Sacrifices, Aspirations and Morality:Williams Reconsidered

Lisa Rivera

Accepted: 22 August 2006# Springer Science + Business Media B.V. 2006

Abstract When a person gives up an end of crucial importance to her in order to promotea moral aim, we regard her as having made a moral sacrifice. The paper analyzes thesesacrifices in light of some of Bernard Williams’ objections to Kantian and Utilitarianaccounts of them. Williams argues that an implausible consequence of these theories is thatthat we are expected to sacrifice projects that make our lives worth living and contribute toour integrity. Williams’ arguments about integrity and meaning are shown to beunconvincing when the content of projects is left open. However, a look at his laterarguments suggests a reason to be concerned about defensible ethical projects asunderstood through what he refers to as “the morality system”. The problem for theoriesof this type turns out to be not merely conflicts between ethical projects and moral demandsbut making sense of some of the ethically relevant features of these projects.Accommodations to moral theories that leave room for ethical projects may be insufficientto explain such features, for example in cases where agents demand more of themselvesthan the theories require. Making the theories more demanding is also problematic.Williams’ view about the role ethics plays in our conception of the life we want to leadprovides a better account of these cases.

Key words demandingness . impartiality . integrity . Kantian ethics . meaning of life . moralpoint of view . moral/nonmoral distinction . utilitarianism . virtue ethics . BernardWilliams

Ethic Theory Moral PracDOI 10.1007/s10677-006-9040-8

For helpful comments on this paper I am indebted to Allen Wood, Karen Jones, Terence Irwin, SusannaSiegel, Jessica Wilson, Lawrence Blum, Ajume Wingo, Claudia Eisen Murphy, Stephen Darwall, and twoanonymous referees of this journal.

L. Rivera (*)Department of Philosophy, University of Massachusetts,100 Morrissey Boulevard, Boston, MA 02125, USAe-mail: lisa.rivera@umb.edu

Morality sometimes asks us to sacrifice things that we hold dear. When we relinquishsomething of critical importance to us for morality’s sake, we have made a moral sacrifice.1

Some say that morality can—and perhaps always does—require moral sacrifices. Othersreject the notion that a moral requirement is the last word on what we should do. BernardWilliams is most closely associated with this latter view, and a great deal of the debatearound what morality can require of us owes itself to his misgivings about the demands ofimpartial moral theories. The arguments generated by these misgivings traverse much of theterrain of moral theory.2 I am concerned here not with the many questions aboutimpartiality or moral requirements that his work raises, but with the narrower related issueof moral sacrifices: the sacrifice of the object of personal interest or concern to satisfy anethical aim.3

Responses to Williams have attended to the fact that when constructing a moral theorywe have to take seriously a person’s conception of what makes her life good. Kantians andutilitarians have offered a variety of solutions to the problem of moral sacrifice that wouldallow us to preserve what we most care about and still satisfy moral requirements. I look attwo characteristic solutions—one Kantian and one utilitarian—to Williams’ concerns aboutthe effects that one conception of moral sacrifices has on a person’s integrity and her reasonto live. These solutions have been thought to accommodate important projects that give ourlives integrity and meaning by limiting morality’s reach. I argue that the structure of thesesolutions has an unexpected result: In certain cases, they cannot explain why we think wemust give up what we care most about or even risk our lives to promote an ethical end. Thealternative—always allowing morality to trump a person’s central concerns when the twoconflict—accommodates an agent’s idea that profound sacrifices are sometimes necessarybut may also impede her pursuit of her good in problematic ways. Surprisingly perhaps, it isWilliams’ view that best explains the ethical demands we place on ourselves in such cases. Idraw on his arguments about the ethical life to explain how agents understand moralsacrifices of this type.

Williams is known for being skeptical of moral theories that take the reasonableness ofcertain types of moral sacrifices for granted. I argue here that it is misleading to see his viewas chiefly focused on convincing us that ethics must therefore have a weak role in our lives.Rather, his insistence on the meaning we derive from our ethical choices enables us tounderstand the perspective of agents who make significant, even extreme, moral sacrifices.While I argue that it is possible to resist some of his conclusions about integrity and

1 A colloquial use of the term ‘moral sacrifice’ connotes doing what is morally right at some cost to oneself. Iuse the term in this sense. If a businessperson is forced to accept a financial loss because the profit would beharmful to others (even if not illegal) he can be said to have made a moral sacrifice. Consider the rug merchantwho discovers his most profitable carpets are made by child laborers. When he changes his stock to ensure hedoesn’t participate in economic transactions that deeply harm others, he does so at great cost to his overall aims.What is ‘sacrificed’ is the end he might have been able to achieve had ethical considerations not intervened.2 There are many refinements of the larger question of what morality may require when it conflicts withnonmoral aims: how much morality can demand of us, whether moral requirements override nonmoralreasons, whether morality should be understood as impartial, and whether agents must consult morality in allpractical reasoning. My concern in this paper is to focus on a question that I think lies in the background ofthese questions but has been less explored: What are some of the ways that agents conceive of the conflictbetween moral and nonmoral ends and what effect, if any, does an agent’s own conception of this conflicthave on the reasonableness of the moral requirement?3 Williams gives the terms “ethical” and “moral” a special sense, which I discuss below. Here and elsewhere, Iuse the terms in roughly Williams’ sense, to emphasize considerations that are particularly salient from thestandpoint of a moral theory or to contrast the perspective of morality with the broader notion of the ethical.

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meaning, reflection on his later arguments about the ethical life shows that his concernsabout integrity and meaning merit rethinking. Even so, taking this aspect of Williams’ viewseriously does not leave everything in its place. If we are to do full justice to the role ethicsplays in our lives, his argument requires us to question the idea that there is a sharpboundary between moral and nonmoral projects. We must also give up the idea that thepersonal importance some ethical choices have for us necessarily originates in a set ofsystematic moral requirements.

1 Williams’ Objections to Impartial Moral Theory

1.1 Integrity

Can making a moral sacrifice injure our positive evaluation of our own character? In aseries of papers, Williams argues that some versions of Kantian and utilitarian theory leaveopen the possibility that an agent who acts rightly (by some moral theories’ lights) may alsodo something contrary to her integrity.

Williams’ objection to Kantian and utilitarian theory begins with his observation that ourlives are ‘bound up’ with certain core concerns. These pursuits, activities and aims that wemay see as central to our character or to our identity he calls ‘ground projects’ and(sometimes) ‘commitments.’ First, in his objections to utilitarianism, Williams claims thatground projects and other commitments are central to a person’s integrity. Integrity, hesuggests, cannot merely be cast aside in favor of impartial morality. Second, in his objectionto Kantian theory, he argues that we have categorical desires for ground projects—and thatthese too should not always give way to moral demands. On one interpretation of his claimconcerning categorical desires, the object of such desires can be seen as forming a basis ofour reason to live—a foundation for what gives our lives meaning.4 Williams’ objection toa certain way of interpreting moral requirements is that a person’s integrity and sense ofmeaningfulness can both be threatened if she is unable to act on her ground projects. Hisobjection thus applies to any view of morality that requires us to give up, undermine orforego actions to realize our ground projects.

Ground projects and commitments are distinguished from other pursuits by theirimportance to the person and by their role in forming her character. For example, Williamsargues that what distinguishes a person’s pursuit of a ground project from other things shecares about is that “it is at once more thoroughgoing and serious...more individual andpermeated with character than the desire for the necessities of life.” (Williams and Smart1973, p. 111). While there are probably intuitive limits on ground projects given the sorts ofthings that people tend to care deeply about, Williams places no obvious rational orconceptual limits on ground projects: “One can be committed to such things as a person, acause, an institution, a career, one’s own genius, or the pursuit of danger.” (Williams andSmart 1973, p. 111).

Roughly speaking, the ground projects Williams focuses on are those things we arefamiliar with as ‘core’ or ‘central’ to the cluster of concerns we structure our agency around;they are important to our identity. His central examples are cases in which a person, if facedwith a practical conflict, cannot do what is required by morality and still continue to promote

4 The idea that projects give life meaning need not depend on an assumption that human life has meaningfrom an objective standpoint. Rather, Williams can be understood as concerned with what the agent needs tofind her life worth living.

Sacrifices, Aspirations and Morality: Williams Reconsidered

her ground project. The following example, borrowed from a paper of Williams that makes adifferent but related claim, shows how this practical conflict can be understood. Consider anartist—call him “Gauguin”—who correctly believes that his ability to realize his artisticpurpose is hampered by continual contact with bourgeois society and its demands. He seesthat the most effective (perhaps the only) way to escape the stultifying effects of bourgeoismodernity is to abandon his wife and children in France and work in Tahiti. Gauguin, then,sees a practical conflict between a pressing (and overriding, for the utilitarian and Kantian)obligation to care for his children, and the ground project that is central to his life. If we followWilliams’ integrity argument, the centrality of the project indicates that Gauguin’s integrity isat stake. If Gauguin is required by morality to act against his project, he is also being requiredto compromise or perhaps relinquish his integrity.5

Williams’ early work on utilitarianism rejects the utilitarian demand to promote utility atthe expense of ground projects and commitments. Our integrity requires us to act in accordwith these. Thus, utilitarianism requires us to relinquish our integrity.

The point here is not...that if the project or attitude is that central to his life, then toabandon it will be very disagreeable to him and a great loss of utility will beinvolved... The point is that he is identified with his actions as flowing from projectsand attitudes which in some cases he takes seriously at the deepest level as what hislife is about... It is absurd to demand of such a man, when the sums come in from theutility network... that he should step aside from his own project and decision andacknowledge the decision which the utilitarian calculation requires. It is to alienatehim in a real sense from his actions and the source of his actions in his ownconvictions. (Williams and Smart 1973, p. 116)

Williams’ objection to utilitarianism here has a very wide scope. It will in fact provide anobjection to any moral theory that would require a person to step aside from her projectswhen her pursuit conflicts with morality. When a person is expected to act contrary to herprojects, submitting to this expectation can constitute a violation of her integrity. The‘absurdity’ Williams sees perhaps comes from the close link between who we are and whatwe are about and our ground projects: It is absurd to require someone to utilize her agencyto subvert the very thing that is central to her conception of herself as agent.

2 Compromising Integrity: Internal Conflicts Versus Obstacles to Action

Williams’ argument does not need to capture everything we mean by ‘integrity.’ We canthink of the sort of integrity that ties up with ground projects as a kind of integrity-as-wholeness—a concern to act consistently with those aims that one has decided should havecentral significance. Such a concern is surely significant to our agency.6 Whether or notWilliams gives us a complete picture of what integrity consists in, he does capture an

5 The Gauguin example is from “Moral Luck” in Williams (1981). While its details bear some connection tothe historical Gauguin, Williams acknowledges its fictional nature. I use the example because it is structuredmuch like the dilemmas in the cases of conflict Williams is concerned with in other papers. However,Williams uses this example to demonstrate the luck involved in Gauguin’s ability to justify such a choice tohimself after he sees its results. Williams argues that if Gauguin’s project fails, he lacks a subsequentjustification for his choice. Williams also acknowledges that, whether Gauguin fails or succeeds, he may nothave a justification that will be satisfying to everyone (his family, for example).6 Cf. Calhoun (1995), Davion (1991), McFall (1987); for other accounts of integrity.

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undeniably central element of what it is to relinquish or lose your integrity. While I willargue that the situation is often more complex, it is true on the face of it that acting contraryto concerns you regard as deeply significant has the potential to compromise your integrity.Our ordinary sense of maintaining integrity involves—at the very least—holding fast inaction to what you claim to hold most dear.

The problem with Williams’ objection here is that we can’t make sense of the idea that Iwill violate my integrity by acting on a moral reason unless we already assume that I seethe moral reason as a worse reason. The force of Williams’ objection depends on the statusthe agent assigns to her reason to pursue her ground project and her attitude toward thatreason. Compromising integrity requires more than acting contrary to something we careabout. While integrity itself has additional dimensions, to make sense of a person’s self-evaluation that she has violated her own integrity, we have to suppose that she actedcontrary to what she regarded herself as having most reason to do. It is useful to contrast agenuine conflict of aims that undermines an action promoting a project, and a mere obstacleto realizing that action. Imagine a woman who must, with others, adjudicate a sexualharassment case in the workplace. She is under enormous pressure from her colleagues toacquit the accused harasser because he is both a brilliant physicist and tremendously wellliked by all members of the department. As much as she likes him, she finds the evidenceshe is presented with overwhelmingly incriminating, and she cares deeply about the rightsof female students in her department. If she submits to the pressure to acquit him, she willhave compromised her integrity and her ground project to promote the career of talentedwomen physicists will be jeopardized. Yet if she votes to convict him and her colleaguesprevail, her integrity will be maintained even though the success of her ground project willbe similarly threatened. In other words, the issue is not whether her project is threatened,but whether she acts against her own better judgment. The issue is not interference withone’s ground projects, but how the person herself conceives of this interference.

Integrity is undermined when the ground project is threatened from within—when shechooses a lesser aim over one she regards as significantly more valuable. If a situation musthave this structure for a loss of integrity to occur, this raises a problem for Williams’argument. He says that a failure to act on our ground project, or acting contrary to ourground project, causes a loss of integrity. However, the real failure of integrity occurs whenit is consistent with what I claimed to care about to reject the alternative I ended upchoosing. I lack integrity when I choose the option I believe to be morally or otherwiseworse over the one I claimed to believe was better. If I give in to my colleagues’ pressure tolet a sexual harasser off when I believe he is guilty, I should have held fast to what I judgedwas most important (truth and fairness). Instead, I opted for what I believe matters less(others’ approval).

The problem is that Williams’ objection may force us to assume that the person whosacrifices her ground project to do what morality requires (and what is objectionable to her)already has some reason to reject this requirement. If that is so, then the question aboutwhether it is reasonable to act for morality’s sake is already answered. It is not reasonable ifI already have some reason to ignore morality’s claims. Gauguin might not have integrity ifhe regards the requirement to care for his children as bourgeois and stultifying butnevertheless decides to act on his obligations. But when we assume that he compromiseshis integrity by acting on his obligations we must also assume that acting on his obligationsis not what he has most reason to do.

This seems to stack the deck against the moral requirements Williams findsobjectionable. What is being asked here is whether people have a good reason to do what

Sacrifices, Aspirations and Morality: Williams Reconsidered

morality requires not just when their interests, their passions, and their attachments lieelsewhere but when morality has little or no pull for them. We might say no to thisquestion, but Williams’ arguments about integrity do not provide us with evidence to drawthis conclusion. We know that a person who doesn’t see a reason to be moral in a particularcase will be troubled or dissatisfied if she does what morality might ask of her when shewants to do something else. But we’ve always known that.

2.1 Internal Reasons

Williams’ well-known skepticism about the normative status of moral reasons when theyconflict with an agent’s desires suggests an additional argument that some moral sacrificesare unreasonable. Consider, for example, that Gauguin’s integrity might be compromised ifhe gave in to the pressure from others to do what they thought morally right and he had noother motive. Focusing on the question of motivation may lend itself to an argument that aperson’s integrity is compromised if she acts on what she takes to be a moral reason whosecontent is unconnected to her own desires, concerns or wishes.7 In “Internal and ExternalReasons” Williams argues that what may be thought a rational consideration is not a reasonfor that agent unless some psychological fact in an agent’s psychology that couldconceivably serve as a motivation to act on that reason. The model of reasons Williamsdefends (the ‘sub-Humean model’) claims that any motive grounding a reason must comefrom an agent’s prior set of motivations or “subjective motivational set (S).” Hence, anyreason that is a reason for a particular agent is one that would satisfy some element in hisS. ‘Internal reasons’ are those reasons a person has due to what is in his S. Therefore,external reasons are moral reasons that have no motivational pull for the agent because theydon’t satisfy elements in his S. On the internalist view of reasons, a “sound deliberativeroute” from elements in the S to one’s reasons is a necessary condition for having a reason.On the externalist view, there may be paths to a reason that do not begin with S and thus thesound route is not a necessary condition. Thus, we can imagine one kind of moral theorythat is externalist in Williams’ sense asserting that everyone has a reason to be moralwhatever he or she happens to want.8 Williams rejects this possibility.9

It’s important to note that Williams’ picture is not a simple mechanistic view that aperson’s reason to act at T is automatically derived from his strongest desire at T. Further,contents of the S are understood rather broadly to include not only desires but “dispositions ofevaluation, patterns of emotional reaction, personal loyalties, and various projects, as theymay be abstractly called, embodying commitments of the agent.” (Williams 1981, p. 105).

7 I assume here that all reasons must be motivating and so assume that no one acts from a reason that isunconnected to his desires, wishes, etc. What I describe here is the case of someone who acts on a reason tosuccumb to some sort of external pressure (e.g., because morality demands it) but who does not value themoral aim the action would bring about.8 In “Internal Reasons and the Obscurity of Blame” Williams gives a detailed picture of what counts as asound deliberative route. “The internalist proposal sticks with its Humean origins to the extent of makingcorrection of fact and reasoning part of the notion of a ‘sound deliberative route to this act’ but not, fromoutside, prudential and moral considerations.” Furthermore, Williams says that “any rational deliberativeagent has in his S a general interest in being factually and rationally informed” but if we add to this that everyrational agent similarly has an interest in being moral “there has to be an argument for this conclusion.” Anexplanation for our tendency to appeal to extant reasons in moral argument is that we assume most people dohave some general desire to be moral (Williams 1995, pp. 36–37).9 For an alternative view of reasons see Nagel (1979, p. 27). Some direct critiques of Williams’ view arefound in Korsgaard (1996a, pp. 311–334), Wedgewood (2002) and Scanlon (1998, pp. 363–374).

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Elements of an ethical life, the full import of which I will discuss below, are undoubtedlyincluded in the “nonegoistic projects” that Williams says can be part of the S. Moreover,elements in S can change, and deliberation about corollaries to elements in one’s S maylead one to desire new aims. There is a role for reflection here and the importance of thesound deliberative route makes clear that a person can be mistaken about his reasons to !as well as mistaken about what he has most reason to do.

Thus, Williams claims that only internal reasons are normative reasons. If he is right,then we indeed have a picture where the external moral reason represents a worse reason fora person. This is because it doesn’t represent a reason for her at all. A person called upon tomake a moral sacrifice based on an external moral reason is expected to act contrary to herS. If she continues to see the moral matter as she does because of the contents of her S ande.g., succumbs to the social pressures that can so easily influence us, then she could regardthat action as contrary to her integrity.10 In the case of the professor who might vote toacquit the sexual harasser, I argued that she will see her integrity as compromised if she actson pressure from her colleagues since giving in to pressure is a worse reason than valuing afair outcome. To marry the internal reasons argument to the integrity objection we can saythat the internal reasons argument, if correct, would show that (1) if a person is presentedonly with an external moral reason and (2) she is deeply committed to an end that competeswith that moral reason then (3) the moral sacrifice involved in acting on the moral reason isat the very least not what she has most reason to do.

3 Ethical Projects and Commitments

Again, we need to consider how serious a critique this is of the standard ways moraltheories construe moral sacrifices. Even if Williams’ internalist view is right, we canimagine many scenarios where the requirement to compromise integrity or give up one’sreason to live for morality’s sake is unobjectionable.11 If Rita’s ground project involvesdoing terrible things, integrity is not enough to make us give up the expectation she shouldnot do them, even when her commitment to her awful project is reflective and deeply rootedin her character. Williams should grant this point, since he seems to grant that a person whofails to have elements in their S that would give them a reason for basic kinds of decentbehavior is nevertheless open to moral criticism.

There are of course many things that a speaker may say to one who is not disposed to! when the speaker thinks that he should be, as that he is inconsiderate, or cruel, orselfish or imprudent; or that things, and he, would be a lot nicer if he were somotivated.12

What we can’t say to Rita is that there is a reason she must act on or otherwiseacknowledge, on pain of irrationality. Even in Williams’ account those moralists who are

10 It is also possible for the person to agree intellectually that the moral reason is the right thing to do, but tohave no desire to do the right thing. Only in strange instances (where she regards herself as committed todoing the wrong thing) will that case involve a threat to integrity in Williams’ sense. However, concernsabout threats to the integrity of committed amoralists do not pose any significant objection to a moral theory.11 Of course, Williams’ arguments about reasons are very significant with respect to the question of moralmotivation and the ‘why be moral’ question.12 Williams (1981, p. 110). He also makes this point in “Internal Reasons and the Obscurity of Blame,” 1981,p. 39.

Sacrifices, Aspirations and Morality: Williams Reconsidered

willing to give up the charge of irrationality have a great deal to say. While Rita may bepersonally devastated by the loss of her project if she gives in to the weight of others’disapproval, these feelings seem to present no serious charge against a moral perspectivethat it’s better if she does give in.

Even so, there remains a compelling version of the integrity example (which can also beextended to the concern about categorical desires). To consider this, I must reach beyondWilliams’ explicit arguments. Although it seems unproblematic to sacrifice evil or trivialends for morality’s sake, we can imagine cases where complying with the moralrequirement would require a person to sacrifice her ethical values. Suppose the endthreatened by the moral sacrifice is a person’s deeply valued ethical end, one that isdefensible on ethical grounds. While some may not agree that integrity or meaning shouldcarry the day here, at the same time, to echo Williams, we don’t want people to “just stepaside” from their ethical commitments.

Examples of conflicts between long-standing ethical commitments and moral require-ments are not hard to come by. Adele’s loyalty to a friend makes her refuse to cooperate withlegitimate legal authorities that threaten her friend with punishment. Everardo’s commitmentto a revolution against an unjust and repressive regime leads him to lie, steal and commitindustrial sabotage. The point in each case is not that the person will do the right thing or eventhat pursuing ethical commitments is always defensible, all things considered. Yet, we have togrant there is at least prima facie reason for someone to be concerned with her integrity whenshe is expected to act contrary to a defensible ethical commitment.13

We might call this, then, a problem of ethical integrity. I use Williams’ later arguments(primarily those in Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy) to consider what it shows aboutmoral sacrifice.14

We might find it initially strange to suppose that an ethical commitment can present agenuine conflict with a moral requirement because it may seem that there is some larger‘covering’ commitment (such as the general happiness) or general obligation (such as thecategorical imperative) that should form the basis of our ultimate decision. Thus, it wouldonly be an apparent conflict, one that waits for morality to render a verdict about where ourultimate responsibility lies. Williams, however, would diagnose this reaction as the result ofseeing ethics through the lens of morality, the “special system.” He claims that the moralitysystem cannot accurately capture all ethical concerns.

Ethics is in fact a broader category, one among the many things we consider when we try toanswer the question ‘how should one live?’Williams contends that ethical matters constitutea wide spectrum and that the boundary between ethical and nonethical matters is vague. Someof our ethical obligations result from voluntary choices (like promising) but most are notassumed voluntarily and many arise within nonchosen social contexts such as “a role, aposition, or relationship.” (Williams 1985, p. 7) The thought that something would be ‘forthe best’ is an ethical consideration, one that can represent a weighted evaluative judgmentindependent of the general happiness. Certain actions are “of some ethically relevant kind”

13 I mean something very simple by ‘defensible.’ These projects would be regarded as worthwhile ethicalprojects for good reasons and most people would recognize them both as ethical projects and reasonableprojects in the absence of countervailing considerations. I leave open what counts as a good reason. It is notmeant to imply an externalist account but simply what the person and others find reasonable. (I limit myclaims to projects that most moral theories would approve of in some way or other although I think theburden of proof is on any moral theory to account for reasonable ethical projects.)14 In discussing this idea I rely on several features of practical choice that Williams thinks apply to a varietyof concerns, not only ethical ones. I do not intend to imply that ethical integrity is the only part of our livesWilliams thinks morality distorts.

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and our choices may reflect this description of the action—for example, refusing to dosomething because it is dishonorable. Virtues also participate in this language of ethicaldescription. However, the content of the ethical is not up for grabs nor is it determined onlyby how an individual chooses to see things. Rather, the explanation for the diversity of theethical is “what one would expect to find, if only because we are heirs to a long andcomplex ethical tradition, with many different religious and other social strands.”15 Somematters of ethical relevance may arise only in particular situations. Even so, ethics need notbe a set of parochial concerns. Williams allows that some ethical demands “seem to besatisfied only be a universal concern, one that extends to all human beings, and perhapsbeyond the human race.” (Williams 1985, p. 14)

Morality, on the other hand, insists that all moral concerns must be “marked by thisuniversality.” (Williams 1985, p. 14). Morality attempts to reduce the diversity of ethics. Itis a “special system that demands a sharp boundary” which attempts to carve up andsystematize the ethical landscape. Morality makes it appear that all our ethical commitmentswill be contained within a framework that will harmonize and regulate them, especially,Williams argues, by making everything of ethical relevance appear to be an obligation (Cf.especially Williams, 1985, pp. 174–182). Morality is not merely the creation ofphilosophers, but “the outlook, or incoherently, part of the outlook of almost all of us.”

Williams levels many charges at the morality system; only a few are relevant here. Whatwill help us understand ethical integrity is his point that some crucial aspects of the ethicallife cannot be systematized or brought under the rubric of moral obligation withoutdistorting or erasing their significance.16 To see this point, imagine Julie, whose life centersaround environmental issues, primarily activism towards governments that refuse to addressglobal climate change. This project could be understood as either ethical or moral inWilliams’ sense.

I assume here that, if something is recognizably a significant ethical concern, it followsthat a systematic and complete picture of morality has to account for it. Williams claim thatmorality requires all ethical matters to be captured by the idea of a general obligation. Tounderstand Julie’s project within morality, Williams argues, we must see it as a specific wayof fulfilling a more general moral requirement, specifically, an obligation. According toWilliams, the way of seeing things provided by morality means that we must regard theproject either as lacking moral (and therefore ethical) content or as an instance where sheacts on a moral obligation. Both of these options involve a mistake. Discarding the formeroption and claiming the project is ethical (and therefore must be relevant to a moral theory)simply because of its content is obviously controversial.17 However, Julie’s project ismotivated in part by her concern for the future of humanity. Only a very odd view wouldmake such a concern irrelevant to morality.

15 Williams (1985, p. 16). Williams also considers ethical conviction to have a complex relationship to socialconformation. (1985, p. 170.) Again, this is not a purely conventionalist view since rational reflection plays asignificant role.

17 The Kantian view is that her particular project counts as moral if it stems from a moral motive. Generally,Julie’s is the type of project that often is moral on the Kantian view, since it is the type of project that canresult from an intention to treat others as ends in themselves. (It is arguable that allowing climate change tooccur for the usual economic reasons also treats persons as means, particularly the poorer inhabitants of theglobal south who are most vulnerable to the immediate harms of global climate change.) I leave the issue ofwhich motives count as moral to one side as it is not directly relevant to Williams’ claim that the moralitysystem requires all ethical concerns to fit within the idea of obligation.

16 “Ethical life” is Williams’ term. Williams (1985, p. 114.) See also “Modernity and Ethical Life” (Williams2005, pp. 48–51).

Sacrifices, Aspirations and Morality: Williams Reconsidered

This leaves the idea that Julie acts from obligation. Williams’ argument alerts us toproblems that arise if we hope to understand someone’s relationship to her own ethicalprojects as acting on obligation. First, obligation fails to account for the personal nature ofher commitment. The notion of moral obligation does not explain the role the projectplays within her life, shaping and determining her choices and the shape her life takes.There is nothing within the obligation itself that would demand this of her (given the typeof project this is), yet the fact she does so is part and parcel of what it is for her to havethis ethical value. Second, the notion of obligation does not address the way in whichsome aspects of ethical choice are situation-dependent. We are sometimes confronted withsituations of deep ethical relevance that are not of our own choosing. Our way ofperceiving the situation may account for the belief that action is pressing or evennecessary. The kind of project Julie is engaged in would surely satisfy an obligation withinmost moral theories. However, obligations are universal and general. A multitude ofavailable projects and choices would satisfy the very general obligation that moralitywould regard her as acting on here. Yet it seems unlikely that Julie herself would see hercommitment to activism as an instance where she has made a general obligation morespecific; that she must do ‘something’ and her commitment is a way of satisfying thisgeneral demand. Williams’ view seems more plausible in that her choice is most likelyshaped by her attention to diverse ethical considerations that can’t be reduced to a singlebasic consideration. For example, she believes herself confronted with a society thatappears indifferent to the current and future harms of global climate change. She seesclimate change as a grave danger to what is valuable. She believes her participation in thissociety and her relative social privilege give her a reason to act. In a loose sense, she maybelieve these facts ‘force’ her to act.18

Many of the responses to Williams’ arguments about moral sacrifices suggest that hisconcern is primarily with the encroachment of morality on nonmoral desires and interests.Fewer commentators have attended to Williams’ idea that morality is a type of Procrusteanbed that chops off significant aspects of our ethical lives.19 I don’t claim to show thateverything Williams says about morality is right, only that there is some reason to think heis right about ethical projects and commitments. If we want to make these a part of morality,we run the risk of failing to understand what they mean to agents and we overlook most ofwhat is ethically relevant about them. If we want to exclude them from morality entirely, wesuggest there is no ethical cost when someone abandons what they reasonably see as mostcrucial and valuable; thus we make things that are defensibly of great importance appearrelatively insignificant.20 Seen in the light of his later claims about ethics, Williams’

19 It does so in part by designating some ethical projects as nonmoral, particularly when these projects cannoteasily be categorized as ones of acting on obligation.

18 I discuss Williams’ idea of practical necessity below. Williams claims that ethical concerns may involve anagent’s sense of practical necessity but that a number of other concerns may as well. Cf. Williams (1985,pp. 186–191).

20 The discussion of the integrity argument above shows that it is also not plausible to expect that ethicalprojects can always reasonably be seen as more important than anything else, particularly moral sideconstraints not to harm, etc. However, there is a way for Williams to accommodate this point (in a limitedway) within his idea of the ethically serious person. The person who takes ethics seriously will be one whowill obviously have a whole host of ethical concerns. Williams is not a skeptic about the existence ofobligations (even though he is a skeptic of the use morality makes of them), so among these concerns will beobligations that cover the territory of side constraints. As ethically serious people ourselves, we can criticizethose people who lack the relevant concern. The major difference between this ethical account and a moralaccount is that we cannot show they must have the concern.

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arguments about integrity and meaning do not reflect the type of ethical skepticism thatresponses to him suggest he tacitly holds. On the contrary, we must take ethics seriously atthe highest level—as necessary to the lives many of us believe we should lead. What thisentails is more surprising and more interesting than mere antimoralism. Williams’ argumentallows us to see that ethical concerns can make up a vital part of the lives we believe weshould live and it is this fact that cannot be fully captured by moral obligation. Many thingswe do and care about have their source in ethical concerns and when we limit ourselves tothe account morality provides we cannot fully account for this.21

4 Sacrifice and Ethical Aspirations

4.1 Leaving Room for Projects

One way to account for some of Williams’ observations about integrity and meaning is toargue for a view of moral requirements that does not intrude on our pursuit of these valuedprojects. Some consequentialist and deontological theorists have tried to accommodate ourneed to structure our life around stable pursuits that give our lives worth and significance.Both views have utilized the strategy of leaving room for a person to pursue her projects bygiving her the option to pass up opportunities to benefit others when doing so wouldinterfere with her ability to pursue projects she cares deeply about. Moral sacrifices may berequired of people on these views, but they are limited to a smaller number of cases and canbe less devastating to that which we hold significant.

A characteristic response to the concern that morality threatens our long-standingcommitments is that of Barbara Herman. She argues that Kantian theory leaves a great dealof room for those who value morality to pursue valued personal projects:

Whereas utilitarianism places a moral requirement on all actions (that they maximizevalue relative to the available options), Kantian morality imposes a regulative ideal;some of the actions and goals one must choose will be judged impermissible. Thoseactions and projects that are judged permissible are not distanced from the agent’s

21 Christine Korsgaard’s argument in The Sources of Normativity (1996a, see also 1996b, p. 301, esp.) thatany value ultimately depends upon moral obligation, presents a possible objection to Williams’ view thatethics can be understood independently of morality. Korsgaard argues that valuing anything depends on apractical identity of some sort. Since these practical identities require us to value ourselves as human beings,valuing anything therefore requires valuing humanity in ourselves and others. Korsgaard would thereforeargue that ethical concerns are not, at bottom, independent of moral obligation. On the contrary, “moralidentity exerts a kind of governing role over the other kinds. Practical conceptions of your identity which arefundamentally inconsistent with the value of humanity must be given up.” (1986b, pp. 129–130). Williams’primary focus in his response to Korsgaard concerns the question of conflict between a person’s “heart’sdesire” and universal moral claims. Williams questions whether Korsgaard has proven that the categoricalimperative and the value of humanity are inescapably present in our reflections about what to do when theymust also be external to our contingent practical identities, as Korsgaard and Kant seem to require. If moralconsiderations are not inescapable, then it is doubtful that there is a governing practical identity in the senseargued for by Korsgaard. Williams also questions Korsgaard’s assumption “that the reflective question aboutmorality is concerned overwhelmingly with it obligatory aspect, its ‘claims on us’: Aristotelians and othersmight be more impressed by morality’s role as an enabling device for the agent’s own life or by otherconsiderations distinct from those of obligation.” (Williams in Korsgaard 1986b, pp. 210–211)

Sacrifices, Aspirations and Morality: Williams Reconsidered

primary interest in them by that fact. He is not allowed to act only on the conditionthat his actions will realize some impartial value in the world.22

On Herman’s interpretation of Kant, the actions that are judged impermissible areactions that violate narrow (or perfect) duties. Most other-regarding actions that couldinterfere with the pursuit of one’s projects fall under the scope of wide duties. Oneunderstanding of wide duties is that they do not constrain individual action in particularcases, but rather must be acted on at some time. The choice of when to act on a wide duty isleft open. I must adopt the duty of beneficence as my maxim, but presumably I canstructure my beneficent actions around my projects. As long as I am beneficent some of thetime, I will satisfy my duty. Thomas Hill argues that if I’ve been beneficent often enough,additional acts of beneficence will be supererogatory—actions above and beyond what isrequired by duty.23

It is impossible in this paper to describe the multiplicity of ways that utilitarian theorieshave responded to Williams’ objections to what utilitarianism might require of agents.Instead, I will briefly consider one of the most influential of these arguments, propoundedby Samuel Scheffler. Scheffler argues that consequentialist theory should be modified toaccount for Williams’ worries by becoming what Scheffler calls a ‘hybrid theory,’ one thatrequires us to bring about the best consequences but allows us to refrain from doing thiswhen it would interfere with the pursuit of ground projects that do not harm other people. Aperson on this theory has, in Scheffler’s terms, an agent-centered prerogative to favor herown projects over the well-being of others:

[W]ithin the limits established by the principles defining the agent-centeredprerogative [people] could permissibly pursue their own projects. Thus the viewwould clearly avoid the objection dealing with personal integrity... Since it wouldpermit people to devote weight from the impersonal standpoint by their doing so, theview would lack the feature that generates that objection. But at the same time, itwould certainly on such a view be permissible for an agent to bring about the beststate of affairs... On this view, [such] conduct would be supererogatory. (Scheffler1994, pp. 21–22)

Both the Kantian view as described by Herman and Scheffler’s hybrid theory attempt tosolve the problem of moral sacrifices in one crucial respect: By leaving a person room todecide when she should pursue her projects over wide duties, or other-regardingconsiderations, they ensure that she can draw on other sources of value that give meaning

22 Herman (1993, p. 39). The quotation from Herman suggests that Kant’s theory may allow the agent’svalue for projects to be nonderivative, i.e., they can be valuable in their own right. Christine Korsgaardargues that the projects should be conceived of as extrinsically good—goods that are valued as ends. Thegoodness of these ends is conferred on them by our rational will. However, for Kant, the only intrinsic(unconditional) good is a fully rational will (Korsgaard 1996a, pp. 249–274). An alternative response toWilliams is found in Wood (1999, p. 329). Wood argues that Kant would have us see ground projects asincluded within our ethical duties. This means that “if I am a decent person, I will choose to give my lifemeaning by pursuing some set of ends that fall under the general descriptions ‘my own perfections’ and ‘thehappiness of others.’ Where that is so, morality underwrites our ground projects, regarding them as morallymeritorious.”23 Cf. Hill (1992, pp. 168-69): “The best candidate for a supererogatory act is an act which (a) is of a sortcommended by a principle of wider imperfect duty, (b) motivated by a sense of duty..., (c) is neitherforbidden nor required by another, more stringent duty... (d) is in a context where no alternative is required bya more stringent duty nor commended by other principles of wide duty, and (e) is done by an agent who hasadopted the relevant principle of wider imperfect duty and has often and continually acted on that principle.”

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and integrity to our lives. I will argue later that both views fail to account entirely foranother issue: particularly in situations involving evil, or great need or suffering, ethicallyconcerned agents can often see it as nonoptional and even necessary to sacrifice or riskvalued personal projects for moral ends. The strategy of leaving room for projects doesallow us to decide whether we should pursue our ethical projects in such cases or opt to acton other obligations. However, it does so by giving those projects the same status assignedto other, nonmoral projects. By casting them in this light, this view is unable to explain theagent’s idea that her action is not optional.

5 Agents’ Conceptions of Moral Sacrifices

As both Scheffler and Herman have argued, impartial morality leaves room for us to pursueour personal commitments and concerns. I now turn to a case that presents a problem forthis less stringent version of moral theory—one in which a person regards herself ascompelled to choose an ethical end even when that choice requires a sacrifice of otherthings she cares about. She sees this choice as necessary for her rather than as optional.

In Herman or Scheffler’s view a person has deliberative latitude to determine whethershe should act to satisfy a wide duty or bring about non utility-maximizing projects. Theseand other less demanding conceptions of morality therefore minimize the threat of conflictor loss of projects around which we may structure our reason to live. When moral endsconflict with the realization of morally permissible projects, either choice is permissible.There are circumstances, however, in which an agent herself may see anything less than themoral choice as impermissible for her. This must be explained without resorting to a moredemanding moral theory. The demand and sense of necessity arises from the agent’s ownethical aspirations.

In these cases, the agent doesn’t see choosing the end as optional. Instead she sees thefailure to make the ethical choice as a grave mistake—even when she might not havesought and does not welcome the situation that makes that choice necessary. As before, theethical choice could also be cast as a moral choice—one that moral theories should accountfor in some way. I argue below, however, that it is not a universal moral requirement thatmakes her see the choice as necessary. Her belief derives from her view of the situationitself: she sees the ethical choice as a more worthwhile one, given her conception of howshe wants to lead her life.

One such case is described in Julia Alvarez’s In the Time of the Butterflies, which isbased on the lives of the three Mirabal sisters, two of whom were killed for their politicalopposition to Rafael Trujillo.24 Members of the landholding class, the sisters are notpersonally threatened by political repression as long as they pose no threat to the regime.Nevertheless, they risk all their other projects to join the opposition: they sacrifice theircareers and their family farm, and risk their children’s well-being. Alvarez describes howone sister, Patria, gradually comes to realize that she has to act:

My family had not been personally hurt by Trujillo... But others had been sufferinggreat losses. There were the Perozos, not a man left in that family. And Martinez Reyna

24 Trujillo was dictator of the Dominican Republic from 1930 until his assassination in 1961. Minerva, Patriaand Maria Teresa Mirabal were beaten to death by Trujillo’s men on November 25, 1969. Belgica (Dede)Mirabal was not politically involved and survived.

Sacrifices, Aspirations and Morality: Williams Reconsidered

and his wife murdered in their bed, and thousands of Haitians massacred at the border,making the river, they say, still run red... (Alvarez 1994, p. 53).25

Dede, the middle sister, does not join the movement but continues to regret her choice:

Now when she thinks back, Dede asks herself... Why? Why didn’t she goalong withher sisters? She was only thirty-four, she could have started a new life... Even so, thatnight... Dede had been ready to risk her life. It was her marriage she couldn’t put onthe line... Her life had gotten bound up with a domineering man, and so she shrankfrom the challenge her sisters were giving her. (Alvarez 1994, p. 177).

Dede’s weakness of will at this crucial point in her life is a failure to act ethically. Sheregrets choosing her marriage over her sisters’ project because she sees her failure to pursuetheir ethical choice as a mistake. This can be the case even if (a) she does not regard themoral sacrifice as universally required of everyone and (b) her marriage was also central toher reason to live at the time (even if she becomes disillusioned later). But the explanationfor her regret seems to lie elsewhere: in (c) her belief that the course of action she did nottake was a better one.26

Dede’s sisters pay with their lives for their resistance to Trujillo. While sacrificingeverything for this kind of cause is exceptional, it is not unfamiliar. While the person whomakes such a choice when the sacrifice is enormous might be exceptional, it is alsoarguable (even obvious in some cases) that the agent can so act (a) without regardingherself as bound by a universal moral requirement and (b) without regarding herself ashaving two options—either to pursue the ethical course of action or to opt for personalprojects. Instead (c) she believes it necessary to pursue the ethical course of action. PhillipHallie describes the attitude of those who rescued Jews in Le Chambon: “Some of themlaughed in amazement when I told them I thought they were ’good people.’ They saw noalternative to their actions and to the way they acted and therefore they saw what they didas necessary, not something picked out for praise.” (Hallie 1997, p. 17).27 Similarly, MiepGies, who hid the Frank family from the Nazis in Amsterdam, said, “I was only willing todo what was asked of me and what seemed necessary at the time.” (Fogelman 1994, p. 6).

Such people risk losing not only their standing projects but their lives to do what seemsmorally necessary—even when the moral choice is thrust upon them rather than pursued asa goal over time. We can also imagine less extraordinary cases of moral sacrifice. Imaginethat Fernando’s older sister has died and he is faced with choosing to become guardian ofher two children or allowing them to be taken into foster care. If he takes on the children hewill have to give up his beloved job as a travel writer. The responsibility and expense willin fact cause him to scale back or give up many of his current projects. It seems that neitherof the versions of moral theory previously discussed would require him to take on such an

25 Approximately 12,000 Haitian migrant workers were massacred on Trujillo’s order in 1937. See Roorda(1998).

27 See also, Blum (1994, pp. 65–97). Blum argues that noteworthy virtue such as that displayed by rescuersin the Holocaust is better explained by their participation in a community of virtue rather than maximal orminimal (supererogatory) or “personal calling” views.

26 Recall Williams’ claim that ethical considerations can be that (1) something would be for the best or (2)the action is of some “ethically relevant kind.” Both of these can operate here alongside the agent’sconception of the life she wants to live. Williams (1985, p. 8).

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onerous burden even if they would regard it as praiseworthy. However, the fact that they arehis niece and nephew matters to Fernando; he believes taking on the burden of raising themhimself is the best way to ensure they are well cared for. And since this is the case, heconcludes, he must take it on.

This less dramatic situation still requires a significant sacrifice. The point here is not thatmoral theories must become more demanding to account for such cases. There are goodreasons to agree that covering all such cases would result in a brutally demanding view ofmorality. What the examples show is that the moral theories may not account for all theethical reasons we may have or our attitudes towards those reasons.

6 Reasons for Moral Sacrifice

The examples considered show that agents may impose very strong demands upon themselveswithout necessarily embracing a more demanding conception of morality in its entirety. Theyshare several features: (a) the agent risks or loses some or all of her current projects to promote amoral end; (b) these projects are not immoral and on some less demanding Kantian andutilitarian theories the agent would be permitted to pursue them rather than the moral end; (c)the agent does not regard her choice to pursue the moral end as optional but believes thatperforming it is necessary. The specific circumstances of the case make a difference in the wayan agent conceives of her reasons, and to account for this we must consider her conception ofthe life she wants to lead. While this is not the same objection Williams makes to morality, itpreserves the spirit of his objections by asserting that the way we evaluate both our owncharacter and the worth of our life can affect ethical decision making in ways not fullyaccounted for within impartial or universal frameworks of moral reasons.

Is the agent’s belief that what she does is required or necessary—though the actioninvolves hardship and loss—an indication that she embraces a too-demanding conceptionof morality? Perhaps she has the option of preserving her project instead but simply fails torealize this—and thus a less demanding conception of morality makes sense of her attitudeconcerning her project. This explanation is most plausible if we also assume the agentregards herself as generally required to make such sacrifices or if she universalizes thisrequirement to any agent in the same circumstances. However, the examples are intelligiblewhen we don’t assume that the agent takes either of these views. It is possible that a personmay place high ethical demands on herself without expecting others to meet this demand orblaming them when they don’t. This attitude toward her actions is neither irrational norunintelligible. In fact, it is common for people who are ethical in extreme circumstances topass up other opportunities for moral sacrifice. Patria Mirabal was not an inveterate do-gooder, and many of the people who took great risks to resist the Nazi genocide, such asOskar Schindler and Raoul Wallenberg, did not hold a particularly demanding conceptionof morality generally. Rather, their conception of their particular situation demanded aresponse that involved the risk or sacrifice of what, by a moral theory’s lights, are nonmoralprojects. What needs to be explained is not merely why such a person chooses a moredifficult alternative but the way in which the choice is a personal one, linked to her valuesand the course of her life.

If the less-demanding conception of moral requirements is correct, we could alsodescribe the action as supererogatory. Thomas Hill has argued that Kantian theory canallow that some actions are supererogatory. An action that involves the moral sacrificedescribed above would, on this view, be supererogatory if the agent had already met the

Sacrifices, Aspirations and Morality: Williams Reconsidered

standing requirements for wide/imperfect duties. (Hill 1992, pp. 168–169). According toScheffler’s hybrid utilitarian theory, either choice—to sacrifice or not—would bepermissible, although it is to the agent’s credit if she prefers to act morally. It is herprerogative to choose her projects over morality, and when this choice involves greatsacrifice, her action is supererogatory. (Scheffler 1994, p. 22).

Although conceiving of the action in this type of case as supererogatory makes senseof our admiration for the agent who performs it, it doesn’t make sense of the way theagent sees her options ‘from the inside.’ If a person regards her own actions assupererogatory then we should also assume that she (a) would be comfortable actingotherwise and (b) could regard her action as something extraordinary or unexpected. Ifagents of the sort I’ve described regarded their actions as extraordinary, it seemsunlikely that Dede Mirabal would greatly regret her failure to act. Further, rescuers suchas Gies and the Trocmes saw their actions not as extraordinary but simply as what theyshould do. Seeing an action as supererogatory explains why we admire people whoperform it. But it doesn’t seem to capture how the person sees herself since she doesnot find her choice to be either optional or exemplary (even if she finds it difficult).Instead, she sees her choice as one which it would be a mistake not to make. Shewould deeply regret not performing the action.

A third explanation of agent attitudes in these cases is that the person’sunderstanding of the moral demand she places on herself to make the sacrifice is fullyexplicable—but only by a demanding version of moral theory. In other words, moralityuniversally demands of any agent this sacrifice of personal ground projects andcommitments in circumstances of the kind described above. Ruling out this possibilityinvolves an extensive argument and my concern here is to see where Williams’objections take us in considering moral sacrifice. It’s undeniable that demanding moraltheories are appealing in a world with enormous amounts of injustice and suffering.Their drawbacks have been extensively discussed by Williams and others. My hopehere is to show that we can at least capture one advantage of the more demandingview: Leading an ethical life in the face of injustice and suffering will move people tomake considerable sacrifices. At the same time, the suggestion I will now offer does notburden us with an ever-increasing list of moral demands but instead addresses thedimension of ethical choice that involves personal commitment.

7 Personal Reasons for Moral Sacrifice

If we want to take agents’ conceptions of their reasons seriously, I suggest an alternativeexplanation that lies in the possibility that ethical choices can take on a personal character.Ethical projects can take precedence even over other things an agent regards as important inpart because she regards acting on an ethical project as necessary to leading the life sheconsiders most worthwhile.

One aspect of the ethical life that has been somewhat neglected in the debatesurrounding Williams’ critiques of impartial morality is his emphasis on the way in whichagents give ethical acts a personal character. Ethics, in Williams’ sense—and the agent’sown evaluation of the role of ethical action in her life and character—can becomesignificant a significant component in the evaluation of the worth of her life. What Ipropose here is that this conception of her life—when it is shaped by ethical aspirations—presents demands that are compelling in the way impartial moral requirements are thought

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to be.28 When the agent opts to act on a moral reason, she believes the action is necessarybecause she believes that failing to act would involve choosing a worse life over a betterone. This is true even when this action goes beyond what it seems reasonable to universallydemand of all agents (because it involves some significant sacrifice and the projectsacrificed is not contrary to basic morality). There are some similarities here to Williams’idea of practical necessity:

Practical necessity, and the experience of reaching a conclusion of that force, is oneelement that has gone into the idea of moral obligation... Yet practical necessity, evenwhen it is grounded in ethical reasons, does not necessarily signal an obligation. Thecourse of action the agent “must” take may not be associated with others’ expectations,or with blame for failure... The thought may come in the form that it is a demand on him,but not on others, because he is different from others; but the difference will thentypically turn out to consist in the fact that he is someone who has this very conviction.(Williams 1985, pp. 188–189. See also Williams 1993, pp. 75–78)

My account departs from Williams’ in that I doubt such persons see their ethical reasonfor acting as the result of some conviction they happen to have. We should not regard theagent’s conviction alone as responsible for the sense that she must act here. This makes thechoice similar to a preference and thus fails to explain the sense of necessity. To explainwhy she acts from ethical value, we need two ideas: (a) that she regards the end assomething of critical importance over and above her interest in it (it is “important period”)and (b) that failure to act would involve failure to lead the life she chooses for herself.29

The point is not that such a person is morally perfect but that the agent who is willing togive up central aims to bring about something of ethical value evaluates her action in termsof what it means for the worth of her life. Thus, rather than being explicable throughimpartial moral theory (although many impartial theories may also endorse the action) theagent’s choice is situation-sensitive and caused by aspirations upon which meaning andintegrity depend. We can imagine the agent evaluating two possible courses of action. Each

29 For the idea of importance, see Williams, 1985, pp. 181–187.

28 In this respect, and in the crucial role it has in shaping choices and giving meaning to life, what I call anaspiration is similar to what Korsgaard refers to as a practical identity (A person’s moral identity governsthese practical identities. See footnote 21, above.). Korsgaard regards our practical identities as a source ofobligation. Thus, they might provide a competing explanation of the agent’s sense that her action is necessaryeven when it involves sacrificing other aims she cares about. However, a practical identity is insufficient toexplain why the agent believes she must perform the action. Korsgaard argues that the normativity of choicesfrom a particular practical identity depends ultimately upon the moral identity one has as a citizen of thekingdom of ends (see 1986b, p. 130). To explain the agent’s view on the proposed action, she could arguethat the agent’s sense that her moral sacrifice is necessary in this case is explained by the value for humanityrather than her conception of the life she wants to lead. While the relation of dependence between a person’smoral identity and her other practical identities is a large issue that I cannot fully address here, it is worthnoting that even on Korsgaard’s view there remains a question about why the particular end is so pressing forthe agent. The answer cannot lie in a contingent practical identity. Korsgaard makes it clear that we mustalways be willing to question or abandon the obligations those identities seem to provide. On her view, theexplanation for the agent’s sense of necessity would lie in the choice’s moral content. The universalizationtest and the value of humanity undoubtedly are supposed to give some content to ends and not simplyfunction as constraints. However, it is unlikely that they alone dictate the makeup of the agent’s ethicalconcerns; her commitment to a specific concern is what is in question here. It is likely that the agent’s optionsare open on Korsgaard’s view, just as on Herman and Scheffler’s view, when the choice does not amount toviolating the categorical imperative. Failing to do the action would not be morally wrong on Korsgaard’sview, nor would it be morally necessary. We still need an explanation of the agent’s sense of necessity.Korsgaard’s view does not fully explain why the agent believes it is not optional to forego the action thatrealizes her ethical concern.

Sacrifices, Aspirations and Morality: Williams Reconsidered

action will affect the course and character of her life and she believes acting or failing to actwill affect how she evaluates the worth of her life in the future. If she chooses herconception of the life she wants to lead for reasons she regards as decisive, she will not seeit as optional to avoid moral sacrifice even though doing so may be morally permissible onless-demanding moral theories. When someone’s conception of the life she wants to lead ispartly shaped by ethical aspirations, it is always possible that these aspirations may demandof her more than a moral theory might.

One advantage of the idea that it is the agent’s conception of her life that drives her beliefshe must act, rather than thinking that she is impelled by a universally applicable requirement,is that this makes better sense of the role contextual features play in shaping the agent’schoice. An agent’s regret if he does not perform the action is also very context-dependent.From a purely impartial standpoint, an agent may not need to regret failing to take in theorphaned children of a sibling. However, from a partial standpoint he may be acutely awarethat if he fails to do this he will not live up to his own standards for himself and for how hewants to live his life. This is undeniably of ethical importance. He can come to see that, eventhough he has not chosen many features of the situation he finds himself in, his failure torespond in a way consistent with his own aspirations for himself will mar or diminish a futuredevoted solely to other ends, whether or not these projects happen to be successful.

It may seem somewhat perverse to find a relationship between Williams’ critiques of a too-demanding morality and an explanation of cases in which agents find it necessary to make amoral sacrifice. Williams might not have endorsed this view. Even so, the explanation livesup to the spirit of his objections in several crucial respects. A person’s ethical aspirations maytake the form of ground projects. Or they may be less specific than ground projects seem tobe and comprise something like ‘being a good person’ or ‘responding to the needs of others.’Aspirations may also form the content of categorical desires, although they need not. Thecrucial similarity between aspirations and the objects of our agency that Williams focuses onis that aspirations also form a significant part of the structure of a person’s understanding ofhis own agency and reason to live. An agent acts on his moral aspirations because he valuesthe ends they lead to. However, this action is not divorced from the contribution thatsuccessful action on those aspirations provides to his evaluation of his own life and its worth.A person’s unwillingness to compromise his aspirations even though this requires a sacrificeof other projects is the result not only of his value for the end but also of the relativeimportance that living up to the aspiration plays in his conception of his life. It might seemthat Williams would reject the compatibility between the role he provides for personalprojects and categorical desires and the agents I’ve described who make significant sacrificesfor morality. Yet, given that an agent’s ground projects can be identical to what I’ve calledmoral aspirations, Williams’ view leaves open the possibility that an agent’s understanding ofethics may ask much more of her than the impartial theories he criticizes. Williams suggeststhat integrity and one’s reason to live deserve a central or protected place in our thinkingabout agency; this suggests that the problem in his view is not the extent of the demands (as isoften thought) but their source.

8 Conclusion

I don’t pretend to have covered every, or even most, of the implications arising fromWilliams’ objections to morality. Nor have I reconciled his view to impartial moral theory.What I’ve shown instead is that, with respect to moral sacrifices, Williams’ view helps usunderstand why some people are willing to risk everything to do what they believe is good.

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This is not what we have come to expect of Williams; much more attention has been paid tohis complaints about morality’s excessive demandingness. Nor is it hard to explain why thisis the predominant take on his aims: In his arguments about integrity and meaning he wantsus to see the deep significance of projects that give our lives integrity and meaning and heclaims acknowledging this significance will make us doubt the reasonableness of certainmoral obligations. I have argued this point is somewhat unconvincing, since projects mayalso be trivial and ignoring morality for them, despicable. However, Williams’ point doesnot disappear when we consider ethically serious people with defensible ethical projects. Infact, a full consideration of these projects suggest moral theories don’t fully account forsome of their ethically relevant features. Ethical projects often shape and determine ourchoices, and the fact that I am living this life and pursuing this project may make mebelieve it is necessary to give up many things of critical importance. The life I want to leadmay depend therefore on my ethical projects. If Williams is right that moral theories rely onthe idea of obligation to explain my belief my actions are necessary here, moral theorieswill not be able to explain this critical aspect of our ethical lives. The role of ethical projectsin what gives our lives integrity and meaning shows something surprising about Williams:The problems he raises for utilitarian and Kantian theory perhaps should not be understoodprimarily as an attempt to scale back the role of ethics in our lives but to show how weourselves shape the content of our ethical choices. The reconsideration of Williams’argument I’ve offered may force us to see that ultimately his objections are about not onlythe scope of morality’s demands but the source of those demands and their connection tothe person who responds to them.

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Sacrifices, Aspirations and Morality: Williams Reconsidered