Morality in Politics, or the Politics of Morality? "Neopurification" in Romania

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Contributors------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ iii Preface------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ix Is-Applied-Ethics-Still-An-Application-Of-Ethics?- -A-Short-History-of-Applied-Ethics-in-Romania- ------------------------------------------ x Valentin MUREŞAN and Shunzo MAJIMA 1.-Moral-Philosophy What-does-“Metaphysics”-mean-in-Kant’s-- Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals?- --------------------------------------------- 2 Ilie PARVU Kant’s-Highest-Political-Good --------------------------------------------------------------- 15 Sorin BAIASU How-Many-Formulas?-An-Alternative-Reading- ------------------------------------------ 36 Valentin MUREŞAN On-Toleration,-Charity,-and-Epistemic-Fallibilism--------------------------------------- 54 Mircea DUMITRU Intuitive-Methods-of-Moral-Decision-Making,-A-Philosophical-Plea- ----------------- 62 Emilian MIHAILOV e-Moral-Values-and-Partitive-Logic ------------------------------------------------------ 79 Ioan BIRIŞ What-is-Wrong-with-‘Being-Authentic’?- ------------------------------------------------- 94 Cristian IFTODE

Transcript of Morality in Politics, or the Politics of Morality? "Neopurification" in Romania

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Contributors------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- iii

Preface-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ix

Is-Applied-Ethics-Still-An-Application-Of-Ethics?--A-Short-History-of-Applied-Ethics-in-Romania-------------------------------------------x

Valentin MUREŞAN and Shunzo MAJIMA

1.-Moral-Philosophy

What-does-“Metaphysics”-mean-in-Kant’s--Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals ?---------------------------------------------- 2

Ilie PARVU

Kant’s-Highest-Political-Good---------------------------------------------------------------- 15

Sorin BAIASU

How-Many-Formulas?-An-Alternative-Reading------------------------------------------- 36

Valentin MUREŞAN

On-Toleration,-Charity,-and-Epistemic-Fallibilism---------------------------------------- 54

Mircea DUMITRU

Intuitive-Methods-of-Moral-Decision-Making,-A-Philosophical-Plea------------------ 62

Emilian MIHAILOV

The-Moral-Values-and-Partitive-Logic------------------------------------------------------- 79

Ioan BIRIŞ

What-is-Wrong-with-‘Being-Authentic’ ?-------------------------------------------------- 94

Cristian IFTODE

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ContributorsSorin Baiasu��graduated��from��the��Faculty��of��Ph�losophy��of��the��Un�vers�ty��of��Bucharest��and���s��now��Reader���n��Ph�losophy��at��Keele��Un�vers�ty.��He���s�� the��author��of��Kant and Sartre: Re-discovering Critical Ethics��(Palgrave��Macm�l-lan��2011),��co-ed�tor��of��Politics and Metaphysics in Kant�� (UWP��2011)��and��Kant on Practical Justification: Interpretive Essays�� (OUP��2013).��He��guest��ed�ted��spec�al���ssues��of��the��journals��Ethics and Politics Review��(2007;��top�c:��Kant�an��Just�f�cat�ons��of��Pol�t�cal��Norms),��Kantian Review�� (2011;�� top�c:��Graham��B�rd’s��The��Revolut�onary��Kant),��Philosophia�� (forthcom�ng;��top�c:��Tolerat�on��and��Pragmat�sm���n��the��work��of��John��Horton)��and��Collingwood and British Idealist Studies�� (forthcom�ng;�� top�c:��Kant�� and�� the��Br�t�sh��Ideal�sts).��He��currently��acts��as��Secretary��and��member��of�� the��Execut�ve��Comm�ttee��of��the��UK��Kant��Soc�ety,��as��well��as��co-convenor��of��the��Kant�an��Stand�ng��Group��of��the��European��Consort�um��for��Pol�t�cal��Research.��E-ma�l:��s.ba�asu@ph�l.keele.ac.uk

Ioan Biris�� �s��professor��at��West��Un�vers�ty��of��T�m�soara,��Roman�a.��Spec�al-�z�ng���n�� the��Ph�losophy��of��Sc�ence��and��Ph�losophy��of��Soc�al��Sc�ences,��he���s��d�rector��of�� the��Doctoral��School��of��Ph�losophy��at�� the��West��Un�vers�ty��of��T�m�soara.�� Ioan��B�r�s��has��been��professor��“Jean��Monnet”��s�nce��2001.��He��was��assoc�ate��professor��at��Un�vers�ty��of��Padova��(Italy)��dur�ng�� the��per�od��2007-2009.��S�nce��2007,��he��has��been�� the��cha�rman��of�� the��Comm�ttee��of��the��H�story��and��Ph�losophy��of��Sc�ence��and��Techn�que��of�� the��Roman�an��Academy,��T�m�soara��Branch.��H�s��most���mportant��works��publ�shed���nclude:��Totality, system, holon��(1992,��2007);��History and culture��(1996);��Law Values and the intentional logic (1996);��Sociology of civilizations��(2000);��Concepts of science(2010).��E-ma�l:���oan.b�r�s@gma�l.com

Leria Boroş�� stud�ed��ph�losophy��and��appl�ed��eth�cs��at�� the��Un�vers�ty��of��Piteşti (Romania); she is currently a doctoral student in applied ethics at the Un�vers�ty��of��Bucharest,��w�th��a��thes�s��on��codes��of��eth�cs.��Her��ma�n��research��act�v�t�es��are�� �n�� the�� f�eld��of��bus�ness��eth�cs,��b�oeth�cs��and�� the��eth�cs��of���nternat�onal��relat�ons.��In��2008��she��was��a��v�s�t�ng��student��at�� the��Un�vers�ty��of��Burgundy,��D�jon,��France.��Her��publ�cat�ons�� �nclude:��The Environment as Stakeholder, Juventus Press, Piteşti, 2011; “Human Reproduction by��Ectogenes�s.��Eth�cal��Aspects”,�� �n��Morphe Journal,�� vol.�� 1,�� �ssue��1,��February��2012;��“Moral��Absolut�sm���n��Fore�gn��Pol�cy”,�� �n��V�orel��Gul�c�uc��(coord�nator), Limits of Knowledge – Anthology of Humanities,��Teachers’��Publishing House, Bacău, 2013. She has presented various professional papers��at���nternat�onal��conferences���nclud�ng��Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Disarmament. Statement or Fact?,��UN��Youth��Roman�a,��Bucharest,�� the��exploratory��workshop��Inter and Trans-disciplinary Convergences in Applied Ethics, Mihail Kogălniceanu University, Iassy, Romania, and as a fellow researcher��at��the��Research��Center���n��Appl�ed��Eth�cs,��Un�vers�ty��of��Bucharest.��E-ma�l:��ler�a.manas�@gma�l.com

Ion Copoeru is professor of phenomenology and ethics at Babeş-Bolyai Un�vers�ty��Cluj-Napoca.��In��the��area��of��eth�cs,��h�s���nterests��are��ma�nly��located��

2.--Applied-Ethics

Environmental-Risk-and-Moral-Obligations:--Reflections-on-an-East-European-Experience-------------------------------------------114

Adrian-Paul ILIESCU

Ethical-Attitudes-Toward-the-Environment:-The-Romanian-Case--------------------- 131

Adrian MIROIU

The-Ethos-of-Sustainable-Development-and-the-Educational-System:--A-Research-Report-regarding-Romania-------------------------------------------------144

Daniela DUMITRU and Constantin STOENESCU

Applying-Taking-Clauses-Analysis-to-Communist-Nationalization--of-Houses-in-Romania---------------------------------------------------------------------176

Emanuel-Mihail SOCACIU

Collaboration-or-Exit-from-the-Stage?--The-Dilemma-of-the-Elites--in-Dictatorial-Regimes-as-Illustrated-by-the-Heisenberg-Case----------------------- 191

Mircea FLONTA

Morality-in-Politics,-or-the-Politics-of-Morality ?--“Neo-Purification”-in-Romania-----------------------------------------------------------209

Mihaela MIROIU

Moralization-and-Conformism-in-Social-Practices:--The-Case-of-a-Post-communist-Society--------------------------------------------------229

Ion COPOERU and Nicoleta SZABO

Political-Ethics-in-the-War-on-Terror:--Ethics-of-the-International-Crime-of-Aggression-and-Political-Violence------------247

Andreea GAE

Autonomy-and-Plastic-Surgery-for-Teenagers--------------------------------------------263

Leria BOROŞ

Bloggers,-Journalists-and-Epistemic-Responsibility:--A-Particular-Type-of-Self-Regulation-in-the-Romanian-Online-Media-------------276

Victor POPESCU

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�n��“eth�cs���n��profess�ons”,��w�th��a��focus��on��the��profess�ons��of��law,��healthcare,��and��bus�ness.��He�� �s�� the��ed�tor��of��Beyond Identity. Transformations of the Identity in a (Post)-Modern World (w�th��N.��Szabo)��(Cluj,��2004),��Etică şi cultură profesională [Ethics and Professional Culture]��(Cluj,��2008)��and��oth-ers.��He���s��also��the��author��or��co-author��of��a��ser�es��of��stud�es��on��top�cs��related��to��ph�losophy��and��soc�al��sc�ences,��such��as��“A��Schutz�an��Perspect�ve��on��the��Phenomenology��of��Law���n��the��Context��of��Pos�t�v�st�c��Pract�ces”,���n��Human Studies��(2008)��and��The Participating Professional. Phenomenology and the Task of Integrating Ethics into Professional Practices,�� �n:��Thomas��Nenon��and��Ph�l�p��Blosser��(eds.),��Advancing Phenomenology. Essays in Honor of Lester Embree,��Spr�nger,��2010.��H�s��current��research��top�c��(�n��the��framework��of��a��program��of�� the��Un�vers�ty��of��Med�c�ne��and��Pharmacy��Ias�,��Roman�a)���s��“Eth�cs��and��governance��of��the��med�cal��and��soc�al��serv�ces��for��substance��abus�ng��persons”.��E-ma�l:��copoeru@hotma�l.com

Daniela Dumitru���s��project��manager��for��Foundat�on��Educat�on��2000+.��She��has��a��Ph.D.�� �n��Educat�onal��Sc�ences,��and�� two��BA��degrees�� �n��Ph�losophy,��and��Psychology.��Currently,��Dr.��Dum�tru�� �s��a�� lecturer��at��Un�vers�ty��T�tu��Ma�orescu,��Faculty��of��Psychology,��Bucharest,��and���s��teach�ng��Introduction to Cognitive Psychology.��She��coord�nated��projects���n��pre-un�vers�ty��educat�on��and��h�gher��educat�on�� the�� latest��of��wh�ch��was��Education for Sustainable Development Partnership Initiative (ENjoinED, 2010-2012).��The��compara-t�ve��report��was��publ�shed��under�� the��name��Civil rights and obligations are connected to environmental issues in the curricula. A comparative analysis for sustainability content in 9 European countries (2012, Zagreb, NEPC). Other�� top�cs��of�� �nterest�� �nclude:��cr�t�cal�� th�nk�ng,�� the�� transfer��of��cr�t�cal��th�nk�ng��sk�lls�� from��one��doma�n�� to��another,��commun�t�es��of�� �nqu�ry,��and��commun�t�es��of��pract�ce.��E-ma�l:��danan�[email protected]

Mircea Dumitru��holds��a��Ph.D.�� �n��Ph�losophy�� from��Tulane��Un�vers�ty,��New��Orleans,��USA��(1998)��w�th��a�� top�c�� �n��modal�� log�c��and��ph�losophy��of��mathemat�cs,��and��from��the��Un�vers�ty��of��Bucharest��(1998)��w�th��a�� top�c���n��ph�losophy��of��language.��He���s��currently��Pres�dent��(Rector)��of��the��Un�vers�ty��of��Bucharest�� (2012-)�� and��Professor��of��Ph�losophy��at�� the��Un�vers�ty��of��Bucharest�� (s�nce��2004)��as��well��as��Pres�dent��of�� the��European��Soc�ety��of��Analyt�c��Ph�losophy��(2011-2014).��He��has��been��Inv�ted��Professor��at��Tulsa��Un�vers�ty,��CUNY,��and��NYU.��H�s��ma�n��area��of�� research�� �s��ph�losoph�cal��log�c��and��ph�losophy��of�� language.��Ma�n��publ�cat�ons�� �nclude��Modality and Incompleteness�� (UMI,��Ann��Arbor,��1998),��Logic and Philosophical Explorations�� (Human�tas,��Bucharest,��2004),��Words, Theories, and Things. Quine in Focus,��(ed.)��(Pel�can,��2009),��Metaphysics, Meaning, and Modality. Themes from Kit Fine�� (ed.) (Oxford��Un�vers�ty��Press,�� forthcom�ng��2015).��E-ma�l:��m�rdum�[email protected]

Mircea Flonta �s��professor��at�� the��Faculty��of��Ph�losophy��of��the��Un�vers�ty��of��Bucharest��and��Fellow��of��the��Humboldt��Foundat�on.��He���s��a��Fellow��of��the��Roman�an��Academy.��H�s��f�eld��of��concentrat�on���s��the��Theory��of��Knowledge��and��Ph�losophy��of��Sc�ence.��Spec�al�� top�cs��of�� �nterest�� �nclude:�� Immanuel��Kant�� and�� Ludw�g��W�ttgenste�n.�� He�� has�� publ�shed�� Necessary truths?

Monographical study on analiticity, 1975; Philosophical Presuppositions in Exact Science, 1985; Cognitio. A critical introduction in the problem of knowledge, 1994; Images of Science, 1994; How do we recognise the Minerva Owl? Reflections on the perception of philosophy in the Romanian culture, 1998; Kant in his time and today, 2005; The solitary thinker. Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Criticism and Practice of Philosophy, 2008; Darwin and after Darwin, 2010; 20 Questions and Answers on Immanuel Kant, 2012. He��has��also��publ�shed��approx�mately��200��papers���n��Roman�an,��German��and��Engl�sh.��E-ma�l:��m�[email protected]

Andreea Gae �s assoc�ate��ass�stant��professor��and doctoral��student��at�� the��Faculty��of��Ph�losophy,��Un�vers�ty��of��Bucharest,��Roman�a.��She��has��publ�shed��“The��Ar�stotel�an��Be�ng��And��The��Hegel�an��Sp�r�t:��Asymptot�c��Connec-t�ons��and��Synallagmat�c��Reports”,�� �n��Studies On The History Of World Philosophy,��XVIII,��Roman�an��Academy,��Publ�sh�ng��House��of��the��Roman�an��Academy,��Bucharest,�� 2010,��pp.��162-190��and��“The��Bacch�c��Myth��And��The��Hermeneut�cs��Of��The��Rena�ssance��–��M�chelangelo,��Bacchus”�� �n��The Imaginary – Theories and Applications,��Bucharest��Un�vers�ty��Press,��2011,��pp.��250-274.��E-ma�l:��[email protected]

Cristian Iftode�� �s��a��Lecturer��at�� the��Faculty��of��Ph�losophy,��Department��of��Pract�cal��Ph�losophy��and��H�story��of��Ph�losophy,��Un�vers�ty��of��Bucharest,��where��he�� teaches��on��eth�cs,��aesthet�cs��and��contemporary��ph�losophy.�� In��2007��he��obta�ned��h�s��Ph.D.��w�th��a�� thes�s��on��The Role of Analogy in the Elaboration of Aristotle’s Metaphysics.��Between��2007��and��2012��he��held��two��teach�ng��and��research��grants��at�� the��Un�vers�té��Par�s-Est��Créte�l.��He���s��a��found�ng��member��of��the��Romanian Society of Philosophy��and��a��member��of�� �ts��board.��H�s��publ�shed��books�� �n��Roman�an�� �nclude:��Metaphor and Metaphysical Discourse�� (2002),��Philosophy as a Way of Life: Sources of Authenticity (2010),��as��well��as��two��ed�ted��volumes��and��a��number��of��art�cles��and��academ�c��stud�es��deal�ng��w�th��top�cs�� �n�� the��h�story��of��ph�losophy��and���n��eth�cs.��H�s��current��f�elds��of��research��are��moral��ph�losophy,��the��h�story��of���deas��and��French��poststructural�sm.��E-ma�l:��cr�st�an�[email protected]

Adrian-Paul Iliescu �s��Professor��at�� the��Un�vers�ty��of��Bucharest,��Faculty��of��Ph�losophy.��H�s��f�elds��of��research���nclude: Pol�t�cal��Ph�losophy,��Soc�al��Eth�cs��and��Analyt�c��Ph�losophy.��He��has��been��a��v�s�t�ng��fellow at:��Cambridge University��(UK),��St John´s College,��1993;��Bielefeld University (Germany),��1994-1996,��Alexander von Humboldt��fellow;��Institut für die Wissenschaften vom Menschen,��V�enna,��Austr�a,��1999��as��Robert Bosch Senior��fellow.��He��has��lectured��extens�vely��on��var�ous�� top�cs��(�nclud�ng��Rawlsand��W�ttgenste�n)��at��un�vers�t�es��and�� �nst�tutes�� �n��Germany,�� the��Un�ted��K�ngdom,��Belg�um,��Austr�a,�� Hungary�� and��Turkey.�� H�s�� publ�cat�ons�� �n�� Engl�sh�� �nclude:��Wittgenstein:��Why Philosophy Is Bound To Err (Peter��Lang��Publ�sh�ng��House,��Frankfurt�� am��Ma�n,��Berl�n,��Bern,��Bruxelles,��New��York,��W�en,��2000).��Rawls’ Encapsulation of Justice, Institut für die Wissenschaften vom Menschen Work�ng��Papers,��no.��2�� /1999,��http://www.un�v�e.ac.at/�wm/pub-wp.htm.��Pos�t�ons��he��has��held���nclude:��Headperson��-��Department��of��Moral��and��Pol�t�cal��Ph�losophy,��Un�vers�ty��of��Bucharest�� (1996-2007).��Research

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Director��–��New��Europe��College��(Roman�an���nst�tute��of��advanced��stud�es),��(1997/1998).��Member��of�� the��Steer�ng��Comm�ttee��of�� the�� �nternat�onal��research��project��“R�ghts�� to��a��Green��Future,��Uncerta�nty,��Intergenerat�onal��Human��R�ghts��and��Pathways��to��Real�zat�on”,��European��Sc�ence��Foundat�on.��Honors: Doctor Honoris Causa -��Petre��Andre���Un�vers�ty,��Roman�a.��The��Roman�an��Academy Ion Petrovici Pr�ze��(1994).��The Journal for the Study of religions and Ideologies��Ph�losophy��Pr�ze,��2004.��The��European Idea Foundation��Pr�ze,��2005.��E-ma�l:��ad.paul.�l@gma�l.com

Emilian Mihailov�� �s��a��research��fellow��at�� the��Research��Center�� �n��Appl�ed��Eth�cs��(CCEA),��Un�vers�ty��of��Bucharest.��He��rece�ved��h�s��Ph.D.���n��Ph�loso-phy��at�� the��Faculty��of��Ph�losophy,��Un�vers�ty��of��Bucharest,��w�th��a�� thes�s��on��Kant’s�� formulas��of�� the��categor�cal�� �mperat�ve.��H�s�� research�� �nterests��are��Kant’s��moral��ph�losophy,��analyt�c��moral��ph�losophy,��appl�ed��eth�cs,��evolut�on��of��moral�ty��andW�ttgenste�n’s��ph�losophy.��H�s��publ�cat�ons���nclude��several��art�cles��on��appl�ed��eth�cs.��E-ma�l:��em�l�an.m�ha�lov@gma�l.com

Adrian Miroiu�� �s��professor��of��pol�t�cal��sc�ence��at�� the��National School of Political and��Administrative Studies���n��Bucharest.��W�th��a��background���n��ph�-losophy,��he��publ�shed��a��ser�es��of��books��and��journal��art�cles��on��top�cs��w�th�n��the��ph�losophy��of��sc�ence,��modal�� log�c��and�� �ts��appl�cat�ons��and��pol�t�cal��ph�losophy.��More��recently��h�s��ma�n���nterest��concerns��rat�onal��cho�ce��theory,��w�th��a��spec�al���nterest���n��soc�al��cho�ce��and��pol�t�cal��compet�t�on.��In��the��past��two��decades��he��has��held��var�ous��off�c�al��pos�t�ons���n��h�gher��educat�on��and��publ�shed��papers��on��fund�ng��and��qual�ty��assurance���n��h�gher��educat�on��and��un�vers�ty�� rank�ng.��H�s��books�� �nclude:��An Introduction to Philosophical Logic,��Un�vers�ty��of��Bucharest��Publ�sh�ng��House,��1995;��The Ontological Argument,��All,��Bucharest,�� 2002;��Formal Constructs,��Tre�,��Bucharest,��2002;��Public Policy Analysis,��Punct,��2002;��Foundations of Politics,��2��vols,��Polirom, Iași, 2006-7; An Introduction to Political Philosophy, Polirom, Iași, 2009.��E-ma�l:��ad_m�ro�[email protected]

Mihaela Miroiu�� �s��Professor��of��Pol�t�cal��Sc�ences���n��the��Pol�t�cal��Sc�ence��Faculty��at��the��Nat�onal��School��for��Pol�t�cal��Stud�es��and��Publ�c��Adm�n�stra-t�on��(NSPSA),��Bucharest,��Roman�a.��She�� �n�t�ated�� the��f�rst��Ph.D.��program���n��Pol�t�cal��Sc�ence���n��Roman�a�� �n��2000,�� the��f�rst��MA��program���n��Gender��Stud�es��(1998).��Her��research��area��encompasses��the��f�elds��of��pol�t�cal��theory,��pol�t�cal��eth�cs,��post-commun�st�� trans�t�on,��and��gender��and��pol�t�cs.��She���s��the��author��of��12��books.��Among��them��are:��Thoughts of the Shadow: Feminist Approaches in Contemporary Philosophy (1995), Convenio. On Nature, Women and Morals��(1996);��Backward-Looking Society��(1999);��The Road to Autonomy: Feminist Political Theories��(2004);��Beyond Angels and Devils: Ethics in the Romanian Politics (2007).��She��ed�ted��and��co-ed�ted��eleven��other��books,�� �nclud�ng��Contemporary Political Ideologies (2012). M�haela��M�ro�u���s��the��coord�nator��of��the��Gender��Stud�es��ser�es��at��Pol�rom��Publ�sh�ng��House.��She��has��rece�ved��the��Nat�onal��Pr�ze��for��her��publ�c��act�v�ty��aga�nst��d�scr�m�nat�on��and��equal��opportun�t�es��(2005)��and��the��Outstand�ng��Ach�eve-ments��Award��from��the��Amer�can��Assoc�at�on��of��Women���n��Slav�c��and��East-European��Stud�es��(November,��2010).��She��plays��a��very��act�ve��publ�c��role��as��

fem�n�st��and��pol�t�cal��analyst�� �n��Roman�an��c�v�l��soc�ety��and��mass-med�a.��E-ma�l:��m�haela.m�ro�[email protected]

Valentin Mureşan�� �s��professor��of��moral��ph�losophy��at�� the��Faculty��of��Ph�-losophy��of��the��Un�vers�ty��of��Bucharest.��H�s��f�elds��of��concentrat�on��are��moral��ph�losophy��and��eth�cs��management.��He��began��w�th��study�ng��the��ph�losophy��of��sc�ence��and��the��formal�� theory��of��act�on.��He��wrote��several��books��wh�ch���nclude:��commentar�es��to��Plato’s��Republic,��Ar�stotle’s��Nicomachean Ethics,��Kant’s��Groundwork��and��M�ll’s��Utilitarianism.��He��wrote�� the��f�rst��book�� �n��Roman�a��on��Ethics management��and��a��book��on��eth�cal�� theory.��In��Engl�sh:��From Eudaimonia to��Happiness��and��A commentary to Mill’s Utilitarianism.��He��ed�ted��several��books��among��wh�ch��are:��The Moral Philosophy of R.M. Hare,��British Moral Philosophy�� (w�th��A.��Montef�ore);��Metaphysics and Science;��J. S. Mill today (1806-2006).��He��has�� translated��var�ous��authors���nclud�ng��P.��Suppes,��B.��O.��A.��W�ll�ams,��H.��Pr�chard,��R.M.��Hare��and��J.��S.��M�ll.��Former��Dean��of��the��Faculty��of��Ph�losophy,��he���s��now��D�rector��of��the��Doctoral��School,��D�rector��of��the��Romanian Journal of��Analytic Philosophy,��and��d�rector��of�� the��Center of Applied Ethics.��He�� rece�ved�� the��Nat�onal��Order�� for��“Fa�thful��Serv�ce”,�� �n�� rank��of��Kn�ght�� (2000),��and�� the��“M�rcea��Flor�an”��Romanian Academy Prize��for��Ph�losophy��(1997).��E-ma�l:��muresan.valent�n@gma�l.com

Ilie Parvu���s��professor��of��ph�losophy��of��sc�ence��and��metaphys�cs��at��Bucha-rest��Un�vers�ty��and��a��Fellow��of��the��Roman�an��Academy.��He���s��recogn�sed��as��a��found�ng��member��of�� the��Bucharest��“ep�stemolog�cal��school”.�� Interested��ma�nly�� �n�� the��formal��ph�losophy��of��sc�ence,��he��extended�� the��structural�st��approach��of�� sc�ent�f�c�� theor�es�� �nto��a��new��concept�on��of�� the�� theoret�cal��construct�on��of��sc�ence��and�� tr�ed��for�� the��f�rst�� t�me�� to��apply�� th�s��metathe-oret�cal��model��to��ph�losoph�cal��theor�es��(Critique of��Pure Reason,��Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus).��In��h�s��ma�n��ph�losoph�cal��book,��The Architecture of Existence��(2��volumes:��1991,��2001),��he��proposes��a��new��ontolog�cal��parad�gm,��based��on�� the�� �dea��of��generat�ve��structures��as�� these��are��determ�ned��at�� the��level��of��fundamental��(abstract-structural)��theor�es��of��contemporary��sc�ence.��In��h�s��work��on��Kant’s��theoret�cal��program���n��ph�losophy��(The Possibility of Experience,��2004),��he�� tr�ed�� to��explore�� the��Kant�an�� type��of�� theor�z�ng��and��to��br�ng���nto��prom�nence���ts�� �nternal��argumentat�ve��structure.��The��present��study���s��the��f�rst��step��of��an��attempt��to��extend��th�s��new��k�nd��of��“theoret�cal��reconstruct�on”��to��Kant’s��pract�cal��ph�losophy.��E-ma�l:�� �l�[email protected]

Victor Popescu��works��as��a��researcher��at�� the��Alexandru��Dragom�r��Inst�tute��of��Bucharest��and��as��an��ed�tor��for��Tre���Publ�sh�ng��House.��He��earned��a��Ph.D.��degree at the Babeș-BolyaiUniversity, Cluj-Napoca, with a thesis on the Husserl�an��phenomenology��of��values��and���deal�sat�on.��He��obta�ned��an��MA���n��contemporary��ph�losophy��at��Par�s��XII��Un�vers�ty��(Val-de-Marne)��w�th��a��d�ssertat�on��on��ph�losophy��of��spat�al��percept�on���n��Husserl��and��C.��Stumpf.��H�s��ma�n��areas��of��research���nterest��are:��med�a��eth�cs,��value��phenomenology��and��Husserl�an��ph�losophy.��He��has��also��worked��as��reporter���n��d�fferent��med�a���nst�tut�ons�� �nclud�ng��Cot�d�anul��da�ly��newspaper��and��the��National Public

v��� �� �������������x

Radio.��E-ma�l:��v�ctor.popescu77@gma�l.com

Emanuel-Mihail Socaciu �s��Lecturer��at��the��Un�vers�ty��of��Bucharest,��Faculty��of��Ph�losophy,��Programs��Manager��at��the��Research��Center���n��Appl�ed��Eth�cs,��Un�vers�ty��of��Bucharest��and��Found�ng��Member��of�� the��Romanian Society of Philosophy��and��of��the��Romanian Society for Analytic Philosophy.��He���s��currently��coord�nat�ng��a�� team��research��project��ded�cated�� to��evolut�onary��approaches��to��norms��and��moral�ty.��H�s��ma�n��research��areas:��appl�ed��eth�cs��(espec�ally��bus�ness��and��organ�zat�on��eth�cs),��pol�t�cal��and��legal��ph�losophy,��ph�losophy��of��econom�cs.��He���s��ed�tor��(or��co-ed�tor)��of��a��number��of��antholo-g�es��ded�cated�� to��pol�t�cal��ph�losophy,�� appl�ed��eth�cs�� and��evolut�onary��eth�cs.��Forthcom�ng���s��h�s��(2013)��book��on��the��eth�cs��of��rest�tut�on.��E-ma�l:��em�socac�[email protected]

Constantin Stoenescu�� �s��Assoc�ate�� Professor�� �n�� the�� Department�� of��Ph�losophy,��Un�vers�ty��of��Bucharest.��He��holds��a��Ph.D.�� �n��ep�stemology��and��ph�losophy��of��sc�ence��from��the��same��un�vers�ty.��H�s��areas��of�� �nterest,��competence��and�� teach�ng�� �nclude:��Ep�stemology,��Ph�losophy��of��Sc�ence,��Log�c,��Cr�t�cal��Th�nk�ng,��Cogn�t�ve��Sc�ences��and��Soc�ology��of��Sc�ence.��He��has��publ�shed��several��art�cles�� �n��Roman�an��ph�losoph�cal�� journals��and��part�c�pated���n��several��research��projects.��He���s��the��v�ce-dean��of��the��Faculty��of��Ph�losophy.��He�� �s��also��one��of�� the��found�ng��members��of�� the��Romanian��Society for Analytical Philosophy��and��of�� the��Center of Logic, Philosophy and History of Science,��Un�vers�ty��of��Bucharest.��E-ma�l:��noua_al�[email protected]

Nicoleta Szabo���s��currently��a��Ph.D.��student���n��ph�losophy��at��the��Un�vers�ty��of Amiens, France and also holds a BA in Civil Law from the Babeş-Bolyai Un�vers�ty��of��Cluj-Napoca,��Roman�a.��She��has��co-ed�ted��several��books��and��publ�shed��several��art�cles�� �n��collect�ve��books��and�� �nternat�onal�� journals.��These�� �nclude:��“Ident�té��et��créat�on.��L’avatar��esthét�que��de�� l’�dent�té��chez��Edmund��Husserl”,�� �n��Ion��Copoeru,��N�coleta��Szabo��(eds.),��Beyond Identity. Transformations of Identity in a (Post-) Modern World,��House��of��the��Book��of��Sc�ence,��Cluj-Napoca,��2004��and��“L’art�ste��versus�� l’homme��ord�na�re.��Phénoménolog�e�� de�� l’h�sto�re�� à�� part�r�� du�� quot�d�en”,�� �n�� Studia UBB.��Philosophia,��1/2006.��Her��research���nterests��range��from��German��and��French��phenomenology���n��general�� to��soc�al-ontolog�cal�� top�cs��such��as��commun�ty,��act�on,��praxis��and��w�ll.��E-ma�l:��szabo_n�coleta@hotma�l.com

Preface

The��volume��Applied Ethics. Perspectives from Romania �s�� the��f�rst��contr�but�on��that��a�ms��at��show�ng��to��the��Japanese��reader��a��sample��of��contemporary��ph�losophy���n��Roman�a.��At�� the��same��t�me��a��volume��of��contemporary��Japanese��ph�losophy���s��translated���nto��Roman�an��and��w�ll��be��publ�shed��by��the��Un�vers�ty��of��Bucharest��Press.

Applied Ethics. Perspectives from Romania �ncludes��several��or�g�nal��art�cles���n��appl�ed��eth�cs��and��theoret�cal��moral��ph�losophy.��It���s��representat�ve��of��the��var�ety��of��research��and��the��grow�ng���nterest���n��appl�ed��eth�cs���n��the��last��few��years���n��Roman�a.��The��ph�losophy��pract�sed��here���s��at��the��same��t�me��an���nternat�onal��act�v�ty,��but��also��a��k�nd��of��research��deeply���nvolved���n��Roman�an��real�t�es.��The��contr�butors�� to�� the��volume��are��Roman�an��ph�losophers�� from��the��most�� �mportant��Un�vers�t�es�� �n�� the��country,���nclud�ng��members��of��the��Roman�an��Academy,��but��also��jun�or��researchers.

Th�s��volume��was��made��poss�ble��thanks��to��the��relat�onsh�p��establ�shed��between��the��Appl�ed��Eth�cs��Centres��of��the��Un�vers�ty��of��Bucharest,��Roman�a,��and��Hokka�do��Un�vers�ty,��Japan.��I��hope��that��th�s��academ�c��and��sc�ent�f�c��cooperat�on��w�ll��flour�sh���n��the��near��future.��The��br�dge���s��there��to��stay.

Prof.��Dr.��M�rcea��DUMITRUPres�dent��of��the��Un�vers�ty��of��Bucharest

x Is Applied Ethics Still An Application Of Ethics? / Valentin MUREŞAN and Shunzo MAJIMA xi

Is Applied Ethics Still An Application Of Ethics? A Short History of Applied Ethics in Romania

Valentin MUREŞANShunzo��MAJIMA

Moral��ph�losophy���s��more��than��two��thousand��years��old.��The���nterest���n���ts��powers��of��appl�cat�on��dates��back��to��the��same��anc�ent��per�od.��Instead,��what��we��have��called��s�nce��the��second��half��of��the��last��century��“appl�ed��eth�cs”���s��barely��s�xty��years��old,��wh�le��the��subject��of��research��that��we��call�� today��the��new��appl�ed��eth�cs�� �s��even��younger.��Roman�a��d�d��not��make��any��contr�but�on��to��the��b�rth��of��appl�ed��eth�cs,��but��has��been��part�c�pat�ng���n���ts��development��for��the��last��twenty��years.

Or�g�nally,��appl�ed��eth�cs,��as��an��academ�c��spec�al�ty,��was��a��k�nd��of�� smart-course��meant�� to��capture��the���nterest��of��as��many��students��as��poss�ble��on��campus��–��a��k�nd��of��“pop-course”.��In�� the��1960s��the��Western��world��was��bo�l�ng��on��the��verge��of��b�g��transformat�ons.��Students��and��workers��were��s�ncerely���nterested���n��the��great��publ�c��debates��generated��by�� the��enormous��ax�olog�cal��changes��brought��about��by��that��h�stor�cal��moment,��ma�nly���n��Amer�can��soc�ety,��but��also��throughout��the��world:���nclud�ng��c�v�l��r�ghts��movements,�� the��V�etnam��war,�� the��sexual��revolut�on,��student��movements,�� fem�n�st��act�v�sm,��etc.��From��the��street�� to�� the�� journals’��columns��and��further�� to�� leg�slat�ve��debates,�� these�� top�cs��entered���nto�� the��structure��of��un�vers�ty��curr�cula��as��a��k�nd��of��h�gher-level��approach��to�� these��c�v�c��and��pol�t�cal�� top�cs��on��wh�ch��the��un�vers�ty��was��asked��to��offer���ts��expert�se.��In���ts��f�rst��form,��appl�ed��eth�cs��was��an��application of ethical theories��and��other��ph�losoph�cal��concepts�� to�� these��v�tal��publ�c���ssues.��S�multaneously,��under��pol�t�cal��pressure,���n��the��context��of��post-war��correct�ve��pol�c�es��and��some��abuses��reported�� �n��Amer�can��med�cal�� research,��a��process��was��underway��of��propos�ng��and��we�ght�ng��d�fferent��moral��pr�nc�ples��and��other��b�oeth�cal�� restr�ct�ons,��ma�nly�� for�� the��use��of�� sc�ent�f�c�� research��and��med�cal��pract�ce��(the��Belmont Report,��1979).��The��moral��pr�nc�ples��and��the��eth�cal��codes��d�ffused���n��the��bus�ness��f�eld��were��st�mulated��by��the��“soc�al��respons�b�l�ty”��movements.��Step��by��step,��centres��of��research��on��appl�ed��eth�cs��were��set��up,��w�th�n��and��outs�de��un�vers�t�es,�� �nclud�ng��those��pr�vate��f�rms��wh�ch��offered��consultanc�es��on��th�s��new��f�eld��of��research��and��the��opportun�ty��to��carve��out��a��new��profess�on.��In��the�� last��30��years,��Corporate social responsibility��programmes��(CSR)��and��“eth�cs��management”��structures�� (EM)��have��begun�� to��attract��eth�c�sts��and��non-eth�c�sts��as��well.��Th�s��k�nd��of��act�v�ty���nvaded��other��f�elds��(bus�ness,��f�rst��of��all)��and��other��cont�nents.��Some��cr�t�c�zed��the��lack��of��spectacular��results;��but��th�s���s��due,��perhaps,��ma�nly��to��the��rather��unref�ned��early��outputs��of��th�s��p�oneer�ng��research��enterpr�se,��a��fact��that��we��usually��tend��to��forget.

Th�s��academ�c�� fash�on��spread�� �n��Europe,��espec�ally�� �n��Br�t�sh��un�vers�t�es,��and,��much��later,��on��the��Cont�nent.��On��the��one��hand,��the��French��observed��th�s��new��d�sc�pl�ne���n�t�ally��w�th��reserve��and��even��w�th��contempt,��but��eventually��translated��Anglo-Amer�can��works��and��organ�zed�� the�r��own��research��groups.��They��“hardly��

dared��to��call���t��‘eth�cs’,��s�nce���t��was��rather��a��form��of��rat�onal��casu�stry��separated��from��any��k�nd��of��ph�losoph�cal��reflect�on”��and��s�nce���t��apparently��had��nothing to do��w�th��“moral��ph�losophy”.1��Today,�� the�r�� judgement�� �s��no��longer��so��severe.��On��the��other��hand,�� the��Amer�cans�� launched�� the��four��pr�nc�ples��of��Beauchamp��and��Ch�ldress;2��as��an��answer,�� the��Europeans��also��proposed��four��d�fferent��pr�nc�ples��(Basic Ethical Principles in Bioethics and Biolaw).��Such��a��compet�t�on��assured��a��certa�n��dynam�c��to��the��nascent��f�eld��and,��f�nally,��a��portfol�o��of��eth�cal��pr�nc�ples��was��drawn��up��for��use���n��var�ous��f�elds.

Over�� the��years��and�� �n��pa�nstak�ng��steps,�� research�� �n��appl�ed��eth�cs��became��more��and��more��spec�al�zed,��correlated�� to�� the��cl�ents’��needs��and��pract�ced��ma�nly���n��research��centres��and��pr�vate��f�rms.��Today��applied ethics��refers��to��a��large��var�ety��of��methods��capable��of��cr�t�cally��exam�n�ng��and��assess�ng�� the��moral��problems��of��var�ous��profess�ons,�� technolog�es,��publ�c��pol�c�es��etc.,�� �nclud�ng��(amongst��others)��conceptual��analys�s,��phenomenology,��casu�stry,��narrat�v�sm,��reflect�ve��equ�l�br�um,��spec�f�cat�on,��we�gh�ng��of��reasons,��eth�cal��aud�t,��eth�cs��management,��eth�cal��matr�x��etc.��“Appl�ed”��does��not��refer��ma�nly�� to�� the��appl�cat�on��of��major��eth�cal�� theor�es,��but��to��a��k�nd��of��free��market���n��“eth�cal��tools”��and��to��some��w�dely��accepted��eth�cal��methodolog�es,��used��by��eth�c�sts��or��non-eth�c�sts,��dec�s�vely��set��apart��from��the���vory��tower���nhab�ted��by��trad�t�onal��moral��ph�losophers,�� �n��f�rms,��un�vers�t�es,��hosp�tals��etc.��New��profess�ons��appeared,��from��eth�cs��off�cer,��to��eth�cal��consultant��and��eth�cal��aud�tor.��A��k�nd��of��“eth�cal���nfrastructure”,��able��to��embrace��all��these��methodolog�cal��developments��and��to��endow��them��w�th��a��part�cular,��prec�se��sense,��came��to��del�neate��and��def�ne�� the��doma�n��of�� the��new applied ethics��mak�ng�� �t�� an�� �ntr�ns�c��part��of��modern��management���n��each��organ�zat�on.

Dur�ng�� th�s�� slow,�� format�ve�� per�od,�� commun�st�� post-war�� Roman�a�� was��completely��obl�v�ous�� to�� these��pol�t�cal��and�� �ntellectual��movements.��“Eth�cs”��was��certa�nly��an��academ�c��d�sc�pl�ne,��but��one��embedded���n��the��off�c�al���deology.��Th�s��was��a��reason��for���ts��lack��of��appeal��and���ts��slow��dynam�cs.��Some��of��the��great��theoret�cal��works���n�� th�s��f�eld��were��translated��(Plato,��Ar�stotle,��Sp�noza,��Kant��etc.)��and��were��taught���n��un�vers�t�es��after��1970,��but��no��deta�led��commentary��was��ded�cated��to��them��and��even��when��eventually��that��was��the��case,��the��cr�t�cal��approach��read�ly��adopted��the��dom�nant��Marx�st��perspect�ve.��The��analyt�cal��moral��ph�losophy��of��the��t�me��(meta-eth�cs)��was��man�fest�ng���tself��through��only��one��translat�on��of��the��synthes�s��s�gned��by��Svetozar��Stojanov�c�.3��The��tendency��was,��therefore,��to��wr�te��monographs��on��authors��or��ph�losoph�c��trends��(Moore,��Neo-Kant�an�sm,��eth�cal�� �ntu�t�on�sm,��etc.).��But��the��local�� l�terature��on��“appl�ed��eth�cs”��was��completely�� lack�ng.��An��expl�c�t��and��free��approach��to��“sens�t�ve”��pol�t�cal��problems��was��proh�b�ted.

As�� an�� academ�c�� d�sc�pl�ne,�� “appl�ed�� eth�cs”�� was�� �naugurated�� at�� several��un�vers�t�es��only��after�� the��ant�-commun�st�� revolut�on��of��1989.��The��f�rst��book��of��

1�� M.��Canto-Sperber,��La philosophie morale britannique,��PUF,��Par�s,��1994,��p.��99.2�� T.��Beauchamp,��J.��Ch�ldress,��Principles of Biomedical Ethics,��Oxford��Un�vers�ty��Press,��

Oxford,��1979.��3�� S.��Stojanov�c�,��Meta-etica contemporană (Contemporary meta-ethics), Editura ştiinţifică,

Bucureşti, 1972.

x�� Is Applied Ethics Still An Application Of Ethics? / Valentin MUREŞAN and Shunzo MAJIMA xiii

read�ngs��(translated��art�cles)��appeared���n��1995��together��w�th��the��f�rst��courses.4��The��top�cs�� followed�� those��current�� �n��Amer�ca��even�� �f�� they��d�d��not�� f�t�� the��Roman�an��real�t�es.��Later,�� some��other��books��of�� th�s�� type��were�� �ssued,5��but��not��so��much��on��appl�ed��eth�cs��as��on��theoret�cal��moral��ph�losophy.6��Several��courses�� �n��eth�cs��were���ntroduced.��For��example,��at��the��Faculty��of��Ph�losophy��of��the��Un�vers�ty��of��Bucharest��there�� �s��a��course�� �n��eth�cs�� �n��each��year��of��study:�� Introduction to ethics, Ethical theories, Applied ethics, Ethics management.��Var�ous��other��courses��are�� taught��at��masters��and��doctoral��levels.

In�� parallel,�� some�� academ�c�� Roman�an�� ph�losophers�� �n�t�ated�� research��programmes���n��wh�ch��eth�cs,��both�� theoret�cal��and��appl�ed,��had��a��s�gn�f�cant��part.��At Babeş-Bolyai University in Cluj-Napoca, Ion Copoeru, Mihaela Frunză, Imre Ungvàr�-Zr�ny���and��others�� �ntegrated�� top�cs��of��appl�ed��eth�cs�� �nto�� the�r�� research,���nsp�red��mostly��by��phenomenology,��Habermas’s��d�scourse��eth�cs��or��gender��stud�es.

Also,�� at�� the�� West�� Un�vers�ty�� of�� T�m�soara�� eth�cs�� courses�� �n�� several��spec�al�zat�ons��were���ntroduced;��some��personal��research��projects��on��Kant’s��eth�cs��were��developed��and�� the��Doctoral��School��began�� to��do��some��research�� �n��med�cal��eth�cs.

At the University of Medicine of Iaşi (with the cooperation of local ph�losophers)�� the��most��act�ve��and��v�s�ble��centre��of��bioethics��was��set��up��under��the��d�rect�on��of��a��professor��of��legal��med�c�ne,��V.��Astarastoa�e.��The��work��of��th�s��research��group���s��remarkable��both��for�� the�r��d�dact�c��and��research7��ach�evements��as��well��as��for��hav�ng��launched��the��f�rst��Romanian Journal of Bioethics��–��an���nterd�sc�pl�nary��publ�cat�on.��S�m�lar�� act�v�t�es�� took��place�� at�� the��Un�vers�t�es�� of��Med�c�ne��of��Bucurest�,��Cluj,��T�m�soara��and��S�b�u.��The���mpact��on��hosp�tal��eth�cs��or��on��research��eth�cs��was,��however,��precar�ous.��The��overall��est�mat�ons��of�� the��research�� level��of��Roman�an��b�oeth�cs��vary��from��“remarkable”��to��“embryon�c”.

At��Bucharest��Un�vers�ty,��Professor��Adr�an-Paul��Il�escu��started��a��programme��of��“econom�c��and��soc�al��eth�cs”,��followed��by��an���nternat�onal��one��on��“�ntergenerat�onal��eth�cs��and��susta�nable��development”.8��He���s��also��an��analyst��of��the��post-commun�st��

4�� A.��M�ro�u��(ed.),��Etica aplicată��(Applied Ethics), Editura Alternative, Bucureşti, 1995. 5�� I.��Copoeru,��Etica si cultura profesionala (Ethics and Professional Culture), Casa Cărţii de

Stiinţă, Cluj-Napoca, 2008.6 At the University of Bucharest, Valentin Mureşan translated the works of J. S. Mill, I. Kant,

B.��O.��A.��W�ll�ams,��R.��M.��Hare,��H.��Pr�chard,��G.��Anscombe��etc.��He��publ�shed��a��book��of��read-�ngs��w�th��A.��Montef�ore,��British Moral Philosophy, Alternative, Bucureşti, 1998. He also �n�t�ated��a��program��(and��four��courses)�� through��wh�ch��four��commentar�es��were��conce�ved��on��Plato’s��Republic,��the��Nicomachean Ethics,��the��Groundwork��and��Utilitarianism.��He��also��publ�shed���n��Engl�sh��a��collect�on��of��eth�cal��essays,��From Eudaimonia to Happiness,��Un�ver-s�ty��of��Bucharest��Press,��Bucharest,��2010,��and��h�s��commentary��to��Utilitarianism�� (Lambert��Academ�c��Publ�sh�ng,��Saarbrücken,��Germany,��2010).��A��doctoral��thes�s��on��Nationalization in Romania,��wr�tten��by��Emanuel��Socac�u��establ�shed��the��status��of��appl�ed��eth�cs.��

7�� G.��Scr�pcaru,��V.��Astarastoa�e,��C.��Scr�pcaru,��Principii de bioetică, deontologie şi drept medical�� (Principles of��bioethics, deontology and medical law);��V.��Astarastoa�e��et alia,��Essentialia în bioetică�� (Essentialia in bioethics),��G.��Gavr�lov�c�,��Introducere în bioetică��(Introduction to bioethics),��2007.��And��many��others.

8�� Adr�an-Paul��Il�escu,��Etică socială şi politică (Social and Political Ethics),��Ars��Docend�,��

trans�t�on��and��some��of�� �ts��eth�cal��problems.��Professor��Vas�le��Morar��developed��the��f�eld��of��bus�ness��eth�cs��and���n�t�ated��research��on��top�cs��such��as��med�a��eth�cs,��the��eth�cs��of�� terror�sm��and��of�� the��Holocaust.9��Together��w�th��D.��Crac�un��and��V.��Macov�c�uc�� from�� the��Academy��of��Econom�c��Stud�es,�� they�� �ssued��a�� treat�se��on��bus�ness��eth�cs.10 Valentin Mureşan wrote the first book on ethics management��focused��on��methods��of��moral��dec�s�on-mak�ng.11

The��beg�nn�ngs��of��appl�ed��eth�cs���n��Roman�a��(1995)��are��s�gn�f�cantly��marked��by��an���nfus�on��of��Amer�can��top�cs���nto��local��curr�cula��even���f��they��do��not��completely��f�t:��here��I��mean��top�cs�� l�ke��abort�on,��homosexual�ty,��euthanas�a,��an�mal��r�ghts��or��fem�n�st��eth�cs.��Some��of��these��flour�shed,��others��d�d��not,��because��the��contexts��were��and��st�ll��are��very��d�fferent.��What�� �n��Amer�ca��were��hot�� top�cs�� �n��strenuous��publ�c��debate,��were��not��current�� �n��Roman�a.��And��the��local��hot�� top�cs��(e.g.��respons�b�l�ty��under�� commun�sm,��Ceausescu’s�� tr�al,�� corrupt�on,�� the�� eth�cal��management��of���nst�tut�ons��etc.)�� rema�ned��pract�cally��untouched.��The�� lack��of��pol�t�cal�� �nterest�� �n��such��stud�es��was��also��a��character�st�c��of��the��per�od.��Even��more,��the��problems��ra�sed��by���ntermed�ary��parad�gms��such��as��pr�nc�pl�sm,��narrat�v�sm,��moral��casu�stry��etc.,��rema�ned��outs�de��the��academ�c��curr�cula.

In��parallel,��outs�de��un�vers�t�es,��ma�nly���n��bus�ness��c�rcles,��some��CSR��debates��and��off�ces��were��set��up��–��most��of��them��under��the��pol�t�cal��pressure��of��the��European��Comm�ss�on.��But�� th�s��was��not��an��eth�cs��or�ented��trend,��but��a��PR��sub-program��of��study���n��the��departments��hav�ng��th�s��prof�le.��The��whole��CSR��program��was��captured��by��PR��facult�es��and��by��spec�al�sts���n��law��and��econom�cs,��w�thout��any��eth�cal��tra�n�ng��and��w�thout��eth�c�sts.��In��bus�ness��and��commerce,��the��new��CSR��off�cers��were��almost��w�thout��except�on��graduates��of��the��faculty��of��“publ�c��relat�ons”.��Only���n��the��last��s�x��years��some��pr�vate��f�rms��engaged���n��eth�cs��management��and��compl�ance��were��set��up.��Ten��years��ago��a��Research��Center��for��Appl�ed��Eth�cs��was���naugurated��at��the��Faculty��of��Ph�losophy��of��Bucharest��Un�vers�ty��wh�ch���s��now��suff�c�ently��equ�pped��to��offer��consultanc�es��outs�de�� the��un�vers�ty.��Such��a��cooperat�on��took��place,��for��example,��w�th�� the��M�n�stry��of��Research��on��bu�ld�ng��a��new��code��of��eth�cs.��Some��projects��wh�ch���nvolved��eth�cal��consultancy��have��been��developed��at��Cluj��Un�vers�ty���n��the��f�eld��of��legal��eth�cs��by��Professor��Ion��Copoeru.

A��masters��degree��course��on��“eth�cs��management”��was�� �n�t�ated��at��Bucharest��Un�vers�ty.��In�t�ally��met��w�th��scept�c�sm,�� th�s��course��produced��s�gn�f�cant��results:��after��four��years,��there��are��tens��of��graduates��hav�ng��a��remarkable��know how���n��eth�cs��management,��10��doctoral��students�� �n�� th�s��subject,��many��post-graduat�on�� theses,��several��profess�onal��works��conducted��by��professors�� �n��secondary��schools��and��an���nc�p�ent��local��l�terature.��At��Cluj��Un�vers�ty,��two��masters��degree��programs���n��appl�ed��eth�cs��have��been��successfully���mplemented,��one���n��the��Roman�an��language,��the��other��

Bucureşti, 2007. A big international conference on intergenerational ethics, financed by The European��Sc�ence��Foundat�on,��took��place��w�th�n��th�s��programme���n��Bucharest���n��2011.

9�� V.��Morar,��Etica�� (Ethics. The Philosophy of Good and the Moral Science), Pa�de�a,��Bucureşti, 1996.��

10 D. Crăciun, V. Morar, V. Macoviciuc, (eds.), Etica afacerilor (Business Ethics),��Pa�de�a,��Bucureşti, 2005.

11�� V.��Muresan,��Managementul eticii în organizaţii�� (Ethics management in organizations),��Editura Universităţii Bucureşti, 2009.

x�v

�n��Hungar�an.Th�s��was��a��s�gn��that��“appl�ed��eth�cs”��had��already��begun��to��d�vers�fy,��follow�ng��

the�� �nternat�onal�� trend��of�� the�� t�mes,�� �nclud�ng��a��var�ety��of��methods��of�� eth�cal��assessment,��a��movement��towards��spec�al�zed��eth�cs��centres��and��towards��contractual��work��w�th��external��cl�ents.�� In�� the��absence��of��adequate�� leg�slat�on,��contracts��w�th��external��stakeholders��are,��unfortunately,��very��rare,��the��dom�nant��mental�ty��be�ng��that���n��eth�cal��problems��everybody���s��an��expert��and��that��no��spec�al��expert�se,��profess�onal��programs��or��support�ng��organ�zat�onal��structures��are��needed.��However,��an��object�ve��trend�� �n�� the��oppos�te��d�rect�on�� �s�� also��man�fest;�� some��pr�vate�� f�rms��on��eth�cs��management��and��eth�cs��consultancy��have��been��organ�zed.

From��the��po�nt��of��v�ew��of��eth�cs��management,��the���nst�tut�onal��s�tuat�on���s��the��follow�ng.��Most��parts��of��organ�zat�ons��have��an��eth�cal��code,��called��usually��a��“code��of��conduct”,�� just�� to��avo�d�� the�� �nconven�ences��ra�sed��by��a��new��set��of�� restr�ct�ons��and��by��the��obl�gat�on��to��take���nto��account��the���nterests��of��all��the��stakeholders��on��an��equal��foot�ng.��By��m�n�ster�al��decrees��eth�cs��comm�ttees��were��set��up,��but��they��were��conce�ved��as��l�t�gat�on��comm�ttees��not��as��competent��forums��to��debate��and��launch��the��ethical programs��of��the��organ�zat�on��nor��to��update��the��eth�cal��code.��There��are��only��very��rare��eth�cal��tra�n�ngs,��no��eth�cal��hotl�ne,��no��moral��consultancy,��no��eth�cal��aud�t��nor��even���ntra-�nst�tut�onal��appl�ed��eth�cal��debates.��In��short,�� the��lack��of��a��coherent��pol�t�cal��v�s�on��and��w�ll��d�d��not��encourage���nst�tut�onal��eth�cs.��The��na�ve��po�nt��of��v�ew��that��at��the��workplace,��morals���s��someth�ng��w�th�n��our��general��comprehens�on��and��a��subject��that��everyone��knows,��rema�ns��dom�nant.��The��except�on���s��represented��by��fore�gn��compan�es��wh�ch��brought�� �n�� the�r��own��eth�cs��management.��There��are��some��paradoxes:��employees,�� �n��general,��bel�eve�� that��we��need��spec�al�sts�� �n�� the��adm�n�strat�on��of��eth�cs��but,��on��the��other��hand,��the��great��major�ty��of��organ�zat�ons��have��not��h�red��eth�cal��experts��and��are��reluctant��to��set��up��an��eth�cs��off�ce��and��allocate��a��budget.

However,��emp�r�cal��research��shows��that��most��people��are��d�ssat�sf�ed��w�th��these��fragmented��and��part�ally��developed��forms��of��appl�ed��eth�cs��and��w�sh��that��someth�ng��would��be��done��about�� �t.��Thus,�� there�� �s��a��major�ty��wh�ch��holds��a��pos�t�ve��att�tude��towards���nst�tut�onal��eth�cs��and���s��hop�ng��that,��when��the��t�me��comes,��there��w�ll��be��a��ser�ous���mprovement���n��th�s��regard.��T�ll��then,��the��eth�c�sts��keep��prepar�ng��the�r��tools��and�� the��moral��ph�losophers��cont�nue�� the�r�� research�� �n�� the�r�� �vory�� towers��w�thout��tak�ng���nto��account��the��obsess�ve��quest�on��of��the��layperson:��“What’s��the��usefulness��of��all��that?”

1.Moral Philosophy

2 �� What��does��“Metaphys�cs”��mean���n��Kant’s��Groundwork��...����/����Il�e��PARVU������������3

What does “Metaphysics” mean in Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals ?

Il�e��PARVU

“S�nce��the��un�versal�ty��of��the��law��accord�ng��to��wh�ch��effects��happen��const�tutes��what���s��properly��called��nature���n��the��more��general��sense��(accord�ng��to���ts��form),���.e.�� the��ex�stence��of�� th�ngs���n��so��far��at�� �t�� �s��determ�ned��accord�ng��to��un�versal��laws,��the��un�versal���mperat�ve��of��duty��could��also��be��expressed��as��follows:��so act as if the maxim of your��action were to��become by your will a universal law of nature”.��(Kant,��Groundwork,��4:��421)

“S�nce�� the��val�d�ty��of�� the��w�ll,��as��un�versal�� law��for��poss�ble��act�ons,��has��an��analogy��w�th��the��un�versal��connect�on��of��the��ex�stence��of��th�ngs��accord�ng��to��un�versal�� laws,��w�th��wh�ch��what�� �s�� formal�� �n��nature��as��such,�� the��categor�cal���mperat�ve��can��also��be��expressed��as��follows:��act according to maxims that can at the same time have as�� their object themselves as universal laws of nature. Such,�� then���s�� the��formula��of��an��absolutely��good��w�ll”.��(Kant,��Groundwork,��4:��437)

In��the��last��years��a��central��theme���n��the���nterpretat�on��of��Kant’s��moral��ph�losophy,��at��the��general�� theoret�cal�� level,��has��become��the��confrontat�on��between��two��d�fferent��construals��of�� �ts�� fundamentals,��namely,��“real�sm”��(or��metaphys�cal,��ontolog�cal���nterpretat�on)��and��“ant�-real�sm”��(or��“construct�v�st”��–��better��“construct�onal”,��“procedural”���nterpretat�on).1��Th�s��paper���ntends��to��further��develop��the��f�rst��k�nd��of���nterpretat�on��by��replac�ng��the��ent�re��d�scuss�on���nto��a��larger��h�stor�cal��context��and��by��tak�ng���nto��account��new��elements��wh�ch��can��have��determ�nat�ve��s�gn�f�cat�on��for��the��understand�ng��of��foundat�onal��cla�ms��and��ontolog�cal��comm�tments��of��Kant’s��moral��theory.

Em�nently��represented��by��E.��Cass�rer��(for�� theoret�cal��ph�losophy),��H.��Cohen��(for��Kant�an��eth�cs),��or��G.��Mart�n��and��G.��Prauss��(for��fundamentals��of��transcendental��ph�losophy���n��general),�� the��metaphys�cal�� �nterpretat�on��was��adumbrated��by��log�cal��emp�r�c�sts��and��the�r��followers��(l�ke��E.��Nagel��and��H.��Putnam),��contested��by��all��sorts��of��“analyt�cal��Kant�an�sm”��(the��ma�n��form��of�� th�s��contestat�on��addressed�� the��so-called��“two-worlds”���nterpretat�on��of��the��d�st�nct�on��between��phenomena��and��th�ngs-

��1�� For��very�� �nformed��surveys��of�� th�s��d�spute��see:��P.��Ka�n,��“Real�sm��and��Ant�-Real�sm�� �n��Kant’s��Second��Cr�t�que”,��Philosophy Compass,��2006,��1/5:��449-465;��E.��Watk�ns,��Kant and the Metaphysics of Causality,��Cambr�dge,��Cambr�dge��Un�v.��Press.��2005;��E.��Watk�ns,��W.��F�tzPatr�ck,��“O’Ne�l��and��Korsgaard��on�� the��Const�tut�on��of��Normat�v�ty,��The��Journal��of��Value�� Inqu�ry,��2002,��349-67;��B.J.B.��L�scomb��and��J.Kruger Kant’s Moral��Metaphysics,��Berl�n,��De��Gruyter.��2010;��P.��Formosa,��“Is��Kant��a��Moral��Construct�v�st��or��a��Moral��Real�st?”���n��European��Journal of Philosophy,��2011,��1-27.

�n-themselves��wh�ch��was��subst�tuted��by�� the��“two-standpo�nts”��approach��of�� the��Kant�an��d�st�nct�on),��el�m�nated��by��the��“d�sc�pl�nary”��reduct�on��to��eth�cs��of��Kant’s��moral��ph�losophy,��and��eventually��subst�tuted��by�� the��“dom�nant��parad�gm”��of�� the��reconstruct�on�st��approach.��In��the��last��years��we��can��not�ce��a��part�al��rena�ssance��of��the��ontolog�cal�� �nterpretat�on��of��Kant’s��f�rst��Critique�� (not�� �n�� the��sense��advocated��earl�er��by��He�degger,��who���s��not���nterested���n��the��“�mmanent”��or��structural��ontology��of��Kant’s��program��but�� tr�es�� to��art�culate��a��poss�ble��metaphys�cal��precond�t�on��of��the��ent�re��Kant�an��th�nk�ng),�� �n��wh�ch��the��mean�ng��of�� the��transcendental�� �deal�sm���s��completely��recons�dered��and��the��“two-worlds”���nterpretat�on��of��the��fundamental��d�st�nct�on��between��phenomena��and��th�ngs���n�� �tself�� �s�� �ntegrated���n��a��new��k�nd��of��understand�ng��of�� th�s��relat�on��on��the��bas�s��of��a��new��theory,��so-called��“Ground�ng��theory”��(�n��wh�ch��the��ground�ng��relat�on��between��th�ngs���n���tself��and��appearances��can��be��a��metaphys�cal��ground��for��moral�� l�berty).2��Other�� �mportant��developments��of��an��ontolog�cal��approach��of��Kant’s��transcendental���deal�sm��were��proposed��by��R.��Langton,��P.��Abela,��and��K.��Amer�ks.

Th�s�� �nterpretat�ve��movement�� towards��a��“real�st�c”�� �nterpretat�on��of��Kant’s��general��program��also��affected��moral��ph�losophy.��I�� th�nk��that��for��those��who��are��not��“ded�cated��Rawls�ans”��th�s��new��real�st�c��construal��deserves��more��attent�on��even���f���t��cannot��be��cons�dered��the��un�quely��“fa�thful”�� �nterpretat�on��of�� the��fundamentals��of��Kant�an��moral�� theory.��For��some��scholars,�� the��“new��metaphys�cal�� read�ng”��of��Kant’s��moral�� theory��makes��poss�ble�� the��establ�shment��of��a��“synopt�c��v�s�on”�� �n��the�� �nterpretat�on��of��h�s��concept�on,��wh�ch��shares��un�ty��at�� the��fundamental�� level��of�� the��ent�re��cr�t�cal��program��(L�pscom��&��Krueger).��The��need��to��return��to��a��more��comprehens�ve��perspect�ve�� �s��mot�vated��by�� the��propens�ty�� to�� respond�� to�� the��dom�nant,��“pos�t�v�st”�� �nterpretat�on��of��Kant’s��Critiques,�� as��was��portrayed,�� for��example,��by��Fr.��Be�ser:��“S�nce��the��1960s��there��has��been��a��movement��afoot�� �n��the��Anglophone��world�� to��purge��Kant’s��ph�losophy��of��all��metaphys�cs,�� to��make��Kant��san�tary��for��a��more��pos�t�v�st�c��age”.3

The��construct�onal�� type��of�� ant�-real�st��pos�t�on�� (J.��Rawls,��O.��O’Ne�ll,��C.��Korsgaard,��J.��B.��Schneew�nd��et��al.)��den�es��any��fundamental��s�gn�f�cance��of�� the��ontolog�cal��or��metaphys�cal��comm�tments��or��presuppos�t�ons��of��Kant’s�� theory��of��pract�cal�� rat�onal�ty��and��moral�ty.�� In��a��very��synthet�c��but��express�ve��manner�� th�s���nterpretat�on��was��presented��by��Ka�n���n��the��follow�ng��terms:��

“W�th�n��Kant’s��system,��[…]��the��supreme��pr�nc�ple��of��moral�ty�� �s��a��cogn�t�ve��cla�m�� that��m�ght��possess��object�ve��val�d�ty�� (thereby��d�st�ngu�sh�ng��Kant’s��pos�t�on�� from��non-cogn�t�v�st�� ant�-real�sm��and��cogn�t�v�st�� error�� theor�es),��but�� �ts��val�d�ty�� �s�� fundamentally�� ‘stance��dependent’��or��dependent��upon��our��bel�efs,��concept�ons,��or��construct�ve��act�v�ty��and���s��free��of��genu�ne��ontolog�cal��comm�tments”.

In��contrad�st�nct�on,��accord�ng��to��the��real�st��construal,

��2�� E.��Watk�ns,��2005.��3�� Be�ser��2006:��589,��apud��Krueger��&��L�pscom��2010:��2-3.

4 �� What��does��“Metaphys�cs”��mean���n��Kant’s��Groundwork��...����/����Il�e��PARVU������������5

“Kant’s��moral��ph�losophy��should��be��understood��as��a��form��of��real�sm��because��the��moral��law��purports��to��be��val�d��for��every��free��rat�onal��agent,�� �ndependently��of�� �ts�� bel�efs,�� concept�ons,�� and�� act�v�ty,�� and�� purports�� to�� �nvolve�� robust��ontolog�cal��presuppos�t�ons��such��as��real�ty��of��‘transcendental��freedom’,��God��and���mmortal�ty”.��(P.��Ka�n,��2006:��449)

My��perspect�ve��on�� th�s�� foundat�onal��debate��w�ll��not��be��art�culated�� �n�� th�s��paper��on�� the��bas�s��of��an��extended��analyt�c�� research��of�� the��ant�-real�st��pos�t�on,4��but��rather�� �nd�rectly,�� through��an��attempt�� to��reveal�� the��weakness��of�� two���mportant��cla�ms��of�� th�s�� �nterpretat�on��wh�ch��contest�� the��val�d�ty��of�� the��real�st�� �nterpretat�on��on��the��bas�s��that:��(�)���t��enta�ls��an��“extravagant��metaphys�cs”��and,��(��)���n��general,���t���s��not��cons�stent��w�th��the��overall��outlook��of��modern��sc�ence.��The��f�rst��po�nt��cons�sts��merely���n��a��re�terat�on��of��an��old��ant�-metaphys�cal��stance��of��some��representat�ves��of��log�cal��emp�r�c�sm,��and��the��second,���f��the��theoret�cal��construct�on��of��modern��sc�ence���s��properly��understood��and��reconstructed,��proves��to��be��stra�ghtforwardly��false.��In��my��op�n�on,��pos�t�vely��expressed��but�� �n��a��very��condensed��form,��the��ma�n��support��for��the��real�st��construal��of�� the��fundamentals��of��Kant�an��moral��ph�losophy��cons�sts���n�� �ts��coherence��w�th��the��ontolog�cal��foundat�ons��of��modern��sc�ence��and��w�th��the��determ�nat�ve��structure��of��the��ent�re��Kant�an��program���n��transcendental��ph�losophy��(as��expressed��by�� the��nuclear�� theory��conta�n�ng��categor�es��and��pr�nc�ples);�� th�s��perspect�ve��can��also��be��just�f�ed��by��a��rat�onal��reconstruct�on��wh�ch���ntends��to��make��ev�dent�� the�� �nternal��structure��and��ep�stemolog�cal��status��of�� th�s�� type��of��Kant�an��moral��theor�z�ng.

In�� the�� perspect�ve�� of�� th�s�� reconstruct�on�� �t�� �s�� essent�al�� to�� cons�der�� the��manner�� �n��wh�ch�� the�� (structural)�� laws�� funct�on�� �n�� the��ent�re��Kant�an��system��as��const�tut�ve/determ�nat�ve��not��only��for��part�cular��elements��or��components��of�� the��cr�t�cal,��“�mmanent”��ontology,��but��also��for�� the��very���dea��of�� the��world��taken���n���ts���ntegral�ty��and��full��extens�on��(�nclud�ng��not��only�� the��natural��world��but��also,��as��a��“second��nature”,�� the��moral��world).��One�� �mportant��contr�but�on�� �n�� th�s��d�rect�on���s��represented��by��the��m�nute��analys�s��of�� the��determ�nat�ve��funct�on��of�� the���dea��of��law��for�� the��deduct�on��of�� the��object�ve��real�ty��of��categor�es��and��for�� the��real�ty��of��the��transcendental��freedom.5��The��general�zed��law-const�tut�ve��approach,6��based��on��

��4�� For��such��analyses��see:��K.��Amer�ks.��Interpreting Kant’s Critiques,��Oxford,��Oxford��Un�v.��Press.��2003;��P.��Ka�n��2006,��C.��Voeller��2001, The��Metaphysics of the Moral Law. Kant’s Deduction of��Freedom,��New��York��&��London,��Garland��Pb.��Inc;��E.��Watk�ns��&��W.��F�tzPatr�ck.��“O’Ne�ll��and��Korsgaard��on�� the��Construct�on��of��Normat�v�ty”,�� �n��The Journal of Value Inquiry,��2002,��36:��349-367.;��A.W.Wood. Kant’s Ethical Thought,��Cambr�dge,��Cambr�dge��Un�v.��Press,��1999.��R.��Langton.�� “Object�ve��and��Uncond�t�oned��Value”,��Philosophical Review,��2007,��116:��157-185.

��5�� C.��Voeller,��2001��and��for��the��deta�led��exam�nat�on��of��Kant’s��concept��of��a��un�versal��law��of��nature��and��of���ts���nterest��for��Kant’s��moral��ep�stemology��and��moral��ontology��see��J.��Scheuer-mann,“Un�versal��Laws��of��Nature���n��Kant’s��Moral��Ph�losophy”,��Archiv fuer Geschichte der Philosophie,��198769:��269-302.

��6�� The�� term�nology��of��“law-const�tut�ve��approach”��was��employed��by��C.��Voeller,��2001�� -��for��Kant�an��metaphys�cs�� �n��general��and��for��Kant�an��proof��of�� the�� real�ty��of�� freedom,�� �n��part�cular,��and��was��used���n��another��context,�� �n�� the��analys�s��of��Newton’s��metaphys�cs,��by��

a��structural�st��construal��of��sc�ent�f�c�� laws��can��const�tute,�� �n��our��op�n�on,�� the��most��profound��bas�s�� for�� the��un�ty��of�� the��ent�re��Kant�an��system��and��of�� �ts��cons�stency��w�th��the��fundamentals��of��modern��sc�ence.��Th�s��Kant�an��law-approach���n��theoret�cal��and��moral��ph�losophy��(and,��as��was��amply��demonstrated��by��J.��Scheuermann,�� for��the��theory��of��reflect�ve��judgement)���s��not��only��a��common��tra�t��of��the��sc�ent�f�c��and��ph�losoph�c��construct�ons��from��the��so-called��“theoret�cal��modern�ty”��(exemplary���llustrated�� by�� Newton’s�� Principia�� and�� Kant’s�� f�rst�� Critique),�� but�� �t�� �s�� also��character�st�c,��mutatis��mutandis,��of�� the��ma�n��abstract��contemporary�� theor�es��of��sc�ence,��the��structural-abstract��theor�es.��And��th�s��k�nd��of��theor�es��can��determ�ne,��by��rat�onal��reconstruct�on,��the��essent�al��type��of��Kant�an��theor�z�ng���n��all��doma�ns��of���ts��transcendental��program.

On��the��other��hand,��the��structural���nterpretat�on��of��the��Kant�an���dea��of��law��can��offer��some��elements��for�� the�� theoret�cal�� reconstruct�on��and��part�al�� just�f�cat�on��of��“procedural”���nterpretat�on,��for��example,��of���ts��emphas�s��on��human��act�on��and��on���ts��cond�t�ons��of��rat�onal�ty.

The��development’s��phases��of�� the�� �nterpretat�on��of��Kant’s��moral��ph�losophy��sketched��above��correspond��w�th��the��three��movements���n��the���nterpretat�on��of��Kant�an��ph�losophy���n��general,��presented��by��Amer�ks7��as�� three��“waves��of�� �nterpretat�on”:��the��f�rst,��represented��by��the��theoret�cal��reconstruct�ons��of��Kant�an��ph�losophy���n��the��works��of��H.��Cohen,��P.��Natorp��and��E.��Cass�rer,��or��by��the��commentar�es��of��H.J.��Paton��or��N.��Kemp��Sm�th,��offered��“extens�ve��synopt�c��treatments”,��h�stor�cally��grounded��and��comprehens�vely��conce�ved.��In��the��second��wave��of���nterpretat�on,��represented��by��the��works��of��em�nent��analyt�c��ph�losophers��such��as��W.��Sellars,��P.F.��Strawson,��J.��Bennett��et��al.,��the���nterpretat�on��emphas�sed��“the��cr�t�cal��reconstruct�on��of��arguments��that��were��somet�mes��connected��only��loosely��to��the��or�g�nal��text��but��very��effect�vely��engaged��central�� �ssues�� �n��contemporary��analyt�c��ph�losophy”.��Focused��on��“r�gour��and��current�� �ssues”,�� th�s�� �nterpretat�on��“came��w�th��the��cost��of�� leav�ng��most��of�� the��or�g�nal��context��of��Kant’s��work��out��of��s�ght”.��The�� th�rd��wave,��represented��by��H.��All�son,��P.��Guyer,��D.��Henr�ch,��G.��Prauss,��“has��the��spec�al��mer�t��of��comb�n�ng��the��h�stor�cal��concerns��of�� the��n�neteenth��century��w�th�� the��demands�� for��clar�ty��and��relevance��ra�sed���n��the��twent�eth��century”.��But��what���s��m�ss�ng��from��th�s��new��wave��of�� �nterpretat�on,�� �n��Amer�ks’s��v�ew,�� �s�� the��“v�s�on��of�� the��whole��Kant�an��corpus��character�st�c��of��the��f�rst��wave”.8

Th�s�� v�s�on��of�� the��whole�� cannot�� be��obta�ned,�� �n��my��op�n�on,��merely��by��extend�ng��the��scope��of��the��d�rect��commentar�es��of��Kant’s��works,��or��by��re�ntegrat�ng��the��h�stor�cal��d�mens�on�� �n�� the��rat�onal�� reconstruct�ons��of��analyt�c��ph�losophers.��Th�s��global��and��synopt�c��k�nd��of���nterpretat�on��can��be��obta�ned��only��by��a��new��k�nd��of�� rat�onal�� reconstruct�on��of��Kant�an��ph�losophy,��a��“theoret�cal�� reconstruct�on”��wh�ch��a�ms�� to��br�ng�� �nto��prom�nence�� the��general�� type��of��Kant�an�� theor�es��and��of�� the�� subjacent�� structure��of�� the��ent�re�� transcendental��program.��Th�s��new��k�nd��

K.��Brad�ng,��“Newton’s��law-const�tut�ve��approach��to��bod�es:��A��response��to��Descartes”,�� �n��Jan�ak,��Andrew,��Er�ch��Schl�sser��(eds.),��Interpreting��Newton:��Cr�t�cal��Essays,��Cambr�dge,��Cambr�dge��Un�v.��Press.��2012.

��7�� In��h�s��Interpreting Kant’s Critiques,��2003.��8�� K.��Amer�ks,��2003:��2-4.

6 �� What��does��“Metaphys�cs”��mean���n��Kant’s��Groundwork��...����/����Il�e��PARVU������������7

of�� rat�onal�� (re)construct�on,��a��very��common��procedure�� �n�� sc�ence,��was��appl�ed���n�� the��context��of��ph�losoph�cal�� theor�es�� �n�� the��case��of��Kant’s��f�rst��Critique.9��Th�s��k�nd��of��reconstruct�on�� �s��not��a��d�rect��commentary��of��Kant�an’s��work��or��a�� log�cal��reconstruct�on�� w�th�� new�� conceptual�� �nstruments�� of�� Kant�an�� theory�� or�� of�� �ts���nferent�al��structure.10��It��a�ms��to��present��the��“theoret�cal��form”��of��the��“new��sc�ence”��of��the��Critique of Pure Reason,�� to��reconstruct���ts��underly�ng��structure��as��a��spec�al���nstance��of��a��more��general��type��of��theory��construct�on,��and��eventually��to��just�fy���ts��ep�stemolog�cal��status��and��value.��Th�s��k�nd��of��reconstruct�on��can��make��expl�c�t��the��metaphys�cal��foundat�ons��of�� the��Kant�an-type��of�� theor�zat�on,��wh�ch��underl�es�� �ts��ent�re��general�� transcendental��program��and��can��offer��a�� leg�t�mat�on��bas�s��for�� the�r��un�ty��and���nternal��cons�stency.

Th�s�� type��of�� reconstruct�on��was��extended�� to��Kant’s��eth�cal�� theory;11�� �t��can��be�� appl�ed��w�th��m�nor�� adjustments�� to�� all�� theor�es�� of�� pract�cal�� reason�� and��of��reflect�ve�� judgement.�� In�� the��debate��between��real�sts��and��construct�v�sts�� the��usual��strateg�c��procedures��cons�st��e�ther���n��the��analys�s��of��Kant’s��arguments��(w�th��spec�al��emphas�s��on��the�� just�f�cat�on��of�� the��Categor�cal��Imperat�ve�� �n��Grundwork�� III),��or���n�� the��cho�ce��of��one��or��another�� from��the�� formulas��of��Categor�cal�� Imperat�ve��as��the��genu�ne��“exponent”��of��Kant’s��pos�t�on,��for��example,�� the��formula��of��human�ty��for�� real�st�� read�ngs,��and��formulas��of��un�versal�� laws��and��of��k�ngdom��of��ends,�� for��construct�v�sts.12��But��these��strateg�es��are��obv�ously���nconclus�ve.��Ne�ther��read�ng��of��th�s��k�nd��can��be��dec�s�ve.��In��order��to��overcome��th�s��alternat�ve��we��must��reformulate��the��problem��at��a��h�gher��level��of��abstract�on��by���ntroduc�ng��a��new��conceptual��frame��for��the��analys�s��of��the��metaphys�cal��ground�ngs��of��moral��ph�losophy.

My�� construct�ve�� proposal,�� �n�� a�� prel�m�nary�� statement,�� �s�� to�� understand��metaphys�cal�� comm�tments�� of�� Kant’s�� moral�� ph�losophy�� start�ng�� from�� a��reconstruct�on��of��h�s�� theory��of��pract�cal�� reason�� �n�� the��abstract�� framework��of�� the��structural�st��metatheory��of�� sc�ence��and�� to��eluc�date�� �n�� th�s��manner�� the��“world-project”��of��the��nuclear��theory��of��Kant’s��program��as��determ�ned��by��the��matr�x��of���ts��fundamental��laws��(�.e.,�� the��moral��law��w�th���ts��ma�n��“d�mens�ons”��expressed��by��the��“structural�� formulas”��of�� the��Categor�cal�� Imperat�ve:��Formula��of��Un�versal��Law,��Formula��of��Autonomy��and��the��Formula��of��Human�ty).��Th�s��law��(the��moral��law)��as��determ�nat�ve��structure��(“transcendental�� form”���n��Kant’s�� term�nology)��represents���n�� �ts�� �ntegral��express�on��the��genu�ne��“exponent”��of��Kant�an��general��metaphys�cs��of��moral��ph�losophy,��determ�ned��by��the��“sc�ent�f�c��form”��(�ts��form��“as��a��sc�ence”)��of��these��type��of��theor�es.��Th�s��k�nd��of��general��metaphys�cs��or��ontology��represents��a��world-construct�on,��a��“const�tut�on”��of��a��fundamental��and��determ�nat�ve��realm.��In��th�s��sense,��the��ontology��of��Kant’s��moral��ph�losophy,��as��a��ground�ng��metaphys�cs,��has��

��9�� I.��Parvu,��The Possibility of Experience.��A Theoretical Reconstruction of��Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason��(In��Roman�an)��Bucharest,��Pol�te�a��SNSPA,��2004.

10�� As��was��real�zed���n��many��stud�es��by��H.��Scholz,��J.H�nt�kka,��W.��Stregmueller,��M.��Fr�edman,��a.��o.

11�� V.��Muresan,��Commentary�� to��Kant’s��Groundwork�� for�� the��Metaphys�cs��of��Morals�� (�n��Roman�an),���n��Immanuel��Kant,��Intemeierea metafizicii moravurilor,��Bucurest�,��Human�tas.��2006.

12�� See��P.��Formosa,��“Is��Kant��a��Moral��Construct�v�st��or��a��Moral��Real�st?”���n��European��Journal of Philosophy,��2011:��1-27.

no��such��object�ves��as��to��make��expl�c�t��the��ontolog�cal��comm�tments��of��“reg�mented”��theor�es�� (reconstructed�� as�� formal�� theor�es�� �n�� f�rst-order�� log�c,�� as�� �n�� Qu�ne’s��ontology),��or��to��expose��the��poss�ble��referents��of��eth�cal��statements��(as���n��analyt�cal��meta-eth�cs).��Rather,���ts��ma�n��task���s��to��“f�nd��the��exponents”��(“exponieren”)��of��the��moral��“phenomena”��as��the�r��determ�nat�ve��laws��and��grounds.��The��moral��ontology,��determ�ned��by��the��structural��formulas��of��the��Categor�cal��Imperat�ve��as��a��ground�ng��metaphys�cs��has�� an�� analogue�� funct�on��w�th�� the��Analog�es��of��Exper�ence,�� the��“transcendental��laws��of��nature”��of��the��f�rst��Critique,��namely,��to��“really��exh�b�t�� the��un�ty��of��nature���n��the��comb�nat�on��of��all��appearances��under��certa�n��exponents”.13

In��the��ph�losoph�cal���nterpretat�on��or��reconstruct�on��of��Kant’s��eth�cs��we��can��f�nd��many���mportant��stud�es���n��wh�ch��the��metaphys�cal��d�mens�on��of��h�s��moral��theor�z�ng��was��underl�ned���n��var�ous��degrees��and��was��argued��us�ng��d�fferent��rat�onal��techn�ques��or��d�fferent�� �nterpret�ve��schemes,��ma�nly��determ�ned��by��part�cular��ph�losoph�cal��a�ms.��I��w�ll��present���n��the��follow�ng��part��of��my��study��some���mportant��proposals���n��th�s��d�rect�on,��most��of��them��neglected���n��contemporary��Kant�an��secondary��l�terature,��wh�ch�� �s��dom�nated��by�� the��analyt�c�� repud�at�on��of�� the��ontolog�cal��d�mens�on��of��eth�cs�� (as��exemplar�ly��expressed�� �n��Putnam’s��Ethics��without��metaphysics).��The��f�rst��ph�losopher��who��tr�ed��to��make��expl�c�t�� the��ontolog�cal��s�gn�f�cance��of��Kant’s��metaphys�cal��foundat�on��of��eth�cs,��as��a��part��of��a��grand�ose��reconstruct�on��of��Kant�an��transcendental��program��(“die��Wiederherstellung der Kantischen Philosophie”)��was��Hermann��Cohen.��He��argued��for��the���dea��of��an��“eth�cal��real�ty”��as��a��poss�b�l�ty��cond�t�on��for�� the��object�v�ty��of��moral�� judgements.��In��h�s��metaphys�cal��foundat�on��of��moral�� theory��Cohen�� tr�ed�� to�� �m�tate�� the�� two��d�fferent��procedures��of��Kant’s��just�f�cat�on��of��the��transcendental��theory-core��of��theoret�cal��ph�losophy,��presented��as��proceed�ng��accord�ng��to��a��“synthet�c��method”���n��the��f�rst��Cr�t�que��and��as��follow�ng��an��“analyt�c��method”�� �n��Prolegomena.�� In��h�s�� f�rst��attempt�� to�� reconstruct��Kant’s��metaphys�cal�� foundat�ons��of��moral��ph�losophy��(�n��Kants Begrundung der Ethik,��1877)��Cohen��argued��that��by��transcendental��reflect�on��on��the���dea��of��a��pure��w�ll��one��can��determ�ne�� the��poss�b�l�ty��cond�t�ons�� for��establ�sh�ng�� the��object�ve�� real�ty��of��moral��concepts,��and��of��the��object�v�ty��of��moral��judgements.��In��a��second��approach,��(�n��Ethik der reinen��Willens,��1904),��the��reconstruct�on��proceeds,��as���n��the��Prolegomena��formulat�on��of�� the�� transcendental�� theory,�� from��a��“fact��of��sc�ence”��(not��as�� �n�� the��second��Kant�an��Critique,��from��the��“fact��of��reason”),��but��th�s��t�me��the��“Faktum der Wissenschaft”��cannot��be��the��accepted��class�cal��mathemat�cs��and��the��“pure��natural��sc�ence”��(w�th��the�r��object�ve��and��un�versally��val�d��statements),��but��a��“soc�al��sc�ence��of��human�ty”,��namely,��“the��sc�ence��of��jur�sprudence”,��a��“formal��sc�ence”��of��human��act�on,��the��sc�ence��of��“un�versal��laws��of��human��act�on”;��th�s��theory��can��be��accepted��as��a��“fact��of��sc�ence”,��as��the��“g�ven”��for��transcendental��“regress�ve”��determ�nat�on��(and�� just�f�cat�on)��of�� the��general�� foundat�ons��of��every��human��act�on��and��rule��of��behav�our.��By�� transcendental��analys�s��of�� th�s��“g�ven��sc�ence”,��we��can��ascend�� to��the��essent�al��features��of��the��moral��laws,��at��the�r��determ�nat�ve��funct�on��for��“eth�cal��real�ty”.��Th�s��transcendental-metaphys�cal��foundat�on��of��eth�cs���s��mandatory���f��eth�cs��tr�es�� to��rema�n��a��“ph�losoph�cal��d�sc�pl�ne”,��and�� �ts��ma�n�� task��as��a��ph�losoph�cal��theory��(�ts��“sc�ent�f�c��theme”,��die Aufgabe)�� �s�� to��demonstrate��the��val�d�ty��of��moral��

13�� Critique of Pure Reason:��A��216-B��263.��

8 �� What��does��“Metaphys�cs”��mean���n��Kant’s��Groundwork��...����/����Il�e��PARVU������������9

judgements��and,��correlat�vely,�� the��poss�b�l�ty��of��“another��k�nd��of�� real�ty”.14��That���s��the��reason��why��Kant��was,��s�nce��Plato,��the��f�rst��who��has��properly��determ�ned��the��“theme��of��eth�cs”.��For��Kant,��as��for��Plato,��every��attempt��to��rebu�ld��the��foundat�ons��of��eth�cs��must��g�ve��a��solut�on�� to�� the��“ontolog�cal��Aufgabe”,��of�� the��poss�b�l�ty��of��an��“eth�cal��real�ty”.��Th�s���s��a��necessary��cond�t�on��for�� the��poss�b�l�ty��of��eth�cs��as��a��genu�ne��sc�ence.

A��very�� �mportant��contr�but�on��(but��also��quas�-generally�� �gnored��even��by��the��“fr�ends”��of��a��real�st��construal��of��Kant’s��moral��ph�losophy)���s�� to��be��found,�� �n��my��op�n�on,�� �n�� the��study��“The��metaphysical aspect of Kant’s moral philosophy”��of��the��Amer�can��ph�losopher��Robert��E.��Gahr�nger,��publ�shed�� �n��Ethics�� �n��1954,��as��an��extended��vers�on��of��a��very��short��paper,��“Moral Law”��(1953),��and��followed��by��another�� study,��“The Foundation of Necessity in Practical Reason”�� (1962).��The��general�� thes�s��of��h�s��perspect�ve���s�� that�� the��contemporary��“general�� lack��of��respect��for��the��metaphys�cal��aspect��of��Kant’s��reor�entat�on���n��thought”���s��partly��“respons�ble��for�� the�� common�� fa�lure�� to�� apprec�ate�� the��power��of��h�s��moral��ph�losophy.��H�s��central��po�nts��–��h�s�� concept�on��of�� a�� s�ngle��moral�� law,��h�s�� formal�sm,�� and�� the��parallel��between��the��Critiques��–��are��generally��condemned,��and��we��f�nd��no���nterest���n�� the��concept�ons��essent�al�� to��h�s��argument��–��the��form��of�� the��w�ll,�� the��pr�nc�ples��of��self-cr�t�c�sm,�� the��metaphys�cs��of��Freedom.��Kant�� �s�� left��w�th��no��po�nt��and��no��argument”.15��Gahr�nger’s��concept�on��deserves��an��analyt�cal��commentary,��but��for��the��moment���t�� �s�� �mportant�� to��present��only��some��of���ts��ma�n��theses.��In��the��f�rst��place,��Gahr�nger��accepts��the��d�st�nct�on��between��appearances��and��th�ngs-�n-themselves��as��an��ontolog�cal��one,��wh�ch���s��reformulated��from��the��v�ewpo�nt��of��pract�cal��reason��as��a��d�st�nct�on��between��“two��reg�ons��of��real�ty”,��or�� two-worlds,�� the��phenomenal��and��the��moral��world,��both��be�ng��d�st�ngu�shed��and��determ�ned��“as��worlds”��by��the�r��“character�st�c��k�nds��of��lawfulness”,��the��law��of��nature��on��the��one��hand��and��the��moral��pr�nc�ples��on��the��other��hand.��But,��and��th�s���s��a��very��s�gn�f�cant���dea,��the��“metaphys�cal��comm�tments”��of��Kant’s��theor�es��are��not��determ�ned��by��the�r��“part�cular”��laws,��but��only��by�� the��“a��pr�or��� laws��and��pr�nc�ples��of�� two��type��of�� lawfulness��def�n�t�ve��of��two��reg�ons��of��real�ty”.16��In��other��words,��what���s��determ�nat�ve��for��the��“theoret�cal��const�tut�on”��of��a��natural��or��moral��world���s��essent�ally�� the��“a��pr�or���formal�� laws”��or�� the��“formal��Pr�nc�ple��of��pr�nc�ples”�� (the��moral�� law).��Only�� these�� structural��express�ons��of�� lawfulness�� can��be��accepted��as�� “genu�nely��const�tut�ve��of�� the�r��respect�ve��reg�ons��of��real�ty”,��only��at��th�s��level��can��we��determ�ne��the��“metaphys�cal��cond�t�on”,��noet�c��and��ontolog�cal��at��the��same��t�me,��for��these��two��realms��of��real�ty.��By��hav�ng�� stressed�� the��world-const�tut�ve�� role��of�� the��natural�� and��moral�� laws,��Kant,�� �n��Gahr�nger’s��op�n�on,��had��succeeded�� �n�� re�nterpret�ng��“the��old��doctr�ne��of��essence���n��terms��of��the��modern��doctr�ne��of��law”��and���n��h�s��modal�ty��he��at��once��“overcomes��the��dogmat�sm��of��the��old��attempt��to��ground��eth�cs���n��some��occult��and��dogmat�c��essence��of�� the��human��and��preserve�� the��not�on��of�� �ntr�ns�c��pr�nc�ple”.17��

14�� Hermann��Cohen,��Kants Begrundung der Ethik,��Berl�n,��Dummlers��Vg.��1887:��4.15�� R.��Gahr�nger,��“The��Metaphys�cal��aspect��of��Kant’s��Moral��Ph�losophy”,��Ethics,��64,��4:��1954:��

277.16�� Ib�d.17�� Ib�d.,��278.��

The��“reg�on��of��Freedom��then���s��a��noet�c��and��ontolog�cal���dent�ty”��and��th�s��qual�ty��of��structural��lawfulness��can��un�fy��the��funct�on��of��a��moral��pr�nc�ple���n��the��“real�zat�on��of��Freedom”��and���ts��moral��qual�ty.��Th�s��moral��qual�ty�� �s��def�ned��metaphys�cally,���.e.���n��terms��of��the��“actual�ty��of��some��reg�on��of��be�ng”.��In��the��case��of��Freedom,���t���s��then��poss�ble��to��def�ne��“the��moral��character��of��an���mmed�ate��pr�nc�ple���n��terms��of���ts��ontolog�cal��funct�on”.��Th�s��connect�on��between��moral��goodness��and��freedom,��bas�cally��presented��as��a�� formal-structural��understand�ng��of�� the��moral��pr�nc�ples��substant�ates��Kant’s��cla�m��that�� the��Categor�cal�� Imperat�ve��(CI)�� represents��“the��a��pr�or��� form��of��any��f�n�te��pr�nc�ple”.18�� In�� th�s��perspect�ve��of�� the��“formal�� laws��of��moral�ty”,��CI�� �s��not��“an�� �mmed�ate��pr�nc�ple��but�� the�� form��by��wh�ch��part�cular��pr�nc�ples��make��categor�al��demands”.�� It�� �s��a��“const�tut�onal�� law,�� the��form��of�� the��const�tut�ve��relat�on��of��part�cular��pr�nc�ples��to��part�cular��w�lls”.��In��th�s��way���t���s��the��formal��cond�t�on��of��the��moral��world,��“the��formal��cond�t�on��of��the��self��as��object�ve��end”.19��In��th�s��perspect�ve��Gahr�nger��re�nterprets��the��mean�ngs��and��funct�ons��of��all��“formulas”��(“formulat�ons”)��of��the��CI��as��law-const�tut�ve��aspects��or��d�mens�ons��of��the��“form��of��Freedom”.��In��the��same��structural��manner���n��wh�ch��Kant��had��expressed���n��h�s��f�rst��Critique�� the��total�ty��of��the��“categor�al��moments”���n��a��s�ngle��un�f�ed��and��hol�st�c��formula,��Gahr�nger��proposes��to��compress���n��a��un�que��structural-formula��all��the��d�fferent��express�ons��of��CI,��of��the��formal��pr�nc�ple��of��the��w�ll.20��Th�s��analogy���s��founded��on��the��fact��that��“pr�nc�ples��or��max�ms��have��been��allowed��to��appear��much��as���f��they��were��forms,��g�v�ng��structure��to��acts��or��w�lls���n��the��same��way��that��emp�r�cal��concepts��determ�ne��phenomenal��objects”.21�� In�� th�s��way�� the��pr�nc�ple��or��max�m��g�ves��“a��new��k�nd��of��structure��to��behav�or��and��des�re��wh�ch��establ�shes��them���n��the��reg�on��of��Freedom��as��act��and��w�ll”.22��All��these��tra�ts��of��moral��laws��or��of��pr�nc�ples��of��moral�ty��are��s�gns��of��an��abstract��systemat�c��theory��(hav�ng���ts��proper��cons�stency��cond�t�ons,�� termed��by��Gahr�nger�� “transcendental�� cons�stency”),��wh�ch��can��be��correlated��w�th��concrete��moral��act�ons��only��by��a�� long��and��extremely��compl�cated��med�at�ng��reflect�on.��Th�s��was,���n��Gahr�nger’s��op�n�on,��not��the��expl�c�t��a�m��of��Kant’s��Foundations.��Rather,��h�s��ma�n�� �ntent�on��was�� to��bu�ld��a��“world��of��moral�ty”��as��a��“moral��un�verse,��an���ntell�g�ble��whole,���n��wh�ch��be�ng��r�ght���s��essent�ally��connected��w�th��be�ng��rat�onal”.23

Gahr�nger’s��conclus�on�� �s�� that��Kant’s��eth�cs��was��erected��on�� the��bas�s��of��a��“formal”�� theory��def�ned��by��structural��constra�nts��w�th��determ�nat�ve��ontolog�cal��funct�ons��and��power.��In��th�s��sense��the��“formal”��concepts��of��moral�ty,��“by��v�rtue��of��the�r��role���n��thought��[…]��prov�de��structure��for��one��reg�on��of��be�ng”��(Gahr�nger��1962:��41).��At��the��same��t�me,��one��of��the��most���mportant��aspects��of��Kant’s��moral��ph�losophy��expla�ned���n��th�s��perspect�ve���s���ts��cons�stency��(based��on��the��same��“law-const�tut�ve��v�ew��of��the��world”)��w�th��the��general��outlook��of��modern��sc�ence.

Spec�al�� k�nds�� of�� contr�but�ons�� to�� the�� development�� of�� a�� metaphys�cal��

18�� Ib�d.,��280.��19�� Ib�d.,��282.��20�� Ib�d.,��284.��21�� Ib�d.,��284-285.22�� Ib�d.,��285.23�� R.��Gahr�nger,��1962:��25.

10 �� What��does��“Metaphys�cs”��mean���n��Kant’s��Groundwork��...����/����Il�e��PARVU������������11

(ontolog�cal)��perspect�ve��on��Kant’s��moral��theor�z�ng��are��made��by��some��ph�losophers��pr�mar�ly�� �nterested�� �n�� the��const�tut�ve�� funct�on��of�� laws��and��of�� the��moral�� laws���n��part�cular,��expressed��by�� the�r��“formal”��nature.��The��Kant�an�� techn�cal�� term��of��“form”���s�� �ntended�� to��express�� the��essent�al��determ�nat�ve��funct�on��of�� the��general��laws��as��structural��cores��of��the��abstract��theor�es.��In��th�s��d�rect�on��the��analys�s��of��the��ontolog�cal�� funct�on��of�� the��formal��(a��pr�or�)�� laws��was��extended��by��Scheuermann��w�th��the���dea��of��a��un�versal��law��of��a��“system��of��nature”��from��the��perspect�ve��of��the��teleolog�cal�� judgement.��And���n��th�s��enlarged��context��we��can��understand��why��“the��concept��of��nature��as��a�� teleolog�cal��system��of�� rec�procal��causal�ty�� �s��an��adequate��model��for�� the��Categor�cal��Imperat�ve��as��a��pr�nc�ple��of��moral��act�on”,24��or�� the��fact��that��“the��formal��structure��of��natural�� teleology���s��not��merely��analogous�� to�� that��of��un�versal��law��of��freedom.��It���s��the��same���n��both��cases:��only��the��subjects��of��these��laws��d�ffer”.25��Th�s��un�ty��or��structural��analogy��g�ves��us��the��poss�b�l�ty��to��better��understand��the���nternal��coherence��of��all��formulas��of��CI,��“modeled��on��th�s��teleolog�cal��concept��of��nature”,��and��the��spec�al,���rreduc�ble��status��and��funct�on��of��the��“supreme”��pr�nc�ple��of��moral�ty.

Much�� more�� known�� and�� w�dely�� d�scussed�� are�� the�� contr�but�ons�� to�� the��understand�ng��of��Kant’s��metaphys�cal�� foundat�on��of��moral��ph�losophy��presented���n�� the��works��of��some��contemporary��prom�nent��Kant�an��scholars�� l�ke��E.��Watk�ns,��K.��Amer�ks,��A.��Wood,��R.��Langton,��C.��Voeller,��P.��Ka�n��a.o.��In��recent��years,��much��commented��on�� �s��Watk�ns’s�� reconstruct�on��of�� the��Kant�an�� �dea��of�� causal�ty�� �n��terms��of�� “natural�� powers”,�� an�� �nterpret�ve��perspect�ve�� that�� can�� contr�bute�� to��a��un�f�ed��understand�ng��of��natural�� and��“moral”��causat�on.�� In�� th�s��way��we��can��understand�� the��profound��analogy��between�� the��second��analogy��of��exper�ence��and��the��formula��of��autonomy��of��CI��as��a��new��type��of��“causal�ty��from��l�berty”.26��Very���mportant,�� �t��seems��to��me,��are��the��attempts��made��by��Carol��Voeller�� to��demonstrate��the��fundamental��const�tut�ve��funct�on��of��laws���n��the��ent�re��Kant�an��program,��from��the��transcendental��deduct�on��of��categor�es�� to�� the��“deduct�on��of�� the��moral�� law”���n��the��last��sect�on��of��the��Groundwork.27��Th�s,��aga�n,��can��expla�n��not��only��the���nternal��un�ty��of��Kant’s�� transcendental��program��on�� the��bas�s��on��a��“strateg�c��un�t”��of�� the��construct�ve��and��argumentat�ve��structure��but��also�� �ts��“external”��cons�stency��w�th��the��general��foundat�ons��of��modern��sc�ence.��As��a�� last��s�gn�f�cant��contr�but�on��to��a��better��understand�ng��of�� the��ontolog�cal�� foundat�on��of��Kant’s��moral��ph�losophy��I��can��only���nd�cate�� the��new��approach��formulated��by��Rosenkoether��as��a��“referent�al��read�ng��of��Kant’s��pract�cal��project,��accord�ng��to��wh�ch��the��max�ms��are��made��morally��perm�ss�ble��by�� the�r��correspondence�� to��objects,�� though��not�� the��ont�c��objects��of��Kant’s��theoret�cal��project��but��deont�c��objects��(what��ought��to��be)”.28

All��such��spec�al��analyses��and��eluc�dat�ons��of��some��central�� �ssues��of��Kant’s��metaphys�cal�� foundat�on��of��moral��ph�losophy��must��be��completed��and�� �ntegrated��

24�� J.Scheuermann��1987:��290.25�� Ib�d.,��292.��26�� See��E.��Watk�ns,��2005.27�� C.��Voeller��2001.28�� T.��Rosenkoether,��“Kant��on��Construct�on,��Apr�or�ty,��and��the��Moral��Relevance��of��Un�versal�-

zat�on”,��British Journal for the History of Philosophy,��6:��2011:��1143.��

�nto��a��new��k�nd��of��research��wh�ch�� tr�es�� to��uncover�� the��ontolog�cal��comm�tments��of��moral��theor�es��by��an��ascent��to��a��h�gher��level��of��abstract�on,��for��wh�ch��the��object��of�� �nvest�gat�on�� �s�� represented��not��by�� the��Kant�an��works�� (or��“d�scourses”,�� texts��or�� statements),��or��by��spec�f�c��Kant�an�� theor�es,��but�� rather��by�� the�� theory-types,��extens�onally��def�ned��by��some��classes��of��theor�es��w�th��the��same��structural��propert�es��and��hav�ng��s�m�lar��funct�ons��or��relat�ons��w�th��exper�ence��and��real�ty.

As��I��have�� tr�ed�� to�� formulate�� these�� th�ngs�� �n��another��paper,29�� the�� theoret�cal��form��of�� the��ent�re�� system��of��Kant’s��pract�cal��ph�losophy��can��be�� reconstructed��as��a�� fundamental�� theoret�cal��program��cons�st�ng�� �n�� the�� follow�ng�� levels:�� (1)��a��bas�c�� theory,�� represent�ng�� the��determ�nat�ve��matr�x��of�� the��program,�� the�� topos��of�� fundamental�� and�� foundat�onal�� research;�� (2)�� a�� “med�at�ng�� theory”�� (a�� set��of���nterconnected��theor�es��prev�ously��accepted,��of��models,��hypotheses,��methodolog�cal��rules,�� etc.)��wh�ch��“construct�vely��extend”�� the��bas�c�� theory��and��make��poss�ble��the��var�ous��spec�al�zat�ons;�� (3)��a�� fam�ly��of��part�cular�� theor�es,��or�� spec�al�� laws,���nterrelated�� by�� general�� constra�nts,�� w�th�� determ�nate�� objects�� or�� doma�ns�� of��appl�cat�on,��correspond�ng��to��part�cular��forms��of��human��exper�ence��or��act�on.��Kant’s��theoret�cal��system��of��moral��ph�losophy���s��an��arch�tecton�c��construct�on��art�culated���n��conform�ty��w�th��the��“formal”��constra�nts��of��the��“categor�al��moments”��(“moments��of��arch�tecton�c��un�ty”,�� the��essent�al��rules��wh�ch��guarantee��the��object�ve��reference��of�� the��conceptual��abstract��representat�ons),��establ�shed��by��the��f�rst��Cr�t�que.��Th�s��system��represents��a��modular��organ�zat�on��of��theor�es��(theory-elements);��the���ntegral��order��of��th�s��complex��system���s��determ�ned��by��the��“or�g�nal��un�ty��of��freedom”,��the��analogue��for��pract�cal��reason��of��the��famous��“transcendental��un�ty��of��appercept�on”,��and��by��the��formal��pr�nc�ple��of��moral�ty,��a��“pr�nc�ple��of��pr�nc�ples”.

The��most�� �mportant��aspect��of�� th�s��presentat�on��of��Kant’s�� �dea��of��a��sc�ent�f�c��form��of��pract�cal��ph�losophy��refers�� to�� the�� theory-type��correspond�ng��to�� the��bas�c��theory��of�� the��program.�� It�� �s��a��“formal”�� theory�� �n�� the��abstract-structural��sense,��a��“poss�b�l�ty��theory”,��w�thout��a��determ�nate��doma�n��of��reference��and��truth,��but��w�th��many��d�fferent��poss�ble��models��and��parad�gmat�c��exemplars.�� It�� �s��def�ned��by��a��un�versal��formal��structure��and��a��mult�pl�c�ty��of��d�fferent��poss�ble��ways��of��“theoret�c��art�culat�on”��of�� that�� fundamental��structure,��or�� the��“unfold�ng”��of��an��abstract��and��un�versal��categor�al��matr�x.��The��ma�n��structural��constra�nts��of��th�s��theory��represent��at�� the��same��t�me��the��fundamental��express�ons��of�� the��bas�c�� law;��or,��put�� �n��another��way,��the��bas�c��theory���s��def�ned��pr�mar�ly��by���ts��matr�x��of��structural��laws,��the��ground��and��the��source��of��all��lawfulness.

As��w�th��any��abstract-structural��theory,��the��theoret�cal��core��of��Kant’s��program���n��pract�cal��ph�losophy��adm�ts��alternat�ve��gener�c���nterpretat�ons,��d�fferent��formulat�ons��(analyt�c��or��synthet�c��“representat�ons”)��and��many��types��of��“theoret�cal��art�culat�on”��(for��example,��the��deduct�ve-ax�omat�c��Darstellung,��of��the��second��Critique).

Start�ng��from��th�s��general��reconstruct�on’s��pattern��(or���nterpret�ve��framework)��we��can��cons�der��that��the��bas�c��theory��of��Kant’s��pract�cal��ph�losophy,��as���ntroduced���n��the��Groundwork�� �n��a��synthet�c��presentat�on,�� �s��const�tuted��by��the��follow�ng��net��of��the��theory-elements��or��modules:��(�)�� the��f�rst��module��represented��by��a��s�ngleton,��the��“supreme”��pr�nc�ple��of��moral�ty:��a��formal��pr�nc�ple,��a��“pr�nc�ple��of��pr�nc�ples”��

29�� I.��Parvu,��Metaphys�cal��Foundat�on��of��Moral�ty.��2012,��forthcoming.

12 �� What��does��“Metaphys�cs”��mean���n��Kant’s��Groundwork��...����/����Il�e��PARVU������������13

wh�ch��constra�ns�� the�� form��of��all�� theoret�cal��developments,��hav�ng��a�� regulat�ve��funct�on��analogue,�� for�� example,��w�th�� the�� funct�on��of�� the��general��pr�nc�ple��of��relat�v�ty��or��the��cond�t�on��of��general��covar�ance��for��relat�v�st�c��theor�es���n��phys�cs,��or��w�th�� the��“general��pr�nc�ple��of��descr�pt�on�� theor�es”,�� �ntroduced��by��Russell�� �n��h�s��famous��On Denoting��from��1905;��(��)�� the��module��of��the��categor�al��scheme;��th�s��module���s��expl�c�tly���ntroduced��only���n��the��second,��analyt�c��representat�on’s��form��of��the��bas�c��theory��of��the��Critique of practical reason;���n��Groundwork���t���s��subst�tuted��by��the��general��categor�al��“moments”��act�ng��as��constra�nts��for��the��determ�nat�on��of��the��most���mportant��formulas��of��CI;��(���)��the��module��of��the��structural��formulas��of��the��CI,��express�ng��the��ma�n��“d�mens�ons”��of��the��moral��law;��th�s��structural-determ�nat�ve��law�� �s��essent�ally�� �nvolved��as��a��poss�b�l�ty��cond�t�on�� �n�� the��const�tut�on��of�� the��object�v�ty��of��moral�� judgement��and�� �n�� the��determ�nat�on��of�� the��“real��poss�b�l�ty”��of�� the��freedom��and��free��w�ll.��Th�s��module��def�nes�� the��ontolog�cal��project��of�� the��ent�re��pract�cal��ph�losophy;�� (�v)�� the��set��of�� the��“appl�cat�on�� formulas”��of��CI,��or��the��formulas-schemes,��an�� �mportant��class��of��appl�cat�on��pr�nc�ples;�� (v)��a��spec�al��module��conta�n�ng��only��the��Law��of��Nature��Formula��of��CI,��by��wh�ch��the��structural��moral�� laws��are��determ�ned��as��“Analog�es��of��moral��exper�ence”;��at�� the��same��t�me��th�s��formula��has��an���rreduc�ble��regulat�ve��role��for��the��success�ve��construct�on��of��the��doma�ns��of��pract�cal��reason.

Th�s��very��abstract��and��schemat�c��representat�on��of�� the��bas�c��structure��of�� the��Kant�an��program���n��pract�cal��ph�losophy��enables��us�� to�� formulate��as��a��“work�ng��hypothes�s”�� the��follow�ng���nterpretat�on��of�� the��mean�ng��of��Kant’s��“metaphys�cs”��of��moral��ph�losophy:�� �t�� represents��an��ontolog�cal��project��of�� the�� transcendental��construct�on��of��moral�ty,��an��ontology��def�ned�� �n��analogy��w�th�� the�� f�rst��Critique��along�� the��follow�ng�� l�nes:�� (a)�� �t�� �s��an�� �mmanent��or�� �nternal��ontology,��or��as��Kant��h�mself�� sa�d,��an��“�mmanent�� th�nk�ng”;�� th�s��means�� that�� the��ontolog�cal��hor�zon��of�� the��bas�c�� theory���s��not��const�tuted��by��some��“external”��comm�tments,��as�� �n�� the��case��of��Qu�ne’s��ontology,��or��as�� truth-makers�� for��some�� l�ngu�st�c��express�ons,��or��as��“facts”��des�gnated��by��moral��sentences��(as���n��analyt�cal��meta-eth�cs);�� �t�� �s��rather��const�tuted��as��a��“structural��model��of��be�ng”��by��the��formal��cond�t�ons��of��the��moral��law��as��structural��law;��th�s��“formal��project��of��be�ng”���s��not��a��der�vat�ve��result��or��an��external��adjunct�on��to��the��determ�nat�ve��form��of��the��bas�c��theory,��just�f�ed��by��some��sui generis��ph�losoph�cal��arguments,�� �t�� �s��essent�ally��an���nternal��component��of�� the��theory-core��as�� �ts��ontolog�cal�� �nternal��d�mens�on,��w�th��determ�nat�ve�� funct�ons��for��all��subord�nate�� levels��of�� theory��construct�on;�� the��structural�� laws��of�� the��bas�c��theory�� represent��not��only�� the��generat�ve��nucleus��of��all�� theoret�c��developments;��they��represent��at�� the��same��t�me,��as��structural-determ�nat�ve��“forms”,�� the��general���nternal��model��of��ex�stence�� �n�� �ts�� structural��determ�nat�on;�� (b)�� th�s��ontolog�cal��project��of��moral��ph�losophy�� �s��essent�ally��a��world-construct�on,�� the��project�on��of��an��organ�zed��and�� �nternally��determ�ned��whole;�� (c)�� th�s��moral��world�� �s��a�� law-const�tuted��world,��a��world��determ�ned��by��structural��laws��(the��structural��formulas��of��the��CI:�� the��formula��of��un�versal�� law,��the��formula��of��autonomy��and��the��formula��of��human�ty);��th�s���dea��can��be��understood��as��a��general�zat�on��at��the��level��of��an���ntegral��world��of�� the��Newton�an��concept�on��of�� law-const�tut�ve��approach���n��the��def�n�t�on��of�� the��propert�es��of��phys�cal��objects��(as��presented��by��Brad�ng��2012);�� the��fact�� that��Kant�� �ntroduces��for�� th�s�� funct�on��exactly�� those��formulas��of��CI��wh�ch��are��str�ctly��

analogous��w�th��the��fundamental��pr�nc�ples��(ax�oms��of��laws��of��mot�on)��of��Newton�an��rat�onal��mechan�cs��(med�ated��by��the��s�m�lar��Analog�es��of��Exper�ence��def�ned��by��the��Cr�t�que��of��Pure��Reason)���s��the��most���mportant��ev�dence��for��th�s��hypothes�s;��when��Kant��speaks��about��a��“world”,��he��speaks��of���ts��const�tut�on��by��causal�ty,��rec�proc�ty��and��permanent��substratum;30��(d)��th�s��new��ontolog�cal��model���s��obta�ned��by��a��sort��of��“rat�onal��general�zat�on”��of��the��natural��world��(Kant��speaks��expl�c�tly��of��an��“extens�on��of�� the�� theoret�cal��reason”);�� th�s�� �s��a��spec�al��k�nd��of��“extens�on”,��character�st�c��of��transcendental��ph�losophy,��an��extens�on��by��wh�ch��an���deal��prolongat�on��of��a��“natural’��realm��becomes���ts��very��determ�nat�ve��structure,���ts��ground�ng��level��as��a��poss�b�l�ty��cond�t�on;��(e)��be�ng��a��world��const�tuted��by��structural�� laws,�� th�s��ontology��def�nes��at�� the��same��t�me��a��fundamental,��ground�ng��level;�� �n��th�s��sense���t��can��be���ntegrated���n�� the��so-called��“ground�ng��metaphys�cs”,��an��ontology��not��only��“posed”��by�� the��ontolog�cal��comm�tments��of��the��statements��of��a��formal�zed��theory,��but��an��ontology��def�ned��by�� the��“ontolog�cal��pr�nc�ple”��(Wh�tehead),��wh�ch��demands�� to��conce�ve��someth�ng��as��ex�stent��only�� �f�� �ts�� ex�stence�� �s��grounded�� �n�� some��determ�nat�ve��law,���n��a��level��of��real�ty��or��a��generat�ve��structure.��In��th�s��sense��the��Kant�an��moral��ontology��presupposes��a��deep��mean�ng��of��real�ty��or��ex�stence,��a��real�ty��“posed”��as��a��fundamental��ground.

I��must��concede��th�s���s��only��an��abstract��model��for��the��ontolog�cal��component��of��the��structural��theory��of��Kant’s��moral��ph�losophy;���t���s��a��representat�on��at��the��level��of��a��“general��algebra”��of��the��fundamental��“moments”��of��the��structural��determ�nat�on��of��a��moral��real�ty.��It���s��a��theoret�cal��construct,��a��“doctr�nal��funct�on”��wh�ch��must��be���nstant�ated�� �n��concrete��modal�t�es�� �n��order�� to��become��a��determ�nate�� theory.��Th�s��abstract��frame��can��have��an���mportant��expl�cat�ve��power��and��exactly��th�s��explanatory��power��represents���ts��adequacy��cond�t�on.

References

Abela,��P.��2002. Kant’s Empirical Realism,��Oxford,��Clarendon��Press.Amer�ks,��Karl.��2003.��Interpreting Kant’s Critiques,��Oxford,��Oxford��Un�v.��Press.Brad�ng,��Kater�ne.��2012.�� “Newton’s�� law-const�tut�ve�� approach�� to��bod�es:��A�� response�� to��

Descartes”,���n��Jan�ak,��Andrew,��Er�ch��Schl�sser��(eds.),��Interpreting��Newton:��Cr�t�cal��Essays,��Cambr�dge,��Cambr�dge��Un�v.��Press.

Cohen,��Hermann.��1877.��Kants Begrundung der Ethik,��Berl�n,��Dummlers��Vg.Formosa,��Paul.��2011.��“Is��Kant��a��Moral��Construct�v�st��or��a��Moral��Real�st?”,���n��European��Journal

of Philosophy,��2011:��1-27.Gahr�nger,��Robert��E.��1954.��“The��Metaphys�cal��Aspect��of��Kant’s��Moral��Ph�losophy”,��Ethics,��64,��

4:��277-291.Gahr�nger,��Robert��E.��1962.��“The��Foundat�on��of��Necess�ty���n��Pract�cal��Reason”,��International

Philosophical Quarterly,��2,��1:��25-49.Ka�n,��Patr�ck.��2006.��“Real�sm��and��Ant�-Real�sm�� �n��Kant’s��Second��Cr�t�que”,��Philosophy

Compass,��1/5:��449-465.

30�� Z.��Vendler,��“On��the��Poss�b�l�ty��of��Poss�ble��Worlds”,��Canadian Journal of��Philosophy,��1975,��V.��1:��61.

14 �� Kant’s��H�ghest��Pol�t�cal��Good����/����Sor�n��BAIASU������������15

Kant��Immanuel.��2011.��Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals,��A��German-Engl�sh��Ed�t�on,��Jens��T�mmermann��(ed.),��Engl�sh��translat�on��by��Mary��Gregor,��rev�sed��by��Jens��T�mmermann,��Cambr�dge,��Cambr�dge��Un�v.��Press.

Langton,��Rae.��2007.�� “Object�ve�� and��Uncond�t�oned��Value”,��Philosophical Review,�� 116:��157-185.

L�scomb,��Benjam�n,��J.��Bruxvoort,��James��Kruger��(eds.)��2010,��Kant’s Moral��Metaphysics,��Berl�n,��De��Gruyter.

Muresan,��Valent�n.��2006,��Commentary��to��Kant’s��Groundwork��for��the��Metaphys�cs��of��Morals��(�n��Roman�an),���n��Immanuel��Kant,��Intemeierea metafizicii moravurilor,��Bucurest�,��Human�tas.

Parvu,��Il�e.��2004.��The Possibility of Experience.��A Theoretical Reconstruction of��Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason��(In��Roman�an)��Bucharest,��Pol�te�a��SNSPA.

Parvu,��Il�e.��2012,��Metaphys�cal��Foundat�on��of��Moral�ty,��forthcoming.Rosenkoetter,��T�mothy.��2011,��“Kant��on��Construct�on,��Apr�or�ty,��and��the��Moral��Relevance��of��

Un�versal�zat�on”,��British Journal for the History of Philosophy,��6:��1143-1174.Scheuermann,��James.��1987.“Un�versal��Laws��of��Nature�� �n��Kant’s��Moral��Ph�losophy”,��Archiv

fuer Geschichte der Philosophie,��69:��269-302.Vendler,��Zeno,��1975.��“On��the��Poss�b�l�ty��of��Poss�ble��Worlds”,��Canadian Journal of��Philosophy,��

1:��57-72.Voeller,��Carol.��2001,��The��Metaphysics of the Moral Law. Kant’s Deduction of��Freedom,��New��

York��&��London,��Garland��Pb.��Inc.Watk�ns,��Er�c.��2005.��Kant and the Metaphysics of Causality,��Cambr�dge,��Cambr�dge��Un�v.��

Press.Watk�ns,��Er�c,��W�ll�am��F�tzPatr�ck,��2002.��“O’Ne�ll��and��Korsgaard��on�� the��Construct�on��of��

Normat�v�ty”,���n��The Journal of Value Inquiry,��36:��349-367.Wood,��Allen.��1999.��Kant’s Ethical Thought,��Cambr�dge,��Cambr�dge��Un�v.��Press.

Kant’s Highest Political Good�

Sor�n��BAIASU

Introduction2

The���dea��of��the��h�ghest��pol�t�cal��good���s���ntroduced��by��Kant���n��the��Metaphysics of Morals,��more��exactly�� �n�� the��Doctr�ne��of��R�ght,�� �n�� the��Conclus�on�� to��Chapter��III,��Cosmopol�tan��R�ght:��

“But���f�� �t��[the���dea��that��the��best��const�tut�on���s��that���n��wh�ch��power��belongs��to��the��laws,��not��to��human��be�ngs]���s��attempted��and��carr�ed��out��by��gradual��reform��

��1�� An��early��vers�on��of��th�s��paper��was��presented��to��the��Workshop��on��Perpetual��Peace,��organ�sed��by��Harry��Lesser���n��September��2011��at�� the��Un�vers�ty��of��St��Andrews.��I��am��grateful��to��the��organ�ser��for�� the���nv�tat�on,�� to��Adr�an��P�per,��for��extens�ve��comments��and��d�scuss�on,��and��to��part�c�pants�� to�� the��workshop��for�� the�r��quest�ons,�� �n��part�cular�� to��Peter��N�esen,��Lucas��Thorpe��and��Al�ce��P�nhe�ro-Walla.��The��f�n�sh�ng��touches��to��th�s��text��were��put��wh�le��a��Guest��Research��Professor��at�� the��Un�vers�ty��of��V�enna,��as��part��of�� the��ERC��Advanced��Project��“D�stort�ons��of��Normat�v�ty”;��I��am��grateful��to��the��project’s��PI��and��to��Keele��Un�vers�ty��for��mak�ng��th�s��poss�ble.

��2�� In��c�t�ng��Kant’s��works��the��follow�ng��abbrev�at�ons��are��used:�� CPR: Critique of Pure Reason��(Kritik der reinen Vernunft)��(1781;��1787),���n��Kant��Critique of

Pure Reason.��Tr.��Werner��S.��Pluhar.��1996a,��Hackett. GMM: Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals��(Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten)��

(1785),�� �n��Kant��Practical Philosophy.��Tr.��and��ed.��Mary��J.��Gregor.��1996b,��Cambr�dge��Un�vers�ty��Press,��43-108.

CPrR:��Critique of Practical Reason��(Kritik der praktischen Vernunft)��(1788),���n��Kant��Practical Philosophy.��Tr.��and��ed.��Mary��J.��Gregor.��1996b,��Cambr�dge��Un�vers�ty��Press,��137-271.

CJ:��Critique of Judgement��(Kritik der Urteilskraft)��(1790),���n��Kant��Critique of Judgement.��Tr.��W.��S.��Pluhar.��1987,��Hackett.

PP:��Toward Perpetual Peace��(Zum ewigen Frieden)��(1795),���n��Kant��Practical Philosophy.��Tr.��and��ed.��Mary��J.��Gregor.��1996b,��Cambr�dge��Un�vers�ty��Press,��311-52.

MM:��The Metaphysics of Morals�� (Die Metaphysik der Sitten),��compr�s�ng��the��Metaphysical First Principles of the Doctrine of Right��(Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Rechtslehre)��(1797)��and�� the��Metaphysical First Principles of the Doctrine of Virtue (Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Tugendlehre)��(1797),���n��Kant��Practical Philosophy.��Tr.��and��ed.��Mary��J.��Gregor.��1996b,��Cambr�dge��Un�vers�ty��Press,��353-603.

Anth:��Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View�� (Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht),�� �n��Kant��Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View.��Tr.�� and��ed.��Robert��Louden.��2006,��Cambr�dge��Un�vers�ty��Press.

�� ��Pag�nat�on��references�� �n�� the��footnotes��are�� to�� the��volume��and��page��number�� �n�� the��German��ed�t�on�� of�� Kant’s�� works:�� Kant�� Kants gesammelte Schriften.�� Ed.�� by�� the�� Kön�gl�ch��Preuß�schen��Akadem�e�� der��W�ssenschaften,�� subsequently�� Deutsche,�� now�� Berl�n-Brandenburg��Akadem�e��der��W�ssenschaften��(or�g�nally��under�� the��ed�torsh�p��of��W�lhelm��D�lthey).��1900-Georg��Re�mer,��subsequently��Walter��de��Gruyter.��(1900-).��References��to��the��Critique of Pure Reason��follow��the��A��(f�rst��ed�t�on),��B��(second��ed�t�on)��convent�on.

16 �� Kant’s��H�ghest��Pol�t�cal��Good����/����Sor�n��BAIASU������������17

�n��accordance��w�th��f�rm��pr�nc�ples,���t��can��lead��to��cont�nual��approx�mat�on��to��the��h�ghest��pol�t�cal��good,��perpetual��peace”.3

The��Conclus�on��to��Cosmopol�tan��R�ght���s���n��fact��also��the��conclus�on��to��Publ�c��R�ght,��wh�ch���s�� the��second��and��f�nal��part��of�� the��Doctr�ne��of��R�ght.��That��Kant�� talks��here��about��perpetual��peace���s��not��surpr�s�ng,��s�nce��perpetual��peace,��as��the��h�ghest��pol�t�cal��good,���s��supposed��to��be��“the��ent�re��f�nal��end��of��the��doctr�ne��of��r�ght��w�th�n��the��l�m�ts��of��mere��reason”.4��And,��yet,��what���s��surpr�s�ng���s��that,���n��sp�te��of��the��fact��that���t��seems��to��be��a��cruc�al��not�on��for��Kant’s��moral��ph�losophy,��the��not�on��of��the��h�ghest��pol�t�cal��good��rema�ns��largely��myster�ous��and��m�s�nterpreted.

The��a�m��of��th�s��chapter���s��to��address��some��problems���n��recent��d�scuss�ons��of��the��h�ghest��pol�t�cal��good.��My��cla�m���s��that��these��problems��stem��from��an��exaggerat�on��of�� the��s�m�lar�t�es��between��Kant’s��h�ghest��pol�t�cal��good,��perpetual��peace,��and��h�s��h�ghest��eth�cal��good,��wh�ch���s��more��extens�vely��exam�ned��by��Kant��and��has��rece�ved��much��more��attent�on��from��commentators.5��One��problem��ar�ses��when�� the��h�ghest��pol�t�cal��good�� �s��understood��as��a��complex��not�on,��wh�ch�� �ncludes,�� �n�� the��way�� �n��wh�ch��the��h�ghest��eth�cal��good��does,��not��only��moral�ty,��but��also��happ�ness.��Another��problem��ar�ses��when��perpetual��peace���s��regarded,��aga�n��by��analogy��w�th��the��h�ghest��eth�cal��good,��as��an��end��the��poss�b�l�ty��of��wh�ch��requ�res��pract�cal��postulates��or��some��replacement��of��pract�cal��postulates.��F�nally,��a�� th�rd��problem�� �s��generated��by��an��understand�ng��of��the��h�ghest��pol�t�cal��good��as��an��end��wh�ch��has��to��be��del�berately��enforced��by��a��person��or��a��few��persons��on��pa�n��of��depr�v�ng��us��of��freedom��and��moral��respons�b�l�ty,��a��cla�m��wh�ch��aga�n��presupposes�� that�� the��end��of��perpetual��peace��requ�res��for���ts��real�zat�on��eth�cal��mot�ves,�� �n��the��way���n��wh�ch��the��h�ghest��eth�cal��good��does.

In��the��next��sect�on,��I��w�ll��present��Kant’s��not�on��of��the��h�ghest��good��as��an���dea��and��as��an���deal.��In��the��th�rd��sect�on,��I��w�ll���ntroduce��and��argue��aga�nst��the��f�rst��type��of��m�s�nterpretat�on.��I��w�ll��clar�fy��further�� the��not�on��of�� the��h�ghest��pol�t�cal��good��through��an��exam�nat�on��of��Kant’s��d�st�nct�on��between��eth�cal��pr�nc�ples��and��jur�d�cal��norms.��In��Sect�on��5,��I��cons�der��the��second��and��th�rd��types��of��m�s�nterpretat�on.��In��Conclus�on,��I��br�ng��together��the��results��of��the���nvest�gat�on���nto��one��account��of��the��h�ghest��pol�t�cal��good,��an��account��wh�ch��I��cla�m��to��avo�d��the��problems��of��the��three���nterpretat�ons��d�scussed���n��th�s��chapter.

The-highest-good:-Idea-and-ideal

What��does��Kant�� take��the��h�ghest��good��to��be?��Th�s��not�on���s��f�rmly��part��of��Kant’s��pract�cal��or��moral��ph�losophy��(wh�ch���ncludes��eth�cs��and��pol�t�cal/legal��ph�losophy);��nevertheless,��my��start�ng��po�nt��w�ll��be��h�s��metaphys�cs��and��ep�stemology���n��the��f�rst��Critique.��There,���n��the��second��sect�on��of��The��Canon��of��Pure��Reason,��Kant��focuses��On��the��Ideal��of��the��H�ghest��Good,��As��a��Determ�n�ng��Bas�s��of��the��Ult�mate��Purpose��

��3�� MM��6:��355.��4�� MM��6:��355.��5�� I��make��haste��to��add��that��I��do��not��deny��that��s�m�lar�t�es��ex�st��between��these��two��not�ons.

of��Pure��Reason.6��Th�s�� �n�� �ts�� turn��suggests�� that��perhaps�� the�� f�rst��quest�on��should��be:��what,��accord�ng��to��Kant,���s��the���deal��of��the��h�ghest��good?��Go�ng��back��one��step��further��takes��us��to��On��an��Ideal��as��Such,��a��sect�on��at��the��beg�nn�ng��of��The��Ideal��of��Reason,��the��th�rd��and��f�nal��chapter��of��the��Transcendental��D�alect�c.

Kant��presents�� the��not�on��of��an�� �deal�� through��a��compar�son��w�th�� the�� �deas��of��reason��and��the��pure��concepts��of��the��understand�ng.��He��takes��an���deal��to��be��“further��removed��from��object�ve��real�ty�� than���s��even��the�� �dea”.7��The��pure��concepts��of�� the��understand�ng��or��categor�es��are��removed��from��object�ve��real�ty���nsofar��as��they��need���ntu�t�ons���n��order��to��refer��to��the��real�ty��of��the��objects��of��exper�ence.��They��can��refer��to��such��objects��when��they��are��comb�ned��w�th���ntu�t�ons.��W�thout��the��d�rect��reference��to��object�ve��real�ty��that��emp�r�cal���ntu�t�ons��offer,��pure��concepts��of��the��understand�ng��are��mere��forms��of�� thought.��Between��concepts��of�� the��understand�ng��and��object�ve��real�ty,��we��have���ntu�t�ons.

Compared��to��concepts,��the���deas��of��reason��are��further��removed��from��object�ve��real�ty,��s�nce��no���ntu�t�on��can��be��found��correspond�ng��to��these���deas.��Th�s���s��due��to��the��nature��of�� �deas��as��referr�ng�� to�� the��uncond�t�oned,��as�� the��sum��total��of��spec�f�c��cond�t�oned��aspects��of��exper�ence.��Reason��attempts�� to��un�fy�� these��cond�t�oned��aspects�� �n��a��systemat�c��way,��by��go�ng��from��the��cond�t�oned��to�� �ts��cond�t�ons��and��hop�ng��to��reach��“a��certa�n��completeness”.8��Ideas��refer�� to�� these��complete��ser�es��of��cond�t�ons,��but��there���s��no���ntu�t�on��and,��hence,��no��cogn�t�on��of��object�ve��real�ty��that��can��correspond��to��them.

For���nstance,��the���dea��of��the��world-whole��refers��to��the��sum��of��all��appearances��as��connected���n��cause-effect��l�nks.��What��we��can��exper�ence��are��phenomena���n��t�me,��or���n��space��and��t�me.��But��any��such��phenomenon��would��be��the��effect��of��some��other,��preced�ng��phenomenon.��In��try�ng��to��offer��a��un�f�ed��account��of��what��happens���n��the��world,�� reason�� �s��mov�ng��from��cond�t�oned��phenomena�� to�� the�r��cond�t�ons,�� �n�� the��attempt��to��complete��th�s��process��once��the��uncond�t�oned���s��found.��However,��s�nce��our��exper�ence�� �s�� �n��space��and��t�me,��we��cannot��have��exper�ence��of�� th�s��complete��ser�es,��or��of��the��world��as��a��whole��and,��aga�n,��th�s��shows��why���deas��are��even��further��removed��from��real�ty��than��the��categor�es��of��the��understand�ng.

An�� �deal�� �s�� bound�� up�� w�th�� the�� correspond�ng�� �dea,�� and�� �t�� refers�� to�� the��real�zat�on��of��the���dea;���t�� �s��an���nd�v�dual,��wh�ch��represents��the���nstant�at�on��of��the��correspond�ng���dea.��As��an���llustrat�on,��Kant��refers��to��some��moral��concepts,��wh�ch��(as��conce�ved���ndependently��from��pleasure/d�spleasure��and���n��relat�on��to��the��moral��law)��are���deas��of��reason��–��for���nstance,��v�rtue��or��human��w�sdom.��As��an���llustrat�on��of��the���deal,��we��can��say��that,��whereas��w�sdom���s��an���dea,��the��w�se��person���s��an���deal.9

Now��that��we��have��some���nd�cat�on��of��what��Kant��has�� �n��m�nd��when��he�� talks��about��an�� �deal,�� let��us��see��what��he�� takes�� the�� �deal��of�� the��h�ghest��good�� to��be.��H�s��start�ng��po�nt�� �s�� the��assumpt�on�� that�� there��are��moral��pr�nc�ples.10��These��moral��

��6�� A804/B832.��7�� A568/B596.��8�� A568/B596.��9�� A569/B597.10�� It���s��often��noted��that,���n��the��Groundwork,��Kant��attempts��to��offer��a��proof��for��the��ex�stence��of��

the��moral��law��through��freedom��and��that���n��the��second��Critique��he��changes��the��strategy��and��

18 �� Kant’s��H�ghest��Pol�t�cal��Good����/����Sor�n��BAIASU������������19

pr�nc�ples,�� s�nce�� they��are��a��pr�or��� and��prescr�pt�ve,��prov�de��pure�� reason�� (�n�� �ts��pract�cal,��prescr�pt�ve��use)��w�th��pr�nc�ples��of�� the��poss�b�l�ty��of��exper�ence,��more��exactly,��of�� the��exper�ence��of��act�ons��wh�ch��could��be��encountered���n��the��h�story��of��the��human��be�ng��and��wh�ch��would��be�� �n��accordance��w�th��moral��precepts.��Moral��pr�nc�ples��can��be��pr�nc�ples��of��the��poss�b�l�ty��of��exper�ence,��because��of��the��famous��Kant�an�� ‘ought�� �mpl�es��can’��d�ctum:��we��cannot��have��an��obl�gat�on�� to��perform���mposs�ble��act�ons��and,��therefore,��s�nce��the��act�ons��commanded��by��moral��pr�nc�ples��ought��to��occur,��they��are��poss�ble,��can��occur��and,��hence,��can��be��exper�enced.

Yet,�� �f��moral��pr�nc�ples��are��also��pr�nc�ples��of�� the��poss�b�l�ty��of��exper�ence,��then�� the�� act�ons�� commanded��by�� such��pr�nc�ples��must�� be�� �n�� some�� systemat�c��un�ty.��W�thout��a��systemat�c��un�ty,��contrad�ct�ons��between��such��act�ons��would��be��conce�vable��and,��hence,��one��of�� the��act�ons�� �n�� the��contrad�ctory��pa�rs��would��be���mposs�ble,��although��morally��requ�red��and,��hence,��poss�ble.

Kant��concludes��that��pure��reason���n���ts��pract�cal��use��has��causal�ty��w�th��regard��to��free��act�ons.��Yet,��th�s��does��not��g�ve���t��causal�ty��w�th��regard��to��the��laws��of��nature��and,��hence,�� the��systemat�c��un�ty��of��nature��cannot��be��proved.��By��contrast,��g�ven��the��systemat�c��un�ty��of��free��act�ons��and��g�ven��that��the��pr�nc�ples��wh�ch��gu�de��such��act�ons��are��pr�nc�ples��of��the��poss�b�l�ty��of��exper�ence,��as��shown��above,��pr�nc�ples��of��pure��reason���n���ts��pract�cal��use��can��be��shown��to��have��object�ve��real�ty.11��The��world���n��accordance��w�th��all��moral��laws��would��be��a��moral��world.��Next,��Kant��clar�f�es��the��status��of��th�s��world.

On�� the�� one�� hand,�� the�� moral�� world�� �s�� �ntell�g�ble,�� s�nce�� �t�� �s�� a�� world���ndependently��from��all��non-moral��purposes��and��all��obstacles��for��moral�ty,��such��as��the��tendency��to��pr�or�t�se��sens�ble��purposes��over��moral��ends.��In��th�s��sense,��the��moral��world�� �s��a��mere�� �dea.��Yet,��Kant��adds,�� �t�� �s��a��pract�cal�� �dea��w�th��pract�cal��force:�� �t��can��and��ought��to���nfluence��the��actual��world���n��order��to��br�ng���t��as��much��as��poss�ble���n��accordance��w�th�� the��moral�� law.��In�� th�s��sense,�� the�� �dea��of�� the��moral��world��has��object�ve��real�ty.

F�nally,��Kant��spec�f�es��that��th�s��object�ve��real�ty��that��the���dea��of��a��moral��world��has���s��not��to��be��understood��as��an��object��of���ntell�g�ble��or���ntellectual���ntu�t�on��(wh�ch���s��not��ava�lable��to��us��anyway),��but��as��hav�ng��the��same��status��as��the��actual,��sens�ble��world.��However,��th�s��moral��world��would��be��an��object��of��pure��reason���n���ts��pract�cal��use,��that���s,��a��state��of��affa�rs��that��rat�onal��be�ngs��w�th�n��th�s��world��w�ll��br�ng��about���nsofar��as��the�r��power��of��cho�ce���s,��under��moral��laws,���n��systemat�c��un�ty��w�th���tself��and��w�th��the��freedom��of��every��other��such��be�ng.

Next,��Kant��asks:�� �f��a��person��does��what��she��ought��to��do,��what��may��she��hope?��H�s��assumpt�on��here���s��that��hop�ng��a�ms��at��happ�ness.12��Happ�ness���s��the��sat�sfact�on��of��all�� �ncl�nat�ons��–��extens�vely,���ntens�vely��and��protens�vely.��Moreover,��accord�ng��to��Kant,���t���s

attempts��to��demonstrate��freedom��through��the��moral��law.��Accord�ng��to��th�s��account,��when��he��starts��from��the��moral��law,��Kant��just�f�es���t��as��a��fact��of��reason.��But��what��Kant��says��about��the��moral��law���n��the��f�rst��Critique��suggests��prec�sely��an��argument��through��the��fact��of��reason.��(A807/B835)

11�� A808/B836.12�� A806/B834.

“necessary��accord�ng��to��reason���n���ts��pract�cal��use,��so���t���s��equally��necessary��also��accord�ng��to��reason���n���ts��theoret�cal��use��to��assume��that��everyone��has��cause��to��hope��for��happ�ness���nsofar��as��he��has��made��h�mself��worthy��of���t���n��h�s��conduct”.13

Kant��regards���t��as��necessar�ly��the��case��that��happ�ness��w�ll��follow��moral�ty���n��a��moral��world��understood��as���ntell�g�ble��world.��The��cause��of��general��happ�ness,��Kant��th�nks,��would��be��freedom��under��the��moral�� law.14��Yet,��once��we��focus��on��the��actual��world,��where��others��may��not��act��accord�ng�� to�� the��moral�� law,�� the��nature��of�� th�ngs�� �n�� the��world��or��the��causal�ty��of��the��act�ons��accompan�ed��by��the��relat�on��to��moral�ty��can��no��longer��guarantee��happ�ness���n��accordance��w�th��moral�ty.15��The��connect�on��between��worth�ness��of��happ�ness��and��happ�ness���s��necessary��only��“�f��a��supreme��reason��that��commands��accord�ng��to��moral�� laws���s��also�� la�d��at�� the��bas�s��of��nature,��as��nature’s��cause”.16

At��th�s��po�nt,��Kant��def�nes��the���deal��of��the��h�ghest��good:��

“The�� �dea��of�� such��an�� �ntell�gence��where�n�� the��morally��most��perfect��w�ll,��comb�ned��w�th�� the��h�ghest��bl�ss,�� �s�� the��cause��of��all��happ�ness�� �n�� the��world,���nsofar��as�� th�s��happ�ness�� �s��exactly��proport�onate�� to��one’s��moral�ty�� (as�� the��worth�ness��to��be��happy),��I��call��the���deal��of��the��h�ghest��good.��Hence,��only���n��the���deal��of��the��h�ghest��or�g�nal��good��can��pure��reason��f�nd��the��bas�s��of��the��pract�cally��necessary��connect�on��between��the��two��elements��of��the��h�ghest��der�vat�ve��good,��v�z.,��the��bas�s��of��an���ntell�g�ble,���.e.,��moral��world”.17

As��an�� �deal,�� the��h�ghest��good��can��be��e�ther��or�g�nal��or��der�vat�ve.��The��or�g�nal��

13�� A809/B837.14�� One��may��wonder��here��how��Kant��can��answer�� the��follow�ng��object�on,��wh�ch��stems��from��

Kant’s��own��argument�� �n�� the�� second��Critique:�� there,��he��ment�ons�� that��one��obstacle�� to��the��real�sat�on��of�� the��h�ghest��good���s�� that��happ�ness�� �s��somet�mes��d�str�buted��arb�trar�ly,��because��we��do��not��have��control��over��the��way��th�ngs��happen���n��the��world��of��appearances,��and,��as��a��result,��the��consequences��of��our��act�ons��(even���f��the��act�ons��are��moral)��may��lead��to��unhapp�ness.��Let��us��say��I��am���n��a��compet�t�on��and��I��play��absolutely��fa�r��be�ng��also��the��best��compet�tor;��yet,��because��of��some��cont�ngent��factors��(say,��some��event��over��wh�ch��I��have��no��control��affects��me��deeply��and���nfluences��the��way��I��perform),��another��compet�tor��appears��to��the��select�on��comm�ttee��as��worth�er��of��the��benef�t��for��wh�ch��we��compete.��Th�s��would��be��a��s�tuat�on��where��my��worth�ness��to��be��happy���s��not��accompan�ed��by��the��deserved��happ�ness.��One��l�ne��of��reply��starts��from��the��assumpt�on��that��Kant��makes���n��the��f�rst��Critique�� that��the��moral��world���s���ntell�g�ble.��As���ntell�g�ble,��happ�ness��should��no��longer��have��to��do��w�th��the��sat�sfact�on��of��all���ncl�nat�ons��but��perhaps��w�th��the��sat�sfact�on��of��hav�ng��acted��morally.��In��fact,��Kant��suggests��th�s��when��he��refers��to��real�sat�on��of��the��h�ghest��good���n��the���ntell�g�ble��moral��world��as��an�� �mpl�cat�on��of�� the�� �dea��of��a��“system��of��moral�ty�� that�� rewards�� �tself”.��(A809/B837)

15�� Kant��seems��here�� to�� �ntroduce��a��more��spec�f�c�� reason�� �n��support��of�� the��postulate��of�� the��ex�stence��of��God��than��he��offers���n��the��second��Critique,��where��he��ment�ons��that��we��lack��the��necessary��control��over��nature���n��the��processes��whereby��happ�ness���s��obta�ned.��

16�� A810/B838.17�� A810-1/B838-9.

20 �� Kant’s��H�ghest��Pol�t�cal��Good����/����Sor�n��BAIASU������������21

h�ghest��good��(God)��creates��the��der�vat�ve��h�ghest��good��(the���ntell�g�ble��moral��world).��The�� �deal��of�� the��or�g�nal��h�ghest��good�� �s��determ�ned��by�� the�� �dea��of�� the��or�g�nal��h�ghest��good,��and��the��same��goes��for�� the��der�vat�ve�� �deal-�dea��pa�r.��G�ven��that,�� �n��the��moral��world,��all��obstacles�� to��moral�ty��are��removed,��one��may��wonder��why��the��or�g�nal��h�ghest��good��would��at��all��be��necessary��to��connect��the��two��elements��of��the��moral��world,��v�rtue��and��happ�ness.

Th�s,��however,�� �s��not��a��major��problem��for��Kant:�� the��removal��of��obstacles�� to��moral�ty��only��means��that��all��act�ons��w�ll��be��v�rtuous;���t��does��not��yet��mean��that��v�rtue��w�ll��be��rewarded��proport�onally��w�th��happ�ness.��On��the��way��to�� the��h�ghest��good,��as��ment�oned��by��Kant���n��the��second��Critique,��we��st�ll��have��at��least��the��obstacle��of��power,��wh�ch��stands���n��the��way��of��our��happ�ness,��s�nce��what��happens���n��the��world���s��cont�ngent��and��we��have��l�m�ted��power��to��control��th�s.��Hence,��the��second��postulate��of��pract�cal��reason:��the��ex�stence��of��God.18

The���nterest�ng��and��problemat�c���mpl�cat�on��of�� the��d�scuss�on��so��far�� �s�� that�� �t��seems��the��h�ghest��good��should��always��be�� thought��of��by��analogy��w�th�� the�� �dea��of��the��h�ghest��der�vat�ve��good��correspond�ng�� to�� the�� �deal��presented��by��Kant�� �n�� the��f�rst��Cr�t�que.��In��other��words,��whether��we��talk��about��the��h�ghest��pol�t�cal,��eth�cal��or��moral-phys�cal��good,��we��can��understand���t��as��the��necessary��connect�on��between��two��elements��of��the��moral��world��(v�rtue��and��happ�ness).��In��what��follows,��I��w�ll��exam�ne��the��problems��th�s�� �nterpretat�on��ra�ses��for�� the��h�ghest��pol�t�cal��good,��wh�ch��Kant��cons�ders��to��be��perpetual��peace.

Ethics-and-political-highest-good

In��h�s��“Kant’s��Pol�t�cal��Rel�g�on:��The��Transparency��of��Perpetual��Peace��and�� the��H�ghest��Good”,��Robert��Taylor��starts��from��the��famous��Kant�an��‘ought���mpl�es��can’��d�ctum,��wh�ch��he��states���n��the��follow�ng��form��for��the��part�cular��case��of��an��end:��

“[…]���f��we��have��a��duty��to��set��someth�ng��(e.g.,��the��h�ghest��good)��as��an��end,��we��are��author�zed��by��the��source��of��that��duty��–��our��own��pure��pract�cal��reason��–��to��bel�eve��that��end��poss�ble��so�� long��as�� th�s��bel�ef�� �s��not��ruled��out��by��theoret�cal��(speculat�ve)��reason”.19

Hence,���n��order��to��have��a��duty��to��pursue��a��certa�n��end,��a��person��has��to��have��a��bel�ef��that��the��end���s��poss�ble,��a��bel�ef��wh�ch���mpl�es��that��the��end���s��not���mposs�ble,��that���t���s��not��ruled��out��by��theoret�cal��reason.

The��problem,��Taylor��notes,�� �s�� that��persons��who��seem��rat�onal��nevertheless��somet�mes�� set�� themselves��ends��wh�ch�� seem�� to�� them�� �mposs�ble.��Cons�der,�� for���nstance,20��a��nov�ce��at��chess��who��happens��to��play��w�th��the��world��champ�on��and��st�ll��

18�� The��need��for��the��f�rst��postulate,��the���mmortal�ty��of��the��soul,���s��g�ven��by��the��obstacle��of��t�me.��Th�s���s��removed���n��the��moral��world��by��the��assumpt�on��that��all��l�m�ted��rat�onal��be�ngs��l�ke��us��act��morally.

19�� Robert��Taylor,��“Kant’s��Pol�t�cal��Rel�g�on:��The��Transparency��of��Perpetual��Peace��and�� the��H�ghest��Good”,���n��Review of Politics,��Vol.��72,��No.��1,��2010,��p.��6.

20�� Th�s���s��Allen��Wood’s��example,���n��Kant’s Moral Religion.��Cornell��Un�vers�ty��Press.��1970,��p.��

plays��w�th��the��goal��of��w�nn�ng��or21��the��moderately��talented��amateur��runner��who��sets��h�mself��the��goal��of��runn�ng��a��four-m�nute��m�le.

To��account��for��such��s�tuat�ons,��Taylor��proposes��a��d�st�nct�on��between��an��end��and��a��standard��or��cr�ter�on.��The��latter��offers��d�rect�on��for��effort,��allows��movement��towards���t,���t���s��attract�ve��and,��other��th�ngs��be�ng��equal,��be�ng��closer��to���t���s��des�rable.��Hence,��a��standard��or��cr�ter�on,��unl�ke��an��end,��can��be��set��by��a��person,��even��when��she��bel�eves���t�� to��be���mposs�ble.��Th�s��d�st�nct�on,��Taylor��cla�ms,��not��only��accounts��for��s�tuat�ons��wh�ch��seem��plaus�ble��(l�ke�� those�� �n�� the�� two��examples��above),��but��also��for��some��of��Kant’s��cla�ms.��In��part�cular,���n��the��Doctr�ne��of��R�ght,��Kant��cla�ms��that��perpetual��peace,��the��f�nal��end��of��the��doctr�ne��of��r�ght���s��“unach�evable”.22

One��way�� �n��wh�ch��Kant’s�� ‘ought�� �mpl�es�� can’��d�ctum��as�� appl�ed�� to�� ends���s��employed��by��Kant�� �s�� �n�� the��Ant�nomy��of��Pure��Pract�cal��Reason.��There,��Kant��seems��to��suggest�� that��we��can��take�� the��h�ghest��good��as��an��end��only�� �f�� the��h�ghest��good�� �s��a��poss�ble��end.��S�nce�� the��h�ghest��good,��as��we��have��seen�� �n�� the��prev�ous��sect�on,��represents��happ�ness��d�str�buted��proport�onally��to��v�rtue,�� �n��order��for�� th�s��necessary��l�nk��to��be��poss�ble,��Kant���ntroduces��the��postulates��of��pract�cal��reason��(the���mmortal�ty��of��the��soul��and��the��ex�stence��of��God).��If,��however,�� the��‘ought���mpl�es��can’��d�ctum��no��longer��holds,��for���nstance,��due��to��the��d�st�nct�on��between��an��end��and��a��standard,��then��we��no��longer��need��to��assume��the��h�ghest��good���s��poss�ble,���n��order��to��set���t��as��an��end.��The���mpl�cat�on���s��that��we��no��longer��need��the��postulates.

G�ven�� that��perpetual��peace,�� the��h�ghest��pol�t�cal��good,�� �s��presented�� �n�� the��Metaphysics of Morals�� as�� an��unach�evable��a�m,��we��can��make�� sense��of�� �t�� as�� a��standard.��But,�� �f��so,��we��no��longer��need��an��appeal�� to��postulates��of��pract�cal��reason��to��account��for.��Not��surpr�s�ngly,�� therefore,��Taylor��notes,��God��plays��almost��no��role���n��Kant’s��Doctr�ne��of��R�ght.23��W�thout��a��need��for��pract�cal��postulates,��Kant’s��moral��rel�g�on��v�rtually��d�sappears.��So,��one��poss�b�l�ty��would��be��for��h�m��to��revert�� to��the��cla�m��he��makes���n��the��second��Critique��that��the��poss�b�l�ty��of��the��h�ghest��good��must��be��assumed.

Accord�ng��to��Taylor,��th�s��leads��Kant���n��Perpetual Peace�� to��the��v�ew��that��God��offers��a��guarantee��of��perpetual��peace.24�� In��other��words,��once��we��assume��that�� the��h�ghest��pol�t�cal��good��must��be��poss�ble,���n��order��for���ts��real�zat�on��to��be��a��duty,��we��need��God��to��account��for���ts��poss�b�l�ty,���n��the��same��way���n��wh�ch,��on��the��bas�s��of��the��‘ought���mpl�es��can’��d�ctum,��Kant��must���ntroduce��the��postulates��of��pract�cal��reason��(�nclud�ng��that��of�� the��ex�stence��of��God)�� �n��order�� to��account��for�� the��poss�b�l�ty��of��the��h�ghest��good���n��the��second��Critique.��The��assumpt�on,���n��other��words,���s��that��the��s�m�lar�ty��between��the��h�ghest��eth�cal��good���n��the��second��Critique��and��the��h�ghest��pol�t�cal��good�� �n�� the��Metaphysics of Morals�� and��Perpetual Peace�� requ�res�� the��

21.21�� Th�s�� �s��Taylor’s��example,�� �n��“Kant’s��Pol�t�cal��Rel�g�on:��The��Transparency��of��Perpetual��

Peace��and��the��H�ghest��Good”,��op.��c�t.,��p.��7.22�� MM��6:��355;��Robert��Taylor,��“Kant’s��Pol�t�cal��Rel�g�on:��The��Transparency��of��Perpetual��Peace��

and��the��H�ghest��Good”,��op.��c�t.,��p.��8.23�� Robert��Taylor,��“Kant’s��Pol�t�cal��Rel�g�on:��The��Transparency��of��Perpetual��Peace��and�� the��

H�ghest��Good”,��op.��c�t.,��p.��9.24�� Robert��Taylor,��“Kant’s��Pol�t�cal��Rel�g�on:��The��Transparency��of��Perpetual��Peace��and�� the��

H�ghest��Good”,��op.��c�t.,��pp.��9-10.

22 �� Kant’s��H�ghest��Pol�t�cal��Good����/����Sor�n��BAIASU������������23

ex�stence��of��God,��as��long��as��we��assume��that��the��h�ghest��goods��are��ends��that��must��be��poss�ble���n��order��to��be��adopted,��rather��than��be�ng,��to��use��Taylor’s��terms,��standards��or��cr�ter�a.

Nevertheless,��I��th�nk��that��one��cruc�al��d�st�nct�on��that��Kant��draws���n��the��second��Critique,��as��part��of��h�s��argument��for��the��poss�b�l�ty��of��the��h�ghest��good,��needs��to��be��cons�dered��more��ser�ously.��Taylor��only��ment�ons���t��at�� the��beg�nn�ng��of��h�s��art�cle,��and��then���t��no��longer��plays��any��role,��although���t�� �s��I�� th�nk��cruc�al�� �n�� that��context.��As��a��result,��I�� th�nk��Taylor��quest�ons��unnecessar�ly��the��d�fferences��between��Kant’s��argument��about��the��h�ghest��eth�cal��good,�� �n��the��second��Critique��and��h�s��argument��about��the��h�ghest��pol�t�cal��good,���n��the��Doctr�ne��of��R�ght.

At��the��beg�nn�ng��of��the��second��chapter��of��the��D�alect�c��of��pure��pract�cal��reason,��Kant��says:��

“The��concept��of��the��h�ghest��already��conta�ns��an��amb�gu�ty��that,���f��not��attended��to,��can��occas�on��needless��d�sputes.��The��h�ghest��can��mean��e�ther�� the��supreme��(supremum)��or��the��complete��(consummatum).��The��f�rst�� �s�� that��cond�t�on��wh�ch���s�� �tself��uncond�t�oned,��that�� �s,��not��subord�nate��to��any��other��(originarium);�� the��second���s��that��whole��wh�ch���s��not��part��of��a��st�ll��greater��whole��of��the��same��k�nd��(perfectissimum)”.25

Kant�� talks��here��about��an��amb�gu�ty�� that��can�� lead�� to��needless��d�sputes��and�� th�s��amb�gu�ty���s��over��the��adject�ve��“h�ghest”.��The��term��can��be��taken��to��refer��e�ther��to��what���s��normat�vely��pr�mord�al��or��to��what���s��most��complete.��The��supreme��good���s��h�ghest���n��the��sense��that��there���s��noth�ng��normat�vely��more���mportant.��The��complete��good���s��h�ghest���n��the��sense��that��there���s��no��other��good��wh�ch���s��not���ncluded���n���t.

On��the��bas�s��of�� th�s��d�st�nct�on,��we��can��say��that��v�rtue��or��moral�ty��represents��the��h�ghest��good�� �n�� the�� f�rst�� sense,��namely,�� as�� the�� supreme��good��wh�ch�� �s��not��subord�nated��to��any��other��good,��but��wh�ch��subord�nates��the��good��of��happ�ness.��We��can��also��say��that��v�rtue��and��happ�ness���s��the��h�ghest��good,��as��the��complete��or��whole��good,�� �n�� the��sense�� that�� �t�� �s��more��comprehens�ve�� than��e�ther��v�rtue��or��happ�ness��taken���nd�v�dually.��The��supreme��good���s��not��complete,��s�nce���t��lacks��happ�ness;��the��complete��good��need��not��be��supreme,��s�nce��a��comb�nat�on��of��v�rtue��and��happ�ness��wh�ch��does��not��g�ve��pr�de��of��place��to��v�rtue��(�n��the��way���n��wh�ch��the��part�cular��v�ew��of��the��complete��good��does���n��Kant)���s��normat�vely��weaker��than��v�rtue.

In�� the�� l�terature,�� the��‘h�ghest��good’�� �s��usually�� taken��to��refer�� to�� the��complete��good.��Even��when�� the��d�st�nct�on��between�� the�� supreme��and��complete��goods�� �s��acknowledged,��and��even��when���t���s��clear��we��are��deal�ng��w�th��a��supreme��good��when��we��talk��about��perpetual��peace,��a��l�nk��w�th��the��complete��good���s��st�ll��preserved��and��th�s��l�nk���s��too��strong.��There��may��be��var�ous��reasons��for��th�s,���nclud�ng��Kant’s��use,���n��the��Anthropology,��of��the��express�on��“the��h�ghest��moral-phys�cal��good”,26��wh�ch��seems��to��suggest��a��comb�nat�on��of��v�rtue��and��happ�ness,��or,��as��we��have��seen���n��the��prev�ous��sect�on,�� the��way��Kant��def�nes�� the��h�ghest��good���n�� the��f�rst��Critique,��or,��f�nally,��Kant’s��d�scuss�on��of��the��h�ghest��good���n��the��second��Critique.

25�� CPrR��5:��110.26�� Anth��7:��277.

If��we��understand��Kant’s��h�ghest��pol�t�cal��good,��perpetual��peace,�� to��refer�� to��a��complete��good,�� then��we��can���ndeed��ra�se�� the��quest�on��of�� the��asymmetry��between��the��h�ghest��pol�t�cal��good�� �n�� the��Metaphysics of Morals,��and�� the��h�ghest��eth�cal��good���n��the��f�rst��or��second��Critique,��as��well��as���n��Perpetual Peace,���n��part�cular��the��asymmetry��of��these��not�ons���n��the�r��relat�ons��to��the��pract�cal��postulates:��no��appeal��to��the��ex�stence��of��God���n��the��Metaphysics of Morals,��but��reference��to��th�s��postulate���n��Perpetual Peace.��If��the��h�ghest��pol�t�cal��good���s��understood��as��supreme,��then��there���s��at��least��one��reason��why��the��pract�cal��postulates��are��not��needed:��unl�ke��the��complete��good,��the��supreme��good��does��not��have��the��two��elements��for��the��necessary��connect�on��of��wh�ch��we��need��to��account.

The��problem���s��that��Taylor��seems��to��be��aware��of��perpetual��peace��as��a��supreme��good.��Why�� then��does��he�� th�nk�� that��pract�cal��postulates��would��be��needed�� �n�� the��Metaphysics of Morals?��The��answer�� �s�� �n��h�s��v�ew��of�� the��pract�cal��postulates.��He��th�nks�� that��what��accounts�� for�� the��need��of�� the��pract�cal��postulates�� �n�� the��case��of��the��h�ghest��eth�cal��good�� �s��g�ven��by�� the��opac�ty��of��our��mot�vat�ons��and,��hence,��of��our��eth�cal��worth,��as��opposed�� to�� the��observab�l�ty��of��our��external��act�ons,�� the��only��act�ons��Kant���s��concerned��w�th���n��the��Doctr�ne��of��R�ght��of��the��Metaphysics of Morals.��Taylor��devotes��about��one��quarter��of��h�s��art�cle��to��an��account��of��how��opac�ty��makes���t��necessary��for��Kant��to��argue��for��the��pract�cal��postulates.27

Now,�� �f��pract�cal��postulates��are��needed�� to��expla�n�� the��poss�b�l�ty��of��v�rtue��or��moral�ty,�� then,��g�ven��that�� the��h�ghest��pol�t�cal��good,�� l�ke��v�rtue��or��moral�ty,�� �s��h�ghest��good���n��the��sense��of��supreme��good,��there���s��noth�ng��to��prevent��the��need��for��postulates���n��relat�on��to��the��h�ghest��pol�t�cal��good��too.��And��th�s��seems��to��be��beh�nd��Taylor’s��suggest�on��that,���n��Perpetual Peace,��Kant���ntroduces��the��guarantee��of��peace��that��God��can��prov�de�� to��play��a��s�m�lar�� role�� to�� that��of�� the��postulates��of��pract�cal��reason.��These,��on��h�s��account,��are��meant��to��overcome��the��obstacle��of��the��opac�ty��of��mot�vat�ons,��wh�ch��makes���t���mposs�ble��for��us��to��ascerta�n��w�th��certa�nty��our��eth�cal��worth��or,��as��Kant��calls���t,��our��v�rtue.

Taylor��may��have��a��d�ff�culty��here:��the��d�fference��between��perpetual��peace��and��the��h�ghest��eth�cal��good���s��not��s�mply��that��one���s��supreme,��whereas��the��other��one���s��complete;��g�ven�� that��perpetual��peace��represents�� for��Kant�� the��h�ghest��political��good,��perpetual��peace��should��be��understood��as�� the��supreme��good��g�ven��by�� the��un�versal��pr�nc�ple��of��r�ght,��rather��than��s�mply��by��the��categor�cal���mperat�ve.��Kant’s��h�ghest��pol�t�cal��good��requ�res��that��we��perform��act�ons���n��accordance��w�th��jur�d�cal��pr�nc�ples.��The��h�ghest��eth�cal��good,��by��contrast,��requ�res��that��we��perform��act�ons���n��accordance��w�th��eth�cal��pr�nc�ples��and��for�� the��sake��of�� these��pr�nc�ples.�� If��so,��the��h�ghest��pol�t�cal��good��does��not��ra�se�� the��puzzle��of��opac�ty��and��does��not��need��pract�cal��postulates��to��solve���t.��If��so,�� the��fact�� that��God��plays��no��role���n��relat�on��to��perpetual��peace���n��the��Metaphysics of Morals �s��not��an���ssue,��and��Taylor’s��start�ng��po�nt��proves��to��be��a��non-starter.��Before��I��return��to��Taylor,��let��me��exam�ne��further��the��relat�on,���n��Kant,��between��eth�cal��pr�nc�ples��and��jur�d�cal��norms.

27�� Robert��Taylor,��“Kant’s��Pol�t�cal��Rel�g�on:��The��Transparency��of��Perpetual��Peace��and�� the��H�ghest��Good”,��op.��c�t.,��pp.��13-18.

24 �� Kant’s��H�ghest��Pol�t�cal��Good����/����Sor�n��BAIASU������������25

The-ethical-and-the-juridicalI��w�ll��beg�n��w�th��Kant’s��d�st�nct�on��between��eth�cal��and��jur�d�cal��lawg�v�ng��or��norm-g�v�ng,��and��only��after��that��I��w�ll��turn��to��eth�cal��and��jur�d�cal��norms��as��such.28��Thus,��Kant�� �dent�f�es�� two��aspects��of��norm-g�v�ng:�� f�rst,��norm-g�v�ng��conta�ns��a��norm,��wh�ch��“represents��an��act�on��that���s��to��be��done��as��object�vely��necessary”;��secondly,��norm-g�v�ng��has��an�� �ncent�ve,��“wh�ch��connects��a��ground��for��determ�n�ng��cho�ce��to��th�s��act�on��subject�vely��w�th��the��representat�on��of��the��law”��or��norm.29��Hence,���n��g�v�ng��a��norm��or���n��norm-g�v�ng,��we��do��not��only��prov�de��a��norm��wh�ch��represents��a��duty,��but��also��connect��th�s��duty��to��a��ground��wh�ch��determ�nes��us��to��act���n��such��a��way��that��the��duty���s��fulf�lled��by��the��performance��of��the��act�on��represented��by��the��norm.

Now,�� the��d�st�nct�on��between��eth�cal��and�� jur�d�cal��norm-g�v�ng�� �s��drawn�� �n��Kant’s��account��by�� reference�� to�� th�s�� �ncent�ve.��Eth�cal��norm-g�v�ng��has��duty��as���ncent�ve,��whereas��jur�d�cal��norm-g�v�ng��adm�ts��also���ncent�ves��other��than��the���dea��of��duty.��What��th�s���mpl�es���s��that��we��can��have��jur�d�cal��norm-g�v�ng��wh�ch��has��duty��as��an���ncent�ve,��but��we��cannot��have��eth�cal��norm-g�v�ng��wh�ch��does��not��have��duty��as��an���ncent�ve.��It��must��also��be��noted��that,���n��order��for��a��duty��to��allow��enforcement,���t��must��be��of��a��spec�f�c��k�nd.��One��feature��determ�n�ng��enforceab�l�ty���s��external�ty:��jur�d�cal��dut�es��represent��outer��act�ons.30��But��there��are��other��features.31

A��related��d�st�nct�on��Kant���ntroduces��here���s��that��between��legal�ty��and��moral�ty.��Legal�ty�� refers�� to�� the��character��of��act�ons��performed��merely�� �n��conform�ty��w�th��a��norm,��whereas��moral�ty�� refers�� to�� the��character��of�� the��act�on�� that�� �s��performed���n��conform�ty��w�th�� the��norm��and��out��of��duty.��Th�s��means�� that��an��act�on�� that��has��moral�ty��also��has�� legal�ty,��s�nce�� �t�� �s��performed���n��accordance��w�th�� the��norm.��In��add�t�on,��however,��an��act�on��w�th��moral�ty��has��a��spec�f�c���ncent�ve,��namely,��that��the��act�on��to��be��performed���s��a��duty.32��Furthermore,���n��both��eth�cal��and��jur�d�cal��norm-g�v�ng,�� legal�ty�� �s�� �mpl�c�t,��but,�� �n��add�t�on,��depend�ng��on�� the��k�nd��of�� �ncent�ve��presupposed��by��norm-g�v�ng,��the��performed��act�on��m�ght��also��have��moral�ty.

In��add�t�on,��Kant��talks��about���nternal��and��external��dut�es,��and,��moreover,��about���nternal��and��external��norm-g�v�ng.��He��says,��for�� �nstance,�� that��eth�cal��norm-g�v�ng��may��have���nternal��or��external��dut�es,��but��as��norm-g�v�ng,���t��cannot��be��external,��s�nce��the�� �ncent�ve��for��an��eth�cal��norm-g�v�ng���s��duty,��wh�ch��belongs�� to�� �nternal��norm-

28�� I�� talk��about��norms,�� rather�� than��laws��or�� �mperat�ves,��because�� �t�� �s��somet�mes��argued��that��the��express�ons��‘jur�d�cal���mperat�ve’��and��‘�mperat�ve��of��r�ght’��are��m�snomers.��(W�llaschek��2002:��71��n.��11)��However,��Otfr�ed��Höffe��does��use��“�mperat�ve��of��r�ght”��(1990).��G�ven��the��d�st�nct�on��between��law��and���mperat�ve��(for���nstance,��GMM 4:��414��or��MM��6:��222),��I��avo�d��the��use��of��‘law’.��Instead��of��‘law’��(wh�ch��seems��to��me���nappropr�ate)��or��‘�mperat�ve’��(wh�ch��W�llaschek��regards��as��a��m�snomer),��I��use��‘norm’.

29�� MM��6:��218.30�� Note,��however,�� that�� some��dut�es��wh�ch�� represent��outer��act�ons��are��eth�cal��dut�es,�� for��

�nstance,��generos�ty;��even��dut�es��wh�ch��are��enforceable��may��be��eth�cal,��for���nstance,��some��of��the��dut�es��to��oneself.

31�� For���nstance,��other��features��are���mpl�c�t���n��Kant’s��d�scuss�on��of��amb�guous��r�ght.��In��general,��jur�d�cal��dut�es��must��refer��to��other��people,��must��not���mmed�ately��requ�re��a��ground��for��the��determ�nat�on��of��the��w�ll,��and��must��not��presuppose��the��adopt�on��of��an��end.

32�� MM��6:��219.

g�v�ng.��He��also��d�st�ngu�shes��between��eth�cal��and��jur�d�cal��dut�es,��and,��moreover,��between��d�rectly��eth�cal��and���nd�rectly��eth�cal��dut�es.��External��dut�es��are��obl�gat�ons��to��external��act�ons,��but��some��such��can��only��be��eth�cal,�� for�� �nstance,�� the��duty��of��benevolence.��Benevolence,��Kant��says,��can��only��be��eth�cal,��s�nce���ts��norm-g�v�ng��can��only��be���nternal.��I��cannot��call��an��act�on��benevolent,���f��I��am��coerced��to��perform���t.

Kant��also��offers��the��examples��of��dut�es��to��oneself��as��spec�f�cally��eth�cal��dut�es,��but��he��ment�ons��some��such��dut�es��are��shared��between��eth�cs��and��r�ght.��Furthermore,��the��d�st�nct�on��between��d�rectly��eth�cal��and���nd�rectly��eth�cal��dut�es���s��that��between��dut�es��wh�ch��are��spec�f�cally��eth�cal��and�� those��wh�ch��are�� jur�d�cal,��but��become���nd�rectly��eth�cal��through���nternal��norm-g�v�ng.33

F�nally,��on��the��bas�s��of�� the��d�st�nct�on��between��external��and���nternal��act�ons,��Kant��also��draws��a��d�st�nct�on��between��r�ght��generally��and��str�ct��r�ght.��R�ght��generally��has��as���ts��object��what���s��external���n��act�ons.��On��th�s��def�n�t�on,��r�ght��generally��can��refer�� to��norms��wh�ch��become�� �nd�rectly��eth�cal�� through�� �nternal�� lawg�v�ng.��By��contrast,��str�ct��r�ght��presupposes��by��def�n�t�on��the��use��of��coerc�on��and,��hence,��cannot��be��m�xed��w�th��anyth�ng��eth�cal.34

The��poss�b�l�ty��of��coerc�on,��wh�ch�� �s��a��cond�t�on��of��str�ct�� r�ght,�� �s��go�ng�� to��exclude��a��substant�ve��set��of��norms��as�� �nappropr�ate�� for�� jur�d�cal�� leg�slat�on.��For���nstance,��all�� �nternal��norms��can��be��counted��out,��s�nce��the�r��performance��cannot��be��mon�tored��and,��hence,���t���s��not��poss�ble��to��determ�ne��rel�ably��whether��they��have��been��enforced��or��not.35��Furthermore,��all��external��norms,��wh�ch��requ�re�� �nternal��norm-g�v�ng,��such��as��the��norm��of��benevolence,��can��also��be��ruled��out��as��part��of��str�ct��r�ght.��Moreover,��even��when��a��norm���s��external��and��need��not��be��assoc�ated��w�th��an���nternal��norm-g�v�ng,��certa�n��c�rcumstances��may��make���t��unenforceable.��Th�s���s��the��case��of��equ�ty,��where���t���s��not��clear��what��should��be��enforced;��th�s���s��also��the��case��of��a��r�ght��of��necess�ty,��where��the��norm���s��not��enforceable,��s�nce���t���s��not��pun�shable.

I��th�nk��the��set��of��d�st�nct�ons��Kant��draws��around��the��d�v�de��between��eth�cs��and��legal��or��jur�d�cal��ph�losophy���s��go�ng��to��be��useful���n��expla�n�ng��one��d�ff�culty��that��recent��commentators��seem��to��have��w�th��Kant’s��“Toward”��Perpetual Peace.��For��the��moment,��however,��I��would��l�ke��to��return��to��my��suggest�on��concern�ng��a��read�ng��of��perpetual��peace��as��the��not�on��of��supreme��pol�t�cal��good.��The��quest�on��my��suggest�on���nv�tes���s��about��the��relat�on��between��perpetual��peace��and��the��complete��good.��Is��there��perhaps��also��a��complete��pol�t�cal��good?

In��fact,��not��only���s��there��no��complete��pol�t�cal��good,��but��there��cannot��be��one.��The��complete��good,��as��happ�ness��d�str�buted���n��accordance��w�th��v�rtue,��wh�ch��has��normat�ve��pr�or�ty��and��has��to��be��pursued,���ncludes��the��h�ghest��pol�t�cal��good.��Thus,��the��h�ghest��pol�t�cal��good��refers��to��a��s�tuat�on���n��wh�ch��certa�n��norms��are���n��place.��Th�s�� �s��why��Kant�� talks��about��a��cond�t�on��of��peace��[Friedenzustand],�� rather�� than��about��a��peaceful��world.��The��norms���n��place���n��a��cond�t�on��of��peace��are��those��of��the��

33�� MM��6:��220-21.34�� MM��6:��232.35�� Th�s,��however,�� �s��not��altogether��unproblemat�c.��One��could��perhaps�� rel�ably��cond�t�on��

persons��to��form��mot�vat�ons��through��some��form��of��bra�nwash�ng��or��by��s�m�lar��methods.��See��Newey��(2011).

26 �� Kant’s��H�ghest��Pol�t�cal��Good����/����Sor�n��BAIASU������������27

doctr�ne��of��r�ght.36

In��the��Metaphysics of Morals,��Kant��says��that��“all��dut�es,��just��because��they��are��dut�es,��belong��to��eth�cs”.37��He��also��says��that,��“wh�le��there��are��many��d�rectly��eth�cal��dut�es,���nternal��lawg�v�ng��makes��the��rest��of��them,��one��and��all,�� �nd�rectly��eth�cal”.38��Kant��makes�� these��cla�ms�� �n�� the��context��of��draw�ng��a��d�st�nct�on��between��eth�cal��and�� jur�d�cal��norms.��As��we��have��seen,�� jur�d�cal��norms��are�� the��norms,��wh�ch��can��be��enforced��pol�t�cally��and��on�� the��bas�s��of��wh�ch��soc�ety��and�� �ts�� �nst�tut�ons��are��organ�zed.��Kant’s��cla�m,��therefore,�� �s�� that��all��norms,�� �nclud�ng��the��pol�t�cal��norms��wh�ch��are��expressed��by��the��laws��of��a��r�ghtful��soc�ety��ought��to��be��performed,��even���n��the��absence��of��all��pol�t�cal��coerc�on,��because��they��are��morally��r�ght.

The���mpl�cat�on��here���s��that���n��a��just��soc�ety��all��laws��can��be��turned���nto��dut�es.��Eth�cal��norms��are��der�ved��from��the��moral��law.��Pol�t�cal��norms,���nsofar��as��they��are��assoc�ated��w�th���nternal��lawg�v�ng,��should��also��be��der�vable��from��the��moral��law.��As��pol�t�cal��norms,��however,�� they��are��der�ved��from��the��pr�nc�ple��of��r�ght,��because��the��pr�nc�ple��of��r�ght��makes��expl�c�t��reference��to��external��act�ons.��Th�s��means��that,�� the��h�ghest��good��(as��supreme)���s���ndeed��not��der�vable��from��any��other��good.��The��h�ghest��pol�t�cal��good,�� too,�� �s��not��der�vable��from��any��other��good,��unless��we��def�ne���t��as��a��cond�t�on��determ�ned��by��pol�t�cal��norms��assoc�ated��w�th���nternal��lawg�v�ng,���n��wh�ch��case,�� �t��becomes��part��of�� the��h�ghest��good,��but�� �t�� �s��no��longer�� the��h�ghest��pol�t�cal��good.

F�nally,�� there�� �s�� a�� certa�n�� sense�� �n��wh�ch�� the��h�ghest��good�� (as�� complete)���ncludes��the��h�ghest��pol�t�cal��good.��Thus,��accord�ng��to��Kant,��“�t���s��not��the��case��that��a��good��state��const�tut�on���s��to��be��expected��from���nner��moral�ty;��on��the��contrary,��the��good��moral��educat�on��of��a��people���s��to��be��expected��from��a��good��state��const�tut�on”.39��Th�s��suggests�� that�� the��complete��good���mpl�es��as��real�zed��also��the��h�ghest��pol�t�cal��good.��Perhaps��even��more��d�rectly,��one��can��argue��that,��concern�ng��the�r��normat�ve��force,��all��pol�t�cal��norms��are��der�vable��from��the��moral��law��and,��hence,��they��are��part��of��the��complete��good,��at��least��as��far��as��the�r��normat�v�ty���s��concerned.

By��now��we��should��have��a��clearer��p�cture��of��perpetual��peace��as�� the��h�ghest��pol�t�cal�� good:�� �t�� �s�� an�� �dea��of�� reason��w�th��object�ve�� real�ty�� from��a��pract�cal��v�ewpo�nt,��wh�ch��has��supreme��pol�t�cal��normat�ve��force,��but���s��part��of��the��Kant�an��complete��good.��One��object�on��to��the��v�ew��that��Kant’s��perpetual��peace��as��the��h�ghest��pol�t�cal��good��corresponds��more��adequately�� to�� the��supreme��eth�cal��good,�� rather��than��to��the��complete��good��can��start��from��Kant’s��d�scuss�on��of��the��F�rst��supplement��to��prel�m�nary��and��def�n�t�ve��art�cles�� for��perpetual��peace.��Th�s�� f�rst�� supplement���s��a��guarantee��of��perpetual��peace.��If��we��conce�ve��of��perpetual��peace��as��a��k�nd��of��complete��good,��wh�ch��requ�res��two��d�st�nct�ve��elements,��then��the��guarantee��can��be��expla�ned��as��ground�ng��the��connect�on��between��these��two��elements.��If��we��conce�ve��of��perpetual��peace��as��a��s�mple��jur�d�cal��cond�t�on,��then���t���s��not��clear��why��we��would��need��an��add�t�onal��guarantee.

As�� I�� have��ment�oned�� �n�� the��prev�ous�� sect�on,��Taylor�� seems�� to��make�� the��

36�� MM��6:��355.37�� MM��6:��219.38�� MM��6:��221.39�� PP��8:��366.

follow�ng��ph�losoph�cal��move:��He��takes��the��pract�cal��postulates��to��have��the��funct�on��of��solv�ng��the��problem��of��opac�ty.��Th�s��problem��appl�es��also��to��the��supreme��eth�cal��good,��so��perhaps���t��may��also��apply��to��the��supreme��good��represented��by��perpetual��peace.��From��the��perspect�ve��of��th�s��sect�on,��we��now��know��that��Taylor’s��problem���s��that��perpetual��peace��does��not���n��fact��ra�se��a��problem��of��mot�vat�on��and��opac�ty.��So,��Taylor��cannot��suggest��Kant’s��appeal��to��God���n��Perpetual Peace��would��be��s�m�lar��to��h�s��appeal��to��the��pract�cal��postulates���n��the��second��Critique.

But��what��I��call��an�� �ssue��for��Taylor�� turns��out�� to��be��a��puzzle��for��us,��s�nce��he��seems��to��be��aware��of��the��further��d�fference��between��the��h�ghest��eth�cal��and��pol�t�cal��goods.��Th�s��leaves��h�m��w�thout��an��answer��to��the��very��quest�on��w�th��wh�ch��he��starts:��Why��does��Kant���ntroduce��an��appeal��to��God���n��Perpetual Peace,��wh�le��the��h�ghest��pol�t�cal��good���n�� the��Metaphysics of Morals�� �s��presented���ndependently��from��any��such��reference?��It��cannot��be��because�� th�s��would��make�� the��h�ghest��pol�t�cal��good��poss�ble,��s�nce��th�s��represents��a��set��of��jur�d�cal��norms,��the��poss�b�l�ty��of��wh�ch��(�n��terms��of�� feas�b�l�ty��and��enforceab�l�ty)��are��presupposed��by�� the��very��concept��of��a�� jur�d�cal��norm.��I��suggest�� that��Taylor’s��problem���s��a��more��d�ff�cult��one,��hav�ng��to��do��w�th�� the��status��of�� the��guarantee��of��perpetual��peace.��Taylor�� �s��not�� the��only��commentator��who��draws��an��analogy��between�� the��pract�cal��postulates�� and�� the��guarantee,��as��we��w�ll��see�� �n�� the��next��sect�on.��In��fact,�� �n�� the��next��sect�on,��we��w�ll��also��have��an���llustrat�on��of��a��more��ser�ous��m�s�nterpretat�on��–��the��confus�on��of��the��supreme��and��complete��goods.

The-need-for-a-guarantee-of-perpetual-peace

Accord�ng��to��Lea��Yp�,��concern�ng��Kant’s��“Toward”��Perpetual Peace,

“The��real���ssue���s��to��understand��why��a��‘guarantee’��of��perpetual��peace���s��requ�red��at��all��and,�� �f��so,��whether��Kant’s�� thes�s��on��human��progress��may��be��coherently��d�sentangled��from��an��a��Cr�t�cal��assumpt�on��of��prov�dence��and��st�ll��ult�mately��defended”.40

Her��answer�� to�� the��f�rst��quest�on,�� the��quest�on��of�� the��need��for��a��guarantee,��starts��from��the��assumpt�on��that�� those��who��are��expected��to���ntroduce��the��jur�d�cal��norms��of��a��cond�t�on��of��peace��should��act��not��s�mply��on��prudent�al��mot�ves,��but��should��be���nsp�red��by��un�versal��moral��mot�ves.41��Th�s,��she��suggests,��seems��to���mply��that�� the��task��of��br�ng�ng��about��perpetual��peace�� �s��also�� the�� task��of��develop�ng��human�ty’s��moral��d�spos�t�on,��wh�ch��requ�res��coord�nat�on��between��c�t�zens��and��cont�nuous��progress.��Hence,��th�s��leads��to��her��second��quest�on:��can��Kant��just�fy��coord�nat�on��and��cont�nu�ty���n��a��Cr�t�cal��way?

Yp��� argues�� that,�� �n�� the�� second��Critique,��Kant�� addresses�� the��problems��of��

40�� Lea��Yp�,��“Natura��Daedala��Rerum?��On��the��Just�f�cat�on��of��H�stor�cal��Progress�� �n��Kant’s��Guarantee��of��Perpetual��Peace”,���n��Kantian Review,��Vol.��14,��No.��2,��2010,��p.��121.

41�� Lea��Yp�,��“Natura��Daedala��Rerum?��On��the��Just�f�cat�on��of��H�stor�cal��Progress�� �n��Kant’s��Guarantee��of��Perpetual��Peace”,��op.��c�t.,��p.��123.

28 �� Kant’s��H�ghest��Pol�t�cal��Good����/����Sor�n��BAIASU������������29

coord�nat�on��and��cont�nu�ty��by��reference��to��the��pract�cal��postulates.42��Next,��she��notes��that,���n��the��earl�er��“Idea��for��a��un�versal��h�story��w�th��a��cosmopol�tan��purpose”,��Kant��offered��a��d�fferent��solut�on:��for��the��problem��of��coord�nat�on,��he���ntroduced��the���dea��of��man’s��unsoc�al��soc�ab�l�ty��and,��for��the��problem��of��cont�nu�ty,��he��suggested��that��the��task��of��real�z�ng��the��h�ghest��pol�t�cal��good��be��one��for��the��human��spec�es,��not��for���nd�v�duals��w�th��short��l�fe-spans.43

Yet,�� there��seems��to��be��a��rema�n�ng��problem��about��the��status��of��the��guarantee.��The��essay��on��h�story,��Yp���notes,�� suggests��as�� solut�on�� the��way�� �n��wh�ch��nature���ntervenes��teleolog�cally��to��transform��the��human��spec�es,��and��th�s��depr�ves��human��be�ngs��of��moral��respons�b�l�ty,��not��to��ment�on��that��such��a��cla�m��seems��to��go��beyond��the��ep�stemolog�cal��l�m�ts��Cr�t�cal��ph�losophy��establ�shes;��the��approach���n��the��f�rst��two��Critiques,��she��cont�nues,��suggests��that��the��h�ghest��good��can��be��real�zed��by��the��rec�procal��recogn�t�on��of��the��agents’��moral��obl�gat�ons,��but��then���t��becomes��unclear��what��the��funct�on��of��the��pract�cal��postulates���s��and,���n��fact,���t��becomes��aga�n��unclear��why��we��need��a��guarantee��at��all.44

Her��solut�on��makes��recourse��to��Kant’s��th�rd��Critique��and��the��start�ng��po�nt���s��the��d�fference��she��notes��between��Kant’s��v�ew��of��phys�cotheology���n�� the��f�rst��and��th�rd��Critiques.45��In��add�t�on,��she��th�nks��Kant��reformulates��the��pract�cal��postulates���n��the��th�rd��Critique�� through��“the��analys�s��of��natural��teleology��from��the��standpo�nt��of��human��h�story”,��and��th�s��leads��to��a��d�fferent��“conceptual�sat�on��of��a��‘guarantee’��for��the��real�zat�on��of��the��h�ghest��good���n��the��world”.46

Although��I��d�sagree��w�th��some��of�� the��ph�losoph�cal��moves��adopted�� �n��order��to��prov�de��th�s��solut�on47,��I��th�nk��the���nterpretat�on��prov�ded���s��or�g�nal��and��perhaps��worth��explor�ng��on���ts��own;��what��I��would��l�ke��to��emphas�se,��however,�� �s�� that�� the��assumpt�on��seems��to��be��that��the��guarantee���s��meant��to��just�fy��the��poss�b�l�ty��of��the��“h�ghest��good”,48��understood��as�� the��complete��good.��The��funct�on��of�� the��pract�cal��postulates�� �n�� the��Ant�nomy��of��pract�cal�� reason�� �s�� to��demonstrate�� a��necessary��connect�on��between��v�rtue��and��happ�ness.��As��we��have�� seen,�� the��challenge�� for��an�� �nterpretat�on��wh�ch��does��not��d�st�ngu�sh��between�� the��complete��good��and�� the��supreme��good,��and��then��between��the��supreme��eth�cal��and��the��supreme��pol�t�cal��good���n��Kant���s��to��try��to��f�nd��some��way���n��wh�ch��the��guarantee��Kant��offers���n��Perpetual

42�� Lea��Yp�,��“Natura��Daedala��Rerum?��On��the��Just�f�cat�on��of��H�stor�cal��Progress�� �n��Kant’s��Guarantee��of��Perpetual��Peace”,��op.��c�t.,��p.��128.

43�� Lea��Yp�,��“Natura��Daedala��Rerum?��On��the��Just�f�cat�on��of��H�stor�cal��Progress�� �n��Kant’s��Guarantee��of��Perpetual��Peace”,��op.��c�t.,��pp.��128-9.

44�� Lea��Yp�,��“Natura��Daedala��Rerum?��On��the��Just�f�cat�on��of��H�stor�cal��Progress�� �n��Kant’s��Guarantee��of��Perpetual��Peace”,��op.��c�t.,��pp.��129-30.

45�� Lea��Yp�,��“Natura��Daedala��Rerum?��On��the��Just�f�cat�on��of��H�stor�cal��Progress�� �n��Kant’s��Guarantee��of��Perpetual��Peace”,��op.��c�t.,��p.��131.

46�� Lea��Yp�,��“Natura��Daedala��Rerum?��On��the��Just�f�cat�on��of��H�stor�cal��Progress�� �n��Kant’s��Guarantee��of��Perpetual��Peace”,��op.��c�t.,��p.��136.

47�� I��doubt��that��Kant’s��att�tude��to��phys�cotheology��has��changed��from��the��f�rst��Critique�� to��the��th�rd,��and�� the��quotat�on��from��the��f�rst��Critique prov�ded��by��Yp��� �n��support��of��her��cla�m��seems��to��me��to��be���nconclus�ve.

48�� Lea��Yp�,��“Natura��Daedala��Rerum?��On��the��Just�f�cat�on��of��H�stor�cal��Progress�� �n��Kant’s��Guarantee��of��Perpetual��Peace”,��op.��c�t.,��p.��136.

Peace��can��prov�de��an��argument��for�� the��necessary��connect�on��between��v�rtue��and��happ�ness���n��relat�on��to��the��h�ghest��pol�t�cal��good,��perpetual��peace.

Th�s��looks��l�ke��an��attempt��to��square��the��c�rcle,��s�nce��the��h�ghest��pol�t�cal��good���s��a��supreme��pol�t�cal��good,��and��there���s��no��happ�ness��wh�ch���s��requ�red��to��real�ze��th�s��pol�t�cal��good.��In��order��to��expla�n��the��status��of��the��guarantee,��Yp���s�mply���ntroduces��a��requ�rement�� that�� the��h�ghest��pol�t�cal��good��be��real�zed��w�th��eth�cal��mot�vat�ons.��Th�s,��however,���s��ne�ther��requ�red��nor��rejected��by��Kant.

Let��me��cons�der��now��a��th�rd��approach��to��Kant’s��h�ghest��pol�t�cal��good.��Even���n��th�s��case,��I��would��l�ke��to��cla�m,��although��the��status��of��perpetual��peace��as��a��supreme��pol�t�cal��good���s��fully��acknowledged,��there��st�ll��seems��to��rema�n��a��strong��l�nk��to��the��h�ghest��eth�cal��good,��a��l�nk��wh�ch��leads��to��some��problems���n��the��way��perpetual��peace���s��understood.��Accord�ng��to��Katr�n��Fl�kschuh,��we��should��not��read��Kant’s��guarantee��as��g�v�ng��support�� to�� the��h�ghest��pol�t�cal��good.��Instead,��we��should��understand��the��h�ghest��pol�t�cal��good,

“from��the��perspect�ve��of��one��who��acknowledges��the��concept��of��R�ght��as��a��pure��rat�onal��concept��(MM,��6.229-30),��and��who���s��cogn�zant,���n��consequence,��of��the��a��pr�or���obl�gat�on,���n��v�rtue��of��the�r��freedom,��to��act���n��accordance��w�th��R�ght”.49

I��th�nk��both��Yp���and��Taylor��would��agree��w�th��th�s,��although��th�s���s��not��a��v�ew��that��has��always��been��taken��for��granted.50��Fl�kschuh’s��account��d�ffers��however��from��Taylor’s��and��Yp�’s,���nsofar��as��she��no��longer��l�nks��the��guarantee��to��the��pract�cal��postulates.��She��th�nks��that,���n��the��F�rst��supplement,��Kant���ntends��to��show��how���t���s��poss�ble��to��real�ze���n��our��world�� the��noumenal��or��non-sens�ble��demands��of�� the��doctr�ne��of��r�ght.��She��goes��back��to��the��contrast��between��eth�cs��and��jur�d�cal��ph�losophy���n��Kant’s��moral��theory��and��argues��that,�� �n��contrast��to��eth�cs,�� �n��jur�d�cal��ph�losophy,��we��can��regard��agents��as��“externally��compelled��to��act���n��outward��conform�ty��w�th��laws��of��external��freedom”.51��Moreover,�� she�� th�nks�� �n�� the��doma�n��of�� r�ght,�� there�� �s��a�� requ�rement��concern�ng��“the��emp�r�cal��man�festat�on��or�� �nst�tut�onal�sat�on��of��coerc�ve��laws��of��external��freedom”.52

Concern�ng��the��status��of��th�s��problem��of��the��sens�ble��real�zat�on��of��non-sens�ble��jur�d�cal��norms,��she�� th�nks�� �t�� �s��a��“techn�cal”,��not��a��“moral”��problem,��s�nce�� the��‘ought’�� �mpl�es��‘can’��d�ctum��means���t��should��be��poss�ble��for��us��to��pursue��the��end��

49�� Katr�n��Fl�kschuh��“Reason��and��Nature:��Kant’s��Teleolog�cal��Argument���n��Perpetual��Peace”,���n��G.��B�rd��(ed.)��A Companion to Kant.��2006.��Blackwell,��p.��383.

50�� Fl�kschuh,��Taylor�� and��Yp��� make�� reference�� to�� several�� authors�� who�� offer�� alternat�ve���nterpretat�ons,��for�� �nstance,��He�nz-Gerd��Schm�tz��“Moral��oder��Klughe�t?��Überlegung��zur��Gestalt��der��Autonom�e��des��Pol�schen���m��Denken��Kants”,�� �n��Kant-Studien,��Vol.��81,��No.��4,��1990,��413-34;��Y�rm�yahu��Yovel��Kant and the Philosophy of History.��Pr�nceton��Un�vers�ty��Press.��1980;��Otfr�ed��Höffe.��“Even��a��nat�on��of��dev�ls��needs��a��state:��The��d�lemma��of��natural��Just�ce”,���n��H.��W�ll�ams��(ed.)��Kant’s Political Philosophy.��Un�vers�ty��of��Wales��Press.��1992;��Paul��Guyer.��Kant on Freedom, Law and Happiness.��Cambr�dge��Un�vers�ty��Press.��2000.

51�� Katr�n��Fl�kschuh��“Reason��and��Nature:��Kant’s��Teleolog�cal��Argument���n��Perpetual��Peace”,��op.��c�t.,��p.��387.

52�� Katr�n��Fl�kschuh��“Reason��and��Nature:��Kant’s��Teleolog�cal��Argument���n��Perpetual��Peace”,��op.��c�t.,��p.��387.

30 �� Kant’s��H�ghest��Pol�t�cal��Good����/����Sor�n��BAIASU������������31

of��a�� jur�d�cal��cond�t�on��of��peace.��Yet,��“unless��we��do�� �dent�fy��a��way��of��emp�r�cal���nst�tut�ng��external�� relat�ons��of�� r�ght,��we��cannot��d�scharge��our�� acknowledged��jur�d�cal��obl�gat�ons”.53

Accord�ng��to��her,��Kant’s��argument���s��that��nature��makes���t��poss�ble��for��man��to��act���n��accordance��w�th��jur�d�cal��norms,��but��does��not��br�ng��about��man’s��moral��ends��d�rectly.54��Th�s��can��be��seen���n��Kant’s��account��of��“a��poss�ble��future��h�story”,��where��he���ntroduces��the���dea��of��del�berate��human��agency��–��not��as��a��result��of��the��demands��of��pract�cal�� reason,��but�� through��human��understand�ng.55��Fl�kschuh��d�scusses�� th�s���n��relat�on��to��Kant’s��famous��argument��that��“the��problem��of��establ�sh�ng��a��state,��no��matter��how��hard���t��may��sound,���s��soluble��even��for��a��nat�on��of��dev�ls”.56

Her��concern�� �s��ma�nly�� to��reject��a��prudent�al�� read�ng��of��Kant’s��account��here.��The��prudent�al�� �nterpretat�on��takes��Kant�� to��suggest�� that�� the��jur�d�cal��norms��meant��to��regulate��the��l�fe��of��the��c�t�zens���n��a��state��are��to��be��deduced��through��the��test��Kant��formulates���n��the��same��context:��

“G�ven��a��mult�tude��of��rat�onal��be�ngs��all��of��whom��need��un�versal��laws��for��the�r��preservat�on��but��each��of��whom���s�� �ncl�ned��covertly�� to��exempt��h�mself�� from��them,��so��to��order��th�s��mult�tude��and��to��establ�sh��the�r��const�tut�on��that,��although���n��the�r��pr�vate��d�spos�t�ons��they��str�ve��aga�nst��one��another,�� these��yet��so��check��one��another��that���n��the�r��publ�c��conduct��the��result���s��the��same��as���f��they��had��no��such��ev�l��d�spos�t�on”.57

Kant’s���ntent�on��here,��Fl�kschuh��argues,���s��not��to��take��jur�d�cal��norms��to��be��just�f�ed��w�th�� reference�� to�� �ncl�nat�ons,��but�� to��del�berately��use�� �ncl�nat�ons�� for��purposes��of��emp�r�cal�� �nst�tut�onal�sat�on;��nor��should�� th�s��be�� �nterpreted,�� she��adds,��as��an��argument�� that��self-seek�ng�� �ncl�nat�ons��prov�de��reasons��for��enter�ng��a��republ�can��state.58��In��short:��

“Kant’s��account��of��republ�can��const�tut�onal��des�gn���nvolves��a��complex��relat�on��between��reason,��nature,��and��understand�ng.��Reason��d�ctates��acknowledgement��of��a��pr�or���val�d��rec�procal��obl�gat�ons��of��R�ght.��Yet��g�ven��human��moral��fra�lty,��const�tut�on��drafters��abstract�� from��th�s��acknowledged��duty��of��R�ght��as��d�rect���ncent�ve.��The�r��understand�ng��of��nature’s��causal��mechan�sm��enables�� them��to��employ��a��spec�f�cally��targeted��aspect��of��human��nature��that��makes��poss�ble��the��

53�� Katr�n��Fl�kschuh��“Reason��and��Nature:��Kant’s��Teleolog�cal��Argument���n��Perpetual��Peace”,��op.��c�t.,��p.��387.

54�� Katr�n��Fl�kschuh��“Reason��and��Nature:��Kant’s��Teleolog�cal��Argument���n��Perpetual��Peace”,��op.��c�t.,��p.��390.

55�� Katr�n��Fl�kschuh��“Reason��and��Nature:��Kant’s��Teleolog�cal��Argument���n��Perpetual��Peace”,��op.��c�t.,��p.��391.

56�� Katr�n��Fl�kschuh��“Reason��and��Nature:��Kant’s��Teleolog�cal��Argument���n��Perpetual��Peace”,��op.��c�t.,��p.��366.

57�� Katr�n��Fl�kschuh��“Reason��and��Nature:��Kant’s��Teleolog�cal��Argument���n��Perpetual��Peace”,��op.��c�t.,��p.��366.

58�� Katr�n��Fl�kschuh��“Reason��and��Nature:��Kant’s��Teleolog�cal��Argument���n��Perpetual��Peace”,��op.��c�t.,��pp.��391-2.

des�gn��of��emp�r�cal��const�tut�onal��arrangements��that��are���n��outward��conform�ty,��at�� least,��w�th�� the��demands��of��pure��pract�cal��reason.��[…]��S�m�lar��strateg�es��of��argumentat�on��are��employed��w�th��regard��to��the��two��rema�n�ng��levels��of��publ�c��R�ght��–��R�ght��of��nat�ons��and��cosmopol�tan��R�ght”.59

The��suggest�on���s��therefore��that��Kant’s��guarantee��presents��features��of��human��nature��that��can��be��employed��del�berately���n��order��to���ncent�v�se��those��who��cannot��determ�ne��themselves��morally��to��follow��jur�d�cal���mperat�ves��d�ctated��by��reason.��In��the��same��way�� �n��wh�ch�� those��who��draft��a��const�tut�on��can��organ�ze��soc�ety�� �n��such��a��way��that��human��fra�lty���s��overcome��through��the��use��of��prec�sely��the��cause��of��th�s��fra�lty,���ncl�nat�ons,��those��who��real�ze��the��need��for��a��federat�ve��un�on��of��states��can��employ��pr�vate���ncl�nat�ons��at��the���ntrastate��level��to��br�ng��that��un�on��about.

I�� th�nk��Fl�kschuh�� �s�� r�ght�� to�� regard��perpetual��peace��as��merely��a�� jur�d�cal��cond�t�on��of��peace,��cons�st�ng��of��several�� jur�d�cal��norms,��as��d�ctated��by��reason,��and��const�tut�ng��a��h�ghest��pol�t�cal��good,�� �n��the��sense��of��a��supreme��pol�t�cal��good��(although��she��does��not��put��emphas�s��on��the��d�st�nct�on��between��the��supreme��and��the��complete��good��and��she��does��not��argue��aga�nst���nterpretat�ons��wh�ch��read��perpetual��peace��as��a��complete��pol�t�cal��good).��I��th�nk��she���s��r�ght��to��argue��that��the��guarantee���s��a��techn�cal,��rather��than��a��moral��argument,��wh�ch��would��contr�bute��to��the��just�f�cat�on��of��the��jur�d�cal��norms��const�tut�ng��the��cond�t�on��of��peace.��I��am,��however,��uncerta�n��that��the��h�ghest��pol�t�cal��good��needs��a��further��argument��demonstrat�ng��that���t��can��be���nst�tut�onal�sed.

Th�s���s��not��far��from��the��suggest�ons��made��by��Taylor��and��Yp�,��who��both��see��the��h�ghest��pol�t�cal��good��as��need�ng��some��further��argument��due��to��the��‘ought���mpl�es��can’��d�ctum.��Accord�ng��to��Taylor,�� the��guarantee���s��needed��to��show��that��the��h�ghest��pol�t�cal��good���s��ach�evable;��accord�ng��to��Yp�,�� that�� �t��can��be��pursued��for�� the��r�ght��reason��(thus��guarantee�ng��coord�nat�on��and��cont�nu�ty);��accord�ng��to��Fl�kschuh,�� �t���s��needed��for���nst�tut�onal�sat�on.��But��such��arguments��are��puzzl�ng,���f��we��th�nk��back��to��Kant’s��d�scuss�on��of��the��h�ghest��good���n��the��f�rst��Critique.��As���deas��of��reason��or��as���deals,�� the��h�ghest��goods��are���n��a��sense��unach�evable��or��pract�cally���mposs�ble.��Moreover,��the��cond�t�on��Kant��sets��for��jur�d�cal��obl�gat�ons���s��much��weaker:��

“What��would��be��made��our��duty���n��th�s��case��[…]���s��rather��to��act���n��conform�ty��w�th��the���dea��of��that��end,��even���f��there���s��not��the��l�ghtest��theoret�cal��l�kel�hood��that�� �t�� can��be�� real�zed,��as�� long��as�� �ts�� �mposs�b�l�ty��cannot��be��demonstrated��e�ther”.60

So,��when��Fl�kschuh��says��that��“unless��we��do���dent�fy��a��way��of��emp�r�cally���nst�tut�ng��external�� relat�ons��of��R�ght,��we�� cannot��d�scharge��our�� acknowledged�� jur�d�cal��obl�gat�ons”,61��she�� �s��of��course��r�ght,��but��she��cla�ms��th�s��follows��from��the��‘ought��

59�� Katr�n��Fl�kschuh��“Reason��and��Nature:��Kant’s��Teleolog�cal��Argument���n��Perpetual��Peace”,��op.��c�t.,��p.��392.

60�� MM��6:��354.61�� Katr�n��Fl�kschuh��“Reason��and��Nature:��Kant’s��Teleolog�cal��Argument���n��Perpetual��Peace”,��

op.��c�t.,��p.��387.

32 �� Kant’s��H�ghest��Pol�t�cal��Good����/����Sor�n��BAIASU������������33

�mpl�es��can’��d�ctum,��and��th�s���s��wrong.��Moreover,��the��way��she��formulates��th�s��d�ctum���s��much��stronger��than���n��Kant:��“Ought���mpl�es��can:���nsofar��as��we��acknowledge��our��a��pr�or���obl�gat�ons��of��R�ght,��we��must��assume��that���t���s��poss�ble��for��us��to��act��on��these��obl�gat�ons��under��g�ven��sens�ble��cond�t�ons”.62��Kant��only��suggests��that��we��assume���t���s��not���mposs�ble��to��act���n��that��way.��Moreover,��th�s���s��a��cond�t�on��for��acknowledg�ng��our��a��pr�or���jur�d�cal��obl�gat�ons,��not��a��cond�t�on��for��d�scharg�ng��them,��as��Fl�kschuh��has���t��a��b�t��after��th�s.63

Before��conclud�ng,��I��would��l�ke��to��quest�on��an��add�t�onal��cla�m���n��Fl�kschuh’s��argument.��Accord�ng��to��her,��the��h�ghest��pol�t�cal��good���s��go�ng��to��be���nst�tut�onal�sed���n��the��follow�ng��way:��const�tut�ons��drafters��w�ll��contr�bute��to��people’s��compl�ance��w�th��the��jur�d�cal��norms��of��perpetual��peace;��aware��of��human��moral��fra�lt�es,��“they��employ�� the��means��of��nature�� �n��order�� to��effect��an��outcome�� that��ensures��outward��conform�ty��w�th��these��acknowledged��pr�nc�ples��even���f���nd�v�duals’��w�lls��should��fa�l��them”.64��It�� �s��not��clear��why��she��dec�des�� to�� �nterpret��Kant’s��guarantee���n�� th�s��way,��although��Kant��clearly��talks��about��nature��as��br�ng�ng��about��th�s��compl�ance.

One��hypothes�s��I��have��starts��from��Fl�kschuh’s��cla�m��that��“Kant’s��content�on��[…]���s��not��that��nature��br�ngs��about��man’s��moral��ends��d�rectly”.65��Instead,��she��emphas�ses��the��“del�berate��employment��of�� sens�ble�� �ncl�nat�ons�� for��purposes��of��emp�r�cal���nst�tut�onal�sat�on”.66��So��perhaps��one��reason��why��Fl�kschuh��offers��th�s���nterpretat�on��aga�nst��Kant’s��cla�m��that�� �t�� �s��“nature”��that��“does”��someth�ng��for�� the��“purpose��of��perpetual��peace”��may��be��that��she��th�nks��nature��depr�ves��us��of��moral��respons�b�l�ty��or��freedom.��Both��these��cla�ms��are��made���n��the��l�terature.67��The��d�ff�culty,��of��course,���s��that��there��are��var�ous��not�ons��of��freedom���n��Kant.

If��we��talk��about��a��mere��freedom��to��perform��certa�n��external��act�ons,�� then,��as��Fl�kschuh��acknowledges,��although��the��enforcement��of��jur�d�cal��norms��may��reduce��our��freedom���n��th�s��sense,�� �t�� �s��nevertheless��leg�t�mate.68��Whether��the��enforcement��

62�� Katr�n��Fl�kschuh��“Reason��and��Nature:��Kant’s��Teleolog�cal��Argument���n��Perpetual��Peace”,��op.��c�t.,��p.��387.

63�� I��should��add��that��th�s��has��noth�ng��to��do��w�th��the��prudent�al��read�ng��of��the��h�ghest��pol�t�cal��good,��wh�ch��I��agree��w�th��Fl�kschuh���s��not��what��Kant’s��text��suggests.��So��I��rema�n��puzzled��why��she�� l�nks�� the�� two:��“Unless��we��do�� �dent�fy��a��way��of��emp�r�cally�� �nst�tut�ng��external��relat�ons��of��R�ght,��we��cannot��d�scharge��our��acknowledged��jur�d�cal��obl�gat�ons.��The��po�nt���s��s�mply��to���ns�st��aga�nst��prudent�al��read�ngs…”��–��Katr�n��Fl�kschuh��“Reason��and��Nature:��Kant’s��Teleolog�cal��Argument���n��Perpetual��Peace”,��op.��c�t.,��p.��387.

64�� Katr�n��Fl�kschuh��“Reason��and��Nature:��Kant’s��Teleolog�cal��Argument���n��Perpetual��Peace”,��op.��c�t.,��p.��392.

65�� Katr�n��Fl�kschuh��“Reason��and��Nature:��Kant’s��Teleolog�cal��Argument���n��Perpetual��Peace”,��op.��c�t.,��p.��390.��A��cla�m��formulated��also��at��page��388.

66�� Katr�n��Fl�kschuh��“Reason��and��Nature:��Kant’s��Teleolog�cal��Argument���n��Perpetual��Peace”,��op.��c�t.,��p.��390.

67�� For���nstance,��Lea��Yp�,��“Natura��Daedala��Rerum?��On��the��Just�f�cat�on��of��H�stor�cal��Progress���n��Kant’s��Guarantee��of��Perpetual��Peace”,��op.��c�t.,��p.��129��and��Paul��Guyer,��Kant on Freedom, Law and Happiness,��op.��c�t.,��p.��425.��L�ke��Yp�,��Guyer��also�� �ntroduces��as��a�� requ�rement��for��perpetual��peace��that�� �t��be��done��by��“morally��mot�vated��acts��of��human��w�ll”��–��Kant on Freedom, Law and Happiness,��op.��c�t.,��p.��425.

68�� Katr�n��Fl�kschuh��“Reason��and��Nature:��Kant’s��Teleolog�cal��Argument���n��Perpetual��Peace”,��

�s��produced��by��const�tut�on��drafters��or��nature��should��not��matter.�� If��we��talk��about��transcendental��freedom,��as��freedom��from��the��cha�ns��of��causal�ty,��then,��aga�n,��th�s���s��not��go�ng��to��be��affected��by��add�t�onal��causal��l�nks���ntroduced��by��nature.��W�th��Kant’s��Th�rd��Ant�nomy�� �n��m�nd,��we��can��say�� that�� there�� �s��no�� freedom-related�� reason�� to��attr�bute��the��guarantee��to��drafters,��rather��than��to��nature.��The��same��goes��also��for��the��case��when��we��take��freedom��to��refer��to��autonomy.��The��po�nt��of��the��d�scuss�on,���n��the��f�rst��Critique,��about��eth�cal��pr�nc�ples��as��pr�nc�ples��of��the��poss�b�l�ty��of��exper�ence��was��prec�sely�� that��add�t�onal��natural��mechan�sms��w�ll��not�� reduce��our��ab�l�ty�� to��follow��eth�cal��pr�nc�ples��and,��hence,��to��act��autonomously.��The��only��s�tuat�on��wh�ch��would��make��Fl�kschuh’s��cla�m��plaus�ble��would��be��that��where��nature��acts��upon��our���ncl�nat�ons��and��makes��them��stronger��and��more��d�ff�cult�� to��be��opposed,��and��where��the��h�ghest��pol�t�cal��good��would��aga�n��be��taken��to��requ�re��that��act�ons��be��performed��w�th��eth�cal��mot�vat�ons.��But��the��latter��cond�t�on���s��someth�ng��I��have��been��argu�ng��throughout��th�s��paper��that��we��need��to��res�st.

Before��I��conclude,�� I��should��note�� that�� the��d�scuss�on��of�� the��h�ghest��pol�t�cal��good��has��gradually��brought��about��another���mportant��related��top�c,��that��of��the��status��of��the��guarantee��of��perpetual��peace.��For��the��purpose��of��th�s��chapter���t��must��suff�ce��to��ment�on��th�s��problem.��An��exam�nat�on��of��the��guarantee��would��go��beyond��the��scope��of��th�s��chapter.69

Conclusion

The��h�ghest��pol�t�cal��good�� �s��a��cruc�al��not�on�� for��Kant’s��moral��ph�losophy,��but���t��has��not��been�� the�� focus��of��much��d�scuss�on.�� In�� th�s��chapter�� I��have�� started�� to��address��th�s��problem��by��present�ng��some��of��the��not�on’s���mportant��aspects��and��by��exam�n�ng��several��m�s�nterpretat�ons.��I��began��w�th��Kant’s��d�st�nct�on��between��the���dea��and���deal��of��h�ghest��good,��and��w�th��h�s��d�st�nct�on��between��the��or�g�nal��and��the��der�vat�ve��h�ghest��good.��The��or�g�nal��h�ghest��good,��God,���s��the���deal��of��the��or�g�nal��h�ghest��good,��as��happ�ness��d�str�buted���n��accordance��w�th��worth�ness��of��happ�ness.��The��or�g�nal��h�ghest��good�� �s��also�� the��source��of�� the��der�vat�ve��h�ghest��good.��The���deal��of��the��der�vat�ve��h�ghest��good���s��a��moral��world,��where��persons��are��rewarded���n��proport�on�� to�� the�r��v�rtue.��Both�� the�� �dea��and�� the�� �deal��of�� the��h�ghest��good��are��removed��from��object�ve��real�ty,�� �n�� the��sense�� that,�� for�� l�m�ted��rat�onal��be�ngs�� l�ke��us,�� there�� �s��no�� �ntu�t�on��wh�ch��could��prove�� the�r��object�ve��real�ty.��Kant�� takes�� the��systemat�c��un�ty��of�� free��act�ons�� to��have��object�ve�� real�ty,��s�nce��concrete��act�ons��can��be��performed��that��are��v�rtuous.��What��seems��to��be��unreal�zable���s��the���deal��of��a��v�rtuous��person��and��the���deal��of��the��moral��world.��Th�s���s��because��we��are��l�m�ted���n��t�me,��and��the��progress��to��v�rtue���s��unl�m�ted,��and��because��we��are��l�m�ted���n��power,��and��cannot��control��the��d�str�but�on��of��happ�ness���n��accordance��w�th��v�rtue.70

op.��c�t.,��pp.��386-7.69�� I��look��at��th�s���n��Sor�n��Ba�asu,��“The��F�nal��End��of��the��Doctr�ne��of��R�ght:��Comments��on��RL��

6:��354-355”.��Paper��presented��to��a��Workshop��on��Kant’s��Metaphys�cs��of��Morals.��Organ�ser:��Harry��Lesser.��Un�vers�ty��of��Manchester.��2012.

70�� There���s��of��course��also��the��problem��of��opac�ty.��D�scuss�on��of�� th�s��problem��(for�� �nstance,���n��Robert��Taylor,��“Kant’s��Pol�t�cal��Rel�g�on:��The��Transparency��of��Perpetual��Peace��and��the��

34 �� Kant’s��H�ghest��Pol�t�cal��Good����/����Sor�n��BAIASU������������35

I��have��then��argued��that��an���mportant��d�st�nct�on��that��Kant��presents���n��the��second��Critique,��that��between��the��supreme��and��the��complete��h�ghest��good,���s���mportant��for��an��understand�ng��of��the��h�ghest��pol�t�cal��good.��The��h�ghest��eth�cal��good��that��Kant���ntroduces���n��the��f�rst��Critique,��and��that��he��d�scusses��also���n��the��second��Critique,���s��the��complete��good.��By��contrast,��v�rtue��or��the��h�ghest��pol�t�cal��good��are���nstances��of��the��supreme��good.��The��d�fference��between��v�rtue��and��the��h�ghest��pol�t�cal��good��was��clar�f�ed��through��an��exam�nat�on��of��the��relat�on,���n��Kant,��between��eth�cal��pr�nc�ples��and��jur�d�cal��norms.��What���s��spec�f�c��for��v�rtue���s��that��eth�cal��pr�nc�ples��need��to��be��observed��for��the��sake��of��duty,��whereas��the��h�ghest��pol�t�cal��good��only��requ�res��that��we��act���n��conform�ty��w�th��certa�n��jur�d�cal��norms,���rrespect�ve��of��the��mot�vat�on��of��our��act�on.

The��d�scuss�on��of��the��relat�ons��between��the��eth�cal��and��the��jur�d�cal���n��Kant��has��also��demonstrated��that��Kant��takes��as��cond�t�ons��for��leg�t�mate��jur�d�cal��norms��the�r��enforceab�l�ty,��wh�ch���ncludes��the��poss�b�l�ty��of��observ�ng��them��and��the��poss�b�l�ty��of��mon�tor�ng��compl�ance��w�th��them.��Moreover,��accord�ng��to��Kant,��what��we��need���n��order��to��be��able��to��adopt��an��end��as��a��duty���s��only��the��bel�ef��that��the��end��be��not���mposs�ble.��We��must��str�ve��to��real�ze��an��end,��such��as��the��h�ghest��pol�t�cal��end,��even��when��there���s��not�� the��sl�ghtest�� l�kel�hood��that�� �t��can��be��real�zed.��As��we��have��seen��above,��the��poss�b�l�ty��to��mon�tor��and��enforce��are��cond�t�ons��wh�ch��must��be��met��by��jur�d�cal��norms���n��order��to��be��cons�dered��as��able��to��generate��laws���n��a��soc�ety.��Norms��wh�ch��cannot��be��mon�tored��or��enforced��are��excluded��as���mposs�ble.��Those��wh�ch��are��not��excluded���n��th�s��way��rema�n��leg�t�mate��and��must��be��adopted��and��followed.

Hence,�� unl�ke�� the�� h�ghest�� eth�cal�� good,�� the�� h�ghest�� pol�t�cal�� good�� �s��poss�ble��even�� �f��we��do��not�� �ntroduce�� the��postulates��of��pract�cal�� reason��–�� �t��does��not��presuppose�� that��we��have�� �nf�n�te�� t�me�� to�� �mprove��our��worth��and�� �t��does��not��presuppose��a��necessary��connect�on��that��could��be��brought��about��by��an��all-powerful��be�ng.��Moreover,��unl�ke��the��h�ghest��eth�cal��good,��the��h�ghest��pol�t�cal��good��can��be��enforced.��That�� the��h�ghest��pol�t�cal��good���s��enforced��by��nature,��as��Kant��expla�ns��the��guarantee��of��perpetual��peace,��does��not��affect��our��freedom.��It��rema�ns��however��to��be��seen��what��ep�stem�c��status�� the��cla�m��to��such��a��guarantee��can��have��w�thout��transcend�ng��the��l�m�ts��of��reason.

References

Ba�asu,��Sor�n.��2010.��“Kant’s��Account��of��Moral��Mot�vat�on:��A��Sartrean��Response�� to��Some��Hegel�an��Object�ons”,���n��The Bulletin of the Hegel Society of Great Britain,��Vol.��61,��86-106.

Ba�asu,��Sor�n.��2012.��“The��F�nal��End��of��the��Doctr�ne��of��R�ght:��Comments��on��RL 6:��354-355”.��

H�ghest��Good”,��op.��c�t.)��seems��to��suggest�� that��we��know��noth�ng��about�� the��eth�cal��worth��of��our��act�ons.�� I�� th�nk�� that,�� �n�� fact,��Kant’s��po�nt�� �s��only�� that��we��cannot��know��anyth�ng��w�th��absolute��certa�nty.��Yet,��I�� th�nk��th�s��should��not��be��regarded��as��a��huge��problem��–��after��all,�� there�� �s��noth�ng�� that��we��know��w�th��absolute��certa�nty.�� I��argued�� for�� the��poss�b�l�ty��of��plaus�ble�� judgements��of�� eth�cal��worth�� �n��Sor�n��Ba�asu,�� “Kant’s��Account��of��Moral��Mot�vat�on:��A��Sartrean��Response�� to��Some��Hegel�an��Object�ons”,�� �n��The Bulletin of the Hegel Society of Great Britain,��Vol.��61,��86-106.

Paper��presented��to��a��Workshop��on��Kant’s��Metaphysics of Morals.��Organ�ser:��Harry��Lesser.��Un�vers�ty��of��Manchester.

Fl�kschuh,��Katr�n.��2006.��“Reason��and��Nature:��Kant’s��Teleolog�cal��Argument�� �n��Perpetual Peace”,���n��G.��B�rd��(ed.)��A Companion to Kant.��Blackwell.

Formosa,��Paul.��2010.��“Kant��on��the��H�ghest��Moral-Phys�cal��Good:��The��Soc�al��Aspect��of��Kant’s��Moral��Ph�losophy”,���n��Kantian Review,��Vol.��15,��No.��1,��1-36.

Guyer,��Paul.��2000.��Kant on Freedom, Law and Happiness.��Cambr�dge��Un�vers�ty��Press.Höffe,��Otfr�ed.��1990.��Kategorische Rechtsprinzipien: ein Kontrapunkt der Moderne.��Suhrkamp.Höffe,��Otfr�ed.��1992.��“Even��a��nat�on��of��dev�ls��needs��a��state:��The��d�lemma��of��natural��Just�ce”,���n��

H.��W�ll�ams��(ed.)��Kant’s Political Philosophy.��Un�vers�ty��of��Wales��Press.Kant,�� Immanuel.�� 1900-.��Kants gesammelte Schriften.��Ed.��by�� the��Kön�gl�ch��Preuß�schen��

Akadem�e��der��W�ssenschaften,��subsequently��Deutsche,��now��Berl�n-Brandenburg��Akadem�e��der��W�ssenschaften��(or�g�nally��under�� the��ed�torsh�p��of��W�lhelm��D�lthey).��Georg��Re�mer,��subsequently��Walter��de��Gruyter.

Kant,��Immanuel.��1996a.��Critique of Pure Reason.��Tr.��Werner��S.��Pluhar.��Hackett.Kant,�� Immanuel.�� 1996b.��Practical Philosophy.��Tr.�� and�� ed.��Mary�� J.��Gregor.��Cambr�dge��

Un�vers�ty��Press.Kant,�� Immanuel.��1996c.��Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View.��Tr.��and��ed.��R.��B.��

Louden.��Cambr�dge��Un�vers�ty��Press.Kant,��Immanuel.��1987.��Critique of Judgement.��Tr.��W.��S.��Pluhar.��Hackett.Kant,�� Immanuel.��2006��Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View.��Tr.�� and��ed.��Robert��

Louden.��Cambr�dge��Un�vers�ty��Press.Newey,��Glen.��2011.��“How��Not��To��Tolerate��Rel�g�on”,���n��Mon�ca��Mookherjee��(ed.)��Democracy,

Religious Pluralism and the Liberal Dilemma of Accommodation.��Spr�nger.Schm�tz,��He�nz-Gerd.��1990.��“Moral��oder��Klughe�t?��Überlegung��zur��Gestalt��der��Autonom�e��des��

Pol�schen���m��Denken��Kants”,���n��Kant-Studien,��Vol.��81,��No.��4,��413-34.Taylor,��Robert.��2010.��“Kant’s��Pol�t�cal��Rel�g�on:��The��Transparency��of��Perpetual��Peace��and��the��

H�ghest��Good”,���n��The Review of Politics,��Vol.��72,��No.��1,��1-24.W�llaschek,��Marcus.��2002.��“Wh�ch��Imperat�ves��for��R�ght?��On��the��Non-Prescr�pt�ve��Character��of��

Jur�d�cal��Laws���n��Kant’s��Metaphys�cs��of��Morals”,���n��M.��T�mmons��(ed.)��Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals. Interpretative Essays.��Oxford��Un�vers�ty��Press.

Wood,��Allen.��1970.��Kant’s Moral Religion.��Cornell��Un�vers�ty��Press.Wood,��Allen.��1998.��“Kant’s��Project��for��Perpetual��Peace”,���n��Pheng��Cheah��and��Bruce��Robb�ns��

(eds.)��Cosmopolitics. Thinking and Feeling Beyond the Nation.��Un�vers�ty��of��M�nnesota��Press.

Yovel,��Y�rm�yahu.��1980��Kant and the Philosophy of History.��Pr�nceton��Un�vers�ty��Press.Yp�,��Lea.��2010.��“Natura Daedala Rerum?��On��the��Just�f�cat�on��of��H�stor�cal��Progress���n��Kant’s��

Guarantee of Perpetual Peace”,���n��Kantian Review,��Vol.��14,��No.��2,��118-48.

36 �� How��Many��Formulas?��An��Alternat�ve��Read�ng����/����Valent�n��MURESAN������������37

How Many Formulas ? An Alternative Reading

Valent�n��MURESAN

Th�s��art�cle���s��focused��on��the��s�gn�f�cance��of��the��categor�cal���mperat�ve’s��formulas,��on�� the�r��number,�� funct�on��and��rec�procal�� relat�ons.��Th�s�� �s�� the��k�nd��of�� top�c�� that��d�v�ded��Kant’s��commentators�� �nto�� several��groups.��The��number,�� the��nature,�� the��funct�ons,�� the��rec�procal��relat�ons,��even��the��names��of�� the��formulas��were,��over�� the��years,��the��subject��of��v�v�d��d�sputes.

For�� �nstance,��some��remarkable��commentators�� l�ke��D.��Ross��and��H.��J.��Paton��cla�med��that��there��are��f�ve��formulas:��the��Formula��of��the��Un�versal��Law��(FUL),��the��Formula��of��the��Law��of��Nature��(FLN),��the��Formula��of��Human�ty��(FH),��the��Formula��of��the��Autonomy��of��the��w�ll��(FA)��and��the��Formula��of��the��K�ngdom��of��Ends��(FKE).��Some��others��speak��of�� four��formulas:��FUL,��FLN,��FH,��FA��(Duncan)��or��FUL,��FH,��FA,��FKE��(Guyer)��or��FUL,��FLN,��FH,��FKE��(Norman).��There��are��commentators��who��cannot��f�nd��more��than��three��formulas:��FUL,��FH,��FKE��(Ca�rd,��O’Ne�ll)��or��FUL,��FH,��FA��(Broad,��Wood).��And,��as���f��to��complete��th�s��myster�ous��enumerat�on,��Kant��h�mself��spoke��of��“three”��formulas��-��FUL,��FH,��FA��(at��G.��431)��and��FLN,��FH,��FKE��(at��G.��436).1

Moreover,�� one��usually�� speaks��w�thout�� d�st�nct�on�� about�� “formulas”�� and��“formulat�ons”.��In��a��recent��commentary��to��the��Groundwork2, T�mmermann��cla�ms��that��the��supreme��pr�nc�ple��of��moral�ty��(named��by��h�m��“The��Categor�cal��Imperat�ve”)��has��four��“formulat�ons”:��“the��general��formulat�on”��(well��known��as��the��Formula of Universal Law��-��FUL)��and���ts��three��“var�at�ons”.��The��latter��are��what��I��have��called��the��Formula of the Law of Nature�� (FLN),�� the��Formula of Humanity�� (FH)��and��the��Formula of Autonomy�� (FA).3 Hőffe also counts four “formulations” but different from�� those��of��T�mmermann.�� In��an��equally�� recent��commentary,��Sally��Sedgw�ck��speaks��about��“formulat�ons”4��as��well.��Kerste�n��cla�ms�� �nstead�� that�� the��supreme��pr�nc�ple��of��moral�ty��(SPM)���s��not��FUL,��but�� the Formula of Humanity.5 He���s�� �n��agreement��w�th Paul��Guyer��and��many��other��d�st�ngu�shed��authors.6��On��the��other��

��1�� References��to��the��Academy��ed�t�on;��the��translat�on��of��the��Groundwork,��of��the��Critique of Practical��Reason��(CPrR)��and��of��the��Metaphysics of Morals��(MM)���s��by��Mary��Gregor��(�n��I.��Kant,��Practical Philosophy,��Cambr�dge��Un�vers�ty��Press,��1999);�� the�� translat�on��of�� the��Critique of Pure Reason��(CPR)���s��by��N.��Kemp��Sm�th.

��2�� J.��T�mmermann,��Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals: A Commentary,��Cambr�dge��Un�vers�ty��Press,��2007,��p.��77.

3 V. Mureşan, Comentariu la Întemeierea metafizicii moravurilor,�� (A Commentary to the Groundwork)���n��I.��Kant,��Întemeierea metafizicii moravurilor,��Human�tas,��Bucurest�,��2007,��chapter��4.

��4�� S.��Sedgw�ck,��Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals,��An Introduction,��Cambr�dge��U.P.,��2008,��p.��111,��143.

��5�� S.��Kerste�n,��Kant’s Search for the Supreme Principle of Morality,��Cambr�dge��Un�vers�ty��Press,��2004,��p.��46.

��6�� P.��Guyer,��Kant’s System of Nature and Freedom,��Clarendon,��Oxford,��2005,��p.��250.

hand,��Wood��contends�� that�� the��SPM���s��not��one��of�� these��formulas,��but��a��system��of��formulas.

As��concerns��the��rec�procal��relat�ons��between��them,��there��are��wr�ters��uphold�ng��the�r�� logical equivalence (Hőffe, Delbos); this implies that, if there are four, three of�� them��are��dispensable:�� “G�ven�� the�� fact�� that�� the�� four�� formulae��are��equ�valent��between��them,��we��can��focus,��to��s�mpl�fy��th�ngs,��on��the��bas�c��formula��and��on���ts��f�rst��m�nor��formula,��wh�ch��make��from��the��order��of��nature�� the�� type��of��moral�� law”,�� �.e.��we��can��use��in��extremis��only��FUL��and��FLN.7��V�ctor��Delbos���s��also��a��part�san��of��the�r��equ�valence:��“From��each��of��these��formulae��one��can��effect�vely��br�ng��out,��through��a��s�mple��analys�s,��the��other��two,��and��the��three��formulae��analyt�cally��follow��themselves��from��the��concept��of��a��good��w�ll��[...].��For��Kant,�� the��essent�al��formula��of��the��moral��law”���s��FUL.��Some��other��authors��cla�m��they��are��“part�ally���ntens�onally��equ�valent”��(�n��the��sense��that��the��“contrad�ct�on���n��concept�on”��case���s��“�ntens�onally��equ�valent”��to��the��aspect��of��FH��that��requ�res��us��to��act��only��on��max�ms��that��do��not��treat��human�ty��as��mere��means)��and��are��also��“extens�onally��equ�valent”��(g�v�ng��the��same��results���n��the��appra�sal��of��max�ms).8

Now,��how��could��we��manage��th�s��chaot�c��d�vers�ty?��I��shall��beg�n��by��d�scuss�ng��the��background��to��Kant’s��approach.��I��have���n��v�ew��h�s��ep�stemolog�cal��background,���.e.�� the��new��type��of��ethical theory, grounded�� �n�� the��metaphys�cs��of��morals.��Th�s��or�g�nal��concept�on��of��sc�ent�f�c�� theor�es�� (phys�cal��and��eth�cal)�� �s��s�m�lar�� to�� the��approach of contemporary meta-theoretical structuralism (Stegműller, Moulines, Pârvu),��based��on��the��procedure��of��“rat�onal��general�zat�on”��(central��to��Bohr’s��thes�s).��I��am��suggest�ng���n��th�s��art�cle��an��extens�on��to��the��cr�t�que��of��pract�cal��reason��of��the��“theory��of��the��cr�t�que��of��pure��speculat�ve��reason”��reconstructed���n��terms��of��meta-theoret�c��structural�sm��by��Professor��Il�e��Pârvu9��from��the��Un�vers�ty��of��Bucharest.��A��two-fold��funct�on��of��Kant’s��“formula”���s��also��proposed��(that��of��establ�sh�ng��the��criteria��of��all��duty��and��that��of��prov�d�ng��the��procedure�� to��determ�ne��whether�� the��emp�r�cal��max�ms��sat�sfy��these��cr�ter�a).��Therefore,��as���n��many��other��central��concepts��(e.g.�� the��double��nature��of��man,��the��descr�pt�ve-prescr�pt�ve��form��of��pract�cal�� laws,��the���ntell�g�ble/v�s�ble��worlds��etc.)�� the��concept��of��“formula”��has��l�kew�se��a��double��nature.��I��cla�m��that��all��the��well��known��“formulas”��of��Kant’s��theory��belong��to���ts��pure��part;�� the�r��number�� �s��not��arb�trary,�� �t�� �s��prec�sely��determ�ned��by��the��“progress�on��of�� the��categor�es��of��quant�ty”.��The��emp�r�cal��appl�cat�ons��of�� the�� theory��(�.e.�� the��part��called��“appl�ed��eth�cs”)��use��d�st�nct��procedures�� that��belong��to�� the��“power��of��judgement”,��not��to��reason.��In��my���nterpretat�on,��the��supreme��pr�nc�ple��of��moral�ty���s��not��a��s�ngle��formula,��but��a��couple��of��formulas:��FA+FKE,��each��be�ng��a��synthes�s��of��two��others.��These��bas�c��formulas��are��used��to��“der�ve”��the��14��a��pr�or���dut�es��of��human��be�ngs��as such.��Only��through��these��d�st�nct�ve��dut�es��may��the��theory��be��applied�� to��act�ons���n��exper�ence.

7 O. Hőffe, Introduction à la philosophie pratique de Kant,��Vr�n,��Par�s,��1993,��p.��81.��8�� O.��O’Ne�ll,��Constructions of Reason,��Cambr�dge��Un�vers�ty��Press,��1994,��p.��139.��9�� I.��Pârvu,��Posibilitatea experienţei (The Possibility of Experience”),��Pol�te�a-SNSPA,��

Bucureşti, 2004. I have proposed this extension in my commentary included in I. Kant, Întemeierea metafizicii moravurilor�� (Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals),��Humanitas, Bucureşti, 2007, chap. 5.3.

38 �� How��Many��Formulas?��An��Alternat�ve��Read�ng����/����Valent�n��MURESAN������������39

The-metaphysical-“revolution”-and-the-meaning-of-“Formel”A��lot��of��Kant�an��commentators��adopted��what�� I�� shall��call�� the formulation view:��they��accepted��as��standard��the��usual��translat�on��of��the��German��term��“Formel”��w�th��“(l�ngu�st�c)��formulat�on”.��Or,�� they��use��“formula”��and��“formulat�on”��alternat�vely.��As��Alan��Wood��says,�� let��us��study��“Kant’s�� formulations��of�� the��moral�� law”.�� In�� the��same��manner,��T�mmermann��speaks��about��“alternat�ve��formulat�ons”,��or��“var�ants”,��or��“reformulat�ons”��of��SPM.��When��these��authors��say��“the�� formula��of��the��Supreme��Pr�nc�ple�� of�� Moral�ty�� (SPM)”,�� they�� actually�� mean,�� I�� suppose,�� the�� linguistic formulation�� of�� the��SPM��(plus�� �ts�� “reformulat�ons”).��Some��of�� them��speak��also��about�� the��“�ntens�onal��equ�valence”��between��formulat�ons,��about��analyticity��and��the��deductive��mean�ng��of�� the��a��pr�or���“der�vat�on”��of��dut�es,��Kant’s�� theory��be�ng��cons�dered��a�� landmark��of�� the��“deductive�� trad�t�on”10�� �n��eth�cal�� theory.��All�� these��observat�ons���mply��that��such��authors��ass�gn��Kant��a��propositional view��on��sc�ent�f�c��theor�es,�� �n�� the�� logical��Ar�stotel�an�� trad�t�on,��even���f�� they��do��not��expl�c�tly��stress��th�s��aspect.��I��bel�eve��th�s��to��be��a��wrong��cho�ce.��Although��th�s��seems��to��be��someth�ng��per�pheral,���t��w�ll��have,��surpr�s�ngly,��deep���mpl�cat�ons.

The�� reader�� �nterested�� �n��Kant’s��or�g�nal�� approach�� to��moral��ph�losophy�� �s��d�sappo�nted��to��f�nd��that��all�� these��“var�ants”��“serve��[only]��a��rhetor�cal��funct�on”.11��On��the��contrary,��I��am��tempted��to��take��Kant��ser�ously��and��cla�m��that��rhetor�c���s��never��h�s��pr�or�ty��and��the��term��“Formel”��means��“formula”���n��a��technical��sense,��borrowed��partly��from��law,��but��ma�nly��from��mathematics:��

[A�� rev�ewer�� sa�d�� that]�� “no�� new�� pr�nc�ple�� of�� moral�ty�� �s�� set�� forth�� �n�� [the��Groundwork]��but��only��a��new formula. [...]��But��whoever��knows��what��a formula means�� to��a��mathemat�c�an,��wh�ch�� (��)��determ�nes��qu�te��prec�sely��what�� �s�� to��be��done�� to��solve�� (�)��a��problem��and��does��not�� let��h�m��m�ss�� �t,��will not take a formula that does this with respect to all duty in general as something that is insignificant and can be dispensed with”.��(CPrR,��5:��9f)

Therefore,��a��“formula”��(�)��has�� to��state the problem�� to��be��solved,��e.g.��what�� �s�� the��cube��volume?;��wh�ch���s�� the��model�� (cr�ter�a)��of��all��duty���n��general?;��and��(��)��g�ves��us�� the��procedure�� to�� solve�� �t,�� e.g.��an��algor�thm�� to��calculate�� the��cube��volume;��a��procedure��to��der�ve��a��pr�or���the��dut�es��of��human��be�ngs��as��such��w�thout��m�ss�ng��the��target.12��Th�s��k�nd��of��“formula”��as��a��supreme��pr�nc�ple��of��moral�ty,�� together��w�th��the��a��pr�or���dut�es�� for��human��be�ngs��as��such�� that�� result�� from���t,��each��hav�ng�� the��

10�� R.��Dwork�n,��Theory, Practice and Moral Reasoning,�� �n��D.��Copp��(ed.)��Ethical Theory,��Oxford��Un�vers�ty��Press,��2006,��p.��627.��An��eth�cal�� theory��g�ves��us��an��un�versal��moral��pr�nc�ple�� from��wh�ch�� �t�� �s��poss�ble�� to�� logically deduce��general��moral�� rules��concern�ng��act�on-types��wh�ch,�� supplemented��by��a��m�nor��prem�se�� tell�ng�� that�� an��act��has��certa�n��character�st�cs,��allow��us��to��deduce�� that��that��act���s��a��moral��duty.��Ut�l�tar�an�sm,��Kant�an�sm��and��Chr�st�an��eth�cs��are��cons�dered��to��belong��to��th�s��class��of��theor�es.

11�� J.��T�mmermann,��Kant’s Groundwork...,��p.��106.12�� “All��mathemat�cal��problems,�� în��wh�ch�� the�� laws�� for��solv�ng�� the��problem��const�tute�� the��

�mperat�ve,�� �n��that�� they��prescr�be��what��has��to��be��done��should��one��w�sh��to��solve���t�� ...��The��purpose���tself���s��one��of��techn�cal��sk�ll”��(LE,��27:��486).��

form��of��a��categor�cal���mperat�ve,��belong��to��the��pure��part��of��the��theory13��and��not��to��the��empirical��one��(the��“corollar�es”).��The��above��passage��suggests��also��the��two-fold��mean�ng��of�� the��formula��of�� the��supreme��pr�nc�ple��of��moral�ty.��Both��funct�ons��are���mportant��but��how��could��they��be��accompl�shed��s�multaneously?

Th�s��two-fold��mean�ng���s��plaus�ble��and���nterest�ng��only���f��put���n��the��context��of��the��“revolut�on”���ntended��by��Kant�� �n��metaphys�cs��and���s��related��to��h�s�� �nnovat�ve��v�s�on��of�� the��mean�ng��of��“sc�ent�f�c�� theory”,�� �n��part�cular��of�� “eth�cal�� theory”.��The��kernel��of��Kant’s�� revolut�onary��proposal��cons�sts�� �n��changing the method��of��metaphys�cs;��part��of�� th�s��methodolog�cal�� sh�ft�� �s�� represented��by�� the��change��of��the��method��of�� theor�zat�on��and��the��ground�ng��of��actual��emp�r�cal��sc�ence��on��an��a��pr�or��� foundat�on�� (on��“the��metaphys�c��of��nature”)��modeled��on��Newton’s�� theory��of��mathemat�cal��phys�cs.��Th�s��meant�� to��abandon��s�multaneously�� the��Ar�stotel�an��logical��v�ew��of�� theory��as��a��deduct�ve��arch�tecture��of�� true��propos�t�ons��val�dated��by��exper�ence��wh�ch�� �s,��unavo�dably,��an��empirical�� theory.��We��should��say�� today,��roughly,��that��Kant��abandoned��a��k�nd��of��“statement��v�ew”��of��theor�es��and��adopted��a��k�nd��of��“structural�st”��or��“model-theoret�c”��v�ew.14��In��short,��because��Kant��abandoned��the��rece�ved��v�ew��of��sc�ent�f�c��theory��(under��the���nfluence��of��mathemat�cal��phys�cs)���t���s��very��plaus�ble��to��suppose��that��h�s��concept��of��“Formel”��(“the��Formel��of��SPM”)��–��and��many��other��concepts��-��were��adapted��to��the��new��ep�stemolog�cal��context.

The��revolut�onary��project��has��been��announced��over��the��years,��but��the��dec�s�ve��step��was��made���n��the��Critique of Pure Reason:��

“Now��the��concern��of�� th�s��cr�t�que��of��pure��speculat�ve��reason��cons�sts�� �n�� that��attempt�� to�� transform��the��accepted��procedure��of��metaphys�cs,��undertak�ng��an��ent�re��revolut�on��accord�ng��to��the��example of geometers and natural scientists.��It���s��a��treat�se��on��the��method,��not��a��system��of��sc�ence���tself ” .��(CPR,��B��xx���).“For��after�� th�s��alterat�on���n��our��way��of�� th�nk�ng��we��can��very��well��expla�n��the��poss�b�l�ty��of��a��cogn�t�on��[…]��of��the��laws��that��are��the��a priori��ground��of��nature,��as��the��sum��total��of��objects��of��exper�ence”.��(CPR,��B��x�x)

Kant��began��to��approach��th�s��subject��several��years��prev�ously,���n��a��per�od��when��h�s���ndependent��th�nk�ng��had��started��to��gradually��man�fest���tself,��even���f��h�s��or�g�nal��ph�losophy��was��not��yet��art�culated.��The��excerpt��that��follows���s��an��ant�c�pat�on��of��the��new��method��developed���n��a��paper��for��a��compet�t�on��organ�zed��by��the��Academy��of��

13�� FUL,��FA,��FLN,��FH��etc.�� all��have�� the�� form��of�� a�� categor�cal�� �mperat�ve��of�� reason;�� the��categor�cal�� �mperat�ve,��“because���t��asserts��an��obl�gat�on��w�th��respect��to��certa�n��act�ons,�� �s��a��morally��pract�cal�� law”��(MM,��6:��223).��Therefore���t�� �s��a priori.��These��formulas��are��only��formal��categor�cal���mperat�ves��wh�ch��(�)��“only��aff�rms��what��obl�gat�on���s”��and��(��)��show��us��how��we��could��“know”��whether��a��subject�ve��max�m��“also��hold��object�vely”��(6:��225).��The��“pr�nc�ples��of��duty��of�� the��human��be�ng��as��such”��tell��man��“how��he��ought�� to��act”,��be�ng��a��“pr�nc�ple��that��reason��prescr�bes��to��h�m��absolutely��and��so��object�vely”,��therefore��a��pr�or���(6:��226).��So,��to��apply��the��a��pr�or���pr�nc�ples��of��duty��to��act�ons���n��exper�ence��we��need��“pr�nc�ples��of��appl�cat�on”.��One��and��the��same��pr�nc�ple��of��duty��b�nds��a��man���n��a��var�ety��of��ways,��wh�ch��depend��on��the��var�ety��of��matter��the��resultant��hypothet�cal���mperat�ves��have.

14�� I.��Pârvu,��Posibilitatea experienţei (The Possibility of Experience”),��Pol�te�a-SNSPA,��Bucureşti, 2004.

40 �� How��Many��Formulas?��An��Alternat�ve��Read�ng����/����Valent�n��MURESAN������������41

Berl�n��(1763):��

“The��true��method��of��metaphys�cs�� �s��bas�cally�� the��same��as�� that�� �ntroduced��by��Newton���nto��natural��sc�ence��and��wh�ch��has��been��of��such��benef�t��to���t.��Newton’s��method��ma�nta�ns�� that��one��ought,��on�� the��bas�s��of��certa�n��exper�ence��and,�� �f��needed,��w�th�� the��help��of��geometry,�� to��seek��out�� the�� rules�� �n��accordance��w�th��wh�ch��certa�n��phenomena��of��nature��occur.��Even�� �f�� �t��does��not��d�scover�� the��fundamental��pr�nc�ple��of�� these��occurrences�� �n�� the��bod�es�� themselves,�� �t�� �s��nonetheless��certa�n�� that�� they��operate�� �n��accordance��w�th�� th�s�� law.��Complex��natural�� events�� are��expla�ned��once�� �t��has��been��clearly�� shown��how�� they��are��governed��by��these��well-establ�shed��rules”.��L�kew�se���n��metaphys�cs:��we��have��to��seek��out��“by��means��of��certa�n���nner��exper�ence,��that���s��to��say,��by��means��of��an���mmed�ate��and��self-ev�dent���nner��consc�ousness��[...]�� those��character�st�c��marks��wh�ch��are��certa�nly��to��be��found���n��the��concept��of��any��general��property.��And��even���f��you��are��not��acqua�nted��w�th��the��complete��essence��of��the��th�ng,��you��can��st�ll��safely��employ��those��character�st�c��marks��to���nfer��a��great��deal��from��them��about��the��th�ng���n��quest�on”.��(2:��286)15

Kant�� looked��for��an��alternat�ve�� to�� the��emp�r�cal�� theor�es��of��eth�cs�� (“theor�es��hav�ng�� to��do��w�th��objects��of�� �ntu�t�on”)��and��h�s��or�g�nal��proposal��was��a��k�nd��of��theory��“�n��wh�ch��objects��are��represented��only��by��means��of��concepts��(w�th��objects��of��mathemat�cs�� and��objects��of��ph�losophy)”.��Th�s��k�nd��of�� theory,�� �nsp�red��by��mathemat�cal��phys�cs,���ncluded��“objects��that��could��be��thought��qu�te��well”��although��they��“could��not��be��given��at��all,��but��m�ght��well��be��mere��empty��Ideas”��of��wh�ch��“no��use��would��be��made���n��pract�ce”��(TP,��8:��276).��In��a��latter��work,�� the��Metaphysics of Morals,��Kant��stressed��h�s���ntent�on��to��make��eth�cs��a��k�nd��of��sc�ence��based��on��the��a��pr�or���f�rst��pr�nc�ples��of��the��metaphys�cs��of��morals:��

“A philosophy of��any��subject�� (a��system��of��rat�onal��cogn�t�on��from��concepts)��requ�res��a��system��of pure rational concepts�� �ndependent��of��any��cond�t�ons��of���ntu�t�on,�� that�� �s,��metaphys�cs. The��only��quest�on�� �s��whether��every��practical ph�losophy,��as��a��doctr�ne��of��dut�es,��and��so��too��the��doctrine of virtue (eth�cs),��also��needs��metaphysical first principles, so��that���t��can��be��set��forth��as��a��genu�ne��sc�ence��(systemat�cally)��and��not��merely��as��an��aggregate��of��precepts��sought��out��one��by��one��(fragmentar�ly)”.��(MM,��6:��375)

What��does��he�� �ntend�� to��say?��Pract�cal��ph�losophy��(�n��part�cular��eth�cs)��has��to�� �m�tate�� the��ph�losophy��of��nature��wh�ch��was��already��at�� the��stage��of��a��“genu�ne��sc�ence”.��A��“genu�ne��sc�ence”���n��h�s��v�ew��was��a��non-emp�r�cal��sc�ence,��grounded��on��pr�nc�ples��of��an��apod�ct�cal��cert�tude,��therefore��a��pr�or�,��composed��only��of��Ideas��of��reason��that��have��no��relat�on��to��percept�ons.��“As��proper��natural��sc�ence��therefore��requ�res��a��pure��part,��on��wh�ch�� the��apod�ct�c��certa�nty�� that�� reason��seeks�� there�n��

15�� I.��Kant,��Inquiry concerning the distinctness of the principles of natural philosophy and theology�� (1763),�� �n��I.��Kant,��Theoretical Philosophy (1755-1770),��Cambr�dge��Un�vers�ty��Press,��1992,��pp.��42-43.

can��be��based.�� […]��Properly�� so-called��natural�� sc�ence��presupposes,�� �n�� the��same��place,��metaphys�cs��of��nature”16��(469).��The��“metaphys�cal��pr�nc�ples��of�� the��natural��sc�ence”��belong��to��the��pure��part��of��the��natural��sc�ence��and��are��ordered��accord�ng��to��the��categor�es’��t�tles��(s�nce��“the��schema��for��completeness��of��a��metaphys�cal��system��[...]�� �s��the��table��of��categor�es”17);�� th�s��means��1)��the��f�rst��metaphys�cal��pr�nc�ples��of��phoronomy,��2)��[...]��of��dynam�cs,��3)��[...]��of��mechan�cs��and��of��4)��[...]��phenomenology.��From�� these��one��der�ves�� the��a��pr�or���pr�nc�ples��of��Newton�an��phys�cs��and�� then��one��appl�es�� the��pure��phys�cal�� theory�� to��exper�ence��(to�� the��“Newton�an��emp�r�cal��phys�cs”).

Correspond�ng��to�� th�s��h�erarchy,��we��w�ll��have���n��eth�cs,�� I��suppose,��“the��f�rst��metaphys�cal��pr�nc�ples��of��eth�cs”��(ordered��follow�ng��the��categor�es��of��quant�ty):��these��are�� the��couples��FUL+FLN,��FEI+FH��and��FA+FKE.��From��the��f�rst��member��of��each��couple��we��may��rat�onally��der�ve,��w�th��the��help��of��the��second��member,�� the��14��“pure��pr�nc�ples��of��duty”.��F�nally,�� these��a��pr�or���dut�es��are��“appl�ed”��to��assess��the��max�ms���n��our��moral��exper�ence,��to��morally��just�fy��pol�t�cal��const�tut�ons,��or��to���mprove��eth�cal��educat�on��etc.;�� �n��short,�� to��apply�� the��theory��to��an��object��that��ex�sts���ndependently��of��Kant’s��theory.

The��metaphysical first principles of��ethics��are��formal��categor�cal�� �mperat�ves��that��const�tute��the��supreme��pr�nc�ple��of��moral�ty��from��wh�ch��a��complete��system��of��“pure��pr�nc�ples��of��duty”��for��man��as such�� �s��“der�vable”.��They��are��both��formulas��for��establ�sh�ng��cr�ter�a��and��for��extract�ng��procedures���n��order��to��der�ve��from��SPM��the��“pure��pr�nc�ples��of��duty”��of��the��human��be�ng��as��such;��they��make��up��together��the��pure��part��of��the��theory.��The��genu�ne��sc�ence��of��morals��forms��a��complete system��of��a��pr�or���dut�es��ordered��by��an��a��pr�or���pr�nc�ple.��Th�s���s��the��metaphys�cal��or��pure part��of��the��theory.��Its��emp�r�cal��part���ncludes��“appl�cat�ons”��wh�ch��are��cases���n��exper�ence��that��sat�sfy��th�s�� ideal model.��For���nstance,��anthropology��“deals��w�th��the��subject�ve��cond�t�ons��of��human��nature��that��h�nder��people��or��help��them���n��fulf�ll�ng��the��laws��of��a��metaphys�cs��of��morals”��(MM,��6:��217);��th�s���s��a��field��of��appl�cat�ons��(a��part�cular��case��of��appl�cat�on���s,��for��example,��the��moral��assessment��of��max�ms��or��the��development��of��moral��pr�nc�ples���n��the��m�nds��of��youth��through��educat�on,��or��the��bu�ld�ng��of��good��const�tut�ons).��The��a��pr�or���and�� the��emp�r�cal��parts��of��sc�ence��have�� to��be�� treated��separately;��th�s��expla�ns��why��Kant��could���gnore��the��“appl�cat�ons”��and��focus���nstead,��almost��completely,��on��the��“genu�ne��sc�ence”.

In��other��words,��“the��method��borrowed��from��natural��sc�ent�sts”��cons�sted�� �n��f�nd�ng��those���deal��models,���nvented��by��the��researcher’s��reason�ng��about��the��poss�ble��unobservable��structure��of��phys�cal��objects��and��processes,��wh�ch��m�ght��expla�n��the��regular�t�es��obta�ned��from��observat�ons,��measurements��and��exper�ments.��A��theory���s��not��a��set��of�� true��propos�t�ons��form�ng��a�� testable��ax�omat�c��system,��but��rather��a��“theoret�cal��matr�x,��a��set��of��poss�ble��models”��hav�ng��only��an���nd�rect��relat�on��w�th��the��observat�on��data;�� �t�� �s��a��h�erarchy��of��conceptual��structures��establ�sh�ng�� the��a

16�� I.��Kant,��Metaphysical foundations of the natural science,���n��I.��Kant,��Theoretical Philosophy after 1781,��Cambr�dge��Un�vers�ty��Press,��2002,��p.��1288.

17�� I.��Kant,��Metaphysical foundations of the natural science,���n��I.��Kant,��Theoretical Philosophy after 1781,��Cambr�dge��Un�vers�ty��Press,��2002,��p.��1288.

42 �� How��Many��Formulas?��An��Alternat�ve��Read�ng����/����Valent�n��MURESAN������������43

priori��cond�t�ons��of��poss�b�l�ty��for��our��emp�r�cal��moral��act�ons18.��The��appl�cat�on��relat�on�� �s�� �n�� th�s��case�� the��“subsumpt�on”�� relat�on��between��a�� law��of�� reason��and��act�ons���n��exper�ence.��Th�s���s��not��a��deduct�ve��relat�on,��but��rather��a��funct�onal��one.

As�� I�� understand�� �t,�� the�� Groundwork�� shows�� s�m�lar�t�es��ma�nly��w�th�� th�s��structural�st��concept��of��theory,��not��so��much��w�th��the��statement��v�ew.��In��th�s��sense,��to��propose��a��theory��means��to��introduce��a��“formal��structure”��or��a��“structural��pred�cate”,���.e.�� a��pred�cate��def�ned��by��a��number��of�� so-called��“pr�nc�ples”��or��“bas�c�� laws”��wh�ch��do��not��need�� to��be�� just�f�ed��or��“deduced”�� �n��some��way;�� they��are��necessary��assumpt�ons��wh�ch��define��th�s��structural��pred�cate.��In��a��very��s�m�lar��way,��Kant��takes��SPM��w�thout��any��proof,��as��s�mply��“g�ven”,��as��a��“fact��of��pure��reason”,��“because��one��cannot��reason���t��out��from��antecedent��data��of��reason”��(CPrR,��5:��31).��The��applications��of��such��a��theory��do��not��cons�st�� �n��the��emp�r�cally��testable�� logical��consequences��of���ts��“ax�oms”,��but�� �n�� the��set��of��conceptual��or��emp�r�cal��models�� that��satisfy�� (or��are��“subsumed”��under)��the��bas�c��laws19��of��the��structural��pred�cate.��A��theory���s��a��formal��structure��plus��the��fam�ly��of���ts��emp�r�cal��models.

Us�ng��an��analogy,��we��can��also��say��that���n��theoret�cal��eth�cs��we��must��search��for��those��a priori constra�nts��wh�ch��def�ne��a��poss�ble��morally��perfect��world,��a��poss�ble��world��of��autonomous��rat�onal��be�ngs,���.e.��be�ngs��who��are�� free��(w�thout��freedom��of��cho�ce��one��cannot��be��respons�ble,��therefore���mputable,��therefore��subjected��to��moral��laws)��and��self-legislating��(freedom���s��conce�ved��as��a��k�nd��of��causality��of��the��w�ll,��therefore���t��supposes��spec�f�c��causal��laws).��These��constra�nts��are��expressed��by��one��pr�nc�ple��wh�ch���s��supposed��to��govern��the��w�ll��of��each��of��the��holy���nhab�tants��of��th�s��world;��such��an���deal��pr�nc�ple��explains��what��moral��obl�gat�on���s�� �n��our�� �mperfect��human��world,��and,�� �n��part�cular,��wh�ch��are��our��most��general��and��genu�ne��moral��dut�es.��Kant’s��eth�cal��theory���s��an��a��pr�or���structure��def�ned��by��the��supreme��pr�nc�ple��of��moral�ty��(the��“pure”��part��of�� the�� theory,�� the��“metaphys�cs��of��morals”)��plus�� the��appl�cat�ons�� that�� sat�sfy�� the��pr�nc�ple�� (the��part��of��“appl�ed��eth�cs”).�� Its��a��pr�or���pr�nc�ples��and��Ideas��are��“necessary��pract�cal��presuppos�t�ons”��under��wh�ch��alone���t���s��poss�ble��to��“regard��commands��of��reason��as��val�d”��(8:��13).

The-mathematical-root-of-the-“formula-of-all-duty”

As��we��saw,��Kant��uses�� two���nterrelated��mean�ngs��of�� the��term��“formula”��borrowed��from��mathemat�cs:�� that��of�� (�)�� conceptual��model�� that��def�nes�� the��cond�t�ons��of��poss�b�l�ty��of��someth�ng��and�� that��of�� (��)��procedure�� for��solv�ng�� the��problem���f��an��act�on��sat�sf�es��those��cond�t�ons.��Kant��d�sagrees��w�th��those��moral��ph�losophers��who��neglect�� the��eth�cal��analogue��of�� the��mathemat�cal��“formula”,��hav�ng�� �n��m�nd,��of��course,��the��contexts��where��one��speaks��about��the��“formula��of��the��supreme��pr�nc�ple��of��moral�ty”��(CPrR,��5:��9f):��a��“formula”���s��someth�ng��that��gu�des��our��efforts��to��solve��a��moral��problem��and��does��not�� let��us��m�ss���t.��The��procedural�� formulas��(l�ke��FLN)��

18�� I.��Pârvu,��Posibilitatea experienţei (The Possibility of Experience),��Pol�te�a-SNSPA,��Bucureşti, 2004, p. 62-63.

19�� The��“bas�c�� laws”��may��be��Newton’s��pr�nc�ples��for�� the��pred�cate��“�s��a��Newton�an��part�cle��mechan�cs”;��the��“rules”��of��assoc�at�v�ty,���dent�ty��and���nverses��for��the��pred�cate��“�s��a��group”;��as��well��as��FUL��and��FEI��for��“�s��a��‘moral��world’��of��free��be�ngs”.��

are��able��to��play��the�r��role,��but��they��are��also��related��to��the��bas�c��sense��wh�ch��can��be��found���n��the���dea��of��“model”.��There��are��several��contexts��where�n��Kant��used��the��term��“Formel”���n��the��sense��of��propos�t�on��wh�ch��expresses��the��cond�t�ons��of��poss�b�l�ty��of��a��class��of��th�ngs��through��the�r��“formula”,��wh�ch���s��the�r��general model.20��One��of��the��clearest��formulat�ons��–��although��a��mere��analogy��–���s��that��of��Reflexionen:��

“The��pr�nc�ple��or�� the��norm��of��all�� analyt�c��propos�t�ons�� �s�� the��pr�nc�ple��of��contrad�ct�on��and��of���dent�ty.��There���s��(�f��I��cons�der��both��together)��no��axioma but��only��a�� formula,�� �.e.,��a��general��model�� (ein allgemein Modell)��of��analyt�c��propos�t�ons;��for���t��conta�ns��no��medium terminum”.��(Reflexionen��4634)

Th�s�� fragment�� �s�� about�� the�� formula of analytic propositions�� wh�ch�� �s��l�ngu�st�cally��expressed��by��the��conjunction��of��two��“pr�nc�ples”��or��“norms”��or��criteria��of��analyt�c�ty:��the��pr�nc�ple��of��non-contrad�ct�on��and��the��pr�nc�ple��of���dent�ty.��Th�s��conjunct�on��should��not��be��taken��as��an��“ax�om”��(�n��a��demonstrat�ve��syllog�sm),��but��as��a��“formula”,���.e.��as��a��“general��model”��wh�ch��st�pulates��the��essent�al��cond�t�ons��that��all��analyt�c��propos�t�ons��must��satisfy.21

If��we�� transfer�� th�s�� �dea�� to�� the��moral��case,�� the��“formula”�� �n�� the�� f�rst�� sense��should��not��be��seen��as��an��“ax�om”,���.e.��as��a��synthet�c��a��pr�or���proposition��ev�dent��by��

20�� Kant��seems��to��d�st�ngu�sh,��though��not��clearly��enough,��between��the��statement of��SPM��and���ts��formula -��wh�ch��means��the��rat�onal��model��of��all��dut�es��“expressed”��by��th�s��statement;��he��speaks��of��“the��categor�cal���mperat�ve��and���ts��formula”��as��of��two��separate��th�ngs��(G 4:��432��/��II��59).��Whereas,��the��“categor�cal���mperat�ve”��refers��to��a��propos�t�on,��“�ts��formula”��refers��to��a��structure-concept��(“model”)��expressed��by��that��propos�t�on,��e.g.�� to��a��max�mal��set��of��ends���n��themselves��un�ted��by��two��“pr�nc�ples”��or��“norms”��wh�ch��prov�de��the��cr�ter�a��of��the��moral�ty��of��all��max�ms,��or��to��the��synthes�s��of��both��of��them.��T�mmermann��f�nds��the��above��phrase��“�ntr�gu�ng”.��He��bel�eves��that��“the��categor�cal���mperat�ve”��means��an��uncond�t�onal��command��as��such��and��“the��formula”��means��“one��of�� the��earl�est�� formulat�ons”��(“wh�ch��happens��to��be��the��f�rst��var�ant”��-��FLN��(p.��104)).��In��th�s��case,��have��we��to��suppose��that��Kant,��when��he��spec�f�ed��at�� II,��59n�� that��he��would��not�� repeat�� for�� the�� th�rd�� t�me��the��4��examples��brought�� forward�� to��clar�fy�� (Erläuterung)��“the��categor�cal�� �mperat�ve��and�� �ts�� formula”,���ntended��to��say��that��he��had��been��try�ng��to��clar�fy��prev�ously��the��uncond�t�onal��command��and���ts��f�rst��“var�ant”?��Th�s���s��absurd,��s�nce���ts��“f�rst��var�ant”��(FLN)���s��also��an��“uncond�t�onal��command”;��and,��in fact,��he��clar�f�ed��two��var�ants:��FLN��and��FH.

21�� Look��at��another��fragment���n��wh�ch��Kant��uses��the��term��“formula”��w�th��the��same��mean�ng:��“The��propos�t�on��wh�ch��expresses��the��essence��of��every��aff�rmat�on��and��wh�ch��accord�ngly��conta�ns��the��supreme��formula��of��all��aff�rmat�ve��judgements��runs��as��follows:��to��every��subject��there��belongs��a��pred�cate��wh�ch���s���dent�cal��w�th���t.��Th�s���s��the��law of identity”.��The��formula��of��all��negat�ve�� judgements�� �s�� the�� law of contradiction.�� “These�� two��pr�nc�ples�� together��const�tute��the��supreme��un�versal��pr�nc�ple��[...]��of��human��reason���n���ts��ent�rety��(2:��294).��In��the��same��context��he��speaks��about��“the���mmed�ate��supreme��rule��of��all��obl�gat�on”��and��says��that���ts��pr�nc�ple���s��“a��formula��of��obl�gat�on”��(I.��Kant,��Inquiry concerning the distinctness of the principles of natural theology and morality��(1764),���n��I.��Kant,��Theoretical Philosophy (1755-1770),��(D.��Walford,��R.��Meerbote,��eds.),��Cambr�dge��Un�vers�ty��Press,��1992).��See��also��CPR,��A152/B191.

44 �� How��Many��Formulas?��An��Alternat�ve��Read�ng����/����Valent�n��MURESAN������������45

�tself22��from��wh�ch��one��could�� logically��deduce��the��moral��dut�es��as��theorems,23��but��as��a��“general��model��of��all��duty”.��Th�s��means��that��the��pr�nc�ple��of��moral�ty��has��to��be��cons�dered��as��a��fundamental��propos�t�on��(Grundsatz)��wh�ch��“conta�ns”��a�� formula,���.e.��conta�ns�� the��cond�t�ons��of��poss�b�l�ty��of�� the��a��pr�or���dut�es��of��human��be�ngs��as��such.��The��cond�t�ons��are��cr�ter�a��to��be��sat�sf�ed��by��max�ms���n��exper�ence.��They��are��not��g�ven��under��the��form��of��a��set��of��qual�t�es��a��duty��has,��but��as��a��set��of��abstract��ent�t�es�� that��sat�sfy��certa�n��cond�t�ons��g�ven��by��some��“pr�nc�ples”.��Th�s��was�� later��called��a��“structural��pred�cate”.��For��example,��th�s���s��the��manner��the��algebra�c��concept��of��“group”���s���ntroduced.��One��m�ght��say��that��the��structural��pred�cate��(“x���s��a��group”),��wh�ch���s��def�ned��by��three��requ�rements��or��pr�nc�ples,��represents��“the��general��model”��or�� the��“abstract��matr�x”��or�� the��“formal��structure”��for��an��unl�m�ted��set��of��models��or��part�cular��applications,�� �.e.��conceptual��or��emp�r�cal��structures��wh�ch��satisfy�� the��cond�t�ons��st�pulated��by��the��three��pr�nc�ples��(�n��Kant’s�� language,�� the��union��of�� the��three��pr�nc�ples��may��be��called��the��“formula”��of��the��pred�cate��“group”).��The��so-called��“structuralist epistemology” (Sneed, Stegműller, Pârvu etc.) developed much more complex��vers�ons��of��such��a��concept��of��theory,��conce�ved��as��a��h�erarchy��of��models.

Therefore,��when��Kant��uses�� the��phrase��“the��formula��of��[...]��all��duty”��or��“the��pr�nc�ple��of��all��duty”��(II,��41)��–���.e.��the��supreme��pr�nc�ple��of��moral�ty��from��wh�ch��all��dut�es��are��“der�vable”��–��he��very��probably��meant��the��general model��of��all��duty��(plus��the��procedure�� to��der�ve�� them).��And��th�s�� �s��not��a��mere��suppos�t�on��of��m�ne:��Kant��speaks��h�mself���n��terms��of��“model”��when��he��refers��to��the��“moral��world”��of��holy��w�lls��and��of��holy��laws���n��relat�on��to��the��world��of��f�n�te��rat�onal��be�ngs��and��the�r��max�ms��that��approx�mate�� the�� f�rst��w�thout��end��(CPrR,��5:��33).��F�nally,�� �n��speak�ng��about��“der�vat�on”��Kant��does��not��have���n��m�nd��some��k�nd��of��s�mple��log�cal��deduct�on,��but��a��spec�al��k�nd��of��reason�ng,24��gu�ded��by��some��derivation formulas�� (FLN��and��FH),��the��outcome��of��wh�ch���s��the��complete��class�f�cat�on��of��the��“pure��pr�nc�ples��of��duty”.��That��the��supreme��pr�nc�ple��of��moral�ty���s��the��system��of��FLU��“conjo�ned”��w�th��FEI���s��also��proved��by��the��fact��that��Kant��cons�ders��all��dut�es��of��the��human��be�ng��as��such��as��be�ng��der�vable��from��FUL��and��FEI,��as��from��the�r��“supreme��pract�cal��ground”��(G.��4:��421;��429).��When��he��has��approached��and��developed��the��empirical��part��of��h�s��theory,��he��changes�� the��vocabulary��and��speaks��about�� the��“subsumpt�on”��of�� the��mater�al��max�m��under��the��above��ment�oned��pr�nc�ples��and,��rec�procally,��of��the��“appl�cat�on”��of��the��pr�nc�ples��of��duty��to��the��max�ms���n��phenomena��-��therefore��he��speaks��about��the��relat�on��of��satisfying a model.25

To��conclude,�� the��central�ty��of�� the��mathemat�cal�� sense��of��“formula”��has��at��least�� four�� consequences.�� It�� shows�� that�� the�� log�cal-l�ngu�st�c�� reconstruct�on��of��Kant�an��eth�cal�� theory���s��not��adequate.��That��the��relat�on��between��SPM��and��the��14��

22�� S�nce�� �n�� the��Groundwork Kant�� tr�ed�� to��“establ�sh”�� the��supreme��pr�nc�ple��of��moral�ty,�� �t��follows��that��he��d�d��not��cons�der���t��an��obv�ous��ax�om.

23�� There��are��no��log�cal��deduct�ons��of��th�s��type,��nor��any���nstance��of��the��term��“sylog�sm”���n��the��contexts��where��the��“appl�cat�ons”��were��d�scussed.

24�� Dur�ng��wh�ch��the��empty��formal��duty��expressed��by��FUL���s��f�lled��w�th��some��factual-nom�c��content��by��apply�ng���t��to��max�ms��of��human nature,��w�thout��los�ng���ts��a��pr�or���character.��

25�� The��pure��moral�� law��(the��“holy”��one)�� �s��an��Idea��of��reason��“wh�ch��necessar�ly��serves��as��a��model��to��wh�ch��all��f�n�te��rat�onal��be�ngs��can��only��approx�mate��w�thout��end”;��“the��progress��of��one’s��max�ms��toward��th�s��model���s��unended”��(CPrR,��5:��33).

dut�es��“der�ved”���n��the��Metaphysics of Morals�� �s��not��a�� log�cal��deduction�� relat�on,��but��a��sui generis��“der�vat�on”��of��a��class�f�cat�on��of��pr�nc�ples��of��duty��from��SPM.��That�� the��moral��assessment��of��a��max�m��means�� to��be��able�� to��ver�fy�� �f�� that��max�m���s��subsumable26��or��satisfies�� the��a��pr�or���dut�es��of�� the��human��be�ng��as��such��and,��ult�mately,��sat�sf�es�� the��model��or�� the�� formula��of��SPM.��F�nally,�� �t�� shows�� that�� the��s�ngle��supreme��pr�nc�ple��of��moral�ty��may��be��def�ned��by��more��than��one��“formal��law”��(a��plural�ty��un�ted���n��the��single��pr�nc�ple��of��moral�ty).

The-levels-of-Kant’s-theory

Kant’s��theory��has��two��levels:��the��a��pr�or���and��the��emp�r�cal��(G:��4:��388-390).��Wh�ch��are��the��ma�n��“�nhab�tants”��of��the��f�rst�� level?��The��a��pr�or��� level���s�� that��at��wh�ch��we��f�nd��the��supreme��pr�nc�ple��of��moral�ty��(SPM),��“the��sole��pr�nc�ple��of��all��moral��law”��(CPrR,��5:��33),��“the��formal��supreme��determ�n�ng��ground��of��the��w�ll,��regardless��of��all��subject�ve��d�fferences”;���t���s��a��categor�cal���mperat�ve��of��reason��wh�ch��represents��the��“general��model”��of��all��dut�es��of��“human��be�ng��as��such”��through��the���ntermed�ary��of��the��two��fundamental��pr�nc�ples��wh�ch��def�ne���t:��FUL��and��FEI.

At��the��same��level,��there��are��14��(or��16)��“pure��pr�nc�ples��of��duty”��or��“pr�nc�ples��of��obl�gat�on�� for��human��be�ngs��as such”��–��der�ved�� from��SPM��(from��FUL��and��FEI��respect�vely).��“All�� �mperat�ves��of��duty��can��be��der�ved��from���t��as�� from��the�r��pr�nc�ple”��(4:��421,��429)��says��Kant��about��both��FUL��and��FEI.��The��formal��“pur�ty”��of��the��14��dut�es��cannot��be��denied,��and��although��they��use��terms��that��refer��to��the��human��be�ng,�� they��do��so��“only��to��the��extent��necessary,��w�th��reference��to��duty generally”��(CPrR,��5:��8),���.e.��only��to��some��un�versal��–��nom�c��–��character�st�cs��of��human��nature.��They��are��rather��a priori��pr�nc�ples��albe�t��not��pure��ones.��They��represent��a��complete��class�f�cat�on��of��the��a��pr�or���dut�es��for��man��as such, a��k�nd��of��a priori��paradigmatic applications��of��SPM;��we��are��not��speak�ng��here��about��the��“v�s�ble”��man,��but��about��an��abstract��ent�ty,��the��human nature,��or��the��“human��race”��def�ned��only���n��terms��of��necessary properties.��We��are��st�ll���n��the��“pure”��part��of��the��theory.27

26�� “Subsumpt�on”�� �s�� a��k�nd��of��“der�vat�on”��of��an��act�on��or��of��a��duty�� from�� the��pract�cal��object�ve��pr�nc�ple.��In��pract�cal��ph�losophy��Kant��speaks��about��the��“der�vat�on”��of��a��max�m��“by��subsumpt�on”��to��the��pr�nc�ple,��wh�ch���s��the��same��as��“apply�ng”��that��pr�nc�ple��to��act�ons���n��exper�ence��(II,��32,��MM:��237).��Th�s��means��putt�ng��them��in��agreement��w�th��the��pr�nc�ple��(5:��68).��Th�s��agreement���s��asymptot�c.��To��subsume��an��act�on��under��a�� law���s��not�� the��same��as�� to��deduce�� �t�� from�� that�� law.��The�� locus classicus��of�� subsumpt�on�� �s�� the��subsumpt�on��of�� �ntu�t�ons��under��pure��concepts��of��understand�ng.��To��be��able�� to��subsume�� them,�� they��have��to��have��someth�ng���n��common,�� to��be��“homogenous”.��But�� they��are��not.��Therefore��a��th�rd��element���s��added,�� the��schema��of�� �mag�nat�on��wh�ch��has��both an intellectual and an empirical side.��The��subsumpt�on��of�� the�� �ntu�t�ons�� to�� the��categor�es�� �s��equ�valent�� to�� the��application��of��categor�es��to���ntu�t�ons.��S�m�larly,��the��subsumption��of��a��max�m��under��SPM���s��equ�valent�� to�� the��application��of��SPM��to�� that��max�m.��But�� the�� laws��of��freedom��are��not��homogenous��w�th�� the��max�ms���n�� the��phenomena,�� therefore��a�� th�rd��element�� �s��added:�� the��“type”��of��the��moral��law,��or��the��Ideal��of��the��k�ngdom��of��ends��-��wh�ch��are��two-s�des��dev�ces:��an���ntellectual��and��an��emp�r�cal��one.��Th�s��makes��eth�cal��“judgement”��poss�ble.��

27�� “To��cogn�ze��someth�ng��by��reason��only”���s��tantamount��to��“cogn�z�ng���t��a��pr�or�”��(th�s���s��the��“metaphys�cs��of��morals”).��

46 �� How��Many��Formulas?��An��Alternat�ve��Read�ng����/����Valent�n��MURESAN������������47

To��der�ve��the��14��a��pr�or���dut�es��we��have��to��suppose��beforehand��the��relat�on��of��analogy,�� �n��part�cular�� the��analogy��between��the��laws��of��nature��and��the��laws��of�� the��w�ll.��Although��they��have��d�fferent��natures,��they��are���dent�cal��as��concerns��the�� form:��str�ct��un�versal�ty.��Th�s��type��of��analogy���s��present��as��a��k�nd��of��background��for��the��relat�on��between��FUL��and��FLN��and��just�f�es�� the��sudden���ntroduct�on��of��FLN��as��a��d�st�nct��formula��(G,��4:��421).��To��“der�ve”��the��human��dut�es��one��uses��the��concept��of��analogy��as��a��“proport�on��of��concepts”:��

“In��ph�losophy,��however,��analogy���s��not��the���dent�ty��of��two��quant�tat�ve��relat�ons��[as�� �n��mathemat�cs]��but��of�� two��qual�tat�ve��relat�ons,��where��from��three��g�ven��members��I��can��cogn�ze��and��g�ve��a��pr�or���only��the��relat�on��to��a��fourth��member,��but��not�� th�s��fourth��member���tself,��although��I��have��a��rule��for��[...]��seek�ng���t�� �n��exper�ence��and��a��mark��for��d�scover�ng���t��there”.��(CPR,��A179-180/B222)

In��other��words,

The��laws��of��nature��(LN)��are��to��the��laws��of��the��w�ll��(LV)���n��a��relat�onwh�ch���s��the��same

as��the��relat�onbetween��L(m)��and��U(m),

�.e.��although��d�fferent,��the�r��laws��have��the��same��form.28

How��could��we��know�� that�� a��gener�c29��max�m��of��human��be�ngs��as�� such,��m,�� has��moral�� content,�� �.e.��may��become��a�� law��of�� freedom�� (L(m))�� �nsofar�� as��we��don’t��have��cogn�t�ons��about�� the���ntell�g�ble��L(m)?��We��cannot��show��d�rectly��how��th�s�� �s��poss�ble,��but��only���nd�rectly,��w�th��the��help��of��the��concept��of��“law��of��nature”��and���ts��analogy��to��the��law��of��freedom.��Laws��of��the��w�ll��and��laws��of��nature��are��qual�tat�vely��d�fferent,��but��they��have���n��common,��nevertheless,��the��property��of��str�ct��un�versal�ty.��Therefore,��because��we��have��cogn�t�ons��about�� the�� laws��of��nature,��we��can��say��that���f��max�m��m��can��be��un�versal�zed��as���f���t��were��a��law��of��nature,��U(m),���t��can��become��a��law��of��freedom��because���t��has��the��same�� form��as��the��law��of��freedom;��therefore,���t��can��have��moral��content,���t���s��morally��possible.��If��the��max�m��doesn’t��pass��the��test��of��“the��form��of��law��of��nature���n��general”��(5:��69),��I��mean���t���s��not��un�versal�zable��as��a��law��of��nature,��therefore,���t��cannot��have��the��form��of��a��law��of��nature,���dent�cal��to��that��of��a��pract�cal��law,��and��so���t���s��“morally���mposs�ble”.��Consequently,���ts��negat�on���s��a��duty.��The��fa�lure��to��pass��the��test���s��not��the��symptom��of��a��de facto���ncapac�ty,��but��one��wh�ch��concerns��the��impossibility��of��f�nd�ng��a��place��for��the��un�versal�zed��max�m��as��a��law��of��nature��w�th�n��a��poss�ble��un�versal��natural��leg�slat�on.

28�� U(m)���s��the��un�versal��form��of��the��max�m��m��as if���t��were��a��law��of��nature.��L(m)���s��the��law��of��the��human��w�ll��hav�ng��max�m��m��as��a��content.

29�� I’ll��call��a��“gener�c��max�m”��a��max�m��that��does��not��refer��to��some��contingent��emp�r�cal��facts��about��human��be�ngs,��but�� to��some��universal��or��necessary��propert�es��of��man��as��a��spec�es.��Otherw�se,���f��the��max�m��would��be��dependent��on��some��cont�ngent��ends,���t��should��be��relat�ve��to��those��cont�ngent��cond�t�ons��and��could��certa�nly��not��be��from��the��very��beg�nn�ng��a��moral��law.��The��gener�c��max�m��expresses��necessary��truths��about��f�n�te��rat�onal��be�ngs.

The��“appl�cat�on”��of�� the��pure��part��of�� th�s�� eth�cal�� theory�� to�� the��act�ons�� �n��exper�ence��should��be��d�st�ngu�shed��from��the��“der�vat�on”��of��a��pr�or���dut�es.��The��f�rst��operat�on��belongs��to�� the��emp�r�cal��part��of�� the�� theory,�� the��second��to�� the��pure��part.��The��f�rst��refers�� to��the��appl�cat�on��of�� the��14��a��pr�or���pr�nc�ples��of��duty��to��any��k�nd��of��mater�al��max�m,��the��second��concerns��the��der�vat�on��of�� these��a��pr�or���pr�nc�ples��of��duty��us�ng��some��spec�al��k�nds��of��max�ms.��The��standard��emp�r�cal��appl�cat�on���s��“anthropology”.��The��appl�cat�on��tool���s��not��a��rat�onal,��formal��categor�cal���mperat�ve,��as��FLN��and��FEI,��but��a��“rule��of��the��power��of��judgement”,�� the��del�berat�ve��“faculty��of��subsuming��under��rules,��that���s��of��d�st�ngu�sh�ng��whether��someth�ng��does��or��does��not��stand��under��a��g�ven��rule”;��th�s���s��a��del�berat�ve��“pecul�ar��talent”��that��each��man��has��and��wh�ch��may��be��“sharpened”��by��tra�n�ng��and��exper�ence��(CPR,��A133/B172);���t���s��presented���n��some��deta�l���n��the��“typ�c”��chapter��of��the��CPrR.30��Wh�le���n��the��f�rst��trans�t�on��the��test��of��un�versal�zab�l�ty��checked��whether���t���s��poss�ble��to��un�versal�ze��the��max�m��as��a�� law��of��nature�� �n��general,�� the�� law��of��nature��hav�ng��the��same��form��as�� the�� law��of�� freedom,�� �n�� the��second�� trans�t�on��we��check��whether�� the��un�versal��form��of��the��max�m���mag�ned��as��a��law��of��nature���s��compat�ble��to��a��g�ven�� type��of��a��g�ven��moral�� law��wh�ch��backs�� the��14��dut�es��of�� the��“human��be�ng��as��such”.��Some��other��results��of��the��appl�cat�on��are��moral��“pract�cal��precepts”,��hav�ng��the��form��of��a��hypothet�cal���mperat�ve,��wh�ch��are��not��laws,��but��moral��“customs”��(and��consequently��have��a��“subject�ve��necess�ty”)��val�dated��by��the��theory��(5:��12).

The��d�fferences��between��derivation��and��application��are��remarkable.��Derivation��of��the��human��dut�es��as��such���s��an��a��pr�or���procedure;��the��outcome��of��the��der�vat�on���s��a��duty��for��“human��be�ngs��as��such”;��the��procedure���s��“by��reason��alone”��although���t��uses��the��analogy;��the��start�ng��po�nt��for��th�s��a��pr�or���procedure���s��const�tuted��by��the��two��formal��pr�nc�ples�� that��compose��SPM.��On��the��contrary,�� the��application��of�� the��pure��part��of��the��theory��to��exper�ence���s��not��an��a��pr�or���der�vat�on��process,��“cogn�zed��by��reason��alone”,��but��a��del�berat�ve��act�v�ty��of�� the��human��“power��of�� judgement”.��The��outcome���s��a��(rev�sable)��moral��assessment��of��any��k�nd��of��mater�al��max�m;��the��process��cons�sts��of��a��probable��del�berat�on��about��“subsumpt�on”;��the��start�ng��po�nt���s��the��14��a��pr�or���dut�es,��supplemented��by��the�r��“types”.

The��principles of application��are��procedures��similar�� to��FLN��and��FH��s�nce��the��cr�ter�a��of��moral�ty��d�d��not��change,��but,��as��procedures,��they��are��much��more��lax.��What��we��have��as��“pr�nc�ples��of��appl�cat�on”���s��a��system��of��“rules of judgment��under��laws��of��pure��pract�cal��reason”��meant��to��appra�se��the��max�ms��(CPrR,��5:��69).��They��don’t��have��the��form��of��a��categor�cal���mperat�ve,��be�ng��rather��del�berat�ve��procedures.��They��are��“rules��of��(the��power��of)��judgement”��able��to��help��us��to��decide��(to��approx�mate)��the��subsumption��of��an��act�on��under��a��law��of��the��human��w�ll��(CPrR,��5:��70).��They��also��use��analog�es,��def�n�t�ons,��casu�st�c��judgements��and��so��on.��They��are��the���ntermed�ate��dev�ce�� that�� assures�� the�� “trans�t�on”�� from�� the��a priori�� laws��of�� freedom�� to�� the��empirical��act�ons���n��exper�ence.��A��specification��procedure���s��also��used��start�ng��from��dut�es��and��def�n�t�ons;��the��result��may��be��a��(cond�t�oned)��“spec�al��duty”.

30�� In��the��second��trans�t�on��we��have��the��so��called��“rules��of��the��power��of��judgment��under��laws��of��pure��pract�cal��reason”��(CPrR,��5:��69).�� In�� the��f�rst�� trans�t�on��we��used��some��schemes��of��reasoning�� to��der�ve��a��pr�or���a��number��of��moral��a��pr�or��� laws��(categor�cal�� �mperat�ves)��for��human��be�ngs��as such��from��an��a��pr�or���ground,��FUL��and��FEI��(categor�cal���mperat�ves).

48 �� How��Many��Formulas?��An��Alternat�ve��Read�ng����/����Valent�n��MURESAN������������49

How-many-formulas?Strangely��enough,�� the��Groundwork doesn’t��help��us�� to��know��exactly��how many��formulas��“of��the��same��law”��Kant��had���n��m�nd.��Several.��Why��does��he��need��several?��The��commentators��have��counted��very��d�fferently.��Kant��speaks��of�� three��formulas,��but it is not clear to which he refers. Others have identified five. Hőffe takes FUL as��the��“bas�c��formula”��and��FLN,��FH��and��FKE��as��“secondary��formulas”,��all��be�ng���ntens�onally��equ�valent��and�� reduc�ble�� to��one.��T�mmermann��cons�ders�� that��we��have�� four�� formulat�ons��as��well:�� a��main�� formulat�on�� (FUL)��and�� three��“popular��reformulat�ons”�� (FLN,��FH��and��FA)�� (I��have��never��understood��what��a��“popular”��reformulat�on��has��to��do��w�th��a��metaphysics of��morals).

I��w�ll�� show�� �n�� the��pages�� that�� follow�� that�� the��single�� supreme��pr�nc�ple��of��moral�ty���s��a��system��of��three��couples��of��pr�nc�ples,��two��couples��of��pr�nc�ples��be�ng��“un�ted”���n��a��th�rd��one.��The��number��three��results��for��reasons��of��s�m�lar�ty��w�th��the��“progress�on��of��categor�es”��(of��quant�ty)��s�nce��the��system��of��theoret�cal��categor�es���s��the��a��pr�or���class�f�cat�on��ground��of��the��pr�nc�ples��of��every��sc�ence.31��There��are��three��categor�es��of��quant�ty��and��the��th�rd���s��the��synthes�s��of��the��f�rst�� two.��A��s�m�lar��case���s��to��be��made��regard�ng��the��equally��debated��top�c��of��formulas.��Another��thes�s��I��lay��cla�m��to���s��that��the��formulas��are��not��rec�procally��reduc�ble��and��that��the��controversy��around��them��stems��from��the��“pure��part��of��the��eth�cal��theory”,��from��the��metaphys�cs��of��morals,��where��the��“der�vat�on”��of��the��a��pr�or���dut�es��for��man��as such��takes��place.

Let��us�� start��w�th��Kant��h�mself,�� rather�� than��h�s��commentators.��How��many��pr�nc�ples��are��there?��Kant��speaks��of��three��pr�nc�ples��wh�ch��represent��the��ground��of��every��duty��(G.��4:��431);��at��G.4:��436��he��refers��to��them��us�ng��the��express�on��“the��above��three��ways��of��represent�ng��the��pr�nc�ple��of��moral�ty”.��At��the��end��of��th�s��paragraph��he��recalls�� the��three��“concepts”.��Wh�ch��could��be��the��set of three?��Kant��has��already��presented��three��ways��of��represent�ng��the��pr�nc�ple��of��moral�ty���n��an���mperfect��be�ng��at�� (4:��431),�� the��only��case��when�� the��number�� three�� �s��ment�oned:��FUL,��FEI,��FA.��Among��these,��there���s��a��relat�on��of��synthes�s:��one��of��them��“un�tes”��the��other��two���n���t.��But��also��“among��them”��(about��wh�ch��“them”��does��he��speak?)�� there�� �s��a��group��of��formulas��wh�ch��are��more apt to bring “an Idea of reason nearer to intuition (in accordance with a certain analogy)”. One��may��eas�ly��see�� that��among�� the�� three��pr�nc�ples��ment�oned��above,��none���s��nearer��to��emp�r�cal��max�ms,��s�nce��all��have��the��same��theoret�cal��status:��they��f�x��the��cr�ter�a��wh�ch��every��duty��has��to��sat�sfy.

Therefore,��wh�ch��are��the��formulas��that��are��‘nearer�� to’��moral��exper�ence?��The��above��remarks��(�.e.��“�n��accordance��w�th��a��certa�n��analogy”)���nd�cate��the��FLN;��but���mmed�ately��after��formulat�ng��th�s��suggest�on,��Kant��g�ves��a��set��of��three��formulas��of��the��same��k�nd��as��FLN��(�.e.��FLN,��FH��and��FKE)��(IMM,��4:��436,��II,��72).��The��f�rst��two��were��already��“appl�ed”��to��the��four��max�ms���n��Groundwork.

In���ntroduc�ng��them,��he��says:��“among��them”��(�.e.��apparently��among��FUL,��FEI��and��FA)��there���s��a��sub-set��wh�ch���s��able��to��“br�ng��an���dea��of��reason��closer��to���ntu�t�on��(by��a��certa�n��analogy)��and��thereby��to��feel�ng”,��but�� �t�� �s��obv�ous��that�� the��formulas��of�� the��second��set��are��not��s�tuated��“among”��the��formulas��of�� the��f�rst��set!��The��only��

31�� “The��schema��for��completeness��of��a��metaphys�cal��system��[...]�� �s�� the�� table��of��categor�es”��(MFNS:��474).

way��of��mak�ng��sense��of��the��fragment��II,��72���s��by��suppos�ng��the��ex�stence��of��a��tac�t��“conjunct�on”��of�� the�� formulas��arranged�� �n�� the�� two��rows��as�� follows:��FUL+FLN,��FEI+FH32��and��FA+FKE33.��Now,��we��can��say�� that�� the�� three��couples��are��“the�� three��ways��of�� represent�ng�� the��pr�nc�ple��of��moral�ty”��although��“there�� �s��a��d�fference��among them”,�� the��second��row��(FLN,��FH,��FKE)��more��closely��resembl�ng��max�ms��and��cogn�t�ons.��The��f�rst�� row��of��categor�cal�� �mperat�ve��formulas��govern�� the��w�ll��of��human��natural��be�ngs��and��are�� the��counterpart��of�� the��noumenal��pr�nc�ples.��The��second��row��g�ves�� the��procedure�� through��wh�ch��we��can��der�ve�� the��dut�es��of�� the��human��be�ng��as��such��from��the��pr�nc�ples��of��SPM��and��some��gener�c��max�ms.��The��f�rst��row��of��formulas��tells��us��what��cr�ter�a��an��act�on��has��to��sat�sfy��to��be��the��duty��of��a��human��be�ng��as such.��The��second��row��of��formulas��tells��us��how��to��establish��whether��a��max�m��sat�sf�es��these��cr�ter�a.

The��relat�on��between��the��members��of��these��couples���s��s�m�lar��to��that��between��the��two��faces��of��a��co�n:��we��have��only��one��co�n��wh�ch��can��be��seen��from��two��d�st�nct��perspect�ves.��From��one��d�rect�on�� �t�� �s��a��model��of��every��duty��and��from��the��other��d�rect�on���t�� �s��a��der�vat�on��procedure��of��the��dut�es��of��human��be�ng��as such��gu�ded��by�� the��above��ment�oned��cr�ter�a.��Th�s�� �nd�cates�� that�� the��mean�ng��of��“formula”�� �s��that��of��“model”��wh�ch��def�nes��a��pr�or��� the��cr�ter�a��of�� the��dut�es��of��man��as such,��supplemented��by��a��spec�f�c��“gu�de”��wh�ch��does��not��allow��you��to��comm�t��m�stakes���n��select�ng��the��max�ms��wh�ch��sat�sfy��those���deal��cr�ter�a.��The��next��fragment��supports��th�s�� �nterpretat�on:�� the��“formal”��categor�cal�� �mperat�ves�� l�ke��FUL��and��FLN��“only��aff�rms��what��obl�gat�on���s:��Act��upon��a��max�m��that��can��also��hold��as��a��un�versal��law”��(th�s��sets��up��an���deal��cr�ter�on��of��duty).��“But��you��can��know��whether��th�s��pr�nc�ple��(a��max�m��–��V.M.)��also��holds��object�vely��only���n��th�s��way”:��your��reason��has��to��subject��the��max�m��to��the��“test”��of��un�versal�zab�l�ty��(MM,��6:��225).��These��two��s�des��of��the��pr�nc�ple��are��an���nseparable��couple.

We��can��see��now��that��the��procedural��formulas��are��not��s�mple��“reformulat�ons”��of��the��cr�ter�al��formulas,��but��another��type��of��formula,��express�ng��a��der�vat�on��procedure��for�� the��case��of�� the��max�ms��that��are��necessary��to��the��human��be�ng��as such.�� It��now��

32�� Usually,��commentators��do��not��d�st�ngu�sh��between��FEI��and��FH.��I��bel�eve��Kant��does.��When��he��speaks��about��“the��pr�nc�ple��of��every��rat�onal��nature���n��general��as��[an]��end���n���tself”��(I��mean��FEI)��he��cla�ms��that��th�s���s��a��pr�or���and��“appl�es��to��all��rat�onal��be�ngs���n��general,��and��no��exper�ence���s��suff�c�ent��to��determ�ne��anyth�ng��about��that”��(4:��431).��Therefore��th�s��pr�nc�ple��cannot��be��a�� test.�� Its�� formulat�on��could��be:��“All�� rat�onal��be�ngs��stand��under�� the�� law��that��every��one��of��them��ought��to��treat���tself��and��all��others��never��merely��as��a��means,��but��always��at��the��same��t�me��as��an��end���n���tself”.��Th�s���s��a��pr�nc�ple���n��the��“Ideal”��of��the��k�ngdom��of��ends��(4:��433).��On��the��other��s�de,��FH��refers��to��the��human��be�ng��and��h�s��“human�ty”��as��a��“l�m�t�ng��cond�t�on”��of��emp�r�cal��ends;���t���s��a��procedure��wh�ch��has��to��work��on��concrete��max�ms:��“we��w�ll��see��whether�� th�s��(the��content��of�� the��formula��of��human�ty)��can��be��accompl�shed”��(4:��429).��

33�� The��formal��pr�nc�ple��of��all��duty��w�ll��be��formulated��as��follows:��If��you��want��to��act��morally,��you��ought��to��“act��only���n��accordance��w�th��that��max�m��through��wh�ch��you��can��at��the��same��t�me��w�ll��that���t��becomes��a��un�versal��law”��(FUL),��pract�cally��g�ven��by��you��“ought��to��act��as���f�� the��max�m��of��your��act�on��were��to��become��through��your��w�ll��a��un�versal��law��of��nature”��(FLN).��Th�s�� �s��a�� two-facetted��pr�nc�ple:�� �f��you��want�� to��know���f�� �n��a��part�cular��case�� the��criteria��of��all��duty��(FUL)��are��sat�sf�ed,��you��ought��to��do��what��FLN��requ�res.

50 �� How��Many��Formulas?��An��Alternat�ve��Read�ng����/����Valent�n��MURESAN������������51

becomes���ntell�g�ble��what���t��means��to��say��that��the��three��formulas��wh�ch��“represent”��the��pr�nc�ple��of��moral�ty,��“are��at��bottom”��three��“formulas��of�� the��very��same��law”��and��that�� there���s��“among��them”��a��sub-set��wh�ch���s��nearer�� to���ntu�t�on.��Th�s��means��that��each��of�� the��cr�ter�al��formulas��(FUL,��FEI��and��FA)��“can��also��be��expressed”��by��procedural�� formulas�� (FLN,��FH��and��FKE)��–��because�� they��are��one and the same��formulas;��but�� the��latter��row���s��nearer�� to���ntu�t�on��just��because��they��are��procedural��formulas��(the��same��relat�on���s��expressed���n��the��follow�ng��contexts:��FUL��“can��also��go”��as��FLN��and,��respect�vely,��the���dea��of��autonomy��“leads��to��a��very��fru�tful��concept��depend�ng��on���t,��namely��that��of a kingdom of ends” (4:��433)).

But��what��are��we��to��make��of�� the��fact�� that��s�x,��prev�ously��separated,��formulas��now��seem�ngly��converge�� �nto��only��one��(the��“s�ngle”��supreme��pr�nc�ple)?��In��fact,��there��are��s�x��formulas��in��one.��About��the��relat�on��between��the��formulas��of��each��row��we��are��told��that�� �t�� �s��s�m�lar��to��the��“progress�on”��of��the��categor�es��of��quant�ty,�� �.e.��one��of��them��(of��course,��the��th�rd��one,��FKE)��“un�tes��the��other��two���n���t”.��The��relat�on��between��these��formulas���s�� �mmed�ately��transferred��to��the��formulas���n��the��f�rst��row���n��v�rtue��of��the�r��coupled��nature.��I��propose��to��accept��the��conclus�on��that��the��supreme��pr�nc�ple��of��moral�ty��as��a��model��for��every��moral��duty�� �s�� the��couple��of��formulas:��FA+FKE.��They��are���n��fact��only��one��pr�nc�ple��hav�ng��two��faces.

FUL FEI FA

FLN FH FKE

SPM

What��do�� the��categor�es��of��quant�ty�� tell��us?��That�� the��“plural�ty”�� �s��der�vable��from��“un�ty”��–��th�s��means��that��un�ty���s��a��necessary��cond�t�on��of��plural�ty.��A��“plural�ty”���s��a��“mult�tude”��un�ted��by��a��un�versal��property��or��law.��A��s�m�lar��relat�on���s��supposed��to�� take��place��between�� the��correspond�ng�� formulas.��S�nce��“plural�ty”�� supposes��“un�ty”,��the��second��formula��must��be��“der�vable”��from��the��f�rst:���.e.��FEI���s��supposed��to��sat�sfy��the��cond�t�on��of��str�ct��un�versal�ty��(�n��the��doma�n��of��“all��rat�onal��be�ngs��as��such”)��–��wh�ch���s�� the��cond�t�on��requ�red��by��FUL.��Th�s�� �s�� the��relat�on��to��wh�ch��the��much��debated��phrase��of��G.��4:��437��refers:��FUL��“�s�� fundamentally�� the��same”��w�th��FEI��(however,��not��completely��the��same��s�nce��they��are���n��fact��two):��the��moral��max�m’s��universalizability��cond�t�on��requ�res��that���ts��val�d�ty���s��met��and��recogn�zed��by��all��rat�onal��be�ngs��as��such;��th�s���s��fundamentally��the��same��as��FEI’s��cond�t�on:��the��max�m’s��compatibility��w�th��all��rat�onal��be�ngs��as��such��wh�ch��serve��as��the�r��un�versal��“l�m�t�ng��cond�t�on”.��Th�s���s,��perhaps,��the��reason��why��FEI��+��FH���s��the��most��used���n��der�vat�ons.

The��phrase��“one��of��wh�ch��unites�� the��other��two���n���tself”��refers��to��the��relat�on��between��the�� th�rd��category��and��the��f�rst�� two:�� total�ty�� �s��a��plural�ty�� that��cannot��be��but��un�tary.��Reformulated���n��terms��of��formulas:��the��necessary��cond�t�on��for��a��moral��max�m��to��harmon�ze���tself��w�th��the��leg�slat�on��of��a��poss�ble��realm��of��ends��as��a��realm��of��nature��(cf.��FKE)�� �s�� to�� �nclude��subject�ve��ends��compat�ble��w�th��every��rat�onal��nature��poss�ble��(cf.��FEI),��on��the��ground��that�� the��max�m���s��str�ctly��un�versal�zable��

(could��be��w�lled��by��every��rat�onal��nature��poss�ble��(cf.��FUL)).��So,��both��the��formulas��that��g�ve�� the��cr�ter�a��and�� those�� that��g�ve�� the��der�vat�on��procedures��belong�� to�� the��metaphys�cs��of��morals�� (the��“pure”��part��of�� the�� theory).��Kant’s��d�scuss�on��on�� the��“progress�on”��of��categor�es��belongs��to��th�s��pure��strand��too��s�nce���t���s��at��the��level��of��the��metaphys�cs��of��morals��that��one��establ�shes34��the��theoretical criteria��of��moral�ty��for��all��rat�onal��be�ngs��as��such.��Here��we��obv�ously��have��two��kinds��of��formulas:��the��formulas��that��constitute��SPM��and��def�ne���ts��Idea��(the��structural��concept��of��an��[�deal]��“moral��world”,��absolutely��autonomous):��FUL,��FEI��and��FA.��As��Kant��says,��these��are��“formal�� laws”��wh�ch��don’t�� tell��us��what�� to do,��but��“expla�n��[to]��us�� the��concept��of��duty”��and��“what��obl�gat�on��is”��(CPrR,��5:��64-5)��(II,��57).��Then,��we��have��the��pr�nc�ples��of��der�vat�on��(FLN,��FH��and��FKE).��These��procedural��counterparts��of�� the��f�rst�� type��of��formulas��make��us��“know��whether��a��g�ven��[subject�ve]��pr�nc�ple��[max�m]��also��holds��object�vely”��(MM,��6:��225).��Kant’s��test���s,��therefore,��a��system��of��tests,��namely,��FLN��and��FH,��un�ted�� �n��a�� th�rd��one��(FKE)�� �f��we��were�� to��respect�� the�r��systemat�c��“progress�on”��cons�dered��to��be��s�m�lar��to��that��of��the��categories of quantity.��But��the��relat�on��of��categor�es���s��a��“synthes�s”,��wh�ch���s��not��a��s�mple��“un�on”��of��the��f�rst��two��categor�es���n��the��th�rd.��The��th�rd���s��a��sui generis��category,��wh�ch��ex�sts��by���tself;��th�s��fact��expla�ns��why��the��th�rd��category���s��not��appl�cable��where��the��f�rst��two��are.

An��error��we��usually��comm�t���s��to��treat��the��relat�ons��between��the��categor�es��of��quant�ty��and��those��between��the��correspond�ng��formulas��as�� �dent�cal;�� �t�� �s��rather��a��similarity��relat�on��(“a��progress�on��happens��here��as through��the��categor�es”)��(4:��436).��What�� �s��a��“synthes�s”�� �n�� the��f�rst��case,��may��be��a��“un�on”��proper�� �n�� the��formulas��case��(4:��436),��s�m�lar��to��the��“un�on”��of��the��two��log�cal��pr�nc�ples��of��analyt�c�ty��(we��“cons�der��them��both together”��and��th�s��union��of��them��forms��a��“general��model”��of��all��duty)��(Refl.��4634).��As��a��matter��of��fact��we��can��f�nd��such��a��“un�on”��of��pr�nc�ples���n��the��follow�ng��formulat�on��of��FKE:��

(FKE)��“Every��rat�onal��be�ng��must��act��as���f��he��were��by��h�s��max�ms��at��all��t�mes��a�� lawg�v�ng��member��of�� the��un�versal��k�ngdom��of��ends.��The��formal��pr�nc�ple��of��these��max�ms���s,��act as if your maxims were to serve at the same time as a universal law��(for��all��rat�onal��be�ngs)��[FLN].��A��k�ngdom��of��ends���s��thus��poss�ble��only��by��analogy��w�th��a��k�ngdom��of��nature��(4:��438).��[...]��The��rat�onal��be�ng,��as��an��end���n��accordance��w�th���ts��nature,��hence��as��an��end���n���tself,��must��serve��for��every��max�m��as��a��limiting condition��of��a��merely��relat�ve��and��arb�trary��ends”.��[FH]��(4:��436)

We��can��eas�ly��recogn�ze��FLN��and��FH��w�th�n��FKE.��It��should��be��ment�oned��that��the��correct��label��for��FKE���s��the��“formula��of��the��k�ngdom��of��ends��in analogy with the

34�� “One��establ�shes”�� �s��only��a��manner��of�� speak�ng��because�� they��cannot��be�� theoret�cally��deduced,��nor��emp�r�cally�� �llustrated��as��Kant��hoped���n��Groundwork�� III,��by��attempt�ng��an��a��pr�or���“deduct�on”��of��SPM.��The��Idea��of��SPM��appears��to��our��moral��consc�ence��w�th��the��obv�ous��force��of��a��part�cular��“fact”.��The��SPM���s��rather��a��“fact��of��reason”,���dent�cal��to��the��consc�ousness��of�� freedom��or��of�� the��autonomy��wh�ch��we��all��have��(CRPr:��31,��412,��414).��Therefore,��“the��moral�� law�� �s��given�� to��us��as��a�� ‘fact��of�� reason’��”�� (CRPr:��47).�� It��can’t��be��demonstrated���n��any��way.

52 �� How��Many��Formulas?��An��Alternat�ve��Read�ng����/����Valent�n��MURESAN������������53

kingdom of nature”. Otherw�se,��FLN��doesn’t��make��sense.��In��Kant’s��v�ew��FKE���s��appl�cable��through���ts��two��components:��he��appl�es��the��test��tw�ce���n��the��Groundwork,��f�rst��FLN��and��second��FH,��but��he��doesn’t��add��the��th�rd��test,��FKE,��because���t��seems��to��h�m��to��be��redundant:���n��fact,���t���s��useless��because���t��“can��serve��for��the��same��end”��(�.e.�� [FA+FKE]��does�� the��same��job��as��FLN��and��FH)��(4:��432n).��However,��FKE���s��not��abandoned.��Therefore,��everywhere��we��shall��see��FLN��and��FH��actually��used���n��a��pr�or���der�vat�ons��of��dut�es��as��such��(as���n��MM,��for���nstance),��we��have��to��suppose��the��presence��of��the��frame-cond�t�ons��st�pulated��by��FKE.

To��conclude,��as��Kant��expl�c�tly��cla�ms,�� there�� �s��only��one��SPM,��but�� �t��has��a��complex��structure.��Th�s��pr�nc�ple�� �s��expressed�� �n��an�� �mperfect��human��be�ng��by��a��formal��categor�cal�� �mperat�ve��(FA)��plus�� �ts��procedural��counterpart�� (FKE)��wh�ch��helps��us��to��determ�ne��whether��a��max�m��belong�ng��to��a��human��w�ll��as such��sat�sf�es��the��cond�t�ons��st�pulated��by��FA��or��not.��These�� �deal��cr�ter�a��are��not��der�ved,��but���ntroduced��as��a��“fact��of��reason”��by��two��pr�nc�ples:��FUL��and��FEI��wh�ch��def�ne��the��structural-Idea��of��the��“moral��world”��of��autonomous��be�ngs.��To���ntroduce��the��theory���s�� tantamount�� to�� �ntroduc�ng�� th�s��structural-Idea.��Every��act�on-type�� that��sat�sf�es��these��cr�ter�a�� through���ts��max�m��may��be��an��a��pr�or���duty��of��human��be�ng��as such.��The��two��pr�nc�ples��(FUL��and��FEI)��that��enter��together���nto��the��compos�t�on��of��FA��are��necessar�ly��assoc�ated��w�th��procedures��able��to��determ�ne��whether��a��max�m��sat�sf�es��or��not��the��cr�ter�a��(FLN��and��FH).

The��14��a��pr�or���dut�es��der�ved��from��SPM���n�� the��Metaphysics of Morals��are��then��applied�� to��act�ons�� �n��exper�ence��(here��we��obta�n�� the��“corollar�es”��of�� these��a��pr�or���dut�es).��Th�s�� t�me��around,�� the��appl�cat�on��pr�nc�ples��are��not�� the��categor�cal���mperat�ves��used��to��“der�ve”��the��a��pr�or���dut�es,��but��“rules��of��judgement”��belong�ng��to��the���ntellect��and��able��to��med�ate��between��reason��and��exper�ence.

The��“pr�nc�ples��of��(emp�r�cal)��appl�cat�on”��are��d�st�nct�� �n��FLN,��FH��and��FKE��(although��they��may��be��similar��s�nce��the��cr�ter�a��of��moral�ty��rema�ned��unchanged).��They��are,��however,��“rules��of��the��power��of��judgement”��meant��to��“subsume”��act�ons���n��exper�ence��to��the��moral��laws.��The��appl�cat�on��procedure��seems,��therefore,��to��be��a��deliberative��process��w�th��verd�cts��wh�ch��are��always��rev�sable.��Unfortunately,��Kant��d�d��not��develop��the��subject.

References

Dwork�n,��R..��2006.��“Theory,��Pract�ce��and��Moral��Reason�ng”,��D.��Copp��(ed.)��Ethical Theory,��Oxford,��Oxford��Un�vers�ty��Press.

Guyer,��P.��2005.��Kant’s System of Nature and Freedom,��Oxford:��Clarendon.Hőffe, O. 1993. Introduction à la philosophie pratique de Kant,��Par�s:��Vr�n.Kant,��I.��1992.��“Inqu�ry��concern�ng��the��d�st�nctness��of��the��pr�nc�ples��of��natural��ph�losophy��and��

theology”��(1763),���n��I.��Kant,��Theoretical Philosophy (1755-1770),��Cambr�dge:��Cambr�dge��Un�vers�ty��Press.

Kant,��I.��Critique of Pure Reason��(CPR),��1993��(1929),��(transl.��N.��Kemp��Sm�th),��MacM�llan.Kant,��I.,��1999.��Practical Philosophy,��(transl.��Mary��Gregor),��Cambr�dge:��Cambr�dge��Un�vers�ty��

Press.Kant,�� I.��2002.��“Metaphys�cal�� foundat�ons��of�� the��natural�� sc�ence”,�� �n�� I.��Kant,��Theoretical

Philosophy after 1781,��Cambr�dge:��Cambr�dge��Un�vers�ty��Press.Kant,�� I.�� 2004.��Lectures on Ethics�� (LE),�� (transl.��P.��Heath)��1997,��Cambr�dge:��Cambr�dge��

Un�vers�ty��Press.Kerste�n,��S.��2004.��Kant’s Search for the Supreme Principle of Morality,��Cambr�dge:��Cambr�dge��

Un�vers�ty��Press.Mureşan, V. 2007. Comentariu la Întemeierea metafizicii moravurilor, (A Commentary to the

Groundwork)���n��I.��Kant,��Întemeierea metafizicii moravurilor,��Bucurest�,��Human�tas.O’Ne�ll,��O.��1994.��Constructions of Reason,��Cambr�dge:��Cambr�dge��Un�vers�ty��Press.Pârvu,��I.��2004.��Posibilitatea experienţei (The Possibility of Experience), Bucureşti, Politeia-

SNSPA.Sedgw�ck,��S.��2008.��Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals.��An Introduction,��

Cambr�dge:��Cambr�dge��Un�vers�ty��Press.T�mmermann,�� J.��2007.��Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. A Commentary,��

Cambr�dge:��Cambr�dge��Un�vers�ty��Press.

54 �� On��Tolerat�on,��Char�ty,��and��Ep�stem�c��Fall�b�l�sm����/����M�rcea��DUMITRU������������55

On Toleration, Charity, and Epistemic Fallibilism

M�rcea��DUMITRU

In�� th�s��paper�� I��exam�ne��some��presuppos�t�ons��of�� tolerat�on��and��plural�sm��and�� I��explore��two��models,��v�z.��a��deontolog�cal��and��a��consequent�al�st��model��respect�vely,��wh�ch��could��support�� the��v�ew�� that�� rat�onal��agents��should��act�� �n��a�� tolerant��way.��Aga�nst��the��background��wh�ch���s��offered��by��the��f�rst��model��I��g�ve��two��arguments���n��favor��of��the��v�ew��that��people��are��better��off��and��more��rat�onal���f��they��act���n��a��tolerant��way.��The��f�rst��argument��draws��upon��a��principle of charity��wh�ch��one��usually��makes��use��of���n��ph�losophy��of��m�nd��and��ph�losophy��of��language��but��wh�ch��could��equally��well��work��w�th��regard��to��th�s��foundat�onal���ssue���n��eth�cs��and��ph�losophy��of��act�on.��The��second��argument�� �s��bu�lt��upon��the��ep�stem�c��principle of fallibilism��and���t�� �s��meant��to��show��that��from��th�s��vantage��po�nt��act�ng���n��a��tolerant��way���s��the��rat�onal��th�ng��to��do.

Introductory-remarks

It�� �s��very��l�kely�� that�� the��most��d�ff�cult�� task��of��moral��and��pol�t�cal��ph�losophy��has��been�� that��of��assess�ng��comprehens�ve��v�ews��wh�ch��contrad�ct��each��other��not��so��much���n��what��concerns��the���nterests��expressed��by���nd�v�duals��but���n��regards��to��what���s��cons�dered��to��be��of��genu�ne��value.1��If�� �nd�v�duals��do��not��agree��w�th��each��other��about��what��const�tutes��a��good��and��valuable��l�fe,�� then��they��would��probably��end��up��hav�ng��dramat�c��confl�cts,��even���f��the�r��act�ons��are��mot�vated��by��an��honest��altru�st�c��att�tude.��Our��deep��bel�efs��about��what�� �s��good��and��valuable��for�� the�� l�fe��of��all�� the���nd�v�duals���n��our��own��commun�ty��w�ll��prompt��us��to��use��the��coerc�ve��mechan�sms��of��the��state���n��order��to��ach�eve��the��des�derata��and��the���deals��that��we��share,��not��only��for��our��own��sake��but��also��for��those��who��happen��not��to��share��the��same��v�s�on��on��the��values��and��mean�ngfulness��of��a��good��l�fe.��Of��course,��those��who��d�sagree��w�th��us��w�ll��try��to��make��use��of��the���nst�tut�ons��of��the��state���n��the��very��same��way��as��we��do���n��order��to��promote��and��support�� the�r��own��values��and�� �deals.��Unfortunately,��as��we��know��too��well��from��h�story,��the��deep��d�sagreements��concern�ng��values��can��turn���nto��very��traumat�c��confl�cts��to��a��much��greater��extent��than��mere��confl�cts��of���nterests.

Now,�� some��of��our��value��d�sagreements�� can��be�� resolved�� through��pol�t�cal��mechan�sms��tr�ggered��by�� the��publ�c��debates��concern�ng�� the��goals��of��our��act�ons,��debates��wh�ch��a�m��at��g�v�ng��strong��support�� to�� the��pol�c�es��wh�ch��promote�� those��goals;��however,��some��other��d�sagreements��wh�ch��go��more��deeply��cannot��have��the��usual��pol�t�cal��solut�ons.��Here��we��can���nclude��deep��rel�g�ous��d�fferences��and��also��certa�n��ph�losoph�cal��bel�efs��concern�ng��the��value��and��the��ult�mate��mean�ng��of��l�fe.

But��now,��when�� the�� regular��pol�t�cal��mechan�sms�� for��acqu�r�ng�� soc�al�� and��pol�t�cal�� stab�l�ty�� fa�l�� to��produce�� the��outcomes��we��w�sh,�� �s�� there��a��more��subtle��mechan�sm��wh�ch��could��keep��d�sagreements��w�th�n��reasonable��and��non-explos�ve��

��1�� Cf.��Thomas��Nagel,��Equality and Partiality,��Oxford��Un�vers�ty��Press,��1991,��p.��154-168.

bounds?��In��such��cases,��people��are��supposed��to��learn��to��l�ve���n��a��rat�onal��way��w�th��d�fferences,��d�sagreements��and��profound��alter�ty��by�� refra�n�ng�� from��us�ng�� the��coerc�ve��mechan�sms��of��the��state,��w�th��the��a�m��of��not��plac�ng��unreasonable��l�m�ts��upon��the��freedom��and��r�ghts��of��those��people��who��share��values��wh�ch��happen��not��to��be��adm�ss�ble��by��the��dom�nant��group���n��that��soc�ety.��In��a��few��words,��what��people��need���n��such��c�rcumstances���s��tolerat�on.

Roughly,�� the��whole��spectrum��of��the��concept��of�� tolerat�on��unfolds��aga�nst�� the��background��of��a��pa�r��of��presuppos�t�ons,��namely,�� the discriminating identification of the alterity (of the other)��together��w�th��the��dec�s�on��to��recognize and accept this difference��through��an��act�ve���nter-cultural��and��persuas�ve��d�alogue.

A��very��prom�s�ng��start�ng��po�nt��for��our��d�scuss�on,��albe�t��rather��paradox�cal,���s�� the��model��of�� those�� soc�al�� arrangements��and��construct�ons��wh�ch��are��known��as��Utop�a.2��Leav�ng��as�de�� the�� �ntr�cate��and��rather��exot�c��deta�ls��of�� the��narrat�ves��concern�ng��Utop�a,��the��general��model��wh�ch��emerges��here���s��that��an��aggregat�on��of��all�� the��features��that��we��w�sh��a��Utop�a��to���nstant�ate�� �s��someth�ng���ncons�stent��and��unach�evable.��It���s��a��sad��fact��of��l�fe��(wh�ch���s��worth��explor�ng)��that���t���s���mposs�ble��to��ach�eve��s�multaneously��and��cont�nuously��all�� that�� �s��cons�dered��soc�ally��and��pol�t�cally��good.��A��perfect��deont�c�� and��eth�cal��world��wh�ch��compl�es��w�th��all��dut�es,��obl�gat�ons��and��necessary��normat�ve��constra�nts��may��be��a��very��attract�ve��representat�on��and���deal,��but���n��any��rate���t�� �s��not��a��world��access�ble��from��our��own��cont�ngent��world��whose��den�zens��we��happen�� to��be.�� In�� the��best��of�� all��poss�ble��worlds,��tolerat�on��has��no��po�nt.��The��rat�onale��for��tolerant��att�tudes��and��behav�ors���s��g�ven��by��prec�sely��th�s��deont�c��fa�lure��and���mperfect�on��and��also��by��the��pr�nc�pled���mposs�b�l�ty�� to��ach�eve��all�� the���deals�� that��are��to��be��pra�sed��from��a��pol�t�cal��stand��po�nt.

But��why,��after��all,��are��we��supposed��to��act�� �n��a�� tolerant��manner�� �n��our��world��wh�ch���s��not��perfect��morally,��deont�cally,��and��pol�t�cally?��What���s���t�� that��makes��the���mperfect�on��of��our��own��world���mpose��the��moral��pr�nc�ple��of���dent�ty��d�scr�m�nat�on��and��also��of�� recogn�z�ng�� the��alter�ty?��What�� conceptual�� and�� log�cal�� connect�on��operates��between��moral��leg�t�macy��and��tolerat�on,��and��between��moral���lleg�t�macy��and��lack��of��tolerat�on,��respect�vely?

If��we��go��beyond��the��pr�ma��fac�e��attract�ve��moral��pos�t�on��wh�ch��urges��us�� to��be�� tolerant��and��embrace��plural�sm,�� then��we��have�� to��acknowledge�� that��both�� the��conceptual��analys�s��of�� the��deep��cultural��d�fferences��and��the��cultural��and��pol�t�cal��pract�ce��of��tolerat�on��lead��us���nto��paradox.��For��as��Thomas��Nagel��very��aptly��puts���t,

“l�beral�sm��asks��that��c�t�zens��accept��a��certa�n��restra�nt�� �n��call�ng��on��the��power��of��the��state��to��enforce��some��of��the�r��most��deeply��held��conv�ct�ons��aga�nst��others��who��do��not��accept��them,��and��holds��that��the��leg�t�mate��exerc�se��of��pol�t�cal��power��must��be��just�f�ed��on��more��restr�cted��grounds��–��grounds��wh�ch��belong���n��some��sense��to��a��common��or��publ�c��doma�n”.3

Th�s�� �s��where��paradox��str�kes��and��myst�f�es��our��common��sense.��For��why��should��

��2�� See��Robert,��Noz�ck��Anarchy, State, and Utopia,��Blackwell,��1974,��p.��297-334.��3�� Thomas��Nagel,��ibid.,��p.��158.

56 �� On��Tolerat�on,��Char�ty,��and��Ep�stem�c��Fall�b�l�sm����/����M�rcea��DUMITRU������������57

such��a�� l�m�tat�on��placed��upon�� just�f�cat�on��be�� the�� standard�� form��of��ground�ng��pol�t�cal��leg�t�macy?��After��all,��for��all��those��who��do��not��accept��that��relat�v�sm���s��the��most��attract�ve��ball��game���n��town��nowadays,�� the��arguments��against�� th�s��l�m�tat�on���mposed��upon��the�� just�f�catory��bas�s��of�� the��pol�t�cal��dec�s�ons��could��appear��very��conv�nc�ng��and��as��honest��as��one��can��get.��And��they��could��very��well��ask��themselves���n��a��very��proper��way��the��follow�ng��quest�ons,��as��Nagel��h�mself��does,���n��order��to��g�ve��the��best��chance��to��the��argument���n��favor��of��l�beral��tolerat�on:��

“Why��should��I��care��what��others��w�th��whom��I��d�sagree��th�nk��about��the��grounds��on��wh�ch��state��power���s��exerc�sed?��Why��shouldn’t��I��d�scount��the�r��reject�on���f���t���s��based��on��rel�g�ous��or��moral��or��cultural��values��that��I��bel�eve��to��be��m�staken?��Isn’t��that��be�ng��too�� �mpart�al,��g�v�ng��too��much��author�ty��to��those��whose��values��confl�ct��w�th��m�ne��–��betray�ng��my��own��values,���n��fact?��If��I��bel�eve��someth�ng,��I��bel�eve���t��to��be��true,��yet��here��I��am��asked��to��refra�n��from��act�ng��on��that��bel�ef���n��deference�� to��bel�efs�� I�� th�nk��are�� false.�� It�� �s��unclear��what��poss�ble��moral��mot�vat�on��I��could��have��for��do�ng��that.��Impart�al�ty��among��persons���s��one��th�ng,��but�� �mpart�al�ty��among��concept�ons��of�� the��good���s��qu�te��another.��True�� just�ce��ought�� to��cons�st��of��g�v�ng��everyone��the��best��poss�ble��chance��of��salvat�on,��for��example,��or��of��a��good��l�fe.��In��other��words,��we��have��to��start��from��the��values��that��we��ourselves��accept���n��dec�d�ng��how��state��power��may��leg�t�mately��be��used”.4

Two-justificatory-models-of-tolerationWhy��are��we��supposed,��then,��after��all��to��be��tolerant?��Roughly��speak�ng,��we��can��g�ve��two��answers��wh�ch��lead��to��two��just�f�catory��models��for��the��v�rtue��of��tolerat�on:��one���s��deontolog�cal��and��the��other���s��consequent�al�st.��We��w�ll��exam�ne��them���n��turn.

The-deontological-model

Accord�ng�� to�� the��deontolog�cal��model,�� tolerat�on�� �s��a��morally��necessary��v�rtue��whose��value��does��not��follow,��f�rst��and��foremost,��from��certa�n��des�rable��soc�al��and��pol�t�cal��consequences,��regardless��of��how���mportant�� those��consequences��could��be��for��the��soc�al��and��pol�t�cal��stab�l�ty��of��our���nst�tut�ons.��A��full��grasp��of��the��power��of��th�s��deontolog�cal��concept���s��fac�l�tated��by��th�nk�ng��counterfactually.��Thus��to��th�nk���n��a��strong��deontolog�cal��sense��that��any��value��or��any��moral��norm��whatsoever��should��be��followed���n��our��act�ons��means��that��we��are��comm�tt�ng��ourselves��to��those��norms��even���n��those��contrary-to-fact��s�tuat�ons���n��wh�ch,���f��we��acted��accord�ng��to��them,��we��would��be���n��a��worse-off��s�tuat�on,��compared��w�th��the��actual��state���n��wh�ch��we��are,��than��we��would��be��should��we��not��have��acted���n��accordance��w�th��them.

From��where��does��th�s��strong��moral��necess�ty��to��be��tolerant��w�th��those��who��are��d�fferent�� from��us�� �n��a��very��profound��and��(maybe)��non��reconc�lable��way��follow?��F�rst,���t���s��worth��emphas�z�ng��that��the��background��aga�nst��wh�ch��we��place��th�s��strong��moral��constra�nt��of�� tolerat�on��cons�sts�� �n��a��deep��asymmetr�cal�� relat�on��between��those��who��tolerate��and��those��who��are��tolerated;��but��then,��aga�n,�� the��same��relat�on,��

��4�� Thomas��Nagel,���b�d.,��p.��158.

�f�� looked��at��from��a��d�fferent��angle,��has��a��tendency��to��become��symmetr�cal,��wh�ch���s��nowadays��one��of��the��ma�n��sources��of��the��contemporary��cr�s�s��of�� the��concept��of��tolerat�on.5��A��short��explanat�on��w�ll��help��us��here.

Tolerat�on�� �s�� requ�red��by�� the�� log�c��of�� the�� commun�tar�an�� l�fe��when�� there��are��at�� least�� two��groups��wh�ch��are��pos�t�oned��asymmetr�cally��w�th�� regard�� to�� the��normat�ve��centre��of��the��pol�t�cal��and��ep�stem�c��power.��In��order��to��comply��w�th��the��requ�rements��of��tolerat�on��the��group��wh�ch��controls��the��power���n��th�s��asymmetr�cal��relat�on��should��accept��restra�n��on���ts��means��of��coerc�on,��wh�ch��may��very��well��be��rooted�� �n�� the��exerc�se��of�� �ts��pol�t�cal��power,��and�� to��bu�ld,�� �n��an��alternat�ve��way,��strong��argumentat�ve��strateg�es��wh�ch��are��persuas�ve��and�� rat�onal�� (maybe��even��compell�ng).

We��get�� thus�� to�� the��key�� term��for��understand�ng�� the��deontolog�cal��concept��of��toleration. This term is “reason”. In his paper on the issue of toleration, Andrei Pleşu g�ves��a��very��clear��and��unequ�vocal��account��for��th�s��pos�t�on:��

“We��can��be�� tolerant�� �n�� the��name��of�� reason,��establ�sh�ng�� that�� everybody�� �s��ent�tled�� to��have��h�s��or��her��own��op�n�on��and��that�� the��pr�nc�ple��of�� th�s�� r�ght�� �s��rat�onal�ty,��but��we��can��also��be�� tolerant�� �n�� the��name��of��our��var�ous��fa�lures�� �n��act�ng��rat�onally,��recogn�z�ng��that��we��don’t��have��access��to��the��absolute��un�versal��truth,��and��therefore��to�� the��ult�mate��certa�nty,��and��thus��our��cla�m��to��be��always��r�ght��has��no��grounds”.6

What���s���mpl�ed��here��are��two��pr�nc�ples��whose��mean�ngfulness���s��cruc�al��for��a��profound��understand�ng��of���mportant��ph�losoph�cal��pr�nc�ples��wh�ch��are��recurrent���n��many��quarters��of��contemporary��systemat�c��ph�losophy,��such��as��ph�losophy��of��m�nd,��ph�losophy��of��language,��ep�stemology��and��eth�cs:��what��I��mean��here���s��the��pr�nc�ple��of��char�ty��and��the��pr�nc�ple��of��ep�stem�c��fall�b�l�sm.

Toleration-and-charity

If��we��follow��closely��the��pr�nc�ple��of��char�ty��we��w�ll��see��r�ght��away��how��the���dea��of��tolerat�on�� �s��essent�ally��conta�ned���n��our��common��mental��and��moral��att�tudes.��To��make��th�s��clear�� �t�� �s��worth��po�nt�ng��to�� the��h�ghly�� �nfluent�al�� remarks�� that��Donald��Dav�dson��made��on��th�s��subject���n��the��context��of��h�s��sem�nal��d�scuss�on���n��ph�losophy��of��m�nd.

The��stance�� that��Dav�dson��defends��w�th�� regard�� to�� the��m�nd-body��relat�on�� �s��

5 In a very suggestive and illuminating way Andrei Pleşu, in his Cuvântul�� conference,��“Toleranţa şi intolerabilul. Criza unui concept” (in Romanian) (“Toleration and the Intolerable.��The��Cr�s�s��of��a��Concept”)��(publ�shed��by��the��journal��Cuvântul,��XI��(XVI),��no.��2��(332),��February��2005,��pg.��11-13),��br�ngs���nto��d�scuss�on��the��d�alect�cs��of��the��rule-except�on��relat�on.��What��unt�l��recently��has��been��tolerated��becomes��someth�ng��leg�t�mate��today��and���s��quest�on�ng��the��leg�t�macy��of��the��tolerat�ng���nstance:��“The��except�on��becomes��tolerant��w�th��the��rule,��and��the��rule��develops��a��gu�lt��complex,��and��thus��an���nfer�or�ty��complex���n��relat�on��to��the��except�on.��The��except�on��becomes��m�l�tant,��self-suff�c�ent,��and,��eventually,��d�scr�m�na-tory��and���ntolerant!”

6 Andrei Pleşu, ibid.

58 �� On��Tolerat�on,��Char�ty,��and��Ep�stem�c��Fall�b�l�sm����/����M�rcea��DUMITRU������������59

called�� the�� thes�s��of��anomalous��mon�sm7��–��roughly�� the��v�ew��that�� there��cannot��be��any��psycho-phys�cal��causal�� laws��wh�ch��connect��mental��phenomena��w�th��phys�cal��phenomena.��One��of�� the��cruc�al��prem�ses��of�� th�s��concept�on�� �s�� that�� the��pract�ce��of��attr�but�ng�� �ntent�onal��stances�� to�� �nd�v�duals��–��mental��states��such��as��bel�efs��or��w�shes��–�� �s��governed��by��pr�nc�ples��of��rat�onal�ty,��wh�le�� the��phys�cal�� realm���s��not��subject�� to��such��constra�nts;��hence,��as��Dav�dson��very��aptly��puts�� �t,�� the��pr�nc�ple��of��rat�onal�ty��and��coherence��“has��no��echo��whatsoever”���n��the��phys�cal�� theory,��wh�ch��makes�� �mposs�ble��any��causal��connect�on��of�� the��mental��phenomena��w�th��phys�cal��phenomena.

Those��pr�nc�ples��of��rat�onal�ty��warrant�� that�� the�� total��set��of�� �ntent�onal��states��that��we��attr�bute��to��a��subject,��and��through��wh�ch��one��can���nterpret��and��pred�ct��her��act�ons��under��normal��c�rcumstances,��w�ll��be��as��coherent��and��as��rat�onal��as��poss�ble.��Of��course,��th�s��does��not��mean��that��we��w�ll��make��the��unreal�st�c,��and��actually��false,��presuppos�t�on��that��those���nd�v�duals��whose��utterances��and��act�ons��are��the��object��of��our���nterpretat�ons��could��not��have��false��bel�efs.��To��the��contrary,��we��know��that��what��g�ves��to��our��bel�efs��the��ph�losoph�cal��b�te��that��makes��them��theoret�cally���nterest�ng���s��the��fact��that��they��could��be��–��and��some��of��them��actually��are��–��false.��The��pr�nc�ples��of��rat�onal�ty,��wh�ch��govern��the��attr�but�on��of���ntent�onal��states,��encapsulate��the���dea��that��“we��can,��however,��take���t��as��g�ven��that��most��bel�efs��are��correct.��The��reason��for��th�s���s��that��a��bel�ef���s���dent�f�ed��by���ts��locat�on���n��a��pattern��of��bel�efs;���t���s��th�s��pattern��that��determ�nes��the��subject��matter��of��the��bel�ef,��what��the��bel�ef���s��about”.8

What�� follows�� from�� th�s�� ep�stem�c�� duty�� that�� we�� have�� toward�� others�� as���nterpreters��of�� the�r��utterances��and��act�ons�� �s�� that��we��should��be��char�table�� �n�� the���nterpretat�on��of�� the�r�� �ntent�onal��states��and��that��we��should��refra�n��ourselves��from��attr�but�ng��to�� them��obv�ously��contrad�ctory��bel�efs,��even��when��the��sentences�� that��they��utter��are���ncompat�ble��w�th��the��bel�efs��that��we��share��or��even��worse,��when��the�r��sentences��have��the��surface��form��of��a��log�cal��contrad�ct�on.

Consequently,��what�� �s��requ�red��from��an���nterpreter,�� �n��order��for��us�� to��accept��her���nterpretat�on,���s�� to��come��up��w�th��an��account��for��the��mean�ng��of��the��sentences��and��act�ons��of�� the�� �nterpreted�� �nd�v�dual��as��coherent��and��as�� rat�onal��as��poss�ble.��And��when��the���nterpreter��fa�ls��to��produce��such��a��cons�stent���nterpretat�on,���t���s��very��natural�� to��blame�� the�� �nterpreter��herself�� for�� the�� �nterpretat�ve�� fa�lure��and��not�� the���nterpreted��person��for��hold�ng��unacceptable��and���ncons�stent��bel�efs.

To��sum��up,��the��pr�nc�ple��of��char�ty��w�ll��be��encapsulated��w�th�n��the��follow�ng��thes�s:��the��requ�rement��of��rat�onal�ty��and��coherence��perta�ns��to��the��very��essence��of��the��m�nd��–��that�� �s,�� �t�� �s��const�tut�ve��to��the��mental�� �n��the��sense��that��rat�onal�ty��and��coherence��make��the��m�nd��be��exactly��what�� �t�� �s.��And���f,��per absurdum,�� there��were��“bel�efs”��wh�ch��would��escape��from��the��constra�nt��of��th�s��pr�nc�ple,�� then��those��sui-generis��“bel�efs”��could��not��be��cons�dered��any��longer��mental��states.

Where��does��all�� th�s��lead��us���n��relat�on��to��our��top�c?��If��we��apprec�ate��properly��

��7�� See��Donald��Dav�dson��“Mental��Events”��(1970),��“Psychology��as��Ph�losophy”��(1974)��and��“The��Mater�al��M�nd”��(1973),���n��Donald��Dav�dson��Essays on Actions and Events,��Clarendon��Press,��Oxford,��1980,��pp.��205-259.

��8�� Donald��Dav�dson,��“Thought��and��Talk”,���n��Inquiries into Truth & Interpretation,��Clarendon��Press,��Oxford,��1984,��p.��168.

the��force��of��all�� those��Dav�dson�an��remarks��we��shall��understand��why��the��pr�nc�ple��of��char�ty��occup�es��a��central��place�� �n��any��ser�ous��attempt�� to��expla�n�� theoret�cally��how���t���s��poss�ble��to��understand��the��others’��utterances��and��act�ons���n��a��rat�onal��way.��Dav�dson���s��crystal��clear��about��th�s:��

“S�nce��char�ty���s��not��an��opt�on,��but��a��cond�t�on��of��hav�ng��a��workable��theory,���t���s��mean�ngless��to��suggest��that��we��m�ght��fall���nto��mass�ve��error��by��endors�ng���t.��[…]��Char�ty���s��forced��on��us;��whether��we��l�ke���t��or��not,���f��we��want��to��understand��others,��we��must��count��them��r�ght���n��most��matters.��If��we��can��produce��a��theory��that��reconc�les��char�ty��and��the��formal��cond�t�ons��for��a��theory,��we��have��done��all��that��could��be��done�� to��ensure��commun�cat�on.��Noth�ng��more�� �s��poss�ble,��and��noth�ng��more���s��needed”.9

Summ�ng��up�� the��deontolog�cal��concept��of�� tolerat�on,�� the��Dav�dson�an��pr�nc�ple��of�� char�ty�� requ�res��us�� to��prefer�� theor�es��of�� �nterpretat�on��wh�ch��m�n�m�ze�� the��d�sagreements.��Th�s���s��why��mak�ng��an��appeal��to��char�ty��–��and��ipso facto��to��tolerat�on��–���s��somehow���nev�table.

The��current��cr�s�s��of�� the��concept��of��tolerat�on��erodes��th�s��pr�nc�ple��of��char�ty��wh�ch���s��so��generous��and���t���s��also��fed,���n���ts��turn,��by��a��very��feeble��and���ncomplete��appl�cat�on��of���t.��For,��as��Dav�dson��r�ghtly��emphas�zes,��“m�n�m�z�ng��d�sagreements,��or��max�m�z�ng��agreement,�� �s��a��confused�� �deal.��The��a�m��of�� �nterpretat�on�� �s��not��agreement��but��understand�ng”.10

Along the same general lines, Andrei Pleşu, in his essay, is worried by the rad�cal��d�stort�on��of�� the��mean�ng��of�� the��concept��of�� tolerat�on��and��he��deplores�� the��degradat�on��of��the��honest��d�alogue��w�th��the��other��who���s��substant�ally��“d�fferent”,��a��d�alogue��wh�ch��g�ves��genu�ne��substance��to��the��tolerant��att�tude;��and���t���s��th�s��fact��–��says Pleşu – which “amputates the appetite for knowledge, for the real understanding of��the��alter�ty,��and��wh�ch��underm�nes��the��necess�ty��for��hav�ng��debates”.11

We��thus��get��to��the��po�nt��where��we��are��trapped���n��a��v�c�ous��c�rcle��wh�ch���s��very��hard��to��get��through.��For,��on��the��one��hand,��the��genu�ne��debate���s��cancelled,��because��we��are��told���n��a��way��wh�ch���s���rrespons�ble��from��an��ep�stem�c��and��eth�cal��po�nt��of��v�ew,�� that�� there���s��no��truth��to��d�scover��and��no��reason�ng��to��undertake,��and��on��the��other��hand,��conversely,���mportant��truths��have��no��echo���n��us��and��they��are���gnored��by��us��–��d�scurs�ve��reason�ng��becomes��weak��and���s��degrad�ng��fallac�ously��because��the��authent�c��debate���s��cancelled.

Toleration-and-fallibilism

We��also��have�� to��be�� tolerant��due�� to��our��ep�stem�c��fall�b�l�sm:��we��have��no��access��whatsoever��to��absolute��truth��and��certa�nty���n��what��concerns��those��th�ngs��wh�ch��are��of��

��9�� Donald��Dav�dson,��“On��the��Very��Idea��of��a��Conceptual��Scheme”,���n��Inquiries into Truth & Interpretation,��Clarendon��Press,��Oxford,��1984,��p.��197.

10�� Donald��Dav�dson,��Inquiries into Truth & Interpretation,��Clarendon��Press,��Oxford,��1984,��pg.��xv��.

11 Andrei Pleşu, ibid.

60 �� On��Tolerat�on,��Char�ty,��and��Ep�stem�c��Fall�b�l�sm����/����M�rcea��DUMITRU������������61

utmost���mportance��for��the��moral,��rel�g�ous��and��pol�t�cal��l�fe��of��our��own��commun�ty.��S�nce��our��own��moral�� and��pol�t�cal��bel�efs�� that��we��pra�se��mostly��and��cons�der��honestly��and��w�th��some��grounds��r�ght��may��be��nevertheless��wrong,���t�� �s��reasonable��to��acknowledge��that�� those��who��do��not��share��our��fundamental��comm�tments��are��as��ent�tled��ep�stem�cally��as��we��are,��accord�ng��to��the�r��own��just�f�cat�ons,�� to��contrary��op�n�ons.

The-consequentialist-model

Now,��accord�ng��to��the��consequent�al�st��model,�� tolerat�on��appears��as��a��pol�t�cal��tool��for��allev�at�ng��dangerous��d�sagreements��or��tens�ons��wh�ch��are��a��threat��to��the��soc�al��order.��If��what��we��are��look�ng��for���s��a��soc�al��and��pol�t�cal��stab�l�ty��compact��then���t���s��reasonable��to��not��d�scr�m�nate��and��accept��th�ngs,��wh�ch��otherw�se��we��had��strong��reasons��to��d�sagree��w�th��and��reject.��In��short,��mak�ng��a��consequent�al�st��calculus��we��see��that�� there��are��more��numerous��reasons��by��far��for��be�ng��tolerant�� than��for��be�ng��fanat�cal��and���ntolerant.

A-“paradox”-of-toleration?

I�� shall�� f�n�sh��by��mak�ng�� a�� short�� remark��on��one��of�� the�� sources��of�� the�� current��pathology��of�� the�� concept�� and��pract�ce��of�� tolerat�on.��Th�s��mot�vates��what�� can��be��called��a��“paradox��of�� tolerat�on”:��how��should��we��react��when��confronted��w�th���ntolerance?��What��are��the��l�m�ts��of��tolerat�on���n��relat�on��to��fanat�c�sm��and��to��what���s���ntolerable?��Is���t��poss�ble,��and���f��so���s���t��des�rable,��to��f�nd��a��rat�onal��ground�ng��for��accept�ng��what���s��otherw�se��unacceptable?

Thomas��Nagel��also�� sees�� the�� real��problem��and��danger��beh�nd�� th�s�� form��of��unbounded��and��unreflect�ve��tolerat�on��when��he��speaks��about��the��over-exaggerat�on��of��pos�t�ve��d�scr�m�nat�on,��better��known��today��as�� the��aff�rmat�ve��act�on��pol�cy.12��What’s��all�� th�s��about?��Tolerat�on��plays,��as�� �t��were,�� the�� role��of�� the��m�ddle�� term��between��freedom��of��speech��and��op�n�on��(accord�ng�� to��J.��S.��M�ll,�� tolerat�on�� �s��a��necessary��product��of��l�berty)��and��pol�t�cal��equal�ty��(accord�ng��to��J.��Rawls,��tolerat�on���s�� log�cally��correlated�� to��equal�ty).�� It�� �s��a�� real��challenge�� then�� to��keep��a��dynam�c��equ�l�br�um��between��the���nd�v�dual��and��soc�al��just�ce,��on��the��one��hand,��and��freedom��of��speech��(and��op�n�on),��on��the��other��hand.��The��same��k�nd��of��problem��w�ll��occur��when��we��look��for��equ�l�br�um��between��norms��and��whatever��dev�ates��from��norms��or��between��rules��and��except�ons.��The��current��tendency���s��to��focus��upon,��somet�mes��even��to��over-emphas�ze,��the��value��of��equal�ty.��However,��what��the��pol�t�cal��pract�ce��of��pos�t�ve��d�scr�m�nat�on��shows,��espec�ally��when��one��abuses�� �t,�� �s�� the��d�ff�culty��to��keep��the��r�ght��balance��between��equal�ty��and��l�berty:��the��requ�rement��of��equal�ty��threatens�� the��requ�rement��of�� free��compet�t�on��and��free��cho�ce.�� If��we��push�� to�� the��extreme��the��norms��of��pos�t�ve��d�scr�m�nat�on��we��end��up��on��a��sl�ppery-slope��and��we��w�ll��not��be��sure��any��more��whether�� �t�� �s��not��fa�r�� that��one��should��always��prefer��whomever�� �s��naturally��worse-off�� than��whomever�� �s��better-off,��hav�ng�� �n��v�ew��a��rather��abstract��and��formal��representat�on��of�� the��d�fferences��for��wh�ch��ne�ther��one��

12�� Cf.��Thomas��Nagel,��Mortal Questions,��Cambr�dge��Un�vers�ty��Press,��1979.

has��any��obv�ous��moral��mer�t.��The��leg�t�mate��worry��here���s��th�s:���f��we��general�ze��th�s��cr�ter�on��for��cho�ce,��should��we��not��st�ck��to��the��same��log�c��and��whenever��we��have��to��make��a��cho�ce��should��we��not��always��choose�� the��worse-off,�� �n��order�� to��correct��her��nat�ve�� lack��of��chance,��for��wh�ch,��at��any��rate,��she��has��no��moral��respons�b�l�ty��whatsoever?

Thomas��Nagel’s�� remarks��have�� the��mer�t��of��awaken�ng��us�� from��our��moral��slumber,��as�� �t��were,��and��make��us��become��aware��that�� �f��we��go��down��th�s��sl�ppery-slope��we��end��up��at�� the��border��of��a��moral��Utop�a.��If��we��w�sh��to��accept��someth�ng,��wh�ch��otherw�se���s��unacceptable,��we��w�ll��have��to��make���t��be��the��case��that��one��should��produce��what���s���mposs�ble.��Well,���f��th�s���s��what��we��really��wish��or��want,��then��we��see��that��we��are��l�kely��to��end��up��where��we��began��th�s��journey,���n��Utop�a.��However,��as��we��already��know,���n��Utop�a��tolerat�on��has��no��real��po�nt��or��moral��mer�t.13

References

Dav�dson��Donald.��1980.��Essays on Actions and Events,��Oxford,��Clarendon��Press.Dav�dson,��Donald.��1984.��Inquiries into Truth & Interpretation,��Oxford,��Clarendon��Press.Nagel,��Thomas.��1979.��Mortal Questions,��Cambr�dge��Un�vers�ty��Press.Nagel,��Thomas.��1991.��Equality and Partiality,��Oxford��Un�vers�ty��Press.Noz�ck,��Robert.��1973.��Anarchy, State, and Utopia,��Blackwell.Pleşu, Andrei. 2005. “Toleranţa şi intolerabilul. Criza unui concept” (“Toleration and the

�ntolerable”),��publ�c��conference��Cuvântul,�� �n��Cuvântul,��XI��(XVI),��no.��2��(332),��February��2005,��11-13.

13 I am grateful to Professor Andrei Pleşu for inviting me to comment publicly his paper “Toleranţa şi intolerabilul. Criza unui concept” (“Toleration and the Intolerable. The Crisis of��a��Concept”),��wh�ch��was��publ�shed��afterwards��by��Cuvântul.��Th�s��k�nd���nv�tat�on��gave��me��the���nput��to��wr�te��a��f�rst��draft��of��the��paper��that��I��am��present�ng��here.��I��would��also��l�ke��to��thank��my��colleague,��Professor��Adr�an-Paul��Il�escu,��for��h�s��cr�t�c�sm��wh�ch��helped��me��to���mprove��the��paper.��It��goes��w�thout��say�ng��that��I��am��the��only��one��respons�ble��for��the��contents��and��arguments��that��I��am��putt�ng��forward���n��th�s��paper.

62 �� Intu�t�ve��Methods��of��Moral��Dec�s�on��Mak�ng,��A��Ph�losoph�cal��Plea������/����Em�l�an��MIHAILOV��������������63

Intuitive Methods of Moral Decision Making, A Philosophical Plea

Em�l�an��MIHAILOV

Eth�cal�� theor�es��a�m��to��ground��moral�� judgements��or��at�� least�� to��make��sense��of�� the��moral��un�verse.��Kant��developed��an��a��pr�or� ground�ng��of��moral��dut�es.��What��one��ought��to��do���s��what��can��be��w�lled��by��any��rat�onal��be�ng.��A��rule���s��moral���f���t��can��be��w�lled��as��a��un�versal��law.��M�ll,��on��the��other��hand,��focused��on��the��outcome��of��act�ons.��H�s��ut�l�tar�an��pr�nc�ple��confers��moral��value��to��an��act�on���n��as��much��as���t��max�m�zes��happ�ness��and��m�n�m�zes��pa�n.��Both��ph�losophers��assume��that��at��least��two��object�ves��can��be��expected��from��a��moral��theory:��(�)�� to��prov�de��a��cr�ter�on��of��the��moral��good,��and,���mpl�c�tly,��(��)�� to��offer��a��method��for��test�ng��whether��the��cr�ter�on��of��the��moral��good���s��sat�sf�ed.��Thus,��any��moral�� theory��prov�des��a��general��framework��for��moral��dec�s�on��mak�ng.

Problems��of��appl�ed��eth�cs��have��been��approached��w�th��parad�gmat�c��eth�cal��theor�es.��These�� theoret�cal��conceptual�� frameworks��have��been��appl�ed�� �n��a�� top-down��fash�on��to��press�ng��moral��d�ff�cult�es.��Gradually,��scept�cal��vo�ces��began��to��be��heard.��Mark��S�egler��s�gnalled��the��fact��that��the��trad�t�on��of��ph�losoph�cal��eth�cs��and��top-down��approaches,��wh�ch��are��dom�nant���n��med�cal��eth�cs,��cannot��cla�m��any��real��progress���n��the��pract�ce��of��med�cal��eth�cs.1��S�egler’s��remarks��can��determ�ne��an��ant�-theory��att�tude��of��reject�ng��the��usefulness��of��conceptual��frameworks,��even��though��S�egler��h�mself��does��not��sympath�ze��w�th��such��att�tude.��I��bel�eve��that��more���mportant��than�� the��debate��between�� theory��and��ant�-theory,��are�� the��assumpt�ons��beh�nd�� th�s��scept�cal��vo�ce.

Ph�losoph�cal��and��legal�st�c��approaches��d�d��not��manage��to��accompl�sh��major��progress�� �n�� the��pract�ce��of��med�cal��eth�cs��because�� they��do��not��capture�� the��whole��story��of��moral��dec�s�on��mak�ng,�� the��needs��and��expectat�ons��of�� those��confronted��on��a��da�ly��bas�s��w�th��s�tuat�onal��constra�nts.��V�s�ble��progress��also��starts��from��the��m�cro��level��of��part�es��who��constantly��deal��w�th��d�ff�cult��moral��s�tuat�ons.��Extens�ve��progress�� �s��hard�� to��come��by��s�nce�� the��emp�r�cal��eth�cs��of��med�cal��pract�ce��are��underdeveloped.��The��real��expectat�ons��of��doctors��and��pat�ents��cons�st�� �n��hav�ng��a��clearer��p�cture��of��what���s��happen�ng��and��how��to��proceed���n��a��fam�l�ar��manner.��They��are��the��hot spot,��the��ult�mate��benef�c�ary��of��d�sentangl�ng��moral��d�ff�cult�es.��Here,���t���s��necessary��for��tools��of��moral��assessment��to��be��in hand.��Though��moral��ph�losophers��have��a��tendency��to��focus��on��general��tra�ts,���n��the��context��of��the��pract�ce��of��med�cal��eth�cs�� the��d�vers�ty��of��moral�� relevant�� factors��and�� the�� �ntu�t�ve��aspect��of��moral��assessment���s���n��the��forefront.��Therefore,��S�egler’s��presuppos�t�on���s��that��the��needs��and��expectat�ons��of��those��who��const�tute��the��cr�t�cal��mass��of��the��pract�ce��of��med�cal��eth�cs��are��far��too���gnored.

��1�� S�egler,��M.,��“Med�cal��eth�cs��as��a��med�cal��matter”���n��R.��Baker,��A.��Kaplan,��L.��Emanuel,��S.��Latham��(eds.),��The American Medical Ethics Revolution,��John��Hopk�ns��Un�vers�ty��Press,��1999,��p.��178.

Tak�ng���nto��cons�derat�on��the��needs��underl�ned��above,��one��faces��the��challenge��of��prov�d�ng���ntu�t�ve��methods��of��enhanc�ng��moral��judgement���n��the��da�ly��pract�ce��of��med�cal��eth�cs��or��any��other�� f�eld.�� Intu�t�ve��methods��are��s�mple��procedures��by��wh�ch��an��agent��evaluates�� the��moral�ty��of��an��act�on��w�th��ease��and���n��a��very��short��per�od��of��t�me.��Intu�t�veness���s��prov�ded��by��the��speed��and��ease��w�th��wh�ch��normat�ve��contents��come��to��m�nd.��The��a�m��of��th�s��paper���s��to��argue��that���ntu�t�ve��methods��of��moral��dec�s�on��mak�ng��are��object�ve�� tools��on�� the��grounds�� that�� they��are��reasons-based.��F�rst,��I��w�ll��conduct��a��prel�m�nary��analys�s���n��wh�ch��I��h�ghl�ght��the��acceptance��of��methodolog�cal��plural�sm���n�� the��pract�ce��of��med�cal��eth�cs.��Here,�� the��po�nt�� �s��to��show��the��poss�b�l�ty��of��us�ng���ntu�t�ve��methods��g�ven��the��plural�sm��framework.��Second,��I��w�ll��argue�� that�� the��best��start�ng��po�nt��of��elaborat�ng��such��methods�� �s��a��bottom-up��perspect�ve.��Th�rd,��I��w�ll��address��the��worry��of��subject�v�sm.��Under��the���nfluence��of��certa�n�� rat�onal�st��pos�t�ons2��and�� recent��developments�� �n��cogn�t�ve��sc�ence��and��moral��psychology,3��one��m�ght�� th�nk�� that�� �ntu�t�ve��methods��of��moral��dec�s�on��mak�ng��are��essent�ally��subject�ve��and��emot�on��based.��If��moral���ntu�t�ons��are��the��result��of��emot�onal��react�ons��and���ntu�t�ve��reason�ng���s��emot�onally��dr�ven,��then��there��are��reasons��to��bel�eve���ntu�t�ve��methods��are��subject�ve��and��relat�ve��to��part�cular��psycholog�cal��const�tut�on.��Aga�nst��th�s��p�cture,��I��w�ll��argue��that���ntu�t�ve��methods��of��moral��dec�s�on��mak�ng��are��essent�ally��reasons-based.��A��W�ttgenste�n�an��approach��w�ll��show��that���ntu�t�ve��methods��of��moral��dec�s�on��mak�ng��are��conceptually��l�nked��w�th��cr�ter�a��of��moral�ty.

Methodological-pluralism

In��the��f�eld��of��b�oeth�cs,��broadly��construed,��there���s��a��grow�ng��consensus��that��eth�cal��theor�es��do��not��have��a��stra�ght�� forward��appl�cat�on�� to��concrete��moral��dec�s�ons.��The��road��from��abstract��moral��pr�nc�ples��to��part�cular��moral��dec�s�ons���s��paved��w�th���ntermed�ary��steps,��at��least��concern�ng��the��spec�f�c�ty��of��moral��content��and��the��scope��of��pr�nc�ples.��The��funct�on��of���ntermed�ary��procedures���s��to��grasp��the��complex�t�es��of��dec�d�ng��on��part�cular��cases.��I��w�ll��d�scuss��only��the��two��most��popular��wh�ch��are��usually��cons�dered���n��oppos�t�on��to��each��other��because��of��the��d�fferent��just�f�cat�on��and��normat�ve��presuppos�t�ons.��Pr�nc�pl�sm��and��casu�stry��are�� the��most�� �nfluent�al��methods��of��moral��dec�s�on��mak�ng���n��med�cal��eth�cs,��and��often��the��quest�on��ar�ses��of��wh�ch��one��to��choose.

Beauchamp��and��Ch�ldress��reject�� the�� trad�t�onal��models��of��moral�� just�f�cat�on��(top-down��and��bottom-up)��and��argue��for��a��coherence��cr�ter�on���nsp�red��by��Rawls’��methods��of�� reflect�ve�� equ�l�br�um.4��Through��a��process��of��del�berat�on,��one�� �s��supposed��to��pursue��a��reflect�ve��equ�l�br�um��between��general��pr�nc�ples,��rules,��r�ghts,��

2 See Mureșan, V., Fericirea, datoria și decizia etică,��Un�vers�ty��of��Bucharest��Press,��2010.��3�� See��Greene,�� J.��D.,��Sommerv�lle,��R.��B.,��Nystrom,��L.��E.,��Darley,�� J.��M.,��Cohen,�� J.��D.,��

“An��fMRI�� Invest�gat�on��of��Emot�onal��Engagement�� �n��Moral�� Judgment”,��Science��293:��2105-2108,��2001,��and��Ha�dt,�� J.,�� “The��Emot�onal��Dog��and�� Its��Rat�onal��Ta�l:��A��Soc�al��Intu�t�on�st��Approach��to��Moral��Judgment”,��Psychological Review,��108:��814-834,��2001.

��4�� Beauchamp,��T.,��Ch�ldress,��J.,��Principles of Biomedical Ethics, Oxford��Un�vers�ty��Press,��2001.��See��also��Rawls,��J.,��“Outl�ne��of��a��Dec�s�on��Procedure��for��Eth�cs”,��The Philosophical Review,��60.2:��177-197,��1951.

64 �� Intu�t�ve��Methods��of��Moral��Dec�s�on��Mak�ng,��A��Ph�losoph�cal��Plea������/����Em�l�an��MIHAILOV��������������65

on��the��one��hand,��and��moral���ntu�t�ons,��v�rtues,��bel�efs��on��the��other��hand.��When��there���s��a��confl�ct��between��d�fferent��normat�ve��reasons,��assess�ng��what��one��ought�� to��do���s��a�� reflect�ve��process��of�� just�f�cat�on�� through��wh�ch��a��certa�n��moral��perspect�ve��ga�ns��“we�ght”.��W�th��regards�� to��normat�ve��presuppos�t�ons,��pr�nc�pl�sm��assumes��a��normat�ve�� framework��based��on��four��moral��pr�nc�ples��extracted�� from��common��moral�ty.��These��pr�nc�ples��are��central��to��the��pract�ce��of��med�cal��eth�cs:��the��pr�nc�ple��of��autonomy,��the��pr�nc�ple��of��benevolence,��the��pr�nc�ple��of��non-malef�cence��and��the��pr�nc�ple��of��just�ce.��Pr�nc�pl�sm��conce�ves��these��pr�nc�ples��as��prima facie��pr�nc�ples,��that���s,��they��are��not��absolute.��A��pr�nc�ple��can��be��just�f�ably��overr�dden��by��another���n��some��c�rcumstances,��and��there���s��no��h�erarchy��among��them.

On�� the��other�� s�de,�� casu�stry��has�� a��much�� longer�� trad�t�on,��beg�nn�ng��w�th��Ar�stotel�an��eth�cs.��What�� �s��spec�f�c�� to��casu�stry�� �s�� the��bottom-up��just�f�cat�on.��It��starts��from��moral��judgements��about��part�cular��s�tuat�ons��and��afterwards��formulates��more��general�� recommendat�ons.��The��moral�� solut�on�� for��a��part�cular��d�lemma�� �s��general�zed��to��s�m�lar��s�tuat�ons.��Casu�stry��gu�des��a��moral��solut�on��reached���n��a��case��to��other��cases��on�� the��bas�s��of��s�m�lar�t�es��and��d�fferences.�� If��new��cases��resemble��far��enough��a��parad�gmat�c��case,��then���t���s��just�f�ed��to��apply��the��parad�gmat�c��moral��solut�on.��If��th�s���s��not��the��case,��then��one��must��f�nd��a��d�fferent��parad�gmat�c��example.��Casu�stry��need��not��assume��an��a priori normat�ve�� framework.�� It�� just��happens�� to��f�nd���n��moral��exper�ence��parad�gmat�c��cases��and��reason��from��them��by��analogy.��The��moral��ped�gree��of��these��exemplary��cases��represents��the��source��of��author�ty��for��moral��dec�s�ons.��Parad�gmat�c��cases��are��not�� t�meless.��Th�s�� �s��why��there��are��precedents.��Casu�stry�� �s��rather��an��a posteriori endeavour.��It�� just�� looks��for��parad�gmat�c��cases���n��our��moral��pract�ce��wh�ch�� represent�� the��bas�s�� for��moral��arguments��and��have��a��dec�s�ve�� �mpact��on��moral��dec�s�ons.5��Problems��ar�se��when�� two��parad�gmat�c��cases��compete��w�th��each��other.��Soc�al��and��cultural��h�story��can��success�vely��reveal��s�gn�f�cant��clar�f�cat�ons��that��can��solve��such��d�ff�cult�es.��The��advocates��of��casu�stry��bel�eve��that��the��cultural��context��sheds��l�ght��on��what��parad�gmat�c��moral��solut�on���s��to��be��appl�ed.

Fr�ct�ons��have��emerged��between��the��two��approaches��to��moral��dec�s�on��mak�ng.��The��supporters��of��casu�stry��are��protest�ng��aga�nst�� the��“tyranny��of��pr�nc�ples”6.��There���s��a��dynam�c��of��moral��judgement��that���s��not��properly��expressed��by��pr�nc�ples.��Pr�nc�pl�sts��warn��that,��w�thout��a��stable��framework��of��pr�nc�ples,��there���s��no��control��on��moral�� judgements��and��no��prevent�on��aga�nst��prejud�ced��soc�al��convent�ons.��Bas�cally,��“casu�stry�� �s��a��method without content”.7��Desp�te�� the��f�erce��debate��and��methodolog�cal�� r�valry,��both��camps��gradually��began�� to��accept��methodolog�cal��plural�sm.�� Jonsen�� expla�ns�� that�� the�� moral�� arguments,�� wh�ch�� are�� �nternal�� to��parad�gmat�c��cases,��have�� the�� form��of��moral��max�ms��and�� that�� the��general��moral��pr�nc�ples,�� so��often��appl�ed�� to��publ�c��moral��debates,�� are��not�� so��d�fferent�� from��the�� former.8��Parad�gmat�c��cases��embody��moral��max�ms��h�ghly��s�m�lar�� to��moral��

��5�� Jonsen,��A.,��Toulm�n,��S.,��The Abuse of Casuistry,��Un�vers�ty��of��Cal�forn�a��Press,��1988,��p.��306.

��6�� Toulm�n,��S.,��“The��Tyranny��of��Pr�nc�ples”,��The Hastings Center Report,��11.6:��31-39,��1981.��7�� Beauchamp,��Ch�ldress,��Principles of Biomedical Ethics,��p.��395.��8�� Jonsen,��A.,��“Casu�stry:��An��Alternat�ve��or��Complement��to��Pr�nc�ples?”,��Kennedy Institute of

pr�nc�ples.�� In�� th�s��way,��casu�stry�� �s��not��a�� fundamental��alternat�ve�� to��pr�nc�pl�sm.��Beauchamp��cons�ders�� that��casu�stry��need��not��be��a�� r�val�� to��pr�nc�pl�sm��because��parad�gmat�c��cases��are��often��the��dec�s�ve��source��of��author�ty��for��moral��assessment.9��Pr�nc�pl�sm��and��casu�stry��can��co-ex�st,��both��on��normat�ve��content��and��just�f�cat�on���ssues.

Beauchamp��adm�ts�� that�� there�� “there�� �s�� no�� reason�� to�� suppose�� that��moral��ph�losophy��or��methods��of��spec�f�cat�on��supply��the��only��way��or��the��best��way��to��treat��a��case.��From��th�s��perspect�ve,��there��may��be��no��s�ngle��r�ght��solut�on��to��the��problems��presented���n��a��case”.10��For��th�s��reason,��methodolog�cal��plural�sm��has��become��a��soc�al��fact�� �n�� the��pract�ce��of��med�cal��eth�cs.��Wh�le��methodolog�cal��mon�sm��m�ght��st�ll��be��defended��ph�losoph�cally,�� �t�� �s��h�ghly���mpract�cal�� to��shape��a��pract�ce��accord�ng��to��one��s�ngle��eth�cal��procedure��or�� theory.��S�nce��there�� �s��no��consensus,��and��m�ght��not��be��one,��about��wh�ch���s�� the��true��theory��or��procedure,��mon�sm��w�ll��always��face��the��quest�on��“why��th�s��procedure��and��not�� the��other?”��G�ven��that��methodolog�cal��plural�sm��has��made���ts��way���nto��the��pract�ce��of��med�cal��eth�cs,���ntu�t�ve��procedures��can��get��a��p�ece��of��the��methodolog�cal��cake.11

Starting-point

The��quest�on��to��be��answered��now���s��where��one��starts��w�th��draft�ng���ntu�t�ve��methods:��w�ll��one��cons�der��eth�cal��theor�es��the��start�ng��po�nt��and��by��a��process��of��s�mpl�f�cat�on��and��custom�zat�on��arr�ve��at�� s�mpler��and�� �ntu�t�ve�� forms��or��one��w�ll�� start�� from��common��moral�ty,��understood��as�� the��pract�ce��and��exper�ence��of��ord�nary��moral��judgement?

The��f�rst��strategy���s��suggested��by��the��standard��p�cture��wh�ch��can��be��found���n��appl�ed��eth�cs��handbooks.��S�mple��forms��of��class�cal��eth�cal��theor�es��are��appl�ed��to��press�ng��moral�� �ssues��such��as��abort�on��and��euthanas�a.��For��d�dact�c�� reasons,�� the��theoret�cal��structure���s��s�mpl�f�ed��and��appl�ed��to��part�cular��cases���n��order��to��fac�l�tate��the��understand�ng��and��usage��of��abstract��moral��concepts.��Under�� the�� �nfluence��of��th�s��p�cture,�� �t��has��been��proposed�� to�� s�mpl�fy��Kant’s��eth�cs,��ut�l�tar�an�sm��and��v�rtue��eth�cs�� �n��order�� to��del�ver��methods��wh�ch��are��easy��to��use.12��Second,�� there���s��the��argument�� that�� �t�� �s��not�� just��about�� the�� �ntu�t�ve��character��of��s�mpl�f�ed��eth�cal��theor�es.��Moral��object�v�ty���s��also��at��stake.��If��the��start�ng��po�nt���s��eth�cal��theory,��then��the��object�v�ty��of���ntu�t�ve��forms��of��moral��dec�s�on��mak�ng���s��preserved.��Although��s�mpl�f�ed��vers�ons��of��eth�cal�� theor�es��m�ght��not��be��as�� �ntu�t�ve��as��one��expected,��at�� least��object�v�ty�� �s��conferred��upon��them.��Th�s��concern�� �s��understandable��s�nce��we��do��not��want��arb�trary��moral��dec�s�ons��and���f��th�s���s��the��case��then��th�s��strategy���s��appeal�ng.��However,��th�s��k�nd��of��reason�ng��assumes��that��eth�cal��theor�es��are��the��only��

Ethics Journal,��5.3,��1995,��p.��246.��9�� Beauchamp,��T.,��“Methods��and��pr�nc�ples���n��b�omed�cal��eth�cs”,��Journal of Medical Ethics��

29,��2003,��p.��269.10�� Idem.11�� I��leave��as��an��open��quest�on��the��a�m��of��determ�n�ng��more��prec�sely��when��and��how���ntu�t�ve��

methods��are��to��be��used.12�� Sw�nton,��L.,�� “Eth�cal��Dec�s�on��Mak�ng:��How�� to��Make��Eth�cal��Dec�s�ons�� �n��5��Steps”,��

Mftrou.com,��http://www.mftrou.com/eth�cal-dec�s�on-mak�ng.html,��2007.��

66 �� Intu�t�ve��Methods��of��Moral��Dec�s�on��Mak�ng,��A��Ph�losoph�cal��Plea������/����Em�l�an��MIHAILOV��������������67

source��of��moral��object�v�ty��and��reasons��for��what��we��ought��to��do.��I��w�ll��address��th�s��concern��later���n��the��paper.

The��error��w�th��the��f�rst��po�nt���s��the��confus�on��between��a��pedagog�cal��approach��to��appl�ed��eth�cs��and��actual��moral��dec�s�on��mak�ng.13��In��order��to��be��appl�ed,��general��moral��pr�nc�ples��need��not��be��s�mpl�f�ed��or��made��tr�v�al��as���n��the��case��of��academ�c��eth�cal��tra�n�ng.��Moral��pr�nc�ples��do��not��need��to��be��turned���nto��tr�v�al��prescr�pt�ons.��We’ll��get��better��gu�dance�� �n�� the��pract�ce��of��moral��assessment�� �f��moral��pr�nc�ples��are��“used��artfully��as��perspect�ves,��not��rules,���nclud�ng��part�cular��lenses��from��wh�ch��cogn�t�ve��or�entat�ons��and��att�tudes��der�ve”.14��Understood��as��such,��to��apply��a��moral��pr�nc�ple��means��to��approach��a��moral���ssue��from��a��certain moral��po�nt��of��v�ew.��Not��only��moral��psycholog�sts��make��the��case��that��a��moral��pr�nc�ple��g�ves��us��a��cogn�t�ve��perspect�ve,15��but��also��ph�losophers.��For��example,��Thomas��H�ll�� Jr.��expla�ns�� that��h�s��project��of��reconstruct�ng��Kant’s��eth�cs���n��order��to��tackle��the��moral���mpl�cat�ons��of�� terror�sm�� �s�� not�� based�� on�� the�� concept�on�� that�� one�� needs�� to�� draw�� log�cal��conclus�ons��from��moral��pr�nc�ples.��There���s��no��sharp��l�ne��between��perm�ss�b�l�ty��and���mperm�ss�b�l�ty��when��assess�ng��the��problem��of��terror�sm.��Rather,��one��should��try��to��see���f��Kant�an��eth�cs��can��prov�de��a��reasonable��and��coherent��perspect�ve��to��approach��problemat�c��cases.��H�ll��does��not��want��to��br�ng��to��bear��the��Kant�an��abstract��pr�nc�ples���n��an���ntu�t�ve��form���n��order��to��der�ve��conclus�ons��for��part�cular��cases.��H�s��a�m���s��to��extract��a��perspect�ve��wh�ch��sets��the��power��l�nes��of��moral��cons�derat�on.16��A��Kant�an��pr�nc�ple��offers��an��opt�c�� through��wh�ch��one��sees�� the��relevant��moral�� facts�� from��a��certain angle.��Eth�cal��theor�es��m�ght��be��best��su�ted��to��be�ng��appl�ed���f��we��take��them��to��be��“lenses”��of��moral��th�nk�ng,��not��tr�v�al��prescr�pt�ons��or��procedures.��If��we��want��to��have��full��use��of��an��eth�cal��theory,���t��m�ght��be��best��not��to��s�mpl�fy���t��so��as��to��make���t���ntu�t�ve.

One��m�ght��object�� that��eth�cal�� theor�es��do��conta�n��and��refer��to��common��moral���ntu�t�ons��and��bel�efs��and��often��we��use��moral�� �ntu�t�ons�� to�� test�� the��plaus�b�l�ty��of��eth�cal�� theor�es.��The��reply�� �s��obv�ous.�� If��eth�cal�� theor�z�ng��uses��moral�� �ntu�t�ons��and��common��moral��bel�efs,��why��not��start��w�th��them��d�rectly.��Kant��cla�ms��that�� the��categor�cal�� �mperat�ve��as�� the��supreme��pr�nc�ple��of��moral�ty�� �s��already��operat�onal���n��ord�nary��moral��understand�ng,�� though��not�� �n�� �ts��abstract��and�� theoret�cal�� form.��Why��not��use��d�rectly�� the�� �ntu�t�ve��and�� fam�l�ar�� form,��character�st�c��of��common��moral��understand�ng?��It��seems��counter-product�ve��to��try��mak�ng��someth�ng���ntu�t�ve��wh�ch���n��the��f�rst��place���s��res�stant��to���t��and���gnor�ng��the��real���ntu�t�ve��forms��of��moral��reason�ng��that��are��funct�onal���n��common��moral�ty.

Often��ph�losoph�cal��pos�t�ons��are��presented��as��car�catures.��A��standard��p�cture��

13�� R�chard��Hare��po�nts��out�� the�� crude�� “k�nd��of�� act-ut�l�tar�an�sm�� to��wh�ch�� all�� beg�nner��ph�losophy��students��are��taught��the��standard��object�ons”.��See��Hare,��R.M.,��Essays in Ethical Theory,��Oxford��Un�vers�ty��Press,��1989,��p.��188.

14�� Puka,��B.,��“Moral��Int�macy��and��Moral��Judgment—Ta�lor�ng��General��Theor�es��to��Personal��Contexts”,��p.��165,���n��W.��Edelste�n,��G.��Nunner-W�nkler��(eds.),��Morality in Context,��Elsev�er,��2005.

15�� Kohlberg,��L.,��Essays on moral development: Vol. 1. The philosophy of moral development: Moral stages and the idea of justice.��San��Franc�sco:��Harper��&��R��Press,��1981a.��

16�� H�ll,��T.��Jr.��Dignity and Practical Reason in Kant’s Moral Theory.��Cornell��Un�vers�ty��Press,��1992,��p.��197.

�s�� that��ph�losoph�cal�� theory�� �gnores��how�� th�ngs�� really��are��and�� that�� �n��order�� to��solve��moral��problems�� �t�� �s��necessary�� to��apply,��almost�� �n��a��mechan�cal��manner,���ts��conceptual�� framework.��A��careful�� read�ng��shows��otherw�se.��F�rst,��we��see�� the��d�st�nct�on��between��foundat�onal��endeavours�� to��ground��what��ought�� to��be��enacted��and��da�ly��moral��dec�s�ons.��For�� the��pract�ce��of��da�ly��moral��dec�s�ons,�� there�� �s��no��amb�t�ous�� requ�rement�� to��use��an��ent�re�� theoret�cal��dev�ce.��The��ma�n��goal��of�� a��ph�losoph�cal�� �nvest�gat�on�� �s��a�� just�f�catory��one.��It��seeks�� to��answer��what��act�ons��should��be��performed.��Most��of�� the�� t�me,�� the��pract�ce��of��moral��dec�s�ons�� �s��about��putt�ng���n��act�on��what���s��already��acknowledged��as��the��r�ght��th�ng��to��do.��Though��the��argument�� that��eth�cal�� theory��should��superv�se�� th�s��pract�ce��can��be��made,�� �t�� �s��not��necessary��to��start��w�th��eth�cal��theory.��Ph�losophers��do��share��th�s��reasonable��p�cture.17

For��Kant��a��ph�losoph�cal�� �nvest�gat�on��should��ground��and��clar�fy��our��moral��dut�es.��Nevertheless,�� �n�� the�� case��of��ord�nary��moral��dec�s�ons�� a��ph�losoph�cal���ntervent�on���s��not�� ipso facto necessary��because��common��understand�ng���s��able��to��judge��on���ts��own��what��ought��to��be��the��case:��“would���t��not��more��adv�sable,���n��moral��th�ngs,�� to�� leave�� �t��w�th�� the�� judgement��of��common��reason,��and��at��most�� to��br�ng��on��ph�losophy�� to��present�� the��system��of��morals��more��completely��and��access�bly��[…]��but��not�� to�� let�� �t�� lead��common��human��understand�ng��away��from���ts��fortunate��s�mpl�c�ty�� for��pract�cal�� purposes”�� (IV:��404).18��Common��moral�� understand�ng��knows��well��enough��what��dut�es��ought�� to��be��respected���n��everyday��l�fe,��and��Kant��somet�mes��acknowledges��that�� �t��“even��becomes��subtle��[…]��referr�ng��to��what���s�� to��be��called��r�ght”��(IV:��404).��At��th�s��po�nt,��I��am��not��concerned��w�th��how��and��when��a��ph�losoph�cal���ntervent�on���s��called��for,��but��only��w�th��grant�ng��that��common��moral��judgement��has��at�� least��some��autonomy���n�� the��sense�� that��most��of�� the�� t�me�� �t��can��perform��on���ts��own��to��determ�ne��what���s��the��r�ght��th�ng��to��do.

S�m�lar�� thoughts�� are�� to��be�� found�� �n��M�ll’s��Utilitarianism.��Defend�ng��h�s��pr�nc�ple��of��ut�l�ty,��M�ll�� tr�es�� to�� reject�� the��common��object�on�� that�� �n��most��cases��apply�ng��the��pr�nc�ple��of��ut�l�ty��at��best��compl�cates�� th�ngs.��In��da�ly�� l�fe,��we��have��l�m�ted��t�me��resources��and��knowledge.��Due��to��these��constra�nts��the��requ�rement��to��apply��a�� theoret�cal�� framework��makes�� th�ngs��worse.��The��object�on�� �s�� that,�� �n��real��l�fe,��we��do��not��have��the��t�me��and��knowledge��to��calculate��or��determ�ne��each��token��consequence��of��our��act�ons.��Most��of�� the�� t�me,��we��act��w�thout��consc�ent�ously��mak�ng��a�� calculus��of��happ�ness��wh�ch�� �s�� requ�red��by�� the��pr�nc�ple��of��ut�l�ty.��Apply�ng��to��each��token��s�tuat�on��the��pr�nc�ple��of��ut�l�ty,��w�thout��any��spec�al��need,��w�ll��make��matters��worse.��But��M�ll,��as��well��as��Kant,��accepts��th�s��po�nt.��That���s��why���n��h�s��reply��M�ll��po�nts��out��the��just�f�catory��funct�on��of��the��pr�nc�ple��of��ut�l�ty��and��demarcates���t��from��“the��rules��of��moral�ty��for��the��mult�tude”��wh�ch��are��funct�onal���n��the��pract�ce��of��moral��dec�s�ons:��“Dur�ng��all��that��t�me��mank�nd��have��been��learn�ng��by��

17�� It��m�ght��be��objected��that��ph�losophers��do��care��about��the��appl�cab�l�ty��of��the�r��theor�es��and��about��putt�ng��them��to��work���n��order�� to��solve��pract�cal��problems.��Surely��they��do,��but�� the���ssue��I’m��press�ng��on���s��not��about��the��pract�cal���mpl�cat�ons��of��ph�losoph�cal��eth�cs.��I�� just��want�� to��po�nt��out�� that��ph�losophers��accept��some��autonomy��for��ord�nary��moral��dec�s�ons��w�thout��the���ntervent�on��of��theory.��

18�� Kant,�� I.,��Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals,�� translated��by��Mary��Gregor,�� Jens��T�mmermann.��Cambr�dge��Un�vers�ty��Press,��2011.

68 �� Intu�t�ve��Methods��of��Moral��Dec�s�on��Mak�ng,��A��Ph�losoph�cal��Plea������/����Em�l�an��MIHAILOV��������������69

exper�ence��the��tendenc�es��of��act�ons;��on��wh�ch��exper�ence��all��the��prudence,��as��well��as��all��the��moral�ty��of��l�fe,���s��dependent”.19

In��the��pract�ce��of��moral��dec�s�ons��we��do��not��use,��and���t��may��not��be��des�rable��to��use��on��each��token��s�tuat�on,��the��theoret�cal��form��of��moral��pr�nc�ples.��In��everyday��l�fe��we��rely��on��moral��educat�on��and��the��pract�ce��of��common��moral�ty.��When��faced��w�th��d�lemmas��or��h�ghly��complex���ssues��eth�cal�� theor�es��are��called��upon,��but�� �n��many��cases��common��moral��judgement��works��well.��Both��ph�losophers��would��have��accepted���n��pr�nc�ple��th�s��reasonable��cla�m.

R�chard��Hare���s��the��parad�gmat�c��ph�losopher��who��argues��for��a��clear��separat�on��between��ord�nary��moral�� judgement�� and�� cr�t�cal��moral�� judgement.��H�s�� theory��d�st�ngu�shes��between�� two�� levels��of��moral�� th�nk�ng:�� the�� �ntu�t�ve�� level��and�� the��cr�t�cal��level.��The���ntu�t�ve��level���s��man�fested���n��everyday��l�fe��moral��dec�s�ons.��Only��when��faced��w�th��except�onal��cases,��such��as��moral��d�lemmas��or��normat�ve��gaps,��one��has�� to��ascend��to��a��super�or�� level��where��a��solut�on��can��be��reached.��At�� the��cr�t�cal��level,��one��dec�des��accord�ng��to��a��ut�l�tar�an��pr�nc�ple.��I��w�ll��not��d�scuss��the��cr�t�cal��level.�� I��only��want�� to��draw��attent�on�� to��Hare’s��descr�pt�on��of�� the�� �ntu�t�ve�� level:��“The���ntu�t�ve��level,��w�th���ts��prima facie��dut�es��and��pr�nc�ples,���s��the��ma�n��locus��of��everyday��moral��dec�s�ons��[...]��when��we��face��a��moral��quest�on,��dec�de���t��on��the��bas�s��of��d�spos�t�on,��hab�ts��of��thought[,]��moral���ntu�t�ons��(�t��makes��l�ttle��d�fference��what��we��call�� them)��wh�ch��we��have��absorbed��dur�ng��our��earl�er��upbr�ng�ng��and��follow��w�thout��reflect�on”.20��Hare’s��v�ew���s��that��ord�nary��moral��dec�s�ons��are��the��result��of���mpl�c�t��moral���ntu�t�ons��and��hab�ts.

Relevant��for��th�s��analys�s�� �s��not��whether��the��above��v�ews��descr�be��accurately��common��moral�ty��or��moral���ntu�t�ons,��but��only��the��acceptance��of��the��prem�se��that���n��ord�nary��moral��assessment��there���s��no��absolute��necess�ty��for��“theory���ntervent�on”.��Ph�losophers�� accept�� that�� most�� of�� the�� t�me�� we�� can�� handle�� moral�� dec�s�ons,���ndependent��of��eth�cal��theor�es.

If�� �n��many��human��act�v�t�es��“rules��of�� thumb”��have��emerged��w�th��the��goal��of��fac�l�tat�ng��the��accompl�shment��of��certa�n��object�ves,�� then��why��should��we���gnore��the��“rules��of��thumb”��of��moral��evaluat�on?��If��there��are��no��reasons��to��reject��the��f�rst,��then��there��are��no��reasons��to���gnore��the��second.��The��best��start�ng��po�nt��for��draft�ng���ntu�t�ve��methods��of��moral��dec�s�on��mak�ng�� �s�� the��pract�ce��of�� common��moral��judgement.

Intu�t�ve�� methods�� of�� moral�� dec�s�on�� mak�ng�� can�� have�� the�� form�� of��methodolog�cal�� quest�ons,�� cons�dered�� natural�� and�� fam�l�ar�� because�� one�� has��ass�m�lated��them��through��moral��educat�on��and��pract�ce.��The��golden��rule,��do��to��others��as��you��would��have��them��do��unto��you,���s��maybe��the��most��prevalent���ntu�t�ve��method.��Bes�des��th�s,�� there��are��other�� �ntu�t�ve��methods��wh�ch��help��us�� track��down��relevant��moral�� features.��Methodolog�cal��quest�ons��such��as��“what�� �f��my��mot�ve��for��act�on��were��made��publ�c?”,��“what���f��everybody��d�d��that?”,��“what���f��the��same��th�ng��would��happen��to��me?”,��“what��would��my��fam�ly��have��to��say��about�� th�s?”��m�ght��be��good��cand�dates��for���ntu�t�ve��procedures.��Then��aga�n,�� there��m�ght��be��others.��Ident�fy�ng��the��exact��form��and��content���s��a��task��for��emp�r�cal���nvest�gat�on.

19�� M�ll,��J.��St.,��Utilitarianism and On Liberty,��Blackwell��Publ�sh�ng,��2003,��p.��200.20�� Hare,��R.��M.,��Essays on Bioethics,��Oxford��Un�vers�ty��Press,��1993,��p.��18.

The��ma�n��object�ve��of�� these��k�nds��of��methods�� �s�� to�� track��down��the��relevant��moral��aspects��of��a��s�tuat�on��w�thout��much��del�berat�on���n��order��to��enable��an��eas�er��moral��dec�s�on.��Of��course,�� the��output��of��an�� �ntu�t�ve��method��can��be��defeas�ble.��Kahneman’s��research��shows��that�� there��are��many��ways���n��wh�ch���ntu�t�ve��th�nk�ng��can�� lead�� to��poor��dec�s�ons��at�� least�� �n��non-moral��contexts.21�� It�� �s��also��argued�� that���ntu�t�ve��th�nk�ng��leads��to��systemat�c��errors��even���n��moral��contexts.22��Moreover,��non-reflect�ve��judgement���s��prone��to��many��b�ases.��For��example,��moral�� judgements��are��made��more��severe��by��the��presence��of��d�sgust,23��and��less��severe��when��the��concept��of��cleanl�ness�� �s��sal�ent.24��Nevertheless,�� �t�� �s��acknowledged��at�� the��same��t�me��that���ntu�t�ve��th�nk�ng���s��“safe”���n��a��var�ety��of��cases.��The��goal��of��my��analys�s���s�� to��see��how���ntu�t�ve��methods��work,��whether��they��are��actually��track�ng��down��moral��reasons��or��are��subject�ve��and��emot�on��based.��As��I��sa�d��earl�er,�� �t�� �s�� the��goal��of��emp�r�cal���nvest�gat�on��to���dent�fy��the��exact��form��and��content��of��moral��“short-cuts”��or��“rules��of��thumb”.

The��stake��of���ntu�t�ve��methods���s��to��prov�de��in hand solut�ons��to��moral��dec�s�on��mak�ng���n��da�ly��pract�ce.��Analogous��to��cogn�t�ve��psychology��where��pract�cal��aptness���s��measured���n��relat�on��w�th��act�v�ty�� that��comes���n��a��natural��manner��for��real�� t�me��s�tuat�ons25,��one��can��measure��the��eff�c�ency��of���ntu�t�ve��methods���n��relat�on��w�th��a��natural��eas�ness��that��tracks��down��relevant��moral��aspects��for��real��t�me��s�tuat�ons.

A-philosophical-plea

Are���ntu�t�ve��methods��track�ng��moral��reasons?��Doubts��can��be��ra�sed.��The��challenge��comes��from��Kant’s��cr�t�que��of��the��golden��rule.��In��h�s��pursu�t��of��the��supreme��pr�nc�ple��of��moral�ty,��Kant��rejects��the��golden��rule��as��a��poss�ble��cand�date��for��the��pr�nc�ple��of��moral�ty:��

“the��tr�v�al��quod tibi non vis fieri��[…]��can��be��no��un�versal��law,��for���t��does��not��conta�n��the��ground��of��dut�es��to��oneself,��not��of��dut�es��of��love��to��others��(for��many��a��man��would��gladly��agree��that��others��should��not��benef�t��h�m���f��only��he��m�ght��be��exempt��from��show�ng��them��benef�cence),��f�nally��not��of��owed��dut�es��to��one��another;�� for�� the��cr�m�nal��would��argue��on��th�s��ground��aga�nst�� the�� judges��who��pun�sh��h�m,��and��so��on”.��(IV:��430,��fn.20)

The��charge��of��subject�v�sm��that��can��be��extracted��from��Kant’s��cr�t�que��of�� the��golden��rule��has�� two��roots.��F�rst,�� �ntu�t�ve��methods��are��arb�trary��and��can��generate��unsat�sfactory��outcomes��be�ng��dependent��on��cont�ngent��and��subject�ve��factors.��The��cr�m�nal’s��argument��aga�nst��pun�shment��str�kes��everyone��as��pla�n��false.��The��golden��

21�� See��Kahneman,��D.,��Thinking Fast and Slow,��Farrar,��Straus��and��G�roux��Press,��New��York,��2011.

22�� Sunste�n,��C.,��“Moral��heur�st�cs”,��Behavioral and Brain Sciences,��28,��531-573,��2005.23�� Wheatley,��T.,��Ha�dt,�� J.,�� “Hypnot�c��D�sgust��Makes��Moral�� Judgments��More��Severe”,��

Psychological Science,��Vol.��16.��No.��10,��2005.24�� Schnall,��S.,��Benton,�� J.,��Harvey,��S.,��“W�th��a��clean��consc�ence.��Cleanl�ness�� reduces�� the��

sever�ty��of��moral��judgments”,��Psychological Science,��19,��1219-1222,��2008.25�� Puka,��B.,���b�d.,��p.��164.��

70 �� Intu�t�ve��Methods��of��Moral��Dec�s�on��Mak�ng,��A��Ph�losoph�cal��Plea������/����Em�l�an��MIHAILOV��������������71

rule,��accord�ng��to��Kant,��generates��th�s��outcome��because���t��seems��that��the��cr�m�nal’s��reason�ng���s��based��on��an��arb�trary��factor,��namely,�� the��fact�� that��he��does��not�� l�ke��to��be��pun�shed.��The��worry��pops��up���mmed�ately:��how��can��one��trust�� the��golden��rule?��Imag�ne��a��doctor��who��asks��h�mself��what��h�s�� fellow��colleagues��would��say��about��a��course��of�� treatment,��and��by��acc�dent��h�s��colleagues��are��extremely��paternal�st�c��about�� th�s.��As��such,�� they��would��probably��say�� to��completely�� �gnore�� the��pat�ent’s��des�res.��Moreover,�� �n�� the��sp�r�t��of��Kant’s��examples,��another��poss�ble��outcome���s��moral�� �nd�fference.��Or,��cons�der��cla�ms��from��the��neurosc�ence��of�� �ntu�t�ve��moral��th�nk�ng.��Greene et��al.��cla�m��that��emot�onal��engagement��dr�ves��people’s�� �ntu�t�ve��moral�� judgement.26�� In�� the�� trolley��d�lemma��there�� �s��no��d�rect��contact.��One��has�� to��pull��a��hand��lever�� to��sw�tch�� the�� tracks�� �n��order�� to��save�� the��f�ve��people,��but�� �n�� the��footbr�dge��d�lemma��one��has��to��push��a��fat��man��onto��the��track��to��save��them.��From��a��normat�ve��standpo�nt,�� the��fact��of��d�rect��contact�� �s��arb�trary�� to��whether��someth�ng���s�� to��be�� cons�dered��morally��perm�ss�ble��or��not.27�� It�� should��not��play�� a�� role�� �n��determ�n�ng��the��moral��perm�ss�b�l�ty��of��an��act�on.��Second,���ntu�t�ve��methods��are��not��theoret�cally��sound���n��order��to��be��a��source��of��moral��object�v�ty.��The��golden��rule���s��short��on��ground�ng��core��moral��dut�es,��such��as��benef�cence,��or��dut�es��to��oneself,��such��as��cult�vat�ng��talents��and��promot�ng��one’s��health.��In��compar�son��w�th��an���ntu�t�ve��method,��a��ph�losoph�cal��moral��pr�nc�ple�� �s��supposed��to��ground��all�� these��k�nds��of��dut�es.

Those��who��want��to��attack���ntu�t�ve��methods��s�d�ng��w�th��the��f�rst��object�on��also��need�� to��accept�� that��even�� the��most�� �nfluent�al��procedure�� �n��moral��ph�losophy��can��generate��morally��worse��outcomes���n���ts��appl�cat�on.��Kant’s��famous��formula��of��the��un�versal��law,��at�� least�� the��“contrad�ct�on���n��concept�on”��test,�� �s��one��example.��Kant��adm�ts��that��the��ego�st��max�m��not��to��care��about��the��other’s��welfare��passes��the��test��of��un�versal�ty��and,��therefore,��moral���nd�fference���s��perm�ss�ble.28��The��moral��absurd�ty���s��that��benef�cence���s��no��longer��a��moral��duty��s�nce��the��ego�st��max�m���s��perm�ss�ble,��wh�le��everybody��acknowledges��that��we��ought��to��help��others���n��need.��To��solve��th�s��d�ff�culty,��Kant���ntroduces��a��new��test��of��perm�ss�b�l�ty,��namely��the��contrad�ct�on���n��the��w�ll��test:��

“It�� �s��st�ll�� �mposs�ble��to��WILL��that��such��a��pr�nc�ple��hold��everywhere��as��a��law��of��nature.��For��a��w�ll��that��resolved��upon��th�s��would��confl�ct��w�th���tself,��as��many��cases��can��yet��come�� to��pass�� �n��wh�ch��one��needs�� the�� love��and��compass�on��of��others,��and�� �n��wh�ch,��by��such��a�� law��of��nature��sprung��from��h�s��own��w�ll,��he��would��rob��h�mself��of��all��hope��the��ass�stance��he��w�shes��for��h�mself”.��(4:��423)

One��cannot��w�ll��the��max�m��of��moral���nd�fference��as��a��un�versal��law��because���t��

26�� Greene��et��al.,���b�d.,��p.��2106.27�� The��fact�� that��d�rect��contact��changes��one’s��moral��att�tudes��may��not��be��arb�trary��from��an��

evolut�onary��standpo�nt.��Evolut�onary��explanat�ons��can��be��formulated��to��account��for�� th�s��react�on.��

28�� Kant��says�� that��“�f��such��a��way��of�� th�nk�ng��were��to��become��a��un�versal�� law��of��nature,�� the��human��race��could��very��well��subs�st,��and��no��doubt��st�ll��better��than��when��everyone��chatters��about��compass�on��and��benevolence”.��(4:��423)

would��be���mposs�ble��to��ask��for��help���n��future��moments��of��h�s��l�fe��when��he��w�shes��for��ass�stance.��As��Parf�t��puts���t,��the��contrad�ct�on���n��the��w�ll��test��st�ll��does��not��work��because���ts��scope��are��people��who��want��to��be��helped.29��Th�s��test���s��not��appl�cable��to��those��who��do��not��want��to��be��helped.��Therefore,��the��max�m��of��moral���nd�fference��can��be��w�lled��as��a��un�versal�� law��by��those��who��do��not��w�sh��to��be��helped.��Even��though��Kant��uses��the��term��“w�sh”,��most��Kant�ans��would��reply��that��to��w�ll��someth�ng��does��not��mean�� to��want��or��w�sh��for��someth�ng.��Certa�nly,��Kant’s��concept��of��w�ll�ng�� �s��not��des�re��based,��but��then��we��do��not��have��to��understand��the��golden��rule���n��terms��of��s�mpl�st�c��emot�onal��react�ons��as��I��w�ll��show.

Nevertheless,�� let��us��accept��Kant’s�� �nterpretat�on��of�� the��golden��rule.��Even��so,��one��can��reply�� that�� the��object�on�� �s��based��on�� the��quest�onable��presuppos�t�on�� that��agents��who��use�� �ntu�t�ve��methods��are��morally�� �ll�terate.��They��do��not��have��any��moral��background��or��moral��sens�t�v�ty�� �ndependent��of�� �ntu�t�ve��methods��of��moral��dec�s�on��mak�ng��or��eth�cal��theory.��If��th�s���s��the��p�cture��of��normal��agents,��then��wrong��judgements��can��be��formulated��even��by��follow�ng��eth�cal��theor�es.��An���ll�terate��agent��can��make��bad��judgements��even��though��he��appl�es��the��most��sol�d��theory.��Cons�der��a��doctor��who��knows��all�� the��r�ght�� rules�� to��follow,��but��when�� �t��comes�� to��how��and��when��to��apply��them��he���s���ll�terate.��The��“r�ghtness”��of��the��rules��does��not��grant��the��correct��appl�cat�on.��It���s��hard��to��bel�eve��that��normal��agents��do��not��have��any��further��exper�ence��or��moral��flags��to��gu�de��and��check��the��appl�cat�on��of��procedures.��Suppose,��as��Kant��does,�� that�� the��golden��rule��argument�� �s�� that�� the�� judge��does��not�� l�ke�� to��be��pun�shed��so��he��should��not��pun�sh��the��cr�m�nal.��And��next�� that��a��normal��agent��w�ll��apply��the��pos�t�ve��form��of��th�s��pattern��of��reason�ng,��namely,��do��to��others��what��you��would��l�ke��others��to��do��to��you.��One��outcome��m�ght��be��th�s:��because��I��l�ke��others��to��create��a��stressful��env�ronment��(�t��m�ght��make��me��work��better),��I��w�ll��create��the��same��cond�t�ons��for��others.��W�ll��the��agent��who��arr�ves��at��th�s��outcome��stop��here?��If��th�s���s��the��result,�� then���s��that���t?��W�ll��he��s�ncerely��bel�eve��that��he��ought��to��create��stressful��cond�t�ons��for��others?��It���s��h�ghly���mplaus�ble.��We��do��not��uncond�t�onally��accept��any��outcome.��If��an��outcome��confl�cts��w�th��core��moral���ntu�t�ons��then���t��w�ll��be��further��exam�ned.��It���s��hard��to��just�fy��the��presuppos�t�on��that��we��are���ncapable��of��real�z�ng��when��our��judgements��and��act�ons��are��clearly��trespass�ng��aga�nst��the��boundar�es��of��moral�ty.��Normal��agents�� that��apply���ntu�t�ve��methods��are��not��morally��bl�nd-s�ded.��They��have�� �mpl�c�t��or��expl�c�t��moral��knowledge�� that��supports�� further��gu�dance.��Usually,��we��can��see��that��someth�ng���s��not��r�ght.��Intu�t�ve��methods��do��not��subst�tute��for��moral��th�nk�ng,��they��just��help���t.��One��should��cons�der��them��dec�s�on��a�ds.��Th�s���s��why��the��danger��of��enact�ng��such��arb�trary��outcomes���s��exaggerated.��Remember��that��the��cr�m�nal’s��argument��str�kes��everyone��as��odd.

An�� �ntu�t�ve��method��may�� seem�� to�� lack��object�v�ty��when�� compared��w�th��un�versal��pr�nc�ples.�� It��must��be��grounded��on��a�� robust�� theoret�cal�� construct�on��wh�ch��covers��a��w�de��range��of��normat�ve��s�tuat�ons.��Th�s��seems��to��be��the���deal.��If��they��do��not��meet�� theoret�cal��rat�onal��standards��of��excellence,�� then��they��fall��short��on objectivity. Valentin Mureșan suggests this claim implicitly when he says “it �s��necessary��for��procedures��of��moral��dec�s�on��mak�ng�� to��be�� removed��from��the�r��handbook��s�mpl�c�ty�� �f��we��want�� the�r�� soc�al��usefulness.��And�� �n�� the��context�� �n��

29�� Parf�t,��D.,��On What Matters,��Oxford��Un�vers�ty��Press,��2011,��p.��322.

72 �� Intu�t�ve��Methods��of��Moral��Dec�s�on��Mak�ng,��A��Ph�losoph�cal��Plea������/����Em�l�an��MIHAILOV��������������73

wh�ch��the��usefulness��of��appl�ed��eth�cs���s��d�sputed���t��seems��to��me��that��only��a��mature proceduralization��can��bu�ld���ts��cred�b�l�ty”.30��The���dea���s��that���n��order��to��determ�ne��the��“qual�ty”��of��a��method��we��have�� to��see�� �f��certa�n��mature��conceptual��standards��are��sat�sf�ed.��Any��proposed��method��ought�� to��be�� theoret�cally��mature,��val�dated���ndependently��of���ts��usefulness��for��a��pract�ce.��Kant��cla�ms��th�s��expl�c�tly.��The��golden��rule��cannot��ground��dut�es��to��oneself��or��dut�es��of��benef�cence.��A��normat�ve��cr�ter�on���s��needed��wh�ch��can��cover��all��these��cases,��a��robust��pr�nc�ple��that��can��deal��un�versally��w�th��what��we��ought�� to��do.��The���dea��beh�nd��these��concept�ons�� �s�� that��a��procedure��must��sat�sfy��a��pr�or� theoret�cal��standards,��such��as��un�versal�ty,���n��order��to��be��a��sound��tool��for��moral��assessment.��Mature��procedural�zat�on��and��theoret�cal��reflect�on��are��needed��to��analyze��d�ff�cult��cases��w�th��major��soc�al�� �mpl�cat�ons.��However,��at�� the��m�cro�� level��of��dec�s�on��mak�ng��where�� there��are��s�tuat�onal��constra�nts,�� �ntu�t�ve��methods��can��do��a��better��job.

The-language-games-of-intuitive-methods

My��plea��for���ntu�t�ve��methods��also��or�g�nates���n��Kant’s��cr�t�que��of��the��golden��rule.��More��exactly,�� �n��what��Kant��om�ts�� to��say.��Surely,��un�versal�ty�� �s��one��of�� the��most���nfluent�al�� standards�� for��moral�� th�nk�ng.��However,��we��need��not��assume��a��pr�or� that��all��moral��pr�nc�ples��are��un�versal��pr�nc�ples��because��th�s���s��an��open��quest�on��to��ph�losoph�cal�� �nvest�gat�on.31��We��should��not��a��pr�or� expect�� to��f�nd��only��un�versal��pr�nc�ples.��One��may��f�nd��general��pr�nc�ples��or��not.��Or��among��general��pr�nc�ples��one��may��f�nd��local��ones,��wh�ch��deal��only��w�th��certa�n��types��of��act�ons��and��s�tuat�ons.��Now��what���s���nterest�ng���s��that���n��Kant’s��cr�t�que��one��does��not��f�nd��the��charge��that��the��golden��rule��cannot��track��certa�n��moral��rules��at all.��Yes,���t��does��not��ground��dut�es��to��oneself��or��dut�es��of��benef�cence,��but�� �t�� can��ground��other��moral�� rules.��When��somebody��asks��h�mself�� �f��he��wants��to��happen��to��h�m��what��he��would��do��to��others,��he��real�zes��that�� the��w�ll��of��others���s�� just��as�� �mportant��as��h�s��own.��Th�s��shows��that��the��moral�� reasons��at��work��are��about��negat�ve��dut�es�� towards��others.��One��should��not��cause��pa�n��to��others��because��he��would��expect��others��not��to��cause��h�m��pa�n.��The��golden��rule�� tracks��at�� least�� the��negat�ve��vers�on��of�� the��pr�nc�ple��of��moral��equal�ty.��Th�s��pr�nc�ple��can��be��sa�d��to��be��local��or�� l�m�ted��to��certa�n��parts��of��moral�ty�� �n��as��much��as�� �t��cannot��ground��all�� types��of��dut�es.��The��key��quest�on��we��have��to��ask���s��why��th�s���s��the��case.��Intu�t�ve��methods��can��track��moral��standards,��maybe��not��always��un�versally��or��generally,��but��why��can��they��do��so?

The��answer��to��th�s��quest�on���s��the��key��to��understand�ng��how���ntu�t�ve��methods��work.��The��natural��approach���s��to��see��how��people��use��them.��Follow�ng��W�ttgenste�n’s��ph�losoph�cal�� method�� we�� have�� to�� descr�be�� the�� language�� games�� of�� �ntu�t�ve��procedures.��W�ttgenste�n��rejects��Socrates’��way��of��do�ng��ph�losophy.��We��have�� to��see��the��problem,��not��through��Socrates’��eyes,��but��through��h�s��compan�ons’��eyes.��To��the��quest�on��“what�� �s�� the��moral��good?”��Socrates��wants��a��un�que,��general��answer,��but��h�s��fellow��compan�ons��answer��what�� they��have��learned��to��be��morally��good.��In��

30 Mureșan, V., ibid., p. 159. 31�� Scanlon,��T.,�� “Moral��Theory:�� Understand�ng�� and�� D�sagreement”,�� Philosophy and

Phenomenological Research,��Vol.��55.��No.��2,��1995.

W�ttgenste�n’s�� terms,�� they��g�ve��examples��of��how��the��word��“good”���s��used.��These��are��language��games.��The��language��games��of��moral�ty��are��bas�c��act�v�t�es��that��form��a��pract�ce,��by��wh�ch��one�� learns��what��act�ons��are��obl�gatory��or��perm�ss�ble,��what��att�tudes��one��ought��to��show���n��human��relat�onsh�ps,��that��certa�n��feel�ngs��ought��to��be��suppressed��wh�le��others��nurtured.32��We��learn��that��an��act�on���s��r�ght��when���t��spr�ngs��from��the��mot�ve��of��duty,��but��also��when���t��produces��good��consequences.��There��are��many��language��games��by��wh�ch��one��learns��the��many��facets��of��moral�ty.

Analyz�ng��the��language��games��of��moral�ty��helps��us��to��understand��the��way��the��golden��rule��and��other�� �ntu�t�ve��methods��work.��What�� �s��actually��asked��when��one��formulates�� these���ntu�t�ve��methodolog�cal��quest�ons?��When��one��asks���f��somebody��w�shes��to��have��done��to��h�m��what��he��would��do��to��others,��he��does��not��ask��whether��th�s���s��conven�ent��to��h�m��or���f��h�s��psycholog�cal��const�tut�on��can��handle��such��events.��The��purpose��of�� the��quest�on���s��whether,��by��ask�ng���t,��he��sees��someth�ng��wrong��from��a��moral��po�nt��of��v�ew.��For��example,��suppose��that��Albert���nsults��Mart�n��and��afterwards��Albert��appl�es�� the��golden�� rule.��The��problem�� �s��not��whether��Albert’s�� subject�ve��prof�le��can��handle���nsults.��He��m�ght��very��well��not��care,��whereas��Mart�n��m�ght��be��deeply��offended.��When��one��ass�m�lates�� the��golden��rule�� through��moral��educat�on,��he��does��not��ask���f��a��course��of��act�on���s��conven�ent��to��h�m��or��whether��he��can��handle��psycholog�cally��some��events.��He��has��learned��someth�ng��else.��Apply�ng��the��golden��rule��Albert�� tr�es�� to��see��what��moral��cr�ter�a��become��man�fest�� �n��order��to��assess��the��respect�ve��act�on��as��be�ng��the��r�ght��one��or��not.��When��Albert�� �mag�nes��that��Mart�n���nsults��h�m,��he���s��constra�ned��to��remember��the��moral��cr�ter�a��he��already��ass�m�lated,��reach�ng�� the��conclus�on�� that�� the��act�on��of�� �nsult�ng��somebody���s��morally��wrong.��The��moral��rule��that���nsult�ng���s��morally��bad��has��been��learned��by��a��language��game��of��moral�ty.��Th�s��language��games��carr�es��w�th���t�� the��structure��that�� �nsult�ng���s��bad��even��though��the��person���nsulted��m�ght��not��be��offended.��The��act��of���nsult�ng���s��l�nked��then��to��the��negat�ve��assessment��of��one’s��character.��Th�s��framework��of��the��mean�ng��of��rules��and��how��to��use��them��const�tutes��the��moral��language��game��of���nsult�ng.��Th�s��language��game��represents��a��part��of��our��shared��moral��educat�on��and��pract�ce.��Albert��can��cla�m��cons�stently��at��the��same��t�me��that��he��does��not��m�nd���f��he���s���nsulted��and��that��the��act�on��of���nsult�ng���s��morally��wrong.��He��can��cla�m��th�s��cons�stently��exactly��because�� the��golden��rule�� �s��coupled��w�th��moral�� reasons,��not��w�th��cont�ngent��and��subject�ve��preferences.��By��descr�b�ng��such��language��games,�� �t��becomes��clear�� that���n��the��process��of��learn�ng��what���s��morally��r�ght��or��wrong,���ntu�t�ve��methods��are��not��l�nked��w�th��cont�ngent��factors,��but��w�th��necessary��ones.��If��somebody��answers��that��he���s��not��bothered��by���nsults,��he��does��not��ipso facto hold��that�� �nsult�ng���s��morally��perm�ss�ble.��Through��moral��educat�on,��one��has�� learned�� that�� the��golden�� rule�� �s��coupled��w�th��the���dea��that��rec�proc�ty��and��equal��stand�ng��matter.

32�� W�ttgenste�n��g�ves��s�mple��examples��of��language��games:��“And��the��processes��of��nam�ng��the��stones��and��of��repeat�ng��words��after��someone��m�ght��also��be��called��language-games.��Th�nk��of��much��of��the��use��of��words���n��games��l�ke��r�ng-a-r�ng-a-roses.��I��shall��also��call�� the��whole,��cons�st�ng��of�� language��and�� the��act�ons�� �nto��wh�ch�� �t�� �s��woven,�� the��«language-game»”.��W�ttgenste�n,��L.,��Philosophical Investigations,��Blackwell,��1953,��p.��5.��Though��he��does��not��g�ve��examples��of��normat�ve��s�tuat�ons,��we��should��not��assume��that�� there��are��no��language��games��of��moral�ty.��S�nce��normat�ve��language��and��moral��judgement��are��also��learned,��there��are��certa�nly��language��games��of��moral�ty.��

74 �� Intu�t�ve��Methods��of��Moral��Dec�s�on��Mak�ng,��A��Ph�losoph�cal��Plea������/����Em�l�an��MIHAILOV��������������75

The��same��remarks��apply��to��the��methodolog�cal��quest�on��“what��do��your��parents��have��to��say��about��that?”��When��one��asks��th�s��quest�on��he���s��supposed��to��remember��what��h�s��parents��told��h�m���s��the��r�ght��th�ng��to��do.��One��asks��what��they��had��taught��h�m���s��the��r�ght��th�ng��to��do,��not��what��the�r��subject�ve��react�ons��were��or��what��the�r��mood��was.��At�� th�s��po�nt,�� the��ma�n��object�on��aga�nst�� �ntu�t�ve��methods��can��be��d�sm�ssed��by��show�ng��that���t��rests��on��a��m�sunderstand�ng.��As��Kant��objects,��one��may��say��that��there��are��fam�l�es��where��ch�ldren��learn��that��theft���s��perm�ss�ble��and��even��worthy��of��pursu�ng.��In��these��cases,��as���n��the��cr�m�nal��case,��the��appl�cat�on��of���ntu�t�ve��methods��w�ll��br�ng��about��certa�n��outcomes�� that��we��cons�der��morally��worse.��When�� these��ch�ldren��ask�� themselves��what�� the�r��parents��would��have�� to��say��about��a��course��of��act�on,��they��w�ll��answer��that���t���s��perm�ss�ble,��where���t���s��clearly��not��so.��Therefore,��one��can��say,�� �ntu�t�ve��methods��must��be��rejected.��Th�s��example��does��not��show��that���ntu�t�ve��methods��are��not��rel�able.��The��problem���s��deeper,��and���t��concerns��the��cr�ter�a��of��moral�ty,��not���ntu�t�ve��methods��themselves.��The��problem���s��that��these��ch�ldren��d�d��not��learn��correctly��what��they��ought��to��do.��They��rece�ved��an���nadequate��educat�on.��Those��who��learn��that��theft��or��v�olence���s��morally��perm�ss�ble��have��not��ass�m�lated��the�� language��games��of��moral�ty.��They��have��been�� taught��someth�ng��else.�� I’m��not��speak�ng��about��except�onal�� cases��where�� steal�ng�� someth�ng�� for��altru�st�c��ends��m�ght��be��the��r�ght��th�ng��to��do.��Here,���t�� �s��about��the��usual��fabr�c��of��moral��relat�ons.��The��cr�m�nal��d�d��not��learn��correctly��how��to��apply��the��golden��rule��g�ven��our��shared��framework��of��moral��educat�on.��Th�s���s��why��h�s��argument��str�kes��everybody��as��false.��It���s��not��that��the��argument��follows��from��the��golden��rule��and��that��one��cannot��accept��the��conclus�on;���t�� �s�� that��he��t�es��the��golden��rule��to��someth�ng��that��one��has��learned���s���rrelevant��or���ncorrect.��The��fact��that��a��judge��m�ght��have��a��strong��personal��des�re��not�� to��be��pun�shed��at��all��by��anybody���t��not��relevant��w�th��respect�� to��condemn�ng��a��cr�m�nal.��When��the��cr�m�nal��argues��that��he��should��not��be��pun�shed��because��the��judge��does��not��want��to��be��pun�shed��e�ther,��he��d�storts��our��shared��pract�ce��of��pun�shment.��We��pun�sh��people��not��because��we��s�mply��want��to.��We��pun�sh��them��because��they��d�d��someth�ng��wrong.��Be�ng��pun�shed���s���ndependent��of��our��des�res.��

Moral��educat�on�� �s�� the��process��by��wh�ch��an��agent�� learns��what��a��commun�ty��bel�eves���t�� �s�� the��r�ght�� th�ng��to��do.��When��we��say��that��a��ch�ld��has��a��rece�ved��a��bad��educat�on��we��want��to��say,��on��the��one��hand,��that��he��was��not��educated��at��all��and,��on��the��other��hand,��that��a��wrong��bel�ef��was��passed��on.��The��bel�ef��that��steal�ng���s��morally��perm�ss�ble�� �s�� false��because�� �t�� runs��counter�� to��our��commonly��shared��bel�ef�� that��steal�ng���s��morally��wrong.��The��skept�c��w�ll��say��that��the��two��bel�efs��can��be��equally��true��or��that��we��do��not��know��wh�ch��one���s��false.��Th�s��object�on���s��essent�ally��tell�ng��us��that���ntu�t�ve��methods��cannot��deal��w�th��the��problem��of��relat�v�sm.��Well,��the��reply���s�� that�� th�s�� �s��a��problem,��not��for�� �ntu�t�ve��methods,��but��for�� the��cr�ter�a��of��moral�ty���tself.�� It��does��not��matter�� �f��we��adopt��a��part�cular�st��or��general�st��concept�on��of��moral�ty,���ntu�t�ve��methods��are��st�ll�� l�nked��w�th��moral��reasons.��The��debate��whether��moral��reasons��are��general��or��not��does��not�� touch��the��fact�� the�� �ntu�t�ve��methods�� �n��the��process��of��moral��educat�on��are��coupled��w�th��necessary��moral��factors,��and��not��w�th��cont�ngent��or��subject�ve��ones.�� It��only�� �mpacts�� the��nature��of��moral�� reasons,��not��whether�� they��are��coupled��w�th�� �ntu�t�ve��methods��of��moral��dec�s�on��mak�ng.��

Suppose��that�� �n��a��commun�ty��steal�ng���s��cons�dered��a��moral��duty.33��Each��member��of�� that��commun�ty��w�ll��steal��w�thout�� remorse��and��feel�ng��good��about�� �t.��Even�� �f��there��are��commun�t�es��w�th��oppos�ng��moral��bel�efs,�� those��moral��bel�efs��are��not��the��result��of��arb�trary��factors.��If��somebody��dec�des��not��to��steal,��the��commun�ty��w�ll��st�ll��cons�der��that��dec�s�on��as��be�ng��morally��wrong.��Whatever��the��reasons��for��ground�ng��the��duty��to��steal,�� they��cannot��be��part�cular��and��cont�ngent��psycholog�cal��facts��such��as��mood,��temporary��d�spos�t�on,���ntens�ty��of��des�res��and��so��forth.�� ��Even���f�� there���s��a��true��moral��duty��to��steal,�� then��what��I��have��shown���s��that���t��must��be��based��also��on��non-cont�ngent�� features.�� Irrespect�ve��of�� the��quest�on��whether��moral�� reasons��are��general��or��not,��the��language��games��of��moral�ty��show��that���ntu�t�ve��methods��are��not��based��on��cont�ngent�� factors,��but��on��someth�ng��morally��necessary.��The��necessary��moral��factors��m�ght��be��general��or��part�cular.��We��may��reject��certa�n��pract�ces��as��be�ng��morally��wrong,��or��we��can��accept�� them��as��be�ng�� just�f�ed.��Nevertheless,�� �ns�de��a��pract�ce,��there��are��normat�ve��cr�ter�a��that��shape��people’s��behav�our.��Moral��th�nk�ng��makes��sense�� �n�� relat�on��w�th��what��one��has�� learned�� to�� th�nk��about��such��matters.��Intu�t�ve��methods��have��been��transm�tted��through��moral��educat�on���n��order��to��track��and��to��make��man�fest��relevant��moral��aspects.��Th�s�� �s��what�� language��games��show.��The��golden��rule��does��not��cover��a��var�ety��of��cases��because���n�� the��language��games���n��wh�ch���t��funct�ons,�� �t�� �s�� t�ed��w�th��moral��cr�ter�a��regard�ng��rec�proc�ty��and��equal��treatment.��Other�� �ntu�t�ve��methods��are�� l�nked��w�th��other��moral��standards��such��as��benef�cence��or�� �ntegr�ty.��The��way��one��uses���ntu�t�ve��methods��of��dec�s�on��mak�ng,��as��a��result��of��moral��educat�on��and��pract�ce,��shows��that�� they��are��essentially�� t�ed��to��normat�ve��cr�ter�a,��not��subject�ve��preferences��or��cont�ngent��emot�onal�� react�ons.��Methodolog�cal��quest�ons��such��as��“can��my��dec�s�on��be��publ�cly��endorsed?”��or��“what���f��everybody��d�d��that?”��constra�n��the��agent�� to�� take��more��eas�ly�� �nto��cons�derat�on��relevant��moral��factors.

The��usage��of�� �ntu�t�ve��methods��makes��sense��within�� the�� language��games��of��moral�ty��that��one��has��learned.��A��methodolog�cal��quest�on,��such��as��the��golden��rule,��funct�ons�� to��make��man�fest��what��one��already��knows���s�� the��r�ght�� th�ng��to��do.��The��cr�m�nal,�� �n��Kant’s��case,�� �gnores��how��the��golden��rule��works�� �n��our��shared��moral��pract�ce.��The��rule��embedded���n��the��language��games��of��moral�ty��marks��the��funct�onal��l�m�ts��w�th�n��wh�ch��one��can��judge��and��act.��The��pract�ce��of��moral��educat�on���s��s�mple��and��transparent,��and,��by��descr�b�ng���t,��we��see��w�th��clar�ty��what��k�nd��of��relat�on��ex�sts��between�� �ntu�t�ve��methods��and��moral��cr�ter�a.��The�� �mportance��of��descr�b�ng�� the��language��games��of��moral�ty��cons�sts���n��the��advantage��that���t��makes��transparent��the��internal relation between���ntu�t�ve��methods��and��normat�ve��reasons.

The��result��of��my��analys�s��has���mpl�cat�ons��for��the��sc�ent�f�c��understand�ng��of���ntu�t�ve��moral�� th�nk�ng.��Intu�t�ve�� th�nk�ng���s��often��referred��to��as��a��“gut��feel�ng”.��The��p�cture���s��that��we��“feel”��or��“sense”��that��someth�ng���s��r�ght��or��wrong.��There���s��an���nfluent�al��research��parad�gm���n��neurosc�ence��and��psychology��of��moral��dec�s�on��mak�ng��wh�ch��advocates��for��an��emot�on��based��model.��Both��Greene��and��Ha�dt��cla�m��that��most��moral��judgements��are��not��del�berate��reason�ng��but��a��matter��of��emot�on��and��

33�� I��am��not��concerned��w�th��the��problem��that��such��a��moral��duty���s��self-defeat�ng.����If��everybody��steals��then���t�� �s�� �mposs�ble��to��fulf�ll�� th�s��moral��duty��because��there��w�ll��be��noth�ng��else��to��steal.

76 �� Intu�t�ve��Methods��of��Moral��Dec�s�on��Mak�ng,��A��Ph�losoph�cal��Plea������/����Em�l�an��MIHAILOV��������������77

affect�ve���ntu�t�on.34��Reason���s��a��del�berate��process,��whereas���ntu�t�on���s��an��affect�ve��process.��Kahane et al.��challenge�� th�s��cla�m.��The�r�� f�nd�ngs��suggest�� that�� �ntu�t�ve��judgements��m�ght��not��be��dr�ven��by��affect�ve��responses.35��Therefore,���ntu�t�ve��moral��th�nk�ng��may��not��conta�n��affect�ve��processes.��My��result��shows��that���ntu�t�ve��moral��th�nk�ng�� �s��conceptually�� l�nked��w�th�� the��cr�ter�a��of��moral�ty��ass�m�lated�� through��moral��educat�on.��Th�s��conceptual�� relat�on�� �mpl�es�� that�� �ntu�t�ve��moral�� th�nk�ng��has�� to��be�� l�nked��at�� least��w�th�� �mpl�c�t��cogn�t�ve��processes�� that��p�ck��out��from��the��env�ronment��wh�ch��moral��reasons��are��relevant��for��certa�n��s�tuat�ons.��From��a��learn�ng��perspect�ve,�� �t�� �s��a��process��based��on��pr�or�� learn�ng��and��exper�ence.36��Moreover,��neurocogn�t�ve��results��support��my��conceptual��analys�s.��Thus,��K�rsten��Volz��et��al. developed��a��neurocogn�t�ve��model��expla�n�ng�� �ntu�t�ve�� judgements�� �n�� terms��of��a��part�ally��analyzed��vers�on��of��an���nput��that���s��qu�ckly��projected��to��the��rostal��med�al��OFC��wh�ch���s��a��common��neural��substrate��for��coherence.37��The��model�� �s��bas�cally��tell�ng��us��that�� �ntu�t�ve��judgements��are��two-step��processes���n��wh�ch��relevant��parts��of���nformat�on��are��p�cked��out��from��the��env�ronment��and��made��coherent��w�th��pr�or��learn�ng��and��exper�ence.��Even�� though�� the��model�� refers�� to��v�sual�� and��aud�tory���ntu�t�ve��coherence��judgements,���t��can��be��extended��and��tested���n��normat�ve��contexts.��It�� �s��plaus�ble��for��the��model��to��hold���n��normat�ve��contexts.��G�gerenzer��argues��that��“by��expl�cat�ng��the��processes��underly�ng��“feel�ng”��or��“�ntu�t�on”,��the��feel�ng/reason��d�st�nct�on�� �s��replaced��by��one��between��the��consc�ous��versus��unconsc�ous��reasons��that��cause��moral�� judgments”.38��Hence,�� �ntu�t�on��can��be��cogn�t�vely��expla�ned��by��heur�st�cs��based��on��unconsc�ous��reasons.

The���mpl�cat�on���s�� that��not��all�� �ntu�t�ve��th�nk�ng���s��affect��and��emot�on��based.��If�� through�� �ntu�t�ve��moral�� th�nk�ng��one��effortlessly�� tracks��moral�� rules�� that��have��been��prev�ously��ass�m�lated,��and��there���s��no��express�on��of��cont�ngent��psycholog�cal��react�ons,��then��there��are��at��least��some��cases��where��emot�onal��affect�ve��states��do��not��play��a��key��role���n��dr�v�ng��one’s��moral��judgements.��We��can��accept��cases��where���t���s��clear��that��moral��judgement���s��emot�onally��dr�ven.��Emot�onal��contag�on���s��a��strong��

34�� See��Greene,�� J.��D.,��Sommerv�lle,��R.��B.,��Nystrom,��L.��E.,��Darley,�� J.��M.,��Cohen,�� J.��D.,��“An��fMRI�� Invest�gat�on��of��Emot�onal��Engagement�� �n��Moral�� Judgment”,��Science��293:��2105-2108,��2001,��and��Ha�dt,�� J.,�� “The��Emot�onal��Dog��and�� Its��Rat�onal��Ta�l:��A��Soc�al��Intu�t�on�st��Approach��to��Moral��Judgment”,��Psychological Review,��108:��814-834,��2001.

35�� Kahane,��G.,��W�ech,��K.,��Shackel,��N.,��Far�as,��M.,��Savulescu,�� J.,��Tracey,�� I.,�� “The��neural��bas�s��of�� �ntu�t�ve��and��counter�ntu�t�ve��moral�� judgment”,��Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience,��2012,��Vol.:��7(4):��393-402.

36�� See��Sadler-Sm�th,��E.,��Inside intuition,��London��Routledge,��2008.37�� Volz,��K.��G.,��Rübsamen,��R.,��Yves��von��Cramon,��D.,�� “Cort�cal�� reg�ons��act�vated��by�� the��

subject�ve�� sense��of��perceptual�� coherence��of�� env�ronmental�� sounds:��A��proposal�� for�� a��neurosc�ence��of���ntu�t�on”,��Cognitive, Affective, & Behavioral Neuroscience,��2008,��8��(3),��pp.��318-328;��Volz,��K.��G.,��Yves��von��Cramon,��D.,��“What��Neurosc�ence��Can��Tell��about��Intu�t�ve��Processes�� �n�� the��Context��of��Perceptual��D�scovery”,��Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience,��2006,��18(12),��pp.��1-11.��

38�� G�gerenzer,��G.,��“Moral��Intu�t�on��=��Fast��and��Frugal��Heur�st�cs?”,��p.��10,�� �n��Walter��S�nnott-Armstrong��(ed.),��Moral Psychology. Vol. 2: The Cognitive Science of Morality: Intuition and Diversity,��MIT��Press,��2008.

affect�ve��process��that��makes��us��react��automat�cally��to��the��suffer�ng��of��others.39��By��descr�b�ng��how��some���ntu�t�ve��methods��of��moral��dec�s�on��mak�ng��work,��we��can��reject��the��model��that���ntu�t�on���s��l�nked��to��emot�ons,��whereas��del�berat�on���s��l�nked��to��reason.

Conclusion

From��the��standpo�nt��of�� trad�t�onal��ph�losophy,��wh�ch�� �s�� focused��on��overarch�ng��moral��pr�nc�ples,���ntu�t�ve��methods��of��moral��dec�s�on��mak�ng��may��appear��subject�ve��and��arb�trary.�� I��have��shown�� that�� the�� theoret�cal��“ch�p”��d�d��not�� fall�� far�� from��the��“tree”��of��common��moral�ty.��An��eth�cal�� theory��proposes��a��def�n�t�on��of�� the��moral��good��and���mpl�c�tly��a��test��for��ver�fy�ng��the��appl�cat�on��of��the��respect�ve��def�n�t�on.��Eth�cal�� theor�es��funct�on��s�m�larly��to���ntu�t�ve��methods��of��moral��dec�s�on��mak�ng.��In��both��cases���t���s��assumed��an���nternal��relat�on��between��the��procedure��and��cr�ter�a��of��moral�ty.��Both��eth�cal��theor�es��and���ntu�t�ve��methods��track��what���s��morally��relevant.

Once��methodolog�cal��plural�sm��has��made���ts��way���nto��the��pract�ce��of��med�cal��eth�cs,�� �t�� �s�� reasonable�� to��cla�m��that�� �ntu�t�ve��methods��of��moral��dec�s�on��mak�ng��are��prima facie��rel�able��heur�st�cs.��In��th�s��case,���ntu�t�ve��procedures��w�ll��prove��the�r��usefulness���f�� they��can��respond��to��certa�n��needs��and���f�� they��or�g�nate���n��a��pract�ce.��W�th��reference��to��a��pract�ce,��they��m�ght��not��seem��so��precar�ous.��It���s��not��surpr�s�ng��that��ord�nary��people��react��so��naturally��and��fam�l�arly��to��these��k�nds��of��moral��tests.��They��have��been��ra�sed��w�th��them��all��along���n��order��to��see��more��clearly��what��the��r�ght��th�ng��to��do���s.40

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40�� ��I��am��grateful��to��L�v�a��Juresch�,��Em���Socac�u��and��Adr�an��Paul��Il�escu��for��useful��comments.��I��have also greatly benefitted from comments by Valentin Mureșan.

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Revolution,��eds.��R.��Baker,��A.��Kaplan,��L.��Emanuel,��S.��Latham.��John��Hopk�ns��Un�vers�ty��Press.

Sunste�n,��C.��2005.��“Moral��heur�st�cs”.��Behavioral and Brain Sciences.��28,��531-573.Sw�nton,��L.��2007.��“Eth�cal��Dec�s�on��Mak�ng:��How��to��Make��Eth�cal��Dec�s�ons�� �n��5��Steps”.��

Mftrou.com,��http://www.mftrou.com/eth�cal-dec�s�on-mak�ng.html.Schnall,��S.,��Benton,��J.,��Harvey,��S.��2008.��“W�th��a��clean��consc�ence.��Cleanl�ness��reduces�� the��

sever�ty��of��moral��judgments”.��Psychological Science,��19,��1219-1222.Toulm�n,��S.��1981.��“The��Tyranny��of��Pr�nc�ples”.��The��Hast�ngs��Center��Report��11.6:��31-39.Volz,��K.G.,��Yves��von��Cramon,��D.��2006.��“What��Neurosc�ence��Can��Tell��about��Intu�t�ve��Processes��

�n��the��Context��of��Perceptual��D�scovery”,��Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience,��18(12):��1-11.Volz,��K.G.,��Rübsamen,��R.,��Yves��von��Cramon,��D.��2008.��“Cort�cal�� reg�ons��act�vated��by�� the��

subject�ve�� sense��of��perceptual�� coherence��of�� env�ronmental�� sounds:��A��proposal�� for�� a��neurosc�ence��of���ntu�t�on”,��Cognitive, Affective, & Behavioral Neuroscience,��8��(3):��318-328.

Wheatley,��T.,��Ha�dt,��J.��2005.��“Hypnot�c��D�sgust��Makes��Moral��Judgments��More��Severe”.Psychological Science.��Vol.��16.��No.��10.W�ttgenste�n,��L.��1953.��Philosophical Investigations.��Translated��by��G.M.��Anscombe,��Bas�l��

Blackwell.

The Moral Values and Partitive Logic

Ioan BIRIŞ

About��values�� �t��has��been��sa�d�� that�� they��are��“queer�� th�ngs”1�� (J.��L.��Mack�e),��and��the��Roman�an��ph�losopher��Luc�an��Blaga��called�� them��“amph�b�ous-ex�stences”,2��emphas�z�ng�� the�r��subject�ve��but��also��object�ve��character.��At�� the��same��t�me,�� �t�� �s��sa�d�� that��values��are��seen��as��“un�ts”��and��for��example�� the��value��of��“good”�� �s��not��made��up��of��any��part,3�� that���s�� the��values��represent��ent�t�es��organ�cally��un�f�ed.4��The��fundamental��values�� (or�� the��a�m-values)��have�� the�� role��of�� log�cal��and��ontolog�cal��bas�s,�� respect�vely��of��“poss�b�l�ty��cond�t�ons”5��for�� the��values��of�� the��oppos�te��pole��(known��as���ntermed�ary��or��med�ate-values).

Start�ng��from��these��assessments,��the��purpose��of��our��study���s��to��establ�sh��what��the��adequate��log�c��for��the��analys�s��of��values6���s��espec�ally��that��of��moral��values.��It���s��almost��ev�dent��that��s�nce��the��values��are��“wholes”,��the��adequate��log�c��for��th�s��subject��would��be��part�t�ve��log�c.��Th�s��has��found���ts��place���n��“a��map��of�� log�c”7�� �n��a��ser�es��of��metaphys�cal��appl�cat�ons��from��ph�losoph�cal�� log�c.��But��the��part�t�ve��log�c��also��has��some��d�fferent��var�ants,��as��for��example��the��mereology �n�t�ated��by Lesn�ewsk�,��or�� the��holology�� theor�zed��by��Brentano.��Some��authors��cons�der�� that�� these��types��of��part�t�ve��log�c��are���nstruments��that��have��been��perfected��enough��to��expla�n��the��log�c��performance��of��values.��G�ven��our��concerns,��we��advance��the��hypothes�s��that��for��the��moral��values��a��var�ant��of��part�t�ve��log�c��wh�ch��we��w�ll��call��holomery���s��more��su�table��var�ant��and��one��wh�ch��we��try��to��bu�ld��as��an��alternat�ve��to��mereology��and��holology,��start�ng��from��the��suggest�ons��of��the��Roman�an��ph�losopher��Constant�n��No�ca.8

Before��d�scuss�ng��the��known��var�ants��of��part�t�ve��log�c,��we��cons�der��that��some��supplementary��explanat�ons�� �n��relat�on�� to�� the��part�culars��of�� the��moral��values��are��necessary.��The��moral��values��are�� �ntegrat�ve���n��a��commun�ty par excellence,��s�nce��they��funct�on��as��bas�c��values��(values-a�m).��But��they��also��funct�on���n��the�r��qual�ty��of���nstrumental��values��(values-means)���n��the��express�on��“the��good��deeds”,��deeds��wh�ch��always��have��as��an���deal��“The��Good”.��Then,��beyond��the��level��of��the��“good��deeds”��we��have��the��level��of��norms,��wh�ch��perm�t��us��to��judge���f��the��deeds��are��“good”��or��not.��So,��one��should��be��able��to��expla�n��log�cally��the��process��of��passage��one��way��or��the��

1 J. L. Mackie, Subiectivitatea valorilor, in Valentin Mureşan (ed.), Valorile şi adevărul moral, Editura Alternative, Bucureşti, 1995, p. 155.

��2�� Luc�an��Blaga,��Opere, vol. 10, (Trilogia valorilor), Editura Minerva, Bucureşti, 1987, p. 504. 3 G. E. Moore, Obiectul eticii, in Valentin Mureşan (ed.), Valorile şi adevărul moral,��p.��33. 4 R. Nozick, Valoare şi sens, in Valentin Mureşan (ed.), Valorile şi adevărul moral,��p.��177.��5�� N�cola���Hartmann,��Ethik,��de��Gruyter,��Berl�n-Le�pz�g,��1926,��p.��338.��6�� In��th�s��study��d�d��not��cons�der��deont�c��log�c,��wh�ch���s��a��pract�cal��log�c��of��norms.��Here��we��are��

�nterested���n��the��ph�losoph�cal��log�c��of��values��as��wholes.��7�� N�cholas�� Rescher,�� Topics in Philosophical Logic,�� D.�� Re�del�� Publ�sh�ng�� Company,��

Dordrecht,��1968.��8�� Constant�n�� No�ca,�� Scrisori despre logica lui Hermes, Editura Cartea Românească,

Bucureşti, 1986.

80 The Moral Values and Partitive Logic / Ioan BIRIŞ 81

other��from��“Good”��to��“good��deeds”��and��to��the��“norms��of��good”,��and��the��reverse���s��also��poss�ble.��Th�s��passage��presupposes��the��pr�nc�ple��of���dent�ty.��But��how��w�ll��th�s��pr�nc�ple��funct�on���f��one��passes��from��wholes��to��other��wholes?

One��has��often��formulated��contrad�ctory��op�n�ons��about��the��pr�nc�ple��of���dent�ty.��Some��cons�der�� that�� �t�� �s��a�� tr�v�al��pr�nc�ple,��others��cons�der�� �t��absurd��and��w�thout��solut�on��(W�ttgenste�n),��but�� there��are��also��authors��who�� th�nk�� that�� �dent�ty�� �s��not��tr�v�al,��for��Frege��two��d�fferent��names��may��have��the��same��referent,��or��for��Qu�ne��the��cases�� �n��wh�ch�� two��names,�� two��s�gns��or�� two��d�fferent��express�ons��des�gnate�� the��same��object.��Qu�ne��also��talks��to��us��about��the���ndeterm�nat�on��of��translat�on,��wh�ch��means��that��we��can��have��only��relat�ve���dent�t�es��and��not��absolute��ones.��In��Roman�an��ph�losophy,��Luc�an��Blaga��offers��a��nuanced��analys�s��of�� the��pr�nc�ple��of�� �dent�ty.��He��not�ces�� that�� the��pr�nc�ple��of�� �dent�ty��was��always��used�� �n��order�� to�� rat�onal�ze��exper�ence.��The��use��of��a��“pure���dent�ty”���s��almost���mposs�ble,��s�nce���t��may��cancel��not��only��ex�stent�al��d�vers�ty��but��also��“becom�ng���n��t�me”.��One��cannot��abandon���dent�ty.��D�fferent��var�ants��of�� �t��have��been��stated��and��Blaga��establ�shed�� the��follow�ng:��a)��the��attenuated���dent�ty,��wh�ch��has��two��spec�es:��a1)��part�al�� �dent�ty,��as��works���n��the��relat�on��genus-spec�es;��a2)�� the��elast�c�� �dent�ty,�� that�� �s�� the�� �dent�ty��wh�ch��allows��the��acqu�s�t�on��of��new��notes���n��the��concept��content;��b)�� the���dent�ty��as��mathemat�c��equal�ty,��an��equal�ty��of��a��quant�ty��or��structural��type;��and��c)��the��contrad�ctory���dent�ty,��spec�f�c��to��d�alect�cal��th�nk�ng.9

For��the��needs��of��our��study,��the��most���mportant��var�ant���s��that��of��the��attenuated identity,��w�th���ts��two��subspec�es.��Let��us��say,��for��example��that��at��the��level��of��a��soc�ety��we��have��the��value��of��“good”��G1,��at��the��level��of��a��soc�al��group��from��that��soc�ety��we��have��G2,��and��at��the��level��of��a��person��from��the��respect�ve��group��G3.��Thus,��a��class��of��{G1,��G2,��G3}���s��formed,��and���f��one��assumes��a��temporary��part�al�� �dent�ty,��we��would��know��that��any��part�cular�� form��(let��us��say��x)��of��G1�� �mpl�es��also��G2,��and��G3.��The��mechan�sm��of��the��part�al���dent�ty��w�ll��funct�on��then���n��the��follow�ng��way:��

(

A

x)��(G1x → G2x)��and(

A

x)��(G1x → G3x)

Ident�ty,��of��course,�� �s��a��form��of��equ�valence,��and��the��equ�valence��relat�on��has��the��propert�es��of��reflex�v�ty,�� trans�t�v�ty��and��symmetry.��But��such��a��relat�on���s�� too��strong,��perm�tt�ng��subst�tut�on��operat�ons.��But��then��we��would��have��a��total���dent�ty,��wh�ch���s��not�� the��case��here,��s�nce���n��any��emp�r�cal��sc�ent�f�c��demarche��one��cannot��speak��of��a�� total�� �dent�ty,��but��only��a��part�al��one.��If�� the�� �dent�ty�� �s��part�al,�� then��the��symmetry��of��equ�valence��must��be��avo�ded.��In��th�s��way��a��relat�on��of��order���s��be�ng���nst�tuted,��the��relat�on��of��order��(�n��compar�son��w�th��the��equ�valence)���s��born��through��the�� replacement��of��symmetry��w�th��ant�-symmetry.10��One��reaches��ant�-symmetry��through��a�� form��of��convers�on��of�� symmetry�� �n��wh�ch��only�� the��order��of�� terms�� �s��changed,��rather��than��the��relat�on.11 For example, if we take the relation of order ≤,

��9�� Luc�an��Blaga,��Opere, vol.��8,��Trilogia cunoaşterii, Editura Minerva, Bucureşti, 1983.10�� Ala�n��Bad�ou,��Logiques des mondes,��Seu�l,��2006,��p.��170.11�� See��Gheorghe��Enescu,��Logica simbolică, Editura ştiinţifică, Bucureşti, 1971, p. 167.

then��the��ant�-symmetry��property��can��be��expressed���n��the��follow�ng��way:��12

[(x ≤ y) ˄ (y ≤ x)] → (x = y)

Th�s��emphas�zes��the��fact��that��between��the��subord�nat�on��of��the��relat�on��of��order��x ≤ y and the conjunctive equation x ∩ y = x we have a very tight relation, since the��common��nucleus��from��the��part�al���dent�ty��can��only��be��x.��From��here��the��result���s��that, by replacing x in the relation of order, we have x ∩ y ≤ y. So, if we have x ∩ y = x, then we also have x ≤ y. This means that between the relation of order and the conjunct�ve��equat�on��we��w�ll��have��an��equ�valence:��13

(x ≤ y) ↔ (x ∩ y = x)

In��other��words,�� the��common��nucleus��of��a��part�al�� �dent�ty��allows��us��–��because��of��the��po�nted��equ�valence��–��to��also��accompl�sh��subst�tut�ons��of��elements.��But,��one��can��understand��through���ntu�t�on��too,�� that�� �dent�ty�� �n�� t�me���mpl�es�� the��problem��of��pers�stence.��In��a��part�al�� �dent�ty��pers�stence���s��assured��at�� least��under��the��form��of��a��nucleus.��But�� �dent�ty��can��become��weak��so��that��at��a��p�nch���t��can��be��annulled��as�� �t��happens��when��the��“good”��becomes���ts��oppos�te��“bad”.��Even���f�� the��passage��to�� the��negat�ve��of��the��value���s��not��made,��one��must��take���nto��cons�derat�on��the��relat�v�ty��of��the��passages��from��one��level��to��another.��A��th�ng��wh�ch���s��“good”��for��a��soc�ety��may��be��cons�dered��“bad”��by��a��soc�al��group,��then��what���s��cons�dered��“good”��for��a��group��may��be��perce�ved��as��“bad”��for��one��or��other��member��of��the��group.��Log�cally��speak�ng,���n��such��cases��the��moments��do��not��enter���n��the��same��ser�es,��that���s,��the��relat�on��between��them���s��not��of�� the�� type��genus-spec�es,��but�� that�� from��a��d�fferent��whole�� to��another��d�fferent��whole.��In��th�s��s�tuat�on,��the��attenuated���dent�ty,��the��weak���dent�ty��should��be��able��to��show��us��how��a��cont�nu�ty��between��valor�c��un�ts��may��be��establ�shed.��In��th�s��context,��the��ma�n��operat�ons��are��not��of��genus-spec�es��subord�nate��type,��but��those��that��potentialize��the��element��(part)��and��the��compenetration��of��wholes.

But��what��form��of��part�t�ve��log�c�� �s��adequate��for�� these��operat�ons?��To��answer��th�s��quest�on��we��w�ll��show��br�efly��what���s��spec�f�c��for��the��mereolog�cal��perspect�ve��and��for��the��hololog�cal��perspect�ve.

The-mereological-perspective

A��spec�al�� cons�derat�on�� �n�� the��propos�t�on��of�� th�s�� log�c��belongs�� to��Stan�slaw��Lesn�ewsk�.14��In��the��sp�r�t��of��mereology��(as��an��extens�on��of��ontology)��one��can��talk��about��ent�t�es,��about��classes��of��ent�t�es��where��an��ent�ty���s��cons�dered��as��a��whole.��Let��us��take��for��example��the��class��of��planets��(the��example��used��by��M�ev�lle,��follow�ng��Gr�ze).

In��the��sense��of��class�cal��log�c,���t��expresses��the��extens�on��of��the��concept��“planet”,��

12�� Ala�n��Bad�ou,��Logiques des mondes,��p.��170.13�� Ib�d.,��p.��174.14 I have treated these aspects at large in the book Ioan Biriş, Totalitate, sistem, holon, ediţia a

doua, Editura Universităţii de Vest, Timişoara, 2007.

82 The Moral Values and Partitive Logic / Ioan BIRIŞ 83

that���s:��

p��=��df��{Mercury,��Venus,��Earth,��Mars,��Jup�ter,��Saturn,��Uranus,��Neptune,��Pluto}.

Put��otherw�se,���n���ts��qual�ty��as��a��d�str�but�ve��class,��the��class��of��planets��conta�ns��n�ne��elements��and��noth�ng��else.��The��elements��wh�ch��compr�se�� �t��have�� the��same��feature��(=��that��of��be�ng��planets)��and��the��class���s��un�d�mens�onal.��In��a��collect�ve��sense,��mereolog�cally,�� the��class��of��planets��w�ll��be��plur�-d�mens�onal.��It��conta�ns��the��n�ne��planets,��but��also��many��other�� th�ngs.��For��example,�� the��d�str�but�ve��class��of��planets��does��not���nclude��the��polar���ce��from��Mars��or��the��red��sta�ns��from��Jup�ter��or��Saturn’s��r�ngs.��The��collect�ve��class��of��planets��must��close��th�s��gap.

More��s�gn�f�cantly,��one��can��cons�der��an��example��from��elementary��geometry,��follow�ng��the��f�gure:��

�� A�� F�� E

● G������������������● H

������������������������������● ��I�� B�� C�� D

In��a��d�str�but�ve��sense,�� the��d�str�but�ve��class��(dCl)��wh�ch��expresses�� th�s��f�gure��has�� only�� three�� elements.�� dCl:��ABCF,��FCDE,��ABDE.�� If��we��now�� take�� the�� same��f�gure���n��a��collect�ve��sense,��mereolog�cally,��then��the��mereolog�cal��class��(mCl)��w�ll��also��compr�se�� the��three��elements,��plus��an���nf�n�ty��of��other��elements,��as��po�nt��“I”,��segment��“GH”,��the��l�ne��“ABCFE”��and��so��on.��Lesn�ewsk��� th�nks��that��although��the��mereolog�cal��class��represents��a��“whole”���n��the��hard��sense��of��the��word,��the��relat�ons��part-whole��are��not��that��restr�ct�ve��as���n��the��case��of��the��d�str�but�ve��classes.��And��they��are��not�� that�� restr�ct�ve�� just��because�� the��construct�ve��operat�ons��wh�ch�� �ntervene���n��mereology���ntroduce��a��ser�es��of��“l�bert�es”��for��“part”��or��for��“whole”,��wh�le��the��operat�on��of��trans�t�v�ty��does��not��allow��such��dev�at�ons��as��“l�bert�es”.

After�� th�s��determ�nat�on,��w�thout��want�ng��to��deepen��Lesn�ewsk�’s��system,��let��us��remember��only��the��ax�oms��of��th�s��system.15

Axiom 1. If��P���s��part��of��the��object��Q,��then��Q���s��not��part��of��object��P;

Axiom 2. If��P���s��part��of��object��Q,��and��Q���s��part��of��object��R,�� then��P���s��part��of��object��R;

Definition 1. P���s��an���ngred�ent��of��object��Q���f��and��only���f��P���s��an��object��of��the��same��type��as��Q��or���s��part��of��object��Q;

15�� Stan�slav��Lesn�ewsk�,��On�� the��Foundat�ons��of��Mathemat�cs,�� �n��Topoi, An International Review of Philosophy,��D.��Re�del��Publ�sh�ng��Company,��June��1983,��p.��25.

Definition 2. P���s��the��class��of��objects��“a”���f��and��only���f��the��follow�ng��cond�t�ons��are��fulf�lled:��

α) P is an object;β) any “a” is an ingredient of object P;γ) for any Q – if Q is an ingredient of object P, then any ingredient of

object��Q���s��an���ngred�ent��of��any��“a”;

Axiom 3. If��P���s��the��class��of��objects��“a”��and��Q���s��the��class��of��objects��“a”,��then��P���s��Q;

Axiom 4. If��an��object���s��“a”,��then��the��respect�ve��object���s��the��class��of��objects��“a”.

From�� the��ax�oms�� (and��also�� from�� the��explanatory��notes��wh�ch��accompany��them)���t��turns��out��that��Lesn�ewsk���cared��very��much��for��the��ontolog�cal��aspect���n��the��elaborat�on��of��mereology,��s�nce��the��classes��denote��obl�gator�ly��real��objects.��Ax�om��1���s��the��ax�om��of��asymmetry��and��ax�om��2���s��that��of��trans�t�v�ty.��About��ax�oms��number��3��and��4��one��could��say��that��they��belong��to��equal�ty��and��to��real�ty��respect�vely.

In��Lesn�ewsk�’s��theory��the��term��“part”���s��a��pr�m�t�ve��one:��Apt��B��(A���s��part��of��B).��Th�s�� term��des�gnates��an�� �rreflex�ve,��asymmetr�c��and�� trans�t�ve�� relat�on.��The��propert�es��of��asymmetry��and��trans�t�v�ty��result��clearly��from��ax�oms��1��and��2.��On��the��property��of���rreflex�v�ty��Lesn�ewsk���does��not���ns�st���n��a��spec�al��way,��cons�der�ng��that���t���s��suff�c�ently��ev�dent��from��the��mean�ng��of��the��not�on��of��“part”��s�nce���ntu�t�vely��any��“part”��of��someth�ng��cannot��be��also���ts��“part”���tself.

Then,��for��Lesn�ewsk�’s��system,��the��propert�es��of��the��relat�on��part-whole��are:��

�rreflex�v�ty:��(∀ x)��(∀ y)��((Rxy∨ Ryx)→¬Rxx));asymmetry:��(∀ x)��(∀ y)��(Rxy→¬Ryx);trans�t�v�ty:��(∀ x)��(∀ y)��(∀ z)��((Rxy∨ Ryz)→Rxz));

In�� th�s��way��we��are��hav�ng��an��ascendant��perspect�ve16��of���ntegrat�ve��passages,��s�nce��any��part��(wh�ch��can��also��be��cons�dered��whole)���ntegrates��success�vely���n��the��ser�es��of��the��un�ts.��As��far��as��Lesn�ewsk�’s��perspect�ve���s��concerned,���t���s���n��an��accentuated��way��funct�onal,��of��funct�onal��mereology,��a��case���n��wh�ch��we��attend��to��an���ntegrat�on��from��parts��to��wholes��and��wholes��of��wholes��l�ke���n��a��relat�on��“from��one��to��more”,���n��a��co-un�vocal��relat�on.��Can��th�s��type��of��mereology��help��us��express��weak���dent�ty���n��the��case��of��moral��values?��We��th�nk��not,��s�nce��Lesn�ewsk�’s��mereology��does��not��a�m��at��weaken�ng��the�� �dent�ty�� transm�tted�� through�� trans�t�v�ty��and�� �n��any��case�� �s��not��an��annulment��of�� �t.�� It�� �s�� true,�� that�� there�� �s�� the��poss�b�l�ty�� to�� take�� �nto��cons�derat�on�� the�� �dea��of��mereological supervenience,��an���dea���n��conform�ty��w�th��a��certa�n��whole��succeeds���n��pers�st�ng��through��the��superven�ence��of��a��ser�es��of��collect�ons��of��organ�zed��parts���n��a��certa�n��way17��(“pr�nc�ples��of��d�achron�c��un�ty��state�� that��a��pers�st�ng��whole��of��

16�� Roberto��Pol�,��Între speranţă şi responsabilitate, Editura Curtea Veche, Bucureşti, 2009, p. 216.

17�� Dean��W.��Z�mmerman,��Criteria of identity and the ‚Identity Mystics’,���n��Erkenntnis,��48/1998,��

84 The Moral Values and Partitive Logic / Ioan BIRIŞ 85

a��certa�n��sort��supervenes��upon��a��ser�es��of��collect�ons��of��parts��arranged���n��certa�n��ways”).��But�� th�s��cannot��const�tute��a��sure��gu�de18��for�� the��d�achron�c���dent�ty��(“[...]��mereolog�cal��superven�ence���s��no��sure��gu�de��to��d�achron�c���dent�ty”).

The-perspective-of-holology

Franz��Brentano’s��work��–��Vom Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntnis (1889)��–��has��been��descr�bed��as��br�ll�ant��and�� �t�� represents��an�� �mportant�� reference�� for��eth�cs.19��H�s��concept�on��of�� the�� log�c��of��values��was��called��holology�� �n��order�� to��emphas�ze�� the��accent��put��on��the��statute��of��“wholes”���n��the��study��of��values.��Brentano’s���deas��have���nsp�red��attempts�� to��elaborate��a�� formal��ax�ology.20��He��d�st�ngu�shes��between�� the��wholes-sum��and��the��wholes-product��(the��second��be�ng��called��“organ�c��un�t�es”��by��Moore).��For��the��wholes-sum��the��value��of��the��whole���s��equal��to��the��sum��of��values��of���ts��parts,��and��for�� the��wholes-product�� the��value��of�� the��whole��can��be��d�fferent��from��the��sum��of��values��of���ts��component��parts.��The��d�fference��between��the��two��types��of��wholes�� �s��due�� to�� the��connect�ons��wh�ch�� l�nk�� the��parts.��For�� the��whole-sum,�� these��connect�ons��are��not���mportant,��but��for��the��whole-product��connect�ons��are��v�tal,��s�nce��the��value��of��the��whole���s��g�ven��espec�ally��by��them.��F�nally,��the��wholes-sum��could��be��cons�dered��“a��case��l�m�t”��of��the��organ�c��wholes:���n��th�s��sense,��the��wholes-sum��could��be��some��number��of��organ�c��wholes,��w�thout���nteract�ons��between��parts.21

For��the��wholes-sum��the��follow�ng��three��ax�oms��are���mportant:��

1.�� G��>��G��+��B��>��B

(�n��words:��a��whole��of��“good”���s��preferable��to��a��sum��of��“good”��and��“bad”,��sum��wh�ch��at���ts��turn,���s��preferable��to��a��whole��of��“bad”;��G���s��the��symbol��for��“good”,��B���s��the��symbol��for��“bad”,��“>”��expresses��the��preference,��and��“+”��expresses��the��sum).��W�th��the��determ�nat�on��that��the��ax�om���s��val�d���f��all��G��are���nterpreted��as��pos�t�ve��values��and��all��B��as��negat�ve��values.

2.�� G1��+��G2��>��G1��(or��G2)

(That�� �s,�� a��un�t��of��good��–��as�� sum��of��G1��and��G2��–�� �s��better�� than�� �ts��parts�� taken��separately).

3.�� G1��>��G2��˄ ¬for (G2,��G1) → ∃G3��(G3 ≡ G2 ˄ pt (G3,��G1))

p.��284.18�� N�kolaus��Wand�nger,��Masses of stuff and Identity,���n��Erkenntnis,��48/1998,��p.��306.19�� In��th�s��work��–��notes��Andrea��Göb��–��the��bas�c���deas��of���ts��eth�cs��are��formulated,��wh�ch��have��

a��b�g���nfluence���n��contemporary��moral��ph�losophy��(In dieser Schrift sind die Kerngedanken seiner Ethik, die groβen Einfluss auf die zeitgenössische Moralphilosophie hatten):��Andrea��Göb,��E�nle�tung,���n��Franz��Brentano,��Schriften zur Ethik und Ästhetik,��Ontos��Verlag,��2010.��www.ontosverlag.com��

20�� We��cont�nue��here��Roberto��Pol�’s��formal�zat�on,��Între speranţă şi responsabilitate.21�� Ib�d.,��p.��208.

(A��un�t��of��value��G1���s��preferable��to��another��un�t��of��value��G2,��G2��not��be�ng��part��of��G1,��wh�ch���mpl�es��the��fact��that��there��ex�sts��a��th�rd��un�t��of��value��G3,��equ�valent��to��G2,��and��that��G3���s��part��of��G1).��Th�s��thes�s���s��very��strong,��po�nts��out��Roberto��Pol�,��s�nce���t��tells��us��that��“two��un�ts��of��value��are��comparable���n��what��the��quant�ty��of��value���s��concerned��only if�� these��un�ts��are��made��of��values��of the same type”.22��Th�s��means��we��have��to��understand,���n��the��s�mplest��s�tuat�on,��that��G2��and��G3��are��cases��of��the��same��spec�es��of��value.

Let��us��see�� the��ma�n�� thes�s�� related�� to�� the��organ�c��un�ts.��As��we��have��already��emphas�zed,���n��the�r��cases��the��relat�on��between��un�ts��and��parts���s��changed��as��the�r��connect�on���s��essent�al.��In��add�t�on,��one��passes��to��a��frame��w�th��three��categor�es:��good��(G),��bad��(B)��and���nd�fferent��(I).��From��the��more���mportant��ax�oms��one��can��reta�n:��

(1)�� G1��•��G2��>��G1��+��G2��(G1��composed��w�th��G2���s��worth��more��than��the�r��sum)(2)����G1��•��I��>��G1��+��I��(G1��composed��w�th��I���s��worth��more��than��the�r��sum)(3)�� B1��+�� B2��>�� B1�� •�� B2�� (the�� sum�� of�� two�� bad�� th�ngs�� �s�� preferable�� to�� the�r��

compos�t�on)(4)�� B��+��I��>��B��•��I��(the��sum��of��a��bad��th�ng��w�th��an���nd�fferent��one���s��preferable��to��

the�r��compos�t�on).

It���s��d�ff�cult��to��say���f��these��ax�oms��are��suff�c�ent.��Important���s��the��fact��that��the��value��of��these��organ�c��wholes���s��not��d�m�n�shed���n��the��value��of��the�r��parts.23��Can��th�s��hololog�cal��perspect�ve��help��us���n��understand�ng��the��weak���dent�ty��further?��At��f�rst��glance���t��may��seem��so,��s�nce,��at�� least��for��the��organ�c��un�ts,��we��w�tness��a��ser�es��of��nuances.��Respect�vely,�� the��compos�t�on��of��some��un�ts��of��values��can�� �ntens�fy�� the��valor�zat�on,���t��may��even��annul���t��or��perm�t��the��pass�ng��to��other��un�ts.��The��wholes-sum��do��not��help��us�� s�nce�� the�� th�rd��ax�om��demands�� that��we��have��values��of�� the��same��type��that�� �s,�� there�� �s��no��more��space��for��contrary��values.��We��do��not��advance��greatly��w�th��the��organ�c��wholes,��s�nce��we��cannot��not�ce��clearly��the��mechan�sm��of���dent�ty���n��the��passages��wh�ch��occur��there.��The��great��d�fference���n��compar�son��w�th��Lesn�ewsk�’s��mereology��cons�sts�� �n�� the��descendant��perspect�ve��of�� the��demarche,��from��the��more��comprehens�ve��un�ts��to��the��subord�nate��un�ts.

The-symbolical-identity-and-holomery

Why��can’t��we��stay��w�th��the��two��forms��of��part�t�ve��log�c?��Lesn�ewsk�’s��log�c,���n��an��ascendant��and���nduct�ve��perspect�ve��can��lead��to��contrad�ct�ons��such��as��the��paradox��of��the��f�ss�on.��Th�s��type��of��paradox��threatens��any��trans�t�v�ty��such��as��“one��–��several”���n��a��temporal��reg�ster,��as��happens���n��the��famous��example��w�th��Theseus’��sh�p:��a��sh�p��(a)���s��repa�red��dur�ng��her��voyage,��by��replac�ng��each��board,��so��that���n��fact��we��have��a��new��sh�p��(b),��wh�ch,��though���t��has��new��boards���s��the��equ�valent��of��the��f�rst��sh�p��(a = b);���f��someone��bu�lds��from��the��old��boards��another��sh�p��(c)���dent�cal��to��the��f�rst��one,��we��w�ll��have��(a = c);��but��(b ≠ c),��wh�ch��leads��us��to��the��follow�ng��paradox:��

22�� Ib�d.,��p.��217.23�� Ib�d.,��p.��230.

86 The Moral Values and Partitive Logic / Ioan BIRIŞ 87

1) b��=��a2) c��=��a3) b ≠ c

Do��such��s�tuat�ons��happen��only���n��the��case��of��artefacts��or���n��the��world��of��values��as��well?��We��cons�der��that��paradox�cal��s�tuat�ons��appear���n��soc�al��l�fe��too,���nclud�ng���n��the��sphere��of��moral�ty.��Here��“the��perverse��effects”��emphas�zed��by��the��soc�olog�st��Raymond��Boudon,��when��an���nd�v�dual��agent��or��Other��acts��reasonably��w�th��the��a�m��of��mak�ng��“good”��but���n��the���ntegrated��assembly��of��act�ons���t���s��not�ced��that��the��deed���s��“bad”,��the��trans�t�v�ty��of��“good”��may��be��annulled.��Log�cally��speak�ng,��here��we��have��a��bas�c��l�m�t��to��any��ascendant-�nduct�ve��demarche:��the��loss��of��the���n�t�al��un�t��through��the��subord�nat�ons��and��success�ve���ntegrat�ons��wh�ch��take��place.

We��can��f�nd��a��s�m�lar��s�tuat�on��also��on��the���nverted��road��of��Brentano’s��holology.��Through��the��success�ve,��descendant,��passage��from��a��more��general��whole��to���nd�v�dual��wholes,��the���nd�v�dual���s��subord�nated��l�ke��a��stat�st�c��–��No�ca��tells��us��–��and���n��the��end���s��abol�shed.��Then,��the��class�c��deduct�on��does��not��account��for��the��process��through��wh�ch��the��passage��of��the��exter�or��means��of��general��to��the���nter�or��means��of��the���nd�v�dual��takes��place.24��As��we��have��po�nted��out,���t���s��true,��that��Brentano’s��holology���s��more��nuanced,��allow�ng��an��analys�s��w�th��three��values:��good,��bad��and���nd�fferent.��One��tells��us��that��a��whole��of��“Good”��can��be��b�gger��or��smaller,��the��same��happens��w�th��the��“Bad”,��but��one��does��not��have��the��log�cal��mechan�sm��through��wh�ch��the��“Good”��can��become��“Bad”,��can��become��“Ind�fferent”��or��backward.��How��can��we��expla�n��log�cally��the��fact��that��a��whole��of��more��general��“Good”��can��become��a��whole��of��“Good”��that���s��smaller,��less��apprec�ated��by��a��soc�al��group��that���s��l�m�ted��or��by��a��person?��Or��that��the��same��whole��of��“Good”��can��become��a��whole��“Ind�fferent”��for��another��soc�al��group/��for��another��person?��Or��that�� the��respect�ve��whole��of��“Good”��appears��as��a��whole��of��“Bad”��for��another��soc�al��group/person��or��for��the��same��soc�al��group/person���n��another��temporal��moment?

As��N�cola���Hartmann��po�nts��out25��one��must��take���nto��account��the��fact��that���n��the��sphere��of��moral�ty��the��follow�ng��types��of��relat�v�t�es��funct�on;��1)��the��eth�cal��values��are��relat�ve��for��“free”��persons���n��the�r��qual�ty��as��carr�ers��of��value;��2)��the��values��are��relat�ve�� to��“be�ng��valuable�� for��someone”.��So��values��such��as�� loyalty,�� fr�endsh�p,��love,��secur�ty��and��so��on��count��only��for��the��one��who��cher�shes��them;��3)��the��values��are��relat�ve��to��context,��human��behav�ours��are��cons�dered��valuable���n��a��d�fferent��way��from��one��s�tuat�on��to��another,��for��example���n��s�tuat�ons��of��danger��courage���s��valued,���n��emot�onal��s�tuat�ons��composure���s��valued,���n��contests��fa�rplay��and��so��on.��Here��the��d�vers�ty��of��good���s���ndurated.

If��one�� takes�� �nto��cons�derat�on�� these��relat�v�t�es,�� then��one��must��concentrate��on�� the��performance��of�� �dent�ty�� �n�� the��passages��from��a��whole��of��value�� to��another��status.��If��the��qual�ty��of��trans�t�v�ty��res�sts,���t���s��necessary��to��establ�sh��log�cally��what��happens��to���dent�ty��when��the��wholes��can��compenetrate��and��succeed���n���ntens�fy�ng��

24�� Constant�n��No�ca,��Scrisori despre logica lui Hermes,��p.��108.25�� N�cola���Hartmann,��Vechea şi noua ontologie��şi alte scrieri filosofice,��Ed�tura��Pa�de�a,��

Bucureşti, 1997, pp. 104-105.

themselves.��F�nally,��a�� th�ng��wh�ch��d�spleases��us�� �n��mereology��and��holology�� �s��the�� fact�� that��we��do��not��know��exactly��how�� the��pr�nc�ple��of�� �dent�ty�� funct�ons.��In��order�� to��clar�fy�� th�s��problem,�� the��Roman�an��ph�losopher��Constant�n��No�ca,��whose��suggest�ons��we��are��us�ng�� �n��what�� follows��here,��po�nts��out�� that��we��need��a��hermeneut�cal�� log�c,��a�� log�c�� �n��wh�ch�� the potentialize��operat�ons��of��elements,��of��parts��and��of��compenetration��of��elements��and��of��wholes��are�� �mportant.��The��ent�ty��wh�ch��can��express��the��means���n��wh�ch��the���nd�v�dual��can��be��potent�al�zed��at��the��level��of��the��whole��(be�ng��part��of��the��power��of��the��whole)��and��succeeds,��at��the��same��t�me,��by��compenetrat�on,���n���tself��transm�tted��as��a��whole,���s��the��holomer (whole��and��part��at��once).

At��the��end��of��h�s��book��Modelul cultural european (European��Cultural��Model),��Constant�n��No�ca��offers��us��as��a��model�� for��a��holomer�� the��mathemat�cal��“po�nt”.��Let��us�� take��for��example,��says��No�ca,��“a�� tr�d�mens�onal��cube”.��If��you��flatten�� �t,�� �t��becomes��a��square,��wh�ch���s��a��cube��st�ll,��but��b�d�mens�onal.��If��one��flattens��the��square,���t��becomes��a��segment��of��stra�ght��l�ne,��wh�ch���s��a��un�d�mens�onal��cube.��And���f��you��flatten��from��the��extrem�t�es��the��l�ne��too,��mak�ng��of���t��a��po�nt,��one��could��say��(and��not��only��say)��that��the��po�nt���s��a��zero-d�mens�onal��cube.��Soc�ety’s��problem���s:��what��k�nd��of��po�nt�� �s��added?26��Bes�des�� the��metaphys�cal��model��of��Le�bn�z’s��monad��and��the��approaches��wh�ch��can��be��made��w�th��caut�on��to��the��model��of��b�olog�cal��evolut�on,��the��mathemat�cal��model��offers,��may��be��open�ngs��even��more��nuanced��for��the��holomer�c���nd�v�duals��as��No�ca��env�s�ons.

In��No�ca’s��op�n�on,27��Ar�stotle’s�� log�c,��and��the��concepts��obta�ned��here��suffer��on��the��methodolog�cal��s�de��from��two��major��def�c�enc�es:��the��concepts��are��st�ll,��they��lack��movement��and��flu�d�ty;��one��or��other��of�� the�� terms��(the��general,��part�cular��or���nd�v�dual)���s��h�dden��or��even��el�m�nated���n��all��forms��of��log�c��used��by��the��old��or��new��log�c.��So,��Hermes’s��new��log�c��must��outgrow��these��def�c�enc�es,��and���n��order��to��be��developed���t��needs��other��models��d�fferent��from��those��already��tr�ed,��respect�vely��by��the��b�olog�cal��world��of��genres��and��spec�es��for��Ar�stotle’s��concept�on��or��by��the��theory��of��ensembles��for��modern��symbol�cal��log�c.

The��f�rst��def�c�ency��po�nted��out,��that��of��the��conceptual��stat�c��of��Ar�stotle’s��log�c,��can��be��el�m�nated���f��one��conce�ves��all��the��log�c��s�tuat�ons��(repet�t�ons,��symmetr�es,��proport�onal�t�es,�� coord�nat�ons��or�� contrad�ct�ons)�� from�� the��perspect�ve��of�� the��log�cal��f�eld,��a��f�eld���n��wh�ch��the��const�tuents��are��found���n��perpetual��movement,���n��transformat�on,��operat�ng��one��aga�nst�� the��others.��In��a�� log�cal��f�eld��not��only���s�� the��part��found���n��the��un�t,��as��presented��by��Ar�stotle’s��log�c��the��symbol�cal��log�c��so��far,��but��also��the��whole���s���n��the��part,��the��part��wear�ng���n���t��all��the��load��of��the��whole.��Th�s��s�tuat�on��appears��clearly���n��the��world��of��man,���n��the��world��of��human��values.

The��second��def�c�ency,��that��of��the��el�m�nat�on��or��d�ssolut�on��of��a��term��from��the��log�c�� tr�angle��(general,��part�cular,�� �nd�v�dual)��can��also��be��el�m�nated���n��Hermes’s��log�c��by��abandon�ng��the��class�c��log�c��operat�ons��and��establ�sh�ng��other��operat�ons��

26�� Constant�n��No�ca,��Modelul cultural european, Editura Humanitas, Bucureşti, 1993, pp. 155-156.

27 I treated these concepts in Ioan Biriş, Conceptele hermeneutice şi logica lui Hermes, în Alexandru Surdu, Viorel Cernica, Titus Lateş (coord.) Studii de istorie a filosofiei româneşti, vol. V, Editura Academiei Române, Bucureşti, 2009.

88 The Moral Values and Partitive Logic / Ioan BIRIŞ 89

proper��to��the��s�tuat�ons��of��the��log�cal��f�eld.��The��operat�ons��of���nclus�on��(of��spec�es���n��genus,��or��the���nclus�on��of��classes)��the��membersh�p,��the���mpl�cat�ons,��the��conjunct�on,��the��d�sjunct�on,��the��reun�on��and���ntersect�on��of��ensembles��and��so��on��are��not��apt��to��express��a��whole��wh�ch���s��made,���s��const�tuted��and��accounts��for��the��process�ng��of��the��passage��of��the��whole���n��the��part.��But��the��log�c��unt�l��now��treated��the��ensembles��as��collect�ons��of��elements,�� �n��the��perspect�ve��of��Hermes’s��log�c��the��second��ensemble��(as��No�ca��calls�� �t)��does��not��represent��a��collect�on��of��elements��any��longer,��but�� the��d�str�but�on��of��a��whole��of��elements.��Ins�de��each��ensemble��other��operat�ons��are��then��val�d,�� those��of��potent�al�z�ng��of�� the��element��and��of��compenetrat�on,��as��we��have��already��ment�oned��here.

The�� elements�� are�� composed�� through�� compenetrat�on�� and�� not�� through��conjunct�ons,��d�sjunct�ons��or���mpl�cat�ons,��wh�ch��makes��them��equ�valent��as��bearers��of�� the��same��whole,��but��not��necessar�ly��equ�potent,��s�nce��only��some��elements��can��r�se��(symbol�cally)��to��the��power��of��the��whole.��The��relat�on��part-whole��can��only��be��c�rcular,��the��whole��be�ng��that��wh�ch��perm�ts��the��ex�stence��of��parts,��s�nce���t���s��a��cause��and��law��for��them,��and��they��def�ne��the��un�t,��make���t��poss�ble��because��the��un�t���s��made,���t�� �s��not��a��“g�ven”.��Th�s��means��of��compos�t�on��of�� the��element-holomer,��w�ll�� thus��abol�sh��the��known��law��of�� the���nverted��relat�on��content-sphere��of�� trad�t�onal�� log�c,��because,��through��the��operat�on��of��compenetrat�on,��the��more��comprehens�ve���t��gets,��that���s���f���t���ncreases���ts��sphere,��the��better��w�ll��be��the��determ�nat�on,��wh�ch��means��that��the��content��w�ll��also��grow.��There��are,��of��course��d�fferent�� types��of��compenetrat�on��such�� as�� the��phys�cal�� ones�� (the��phys�cal�� f�eld),�� the��b�olog�cal�� (the��b�olog�cal��characters)��or��the��d�fferent��h�stor�cal��and��sp�r�tual��express�ons.��In��all��cases��var�at�ons��of��the��sphere��and��content��of��the��concepts��takes��place,��because��they��become��dynam�c��through��compenetrat�on,�� �n��a��vert�cal��movement.��But��–��No�ca��wonders��–��what��flow�ng��calculus��can��render��th�s��creat�on��of��the��concept���n��success�ve��steps?��None��of��them,��maybe��the��platon�c��type��approx�mat�on��of��the��Idea��or��a��calculus��of��conceptual��probab�l�t�es.28

If�� the�� ent�rety��of��mathemat�cs�� can��be��bu�lt�� start�ng�� from�� the�� relat�on��of��membersh�p�� (s�nce�� �nclus�on�� �s��a��double��membersh�p,�� the��equal�ty�� �s��a��double���nclus�on,��and��from��here��one��can��pass��to��correspondence,��through��wh�ch��one��reaches��the��number,��number��wh�ch�� �s��const�tuted��as�� the��bas�s��of�� the��ent�re��mathemat�cal��ed�f�ce),��med�tates��No�ca,��then��all�� that���s��non-mathemat�cal,��could��be��bu�lt��start�ng��w�th��un�lateral���dent�ty.29��The��holomers��–��as��true��elements��of��real�ty��and��of��thought,��of�� the��world��of��values��–��are��ensembles��w�th��a��s�ngle��element,��and�� the��un�lateral���dent�ty��adm�ts��compenetrat�on.��Follow�ng��th�s��process��of��compenetrat�on��(poss�ble��only��under�� the��cond�t�on��of�� the��un�lateral�� �dent�ty)�� the��mult�tude�� �s�� converted��gradually��through��vert�cal��steps,���n��new��un�ts,��and��thus���t��reaches��the��concept��of��the��law��and��the��mean�ng.��The��second��ensembles,��as��hermeneut�cal��ensembles��have��a��spec�al��feature,�� the�r��elements��are��more��than��s�mple��elements,�� they��are��ensembles���n�� themselves.��So��“the�� second��ensemble�� �s�� the��ensemble��of�� ensembles��w�th��a��sole��element,��of��a��doma�n��of��real�ty��and�� thought”.30��Th�s��counts��as�� the��nature��of��

28�� Constant�n��No�ca,��Scrisori despre logica lui Hermes,��p.��158.29�� Ib�d.,��p.��161.30�� Ib�d.,��p.��159.

the��element,��because�� th�s��nature�� �s�� the��bearer��of��a��un�t,��wh�ch��can��be��expressed��symbol�cally���n��the��follow�ng��way:��

M��=��{��{a},��{b},...........{n}}

Here��we��cannot��say��that��an��element��belongs��to��the��ensemble,��but���nstead��that��the��element�� �s��“an���mage”��of�� the��ensemble,��as��w�th��Le�bn�z’s��monada,�� there���s��an���nt�mate�� (due�� to��compenetrat�on)��element-ensemble��wh�ch��can��be��approx�mated��through��an��equal�ty,��or,��says��No�ca,��through��a��un�lateral���dent�ty.��Th�s���nt�macy��can��be���mag�ned��as��a��complete��self-suff�c�ency��of��the��element,��unt�l���t���s��totally��closed,��l�ke��Le�bn�z’s��monada.��Due�� to�� the��degrees��of�� �nt�macy�� �mpl�ed��here,�� the�� results���s�� that�� the��elements-holomers��may��be��equ�valent,��as��already��ment�oned,��but��not��necessar�ly��equ�potent,�� the��d�vers�f�cat�on��of�� the��element�� through��compenetrat�on��could��have��a��potent�al��of�� �ts��own,��d�fferent��from��the��others.��The��second��ensemble���s�� the��ensemble��of��ensembles��w�th��a�� sole��element��because�� the��compenetrat�on��operat�on��cannot��be��made��except��under��the��same��un�t,��wh�ch��means��that��the��elements��have��an��aff�n�ty��between��them,��that���s,��the��element��{a}���s���n��fact��aM,��and��element��{b}���s��bM��and��so��on��by��v�rtue��of��the��same��parameter��of��the��ensemble.��The��operat�ons���ns�de��the��second��ensemble,��as��already��shown��are��two:�� the��potent�al�zat�on��of�� the��element��(=���ts��elevat�on��at�� the��power��of�� the��un�t)��or�� the��de-potent�al�zat�on��of�� the��ensemble�� �n�� �ts�� �nd�v�s�on��d�str�but�on,�� that�� �s,�� �n�� the��symbol�cal�� transcr�pt�on��aA��(ensemble��A��has��de-potent�al�zed�� �n��element��a);�� the��compenetrat�on��operat�on,��respect�vely���n��symbol�cal��form��aM��(element��a���n��compenetrat�on��w�th��ensemble��M),��bM��et��cetera.

But��what�� �s�� the unilateral identity�� �n��an��appl�cat�on?��Is�� �t�� the��same��th�ng��as��the��weak���dent�ty��about��wh�ch��we��have��spoken��at�� the��beg�nn�ng��of��the��study?��Yes��and��no,�� �t�� �s��an�� �dent�ty��weakened�� �n��compar�son��w�th�� the��hard��sense��of�� �dent�ty��but,��at�� the��same�� t�me,�� �t��cannot��be��reduced�� to��a��weak�� �dent�ty,��because,��under��a��symbol�cal��aspect,�� �t�� �s��ma�nta�ned,��though��the��power��of��the��whole.��In��the��relat�on��whole → part identity functions absolutely, thus having the properties of reflexivity, symmetry��(the��symmetry��of��the��un�t��wh�ch���s��“an��exter�or��means”���n��a��f�rst��phase��w�th��the��same��un�t,��wh�ch��pass�ng���n��part,��has��become��“an���nter�or��means”,��that���s��symmetry��exter�or��means-�nter�or��means)��and��trans�t�v�ty.��For��example,���f��a��pol�t�cal��party��proposes��an��econom�c��solut�on���s��apprec�ated��as��“good”��for�� the��country��the��valor�zat�on��of��“good”��can��pass���n��whole��to��the��level��of��the��branches��of��the��party,��then��to��the��level��of�� the��members��of�� the��respect�ve��party.��That�� �s,�� the��whole��of�� the��valor�zat�on��“good”��passes���ntegrally��to��the��subord�nate��“parts”,��the���dent�ty��hav�ng��a��strong��but��un�lateral��sense��from��whole��to��parts,��wh�ch��we��can��express��w�th��the��help��of��the��log�c��of��relat�ons:��

reflex�v�ty:��(∀ x)��(∀ y)��((Rxy∨ Ryx)→Rxx));symmetry:��(∀ x)��(∀ y) (Rxy → Ryx);trans�t�v�ty:��(∀ x)��(∀ y)��(∀ z)��((Rxy∧Ryz)→Rxz)).

But�� let��us��adm�t�� that�� th�s�� �s�� just��an�� �deal��case�� �n�� the��world��of��values,��when��

90 The Moral Values and Partitive Logic / Ioan BIRIŞ 91

�dent�ty�� can�� funct�on�� ent�rely��by��pass�ng�� from��whole�� to��part.�� If��we�� take�� �nto��cons�derat�on�� the�� three�� types��of�� relat�v�t�es��of�� the��eth�cal��values��establ�shed��by��Hartmann,�� then��we��w�ll��have�� to��confess,�� that�� somet�mes,�� for��d�fferent�� reasons��(d�fferent���nterests,��d�fferent��valor�zat�ons,��d�fferent��s�tuat�ons),��what���s��cons�dered��“good”��by��a��party��at�� the��country�� level,�� �n��order�� to��use�� the��same��example,��can��be��cons�dered��“bad”�� from��the��part��of��a��branch��of�� the��party��or��by�� the��part��of��some��members,��or���t��may��be��cons�dered��“�nd�fferent”.��What��happens���n��such��cases?��Here��a��un�lateral���dent�ty��does��not��funct�on��anymore,��but��a��unilateral contradiction��does��suggests Noica, since in the relation part → whole, the part contradicts the whole (the��“bad”��valor�zat�on��from��the��subord�nate��part��contrad�cts��the��“good”��valor�zat�on��from��the��whole��level),��a�� th�ng��wh�ch��can��be��expressed��–��also��w�th��the��help��of��the��log�c��of��relat�ons��–��as��follows:��

�rreflex�v�ty:��(∀ x)��(∀ y)��((Rxy∨ Ryx) ¬→ Rxx));asymmetry:��(∀ x)��(∀ y��)��(Rxy ¬→ Ryx);�ntrans�t�v�ty:��(∀ x)��(∀ y)��(∀ z)��((Rxy��∧ ��Ryz)→ ¬Rxz)).

But��th�s���s��also��a��subl�mat�on��at��the��other��extreme.��No�ca��po�nts��out��that���n��the��world��of��values��we��have�� the��relat�ons��of��potent�al�zat�on��and��compenetrat�on,��so��we��are�� �nterested��by��the��s�tuat�ons���n�� the��cont�nuum��between��these��extremes,�� that���s��between��the��extremes��of�� the��un�lateral�� �dent�ty��and��the��un�lateral��contrad�ct�on.��One��must��not�ce��that��everyth�ng��we��know��from��class�cal��log�c��or��from��modern��log�c��concern�ng��the��ma�ntenance��of�� the��pr�nc�ple��of�� �dent�ty��and��of��b�valence��does��not��help��us��at��all.��In��our��op�n�on,��known��log�c��cannot��help��us��s�nce��they��were��created���n��order��to��express��poss�ble��s�tuat�ons��of��un�voc�ty��and��not��equ�vocal�ty.��As��No�ca��tell��us,��these��log�cs��d�d��not��take���nto��account��the��operat�ons��of��compenetrat�on��and��potent�al�ze��of��elements.��As��some��other��authors��have��not�ced,��we��have��two��types��of��parad�gms��and��two��types��of��codes��attached��to��them���n��the��approach��to��ex�stence:��the��d�g�tal��parad�gm��and��the��analog�cal��parad�gm.��The��d�g�tal��parad�gm��operated��w�th��clearly��separated��un�ts,��wh�le��the��analog�c��one��presupposes��a��cont�nu�ng��scale.��But��ex�stence��and��nature�� �n��general�� �s��“composed��of��analog�c��elements”31�� that�� �s��why��one��can��say��that�� the��analog�cal�� language���s��pr�mord�al.��In��the��d�g�tal�� language��the��b�nary��opposed��categor�es��dom�nate:��A��or��B,��C��or��D��etcetera.��The��b�bl�cal��genes�s,��for��example,��can��be��“read”���n��a��d�g�tal��code,�� too��when��we��say��that��darkness��was��separated��by��l�ght,��the��earth��by��water��and��so��on.��But��when��we��are��talk�ng��about��the��ex�stence��and��knowledge��of��God,��about�� the��d�v�ne��“Good”��and��about�� the��d�v�ne��creat�on��through��wh�ch��God��reveals��H�mself,��d�g�tal�� language��no��longer��helps��us,��and��we��must��appeal��to��the��analog�cal��language.��Analogy���s��necessary��because��“nature���tself���s��rather��a��ser�es��of��analog�c��cont�nuums��than��a��ser�es��of��dec�ded��categor�es”.32

If��nature���tself��can��be��cons�dered��an��analog�cal��cont�nuum,��then��the��world��of��values���s��also��a��“cont�nuum”,�� that�� �s��why��the��appl�cat�on��of��a��“d�g�tal”�� type��log�c��to�� th�s�� real�ty��can��only�� lead�� to��confus�on.��Analogy�� �mpl�es��amb�valence,�� even��prevar�cat�on��s�nce���t��passes��over��each��b�nary��category��and���t�� takes��features��from��

31�� John��F�ske,��Introducere în ştiinţele comunicării, Editura Polirom, Iaşi, 2003, p. 91.32�� Ibid.,��p.��152.

each��of�� them,��as�� �t��happens�� �n�� the��compenetrat�on��process��proposed��by��No�ca.��Th�s�� �s�� the��reason��why��the��analog�cal��concepts��(equ�vocal)��can��be�� too��strong,��by��hav�ng��an��“excess��of��s�gn�f�cance”.��Do��the��equ�vocal��var�ants��enter��by��all��means���n��contrad�ct�on?��Such��a��quest�on��confuses��not��only��trad�t�onal��log�c��but��also��the��actual��ph�losophy��of��sc�ence.��For��example,�� the��concept��of��“mass”�� �n��Newton’s��phys�cs��(of�� the��formula��F = m∙a)��and��the��concept��of��“mass”���n��E�nste�n’s��phys�cs��(of�� the��formula��E = m∙c2)��are��often��seen��as��pla�nly��contrad�ctory,��result�ng���n��the���dea��of��the���ncommensurab�l�ty��of��parad�gms,��as��suggested��by��Thomas��Kuhn.��Are��they��really��contrad�ctory?��We��cons�der��that��no,��s�nce��they��are��only��equ�vocal,��that���s��they��offer��us��two��d�fferent��mean�ngs��wh�ch��we��call��“phys�cal��mass”.��The��contrad�ct�on��between��these��two��utterances��presupposes��that��we��talk���n��the��same��way��about��the��referent��but��one��utterance��must��agree���n��th�s��sense��and��the��other��must��d�sagree,��and��be��excluded,��wh�ch���s��not��the��case��w�th��equ�vocal�ty.

We�� f�nd�� ourselves�� �n�� the�� same�� s�tuat�on�� w�th�� moral�� values�� when�� they��compenetrate.��The��more��general��“Good”��of��the��prev�ous��example��can��pass��also��as��“good”��at�� the��subord�nated��level��of��branches��or��members��of��a��party,��but�� �t��can��be��revalued��and��cons�dered,���n��a��equ�vocal��way��as��a��“bad”��or��someth�ng��“�nd�fferent”.��Because��of�� the�� spec�al�� s�tuat�on��of��analogy,�� as��a��pr�mord�al�� language,��we��can��state�� that,�� �n��accordance��w�th��Emer�ch��Coreth,�� that�� the��analog�cal�� terms��represent��the��cond�t�on��of��poss�b�l�ty�� for��conceptual�� thought��as�� such.33��W�thout�� th�s�� last,��comprehens�ve��un�ty�� (all-encompass�ng),��only��a��conceptual��chaos��would��ex�st.��Follow�ng��Coreth’s��suggest�on,��from��the��analog�cal��concepts��can��be��der�ved,��on��the��one��hand��the��un�vocal��concepts��(wh�ch��apply��to��the�r��objects���n��the��same��sense)��and��on��the��other��hand,��the��equ�vocal��concepts��(wh�ch��apply��to��the�r��objects���n��d�fferent��senses).��Th�s��means��that��the��analog�cal��terms��apply��to��the�r��objects��part�ally���n��the��same��sense��and��part�ally�� �n��d�fferent��senses.��In�� the�r��qual�ty��of��ult�mate��cond�t�on��of��poss�b�l�ty��for��the��conceptual��th�nk�ng��as��such,��the��analog�cal��terms��present��two��tra�ts:��a)�� they��cannot��rece�ve��supplementary��determ�nat�ons��from��outs�de,��but��only��from��themselves,�� that�� �s�� they��determ�ne�� themselves;��and��b)�� these�� terms��are��not��cond�t�oned��(where��a��feature���s��caused��by��the��f�rst��one).��Such��character�st�cs��rem�nd��us��of��the��status��of��forms���n��Plato’s��theory.��When��a��feature���s��val�d��not��only���n��relat�on��to��an��ent�ty��but��also���n��relat�on��to���ts��contrary,��when��a��form��can��“commun�cate”��w�th��other��forms,���nclud�ng��the��contrary��ones,���t��means��that��the���nternal��structure��of��the��forms��can��only��be��analog�c.

In��th�s��s�tuat�on,��one��must��ask��wh�ch���s��the��nature��of��the��un�lateral���dent�ty��from��the��valuable��compenetrat�ons?��In��trad�t�onal��and��modern��log�c��one��has��d�st�ngu�shed��between two meanings of identity: the material identity “≡” which expresses an extens�onal��equ�valence,�� �n��conform�ty��w�th��the��theory��of�� the��truth��establ�shed��by��Tarsk�;���ts��formal���dent�ty��“<=>”���s��an���ntens�onal���dent�ty.��Generally��speak�ng,��soc�al��real�ty��presupposes��an���ntens�onal��log�c,��a��log�c��of��the��senses,��because���n��the��soc�al��world��the��referents��have��a��h�gh��degree��of��opac�ty��(�n��Qu�ne’s��sense).��We��cons�der��that�� the��un�lateral�� �dent�ty�� �n��our�� theory�� �s��a��spec�es��of��formal�� �dent�ty,��a��spec�es��wh�ch��we��call��symbolical identity,��because��the��holomer��(as��part��of��the��power��of��the��whole)���s���ntens�onal��and��symbol�cally��the��bearer��of��the��whole,���s��not��necessar�ly��a��

33�� Emer�ch��Coreth,��Metaphysics,��Herder��and��Herder,��New��York,��1968,��p.��114.

92 The Moral Values and Partitive Logic / Ioan BIRIŞ 93

mater�al��one.��As��a��formula��we��w�ll��wr�te��“<=> sym”,��that���s,���n��a��holomer��the��whole��of��value��<=> sym�� the��part��of��value��(the��whole��of��value���s�� �dent�cal��symbol�cally��w�th��the��part��of��value).

The��nature��of�� the�� symbol�c��carr�es�� someth�ng�� rel�g�ous�� �n�� �ts��or�g�n34�� that���mpulse��of��l�ft�ng��the��soul��to��the��superhuman35��and���n��the��world��of��moral��values��we��f�nd��th�s��nature���n��the��flush��of��l�ft�ng��the��valued��element��to��the��level��of��the��whole.��In�� the��holomer,�� the��compenetrat�on��of�� the��whole��w�th�� the��element�� �mpl�es,��on��the��one��hand,��a��s�tuat�on��of��homogene�ty,��and��on��the��other��hand��a��heterogeneous��s�tuat�on.��Log�cally,��the��symbol�cal���dent�ty��of��the��holomer���s��found���n��the��d�rect�on��of movement whole → part, highlighting the situation of homogeneity. In the opposite direction, part → whole, we will have the unilateral contradiction which reflects��the��heterogene�ty.��That���s��why,���n��a��holomer��the��process��of��compenetrat�on��must��comb�ne,��log�cally,��the��reflex�v�ty��of��the��whole��of��value��w�th��the���rreflex�v�ty��of��the��part��of��value,��the��symmetry��from��the��old��un�t��w�th��the��asymmetry��of��the��part��becom�ng��a��holomer,��but��also��the��trans�t�v�ty��of��the��old��un�t��w�th��the��non-trans�t�v�ty��of��the��new��part.��The��log�cal��propert�es��of��the��holomer,��expressed��also��through��the��log�c��of��relat�ons,��seem��then��to��be��the��follow�ng:��

non-reflex�v�ty:��(∀ x)��(∃y) ((Rxy ˅ Ryx) ˄ ¬Rxx));non-symmetry:��(∀ x)��(∃y) (Rxy ˄ ¬Ryx);non-trans�t�v�ty:��(∃x)��(∃y)��(∃z)��((Rxy ˄ Ryz) ˄ ¬Rxz)).

These��propert�es��of�� the��holomer�c�� relat�on,��we�� th�nk,�� express�� �n�� a��more��adequate��way��the��analog�cal��structure��of��the��holomer,��a��structure��where��the���dent�ty��of��the��old��whole���s��found��symbol�cally���n��the��new��part,��but��there��can��be��parts��where���t��cannot��be��found��(the��“good”��cons�dered��by��a��soc�al��group��can��be��found���n�� the��same��qual�ty��as��a��subgroup,��but��there��can��be��other��subgroups��where��the��same��“good’���s��cons�dered��as��“bad”);���dent�ty��of��the��old��whole���s��symmetr�cal��to��a��certa�n��po�nt���n��the��new��holomer,��but�� �s��becomes��asymmetr�cal��from��the��moment��when��the��ex-part���s��opposed��to��the��old��whole;��the��un�form�ty��from��the��symbol�cal���dent�ty��allows��the�� trans�t�v�ty�� from��whole�� to��part,��but�� the��unevenness��of�� the��new��part��wh�ch�� �s��re�nforced��at��the��power��of��a��new��whole��cancels��trans�t�v�ty,��per��assembly��hav�ng��non��trans�t�v�ty.

References

Alleau��René.��2006.��De la nature des symboles,��Par�s,��Payot.Bad�ou,��Ala�n. 2006.��Logiques des mondes,��Par�s,��Seu�l.Biriş, Ioan. 2007.��Totalitate, sistem, holon, ediţia a doua, Timişoara, Editura Universităţii de

Vest.

34 See also Ioan Biriş, “Religious Violence and the Logic of Weak Thinking: between R. G�rard��and��G.��Vatt�mo”,���n��Journal for the Study of Religions and Ideologies,��vol.��11,��No.��32,��2012.

35�� See��Ren�Alleau,��De la nature des symboles,��Payot,��Par�s,��2006,��p.��24.

–2012.��“Rel�g�ous��V�olence��and�� the��Log�c��of��Weak��Th�nk�ng:��between��R.��G�rard��and��G.��Vatt�mo”,��Journal for the Study of Religions and Ideologies,��vol.��11,��No.��32.

Blaga,��Luc�an��1983.��Opere, vol.��8,��Trilogia cunoaşterii, Bucureşti, Editura Minerva.–1987.��Opere, vol. 10, (Trilogia valorilor), Bucureşti, Editura Minerva.Coreth,��Emer�ch.��1968.��Metaphysics,��New��York,��Herder��and��Herder.Enescu,��Gheorghe. 1971.��Logica simbolică, Bucureşti, Editura ştiinţifică.F�ske,��John.��2003.��Introducere în ştiinţele comunicării, Iaşi, Editura Polirom.Göb,��Andrea.��2010.��“E�nle�tung”,�� �n��Franz��Brentano,��Schriften zur Ethik und Ästhetik,��Ontos��

Verlag.Hartmann,��N�cola�.��1926.��Ethik,��Berl�n-Le�pz�g,��de��Gruyter.Hartmann,��N�cola�. 1997.��Vechea şi noua ontologie��şi alte scrieri filosofice, Bucureşti, Editura

Pa�de�a.Lesn�ewsk�,��Stan�slav.��1983.��On��the��Foundat�ons��of��Mathemat�cs,�� �n��Topoi, An International

Review of Philosophy,��D.��Re�del��Publ�sh�ng��Company,��June.Mackie, J. L. 1995. Subiectivitatea valorilor, in Valentin Mureşan (ed.), Valorile şi adevărul

moral, Bucureşti, Editura Alternative.No�ca,��Constant�n. 1986.��Scrisori despre logica lui Hermes, Bucureşti, Editura Cartea

Românească.Nozick, Robert. 1995. Valoare şi sens, in Valentin Mureşan (ed.), Valorile şi adevărul moral,

Bucureşti, Editura Alternative.Pol�,��Roberto. 2009.��Între speranţă şi responsabilitate, Bucureşti, Editura Curtea Veche.Rescher,��N�cholas. 1968.��Topics in Philosophical Logic,��Dordrecht,��D.��Re�del��Publ�sh�ng��

Company.Wand�nger,��N�kolaus. 1998.��Masses of stuff and Identity,���n��Erkenntnis,��48/303-307.Z�mmerman,��Dean��W.��1998.��Criteria of identity and the Identity Mystics’,�� �n��Erkenntnis,��

48/281-301.

94 �� What���s��Wrong��w�th��‘Be�ng��Authent�c’?����/����Cr�st�an��IFTODE������������95

What is Wrong with ‘Being Authentic’ ?

Cr�st�an��IFTODE

The-modern-culture-of-authenticity-and-the-inconsistence-of-the-common-notion-of-“authentic-self”

Accord�ng�� to��Taylor’s��def�n�t�on,�� the��culture��of��authent�c�ty��des�gnates�� the��new��“understand�ng��of�� l�fe��wh�ch��emerges��w�th�� the��Romant�c�� express�v�sm��of�� the��late�� e�ghteenth��century,�� that�� each��one��of��us��has��h�s/her��own��way��of�� real�z�ng��our��human�ty,��and�� that�� �t�� �s�� �mportant�� to�� f�nd��and�� l�ve��out��one’s��own,��as��aga�nst��surrender�ng��to��conform�ty��w�th��a��model�� �mposed��on��us��from��outs�de,��by��soc�ety,��or�� the��prev�ous��generat�on,��or��rel�g�ous��or��pol�t�cal��author�ty”.1��The��modern���deal��of��authent�c�ty��would��have��been��made��poss�ble��by��an��“express�v�st��turn”��hav�ng���n��Rousseau’s��wr�t�ngs��“�ts��po�nt��of��departure”,��and���n�� the��work��of��Herder,��“�ts��f�rst���mportant��art�culat�on”.2��But��why��would���t��be��relevant�� �n��the��context��of�� today,��for��our��own��present��or��“part�cular��moment”,��as��Foucault��m�ght��have��put���t,3��to��undergo��an��analys�s��of��such��express�v�sm,��bes�de��the��h�stor�cal���nterest?��It���s��a��fact��that��th�s���deal��of��authent�c�ty��was���n�t�ally��appeal�ng��only��to�� �ntellectual��and��art�st�c��él�tes;��but�� �t��can��be��argued,��as��Taylor��does�� �n��h�s��book��A��Secular��Age,�� that�� �n��Western��contemporary��soc�et�es,��“th�s��k�nd��of��self-or�entat�on��seems��to��have��become��a��mass-phenomenon”.4��Taylor’s�� thes�s�� �s�� that��a��“s�mpl�f�ed��express�v�sm”��has��permeated��Western��soc�ety��s�nce��the��Second��World��War:��“Express�ons��l�ke��‘do��your��own��th�ng’��become��current;��a��beer��commerc�al��of�� the��early��70s��enjo�ned��us��to��‘be��yourselves���n�� the��world��of�� today’�� […].��Therap�es��mult�ply��wh�ch��prom�se�� to��help��you��f�nd��yourself,��real�ze��yourself,��release��your��true��self,��and��so��on”.5

The��extraord�nary���mpact��that��the��self-help���ndustry��and��the��self-�mprovement��movements��have��had��on��Western��soc�ety��over��the��last��decades���s��symptomat�c��for��th�s��popular��culture��of��authent�c�ty,��as��Gu�gnon��argues���n��h�s�� �llum�nat�ng��text��On��be�ng��authent�c.6�� It�� �s��clear�� that��beh�nd��all�� these��exhortat�ons��and��rec�pes��on��how��to��f�nd��yourself��and�� �mprove��your�� l�fe��(the��“me,��me,��me”��culture,��as��Tom��Wolfe��sarcast�cally��labeled���t)��l�es��a��spec�f�c��concept�on��of��the��self,��a��spec�f�c��relat�onsh�p��to�� the��self.��Th�s��part�cular��v�ew���s��reflected,�� for�� �nstance,�� �n�� the��follow�ng��words��of��Ph�ll�p��McGraw��or��‘Dr.��Ph�l’��(one��of��the��gurus��of��the��self-help��programs,��along��w�th��the��famous��Oprah��W�nfrey),��extracted��from��h�s��huge��bestseller��Self��Matters:��Creat�ng��your��L�fe��from��the��Ins�de��Out��(2001):��

��1�� Ch.��Taylor,��A Secular Age,��Cambr�dge,��MA:��The��Belknap��Press��of��Harvard��Un�vers�ty��Press,��2007,��p.��473.

��2�� Idem,��The Sources of the Self. The Making of the Modern Identity,��Cambr�dge,��MA:��Harvard��Un�vers�ty��Press,��1989,��p.��368.

��3�� See��M.��Foucault,�� “What�� �s��Enl�ghtenment?”,�� �n The Foucault Reader,�� ed�ted��by��Paul��Rab�now,��New��York:��Pantheon��Books,��1984,��p.��38.

��4�� Ch.��Taylor,��A Secular Age,��p.��474.��5�� Ib�d.,��p.��475.��6�� Ch.��Gu�gnon,��On Being Authentic,��London:��Routledge,��Taylor��&��Franc�s��e-L�brary,��2005.

“The��authent�c��self���s��the��you��that��can��be��found��at��your��absolute��core.��It���s��the��part��of��you��that���s��not��def�ned��by��your��job,��or��your��funct�on,��or��your��role.��It���s��the��compos�te��of��all��your��un�que��g�fts,��sk�lls,��ab�l�t�es,���nterests,��talents,���ns�ghts,��and��w�sdom.�� It�� �s��all��your��strengths��and��values�� that��are��un�quely��yours��and��need��express�on,��versus��what��you��have��been��programmed��to��bel�eve��that��you��are��‘supposed��to��be��and��do’.��It���s��the��you��that��flour�shed,��unself-consc�ously,���n��those��t�mes���n��your��l�fe��when��you��felt��happ�est��and��most��fulf�lled”.7

However��appeal�ng��th�s��v�s�on��of�� the��“Real��Me”��or��“authent�c��self”�� ly�ng��at��the��core��of��every��human��be�ng��may��be��–��and��even��salutary,���n��the��present��context��of��global�zat�on��and��consumer�sm��–���t��runs��the��r�sk��of��be�ng��profoundly���ncons�stent��and��extremely��vulnerable�� to��d�fferent��k�nds��of��object�ons.�� I��suggest��we��comb�ne��these��poss�ble��cr�t�c�sms���n��a��sequence��somehow��s�m�lar��to��the��famous��three-stage��argumentat�on��On�� the��Non-ex�stent��belong�ng�� to��Gorg�as�� (Noth�ng��ex�sts;��even���f��someth�ng��ex�sts,�� �t��cannot��be��known;��even�� �f�� �t��could��be��known,�� �t��cannot��be��commun�cated).

(1)��There���s��no��“Real��Me”,��no��“authent�c��self”.��Th�s��thes�s��can��be��endorsed���n��more��than��one��way.

(a)�� It��can��be��argued�� that�� th�s��whole�� �dea��of�� the��self��conce�ved��as��a��“un�que��constellat�on��of���nner��tra�ts”8��–��qual�t�es��that��def�ne��you��once��and��for��all,��but��need��express�on���n��the��external��world��–���s��really��a��h�stor�cal��and��cultural��product��rather��than��some��natural��cond�t�on��or���nnate���dea��of��every��self-reflect�ve��human��be�ng.��The��Romant�c��express�v�sm���s���tself��a��consequence��of��the��b�rth��of��modern���nd�v�dual�sm:��a��v�s�on��of��us��as��self-conta�ned,��self-encapsulated��subjects,��as��monads.��We��are��‘soc�al��atoms’��w�th��r�ghts��and��dut�es��who��perform��var�ous��roles��on�� the��soc�al��stage;�� the��“Real��Me”��can��then��be��found��only���n��our���nner��depth:��a��f�eld��protected��from��soc�al��boundar�es��(our��very��own��“secret��garden”),�� �n��short,��a��“nuclear��self”��(Gu�gnon).��But��“what�� �f�� �t�� turns��out�� that�� the��concept�on��of�� �nwardness��presupposed��by�� the��authent�c�ty��culture,��far��from��be�ng��some��elemental��feature��of��the��human��cond�t�on,���s�� �n��fact��a��product��of��soc�al��and��h�stor�cal��cond�t�ons�� that��need��to��be��called�� �nto��quest�on?”9��What�� �f��not��only��some��of��our��most�� �nt�mate��and��personal��asp�rat�ons,��thoughts��and��des�res��are���n��fact��soc�ally���nduced��(maybe��noth�ng��more��than��effects��of�� successful�� advert�s�ng),��but�� the��d�st�nct�on�� �tself��between�� (real)��person��and��(soc�al)��role�� �s��a��cultural��product,��as��suggested��by��Goffman?10��Maybe��“the��self�� �s��noth�ng��else��than��the��h�stor�cal��correlat�on”��of��a��spec�f�c��“technology”11,��maybe��the��relat�onsh�p��to��the��self���s��always��the��result��of��an��eth�cal��(or,���n��modern��t�mes,��rather��b�opol�t�cal)��process��of��subject�vat�on,��as��Foucault��repeatedly��po�nted��out���n��h�s��f�nal��

��7�� Ph.��McGraw,��quoted��by��Ch.��Gu�gnon,��op. cit.,��pp.��1-2.��8�� Ch.��Gu�gnon,��op. cit.,��p.��4.��9�� Ib�d.��p.��5.10�� See��for���nstance��E.��Goffman,��Frame Analysis. An Essay on the Organization of Experience,��

Boston:��Northeastern��Un�vers�ty��Press,��1986,��pp.��293-300.11�� M.��Foucault,��“About�� the��Beg�nn�ngs��of�� the��Hermeneut�cs��of�� the��Self:��Two��Lectures��at��

Dartmouth”,��Political Theory,��Vol.��21,��No.��2��(May,��1993),��p.��222.

96 �� What���s��Wrong��w�th��‘Be�ng��Authent�c’?����/����Cr�st�an��IFTODE������������97

texts,���nterv�ews��and��lectures.(b)��Another��way��of��attack�ng��th�s��allegedly��“authent�c��self”��of��modern��t�mes��

�s��by��emphas�z�ng��the��theolog�cal��“aura”��of��the��“jargon��of��authent�c�ty”��(Adorno).��There���s��no��doubt��that��the��vocabulary��and��the��th�nk�ng��reflexes��of��key��f�gures��such��as��Oprah��or��Dr.��Ph�l��hold��deep��connect�ons��w�th��the��Chr�st�an��trad�t�on,���n��part�cular��w�th��the��exhortat�ons��made��by��modern��Protestant��reformers��to��search��for��your���nner��truth�� �n��order�� to��f�nd��sp�r�tual��gu�dance��for��your�� l�fe��(“the��K�ngdom��of��God���s�� �n��you”),�� to��detect��and��exerc�se��your��part�cular��g�fts,��your��prec�se��call�ng,���n��order��to��lead��a��good��l�fe.��The��quest�on���s��whether��th�s��way��of��th�nk�ng��can��st�ll��make��sense��when��taken��out��of���ts��rel�g�ous��frame��and��planted���n��a��“secular�zed��so�l”.��“For��when��my��gu�de���s��understood��as��noth�ng��other��than��me,���t���s��hard��to��see��what��author�ty��th�s��gu�dance��could��or��should��have”.12

(c)��There���s��also��the��poss�b�l�ty��of��contrast�ng��the��pop��culture��of��authent�c�ty��w�th��all�� the��contemporary��ph�losoph�cal��approaches��–��and��also�� those�� from�� the��soc�al��sc�ences��–��who��are��engag�ng���n��a��‘postmodern’��deconstruct�on��of��the��subject��(understood��as��an��absolute��centre��of��knowledge��and��act�on)��and��are��embrac�ng��a��sort��of��‘neobuddh�st’,�� reduct�on�st��v�ew��of��personal�� �dent�ty,��somet�mes���nv�t�ng��us�� to��a��prol�ferat�on��of��roles��and��characters���n��our��l�ves��(as,��for���nstance,���n��the��Deleuze-Guattar���project��of��a��“sch�zoanalys�s”).13

(2)��Even���f��an��“authent�c��self”��really��does��ex�st,���t��could��not��be��known.��Let��us��suppose�� that�� th�s��“authent�c��self”��conce�ved��as�� the��core��of��every��human��be�ng,��a��s�ngular��m�xture��of��ab�l�t�es,�� �nterests��and��other���nner��tra�ts��really��does��ex�st.��How��am��I��to��know���t,��how��am��I��to��get���n��touch��w�th��th�s��“Real��Me”?��What��I��exper�ence��as��a��subject��of��self-reflect�on,��from��a��psycholog�cal��po�nt��of��v�ew,���s��a��cont�nuous��stream��of���mpulses,��urges,��feel�ngs,��thoughts��and��needs.��But��am��I��to��rely��only��on��the���ntens�ty��of��what��I��feel,�� trust��or��seem��to��need���n��th�s��present��moment?��Apparently,��“th�s��self-knowledge��has��noth�ng��to��go��on��bes�des��what�� �s�� l�t��up���n�� the��fl�cker�ng��l�ght��of��self-reflect�on”,��“no��markers��to���nd�cate��whether��what��shows��up���s���mportant��or��per�pheral”.14��As��to��the��var�ous��“recovery”��or��“self-�mprovement”��programs��that��flour�sh�� �n�� the��Western��soc�et�es��nowadays��(part�cularly�� �n�� the��States),��Gu�gnon��po�nts��out��that,���nstead��of��help�ng��people��“get���n��touch��w�th��the�r��true��selves”,��they��“often��have��the��effect��of��pressur�ng��people���nto��th�nk�ng���n��ways��that��conf�rm��the���deology��of��the��founders��of��the��program”.15

12�� Ch.��Gu�gnon,��op. cit.,��p.��V.13�� “It�� �s��certa�n�� that��ne�ther��men��nor��women��are��clearly��def�ned��personal�t�es,��but�� rather��

v�brat�ons,��flows,��sch�zzes,��and��“knots”��[…]��The��task��of��sch�zoanalys�s���s��that��of��t�relessly��tak�ng��apart��egos��and�� the�r��presuppos�t�ons;�� l�berat�ng�� the��prepersonal��s�ngular�t�es�� they��enclose��and��repress;��mob�l�z�ng��the��flows��they��would��be��capable��of��transm�tt�ng,��rece�v�ng,��or���ntercept�ng…��For��everyone���s��a��l�ttle��group��(un groupuscule) and��must��l�ve��as��such��–��or��rather,�� l�ke��the��Zen��tea��box��broken���n��a��hundred��places��[…]”��(G.��Deleuze��and��F.��Guattar�,��Anti-Oedipus. Capitalism and Schizophrenia,��translated��by��R.��Hurley,��M.��Seem,��H.R.��Lane,��M�nneapol�s:��Un�vers�ty��of��M�nnesota��Press,��1983,��p.��362).

14�� Ch.��Gu�gnon,��op. cit.,��p.��5.15�� Ib�d.

(3)��Even�� �f�� the��“authent�c��self”��could��be��known��by��means��of�� �ntrospect�on,���t��cannot��be��expressed,��that�� �s,��commun�cated��to��others���n��a��way��that��preserves���ts��s�ngular�ty��and�� �ts�� r�chness.��Now��let��us��suppose�� that�� I��can��get�� �n�� touch��w�th�� th�s��“true��self”��of��m�ne��conce�ved��as�� the��core��and�� the��mark��of��my��s�ngular�ty,��of��my��un�queness��as��a��human��be�ng.��How��w�ll��I��be��able��to��share��th�s��s�ngular��truth��about��myself��w�th��other��human��be�ngs?��Th�s��argument��may��be�� �nsp�red��by��N�etzsche’s��cla�m��that�� language��and��consc�ence��are��secondary��facts��of��our��nature,��appear�ng��only��under�� the��pressure��of��a��“need�� to��commun�cate”;�� �n�� fact,�� language��as��such��would��suppose��an���nescapable��fals�f�cat�on,�� level�ng��or��“equal�zat�on”��of��s�ngular��exper�ences,��just��as���n��the��f�eld��of��consc�ousness��there��would��be��no��room��except��for��“what���s��common”,��what��can��be��made��publ�c,��what��belongs��to��everyone��and��no��one���n��part�cular.16��Or��we��m�ght��content��ourselves��to��repeat��Adorno’s��statement��from��The��Jargon��of��Authent�c�ty,��that��“language���tself��–��through���ts��general�ty��and��object�v�ty��–��already��negates��the��whole��man,��the��part�cular��speak�ng���nd�v�dual��subject:��the��f�rst��pr�ce��exacted��by��language���s��the��essence��of��the���nd�v�dual”.17

Bes�de��these��powerful��cr�t�c�sms��a�med��to��prove��the���ncons�stency��of��the��not�on��of��“authent�c��self”��used��w�th�n��the��context��of��self-�mprovement��projects��and��self-help��programs,��there���s��also��an��object�on��of��the��pragmat�c��k�nd��that��can��be��brought��aga�nst��th�s���dea.��Suppos�ng��we��have��a��“true��self”��that��can��be��known��and��expressed���n��the��external��world,��how��can��we��be��so��sure��that��th�s��w�ll��really���mprove��our��da�ly��ex�stence��or��help��us�� lead��a��more��fulf�ll�ng�� l�fe?��Maybe��there�� �s��someth�ng��‘dark’��there,��wh�ch���s��better�� to��rema�n��h�dden��–�� let��us��say��our��most��aggress�ve,��cruelest��dr�ves��that,��freely��expressed,��w�ll��only��“aggravate��the��d�ff�cult�es��of��l�v�ng��we��face���n��the��modern��world��rather��than��allev�at�ng��or��cur�ng��them”18;��maybe��the��“authent�c��self”���s��noth�ng��more��than��that��“vast��reservo�r��of��energy��push�ng��us��to��sat�sfy��bas�c��needs��and��dr�ves”19��that��Freud��called��the���d;��maybe��there���s��noth�ng��so��spec�al��about��our��deepest��feel�ngs��and��thoughts,��noth�ng��so���nterest�ng��or��or�g�nal:��“deep��down��below��all��our��secrets��are��the��same”,��repeats�� �n��almost��every���nterv�ew��the��famous��novel�st��Amos��Oz.20

The-Romantic-expressivism-as-a-major-source-of-the-modern-understanding-of-the-self:-Christian-relational-personalism-vs.-modern-monadological-individualism

I��ment�oned��at��the��beg�nn�ng��of��th�s��text��that��the��work��of��Rousseau���s��generally��seen��

16�� See��for���nstance��G.��Bondor,��Dansul măştilor. Nietzsche şi filosofia interpretării��(The Dance of the Masks. Nietzsche and the Philosophy of Interpretation), Bucureşti: Ed. Humanitas, 2008,��pp.��300-301.

17�� Th.��Adorno,��The Jargon of Authenticity,��translated��by��K.��Tarnowsky��and��Fr.��W�ll,��London:��Routledge,��2003,��p.��10.

18�� Ch.��Gu�gnon,��op. cit.,��p.��5.19�� Ib�d.,��p.��51.20�� See��for�� �nstance��Amos��Oz,�� the�� �nterv�ew��w�th��El�zabeth��Farnsworth,��“Cop�ng��w�th��Con-

fl�ct”,��from��Jan.��23,��2002,��ava�lable��at:��http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/m�ddle_east/jan-june02/oz_1-23.html.

98 �� What���s��Wrong��w�th��‘Be�ng��Authent�c’?����/����Cr�st�an��IFTODE������������99

as��the��start�ng��po�nt��of��the��Romant�c��express�v�sm��or��“culture��of��authent�c�ty”.��We��could��add��that��Romant�c�sm���s��usually��cons�dered��as��an��“undercurrent��of��react�on��aga�nst��Enl�ghtenment�� rat�onal�ty��and��mechan�zat�on”,��an��“attempt�� to�� recover��a��sense��of��oneness��and��wholeness�� that��appears�� to��have��been�� lost��w�th�� the�� r�se��of��modern�ty”.21��The��emphas�s��that��Rousseau��placed��on��“the��vo�ce��of��nature”��would��be��of��major��s�gn�f�cance��for��the��Romant�c��quest��for��the���nner��self��seen��as��the��ult�mate��real�ty��and��truth��of��the��human��be�ng.��“Let��us��lay���t��down��as��an���nconvert�ble��rule��that��the��f�rst�� �mpulses��of��nature��are��always��r�ght;�� there���s��no��or�g�nal��s�n���n��the��human��heart”,���t���s��sa�d���n��the��famous��novel��Em�le.22��The��“vo�ce��of��nature”���s��regarded��as��an��oppos�te��of��the��publ�c��world��and��of��all��the��soc�al��pressures��that��pervert��our��pr�mary,��ch�ld�sh��be�ng.��“The��or�g�nal���mpulse��of��nature���s��r�ght,��but��the��effect��of��a��depraved��culture�� �s�� that��we�� lose��contact��w�th�� �t.��We��suffer�� th�s�� loss��because��we��no�� longer��depend��on��ourselves��and��th�s���nner���mpulse,��but��rather��on��others��and��on��what��they��th�nk��of��us,��adm�re��or��desp�se���n��us,��reward��or��pun�sh���n��us.��We��are��separated��from��nature��by��the��dense��web��of��op�n�on��wh�ch���s��woven��between��us���n��soc�ety��and��can��no��longer��recover��contact��w�th���t”.23

The��only��way��of��hear�ng��the��“vo�ce��of��nature”��and��gett�ng���n��touch��w�th��our��‘true’��self��would��be��by��d�sconnect�ng��from��soc�al�� real�ty��and�� �ts��constra�nts,��“by��turn�ng���nward��and��access�ng��our��most��spontaneous��and��bas�c��feel�ngs”.24��In��order��to��do��that,��Rousseau��w�ll��produce��a��large��number��of��autob�ograph�cal��wr�t�ngs,��start�ng��w�th��h�s��famous��and���nfluent�al��Confess�ons.��The�r��role���s��not��to���mpose��a��somehow��art�f�c�al��un�ty��onto��a��l�fe��story,��nor��to��present��sheer��facts��exactly��as��they��happened,��but�� rather�� to�� record��“feel�ngs��one��now��has��about�� the��past”:�� 25�� the��pr�mary�� truth��becomes��subject�ve;���t���s��the��truth��of��my��subject�v�ty,��the��truth��as��“authent�c�ty”.

But�� the��genre��of��confess�ons�� �s��clearly��not��a��Romant�c�� �nvent�on.��Foucault��po�nted��out��w�th��extreme��clar�ty��that��the��b�rth��of��confess�on��should��be��traced��back��to��the��f�rst��Chr�st�an��monast�c��pract�ces,���n��the��trans�t�on��of��Chr�st�an��sp�r�tual��pract�ces��from��exomologes�s�� to��exagoreus�s26,��and��that��“confess�on”��should��be��regarded��as��

21�� Ch.��Gu�gnon,��op. cit.,��p.��27;��see��also��Ch.��Taylor,��Sources of the Self,��pp.��413-414.22�� “In��the��orthodox��theory,��the��source��of��the��h�gher��love���s��grace;���t�� �s�� the��God��of��Abraham,��

Isaac,��and��Jacob.��For��Rousseau,��(w�thout��ent�rely��ceas�ng��to��be��God,��at��least��of��the��ph�loso-phers),�� �t��has��become��the��vo�ce��of��nature.��The��doctr�ne��of��the��or�g�nal��s�n,���n���ts��orthodox��understand�ng,��has��been��abandoned.��Nature���s��fundamentally��good,��and��the��estrangement��wh�ch��depraves��us���s��one��wh�ch��separates��us��from���t”��(Ch.��Taylor,��Sources of the Self,��p.��357).

23�� Ib�d.24�� Ch.��Gu�gnon,��op. cit.,��p.��30. It��could��be��argued��that,��wh�le��attempt�ng��to��recover��a��sense��of��

wholeness��and��commun�on��w�th��nature,�� the��Romant�c��flee�ng��from��the��publ�c��world��does��noth�ng��but��re�nforce��the��modern���nd�v�dual�sm��w�th���ts��sense��of��an��essent�al��sol�tude��of��men,��der�ved��from��an���mage��of��“my��true��be�ng”��as��a��pr�vate,��self-encapsulated,��monadolog�-cal��self:��“the��self���s��not��just��the��center��of��the��un�verse.��It���s��the��un�verse”��(Ibid.,��p.��34).

25�� Ib�d.,��p.��36.26�� See��on��th�s��top�c��the��excellent��study��of��Fr.��Gros,��“Le��souc���de��so���chez��M�chel��Foucault.��A��

rev�ew��of��The Hermeneutics of the Self: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1981-1982”,��publ�shed���n��Philosophy and Social Criticism,��vol.��31,��no.��5-6,��2005,��pp.��697-708,��as��well��as��M.��Foucault’s�� lectures��“About�� the��Beg�nn�ngs��of�� the��Hermeneut�cs��of�� the��Self:��Two��

emblemat�c��for��the��h�stor�cal��appearance��of��a��new��k�nd��of��relat�onsh�p��to��the��self:��the��hermeneut�cs��of�� the�� self,�� seen��as��“the��met�culous,��analyt�cal�� �nterpretat�on��(déch�ffrement)��of��one’s��states��of��consc�ousness,��the��read�ng��(lecture)��of��the��traces��of��des�re�� �n��one’s��own��thoughts,��etc”.27��Foucault�� �s�� �nterested�� �n��contrast�ng�� th�s��Chr�st�an��“hermeneut�cal”��self��w�th�� the��“gnom�c”��self��of�� the��Greek��and��Roman��ph�losophers,28��hold�ng�� that�� “anc�ent�� sp�r�tual�� exerc�ses�� suppose��absolutely��no���ntrospect�on”.��Tak�ng��the��well-known��example��of�� the��exam�nat�on��of��consc�ence,��Foucault��w�ll��show��that��“for��Seneca���t�� �s��not��a��matter��of��dec�pher�ng��or��detect�ng,��through��th�s��regular��exam�nat�on,��someth�ng��w�th�n��oneself,��such��as��a��secret���dent�ty��or��h�dden��nature,��but��of��assur�ng��the��regulat�on��of�� the��pr�nc�ples��of��act�ons��that�� �t��g�ves�� to�� �tself��and�� that�� �t��effect�vely��accompl�shes”.29��So��we��could��state�� that�� the��anc�ent��self���s��not��a��secret��or��a��h�dden��nature,��but��rather��“a��work��to��accompl�sh:��the��work��of��l�fe��(oeuvre��de��v�e)”.30

We��could��say�� that�� the��Romant�c��self�� �s�� �n��some���mportant��ways��descend�ng��from��the��Chr�st�an��hermeneut�cal��relat�onsh�p��to��the��self.��There��ex�sts,��however,��an��essent�al��d�fference��that��has��to��be��acknowledged.

The��key��Chr�st�an��f�gure���n��stress�ng��the��exper�ence��of���nwardness��as��the��r�ght��way��of�� relat�ng�� to��ourselves�� �s�� surely��August�ne,��author��of��Confess�ons��and��an���mportant��source��of�� �nsp�rat�on��for��Rousseau’s��autob�ography.��One��of��August�ne’s��famous��l�nes�� �s�� the��follow�ng:��“Do��not��go��outward;��return��w�th�n��yourself.�� In�� the���nward��man��(�n�� �nter�or��hom�ne)��dwells�� truth”.31��But��August�ne’s��exper�ence��of���nwardness���s��only��“a��step��towards��God”.��“By��go�ng���nward,��I��am��drawn��upward”��or,��“as��G�lson��put���t,��August�ne’s��path���s��one��‘lead�ng��from��the��exter�or��to��the���nter�or��and��from��the���nter�or��to��super�or’,��God��“be�ng��closer��to��me��than��I��am��myself,��wh�le��be�ng���nf�n�tely��above��me”.32��In��contrast��to��th�s��bel�ef,��we��f�nd���n��Rousseau’s��Em�le��a��very��d�fferent��declarat�on��of��fa�th:��“I��long��for��the��t�me��when,��freed��from��the��fetters��of��the��body,��I��shall��be��myself,��at��one��w�th��myself,��no��longer��torn���n��two,��when��I��myself��shall��suff�ce��for��my��own��happ�ness”.33��So��“the��source��of��un�ty��and��wholeness��wh�ch��August�ne��found��only���n��God���s��now��to��be��d�scovered��w�th�n��the��self”.34

In�� the��same��l�ne��of�� thought,��accord�ng��to��Foucault,�� the��Chr�st�an��confess�on��to��an��Other��(your��sp�r�tual��father),�� the��cont�nuous��verbal�zat�on��of�� the��movements��

Lectures��at��Dartmouth”,��publ�shed���n��Political Theory,��vol. 21,��no.��2,��1993,��pp.��198-227.27�� Fr.��Gros,��op. cit.,��p.��697.28�� “The��term��gnomé��des�gnates��the��un�ty��of��w�ll��and��knowledge;���t��des�gnates��also��a��br�ef��p�ece��

of��d�scourse��through��wh�ch��truth��appeared��w�th��all�� �ts��force��and��encrusts���tself���n��the��soul��of��people.��Then,��we��could��say��that��even��as��late��as��the��f�rst��century��A.D.,��the��type��of��subject��wh�ch���s��proposed��as��a��model��and��as��a��target���n��the��Greek,��or���n��the��Hellen�st�c��or��Roman,��ph�losophy,���s��a��gnom�c��self,��where��force��of��the��truth���s��one��w�th��the��form��of��the��w�ll”��(M.��Foucault,��“About��the��Beg�nn�ngs��of��the��Hermeneut�cs��of��the��Self”,��pp.��209-210).

29�� Fr.��Gros,��op. cit.,��p.��703.30�� Ib�d.,��p.��705.31�� August�ne,��De vera Religione,��XXXIX,��72,��quoted��by��Ch.��Taylor,��Sources of the Self,��p.��

129.32�� Ch.��Taylor,��Sources of the Self,��p.��134;��p.��136.33�� J.-J.��Rousseau,��Emile, or Education,��translated��by��B.��Foxley,��London:��Dent,��1911,��p.��257.34�� Ch.��Taylor,��op. cit.,��362.

100 �� What���s��Wrong��w�th��‘Be�ng��Authent�c’?����/����Cr�st�an��IFTODE������������101

of��th�nk�ng,���s��not��an��end���n���tself,��but��rather��a��means,��a��necessary��moment��on��the��way��to��renunc�at�on��of��the��self:��“the��revelat�on��of��the��truth��about��oneself��cannot��be��d�ssoc�ated��from��the��obl�gat�on��to��renounce��oneself”,��states��Foucault.35��The��f�nal��a�m��of��a��Chr�st�an��sp�r�tual��and��ascet�c��l�fe���s��not��subject�vat�on��by��way��of��d�scover�ng��and��express�ng��the��h�dden��nature��of��an�� �nd�v�dual,��but��rather�� trans-subject�vat�on��through��personal��commun�on��w�th��God.��So�� �t��could��be��argued��that��Romant�c�sm��re�nstalls��not��the��Chr�st�an��hermeneut�cal��self,��but��a��modern,��secular�zed��vers�on��of���t:��no��longer��able��to��se�ze��the��perspect�ve��of��a��personal��commun�on��w�th��God,��the��modern��man���s��forced��to��rema�n��on��the��level��of��h�s���nd�v�dual�ty,�� to��hold��on��to��h�s��most���nt�mate��feel�ngs,��dr�ves��and��dreams,��that��he��w�ll�� judge��as��express�ons��of��the��f�nal��truth��about��h�mself.

I�� th�nk�� that��Foucault’s�� judgement��about�� the�� f�nal��a�m��of��Chr�st�an��sp�r�tual��pract�ce��can��be��approved��from��a��theolog�cal��po�nt��of��v�ew,��but��only���f��we��add��to���t��a��cruc�al��assumpt�on:��the��“self”��that��the��Chr�st�an��bel�ever��must��abandon��or��sacr�f�ce��on��h�s��way��to��God���s��h�s��ego�st�c��and��pass�onate���nd�v�dual�ty,��but��not��h�s��sp�r�tual��be�ng,��h�s��person��or��hypostas�s:��“the��root��pr�nc�ple��of��ascet�c�sm;��a��free��renunc�at�on��of��one’s��free��w�ll,��of��the��mere��s�mulacrum��of���nd�v�dual��l�berty,���n��order��to��recover��the��true��l�berty,��that��of��the��person��wh�ch���s��the���mage��of��God���n��each��one”.36��The��fact��that,��to��the��best��of��my��knowledge,��Foucault’s��texts��on��Chr�st�an��sp�r�tual�ty��lack��such��a��cruc�al��d�st�nct�on���s��not��all�� that��surpr�s�ng,�� �f��we��take���nto��account�� the��cultural��context��of��h�s��own��work.��In��order�� to��make��ourselves��clear��on��th�s��essent�al�� top�c,��let��us��take���nto��cons�derat�on��another��way��of��see�ng��the��Romant�c��express�v�sm��as��hav�ng���ts��roots���n��the��Chr�st�an��personal�st��trad�t�on.

I��ment�oned��earl�er�� that,��accord�ng�� to��Taylor’s�� �nterpretat�on,��we��should��see��the��work��of��Herder��as�� the��“f�rst�� �mportant��art�culat�on”��of�� the��modern�� �deal��of��authent�c�ty.

“Herder��put�� forward�� the�� �dea�� that��each��of��us��has��an��or�g�nal��way��of��be�ng��human.��Each��person��has��h�s��or��her��own��‘measure’[...].��There���s��a��certa�n��way��of��be�ng��human��that���s��my��way.��I��am��called��upon��to��l�ve��my��l�fe���n��th�s��way,��and��not���n���m�tat�on��of��anyone��else’s��[...].��Be�ng��true��to��myself��means��be�ng��true��to��my��own��or�g�nal�ty,��and��that�� �s��someth�ng��only��I��can��art�culate��and��d�scover.��In��art�culat�ng���t,��I��am��also��def�n�ng��myself,��I��am��real�z�ng��a��potent�al�ty��that���s��properly��my��own.��Th�s���s��the��background��understand�ng��to��the��modern���deal��of��authent�c�ty”.37

An��essent�al��feature��of��Taylor’s��def�n�t�on��of��“express�v�sm”���s��the���dea��that��the��only��way��of��gett�ng���n��touch��w�th��th�s���nner��vo�ce��or���mpulse,��wh�ch���s��the��call��of��my��‘true’��nature,�� �s�� through��“art�culat�ng��what��we��f�nd��w�th�n��us”:��so���t�� �s��“not��only��a��

35�� M.��Foucault,��“About��the��Beg�nn�ngs��of��the��Hermeneut�cs��of��the��Self”,��p.��221.36�� Vl.��Lossky,��The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church,�� trans.��Fellowsh�p��of��St.��Alban��

and��St.��Serg�us,��New��York:��St.��Vlad�m�r’s��Sem�nary��Press,��1976, p.��122.37�� Ch.��Taylor,��The Ethics of Authenticity,��Cambr�dge,��MA:��Harvard��Un�vers�ty��Press,��1992,��pp.��

28-29.

mak�ng��man�fest��but��also��a��mak�ng,��a��br�ng�ng��of��someth�ng��to��be”.38��In��other��words,���t���s��equally��about��d�scover�ng��the��self��and��creat�ng��the��self���n��the��process.��One��other��th�ng��has�� to��be��added:��express�v�sm���s��not��meant�� to��be��a��mere��descr�pt�on��of��our��way��of��ex�st�ng��as��un�que��and��or�g�nal���nd�v�duals;���t���s��a��doctr�ne��stress�ng��a��moral��obl�gat�on.��We��have��“to��l�ve��up��to��our��or�g�nal�ty”.39

Taylor�� regards�� th�s��not�on��of��authent�c�ty��as��be�ng��prepared��by��some��older��Chr�st�an���deas,��as��the��not�on��of��“a��var�ety��of��g�fts��wh�ch���s��correlat�ve��to��the��var�ety��of��vocat�ons,��wh�ch��we��see��expressed���n��St.��Paul,��and��then��taken��up”��and��emphas�zed��by�� the��Pur�tans.40��Nevertheless,��he��bel�eves�� that�� the�� late��e�ghteenth��century��adds��to�� th�s��older��v�ew��someth�ng��new��and��unprecedented,��wh�ch�� �s�� “the��not�on��of��or�g�nal�ty.��It��goes��beyond��a��f�xed��set��of��call�ngs��to��the��not�on��that��each��human��be�ng��has��some��or�g�nal��and��unrepeatable��‘measure’”.41��Tak�ng���nto��account��the��trad�t�onal��Orthodox��theology,��I��tend��to��d�sagree��w�th��Taylor��on��th�s��part�cular��po�nt.

I�� th�nk��the���mportant��quest�on��we��have��to��ask��regard�ng��th�s�� �ssue���s��whether��th�s��expressed��bel�ef���n��each��person’s��“or�g�nal�ty”,��wh�ch��has��shaped��our��very��own���deal��of��authent�c�ty,���s��ent�rely��the��product��of��modern��t�mes,��or��rather��a��s�gn�f�cant��(�nd�v�dual�st�c)�� �nflect�on��of��an��older��v�ew��about��the��nature��of��human��be�ngs��and��the�r��fundamental��ends.��The��Chr�st�an��theology��has��always���ns�sted��on��the��fact��that��the��human��be�ng�� �s��made�� �n�� the�� �mage��and��l�keness��of��God,��as��Scr�pture��aff�rms��(Gen.��1:��26-7),��the��mystery��of��personhood��be�ng��that��each��and��every��one��of��us���s��a��s�ngular��“�con”��of��God,��a��s�ngular��“measure”��(as��Herder��w�ll��put���t)��of��th�s��d�v�ne��l�keness,��and��also��an��un�que��perspect�ve��over�� the��world��and���ts��Creator.42��We��can��argue��that��none��of��the��rel�g�ons��or��ph�losoph�es��prev�ous��to��the��Chr�st�an��era��has��ever��placed��such��a��huge���mportance��on��a��s�ngle��human��l�fe,��a��s�ngle��sp�r�tual��call�ng��or��personal��relat�onsh�p��of��every��human��be�ng��to��the��lov�ng��God,��as��Chr�st�an�ty��d�d.43��

38�� Idem,��The Sources of the Self,��p.��374.39�� “Each��one��of��us��has��an��or�g�nal��path��wh�ch��we��ought��to��tread”��(Ibid.,��p.��375).40�� Ib�d.��On��th�s��matter,��see��the��class�cal��analys�s��of��M.��Weber,��The Protestant Ethic and the

Spirit of Capitalism,��translated��by��T.��Parsons,��New��York:��Scr�bner,��1958.41�� Ch.��Taylor,��The Sources of the Self,��p.��376.42�� See,�� for�� �nstance,��Pseudo-D�onys�us�� the��Areopag�te’s��use��of�� the�� term��“analogy”,��a�� term��

w�th��double��mean�ng,��as��Vl.��Lossky��expla�ns,��s�gn�fy�ng��“à��la��fo�s��le��rapport��des��créatures��à��D�eu��(amour��et��dés�r��de��dé�f�cat�on)��et��le��rapport��de��D�eu��aux��êtres��créés��(�dées��d�v�nes��et��théophan�es)”��(Vl.��Lossky,��“La��not�on��des��«analog�es»��chez��Denys��le��Pseudo-Aréopag�te”,���n��Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Age,��5/1930,��p.��309).��Lossky���ns�sts��on��the��fact��that,��accord�ng��to��Pseudo-D�onys�us,��one��of��the��most���nfluent�al��Chr�st�an��wr�ters��of��the��old��t�mes,��there���s��a��“measure��of��part�c�pat�on”��to��the��d�v�ne��v�rtues��that���s��spec�f�c��to��every��s�ngle��creature��and��def�nes���ts��rank���n��the��Un�verse:��“la��mesure��de��part�c�pat�on��des��êtres��aux��vertues”;��“modes��de��part�c�pat�on��prescr�ts��à��chaque��créature”��(p.��300);��“D�eu,��Cause��de��tout��être,��se��man�feste��à��chaque��creature��et��se��fa�t��a�mer��par��elle��à��travers��l’�dée��qu���lu���est��appropr�ée”��(p.��302);��“l’ass�m�lat�on��aux��vertues��d�v�nes,��selon��le��mode��préétabl���pour��chacun”��(p.��305).

43�� J.��Z�z�oulas,��one��of�� the��most�� �mportant��Orthodox�� theolog�ans��of��our�� t�mes,�� sees��“the identification of the «hypostasis» with the «person»”��as��the��great��“revolut�on”��accompl�shed���n�� the��Greek�� thought��of�� the�� f�rst��Chr�st�an��centur�es:��“The�� term��‘hypostas�s’��never��had��any��connect�on��w�th�� the�� term��‘person’�� �n��Greek��ph�losophy…��‘person’��would��have��been��

102 �� What���s��Wrong��w�th��‘Be�ng��Authent�c’?����/����Cr�st�an��IFTODE������������103

There���s��“a��Chr�st�an��consc�ousness��of��the��un�que��character��and��great��eternal��worth��of��every��human��be�ng”,��states��Arch�mandr�te��Sophrony���n��h�s�� �nfluent�al��book��on��St.��S�louan��the��Athon�te.44��And��even���f���t���s��true��that��Chr�st�an��sp�r�tual��l�fe��demands��a��“renunc�at�on��of��the��self”,��a��spec�f�c��self-loss,��self-empty�ng��or��kenôs�s,��the���deal��commun�on��w�th��God��or��theôs�s���s��not��meant��to��abol�sh��the��personal��be�ng��or��human��hypostas�s.

But��the��modern��Chr�st�an��wr�ters��feel��also��the��need��to���ns�st��on��the��oppos�t�on��between��the��prevalent��not�on��of���nd�v�dual��and��the��Chr�st�an��concept��of��personhood��or��human��hypostas�s,�� and��hence��between��what�� I��would�� call�� a��monadolog�cal���nd�v�dual�sm���n��contrast��to��a��relat�onal��personal�sm.

“When��we��speak��of��the���nd�v�dual��(�n��Greek,��atomon),��we��speak��of��the��human��be�ng�� �n�� �solat�on,�� �n��separateness,��of�� the��human��be�ng��as��compet�tor.��When��we��speak��of�� the��person��(�n��Greek,��prosopon),��we��speak��of�� the��human��be�ng���n�� relat�onsh�p,�� �n��commun�on,��of�� the��human��be�ng��as��co-worker.��Shut��off��from��others,��self-centered,��unrelated,��each�� �s��an�� �nd�v�dual��–��a��un�t�� recorded���n��a��census��–��but��not��an��authent�c��person.��It�� �s��our��relat�onsh�ps��that��make��us��persons�� […].��Personal�sm��stands�� �n�� th�s��way��at�� the��oppos�te��extreme�� from���nd�v�dual�sm”.45

J.��D.��Z�z�oulas��has��argued�� that��Chr�st�an�� theology��has�� �nsp�red,�� �n�� fact,��not��one,��but�� two��d�fferent��anthropolog�es,��one��of�� them��focus�ng��on�� the�� �ntrospect�ve��movement,��wh�le��the��other��has��tr�ed��to��emphas�ze��the��mystery��of��the��human��person���n�� the�� l�ght��of��man’s��capac�ty�� to�� relate�� to��God��and�� the��other��human��be�ngs.��The��concept��of��man��that��has��preva�led���n��Western��ph�losophy��and��culture��would��actually��be��“a��cross-fert�l�zat�on”��between��Boeth�us’��def�n�t�on��of��the��person��as��“an���nd�v�dual��substance��of�� a�� rat�onal��nature”�� (naturae�� rat�onab�l�s�� �nd�v�dua�� substant�a)�� and��August�ne’s��subject��of�� �ntrospect�on;�� �n��other��words,��“a��comb�nat�on��of�� two��bas�c��components:��rat�onal�� �nd�v�dual�ty��on��the��one��hand��and��psycholog�cal��exper�ence��and��consc�ousness��on��the��other”.��Th�s��would��have��set��the��ground��for���nd�v�dual�sm��and�� the�� concept�on��of�� the��human��be�ng��as�� “a��un�t�� endowed��w�th�� �ntellectual,��

regarded��by��the��Greeks��as��express�ve��of��anyth�ng��but��the��essence��of��man,��whereas��the��term��‘hypostas�s’��was��already��closely��l�nked��w�th��the��term��‘substance’��and��f�nally��was���dent�f�ed��fully��w�th���t…��from��an��adjunct��to��a��be�ng��(a��k�nd��of��mask)��the��person��becomes��the��be�ng���tself��and�� �s�� s�multaneously��–��a��most�� s�gn�f�cant��po�nt��–�� the constitutive element�� (the��‘pr�nc�ple’��or��‘cause’)��of��be�ngs”��(J.��Z�z�oulas,��Being as Communion. Studies in Personhood and the Church,��New��York:��St.��Vlad�m�r’s��Sem�nary��Press,��1997,��pp.��36-39).

44�� Sophrony,��Arch�mandr�te,��Saint Silouan the Athonite,�� translated��by��R.��Edmonds,��Waldon:��Stavropeg�c��Monastery��of��St.��John��the��Bapt�st,��1991,��p.��227.

45�� K.��Ware,��“The��Human��Person��as��an��Icon��of��the��Tr�n�ty”,���n��Sobornost,��8,��2��(1986),��p.��17.��See��also��N.��Berdyaev,��The Beginning and the End,�� translated��by��R.��M.��French,��London:��Geoffrey��Bles,��1952,��pp.��135-136:��“the���nd�v�dual���s��a��natural�st�c��and��soc�olog�cal��category.��The���nd�v�dual���s��born��w�th�n��the��gener�c��process��and��belongs��to��the��natural��world.��Personal-�ty,��on�� the��other��hand,�� �s��a��sp�r�tual��and��eth�cal��category.�� It�� �s��not��born��of��a�� father��and��mother,���t���s��created��sp�r�tually��and��g�ves��actual��effect��to��the��d�v�ne���dea��of��man.��Personal�ty���s��not��nature,���t���s��freedom,��and���t���s��sp�r�t”.

psycholog�cal��and��moral��qual�t�es��centered��on��the��ax�s��of��consc�ousness”.46

But�� the�� theology��of�� the��Eastern��Church��would��have�� �nsp�red��an��extremely��d�fferent��approach,�� reject�ng�� the��understand�ng��of�� the��human��personhood��as��“a��complex��of��natural,��psycholog�cal��or��moral��qual�t�es��wh�ch��are�� �n�� some��sense��‘possessed’��by��or�� ‘conta�ned’�� �n�� the��human�� �nd�v�duum”,��wh�le��argu�ng�� that�� the��person��cannot��be��conce�ved��“as��a��stat�c��ent�ty,��but��only��as���t��relates��to”.��Accord�ng��to�� th�s��v�ew,��personhood��should��be��conce�ved��as��pr�or�� to��consc�ous�� reflect�on,��rat�onal��dec�s�on��or��product�v�ty,��reveal�ng���tself��only��through��the��acts��of��freedom,��creat�v�ty��and��love.��The��“two��bas�c��aspects��of��personhood”��would��be��ekstas�s��and��hypostas�s:��on��the��one��hand,��the��“openness��of��be�ng”,��“the��ek-stas�s��of��be�ng,��that���s,��a��movement��towards��commun�on��wh�ch��leads��to��transcendence��of��the��boundar�es��of��the��‘self’��and��thus��to��freedom”;��on��the��other��hand,��“a��cathol�c,��that���s,�� �ntegral��and��und�v�ded”��mode��of��ex�stence,��a��hypostas�s��“absolutely��un�que��and��unrepeatable”��that��should��not��be��seen��as��an��atom��or��a��“part”��of��human�ty,��but��as��a��s�ngular��measure��of��“the��total�ty��of��human��nature”.47

It��follows��that��from��the��po�nt��of��v�ew��of��a��Chr�st�an��Orthodox��anthropology,��the��person��and��the���nd�v�dual��should��be��conce�ved��as��the��two��oppos�te��poles��of��the��human��real�ty��(as��Arch�mandr�te��Sophrony��and��others��have��argued):��the��state��of��the���nd�v�dual��(atomon)���s��a��state��of��separat�on��and��estrangement��reflect�ng��the��Fall��of��Man,��wh�le��the��person��(prosopon,��persona)��refers��to��the��everlast�ng���mage��of��God��and��should��be��understood��merely��as��a��potent�al�ty��that��may��or��may��not��be��actual�zed���n��our��earthly��ex�stence��(the��same��was��the��case��w�th��Herder’s��not�on��of��“or�g�nal�ty”).

In��add�t�on��to��th�s,���t���s���mportant��to��real�ze,��at��the��level��of��self-express�on,��that��any��attempt��to��capture��the��mystery��or��the��‘alter�ty’��of��a��s�ngular��person���n��a��d�scourse��w�ll��unavo�dably��sum��up��a��m�xture��of��so-called��‘�nd�v�dual’��character�st�cs,��‘tra�ts��of��character’��that��really��belong��to��no��one���n��part�cular,��that��are��gener�c,���mpersonal��features��of�� the��common��nature��of��man.48��And��I�� th�nk��that��follow�ng��a��completely��d�fferent��path,��M.��Foucault��has��reached��a��s�m�lar��conclus�on��when��he��denounces��the��perverse,�� �ns�d�ous��all�ance��between��the��effect��of�� total�zat�on��and��the��effect��of���nd�v�dual�zat�on��character�z�ng�� the��modern��b�opol�t�cal��parad�gm.��In��Foucault’s��v�ew,��“b�o-power”���s��not��about��repress�ng���nd�v�duals,��deny�ng��them��the��means��of��self-express�on,��but��rather���t���s��about��produc�ng���nd�v�duals��and���dent�t�es��by��way��of��comb�n�ng��the��d�sc�pl�nes��of��the��body��w�th��the��regulat�ons��of��the��populat�on.49

To��conclude��th�s��sect�on,��I��would��hold��that��modern���nd�v�dual�sm��may��actually��

46�� J.��Z�z�oulas,�� “Human��Capac�ty��and��Human�� Incapac�ty:��A��Theolog�cal��Explorat�on��of��Personhood”,��repr�nted���n��Communion and Otherness: Further Studies in Personhood and the Church,��ed�ted��by��Paul��McPartlan,��London:��T&T��Clark,��2006,��pp.��210-211.

47�� Ib�d.,��pp.��212-213.48�� “F�nally,��we��adm�t�� that��what�� �s��most��dear�� to��us�� �n��someone,��what��makes��h�m��h�mself,��

rema�ns���ndef�nable,��for�� there���s��noth�ng���n��nature��wh�ch��properly��perta�ns��to��the��person,��wh�ch�� �s��always��un�que��and�� �ncomparable”�� (Vl.��Lossky,��The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church,��p.��121).

49�� See��M.��Foucault,��“The��Subject��and��Power”,���n��Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics,��ed�ted��by��Hubert��L.��Dreyfus��and��Paul��Rab�now,��Ch�cago:��Ch�cago��Un�vers�ty��Press,��1983,��p.��213.

104 �� What���s��Wrong��w�th��‘Be�ng��Authent�c’?����/����Cr�st�an��IFTODE������������105

have���ts��roots���n��the��Chr�st�an��trad�t�on��(as���n��the��case��of��Le�bn�z,50��h�s��perspect�v�sm��be�ng��cruc�al��for��what��A.��Renaut��and��others��have��called��“the��Age��of��the��Ind�v�dual”),��but�� �t�� comes�� to��be��seen,��at�� least�� �n�� the��Orthodox�� trad�t�on,��as�� the��adversary��of��relat�onal��personal�sm.��And�� that�� �s��because,��unl�ke��monads��w�th��“no��w�ndows”��(Le�bn�z,��Monadology,��§7),��human��persons�� f�nd�� the�r�� real�ty��and�� the�r�� ‘be�ng’,��accord�ng��to��th�s��Chr�st�an��perspect�ve,��only���n��relat�on��to��God��and��to��one��another��–��and��above��all,���n��that��parad�gmat�c��relat�onsh�p��called��love:��that��self-transcendent��love��supposed��to��transfer��the��be�ng��of��the��person��who��loves���nto��the��person��that���s��loved,��follow�ng��the��d�v�ne,��per�choret�c��model��of��the��Holy��Tr�n�ty.

The-‘final’-Foucault-about-philosophy-as-care-of-the-self-and-politics-of-ourselves:-Towards-an-understanding-of-authenticity-as-a-social-virtue

Let��us�� return��now��to�� the��poss�b�l�t�es�� that��Western��contemporary��soc�et�es��seem��to��offer���n��terms��of��choos�ng��a��part�cular��way��of��l�fe��and��self-fash�on�ng.��It��would��appear�� that��we�� face��an��unfortunate��d�lemma:��e�ther��we��hold��on�� to�� the�� �deal��of��authent�c�ty��conce�ved��as�� the��free��express�on��of��our�� �nd�v�dual�ty,��no��matter��how���ncons�stent�� th�s��understand�ng��of��the��self�� turns��out��to��be,��or��we��surrender��to��“the��phon�ness��of��game-play�ng”��(Fr�tz��Perls)��that��seems��to��character�ze��our��day-to-day��soc�al���nteract�ons.51

In��h�s��1982��lectures��at��the��Collège��de��France,��Foucault��makes��at��some��po�nt��th�s��cap�tal��statement:��

“When��one��sees��the��mean�ng,��or��rather��the��near-total��absence��of��mean�ng,��g�ven��to��all�� the��fam�l�ar��express�ons,��such��as:��come��back��to��yourself,�� free��yourself,��be��yourself,��be��authent�c,��etc.��[...]��one��m�ght��beg�n��to��suspect��the���mposs�b�l�ty��of��const�tut�ng�� today��an��eth�c��of�� the��self.��However,�� �t�� �s��perhaps��an��urgent,��fundamental,��and��pol�t�cally�� �nd�spensable�� task�� that��of��const�tut�ng��an��eth�c��of��the��self,�� �f�� �t�� �s��true��that��after��all�� there���s��no��other��po�nt��[...]��of��res�stance��to��pol�t�cal��power��than���n��the��relat�on��of��the��self��to���tself”.52

Foucault��was��well��aware��of��the��‘strateg�c’��use��that��the��rhetor�c��of��authent�c�ty��and��self-determ�nat�on��may��have���n��the��context��of��a��b�opol�t�cal��process��of��subject�vat�on,��

50�� See��on�� th�s��matter��Le�bn�z,��Système nouveau de la nature et de la communication des substances�� (1695),��§16,��where��he��deems��h�s��ph�losoph�cal�� �nd�v�dual�sm��to��be��a��way��of��re�nforc�ng��fa�th���n��God,��etern�ty��of��the��soul��and��free��w�ll.

51�� In��th�s��second��case,��we��m�ght��st�ll��procla�m,��as��Gu�gnon��po�nts��out,��“a��sort��of��postmodern��vers�on��of�� authent�c�ty”:�� “embrac�ng�� the�� fact�� that�� there�� �s��no�� ‘true�� self’�� to��be”,�� “the��postmodern���deal,�� then,�� �s�� to��be�� that�� lack��of��self��w�th��playfulness��and���ron�c��amusement”��(Ch.��Gu�gnon,��op. cit., p.��61).

52�� The��passage�� �s��quoted��after��E.��McGush�n,��Foucault’s Askêsis: An Introduction to the Philosophical Life,��Evanston,�� IL:��Northwestern��Un�vers�ty��Press,��2007,��p.��XV;�� the��full��passage,���n��a��sl�ghtly��d�fferent��translat�on,���s��to��be��found���n��M.��Foucault,��The��Hermeneutics of the Subject. Lectures at the Collège de France 1981-1982,�� translated��by��G.��Burchell,��New��York:��Palgrave��MacM�llan,��2005,��pp.��251-252.

free�ng��us��from��the��‘burden’��of��fundamental��eth�cal��and��pol�t�cal��obl�gat�ons.��The��seem�ng��paradox���s��that��by��encourag�ng��us��to��“be��ourselves”��w�thout��any��sp�r�tual��‘tra�n�ng’��whatsoever,�� the��pop��culture��of��authent�c�ty��actually��makes��us��extremely��vulnerable�� to��all�� the��‘rec�pes’��for��happ�ness��and��self-accompl�shment��del�vered���n��the��publ�c��space,��wh�le��mak�ng��us���nd�fferent��to��the��mechan�sms��and��the��procedures��of��pol�t�cal��dec�s�on.��Thus,�� the��demand��for��authent�c�ty�� loses��any��actual��mean�ng��and,��worse��than��that,���t��becomes���tself��a��d�sc�pl�nary��techn�que,��an���nstrument��used���n��ascr�b�ng��to���nd�v�duals��‘normal’,��standard���dent�t�es,��reassur�ng��them��that��th�s���s��what�� they��‘really’��want��or��what�� they��‘really’��are.53��But��know�ng��all�� th�s,��Foucault��st�ll��procla�ms��that��to��art�culate��“an��eth�c��of��the��self”���s��the��only��poss�ble��“res�stance”��to��d�sc�pl�nary��power.

What��I��w�sh��to��suggest���n��th�s��f�nal��sect�on���s��that,��contrary��to��the��general��v�ews��expressed���n��the��80s��and��the��90s��accus�ng��the��‘last’��Foucault��of��a��narc�ss�st�c,��“ant�-human�st�� �nd�v�dual�sm”��(as��A.��Renaut��and��many��others��have��argued),��h�s�� f�nal��eth�cal��project��may��actually��help��us��w�th��some��v�tal��clues��about��how��to��elaborate��a��not�on��of��authent�c�ty�� that��avo�ds�� �f��not��all,��at�� least��many��of�� the��p�tfalls��of�� the��modern��culture��of��authent�c�ty��that��I��ment�oned���n��the��beg�nn�ng��of��my��paper.

It��could��be��argued��that��the��very��ment�on�ng��of��Foucault��as��an��‘�nd�v�dual�st’���s��unsu�table,54��tak�ng���nto��account��that��the��French��th�nker��judged��the��def�n�t�on��of��“the��self��as��someth�ng��wholly��conta�ned��w�th�n��an���nd�v�dual��monad”��as��actually��be�ng��“the��effect��of��techn�ques��of��separat�on,���solat�on,���nd�v�duat�on,��and��d�fferent�at�on”��that��shape��the��modern��world.55��Follow�ng��McGush�n’s��remarks,��we��could��state��that��a��monadolog�cal���nd�v�dual�sm���s��noth�ng��but��“a��d�sc�pl�nary��effect”��of��the��modern��b�opol�t�cal��parad�gm��and��that��“for��Foucault,�� the��self�� �s��not��conta�ned��w�th�n���tself��but���s��always��outs�de��of���tself��—���nhab�t�ng���ts��relat�onsh�ps,��grasp�ng���tself��through��soc�al��and��h�stor�cal��pract�ces,��know�ng���tself���n��terms��of��d�scourses��produced��around��and��through���t”.56��And��th�s�� �s��what��I�� th�nk��expla�ns��h�s��f�nal��return�� to�� the��anc�ent��understand�ng��of��ph�losophy��as��“ascet�cs”��and��“care��of��the��self”.

As��Fr.��Gros��expla�ns�� �t,�� “what�� �nterests��Foucault�� �n�� the��care��of�� the��self,�� �s��the��manner��by��wh�ch�� �t�� �s�� �ntegrated�� �n�� the��soc�al�� fabr�c��and��const�tutes��a��motor��

53�� “Of��course��the���ndependence��can��become��a��very��shallow��affa�r,���n��wh�ch��masses��of��people��each��try��to��express��the�r���nd�v�dual�ty���n��stereotyped��fash�on.��It�� �s��a��cr�t�que��that��has��often��been��made��of��modern��consumer��soc�ety��that���t��tends��to��breed��a��herd��of��conform�st���nd�v�du-als”��(Ch.��Taylor,��Sources of the Self,��p.��40).

54�� I��developed��th�s��argument,�� �n��s�m�lar�� terms,�� �n��my��art�cle��“Foucault’s��Idea��of��Ph�losophy��as��‘Care��of�� the��Self’:��Cr�t�cal��Assessment��and��Confl�ct�ng��Metaph�losoph�cal��V�ews”,�� �n��Elsevier Procedia – Social and Behavioral Sciences,��71��(2013),��pp.��76-85.

55�� E.��McGush�n,��Foucault’s Askêsis,��p.��301.�� In��h�s�� �llum�nat�ng��study��“The��Subject��and��Power”,��Foucault��states��that�� the��struggle��for��a��modern��subject�v�ty���nvolves��two��levels��of��res�stance:��on��the��one��hand,��there���s��the��res�stance��to��normalization��by��assert�ng��“the��r�ght��to��be��d�fferent”;��on��the��other��hand,��we��may��speak��of��a��res�stance��to��sol�tude��or��estrangement,��to��“everyth�ng��wh�ch�� separates�� the�� �nd�v�dual,��breaks��h�s�� l�nks��w�th��others,�� spl�ts��up��commun�ty��l�fe,��forces��the���nd�v�dual��back��on��h�mself��and��t�es��h�m��to��h�s��own���dent�ty���n��a��constra�n�ng��way”��(pp.��211-212).

56�� E.��McGush�n,��Foucault’s Askêsis,��p.��301.

106 �� What���s��Wrong��w�th��‘Be�ng��Authent�c’?����/����Cr�st�an��IFTODE������������107

for��pol�t�cal��act�on”.57��It�� �s��of��v�tal�� �mportance��to��remember��that�� �n���ts��Socrat�c��or��Sto�c��context,��the��care��of��the��self��d�dn’t���mply��“a��sol�tary��act�v�ty”,��but��that���t��“was��exerc�sed�� �n��a�� largely��communal��and�� �nst�tut�onal�� framework”,��const�tut�ng��“an���ntens�f�ed��mode��of��soc�al�� relat�on”��and��hav�ng��a��goal�� that��was��both��eth�cal��and��pol�t�cal.��We��should��not��also��neglect��the��essent�al��role��of��a��partner���n��the��act�v�t�es��of��tak�ng��care��of��oneself,��“the��f�gure��of��the��master��of��ex�stence”,��the��one��help�ng��me��to��learn��how��to��‘care’.��It���s��equally��true��that��for��a��Greek��or��a��Roman��ph�losopher,��the��care��of��the��self��could��not��be��separated��from��the��care��for��others.��In��fact,��most��of��the��sp�r�tual��exerc�ses��or��“techn�ques��of�� the��self”��(understood��as��concrete��pract�ces��of��eth�cal��subject�vat�on)��took��“the��form��of��em�nently��soc�al��act�v�t�es:��conversat�ons,��correspondences,�� teach�ng��and��apprent�cesh�p���n��the��schools,�� �nd�v�dual��format�on,��et��cetera”.58�� In��add�t�on,�� �f��we��accept��Hadot’s��read�ng��of�� the��sp�r�tual��exerc�ses,59��all��of�� them��supposed��a��d�alog�cal��structure,�� �mpl�c�t�� �f��not��expl�c�t:�� they���nvolved��enhanc�ng��attent�on��and��a��permanent��d�alogue��w�th��oneself�� as��well�� as��others,��assum�ng��the��‘self’��as��a��work��to��accompl�sh��and��thus��a��part�cular��d�stance��between��myself��as��I��am��at��the��present��moment��and��the��one��I��could��become,��a��relat�onsh�p��to��my��own��self��as��another��(than��the��person��I��am��now).

But��how��could��all��these��reflect�ons��about��the��anc�ent��ph�losoph�cal��pract�ce��seen��as��a��“way��of��l�fe”,���f��not��as��the��“true��l�fe”��(alêthês��b�os),��help��us��w�th��our��modern��not�on��of��authent�c�ty?��Follow�ng��up��to��a��certa�n��po�nt��Gu�gnon’s��remarks��from��the��last��chapter��of��h�s��book��On��be�ng��Authent�c,��I��would��say��that��the��b�g��problem��comes��from��the��fact�� that��we��are��accustomed��to��th�nk��of��the���deal��of��authent�c�ty���n��terms��of��a��self-regard�ng,���nd�v�dual�st�c��v�rtue,��when���t��should��be��cons�dered��(at��the��same��t�me)��a��soc�al��v�rtue.

In��an�� �ns�ghtful��chapter��of��h�s��book��Truth��and��Truthfulness60,��B.��W�ll�ams��argues�� that�� the��very��mean�ng��of��not�ons��such��as��“att�tude”��or��“bel�ef”�� �mpl�es��an���dea��of��stead�ness:��“our��declarat�ons��do��need��to��be��patterned���n��some��ways��rather��than��others���f�� they��are��to��count��as��declarat�ons��of��any��sort��of��bel�ef��or��op�n�on”.61��But�� th�s��stead�ness�� �s��not��someth�ng��we��naturally��possess��or�� that��could��be��eas�ly��obta�ned��through���ntrospect�on,���n��a��Rousseau�st��self-transparency;��the���nteract�ons��w�th��others��w�th�n��the��soc�al��context��are��the��th�ng��that���s��forc�ng��us���nto��“steady�ng”��our��m�nds.��“The��bas�c��mechan�sm��depends��on��the��fact��that��there��are��others��who��need��to��rely��on��our��d�spos�t�ons,��and��we��want��them��to��be��able��to��rely��on��our��d�spos�t�ons��because��we,��up�� to��a��po�nt,��want�� to�� rely��on�� the�rs”.62��The�� lesson�� that��W�ll�ams��draws��from��confront�ng��two��key��f�gures��of��Enl�ghtenment,��Rousseau��and��D�derot,���s�� that��“we��need��each��other�� �n��order�� to��be��anybody”.63��“Drawn��to��[…]��make��my��

57�� Fr.��Gros,��“Le��souc���de��so���chez��M�chel��Foucault”,��p.��701.58�� Ib�d.,��p.��702.59�� See��P.��Hadot,��Philosophy as a Way of Life: Spiritual Exercises from Socrates to Foucault,��

translated��by��M.��Chase,��Oxford��UK��and��Cambr�dge��USA:��Blackwell,��1995.60�� See��B.��W�ll�ams,��“From��S�ncer�ty��to��Authent�c�ty”,���n��Truth and Truthfulness: An Essay in

Genealogy,��Pr�nceton��and��Oxford:��Pr�nceton��Un�vers�ty��Press,��2002.61�� Ib�d.��p.��192.62�� Ib�d.63�� Ib�d.,��p.��200.

own��bel�efs��and��feel�ngs��stead�er��(to��make��them,��at��the��l�m�t,��for��the��f�rst��t�me���nto��bel�efs),��I��become��what��w�th���ncreas�ng��stead�ness��I��can��s�ncerely��profess”,��states��W�ll�ams.64��But���sn’t��th�s��an��accurate��descr�pt�on��of��the��“gnom�c”��self��of��the��Anc�ents���n��Foucault’s��read�ng,��the��very���dea��of��an��“etho-poet�c”��effort,��the��real��sense��of��the��“aesthet�cs��of��ex�stence”��–��not��“a��dandy�sm��of��the��20th��century”��(as��Hadot��th�nks),��but��“a��harmony��between��logo���and��erga”��(Gros)?

The��key��quest�on��we��have��to��ask��at�� th�s��f�nal��po�nt�� �s�� the��follow�ng:��who��are��the��others��that��help��me��stab�l�ze��my��bel�efs��and��f�nally��shape��my��personal���dent�ty?��And��does��th�s�� �nescapable��relat�onsh�p��to��others��automat�cally��mean��surrender�ng��to��“the��d�ctatorsh�p��of��the��Anyone”��(He�degger’s��das��Man)��or��to��“the��latest��fads��and��fanc�es��purveyed��by��the��med�a”?65��The��others��are��hold�ng��the��scales��for��we�gh�ng��the�� ‘quant�t�es’��of�� self-d�scovery��and�� self-�nvent�on�� �nvolved�� �n��my��very��own��search��for��authent�c�ty.��But��these��others��aren’t��just��anyone;��they��are��“the��s�gn�f�cant��others”66,��“the��cr�t�cal��fr�ends”67,��or��maybe��those��who,��l�ke��myself,��have��undergone��a��ph�losoph�cal�� tra�n�ng��that��prov�ded��them��w�th��the��conceptual�� tools��necessary���n��order�� to��analyze��and��cr�t�c�ze��my��att�tudes,��bel�efs��and��general��v�ews.��Or��–��even��more��restr�ct�vely��–�� those��who��have��proved��that�� they��know��how��‘to�� take��care��of��themselves’.�� In��short,�� those��w�th��whom��I��sense��myself��closer�� to�� that�� �deal��state��that��Jaspers��called��“authent�c��commun�cat�on”,68��and��K.-O.��Apel,��“argumentat�ve��commun�ty”.69

I�� th�nk�� that��Foucault’s�� return,�� �n��h�s�� f�nal��years,�� to��a��ph�losophy��seen��as��a��sp�r�tual��pract�ce��and��an��effort��of��self-transformat�on��may��help��us���n��mak�ng��more��sense��of��our��modern��not�on��of��authent�c�ty.��Th�s��convers�on���mpl�es��two��d�mens�ons���nextr�cably�� t�ed�� together.��On��the��one��hand,��at��a��personal��or�� rather�� �nterpersonal��

64�� Ib�d.��p.��204.65�� Ch.��Gu�gnon,��op. cit.,��p.��5.66�� See��G.��H.��Mead,��Mind, Self, and Society,��ed�ted��by��Ch.��Morr�s,��Ch�cago��and��London:��The��

Un�vers�ty��of��Ch�cago��Press,��1962,���n��part�cular��pp.��140-141;��p.��195;��pp.��368-373.��See��also��H.��S.��Sull�van,��The Interpersonal Theory of Psychiatry,��London:��Routledge,��2001.

67�� See��for���nstance��the���nterv�ew��“The��Illus�on��of��Self-Suff�c�ency”,��g�ven��by��Al.��MacIntyre��to��A.��Voorhoeve,�� �n��Conversations on Ethics,��New��York:��Oxford��Un�vers�ty��Press,��2009,��p.��120:��“What���s��the��consequence��of��not��hav�ng��cr�t�cal��fr�ends?��It���s��that��one��becomes��the��v�ct�m��of��one’s��hopes��and��fears,��of��w�shful��th�nk�ng��and��fantasy”.

68�� “The��certa�nty��of��authent�c��be�ng��res�des��only���n��unreserved��commun�cat�on��between��men��who��l�ve��together��and��v�e��w�th��one��another���n��a��free��commun�ty,��who��regard��the�r��assoc�a-t�on��w�th��one��another��as��but��a��prel�m�nary��stage,��who��take��noth�ng��for��granted��and��quest�on��everyth�ng”��(K.��Jaspers,��Way to Wisdom: An Introduction to Philosophy,�� translated��by��R.��Manhe�m,��New��Haven��and��London:��Yale��Un�vers�ty��Press,��1954, p.��26).

69�� See��K.-O.��Apel,��“The��A Priori of��the��Commun�cat�on��Commun�ty��and��the��Foundat�on��of��Eth�cs:��The��Problem��of��a��Rat�onal��Foundat�on��of��Eth�cs���n��the��Sc�ent�f�c��Age”,���n��Selected Essays. Volume Two: Ethics and the Theory of Rationality,��ed�ted��by��E.��Mend�era,��New��Jersey:��Human�t�es��Press,��1996.��See��also��Ch.��Taylor,��Sources of the Self,��p.��37:��“They��are��st�ll���n��a��web,��but��the��one��they��def�ne��themselves��by���s��no��longer��the��g�ven��h�stor�cal��com-mun�ty.��It���s��the��sav�ng��remnant,��or��the��commun�ty��of��the��l�ke-m�nded��souls,��or��the��company��of��ph�losophers,��or��the��small��group��of��w�se��men���n��the��mass��of��fools,��as��the��Sto�cs��saw���t,��or��the��close��c�rcle��of��fr�ends��that��played��such��a��role���n��Ep�cur�an��thought”.

108 �� What���s��Wrong��w�th��‘Be�ng��Authent�c’?����/����Cr�st�an��IFTODE������������109

level,��there���s��the��care��of��the��self:��the��struggle��to��l�ve���n��perfect��harmony��to��a��chosen��ph�losophy,�� to��completely��absorb���t�� �nto��one’s�� l�fe��and��act�ons,�� to��make���t�� true��by��your��own��example.��On�� the��other��hand,��at��a��publ�c�� level,�� there�� �s�� the��pol�t�cs��of��ourselves.��Th�s��means��be�ng��able��to��address��a��v�tal��quest�on:��“�n��what���s��g�ven��to��us��as��un�versal,��necessary,��obl�gatory,��what��place���s��occup�ed��by��whatever���s��s�ngular,��cont�ngent,��and��the��product��of��arb�trary��constra�nts?”.70��At��th�s��stage,��we��can��truly��grasp�� the�� �mportance��of��authent�c�ty��conce�ved��as��a��soc�al��v�rtue;�� �t�� �nvolves�� the��sincerity and the courage of those people that Foucault named “parrhēsiasts”: people that��don’t��hes�tate��to��express��“the��unpopular��v�ews”,��th�s��be�ng��a��cruc�al��cond�t�on��for��the��proper��funct�on�ng��of��a��democrat�c��reg�me.71

Instead��of��abandon�ng��the��culture��of��authent�c�ty��together��w�th��the��eth�c��of��the��self,��maybe���t���s��t�me��to��shape��an���dea��of��authent�c�ty��that��w�ll��not��be��the��express�on��of��monadolog�cal�� �nd�v�dual�sm,��but�� that��w�ll��hold��a��s�gn�f�cant��commun�tar�an��d�mens�on.��At�� th�s�� po�nt,�� �f��we��manage�� to��d�stance��ourselves�� from��a�� str�ctly��N�etzschean��read�ng��of��Foucault’s��ph�losophy��(whether���t�� �s��a��favorable��one,��as���n��the��case��of��Deleuze’s��monography72,��a��less��favorable��one,��as���n��the��case��of��Rorty73,��or��an��extremely��cr�t�cal��one,��as���n��the��case��of��Ferry,��Renaut74,��Habermas75,��or��even��Taylor76),��we��m�ght��recons�der��h�s��f�nal��reflect�ons��about�� the��“care��of�� the��self”��as��art�culat�ng��a��way��to��reject��an���deal��of��authent�c�ty��rooted���n��N�etzsche’s��dream��of��a��“great��man”.77

70�� M.��Foucault,��“What���s��Enl�ghtenment?”,��p.��42.71�� “The��express�on��of��unpopular��v�ews�� �s��espec�ally�� �mportant�� for��a��democrat�c�� soc�ety,��

because���t���s��a��presuppos�t�on��of��a��free��soc�ety��that���t���s��only��by��play�ng��off��a��d�verse��range��of��v�ews���n��the��ongo�ng��conversat�on��of��the��commun�ty��that��the��best��poss�ble��answers��can��be��reached”��(Gu�gnon,��op. cit., p.��82).

72�� See��G.��Deleuze,��Foucault,�� translated��by��S.��Hand,��M�nneapol�s:��Un�vers�ty��of��M�nnesota��Press,��1988.

73�� See��R.��Rorty,��“Moral��Ident�ty��and��Pr�vate��Autonomy:��The��Case��of��Foucault”,���n��Essays on Heidegger and Others,��New��York:��Cambr�dge��Un�vers�ty��Press,��1991.

74�� See��L.��Ferry��and��A.��Renaut,��French Philosophy of the Sixties: An Essay on Antihumanism,��translated��by��M.��Cattan�,��Amherst:��The��Un�vers�ty��of��Massachusetts��Press,��1990.

75�� See��J.��Habermas,��The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures,��translated��by��Fr.��Lawrence,��Cambr�dge,��MA:��The��MIT��Press,��1987.

76�� See��Ch.��Taylor,��“Foucault��on��Freedom��and��Truth”,���n��Political Theory,��Vol.��12,��No.��2,��1984,��pp.��152-183.

77�� “A��great��man��–��a��man��whom��nature��has��constructed��and���nvented���n��the��grand��style��–��what���s��he?��[…].��If��he��cannot��lead,��he��goes��alone;��then���t��can��happen��that��he��may��snarl��at��some��th�ngs��he��meets��on��h�s��way��[…]��he��wants��no��‘sympathet�c’��heart,��but��servants,��tools;���n��h�s���ntercourse��w�th��men��he���s��always���ntent��on��mak�ng��someth�ng��out��of��them.��He��knows��he���s���ncommun�cable:��he��f�nds���t��tasteless��to��be��fam�l�ar;��and��when��one��th�nks��he���s,��he��usually���s��not.��When��not��speak�ng��to��h�mself,��he��wears��a��mask.��He��rather��l�es��than��tells��the��truth:���t��requ�res��more��sp�r�t��and��will.��There���s��a��sol�tude��w�th�n��h�m��that���s���naccess�ble��to��pra�se��or��blame,��h�s��own��just�ce��that���s��beyond��appeal”��(Fr.��N�etzsche,��The Will to Power,��translated��by��W.��Kaufmann��and��R.��J.��Holl�ngdale,��New��York:��V�ntage��Books,��1968,��§��962,��p.��505).��Th�s��passage���s��also��quoted��by��Al.��MacIntyre���n��the��f�nal��chapter��of��h�s��already��class�cal��book��After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory,��th�rd��ed�t�on,��Notre��Dame:��Un�vers�ty��of��Notre��Dame��Press,��2007.

F�rst�� of�� all,��we��would��have�� to�� recogn�ze�� that�� there�� �sn’t�� such�� a�� th�ng�� as��choos�ng��oneself��‘from��scratch’,��s�nce��I��am��always��already���nstalled���n��a��commun�ty,��(de)formed��by��a��part�cular��educat�on��and��const�tuted��by��some���nternal�zed��soc�al��demands.78��Th�s��means�� that�� the��act��of��choos�ng��oneself�� �s�� real�zed��only�� �n�� the��complex�� game�� of�� assum�ng/d�stanc�ng�� from�� the�� standards�� and�� values�� of�� my��commun�ty��and��my��t�me.79��Th�s��also��means�� that�� the��new��‘values’��or��‘goods’�� that��a��‘great��man’��would��propose��are��not��values��as��such,��but��only��cand�dates��for�� th�s��t�tle,��wa�t�ng��and��hop�ng��for��the�r��val�dat�on���n��the��context��of��soc�al�� �nteract�ons.80��It�� follows�� that�� a�� cons�stent�� �dea��of�� authent�c�ty�� should��not�� �mply�� the�� rad�cal��sol�tude��of��N�etzsche’s�� ‘great��man’��–��“a��pseudo-concept”,��“�nd�v�dual�sm’s��f�nal��attempt��to��escape��from���ts��own��consequences”,��accord�ng��to��MacIntyre81��–��but��the���ntens�f�cat�on��of��soc�al�� relat�onsh�ps,�� �n��agreement��w�th�� the��or�g�nal��mean�ng��of��ep�mele�a��heautou��(“care��of��the��self”).

To��conclude,��I��am��not�� try�ng��to��suggest�� that��Foucault’s��ph�losophy��does��not��suppose��an��unden�able��N�etzschean��source.��But��th�s��could��be��expla�ned���n��terms��of��Foucault’s��acknowledgement��of��a��v�tal��need,���n��any��commun�ty,��not��only��for��‘good’��Cyn�cs�� (as��MacIntyre,��Taylor��and��other��cr�t�cs��of��modern�ty),��but��also�� for�� ‘bad’��Cyn�cs:��82��the��ones��forc�ng��upon��us��a��rad�cal��cr�t�que��of��our���nst�tut�ons,��pract�ces��and��“games��of��truth”,��deconstruct�ng��the��“jargon��of��authent�c�ty”���n��the��name��of��a��more��genu�ne��search��for��authent�c�ty,��well��aware��of��the��fact��that��any��focus��of��res�stance��to��d�sc�pl�nary��power��w�ll��soon��become��a��structure��of��power���n���tself,���f��not��cons�stently��

78�� “Th�ngs��take��on���mportance��aga�nst��a��background��of���ntell�g�b�l�ty.��Let��us��call��th�s��a��hor�zon.��It��follows��that��one��of��the��th�ngs��we��can’t��do,���f��we��are��to��def�ne��ourselves��s�gn�f�cantly,���s��suppress��or��deny��the��hor�zons��aga�nst��wh�ch��th�ngs��take��on��s�gn�f�cance��for��us��[…]��Self-cho�ce��as��an���deal��makes��sense��only��because��some���ssues��are��more��s�gn�f�cant��than��others…��Wh�ch���ssues��are��s�gn�f�cant,��I��do��not��determ�ne.��If��I��d�d,��no���ssue��would��be��s�gn�f�cant.��But��then��the��very���deal��of��self-choos�ng��as��a��moral���deal��would��be���mposs�ble��[…]��Otherw�se��put,�� I��can��def�ne��my�� �dent�ty��only��aga�nst�� the��background��of�� th�ngs�� that��matter.��But�� to��bracket��out��h�story,��nature,��soc�ety,�� the��demands��of��sol�dar�ty,��everyth�ng��but��what��I��f�nd���n��myself,��would��be��to��el�m�nate��all��cand�dates��for��what��matters��[…]��Authent�c�ty�� �s��not��the��enemy��of��demands��that��emanate��from��beyond��the��self;���t��supposes��such��demands”��(Ch.��Taylor,��The Ethics of Authenticity,��pp.��37-41).

79�� “[…]��the��def�n�t�on��of��our���dent�ty.��We��def�ne��th�s��always���n��d�alogue��w�th,��somet�mes���n��struggle��aga�nst,��the���dent�t�es��our��s�gn�f�cant��others��want��to��recogn�ze���n��us.��And��even��when��we��outgrow��some��of�� the��latter��–��our��parents,��for�� �nstance��–��and��they��d�sappear��from��our��l�ves,��the��conversat�on��w�th��them��cont�nues��w�th�n��us��as��long��as��we��l�ve”��(Ib�d.,��p.��33).

80�� “Goods,��and��w�th��them��the��only��grounds��for��the��author�ty��of��laws��and��v�rtues,��can��only��be��d�scovered��by��enter�ng���nto��those��relat�onsh�ps��wh�ch��const�tutes��commun�t�es��whose��central��bound���s��a��shared��v�s�on��of��and��understand�ng��of��goods”��(Al.��MacIntyre,��After Virtue,��p.��258).

81�� Ib�d.,��p.��259.82�� “In�� th�s��West,��wh�ch��has�� �nvented��many��d�fferent�� truths��and��fash�oned��so��many��arts��of��

ex�stence,��Cyn�c�sm��constantly��rem�nds��us��that��very��l�ttle��truth���s���nd�spensable��for��whoever��w�shes��to��l�ve��truly��and��that��very��l�ttle��l�fe���s��needed��when��one��truly��holds��to��the��truth”��(M.��Foucault,��The Courage of the Truth (The Government of Self and Others II): Lectures at the Collège de France 1983-1984,�� translated��by��G.��Burchell,��New��York:��Palgrave��Macm�llan,��2011,��p.��190).

110 �� What���s��Wrong��w�th��‘Be�ng��Authent�c’?����/����Cr�st�an��IFTODE������������111

cr�t�cally��approached���n�� �ts�� turn.��I�� th�nk���t�� �s��qu�te��poss�ble�� that�� th�s��k�nd��of��‘bad’��Cyn�c�sm��was,�� �n��Foucault’s��v�ew,�� the�� r�ght��“pol�t�cs��of��ourselves”.�� I��also�� th�nk��that���t���s��from��th�s��po�nt��of��v�ew��that��we��should��understand��Foucault’s���nv�tat�on��to��cult�vate���n��our��l�ves��what��N�etzsche��once��called��“br�ef��hab�ts”,��h�s���ns�stence��upon��the��fact�� that��“tak�ng��d�stance��on��oneself”��or��“th�nk�ng��otherw�se�� than��before”��(se��déprendre��de��so�-même)��should��be��cons�dered��“the��eth�c��of��an�� �ntellectual�� �n��our��day”.83

“My��po�nt���s��not��that��everyth�ng���s��bad,��but��that��everyth�ng���s��dangerous,��wh�ch���s��not��exactly�� the��same��as��bad.�� If��everyth�ng�� �s��dangerous,�� then��we��always��have��someth�ng��to��do.��So��my��pos�t�on��leads��not��to��apathy��but��to��a��hyper-��and��pess�m�st�c��act�v�sm”.84

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Stavropeg�c��Monastery��of��St.��John��the��Bapt�st.Sull�van,��H.��S.��2001.��The Interpersonal Theory of Psychiatry,��London:��Routledge.Taylor,��Ch.��1984.��“Foucault��on��Freedom��and��Truth”,���n��Political Theory,��Vol.��12,��No.��2.–1989. The Sources of the Self. The Making of the Modern Identity,��Cambr�dge,��MA:��Harvard��

Un�vers�ty��Press.

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–1992.��The Ethics of Authenticity,��Cambr�dge,��MA:��Harvard��Un�vers�ty��Press.–2007.��A Secular Age, Cambridge,��MA:��The��Belknap��Press��of��Harvard��Un�vers�ty��Press.Ware,��K.��1986.��“The��Human��Person��as��an��Icon��of��the��Tr�n�ty”,���n��Sobornost,��8,��2.Weber,��M.��1958.��The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism,�� translated��by��T.��Parsons,��

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2.AppliedEthics

114 �� Env�ronmental��R�sk��and��Moral��Obl�gat�ons����/����Adr�an-Paul��ILIESCU������������115

Environmental Risk and Moral Obligations: Reflections on an East European Experience

Adr�an-Paul��ILIESCU

Th�s��paper��a�ms��to��contr�bute��to��an��assessment��of��the��proport�on���n��wh�ch��Roman�an��author�t�es�� fulf�ll�� the�r��moral��duty�� to��protect�� the��populat�on��from��env�ronmental��r�sk��created��by��the��ex�stence��of��nuclear��fac�l�t�es���n��a��country��wh�ch���s��also��exposed��to��se�sm�c��hazard.��Such��an��assessment,�� �n��a��complete��and��elaborated��form,��would���mply��a�� lot��of��work��wh�ch��cannot��be��done��here.��But�� �t�� �s�� �mportant�� that,��at�� least,��some��analyses��be��done��and��some��(worry�ng)�� th�ngs��be��sa�d,��even��before��a�� full-fledged��evaluat�on��of��the��s�tuat�on���s��prov�ded.

Facts-and-threats

Although��Roman�a��ranked��82nd�� (WRI��6.78%)�� �n�� the��Un�ted��Nat�ons’��World Risk Index,��wh�ch�� �mpl�es�� that generally speaking�� �t�� �s�� not�� a��h�gh�� r�sk�� country�� as��compared,��for�� �nstance,��w�th��the��Ph�l�pp�nes��(place��3,��WRI��27.98%)��or��even��w�th��Japan��(place��16,��WRI��13.53%),1��yet���t�� �s��st�ll��a high seismic hazard��country.2��Even��more��alarm�ngly,�� �n��a��certa�n��sense��“on��a��European��scale,��Roman�a��and��Moldav�a��come off worstˮ, due to their high susceptibility, i.e. “likelihood of harm, loss and disruption in an extreme event triggered by a natural hazardˮ.3�� In��part�cular,��Bucharest,�� the��cap�tal��of��Roman�a,�� �s��a��h�gh��se�sm�c�� r�sk�� town,�� ranked��as��“the��10th capital city worldwide in terms of seismic riskˮ and “one of the cities with highest seismic risk in Europeˮ.4��A��h�ghly��reputed��Roman�an��expert,��Dan��Lungu,��ma�nta�ns�� that��Bucharest�� �s�� the��European��cap�tal��w�th�� the��h�ghest��se�sm�c�� r�sk,5��and��h�s��cla�m��seems��to��be��v�nd�cated��by��the��Se�sm�c��Hazard��D�str�but�on��Map��of��Europe,��show�ng��Bucharest��placed�� �n�� the��most��dangerous��b�gger��se�sm�c��area�� �n��Europe.6��The��Roman�an��cap�tal���s��a��crowded��c�ty,��hav�ng��off�c�ally��almost��2��m�ll�on���nhab�tants,��but���n��wh�ch��there��always��are��many��more��people��actually��l�v�ng��(even���f��unreg�stered),��work�ng,�� shopp�ng��or��v�s�t�ng�� temporar�ly;��accord�ng�� to�� some��

��1�� UNO��World Risk Report 2012, onl�ne��document�� at�� the�� address��http://www.ehs.unu.edu/art�cle/read/worldr�skreport-2012,��p.��63.

��2�� For a short but edifying explanation of this ranking see Iuliana Armaş “Earthquake Risk Percept�on���n��Bucharest,��Roman�a”,���n��Risk Analysis,��Vol.��26,��No.��5,��2006,��p.��1224.

��3�� UNO��World Risk Report 2012,��op.��c�t.,��p.��21��and��p.��15. 4 Iuliana Armaş, “Earthquake Risk Perception in Bucharest, Romania”, op. cit., p. 1224.��5�� Dan��Lungu,�� �n�� an�� �nterv�ew��publ�shed��by�� the��newspaper��Adevărul,�� see�� the�� address:��

http://www.adevarul.ro/actual�tate/even�ment/Bucurest�ul-r�d�cat-r�sc-se�sm�c-Europa_0_42597031.html#.��See��also��Dan��Lungu’s��presentat�on��at��the��World Conference on Disaster Reduction,��Japan,��January��18-22,��2005.��

��6�� See��the��map��posted��by��the��World��Health��Organ�zat�on:��http://www.euro.who.�nt/en/what-we-do/health-top�cs/env�ronment-and-health/Cl�mate-change/news/news/2012/03/where-do-natural-hazards-pose-a-publ�c-health-r�sk��(retr�eved��on��12.11.2012).��

est�mates,��on��a��normal��work�ng��day��up��to��3��m�ll�on��people��can��actually��be��present���n�� the��larger��metropol�tan��area��of��Bucharest��(a��f�gure,��however,�� that��could��not��be��ver�f�ed��systemat�cally).��These��d�mens�ons��const�tute��the��very��f�rst��factor��support�ng��the��conclus�on�� that��soc�etal�� r�sk�� �s��h�gh��here.��Among��other�� factors��consol�dat�ng��the�� conclus�on�� that�� Bucharest�� �s�� part�cularly�� vulnerable�� to�� se�sm�c�� hazard,��Roman�an��experts��enumerate:��“the��h�gh��dens�ty��of�� �nhab�tants,��espec�ally��w�th�n��the residential districts with blocks of flats; the old public utility fund; the out-of-date���nfrastructure;��the��numerous���ndustr�al��parks��that��are��undergo�ng��a��restructur�ng��process, not to mention the inefficient organization of civil protection and poor education of the population regarding seismic riskˮ.7

The��level��of��env�ronmental��r�sk���s��s�gn�f�cantly��ampl�f�ed��by��the��ex�stence��of��a big nuclear power plant at Cernavodă,8��less��than��160��km.��(�n��a��stra�ght��l�ne)��from��Bucharest,��wh�le��both�� the��cap�tal��and��the��nuclear��power��plant��are��s�tuated��at�� less��than��200��km.��d�stance��(�n��a��stra�ght��l�ne)��from��the��most��act�ve��se�sm�c��area���n��the��Vrancea��reg�on��(south-east��of��the��country).��As��M�rcea��Radul�an,��Sc�ent�f�c��D�rector��of�� the��Nat�onal�� Inst�tute��for��Earth��Phys�cs��emphas�ses,�� the��Vrancea��se�sm�c��area���s��dangerous��even�� �f�� �t�� �s��200��km.��away��from��the��nuclear��plant.9��The��Roman�an��expert�� spec�f�es�� that�� �t��would�� take��a��magn�tude��8�� (R�chter��Scale)��earthquake�� to��cause��an��explos�on��at�� the��nuclear��power��plant��–�� that,��of��course,�� �s��a��stat�st�cally��rare��phenomenon.��But,��although��unl�kely��over��short��per�ods��of��t�me,��such��an��event��unfortunately��rema�ns��ent�rely��poss�ble.��Stat�st�cal��data��shows��that��7.5��magn�tude��earthquakes��occur�� �n�� the��Vrancea�� reg�on�� every��80��years;10�� 8�� or�� 9��magn�tude��earthquakes��are��much��rarer,��but��of��course��not��excluded.��Thus,��a��very��b�g��earthquake��tak�ng��place�� �n�� that�� reg�on��can��affect��d�rectly��both��Bucharest�� and�� the��nuclear��power��plant,��and��eventually��damage��done��to�� the��nuclear��fac�l�t�es��can��generate��a��nuclear��acc�dent��w�th��grave��consequences��to�� the��cap�tal��and���ts��populat�on.��R�sks��and��dangers��should��thus��be��d�scussed��also��from��a��comb�ned��‘se�sm�c��plus��nuclear��hazard’-perspect�ve,��wh�ch�� �n�� fact�� �s��almost��never��done,��because�� the��Roman�an��author�t�es��avo�d��d�scuss�ng��comb�ned��r�sks��and���nstead��tell��people��s�mply��that��b�g��earthquakes��are��very��rare��and��that��the��nuclear��fac�l�t�es��are��very��safe.

Desp�te��such��sooth�ng��declarat�ons,��Roman�a��could��be��confronted��some��day��w�th��an��extremely��dangerous��s�tuat�on,�� the��mere��poss�b�l�ty��of��wh�ch��creates��huge��respons�b�l�t�es�� for�� �ts�� �nhab�tants��and�� �ts�� (central��or�� local)��author�t�es.��Both�� the��populat�on��and��the���nst�tut�ons��fa�l��systemat�cally��to��react��adequately��to��th�s��r�sk,��but���n��the��present��paper��I��shall��only��deal��w�th��some���nst�tut�onal��fa�lures,��more��prec�sely��w�th��the�r��moral��aspects.����

Although�� �t�� has�� been�� cla�med�� that�� “pol�t�cs,�� as�� a�� pract�ce,�� whatever�� �ts��

7 Iuliana Armaş, “Earthquake Risk Perception in Bucharest, Romania”, op. cit., p. 1223. 8 The Cernavodă nuclear power plant has two reactors of the CANDU type. For more

deta�ls��on��the��power��plant��and��nuclear��energy���n��Roman�a,��see��http://www.world-nuclear.org/�nfo/�nf93.html.

��9�� M�rcea��Radul�an,�� �nterv�ew��posted��on�� the�� s�te��www.z�uanews.ro,�� at��02.05.2012;�� see��http://www.z�uanews.ro/dezvalu�r�-�nvest�gat��/roman�a-trece-sub-tacere-un-per�col-nuclear-la-cernavoda-de-t�p-fukosh�ma-15122��(retr�eved��on��12.11.2012).

10 Iuliana Armaş, “Earthquake Risk Perception in Bucharest, Romania”, op. cit., p. 1224 (quot�ng��other��sources).

116 �� Env�ronmental��R�sk��and��Moral��Obl�gat�ons����/����Adr�an-Paul��ILIESCU������������117

professions, has always been a systematic organization of hatredˮ (Henry Adams), most��people��st�ll��th�nk��that��pol�t�c�ans��and��pol�t�cal���nst�tut�ons��do��have��moral��dut�es��as��well,��not��only��resentments��and��self�sh���nterests.��Th�s���s��expla�ned��not��only��by��the��fact�� that��ord�nary��people�� trust�� the�r�� �ncumbents��and��expect�� them��to��promote��the�r���nterests,��but��also��by��the��fact��that��the��pol�t�c�ans��present��themselves��as��‘trustees’��who��a�m��at��fulf�ll�ng��the�r��moral��duty��to��protect��and��promote��the���nterests��of��c�t�zens.

Fiduciary-duties:-An-analogy-with-medical-ethics

Here��I��am��start�ng��from��the��prem�se�� that��prevent�ng��r�sk��of��env�ronmental��cr�s�s,��cop�ng��w�th��cr�ses��and��m�t�gat�ng�� the�r��consequences��are��major��moral��dut�es��of��government��(�n�� �ts��w�dest��sense)�� towards�� �ts��c�t�zens.��Th�s��prem�se��can��be�� taken��as��unproblemat�c,��s�nce��r�sks��and��cr�ses��affect��publ�c��safety,��and��the��most��d�verse��theor�es��of��government��acknowledge�� that��prov�d�ng��publ�c��safety�� �s��a��central��–��and���ndeed��an��elementary��–��task��of��government.��Thus,��pol�t�cal��d�sputat�ons��about��the�� tasks��and��dut�es��of��government��need��not��bother��us��here��because�� the�� role��of��government��as��prov�der��of��publ�c��safety�� �s��probably�� the�� least��controvers�al;��w�th��some��(extreme)��except�ons��mostly��connected��to��anarch�sm,��even��the���nterpretat�ons��that��seek��obst�nately�� to��generally��m�n�m�ze��the�� tasks��of��pol�t�cal��power�� take���t��as��granted.��Moreover,�� the��very���dea��of��pol�t�cal��representat�on��consol�dates��th�s�� task:��prima facie,11�� the�� �ncumbents’��care�� for��safety��should�� reflect�� the��voters’��care�� for��the��same��good.��In��modern��pol�t�cal��reg�mes��c�t�zens��expect��both��central��and��local��governments�� to��guarantee��publ�c��safety��and�� th�s��moral��expectat�on�� �s��part��of�� the���mpl�c�t��contract��between��a��c�t�zen��and��a��pol�t�c�an,��by��wh�ch��the��latter��comm�ts��to��represent�ng��the��concerns��of��the��former��–��thus,��the��moral��obl�gat�on��of��the��latter��to��deal��w�th��env�ronmental��r�sks��and��cr�ses�� �s��beyond��reasonable��doubt.��Adopt�ng��a��term��used���n��both��agency��law��and��bus�ness��eth�cs,��one��could��say��that�� �ncumbents��have��a��fiduciary duty��to��act��for��the��c�t�zen’s��benef�t��(of��r�sk��avo�dance,��cop�ng��w�th��cr�ses��and��m�t�gat�on��of��the�r��effects);��but,��of��course,��th�s��duty���s��only��a��moral��one,��because���t��spr�ngs��from��mere��publ�c��prom�ses,��not��from��legal��comm�tments,��as��no��proper��(legally��enforceable)��contract��ex�sts��between��pol�t�c�ans��and��voters.

How��exactly��the��fulf�lment��of��such��a��f�duc�ary��duty��should��be��assessed���s,��of��course,��a��compl�cated��and��poss�bly��controvers�al��top�c.��My��proposal��here��w�ll��be��to��analyse��a��part�cular��case��by��us�ng,��as��standards��of��evaluat�on,��a��ser�es��of���nterrelated��pr�nc�ples��that��are��commonly��accepted���n��several��areas��of��eth�cal��dec�s�on-mak�ng��(�nclud�ng,��most��notably,��the��f�eld��of��med�cal��dec�s�ons)��on��matters���mply�ng��r�sks:��the principle of respect��(for��the��autonomy��of��the��people��concerned,���.e.��exposed��to��r�sk),�� the principle of informed��consent�� (of�� those��who��run��r�sks),�� the principle of non-manipulation�� (of��all��stakeholders).��Although���n�t�ally��conce�ved��as��normat�ve��gu�des��for��b�nary,��pr�vate,�� relat�onsh�ps��of�� the��‘phys�c�an–pat�ent’�� type,��as��shown���n�� the��class�c��Principles of Biomedical Ethics�� by��Tom��Beauchamp��and�� James��

11�� Only��prima facie,��because,��as�� shown��below,�� there��are��good�� reasons�� to��cla�m�� that�� the���ncumbents’��concerns��w�th��env�ronmental��safety��should��be��even��greater�� than��the��c�t�zens’��concerns.

Ch�ldress,12�� these��pr�nc�ples��exempl�fy��some��v�tal�� �mpl�cat�ons��of��any��f�duc�ary��duty���n��matters�� �mply�ng��r�sks,��and��to��that��extent�� they��can��also��be��used��as��gu�des��for��clar�fy�ng��other��relat�onsh�ps,��such��as�� the��more��complex��relat�onsh�p��between��pol�t�c�ans/�nst�tut�ons��and��c�t�zens���n��the��area��of��publ�c��dec�s�ons��that���mply��r�sks��for��a��whole��commun�ty.

The�� pr�nc�ple�� of�� respect�� �tself�� can�� be�� �nterpreted�� �n�� many�� ways�� and�� �ts���mpl�cat�ons��can��accord�ngly��be��seen���n��var�ous��ways.��I��w�ll��not��attempt��a��general��approach��here,��but��rather��restr�ct��my��d�scuss�on��to��some��relevant��aspects���nsp�red��by��the��Roman�an��case��–��some��aspects��wh�ch,��moreover,��can��be��analysed��by��rely�ng��on��a��less��controvers�al��v�ew��of��th�s��pr�nc�ple.��Desp�te��the��lack��of��a��un�tary��and��und�sputed���nterpretat�on��of�� respect��and��of�� �ts�� �mpl�cat�ons,�� there��actually��are��some��weaker���mpl�cat�ons��of��the��pr�nc�ple��of��respect��that��can��hardly��be��d�sputed.��In��order��to��avo�d��controvers�es��and��object�ons��that��cannot��be��dealt��w�th��here,��I��shall��only��address��such���mpl�cat�ons.

The-duty-to-get-informed-consent-from-the-people-exposed

For���nstance,���t��can��hardly��be��den�ed��that��respect��for��c�t�zens���mpl�es��that��they��should��be��(at�� least)��consulted��on��matters�� that�� �nvolve��some��poss�ble��r�sks��for�� themselves��and�� the�r��descendants.��Th�s��modest�� requ�rement�� seems�� to��be�� �nseparable�� from��democrat�c��government,��and�� �t��has��always��been��acknowledged,��even�� �f�� �n��very��vague��word�ngs�� l�ke�� those��used���n��a��class�c��art�cle��on��r�sk��percept�ons��by��Slov�c,��F�shhoff��and��L�chtenste�n:��“ask�ng��people��how��they��v�ew��technolog�cal��hazards���s��a��valid component of representative governmentˮ.13��A��weaker��vers�on��of��the��pr�nc�ple��of��respect��as�� �mply�ng��consultat�on�� �s��hard�� to�� �mag�ne;�� �n��fact,��Slov�c��et��al.��only��recogn�ze��a��r�ght,��not��also��a��duty,��to��ask��people��what��they��th�nk��about��hazards.��But��the���dea��that��the���ncumbents��also��have��a��duty��to��consult��people��on��such��matters���s��very��common��and��hardly��controvers�al��any��more��–��author�t�es�� �n��any��democrat�c��country��accept���t��off�c�ally.��The��problem���s��that��consultat�on���s��such��an��amb�guous���dea,�� that��almost��everyth�ng,��from��s�mple���nterv�ews��and��publ�c��op�n�on��polls�� to��a��fully-fledged��referendum,��can��be��taken��as��prov�ng��that��the��duty��has��been��fulf�lled.��In��Roman�a,��a��referendum��on��nuclear��energy��has��never��taken��place,��although��several��such��nat�onal��consultat�ons��were��organ�zed,��somet�mes��on��rather��m�nor��d�lemmas��l�ke��reducing or not the total number of elected representatives���n��the��Parl�ament��–��a��matter��that���s��ne�ther��extremely��urgent,��nor��very��dramat�c���n���ts���mpl�cat�ons.��Why��do��Roman�an��author�t�es��avo�d��organ�z�ng��a��referendum��on��nuclear��energy,��wh�ch,��espec�ally��after��the��Fukush�ma��acc�dent,��appears��to��be��the��decent��th�ng��to��do��from��the��po�nt��of��v�ew��of��democrat�c��consultat�on?��There��are��several�� �nterconnected��answers.

The��f�rst���s��that,���n��contrast��w�th��the��s�tuat�on���n��other��countr�es,��publ�c��op�n�on��has��never��asked��for��consultat�on���mperat�vely��or��at��least���ns�stently.��Although��some��

12�� Tom��L.��Beauchamp,��James��F.��Ch�ldress��Principles of Biomedical Ethics, Oxford��Un�vers�ty��Press,��s�xth��ed�t�on,��1985-2008.

13�� Paul��Slov�c,��Baruch��F�schhoff,��Sarah��L�chtenste�n��“Why��Study��R�sk��Percept�on?”���n��Risk Analysis,��Vol.2,��No.��2,��1982,��p.��92.

118 �� Env�ronmental��R�sk��and��Moral��Obl�gat�ons����/����Adr�an-Paul��ILIESCU������������119

NGOs��and��some��ecolog�cally-m�nded��publ�c��f�gures��have���ns�sted�� that��Roman�an��c�t�zens��should��be��g�ven��the��r�ght�� to��choose��on��nuclear��matters,14�� the��w�der��publ�c��has��never�� ra�sed��such��a��cla�m�� �n��a��s�gn�f�cant��proport�on.��Soc�olog�cal�� research��shows�� that��desp�te�� the��ex�stence��of��se�sm�c��r�sk,��only��10%��of�� the�� �nhab�tants��of��Bucharest��l�ve��w�th��a��constant��fear��of��earthquakes;��only��38%��of��men��th�nk��that��the��se�sm�c��danger���s��h�gh��(wh�le��62%��of��women��have��the��same��bel�ef).15��There��are��no��data��on��how��people��evaluate��the��comb�ned��danger��of��an��earthquake��and��a��nuclear��accident at the nuclear power plant in Cernavodă, but it is rational to suppose that the��probab�l�t�es��attr�buted��by��the��publ�c��to��such��a��devastat�ng��comb�nat�on��of��events��are��even��smaller.��There��are��many��reasons�� for�� th�s��excess�ve��seren�ty.��Some��are��obv�ous��and��banal:��people��do��not��have��enough���nformat�on��on��the��relevant��r�sks;��and��they��are��man�pulated��by��author�t�es���nto��bel�ev�ng��that��r�sks��are��very��small��or��non-ex�stent��(I��shall��elaborate��on��that��below).

But��there��are��reasons��of��much��more���nterest��to��us.��It���s��well��known��that��people��tend��to��neglect��any��danger��w�th��low��probab�l�ty��of��occurrence,��even���f��character�zed��by��huge��potent�al��loss;16�� th�s,��Slov�c��et��al.��cla�m,���s��understandable:��“l�m�tat�ons��of��people’s��t�me,��energy��and��attent�onal��capac�t�es��create��a��f�n�te��reservo�r��of��concern.��Unless��we���gnored��many��low-probab�l�ty��threats,��we��would��become��so��burdened��that��any��sort��of��product�ve��l�fe��would��become���mposs�ble”.17��The��soc�olog�cal��research��conducted���n��Bucharest��has��conf�rmed��th�s��explanat�on:��the��most��frequent��mot�vat�on��for��not��car�ng��about��the��se�sm�c��danger��has��been��“the���mmed�ate��pressure��of��other��current problems, mostly economic onesˮ.18��People��are��overwhelmed��w�th��urgent��needs��and��major��d�ff�cult�es,��so��that�� they���nst�nct�vely���gnore��low-probab�l�ty��r�sks��and��focus��on��more���mmed�ate��pressures.

It�� �s��prec�sely�� th�s�� fact�� that��opens��some��perspect�ves��wh�ch��are�� �nterest�ng��from��the��moral��po�nt��of��v�ew.��Wh�le���gnor�ng��(some)��r�sks���s��an��att�tude��that��can��be��understood��and��perhaps��“forg�ven”��when��ord�nary��people��are��concerned,��a��s�m�lar��att�tude��man�fested��by��author�t�es��seems��unforg�vable.��Persons��can��s�mply��be��too��busy��or��too��much��affected��by��lack��of��resources��to��act��w�th��precaut�on,��but��author�t�es��cannot��use��the��same��excuse,��because��they��have��both��the��power��to��create��spec�al�zed���nst�tut�ons��(�n��order��to��manage��r�sks��and��prevent��d�sasters)��and��the��power��to��allocate��resources��to��th�s��a�m��–��and��they��are��expected��to��use��these��powers���n��order��to��protect��people.�� In��our��med�cal��eth�cs’�� terms,�� the��pat�ent��can��understandably��be��careless��or��negl�gent,��but�� there��can��be��no��moral�� just�f�cat�on��for��a��phys�c�an’s��negl�gence��or�� lack��of��concern,��because��carefulness���s��a��major��moral��duty��assoc�ated��w�th��the��med�cal��profess�on.��Analogously,��as�� long��as�� they��have�� the��moral��duty�� to��prevent��env�ronmental��cr�ses��and��to��guarantee��publ�c��safety,��the��pol�t�cal���nst�tut�ons��cannot��leg�t�mately��opt��for��s�mply��turn�ng��a��bl�nd��eye��to��se�sm�c��and��nuclear��hazards��and��for��

14�� See,��for�� �nstance,�� the��appeal��of�� the��organ�zat�on��Terra Mileniul III,��at�� the��address:��http://terra���.ngo.ro/date/b2d1f2f8f1bb3ec1206dd2e29da29cba/APEL.pdf��(retr�eved��12.11.2012).

15 Iuliana Armaş “Earthquake Risk Perception in Bucharest, Romania”, op. cit.,��p.��1229-1230.16�� Paul��Slov�c,��Baruch��F�schhoff,��Sarah��L�chtenste�n,��“Why��Study��R�sk��Percept�on?”,���n��Risk

Analysis,��Vol.2,��No.��2,��1982,��p.��90.17�� Paul��Slov�c,��Baruch��F�schhoff,��Sarah��L�chtenste�n,��“Why��Study��R�sk��Percept�on?”,��op. cit.18 Iuliana Armaş “Earthquake Risk Perception in Bucharest, Romania”, op. cit.,��p.��1229.

leav�ng��ord�nary��people’s��peace��of��m�nd��und�sturbed���n��th�s��respect.��The��Commun�st��leaders who have decided to place the nuclear power plant at Cernavodă, in a se�sm�cally��dangerous��zone,��w�thout�� seek�ng��some��sort��of��democrat�c��approval��from��c�t�zens��have��of��course��been���rrespons�ble.��But��the��operat�onal��act�v�ty��of��the��f�rst��reactor���n��th�s��plant��began���n��1996,��and��the��operat�onal��act�v�ty��of��the��second���n��2007,��aga�n��w�thout��any��sort��of��democrat�c��approval��be�ng��sought.��Roman�an��author�t�es��have��made��no��attempt�� to��get�� the�� �nformed��consent��of�� the��populat�on��on��hazardous��nuclear��act�v�t�es,��and��th�s���s��a��proof��of���lleg�t�mate��‘�mpos�ng��r�sks’��conduct.��The���mmoral��character��of��mak�ng��such��dec�s�ons��that�� �mpose��r�sks��upon��people��has��never��been��cons�dered��and��d�scussed��publ�cly,�� the��general�� tendency��be�ng��to��spread��the��feel�ng��that�� there��was��no��‘real’��r�sk.��Roman�an��author�t�es��that��after��1989��took��the��cont�nuat�on��of��nuclear��act�v�t�es�� �n��the��same��area��for��granted��and��om�tted��to��organ�ze��a��publ�c��debate��or��any��publ�c��consultat�on��on��the��matter,��can��thus��be��sa�d��to��have��not��been��more��respons�ble��morally��than��the�r��Commun�st��predecessors.��To��a��great��extent,���t��was��‘short��term�sm’��that��bl�nded��them:���mprov�ng��econom�c��cond�t�ons��or��creat�ng��new��jobs��as��soon��as��poss�ble��and�� thus��secur�ng��the��sympathy��of��voters��were��seen��as��compell�ng���mmed�ate��tasks���n��compar�son��to��wh�ch��secur�ng���nformed��consent��on��prevent�on��of��se�sm�c��and��nuclear��r�sks��seemed��to��be��only��a��m�nor���ssue.

Justified-moral-paternalism

The�� �ncumbents��could�� try�� to�� just�fy�� the�r��nonchalance�� �n�� se�sm�c��plus��nuclear��matters��by��say�ng��that�� the�r�� lack��of��concern��was��s�mply��express�ng��the��dom�nant��att�tude��among��Roman�an��voters��(after��all,��pol�t�c�ans��are��supposed��to��represent��the�r��const�tuenc�es).��Although��from��some��purely��pol�t�cal��po�nt��of��v�ew,��rely�ng��on��an��overs�mpl�f�ed���dea��of��duty��towards��the��electorate,��m�ght��seem��to��be��work�ng��well��as��a��just�f�cat�on,��from��a��moral��po�nt��of��v�ew���t���s��very��weak.��Let��us��remember��that��lack��of��concern��for��se�sm�c��and��nuclear��r�sks��among��the���nhab�tants��of��Bucharest��has��been��expla�ned��by��e�ther��lack��of���nformat�on,��or��by���ncapac�ty��to��cope��w�th��all��the�r��press�ng��current��problems.��Both��elements��tend��to��present��the���nhab�tants��as��people��w�th��an���mpa�red��autonomy,���n��the��f�rst��case��due��to��ignorance��and���n��the��second��due��to��duress.��If�� the��source��of��th�s��hand�cap���s��lack��of���nformat�on,��then��the���nhab�tant��of��Bucharest��should��be��compared��w�th��the��person��who��was��unaware��of��the��danger��of��cross�ng��an��unsafe��br�dge,���n��the��famous��example��g�ven��by��J.S.��M�ll;19�� the��duty��of�� the��author�t�es�� �s�� �n��such��a��case��to�� �mpose��safety��measures,��even���f��aga�nst�� the��man�fest�� �ntent�ons��of��the��unaware��person,��s�nce��that���s��not��a��case��of��v�olat�ng��her���nterests,��but��one��of��promot�ng��them��desp�te��her��un�nformed��and��thus�� �nadequate��dec�s�ons.��As��long��as��they��represent��the��publ�c’s���nterests��for��safety,��the��author�t�es��have��the��f�duc�ary��duty��to��promote��these���nterests��even���n��cases��where,��due��to��lack��of���nformat�on,��the��publ�c���tself��s�mply��does��not��ask��for��the��adequate��governmental��measures.�� In�� such�� s�tuat�ons,�� there�� �s�� a�� case�� for��moral��paternal�sm,��as��Gerald��Dwork�n��has��argued���n��h�s��class�c��older��text.20��Dwork�n��used��s�mpler��examples,��such��

19�� J.S.��M�ll��On Liberty,��W.W.��Norton��and��Co.,��1975,��Chapter��V,��Appl�cat�ons.20�� Gerald��Dwork�n��“Paternal�sm”,���n��The Monist,��Vol.��56,��no.��1,��1972,��pp.��64-84.

120 �� Env�ronmental��R�sk��and��Moral��Obl�gat�ons����/����Adr�an-Paul��ILIESCU������������121

as�� �mpos�ng��the��obl�gat�on��of��wear�ng��protect�ve��helmets��upon��motorcycl�sts,��but��the��problem���s��the��same:��be�ng��empowered��to��protect��and��prevent,��author�t�es��have��a��duty��to��act��even���f��the��people��concerned��are��themselves��pass�ve��and���nd�fferent.

If�� the�� source�� of�� the�� hand�cap�� of�� the�� �nhab�tants�� �s�� the�r�� state�� of�� be�ng��overwhelmed with worries and pressures,�� then��aga�n��the��author�t�es��have��a��moral��duty��to��act��for��the�r��benef�t.��In��such��a��case,��the��f�duc�ary��duty��of��pol�t�c�ans���s��s�m�lar��to��the��f�duc�ary��duty��of��phys�c�ans,��who��have��to��act��for��the��benef�t��of��the�r��pat�ents��even���n��cases��where��the��pat�ents,��overwhelmed��by��health��problems,��do��not��ask��for��certa�n��benef�c�al��act�ons.��The���ncumbents��cannot��just�fy��the�r�� lack��of��concern��for��publ�c��safety��(�n��nuclear��matters)��by��cla�m�ng��that��they��s�mply��expressed��the��lack��of��relevant��concern��among��the��publ�c,�� just�� l�ke��a��phys�c�an��cannot��just�fy��her��lack��of��concern��for��her��pat�ent’s��health��by��say�ng��that��the��pat�ent��herself��was��unconcerned.��Any�� attempt�� to�� use�� such�� a�� just�f�cat�on�� should�� be�� rejected�� w�th�� the�� obv�ous��argument:��‘prec�sely��because��the��people��to��be��protected��cannot��afford��to��man�fest��concern��for��some��of�� the�r��v�tal��problems,�� those��who��have��a��f�duc�ary��duty��should��be��concerned��and��should��consequently��make��sure��that��the�r���nterests��are��protected’;��that���s���mpl�ed��by��the��very��sense��of��a��f�duc�ary��moral��duty.��Respect��for��people��who��run��r�sks,�� l�ke�� the�� �nhab�tants��of��Bucharest,�� �mpl�es��preoccupat�on��for��prevent�ng��such��r�sks,�� for�� �nform�ng��people��about�� them��and��for��gett�ng���nformed��consent��on��the��necessary��prevent�ve��measures.��Thus,�� the��moral��duty��of��author�t�es�� to��prevent��env�ronmental��r�sk��should��not��only��reflect��mechan�cally��the��correspond�ng��degree��of��prevent�ve���nterest��among��the��publ�c,��but,��as��I��have��already��suggested,21��should��also��cover��the��cases���n��wh�ch��the��publ�c���tself��does��not��man�fest��enough���nterest��for���ts��own��safety��because��of���ts���mpa�red��autonomy��(due��to��duress).��Duress,��as��a��temporary��state,��cannot��just�fy��abandonment��of��the��pat�ent��by��her��phys�c�an,��or��of��the��publ�c��by��government;��on��the��contrary,���t��requ�res��protect�ve���ntervent�on��from��the��agents��hav�ng��the��f�duc�ary��duty,��for��the��benef�t��of��those��under��duress.

There��are,�� though,��some��object�ons��that��can��be��ra�sed.��The��f�rst��one��concerns���nst�tut�onal��duress:��what���f��government���tself���s��under��duress?22��If���t��can��be��proved��that��the��government��has��acted��under��duress,��then��of��course���ts��neglect��of��some��moral��dut�es��to��protect��the��publ�c��aga�nst��env�ronmental��r�sk��can��be��excused.��But���n��fact��a��regular��government��can��rarely��do��that,��because���t��takes��a��very��severe��cr�s�s��(l�ke��war���n��a��very��dangerous��phase,��for���nstance)���n��order��to��rel�eve��author�t�es��from��some��(and��never��from��all)��of��the�r��f�duc�ary��burdens.��More��prec�sely,��what���s��requ�red���s��that��the��author�t�es��prove��that��the�r��lack��of��adequate��concern��for��some��v�tal���nterests��of��the��c�t�zens���s��just�f�ed��by���ts��absorpt�on���n��attempts��to��protect��other,��equally��v�tal,��publ�c���nterests.

A��second��object�on��rel�es��on��the���dea��of��opportun�ty��costs:��there��m�ght��be��cases���n��wh�ch��lack��of��governmental���nterest���n��tak�ng��protect�ve��steps��could��be��just�f�ed��by�� the��excess�vely��h�gh��opportun�ty��costs��of��such��measures.��“Cr�t�cs��have��been��qu�ck��to��put��the��blame��on��pol�t�c�ans��and��the�r��apparent��fa�lure��to��prevent��or��at��least��reduce��mortal�ty��from��earthquakes.��Yet,��our��theory��suggests�� that�� �n��countr�es��w�th��

21�� See��above,��footnote��11.22�� A��famous��case��of��government��under��duress���s��the��one��debated���n��United States v. Bethlehem

Steel Co.,��315��U.S.��289��(1942).��

low��quake��propens�ty,��fa�lure��to��enact��and��enforce��regulat�ons��for��earthquake��proof��construct�on�� �s��not��necessar�ly��a��fa�lure,��but��may��be��perfectly��rat�onal,�� follow�ng��opportunity cost considerationsˮ.23��Th�s,��of��course,��makes��perfect��econom�c��sense,��but�� �t�� �s��of��a��very�� l�m�ted��moral��relevance.��If��what��we��are�� �nterested�� �n�� �s��sav�ng��l�ves�� (by�� reduc�ng��earthquake��mortal�ty��and��nuclear��acc�dents��mortal�ty),�� then��analys�s���n��terms��of��opportun�ty��costs���s�� �n��fact��analys�s���n��terms��of��what��k�nds��of��spend�ng��are��suscept�ble��to��save��more��l�ves,��as��compared��to��the��ava�lable��spend�ng��alternat�ves.��Consequently,�� �f��governments��avo�d�� �nvest�ng�� �n��prevent�ve��pol�c�es��that��reduce��earthquake��and��nuclear��acc�dents��mortal�ty,��they��should��be��able��to��show��that�� the��amount��of��money�� thus��saved��has��been��better�� �nvested�� �n��other��pol�c�es��that��are��suscept�ble�� to��save��even��more�� l�ves�� than�� those��prevent�ve,��ant�-se�sm�c��and��ant�-nuclear��d�saster,��pol�c�es��–��only��such��a��proof��can��be��relevant��as��a��moral��just�f�cat�on��for��hav�ng��fa�led��to��fulf�l��the��f�duc�ary��duty��of��prevent�on.��For���nstance,��the��author�t�es��should��be��able��to��prove��that�� the��amount��of��money��needed��for��ant�-se�sm�c��and��ant�-nuclear��acc�dents��measures��can��be��better��used���n��order��to��ach�eve��a��greater��reduct�on��of��ch�ld��mortal�ty.��But��such��proofs��can��hardly��be��g�ven.��Due��to��the��numerous��uncerta�nt�es��of��the��alternat�ve��scenar�os,���t�� �s��hardly��poss�ble��to��prov�de��such��a��demonstrat�on.��In��any��case,��Roman�an��author�t�es��could��never�� just�fy��the�r��lack��of��concern��for��ant�-se�sm�c��and��ant�-nuclear��acc�dents’��pol�c�es��by���nvok�ng��the�r��absorpt�on���n��other,��equally���mportant,��l�fe-sav�ng��publ�c��pol�c�es.��State���nvestments���n��publ�c��health��and���n��related��l�fe-sav�ng��areas��have��d�m�n�shed��constantly���n��the��last�� twenty��years,�� �n��correspondence��w�th��both��the��shortage��of��publ�c��fund�ng��and��the��newly��and��enthus�ast�cally��embraced��dogma��that��all��concerns��for��health��and��other��v�tal��needs��should��be��pr�vat�zed.��At��the��same��t�me,��b�g���nvestments��have��been��made���n��areas��that��cannot��be��sa�d��to��be��of��v�tal�� �nterest,��as��I��shall��ment�on��below.��There���s��thus��absolutely��no��hope��for��Roman�an��publ�c���nst�tut�ons��to��be��able��to��show��that��they��have��managed��to��save��more��l�ves��by��us�ng��funds���n��the��way��they��actually��d�d,�� than��they��would��have��saved���f�� they��had��spent�� them��on��ant�-se�sm�c��and��ant�-nuclear��acc�dents��measures.��Once��aga�n,��what��we��have��to��deal��w�th���s��sheer��pol�t�cal���rrespons�b�l�ty,��not��a��rat�onal��tradeoff��between��var�ous��ways��of��sav�ng��l�ves��and��of��protect�ng��v�tal��publ�c���nterests.

Moral-irresponsibility-in-political-activity

The��degree��to��wh�ch��Roman�an��author�t�es��have��man�fested���rrespons�b�l�ty��towards��se�sm�c��hazards��can��be��exempl�f�ed��by��h�ghl�ght�ng��the��results��of��pol�c�es��developed���n��Bucharest,���n��order��to��consol�date��bu�ld�ngs��affected��by��the��1977��earthquake��and��to��prevent��further��damage��and��further��casualt�es���n��case��a��new��earthquake��took��place.��The��1977��earthquake,��of��7.2��magn�tude��(R�chter��Scale),��has��cla�med��1570��human��l�ves��(90��per��cent��of�� them���n��Bucharest).��More��than��32,000��bu�ld�ngs���n��southern��and��south-east��Roman�a��have��been��destroyed��or��severely��damaged.��A��program��of��

23�� Ph�l�p��Keefer,��Er�c��Neumayer,��Thomas��Plümper��“Earthquake��Propens�ty��and��the��Pol�t�cs��of��Mortal�ty��Prevent�on”,��Pol�cy��Research��Work�ng��Paper��5182,��The��World��Bank��Development��Research��Group��Macroeconom�cs�� and��Growth��Team��&��Global��Fac�l�ty�� for��D�saster��Reduct�on��and��Recovery��Department,��2010,��p.��32.

122 �� Env�ronmental��R�sk��and��Moral��Obl�gat�ons����/����Adr�an-Paul��ILIESCU������������123

consol�dat�on��of��the��most��affected��bu�ld�ngs��has��been��dev�sed,��but���ts��results��can��be��deemed��pathet�c.��Even��today,��after��35��years��from��the��se�sm�c��event,��there��are��1,000��buildings in Bucharest “in a state of total or partial collapseˮ.24

The��expected��losses,�� �n��case��a��b�g��earthquake��would�� take��place��aga�n�� �n�� the��Vrancea��reg�on,��are��very��h�gh:��“Should��an��earthquake��s�m�lar��to��that���n��1977��occur��dur�ng�� the��n�ght,�� the��most��sombre��scenar�os��conce�ved��by��the��Bu�ld�ng��Research��Inst�tute,��Bucharest��(INCERC)��(www.�ncerc.ro)���nd�cate��that�� the��populat�on��of��the��cap�tal��c�ty��would��drop��by��almost��half��(450,000��casualt�es).��Approx�mately��6,500��people would stand no chance of survivalˮ.25��How��d�d��Roman�an��author�t�es��act,���n��such��an��alarm�ng��s�tuat�on?��Incred�bly,�� the��process��of��consol�dat�ng��the��dangerous��bu�ld�ngs���s��extremely��slow.��Accord�ng��to��data��prov�ded��by��the��mayor��of��Bucharest,��there��are��800��bu�ld�ngs���n��Bucharest��w�th��a��s�gn�f�cant��degree��of��se�sm�c��r�sk��that��need��consol�dat�on.26��Among��these,��at�� least��112��bu�ld�ngs��run��the��h�ghest��se�sm�c��r�sk,��and,��be�ng��mostly��blocks��of�� flats,��many�� thousands��of��persons��are��exposed.��Desp�te��th�s��huge��r�sk,��accord�ng��to���nformat�on��prov�ded��by��the��Roman�an��M�n�stry��of��Reg�onal��Development,��on��March,��4,��2012,��unt�l��now��only��15��bu�ld�ngs��of�� the��h�ghest��se�sm�c��r�sk��have��been��consol�dated.27��At�� the��same��t�me,�� local��author�t�es,��as��well��as��the��M�n�stry��for��Reg�onal��Development,��have��systemat�cally��spent��a��lot��of��money��for�� low��pr�or�ty��urban���mprovements,�� l�ke��floral��decorat�ons,��Chr�stmas��decorat�ons,��gadgets��(such��as��b�g,��expens�ve,��‘retro’-style,��d�g�tal��watches��placed���n��some��central��squares���n��Bucharest)��or��var�ous��le�sure��fac�l�t�es.��Thus,��the��Roman�an��author�t�es��could��never��prove��that��they��have��om�tted��to���nvest���n��prevent�ve��pol�c�es��meant��to��save��l�ves���n��case��of��earthquakes��or��nuclear��acc�dents��because��they��have��focused��on��other��k�nds��of�� l�fe-sav�ng��pol�c�es.��What�� �n�� fact��happened��and�� �t�� �s��w�dely��recogn�zed��as��such,��was��that��a��lot��of��money��has��been��fool�shly��spent,��often���n��relat�on��to��corrupt�on,��wh�le��v�tal��measures��for���mprov�ng��se�sm�c��safety��have��been���ndef�n�tely��postponed��or��neglected.

The�� same��Roman�an��government�� that��managed�� to�� f�nd�� t�me,�� energy�� and��resources�� to��organ�ze��referendums��on��such��matters��as��a��certa�n��‘reduct�on��of�� the��total��number��of��members��of�� the��Parl�ament’,��or��some��‘part�cular��changes�� �n�� the��vot�ng��procedures’,��cannot��now��cla�m��ser�ously��to��have��been��under��duress��and��thus��unable��to��organ�ze��a��referendum��on��nuclear��energy.��In��real�ty,��Roman�an��author�t�es��could��eas�ly��man�fest�� the�r��concern��for��publ�c��safety��by��consult�ng��the��publ�c,��but���t��seems��that�� they��have��no���nterest��whatsoever�� to��do��that.��Emp�r�cal��research��has��proved��that��governments��are��suscept�ble�� to��man�fest��concern��for��se�sm�c��dangers,��such��as��mortal�ty��generated��by��the��collapse��of��bu�ld�ngs,��only��where��the��publ�c���s��

24 All the data in this fragment are taken from Iuliana Armaş “Earthquake Risk Perception in Bucharest,��Roman�a”,��op. cit.,��pp.��1225-1226.

25 Iuliana Armaş “Earthquake Risk Perception in Bucharest, Romania”, op. cit., pp. 1226, quot�ng��other��sources��

26�� See�� the�� �nformat�on��prov�ded��by�� the��Mayor��at:��http://st�r�.acasa.ro/soc�al-125/l�sta-de-cutremur-a-lu�-oprescu-108688.html��(retr�eved��on��12.11.2012).��The��whole��l�st��of��vulnerable��bu�ld�ngs��can��be��found��at��http://www.1as�g.ro/documente/l�sta_clad�r�lor_cu_grad_de_r�sc_se�sm�c.pdf��.

27�� See��http://www.curentul.ro/2012/�ndex.php/2012030569432/Soc�al/Doar-15-clad�r�-cu-r�sc-se�sm�c-r�d�cat-d�n-Bucurest�-au-fost-reab�l�tate.html��(retr�eved��on��12.11.2012).

capable��of��sanct�on�ng�� the�r��under-ach�evements:��“In��countr�es��where��c�t�zens��or��members��of��the��rul�ng��party��can��more��eas�ly��sanct�on��leaders��for��poor��performance,��leaders��are��more�� l�kely�� to�� take��–��and�� to��enforce��–��measures�� to��prevent��d�saster��mortalityˮ.28��As��Roman�an��voters��d�d��not��prove��capable��of��sanct�on�ng��the�r��leaders��for��poor��performance,�� the���ncumbents��are��expl�cably��not�� l�kely��to��take��prevent�ve��measures,��and��even��less�� l�kely��to��consult�� the��publ�c��as��regards��such��measures.��In��other��words,��the��f�duc�ary��dut�es��are��fulf�lled��only��where��the���ncumbents��are��afra�d��of��electoral��sanct�ons;��where��not��afra�d,��they��nonchalantly���gnore��the�r��dut�es.��Th�s��only��conf�rms��that��moral concern,�� typ�cally�� �nsp�red��by��moral��dut�es��not��by��fear,���s�� s�mply��m�ss�ng�� �n��Roman�an��pol�t�cal��and��adm�n�strat�ve��act�v�ty.��The��moral��obl�gat�ons��towards��publ�c��safety��are��forgotten,��as�� long��as��fear��of��popular��protest��van�shes;��respect��for��publ�c��op�n�on���s��even��more��elus�ve,��as��long��as��the���ncumbents��are��not��afra�d��of��negat�ve��votes.��The��moral��po�nt��of��v�ew��tends��to��d�sappear��from��governmental��act�v�t�es.��Wh�le��to��some��extent��Roman�an��author�t�es��feel��pol�t�cally��respons�ble�� towards�� the�r��const�tuenc�es��or��at�� least��are��afra�d��of�� the�r��sanct�ons,��moral���rrespons�b�l�ty��re�gns.

Institutional-moral-failure

Moral���rrespons�b�l�ty��can��be��detected��not��only���n��governmental��act�v�t�es,��but��also���n��the��act�v�ty��of���nst�tut�ons��created��to��protect�� the��populat�on��from��env�ronmental��r�sk,�� among��wh�ch,�� for�� �nstance,�� are��CNCAN�� and��ANDR.29��Due�� to�� �ts��off�c�al��m�ss�on,��CNCAN��should��be��permanently��preoccup�ed��w�th��detect�ng��nuclear��r�sks,���nclud�ng��those��created��by��se�sm�c��hazard,��and��w�th��prevent�ng��them.��In��part�cular,��accord�ng��to��the��eth�cal��pr�nc�ples��already��ment�oned,��CNCAN��should���nform��people��correctly��about��nuclear��r�sks��and��avo�d��man�pulat�on��of��publ�c��op�n�on.��But���n��fact,���nstead��of��concentrat�ng��on��correct�� �nformat�on��about��r�sks,��CNCAN��man�pulates��publ�c��op�n�on���nto��bel�ev�ng��that�� there��are��no��actual��nuclear��r�sks�� �n��Roman�a;��a��careful��analys�s��of���ts��act�v�ty��shows��that���n��many��cases��CNCAN���s��more���nterested���n��allay�ng��people’s��fears��and���n��reduc�ng��anx�ety��concern�ng��r�sks��than���n���nform�ng��the��publ�c��correctly��or���n��tak�ng���n�t�at�ves��for��safety���mprovement.30��Thus,��CNCAN,��wh�ch��should��act��ma�nly��as��a��protector,���n��v�rtue��of���ts��f�duc�ary��duty,��does,���n��fact,��often��act��more�� l�ke��a��promoter.31��Due�� to�� lack��of��space,��a�� full��presentat�on��of�� �ts��

28�� Ph�l�p��Keefer,��Er�c��Neumayer,��Thomas��Plümper��“Earthquake��Propens�ty��and��the��Pol�t�cs��of��Mortal�ty��Prevent�on”,��Pol�cy��Research��Work�ng��Paper��5182,��The��World��Bank��Development��Research��Group��Macroeconom�cs�� and��Growth��Team��&��Global��Fac�l�ty�� for��D�saster��Reduct�on��and��Recovery��Department,��2010,��p.��8.

29�� ‘CNCAN’���s��the��Roman�an��acronym��for��the��Nat�onal��Nuclear��Act�v�t�es��Watch��Comm�ss�on.��For��more���nformat�on��on��the��act�v�ty��of��th�s�� �nst�tut�on,��see��http://www.CNCAN.ro/ma�n-page/.�� ‘ANDR’�� �s�� the��Roman�an��acronym�� for�� the��Agency�� for��Nuclear��Act�v�t�es�� and��Rad�oact�ve��Waste.��More��about��ANDR��at��www.ANDRad.ro.

30�� The��off�c�al��pos�t�on���s��very��opt�m�st�c:��CNCAN��“makes��sure��that��nuclear��energy���s��used���n��Romania in a safe mannerˮ - see http://www.CNCAN.ro/acasa/despre-no�/mesaj-presed�nte/��

31�� The��d�st�nct�on��between��promoters�� and��protectors,�� has�� been��developed��by��Lennart��Sjöberg���n��h�s��paper��“R�sk��Percept�on��by��the��Publ�c��and��by��Experts:��A��D�lemma���n��R�sk��Management”,��Human Ecology Review,��vol.��6,��No.��2,��1999,��p.��4.

124 �� Env�ronmental��R�sk��and��Moral��Obl�gat�ons����/����Adr�an-Paul��ILIESCU������������125

act�v�t�es��cannot��be��done��here,��but��an��example��can��be��g�ven.��Present�ng��sooth�ngly��the safety measures taken at the Cernavodă Nuclear Power Plant after the Fukushima acc�dent,��Vajda��Borbala,��Cha�rwoman��of��CNCAN,��declared���n��September��2011��that��th�s��power��plant��can��face��safely��a��7.8��magn�tude��earthquake,��an��event��wh�ch,���n��fact,��occurs��only��once���n��1000��years.32��The���mpl�cat�on��of��th�s��off�c�al��statement��was��that��Romanians have nothing to worry about: the Cernavodă Nuclear Power Plant is very safe.��Let��us��analyse��th�s��encourag�ng��announcement��a��l�ttle��further.��Beh�nd���t,��there���s��a��fam�l�ar��argument��advanced��by��both��experts���n��nuclear��matters��and��pol�t�c�ans:��the��argument��that��se�sm�c��r�sks��suscept�ble��of��creat�ng��nuclear��r�sks��are��very��small;��s�nce��nuclear��r�sk��com�ng��from��earthquakes���s��created��by��a��conjunct�on��of��such��rare��events,�� there�� �s��no��object�ve��reason��to��be��worr�ed.�� It�� �s�� thus�� �mpl�ed�� that��nuclear��act�v�t�es��should��cont�nue��unh�ndered.��When��such��l�nes��of��reason�ng��are��followed��by��‘promoters’��–���nvestors���nterested���n��nuclear��energy��product�on��–��the��complacency��h�dden�� �n�� them�� �s�� eas�er�� to��understand.��But��when�� followed��and��advert�sed��by���ncumbents��expected��to��protect��people,��such��arguments��are��s�mply��outrageous.

Let��us��have��a��closer�� look��at�� th�s��matter.��The��cla�m�� that�� there��should��be��no��worry��because��the��r�sk���s��small��can��be���nterpreted���n��several��ways.��F�rst,�� �t��can��be���nterpreted��as��complete��den�al:��“�f�� the��r�sk���s��small,�� then��the��unhappy��event��–��b�g��earthquake��plus��nuclear��acc�dent��–��s�mply��won’t��happen”.��To��naïve��people,��th�s��can��sound��l�ke��good��news,��but���t��obv�ously���s,���n��fact,��a��bad,��m�slead�ng,��argument.��The��fact�� that��a��comb�ned��dangerous��event�� �s��stat�st�cally��rare��does��not��el�m�nate��r�sk.��Although��so��rare,��an��8��magn�tude��(or��more)��earthquake��can��str�ke��at��any��moment��and��can��affect��any��generat�on,��even��ourselves.��It���s���nterest�ng��to��note��that��ord�nary��people��seem��to��understand��that,��for��they��do��not��pay��much��attent�on��to��rar�ty.��People��are��not��rel�eved��by��the��sheer��rar�ty��of��d�sasters;��they��are��more���nterested���n��‘no��harm’-guarantees,��than���n��small��probab�l�t�es:��

“People��want��to��avo�d��d�sastrous��consequences��no��matter��how��small��the��experts��assert�� the�r��probab�l�ty��to��be.��Experts��who��vouch��for��the��probab�l�t�es��as��be�ng��negl�g�ble��are�� tak�ng��a��b�g�� r�sk.��Unexpected��events��occur��all�� the�� t�me,��and��today’s��complex�� technolog�es�� tend�� to��behave,��at�� t�mes,�� �n��unexpected��ways.��Demand��for��r�sk��m�t�gat�on���s��not��strongly��related��to��perce�ved��r�sk,��but��to��the��expected��consequences��of��acc�dents��or��other��unwanted��events”.33

Obv�ously,�� the��general�� publ�c’s�� demand�� for�� ‘no��harm’-guarantees�� �s�� not��sat�sf�ed��by��merely���nvok�ng��the��small��probab�l�t�es��of��r�sk.��When��author�t�es��cla�m��that��“safety���s��guaranteed,��because��the��r�sks��are��small”,�� th�s��cla�m��shows��that��they��are��not��really��answer�ng��demands��for��‘no��harm’-��guarantees,��but��s�mply��dev�at�ng��attent�on��from��poss�ble��harms��to��the��rar�ty��of��very��dangerous��events.��For��promoters,��

32�� Vajda��Borbala’s��statement,��on��16.09.2011,��has��been��reported��off�c�ally��by��the��Roman�an��news�� agency�� AGERPRES,�� and�� can�� be�� read�� at�� http://www.agerpres.ro/med�a/�ndex.php/econom�c/�tem/119363-CNE-Cernavoda-poate-rez�sta-la-un-cutremur-de-peste-8-grade-R�chter-fara-a-f�-afectata-s�guranta-funct�onar��.html��.

33�� Lennart��Sjöberg��“Pr�nc�ples��of��r�sk��percept�on��appl�ed��to��gene��technology”,��EMBO��Report��2004��October;��5(Suppl.��1):��S47–S51.

�t�� �s��not��necessar�ly��a��fa�lure,��s�nce��promoters��are��not��def�ned��by��a��f�duc�ary��duty��to��defend;��but��for��protectors,��who��are��def�ned��by��the�r�� task��to��protect,��neglect�ng��threats��of��harm��posed��by���mprobable��r�sks,��desp�te��the��fact��that��people��have��a��r�ght��to��be��protected��aga�nst��them,���s��obv�ously��a��fa�lure��and��a��fault.��The��moral��obl�gat�on��of��protect�ve���nst�tut�ons���s��to��defend��the��leg�t�mate��cla�ms��of��populat�on,���n��our��case��cla�ms��to��safety��expressed��as��requests��for��‘no��harm’-guarantees.��Author�t�es��fa�l�� to��fulf�l��th�s��obl�gat�on,��when��they��adopt��a��‘techn�cal’��po�nt��of��v�ew��from��wh�ch��harms��are���rrelevant��because��probab�l�t�es��are��small.��Th�s���s��f�rst��of��all��a��moral��fa�lure,��but���t���s��also��a��legal��one,��as��long��as��the��off�c�al��m�ss�on��of��bod�es��l�ke��CNCAN���s��to��protect��the��publ�c��and��the��commun�ty,��not�� to��underrate��r�sks.��It��can��of��course��be��objected��that��such��strong��guarantees��cannot��be��g�ven,���f��nuclear��act�v�t�es��are��to��cont�nue��–��wh�ch���s��the��fam�l�ar��object�on��ra�sed��by��promoters.��But��that���s��not��a��good��argument��from��a��moral��po�nt��of��v�ew,��as�� long��as��author�t�es��have��fa�led��to��present��publ�cly,��clearly,�� the��d�lemma��“e�ther��we��have��nuclear��act�v�t�es��w�th��no��guarantees��aga�nst��unl�kely��but��poss�bly��huge��harm,��or��we��have��‘no��harm’-guarantees��by��abandon�ng��nuclear energy altogetherˮ. When technologies cannot provide ‘no harm’-guarantees, the��ma�n��moral��duty��of��author�t�es,�� spr�ng�ng�� from��due�� respect�� for�� the��people��exposed,���s��to��tell��that��to��the��publ�c��and��ask��for���ts���nformed��consent��on��cont�nu�ng��or��d�scont�nu�ng��the��r�sky��act�v�t�es.��Roman�an��author�t�es��have��permanently��fa�led��to��fulf�l��th�s��duty.

Someone��could��also��be��tempted��to��object��that���nst�tut�ons��and���ncumbents��are��not��expected��to��answer��popular��concerns��and��fears�� if such concerns and fears are irrational.��But�� that�� �s��prec�sely�� the��ma�n��po�nt��here:��concerns��about��an��unl�kely��event��are��not���rrat�onal��at��all,��when��the��expected��consequences��of���t��are��huge��or��the��result�ng��loss���s��great��(they��would��only��be���rrat�onal���f��the��loss��was��both��unl�kely��and��small).��Although��stat�st�cally���nfrequent,��the��comb�ned��d�saster��of��a��b�g��earthquake��and��a��nuclear��acc�dent���s��st�ll��poss�ble,��and���ts��dramat�c��consequences��make��concerns��perfectly�� rat�onal,�� for��although�� �ts��probab�l�ty�� �s�� small,�� �ts�� soc�etal�� r�sk�� �s��very��great.��Thus,��popular��worr�es��about��such��a��d�saster��are��not�� �rrat�onal��at��all��and��the��c�t�zens��can��leg�t�mately��compla�n��that�� the�r��f�duc�ary��agent,��CNCAN�� for���nstance,���s��neglect�ng�� �ts��moral��duty�� to��protect��when���t�� �s��man�fest�ng��complacency��about��nuclear��safety.��Obv�ously,��the��moral��duty��of��CNCAN,��as��a��f�duc�ary��agent,���s��to��adopt��the��perspect�ve��from��wh�ch��c�t�zens��judge��th�ngs��and��assess��dangers,��e.g.��by��us�ng��as��a��cr�ter�on��the��d�mens�ons��of��soc�etal��r�sks,��and��not��the��mere��stat�st�cal��probab�l�ty��of��phys�cal��or��technolog�cal��events��(a��probab�l�ty��that��leaves��out��the��very���mportant��aspect��of��poss�ble��human��loss).

But��probably�� the��preferred�� �nterpretat�on��of�� the��above-ment�oned��argument��w�ll��not��be��that��the��d�saster��won’t��come,��but��rather��the��follow�ng:��“due��to���ts��rar�ty,��the��d�saster��won’t��str�ke��soon,��and��thus��we��won’t��be��affected,��and��ne�ther��w�ll��be��our���mmed�ate��descendants;��the��d�saster���s��not���mm�nent,��so��why��should��we��worry��about it?ˮ This second interpretation should be rejected too, for several reasons. On��one��hand,���t���s��a��m�staken���nterpretat�on��because��the��rar�ty��of��the��event��does��not��guarantee�� �ts�� ‘lateness’:�� the��fact�� that��a��great��d�saster�� �s��stat�st�cally��rare��does��not���mply��that���t��w�ll�� take��place��very��late��(from��now),��some��t�me���n��a��very��d�stant��and��foggy��future.��The��se�sm�c��plus��nuclear��d�saster��can even happen any moment now��(desp�te��the��fact��of��be�ng��very��unl�kely��that���t��w�ll).��Moral��sens�t�v�ty��should��make��

126 �� Env�ronmental��R�sk��and��Moral��Obl�gat�ons����/����Adr�an-Paul��ILIESCU������������127

us��concerned��about�� the��fact�� that,��although��unl�kely,�� the��d�saster��could��st�ll��str�ke���mmed�ately��and��affect��people.��Th�s��can��be��proved��by��resort�ng��once��aga�n��to��our��analogy��between��the��moral��duty��of��a��phys�c�an��to��protect��pat�ents��and��the��moral��duty��of��an���nst�tut�on��to��protect��c�t�zens.��Here���s��an��example��of��how��a��morally��sens�t�ve��med�cal��expert��th�nks:��“R�sk���s��probab�l�st�c,��and��the��ex�stence��of��a��1��per��cent��r�sk��of��death��from��a��part�cular��procedure��does��not���dent�fy��wh�ch��99��pat�ents��w�ll��benef�t��w�thout��detr�ment,��and��wh�ch��one��w�ll��d�e��w�thout��any��benef�t.��Even���f��r�sks��were��known��for��every��age��of��pat�ent��and��for��every��stage��of��a��d�sease,��the��problem��would��remain: will I do good or harm to this patient?ˮ34��Analogously,��a��f�duc�ary��agent��of��Roman�an��c�t�zens��should��ask:��“even�� �f�� r�sks��of��se�sm�c��plus��nuclear��d�saster��are�� small,�� the��problem��rema�ns:��what�� �f�� such��a��d�saster�� str�kes�� �mmed�ately?”��That�� �s,�� from��a��moral��po�nt��of��v�ew��general��probab�l�t�es��are��not��enough:��small��general��probab�l�t�es��of��harm��do��not��el�m�nate��moral��concern��for��poss�ble��harm���n��a��part�cular��case.��The��med�cal��expert���s��not��sat�sf�ed��w�th��the��mere��stat�st�cal��rar�ty��of��the��harmful��consequences;��he���s��worr�ed��by��what��could��happen�� to some particular people,�� the���nterests��of��whom��he��feels��respons�ble��for.��Analogously,�� the��f�duc�ary��agents�� requ�red�� to��watch��publ�c��safety��should��be��worr�ed��by��what��could��happen��to��c�t�zens��when��a�� se�sm�c��plus��nuclear��d�saster��would��str�ke,�� �nstead��of��be�ng��very��serene��because��such��an��event�� �s��unl�kely.��When���nst�tut�ons��and���ncumbents��neglect�� to��worry���n�� th�s��sense,�� they��man�fest��some��sort��of��moral��def�c�ency:�� they��lack��both��moral��sens�t�v�ty��to��the��poss�ble��drama��of��present��generat�ons��and��moral��respons�b�l�ty��as��f�duc�ary��agents.��But�� the��same��should��be��sa�d��concern�ng��future��generat�ons.��Suppose��that��the��d�saster��w�ll��not��happen���n��the��near��future,��but��much��later.��No��generat�on��we��are�� fam�l�ar��w�th��w�ll�� thus��be��affected,��but��only�� some��generat�ons��we��know��almost��noth�ng��about,��wh�ch��have��a��very���nd�rect��and��weak��connect�on�� to��us��–��so�� that�� �t�� �s��hard�� for��us��even�� to�� �mag�ne��what�� they�� look�� l�ke���ntellectually��and��morally.��We��cannot��eas�ly�� �dent�fy��w�th�� them,��but�� that��does��not��el�m�nate�� the��moral��problem��of��us�ng�� technolog�es�� that��are��go�ng�� to��harm.��The��fact��that��a��se�sm�cally���nduced��nuclear��acc�dent��w�ll��affect��others,��not��the��ones��we��care��most��for,��does��not��d�m�n�sh��moral��respons�b�l�ty.��For��any��un�versal�st�c��eth�cs,��d�stance���n��t�me��does��not��matter,��s�nce��the��‘Damocle’s��sword’��character35��of��nuclear��technology��rema�ns��unchanged:��some��future��generat�on��can��st�ll��be��harmed.��Wh�ch��one��exactly��w�ll��suffer���s��morally���rrelevant,��as��moral��reason�ng��beh�nd��a��Rawls�an��‘ve�l��of�� �gnorance’��can��prove.��The��f�duc�ary��agents��have��moral��dut�es�� towards��all��generat�ons.

One��can��of��course��hope��that��the��d�saster��w�ll��str�ke��after��the��decomm�ss�on�ng��of��the��nuclear��power��plant,��but��that���s��noth�ng��more��than��a��hope��–��and���n��no��way��an��argument.

34�� S�r��Edward��Poch�n��“R�sk��and��Med�cal��Eth�cs”,��Journal of Medical Ethics,��1982,��8,��180-184,��p.��180.

35�� The�� ‘Damocles��sword’��as��a�� label�� for�� r�sks�� l�ke�� the��nuclear��ones��has��been��proposed��by��Ortw�n��Renn.��See��O.��Renn,��A.��Kl�nke.��“Damokles-Schwerter��und��KassANDRa-Rufe.��Empfehlungen��für��d�e.��Kommun�kat�on��von��R�s�ken”,��Ethik Magazin,��Heft��2,��3.��Jahrgang��(2001),��30-39.

Moral-failures-and-conflicts-of-interestsThe��most��pern�c�ous��myst�f�cat�on��by��wh�ch��some���nst�tut�ons��man�pulate��publ�c��op�n�on���nto��feel�ng��safe��from��se�sm�c��plus��nuclear��hazards�� �s��perhaps�� the��use��of��purely��geophys�cal��or�� technolog�cal��cr�ter�a�� for��assess�ng��r�sk.��Thus,�� �nst�tut�ons��l�ke��CNCAN,��but��also��pol�t�c�ans��and��experts,��dec�de��upon��c�t�zen’s��safety��by��us�ng��such��cr�ter�a��as��‘the��probab�l�ty��of��an��8��magn�tude��earthquake’��or��‘the��probab�l�ty��of��a��‘melt��down’-acc�dent�� �n��a��nuclear��plant’.��Obv�ously,��such��cr�ter�a��completely��leave��out��both��the��harm��component��of���nd�v�dual��r�sk��and��the��soc�etal��aspects��of��r�sk.��But��what���s��often��forgotten���s��that,��from��a��moral��po�nt��of��v�ew,��us�ng��such��cr�ter�a��means��‘betray�ng’��the��persons��to��whom���ncumbents��and���nst�tut�ons��have��a��f�duc�ary��duty.��Real��persons�� (as��already��ment�oned��above)��are��not�� �nterested�� �n��general��probab�l�t�es,��but��rather���n��the��harmful��consequences��that��people��could��suffer.��Such��harmful��consequences��do��not��depend��exclus�vely��on��general��probab�l�t�es,��but��also��on��part�cular��soc�al��cond�t�ons��wh�ch��may��ampl�fy��r�sks.��Perhaps��the��b�ggest��‘betrayal’��of��people’s�� �nterests��by��the���ncumbents��and��the���nst�tut�ons��meant�� to��protect�� them��cons�sts�� �n�� the��neglect��of�� the�� soc�al�� ampl�f�cat�on��of�� r�sks.36��R�sks��are��clearly��ampl�f�ed��and��harm��to��people�� �s��surely�� �ncreased��by��many��soc�al��factors:��“Soc�al��ampl�f�cat�on��of�� r�sk��denotes�� the��phenomenon��by��wh�ch�� �nformat�on��processes,���nst�tut�onal��structures,��soc�al-group��behav�our,��and���nd�v�dual��responses��shape��the��social experience of risk, thereby contributing to risk consequencesˮ.37��Roman�a���s��a��country���n��wh�ch��many��pecul�ar�t�es��suscept�ble��to��ampl�f�ed��r�sks��do��ex�st��and��are��w�dely��acknowledged:���nst�tut�onal���neff�cacy��and���nst�tut�onal��fa�lure��have��reached��dramat�c��levels,��lack��of��soc�al��cap�tal���s��acute,��law-ab�d�ngness���s��reduced��and��so��on.��It�� �s��h�ghly��probable��that��these��pecul�ar�t�es��generate��supplementary��vulnerab�l�t�es��for��c�t�zens,���nasmuch��as��they��d�m�n�sh��the��soc�al��capac�ty��to��cope��w�th��both��se�sm�c��r�sks��and��nuclear��r�sks.��Th�s��amounts��to��ampl�f�cat�on��of��the��probab�l�ty��that��a��b�g��earthquake��plus��nuclear��acc�dent��would�� lead�� to��d�saster,��and��the��d�saster�� to��huge��losses�� �n��Roman�a.��By��om�tt�ng�� to�� take�� �nto��account�� the��soc�al,�� �nst�tut�onal,��and��psycholog�cal��r�sk-ampl�fy�ng��factors,��author�t�es��s�mply��neglect��huge��vulnerab�l�t�es��that��make�� the��actual��s�tuat�on��of�� the��populat�on��much��worse�� than��expected��from��some��general��geophys�cal��and�� technolog�cal��po�nt��of��v�ew.��The��error��made�� �n��so��do�ng��can��be��compared��to��the��error��of��a��phys�c�an��who��would��take���nto��account��only��general��r�sk���mpl�ed��by��stat�st�cs,�� l�ke��“among��male��adults��malady��M��occurs��w�th��a��probab�l�ty��of��20%”,��wh�le���gnor�ng��the��spec�f�c��factors��of��r�sk��character�z�ng��the��part�cular��pat�ents��under��scrut�ny��–��factors��that���ncrease��very��much��the��probab�l�ty��of��gett�ng���ll��for��those��part�cular��pat�ents.��The��pat�ents��under��scrut�ny��could,��of��course,��leg�t�mately��compla�n��that�� the��phys�c�an��has���rrespons�bly��neglected��some��of��the�r��part�cular�t�es��and��hazards,��and��that��he��has��thereby��made��m�slead�ng,��over-opt�m�st�c,��pred�ct�ons��about��the�r��health��prospects.��Analogously,��when��experts��and���ncumbents���nform��people��about��the��ex�st�ng��se�sm�c��and��nuclear��r�sks��by��s�mply��report�ng��the��natural��and�� technolog�cal��probab�l�t�es��wh�le��neglect�ng�� the��soc�al��ampl�f�cat�on��

36�� For��a��complex��v�ew��of��the��soc�al��ampl�f�cat�on��of��r�sks,��see��N�ck��P�dgeon,��Roger��Kasperson,��Paul��Slov�c��(eds.)��The Social Amplification of Risks,��Cambr�dge��Un�vers�ty��Press,��2003.

37�� Kasperson��et��al.��The Social Amplification of Risk,��p.��181.��

128 �� Env�ronmental��R�sk��and��Moral��Obl�gat�ons����/����Adr�an-Paul��ILIESCU������������129

of�� r�sks,�� they��can��be�� sa�d�� to��man�pulate�� the��populat�on��w�th��m�slead�ng,��over-opt�m�st�c��pred�ct�ons��about��the��dangers��created��by��such��events���n��the��part�cular��case��of��Roman�a.��That��can��thus��be��seen��as��a��‘betrayal’��of��the���nterests��of��the��populat�on��to��wh�ch�� they��have��a�� f�duc�ary��duty.��Obv�ously,��people��expect�� the��author�t�es�� to��judge��th�ngs��and��to��assess��dangers��not��by��s�mply��look�ng��at��some��general��stat�st�cs��for��natural��and��technolog�cal�� �nc�dents,��but��by��tak�ng���nto��account��all�� the��relevant��part�cular��factors�� that��can�� �ncrease��r�sks��and��damages��for�� those��exposed,��exactly��as�� the��pat�ents�� expect�� the��phys�c�an�� to��make��pred�ct�ons��not��by�� s�mply��us�ng��general��mortal�ty��stat�st�cs,��but��by�� tak�ng�� �nto��account�� the��part�cular�t�es��wh�ch��m�ght���mprove��or��worsen��the�r��surv�val��prospects���n��a��certa�n��per�od��of��t�me.��Such��expectat�ons,�� �mpl�ed��by��the��fact��(ment�oned��above)��that��people��are��not�� �nterested���n��sheer��probab�l�t�es��but��rather�� �n�� the��‘no��harm’-guarantees,��are��both��normal��and��leg�t�mate,��as��long��as��both��author�t�es��and��phys�c�ans��have��a��f�duc�ary��duty��to��those��exposed��to��r�sks.��Fa�l�ng��to��act�� �n��accord��w�th��these��expectat�ons,�� the���ncumbents��fa�l�� to�� fulf�l�� the�r��moral��duty�� to��people.�� In��both��cases,�� the��moral�� fa�lure��has�� the��same��cause:��the��trustees’��om�ss�on��to��care��about��the��pecul�ar�t�es��of��the��s�tuat�on’s��character�st�cs��to��the��persons��they��were��meant��to��protect.

A��s�m�lar��error��can��be��detected���n��the��area��of��safety��measures.��Both��experts��and��pol�t�c�ans�� �ns�st��proudly�� that��Roman�an��author�t�es��have��succeeded�� �n��enforc�ng��the��same��safety��standards�� that�� �nternat�onal��organ�zat�ons�� l�ke��IAEA���mpose��and��that�� the��developed��countr�es�� themselves��enforce.��Th�s��pr�de�� �s��understandable��for��a��develop�ng��country��obsessed��w�th�� �ts��own�� technolog�cal��and�� �nst�tut�onal��backwardness,�� preoccup�ed�� by�� ‘convergence’�� w�th�� the�� developed�� world�� and��confronted��permanently��w�th�� fa�lures�� �n�� �ts�� attempts�� to�� ‘catch��up’.��But��wh�le��compl�ance��w�th���nternat�onally��recogn�zed��safety��standards��certa�nly���s��a��necessary��cond�t�on,�� �t�� �s��not�� also��a�� suff�c�ent��one.��Due�� to�� �ts��part�cular��vulnerab�l�t�es,��emphas�sed��also��by���nternat�onal��assessments��l�ke��the��World Risk Index,38��Roman�a��m�ght��be�� requ�red�� to��use��h�gher�� standards��of�� safety��and�� to�� take��supplementary��precaut�onary�� measures,�� as�� compared�� w�th�� many�� developed�� countr�es.��The��sat�sfact�on�� w�th�� wh�ch�� CNCAN�� and�� ANDR�� present�� sheer�� compl�ance�� as�� an��ach�evement��can��also��be��seen��as��a��s�gnal��of��complacency.��But��the��general��s�tuat�on��of��Roman�a,��as��regards���ts��capac�ty��to��prevent��d�sasters��and��to��cope��w�th��them,���s��too��bad��to��allow��for��self-sat�sfact�on.

S�nce��the��vulnerab�l�t�es��created��by��soc�al��r�sk-ampl�fy�ng��factors��are��at�� least��partly��due�� to�� the�r��own��poor��ach�evements,�� central�� author�t�es��and��spec�al�zed���nst�tut�ons��are��of��course��very���nterested���n��om�tt�ng��to��acknowledge��the��part�cular��vulnerab�l�t�es��of�� the��Roman�an��populat�on.��Th�s��fact�� ra�ses��a��new��susp�c�on:�� the��moral��fault��can��be��greater��than���t��m�ght��seem,��be�ng��connected��not��s�mply��w�th��poor��pol�t�cal��and��adm�n�strat�ve��performance��but��also��w�th��hidden special interests.�� Is��the�� �nst�tut�onal�� fa�lure�� to��deal��w�th��concerns��about��se�sm�c��plus��nuclear��hazards��merely��a��consequence��of��complacency��and��negl�gence,�� two��organ�zat�onal��v�ces��relat�vely��easy��to��el�m�nate?��Unfortunately,��there��are��some��reasons��to��th�nk��that��the��s�tuat�on���s��worse��than��that:���nst�tut�ons��l�ke��CNCAN��and��ANDR��are��character�zed��by��

38�� I��have��already��ment�oned��that��the��World Risk Index 2012��emphas�zes��the��h�gh��suscept�b�l�ty��of��damage��and��loss���n��countr�es��l�ke��Roman�a��and��Moldav�a.��See��above,��footnote��3.

a��bu�lt-�n��confl�ct��of���nterests��wh�ch���ncapac�tates��them��systemat�cally��(not��legally,��but���n��pract�ce).��On��one��hand,��these���nst�tut�ons��are��des�gned��to��control��potent�ally��hazardous��act�v�t�es��and��consequently��they��str�ve��to��fulf�l��the�r��task��of��mak�ng��sure��that��nuclear��act�v�t�es��w�ll��not��put��people��at��r�sk;�� �n��th�s��respect,�� they��are��‘natural��enem�es’��of��all�� the��promoters��of��nuclear�� technology.��On��the��other��hand,�� though,��the��same���nst�tut�ons��have��the��task��to���ssue��perm�ts,��cert�f�cates��and��clearances��for��nuclear��act�v�t�es��and they get much of their funding from these licensing activities.��In�� th�s�� respect,�� they�� somehow��become�� ‘natural�� all�es’��of�� the��promoters.��Thus,��CNCAN��and��ANDR��are��at�� the��same��t�me��protectors�� (aga�nst��nuclear�� r�sks)��when��they��fulf�l��the�r��duty��to��check��and��ver�fy,��but��also��promoters,���nterested��to��cooperate��smoothly��w�th��nuclear��enterpr�ses,�� regard�ng��act�v�t�es�� from��wh�ch�� they�� stand��to��ga�n.�� Instead��of��be�ng��only��protectors,��ent�rely��comm�tted�� to��protect�on,�� they��somehow��comb�ne��protect�on��and��promot�on,��wh�ch���nev�tably��creates��a��temptat�on��to��comprom�se��and��somet�mes��a��whole��mess.��The��requ�rements��of��an��adversar�al��log�c,�� that�� �s��benef�c�al��for��check�ng��tasks,��are�� thus��def�ed.��Us�ng��once��aga�n��our��analogy��w�th��med�cal��eth�cs,���t��can��be��sa�d��that��the��s�tuat�on��of��CNCAN��and��ANDR���s��comparable��to��the��s�tuat�on��of��a��phys�c�an��who���s��s�multaneously��asked��to��protect��pat�ents,��but��also�� to��cooperate��w�th�� ‘b�g��pharma’�� �n��promot�ng��some��drugs��and��some��med�cal��treatments��based��on��them.��The��confl�ct��of���nterests���s��ev�dent,��and��the��l�kel�ness�� that�� �nadequate��care��for�� the��pat�ents��m�ght��ensue���s��also��ev�dent.��In�� the��same��sense,���t���s��l�kely��that��Roman�an���nst�tut�ons��cannot��take��care��adequately��of��the��people��exposed��to��se�sm�c��plus��nuclear��r�sks��as��long��as��they��are��doubly��comm�tted��to��protect�on��and��promot�on.��Lax�ty�� �n��compl�ance��w�th��safety��standards��and��a��hab�t��of��be�ng��‘econom�cal��w�th�� the�� truth’��when�� �nformat�on��about��hazards��and��vulnerab�l�t�es��should��be��made��publ�c��are��to��be��expected,��as��long��as��such���nst�tut�ons��are���nterested���n��protect�ng��the�r��fund�ng��and��also��the�r��own��ex�stence.��Why��should��an���nst�tut�on��that��just�f�es���ts��own��ex�stence��by��watch�ng��nuclear��act�v�t�es��be��eager��to��acknowledge��that�� these��act�v�t�es��are��too��dangerous,�� too��expens�ve��(�n��case��the��h�ghest��standards��of��safety��are��to��be��enforced)��and��should��perhaps��be���nterrupted?��Such��s�ncer�ty��would��be��su�c�dal,��and�� �nst�tut�ons��are��never�� tempted�� to��comm�t��su�c�de.��We��thus��have��to��not�ce��a��perverse��consequence��of��the���nst�tut�onal��des�gn��of��the��Roman�an��‘ant�-nuclear��hazards’��protect�on��system:��the���nst�tut�ons��des�gned��to��detect��and��d�sclose��nuclear��dangers��are��themselves��at��least��part�ally���nterested��to��conceal��alarm�ng���nformat�on��and��to��man�fest��opt�m�sm��about��r�sks��the��protectors��are��bound��to��promote.��The�r��fa�lure�� to�� �nform��correctly,�� to��seek���nformed��consent��and��to��avo�d��any��man�pulat�on���s��thus��almost���nev�table:�� the�r��moral��fa�lure���s,�� �n��a��certa�n��sense,��bu�lt-�n.

�� Part��of�� the�� research��work�� for�� th�s�� art�cle��has��been��done�� �ns�de�� the�� framework��of�� the��“Rights to a Green Future, Uncertainty, Intergenerational Human Rights and Pathways to Realization (ENRI-Future)”�� �nternat�onal��project,��wh�ch�� �s�� funded��by�� the��European Science Foundation�� to��whom��I��am��pleased��to��express��my��grat�tude.��I��am��very���ndebted��to��Dr.��Dan�ela��D�aconu��and��to��Dr.��Mar�n��Constant�n,��both��from��the��Pitesti Institute for Nuclear Research,��for��fru�tful��d�scuss�ons��and��many���nformat�ons��on��nuclear��matters.��And��to��Ileana��Dascalu,��my��PhD��student,��for��many��useful��talks��and��for��some���mprovements��of��my��Engl�sh.

130 �� Eth�cal��Att�tudes��Toward��the��Env�ronment����/����Adr�an��MIROIU������������131

References

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Beauchamp,��Tom��L.,��Ch�ldress,�� James��F.��2008.��Principles of Biomedical Ethics, Oxford��Un�vers�ty��Press,��6th��ed�t�on.

Dworkin, Gerald. 1972. “Paternalismˮ, The Monist,��Vol.��56,��no.��1.Kasperson,��Roger��E.;��Renn,��Ortw�n;��Slov�c,��Paul;��Brown,��Hal�na��S.;��Emel,��Jacque;Goble,��Robert�� ;��Kasperson,��Jeanne��X.;��Rat�ck,��Samuel.��1988.��“The��Soc�al��Ampl�f�cat�on��of��

Risk: A Conceptual Frameworkˮ, Risk Analysis,��vol.��8.��No.��2.Keefer,��Ph�l�p;��Neumayer,��Er�c;��Plümper,��Thomas.��2010.��“Earthquake��Propens�ty��and�� the��

Pol�t�cs��of��Mortal�ty��Prevent�on”,��Pol�cy��Research��Work�ng��Paper��5182,��The��World��Bank��Development��Research��Group��Macroeconom�cs��and��Growth��Team��&��Global��Fac�l�ty��for��D�saster��Reduct�on��and��Recovery��Department.

Lungu,��Dan.��2007.�� Interv�ew��publ�shed��by�� the��newspaper��Adevărul,��March,��3.��http://www.adevarul.ro/actual�tate/even�ment/Bucurest�ul-r�d�cat-r�sc-se�sm�c-Europa_0_42597031.html#��(retr�eved��12.11.2012).

Lungu,��Dan.��2005.��Presentat�on��at��the��World Conference on Disaster Reduction,��Kobe,��Hyogo,��Japan,��18-22��January.��http://www.un�sdr.org/2005/wcdr/themat�c-sess�ons/presentat�ons/sess�on4-6/roman�a-dr-lungu.pdf,��(retr�eved��12.11.2012)

M�ll,��J.S.��1975.��On Liberty,��W.W.��Norton��and��Co.P�dgeon,��N�ck;��Kasperson,��Roger��E.;��Slov�c,��Paul��(eds.)��2003.��The Social Amplification of Risks,��

Cambr�dge��Un�vers�ty��Press.Pochin, Sir Edward. 1982. “Risk and Medical Ethicsˮ, Journal of Medical Ethics,��8,��180-184.Radul�an,��M�rcea.��2012.��Interv�ew��for��www.z�uanews.ro,��May,��2.http://www.z�uanews.ro/dezvalu�r�-�nvest�gat��/roman�a-trece-sub-tacere-un-per�col-nuclear-la-

cernavoda-de-t�p-fukosh�ma-15122��(retr�eved��on��12.11.2012).Renn,��O.��und��Kl�nke,��A.��2001.��“Damokles-Schwerter��und��KassANDRa-Rufe.��Empfehlungen��für��

die Kommunikation von Risikenˮ, Ethik Magazin,��Heft��2,��3.��Jahrgang,��30-39.Sjöberg,��Lennart.��1999. “R�sk��Percept�on��by��the��Publ�c��and��by��Experts:��A��D�lemma���n��R�sk��

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Ethical Attitudes Toward the Environment: The Romanian Case

Adr�an��MIROIU

Introduction

“In��the��th�ck��forests��around��Ba�a��Mare,��240��m�les��northwest��of��Bucharest,�� the��tox�c��em�ss�ons��of��th�s��metallurg�cal��center��have��cut��plant��growth���n��half.��About��one��th�rd��of��the��roughly��30,000��acres��of��forest��have��been��devastated.��Some��trees��have��lost��up��to��two��th�rds��of��the�r��fol�age.��Even���n��the��least��affected��areas,��ac�d��ra�n��has��covered��the��leaves��w�th��brown��spots.��[...]��The��two��ma�n��culpr�ts,�� the��state-owned��Romplumb��and��Phoen�x��plants,��are��st�ll��operat�ng,��spew�ng��sulfur��d�ox�de��and��lead���nto�� the��a�r��at�� levels��100��to��200��percent��over�� the��Roman�an��norms”.1

Th�s��terr�fy�ng��descr�pt�on��of��twenty��years��ago��has���mpressed��many��readers��of��The New York Times.��At��that��t�me,��the��Roman�an��nat�onal��telev�s�on��repeatedly��broadcast��reports��on��the��env�ronmental��tragedy���n��the��Northern��part��of��the��country;��but��qu�te��a��few��people���n��Roman�a��trembled��at��those���mages,��and��even��so,��they��d�d��not��f�nd��themselves��determ�ned��to��act.��As��The New York Times��ac�dly��commented,��‘The��c�ty��government��has��brought�� the�� two��plants�� to��court,�� seek�ng��damages��of��$3,000��for��each��day��of��operat�on.��But��few��people��take��the��move��ser�ously’.��The���ssue��I��would��l�ke��to��take���nto��account���n��th�s��paper���s��why��env�ronmental���ssues��(�nclud�ng��cases��l�ke��pollut�on�� �n��Ba�a��Mare)��were��not��perce�ved�� �n��Roman�a��even�� �n�� the��n�net�es��as��problems�� �n��need��of��careful,�� reasoned��exam�nat�on��and��resolut�on.�� I��shall��not��spend��much��t�me��w�th��the��well��known��cla�m��that���n��countr�es��character�zed��by��huge��econom�c��problems��concern��for��the��env�ronment���s��seen��as��a��luxury,��as��opposed��to��more��press�ng��dec�s�ons.��To��quote��aga�n��from��The New York Times:��

“The�� human�� cost�� �s�� appall�ng.�� For�� Ba�a�� Mare’s�� 150,000�� res�dents,�� l�fe��expectancy���s��50,��nearly��20��years��below��the��Roman�an��average.��Ch�ldren���n��a��health��survey��conducted��by��UNESCO��show��h�gh��depos�ts��of��lead���n��the�r��bones��and teeth. Chronic bronchial diseases are endemic [...]. ʽWe put our protestsʼ, Petre Mărcuţă, state secretary of the Ministry of Environment in Bucharest, said. ʽBut given that we don’t have legal rights and because of the grave economic s�tuat�on��generally,��we’ll��have��to��wa�t��a��l�ttle��longer��for��the��necessary��means��to��make a differenceʼ ”.

These�� comments�� are��undoubtedly�� correct;�� but�� they��po�nt��only�� to�� surface�� and��c�rcumstant�al��bel�efs��and��att�tudes,��wh�le��leav�ng��unquest�oned��the��deeper��roots��of��

��1�� The New York Times,��1992.��August��16.

132 �� Eth�cal��Att�tudes��Toward��the��Env�ronment����/����Adr�an��MIROIU������������133

the��prevalent��bel�efs��on,��and��att�tudes��toward��the��env�ronment���n��today’s��Roman�a.2

The-web-of-domination

Env�ronmental��eth�cs�� seeks�� to��broaden�� the�� scope��of��moral��concern��by��argu�ng��that��concepts�� l�ke��duty,��obl�gat�on,�� respect��or�� r�ghts��genu�nely��apply�� to�� �tems�� �n��the��natural��world;�� the��range��of�� these�� �tems��var�es��from��theory�� to�� theory,��stead�ly��extend�ng��from��h�gher��an�mals��to��all��l�v�ng��organ�sms,��to��spec�es,��ecosystems,��land��and��even��Earth.�� Influent�al��env�ronmental��ph�losophers��see�� th�s��movement��as��a��f�nal��step���n��a��long��process��of��turn�ng��away��from��the��merely��part�cular��(myself,��my��fam�ly,��my��clan,��my��fellow��humans,��etc.)�� to�� the��un�versal.��Self�shness��(d�sgu�sed���n�� trad�t�onal��Western�� eth�cs��under�� some��brand��of�� “human��chauv�n�sm”)��was��completely��d�scarded��and,��as��a��last��successful��general�zat�on,��nature��was��recogn�zed��as��morally��cons�derable.

The��underly�ng��assumpt�on��of�� th�s��pos�t�on�� �s�� that��of��a��close��assoc�at�on��of��eth�cal��assessment��w�th��un�versal�zat�on��and��abstract�on.��Env�ronmental��eth�cal��theor�es��a�m��at��putt�ng�� forward��un�versal�zable��max�ms,�� �n�� the�� form��of��eth�cal��pr�nc�ples��and��rules��of��conduct.��Many��authors��devoted��a��large��space��to��stat�ng��and��defend�ng��pr�nc�ples��and��rules,��and��were��much��concerned��w�th��the��methodolog�cal��requ�rements�� for��accept�ng��a��pr�nc�ple��or��a�� rule.3��When��concrete��cases��were�� �n��need��of��concrete�� resolut�ons,�� the��strategy��was�� to��produce��new,��more��substant�ve��pr�nc�ples,��along��w�th��some��second-order��pr�nc�ples�� to��regulate�� �ssues��of��pr�or�ty���n��apply�ng�� the��f�rst-order��ones.��For��example,�� �f��we��cannot��avo�d��be�ng��exposed��to�� some��dangerous��or��harmful��organ�sms,��Taylor’s��“pr�nc�ple��of�� self-defence”��perm�ts��us��to��protect��ourselves��even��by��destroy�ng��them.4��We��may��act�� �n��a��certa�n��way��because��we��are��gu�ded��by��a��general��pr�nc�ple.��But��the��eth�cal��theory��must��also��conta�n��some��new��(and��general)��second-order��pr�nc�ple��enta�l�ng��that���n��any��case��of��that��sort�� the��pr�nc�ple��of��self-defence��takes��pr�or�ty��over��the��(general)��pr�nc�ple��of��respect��for��l�v�ng��organ�sms.

Th�s��p�cture��was,��however,��subject��to��strong��cr�t�c�sm��from��var�ous��d�rect�ons.��F�rst,��some��fem�n�sts��quest�oned��the��emphas�s��on��abstract�on��and��un�versal�zat�on,��and�� the�� �mpl�c�t��d�sregard��of�� the��part�cular��and�� the��emot�onal.��They��argued�� that��when�� these��are��set��as�de��as�� �rrelevant��or�� suspect,��as��subject�ve��or��personal,�� the��only��conclus�on��to��emerge���s��that��the��bas�s��of��moral�ty��cons�sts���n��rules��of��abstract��reason,�� �n�� �mpersonal��procedures��best��exempl�f�ed�� �n�� the��publ�c�� sphere.5��As��V.��Plumwood��put�� �t,�� “The��oppos�t�on��between�� the��care��and��concern�� for��part�cular��

��2�� Th�ngs��changed���n��the��past��years,��w�th��the��pressure��of��the��European��Un�on��to���mplement��the��acquis communautaire.��However,��I��shall��have���n��m�nd��espec�ally��the��case��of��the��last��decade��of��the��20th��century.

��3�� See,��for��example,��T.��Regan,��The Case for Animal Rights,��Un�vers�ty��of��Cal�forn�a��Press,��Berkeley,��Los��Angeles,��1983,��Chapter��4;��P.��Taylor,��Respect for Nature,��Pr�nceton��Un�vers�ty��Press,��Pr�nceton,��NJ,��1986,��Chapter��4;��P.��Wenz,��Environmental Justice,��SUNY��Press,��Albany,��1988.

��4�� P.��Taylor,��Respect for Nature,��pp.��264-65.��5�� See��also��the��eco-fem�n�st��v�ew��developed���n��M.��M�ro�u,��Convenio. Despre natură, femei și

morală, Polirom, Iași, 2002.

others��and��general�zed��moral��concern���s��assoc�ated��w�th��a��sharp��d�v�s�on��between��publ�c��(mascul�ne)��and��pr�vate��(fem�n�ne)��realms.��Thus���t���s��part��of��a��set��of��dual�st�c��contrasts���n��wh�ch��the��problem��of��the��Western��treatment��of��nature���s��rooted.��And��the��oppos�t�on��between��care��for��part�cular��others��and��general��moral��concern���s��a��false��one”.6

Second,�� the��establ�shment��of��grounded��pr�nc�ples��for�� treat�ng��new��ent�t�es�� �s��often��regarded��as��a��mark��of��progress.��But���s�� �t��necessar�ly��so?��If��successful��at��all,��would�� theor�es��of��env�ronmental��eth�cs�� (�.e.,�� structured��collect�ons��of�� f�rst-order��general��pr�nc�ples��and��second-order��general��pr�or�ty��pr�nc�ples)��be��s�gns��of��a��moral���mprovement?��As��far��as��env�ronmental��eth�c�sts��are��comm�tted�� to��an��aff�rmat�ve��answer,�� �t��may��be��argued�� that�� they��are��wrong.��To��see��why,�� let��me��start��w�th��an��analogy.��Suppose�� I�� learned�� that�� �n��a��certa�n��country,�� say�� �n��Eastern��Europe,��a��spectacular���ncrease���n��just�ce��happened���n��the��f�rst��f�ve��to��ten��years��after��the��collapse��of��the��old��reg�me.��Fa�r��dec�s�ons,��subject��to���mpart�al��and��procedural��mechan�sms,��der�ved��from��general��pr�nc�ples,�� largely��replaced��the��old��and��unbearable��burden��of��lack��of��l�berty,��and��other��unjust��constra�nts���n��publ�c��l�fe.��The��pol�t�cal���mprovement���s��surely��unden�able.��But��can��we��say,��from��th�s���nformat�on��alone,��that��th�s���ncrease��of��just�ce���s��assoc�ated��w�th��an��overall��moral���mprovement?��Well,�� �t��depends.��“[A]��ga�n���n��just�ce��can��come��about���n��one��of��two��ways;���t��can��ar�se��where��before��there��was���njust�ce,��or���t��can��occur��where��before��there��was��ne�ther��just�ce��nor���njust�ce��but��a��suff�c�ent��measure��of��benevolence��or��fratern�ty��such��that��the��v�rtue��of��just�ce��had��not��been��extens�vely��engaged”.7��In��the��former��case,��we��can��hardly��doubt��the��moral���mprovement.8��But,��as��M.��Sandel��argues,��th�ngs��are��not��so��very��stra�ght���n��the��latter��case.��For��example,���n��a��(more��or��less���deal)��fam�ly��or��group��of��fr�ends,��relat�ons��are��governed�� �n�� large��part��by��spontaneous��affect�on,��by��generos�ty��and��care.��Cla�ms��of�� fa�r��shares��are��rarely��made,��and��even�� �f��one��gets�� less�� than��she��would��under��a��d�str�but�on��governed��by��pr�nc�ples��of�� just�ce,�� th�s��quest�on���s��not��part��of�� the��core��of��that��way��of��l�fe.��But��suppose��that��d�ssent��appears��and,��due��to��grow�ng��d�vergent���nterests,��affect�on,��spontane�ty,��generos�ty��and��care��come��to��be��replaced��by��demands��for��fa�rness��and��the��observance��of��r�ghts,��and��that��moral��necess�t�es��are��met��w�th��just�ce,��such��that��no���njust�ce��looms.��Parents��and��ch�ldren,��w�fe��and��husband,��and��fr�ends��regulate��the�r���nteract�ons��w�th��all-encompass�ng��just�ce.��Are��we���ncl�ned��to��see���n��th�s��new��s�tuat�on��a��restorat�on��of��the��full��moral��character��of��l�fe���n��the��old��days?��Is�� the��arr�val��of�� just�ce��a��moral�� �mprovement��not��only��over�� the��confl�ctual��s�tuat�on,��but��also��over��the��moral�ty��brought��about��by��affect�on,��generos�ty,��and��so��on?

The��case�� I��have�� �n��m�nd�� �s��not�� that��general��pr�nc�ples��of�� just�ce��are��not�� to��govern��modern��soc�et�es;��rather��I��worry��about��the���ncl�nat�on��to��allow��them��to���nvade��

��6�� Val��Plumwood,��“Nature,��Self��and��Gender:��Fem�n�sm,��Env�ronmental��Ph�losophy,��and��the��Cr�t�que��of��Rat�onal�sm”,�� �n��L.��Gruen,��D.��Jam�eson��(eds.),��Reflecting on Nature,��Oxford��Un�vers�ty��Press,��New��York,��Oxford,��1994,��p.��145.

��7�� M.��Sandel,��Liberalism and the Limits of Justice,��Cambr�dge��Un�vers�ty��Press,��Cambr�dge,��1982,��p.��32.

��8�� In��the��two��decades��follow�ng��the��collapse��of��commun�sm,��the��lack��of��moral��pr�nc�ples���n��publ�c��l�fe��became��obv�ous.��Two��of��the��most���mportant���ssues���n��Roman�a��were��corrupt�on��and��econom�c���nequal�ty.��

134 �� Eth�cal��Att�tudes��Toward��the��Env�ronment����/����Adr�an��MIROIU������������135

the��pr�vate��moral��sphere��w�th��s�m�lar��standards��and��procedures.��My��background,��as��a��person��who��l�ved��h�s��youth���n��the��late��sevent�es��and���n��the��e�ght�es,��makes��me��very��caut�ous��about��the��dangers��such��an���ncl�nat�on��m�ght���nvolve.��Wh�le���n��Poland��or��Hungary,��for��example,�� the��s�gns��of��a��new��order��could��at�� least��be��dreamt��of�� �n��that��per�od,��Roman�an��soc�ety��fell��under��a��strong��author�tar�an��reg�me.��The��party-state��a�med��to��br�ng��under���ts��regulat�on��the��ent�re��publ�c��sphere.��Any��free��econom�c��act�v�ty��was��strongly��proh�b�ted,��and��no��forms��of��c�v�c��organ�sms��were��perm�tted.��A��free��press��was��not��even��conce�vable.��The���deolog�cal��pressures��extended��to��all��members��of�� the��soc�ety.��Mass��med�a��were��under��strong�� �deolog�cal��control.��The��pressure��of��the��publ�c��sphere��over��the��pr�vate��one��was��overwhelm�ng.

A��pol�t�c�zed��publ�c��sphere��governed��by�� �mpersonal,��general��pr�nc�ples,��no��prospects�� for��profess�onal��ach�evements,��a��more��and��more��aggravated��econom�c��cr�s�s,��and��a��hum�l�at�ng�� lack��of��even��elementary��means��of�� subs�stence.�� In�� th�s��context,��many��people��d�rected�� the�r�� energy�� to�� the��pr�vate�� sphere.��Fam�ly��and��groups��of��fr�ends��became��the��only��realm��of��enjoyment��and��happ�ness;��even���n��those��soc�al��or��pol�t�cal��cond�t�ons,��human��flour�sh�ng��was��st�ll��pursued.��And��we��found���mmense��sources��of��self-ach�evement���n��close��connect�ons��w�th��parents��and��ch�ldren,���n�� fr�endsh�p��and�� �n��other�� �nterpersonal�� relat�ons.��Moral�ty��was�� seen�� to��def�ne��behav�our��and��character��tra�ts���n��th�s��pr�vate��sphere��—��wh�le��the��publ�c��sphere��was��largely��regarded��as��outs�de��of��or��external��to��moral�ty.��What���s��moral��was��understood���n�� terms��of��affect�on,�� trust,��care,��generos�ty;��wh�le��dut�es,��obl�gat�ons,��or�� r�ghts��were���mmed�ately��rejected��as��external,��publ�c��and��hence��amoral��constra�nts.��Such��a��react�on��was��due��espec�ally�� to�� the��general��and���mpersonal��connotat�on��of�� these��terms.��Un�versal��pr�nc�ples��d�d��not��d�rectly��perta�n��to��the��concreteness��of��real��moral���nterpersonal��relat�ons.9

In��general,�� the�� �nd�v�duals’��att�tude�� �n�� that�� t�me��was�� to��f�nd��means�� to��res�st,��and�� to�� �nd�v�duate�� themselves��as��be�ngs��d�fferent�� from��publ�c��oppress�on��able��to�� �nd�v�dually�� flour�sh.��The�r��ma�n��strategy��was�� to�� retreat�� to�� the��pr�vate��sphere��of�� fam�ly��and�� fr�endsh�p,��or�� the��pr�vate�� study��of��culture,��art��or�� sc�ence.��Moral��boundar�es��were��supposed��to��work��there,���n��contrast��to��the��al�en,��neutral��and��h�ghly��pol�t�c�zed��publ�c�� f�eld��of�� the�r�� l�fe.��To��oppose��was�� to�� retreat.��To�� f�ght��aga�nst��aggress�on��was�� to��develop��alternat�ve��n�ches�� �n�� l�fe,�� �n��wh�ch��aggress�on��was��po�ntless.��The��att�tudes��one��found���n��her��or��h�s��fam�ly��(e.g.,��care,��generos�ty��and��trust)��had��noth�ng��to��do��w�th��the��equ�ty��standards��promoted��by��the��party-state.��One��

��9�� The��contrast��between��more��personal�zed,��more��concrete��t�es���n��soc�ety,��on��the��one��hand,��and��more��unpersonal�zed,��anonymous��relat�ons��among��people,��on��the��other,�� �s��analyzed��from��mult�ple�� theoret�cal��perspect�ves.��See��for��example��the��soc�olog�cal��v�ew,��as��expressed���n��Granovetter,��M.,��“Econom�c��Act�on��and��Soc�al��Structure:��the��Problem��of��Embeddedness”,��American Journal of Sociology,��91,��1985,��pp.��481-510,��and��the��econom�c��v�ew,��descr�bed���n��Platteau,��J.-Ph.,��“Beh�nd�� the��Market��State��–��Where��Real��Soc�et�es��Ex�st”,��Journal of Development Studies,��30,��1994,��pp.��533-577;��753-817��or��Gre�f,��A.,��Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy,��Cambr�dge��Un�v.��Press,��2006.��A��very��general��approach,��appl�cable��also��to��the��Roman�an��soc�ety,��both��dur�ng��the��commun�st��reg�me��and���n��the��trans�t�on��per�od��follow�ng���t,���s��developed���n��North,��D.C.,��Wall�s,��J.J.,��We�ngast,��B.R.,��Violence and Social Orders.A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History, Cambr�dge��Un�vers�ty��Press,��Cambr�dge,��2009.

could��not��be��neutral��and��formal��w�th��one’s��fr�ends.��Equ�ty��and��fa�r��shares��were��not��usually��among��the��concepts��one��thought��of��when��spend�ng��t�me,��energy��or��money��together��w�th��fam�ly��or��fr�ends.��Hence,�� to��res�st��was�� to��develop��new��and��pr�vate��forms��of��l�fe.��They��were��not��d�rectly��opposed��to��the��publ�c��one,��but��nevertheless��they��were��outs�de���ts��control.

My��po�nt���s��not��that��un�versal��pr�nc�ples��are��not��an��essent�al��part��of��an��eth�cal��outlook.�� I��do��not�� �ntend�� to�� rely��on�� the��plethora��of��ant�-theor�sts,��who��deny�� the��s�gn�f�cance,��or��at�� least�� the��usefulness,��of��eth�cal�� theor�es.��Rather��my��argument���s�� that��an��env�ronmental��outlook��expressed��only�� �n�� terms��of��un�versal�� f�rst-order��and��second-order��pr�nc�ples��should��also��make��room��for��moral��concepts�� l�ke��care,��shar�ng,��love,��benevolence��and��so��on.

What��about��the��att�tude��toward��nature?��The��off�c�al��v�ew��dur�ng��the��commun�st��per�od��was�� that��nature��needs�� to��be��conquered,��dom�nated��and��subjugated.10��The��largest��part��of��the��Danube��Delta,��a��huge��area��of��w�lderness,�� the��home��of��hundreds��of��spec�es��of��b�rds,��was��transformed���nto��an���ndustr�al��complex��of��reed��harvest�ng.��The��ecosystems��on��the��Danube��holm��were��destroyed:���n��less��than��twenty��years��some��m�ll�on��acres��turned���nto���rr�gated��land.��On��most��mounta�n��r�vers,��dams��were��bu�lt:��around��them,��deforestat�on��was��extens�ve,��and��many��years��later��one��could��st�ll��see��monstrous,��d�lap�dated��s�tes��of��aux�l�ary��bu�ld�ngs��or��mater�als.��Nature��was��v�ewed���nstrumentally:�� �ts��value��was���ts��capac�ty�� to��fulf�l��collect�ve��goals��put��forward��by��pol�t�cal��organ�zat�ons.��So,��people’s��da�ly�� l�fe��and��nature��were�� �n�� the��same��boat:��fellow��subjects��to��the��same��source��of��dom�nat�on.��S�tuat�ons��l�ke��the��one���n��the��c�ty��of��Ba�a��Mare��were��perce�ved��as��a��case��of��shar�ng��a��common��fate:��people’s��l�fe��of��m�sery��had���ts��counterpart���n��hard��pollut�on.��In��th�s��context,���f��relat�on��to��nature���s��to��be��moral,��people’s��att�tudes��to���t��were��more��personal�zed.��They��were��more��concerned��w�th��concepts��l�ke��empathy��or��care,��than��w�th��duty,��obl�gat�on��or��just�ce.

Redeemed-nature

Talk��about�� trad�t�onal��Western��att�tudes�� toward��nature�� �s��usually��contrasted��w�th��two��k�nds��of��worldv�ews.��One��was��born��three��or��four��decades��ago��somewhere�� �n��the��Un�ted��States��(and��maybe��Austral�a),��and��bapt�zed��env�ronmental��ph�losophy,��and�� spec�f�cally�� env�ronmental�� eth�cs.��The��other��k�nd�� compr�ses�� less�� recent,��but��neglected,�� rejected,��undervalued��or��even�� lost��worldv�ews,��among�� them�� the��nat�ve��Amer�can��or�� the��abor�g�nal��Austral�an��outlooks.11(Th�s�� type��of��approach���s��not��pecul�ar�� to�� th�s�� f�eld��of�� �nqu�ry.��As��some��popular��wr�ters,��seldom��quoted��by��env�ronmental��ph�losophers��not�ced,��certa�n��v�ews��of��modern��phys�cs��d�splay��certa�n��resemblances��to��Or�ental��ones).

At��least��two��ma�n��fundamental��att�tudes��toward��nature��can��be��d�scerned���n��the��Western��rel�g�ously-grounded��world-v�ew:�� the��despot�c��and�� that��of��stewardsh�p.��

10�� In�� the��commun�st��per�od,��econom�c��planners�� fa�led�� to��address�� �ssues�� l�ke��pollut�on,��or��destroy�ng��many��natural��s�tes.��Env�ronmental��damage��was��noth�ng��but��an��external�ty.

11�� See,�� e.g.�� J.�� B.�� Call�cott,�� Earth’s Insights: A Survey of Ecological Ethics from the Mediterranean Basin to the Australian Outback,��Un�vers�ty��of��Cal�forn�a��Press,��Berkeley,��1994.

136 �� Eth�cal��Att�tudes��Toward��the��Env�ronment����/����Adr�an��MIROIU������������137

The��ult�mate��roots��of��these��v�ews��are��sought���n��the��f�rst��chapters��of��Genesis,��and��the��ent�re��ev�dence���s��prov�ded��from��that��book��of��the��Old Testament.��W�th��a��v�ew��to��the��non-despot�c���nterpretat�on��of��Genesis,��J.��B.��Call�cott��wr�tes:��

“The��God��of��the��Judeo-Chr�st�an��trad�t�on���s�� transcendent,��not�� �mmanent.��The��hypothes�s��of��such��a��God��therefore��perm�ts��us�� to��conce�ve�� �ntr�ns�c��value��as��determ�ned��object�vely,�� that�� �s,�� from��some��po�nt��of�� reference��outs�de��human��consc�ousness.��From��God’s��po�nt��of��v�ew,��we��may�� �mag�ne�� the��creat�on��as��a whole and all its parts are ʽgoodʼ. Everything may not seem good from a subject�ve��human��perspect�ve��–��po�son���vy,��mosqu�toes,��rattlesnakes��–��but��they��are all ʽGod’s creaturesʼ, and therefore good in His eyes. [...] The mastery of Homo sapiens��over��other��spec�es��[...]���s��a��s�gn��of��the��fallen��and��cursed��cond�t�on��of��Homo sapiens,��not��a��pr�v�lege��orda�ned��by��God”.12

Th�s�� J-the�sm��does��not�� look��at�� f�rst�� s�ght�� �ncompat�ble��w�th��accept�ng�� the��genu�ne,�� �ntr�ns�c��value��of��natural�� �tems:��they��are��part��of��God’s��creat�on,��and��God��saw��that��all��of��H�s��creat�on��was��good.��Note��that��an��essent�al��assumpt�on��l�es��beh�nd��such��an��account.��An���rreconc�lable��dual�sm��between��nature��and��d�v�n�ty�� �s�� taken��for��granted;�� the��gap��between�� the�� two��realms�� �s��absolute,��and��any��attempt�� to�� f�ll���t�� �s��hardly�� �ntell�g�ble.��Th�s�� �nterpretat�on��m�ght�� �ndeed��allow��for��conce�v�ng��of��natural���tems��as��good,��from��God’s��v�ew,��and��hence��as���ntr�ns�cally��valuable.��But,��to��use��a��phrase��J.��B.��Call�cott��l�kes,��the�r��value���s���ntr�ns�c��only���n��a��‘truncated’��sense.��For��accord�ng�� to�� the��Juda�c�� trad�t�on,��when��we��say�� that��someth�ng�� �s��good,��our��statement���s��qu�te��d�fferent��from��the��statement��that��God���s��good.��God���s��so��h�ghly��s�tuated,��and��H�s��creat�on���s��so��low,��that�� the��value��of��such��a��be�ng���s��hardly��more��than��noth�ngness.��God���s��absolute��pos�t�v�ty,��H�s��creat�on��–��and��nature,��consequently��–�s��negat�v�ty;��genu�ne���ntr�ns�c��value���s��w�th��God,��wh�le�� the��value��of��any��part��of��H�s��creat�on�� �s��only��secondary��and��der�vat�ve.��The��value��of��each��be�ng��can�� thus��be���ntr�ns�c��only���f��relat�ve��and��dependent.��The��fact�� that�� the��value��of�� these��be�ngs���s��object�vely��determ�ned�� �s��po�ntless:��s�nce�� �t��appl�es�� to��everyth�ng��and��noth�ng���s��excluded,�� �t�� �s��vo�d;��and��s�nce��from��that��perspect�ve�� the��value��of��any��creature��amounts��to��noth�ng,��actually��we��are��left��w�th��no��value��at��all.��Call�cott�� �s��r�ght:�� the��underly�ng��prem�se��of��th�s��pos�t�on���s��the��hypothes�s��that��God���s��transcendent,��and��no��transfer�� �s��poss�ble��from��the��transcendent��realm��to��the��natural,�� �mmanent��one.��But,��as��I��shall��try��to��argue,��he���s��wrong��when��assum�ng��that��th�s��v�ew���s��the ‘Judeo-Chr�st�an’��one.

On��the��other��hand,��humans��are�� �n��a��sense��opposed��both�� to��God��and��nature.��Humans��are��also��part��of��creat�on,��and��are��as��d�stant��as��any��natural�� �tem��from��the��transcendent��d�v�n�ty.��The�r���ntr�ns�c��value���s��as��dependent��onGod��as���n��the��case��of��any��other��be�ng.��Human��l�fe���s��sacred��but��only��because���t���s��the��g�ft��God��gave��us,��not��because���t�� �s��m�ne��or��yours.��However,��humans��were��created���n��God’s���mage,��after��H�s��l�keness.��In��contrast��w�th��mere��natural��th�ngs,��they��are��not��just��body.��They��have��sp�r�t.��Th�s��g�ves��them��a��spec�al��place���n��the��world��of��creat�on.��The��dual�sm��between��

12�� J.��B.��Call�cott,��“On��the��Intr�ns�c��Value��of��Nonhuman��Spec�es”,���n��h�s��In Defense of the Land Ethic,��SUNY��Press,��Albany,��1989,��pp.��137-38.

body��and��sp�r�t��became��the��operat�onal��counterpart��of�� the��dual�sm��between��what���s��d�v�ne��and��what�� �s��created.��Body���s��nature,��and���t��g�ves��no��chance��to��salvat�on.��Our��only��hope���s�� the��sp�r�t.��Even��w�th�n��the��stewardsh�p��trad�t�on,��wh�ch��requ�red��reverence�� for��nature,�� the��contrast��between��what�� �s�� �mmanent,�� created,��and�� the��transcendent��God���s��absolute.��The��worth��of��natural�� �tems,�� �f��ex�stent��at��all,�� �s��not���nherently��the�rs;���t���s��der�ved��from��the��fact��that��they��are��part��of��creat�on.

The��story��that��der�ved��from��th�s��world-v�ew���s��well��known:��body��was��assoc�ated��w�th��matter,��w�th��nature,��w�th�� the��negat�ve,�� the�� �nfer�or,�� the��pass�ve,��dependence,��the��fem�n�ne,��etc.��The��dual�sm��resulted���nto��a��strong��ax�olog�cal��asymmetry.��Nature,��women,��pass�ons,��etc.��were��undervalued.��And��natural�� th�ngs��were��d�scr�m�nated��aga�nst��as��devo�d��of��any��moral��stand�ng.

I��do��not���ntend��to��l�nger��over��these���ssues.��What��I��want��to��not�ce���s��that��some��authors�� l�ke�� to��use��sharp��d�st�nct�ons�� �n�� the�r��env�ronmental��eth�cal�� theor�es.��Are��humans��natural��be�ngs,��and��should��what�� they��do��be��assessed��along��w�th��natural��events?��Or�� �s�� th�s��not�� the��case,��and��should��we��sharply��d�st�ngu�sh�� the��results��of��human��act�on��from��natural�� results?��Or,�� �s�� there��a�� fundamental��contrast��between��the��moral��status��of��my��pet��dog��and��that��of��a��w�ld��wolf?13�� Is�� �t��poss�ble�� to��def�ne��w�lderness��as��a��total��lack��of��human���nvolvement?14��I��do��not��favour��such��d�chotom�es.��My��reasons��for��hold�ng��th�s��v�ew��w�ll��be��apparent��once��I���nvoke��a��Byzant�ne��account��of��nature.

Note��f�rst�� that��here��we��face��a��profound��tens�on��w�th��some��spec�f�c��Chr�st�an��doctr�nes.��Indeed,��the��doctr�ne��of���ncarnat�on��supported��a��‘sacramental’��v�ew��ofthe��whole��of��creat�on.��The��embod�ment��of��Chr�st��left��ungrounded��the��absolute��contrast��between��the��transcendent��and��the���mmanent,��and��hence��the��der�ved��dual�sm��between��sp�r�t��and��body.��If��Chr�st��was��fully��human,��then��H�s��human��body��was��also��d�v�ne���n��character.��D�v�n�ty��was��not��degraded��when��transf�gured���n��human��flesh��and��bones.��Rather��creat�on��was��elevated��to��a��new��d�gn�ty.

It��m�ght��be��objected,��however,�� that��although��w�th�n�� th�s��doctr�ne�� the��status��of��human��be�ngs���s��rendered��d�fferently,��nature��st�ll�� rema�ns���n�� the��oppos�te��pole:��Jesus��Chr�st��was��a��human,��and���t��was��the��human��m�l�eu��that��got��a��new��status.��But��th�s��would��not��proh�b�t��att�tudes��of��dom�nat�on��and���nstrumental��accounts��of��‘mere��natural’�� th�ngs��(as,�� �n��fact,�� the��h�story��of��Chr�st�an�ty��proved��so��many��t�mes).��Th�s��argument�� �s,�� I�� th�nk,��not��correct.��On�� the��one��hand,�� the��d�v�ne��embod�ment��cast��doubts��on��the��patterns��of��d�chotomous��oppos�t�ons��and��of��h�erarch�cal��dom�nat�on��and��subjugat�on.��God’s��hum�l�ty��and��human��haught�ness��do��not��match��very��well.��If���t�� �s��poss�ble��for��God��to��have��a��body,��then��the��absolute��gap��between��our��sp�r�t��and��the��dust���n��us���s��rendered��un�ntell�g�ble.��On��the��other��hand,��the��attempt��to��l�m�t��the��

13�� For��a��cr�t�cal��perspect�ve��on�� th�s��d�st�nct�on,��see��Ell�ot��Sober,��“Ph�losoph�cal��Problems��for��Env�ronmental�sm”,�� �n��B.��G.��Norton�� (ed.),��The Preservation of Species,��Pr�nceton��Un�vers�ty��Press,��Pr�nceton,��1986,��pp.��173-194.

14�� See��for��example��the��oppos�ng��v�ews��of��J.��B.��Call�cott��and��H.��Rolston,��III.��See��J.��B.��Call�cott,��“The��W�lderness�� Idea��Rev�s�ted:��The��Susta�nable��Development��Alternat�ve”,�� �n��The Environmental Professional,��13��(1991),��pp.��235-47;��H.��Rolston,��III,��“The��W�lderness��Idea��Reaff�rmed”,���n��The Environmental Professional,��13��(1991),��pp.��370-77;��J.��B.��Call�cott,��“That��Good��Old��T�me��W�lderness��Rel�g�on”,�� �n��The Environmental Professional,��13��(1991),��pp.��378-79.

138 �� Eth�cal��Att�tudes��Toward��the��Env�ronment����/����Adr�an��MIROIU������������139

relevance��of��Chr�st’s��embod�ment��to��the��human��sphere���s��just��one��of��many��poss�ble���nterpretat�ons.

Byzant�ne��or��orthodox��Chr�st�an�ty��does��not�� follow�� these�� l�nes.�� I�� cannot��smother��my��surpr�se�� to�� f�nd��out�� that�� the��orthodox��v�ew��of��nature��was�� largely��neglected���n��the��works��of��env�ronmental��ph�losophers.��For��orthodoxy���s��an��essent�al��part��of��the��European��trad�t�on,��not��an��exot�c��world-v�ew:��Greeks,��Serbs,��Bulgar�ans,��Roman�ans,��Ukra�n�ans,��Russ�ans,�� etc.�� are��orthodox.��For�� the��orthodox��myst�c��doctr�ne,15��Chr�st’s��embod�ment��d�d��not��concern��just��the��human��world.��The��human��body�� �s��dust�� from�� the��ground,��and��embod�ment��affected�� the��ent�re��nature.��The��mean�ng��of��H�s��com�ng��was��to��save��humans��both��as��sp�r�tual��and��as��bod�ly,��natural��be�ngs.�� In�� th�s��way,��H�s��sacr�f�c�al��act��meant�� that�� the��entire creation��was��saved.��Accord�ng��to��the��orthodox��v�ew,��nature��per se��cannot��be��subject��to��be�ng��d�svalued.��It���s��not��s�nful,��the��eternal��source��of��the��ev�l.��There���s��no��room��for��somatophob�a���n��the��orthodox��world-v�ew,��and��the��contrast��between��sp�r�t��and��body��has��no��strong��support.��Our��bod�ly��needs,��our��affect�ons��and��pass�ons,��our��pa�ns��and��d�seases��are��not��ev�l���n��themselves.��Flesh���s��not��s�nful.��Human��be�ngs,��as��well��as��natural��ent�t�es,��are��equally��redeemed.

Natural��ent�t�es��and��w�lderness��are��not��opposed�� to��humans;��although��most��of�� them��are��outs�de��human��control�� and��understand�ng,�� they��are��not��v�ewed��as��myster�ous��and��dangerous��sources��of��ev�l,�� for�� they��are��God’s��creat�on,��and��hence��good.��But��not�ce��a��fundamental��d�fference��between��th�s��pos�t�on��and��the��one��reported��by��Call�cott:��for��orthodox��Chr�st�an�ty,�� the��fact��that��natural��be�ngs��are���ntr�ns�cally��valuable�� �s��not�� to��be��expla�ned��by��the��fact�� that�� they��look��good��from��an��absolute,��transcendent��and��thus��object�ve��perspect�ve.��The��explanat�on��runs��d�fferently:��natural��be�ngs��are��(object�vely)���ntr�ns�cally��valuable��because��(1)��humans��are���ntr�ns�cally��valuable,��as��Jesus��Chr�st��proved��by��H�s��sacr�f�ce��on��the��cross;��and��(2)��humans��and��the��other��natural��be�ngs��are��on��the��same��par.��We��share��the��same��fate.��Both��humans��and��nature��are��part��of��creat�on��and��salvat�on��brought��by��Jesus��Chr�st��concerns��both��humans��and��nature.

It��would�� then��be�� �ncons�stent�� to��hold�� that��we��human��be�ngs��are�� �ntr�ns�cally��valuable,��wh�le��natural��be�ngs��lack��th�s��sort��of��value.��S�nce��th�s��would��enta�l��that��we��are��only��sp�r�tual��creatures,��and��that��our��bod�es��–��dust��from��the��ground��–��would��not��be��valuable;��th�s��would��requ�re��that��embod�ment��was��not��total,��that��Jesus��Chr�st��had��not��human��flesh��and��bones.

For��orthodox��Chr�st�ans,��the��prem�se��Call�cott��takes��for��granted,��that��“[t]he��God��of�� the��Judeo-Chr�st�an��trad�t�on���s�� transcendent,��not�� �mmanent”���s��hard��to��defend.��Jesus��Chr�st�� �s��not�� �ntang�ble��and��far,�� too��far��from��us.�� In��fact,��H�s��dwell�ng�� �s�� �n��our���nnermost��nature.��Insuperable��dual�sms,��and��the��h�erarch�cal��v�ews��they��enta�l��are��al�en�� to��and��not��supported��by�� the��orthodox��doctr�ne.��Nature,��body,��affect�on,��the�� fem�n�ne,�� the�� subject�ve��are��not�� �nfer�or;��culture,�� sp�r�t,�� the��mascul�ne,�� the��object�ve��enjoy��no��pr�or�ty.��The��orthodox��att�tude��toward��natural���tems��d�d��not��then���nvolve��the���ssue��of���nclud�ng��them���n��the��moral��sphere,��as��requ�red��when��class�cal,��pr�mar�ly��Western��eth�cal��theor�es��were��cons�dered.��For��orthodox��Chr�st�ans,��the��fact��

15�� Some��orthodox��th�nkers��argued��that�� the�r��doctr�ne���s��better��descr�bable��as��myst�cal��rather��than��theolog�cal���n��nature.

that��moral��boundar�es��do��not��enclose��exclus�vely��the��human��world��has��profound,��rel�g�ous��grounds.

Environmental-concern:-Why-is-it-ethical?

In��the��prev�ous��sect�ons��I��argued��for��two��theses.��F�rst,��I��argued��that���n��the��Roman�an��soc�ety��non-personal�zed��eth�cal��pr�nc�ples��and��rules,��grounded���n��un�versal�zable��max�ms��were��assoc�ated,��espec�ally���n��the��past��half��century,��w�th��the��publ�c,��h�ghly���deolog�sed�� (and�� felt��as��amoral)�� sphere,��controlled��by��an��oppress�ve�� reg�me.�� If��moral�ty��perta�ns��to��human��flour�sh�ng,���f���t���s��to��prov�de��a��gu�de��on��how��we��should��l�ve,�� then��h�ghly�� �nd�v�dual�zed��connect�ons��w�th��other��humans��or��natural�� �tems��are��ult�mately�� relevant.��An��env�ronmental��eth�c�� theory�� follow�ng��usual��patterns��of��concentrat�ng��on��f�rst-order��and��second-order��pr�nc�ples��and��rules��would��not��be��appeal�ng��for��a��Roman�an��ph�losopher.��S/he��would��feel��more��comfortable��w�th��attempts��to��make��pr�nc�ples��and��rules��more��substant�ve,��full��of��concrete��content��and��far��from��cla�m�ng��to��settle��large��collect�ons��of��cases.16

Secondly,��I��argued��that�� the��Chr�st�an��orthodox��rel�g�on��prov�des��a��bas�s��for��a��genu�ne��env�ronmental��eth�c.��Natural�� �tems��have���ntr�ns�c��value.��On��th�s��prem�se,��the��argument��runs��further��as��follows:��Chr�st�� redeemed��humans��from��the��or�g�nal��s�n.��Salvat�on��concerned��human��be�ngs���n��the�r�� �ntegr�ty,��as��sp�r�t��as��well��as��body.��S�nce��redempt�on���nvolves��also��the��body,��nature���s��not��ev�l���n���tself.��So,���t��would��be���ncons�stent��to��hold��that��human��be�ngs��are���ntr�ns�cally��valuable,��wh�le��natural���tems��are��not.��Or,��to��put���t���n��another��way,��nature���s��valuable��because��humans��are��valuable.��Humans’��hav�ng���ntr�ns�c��value��expla�ns��why��natural���tems��are��not��eth�cally��neutral.��Not�ce�� that�� the��reference�� to�� the�� �ntr�ns�c��value��of��human��be�ngs�� �s��essent�al.��But��th�s��does��not�� �nvolve��a��subject�ve��v�ew��on��the��value��of��natural�� �tems:�� the��sort��of��value��attached�� to�� them���s��object�ve.��The�� �nference�� �nvolved�� �s��not�� that��a��natural���tem��has�� �ntr�ns�c��value��because��some��humans��value�� �t��as�� �ntr�ns�cally��valuable.��It�� �s��a�� fundamental��ontolog�cal�� fact�� that��grounds�� the��assert�on��of��value:��Chr�st’s��embod�ment��to��redeem��the��ent�re��creat�on.��Object�v�ty���s���ndependence��from��human��valuers.��But���t��does��not��result��from��a��transcendent��assessment.��Rather���t��comes��from��the���nner��nature��of��any��creature,��be���t��e�ther��human��or��natural.

These��two��theses��have,��on��my��v�ew,��a��pecul�ar��ep�stemolog�cal��status.��They��are��not��the��sorts��of��th�ngs��one��can��d�rectly���nclude���n��her/h�s��preferred��theory.��Indeed,��they��are��not��f�rst-order��pr�nc�ples��concern�ng��what���t���s��for��someth�ng��to��have��moral��status���n��a��theory,���.e.��to��have��r�ghts,��or��to��be��a��subject��of��dut�es��or��obl�gat�ons,��of��our��care��or��benevolence��and��so��on.��Rather�� these��theses��express��general��cond�t�ons��on��the��acceptab�l�ty��of��an��eth�cal��theory.��They���nvolve��requ�rements��one��cannot���gnore���f��she��attempts��to��frame��an��env�ronmental��eth�cal�� theory.��Suppose��that,��say���n��the��Roman�an��cultural��context��sketched��above,��I��want��to��put��forth��an��eth�cal��theory��that��genu�nely��concerns�� the��env�ronment.��Then,�� �ts��pr�nc�ples��and��rules��must�� �nvolve��moral��concepts��l�ke��car�ng,��shar�ng,��love,��etc.,��as��well��as��r�ghts,��dut�es��or��obl�gat�ons.��Moreover,��l�v�ng��w�th��that��theory��should��not��have��oppress�ve��results:���ts��pr�nc�ples��

16�� H.��Rolston,��III,��Conserving Natural Value,��Columb�a��Un�vers�ty��Press,��New��York,��1994,��pp.��26-33;��62-67;��97-100;��134-141;��228-234,��and��passim.

140 �� Eth�cal��Att�tudes��Toward��the��Env�ronment����/����Adr�an��MIROIU������������141

should��not��compel��ways��of��behav�ng���n��most���nt�mate��spheres,��from��a��publ�c,��al�en��pos�t�on;��f�nally,�� the��eth�cal�� theory��should��assume��that��natural�� �tems��are��valuable���n��themselves.��Such��constra�nts��are��not��suff�c�ent,��though,��to��restr�ct��opt�ons��to��one��theory��or��to��one��sort��of��env�ronmental��eth�cal��theory.��A��large��palette���s��st�ll��ava�lable.

In�� th�s�� sense,��my��pos�t�on�� �s��not�� subject�� to�� an��obv�ous�� l�ne��of�� cr�t�c�sm,��wh�ch��runs��as��follows.��It�� �s��doubtful�� that��one��can��mean�ngfully��speak��about��(all)��Roman�ans’��v�ew��on��the��env�ronment.��The��very���dea��of���nvest�gat�ng��the���dea��of��a��Volkgeist��m�ght��have��had��some��respectab�l�ty���n��Europe���n��the��f�rst��decades��of��the��past��century,17��but�� �t�� �s��an��obsolete��one�� today.��So,�� to��assume��that�� there��m�ght��be��a��Roman�an��eth�cal�� theory�� �s��not��a��prom�s�ng��strategy.�� I��agree��w�th�� th�s.��But��my��argument��was��not��concerned��w�th��an��abstract,��atemporal,��and��absolute��not�on��of��a��Roman�an��Volkgeist.�� I��only��rel�ed��on��some��cultural��features��of�� today’s��Roman�an��cultural��context��that��m�ght��have��some��relevance��to��accept�ng��env�ronmental��eth�cs��approaches.��Secondly,��and��more���mportantly,��I��d�d��not��argue��that��Roman�ans’��v�ew��is��a��certa�n,��spec�f�c��eth�cal��theory.��Rather,��the���mpl�cat�on��was��that��such��a��context��would��prov�de��us�� some��structural�� (ep�stemolog�cal)�� constra�nts��on��acceptable��eth�cal��theor�es,��rather��than��substant�ve��ones.��Those��constra�nts��concern��the��class��of��preferable��eth�cal��theor�es,��not��just��a��preferred��one.

I�� th�nk�� �t�� �s��worth��ment�on�ng��a��sharp��d�fference��between�� the��consequences��of��these��structural��constra�nts��and��the��problems��faced��by��authors��who��work���n��the��‘standard’��Western�� trad�t�on.��Env�ronmental��eth�c�sts��argued�� that��a�� sat�sfactory��eth�cal��theory��should��make��sense��of��the���ntr�ns�c��value��of��natural���tems.��The��theory’s��range��of��appl�cat�on��cannot��cons�st��only�� �n��human��be�ngs��and�� the�r��behav�our.��It��should��essent�ally��concern��natural�� �tems.�� If��one��agrees��w�th�� the��bas�c��pos�t�on��emerg�ng��from��the��Roman�an��cultural��context,��then��the��eth�cal��theor�es��she���s��l�kely��to��accept��would��naturally���nvolve��a��genu�ne��env�ronmental��concern.��Keep���n��m�nd��that��th�s��constra�nt���s���ndependent��of,��and��pr�or��to,��fram�ng��part�cular��eth�cal��theor�es.

In��the��past��decades��enormous��theoret�cal��(as��well��as��pract�cal)��effort��was��spent��to��acknowledge�� that��env�ronmental��eth�cs�� �s��a�� respectable��academ�c��d�sc�pl�ne.��From��my��po�nt��of��v�ew,��two��d�fferent,��although��not��always��carefully��d�st�ngu�shed��theoret�cal��accounts��contr�buted�� to�� th�s��ach�evement.��On�� the��one��hand,�� the��b�rth��of��env�ronmental��eth�cs�� �nvolved��construct�on,�� test�ng,��and��compar�son��of��eth�cal��theor�es.��Some��of��these��constructs��proved��to��be��better��art�culated,��more��prom�s�ng,��broader���n��scope��and��asp�rat�ons��than��others,��wh�le��some��such��constructs��fa�led��when��the�r�� �nternal��cons�stency��was���nvest�gated,��or�� they��were��regarded��as���ncompat�ble��w�th��certa�n��cons�dered��eth�cal�� judgements.��Not��surpr�s�ngly,�� �t��was�� tempt�ng��for��many��env�ronmental��ph�losophers��to��locate��around��these��l�nes��the��ma�n��controvers�es��and��results.��For���n��th�s��way��the�r��work��looked��s�m�lar��to��what��other��people,���n��h�ghly��esteemed��academ�c��f�elds,��d�d:��produce,��test��and��use��general,��compet�ng��accounts��of��the��relevant��phenomena.

Th�s��p�cture�� �s��correct,�� �f��part�al.�� It��overlooks��a��non-compet�t�ve,�� rather��co-operat�ve��theoret�cal��act�v�ty��of��env�ronmental��eth�c�sts,��cons�st�ng��of��br�ng�ng��about��reasons,��mot�ves��and��arguments�� for��acknowledg�ng�� that��cases�� �n��wh�ch��natural��

17�� Follow�ng��German��authors��they��were��most��acqua�nted��w�th,��many��Roman�an��ph�losophers��dealt��extens�vely��w�th��th�s��top�c.��

ent�t�es��were���nvolved��are��genu�nely��eth�cal.��A��favour�te��example��of��H.��Rolston���s��th�s:��‘A��b�son��fell��through��the���ce���nto��a��r�ver���n��Yellowstone��Park;��the��env�ronmental��eth�c�� there,�� lett�ng��nature�� take�� �ts��course,�� forbade��would-be��rescuers�� from��e�ther��sav�ng��or��k�ll�ng��the��suffer�ng��an�mal��to��put���t��out��of���ts��m�sery.’18��I��wonder,��was��that��dec�s�on��an��eth�cal��one?��I��do��not��ask��whether�� �t��was��r�ght��or��wrong.��My��quest�on���s,��d�d���t��make��sense��to��say��that��as��a��matter��of��eth�cal��assessment��we��ought�� to�� let��that��an�mal��d�e?��Rolston���s��expl�c�t:��‘the��env�ronmental��eth�c��there’,��nature��took���ts��course.��Today��we��may��agree�� that�� the��prem�se�� that�� th�s��s�tuat�on���s��a��moral��one���s��apparent��and��not��problemat�c.��But��was���t��so��a��few��decades��ago?��D�d��we��really��th�nk��then��that��the��dec�s�on��of��the��park��off�cer��was��eth�cal���n��character?

I��want�� to��argue��that�� the��b�rth��of��env�ronmental��eth�cs�� �nvolved��two��d�fferent��types��of��eth�cal��act�v�ty.��One��such��act�v�ty�� �s�� the��standard��one��of��construct�ng,��test�ng��and��compar�ng��theor�es.��But�� these��aspects��as�de,��a��qu�te��d�fferent��k�nd��of��eth�cal��act�v�ty��was��developed:���t��was��extens�vely��argued��that��moral��boundar�es��are��not��establ�shed��once��and��forever;�� that��cases��wh�ch��reasonably��(�.e.,��accord�ng�� to��establ�shed��eth�cal��theor�es)��were��regarded��as��outs�de��the��scope��of��moral�ty��actually��were��m�sunderstood;�� that��ent�t�es��wh�ch�� reasonably��were�� thought��not�� to��belong��to�� the��moral��sphere��actually��could��be��sa�d�� to��deserve��moral��cons�derab�l�ty.��The��former��type��of��theoret�cal��act�v�ty��concerns��a��substantive �ssue:��what��as��a��matter��of��‘eth�cal��fact’��deserves��moral��cons�derab�l�ty?19��The��latter�� type���s��conceptual:��what��can��be��mean�ngfully��sa�d��to��deserve��moral��cons�derat�on?20��When��we���nqu�re��about��what��can��have��moral��stand�ng,��and��consequently��about�� the�� range��of��mean�ngful��appl�cat�ons��of��an��env�ronmental��eth�c�� theory,�� the�� �nvest�gat�on���s��not��bound��to��a��pecul�ar�� theory,��however��appeal�ng�� �t��m�ght��appear.��Rather�� �t�� �s��disciplinary:�� �t��po�nts��to��the��sorts��of��be�ngs��and��concrete��s�tuat�ons��wh�ch��a��sat�sfactory��theory���n��that��d�sc�pl�ne���s��expected��to��deal��w�th.��The��env�ronmental��eth�c�sts��succeeded���n��show�ng�� that��eth�cal�� theor�es��cannot��afford�� to��be��s�lent��on��env�ronmental�� �ssues.��The��fact��that��an��eth�cal��theory��fa�led��to��prov�de��sat�sfactory��accounts��could��not��then��be��treated��s�mply��as��a��consequence��of��the��fact�� that�� the��theory���tself��d�d��not���ntend��to��deal��w�th��such��cases.��The��argument���s��that,���f��genu�nely��eth�cal��at��all,��the��theory��should deal��w�th��those��cases.��Env�ronmental���ssues��were��proved��to��be��not��marg�nal��and��opt�onal��f�elds��of��appl�cat�on��of��eth�cal��theor�es.��Rather��they��had��to��be��regarded,��to��use��Th.��Kuhn’s��famous��phrase,��as��paradigmatic��appl�cat�ons.21��Fa�lure�� to��deal���n��an��appropr�ate��manner��w�th��them���s��blame��on��the��theory,��and��no���mmun�zat�on��procedure��can��help.22

18�� H.��Rolston,��III,��“Env�ronmental��Eth�cs:��Values���n��and��Dut�es��to��the��Natural��World”,�� �n��F.��H.��Borman,��St.��R.��Kellert�� (eds.),��The Broken Circle: Ecology, Economics, Ethics,��Yale��Un�vers�ty��Press,��New��Haven,��1991,��p.��74.��

19�� See��K.��Goodpaster,��“On��Be�ng��Morally��Cons�derable”,���n��The Journal of Philosophy,��1978,��pp.��308-25.��

20�� I��d�scussed��these���ssues��at��length���n��my��papers��“The��Conceptual/Normat�ve��D�st�nct�on���n��Env�ronmental��Eth�cs”,��Revue Roumaine de Philosophie,��42-43,��1999,��pp.��133-145��;��‘Two��Approaches��to��Intr�ns�c��Value’,��Revue Roumaine de Philosophie,��44,��2000,��pp.��367-376.

21�� Th.��Kuhn,��The Structure of Scientific Revolutions,��second��ed.,��Ch�cago��Un�vers�ty��Press,��Ch�cago,��1970.

22�� See��also��my��paper��“Global��Warm�ng��and��Moral��Theor�z�ng”,���n��Theoria,��11��(1996),��27,��pp.��

142 �� Eth�cal��Att�tudes��Toward��the��Env�ronment����/����Adr�an��MIROIU������������143

To��conclude,�� tak�ng���nto��account��the��att�tudes��of��a��ph�losopher��who��wants��to��make��sense��of��the��sorts��of��moral��exper�ences��people��faced���n��the��past��half��century���n��a��country��l�ke��Roman�a��has��s�gn�f�cant���mpl�cat�ons.��The��conceptual���ssues��are���n��her��case��settled��to��a��large��extent:���t���s��eas�er��and��more��d�rectly��arguable��that��cases���n��wh�ch��some��natural�� �tems��occur,��essent�ally��may��be��regarded��as��genu�nely��eth�cal.��Spec�f�cally,��env�ronmental��eth�cs��as��a��d�sc�pl�ne���s��less��problemat�c.

References

Call�cott,��J.��B.��1989.��“On��the��Intr�ns�c��Value��of��Nonhuman��Spec�es”,���n��In Defense of the Land Ethic,��Albany,��SUNY��Press.

Call�cott,�� J.��B.�� 1991.�� “That��Good��Old��T�me��W�lderness��Rel�g�on”,�� The Environmental Professional,��13,��pp.��378-79.

Call�cott,�� J.�� B.�� 1991.�� “The��W�lderness�� Idea�� Rev�s�ted:��The�� Susta�nable�� Development��Alternat�ve”,��The Environmental Professional,��13,��pp.��235-47.

Call�cott,��J.��B.��1994.��Earth’s Insights: A Survey of Ecological Ethics from the Mediterranean Basin to the Australian Outback,��Berkeley,��Un�vers�ty��of��Cal�forn�a��Press.

Goodpaster,��K.��1978.��“On��Be�ng��Morally��Cons�derable”,��The Journal of Philosophy,��75��(6),��pp.��308-325.

Granovetter,��M.,��“Econom�c��Act�on��and��Soc�al��Structure:�� the��Problem��of��Embeddedness”,��American Journal of Sociology,��91,��1985,��pp.��481-510.

Gre�f,��A.��2006.�� Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy,��Cambr�dge,��Cambr�dge��Un�vers�ty��Press.

Kuhn,��Th.��1970.��The Structure of Scientific Revolutions,�� second��ed.,��Ch�cago,��Ch�cago��Un�vers�ty��Press.

M�ro�u,��A.��1996.��Global��Warm�ng��and��Moral��Theor�z�ng”,��Theoria,��11��(27),��pp.��61-81.M�ro�u,��A.��1999.��The��Conceptual/Normat�ve��D�st�nct�on�� �n��Env�ronmental��Eth�cs”,��Revue

Roumaine de Philosophie,��42-43,��pp.��133-145.M�ro�u,��A.��2000.��‘Two��Approaches��to��Intr�ns�c��Value’,��Revue Roumaine de Philosophie,��44,��pp.��

367-376.M�ro�u,��M.��2002.��Convenio. Despre natură, femei și morală, Iași, Polirom.North,��D.C.,��Wall�s,�� J.J.,��We�ngast,��B.R.��2009.��Violence and Social Orders.A Conceptual

Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History, Cambr�dge,��Cambr�dge��Un�vers�ty��Press.

Platteau,��J.-Ph.��1994.��“Beh�nd�� the��Market��State��–��Where��Real��Soc�et�es��Ex�st”,��Journal of Development Studies,��30,��pp.��533-577;��753-817.

Plumwood,��V.��1994.��“Nature,��Self��and��Gender:��Fem�n�sm,��Env�ronmental��Ph�losophy,��and��the��Cr�t�que��of��Rat�onal�sm”,�� �n��L.��Gruen,��D.��Jam�eson��(eds.),��Reflecting on Nature,��Oxford,��Oxford��Un�vers�ty��Press.

Regan,��T.��1983.��The Case for Animal Rights,��Berkeley,��Los��Angeles,��Un�vers�ty��of��Cal�forn�a��Press.

Rolston,��H.��III,��1991.��“Env�ronmental��Eth�cs:��Values���n��and��Dut�es��to��the��Natural��World”,�� �n��F.��H.��Borman,��St.��R.��Kellert��(eds.),��The Broken Circle: Ecology, Economics, Ethics,��New��

61-81.��

Haven,��Yale��Un�vers�ty��Press.Rolston,��H.��III,��1991.��“The��W�lderness��Idea��Reaff�rmed”,��The Environmental Professional,��13,��

pp.��370-77.Rolston,��H.��III,��1994.��Conserving Natural Value,��New��York,��Columb�a��Un�vers�ty��Press.Sandel,��M.��1982.��Liberalism and the Limits of Justice,��Cambr�dge,��Cambr�dge��Un�vers�ty��Press.Sober,��E.��1986.��“Ph�losoph�cal��Problems��for��Env�ronmental�sm”,�� �n��B.��G.��Norton��(ed.),��The

Preservation of Species,��Pr�nceton,��Pr�nceton��Un�vers�ty��Press.Taylor,��P.��1986.��Respect for Nature,��Pr�nceton,��Pr�nceton��Un�vers�ty��Press.Wenz,��P.��1988.��Environmental Justice,��Albany,��SUNY��Press.

144 ��The��Ethos��of��Susta�nable��Development��and��...����/����Dan�ela��DUMITRU����and��Constant�n��STOENESCU������������145

The Ethos of Sustainable Development and the Educational System: A Research Report regarding Romania

Dan�ela��DUMITRUConstant�n��STOENESCU1

IntroductionWhy focus on ESD? Why is ESD important?

“The��world��cont�nues�� to�� face��var�ous��cr�t�cal�� challenges�� such��as:��human-�nduced��cl�mate��change,��the��rap�d��deplet�on��of��natural��resources,��the��frequency��of��natural��d�sasters,��the��spread��of��(old��and��new)���nfect�ous��d�seases,��the��loss��of��b�od�vers�ty,�� the��v�olat�on��of��human��r�ghts,�� �ncreased��poverty,�� the��dependency��of��our��econom�c��systems��on��cont�nuous��growth���n��consumer�sm��and��so��forth.��Susta�nable��development�� (SD)��has��become��a��veh�cle��around�� the��globe�� for��express�ng��the��need��to��depart�� from��present��dom�nant��models��of��development��wh�ch��appear��unable��to��balance��the��needs��of��people��and��the��planet���n��the��pursu�t��of��peace��and��prosper�ty”.2

Ent�re��generat�ons�� are�� at�� least�� �n��part�� shaped�� �n�� the�r�� att�tudes,�� personal�� and��communal��asp�rat�ons,��and���n��the�r��development��goals,��by��what��formal��educat�onal��systems��equ�pped��them��w�th���n��terms��of��conceptual��toolboxes��and��mental��models.��If�� the�� current�� pred�cament�� �s�� seen�� as��unbalanced,�� as��not�� susta�nable�� through��forthcom�ng��generat�ons��and��thus���n��need��of��alterat�on,���t��cannot��be��altered��us�ng��the��ex�st�ng��dom�nant��ways��of��act�ng��and��l�v�ng.3And��those��ways��of��act�ng��and��l�v�ng��are,��at�� least��partly,��a��product��of��the��ex�st�ng��formal��educat�on.��In��order��to��abandon��them,��educat�onal��systems��have��to��be��reconceptual�sed��to��prov�de��current��and��future��generat�ons��w�th��new��mental��models��of�� l�v�ng��and�� the�r�� role�� �n��soc�o-econom�c��processes.

Among�� trad�t�onal�� tasks��of��equ�pp�ng��young��people�� to��become��successful��members��of��nat�onal��and��global��commun�t�es,�� formal��educat�on��w�ll��also��have��to��enable��them��to��l�ve��together���n��a��way��that��contr�butes��to��the��susta�nable��development��

��1�� Th�s��study��was���n�t�ally��wr�tten��as��a��research��report��for��the��project��Education for sustainable Development �mplemented��by��Network��of��Educat�on��Pol�cy��Center,��Zagreb,��Croat�a,��w�th��the��support��of��European��funds.��The��authors��thank��to��the��team��who��was��respons�ble��for��the��des�gn��of��the��methodology��of��the��research,��namely,��Mladen��Domazet,��Lana��Jurko��and��Kaja��Petersen.

��2�� UNESCO,��Sect�on�� for��DESD��Coord�nat�on.�� Review of Contexts and Structures for Education for Sustainable Development 2009,��Par�s:��UNESCO.��p.��6.��

��3�� D.��T�llbury,��“Learn�ng��based��change��for��susta�nab�l�ty:��Perspect�ves��and��pathways”.��In��A.��E.��J.��Wals��(ed.)��Social learning towards a sustainable world.��Wagen�ngen:��Wagen�ngen��Academ�c��Publ�shers,��pp.��117-132,��2007.��

of�� the�r��commun�t�es.��Education for sustainable development (ESD) �s�� formal��educat�on’s��response��to��global��challenges���n��order��to��help��students��understand��what��susta�nable��development��requ�res��globally��and��locally,��help��them��understand��how��to��use��the�r��own��capac�ty��for��cr�t�cal��reflect�on��and��system�c��futures-th�nk�ng��and��mot�vate��them��to��cons�der���nd�v�dual��act�ons��contr�but�ng��to��communal��susta�nable��development.

Why this study?UNESCO��(2009)�� reports�� that�� the��most��common��global�� response�� to�� the��calls�� for���nclus�on��of��ESD���nto��formal��educat�on�� �s�� to��make��adjustments�� (e�ther��m�nor��or��substant�al)�� to�� the��ex�st�ng��educat�onal��system,��w�th��all�� �ts��pre-ex�st�ng��strengths��and��weaknesses.��However,��all��add�t�ons��to��the��nat�onal��formal��educat�on��curr�cula��struggle��w�th��an��already��crowded��curr�culum��wh�ch��has��a��pr�mary��task��of��teach�ng��the��bas�cs��of�� read�ng,��wr�t�ng��and��ar�thmet�c.��ESD��content��can��be�� seen��as��“an���ntegrat�ve,��cross-curr�cular��theme��that��can��br�ng��together��many��of��the��s�ngle���ssues��that��schools��are��already��expected��to��address”.4

The��research��sets��out�� to��map�� the��content�� that��already��ex�sts�� �n�� the��nat�onal��curr�cula,�� the��content�� that�� �s��e�ther��expl�c�tly��al�gned��w�th��teach�ng��for��susta�nable��development,��or���s��related��to���t.��Based��on��such��mapp�ng���t���s��expected��to��show��how��the��ex�st�ng��curr�cular��content��can��be��mod�f�ed��(�n��a��m�nor��or��substant�al��manner)��to��contr�bute�� to��ESD.��Bes�des��curr�cular��mapp�ng��the��research���s�� look�ng���nto��the��subject��curr�cula��and�� textbooks��concern�ng�� the��same��ESD��content.��Though��not��as��comprehens�ve��as�� the��curr�cular��mapp�ng,�� th�s��prov�des��a��clearer�� �dea��of��how���mportant��goals��expressed�� �n�� the��framework��curr�culum��are��presented��d�rectly�� to��pup�ls.

It�� �s��expected�� that�� th�s��mapp�ng��w�ll��prov�de�� the�� foundat�on�� �n��each��of�� the��part�c�pat�ng��countr�es��for��a��publ�c��debate��on���nclus�on��of��ESD��learn�ng��outcomes���n��the��nat�onal��curr�cula��(and��further��educat�onal��documents��based��on��them)��and��the�r���mportance��for��future��susta�nable��development.��It�� �s��expected��that���t��w�ll��po�nt��out��and��stress��the���mportant��role��wh�ch��formal��educat�on��has���n��act�vely��shap�ng��a��more��secure��future��for��the��next��generat�on.

Sustainable-development-and-education-for-sustainable-development

The notion of sustainable developmentAccord�ng��to��the��World��Comm�ss�on��on��Susta�nable��Development��(WCSD)��report,5��susta�nable��development��marks��the��ab�l�ty��of��“human�ty��to��[…]��ensure��that���t��meets��the��needs��of��the��present��w�thout��comprom�s�ng��the��ab�l�ty��of��future��generat�ons��to��meet��the�r��own��needs”.��Thus,��the��report��called��for��the��need��to��look��beyond��today’s��needs��and��short-term��effects��of��dec�s�ons.

The��pursu�t�� of�� susta�nable��development��was�� repeated��at�� the��R�o��Summ�t��

��4�� UNESCO,��2009,��p.��48.��5�� Also�� referred�� to��as�� the��Brundtland��Report,�� “World��Comm�ss�on��on��Env�ronment��and��

Development;��Our��Common��Future”,��Oxford/New��York,��Oxford��Un�vers�ty��Press��1987.��

146 ��The��Ethos��of��Susta�nable��Development��and��...����/����Dan�ela��DUMITRU����and��Constant�n��STOENESCU������������147

�n��1992�� �n��s�gn�ng��Agenda��21;�� the��comm�tment��was�� renewed�� �n�� the��Summ�t��on��Susta�nable��Development�� �n�� Johannesburg�� �n��2002�� (R�o+10).�� In��2012�� the��R�o��process��shall��celebrate�� �ts��20th��ann�versary,��but�� the��def�n�t�on��of��SD��cont�nues�� to��evolve.��The��evolut�on��of��SD��has��been��marked��by��attempts��to��develop��a��clear��not�on��of�� �t.��However,�� �t��has��been��real�zed��that��def�n�ng��SD���s��actually���mplement�ng��the��SD.��Today,��susta�nab�l�ty�� �s�� f�rmly��embedded�� �n�� the�� language��of��development��–��locally,��globally��and��at��every�� level�� �n��between,��but��accord�ng�� to��several��authors��the��popular�ty��of��the��not�on��has��been��accompan�ed��more��by��verbal��adherence��than��pract�cal�� �mplementat�on.6��Moreover,�� the��pract�ce��at��all�� levels�� largely��follows��the��ma�nstream��econom�c��growth��agenda.��The��d�ff�cult�es��of��apply�ng�� the��SD��der�ve��from��the��need��for��fundamental��changes���n��values��and��percept�ons,��but��also��pol�t�cal��and��adm�n�strat�ve��structures.

As��SD���s��very��much��dependant��on��the��soc�al-cultural,��pol�t�cal��and��econom�c��contexts,�� the�� �nterpretat�on��of��susta�nab�l�ty��changes��between��contexts��and��also��over�� t�me,��as��new��knowledge��emerges.��Weaver��and��Rotmans��(2006)��propose�� the��use��‘susta�nab�l�ty���nterpretat�on’��rather��than��‘susta�nab�l�ty��def�n�t�on’.��In��add�t�on��to��the��soc�etal��context,�� the���nterpretat�on��of��SD��may��depend��on��other��perspect�ves,��such��as��the��extent��of��trade-offs��made��between��d�fferent��values��(econom�c,��soc�al��and��env�ronmental).

In��conclus�on,�� the��concept��of�� susta�nable��development��has��created��a��great��challenge�� for�� soc�o-econom�c��development.��The�� concept��of��weak��and�� strong��susta�nab�l�ty��has��drawn�� �nto��quest�on�� the�� l�m�ts��of�� the��Earth�� to��cope��w�th�� the��grow�ng�� demand�� for�� resources�� and�� the�� thresholds�� for�� harmful�� �mpacts.�� But��Rockström��et��al.��(2009)��have���dent�f�ed��the��earth-system��processes��and��assoc�ated��thresholds��wh�ch,�� �f��crossed,��would��generate��unacceptable��env�ronmental��change.��Th�s��group��of��researchers��has��presented��ev�dence�� that�� three��boundar�es��of��earth-system��processes��(cl�mate��change,�� rate��of��b�od�vers�ty�� loss,��n�trogen��cycle)��have��been��overstepped��already.��The��debate��over��WS��and��SS���s��largely��about��the��opt�ons��for��subst�tutab�l�ty��of��natural��assets,��on��the��one��hand,��and��the��acceptab�l�ty��of��th�s��by��people��and��commun�t�es��on��the��other��hand.��Understand�ng��the��SD��concept��assumes��look�ng��beyond��today’s��needs��and��the��short-term��effects��of��dec�s�ons;��develop�ng��th�s��ab�l�ty��has��become��the��focus��of��ESD.

Education for sustainable developmentWh�le�� the�� roots��of��education for sustainable development (ESD)�� can��be�� traced��back��to��the��early��1970s��ESD��was��formally��tabled��at��the��Un�ted��Nat�ons��Conference��on��Env�ronment��and��Development��(UNCED)���n��R�o��de��Jane�ro���n��1992.��UNCED��among��other�� landmark��publ�cat�ons,��also��resulted���n��“Agenda 21”��wh�ch��prov�des��a��comprehens�ve��plan��of��act�on�� to��be��undertaken��globally,��nat�onally��and�� locally��by��UN��agenc�es,��governments��and��major��organ�zat�ons��and��networks��to��reduce��the��human���mpact��on��the��env�ronment.��Agenda��21,��the��R�o��Declarat�on��on��Env�ronment��and��Development��and��the��Statement��of��Pr�nc�ples��for��the��Susta�nable��Management��of��Forests��were��adopted��by��178��Governments.��The��Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD)��was��created���n��December��1992��to��ensure��effect�ve��follow-up��of��

��6�� G�bson��et��al.��2005.

UNCED��and��to��mon�tor��and��report��on���mplementat�on��of��mult�lateral��env�ronmental��agreements.

Chapter��36��of��Agenda��21��addresses��the��need��for��educat�on,��tra�n�ng��and��publ�c��awareness.��UNESCO has been designated as Task Manager for ESD��to��address��four��overarch�ng��goals,��namely:��

•���� promote��and���mprove��the��qual�ty��of��educat�on:��the��a�m���s��to��refocus��l�felong��educat�on��on�� the��acqu�s�t�on��of��knowledge,�� sk�lls��and��values��needed��by��c�t�zens��to���mprove��the�r��qual�ty��of��l�fe;

•���� reor�ent�� the��curr�cula:�� from��pre-school�� to��un�vers�ty,��educat�on��must��be��rethought��and��reformed��to��be��a��veh�cle��of��knowledge,��thought��patterns��and��values��needed��to��bu�ld��a��susta�nable��world;

•���� ra�se��publ�c��awareness��of��the��concept��of��susta�nable��development:��th�s��w�ll��make���t��poss�ble��to��develop��enl�ghtened,��act�ve��and��respons�ble��c�t�zensh�p��locally,��nat�onally��and���nternat�onally;

•���� tra�n�� the��workforce:�� cont�nu�ng�� techn�cal�� and��vocat�onal�� educat�on��of��d�rectors��and��workers,��part�cularly�� those�� �n�� trade��and�� �ndustry,��w�ll��be��enr�ched�� to��enable�� them�� to��adopt�� susta�nable��modes��of��product�on��and��consumpt�on.7

Although��w�despread��consensus��appears�� to��ex�st��regard�ng��these��goals,�� there���s�� less��agreement��about�� the��mean�ng��of��ESD.��Just��as�� �s�� the��case��w�th��susta�nable��development,�� there�� �s��not��one��s�ngle��correct�� �nterpretat�on��and��use��of��ESD.��One��argument���s��that��ESD��should��be��seen��as��the��total��sum��of��d�verse��ways��to��arr�ve��at��a��‘learn�ng��soc�ety’���n��wh�ch��people��learn��from,��and��w�th��one��another,��and��collect�vely��become��more��capable��of��w�thstand�ng��setbacks��and��deal�ng��w�th��susta�nab�l�ty-�nduced���nsecur�ty,��complex�ty��and��r�sks.��From��th�s��po�nt��of��v�ew,��ESD���s��about��–��engaging people in SD issues, developing their capacities to give meaning to SD and to contribute to its development and utilising the diversity represented by all people��through��educat�on��and��learn�ng.

In��order��to��br�ng��ESD��to��the��attent�on��of��governments��and��the��publ�c,��the��Un�ted��Nat�ons��has��declared��a��Decade of Education for Sustainable Development (DESD).��Resolut�on��57/254��on��the��DESD��(2005-2014)��was��adopted��by��the��Un�ted��Nat�ons��General��Assembly���n��December��2002,��shortly��after��the��World��Summ�t��on��Susta�nable��Development��(R�o��plus��10)��wh�ch��was��held���n��Johannesburg���n��August/September��of�� the��same��year.��The��bas�c��v�s�on��of�� the��decade���s��of��a��world���n��wh�ch��everyone��has��the��opportun�ty��to��benef�t��from��educat�on��and��learn��the��values,��behav�ours��and��l�festyles��requ�red��for��a��susta�nable��future��and��for��pos�t�ve��soc�etal�� transformat�on.��DESD��seeks��to��promote��the��mean�ngful��development��and���mplementat�on��of��ESD��on��all��geograph�cal��scales��(locally,��nat�onally,��reg�onally��and���nternat�onally)��w�th��the���nvolvement��of��a��w�de��range��of��stakeholders.��At��the��start��of��the��decade,��th�s��v�s�on��was��translated���nto��four��object�ves:��1)��fac�l�tate��network�ng,��l�nkages,��exchange��and���nteract�on��among��stakeholders�� �n��ESD;��2)��foster��an���ncreased��qual�ty��of�� teach�ng��and��learn�ng���n��ESD;��3)��help��countr�es��progress��towards��and��atta�n��the��M�llenn�um��

7�� http://www.un.org/esa/dsd/agenda21/res_agenda21_36.shtml��.

148 ��The��Ethos��of��Susta�nable��Development��and��...����/����Dan�ela��DUMITRU����and��Constant�n��STOENESCU������������149

Development��Goals;��and��4)��prov�de��countr�es��w�th��new��opportun�t�es��to���ncorporate��ESD���nto��educat�on��reform��efforts.

The��current��project��addresses��all�� the��four��goals��of��DESD,��and��spec�f�cally��the��goal��of��network�ng,�� l�nkages��and�� learn�ng��among��educat�on��centres�� �n��Europe�� �n��ESD,��foster�ng��the���ncreased��qual�ty��of�� teach�ng��and��learn�ng���n��ESD��and��shar�ng��exper�ences��and��knowledge��of��teach�ng��ESD.

Sustainable-development-in-national-curricula

Dan�ela��T�llbury�� (2007:��119),��D�rector��of�� Internat�onal��Research�� Inst�tute�� �n��Susta�nab�l�ty��(IRIS),��suggests�� that��susta�nab�l�ty�� �s��about��challeng�ng��our��mental��models,��pol�c�es��and��pract�ces��and��not��just��about��accommodat�ng��new��d�mens�ons���nto��current��work��or��f�nd�ng��common��ground��between��related��ex�st�ng��programmes.��She��holds�� that�� learn�ng-based��change�� for�� susta�nab�l�ty��challenges��educators�� to��th�nk��beyond��ra�s�ng��awareness��and��go��beyond���nvolv�ng��learners��merely�� �n��one-off��act�v�t�es��such��as��clean�ng��up��or��plant�ng�� trees.��Though�� these��are��useful��and��benef�c�al��act�v�t�es,��what���s��essent�al���s��to��encourage��learners��to��develop��cr�t�cal��and��system�c��th�nk�ng��sk�lls��that��enable��them��to��get��to��the��core��of��the���ssues.��Th�s��reflects��the��major��sh�ft�� �n��th�nk�ng��from��environmental education (EE) to education for sustainability��or��ESD.8

Figure �: Three basic elements of sustainability: environmental, social and economic (Source: Wikipedia)

Environment

Social

Economic

Equitable

Sustainable

Viable

Bearable

In��terms��of��curr�cula��content,��EE��can��be��a��whole��or��part��of��ESD,��or��can��have��s�gn�f�cant��overlaps��w�th��ESD,��but��EE���s���nsuff�c�ent��to��replace��ESD��as���t��lacks��the��soc�o-cultural��and��econom�c��d�mens�ons��(see��Methodology,��next��chapter).��Conceptu-ally,��ESD��also��conta�ns���mportant��pedagog�cal��elements��that��are��somewhat��harder��to��capture��w�th��our��current��research,��and��wh�ch���ncludes��soc�al��learn�ng,��part�c�pat�on��

8�� T�llbury,��op. cit.:��120.

and��capac�ty-bu�ld�ng.��On��top��of��these,��some��countr�es��are��mov�ng��away��from��the��anthropocentr�c��(or��human-centred)��perspect�ve��towards��eco-centr�c���nterpretat�ons��of��susta�nable��development�� through��references�� to�� l�v�ng�� �n��harmony��w�th��nature��and��the��r�ghts��of��other��spec�es��and��the��non-human��world.It���s��clear��from��the��above��that��ESD���s��not��just��a��matter��of���nformat�on,��but���s��sett�ng��the��ground��for��a��gradual��learn�ng-based��change.��Th�s��comes��from��the��perspect�ve��that�� the��dom�nant��current��models��of��development��appear��unable��to��balance��the��needs��of��people��and��the��plant���n��the��pursu�t��of��peace��and��prosper�ty.��SD���s��ma�nly��portrayed��through��three��d�mens�ons��and��the�r���nterrelat�on���n��t�me��(past-present-future)��and���n��space��(near-far).

Figure 2: sustainability representation showing how environment and society limit economics (Source: Wikipedia)

Environment

Society

Economy

Sustainable social development (people)���s��a�med��at��the��development��of��people��and�� the�r��soc�al��organ�zat�on,�� �n��wh�ch�� the��real�zat�on��of��soc�al��cohes�on,��equ�ty,��just�ce��and��wellbe�ng��plays��an���mportant��role.

A��sustainable environmental development (planetary boundaries)��refers��to��the��development��of��natural��ecosystems���n��ways��that��ma�nta�n��the��carry�ng��capac�ty��of��the��Earth��and��respect��for��the��non-human��world.

Sustainable socio-economic development (prosperity)��focuses��on��the��develop-ment��of��the��soc�o-econom�c���nfrastructure,���n��wh�ch��eff�c�ent��management��of��natural��and��human��resources���s���mportant.��It��f�nds��balanced��ways��to���ntegrate��these��d�men-s�ons���n��everyday��l�v�ng��and��work�ng��and��poses,��perhaps,��the��greatest��challenge��of��our��t�me��as��th�s��requ�res��alternat�ve��ways��of��th�nk�ng,��valu�ng��and��act�ng.

In��br�ef,���n��the��SD��context���t���s���mportant��to��cons�der��env�ronmental��and��soc�o-econom�c��development���n��cross��generat�onal��(�.e.���ntergenerat�onal)��perspect�ve.

150 ��The��Ethos��of��Susta�nable��Development��and��...����/����Dan�ela��DUMITRU����and��Constant�n��STOENESCU������������151

Accord�ng�� to��UNESCO��(2009)9,��ESD��would��be��focused��on��development��of��knowledge,��capac�t�es,��qual�t�es��or��competences��requ�red��for��act�ve,��cr�t�cal��and��mean�ngful��contr�but�on��to��susta�nable��development,��and��on��the��transfer��of��appropr�-ate��sets��of��knowledge,��att�tudes,��values��and��behav�our.��The��report��states:��

ESD��must��be�� seen��as�� a�� comprehens�ve��package�� for��qual�ty��educat�on��and��learn�ng�� w�th�n�� wh�ch�� key�� �ssues�� such�� as�� poverty�� reduct�on,�� susta�nable��l�vel�hoods,��cl�mate��change,��gender��equal�ty,��corporate��soc�al��respons�b�l�ty��and��protect�on��of���nd�genous��cultures,��to��name��a��few,��are��found”.

ESD��supports��f�ve��fundamental�� types��of��learn�ng��to��prov�de��qual�ty��educat�on��and��foster��susta�nable��human��development��–��learn�ng��to��know,��learn�ng��to��be,��learn�ng��to��l�ve��together,�� learn�ng��to��do��and��learn�ng��to��transform��oneself��and��soc�ety.

ESD���s��a�� learn�ng��process��(or��approach�� to�� teach�ng)��based��on�� the�� �deals��and��pr�nc�ples��that��underl�e��susta�nab�l�ty��and���s��concerned��w�th��all��levels��and��types��of��educat�on.

However,��ESD��st�ll��rema�ns��debatable��around��the��world.��It�� �s��now��understood��that��more��room��w�ll��be��left��for��local�zat�on��and��contextual�zat�on,��and��nat�onal��and��reg�onal��debates�� towards�� the��development��of��ESD’s��mean�ng��are��seen��as��cruc�al.��Furthermore,�� the��current�� study��a�ms��at�� �dent�fy�ng�� the��cogn�t�ve,��and�� the��sk�lls��and��values��elements��of��susta�nable��development�� �n�� the��nat�onal��curr�cula�� �n��e�ght��European��countr�es.

ESD-in-Romania

In��Roman�a��there��were��several��attempts��to��reform��the��educat�onal��system,���nclud�ng��the��nat�onal��curr�culum��and��the��school��programmes.��None��of�� these��reforms��were��cons�stently��led��to��complet�on��s�nce��the��t�me��to��complete��such��a��project��was��longer��than�� the��var�ous��m�n�sters’��mandate.��Eventually,��a��mod�f�cat�on��of�� the��nat�onal��curr�culum��was��adopted��dur�ng��Andre���Marga’s��mandate,�� the��reference��framework��adopted��then��replaced��the��old��one,��and���s��st�ll��used��nowadays;�� �t�� �s,��of��course,�� the��one��we��used��for��th�s��study.��Susta�nable��development��educat�on��was��not��cons�dered��unt�l��now��a��strateg�c��object�ve��of��the��educat�onal��reform.��Although,��after��the��fall��of��the��commun�st�� reg�me���n��1989,��each��government��and��each��m�n�ster��of��educat�on��aff�rmed��that��an��educat�onal��reform��was��needed,��susta�nable��development��educat�on��was�� not�� expl�c�tly�� cons�dered�� a�� necess�ty�� and�� a�� pr�or�ty�� act�on.�� Susta�nable��development��educat�on��was��not��def�ned��as��a��component��of��the��curr�cular��reform,��and���n��the��publ�c��debate,���nclud�ng��the��one��that��attended��the��new��educat�on��law,��the��top�c��was��almost��absent,��crowded��out��by��other���ssues��and��top�cs��cons�dered��to��be��nat�onal��pr�or�t�es.��Unfortunately,��ne�ther��the��general��publ�c��nor��the��educat�onal��experts��nor��the��env�ronmental�sts,��engaged���n��any��systemat�c��and��concerted��act�on��to��promote��

9�� DESD Monitoring and Evaluation document.

susta�nable��development��educat�on��as��a��top�c��of��publ�c���nterest.��Nor��were��the��med�a���nvolved���n��any���n�t�at�ve,��or��awareness��campa�gn��on��the��top�c.

We�� would�� say,�� however,�� that�� some�� susta�nable�� development�� educat�on��aspects��were��cons�dered��by��educat�onal��and��env�ronmental�st��non-governmental��organ�zat�ons.��These��organ�zat�ons��developed��pract�cal��act�v�t�es��for��young��students��w�th��spec�f�c��susta�nable��development��educat�on��content.��Hand���n��hand��w�th��schools,��the��non-governmental��organ�zat�ons��(NGOs)��also��developed��alternate��non-formal��educat�on��act�v�t�es,��most��of��them��or�ented��to���mplement�ng��d�fferent��object�ves���n��susta�nable��development��educat�on.��These��act�v�t�es��were��f�nanced��before��Roman�a��jo�ned��the��European��Un�on,��through��the��PHARE��program,��to��wh�ch��we��add��the��C�v�l��Soc�ety��Development��Foundat�on��and��Open��Soc�ety��Foundat�on��–��w�th�� focused��attent�on��on��NGOs.��Spec�f�cally,�� the��Youth��M�n�stry,�� �n�� �ts��var�ous�� �nst�tut�onal��forms,��f�nanced��or��managed��through��d�fferent��agenc�es��the��European��funds��for��Youth��NGOs��most��of��wh�ch��had��susta�nable��development��educat�on��as��a��goal.��Th�s��way,��we��can��say��that��the��educat�onal��system,��central�zed��and��top-heavy,��reacted��w�th��delay��to���nternal�ze��the��spec�f�c��values��and��object�ves��of��susta�nable��development��educat�on,��wh�le��the��much��more��dynam�c��c�v�c��soc�ety��became��an��alternat�ve��prov�der��and���n��do�ng��so,��part�ally��addressed��the��system’s��def�c�enc�es.

The��educat�onal��system���n��Roman�a��was��never��evaluated��from��the��perspect�ve��of�� spec�f�c�� susta�nable�� development�� educat�on�� �n�� order�� to�� act�vate�� strateg�c��operat�onal��object�ves,��and��a��publ�c��debate��on�� th�s�� top�c��was��never�� �n�t�ated.��No��educat�on��m�n�ster��or��h�s��representat�ves��ever��expl�c�tly��ment�oned��the��necess�ty��of���nclud�ng���n��the��reform��process��some��elements��of��susta�nable��development.��Nor��d�d��any���nst�tut�ons��or��organ�zat�ons���nvolved���n��the��educat�onal��f�eld,�� �nclud�ng��those���n��educat�onal��research,��start��any��curr�cular��reform��projects.��Unfortunately,��ne�ther��cultural��publ�cat�ons��nor�� the�� �ntellectuals��have��a��s�gn�f�cant�� share��of�� the��publ�c��debate��on��susta�nable��development�� top�cs,��a�� fact��wh�ch�� �s��surpr�s�ng��as�� �n��other��European��countr�es��such��debates��are���mportant,��and��Roman�an��soc�ety���s��known��for���ts���nterest���n��keep�ng��up��w�th��what���s��fash�onable.

Therefore,��susta�nable��development��educat�on��has��a��per�pheral��place�� �n�� the��nat�onal��curr�culum,���ts��components��be�ng��ment�oned��only��fragmentar�ly���n��sc�ent�f�c��subjects�� such��as��B�ology��and��Geography.��Hence,��no��cross-curr�cular�� subjects��were���dent�f�ed��and��there��were��no���n�t�at�ves��to��susta�n��the��presence��of��susta�nable��development�� educat�on�� �n�� the��nat�onal�� curr�culum.��The�� educat�onal�� system’s��cond�t�on��can��be��cons�dered��precar�ous��and��we��can��d�agnose��a��severe��h�stor�cal��delay��regard�ng��the��ass�m�lat�on��of��susta�nable��development��educat�on��values.��Although���n��some��lessons,�� top�cs��w�th��good��educat�onal��opportun�t�es��are��be�ng��taught,�� the���ntellectual��approach��be�ng��promoted��and��the��preferred��type��of��debate��are��st�ll�� �n��confl�ct��w�th��susta�nable��development��values.

Nowadays,��the��pre-un�vers�ty��system���n��Roman�a���n��organ�zed��on��three��levels��of��four��years��each:��pr�mary��educat�on,��secondary��educat�on��or��gymnas�um,��and��h�gh��school.��It���s��mandatory��to��complete��ten��years��of��educat�on.��Once��the��new��educat�on��law���s��observed,��the��n�nth��grade��w�ll��be��cons�dered��secondary��school,��so��the��three��levels��w�ll��have��new��d�mens�ons:�� four-f�ve-three��years.��The��f�rst�� two�� levels��are��the��same��for��everyone,��and,��as��we��ment�oned��prev�ously,��a��nat�onal��curr�culum���s��be�ng��adopted.��St�ll,�� th�s��curr�culum��offers�� the��school�� the��poss�b�l�ty�� to��choose��

152 ��The��Ethos��of��Susta�nable��Development��and��...����/����Dan�ela��DUMITRU����and��Constant�n��STOENESCU������������153

certa�n��subjects,��accord�ngly��to��the��school��prof�le,��from��mathemat�cs��or��sc�ences��to��soc�al-cultural��d�sc�pl�nes.��Th�s��approach��does��not�� leave��space��for�� trans-d�sc�pl�ne��or��mult�d�sc�pl�nary��top�cs.��At��the��h�gh��school��level��spec�al�zat�on��occurs,��mean�ng��that��the��graduates��can��choose��var�ous��prof�les,��from��theoret�cal��(or��academ�c)��h�gh��schools��to��technolog�cal,��econom�c��or��vocat�onal��h�gh��schools.��Ins�de��each��of��these��prof�les��several��other��spec�al�zat�ons��can��be��chosen,��for��example,���n��theoret�cal��h�gh��schools,��you��can��choose��from��mathemat�cs,��phys�cs,��b�ology��and��chem�stry,��or��soc�al��sc�ences.

Methodology

The��a�m��of��the��research��was��to��collect��and��analyse��the��ex�st�ng��content��most��d�rectly��relevant�� to��susta�nable��development�� �n�� the��nat�onal��curr�cula��of�� the��part�c�pat�ng��countr�es.��The��research��methodology��was��des�gned��by��the��Central��Research��Team��(CRT)��of��the��project��to��be��as��stra�ghtforward��and��eff�c�ent��as��poss�ble��for��the��country��teams�� to��gather��as��well��as�� to��analyse��such��complex��data,��and�� to��a�d�� the��CRT���n��comparat�ve��analyses��of��the��f�nd�ngs.��The��method���nvolved��three��separate��phases��(A,��B��and��C)��that��a�med��to��restra�n��and��c�rcumscr�be��the��scope��of��research��from��the��most��abstract��educat�onal��documents��(framework��curr�culum)��to��the��“grass��roots”,��to��what��exactly���s��del�vered��to��the��ch�ldren���n��the��classroom��(the��textbooks).

All��three��phases��used��the��ESD��content��l�st��(annex��1)��categor�zat�on��as��well��as��spec�ally��des�gned��matr�xes��for��each��phase.

ESD Content list��-�� there��are��two��major��groups��of��SD��content��elements��that��make��up��the��content�� l�st:��cognitive content��and��skills and values.��The��cogn�t�ve��content��was��organ�zed���n��three��categor�es:��soc�al-cultural��elements��(human��r�ghts,��peace��and��human��secur�ty,��gender��equal�ty,��etc.),��env�ronmental��elements��(natural��resources,��water,��so�l,��a�r,��energy,��etc��and��econom�c��elements��(poverty,��planetary��boundar�es,��market��economy,��corporate��and��soc�al��respons�b�l�ty��and��accountab�l�ty,��etc.).��The��sk�lls��and��values��group��conta�ns���tems��such��as��act�ng��w�th��respons�b�l�ty��locally��and��globally,��act�ng��w�th��respect��to��others,��cr�t�cal��reflect�ve��th�nk�ng,��apply�ng��learn�ng���n��a��var�ety��of��l�fe-w�de��contents,��and��so��on.

All��elements��of��the��content��l�sts��had��codes��ass�gned��and��descr�pt�ons��that��added��coherence��and��un�ty��to��the��analys�s��process���n��all��part�c�pat�ng��countr�es,��wh�le��at��the��same��t�me��perm�tt�ng��a��quant�tat�ve��approach��along��w�th��the��qual�tat�ve��one.

Categories - the��research��also��used��for��analyses��five categories:��Env�ronment��affects��Human�ty��(EH),��Human�ty��affects��Env�ronment��(HE),��Ind�v�duals��affect��Env�ron-ment��(IE),��Susta�nable��Development��Values��(V)��and��Other��(O).��The��f�ve��categor�es��a�m��to��show���f��the��curr�cula��have��an��or�entat�on��or��a��v�s�on.

Phase A��of�� the��research��a�ms��to��scan��the��framework��curr�culum��to��reveal�� the��SD��content��and���ts��d�str�but�on���n��s�x��curr�cular��areas,��by��go�ng��through��the��document(s)��and��record�ng���n��the��matr�x��all��occurrences��of��ESD��content��accord�ng��to��the��content��l�st��as��well��as��categor�z�ng���t��accord�ng��to��the��categor�es.

The��g�ven��curr�cular��areas��were��reorgan�zed��(for��coherence��across��countr�es)��as��

follows:��

Area��A��–��natural��sc�ences,��phys�cal��env�ronment��and��technologyArea��B��–��soc�al��sc�ences,��soc�o-econom�c��development,��h�story��and��

econom�csArea��C��–��values��and��eth�cs��educat�on,��c�t�zensh�p��educat�on,��rel�g�ous��

educat�on��and��ph�losophyArea��D��–��arts,��human�t�es��and��languages��(commun�cat�on)Area��E��–��mathemat�csArea��F��–��phys�cal��and��health��educat�on

Phase B�� of�� the�� research��analysed�� the�� subject�� curr�cula.�� In��order�� to�� focus�� the��research,��the��two��most��loaded��curr�cular��areas��based��on��phase��A��were��selected:��one��accord�ng��to��cogn�t�ve��content��and��one��accord�ng��to��sk�lls��and��values��content.��Once��the��curr�culum��areas��were��selected��country��researchers�� �n��consultat�on��w�th��CRT��selected��subjects��aga�n��by��the��cr�ter�on��of��SD��load�ng��at��certa�n��grade��levels��(max.��s�x��subjects),��for��deeper��analyses.

For��phase��B��of��the��research��the��follow�ng��subjects��were��selected:��

•�� Env�ronment,��1st��-3rd��grade•�� Natural��Sc�ences,��3rd-4th��grade•�� H�story,��4th-8th��grade•�� Geography,��4th-8th��grade•�� B�ology,��5th-8th��grade•�� Phys�cs,��6th-8th��grade•�� Chem�stry,��7th-8th��grade

The��steps��from��phase��A��were��then��repeated��on��the��selected��subject��curr�cula��wh�le��the��SD��content��from��the��content�� l�st��was��recorded���nto��predes�gned��matr�xes��and��categor�zed��accord�ng��to��categor�es.

Phase C��of��the��research��analysed��textbooks��and��was��conducted���n��two��steps.��Step��1��of��th�s��phase��a�med��to��select��the��three��textbooks��whose��content��was��analysed.��Th�s��was��based��on��phase��B��of��the��research��and���ncluded��the��follow�ng��cr�ter�a:��

1.��The��most��content��loaded��subject��+��grade��comb�nat�on.��Th�s��was��based��on��the��h�ghest��number��of��content��elements��and��sk�lls��and��values��elements.

2.��The��most��‘IE��only’��loaded��subject��+��grade��comb�nat�on.��Th�s��was��based��on��the��h�ghest��number��of��category��IE��(�nd�v�duals��affect��env�ronment).

3.��The��most��‘IE��alone��or��w�th��other��categor�es��comb�nat�on’��loaded��subject��+��grade��comb�nat�on.��Th�s��was��based��on��the��h�ghest��number��of��IE��(�nd�v�duals��affect��env�ronment)���n��comb�nat�on��w�th��other��category.

The��rat�onale��beh�nd��th�s��select�on��procedure��was��to���ncrease��the��focus��on��fram�ng��the��content,��as��denoted��by��the��categor�es.��The��pr�mary��dr�ve��beh�nd��the��select�on��of��textbooks��was��not��to��perform��an��evaluat�on��of��such��a��l�m�ted��sample,��but��to��prov�de��

154 ��The��Ethos��of��Susta�nable��Development��and��...����/����Dan�ela��DUMITRU����and��Constant�n��STOENESCU������������155

�nternat�onally��comparable��examples��of��good��pract�ce�� �n�� �nterweav�ng��d�fferent��aspects��of��ESD���nto��a��coherent��narrat�ve��del�vered��to��students.��Also,��the��relat�onsh�p��between�� the��curr�cular��proscr�pt�ons�� (�nd�cated��both�� �n�� the�� framework��curr�cula��and��the��spec�f�c��subject��curr�cula)��and��the��content,�� tasks��and���llustrat�ons��d�rectly��presented��to��students��was��to��be��mapped.

A��deta�led��analys�s��of�� the��contents��conf�rmed��the��work�ng��hypotheses��wh�ch��were��developed��based��on��an���n�t�al��curr�cular��analys�s.��For��the��selected��subjects,��the��most��s�gn�f�cant��number��of��elements��w�th��env�ronmental��cogn�t�ve��content���s��found���n��Geography��and��Env�ronment,��subjects��that��assume��values��spec�f�c��for��susta�nable��development.��The��var�ous��natural��sc�ences��such��as��Phys�cs,��B�ology��and��Chem�stry,���n��add�t�on��to��the�r��spec�f�c��contents,��have��a��format�ve��role,��hence,�� the��hypothes�s��that��these��subjects��develop��competenc�es��that��encourage��ESD.

As��a��consequence,��for��phase��C��of�� the��research��the��follow�ng��textbooks��were��selected:��

•�� Natural��Sc�ences,��4th��grade•�� Geography,��5th��grade•�� Phys�cs,��8th��grade

The��second��step of��phase��C��had��a��matr�x��wh�ch��asked�� the��researcher�� to��analyse��content,���llustrat�ons��and��tasks��from��each��textbook��selected.

Research limitations.��We��must��draw��attent�on��to��some��l�m�tat�ons��of�� the��present��research,��wh�ch��are�� �nherent�� to��emp�r�cal��soc�al��stud�es.��Th�s�� �s��an�� �nternat�onal���n�t�at�ve,��deployed���n��e�ght��countr�es��w�th��d�fferent��l�ngu�st�c,��cultural,��h�stor�cal��and��soc�al��contexts.��Each��country��had��a��team��formed��by��an��educat�onal��partner��and��an��env�ronmental��partner.��A��certa�n��amount��of��subject�v�ty���n��analys�ng��the��curr�culum���s��present,��due��to��so��many��researchers��be�ng���nvolved.��The��CRT��ant�c�pated��th�s��and���t�� �s�� the��reason��for���ntroduc�ng��codes.��However���t�� �s��not��poss�ble��to��ensure��that��all��cod�ng���s�� totally��un�form��and��standard�zed.��The��CRT��tr�ed��to��keep��subject�v�ty��at��a��m�n�mum��by��descr�b�ng��accurately��all��SD��elements��and��d�scuss�ng���n��depth��w�th��country��teams��every��aspect��of��the��tasks.

National-specifics

The�� framework�� document�� on�� wh�ch�� our�� research�� �s�� based�� �s�� the�� Nat�onal��Curr�culum��for��Mandatory��Educat�on��–�� reference�� framework,��approved��by�� the��M�n�stry��of��Educat�on��and��Nat�onal��Counc�l��for��Curr�culum���n��1998.��The��document��was��developed��by��a��group��of�� researchers��of�� the��Educat�onal��Sc�ences�� Inst�tute,��coord�nated��by��Alexandru��Cr�san.

Cons�dered��by��the��former��m�n�ster��of��educat�on,��Andre���Marga,��as��an��essent�al��component��of��a��systemat�c��and��comprehens�ve��reform,�� the��document��def�nes�� the��ma�n��benchmarks��of�� the��educat�onal��pol�cy��and��strategy.��The��document��has�� the��follow�ng��structure:��

•�� Present�ng�� the�� fundamental�� opt�ons�� of�� the�� educat�onal�� pol�cy�� �n�� the��

curr�culum��f�eld•�� Def�n�ng��key��concepts��and��the��nat�onal��curr�culum��components•�� Spec�fy�ng��the��pr�nc�ples��and��establ�sh�ng��the��select�on��cr�ter�a•�� Determ�n�ng��the��purposes��of��the��educat�onal��levels��and��the��object�ves��of��the��

curr�cular��cycles•�� Descr�b�ng��the��tra�n�ng��prof�le��of��mandatory��educat�on•�� Present�ng��the��dom�nants��of��the��curr�cular��areas��and��school��subjects•�� Present�ng��the��school��programme��structure•�� Spec�fy�ng��the��structure��of��curr�cular��performance���nd�cators•�� Def�n�ng��benchmarks��to��elaborate��the��curr�culum��dec�ded��by��the��school

The��framework��document���s��too��general��to��set��spec�f�c��educat�onal��object�ves��such��as��susta�nable��development��educat�on.�� In�� fact,��as��we��w�ll��demonstrate,�� the��ma�n��a�m��of�� th�s��document,��def�ned��as��a��component��of�� the��reform,���s��sh�ft�ng��the��content��and��teacher-focused��or�entat�on��to��a��competency��and��student-focused��form��of��educat�on.��Unfortunately,�� the��document��m�n�m�zes��the���ssue��of��def�n�ng��values��that��underp�n�� the��educat�onal��process��and��becomes��obsessed��w�th��promot�ng�� the���mportance��of��develop�ng��sk�lls��and��competenc�es.

In��phase��B��of��our�� research��we��used�� the��school��programmes��of�� the��selected��subjects,��as��follows:��

o�� Environment,�� 1st�� and��2nd�� grade,�� school��programme��approved�� through��M�n�stry��of��Educat�on��Order��no.��4686/5.08.2003

o�� Natural Scicences,��3rd��grade,��school��programme��approved��through��M�n�stry��of��Educat�on��Order��no.��5198/1.11.2004

o�� Natural Sciences, History, Geography,��4th��grade,�� school��programmes��approved��through��M�n�stry��of��Educat�on��Order��no.��3919/20.04.2005

o�� History, Geography, Biology,�� 5th-8th�� grade,�� Physics,�� 6th-8th�� grade,��Chemistry,��7th-8th��grade,��programmes��publ�shed���n��2009

All��of��these��programmes��show��an��effort��to��adapt��to��the��National Curriculum for Mandatory Education,�� but��w�thout�� any�� �nnovat�ve��d�mens�on.��The��new��programmes,��compared��to��the��old��ones,��search��for��a��balance��between��contents��and��competenc�es,��but��most��of�� the��t�me��w�thout��any��d�dact�c�� �nnovat�on��regard�ng��the��connect�on��of��the��two��components.

In��phase��C��of�� our�� research,��we�� selected�� the�� Natural Sciences�� 4th�� grade��handbook,��the��Geography��5th��grade��handbook��and the Physics��8th��grade��handbook.��The��last��publ�shed��ed�t�ons��of��these��handbooks��were��used.��The��handbooks��are��the��best��ev�dence��for��the��pace��of��educat�onal��reform,��mean�ng��that���f���n��the��programmes��we��can��st�ll��f�nd��the��reform�st��sp�r�t��of��the��nat�onal��curr�culum,���n��these��handbooks��we��are��the��w�tnesses��of��an��even��b�gger��d�ss�pat�on��of��the���n�t�al��reform�st���ntent�ons.��The��handbooks��are�� st�ll��or�ented�� to�� the��past,��prov�ng�� that�� the��old�� reflexes��are��stronger��than��the��reform�st���ntent�ons.��Secondary��level��handbooks��espec�ally��are��st�ll��overloaded��and��heavy,��and��probably��act��as��an��obstacle��for��students��and��teachers.��St�ll,��compared��to��the��older��handbooks��versus��the��susta�nable��development��educat�on��requ�rements,�� they��are��a�� few��steps�� further��evolved,��but��not��enough�� to��ensure��a��

156 ��The��Ethos��of��Susta�nable��Development��and��...����/����Dan�ela��DUMITRU����and��Constant�n��STOENESCU������������157

dec�s�ve��change�� �n�� the��educat�onal��system,��ma�nly��because��of�� the��way�� �n��wh�ch��classroom��lessons��are��conducted.

The��present��report���s��the��wr�tten��analys�s��of��all��three��phases,��as��they��are���n��our��country.

Introduction-to-analyses

The path towards ESD as a path towards a durable futureThe��current��pred�cament���s,��at��least���n��part,��fraught��w�th��problems��wh�ch��cannot��be��resolved��us�ng��the��ex�st�ng��dom�nant��ways��of��act�ng��and��l�v�ng;��they��requ�re��a��step��out��of��the��standard��conceptual�sat�on��of��our��mater�al,��l�v�ng��and��soc�al��env�ronments��and��the�r��role���n��soc�o-econom�c��processes.10

Though��th�s�� �s��a��broader��soc�o-cultural�� task�� than��any��formal��curr�culum��can��hope�� to��encompass,��on�� the��conceptual�� level�� �t�� requ�res��quest�on�ng�� the��ex�st�ng��mental�� models,�� mostly�� successfully�� reproduced�� through�� formal�� educat�on,��wh�ch��have��cons�gned��most��contemporary��soc�et�es�� to�� the��path��of��unsusta�nable��development.��Alongs�de���nqu�s�t�ve��recons�derat�on��of��how��we��act,��th�s��also���ncludes��a��better��understand�ng��of�� the�� soc�al��expectat�ons��and��prejud�ces�� that�� �nfluence���nd�v�dual��act�on.��The��requ�red��change���s��demand�ng��and��pa�nful,��much��deeper��than��a��curr�cular���ntervent�on,��but��necessar�ly��based��on��educat�onal��processes��and��learn�ng��that�� �s��all-�nclus�ve,��well-d�rected��and��carefully��planned.��Though�� the��perce�ved��threat���s��great,��every��commun�ty��should��avo�d��address�ng���t��through��hasty,��externally���mposed��responses�� that��are��not��based��on��planned��and��all-encompass�ng�� learn�ng��and��understand�ng.��For��th�s��we��need��to��reconstruct��educat�on���nto��ESD;��th�s��means��more��than��the��reduct�on��of�� �gnorance��and��adopt�on��of�� �nert��facts��–���t�� �nvolves��the��development��of��mot�vat�on��to��act��based��on��st�mul���from��the���mmed�ate��env�ronment��and���ndependent��formulat�on��of��one’s��own���nterests��and��att�tudes.

One��of�� the��current��and��future�� tasks��of��educat�on�� �s�� to��enable��people�� to�� l�ve��together�� �n��ways��that��contr�bute�� to��susta�nable��development��of�� the�r��commun�t�es��and�� states.��But�� at��present�� educat�on��often��contr�butes�� to��unsusta�nable�� l�v�ng��because��of��the��lack��of��opportun�ty��for��learners��to��quest�on��the�r��own��l�festyles��and��the��systems�� that��promote�� those�� l�festyles,��and��because�� �t��advocates�� reproduct�on��of��unsusta�nable��models�� and��pract�ces.��A�� reor�entat�on��of�� formal�� educat�onal��content�� towards��susta�nable��development�� �s�� thus��recommended.��More��concretely,��that�� �ncludes��help�ng��students��understand��what��susta�nable��development��requ�res��globally��and��locally;���t��also���nvolves��help�ng��them��understand��how��to��use��the�r��own��capac�ty��for��cr�t�cal��reflect�on��and��system�c��and��futures-th�nk�ng,��as��well��as��help�ng��to��mot�vate��them��to��cons�der��act�ons��that��fac�l�tate��susta�nable��development.

ESD and the national curriculumThe��most��common��global�� response�� to�� the��calls�� for�� �nclus�on��of��ESD���nto��formal��educat�on���s��to��make��adjustments��(m�nor��or��substant�al)��to��the��ex�st�ng��educat�onal��system,��w�th�� all�� �ts�� fra�lt�es�� and�� �d�osyncras�es.��Th�s�� �s�� ach�eved��e�ther�� as�� an��expans�on��of�� the��ex�st�ng�� �nclus�on��of��EE�� top�cs�� (thus�� the�r�� �mportance�� �n��our��

10�� T�llbury,��op. cit.

methodology��and�� the�� results);��or��as��adopt�on��of��altogether��new��cross-curr�cular��and���nterd�sc�pl�nary��teach�ng��and��learn�ng��(much��less��represented).��It�� �s��espec�ally���nterest�ng��that��at�� the��global�� level11�� few��countr�es��report��support�ng��ESD���n��early��ch�ldhood��educat�on,��wh�ch���s��someth�ng��we��have���nvest�gated���n��greater��deta�l��from��both��the��s�de��of��sk�lls��and��values��development��and��the��cogn�t�ve��content���ntroduced��through��analys�s��of��curr�cula�� from��the��beg�nn�ng��of��compulsory��school�ng.�� It�� �s��often��the��case��that��ESD��themes��are��seen��as��too��complex��and��su�table��only��for��later��stages��of��educat�on,��rather��than��be�ng��seen��as��mostly��a��matter��of��presentat�on���n��the��ex�st�ng��curr�cular��content.��But�� �n��our��country��(as�� �s�� the��case��w�th��most��countr�es���n��the��reg�on),���n��later��stages��of��educat�on��d�vers�f�cat�on,��and���n��some��cases��strong��vocat�onal��or�entat�on,��sets�� �n.��As�� �t�� �s��a��global�� trend12�� to�� �ncrease�� �ntegrat�on��of��forms��of��ESD���nto��vocat�onal��educat�on,��we��note�� the��avenues��for��cont�nu�ng�� the��present��research���n��our��country.

All��add�t�ons��to��the��nat�onal��framework��curr�cula,��such��as��susta�nable��develop-ment�� top�cs,��need�� to��be��added�� to��an��already��crowded��curr�culum,��wh�ch�� �n�� the��case��of��formal��compulsory��educat�on��has��the��expl�c�t��task��of��teach�ng��the��bas�cs��of��read�ng,��wr�t�ng��and��ar�thmet�c.��We��therefore��started��our��analyses��w�th��mapp�ng��of��what��content��already��ex�sts�� �n�� the��nat�onal��curr�cula��(both��framework��and��subject��curr�cula)��that��e�ther��expl�c�tly��conforms��to��teach�ng��susta�nable��development,��or���s��related��to���t.��In��the��case��of��the��latter,��we shall endeavour to show how the existing content can be slightly modified to contribute to education for sustainable development (ESD)��w�thout���ntroduc�ng��add�t�onal��content��to��the��curr�culum.��It�� �s��therefore��of��utmost���mportance��for��us��that��the��susta�nable��development��content��can��be��seen��as��“an���ntegrat�ve,��cross-curr�cular��theme��that��can��br�ng��together��many��of��the��s�ngle���ssues��that��schools��are��already��expected��to��address”.13

As���s��expected��from��the��2009��Review of Contexts and Structures for ESD14��most��of��the��ESD��content��was��found���n��those��curr�cular��segments��where��EE��content��can��trad�t�onally��be��found,��namely,���n��natural��sc�ences��(�nclud�ng��geography).��It��was���n��th�s��segment��of��the��nat�onal��framework��curr�culum��that��most��content��was���dent�f�ed���n��all�� the��part�c�pat�ng��countr�es.��It��was��espec�ally�� �nterest�ng��for��us�� to��determ�ne��the��extent�� to��wh�ch��the��generally-appl�cable�� learn�ng��goals��(part��of��our��sk�lls��and��values��content��elements��–��SV),��such��as��act�ng��w�th��respect��for��others,��act�ng��w�th��respons�b�l�ty��globally��and�� locally,��cr�t�cal�� th�nk�ng,��understand�ng��complex�ty,��futures-th�nk�ng,��understand�ng���nterd�sc�pl�nary��relat�ons��and��the��ab�l�ty��to���dent�fy��and��clar�fy��values��are�� represented��across�� the��nat�onal�� framework��and��selected��subject��curr�cula.��Some��of��these��learn�ng��outcomes��can��be��seen��as���nstrumental��(for��example,��act�ng��w�th��respons�b�l�ty,��futures-th�nk�ng��or��understand�ng���nterd�sc�pl�n-ary�� relat�ons),��wh�le��others��are��more��emanc�patory�� (e.g.�� cr�t�cal�� and�� reflex�ve��th�nk�ng,��part�c�pat�ng���n��consensus��bu�ld�ng��and��democrat�c��dec�s�on-mak�ng,��or��dec�s�on-mak�ng���n��uncerta�n��s�tuat�ons).��As��the��Review of Contexts and Structures for ESD��notes,�� these��d�fferences��may��reflect�� the��h�stor�cal��and��pol�t�cal��context��of��

11�� UNESCO,��2009,��p.��48.12�� Ib�d.��13�� Ib�d.14�� Ib�d.

158 ��The��Ethos��of��Susta�nable��Development��and��...����/����Dan�ela��DUMITRU����and��Constant�n��STOENESCU������������159

�nd�v�dual��countr�es,��but�� through��expl�c�tly��present�ng��ESD’s��role��and��pos�t�on���n��the��curr�culum��we��hope��to��open��a��publ�c��debate��about���ts���mportance��for��susta�nable��development.

What we teach and how we teach itIn�� that�� l�ght,�� and��bu�ld�ng��on�� the��methodolog�cal�� and��h�stor�cal�� foundat�on��of��ESD���n��EE,��we��also��sought��to��map��how��curr�cular��content��presents��the���nteract�on��between���nd�v�duals,��human�ty��and��the�r��b�o-phys�cal��env�ronment;��we��thus��report��on��the��overall�� f�nd�ngs��of�� th�s�� type��of��fram�ng���n�� the��curr�cular��content.��We��have��sought��to��map��whether��the��segments��of��the��curr�culum��state��that��some��aspect��of��a��natural��system��affects��people,��or��whether��human�ty���s��dependent��on��some��aspect��of��the��Earth��or��env�ronment;��we��have��also��looked��at��dep�ct�ons��of��how��the��act�ons��or��dec�s�ons��of��soc�ety�� �nfluence��or��change��the��Earth��and��env�ronment,�� for��better��or��worse��and��whether��the��act�ons��or��dec�s�ons��of���nd�v�duals,���n��the�r��pr�vate��capac�ty,���nfluence��or��change��the��Earth��and��env�ronment,��for��better��or��worse.15��The��latter�� �s��espec�ally���mportant��for���ts��emanc�patory��aspect���n��comb�nat�on��w�th��development��of��certa�n��sk�lls��and��values.��We��have��sought��to��map��and��report��on��the��content��from��selected��textbooks��w�th��respect�� to��how��they��reflect��and��represent�� these��curr�cular��recommendat�ons.��W�th��regards��to��overall��nat�onal��and��selected��subject��curr�cula,��our��analys�s��w�ll��show��the��prevalence��of��d�fferent��fram�ngs��of��perce�ved���nteract�on��between���nd�v�duals,��commun�t�es��and��the��env�ronment.

Follow�ng��the��Review of Contexts and Structures��analys�s��and��recommendat�ons��we��sought��to��map��both��the��env�ronmental��as��well��as��the��developmental,��d�saster��pre-vent�on,��corporate��and��soc�al��respons�b�l�ty��ESD��content��themes.��As���s��the��general��global�� trend,�� �t�� �s��most��often��the��case�� that�� the�� trad�t�onal��env�ronmental��elements��(natural�� resource��management,��health,��water��and�� �mportance��of��b�od�vers�ty)��are��more��represented��than��the��soc�al,��cultural��and��econom�c��aspects��of��development.��It���s��also��a��global��trend��that��the��countr�es��from��wealth�er��reg�ons��are��less��preoccup�ed��w�th��address�ng��the��soc�o-cultural��aspects��of��SD���n��the�r��curr�cula��than���s�� the��case��w�th��countr�es��from��poorer��reg�ons.��In��the��latter��case��on��a��global��level,��top�cs��such��as��peace,��c�t�zensh�p,��eth�cs,��equal�ty,��poverty��and��cultural��d�vers�ty��are��emphas�sed��more��strongly��relat�ve��to��others.��It�� �s���mportant��for��the��presentat�on��of��our��nat�onal��results��to��note��that,��globally,��two��SD��focal��areas��emerge��(a)��a��focus��on��understand�ng��the��causes��and�� �mpacts��of��key�� �ssues��and�� the�r��mutual�� �nterconnect�ons,��and��(b)��a��focus��on��capac�ty��development��for��address�ng�� the��key�� �ssues��at�� the�� �nd�v�dual,��communal��and��global��level.16

Our��analys�s�� tr�es�� to��shed��some��l�ght��on��these��two��aspects�� �n��our��country��by��look�ng�� �n��greater��deta�l�� �nto��both�� the��subjects�� that��were��expected�� to��conta�n�� the��most��cogn�t�ve,�� env�ronmental,�� econom�c��and��soc�o-cultural�� content�� (CC)��and��those��subjects�� that��were��expected�� to��conta�n�� the��most�� ‘sk�lls��and��values’��content��(SV).��Each��w�ll��be��presented���n��greater��deta�l��below.��It���s���mportant��to��note��that��our��ent�re��approach��focuses��on��the��more��convent�onal��presentat�on��of��the��ESD��content,��

15�� K.A.��Kastens��and��M.��Tur�n,��“To��What��Extent��Should��Human/Env�ronment��Interact�ons��be���ncluded���n��Sc�ence��Educat�on?”,��Journal of Geoscience Education,��v.54.��n.3.��2006.

16�� UNESCO,��2009.

through���ntegrat�on��of��the��ESD��and��SD���ssues���n��the��ex�st�ng��school��subjects,��rather��than�� through�� �nnovat�ve��methods��such��as��‘adopt�ng��a��whole��school’��approach�� to��ESD.��Though��the��latter�� �s�� �mportant,�� �n��our��country���t��does��not��have��the��potent�al��to��reach��as��w�de��a��number��of��students��as�� the��former,��and��thus���t�� rema�ns��an��open��top�c��for��further��analyses��and��project��development.��Moreover,�� �ntervent�ons���n��the��formal��nat�onal��curr�culum��lead�� to��more��urgent��and��read�ly��adoptable�� responses��among��pol�cy-makers,��wh�ch���s��one��of�� the���mportant��f�rst��steps�� towards��or�ent�ng��educat�onal��pract�ce���n��the��d�rect�on��of��a��susta�nable��way��of��l�fe.

Overview of country findings (both cognitive, SV contact and categories)The��comparat�ve��research��of�� the��s�x��curr�cular��areas��must�� take���nto��cons�derat�on��the��debate�� that�� took��place�� �n��Roman�a��dur�ng�� the�� last��decade��of�� the�� last��century,��concern�ng�� the��contents��of��a��profound��reform��of�� the��educat�onal��system.��In�� th�s��case,�� the��dec�s�on�� to�� reor�ent�� the�� teach�ng��process�� from�� teacher�� to�� student��has��d�rect�� effects��on�� the�� relat�onsh�p��among��cogn�t�ve��content,�� competenc�es�� and��values.��The��general��op�n�on,��not��only�� �n��educat�onal��experts’��v�ews,��was�� that�� the��educat�onal��system��dur�ng��the��commun�st��per�od��was��centred��on��the��teacher��and��on��transm�tt�ng��knowledge.��Also,��the��general��op�n�on��stated��that��the��school��programme��and��the��assoc�ated��manuals��had��too��much���nformat�on,��so�� the��urgent��need��was��to��refocus��the��educat�onal��system��on��the��student��and��create��competenc�es.��A��s�gn��of��equ�l�br�um��appeared��but��from��the��beg�nn�ng��there��was��an��obv�ous��shap�ng��of��some��formal��reflexes.��Unfortunately,��ESD��was��not��one��of��the��reform’s��object�ves,��but��the��school��classes��that�� trad�t�onally��d�scussed��spec�f�c��top�cs��such��as��the��env�ronment,��cont�nued��to��do��so.

Curr�cular��Area��A,��Natural sciences, physical environment and technology, �s��a��good��example��of��focus�ng��on��creat�ng��competenc�es��on��a��curr�cular��level.��Natural sciences,��for��pr�mary��educat�on��and��Physics, Chemistry and Biology��for��secondary��educat�on,��are��des�gned��accord�ng��to��the�r��format�ve��potent�al.��The��core��of��the��com-petenc�es��assumed��by��these��subjects���s��def�ned��by��what��can��be���ncluded���n��the��more��general��category��of��exper�ent�al�� learn�ng,��us�ng��observat�on��as��a��research��method��and��mak�ng�� �nferences��based��on�� those��observat�ons.��Furthermore,�� �t�� proposes���nterd�sc�pl�nary��correlat�ons��and��contextual��approaches.��From��the��perspect�ve��of��ESD,��Subject��Area��A��prov�des��max�mum��competenc�es,��but,��w�th��few��except�ons,��does��so��w�thout��ment�on�ng��cogn�t�ve��contents��and��values��spec�f�c��to��durab�l�ty.

Curr�cular��Area��B,��Social Sciences, socio-economic development, history and economics,��can��be��seen,�� �n��contrast�� to�� the��Subject��Area��A,��as��a��counterbalanc�ng��element.��W�th��subjects��such��as��History��and��Geography,��Area��B��offers��most��of��the��values��and��cogn�t�ve��contents,��but��a��m�n�mum��of��competenc�es.��History��excels���n��offer�ng��soc�o-cultural��cogn�t�ve��content,�� from��human��r�ghts�� �ssues�� to�� forms��of��government.��Geography offers��all��of�� the��elements��regard�ng��the��env�ronment,��from��natural��resources,��a�r,��water��and��so�l��to���ssues��concern�ng��pollut�on��and��waste.��Moreover,��parts��of��populat�on��and��settlement��geography���nclude��deta�led��cogn�t�ve��elements��about��rural��development��and��urban�zat�on,��but��also��cover��soc�al��aspects��such��as��cultural��d�vers�ty.��Ult�mately,��Economy,��as��a��subject�� taught��only�� �n��h�gh��school,��prov�des��spec�f�c��content,��but��w�thout��an��approach��that���ncludes,��on��a��sup-pos�t�onal��level,���mpl�c�tly,��an��opt�on��for��susta�nable��development��values.

160 ��The��Ethos��of��Susta�nable��Development��and��...����/����Dan�ela��DUMITRU����and��Constant�n��STOENESCU������������161

Curr�cular��Area��C,��Values and ethics education, citizenship education, religious education and philosophy,��presents��soc�o-cultural��elements,��expl�c�tly��focused��on��d�vers�ty��and��tolerance��values��rather��than��the��broad��spectrum��of��susta�nable��develop-ment.��Curr�cular��Area��D,��Arts, humanities and languages,��offers��commun�cat�on��competenc�es��and��elements��of��procedural�� learn�ng��through��solv�ng��problems.��Cur-r�cular��Area��E, Mathematics,��develops��spec�f�c��competenc�es,�� th�s��t�me��concern�ng��numeracy.��F�nally,��Curr�cular��Area��F,��Physical and health education,���s��restr�cted��to��m�n�mal��spec�f�c��contents��and��competenc�es.

As��a��result��of��these��observat�ons��on��curr�cular��areas���n��the��nat�onal��curr�culum,��phase��B��of��the��research��selected��the��follow�ng��subjects:��

•�� Env�ronment,��1st��-3rd��grade•�� Natural��Sc�ences,��3rd-4th��grade•�� H�story,��4th-8th��grade•�� Geography,��4th-8th��grade•�� B�ology,��5th-8th��grade•�� Phys�cs,��6th-8th��grade•�� Chem�stry,��7th-8th��grade

A��deta�led��analys�s��of�� the��contents��conf�rmed��the��work�ng��hypotheses��wh�ch��were��developed��from��an�� �n�t�al��curr�cular��analys�s.��For�� the��selected��subjects,�� the��most��s�gn�f�cant��number��of��elements��w�th��env�ronmental��cogn�t�ve��content���s��found���n��Geography��and��Env�ronment,��subjects��that��assume��values��spec�f�c��for��susta�nable��development.��The��var�ous��natural��sc�ences��such��as��Phys�cs,��B�ology��and��Chem�stry,���n��add�t�on��to��the�r��spec�f�c��contents,��have��a��format�ve��role,��hence,�� the��hypothes�s��that��these��subjects��can��develop��competenc�es��that��encourage��ESD.

As��a��consequence,��for��phase��C��of��the��research��the��handbooks��for��the��follow�ng��subjects��were��selected:��

•�� Natural��Sc�ences,��4th��grade•�� Geography,��5th��grade•�� Phys�cs,��8th��grade

The��4th��Natural��Sc�ences��handbook�� �s��based��on�� �nteract�ve��and��part�c�pat�ve��teach�ng��methods,��wh�ch��makes�� them��dependent��on�� the�� teacher’s��capac�ty��and��pedagog�cal��ab�l�ty�� to��offer�� the��contents.��The��5th��grade��Geography��handbook�� �s��des�gned�� �n�� a�� trad�t�onal��manner,�� almost��unchanged��compared�� to�� any�� s�m�lar��handbooks��from��the��last��decades.��It��offers��cons�derable�� �nformat�on,��(perhaps��too��much),��and���t�� �s��hard��to��bel�eve��that��a��student��w�ll��reta�n��everyth�ng.��So��although��we��f�nd��a��number��of��cogn�t�ve��elements��regard�ng�� the��env�ronment,�� the��quant�ty��overwhelms�� the�� learn�ng��capac�ty��of�� the��student.��Lastly,�� the��Phys�cs��handbook,��also��replete��w�th��cogn�t�ve��elements��regard�ng��phys�cal��phenomenon,���s��focused��at��the��same��t�me��on��develop�ng��competenc�es,��espec�ally��those��based��on��exper�ent�al��learn�ng.��Moreover,��when�� top�cs��connected�� to�� the��env�ronment��such��as��rad�at�on��and��nuclear��reactors��are��covered,��the���mpl�cat�ons��for��the��env�ronment��are��analysed.��Generally,�� th�s��handbook�� leaves�� the�� �mpress�on�� that�� there��has��been��an��effort�� to��

modern�ze.The���llustrat�ons��found���n��the��4th��grade��Natural��Sc�ences��handbook��are��ent�rely��

age��spec�f�c��draw�ngs,��wh�ch��fac�l�tates��a��very��good��understand�ng��by��the��students.��In�� the�� 5th�� grade�� Geography�� handbook,�� photos�� and�� graph�c�� schemes�� preva�l,��respect�ng�� the��rule��accord�ng�� to��wh�ch��a��referent�al�� that��can��be��represented��non-propos�t�onally,��usually�� thorough��an�� �mage,�� �s��allocated�� to��a�� term.��The��Phys�cs��handbook��part�cularly,�� �s��based��on��graph�c��schemes,��but�� �t��also��uses��photography��when��poss�ble.��Generally,��we��f�nd��adequate��terms,��w�thout��errors��or��other��formal��or��mater�al��m�stakes��between��the��content��and��the���mages��used.��The���llustrat�ons��also��take���nto��cons�derat�on��the��students`���ntu�t�ve��capac�ty,��usually��conce�ved��as��support��documents��for��var�ous��explanatory��or��evaluat�ve��propos�t�onal��content.

The��top�cs��from��the��Natural��Sc�ences��handbook��comb�ne��rout�ne��procedures��w�th�� process�� learn�ng,�� where�� qu�te�� a�� number�� of�� cases�� �n�� wh�ch�� the�� ch�ld`s���mag�nat�on��and��creat�v�ty��are��called��for.��The��Geography��handbook,��one��of��the��old��school��mater�als,�� �s��st�ll��count�ng��on��memor�z�ng��data��and���s��dom�nated��by��top�cs��that��requ�re��such��an��effort.��F�nally,��the��top�cs��from��the��Phys�cs��handbook��are��actually��quest�ons��and��themat�c��exerc�ses��where��the��authors’��efforts�� to��ensure��coverage��of��top�cs��that��develop��competenc�es��such��as���nferent�al��capac�ty,��can��be��not�ced.

The analysis of the SD cognitive contentResearch��on�� the�� curr�cular�� areas�� focused��on�� contents�� spec�f�c�� to�� susta�nable��development�� leads�� to�� the�� conclus�on�� that��ESD�� �s��not�� a��pr�or�ty�� at�� the��des�gn��stage;��when��these��spec�f�c��contents��emerge�� �t�� �s��as��a��consequence��of�� the��content��character�st�cs��of��var�ous��subjects.

A��generous��assessment��of��the��s�tuat�on��allows��us��to���dent�fy��spec�f�c��elements��of�� susta�nable��development��educat�on.�� In��Curr�cular��Area��A,��Natural sciences, physical environment and technology, we���dent�fy��the��practical skill domain, whose��content��should��be��adaptable�� to�� local�� resources;�� th�s��would�� requ�re��know�ng�� the��local��resources��as��elements��of�� the��env�ronment,��correspond�ng��to�� the��B1��element��but��also��to��the��Technological Education domain��for��wh�ch��there���s��a��requ�rement��to��st�mulate�� the��entrepreneur�al�� �n�t�at�ve.��The��latter��corresponds��to�� the��econom�c��character��content��elements��such��as��the��econom�c��market��and��the��relat�on��between��product�on��and��consumpt�on,��and��thus��to��elements��C4��and��C5.

In��Curr�cular��Area��B,��Social Sciences, socio-economic development, history and economics, the��ma�n��prov�ders��of��cogn�t�ve��contents��spec�f�c�� to��susta�nable��development��are��History and��Geography.��The��f�rst���s��be�ng��asked��to��offer��‘complete’��knowledge��that��covers��all��of��h�story’s��doma�ns,��the��cultural,��the��soc�al��and��the��pol�t�-cal��convey���nformat�on��that��conta�ns��content��spec�f�c��to��A1-4��and��C1-2��and��C4.��The��second��rema�ns��the��ma�n��prov�der��of��cogn�t�ve��elements��related��to��the��env�ronment,��and���s��focused��on��develop�ng��understand�ng��and��capac�t�es��for��facts��and��processes��spec�f�c��to��the��geograph�cal��env�ronment;��th�s��emphas�ses��develop�ng���nvest�gat�ve��and��research��sk�lls,��and��thus��addresses��the��full��range��of��elements��B1-14.

Curr�cular��Area��C, Values and ethics education, citizenship education, religious education and philosophy,�� also��has�� a��m�n�mal�� offer�ng�� �n��Civic��Education.��Elements�� related�� to��human��r�ghts��and��cultural��d�vers�ty��are�� �dent�f�ed��accord�ng��to��elements��A1��and��A4,��w�th�� the��curr�cular��object�ve��be�ng�� to��encourage��group��

162 ��The��Ethos��of��Susta�nable��Development��and��...����/����Dan�ela��DUMITRU����and��Constant�n��STOENESCU������������163

�nteract�on��for��respons�ble��part�c�pat�on���n��soc�ety.��Also,��Religion��could��be,��under��certa�n��cond�t�ons��a��prov�der��of��cultural��elements��regard�ng��understand�ng��cultural��d�vers�ty.��The��same��element,��A4,���s��at��stake���n��Curr�cular��Area��D, Arts, humanities and languages,�� s�nce��Plastic and Musical Education�� �s��based��on�� the��ab�l�ty�� to��d�st�ngu�sh��cultural��d�vers�ty��and��requ�res��free��express�on��of��personal�ty.��Curr�cular��Area��E,��Mathematics,��does��not�� �nclude��any��cogn�t�ve��elements��spec�f�c�� to��ESD��and���n��Curr�cular��Area��F, Physical and health education�� the��school��programme���s��adapted�� to��spec�f�c��ex�st�ng��mater�als�� that��conform��to�� local�� trad�t�ons;�� th�s��aga�n��allows��understand�ng��of��cultural��d�vers�ty,��accord�ng��to��A4`s��descr�pt�on.

Environmental aspect vs. other aspects of SD representation in the curriculumThe�� contents�� spec�f�c�� to�� ESD�� can�� be�� found�� �n�� the�� nat�onal�� curr�culum,�� �n��programmes��of��d�fferent��subjects��and�� �n��handbooks,��depend�ng��on�� the��cogn�t�ve��content��of�� the��subject.��Therefore,�� �n��Geography��we��can���dent�fy��ma�nly��cogn�t�ve��elements��from��the��category��of��the��env�ronment,���n��H�story,��soc�o-cultural��elements,��and���n��Economy,��econom�c��elements.��The��nat�onal��curr�culum��does��not��expl�c�tly��st�pulate��spec�f�c��object�ves�� for��susta�nable��development,��although�� the��necess�ty��to��protect�� the��env�ronment��was��ass�m�lated��as��an��educat�onal��object�ve.��Th�s��open��m�ndedness��towards��env�ronmental���ssues��has��determ�ned��an���ncreas�ng��share��of��the��top�cs��that��approach��the��subject.��Therefore,��even��sc�ence��subjects��such��as��Phys�cs��br�ng���nto��quest�on��aspects��of��the���mpact��that��humans��have��on��the��env�ronment,��such��as,��for��example,��the��effects��of��nuclear��energy.

The��nat�onal��curr�culum���s��ma�nly��or�ented�� to��spec�fy�ng��competenc�es�� that��every��researched��curr�cular��area��should��develop,��therefore��an��assay��of��the��presence��of��elements��w�th��env�ronmentally-spec�f�c��cogn�t�ve��content��can��be��made��only��at��the��school��programme��level��for��d�fferent��subjects,��wh�ch���s��exactly��what��we��d�d���n��phase��B��of��our��research���n��wh�ch��school��programmes��for��subjects���n��curr�cular��areas��A��and��B��were��analysed.��In��Area��A,��pr�mary��educat�on��subjects��were��selected:��

• Environment,��wh�ch���s��stud�ed���n��the��f�rst��two��grades• Natural sciences,��stud�ed���n��the��3rd��and��4th��grade.

For��gymnas�um,��Biology, Physics�� and��Chemistry��were�� selected.�� In��Area��B,��Geography��and��History��were��analysed.

In��Curr�cular��Area��A,��pr�mary��educat�on��subjects��Environment��and��Natural Sciences�� are��based,�� accord�ng�� to�� the��programme,��on��act�ve�� learn�ng��methods��connected��to��env�ronmental��observat�on.��Generally,��students��are��asked��to��descr�be��var�ous��s�tuat�ons���n��real��l�fe��that��help��them��understand��processes��and��phenomena���n��the��env�ronment.��Th�s��way,��students��learn��to��descr�be��and��use��theoret�cal���deas��about��natural��resources,��water,��a�r,��so�l,��but��also��learn��the��consequences��of��human��act�v�ty��on��env�ronment��and��on��l�fe,��w�th��humans��be�ng��a��l�v�ng��part��of��the��system.

Biology�� conta�ns��numerous��cogn�t�ve��env�ronmental��elements�� from�� the��5th��grade��onwards;��the��8th��grade��handbook���s��very��r�ch���n��th�s��k�nd��of��content.��The��5th��grade��programme��has��as���ts��object�ve:��know�ng��the��l�v�ng��world��or��more��spec�f�cally,��the��vegetal��world��and�� �ts�� �mpact��on�� the��env�ronment��and��human��l�fe.��For�� the��6th��grade,��when��the��an�mal��world���s��stud�ed,��content��object�ves��are��set��such��as��analys�ng��

the�� env�ronment,�� the��d�vers�ty��of�� the�� an�mal��world�� “establ�sh�ng��connect�ons��between��env�ronmental�� factors��and��an�mal��d�vers�ty”��and��also��“problem��solv�ng���n��the��relat�onsh�p��between��man��and��the��an�mal��k�ngdom”.��In��the��7th��grade,��when��anatomy��and��the��human��phys�ology��are��stud�ed,��cogn�t�ve��content��B��13���s��targeted���n��order��to��“establ�sh��connect�ons��between��the��system��of��organs���n��the��human��body��and��the���nfluence��of��the��env�ronment”.��The��8th��grade��programme��g�ves��the��h�ghest��rat�ng��to��elements��w�th��env�ronmental��cogn�t�ve��content,��among��wh�ch��we��can��ment�on���dent�f�cat�on��of�� the��components��of��an��ecosystem,��compar�son��of��d�fferent��natural��or��anthropogen�c��ecosystems,��damage��of�� the��env�ronment�� through��pollut�on��and��overexplo�tat�on,���nsert�ng��new��spec�es���n��the��ecosystems,��protect�ng��and��conserv�ng��the��env�ronment��or�� collect�ng��waste,�� and��also��natural��parks��and�� reservat�ons.��Balances��and���mbalances���n��ecosystems���s��also��a��top�c.

For�� the�� 8th�� grade,�� �n�� Chemistry,�� there�� are�� two�� object�ves�� that�� lead�� to���ncorporat�ng��certa�n��env�ronmental��cogn�t�ve��contents,�� the��f�rst�� �mpl�c�t��and�� the��second��expl�c�t.��The��f�rst��object�ve��cons�sts�� �n��“assess�ng�� the��advantages��and�� the��d�sadvantages��of��chem�cal�� substances”��and�� the�� second��one�� �n��“�dent�fy�ng�� the��agents��that��pollute��water,��so�l,��a�r��and��ways��to��prevent��and��reduce��pollut�on”.��When���t��comes��to��Physics, there���s��a��s�m�lar��object�ve��for��the��7th��and��the��8th��grade,��wh�ch���s�� to��“argue��advantages��and��d�sadvantages��of��new��and��future��technolog�es��for�� the��env�ronment”.��A��deta�led��analys�s��on��an��8th��grade��Physics��handbook��showed��that��follow�ng��the��f�eld-spec�f�c��top�cs,�� there��are��top�cs��about��the���mpact��of��technology��on��the��env�ronment��accord�ngly��to��B��12��and��B13��content��elements��–��pollut�on��and��waste���n��d�st�nct�ve��lessons.��The��two��top�cs��are��called��“Irrad�at�on,��b�olog�c��effects��and��rad�oprotect�on”��and��“Nuclear��energy��and��nuclear��acc�dents”.

In�� Curr�cular��Area�� B,�� programmes�� for�� History�� and�� Geography were��analysed.��The��programme��for��History does��not��have��as��an��object�ve�� transm�tt�ng��knowledge��about�� the��env�ronment,��except�� �n��some��cases��where��h�stor�cal��events��are��related��to�� the��geograph�cal��env�ronment��and��other��env�ronmental��factors��such��as��the��cl�mate.��The��env�ronment���s��also��ment�oned��when��the��top�c���s��about��var�ous��natural��d�sasters��that��have��marked��the��h�story��of��some��commun�t�es.��Not��least,�� the��h�stor�cal��presentat�on��of�� the��rural��and��urban��development��process��cons�ders��not��only��env�ronmental��dependence��but��also�� �ts�� �nfluence.��The��programme��w�th�� the��heav�est��cogn�t�ve��env�ronmental��content,��along��w�th�� the��Biology��programme,�� �s��the��Geography��programme.��Techn�cally,�� �n��four��years��of��secondary��school��all��of��the��fourteen��elements�� �ncluded���n�� the��research�� �nstrument��are��covered.��The��study��top�cs��are��ass�gned�� to��one��element,�� for��example��water��or��so�l,��and��offer��spec�f�c��geograph�cal��data,�� from��general�� �nformat�on��regard�ng��cont�nental��geography�� to��spec�f�c��deta�ls��of��Roman�a’s��geography.��Cons�derable�� �nformat�on�� �s��prov�ded,��a�� fact�� that�� requ�res��negot�at�on��among�� the��stakeholders��s�nce�� the��object�ve�� �s�� to���mprove��the��ex�st�ng��handbooks��and��space���s��at��a��prem�um.

Framing-of-environmental-aspects-(IE/EI/HE)

In��the��selected��programmes,��d�fferent��frameworks��of��analys�s��were��used,��depend�ng��on��the��context��and��accord�ng��to�� the��research��categor�es��d�st�ngu�shed,��from��those��that��concern��the��way��that��the��env�ronment���nfluences��human�ty��to��those��concern�ng��

164 ��The��Ethos��of��Susta�nable��Development��and��...����/����Dan�ela��DUMITRU����and��Constant�n��STOENESCU������������165

the��way��human�ty���nfluences��the��env�ronment.Generally,�� the��Geography��programme���s��based��on��a��very��useful��amb�valence��

supported��both��by�� the�� �dea�� that�� the��env�ronment�� �nfluences�� the��development��of��humank�nd��and��that��humank�nd,��espec�ally��through���ndustr�al��act�v�ty,��mod�f�es��and��affects�� the��env�ronment.��The�� top�c��of��anthropogen�c�� �nfluences�� �s��approached�� �n��var�ous��contexts,��accord�ng��to��the��age��of��the��student.��From��a��deta�led��analys�s��of��the��5th��grade��Geography��handbook��we��can��observe��a��rule��accord�ng��to��wh�ch,��whenever��such��a��step���s��poss�ble,��some��human��act�v�t�es��can��have��a��negat�ve���nfluence��on��the��env�ronment��through��pollut�on.��For��example,���n��the��chapter��about��atmosphere��there���s��a�� lesson��about�� the��cl�mate��and��a�r��pollut�on.��A��paragraph��called��“Pollut�on��and��cl�mate��changes”��proposes��the��next��fragment:��“If��carbon��d�ox�de���n��the��atmosphere��overcomes��the��0.03%��l�m�t,�� the��med�um��global��annual�� temperature��w�ll�� �ncrease.��The��consequences��are��catastroph�c.��The��level��of�� the��planetary��ocean��w�ll�� �ncrease��because��of��the��melt�ng���ce��caps.��The��oceans��w�ll�� �nvade��the��cont�nents.��The��desert��areas��w�ll��broaden”��(p.��71).

For��H�story��top�cs��as��well,���t���s��assumed��that��h�stor�cal��development��happened���n��connect�on��to��the��env�ronment,��and��the��fact��that��rural��and��urban��development��left��a��human��mark��on��the��env�ronment.

The��other��natural��sc�ence��handbooks��expl�c�tly�� treat��aspects��of�� technology’s��effects��on��the��env�ronment��as��well.��For��example,�� the��8th��grade Physics��handbook,��lesson��8.3,��approaches��“Rad�oprotect�on��and��b�olog�cal��effects”,��by���nd�cat�ng��the��effects��of��natural��or��art�f�c�al��rad�at�on��on��the��env�ronment��or��on���nd�v�duals.��Here���s��a��fragment�� that�� �llustrates�� the��IE��case,��where��a��rad�oact�ve��env�ronment��affects��the���nd�v�dual:��“As��a��consequence��of�� the���nteract�on��between��rad�at�on��and��l�v�ng��organ�sms,��phys�cal��phenomenon��emerge��(st�mulat�on,�� �on�zat�on)�� that��determ�ne��chem�cal��phenomenon��(alterat�on��of��macromolecules��and��enzymat�c��systems)��[…]��b�ochem�cal��and��morpholog�cal�� �njur�es��may��occur”�� (p.��148).��But��by��analys�ng��the��consequences,��an��EH��type��s�tuat�on�� �s��underl�ned:��“Ma�nta�n�ng��a��permanent��level��of�� �rrad�at�on,��even��at��a�� low��level,�� that��produces��a��m�n�mum��of��mutat�ons���n��a��generat�on��can��lead��to��real��ecolog�cal��d�sasters�� �n��the��next��generat�ons��of�� the��ecosystem”��(p.��148).��A�� lesson��ded�cated�� to��nuclear��energy��conveyed��references��to��nuclear�� acc�dents�� and�� to�� the�� �ssue��of��waste�� storage,�� �nd�cat�ng�� that�� �n�� th�s��context�� there��were��expected��r�sks��of��nuclear��energy��and��assoc�ated��effects��on��the��env�ronment.��The��text�� �n�� the��handbook��says:��“[…]��techn�cally,��no��nuclear��reactor��can��explode��l�ke��a��bomb.��Although��there��are��poss�ble��acc�dents��where��the��reactor��can��overheat��and��the�r��components,��depend�ng��on��what��mater�als��are��used��to��bu�ld��them,��melt��or��burn.��The�� �ncreased��pressure��of�� the��cool�ng��agent��can��become��the��cause��of��mechan�cal��explos�ons�� that��would��deter�orate�� the�� reactor`s��case��or�� the��cool�ng��system.��Th�s��way,��rad�oact�ve��mater�als��can��contam�nate��the��env�ronment”.��(p.��161).��Acc�dents��from��Three��M�le��Island��or��Chernobyl��are��ment�oned,��where��“the��human��factor��was�� the��cause,��but��because��of�� the��d�fferent��protect�on��systems�� the��consequences��were��d�fferent”��(p.��161).��Also��the��waste��d�sposal�� �ssue���s��conc�sely��descr�bed:��“A��spec�al�� �ssue���n�� the��nuclear��f�eld���s�� the��nuclear��waste��d�sposal.��The��nuclear��reactors��produce��nuclear��waste.��These��can���nfect�� the��atmospher�c��a�r,�� the��ground��waters,�� the��plants��etc.;��nuclear��waste�� �s��depos�ted���n��spec�al��conta�ners�� �n��spec�al��areas.��Frequently,�� these��areas��are��underground,���n��old��m�nes.��In��1967,���n��a��

storage��place���n��the��Ural��Mounta�ns,��Russ�a,��the��nuclear��waste��myster�ously��caught��f�re��and��exploded.��Dozens��of��people��d�ed”.��(p.��161).

Representation-of-economic-aspects-in-the-curriculum

In��the��nat�onal��curr�culum��for��secondary��school�� there��are��very��few��elements��w�th��econom�c��content.��These��types��of��elements��are��programmed��to��be��stud�ed���n��h�gh��school,��ma�nly���n��Economy��and��other��connected��subjects��such��as��Appl�ed��Economy��or��Entrepreneur�al��Educat�on,��subjects��that��lately��have��been��preferred��to��other��soc�al��sc�ences,��perhaps��unduly,��and��w�th��unfavourable��consequences��on��the���ntellectual��development��process��of��the��students.��So��w�th��these��changes,��the��share��of��econom�c��curr�cula��elements���ncreased��and��the��soc�o-cultural��elements��were��reduced.

In�� the��current��nat�onal��curr�culum��for��secondary��school�� there��are�� two��cases��where��we��can���dent�fy��favourable��contexts��for�� transm�tt�ng��econom�cal��cogn�t�ve��contents.��Therefore,���n��curr�cular��area��A,��the��subject��Technological Education��a�ms��to��st�mulate��entrepreneur�al���n�t�at�ve��and��the��subject��of��History��from��curr�cular��area��B��must��offer��content�� that�� �ncludes��all��h�stor�cal��d�mens�ons��(cultural,��econom�cal,��soc�al��and��pol�t�cal).

Dur�ng�� the��school��programmes��analys�s��we��can�� f�nd��expl�c�t�� references�� to��susta�nable��development.��We��present�� the�� full�� statements��because�� the��context�� �s��relevant�� for�� the��way�� that��susta�nable��development�� �s��understood.��The��subject��of��Biology��has��to��ach�eve��a��complex��object�ve��composed��of�� the��follow�ng��elements:��“protect�ng��and��preserv�ng��the��env�ronment,��susta�nable��development,��and��rat�onal��explo�tat�on��of��natural�� resources,��select�ve��collect�on��of��waste,��parks��and��natural��reservat�ons”.��History also takes���nto��account��some��econom�c��elements��assoc�ated��w�th�� �nst�tut�onal��aspects�� �nclud�ng:��“market��economy,��econom�c��compet�t�on,��progress,�� technology,��NATO,��European��Un�on,��global�zat�on”.��F�nally,��Geography a�ms��to��“elaborate��models��and��solut�ons��for��organ�z�ng��the��geograph�cal��space���n��terms��of��susta�nable��development”,��and��for��the��8th��grade,��when��Roman�a’s��geography���s��taught,��there���s��an��amb�guous��object�ve:��“elements��of��susta�nable��development”.

Socio-cultural representations in the curriculumSome�� elements�� of�� soc�o-cultural�� content�� �n�� the�� curr�culum�� are�� presented�� as��d�st�nct�ve��top�cs,��but��w�thout��appropr�ate��depth.��Cultural��d�vers�ty��and���ntercultural��understand�ng��but��also��a�� tolerant��att�tude,��are��present�� �n�� themat�c��contexts.��We��also��f�nd��these��elements�� �n��h�story��lessons��about�� the��connect�ons��among��d�fferent��cultures��and��c�v�l�zat�ons,��start�ng��w�th��the��Greek��att�tude��towards��the�r��ne�ghbours���n��colon�al��emp�res,��or���n��geography��lessons��about��the��ethn�c��d�vers�ty��on��Earth.

In��the��nat�onal��curr�culum��there��are��more��goals��that��refer��to��human��r�ght���ssues��and��equal�ty,��peace��and��secur�ty�� �ssues,��but��most��of��all��relate�� to��cultural��d�vers�ty��and���ntercultural��understand�ng.��For���nstance,��when��d�scuss�ng��curr�cular��area��B,��for��the��subject��History (2005),��we��can���dent�fy��“creat�ng��knowledge��that��expresses��all��of��h�story’s��d�mens�ons:��cultural,��econom�c,��soc�al��and��pol�t�cal”,��wh�ch���s��a��fa�rly��comprehens�ve��enunc�at�on��that��can���nclude��any��other��element��w�th��soc�o-cultural��content.��When��d�scuss�ng��curr�cular��area��C,��for��the��subject��Civic Education��(2005)��the��focus���s��on��“encourag�ng��creat�v�ty��and��group���nteract�ons���n��order��to��respons�bly��

166 ��The��Ethos��of��Susta�nable��Development��and��...����/����Dan�ela��DUMITRU����and��Constant�n��STOENESCU������������167

part�c�pate�� �s��soc�al�� l�fe”,��and���n�� the��case of Religion (2005),�� the��object�ve�� �s��“to��cap�tal�ze��on��the��contents��by��connect�ng���t��w�th��other��subjects”.��In��curr�cular��area��D,��ded�cated��to��art��and��l�ngu�st�c��commun�cat�on,��for��the��subject��Plastic Education (2005),��a��certa�n��“content��flex�b�l�ty�� that��allows��adaptat�on��to��real��cond�t�ons��and���ntroduct�on��of�� local��and��trad�t�onal��culture��elements”�� �s��env�saged.��F�nally,��w�th��reference�� to��elements�� related�� to��cultural��d�vers�ty,�� the��goal�� �n��curr�cular��area��F,��subject��Physical Education (2004),��says�� that��“curr�culum���s��adapted�� to��spec�f�c��mater�als��and��local��trad�t�ons”.

Analys�ng��var�ous��programmes�� revealed�� several�� statements�� about�� soc�al��and��cultural��elements.��For��curr�cular��area��A,��subject��Environment (2003),��some��elements��about��health,��are��ment�oned��such��as��“rules��about��personal��hyg�ene��and��al�mentat�on,��based��on�� rece�ved�� �nformat�on”.��Physics (2005)�� �s��also��seen��as��a��contr�butor��to��the��soc�al��top�cs��through��cult�vat�ng��tolerance��of��other’s��op�n�ons.

When��talk�ng��about��History,��the��prov�s�on���s��more��complex,��compared��to��other��subjects.��The��curr�culum��sets��goals�� that�� �mpl�c�tly��requ�re��anchor�ng��some��soc�o-cultural��cogn�t�ve��contents.��Th�s��way,��d�dact�c��act�v�t�es��such��as��“descr�b�ng��prosa�c��aspects��of�� l�fe�� �n��a�� reg�on,��us�ng�� the��consulted��sources”,��“attend�ng��celebrat�ons��and��local��ceremon�es”,��and��“group��d�scuss�ons��on��‘travelers�� �n�� the��reg�on’��notes”��are��ment�oned.��Also,��the��programme��sets��as��a��goal��coverage��of��top�cs��w�th��expl�c�t��soc�al��and��cultural��cogn�t�ve��content,��such��as��“respect�ng��fundamental��human��r�ghts”��and��“assum�ng��ethn�c,��soc�al,��rel�g�ous��and��cultural��d�vers�ty”.��The��programme��also���ncludes��a��number��of��un�ts�� relevant�� for��soc�al��and��cultural��components,�� such��as��rel�g�ous��reform��and��the��Counter��Reformat�on,��c�v�l��soc�ety,��c�v�c��movements��and��state��law��and��human��r�ghts.��In��the��programme��for��Geography (2005) there��are��goals��w�th��expl�c�t��soc�o-cultural��content,��such��as��“�dent�fy�ng��and��expla�n�ng��the��soc�al,��c�v�c��and��cultural��d�mens�on��of��the��geograph�cal��space’s��character�st�cs”��and��“respect��for��the��natural��and��human��d�vers�ty���n��the��present”.

Cons�der�� the��5th��grade��Geography��handbook,��where�� there��are�� top�cs��about��populat�on�� geography.��The�� 4th�� lesson�� shows�� the�� rac�al,�� ethno-l�ngu�st�c�� and��rel�g�ous��structure��of��populat�on��and��the��5th�� lesson��presents,�� �n��the��f�rst��part,��some��demograph�c��class�f�cat�ons,��such��as��gender,��age,��profess�on��or��res�dence��structures.��The��rel�g�ous��d�vers�ty��of�� the��world’s��populat�on�� �s�� �llustrated��w�th��a��world��map��where��d�fferent��dom�nant�� reg�ons��are��represented�� �n��var�ous��colours.��The�� text�� �n��the��handbook���s��m�n�mal��and��has��only��a��def�n�t�on��of��what��we��understand��by��the��term��“rel�g�on”,��namely��“a��jo�nt��commun�ty��of��bel�evers��and��dogmata��that��def�nes��the��relat�on��between��human�ty��and��d�v�n�ty”��(p.��117),��as��well��as��a��l�st��of�� the��most���mportant��rel�g�ons.

The analysis of skills and valuesThe�� debates�� �n�� Roman�a�� concern�ng�� student-centred�� educat�on�� had,�� as�� a��consequence,��an�� �ncreased��attent�on�� to�� the��sk�lls�� that�� the��system��should��develop.��Therefore,�� a�� few��key��competences,�� such��as��cr�t�cal�� th�nk�ng,�� �nterd�sc�pl�nary��understand�ng,��appl�cat�ons,��creat�ve��ones,��of��the��acqu�red��knowledge��can��be��found���n��almost��all��of��the��school��programmes.��Most��of��the��school��subjects��have��the��same��tasks��regard�ng��the��competenc�es��and��they��are��expressed��us�ng��the��same��stereotypes.��Here��are��a��few��spec�f�c��d�fferences,��as��they��appear���n��the��nat�onal��curr�culum.

The��natural��sc�ences��are��cons�dered��to��be��able��to��develop��of��such��competenc�es,��g�ven�� the�� fact�� that��“sc�ence�� �s��approached��as��an��exper�ent�al�� learn�ng��process”.��Among��the��curr�cular��object�ves���n��Area��A,��we��note:��“mult�d�sc�pl�nary��correlat�on��w�th��other�� sc�ences�� to��s�multaneously��d�scover�� the��common��areas��and��us[e]��an��adequate�� mathemat�cal�� formal�zat�on”,�� “develop�ng�� learn�ng�� sequences�� that��st�mulate��cur�os�ty��and��allows�� �nvest�gat�ve��act�v�t�es”,��“sh�ft�ng�� the��focus��on�� to��procedural��learn�ng��and��bu�ld�ng��personal��strateg�es��to��explore��and���nvest�gate”.

Subjects�� �n��curr�cular��area��B��are��spec�f�cally�� requ�red�� to��“develop��solv�ng��problems��and��dec�s�on-mak�ng��sk�lls”,��and��Geography�� �s�� requ�red�� to��“carry��out��learn�ng��act�v�t�es��based��on��a��d�rect��observat�on��of�� the��env�ronment”.��Another��spec�f�c��request���s��ment�oned��when��talk�ng��about��subjects���n��curr�cular��area��D,��wh�ch���s��develop�ng��commun�cat�on��sk�lls.

The��deta�led��analys�s��of��the��school��programmes��h�ghl�ghts���nterest�ng��aspects.��For�� the��natural��sc�ences��curr�cular��area�� there��are��many��generously��set��object�ves��l�ke�� ‘develop�ng��competenc�es��and��values�� spec�f�c�� to�� susta�nable��development��educat�on’.��For�� subjects�� l�ke��Environment�� and��Natural Sciences,�� stud�ed�� �n��pr�mary��school,��1st��–��2nd��grade,��and��3rd��–��4th��grade,�� there��are��object�ves��to��develop��competenc�es��such��as:��

o�� Develop�ng��a��pos�t�ve��att�tude�� to�� the��env�ronment�� through�� st�mulat�ng���nterest�� �n��ma�nta�n�ng��a��balanced��env�ronment��and��pract�c�ng��car�ng��and��protect�ng��sk�lls,��accord�ng��to��element��A��(SV��1��–��Act�ng��w�th��respons�b�l�ty��locally��and��globally).

o�� Invest�gat�on�� and�� �nterpretat�on��of�� the�� �nterconnect�ons�� �n�� and��among��b�olog�cal,�� phys�cal�� and�� chem�cal�� systems,�� accord�ng�� to�� elements��SV��4��–��Understand�ng��complex�ty/��apply�ng��system�c�� th�nk�ng��and��SV��7��–��Understand�ng��relat�onsh�ps��across��d�sc�pl�nes.

o�� Encourag�ng��students�� to�� take��on��respons�b�l�t�es��and��cooperate,��accord�ng��to��element��SV��1-2,��Act�ng��w�th��respons�b�l�ty�� locally��and��globally,��Act�ng��w�th��respect��to��others,��but��also��SV��13��–��Part�c�pat�on���n��democrat�c��dec�s�on-mak�ng.

o�� Know�ng,��understand�ng��and��us�ng��commun�cat�on-spec�f�c��terms���n��order��to��descr�be��observed��phenomena���n��the��env�ronment,��accord�ng��to��element��SV��20��–��Commun�cat�on��and��understand�ng��graphs��and��symbols.

Subsequently,��these��competenc�es��and��values��are��strengthened��by��study�ng��each��of��the��natural��sc�ences��–��phys�cs,��chem�stry,��b�ology��–���n��secondary��educat�on.��For��Biology (2005),��the��best��examples��of��such��object�ves��are:��

o�� Develop�ng��and���mplement�ng��env�ronmental��projectso�� Everyday��use��of��vegetal��b�ology��knowledgeo�� Transferr�ng��exper�mental��results���n��an�mal��growth��and��care��act�v�t�eso�� Ident�fy�ng��the��components��of��an��ecosystemo�� Compar�ng��natural��and��entrop�c��systemso�� Protect�ng�� and��preserv�ng�� the�� env�ronment,�� susta�nable��development,��

rat�onal��explo�tat�on��of�� the��natural�� resources,�� select�ve��waste��collect�on,��

168 ��The��Ethos��of��Susta�nable��Development��and��...����/����Dan�ela��DUMITRU����and��Constant�n��STOENESCU������������169

natural��parks��and��reservat�onso�� Show�ng��an��ecolog�cal��way��of��th�nk�ng���n��mak�ng��dec�s�onso�� Understand�ng��the��consequences��of�� the�r��own��behav�our�� �n��relat�on��to�� the��

env�ronment

For��Physics (2005),��we��note��the��follow�ng��competenc�es:��

o�� Ut�l�s�ng��safety��at��work��for��themselves,��for��the��other��and��the��env�ronmento�� Know�ng��and��understand�ng��phys�cal��phenomena,��term�nology��and��concepts,��

laws��and��spec�f�c��work�ng��methods,��expla�n�ng�� the��operat�on��and��use��of��technology��products��encountered���n��everyday��l�fe

o�� Trust���n��sc�ent�f�cally��truths��and��the�r��cr�t�cal��appra�salo�� Commun�cat�on��us�ng��sc�ent�f�c��languageo�� Ut�l�sat�on��of��systemat�c��methods��when���nterpret�ng��exper�mental��datao�� Graph�c��representat�on��of��phys�cal��data��var�at�ono�� Us�ng��elementary��work�ng��methods��w�th��var�ous���nstruments��to��measure��and��

determ�ne��quant�t�es.

For�� the�� 5th�� grade�� Physics�� handbook�� we�� can�� say�� that�� the�� ma�n�� group�� of��competenc�es���s��represented��by��SV��15��–��17:��observ�ng��qual�tat�ve��aspects,��measur�ng��quant�tat�ve��d�mens�ons,��and���nference��based��on��observ�ng��element.��For��each��one��of��these��research��phenomena,��a��gradual��approach��of��l�nk�ng��the��observat�onal��and��theoret�cal�� levels�� �s��be�ng��proposed��wh�ch��respects�� the��rules��based��on��qual�tat�ve��observat�on��of��phys�cal��phenomena��and��relevant��quant�tat�ve��measurements;��these���n��turn,��create��the��prem�ses��of���nference��based��on��observ�ng��the��general��character�st�cs��of��the��phenomenon.��For��example,�� through��elementary��observat�on��of��Arch�medes’��law,��the��hydrostat�c��phenomena��can��be���nferred.

We��can��f�nd��s�m�lar��or��equ�valent��statements�� �n�� the��Chem�stry��handbook,�� to��wh�ch��a��spec�f�c��requ�rement���s��added,��namely,��d�st�ngu�sh�ng��phys�cal��phenomena��from��chem�cal��phenomena,��phys�cal��propert�es��from��chem�cal��propert�es��and��pure��substances��from��m�xtures.

For�� curr�cular�� area��B��we��not�ce�� that,�� generally,�� the��object�ves�� from�� the��nat�onal��curr�culum��are��reproduced���n��most��of��the��subject��programmes,��w�th��small��spec�f�c��add�t�ons.��For��History, we��refer��to��“non-v�olent��confl�ct��resolut�on”,��wh�ch��corresponds��to��SV��14��–��Negot�at�on��and��consensus��bu�ld�ng��and��also��“develop�ng��prospect�ve�� th�nk�ng�� through��understand�ng��h�story’s�� role�� �n��our�� l�fe�� and��as��a��pred�ct�ve��factor”,��accord�ng��to��SV��5��–��Futures-th�nk�ng��and��SV��6��–��Plann�ng��and��manag�ng��change��elements.��The��Geography��programme��st�pulates��develop�ng��competenc�es��such��as��SV��15��–��18��wh�ch���nclude��“observ�ng��qual�tat�ve,��measur�ng��quant�tat�ve,���nferr�ng��based��on��observat�on,��class�fy�ng,��start�ng��from��observ�ng��the��env�ronment��and��proper��knowledge��about��d�fferent��taxonom�es”.

A�� f�nal��observat�on��about�� the��exerc�ses�� �n�� the�� stud�ed��handbooks�� �s�� that,��generally��speak�ng,��compared��to�� the��handbooks��from��over�� ten��years��ago,��we��can��not�ce��an�� �mprovement�� �n��graph�cs��and��also�� �n�� the��contents��of�� the��exerc�ses�� that��connect�� them��w�th��the��competenc�es’��development��process.��Yet,��for��descr�pt�ve��or��taxonom�c��subjects��such��as��Botany,��Zoology,��Anatomy,��Phys�ology��or��Geography,��

there��st�ll���s��a��h�gh��share��of��rout�ne��exerc�ses,��based��on��memor�zat�on.For��example�� �n�� the��Environment��handbook,��for�� the��“Natural��and��processed��

mater�als”��lesson��an���mage��of��a��sheepfold���s��shown��and��students��are��asked��to��answer��a��few��quest�ons:��

•�� Name��the��elements��that��you��can��f�nd���n��nature��wh�ch��are��not��transformed��by��humans.

•�� Wh�ch��objects��are��made��by��humans?•�� What��can��we��obta�n��from��sheep��m�lk?��What��about��the�r��wool?•�� What��objects��are��made��from��wood?

The��natural��resources��top�c���s���ntroduced��w�th��a��r�ddle:��rotten��trees/��blackened���n��the��ground/��removed��from��the��m�ne/��burned���n��the��oven.

In��the��5th��grade��Geography��handbook��for��the��“earth��cl�mate��and��cl�mat�c��areas”��lesson,��the��follow�ng��quest�ons��are��asked��(p.��67):��

•�� What���s��the��d�fference��between��weather��and��cl�mate?��Wh�ch��are��the��cl�mat�c��factors?

•�� What�� types��of��cl�mate��can��we��f�nd�� �n�� the��warm��areas?��Show��them��on��a��phys�cal��world��map.

•�� Descr�be�� the�� types�� of�� cl�mate�� �n�� the�� temperate�� areas�� and�� map�� the�r��d�str�but�on���n��the��phys�cal��world.

•�� Why���s���t��that���n��the��polar��areas��the��temperatures��are��very��low?•�� What��k�nd��of��connect�ons��are�� there��among��temperature,��prec�p�tat�on��and��

alt�tude?•�� Look��at��the���mages��and���dent�fy��the��cl�mat�c��areas.

Th�s��group��of��exerc�ses���s��the��best��way��to��show��how��to��reduce��the��use��of��memory��for��homework.��Although��needed,��the���nformat�on���s��recalled���n��a��way��that��fac�l�tates��us�ng��other��competenc�es.

Th�ngs��are��s�m�lar��when��the��8th��grade��Physics��handbook���s��d�scussed.��Cons�der��the��“nuclear��energy”��lesson.��Here��are��a��few��relevant��quest�ons��–���ssues��(p.��163):��

•�� Compare��the��energy��cha�ns��of��d�fferent��electr�c��energy-produc�ng��stat�ons.•�� Descr�be��some��of��the��energy��losses���n��a��nuclear��stat�on.•�� Wh�ch��are�� the��advantages��of��nuclear��stat�ons,��compared�� to��steam��power��

stat�ons��or��hydroelectr�c��power��stat�ons?•�� What��k�nd��of��react�on��happens���n��a��nuclear��reactor?•�� Why��does�� the��uran�um,��used�� �n��some��of�� the��nuclear�� reactors,��need�� to��be��

enr�ched?•�� How���s��nuclear��fuel��arranged?��Try��to��expla�n��th�s��form.

Conclusions-and-recommendations

Th�s�� research,�� ma�nly�� through�� �ts�� methodology,�� allows�� us�� to�� shape�� general��conclus�ons��about��the��presence��of��susta�nable��development��educat�on���n��the��nat�onal��

170 ��The��Ethos��of��Susta�nable��Development��and��...����/����Dan�ela��DUMITRU����and��Constant�n��STOENESCU������������171

curr�culum���n��Roman�a��and���n��the��programmes��of��var�ous��subjects���n��pr�mary��and��secondary��school��(1st-8th��grade).

The��general�� conclus�on�� �s�� that�� susta�nable��development�� educat�on�� �s��not��expl�c�tly��ment�oned�� �n�� the��current��nat�onal��curr�culum��as��a��spec�f�c��educat�onal��object�ve.�� Susta�nable�� development�� educat�on�� elements�� do�� appear�� �n�� some��programmes,��but��not��systemat�cally��and��always��w�thout��expl�c�tly��assum�ng��th�s���s��an��educat�onal��object�ve.

The��cogn�t�ve��contents��spec�f�c��to��susta�nable��development��educat�on,��namely,��the��soc�o-cultural,��the��env�ronmental��and��the��econom�c,��are��d�fferently��covered��w�th��the��env�ronment��hav�ng��the��largest��share��of��coverage.��Perhaps��th�s��s�tuat�on��can��be��expla�ned��by��the��m�staken��bel�ef�� that��env�ronmental��problems��are��equ�valent�� to��a��much��broader��theme��–��susta�nable��development.

We��cons�der�� that��an���mprovement��of��Roman�a’s��s�tuat�on��regard�ng��the��ESD��can��be��made��only���f��coherent��act�on���s��undertaken��on��the��follow�ng��four��levels:��

1.�� System analysis, monitoring and evaluation.��It���s��necessary��to��cont�nue��the��analys�s��of��the��educat�onal��system,��us�ng��the��pattern��offered���n��th�s��report,��so��that��a��strateg�c��dec�s�on��about��susta�nable��development��educat�on��can��be��adopted.��For��th�s��to��occur,��a��deta�led��analys�s��of��the��school��programmes��and��a��system��assessment��from��the��perspect�ve��of��ava�lable��human��resources���s��needed.

2.�� Developing the national curriculum.��Th�s��object�ve��can��be��ach�eved��by���nclud�ng��susta�nable-��development��spec�f�c��components�� �n�� the��nat�onal��curr�culum.��The��current��nat�onal��curr�culum���s��already��obsolete��and��reflects��a��certa�n��h�stor�cal��context,��so��a��new��one���s��a��pr�or�ty.

3.�� Institutional development and educational management . �� The��modern�zat�on��of��the��educat�onal��system��must��be��done��by��mak�ng��m�n�ster�al��dec�s�ons,�� for��subord�nate�� �nst�tut�ons,�� �nclud�ng��school�� �nspectorates��or��other��structures.��In��fact,��these���nst�tut�ons��themselves��need��to��be��modern�zed��and�� to�� �ncrease�� the�r��potent�al��by��ass�m�lat�ng��susta�nable��development��values��and��synchron�z�ng��them��w�th��what��occurs���n��developed��countr�es.

4.�� Professional development in the education system.��Nowadays,�� �n�� the��educat�onal��system��tra�n�ng��act�v�t�es��are��undertaken��accord�ng��to��var�ous��educat�onal��pr�or�t�es,��dec�ded��at��an��off�c�al�� level��or��by�� the�� labor��market.��An��educat�onal��prov�s�on��that��promotes��susta�nable��development��educat�on���s��also��necessary,��and��assum�ng�� the��nat�onal��curr�culum��w�ll�� �mprove,��a��Training of Trainers��module��w�ll��become��mandatory.

A��comparat�ve��assessment��of�� the��var�ous��educat�onal�� systems�� reveals�� that��countr�es��w�th��a��h�gh��l�v�ng��standard��are��the��ones��that��g�ve��susta�nable��development��educat�on��an���mportant��role��and��that�� there�� �s��a��connect�on��between��l�fe��standards��and��educat�on.��We��bel�eve��that��susta�nable��development��depends��on��educat�on,��so���nvest�ng���n��educat�on��leads��to��econom�c��growth.��Also,��educat�on��can��add��the��soc�al��and��env�ronmental��d�mens�on��of��susta�nab�l�ty��to��econom�c��growth��and��to��the��market��economy.

References

Corega��C.,��Haralamb��D.,��Talpalaru��Seryl.��2001.��Fizică. Manual pentru clasa a VIII-a, Bucureşti, Ed�tura��Teora.

Domazet,�� M.,�� Dum�tru,�� D.,�� Jurko,�� L.,�� K.�� Petersson.�� 2011.�� Education for Sustainable Development Partnership Initiative (EsdPI) Research Documentation.��www.enjo�ned.net/research.

G�bson,��R.��B.,��Hassan,��S.,��Holtz,��S.,��Tansey,��J,��Wh�telaw,��G.��2005. Sustainability Assessment: Criteria, Processes and Applications.��London;��Sterl�ng,��VA,��Earthscan.

Ionaşcu J., Dumitru D. 2010. Geografie. Manual pentru clasa a V-a, Bucureşti, Editura Didactică şi Pedagogică.

Kastens��K.��A.��&��Turr�n��M.��2006.��“To��What��Extent��Should��Human/Env�ronment��Interact�ons��be���ncluded���n��Sc�ence��Educat�on?”,��Journal of Geoscience Education,��v.54.��n.3.

Lancour��K.��L.,��Process��Sk�lls��for��L�fe��Sc�ence��http://www.tufts.edu/as/wr�ght_center/products/sc�_olymp�ad/pslsl_tra�n�ng_hammond.pdf.

M�n�stry��of��Educat�on.��1998.��Nat�onal��Curr�culum��Counc�l.��Curriculum naţional pentru învăţământul obligatoriu. Cadru de referinţă. Bucureşti, http://www.edu.ro/�ndex.php/art�cles/c877/��(accesed��January��15,��2011).

– 2003. National Curriculum Council. Programă şcolară. Cunoaşterea mediului, clasele I şi a II-a, Bucureşti http://www.curr�culum2009.edu.ro/��(accesed��January��15,��2011).

– 2004. National Curriculum Council. Programă şcolară. Ştiinţe ale naturii, clasa a III-a, Bucureşti, http://www.curr�culum2009.edu.ro/��(accesed��January��15,��2011).

– 2005. National Curriculum Council. Programă şcolară. Ştiinţe ale naturii, clasa a IV-a, Bucureşti, http://www.curr�culum2009.edu.ro/��(accesed��January��15,��2011).

– 2005. National Curriculum Council. Programă şcolară. Geografie, clasa a IV-a, Bucureşti, http://www.curr�culum2009.edu.ro/��(accesed��January��15,��2011).

– 2005. National Curriculum Council. Programă şcolară. Istorie, clasa a IV-a, Bucureşti, http://www.curr�culum2009.edu.ro/��(accesed��January��15,��2011).

– 2009. National Curriculum Council. Programă şcolară. Geografie, clasele V-VIII, Bucureşti, http://www.curr�culum2009.edu.ro/��(accesed��January��15,��2011).

– 2009. National Curriculum Council.Programă şcolară. Istorie, clasele V-VIII, Bucureşti, http://www.curr�culum2009.edu.ro/��(accesed��January��15,��2011).

– 2009. National Curriculum Council. Programă şcolară, Biologie, clasele V-VIII, Bucureşti, http://www.curr�culum2009.edu.ro/��(accesed��January��15,��2011).

– 2009. National Curriculum Council. Programă şcolară. Fizică, clasele VI-VIII, Bucureşti. http://www.curr�culum2009.edu.ro/��(accesed��January��15,��2011).

– 2009. National Curriculum Council. Programă şcolară. Chimie, clasele VII-VIII, Bucureşti. http://www.curr�culum2009.edu.ro/��(accesed��January��15,��2011).

Rockström,��J.,��Steffen,��W.,��Noone,��K.,��Persson,��A.,��Chapl�n,��F.S.��2009.�� Inst�tute��of��Arct�c��B�ology��et��al.��“A��safe��operat�ng��space��for��human�ty”��Nature��461:��472-475.

T�llbury,��D.��2007.��“Learn�ng��based��change��for��susta�nab�l�ty:��Perspect�ves��and��pathways”.��In��A.��E.��J.��Wals��(ed.)��Social learning towards a sustainable world.��Wagen�ngen:��Wagen�ngen��Academ�c��Publ�shers,��pp.��117-132.

UNESCO,��Sect�on�� for��DESD��Coord�nat�on.��2009.��Review of Contexts and Structures for Education for Sustainable Development 2009,��Par�s:��UNESCO.

172 ��The��Ethos��of��Susta�nable��Development��and��...����/����Dan�ela��DUMITRU����and��Constant�n��STOENESCU������������173

WCED��1987.��“World��Comm�ss�on��on��Env�ronment��and��Development”;��G.H.��Brundtland,��cha�r,��Our��Common��Future.��Oxford/New��York,��Oxford��Un�vers�ty��Press.

Weaver,��P.��M.,��Rotmans,��J.��2006.��“Integrated��Susta�nab�l�ty��Assessment.��What?��Why?��How?”��MATISSE Working Papers No 1.��J.��Jäger,��Weaver,��P.M.��No10/2006:��22.

W�k�ped�a��contr�butors,��Susta�nable��development.�� In��Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia,��http://en.w�k�ped�a.org/w/�ndex.php?t�tle=Susta�nable_development&old�d=411464216��(accessed��February��4,��2011).

CONTENT LIST

Below���s��a��l�st��of��content��elements��that��map��and��extract��curr�cular��content��related��to��ESD.��For��ease��of��use��the��l�st���s��d�v�ded���nto��several��sect�ons,��pr�mar�ly���nto��cogn�t�ve��content�� (knowledge,�� facts,�� learn�ng)��and��SV��(sk�ll��development,�� competences;��understand�ng,��acqu�r�ng��and��shar�ng��values).

I COGNITIVE CONTENT

I-A Social-Cultural elements

1 Human��r�ghtsC�v�l��and��pol�t�cal��r�ghts,��econom�c;��soc�al��and��cultural��r�ghts;��env�ronmental��r�ghts��(r�ght��for��clean��env�ronment)���s��currently��debated.

2 Peace��and��human��secur�ty

References��to��benef�ts��and��mechan�sms��of��global��peace,��and��secur�ng��"freedom��from��want"��and��"freedom��from��fear"��for��all��persons.

3 Gender��equal�ty In��employment,��career��and��salary;���n��pol�t�cal��and��soc�al��r�ghts.��

4Cultural��d�vers�ty��and���ntercultural��understand�ng

Tolerance��to��other��values��and��percept�ons.

5 Health Human��health,��health��problems,��env�ronmental��health,��age�ng.��

6 New��forms��of��governance��New��ways��to��manage��govern�ng��of��goods��and��commun�t�es,��e.g.��env�ronmental��governance��(env�ronmental��aspects��cons�dered���n��dec�s�on-mak�ng);��democrat�c��dec�s�on-mak�ng��(transparent,���nvolv�ng��stakeholders).��

I-B Environmental elements

1 Natural��resources M�nerals,��forest,��land,��so�l��etc��(amount,��locat�on,��qual�ty).

2 Water Fresh��water,��mar�ne��water,��dr�nk�ng��water��(locat�on,��qual�ty).

3 A�r Amb�ent��a�r��(qual�ty).

4 So�l Agr�cultural��so�l,��forest��so�l��(qual�ty);��so�l��eros�on��processes.��

5 Energy Foss�l��fuel-based��energy,��renewable��energy��(resources,��dependence��on��these��sources).

6 Agr�cultureRole��of��agr�culture��(food,��employment);��pos�t�on��of��agr�culture��w�th�n��a��w�der��econom�cs��system;��forms��of��agr�culture��(�ndustr�al,��small��scale,��organ�c,��susta�nable��etc.)

7 B�od�vers�ty Spec�es��and��hab�tats��(ecosystems)��-��d�vers�ty,��qual�ty,��loss.

8 Cl�mate��change Global��phenomenon;��reasons��and��act�ons��(m�t�gat�on,��adaptat�on).��

9 Rural��development V�llages,��commun�t�es��-��role,��age��rat�o,��employment;��pos�t�on��w�th�n��w�der��soc�ety,��econom�c��base.��

10 Urban�zat�on��(urban��footpr�nt;��urban��sprawl)

C�t�es/towns��-��s�ze,��populat�on,��dynam�cs,��c�ty��plann�ng,���nc��transport��plann�ng;���mpact��on��the��landscape��and��w�der��env�ronment;��qual�ty��of��l�fe.

11 Natural��d�sasters e.g.��floods,��droughts,��volcano��erupt�ons,��tsunam�s,��extreme��weather��events.��

12 Pollut�on A�r��pollut�on,��water��pollut�on,��so�l��pollut�on;��chem�cal,��b�olog�cal,��phys�cal;��system�c��or��acc�dental.

13 Human��be�ngs��(as��l�v�ng��organ�sms)

Anatomy��and��phys�ology��of��human��be�ng��as��a��l�v�ng��organ�sm;��human��be�ng��as��a��one��of��the��l�v�ng��organ�sms���n��ecosystem/b�osphere.

14 Waste Sol�d��waste,��l�qu�d��waste,��waste��management;��recycl�ng.��

I-C Economic elements

1 PovertyPopulat�on��l�v�ng��below��average��l�v�ng��standards;��san�tat�on��problems,��food��shortage,��health��care��def�c�ency,��ava�lab�l�ty��of��educat�on;��relat�on��to��natural��resources��and��econom�cs.��

2 Planetary��boundar�es Planet��Earth��has��l�m�ted��resources��for��human��consumpt�on��and��em�ss�on��m�t�gat�on��(or��absorpt�on��back���nto��b�olog�cal��cycle).��

3Corporate��soc�al��respons�b�l�ty��and��accountab�l�ty

Compan�es��work��out��and���mplement��certa�n��plans��on��respons�ble��resource��use,��a��pos�t�ve���mpact��through���ts��act�v�t�es��on��the��env�ronment,��consumers,��employees,��commun�t�es,��stakeholders��and��all��other��members��of��the��publ�c��sphere.��

4 Market��economy An��econom�c��model;���ts��role���n��today's��global��soc�ety.

5 Product�on��and/or��consumpt�on��

Elements��of��contemporary��market��economy,��role��of��compan�es,��role��of��customers;��cultural��effects,��env�ronmental��effects,��examples��from��students'��everyday��l�fe.��

6 Susta�nab�l�ty,��susta�nable��development

Susta�nable��development���s��development��that��meets��the��needs��of��the��present��w�thout��comprom�s�ng��the��ab�l�ty��of��future��generat�ons��to��meet��the�r��own��needs.��

174 ��The��Ethos��of��Susta�nable��Development��and��...����/����Dan�ela��DUMITRU����and��Constant�n��STOENESCU������������175

II SKILLS AND VALUES CONTENT

1 Act�ng��w�th��respons�b�l�ty��locally��and��globally ��

2 Act�ng��w�th��respect��to��others

In��th�s��case��'others'��may���nclude��other��people,��other��commun�t�es��(anthropocentr�c)��or��other��be�ngs��(b�ocentr�c).��

3 Cr�t�cal��reflect�ve��th�nk�ng ��

4Understand�ng��complex�ty��/��apply�ng��system�c��th�nk�ng

Understand�ng��how��th�ngs���nfluence��one��another��w�th�n��a��whole,��for��example���n��ecosystems��where��a�r,��water,��movement,��plants��and��an�mals��comb�ne��to��a��complex��effect.��

5 Futures-th�nk�ng

Develop�ng��reason�ng��about��poss�ble,��probable��and��preferable��futures,��understand�ng��worldv�ews��and��myths��that��underl�e��them.��Most��clearly��ev�dent���n��project�ng��from��study��of��h�story���nto��what���s��l�kely��to��cont�nue,��what���s��l�kely��to��change��and��what���s��ent�rely��novel.��Based��on��spott�ng��patterns���n��past��and��present.��

6 Plann�ng��and��manag�ng��change ��

7Understand�ng���nterrelat�onsh�ps��across��d�sc�pl�nes

Be�ng��taught��how��top�cs��and��processes��from��d�fferent��sc�ent�f�c��and��art�st�c��d�sc�pl�nes��and��subjects��overlap,��how���nd�v�dual���ssues��may��be��v�ewed��from��several��d�sc�pl�nes,��e.g.��phys�cs��and��econom�cs.��

8Apply�ng��learn�ng���n��a��var�ety��of��l�fe-w�de��contents

Be�ng���nstructed���n��how��to��apply��the��curr�cular��knowledge���n��everyday��l�fe,��but��also��bas�c��pedagog�c���nstruct�ons��how��to��learn��from��everyday��s�tuat�ons��(tr�al��and��error��heur�st�c).��

9Dec�s�on-mak�ng,���nclud�ng���n��uncerta�n��s�tuat�ons

Be�ng��taught��about��the��process��of��dec�s�on-mak�ng,���nd�v�dually,��w�th�n��groups��and��whole��soc�et�es.��Develop�ng��a��sk�ll��of��dec�s�on-mak�ng���n��s�tuat�ons��where��there���s��no��predeterm�ned��r�ght��outcome.��

10 Deal�ng��w�th��cr�s�s��and��r�sks

Learn�ng��about��responses��to��cr�ses��and��about��assess�ng��var�ous��r�sks���n��the��env�ronment.��Tra�n�ng���n��manag�ng��one's��own��response��to��cr�ses.��

11 Ab�l�ty��to���dent�fy��and��clar�fy��values

Develop�ng��sk�lls���n��clar�fy�ng��one's��own��and��others'��values,��as��well��as���dent�fy�ng��values��that��l�e��beh�nd��att�tudes��and��statements.��

12 Ident�fy�ng��stakeholders��and��the�r���nterests

Be�ng��able��to��d�scern��who��stands��beh�nd��certa�n��statements��and��att�tudes��and��what��the�r���nterests��m�ght��be.��Also��be�ng��able��to��observe��an���ssue��from��the��mult�ple��perspect�ves��of��d�fferent��stakeholders��and��the�r���nterests���n���t.��

13Part�c�pat�on���n��democrat�c��dec�s�on-mak�ng

Access��to���nformat�on,��part�c�pat�on���n��dec�s�on-mak�ng��(on��plans��and��perm�ts),��access��to��just�ce.

14 Negot�at�ng��and��consensus��bu�ld�ng Resolv�ng��confl�cts��(for��example).��

15 Observ�ng��-��qual�tat�vePart��of��bas�c��sc�ence��process��sk�lls:��prov�d�ng��descr�pt�ons��of��the��object��of���nterest��based��on���nformat�on��gather�ng��us�ng��one's��senses.��

16 Measur�ng��-��quant�tat�vePart��of��bas�c��sc�ence��process��sk�lls:��us�ng��standard��measures��or��est�mat�ons��to��descr�be��spec�f�c��d�mens�ons��of��objects��of���nterest.��

17 Inferr�ng��-��based��on��observat�on

Part��of��bas�c��sc�ence��process��sk�lls:��formulat�ng��assumpt�ons��or��poss�ble��explanat�ons��based��upon��observat�ons.��

18 Class�fy�ngPart��of��bas�c��sc�ence��process��sk�lls:��group�ng��or��order�ng��objects��or��events���nto��categor�es��based��upon��character�st�cs��or��def�ned��cr�ter�a.��

19 Pred�ct�ng Part��of��bas�c��sc�ence��process��sk�lls:��guess�ng��the��most��l�kely��outcome��of��a��future��event��based��upon��a��pattern��of��ev�dence.��

20Commun�cat�on��and��understand�ng��graphs��and��symbols

Part��of��bas�c��sc�ence��process��sk�lls:��us�ng��age-appropr�ate��sc�ent�f�c��and��mathemat�cal��symbol�c��language��and��graphs.��

21 Man�pulat�ng��mathemat�cal��rat�os��

Mathemat�cal��rat�os��(�nclud�ng��equat�ons��and���nequal�t�es)��are��representat�on��of��relat�onsh�ps��wh�ch���n��turn���nd�cate��dependency.��Dependency��concerns��the��fact��that��propert�es��and��changes��of��certa�n��mathemat�cal��objects��may��depend��on��or���nfluence��propert�es��and��changes��of��other��mathemat�cal��objects.��

176 �� Apply�ng��Tak�ng��Clauses��Analys�s...����/����Emanuel-M�ha�l��SOCACIU������������177

Applying Taking Clauses Analysis to Communist Nationalization of Houses in Romania�

Emanuel-M�ha�l��SOCACIU

The��ma�n��object�ve��of�� th�s��paper�� �s�� to�� analyse�� the��commun�st��nat�onal�zat�on��of��houses�� �n��Roman�a��w�th�n�� the�� theoret�cal�� framework��prov�ded��by��class�cal��d�scuss�ons��of��the��tak�ngs��clauses���n��legal��ph�losophy.��The��f�rst��thes�s��defended��here���s��that��nat�onal�zat�on��should��be��cons�dered��as��a��tak�ng,��rather��than��a��regulat�on.��A��second��argument��tr�es��to��support�� the��thes�s�� that�� the��nat�onal�zat�on��decree��v�olates��the��tak�ng��clause��of��the��1948��commun�st��const�tut�on��of��Roman�a,���n��any��reasonable��moral��and��legal���nterpretat�on��of���t.

The-legal-framework-of-nationalization

For��the��commun�st��doctr�ne,��the��r�ghts��to��pr�vate��property,��along��w�th��the�r��holders,��were��not��only��the��theoret�cal��source��of��all��soc�al��and��moral��ev�ls,��but��also��the��ma�n��enem�es���n��the��f�rst��pol�t�cal��battles��a�med��towards��bu�ld�ng��the��commun�st��soc�ety.��Th�s���dea��was��expl�c�tly��stated��by��the��found�ng��fathers��of��commun�sm:��“the��theory��of�� the��Commun�st��may��be��summed��up���n��the��s�ngle��sentence:��abolition of private property”.2

After�� the�r��pol�t�cal��power��had��been��acqu�red��and��secured,��one��of�� the��ma�n��object�ves��for��Roman�an��commun�sts��was�� to��shape�� the��const�tut�onal�� framework��that��would��make��ach�ev�ng�� th�s��goal��poss�ble.��The��outcome��of�� th�s��effort��was��the��Const�tut�on��of�� the��People’s��Republ�c��of��Roman�a,��wr�tten�� �n��1948��(the��f�rst��Roman�an��commun�st��const�tut�on).��The��const�tut�onal��norms��regard�ng��pr�vate��property��do��not��seem��too��d�fferent�� from��those��of��democrat�c��reg�mes,��at�� least�� �n��the�r��letter.��For��example,��Art�cle��5��states��that���n��the��People’s��Republ�c��of��Roman�a,��“the��means��of��product�on��belong��to�� the��State,��as��publ�c��goods,��or�� to��co-operat�ve��organ�zat�ons,��or�� to��pr�vate��agents,�� �nd�v�duals��or�� f�rms”.3��Moreover,��Art�cle��8��acknowledges�� the��fact�� that:��“the��r�ghts�� to��pr�vate��property��and�� to�� �nher�tance��are��recogn�zed��and��guaranteed��by��law.��Pr�vate��property,��acqu�red��by��work��and��sav�ngs,���s��part�cularly��protected”;��wh�le��Art�cle��10��determ�nes��the��const�tut�onal��framework��

1 This paper was published in Romanian as “Despre naţionalizarea comunistă a imobilelor şi clauzele constituţionale ale exproprierilor”, in Sfera Politicii,��no.��126-127��(http://www.sferapol�t�c��.ro/sfera/126-127/art04-socac�u.html).��The�� translat�on�� �nto��Engl�sh��was��f�rst��made��by��my��colleague��Oana��Zamf�rache��(a��strenuous��effort��for��wh�ch��I��am��grateful)��and��then��rev�sed��by��me.

��2�� Karl��Marx��and��Fr�edr�ch��Engels��(1908),��Manifesto of the Communist Party,��New��York:��Labor��News��Co,��p.��498.

��3�� The��Const�tut�on��of��the��People’s��Republ�c��of��Roman�a,��publ�shed���n��Mon�torul��Of�c�al��nr.��87��bis, April 13th, 1948. Apud. Flavius Baias, Bogdan Dumitrache şi Marian Nicolae (2001), Regimul juridic al imobilelor preluate abuziv, Vol. II: Legislaţie şi jurisprudenţă (The Legal Status of Abusively Taken Houses, vol II: Law and Jurisprudence), Bucureşti: Rosetti, p. 7.

of��tak�ngs:��“Tak�ngs��are��allowed��so��that��publ�c��ut�l�ty���s��ach�eved,��on��the��bas�s��of��law��and��w�th��a��fa�r��compensat�on,��establ�shed��by��the��jud�c�ary”.4��These��three��art�cles��determ�ne,�� �n���ts��ma�n��conf�gurat�on,�� the��const�tut�onal��system��of��reference��for��the��success�ve��tak�ngs��laws��enacted��between��1948��and��1951,��before��the��abrogat�on��of��the��1948��Const�tut�on��(through��the��establ�shment��of��a��new��const�tut�onal��document���n��1952).5

Among��all��nat�onal�zat�on�� laws,�� �t�� �s�� the��Decree��no.��92/1950�� that��prov�des��the��essent�al��mater�al��for��our��d�scuss�on.6��Its���mportance��res�des���n��the��fact��that��the��major�ty��of�� the��houses’�� tak�ngs��were��made��poss�ble��by��th�s��decree.��Actually,��most��of��the��rect�f�cat�ons��appl�ed��after��the��fall��of��the��commun�st��reg�me���n��Roman�a��were��meant��to��correct��the��unfa�r��state��of��affa�rs��wh�ch��resulted��from���ts��appl�cat�on.7��The��f�rst��art�cle��of��th�s��decree��establ�shes��that:��“for��the��consol�dat�on��and��development��of��the��soc�al�st��sector���n��People’s��Republ�c��of��Roman�a”,��“for��a��better��management��of��the��hous�ng��pool,��doomed��to��degradat�on��caused��by��bourgeo�s��sabotage��[...]”��and��“to��take��away��an���mportant��means��of��explo�tat�on��from��the��hands��of��the��explo�ters��“the��follow�ng��types��of��bu�ld�ngs��were��to��be��nat�onal�zed:��

1)��The��bu�ld�ngs��owned��by��former���ndustr�al�sts,��landlords,��bankers,��traders��and��other��elements��of��the��bourgeo�s�e.

2)��The��bu�ld�ngs��owned��by��the��explo�ters��of��the��hous�ng��pool.8

3)��The��hotels,��along��w�th��the�r��ent�re���nventory.4)��The�� bu�ld�ngs�� under�� construct�on,�� bu�lt�� for�� explo�tat�on,�� wh�ch�� were��

abandoned��by��the�r��owners,��along��w�th��construct�on��mater�als,��wherever��the��depos�ts��m�ght��be.

5)��The��bu�ld�ngs,��meant�� for��explo�tat�on,��damaged��or��destroyed��by��war��or��

��4�� Idem, p. 8.��Compare��w�th��the��tak�ngs��clause��of��the��US��Const�tut�on,��The��F�fth��Amendment:��“[...]��nor��shall��pr�vate��property��be��taken��for��publ�c��use,��w�thout��just��compensat�on”��or��w�th��the��same��clause���n��the��contemporary��Const�tut�on��of��Roman�a:��“Nobody��can��be��expropr�ated��except��for��a��publ�c���nterest,��establ�shed��by��law��and��rece�v�ng��pr�or��and��just��compensat�on”.��(art.��44,��al�gn.3).

��5�� For��an��analys�s��of�� the��Roman�an��Const�tut�ons�� �n�� the��commun�st�� reg�me,�� see��Eleodor��Focşeneanu (1992), Istoria Constituţională a României: 1859-1991 (The Constitutional History of Romania: 1859-1991), Bucureşti: Humanitas, especially chapter VIII.

��6�� The��92/1950��Decree�� for�� the��nat�onal�zat�on��of�� some��bu�ld�ngs,��publ�shed�� �n��Bulet�nul��Of�c�al��no.��36,��Apr�l��20th,��1950.��The��document�� �s��c�ted�� �n��full�� length�� �n��Flav�us��Ba�as,��Bogdan Dumitrache şi Marian Nicolae, Op. cit.,��pp.��35-37

��7�� The��92/1950��Decree��was��not��the��only��decree��produc�ng��effects��that��post-commun�st�� laws��and�� jur�sprudence��attempted�� to�� rect�fy.�� It�� represents��a��parad�gmat�c�� form��of��a��ser�es��of��normat�ve��acts,��start�ng��w�th�� the��139/1940��law,��followed��by�� the��312/1945��law,�� that��was��a�med��at��prosecut�ng��and��pun�sh�ng��the��persons��gu�lty��for��the��decay��of��the��country��and��for��war��cr�mes,��and��by��the��famous��(�n��Roman�a)��119/1948��law,��that��nat�onal�zed��the���ndustr�al��compan�es,��banks,���nsurance��compan�es��and��m�n�ng��and��transportat�on��compan�es,��and��also��by��a��ser�es��of��less���mportant��normat�ve��acts;��the��process��cont�nued��unt�l��the��end��of��the��70’s��(for��example��the��58/1974��law,��regard�ng��the��organ�zat�on��of��the��terr�tory��and��of��the��urban��and��rural��commun�t�es).��

��8�� �.e.,��rented��by��the��owners.��

178 �� Apply�ng��Tak�ng��Clauses��Analys�s...����/����Emanuel-M�ha�l��SOCACIU������������179

earthquake��and��not��repa�red��or��reconstructed��by��the�r��owners.

The��next��couple��of��art�cles��are��also��cruc�al��for��understand�ng��post-commun�st��dec�s�ons��by��both��Roman�an��courts��and��the��European��Court��of��Human��R�ghts:��

“Art.��II.��The��decree��does��not��apply��to��bu�ld�ngs��that��belong��to��workers,��clerks,��work��sm�ths,���ntellectuals��and��ret�red��persons��and��they��w�ll��not��be��nat�onal�zed.Art.��III.��The��nat�onal�zed��bu�ld�ngs��become��the��property��of��the��State��as��publ�c��goods,��w�th��no��compensat�on��and��do��not��make��the��object��of��any��dut�es��or��real��r�ghts��of��any��k�nd”.

Before��mov�ng�� from�� the�� legal�� framework��of��nat�onal�zat�on,�� I�� th�nk�� two��supplementary��po�nts��should��be��made.

F�rst,�� there�� �s��a��d�st�nct�on,��well��known�� �n�� the��const�tut�onal�� law,��between��the��“wr�tten”��const�tut�on��and�� the��“l�v�ng”��const�tut�on��(�n��other��words,��between��the��formal��system��of��norms��and��those�� that��are��operat�ng��de facto,��along��w�th�� the��agents’��att�tude��towards��the��legal��documents).��In�� the��case��of�� the��early��commun�st��leg�slat�on,�� the��d�fference��between��these��two��was��substant�al.��The��early��f�gures��of��the��commun�st��reg�me��often��cons�dered��the��appl�cat�on��of�� the�r��own��laws��to��be��a��moral��fr�vol�ty.��The��pract�cal��outcome��of��th�s��att�tude��was��that��many��of��the��tak�ngs��were��not��in conformity��w�th��the��law,��but��related to�� �t.��Therefore,��numerous��tak�ngs��d�d��not��belong��to��any��of��the��f�ve��categor�es��ment�oned���n��the��decree.��Moreover,��a��s�gn�f�cant��number��of��the��nat�onal�zed��bu�ld�ngs��were��taken��by���gnor�ng��the��second��art�cle,��g�ven�� the�� fact�� that�� they��belonged,��at�� the�� t�me,�� to��urban�� �ntellectuals,�� to��ret�red��persons��and��even��to��workers.��The��s�tuat�on��becomes��more��compl�cated��also��because��a��s�gn�f�cant��number��of��bu�ld�ngs9��have��been��taken��de facto��w�th��no��legal��dec�s�on���ssued��by��a��law-court��or��by��the��local��author�t�es,��as��had��been��st�pulated���n��the��92/1950��decree.��The��d�st�nct�on��between��bu�ld�ngs��taken��“w�th��(legal)��t�tle”��and��those��“w�thout��t�tle”���s��cruc�al���n��the��understand�ng��of��the��legal��debates��concern�ng��th�s��problem��and��the��moral��evaluat�on��of��rest�tut�ve��pol�c�es.

Second,��we��could��even�� ser�ously��doubt�� the�� const�tut�onal��val�d�ty��of�� the��Decree��no.��92.�� It�� �s,�� for��at�� least�� three�� reasons,�� �n�� flagrant��contrad�ct�on�� to�� the��const�tut�on��of�� that�� t�me�� (�t�� had��been�� �ssued��by�� the�� execut�ve�� and��not��by�� the��leg�slat�ve��power;��a��char�table��att�tude�� towards�� the��oppressed��would�� just�fy��only��two��out��of��f�ve��categor�es��of��bu�ld�ngs��that��had��been��taken��w�thout��compensat�on;��the��nat�onal�zat�on��w�thout�� compensat�on��d�rectly��v�olates�� the�� const�tut�onal��clause��as���t��had��been��formulated���n��the��10th��art�cle��of��the��1949��Const�tut�on).��After��1989,�� the��legal��val�d�ty��of�� the��decree��was��several�� t�mes��d�sputed��at�� the��Roman�an��Const�tut�onal��Court,��w�th��the��Court��deny�ng���ts��own��author�ty��to���ssue��a��rul�ng,��a��controvers�al��dec�s�on��among��Roman�an��legal��theor�sts��and��pract�t�oners.10

The��hypothes�s��that��I���ntend��to��explore��further���s��whether��(and���n��what��degree)��

��9�� Accord�ng�� to��some��authors,�� �t�� �s�� the��case��of��many��of�� them��(cf.��Flav�us��Ba�as,��Bogdan��Dumitrache şi Marian Nicolae (2001), Regimul juridic al imobilelor preluate abuziv, Vol. I: Legea Nr. 10/2001 comentată şi adnotată, Bucureşti: Rosetti, Bucureşti, p. 45.

10�� Idem,��pp.��75-77.

commun�st��nat�onal�zat�on��could��be��analysed��w�th�n��the��framework��of��a��legal��and��ph�losoph�cal���nterpretat�on��of��const�tut�onal��clauses��for��tak�ngs.

The-crude-positivist-argument

Let’s��start�� from��a��conc�se��d�scuss�on��of��what��we��m�ght��call��“the��crude��pos�t�v�st��argument”.��Even��though��th�s��argument���s��rather��weak��and��often��takes��the��form��of��an��ad hoc��plea,���t��has��been��used��so��often���n��publ�c��d�scourse���n��Eastern��Europe��that���t��m�ght��st�ll��be��worth��analys�ng.

Thus,�� �f��we��bel�eved,��along��w�th��a��venerable�� trad�t�on��of�� legal��pos�t�v�sts,��that�� the�� law���s�� the��express�on��of��an��unquest�onable��pol�t�cal��w�ll��of�� the��sovere�gn��power��and��that��the��d�st�nct�on��between��the law as it���s��and��the law as it should be���s��absurd,��we��m�ght��put��forward��the��follow�ng��argument.��In��the��`50’s,��sovere�gn��power��was��embod�ed��by��the��Roman�an��Workers’��Party��wh�ch��had��a��commun�st�� �deology.��Be�ng��the��only��legally��recogn�zed��party��and��the��sole��holder��of��pol�t�cal��power,��th�s��party��had��the��unquest�onable��author�ty��to��ach�eve���ts��pol�t�cal��object�ves,���nclud�ng��the��author�ty�� to��enact�� laws��promot�ng��such��object�ves��(such��as�� laws��nat�onal�z�ng��pr�vate��property).��The��fact��that��after��1989��the��pol�t�cal��reg�me��changed��has��put��the��democrat�c��government���n��a��new��s�tuat�on,��where��the��pr�or�ty��would��have��been��to��manage��the��ex�stent��state��of��affa�rs.��Why��should��the��new��democrat�c��government��be��forced��to��pay��the��costs��of��revers�ng��the��legal��dec�s�ons��taken��by��the��commun�sts?��Such��dec�s�ons��could��be��cons�dered��un�nsp�red��or���neff�c�ent,��but��surely��not��unjust���f��cons�dered��as��part��of��the��legal��framework��and��values��of��that��per�od.

Th�s��type��of��argument��challenges��the��fundamental��assumpt�on��of��any��attempt��to��just�fy��redress��or��rest�tut�on:�� that�� there���s��a��set��of��act�ons��from��the��past�� that��are��cons�dered��unjust��and��the��outcomes��of��wh�ch��need��to��be��somehow��rect�f�ed.��G�ven��the��fact��that��a��law���ssued��by��a��sovere�gn��power���s��val�d��by��v�rtue��of���ts��sheer��genes�s,��and��that��we��should��never,��even���n��pr�nc�ple,��quest�on���ts��moral�ty,��then���t���s��ev�dent��that��amongst�� the��“�ngred�ents”��of��present��states��of��affa�rs�� there�� �s��no��“h�stor�cal��shadow”��of��a��past���njust�ce.11��If��there���s��no��po�nt���n��talk�ng��about��past���njust�ces,��why��should��there��be��one���n��talk�ng��about��undo�ng��them?

Th�s��approach���s��completely��unsat�sfactory,��for��at��least��two��reasons.��F�rst��of��all,���t��den�es��from��the��outset�� the��poss�b�l�ty��of��moral��evaluat�on.��If��we��cannot��d�scuss��the��fa�rness��or��unfa�rness��of��past��laws,��we��cannot��d�scuss��the��cr�ter�a��that��a��new��law��should��accord��w�th���n��order��to��be��just.��Surely,��we��should��not��treat��law��and��moral�ty��as��coextens�ve,��and��the��contr�but�on��of��legal��pos�t�v�sm���n��p�npo�nt�ng��the��d�fference���s��remarkable.��But���t��would��be��also��ser�ously��dangerous��to��accept��the��stronger��thes�s��of��some��legal��pos�t�v�sts,��accord�ng��to��whom��there���s��an���nsurmountable��gap��between��the��two��realms.

The��second��object�on�� to�� the��crude��pos�t�v�st��argument�� �s�� that�� �t��completely��m�sses���ts��target,��that���s��to��say��that���t��does��not��really��confute��rest�tut�on.��In��the��best��case��scenar�o,�� the��conclus�on���s�� that��concern�ng��leg�slat�on��everyth�ng���s��allowed��

11�� Jeremy��Waldron��labels��th�s��k�nd��of��att�tude,��w�thout��relat�ng���t��to��legal��pos�t�v�sm,��as��the��“let bygones be bygones”��approach.��For��more��deta�ls,��see��Jeremy��Waldron��(1992),��“Supersed�ng��H�stor�c��Injust�ce”,��Ethics,��vol.��103,��no.��1,��199,��p.��14.��

180 �� Apply�ng��Tak�ng��Clauses��Analys�s...����/����Emanuel-M�ha�l��SOCACIU������������181

�f��th�s���s��the��w�ll��of��the��sovere�gn��power.��If��nat�onal�zat�on,��as��an��express�on��of��the��sovere�gn��commun�st��power,�� �s��morally��unquest�onable,�� the��same��should��be��sa�d��about��full��rest�tut�on��(g�ven��that�� �t��would��be��the��w�ll��of��a��new��pol�t�cal��power).��In��other��words,��the��crude��pos�t�v�st��argument���s��self-defeat�ng.

Although��ph�losoph�cally�� frag�le,�� th�s��argument�� �s��not��a��straw��man,��as��one��m�ght��th�nk.��There��are��many��other��vers�ons,��maybe���n��a��sl�ghtly��more��ref�ned��wrap-p�ng.��For��example,���n��a��s�m�lar��tone,��the��Roman�an��Supreme��Court��of��Just�ce��ruled��(Rul�ng��no.1,��February��2nd,��1995)��that��the��Decree��52/1950��was��a��“governance��act”��that��could��never��be��censored��by��the��jud�c�ary.12

Even��though��the��crude��pos�t�v�st��argument���s��rud�mentary��and���ncorrect,���t��has��an���mportant��heur�st�c��qual�ty:��that��of��p�npo�nt�ng,���n��a��brutal��form,��an���ntu�t�on��that��grounds��many��soph�st�cated��debates,��legal��and��ph�losoph�cal.��D�rectly��l�nked��to��our��top�c�� �s�� the��pos�t�v�st��approach��to��pr�vate��property��r�ghts��(formulated��for�� the��f�rst��t�me��by��Jeremy��Bentham).13��The��core��of�� th�s��concept�on�� �s��clearly��and��conc�sely��stated��by��Frank��M�chelman:��“accord�ng��to��a��so-called��pos�t�v�st��v�ew,��a��property��hold�ng’s��scope���s��always��necessar�ly��hostage��to��state��lawmak�ng.��‘Property’���n��th�s��v�ew��cons�sts��of��noth�ng��but��the��law’s��conf�rmat�on��of��ent�tlements��and��prerogat�ves��to��possessors��or��other��‘owners’”.14��From��such��a��perspect�ve,�� the��establ�shment��of��pr�vate��property�� laws�� �s��always��a��quest�on��of��h�stor�cal��acc�dent.�� If�� the��structure��of�� transact�onal��costs��and/or��pol�t�cal��pr�or�t�es��would��change,�� there��would��be��no��pr�nc�pled��moral��or��legal��barr�er���n��mod�fy�ng��these��norms.��Moreover,��there��would��be��no��barr�er��aga�nst��potent�al��changes��result�ng��from��the��fancy��of��a��hyperact�ve��legal��power.��But,��as��M�chelman��asks,��“can��such��an��accord�on-l�ke��concept�on��of��property��poss�bly��serve��as��a��basel�ne��for��const�tut�onal��‘tak�ng’��determ�nat�ons?”15��Th�s���s��one��of��the��quest�ons��that��I��w�ll��try��to��plaus�bly��answer���n��the��follow�ng��pages,��by��apply�ng��th�s��analys�s��to��the��commun�st��nat�onal�zat�on��of��houses.

Communist-nationalization-and-the-takings-clause:-Blueprint-for-a-constitutional-analysis

I��have��suggested��above��that�� there��are�� two���ncompat�b�l�t�es��related�� to��Decree��no.��

12 Flavius Baias, Bogdan Dumitrache şi Marian Nicolae, Op.cit.,��vol.II��anexa��IX,��pp.��205-206.13�� Jeremy��Bentham��(1987),��The Theory of Legislation,��Rothman��Repr�nt,��pp.��111-113.14�� Frank��M�chelman�� (1997)�� “The��Common��Law��Basel�ne�� and��Rest�tut�on�� for�� the��Lost��

Commons:��A��Reply��to��Professor��Epste�n”,��The University of Chicago Law Review,��vol.��64,��no.��1,��p.��57

15�� Frank��M�chelman,��Op. cit.,��p.��58.��M�chelman’s��answer�� �s��negat�ve,��and��h�s��proposal�� �s��that��the��role��of��th�s��system��of��reference���s��to��be��played��by��a��pol�t�cal��v�s�on��upon��the��fa�r��d�str�but�on��of��publ�c��burdens.��H�s��class�cal��polem�c��w�th��Epste�n���s��very���nstruct�ve;�� the��latter��bel�eves��that��a��“natural”���nterpretat�on��of��pr�vate��property��r�ghts���s��the��most��adequate��for��th�s��role��(see��R�chard��Epste�n��(1985)��(1987),��Takings. Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain,��Harvard��Un�vers�ty��Press,��1985��cap.��1-3��and��(1997)��“Tak�ngs,��Exclus�v�ty��and��Speech:��The��Legacy��of��‘PruneYard��v.��Rob�ns’”,��The University of Chicago Law Review vol.��64,��no.��1).��For��conc�s�on,�� I�� l�m�t��myself�� to��ment�on�� th�s��debate�� (that��also�� featured��at��some��po�nt��Bruce��Ackerman��and��Joseph��Sax),��w�thout��work�ng��out�� �ts��more��deta�led���mpl�cat�ons.��

92/1950.��On��one��hand,�� the��decree��clearly��contrad�cts�� the��const�tut�onal��clause��of��the��tak�ngs��at�� that��t�me.��On��the��other��hand,��the��real��tak�ngs,�� �n��many��cases,��a�med��at��bu�ld�ngs��that��d�d��not��belong��to��the��categor�es��ment�oned���n��the��decree.��In�� th�s��sect�on��I��w�ll��expand��the��analys�s��of��these��confl�cts.

Even��lawyers��often��joke��about��the���naccess�b�l�ty��of��legal��analys�s��for��the��lay-man.��Legal��concepts��are��very��spec�al�zed��and��somet�mes��have��a��d�fferent��mean�ng��from��those���n��the��common��language.��Even��though��between��the��spec�f�cat�ons��from��the��1948��Const�tut�on��(“Tak�ngs��are��allowed��so��that��publ�c��ut�l�ty���s��ach�eved,��on��the��bas�s��of��law��and��w�th��a��fa�r��compensat�on,��establ�shed��by��the��jud�c�ary”)16��and��those��of��the��Decree��no.��92��(nat�onal�zat�on���s��to��be��made��so��that��“an���mportant��means��of��explo�tat�on��would��be��taken��out��of��the��hands��of��the��explo�ters”��and��“the��nat�onal�zed��bu�ld�ngs��become��the��property��of��the��State��as��publ�c��goods,��w�th��no��compensat�on��and��do��not��make��the��object��of��any��dut�es��or��real��r�ghts��of��any��k�nd”)17��there��seems��to��be��a��log�cal��gap,��although���t��m�ght��be��only��apparent.��Maybe��some��deeper��mean�ng��w�ll��show��that��the��two��are��actually��compat�ble.

I��w�ll��try��to��cover��th�s��base��by��show�ng��that��the��gap���s��real��and��that��the��decree��v�olates��the��const�tut�onal��tak�ngs��clause,��in any reasonable interpretation of it.��The��object�ve��of��th�s��attempt���s��not��to��offer��a��spec�al�zed��legal��analys�s��(�t�� �s�� �rrelevant��for�� the��present��argument�� �f,�� for��example,�� �n��1950�� �n��Roman�a�� there��was��a�� legal��def�n�t�on��of��nat�onal�zat�on��as��someth�ng��other��than��a��tak�ng),��but��rather��to��explore��the��poss�b�l�ty��of��mak�ng��them��compat�ble��through��a��larger��framework��and��by��us�ng��conceptual���nstruments��from��eth�cs��and��the��ph�losophy��of��law.

One��poss�ble��object�on��to��the��not�on��of���ncompat�b�l�ty��between��the��commun�st��nat�onal�zat�on��decree��and�� the��const�tut�onal�� tak�ngs��clause��(as��expressed��by�� the��1948��Const�tut�on)��would��be�� to��challenge�� the�� thes�s�� that�� the��nat�onal�zat�on��of��bu�ld�ngs�� �s��a�� tak�ng��(�n�� the��usual��sense��of�� the��const�tut�onal��spec�f�cat�ons).��The��argument��could��take��the��follow�ng��form:��‘tak�ng’��refers��to��spec�f�c��r�ghts��(propert�es)��of��well-def�ned��categor�es��of��agents.��For��example,���f��the��state��wants��to��bu�ld��a��new��h�ghway��between��two��c�t�es��then,��accord�ng��to��the��const�tut�onal��clause��and��to��a��law��that��def�nes�� the��adm�n�strat�ve��procedures��of�� the�� tak�ng,�� the��author�t�es��would��be��allowed��to��take��the��necessary��lands��for�� the��construct�on��of�� the��h�ghway,��prec�sely���dent�f�ed��by��geograph�cal��coord�nates.��(Th�s��would��be��an��example��of��a��large��scale��tak�ng;��typ�cally,��one��m�ght��refer��to��the��state��tak�ng��the��lands��of��one��owner,��to��bu�ld,��let’s��say,��a��pol�ce��stat�on).��Such��tak�ng��would��not��affect��all��sets��of��landowners,��not��even��all��the��categor�es��of��landowners��that��have��a��spec�f�c��k�nd��of��act�v�ty,��but��only��the��land��targeted��by��the��h�ghway’s��trajectory��(the��cr�ter�on��appl�ed���s��not��the���dent�ty��of��the��owner,��but��the��geograph�cal��pos�t�on��of��the��land).

The��commun�st��nat�onal�zat�on��case��seems��very��d�fferent��at��f�rst��glance.��It��was��an��act�� that��bore�� the��hallmark��of��general�ty;�� �t��affected��every��category��of��bu�ld�ng��owner.18��There��are��d�fferent��ways�� �n��wh�ch��we��m�ght��expect�� the��state’s��dec�s�ons��

16�� In��Ba�as,��Dum�trache,��N�colae,��Op. cit.,��vol.��II,��p.��8.17�� Idem,��p.��35.18�� For��the��present��argument���s��not�� �mportant�� that�� th�s��general�ty��was��cons�dered��only���n��the��

pract�cal��appl�cat�on��of��the��decree,��not���n���ts��formulat�on��(the��decree��clearly��excepted��from��nat�onal�zat�on��some��spec�f�c��categor�es��of��owners).

182 �� Apply�ng��Tak�ng��Clauses��Analys�s...����/����Emanuel-M�ha�l��SOCACIU������������183

to���mpact��upon��our��property��r�ghts.��Through��taxes,��one��part��of��our��pr�vate��property���s��l�terally��becom�ng��the��property��of��the��state;��st�ll,�� �t�� �s��not��plaus�ble��to��th�nk��that��one��could��w�n��the��tr�al�� �f��he/she��would��sue��the��government��for��not��respect�ng��the��const�tut�onal�� tak�ngs��clauses.��Also,�� �f�� the�� law��forb�ds��me��to��use��my��resources�� �n��order�� to��make��a��bomb,��th�s�� �s�� the��same��th�ng��as��to��say��that�� the��respect�ve��r�ght�� �s��be�ng��taken.��In��a��s�m�lar��way,��rece�v�ng��a��f�ne��for��speed�ng���s��l�terally��a��tak�ng.��But,���f��I��am��a��normal��soc�al��be�ng��and��I��adhere��to��the��dom�nant��legal��and��moral��culture��of��my��t�me,��I��w�ll��not��feel��(too)��morally��harmed��by��th�s.��Be�ng��formulated���n��general��terms,��nat�onal�zat�on���s��more��l�ke��these��k�nds��of��examples��rather��than��those��tak�ngs��whose��l�m�tat�on���s��a�med��at��by��the��Const�tut�on.��Therefore,��em�nent��doma�n��realm���s��not��coextens�ve��to��these��nat�onal�zat�on��pol�c�es.

But�� such�� an�� argument�� �s�� tw�ce�� defect�ve.�� F�rst,�� because�� �t�� assumes�� an���mplaus�ble��def�n�t�on��of�� tak�ng.��Second,�� �ts��underly�ng��ar�thmet�c�� �s��morally��quest�onable.��The��essent�al��deta�l��m�ssed��by�� th�s��k�nd��of�� argument�� �s�� that,��no��matter��what��the��general�ty��of���ts��formulat�on,��a��legal��act,�� �n���ts��effects,��bears��upon���nd�v�duals.��R�chard��Epste�n��persuas�vely���nd�cates��the��essence��of��th�s��object�on:��

“[…]��pr�ma��fac�e,��the��greater��the��numbers,��the��greater��the��wrong.��What��stamps��a��government��act�on��as��a�� tak�ng��s�mpl�c�ter�� �s��what�� �t��does�� to�� the��property��r�ghts��of��each���nd�v�dual��who���s��subject�� to���ts��act�ons:��noth�ng��more��or�� less���s��relevant,�� �nclud�ng��the��conduct��of�� the��government���n��relat�on��to��other��people.��The��pr�nc�ples��of��em�nent��doma�n��that��govern��a�� tak�ng��of��all��of��one��person’s��property��also��govern��a�� tak�ng��of��part��of�� that��property.��The��pr�nc�ples�� that��determ�ne��whether��one��person’s��property��has��been��taken,�� �n��whole��or�� �n��part,��also��determ�ne��whether��many��people’s��property��has��been��taken���n��whole��or���n��part”.19

A��tak�ng��that��affects��Mary��does��not��become��someth�ng��else��just��because���t��also��affects��John��or��a��m�ll�on��other��people��as��well.��The���mportant��th�ng���s��the��effect��of��the��law��for��the��r�ghts��of��every���nd�v�dual.

In�� the��proper��sense��of�� the�� term,��a��‘tak�ng’��refers�� to�� the��effect��of�� the��govern-ment’s��act�on��upon��the��pr�vate��property��r�ghts��of�� �nd�v�duals.��The��most��common��structure��of��the��s�tuat�on���s��the��follow�ng:��at��the��t�me��t,��the��good��x��belongs��to��A;��at��t�me��t+1,��the��government��takes��(totally��or��part�ally)��h�s��or��her��x.20��To��better���llustrate��the��d�fference��between��tak�ng��and��regulat�on,��I��w�ll��use��an��example��g�ven��by��Bruce��Ackerman.21��Let’s��say��that��fam�ly��A��has��two��cars��that��are��relevant��for��the��evaluat�on��of��the�r�� l�v�ng��standard,��each��of��them��worth��5000��un�ts��of��value.��A��cr�s�s��between��A’s��country��and��an��Arab��country��forces��the��government��to��adopt��severe��measures��to��save��gas.��The��econom�cal��counselors��suggest�� two��poss�ble��pol�c�es.22��The��f�rst��

19�� R�chard��Epste�n��(1985),��Op. cit.��p.��94.20�� For��a��more��deta�led��analys�s��of��the��structure��of��the��tak�ng��problem���n��common��legal��culture,��

see��Bruce��Ackerman��(1997),��Private Property and the Constitution,��Yale��Un�vers�ty��Press,��pp.��101��et seq.��

21�� Idem,��pp.��124-125.22�� It�� �s��obv�ous�� that��we��assume��that�� these�� two��pol�c�es��are�� the��only��ones��poss�ble��and��that,��

one��would��be��l�m�t�ng��the��legal��speed��to��40km/h��on��all��h�ghways,��and��the��second��one��would��be��the��tak�ng��of��half��of��the��nat�on’s��cars.��In��both��cases,��the��general��result��would��be��halv�ng��the��gas��consumpt�on,��and��the���mmed�ate��consequence��for��fam�ly��A���s�� the��net�� loss��of��4000��un�ts��(the��f�rst��measure��would��determ�ne��the��decrease��of��the��value��of��the��two��cars��at��3000��un�ts,��and��the��second��measure��would��determ�ne��the��value��of��the��rema�n�ng��car��to��r�se��to��6000��un�ts).��Even��though��the��f�nanc�al��loss��of��A��would��be���n��both��cases��4000��un�ts,��the��const�tut�onal��tak�ngs��clause��would��ent�tle��them��to��compensat�on��only���f�� the��government��would��resort�� to��conf�scat�on.��In��the��case��of��speed��l�m�t�ng,��we��tend��to��th�nk��that��both��cars��st�ll��belong��to��A��and��that��they��s�mply��decrease���n��value��as��a��result��of��the��pol�cy��(the��same��th�ng��maybe��would��have��happened���f��the��state��had��not���ntervened��and��the��gas��pr�ce��had��tr�pled��on��the��market).��Even��though��such��a��pol�cy��could��be��challenged��on��other��grounds,���t���s��not��“covered”��by��the��const�tut�onal��tak�ngs��clauses.23

Was��nat�onal�zat�on��s�m�lar�� to��any��of�� these��examples?��The��stra�ghtforward��answer���s�� that�� �t��rather��resembled��the��conf�scat�on��case.��But,�� �f��commun�st��nat�on-al�zat�on��was��a��tak�ng,��we��have��to��d�scuss��the��problem��w�th�n��the��l�m�tat�ons��of��the��two��key��prov�sos���n��the��clause:��“publ�c��ut�l�ty”��and��“fa�r��compensat�on”.

The��“publ�c��ut�l�ty”��prov�so��could��be��understood�� �n�� two��d�fferent��ways.��On��the��one��hand,��one��m�ght��argue��that��any��object�ve��of�� the��state,�� �f��const�tut�onal,�� �s��at��the��same��t�me��suff�c�ently��publ�c��for���t��not��to��be��quest�onable��on��tak�ngs��clauses��grounds.��But��th�s��vague��understand�ng,��even��though���t��does��not��lack��supporters,�� �s��rather��frag�le.

The��f�rst��problem��becomes��clear�� �f��we��wonder��why��hav�ng��the��publ�c��ut�l�ty��prov�so��at��all,��as��part��of��the��tak�ngs��clause?��It���s��obv�ous��that��there��would��be��no��such��const�tut�onal��clauses���f�� there��had��not��been��an���ntent�on��to��g�ve��some��protect�on��to��the���nd�v�dual��and��h�s��or��her��property.��On��the��other��hand,��protect�on���s��not��absolute��(tak�ngs��are��not��proh�b�ted��from��the��outset).��The��tak�ngs��clauses���llustrate��the��not�on��of��soc�ally��accepted��l�m�tat�ons��of��pr�vate��property��r�ghts.��A��plaus�ble��approx�mat�on��would��be��that��the��mean�ng��of��const�tut�onal��tak�ngs��clauses���s��to��ma�nta�n��a��reason-

morally��speak�ng,��there���s��no��problem��for��the��government��to��adopt��them.��Both��assumpt�ons��are��quest�onable,��but,���n��the��end,��th�s���s��an���mag�nary��example.

23�� At��a��more��deta�led��analys�s,�� th�s��d�st�nct�on��between��regulat�on��and��tak�ng��becomes��even��less��clear,��but��not�� �n��favor��of��regulat�on.��Any��regulat�on�� that�� l�m�ts�� the��opt�ons�� that��one��has��concern�ng��the��use��of��a��good��that��he/she��owns��takes��one��or��more��r�ghts��from��the��sum��of��r�ghts��he/she��had��had��before.��G�ven��the��fact��that��my��own�ng��a �s��def�ned��as��the��total�ty��of��r�ghts��concern�ng��a,�� �f��a��certa�n��part��of�� these��r�ghts�� �s��be�ng��annulled,�� that��means��that��a��part�al��expropr�at�on��has��taken��place.��As��R�chard��Epste�n��sa�d��“all��regulat�on,��all�� taxes��and��all�� the��mod�f�cat�ons��of�� l�ab�l�ty�� rules��are�� tak�ngs��of��pr�vate��property,��pr�ma�� fac�e��compensable��by��the��state”.��(Takings, p.��95).��Accord�ng��to��Epste�n,��the���mportant��d�fference��concerns�� the��compensat�on��mechan�sm:�� �n�� the��case��of�� regulat�ons,�� the��compensat�on�� �s���mpl�c�t�� (the��compensat�on�� that�� the��state��g�ves��me�� �nstead��of��my��expropr�at�on�� through��taxes�� �s��publ�c��order,��personal��secur�ty��or��clean��a�r.).��From��the��const�tut�onal��analys�s��of��expropr�at�on,�� regulat�ons��become��suspect��when�� the��compensat�on��does��not��ex�st��even���mpl�c�tly��or���t���s���ns�gn�f�cant��g�ven��the���nd�v�dual��losses.��If��the��nat�onal�zat�on��of��houses���s��rather��a��brutal��expropr�at�on,��then��our��d�scuss�on��could��eas�ly��avo�d��the��soph�st�cated��deta�ls��of��th�s��d�st�nct�on.

184 �� Apply�ng��Tak�ng��Clauses��Analys�s...����/����Emanuel-M�ha�l��SOCACIU������������185

able��balance��between��the��state’s�� �ntervent�on�st��powers��and��the���nd�v�duals’��r�ghts��aga�nst��such�� �ntrus�on.��More��r�gorously��put:��“stated��formally,�� the�� task��of��a�� legal��system���s�� to��m�n�m�ze�� the��sum��of��errors�� that��ar�se��from��expropr�at�on��and��under-compensat�on,��where��the��two��are���nversely��related”.24��But���f��we��accept�� th�s��vague��understand�ng��of��publ�c��ut�l�ty,�� the��balance��d�sappears:�� �f�� there��are��no��l�m�tat�ons,��where�� �s�� the��protect�on��of�� the�� �nd�v�dual?��It��s�mply��means�� that�� the��const�tut�onal��prov�so���s��redundant.

There���s��another,��more��techn�cal��reason,��for��wh�ch��the���nterpretat�on��“anyth�ng��that��the��state��does,���f��legal,���s��of��publ�c��ut�l�ty”���s��wrong.��Accord�ng��to��Epste�n,��the��key��to��understand�ng��the��publ�c��ut�l�ty��prov�so���s�� to��cons�der��what�� the��legally��and��morally��acceptable��mechan�sms��for��the��appropr�at�on��of��transact�onal��surpluses��are.��The��just�f�cat�on��for��such��a��prevent�on��mechan�sm���s���n��fact��of��a��moral��nature:��that��of��m�n�m�z�ng�� the��poss�b�l�ty��of��unjust��appropr�at�ons��resulted��from��the��exerc�se��of��“less��publ�c”��governmental��object�ves:��“tak�ngs�� for��pr�vate��use��are�� therefore��forb�dden��because��the��takers��get��to��keep��the��full��surplus,��even���f��just��compensat�on���s��pa�d”.25��Let’s��take��a��relevant��example26:��A��owns��x��that��he��or��she��values��at��100��un�ts��and��that��B��values��at��150��un�ts.��The��transact�on��between��the��two��(suppos�ng��that��the��transact�onal��costs��would��be��zero)��would��be��determ�ned��at��any��pr�ce��between��the��two��evaluat�ons,��accord�ng��to�� the�r��negot�at�on��sk�lls,��c�rcumstances,��etc.��In��pr�nc�ple,��any��of��them��could��appropr�ate��the��max�mal��50��ga�n;��there���s��ex ante��no��prescr�bed��w�nner.��But�� �f��B��has�� the��ab�l�ty�� to��appeal�� to�� the��expropr�at�ng��power��of�� the��state,��he��could��short-c�rcu�t�� the��negot�at�on��process��and��obta�n��x��for��100��un�ts�� (wh�ch��approx�mates��a��pr�mary���nterpretat�on��of��fa�r��compensat�on27)��thus��appropr�at�ng��the��max�mal��poss�ble��ga�n.��The��prov�so��of��“publ�c��ut�l�ty”���s��an���nstrument��to��prevent��the��use��of��governmental��power�� for��pursu�ng��pr�vate��ends�� (eventually,�� those��of��pol�t�c�ans,��d�gn�tar�es��and��bureaucrats).��If��the��above��argument���s��correct,��that��means��that��the��vague��understand�ng��of��publ�c��ut�l�ty���s��wrong.��Do��we��have��another,��more��reasonable��one?

Epste�n’s��answer���s��that��publ�c��ut�l�ty,���n���ts��proper��const�tut�onal��understand�ng,��can��only��mean��two��th�ngs:��28�� the��product�on��of��publ�c��goods��(�n��a��techn�cal��sense)��or��goods��for��wh�ch��there���s��“a��publ�c��r�ght��of��use”��(h�ghways,��parks��etc).��For��such��a��r�ght��to��ex�st,���t���s��necessary��that��the��cond�t�on��of��un�versal��and��non-d�scr�m�natory��access���s��sat�sf�ed.��Th�s��cond�t�on��guarantees��“that��no���nd�v�dual��or��small��group��of���nd�v�duals��[…]���s��able��to��capture��the��ent�re��surplus��to��the��exclus�on��of��others”.29��For��the��cond�t�on��of��publ�c��ut�l�ty��to��be��sat�sf�ed,��the���mportant��th�ng���s��that��all���nd�v�du-als��could��have,���n��a��non-d�scr�m�natory��manner,��the��r�ght��to��use��the��respect�ve��good,��even��though,���n��pract�ce,���t���s���mposs�ble��for��all��of��them��to��use���t��at��the��same��t�me.

At�� th�s�� juncture,�� �t�� �s�� rather��easy�� to��analyse�� the��92/1950��Decree�� from�� th�s��

24�� R�chard��Epste�n�� (1997),��“A��Clear��V�ew��of�� the��Cathedral:��The��Dom�nance��of��Property��Rules”,���n��The Yale Law Journal,��vol.��106,��no.��7,��p.��2091.

25�� Epste�n��(1985),��Op.��c�t.,��p.��164.��For��the��complete��structure��of��th�s��argument,��see��chapter��12,��pp.��161-181.

26�� Cf.��idem,��pp.��164-165.27�� Eventually��he��w�ll��pay��w�th��state’s��money��and��not��h�s��own.28�� Ib�d.,��pp.��167��et��seq.29�� Ib�d., p.��168.

perspect�ve.��Even��to��a��superf�c�al��eye,���t�� �s��obv�ous��that��commun�st��nat�onal�zat�on��d�d��not��fulf�ll��th�s��cond�t�on.��It��d�dn’t���n���ts��language��and��even��less���n���ts��appl�cat�on.

A��house,��as��a�� type��of��good,�� �s��d�fferent�� from��a��park��or��a�� l�ghthouse�� �n��an��essent�al��way.��The��fact��that��I��am��an��owner��(or��even��a��tenant)��g�ves��me��the��r�ght,���n��standard��s�tuat�ons,��to��exclude��others��from��us�ng��the��house.��There��can��even��be��more��than��one��tenant,��and��normally��they��have��the��r�ght��to��collect�vely��exclude��others���n��the��per�od��and���n��the��cond�t�ons��establ�shed��by��contract.��Except���n��some��rare��cases��(where�� the��houses�� �n��quest�on��have��become��schools,��hosp�tals,��museums��etc.)�� �t���s��d�ff�cult�� to��see��how��nat�onal�zat�on��could��sat�sfy��the��publ�c��ut�l�ty��cond�t�on,�� �n���ts��proper��understand�ng.�� It�� �s�� �mportant��however�� to��d�st�ngu�sh��between��“publ�c��property”��and��“publ�c��ut�l�ty”.��Through��nat�onal�zat�on,��the��houses��have��become��the��publ�c��property��of��the��state��(of��the��ent�re��people,��as��the��commun�sts��l�ked��to��say);��but��th�s��was��only��so��from��the��legal��po�nt��of��v�ew,��s�nce��the��“use”��of��the��taken��propert�es��was��markedly��pr�vate.

There���s��another��cons�derat�on��that��would��g�ve��an��even��more��brutal��d�agnost�c.��In��many��cases��(espec�ally��those��of��the��tak�ngs��“w�thout��t�tle”)��what��really��happened��was�� that�� �mportant��people��of�� that�� t�me��(�n��v�rtue��of�� the�r��pos�t�on�� �n�� the��nat�onal��government��or���n��the��local��organ�zat�on��of��the��commun�st��party)��had��the�r��eyes��on��a��bu�ld�ng��and��used��the��nat�onal�zat�on��process��(�.e.�� the��power��of��the��state)��to��obta�n��the��“r�ght”��to��l�ve���n���t��(that���s,��to��pr�vate��ut�l�ty).��Even��though��th�s��k�nd��of��s�tuat�on���s��v�v�d���n��the��collect�ve��memory��(espec�ally���n��that��of��the��v�ct�ms)���t�� �s��very��often��d�ff�cult��to��document,��both��h�stor�cally��and��legally.��Therefore,��th�s��k�nd��of��s�tuat�on��could��be��cons�dered��except�onal.��However,��they��are��not��necessary��for��my��argument,��s�nce��the��nat�onal�zat�on,��even���n���ts��more��standard��form,��d�d��not��ab�de��the��publ�c��ut�l�ty��cond�t�on.

One��could��object�� that��such��a��conclus�on���s�� too��drast�c.��After��all,��at�� least�� two��of��the��just�f�cat�ons��ment�oned���n��the��nat�onal�zat�on��decree��had��a��“publ�c��flavour”.��Nat�onal�zat�on��was��needed,�� �t��was��sa�d,��so�� that��a��means��of��explo�tat�on��could��be��taken��from��the��hands��of��the��explo�ters��and��for��“a��better��management��of��the��hous�ng��pool”,��“houses��that��are��doomed��to��degradat�on”��(see��above).��But��the��publ�c��aspect��was��only��apparent�� for��both��object�ves�� �n�� the��const�tut�onal��sense��used��here.��The��d�sabl�ng��of��the��explo�ters��was��a��pol�t�cal��object�ve,��and��can��be��seen��as��publ�c��only��by��greatly��push�ng��the��vague��and���mproper���nterpretat�on��of��the��tak�ngs��clause.��“A��better��management��of��the��hous�ng��pool”��could��appear��more��prom�s�ng.��But���f��we��l�ft��the��rhetor�cal��ve�l,��the��result���s��the��same:��the��management���s��publ�c��only���n��the��sense��that���t���s��made��by��the��state,��but��the��ut�l�ty��of��the��bu�ld�ngs��cont�nued��to��be��pr�vate.

I��have��argued��so��far��that��the��commun�st��nat�onal�zat�on��of��houses���n��Roman�a��was��a��form��of��tak�ng��(�n��the��reasonable��const�tut�onal��sense)��and��that���t��took��place,��w�th��very�� few��except�ons��by�� transgress�ng�� the��publ�c��ut�l�ty�� cond�t�on.��These��conclus�ons��work��as��a��sol�d�� just�f�cat�on��for�� the�� �dea�� that�� the��owners��would��have��been��ent�tled,�� �mmed�ately��after�� the�� tak�ng,�� to�� �mmed�ate�� full�� rest�tut�on�� (�n�� the��case��of��those��whose��bu�ld�ngs��had��been��taken��w�thout��ab�d�ng��by��the��publ�c��ut�l�ty��cond�t�on)��or��to��just��compensat�on��(where��the��cond�t�on��was��fulf�lled).30��From��th�s��

30�� Let’s��note�� that�� the��arguments�� that�� establ�sh�� the��prima facie�� ent�tlement��of��owners�� to��rest�tut�on/compensat�on�� �mmed�ately��after��nat�onal�zat�on��does��not�� funct�on��eo ipso��as��

186 �� Apply�ng��Tak�ng��Clauses��Analys�s...����/����Emanuel-M�ha�l��SOCACIU������������187

perspect�ve�� the�� �ncompat�b�l�ty��between��Decree��no.��92��and�� the�� tak�ngs��clause�� �s��brutally��obv�ous:��the��decree��st�pulates��that��the��bu�ld�ngs��became��the��property��of��the��state��w�thout��any��compensat�on,��wh�ch��means��that��former��owners��could��not��legally��cla�m��any��redress.31

What��are��the��morally��just�f�ed��cr�ter�a��by��wh�ch��the��compensat�on��should��have��been��establ�shed��at�� the�� t�me?��The��deta�led��response�� to�� th�s��quest�on��has��a��d�rect���mpact��upon��the��evaluat�on��of��the��present��compensat�on��procedures��for��tak�ngs��(for��example,�� tak�ngs��for�� the��construct�on��of��a��h�ghway).��On��the��other��hand,�� there��are���nterest�ng��s�m�lar�t�es��between�� th�s��d�scuss�on��and�� the��one��on�� the��compensatory��proceed�ngs��for��“h�stor�cal���njust�ces”��that��we��w�ll��analyse��at��th�s��end��of��th�s��art�cle.��Moreover,�� recent�� jur�sprudence��(espec�ally�� that��of�� the��European��Court��of��Human��R�ghts)��uses��the��same���nstruments��for��calculat�ng��compensat�ons.��For��these��reasons,��I��w�ll��just��br�efly��ment�on��some��typ�cal��responses��found���n��the��l�terature,��w�thout��any��attempt��to��cr�t�cally��analyse��them.��Nevertheless,��they��could��funct�on��as��an���ntroduc-t�on��to��a��further,��more��del�cate��and��complex��d�scuss�on.

Bruce��Ackerman��d�st�ngu�shes��between��two��manners��of��understand�ng��and��ex-pla�n�ng��the��substance��of��the��law.��The��f�rst��one���s��that��of��a��“Sc�ent�f�c��Pol�cymaker”,��wh�le��the��second��belongs��to��the��“Ord�nary��Observer”��(a��legally��cultured��layman��who���s�� �nterested��ma�nly�� �n��observ�ng�� the��relat�on��between��legal��norms��and��dom�nant��soc�al��pract�ces).

In��Ackerman’s�� terms,�� the��‘sc�ent�f�c’�� lawyer��uses��spec�f�c�� legal��concepts�� �n��order�� to��outl�ne�� the��relat�on��between�� the�� legal��norms��and��a��comprehens�ve��v�ew��govern�ng�� the�� legal��system,��wh�le�� the��‘ord�nary��observer’��would��rather��elaborate��extra-legal�� concepts�� �n��order�� to��explore�� the�� relat�on��between�� legal��norms��and��soc�al��expectat�ons.32��The��cho�ce��between��the��two��ways��of��understand�ng��the��law���s��essent�ally��a��ph�losoph�cal��cho�ce.��In��pract�ce,��however,��they��are��complementary��and��can��both��be��found���n��the��same��text��(as���s��the��case���n��the��present��art�cle).

But��th�s��scholarly��d�st�nct�on���s���mportant��when��we��d�scuss��the��mechan�sm��of��establ�sh�ng��the��amount��of��compensat�on��to��be��pa�d,��s�nce��the��chosen��ph�losoph�cal��perspect�ve��w�ll��gu�de��the��preferred��calculat�on��procedure.

Thus,�� the�� “sc�ent�f�c”�� pos�t�on�� would�� dec�s�vely�� depend�� on�� the�� chosen��“comprehens�ve��v�ew”.33��Even��thought,�� in abstracto,�� there��are��numerous��ava�lable��comprehens�ve��v�ews,��accord�ng�� to��Ackerman��only�� two��are��dom�nant�� �n��present��

arguments��for��a��s�m�lar��ent�tlement��some��years��after.��Such��a��presuppos�t�on��would��amount��to��a�� log�cal��art�f�ce,��even��though���t��was��not��uncommon���n��publ�c��d�scourse�� �n��Roman�a.��A��sound�� just�f�cat�on��of�� the��second�� type��of��ent�tlement��should,�� �n��one��way��or��another,��account��for�� the��temporal��hor�zon��of�� the��rect�fy�ng��just�ce��and��for��quest�ons��perta�n�ng��to���ntergenerat�onal��aspects.

31�� In��“A��Clear��V�ew��of��the��Cathedral:��The��Dom�nance��of��Property��Rules”,��p.��2113,��Epste�n��tells��a��well��known��joke��amongst��ph�losophers��of�� law��and��jur�sts�� that��d�scuss�� the�� tak�ngs��const�tut�onal�� clause:��g�ven�� the�� fact�� that�� the��const�tut�ons�� take�� �nto��account��only�� the��publ�c��ut�l�ty,��we��can��conclude��that��the��tak�ngs��for��pr�vate��use��are��adm�ss�ble��w�thout��any��compensat�on.��It���s��a��joke��that��the��commun�st��nat�onal�zers��took��very��ser�ously.��

32�� Bruce��Ackerman,��Op. cit.,��p.��15.33�� For��Ackerman,��“comprehens�ve��v�ew”��means��a��core��of��pr�nc�ples��and���deals��that��the��legal��

system��seems��to��promote.

legal��culture:�� the��one�� that��says�� that�� the��scope��of�� the�� legal��system���s�� to��promote��eff�c�ency��(d�versely��understood)��and��the��one��that��says��that��the��funct�on��of��laws���s��to��promote��the��d�gn�ty��of��soc�ety’s���nd�v�dual��members.34��Intermed�ary��pos�t�ons��are��also��poss�ble��as��d�fferent��dosages��of��the��two��parad�gms.��For��our��present��d�scuss�on,��the�� �mportant�� th�ng�� �s�� that��us�ng��a�� ‘sc�ent�f�c’��perspect�ve��of�� the�� legal�� system��amounts��to��assum�ng��a��certa�n��set��of��moral��presuppos�t�ons:��the��typ�cal��‘sc�ent�f�c’��lawyer���s��a��ut�l�tar�an,��a��Kant�an��or��a��comb�nat�on��of��the��two.35

A��ut�l�tar�an��perspect�ve��upon�� the�� just��compensat�on��cond�t�on��would��beg�n��w�th��the��determ�nat�on��of��the��correlat�on��between��certa�n��types��of��costs.36��Thus,���n��the��most��general�� terms,�� the��cruc�al��quest�on��for��a��ut�l�tar�an���s�� �n��what��degree��the��costs��of��the��compensat�on��(D)��would��be��b�gger��or��smaller��than��the��other��costs��gener-ated��by��the��tak�ng.��The��f�rst���mportant��costs��generated��by��the��tak�ng��(as�de��from��the��costs��for��the��former��owners)��are��the��costs��that��result��from��the��augmentat�on��of��the���ncert�tude.��Any��measure�� that��augments�� the�� �ncert�tude��regard�ng��soc�al��arrange-ments�� �n��wh�ch��agents��operate��(and��generally,�� tak�ngs��have��th�s��qual�ty)��and��that��makes��harder��to��evaluate��the��r�sks��of��assum�ng��a��l�fe��plan��amounts��to���mpos�ng��costs��(I).��On��the��other��hand,�� there��are���mportant��costs��generated��by��the��c�t�zen’s��doubts��regard�ng��the��general��ut�l�ty��of��the��projects���n��name��of��wh�ch��the��tak�ngs��are��made��(C).��Therefore,��a��poss�ble��ut�l�tar�an��cr�ter�on��for��the��compensat�on��quantum��would��be D ≤ I+C (compensation is considered fair prima facie unt�l�� �ts��costs��surpass��the��costs��of�� the�� tak�ng).��Accord�ng��to��Joseph��Sax37�� there��are�� two��elements�� that��make��the��predom�nance��of��compensatory��pract�ces��plaus�ble�� �n��a��ut�l�tar�an��framework:��compensat�ons��for��tak�ngs��reduce��the��mot�vat�on��of��the��agents��affected��by��tak�ngs��to��generate��corrupt�on��(for��example��to��g�ve��br�bes��to��pol�t�c�ans��or��clerks��so��that��the��ne�ghbour’s��land��should��be��taken��over��sooner)��and,��obv�ously,��reduces��d�sut�l�ty��of��the��expropr�ated��c�t�zens,��wh�ch,���n���ts��turn,��would��translate���n��m�n�m�z�ng��the��r�sk��of��soc�al��d�sorder.38

From��a��compet�ng��perspect�ve,�� loosely��speak�ng��Kant�an,�� the��cr�ter�a��for�� the��

34�� Aga�n,��Ackerman’s��analys�s��refers��to��Amer�can��culture.��But��I��th�nk��that���t��can��be��transferred��w�th��l�ttle���nconven�ence��to��the��Roman�an��context.

35�� “Kant�an”��or��“ut�l�tar�an”��are�� terms��used��here��w�th��no��exeget�c��pretent�ons,��but��rather��as��symbols��for��two��d�fferent��att�tudes��towards��values��that��could��be��used��to��evaluate��a��pol�cy.

36�� Start�ng�� �n�� the��60’s,�� �mportant��contr�but�ons��have��been��made�� for�� the��understand�ng��of��the��ut�l�tar�an�� �nterpretat�on��of�� the�� tak�ngs��clause.��Here�nafter,�� I��w�ll��use�� the�r��common��conclus�ons���n��very��general��terms,��but��I��also��want��to��po�nt��to��more��ref�ned��analys�s.��In��that��sense,��see��Frank��M�chelman��(1967)��“Property,��Ut�l�ty,��and��Fa�rness:��Comments��on�� the��Eth�cal��Foundat�ons��of��‘Just��Compensat�on’��Law,��Harvard Law Review,��vol.��80;��Joseph��Sax��(1964),��“Tak�ngs��and��the��Pol�ce��Power”,��Yale Law Journal,��vol.��74,��no.��36��and��(1971)��“Tak�ngs,��Pr�vate��Property��and��Publ�c��R�ghts”,��Yale Law Journal,��vol.��81,��no.��149��and��also��a��very��r�ch��l�terature��generated��afterwards.��For��a��more��deta�led��and���nterpretat�ve��abstract��of��th�s��d�scuss�on��see��Bruce��Ackerman,��Op. cit.,��chapter��4.

37�� Joseph��Sax��(1971),��Op. cit.,��pp.��63-67.38�� G�ven��the��fact��that���t���s��l�kely��that��the���ntens�ty��of��d�ssat�sfact�on��and��the��tendency��towards��

protests��of��the��expropr�ated��agents��would��often��be��suff�c�ently��drast�c��to��we�ght��as��much��as��the��l�ttle��ga�n��of��publ�c��ut�l�ty��(resulted���n��the��construct�on��of��a��h�ghway,��for��example).��Th�s���s��one��of��the��class�cal��d�lemmas��concern�ng��the��coord�nat�on��of��collect�ve��act�on.

188 �� Apply�ng��Tak�ng��Clauses��Analys�s...����/����Emanuel-M�ha�l��SOCACIU������������189

fa�rness��of��the��compensat�on��are��more��d�ff�cult��to��be��quant�f�ed���n��a��formula.��St�ll,��the��frame��of��reference���s��g�ven��by��the���dea��that,��through��the��tak�ngs��clause,��the��state��has��the��legal��obl�gat�on��(der�ved��from��a��more��fundamental��moral��one)��to��make��sure��that�� the��expropr�ated��agents��are��not��cons�dered��s�mple��means��for�� the��promot�on��of�� some��ends��such��as��soc�al��ut�l�ty,��but�� rather�� they��are�� to��be�� treated��as��ends�� �n��themselves.��An��argument��g�ven��by��Frank��M�chelman,39���nsp�red��by��Kant��and��Rawls,���nterprets��the��moral��ground�ng��of��the��const�tut�onal��tak�ngs��clauses��to��be��related��to��a��certa�n�� �dea��of�� just�ce:�� �t��would��be��unjust�� �f�� there��would��be��major��asymmetr�es��amongst��the��burdens��borne��by��each��c�t�zen��for��the��complet�on��of��publ�c��projects.��In��other��words,�� �t��would��be��unjust���f��only��some��(the��expropr�ated)��would��support�� the��costs��for��projects�� that��w�ll��benef�t��all;�� the��burden��should��be��red�str�buted��through��compensat�on.��A��poss�ble��manner���n��wh�ch��th�s���dea��could��be��made��operat�onal���s��to��st�pulate,��for��example,��that��a��compensat�on��that��would���nd�cate��to��the��expropr�ated��agent��that��he/she���s��not��cons�dered��only��a��means���s��that��wh�ch��leaves��h�m/her���n��an��equal��pos�t�on��to��that��before��the��tak�ng.40

On�� the��other��hand,�� from�� the��ord�nary��observer’s�� standpo�nt�� (that��does��not��assume��a��comprehens�ve��v�ew,��but��rather��tr�es��to��g�ve��a��legal���nterpretat�on��from��the��perspect�ve��of��da�ly��moral��exper�ence)��the��s�tuat�on��seems��much��s�mpler.��The��state��has��taken��from��me��the��property��x,��therefore���t��has��to��compensate��me��for��(the��value��of)��x.��But��even��so,��the��d�scuss�on��could��take��more��soph�st�cated��forms.��A��plaus�ble��cr�ter�on��could��be��the��follow�ng:��“the���deal��solut�on���s��that��of��leav�ng��the���nd�v�dual��owner�� �nd�fferent�� to�� tak�ng��or��keep�ng�� the��property”.41��The��f�rst��consequence��of��embrac�ng��such��cr�ter�a���s��that��the��reasonable��bas�s��for��determ�n�ng��the��compensat�on���s�� the��value��of�� the��property��(�ts��value��on��the��market)��and��not�� the�� �n�t�al��cost.�� If�� I��bought��a��property��w�th��100��un�ts��and���f�� �t��cost��me��100��un�ts�� to��operate���t,��and,�� �n��the��moment��of��the��tak�ng���ts��value��on��the��market��was��300,��the��reasonable��bas�s��for��compensat�on���s��300��un�ts,��not��200��(that���s��100+100;��let’s��observe��that���t���s��st�ll��the��value��of��the��property��that��should��be��cons�dered��the��reasonable��bas�s��even���f��the��value��of�� the��property��would��cont�nue��to��be��100��or��even���f�� �t��would��have��d�m�n�shed).42��Accord�ng�� to��Epste�n,�� another�� �nterest�ng��consequence�� �s�� that�� the��value��of�� the��property��on��the��market��at��the��moment��of��the��tak�ng,��even���f���t���s��a��good��start�ng��po�nt��for��determ�n�ng��the��compensat�on��sum,��cannot��represent��the��sum��as��such.��An��owner��that��has��been��compensated��w�th�� the��market��value�� �s��not�� �nd�fferent�� to�� the��cho�ce��between��keep�ng��the��property��and��hav�ng���t�� taken.��The��reason���s��qu�te��s�mple:�� the��market��value��represents��a��fa�r��compensat�on���f�� the�� transact�on���s��voluntary,�� �f�� the��

39�� Frank��M�chelman��(1997)��Op. cit.,��pp.��67-69.40�� For��a��development��of�� the��“Kant�an”��cr�ter�a��of�� �nterpretat�on��of�� the�� just��compensat�on��

clause,��see��Franck��M�chelman��(1967),��Op. cit. and��Bruce��Ackerman,��Op. cit.41�� R�chard��Epste�n��(1985),��Op. cit.,��p.��182.42�� From��the��perspect�ve��synthes�zed��here��an��example��of��creat�ve���nterpretat�on��of�� the��‘pr�or��

and��just��compensat�on’��prov�so��was��the��one��used��the��Greek��state��for��the��compensat�on��of��the��owners��whose��lands��have��been��expropr�ated��for��the��construct�on��of��a��new��a�rport���n��Athens��for�� the��2004��Olymp�cs.��Thus,�� the��owners��have�� rece�ved�� (at�� the�� t�me��of��expropr�at�on)��governmental��bonds��that��could��be��redeemed��after��a��number��of��years��(and,��w�th��the��current��f�scal��s�tuat�on�� �n��Greece,��not��very��soon��probably).��The��value��of�� the��compensat�on��was��calculated��as��the��average��between��the��market��values��of��the��lands���n��the��last��20��years��(g�ven��the��accelerated��and��expans�ve��development��of��Athens,��the��d�fferences��were��s�gn�f�cant).��

seller��wants��to��sell.��But��usually,��th�s���s��not��the��case��of��the��expropr�ated��agent;43��he��does��not��want��to��sell��and��almost��certa�nly,��he��does��not��want��to��be��expropr�ated.��The��best��solut�on��would��be�� to��cons�der�� fa�r��compensat�on��as�� the��market��value��of�� the��taken��property��plus��a��suff�c�ent��bonus��that��would��cover��the��transact�onal��costs��of��the��expropr�ated��agent��(for��example,��the��costs��related��to��the��effort��of��f�nd�ng��and��buy�ng��another��property).44��But���n��the��major�ty��of��cases��of��the��nat�onal�zed��bu�ld�ngs��taken��through��the��92��decree,��there��wasn’t��any��k�nd��of��compensat�on��whatsoever���nvolved.

Conclusion

I��have��argued��that�� the��commun�st��nat�onal�zat�on��decree���n��Roman�a��was��a��tak�ng��act��and�� that,�� therefore,�� �t�� �s�� to��be��analysed��w�th�n�� the�� framework��g�ven��by�� the��const�tut�onal�� tak�ngs��clauses.��However,�� �n��Roman�a,�� the��nat�onal�zat�on��process��has��taken��place��by���gnor�ng��the��const�tut�onal��clause,�� �n��any��reasonable��legal��and��moral���nterpretat�on��of���t.��Therefore,���mmed�ately��after��the��tak�ngs,��the��owners��were��ent�tled��to��rest�tut�on��or��compensat�on.��But���t���s���mportant��to��note��that��the��temporal��var�able��counts�� for��someth�ng�� �n�� the��moral��evaluat�on.��The��establ�shment��of�� the��ent�tlement��of��A��at��the��moment��T��does��not��mean��that��there���s��a��suff�c�ent��ground��to��assert��the��ent�tlement��of��A��(or��any��agent��related��to��A)��at��the��moment��T+50��(years).��In��other��words,�� the��object�ve��of�� th�s��art�cle�� �s��not�� to��aff�rm��the��moral��fa�rness��of��rest�tut�on.��For��th�s��to��happen,��we��need��an��add�t�onal��argument.

References

Ackerman,��Bruce.��1977.��Private Property and the Constitution,��New��Haven:��Yale��Un�vers�ty��Press.

Baias, Flavius, Dumitrache, Bogdan şi Nicolae, Marian. 2001. Regimul juridic al imobilelor preluate abuziv, Vol. I: Legea Nr. 10/2001 comentată şi adnotată, Bucureşti: Rosetti.

Bentham��Jeremy. 1987.��The Theory of Legislation,��Rothman��Repr�nt,��pp.��111-113.The��Const�tut�on��of��the��People’s��Republ�c��of��Roman�a,��1948.��Mon�torul��Of�c�al��nr.��87��b�s,��Apr�l��

13th.Epste�n,��R�chard.��1985.��Takings. Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain,��Harvard��

Un�vers�ty��Press.Epste�n,��R�chard.��1997.��“A��Clear��V�ew��of��the��Cathedral:��The��Dom�nance��of��Property��Rules”,��

The Yale Law Journal,��vol.��106,��no.��7.Epste�n,��R�chard.��1997.��“Tak�ngs,��Exclus�v�ty��and��Speech:��The��Legacy��of�� ‘PruneYard��v.��

Rob�ns’”,��The University of Chicago Law Review vol.��64,��no.��1.Focşeneanu, Eleodor. 1992. Istoria Constituţională a României: 1859-1991, Bucureşti:

Human�tas.Marx,��Karl��and��Engels,��Fr�edr�ch.��1908.��Manifesto of the Communist Party,��New��York:��Labor��

43�� For��a��more��spec�al�zed��and��scrupulous��argumentat�on,��see��R�chard��Epste�n��(1985),��Op. cit.,��p.��183.

44�� In��Br�t�sh��common��law,��for��example,�� th�s��bonus���s��10%��of��the��market��value��(cf.�� idem,��p.��184).

190 �� Collaborat�on��or��Ex�t��from��the��Stage?����/����M�rcea��FLONTA������������191

News��Co.M�chelman,��Frank.��1967.��“Property,��Ut�l�ty,��and��Fa�rness:��Comments��on��the��Eth�cal��Foundat�ons��

of��‘Just��Compensat�on’��Law”,��Harvard Law Review,��vol.��80.M�chelman,��Frank.��1997.��“The��Common��Law��Basel�ne��and��Rest�tut�on��for��the��Lost��Commons:��

A��Reply��to��Professor��Epste�n”,��The University of Chicago Law Review,��vol.��64,��no.��1.Sax,��Joseph.��1964.��“Tak�ngs��and��the��Pol�ce��Power”,��Yale Law Journal,��vol.��74,��no.��36.Sax,��Joseph.��1971.��“Tak�ngs,��Pr�vate��Property��and��Publ�c��R�ghts”,��Yale Law Journal,��vol.��81,��

no.��149.Waldron,��Jeremy.��1992.��“Supersed�ng��H�stor�c��Injust�ce”,��Ethics,��vol.��103,��no.4,��pp��4-28.

Collaboration or Exit from the Stage? The Dilemma of the Elites in Dictatorial Regimes as Illustrated by the Heisenberg Case

M�rcea��FLONTA

No��one��who��d�scusses��the��exper�ence��of��d�ctator�al��reg�mes���n��the��20th��century���n��Europe��can��avo�d��the��quest�ons��of��whether��and��where��and��under��what��c�rcumstances��we��may��just�fy�� the��collaborat�on��of��sc�ent�f�c,�� techn�cal,��art�st�c��or��adm�n�strat�ve��el�tes��w�th�� the�� author�t�es��of�� those�� t�mes.��The��quest�on��was�� adamantly�� asked��about�� the��people��who��belonged�� to�� these��groups��after��1917�� �n�� the��Sov�et��Un�on,���n��nat�onal-soc�al�st��Germany,��as��well��as�� �n�� the��countr�es��of�� the��Sov�et��bloc,��after��World��War��II.��It��also��stands��before��the��h�stor�ans��of��today.��The��top�c��has��generated��many��pass�onate,��often��v�rulent��controvers�es�� �n��post-1989��Roman�a.��Those��who��take�� �nterest�� �n�� the��work��of��Roman�an��ph�losophers:��Blaga,��V�anu��or��No�ca1��face��th�s���ssue���n���ts��mult�ple��hypostases��and��aspects.��I��ment�oned��these��names��because,��just��as���n��the��He�senberg��case,��I�� th�nk���t�� �s��about��personal�t�es��character�zed��by��an��outstand�ng��moral��ser�ousness.

Pass�ng��a��balanced,��unb�ased�� judgement��on�� the�� respons�b�l�ty��of�� the��el�tes���n��d�ctator�al��reg�mes��seems��to��me��to��be��a��goal��wh�ch���mpl�es��d�ff�cult�es��that��can��hardly��be��est�mated.��On��the��one��hand,��because�� the��one�� that�� judges��should��know��well��and��take���nto��account��all��the��elements��of��the��h�stor�cal��background,��and��all��the��data��of��the��s�tuat�on��these��people��faced,��wh�ch���s��a��very��d�ff�cult��th�ng��to��do,���f��not��downr�ght���mposs�ble.��On��the��other��hand,��because��a��person��judg�ng��fa�rly��w�ll��not��be��ent�tled��to��operate��w�th��moral��standards��that��are��more��demand�ng��than��the��ones��they��would��be��w�ll�ng��to��apply���n��evaluat�ng��the�r��own��act�ons��and��dec�s�ons.��People��that��embark��on��such��a��debate��should��be��aware��that��they��face,��at��each��step,��the��r�sk��of��fa�l�ng��to��establ�sh��the��r�ght��rat�os,��of��s�mpl�fy�ng��th�ngs,��thus��jump�ng��to��shallow��and��b�ased��conclus�ons.��That��wh�ch��may,��nevertheless,��mot�vate�� them��to��proceed��onto��th�s��m�ned��land��w�ll��have��the��feel�ng��that��the��d�scuss�on��may��have��a��s�gn�f�cant��potent�al��for��art�culat�ng��and��re�nforc�ng��moral��d�scernment.

F�rst��and�� foremost,�� I�� f�nd�� �t�� �mportant�� to��understand��how��hard�� �t��would��be��for��prom�nent��el�te��f�gures,�� �n��a��relat�vely��stable��d�ctator�al��reg�me,�� to��refuse��any��collaborat�on��w�th��the��author�t�es.��F�rstly,��because��the��pressure��that��can��be��put��on��an��outstand�ng��personal�ty�� �s��stronger�� than�� the��one��placed��on�� the��ord�nary��man.��We��should��th�nk��of��the��loss��of��soc�al��status��and��of��the��acute��degradat�on��of��l�v�ng��standards��not��only��for��the��respect�ve��person��but��also��for��her��fam�ly��and��other��persons��to��whom��she��has��respons�b�l�t�es.��We��talk��here,��therefore,��about��losses��that��affect��not��only��the��person���n��quest�on��but��also��the��members��of��the�r��fam�l�es,��and��often��larger��

��1�� Luc�an��Blaga��(1895-1961),��poet��and��Roman�an��ph�losopher,��Tudor��V�anu��(1897-1964),��ph�losopher��and��Roman�an�� l�terature�� theor�st,��Constant�n��No�ca��(1907-1987),��Roman�an��ph�losopher.��

192 �� Collaborat�on��or��Ex�t��from��the��Stage?����/����M�rcea��FLONTA������������193

groups��of��close��people.��These��are��sacr�f�ces��hard��to��accept��when��there���s��no��prospect��of��change��loom�ng,��even���n��a��more��remote��future.��It���s��also��hard��to��fathom��whether��burn�ng��all��br�dges��does��not���nvolve��cons�derable��r�sks��for��one’s��personal��safety��and��for��those��that��every���nd�v�dual��feels��compelled��to��defend��and��protect.

Even���f��prom�nent��f�gures��dec�de��to��accept��extremely��pa�nful��sacr�f�ces��and��face��ser�ous��dangers,��they��should,��however,��take���nto��account��yet��other��consequences��of��the�r��refusal.��Let��us��speak��a��l�ttle��about��these��k�nds��of��consequences.��The��collect�v�ty��w�ll��def�n�tely��see��as��a��loss��the��replacement��of��a��qual�f�ed��sc�ent�st��or��professor��w�th��one��less��sk�lled��and��less��mot�vated.��Th�ngs��w�ll��stand��just�� the��same��w�th��doctors,��eng�neers,��arch�tects,��adm�n�strators,��and��other��experts.��What��w�ll��the��decl�ne��of��any��respons�b�l�t�es��by��the��el�te��mean��at��that��po�nt��to��the��collect�v�ty?

The�r��ex�t��from��the��stage��w�ll��have��yet��more��dramat�c��consequences.��The��path��to��the��top��w�ll��be��opened��to��med�ocre��people,��often��career�sts��w�thout��scruples.��The��damage��that�� these��persons��may��cause��w�ll��be��felt��by��many��people.��The��refusal��of��the��el�tes��to��accept��respons�b�l�t�es��w�ll��also��cause��the��annulment��of��many��ways���n��wh�ch��the��author�t�es’��dec�s�ons��m�ght��be��moderated.��Th�s���s��an���nfluence��that��may��have��s�gn�f�cant��effects,��when��we��speak��about��f�gures��of��great��prest�ge,��endowed��also��w�th��the��ab�l�ty��to��manoeuvre��and��strong��persuas�ve��capac�ty.��It���s��clear��that��the��places��vacated��by��the��w�thdrawal��of��except�onal��personal�t�es��w�ll��be��f�lled,��at��best,��by��people��much��less��s�gn�f�cant�� �n�� terms��of��profess�onal��sk�lls.��Exper�ence��shows��that�� �n�� the�r�� relat�ons��w�th�� the��author�t�es�� these��people�� tend�� to��become��yes men.��Those��who��have��known���nt�mately��the��funct�on�ng��mechan�sms��of��these��systems��w�ll��f�nd���t��d�ff�cult��to��accept��as��reasonable��the��character�zat�on��of��any��reasons���nvoked���n�� favour��of��agree�ng�� to�� �nst�tut�onal�� respons�b�l�t�es��by��profess�onal,�� sc�ent�f�c��or��prom�nent��cultural�� f�gures��as��a��post festum�� just�f�cat�on�� for��moral��weakness��and��opportun�sm.��We��are��go�ng�� to��have�� to��exam�ne,��whether��an��assert�on�� that��He�senberg��made��after��the��war���s��just�f�ed��that���n��a��d�ctatorsh�p,��only��those��fe�gn�ng��to��collaborate��w�th��the��reg�me��can��oppose��res�stance.��When��someone��takes��an��open��stand��aga�nst�� the��reg�me,���t�� �s��clear��that�� they��wa�ve��any��means��to��put��up��an��act�ve��res�stance.

It�� �s�� true�� that��such��observat�ons��are��counterbalanced��by��arguments�� that�� look��very��conv�nc�ng���n��favour��of�� the��refusal�� to��collaborate��or��of�� �ts��drast�c�� l�m�tat�on.��Here��are�� just�� a�� few��of�� them.��The��collaborat�on��of��a��prest�g�ous�� f�gure��w�ll��be��perce�ved���n��the��w�der��c�rcles��of��the��populat�on��as��a��leg�t�mat�on��of��the��reg�me.��It���s��go�ng��to��d�shearten��those��who��put��up��res�stance,��even��though,��most��often,��th�s���s��a passive resistance. Vasile Bancilă, one of Lucian Blaga’s admirers and friends, excla�med�� �n��1959��when�� the�� latter��publ�shed��an��art�cle�� that��pra�sed��some��of�� the��achievements of the regime: “The Ceahlău Mountain2��has��crumbled��down”.�� It���s��only��natural�� for��ord�nary��people�� to��see��outstand�ng��personal�t�es��also��as��moral���nstances.��The�r��w�ll�ngness�� to�� collaborate,��w�th�� �nst�tut�ons�� subjected�� to�� the��command��and��control��of��some��oppress�ve��author�ty,��w�ll��be��at�� least��confus�ng��to��the��opponents��of��the��reg�me.��D�ctator�al��systems��of��every��k�nd��are��very��well��aware��of��th�s��psycholog�cal��effect,��and��they��are���nterested���n��us�ng���t.��They��seek��to��get��the��collaborat�on��of��certa�n��el�tes��through��a��more��or��less��well��measured��comb�nat�on��of��

��2�� An���mpos�ng��mounta�n��peak���n��eastern��Roman�a.��

threats��and��pressure��accompan�ed��by��flattery,��advantages,��pr�v�leges,��and��often��by��the��prom�se��that�� those��who��w�ll��assume��respons�b�l�t�es��w�ll��enjoy��a��certa�n��space��for��personal��dec�s�on-mak�ng.��They��count,��and��for��good��reason�� too,��on�� the�� fact��that��few��people��are��apt��to��grasp��the��reasons��of��a��collaborat�on��w�th��the��author�t�es��that�� �s��not��based��on��fear��or��opportun�sm,��on��the��unw�ll�ngness�� to��g�ve��up��certa�n��benef�ts,��but��on�� the��sense��of��respons�b�l�ty��for�� the�� l�fe��of�� the��commun�ty.��People��tend�� to��see��any��ava�lab�l�ty�� to��collaborate��as��a��s�gn�� that��prom�nent��personal�t�es��would��absolve��the��reg�me��of��ser�ous��moral��offences.��For���nstance,���n��the��case��of��the��nat�onal-soc�al�st��reg�me,��the��culpab�l�ty��of��the��rac�al��persecut�ons��and��cr�mes;���n��the��case��of��commun�st��author�tar�an��systems,��the��culpab�l�ty��of��mass��exterm�nat�on��of��opponents��or��that��of��condemn�ng��a��large��number��of��persons��to��a��l�fe��of��hum�l�at�on��and��pr�vat�on��on��account��of��the�r��soc�al��background,��or��bel�efs��and��conv�ct�ons��that��run��counter�� to�� the��off�c�al��doctr�ne.��Moreover��one��cannot��overlook�� the��so-called��argument��of�� the��“sl�ppery-slope”.��F�gures��dr�ven��by��good�� �ntent�ons�� that��accept��publ�c��respons�b�l�t�es���n��these��systems��run��the��r�sk��of��no��longer��f�nd�ng��acceptable��retreat��paths��when��collaborat�on��w�th��the��author�t�es���nvolves��moral��comprom�ses��of��the��most��ser�ous��nature.

In��a��way,��we��could��envy��those��who��honestly��bel�eve��that��the��pros��and��cons��of��the�� �mpl�cat�on��of�� the��el�tes�� �n��d�ctator�al�� reg�mes��are��very��strong,��whereas�� those��opposed��to��them��are��weak.��For,��as��they��see��th�ngs,�� there��are��good��reasons���n��each��case��to��accept��or��refuse��collaborat�on.��It���s���nferred��that��where��talent��and��except�onal��competence��comb�ne��w�th��the��f�rm��attachment��to��moral��landmarks,��what���s��asked��of��those��who��posses��them���s��the��strength��of��character��requ�red��to��unswerv�ngly��follow��the��vo�ce��of��consc�ence.��If��we��are,��on��the��contrary,��led��towards��the��conclus�on��that��the��pros��and��cons��stand���n��balance,��then��we��w�ll��have��to��adm�t��that��the��s�tuat�on���s��not��only��dramat�c,�� �n�� terms��of��personal��dest�ny,��but��also��part�cularly��quest�onable��from��a��moral��po�nt��of��v�ew.��Th�s���s��to��say��there���s��no��solut�on��that��could��offer��the���nd�v�dual��full��sat�sfact�on���n��the�r��capac�ty��as��a��respons�ble��person.

D�lemmas��such��as��these��take��a��clear��form��as��soon��as��th�ngs��whose��d�ssoc�at�on��would��be��salutary�� �n�� terms��of��moral��ex�genc�es��cannot�� �n��fact��be��separated.��How��could,��for���nstance,��devot�on��and��loyalty��to��the��country��you��were��born��and��l�ve���n,��to��cultural�� trad�t�ons��and��ways��of�� l�fe�� rooted��deep�� �n��h�story,��be��reconc�led��w�th��avers�on��to��a��repress�ve��power��when��open��res�stance��and��the��frontal��coll�s�on��th�s��k�nd��of��res�stance���nvolves���s��not,��at��least��sl�ghtly,��a��real�st�c��alternat�ve?3��By��serv�ng��your��country��and��act�ng�� for�� the��welfare��of��your�� fellow��countrymen,��would��you��not��be��support�ng��those��that��hold��power��and��have��the��last��say���n��dec�s�on-mak�ng?��On��the��other��hand,��wh�le��refus�ng��any��collaborat�on,��would��you��not��place��yourself���n�� the�� �mposs�b�l�ty��of��ach�ev�ng�� th�ngs�� that��are�� �mportant��not�� just�� to��you��but�� to��others��as��well,��and��of��m�n�m�z�ng��bad��outcomes?��These��are��quest�ons��that��are��to��be��answered��by��an��outstand�ng��person,��who���s��deeply��comm�tted��to��fundamental��moral��values,��when��faced��w�th�� the��cho�ce��of��assum�ng��respons�b�l�t�es��or�� refus�ng��any���nvolvement.��I��bel�eve��that��d�scuss�ng��a��case��such��as��that��of��He�senberg��may��help��

��3�� Even��the��most��undaunted��opponents��take��act�on��only��when��they��stand��a��chance��that��by��the�r��sacr�f�ce��they��would��obta�n��a��weaken�ng��of��the��system,��a��strengthen�ng��of��the��res�stance.��Put��otherw�se,��they��act��reasonably,��solely���n��th�s��case.

194 �� Collaborat�on��or��Ex�t��from��the��Stage?����/����M�rcea��FLONTA������������195

formulate��more��art�culate��answers��to��such��quest�ons.There�� �s�� a�� consensus�� about�� the�� except�onal�� sc�ent�f�c�� accompl�shments��

of��Werner��He�senberg,��but�� the��moral��evaluat�on��of��h�s��pos�t�on��as��ch�ef��of�� the��programme��of��atom�c��energy,�� the��so-called��“Uran�um��project”,��dur�ng��the��Second��World��War�� �s�� st�ll�� a�� controvers�al�� �ssue.��There�� �s�� a��grow�ng�� l�terature��on�� the��matter.��No��doubt,��by��accept�ng�� to�� lead��such��a��project,��He�senberg��also��accepted��to��collaborate��w�th��Naz���author�t�es.��Most��of�� those��who��d�scussed��He�senberg’s��behav�our�� �n�� th�s��project,��presupposed�� that�� the��moral�� reasons�� for��accept�ng��or��refus�ng��the��collaborat�on��were��clear��and��w�thout��amb�gu�ty.��In��my��op�n�on,��th�s���s��the��presuppos�t�on��assumed��by��some��cr�t�cs��or��supporters��of��He�senberg’s��act�v�ty��as��ch�ef��of�� the��Uran�um��project.��One��object�ve��of��my��analys�s�� �s�� to��quest�on��th�s��presuppos�t�on,��to��determ�ne��whether���t���s��just�f�ed��and��to��po�nt��out��the��l�m�ts��of���ts��just�f�cat�on.

Before�� the�� beg�nn�ng�� of��World��War�� II,��Werner�� He�senberg�� enjoyed�� an��und�sputed��repute��w�th�n�� the��world��commun�ty��of��phys�c�sts.��A��researcher��of��an��uncommon��precoc�ty,��he��was��awarded��the��Nobel��Pr�ze���n��1933,��for��“establ�sh�ng”��quantum��mechan�cs��when��aged�� th�rty-two.��Works�� that��made��h�s��name��known��throughout�� the��world��had��been��publ�shed��as��early��as��1925-1927.��In�� the��m�l�eu��of��phys�c�sts��of��Germany��–��who��em�grated�� to�� the��Un�ted��States��of��Amer�ca��and�� to��Great��Br�ta�n��when��H�tler��came��to��power��–��He�senberg��was��also��h�ghly��v�ewed��for��h�s��character.��F�rst,��as��a��favour�te��student��of��N�els��Bohr��who��was��worsh�pped���n��the��fam�ly��of��phys�c�sts��not��only��on��account��of��h�s��sc�ent�f�c��work��but��also��for��h�s��moral���ntegr�ty;��secondly,��for��h�s��courage��and��cons�stency��of��bel�ef.��In��1933,��He�senberg��s�gned,��together��w�th��Max��Planck,��Max��von��Laue��and��Arnold��Sommerfeld,��a��pet�t�on��of��protest��aga�nst�� the��d�sm�ssal��of�� Jew�sh��sc�ent�sts�� from��German��un�vers�t�es.��What��captured��spec�al��attent�on��was�� that�� the��young��professor4��d�d��not��hes�tate�� to��cont�nue��g�v�ng��lectures��about��the��theory��of��relat�v�ty��of��Albert��E�nste�n,��an��od�ous��name��to��the��German��author�t�es.��These��nonconform�st��stands��made��He�senberg��one��of��the��targets��of��attacks��by��the��advocates��of��“Aryan��phys�cs”��aga�nst��the��so-called��“Jew�sh��phys�cs”.5��In��1937-1938,��He�senberg��had��become��so��overwhelmed��by��these��attacks��that��he��ser�ously��cons�dered��em�grat�on.6��He��gave��up��the��thought��only��when��the��attacks��stopped��upon��the���ntervent�on��of�� the��author�t�es.��Th�s���ntervent�on��was��d�ctated��by��the��fact��that,��after��the��mass�ve��em�grat�on��of��sc�ent�sts��of��Jew�sh��b�rth,��the��loss��of��a��valuable��phys�c�st��such��as��He�senberg��was��not��des�red.

In�� the�� summer��of��1939,�� shortly��before�� the��German��attack��aga�nst��Poland,��

��4�� He�senberg��held�� the��Department��of��Theoret�cal��Phys�cs��of��Le�pz�g��Un�vers�ty�� �n��1927,��becom�ng��the��youngest��professor���n��the��h�story��of��the��German��un�vers�ty.

��5�� In��publ�c��speeches��and��press��art�cles,��He�senberg��was��st�gmat�zed��as��a��“wh�te��Jew”��and��“sp�r�t�� from��E�nste�n’s��sp�r�t”.��For��more��deta�ls��on��th�s�� top�c��see��H.��Rechenberg,��Werner Heisenberg. Deutsche und Judische Physik,��München/Zür�ch,��P�per��Verlag,��1992.

��6�� In��a��letter��addressed��to��h�s��former��professor,��Arnold��Sommerfeld,��on��Apr�l��14,��1938,��He�sen-berg��wrote:��“R�ght��now,��I��don’t��have��any��other��cho�ce��but��to��requ�re��my��d�sm�ssal��should��I��be��den�ed��the��r�ght��to��defend��my��honour��[...]�� .��You��know��too��well��how��pa�nful���t��would��be��for��me��to��leave��Germany;��I��wouldn’t��l�ke��to��do���t��unless��absolutely��necessary”.��(Quoted��after��Arm�n��Hermann,��Werner Heisenberg,��Re�nbeck��be���Hamburg,��Rowolth��Taschenbuch��Verlag,��1976,��p.��63).

He�senberg��pa�d��a��v�s�t��to��the��Un�ted��States��of��Amer�ca.��He��was��warmly��welcomed��both��by��the��Amer�can��hosts��and��by��the��phys�c�sts��that��had��em�grated��from��Germany.��The��latter���n��part�cular��–��Eugen��W�gner,��Leo��Zs�lard,��Hans��Bethe,��V�ctor��We�sskopf,��Edward��Teller��–��tr�ed��to��persuade��h�m��not��to��return��to��Germany.��He�senberg��rece�ved��offers��from��h�ghly��reputable��Amer�can��un�vers�t�es�� that��proposed��most��attract�ve��pos�t�ons.��No��one��succeeded���n��mak�ng��h�m��em�grate.

Here��are��the��explanat�ons��that��He�senberg��gave��later��on��for��th�s��dec�s�on.��The��pos�t�ons�� �n��western��un�vers�t�es��should��be��g�ven�� to�� those��who��could��not��stay�� �n��Germany��and��Austr�a.��The��path��toward��tak�ng��the��leadersh�p��of��sc�ent�f�c���nst�tut�ons���n��Germany��should��not��be��opened�� to��career�sts�� and��even�� less�� to�� supporters��of��nat�onal�� soc�al�sm.��He,��He�senberg��could��not��desert��h�s��young��co-workers��who��would�� f�nd�� �t��d�ff�cult�� to��get��opportun�t�es�� to�� further�� the�r��career��as�� researchers��outs�de��the��borders��of��Germany.��Last��but��not��least,��he��hoped��to��be��able��to��bu�ld��some��“�slands��of��stab�l�ty”��and,��g�ven��h�s��sc�ent�f�c��prest�ge��and��h�s��loyalty��to��Germany,��to��attempt��to���nfluence��some��of��the��author�t�es’��dec�s�ons.��Should��a��war��break��out,��he��would��be��able��to��prevent��or��l�m�t��the��send�ng��of��young��phys�c�sts��to��the��front.��To��the��observat�on��that���n��h�s��capac�ty��as��an��atom�st��phys�c�st��he��could��be��compelled��to��take��part�� �n��m�l�tary��programs,��He�senberg��answered��that,��f�rst,�� the��poss�b�l�ty��of��us�ng��nuclear��power��to��manufacture��weapons��was��at��least��problemat�c��(an��op�n�on��shared��at�� the��t�me��by��phys�c�sts��of��democrat�c��countr�es��as��well),��and��secondly,��should���t��be��proved�� that��a��nuclear��weapon��could��be��bu�lt��after��all,�� th�s��could��only��happen��much��later,��after�� the��war��had��ended.��He�senberg��also��adm�tted��that��h�s��stay�ng���n��nat�onal-soc�al�st��Germany��would��force��h�m��to��make��pa�nful��comprom�ses.��The��conclus�on��was��that��for��a��man���n��h�s��pos�t�on��there��was��not,���n��general,��a��truly��good��alternat�ve.��In��th�s��respect,��he��quoted��an��observat�on��that��Planck��made��after��H�tler��had��come��to��power,��when��He�senberg��asked��h�m��what��was��to��be��done:��“Under��the��terr�ble��c�rcumstances��that��we��f�nd��today���n��Germany,��there���s��no��way��one��can��act��fa�rly.��Every��dec�s�on��makes��one��part��of��an�� �njust�ce”.7��Planck’s��words��express��most�� suggest�vely�� the�� state��of��m�nd��of�� a��patr�ot��who�� foresaw�� that�� the�� reg�me���nstalled���n��1933��would��lead��the��German��people�� to��catastrophe,��but��also��bel�eved��that�� researchers�� loyal�� to�� the��country,��part�cularly�� those��belong�ng�� to�� the��younger��generat�on,��should��th�nk��of��the��future��of��German��sc�ence.��Those��words��also��m�rrored��He�senberg’s��frame��of��m�nd.

H�s��colleagues�� �n�� the��Un�ted��States��could��not�� �gnore�� the�� �mpress�on�� that�� �n��He�senberg’s��reason�ng,�� the��feel�ng��of��belong�ng��to�� the��German��nat�on��somehow��

��7�� See��W.��He�senberg,��Der Teil und das Ganze. Gespräche im Umkreis der Atomphysik,��München,��P�per��Verlag,��p.��209.��It�� �s��worth��ment�on�ng��that��after��the��war��a��s�m�lar��op�n�on��was�� stated��by�� the��German��astrophys�c�st��Walter��Grotr�an�� �n��a�� letter�� to�� the�� renowned��Jew�sh��phys�c�st��L�se��Me�tner,��who�� left��Germany��after�� the��nat�onal�� soc�al�sts��came�� to��power.��Grotr�an��character�sed��the��s�tuat�on��of��German��patr�ots,��who��had��an��host�le��att�tude��towards��the��Naz���d�ctatorsh�p,��as��follows:��“We��only��had��the��cho�ce��between��d�fferent��ev�ls,��w�thout��be�ng��clear��wh�ch��one���s��the��worse.��I��have��cons�dered��the��total��destruct�on��(völlige Niederlage)��of��Germany��as��the��worst��among��them��and��after�� �t��had��happened��I��found��my��fear��conf�rmed”.�� (The�� letter�� �s��dated��on�� the��29.12.1947)��Quote��after��D�eter��Hoffmann,��“Kopenhagen” war kein Einzelfall,�� �n��M�chael��Frayn,��Kopenhagen,��Gött�ngen,��Wallste�n��Verlag,��2001,��p.��187.��

196 �� Collaborat�on��or��Ex�t��from��the��Stage?����/����M�rcea��FLONTA������������197

overshadowed�� the�� fear�� that�� the�� nat�onal-soc�al�st�� reg�me�� would�� cause�� an��unprecedented��catastrophe���n��the��h�story��of��Germany.��He�senberg��d�d��not��seem��to��understand��that��a��d�ctator�al��reg�me���nsp�red��from��the��doctr�ne��of��rac�al��hatred��would���nev�tably��become��a��cr�m�nal��reg�me.��He��was��not��prepared��to��separate��very��sharply��the���nterests��of��the��German��people��from��the��pol�cy��of��the��author�t�es.��That���s��why��h�s��fr�ends���n��Amer�ca��d�d��not��fully��understand��h�m��and,���n��the��years��that��followed,��they��were�� �ncl�ned�� to�� �ncreas�ngly��suspect��h�s��pol�t�cal�� reason�ng.��H�s�� refusal�� to��leave��Germany��was��seen��as��a��d�squ�et�ng���nd�cat�on��of��h�s��w�ll�ngness��to��collaborate��w�th��the��author�t�es��of��the��state.��Th�s��was��all��the��more��d�squ�et�ng��as��He�senberg��was��deemed��by��far��the��most��capable��German��phys�c�st.��These��susp�c�ons��were��actually��corroborated��by��some��of��He�senberg’s�� remarks��and�� react�ons��dur�ng�� the��war.�� It��was��obv�ous��that��he��d�d��not��want��H�tler�� to��w�n,��but��he��d�d��not��want��a��total��defeat��of��Germany��e�ther��and��much��less��so��the��strengthen�ng��of��the��pos�t�on��of��the��Sov�et��Un�on��that��would��have��been��one��of��the��consequences��of��such��a��defeat.8��R�ght��after��the��host�l�t�es��had��started,�� �n��September��1939,��He�senberg��and��some��of��h�s��close��colleagues��were��mob�l�sed��for�� the��Uran�um��programme,��a��research��project��of�� the��German��army��meant��to��establ�sh��whether��nuclear��power��could��be��used��for��m�l�tary��purposes.��It��was��already��a��matter��of��common��knowledge��that��the��raw��mater�al��for��a��cha�n��react�on��was��uran�um��235,��an���sotope��extremely��hard��to��separate��from��uran�um��238��that��could��eas�ly��be��procured.��At��that��t�me,��the��op�n�ons��of��German��researchers��as��to��the��techn�cal��poss�b�l�t�es��of��obta�n�ng��a��larger��quant�ty��of��uran�um��235��were��d�v�ded.��After��the��war,��He�senberg��just�f�ed��h�s��be�ng��part��of��th�s��project��as��follows.��Together��w�th��h�s��colleagues,��he��made�� from�� the��very��beg�nn�ng�� the��d�st�nct�on��between��a��reactor��capable��of��produc�ng��energy��and��a��bomb��that��requ�red��uran�um��235,��assert�ng��that��the��f�rst��project��was��feas�ble��whereas��the��second��was��beyond��the��techn�cal��poss�b�l�t�es��ex�st�ng���n��Germany��at�� the��t�me.��He��also��bel�eved���t�� �s��very���mportant�� that�� respons�ble��people��should��keep��control��over�� the��project,��and�� that��thanks��to�� th�s��project��many��young��phys�c�sts��would��not��be��sent�� to�� the��front.9��The��

��8�� There�� are�� conf�rmat�ons��of�� these�� susp�c�ons�� that��were�� �nvoked�� �ns�stently�� and��even��overstated��by��those��colleagues��and��h�stor�ans��that��sketched,��after��the��war,��a��negat�ve��moral��portra�t��of��He�senberg.��He��sa�d,��for���nstance,�� to��the��Dutch��phys�c�st��Hendr�k��Cas�m�r��that��Germany��had��the��role�� to��protect��Western��culture��from��the��threats��com�ng��from��the��East,��and��concluded:��“A��Europe��under��German��leadersh�p��m�ght��be��the��least��harm,��though”.��In��general,��He�senberg��would��clearly��express��h�s��oppos�t�on��to��the��reg�me���n��the��c�rcle��of��h�s��fr�ends,��but��he��was��try�ng��to��protect��Germany���n��front��of��fore�gners,��hes�tat�ng��to��expl�c�tly��separate�� the�� �nterests��of�� �ts��people�� from��H�tler’s��pol�cy.��Wh�le�� �n��Zur�ch�� for�� sc�ent�f�c��conferences�� �n��December��1944,��on�� the�� �nv�tat�on��of��h�s��Sw�ss�� fr�end��Paul��Scherrer,�� the��latter’s��w�fe��asked��h�m��what��he��thought��about��the��atroc�t�es��perpetrated��by��the��Naz�s��aga�nst��the��Jews���n��France��and��the��Netherlands.��He�senberg’s��reply��was��that��he��had��no��knowledge��about��that.��Accused,��on��the��same��occas�on,��by��young��phys�c�st��P�et��Gugelot,��who��was���n��Scherrer’s�� team,��that��he��supported��H�tler’s��pol�cy,��He�senberg��repl�ed:��“I��am��German��but��I��am��not��a��Naz�”.��W�th��regard�� to�� the��Sov�et��danger,��He�senberg��answered��h�s��colleague��Gregor��Wentzel��who��had��asked��h�m��whether��he��accepted��the���dea��that��the��war��was��lost:��“Yes,��but���t��would��have��been��great���f��we��had��won”.��(See��Thomas��Powers,��Heisenberg’s War. The Secret History of the German Bomb,��New��York,��Da��Capo��Press,��1993).

��9�� See��W.��He�senberg,��Der Teil und das Ganze,��pp.��236-239.

reasonable��character��of�� these��cons�derat�ons��cannot��be��quest�oned,��even��though���t��could��be��sa�d��they��are��post festum.

In��m�d-1940,��Germany��was���n��a��favourable��pos�t�on��to��obta�n��the��raw��mater�al��for�� the��cha�n��react�on.��Bes�de��the��uran�um��from��the��m�nes���n��Czechoslovak�a��and��the��one��from��Congo��that��had��been��requ�s�t�oned��by��the��German��troops���n��France,���t��also��possessed��the��sole��heavy��water��plant���n��Europe���n��Ryukan,��Norway.��Had��those���nvolved���n��the��project,��He�senberg��f�rst��among��them,��been��determ�ned��to��try��mak�ng��the��bomb,��they��should��have��demanded��at��that��po�nt��the��concentrat�on��of��all��ex�stent��sc�ent�f�c��and�� technolog�cal�� forces,�� as��well�� as��cons�derable�� funds�� to��allow�� the��process��to��be��speeded��up,��thereby��accelerat�ng��all�� those��act�v�t�es��that��were��cruc�al��to��bu�ld�ng��a��weapon��that��could��assure��the��war��would��be��won.��Th�s���s��what��was��done���n��the��Un�ted��States��of��Amer�ca���n��1942��for��the��Manhattan��project.��The��m�l�tary��and��c�v�l��author�t�es��were��not,��however,���nformed��by��the��researchers��on��the��except�onal��m�l�tary��s�gn�f�cance��of��the��programme.��He�senberg,��for���nstance,��cont�nued��to��l�ve���n��Le�pz�g,��where��he��saw��to��h�s��dut�es��as��a��professor,��and��came��to��Berl�n��just��once��a��week��for�� the��Uran�um��project.��Wh�le���n��Amer�ca,�� the��em�grants��were��becom�ng��h�ghly��worr�ed��and��warned�� the��author�t�es�� about�� the�� �mm�nence��of�� a��German��nuclear��program��w�th��m�l�tary��object�ves,��He�senberg��was��tell�ng��ant�-Naz���phys�c�st��Fr�edr�ch��Georg��Houtermans��that��h�s��goal��was��to��bu�ld��a��reactor��and��not��a��bomb,��and��to��protect��h�s��colleagues��dur�ng��the��war.10��All��these��seem��to���nd�cate��that��He�senberg��d�d��not��have��the���ntent�on��or��the��des�re��to��bu�ld��a��nuclear��weapon.��Together��w�th��h�s��colleagues,��he��had��not��even��reached,��at�� that��moment,��a��bas�c��conclus�on��about��the��poss�b�l�ty��of��manufactur�ng��such��a��weapon.

Th�ngs��changed,��however,�� �n�� the��summer��of��1941.��Theoret�cal�� research��had��got��to��a��po�nt��that���nd�cated��a��nuclear��bomb��could��be��made��prov�ded��huge��resources��were��mob�l�sed�� to��solve��extremely��d�ff�cult�� techn�cal��problems.��Th�s��conclus�on��created��a��great��deal��of��worry.��He�senberg��and��h�s��closer��co-researchers��knew��now��that�� the��other��s�de��m�ght��bu�ld�� the��bomb��as��well.��And��they��assumed��that��German��researchers��close��to��the��reg�me��m�ght��warn��the��author�t�es.��The��consequence��would��have��been��a�� f�erce�� race��between�� the�� two��s�des�� to��ach�eve�� the��project.��What��had��He�senberg��set��h�s��m�nd��to,���n��all��l�kel�hood,��so��as��to��prevent��such��a��development?��On�� the��one��hand,��he��bel�eved�� that��sc�ent�sts��d�d��not��have�� the��moral�� r�ght�� to��get���nvolved���n��manufactur�ng��weapons��of��mass��destruct�on,��espec�ally��weapons��w�th��such��destruct�ve��potent�al.��On��the��other��hand,��he��thought��that�� the��resources��of��the��countr�es�� �n�� the��ant�-H�tler��coal�t�on��were��b�gger,��and�� that��should�� the��weapon��be��manufactured,���t��would���nev�tably��lead��to��the��catastroph�c��defeat��of��Germany��that��he��d�d��not��want��to��see��happen.

Should��we��assume��that��He�senberg��and��h�s��fr�ends��saw��th�ngs��th�s��way,�� then��they��should��have��tr�ed��to��do��two��th�ngs.��F�rst,��they��had��to��keep��the��conf�dence��of��the��author�t�es���n��order��to��be��able��to���nfluence��the�r��dec�s�ons,��and��secondly,��to��send��to��the��other��s�de��the��message��that��no��nuclear��weapon��was��go�ng��to��be��manufactured���n��Germany.��The���nd�rect��suggest�on��was��that��the��ongo�ng��war��was��to��be��fought��w�th��convent�onal��weapons.��At�� that�� t�me,��and��dur�ng��the��follow�ng��per�od,��He�senberg��deemed��that��send�ng��a��message��l�ke��th�s��was��cruc�al��s�nce��the��very��fear��that��H�tler��

10�� See��Houtermans’��story��at��the��end��of��the��war,��quoted��by��Thomas��Powers,��op. cit.

198 �� Collaborat�on��or��Ex�t��from��the��Stage?����/����M�rcea��FLONTA������������199

m�ght��have��a��nuclear��weapon��bu�lt��would��be��the��ma�n��mot�vat�on��for��the��pol�t�cal��leadersh�p��and��the��researchers���n��all��democrat�c��countr�es��to��mob�l�se��all��forces��and��resources���n��the��project��of��manufactur�ng��the��bomb.��As��long��as��the��suppos�t�on��that��Germany��could��bu�ld��the��bomb��seemed��cred�ble,��the��stake��was��ne�ther��more��nor��less��than��the��surv�val��of��the��free��world.

He�senberg��thought���t��was���mportant��to��check��whether��h�s��analys�s��was��correct��and,��at�� the��same��t�me,�� to�� try�� to��convey�� the��message�� to�� the��other��s�de.11��Together��w�th��h�s��closest��colleague,��Carl��Fr�edr�ch��von��We�zsäcker,��He�senberg��thought��that��the��best��way��to��atta�n��these��goals��was��to��have��a��conf�dent�al��talk��w�th��h�s��sc�ent�f�c��mentor��and��old�� fr�end,�� the��prest�g�ous��Dan�sh��phys�c�st��N�els��Bohr.��He�senberg���ntended��to��confer��w�th��Bohr��about��what��he��should��tell��the��German��author�t�es,��and��he��would��have��also��l�ked��to��f�nd��out��from��Bohr��whether�� the��All�es��were��work�ng��on��manufactur�ng��a��nuclear��bomb.��He��hoped��that�� through��Bohr��a�� jo�nt��stand��and��a��convergent��act�on��of��phys�c�sts��worldw�de��could��be��establ�shed��on��the��quest�on��of��the��nuclear��bomb.��The��relat�onsh�p��between��the��two��had��been��very��t�ght;��dur�ng��h�s��stay���n��Copenhagen���n��the��1920s,��the��young��German��phys�c�st��was��treated��l�ke��a��member��of��Bohr’s�� fam�ly.��He�senberg��surm�sed�� that�� �t��was��prec�sely�� the�� full��conf�dence��that��character�zed��h�s��relat�onsh�p��w�th��h�s��Dan�sh��fr�end��wh�ch��m�ght��favour��h�s��audac�ous��project.��An��encounter��w�th��Bohr�� that��should��not��attract�� the��attent�on��of��the��spec�al��serv�ces��could��have��been��poss�ble��only��prov�ded��He�senberg��had��pa�d��an��off�c�al��v�s�t�� to��Copenhagen.��C�rcumstance��worked�� �n��favour��of�� th�s��project.�� In��Copenhagen��there��was��a��German��cultural�� �nst�tute��subord�nated��to�� the��Fore�gn��M�n�ster�� �n��Berl�n,��and��the��Secretary��General��of�� the��M�n�stry��was��at�� that��t�me��career��d�plomat��Er�ch��von��We�zsacker,��the��father��of��Carl��Fr�edr�ch.��Th�s���s��how��He�senberg’s��v�s�t��could��be��arranged���n��September��1941��at�� the��head��of��a��group��of��German��researchers.��The��members��of��the��delegat�on��were��supposed��to��g�ve��sc�ent�f�c��lectures��and��have��talks��w�th��the�r��Dan�sh��colleagues.

He�senberg��and��Carl��Fr�edr�ch��We�zsäcker��underest�mated��from��the��start�� the��r�sks��of��the�r��double��game.��They��were��arr�v�ng���n��a��country��occup�ed��by��Germany,��as��guests��of�� the��author�t�es��of�� the��nat�onal-soc�al�st�� reg�me��of��Copenhagen;��put��otherw�se,��they��were��there��as��off�c�al��envoys��of��a��country��that��was��perce�ved��by��the��Dan�sh��publ�c��op�n�on��as��the��enemy.��On��the��other��hand,��the��planned��talk,��that��could��not��avo�d��the��m�l�tary��project��He�senberg��was���nvolved���n,��was,�� �n��the��eyes��of��the��German��author�t�es,��an��act��of��treason.��At��the��worst,��He�senberg��was��runn�ng��the��r�sk��of��be�ng��charged��of��h�gh��treason.��It��was��h�ghly���mprobable��for��h�m��to��have��an��open��talk��w�th��Bohr��w�thout��the��author�t�es��becom�ng��susp�c�ous.

What��happened���n��Copenhagen?��The��encounter��between��He�senberg��and��Bohr��took��place��at��the��acme��of��the��pol�cy��of��expans�on��of��H�tler’s��Germany.��The��German��

11�� Th�s���s��about��a��message��d�fferent��from��the��one��already��sent��by��Houtermans.��Through��the��agency��of��German��phys�c�st��Fr�tz��Re�che,��a�� former��ass�stant��of��Planck’s��and�� fr�end��of��E�nste�n’s,��who��had��em�grated�� to�� the��USA���n��May��1941,��Houterman��had��commun�cated��that��Germany��was��work�ng��on��a��m�l�tary��project��for��us�ng��nuclear��energy.��And��although��the��German��phys�c�sts,�� led��by��He�senberg,��d�d��not��enthus�ast�cally��cooperate�� �n�� that��project,��str�v�ng��even��to��slow���t��down,��they��could��be��subjected��to��great��pressure,��so��the��other��s�de��had��better��hurry��th�ngs��up.��(After��Thomas��Powers,��accord�ng��to��an���nterv�ew��w�th��Re�che��taken���n��1962).

troops��were��gett�ng��closer��and��closer��to��Moscow,��and��the��v�ctory��aga�nst��the��Sov�et��Un�on��looked��to��be��near.��The��occupants��were���ncreas�ngly��arrogant,��and��the��ant�-German��frame��of��m�nd��of�� the��populat�on��was��more��acute��w�th��every��pass�ng��day.��He�senberg�� fa�led�� to��understand��someth�ng��cruc�al,��and�� that��was�� that��under�� the��c�rcumstances��Bohr��was��go�ng�� to��see�� �n��h�m��not��only��h�s��old��fr�end��but��also�� the��envoy��of��an��enemy��country.

Bohr��had��no��way��of��know�ng��He�senberg’s��pol�t�cal��stance��but,�� �nstead,��had��good��reasons�� to��presuppose�� that��he�� too��had��been��contam�nated��by�� the��euphor�c��state��H�tler’s��m�l�tary��v�ctor�es��had��brought��about�� �n��Germany.��Bohr’s��susp�c�on��grew��follow�ng��certa�n��allegat�ons��He�senberg��made��dur�ng��talks��w�th��h�s��Dan�sh��colleagues,��before��the�r��meet�ng.��Accept�ng��that��he��could��not��just�fy��the��occupat�on��of��Denmark,��He�senberg��hold��that��the���nroads��on��Poland��and��the��Sov�et��Un�on��had��been��good��and��necessary.��He�senberg��could��not��avo�d��pol�t�cal��d�scuss�ons��and��at��the��same��t�me��could��not��have��expressed��a��stance��opposed�� to�� that��of�� the��German��author�t�es��as�� long��as��he��d�d��not��have��perfect��guarantees��of��conf�dent�al�ty.��Bohr��d�d��not�� real�ze��He�senberg��played��a��double��game��and�� took��h�s��statements��as��an��express�on��of��h�s��actual��op�n�ons.��Moreover,��Bohr��was��bound��to��assoc�ate��the��trust��publ�cly��vo�ced��by��He�senberg�� �n�� the��v�ctory��of��Germany��w�th�� the��hope�� that�� the��Germans��would��be��the��f�rst��to��develop��an��atom�c��weapon.��All��th�s���n��no��way��fostered��a��background��of��full��mutual��trust.

There���s��a��vers�on��by��He�senberg��of��the��talk��but��no��wr�tten��rend�t�on��by��Bohr.12��Based��on��He�senberg’s��comments��and��on��what��Bohr��recounted��to��the��members��of��h�s��fam�ly,��the��encounter��can��be��reconstructed��as��follows.��F�rst��they��talked��about��the��war.��He�senberg��told��Bohr,��among��other��th�ngs,��that��the��defeat��of��the��Sov�et��Un�on��would��be��des�rable.��Bohr��d�d��not��agree.��H�s�� �rr�tat�on��d�d��not�� represent��a��happy��prem�se��for��good��commun�cat�on��on��the��major��top�c��of��d�scuss�on.��He�senberg��asked��h�m��whether��he��bel�eved��phys�c�sts��had��the��moral��r�ght��to��work��on��projects���nvolv�ng��atom�c��power.��Th�s��quest�on��Bohr��answered��by��another,��namely,��whether��an��atom�c��weapon��could��be��developed.��He�senberg��repl�ed��that,���n��pr�nc�ple,��such��a��project��was��feas�ble��but�� that��a��long��per�od��of��work��and��colossal��efforts��would��be��necessary��to��reach��that��goal.��And,��he��added��that��phys�c�sts��could��argue���n��good��fa�th���n��front��of��the�r��governments��that��the��bomb��would��not��be��ready��to��use���n��the��war��underway.

Bohr��was��so��shocked��to�� learn��from��such��a��competent��phys�c�st��who��worked��on��a��m�l�tary��program��that��the��bomb��could��be��developed��that��he��no��longer��ev�nced��the��needed��read�ness�� to��cont�nue�� the��d�scuss�on.��When��He�senberg��asked��about��the��poss�b�l�ty�� that�� the��phys�c�sts�� �n��both��camps��m�ght��agree��not�� to��promote�� the��project,��Bohr��repl�ed��that���t��was��only��natural��that���n��wart�me��researchers��should��work��

12�� The��f�rst��vers�on��of��He�nseberg’s�� talk��w�th��Bohr��can��be��found�� �n��Robert��Jungk’s��book,��Heller als tausend Sonnen,��publ�shed���n��1956.��After��Bohr’s��death,���n��a��copy��of��th�s��book,��found�� �n��h�s��bookcase,�� a�� letter��was��d�scovered��addressed�� to��He�senberg.�� It�� conta�ned��correct�ons��and��amendments��of��the��vers�on��related��by��He�senberg.��In��the��end,��Bohr��chose��not��to��send��the��letter,��wh�ch���s��preserved��today���n��the��Bohr��Arch�ves.��The��controvers�es���n��connect�on��w�th��the��Bohr-He�senberg��meet�ng��aroused��by��the��publ�cat�on��of��Jungk’s��book��were��recently��enhanced��by��the��play��of��Br�t�sh��playwr�ght��M�chael��Frayn,��Kopenhagen.��The��art�st�c��transpos�t�on��of��the��1941��meet�ng��has��Bohr,��h�s��w�fe��Margrethe,��and��He�senberg��as��characters.

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for�� the�r��governments.��He��thought�� that��what��He�senberg��wanted��was�� to��persuade��phys�c�sts�� from��the��all�ed��countr�es��not�� to��get�� �nvolved�� �n�� the��project.��What��he��reta�ned��was��that��German��phys�c�sts��knew��how��to��make��the��bomb.��Consequently,��he��assumed��they��were��work�ng���ntensely��to��carry��out��the��project.��In��an���nterv�ew��w�th��h�stor�an��Dav�d��Irv�ng,��dated��October��1965,��He�senberg��adm�tted��that��the��proposal��he��had��put��forth��could��have��seemed��suspect�� to��Bohr��as�� long��as�� the��Un�ted��States��enjoyed��better��prem�ses��to��bu�ld��the��bomb��than��Germany,��and���t��was��but��natural��to��try��to��use��the�r��edge��aga�nst��H�tler���n��th�s��f�eld,��as��well.

He�senberg��real�zed��from��the��very��beg�nn�ng�� that��Bohr��had��not��understood��h�s��message��properly.��In��fact,�� th�ngs��were��even��worse.��The��effects��of��the��talk��were��largely��opposed��to��what��He�senberg��had��wanted.��Bohr��was���ncl�ned��to��bel�eve��that��the��Germans��were��work�ng��on��the��des�gn��of��the��atom�c��bomb��and��that��He�senberg��would��have��wanted��to��learn��from��h�m��what��the��other��s�de��was��do�ng.��Th�s���s��what��Bohr��sa�d��at��home,��when��he��returned��after��the��meet�ng,��as��well��as��when��he��reached��the��Un�ted��States,���n��1943.��Later,��Bohr��refused��to��say��anyth�ng��about��He�senberg’s��v�s�t��although��h�s��w�fe��apprec�ated��that��the��v�s�t��was��that��of��an��“enemy”.��In��any��case,���t��was�� to��be��expected�� that��He�senberg’s��plan�� to��commun�cate,��v�a��Bohr,��w�th�� the��atom�c��phys�c�sts���n��the��other��camp��would��fa�l.��He�senberg��wanted��to��have��an��open��conversat�on��w�th��Bohr��but��d�d��not�� real�ze�� that,��under�� the��c�rcumstances,��such��a��th�ng��was��not��poss�ble.

After�� the��war,��He�senberg��wrote�� a�� text,�� ent�tled��The active and passive resistance during the Third Reich,��wh�ch��was��not��publ�shed.��Tak�ng���nto��account��that�� the��nat�onal-soc�al�st�� reg�me��ga�ned��stab�l�ty�� �n�� the��per�od��before�� the��war��started,��He�senberg��cons�dered�� that�� those��who��d�rectly��opposed�� �t��were��only�� left��w�th��the��cho�ce��of��em�grat�ng��or��wa�t�ng��for��the��reg�me��to��be��removed��from��power��by��external��opponents.��He��called�� th�s�� res�stance��aga�nst�� the��reg�me��passive.��The��other��solut�on,��of��oppos�ng�� the�� reg�me,��was�� to��w�n�� the��author�t�es�� trust�� �n��order��to�� �nfluence��the��state��of��affa�rs�� �n�� the��oppos�te��d�rect�on��of�� the��reg�me’s�� �nterests.��Those��who��chose��th�s��path,��wh�ch���mpl�ed��many��comprom�ses,�� took��the��r�sk��to��be��labelled�� later��as��collaborators.��Nevertheless,�� they��could��exert��a��k�nd��of�� �nfluence��on��the��course��of��events��counter��to��the��reg�me’���ntent�ons.��Th�s���s��what��He�senberg��character�zed��as��active resistance.

Desp�te��op�n�ons�� to�� the��contrary,�� �t��can��be��argued�� that�� the��way��He�senberg��reacted��later��on���llustrates��what��he��thought��of��“act�ve��res�stance”��and��more��prec�sely,��the��sense��that��he��and��h�s��collaborators��had��accepted��concess�ons���n��less��s�gn�f�cant��matters�� �n��order�� to��be��able�� to��w�eld�� the�r�� �nfluence�� �n��dec�s�ons�� that��were�� truly���mportant.��Many��of��He�senberg’s��act�ons��and��stances��dur�ng��the��war��can��be��seen��from��th�s��perspect�ve.

A��talk��w�th��sc�ent�sts,���n��July��1942,��attended��by��h�gh��c�v�l��and��m�l�tary��off�c�als,��and��headed��by�� the��m�n�ster��of��m�l�tary��product�on,��Albert��Speer,�� represented�� the��turn�ng��po�nt�� �n�� the��h�story��of�� the��German��atom�c��project.��He�senberg��was�� the��major��speaker��on��behalf��of�� the��sc�ent�sts.��F�rst��he��deplored��how��German��research��was��lagg�ng,��one��reason��be�ng��on��account��of��the��fact��that��many��techn�cal��staff��from��laborator�es��had��been��sent�� to�� the��front;�� �n�� th�s��way��he��managed��to��have��hundreds��of�� them��recalled.��Further��on,��He�senberg�� �ns�sted��on��the��poss�b�l�ty��of��bu�ld�ng��a��reactor�� that��could��produce��energy.��As��an��answer�� to��Speer’s��quest�on,��he��asserted,��

just��as��he��had��done���n��h�s��talk��to��Bohr,��that���n��pr�nc�ple���t��was��poss�ble��to��bu�ld��an��atom�c��bomb,��but��such��an��act�on��would��requ�re��huge��efforts��and��expend�ture.��And��the��project��could��be��slowed��down���f��not��actually��jeopard�zed��by��an���ntens�f�cat�on��of��the��a�r��ra�ds��over��Germany.��An��energy-produc�ng��reactor��could��be��bu�lt��though��w�th��relat�vely��modest��means.��As��far��as��the��prospects��of��the��Amer�cans��were��concerned,��He�senberg��apprec�ated�� that�� they��could��bu�ld��a��reactor��by�� the��end��of��1942��and��a��bomb��by��the��end��of��1944,��at��best.��Everyone��was��conv�nced,��however,��that��by��then��the��war��would��have��already��ended.��After�� the��war,��He�senberg��underl�ned��that��h�s��prognos�s��had��been��correct.��And��he��added��that���t��was��h�ghly��lucky��for��the��German��researchers�� to��have��asserted���n��good��fa�th�� that�� the��product�on��of��an��atom�c��bomb��to��be��used��by��the��German��army��was��not��a��feas�ble��project.13��Such��a��presentat�on��of�� the��s�tuat�on,��under��cond�t�ons��when�� the��German�� leadersh�p��apprec�ated�� that��only��armaments��projects��that��could��y�eld��results���n��a��short��per�od��of��t�me��should��be��supported,��had��the��results��env�saged��by��He�senberg.��Later,��he��told��h�stor�an��Irv�ng��that��when��he��had��warned��of��the��huge��costs��and��the��long��per�od��of��t�me��necessary��to��bu�ld��an��atom�c��bomb,��he��knew��that��H�tler��had��dec�ded��to��no��longer��pursue��m�l�tary��projects��the��results��of��wh�ch��would��take��more��than��a��year.14��Speer��trusted��He�senberg��completely.��He��would��have��agreed��to��throw���n��all��ava�lable��resources,��had��he��been��told�� that�� the��bomb��could��be��developed�� �n��a��short�� �nterval��of�� t�me.��Not��only��d�d��He�senberg��not��prom�se��h�m��that,��but��he��also��prov�ded��someth�ng��of��an��equ�vocal��answer��to��the��quest�on��of��whether��the��cha�n��react�on��could��be��controlled��and���f��there��d�d��not��ex�st�� the��r�sk��of��a��planetary��catastrophe.��Thus���nformed,��Speer��dec�ded��to��pull��the��army��out��of��the��project,��and��He�senberg��was��charged��to��conduct��the��bu�ld�ng��of��a��reactor.��In��Speer’s��memo�rs��we��f�nd��the��follow�ng��reveal�ng��excerpt:��

“At��the��suggest�on��of��experts���n��nuclear��phys�cs��we��renounced��the��construct�on��of��the��atom��bomb��as��early��as��the��autumn��of��1942.��Then��I��asked��one��more��t�me���n��what���nterval��of��t�me��that��project��could��be��accompl�shed��and��I��was��answered��that��three��or��four��years��should��be��cons�dered,��a��per�od���n��wh�ch��the��outcome��of��the��war��would��have��been��long��cleared”.15

The�� test�mony��of��Speer,��wh�ch��makes��clear��he��had��no�� �nterest�� �n��defend�ng�� the��prest�ge��of��German��atom�c��researchers,��shows��w�thout��a��shadow��of��doubt��that���t��was��these��very��sc�ent�sts��who��played��a��dec�s�ve��role���n��abandon�ng��the��construct�on��of��the��atom��bomb��for��the��German��army.��The��year��1942��was��a��dec�s�ve��one.��Subsequently,��the��Un�ted��States�� resolved�� to��work��at��a��most��susta�ned��pace,��mob�l�s�ng��all�� the��ava�lable��mater�al��and��human��resources�� to��bu�ld�� the��bomb,��wh�le�� �n��Germany��a��project��cont�nued,��w�th��approx�mately��a��tenth��of��the��prev�ous��funds,�� to��pursue��the��product�on��of��nuclear��power��for��the���ndustry��and��for��transport.

In��h�s��book,��Robert��Jungk��wrote:��“It��seems��paradox�cal��that��German��phys�c�sts,��

13�� See��W.��He�senberg,��Uber die Arbeiten zur technischen Ausnutzung der Atomkemenergie in Deutschland,�� �n��Naturwissenschaften,��33,��Dec.��1946,��and��Gott sei Dank, wir konnten sie nicht bauen,���n��Spiegel,��July��3,��1967.

14�� See��Th.��Powers,��op. cit.15�� See��Albert��Speer,��Erinnerungen,��Berl�n,��Ullste�n��Taschenbuchverlag,��2005.

202 �� Collaborat�on��or��Ex�t��from��the��Stage?����/����M�rcea��FLONTA������������203

who��l�ved��under��a��m�l�tary��d�ctatorsh�p��should��l�sten��to��the��vo�ce��of��the�r��consc�ence,��try�ng��to��prevent��the��development��of��the��bomb,��wh�le��the�r��colleagues���n��democrat�c��states,��who��had��no�� reason�� to�� fear��oppress�on,��embarked��w�th��utmost��energy�� �n��the��serv�ce��of�� the��new��weapon,��w�th��very�� few��except�ons”.16��Subsequently,�� the��author��rev�ewed��h�s��op�n�on.��He�senberg��d�d��not��agree��w�th��that��statement��from��the��outset.��He��rejected��the��suggest�on��that��German��researchers��would��have��thus��proved��super�or,��from��a��moral��po�nt��of��v�ew,��to��the�r��colleagues���n��the��Un�ted��States.��The��former��d�d��not��deem��the��object�ve��of��the��pol�t�cal��leadersh�p��–��w�nn�ng��at��all��costs��–��to��be��the�r��own��cause��as��the��latter��thought.��For��the��Germans,��He�senberg��apprec�ated���n��retrospect,��that���t��was��lucky��they��could��support��w�th��f�ne��arguments��the��unreal�st�c��nature��of��develop�ng��an��atom�c��weapon���n��such��a��short��t�me.��On��the��other��hand,��the��sc�ent�sts���n��the��other��camp��had��an��ent�rely��d�fferent��att�tude.��Imm�grant��phys�c�sts,��who��played��an���mportant��role�� �n�� the��promot�on��and��complet�on��of�� the��Manhattan��project,�� st�ll��had��v�v�d��memor�es��of�� the��persecut�ons�� they��had��endured��not��only��from��German��author�t�es,��but��somet�mes��also��from��the�r��German��colleagues��and��professors.��As��well��as�� the��frustrat�ng��feel�ng�� that�� they��had��not��been��protected��by��those��German��students��and��professors��whom��they��respected.��Together��w�th��the��other��researchers���n��the��Un�ted��States,�� they��could��not��understand��He�senberg’s��refusal��to���mm�grate��and��d�d��not��put���t��past��h�m��to��have��zealously��worked��to��produce��the��bomb.��The�r��plaus�ble��conclus�on��was��that��there��ex�sted��a��race��to��manufacture��the��weapon,��and��that��v�ctory���n��that��race��would��be��dec�s�ve��for��the��surv�val��of��the��free��world.

Two��th�ngs��appear��essent�al�� �n��order�� to��apprec�ate�� the��att�tude��of��He�senberg��and��of��other��members��of�� the��German��sc�ent�f�c��el�te,�� �n�� th�s��context.��F�rst,�� they��d�d��not�� �nform�� the��author�t�es��on�� the��preparat�ons��of�� the��other��s�de�� to��bu�ld�� the��bomb��although��they��possessed��s�gn�f�cant��clues���n��th�s��respect.��Second,�� they��tr�ed��repeatedly��to��convey��to��the��other��s�de��the���nformat�on��that��the��relevant��programme��had��been��dropped���n��Germany.

As��far��as��the��f�rst��aspect���s��concerned,��He�senberg��and��h�s��colleagues��stressed,��whenever��the��off�c�als��asked��them,��that���n��order��to���mplement��the��project��not��only��huge��resources��were��needed��but��also��a��lengthy��per�od��of��t�me��and��consequently,���t��was��pract�cally��out��of��the��quest�on��that��such��a��weapon��could��be��used���n��the��ongo�ng��war.��On��the��other��hand,�� they��d�d��not��help�� the��German��author�t�es��understand�� the��true��s�gn�f�cance��of��certa�n��act�ons��by��the��All�es,��such��as��the��repeated��bomb�ng��of��the��heavy��water��plant��of��Ryukan,��Norway,��then��under��German��control.��Early���n��the��summer��of��1944��an��a�de��of��Gor�ng��asked��He�senberg���f��he��bel�eved��the��Amer�cans��were��bu�ld�ng��such��a��bomb,��and��the��answer��he��rece�ved��was���n�� the��negat�ve.17�� In��exchanges��among�� fr�ends,��He�senberg��deemed�� they��had��m�xed��chances�� �n�� that��regard.��In��other��words,��he��avo�ded��offer�ng��h�s��true��op�n�on��before��author�t�es��that��cons�dered��h�m��a��loyal��subject.

The�� second�� aspect�� also�� deserves�� spec�al�� attent�on.��There�� are�� numerous��test�mon�es��regard�ng��the��attempts��of��German��experts�� to��establ�sh��commun�cat�on��w�th�� the�r��colleagues�� �n�� the��oppos�te��camp.��Thus�� �n�� the��summer��of��1942,��Hans��Jensen,��a��phys�c�st��at�� the��Hamburg��Un�vers�ty,��conveyed��to��Bohr�� the��fact�� that�� �n��

16�� See��R.��Jungk,��op. cit.17�� See��Th.��Powers,��op. cit.

Germany��they��worked��on��a��reactor��that��would��produce��energy,��and��not��on��an��atom�c��weapon.��He�senberg��h�mself��told��Fr�tz��Houtermans,��whom��he��knew��to��have��relat�ons��of��trust��w�th��phys�c�sts��from��countr�es��w�th���nterests�� �n�m�cal�� to��Germany,��as��well��as��Sw�ss��phys�c�sts��Wentzel��and��Scherrer,�� that��he��worked��only��on��the��construct�on��of��a��reactor.��There���s��no��need��to��underl�ne��that�� transm�tt�ng��such���nformat�on��was��extremely��r�sky.��Had�� th�s��become��known��to�� the��German��secret��serv�ces�� �t��could��have�� led�� to��an��accusat�on��of�� treason.��One��can��hardly��contest�� the��po�nt�� that��such��“collaborat�on”��w�th��the��author�t�es��represented��an��act��of��res�stance.

On��the��other��hand,��we��may��be��surpr�sed�� that��He�senberg��and��other��German��scholars��d�d��not�� see�� that�� the�r��efforts�� to��commun�cate��w�th�� the��other�� s�de��were��doomed.��The��all�ed��secret��serv�ces���nterpreted��these��messages��as��var�ous��attempts��to��m�slead��the��enemy.��In��the��atmosphere��of��general��susp�c�on��ex�st�ng��at�� the��t�me,��Oppenhe�mer��and��h�s��collaborators��cons�dered��even�� the��sketch��of��a�� reactor�� that��He�senberg��gave��to��Bohr��when��they��met���n��Copenhagen��to��be��that��of��an��atom��bomb.��Oppenhe�mer��even��agreed��to��the���dea��of�� the��Amer�can��secret��serv�ces��k�dnapp�ng��He�senberg��on��the��occas�on��of��h�s��v�s�t��to��Sw�tzerland,���n��December��1944.18��Th�s���s��a��clear���nd�cat�on��that��the��US��phys�c�sts��d�d��not��bel�eve��the��messages��conveyed,���n��var�ous��ways,��by��the�r��colleague��from��Germany.

Two��po�nts��of��v�ew��have��been��a�red�� �n��connect�on��w�th�� the��controvers�es��between��He�senberg��and��h�s��cr�t�cs��after��the��war,��as��well��as��w�th��the��later��d�sputes��between��h�stor�ans.��Accord�ng��to��the��f�rst,��accept�ng��an���nst�tut�onal��pos�t�on��as��well��as�� the��collaborat�on��der�v�ng��thereof��w�th�� the��author�t�es��of��a��reg�me��that��proved��murderous��uncond�t�onally�� tr�ggers��a�� just�f�able��harsh��moral��condemnat�on��of�� the��person���n��quest�on.��Accord�ng��to��the��second,���t�� �s��exactly��th�s��collaborat�on��w�th�n��certa�n��l�m�ts��that��const�tuted��the��necessary��prem�se��of��an��act�ve��res�stance.

He�senberg’s��major��cr�t�c�� �n�� the��years�� follow�ng�� the��conclus�on��of�� the��war��was��Samuel��Goudsm�t,��an��Amer�can��phys�c�st��of��Dutch��descent.��The��two��had��been��fr�ends���n�� the�r��youth.��On��the��occas�on��of��He�senberg’s��v�s�t�� to�� the��Un�ted��States,��Goudsm�t�� tr�ed�� to��persuade��h�m��not�� to�� return�� to��Germany.�� In��1944,��Goudsm�t��was��appo�nted��sc�ent�f�c��d�rector��of�� the��ALSOS��m�ss�on,�� �n��charge��of��gather�ng���nformat�on��on�� the��German��atom�c��project�� and��captur�ng�� the��German��atom�st��phys�c�sts���n��order��to��extract��from��them��where��Germany��stood��w�th��research,��and��at��the��same��t�me��to��prevent��them��from��work�ng��w�th��the��Sov�et��Un�on.��In��that��pos�t�on,��Goudsm�t��met��He�senberg���n��May��1945.��The��German,��who��d�d��not��know��anyth�ng��about�� the��Amer�can��atom�c��program,��seemed��“arrogant”�� to��Goudsm�t��because��he��offered��to��convey��to��the��Amer�cans��the��results��of��h�s��research��on��uran�um.��That��offer��gave��substance��to��He�senberg’s��conv�ct�on��that��the��German��atom�st��phys�c�sts��knew��more��than��the�r��colleagues��overseas.��When��asked��by��Goudsm�t���f��he��wanted��to��work���n��the��Un�ted��States,��He�senberg��supposedly��answered:��“No,��I��don’t��want��to��leave.��Germany��needs��me!”��All��th�s���rr�tated��Goudsm�t��who��was��traumat�zed��by��the��news��of��h�s��parents��be�ng��k�lled��at��Auschw�tz.��In��h�s��off�c�al��report��of��May��11,��1945��on��the��conversat�on,��he��noted��that��He�senberg��took��an��ant�-Naz�,��yet��strongly��nat�onal�st�c��stand.��Goudsm�t’s��resentment��grew��when��he��read��the��records��of��the��talks��carr�ed��by��the��German��phys�c�sts��reta�ned���n��a��castle���n��England,���n��August��1945,��when��the��f�rst��

18�� These���nformat�on��and��others��can��be��found���n��Powers’��book.��

204 �� Collaborat�on��or��Ex�t��from��the��Stage?����/����M�rcea��FLONTA������������205

atom�c��bomb��went��off���n��H�rosh�ma.��The�r��negat�ve��react�on��to��the��product�on��and��ut�l�sat�on��of��the��bomb,��as��well��as��the�r���ns�stence��on��the���dea��they��had��not��worked��to��bu�ld�� the��bomb�� led��Goudsm�t�� to��bel�eve�� that��German��phys�c�sts�� cons�dered��themselves��morally�� super�or.�� Irate,��he��acceded�� to�� the��conclus�on�� that��German��phys�c�sts��had��wanted��to��bu�ld��the��bomb��but��fa�led��out��of�� �ncompetence��and��they��were��now��try�ng��to��h�de�� th�s��fa�lure��by��evok�ng��moral��scruples�� that,�� �n��fact,�� they��d�d��not��have.�� In��h�s��book,��publ�shed�� �n��1947,��on�� the��ALSOS��m�ss�on,��Goudsm�t��ma�nta�ned��th�s��po�nt��of��v�ew��and��reproached��He�senberg��for��h�s�� lack��of��s�ncer�ty.��The��atmosphere��after�� the��war,��when�� the��hard-to-�mag�ne��atroc�t�es��perpetrated��by��the��Naz�s��were��d�scovered,�� turned��frequently��on�� just��such��b�ased�� judgements,��commonly��accepted��by��western��sc�ent�f�c��c�rcles.��Frayn’s��play,��wh�ch��bu�lds�� the��plot��on��met�culous��h�stor�cal��documentat�on,��as��well��as��Powers’s��book,��shows��that��th�ngs��are��more��compl�cated.�� It�� seems�� that��He�senberg�� �ndeed��m�scalculated�� the��amount��of��uran�um��235��necessary��to��obta�n��the��cr�t�cal��mass,��although��reports���n��th�s��respect��are��contrad�ctory.��In��any��case,��the��n�ght��after��H�rosh�ma��He�senberg��correctly��expla�ned��to��Otto��Hahn��that��the��bomb��operated��w�th��rap�d��neutrons���n��uran�um��235.��It���s��ent�rely��plaus�ble��that���f��He�senberg��and��h�s��collaborators��had��had��a��comparable��mot�vat�on�� to��bu�ld�� the��bomb,��as�� the�r��colleagues�� �n��Amer�ca��d�d,�� then��m�stakes��l�ke��the��one��ment�oned��could��have��been��d�scovered��and��corrected.��In��fact,��German��researchers��d�d��not��even��get��as��far��as��approach�ng��the��techn�cal��data��related��to��the��product�on��of��the��bomb.

He�senberg��tr�ed��for��a��wh�le��to��commun�cate��w�th��Goudsm�t���n��order��to��reach��an��agreement��on��facts��and,��on��th�s��bas�s,��an��unb�ased��moral��valuat�on.��He��underl�ned��that��he��had��understood��very��well�� the��d�fference��between��bu�ld�ng��a��reactor��and��a��bomb��and��that��he��worked��only��on��the��f�rst��project.��A��reactor��operates��w�th��natural��uran�um��and��slow��neutrons,��and��He�senberg��knew��very��well��that��the��bomb��requ�red��pure��U��235��and��rap�d��neutrons.��In��a�� letter��dated��September��23,��1947,��He�senberg��descr�bed��to��Goudsm�t��the��psycholog�cal��state��of��German��researchers��who��opposed��the�� total�tar�an��system��but��worked,��nonetheless,��on��government��programs,�� �n�� the��follow�ng��terms:��“On��the��one��hand��I��real�zed��that��a��v�ctory��of��nat�onal��soc�al�sm���n��Europe��would��have��terr�ble��consequences,��and��on��the��other,��tak�ng���nto��account��the��hatred��ar�sen��by��th�s��pol�t�cal��trend,���t��was��obv�ous��there��was��not��too��much��hope���f��Germany��was�� thoroughly��defeated.��Th�s��s�tuat�on��automat�cally�� led�� to��a��pass�ve,��reserved��att�tude,��to��ass�stance��granted��on��a��small��scale��to��save��what��there��was��st�ll��to��save��or�� to��an��act�v�ty��that��could��prove��useful�� later”.19��Condemned��to��be��on��the��defens�ve,��He�senberg��d�d��not��even��ment�on��act�ons��that��d�d��not���llustrate��“a��pass�ve��att�tude”,��as�� the�� �ns�stent�� s�gnals��conveyed�� to�� the�r��colleagues�� �n��Amer�ca�� that��Germany��was��not��work�ng��on��the��bomb,��or��the��refusal��to��draw��the��attent�on��of��the��German��author�t�es��to��obv�ous���nd�cat�ons��that��the��other��s�de��was.��For��Goudsm�t��and��those��who��shared��th�s��op�n�on��the��dec�s�ve��fact��was��that��He�senberg��had��accepted��off�c�al��pos�t�ons��and��respons�b�l�t�es�� �n��a��state�� that��created��“the��camps��of��death”.��He�senberg��was��profoundly��affected��by��the��fa�lure��of��h�s��repeated��attempts��to��expla�n��the��log�c��of��h�s��pos�t�on.��F�nally,��he��res�gned.��H�s��w�fe��expla�ned��th�s��res�gnat�on���n��terms��of��h�s��wounded��pr�de.

19�� Quoted��from��Th.��Powers.

The��controversy��between��the��h�stor�ans��who��pass��harsh��judgements��on��h�m��or��who��v�v�dly��defend��h�m��cont�nued��unabated.��In��h�s��book,��publ�shed���n��the��year��1998,��Heisenberg and the Nazi Atomic Bomb Project: A Study in German Culture,��Br�t�sh��h�stor�an��Paul��Lawrence��Rose��endowed��He�senberg��w�th��Naz���value��representat�ons,��as��well��as��the��des�re��to��serve��H�tler’s��reg�me��unreservedly.��It���s��surpr�s�ng��that��Rose��d�d��not�� th�nk��that��a��man��who��had��such��persuas�ons��would��have��acted��completely��d�fferent�� �n��many��s�tuat�ons�� than��He�senberg��had��between��1939��and��1945.��Rose��also��attacked��the��play��of��h�s��fellow-countryman,��Frayn,20��say�ng�� that�� �t��ser�ously��d�storted��He�senberg’s��relat�ons��w�th��nat�onal��soc�al�sm.��The��fact�� that�� �n�� the��play��He�senberg��and��Bohr��are��presented��as��comparable��personal�t�es��from��the��vantage��of��moral��respons�b�l�t�es��seems��scandalous��to��Rose.��He�senberg,�� the��Br�t�sh��h�stor�an��remarks,��never��acknowledged��h�s��moral��respons�b�l�ty��for��hav�ng��collaborated��w�th��the��Naz���author�t�es,��wh�le��Bohr��regretted��h�s���nvolvement���n��the��construct�on��of��the��atom�c��bomb���n��the��Un�ted��States,��such��as���t��was.21��The��ma�n��target��of��Rose’s��attacks��rema�ns�� the��book��on��He�senberg��wr�tten��by��Amer�can��journal�st��Thomas��Powers.��Follow�ng��a��cons�derable��effort��to��put��together��and��analyse��reveal�ng��facts,��Powers��comes��to��the��conclus�on��that��had��He�senberg���dent�f�ed��h�mself��w�th��the��goals��of��the��reg�me��dur�ng��the��war��years,��he��would��have��behaved��ent�rely��d�fferently��and��would��have��engaged�� �n��completely��d�fferent�� �n�t�at�ves.��There�� �s��no��document��show�ng��that��He�senberg��would��have��ever��attempted��to��persuade��the��author�t�es��to��support��a��project��to��bu�ld��the��bomb.��Many��of��h�s��act�ons���llustrated,��on��the��contrary,��what��he��called��an��“act�ve��res�stance”.��None��would��have��been��poss�ble���f��He�senberg��had��not��enjoyed��the��off�c�als’��conf�dence.��It��can��be��conv�nc�ngly��added��that��had��the��famous��phys�c�st��openly��declared��h�mself��aga�nst��the��system��and��been��el�m�nated��from��the���nst�tut�onal��p�cture,��the��project��of��an��atom�c��bomb��for��the��German��army��would��not��have��been��bur�ed��so��qu�ckly,��and��would,��perhaps,��have��been��resumed.��Th�s�� �s�� the��ma�n��way���n��wh�ch��He�senberg��d�d��not��support��H�tler’s��reg�me���n��the��least.��It���s��true��he��never��stated���t��publ�cly��not��only��because��he��d�d��not��want��to��appropr�ate��mer�ts��that��could��have��been���nterpreted��as��exaggerated���n�� the��general��atmosphere��of�� the��post-war��years��but��also��because��he��would��have��had��to��adm�t��that��he��had��actually��not��been��loyal��to��the��author�t�es��that��granted��h�m��h�gh��pos�t�ons��and��trust.��In��th�s��respect,��He�senberg��was��faced��w�th��a��d�lemma��not��only���n��the��years��of��the��nat�onal-soc�al�st��reg�me,��but��also��later��on,��to��a��certa�n��extent.

Among��those��who��pos�t�vely��or��negat�vely��assess��He�senberg’s��behav�our,��as��leader��of�� the��Uran�um��project,�� there�� �s��a��consensus��on��a��s�ngle��po�nt.��That�� �s,��he��had��an���mportant��role���n��shap�ng��the��course��of��events��wh�ch��led��to��abandon�ng��the��project��of��bu�ld�ng��an��atom�c��weapon�� �n��Naz���Germany.��From��th�s��po�nt��on,�� the���nterpretat�on��of��facts��g�ven��by��h�stor�ans��beg�ns��to��d�ffer��and��gu�des��them��to��sharply��oppos�ng��conclus�ons.

Some,�� l�ke��Paul��L.��Rose,��cla�med��that��He�senberg��wanted�� to��serve�� the��Naz���reg�me��and��to��prov�de��the��atom�c��weapon.��H�s��fa�lure��m�ght��have��been��caused��by��ser�ous��sc�ent�f�c��m�stakes���n��assess�ng��the��necessary��quant�ty��of��uran�um��235��for��

20�� M�chael��Frayn,��Kopenhagen,��1998.21�� See��also��P.��L.��Rose,��Kopenhagener Deutung-Heisenbergs Leseart,�� �n��M.��Frayn,��Kopenha-

gen,��p.��229.

206 �� Collaborat�on��or��Ex�t��from��the��Stage?����/����M�rcea��FLONTA������������207

bu�ld�ng��the��bomb��and��the��so-called��“cr�t�cal��mass”.��These��m�stakes��led��He�senberg��to��be��scept�cal��about��the��probab�l�ty��of��bu�ld�ng��an��atom�c��bomb���n��such��a��short��t�me.��Therefore,��He�senberg’s��loyalty��towards��the��reg�me���s��not��quest�oned��by��th�s��role���n��abandon�ng��the��project��by��the��m�l�tary��author�t�es,�� �n��the��summer��of��1942.��Others��h�stor�ans,��l�ke��Thomas��Powers,��stra�ghtforwardly��defend��the��act�ve��res�stance��thes�s,��and��even��the��extreme��vers�on��of��sabotag�ng��the��project.��Accord�ng��to��th�s��vers�on,��He�senberg��knew��very��well��what��needed�� to��be��done�� �n��order�� to��bu�ld��an��atom�c��bomb���n��such��a��short��t�me,��but��he��dec�ded��to��conceal��th�s��from��the��author�t�es.

How��are�� these�� �ncompat�ble��percept�ons��and��presentat�ons��of��an��h�stor�cal��event��even��poss�ble,��com�ng��from��otherw�se��well�� �nformed��and��honest��h�stor�ans?��No��doubt,�� the�� f�rst�� explanat�on�� �s�� that��well�� known�� facts��do��not��un�quely�� and��compell�ngly��d�ctate��a��certa�n��conclus�on.��There��are�� facts��wh�ch��can��be��seen��as��ev�dence��of��collaborat�on��w�th��author�t�es��or��as��ev�dence��of��pursu�ng��goals��that��run��counter��to��the���nterests��of��the��nat�onal-soc�al�st��reg�me.��There���s��a��var�ety��of��reasons��wh�ch��lead��those��who���nvest�gate��these��facts��to��g�ve��them��more��or��less��we�ght��or��to��g�ve��d�fferent���nterpretat�ons��to��the��same��ev�dence.��In��th�s��way,��we��can��understand��not��only��the��oppos�ng��verd�cts��formulated��by��those��who��analysed��the��He�senberg��case,��but��also��the��osc�llat�on��of��judgements��of��the��same��person.��Thus,��Robert��Jungk,��who�� f�rst��proposed�� the��act�ve�� res�stance�� thes�s�� �n��h�s��book��publ�shed�� �n��1956,��cla�med��later��on��that��he��let��h�mself��be��persuaded��by��a��false��bel�ef��and,�� therefore,��contr�buted��to��the��creat�on��of��a��myth.��In��contrast,��Samuel��Goudsm�t,��who���n��h�s��book��Alsos,��publ�shed���n��London���n��1947,��severely��judged��He�senberg’s��behav�our��from��a��moral��po�nt��of��v�ew,��wrote��the��follow�ng��shortly��before��h�s��death���n��1978:��“He�senberg��was��a��great��phys�c�st,��a��profound��th�nker��and��a��noble��and��brave��man.��He��was��one��of��the��greatest��phys�c�sts��of��our��t�me��and��he��had��suffered��a��lot��from��the��unjust�f�ed��attacks��of��fanat�c��colleagues.��In��my��op�n�on,��we��must��cons�der��h�m,���n��some��regards,��as��a��v�ct�m��of�� the��Naz��� reg�me”.22��My��suggest�on�� �s�� that��oppos�ng��evaluat�ons��l�ke�� these,��as��well��as��osc�llat�ons��between��them,��are��consequences��of�� the���mpl�c�t��presuppos�t�on��that��res�stance��excludes��collaborat�on��and��vice versa.��The��fact��of��not��oppos�ng��the��project��of��bu�ld�ng��an��atom�c��weapon���n��Naz���Germany��seems��to��be��the��result��of��both�� techn�cal��and��sc�ent�f�cally��erroneous��assessments��and��the�� total��lack��of��des�re��to��do��so��on��the��part��of��He�senberg’s��group.��Both��the��lack��of��des�re��and��the��trust��of��author�t�es���n��the��loyalty��of��sc�ent�sts��were���nd�spensable��for��abandon�ng��the��project.��If��he��had��not��produced��ev�dence��of��h�s��collaborat�on��w�th��the��reg�me,��He�senberg��would��not��have��been��so��conv�nc�ng��when��he��argued,���n��the��summer��of��1942,��that��the��project��of��bu�ld�ng��the��weapon��would��be��just��as��labour-�ntens�ve��and��costly��as���t��would��be��uncerta�n��to��ach�eve��success���n��such��a��short��t�me.

Can��the���ncompat�ble��conclus�ons��formulated���n��recent��h�stor�cal��wr�t�ngs��about��He�senberg’s��behav�our��as��a��sc�ent�st��w�th��much��respons�b�l�ty�� �n�� the��f�nal��per�od��of��the��Th�rd��Re�ch��be��expla�ned���n��terms��that��some��people��supposedly��want��to��f�nd��out�� the��actual�� truth��and��others�� to��h�de�� �t?��I��do��not�� th�nk��so.�� It��seems��much��more��reasonable��to��me��to��adm�t��that��the��authors��of��these��wr�t�ngs��have��focused��e�ther��on��the��comprom�ses���mpl�ed��by��an���nst�tut�onal��pos�t�on��assumed���n��a��reg�me��such��as��H�tler’s,��or��on��the��emphas�s��of��the��type��of��res�stance��wh�ch���s��poss�ble��only��by��the��

22�� Quote��after��M.��Frayn,��Nachwort,���n��Kopenhagen,��p.��109.

very��acceptance��of��such��a��pos�t�on.��Once��He�senberg��dec�ded��not��to���mm�grate��from��Naz���Germany��he��had��to��choose��between��abd�cat�ng��the��respons�b�l�t�es��he��felt��he��had��towards��the��sc�ent�f�c��commun�ty��and��the��German��people,��and��accept�ng��those��comprom�ses��that��represented��the���nev�table��pr�ce��to��be��pa�d���n��order��to���nfluence��the��dec�s�ons��of��the��nat�onal-soc�al�st��author�t�es.

A�� compar�son,�� although�� unsat�sfactory�� �n�� many�� ways,�� could�� help�� us�� to��balance��our��evaluat�on��of�� the��behav�our��of��some��Roman�an��el�tes��dur�ng��the��f�rst��phase��of�� the��commun�st�� reg�me.��Roman�an��wr�ter��and��ph�losopher��Luc�an��Blaga��know�ngly��accepted��be�ng��completely��s�del�ned�� from��the��very��beg�nn�ng��of�� the��commun�st��reg�me.��He��pa�d��for��h�s��democrat�c��pol�t�cal��conv�ct�ons��and��h�s��refusal��to��collaborate���n��any��way��w�th��the��author�t�es��of��a��ruthless��repress�ve��system,��not��only��by��mak�ng��huge��personal��sacr�f�ces,��but��also��by��consent�ng��to��see�ng��h�s��work��pushed��out��of�� the��publ�c��arena.��Blaga��d�d��not��accept��any�� transact�on�� that��would��have���mpl�ed��a��cr�t�cal��d�stanc�ng��from��h�s��ph�losoph�cal��and��art�st�c��creed��and��d�d��not��g�ve�� �n�� to��any�� temptat�on,��unl�ke��numerous��other��prom�nent��personal�t�es��of��Roman�an��culture��at��the��t�me.��Ever��more��concerned��that��h�s��name��and��work��would��gather��dust,�� that��not��only��h�s��ph�losophy,��but��also��h�s��l�terary��works��could��become��absolutely�� �naccess�ble�� to�� the��younger��generat�on,��he��publ�shed,�� �n�� the�� last�� two��years��of��h�s�� l�fe,��a�� few��art�cles��conta�n�ng��pos�t�ve��apprec�at�ons��of��some��of�� the��reg�me’s��accompl�shments.��Here��are��the��words��of��a��person��whom��Blaga��trusted��to��whom��he��expla�ned��the��reasons��for��h�s��dec�s�on��less��than��one��year��before��h�s��death,���n��September��1960:��“Poems��have��started��to��be��pr�nted,��but��a��volume��not.��He��wants��to��see��h�s��volumes��publ�shed��because��t�me��fl�es,��he��grows��old��and��soon��he��w�ll��be��forgotten.��H�s��conv�ct�on���s�� that�� the��reg�me��w�ll�� last�� long,��most��l�kely��past��h�s��l�fe��[s�c]”.23��We��can��certa�nly��regret��such��concess�ons;��even��condemn��them���f��we��take��the��easy��stance��of��h�nds�ght.��Blaga��made��the��respect�ve��concess�ons���n��a��per�od��when��the��system��was��gett�ng��stronger��and��we��have��to��judge��h�s��dec�s�on��by��tak�ng���nto��account��all���ts��consequences���n��the��s�tuat�on��at��the��t�me.

He�senberg’s��case���s��part�cularly���nstruct�ve��for��the��very��reason��that���t��prompts��us��to��c�rcumspect�on,��to��a��dub�tat�ve��att�tude��that��favours��tak�ng���nto��cons�derat�on��the��complex�ty��of�� s�tuat�ons�� �n��wh�ch��personal�t�es��w�th��great�� respons�b�l�t�es��f�nd�� themselves,�� �n��contexts��where�� there�� �s��no��alternat�ve��capable��of��prov�d�ng��full��sat�sfact�on��both��to��the��requ�rements��of��oneself��as��a��moral��subject,��and��to��the��commun�ty.��The�r�� respons�b�l�t�es��are��commensurate��w�th�� the�r�� recogn�t�on��and��the��prest�ge�� they��enjoy.��No��matter��how��comfortable,��black-and-wh�te�� judgements��–��hero�sm��versus��moral��abd�cat�on��–��do��not��seem��appropr�ate�� �n��such��cases.��As��a��commentator��of��Frayn’s��play��remarks,��the��r�sk��ex�sts��that��the��characters��of��h�stor�cal��wr�t�ng��may��rece�ve��clearer��del�neat�ons��than��h�stor�cal��documents��and��sources��allow��us��to��make.24��For��those��who��are��so��unlucky��as��to��l�ve���n��an��oppress�ve��d�ctator�al��reg�me���t��seems��there��are��only��two��cho�ces:��res�stance��or��collaborat�on.��He�senberg’s��case��shows��us��that��you��can��have��collaborat�on��and��res�stance��m�xed���n��one.��It�� thus��becomes��clear��how��under��certa�n��c�rcumstances��the��very��acceptance��of��collaborat�on��

23�� Dorl���Blaga,��Ion��Balu,��Blaga surveilled by the Security,��Cluj,��Apostrof��Collect�on,��p.��165.24�� See��Klaus��Hentschel,��Endlich einmal historische Polyphonie,���n��M.��Frayn,��Kopenhagen,��pp.��

177-181.

208 �� Moral�ty���n��Pol�t�cs,��or��the��Pol�t�cs��of��Moral�ty?����/����M�haela��MIROIU������������209

makes��res�stance��poss�ble.

English translation by��Ileana��BARBU��and��Al�na��CÂRÂC

References

Blaga,��D.,��Balu,��I.��1998.��Blaga surveilled by the Security.��Cluj,��Apostrof��Collect�on.Frayn,��M.��2001.��Kopenhagen: Stück in zwei Akten. Mit zehn wissenschaftsgeschichtlichen

Kommentaren.��Gött�ngen,��Wallste�n��Verlag.Goudsm�t,��S.��1947.��Alsos.��New��York,��H.��Schuman��Inc,��London,��S�gma��Books.He�senberg,��W.��1967.��“Gott��se���Dank,��w�r��konnten��s�e��n�cht��bauen”.��Spiegel,��July��3.He�senberg,��W.��1946.��“Uber��d�e��Arbe�ten��zur��techn�schen��Ausnutzung��der��Atomkemenerg�e���n��

Deutschland”.��Naturwissenschaflen,��33,��Dec.He�senberg,��W.��1971.��Der Teil und das Ganze. Gespräche im Umkreis der Atomphysik.��

München,��P�per��Verlag.Hentschel,��K.��2001.��Endlich einmal historische Polyphonie,�� �n��M.��Frayn,��Kopenhagen.��

Gött�ngen,��Wallste�n��Verlag.Hermann,��A.��1976.��Werner Heisenberg.��Re�nbeck��be���Hamburg,��Rowolth��Taschenbuch��Verlag.Jungk,��R.��1958.��Brighter than a Thousand Suns: A Personal History of the Atomic Scientists.��

New��York,��Hartcourt,��Brace,��&��Co.Powers,��T.��1993.��Heisenberg’s War. The Secret History of the German Bomb.��New��York,��Alfred��

A. Knopf.Rechenberg,��H.��1992.��Werner Heisenberg. Deutsche und Judische Physik.��München/Zür�ch,��

P�per��Verlag.Rose,��P.��L.��1998.��Heisenberg and the Nazi Atomic Bomb Project: A Study in German Culture.��

Berkeley,��Un�vers�ty��of��Cal�forn�a��Press.Rose,��P.��L.��1998.��Kopenhagener Deutung-Heisenbergs Leseart,���n��M.��Frayn,��Kopenhagen.Speer,��A.��2005.��Erinnerungen.��Berl�n,��Ullste�n��Taschenbuchverlag.

Morality in Politics, or the Politics of Morality ?: “Neo-Purification” in Romania�

M�haela��MIROIU

“Morals��mean��the��rules��of��a��good��coex�stence.��W�thout��them,��the��coex�stence���s��not��just��bad,��but���mposs�ble”. (Norberto��Bobb�o)

IntroductionMy��contr�but�on��to��th�s��volume��w�ll��address��the��problem��of��retr�but�ve��just�ce��under��post-commun�sm.��What��happens��when��the��pr�nc�ple��of��proport�onal��respons�b�l�ty��becomes��mean�ngless��and��“conven�ent��truth”��g�ves��b�rth��to��a��“conven�ent��just�ce”?��What���s��the��proper��relat�onsh�p��between��eth�cal��culpab�l�ty,��legal��respons�b�l�ty��and��pol�t�cs���n��a��free��soc�ety?��In��order��to��reach��the��answers��from��the��perspect�ve��of��eth�cs��appl�ed���n��pol�t�cs,��I��w�ll��focus��on��the��problem��of��trans�t�onal��just�ce��and��lustrat�on���n��Eastern��Europe��as��well��as��on��a��spec�f�c��case-study��of��the��pol�t�c�zat�on��of��moral�ty���n��the��Roman�an��context.

After�� the��collapse��of��commun�sm��(1989),�� the��problem��of��moral��and��pol�t�cal��gu�lt�� �n��commun�sm��has��not��been��at��all��popular.��Just��small��groups,��mostly��former��pol�t�cal��pr�soners,��a�� few��d�ss�dents,�� some��publ�c�� �ntellectuals��and��people��who��wanted��to��recla�m��property��were��look�ng��for��reparatory��and��rest�tut�ve��just�ce��(from��Lat�n:��restitutio:�� to��g�ve��back).��The��w�der��publ�c��had��other��agendas���n��a��world��of��dramat�c��changes�� to�� �dent�t�es,�� jobs,�� the��soc�al��env�ronment,��and�� the��d�ssolut�on��of�� �nst�tut�ons��and��hab�ts��as��well��as�� the��creat�on��of��new��ones��(see��also��L�nz��and��Stepan,��1996).��The��most��cur�ous��fact�� �s�� that�� the��problem��of��moral��“pur�f�cat�on”,��of�� lustrat�on,��and��reparatory��and��retr�but�ve��just�ce��became���mportant��as��far��as��the��med�a��was��concerned,��17��years��after�� the��off�c�al��death��of��commun�sm.��It��became��obv�ous�� for�� the��publ�c�� that�� �n��order�� to��get�� r�d��of�� the�� traumat�c��past,��we��have�� to��bury���t,��to��conduct��proper��funerals,��but��what��do��we��bury��when��we��know��very��l�ttle��about��the��past?��To��jo�n��Europe��also��meant��clean�ng��up��the��d�rt��of��the��past,���n��order��to��morally��and/or��pol�t�cally��cure��soc�ety��of�� �ts�� �mpur�t�es.�� I��do��not��wr�te��about��“�mpure��people”��here,��but��about��the��necessary��d�stance��from��our��moral��fa�lures��as��human��be�ngs��dur�ng��the��commun�st��reg�me.��I��w�ll��argue��how��the��ma�n��result��of��the��“cleans�ng”��meant��not��more��moral�ty���n��pol�t�cs,��but��the��pol�t�c�zat�on��of��moral�ty.

��1�� The��paper,��wh�ch��has��a��f�rst��vers�on��as��a��publ�c��talk��at��Ind�ana��Un�vers�ty���s��rev�s�ted��for��publ�cat�on��under�� the��framework��of�� the��Project��“C�v�l��Soc�ety��and�� the��State.��Analyz�ng��Publ�c��Debates��on��Gender�� and��Env�ronmental�� Issues�� �n��Post-Commun�st��Roman�a”,��CNCSIS��-�� Ide�,��PN-II-ID-PCE-2011-3.�� I��am��very��grateful�� to��my��fr�ends,��Mar�a��Bucur,��Jeffrey��Isaac��and��Ivona��Hed�ng��(Ind�ana��Un�vers�ty)��for��the�r��comments.

210 �� Moral�ty���n��Pol�t�cs,��or��the��Pol�t�cs��of��Moral�ty?����/����M�haela��MIROIU������������211

A comprehensive view of the sins, sinners and supervisorsCommun�sm��meant�� the��un�f�cat�on��between��pol�t�cs��and��morals:�� from��an��off�c�al��po�nt��of��v�ew,��commun�sm��employed��a��un�que��moral�ty,��val�d��for��both��pr�vate��and��publ�c��l�fe��(wr�tten���n��The Code of Socialist Ethic and Equity, of Communists��Life and Work).��It���s���n��the��nature��of��the��reg�me��to��control��every��human��be�ng,��to��restra�n��freedom,��to��leave��very��l�ttle��room��for��pr�vacy.��It���s���n��the��nature��of��the��reg�me��to��treat��people��as��non-fully-rat�onal,��unable��to��judge��the�r��own���nterests,��to��project��the�r��own��good,��even���n��the��deta�ls��of��the�r��personal��l�fe���nclud�ng:��what��to��th�nk,��what��to��learn,��how��much��to��eat,��whom��should��one��marry��or��befr�end,��where��to��work��and��l�ve,��how��many��ch�ldren��to��have.2��Once��you��dev�ate��or��worse��from��the��off�c�al��Party��l�ne,��you��are��erect�ng��your��own���nterests��above��the��“People’s”;��you��become��morally��dub�ous���f��not��pol�t�cally��dangerous.

It��was��hard�� to��surv�ve��by�� respect�ng�� legal�ty��and��moral�ty.��The��greater�� the��constra�nts,�� the��greater�� are�� the�� s�ns;�� thus,�� the��greater�� �s�� the��need�� for�� trust�ng��superv�sors��and��guard�ans��to��keep��each���nd�v�dual��under��surve�llance,��control,��and��to��pun�sh��the��s�nners.��We��are��always��supposed��to��remember��that��the��off�c�al���deology��has��prom�sed��the��terrestr�al,��soc�al��parad�se��and��every��s�n��aga�nst�� the��off�c�al�� l�ne��matters��on��earth,��not���n��the��afterl�fe.��From��th�s��po�nt��of��v�ew,��we��can��eas�ly��recogn�ze��a��total�tar�an��reg�me��as��d�st�nct��from��an��author�tar�an��one:��the���ntrus�on���nto��personal��l�fe��and��the��fundamental�st��relat�onsh�p��between��the��moral,�� legal��and��pol�t�cal��are��necessary��cond�t�ons.

In�� the��1970’s��and��1980’s��Roman�an��commun�sm��was��total�tar�an,��not��s�mply��author�tar�an,��as��were��other��East��European��commun�sms��(see��Verdery,��1996,��and��T�smaneanu,��2003,��2011).��Surv�val��was��poss�ble��by��ly�ng,�� l�v�ng���n��dupl�c�ty��and��complicity (See Kligman, 1998 and Cioflâncă, Jinga, 2011). The number of the Secur�tate��off�cers��and��of�� �nformers��was��tr�ple�� that��of��other��commun�st��countr�es.��It��was��so��easy��to��become��a��s�nner,��a��cr�m�nal,��or��a��coward.��It��was��hard��to��be��a��hero��and,��certa�nly,��one��had��l�ttle��chance��to��be��s�mply��a��normal��and��reasonable��person,��accord�ng��to��the��common��standards��of��a��free��country.��The��absolute��power��to��name��the��s�ns��and��make��the��rules��belonged��to��the��upper��echelons��of��the��Commun�st��Party.��The��power��to��control��and��correct��the��s�nners��belonged��to��the��second��and��th�rd��level��act�v�sts��(those��pa�d��for)��and��to��the��Secur�tate��(as��pol�t�cal��pol�ce).��The���nformers��were��recru�ted��mostly��from��among��the��s�nners��through��blackma�l,��those��tempted��by��access��to��a��better��job��or��profess�onal��pos�t�on,��other��resources��(even��a��passport)��or,��why��not,�� the��env�ous.��Th�s���s�� the��ma�n��reason��people��hate��the���nformers��the��most,��even�� �f�� the��ma�n��respons�b�l�ty��for�� these��dec�s�ons��belonged�� to�� the��Party��and�� the��Secur�tate:�� �nformers��h�d��beh�nd��facades��of��what��seemed��l�ke��average��colleagues,��

��2�� See��also��other��books��and��art�cles��I��have��publ�shed��on��the��top�c:��România. Starea de fapt (Romania. Matter of Facts), Nem�ra,��Bucharest,��1997��(co-authored��w�th��V.��Past���and Cornel��Cod�ta));��Societatea Retro (The Backward-Looking Society),��Tre���Pub.��House,��Bucharest, 1999;��Drumul către autonomie. Teorii politice feministe (The Road to Autonomy. Feminist Political Theories),��Pol�rom,�� Ias�,��2004;��“V�c�ous��C�rcle��of�� the��Anonym�ty”,��Thinking, Montcla�r, USA,��no.��1,��1994;��“Ana’s��Land.��The��R�ght�� to��be��Sacr�f�ced”,�� �n��Ana’s Land, Westv�ew��Press Publ�cat�ons,��Boulder,��Colorado,��1996;��“Post-Total�tar�an��Pre-Fem�n�sm”,���n��Romania since 1989. Politics, Economics and Society, Henry��F.��Carey��(ed.),��Lex�ngton��Books,��Maryland,��2004��(w�th��L�l�ana��Popescu).

fr�ends,��teachers,��students,��relat�ves,��ne�ghbours,��boy/g�rlfr�ends,��or��spouses.

Morality-in-politics:-A-matter-of-principles

Moral relativism for democracy, moral absolutism for tyranny

Motto:��Do�na��Cornea:��The truth is not pure because we are not pure: The truth always corresponds to what is real. The ultimate reality is The Being. Our impurity is progressively degrading truths.A��Secur�tate��off�cer:��There is no absolute truth, simply convenient truth.3

Stable��democrac�es��are��very��comfortable�� �n��adm�tt�ng��an��amount��of�� relat�v�sm,���nd�v�dual���nterests��(consonant��w�th��the���dea��of��the��rat�onal��actor),��and��a��perspect�val��approach�� to�� truth.��Democrac�es�� recogn�ze�� the�� leg�t�macy��of�� �nd�v�dual�� �nterests��and��the��convent�onal��character��of��lay��eth�cs��appl�ed���n��profess�ons,��publ�c��l�fe��and��pol�t�cs.��Pol�t�c�ans��themselves��have��had��to��adm�t��that��democracy���s��bu�lt��from��and��depends��on��publ�c�� trust��(see��Tronto,��1993,��Shap�ro,��2003,��Sandel,��2005,��Mendus,��2009).��They��have��to��respect��some��moral��commands���n��pol�t�cs���n��order��to��ma�nta�n��the�r��publ�c��pos�t�on��as�� �n:��do��not��use��the��c�t�zens��as��a��means��for��your��own��ends.��Ask��for��the�r���nformed��consent;��refra�n��from��g�v�ng��false��prom�ses��or,���f��you��d�d��not,��the��consequences��of��your��pol�t�cal��act�ons��have��to��have��an���mpress�ve��ut�l�ty��for��the��larger��publ�c���n��order��to��ask��for��forg�veness��and��to��be��accepted��as��a��moral��pol�t�c�an��accord�ng��to��ut�l�tar�an��cr�ter�a.4

As��readers��w�ll��have��not�ced���n��the��motto,��percept�ons��regard�ng��moral��values��are��d�fferent���n��non-democrat�c��reg�mes��than���n��democrat�c��ones.��On��one��hand��we��have��the��most��courageous��d�ss�dent��of��the��1980s,��Do�nea��Cornea5.��She��adopted��an��absolut�st��perspect�ve��on��morals,��a��metaphys�cal��po�nt��of��v�ew��on��truth.��For��her��the��truth���s��one��and��pure,��but��our���mpure��behav�our���s��progress�vely��degrad�ng��th�s��truth.��Be�ng��a��woman,��her��approach��and���deas��became��rather��a��subject��of��mockery���n��a��publ�c��space��over-saturated��w�th��m�sogyny��and��sex�sm.6

The��Secur�tate��off�cer��on��the��other��hand,��appears��to��have��a��v�ew��wh�ch���s��closer��to��a��relat�v�st��and��democrat�c��one:��there is no absolute truth, but��convenient truths. Both��perspect�ves��are��very��relevant��for��today’s��publ�c��d�scuss�ons��around��the��moral,��legal��and��pol�t�cal�� respons�b�l�ty��for�� the��wrongness��and��cr�mes��of�� the��commun�st��reg�me.

Maybe���t���s��d�ff�cult��for��us��to��understand��the��moral��d�chotom�es���n��a��total�tar�an��

��3�� Do�na��Cornea,��March��2,��2005��and��w�th��Secur�tate��off�cer��X,��February��23,��2005��(Interv�ewed��by��Camel�a��S�meon���upon��my��request).��

��4�� See��the��whole��modern��trad�t�on��from��Kant��and��M�ll��to��Rawls��and��Dwork�n.��5�� Do�na��Cornea���s�� the��author��of��31��publ�c��protests;��she��has��lectured��on��Rad�o��Free��Europe��

and��contr�buted��to��other��160��Man�festos.��She��was���nterrogated��and��arrested��many��t�mes��and��subm�tted��to��home��arrest��unt�l��December,��1989.

��6�� Even��nowadays�� the��Global Gender Gap Report�� (2011)�� �s��show�ng��Roman�a�� �n�� the��112��pos�t�on���n��the��world���n��terms��of��women’s��part�c�pat�on��and��representat�on���n��pol�t�cs��(see��http://www.u�s.unesco.org/L�brary/Documents/global-gender-gap-report-educat�on-2011��/��Nov.��20:��2012).��

212 �� Moral�ty���n��Pol�t�cs,��or��the��Pol�t�cs��of��Moral�ty?����/����M�haela��MIROIU������������213

reg�me.��But��people��had�� to��confront�� two��k�nds��of��absolut�sms:��one��of�� the��un�que��party,��wh�ch��has��dec�ded��that�� there�� �s�� just��one��moral�ty,��valuable��for��all��k�nds��of��roles��from��parent�� to��worker��or��member��of�� the��party;�� for��all��k�nds��of�� �nst�tut�ons��from��fam�ly��to��the��state;��for�� the��pr�vate,��as��well��as��for�� the��publ�c��sphere.��It��was��a��moral�ty��of��duty��and��obed�ence,��rather��than���nd�v�dual��r�ghts��and��respons�b�l�t�es.��It��has��created��a��r�tual��of��dupl�c�ty��for��most��women��and��men,��as��well��as��of��compl�c�ty��for��many��of��them.��How��can��one��oppose��the��wrongs��of��such��a��reg�me��by��embrac�ng��a��relat�v�st��perspect�ve��on��morals?��In��order��to��be��morally��pure���n��a��democrat�c��reg�me,��we��can��be��just��respons�ble��and��reasonable��c�t�zens.��In��a��tyrann�cal��reg�me��one��has��to��be��a��hero��or��a��sa�nt.

I��w�ll��not��d�scuss�� �n�� th�s��paper�� the��f�rst��stage��of��commun�sm,�� the��proletar�an��d�ctatorsh�p��(1948-1964),��even�� though��most��pol�t�cal��cr�mes��were��related�� to�� th�s��per�od.��The��reasons��for��not��do�ng��so��cons�st���n��the��fact��that��most��of���ts��protagon�sts��are��not��al�ve��anymore��or��they��are��no��longer���n��a��pos�t�on��of��power.��I��prefer��to��l�m�t��my��d�scuss�on��to�� the��so��called��“Ceausescu��era”��(1965-1989)��because��most��of�� the��protagon�sts��of�� that��per�od��are��al�ve��and��act�ve,��some��of�� them��st�ll�� �n��power��and��many��at��the��heart��of��the��new��cap�tal�st��class��(See��Past�,��2006).��Pol�t�cal��pr�sons��were��closed��by��state��decree���n��1964.��“Class��enem�es”��(members��of�� the��former��pol�t�cal��part�es,��the��bourgeo�s�e,��wealthy��peasants��and��traders,��publ�c���ntellectuals,��stubborn��pr�ests),��had��already��d�sappeared�� from��any��pol�t�cal��power��or��s�gn�f�cant�� soc�al���nfluence.

After��1971��d�sobed�ence��or��protest��meant�� �mportant��and��var�ous��r�sks,�� from��the��supreme,��but��very�� real�� r�sks�� such��as��death,7�� �mpr�sonment��and��prosecut�on��of��one’s�� fam�ly,�� to��severe��but��also�� real�� r�sks:�� loss��of��one’s�� job,�� �solat�on,��house��arrest,��pr�vat�on��and��ex�le,�� to��‘soft’,��very��common��ones��such��as��restr�ct�ons��aga�nst��travel��abroad,�� �nterd�ct�ons��aga�nst��certa�n��profess�onal�� jobs��(e.g.�� �n��order��to��teach��soc�al��sc�ences��you��had��to��be��a��party��member)��or���nterd�ct�ons��aga�nst��profess�onal��advancement.

Rad�cal��d�sobed�ence��meant��oppos�t�on��aga�nst�� the��reg�me���tself��and��attracted��both��supreme��and��severe��r�sks.�� In�� th�s��case��one��had�� to��be��hero��or��sa�nt,��not�� just��a�� respons�ble�� c�t�zen.�� I��wonder�� �f��one��can,�� �n�� fact,�� speak��about�� c�t�zensh�p�� �n��commun�sm,��hav�ng��a��s�m�lar��mean�ng��as��we��are��used��to�� �n��democrat�c��reg�mes.��A��few��such��d�ss�dents��are��heroes,��but�� they��have��never��been��publ�cly�� recogn�zed��as��such.��I��shall��g�ve��some��of��the��most���mportant��names��of��these��heroes:��Gheorghe��Ursu,��Do�na��Cornea,��Vas�le��Parasch�v,��Radu��F�l�pescu,��Gabr�el��Andreescu,��M�rcea��D�nescu,��Paul��Goma,��Dan��Petrescu,��Dor�n��Tudoran,��Petre��M�ha���Bacanu,��Anton��Uncu.��The��readers��should��not��be��surpr�sed��by��the��lack��of��recogn�t�on.��It�� �s��hard��to��recogn�ze��a��hero,��espec�ally��when��the��hero���s��of��the��same��generat�on��as��you��and���s��st�ll��al�ve��and��act�ve.��Most��people��would��feel��cowardly��and��others��gu�lty���f��they��were��to��recogn�ze��such��heroes.��For��the��f�rst��group���t���s��not��morally��comfortable��wh�le��for��the��second���t���s��even��dangerous.��The��consequence���s��that��we,��the��others,��need��not��be��e�ther��moral��and��pol�t�cal��heroes,��or��cr�m�nals.

��7�� See��e.g.��Gheorghe��Ursu��who��was��beaten��to��death.

The-paradoxes-of-‘the-truth’-about-communismQuest�on:��Where is the truth about our faults under communism, and who will‘reveal’ it to us?The��pol�t�cal��answer:��The truth is written by the political police in our personal files and they will ‘reveal’ (disclose) it to us.

If��we��are��adopt�ng�� the��correspondence�� theory��of�� truth,��a��statement�� �s�� true�� �f��and��only���f��we��can��f�nd��proof��that�� the��content��of��our��statements��have��a��correspondent���n��real�ty.��For��example,��the��ma�n��suppos�t�on���s��that���f��we��want��to��know��who��were��gu�lty��for��the��wrongs��of��the��commun�st��reg�me���t���s��not��necessary��to��ask��the��v�ct�ms��and��the��w�tnesses,��or��to��consult��the���nst�tut�ons��arch�ves,��but��the��Secur�tate��f�les.��Th�s��statement�� �s��bu�lt��on�� the��assumpt�on��that��someone��has�� �mpart�ally��and��accurately��descr�bed��what��we��have��done���n��our��past���n��these��f�les.��The��ma�n���mage��about��the��Secur�tate���s��that���t��was��not��an���nst�tut�on��l�ke��any��other,��but��rather��the��treasurer��and��the��guard�an��of��the��Truth.��In��my��op�n�on,��th�s,���n��fact,��has��been��the��ma�n��v�ctory��of��the��pol�t�cal��pol�ce��over�� the��h�story��of��commun�sm.��The��defenders��of�� the��act�v�ty��of��the��comm�ss�on���n��charge��of��the���nvest�gat�ons��of��the��Secur�tate��f�les��w�ll��argue��that��the��comm�ss�on���s��not��tak�ng��the��f�nd�ngs��l�terally,��but���s��mak�ng��the��necessary��correlat�ons��w�th��other��f�les���n��order��to��prove��the��ver�ty��of��the���nformat�on.��We��are��now���n��a��full��v�c�ous��c�rcle.��The��data��cannot��be��confronted��w�th��proofs��other��than��the���nformat�ve��notes.

Paradox�cally,��only�� the�� ‘products’��of�� the��pol�t�cal��pol�ce��have��cred�b�l�ty��nowadays.��In��Foucault’s��terms��(Discipline and Punish -��Surveiller et Punir, 1975),��they��have��created��the��new��off�c�al��“reg�me��of��truth”.

Lustration8 as a form of transitional justiceAfter�� the��fall��of�� the��var�ous��commun�st�� reg�mes��(1989-1991),�� the�� term��lustrat�on��came��to��refer�� to�� the��vett�ng��of��publ�c��off�c�als�� �n��Eastern��Europe��for�� l�nks�� to�� the��Commun�st-era��secur�ty��serv�ces;�� �t��means�� the��pol�cy��of�� l�m�t�ng��part�c�pat�on��of��former��commun�sts,��and��espec�ally�� �nformants��of�� the��commun�st��secret��pol�ce,�� �n��the��successor��governments��or��even���n��c�v�l��serv�ce��pos�t�ons.��In��my��op�n�on,��one��of��the��most��relevant��stud�es��for�� the��top�c��I��am��deal�ng��w�th���s��Explaining Lustration in Eastern Europe:‘A Post-communist politics approach’�� (W�ll�ams,��Szczerb�ak,��Fowler,��2003).9��The��authors��are��stress�ng��the��“tuff”��(legally��based��lustrat�on)��and��the��

��8�� The��or�g�nal��etymolog�cal��mean�ng���s��assoc�ated��w�th��anc�ent��Roman��r�tes��of��pur�f�cat�on.��9�� The��study��of��W�ll�ams��K�eran,��Aleks��Szczerb�ak,��Br�g�d��Fowler,��Explaining Lustration in

Eastern Europe: A Post-communist Politics Approach,��SEI��Work�ng��Paper��No��62,��(2003)��has��many��analyt�cal��v�rtues��and�� �s��very��appropr�ate��as��a��bas�s�� for��eth�cal�� reflect�ons��on��lustrat�on.��They��have���ncorporated��many���mportant��stud�es��concern�ng��trans�t�onal�� just�ce���n��post-commun�sm��such��as��Samuel��Hunt�ngton,��The��Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, 1991;��Ne�l��J.��Kr�tz,�� (ed.),��Transitional Justice: How Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes,��1995;��Av�ezer��Tucker,��Parano�ds��May��be��Persecuted:��Post-total�tar�an,��Retroact�ve�� ‘Just�ce’,��Archives Européenes de Sociologie,��40��(1999);��Adr�enne��M.��Qu�ll,��To Prosecute or Not to Prosecute: Problems Encountered in the Prosecution of Former Communist Officials in Germany, Czechoslovakia, and the

214 �� Moral�ty���n��Pol�t�cs,��or��the��Pol�t�cs��of��Moral�ty?����/����M�haela��MIROIU������������215

“m�ld”��(morally��based��lustrat�on)��as��we��shall��see��later.One��character�st�c��of�� a��democrat�c�� reg�me�� �s�� that�� �t�� has��no��propens�ty�� to��

�nst�tut�onal�se�� the��whole��of��soc�al��moral�ty�� �nto�� leg�slat�on��and�� thus��should��be��tolerant�� towards��v�ct�mless�� cr�mes.��Trans�t�onal�� just�ce,�� from��a�� total�tar�an��or��author�tar�an��reg�me�� to��a��democrat�c��one�� �s��a��very��hard��and��unusual�� task.��Apart��from��the��other��forms��(procedural,��retr�but�ve��and��d�str�but�ve��just�ce),�� trans�t�onal��just�ce��has��to��be��reparatory��for��d�fferent��k�nds��of��v�ct�ms.��Usually��trans�t�onal��just�ce���ncludes��cr�m�nal��prosecut�on��of��prom�nent��or��representat�ve��off�c�als,��the��rest�tut�on��of��conf�scated��property�� to�� �ts�� leg�t�mate��owners;�� the��declass�f�cat�on��of�� the��secret��f�les��and��publ�c��access��to��the�r��contents��(see��McAdams��(ed.)��1997;��Kommers,��1997;��W�ll�ams��et��al.,��2003).

Lustration ascerta�ns��whether��an��occupant��of,��or��cand�date�� for��a��part�cular��post��worked��for��or��collaborated��w�th��the��Commun�st��Secur�tate��(read��also��STASI,��KGB��and��so��on).��Decommunization refers�� to�� the��w�der��removal��and��exclus�on��of��people��from��off�ce��for��hav�ng��been��pa�d��as��act�v�sts��of�� the��Commun�st��Party.��The��process��cons�sts��of��two��k�nds��of��measures:��(1)��vett�ng��or��screen�ng���nd�v�duals��for��the�r��assoc�at�on��w�th��nomenklatura��(read��the��apparatch�k��and��the��pol�t�cal��pol�ce��off�cers);��or,��(2)��the�r��exclus�on��from��pol�t�cal��and��publ�c��leadersh�p��pos�t�ons.��The��former��Czechoslovak�a��had��the��most��severe��law��s�nce��1991:��“automat�c��exclus�on��from��the��spec�f�ed��off�ces”.��Or�g�nally,�� the�� law��was��to��be���n��effect��for��f�ve��years,��then��unt�l��2000,��and��f�nally��a��ban��for�� l�fe��Hungary��(1994).��“Lustrat�on��rests��on��publ�c��exposure��w�th��d�screet��pressure��placed��on���nd�v�duals�� to��res�gn���f�� they��are��found��to��have��been��agents”;��(Poland��1997). Poland��projected��the��extens�on��of�� the��exclus�on��even��to��the��execut�ve��pos�t�ons���n��pr�vate��compan�es,��as��well��as��cutt�ng��the��ret�rement��benef�ts��for��secret��serv�ce��off�cers��(see��W�ll�ams��et��al.,��2003).

In��Roman�a��the��c�v�l��movement��for��lustrat�on��started���n��March,��1990��under��the��name��The Timisoara Proclamation (Proclamatia de la Timisoara (art�cle��8)��and���t��became��the��ma�n��purpose��of��the��month-long��s�t-�n��protest��at��the��marathon��meet�ng��of��Piața Universității (University Square) �n��Bucharest.��The��protesters��called��for��bann�ng��access�� to��pol�t�cal��pos�t�ons��for�� two��electoral��cycles��for�� those��who��were��act�v�sts��of��the��Commun�st��Party��and��the��members��of��the��Secur�tate.��The��movement��was��not��at��all��popular.��Seventy��seven��per��cent��of�� the��populat�on��rejected��the���dea��by��vot�ng��for��a��formerly���mportant��apparatch�k,��Ion��Il�escu,��as��Pres�dent.��The��early��demand�� for�� lustrat�on�� �n��Roman�a��was��cons�stent��w�th��Hunt�ngton’s��pred�ct�on��(1991):��

“If�� the�� last�� leaders��of�� the��non-democrat�c��reg�me��w�ll�� res�st��v�olently�� �n��face��of��reg�me��change,�� there��would��be��strong��w�ll��for��retr�but�on.��If�� they��w�ll��qu�t��

Czech Republic,��1996;��Charles��Bertsch�, ‘Lustration and the Transition to Democracy: The Cases of Poland and Bulgaria’,��1995;��John��P.��Moran,��‘The Communist Torturers of Eastern Europe: Prosecute and Punish or Forgive and Forget?’,��1994;��Juan��J.��L�nz��and��Alfred��Stepan,��Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America and Post-Communist Europe, 1996;��K�eran��W�ll�ams��and��Denn�s��Deletant,��Security Intelligence Services in New��Democracies: The Czech Republic, Slovakia and Romania, 2001��and��many��other��stud�es��wh�ch��are��relevant��from��a��legal,��moral��and��pol�t�cal��po�nt��of��v�ew.

peacefully,��or��w�ll���n�t�ate��the��post-commun�sm��and��the��necessary��reforms��then��qu�t,��persecut�on��would��be��avo�ded”.��(Hunt�ngton,��1991,��p.��211)

Hunt�ngton��bel�eved��that��Roman�a��and��East��Germany��w�ll��have��the��tendency��to��prosecute��commun�st��leaders,��wh�le��the��rest��would��forg�ve��and��forget��(see��W�ll�ams��et��al.,��2001).��The��prophecy��fa�led.��Once��the��alarm��started,��the��‘targets’��of��retr�but�ve��just�ce��had��the��means��to��man�pulate��and��d�vert��the��whole��revolut�on��and��to��explo�t��the��new��fears��result�ng��from��the�� trans�t�on��process.��People��were��confronted��w�th��the��loss��of��the�r��work�ng��places���n��a��large��scale��de-�ndustr�al�zat�on��process��as��well��as��w�th��what��they��exper�enced��as��a��deep��soc�al��polar�zat�on.��In��such��c�rcumstances���t��was��easy��for��the��former��nomenklatura��to��occupy,��openly��or��d�screetly,��the��med�a��and��the��pol�t�cal��spectrum.��The�r��weak��pol�t�cal��compet�tors10��were��deeply��or�ented��towards��a��rest�tut�ve��just�ce,��a��pol�t�cal��agenda��wh�ch��was��far��from��most��people’s��concerns��and���nterests��(M�ro�u,��1999).

The��pred�cted��lustrat�on��and��decommun�zat�on��d�sappeared��from��most��part�es’��pol�t�cal��agenda,��as��well��as��from��publ�c���nterest.��Th�s��d�m�n�shment��was��fac�l�tated��by��the��d�vers�on��mach�nery��wh�ch��worked��very��eff�c�ently�� to��d�sclose��the��f�les��of��some��respected��wr�ters��who��were���nformers��of��Secur�tate.��I��agree��w�th��some��of��the��perspect�ves��concern�ng��the��process��of��lustrat�on��and��decommun�zat�on,��wh�ch��state��that��they��were��dependent��on��the��dynam�cs��of��post-commun�st��pol�t�cal��compet�t�on.

“We��f�nd��that��the��passage��of��a��lustrat�on��b�ll��depended��on��the��ab�l�ty��of���ts��most��ardent��advocates�� to��persuade��a��heterogeneous��plural�ty��of�� leg�slators�� that�� the��safeguard�ng��of��democracy��[was]��requ�red.��The��quest�on��of��how��to��deal��w�th��[a]��prev�ous��non-democrat�c��reg�me’s��funct�onar�es��and��collaborators��has��been��an���mportant��source��of��pol�t�cal��d�v�s�ons���n��post-Commun�st��Eastern��Europe��[…].��Att�tudes�� to�� the��past��developed���nto��an�� �ssue��on��wh�ch��part�es��cooperate��and��compete”.��(W�ll�ams��K.,��A.��Szczerb�ak,��B.��Fowler,��2003,��p.��3)

Welsh’s��v�ew��on��early��or��late��pursu�t��of��trans�t�onal��just�ce��has��a��strong��anchor���n��the��actual��process:��as��t�me��passed,��commun�sm��and��the��pol�t�cal��pol�ce��“became��a�� tool�� �n�� the��struggle��for��pol�t�cal��power”��and��was��explo�ted��by��some��pol�t�c�ans��aga�nst�� the�r��opponents”�� (Welsh,��1996,��p.��93).��The��analysts��of�� the��pol�t�cs��of��lustrat�on��conclude��that��w�th�n��the��pol�t�cal��spectrum��the��r�ght��was���n��the��favour��of��a��“tuff”��(legal)��lustrat�on��and��the��left,���n��contrast��accepted��a��m�ld��(moral)��one��to��the��extent��they��accepted��any.

“The��passage��of�� each�� lustrat�on��b�ll,�� and�� the�� sanct�ons��conta�ned�� there�n,��reflected�� not�� the�� country’s�� pol�t�cal�� h�story�� but�� rather�� the�� parl�amentary��ar�thmet�c��of��flu�d��party��systems��….��The��story��of�� lustrat�on,�� therefore,�� �s��one��of��post-Commun�st��pol�t�cal��compet�t�on��and�� leg�slat�ve��coal�t�on-bu�ld�ng,��

10�� The��Nat�onal��L�beral��Party��and��Nat�onal��Chr�st�an��Democrat��Peasants��Party��were��restored��very��soon��after��December,��1989,��shar�ng��a��golden-age,���deal�st��nostalg�a��for��pre-commun�st��t�mes��and��a��less���deal�st�c��concern��to��rega�n��lost��propert�es��that��had��been��conf�scated��by��the��commun�sts���n��1948��.

216 �� Moral�ty���n��Pol�t�cs,��or��the��Pol�t�cs��of��Moral�ty?����/����M�haela��MIROIU������������217

and��should��be��told��w�th��emphas�s��on��the��rhetor�c,��moves��and��comprom�ses��that��compet�t�on��and��coal�t�ons��requ�re”.�� (W�ll�ams��K.,��A.��Szczerb�ak,��B.��Fowler,��2003p.��12)

To��paraphrase��Thomas��Nagel’s�� t�tle,��The mor(t)al questions rema�ned��on��the��agenda��of��a��powerless��m�nor�ty.��Who��are��the��gu�lty��who��are��respons�ble��for��our��da�ly��fears��and���nsecur�ty?��Who��was��spy�ng��on��our��pr�vate��l�ves?��What��k�nd��of��pun�shment��do�� they��deserve?��Do�� they��deserve��a��moral��or�� a��pol�t�cal��pun�shment?��Can��we��use��ex�le��or��ban�shment,�� the��same��for��all��of�� them���rrespect�ve��of�� the�r�� �nd�v�dual��h�stor�es?��If��we��are��promot�ng��l�beral��democracy��and��the��rule��of�� law,��how��are��we��supposed��to��treat��those��who��are��accused��of��v�ct�mless��cr�mes,��just��because��they��have��s�gned��a��comm�tment��to��the��Secur�tate?

“Lustrat�on��was,�� therefore,��presented��as��a��means��of�� safeguard�ng�� the�� state��and��democracy��e�ther��by��compell�ng�� thousands��of��cand�dates��and��off�c�als��to��d�sclose�� the�r��personal��h�stor�es,��or��by�� �nstall�ng��a��d�screet��bureaucrat�c��procedure�� to�� f�lter�� such��people��out��of�� the�� state�� sector”.�� (W�ll�ams��K.,��A.��Szczerb�ak,��B.��Fowler,��2003,��p.��9)

If�� the�� legal�� and��moral�� process��was��delayed,�� as�� �n��our�� case,�� some��of�� the��pred�ct�ons��of��the��pro-lustrat�on��part�sans��concern�ng��the��r�sks��of��not�� leg�slat�ng���t��are��already��real�zed.

a.��State��capture:��avo�d�ng��lustrat�on��as��a��prophylact�c��means��w�ll�� lead��to�� the��pr�vat�zat�on��of�� the��common��goods��by�� the��party��barons��and��secret��pol�ce��operat�ves;

b.��Blackma�l:��the��fear��about��the��cont�nuous���nfluence��of��the��secret��pol�ce��by��the��uncontrolled��use��of��the��f�les:��the���nformers��are��vulnerable��and��w�ll��be��subject��to��blackma�l��by��the��off�cers��(some��ret�red,��others��st�ll��act�ve)��to��act��aga�nst��the��publ�c���nterest;

c.��The��dub�ous��character��of��the��pol�t�cal���nst�tut�ons:��publ�c��transparency��about��commun�sm��w�ll�� �ncrease��conf�dence���n�� the��newly��democrat�c�� �nst�tut�ons��and���n��the��protect�on��of��the��c�t�zens’��r�ghts��(see��also��W�ll�ams��et��al.,��2003,��pp.��9-11).

These��speculat�ve��s�de��effects��are��mean�ngless�� �n��post-commun�st��Roman�a,��where��no��lustrat�on��law��has��been��passed.��Even���f�� the��projected��lustrat�on��law��w�ll��pass��(wh�ch��I��doubt,��22��years��after��1989),�� the��consequences��of�� the��state��capture��rema�n.��The��pol�t�cal��and��econom�c��el�te��do��not��fear��lustrat�on,��but��rather��the��creat�on��of the National Agency to Fight Corruption (Agenția Națională Anticorupție: ANI)

�n�t�ated��by��Mon�ca��Macove�,11�� the��former��M�n�ster��of��Just�ce��(Jan.��2005��-��Apr�l,��2007).��ANI��was��supposed��to��play��an���mportant��role���n��the��necessary��clar�f�cat�ons��concern�ng�� the��sources��of��pol�t�c�ans’��wealth,��as��well��as��prevent�ng��and��f�ght�ng��corrupt�on.��W�th��the��help��of��the��Parl�ament,��the��project��became��vo�d��of��mean�ng��and��the��government��got��r�d��of��Mon�ca��Macove�.12��Lustrat�on��as��an��el�te-dr�ven��process��was��not��very��popular��and��had�� l�ttle��publ�c��support.��People’s��memor�es��appear�� to��be��very��short.��In��order��to��be��sens�t�ve��to��the��past�� �njust�ces��and��al�gn��oneself��w�th��the���dea��of��a��retr�but�ve��just�ce��wh�ch��would��pun�sh��those��who��are��gu�lty,��one��has��to�� l�ve�� �n��soc�ety��w�th��a��h�gh�� level��of��awareness��of�� just�ce�� �n�� the��present.��Moral��sens�t�v�ty��to��the��wrongness��of��the��past��cannot��funct�on���n��a��proper��manner��w�th�n��a��surv�val��soc�ety��subject��to��deep��polar�zat�on��and���nsecur�ty.��The��proport�on��of��the��soc�al��and��econom�c��v�ct�ms��of�� the��spontaneous�� trans�t�on��s�gn�f�cantly��exceeds��the��proport�on��of��the��perce�ved��v�ct�ms��of��commun�sm��(accord�ng��to��the��Report of the��Presidential Commission for the Study of Communism,��between��500,000��and��2��m�ll�on).��For��example,��a��nat�onal��op�n�on��poll���n��October,��2006��(a��few��months��before��the��Pres�dent�al��Comm�ss�on’s��Report)�� found��that�� just��s�x��per��cent��of�� the��people��cons�dered��themselves��d�rect��v�ct�ms��of��commun�sm.13

The-politics-of-morality

Oblivion and forgivenessIn��general��terms,��the��governments��of��a��‘post’��author�tar�an��era��prefer��the��pol�t�cs��of��obl�v�on��and��forg�v�ng��to�� the��pol�t�cs��of��remember�ng,��restor�ng��or��d�sclos�ng��the��actual��past.��Usually��they��are��us�ng��the��past���n��pol�t�cal��confl�cts���n��order��to��destroy��the�r��enem�es��or��compet�tors.��The��recent��cases��are���mpress�ve.��Once,��we��hoped��that��after��the��elect�ons���n��2004��the��relat�ons��w�th��the��past��would��be��clar�f�ed,��yet��the��past��was��used��to��destroy���nternal��compet�tors���n��the��Nat�onal��L�beral��Party��and��to��sw�tch��the��agenda��from��ant�-corrupt�on��pol�t�cs��to��a��false��retr�but�ve��just�ce.��But��th�s��w�ll��be��a��later��subject.��From��a��pol�t�cal��po�nt��of��v�ew,��obl�v�on���s��more��advantageous��than��remember�ng��(see��Forty��and��Küchler,��2001).

Apparently�� those��respons�ble��for��cr�mes��and��abuses��“benef�t�� from��a��general,��tac�t��unasked��de facto amnesty”[…].�� Implemented,��under�� the��pressure��of��c�v�l��soc�ety,�� the��“T�cu��Dum�trescu��Law”��(Law��no.��187/��December��9,��1999),��grant�ng��access��to��the��f�les��of��the��Secur�tate��as��pol�t�cal��pol�ce,��proved��to��be���neff�c�ent���n��the��intended ‘moral purification’ of post-communist society” (Cioflâncă, 2002, p. 88). The��Nat�onal��Counc�l��for��the��Study��of��the��Secur�tate��F�les���s��also��a��part�al��fa�lure.��The��strongest��arguments��for��obl�v�on��are��related��to�� the��repress�on��or��d�vers�on��of���nconven�ent,��embarrass�ng��memor�es.

11 She was appointed by the Democrat Party and by the President Traian Băsescu as a prom�nent��representat�ve��of��c�v�l��soc�ety��deal�ng��w�th��human��r�ghts��(Hels�nk���Comm�ttee,��Bucharest).

12�� Later��on,��ANI��also��became��a��pol�t�cal��tool��to��get��r�d��of��dangerous��pol�t�cal��compet�tors.��13 Barometrul de Opinie Publica al Fundatiei Soros Romania, Octombrie 2006, București.

Similar perceptions were found in other polls: Atitudini şi opinii despre regimul comunist d�n��Român�a��Sondaj��de��op�n�e��publ�c,��IICCMER,��Septembr�e,��2010.

218 �� Moral�ty���n��Pol�t�cs,��or��the��Pol�t�cs��of��Moral�ty?����/����M�haela��MIROIU������������219

What��are��the��general��explanat�ons��of��the��soc�al��preference��for��obl�v�on?14

a.��The�� soc�al�sat�on��of��most��people�� �n�� commun�st�� �deology,��pol�t�cs�� and���nst�tut�ons.�� One�� cannot�� expect�� a�� qu�ck�� and�� general�� bra�n-wash,�� a��replacement��of��collect�v�st�� th�nk�ng��cond�t�oned��by��dut�es��and�� the�� long��exper�ence��of��paternal�st��pol�t�cal��hab�ts,��w�th��an�� �nd�v�dual�st�� th�nk�ng,��or�ented��to��r�ghts��and��the��need��for��personal��autonomy;

b.��The��nostalg�a��for��commun�sm��of��many��people.��Commun�sm��also��meant��the��protect�ve��role��of��the��state,��stab�l�ty,��job��secur�ty��and��the��lead�ng��pos�t�on��of��the��work�ng��class.��Even��the��psycholog�cal��fact��that��many��people��were��young��and��they��are��nostalg�c��for��the�r��youth���s���mportant��as���s��the��fact��that��present��problems��are��far��more��press�ng��than��past��ones;

c.��General�zed��respons�b�l�ty��and��gu�lt�� feel�ngs.��Commun�sm��created��a�� large��scale��membersh�p��for���ts��organ�zat�ons:��from��the��age��of��f�ve��unt�l��death,��any��person��l�v�ng���n��Roman�a��belonged��to��the��Homeland��Falcons;��the��P�oneers��or��Commun�st��Youth;�� the��Commun�st��Party��or�� the��Democracy��and��Un�ty��Soc�al�st��Front.��The��forced���nterpretat�on���s�� that��everybody��was��‘gu�lty’��by��the��formal��appurtenance��as��“collaborat�on�st”,��yet��no��one��was��to��blame;

d.��The��d�rect�� �nterests��of�� the��pol�t�c�ans�� to�� �mpede��decommun�zat�on��and��lustrat�on��(more�� than��20%��of�� the��pol�t�cal��class��was��bu�lt��by�� the�� �nformal��commun�st�� networks,�� un�nterested�� �n�� transparency�� concern�ng�� the�r��communist past. (See also Cioflâncă, 2002 and Scalat, 2004).

The��arguments��pro��obl�v�on��are��def�n�tely��those��wh�ch��belong��to��those��who��are��d�rectly���nterested���n��obl�v�on��rather��than���n��forg�veness���.e.���t���s��better��to��forget��than��forg�ve.

a.��Lustrat�on��and��de-commun�zat�on��are�� subvers�ve:�� they��w�ll�� jeopard�ze��reconc�l�at�on��and��the��un�ty��and��sol�dar�ty��of��the��people;

b.��Respons�b�l�ty���s��collect�ve��and���nst�tut�onal,��not���nd�v�dual;c.��The��search��for��the��gu�lty���s��a��w�tch-hunt��(even��the��author�ty��of��the��famous��

d�ss�dent��Adam��M�chn�ck��was��used��to��enforce��th�s���dea);d.��There�� �s��no��clear��cut�� l�ne��between��‘us’��and��‘them’��(Havel’s��author�ty��was��

used��as��well);e.��It�� �s��not�� the��r�ght��moment.��We��were��e�ther�� too��close��to��commun�sm��(early��

‘90’s��or��are��too��far��from���t��r�ght��now);f.��We�� cannot�� consume�� the�� l�ttle�� energy�� left�� for�� deal�ng�� w�th�� the�� past.��

Commun�sm���s��exhaust�ng��and��had��no��deadl�ne.��The��‘post’��soc�ety�� �s��an��exhaust�ve��enterpr�se��people��have��to��confront��on��a��da�ly��bas�s;

g.��We��have��other��pr�or�t�es�� and��we��do��not�� let�� the��past�� underm�ne�� future��projects.15

Some��of��these��arguments��are��reasonable,��understandable��and��shared��by��many��

14�� See��also��Cofl�nca’s���nterpretat�ons,��2002.15 For details see also Cioflâncă, 2002.

people,��apart��from��those��d�rectly���nterested���n��obl�v�on.The��general,��non-part�san��arguments��for��forg�veness��are��as��follows:��

a.�� Human�st��and��Chr�st�an��arguments.��Everyone��needs��a��second��chance��and���nd�v�duals��can��be��redeemed.��We��have�� to��forg�ve.��But�� �n��order�� to��have��a��second��chance,��others��have�� to��know��how��you��used�� the��f�rst.��Forg�veness���s��someth�ng��d�fferent��from��forgett�ng.��We��can��convert��to��other��bel�efs��and��can��play��a��s�gn�f�cant�� role�� �n�� the�� future�� (as��d�d��St.��Paul,�� the��Chr�st�ans’��persecutor);

b.�� People��tend��to��act�� �n��favour��of��a��prospect�ve��respons�b�l�ty��rather�� than��for��a�� retrospect�ve��one.��What��a��person��d�d��or�� �s��supposed�� to��have��done�� �n��a��democrat�c��t�me��under��cond�t�ons��of��freedom���s��more��valuable,��than��her��past��m�stakes��under��constra�nts.��Is���t��better��to��know��‘the��truth’,��or��just��to��judge��by��ourselves���f��a��pol�t�c�an��who��acted���n��the��publ�c���nterests���n��the��last��years��has��been��‘pur�f�ed’��by��h�s��own��pol�t�cal��acts?

In��order��to��report��a��reg�me��as���lleg�t�mate��and��cr�m�nal��from��a��moral��and��legal��po�nt��of��v�ew,��we��need��fundamental��standards��by��wh�ch�� to��pass�� judgements.�� In��my��v�ew, these��standards��are,�� �n�� the��end,��related��to��human��r�ghts��and��Kant’s��f�rst���mperat�ve��of��modern��eth�cs,��namely,�� that��every��person�� �s��an��end�� �n��herself��and��should��not��be��treated��just��as��a��means.

“Act��w�th��reference�� to��every��rat�onal��be�ng��(whether��yourself��or��another)��so��that it is an end in itself in your maxim [...], meaning the rational being is ʽthe basis of all maxims of actionʼ and must be as a mere means but as the supreme l�m�t�ng��cond�t�on���n��the��use��of��all��means,���.e.,��as��an��end��at��the��same��t�me”.��(Kant,��Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals (1785:��437-438)

From��th�s��bas�c��moral��ax�om��we��can��der�ve�� those��of��pol�t�cal��moral�ty.��The��elementary��pol�t�cal��cond�t�ons��for��humans��to��be��ends��unto��themselves��are��pol�t�cal��l�berty�� (to��be��governed��by��consent);�� freedom��of�� speech��and��assembly;�� l�berty��of��consc�ence��and�� freedom��of�� thought;�� �n�� short,�� a��pol�t�cal��env�ronment��wh�ch��encourages��personal��autonomy.��Who��was��then��respons�ble��for��transform�ng��c�t�zens���nto��s�mple��means�� for�� the��party’s��w�ll?��When�� th�s��quest�on�� �s�� ra�sed,�� �t�� starts��a��sudden��avalanche��of��unw�ll�ngness��to��take��respons�b�l�ty��for��events��a��tact�c��pract�ced��ma�nly��by��members��of�� the��former��nomenklatura��and��by��nat�onal�sts.��They��plead���mpl�c�tly��for��tac�t��amnesty��w�thout��memory��and��demand��forg�veness.��The�r��arsenal��for��evad�ng��respons�b�l�ty���ncludes:��

220 �� Moral�ty���n��Pol�t�cs,��or��the��Pol�t�cs��of��Moral�ty?����/����M�haela��MIROIU������������221

a.��A��pos�t�ve��deontolog�cal��v�s�on.��Commun�sm��was��good,��but��var�ous��leaders��had��corrupted�� the�� �deology��and�� the��soc�al��evolut�on��(Len�n,��Stal�n,��Mao,��Ceausescu,��K�m��Ir��Sen,��Enver��Hodja);

b.�� Un�-d�rect�onal�� respons�b�l�ty.��The�� respons�ble�� lay�� w�th�� the�� d�ctator��Ceausescu�� plus�� h�s�� w�fe�� and�� they�� were�� condemned�� and�� executed�� �n��December,��1998;

c.��Perpetual��v�ct�m�zat�on.��Roman�ans��were��the��perpetual��v�ct�ms��of�� the��Iron��Curta�n,��the��Cold��War,��the��Sov�et��Un�on,��the��CIA,��the��West,��MOSAD��or��fate���tself.��It���s,���n��fact,��a��conven�ent��fatal�st-determ�n�st��v�ew��of��h�story;

d.�� The�� use�� of�� �mpersonal,�� anonymous,�� abstract�� concepts�� �n�� nam�ng��respons�b�l�ty�� (d�ctatorsh�p,�� commun�sm,�� total�tar�an�sm,��h�story,�� fate,��“THEY”) (see Cioflâncă, ibid);

e.��The��use��of��the��class�cal��argument��of��dirty handed pol�t�cs:��“ra�sons��d’etat”;��state��secur�ty,��nat�onal�� �nterest��(see��Walzer,��1973;��Johnson,��1993;��Buckler,��1994;��Coday,��1996).

But��how���s���t��poss�ble��to��forg�ve��w�thout��memory?In Adrian Cioflâncă’s words: “In the Romanian case, amnesty would mean the

�nc�nerat�on��of��past��truths���nstead��of��plac�ng��them��front��and��center.��It���s��d�ff�cult��to��store��myster�es��or��phantoms”��(2002,��pp.��92-93).

Until a six years ago with: Until a decade agoIn��sp�te��of��the��Law��allow�ng��people��free��access��to��the�r��own��Secur�tate��f�les��and��the��‘de-consp�racy’��of��the��Secur�tate��as��pol�t�cal��pol�ce��(Law��Nr.��187/1999��)16��adopted��ten��years��after�� the�� fall��of��commun�sm,�� for��many��years��we��were��deal�ng��w�th��a��preference��for��amnes�a.��Unt�l��s�x��years��ago��the��general��publ�c��was��rarely��sens�t�ve��to��the��subject��of��retr�but�ve��just�ce��for��the��wrongs��of��the��past.17��In��Roman�a’s��trans�t�on,��the��pressure��for��memory��and��retr�but�ve��just�ce��was��s�mulated��by��some��NGO’s��(The��Assoc�at�on��of��Former��Pol�t�cal��Pr�soners,��The��C�v�c��All�ance,��The��Revolut�onary��Assoc�at�on,��and��The��Group�� for��Soc�al��D�alogue)��and��by��parl�amentary��means��(the��Nat�onal��Chr�st�an��Democrat�c��Party��and��the��Nat�onal��L�beral��Part,��both��self��-�dent�f�ed��as��r�ght��w�ng).

As Adrian Cioflâncă shows, in order to forget Romanians have to know what is to��be��forgotten���n��a��rat�onal��manner:��

“[...]�� to��know��the��truths��and��to��store��them���n��an��orderly��manner.��For��16��years��there��were��just��sporad�c��memor�es��wh�ch��were��not��pol�t�c�zed��as��a��base��for��a��proper�� treatment��of�� the��former��reg�me.�� It��was��a�� long��per�od��of��pol�t�cal��and��public amnesia combined with a tacit amnesty”. (Cioflâncă, 2002, 98)

The case is very different, as Cioflâncă has shown, if we compare to other post-d�ctator�al��reg�mes.��In��South��Afr�ca��amnesty��was��granted��to�� those��who��fully��

16 In Romanian: Legea privind accesul la propriul dosar şi deconspirarea securităţii ca poliţie politică.

17�� See��the��polls��ment�oned��earl�er.

confessed.�� In��Lat�n��Amer�ca�� the��perpetrators�� and�� the��v�ct�ms��were�� two��well-known��and��d�st�nct��groups.��In��our��case��the��confess�ons��are��almost��m�ss�ng��and��the��compet�t�on��to��be�� �ncluded��among��the��v�ct�ms18��was��so��h�gh��that�� �t�� lost�� �ts��moral��s�gn�f�cance.

In��Roman�a,��w�th��very�� few��except�ons,�� the�� culpr�ts��were�� recogn�zed��and��politically assumed as such by the President Traian Băsescu only in December, 2006 �n��the��Final Report of the Presidential Commission for Analysis of the Communist Dictatorship (December,�� 2006).��The�� Report�� concludes�� that�� the�� reg�me�� was��“�lleg�t�mate and��cr�m�nal”.

The��pol�t�cal��gesture��of��the��Pres�dent��belongs��to��the��moral��de-commun�zat�on��process,��not�� to�� lustrat�on��and��does��not�� �nvolve��automat�cally��a�� lustrat�on��law,��but��rather��an��ex�t��from��the��del�berate���gnorance��(an���ntent�onal��amnes�a)��of��the��publ�c���nst�tut�ons��as��a��m�n�mal��and��necessary��cond�t�on��for��a��poss�ble��moral��amnesty.

Amnesty��or��moral��forg�veness��can��be��expressed��as��a��request��and��a��declarat�on��of��mea culpa by��the��people��who��feel��respons�ble��for��moral,��pol�t�cal��or��legal��cr�mes��related��to��the��commun�st��reg�me.��There��were��some���solated��cases��of��the��‘soft’��former���nformers,��such��as��the��wr�ter��Alexandru��Paleologu,��or��N�cola�e��Corneanu,��the��B�shop��of��Banat,��who��confessed��and��assumed��the�r��culpa. But��most��of��the��others��cla�m��the��“d�rty��hands”��argument,��the��separat�on��between��moral�ty��and��pol�t�cs���.e.,��the��raison d’etat (state��secur�ty)��or��patr�ot�sm.

Public intellectuals as “emergency democrats”, ethical purists, and un/intentional tools of political fights

What�� �s��very�� �nterest�ng�� �s�� that�� the��most��prom�nent��publ�c�� �ntellectuals��belong��to�� the��category��I��call�� ‘emergency��democrats’.��By�� th�s�� I��mean�� the��k�nd��of��publ�c���ntellectuals��who��ord�nar�ly��reject��equal��opportun�t�es,��are�� �nd�fferent��or��reluctant��to��non-d�scr�m�nat�on��pol�t�cs,��are��ant�-fem�n�st��and/or��ant�-m�nor�t�es’��r�ghts.��But��when��the��rule��of��law��and��the��foundat�ons��of��democracy��are���n��danger,��they���ntervene��through��protest�ng,��mak�ng��publ�c��statements��and��ask�ng��for��sol�dar�ty��around��the���ssues��of��bas�c��r�ghts��and��l�bert�es.

Sequent�ally��I��use��two��k�nds��of��explanat�ons��for�� the�r��att�tude:��one���s��related��to��the��success��they��have��for��aesthet�c��reasons;��the��publ�c���s��very��well��soc�al�sed���n��d�gest�ng�� text-appeal�ng��metaphors��and��are��av�d��for�� them.��The��other��argument�� �s��related��to��the��trad�t�on��or��lack��of,��concern�ng��the��contractar�an��eth�cs��of��publ�c��l�fe���n��the��modern��sense��(the��so��called��fa�lure��of��deep��modern�zat�on).��H�stor�cally,��the��cond�t�ons��for��a��proper��debate��on��moral�ty���n��publ�c��l�fe��and��pol�t�cs��were��never��on��the��ma�nstream��agenda��due��to��var�ous��contextual��facts:��

1.��The��secular�zat�on��and��la�c�zat�on��of��morals��fa�led��because��of��commun�sm��and��was���mposed���n��a��non-contractar�an��manner,��by��the��Commun�st��Party��decree��as��s�ngle��perspect�ve��on��moral�ty��(The��Code��of��Soc�al�st��Eth�c��and��Equ�ty).

18�� For��the��deta�ls��concern�ng��the��compet�t�on��among��v�ct�ms��see��M�haela��M�ro�u,��State Men, Market Women �n�� the�� rev�ew��Feminismos, Muyer y participation politica, Un�vers�ta��Al�cante,��Numero��3,��Juno��de��2004.

222 �� Moral�ty���n��Pol�t�cs,��or��the��Pol�t�cs��of��Moral�ty?����/����M�haela��MIROIU������������223

2.��After��the��fall��of��commun�sm��the��Church��rega�ned��a��lead�ng��and��recogn�zed��moral��role���n��soc�ety.��All��s�gn�f�cant��(though��tentat�ve)��attempts��to���ntroduce��lay��eth�cs��were��merely��rejected��as��“athe�st”��and��“commun�st”��and��they��are��popular��only���n��the��narrow��c�rcles��of��academ�cs��and��human��r�ghts��NGOs.

3.��The��ma�n�� �ntellectual�� response�� to�� the��moral�� �ssues��was��metaphys�cal,��d�chotom�zed��and��absolut�st;��no��comprom�ses���n��morals��could��be��enterta�ned.��No��d�fferences��between��pr�vate��and��pol�t�cal��moral�ty��were��made.

The��ma�n��judgements��about��the��relat�on��between��moral�ty��and��pol�t�cs��are��not��deontolog�st��or��consequent�al�st.��They��are��not��to��be��found���n��relat�on��to��the��eth�c��of��r�ghts,��of��duty,��of��care,��or��to��v�rtue��eth�cs.��In��the��book��Beyond Angels and Devils. Ethics in Romanian Politics (2007)��I��largely��expla�ned��the��dom�nant��perspect�ves���n��the��relat�onsh�p��between���deolog�cal��and��moral�� tendenc�es���n��publ�c��d�scourse��and��publ�c��op�n�on.��Overwhelm�ngly,��the��ma�n��trends���n��the��publ�c��debates��belong��to��the��follow�ng��types:��

a.��Mach�avell�an��amoral�sm��(pol�t�cs��are��all��about��power��and���nterests,��moral�ty���s��a��pr�vate���ssue��–��v�s�on���s��shared��ma�nly��among��pol�t�c�ans);

b.��Moral��pur�ty.��Pol�t�c�ans��are��absolute��bastards��and��pol�t�cs��st�nks��–a��v�ew��shared��by��the��pur�st��publ�c���ntellectuals��as��well��as��a��s�gn�f�cant��proport�on��of��c�t�zens��(20%)��accord�ng��to��the��major�ty��of��the��last��polls;

c.��Absolut�sm.��Pol�t�cs��and��pol�t�c�ans��are��e�ther��very��good,��or��bad,�� tertium non datur – a��v�ew��also��shared��by��pur�st��publ�c�� �ntellectuals��as��well��as��a��s�gn�f�cant��proport�on��of��c�t�zens;

d.��Group��Man�chae�sm.��Ours��are��good��and��honest,��theirs��are��bad��and��d�shonest��(a��v�ew��shared��by��pol�t�cal��part�es��and��the�r��supporters);

e.��Rel�g�ous�� transfer.��X�� �s��a��good��Chr�st�an,��a��merc�ful��person,��eventually��v�s�ted��by��the��Sa�nt��Sp�r�t,�� then��became��a��good��pol�t�c�an;�� th�s�� �s�� the��new��tendency��concern�ng��a��pol�t�c�an��who���s��pract�c�ng��mass-char�ty��w�th�n��a��clear��pol�t�cal��popul�sm��(11%);

f.��Excess�ve��transfer��of��v�rtues��from��the��moral�ty��of��pr�vate��l�fe.��Pol�t�c�ans��have��to��be��good��and��car�ng��parents��for��the��c�t�zens��–��strong��and��soft��paternal�st-c�t�zens,��accord�ng��to��the��latest��poll��equally��d�v�ded��between��‘soft’��and��‘hard’��paternal�sts.19

If�� pol�t�c�ans�� are��marked��by��an��obv�ous��personal�� �nterest,�� pro��or�� aga�nst��lustrat�on,��or�� �n��general��by�� the��pol�t�cal��use��of��moral�ty,�� the�� successful��publ�c���ntellectuals’��approach���s��marked��by��essent�al�sm,��pur�sm,��absolut�sm��and��a��deeply��emot�onal��or�entat�on.

The��greatest�� fame�� �n�� the��publ�c�� debate��on�� th�s�� �ssue��belongs�� to��Gabr�el��L��ceanu,��a��He�ddeger�an��ph�losopher��and��D�rector��of��a��very���mportant��publ�sh�ng��house���n��Bucharest:��Human�tas.��S�nce��1989,��he��has��launched��a��well-known��Appeal

19�� The��data��are��accord�ng�� to�� the��nat�onal��poll��on��Gender,��Pol�t�cal�� Interests��and��European��Insert�on,��M�haela��M�ro�u,��Ana��Bula���(Coord.),��Nat�onal��School��of��Pol�t�cal��Stud�es��and��Publ�c��Adm�n�strat�on,��Bucharest,��January,��2007.

to��Scoundrels (addressed��to��members��of��the��nomenklatura��and��to��Secur�tate��off�cers��and���nformers).��H�s��good��sense���dea��was:��“Take a leave from the public arena for a while” ask�ng�� them��to��qu�t�� the��front��stage��of��pol�t�cs��and��publ�c�� l�fe.��The�� last��sentence��of��the��naïve��and��utop�an��Appeal was��“If��you��w�ll��do���t,��we��w�ll��love��you!”��L��ceanu’s��call��has��had��an��oppos�te��echo.��It��has��prompted��the��“scoundrels”��to��assume��a��necessary��sol�dar�ty��when��faced��w�th��a��common��enemy.

In 2005 President Băsescu ordered that all Securitate files be given to the Nat�onal��Counc�l�� for�� the��Study��of��Secur�tate��F�les��(NCSSF)��where�� they��could��be��actually��consulted��by��the��publ�c.��In��do�ng��so��the��problem��of��the��moral�ty��of��the��past��returned��to�� the��pol�t�cal��market��and��was��obv�ously��used��to��destroy��some��pol�t�cal��enem�es.��Yet,��few��of��them��came��from��the��ranks��of��the��nomenklatura��or��were��act�ve��Secur�tate��off�cers;�� �nstead,��most��were�� �nformers,��many��just��people��who��s�gned��a��comm�tment��for��potent�al��collaborat�on,��but��w�th��no��ev�dence��of��the�r��actual��pol�t�cal��pol�ce��act�v�t�es.��The��s�gnature�� �tself��was�� taken��as��proof��of��assoc�at�on��w�th�� the��pol�t�cal��pol�ce.��Th�rsty��for��scandal,��the��mass-med�a��contr�buted��to��the��breakdown��of��any��reasonable��judgements��on���nd�v�dual��cases.��A��s�gnature��was��taken��as��a��proof��of��collaborat�on��and��as��ev�dence��for��act�v�t�es��w�th��the��pol�t�cal��pol�ce.

In��August,��2006�� the�� �nternal��pol�t�cal�� f�ght�� �n��Nat�onal��L�beral��Party��(NLP)��ordered by the Prime Minister, Călin Popescu Tăriceanu brought to light a new wave of��‘revelat�ons’,�� just�� �n�� t�me��to��get��r�d��of�� the��compet�tors.��The��moment��co�nc�ded��w�th�� the��collapse��of�� the��pr�nc�ple��of��proport�onal��respons�b�l�ty�� �n��pol�t�cs,��along��w�th�� the��purely��pol�t�cal��use��of�� the�� �mmoral�ty��of�� the��commun�st��past.��The��most��famous victim of this political operation was Mona Muscă, the��V�ce-pres�dent��of��NLP.��She��was��the��most��popular��pol�t�c�an,��next��to��the��Pres�dent���n��every��poll,��and��a��person��h�ghly��respected��by��the��publ�c��and��c�v�l��soc�ety��for��the��laws��she��promoted��concern�ng��publ�c�� transparency��of��government��act�v�t�es,��NGO��f�nanc�ng��systems��and,�� last��but��not�� least,��prom�nent�� �n�t�ator��and��promoter��of�� the��project��of�� the��Law��of��Lustrat�on��and��of��ant�-corrupt�on��pol�t�cs.��In��add�t�on��to��her��act�v�ty��as��M�n�ster��of��Culture,�� she��was��deeply��apprec�ated�� for��her��moral�� �ntegr�ty��w�th�n��a��corrupt��env�ronment.

It�� �s��obv�ous�� that�� she��was��a�� real��danger�� for��her�� fellow��pol�t�c�ans��and�� for��dub�ous��bus�ness��c�rcles.��Her��h�dden��(or��purportedly�� �ns�gn�f�cant)��“or�g�nal��s�n”��cons�sted��of��the��fact��that��30��years��prev�ously��she��had��s�gned��that��she��would���nform��the��Secur�tate���f��her��fore�gn��students��from��Cyprus,��Iran��and��Iraq��comm�tted��acts��of��v�olence��aga�nst��each��other,��or��behaved��as��a��threat��to��nat�onal��secur�ty.��The��contract��was��for��one��year,��after��wh�ch��she��moved��to��Bucharest,��and��her��relat�onsh�p��w�th��the Securitate ended. In her personal file, which Muscă herself made public on the �nternet��after��the��‘d�sclosure’��and��her��v�s�t�� to��the��NCSSF,��there���s��no��ev�dence��that��she violated any human rights principles or that she hurt another person. Muscă publ�cly��cla�med��that��she��d�d��not��cons�der�� th�s��an��act��relevant�� to�� the��act�v�t�es��of��

224 �� Moral�ty���n��Pol�t�cs,��or��the��Pol�t�cs��of��Moral�ty?����/����M�haela��MIROIU������������225

the��pol�t�cal��pol�ce,��but��rather��a��normal��act��to��secure��the��students’��personal��secur�ty.��But��because��she��was��hunted��by��her��fellow��colleagues���n��the��party,��the��ent�re��mise-en-scene�� �nfluenced��a��verd�ct��of��“pol�t�cal��pol�ce”.��From��the��very��moment��of�� the��disclosure, Mona Muscă was subjected to a symbolic lynching by the media. The vanguard���nqu�s�tor��was��Gabr�el��L��ceanu��who��funct�oned��as��a��recogn�zed,��publ�c��morals��author�ty.��He��publ�shed��a�� letter��wh�ch��ru�ned��her��publ�c�� reputat�on��more��than��any��Secur�tate��f�le��m�ght��have.��The��letter��has��attracted��the��expl�c�t��back�ng��of��most��publ�c�� �ntellectuals.��In��order�� to��understand��better��why��such��an��open��letter�� �s��s�gn�f�cant��for��the��pur�st��and��absolut�st��approach��to��pol�t�cs,��I��shall��quote��extens�vely��from���ts��contents:��

The Gifted Madam Muscă or On Lying in Ecstasy“In��order�� to��wr�te,�� �t�� �s��necessary�� for��me�� to��suffer��an��emot�onal��commot�on��wh�ch��makes��me��excess�vely��mad,��so��much��so,��as��to��enable��me��to��s�t��down���n��front��of��a��wh�te��page,��w�th��the��feel�ng��that���f��I��do��not��do���t,��I��shall��suffocate....��After��see�ng��you��and��l�sten�ng��to��you,��I��sa�d��to��myself,��w�th��that��b�tterness��and��desperat�on��of�� the��Roman�an��soul�� that��went�� through��40��years��of��commun�sm,��and�� through�� the��16��years�� that��came��after�� �t:�� “How��much��corrupt�on�� �n�� th�s��human��be�ng!“��Madam,��I��shall…expla�n�� to��you��why��I��bel�eve�� that�� there��has��been��noth�ng,��over�� these�� last��16��years,��more��pathet�c�� than�� the��show��that��you��have��offered��me....��The��ent�re��Secur�tate,�� from��the�� lady��mopp�ng�� the�� floors��of�� the��M�n�stry��of��Internal��Affa�rs�� to�� the��Secur�tate��generals,�� from��the��person��“contacted”��w�thout��any��comm�tment,��but��w�ll�ng�� to��“fl�rt”��w�th�� the��off�cer��v�s�t�ng��her,�� to�� the��“employee”��w�th��proper��documents��and��a��code��name��(l�ke��yourself),��from��the��“worker”���ns�de��the��country��to��the��person��spy�ng��from��the��outs�de,��“for�� the��good��of�� the��country”,��every��s�ngle��one,��contr�buted�� to�� the��funct�on�ng��of��the��most���mproved��system��of��repress�on��and��fear.��All��of��you��made��terror��poss�ble.��You��all��felt��more���mportant,��you��all��had��a��d�rty��contract��beh�nd��our��backs��and��on��our��shoulders,��and��you��all��pa�d��your��peace,��safety��and��audac�ty��w�th��our��fears,��our��hum�l�at�on��and��our��anx�ety....��Do��not��ask��me��to��d�st�ngu�sh��between the lady mopping the floors, you as an informer and General Pleșiță 20��who��ordered��beat�ngs��or��planned��murders.��Stop��play�ng��that��d�sgust�ng��act….�� Do�na��Cornea��sa�d��about��Il�escu21���n��1990��“that��he��shot��a��moral��bullet���nto��the��chests��of��the��Roman�an��young��people”.��You��d�dn’t��shoot��a��bullet.��You��f�red��a��bazooka...��You��conf�scated��the��ent�re��reserve��of��moral�ty��of��the��language,��the��gestures,��and��the��m�m�cry.��And��you��turned���t�� �nto��dust.��By��putt�ng��on��a��robe��of��pur�ty��on��the��largest��stage��of��the��country,�� the��pol�t�cal��stage,��you��destroyed��both��pur�ty��and��pol�t�cs….��As��of��now,��thanks��to��you,��Roman�ans��have��a��weaker��soul.��And��an��even��greater��number��of��young��people��shall��leave��Roman�a��sp�tt�ng��beh�nd��them,��because��of��you.��But��f�ght�ng��for��a��law��on��cleans�ng,��mean�ng��of��pur�f�cat�on,��of��clean�ng��up��an���mpure��space,��a��law��that��should��have��started��w�th��you?

20 General Pleșiță was one of the most frightening promoter of the political police in Romania.21�� Ion��Il�escu��was��the��Pres�dent��of��Roman�a��between��1990-1996��and��2001-2004.

�� On��December��30,��1989��I��wrote��a��text��called��Appeal��to��Scoundrels.��Why��do��you��need��to��contr�bute,��w�th��your��moral��wretchedness,��to��nurs�ng��our��souls��back��to��health?��Why��do��you��keep��com�ng,��w�th��your��foul��smell�ng��dowry,��to��propose��bunches��of��roses��to��us?��Wh�ch,��because��they��are��held��by��you,��st�nk.��They��st�nk,��st�nk,��st�nk!��In��fact,��th�s���s��what��you��d�d:��you��made��everyth�ng��st�nk��for��us…��just��as��the��other��Scoundrels��undoubtedly,��you��shall��not��res�gn”.22

As��Gabr�el��Andreescu,��a��pol�t�cal��sc�ent�st��and��a��well-known��act�v�st��for��human��and��m�nor�ty��r�ghts��and��former��d�ss�dent��notes,��what��happened���n��many��notor�ous��cases��was��not��unjust,��but��s�mply��grotesque.

“The��abus�ve��use�� the��documents�� fabr�cated��by��Secur�tate�� for�� the�� symbol�c��d�struct�on��of��some��people���s��an��act��of���njust�ce.��The��arch�ves��man�pulat�on��leads��to��the��d�stort�on��of��the���nterpretat�on��of��the��past,[�t]�� �s��spread�ng��the��confus�on��over��45��years��of��commun�st��h�story,���s��revers�ng��the��log�c��and��the��mean�ngs��of���t��and��represents��a��huge��and��costly��collect�ve��fa�lure”.��(Andreescu,��2013,��p.��5)

The��gender��asymmetry��of��h�s��judgement���s��obv�ous��too.��Women��are��supposed��to��be��pr�mary��moral��agents,�� the��guard�ans��of��moral�ty�� �n��pol�t�cs.��One��m�stake�� �s��enough,�� �t��does��not��matter��how��m�nor���t�� �s,�� to��become���nfamous��and��persona non grata.23

Mona Muscă was dismissed from the Liberal Party, the same party which never had��a��problem��keep�ng��Secur�tate��off�cers��and��members��who��acted��as��pol�t�cal��pol�ce���nformers.��In��March,��2007��she��res�gned��from��the��Parl�ament��and��all��other��pol�t�cal��pos�t�ons.��She��was��the��only��one��who��d�d.��Soon��after,��when��the��Pr�me��M�n�ster��and��the��head��of�� the��L�beral��Party��succeeded�� �n��gett�ng��r�d��of��all��of��h�s��opponents�� �n��the��government,��he��procla�med��that��h�s��agenda��would��focus��on��secur�ng��people’s��prosper�ty.��The��focus��on��the��past���s��over.��People��need��s�lence��and��stab�l�ty.

Final-comments-and-conclusions

For��a��democrat�c��pol�t�cal��reg�me��the��card�nal��s�n���s��the��v�olat�on��of��bas�c��r�ghts��to��l�fe,��freedom,��property,��free��assoc�at�on��(the��deontolog�st��po�nt��of��v�ew),��even��the��pursu�t��of��happ�ness��(�f��we��want�� to�� �nclude��a��moral��cr�ter�on��of��ut�l�tar�an�sm��as��well).

I��do��share��M�chael��Waltzer’s��v�ew��(1973)�� that�� the��degree��of�� respons�b�l�ty��var�es��proport�onally��w�th��the��degree��of��freedom��and���nformat�on.��It���s��s�mply��unjust��to��cons�der��that��from��a��moral��po�nt��of��v�ew��people��are��absolutely��gu�lty��or��absolutely���nnocent.��The��proport�onal�ty��pr�nc�ple�� �s��valuable�� �rrespect�ve��of�� the��normat�ve��sphere��w�th��wh�ch��we��are��deal�ng.

22�� Gabr�el��L��ceanu,��“Talentata��doamna��Musca��sau��despre��m�nc�una�� �n��extaz”��Cotidianul, August,��15,��2006,��translat�on��by��M�runa��Coca-Cozma,��September��8th,��2006,��publ�shed��on��her��personal��blog.

23�� The��same��k�nd��of��judgment��was��appl�ed���n��the��case��of��corrupt�on.��Women��were��pun�shed���mmed�ately��by��the��part�es,��med�a��and��the��publ�c.��

226 �� Moral�ty���n��Pol�t�cs,��or��the��Pol�t�cs��of��Moral�ty?����/����M�haela��MIROIU������������227

I��also��share�� the�� �dea�� that��when��appl�ed�� to��a��category��of��people��as��a��whole,��culpab�l�ty��has��a��moral��and��pol�t�cal��content.��The��most��of�� the��people��accepted��to��belong�� to�� these��categor�es.��The��d�st�nct�on��between��cr�mes��w�th��v�ct�ms��and��v�ct�mless��cr�mes���s��fundamental��for��a��fa�r��and��proport�onal��judgement.��Only��at��the���nd�v�dual��level��can��one��can��speak��about��legal��respons�b�l�ty��and��retr�but�ve��just�ce���n��the��legal��sense.��Otherw�se,��we��w�ll��embrace��a��rad�cal��v�ew��on��respons�b�l�ty,��s�m�lar��to��Jean��Paul��Sartre’s���dea:��“�n��the��war��there��are��no���nnocent��v�ct�ms”.��In��commun�sm��one��cannot��speak��of���nnocent��adults:��almost��all��of��us��were��p�oneers,��members��of��the��commun�st��youth��organ�zat�on��or��subm�tted��to�� the��reg�me��by��profess�onal��means.��From��a��Sartrean��po�nt��of��v�ew��one��can��cla�m��that��we��all��had��other��alternat�ves:�� to��em�grate,��to��protest��or��to��comm�t��su�c�de.��Once��we��were���n��the��system,��we��belonged��to���t,���t��was��our��respons�b�l�ty.��Paradox�cally,��th�s��rad�cal��v�ew���s��perfectly��cons�stent��w�th��the���nterests��of��the��enem�es��of��retr�but�ve��just�ce.��In��fact,��at�� the��beg�nn�ng��of��th�s��process��some��of��us��were��rather���ncl�ned��to��a��Rawls�an��perspect�ve:��we��are���n��a��new��“or�go”��po�nt��of��our��own��h�story.��How��can��we��bu�ld,��then,��a��just��soc�ety��from��the��original position,24���n��wh�ch��everyone��dec�des��pr�nc�ples��of��just�ce��from��beh�nd��a��veil of ignorance?��Th�s��“ve�l”�� �s��one�� that��essent�ally��bl�nds��people�� to��all�� facts��about��themselves��that��m�ght��cloud��the��not�on��of�� just�ce��that�� �s��developed.��No��one��knew��her/h�s��place���n��the��new��soc�ety.��In��a��way,���t��was��the��r�ght��moment��to��choose��the��pr�nc�ples��of��just�ce.��Th�s��was��our���llus�on,��after��the��fall��of��commun�sm:��to��start��from��a��real,��not��a��hypothet�cal��or�g�nal��pos�t�on.��But��not��all��of��us��accepted��the��ve�l��of���gnorance��or��the��‘ve�l’��concern�ng��our��personal,��self�sh���nterests.��Some��had��rejected��the��ve�l��because��they��were��v�ct�ms,��others��because��they��are��respons�ble��for��the��past���njust�ce��and��for��the��present��pol�t�cs��of��red�str�but�ng��wealth��and��truth.

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24�� See��John��Rawls���deas��on��the��cond�t�ons��of��just�ce��as��formulated���n��A Theory of Justice,1971.

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(Contemporary Political Ideologies. Meanings, Evolutions and Impact),��Pol�rom:��Ias�.M�ro�u,��M�haela.��V.��Past���and Cornel��Cod�ta.��1997.��România. Starea de fapt (Romania. Matter

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M�ro�u,��M�haela,��Ana��Bula���(Coord.). 2007.��Gender, Political Interests and European Insertion,��(report).��Bucharest:��Nat�onal��School��of��Pol�t�cal��Stud�es��and��Publ�c��Adm�n�strat�on,��January.

Nagel,��Thomas.��1996.��Veșnice întrebări (Mor(t)al Questions, 1979), București: All.Past�,��Vlad�m�r,��2006.��Noul capitalism românesc, Polirom: Iași.Raportul Final al Comisiei Prezidențiale pentru Comuniste din România. 2006.��Decembr�e.Rawls,��John.��1971.��A Theory of Justice, Cambr�dge,��MA:��Harvard��Un�vers�ty��Press.

228 �� Moral�zat�on��and��Conform�sm���n��Soc�al��Pract�ces����/����Ion��COPOERU��and��N�coleta��SZABO������������229

Moralization and Conformism in Social Practices: The Case of a Post-communist Society

Ion��COPOERUN�coleta��SZABO

IntroductionWe��propose��to�� tackle�� �n�� th�s��paper�� the�� �mportance��of�� the��concept��of��moral�zat�on��w�th��respect��to��the��quot�d�an��l�fe���n��general��and��to��the��soc�al���mpact��of��the��pol�t�cal��transformat�ons��enacted�� �n��Roman�a�� �n�� the�� last�� two��decades.��Our��approach�� �s��enabled��by��the��phenomenolog�cal��method,��appl�ed��to��soc�al��sc�ences,��wh�ch��takes���nto��account��pr�mar�ly�� the��subject�ve��po�nt��of��v�ew��of�� the��actor.��We��w�ll��ab�de,��therefore,��by��the��Schutzean��pr�nc�ple��to��“go��back��to��the��‘forgotten��man’��of��the��soc�al��sc�ences,��to��the��actor���n��the��soc�al��world��whose��do�ng��and��feel�ng��l�e��at��the��bottom��of��the��whole��system”.1��The��elements��of��soc�olog�cal��phenomenology��handed��down��by��the��phenomenolog�cal��trad�t�on��and��able��to��enl�ghten��the��concept��of��moral�zat�on��are:�� the�� l�fe-world��(Lebenswelt),�� f�del�ty��(Treue)��and��normat�v�ty��(Normativität).��At��the��same��t�me,���n��v�ew��of��the��part�cular�ty��of��moral�zat�on��as��both��a��subject�ve��and��a��soc�al��pract�ce,��we��w�ll��propose��a��d�alog�cal��approach��between��a��theoret�cal��(phenomenolog�cal)�� and��a��pract�cal��po�nt��of��v�ew.��The�� latter�� �s��del�neated��by��examples��from��the��legal��and��soc�o-pol�t�cal��f�elds,��spec�f�c�� to��the��Roman�an��post-commun�st��soc�etal��evolut�on.��Therefore,��we��w�ll��approach��f�rstly�� the relationship between normativity and life,��wh�ch��g�ves��us��an�� �nd�cat�on��of�� the��spec�al��place��that��moral�zat�on��occup�es��as��a��matter��of�� research:��between�� theoria��and��praxis.��Secondly,��the particular philosophical makeover of the concept of moralization��w�ll��be��stud�ed��shortly��so��as��to��g�ve��substance��to���ts��cla�ms��regard�ng��the��transformat�on��of�� �nd�v�dual��and��collect�ve��soc�al�� l�fe.��The�� th�rd��sect�on��w�ll��analyse different forms of moral, political and cultural conformism��wh�ch��represent��a��hollow��form��of��moral�zat�on.��F�nally,��we��w�ll��proceed��w�th��two examples chosen from the Romanian legal and social spheres of life�� �n��order�� to�� show�� that��moral�zat�on,�� �n�� sp�te��of���mportant��drawbacks,���s��really��at��work���n��the��Roman�an��post-commun�st��soc�ety.

Moralization:-Between-normativity-and-life

One��poss�ble��way��towards��the��“l�fe��of��norms”���s��opened��by��the��phenomenolog�cal��concept��of�� the��quot�d�an��world.��The��latter�� �s��descr�bed��through���ts��“regular�ty”��or��“rout�ne”,��but��also��and��equally��essent�al��as��effort��–��wh�ch�� takes��many��forms:��an��effort�� to��adapt��oneself�� to�� the��d�vers�f�ed��normat�ve��env�ronment�� (moral,��eth�cal,��legal,��etc.),��to��a��var�ety��of��more��or��less��r�g�d��constra�nts,��and��mutually��to��adapt��th�s��

��1�� Cf.��Alfred��Schütz,��The Social World and the Theory of Social Action���n��Collected Papers II. Studies in Social Theory,��ed�ted��by��A.��Brodersen,��Mart�nus��N�jhoff��Publ�shers,��Dordrecht,��The��Netherlands,��1976.

Scalat, Laurențiu Stefan. 2004. Political Elites in Post-communist Romania, București: Nemira.Sandel,��M�chael.��2005.��Publ�c��Ph�losophy.��Essays��on��Moral�ty�� �n��Pol�t�cs,��Cambr�dge.��MA:��

Harvard��Un�vers�ty��Press.Shap�ro,��Ian.��2003.��The Moral Foundations of Politics,��New��Haven��&��London,��Yale��Un�vers�ty��

Press.T�smãneanu,��Vlad�m�r.��1999.��Fantasmele salvării. Democrație, naționalism și mit în Europa

post-comunistã, Iași, Polirom.Tismăneanu, Vladimir. 2003. Stalinism for All Seasons. A Political History of RomanianCommunism, Los��Angeles,��Un�vers�ty��of��Cal�forn�a��Press.Tismăneanu, Vladimir. 2011. Despre comunism. Destinul unei religii politice, Bucureşti,

Human�tas.Tronto,��Joan. 1993.��Moral Boundaries. A Political Argument for an Ethic of Care,��Routledge,��

New��York.Verdery,��Kather�ne.��1996.��What is Socialism and What Comes Next, Pr�nceton��Un�vers�tyPress,��New��Jersey.Walzer,��M�chael.��1973.��“Pol�t�cal��act�on:�� the��problem��of��d�rty��hands”,��Philosophy and Public

Affairs,��2,��No.��2,��pp.��160-180.Welsh,��Helga,��1996.��“Deal�ng��w�th��the��Commun�st��Past”,��Claus��Offe��(ed.),��Varietiesof Transition: The East European and East German Experience, Cambr�dge,��Pol�tyPress,��pp.��413-428.W�ll�ams,��K�eran,��Aleks��Szczerb�ak��and��Br�g�d��Fowler.��2003.��Explaining Lustration in Eastern

Europe: ‘A Post-communist politics approach’,��Sussex��European��Inst�tute��SEI Work�ng��Paper��No��62,��pp.��1-30

230 �� Moral�zat�on��and��Conform�sm���n��Soc�al��Pract�ces����/����Ion��COPOERU��and��N�coleta��SZABO������������231

env�ronment��to��the��subject’s��d�fferent��needs.��In��the��space��opened��up��between��the��self��and��the��other,���n��the�r��respect�ve��play��of���ntent�onal�t�es,��becomes��man�fest��a��power��of��transformat�on,��an��or�g�nal��“I��can”,��who,��as��a��general���nchoat�ve��force,���s��or�ented��towards��the��self��and��the��(external)��world��and���ts��structures.

Therefore,�� the��concept��of��normat�v�ty�� should��be��approached��not�� from�� the��perspect�ve��of�� the��representat�ons��about�� the��world,��from��a��theoret�cal��perspect�ve,��but�� from�� the��po�nt��of��v�ew��of��act�on,��of��praxis�� �n��general.��The��analys�s��of�� the��relat�onsh�p��of��norms��w�th��the�r��pract�cal��contexts��of�� �mplementat�on2��reveals�� the��fact�� that��not��only�� the��quot�d�an��world��develops��a��var�ety��of�� types��of��normat�v�ty,���nsuff�c�ently��reflected��upon,��but��also�� that�� there�� �s��a��c�rcular�ty��wh�ch��allows��for��the�� transformat�on,�� through��d�fferent��modes��of��act�on,��of�� the��context�� �tself;�� the��latter��contr�butes�� to�� the��uncover�ng��of��a��const�tut�ve��power�� that��Husserl��called,��controvers�ally,��“the��transcendental��I”.3��W�th��th�s��spec�al��form��of��transcendental�ty��wh�ch��goes�� through�� the��“subject�ve”�� f�eld��of��phenomena��–��a�� ser�es��of�� s�ngular��appar�t�ons��dependent��on�� the��const�tut�ve��and�� format�ve��power��of��a��“subject”,��Husserl�� �nd�cates�� a�� poss�ble�� connect�on�� between�� theoria�� and�� praxis:�� th�s��phenomenolog�cal��overhaul��des�gnates��a��spec�al��way��of��art�culat�ng��the��regulat�ons��perta�n�ng��to��knowledge��and���ts��afferent��necess�t�es��ensu�ng��from��a��part�cular��form��or��style��of��l�fe.��Th�s��art�culat�on��stands��out��aga�nst��the��background��of��the���mmanent��(pre-pred�cat�ve)��sphere��of��“consc�ousness”��(of��the��subject)��and��ult�mately��s�tuates��the�� source��of�� normat�v�ty�� �n�� the��doma�n��of�� the��v�tal,�� l�fe-�mbued��operat�ons��(Leistungen)��of��the��consc�ous��subject.

Therefore,��the��fact��that��l�fe��and��l�v�ng��always��seem��to��exceed��the��normat�v�ty��expressed���n�� the��ex�st�ng��regulat�ons��and���mplementat�ons��represents��an��ev�dence��for��phenomenology��and�� �t��contrad�cts�� the�� (transcendental?)��appearance�� that�� the��actual��norms,�� through�� the�r��power��of��object�vat�on,��“regulate”�� l�fe,�� forc�ng�� �ts��or�entat�on��and��preoccupat�on��w�th��what�� �s�� transcendently��and���mperat�vely��(pre-)g�ven.��The��nature��of��th�s��excess�ve,��const�tut�ve��power��of��l�fe,��amply��d�scussed��by��Husserl’s��d�sc�ples,4��demands��a��double��approach��–��genealog�cal��and��themat�cally��

��2�� Cf.�� Marc�� Maesschalck,�� Normes et contextes. Les fondements d’une pragmatique contextuelle, Georg��Olms��Verlag,��H�ldeshe�m,��Zür�ch,��New-York,��2001.��Declar�ng�� �tself��to��be��a��“work��of��eth�cal��ep�stemology”,�� th�s��book��emphas�ses��the��fact�� that��contexts��have��a��part�cular��normat�v�ty:��the��norms��are��not��s�mply��absorbed��by��them,��but,��on��the��contrary,��they��react��to��the��const�tut�ve��background��of��contexts.��In��th�s��v�ew,��contexts��are��“forms��of��l�fe”��wh�ch��are��shaped��by��the��product�v�ty��of��norms,��w�thout��be�ng��completely��transformed��by��them.��Consequently,��contexts��c�rcumvent,�� �n��d�fferent��degrees,�� the��normat�ve��hold��of��norms.��

��3�� Cf.��Jean-Franco�s��Lav�gne,��Husserl et la naissance de la phénoménologie (1900-1913).��Des Recherches��log�ques��aux Ideen:��la genèse de l’idéalisme transcendantal phénoménologique,��Presses��Un�vers�ta�res��de��France,��Par�s,��2005.

��4�� See�� for�� example,��Alfred��Schutz,��On Phenomenology and Social Relations. Selected Writings,��ed�ted��by��Helmut��R.��Wagner,��The��Un�vers�ty��of��Ch�cago��Press,��Ch�cago��and��London,��1970;��Maur�ce��Merleau-Ponty,��Signes,��Les��Éd�t�ons��Gall�mard,��Par�s,��1960;��Jan��Patocka,��Le monde naturel et le mouvement de l’existence humaine,��Phaenomenolog�ca��110,��Kluwer��Academ�c��Publ�shers,��Dordrecht,��2003;��Max��Scheler,��Problems of a Sociology of Knowledge,�� translated��by��Manfred��S.��Fr�ngs,��Routledge��&��Kegan��Paul,��London,��1980;��

or�ented��towards��the��quot�d�an��l�fe��–���n��order��that���ts��part�cular��structures��and��general��s�gn�f�cance��can��be��clar�f�ed.

The��concept��of��Lebenswelt�� (l�fe-world)��was��employed��by��Husserl�� start�ng��w�th��h�s��analyses��developed���n��the��course��of��the��second��decade��of��the��20th��century��and��coll�gated���n��the��second��volume��of��Ideas II.5��It��was��once��more��approached��by��Husserl��w�th�n��the��per�od��of��h�s��redact�ng��Krisis6�� �n�� the��1930s,��w�thout,��however,��succeed�ng���n��completely��clar�fy�ng���ts��s�gn�f�cant��content.��It’s��clear,��nevertheless,��that�� “l�fe”��–��one��component��of�� the��concept�� “l�fe-world”��–��does��not��des�gnate��e�ther��a��b�olog�cal��sense,��or��a��creat�ve��spontane�ty��or��some��form��of��var�ab�l�ty.��The��term��“world”��–��the��second��part��of��the��express�on��forged��by��Husserl��–��has��a��strong���deal�st��and��transcendental��hue��wh�ch��m�ght���mply��for��certa�n��cr�t�cs,��such��as��Bruce��Bégout��for��example,��that��“the��l�fe-world���s��the��un�que��product��of��the��transcendental��subject�v�ty”.7��Consequently,��for��Bégout,��the��Husserl�an��approach,��by��stak�ng���tself��exclus�vely��on��the��act�v�ty��of��the��ego��as��a��un�que��source��for��the��const�tut�on��of��the��world,��seems��to��be��“�ncomplete”.8��“It���s��not���n��rapport��w�th��the��const�tut�ve��subject��[…]��that�� the��pre-g�ven��world��and���ts��allegedly��absolute��certa�nty��are��relat�v�zed”��–��adds��the��French��author��–��but�� the��l�fe-world���s��“�n��a��more��fundamental��way,�� the��result��of��a��soc�o-transcendental��sense formation��wh�ch��exceeds��once��and��for��all��any��subject�ve��const�tut�on��and��stems��from��an��anonymous,��collect�ve��construct�on��of��the��quot�d�an��world”.9��Certa�nly,��the��l�fe-world���s��not��the��product��–���n��a��const�tut�ve��sense��–��of��a��subject�ve��sense-g�v�ng.��Nevertheless,��th�s��does��not��mean��that��the��tran-scendental��subject�v�ty��would��be��cut��off��from��any��form��of��l�fe,��espec�ally��from��the��quot�d�an��l�fe.��Equally���mportant���s��to��not���solate���t���n��the��sphere��of��theoret�cal��acts.��Consequently,�� the��l�fe-world���s�� the��result��of��a��sense��format�on��w�th��a��prom�nently��pract�cal��and��normat�ve��character.��It���s��a��concept��that��must��be��understood��pr�mar�ly��as��a��“world”.

The��relat�onsh�p��between��normat�v�ty��and��“the��subject��of�� l�fe”�� �s��not��a��con-t�ngent��fact��and���t��certa�nly��should��not��be��conce�ved��on��the��strength��of��a��rapport��of��force:��namely,��the��force��of��object�ve��norms��upon��the��obed�ent,��pass�ve��subject.��From��a��pract�cal��po�nt��of��v�ew,��the��quest�on���s��thus��the��follow�ng:��how��can��a��d�fferent�at�on��and��a��k�nd��of��mastery10��be���nserted���n��an��already��const�tuted��typ�cal��form��of��norma-t�v�ty��so��as��to��open��up��a��space��for��moral�zat�on��and��eth�cal��l�v�ng��and��th�nk�ng?��The���ntroduct�on��of��th�s��moral��d�mens�on���n�t�ates��a��dynam�c��wh�ch���s��not��the��dynam�c��of��the��natural,��object�ve��world,��but��one��wh�ch��makes��room��for��the��pract�cal���nvent�on��

Bernhard��Waldenfels,��“ Normalité et normativité”. Entre phénoménologie et structuralisme,���n��Revue de métaphysique et morale,��nr.��45,��2005/1,��pp.��57-67.��

��5�� Cf.��Edmund��Husserl,��Ideen zur einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie.�� Zwe�tes�� Buch:�� Phänomenolog�sche�� Untersuchungen�� zur�� Konst�tut�on,��herausgegeben��von��Marly��B�emel,��Mart�nus��N�jhoff,��The��Hague,��1952.

��6�� Cf.��Edmund��Husserl,��Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie.��E�ne��E�nle�tung���n��d�e��phänomenolog�sche��Ph�losoph�e,��herausgegeben��von��Walter��B�emel,��Mart�nus��N�jhoff,��The��Hague,��1976.��

��7�� Cf.��Bruce��Bégout,��La Decouverte du quotidien,��Al�a,��Par�s,��2005,��p.��267.��8�� Ib�d.��9�� Ib�d.��It���s��our��translat�on��from��French��to��Engl�sh.��10�� Maesschlack��speaks��of��a��“reflex�ve��d�fferent�at�on”��(op. cit.,��p.��5).��

232 �� Moral�zat�on��and��Conform�sm���n��Soc�al��Pract�ces����/����Ion��COPOERU��and��N�coleta��SZABO������������233

to��emerge:�� the��hab�ts�� lose�� the�r��neutral�ty,��pos�t�v�ty��and�� the�r��sol�dar�ty��w�th��an��object�v�st�c��ep�stemology��–�� �n�� the��sense��of��Maesschalk,11��and��become��a��modus operandi��that��comb�nes��the��or�entat�on��of��a��conduct��w�th��the��moral��auto-evaluat�on��of��the��subject.

The-concept-of-moralization

Wh�ch�� �s�� the��ph�losoph�cal��package��of�� the��concept��of��moral�zat�on?�� In�� the�� f�rst���nstance,��moral�zat�on��means��the��process��of���nternal�zat�on��of��certa�n��moral��norms,��of��spec�f�c��requ�rements,��obl�gat�ons��and��courses��of��act�on��by��wh�ch��the���nd�v�dual���s��bound��or��restr�cted.��The��pass�ve��aspect��of�� �nternal�zat�on�� �s��const�tuted��by�� the��pre-reflex�ve,��acqu�s�t�ve��power��of�� the��hab�t�� �mposed��by�� the��normat�ve�� form��of��the��part�cular�� l�fe��of�� the��subject.��The��second��component,�� the��reflex�ve��act�ve��one,��presupposes��the��appropr�at�on��or��the��re-appropr�at�on��of��norms:��e�ther��one��adheres��to��a��new��norm,��wh�ch��re-shapes��the��s�tuat�on��from��a��certa�n��f�eld;��or��one��rev�ews��and��quest�ons��the��pass�v�ty��or��the��pass�ve��spontane�ty��of��an��old��adhes�on.

Edmund��Husserl��proposes��the��psycholog�cal-moral��concept��of��f�del�ty��towards��oneself12�� �n�� the��sense�� �n��wh�ch��a��subject��accompl�shes�� repeated��acts��of�� rat�onal��reflect�on��on�� the��goals��of��h�s��act�ons.��Th�s��repet�t�ve��reflex�ve��act�v�ty�� �s��needed��because��the��subject’s��natural��background��(�nst�ncts,��hab�ts,��sed�ments��of�� the��past,��dr�ves,��etc.��–�� the��anonymous�� l�fe��of�� the��subject)��m�ght��urge��h�m��to��dev�ate��from��the��construct�on��of��a��sp�r�tual��personal�ty��transparent�� to��h�mself.��A��subject��who���s��fa�thful��to��h�mself��str�ves��for��ga�n�ng��an���deal��coherence��of��h�s��own��l�fe��and���s��aware��that��h�s�� rat�onal��dec�s�ons��engage��completely��h�s�� respons�b�l�ty�� for��becom�ng��a��human��person.��Therefore,��he��a�ms��for��an��understand�ng��of��the��sense��of��h�s��own��l�fe��through��an��ongo�ng��auto-med�tat�on��(Selbstbesinnung).��The��subject�ve,�� reflex�ve��un�ty��of�� l�fe��produced��consc�ously��by�� the��w�ll��of�� rat�onal��auto-determ�nat�on��of��the��subject��comes���nto��confl�ct��w�th��the��pass�ve��w�ll��of��h�s��naïve��l�fe,��wh�ch��stems��from��h�s���nst�nctual��dr�ves��and��pass�ve��affect�v�ty.��The��latter��compr�se��h�s��or�g�nary��pred�spos�t�ons��whose�� force�� �s��man�fest�� �n�� the�� �mpos�t�on��of��a��spec�f�c,��pass�ve��l�fe-project��upon�� the��subject.��The��re-appropr�at�on��of�� th�s��natural��background��of��the��personal�ty��w�th�n��the��teleolog�cal��movement��of��a��reflex�vely��coherent��project���mpl�es��a�� luc�d,��w�de-awake��reflect�on��on��the��subject’s��personal��data (b�ography,��

11�� Idem,��p.��108.�� In��underl�n�ng,��w�th��Bourd�eu,�� the�� temporal��d�mens�on��of��hab�tus�� (�n�� the��sense��of��the��ant�c�pat�ng��temporal�ty��of��the��pract�cal��sphere��wh�ch��does��not��enta�l��a��strateg�c��calculus,��but��a��judgment���n��relat�on��w�th��a��style��of��l�fe),��Maesschalck��states��“la��présent�f�ca-t�on��du��pouvo�r-être��object�f��conçue��comme�� transformat�on��modal�sante��du�� rapport��au��monde”��(op. cit.,��p.��110).

12�� Cf.��Edmund��Husserl,��Psychologie phénoménologique (1925-1928),��Par�s,��Vr�n,��2001��(tradu�t��de��l’allemand��par��Ph�l�ppe��Cabestan,��Natal�e��Depraz��et��Anton�no��Mazzu),��p.��201:��En dernière instance, la vie egoïque est traversée par une aspiration à parvenir à une unité et à une unanimité dans la multiplicité de ses convictions, de telle sorte que le moi veut devenir un moi tel qu’il reste fidèle à lui-même, ou tel qu’il peut rester fidèle à lui-même, pour autant qu’il n’est plus jamais enclin à abandonner ses convictions et – cela va de pair de façon essentielle – à se perdre lui-même. Il s’agit naturallement d’unde idée, mais elle caractérise le sens de l’aspiration à la conservation de soi dans l’idéalité.

memor�es,��conv�ct�ons,��dec�s�ons,��character,��hab�ts,��etc.)��and��on��the��way��they��blend��together���n��h�s��global��l�fe-project.

But��a�� too��strong�� f�del�ty�� towards��oneself�� (conform�sm)��or�� the�� lack�� thereof��(�rrespons�b�l�ty),�� lead,��dramat�cally��or��s�mply��na�vely,�� to�� los�ng��oneself.��Husserl��descr�bes��an�� �ntent�onal�� form��of�� respons�b�l�ty��–�� the��ego-respons�b�l�ty��–��where��normat�v�ty��appears��as��an�� �nternal��process��of��moral�zat�on:��a��subject�ve��dec�s�on��to�� follow��a��certa�n��course��of�� l�fe��wh�ch�� �s��coherent��and��completely�� just�f�able��by��way��of�� reason.��The�� start�ng��po�nt��of�� th�s�� form��of��moral�zat�on�� �s�� the��auto-apprehens�on��of��the��self��as��the��sp�r�tual��ego��of��all��h�s��acts,��where�n��the��sense��of��h�s��past��and��future��l�fe���s��const�tuted.��Therefore,���n��Husserl’s��v�ew,��the��bu�ld�ng��of��the��personal��self���n��reflect�on��represents��the��kernel��of��the��construct�on��of��a��respons�ble��human�ty��(Humanität).�� If�� the�� �nd�v�dual��does��not�� take��respons�b�l�ty��for��h�s��own��l�fe-project,��then��any��(soc�al��or��commun�ty)��norm��falls��outs�de��h�s��luc�d��dec�s�on��of��appropr�at�on��and��m�sses���ts��target.��Moral�zat�on���s��not��eff�c�ent��when��the���nd�v�dual��mob�l�sat�on��towards��ego-respons�b�l�ty���s��lack�ng.��The��norm��alone��does��not��possess��the��necessary��force��to���n�t�ate��th�s��k�nd��of��auto-mob�l�sat�on��and,��consequently,��for��Husserl��only��a��personal��dec�s�on��may��tr�gger��the��process��of��rat�onal��appropr�at�on��of��norms���n��the��context��of��moral�zat�on,��of��develop�ng��a��rat�onal��and��respons�ble��l�fe-project.��And��the��dec�s�on���tself��seems��to��be��forced��out��by��the��double��“face”��of��the��const�tut�on��of��the��subject��–��phys�c-psycholog�cal��and��sp�r�tual��–��by��h�s��part�c�pat�on��to��two��k�nds��of��real�ty,��wh�ch��each���mposes��upon��h�m��the�r��own��determ�nat�ons��and��demands.��Consequently��for��Husserl��to��act��morally��(f�del�ty��towards��oneself)��or��to��act���mmorally��(to��lose��oneself)��represent��two��poss�ble��outcomes��for��the��human��l�fe.

The��process��of��moral�zat�on��enables��a��d�ff�cult��and��demand�ng��way��of��be�ng��fa�thful,�� steadfast��and�� loyal�� to��oneself�� �n�� the��course��of��an��act�on��or�� �n�� relat�on��w�th��a��form��of��soc�al��organ�zat�on,��where��the��other��person��and��h�s��moral��qu�bbles��become��equally���mportant.13��On��the��strength��of��the��sed�mentat�on��of��the��normat�ve���njunct�ons��at�� the�� level��of�� (pass�ve��or��act�ve)��consc�ousness,�� the��bas�c�� techn�que��of��moral�zat�on�� �s��memory.��The��second��concept��of��moral�zat�on,��stemm�ng��from��N�etzsche’s�� theor�es,14�� enta�ls�� a��process��of�� construct�on��of�� the��memory��of�� the���nd�v�dual’s��obl�gat�ons�� towards��h�mself�� and�� the�� commun�ty.��The��memory��of��what��we��owe�� �n��general�� (to��ourselves��and�� to��others)�� represents��a�� form��of��moral��mob�l�sat�on��aga�nst��forgetfulness;���t���s��the��ord�nary��d�gest�ve��organ��of��our��quot�d�an��l�fe,��wh�ch�� �s��character�zed��by�� the��d�fferent��strength��of��our��engagements,��by�� the��celer�ty��of��our�� renouncement��and��by�� the�� just�f�cat�ons��of��our�� �nd�fference.��The��h�stor�c�ty��of��moral�zat�on��emphas�ses,�� therefore,�� the��funct�on��of��memory��and���ts��capac�ty�� to��b�nd��almost��bl�ndly��a��subject�� to��a��set��of��norms�� �mposed��by��a��certa�n��commun�ty�� l�fe.��What�� �s�� spec�f�c�� for�� th�s�� form��of��moral�zat�on�� �s�� the��emphas�s��

13�� See��for��example,��Joona��Ta�pale,��Twofold Normality: Husserl and the Normative Relevance of Primordial Constitution,��Husserl��Stud�es,��Kluwer��Academ�c��Publ�shers,��pr�nted�� �n��the��Netherlands��nr.��28,��2012,��pp.��49-60,��where���t�� �s��emphas�zed��the��tens�on��between��two��d�mens�ons��of��normat�v�ty��(pr�mord�al��and���ntersubject�ve)��wh�ch��are��not��eas�ly��resolved���n��Husserl’s��work.��

14�� Cf.��Fr�edr�ch��N�etzsche,��The Genealogy of Morals,�� translated��by��Horace��Barnett��Samuel,��New��York:��Cour�er��Dover��Publ�cat�ons,��2003.

234 �� Moral�zat�on��and��Conform�sm���n��Soc�al��Pract�ces����/����Ion��COPOERU��and��N�coleta��SZABO������������235

bestowed��on��the��obl�gat�ons��towards��the��other,��wh�ch��must��be��taken���nto��account��ser�ously��pr�or�� to��any��concerns��about�� the��personal��construct�on��of�� the�� �nd�v�dual.��The��memory���s��thus��tra�ned���n��order��to��not��forget��the��constant��presence��of��the��other��w�th�n�� the��pract�cal��hor�zon��of�� the��quot�d�an�� l�fe,�� together��w�th��all�� the��demands��and��obl�gat�ons��that��such��a��fore�gn��presence��enta�ls.��Consequently,�� the��process��of��moral�zat�on��or�g�nates���n��the��pr�nc�ple��of��non-�nd�fference��towards��the��other.

In�� the�� soc�al�� sphere��of�� l�fe,��moral�zat�on�� �nduces�� two��ways��of��not��be�ng���nd�fferent,��of��l�v�ng��together��w�th��the��others:��f�rst,��the��coordination��of��the��behav�our��accord�ng��to��purely��exter�or��prescr�pt�ons��wh�ch��hold��true��for��the��f�eld��of��act�v�ty���n��quest�on;��secondly,��cooperation,��namely,��the��part�c�pat�on���n��the��normat�ve��act�v�t�es��wh�ch��are��not��based��on��techn�cal��arguments��but��rather���nvolve��the��commun�tar�an��d�mens�on��of�� “be�ng�� together��w�th�� the��other”.��To��contr�bute�� to�� the��normat�ve��act�v�ty��does��not��only��mean��to��propose��norms��wh�ch��meet��the��cond�t�ons��of��my��own��relat�onsh�p��w�th��the��commun�ty,��together��w�th��all�� the��s�gn�f�cat�ons��that��th�s���nter-relat�onsh�p��connotes��w�th�� regard�� to��my��own��personal�� l�fe-h�story,��but�� to�� really��engage��myself�� �n��construct�ng,�� through�� the��proposed��norms,��an��env�ronment,��an���ntersubject�ve��amb�ance��favourable��to��the��others’��subject�ve��relat�onsh�ps��w�th��the��commun�ty.��In��th�s��way,��the��norms��are��bu�lt��from��w�th�n��the��commun�ty,��through��the��mob�l�sat�on��of��a��genu�ne���nterest��for��the��other��and��through��the��battle��for��creat�ng��an��understand�ng��between��the��s�ngular��and��the��collect�ve.

If��not,��both�� the�� lack��of��norms��wh�ch��organ�ze��clearly��and�� �n��a�� just��manner��a��certa�n�� f�eld��of�� the��soc�al�� l�fe�� (profess�onal��or��other),��and�� the��eschew�ng��from��a��m�n�mum��part�c�pat�on��of�� �nd�v�duals�� to�� the��format�on��of��a��normat�ve��reg�me,��generate��de-moral�zat�on,�� res�stance��aga�nst�� the�� f�rm��force��of��stat�c,�� somet�mes��un-l�veable��norms��and��rules.�� In��contemporary��soc�ety,��espec�ally�� �n�� the��European��Un�on,��present-day��l�fe���s�� the��result��of��an���nter-re�gn,��of��a��sem�-vo�d��between��two��types��of��organ�zat�on��of��normat�ve��systems:��those��of��the��s�ngular,��nat�onal��states��and��those��of��the��European��commun�ty,��wh�ch��must��be��made��to��su�t��one��another��or,���f��th�s��solut�on��proves�� to��be�� �mposs�ble��or�� too��costly,��must��be��re-�nvented��from��scratch.��Ident�fy�ng��those��substant�al��sources��and��resources��of�� the��soc�al�� l�fe��wh�ch��could��susta�n��the��relevance��of��a��certa�n��norm���s��essent�al,��so��that��the��respect�ve��normat�ve��system��does��not��become��ex�stent�ally�� false��and��damag�ng.15Soc�al��and��pol�t�cal��anthropolog�cal�� stud�es16��underl�ne�� the�� �mportance��of�� the��v�tal-force��of��a��norm,��wh�ch��contr�butes,��as��med�ator,��to��the��creat�on��of��an��order��of��th�ngs��and��of��act�ons��

15�� For�� the�� �mportance��of�� the��concept��of�� relevance�� �n�� the��soc�al�� theory,��see��Alfred��Schütz,��Reflections on the Problem of Relevance,��R�chard��Zaner��(ed.),��Yale��Un�vers�ty��Press,��New��Haven,��1970.

16�� See��for��example,��Alfred��Schütz,��Some Equivocations in the Notion of Responsibility,�� �n��Collected Papers II. Studies in Social Theory,��ed�ted��by��A.��Brodersen,��Mart�nus��N�jhoff��Publ�shers,��Dordrecht,��The��Netherlands,��1976;��Peter��L.��Berger��and��Thomas��Luckmann,��The Social Construction of Reality,��Pengu�n��Books,��London,��1991;��Scott,��J.��F.,��Internalization of Norms: A Sociological Theory of Moral Commitment,��Prent�ce��Hall,��New��Jersey,��1971;��Hechter,��M.��and��K.-D.��Opp,��Social Norms,��Russel��Sage��Foundat�on,��New��York,��2001;��B�cch�er�,��C.,��The Grammar of Society: the Nature and Dynamics of Social Norms,��Cambr�dge��Un�vers�ty��Press,��New��York,��2006;��Alexander,��J.M.,��The Structural Evolution of Morality,��Cambr�dge��Un�vers�ty��Press,��Cambr�dge,��2007.

that���ntends��them���n��such��a��way��that���t��fac�l�tates��the��stance��of��the���nd�v�dual��among��them.��Any��norm��generates��a��course��of��act�on��wh�ch��aff�rms��and��enhances��the��l�fe��of��the���nd�v�dual��and��the��commun�ty,��or���n��the��case��of��v�t�ated��norms��(vested���nterests,��mal�gn���ntent,���gnorance),��produces��more��harm��than��good.��A��l�fe��l�ved���n��a��state��of��max�mum��ava�lab�l�ty,��w�thout��any��des�re�� to��engage���n��a�� l�fe-project��wh�ch��could��dev�se��a��certa�n��coherent��conf�gurat�on��shaped��at��least��m�n�mally��by��certa�n��norms,��t�lts��dramat�cally��towards��a��m�serable��vo�d.��De-moral�zat�on��means��that��the��general���nd�fference�� towards��norms�� leads�� �nev�tably�� to�� the�� �nd�fference�� towards��h�s/her��own��l�fe-project.��Th�s��s�tuat�on��represents�� the��decadent��outcome��of�� the��neglect��of��the��Kant�an��ph�losoph�cal��warn�ng,��accord�ng��to��wh�ch��man’s��l�berty��needs��a��moral��norm���n��order�� to��exerc�se�� �tself��as��such:�� the���nd�fference��towards��norms���s�� �n��fact��carelessness��towards��h�s/her��own��l�fe,��l�ved��completely���n��the��natural��re�gn��and��at��the��absolute��mercy��of��the��moment’s���mpulse.

Moralization-in-the-civil-code

We��w�ll��analyse,�� �n�� th�s��sect�on,��a��part�cular��pract�ce��from��the��legal��sphere��of�� l�fe���n��order�� to��emphas�se��the���mportance��of��moral�zat�on.��Th�s�� �llustrat�on���s��relevant��because���t��stems��from��a��normally��str�ctly��normat�ve��f�eld��where��the��act�ve��subjects��are��soc�ally��charged��w�th��a��strong��force��of��auto-mob�l�sat�on:��the��c�v�l��law.

The�� l�berty�� to��engage�� �n��var�ous��soc�al��acts,��on��your��own��or�� together��w�th��the��others,�� �s��warranted,��preserved��and��defended��by��c�v�l�� law.��Th�s��contractual��mob�l�ty��must��respect��certa�n��l�m�ts��and��ex�genc�es��cod�f�ed���n�� the��c�v�l��code,��but��the��fundamental��pr�nc�ple��of��the��c�v�l��legal��sphere���s��the��l�berty��to��enter��contractual��relat�onsh�ps��w�th�� the��others.�� In�� the��case��of��a��breach��of�� the��obl�gat�ons�� freely��undertaken��by��the��contract�ng��parts,�� the�r�� respons�b�l�ty�� �s��act�vated��accord�ng��to��the�r��respect�ve��legal��transgress�ons.��Therefore,��the��Roman�an��C�v�l��Code17��defends��express�vely�� the��wronged��contract�ng��part��by��b�nd�ng�� the��gu�lty��one�� to��make��an��adm�ss�on��of�� l�ab�l�ty��and�� the�� remed�es�� settlement��env�sages��prec�sely�� the�� re-�nstaurat�on��of��the��equal�ty,��on��the��grounds��of��equ�ty,��between��the��contract�ng��parts��concerned.

What��happens,��however,�� �f�� the��one��respons�ble��for�� the��damages��caused���s,�� �n��fact,��a��th�rd��party,��from��outs�de��the��contract,��such��as���n��the��case��of��the��respons�b�l�ty��for��defect�ve��products,�� �mplemented��at�� the�� level��of�� the��European��Un�on?18�� In��th�s��part�cular��s�tuat�on,�� the��we�ght��of�� l�ab�l�ty��rests��not��only��w�th�� the��sellers�� that��commerc�al�sed��the��defect�ve��product��caus�ng��damage��to��the��buyer��or��consumer,��but,��through��a��procedure��of��jo�nt-respons�b�l�ty,��w�th��the��producer��who��made��and��put��the��defect�ve��product��on��the��market.��How���s��th�s��poss�ble��cons�der�ng��that��the��producer���s��not��a��contract�ng��part��of��the��commerc�al��contract��w�th�n��the��cond�t�ons��st�pulated��

17�� Cf.��art.��1349-1350,��art.��1376.,��the��Roman�an��C�v�l��Code,��2011.��18�� Cf.��The Product Liability Directive,��formally��Counc�l��D�rect�ve��85/374/EEC��of��25��July��1985��

on��the��approx�mat�on��of��the��laws,��regulat�ons��and��adm�n�strat�ve��prov�s�ons��of��the��Member��States��concern�ng��l�ab�l�ty��for��defect�ve��products,��under��wh�ch��any��producer��of��a��defect�ve��movable��must��make��good�� the��damage��caused�� to�� the��phys�cal��well-be�ng��or��property��of���nd�v�duals.

236 �� Moral�zat�on��and��Conform�sm���n��Soc�al��Pract�ces����/����Ion��COPOERU��and��N�coleta��SZABO������������237

by��the��C�v�l��Code?��Should���t��be��the��case��that��the��rules��prov�ded��by��the��c�v�l��sphere��lose��the�r��force��of��regulat�on��and���mplementat�on��when��a��contractual��s�tuat�on��falls��at��the��same��t�me��under��the��st�pulat�ons��of��another��legal��sphere,��namely��the��consumer��code?��Does��the��b�nd�ng��force��of��the��contract��d�sappear���f��a��th�rd��party,��outs�de��the��contract,���s��l�able��accord�ng��to��var�ous��and��fluctuat�ng��legal��class�f�cat�ons?

The���ntent��of��the��leg�slat�ve��author�ty��was��pr�mar�ly��to��allow��the��v�ct�ms��to��seek��a��proper��and��equ�table��redress��for��the��damages��to��the�r��health,��safety��and��property,���nduced��by�� the��defect�ve��products;��but�� �t��also�� �ntended�� to��prevent��such��damages��from��happen�ng��by��creat�ng��a�� regulatory�� framework��whereby�� the��producers��are��obl�ged��to���mprove��the�r��products.��The��European��D�rect�ve��a�ms,��therefore,��for��a��fa�r��apport�onment��of��the��r�sks���nherent���n��modern��product�on.

The��pr�nc�ple��of��the��l�berty��to��enter��contractual��relat�onsh�ps��ga�ns���n��th�s��way��an��unden�able��moral��d�mens�on:�� the�� l�berty�� to��b�nd��oneself�� through��contracts�� �s��“moral�zed”��by��the��pr�nc�ple��of��non-�nd�fference��towards��the��other.��Th�s��moral�z�ng��hue���mposes��the��ex�gency��that��not��only��the��contract�ng��parts,��but��also��the��th�rd��party,��outs�de��the��contract,��who��has��a��stake���n��the��mater�al��object��of��the��contract��should��not��cause��product-related��damages��to��the��others.��It���s��an��extens�on��of��c�v�l��respons�b�l�ty,���n���ts��spec�f�c,��contractual��sense,��towards��an��outs�de-the-contract��th�rd��party,��on��the��bas�s��of��moral��reason�ng.��The���nter-cod�f�cat�on��of�� the��concrete��s�tuat�on��does��not��make��for��a��form��of��pos�t�v�st��legal���nflat�on�sm,��but��rather��cla�ms��and��recogn�zes��the��necess�ty��to��ab�de��by��a��moral��pr�nc�ple.

After��1989,�� �n��Roman�a,��d�fferent��soc�al��acts��were��accompl�shed��under�� the��st�pulat�ons��of��a��general��legal��pract�ce��wh�ch���nc�ted��d�fferent��forms��of��mob�l�sat�on��(contractual��or��otherw�se),��supported��generously��by��the��l�berty��to��enter��contractual��relat�onsh�ps�� fully��warranted��by��Roman�an��norms.��After�� the�� �ntegrat�on�� �nto��the��European��Un�on��and�� �n�� the��wake��of�� the�� �mplementat�on��of�� �ts��d�rect�ves,��“the��mob�l�sat�on�� towards��mob�l�ty”�� �s�� t�nged��w�th�� “the��mob�l�sat�on�� towards��moral�zat�on”,��w�th��the��ex�gency,��backed��by��law,��to��take��the��other���nto��account��and��to��accompl�sh��a��pract�cal��and��moral��exerc�se��of��non-�nd�fference��towards��the��other.��To��take��heed��of�� the��other��as��a�� leg�slator,��or��as��a��mere��soc�al��subject�� �ntroduces��a��d�mens�on��of��vert�cal�zat�on��of��soc�al��pract�ce,��of��ampl�fy�ng���ts��cla�ms��and��stakes��so��as��to��compr�se��the��moral��sphere��of��l�fe.

The-pitfalls-of-the-moral-and-political-conformism

An���mportant��part��of�� the��present-day��pol�t�cal��and��cultural�� th�nk�ng19�� �s��polar�zed��themat�cally��by�� the��problem��of��otherness,��of�� the��other��as��a��d�fference,��by�� the��

19�� See��for��example,��Mark��Curr�e,��Difference (The New Critical Idiom),��Routledge,��London��and��New��York,��2004;��Rud���V�sker,��The Inhuman Condition: Looking for Difference after Levinas and Heidegger,��Phaenomenolog�ca��175,��Kluwer��Academ�c��Publ�shers,��New��York,��Boston,��Dordrecht,��London,��Moscow,��2004;��Ir�s��Mar�on��Young,��Justice and the Politics of Difference,��Pr�nceton��Un�vers�ty��Press,��New��Jersey,��2011;��Todd��May,��Reconsidering Difference: Nancy, Derrida, Levinas, and Deleuze,��Pennsylvan�a��State��Un�vers�ty,��1997;��Allan��W.��Norr�e,��Dialectic and Difference: Dialectical Critical Realism and the Grounds of Justice,��Routledge,��Ab�ngdon,��2009;�� Jeffrey��A.��Bell,��The Problem of Difference: Phenomenology and Poststructuralism,��Un�vers�ty��of��Toronto��Press,��Toronto,��1998.

problem��of�� the��emanc�pat�on��of��m�nor�t�es�� (ethn�c/terr�tor�al��or��extra-terr�tor�al,��sexual,��les sans-papiers,��etc.),��by��the��cla�ms��ra�sed��by��the��pr�nc�ples��of��d�str�but�ve��soc�al�� just�ce��based��on�� the�� �dea��of��equal��opportun�t�es�� for��everyone��and��on�� the��awareness��of�� the��cultural��d�fferences��of�� the��pol�t�cal/soc�al��agent.��To��summon��the��top�c��of��d�fference,���n��all�� �ts��var�ous��forms,��represents��a��commonplace��strategy��for��the��current��pol�t�cal��and��cultural��debates.��It���s,��therefore,��adv�sable��to���dent�fy��those��sore��spots��where��the��d�scourse��about��d�fference��loses��val�d�ty;��or,��when��val�d,���t��does��not��exerc�se��an���mpell�ng��cr�t�cal��force�� �n�� the��soc�al,��cultural��and��pol�t�cal��sphere��of�� l�fe,��but��only��acknowledges�� the��status quo.�� In�� the�� latter��case,�� the��d�scourse��on��d�fference��represents��noth�ng��more��than��a��form��of��conform�sm��to��the��g�ven��soc�al,��pol�t�cal��and��cultural��structures��of��the��world.��There���s��also��a��conform�sm��to��a��way��of��th�nk�ng��about��the��pol�t�cal��debunked��by��postmodern�sm,��wh�ch��cla�ms��that�� the��conceptual��categor�es�� that��are��meant�� to��expla�n�� the��pr�nc�ples��of��pol�t�cal��act�on���nd�cate,�� �n��fact,��a��deleter�ous��oss�f�cat�on,��aga�nst��wh�ch��new��forms��of��res�stance��must��be���nvented.��Conform�sm���s��the��danger��subsequent��to��the��effort��to���mpose��and��leg�t�m�se��d�fference��per se.

a) Political conformismThe��current��pol�t�cal��and��soc�al��s�tuat�on���n��Roman�a���s��shaped��by��the��fact��that��the��country��went�� through��a��50��year��per�od��of��commun�sm,��and�� the��post-commun�st��soc�ety�� �nher�ts��commun�st�� soc�al��nomenclature��and��structures��wh�ch��w�thstand��soc�al�� and��pol�t�cal�� reforms��and�� transformat�ons.��Franço�se��Thom�� �n��her��book��Les fins du communism20��shows��that��“la fronde conformiste”��of�� the�� �ntell�gents�a��funct�oned��as��an�� �llus�on��of��a��pol�t�cal��d�fferent�at�on��w�th�n��soc�ety��and��delayed��the��fall��of��the��commun�st��total�tar�an��state.��The���ntell�gents�a��cla�med��to��take��up��the��role��of��c�v�l��soc�ety,��wh�ch��was��non-ex�stent���n��commun�sm,��but���n��real�ty��they��had��a�� false�� �ndependence�� �n�� rapport��w�th�� the��commun�st�� reg�me.�� In��post-commun�st��soc�ety,�� the��change��of�� the��commun�st�� �deology��w�th�� the��pr�nc�ples��of��democracy��does��not��fully��warrant��the��escape��from��the��clutches��of��pol�t�cal��conform�sm:���ts��very��nature��represents��not��merely��an���deolog�cal��category,��but��an��eth�cal��one.

b) The ethical conformism of the outcastsAfter�� the�� fall�� of�� commun�sm,�� the��democrat�c��overhaul��of�� soc�ety�� and�� l�beral��cap�tal�sm��ga�ned��the��consensus��of��pol�t�cal��th�nkers:��they��became��the��benchmarks��of��the��construct�on��of��the��new��state.��The��forms��of��res�stance��are,��therefore,��pushed��back���nto��the��part�cular��sphere��of��the��outcasts:�� the��unemployed,�� the��have-nots,�� les sans-papier,�� the�� �mm�grants,�� fore�gners,��A�ds��pat�ents,��and��so��on.��The��German��ph�losopher��Günther��Anders��analyses�� the�� reformat�ve��potent�al��of�� the��outcasts’��oppos�t�on��to�� the��ex�stent,��soc�al-pol�t�cal��order��accord�ng��to��a��moral��perspect�ve.��The��r�sk��to��wh�ch��they��expose��themselves��–��Anders��calls��the��outcasts��by��a��gener�c��term:��“the��metaphys�cal��unemployed”��–��cons�sts�� �n�� feel�ng�� the��need�� to�� subject��themselves��to��author�ty,��to��attach��themselves��to��a��f�xed��world21��more��strongly��than��

20�� Cf.��Franço�se��Thom,��Les fins du communisme,��Cr�ter�on,��Par�s,��1994.��21�� For��Anders,�� the��outcasts�� lo�ter��between��“�nter-worlds”��because�� they��are��rejected��by�� the��

techn�cal-pol�t�cal�� apparatus��of��democracy:�� cf.��Günther��Anders,��Mensch ohne Welt.

238 �� Moral�zat�on��and��Conform�sm���n��Soc�al��Pract�ces����/����Ion��COPOERU��and��N�coleta��SZABO������������239

to��grab��the��poss�b�l�ty�� they��have��to��force��a��reformat�on��of�� the��soc�al��and��pol�t�cal��dev�ces��and��structures��that��reject��them.��Therefore,��the��outcasts��long��to��be���ntegrated��and��accepted��by��the��world,��to��part�c�pate���n,��and��to��be��a��part��of,��the��soc�al-pol�t�cal��order��wh�ch�� turns�� them��away.��Consequently,�� they��develop�� a�� spec�al�� form��of��pathology��–��the��pathology��of��f�x�ty��–��as��though��they��were��not��able��to��see��themselves��except��as��a��part��of�� the��order�� that��excludes�� them.��Anders��des�gnates�� th�s��w�ll��of��conform�sm��as��eth�cal��coward�ce.

c) The conformism of the cultural pluralismThe��same��ph�losopher,��Günther��Anders,��develops��a��cr�t�que��of��cultural��plural�sm,��but�� �n��contrad�st�nct�on��to��the��hab�tual��cr�t�ques��wh�ch��cons�der���t�� to��be��a��form��of��n�h�l�sm��(h�stor�c�st��or��ax�olog�cal),22��Anders��sees��here��rather��another��example��of��conform�sm.��Plural�sm��means�� to��have��a��certa�n��att�tude�� towards�� the��world��wh�ch���s��character�zed��by�� the�� recogn�t�on,��as�� such,��of��d�fferent��concept�ons��about�� the��world��and��of�� the��equal��value��of�� the��cultural�� �tems��and��goods��through��wh�ch��they��are���ncarnate.��The��recogn�t�on��operates��on��the��bas�s��of��an��acceptance���n��the��sense��of��“Sowohl-als-auch”.�� It�� �s��a��cultural��conform�sm��wh�ch��proceeds�� to�� the��never-end�ng���ntegrat�on��of��d�verse��cultural�� �tems��and��goods��w�th�n��the���nf�n�te��space��of��consumer��pract�ces.��Plural�sm’s��flaw��does��not��cons�st���n��n�h�l�st�c��destruct�on:���f��all��the��concept�ons��about��the��world��have��the��same��value,��then��they��have��none.��On��the��contrary,�� �ts��bl�nd��spot��des�gnates�� the��pass�ve��acceptance��of�� the��d�fference��wh�ch��passes��eas�ly��and��automat�cally��as��val�d��and��charged��w�th��value��w�th�n��the��cultural��system.��Consequently,��a��real��confrontat�on��between��the��d�fferent��concept�ons��about��the��world��does��not��take��place��nor��a��real��recogn�t�on��of��them��as��such.��It���s��the��age��of��cultural��prom�scu�ty,��of��the��conform�sm��to��a��false��plural�sm.

As��soon��as��the��d�fferences��lack��the��poss�b�l�ty��to��val�date��themselves��by��exter�or���nstances��of�� leg�t�mat�on��–��e�ther��w�th�n�� the�� theoret�cal�� framework��of��var�ous��gnoseolog�cal��construct�ons��wh�ch��de-essent�al�ze�� them���n��order�� to��establ�sh�� the��pr�nc�ple��of��equal�ty��as��the��only��cla�m��for��a��leg�t�mate��and��leg�t�mat�ng��essence;��or��w�th�n��the��framework��of��the��quot�d�an��l�fe��(profess�on,��fam�ly,��groups��of��subjects,��the��ecstat�c��enterta�nment��of��le�sure,��etc.)��where��d�fferences��do��not��appear��anymore��to��the��alert,��fully��awake��attent�on��of��the��subjects,��but��are��s�mply��brushed��off��w�th��an���nd�fferent��acceptance��–��conform�sm��comes��to��the��forefront��of��soc�al,��pol�t�cal��and��cultural��l�fe��and��can��only��be��challenged��by��an��educated��effort�� to��take���nto��account��the��part�cular��contents��of�� the��d�fferences�� �n��order�� to�� fully��understand�� them��and��ult�mately�� to��apprec�ate�� the�r�� �mportant�� �nput.��The��comprehens�ve��grasp��of�� these��d�fferences,��wh�ch��saves��them��from��the��sphere��of��automat�c���nd�fference��where��they��normally�� land,�� requ�res�� the��development��of��a��soc�al-pol�t�cal��culture;�� th�s��would��allow��for�� the��negot�at�on��of��a��vert�cal23�� (normat�ve)��arrangement��of��d�fferences,��

Schriften zur Kunst und Literatur,��München,��Verlag��C.��H.��Beck,��1984,��p.��XI.��22�� See��for��example,��Mar�a��Baghram�an,��Relativism,��Routledge,��London��and��New��York,��2004;��

Aron��Gurw�tsch,��On Contemporary Nihilism,���n��The Review of Politics,��Vol.��7,��No.��2,��1945,��pp.��170-198.

23�� Th�s�� vert�cal�� arrangement�� �s�� not�� the��product�� of�� a�� vert�cal�� subsumat�on��of�� concrete��d�fferences��under��“essent�al�� d�fferences”��because�� th�s��would�� enta�l�� once�� aga�n�� the��

accord�ng��to��the�r��value��and���mportance.��The��hor�zontal��arrangement��of��d�fferences��depr�ves�� them��of�� the�r��potent�al��effects�� �n�� the��order��of�� real�ty��because�� they�� lose��themselves��amongst�� the��other��d�fferences��already�� �n��place��or�� lay�ng��cla�m�� to��a��place��of�� the�r��own.��Therefore,��compared��w�th�� the��mult�ple��pre-g�ven��d�fferences,��the��new��d�fferences��seem��just��another��set��of�� the��same,��old��d�fferences�� to��rap�dly��acknowledge��w�thout���nterest.��How��to��negot�ate,��to��commun�cate���n��order��to��obta�n��the��recogn�t�on��of��the��d�st�nct�on��of��a��d�fference���n��rapport��w�th��others,��descr�b�ng��the��effort��to��make��a��d�fference��stand��out��and��to��val�date���ts��d�st�nct�veness��const�tutes��the�� research�� theme��of�� the��contemporary��soc�olog�es.24��Nevertheless,�� the��current��soc�olog�es��approach��the��subject��matter��of��d�fferences��from��a��h�ghly��object�ve��po�nt��of��v�ew:��they��are���nterested���n��the��dynam�c��of��object�ve��soc�etal��systems,��where�n��the��concrete���nd�v�dual��and��h�s��pract�cal��behav�our��(profess�onal��or��otherw�se)��does��not��escape��the��force��of��suct�on��of��the��soc�ety’s��macro-structures��and��rema�ns��a��pure��abstract�on.25��To��approach���nstead��the��const�tut�on��and��val�dat�on��of��d�fferences��from��the��po�nt��of��v�ew��of��the��d�fferent�at�ng��pract�ces��themselves,��as��they��are��conducted��by��“flesh��and��blood”���nd�v�duals��and��to��evaluate�� the�r��actual��normat�ve��capac�ty,��demands��a��major��overhaul��of��the��concept��of��normat�v�ty,��understood���n��the��sense��of��what��people��should��be��(normat�ve��ontology),��or��as��what��people��should��do��(eth�cs,��profess�onal��deontology).��The�� source��of��normat�v�ty,�� sought�� from�� the��bottom��upwards,��and��from��w�th�n��the��l�fe-world,��transforms��the��language��categor�es��wh�ch��are��meant��to��expla�n���t:�� �n��contrad�st�nct�on��to��the��prev�ous��models��of��cod�f�cat�on��reg�stered�� �n�� the�� last�� two��decades,�� today��a��new��type��of��conceptual��vocabulary�� �s��develop�ng��w�th��a��strong��emphas�s��on��personal�zat�on��and��co-�nvolvement��of��the��ad-dressee���n��the��respect�ve��cod�f�cat�on.26��The��creat�on��of��normat�v�ty,���ts��v�tal��source��and���ts��benef�c�al��effects��m�ght��be��cons�dered��as��a��form��of��soc�al�� �nd�v�duat�on��of��the��person��(profess�onal,��stat�st�cal,��communal,��d�fferent�al,��etc.)��who���s��not���solated��and��completely��autonomous��from��the��soc�al��env�ronment;��on��the��contrary,��she��tends��to��enr�ch��her��soc�al��relat�onsh�ps,��somet�mes��successfully,��through��d�screet��or��ample���ntervent�ons,�� to�� transform��the��var�ous��unequal��conf�gurat�ons��of�� the��soc�al��world��accord�ng��to��the��moral��pr�nc�ples��of��rec�proc�ty��and��equ�ty.

Consequently,�� the��new��act�ve��approach��of��d�fferences��based��on��the��pr�nc�ple��of��equal�ty,��wh�ch��prevents��them��from��be�ng��laz�ly��absorbed���n��the��soc�al,��cultural,��

uncontrollable�� �ntervent�on��of�� the��pol�t�cal�� �n�� the��soc�al��sphere;��on�� the��contrary,�� �t�� �s��a��vert�cal�ty���mposed��by��the��pr�nc�ple��of��moral�ty,���ntr�ns�c��to��the��soc�al��pract�ce.��

24�� See��for��example,��Axel��Honneth,��The Struggle for Recognition. The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts,�� translated��by��Joel��Anderson,��The��MIT��Press,��Cambr�dge,��Massachusetts,��1995,��and��espec�ally��Axel��Honneth,��Disrespect. The Normative Foundations of Critical Theory,��Pol�ty��Press,��Malden,��2007.��

25�� Th�s�� �s�� the��cr�t�que��that��phenomenology��usually��d�rects��aga�nst�� the��exclus�vely��object�ve��treatment��of��soc�al��phenomena:��see�� for��example,��Alfred��Schutz,��The Social World and the Theory of Social Action�� �n��Collected Papers II. Studies in Social Theory,��ed�ted��by��A.��Brodersen,��Mart�nus��N�jhoff��Publ�shers,��Dordrecht,��The��Netherlands,��1976.��

26�� See��for��example,��Alfred��Schutz,��The Stranger�� �n��Collected Papers II. Studies in Social Theory,��ed�ted��by��A.��Brodersen,��Mart�nus��N�jhoff��Publ�shers,��Dordrecht,��The��Netherlands,��1976;��Alfred��Schütz,��Reflections on the Problem of Relevance,��op. cit.;��Harry��G.��Frankfurt,��The Importance of What We Care About,��Cambr�dge��Un�vers�ty��Press,��1988.

240 �� Moral�zat�on��and��Conform�sm���n��Soc�al��Pract�ces����/����Ion��COPOERU��and��N�coleta��SZABO������������241

moral��or��pol�t�cal��conform�sm,��and��the��recogn�t�on��of��the�r��contr�but�on��to��the��f�eld��of��normat�v�ty��demands,���n��the��long��run,��a��re-th�nk�ng��of��normat�v�ty��as��a��pract�ce��of��regulat�on,��open��to��the��d�fferent�at�ng��and��part�cular��man�festat�ons��of��l�fe,��wh�ch��cont�nuously��challenge��the���ncl�nat�on��towards��closure��and��oss�f�cat�on��spec�f�c�� to��any��system.��From��the��po�nt��of��v�ew��of��the��l�fe-world,��any��normat�ve��system��w�ll��ap-pear,��eventually,��stuck,��frozen���n��an��obsolete��s�tuat�on.��Notw�thstand�ng,��the��mordant��warn�ngs��of��N�etzsche��should��not��be�� forgotten�� regard�ng�� the��d�m�nut�on��of�� the��qual�ty��of��l�fe��when���ts��v�tal��v�gour���s��sucked��dry��by���ntense��and��perversely��cod�f�ed��forms��of��organ�zat�on��(e�ther���n��a��moral��N�etzschean��sense,��or�� �n��the��largest��sense��of��bombard�ng,�� �nvad�ng��and��conquer�ng��the��quot�d�an��l�fe��w�th�� the��symbols��and��pract�ces��of��consumer�sm,��of��a��gallop�ng,��d�ff�cult��urban�sm,��or��of��the��omn�present��geopol�t�cal�� tact�cs).27��The��research��apparatus��m�ght��use,��bes�des�� the��N�etzschean��method��of�� susp�c�on,��other��approaches:�� luc�d��and�� revelatory��phenomenolog�cal��descr�pt�ons,��r�gorous��v�v�sect�ons��of�� the��moral��d�lemmas��wh�ch��surface��when��the��coll�s�on��between�� the�� �nd�v�dual��or��collect�ve�� l�fe��and�� the��blunt��or��v�t�ated��norm��result�� �n�� the�r�� rec�procal��aggravat�on.��The��a�m�� �s�� to�� recapture��and�� �nvest�gate,��through��caut�ous��explorat�on,��the��flu�d��and��fresh��representat�ons��about��a��certa�n��form��of��l�fe��and���ts��current��pract�ces,���n��all��the�r��d�fferent�at�on��and��d�fferences,���n��order��to��unmask,��enr�ch��or��s�mply��conf�rm��the��accuracy��of��the��stat�c,��f�xed��representat�ons,��d�spersed��through��the��present��by��trad�t�on,���n��order��to��grasp��and��expla�n��the��genes�s��and��the���nstaurat�on��of��l�ved��normat�v�ty.28

From-“mobilisation”-to-“moralization”:-A-social-approach-to-moralization

The��theme��of��profess�onal��conduct���n��Roman�a,��had��not��rece�ved��suff�c�ent��research��attent�on,��e�ther�� theoret�cal��or��pract�cal��–��unt�l�� recently��–��and��had��not�� reg�stered��prom�nently��as��a��source��of�� �nterest�� for�� the��Roman�an��profess�onal��commun�ty��at��large.��Moreover,��the��standards��of��profess�onal��conduct��were��not,��as��a��matter��of��fact,��cod�f�ed��by��spec�f�c��regulat�ons,��so�� they��d�d��not��change���n�� t�me,��and��allowed��for��pract�ces��from��the��commun�st��per�od��to��perpetuate�� themselves,��albe�t�� �n��d�fferent��forms,�� and�� for�� flawed,��or��pla�nly��wrong,�� forms��of��management�� to��eas�ly��ga�n��precedence���n��profess�onal�� l�fe.��On��the��other��hand,�� �n��a��total�tar�an��reg�me,��where��the�� total��mob�l�sat�on��of�� �nd�v�duals��was�� the��ma�n��preoccupat�on,�� the��cons�stent��development��of��a��moral��d�mens�on��w�th�n��profess�onal��act�v�ty��was���deolog�cally��and��pract�cally��very��d�ff�cult:���n��real�ty,��no��one��dared��to��publ�cly��embrace��pr�nc�ples,��

27�� See��for��example,��Jean��Baudr�llard,��The Consumer Society: Myths and Structures,��translated��by�� Chr�s��Turner,�� Sage,�� London,�� England,�� 1998;�� Jean�� Baudr�llard,��“ Simulacra and Simulation”,�� translated��by��She�la��Far�a��Glaser,��Un�vers�ty��of��M�ch�gan��Press,��M�ch�gan,��2004.��

28�� It�� �s��a�� transpos�t�on��of�� the��Husserl�an��method��of��“�nqu�r�ng��back�� �nto”��(Rückfragen)�� to��the�� f�eld��of��normat�v�ty:��as�� the��ev�dences��of�� the�� l�fe-world��are��absconded��beneath�� the��sc�ent�f�c��ve�l��of���deal�sat�ons��and��formulat�ons��and��the��spec�al��method��of��regress�ve���nqu�ry���s�� therefore��needed�� to��debunk�� them,��a�� step��back�� from�� the�r��“object�ve”��man�festat�on���s�� requ�red�� �n��order�� to��grasp�� the�r��subject�ve��source��of��mean�ng;�� th�s��appl�es��as��well�� to��normat�v�ty.��

moral��values,�� eth�cal��norms��and�� rules��wh�ch��were��not��part��of�� the�� �deolog�cal��makeover��of��the��commun�st��state.��The���dea��of���nd�v�dual��respons�b�l�ty��for��h�s��own��profess�onal��act�v�ty��was,��therefore,��badly��damaged.��After��the��fall��of��the��commun�st��party��as��the��“moral”,��strateg�c��centre��of��the��Roman�an��soc�ety,��the���dea��of��collect�ve��respons�b�l�ty��came��equally���nto��d�srepute.

In��the��context��of��preparat�ons��for��the���ntegrat�on��of��Roman�a���nto��the��European��Un�on��and��of��the��grow�ng��publ�c��debate��about��the��moral�ty��of��publ�c��persons,�� the���nst�tut�onal�sat�on��of��deontolog�cal��codes�� �n��2005��represented,��w�thout��doubt,��a��return�� to�� the�� �deal��of��moral�ty�� to��publ�c��and��profess�onal�� l�fe.��The��path�� towards��“moral�zat�on”��was,��therefore,��underway.��However,��the��moral��conduct���n��profess�ons��was��merely��descr�bed���n��a��general��fash�on��by��the��deontolog�cal��codes��wh�ch��each��profess�on��had�� to��adopt.��Th�s��sketchy�� treatment��proved�� to��be��h�ghly�� �nsuff�c�ent��for��properly��challeng�ng��profess�onals�� to��reflect�� thoroughly��on��the��moral��conduct��requ�red���n��the��exerc�se��of��the�r��profess�on.��To��embed��expl�c�tly��the��moral��pr�nc�ples��of��a��democrat�c��and��plural�st��soc�ety��w�th�n�� the��ex�genc�es��of��each��profess�on,�� �n��the��rout�ne��of��da�ly��work�ng,�� to��d�sclose��and�� to��debate�� the��pr�nc�ples��and��values��around��wh�ch��each��profess�on��crystall�zed�� �tself,�� to��start��certa�n��new��processes��of�� regulat�ng��and��cod�fy�ng��profess�onal��behav�ours,��wh�ch��have�� to��comply��w�th��eff�c�ency��standards��and��equally��w�th�� the��need��to��strengthen��the��moral��consensus��–��these��represent�� the��key��elements��of�� the��democrat�c�� transformat�on��of��Roman�an��soc�ety��and��are�� the�� leg�t�mate�� themes��for��research��conducted��w�th�� the��purpose��of��encourag�ng��and��enhanc�ng��the���nnovat�on��and��development��of��an���nst�tut�onal��soc�al��l�fe.

In��order�� to��step��out��of�� the���mpasse��created��by��the��oppos�t�on��between��theory��and��pract�ces��–��where�� theory�� funct�ons�� �n�� a�� f�eld��w�th�n��wh�ch��pract�ces�� are��“vert�cally”��homogen�sed��–��an��adequate��method��for��neutral�s�ng�� th�s��oppos�t�on��cons�sts���n��develop�ng��a��d�alog�cal��approach.��The��task��of��the��latter��env�sages,��not��a��correct��descr�pt�on��of��“real�ty”��–��wh�ch���mpl�es��that��there��already���s��a��real�ty��to��be��descr�bed��–��but��f�nd�ng��a��way��to��cope��w�th��the��plural�sat�on��of��personal��conv�ct�ons��and��bel�efs,��w�th��the��fragmentat�on��of��the��soc�al��and��pol�t�cal��modes��of��structurat�on,��w�th��the��transformat�on��of��the��types��of��soc�al��act�on��and��governance,��a��way,��f�nally,��to��manage��the��cont�nuous���nteract�on��between��global��and��local��dynam�cs.

The��d�alog�cal��approach��enables��a��double��cultural��transformat�on��of��the��role��of��the��“theor�st”��and��of��the��“profess�onal”��respect�vely.��In��try�ng��to��theor�ze��the��f�eld��of��pract�ce,��the��theor�st���s��pushed��to��reverse��the��relat�onsh�p��between��representat�on��and��act�on���n��favour��of�� the��latter��and��to��actually��“adhere”��to�� the��pract�ces�� that��he��w�shes��to��engage��w�th��theoret�cally,�� to���nvolve��h�mself��w�th��them���n��a��way��wh�ch���s��very��d�fferent��from��that��of��the��detached��spectator;��when��aware��of��the��complex�ty��of��the��profess�onal��l�fe,��the��profess�onal��can��no��longer��be��a��mere��“bl�nd��executant”,��obl�v�ous�� to�� the��potent�al��consequences��of��h�s��acts,��wh�ch��may��be��dangerous��for��h�mself��and��others.��Therefore,�� �t�� �s��necessary�� to�� take�� �nto��account�� the�� �dea��of��a��prax�s,�� that�� the��d�alogue��renders��as�� transparent��as��poss�ble��and��wh�ch��emphas�ses���ts�� reflex�ve��d�mens�on,�� the�� �dea��of��a�� (moral��and�� jur�d�cal)��normat�v�ty��wh�ch,��not��bas�ng���tself��anymore��on��f�ct�ons,�� tears��apart�� the��ve�l��of��a��false��natural�ty��and��contr�butes��to��the��redef�n�t�on��of�� the��logos��and��of�� the��reason��embedded���n��publ�c,��as��well��as��profess�onal,�� l�fe.��For�� that��matter,��w�th�� the��“hor�zontal”��structurat�on��

242 �� Moral�zat�on��and��Conform�sm���n��Soc�al��Pract�ces����/����Ion��COPOERU��and��N�coleta��SZABO������������243

of��pract�ces,�� the��relat�on��between��these��two��changes��and��the�r��d�fferences��become��vaguer.29

After��1989,��Roman�an��soc�ety��followed��what��Franc�s��Fukuyama��called,��rather��hast�ly��and��controvers�ally,�� the��apparently�� sole��global��course�� towards��a�� l�beral��democracy.30��Beyond��the��spectacular��change��of��the��pol�t�cal��reg�me,��another��ongo�ng��transformat�on��was��v�s�ble:��the��mode��of��funct�on�ng��of��the��state��and,��perhaps,��even��of�� �ts��nature.��Today,�� the��problems��ra�sed��by�� the��concrete,��pol�t�cal��pract�ces��are��much��more�� �mportant�� than�� the�� l�beral��doctr�ne��per se;��espec�ally��noteworthy��are��the��problems��related��to��the��act�v�ty��of��govern�ng��certa�n��populat�ons��wh�ch���n��t�me��became��more��heterogeneous��(e�ther�� through��the��recogn�t�on��or�� the��resurgence��of��old��d�st�nct�ons,��most��often��ethn�c��or��rel�g�ous,��or�� through��the��emergence��of��new��d�st�nct�ons,��usually��cultural).��The��contemporary��state��cannot��afford��to��proceed��to��a��homogen�sat�on��of��populat�ons,��as��happened��prev�ously��w�th��the��modern��(nat�onal)��state.��Consequently,��pol�t�cal��act�on��cannot��be��structured��after��the��model��“command��and��control”,��as��was��the��case��for��prev�ous��homogen�sed,��mass��soc�et�es.��In��a��plural��soc�ety,��where��mass�f�cat�on��no��longer��enta�ls��the��construct�on��(on��symbol�c��bases)��of�� large��human��groups,��but�� rather��a��k�nd��of��general�zed��and��apparently��chaot�c���nd�v�dual�sm,�� the��soc�al��auto-��and��co-regulat�on��processes�� tend��to��preva�l��and��to��replace��pol�t�cal��act�on���n���ts��trad�t�onal��sense.��Correspond�ngly,��the��already��anc�ent��forms��of��author�ty,��based��on��collect�v�st��values�� (for��example��patr�ot�sm)��are�� �n��decl�ne,��and�� �nd�v�dual�st��values,��such��as��happ�ness��and��“the��good��l�fe”,��seem��to��have�� taken�� the�r��place.��These��problems��perta�n�ng�� to��governance�� �n�� the��“age��of��global�sat�on”��are��essent�ally��pract�cal��problems,���n��contrad�st�nct�on��to��the��old��types��of��pol�t�cal��act�on��wh�ch��transferred��them��to��the��realm��of��ph�losophy��as��problems��of��leg�t�macy.

Yet��the��ongo�ng��process��of��modern�zat�on��wh�ch��has��been��engag�ng��Roman�an��soc�ety��for�� the�� last�� two��decades�� �s��unexpla�ned��from��a�� theoret�cal��po�nt��of��v�ew.��Modern�zat�on��presupposes�� �mportant,��overall�� structural��changes.��And�� �t�� should��also��tackle��top�cal��changes���n��the��cultural��norms��wh�ch��have��a��cons�derable���mpact��on��collect�ve��soc�al��act�on��and��on��soc�al��stab�l�ty;�� these��norms��have��to��cope��w�th��the��cr�ses��of��the��mechan�sms��of��central�zed��appl�cat�on��and��execut�on��of��laws��and��regulat�ons,��mechan�sms��that��represent�� the��hallmark��of�� the��modern��nat�onal��state��and��that��are��focused��more��on��the��conservat�on��of�� the��soc�al��order��and��less��on��the��recogn�t�on��of�� soc�al��creat�v�ty.�� In��Roman�a,�� the��new��soc�al�� landscape�� tends�� to��bypass��the��passé��and��strongly���deolog�cal��fantas�es���n��favour��of��the���nchoat�ve��and��st�ll��vague��vers�on��of��a��l�beral��soc�ety��and��democrat�c��governance.��The��state���s��less��dependent��on��a��mess�an�c��form��(rel�g�ous��or��secular)��and���s��more��character�zed��by��argumentat�ve��structures��based��on��contract��and�� rec�proc�ty.��Therefore,�� the��state���s��conce�ved�� less��as��“the��sav�our��of�� the��nat�on”��and��env�saged��more��as��a��mean��of�� real�z�ng�� �nd�v�dual��goals��wh�ch��ga�ned�� leg�t�macy��aga�nst�� the�� trad�t�onal,��

29�� For�� the�� last��decades,��a�� reconf�gurat�on��of��pract�ces�� �n�� the��developed��soc�et�es�� (usually��cons�dered��to��belong��to��some��autonomous��sphere)��has��been��tak�ng��place��and,��consequently,��the�r��regulat�on��(moral��or��legal)��needs��to��be��scrut�n�zed��anew.��

30�� Cf.��Franc�s��Fukuyama,��The End of History and the Last Man,��The��Free��Press,��Maxwell��Macm�llan,��New��York,��1992.

collect�v�st�c��goals��of��the��past.Democrat�c��accompl�shments��cannot��be��cons�dered��def�n�t�ve��acqu�s�t�ons,��

espec�ally���n��the��case��of��“per�pheral”��soc�et�es,��and��the��overall��democrat�c��process��cannot��be��taken��for��granted.��The��reason��for��th�s��precaut�on���s��just�f�ed��by��the��fact��that��apparently���rreconc�lable��confl�cts��started��to��surface��from��w�th�n��the��confrontat�on��of��plural�st��v�s�ons,��once��the��des�re��for��recogn�t�on,��the��need��to��stand��out��was��allowed��to��unleash���tself��and��to��man�fest�� �tself�� today���n��an��uncensored,��even��brutal,�� form.��Re-enter�ng��h�story��does��not��mean��anymore�� the��appropr�at�on��of��a�� leg�t�mat�ng��narrat�ve,��as���n��the��19th��century,��but��a��symbol�c��construct�on��wh�ch��holds���n���ts��centre��the��pr�nc�ple��of��legal�ty��–��the��rule��of��law��–��soc�al��just�ce��and���nd�v�dual��moral�ty.

W�th�� the��prol�ferat�on��of��c�v�l��and��pol�t�cal��r�ghts,�� the��state��as��subject�� to�� the��rule��of�� law���s�� redef�ned��so��as�� to��not�� fulf�l��exclus�vely��a��pol�t�cal��demand��(�n�� �ts��anc�ent,��trad�t�onal��sense��of��“command��and��control”).��A��space��for��debate��and��moral��confrontat�on,��for��new��ways��of��form�ng��the��moral��consensus��opens��up��w�th��th�s��new��concept�on��of�� the��state��–�� th�s�� �s�� the��new��complex��s�tuat�on��descr�bed��by��the��term��“moral�zat�on”.��It��presupposes��not��only�� to�� leave��beh�nd��the��old��soc�al��mechan�cs��of��“mob�l�sat�on”,��but��also��to��take���nto��account��the��new��forms��of��subject�vat�on��of��soc�al��requ�rements,�� the��new��mechan�sms��of��respons�b�l�ty��and��auto-respons�b�l�ty��that��are�� �n��play�� �n�� the��soc�al��world.��However,�� the��“pos�t�v�sm”��wh�ch�� ta�nts�� the��const�tut�on��and�� the�� funct�on�ng��of��profess�onal��organ�zat�ons��and��pract�ces��and��wh�ch��forces�� them���nto��subord�nat�on��and��conform�ty,�� �s��not��s�mply��swept��away��by�� these��new��changes.��To��expose�� �ts��new��faces��and�� theoret�cal��prem�ses��should��const�tute��one��of�� the��new�� tasks��of��a��ph�losophy��of��pract�ce.31��Reflect�on��on�� the��concept��of��moral�zat�on��emphas�sed��the��dynam�c��relat�onsh�p��between��the���nd�v�dual��and��the��norms��wh�ch��shape,�� �n�� the�r��own��r�ght,�� the��relat�onsh�p��of�� the�� �nd�v�dual��w�th��the��soc�al��env�ronment��and��w�th��h�s��consoc�ates.��But��equally���mportant�� �s�� to��not��overlook��the��p�tfalls��of��conform�sm,���n��all�� �ts��forms��–��moral,��pol�t�cal,��cultural��–��when�� �t��pervades�� the��pract�ces��of��normat�ve��val�dat�on��of�� the�� (subject�ve��and��object�ve)��d�fferences��wh�ch��are��necessary���n��order��to��bu�ld��a��soc�al��order��as��flex�ble��as��the��concrete��ex�genc�es��of��soc�al��l�fe.

Conclusions

The�� �nd�v�dual�zat�on��of�� the��moral��agent�� through�� the��process��of�� soc�o-pol�t�cal��d�fferent�at�on��may��produce��benef�c�al��effects��from��the��po�nt��of��v�ew��of��mult�ply�ng��the�� forms�� of�� leg�t�mat�on.�� However,�� from�� the�� perspect�ve�� of�� the�� eff�c�ency��perta�n�ng��to��the��reformat�on��of��the��soc�o-pol�t�cal��order,��conform�sm��s�gnals��a��false��leg�t�mat�on��of��d�fferences��and��represents��a��danger��of��stagnat�on.��A��new��approach��demands��that�� these��matters��should��be��understood��pr�mar�ly��as��practical��problems��and��only��subs�d�ar�ly��as��problems��regard�ng��the��pol�t�cal/�deolog�cal��leg�t�mat�on��of��d�fferences.

The��soc�al��pract�ces,��as�� the��pract�cal��sphere���n��wh�ch��the���nd�v�dual��conducts��h�s�� l�fe,��need��at�� least�� a��m�n�mal�� form��of��normat�v�ty,�� elaborated�� together��w�th��

31�� See��for��example,��Theodore��R.��Schatzk�,��Kar�n��Knorr��Cet�na,��and��E�ke��von��Sav�gny��(eds.),��The Practice Turn in Contemporary Theory,��Routledge,��London��and��New��York,��2001.

244 �� Moral�zat�on��and��Conform�sm���n��Soc�al��Pract�ces����/����Ion��COPOERU��and��N�coleta��SZABO������������245

consoc�ates,��w�th�n��commun�cat�on��pract�ces��ded�cated��to��the��re�nv�gorat�on��of��the��obsolete��body��of��laws��or��to��the���nvent�on��of��a��new��package��of��normat�ve��parameters.��Otherw�se,�� through��the��lack��of��ser�ous��reflect�on��on��the��status quo,��or��through��the���nd�fferent��acceptance��of�� the��regulat�ons��as�� they��are��or��as�� they��come��about,�� there��emerges��d�fferent��forms��of��conform�sm��wh�ch��clash��w�th��the��real��soc�al,��pol�t�cal,��cultural��needs��of�� the���nd�v�duals.��Therefore,�� the��mob�l�sat�on��of�� the��members��of��a��commun�ty��of��l�fe��to��undergo��the��d�ff�cult��process��of��moral�zat�on��(�nd�v�dually��and��together��respect�vely)��appears��to��be��a��salutary��solut�on.��In��th�s��sense,��a��phenomenol-ogy��of��normat�v�ty��cannot��be��reduced�� to�� the��determ�nat�on��of�� �ts��essence��and�� to��the��descr�pt�on��of���ts��part�cular��structures:�� the��subjects��capable��of��moral�zat�on,��of��reflex�ve��respons�b�l�ty��and��normat�ve��creat�on��must��be��stud�ed��by��phenomenolog�-cal��psychology,��and�� the��const�tut�ve�� relat�onsh�ps��between�� the��subjects��must��be��addressed��by��a��phenomenolog�cal��soc�al��eth�cs.��The��phenomenology��of��normat�v�ty��does��not��have��a��neutral��object��of��study;��on��the��contrary�� �t�� �s��already��loaded��w�th��the��pract�cal,��cultural,��and��eth�cal��s�gn�f�cat�ons��const�tuted��by��human��be�ngs���n��the��course��of��the�r��l�fe.

References

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Scott,��J.��F.��1971.��Internalization of Norms: A Sociological Theory of Moral Commitment,��New��Jersey,��Prent�ce-Hall.

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Thom,��Franço�se.��1994.��Les fins du communisme,��Par�s,��Cr�ter�on.V�sker,��Rud�.�� 2004.��The Inhuman Condition: Looking for Difference after Levinas and

Heidegger,��Phaenomenolog�ca��175,��New��York,��Boston,��Dordrecht,��London,��Moscow,��Kluwer��Academ�c��Publ�shers.

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Waldenfels,��Bernhard.��2005. “‘Normal�té��et��normat�v�té’. Entre��phénoménolog�e��et��structura-l�sme”���n��Revue de métaphysique et morale,��nr.��45,��2005/1,��pp.��57-67.

Political Ethics in the War on Terror: Ethics of the International Crime of Aggression and Political Violence

Andreea��GAE

The��war��on��terror���s��commonly��character�zed��as��a��fundamentally��d�fferent��k�nd��of��armed��confl�ct�� from��the��po�nt��of��v�ew��of��more�� trad�t�onal��warfare.��Furthermore,��both��m�l�tary��and��pol�t�cal�� analysts��have��argued�� that�� the��new��war��pol�cy��must���nvolve�� totally��d�fferent��pr�nc�ples,�� rules��and,��consequently,��part�cular��appl�ed��eth�cs��cr�ter�a.��Under�� these��c�rcumstances, the purpose��of�� th�s��paper�� �s�� to��explore��the��eth�cal�� �ssues��assoc�ated��w�th��the��practices of��the��“war��on��terror�sm”��that��was��declared��follow�ng��the��events��of��9/11,��e.g.�� torture,��assass�nat�on,��targeted��k�ll�ng��–��wh�ch���dent�fy��the��enem�es’��combatant��status��as��an��except�on��to��trad�t�onal��norms��of��eth�cs,��proport�onal��just�ce��and��just��war��theory.��Therefore,��the��eth�cal��boundar�es��of��counter-terror�st��operat�ons,��as���nd�cated���n��the��statement��“eth�cal��cons�derat�ons��are��central�� to��dec�s�ons�� �nvolv�ng��d�scret�on,�� force��and��due��process�� that�� requ�re��people��to��make��enl�ghtened��moral��judgments”,1��w�ll��not��address��the���ssue��of��whether��terror�sm��can��ever��be��morally�� just�f�ed,2�� though��they��cons�der�� the��problem��of�� the��morally��just�f�able��constra�nts��and��restr�ct�ons��that��a��government��should��be��perm�tted��to�� �mpose��on���ts��c�t�zens�� �n��order�� to��succeed���n�� the��war��on�� terror�sm.��Ult�mately,��the��conclus�on���s��that��there���s��noth�ng���nherently��moral���n��the��taxonomy��of��d�fferent��except�onal�sms��der�ved��from��the��new��pol�t�cal��v�olence,��because��the��quest�on��may��be��whether��condon�ng��v�olat�ons��of��human��r�ghts��and��l�beral��pr�nc�ples���n��conduct�ng��an���nternat�onal��war��on��terror�sm,��also��r�sks��underm�n�ng��respect��for��fundamental��

laws��that��destroys��comm�tment��to��just�ce��and��eth�cs.

The-just-war-and-the-war-on-terror:--Law-enforcement-or-self-defence?

Present�ng��two��sets��of��cr�ter�a3��wh�ch��establ�sh��jus ad bellum��(the��r�ght��to��go��to��war)��and�� jus in bello�� (the��r�ght��conduct��w�th�n��war),�� the�� just��war�� theory��cons�sts��of��a��doctr�ne��of��m�l�tary��eth�cs��wh�ch��holds��that��a��v�olent��confl�ct��ought��to��meet��several��

��1�� Joycelyn��M.��Pollock,��Ethical Dilemmas and Decisions in Criminal Justice,��Cengage��Lean�ng,��Wadsworth,��2010,��p.��7.

��2�� See,��for��example:��J.��Angelo��Corlett,��Terrorism: A Philosophical Analysis,��Spr�nger��Publ�sh-�ng,��New��York,��2003;��R.G.��Frey,��C.W.��Morr�s,��Violence, Terrorism and Justice,��Cambr�dge��Un�vers�ty��Press,��New��York,��1991; V�rg�n�a��Held,��“Terror�sm,��r�ghts,��and��pol�t�cal��goals”, Ib�d., pp.��59-85;�� Jan��Narveson, “ Terrorism and Morality”, Ib�d.,��pp.��116-169; Uwe Ste�nhoff, On The Ethics of War and Terrorism, Oxford��Un�vers�ty��Press,��Oxford,��2007.

��3�� F.��James��Ch�ldress,��1978.��“Just-War��Theor�es:��The��Bases,�� Interrelat�ons,��Pr�or�t�es,��and��Funct�ons��of��The�r��Cr�ter�a”,��Theological Studies��39,��pp.��427-445.

248 �� Pol�t�cal��Eth�cs���n��the��War��on��Terror����/����Andreea��GAE������������249

reasonable��and��necessary��elements.��F�rstly,�� the�� jus ad bellum��advances��just��cause,��comparat�ve��just�ce,��competent��author�ty,��r�ght���ntent�on,��probab�l�ty��of��success,��last��resort��and��macro-proport�onal�ty��of�� the��ant�c�pated��benef�ts.��Secondly,�� the�� jus in bello br�ngs��forward��d�st�nct�ons��between��enemy��combatants��and��non-combatants,��proport�onal�ty��between��c�v�l�an���njur�es��and��m�l�tary��advantage,��m�l�tary��necess�ty,��fa�r��treatment��of��pr�soners��of��war��and��no��means��malum in se.

On��the��contrary,��the��war��on��terror�sm’s��strategy���nvolves��plans��and��operat�ons��often�� character�zed�� as�� warfare�� rather�� than�� law�� and�� enforcement�� because�� �t���ncorporates�� elements��of�� a�� convent�onal��war��but��w�th�� s�gn�f�cant��d�fferences���nclud�ng��purpose,��def�n�te��durat�on,��object,��methods��and��mult�ple��def�n�t�ons��of��terror�sm���tself.

The��academ�c��Paul��W�lk�nson��focuses��on�� the��pol�t�cal��nature��of�� the��war��on��terror��suggest�ng��that:��

“Terror�sm���s�� the��systemat�c��use��of��coerc�ve�� �nt�m�dat�on,��usually�� to��serv�ce��pol�t�cal��ends.��It�� �s��used��to��create��and��explo�t��a��cl�mate��of��fear��among��a��w�der��target��group�� than�� the�� �mmed�ate��v�ct�ms��of�� the��v�olence,��and�� to��publ�c�ze��a��cause,��as��well��as��to��coerce��a��target��to��acced�ng��to��the��terror�sts’��cla�ms”.4

By��contrast,�� the��Un�ted��Nat�ons��Secur�ty��Counc�l�� �n��Resolut�on��1566��of��October,��2004��st�pulates��a��cr�m�nal��perspect�ve��w�thout��ment�on�ng��expl�c�tly�� �ts��pol�t�cal��object�ves:��

“[...]�� cr�m�nal�� acts,�� �nclud�ng�� those�� aga�nst�� c�v�l�ans,�� comm�tted��w�th�� the���ntent�� to��cause��death��or��ser�ous��bod�ly�� �njury,��or�� tak�ng��of��hostages,��w�th�� the��purpose�� to��provoke��a�� state��of�� terror�� �n�� the��general��publ�c��or�� �n��a��group��of��persons��or��part�cular��persons,���nt�m�date��a��populat�on��or��compel��a��government��or��an���nternat�onal��organ�zat�on��to��do��or��to��absta�n��from��do�ng��any��act,��wh�ch��const�tutes��offenses��w�th�n�� the��scope��of��and��as��def�ned�� �n�� the�� �nternat�onal��convent�ons��and��protocols�� relat�ng�� to�� terror�sm,��are��under��no��c�rcumstances��just�f�able��by��cons�derat�ons��of��a��pol�t�cal,��ph�losoph�cal,�� �deolog�cal,�� rac�al,��ethn�c,��rel�g�ous��or��other��s�m�lar��nature,��and��calls��upon��all��States��to��prevent��such��acts��and,�� �f��not��prevented,�� to��ensure�� that��such��acts��are��pun�shed��by��penalt�es��cons�stent��w�th��the�r��grave��nature;��[…]”.5

For��the��Un�ted��K�ngdom,��the��Terror�sm��Act��of��2000��def�nes��terror�sm��as��use��of��a��threat��or��act�on��des�gned��to���nt�m�date��or���nfluence��the��publ�c��and��government��for��advanc�ng��a��pol�t�cal,�� rel�g�ous��or�� �deolog�cal��cause,�� �ntroduc�ng��ser�ous��v�olence��and��damage��aga�nst�� l�fe,��property��and��safety.6��As��for�� the��Un�ted��States,�� the��U.S.��Code��T�tle��22,��Sect�on��2656,���ntroduces��a��spec�f�c��not�on��of��international terrorism,��related��to��the��concept��of��v�olence��and���gnor�ng��any��reference��of��state��terror�sm:��

��4�� Paul��W�lk�nson,��Terrorism Vs. Democracy: The Liberal State Response,��Frank��Cass��Publ�shers,��London,��2001,��pp.��12-13.

��5�� United Nations Security Council Resolution 1566,��Art�cle��3,��2004.��6�� Parl�ament��of��the��Un�ted��K�ngdom,��The Terrorism Act 2000,��2000.

“The�� term�� terror�sm�� means�� premed�tated�� pol�t�cally�� mot�vated�� v�olence��perpetrated��aga�nst��non-combatant��targets��by��sub-nat�onal��groups��or��clandest�ne��agents,��usually�� �ntended�� to�� �nfluence��an��aud�ence.��The�� term�� �nternat�onal��terror�sm��means�� terror�sm�� �nvolv�ng��c�t�zens��or�� the�� terr�tory��of��more�� than��one��country.��The��term��terror�st��group��means��any��group��pract�c�ng,��or�� that��has��s�gn�f�cant��subgroups��that��pract�ce,���nternat�onal��terror�sm”.7

In�� add�t�on,�� the�� FBI�� adm�ts�� a�� formulat�on�� of�� the�� U.S.�� Code�� of�� Federal��Regulat�ons��wh�ch��focuses��on��coerc�on��and��unlawfulness,��plead�ng��for��soc�al��and��pol�t�cal��object�ves:��

“Terror�sm���s��the��unlawful��use��of��force��and��v�olence��aga�nst��person��or��property��to���nt�m�date��or��coerce��a��government,�� the��c�v�l�an��populat�on,��or��any��segment��thereof,���n��further��of��pol�t�cal��or��soc�al��object�ves”.8

In��the��end,��for��the��U.S��Defense��Department���t���s��“the��unlawful��use��or��threatened��use��of�� force��or��v�olence��aga�nst�� �nd�v�duals��or��property�� to��coerce��or�� �nt�m�date��governments��or�� soc�et�es,�� often�� to�� ach�eve��pol�t�cal,�� rel�g�ous,��or�� �deolog�cal��object�ves”.9

Wh�ch���s��st�ll�� the��most��preferable��manner��of��deal�ng��w�th��an��armed��confl�ct���n��an��age��when��m�l�tary��v�olence��seems��just�f�ed?��In��other�� terms,��could��counter-terror��war��be��just��and��compulsory���n��the��cond�t�ons��where���t��can��be��treated��as��hav�ng��just�f�ed��reasons?

From��one��po�nt��of��v�ew,��the��class�cal�� just��war��theory��may��argue���n��favour��of��three��d�fferent��reasons.��F�rst��of��all,��desp�te��the��cla�ms��that��eth�cal��arguments��delete��any��connect�on��w�th��pol�t�cs��and��m�l�tary��strategy,��the��dom�nant��eth�cal��framework��w�th��respect�� to��war��–��taught��at��m�l�tary��academ�es��and��art�culated���n���nternat�onal��laws��or���n��the��code��of��m�l�tary��just�ce��–���s��bas�cally��just��war��theory,��often���nvoked��by��the��modern��war��on��terror���tself,��as���n��the��case��of��the��Bush��adm�n�strat�on:��

“Because��the��war��on��terror��w�ll��requ�re��resolve��and��pat�ence,���t��w�ll��also��requ�re��firm moral purpose��[…].��We��have��a��great��opportun�ty��to��extend��a��just��peace,��by��replac�ng��poverty,��repress�on,��and��resentment��around��the��world��w�th��hope��of��a��better��day��[…].��We��w�ll��work��for��a��just��and��peaceful��world��beyond��the��war��on��terror”.10

Secondly,�� the��counter-terror�sm��strategy��appears�� to�� �mply�� �n�� �ts��prel�m�nary��phases��categor�es��of�� the�� just��war�� theory,��betrayed,��however,��by��a�� large��use��of��

��7�� Code of Laws of the United States of America,��T�tle��22,��Sect�on��2656��(f)d.��8�� Un�ted��States��Department��of��Just�ce,��Federal��Bureau��of��Invest�gat�on,��The Code of Federal

Regulations,��T�tle��28,��Sect�on��0.85.��9�� Tom�s��Kap�tan,��“‘Terror�sm’��As��A��Method��of��Terror�sm”,��Georg��Meggle,��Ethics of Terrorism

& Counter-Terrorism,��Ontos,��Heusenstamm,��2004,��p.��21.10�� Wh�te��House��Off�ce��of�� the��Press��Secretary,��George��W.��Bush,��Graduation Speech at the

United States Military Academy at West Point,��New��York,��June��1,��2002.

250 �� Pol�t�cal��Eth�cs���n��the��War��on��Terror����/����Andreea��GAE������������251

non-necessary�� force,�� �ndependent��of�� a�� just��war�� log�c,�� for�� �nstance,�� the��war�� �n��Afghan�stan:��“The��purpose��for��our��act�ons��w�ll��always��be�� to��el�m�nate��a��spec�f�c��threat��to��the��Un�ted��States��or��our��all�es��and��fr�ends.��The��reason��for��our��act�ons��w�ll��be��clear,��the��force��measured,��and��the��cause��just”.11

Th�rdly,�� the�� class�cal�� just��war�� theory�� and�� the��war�� on�� terror�� share��many��part�cular,��common��elements,��and��somet�mes��even��de-emphas�se�� themselves�� �n��favour��of��the��other.��For��example,��Jean��Elshta�n��argued��that��“desp�te��the���mpress�ve��and��determ�ned��efforts,�� the�� just��war�� frame�� �s��stretched�� to�� the��break�ng��po�nt��as���t��can��no�� longer��prov�de��a��coherent��p�cture��of�� �ts��d�scurs�ve��object��–��war�� �n��any��convent�onal��sense”.12

From��another��po�nt��of��v�ew,�� the��arguments��of�� the��new��strategy�� �n��counter-terror��war��rest��on��the��cla�m��that��the��nature��of��war���tself�� �s��now��transformed���n��the��contemporary��context.��Th�s�� technolog�cal��and��conceptual�� revolut�on��can��be��also��understood��as�� a��problem��concern�ng�� the��asymmetr�es�� �n��m�l�tary��capab�l�t�es,��wh�ch�� leads�� to�� asymmetr�c�� confl�cts��where��opponents��use��unequal��weapons:��“We��can��assume�� that��our��enem�es��and��future��adversar�es��have�� learned��from��the��Gulf��War.��They�� are��unl�kely�� to�� confront�� us�� convent�onally��w�th��mass�� armor��format�ons,��a�r�� super�or�ty�� forces,��and��deep-water��naval�� fleets��of�� the�r��own,��all��areas��of��overwhelm�ng��U.S.��strength��today.��Instead��they��may��f�nd��ways��to��attack��our�� �nterests,��our��forces,��and��our��c�t�zens,�� they��w�ll�� look��for��ways�� to��match�� the�r��strengths��aga�nst��our��weaknesses”.13

In��assert�ng��whether��war��on��terror���s��acceptable,��the��prev�ous��trad�t�onal��cla�ms��w�ll��have��to��analyse���f��other��methods��of��deal�ng��w�th��terror�sm��m�ght��be��effect�ve��or,��as��some��just��war��theor�sts��suggest,�� to��even��d�st�ngu�sh��counter-terror�sm��from��a��real��war.14��Nevertheless,��understood��as��war��and��conce�ved���n���ts��real��man�festat�ons,��terror�sm��expands��the��not�ons��and��pract�ce��of��trad�t�onal��warfare��because��“the��threat��of��terror�st��attack���s��terror�sm”15��and��counter-terror�sm��or��the��war��on��terror��s�m�larly��explores�� the��conf�gurat�on��and�� l�m�ts��of��m�l�tary��strategy�� �tself��because��“there�� �s��no��way�� to��defend��everywhere��at��every�� t�me��aga�nst��every�� techn�que.��Therefore��you��s�mply��have��to��go��after��them”.16��The���nab�l�ty��to��protect��all��assets���n��a��just��war��or�� from��terror�sm��s�tuates��prevent�on��on��a��h�gher�� level,��w�th�� the��d�fference�� that,��th�s��t�me,���t��w�ll��be��exclus�vely��def�ned��as��a��pre-empt�ve��str�ke��w�th��no��reasonable��strategy��or��negot�at�ons:��“The��only��defense��aga�nst�� terror�sm���s��offence.��You��have��to��s�mply��take��the��battle��to��them��because��everyth�ng��–��every��advantage��accrues��to��

11�� Execut�ve��Off�ce��of�� the��Pres�dent��of�� the��Un�ted��States,��Un�ted��States��Nat�onal��Secur�ty��Counc�l,��The national security strategy of the United States of America,��Chapter��V,��Wash�ngton��D.C.,��September,��2002.

12�� Jean��Bethge��Elshta�n,��“Reflect�ons��on��war��and��pol�t�cal��d�scourse:��Real�sm,��just��war,��and��fem�n�sm���n��a��nuclear��age”,��Just War Theory,��Columb�a��Un�vers�ty��Press,��New��York,��p.��268.

13�� Un�ted�� States�� Government�� Pr�nt�ng�� Off�ce,�� Un�ted�� States�� Nat�onal�� Defense�� Panel,��Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century,��Wash�ngton��D.C.,��1997,��p.��11.

14�� M�chael��Walzer,��“F�rst,��def�ne��the��battlef�eld”,��The New York Times,��21��September��2001,��A27.

15�� Paul��R.��P�llar,��Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy,��Brook�ngs��Inst�tut�on��Press,��Wash�ngton��D.C.,��2001,��p.��14.

16�� Donald��H.��Rumsfeld,��Interv�ew��w�th��USA Today,��24��October��2001.

the��attacker���n��the��case��of��a��terror�st.��The��cho�ce��of��when��to��do���t,��the��cho�ce��of��what���nstruments��to��use��and��the��cho�ce��of��where��to��do���t,��all��of��those��th�ngs��are��advantages��of�� the��attacker”.17��In��other�� terms,�� the��war��on��terror��would��leg�t�mate��performance��of��extra��perm�ss�on��act�v�t�es��and��the��just��war��should��tac�tly��approve��these��because��“there�� �s��no��other��cho�ce”�� �n��cond�t�ons��where�� the��new��confl�ct�� seems�� to��be��a��parad�gm��case��of��“just�� fear”��wh�ch��demands��spec�f�c��pre-empt�on��or��combat�ve��act�on.�� Indeed,�� the��war��on�� terror��adopts��new��coord�nates��concern�ng��spat�al��and��temporal��l�m�ts��because��the��trad�t�onal��battlef�eld��or��durat�on��already��fade��away:��“We��must��take��the��battle��to��the��enemy,��d�srupt��h�s��plans,��and��confront��the��worst��threats��before��they��emerge��[…].��Our��secur�ty��w�ll��requ�re��[…]��a��m�l�tary��that��must��be��ready��to��str�ke��at��a��moment’s��not�ce�� �n��any��dark��corner��of�� the��world.��And��our��secur�ty��w�ll��requ�re��all��Amer�cans��to��be��forward-look�ng��and��resolute,��to��be��ready��for��pre-empt�ve��act�on��when��necessary��to��defend��our��l�berty��and��to��defend��our��l�ves”.18��You��attack��f�rst��or��you��w�ll��be��attacked��anyway.��In�� th�s��v�ew,�� the��war��on�� terror�� looks��rather�� l�ke��state��pol�t�cs�� than��a��def�ned��armed��confl�ct:��“Our��war��on��terror��beg�ns��w�th��Al��Qaeda,��but���t��does��not��end��there.��It��w�ll��not��end��unt�l��every��terror�st��group��of��global�� reach��has��been�� found,��stopped��and��defeated”.19�� Indeed,��“we�� �ntend�� to��pursue���t��unt�l��such��t�me��as��we’re��sat�sf�ed��that��those��terror�st��networks��don’t��ex�st.��That��they��have��been��destroyed”.20��Consequently,�� though���t�� �s��st�ll��poss�ble��to��f�ght���n��self-defence��–��as��already��stated,��a�� just��war�� �s��conducted�� �n��cond�t�ons��of��self-defence��or���n��defence��of��another��(w�th��suff�c�ent��ev�dence);��add�t�onally,��Art�cle��5121��leg�t�m�ses��an�� �mmed�ate��act�on�� �n��self-defence,��although�� �t��does��not��necessar�ly��just�fy��an���ndef�n�te,��open-ended��use��of��m�l�tary��force.��Under��these��c�rcumstances,��the��potent�al�� targets��of�� terror�st��assault��should��be��protected�� to�� the��greatest��extent��poss�ble,��reduc�ng��vulnerab�l�t�es��wh�le��ma�nta�n�ng��a��jud�c�ous��but��legal��alert��wh�ch��l�m�ts�� the��damages��of��a�� terror�st��attack��and��s�multaneously��const�tutes��a��form��of��deterrence���f�� terror�sts��bel�eve��the�r��a�ms��are��comprom�sed.22�� In��add�t�on,��spec�f�c��

17�� Un�ted��States��Department��of��Defense,��Off�ce��of��the��Ass�stant��Secretary��of��Defense��(Publ�c��Affa�rs), DoD News Briefing - Secretary Rumsfeld and Gen. Myers,��18��October��2001.

18�� Wh�te��House��Off�ce��of�� the��Press��Secretary,��George��W.��Bush,��Graduation Speech at the United States Military Academy at West Point,��New��York,��June��1,��2002.

19�� George��W.��Bush,��“Address��on��terror�sm��before��a��jo�nt��meet�ng��of��Congress”,��The New York Times,��September��21,��2001,��B4.

20�� Un�ted��States��Department��of��Defense,��Off�ce��of��the��Ass�stant��Secretary��of��Defense��(Publ�c��Affa�rs),��Donald H. Rumsfeld, General Richard Myers��Briefing on Enduring Freedom,��October��7,��2001.

21�� “Noth�ng���n��the��present��Charter��shall�� �mpa�r�� the���nherent��r�ght��of�� �nd�v�dual��or��collect�ve��self-defence�� �f��an��armed��attack��occurs��aga�nst��a��Member��of�� the��Un�ted��Nat�ons,��unt�l��the��Secur�ty��Counc�l��has�� taken��measures��necessary�� to��ma�nta�n�� �nternat�onal��peace��and��secur�ty.��Measures��taken��by��Members���n��the��exerc�se��of��th�s��r�ght��of��self-defence��shall��be���mmed�ately��reported��to��the��Secur�ty��Counc�l��and��shall��not���n��any��way��affect��the��author�ty��and��respons�b�l�ty��of��the��Secur�ty��Counc�l��under��the��present��Charter��to��take��at��any��t�me��such��act�on��as���t��deems��necessary���n��order��to��ma�nta�n��or��restore���nternat�onal��peace��and��secur�ty”��(Charter of the United Nations,��Chapter��VII,��Art�cle��51,��1945).

22�� Paul��R.��P�llar,��Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy,��Brook�ngs��Inst�tut�on��Press,��Wash�ngton��D.C.,��2001;��Jess�ca��Stern,��The Ultimate Terrorists,��Harvard��Un�vers�ty��Press,��1999.

252 �� Pol�t�cal��Eth�cs���n��the��War��on��Terror����/����Andreea��GAE������������253

or��ta�lored���ntell�gence,��spec�al��operat�ons��and��law��enforcement��m�l�tary��strateg�es��should��be�� �mplemented��and��d�str�buted�� �n��order�� to��detect,��d�srupt��and��sabotage��terror�st��plann�ng��and��act�on,23��w�thout��recurrence�� to�� �njur�ous��acts�� l�ke�� �rregular��rend�t�on��or�� “torture��by��proxy”,�� accord�ng�� to�� a��nat�onally�� and�� �nternat�onally��effect�ve��strategy���n��order��to��prevent��and��reverse��terror�sm��causes��and��consequences;��th�s��would��prov�de��a�� real��alternat�ve�� to��pol�t�cal��v�olence��and��counter-terror�sm��warfare.��Strateg�c��defence���n�t�at�ves��l�ke��the��one��outl�ned��by��Ronald��Reagan���n��h�s��d�scourse��over��h�s��fore�gn��pol�cy��pos�t�on��to��halt�� terror�sm��–��“We��don’t��negot�ate��w�th��terror�sts”��–��are��fut�le��and���neffect�ve��not��because��d�plomacy��and��underground��negot�at�ons��don’t��work,��but��because��both��terror�sts��and��counter-terror�sts��w�ll��ut�l�se��long-term��v�olence��as��a��leg�t�mate��and��sole��tool.24

In��sum,�� the��moral�ty��of�� the��counter-terror�st��strategy��calls�� �nto��quest�on�� the��problem��that��the��war��“ex�sts���n��a��parallel�� legal��un�verse���n��wh�ch��compl�ance��w�th��legal��norms���s��a��matter��of��execut�ve��grace��or�� �s�� taken��out��of��d�plomat�c��or��publ�c��relat�ons��necess�ty”.25

What��are,�� therefore,�� the��morally�� just�f�able��pol�t�cal��constra�nts��and��m�l�tary��restr�ct�ons��that��a��government��should��be��perm�tted��to��apply��to���ts��strateg�es��and��to���mpose��on���ts��c�t�zens��or��sold�ers�� �n��a��war��on��terror�sm��and,�� �n��contrast,��what��are��the��spec�al��act�v�t�es��or�� the��counter-terror�sm��strateg�es�� they��should��engage�� �n?��A��pert�nent��argumentat�on��should��be��centred��on��notable��param�l�tary��not�ons�� l�ke��coerc�on��or��torture,��assass�nat�on��or��targeted��k�ll�ngs��and��the��eth�cs��of��pun�shment��or��except�onal�sm.

The-ethics-of-exceptionalism:-Execution,-coercion-and-targeted-killing

The��d�scourse��on�� the��war��on�� terror��has�� �mposed��on��ph�losophers��and�� terror�sm��analysts��a��debate��over�� the��extent��of�� the��perm�ss�ble��restr�ct�ons��on��human��r�ghts��and��c�v�l�� l�bert�es��perce�ved��as��“necessary”��to��prosecute��counter-terror�sm��warfare.��Essent�ally,�� the��polem�cs��have��centred��on��whether�� any�� restr�ct�ons�� should��be��requ�red,��and,�� �f�� they��are,�� the��balance��that��can��be��just�f�ed��accord�ng��to��r�ghts��and��pun�shment�� �n�� the��counter-terror�sm��c�rcumstances.�� In�� the��end,��“the�� f�rst��a�m��of��terror�st��v�olence�� �s�� the��product�on��of�� fear,��horror��etc.��among��a��broad��group��of��persons”26��because�� the��“terror�st�� calculat�on”27�� rel�es��on��unpred�ctable�� random��v�olence,���nsecur�ty��and��fear.

W�lk�nson��argues�� that��counter-terror�sm��warfare��must��be��suppressed��“w�th��

23�� Er�c��L�chtblau,��“U.S.��ra�ds��fo�l��plots��to��send��arms��to��al��Qaeda��and��others”,��The New York Times,��November��7,��2002,��A18.

24�� Execut�ve��Off�ce��of�� the��Pres�dent��of�� the��Un�ted��States,��Un�ted��States��Nat�onal��Secur�ty��Counc�l,��The national security strategy of the United States of America,��Wash�ngton��D.C.,��September��2002,��pp.��5-6.

25�� UNESCO��Off�ce��of��Publ�c��Informat�on,��Paul��Hoffman,��Paper for UNESCO’s World Forum on Human Rights,��May��2004.

26�� Dan�el��Messelken, “Terror�sm��and��Guer�lla��Warfare:��A��Comparat�ve��Essay”�� �n��Georg��Megle,��Ethics of Terrorism & Counter-Terrorism,��Ontos��Verlag,��Frankfurt,��2005,��p.��58.

27�� Ib�d.

crush�ng��m�l�tary�� force”28��because��“the��only��good�� terror�st�� �s��a��dead�� terror�st”.29��Consequently,��a��Mach�avell�an��pos�t�on��w�ll��argue�� that�� terror�st��pr�soners��should��be���ncluded���n��a��spec�f�c��legal��category��because��the�r��acts��forfe�t��human��r�ghts��and,��therefore,�� just�fy��a��d�fferent��and��appropr�ate��treatment���n��cr�m�nal��courts,���nclud�ng��torture;�� �n��contrast,�� theor�sts��for��whom��the��ends��do��not��just�fy��the��means��cons�der��that��abandon�ng��the��norms��and��values��that��are��the��foundat�ons��of��modern��democracy��w�ll��const�tute��a��legal��confl�ct,��mak�ng��the��state��more��vulnerable��aga�nst��a��terror�st��attack;��W�lk�nson��part�cularly,��states��that��abr�dg�ng��const�tut�onal��r�ghts��and��l�bert�es��corrupts��c�v�l�an��and��m�l�tary��adm�n�strat�on,��promot�ng��major���njust�ces���n��the��name��of��nat�onal��secur�ty30��(e.g.��the��case��of��restr�ct�ng��measures��adopted���n��Italy���n��1970s,��dur�ng��the��Red��Br�gades’��terror�st��act�v�t�es��or��the��U.S.��Patr�ot��Act,��formulated��only��6��weeks��after��9/11).

In�� these��cond�t�ons,�� �n�� the��case��when�� terror�st��acts��cause��a��government�� to��adopt��emergency��measures��such��as��suspend�ng��habeas corpus,��the��r�sk��of��al�enat�ng���ts��own��c�t�zens��and��man�pulat�ng�� terror�st�� tact�cs�� through��a��perm�ss�ve,�� legal,��counter-terror�st��network,��becomes��a��fundamental��collateral��threat:�� 31��“�t��must��be��a��card�nal��pr�nc�ple��of��a��l�beral��democracy���n��deal�ng��w�th��the��problems��of��terror�sm,��however��ser�ous��these��may��be,��never��to��be��tempted���nto��us�ng��methods��wh�ch��are���ncompat�ble��w�th�� the��l�beral��values��of��human�ty,�� l�berty,��and��just�ce”.32��The��U.S.��Attorney��General��John��Ashcroft�� (2001-2005)��warned��human��r�ghts��act�v�sts��who��revealed��the��m�streatment��of��pr�soners:��“To��those��who��scare��peace-lov�ng��people��w�th��phantoms��of�� lost�� l�berty;��my��message���s�� th�s:��Your�� tact�cs��only��a�d�� terror�sts��[…]”.33��Also,�� �n�� a��memorandum�� to�� the��Pres�dent��Bush��on�� January��25,�� 2002,��Attorney��General��Alberto��Gonzales��(2005-2007),��the��Wh�te��House’s��legal��counsel���n��s�del�n�ng��the��State��Department’s��concerns��about��the��use��of��coerc�on,��argues��that��“the��nature��of��the��new��war34��places��a��h�gh��prem�um��on��other��factors,��such��as��the��ab�l�ty��to��qu�ckly��obta�n���nformat�on��from��captured��terror�sts��and��the�r��sponsors���n��order��to��avo�d��further��atroc�t�es��aga�nst��Amer�can��c�v�l�ans��[…].��Th�s��new��parad�gm��renders��obsolete��Geneva’s35��str�ct��l�m�tat�ons��on��quest�on�ng��of��enemy��pr�soners”.36��In��sum,���t�� �s�� suggested�� that�� the��cases��of��alleged�� torture��are��not��arguments��of��a��counter-terror�sm��except�onal�sm�� though�� they��are��elements��of��a�� systemat�c��programme��des�gnated��to��extract�� �nformat�on��from��terror�st��suspects,�� the�r��assoc�ates��and��any��other��alleged��enem�es��of��the��U.S.

28�� Paul��W�lk�nson,��Terrorism versus Democracy – The liberal state response,��Routledge,��New��York,��2011,��p.��77.

29�� Ib�d.30�� Ib�d.31�� Paul��W�lk�nson,��Terrorism Vs. Democracy: The Liberal State Response,��Frank��Cass��

Publ�shers,��London,��2001,��p.��23.32�� Ib�d.,��p.��115.33�� Un�ted��States��Senate��Comm�ttee��on��the��Jud�c�ary,��John��Ashcroft,��Preserving our freedoms

while defending against terrorism: hearing before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,��107th��Congress,��2001.

34�� On��terror�sm.35�� Geneva Protocol on the Treatment of Prisoners of War,��1949.36�� Anthony��Lew�s,��“Mak�ng��torture��legal”,��New York Review��15:��12,��July��15,��2004,��p.��2.

254 �� Pol�t�cal��Eth�cs���n��the��War��on��Terror����/����Andreea��GAE������������255

Is��th�s��k�nd��of��strategy��ever��just�f�able,��are��democrat�c��governments��not��obl�ged��to���mplement��any��poss�ble��methods��to��protect��the�r��c�t�zens��and���s���t��more��preferable��to���nfl�ct��pa�n��on��one��gu�lty��suspect��than��place��at��r�sk��thousands��of��potent�al��v�ct�ms��of��a��terror�st��atroc�ty?

M�chael��Ignat�eff��character�zes�� th�s��case��as��one��of��“lesser��ev�l��eth�cs”��where��a��pol�t�cal��eth�cs�� �s��pred�cated��on�� the�� �dea��of��cho�ce,��performed��by��antagon�st�c��leaders,��between��d�fferent��ev�ls.37��Therefore,��the��proh�b�t�on��on��coerc�on��should��be��ma�nta�ned,���nvok�ng��at��least��three��major��reasons,���gnorance��of��wh�ch��would��shake��an�� �nd�v�dual’s�� fundamental�� r�ghts:�� f�rstly,�� the��ut�l�tar�an��argument�� that��“torture��always��works”��can��be��equal��to��the��l�beral��statement��that��“torture��does��not��work”38,��because�� the�� results��of��coerc�on��are��d�rectly��proport�onal�� to��every��spec�f�c��case��and�� the�r��ut�l�tar�an��cla�ms��cannot��synthes�ze��a��golden��rat�o�� �n��order�� to��overr�de��the�� fundamental�� r�ghts��arguments;�� secondly,�� coerc�on��v�olates�� the�� jus in bello��pr�nc�ple��of�� the��non-combatant�� �mmun�ty��wh�ch��can��never��be��abrogated,��even��by��the��except�onal�sm;39��th�rdly,��coerc�on��cannot��be��just�f�ed��by��an��eth�cal��background,��because��the��cla�m�ng��of��a��moral��r�ght�� to��torture��pr�soners��for��extract�ng��necessary���nformat�on��creates��a��precedent��that��others��may��use��by��abus�ng��deta�nees,��m�nor�t�es��and��other��c�v�l�ans.40��St�ll,��except�onal��c�rcumstances��and��desperate��necess�ty��may��d�ctate,��though��not��excuse,��the��use��of��coerc�on��wh�ch��law��and��eth�cs��properly��def�nes���n��the��1984��U.N.��convent�on��aga�nst��Torture��as:��

“Any��act��by��wh�ch��severe��pa�n��or��suffer�ng,��whether��phys�cal��or��mental,�� �s���ntent�onally���nfl�cted��on��a��person��for��such��purposes��as��obta�n�ng��from��h�m��or��a��th�rd��person���nformat�on��or��a��confess�on,��pun�sh�ng��h�m��for��an��act��he��or��a��th�rd��person��has��comm�tted��or�� �s�� suspected��of��hav�ng��comm�tted,��or�� �nt�m�dat�ng��h�m��or��a�� th�rd��person,��or��for��any��reason��based��on��d�scr�m�nat�on��of��any��k�nd,��when��such��pa�n��or��suffer�ng���s�� �nfl�cted��by��or��at�� the���nst�gat�on��of��or��w�th��the��consent��or��acqu�escence��of��a��publ�c��off�c�al��or��other��person��act�ng���n��an��off�c�al��capac�ty”.41

And�� consequently,�� �n�� order�� to�� just�fy�� the�� use�� of�� coerc�ve�� �nterrogat�on��techn�ques���n��the��war��on��terror,��governments��have��adopted��two��legal��strateg�es��for��the��proh�b�t�on��of�� torture.��For�� �nstance,�� the��U.S.��Defense��Department��argues�� that��the��Pres�dent’s��author�ty��of��manag�ng��m�l�tary��operat�ons��cannot��be��underm�ned��by��

37�� M�chael��Ignat�eff,��The lesser evil: political ethics in an age of terror,��Ed�nburgh��Un�vers�ty��Press,��Ed�nburgh,��2004,��p.��140.

38�� Mark��Bowden,��“The��dark��art��of�� �nterrogat�on”,��Atlantic Monthly��292,��October��2003,��pp.��51-71.

39�� John��E.��F�nn,��Constitutions in crisis: political violence and the rule of law,��Oxford��Un�vers�ty��Press,��Oxford,��1991,��p.��42.

40�� Jeff��McMahan,��“War��as��self-defense”,��Ethics and International Affairs��18:��1,��2004,��pp.��75-80;��Fernando��R.��Teson,��“Self-defense���n���nternat�onal��law��and��r�ghts��of��persons”,��Ethics and International Affairs��18:��1,��2004,��pp.��87-91;��Dav�d��Rod�n,��“Beyond��nat�onal��defense”,��Ethics and International Affairs��18:��1,��2004,��pp.��93-98.

41�� United Nations��Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,��Art�cle��I,��1984.

�nternat�onal��just�ce��and��that���nd�v�dual���nterrogators��who��use��force��or��coerc�on��may��not��v�olate��the��lawful��proh�b�t�on��because��the�r��act��represents��a��nat�onal��self-defense��m�ss�on;�� �n�� th�s�� respect,��“necess�ty��and��self-defense��could��prov�de�� just�f�cat�ons��that��would��el�m�nate��any��cr�m�nal��l�ab�l�ty”.42��The��second��strategy��man�pulates��the���nterpretat�on��of��coerc�on�� �tself;��a��Defense��Department��memorandum��leaked�� to��the��publ�c��argued��that�� the��adm�n�strat�on��of��drugs�� to��deta�nees��would��v�olate�� the��proh�b�t�on��of��torture��only���f���t��was��calculated��and���ntended��to��produce��“an��extreme��effect”.43��S�m�larly,�� the��Ass�stant��Attorney��General��Jay��Bybee��(2001-2003)��states��that��real��coerc�on��must���nfl�ct��more��than��just��moderate��or��fleet�ng��pa�n:��“torture��must��be��equ�valent���n���ntens�ty��to��the��pa�n��accompany�ng��ser�ous��phys�cal���njury,��such��as��organ��fa�lure,���mpa�rment��of��bod�ly��funct�on,��or��even��death”.44

In�� the��same��jud�c�al�� framework,�� the�� targeted��k�ll�ng��or��assass�nat�on��of��U.S.��c�t�zens���n��the��Un�ted��States’��terr�tory��seems��to��be��proh�b�ted��by��the��Const�tut�on��of��the��Un�ted��States��and��by��other��Execut�ve��Orders��of��the��U.S.��Intell�gence.

F�rst��of��all,��the��only��felony��actually��formulated��by��the��Const�tut�on���s��treason.45��St�ll,�� the��Due��Process��Clause’s��protect�on��of��“any��person”��from��be�ng��“depr�ved��of�� l�fe�� […]��w�thout��due��process��of�� law”,46�� ra�ses�� the�� �ssue��of��cap�tal��pun�shment��through���ts��connect�on��w�th��a��“ser�ous��harm”��wh�ch���s��not��unlawful��because�� �t�� �s���mposed��w�th��the��full��jud�c�al��process��of��cr�m�nal��law��although��extra-jud�c�al��k�ll�ng���s��ord�nar�ly��excluded�� from��such��except�onal��process.��Add�t�onally,�� the��Fourth��Amendment’s��protect�on��aga�nst��unreasonable��se�zures47�� �nd�cates��another��reason,��because��k�ll�ng��a��suspect��when��apprehens�on���s�� �mposs�ble��or��poss�ble��only��at�� the��r�sk��of��ser�ous��harm��to��self��or��others�� �s��reasonable��as��a�� last��resort,48��wh�le��k�ll�ng��h�m��when��apprehens�on���s��poss�ble��w�thout��r�sk��of��ser�ous��harm��to��self��or��others���s��not,��and��v�olates��the��Fourth��Amendment.49��Thus,��the��premed�tated��k�ll�ng��of��a��U.S.��c�t�zen���n��the��Un�ted��States��or��an��assass�nat�on��would��be��unlawful,��yet��the��targeted��k�ll�ng��d�scourse�� typ�cally��organ�zes�� �ts��arguments��aga�nst��al�ens��abroad��who��are��not���ncluded���n��the��Fourth��Amendment.��In��the��United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez,50 the��Court��determ�ned��that�� the���nd�v�duals��protected��by��the��Fourth��Amendment��do��not�� �nclude��al�ens��s�tuated��outs�de��the��Un�ted��States��who��do��not��have��“substant�al��connect�ons��w�th�� th�s��country”51�� so�� the��Fourth��Amendment’s��protect�on��aga�nst��unreasonable��confl�ct��cannot,��apparently,��oppose��the��targeted��k�ll�ng��of��a��spec�f�c��“unconnected”��fore�gn��nat�onal��abroad.

42�� “Ashcroft��holds��torture��memo”,��AFP,��June��9,��2004.43�� Anthony��Lew�s,��“Mak�ng��torture��legal”,��New York Review��15:��12,��15��July��2004,��p.��2.44�� Ib�d.45�� Constitution of The United States,��Art�cle��III,��§��3,��cl.��1.46�� Constitution of The United States,��Amendment��V;��Amendment��XIV,��§��1.47�� The Fourth Amendment��st�pulates��that��people��have��the��r�ght��“to��be��secure���n��the�r��persons,��

houses,��papers,��and��effects,��aga�nst��unreasonable��searches��and��se�zures”��(Constitution of The United States,��Amendment��IV).

48�� W�ll�am��C.��Banks,��Peter��Raven-Hansen,��“Targeted��K�ll�ng��and��Assass�nat�on:��The��U.S.��Legal��Framework”,��37��U.��R�ch.��L.��Rev.��667,��March��2002.

49�� Ib�d.50�� United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez,��494��U.S.��259,��1990.51�� Ib�d.,��271.

256 �� Pol�t�cal��Eth�cs���n��the��War��on��Terror����/����Andreea��GAE������������257

On�� the�� contrary,�� the�� F�fth��Amendment�� protects�� “any�� person”�� from�� the��depr�vat�on��of��l�fe��w�thout��due��process,52��mean�ng��the��r�ghts��of��al�ens��abroad��(“all��would��agree��[…]��that��the��d�ctates��of��the��Due��Process��Clause��of��the��F�fth��Amendment��protect��the��defendant”,���n��that��case��a��Mex�can��nat�onal��res�d�ng��abroad53)��and��even��the�r��targeted��k�ll�ng��abroad,��as��one��appellate��Court��has��expressly��stated���n��d�ctum.54��However,�� the��major�ty�� �n��Verdugo-Urquidez��also�� �mpl�edly�� that�� they��rejected�� the��fact��that��enemy��al�ens��may��be��ent�tled��to��due��process��r�ghts��abroad,55��consequently,��the��D.C.��C�rcu�t��Court��of��Appeals��has,��more��recently,��f�rmly��rejected��the��fact�� that��the��F�fth��Amendment��proh�b�ts��U.S.��assets��from��tortur�ng��fore�gn��nat�onals��abroad.��If��the��Court���s��r�ght,��then��the��F�fth��Amendment��would��not��be��aga�nst��to��the��targeted��k�ll�ng��of��fore�gn��nat�onals.

The��Un�ted��States��Intell�gence��Execut�ve��Order��12333,56��coord�nated��by�� the��Department��of��State,��General��Counsel,��Central��Intell�gence��Agency,��Legal��Adv�ser,��Nat�onal��Secur�ty��Counc�l,��Off�ce��of��Legal��Pol�cy,��Department��of��Just�ce,��General��Counsel,��Department��of��Defense��and��the��Judge��Advocate��Generals��of��the��Navy��and��A�r��Force,��proh�b�ts��assass�nat�on��as��a��matter��of��nat�onal��pol�cy,�� though��w�thout��explor�ng�� �ts��connotat�ons��or��appl�cat�ons.��Only��assass�nat�on�� �n�� the��context��of��nat�onal��and���nternat�onal��law��for��prov�d�ng��gu�dance���n��rev�s�on��of��U.S.��Army��F�eld��Manual��27-10,��The Law of Land Warfare,��cons�stent��w�th��Execut�ve��Order��12333���s��explored;���n��add�t�on,���ts��d�scla�mer��states��that��the��memorandum���s��not���ntended��to��be��and��does��not��const�tute��a��statement��of��pol�cy.��In��d�fferent��words,���ts��jud�c�al��value���s��d�sregarded.

Under�� these��c�rcumstances,��what�� �t�� �s��about�� torture,57��as��opposed�� to��s�mply��k�ll�ng��someone���n��war,�� that��makes�� �t��so��blamable��and��why��does�� the��ax�ology��of��warfare��d�st�ngu�sh��between��“just��war”��and��“(unjust)��war��on�� terror�sm”��wh�le��coerc�on��s�mply��rema�ns���dent�cal��to��a��non-adm�ss�ble��pol�cy?

Typ�cally,�� the��d�scourse��can��analyse��four��d�st�nct��arguments.��Dav�d��Sussman��aff�rms�� that��coerc�on�� �s��wrong��because�� �ts��ult�mate�� reason�� �s�� to�� force�� the��v�ct�m���nto��collud�ng��aga�nst��h�mself,��exper�ment�ng��w�th��powerlessness��and��yet��be�ng��constra�ned��to��man�fest��“act�ve��compl�c�ty�� �n��h�s��own��v�olat�on”,58��wh�ch��v�olates��not��only��h�s��agency��and��autonomy��but��also��act�vely��perverts�� them.59��At�� the��same��t�me,��an��eth�cal��argument��aga�nst��coerc�on��cr�t�c�zes��the��use��of��v�olence��aga�nst��non-combatants��and��defenceless�� �nd�v�duals,�� therefore��v�olat�ng�� the��pr�nc�ple��of��non-combatant�� �mmun�ty60��wh�ch��cannot��be�� just�f�ed��us�ng�� the��same��pattern��as��other��

52�� Constitution of The United States,��Amendment��V.53�� United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez,��494��U.S.��278��(1990).54�� Ib�d.55�� Ib�d.,��269.56�� Off�ce��of��the��Judge��Advocate��General’s��Corps��of��the��Un�ted��States��Army,��Memorandum of

Law��– Executive Order 12333 and Assassination,��20310-2200,��Wash�ngton��D.C.,��November��2,��1989.

57�� Maj�ma��Shunzo,��“Just��Torture?”,��Journal of Military Ethics��11��(2),��2012,��pp.��136-148.58�� Dav�d��Sussman,��“What’s��wrong��w�th��torture?”,��Philosophy and Public Affairs��33:��1,��2005,��

p.��4.59�� Ib�d.,��p.��30.60�� Henry��Shue,��“Torture”,��Philosophy and Public Affairs��7:��2,��1978,��pp.��124-143.

sorts��of��pol�t�cal��v�olence.��On��one��hand,�� the��secular��cr�t�cs��advance�� the��analogy��w�th�� �nd�v�dual��self-defence,��where��an�� �nd�v�dual��can��defend��h�mself��aga�nst��an��abus�ng��attack��and��even��k�ll��h�s��attacker��as�� long��as�� the��k�ll�ng���s��compulsory��and��proport�onate��and��the��pun�shment��fa�rly��appl�ed.��On��the��other,��k�ll�ng���s��just�f�ed��as��long��as���t�� �s��conducted��w�th��r�ght���ntent�ons,��for��the��common��good��and��to��preserve��peace,��and�� �s��not��undertaken��out��of�� feel�ngs��or�� �mpulses�� (hate,��envy,�� retr�but�on��etc).��The��cr�t�cal��d�fference��wh�ch�� �nterferes��between��a�� sold�er��on��a��battlef�eld��and��a��v�ct�m��of�� torture�� �s�� that�� the�� latter��does��not��pose��any�� threat�� to�� the�� torturer��because��after��h�s��capture��he��ceases��to��const�tute��a��combatant��but��he��becomes��a��non-combatant��and��therefore���nv�olable.61��S�multaneously,�� the��problem��opens��the���ssue��of��the��“t�ck�ng��bomb”��parad�gm,��where��the��terror�st��who��knows��about��the��locat�on��of��a��planted��bomb��refuses�� to��cooperate��w�th�� the�� �nterrogator,��yet�� �s��cons�dered��a��non-combatant.62��The��argument��could��also��be��m�s�nterpreted;��capt�ve��combatants��could��plaus�bly��st�ll��be��cons�dered��combatants��for�� the��durat�on��of�� the��confl�ct��and��tortured,��on��the��log�cal��assumpt�on��that��they��have��to��be��aware��of��operat�onal��secrets��wh�ch��could��bas�cally��save��other�� l�ves.��Aga�n,�� the��deontolog�cal��argument,��wh�ch��holds��torture��as��wrong���n���tself,��because���t��v�olates��fundamental��human��r�ghts��and��c�v�l��l�bert�es:��“there���s��[…]��no��object�on���n��pr�nc�ple��to��the���dea��of��human��r�ghts��that��are��absolute�� �n�� the��sense��of��be�ng��categor�cally��except�onless.��The��most��plaus�ble��cand�dates,�� l�ke�� the��r�ght��not�� to��be�� tortured,��w�ll��be��pass�ve��negat�ve��r�ghts,�� that���s,��r�ghts��not�� to��be��done��to��by��others�� �n��certa�n��ways”.63��In��the��end,�� the��ut�l�tar�an��argument��expos�ng��the��rec�proc�ty��and��value��of��moral��cons�stency,��wh�ch��ach�eves��the��greatest��and��object�ve��good��by�� follow�ng��a�� rule��proh�b�t�ng�� torture.�� In�� fact,��the��records��test�fy��that��coerc�on���s��more��often��used��as��a��subject�ve���nstrument��for��ach�ev�ng��self�sh��and���nd�v�dual��purposes��aga�nst��opponents,�� �ts��proh�b�t�on��be�ng��then���ntr�ns�c��to��the��preservat�on��of��democrat�c��and��l�beral��pr�nc�ples.��In��add�t�on,��the��pr�nc�ple��of�� rec�proc�ty��may��cert�fy��a��mutual��benef�t�� from��a��rule��proh�b�t�ng��torture,��g�ven��cond�t�ons��where��all��combatants��are��potent�al��v�ct�ms��of��coerc�on��at��a��certa�n��moment��of��t�me,��so��the��greatest��good���s��obta�ned��by��establ�sh�ng��a��general��proh�b�t�on��on��torture.64

Proportionality-and-exceptionalism-in-the-ethics-of-terror

The�� contemporary�� advent�� of�� counter-terror�sm�� warfare�� comprom�ses�� all��convent�onal��and��trad�t�onal��confl�ct�� features65�� l�ke�� the��combatant/non-combatant��d�st�nct�on,�� sustenance,�� targets,�� strateg�es��and��commun�cat�ons,�� �dent�fy�ng,��by��way��of��contrast,�� the��archetyp�cal��pract�ces�� that��catalyse�� the�� �naugural��d�scuss�on��on�� the��war��on�� terror:��coerc�on��(espec�ally�� �nterrogat�onal��methods��and��var�ants);��

61�� Ib�d.,��pp.��127-130.62�� Ib�d.,��p.��141.63�� Joel��Fe�nberg,��Social Philosophy,��Prent�ce-Hall,��Englewood��Cl�ffs,��New��Jersey,��1973,��p.��88.64�� Fr�tz��Allhoff,��“Terror�sm��and��torture”,��International Journal of Applied Philosophy��17:��I,��

2003,��p.��107.65�� T�mothy��Shanahan,��Philosophy 9/11: Thinking about the War On Terror,��Open��Court��

Publ�sh�ng��Co.,��Peru,��2005;��L�onel��K.��McPherson��“Is��Terror�sm��D�st�nct�vely��Wrong?”,��Ethics��117,��pp.��524-546.

258 �� Pol�t�cal��Eth�cs���n��the��War��on��Terror����/����Andreea��GAE������������259

assass�nat�on��and��targeted��k�ll�ng;��enemy��combatancy��and��pr�soner��of��war��status;��each��of�� them��const�tut�ng��ser�ous��v�olat�ons��of��fundamental��human��r�ghts��as��well��as��of�� �nternat�onal�� law��enforcement.��Consequently,�� �ncorporat�ng�� the�� above-ment�oned��and��d�fferent��examples,��all��these��c�rcumstances��susta�n��an��extreme��eth�cal��perspect�ve,�� suggest�ng�� the��necess�ty�� to��make��except�ons�� to�� trad�t�onal��norms,��wh�ch��can��ult�mately��normal�se�� �mmoral��behav�our,��because��both�� jur�d�cally��and��ph�losoph�cally,��there��would��no��longer��be��just�f�cat�on��for��the��except�on���tself.66

Part�cularly,�� the��eth�cs��of��except�onal�sm��should��prov�de��an��account��of�� four��elements.��F�rstly,�� �t��must��conf�gure�� the��nature��of��except�on,��determ�n�ng��a��sort��of��str�cture�� that��would��apply�� �n�� the��absence��of�� the��except�on;�� th�s��would��cons�st��of��pr�mar�ly��moral��and�� legal�� l�m�tat�ons��or��norms��wh�ch��could��be��appl�ed��for��both��classes��(eth�cal��and��jur�d�cal),��the�r��var�ous��d�st�nct�ons��be�ng��pract�cally��el�m�nated.��Secondly,�� �t�� should��clearly�� state��wh�ch��object�� �s��be�ng��excepted,��because�� the��except�ons��have��to��be��granted��to��a��spec�f�c��subset��of��b�nd�ng��norms;��therefore,��what���s��excepted��must��be��an��object�� to��wh�ch�� the��norm��otherw�se��would��have��appl�ed,���f�� �t��were��not��for�� the��except�on.��Th�rdly,�� �t��must��properly��determ�ne�� the��scope��of��the��except�ons;�� �n�� the��case��of��counter-terror��warfare��where�� the��purpose�� �s��group-based,��some��groups��have��a��structural��conf�gurat�on,��whereas��others��are��excepted��(except�onal�sm���s��fully��cons�stent��w�th��“All��Xs can/cannot/must φ, except for Ys��and��Zs”);��add�t�onally,��th�s��k�nd��of��scope��should��not��be��mutually��exclus�ve��(some��norms��could��b�nd��pursuant��to��two��d�fferent��requ�rements��and��otherw�se��be��excepted)��though��they��may��be��d�v�ded��accord�ng��to��temporal��and��spat�al��except�ons,��occurr�ng��under��temporal��and��spat�al��axes��respect�vely.��Fourthly,���t��should��expl�cate��the��reasons��why��the��except�on��and��the��norms��are��be�ng��made��and���n��do�ng��so��avo�d��any��arb�trary��or��cont�ngent��character.��In��the��context��of��the��war��on��terror,��the��eth�cs��of��except�onal�sm��should��spec�f�cally��determ�ne��the��groups��that��must��be��excepted��and��the��relat�onsh�p��that�� they��bear�� to�� the��groups�� that��w�ll��not��be��excepted,��cons�der�ng��whether�� there��ex�sts��morally��relevant��d�st�nct�ons��between��these��groups��that��m�ght��serve��to��effect��a��d�fferent�al��moral��status��to��them.��Both��of��the��groups��that��are��affected��by��except�ons��made��for��coerc�on��and��enemy��combatant��status��represent,�� �deally,�� those��that��have��cr�t�cal���ntell�gence,��and��those��that��are��targeted��for��assass�nat�on��are��s�m�lar��as��they��are��assessed��to��pose��threats���n��the��present��or���n��the��future.��Desp�te��d�fferences��–��the��former��group’s��cr�mes��could��be��of��om�ss�on��(not��reveal�ng���nformat�on),��wh�le��the��latter��group’s��cr�mes��would��be��of��comm�ss�on��(effect�ng��the��harm��d�rectly),��all��of��these��excepted��groups��are��respons�ble,��act�vely��or��pass�vely,��for��some��threat��and,��through��the�r��agency��can��abrogate��the��threat.67

In��sum,��the��eth�cs��of��except�onal�sm��could��encounter��ser�ous��object�ons��because��many��of��those��subject�� to��detent�on��or�� torture��have,�� �n��fact,��no��cr�t�cal�� �ntell�gence��and��some��of�� them��are��not��even��real�� terror�sts��at��all.68��Consequently,��several��cases��

66�� Andrew��F�ala,�� “A��Cr�t�que��of��Except�ons:��Torture,��Terror�sm,�� and�� the��Lesser��Ev�l”,��International Journal of Applied Philosophy��20(1),��2006,��pp.��127-142;��Dav�d��Rod�n,��“The��Eth�cs��of��War:��State��of��the��Art”,��Journal��of Applied Philosophy,��23(3),��2006,��pp.��241-246.

67�� Fr�tz��Allhoff,��“The��War��on��Terror��and��the��Eth�cs��of��Except�onal�sm”,��Journal of Military Ethics,��Vol.��8,��No.��4,��2009,��p.��279.

68�� Lol�ta��Baldor,��“More��Than��Half��of��Guantánamo��Deta�nees��Not��Accused��of��Host�le��Acts”

of��targeted��assass�nat�on��concern���nnocent��subjects��who��s�mply��d�sagree��about��the��counter-terror�sm��strategy��or��other��ava�lable��opt�ons.�� In�� these�� terms,�� the��analys�s��does��not��present���mportant���mpl�cat�ons��regard�ng��the��moral�ty��of��groups��wh�ch��are��the��bas�s��of�� the��except�onal�sm,��but��only��concerns��part�cular��cases:�� �t��only��shows��that��the��except�ons��were��appl�ed��to��the��wrong��groups,��a��group��that��(maybe)���ncludes��terror�sts,��as��well��as��non-combatants�� to��whom��the��except�ons��should��not��apply.��Nevertheless,��the��eth�cs��of��except�onal�sm��would,��most��probably,���mplement���ts��own��“shock��and��awe”��counter-terror�st��strategy,��count�ng��the��non-except�ons��among��the��“necessary��and���nev�table��casualt�es”.��Put��otherw�se,�� th�s��means��endur�ng��war��on��terror�sm’s��eth�cal��values.

F�nally,��the��pr�nc�ples��and��the��response��to��terror�sm��are��nowadays��s�gn�f�cantly��conta�ned�� �n�� the�� two��Hague��Convent�ons�� (1899��and��1907)��and�� the�� four��Geneva��Convent�ons��of��1949,��whose��documents�� l�m�t�� how��wars�� can��be�� fought,��what��weapons��can��be��used,��and��what��persons��can��be��attacked.��The��laws��of��just��war��and��the��regulat�ons��of��the��war��on��terror,���ncomplete��as��they��certa�nly��are,��can��be��expla�ned��and��resumed��on�� the��bas�s��of�� two��human�tar�an��pr�nc�ples:�� f�rst,��each�� �nd�v�dual��deserves��respect��as��a��human��be�ng��(Kant),��us�ng��the��term��“person”��to��refer��to��self-consc�ous,��autonomous,�� r�ghts-bear�ng�� �nd�v�duals;��second,��human��suffer�ng��and��m�l�tary��casualt�es��ought��to��be��m�n�m�zed:��

“In�� poss�ble�� responses�� to�� �nternat�onal�� terror�sm,�� the�� use�� of�� d�rected�� or��controlled��v�olence��aga�nst�� the�� respons�ble�� terror�sts�� seems�� just�f�ed��when��less��rad�cal��means��of��effect�ve��response��are��not��ava�lable��[…].��If��v�olence�� �s��employed��only��as��a�� last��resort,��both��procedural��and���nst�tut�onal�� just�f�cat�ons��are��cred�ble���n��such��a��s�tuat�on���n��terms��of���nherent��human��r�ghts.��When��non-combatants��are��know�ngly��endangered,��however,��even���f��such��r�sk���s��necessary��to��perm�t��effect�ve��response,��the��case��becomes��much��less��clear��[…]��Under��the��murky��moral��cond�t�ons��of��counter-terror�st��act�v�ty��and��the��prosecut�on��of��low-�ntens�ty��warfare��—��the��most��l�kely��forms��of��comm�tment��for��Amer�can��m�l�tary��forces���n��the��near��future��—��the��moral��d�mens�ons��of��m�l�tary��act�v�ty��become��hard��to��d�scern��[…]��let��me��also��note��that��those��act�ons��aga�nst��terror�sm��that��are��appropr�ate��for��our��government��should��be��carr�ed��out��w�th��max�mum��force��and��eff�c�ency��for�� �nternat�onal�� terror�sm���s�� �ndeed��a��grow�ng��threat�� to�� leg�t�mate��governments��—��a��threat��more��dangerous��than��many��apprec�ate.��Paul��Johnson��calls���t��‘the��cancer��of��the��modern��world.’��If��we��are��to��prevent���t��from��destroy�ng��the��soc�et�es�� �t��attacks,��we��must��apply��drast�c��and��rad�cal�� treatment�� to��what��clearly���s��a��mal�gnancy.��At��the��same��t�me,��we��must��ensure��that��our��responses��to��terror�sm��do��not���njure��the��moral��fabr�c��of��our��soc�ety”.69

Some�� responses�� to�� terror�sm��also�� �mply�� the��v�olat�on��or�� �nfr�ngement��of��

,��Associated Press,��9��February��2006;��Dar�us��Rejal�,��Torture and Democracy,��Pr�nceton��Un�vers�ty��Press,��Pr�nceton,��New��Jersey,��2007,��p.��510.

69�� Un�ted��States��Department��of��Defense,��Un�ted��States��Army��War��College��Quarterly,��Un�ted��States��Army��War��College,��Anthony��E.��Hartle,��“A��M�l�tary��Eth�c�� �n��An��Age��of��Terror”,��Parameters,��Vol.��17,��No.��2,��Carl�sle��Barracks,��Pennsylvan�a,��1987,��pp.��68-75.

260 �� Pol�t�cal��Eth�cs���n��the��War��on��Terror����/����Andreea��GAE������������261

�nd�v�dual��r�ghts.��Under��what��c�rcumstances��can��such��r�ghts��be��just�f�ably���nfr�nged��or��overr�dden?��In��poss�ble��strateg�es�� to��combat�� �nternat�onal�� terror�sm,�� the��use��of��d�rected��or��controlled��v�olence��aga�nst��the��terror�st��assets��seems��just�f�ed��when��less��rad�cal��means��of��warfare��or��effect�ve�� law��enforcement��are��not��ava�lable.��St�ll�� the��r�ghts��of��the��terror�sts��should��be���nfr�nged���n��the��same��manner��that��the��r�ghts��are��of��a��cr�m�nal��before��the��Court,��otherw�se��resort�ng��to��counter-terror��w�ll��be��undertaken��only��as��a��f�nal��solut�on,���n��wh�ch��both��procedural��and���nst�tut�onal��just�f�cat�ons��are��know�ngly��endangered.��Though,��when��non-combatants��are��purposely�� threatened,��however,�� even�� �f�� such�� r�sk�� �s��necessary�� to��allow��effect�ve��operat�ons,�� the��case��becomes��much��less��clear.

As��a��f�nal��po�nt,�� to��f�ght��for��freedom��wh�le���mplement�ng��a��genu�ne��counter-terror�st��operat�on��means�� to��confront��oppress�on��and��v�olat�on��of�� fundamental��human��r�ghts.��Hence,�� to��f�ght��for��freedom��and��aga�nst�� terror�sm��means��to��oppose��such�� �nfr�ngements.��Under�� these��c�rcumstances,�� �f�� terror�sm�� �s��def�ned��as��“the��del�berate��and��systemat�c��murder,��ma�m�ng,��and��menac�ng��of��the���nnocent��to���nsp�re��fear��for��pol�t�cal��ends”,��then��a��genu�ne��counter-terror�st��act�on��cannot��be��comm�tted��w�th��log�cal��cons�stency��and��reason��aga�nst��such��v�olat�ons,��for���t��would��become��a��terror�st��warfare���tself���n��the��name��of��confront�ng��a��lesser��ev�l.

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Autonomy and Plastic Surgery for Teenagers

Leria BOROŞ

A-principlist-approach-to-medical-ethics

Th�s��paper���s��ded�cated��to��several��problems��that��I��tackled���n��Apr�l��2012��dur�ng��a��one��day��workshop��held���n��a��Roman�an��h�gh��school1.��The��ma�n��goal��of��my��workshop��was��to��teach��students��about��moral��pr�nc�ples��and��to��show��them��how��they��can��use��these��pr�nc�ples���n��eth�cal��dec�s�on-mak�ng��regard�ng��plast�c��surgery.��The��second��goal��was��to��assess��the�r��react�on��concern�ng��teenagers’��capac�ty��to��take��good��dec�s�ons��when���t��comes�� to��plast�c��surgery.��My��hypothes�s��was�� that�� they��would��pra�se�� teenagers’��and��youngsters’��autonomy.��Although��the��eth�cal��matr�x��that��I��f�lled��out��w�th��them��revealed��an��or�entat�on��towards��the��dec�s�on��to��undertake��plast�c��surgery,��st�ll�� the��students��were��also�� �nterested�� �n�� f�nd�ng��out��more��about�� the�� long-term��effects��of��aesthet�c��surgery���ntervent�ons��before��dec�d�ng��to��change��some��part��of�� the�r��body.��Of��course,��plast�c��surgery���nvolves��more��than��one��actor��–��the��pat�ent��–��and��the��goal��of�� th�s��art�cle�� �s�� to��d�scuss�� the��eth�cal��aspects��of��plast�c��surgery�� �ntervent�ons��for��teenagers���n��a��more��deta�led��manner��than��I��have��done��before,���n��my��workshop,��and��from��a��pr�nc�pl�st��po�nt��of��v�ew.��The��pr�nc�pl�st��parad�gm���s��not��elaborated��here���n��deta�l,��only��the��ma�n��aspects��of��th�s��approach��are��re�terated.

Plast�c��surgery��for��teenagers���s��a��subject��of��debate��d�fferent��from��other��subjects��because���t���s��a��part�cular��type��of��surgery.��The��problem��of��pat�ents’��autonomy���s��much��more��del�cate��here��s�nce��we��are�� talk�ng��about��med�cal�� �ntervent�ons�� that��are��not��a�med��at��cur�ng��or��allev�at�ng��a��health��problem,��but��chang�ng��one��or��more��deta�ls��of��one’s��appearance.��Moreover,��wh�le�� �n��other�� types��of��med�cal�� �ntervent�ons��we��are��used��to��focus�ng��on��the��problem��of�� �nformed��consent,�� �n��what��concerns��aesthet�c���ntervent�ons��for��teenagers��we��may��say��that��these��pat�ents��are��rush�ng��to��g�ve��the�r��consent��for��hav�ng��the�r��bod�es��operated��upon.��They��may��seem��very��dec�ded��and��even��very��competent�� to��dec�de��on��hav�ng��plast�c��surgery�� �ntervent�ons,��but�� these��could��be��s�mply��appearances��wh�ch��h�de��some��ser�ous��problems��of��self-conf�dence.��Teenagers��are��a��vulnerable��category��of��pat�ents.��They��are��not��yet��adults,��but�� they��have��some��legal��r�ghts��that��adults��enjoy,���nclud�ng��the��r�ght��to��have��plast�c��surgery.��A��doctor��may��not�ce��that��a�� teenager��has��some��problems��of��self-conf�dence��wh�ch��may��not��be��allev�ated��through��aesthet�c��surgery��because��they��come��from��a��d�sorder��related��to��self-�mage,��rather��than��to��a��real��need��to��correct��some��part��of��the��body.��In��th�s��case,��the��doctor��may��refuse��to��make��the���ntervent�on,��but��the��pat�ent��may��accuse��h�m��of��breach�ng�� the��pr�nc�ple��of�� respect�� for��autonomy.��The��doctor��m�ght��argue��that��s(he)��respects��the��pr�nc�ple��of��benef�cence,��wh�ch���n��some��cases��preva�ls��over��autonomy.��In��order��to��take��a��good��dec�s�on��the��doctor��must��cons�der��the���ssue���n���ts��complex�ty;��a��good��tool��for��help�ng��h�m���s��the��eth�cal��matr�x,��wh�ch��deals,�� �n��Ben��

1 I held the workshop at the Theorethic High-School of Costeşti, county Argeş, with students of��a��12th��grade��class,��at��the���nv�tat�on��of��the�r��ph�losophy��teacher,��Iul�ana��Gabr�ela��Popa.��

264 Autonomy and Plastic Surgery for Teenagers / Leria BOROŞ 265

Mepham’s��vers�on2,��w�th��three��pr�nc�ples:��wellbe�ng,��autonomy��and��fa�rness.Autonomy��has��been��largely��debated��for��the��last��decades���n��b�oeth�cal��l�terature,��

but��a��consensus��has��not��been��reached��on�� �t��nor��on��what��concerns��competence,��a��concept��wh�ch���s��strongly��related��to��autonomy.��I��defend��an��account��of��autonomy��as��part��of��a��cluster��of��pr�nc�ples��wh�ch��also��compr�ses��benef�cence,��non-malef�cence��and�� just�ce.��Some��authors�� argue�� for�� fewer��pr�nc�ples,��but�� I��plead�� for�� a�� r�cher��pr�nc�pl�sm,��more��capable��of��help�ng��a��moral��agent�� to�� take��dec�s�ons�� �n��morally��compl�cated��s�tuat�ons.��The��moral�� framework�� that�� I��cons�der��more��su�table�� for��med�cal��eth�cs���s��the��pr�nc�pl�sm��of��Tom��Beauchamp��and��James��Ch�ldress��d�scussed���n��Principles of Biomedical Ethics.��Beauchamp��and��Ch�ldress��def�ne��“common��moral�ty”��as��“the��set��of��norms��that��all��morally��ser�ous��persons��share”.3��Common��moral�ty�� compr�ses�� un�versal�� norms,�� �.e.�� always�� ava�lable�� and�� appl�cable�� to��everybody.��These��rules��come��under��bas�c��eth�cal��pr�nc�ples,��namely��benef�cence,��non-malef�cence,��autonomy��and�� just�ce.��For�� the��purpose��of�� th�s��paper�� �t�� �s��not��necessary�� to��have��d�st�nct��columns�� for��benef�cence��and��non-malef�cence,�� they��may��be���ncluded��under��the��pr�nc�ple��of��wellbe�ng.��Thus,��the��correspond�ng��eth�cal��matr�x��w�ll��cons�st��of��a��table���n��wh�ch��I��ment�on��the��prima facie��eth�cal��pr�nc�ples��of��autonomy,��wellbe�ng��and��fa�rness�� �n��columns��and�� the�� two��ma�n��categor�es��of��stakeholders��–��pat�ents��and��doctors��–���n��rows.��Th�s��table���s��followed��by��a��matr�x��of��consequences��regard�ng��the��dec�s�on��to��undertake��or��not��to��undertake��plast�c��surgery���ntervent�ons��by��teenager��pat�ents.��However,��the��eth�cal��matr�x��must��not��be��confused��w�th��an��eth�cal��dec�s�on-mak�ng�� tool,��but�� regarded��as��an�� �nstrument��wh�ch��g�ves��gu�dance�� to�� the��eth�cal��dec�s�on-mak�ng��process,��because�� �t��sheds�� l�ght��upon��the��eth�cal���mpl�cat�ons��of��a��problem.

Autonomy-and-competence

I��have��already��ment�oned��that�� the�� l�terature��on��autonomy���s��d�v�ded��and��that��authors�� �n�� th�s��f�eld��have��d�fferent��op�n�ons,��but��we��can��st�ll��draw��some��common��po�nts�� out�� of�� these��d�fferent�� accounts.��We��need�� to�� establ�sh�� the�� elements�� of��autonomy���n��order��to��analyse��the��problem��of��plast�c��surgery��for��teenagers.

Derek��Morgan��bel�eves�� that��autonomy�� �s��g�ven��by��self-control,��procedural���ndependence��and��competence.��Procedural�� �ndependence���s��an���nterest�ng��concept��and��a��very��useful��one�� �n��cons�der�ng��our��subject,��because,��as�� the��author��wr�tes,���t��means�� freedom��“from�� the��dom�nat�on��of��others,�� �n��wh�ch�� judgments��are��not��founded��on��fash�on,��custom��or��the��op�n�on��of��others”.4��When��a��teenager���s��w�ll�ng��to��have��an��aesthet�c��med�cal�� �ntervent�on��we��may��wonder�� �f��he��or��she�� �s��mak�ng��a��rat�onal��dec�s�on��or�� �s��s�mply��follow�ng��some���deal��of��beauty��d�ctated��by��mass��

��2�� Ben��Mepham,��Matth�as��Ka�ser,��Er�k��Thorstensen,��Sandy��Tomk�ns,��Kate��M�llar��publ�shed��Ethical Matrix Manual���n��February��2006,��as��a��result��of��the�r��work��dur�ng��the��project��Ethical Bio-Technology Assessment Tools for Agriculture and Food Production�� founded��by�� the��European��Comm�ss�on,��DG��Research.��

��3�� Tom��L.��Beauchamp,��James��F.��Ch�ldress,��Principles of Biomedical Ethics,�� s�xth��ed�t�on,��Oxford:��Oxford��Un�vers�ty��Press,��2009,��p.��3.

��4�� Derek��Morgan,��Issues in Medical Law and Ethics,��London:��Cavend�sh��Publ�sh�ng,��2001,��p.��88.

med�a,��by��fash�on��des�gners,�� through��subl�m�nal��advert�s�ng,��or��by��someone��else.��Th�s��problem���s��t�ghtly��related��to��competence,��because��we��have��to��understand��when��a�� teenager�� �s��competent�� to��dec�de�� to��have��plast�c��surgery��and��when��(s)he�� �s��not��competent��and���s��just��under��the���nfluence��of��fash�on��or��of��what��others��say.��Morgan��th�nks�� that��an��autonomous��dec�s�on�� �mpl�es��a�� rat�onal��cho�ce��mot�vated��by�� the��conv�ct�on��that��the��chosen��th�ng���s��a��good��one.��The��mot�vat�on��must��not��be��reward��or��fear��of��pun�shment.��What��the��author��says��does��make��sense��and��has��an���nterest�ng��s�gn�f�cat�on��for��our��subject,��because��aesthet�c�� �ntervent�ons��are��not��mot�vated��by��the��des�re��to��treat��health��problems,��but��by��a��d�fferent��des�re��–��to��change��someth�ng���n��one’s��appearance.

Other�� authors�� bel�eve�� that�� rat�onal�� dec�s�on-mak�ng�� �s�� an�� element�� of��competence.��Gert,��Culver��and��Clouser��state��that��a��competent��pat�ent��has��the��ab�l�ty��to�� take�� rat�onal��dec�s�ons��after��he��has��understood�� the�� �nformat�on��he��has��been��prov�ded��w�th��and��has��apprec�ated��the��r�sks��and��the��consequences��that��the��med�cal���ntervent�on��w�ll��have.5��I��shall��d�scuss��the��problem��of��competence���n��the��follow�ng��sect�on��of�� th�s��art�cle;��here�� I��want�� to��draw��attent�on�� to�� the�� fact�� that�� somet�mes��concepts�� l�ke�� autonomy,�� competence��and��even��voluntar�ness�� are��descr�bed��as��synonyms,��though��they��are��not,��or��as��hav�ng��the��same��const�tuents,��wh�ch��they��do��not.��The��confus�on��between��autonomy��and��competence���s��somehow��understandable.��As��Beauchamp��and��Ch�ldress��note,��“the��cr�ter�a��of��the��autonomous��person��and��of��the��competent��person��are��str�k�ngly��s�m�lar”.6��So��what��are��the��cr�ter�a��on��wh�ch��we��can��ground��our��assessment��of��autonomy?

Before��analys�ng�� the��cr�ter�a��of��autonomy,�� �t�� �s��necessary�� to��emphas�se�� the��fact�� that��we��cannot�� talk��about��complete��autonomy��or��absolute�� lack��of��autonomy.��A��person�� �s��more��or�� less��autonomous,�� so��a��proper��account��of��autonomy�� takes���nto��cons�derat�on�� that�� there��are��degrees��of��autonomy.��Beauchamp��and��Ch�ldress��d�st�ngu�sh�� three��cond�t�ons��of��an��autonomous��act�on:��act�ng���ntent�onally,��act�ng��w�th��understand�ng��and��act�ng��w�thout��controll�ng�� �nfluences�� that��determ�ne�� the��act�on.7�� If�� the�� f�rst��cond�t�on��does��not��allow��degrees,�� the��other�� two��are�� fulf�lled���n��d�fferent��degrees.��The��authors��bel�eve�� that��a��complete��absence��of�� �nfluence���s�� �mposs�ble��and�� thus��we��cannot��expect�� to��have��absolute��autonomy.��Of��course,��we��should��be��careful��not�� to��cons�der��a��dec�s�on��made��under��constra�nt��or�� lack��of��understand�ng��autonomous.��James��Stacey��Taylor��talks��about��a��threshold��cond�t�on,���.e.��a�� lack��of�� �nfluence��through���nformat�on.��In��order�� to��be��autonomous��the��moral��agent��should��not��be��man�pulated��by��others.��However,�� the��author��bel�eves��that�� th�s��cond�t�on���s��rather��an��ontolog�cal��one��and��that��we��need��ep�stemolog�cal��cond�t�ons��for��an��adequate��account��of��autonomy.��Taylor��states�� that��“�t�� �s��fa�r�� to��adopt��as�� the��default��pos�t�on��the��v�ew��that��unless��there���s��reason��to��bel�eve��otherw�se���t��should��not��be��assumed�� that��persons’��autonomy��w�th�� respect�� to�� the�r��dec�s�ons�� (des�res,��act�ons,��and��so��on)���s��comprom�sed��through��the���lleg�t�mate���nfluence��of��others”.8��

��5�� Bernard��Gert,��Charles��M.��Culver,��K.��Danner��Clouser,��Bioethics. A systematic approach,��second��ed�t�on,��Oxford:��Oxford��Un�vers�ty��Press,��2006,��p.��231.��

��6�� Tom��L.��Beauchamp,��James��F.��Ch�ldress,��op.��c�t.,��p.��113.��7�� Ib�d.,��p.��101.��8�� James��Stacey��Taylor,��Practical Autonomy and Bioethics,��New��York:��Routledge,��2009,��p.��16.

266 Autonomy and Plastic Surgery for Teenagers / Leria BOROŞ 267

Th�s���s��l�ke��say�ng��that���n��real��l�fe��people��may��suffer��from��others’���nfluence,��but��from��an��ep�stemolog�cal��po�nt��of��v�ew��we��are��not��allowed��to��analyse��autonomy���n��th�s��manner.��Personally��I��bel�eve�� that��an��ep�stemolog�cal��account��of��autonomy��wh�ch��excludes��an��ontolog�cal��po�nt��of��v�ew���s��useless,��espec�ally��wh�t��respect��to��appl�ed��eth�cs.

The��problem��of�� �nfluence,�� though��d�ff�cult�� to�� tackle,�� should��concern��us�� �n��general��when��we�� talk��about��autonomy��and��spec�al��attent�on��should��be��pa�d�� to�� �t��when��we��deal��w�th��vulnerable��categor�es��of��people��such��as�� teenagers.��We��s�mply��cannot��close��our��eyes��and��th�nk��that��teenagers��are��not��somet�mes���nfluenced���n��the�r��dec�s�on-mak�ng��by��mass��med�a��and��fash�on��trends.��They��may��become��v�ct�ms��of���nadequate��messages��about��an���deal��of��beauty.��Th�s��k�nd��of���nfluence���s��usually��too��subtle��to��not�ce��and��doctors��have��to��rely��on��the��absence��of��a��more��obv�ous��type��of��controll�ng���nfluence.

However,��as��somet�mes�� �t��may��be��d�ff�cult�� to��detect��any�� type��of�� �nfluence,��doctors��have�� two��other��elements��wh�ch��can��help�� them���n��establ�sh�ng�� the��degree��of��a��pat�ent’s��autonomy.��Thus,��a��s�mpler��task���s��to��determ�ne���f��the��pat�ent���s��act�ng���ntent�onally,�� �.e.�� to��determ�ne���f��he��or��she���s��man�fest�ng��an��obv�ous�� �ntent�on��to��have��the��aesthet�c���ntervent�on.��There���s��no��need��to��g�ve��a��more��deta�led��account��to��th�s��element��of��autonomy.��F�nally,��the��doctor��should��assess��the��pat�ent’s��competence.��Th�s�� �s��a��more��d�ff�cult�� task,��because��competence���s��a��complex��capac�ty��and,�� l�ke��autonomy,���t���s��present���n��d�fferent��degrees.��Although��a��pat�ent��may��seem��competent��from��a��legal��po�nt��of��v�ew,��he��or��she��may��be��less��competent��from��a��moral��po�nt��of��v�ew.��A��doctor��may��f�nd��a��pat�ent��autonomous��and��competent,��but��not��autonomous��and��competent��enough�� to��have��a��plast�c�� surgery�� �ntervent�on.��The�� threshold��of��autonomy��and��of��competence���s��legally��a��f�xed��one,��but��from��a��moral��po�nt��of��v�ew��th�ngs��may��be��d�fferent��and��a��doctor��should��have��a��moral��ground��for��dec�d�ng��to��refuse��an��aesthet�c���ntervent�on��for��a��teen��pat�ent.��Such��a��moral��ground��can��very��well��be��the��respect��for��benef�cence.

I��have��ment�oned��above�� that�� for��Beauchamp��and��Ch�ldress��an��autonomous��act�on��must�� fulf�ll�� three�� requ�rements:�� �ntent�onal�ty,��understand�ng��and�� lack��of��controll�ng�� �nfluences.��The��cond�t�on��of��understand�ng��can��be��replaced��w�th�� the��cond�t�on��of��competence,��wh�ch�� �s��a��very�� �mportant��concept��when�� �t�� comes�� to��autonomy.��The��follow�ng��sect�on��w�ll��deal��prec�sely��w�th�� th�s��concept�� �n��order�� to��g�ve��a��deeper���ns�ght�� �nto��autonomy���tself.��Competence���s��essent�al��for��autonomy,��but��competence��cannot��be��reduced�� to��understand�ng�� the�� �nformat�on��a��pat�ent�� �s��g�ven��by��h�s��phys�c�an.

Are-teenagers-competent-enough-to-decide?

The��accounts��of�� the��concept��of��competence��are��somet�mes�� too��permeated��w�th��techn�cal��deta�ls,��a��matter��wh�ch��br�ngs�� them��more�� �nto�� the��sphere��of��a�� jur�d�cal��concept�� than��a��moral��one.�� If�� th�ngs��were�� that��s�mple��we��would��not��be��ask�ng�� �f��teenagers��were��competent��to��dec�de��on��hav�ng��plast�c��surgery���ntervent�ons.��What��makes�� the��moral��concept��of��competence��d�fferent�� from��the�� legal��one�� �s�� that�� the��former��allows��degrees��of��the��capac�ty��to��take��dec�s�ons,��wh�le��the��latter��cannot��allow��degrees��and��must��be��very��clearly��d�st�ngu�shed��from���ncompetence.��What��law��allows��

�s��not��always��moral��and���f��we��th�nk��of��our��subject,��we��may��say��that��doctors��should��med�tate��a��b�t��before��respond�ng��to��the�r��teen��pat�ents’��requests.

What��Beauchamp��and��Ch�ldress��understand��by��standards��of��competence�� �s��close��to�� the��same��th�ng��as��Gert,��Culver��and��Clouser��express�� �n�� the�r��def�n�t�on��of��competence.��Beauchamp��and��Ch�ldress��state�� that,��“phys�c�ans��usually��cons�der��a��person��competent���f��he��or��she��can��understand��a��therapeut�c��or��research��procedure,��del�berate��regard�ng���ts��major��r�sks��and��benef�ts,��and��make��a��dec�s�on���n��l�ght��of��th�s��del�berat�on”.9��Other��authors��argue��that��“competence���s��the��ab�l�ty��to��make��a��rat�onal��dec�s�on”.10��They��f�rst��express��a��def�n�t�on��wh�ch��cons�ders��competence��as��a��pat�ent’s��capac�ty��to��understand��the���nformat�on��(s)he���s��be�ng��g�ven��about��h�s/her��cond�t�on��and��about��the��med�cal���ntervent�on��the��doctor��proposes��and��to��apprec�ate��the��r�sks��and��outcomes��that��the���ntervent�on���nvolves.��They��call��th�s��the��U��+��A��def�n�t�on,��U��mean�ng��understand�ng��and��A��apprec�at�on.��Gert,��Culver��and��Clouser��cla�m��that��th�s��def�n�t�on���s��not��comprehens�ve��enough��because��a��pat�ent��may��show��understand�ng��and��apprec�at�on��of��the��benef�ts��and��r�sks��of��an���ntervent�on,��but��he��or��she��can��st�ll��dec�de��not��to��have���t��because��of��some���rrat�onal��reasons.��The��problem��here���s�� that��Gert,��Culver��and��Clouser��cons�der��a�� rat�onal��dec�s�on�� to��be�� that��dec�s�on��wh�ch��compl�es��w�th��the��doctor’s��op�n�on��regard�ng��the��med�cal�� �ntervent�on.��Moreover,��they��bel�eve��that�� the�r��def�n�t�on��tac�tly��compr�ses��understand�ng��and��apprec�at�on��of��the��benef�ts��and��r�sks��of��an���ntervent�on��and��that��these��should��not��be��ment�oned,��because��they��are���mpl�ed��by��the��rat�onal��dec�s�on.��However,��as��I��have��h�ghl�ghted��above,�� the�r��account��about�� the��rat�onal��dec�s�on��emphas�ses�� �ts��compl�ance��w�th��the��doctor’s��op�n�on��whereas��any��dec�s�on��wh�ch�� �s��contrary�� to�� th�s��op�n�on�� �s���rrat�onal.��We��should��not��forget��that��doctors��may��be��wrong���n��the�r��op�n�ons��and��that��pat�ents��may��have��the�r��reasons��to��refuse��a��med�cal�� �ntervent�on.��If�� they��properly��understand��and��apprec�ate��the���nformat�on��but��refuse��the���ntervent�on��they��are��not��necessar�ly��completely�� �ncompetent.��On�� the��other��hand,�� they��can��agree��w�th�� the��doctor’s��op�n�on,��though��they��do��not��understand��and��apprec�ate��the�r��cond�t�on��and��the��consequences��and��r�sks��of��a��med�cal���ntervent�on.��Of��course,��when��we��cons�der��health��pol�c�es�� and�� laws��we��must��d�st�ngu�sh��competence�� from�� �ncompetence��and��we��must��have��a��clear��threshold��beyond��wh�ch��we��can��say��about��a��person��that��she���s��competent.��Th�ngs��are��not��s�mple��though��and��that�� �s��why��eth�cal��d�lemmas��appear.�� It�� �s��also��why��I��bel�eve��that��an��adequate��def�n�t�on��of��competence��should���nclude�� the��cond�t�on��of��understand�ng��and��apprec�at�on��of�� the��benef�ts��and��r�sks��of��an���ntervent�on.��Understand�ng��and��apprec�at�ng��the��poss�ble��good��and��the��bad��consequences��of��an���ntervent�on��are��very���mportant���n��assess�ng��a��teenager’s��degree��of��competence,��espec�ally��when���t��comes��to��apprec�at�ng��the��longer��term��outcomes,��because��plast�c��surgery��results�� �n��a��change��of��personal��appearance��that��may��br�ng��about��compl�cat�ons.��In��a��sect�on��of�� the��n�nth��chapter��of��her��book��The Makeover Myth,��Bethanne��Snodgrass,��a��plast�c��and��reconstruct�ve��surgeon,��exposes��several��psycholog�cal��compl�cat�ons��caused��by��undertak�ng��plast�c��surgery.��An��undes�red��consequence��of��cosmet�c��surgery��may��be��the��d�stress��exper�enced��by��the��partner��of��a��pat�ent��who��has��undertaken��one��or��more���ntervent�ons.��The��pat�ent’s��partner��may��

��9�� Ib�d.,��p.��114.10�� Bernard��Gert,��Charles��M.��Culver,��K.��Danner��Clouser,��op. cit.,��p.��226.

268 Autonomy and Plastic Surgery for Teenagers / Leria BOROŞ 269

feel���nfer�or��and��(s)he��may��want��to��escape��from��an��unequal��relat�onsh�p.��Moreover,��the��pat�ents��may�� later�� suffer�� from��“major��psycholog�cal��problems��assoc�ated��w�th��cosmet�c��surgery,�� �nclud�ng��body�� �mage��d�sturbances��and��var�ous�� forms��of��mental�� �llness��(cosmet�c��surgery��add�ct�on,��eat�ng��d�sorders,��delus�onal��d�sorders,��sch�zophren�a,��and��others).��Stud�es���nd�cate��that��up��to��15��percent��of��people��seek�ng��cosmet�c��surgery��have��BDD,11��the��most��severe��form��of��body���mage��d�sturbance”.12��Psycholog�cal��compl�cat�ons��of�� the��k�nd��ment�oned��are�� less�� l�kely�� to��occur��when���t�� comes�� to��med�cal�� �ntervent�ons�� for�� treat�ng��health��problems.��Moreover,�� the���ntervent�ons��for�� treat�ng��health��problems��are��mot�vated��by��compl�cat�ons��related��to��body��funct�onal�ty,��not��by��aesthet�c�� �deals.�� It�� �s��eas�er�� to��say�� that��dec�d�ng�� to��have��a��med�cal�� �ntervent�on��for�� treat�ng��a��health��problem���s��a�� rat�onal��dec�s�on.��However,��about��a��plast�c��surgery���ntervent�on,�� �s�� �t��s�m�larly��s�mple�� to��say���t�� �s��a��rat�onal��dec�s�on��to��have���t?��Apprec�at�ng��that��the��psycholog�cal��r�sks��for��teenagers��who��have��aesthet�c�� �ntervent�ons��are��h�gh�� �s��d�fferent�� from��propos�ng��a��sl�d�ng-scale�� strategy�� for��assess�ng�� teenagers’��competence.��The�� sl�d�ng-scale�� strategy,��wh�ch��f�nds��fervent��proponents�� �n��Buchanan��and��Brock,13��wants��us�� to��assess�� the��competence��of�� the�� �nd�v�dual��by�� tak�ng�� �nto��cons�derat�on�� the�� r�sks�� �nvolved��by��a��med�cal�� �ntervent�on.��The��h�gher�� the��r�sks��are,�� the��h�gher�� the��competence��level��should��be.��Such��a��v�ew�� �s��dangerous��and��does��not��have��sound��grounds.��Such��a��cont�ngency�� regard�ng��competence�� �s��not��acceptable��and�� �t��cannot��help��doctors���n�� the�r��dec�s�ons.��The��problem��here�� �s��not��about�� the��level��of��r�sks,��but��about�� the��nature��of��r�sks��and��the��actors���nvolved.��What��doctors��need���s��not��an��assessment��of��competence��based��on��the��level��of��r�sks,��they��need��to��act��w�th��respons�b�l�ty��and��what��else���s��respons�b�l�ty���f��not��a��pr�nc�ple��of��benef�cence?��However,��the��proponents��of��the��sl�de-scal�ng��strategy��are��not��ent�rely��wrong.��They��perhaps��not�ced��that��doctors��do��not��ask��a��pat�ent’s��consent��for��adm�n�ster�ng��a�� l�ght��analges�c,��but��when��they��want��to��proceed��to��a��sp�nal���ntervent�on,��for���nstance,��they��want��to��make��sure��that��the�r��pat�ent���s��competent��and��that��he��or��she��understands��the��r�sks���nvolved��by��th�s��k�nd��of���ntervent�on.��What��changes���n��the��two��cases���s��not��the��pat�ent’s��competence,��but��the��r�sks��of��the��med�cal��procedures.��Therefore,��the��doctor’s��need��to��see��that��the��pat�ent��understands��h�s��or��her��cond�t�on��and��that��he��or��she��correctly��apprec�ates��the��consequences��of�� the�� �ntervent�on��change��as��well.��The��degree��of��competence��may��be��the��same��for��the��pat�ent��who���s��adm�n�stered��a��l�ght��analges�c��and��for��the��pat�ent��who���s��subject��to��a��sp�nal���ntervent�on,��but���f��the��doctor��does��not��cons�der���nformed��consent��necessary��for��the��former��s�tuat�on��and��thus��competence���n��g�v�ng���nformed��consent,�� �n�� the�� latter�� s�tuat�on�� the��doctor��needs�� to��make��sure�� that�� the��pat�ent�� �s��competent��enough��to��dec�de.��What��has��changed���s��not��the��competence,��but��the��need��to��assess���t.

11�� BDD��stands��for��body��dysmorph�c��d�sorder.��12�� Bethanne��Snodgrass,��The Makeover Myth. The Real Story Behind Cosmetic Surgery,

Injectables, Lasers, Gimmicks, and Hype, and What You Need to Know to Stay Safe,��W�l-l�am��Morrow��&��Co,��2006,��pp.��216-217.��

13�� Allan��B.��Buchanan,��Dan��W.��Brock,��“Dec�d�ng��for��others”,�� �n��Milbank Quarterly,��vol.��64,��Supplement��2,��1986,��52-55.��

The-ethical-matrixThe��eth�cal��matr�x�� �s��a�� tool��wh�ch��had��at�� the��beg�nn�ng��the��role��of��help�ng��those��who��wanted��to��assess,��from��an��eth�cal��po�nt��of��v�ew,��the���ntroduct�on��of��new��b�o-technolog�es,��but��who��d�d��not��have��eth�cal��expert�se.��It��proved��to��be��a��very��useful���nstrument,��wh�ch��does��not��have��as�� �ts�� result�� a��dec�s�on,��but��wh�ch��helps�� the��dec�s�on-mak�ng��process.��The��eth�cal��matr�x��must��be���nformed��by��judgements��and��reflect�on���n��order��to��reach��an��eth�cal��dec�s�on.

How��th�s��tool��can��be��used��based��on��the��three��pr�nc�ples��of��wellbe�ng,��autonomy��and��fa�rness���s��shown��below.��I��br�ng��to��attent�on��a��few��problems���nvolved���n��plast�c��surgery��for��teenagers��and��I��w�ll��refer��only��to��pat�ents��and��doctors��as��stakeholders,���.e.�� �nvolved��actors,��because�� �t�� �s��not��necessary��for�� the��purposes��of�� th�s��art�cle�� to���nclude��the��parents,��the��commun�ty��or��the��soc�ety���n��general.��The��matr�x��w�ll��serve��only��as��an���llustrat�on��of��how��the��tool��can��be��used,��so��I��do��not��a�m��to��treat��the��subject��exhaust�vely���n��the��table���n��f�gure��1.

Perhaps���t�� �s��not��very��obv�ous��what�� just�ce��has��to��do��w�th��plast�c��surgery��for��teens.��However,��some��students��ra�sed��problems��of��fa�rness��regard�ng��plast�c��surgery��for�� teenagers.�� I��have��not�� �ncluded��just�ce�� �n�� the��eth�cal��matr�x,��because��I��had��not��deemed���t��necessary��s�nce��the��stakeholders���nvolved���n��my��analys�s��were��doctors��and��pat�ents.��I��had��thought��of�� just�ce��more��from��the��po�nt��of��v�ew��of��laws��that��should��take���nto��cons�derat�on��the��d�fferences���n��psycho-somat�c��development,�� �n��order��to��protect�� teen��pat�ents��from��tak�ng��r�sky��dec�s�ons��about��undergo�ng��plast�c��surgery.��They�� thought�� that,��although��plast�c��surgery�� �ntervent�ons��do��not��have��a��med�cal��rat�onale,��these��operat�ons��should��be��pa�d��from��the��publ�c��budget,��because���t�� �s��not��fa�r�� that��some��teens��can��afford�� �t��wh�le��others��cannot.��The�� teens��who��afford��and��undergo��plast�c��surgery���ntervent�ons��ga�n��a��more��pleasant��phys�cal��aspect,��wh�le��other��persons��of�� the�r��age��may��lose�� the�r��self-conf�dence.��Therefore,�� the��students��who��deemed��unjust�� the��fact�� that��some��teens��undergo��plast�c��surgery��because��they��afford���t��and��others��cannot��have��aesthet�c��surgery���ntervent�ons��because��the�r��parents��are��poorer�� thought��as��well�� that�� th�s�� �njust�ce��should��be��compensated��for��by��state���ntervent�on.��In�� the�r��op�n�on,��a��budget��from��publ�c��funds��should��be��ava�lable��for��teenagers��who��want�� to��undergo��plast�c��surgery���ntervent�ons.��After�� the��d�scuss�on��that��I��had��w�th�� the��students��I��rev�ewed��my��approach��and���ncluded��fa�rness�� �n�� the��matr�x.

In��what��concerns�� the��pr�nc�ple��of��non-malef�cence,�� �t��must��be��sa�d�� that�� �t�� �s��extremely���mportant��that��teen��pat�ents��be��caut�ous��not��to��dec�de��on��an���ntervent�on��wh�ch��they��later��regret��(wh�ch��br�ngs��undes�red��s�de��effects,��pa�n,��undes�red��changes��of��one’s��self-�mage).��That�� �s��why�� the��aspect��of��understand�ng�� �s��so�� �mportant�� �n��assess�ng��a��person’s��autonomy.��In��the�r�� turn,��doctor��must��str�ve��to��avo�d��negat�ve��outcomes14�� l�ke��problems��w�th��pregnancy,��lactat�on��and��breast��feed�ng,��asymmetry��(�n��breast�� �mplant)15,��under-correct�on��(res�dual��deform�ty),��over-correct�on��(new��

14�� The��examples��are��taken��from��Chr�stopher��Stone’s��book��Plastic Surgery. Facts.��2006.15�� Stone��g�ves���n��h�s��book��more���nformat�on��about��d�fferent��k�nds��of��aesthet�c�� �ntervent�on,��

�nclud�ng��r�sks��and��poss�ble��negat�ve��outcomes.��In��what��concerns��breast���mplantat�on��there���s��also��the��r�sk��of��mak�ng��a��rad�olog�cal��d�agnos�s��of��breast��cancer��more��d�ff�cult��or��the��r�sk,��

270 Autonomy and Plastic Surgery for Teenagers / Leria BOROŞ 271

deform�ty),��a�rway��obstruct�on,��scars�� (�n�� rh�noplasty)��and��so��on.��These��are�� r�sks���nvolved�� �n��plast�c�� surgery��and�� they��cannot��be��pred�cted��w�th��certa�nty.��They��may��or��may��not��occur.��They��are��often��the��result��of��doctor’s��m�stakes,��but��doctors��m�ght��make��m�stakes�� �n��e�ther��plast�c��or��ord�nary��surgery.��We��cannot��deem��them��as��hypothet�cal��consequences��and��that���s��the��reason��why��I��have��not���ncluded���n��the��eth�cal��matr�x��the��aspects��related��to��non-malef�cence.��On��the��other��hand,�� they��are��an�� �mportant��part��of�� the��debate��on��plast�c��surgery��for�� teenagers,��as��I��noted��when��I��brought�� to��attent�on�� the�� �ssue��of��understand�ng��w�th�� respect�� to�� the��concept��of��autonomy.��However,�� I��have��not�� �ncluded��fa�rness�� �n�� the��matr�x��of��consequences,��because�� the�� “battle”�� �n�� the��debate�� I�� had��w�th�� students��was�� actually��between��autonomy��and��benef�cence��and��the��aspects��related��to��just�ce��are��less��relevant���n��what��factors��concern��the��dec�s�on��to��undergo��plast�c��surgery���ntervent�ons.

��Respect��for: Autonomy Wellbeing Fairness

PatientFreedom��to��act��w�thout��parents’��and��school���ntervent�on.��

Sat�sfact�on��regard�ng��the��phys�cal��aspect.

Undergo�ng��plast�c��surgery���ntervent�ons���n��the��publ�c��health��system.

Doctor

Be�ng��free��to��agree��to��an���ntervent�on��when��a��h�gh��enough��degree��of��pat�ent’s��competence��or��autonomy���s��not�ced.

Refus�ng��an���ntervent�on���n��order��to��do��what���s��best��for��the��pat�ent,���.e.��to��preserve��the��appearance��of��a��part��of��the��body��where��change��m�ght��result���n��an��undes�red��psycholog�cal��outcome.

Us�ng��resources��from��med�cal��publ�c���nst�tut�ons��for��plast�c��surgery���ntervent�ons��(and��not��only��for��surgery���ntervent�ons��wh�ch��allev�ate��health��problems).��16

Figure �: An ethical matrix used in the ethical analysis of plastic surgery for teens

�n��case��of��cancer��d�agnos�s,��of��undergo�ng��a��mastectomy���nstead��of��a��lumpectomy.��The��r�sks��are��the��same��for��teen��as��for��adult��pat�ents,��but��we��may��wonder���f��the��former’s��understand�ng��and��apprec�at�on��related��to��these��r�sks��are��the��same��as��the��latter’s.��How��many��young��g�rls��would��th�nk��of��d�ff�cult�es�� �n��breast��cancer��d�agnos�s?��When��they��are��young��they��bel�eve��they��w�ll��never��be��s�ck.��Bes�des��these��r�sks��related��to��breast��cancer��d�agnos�s��and��treatment��there��are��also��other�� r�sks,��even��aesthet�c��compl�cat�ons��of��plast�c��surgery�� �ntervent�ons��wh�ch��may��not��be��ser�ously��taken���nto��cons�derat�on��when��the��pat�ent��strongly��des�res��an��operat�on.��Every��surg�cal�� �ntervent�on��has�� �ts��r�sks,��but��when��there�� �s��a��med�cal��urgency���t�� �s��understandable�� to�� take��the��r�sks.��Tak�ng��the��r�sks�� �n��med�cal��urgenc�es�� �s��a�� just�f�ed��dec�s�on��and��s�nce��surg�cal���ntervent�ons��for��health��problems��are��done��w�th��the��clear��goal��of��allev�at�ng��or��treat�ng��these��problems��we��cannot��suspect��h�dden,��subtle���nfluences���n��the��pat�ent’s��dec�s�on.��The��doctor��must��detect��more��obv�ous�� �nfluences,�� l�ke�� the��pressure��of��fam�ly��members.��I’m��not��say�ng��that��th�s��task���s��a��s�mple��one,��my��goal���s��just��to��h�ghl�ght��the��d�fference��between��precaut�ons��(as��an��att�tude��reflect�ng��respect��for��the��pr�nc�ple��of��non-malef�cence)��needed���n��the��case��of��med�cal��urgenc�es��and��precaut�ons��needed���n��the��case��of��plast�c��surgery.����

16�� ��1�� In��publ�c��med�cal���nst�tut�ons��only��very��few��aesthet�c���ntervent�ons��are��allowed,��when��

The��matr�x��can��be��f�lled��w�th��more��aspects��and��each��can��rece�ve��a��score,��for���nstance��on��a��scale��from��-2��to��+2.��Us�ng��a��score���s��not��a��mathemat�cal��operat�on,��but�� �s��an��operat�on��wh�ch��helps�� the��stakeholders�� �nvolved.��The��score�� �s��ass�gned��depend�ng��on�� the��consequences��of�� the��poss�ble��act�ons.��The��scale��from��-2�� to��+2��can��help��us�� to��assess�� the��degree�� �n��wh�ch��an��act�on��sat�sf�es��a��pr�nc�ple��or��not.��We��may�� thus��draw��another�� table��correspond�ng�� to��a��matr�x��of�� the��consequences��of��undergo�ng��and��not��undergo�ng��plast�c��surgery���ntervent�ons��by��teenagers.��The��cells���n��the��table��below��(f�gure��2)��summar�ze��the���ssues��d�scussed��w�th��students��and��the��scores��that��they��have��ass�gned��to��each��aspect.��Moreover,��the��matr�x���n��f�gure��2��compr�ses��just��aspects��related��to��teen��pat�ents��s�nce��only��students��were��present��at��the��workshop.��W�th��respect��to��doctors,��the��poss�ble��act�ons��to��take���nto��cons�derat�on��are��a��b�t��d�fferent.��For���nstance,��a��doctor��can��dec�de��to��operate��on��a��pat�ent��or��to��refuse��a��plast�c��surgery���ntervent�on��to��a�� teenager,��but�� these��are��d�fferent��dec�s�ons��from��those��of��teenagers.��Though��the��results��may��seem��the��same��–��the��teen��pat�ent���s��e�ther��operated��on��or��not��–��one��cannot��subst�tute��one’s��op�n�on��for��a��doctor’s��op�n�on.��A��doctor’s��reasons��to��agree��or��to��refuse��to��operate��on��a��teenager��are��s�gn�f�cant���n��h�s/her��dec�s�on.��Supplementary��debate��w�th��doctors��would,��therefore,��be��necessary���n��order�� to�� f�ll�� the��matr�x.��Of�� course,�� the��d�scuss�on��can��cont�nue��w�th��more��stakeholders:��parents,��schools,��pol�cy-makers,��commun�ty��representat�ves.

they��are���ntended��to��correct��some���njur�es��l�ke��scars��due��to��a��f�re,��for���nstance.��Rh�noplast�es,��abdom�noplast�es,��breast�� �mplants��etc.��are��only��performed���n��pr�vate��med�cal�� �nst�tut�ons.��However,�� somet�mes�� �t�� �s��d�ff�cult�� to��control�� the��s�tuat�on��and��doctors��may��perform���n��publ�c���nst�tut�ons���ntervent�ons��l�ke��rh�noplast�es��when��they��perform��septoplast�es,��wh�ch��are��deemed��necessary��because��of��the��symptoms��they���nvolve:���nab�l�ty��of��normal��breath�ng,��nasal��bleed�ng,��pa�ns��and�� so��on.��Doctors�� should��not��use�� resources��of��publ�c��med�cal���nst�tut�ons��for��plast�c��surgery�� �ntervent�ons��wh�ch��are��not��allowed���n�� these�� �nst�tut�ons,��because�� those��resources��are��pa�d�� through��taxes�� taken��from��every��c�t�zen��and��we��cannot��pretend,��at��least��for��the��moment,��that��c�t�zens��should��contr�bute��to��the��fulf�llment��of��some��of��the��aesthet�c��des�res��of��other��c�t�zens.��The��resources��dest�ned��for��health��problems��should��be��used��for��th�s��purpose��alone.��Tak�ng��away��someth�ng��from��these��resources��and��g�v�ng��them��another��dest�nat�on���s��unjust.��

Respect��for: Autonomy Wellbeing

The patient undertakes plastic surgery

The patient does not undertake plastic surgery

The patient undertakes plastic surgery

The patient does not undertake plastic surgery

Patient

Enjoys��h�s/her��freedom��to��do��what��he/she��wants��w�th��h�s/her��body��(+2).The��teenager��feels��treated��as��a��free��and��respons�ble��person��(+2).

(S)he��feels��constra�ned��by��fam�ly/school��to��refra�n��from��do�ng��what��he/she��wants��w�th��h�s/her��body��(-2).The��teenager��feels��that��h�s/her��parents��do��not��trust��h�s/her��competence��to��take��good��dec�s�ons��(-2).

(S)he��m�ght��ga�n��a��h�gher��self-esteem��and��self-�mage��(+1).The��teenager��m�ght��become��more��attract�ve��and��adm�red��by��persons��of��the��same��age��(+1).

(S)he��avo�ds��the��r�sks���nvolved��by����plast�c��surgery���ntervent�ons��(+1).The��teenager��does��not��obta�n��the��phys�cal��appearance��that��(s)he��des�res��(-2).

Figure 2: A matrix of consequences used in the ethical analysis of plastic surgery for teens

272 Autonomy and Plastic Surgery for Teenagers / Leria BOROŞ 273

Although��the��purpose��of�� the��eth�cal��matr�x���s��not�� to��draw��a��conclus�on��about��a��dec�s�on��based��on��mathemat�cal��calculat�ons,�� the��scores��ass�gned��to��each��aspect��revealed�� �n�� the�� table��above��m�ght��or�ent��us�� �n��one��or��other��d�rect�on.��From��the��po�nt��of��v�ew��of��students,�� the��dec�s�on�� to��undertake��plast�c��surgery��seems�� to��be��more��des�rable�� �f��we�� take�� �nto��cons�derat�on�� the��pr�nc�ple��of��autonomy.�� In��what��concerns��the��pr�nc�ple��of��wellbe�ng,��the��consequences��matr�x��seems��to��susta�n��once��aga�n�� the��dec�s�on�� to��undertake��plast�c��surgery�� to�� the��detr�ment��of�� the��oppos�te��dec�s�on.��However,��students��were��not��very��rad�cal��and��they��agreed��that��they��m�ght��have��subject�ve��and���mmature��op�n�ons.��Most��of�� the��teens��expressed��the�r�� �nterest���n�� learn�ng��about��other��stakeholders’��op�n�ons��regard�ng��plast�c��surgery��and�� they��acknowledged��that��they��m�ght��not��know��certa�n��valuable���nformat�on��concern�ng��the��consequences��of��plast�c��surgery.������

Conclusion

Dur�ng�� the��one��day��workshop��on��plast�c�� surgery�� and�� eth�cal�� dec�s�ons�� that�� I��held�� �n��a��Roman�an��h�gh��school�� �n��Apr�l��2012��I��understood�� that��my��hypothes�s��regard�ng�� the�� teenagers’��procl�v�ty�� to��pra�se��autonomy��to�� the��detr�ment��of��other��moral��pr�nc�ples��was��not��ent�rely��conf�rmed.��The��results��presented�� �n�� the��eth�cal��matr�x���ncluded���n��the��pr�or��sect�on��of��the��paper��reveal��an��or�entat�on��of��teenagers��towards��valu�ng��autonomous��dec�s�ons,�� but�� at�� the�� same�� t�me��many�� teenagers��f�rmly��expressed��the�r��concerns��related��to��the��phys�cal��and��psycholog�cal��r�sks��that��cosmet�c��surgery��may��br�ng��to��teen��pat�ents.��Some��of��them��also��had��doubts��that��a��teenager��who���s��unsat�sf�ed��w�th��h�s/her��phys�cal��appearance��has�� the��capac�ty�� to��make�� the��best��cho�ce��when�� �t��comes�� to��dec�d�ng�� to��undertake��plast�c��surgery��or��not.��Other��students��cla�med�� that�� �t��was��better�� for�� teenagers�� to��keep�� the�r��natural��look�� �nstead��of��undertak�ng��plast�c�� surgery.��However,�� there��were��also��students��who��stated��that��teenagers��should��be��completely��free��when���t��comes��to��dec�s�ons��to��undertake��plast�c��surgery.��The��debates��dur�ng��the��workshop��revealed��that��even���f��the��most��of��the��students��who��expressed��the�r��op�n�ons��d�d��not��bel�eve��that��all��teenagers��were��competent��enough��to��make��good��dec�s�ons��related��to��plast�c��surgery��and��that��therefore��they��should��not��be��cons�dered��autonomous,��there��were��st�ll��other��teens��who��pra�sed��autonomy��and��who��were��not��aware��of��the��r�sks���mpl�ed��by��cosmet�c��med�cal���ntervent�ons.

Plast�c��surgery��const�tutes��a��spec�al��type��of��surgery��for��several��reasons��and��as��a��spec�al��type���t���nvolves��spec�al��eth�cal���mpl�cat�ons.��F�rst,��plast�c��surgery,��or��at��least��a��great��deal��of���t,��has��not��a��str�ctly��med�cal��mot�vat�on,��but���t���s��mot�vated��by��aesthet�c���deals��that��pat�ents��want��to��ach�eve.��The��outcomes��expected��from��plast�c��surgery��are��qu�te��d�fferent��than��the��outcomes��expected��from��ord�nary���ntervent�ons��wh�ch��people��undergo�� �n��order�� to��heal��or��allev�ate��a��health��problem.��Second,�� �f�� �n��other�� types��of��surgery�� the��doctors��face�� the��problem��of��hav�ng�� to��conv�nce��pat�ents�� to��accept���ntervent�ons��wh�ch��allev�ate��health��problems��or��even��save�� the�r�� l�ves,�� �n��plast�c��surgery��pat�ents��somet�mes��have��odd���deas��about��how��the�r��body��should��look��and��somet�mes��they��request���ntervent�ons��wh�ch��m�ght��be��dangerous��and��unsu�table��for��the�r��phys�cal��const�tut�on.��Th�rd,��the���nfluences��wh�ch��m�ght��lead��a��person��to��dec�de���n�� favour��of��plast�c��surgery��are��more��d�ff�cult�� to��detect�� than�� �n��cases��of��general��

surgery,��because��they��are��usually��more��subtle��and��h�dden.��Moreover,�� teen��pat�ents��deemed,��legally��speak�ng,��autonomous��and��competent��to��have��plast�c���ntervent�ons,��are��more��vulnerable��to��some��types��of���nfluences,��such��as��those��exerc�sed��by��mass��med�a��and��fash�on,�� than��adult��pat�ents��are.��Teens��may��be��subject��of��man�pulat�on��not��only��because�� they��do��not��have�� the��necessary��matur�ty�� to��defend�� themselves��from��th�s��type��of���nfluence,��but��also��because��the���mpact��of��th�s��man�pulat�on���s��more��ser�ous��at��the�r��age,��when��phys�cal��appearance��becomes��a��cr�t�cal��preoccupat�on��and��subject��of��concern.��However,��the��phys�cal��aspect��of��appearance��stays���mportant��after��surger�es��too��and���f��a��person��had��some��self-�mage��d�sorders��before��undergo�ng��an��aesthet�c���ntervent�on,��he��or��she���s��l�kely��to��rema�n��unsat�sf�ed��or��to��request��another���ntervent�on.��Psycholog�sts��should��evaluate��pat�ents��before��they��have��an��operat�on,��but��psycholog�cal��assessments��cannot��deal��w�th��the��whole��range��of��problems��that��m�ght��appear���n��plast�c��surgery��for��teenagers.��I��have��tr�ed���n��th�s��art�cle��to��g�ve��an���ns�ght�� �nto�� the��problem��from��an��eth�cal��po�nt��of��v�ew��and��to��propose��the��eth�cal��matr�x��as��a��tool��for��gu�d�ng��dec�ders���n��these��cases.

Some��m�ght��be��scept�cal��about�� the�� �nfluences�� that��mass��med�a��and��fash�on��are��exerc�s�ng��over�� teenagers��and��m�ght��argue�� that��every��person��has��a��h�story�� �n��the��sense��that��h�s��or��her��op�n�ons��and��conv�ct�ons��are��a��result��of�� the���nfluences��of��soc�ety,��fam�ly,��educat�on,��culture.��I��agree��that��we��cannot��speak��of��coerc�on��l�ke��the��coerc�on��suffered��by��people��from��certa�n��commun�t�es,��where��g�rls��are��pressured��to��get��fat��(�n��Maur�tan�a),�� to��wear��plates���n��the�r��lower��l�ps��(�n��the��Murs���tr�be),�� to��elongate��the�r��necks��(Kayan��populat�on���n��Burma)��and��so��on.��However,��people��and��espec�ally��g�rls��are��often��pressured,�� �n��more��or�� less��subtle��ways,�� to��comply��w�th���deals��of��beauty��wh�ch��somet�mes�� �nvolve��dangerous��and��damag�ng��procedures.��Many��beauty�� �deals�� are�� just�� exaggerat�ons��of�� some��part�cular�� feature,�� l�ke�� a��slender��wa�st,��small��feet,��stra�ght��teeth��and��so��on.��These��features��are��usually��more��pronounced���n��women��and��somet�mes��people��tend��to��exaggerate��them��by��v�rtue��of��a��conv�ct�on��that��th�s��exaggerat�on��w�ll��make��women��more��attract�ve.��Breast���mplants��m�ght��be��such��an��exaggerat�on��com�ng��from��a��des�re��to��h�ghl�ght��a��fem�n�ne��feature��wh�ch��suggests��fert�l�ty.�� Ideals��of��beauty��are��usually��h�d�ng��messages��of��fert�l�ty,��because��they��all���nvolve��phys�cal��features��that��suggest��health��and��youth.��Of��course,��people�� request�ng��plast�c�� �ntervent�ons��are��not��consc�ously�� th�nk�ng��of�� fert�l�ty,��they��just��want��to��look��better.��But��what��does���t��mean��to��look��better��when��we��know��how��beauty�� �deals��change��h�stor�cally��and��how��exaggerated�� they��are��somet�mes?��Th�s�� �s��not��a��problem��of��aesthet�cs,��of��expla�n�ng��what��beauty���s,��but�� �t�� �s��s�mply��a��problem��that�� reveals��some��d�ff�cult�es��when��deal�ng��w�th��persons��who��want�� to��follow��an���deal��of��beauty��and��to��undergo��plast�c��surgery��for��ach�ev�ng��th�s�� �deal.��That�� �s��why��a��doctor��may��wonder�� �f��h�s/her�� teen��pat�ent�� �s�� competent�� enough��to��be��aware��of�� the��or�g�n��of��h�s��or��her��des�re�� to��change��a��part��of��h�s��or��her��body��and���f��he��or��she��correctly��apprec�ates�� the��r�sks��and��consequences.��A��pat�ent��must��understand��the���nformat�on��he��or��she���s��g�ven��and��must��correctly��apprec�ate��what��th�s���nformat�on��means��for��h�m��or��her.��These��two��cond�t�ons��are��necessary���n��tak�ng��a��rat�onal��dec�s�on��and��together��w�th��the��rat�onal��dec�s�on��const�tute��the��competence��of��a��pat�ent.��However,��competence��comes���n��degrees��from��a��moral��po�nt��of��v�ew.��Only��from��the��legal��po�nt��of��v�ew��pat�ents��are��e�ther��competent��or���ncompetent.��Th�s��becomes��the��hard��task��for��the��doctor��who��must��dec�de���f��the��pat�ent��has��a��suff�c�ently��

274 Autonomy and Plastic Surgery for Teenagers / Leria BOROŞ 275

h�gh��level��of��competence,��an���mportant��capac�ty�� �n�� tak�ng��autonomous��dec�s�ons.��F�nally,��the��dec�s�on��to��undergo��plast�c��surgery��must��be��an���ntent�onal��one.��There��are��no��degrees���n��what��const�tutes���ntent�onal�ty��and��we��can��eas�ly��d�scern���ntent�onal��acts��from��non-�ntent�onal��ones.��These��three��cond�t�ons��of��autonomy��–��competence,��absence��of��controll�ng���nfluence��and���ntent�onal�ty��–��were��exam�ned��and��expla�ned.��The��quest�on��one��may��ask���s��what��should��a��doctor��do��and��on��what��grounds��when��a��pat�ent���s��legally��autonomous,��but��morally��speak�ng,��h�s/her��degree��of��autonomy���s��not��suff�c�ently��sat�sfactory��to��allow��them��to��undergo��a��plast�c��surgery?��I��tr�ed��to��offer��an��answer���n��the��second��part��of��the��paper.��Thus,��although��a��teenager��may��seem��autonomous��enough,��from��a��legal��po�nt��of��v�ew,��to��have��an��aesthet�c���ntervent�on,��a��doctor��may��deem��h�s��or��her��level��of��autonomy��unsat�sfactory.��For���nstance,��suppose��that��a��16��year��old��pat�ent��wants��to��undergo��a��breast���mplant���ntervent�on.��However,��the��doctor��f�nds��out��that��the��pat�ent��des�res��the���ntervent�on��because��she��wants��to��be��a��model��but��does��not��have��the��“su�table”��d�mens�ons��for��th�s��career.��(S)he��suspects��that��the��g�rl��m�ght��further��request��other���ntervent�ons���n��order��to��completely��comply��w�th��an���deal��of��beauty��proposed��by��fash�on��des�gners��and��the��med�a.��Although��the��psycholog�cal��test��requested��by��the��doctor��does��not��show��problems��that��would��ra�se��great��concerns,��(s)he��st�ll��has��some��doubts��about�� the��pat�ent’s��autonomy,��because��she���s���nfluenced,��though��not��coerced,��by��others’��op�n�on��about��how��her��body��should��look.��If�� the��doctor��refuses��to��operate��her��(s)he��m�ght��be��accused��of��not��respect�ng��the��pat�ent’s��autonomy,��but��autonomy���s��not��the��only��eth�cal��pr�nc�ple��that��(s)he��can��appeal��to.��Refus�ng��the���ntervent�on��and��thus��breach�ng��the��pat�ent’s��autonomy,��the��doctor���s��not��engag�ng���n��unjust�f�ed��paternal�st�c��behav�our,��but��(s)he���s��respect�ng��the��pr�nc�ple��of��benef�cence,��because��he���s��do�ng��what���s��good��for��the��pat�ent,�� �.e.���s��preserv�ng�� the��appearance��of��a��part��of�� the��body��whose��change��m�ght��result�� �n��an��undes�red��psycholog�cal�� �mpact��or��whose��change��m�ght��not��br�ng��sat�sfact�on.��Of��course,�� the��po�nt��of��v�ew��of�� teenagers�� �s�� �mportant��and��the��eth�cal��matr�x�� that��I��developed��and��f�lled��w�th��the��students��part�c�pat�ng���n��my��workshop��was��a��good��occas�on��to��learn��more��about��teens’��op�n�on��concern�ng��plast�c��surgery.

Doctors,��but��also��eth�cal��counselors,��parents,��pat�ents�� themselves,��pol�cy-makers,�� should��pay��more��attent�on�� to�� the�� four��pr�nc�ples��of��b�omed�cal��eth�cs��–��autonomy,��benef�cence,��non-malef�cence,�� just�ce��–���n��favour��of��wh�ch��I��argued���n��th�s��paper��and��they��may��use��an��eth�cal��matr�x��to��gu�de��them���n��the��dec�s�on-mak�ng��process�� related�� to��plast�c��surgery�� for�� teenagers.��The��consequences��matr�x�� that�� I��prov�de�� �n�� the�� last��part��of�� the��art�cle��offers��a��gu�de�� to��dec�s�on-mak�ng,��w�thout��treat�ng��the��problem��exhaust�vely��and��w�thout��pretend�ng��to��be��a��tool��for��el�c�t�ng��dec�s�ons.��It��compr�ses��the��results��of��the��debate��that��I��had��w�th��students��dur�ng��the��workshop��and��for��a��greater���ns�ght���nto��the��problem��of��plast�c��surgery��for��teenagers���t��has��to��be��developed��as��a��result��of��debates��w�th��more��stakeholders,��such��as��parents,��doctors,��schools,��commun�ty,��pol�cy-makers.

References

Beauchamp,��Tom��L.,�� James��F.��Ch�ldress.��2009.��Principles of Biomedical Ethics,�� s�xth��ed.,��

Oxford:��Oxford��Un�vers�ty��Press.Buchanan,��Allan��B.,��Dan��W.��Brock.��1986.��“Dec�d�ng��for��others”,���n��Milbank Quarterly,��vol.��64,��

Supplement��2,��17-94.Dwork�n,��Gerald.��The Theory and Practice of Autonomy.�� 1988.��Cambr�dge:��Cambr�dge��

Un�vers�ty��Press.Frankena,��W�ll�am��K.��1973.��Ethics,��Prent�ce-Hall.Gert,��Bernard,��Charles��M.��Culver,��K.��Danner��Clouser.��2006.��Bioethics. A systematic approach,��

second��ed.,��Oxford:��Oxford��Un�vers�ty��Press.Mepham,��Ben,��Matth�as��Ka�ser,��Er�k��Thorstensen,��Sandy��Tomk�ns,��Kate��M�llar.��2006.��Ethical

Matrix Manual,��The��Hague:��LEI.Morgan,��Derek.��2001.��Issues in Medical Law and Ethics,��London:��Cavend�sh��Publ�sh�ng.Snodgrass,��Bethanne.��2006.��The Makeover Myth. The Real Story Behind Cosmetic Surgery,

Injectables, Lasers, Gimmicks, and Hype, and What You Need to Know to Stay Safe,��W�ll�am��Morrow��&��Co.

Stone,��Chr�stopher.��2006.��Plastic Surgery. Facts,�� second��ed.,��Cambr�dge��Un�vers�ty��Press,��Cambr�dge.

Stopes-Roe,��Harry.��1994.��“Pr�nc�ples��and��L�fe��Stances:��A��Human��V�ew”,���n��G�llon,��Raanan��(ed.),��Principles of Health Care Ethics,��New��York:��John��W�ley��&��Sons��Ltd.,��117-133.

Taylor,��James��Stacey.��2009.��Practical Autonomy and Bioethics,��New��York:��Routledge.

276 �� Bloggers,��Journal�sts��and��Ep�stem�c��Respons�b�l�ty����/����V�ctor��POPESCU������������277

Bloggers, Journalists and Epistemic Responsibility: A Particular Type of Self-Regulation in the Romanian Online Media�

V�ctor��POPESCU

The��passage�� from�� trad�t�onal��press�� to��d�g�tal��med�a�� requ�res�� from��profess�onal��journal�sts��not��only��an���mprovement��of��the�r��technolog�cal��sk�lls,��but��also��a��spec�al��k�nd��of��awareness��of��the��new��deontolog�cal��challenges.��Our��attempt���s��to���dent�fy��the��novel��d�mens�ons��of��respons�b�l�ty,��accuracy��and��truthfulness���n��d�g�tal�� journal�sm��and��the��“�ntellectual��v�rtues”��that��onl�ne��journal�sts��should��embody.��We��w�ll���dent�fy��these��v�rtues��start�ng��from��the��cr�t�c�sm��brought��by��Roman�an��bloggers��(many��of��whom��are��or��used��to��be��journal�sts)��to��the��lack��of��profess�onal�sm��of��onl�ne��med�a��journal�sts.��Add�t�onally,��we��w�ll��try��to���dent�fy��a��part�cular��type��of��“regulat�on”��for��the��Roman�an��d�g�tal��med�a,�� founded��upon��a��collect�ve��cr�t�que��developed���n�� the��blogosphere��and��focused��on��the���nappropr�ate��pract�ces��of��the��journal�sts�� that�� lack��d�g�tal��l�teracy��and��accuracy.

Introduction:-“bloggers-vs.-journalists”,-a-fake-problem

“Once��they��have��been��roused��from��the�r��comfortable��rout�ne,��Roman�an��journal�sts��are��at�� f�rst�� confused�� (they��don’t��have��a��clue��what’s��go�ng��on��w�th�� the��blasted��Internet),��then��they��become��downr�ght��aggress�ve��only��to��g�ve��up���n��the��end��or��qu�t��the�r��jobs”,��the��blogger��“Zoso”��(Val���Petcu)��recently��wrote���n��an��analys�s��of��the��local��onl�ne��press.2��The��author��of�� the��best��Roman�an��med�a��blog���n��20073��cr�t�c�zes��the��journal�sts’��lack��of��savoir faire,��underl�n�ng��the��fact��that��these��journal�sts��post��onl�ne��mater�als��wh�ch��barely��f�t���n��the��overly-crowded��pages,��use��non-copyr�ghted��photos��and��s�gn��art�cles��that��plag�ar�ze��the��content��of��other��blogs��–��not��to��ment�on��the��lack��of��l�nks��to��the��sources,��wh�ch���s��one��of��the��cap�tal��m�stakes��of���nexper�enced��onl�ne��journal�sts:��“L�nk�ng��to��the��source��story���s��actually��not��a��bad��th�ng��because,��even���f��I��go��to��FemaleFirst.co.uk, I’m��not��go�ng��to��stay��there,��because��I��am��st�ll��one��of��

��1�� The��art�cle���s��part��of��a��more��extens�ve��research��project��centr�ng��on��the��eth�cal��challenges���n��onl�ne��journal�sm,��wh�ch���s��supported��by��the��grant��PN-II-RU-PD-2011-3-0037,��f�nanced��by��The��Nat�onal��Research��Counc�l��(The��Execut�ve��Agency��for��H�gher��Educat�on,��Research,��Development�� and�� Innovat�on��Fund�ng��–��UEFISCDI).��The�� research�� �s�� hosted��by�� the��Roman�an��Soc�ety��for��Phenomenology,��The��Inst�tute��of��Ph�losophy��“Alexandru��Dragom�r”���n��Bucharest.��

��2�� Zoso,��“Starea��jurnal�smulu���onl�ne��românesc”��[“The��present��state��of��affa�res���n��Roman�an��onl�ne�� journal�sm”],�� 22�� June��2011,��http://www.zoso.ro/starea-jurnal�smulu�-onl�ne-romanesc-2011/��(all�� the��Internet��pages��quoted��below��were��accessed��before��30��November,��2012).

��3�� The��pr�ze��was��awarded��at��the��2007��ed�t�on��of��RoBlogFest��(http://www.zoso.ro/about-me/).��In��December��2012,��Zoso��had��the��traff�c��rank��of��105��out��of��the��Roman�an��s�tes��(Alexa.com).��

Mediafax.ro’s��readers”.Zoso’s��op�n�ons��are��not��s�ngular��and��they��have��been��re�terated��by��several��other��

Roman�an��bloggers,��some��of��whom��prev�ously��worked��as��journal�sts.��On��the��other��hand,��current��journal�sts,��espec�ally��those��who��got��most��of��the�r��exper�ence��before��the��days��of��The��Internet,��cont�nue��to��stand��the�r��ground.��They��refuse��from��the��very��beg�nn�ng��to��be��compared��to��bloggers.��The��value��of��the��top�cs��that��bloggers��broach��can��be��descr�bed��as��“substandard”,��accord�ng��to��one��of�� the��veterans��of��Roman�an��pr�nt��med�a,��Cornel��N�storescu,��who���s�� the��current��owner��of��the��onl�ne��newspaper��Cotidianul.ro.4 The��blogosphere,��he��says,��“concentrates��on��tr�fles��such��as��th�s��guy��has�� left�� th�s��party,�� that��pol�t�c�an’s��w�fe��has��affa�rs��or�� the�� l�ke”.��Very��often,��such��top�cs��are��not��only�� �rrelevant,��but��also��undocumented,��N�storescu��po�nts��out.��For��h�m,��a��blog�� �s�� just��a��personal��d�ary,�� lack�ng��any��k�nd��of��news��value��or��cr�t�cal��relevance.

It�� �s,��however,��unfa�r�� to��env�sage��the��blogosphere��as��a��bundle��of��superfluous���nformat�on��or��s�mply��as��a��new��compet�tor�� to�� the��trad�t�onal��med�a.��It�� �s�� true��that��several��of�� these��personal��s�tes,�� together��w�th��soc�al�s�ng��networks��(Facebook)��and��alternat�ve���nformat�on��platforms��(IndyMedia)��have��become���nstruments��promot�ng��c�v�c�� respons�b�l�ty,��soc�al��cr�t�c�sm��and��alternat�ve�� �nformat�on,��compet�ng��w�th��the��trad�t�onal��press,��wh�ch��has��a��hard��t�me��adapt�ng��to�� the��new��wave��of��“c�t�zen��journal�sm”.5��However,�� the��he�ghts�� reached��by��c�t�zen�� journal�sm��(and��here��we��have�� �n��m�nd��espec�ally�� the��blogosphere��centr�ng��on��soc�al,��pol�t�cal��and��even��med�a�� themes)�� should��not��be�� regarded��as��a�� threat�� to�� the��class�c��or�� trad�t�onal��med�a,��but��rather��as��a��complement�� to�� those��med�a.��Thus,��we��should��see��blogg�ng��as�� “supplement�ng�� and�� �nterconnect�ng�� the��work��of��profess�onal�� journal�sts”��wh�le��bloggers��d�str�bute��and��comment��on��the��art�cles��from��the��trad�t�onal��med�a,��broaden�ng���ts��aud�ence.6

W�thout�� fall�ng�� �nto�� the�� trap��of�� the�� f�erce��d�spute��between��bloggers�� and��journal�sts��and��w�thout��succumb�ng��to��apocalypt�c��pred�ct�ons��such��as��“The��Internet���s��go�ng��to��k�ll��all��pr�nt��newspapers”,��we��shall��start��from��the��prem�se��that��the��d�g�tal��med�a��channels��and��platforms��should��be��seen��as��a��way��of��challeng�ng��the��class�c��press��to��take��the��next��step��towards��the��2.0��Web���nteract�ve��culture.7��Judg�ng��from��the��perspect�ve��of��med�a��changes��and��technolog�cal��convergence,��as��expla�ned��by��Roger��F�dler,��the��newspapers,��the��magaz�nes,��the��TV��and��the��rad�o��w�ll��not��be��superseded��

4 Cornel Nistorescu, “România, între bloggeri și jurnaliști” [“Romania, between bloggers and��journal�sts”],�� �n��Cotidianul.ro,��27��Apr�l��2010��(http://www.cot�d�anul.ro/roman�a-�ntre-blogger�-s�-jurnal�st�-113321).

��5�� In��a��standard��def�n�t�on,��“c�t�zen��journal�sm”��refers��to��“any��contr�but�on��to��d�scuss�on���n��the��publ�c��sphere,��whether���n��the��form��of��s�mple���nformat�on,��syntheses,��report�ng,��or��op�n�on”��(Lew�s��Fr�edland��and��Nakho��K�m,��“C�t�zen��Journal�sm”,���n��Chr�stopher��H.��Sterl�ng,��(ed.),��Encyclopaedia of Journalism, Los��Angeles,��Sage��Publ�cat�ons,��2009,��p.��297).

��6�� Stephen��D.��Reese��et��al.,��“Mapp�ng��the��Blogosphere.��Profess�onal��and��C�t�zen-Based��Med�a���n��the��Global��News��Arena”,��Journalism, vol.��8(3),��2007,��p.��258.

��7�� Forged��by��T�m��O’Re�lly,�� the��concept��of��Web��2.0��“�ncludes��a��soc�al��element��where��users��generate��and��d�str�bute��content,��often��w�th��freedom��to��share��and��reuse”,��such��as���n��YouTube��or��W�k�ped�a��(Glen��Creeber��and��Royston��Mart�n,��“Introduct�on”�� �n�� idem,�� (eds.),��Digital Cultures. Understanding New Media,��New��York:��Open��Un�vers�ty��Press,��p.��3).��

278 �� Bloggers,��Journal�sts��and��Ep�stem�c��Respons�b�l�ty����/����V�ctor��POPESCU������������279

by��the��new��med�a,��but��re�ntegrated���n��the��d�g�tal��space.��The���dent�ty��of��the��source,���ts��cred�b�l�ty��and���ts��ed�tors’��brand��name��w�ll��cont�nue��to��matter���n��the��v�rtual��space.8��No��matter��what��publ�cat�on��med�um��the��future��news��journals��w�ll��belong��to,�� the�r��core��dut�es��rema�n�� the��same��–��prov�d�ng��respons�ble�� �nformat�on�� to�� the��publ�c,��a��strong��react�on�� to��abuses��and�� l�bert�es-or-l�fe-threats,��and�� the��support��of��op�n�on��exchanges��and��publ�c��d�scourses.9��At��the��same��t�me,��d�g�tal��journal�sts��w�ll��have��to��pay���ncreased��attent�on��to��the��values��spec�f�c��to���nteract�ve��journal�sm,���n��order��to��be��able��to��make��a��genu�ne��d�fference���n��the��realm��of��alternat�ve��sources��of���nformat�on��(blogs,��advocacy��and��c�t�zen��journal�sm��s�tes,��news��aggregators).

In��order��to��understand��what��the��new��eth�cal��and��profess�onal��po�nts��of��reference���n��onl�ne�� journal�sm��are��and��how��can��these��be�� �nst�lled�� �nto��med�a��profess�onals,��our��art�cle��w�ll��attempt�� to��solve�� two�� �nterrelated�� themes:��A)�� the��s�gn�f�cance��of��“�ntellectual��v�rtues”���n��onl�ne��journal�sm��and��B)��the���mportance��of��the��Roman�an��blogosphere��as��a��watchdog��for��profess�onal��journal�sm.

A)��Our��f�rst��hypothes�s���s��that��the��d�g�tal��journal�st’s��values/v�rtues��are��gu�ded��by��truth,�� transparency��and��cred�b�l�ty�� �n��front��of�� the��publ�c.��Thus,��we��w�ll��show��that�� the��profess�onal�zat�on�� �n�� the��onl�ne��med�a�� �nvolves�� �ncreased��emphas�s��on��the���ntellectual��v�rtues��(accuracy,��cur�os�ty��and��perseverance,��d�g�tal�� l�teracy),��wh�ch��can��be�� subsumed��by�� the��concept��of�� “ep�stem�c��respons�b�l�ty”,��understood��as��the��“central��[�ntellectual]��v�rtue��from��wh�ch��all��others�� rad�ate”.10��The��current��emphas�s��on�� the��aforement�oned��v�rtues���s��due��prec�sely��to�� the��fact�� that,��among��those��standards��of��excellence��that��are�� �nher�ted��from��the��class�c��press��(good��wr�t�ng,��depth�� �nqu�ry,��care��for��the��publ�c�� �nterest),�� those�� that��centre��on��accuracy11��and�� rel�ab�l�ty12�� are��the��most�� threatened�� �n�� the��context��of�� the��bus�ness��pressures��and��of�� the��f�erce��compet�t�on��among��onl�ne��newspapers��wh�ch�� tend�� to�� rec�procally��“cann�bal�ze”��the�r��genu�ne��content.13

��8�� Roger��F�dler,��Mediamorphosis. Understanding New Media, Thousand��Oaks,��CA:��P�ne��Forge��Press:��1997,��p.��257-258.��

��9�� Ib�d.10�� Lorra�ne�� Code,�� “Toward�� a�� ‘Respons�b�l�st’�� Ep�stemology”,�� �n�� Philosophy and

Phenomenological Research, vol.��45,��no��1,��Sept.��1984,��p.��34.��11�� Comment�ng��on��the��standards��for��excellence��(the��“v�rtues”)���n��onl�ne��journal�sm,��Dav�d��A.��

Cra�g��underl�nes�� the�� �mportance��of��speed��and��accuracy���n��break�ng��news:��“When��onl�ne��wr�ters��and��ed�tors��work��qu�ckly�� to��produce��mult�ple��stor�es��per��day�� �n��mult�ple�� forms��wh�le��hold�ng��str�ctly��to��accuracy��and��seek�ng��depth,��they��ach�eve��a��k�nd��of��newness��that��ra�ses��the��bar��for��what���mmed�ate��report�ng��can��prov�de��for��an��aud�ence”��(Dav�d��A.��Cra�g,��Excellence in Online Journalism,��Thousand��Oaks,��Ca.:��Sage,��2011,��p.��34).

12�� The��lax��ver�f�cat�on��or��even��the��confl�cts��of�� �nterest��are��very��dangerous��d�mens�ons��at��a��t�me��when��journal�sm��“requ�res��h�gher��standards��of�� �ntellectual��rel�ab�l�ty�� to��shore��up���ts��cred�b�l�ty��and��to��compensate��for��organ�zat�onal��pressures��to��d�lute���ts��standards”��(Sandra��L.��Borden,��Journalism as Practice: MacIntyre, Virtue Ethics and Press,��Hampsh�re:��Ashgate,��2007,��p.��86).

13�� Cf.��Angela��Ph�ll�ps,��“Old��Sources:��New��Bottles”,���n��Natal�e��Fenton��(ed.),��New Media, Old News. Journalism & Democracy in the Digital Age,��Los��Angeles:��Sage��Publ�cat�ons,��2010,��

B)��Our��second��hypothes�s�� �s�� that,�� �n��Roman�a,��h�ghl�ght�ng�� the��“�ntellectual��v�rtues”��of��d�g�tal�� journal�sts�� �s��due��espec�ally�� to�� the��cr�t�c�sms��made��by��the�� local��blogosphere.��Wh�le��one��cannot�� talk��about��moral-ph�losoph�cal��conceptual�sat�ons��made��by��these��Roman�an��bloggers,�� the��cr�t�cal��remarks��that��these��bloggers��d�rect��aga�nst��the��errors���n��onl�ne��journal�sm��can��be��seen��as��an��unprecedented��k�nd��of��“self-regulat�on”���n��the��Roman�an��med�a.��Thus,��the��adaptat�on��of�� journal�sts�� to�� the��ecology��of��d�g�tal��commun�cat�on��and��the�r��profess�onal��growth��could��be��encouraged��and,��partly,��fac�l�tated��by��the��much-cr�t�c�zed��bloggers.14��Often��act�ng��as��a��useful��m�rror��for�� journal�sts,��the��bloggers��play�� an��unprecedented�� funct�on��of�� regulat�on��w�th�n�� the��onl�ne��med�um,��adopt�ng��“the��role��of��watchdogs��of�� the��more��ma�nstream,��establ�shed��news��med�a”.15��Wh�le���t���s��not��an��obv�ous��h�gh-�mpact��trend,��th�s��cr�t�cal���n�t�at�ve��of��the��new��watchdogs��of��the��press���s��useful���n��the��Roman�an��env�ronment,��where�� the��wr�tten��press��has�� long�� lacked��enforcement��of��deontolog�cal��rules.16

These�� two��hypotheses��w�ll��be��addressed��concom�tantly,��only�� to��be��repr�sed��separately�� �n�� the��f�nal��sect�on.��Bes�des��an��attempt�� to��summar�ze�� the��op�n�ons��on��the��med�a��of�� the��most��w�dely��read��bloggers�� �n��Roman�a,��our��art�cle��w�ll�� rely��on��the��appl�cat�on��of��v�rtue��eth�cs�� to�� the��med�a�� (D.A.��Cra�g,��S.L.��Borden),��on�� the��observat�ons���n��v�rtue��ep�stemology��regard�ng��the��“�ntellectual/ep�stem�c��v�rtues”��(L.��Code),��and��on��the��analyses��centr�ng��on��the��profess�onal��env�ronment��of��the��d�g�tal��journal�sm���n��Roman�a.17

The-development-of-the-blogosphere:-From-“rough”-information-to-a-debate-space

The��terror�st��attacks��of��9/11��are��often��seen��as��a��breakthrough��moment��concern�ng��the��evolut�on��of��new��med�a.��Those��who��w�tnessed��the��collapse��of��the��Tw�n��Towers��

p.��96.14�� The�� journal�sts’��d�sparagement��of��bloggers�� �s��also��present�� �n��Western��countr�es,��where��

profess�onal�� journal�sts��cla�m�� that��blogs��are��badly��wr�tten,��egocentr�c,�� subject�ve��and��amateur�sh��-��cf.��Joyce��Y.M.��N�p,��“Explor�ng�� the��second��phase��of��publ�c�� journal�sm”,�� �n��Journalism Studies,��7(2),��2006,��p.��212-236.

15�� Laura��Hendr�ckson,��“Press��Protect�on���n��Blogosphere:��Apply�ng��a��Funct�onal��Def�n�t�on��of��‘Press’��to��News��Web��Logs”,���n��Mark��Tremayne��(ed.),��Blogging, Citizenship and Future of Media, New��York:��Routledge/Taylor��&��Franc�s��Group,��2007,��p.��187.��

16�� Cr�st�an��Gh�nea��and��Al�na��Mung�u-P�pp�d�,��“The��case��of��Roman�a”,�� �n�� the��Med�adem��Consort�um��report��Media policies and regulatory practices in a selected set of European countries, The EU and the Council of Europe, October��2010,��p.��327.

17�� See��Natal�a��Vas�lend�uc��and��Peter��Gross,��“New��Technology,��new��profess�onal��pract�ces:��A��study��on��Roman�an��new��med�a”,���n��Comunicatión Y Sociedad,��vol.��XXV,��num��1,��2012,��p.��59-83;��Mar�us��Dragom�r��and��Mark��Thompson��(eds.),��Mapping Digital Media: Romania,��London:��Open��Soc�ety��Foundat�on,��2010;��Rom�na��Surug�u��and��Raluca��Radu,��“Introduc�ng��New��Technolog�es���n��Med�a��Compan�es��from��Roman�a,��Portugal��and��Cyprus.��A��Comparat�-ve��Approach”,���n��Revista Română de Jurnalism și Comunicare, 3(4),��2009,��p.��93-102.��

280 �� Bloggers,��Journal�sts��and��Ep�stem�c��Respons�b�l�ty����/����V�ctor��POPESCU������������281

posted�� terr�fy�ng�� �mages��onl�ne�� shortly��after,�� �mages��wh�ch��were�� later��used��as��f�rst-hand��sources��by��newspapers��and��TV��networks.��L�ve���nformat�on��and��mov�ng��sequences��were��offered��at�� a�� rap�d��pace,�� somet�mes��as��m�nute-by-m�nute��news��bullet�ns.��The��terr�fy�ng��Amer�can��tragedy��“led��to��the��emergence��of��an��alternat�ve��space��of��commun�cat�on,��espec�ally��s�nce��the��trad�t�onal��med�a��were��unable��to��fulf�l��the��global��need��of���nformat�on”.18��Th�s��alternate���nformat�on��channels��rose��“rap�dly��offer�ng��correct��and��cred�ble�� �nformat�on”��on��several��subsequent�� traged�es��–�� the��Katr�na��Hurr�cane,�� the��As�an�� tsunami��and��the��London��or��Spa�n��terror�st��attacks.19��Moreover,��bes�des�� the�r�� �nformat�ve��value,�� the��blogs��became��arenas��of��debate��on��the��respons�b�l�ty��and��poss�ble��solut�ons�� to�� the��consequences��of�� those�� traged�es.��Although��an���mportant��part��of��the��alternat�ve��news��med�a��has��been��appropr�ated��by��“consumer�sm”��(advert�s�ng��and��brand�ng),��The��Internet��contr�butes,��at�� the��same��t�me,��to��the��democrat�zat�on��of���nformat�on��and��to��a��w�den�ng��of��the��publ�c��debate��arena.��New��med�a��allows�� the��creat�on��of��a��d�alogue��space�� through�� forums��and��d�scuss�on��groups��and��accelerates��the��mob�l�sat�on��of��d�fferent��op�n�ons.20

A��s�m�lar��development�� took��place�� �n�� the��Roman�an��blogosphere.21��Born��on��September��16,��2001,��w�th��a��note��on��the��d�sastrous��s�tuat�on��of��Roman�an��roads��(on��tron�u.blogspot.com),��blogg�ng��was��taken��ser�ously��only���n��2003,��when���t��was��tested��by several local pioneers coming either from journalism (Brăduț Ulmanu, with Jurnalismonline.ro)��or��from��the��entrepreneur�al��s�de��(Bogdan��“Bobby”��Vo�cu,��who��subsequently��became��Community Manager��for��Yahoo!Romania).��From��2005,��there���s��a��s�gn�f�cant��r�se��of��those��blogs��wr�tten��by��young��people��who��are���nexper�enced��wr�ters,�� followed�� �n��2006��by�� the��onl�ne��presence��of��veterans�� �n�� the�� f�elds��of��journal�sm,�� technology��or��publ�c�ty.��Thus,��blogg�ng��become��a�� trend,��“spark�ng��debate��over��whether��blogs��would��replace��trad�t�onal��med�a”.22��In�� th�s��manner,�� the��spec�al�zed��blogs��are��born,��wh�ch��w�ll��br�ng��cred�ble���nformat�on��and��w�ll��represent��an��essent�al��alternat�ve�� to�� the�� trad�t�onal��med�a�� that�� lean��more��and��more�� towards��the�� tablo�d��genre,��wh�ch�� �s��devo�d��of�� respons�b�l�ty.��The��new��med�a��became��a��cons�derable��force��and��a��regulat�ng��pr�nc�ple��of��soc�ety���n��an��age��where��“the��class�c��med�a��have��rema�ned��somewhat��a�mless��–��not��only�� �n��Roman�a��–��because��of�� �ts��opulence�� that��suppresses�� the��aud�ence's��concern��for�� the��common���nterest��and��the��future��of��the��nat�on,���n��contrast��to��the��aud�ence's��crave��for��enterta�nment”.23

The��alternat�ve��med�a��(blogs,��soc�al�s�ng��networks,��d�scuss�on��forums)�� thus��represent��more�� than��a��bunch��of��d�ary�� �mpress�ons,��accompan�ed��by��food��rec�pes��and��amateur��photos.��S�nce��the��pr�vate��l�fe��elements��and��the��“rough”���nformat�on��on��

18 Dorina Guțu-Tudor, New Media,��second��ed�t�on,��Bucharest:��Tr�ton�c,��2008,��p.��39.��19�� Ib�d.,��p.��40.��20�� Rémy��R�effel,��Sociologie des médias, Par�s:��Ell�pses��Publ�sh�ng,��2001.21 Our short history is based on the synthesis the media analyst Iulian Comănescu makes in his

book��Cum să devii un Nimeni [How to Become a Nobody],��(Bucharest:��Human�tas,��2009,��pp.��135-136)��and���n��h�s��art�cle��“The��collect�ve��art�cle��on��the��f�rst��Roman�an��blog”��(Dilema veche, 15��December��2007:��http://www.d�lemaveche.ro/sect�une/mass-comed�a/art�col/art�col-colect�v-despre-pr�mul-blog). Comănescu is also blogger and editor-in-chief of The Industry med�a��magaz�ne.��

22�� C.��Gh�nea��and��A.��Mung�u-P�pp�d�,��op. cit.,��p.��320.23 I. Comănescu, Cum să devii un Nimeni,��p.��147.

publ�c��events��moved��ma�nly�� to�� the��soc�al�s�ng��networks��(Facebook,��Tw�tter),�� the��blogosphere��has��offered��more��room��for��debate,��for��soc�al��cr�t�c�sm��and��alternat�ve���nformat�on,��necessary���ngred�ents��of�� the��democrat�c��publ�c��sphere,��of��a��d�alogue��space��wh�ch���s��not��dom�nated��by��econom�c���nterests��and��the��lobb�es��of�� the��med�a��trusts.24�� In�� the�� same��manner�� as�� abroad,�� the��blogs�� �n��Roman�a�� too,�� no�� longer��place��emphas�s��on��the��d�mens�on��of��d�ar�es��but��on��that��of��debate,��evaluat�on��and��comment.25

The-internet-generation-and-the-“antibody-blogs”

“We��don’t�� l�ke�� to��watch�� the��news��on��TV”,�� the��Internet-savvy��young��people��say;��the��d�g�tally-educated��generat�on��has��been��fed,��from��a��very��early��age,��on��publ�c�ty��and��market�ng��ads��and��has��thus��learned��to��be��susp�c�ous��of��the��messages��laced��w�th��tablo�d��exaggerat�on��or��econom�c���nterests.��“Honesty,��transparency��and��authent�c�ty��are��cruc�al���f��you��want��to��get��through��to��the��Net��Generat�on”.26��Th�s���s��the��context���n��wh�ch���ndependent��blogs��somet�mes��come��to��enjoy��as��much��cred�b�l�ty��as��trad�t�onal��med�a,��wh�ch��are��now��more��often�� than��not��met��w�th��“the��susp�c�on��of��corporate��control”.27

More�� and��more��people�� choose�� alternat�ve�� sources��of�� �nformat�on,�� often��preferr�ng��a��blog��or��an��onl�ne��local��newspaper��to��the��nat�onal��journals,��wh�ch��must��have��lost��some��of��the�r��relevance��and��cred�b�l�ty.28��Moreover,��the��blogosphere��hosts��an�� �ncreas�ng��number��of��spec�al�sts��com�ng��from��var�ous��areas,��who��do��not��seek��notor�ety,��but��only��want��to��counteract��the��d�stort�ons��of��the��truth��often��perpetrated��by��the��press.��Bloggers��w�th��legal�� tra�n�ng��often��correct�� the��tablo�d��news��referr�ng��to�� laws��and��penalt�es,��med�cal��experts��(for��example��PharmaGoss�p)��f�ght��aga�nst��

24�� Dav�d��Beers,��“The��Publ�c��Sphere��of��Onl�ne,��Independent��Journal�sm”,���n��Canadian Journal of Education,��2006,��pp.��109-130.��

25�� One��has�� to��not�ce�� that,�� �n��2009,��only��35%��of�� the��Roman�ans�� read��onl�ne��newspapers��(wh�le�� �n�� the��US��and��Germany,�� there��were�� tw�ce��as��much��such��readers)��and��only��15%��read��blogs��weekly.��In��2012,�� the��Roman�an��onl�ne��aud�ence���ncreased��s�gn�f�cantly��by��up��to��73%��(see��Sor�n��Adam��Mate�,��“50%��d�n��român���ajunge��pe��Net”��[”50%��of��Roman�ans��surf�� the��Net”],��publ�shed��on��Pagini.com,��September��8��2009,��at��http://www.pag�n�.com/blog/2009/09/08/roman��-ajung-pe-net-d�n-ce-�n-ce-ma�-des-unde-��-asteapta-m�rcea-badea/,��and��Eurostat�� report��“Internet��Access��and��Use�� �n��2012”,��at��http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_PUBLIC/4-18122012-AP/EN/4-18122012-AP-EN.PDF).��

26�� Don��Tapscott,��Grown Up Digital: How the Net Generation is Changing your World, New��York:��McGraw��H�ll,��2008,��p.��285.��

27�� Den���Ell�ott,��“Essent�al��Shared��Values��and��21st��Century��Journal�sm”,�� �n��Lee��W�lk�ns��and��Cl�fford��G.��Chr�st�ans��(eds.)��The Handbook of Mass Media Ethics,��New��York��/��London,��Routledge,��2009,��p.��36.��

28�� Read�ng��blogs���s��also��a��part��of��the��new��“mon�tor�al”��read�ng��style:��people��“scan��all��k�nds��of��news��and���nformat�on��sources��–��newspapers,��magaz�nes,��TV��shows,��blogs,��onl�ne��and��offl�ne��soc�al��networks,��and��so��on��–��for��the��top�cs��that��matter�� to��the�r��personal�ty”��(Mark��Deuze,��“Journal�sm,��C�t�zensh�p,��and��D�g�tal��Culture”,���n��Z.��Papachar�ss�,��(ed.),��Journalism and Citizenship: New Agendas. New��York:��Lawrence��Erlbaum/Taylor��and��Franc�s,��2009,��p.��18).

282 �� Bloggers,��Journal�sts��and��Ep�stem�c��Respons�b�l�ty����/����V�ctor��POPESCU������������283

the��publ�c�ty��campa�gns��of��the��pharmaceut�cs���ndustry,��wh�le��other��blogs��often��try��to��g�ve��a��clearer��p�cture��of�� the�� local��adm�n�strat�on’s��act�v�ty�� (MayorWatch,�� for��example,�� �s��centred��on��the��London��adm�n�strat�on).29��When��asked��why��they��have��chosen��th�s��form��of��“c�t�zen��journal�sm”,��the��authors��of��th�s��type��of��blog���nvar�ably��answer��that��they��only��want��to��“correct”��the��class�c��press���nformat�on.��“There��would��not��be��a��need��for��bloggers��l�ke��me���f��the��journal�sts��d�d��the�r��job��properly”,��says��an��adm�n�strator��of��one��of��these��profess�onal��blogs.30

It�� �s��hard�� to�� say�� to��what�� extent�� the��Roman�an��blogosphere�� �ncludes�� such��profess�onal��s�tes,��meant��to��correct��the���naccurac�es��of��the��press.��Wh�le��th�s��quest�on��rema�ns��open��for��further��research,��we��can,��however,�� �dent�fy��a��number��of��blogs,��often��owned��by��persons��who��worked��as��journal�sts��and��who��are��able��to��regard��the��press,��espec�ally��the��onl�ne��k�nd,���n��a��cr�t�cal��manner.��BlogulDeMedia��for��example��talks��about��the��“�nherent��blunders”���n��th�s��area.31��ReporterVirtual,��another��Roman�an��med�a��blog, often��broaches�� top�cs��wh�ch��concentrate��on�� the�� �nterface��between��management��and��the��pol�t�cal��d�mens�ons��of��journal�sm,��hop�ng��to��restore��the��“lost��d�gn�ty”��of�� the��press.32��There�� �s��a�� long�� l�st��of��well-known��blogs,��wh�ch��refer,�� �n��one��way��or��another,�� to�� the��press�� (StareaPresei,��PaginaDeMedia, Tolo.ro).��What��we��are���nterested���n���s��the��fact��that��blogg�ng��journal�sts��have��already��carved��out��for��themselves,���n��a��spontaneous��manner,��a��place��that��hosts��debates��on��the��top�c��of��the��Roman�an��press��(class�c��and��d�g�tal).��“Zoso’s”��cr�t�c�sm��of��the��journal�sts’���nab�l�ty��to��adapt�� to��the��requests��of�� the��onl�ne��med�um��(see��above)��exempl�f�es��the��type��of��react�ons��awakened��by�� the��errors��made��by��class�c�� journal�sts�� �n�� the�r��passage�� to��d�g�tal��med�a.

It�� �s��by��that��k�nd��of��bloggers’��cr�t�c�sm��that��“the��new��med�a��become��the��only��feedback��mechan�sm��of��the��classic��or��old��med�a”��and��the��blogs��become��the��“natural��ant�bod�es��of��democracy”.33��Even���f��th�s��label��w�dely��refers��to��the��publ�c��space,��we��bel�eve�� that�� �t��could��be��also��appropr�ate�� for�� the��m�cro��publ�c��space�� �nhab�ted��by��journal�sts��and��bloggers,��s�nce��the��latter��are��regarded��as��“med�a��watchdogs”:��“they��employ��the��blogosphere��to��draw��attent�on��to���ssues��marg�nal�zed��or���gnored��by��the��ma�nstream��med�a”.34��Th�s��spec�al��type��of��“regulat�on”���n��the��new��med�a,��cons�st�ng��of��op�n�ons��and��cr�t�c�sm��by��the��blogosphere��d�rected��aga�nst��the��press��(or��the��other��way��round),��proves��espec�ally�� �mportant�� for�� the��funct�on�ng��of�� the��d�g�tal��press.��These��are��reasons��why��we��bel�eve��th�s��phenomenon���s��worth��clar�fy�ng,���nstead��of��be�ng��seen��as��a��mere��symptom��of��the��f�erce��debate��between��bloggers��and��journal�sts:��

•�� Compared��to��other��profess�ons,��there���s��no��“job��descr�pt�on”��for��journal�sts��that���s��subject��to��well-def�ned��regulat�on;���n��other��words,��there��are��no��clear��

29�� N�ck��Couldry,��“New��Onl�ne��News��Sources��and��Wr�ter-Gatherers”,���n��Natal�e��Fenton��(ed.),��New Media, Old News. Journalism & Democracy in the Digital Age,��pp.��142-144.

30�� Ib�d.,��p.��144.31�� Cf.��http://bloguldemed�a.ro/despre/.��32�� Cf.��http://www.reporterv�rtual.ro/about.��33 I. Comănescu, Cum să devii un Nimeni,��p.��149.��34�� Z�z���Papachar�ss�,��“The��C�t�zen���s��the��Message.��Alternat�ve��Modes��of��C�v�c��Engagement”,���n��

�dem,��(ed.)��Journalism and Citizenship: New Agendas.��New��York:��Lawrence��Erlbaum/Tay-lor��and��Franc�s,��2009,��p.��37.

standards�� that��refer�� to��spec�f�c��areas��of��competence,��except��for��a��var�able��set��of��ed�t�ng��techn�ques��and��of��“a��body��of��knowledge��wh�ch��leg�t�m�ses��the��journal�sts’��m�ss�on��and��soc�al��respons�b�l�ty”.35

•�� Although��Roman�a��has��possessed��a��un�f�ed��Profess�onal��Eth�cs��Code��s�nce��2009,�� followed��by�� the��organ�zat�ons�� that�� represent�� the��wr�tten��press,�� th�s��Code��has��not��been���nternal�zed��and��enforce���n��an��adequate��manner��by��the��journal�sts��or��by��those���n��charge.36

•�� There�� �s��no��eth�cal��organ�zat�on�� that�� spec�al�zes�� �n�� the�� regulat�on��of�� the��wr�tten��press�� (pr�nt��or��onl�ne),37��wh�ch��would��be��an�� �nst�tut�on��hav�ng��a��s�m�lar��role��to��that��of��the��Nat�onal��Aud�o-v�sual��Counc�l��wh�ch��takes��care��of��the��Roman�an��publ�c��TV��and��rad�o��networks.

•�� The��bloggers��that��have��a��man�fest���nterest���n��the��regulat�on��of��the��press��have��become��notor�ous���n��the��sphere��of��the��new��med�a.38

What-bloggers-demand:-Accuracy,-transparency,-digital-expertise

The��age��of��“bel�eve��me,��but�� �t�� �s��as�� I��say”,�� that�� �s,��of�� the��ep�stem�c��author�ty��of��the��journal�st,�� �s��at��an��end.��The��grow�ng��mult�tude��of�� the��med�a��channels��and��the��susp�c�ous��att�tude��of��the��“Net��Generat�on”��have��g�ven��r�se��to��a��new��att�tude,��wh�ch��can��be��summed��up��by��the��pr�nc�ple:��“Be��scept�cal!”��Th�s��means��that��we,��the��readers,��don’t��have��“to��take��for��granted��the��trustworth�ness��of��what��we��read,��see��or��hear��from��med�a��of��all��k�nds,��whether�� from��trad�t�onal��news��organ�zat�ons,��blogs��or��onl�ne��v�deos”.39

Bloggers��are��undoubtedly��the��most��demand�ng,��cr�t�cal��and��“scept�cal”��readers��of�� the��profess�onal��med�a,��because�� they��compete��w�th��news��profess�onals��and��

35�� M�ha���Coman,��Introducere în sistemul mass-media��[Introduction to the Media System],��th�rd��edition, Iași: Polirom, 2007, p. 240.

36�� A��major��concern��for��the��Roman�an��press,���dent�f�ed���n��2011��by��the��M�ss�on��of��the��European��Federat�on��of��Journal�sts��(EFJ),���s��the��lack��of��a��“well��establ�shed��and��recogn�zed��mechan�sm��of��self-regulat�on���n�� the��med�a”;�� that�� �s��why��EFJ��recommends��the�� journal�sts’��Un�ons�� to��“promote��the��Profess�onal��Eth�cs��Code”��and��to��create��“a��debate��about�� the���mportance��of��a��new��approach�� to��med�a��accountab�l�ty��and��eth�cs”�� (Journalism in the Shadows: The Challenge for Press Freedom in Romania,��Report��of��EJF��M�ss�on,��3-4��February��2011,��p.��14��–��access�ble��onl�ne��at��http://europe.�fj.org/assets/docs/215/123/229d0d7-93d7a7b.pdf).��

37�� Ib�d.38�� In��November��2012,�� the��mon�tor�ng��blog��ZeList.ro�� �ncluded�� �n�� the��Top100��of�� famous��

Roman�an��blogs,��the��blog��Tolo.ro belonging to Cătălin Tolontan, editor-in-chief for “Gazeta Sportur�lor”,��the��aforement�oned��s�te��Reporter Virtual,�� the��op�n�on��aggregators��VoxPublica��and��Contributors,�� �nclud�ng��notor�ous��sen�or��ed�tors,�� the��pol�t�cal��blog��Sutu.ro��of��Cr�st���Șuțu, former senior editor of serveral newspapers, Orlando.ro,�� the��blog��belong�ng�� to��Orlando Nicoară, the head of the Mediafax Group, and the blog Ciutacu.ro of the former ed�tor-�n-ch�ef��of��the��nat�onal��newspaper��Jurnalul Național.��All��these��blogs��frequently��post���nformat�on,��op�n�ons,��evaluat�ons��and��debates��on��the��top�c��of��the��Roman�an��press.��

39�� Dan��G�llmor,�� “Toward��a�� (New)��Med�a��L�teracy�� �n�� a��Med�a��Saturated��World”,�� �n��Z.��Papachar�ss�,�� (ed.),��Journalism and Citizenship: New Agendas. New��York:��Lawrence��Erlbaum/Taylor��and��Franc�s,��2009,��p.��9.

284 �� Bloggers,��Journal�sts��and��Ep�stem�c��Respons�b�l�ty����/����V�ctor��POPESCU������������285

cont�nuously��challenge�� the��“author�ty”��of�� trad�t�onal��med�a40.��But�� th�s��challenge��to��author�ty��can��also��be��seen��as��a��chance��to��ra�se��the��standards��of��excellence��of��the��onl�ne��med�a.��As�� the�� famous�� journal�st��Alex��Jones��stated,��“accountab�l�ty�� �s�� the��greatest��th�ng��that��blogs��are��br�ng�ng��to��journal�sm”.41��As��we��w�ll��show��below,��the��ma�n��values��and��v�rtues��that��bloggers��demand��from��journal�sts��are��those��belong�ng��to��the��“�ntellectual”��realm:��truth,��cred�b�l�ty,��transparency,��honesty��and��trust.��In��the��struggle��aga�nst��alternat�ve��sources,��cred�b�l�ty��and��the��reader’s��trust��are��the��surv�val��chance��of��the��trad�t�onal��med�a��wh�ch��seeks��to��take���ts��place��among��the��new��med�a.��Here��are��some��examples���n��th�s��respect:��

Accuracy and fact checking. Some��years�� ago,��one��of�� the��most��popular��Romanian bloggers, musician and actor Tudor Chirilă (who is an exception compared��to��the��other��bloggers��who��wr�te��about��the��med�a,��s�nce��he��does��not��have��press��exper�ence)��conducted��an��exper�ment��meant��to��demonstrate��the���ncompetence��of�� the��so-called��“copy-paste”�� journal�sts,��who,�� �n��haste,��mechan�cally��copy�� the��news, without even minimally checking them. Chirilă wrote on his blog42��the��story��of��how��he��ran��stark��naked���n��the��c�ty��centre��of��Bucharest.��Shortly��after, Ziare.com��(a��news��aggregator)�� took��over�� th�s�� �tem��of��news��as��such,��w�thout��pr�or��check�ng.��After Chirilă admitted this was a hoax43,��Ziare.com cla�med��that�� the�� �nformat�on��should��not��be��checked���f���t��was��d�rectly��taken��from��the��person���nvolved.��The��way���n��wh�ch��the��news��aggregator��above��chose��to��defend���tself��reveals��the��general��s�tuat�on��of��Roman�an��journal�sts,��who��are��more���nto��fast��select�on��among��mult�ple��sources��(blogs,��mob�le��conversat�ons,��chats,��RSS)��and��much��less��concerned��w�th��d�gg�ng��for���nformat�on.��In��Roman�an��onl�ne��journal�sm,��“pr�v�leg�ng��speed��over��thorough��fact��check�ng”���s��an��unfortunate��outcome��of��the��d�g�t�zat�on��of��the��journal�sts’��work.44

Digital expertise. At�� the�� beg�nn�ng�� of�� the�� art�cle,�� we�� quoted�� “Zoso’s”��observat�ons��concern�ng��the���nab�l�ty��of��onl�ne��journal�sts�� to��organ�ze��the��content��of��a��webpage.��The��blogger��and��former��ed�tor-�n-ch�ef��of�� the��nat�onal��newspaper��Adevărul Mihnea Măruță also talks about the way in which bloggers know how to�� tell��stor�es�� that��“warm��the��readers’��hearts”,��someth�ng��that�� trad�t�onally-tra�ned��journal�sts��need�� to�� learn:��“Now��you��can��add��v�deo��mater�als,�� texts,�� l�nks�� to�� the��sources��you��used,��wh�ch���s,��over��all,��more��than��you��were��able��to��do���n��pr�nt,��where��you��could��at��most��add��a��photo��gallery”.45��The��access�on��of��the��press��to��the��onl�ne��

40�� See��Stephen��D.��Reese��et��al.,��op. cit.,��p.��259.41�� Quoted��by��Rebecca��MacK�nnon���n��her��report��of��the��press��conference��“Blogg�ng,��Journal�sm��

&��Cred�b�l�ty.��Battleground��and��Common��Ground”��wh�ch��took��place���n��2005���n��Harvard��(http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/publ�cat�ons/2005/Blogg�ng_Journal�sm_Cred�b�l�ty).��

42 Tudor Chirila, “300. Erată” [“300. Erratum”], May 15, 2008 on Tudor Chirila.blogspot.com��(http://tudorch�r�la.blogspot.com/2008/05/300-erata.html).

43�� S�nce��Internet��hoaxes��are��more��and��more��frequent,���t���s��no��wonder��that��the��updated��var�ant��of��the��eth�cal��code��of��the��Canad�an��Assoc�at�on��of��Journal�sts��st�pulates:��“We��cons�der��all��onl�ne��content��carefully,���nclud�ng��blogg�ng,��and��content��posted��to��soc�al��med�a.��We��do��not��re-post��rumours��–��see��CAJ Ethics Guidelines,��http://j-source.ca/art�cle/caj-eth�cs-gu�del�nes.

44�� Mar�us��Dragom�r��and��Mark��Thompson��(eds.),��op. cit., p.��43.45 Mihnea Măruță, “Revoluția biografică” [“The biographical turn”] communication presented

at��the��th�rd��ed�t�on��of��the��debate��ser�es��“D�n��On��în��Off”��organ�zed��by��the��blog��TVdece.ro���n��Cluj��on��October��27,��2011.��See��the��v�deo��record�ng��on��http://m�hneamaruta.ro/2011/10/28/

med�um��requ�res��journal�sts��to��become��adequately��fam�l�ar��w�th��the���nstruments��and��“ecology”��of��the��d�g�tal��med�a.��Journal�sts��have��to��adapt��the�r��wr�t�ng��style��(wh�ch��should��be��shorter��and��more��d�rect),�� to��effect�vely��use��search�� tools,�� to��be��able�� to��ed�t��v�deo��and��aud�o��mater�als.��All���s��part��of��a��“d�g�tal��expert�se”��that���s��necessary���n��order�� to�� �mprove�� the��qual�ty��of��onl�ne�� journal�sm.46��Unfortunately,��Roman�an��onl�ne��journal�sts��had��a��harder��t�me��adapt�ng��to��the��new��med�a��than��bloggers,��ma�nly��because,���n��Roman�a,��the��d�g�t�zat�on��of��the��med�a��began��later��than���n��the��countr�es��of��Western��Europe,��but��also��because��Roman�an��med�a��compan�es��“d�d��not��organ�ze��coherent��tra�n�ng��programs��for��the��use��of��new��technolog�es”.47

Transparency and integrity. “The��blogosphere’s��golden��rule”�� �s�� to��always��quote��sources��and��also�� the��reasons��for��wh�ch��you��wr�te,�� the��pr�nc�ples��you��ab�de��by��and�� the��means��by��wh�ch��you��came��by�� the��sources��you��offer.48�� It�� that�� sense,��journalist, blogger and “green” activist Mihai Goțiu “denounces”, on the blog aggregator VoxPublica,��a��number��of��ads��that��were��presented���n��the��gu�se��of��news��on�� the�� s�te��of��Realitatea TV�� (both��outlets�� are��part��of�� the�� same��med�a��group��–��Realitatea Media).��The��“advertor�als”��were��advocat�ng��a��quest�onable��gold��m�n�ng��project�� �n��Roman�a.49��The�� lack��of�� transparency/�ntegr�ty��can��be��expla�ned��by�� the��mental�ty��of��the��journal�sts��of��the��2000s��generat�on,��who��are��known��to��g�ve���n��to��the��bus�ness��demands��of��the��med�a��trusts��they��belong��to.��The��d�g�tal��med�um���s��used��by��Roman�an��onl�ne��journal�sts��for��“�ncreas�ng��the��array��of��money-mak�ng��veh�cles��to��the��detr�ment��of���ncreas�ng��the��platforms��for��soc�ally��respons�ble��med�a”.50

The�� l�st�� conta�n�ng�� the��bloggers’�� cr�t�cal�� remarks��d�rected��aga�nst��onl�ne��journal�sts�� could�� go�� on�� –�� from�� plag�ar�sm�� (“copy-paste”�� journal�sm)�� to��unacknowledged��correct�ons��(correct�ons���ntroduced��d�rectly���ns�de��the��body��of��the��art�cle,�� �nstead��of��prov�d�ng��an��errata),��from��the��lack��of���nteract�on��w�th��readers��to��confl�cts��of���nterests.��All�� these��standards��are��necessary��to��ensure��the��cred�b�l�ty��of��onl�ne��journal�sm,��wh�ch��has��been��challenged��by��bloggers,��and��to��offer��val�d��and��useful���nformat�on��to��the��publ�c.��Bes�des��the��care��for��the��commun�ty’s��welfare,���n��the��context��of��“the��pressure��of���mmed�acy”,��onl�ne��journal�sts��must��comb�ne��the��concern��for��accuracy,��the��sp�r�t��of���n�t�at�ve��and��the���nqu�s�t�veness��and,��last��but��not��least,��the��ab�l�ty��to��d�scern��between��the��real��knowledge��of��hoaxes��and��goss�p.51

In��the��last��sect�on,��we��w�ll��not��only��attempt��to��summar�ze��the��most���mportant��ab�l�t�es��or�� “v�rtues”��of�� the�� journal�sts�� that�� l�ve�� �n�� the��Web��2.0.�� age,��but�� also���nvest�gate���n��what��way��the��cr�t�c�sm��brought��by��blogg�ng��journal�sts��could��partly��

revolut�a-b�ograf�ca/.46�� Dom�n�c�� Boyer,�� “D�g�tal�� Expert�se�� �n�� Onl�ne�� Journal�sm�� (and��Anthropology)”,�� �n��

Anthropological Quarterly,��volume��83(1),��2010,��p.��87-89.��47�� R.��Surug�u��and��R.��Radu,��op. cit.48�� Cec�l�a��Fr�end��and��Jane��B.��S�nger,��Online Journalism Ethics. Traditions and Transitions,��

M.E.��Sharpe,��New��York,��p.��123.49 Mihai Goțiu, “MythBusters la Roșia Montană” [“MythBusters joining Roșia Montană”],

publ�shed��on��VoxPublica�� (http://voxpubl�ca.real�tatea.net/pol�t�ca-soc�etate/mythbusters-la-ros�a-montana-noua-avalansa-de-m�nc�un�-publ�c�tare-de-la-rmgc-ch�ar-pe-a�c�-pe-real�tatea-net-68940.html).

50�� N.��Vas�lend�uc��and��P.��Gross,��op. cit.,��p.��80.51�� D.A.��Cra�g,��op. cit., p.��21.��

286 �� Bloggers,��Journal�sts��and��Ep�stem�c��Respons�b�l�ty����/����V�ctor��POPESCU������������287

support�� the��eth�c��and��profess�onal�� regulat�on��of�� the��onl�ne��press.��We��w�ll�� try�� to��exam�ne���n��what��way,��values��and��pr�nc�ples�� that��are��spec�f�c�� to��d�g�tal�� journal�sts��can��be���nculcated���n���nnovat�ve��ways��w�thout��appeal�ng��to��restr�ct�ng��and��pol�t�cally��sens�t�ve��laws.

The-ethics-of-intellectual-virtues-and-its-regulation-by-the-blogosphere

Epistemic responsibility. As��a�� funct�on��of�� f�nanc�al��and�� temporal�� l�m�tat�ons,��journal�sm��was��def�ned��as��a��hast�ly��wr�tten��h�story.52��The��novelty,��by��no��means��easy��to��accept,��of��the��new��med�a���s��that��now��contents��are��no��longer��per�shable,��but��can��be��accessed��(almost)��any��t�me��and��(almost)��anywhere.��Wh�le�� �n�� the��past,��a��rad�o��show��was��lost���nto��th�n��a�r��once���t��was��over��and��paper��soon��found���ts��way���nto��the��garbage��b�n,���n��the��onl�ne��med�um,��the��rad�o��show��can��now��become��a��podcast��and��the��ed�t�on��of��the��paper��that��was��publ�shed��a��month��ago��becomes��quas�-synonymous��w�th�� the�� s�te��of�� the�� same��newspaper.��Th�s�� �s��what��prompts�� the��update��or�� the��rev�s�on��of��the��mater�als��wh�ch��appear���n��onl�ne��newspapers��once��new��and��relevant���nformat�on��has��appeared��on��the��same��top�c.��Metaphor�cally��speak�ng,���f��the��class�c��press��suffered��from��an��“attent�on��def�c�t”��–��wh�ch��meant��that��an���tem��of��news��was��read�ly��abandoned��and�� �ts��consequences��seldom��mon�tored,��due�� to�� the��prejud�ce��that��the��publ�c��would��lose���nterest��soon��after,��the��new��med�a��seem��to��suffer��from��the��reverse��tendency,��an��“obsess�ve-compuls�ve”��one:��the��blogger��(but��also��the��d�g�tal��journal�st)��comes��w�th��“a�� l�near��d�scourse,�� �ntertw�ned��cases��and��stor�es,��wh�ch��repeat��themselves��and��become��more��complex��w�th��each��pass�ng��day”.53��Due��to��the��poss�b�l�ty��of��complet�on��and��subsequent��adjustment��of��the��s�tuat�on,��the��so-called��hast�ly��wr�tten��h�story��should��become,�� �n��The��Internet��age,��a��cumulat�ve��h�story,��wh�ch��grows��more��and��more��accurate��and��cred�ble.

From��the��po�nt��of��v�ew��of��the��necess�ty��to��rev�se��and��complete��the��news,��onl�ne��event�� report�ng��has��begun�� to�� resemble��sc�ent�f�c�� research,�� s�nce�� �t�� requ�res�� the��same��type��of���ntellectual��v�rtues.��In��the��case��of��lab���nvest�gat�ons,��bes�des��phys�cal��sk�lls,��such��as��v�sual��acu�ty��(wh�ch���s��a��requ�red��“sensor�al”��v�rtue),��the��stress��falls��on��the��ab�l�t�es�� that��perta�n�� to��determ�nat�on��and���nqu�s�t�veness:��a��sharp��sp�r�t��of��observat�on,��an��open��m�nd��from��an���ntellectual��po�nt��of��v�ew��(the��ab�l�ty��of��accept�ng��that��your��hypothes�s���s��wrong),��the��care��for��check�ng��data,��perseverance��(a��cont�nual��actual�zat�on��of��your��knowledge).��All�� these��sk�lls,��wh�ch��guarantee��profess�onal��excellence�� �n�� the�� f�eld��of�� research,��contr�bute�� to��“our��reliability as agents;�� they��enable��us�� to��deploy�� rel�able�� facult�es��and��mechan�sms�� to��good��effect”.54��These��

52�� Cl�fford��G.��Chr�st�ans��et��al.,��Media Ethics: Cases and Moral Reasoning,��n�nth��ed�t�on,��New��York:��Pearson,��2011.��

53 I. Comănescu, Cum să devii un Nimeni,��p.��146.��An��example���n��th�s��respect���s��the��temporary��add�t�on���n��the��d�g�tal��layout��of��Roman�an��newspapers��(Adevărul, Evenimentul Zilei)��of��new��sect�ons,��bes�des��the��trad�t�onal��ones��(Pol�t�cs,��Soc�ety,��Art��&��Culture,��Sport)��centr�ng��on��the��report��of��more��complex��events��or��stor�es��stretch�ng��on��several��days��(a��famous��f�lm��fest�val,��a��ser�es��on��the��recent��h�story��of��Roman�an��Commun�sm,��etc.).��

54�� Chr�stopher��Hookway,��“How��to��be��a��V�rtue��Ep�stemolog�st”,���n��M.��DePaul��and��L.��Zagzebsk���(eds.),��Intellectual Virtue. Perspectives from Ethics and Epistemology,��Oxford:��Clarendon��

“�ntellectual��v�rtues”��are��not��requ�red��only���n�� the��case��of��phys�c�sts��or��b�olog�sts.��They��should��also��be��shared��by��another��type��of��“agent”,��who���s��also���n��pursu�t��of��the��truth,��namely��the��journal�st.��In��the��case��of�� the��onl�ne��journal�st,��perseverance��(the��news��update)��and��a��preoccupat�on��for��an��attent�ve��source��check��(from��blog��goss�p��to�� fake��statements)��acqu�res��new��d�mens�ons��wh�ch��d�d��not��character�ze��class�c��journal�sm,��where��the��sources��(faxes,��phone��calls,��press��conferences)��were��usually��more��rel�able.

W�thout��deny�ng��the���mportance��of��courage,��of��honesty,���mpart�al�ty,��the��search��for�� just�ce��or�� �nvolvement�� �n�� the��commun�ty’s��causes��(for�� the��greater��good)��or��of��the��respect��for��trad�t�on,55��we��bel�eve��that��the��passage��from��class�c��journal�sm��to��the��new��med�a��requ�res,��above��all,�� the��strengthen�ng��and��tra�n�ng��of�� two��profess�onal��v�rtues�� that��are�� separate��yet�� �ntertw�ned:��on�� the��one��hand,�� the�� loyalty�� towards��one’s��publ�c��(a��v�rtue��that��has��become���ncreas�ngly��necessary���n��the��context��of��an���ncreased���nteract�v�ty��between��journal�sts��and��readers,��as��readers��are��able��to��post��the�r��op�n�ons��at��the��end��of��the��onl�ne��art�cle),��and��on��the��other��hand,��what��we��could��call��“ep�stem�c��respons�b�l�ty”.56��The��latter��actually��compr�ses��several�� �ntellectual��“sub-v�rtues”,��some��of��wh�ch��were��already��d�scussed���n��the��prev�ous��sect�ons.��The��journal�st’s��scept�c�sm��of�� the��poss�ble��“traps”��set��by��pol�t�c�ans��or��by��those���n��the��advert�s�ng��bus�ness,��the�r��modesty��(the��ava�lab�l�ty��to��correct��the�r��reports),��but��also��the��honesty��(transparency)��and��the��cred�b�l�ty��offered��by��the��accuracy��and��attent�ve���nformat�on��check57��are��all���ntellectual��v�rtues��essent�al��to��any��journal�st�c��genre,��but,��more��than��ever,��espec�ally��for��the��onl�ne��med�a.��All��th�s��can��be��placed���n��the��realm��of��“ep�stem�c��respons�b�l�ty”,���n��the��sense��of��an��ab�l�ty��to��d�scern��between��knowledge��and�� rumour/op�n�on�� and�� to��del�m�t�� the�� �nformat�on��wh�ch�� �s��worth�� thorough��research.��In��the��terms��of��v�rtue��ep�stemology��(L.��Code),��“ep�stem�c��respons�b�l�ty”��(synonymous��w�th��Ar�stotel�an��“w�sdom”)��presupposes��an��ab�l�ty�� to�� real�ze��how��ser�ous��the��effort��of���nqu�ry��should��be��“before���t���s��reasonable��to��cla�m��knowledge”��and��“what��cogn�t�ve��ends��are��worth��pursu�ng”���n��our��own���nterest,��but��espec�ally���n��the��common���nterest��of��an��ent�re��commun�ty.58

The��stress��on�� �ntellectual��v�rtues�� �s�� translated�� �n�� the��case��of�� journal�sm��as��an��extra��degree��of��profess�onal�zat�on.��The�� �mprovement��of�� the��qual�ty��of�� the��journal�st’s��work��co�nc�des�� �n�� th�s��case��w�th��an��eth�cs��of��“�ntellectual��v�rtues”.��Along��w�th��L�povetsky,��we��state��that��address�ng��the��essent�al��quest�ons��and��res�st�ng��rumour��and��man�pulat�on��are��sk�lls��enacted��not��only��due��to��a��“clear��consc�ence”,��but��ma�nly��due��to��“profess�onal���ntell�gence”.��Th�s���s��acqu�red��above��all��due��to��an��

Press,��2003,��p.��188.55�� Dan��G�llmor,��We the Media. Grassroots Journalism by the People for the People,��Sebas-

topol,��Ca.:��O’Re�lly��Med�a,��2004,��p.��134.56�� We��take��over�� th�s��concept��from��an��approach��on��the��eth�cs��of�� journal�sm��based��on��v�rtue��

eth�cs.��A��former��journal�st,��but��also��a��spec�al�st���n��Alasda�r��MacIntyre’s��ph�losophy,��Sandra��L.��Borden��uses��the��term��“ep�stem�c��respons�b�l�ty”���n��order��to��refer��to��a��group��of���ntellectual��v�rtues,��wh�ch�� range�� from��honesty�� and�� cred�b�l�ty�� to�� the��w�ll�ngness�� to��prov�de�� the���nformat�on��necessary��for��the��flour�sh�ng��of��the��commun�ty��(Sandra��L.��Borden,��Journalism as Practice: MacIntyre, Virtue Ethics and Press,��ed.��c�t.,��p.��50��et��sq.).

57�� For��the��l�st��of��the��journal�st’s���ntellectual��v�rtues��see��S.L.��Borden,��op. cit., pp.��17-20.��58�� L.��Code,��op. cit., p.��41.

288 �� Bloggers,��Journal�sts��and��Ep�stem�c��Respons�b�l�ty����/����V�ctor��POPESCU������������289

“�ntellectual�st��eth�cs”��concerned��w�th��profess�onal�zat�on,�� the��pursu�t��of�� truth��and��the��cur�os�ty��for��the��world.59

A substitute for ethics committees.��The���nterest�ng���ssue,��at��least��for��Roman�a,���s��that��the���ntellectual��values��and��v�rtues��of��onl�ne��journal�sm,��wh�ch��res�de��w�th�n��the��per�meter��of��ep�stem�c��respons�b�l�ty,��are��taken���nto��account��by��bloggers��rather��than��by��an��eth�cs��code��or��by��eth�cal��boards.��The��2009��Profess�onal��Eth�cs��Code,��adopted��by�� the��Convent�on��of�� the��Med�a��Organ�zat�ons�� �n��Roman�a,�� �ncludes��chapters��referr�ng��to��check�ng���nformat�on,��to��plag�ar�sm��or���nformat�on��correct�ons,��but���t��was��not��updated��(to��the��end��of��2012)��to��refer��to��onl�ne��journal�sm.60��Even���f���t��st�pulated��that��the��rules��and��pr�nc�ples��of��th�s��code��refer��to��the��onl�ne��med�um��as��well��(art.��1.3),��as��well��as��for��the��wr�tten��press��(pr�nt��and��onl�ne),��there���s��no��eth�cal��and��nat�onal��counc�l��meant��to��enforce��the��conduct��code,��such��as,��for��example,�� the��Press��Compla�nt��Comm�ss�on���n��the��Un�ted��K�ngdom.��Thus,�� the��self-regulat�on��of��the��Roman�an��press��cannot��funct�on��properly.61

Th�s�� �s��why��we��bel�eve�� that�� the��debates��and��cr�t�c�sms�� that��have��appeared���n��the��blogosphere��on��the��level��of�� the��profess�onal��press,��concern�ng��not��only��the��journal�sts,��but��also��the��abus�ve��managers��and��pol�t�c�ans��who��man�pulate��the��press,��are��meant��to��compensate��for��certa�n��gaps��regard�ng��the���nst�tut�onal�zat�on��of��med�a��eth�cs;��deontolog�cal��codes��have��not��been��properly���nternal�zed��and��the��owners��of��press��trusts���nterfere���n��the��ed�tor�al��process��or��abus�vely��f�re��those��who��have��become��an��encumbrance.��There��are��no��eth�cal��comm�ttees��for��the��wr�tten��press��and��last,��but��not��least,��there��are��no��ombudsmen���n��the��pr�vate��trusts��who��would��l�sten��and��react��to��the��publ�c’s��cr�t�c�sm.��W�thout��be�ng��a��separate���nst�tut�on��and��w�thout��represent�ng��the��w�ll��of��the��people,��blogg�ng��journal�sts��appear��as��a��sui generis�� �nstance��placed��somewhere��between�� the��press��counc�ls,��made��up��of��exper�enced�� journal�sts��who��da�ly��analyse��poss�ble��code��v�olat�ons��for��s�gn�f�cant��newspapers,��and��the��c�t�zen��assoc�at�ons��that��lodge��compla�nts��or��wr�te��letters��deplor�ng��the��uneth�cal��deal�ngs��of��the��press.62

Thus,��beyond��the��bell�gerent��parad�gm��wh�ch��opposes��bloggers��to��journal�sts,��we��bel�eve�� that,��w�th�n�� the��Roman�an��context,�� the��cr�t�cal��att�tude��com�ng��from��the��blogs��that��centre��on��the��cr�t�c�sm��of�� journal�sm���s��a��pos�t�ve��th�ng,��wh�ch��can��contr�bute�� to��a��better��awareness��of�� the�� �mportance��of��cred�b�l�ty��and��verac�ty�� �n��the��onl�ne��med�a,��where��loyalty��to��an���ncreas�ngly��d�scr�m�nat�ng��publ�c���s��the��key��to�� the��surv�val��of��profess�onal�� journal�sm.��Naturally,�� the��cr�t�c�sm��on�� the�� themes��of��eth�cs��and��profess�onal�zat�on�� �ssued��by��watchdog��bloggers��does��not�� replace��

59�� G�lles��L�povetsky,��Le Crépuscule du devoir. L’éthique indolore des nouveaux temps démocratiques,��Par�s:��Gall�mard,��1993.

60�� If��we�� look��at�� the��Ethics Guidelines of�� the��Canad�an��Assoc�at�on��of�� Journal�sts�� (CAJ),��for��example,��we��w�ll��see�� that�� �t�� �ncludes��a�� f�nal��chapter�� focus�ng��on�� the��rules��of��onl�ne��journal�sm��and��on�� the��way�� �n��wh�ch��pr�nc�ples��apply�� �n�� th�s��context�� (see��CAJ Ethics Guidelines,��publ�shed��on��http://j-source.ca/art�cle/caj-eth�cs-gu�del�nes).��The��Profess�onal��Eth�cs��Code��for��the��Roman�an��Press��can��be��found��at��http://www.organ�zat��med�a.ro.��

61�� See��C.��Gh�nea��and��A.��Mung�u-P�pp�d�,��op. cit.,��p.��329.62�� Regard�ng�� the��prec�se��role��of�� these�� �nstances��for�� the�� trad�t�onal��med�a,��see��Claude-Jean��

Bertrand,��Media Ethics and Accountability Systems,��New��Brunsw�ck,��NJ:��Transact�on��Publ�shers,��2000,��pp.��107-111.��

eth�cal��comm�ss�ons,��but��can��be��of��genu�ne��help���n��the��env�ronment��of��Roman�an��journal�sm.

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