Models of Innovative Knowledge Communities and Three Metaphors of Learning

THREE METAPHORS OF LEARNING

Models of Innovative Knowledge Communities and Three

Metaphors of Learning

Sami Paavola, Lasse Lipponen, and Kai Hakkarainen

University of Helsinki

Review of Educational Research, Winter 2004, Vol. 74, No. 4, pp. 557-576.

The authors analyze and compare three models of innovative knowledge communities:

Nonaka and Takeuchi’s model of knowledge-creation, Engeström’s model of

expansive learning, and Bereiter’s model of knowledge building. Despite basic

differences, these models have pertinent features in common: Most fundamentally,

they emphasize dynamic processes for transforming prevailing knowledge and

practices. Beyond characterizing learning as knowledge acquisition (the acquisition

metaphor) and as participation in a social community (the participation metaphor),

the authors of this article distinguish a third aspect: learning (and intelligent activity

in general) as knowledge creation (the knowledge-creation metaphor). This approach

focuses on investigating mediated processes of knowledge creation that have become

especially important in a knowledge society.

KEYWORDS: expansive learning, innovative knowledge community, knowledge

building, knowledge creation, metaphors of learning.

In her article “On Two Metaphors for Learning and the Dangers of Choosing

Just One,” Anna Sfard (1998) proposed that there are two main ways of thinking

about the genesis of new knowledge, namely, the acquisition and participation

metaphors. Behind these two metaphors is the debate between cognitive and situated

(or “situative”) perspectives on learning and human activity (see Anderson, Reder, &

Simon, 1996, 1997; Greeno, 1997). The acquisition metaphor, roughly speaking,


relies on a “folk theory” of mind and learning. It is in accordance with the commonly

held view that people’s behavior is determined, and can be accounted for, by their

beliefs and desires. In this view, the mind is a kind of container of knowledge, and

learning is a process that fills the container, implanting knowledge there. Hence

knowledge is understood as a property or capacity of an individual mind, in which

learning is a matter of construction, acquisition, and outcomes, which are realized in

the process of transfer (that is, the process of using and applying knowledge in new

situations). This view emphasizes computational models of mind and knowledge,

aiming to simulate the way that the individual mind operates with knowledge.

In contrast, adherents of the participation metaphor examine learning as a

process of participation in various cultural practices and shared learning activities. In

this view, the focus is on activities (“knowing”) more than on outcomes or products

(“knowledge”). Knowledge does not exist either in a world of its own or in individual

minds, but is an aspect of participation in cultural practices (Brown {558}, Collins, &

Duguid, 1989; Lave, 1988; Lave & Wenger, 1991). Cognition and knowing are

distributed over both individuals and their environments, and learning is “situated” in

these relations and networks of distributed activities of participation. The argument is

that knowledge and knowing cannot be separated from situations where they are used

or where they take place. In the participation metaphor, learning is a matter of

participation in practices and actions (Anderson, Reder, & Simon, 1997; Greeno,

1997), “enculturation” (Brown, Collins, & Duguid, 1989), or “legitimate peripheral

participation” (Lave & Wenger, 1991). In this framework, terms such as acquisition

and accumulation are supplemented, or in some cases replaced, by concepts such as

discourse, interaction, activity, and participation.

In the history of the learning sciences (and “cognitive science”), the

acquisition approach has been the prominent one. However, in the recent years, the

participation metaphor has attracted considerable attention. From her analysis, Sfard

(1998) concluded that both perspectives are needed; they are not simply rivals but

also complement each other. Anderson and his colleagues (2000) arrive at the same

conclusion. They point out that both the cognitive and the situative perspective are

needed, and more research should be pursued on both fronts (see also Cobb &

Bowers, 1999; Greeno & Middle School Mathematics Through Applications Project


Group, 1998). This “consensus” approach appears to be a way of avoiding a drastic

conflict between the two approaches. Combining the two may be problematic,

however.

In this article, we analyze three influential models of innovative knowledge

communities: (a) Ikujiro Nonaka and Hirotaka Takeuchi’s model of knowledge

creation; (b) Yrjö Engeström’s model of expansive learning; and (b) Carl Bereiter’s

model of knowledge building. Despite some basic differences in their backgrounds

and presuppositions, these models have surprising similarities. However, we do not

argue that they are similar, but rather that they have important commonalities. More

important, we propose that the commonalities contradict the distinctions commonly

asserted between the two approaches and that, in fact, both are variants of a third

approach: the knowledge-creation model of learning (Paavola, Lipponen, &

Hakkarainen, 2002; Hakkarainen, Palonen, Paavola, & Lehtinen, 2004). We maintain

that there is room—and a need—for a third main metaphor of learning, whose

characteristics can be illuminated by analyzing all three models as powerful

representatives of this metaphor. The knowledge-creation model strongly emphasizes

the aspect of collective knowledge creation for developing shared objects of activity,

an aspect that has not been the focus of the other two models. Other elements also

differentiate the knowledge-creation approach. However, it shares common aspects

with both the acquisition approach and the participation approach, and is thus a

promising way of softening the contrast between those two perspectives.

Three Models of Innovative Knowledge Communities

All three of the models discussed so far represent attempts to determine how

innovative communities are and should be organized to facilitate advancement of

practices and knowledge creation. We refer to them as “models of innovative

knowledge communities.” Nonaka and Takeuchi’s model focuses on knowledge

management and organization in firms to enable them to operate innovatively.

Engeström’s model is strongly rooted in the tradition of cultural-historical activity

theory; it seeks not only to analyze but also to change the learning and working {559}

practices of organizations. Bereiter’s theory of knowledge building is a new way of


understanding education, on the basis of criticism of the folk theory of mind and

knowledge. At the outset, these models appear to have little in common. They were

developed for very different purposes, representing very different methodological

traditions and theoretical foundations. The present comparison does not capture all of

their aspects. However, even a general analysis of the shared elements of these

models reveals important aspects of innovative knowledge communities and

knowledge creation.

Nonaka and Takeuchi’s Model of Knowledge Creation

In their book The Knowledge-Creating Company, Ikujiro Nonaka and

Hirotaka Takeuchi (1995) presented a model of innovation processes, central to which

is an epistemological distinction between two kinds of knowledge, tacit and explicit.

Explicit knowledge is knowledge that is easy to articulate and express formally and in

clear terms. Tacit knowledge, which is more important in creating innovations, is

“personal knowledge embedded in individual experience and involves intangible

factors such as personal belief, perspective, and the value system” (viii). Another

fundamental point in this model is an “ontological” framework of four levels of

“entities” that operate in knowledge creation: the individual, group, organizational,

and inter-organizational levels. According to Nonaka and Takeuchi, knowledge is

created and transformed in an ascending process, or spiral, from the individual level

to the group and organizational levels, and finally between organizations.

The dynamics of this model arise from the interaction between tacit

knowledge and explicit knowledge. A “knowledge spiral” is grounded in four

complementary types of knowledge conversion: (a) from tacit knowledge to tacit

knowledge, labeled socialization; (b) from tacit to explicit knowledge, called

externalization; (c) from explicit to explicit knowledge, or combination; and (d) from

explicit to tacit knowledge, or internalization. The knowledge creation spiral starts

from socialization, sharing tacit knowledge and experiences at the group level. In this

phase, a close interaction and collaboration within a group is needed. The aim of the

socialization process is to create common understanding and trust within the group.

The next phase, externalization, is the central one in knowledge creation. In this


phase, tacit knowledge is explicated and conceptualized by means of metaphors,

analogies, and concepts. In Nonaka and Takeuchi’s model, the basic source of

innovation is tacit knowledge, which needs to be explicated in order to be transformed

into knowledge that is useful at the levels of the group and the whole organization. At

the combination stage, units of already-existing explicit knowledge are combined and

exchanged. Finally, to have real effects in an organization, the explicit knowledge of

the group or organization must be internalized by individuals and transformed into

tacit knowledge and into action through “learning by doing.” After internalization, a

new round of the knowledge spiral will begin.

Nonaka and Takeuchi provide various examples of the importance of

externalization of tacit knowledge for innovation in Japanese firms. Personal hunches

must be convertible to explicit knowledge and shared with others to be fruitful.

Nonaka and Takeuchi describe, for example, the development of a new type of urban

car by Honda. Characteristic of this process were slogans and phrases (such as

“Theory of Automobile Evolution”) that were a form of explication of the personal

hunches of various people. From considering how automobiles (taken as living

beings) {560} would evolve emerged the concept of “Tall Boy” (a car that grows

higher without becoming otherwise bigger) that provided a background for modern

city cars. The slogans operated as ideals for the whole group of developers (Nonaka &

Takeuchi, 1995, pp. 11–12). In another example given by Nonaka and Takeuchi, an

essential aspect of developing the automatic home bread-making machine was

explication of the tacit knowledge of master bakers. The engineers and developers

alone did not have success in constructing a machine that could bake tasty bread. To

learn the skill of making bread, they apprenticed to a famous master baker. An

important element of this process occurred when one of the developers was able to

explicate a crucial aspect of baker’s kneading skill. After this explication, the

knowledge could be built into the construction of the machine, although the effort was

time consuming. The point is that explication of tacit knowledge was of crucial

importance in the genesis of the innovation (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995, pp. 63–64,

95–123).


Engeström’s Model of Expansive Learning

Yrjö Engeström (1999b) has studied and developed innovative learning cycles

in work teams by using Cultural-Historical Activity Theory (CHAT) and the theory of

expansive learning to provide the framework for his analysis. The central tenet of

CHAT is that human beings do not live in a vacuum but are embedded in their

sociocultural context, and that their behavior cannot be understood independently of

that context (Engeström, 1987; see also Engeström, Miettinen, & Punamäki, 1999).

The basic unit of analysis in CHAT is human activity, which is mediated through the

conceptual and material cultural artifacts people use. Engeström’s model of expansive

learning in work teams is based on a learning cycle with seven stages in its ideal form

(Engeström, 1999b, pp. 383–384; cf. Engeström, 1987, pp. 188–191, 321–336). First,

individual participants question and criticize certain existing practices. Second, they

analyze the situation; that is, they analyze the historical causes and empirical inner

relations of the activity system in question. Third, the participants engage in modeling

a new solution to the problematic situation. Fourth, they examine the new model by

experimenting to determine whether it works and what potentialities and limitations it

has. Fifth, they implement the new model to explore practical action and applications.

Sixth, they reflect on and evaluate the process. Finally, they engage in consolidating

the new practice in its new form. Through this expansive cycle, in which the

participants focus on reconceptualizing their own activity system in relation to their

shared objects of activity, both the objects and the existing scripts are

reconceptualized; the activity system is transformed; and new motives and objects for

the activity system are created. This sequential model should be understood as an

ideal or heuristic tool for analyzing elements of expansive learning, because the

cycles of expansive learning do not necessarily follow any fixed order.

Engeström and his colleagues (Engeström, Engeström, & Kärkkäinen, 1995;

Ahonen, Engeström, & Virkkunen, 2000) have developed an intervention method,

called the “boundary-crossing laboratory or “change laboratory,” that is used in

several types of workplaces—for example, telecommunication companies, hospitals,

and schools. The intent of the boundary-crossing laboratory is to guide the members

of a workplace community to reflect on their mutual activities with the help of


researchers. It is based on an ethnographic approach to observing and recording a

community’s everyday activities. Advancement of knowledge is fun{561}damentally

dependent on changes in tools, methods, and active practices. For example, Ahonen,

Engeström, and Virkkunen (2000) investigated a telephone company that faced the

challenge of transforming itself from a provincial monopoly, providing basic

telephone services, to one that would provide knowledge-intensive and competitive

GSM mobile connections and digital network services. The boundary-crossing

laboratory focuses on making the constraints of a community’s current activity system

visible to the participants and helping them to move beyond the constraints. The

interventions focus on identifying the developmental challenges of the organization’s

activity system, collectively constructing a vision of the organization’s future, and

implementing a series of practical changes. Toward this end, the researchers may

observe and videotape work activities and interview workers, administrators, and

managers.

Bereiter’s Model of Knowledge Building

Carl Bereiter (2002) argued that the emergence of the knowledge society has

given rise to a view of knowledge as a thing that can be systematically produced and

shared among members of a community. In creating a theoretical and practical model

for future education, Scardamalia and Bereiter (1994) have proposed the concept of

knowledge building. Knowledge building refers to collective work for the

advancement and elaboration of conceptual artifacts (product plans, business

strategies, marketing plans, theories, ideas, and models), the entities of Karl Popper’s

World 3 (the world of cultural knowledge). Popper has emphasized that in addition to

physical and material reality (World 1) and the reality that concerns mental states

(World 2), there is a third realm (World 3), which includes conceptual entities such as

theories and ideas (Popper, 1972). World 3 is especially important for human beings

because they do not operate only in the physical and mental realms, but also

understand and develop objects belonging to the third realm. World 3 is dependent on

World 2 and World 1, but it is nevertheless rather autonomous. Bereiter criticizes

theories of learning that do not take into account World 3 and that therefore rely on


the mind-as-container metaphor. In such theories, learning is viewed as an

accumulation of information ready-made for the human mind —the mind being

understood as a container or archive of knowledge.

An important aspect of Bereiter’s theory is to make a conceptual distinction

between learning, which operates in the realm of mental states (Popper’s World 2),

and knowledge building, which operates in the realm of theories and ideas (Popper’s

World 3). In modern enterprises, knowledge is considered to consist of objects or

conceptual artifacts that can be systematically produced and developed; in other

words, there is a process of knowledge building, not learning, in Bereiter’s sense. It

should be remarked that when we speak in this article about the knowledge-creation

metaphor of learning, we use the term “learning” quite broadly, to include what

Bereiter calls “knowledge building.” In any case, scientific research groups are

typically working with theories and models that may be understood as shared

knowledge objects rather than as representing mental states. Naturally, simple

learning (i.e. learning in Bereiter’s sense) does occur in the business world and in

scientific research, but it is not the main focus of these domains of activity. The

primary goal of members of an innovative expert community is not to learn something

(i.e., to change, or simply add to, their own mental states) but to solve problems,

originate new thoughts, and advance communal knowledge. In other words, their goal

is to {562} create new knowledge and add the value of conceptual artifacts. Bereiter

takes a pragmatic and naturalistic stance toward conceptual artifacts. Although they

are nonmaterial, we should consider them to be as real as the objects of World 1 (the

physical realm).

Bereiter’s knowledge-building approach has been used extensively in

educational institutions to guide students and teachers to engage in collaborative

efforts to develop their thoughts and ideas (Bereiter, 2002). Moreover, the model

provides conceptual foundations for research and development of groupware systems

(knowledge-building technology) deliberately designed to facilitate collaborative

work toward advancing shared knowledge artifacts (Scardamalia & Bereiter, 1994).

For instance, Ann Russell and her colleagues (see Russell, 2002) have analyzed an

interprofessional teams’ progress toward becoming a knowledge-building community

within a rehabilitation hospital. Traditionally, each profession engaged in its own


training, whereas the present project guided them to engage in a knowledge-building

process as a multiprofessional team within their own work context. A collaborative

environment entitled Knowledge Forum (KF, see www.learn.motion.com) was used to

foster building of professional knowledge among the teams. The participants were

asked over 16-month period to use the KF environment to construct professional

learning portfolios to be read and commented on by their fellow professionals. These

learning portfolios turned out to provide a rich resource for advancement of the

participants’ professional community in ways that helped them to share their higher-

level reflections with each other. It is not a part of healthcare professionals’ culture to

engage in deliberate building of their knowledge and reflection of their practices.

Gradually, however, the participants took part in increasingly demanding discourses

in which they not only reported their own activities but also engaged in a genuine

multiprofessional process of building professional knowledge.

All the models presented above challenge common notions of what learning

and knowledge are. Table 1 provides a schematic representation of the key features of

the innovative communities as depicted in the three models.

Common Aspects of the Three Models of Innovative Communities

In spite of epistemological and ontological differences among the models of

Nonaka and Takeuchi, Engeström, and Bereiter, they have many features in common.

In the following paragraphs we present seven of their commonalities.

The Pursuit of Newness

All three models use the dynamics of knowledge creation and the pursuit of

newness as a focal starting point. Nonaka and Takeuchi point out that their focus is

“on knowledge creation, not on knowledge per se” (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995, p. 6).

This dynamic view of epistemology is the basis of their criticism of the “Western

epistemological tradition” (1995, p. 49), which, in their view, has emphasized

knowledge as such but has not provided sufficient means for analyzing how to create

new knowledge. Although their analysis of Western epistemology is rather crude (see

http://www.learn.motion.com


especially 1995, pp. 21–27) and does not take into account new developments (e.g.,

chaos theory, LeCompte, 1994; self-organizing systems, Resnick, 1994;

connectionism, Dawson, 2004), it makes their own emphasis on {563}

TABLE 1

Three models of innovative knowledge communities

Nonaka & Takeuchi Engeström Bereiter

Type of processes

focused on

Emphasis on the

knowledge spiral,

based on tacit versus

explicit knowledge

Emphasis on material

object–oriented

activities and

practices

Emphasis on

knowledge building

with conceptual

artifacts

Source of

innovation

Transforming tacit

knowledge into

explicit knowledge

Overcoming

tensions,

disturbances, and

ambiguities through

expansive learning

Working

deliberately to

create and extend

knowledge objects

Scope of framework Ontological levels

(individual, group,

organizational, and

inter-organizational

Activity systems and

networks of activity

systems

Knowledge-

building

communities

knowledge creation very clear. Engeström’s model concentrates on expansive,

qualitative changes in activity systems (1987). He contrasts expansive learning with

“reactive” forms of learning, which presuppose a given context and a preset learning

task (1987, p. 2). According to Engeström, “[i]n important transformations of our

personal lives and organizational practices, we must learn new forms of activity

which are not yet there,” and in attempting to do so, standard theories of learning are

not enough (Engeström 2001, pp. 137–139). According to Bereiter (see Bereiter &

Scardamalia, 1993), creative expertise is the continuous effort of going beyond the

current level of accomplishment and working at the edge of one’s competence to


adapt to the progressively changing requirements of the environment. In Bereiter’s

model, the conceptual artifacts of World 3 are not eternal verities or pure ideas, but

human constructions in constant process of actual or potential change and

improvement (2002, pp. 465–483). Bereiter distinguishes learning from knowledge

building by arguing that the main focus of experts is not only to improve their

individual understanding but to work for developing new culturally shared knowledge

objects. Activity theory makes a corresponding distinction by distinguishing between

“learning the given new” (i.e., transmitting culturally given knowledge to students, as

is typical in formal education) and “learning the societal new” (i.e., innovative

learning activity at workplaces that focuses on collaborative mastering of culturally

new practices and knowledge) (Sutter, 2002). It is no coincidence that in all these

models, innovative learning and knowledge advancement are characterized as cyclical

and iterative processes, which have several implications. Knowledge creation often

requires sustained periods of time and is not correctly described by traditional

narratives of heroic individuals making ingenious discoveries through sudden

moments of insight. Moreover, knowledge creation is not linear (Engeström, 1987, p.

214). It is more a process of ambiguity and “creative chaos” (Nonaka & Takeuchi,

1995, pp. 78–80), involving the sense of progress. Knowledge creation does not start

{564} from scratch but is a process of transforming and developing—sometimes in a

radical way—existing ideas and practices.

Mediating Elements to avoid Cartesian dualisms

All of these models, according to their proponents, stand in opposition to

mentalism and Cartesian dichotomies by bringing mediating elements to the process

of knowledge creation (although in Nonaka and Takeuchi’s model the role of

mediation is not so obvious). Nonaka and Takeuchi try to avoid the “Cartesian split”

between subject and object (a dichotomy that they view as common in Western

thought) by referring to the Japanese way of thinking. Japanese tradition does not

separate humanity and nature, body and mind, or self and other as sharply as the

Cartesian tradition has done (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995, pp. 20–32). It does not so

clearly separate knowledge and rationality from emotion, figurative speech, action,


and so on; in the processes of innovation, these vague and even chaotic elements are

fuel for the emergence of something new. To avoid such dualisms, and in particular,

mentalism, Engeström emphasizes the element of thirdness (i.e., mediation) in

expansive learning (Engeström, 1987, pp. 221–222, 302–304). The concepts of

activity and dialectics operate as mediating factors, bringing dynamics to the model

(pp. 140, 310). Similarly, Bereiter opposes Cartesian dualisms between the material

realm (World 1) and the mental realm (World 2) by emphasizing the objects of World

3. In this sense, the objects of World 3 can be considered to be mediators between

mind and matter, although Bereiter himself does not emphasize such a role explicitly.

Questions and questioning also have an important mediating role in these

models. All of three models are intended to capture the dynamic processes of

innovative learning and knowledge advancement, where questioning and various

disturbances initiate cycles of innovation. In Bereiter’s model, questions and problems

of understanding are the moving force for progressive knowledge building (Bereiter

& Scardamalia, 1993, pp. 210–211). In Engeström’s model, questioning and criticism

of existing practices is the starting point of the expansive learning cycle (Engeström,

1999b, p. 383). Although Nonaka and Takeuchi do not emphasize conflicts or

questioning, those topics are involved in their model (1995, p. 13–14). We will return

to this issue.

Viewing Knowledge Creation As a Social Process

In all of the models, knowledge creation is fundamentally a social process.

The models appear to share a view that social interaction provides essential cognitive

resources for human cognitive accomplishment (Miyake, 1986; Hutchins, 1995;

Vygotsky, 1978). Understanding is seen as iterative in nature; that is, it emerges

through a series of attempts to explain and understand the processes and mechanisms

being investigated. In a shared problem-solving process, agents who have partial but

different information about the problem in question appear to improve their

understanding collectively through social interaction. Accordingly, new ideas and

innovations emerge between rather than within people. Each of the three models

provides a perspective of its own on epistemic communities and organizations. All


share the idea that innovation or intelligence arises from systemic features of a whole

community or organization. Knowledge creation is not primarily a matter of creative

individuals, but instead requires fundamental reorganization of the {565} practices of

a whole community. Epistemological processes require supporting social processes,

and vice versa.

Emphasis on the Role of Individual Subjects in Knowledge Creation

Although in these models, innovation processes are fundamentally social,

individual activity also is emphasized—not that of individuals separately but of

individuals acting as a part of a stream of social activities. Nonaka and Takeuchi state

that new knowledge always starts with an individual (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995, pp.

13, 59). Thus, individuals’ hunches and tacit knowledge should be explicated for

communal and organizational use. In Engeström’s model, although the role of

communities, material things, and cultural history is emphasized, it is individual

subjects who question the existing practices and start the cycle of expansive learning

(Engeström, 1999b, p. 383; 1987, p. 322; 1999a; see also Engeström & Cole, 1997).

Similarly, although Bereiter’s approach builds on cognitive theories of expertise, he

stresses the individual’s efforts to solve knowledge problems and to develop an

increasingly complex relation to knowledge objects, along with fellow inquirers.

Going beyond Propositional and Conceptual Knowledge

All three models share the idea of going beyond pure propositional and

conceptual knowledge. While recognizing the importance of such knowledge, they

stress other types of knowledge as well. Without going into detail, a rough distinction

between three basic forms of knowledge is recapitulated here (see Bereiter &

Scardamalia, 1993, pp. 43–47): Declarative knowledge means “formal” or

propositional knowledge. Procedural knowledge or know-how means knowledge

embedded in skills and not guided by explicit rules or propositional knowledge;

rather, it is manifest in rule-like behavior that emerges from knowledgeable action

(see Bereiter, 2002). Lastly, hidden knowledge or tacit knowledge is based on


impressions and a “sense” of things. This kind of distinction does not take into

account the variety of forms or formulations of knowledge, but it can be used to

identify a common point in these models of innovative learning. They all criticize the

traditional view of human cognition as a rule-based symbolic system that relies on

explicit propositional knowledge. An emphasis on propositional knowledge can lead,

for example, to the so-called “paralysis by analysis” syndrome (Nonaka & Takeuchi,

1995, p. 198). Connectionism (see Bechtel & Abrahamsen, 1991; Dawson, 2004) is a

conceptual foundation that Bereiter (1991) uses to search for an alternative to

traditional rule-based models of cognition. In Engeström’s model and in the cultural-

historical approach, knowledge is always embedded in practices, in contrast to the

mentalistic tradition of “knowledge in the head” (see, e.g., Engeström, 1999b, p. 397).

Tacit knowledge is an important aspect of innovative knowledge communities,

although its interpretation varies in the three models. For Nonaka and Takeuchi, tacit

knowledge includes the subjective insights, intuitions, hunches, and ideals that are the

crucial basis for innovative processes (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995, pp. 8–10).

Engeström has not explicitly emphasized tacit knowledge because in expansive

learning, more stress is placed on knowledge embedded in practices. However, he has

given credit to Nonaka and Takeuchi’s circle for identifying various modes of

knowledge and discussing transitions between tacit knowledge and {566} explicit

knowledge (Engeström, 1999b, p. 401). Tacit knowledge is also important in

Bereiter’s model of expertise. Skills and know-how manifest themselves in

performance, but tacit knowledge is much harder to recognize directly. However, this

difficulty does not mean that it is an insignificant form of knowledge—quite the

contrary. Bereiter and Scardamalia (1993, pp. 133–152; see also Bereiter, 2002)

argue, for example, that knowledge of “promisingness,” which is for them one form

of tacit knowledge, is an essential resource of creative experts. Having continuously

solved problems in their own area of expertise, creative experts have some sort of

sense about what is promising and how to make progress in their field. They deal with

uncertainty and embark on ventures and risky efforts as part of their innovative

processes.


Recognizing Conceptualizations and Conceptual Artifacts as Important

Although these models of innovative learning criticize propositional and

conceptual knowledge when presented as the only form of knowledge, they

nevertheless emphasize the role of conceptualization and the role of making

knowledge explicit in innovative processes. According to Nonaka and Takeuchi, one

key process in innovation involves the externalization of tacit knowledge. In a similar

vein, an important phase in Engeström’s expansive learning cycle requires

constructing an explicit model that offers a new solution to the problem in question.

Even if the models constructed in the expansive cycle are rooted in material practices,

they often are also theoretical and symbolic in nature (see Wartofsky, 1979).

Bereiter’s model is based on the idea of conceptual artifacts and solving problems of

understanding. Thus, in Bereiter’s model, the goal is to develop, evaluate, and modify

conceptual artifacts collaboratively. An important aspect of these three models of

innovative learning is the “dialectical” interaction between different forms of

knowledge, and especially the process of creating conceptual knowledge and

conceptual models that can be used in subsequent activity.

Interaction Around and Through Shared Objects

Finally, all three models describe how to organize collaboration for

developing shared objects of activity in an innovative way. This commonality

connects the other six commonalities, discussed above, and is closely related to the

role of mediation in all three models. The shared objects are different in each case: In

Nonaka and Takeuchi’s model they are concrete products (such as cars or baking

machines); in Engeström’s they involve practices and activity systems; and in

Bereiter’s they are conceptual artifacts. But the overall structure of the process—the

organization of the interaction around these mediating objects or artifacts—is quite

similar in the three models. The interaction takes place through these objects, not just

between people. Neither individual initiative nor collective practices as such are

important; what is crucial is how they can be directed and organized toward

developing shared objects. The importance of conceptualization and “conceptual


artifacts” in these models also is closely related to the fact that all three describe how

to direct collaborative efforts for developing shared objects of activity within long-

term processes. Through conceptualization, new ideas are formulated for communal

use and for subsequent development. {567}

Different After All?

In the previous pages, we have detailed how three models of innovative

knowledge communities are similar. Although we emphasized their commonalities,

we could have focused on differences, especially because the backgrounds of the

models appear at first to be so far apart. However, on closer examination, the

differences prove to be complementary rather than drastically in conflict.

Engeström, for example, has criticized Nonaka and Takeuchi for failing to

take into account the first two phases of the expansive cycle—questioning and

analyzing the situation—and thus neglecting the importance of controversies and

conflicts in knowledge creation (Engeström, 1999b, p. 380). As a consequence,

Engeström feels that Nonaka and Takeuchi take problems as given or as defined by

the management, without analyzing how they originate. However, questioning and

conflicts do have a role in Nonaka and Takeuchi’s model, although they are not so

strongly emphasized as in Engeström’s expansive cycle. Socialization in Nonaka and

Takeuchi’s model involves dialogue and discussion, and “[t]his dialogue can involve

considerable conflict and disagreement, but it is precisely such conflict that pushes

employees to question existing premises and to make sense of their experience in a

new way” (1995, p. 14). It appears that both of these aspects—on the one hand, the

creation of mutual trust and understanding by strong socialization, and on the other

hand, the opportunity and acceptance for criticism and questioning—are needed in

knowledge innovation. One reason for the difference between Engeström and Nonaka

and Takeuchi may be cultural. Engeström analyzed knowledge creation in Western

organizations, whereas Nonaka and Takeuchi worked mostly in Japanese

organizations. In Japanese culture, harmony and group thinking are more strongly

emphasized than in Western culture, where both individual differences and conflicts

are given more prominence (see Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995, pp. 31, 63).


Bereiter (2002, pp. 174–185) has argued that Nonaka and Takeuchi’s model

falls short of its goals. According to Bereiter, this model does not adequately explain

creativity, knowledge work, collaborative knowledge building, or the role of

understanding. Yet this is not so much a criticism of Nonaka and Takeuchi’s model as

it is a list of shortcomings, from Bereiter’s point of view. A more radical argument by

Bereiter is that Nonaka and Takeuchi’s model is still rooted in mentalistic “folk

epistemology”: It is based on the externalization of tacit knowledge and appears to

rely on a mentalistic assumption that knowledge resides and is created in an

individual’s head. Bereiter feels that what is missing from this model is knowledge

“in the world” in the form of “conceptual artifacts,” along with the idea of knowledge

building in Popper’s World 3. But despite his criticism, Bereiter acknowledges that

Nonaka and Takeuchi’s model goes “pretty far” in dealing with knowledge creation

(Bereiter, 2002, pp. 175–176).

In general, it appears that individuals have a more central role in Nonaka and

Takeuchi’s model of knowledge creation than in Engeström’s or Bereiter’s. One could

say that in Nonaka and Takeuchi’s model, the individual cognitive agent appears to be

taken as given. Nonaka and Takeuchi talk about individuals who pursue processes of

innovation, but the actual individual and his or her knowledge remain, to a large

extent, unanalyzed. The idea of individual transformation through collective activity

is much stronger in Bereiter’s and Engeström’s model. However, {568} for Nonaka

and Takeuchi, knowledge is also produced collaboratively (not only in individual

minds), and the explication phase of knowledge to the group and organizational levels

is a focal part of the overall cycle of knowledge creation. Although there is no explicit

room for conceptual artifacts in Nonaka and Takeuchi’s model, the model appears to

be quite compatible with the general idea of Bereiter’s knowledge building. And

although Nonaka and Takeuchi emphasize the role of individuals, they also argue that

“Western epistemology” is too much focused on the individual (“Cartesian”) subject

and has largely abandoned the social interaction. They refer to the Japanese tradition

(and “organic” worldview) where self is embedded in collective action. Knowledge

conversion is, in a fundamental way, a social process and “not confined within an

individual” (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995, p. 61; see also pp. 31–32, 226). Thus, in all of


these models of innovative knowledge communities, knowledge creation is a matter

of individual initiative embedded in fertile group and organizational activities.

At the outset, Bereiter’s and Engeström’s ideas appear to be totally opposed to

each other. From Engeström’s perspective, Bereiter’s emphasis on Popper’s World 3

and conceptual artifacts leads to an overly intellectualist or formal approach, in which

conceptions are separated from activities and social practices (Engeström, 1987, pp.

46–49; Engeström & Cole, 1997, pp. 306–307). From Bereiter’s perspective,

sociocultural approaches miss the idea of conceptual artifacts and therefore fail to

appreciate the importance of knowledge that is not clearly and immediately connected

to practices and situations (Bereiter, 2002, pp. 56–92, 465–483). But even here, the

difference may not be as radical as might appear at first. The basic processes

delineated in these models are very similar. Both models try to capture dynamic

processes of change and transformation and reject Cartesian dualism. Although

Bereiter emphasizes conceptual artifacts, their building does not rely only on

symbolic and propositional knowledge. In this sense, Bereiter’s World 3 is not an

isolated and self-sustained conceptual realm but has a history and a close connection

with cultural practices (pp. 466–467). And although Engeström emphasizes practices

and knowledge embedded in practices, he also allows a clear role for abstractions and

conceptual models (see e.g. Engeström, 1999b, pp. 382–384; also see

Wartofsky,1979). Engeström’s model connects with activity theory, which has its

basis in the Vygotskyan idea that both signs and tools (related to conceptual artifacts

and material practices, respectively) constitute the starting point for mediated human

action (Vygotsky, 1978; see Engeström, 1999a, pp. 23–25).

In summary, we acknowledge differences among the three models. Their

emphases are different, especially with respect to the fundamental target or object of

innovation, as noted earlier. In Nonaka and Takeuchi’s model, the focus is on

externalizing ideas and insights to communal use and for the production of innovative

products in firms. In Engeström’s model, the main focus is on expanding and

transforming activity systems and developing practices to solve disturbances and

contradictions. Bereiter emphasizes conceptual artifacts and how those objects of

World 3 are developed and transformed. We have shown, however, that in a

fundamental sense, the three models appear to be close to each other, similarly


addressing questions about how innovative communities create new knowledge,

artifacts, and practices collaboratively, in mediated processes of activity. The central

aspect of collaborative knowledge advancement is to expand and transform ideas,

prac{569}tices, and material and conceptual artifacts. In this sense, the three models

complement rather than oppose each other.

Toward the Knowledge-Creation Approach to Learning

We began by identifying two main metaphors of learning: acquisition and

participation. We here maintain that our discussion of the models of innovative

knowledge communities creates a basis for a third main metaphor of learning, one that

concentrates on mediated processes of knowledge creation. The models that we have

reviewed emphasize that previous conceptions of learning have been inadequate for

dealing with innovative, expansive, or progressive aspects of knowledge advancement

in a profound way. Neither the acquisition approach nor the participation approach

has been sufficient, at least not in ideal typical form. The main focus of the

acquisition perspective has been on the acquisition of knowledge that is more or less

ready-made or on clear-cut developmental rules or phases, rather than on the creation

of something “expansively” new. The participation perspective typically has focused

on examining how knowledge and practices are passed from one generation to another

in traditional cultures or in cultures without substantial and deliberate changes or

cultural transformations (see, e.g., Lave & Wenger, 1991). The focus has been on how

newcomers become old-timers by participating in cultural practices, not on the radical

advancement of knowledge or practices.

More recently, the acquisition and participation approaches have been revised

to deal with innovation. But the shared claim in the models of innovative knowledge

communities is that to genuinely tackle the issues of knowledge creation, something

else is needed beyond what is provided in the acquisition or participation models. The

metaphors of learning are collections of various features related to major approaches

to learning. In this sense there are no clear-cut divisions between the metaphors;

rather, they overlap, because more concrete models of learning can combine their

features in different ways and degrees. The importance of these metaphors is that they


present, in concise form, typical and important main alternatives for understanding

learning. Approaches belonging to the acquisition metaphor typically emphasize

individuals, processes happening in individuals’ minds, conceptual knowledge, and

clear-cut logical rules. To these features can be added innovativeness, such as in

models of inquiry where creative efforts of searching through conceptual spaces are

emphasized (e.g., Boden, 2004; Simon, 1977). In epistemology, these approaches are

closely related to attempts to develop the logic of discovery (e.g., Hanson, 1958).

Approaches belonging to the participation metaphor typically emphasize

communities, social practices, activities, and the situated nature of human cognition

and knowledge. This emphasis can also include progressive development of activities

(see, e.g., Brown & Duguid, 1999; Stewart, 1997).

What, then, are the emphases of the knowledge-creation approach, besides the

focus on creating and developing something new? Knowledge-creation models

conceptualize learning and knowledge advancement as collaborative processes for

developing shared objects of activity. Learning is not conceptualized through

processes occurring in individuals’ minds, or through processes of participation in

social practices. Learning is understood as a collaborative effort directed toward

developing some mediated artifacts, broadly defined as including knowledge, {570}

ideas, practices, and material or conceptual artifacts. The interaction among different

forms of knowledge or between knowledge and other activities is emphasized as a

requirement for this kind of innovativeness in learning and knowledge creation.

Our label for the third metaphor—the knowledge-creation metaphor of

learning—is not intended to suggest that only knowledge is created or developed in all

of these models. Rather, knowledge resembles other artifacts that are designed and

transformed. In Nonaka and Takeuchi’s model, concrete products are developed; in

Engeström’s model, the product is practices and activity systems; and in Bereiter’s

model, it is conceptual artifacts. Nevertheless, it can be argued that the shared objects

of activity are distinctively “knowledge-laden” or impregnated with knowledge. In

Nonaka and Takeuchi’s model, the interaction between tacit knowledge and explicit

knowledge is essential; in Engeström’s model, practices and activity systems are

informed by conceptualized models and reflection; and in Bereiter’s (2002) model,

conceptual artifacts are explicitly “knowledge objects.”


The acquisition perspective emphasizes knowledge and also is closely

connected to the Western, Cartesian tradition that seeks certainty as a basis for

knowledge. From the participation perspective, this epistemological emphasis is too

strong; the participation perspective requires that more attention be paid to social and

cultural aspects of knowledge advancement. Knowledge work is not accomplished by

epistemological means alone, but by participating in cultural practices and by

becoming members of knowledge communities (see Packer & Goicoechea, 2000).

From the point of view of the knowledge-creation metaphor, this broader perspective

also is needed because it is important to understand those practices through which

innovative knowledge communities function. The knowledge-creation metaphor does

not, however, exclude epistemological processes; it holds that epistemology must be

analyzed anew. Accordingly, the focus is not on the certainty of knowledge but how

knowledge is used and how it is developed. The models of innovative knowledge

communities are important just because they analyze processes of knowledge creation

in a detailed and concrete way. Such analysis requires that both social and

epistemological perspectives be taken into account.

The models analyzed in this article are not the only representatives of the

knowledge-creation metaphor of learning, but they represent that metaphor in an

explicit manner. And the metaphor is not proposed as totally new. For example,

classical models and theories of education (e.g., those by Piaget, Vygotsky, and

Dewey) could be analyzed from the metaphorical point of view. Perhaps one element

that makes a model a “classic” is that it includes aspects from all metaphors analyzed

here, though with various emphases and depending on how the models are interpreted.

For example, if Vygotsky (1978) were classified according to the dualist division

between acquisition and participation perspectives, he would belong without doubt to

the participation approach. He emphasized activities and social interaction with the

surrounding culture as a starting point for the child’s development. But, as we have

interpreted it, Vygotsky’s idea that human activity is mediated by tools and signs is

one of the central bases for the knowledge-creation approach, especially if interpreted

through the theory of expansive learning (see Engeström 1987, 1999a). In the

knowledge-creation metaphor, the emphasis is not on the situatedness of cognition or

on social practices alone, but rather on progressive development of these practices and


artifacts through mediated activities (see Engeström & Cole, 1997; cf. Brown,

Collins, & Duguid, 1989). Interestingly, Nonaka’s notion {571} of knowledge

conversation comes close to Vygotsky’s (1962) idea that everyday concepts develop

into scientific ones by gaining systematicity and conceptual clarity, and that scientific

concepts also develop into everyday concepts through use and application1 (see also

Engeström, 1999b, p. 398).

Even though the knowledge-creation metaphor has historical roots, the

present-day challenge of developing individual and collective competencies related to

knowledge creation in both educational and work settings is a novelty. This, at least,

is what the models of innovative knowledge communities emphasize. According to

Engeström, “learning and expansion are becoming integrated, forming a historically

new type of activity” (Engeström, 1987, p. 27). Bereiter states that instantiating

creative practices of working with knowledge, and constantly going beyond that

prevailing practices that formerly characterized mainly scientific communities, are

crucial in workplaces and should be essential also in schooling. These models of

innovative knowledge communities appear to provide valuable guidance for

restructuring school and work settings into innovative knowledge communities by

helping teachers, students, and people in various organizations to work deliberately

toward advancing their knowledge. They also help to guide the transformation of

practices and support people in reflecting on and transforming their communities.

This is a challenging task, as can be seen in situations where the models of innovative

knowledge communities have been used to guide schools as organizations, or schools

as teacher communities, in developing similar practices; these models have also been

used at the classroom level (Ahonen, Engeström, & Virkkunen, 2000; Bereiter, 2002;

Engeström, Engeström, & Kärkkäinen, 1995; Hargreaves, 1999; Scardamalia, 2002;

see also Paavola, Lipponen, & Hakkarainen, 2002; Hakkarainen, Palonen, Paavola, &

Lehtinen, 2004).

Activity theory appears to provide tools that help to address the larger

processes of social and cultural transformation in educational contexts. For example,


Engeström and his colleagues (2002) have pursued a change-laboratory intervention

with teacher communities in a middle school. According to their analysis, there are

several factors that make pedagogical transformation of a school very difficult. They

include factors such as the social, spatial, and temporal structures embedded in

classroom-based studies and the teachers’ tradition of working as isolated individual

professionals. These fundamental constraints may make it very difficult for

participants to reflect jointly on their practices and to pursue transformations by

asking questions, constructing models and visions, and examining emerging, novel

pedagogical approaches in practice. The change laboratory focuses on making these

constraints visible to the participants and helping them to overcome the constraints.

The laboratory helps them to recognize developmental challenges to the activity

system of the school, collectively creating a vision of the school’s future and

implementing a series of practical changes.

David Hargreaves (1999) has talked about the “knowledge-creating school”

when applying Nonaka and Takeuchi’s theory to schools. He argues that, to answer

the challenges of the knowledge society, schools, and especially teachers and

headmasters, need to become creators of professional knowledge. This change entails

a conscious effort to articulate teachers’ professional experiences into shareable

knowledge within and between schools. To help students, too, develop the skills and

competencies needed for knowledge creation, teachers should have personal

experiences of creating professional knowledge. {572}

Bereiter and Scardamalia’s (1993) notion of schools as knowledge-building

communities addresses the challenges that both teachers and students are facing.

Bereiter (2002) argued that prevailing educational practices do not provide students

with an opportunity to engage in intentional efforts of knowledge advancement.

Together with their colleagues, the authors carried out a series of design experiments

for facilitating collaborative building of knowledge at school (Scardamalia &

Bereiter, 1994, 1999). Because of the knowledge limitations of young students, they

usually are not in a position to create knowledge in a demanding sense. Yet there is

still a wide variety of opportunities for students to understand and explain the issues

that they are dealing with, as well as to transform their prevailing social practices and

ways of operating within a culture that supports working with knowledge


(Hakkarainen, 2003, 2004; Hakkarainen & Sintonen, 2002). Even if the product that

emerges from students’ efforts lacks wider cultural value as an innovation, it is most

important for students to engage in knowledge-creating inquiry and to develop a

corresponding identity—that is, to consider themselves to be not only consumers but

also creators of knowledge. They may create knowledge for their local community,

and they certainly can create knowledge in relation to their own initial position as

learners. These kinds of considerations make evident the value of restructuring

educational practices in accordance with knowledge-creation models.

Conclusions

The issues that we have raised in our discussion of the knowledge-creation

metaphor resemble in some ways those articulated in the debates about constructivism

in its several forms. For this reason, we offer some clarifying remarks. It may be

argued that the most widely used metaphor for learning today is “construction”—

based on the constructivist view that knowledge and social practices are constructed

by learners. The main reason that we have not used that metaphor here is that

constructivism has many versions and interpretations (see, e.g., Steffe & Gale, 1995;

Phillips, 1997). The term, by itself, has become rather meaningless unless further

qualified. Constructivism can, for instance, refer to an enhanced version of the

acquisition metaphor of learning if the emphasis is on the basic Kantian idea that

knowledge cannot be acquired directly but must be accessed through inborn schemes

or the like. Yet constructivism can also have affinities with the participation metaphor

of learning if the idea is that social and cultural practices are primarily constructed.

We share with constructivists an interest in understanding the creative aspects

of human cognition. The knowledge-creation metaphor, arguably, is also a form of

constructivism in the sense that it emphasizes the creation of something new in the

process of learning. The problem with a “constructivist” stance in psychology and

education is that it often does not involve specific analyses of “constructive”

processes, particularly with respect to innovation. As a consequence, the

understanding of these processes has not become more specific during the past two

decades. We think that the metaphors and models of innovative knowledge


communities that are discussed here can raise similar issues, so that the discussion

concerning constructivism may be furthered. In addition, we believe that we have

provided a more detailed analysis of knowledge-creation processes, particularly with

respect to innovation at the individual and communal levels. {573}

For the most part, we have analyzed the models on a quite general level. A

more specific analysis would have brought their differences more to the fore. Yet we

believe that a general analysis is fruitful. The central function of delineating general

metaphors of learning is to shed light on the basic, alternative starting points for

understanding learning and human activity. Speaking very generally, the acquisition

perspective focuses on knowledge and knowledge structures in learning and processes

of learning within individuals’ minds. The participation perspective emphasizes the

meaning of social practices and activities as bases for learning. And the knowledge-

creation perspective focuses on analyzing the processes whereby new knowledge and

new mediating objects of activity are collaboratively created, whether in schools or at

work.

In contemporary society, human work increasingly is constituted by creation

of knowledge artifacts. Most people are required to develop competencies that allow

them to work productively at levels of knowledge that formerly characterized only a

small elite of intellectuals. Rather than relying on pure mentation, educational

institutions could teach young students to deliberately use and construct artifacts for

expanding their intellectual resources. The knowledge society is not reflected in

citizen’s lives merely through work; our entire everyday environment also is

undergoing similar changes. Ensuring our development and well-being outside work

requires us to develop the advanced skills of a knowledge society. As a consequence,

there is an increasing need, in almost every area of life, to understand theoretically

and practically how new knowledge, mediating artifacts, and practices are created.

Thus it may be argued that conceptually well-founded approaches to knowledge-

creation are needed to help people make the epistemological and ontological shifts

required to participate productively in an advanced knowledge society. We believe

that the models of innovative knowledge communities and knowledge creation take

the challenge seriously and can help us to understand and cope with the fundamental

changes in our society.


Notes

The first author was supported by a grant from the Finnish Cultural

Foundation. We would like to thank Hal White, the editors, and the anonymous

reviewers of Review of Educational Research for valuable comments, as well as for

editorial help on this article.

This article is a revised and developed version of Paavola, Lipponen, and

Hakkarainen, 2002. Sami Paavola and Kai Hakkarainen constructed the preliminary

version of the manuscript. Lasse Lipponen helped to improve the article and

strengthen its argumentation. The final version was constructed by all of us together.

Many of the core ideas have been extensively articulated in Hakkarainen, Palonen,

Paavola, and Lehtinen, 2004.1 We owe this remark to the reviewers of this journal.

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Authors

SAMI PAAVOLA is a researcher at the Centre for Research on Networked Learning and

Knowledge Building, Department of Psychology, University of Helsinki, P.O.

Box 9 (Siltavuorenpenger 20 D), SF-00014 Helsinki, Finland; e-mail

[email protected]. Philosophy is his main field of research. His program

focuses on models and theories of discovery, inquiry, and learning.

Correspondence regarding this article can be addressed to him.

LASSE LIPPONEN is a senior lecturer in the Department of Psychology, and the

Department of Applied Educational Science. He can be contacted at the

Department of Psychology, University of Helsinki, P.O. Box 9

mailto:[email protected]


(Siltavuorenpenger 20 D), SF-00014 Helsinki, Finland;

[email protected]. His research focuses on collaborative and

technology-mediated practices of learning and working.

KAI HAKKARAINEN is the Director of the Centre for Research on Networked

Learning and Knowledge Building, Department of Psychology, University of

Helsinki, P.O. Box 9 (Siltavuorenpenger 20 D), SF-00014 Helsinki, Finland;

e-mail [email protected]. His research includes investigating how

collaborative technology may be used to facilitate in-depth learning and

promote the creation, sharing, and management of knowledge in education and

workplaces.



Models of Innovative Knowledge Communities and Three Metaphors of Learning

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