallethicsispartofeverydaysociallife.Thatis,itrecognizesthattoliveahumanlifeistospendalifetimeshiftingbetweenmoralityandethics.

Acknowledgments Iwould like to thankTalalAsad,MichaelBlim,GeraldCreed,NancyRies, and

ChrisHannfortheirhelpandcommentsonearlierversionsofthisarticle.IwouldalsoliketothanktheeditorsofEthnosfortheirguidanceandtheanonymousre-viewers for their comments. The writing of this article was made possible by aResearchFellowshipattheMaxPlanckInstituteforSocialAnthropology.There-searchusedherewasmadepossiblebyanssrcEurasiaProgramGraduateTrainingFellowship(Titleviii)andaFulbright-HaysDoctoralDissertationResearchAbroadFellowship.PartsofthisarticlehaveappearedinMorality: An Anthropological Per-spective(Oxford:BergPublishers2008).

Notes1. Robbins followsWeberanduses the termvalue sphere.However, in this article

Iusethetermmoral-valuespheretodescribeRobbins’usagebecauseIbelieveitmoreaccuratelycaptureswhathe intends. Italso, I suggest,makesamorecleardistinctionbetweenhisviewandthatofbothWeberandDumont.

2. Iuseaspectinthephenomenologicalsenseofoneofmanythatwhenputtogether




constructwhat is consideredawhole.For example, theperceptionof two sides(aspects)ofacubeallowforthecognitiveconstructionofthewholeofthecubealthoughallthesidesareneverperceived.

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Morality Within a Range of Possibilities: A Dialogue with Joel Robbins

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